Organized Crime: From Trafficking to Terrorism

Organized Crime

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Organized Crime From Trafficking to Terrorism Volume One

Frank G. Shanty, Editor Patit Paban Mishra, Contributing Editor

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Copyright © 2008 by ABC-CLIO, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Organized crime : from trafficking to terrorism / Frank G. Shanty, editor, Patit Paban Mishra, contributing editor. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-1-57607-337-7 (hard copy : alk. paper) ISBN-13: 978-1-59884-102-2 (ebook) 1. Organized crime. 2. Terrorism. I. Shanty, Frank, 1950– II. Mishra, Patit Paban. HV6441.O745 2007 364.1'06—dc22 2007017471 07

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Contents Acknowledgments ix Preface xi Introduction xiii Organized Crime: From Trafficking to Terrorism Section I Organized Crime, Criminal Groups, and National and Regional Threats 1 A. Historical Antecedents of Organized Crime Organized Crime throughout History: Renaissance and Early Modern Period 4 The History and Evolution of Organized Crime: United States 10 American Mafia 14 Ethnic Group Involvement in Organized Crime: Historical Perspectives and Emerging Trends 18 The Historical Impact of Organized Crime on American Society 20 Film and Television Portrayals of Organized Crime 25 B. Organized Crime: Definitions, Theories, Concepts, Structure, and Function The Activities of Transnational Organized Crime 30 Causation Theories and Concepts of Organized Criminal Behavior 35 Characteristics and Operational Tactics of Organized Crime 39 Concept of Transnational Organized Crime 42

Defining Organized Crime: Economic, Legal, and Social Factors 43 Difficulties in Applying Generic Conceptualizations of Organized Crime to Specific National Circumstances 47 Structure and Functional Organization of Criminal Groups 51 Traditional and Nontraditional Organized Crime Groups 53 C. Global, Regional, and National National and International Threats: Regional Profiles 56 Organized Crime in Africa 60 Organized Crime in Asia 66 Triads and Tongs: Asian Organized Crime in America 71 Organized Crime in Australia: Drug Trafficking and Human Smuggling 74 Organized Crime in the Balkans and Implications for Regional Security 78 Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Political-Criminal Nexus 84 The Jogo do Bicho: Brazil’s Illicit Lottery 88 Transnational Crime in the Caribbean Region 93 Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean 96 v

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The Central Asian Republics 102 Child Sex Trafficking in Cambodia 107 Organized Crime in Eastern Europe 110 Europe: Central Europe, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, the Baltic States, and the European Union 113 Gang Crimes: Latino Gangs in America 120 International Organized Crime and Its Impact on U.S. National Security 125 Crime and Corruption in Japan: The Yakuza 128 The Relationship between Politics and Organized Crime in Latin America 132 North America 136 Arms and Drug Trafficking: The Case of North Korea 142 Drug Trafficking in Northern Ireland 145 The International Arm of Russian Organized Crime: Russian Mafiya 148 Organized Crime in South America 152 Organized Criminal Activity in South America’s Tri-Border Region 159 Turkish Organized Crime: Heroin Trafficking and Money Laundering Operations 162 Child Trafficking in West Africa 165

Section II Criminal Enterprises and Sources of Financing 169 A. Criminal Enterprises: Trafficking and Other Illegal Business Activities of Organized Crime Bribery and Corruption of Police Officials 171 Consumer-Driven Crimes: Drugs, Gambling, and Prostitution 173 Criminal Copyright Infringement: Pirating of Electronics, Music, and Computer Software 177 Criminal Motor Vehicle Theft and Trafficking 180 Criminal Trafficking and Trade in Counterfeit Consumer Products 181 Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime: The Rise and Evolution of International Drug Cartels 184

Fuel Racketeering, Motor-Fuel Tax Fraud, and Illegal Export Smuggling 190 Gambling: Numbers and Bookmaking 192 The Global Sex Trade: Commercial Sex, Pornography, and International Sex Tourism, a Multibillion-Dollar Industry 194 The Historical Involvement of Organized Crime in Labor Racketeering 197 Illegal Gambling and Loan-Sharking 202 Illegal Trading in Diamonds, Gems, and Precious Metals 204 International Trafficking of Men, Women, and Children 206 Murder for Hire: Assassination and Contract Killings 210 Nontraditional Organized Crime: Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs 211 The Relationship between Legitimate and Illegal Markets 214 The RICO Statute: An Overview 216 Trafficking in Persons and Human Organs 219 Trafficking in Stolen Art, Antiques, and Cultural Property 223 B. Financial Crimes, Fraud, and Money Laundering Computer Intrusions and Intellectual Property Theft 226 Credit, Insurance, and Securities Fraud and Fraudulent Bankruptcies 228 Foreign Economic Espionage: Theft of Trade and High-Tech Secrets 229 Global Efforts to Combat Money Laundering: The Egmont Group and the Financial Action Task Force 233 Health Care Fraud: An Emerging Criminal Enterprise 237 Identity Theft, Fraud, and Criminal Activity 240 International Money Laundering Control: Law Enforcement Issues 243 Money Laundering and the Global Financial System 246 Offshore Financial Services: Bank Secrecy Jurisdictions and Offshore Banking 249

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The Process of Money Laundering: Placement, Layering, and Integration 251 Money Laundering, Tax Evasion, and Financial Havens 253 Money Laundering: Typologies, Methods, and Current Trends 256 Organized Theft Rings: Interstate Theft and Transportation of Stolen Property 260 Product Counterfeiting Operations of Organized Criminal Groups 263 Securities Fraud and Stock Manipulation Schemes 266 Tax Evasion and Trust Schemes 269 Trade, Banking, and Financial Institution Fraud 270

Section III The Global Impact of Organized Crime 275 A. The Globalization of Crime Criminal Infiltration in Legitimate Businesses and Industries 277 Economic, Political, and Social Impact of Transnational Organized Crime 280 Environmental Crime: The Illegal Storage and Disposal of Hazardous and Toxic Waste 284 Global Crime Victimization: Impact on Social Order and Democracy 286 Internet Extortion and Information Security 289 Strategic Alliances between Organized Crime Groups 292 Transnational Crime and Its Impact on International Security 294 B. Transporter Crime and Smuggling Networks and Piracy Attacks on Commercial Vessels: Piracy in the Malacca Strait and South China Sea 299 Drugs, Guns, and Armed Conflict 303 Human Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants and Illegal Aliens: A Global Overview 305 Maritime Smuggling of Migrants 309 Organized Crime, the Russian Military, and Nuclear Smuggling 313

Snakeheads and Human Migrant Smuggling: China’s Fujian Province 314 C. Illegal Drugs, Trade, and Trafficking Drug Production and Trafficking in the Western Hemisphere: The Andean Region of South America 318 The Global Cocaine Trade: Coca Cultivation, Cocaine Production, and Distribution 322 The Global Opium Trade: Cultivation, Production, and Distribution 327 Mexican Organized Crime: Drug Cartels 332 Social and Economic Impact of the Drug Trade: A Global Perspective 335 Violence, Drugs, and Organized Crime 338 D. Non-State Actors: International Criminals and Terrorists Drug Trafficking, Transnational Crime, and International Terrorist Groups 342 Financial Networks of Global Terrorism 345 Has Al-Qaeda Acquired Nuclear Weapons? The State of Existing Knowledge 350 Organized Crime, Nonstate Actors, and Weak or Failed States 357 Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime in Comparative Perspective 363 Underground Commerce: Black Markets 371 E. International Measures to Combat Organized Crime and Corruption Combating Transnational Organized Crime: Technical and Legal Issues 375 The Concept and Role of International Financial Intelligence Units 377 The Criminal Intelligence Process and Organized Crime 379 Current International Efforts to Combat Organized Crime 381 Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties 385 Human Smuggling and Trafficking: The Limitations of Official Statistics 387 International Efforts to Combat Human Trafficking 391 International Initiatives Dealing with the Abuse and Trafficking of Illegal Drugs 394

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The 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (Palermo Convention) 398 F. National and International Law Enforcement and Intelligence Agencies Australian Crime Commission 404 Canadian Security Intelligence Service 406 Caribbean Financial Action Task Force 408 Central Intelligence Agency 409 Criminal Intelligence Service of Canada 411 Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, Italy 413 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration 414 Europol 416 Federal Bureau of Investigation 418 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 420 International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition (IACC) 422 International Atomic Energy Agency 423 International Criminal Court 424 International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) 427 International Law Enforcement Academies 428 National Crime Authority 430 National Criminal Intelligence Service (United Kingdom) 431 Serious Organised Crime Agency (United Kingdom) 433 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 435 Task Force to Fight Illicit Trafficking in Cultural Property Stolen in Iraq 436 U.S. Customs and Border Protection 438 G. Future Direction of Global Organized Crime and Its Control Organized Crime Control: The Merger of International Law Enforcement and Intelligence Operations 441 Organized Crime Studies: An Agenda for Future Research 443

Appendix: Directory of Major Organized Criminal Groups Aboriginal-Based Criminal Groups, Canada 449 Albanian Mafia 449 Alperon Crime Organization (Israel) 450 Asian Gangs 451

Azerbaijani Groups 451 Balkan Crime Groups 452 Big Circle Boys 452 Black Gangster Disciples 453 Born to Kill 453 Cambodian Crime Groups 453 Chechen Criminal Gangs 454 Chinatown Gangs 454 Chinese Triads 455 Colombian Drug Cartels 455 La Cosa Nostra (Sicilian Mafia) Italy 456 Dragon Syndicates 456 East European-Based Criminal Groups 457 Fuk Ching 457 Gang Crime (International Street and Prison Gangs) 458 Georgian Mafiya 458 Great Circle Triad 458 Jamaican Criminal Organizations: Shower Posse 459 Khalil Kharfan Organization 459 Kuratong Balaleng (Philippines) 459 Latino Gangs 460 Malina Organizatsia 460 Marielito Gangs 461 Mexican Federation 461 ’Ndrangheta: The Calabrian Mafia (Italy) 462 Neapolitan Camorra (Italy) 462 Nigerian Criminal Organizations 463 Odessa Mafiya 463 Pentagon 463 Russian Mafiya 464 Sacra Corona Unita 464 South African Crime Groups 465 Sun Yee On 465 Taiwan’s Triads 466 14K (Hong Kong) 466 Tiendaomeng Crime Syndicate 466 Turkish/Kurdish Gangs 467 Turkish Mafia 467 Ukrainian Mafia 467 Wah Ching Crime Syndicate 468 West African Gangs 468 Wo Group 468 Yakuza 469 Index I-1

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Acknowledgments This project required the combined efforts of many dedicated individuals. Most notably, the major credit and the utmost gratitude go to those who have taken time from their busy schedules to contribute their knowledge and expertise. Without their commitment and untiring effort, this publication could not have been completed. Any encyclopedia entails a lot of effort and often requires some sacrifice of those involved in its conception, production, and completion. Certainly this present effort, Organized Crime: From Trafficking to Terrorism, was no exception. An undertaking of this magnitude often involves delays, changes, additions, a search for qualified people, and sometimes last-minute problems requiring the replacement of qualified writers. Again, this present effort was no exception. I would like to extend a debt of gratitude to my longtime friend Ralph Carrick, who passed away during the course of this effort. Ralph was a unique individual. He is one of the few people I have known who spent more time listening than he did talking. What a rare quality. I valued his friendship very much. I thank him for all the support he gave me on this project and for always being there. I would also like to thank my father, Dr. Frank Shanty, who has always provided support and encouragement to me. He is a special person, and I consider myself a better man for having had the benefit of his counsel and wisdom over the years. I would like to extend my utmost gratitude to several people who went above and beyond the call of

duty to ensure that major topics were assigned and completed. Oftentimes these individuals personally took responsibility for writing an entry that contributed significantly to the overall depth and comprehensiveness of this two-volume work. Dr. Robert Hanser assisted this effort by writing several entries and served as coauthor on several others. He also helped solicit qualified contributors, and on most of these entries he provided his insights and knowledge to ensure the integrity of the final product. A special debt of gratitude is also extended to Daniel Mabry and Joseph Serio. Both individuals have personally contributed entries to this work and have also provided assistance on locating qualified contributors. Other individuals also deserve special recognition for assuming more responsibility than was expected: Nathan Moran, Laura Ferola, Georgios Antonopoulos, Edgar Tijhuis, Kelly Hignett, Don Liddick, Mark Galeotti, Sean Griffin, Marilyn Peterson, and Hua-Lun Huang. Without their invaluable assistance, this project would have been much more difficult to complete. On the technical side, I would like to thank my coeditor, Dr. Patit Mishra, for his invaluable assistance on the documents (Volume 2) and for his friendship and kind words. A special note of gratitude is extended to Dr. James Ciment for his ongoing methodological guidance and technical support and for bringing this publication to fruition. The ABC-CLIO staff deserves special recognition. First, I would like to thank Dr. Alex Mikaberidze, submissions editor for ABC-CLIO, for his

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understanding, patience, guidance, and technical support throughout this entire project. Alex is a true professional, and ABC-CLIO is fortunate to have him. Last but certainly not least, I would like to thank my wife, Melanie, for accepting long hours, missed dinners, and weekends spent on the keyboard or with pen in hand. She has provided encouragement and understanding throughout this project as well as my ongoing PhD dissertation.

Finally, this two-volume encyclopedia is dedicated to my son Jason, a U.S. Marine, and to other Marines serving with him and other sons and daughters who are serving our country in various branches of the U.S. military during this critical period in this country’s history and indeed in the history of the entire global community. May God bless all of these brave men and women. Frank Shanty General Editor

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Preface Organized crime is an international phenomena and a major twenty-first-century security threat. This two-volume edition addresses issues that are critical to our understanding of this problem. Volume one begins with several articles that serve as a background and an introduction to this timely topic. Historical antecedents, causation theories, and group dynamics are discussed by scholars with an intimate knowledge of these issues. While organized crime is not a new problem, it has taken on new significance since the events of September 11, 2001. Volume one addresses the crime problem from a global perspective. Key issues such as the globalization of crime, the criminal infiltration of the legitimate business sector, and the operational characteristics of various organized criminal groups and enterprises are a few of the topics discussed in detail in volume one. Also covered in detail are financial crimes—including fraud and money laundering, transporter and smuggling networks, piracy, and the international illicit drug problem—and current measures used to combat global organized crime and corruption both nationally and internationally. A major issue for governments as well as law enforcement is the involvement of terrorist organizations in criminal activity to finance their operations. With this in mind, two leading authorities knowledgeable in this area have contributed entries that discuss the controversy surrounding the criminal-terrorist nexus. While the objective of this project was to present the relevant issues from a global perspective, we believe that this can best be accomplished with a thor-

ough discussion of organized crime as it impacts the nation-state. Therefore, several entries tackle this problem from a national and regional perspective. Other key issues addressed are the trafficking in persons, with an emphasis on the trafficking of women, children, and migrants. The manufacture and trafficking of arms, munitions, and explosives is also discussed. Given the diversity of the global crime problem, we have included entries that address the trading or transfer of a wide range of illegal contraband. One of the defining characteristics of twentyfirst-century criminal activity is its global reach. Therefore, we have included topics of special concern such as environmental crime, the impact of transnational crime on international security, and the future of global organized crime control. Additionally, since organized crime affects the entire international community, a profile of various national and international law enforcement and intelligence agencies charged with combating this problem is provided. Also included is a directory of some of the major organized criminal groups presently operating throughout the world. Finally, volume two provides key multilateral and international documents such as treaties, conventions, protocols, and other legal instruments designed to combat national, regional, and international criminal activity and regulate the activities of individuals as well as the responses given to this problem by nation-states and the international community as a whole.

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Throughout this two-volume set, we have attempted to address those aspects of global crime that presently challenge the capabilities of law enforcement and other international agencies and governing bodies. Comprehensive in scope and written by top scholars in the field, Organized Crime: From Trafficking to Terrorism is suitable for use by stu-

dents, researchers, scholars, those charged with combating this problem, and others interested in learning more about this continually evolving international problem that threatens nation-state survival as well as public safety. Frank Shanty General Editor

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Introduction Organized Crime 2006: A Global Overview of Current Events, Recent Trends, and Emerging Patterns Don Liddick Transnational organized crime is a virulent breed of criminality that transcends national boundaries and permeates the globe. Although certain forms of transnational crime such as slave trading have existed for many centuries, the phenomenon expanded rapidly in the second half of the twentieth century. Facilitated by technological advances that vastly improved communications and transportation and integrated world markets, transnational organized crime now thrives in a broad array of economic and political situations and virtually any place where regulation of industry, government, and the administration of justice are inadequate. The proscription of goods and services creates huge global black markets supplied by networks of illegal entrepreneurs who are enabled by corrupt government officials, intelligence and military personnel, corporate businesspeople, and the international banking community. The profits generated from transnational crime are so great that they create what criminologists have called a political-criminal nexus, whereby political and criminal power are fused and criminal interests shape the course of international affairs. Transnational crime consists of a staggering range of infractions but is most notably manifested in the production and smuggling of narcotics; arms trafficking; cargo theft from trucks and shipping terminals; automobile theft; piracy on the high seas; art and antiquities theft; software piracy; the smuggling of illegal migrants; sexual slavery and transnational

prostitution; pornography; traffic in human organs; smuggling toxic wastes; traffic in exotic life forms and endangered species; money laundering; the violation of intellectual property rights; product counterfeiting; currency counterfeiting; industrial theft and economic espionage; various financial frauds and high-tech computer crimes; terrorism; the traffic in nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons; cyberterrorism; kidnapping; the pirating of music compact discs and digital video discs; sports bribery; securities fraud; the smuggling of gems and gold; poaching of fish and other wildlife; the illegal dumping of toxic wastes; capital flight from developing nations; and bankruptcy and insurance fraud. The terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001 were a form of transnational crime and represent a good example of the impact of this global problem. Political-Criminal Nexus The damage from transnational crime is exacerbated by the fact that the most important criminals are typically political and societal elites: informal power brokers, powerful politicians, and businesspeople. The nexus between organized crime groups and state authorities is driven by the motives of profit and power and is exemplified by countless mutually beneficial exchange relationships. Acquiring access to state power allows crime groups to gain immunity for their illegal enterprises and exploit the social, xiii

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A UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter flies past one of Saddam Hussein’s former palaces in Tikrit, Iraq. Hussein used Oil-ForFood funds to finance lavish personal projects like this one. (Department of Defense)

economic, and political apparatus of the state, while for their part government officials pursue cooperative arrangements with organized criminals to fatten their wallets, secure votes, and control political enemies. Classifying heads of state and other national and international leaders as transnational organized criminals is appropriate. For example, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein pilfered oil wealth and United Nations (UN) Oil-for-Food money intended for Iraqi civilians to build palaces. The impact of transnational crime is immeasurable. Transnational criminals have become so powerful that their activities destabilize new democracies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and undermine the sovereignty of weak nations in Latin America, Africa, and the Caribbean. Transnational organized crime is responsible for overpriced goods

and services; the poisoning of men, women, and children with harmful drugs; the exacerbation of regional conflicts and wars; the funding of terrorist organizations; the usurpation of legitimate governments and the siphoning of public resources; and the physical suffering of millions of people worldwide. Through the restraint of trade and other debilitating effects, transnational crime delivers a terrible blow to the legitimate economy of all nations. The Rise of Transnational Criminal Organizations The growth of transnational crime in the last half of the twentieth century arose from several factors, including economic liberalization and globalization, high profits driven by prohibition laws, the increasing global demand for illicit goods and services, and state

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failures and civil wars. Economic liberalization and the opening of borders, while beneficial in many ways, have also facilitated illegal sectors of the global economy. For example, financial liberalization has made the movement and laundering of illicit funds much easier. Similarly, tax amnesties on repatriated capital attracts legal money but is also an encouragement to money launderers. Free trade measures may be good for the global economy, but the subsequent growth in cross-border traffic has made it simpler for smugglers to hide contraband among legal goods. Another example is the economic reforms in Mexico that produced social disruptions and spurred increased opium and marijuana cultivation. Transnational crime also flourishes because of the lack of political will to stop it. If issues over sovereignty, jurisdiction, and the incompatibility of the laws of different nations were not problematic enough, the profits from crime are so great that public officials and other powerful elites choose to participate in crime and reap the benefits, as opposed to developing national and international strategies for attacking the problem. Entire nation-states have been and remain the sponsors of terrorism and transnational organized crime. Transnational crime groups have grown more sophisticated, coordinating their ventures and sharing information, resources, and market access. By forming global criminal alliances, the world’s most prolific criminal organizations have managed to reduce risks and expand the breadth of their operations. For example, the leaders of South American drug cartels coordinate with criminal organizations in France and Italy, who develop arrangements with criminals in Poland and Russia, who complete the circuit by establishing relations with organized criminals back in Latin America. Additional examples include German pornographers who work with Chinese Triads to produce child pornography in Southeast Asia, Jamaican Yardies who enforce drug rule in England with automatic weapons provided by the Russian Mafiya, a deal between the Sicilian Mafia and Russian crime gangs to traffic in stolen nuclear materials, and Mexican drug cartels that partner with outlaw motorcycle gangs to distribute methamphetamine in the United States and Canada. The incidence of criminal partnerships on such a global scale has created new

difficulties for law enforcement in terms of jurisdiction, resources, and the corruption of public officials. Some transnational crime organizations are highly diversified and operate a large number of legal as well as illegal enterprises. Many groups have businesslike structures and use technological advances and specialists to improve efficiency. Criminals use financial experts and banking officials to launder money, manage investments, and establish front companies, while some drug smuggling organizations use transportation specialists and legal experts to research commercial flows, learn about tariff laws, and master administrative procedures in commercial ports. Corrupt lawyers manipulate the law and the judicial system to thwart investigations and shape legislation. The criminals also use information and communication technologies that allow them to obtain, process, and protect information in order to evade law enforcement. The capacity of modern computers and telecommunication systems allows transnational criminals to create decoys and false trails for investigators, plot market strategies for the distribution of illicit goods, and identify the most efficient smuggling and money laundering routes. The vast proceeds from crime are used to purchase the most recent surveillance technologies to keep track of law enforcement personnel and develop counterintelligence. Another ominous development is the movement of terrorists and extremist groups into organized crime activities. For example, Marxist insurgents in Colombia, unable to rely on Soviet or Cuban aid since the late 1980s, have turned to the drug trade for financing. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) tax and protect the cocaine trade in that country. Similarly, in Angola and Sierra Leone terrorists pay for the costs of insurgency by mining and illegally exporting diamonds. A Hezbollah cell in North Carolina was prosecuted for trafficking in cigarettes, and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) has been known to engage in extortion rackets. In those cases where terrorists don’t operate illegal enterprises independently, they foster relationships with organized criminals to gain contacts with immigration officials, corrupt law enforcers, develop relationships with money launderers, and acquire weapons, encryption software, and global positioning equipment. xv

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The Global Reach of Transnational Crime The principal threat from Western Europe is Italian criminal organizations, which maintain an active presence in the United States and are involved in extortion, gambling, counterfeiting, money laundering, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and financial frauds. While the Neopolitan Camorra and the N’drangheta are significant Italian-based crime groups, the Sicilian Mafia remains one of the most prolific global crime organizations, with a significant presence in some forty countries. Comprised of perhaps 180 families, or clans, the group has acquired most of its wealth and power through heroin trafficking. In 1997 thirty-one Sicilian Mafia members, including the reputed boss of bosses, Salvatore Riina, were convicted in association with the 1992 slaying of Italy’s top crime prosecutor. Authorities estimate that $20 billion per year is repatriated to Palermo, Sicily, the base of the Sicilian Mafia. The growth of transnational organized crime is especially prominent in Asia and Eastern Europe. Ethnic conflict in the Balkans in the 1990s precipitated lasting networks of terrorists and organized criminals who traffic in weapons, contraband, stolen art, and people. Transnational crime in the former Soviet Republics is especially serious. More than one hundred major Russian Mafiya gangs are believed to operate in forty-four countries around the world. Authorities believe that 70–80 percent of private banks in Russia are controlled by organized crime. In 1999 several people and two companies were charged with laundering some $7–10 billion in illicit and legitimate revenue through the Bank of New York on behalf of Russian criminals. Russian Mafiya groups also maintain a heroin pipeline that runs from Myanmar to the Balkans, through Germany and Nigeria, and on to distributors throughout Europe and the United States. Southeast Asia is also a major growth region for transnational crime. More than half of the heroin produced in Myanmar is trafficked through Yunnan Province in China on its way to drug markets in North America and Australia. Factories in Guandong Province are significant producers of counterfeit and pirated goods. The six major Chinese Triad societies, along with many smaller satellite groups, comprise the world’s largest criminal associ-

ation, with more than 100,000 members. The largest group, the Sun Yee On, is based in Hong Kong, has direct ties to the Beijing government, and engages in heroin trafficking, alien smuggling, and extortion in Canada, Thailand, Australia, and Central America. In 2001, mafia-style crimes increased by 530% in China, and 2,600 Chinese officials were implicated as being in collusion with organized crime. Chinese Triads in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, along with other crime groups in Mainland China, have extended their criminal activities and developed relationships with ethnic Chinese crime groups in the United States. The Chinese syndicates engage in a broad array of crimes, including drug trafficking, alien smuggling, weapons trafficking, money laundering, credit card fraud, and software piracy. The Yakuza, considered to be among the world’s largest and most powerful criminal confederations, are thought to generate about $13 billion in annual revenue. Yakuza gangs control casinos and brothels, own real estate and sports and entertainment companies, and engage in methamphetamine trafficking, extortion, and loan-sharking. The gangs are involved in every aspect of the Japanese economy and extort huge sums of money from corporations and banks. Perhaps $1 trillion of Japan’s bad debts are owed to banks by Yakuza-related real estate speculators. Yakuza gangs can be found in Australia, Costa Rica, Hawaii, Brazil, South Korea, and on the West Coast of the United States. U.S. law enforcement has noted that Yakuza groups have laundered money through the U.S. stock market and invested heavily in real estate, including golf courses and hotels. A Yakuza affiliate is believed to have purchased shares in Dow Chemical, Chase Manhattan, IBM, General Motors, Atlantic Ritchfield, and Bank of America. Latin America is a major source of transnational crime. Colombian traffickers are responsible for supplying most of the world’s refined cocaine, with the majority going to the United States. The Andean countries of Peru and Bolivia are the primary sources of coca, while Venezuela is a major transshipment corridor for drugs trafficked through the Caribbean and destined for the United States. However, drug trafficking is not the only transnational criminal enterprise emanating from Latin America. Colombia is

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also the leader in manufacturing counterfeit U.S. currency. Bolivia is a staging area for the movement of illegal migrants from China and the Middle East to the United States. Authorities estimate that patent and trademark infringements in Argentina and Brazil cost U.S. firms $500 million in lost sales every year. In addition, the Caribbean is a major transshipment route for the passage of arms, drugs, illegal migrants, and contraband. Jamaica is the largest exporter of marijuana in the Caribbean and has well-established crime gangs with contacts in Colombia and the United States. Puerto Rico sits at the middle of three trans-Caribbean smuggling routes, while Dominican traffickers control the shipment of cocaine and marijuana from Puerto Rico to the United States. Caribbean nations also serve as offshore banking centers used for money laundering and income tax evasion. Money laundered through the Colon Free Zone is estimated to be $1 billion to $4 billion annually. Countries in Central America are conduits for the shipment of drugs and other contraband, from points south up through Mexico and into the United States. Mexico and the countries of Central America are by far the largest source of illegal migrants to the United States. Many of the migrants are from the region, primarily Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico, but tens of thousands of others come from China, India, and other Asian, African, and Middle Eastern countries. The U.S. government estimates that alien smuggling networks in Central America generate about $1 billion a year in gross annual revenue. In Mexico, drug traffickers corrupt public officials and exploit the huge amount of legitimate traffic along the porous U.S.-Mexican border. Mexican traffickers dominate the U.S. methamphetamine market, while approximately half of the cocaine smuggled into the United States crosses the southwestern border. The smuggling of stolen vehicles, firearms, tobacco, alcohol, pirated goods, and illegal migrants are also common along the U.S.-Mexican border. With the world’s largest and most diversified economy, the United States is an excellent breeding ground for transnational organized crime. The United States is a leading source of contraband luxury goods, especially automobiles, firearms, tobacco products, and alcohol. While the United States re-

mains the world’s largest consumer of illicit drugs, it is also a leading producer and exporter of marijuana, crack cocaine, and methamphetamine. The United States is a major transshipment point for contraband shipped from one foreign nation to another and is a significant source of precursor chemicals used in the global drug traffic. The principal crime groups originating in the United States that have transnational dimensions are outlaw motorcycle gangs and the American La Cosa Nostra. The response to the transnational crime problem has been tardy and ineffective. Attempts to strike at transnational criminal networks are hindered by the global dimensions of the problem and its diffuse and expansive nature as well as widespread corruption of public officials and the challenges of international cooperation. Increasing global demand for drugs and other black market commodities drive the transnational crime engine, while religious zealotry, ethnic rivalries, and ideological radicals fuel international terrorism. While strong legislation and technological innovations give government and private-sector personnel tools to fight criminals, the tools themselves give rise to serious questions regarding privacy rights and the scope of government power. Money Laundering Among all transnational crimes, the outlook on fighting money laundering is especially grim. Methods and characteristics of money laundering are limited only by the imagination of the given criminal. For example, with real estate fraud, developers acquire large loans, wire the money to bank accounts outside the United States, and then declare bankruptcy. With terrorism and the illegal trade in arms and nuclear materials, methods can vary because criminals typically intend to conceal the destination as well as the origin of funds. In the fight against money laundering, banks and other depository institutions remain the first line of defense. In the United States, the government has largely succeeded in stopping money launderers from gaining direct access to U.S. banks. However, money launderers now look increasingly to international mechanisms and nonbank money transmitters. Major factors that confound law enforcement include the full-scale automation of

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wire transfer services with increased on-line access and less human intervention or monitoring, the exponential growth of international and multinational business transactions, the use of underground or informal banking systems such as the chit and hawala systems, the global interdependence of financial institutions and clearing mechanisms, the increase in correspondent relationships among foreign banks, specialized bank accounts that cater to foreign clients, the development of money management services, foreign exchange trading, swaps and derivative trading, and new trends in banking such as direct-access banking and cybercurrency. International Efforts to Combat Global Crime Some promising trends in fighting transnational crime have emerged. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) are bilateral accords among nations intended to facilitate the prosecution of crimes with international dimensions. MLATs and executive agreements are especially productive in regularizing international asset forfeiture cooperation among treaty partners. MLATs strengthen procedures for international cooperation and create obligations and channels of communication for exchange of information and evidence in criminal investigations and proceedings. The UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, also called the Palermo Convention, was ratified in December 2000. The treaty has two primary goals: to bridge the gap between international legal systems and to establish standards for domestic laws to effectively combat organized crime. Signatory governments pledge to criminalize activities committed by organized crime groups, expedite extradition proceedings, enhance anti–money laundering efforts, and generally improve international cooperation. The Palermo Convention also established a series of protocols aimed at combating specific crimes, including trafficking in women and children, the smuggling of migrants, and the traffic in illegal firearms. Interpol has undergone dramatic changes since the mid-1990s in response to the growing threat of transnational crime. With 177 member nations, its principal challenge has been to develop a system that allows for the sharing and dissemination of information among the member states. Interpol also continues to explore initiatives to standardize

how law enforcement agencies in different countries collect, analyze, store, and utilize evidence of criminal acts. The long-range goal of the organization is to create a global database of organized criminals and criminal organizations. While efforts to combat transnational organized crime are extensive, aggressive legislation such as the U.S. Patriot Act and the recommendations of international bodies such as the Financial Action Task Force are not enough to counter the threat of transnational organized crime. Making significant inroads will require transnational political will and cooperation, elements of international crime control that remain noticeably absent. Stemming from the war and subsequent atrocities in the Balkans in the early to mid-1990s, the UN General Assembly decided to convene a diplomatic conference on the establishment of an International Criminal Court. The conference, held in Rome during June–July 1998, precipitated the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Ratification remains incomplete and is opposed by the United States. Issues related to national sovereignty, criminal definitions, and the incompatibility of the laws of different nations make it unlikely that an International Criminal Court will soon be an effective tool in combating transnational organized crime. Conclusion An International Crime Threat Assessment developed by the U.S. government in 2000 predicted that the process of globalization and the erosion of state authority would precipitate further diversification of transnational crimes. The report also suggested that large criminal syndicates such as the Sicilian Mafia, the Chinese Triad societies, and the Russian Mafiya will continue to pose a major threat to U.S. interests and would probably grow to become even more self-sufficient. Cooperation among large criminal syndicates could be replaced by fully integrated transnational crime groups, or perhaps large interactive networks of smaller crime groups will cooperate and specialize in criminal ventures. On the other hand, law enforcement will be challenged by individuals and small groups of criminals who utilize hightech computer skills and telecommunications. Electronic theft and the manipulation of financial

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markets were cited in the threat assessment as continuing problems. Transnational criminals are also likely to take advantage of scientific and manufacturing advances to produce new synthetic drugs and high-quality counterfeit products. Illegal enterprises such as drug trafficking, alien smuggling, and the traffic in women and children will continue, but perhaps an even greater threat will be the role that transnational crime is expected to play in the undermining of national security and the destabilization of regions in conflict. Transnational criminals will continue to broker deals for illicit arms and weapons of mass destruction to foreign armies, militias, and terrorists, while crime groups and individuals are expected to become proficient at exploiting computer networks that control vital information infrastructures. References Abadinsky, Howard. Organized Crime. 6th ed. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 2000. Berdal, Mats, and Monica Serrano. Transnational Organized Crime and International Security:

Business As Usual? Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002. Finckenauer, James O., and Yuri Voronin. The Threat of Russian Organized Crime. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 2001. Godson, Roy. “Special Focus: The International Fight Against Money Laundering.” Trends in Organized Crime 4(4) (1999): 1–7. Godson, Roy, ed. “International Crime Threat Assessment.” Trends in Organized Crime 5(4) (2000): 32–144. Lupsha, Peter. “Transnational Organized Crime versus the Nation State.” Transnational Organized Crime 2(1) (1966): 21–48. United States Congress, House Committee on International Relations. Global Organized Crime. 104th Cong., 2nd sess. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996. Viano, Emilio C. Global Organized Crime and International Security. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1999. Williams, Phil, and Dimitri Vlassis, eds. “Combating Transnational Crime: Concepts, Activities, and Responses.” Transnational Organized Crime 4(3–4) (1998): 57–87.

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Section I Organized Crime, Criminal Groups, and National and Regional Threats Don Liddick

Transnational crime can be found in practically every region around the globe. The nexus between organized crime groups and state authorities is driven by the motives of profit and power, a pattern of corruption that is evident regardless of differing economic and political systems. Transnational crime has a tremendous impact on all nations and is so pervasive that it destabilizes countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa, as well as new democracies in Eastern Europe. Through the restraint of trade, capital flight, various black markets, tax evasion, and the traffic in armaments, people, and drugs, transnational crime weakens the function of governments and severely damages legitimate commerce on a global scale. Western Europe Transnational crime poses a significant threat to legitimate government and commercial structures throughout Western Europe. The most visible criminal organizations in this region are Italian in origin and include the Sicilian Mafia, the ’Ndrangheta, and the Camorra. All three groups possess global reach: the Sicilian Mafia maintains a significant presence in forty countries around the world, while the Camorra and the ’Ndrangheta maintain operations in several U.S. East Coast cities. Although the Italian criminal organizations are involved in numerous illegal endeavors, historically their most significant illicit enterprise has been the global trade in heroin. Of course, the problem of transnational crime is in no way limited to Italian-based groups or, for that matter, organizations indigenous to

Western Europe. Jamiacan Yardies enforce the drug trade in England with automatic weapons supplied by the Russian Mafiya, and various crime gangs from Eastern Europe traffic women and children into the region to staff the thriving illicit sex trade. Operated by criminal gangs in Eastern Europe and Russia, nuclear materials are smuggled into Germany, known as the hub of nuclear terrorism. Eastern Europe Ethnic-driven wars in the Balkans in the 1990s facilitated the rise of durable networks of terrorists and organized criminals who specialize in weapons trafficking, human smuggling, and the traffic in stolen art. Transnational crime in the former Soviet Republics is quite pronounced. For example, more than 100 Russian Mafiya gangs are believed to operate in forty-four countries around the world. In just the period 1990–1996, the number of documented Mafiya groups grew from 785 to more than 8,000. The more sophisticated groups, numbering perhaps 300, include the Solntsevskaya, the Odessa Mafiya, and various Armenian groups. Capital flight from Russia involves a siphoning of state wealth and natural resources to the tune of $1.5 billion to $3 billion per month, while the Ukrainian shadow economy is thought to comprise 60 percent of the gross domestic product. Asia Transnational crime is a rapidly expanding problem in Asia. Heroin produced in Myanmar, much of it trafficked through Yunnan Province in China, 1

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supplies drug markets in Australia, Europe, and North America. Factories in Guandong Province are infamous for producing pirated and counterfeit goods. China’s Triad societies make up the world’s largest criminal network, with more than 100,000 members. The most significant group, the Sun Yee On, is based in Hong Kong and has direct links to the Beijing government. The Chinese syndicates are involved in a broad range of criminal activities including weapons trafficking, money laundering, credit card fraud, drug trafficking, alien smuggling, and software piracy. Based in Japan, the Yakuza remains one of the world’s largest crime organizations. Yakuza gangs engage in methamphetamine trafficking, extortion, and loan-sharking and own real estate, casinos, brothels, and sports and entertainment companies. The gangs extort huge sums from corporations and banks and have a tremendous negative impact on the Japanese economy. Yakuza gangs can be found throughout the world, from Brazil to Australia to Hawaii. Latin America Transnational crime in Latin America is quite pervasive. Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador are the primary staging areas for drugs exported to the United States. In fact, Colombian traffickers supply most of the world’s refined cocaine. Bolivia is a staging area for the movement of illegal migrants from China and the Middle East to the United States, while Peru and Ecuador contain the principal coca-growing regions. The Caribbean is a major transshipment route for the passage of contraband, arms, drugs, and illegal migrants. Caribbean nations and Panama are major offshore banking centers used for money laundering and tax evasion. Central America is a major conduit for the shipment of drugs, migrants, and other contraband from points south, and U.S. officials estimate that alien smuggling networks in the region generate about $1 billion a year for organized criminals. In Mexico, drug traffickers have completely corrupted public officials and the military. Mexican traffickers largely control the U.S. methamphetamine market, while perhaps half of the cocaine smuggled into the United States crosses the northern border of Mexico. Criminals take further advantage of the porous U.S.-Mexican border

by smuggling firearms, tobacco, stolen vehicles, alcohol, pirated goods, and, most significantly, illegal migrants. North America In North America, the United States is a significant source of transnational organized crime. The United States is a major supplier of contraband luxury goods, tobacco, automobiles, firearms, and alcohol. The world’s largest consumer of illicit drugs, the United States is simultaneously a major supplier of marijuana and methamphetamine. The principal transnational criminal organizations based in the United States are outlaw motorcycle gangs and the American La Cosa Nostra. Transnational organized crime in Canada is a growing threat as well. Drug trafficking, money laundering, securities fraud, telemarketing scams, migrant smuggling, and the smuggling of tobacco products, jewelry, and alcohol are just a few of the more significant rackets. Among the transnational crime groups operating in Canada are the Sicilian Mafia; various Asian gangs, including Chinese Triads; aboriginal organized crime groups; transnational crime groups from Eastern Europe; and outlaw motorcycle gangs. Africa Transnational organized crime is burgeoning in Africa. Perhaps the most significant source is Nigeria. As much as 40 percent of the heroin smuggled into the United States is imported by Nigerian criminal gangs who work as subcontractors for other transnational crime groups. Nigerian organized criminals are also involved in bank fraud, insurance fraud, ivory smuggling, the manufacture and use of false identifications, advance-fee frauds, cocaine trafficking, and credit card scams. Elsewhere, the ethnic conflicts and civil wars endemic in Africa facilitate international arms trafficking and the smuggling of precious gems used to finance wars. Drugs and firearms are smuggled over land and through ports to South Africa and then on to Europe and the United States. Organized crime is a significant and growing problem in South Africa. The FBI notes that some criminal groups operating in North America are based in nations such as Liberia and Ghana.

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Conclusion Transnational organized crime also thrives in Australia and is emerging in New Zealand. Australia’s strong economy and modern shipping have overcome any geographical impediments to drug trafficking on a wide scale. Even New Zealand, isolated in the South Pacific, has become the home of organized crime groups, including ethnic Maori and Polynesian gangs, Chinese Triad societies, and the Hells Angels motorcycle club.

References Godson, Roy, ed. “International Crime Threat Assessment.” Trends in Organized Crime 5(4) (2000): 32–144. Newbold, Greg. “The Emergence of Organized Crime in New Zealand.” Trends in Organized Crime 3(3) (1997): 73–94. Potter, Gary, and Bankole Thompson. “Emerging Influences and Trends in African Organized Crime.” Criminal Organizations 11(1–2) 1997: 4–9. Williams, Phil, and Dimitri Vlassis, eds. “Combating Transnational Crime: Concepts, Activities, and Responses.” Transnational Organized Crime 4 (1998): 3–4.

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A. Historical Antecedents of Organized Crime

Organized Crime throughout History: Renaissance and Early Modern Period Concepcion Saenz-Cambra Organized crime, understood in a literal sense as a systematic illegal activity with the purpose of increasing wealth or power, is as old as the first systems of government and law. Piracy, smuggling, banditry, kidnapping, and extortion are all ancient and transnational occupations, but the Renaissance and early modern periods were, undeniably, a golden age for the history of organized crime. Organized crime, as characterized by a few basic qualities such as durability, hierarchical structure, access to political protection, being capital orientated, and use of violence happened across all classes of society. While the upper classes and the bourgeois were highly involved in the smuggling business of illegal goods and trafficking in human beings, the lower classes suffered an increase in criminality and delinquency in relation to the growth of urban society and a deep social dislocation. Organized groups of robbers, bandits, and burglars represented the majority of prisoners sentenced for criminal activities up to the end of the eighteenth century. Even though society despised them, some of these outlaws, such as Rob Roy MacGregor, a Scottish freebooter, became folk heroes. Organized crime rose rapidly over the last two decades of the sixteenth century and reached particularly soaring levels during the second half of the 1590s, when widespread piracy and privateering throughout the Caribbean led to constant smuggling

of illegal and stolen goods and the slave trade. This period also saw the birth of some of the most notable secret criminal societies in history: the Mafia, the Garduna, the Camorra, the ’Ndrangheta, and the Yakuza. The increase in criminal activities led to changes in criminal law and methods of law enforcement. The first result of this development of jurisprudence was the creation of the first professional police force in the modern sense, in this case by the government of King Louis XIV in 1667 to police the city of Paris. Subsequently, new prisons were established such as the Bastille in France, a medieval defensive structure that was converted into a state prison in the early seventeenth century by Cardinal Richelieu (1585–1642). In addition to the ordinary criminal courts, the Inquisition acted as a criminal tribunal charged with the detection, prosecution, and punishment of heresy, apostasy, and other deviations and crimes against the Catholic faith. Religious courts are a clear illustration of the ever-evolving nature and definition of crime and subsequently of the understanding of organized crime. Even though the Inquisition found in Islamism, Judaism, and Protestantism a kind of organized religious criminal activity, the tribunal’s actions tell us more about a society unable to cope with diversity than about factual organized criminality. An additional complication to the changing description of crime lies in the survival of sources. In general, the farther back in time we go, the fewer records that survive. It is from these records that we

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Legendary Scottish outlaw and folk hero Robert Roy MacGregor, also known as “Rob Roy” or “Red MacGregor,” during a sword fight ca. 1700. (Getty Images)

can gain an understanding of the form and extent of criminal activity of the time. Thus, special attention will be drawn to these three subjects: piracy and privateering, the slave trade, and the emergence of secret criminal societies. Piracy and Privateering In practice, piracy is as old as the history of sailing itself. An indication of its antiquity is the fact that the word “pirate” derives from the Greek verb peiraw, meaning “to make an effort” or “to adventure one’s self.” The earliest documented pirates were the Phoenicians in the second millennium B.C. During Antiquity and the Middle Ages, piracy was practiced in all known seas, being particularly important in the Red Sea, the Mediterranean, and the China Sea. But the discovery of America marked a radical break with the immediate past. The enormous increase in

the traffic of goods by sea was accompanied by the appearance of highly organized criminal naval enterprises in the hands of new types of pirates: corsairs, buccaneers, and filibusters. The most popular synonym to describe pirates was the term “corsairs,” but they were also often referred to as buccaneers and filibusters. The term “corsair,” which etymologically originates from Italian corso, meaning “to chase,” referred to pirates who had an official sanction by a government to sail. Those pirates who did not have it became known as buccaneers, from the French word boucaner, meaning “to cure meat,” and filibusters, from the Dutch word vrijbuiter, meaning a “free booter” or “plunderer.” The Corsairs Corsairs were captains of private ships, and their crew members specialized in maritime robbery and 5

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pillaging of port cities, operating with an official sanction of their government to attack the vessels and ports of an enemy nation during wartime. In England, piracy became a legal business with Henry VIII, and later, under Queen Elizabeth I, it became a maritime enterprise granting the licenses in exchange for part of the booty. After the license expired or the war was over, some corsairs returned to private activities as rich bourgeois recognized by their monarchs with awards. The most famous corsair was Francis Drake, appointed admiral and knighted by Queen Elizabeth. Others continued with their criminal activities, and some, such as Captain John Hawkins, became slave dealers. Not all corsairs, however, targeted the Caribbean. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Mediterranean Sea suffered the incursions of the Turkish and North African corsairs, who attacked the European vessels in an atmosphere of conflict between Christianity and Islam. The most famous of these Barbary corsairs was Aruch Barbarossa. Buccaneers Those pirates based in the Caribbean who lacked an authorization by a country’s government and kept the entire booty for themselves were referred to as buccaneers. They also acted as slave dealers and smugglers. They formed an association called the brotherhood of the coast that admitted outlaws, fugitives, and criminals. They terrorized mainly the towns and villages on the Gulf of Mexico and in the Caribbean. The most famous buccaneer was Henry Morgan, who sacked the city of Puerto Bello in 1668. Filibusters Another type of early modern pirate was the filibuster. Like all other pirates, their main goal was to assault the Spanish fleet, but they also smuggled illegal goods, especially into the ports of Cuba and the surrounding islands from their base in Belize. Their distinguishing feature was their motto: “We live for today, because we will probably all hang tomorrow.” Their maxim was supported by their custom of selling the booties extremely quickly and expending the gains in bacchanals.

Captain William Kidd, a privateer convicted of piracy, was hanged on May 23, 1701. His body was displayed at Tilbury Point at the mouth of the Thames River in England as an example to sailors tempted to engage in piracy. (Library of Congress)

Punishment The punishment for piracy was death. Trials for piracy were usually held in admiralty courts. If found guilty, the pirate could be hanged immediately after the trial. The bodies of the most notorious captains were often hung from a gibbet in a conspicuous place by the water’s edge as a frightening example to those leaning toward the temptation of piracy. Such was the end for Captain William Kidd, who was hanged on 23 May 1701.

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Slave Trade As a practice, slavery has flourished from the earliest recorded history until the early twentieth century, but the discovery of America and the subsequent escalation of piracy had an enormous impact in the development of international slave trade organizations. In the early fifteenth century, Europeans carried out their first slave raids along the coast of Africa. Black African slaves’ skill as agricultural laborers and their adaptability to tropical climates made them sorely needed in the agricultural economy of the European colonies, an economy based on the plantation system. Because in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries much of the slave trade was done illegally, with many operating without license and others disregarding quotas, the records are scarce. However, the estimated export of slaves from Africa to the Americas was as much as 3 million in the period between 1450 and 1600. It is estimated that about 25 percent of the slaves died during the journey. While practiced by most European countries, slavery was an accepted social institution, and the slave trade became one of the most profitable legal activities that a merchant could exercise. Secret Criminal Societies Not all organized crime was state supported or trade related. In fact, the most notable secret criminal societies in history—the Mafia, the Garduna, the Camorra, the ’Ndrangheta, and the Yakuza—had their origins in the early modern period. These powerful criminal organizations were not the only secret societies to appear at this time. The reasons for the appearance of secret criminal societies at this precise moment in time are innumerable, but the most prominent is the social dislocation produced by the transition between two clashing periods, from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance in Europe, and from its somehow parallel movement in Japan, from the Late Tokugawa Shogunate to the Meiji period. Curiously, in both cases the state had been a coercive enterprise that was based on the concept of protection as business. Social realities and the ne-

cessities of statecraft had overridden the exiguous egalitarian principles of early communities. Even though by the fourth century A.D. the dominant form of government was the hereditary monarchy, the end of both eras saw several fierce contests for the Crown by powerful regional noble families who ruled over the surrounding populace. The peasantry needed the nobility—or, to be more exact, their army—for protection against local violence and external invasion. These armies were not professional armies in the modern sense but rather consisted of local warriors related by kinship or ethnicity to the nobleman. In return for being protected by these military forces, the peasantry paid taxes—assessed in money, goods, or labor—that supported the nobility and its army and bestowed legitimacy upon them. The Renaissance and the Meiji period sparked a centralization of power by monarchies, which created a disruption in the established order that led to social struggles and, in most cases, violence. One feature shared in common among all secret societies was that of a membership structure consisting of graded or hierarchical degrees. Most of the characteristics of these groups can be almost entirely explained by family structure itself, but the roots of early modern secret societies can be traced back to medieval society. Some formal characteristics can be found in the medieval guilds, which emerged as a way to train personnel and trade goods but also served as a kind of judicial system. In many cases, the guilds took care of judicial problems internally, which created an incipient step toward the creation of secretive organizations, but unlike the guilds and other secret organizations, members of these criminal societies commanded respect and control through their use of violence, trepidation, thievery, and murder. Like in the modern criminal societies, the most remarkable characteristics were their common use of violence, the loyalty of its members regardless of the menace, and the strict code of silence they followed. Moreover, almost all criminal societies’ members had at least one common characteristic: they came from poor backgrounds and were outcasts of society. The organization supplemented or replaced their family network and offered unconditional

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friends, financial support, and safety, giving meaning and purpose to their lives. The Mafia The Mafia is the most famous, and infamous, of the Western criminal societies. The Mafia in present times is synonymous with violence and illegal acts, but it began as an administrative system implemented by landowners to keep control of their estates in their absence. The origin of the word “mafia” is debated. Historically, it was first used in the 1863 theatrical play I mafiusi de la Vivaria, written by Giuseppe Rizzotto, that describes the behavior and the activities of a group of Mafiosi. The word itself, however, made its first official appearance in a report about illegal activities by the chief prosecutor in Palermo, Filippo Gualtiero, in 1865. The most likely source is from the Sicilian dialect meaning “boldness” or “bravado,” possibly from the Arabic mahjas, meaning “aggressive boasting” or “bragging.” Eventually, it was linked with the secret society. Further possibilities are the slogan “Morte alla Francia Italia anela!” (Death to the French is Italy’s cry!). Another possibility, yet highly improbable, is “Mazzini autorizza furti, incendi, avvelenamenti” (Mazzini authorizes theft, arson, poisoning). The Mafia was born in Sicily after the conquest of the island by Spain in the fifteenth century. The Spanish domination had important repercussions on Sicilian society. The implementation of the Spanish centralization system and the transition from the Middle Ages into the Renaissance, which carried a sharp growth in urban life, provoked an exodus of the Sicilian upper class to the vibrant capital of the island of Palermo, but they still owned large estates in the countryside. Subsequently, they employed supervisors, called gabelloti, to take care of the lands and workers. The gabelloti also hired assistants and tax collectors—uomo di fiducia (loyal men) and campieri (mercenaries)—to help them maintain order by using fear and intimidation. The vertical structure of this new administrative system is a direct basis for the modern Mafia, almost paralleling its organization. However, the modern Mafia members provide a more heroic and dramatic origin, one of subversion and resistance against the tyrannical invaders. When

the Spaniards invaded Sicily, they carried with them the Holy Inquisition, which they used to further subordinate the local population. Using fear and intimidation, the Spanish held subdued groups by force and violence. Many Sicilians ran away to the mountains, where they formed an armed society of peasants who, according to popular folklore, enjoyed the respect of the community since they represented defiance and protection against the implacable Spaniards. The Garduna The Garduna was a Spanish secret criminal brotherhood that appeared in the late Middle Ages. According to tradition, a hermit named Apollinario from Andalucia started a sacred army to drive the Moors out of the Iberian Peninsula after an apparition of the Virgin Mary. With God’s blessing to destroy, kill, and loot, those who joined him would be absolved of all wrongdoing. The Garduna soon became a weapon of terror against all heretics and acted with the approval of the Spanish Inquisition until 1670, when the Church withdrew its support for the organization. After this date, the Garduna expanded its scope, and its victims now included Christians as well as Muslims and Jews. With branches allegedly in Spain, Portugal, and Latin America, the Garduna gave evidence of its survival as a secret criminal organization throughout the twentieth century. The Camorra Most historians agree that the Garduna was the precursor to the Neapolitan Camorra, which was most likely transplanted when Spain took Naples in the sixteenth century. The term camorra is a Spanish word meaning “quarrel.” The Camorra’s most distinguishing feature was its recruitment process, since its members were accepted provisionally and could not become official full members until they had committed a murder for the organization. Even though during its long existence it has always been a secret criminal organization associated with robbery and murder, reputedly the Spanish rulers of Naples used the Camorra as mercenary forces to subvert any resistance. After centuries of criminal

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activities, the Camorra was finally suppressed after Benito Mussolini’s takeover in 1922. The ’Ndrangheta The ’Ndrangheta is a Calabrian secret criminal organization. Even though the first factual evidence of its existence as such under this name dates from the late nineteenth century during the Italian unification, its origins are most probably in the Spanish Garduna through the Neapolitan Camorra. Its name derives from the Greek word andragathía, meaning “heroism” and “virtue.” Instead of the pyramid structure of bosses used by other Mafia-type organizations, the ’Ndrangheta uses families based on blood relationships and intermarriages. As in most other criminal societies, all members go through an initiation ceremony, in this case called ’Ndrangheta, a series of questions and answers on loyalty and valor in Calabrian dialect. The ’Ndrangheta is still one of the richest and most powerful criminal organizations. The Yakuza The Yakuza is a Japanese organized crime society that originated during the Tokugawa era in the early seventeenth century. The word yakuza means “8-9-3.” The word ya means “8,” ku means “9,” and za means “3.” The name derives from Oicho-kabu, an old Japanese gambling game. The goal of the game is to get, or come closest to, a score of 9. A player’s score in this game is decided by adding the scores on several cards and using only the smallest digit. Because 8 + 9 + 3 = 20 = 0 points and this combination of cards equates to a losing hand, the term became an expression for useless hands in society. As in the case of the Mafia, the origin of the Yakuza is a controversial subject. Modern Yakuza see machiyakko (servants of the town) as their origin. These men were artisans and craftsmen who took to weapons and defended the villages and the cities against the wayward kabuki-mono (crazy ones). Stories about the people’s champions saturate Japanese folklore. Contrary to this belief, most historians refute this theory and affirm that its members are descendants of the kabuki-mono. They were samurai, distinctive for their extravagant clothes and hair styles, who carried unusually long swords in their belts. During the

Tokugawa era, an extended period of peace in Japan, the services of these samurai were no longer needed, which forced them into unemployment. They became wandering samurai, also know as ronin, who turned to theft and mayhem, plundering villages and small cities. Effects and Repercussions The Renaissance and early modern period were the transitional movements in Europe between medieval and industrial times. Organized crime wanted to penetrate and overturn the internal course of the struggle resulting from these disruptions of social life. At the time, organized crime was able to form legal businesses as the result of the merger between criminal capital and the state power structures, as it happened in the cases of piracy and privateering and the slave trade. The overlap between organized crime and business practices was a reaction to the failures in social consciousness and in legislation, which, in this case, was not amended until the modern era. Related to these social inadequacies was the creation of secret criminal societies in which both crime and victimization served as a sort of noninstitutionalized protest against existing social relationships. Their emergence and the victimization of individuals, but especially businesses, were not only an indicator but also a product of organized crime. Such was the success in seizing control that secret criminal societies have learned to adapt to new realities, and they are still a force in the modern world. References Daraul, Arkon. A History of Secret Societies. New York: Pocket Books, 1969. Duggan, Christopher. The Sicilian Origins of the Mafia. London: Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, 1987. Gatrell, V. A. C., et al., eds. Crime and the Law: The Social History of Crime in Western Europe since 1500. London: Europa, 1980. Hess, Henner. Mafia & Mafiosi: Origin, Power, & Myth. New York: New York University Press, 1998. Konstam, Angus. The History of Pirates. London: Mercury Books, 2005. Lunde, Paul. Organized Crime: An Inside Guide to the World’s Most Successful Industry. London and New York: Dorling Kindersley, 2004. 9

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Thomas, Hugh. The Slave Trade: The Story of the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1440–1870. London: Picador, 1997. Weisser, Michael. Crime and Punishment in Early Modern Europe. Hassocks: Harvester, 1979.

The History and Evolution of Organized Crime: United States Robert Hanser, Kaine Jones, and Walonda Wallace There are a multitude of definitions for organized crime. One simple definition, according to Larry J. Siegel, might be that organized crime is “the ongoing criminal enterprise groups whose ultimate purpose is personal economic gain through illegitimate means.” Alan Block and William Chambliss define organized crime as “those illegal activities connected with the management and coordination of racketeering and the vices, particularly illegal drugs, illegal gambling, usury, and prostitution.” The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) states that organized crime consists of “any group having some manner of a formalized structure and whose primary objective is to obtain money through illegal activities. Such groups maintain their position through the use of actual or threatened violence, corrupt public officials, graft, or extortion, and generally have a significant impact on the people in their locales, region, or the country as a whole.” Any one of these definitions categorizes several groups as organized criminal syndicates. On the basis of these definitions, certain groups such as motorcycle gangs, street gangs, and, most importantly, the Mafia, or La Cosa Nostra, can be categorized as organized crime. Nonetheless, for the sake of simplicity and to ensure that adequate focus and clarity is maintained, this essay will primarily provide a history and evolutionary analysis of the Mafia in the United States, as it is the most recognized organized crime group in the United States. The Mafia As a Prototype for Organized Crime Development The Mafia originated in Sicily, and while it was not originally called the Mafia or La Cosa Nostra it

eventually evolved and took on that name. It all began in Sicily when certain Sicilians formed a secret society to combat outside Arabic, Spanish, and Norman invaders who occupied the country throughout various points in history. The term “mafia” is thought to have origins with the Sicilian Arabic dialects and is derived from terms meaning to protect and act as a guardian. The Mafia in Sicily mainly acted as a protection service in the sense that it would require a certain amount of money in return for protection. Those who did not pay would suffer violent acts of kidnappings, bombings, and murder. In the 1900s, organized crime experienced a surge that strongly affected American society. In the early 1900s members of the Mafia fled to the United States. This was largely due to the efforts of Benito Mussolini, who attempted to rid Italy and Sicily of the Mafiosi through political and military action. It was at this time when the American Mafia grew dramatically in size. While the majority of the Mafiosi were located in New York City, there was quite naturally a strong presence in Chicago as well. In Chicago, such wellknown figures as Al Capone emerged during Prohibition. The Mafiosi in Chicago had specialized in the manufacture of low-cost, high-proof, untaxed alcohol during this time, and this made them ideally suited for illicit sales in this type of commodity. Italian and Sicilian organized crime members would eventually become known as the outfit and would have some unique characteristics. The main distinction centered on the outfit’s willingness to work in cooperation with other groups. Likewise, the managerial aspects of this group tend to be much more centralized than those of other groups that would develop around the nation. Prior to prohibition, organized crime was typically restricted to its own local community. This was true for Italian and Sicilian organized crime groups as well as others such as Jewish and Irish groups. However, Prohibition enabled the Mafia to break out of its own small enclaves in Chicago, New York, and other urban areas and thus allowed for the rapid and lucrative spread of illicit activities and the accumulation of profits. This is also important for another reason: victims of the Mafia now began to

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include persons who were not from the Italian American community. Prior to this, the Mafia did tend to primarily victimize its own communities consisting of fellow immigrants. But from this point on in their evolution, they would intermix their activities to include the broader American population. In most of urban America, the Mafia maintained the dominant influence over organized criminal activity. During the 1930s and 1940s, the Mafia would exert control over important labor unions, illegal gambling operations, and even wholesale drug trafficking. During this time the Mafia also channeled its funds into legitimate businesses as a means of investment and also as a front for illegitimately obtained cash. Lastly, it was also during this time that the term “Cosa Nostra”—meaning “our thing” among its members—emerged. This era of Mafiosi had a distinctly American flavor that served to separate these gangsters from their true Sicilian counterparts. As with most immigrant populations that arrived in America during the late 1880s and early 1900s, many Italian immigrants (both Mafia and nonMafia) found themselves in New York City. During the 1920s in the United States, Mafia groups vied for power during what was referred to as the Castellammarese war. From this point on numerous Mafia crime families emerged, with the New York City faction eventually splitting into five families: the Gambino family, the Genovese family, the Colombo family, the Bonanno family, and the Luchese family. Each of these families is essentially controlled by one boss who in turn is under the main boss, or boss of bosses. The Rise of Mafia Families in the United States The Gambino family was originally led by Salvatore D’Aquila, who was the boss of bosses until he was murdered in Brooklyn in 1928. A series of individuals succeeded D’Aquila. Among them were Frank Scalise, who took over until 1931, and Vincent Mangano, who represented the family from 1931 to 1951. Albert Anastasia then became head of the family and is well known for putting together a hit squad called Murder, Inc. This group of assassins killed an estimated 400 people during the time of

his leadership. Unfortunately for him, his murderous ways made members of the family question his sanity. Ultimately, he was murdered by Larry and Joe Gallo, otherwise known as the Gallo brothers. After the demise of Anastasia, Carlo Gambino took over in 1957 and reigned for almost twenty years. He always tried to stay in the shadows and out of the spot light. This was beneficial for the profits of the family, and because of his behind-the-scenes demeanor he is known as the best boss of the Gambino family. Before his death, he appointed his cousin Paul Castellano to be head of the Gambino family. The soldiers and captains of the Gambino family did not identify with Castellano and thought of him as more of a businessman than a gangster. Before long Castellano lost any sense of respect that he could command from his soldiers and captains. This led to an eventual assassination that was orchestrated by John Gotti, and it was Gotti who took control of the Gambino family in 1985. However, in 1992 Gotti was convicted of murder and racketeering and is serving a life sentence in a federal prison. Presently, Gotti’s son, John Gotti Jr., is acting boss of the Gambino family. Giuseppe “Joe the Boss” Masseria was the first boss of the Genovese family. However, in 1931 the famous gangster Charlie “Lucky” Luciano preceded Masseria and became head of the Genovese family. Luciano got his nickname after being severely beaten by a rival gang; the beating was so severe he was considered lucky to have survived. Luciano remained in power until 1936, when he was forced to go to Sicily due to criminal charges brought against him in New York City. Frank Costello, a close friend of Luciano, took over the Genovese family soon afterward. Costello was murdered by Vincent “Chin” Gigante under orders of Vito Genovese. Genovese held the position of boss of the family for four years, until 1959, when the family went under the rule of a three-man ruling council. Tommy Eboli, Jerry Catena, and Mike Miranda comprised the ruling council that controlled the Genovese family until 1972, when Frank “Funzi” Tieri took over. Vincent “Chin” Gigante replaced Anthony “Fat Tony” Salerno, who resided as the boss of the Genovese family from 1981 until his imprisonment on racketeering charges in 1987. However, Gigante was also 11

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convicted of several racketeering charges in July 1997. Liborio “Barney” Bellomo, who was the acting boss of the family while Fat Tony was incarcerated, entered a guilty plea in 1997 to charges of extortion and was sent to prison for ten years. Currently, the street boss of the Genovese family until Gigante is released from prison is Dominick “Quiet Dom” Cirillo, and many members of the family feel they will continue to be prosperous under him. The initial boss of the Luchese family was Gaetano Reina, who was boss until 1930 when Gaetano Gagliano took over. Gagliono was on the original National Commission of La Cosa Nostra and remained boss of the Luchese Family until 1953. Gaetano “Thomas” Luchese headed the family after Gagliano. Luchese used the garment industry as his primary racket, working closely with Carlo Gambino and the Gambino family. After Luchese’s death in 1967, his son-in-law Carmine Tramunti became boss of the Luchese family until he was incarcerated for murder. In 1974 Anthony “Tony Ducks” Corallo became head of the Luchese family. He reportedly stabilized the family while being boss but was incarcerated in 1986 and subsequently died in 2000. After Tony Ducks there was Vittorio Amuso, who served as boss until 1992 when he received a life sentence due to infractions against the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. Alfonse “Little Al” D’Arco was the initial street boss while Amuso was incarcerated and later turned state’s witness. Presently, the acting boss of the Luchese family is Joe DeFede. It is believed that DeFede is headed for rough times in his attempt to rebuild the family, which has essentially gone from 125 members to less than 100. The Luchese family has been troubled with their own members snitching on the family. In the 1990s alone three major members of the Luchese family have snitched on the family. Joe Profaci was the first boss of the Colombo family, from 1930 to 1962. He was an attention-getter who was frequently in the newspapers. During his time of leadership a lieutenant within the family, “Crazy” Joey Gallo, led a full-fledged war against Profaci in hopes of gaining control of the family. Gallo apparently lacked the support needed to defeat Profaci, and consequently Profaci’s faction of

Vito Genovese (1897–1969) rose through the mafia ranks from hit man for Lucky Luciano to “godfather” of the Genovese crime family. (Library of Congress)

the family defeated Gallo. When Profaci died, Joseph Magliocco took over for a brief period until his death in 1963. Joe Colombo succeeded Magliocco and became a well-known boss in New York City. Consequently, in 1971 he was shot at an Italian American Day rally by a black gunman named Jerome Johnson. It was believed that he acted alone and killed Colombo without reason. Nevertheless, Gambino, who was upset at all the press that Colombo was attracting, was actually the man behind the murder. Colombo remained in a coma for seven years after being shot and finally died in 1978. Joseph Yacovelli became boss of the Colombo family after Colombo was shot and was in control for two years. Then Joseph Brancato took over for five months in 1973 until he was incarcerated for murder. The family then came under the control of Thomas DiBella, who is responsible for creating a period of peace with members of the family headed by Crazy Joey Gallo. Despite his efforts in

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1978, Carmine “Junior” Persico killed DiBella. Persico was eventually convicted on racketeering charges that led to a 100-year sentence. Sometime during the mid-1980s, the Colombo family split into two factions. Persico was head of one faction, while Vic Orena, the acting boss of the Colombo family, had control of the other faction. However, in 1992 Orena was convicted on charges of racketeering, and this began the Colombo war. Members in each faction of the family were killing each other. Persico won the Colombo war once he was able to appoint his nephew, Andrew Russo, as the acting boss. Russo took control of the family, and in a few months he became the permanent boss of the Colombo family. In 1996 Russo was indicted on racketeering charges. The Bono family was first led by Cola Schiro until 1930. Salvatore Maranzano became the boss of the family after Schiro and was also the boss of bosses until other mobsters, mainly Charlie Luciano, conspired and murdered Maranzano in 1931. After the death of Maranzano, Luciano created the National Commission of La Cosa Nostra. Joe Bonanno took the place of Maranzano as the boss of the Bonanno family and held control until 1964. Bonanno is known for being the first boss to break the omerta, or code of silence. Frank LaBruzzo became the boss of the family for the next two years and was then followed by Gaspare DiGregorio, who also took control for two years. Paul Sciacca was the boss for less than a year. Then Phillip “Rusty” Rastelli, Joseph Zicarelli, Joseph DiFillippi, and Natale Evola formed a ruling council that maintained the family for three years. After the three-year rule of council, Evola became the sole boss for one year and was followed by Rastelli, who became the boss in late 1973 until his incarceration in 1974 for racketeering. Carmine Galante succeeded Rastelli but was murdered in 1979. Rastelli was eventually released from prison and regained control of the family. Rastelli had two main members who helped him run the family: Dominick “Sonny Black” Napolitano and Benjamin “Lefty Guns” Ruggiero. These two members also had close dealings with undercover FBI agent Joseph D. Pistone, otherwise known as Donnie Brasco. Nevertheless, after it was discovered that Brasco was an FBI agent, Napolitano disappeared. Ruggiero was put in jail and died of lung

cancer two years after his release. Rastelli was incarcerated yet again in 1985, and in 1989 he turned over control of the family to Joey Massino, who is still in control today. Conclusion Organized crime maintains a hierarchical structure. Those involved conduct their business and make their profits by means of fear, intimidation, violence or threat thereof, corruption of public officials, and extortion with the sole motivation of turning a profit. Organized crime has broadened its operations to include drug smuggling and other commodities as well as made endeavors in industrial and technological espionage, financial market manipulation, and the corruption and control of groups within the legal state system. La Cosa Nostra has become so colossal that other Italian criminal organizations have begun to associate themselves with the group. Currently, there are four Italian organized crime groups in the United States: the Sicilian Mafia, the Camorra, the ’Ndrangheta, and the Sacra Corona Unita. These criminal organizations have continued to immigrate to the United States since the 1960s. They mainly deal in the heroin trade and have grown to an extent that they now have attained control of certain criminal operations that were at one time solely operated by La Cosa Nostra. These Italian organized crime groups have become yet another substantial threat to the American society due to their drug trafficking and money laundering operations. Through the use of sophisticated electronic surveillance and undercover operations, the FBI has begun to make a noteworthy impact on La Cosa Nostra. Due to technological advances as well as covert operations, FBI investigations have resulted in several successful federal prosecutions of members of La Cosa Nostra who are in substantial positions in the hierarchy. While it is doubtful that the FBI will be successful in ridding the United States of La Cosa Nostra altogether, it has made steps toward suppressing this group’s continued prominence. While it is unlikely that the Mafia will ever return to its previous grandeur, it is also unlikely that we will see the total demise of this illicit organization anytime in the near future. 13

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References Abadinsky, H. Organized Crime. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2003. ———. “Organized Crime: Italian-American Mafia.” P. 1096 in Encyclopedia of Criminology, edited by R. A. Wright and J. M. Miller. New York: Routledge, 2005. ———. “Organized Crime: Sicilian Mafia.” P. 1106 in Encyclopedia of Criminology, edited by R. A. Wright and J. M. Miller. New York: Routledge, 2005. Albanese, J. Organized Crime in America. 3rd ed. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson, 1995. Block, Alan A., and William J. Chambliss. Organizing Crime. New York: Oxford, 1981. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Investigative Programs: Organized Crime. Washington, DC: United States Department of Justice, 2005, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/glossary.htm. Finckenauer, J. O. A Cosa Nostra in the United States. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 2000, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ nij/international/lcn_text.html. Paoli, L. Mafia Brotherhoods: Organized Crime, Italian Style. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2003. Siegel, Larry J. Criminology: The Core. 2nd ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2004.

American Mafia Don Liddick As opposed to a highly bureaucratic and rigidly structured organization founded on the island of Sicily and transplanted whole into the United States, the Mafia was in fact a system of patron-client relations that bridged legitimate and illegitimate segments of Sicilian society. Arising out of moral, social, economic, and geographic conditions unique to western Sicily, mafioso (meaning “men of honor”) emerged in the early nineteenth century after the feudal system was abolished and a need arose for someone to mediate and enforce contracts and other relationships. Typically peasants, mafioso used violence to entrench themselves in a patronage system whereby they entered the service of both the landed gentry and other peasants. In the service of landowners, mafioso arranged for adequate rents and the suppression of workers. For peasants,

mafioso provided work and the continuation of contracts. Originally, then, the Mafia was not a crime organization but rather a system of patronage unique to the western part of Sicily. In recent years the term “mafia” has been applied to virtually any criminal organization, network, or informal association that falls within the realm of organized crime. Crime groups have been labeled the Dixie Mafia, the Russian Mafia, the Black Mafia, and so on. However, if the term “mafia” is to be applied to certain criminal groups, then it appropriately belongs to the Sicilian Mafia and the American La Cosa Nostra. The American Mafia In the United States, the phenomenon known as the Mafia has its genesis in events beginning with the emigration of millions of Italians in the period 1880– 1920. Almost from the start, Italian American organized crime was characterized by sensationalism and misconceptions. While gangs of Italian Americans did roam in many American cities by the turn of the twentieth century, it was sensational journalism and anti-immigrant sentiment that fueled the idea that a monolithic and corporate-like crime organization comprised of Italian Americans was preying on the United States. (In reality, nothing so formal or organized has ever existed.) Later, throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the idea that a secretive national crime organization was operating in the United States developed further. Crime fighters such as Thomas Dewey and Harry J. Anslinger fostered the notion of an Italian conspiracy, and the idea of a national crime cartel consisting of Italian Americans was further bolstered when a former associate of the infamous racketeer Dutch Schultz published a series of high-profile articles in Collier’s magazine. As the story goes, under the direction of Lucky Luciano a group of younger Italians assassinated as many as one hundred old-style mafioso leaders across the nation in 1931, a great purge that according to legend gave rise to a national crime organization called the Mafia. While research shows that only four persons were actually murdered, the monolithic and national implications of the event were emphasized by government and the media. The mafia legend grew when Brooklyn District Attorney William O’Dwyer obtained testimony from gangsters

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associated with the notorious Murder, Inc., crowd of assassins. In this context, the congressional Kefauver Committee held televised hearings in the early 1950s investigating the world of organized crime. The committee concluded that a sinister criminal organization known as the Mafia operated throughout the United States. Not long after the committee dramatized the idea of Italian American organized crime, a gathering of sixty-five Italians at the home of Joseph Barbara in Appalachin, New York, on 19 November 1957 was interpreted by the law enforcement community as undisputed proof that a national organization called the Mafia existed. The belief that organized crime in America consisted of an Italian-run superorganization was perpetuated in 1963 when criminal-turnedinformant Joseph Valachi testified before the McClellan Committee. It was Valachi who revealed the new name for the Mafia: La Cosa Nostra, or “our thing.” A few years later in his famous book Theft of the Nation, Donald Cressey stated that Cosa Nostra

Johnny Torrio (1882–1957) was a Chicago mobster considered to be one of the founders of organized crime in America. (Library of Congress)

accounted for almost all of organized crime in America. In reality, Italian American organized criminals, commonly referred to as the Mafia, have operated crime enterprises in the United States since the 1880s. Early rackets included the extortion of legitimate Italian American businessmen. Typically, a shopkeeper would receive a note demanding money or else face a bombing or kidnapping. Around the turn of the twentieth century, New York City’s Ignazio Saietta ran a successful counterfeiting operation. Perhaps the most important New York criminal in that time was Paolo Vaccarelli, also known as Paul Kelly. Kelly organized hundreds of street thugs in the multiethnic Five Points neighborhood of Manhattan and carried on a legendary street war with his Jewish rival, Monk Eastman. Other young Italian street thugs were muscle for hire, coercing the electorate or otherwise intimidating opponents on behalf of municipal authorities. By the 1920s, young Italian hoodlums matured and helped organize the illegal liquor trade during the Prohibition era. Italian gangster John Torrio was largely responsible for organizing the East Coast liquor trade, while former Five-Pointer Alphonse Capone eventually consolidated control of organized crime in Chicago. This tendency toward centralization created the impetus whereby alreadysignificant Italian American criminal enterprises evolved in the direction of what later came to be called the American La Cosa Nostra. Profits from bootlegging and the desire to transcend old-style Sicilian management led infamous gangsters such as Charles “Lucky” Luciano and Meyer Lansky to consolidate Italian and some non-Italian criminal operations into a loose confederacy of some two dozen crime families. Regulated to some extent by a small body of the most powerful crime bosses known as the Commission, La Cosa Nostra has never been a monolithic or formal organization but was clearly the most significant form of organized crime in the United States from the 1930s to the end of the century. Organizational Structure While government and the media have stressed the singular and corporate-like features of Italian American crime families, La Cosa Nostra is in reality less formal than a legitimate organization. 15

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Nevertheless, the national confederacy of Italian American criminal enterprises has been quite durable in the face of tremendous law enforcement pressure. This longevity is largely the function of the Mafia’s ability to create fear, corrupt government officials, and maintain an effective management and authority structure. Structurally, each Mafia family possesses a leadership hierarchy in the shape of a pyramid. The boss is at the top and is the absolute final authority in all major decisions affecting the family. An underboss is second in command and acts as a buffer between the boss and lower-level personnel. A consigliere, or counselor, mediates disputes and advises the boss. The consigliere may in effect have as much power and influence as the underboss. Below these leadership positions are the several capos, or captains, each of whom manages his own unit of soldati (street soldiers). Street soldiers are the lowest rank in the official family membership. As made members of Mafia families, the persons filling the above positions are in for life and owe allegiance to the crime group above all other loyalties upon pain of death. Although street soldiers comprise the lowest level of made members, each runs his own crew of nonmember associates who operate the day-today criminal activities of the organization. Although the law enforcement community and the U.S. government stress the bureaucratic and hierarchical authority structure of the American Mafia, academics have suggested that structurally, the organization is far less formal. Mark Haller, for example, argues that the relationship between Mafia bosses and their subordinates is like the Chamber of Commerce or Rotary Club. Just as legal businessmen join the aforementioned groups to advance their interests, members of the Mafia see the crime family as an association that can further their illicit business affairs. Much additional research in cities throughout the United States indicates that rather than a formal organization, the Mafia is characterized by numerous informal associations of individuals who typically form temporary partnerships to perpetrate organized crimes. Criminal Activities Criminal enterprises operated by the Mafia are prodigious and are intertwined with legitimate com-

merce. The legacy of racketeering in business and labor unions involves the systematic restraint of trade and extensive money laundering through legitimate business and financial institutions. Italian American gangsters have preyed on organized labor from the early years of the twentieth century, most notoriously infiltrating the Teamsters Union and the International Longshoreman’s Association. La Cosa Nostra members and associates have looted millions from union health and welfare funds through fraudulent health care plans and phony loans. Modern racketeers and corrupt government officials have infiltrated numerous industrial sectors and overwhelmed the regulatory role of the government, especially in the areas of environmental protection, waste management, construction projects, and the shipment of goods. The racketeer’s reach is limited only by opportunity, as a partial list of industries controlled by organized crime demonstrates: garments, construction, flower shops, funeral parlors, fish markets, master barbers, musicals, live poultry sellers, newsstands, taxi cab drivers, and window cleaners, among others, have all been subjected to Mafia coercion. The breadth of the Mafia’s influence in the legitimate economy is exemplified by construction in New York City, where for many years major projects were subject to a 2 percent “tax” by Mafia families. Industrial racketeering is of course only one segment of the Mafia’s operations in the United States. Prohibition and tight regulation of businesses that cater to human pleasures has created large-scale black markets and thus organized crimes, including gambling services, pornography, prostitution, and the distribution of illicit drugs. La Cosa Nostra groups have generated huge profits through their hidden ownership of legal casinos in Las Vegas and Atlantic City, while numbers gambling and sports betting remain multibillion dollar operations. In conjunction with their bookmaking interests, La Cosa Nostra figures also have a long history of infiltrating and corrupting professional and amateur athletics, including point-shaving scams, fixed horse and dog races, and the control of some professional boxers. The sex trade has always been a major Mafia money-maker. In New York City by the 1930s, Mafia families set up the prostitution industry as a factory system where women were booked in brothels. In

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later years, Cosa Nostra members would develop their own pornography production and distribution companies. Always keen on providing for human pleasures, La Cosa Nostra historically has maintained hidden ownership in nightclubs and is known to be heavily involved in the music and movie industries. Of course, the illicit production and distribution of drugs continues to be a significant enterprise for the American Mafia, especially the heroin trade and the smuggling of cigarettes from low-tax to high-tax states. But perhaps the most common criminal endeavor engaged in by Mafia members is organized theft, especially from trucking, air, water, and freight terminals. In recent years, Mafia families have extended their activities into the realm of so-called whitecollar crimes. In New York City, La Cosa Nostra has infiltrated Wall Street, running up stock prices and extorting money from brokers and traders. Perhaps as many as two dozen brokerage firms are controlled by organized crime. Similarly, at least twenty-two failed savings and loan institutions have been linked to money laundering operations by organized crime figures. How to distribute money stolen from savings and loans was even the subject of sit-downs among some of New York City’s Mafia families. Government and Law Enforcement Efforts Despite the endurance of the American Mafia, the U.S. government has mounted an impressive attack. Robert Kennedy’s Justice Department placed pressure on the corrupt Teamsters Union in the early 1960s, and by the end of that decade legislation provided for judicially approved electronic surveillance and hefty prison terms for those involved in organized crime. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute has been a particularly effective tool, making it a crime to participate in or conduct the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. RICO provided heavy penalties and removed the constraints on prosecutors, allowing them to try in a single case multiple criminal defendants as a group. The threat of lifetime prison terms coupled with a way out provided by the Witness Protection Program eventually broke down La Cosa Nostra’s infamous code of silence (omerta), and by the 1980s dozens of mob

bosses, underbosses, and capos had been convicted. In the famous Commission case, four of five New York City Mafia bosses were convicted. The transnational dimensions of the American Mafia were highlighted in the Pizza Connection case in which an international law enforcement effort dismantled a network of American Cosa Nostra and Sicilian Mafia groups that had been using U.S. pizzerias as fronts for a $1.6 billion heroin and money laundering operation. The U.S. government has also had considerable success in driving organized crime out of the Teamsters through civil RICO suits and in limiting organized crime on the docks by targeting the International Longshoremen’s Association. Prosecutions of Cosa Nostra members have continued throughout the 1990s and into the twenty-first century and have included the conviction of crime bosses Vincent “The Chin” Gigante, John Gotti, and John Gotti Jr. Conclusion Significant law enforcement successes may have weakened the American Mafia, but it is also clear that new criminal groups indigenous to the United States as well as those originating in Europe, Africa, Asia, and South America have filled the vacuum. Moreover, the demise of La Cosa Nostra predicted by many in law enforcement and academia has not occurred. As of this writing, Italian American criminal organizations remain active in many American cities, and all five families from New York City remain intact. References Albini, Joseph. The American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend. New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1971. Block, Alan A. East-Side West-Side: Organizing Crime in New York, 1930–1950. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1983. Fox, Stephen. Blood and Power. New York: William Morrow, 1989. Jacobs, James B., Christopher Panarella, and Jay Worthington. Busting the Mob: U.S. v. Cosa Nostra. New York: New York University Press, 1994. Liddick, Don. An Empirical, Theoretical, and Historical Overview of Organized Crime. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 1999. 17

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Lyman, Michael D., and Gary W. Potter. Organized Crime. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997.

Ethnic Group Involvement in Organized Crime: Historical Perspectives and Emerging Trends Sean Patrick Griffin Much of the academic and popular literature on organized crime—not to mention the news and entertainment media—is preoccupied with Italian American and Sicilian American groups. Indeed, a casual observer may conclude that organized crime in the United States is or has been the exclusive province of those of Italian and Sicilian descent. Such an observation, although understandable given all the attention to such groups, is patently false. What, then, accounts for this state of affairs, and what merits does the claim that non-Italian and nonSicilian groups are recently emerging hold? The discussion of organized crime in academic literature exhibits remarkable variation. One common hypothesis argues that organized crime committed by groups other than Sicilian Americans and Italian Americans is emerging. However, a competing hypothesis argues that many supposedly emerging groups have long been involved in organized crime and that it is the research in this area that is emerging. Emergence of Non-Sicilian and Non-Italian Organized Crime Several authors have adopted this theme, either explicitly or by implication. For instance, John Conklin explicitly states that “in recent years, ethnic and national groups other than Italian-Americans have developed organizations to pursue profits through illegal means.” There is another manner in which this discussion is presented. Often, authors do not address this debate specifically but instead implicitly adopt the emerging group paradigm by omitting any reference to groups other than Sicilian Americans and Italian Americans. This subset of literature casts doubt on the emerging organized crime hypothesis and, either explicitly

or by inference, argues that it is the research on organized crime committed by groups not of Italian or Sicilian origin that is emerging. Concerning the broad concept of emerging organized crime, James Inciardi notes that “historically, discussions of organized crime have focused almost exclusively on . . . groups like the Mafia and La Cosa Nostra,” while “more recent analyses, however, have extended their interest to other criminal groups.” Ronald Berger and colleagues have explicitly and implicitly addressed the notion of supposedly emerging organized crime groups: “It is important to keep in mind that members of organized crime networks in the United States are by no means exclusively of Italian descent, nor were they ever.” Similarly, Larry Gaines and Roger Miller have stated that “thanks in large part to popular culture and the media, organized crime is often associated with the Italian Mafia. Indeed, to many, organized crime and the Mafia are synonymous, and the myth has become more powerful than reality.” They conclude that “in fact, organized crime is an equal opportunity field of criminal activity, with nearly every ethnic group . . . represented.” Importantly, the logic that organized crime is emerging is not only incorrect but is also damaging to criminological study. That is, emphasizing Sicilian/Italian American groups not only ignores the long history of organized crime before Italian immigration but also overlooks the involvement of many other ethnic and racial groups. As Steve Barkan states, “It also diverts attention away from organized crime’s roots in poverty, in the readiness of citizens to pay for the goods and services it provides, and in the willingness of politicians, law enforcement agents, and legitimate businesses to take bribes and otherwise cooperate with organized crime.” There are two related reasons for the competing emerging organized crime paradigms. The first concerns how authors define organized crime, and the second revolves around the utter lack of quality data regarding non-Sicilian/Italian organized crime (although data is lacking for these groups as well). The lack of data directly affects the ability to operationally define organized crime. The Definition of Organized Crime If mere participation in the vices, racketeering, and/or political graft alone is the operational thresh-

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old, there should be no debate about the existence of extra-Sicilian/Italian American organized crime dating back to the 1800s if not before. Conversely, one could adopt a more stringent threshold, such as mandating that groups exhibit division of labor, corruption, or use of violence to maintain networks and thus group continuity. If this latter approach is adopted, the issue regarding whether such ethnic organized crime has a long history is less settled since there are few substantive studies, and perhaps even less data, on the matter. The Relative Lack of Non-Sicilian/Italian American Organized Crime Data One glaring reason regarding the absence of data in this area concerns the government’s absolute preoccupation with Sicilian/Italian American organized crime. The U.S. government has convened a number of panels and committees over the years to address the issue of criminal syndicates and to create related policies. Most notable are the following: Senator Estes Kefauver’s committee (1951), Senator John L. McClellan’s committee (1963), President Lyndon B. Johnson’s task force (1967), the National Advisory Committee’s task force (1976), and, most recently, President Ronald Reagan’s Commission on Organized Crime (1983). The clear preoccupation of these panels has been the so-called National Crime Syndicate and La Cosa Nostra. Although President Reagan’s commission did, somewhat tentatively, expand the boundaries of organized crime beyond Italian Americans, certainly they were the major emphasis. On a state level, the situation is much the same. Pennsylvania’s commissions and task forces, for instance, have also consistently focused on Italian American groups rather than others. As Philip Jenkins and Gary Potter noted in 1987, “The [Pennsylvania Crime Commission] itself has mentioned in passing that black-run numbers banks were dealing in annual sums several times greater than Italian-run organizations. But it is Italian criminality that is discussed at length.” Scholars may have thus confined their studies of organized crime to Sicilian/Italian American groups partly because of the attention being paid them. Furthermore, the government’s focus necessarily af-

fects other components in the criminal justice system, many of which produce the data of criminological studies. For example, law enforcement agencies and prosecutors, of course, adopted the focus on Sicilian/Italian American groups, and thus researchers who used this data exclusively arrived at narrow, and biased, conclusions. Donald Cressey’s Theft of the Nation (1969) is perhaps the embodiment, and certainly among the most significant examples, of the literature promoting this paradigm. He wrote that “an Italian organization in fact controls all but an insignificant proportion of the organized-crime activities in the United States,” and “if one understands Cosa Nostra he understands organized crime in the United States.” Perhaps such conclusions prompted renowned organized crime scholar Frank Bovenkerk to sarcastically note in his 1998 essay that while discussion of Prohibition has centered around smugglers who were Italians, Irish, and Jewish in Chicago and northeastern cities, “thirsty people must also have lived outside these cities; but who was distilling and selling bootleg liquor in the American South and in the rural areas where there were few if any recent immigrants?” Frank Hagan recently stated that “while the last fifty years in the United States have witnessed the period of Sicilian-Italian domination of syndicate crime, this was preceded by Jewish . . . and Irish domination.” He added, “Prior to these groups, WASPS (White Anglo-Saxon Protestants) controlled organized crime. During these periods, many other ethnic groups—for example, Germans, Lebanese, Greeks, blacks—also participated in organized crime.” In sum, non-Italian/Sicilian American groups have existed for generations, although their structure and significance have been the subject of considerable debate. Another problem with the emerging organized crime hypotheses concerns the operational definition of the term “recent.” Authors who loosely state that organized crime among certain ethnic groups has recently emerged leave open a host of possible interpretations. If “recent” refers to activities within the past five or ten years, these characterizations are quite likely flawed. Several authors have documented that a variety of ethnic syndicates, fitting the more restrictive characterization of organized crime, were present in numerous U.S. cities as 19

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early as the 1800s. For example, Jeffrey Scott McIllwain’s historical work on New York City around 1900 found that Chinese organized crime “predates, in structure and sophistication, organizations of other ethnic origins later recognized as ‘modern’ organized crime by academics, the media and the government.” He thus concluded that the common, trendy discussion of Chinese organized crime as emerging is ahistorical. Historical analyses by Sean Patrick Griffin and Robert Lombardo have concluded that much of the current academic literature on African American organized crime in Philadelphia and Chicago is equally unsophisticated and suspect. Thus, as more studies are conducted, the social system accounting for the multifarious phenomenon of organized crime is commonly exhibited. By definition, these studies will conclude that organized crime is, and has been, an equal opportunity employer. References Barkan, Steve E. Criminology: A Sociological Understanding. 2nd ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2001. Berger, Ronald J., Marvin Free, and Patricia Searles. Crime, Justice and Society: Criminology and the Sociological Imagination. New York: McGrawHill, 2001. Bovenkerk, Frank. “Organized Crime and Ethnic Minorities: Is There a Link?” Transnational Organized Crime 4 (1998): 109–126. Conklin, John E. Criminology. 5th ed. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1995. Cressey, Donald R. Theft of the Nation: The Structure and Operation of Organized Crime. New York: Harper and Row, 1969. Gaines, Larry K., and Roger Leroy Miller. Criminal Justice in Action. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003. Griffin, Sean Patrick. Black Brothers, Inc.: The Violent Rise and Fall of Philadelphia’s Black Mafia. Leicester, UK: Milo, 2005. ———. “‘Emerging’ Organized Crime Hypotheses in Criminology Textbooks: The Case of AfricanAmerican Organized Crime.” Journal of Criminal Justice Education 14 (2003): 287–301. Hagan, Frank E. Introduction to Criminology: Theories, Methods, and Criminal Behavior. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2002. Inciardi, James A. Criminal Justice. 7th ed. Orlando: Harcourt Brace, 2002. Jenkins, Philip, and Gary W. Potter. “The Politics and Mythology of Organized Crime: A

Philadelphia Case Study.” Journal of Criminal Justice 15 (1987): 473–484. Kleinknecht, William. The New Ethnic Mobs: The Changing Face of Organized Crime. New York: Free Press, 1996. Lombardo, Robert M. “The Black Mafia: AfricanAmerican Organized Crime in Chicago, 1890– 1960.” Crime, Law and Social Change 38 (2002): 33–65. McIllwain, Jeffrey Scott. Organizing Crime in Chinatown: Race and Racketeering in New York City, 1890–1910. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2004.

The Historical Impact of Organized Crime on American Society Mark Jones The study of organized crime is seldom divorced from the dimensions of ethnicity and politics. Two areas in which organized crime has impacted American society are ethnic stereotyping, especially of Italian Americans, and the ascension of prominent political figures. Ethnic Stereotyping Contrary to a common perception, organized crime did not originate with Prohibition, and it did not originate with Sicilian immigrants. D. J. Kenney and J. O. Finckenauer suggest that the first forays into organized crime in the American colonies originated with colonial pirates who operated off the East Coast and in the Caribbean. The pirates supplied colonists with cheap and tax-free goods and received protection from corrupt politicians in the colonies, especially in the Carolinas and Virginia. Most pirates were of Anglo extraction, but many Americans associate organized crime with Italian Americans or, more specifically, Sicilian Americans. Six historical events contributed to or created this perception. One event was the tremendous influx of immigrants to the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. More than 12 million people entered the United States via New York’s Ellis Island during the early twentieth century alone. Although most of these immigrants were basically law-abiding, others were not, and their criminal lifestyle came with them. Many immigrants came

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from countries where respect for the government and the criminal justice system was nonexistent in economically disadvantaged subcultures. Sicilians came from a small, rural, impoverished Mediterranean island whose capital, Palermo, has been called the most conquered city in history, enduring oppression at the hands of the Romans, the Carthaginians, the Arabs, the Turks, the Spanish, and mainland Italians. Along with Eastern European Jews and the Irish, Sicilians comprised a disproportionate number of organized criminals during the early twentieth century. Of those three groups, Italians made the biggest impact on organized crime. The second event occurred in New Orleans, another major U.S. city. New Orleans experienced problems with small-time organized criminal activity perpetrated by Italian immigrants. In 1890 a dispute between two groups of Italian dockworkers, the Provenzanos and the Matrangas, beset the New Orleans shipping docks. The dispute came to a head in October of that year when David Hennessey, the New Orleans police chief, was shot to death outside his home. Rumor spread that Hennessey’s last words were “the Dagoes did it.” Nineteen Italian immigrants were arrested, and nine were put on trial for Hennessey’s murder. Hennessey was rumored to be in cahoots with one of the groups of dockworkers, but the news media reported that an honest, incorruptible police chief had been murdered by members of a secret society of foreign criminals intent on thwarting his impending arrest of the mobsters. When the trial ended in mistrials and acquittals, New Orleans residents were outraged. A mob stormed the jail that held the Italian prisoners, and the men were publicly lynched. The lynching created a short-term strain in relations between Italy and the United States and, even more importantly, served as the unofficial beginning of associating organized crime activity with Italian Americans. The third event that exacerbated the association between Italians and organized crime was Prohibition. Prohibition, which came into effect with the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1919 and was revoked by the Twentyfirst Amendment of 1933, turned many small-time street gangs and bootleggers into multimillionaire businessmen. Although practically all ethnic groups

Al Capone, the son of Neapolitan emigrants, is America’s most legendary gangster and for many personifies the phenomenon of “organized crime.” (Library of Congress)

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were involved in Prohibition-era bootlegging, the period witnessed the crystallization of Italian association with big-time organized crime activity. Chicago, in particular, suffered the ill effects of violent crime that sprang from competition among bootleggers. The Chicago gangster Al Capone, an Italian American, is still America’s most infamous criminal godfather. From the 1890s through the 1950s, the perception existed that organized crime in the United States was largely the product of an alien conspiracy of Italian immigrants who were determined to undermine the American way of life and government. This Black Hand was supposedly a secret society of Italians that functioned as a shadow government and co-opted politicians and other public officials, possessing power far beyond that of any other criminal organization. The fourth event that cemented this perception occurred in 1957 near a small town in New York. Some Americans scoffed at the idea that organized crime was sophisticated or that it even existed to a great degree at all. However, when police officers in Appalachin happened upon a meeting of fifty-eight Italian American crime bosses from across the country, proponents of the alien conspiracy idea used the Appalachin conference as proof of their point of view. The fifth event involved television, another emerging innovation in America in the early 1950s. During the 1950s when television was in its infancy and often in desperate straits to find entertainment for its audience, organized crime and the U.S. Senate obliged. The Kefauver Committee hearings, broadcast on national television, were great theater. Senator Estes Kefauver, a Democrat from Tennessee, achieved lasting fame as chairman of the Senate Special Committee to Investigate Crime in Interstate Commerce in the early 1950s. Many of the committee hearings, which took place in fourteen cities, were televised, giving Americans their first view of Mafia figures, and the new and novel medium of television served to promote Kefauver’s reputation. He used the notoriety gained from his mobster hearings to launch an unsuccessful vice presidential campaign in 1956, when he and Adlai Stevenson were defeated by Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon. Another U.S. senator, John McClellan of Arkansas, used organized crime and television to promote his

career as well. One notable piece of testimony came in 1963 and featured Joseph Valachi. The McClellan Committee hearings, which were televised intermittently during the 1950s and 1960s, also attracted a large television audience. Valachi’s 1963 testimony about his life as a low-level soldier in the Genovese crime family marked the first time that the operations of the Italian Mafia, or La Cosa Nostra, were laid bare before the American public. Although some of Valachi’s testimony was later discredited, his unrefuted testimony placed an official government imprimatur on the alien conspiracy idea of a secret group of Italian criminals determined to undermine American government and institutions. The sixth event was the publication of Mario Puzo’s 1969 novel The Godfather. The fascination generated by real-life exposés of mafia life paved the way for sensationalized fictional accounts of the mafia. The Godfather, a runaway best-seller, told the saga of an Italian American crime family, headed by a Sicilian immigrant, and reinforced alreadyexisting perceptions and myths about organized crime and Italian Americans. The novel spawned two films in the early 1970s, both of which enjoyed tremendous critical and popular acclaim, and a third film in 1990. More than any other media event, The Godfather created the American perception of organized crime that persists to this day. The Godfather movies left viewers with the idea that mafia figures were men of honor, misunderstood by a hypocritical mainstream society, corrupt politicians, and public officials. Good mafia bosses, like the movies’ lead characters Vito and Michael Corleone, were honest men simply trying to do what was in the best interest of their family, both their immediate family and the extended family—namely, their criminal enterprises—in a society that would provide no alternative to organized crime. The Godfather movies spawned other popular and critically acclaimed books and movies, most notable among them Casino and Goodfellas. It also led to instances of life imitating art. Some organized criminals imitated behaviors from these films. Ascension of Political Figures Fighting organized crime has been a means of attaining prominence for many American politicians at mu-

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The cast of the film The Godfather pose for a family portrait during a wedding scene in a still from the 1972 film, directed by Francis Ford Coppola and based on the novel by Mario Puzo. (Getty Images)

nicipal, state, and national levels. In addition to Kefauver, four other men, more so than any other nationally known politicians, can attribute a great deal of their success to their efforts to combat organized crime, and their names are inextricably linked to the history of organized crime in the United States. They are Thomas Dewey (1902–1971), John F. Kennedy (1917–1963), Robert F. Kennedy (1925–1968), and Rudolph Giuliani (1944–). From 1933 to 1937, Dewey served as U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, which included Manhattan. While a federal prosecutor, he pursued some of New York’s most prominent organized crime figures, including Dutch Shultz and Lepke Buchalter, the latter bearing the ignominious distinction as the only major American organized crime figure to be executed by the government. Dewey used his fame as a federal prosecutor to get

himself elected as the New York County district attorney in 1937 and as governor of New York in 1942 (for three terms). Dewey is primarily remembered as a footnote to one of the most famous political photographs in American history. He was the Republican nominee for President in 1944, when he was handily defeated by Franklin Roosevelt, and again in 1948, when, despite being heavily favored, he was again defeated, this time by Harry Truman. A Chicago newspaper prematurely declared Dewey the winner, and in a Pulitzer Prize-winning photograph, a beaming Truman is shown holding the newspaper with the headline “Dewey Defeats Truman,” sealing Dewey’s place in history as America’s most famous presidential also-ran. Dewey would not have risen to national prominence had it not been for his successful organized crime prosecutions in the 1930s. 23

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John F. Kennedy belonged to the most prominent Irish American family of the twentieth century. His father, Joseph P. Kennedy, became a millionaire through banking and investment ventures, but the elder Kennedy also had ties to gangsters, especially during Prohibition, when he participated in largescale bootlegging. When the younger Kennedy, upon being elected to the U.S. Senate, was asked to serve on Senator John McClellan’s committee investigating organized crime in labor and business, his father reportedly cautioned against his acceptance. Kennedy served on the McClellan Committee, and his work increased his already-considerable fame and aided his successful 1960 presidential bid. Robert F. Kennedy served as chief counsel for the McClellan Committee and, like his older brother, increased his national visibility by taking on corrupt labor leaders and mobsters. When he was appointed attorney general in his brother’s presidential administration, he made organized crime his top priority. For the first time, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, whose mercurial leader J. Edgar Hoover had for decades ignored organized crime, undertook the battle as well. Kennedy’s crusade against organized crime would aid his political career, but it was to prove fateful as well. In the opinion of many, the Kennedy battle against organized crime resulted in the president’s assassination. The assassination of President Kennedy on 22 November 1963 was one of America’s most horrendous crimes of the twentieth century. Despite intense scrutiny, few crimes are as shrouded in mystery or have been subject to as many wild conspiratorial claims. No one was ever convicted of President Kennedy’s murder. The accused assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, was murdered in front of a national television audience while in police custody. Oswald’s killer, Jack Ruby, was widely believed to be a mob hit man charged with silencing Oswald. Except for one showboat trial conducted by a discredited New Orleans prosecutor named Jim Garrison, no one was ever tried for Kennedy’s murder. According to G. R. Blakely and R. N. Billings, two Kennedy assassination researchers, a likely explanation for that trial was that the prosecutor, who himself had mob ties, may have been trying to divert suspicion away from Carlos Marcello, a New

Orleans mob boss with a long-standing rivalry toward the Kennedy brothers. Using organized crime prosecution as a means of political advancement is far from dead. One such example is found in Rudolph Giuliani. Giuliani is known for his work as New York City mayor and especially for his courageous leadership after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The last chapter in his career has not been written. At this writing he is a Republican candidate for the U.S. presidency. Like others mentioned previously, Giuliani owes his rise to prominence in large measure to his work prosecuting mobsters (and white-collar criminals) in the 1980s. Like Dewey several decades earlier, Giuliani served as U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, a hotbed of organized crime activity. One of the first prosecutors to use the federal RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization) statute to its fullest extent, Giuliani, himself an Italian American, is credited, perhaps too much, with bringing the Italian mob in New York City to its knees. The New York City mob still has not recovered from the Giuliani-led prosecutions of the 1980s. Conclusion Neither of the two phenomena discussed here— ethnic stereotyping and using organized crime as a means of political ascent—will fade away. While Italian American mobsters have been joined and in some respects supplanted by other ethnic groups’ forays into organized crime, the traditional Sicilian mob is far from extinct. In the years to come, other ethnic groups will also bear the brunt of ethnic stereotyping as organized criminals. In addition, public officials will continue to use these criminal organizations as a means of advancement. To illustrate, one of Giuliani’s assistant prosecutors, Michael Chertoff, used the political capital gained from his work with Giuliani’s mobster prosecutions to his own political advantage. After his work as prosecutor under Giuliani, Chertoff held a number of positions, including judge for the U.S. Third Circuit Court of Appeals. In 2005 he was nominated by President George W. Bush to serve as secretary of the Department of Homeland Security.

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References Abadinsky, H. Organized Crime. 7th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2002. Albini, J. The American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend. New York: Irvington, 1971. Beschloss, M., ed. American Heritage Illustrated History of the Presidents. New York: Crown, 2000. Blakey, G. R., and R. N. Billings. The Plot to Kill the President: Organized Crime Assassinated J.F.K. New York: Times Books, 1981. Blok, A. The Mafia of a Sicilian Village, 1860–1960: A Study of Violent Peasant Entrepreneurs. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland, 1974. Cressey, D. R. Theft of the Nation: The Structure and Operations of Organized Crime in America. New York: Harper and Row, 1969. Ellis Island Immigration Museum, www.ellisisland .com. Fox, S. R. Blood and Power: Organized Crime in Twentieth Century America. New York: Morrow, 1989. Kenney, D. J., and J. O. Finckenauer. Organized Crime in America. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1994. Maas, P. The Valachi Papers. New York: Putnam, 1968. McCullough, D. Truman. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992. Persico, Joseph E. “Vendetta in New Orleans.” http://www.americanheritage.com/articles/ magazine/ah/1973/4/1973_4_65.shtml. Puzo, Mario. The Godfather. New York: Putnam, 1969.

Film and Television Portrayals of Organized Crime Brian Cogan Since the early days of film, when D. W. Griffith’s The Musketeers of Pig Alley dramatized a brutal gang war, film and, later, television have both popularized and in some ways romanticized organized crime. Films that involve organized crime, which are usually referred to under the genre of gangster film (although there are numerous subgenres, and not all critics use the same terms) have in many ways captured the American imagination. In the American Film Industry’s (AFI) list of the top one hundred films of all time, numerous films about organized

crime are featured in many of the top spots, and some films such as The Godfather DVDs have been perennial best-sellers in terms of sales since their release. Most notably, films such as The Godfather trilogy, the films of Martin Scorsese (particularly Goodfellas and Casino), and other films such as The Untouchables and even Analyze This have proved to be popular with the general public. Also, the recent success of The Sopranos and other programs such as The Wire, WiseGuy, and even the original Untouchables television series all dealt with organized crime in a manner that has held a particular fascination for the general public. To analyze why these versions, some more romanticized than others, have had such enduring popularity, we must first look at the history of organized crime in mass media portrayals such as films and television shows. The enduring popularity of films that deal with organized crime is thought by many to be a uniquely American phenomenon, but there is also a long tradition of films from other countries that deal with organized crime. In particular, there are numerous examples of how the genre developed in Western countries, such as England and France, as well as films that show the Japanese Yakuza and the Hong Kong Triads, which demonstrates that the fascination with media portrayals of organized crime is a worldwide phenomenon. Origin of Organized Crime Films The first gangster film is considered by many to be D. W. Griffith’s The Musketeers of Pig Alley, a silent film from 1914 that involves the unwitting involvement of a musician and his wife in a large-scale gang war. The film ends with the musician and his wife aiding in the escape of the lead gangster from the police, demonstrating that even at the start of films about organized crime, there was also a tendency to romanticize the gangster as a tragic hero. Although numerous other films about organized crime were made during Hollywood’s early years, the Hays Code (a precursor to the current MPAA ratings system) was adopted in 1930 in order to lessen the glamorization of sex and violence and ensure that criminals had to be punished at the end of the film. (Although many gangster films were allowed more liberties than other films, they also had to dramatically scale 25

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back the level of violence after the introduction of the Hays Code.) Even 1931’s Little Caesar, a film loosely based on the rise of Al Capone and starring Edward G. Robinson as the doomed Rico Bandello, shows a remarkable sympathy to the main character and his meteoric rise and eventual downfall and can almost be interpreted not as an allegory that crime does not pay but that Bandello was not tough enough to lead the gangs of Chicago. The gangster film, as noted by film historian Bernard Dick, was a way in which the American public could look to gangsters as heroes, symbolically doing what the powerless and poverty-stricken American public could not. As Dick noted, gangsters “achieved an emancipation that moviegoers might envy, but could never experience because the price was too high.” Numerous actors such as Robinson, Humphrey Bogart, George Raft, and James Cagney became associated with the genre. While most of the American films about organized crime romanticized the gangster figure, they were also bound by the restrictions of the Hays Code to demonstrate that crime did not pay. In this way, the life and presumed freedom of the members of a gang could be celebrated for the first two reels, until the eventual triumph of the police and the death or capture of the lead gangster and the dissolution of his enterprise. This was more or less the case until the restrictions of the code were largely lifted in the 1950s and 1960s and a new wave of films, more realistic and more modernistic, reinvented the genre of the organized crime film. The Modern American Organized Crime Film from The Godfather to the Present The father of the modern American organized crime film and the template for most media representations of organized crime are the first two Godfather films (the third is generally considered inferior by most critics and writers on organized crime films) by director Francis Ford Coppola. The Godfather films were homages to the traditional romanticized idea of the noble gangster as a man of honor, acting outside the law, but with an exemplary devotion to both the biological family as well as the crime family that he runs with a firm but fair hand and were also a way of criticizing exactly what it was supposedly celebrating. The modern organized crime film (and

television shows, especially in the case of The Sopranos) also relies heavily on a sense of nostalgia for a time long past, when gangsters operated with a distinct set of ethics and a moral code. But as films such as The Godfather make clear, this sense of nostalgia was for an imaginary time, one that never really existed. As film historian James Cawleti has noted, this use of nostalgia was used “as a means of demythologization.” The Godfather films did not evoke the past merely to be nostalgic. Rather, the films sought to demolish the traditional notion of the glamorous and larger-than-life gangster figure. The first film in the series, The Godfather (1972), involved the larger-than-life Shakespearian characters of the Corleone crime family, represented by the Don, Vito Corleone (Marlon Brando), and his sons, most notably Michael (Al Pacino), who was supposed to be the one member of the family insulated from the grim necessities of the Mafia lifestyle. In the course of the film, Michael is corrupted and joins the crime family to avenge the shooting of his father. And although the film romanticized the role of the noble gangster, it also served as an indication that the life of a criminal was not necessarily one of honor and rigorous codes but rather one of revenge and petty murders done sheerly out of necessity. The second Godfather film further demonstrated the parallels made between regular business and organized crime, if only to indicate that both are inherently corrupt and eventually lead to the destruction of the soul. The Godfather films were also ripe with religious imagery as well as gruesome depictions of violence, and both of these themes were later adapted by Martin Scorsese, the foremost American filmmaker in the organized crime genre. The films of Scorsese that deal with organized crime, including Mean Streets (1973), Goodfellas (1990), and Casino (1995)—all of them featuring frequent Scorsese star Robert DeNiro—also demystify the nature of organized crime. In Mean Streets, Scorsese’s earliest major film on the subject, the criminals involved are mostly petty, damaged street thugs who work together out of necessity but are doomed to failure as their plans outstrip their ambitions. As in The Godfather and in early gangster films, the characters are doomed because of their actions and their involvement in crime, and inevitable failure is all but

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assured from the start of the film. While Scorsese films have always involved a strong sense of the symbolic and heavily feature religion, crime is simply a way of life, and the characters have no other choice. As Ian Christie and David Thompson note, Scorsese himself admits that he was “trying to make a sort of homage to the Warner Brothers gangster films.” In his later and better-known organized crime films, Goodfellas and Casino, the characters (such as Henry Hill as played by Ray Liotta in Goodfellas and Joe Pesci in both films) are minor players in a major enterprise. The world they inhabit has a certain logic in terms of moral codes, but it also is a world where violence follows no apparent logic and where anyone not part of the inner circle can die at any time because of provocations real or imagined. The dichotomy of the good earner, the epitome of a good person who kicks up their tribute to the boss, is also contrasted with the cowboy (such as the character of Tommy, as played by Pesci in Goodfellas) who will be tolerated while useful. The characters in Casino and Goodfellas do not live in a world of codes and underground ethics but instead live in a cavalier world in which death can come quickly and without warning. The business, which comes first and foremost, does not rely on personal achievement but rather is a highly organized hierarchy in which proper respect must be paid and money must be kicked up the corporate ladder to the big boss. This type of organized crime portrayal can also be seen in numerous other films, such as Oliver Stone’s Scarface (1983) that glamorized the violent cocaine-addled Tony Montana, who dies violently in a hail of bullets. Scarface has become a favorite of numerous rappers, who use the images and iconography of the film in order to show their perceived realness and authenticity as real gangsters. (Despite the fact that many of them have never been involved in gang activity or organized crime on any level, the mythology is powerful.) Numerous modern organized crime films are also inspired by the work of Scorsese and Coppola. Films such as New Jack City (1991), which deals with the innercity crack trade and how larger gangs soon organized the drug trade into a corporate-like enterprise, and the works of Quentin Tarantino portray a violent but glamorized version of organized crime, where

wealth can be acquired quickly through violent assaults or the drug trade and where a violent death is considered the normal and inevitable conclusion to the life. Other recent films such as Spike Lee’s Clockers (1995) and Antoine Fuqua’s acclaimed Training Day (2001) show a shadowy world where corrupt policemen such as Alonzo Harris (portrayed by Denzel Washington in his Oscar-winning role) form uneasy alliances with local gang-bangers while trying to stave off the vicious Russian mobs who are trying to control the drug trade. Organized Crime in Foreign Films America certainly is not the only country to have glamorized the activities of organized crime. Numerous British films such as Layer Cake (1994), Sexy Beast (2000), and (albeit by an American director, Steven Soderbergh) The Limey (1999) have glamorized the tough-as-nails British gangster. Modern British organized crime films are largely gloomy affairs where betrayal is common and the easiest way in which to climb the rungs of power is through well-thought-out ultraviolent acts. Modern British films about organized crime follow some aspects of the traditional template but locate the modern British organized criminal in a world where wealth, power, and violence are associated with a total lack of conventional morality. French gangster films also have a unique take on the existentialist gangster, doomed to smoke endless cigarettes while watching his perfect plan untangle. In such films as Touchez pas Au Grisbi (Hands Off the Loot) (1954), Le Samuorai (1967), Du Riffifi Chez les Hommes (1955), and Bob le Flambeur (1955), a sense of nostalgia exists, as it is clearly inevitable that the criminal will be caught and his organization dismantled no matter how carefully planned and well-thought-out his crimes are. As Robin Buss noted in his book on film noir in French organized crime dramas, “men . . . confront questions of freedom, loyalty, courage, escape, money, desire and the ironies of fate.” French organized crime films usually do not involve large numbers of gangsters but instead portray smaller and more mobile groups engaged in usually nonviolent enterprises that inevitably end in murder and eventually the downfall and demise of the group. In particular, 27

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the films of Jean-Pierre Melville such as Le Samouri and Le Cercle Rouge (1970) demonstrate a distinct sense of fatalism, not because crime does not pay but because fate is unrelenting and all men are doomed to failure. Two reoccurring Asian genres involve the unique nature of organized crime in Japanese and Chinese culture in the films that chronicle the adventures of the Japanese Yakuza and the Chinese Triads. These films have many similarities with American organized crime films but with a slightly different emphasis. The Yakuza films, such as the films of Fukasaku Kinji, early on dealt with highly stylized samurai-era gangs, the precursors of the modern Yakuza gangs today. These films that enjoyed their greatest popularity during 1963–1973 embodied, according to Japanese film historian Donald Richie, the concept of “giri-ninjo” or the “sacrifice of individuality for the sake of the group” and virtues such as “loyalty, dedication and subservience.” The traditional older Yakuza films featured heroes more concerned with honor than personal gain. As a new Japanese audience started to seek more sophisticated fare, new modern Yakuza films began to rise in popularity, as epitomized in the films of modern Japanese Renaissance man and writer/director/actor “Beat” Takeshi Kitano, who revolutionized the modern Yakuza film into a vibrant genre in which cool killers ruthlessly deal with rival gangs in films such as Hana-Bi (Fireworks) (1997) and Sonatine (1993). Hong Kong–made films about the Triads are usually concerned with questions of honor and a perceived nostalgia for a lost time when the codes of the Triads were followed more faithfully. According to author Bey Logan, the Triads were not always criminal organizations but rather were “originally from the Hung Societies which developed to oppose the Ching rulers of ancient China,” and “today gambling, extortion and drugs have taken the place of more patriotic concerns.” There have been numerous Triad films made, mostly from the Hong Kong region, and the Triads are usually represented by a benevolent older boss and a younger power-hungry boss eager to modernize the gang into the contemporary pursuits of organized crime. There are numerous examples of this, such as The Incorruptible, the Hong Kong version of the Untouchables set in 1950s with popular stars Ray

Lui, Carrie Ng, and Simon Lam. The best-known filmmaker who has done many Triad-based films is the acclaimed John Woo, who now mostly makes films in Hollywood. Woo’s early Hong Kong films such as the two-part A Better Tomorrow (1986 and 1988) as well as his masterpieces The Killer (1989) and Hard Boiled (1992) feature conflicted and honorable contract killers working for gang leaders who do not appreciate their seemingly old-fashioned devotion to honor and loyalty. The main themes of these films romanticize the gangster, as in American films, but also reinforce the Asian sense of mutual dependency and loyalty. The Yakuza films and the Triad films were, and are, very similar in common themes of loyalty and interdependence. Even if it is sometimes unclear exactly which illegal organized crime activities the Triads and Yakuza are engaging in, the overall message is essentially the same. As Italy has also been the home of the original Sicilian Mafia, there have been numerous Italian films made about the Mafia. However, in postwar Italy the influence of the Mafia was so strong that even a director as respected as Lucino Visconti was not able to successfully fund an ambitious trilogy of movies about the Italian gangs because of intimidation from politicians with ties to organized crime. Later, due to popular outcry, the pressure eased, and many films were made demonstrating the hold that the Sicilian Mafia had on certain parts of the country, most notably Fransesco Rosi’s Salvatore Giuliano (1961) and Il CaseoMattei (1972). The Representation of Organized Crime on Television While there have been representations of organized crime on television almost since its inception, the genre has evolved over the years. While early shows such as The Untouchables dealt with fairly straightforward representations of good versus evil, where virtuous treasury agents pursued the brutal gangsters led by Capone, modern television representations are more nuanced. Praised by critics for its dramatic quality as well as its fairly detailed and well-researched portrayal of the modern Mafia, The Sopranos is different in the way in which it revolves around the concept of omerta, or the oath that Mafia members take never to reveal secrets to outsiders.

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Official credentials of U.S. Treasury agent Eliot Ness (1903–1957). Ness authored The Untouchables, an autobiographical novel which inspired a television show and a 1987 film of the same name. (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms)

As the main character, the fairly sympathetic but occasionally murderous Tony Soprano, spends much of every episode revealing secrets to one degree or another to his psychiatrist, Dr. Melfi, it is clear that the show is both a more emotionally nuanced take on the modern organized crime member than in the past and a social commentary on the loss of mythical traditions involving the romanticization of the virtuous criminal. Many critics have praised The Sopranos for its unflinching realism, and psychologist Glen Gabbard likens the program to holding a mirror “up to human nature.” The enormous popularity of The Sopranos is due in part to its portrayal of gangster characters—engaged in clearly illegal activities such as gambling, prostitution, protection rackets, and sometimes larceny and murder—as normal humans with human problems.

culture but who also has a sense of loyalty, honor, and hierarchy that is notably lacking in organized crime in the real world.

Summary Organized crime has been represented in film and television since the inception of each medium, and although the portrayal is different in degree from culture to culture, overall the representation has portrayed the character of the gangster as a romantic figure who belongs to an organization with parallels to contemporary government and corporate

References Buss, Robin. French Film Noir. London: Marion Boyars, 2001. Cawelti, John G. “Chinatown and Generic Transformation in Recent American Films.” Pp. 559–579 in Film Theory and Criticism, 2nd ed., edited by Marshall Cohen and Gerald Mast. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979. Christie, Ian, and David Thompson, eds. Scorsese on Scorsese. London: Faber and Faber, 1989. Dick, Bernard. Anatomy of Film. New York: Bedford-St. Martin’s, 2002. Gabbard, Glen. The Psychology of the Sopranos: Love, Desire and Betrayal in America’s Favorite Gangster Family. New York: Basic Books, 2002. Hammond, Stefan, and Wilkins, Mike. Sex and Zen and a Bullet in the Head. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996. Logan, Bey. Hong Kong Action Cinema. New York: Overlook Press, 1995. Mes, Tom, and Jasper Sharp. The Midnight Eye Guide to New Japanese Film. Berkeley: Stone Bridge, 2005. Richie, Donald. A Hundred Years of Japanese Film. Tokyo: Kodansha, 2005. 29

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B. Organized Crime: Definitions, Theories, Concepts, Structure, and Function

The Activities of Transnational Organized Crime Nathan Moran The Activities of International Organized Crime: A Taxonomy of Crime Of all the crimes perpetrated by international crime organizations, seven are of current interest in the literature: drug trafficking, arms trafficking, smuggling of weapons of mass destruction, trafficking in persons and human body parts, money laundering, computer crime, and infiltration into legal businesses. Drug Trafficking Estimates are that trafficking in narcotics is a $500 billion a year business that has doubled in size since 1987. The connection between international organized crime and drug trafficking is clear. According to Gerhard Mueller, “The illicit traffic in narcotic drugs is entirely controlled by organized crime networks, loosely related with each other geographically, as well as at the various levels of production and marketing, and by type of narcotics. . . . No other form of international and organized crime is as costly in terms of human and national financial suffering as the illicit trade in narcotic drugs.” The Colombian cartels are some of the wealthiest international organizations in existence. The Andes drug organizations in Bolivia and Peru act as subcontractors to the Colombian cartels. They perform the first stages in the drug manufacturing process of refining the raw coca into a cocaine paste or base. The Colombians then provide the

transportation to move the products to the final processing labs, bringing with them large sums of cash to pay for the raw narcotics. According to R. Godson and W. J. Olson, “until recently the Colombians generally did not involve themselves directly in these regional efforts, but with increased law enforcement successes, particularly in Bolivia, that have rolled up whole local organizations, the Colombians have begun to take more control.” To move cocaine to the United States, the Colombians have established vast networks with Mexican cartels, which represent only arrangements of convenience. Indeed, according to Godson and Olson, the Colombians reportedly complain of incompetence on behalf of the Mexicans, “but they need the Mexicans to run the network of local landing strips, safe houses, and logisticalsupport systems—including the network of corrupt officials that the Mexican organizations had developed over the years—necessary to sustain huge long-range drug-trafficking operations.” Similarly, as the Colombians develop ties with the Mexicans, they are also developing ties with the Sicilian Mafia and other organized crime and international crime groups in Europe. They are also establishing contacts in Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States to launder money. The Colombians are colluding with Asian (primarily Chinese) heroin traffickers, occasionally exchanging heroin for cocaine, and are studying the potential to grow poppies in the Andes Mountains, studies that have relied largely on the importation of technicians and agricultural experts from Asia.

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The major heroin trafficking networks of Asia, such as the Golden Triangle, both have and are establishing ties with Nigerian groups for assistance in the international trafficking of heroin. The Nigerians are essentially contracted out as mules to smuggle heroin into the United States in their stomachs and intestines by swallowing condoms filled with the drug. These mules are recruited and trained by Nigerian contractors who operate under a three-cornered network. First, the mules travel from Nigeria to Thailand with money on their persons. The mules then exchange the money for heroin in Thailand. Finally, travel arrangements are made for them to enter the United States and Europe with the drugs in their stomachs, intestines, or body cavities. Recently, U.S. law enforcement has become attuned to fighting this type of smuggling via long detentions and x-rays of suspected smugglers, which has led to variations in the three-cornered smuggling scheme. The Nigerians now travel to many different countries, often with forged or stolen identities and passports, prior to entering their port of choice. This leads to more difficult detection and a clouded travel log, which in turn makes it more difficult for inspection personnel to justify the searches on the basis of countries recently visited. The main drug markets include opium, heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine. The groups that are involved in the trafficking of each of these drugs differ. Opium and heroin are primarily being produced and transported by Asian international crime groups. Those drugs are also being cultivated in Colombia, Venezuela, Vietnam, and post-Soviet Central Asia but on a smaller scale. T. Farer asserts that Colombia now supplies most of the heroin to the United States. Cocaine is produced and shipped primarily by Latin American drug cartels. Methamphetamine is produced and transported by more nontraditional organized crime groups such as outlaw motorcycle clubs. Rising producers and shippers of methamphetamine include groups in North Korea, Poland, China, Russia, Azerbaijan, Mexico, and the Baltic States. There are various methods for controlling the international drug markets, such as the laws and rules promulgated by the Single Convention on Nar-

cotic Drugs (1961), the Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971), and the United Nations (UN) Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988). However, there are severe shortcomings to this theoretical web of international drug smuggling: 1. Underfunding of the specified programs, such as the UN International Drug Programme. 2. Underfunding at the local, regional, and national levels. 3. The emphasis on fighting drug trafficking differs greatly from one country to the next. 4. High levels of corruption in countries that produce and export most of the illegal drugs. 5. The serious issue that developing and nascent democracies lack the legal infrastructure to implement effective programs.

Arms Trafficking Trafficking in arms is related to the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Weapons trafficking is heavily influenced by international crime organizations. According to J. Martin and A. Romano, this activity requires “the clandestine cooperation of various organizations, both public and private, on an international level” and is characterized well in Peter Maas’s 1986 book Manhunt. According to A. Sampson, trading in arms dates back to the time of the Crusades (1095–1254). This trade did not become global, however, until the mid-nineteenth century, or shortly after the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. Since the 1960s, arms sales on the global level have increased exponentially and are principally driven by political movements such as terrorism. Also since the 1960s, China’s various organized crime groups, mainly the Triads, have emerged as one of the Big Four nations for trafficking weapons, behind Russia, the United States, and France in terms of sales. J. H. Cushman has reported the value of arms sales with developing nations at $30 billion, with the United States agreeing to sell $5.6 billion worth of arms each year. Commenting on China’s role in this illicit trade, Martin and Romano have noted that a 1989 special report of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration tracks the illegal trafficking of 31

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Chinese-made AK-47s to gun dealers in California, who in turn were selling the guns to drug traffickers in Colombia and Mexico. The report further notes that drugs were occasionally used rather than cash to pay the smugglers for the weapons. According to Martin and Romano, “This case illustrates one type of cooperative relationship between private arms-traffickers and drug-traffickers. The former supply the latter with illegal arms; the latter pay for the arms with illegal drugs, and presumably the arms-traffickers then sell the drugs for cash with a suitable markup in the value of the drugs involved.” Industrial nations such as the United States have long engaged in both legal and illegal arms transfers to their allies. Such nation-states have also engaged in covert actions with other countries, ranging from propaganda campaigns to paramilitary operations against other governments. The most publicized of all nation-state weapons transfers was the Iran-Contra affair. The exposure of these weapons sales and transfers began with a single shooting on 5 October 1986, when a C-123 American cargo plane was flying ammunition into Nicaragua in support of the Contra rebels against the government of Nicaragua and was shot down. An American ex-Marine parachuted from the plane shortly before the crash and was immediately apprehended by the Nicaraguan military. The exMarine was put on trial, found guilty, and sentenced to thirty years in prison. Shortly thereafter it was publicly revealed that President Ronald Reagan was attempting to free the hostages in Iran by selling weapons to that country and simultaneously selling weapons to the Contra forces in Nicaragua even though Congress had prohibited the supply of weapons to the country. In the ensuing investigation, the only person convicted of illegal weapons transactions was the ex-Marine crew member of the downed C-123 cargo plane, and that was in a Nicaraguan court. Smuggling of Weapons of Mass Destruction The great number of armed conflicts around the world would not be possible without the concerted effort by organized crime groups to network with producers and suppliers in the trafficking of

weapons. The most dangerous of all weapons transactions are in the form of WMDs, which include chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. According to G. O. W. Mueller, “It is now clear that since 1992, on at least five occasions, several relatively small quantities of nuclear material, including pure plutonium, have been diverted from nuclear facilities in former Soviet republics and offered for sale in Germany and other countries west of Russia.” Mueller further asserts that this is a sign that controls in the region are inadequate to ensure that no fissile material becomes available for the international black market. The evidence suggests that known nuclear smuggling is being perpetrated by small groups of individuals rather than large international organizations. The motives of these individuals are usually for individual gain in the criminal underworld. The greatest danger is, of course, that these weapons are sold to the highest bidder, with that person or group being of terrorist ideology. Most of the known fissile material smuggling cases to date were the result of sting operations, with the material never being delivered to a viable buyer. In many of these cases, however, the public has been exposed to radiation. The bulk of the activity in the trafficking of nuclear and fissile material is taking place in Russia, where there is an extreme lack of government controls. Russia currently has more than 10,000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and 700 tons of fissile uranium and plutonium stored outside of delivery systems (e.g., missiles, suitcase nukes, etc.). According to R. W. Lee, Russia “has about the same GNP as the Netherlands with ten times the population.” The faltering government of Russia and the past communist dictatorships have left a power vacuum, which can hinder Russia’s ability to control its WMDs. Lee asserts that an example of Russia’s ability to control its nuclear arsenal is seen in the “soaring illegal traffic in radioactive isotopes and other nuclear material that originates principally in nuclear complexes in former Soviet states.” The possibility that completed nuclear weapons are available on the black market should not be ignored. This possibility is due in large measure to the current state of decay in the Russian nuclear

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The French navy frigate FS Commandant Ducuing (right) prepares to board a British ship as part of visit, board, search, and seizure training in the Persian Gulf on October 30, 2006, as part of exercise Leading Edge 2007, a multi-nation security initiative to stop the trafficking of WMDs. (Department of Defense)

establishment, which can be attributed to the privatization of the Russian nuclear complex and has resulted in wide-scale corruption, insider threats, and criminal conspiracies. The active trafficking in fissile material on a global scale would, no doubt, require the collaboration between nuclear plant managers, corrupt government officials, and international crime groups. Thus, although there is evidence that only small groups are trafficking in fissile material, there is also logical evidence that this cannot be the case in all circumstances. Trafficking in Persons and Human Body Parts Humans have been trafficked as far back as recorded history. The original use of the term “slave trade” includes the white slave trade, or women being transported for the purpose of forced prostitution. The Mann Act of 1910 was one of the earliest laws promulgated for the sole purpose of preventing the trafficking of women for prostitution.

There are several areas of trafficking in persons that are on the rise: 1. The transport of illegal immigrants with resulting involuntary servitude. 2. The transport of women for the purposes of prostitution. 3. The transport of household workers. 4. The transport of children for the purpose of illegal adoption.

Ko-Lin Chin asserts that international crime organizations, and Chinese organizations in particular, conduct much of the illegal transportation in persons. The people being trafficked illegally today are those who have few skills and no political clout, and they are forming a new class of illegal aliens in the United States. Their movement into the United States and other countries, however, has not proven to be problematic for law enforcement, given the lax enforcement standards. 33

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Mueller asserts that “a number of States have dealt unsuccessfully with the influx of illegal immigrants, turning them from an economic liability to an asset, with little if any impact on the crime rate.” Thus, although there is a plethora of local, national, and international laws in place to prevent the trafficking of persons, the enforcement of these laws has been shown to be relatively lax. The demand for various body parts is much greater than the number of body parts available for transplant. The number of donors in the United States is estimated at 12,000, with 35,000 people currently on waiting lists. According to C. Moors, there is evidence of illicit organ transplanting occurring in the United States, Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Turkey, India, England, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, China, and South Africa. The seriousness of this elusive and relatively unresearched phenomenon is highlighted by the fact that several commissions have been created to investigate the illicit trade in human body parts on the international level. Some of these commissions have passed regulations of various sorts, but the enforcement of these regulations is questionable. Sea Piracy Although sea piracy still receives little empirical attention, it is resurfacing as an increasingly sophisticated activity perpetrated by organized criminals. An example of this activity is occurring with the drug cartels of Latin America that, in the past, relied heavily on confiscated vessels, but only after their passengers and crews were killed. According to Mueller, “Several thousand vessels were victimized. As the drug trade became prosperous, it could rely on purchased or (illegally) chartered vessels.” Shipping companies today contract out private security forces or mercenaries for their vessels traveling in pirate waters. According to Mueller, although this is a worldwide phenomenon, the “appearance of piracy in so many parts of the world cannot be attributed to a single organization; it remains a criminological challenge. Obviously, the pirates of the various affected maritime sites do operate as criminal gangs.”

Money Laundering Money laundering is the act of making illicit funds appear to be legitimate sources of revenue. The following is a story from S. Einstein and M. Amir of how and why money laundering is a common practice in the operational reality of international crime organizations: Consider that, in a little village, a poor householder has been struggling for years to patch his roof and feed his cow. All of a sudden, he orders the roofer to put a new roof on his cottage. He also buys a car and sends his kids to summer camp. The villagers ask the question: “Where does the sudden wealth come from?” And so it is nationally and internationally, but the villagers’ curiosity is augmented by laws requiring the divulgence of bank deposits of $10,000.00 or more, and by many other legislative devices. Consider now that a considerable part of the financial gain of the world’s citizens is ill-gotten, for example by bribery, corruption, black market activities and transactions outside the tax laws, and especially by dealing in contraband—weapons, stolen goods, art and cultural heritage, and particularly drugs.

This same concept can be applied to the massive global drug markets. Drug cartels are making hundreds of billions of dollars annually. How can these groups possibly show all of this money to be legitimate revenue? There are many methods and schemes for laundering money. Three of the most famous are bogus real estate investments, purchases of bars of “gold” that are actually painted bars of lead, and real and fictitious sales of art. What each of these methods has in common is an investment that appears to be legitimate. This appearance of a legitimate investment is what accounts for the large amount of money that is made. It is as though these groups simply make wise investments on an ongoing basis. Probably the most widely used method of money laundering is the transfer of money out of the country in which the money was made (by air, sea, land, or the Internet). This cash is then deposited abroad. Next there are a series of international money transfers until it is virtually impossible to track the trail of money. There is a great deal of disagreement between scholars as to the true extent of

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money laundering. What is generally agreed upon is that money laundering activities have an effect on the international economy, the ramifications of which were discussed earlier.

Cushman, J. H. “U.S. Study Sees China As a Top Arms Dealer.” New York Times, 12 May 1988. Einstein, S., and M. Amir. Organized Crime: Uncertainties and Dilemmas. Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice, 1999. Farer, T., ed. Transnational Crime in the Americas. New York: Routledge, 1999. Godson, R., and W. J. Olson. International Organized Crime. Washington, DC: Society, 1995. Hess, D., K. Meyers, M. Gideon, S. Gomez, and J. Daly. “Italian Organized Crime and Money Laundering.” Pp. 345–406 in Organized Crime: Uncertainties and Dilemmas, edited by S. Einstein and M. Amir. Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice, 1999. Jamieson, A. “Transnational Italian Organized Crime.” Transnational Organized Crime 1(2) (1996): 151–165. Lee, R. W., III. “Transnational Organized Crime: An Overview.” Pp. 1–38 in Transnational Crime in the Americas, edited by T. Farer. New York: Routledge, 1999. Martin, J. M., and A. T. Romano. Multinational Crime: Terrorism, Espionage, Drug and Arms Trafficking. London: Sage Publications, 1992. Moors, C. “Body Brokers in Organ Trafficking.” Crime and Justice International: Worldwide News and Trends 15(52) (2001): 5–6, 22–25. Mueller, G. O. W. “Transnational Crime: An Experience in Uncertainties.” Pp. 3–18 in Organized Crime: Uncertainties and Dilemmas, edited by S. Einstein and M. Amir. Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice, 1999. Sampson, A. The Arms Bazaar: From Lebanon to Lockheed. New York: Viking, 1977.

Computer Crime One of the prerequisites for laundering money is the use (or abuse) of computer technology. Computers are used widely by both legitimate and illegitimate markets and are just as accessible to crime organizations as they are to the legitimate world. Although the common perception is that organized crime groups operate via word of mouth and the telephone, computers greatly enhance the ability of international crime groups to communicate worldwide via encrypted technologies and nonencrypted communications. G. Mueller estimated in 1995 that the amount of money lost via illicit computer transactions was up to $8 billion annually, with Australia alone losing an estimated $700 million annually. Although this estimate is dated, the amount of money lost annually to illicit computer transactions can only increase as the Internet becomes more available to the world’s population. Infiltration into Legal Businesses This is the last activity addressed in the taxonomy of organized crime activity because it is the foundation of a highly complex international crime organization. When an organized crime group infiltrates legitimate businesses and economies, it moves from being a purely illicit organization to appearing to be a legitimate organization, which often occurs when organized crime groups utilize front companies. Although there is no evidence, either quantitatively or qualitatively, as to the severity of this infiltration, the amount of money being made in the illicit drug markets ($500 billion annually) is a sign that there most certainly is money to be invested in legitimate businesses and economies. References Abadinsky, H. Organized Crime. 7th ed. New York: Nelson-Hall, 2002. Chin, Ko-Lin. Chinese Subculture and Criminality: Non-traditional Crime Groups in America. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1990.

Causation Theories and Concepts of Organized Criminal Behavior Vincenzo Ruggiero If we accept a common distinction, we can identify three types of organized crime: predatory, parasitic, and symbiotic. Causation theories, inevitably, will vary according to the type under consideration. Organized crime that is mainly predatory in character might be explained through causation theories revolving around notions of strain, subculture, or relative deprivation. Even when the purely predatory element evolves into some form of illicit business, such as the distribution of prohibited goods and services, such theories may still claim a degree 35

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of validity. See, for example, R. Merton’s formulation, whereby individuals and groups who share institutionally acceptable goals (money and success) but do not posses the legitimate means to pursue them will resort to illegitimate means as a form of deviant adaptation. In this way, they innovate, or reinvent, the possible manners to achieve wealth and reputation. When applying this formula to Al Capone, Merton describes the notorious gangster as an example of the triumph of amorality over morally prescribed failure. In its parasitic form, organized crime is equated to a mere service-providing organization. Among the goods provided, trust and protection are singled out as paramount. These, which should be supplied by the state, may under certain circumstances become the preserve of private, if unlawful, entrepreneurs. Organized crime, in this perspective, is an industry for the supply of private protection and the distribution of trust to economic actors who would otherwise be unable to interact safely. Organized crime, in brief, is regarded as a counterpower replacing the authority gap left by an ineffective state. Finally, when faced with symbiotic forms of organized crime, namely with criminal entrepreneurs gaining access to the legitimate economy and the official political arena, causation theories may experience serious difficulties. Eclecticism in such cases may prevail because this type of organized crime may be explained through a combination of subculture, differential association, strain, and, as stressed above, the inadequacy of the state or the lack of a proper entrepreneurial culture. But let us now summarize, in more general terms, the contribution of criminological theory to the analysis of organized crime. An Overview of Etiology When early positivist criminologists discussed organized crime, the emphasis was placed on tradition, which supposedly plays a crucial role in its perpetuation. As Cesare Lombroso argued, “It seems to me that the high persistence of some wicked associations such as the Mafia, the Camorra and brigandage depends first of all on their longterm existence, in that the continuous repetition of

Cesare Lombroso (1835–1909), Italian criminologist and founder of the Italian School of Positivist Criminology. (Library of Congress)

our acts transforms these acts into a custom and therefore into a norm.” Lombroso’s argument sounds very familiar, as it echoes some contemporary analysis that explains the persistence of organized crime by resorting to variables such as backwardness or archaism. Other comments made by Lombroso on the subject matter sound even more familiar: for example, that the perpetuation of organized crime is also due to the lack of stigma attached to the very concept of mafioso. The author notes that the mafiosi are not regarded as individuals belonging to a distant and censurable social universe: in the local popular culture “they are not associated with immorality, nor do they elicit contempt.” Moreover, it is noteworthy that Lombroso, when trying to explain the extraordinary longevity of organized crime in Italy, indicates a strong causality in what he terms the “inadequate governments, which do not rule according to justice, and in a sense make it necessary and useful that people exercise and implement their own justice.” Here, we are in the domain of some theories mentioned above, according to

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which organized crime thrives where the state is absent or is characterized by an authority deficit. Related to these are control theories, which posit that deviant acts are the result of weak individual bonds to society. This causation, however, would imply that organized crime is unable to establish any meaningful relationship with the official society. On the contrary, Merton’s deviant adaptations of the innovative type, as we have seen, suggest that organized criminals are far from displaying weak bonds to the official world, as they share societal values and goals despite pursuing them through illicit means. The dominant culture, Merton argues, makes incompatible demands on those who occupy the lower strata in society: “On the one hand, they are asked to orient their conduct toward the prospect of large wealth, and on the other, they are largely denied effective opportunities to do so institutionally.” Chicago School theorists formulate the notion of social disorganization, which crucially attributes the emergence of organized crime to the decline of informal social control on the one hand and the emergence of homogenous social and cultural enclaves on the other. According to this theory, the degree of organization of illegal structures (be they youth gangs, groups of pimps, gambling syndicates, or others) is dependent on the degree of disorganization of society. In other words, their organization is a function of the distance separating them from other social groups. Sociological studies conducted in Chicago’s delinquent areas unveiled microsocieties of immigrants that were perfectly organized. Deviance, in this perspective, endorses a surrogate social order, a vicarious system that is nevertheless a social system in its own right. In this system, it is perfectly logical that a gangster is not met with disapproval. He is a product of his surroundings in the same way in which good citizens are the product of their environment. Therefore, the problem is not the lack of organization within those particular microsocieties but rather the lack of meaningful communication between these enclaves and society as a whole. Finally, among the analyses offered by sociocriminological literature, subcultural theories should be mentioned. Derived from Merton’s

structural anomic theories and in debt to Edwin H. Sutherland for their emphasis on the learning dimension of criminal conduct, these theories seem to constitute an inexhaustible explanatory source for students of organized crime. Criminal groups are said to adopt criminal solutions to resolve their status problems. They adhere to a delinquent subculture that can provide them with accessible opportunities. Moreover, criminal behavior is learned in a communicative process in which both the techniques and the rationalizations for one’s illegality are slowly acquired. It should be noted that most explanations mentioned so far revolve around notions of deficit, deficiency, and inadequacy. These notions tend to associate all antisocial conducts with a condition of disadvantage, be it economic, cultural, or psychological. In this respect, during the course of an entire century, the etiology of organized crime only moved a few steps forward, as some early positivist tenets, when updated with new linguistic expressions, seem to survive intact in our time. Categories such as low self-control also fall within this paradigm and are applied to all sorts of criminal conduct. As noted by prominent criminologists Michael Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi, “We do believe that there is no need for theories designed specifically to account for gang crime, organized crime, or professional criminals. The theory of crime and self-control is capable of accounting for the facts about ‘organized’ crime.” In brief, according to this causation theory, all criminal conduct is to be imputed to lack of selfcontrol, which characterizes individuals who are prone to physicality, and therefore are unable to postpone gratification, and tend to blame other people first and themselves last. These psychological traits are said to denote not only organized crime but also criminal conduct in general. Criminal Enterprise Authors who are dissatisfied with these explanations argue that theories based on deficit can hardly explain the type of organized crime that develops in affluent societies. In such societies, organized illegal activities seem less the result of poverty, underdevelopment, or lack of self-control than of their 37

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opposites: affluence, development, and the control of resources. The paradigm of deficit, therefore, is said to remain prevalent only in that it provides an irreplaceable ideological device. Social disadvantage, lack of socialization, control deficit, and so on are suitable analytical tools only when one tries to depict organized crime as a distinctive form of social pathology. On the other hand, these tools are ineffective when this type of crime is explained with reference to the ordinary relationships among people and within the normal conditions of the economy. Conventional commentators focus their analysis on the internal relationships within organized groups, hence the emphasis on entities such as crime families, clans, and similar close-knit units. They neglect the fact that in order to reproduce itself, organized crime is bound to establish some external relationships with society at large. The nature and strength of these external relationships may better explain the social and institutional power of organized groups along with their longevity. In this perspective, organized crime can be interpreted as a coalition, as in the research conducted by W. Chambliss, consisting of “politicians, law enforcement people, businessmen, union leaders, and (in some ways least important of all) racketeers.” Subcultural theorists were aware of this aspect of organized crime, although they perhaps failed to draw a logical conclusion from it. Apprentice criminals, some have argued, pass from one status to another in the illegitimate opportunity system, and as they do so they develop a set of relationships with members of the legitimate world. Unless they can form these relationships, the possibility of a stable, protected criminal style of life is effectively precluded. In other words, organized crime can reproduce itself less because crime families maintain their close-knit structures and distinctive subcultures than because they dissolve within the dominant social structure and culture. In fact, the more they do so, the more their criminal opportunities may increase. New skills may be acquired as licit and illicit activities mutually enhance each other. This aspect was highlighted in a 1993 report by the Pennsylvania Crime Commission in which concerns were aired about the

“benign attitudes” displayed by local communities toward racketeering groups. These attitudes were chastised not so much for fostering distrust in the legitimate governmental processes as for permitting racketeers to grow powerful enough to enter into the official economy. “Infiltration of legitimate business” was feared as a synonym for more possibilities to engage in crime. Many of the controversial issues outlined so far stem from the difficulties often met by students of organized crime. As A. Block puts it, the study of organized crime has been fascinated by conspiracy theory, a fascination that leads to the depiction of monolithic, impenetrable, culturally hermetic groups of criminals. He also suggests that the term “organized crime” should be abandoned altogether in favor of the term “illegal enterprises.” This approach is implicitly adopted by scholars analyzing organized crime, and crime in general, as economic activity. Some economists such as R. Andreano and J. Siegfried note that the basic premise of sociological work on crime is that criminals are somehow different from noncriminals, and the major research consists of the ways in which criminals differ. Assuming a rationality to human behavior, such economists argue that criminals should also be acknowledged as being endowed with principles guiding the rationality of their action. In other words, all actors involved in the crime sector of the economy “are consciously or subconsciously weighing the costs and benefits of their actions and making explicit choices among alternatives.” Criminologists and sociologists who have adopted economic variables for the explanation of organized crime include P. Arlacchi, who indicates that “mafia business” develops thanks to partnerships established with corrupt politicians and businesspeople. Many other authors focus on the environment surrounding organized crime to pinpoint the entrepreneurial and political culture conducive to the development of organized forms of criminal enterprise. What most such authors appear to have in common is a perception of the official economy and the official political arena as overworlds that are unable to clearly identify acceptable and unacceptable practices, hence the possibility for organized crime to create remunerative links between

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such fuzzy overworlds and their own criminal underworld. References Arlacchi, P. La mafia imprenditrice. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1983. Andreano, R., and J. Siegfried, eds. The Economics of Crime. New York: Wiley, 1980. Block, A. Perspectives on Organizing Crime. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991. Chambliss, W. On the Take: From Petty Crooks to Presidents. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978. Gambetta, D. La mafia siciliana: Un’industria della protezione privata, Turin: Einaudi, 1992. Gottfredson, Michael R., and Travis Hirschi. A General Theory of Crime. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990. Lombroso, C. L’uomo delinquente. 1876. Reprint, Turin: Bocca, 1971. Merton, R. Social Theory and Social Structure. New York: Free Press, 1968. Pennsylvania Crime Commission. 1992 Report. Conshohocken: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1993. Ruggiero, V. Crime and Markets. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. ———. Organized and Corporate Crime in Europe. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1996. Sutherland, Edwin H. Criminology. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1974.

Characteristics and Operational Tactics of Organized Crime Hua-Lun Huang Defining Organized Crime Seems to Have Become a Sisyphean Job Organized crime has been a hot and fascinating topic in criminology and criminal justice since the late 1920s, when tong fights, piracy, gang wars, and many other organized crime activities were examined by Asbury Herbert. Because of this heavyweight status, numerous books and articles on structured gangs in general and organized crime in particular have been published in the past seven decades. Although many scholars have addressed the subject of organized crime, the definition of the concept of organized crime seems to still be highly controversial among diverse scholars and law

enforcement officials. For example, Maximilian Edelbacher in his paper on organized crime in Austria indicated that “there is no definition that is accepted by all Europeans.” With this in mind, a less controversial way to describe the notion of organized crime is to identify its fundamental features instead of formulating a unanimous definition, which appears to be an endless, if not hopeless, job. Based on this quality-centered approach, previous studies on organized crime will supplement each other. The central problem of the concept of meaning variance, as described by Thomas S. Kuhn, that is often associated with the idea of organized crime may also be minimized. The Cardinal Characteristics of Organized Crime Organized crime is not new to many parts of Asia, Europe, Africa, and America. For instance, as early as the Warring States (481–221 B.C.), organized bandit groups had already appeared in China. During the Dark and Middle Ages, numerous people of Europe and North Africa witnessed plunder and destruction caused by bandits, the Vikings, and countless desperados. Buccaneers, pirates, and privateers played a very important politico-economic role in North Africa, South Europe, and North America in the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries. In the twentieth century, drug rings, human smuggling gangs, underground sex industries, armed pirates, swindle blocs, and many other organized crime groups, to a varying extent, were still active in America and many other countries. All of these underground or illegitimate elements, of course, have been heterogeneous regarding activities, power, leadership styles, initiation ceremonies, and life span. However, such historical and modern organized outlaws, in terms of cultural and socioeconomic factors, have shared certain cardinal qualities. These qualities can be summarized as follows. First, in terms of gender roles (one of the most important factors shaped by culture), the great majority of historical and modern organized crime figures are males. This phenomenon may be due to the situation that androcracy and patriarchy, after 39

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years of being criticized or even challenged, still serve as the rules that dominate gender relationships. Because of these rules, males tend to enjoy dominant statuses and are expected to play the roles of adventurer, supplier, protector, and decision maker. These statuses and roles, in turn, allow males to control more material and symbolic resources (particularly money and power) and to explore new businesses, including illegal ones. Besides androcracy and patriarchy, the formation of organized crime enterprises or companies is related more often than not to three socioeconomic factors, namely the availability of suitable targets, the appearance of criminal opportunities, and the absence of capable guardians. The first of these three factors refers to those people and practices that will allow underground elements to gain and take advantage of economic profits. For example, in terms of people, some undocumented Chinese of coastal provinces want to go America, Japan, or Taiwan to better their lives. To “help” these illegal Chinese immigrants to go overseas, some loosely structured human smuggling rings in America, China, Japan, and Taiwan have established legitimate employment agencies, travel agencies, or manpower companies. Most of these agencies or companies run by outlaws and gang members soon evolve into organized crime strongholds. In terms of practices, a number of routinized industrial and commercial rackets permit gangsters to obtain colossal benefits, as can be exemplified by the waterfront corruption on the Gulf Coast. Such gangsters, under the patronage of some corrupt law enforcement agents, almost immediately became organized crime figures as well. In addition to suitable targets, some countries and areas in the modern world provide outlaws abundant opportunities to develop their businesses. These countries (e.g., Russia and the former Soviet Republics) or regions (e.g., the border areas between America and Mexico or the coastal provinces of China) usually become havens for organized crime groups, particularly for transnational organized crime syndicates, because of widespread corruption, underdeveloped legal systems, characteristics of the natural environment, guerrilla and terrorist movements, civil wars, and so forth.

Ineffective police forces and legal loopholes (i.e., absence of capable guardians), in turn, pave the way for organized crime to survive, expand, or even become institutionalized. Operational Tactics of Organized Crime Groups From the perspective of origin, there are some required cultural and socioeconomic conditions necessary for organized crime groups to form and survive. On the other hand, organized crime associations need to devise and follow certain tactics of operation to safeguard their continuation. In this regard, at least two operational tactics are especially noteworthy. First, as the Mafia families of America were disintegrated, if not eradicated, by the authorities after the 1980s, modern organized crime bosses tended to lead in an absentee fashion. That is, based on the decline of the American Mafia, many organized crime bosses seem to have learned the lesson that it is not safe to establish headquarters and run businesses on the soil of highly industrialized countries, particularly America. Because of this awareness, many big brothers of modern organized crime groups have chosen to reside in developing or economically backward countries such as Mexico, Cambodia, Colombia, China, and Morocco, where laws against organized crime seem to be incomplete or lacking. From these developing countries, organized crime figures will direct their little brothers in the developed and economically advanced nations. With this division of labor, numerous core members of organized crime are able to keep their mob identities low-profile and avoid getting into any legal troubles. Closely related to the operational strategy of absentee leadership is the crime of identity theft. As just mentioned, it is very difficult, if not impossible, for organized crime syndicates to operate in highly industrialized countries such as America. Such a barrier motivates many organized gangs to use con games, electric fraud, or mail theft to steal social security numbers, credit card numbers, and other private information. The confidential data obtained from phishing or similar techniques will then be used by organized crime blocs to acquire

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Organized crime boss John Joseph Gotti Jr., aka “The Dapper Don,” poses for a mugshot in New York City. Gotti’s conspicuous leadership of the Gambino crime family in the 1980s coincided with the increased prosecution and steady decline of the Mafia in the United States; he died in prison on June 10, 2002. (Getty Images)

luxury goods, launder money, smuggle people, and commit usury and many other financial crimes. References Billingsley, Phil. Bandits in Republican China. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988. Chin, Ko-Lin. Smuggled Chinese: Clandestine Immigration to the United States. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999. Cohat, Yves. The Vikings: Lords of the Seas. Translated by Ruth Daniel. New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1992. Edelbacher, Maximilian. “Organized Crime: An Austrian Perspective.” Pp. 249–269 in Organized Crime: Uncertainties and Dilemmas, edited by Stanley Einstein and Menachem Amir. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999. Einstein, Stanley, and Menachem Amir, ed. Organized Crime: Uncertainties and Dilemmas.

Chicago: University of Illinois Chicago Press, 1999. Herbert, Asbury. The French Quarter: An Informal History of the New Orleans Underworld. 1936. Reprint, New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2003. ———. The Gangs of New York: An Informal History of the Underworld. 1928. Reprint, New York: Paragon House, 1990. ———. The Gangs of Chicago: An Informal History of the Chicago Underworld. New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2002. Kuhn, Thomas S. The Road since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 1970–1993, with an Autobiographical Interview. Edited by James Conant and John Haugeland. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. McCall, Andrew. The Medieval Underworld. New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1993. Pennell, C. R. Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader. New York: New York University Press, 2001. 41

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Woodiwiss, Michael. Organized Crime and American Power: A History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001.

Concept of Transnational Organized Crime Nathan Moran Introduction to the Concept of Transnational Organized Crime The concept of transnational organized crime was first introduced in a 1975 professional conference in Geneva at the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders. Agenda Item 5 of the congress addressed “Changes in Forms and Dimensions of Criminality International and National.” This congress similarly addressed the topic of “Violence of International and Comparative International Significance.” The concept of international organized crime has become of increased concern and debate in the international, national, regional, and local communities and by practitioners and scholars alike. M. Cherif Bassiouni and Eduardo Vetere provide evidence of this growing concern in a compilation of all the documents promulgated by the United Nations (UN) between 1975 and 1998. In this book the authors identify more than seventy UN congresses held to specifically address the issue of international organized crime. There are many reasons that international organized crime has become such a global hot-button issue. One of the primary reasons comes from transformations in the global economy that are changing the world in a manner conducive to the development of international organized crime. These transformations have spawned various threats to world order and specifically to nations and states. International crime organizations have complicated relationships both between and within countries. For instance, Colombian drug cartels are drastically changing the political process both inside and outside of Colombia. This in turn debilitates the viability of political representation and ultimately undermines the rule of law. Transformations in the global economy are also making the

trafficking in weapons, drugs, humans, and other illicit and licit commodities a very lucrative business. Indeed, the consequences of the illicit global economy are already being felt, and the impact can only increase as time progresses. International organized crime merits an important position on the agenda of international crime and globalization issues. According to T. Farer, it is the “juxtaposition of powerful crime organizations and weak states [that] poses subtle threats to government authority and legitimacy, and to the operation of free markets in these countries.” It is an accurate statement to assert that international organized crime is a chameleon. You see it when you do not know it, and it can appear to be something else (e.g., licit rather than illicit). The activities perpetrated by international crime groups vary widely and include drug trafficking, weapons trafficking, human trafficking, sea piracy, trade in human body parts, money laundering, computer crime, and infiltrating legal businesses. Background and Trends in International Organized Crime: The Players There are a plethora of international crime groups in existence today. Some include the Colombian drug cartels (Medellin and Cali), Chinese organized crime (Triads, Tongs, and criminal street gangs), Russian organized crime (Russian Mafiya), Japanese organized crime (Yamaguchi-gumi and the Sumiyoshi-rengo Boryokudans), and Mexican cartels (Juarez, Tijuana, Guadalajara, and Gulf ). Global organized crime groups exist in many countries that are not as well known for organized crime activity, including Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Burma (Myanmar), Pakistan, Israel, Albania, Nigeria, and Jamaica. Organized crime and international crime organizations are operating in almost every industrialized country. The major and minor players differ in terms of size, wealth, cohesion, licit and illicit activities, their international links, and the threat they pose. Threats Posed by International Organized Crime International organized crime poses many threats to the domestic United States as well as the inter-

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national community. They include challenges to institutional order, political pressure, economic coercion, and the outputs corresponding with these threats. Each of these has destructive potential that can disturb the international order. References Bassiouni, M. Cherif, and Eduardo Vetere. Organized Crime: A Compilation of U.N. Documents, 1975– 1998. Ardsley, NY: Transnational, 1993. Chin, Ko-Lin. Chinese Subculture and Criminality: Non-traditional Crime Groups in America. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1990. Farer, T., ed. Transnational Crime in the Americas. New York: Routledge, 1999. Frieman, H. R. “Obstructing Markets: Organized Crime Networks and Drug Control in Japan.” Pp. 173–198 in The Illicit Global Economy and State Power, edited by H. R. Friman and P. Andreas. Boston: Rowan and Littlefield, 1999. Friman, H. R., and P. Andreas, eds. The Illicit Global Economy and State Power. Boston: Rowan and Littlefield, 1999. Helleiner, E. “State Power and the Regulation of Illicit Activity in Global Finance.” Pp. 53–90 in The Illicit Global Economy and State Power, edited by H. R. Friman and P. Andreas. Boston: Rowan and Littlefield, 1999. Mueller, G. O. W. “Transnational Crime: An Experience in Uncertainties.” Pp. 3–18 in Organized Crime: Uncertainties and Dilemmas, edited by S. Einstein and M. Amir. Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice, 1999. Richards, J. R. Transnational Criminals Organizations, Cyber Crime, and Moneylaundering. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1999. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders. Report prepared by the secretariat, A/CONF.56/10, 1976. Viano, E. Global Organized Crime and International Security. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1999. Ward, R. H. “The Internationalization of Criminal Justice.” Pp. 267–322 in Boundary Changes in Criminal Justice Organizations, vol. 2, edited by C. M. Friel. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 2000. Williams, Phil. “Getting Rich and Getting Even: Transnational Threats in the Twenty-first Century.” Pp. 19–63 in, Organized Crime: Uncertainties and Dilemmas, edited by S. Einstein and M. Amir. Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice, 1999.

Defining Organized Crime: Economic, Legal, and Social Factors Nathan Moran Research on organized crime has been complicated by a myriad of definitions on the subject. Definitions vary in form and include societal definitions, which are largely driven by the media, governmental definitions, and criminological definitions. However, there has not yet been a definition developed that is adequate for empirical research. The use of anecdotal observations as scientific evidence is contrary to the scientific principles of objective, rigorous research that is premised upon both the philosophy of science and the scientific process. Definitions of organized crime are fluid, vary from researcher to researcher, and are contingent upon whether the research target is local, national, global, or a mix of the three. Organized crime has historically been described in terms of the traditional or familial crime syndicates, which have been broadly labeled La Cosa Nostra, the mob, and the Mafia. Largely because of drug, arms, and human trafficking, this perspective has changed somewhat in the last twenty years to include characteristics such as South American cartels (e.g., the Medellin or Cali cartels) and Asian organized crime groups (e.g., the Triads, Yakuza, and Tongs). Definitional Issues The primary organizational definitions fall into two categories: governmental and academic. Governmental Definitions Governmental entities that have attempted to define organized crime include the 1976 Organized Crime Task Force, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Interpol, the German Bundeskriminalamt (BKA), the Centrale Recherche Informatiedienst (Central Police Investigation Information Service or Dutch Central Investigation Agency Service, CRI), and entities in many other countries, states, and institutions that are having to define organized crime in an attempt to police, investigate, or otherwise deal with organized crime. Governmental definitions of organized crime differ from academic or criminological definitions in that 43

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Mafia leaders under house arrest on the island of Linosa, near Sicily, in 1971: (left to right) Mosario Mancino, Salvatore Sanfilippo, Calogero Migliore, Giuseppe Sirchia, Rosario Riccobono, and Vincenzo Parlapiano. With the rise of Latin American, Russian, and Asian crime groups in recent decades, the traditional perception of organized crime as a familial, largely Italian, phenomena is changing. (Getty Images)

they tend to be specific to organizational goals and lack conceptual operationalization. These goals tend to be driven by politicians, the media, and society. Many of these definitions take the form of a listing approach, as do many academic definitions, in which the characteristics of the organized crime groups or individuals are simply numerically or alphabetically listed. This listing procedure, however, has been criticized as being overly simplistic considering the extreme complexity of transnational organized crime. The 1976 Organized Crime Task Force The 1976 Organized Crime Task Force adopted the listing approach when it defined organized crime as consisting of “two or more persons, who with conti-

nuity of purpose, engage in one or more of the following activities: (1) the supplying of illegal goods and services, i.e., vice, loan-sharking, etc.; (2) predatory crime, i.e., theft, assault, etc. Several distinct types of criminal activity fall within this definition of organized crime. The types may be grouped into five general categories: racketeering, vice-operations, theft/fence rings, gangs, and terrorists.” This definition of organized crime incorporates a list of attributes in paragraph form. Furthermore, this definition is outdated by a full generation and by new forms of organized criminal activity. The definition cannot account for the changing nature of the Italian Mafia, the rise of drug lords, the movement of the drug lords toward transnational-

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ity, and the full-scale globalization of organized crime. The task force’s definition lacks a comprehensive focus that accounts for changes in organized crime activities. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation According to H. Abadinsky, the FBI adopts a different approach in its definition of organized crime: “Any group having some manner of formalized structure and whose primary objective is to obtain money through illegal activities. Such groups maintain their position through the use of violence or threats of violence, corrupt public officials, graft, or extortions, and generally have a significant impact on the people in their locales or regions of the country.” The FBI’s definition focuses on the traditional activities of organized criminals to maintain the group and further its goal: to make money. However, the focus on traditional activities is noninclusive of more advanced forms of organized crime that utilize activities other than those listed in furtherance of their organizational goals. This is a disadvantage that is insufficient for an empirical study of transnational organized crime, although it may be operationally sufficient for the FBI as an investigative agency. Interpol According to P. J. Ryan and G. E. Rush, Interpol maintains a similar approach to that of the FBI in defining organized crime: “Any enterprise or group of persons engaged in a continuing illegal activity which has as its primary purpose the generation of profits and continuance of the enterprise regardless of national boundaries.” The Interpol definition focuses on the structure of the group but not on the acts that are used to further the goals of the group. The Interpol definition does, however, incorporate a critical concept in the study of transnational organized crime: the continuance of the organization regardless of national boundaries. The German Bundeskriminalamt The BKA, which is the German national police force, defines organized crime as “the planned

commission of criminal offenses, determined by the pursuit of profit and power, involving more than two persons over a prolonged or indefinite period of time, using a commercial or business license scheme, violence, and/or intimidation.” In this definition the BKA focuses on one aspect of the group (“more than two persons over a prolonged or indefinite period of time”), two goals (profit and power), and three methods to achieve those goals (a commercial business license scheme, violence, or intimidation). The BKA’s definition is limiting in the sense that for any organized crime organization there is more than one aspect of the group, there are more than two organizational goals, and there are more than three methods of achieving those goals. Thus, there exist many organized crime groups that do not fit this very narrow definition of organized crime. The Dutch Centrale Recherche Informatienest The CRI utilizes a unique approach in defining organized crime that is useful not only for the investigation of organized crime but also for empirical studies. The CRI utilizes a Likert scaling procedure that consists of eight progressive elements focusing on both the group and the group’s activities: 1 = any hierarchical structure 2 = internal support 3 = money laundering 4 = corruption and bribery of legal system officials 5 = involvement in more than one illegal activity 6 = organizations that hide behind front companies 7 = criminal activities which take place over a long period of time 8 = members who act violently against competitors

Using these eight elements, the CRI has created a scale as to the intensity or degree of organized criminal activities and organizational structure. Thus, organized criminal activity on the scale of 1 and 2 represent a low-level organized crime group, 3–5 represents a moderately sophisticated group, and 6–8 represents a highly organized, highly sophisticated organized crime organization. This approach, however, is lacking conceptual clarity and operationalization and in the strictest sense is not a definition of organized crime. 45

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Academic Definitions Definitions of organized crime that are academic or criminological tend to be developed via empirical studies and results and differ dramatically from governmental definitions of organized crime, which tend to be driven by political concerns, the media, and society. Donald Cressey Donald Cressey, in his 1969 book Theft of the Nation: The Structure and Operation of Organized Crime in America, defined organized crime as “any crime committed by a person occupying, in an established division of labor, a position designed for the commission of crime providing that such division of labor also includes at least one position for a corruptor, one position for the corruptee, and one position for an enforcer.” Cressey’s definition was developed from a perspective that is less concerned with the criminal activities themselves than with the perpetrators of the crime. In doing so, he contributed a great deal to the empirical study of organized crime, but he does not include the criminal activities themselves. Michael Maltz In 1976 Michael Maltz published an article specifically addressing issues and difficulties in defining the term “organized crime.” He focused on issues of semantics (e.g., the incongruities in how a specific organized criminal act is referred to as organized crime, but when general organized crime issues are being discussed they are referred to as entities or groups). Maltz addresses the organizational aspects more than the committed behaviors and is specifically concerned with the dynamics of the organized crime group by way of its means (e.g., violence, theft, corruption, economic coercion, deception, and victim participation) and ends (e.g., economic and political objectives). He defined organized crime as “a transaction proscribed by criminal law between offender(s) and victim(s). It is not necessary for the victim to be a complainant or to consider himself victimized for a crime to be committed. An organized crime is a crime in which there is more than one offender, and the offenders are and intend to remain associ-

ated with one another for the purpose of committing crimes. The means of executing the crime include violence, theft, corruption, economic power, deception, and victim participation. These are not mutually exclusive categories; any organized crime may employ a number of these means.” The objective of most organized crimes is power, either political or economic. These two types of objectives are also not mutually exclusive and may coexist in any organized crime. Maltz created one of the first criminological definitions that is applicable to the empirical study of organized crime. However, Abadinsky criticized Maltz’s definition as being “quite broad—it fails to provide a basis for distinguishing between the James Gang (of ‘Wild West’ fame) and the Capone organization (of Prohibition fame).” Abadinsky notes that when Jesse James was killed his organization ended, but when Capone was imprisoned his organization continued for fifty years after the end of Prohibition. Thus, although Maltz provides a model for a definition of organized crime that can be used in empirical research, it is still lacking. Howard Abadinsky Howard Abadinsky attempted to define organized crime on the basis of the strengths of past definitions while reducing the weaknesses. He defines organized crime as: a nonideological enterprise involving a number of persons in close social interaction, organized on a hierarchical basis with at least three levels/ranks, for the purpose of securing profit and power by engaging in illegal and legal activities. Positions in the hierarchy and positions involving functional specialization may be assigned on the basis of kinship or friendship, or rationally assigned according to skill. The positions are not dependent on the individuals occupying them at any particular time. Permanency is assumed by the members who strive to keep the enterprise integral and active in pursuit of its goals. Organized crime eschews competition and strives for monopoly on an industry or territorial basis. Organized crime is willing to use violence and/or bribery to achieve ends or to maintain discipline. Membership is restricted, although nonmembers may be involved on a contin-

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gency basis. There are explicit rules, oral or written, particularly involving the need for secrecy, which are enforced by sanctions that include murder.

Cressey, D. R. Theft of the Nation: The Structure and Operation of Organized Crime in America. New York: Harper and Row, 1969. Hagan, F. Research Methods in Criminal Justice and Criminology. 5th ed. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 2002. Maltz, M. D. “On Defining Organized Crime.” Crime and Delinquency 22 (1976): 338–346. Maltz, M. D. “Toward Defining Organized Crime.” Pp. 21–35 in The Politics and Economics of Organized Crime, edited by H. E. Alexander and G. E. Caiden. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985. Moran, N. An Examination of Russian, Colombian, and Chinese Organized Crime from 1991–2001: A Time Series Analysis. PhD dissertation. Huntsville, TX: Sam Houston State University Press, 2002. Reuter, P., and C. Petrie. Transnational Organized Crime: Summary of a Workshop. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1999. Ryan, P. J., G. E. Rush. Understanding Organized Crime in Global Perspective: A Reader. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1997.

Abadinsky includes the goals of the group, the structure of the group, and activities of the group and operationalizes much of what is included in this definition. Although this is the most advanced definition of organized crime to date, it is lacking insofar as the definition is specific to groups that are not operating on a transnational level. Rather, it is referring to groups that are local or national. From the perspective of this research, Abadinsky’s addition of “crossing of one or more national borders, physically or by other means,” forms a key variable. A Working Definition of Transnational Organized Crime The definition developed by Nathan Moran builds upon the previous definitions addressed above. This definition is not a new definition but rather a refinement and amalgamation of previous definitions that has been operationalized for the empirical study of transnational organized crime. The operationalized definition reads as follows: “Transnational organized crime is a crime or series of crimes that are conducted by a group of two or more people that crosses at least one national border. A transnational organized crime group is self-perpetuating and characterized by a hierarchical structure, a willingness to use force or the fear of force, and the use of bribery and/or corruption in the pursuit of illicit profit and/or power.” This working definition encompasses all of the critical components needed to conduct an empirical study of transnational organized crime. In addition, with slight modification this definition would be appropriate for national organized crime groups as well. References Abadinsky, H. Organized Crime. 7th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2002. Carter, D. L. “International Organized Crime: Emerging Trends in Entrepreneurial Crime.” Pp. 131–148 in Understanding Organized Crime in Global Perspective: A Reader, edited by P. J. Ryan and G. E. Rush. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1997.

Difficulties in Applying Generic Conceptualizations of Organized Crime to Specific National Circumstances Sappho Xenakis The twentieth century witnessed the development of the legal concept of organized crime. Stemming first from a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements and then becoming the subject of international conventions, organized crime has developed into a significant theme for international cooperation. Nevertheless, considerable ambiguity and division have remained apparent with regard to the term’s meaning and, consequently, to the implementation of approaches to combat it. “Organized crime” has continued to be used as an overwhelmingly political, all-inclusive term for a variety of criminal activities. In seeking to simplify and generalize the lessons to be learned from organized criminal activity in specific times and places, approaches to organized crime have been developed internationally that aim for universal applicability but still reflect the specificity of their origins. Several problems have arisen 47

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in the international attempt to distinguish generic conceptualizations of the nature and threat posed by organized crime and then apply these to different national settings. Defining Organized Crime: The Impact of History, Locality, and Structure International political discourse on organized crime has shifted from focusing primarily on the structure of the criminal group (a prevalent approach during the 1950s–1980s) to being concerned more with the commodities traded and their market power (since the 1990s). While the ethnicities of groups are still noted in police records internationally, an increasing concern about illicit trading has led to an effort to map broader networks of cooperation in criminal enterprise. In the mid-twentieth century, international cooperation against organized crime—in the collective sense, distinct from various crimes commonly associated with it such as drug trafficking and arms smuggling—emerged alongside the struggle to combat Mafia activity in Italy and the United States. The basis of international action against organized crime was thereby drawn from a conceptualization of a hierarchical organization of individuals engaged in monopolistic management (primarily the provision of protection) for criminal trade as well as for legitimate businesses. Organized crime was to be distinguished from crime that is organized by its specific, durable, and monopolizing intentions, characteristics that lent to it an extra level of menace than posed by less sophisticated criminal activity. There have been numerous critics of such structural interpretations of organized crime who have argued that organized crime groups may also be based around loose networks and patterns of relations rather than more rigid hierarchical groups. Recent international agreements have promoted a conceptualization of organized crime that is broader than simply Mafia-type groups and focuses more on illicit transnational commercial groups. In 1994 the World Ministerial Conference on Organised Transnational Crime drew up a series of identifying characteristics that included inter alia that the group used violence, intimidation, or corrup-

tion to earn profits, control territories or markets, and launder illicit proceeds; involved hierarchical links or personal relationships that permitted leaders to control the group; and cooperated with other transnational criminal groups. This exceedingly broad set of characteristics included all possible formulations of the notion of organized crime. The 2000 United Nations (UN) Convention against Transnational Organised Crime that replaced the World Ministerial Conference on Organised Transnational Crime was scarcely more acute. This definitional disagreement concerning the nature of organized crime and the activities that characterize it is a primary weakness of the attempt to secure a unified position against organized crime internationally. Efforts to combat the diverse phenomena included in the term do not appear to be comparably differentiated, at least at the international level. Groups that are engaging in organized criminal trade and have a weak communal or geographical basis and scant interest in the provision of protection or monopolization bear little resemblance to organized crime as Mafia-type organization and far more resemblance to gangs. Some scholars argue that in order to successfully tackle the problem of organized crime, the definition of organized crime needs to be tighter and also needs to avoid incorporating everything from gang and white-collar crime to corporate crime and corruption (not to mention terrorism and political and environmental civil disobedience). Universalizing the Threat Assessment of Organized Crime Apart from the reality of localism, which means that organized crime is interpreted as referring to different activities according to each place and time, postulations about the generic nature of the threat posed by organized crime are also problematically applied universally. Many theorists of organized crime diagnose the principal threat as its challenge to the state rather than its multifarious dangers to the security of individuals. Yet while some theorists such as P. Williams have characterized organized crime as a serious threat to both national and international security, particularly in its undermining of state sovereignty, others such as

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L. Shelley argue against this theory-driven analysis, claiming that while such crime may undermine the integrity of certain states, it does not yet pose a real threat to the international community of states. Numerous authors identify the pervasiveness of organized crime as the main reason that states should not expect to be able to counter its threat alone and should instead embark upon more rigorous cooperation with other states to combat it. This emphasis on international cooperation is nevertheless criticized by some observers who argue that the interpretation of organized criminal activity on which such a presumption is based exaggerates the significance of the international dimension of organized crime as opposed to giving more recognition to its more tangible form at the local level. Ironically, however, while it is the very proponents of greater interstate cooperation against organized crime who most strongly characterize its threat to states and state sovereignty as alarming, it is those same people who urge states to relinquish oldfashioned notions of sovereignty and independence that prove hindrances to the establishment of strong policing and juridical links between states. In a 1992 report of a UN General Assembly debate on the strengthening of international cooperation to combat organized crime, the conclusion was that “a too restrictive interpretation of sovereignty and jurisdiction, more applicable to the world of half a century ago, often constitutes a serious obstacle to co-operation.” The condemnation of concepts of sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction as antiquated hindrances to a desirable increase in international cooperation against organized crime has also been made in other UN bodies as well as by some specialists on the subject. Those calling for greater international cooperation against organized crime have championed a collective security approach to understanding the nature of the threat of organized crime. It is assumed that organized crime seeks to maximize its operational opportunities and minimize the risks posed by law enforcement, and therefore international harmonization of law and enforcement procedures is necessary to end the existence of safe havens for criminal activity. The balloon effect—

whereby a route for organized criminal activity has been blocked and the traffic simply moves around the law enforcement obstacle through another country—has been a continual bane to law enforcement efforts to crush organized crime internationally. Thus, there needs to be an effective equal distribution of the risk of organized crime among different states. This can be created by policy and policing harmonization on the issue to reduce the temptation of organized crime groups to relocate to countries where law enforcement is more lax. The collective security approach to organized crime does not support a detailed assessment of the threat posed by any particular facet of organized crime to any particular state. For example, the first point made by the International Association of Penal Law in its conclusions and recommendations presented to the 8th UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime in 1990 was that “organized crime and terrorism are the main threat and danger to democratic institutions and peaceful co-existence in every State.” Indeed, more focused reports, such as that by Europol, on the threat of organized crime in particular regions necessarily acknowledge its differing level of seriousness to states both within and outside the area in question. Maintaining the ambiguity of the threat should also therefore be recognized as an important part of the argument to persuade individual states that the threat is overwhelming and universal and that consequently so too should be the international response. The irony is that the desire for increased international policy and enforcement that is willing to forgo a tight analysis of the nature of the threat of organized crime lays the foundation for the unverifiable nature of the effectiveness of such efforts. Without an effective evaluation procedure, goals cannot be prioritized, and ends and means cannot be satisfactorily distinguished. The Example of Economic Harm The economic harm posed by organized crime is often presented as one of the most serious and general negative effects of the phenomenon internationally. Even with this most apparent case, however, the effects of organized crime are far more varied than is commonly perceived. Indeed, it is 49

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perhaps only in acknowledging the significant extent of such variation that the demand and success of organized criminal activity can realistically be assessed. There are many different ways in which organized crime and related patterns of corruption are regarded as harmful to the legitimate economy of states. Whether or not the crimes are committed by organized groups of criminal entrepreneurs, tax evasion undermines the state’s authority and its power. The wealth accumulated by organized crime provides it with the capital to corrupt state officials, which can be particularly destabilizing in weak or developing countries. The perceived prevalence of organized criminal and corrupt practices also discourages foreign direct investment. Policies of macroeconomic stabilization have created situations in which a demand exists for criminal finances to be invested in markets and meet credit needs since legitimate financiers have refused to become involved. This may cause high inflation to persist and the intended gains of efficiency from economic reforms to be minimized. The suggestion is that criminal finance carries negative potential for developing economies as well as for wealthier and more stable countries. Moreover, the unfair advantage of the authoritarian monopolistic practices of organized crime in the business world makes competition harder for legitimate enterprises, whatever the level of economic development, and may encourage them to adopt similar unethical or illegal practices. There are those, however, who dispute the assumption that organized criminal activity is necessarily harmful to developing economies, especially where alternative forms of market competition are severely limited. Thus, for certain countries, a particular form of illicit trade may provide the economy with an international market niche, enabling that country to exploit a comparative advantage for the production of that good in the world economy, whether the commodity is illegal drugs or illegally exported low-wage workers. Additionally, in the 1970s some theorists suggested that in cases where policies are hampering the efficient mechanism of market activities, corruption could even enhance the welfare of the society.

Trickle-down economic theories imply that profits from organized crime can boost the overall economy of a country and that the notion of a crime of money laundering is little more than a needless criminalization of what are themselves a series of harmless or even positive financial acts. The existence of corruption in developing countries may even be viewed as a positive, though informal, form of taxing the proceeds of the illicit economy. Such arguments are generally met with the observation that the larger profits made by organized crime are unlikely to be reinvested in poor economies and instead will probably be sent to safety in foreign bank accounts in the West. While the former views may be considered extreme, it is often more generally pointed out that for some developing states corruption and crime remain necessary methods of survival. Where economic reforms have reduced the power of the government to provide stability and social safety nets and instead produced socially polarizing and politically disintegrating austerity, black markets and crime are likely to thrive. Moreover, when economic and political transformations coincide, the normative fabric of law and the labeling of criminality are destabilized. From this perspective, economic systems do not function automatically but instead require effort to be created, perpetuated, and legitimized, and they therefore rely on appropriate forms of political and ideological scaffolding. Conclusion The draw of profits and success offered by involvement with organized criminal activity is of course not restricted to individuals and groups in places where the legitimate economy is extremely weak. From illegal immigration to money laundering, to prostitution and the use of drugs, such activities are also supplied to and engaged within developed countries. Yet the threat is not calculated in the same way by all developed states, regardless of the existence of international agreement on the broader assumption of the threat of organized crime and the imperative to act against it in concert. Even among more developed countries, perceptions of the consequences and dangers posed by all these activities as well as their possible benefits vary significantly.

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References Andreas, P. “Smuggling Wars: Law Enforcement and Law Evasion in a Changing World.” Transnational Organized Crime 4(2) (Summer 1998): 75–90. Beare, M., and R. T. Naylor. “Major Issues Relating to Organized Crime: Within the Context of Economic Relationships.” Submission to the Law Commission of Canada, 14 April 1999, Nathanson Centre for the Study of Organized Crime and Corruption, www.ncjrs.gov/nathanson/ organized.html. Europol. European Union Organised Crime Situation Report 2002, http://www.europol.eu .int/index.asp?page=EUOrganisedCrimeSit Rep2002. Fijnaut, C. “Transnational Organized Crime and Institutional Reform in the European Union: The Case of Juridical Co-operation.” Transnational Organized Crime 3/4 (Autumn/Winter 1998): 276–302. Hobbs, D., and C. Dunnighan. “Global Organised Crime: Context and Pretext.” Pp. 289–300 in The New European Criminology: Crime and Social Order in Europe, edited by V. Ruggiero, N. South, and I. Taylor. London: Routledge, 1998. International Association of Penal Law. “Effective National and International Action against a. Organized Crime, b. Terrorist Criminal Activities.” Contribution to the 8th UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August–7 September 1990. Naylor, R. T. Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy. New York: Cornell University Press, 2002. Report of the UN Secretary-General. The Strengthening of International Co-operation in Combatting Organized Crime. United Nations General Assembly, 47th Session Agenda Item 93 (b), Social Development: Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, Doc. A/47/381, 28 September 1992. Reuter, P. Disorganised Crime: The Economics of the Visible Hand. London: MIT Press, 1983. Savona, E. “Harmonising Policies for Reducing the Transnational Organised Crime Risk.” Paper prepared for the international workshop Discontinuous Institutional Change and the Economic System: Theory and Evidence, 8–13 July 1995. Schelling, T. “What Is the Business of Organised Crime?” Journal of Public Law 20 (1971): 71–84. Shelley, L. “Transnational Organized Crime: The New Authoritarianism.” Pp. 25–51 in The Illicit Global Economy and State Power, edited by H. R.

Friman and P. Andreas. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, 2000, www.unodc.org/palermo/ convmain.html. United Nations Economic and Social Research Council. “Most Effective Forms of International Co-operation for the Prevention and Control of Organised Transnational Crime at the Investigative, Prosecutorial and Judicial Levels.” Background Document, World Ministerial Conference on Organised Transnational Crime, Naples, 21–23 November 1994, E/CONF.884/4, 1 September 1994. Williams, P. “Transnational Criminal Organisations and International Security.” Survival 36(1) (Spring 1994): 96–113. World Ministerial Conference on Organised Crime. “Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan against Organized Transnational Crime.” UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Newsletter, Vienna, 26–27 November 1995.

Structure and Functional Organization of Criminal Groups Hua-Lun Huang Two Different Approaches to the Study of Social Groups In the past four decades, the subject of social groups has been examined by numerous scholars. Based on diverse research areas, these scholars can be roughly divided into two groups. The first group includes those organization and management writers searching for ways to maximize the economic benefits or production capacity of legitimate organizations, especially transnational corporations and medium-sized enterprises (as can be exemplified by the faculty of the Sloan School of Management of Massachusetts Institute of Technology). With such an aim to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of commercial or industrial associations, researchers of this group generally focus on issues such as leadership, power, cultures of organization, managerial ideologies, and decision-making processes. Unlike those specialists on legitimate organizations who try to maximize the economic benefits of private or public enterprises, the second group of researchers includes those criminologists and criminal 51

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justice professionals who make great efforts at understanding the configuration and operation of illegitimate organizations, particularly street gangs (as can be exemplified by the faculty of the Department of Criminology at the University of Pennsylvania). With such a goal of preventing the proliferation and development of unlawful or delinquent associations, researchers of this group typically concentrate on topics such as poverty, antisocial subcultures, gang features, crime profiles, sociospatial analysis, and so forth. Of these different topics, the issue about the structure and the functional organization of criminal organizations is usually viewed as one of the most complicated questions within criminology, criminal justice, and gangology. Typologies of Criminal Groups’ Structure In criminology and sociology, the concept of structure usually refers to demographic, politicoeconomic, and sociocultural factors that will cause a society, community, or group to exhibit certain stable or distinguishable qualities (some of the typical factors are racial composition, political system, and religious beliefs). In terms of structure, criminal groups, just like legitimate organizations, display a number of identifiable or established features. These structural features, based on the different manifestations of the three demographic, socioeconomic, and cultural factors—racial homogeneity, level of organizational sophistication, and ideology—can be summarized in the following eight categories: ITS type: identical racial background + tiered organizational arrangements + salient ideology, as can be exemplified by belligerent white supremacy prison gangs in America ITN type: identical racial background + tiered organizational arrangements + negligible ideology, as can be exemplified by the Yamaguchi-gumi, the largest gang in Japan IES type: identical racial background + egalitarian organizational arrangements + salient ideology, as can be exemplified by the skinhead gangs in America and Europe IEN type: identical racial background + egalitarian organizational arrangements + negligible ideology, as can be exemplified by those amateur piratical

groups, organized by some Indonesian, Filipino, and Vietnamese fishermen, in the Strait of Malacca DTS type: divergent racial background + tiered organizational arrangements + salient ideology, as can be exemplified by extremist militia groups in America DTN type: divergent racial background + tiered organizational arrangements + negligible ideology, as can be exemplified by transnational human smuggling rings in North Africa, East Asia, North America, and Europe DES type: divergent racial background + egalitarian organizational arrangements + salient ideology, as can be exemplified by loosely structured occult gangs in America DEN type: divergent racial background + egalitarian organizational arrangements + negligible ideology,

A former member of the Aryan Brotherhood in Calipatria State Prison, Calipatria, California, poses on June 17, 2004. The Aryan Brotherhood’s identifiable features are its racial background, tiered organizational arrangement, and salient ideology. (Mark Allen Johnson/ZUMA/Corbis)

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as can be exemplified by auto theft rings in America and Europe

References Anderson, Elijah. Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City. New York: Norton, 1999. Austin, Joe, and Michael Nevin Willard, eds. Generations of Youth: Youth Cultures and History in Twentieth-Century America. New York: New York University Press, 1998. Chin, Ko-Lin. Smuggled Chinese: Clandestine Immigration to the United States. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999. Handy, Charles. Understanding Organizations. 4th ed. New York: Penguin Books, 1999. Hinton, William. Fanshen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village. New York: Vintage Books, 1966. Miethe, Terance D., Richard C. McCorkle, and Shelley J. Listwan. Crime Profiles: The Anatomy of Dangerous Persons, Places, and Situations. Los Angeles: Roxbury, 2005. Perrow, Charles. Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay. 3rd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1986. Steffensmeier, Darrell J., and Jeffery T. Ulmer. Confessions of a Dying Thief: Understanding Criminal Careers and Illegal Enterprise. New Brunswick, NJ: AldineTransaction, 2005. Steinberg, Steven J., and Sheila L. Steinberg. Geographic Information System for the Social Sciences: Investigating Space and Place. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2006. Valdez, Al. Gangs: A Guide to Understanding Street Gangs. 3rd ed. San Clemente, CA: Law Tech Publishing, 2000.

According to these different features of structure, some criminal groups can be categorized as expressive or ideology-directed gangs (e.g., gangs of ITS, IES, DTS, and DES types). On the other hand, some criminal groups should be classified as instrumental gangs (such as gangs of ITN, IEN, DTN, and DEN types) because they are dominated by the goal of pursuing economic benefits. Typologies of Criminal Groups’ Functional Establishment Although criminal groups exhibit different structural characteristics, no criminal groups can survive without the logistical support of certain legitimate or semilegitimate organizations (i.e., certain lawful or semilegal organizations serve as the functional establishment for criminal groups). In this regard, at least two types of functional establishment can be identified. The first type (which includes corrupt custom officials and police) provides legal documents or statuses to criminal groups. This service has been examined by some sociologists specializing in dealings among human smuggling rings and some lawful companies and agencies in China. For example, in his study of Chinese illegal immigrants who wanted to go to America and other high-income countries to fanshen (improve socioeconomic status), Ko-Lin Chin argues that “without the support of [legal] organizations and networks, the movement of tens of thousands of Chinese peasants and laborers to the United States would not be possible.” The second type of functional establishment provides fencing channels for criminal groups, specifically for rings of auto thieves, burglars, and professional pickpockets. Darrell Steffensmeier and Jeffery Ulmer’s field study clearly shows that career burglars must incorporate elements such as auction houses, antique dealers, secondhand dealers, private collectors, Salvation Army workers, and truckers into their “spider webs.” Without such fencing networks, it would be almost certain that career burglars as well as other professional offenders would have to quit their jobs.

Traditional and Nontraditional Organized Crime Groups Hua-Lun Huang What Are Organized Crime Groups? In 1951, based on the information collected by the Kefauver Committee, chaired by U.S. Senator Estes Kefauver, the American government, according to Jay Albanese, claimed that there is a “sinister criminal organization known as the Mafia operating throughout the country with ties in other nations.” Since then, Mafia organizations and crime families in America have become hot subjects for law enforcement agents, criminologists, investigative reporters, freelance writers, and film producers. Under the influence of this extensive fervor to 53

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examine the centralized Mafia organization in America, numerous authors also use the title of “Mafia” to describe non-Italian gangs, such as the Black Mafia, the Chinese Mafia, the Japanese Mafia, and the Russian Mafia. Although the issue of whether a centralized Mafia group exists in America remains a highly controversial topic for criminologists and law enforcement officials, there is one certain point about the Mafias, namely that Mafias in the modern world (including those in North America, East and Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and Russia) are structured gangs. These structured gangs, without exception, will exhibit five characteristics. Because of these features, the Mafias or structured gangs are classified as organized crime groups in criminology or the sociology of crime literature. These defining features are: Masquerade. Continuous involvement in legitimate businesses (such as in construction, transportation, and entertainment industries) by the Mafias. These involvements are the main channels for gang members to “bleach” their “black” or criminal backgrounds. Authority. Command and obey (or superior and subordinate) relationships between or among Mafia members. Fetters. Regulation of Mafia members through behavioral rules or conduct codes. Iniquity. Persistent involvement in illegitimate activities (e.g., murder, intimidation, and extortion) by the Mafias. Association. Behind-closed-door connections between Mafia groups and some corrupt law enforcement agents or other government officials.

Economic Benefits and Traditional Organized Crime Groups From the perspective of criminology, traditional organized crime groups are firms, corporations, companies, or associations. This means that leaders of traditional organized crime groups (e.g., the St. Petersburg Mafias of Russia, the drug cartels of Colombia, the Yamaguchi-gumi of Japan, the Triad societies of Hong Kong, and the Bamboo Union gang of Taiwan) will spend most of their money,

energy, time, and other resources on businesses that can generate enormous profits (some typical examples of such businesses are human smuggling, printing fake bank notes, loan-sharking, debt collection, kidnappings for high ransoms, con games, identity theft, and intellectual property theft). Since traditional organized crime figures concentrate on the accumulation of wealth, it is not unusual for such mobsters to live in luxurious buildings and behave like successful businessmen or even philanthropists. Typologies of Nontraditional Organized Crime Groups In sharp contrast to traditional organized crime syndicates, some modern organized crime groups do not pursue instrumental goals such as economic interests. Instead, these groups focus on certain expressive goals such as racial or spiritual purity. In this regard, four different types of nontraditional organized crime groups can be identified. The first type is exemplified by the skinheads or neo-Nazi groups of Western and Northern Europe and North America. These radical-racist groups are generally supporters of the doctrines of Christian identity, which advocates the idea that the white race is God’s chosen race. Under the influence of Christian identity, elements of radical racist groups usually believe that the white race (except for the Jews) is the best in the world, while other races are burdens for white people. This racist mind-set then paves the way for various hate crimes. The second category of nontraditional organized crime groups is typified by the Satanic churches or similar churches. These churches, as their titles indicate, teach followers doctrines not found in the teachings of mainstream churches. Such deviant churches may also encourage followers (especially adults) to get involved in nudist rituals or pursue worldly pleasures. Because of these teachings, practices, and philosophies, the Satanic churches seem to be places where child molestations, incest, sexual harassments and assaults, promiscuous sex, or even spouse exchanges are recurrent. Besides aggressive racist groups and the Satanic churches, some nontraditional organized crime groups, both domestic and international, are terror-

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Finally, under some circumstances such as civil war and racial cleansing, organized crimes may be perpetrated by state managers or the military. This phenomenon was evident in the Holocaust against the Jews during World War II and in the massacres and systematic rapes in Indonesia, East Timor, Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and other places during the second half of the twentieth century.

German riot police arrest ultra right-wing skinheads after the confiscation of guns and banned Nazi symbols at the entrance of the Bavarian town of Freilassing near the Austrian border on August 5, 2000. The skinheads were on their way to a meeting of the far right-wing NPD (National Democratic Party) in Freilassing. (Reuters/Corbis)

ist in nature. The concept of terrorism has more than one hundred definitions. No matter which definitions are concentrated upon, all domestic and international terrorists seem to have one thing in common in their worldview: the American government is crooked and is the main source of all evil things in the world. Based on this perception, some people attempted to destroy the American government by joining the Patriot movement of America or international terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda.

References Albanese, Jay S. Organized Crime in America. 3rd ed. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson, 1996. Barton, Blanche. The Secret Life of a Satanist: The Authorized Biography of Anton LaVey. Los Angeles: Federal House, 1992. Bresler, Fenton. The Chinese Mafia. New York: Stein and Day, 1981. Gunaratna, Rohan. Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. New York: Berkley, 2003. Hill, Peter B. The Japanese Mafia: Yakuza, Law, and the State. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. Ianni, Francis A. Black Mafia: Ethnic Succession in Organized Crime. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974. Levin, Brian. “The Patriot Movement: Past, Present, and Future.” Pp. 97–131 in The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium, edited by Harvey W. Kushner. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1998. Perry, Barbara. In the Name of Hate: Understanding Hate Crimes. New York: Routledge, 2001. Totten, Samuel, Williams S. Parsons, and Israel Charny, eds. Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2004. Varese, Federico. The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

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C. Global, Regional and National

National and International Threats: Regional Profiles Rob Hanser Introduction Improvements in communication and travel technologies have created a global community in which distance no longer precludes potential business ventures between parties that are not within the same proximity. Indeed, this same development within the business, cultural, and sociological arenas has also impacted the nature of organized crime around the world. Organized criminal syndicates that once were restricted to their own immediate locale have now found that it is both convenient and lucrative to establish networks throughout various regions of the world. Thus, organized criminal activity is both interregional and intraregional in nature and has become more complicated and difficult to track. This concise and general overview of the state of affairs in each continent, along with some quick notes on the interrelationships that these regional syndicates may have with other organizations in other areas of the world, lays the groundwork for subsequent entries that address regional organized criminal activities in a more in-depth and comprehensive manner. Africa The continent of Africa is currently in a state of turmoil. Several countries throughout this continent are either in a state of civil war or are at war with a neighboring nation. Likewise, the graft and corruption within many of these governments (such as

Nigeria and the Congo) hampers the ability of ethical law enforcement personnel to adequately combat activities instigated by organized criminals, particularly when those groups have essentially bought off many of the top government officials. Thus, the continent of Africa is particularly vulnerable to infiltration of organized criminal activities and is likewise hard-pressed to provide any true deterrent to such activities. Lastly, Africa is very rich in natural resources (such as diamonds, indigenous wildlife, precious stones, and valuable metals), and this tends to attract organized criminal syndicates to the region. Africa acts as a stopover point within the international drug trafficking industry. Drug runners en route to Europe from South America, Southeast Asia (the Golden Crescent), and Southeast Asia (the Golden Triangle) will often use various regions of this continent as a layover point during the long and arduous journey to their destinations in Europe. Likewise, it is at this point that Nigerian organized criminal syndicates often enter the picture in the international drug smuggling arena, acting as transporters who provide assistance in trafficking the drugs into Europe and further distributing them to sellers on European soil. Thus, definite interconnections between Nigerian criminal syndicates and other syndicates in South America and Southeast Asia have been found to clearly exist. Asia and the Middle East The continent of Asia is vast and includes a number of regions that could each entail an entire entry

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Melanie, 28, a former Yakuza prostitute who was tricked into traveling to the Far East, shields her face as she talks during an interview in Risaralda province, Colombia, on October 28, 2003. Japanese crime gangs enslave women by flying them to Japan under false pretenses, then forcing them into prostitution to pay off travel (John Jairo Bonilla/Reuters/Corbis)

(and indeed, independent entries do follow that provide the in-depth coverage needed for each region of this continent). However, it is perhaps best to note that there are basically three broad areas of Asia that have proven particularly noteworthy when studying organized crime: East Asia (including China, Japan, and the region of Southeast Asia), Southeast Asia (primarily including the region known as the Golden Crescent in and around Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan), and Russia (including the Ukraine and areas adjacent to East European countries).

In the area of East Asia, two primary groups immediately come to mind as being particularly influential: the Yakuza of Japan and the Snakeheads and Triads associated with China. Both groups have been actively involved in crimes involving human smuggling and drug trafficking. While business ventures may include a number of other crimes (fire arms trafficking, illicit sex industry and pornography activities, extortion, etc.) their international notoriety tends to revolve around human smuggling and trafficking, drug running, and the illicit sex industry. Furthermore, both groups have 57

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worked in tandem on occasion, while the Yakuza in particular have established operations in the United States and in Colombia. The Yakuza have established relationships with some of the Colombian drug lords and have likewise found the practice of smuggling Colombian women to Japan for use in the illegal sex industry to be a very lucrative activity. In the Golden Triangle region of Asia, opium has been in continuous production and has even been used to finance military operations among guerrilla and extremist groups in the region. In Southeast Asia, the Golden Crescent region has been notorious for producing opium and for being responsible for a substantial amount of the heroin that is smuggled into Europe. Likewise, this same drug trade has also generated funds which finance extremist groups such as Hezbollah and allegedly al-Qaeda. This underscores recent trends in orga-nized crime literature and research that have shown the continued collaboration between organized crime groups and extremist groups. Indeed, in some cases they may be one and the same. Further still, some extremist groups in these regions (such as Hezbollah) have been reported to engage in organized smuggling of rare or precious items or materials to generate funds (as with diamond smuggling schemes in the Congo that have been led by members of Hezbollah as a means of income to finance their terrorist operations). Lastly, Russian organized crime has had a history of operation that has spanned several centuries. In modern times, the protection and extortion rackets common to these groups have been extended to the United States. These groups have been very successful in perpetrating a variety of white-collar crimes (particularly in the banking, insurance, and investment industries) in Russia, the United States, and Europe. Russian organized crime groups are occasionally involved in the human smuggling enterprise in Eastern and Western Europe that is frequently linked to the illicit sex industry in Europe and abroad. Australia In Australia, organized crime syndicates have been found to be most active within the areas of drug trafficking and human smuggling. The human

smuggling issue often revolves around the illicit sex industry (a common theme among organized crime syndicates in each region of the world), particularly with Asian girls and women. However, the Australian government has taken this issue very seriously and has even gone so far as to criminalize illegal immigration into the country. Likewise, the trafficking of heroin has emerged as a problem on this continent, leading to several governmental initiatives to halt the trade in this drug. Europe The impact of organized crime throughout Europe has been both profound and debilitating. Numerous groups both internal and external to Europe engage in a diverse array of activities. One of the more recent trends has been the increase in gun trafficking as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc politico-military structure. Human smuggling seems to again emerge as a threat, with illegal and migrant workers (and sex industry participants) seeking entry into Western Europe. Likewise, drug smuggling into Portugal (particularly along the coast) and in Spain and France (particularly from Africa) continues to occur despite the more relaxed and tolerant laws associated with these crimes (when compared to the United States). The recent emergence of the European Union has been effective in coordinating continental responses to organized crime. Such organizations as Europol and various arrangements such as the Schengen Agreement demonstrate how the various nations of Europe have found it beneficial and necessary to coordinate and collaborate their efforts in combating organized criminal activity. North America North American organized crime entails that which occurs both in Canada and the United States as well as that which occurs in Mexico and Central America. The Mexican drug cartels are seemingly on the rise even though Mexico and the United States have made coordinated efforts to combat their active trafficking of cocaine (from South America) and heroin (from Mexico) into the United States (the major demand center for these drugs).

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Likewise, it has been found that numerous Latino gangs have spread throughout various areas of the United States, and many of these gangs (particularly those from Central American countries) have proven to have a strong penchant for violence. Finally, as with many organized crime groups, human smuggling problems also exist along the border between Mexico and the United States. In Canada and the United States, there has been a noticeable increase in Asian organized crime, including Chinese Triads and the Japanese Yakuza, in western sections of both nations. Other immigrants (such as those of Laotian and Vietnamese descent) have also emerged as organized crime and petty gang threats throughout Canada and the United States. Both countries have likewise seen activity among motorcycle gangs that act as couriers for organized crime syndicates and likewise are involved in numerous rackets spanning much of North America. Lastly, traditional groups such as the American Italian Mafia, while not as influential as was the case decades ago, still ply their trade throughout the United States. In total, it would appear that the United States is a virtual magnet for organized crime syndicates due to its strong demand for illicit drugs and other goods and services as well as the fairly open borders that exist despite recent improvements in internal and external security. South America Organized criminal activity in South America is fairly rampant, particularly that associated with the illicit cocaine trade. The instability of some South American governments and the heavy jungle regions throughout the continent provide an ideal environment for organized crime syndicates. The cocaine trade has continued to flourish despite efforts to counter this activity. The United States as well as Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru have worked to destabilize this activity, and while there have been noticeable results from these efforts, these criminals continue to generate substantial profits. Furthermore, these groups have been found to have networks with other organized crime syndicates from other regions of the world such as the Japanese Yakuza, Nigerian organized crime syndicates

that transport cocaine to Europe, Mexican organized crime syndicates, and traditional syndicates in the United States. Likewise, the cocaine trade in Colombia has proven to be a source of revenue for rebel militant groups that contribute to the continued governmental instability of the region. Conclusion It is clear that where there is a demand for illegal goods and services, there will be those willing to provide such services with the expectation of generating profit. This is the underlying characteristic of most organized crime activity. What is interesting is that this same common denominator seems to exist in each continent across a variety of cultural and demographic groups. Further still, many of the same demands (i.e., drugs, sex industry services, and gun trafficking) seem to exist in each region of the world. Other trends, such as the increased collaboration between organized crime and extremist group activity, have been noted to be on the increase around the world. Thus, it is clear that organized crime is likely to remain a global phenomenon that will become ever more entrenched in their local regions of origin due to local demands for services, while at the same time these groups are likely to experience growth from increased demands abroad, which leads to interconnections between regional groups spanning the globe and further serves to fuel demands for services in new markets that have typically been unavailable to many localized syndicates in the past. References Abadinsky, H. Organized Crime. 7th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2003. Abadinsky, H. “Organized Crime: Italian American Mafia.” Pp. 1096 in Encyclopedia of Criminology, vol. 2, edited by R. A. Wright and J. M. Miller. New York: Routledge, 2005. Abadinsky, H. “Organized Crime: Outlaw Motorcycle Clubs.” Pp. 1102–1103 in Encyclopedia of Criminology, vol. 2, edited by R. A. Wright and J. M. Miller. New York: Routledge, 2005. Committee on International Relations. “Combating International Crime in Africa,” 1998, http:// commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa50884 .000/hfa50884_0.HTM. 59

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David, F. Human Smuggling and Trafficking: An Overview of the Response at the Federal Level. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2000. Finckenauer, J. “Organized Crime: Russian Mafia.” Pp. 1103–1106 in Encyclopedia of Criminology, vol. 2, edited by R. A. Wright and J. M. Miller. New York: Routledge, 2005. Gentleman, J. A. The Regional Security Crisis in the Andes: Patterns of State Response. Washington, DC: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2001. Hanser, R. “Immigration and Crime in Europe.” Criminal Justice International 18(62) (2002): 7–12. Mabrey, John. “Human Smuggling from China.” Crime and Justice International 19(17) (2003): 5–10. Molina, F. P. “Japan, the Mecca for Trafficking in Colombian Women.” Global Alliance against Traffic in Women, 1999, http://www.december18 .net/web/general/paper30ColombiaJapan.pdf. Sutton, A., and S. James. Evaluation of Australian Drug Anti-Trafficking Law Enforcement. Melbourne: Australian Centre for Police Research, 1995. Takemura, N. “Organized Crime: Japanese Mobsters.” Pp. 44–67 in Encyclopedia of Criminology, vol. 2, edited by R. A. Wright and J. M. Miller. New York: Routledge, 2005. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Trend in Reduction in Colombia Continues, but New Statistics in Bolivia and Peru Warrant Close Monitoring.” Vienna, Austria, 2005, http://www .unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2005/unisnar904. html.

Organized Crime in Africa Rob Hanser The continent of Africa has provided a political climate that is ideal for organized crime syndicates to operate with virtual impunity. Indeed, much of the continent is in a virtual state of crisis, with numerous nations mired in civil wars that have continued for years and even decades. Likewise, the draught, famine, and disease (particularly the spread of HIV and AIDS) has created a state of emergency and desperation among the populations of many nations within this continent. Furthermore, there is

an abundance of extremist groups and rebel factions throughout this continent, and this ensures both the continued instability (politically, militarily, and economically) of various regions of the continent and the continued need for martial law in nations that might otherwise be amenable to more democratic approaches. Reform groups, particularly those affiliated with the United Nations (UN), are optimistic that the future of this resource-laden continent will ultimately improve, but numerous challenges have been noted among many groups. One primary challenge that impedes the possibility of reform throughout this vast continent is the continual strife that is caused by the activity of organized criminal syndicates. There exists in Africa a multitude of complex interrelationships among organized criminal syndicates, extremist groups, and various military operations. Certain types of activities may be pertinent to multiple regions or may simply be rampant throughout the entire continent. East Africa: Organized Crime and Relief Efforts Due to the problems associated with famine in East Africa, the UN has coordinated numerous forms of relief projects. However, it appears that these efforts have been undermined by warlords in Somalia who extract fees from relief providers. The warring factions within this country are a source of chaos that helps to ensure the country’s state of lawlessness. However, this form of organized criminal extortion does not parallel the internal corruption that has infiltrated the UN process itself. Indeed, it has been found that in both Kenya and Somalia, many UN officials and employees involved in these efforts were themselves members of organized crime syndicates and were responsible for siphoning off large amounts of monetary aid and supplies. An array of corrupt practices has been reported to occur in East Africa. The process of dividing aid, determining which refugees are given better resettlement options, and even the assignment of various UN officials have all been tainted by the methodical and systematic efforts of organized criminals. For the most part, complaints made by

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local citizenry have been stifled by either organized crime members or the government in Somalia. In other cases, it seems that victim complaints are simply ignored and lost in the chaos and haste of the relief program. Despite the efforts of the UN, the devastation of the area has taken its toll on the population and those working in the region. Indeed, Media Watch has likened the structure of the UN service system in the region to “an organized crime network” that “fulfill[s] the political agenda of the connected few” who have “roots with the past repressive Marxist dictatorship of Somalia and the ruling elite” of certain highly corrupted neighboring city-states in the region. These political interest groups have reportedly confiscated money from the UN and have stored substantial amounts in secret Swiss bank accounts, lining their pockets for their own future political interests in the region. Furthermore, these same criminal syndicates have been noted to print counterfeit money and have used various UN banking programs as a means of laundering the money into worldwide circulation. The generation of these funds has served to further destabilize the overall economy in the region and provides more immediate and short-term benefits to various warring factions. This also provides a source of ready revenue for the purchase of illegal firearms that are routinely trafficked into Somalia. Thus, it is clear that many of these interest groups are directly responsible for much of the civil war and unrest that has plagued Somalia in years past. East Africa: Child Smuggling, Trafficking, and Kidnapping in Sudan, Kenya, and Somalia Due to the desperation of the region, other forms of exploitation have also been noted to take place. One such activity that has been noted is the act of child smuggling from areas of East Africa, particularly Somalia. The combination of international criminal networks, the continuing international isolation of the region, and the general absence of law and order have made this activity a nearly no-risk type of crime that does not generate concern. Due to death and pestilence, the high mortality rate of children, and the frequent kidnappings of children by various extremist groups such as the Lord’s

Resistance Army, which operates in northern Uganda but makes incursions into neighboring Kenya and the Sudan, problems with missing children are essentially a normalized part of the region. Since 1987, the Lord’s Resistance Army has abducted more than 20,000 children who are used as soldiers and human fodder within the guerrilla group that continues its campaign against the Ugandan government. Of the female children who are abducted, the most attractive are forced to be wives and consorts for the upper-ranking persons of this guerrilla extremist group. As has been demonstrated in various other entries, there is an everincreasing link between organized crime activity and extremist or rebel groups in various areas of the world. Much of the smuggling of children out of Africa has been to a variety of destinations in Europe. Cases have been noted in which families in Somalia have paid to have their children smuggled out of the country, believing that they are providing them with a better life. Unfortunately, it appears that many end up in prostitution rings or are simply warehoused by persons receiving government subsidies associated with raising immigrant children. Despite this risk, parents continue to send their children because, according to L. Hannan, the smuggling of “a child abroad accrues no social shame in a society where the future is so bleak and circumstances so extreme.” Because of the lack of education and health care, many parents struggle to get their children out of the country, and smuggling is the quickest way for this to occur. In the meantime, organized criminals specializing in smuggling and trafficking procedures are constantly willing to provide the service for the right price. West Africa: Nigerian Organized Crime Of all the organized crime activities in West Africa, it is perhaps the activity of Nigerian organized crime syndicates that has drawn the most international attention. These syndicates are generally known for their involvement in various forms of fraud and their drug trafficking activities. Of all the African organized crime groups, it is the Nigerian organized crime groups that have impacted the 61

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United States and Europe the most. These criminal enterprises are involved in a wide range of criminal endeavors including financial crimes such as credit card fraud, money laundering, counterfeiting, and the alteration of official documents. These syndicates typically operate in both Africa and the United States, utilizing small interrelated cells that consist of a small cadre of members. Unlike many traditional organized crime groups, Nigerian criminal enterprises tend to be loosely structured, fluid, and dynamic. The organizational structure of syndicates is often founded along family, tribal, or village bonds and relationships. Beyond these loose structures for smaller groups, the larger syndicates do tend to have a more structured organization. The specific type of organizational structure utilized may be open to debate, but three common types of organizational structure have been observed among Nigerian organized crime syndicates. The first of these is referred to as the traditional pyramid or hierarchy. These hierarchies consist of top-rung organizers, many of whom reside in Lagos, and it is these individuals who are most closely linked with other criminal operations elsewhere in the world. Indeed, these organizers have been likened to crime barons and are often members of the elite or of the Nigerian governmental system, or both. Obviously, these individuals maximize their activities through their connections to or positions within the government, staying in Lagos to ensure that they have the most influence possible when protecting their illicit endeavors. These elite organized crime members are also among the beneficiaries of the proceeds from criminal activities abroad that pour profits back into Nigeria. The second form of organization is more of a flexible network. As noted previously, many Nigerian crime groups are fairly small, being based upon common bonds of family, tribal membership, or personal familiarity. These members will often work with larger organizations, at least on a caseby-case basis, but their work tends to be much more freelance in nature. They tend to have a high degree of autonomy due to both their smaller size (making it much easier to settle on common interests) and their lack of allegiance to more hierarchi-

cal forms of criminal organizations. The third type of organized crime group consists of the selfcontained cell in which only a handful of members work in tandem with one another. Each of these members will tend to have very specific agreedupon responsibilities, and the division of labor within the group will frequently be established in a clear and direct manner. These cells may operate as completely independent identities, or they may occasionally unite themselves with other larger organizations when such a union seems particularly lucrative. Among the activities that these groups are known for, it is the proliferation of various fraud scams that tend to be highly lucrative and easy to manage. These fraud scams are often conducted by e-mail but may include any number of mechanisms. These types of crime are often referred to as 4-1-9 or 419 frauds in reference to the section of the Nigerian penal code that addressed fraudulent schemes. Victims are targeted in roughly sixty countries around the world. It would also appear that many of the victims are elderly, particularly those in the United States. These schemes are very successful because they do not actually require the victim to transmit a bank account number or provide other access to personal accounts when solicited to do so. Rather, if the victim merely provides a letterhead, signature, and other such useful imagery, these organized criminals may use it to forge letters of recommendation to the American embassy for travel visas, to con other prospective victims, or to perpetrate identity fraud. With respect to the drug trade, the continent of Africa has emerged as a convenient intermediate transit point for drug traffickers ultimately en route to Europe or the United States. The Nigerian crime syndicates have emerged as primary organizers of the shipments that go through many areas of Africa. Nigerian drug trafficking criminal groups are likewise interlinked with the global community of organized criminals, having extensive networks in numerous foreign countries. For instance, alliances have been created between some Colombian cartels and these Nigerian criminal organizations. Within the borders of Colombia, authorities have reported increasing

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arrests of Nigerian nationals who are involved in cocaine trafficking. Furthermore, law enforcement officials in other South American nations such as Ecuador and Brazil report that Nigerian drug trafficking enterprises in those countries is highly active in the shipment of cocaine to the European drug markets. Indeed, Nigerian organized crime groups have been reported to employ more than 1,500 people in the nation of Brazil alone to assist in their drug trafficking schemes. These groups export well over ten tons of cocaine a year and continually engage in the transportation and sale of cocaine and heroin in European markets. These criminals are also active in trafficking heroin bound for Europe from Mexico, Central America, South America and Asia. In addition, the prices for cocaine in European markets are purportedly higher, and profit margins are greater than in the United States. Thus, Nigerian drug traffickers tend to make more profit for their efforts than do other traffickers who service U.S. drug consumers. Lastly, these groups tend to be very effective in making the necessary border crossings due to their prevalent use of fraudulent documents by couriers, which makes the identification and apprehension of these individuals extremely problematic. As further indication of the transnational nature of Nigerian drug trafficking, Nigerian criminal groups have also had long-standing business dealings with heroin growers in Southeast and Southwest Asia. This is particularly true in Thailand and Pakistan, where Nigerian criminal groups have established and maintained contacts with opium growers and distributors to obtain heroin for distribution in their markets in the United States and Europe. This activity has become so profitable that Nigerian crime syndicates have even been known to operate in the United States itself. Drug enforcement investigations have shown that the trafficking and selling of heroin to users in major cities such as Chicago is largely controlled by Nigerian organized crime groups. Central and South Africa In Zambia, the unique crime of emerald smuggling has been found to be particularly problematic. Zambia loses roughly US$200 million due to this

specific type of smuggling. Indeed, Zambia produces the second-highest quality of emeralds (being bested only by those coming out of Brazil). Given that the Zambian economy is so challenged and also since the emerald mining industry is so crucial to the Zambian economy, the emerald smuggling activity of organized criminal groups in that area has been devastating. Furthermore, these organized criminal groups have been found to likewise operate diamond smuggling operations in South Africa. This demonstrates that the nature of the smuggling and sale of illicit natural resources— in this case precious stones—utilizes similar (if not identical) methods and types of infrastructure, allowing these criminals to ply their illicit activities throughout numerous nations in the area. Neighbor to Angola, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Malawi, Tanzania, and Congo, Zambia is a heavily populated country with an estimated 9 million people. It is saturated with diverse racial and lingual groups. Because of Zambia’s extensive border, people are able to travel back and forth freely within and outside of the country. A part of the copper belt in the Southern African region, much of the organized crime in Zambia is centered around international demand for natural resources of various types. However, the activities of organized criminal groups in this country include a number of activities. Indeed, as Jay Albanese and colleagues indicate, “Organized crime in Zambia manifests itself in motor vehicle theft, drug trafficking, firearms, smuggling, commercial poaching, bank fraud, and money laundering.” As is often the case throughout many nations of Africa, there is an implicit link between organized criminal groups and the local law enforcement officials of the area. In Zambia, law enforcement officials reportedly often act as accomplices out of fear since many officials have been murdered by organized crime syndicates in that country. Thus, law enforcement officials simply act as an extension of the organized crime problem, providing documents such as registrations and driver’s licenses to syndicates in exchange for money and illicit services. Numerous vehicles are stolen from Zambia and are retrieved in adjoining countries, while other vehicles are found in Zambia that have 63

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been illegally stolen from neighboring countries. These vehicles are often used by the syndicates themselves or are sold or discarded for profit through extensive auto theft rings. In the nation of South Africa, organized crime syndicates have emerged throughout many of the major cities. New forms of organized crime, drug trafficking, and even the financing of extremist groups have placed the issue of money laundering as a priority for officials tasked with addressing crime problems in this nation and surrounding nations of the region. The small nations of Lesotha and Swaziland as well as Namibia and Mozambique have likewise been riddled with organized crime syndicates that are active in a variety of criminal activities. The recent relaxation of border checks into South Africa has made the country a regional hub for heroin dealers, and there are an estimated 238 small-time criminal syndicates that operate in the country. Furthermore, the laundering of drug proceeds through the international banking system has been accomplished with relative ease, as the law enforcement agencies in this country and surrounding nations are fairly inexperienced with such well-orchestrated and well-hidden types of criminal activity. Indeed, it would appear that drug cartels are providing criminals with extensive expertise, and here again (as with other areas of the continent), Nigerian organized crime groups have played a major role in the drug trafficking industry in South Africa. Indeed, Nigerian criminal groups have basically invaded Johannesburg, with roughly 60,000 Nigerian immigrants residing in the city. Neighbor to South Africa, the nation of Mozambique is the region’s second-largest drug trafficking market. As with South African drug traffickers, foreign dealers are often Nigerian (as well as others from abroad, namely South America and Southeast Asia) and tend to work independently or with local gangs in the region. The drug money in both South Africa and Mozambique is then being laundered into legitimate business enterprises such as real estate investment and construction activities. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, there has been increasingly serious concern with respect to diamond smuggling from within that nation’s resource-rich mines. This nation has been wracked

with civil war and unrest for a number of years, and conditions there are completely chaotic. This has led to some very threatening developments for the international community. Due to the nation’s instability, Islamic extremist groups have utilized this smuggling industry as a source of primary revenue to fund their worldwide acts of terrorism. One of these groups, the Lebanese-based Hezbollah, has been particularly fond of this industry. As has been mentioned previously, this again underscores the frequent overlap between organized crime activities and various extremist or guerrilla groups. D. Farah indicates that “in some cases, the militant groups have worked in [the] Congo with Lebanese diamond dealers who also conducted business in Sierra Leone with men identified by the United States as key operatives for Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda network.” Likewise, these terrorist organizations may be intertwined in other forms of resource smuggling, such as the Congo’s gold and uranium trade and the semiprecious stone tanzanite in neighboring Tanzania. Firearms Trafficking throughout Africa According to M. Brunwasser, “there is a growing industry involving firearms trafficking which has also served to exacerbate the emergence of a series of bloody civil wars in countries such as Rwanda, the Congo, and Liberia.” Many of the arms that are trafficked are provided by East European firearms traffickers, with small arms and ammunition being provided at wholesale levels to factions in Angola, Rwanda, Somalia, and the Congo. Heavy cargo planes fly large shipments of these firearms into these countries in direct violation of international embargos. As Brunwasser notes, this entails the activity of “an internationally organized network of individuals that are well funded, well connected and well versed in brokering and logistics, with the ability to move illicit cargo around the world without raising the suspicions of the law or with the ability to deal with obstacles.” Many of the civil conflicts in Central and South African nations center around control of the diamond mining territory of those countries, and as was noted previously, this has also attracted the criminal interests of various extremist groups and

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firearms have been termed blood diamonds by many locals in Africa. Because this exchange is so lucrative and due to the availability of a large surplus of firearms from the previous Soviet Eastern bloc region of Europe and to the ease with which diamonds and other precious gems are smuggled from the region, coupled with the intense demand for firearms from nations throughout the entire continent of Africa, it is likely that this particular form of organized criminal activity will only continue for years to come.

Bodies of refugees line the roadside in Rwanda, victims of cholera and the strife instigated by civil war, October 1994. The chaos created by civil wars in Africa provides fertile ground for smuggling and black markets. (Department of Defense)

organized crime syndicates. These syndicates ply their trade of smuggling the diamond resources out of the country while simultaneously providing arms (often in exchange for the diamonds that they in turn sell for huge profits) to warring factions that further induce instability in this region of the continent. This then further adds to the chaotic political climate of the region, making the area all the more ideal for further activities by organized crime syndicates, creating a cycle of activities that economically feed one another. Because of this trade in firearms and because of the extensive human misery caused by the internal strife and conflict exacerbated by the widespread availability of these firearms, the diamonds used as exchange for

Wildlife Poaching throughout Africa One crime that seems to be common in Africa is the poaching of rare and exotic animal resources. At first glance, such an activity might not seem to be nearly as serious or economically damaging as many of the other activities noted throughout the continent. However, a close examination of the economic costs associated with this organized criminal activity demonstrates otherwise. For instance, in 2000–2001, the Bubiana Conservancy of southern Zimbabwe lost approximately 300,000 animals that were worth US$28.5 billion, all due to the illegal enterprise of poaching. Other countries have also experienced severe losses of their unique and rare animal species. Consider also that in Zambia, Kenya, and Niger, populations of black rhinos, elephants, and giraffes have been decimated, while millions of dollars have lined the pockets of smugglers who sell horns, tusks, and skins in various underground markets throughout the world. Such losses and the international concern over the possible extinction of some of these species has caused multiple law enforcement agencies throughout Africa to join together in order to save wildlife resources from further destruction. One example of this unified effort would be the Lusaka Agreement Task Force (LATF), which has collaborated with the United Nations Environmental Program. Together, these organizations have established a common ground between law enforcement agencies that aid in protecting the animal resources of Africa that were once so abundant but now are a rare commodity that is trafficked within illicit organized criminal networks. 65

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Conclusion The continent of Africa is currently plagued with civil strife, economic instability, famine, and disease. Although Africa is rich in mineral and animal resources, much of these resources seem to serve as a magnet that attracts organized crime ventures due to the inability of many African governments to provide counterresponses to such activities. The weak border security common to most African nations together with the sense of chaos that forebodes much of the continent serves to make such activities fairly easy to pursue. Given the high profits that can be generated and the sense of desperation among much of the populace in many regions of Africa, it is likely that organized crime will continue to be a scourge that further plagues the continent and serves to further perpetuate the instability there, the very instability that makes the efforts of these criminal syndicates possible in the first place.

References Albanese, Jay S., Dilip K. Das, and Arvind Verma. World Perspectives: Organized Crime. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003. Brunwasser, M. “The Embargo Buster: Fueling Bloody Civil Wars.” Frontline World, 2002, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/ sierraleone/bout.html. Committee on International Relations. “Combating International Crime in Africa,” 1998, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/ hfa50884.000/hfa50884_0.HTM. “Drug Crime Wracks Southern Africa.” BBC News, 20 August 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ africa/3167125.stm. Farah, D. “Digging Up Congo’s Dirty Gems.” Global Policy Forum, 30 December 2001, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/ diamond/2001/1230hezbol.htm. Hannan, L. “Somali’s Smuggling Children Overseas.” BBC News, 17 January 2003, http://news.bbc.co .uk/1/hi/world/africa/2667495.stm. Hanser, Robert. “Poaching Problem Growing.” Crime & Justice International 18 (2002): 7–15. Somali Historical Society of North America. “Corruption and Extortion in High Places,” 23 February 2001, http://www.somaliawatch.org/ archivefeb01/010223202.htm.

Plautt, M. “Profile: Uganda’s LRA Rebels.” BBC News, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ africa/3462901.stm. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. IRIN Web Special on Separated Somali Children. 2003, http://www.irinnews.info/ webspecials/Somalichildren/default.asp.

Organized Crime in Asia Richard H. Ward and Daniel J. Mabrey Since the end of the Cold War, crime has been a troubling issue for most of the developing economies of Asia. Many of these states have been characterized by corruption, unstable or weak governments, and, in many cases, criminal justice systems that have neither the funding nor the technology necessary to cope with increasingly sophisticated criminal activity. In many countries throughout Asia, organized criminal groups have long histories, in some cases dating back hundreds of years. In virtually all cases, these groups have been evolutionary, adapting to changing political conditions, to warfare (both domestically and internationally), and, perhaps most important, to the development of technology, communications, travel, and the emergence of a global economy. There are four major types of transnational organized criminality prevalent in Asia: arms trafficking, human trafficking, narcotics trafficking, and corruption. The ten Asian countries discussed here were chosen based on the uniqueness of the organized crime groups, their interrelationships with other groups, and the availability of data and information on organized crime activities within the countries. China The People’s Republic of China (PRC), with a population of more than 1 billion, is the largest country in the world and has evolved since 1949 from a relatively isolated country to a burgeoning superpower. The criminal justice system has undergone numerous changes from the time when the country opened up to the West in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Although crime in China is relatively low by

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A member of Guangzhou’s largest criminal gang looks around during a trial at Guangzhou Municipal Intermediate People’s Court on August 5, 2005, in Guangdon Province, China. Thirty-five members of the gang are accused of crimes ranging from extortion to drug trafficking, kidnapping, and murder. (Getty Images)

Western standards, China has experienced an increasing crime problem since the early 1990s, due in no small measure to a growing economy and the ability of organized crime to move more freely throughout the country. Organized crime in China is somewhat amorphous but generally takes two similar forms. The first involves criminal activity by gangs such as the Triads, frequently in cooperative ventures involving black market activities, large burglaries, thefts, and hijackings. These gangs are also involved in extortion of small businesses. Criminal syndicates make up the second form of Chinese organized crime and are involved in more sophisticated crimes such as prostitution, illegal immigration, slavery, and other organized forms of vice. Historically, Chinese law enforcement officials maintained that organized crime was virtually eliminated under the leadership of Mao Zedong, but it is doubtful that organized crime ever left the coun-

try. Rather, the Triad societies, which moved to Hong Kong following the fall of the Guomindang (Nationalist) government, still maintained a clandestine presence on the mainland. Although data relative to the increase of Triad activity in China is scarce, public security officials are now acknowledging the increasing presence of Triad groups from Hong Kong. There have also been reports of Triads forming drug trafficking networks with the Bamboo Union gangs in Taiwan, the Yakuza in Japan, and even drug cartels from Colombia. The U.S. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs reported that China is a major transit point for illegal narcotics produced in the Golden Triangle, and the largest number of seizures of Southeast Asian heroin now occurs within the country. The southern areas of China will also continue to be major transit routes for Southeast Asian heroin. Heroin in particular is pouring in to China from

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Thailand, Myanmar, and Laos. China is also a major source country for precursor chemicals such as ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and acetic anhydride and is a major producer of crystal methamphetamine. Unemployment and what is commonly referred to as the floating population have created widespread migration to the cities and contribute to increases in organized criminal activities. A significant number of these migrants turn to drug trafficking as a means of supporting themselves, especially when a low-level drug dealer in China can make more money in a day than a farmer would make in a year. The exploitation of women and children for sex and human trafficking by organized criminal groups represents another major problem for China. Yunnan, Sichuan, and Guizhou Provinces are the principal areas from which many women are kidnapped or sold into slavery. Within the country, prostitution has become a major source of revenue for the poor, and as drug addiction has increased, the problem has become more widespread. In the larger cities, organized crime has taken over much of the sex trade, and corruption of police and civilians, such as hotel employees and cab drivers, has contributed to the problem. The custom of bride-selling has returned, and women and girls from North Korea and Vietnam are commonly trafficked into China as wives. Illegal immigration has also become a lucrative business for organized crime, and the smuggling of individuals to all parts of the world has become commonplace. Chinese organized crime groups, especially the Triads, are deeply involved in the human trade business. Traffickers, known as Snakeheads, are part of a global network wherein an individual might pay $30,000 or more to enter the United States. Within the United States, a well-organized criminal network has been developed to foster illegal immigration. Many if not most of the illegal immigrants must work for years to pay off their debt, and many women are destined to be forced into prostitution. Chinese Triads have assumed control of the smuggling of illegal immigrants from smaller familyoperated organizations as an increasingly attractive alternative to drug trafficking because it promises

multibillion-dollar profits without the same severe penalties if caught. Beyond the Triads and sophisticated criminal syndicates, thousands of minor gangs exist throughout the country and are involved in a wide range of illegal thefts and commerce violations. As they become more sophisticated and as travel becomes easier, it is likely that they will broaden their activities and begin to cooperate with other criminal groups. Hong Kong It is interesting that Hong Kong, one of the most successful communities in Asia, has one of the most advanced criminal justice systems in the world yet continues to be the center of Triad activity in Asia. One police estimate calculated as many as fifty Triad societies in Hong Kong, the largest being the Wo Sing Wo and the 14K. Unlike in many of the other countries in Asia, illegal drug trafficking is not viewed as a major problem in Hong Kong, and police place a high priority on drug suppression and the control of precursor chemicals. Drugs smuggled in are primarily for local consumption. Hong Kong is solely a destination point for trafficking women for the purposes of sexual exploitation, with a majority of the women coming from Mainland China, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. Organized crime groups in Hong Kong are heavily involved in counterfeit goods operations and the resale of stolen consumer goods in Hong Kong. This network feeds a massive money laundering operation in Hong Kong that is used to fund other criminal activities and legitimate front businesses. Corruption in Hong Kong is significantly lower than in the other Asian countries in large part because of the anticorruption police units, which are some of most powerful in the world. Japan In recent years, a sluggish economy and revelations about the influence of organized crime, particularly the Yakuza or Boryokudan, in Japanese government and businesses has cast a cloud over Japan’s national crime control efforts. This Yakuza should be considered among the vanguard of organized crime groups

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for the way they have infiltrated Japanese society and government, including the police. The Yakuza influence has infiltrated banks, real estate agencies, corporations, and government, prompting major scandals. The Yakuza are reported to make millions of dollars per year through corporate extortion. Their senior membership is known to buy a small number of shares in a company so that they can attend shareholders’ meetings and spot corporate targets for extortion. There are an estimated 110,000 active members who are part of as many as 2,500 crime families. In 2001, the Japanese National Police arrested 9,893 Yakuza members for possession of stimulants, 1,949 for extortion, and 1,398 for gambling. The exploitation of women by the Yakuza has been an ongoing problem, largely as a result of the large number of foreigners trafficked or smuggled from the Philippines and Thailand who are involved in prostitution. Many of these women turn to Yakuza members to arrange travel to Japan and the United States for work, but when they arrive they are often forced into the Japanese sex trade. Cambodia The major transnational criminal activities in Cambodia are controlled largely by Chinese and Myanmarese organized crime groups and are closely tied to drug and human trafficking. Cambodia has been cited by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) as a source country for the growth of marijuana, which is trafficked largely in Europe, and as a transit country on the international drug market for the distribution of Southeast Asian heroin. Heroin is moved from Laos and Thailand through Phnom Penh as part of the global drug trade. Within the country there has been a significant increase in the use of methamphetamine by young people, prompting the government to take an active role in working with international agencies in antidrug activities. In spite of these improved international relationships, the existence of widespread corruption hampers enforcement efforts. Gambling, prostitution, and money laundering have also fostered the existence of global organized crime networks in the country.

Cambodia, like many nations in Southeast Asia, has a serious problem with human smuggling and trafficking. It is estimated that the number of victims of trafficking in the sex industry ranges from 2,000 to more than 3,000 annually, approximately 80 percent of whom are Vietnamese women and girls. Human traffickers in Cambodia use a variety of methods to acquire victims. In many cases, victims are lured by the promises of legitimate employment. It is not uncommon for a victim’s acquaintances, friends, or even family members to sell the victim outright or receive payment for helping to deceive them. Young children, the majority of them girls, are commonly pledged to brokers or middlemen as collateral for loans by desperately poor parents. The children are then held responsible for repaying the loan and the accumulating interest. Republic of Korea Organized crime in Korea has a unique history when compared to that of other Asian nations. As Korea began to modernize in the 1800s, groups of young men, called Keondal, were formed in and around the places they worked, such as bars, gambling houses, and construction sites. The Keondal were not considered criminal groups, even though they engaged in criminal activities and violence between each other, because they honored loyalty and faithfulness and would sometimes help the weak and the poor. This changed as Korea began to modernize after the Korean War. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Korean organized crime groups developed into nationwide organizations, with some groups even extending their activities to foreign countries through associations with the Yakuza and other organized crime groups in the United States. As of January 2000, the prosecutors in the Violent Crime Department (the agency charged with combating organized crime) estimated that there were more than 11,500 members in 404 organized crime families or groups in Korea, with the average criminal organization having 35 members (Park, 2001). Drug trafficking is the main criminal enterprise for Korean organized crime, with most shipments originating in drug factories in China and Japan 69

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before being smuggled into countries throughout Asia and into the United States. This is interesting because unlike most countries in Asia, drug use is not common among people in Korean society. Prostitution and the exploitation of women is a common problem, due in no small measure to the presence of the large American military presence in the country. However, the U.S. military in Korea now maintains a zero-tolerance policy regarding trafficking and is working with the Korean government to ensure that trafficking is eliminated from establishments that surround U.S. military bases. Russian and Korean-Chinese criminal organizations are involved in trafficking women and migrant workers. The Russian Mafiya provides job opportunities as entertainers to young Russian women and assists them in obtaining Korean tourist visas. The women who apply are sent to Korea to work in entertainment businesses as dancers or barmaids, although they often eventually end up as prostitutes. Myanmar Myanmar, formerly Burma, is a major opiumproducing country with a government and criminal justice system that is rife with corruption. Both of these factors make Myanmar an attractive environment for organized crime and its activities. Drug production and trafficking in Myanmar are controlled by several so-called armies that in effect are the largest organized crime groups in the world. Armed ethnic groups such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Kokang Chinese, and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) control the cultivation areas, refine opium into heroin, and also produce methamphetamine. In areas controlled by the UWSA, the government has virtually no control and has not attempted to eliminate opium production, claiming that cracking down on the organization jeopardizes Myanmar’s national security. Myanmar is a major source country for persons trafficked for labor and sexual exploitation. Many Burmese women can be found in the sex industries of Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Hong Kong, and even Japan. The military is often directly involved

in trafficking for forced labor, and there are reports that some children have been forcibly enlisted into the Myanmar Army. The Myanmar government has been repeatedly censured by international human rights organizations for its forced labor practices. Other Asian Countries In Taiwan, organized crime is controlled largely by the Bamboo Union Gangs. These gangs have close relationships with Triad groups in China and Hong Kong and are primarily involved in drug trafficking (methamphetamine and heroin) from Mainland China. Prostitution, controlled largely by organized crime, was outlawed in 1997, giving rise to floating brothels off the coast of Taiwan. According to one estimate, there were still 60,000 female child prostitutes (ages twelve to seventeen) in Taiwan in 1999, most of whom were sold by their parents to criminal syndicates. The Philippines has long been a haven for the sex industry, both within the country and as part of the human export trade. Organized crime groups control virtually every aspect of the commerce in women and children. Thousands of women are sent to Japan, Thailand, and other countries, and the Philippines is also a major provider of young children for pedophiles who travel from countries throughout the world, including the United States, on so-called sex tours. There are approximately 7.4 million overseas Filipino workers living and working all over the world. It is estimated that 1.62 million of them are irregular migrants, although many are suspected to be victims of trafficking. Thailand’s multibillion-dollar sex industry is one of the most notorious in the world. Organized crime groups have imported an estimated 1 million women from China, Laos, and Vietnam to Thailand. According to the United Nations Children’s Fund, the number of children engaged in prostitution varies from 60,000 to 200,000, with 5 percent of those being boys. Global criminal networks involved in Thailand’s drug trafficking, money laundering, and prostitution operate from China, Hong Kong, Japan, and Singapore. Most of the transnational organized crime groups operating in Vietnam are from bases in other Asian countries, but there are a growing

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number of Vietnamese organized gangs (namely affiliates of the Nam Cam Gang), many of which display characteristics of the more sophisticated groups in Hong Kong and China. The U.S. Department of State has identified Vietnam as a major transit point and production entity for heroin. Heroin from Laos, Myanmar, China, and Thailand and marijuana from Cambodia are frequently moved through Vietnam by organized crime groups. The Future of Asian Organized Crime Organized crime in Asia will continue to grow well into the early twenty-first century. Within the individual countries that have spawned organized criminal activity, many groups have expanded their operations because of weak criminal justice systems and high levels of police corruption. Many of these groups have histories that span several hundred years, and they enjoy tightly knit memberships strengthened by the bonds of familial ties and communal values of honor and loyalty found in Asian societies. Since the late 1980s, one of the most important changes has been the introduction of new forms, or at least more sophisticated forms, of organized crime. Human smuggling, corruption, and the changing nature of the drug trade extensively involve criminal groups. There is evidence that many of the traditional groups in the area of human smuggling have been replaced with small individual cells that operate independently and are motivated by financial gain rather than honor. This changing trend toward the subcontracting of criminal activities to street gangs and loosely tied affiliates poses a new dilemma for law enforcement in its efforts to develop intelligence and clear legal cases. These challenges are compounded in countries where there is no effective mechanism to conduct sophisticated criminal investigations into organized crime. References Bremner, B. “How the Mob Burned the Banks.” Business Week 3460(29) (January 1996): 42–47. Bruno, A. “Unique Gang Organizations—The Yakuza.” Court TV Crime Library, 2003,

http://www.crimelibrary.com/gangsters_outlaws/ gang/. Drug Enforcement Administration. Drug Intelligence Briefs: Cambodia, China, Myanmar. Washington, DC: DEA Publications, 2004. Juvida, S. F. “Philippines—Children: Scourge of Child Prostitution.” IPS-Third World News, October 12 1997, http://www.ips.fi/koulut/ 199742/6.htm. National Police Agency, Criminal Investigation Bureau. “Criminal Trends.” Japan Information Network, 10 October 2002. Park, Y. K. Transnational Organized Crime and the Countermeasures in Korea. Resource Material Series No. 58 of the 116th International Training Course. UNAFEI. Harumi-cho, Fuchu, Tokyo, Japan, 2001, http://www.unafei.or.jp/ english/pdf/PDF_rms/no58/58-06.pdf. United States Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. March 2004, http://www.state.gov/p/ inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/.

Triads and Tongs: Asian Organized Crime in America Hua-Lun Huang Historical Background Creating secret societies to fulfill certain socioeconomic, religious, or political functions by lowerclass people has a long history in China. For instance, during the final years of the Han dynasty (202 B.C.–A.D. 220), bankrupt peasants, drifters, urban outcasts, peddlers, and other lowborn individuals founded various clandestine sectarian organizations to acquire economic resources necessary for livelihood, to be possessed by supernatural beings, to share information about the preordained fate of imperial government, or even to initiate antigovernment revolutionary movements. During the Song (A.D. 960–1267), Yuan (A.D. 1280–1368), and Ming (A.D. 1368–1644) dynasties, people from the bottom layer of society continued the practice of creating secret associations (such as the White Lotus Sect, the Society of Brothers and Elders, and the Green Gang) to obtain economic support or spiritual comforts or to challenge the 71

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authority of imperial governments. Within the context of this long history of establishing and utilizing secret associations to perform miscellaneous social functions, the first Triad society (Sanhehui, also known as Tiandihui, the Society of Heaven and Earth) was founded by Wan Ti Xi, a roaming Fujianese monk, in the 1760s (i.e., during the midQing dynasty, A.D. 1644–1911). Since one of the aliases of monk Wan Ti Xi is Hong Er (both Wan and Hong are last names, as given names are always preceded by family names in Chinese names), some modern Triad societies are also called Hong Men (i.e., the Hong League; in Chinese, the literal meanings of “Hong” are sonorous, grand, enormous, or immense), as some tongs (literally, a grandiose room where the judge can adjudicate cases, festival-related rituals will be performed, or important family/clan decisions will be made) in Chicago, New York, San Francisco, Toronto, Vancouver, and the other big cities in North America bear the title. What should be noted is that in addition to Hong Men or tongs, Triad societies can also bear the overarching title of shan (mountain). This is because Triad societies are acephalous or highly decentralized groups. Any Triad society can name itself as so-and-so shan or tong. At any rate, present-day Triad societies in North America and Europe usually label themselves as so-and-so tong, while those in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the other Asian countries usually choose the blanket titles of shan. Typologies of the Triad Societies Compared to a number of modern Triad societies in Asia, Europe, and North America that have become either violent street gangs or organized crime syndicates, the first Triad society set up by monk Hong Er was not a criminal assembly. On the contrary, the original purpose for Hong Er was to form a mutual aid group that would allow lowincome and unemployed people to help each other financially and emotionally in order to survive in a highly disadvantaged social and geographic environment. Despite its original intention to provide reciprocal assistance, the activities of the Triads, after more than two hundred years of evolution, can be summarized into four categories: mutual

help-oriented triads, revolution-involved triads, ideology-directed triads, and criminal triads. Mutual Help-Oriented Triads Some of the modern Triad societies or tongs still focus their activities on the provision of economic, financial, or social services to members, as did their predecessors in eighteenth-century China. Because of that, such Triads can be viewed as the Chinese equivalents of the Salvation Army or other Western philanthropic organizations. This characteristic can be clearly seen from those tongs (e.g., the Chinese Six Companies of New York City that in 1883 was renamed the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association) founded in America (particularly in San Francisco, New York City, and Washington, D.C.) and Canada (especially Vancouver) during the 1850s to 1890s when numerous Chinese immigrants experienced white hostility, anti-Asian racism, or even anti-Chinese violence. Revolution-Involved Triads The second category of contemporary Triad societies is that of Republican revolution participation. In the 1890s and 1900s, Sun Yat-Sen and his associates came to America and Canada to raise funds hoping that overseas Chinese would assist their efforts to overthrow the Qing government. A few tongs (such as Zhi Gong Tong) in Chicago, Honolulu, New York City, San Francisco, and Vancouver became Sun’s supporters. This participation in the Republican movement of China (1880s–1911) deeply influenced the political stance of modern tongs because after the Republican government was established in 1911, tongs generally considered the Guomindang (Nationalist) government to be the sole legitimate government of China. With such a firm identification, the Nationalist government in China (1911–1949) and in Taiwan (1950–2000) has enjoyed several decades of support from tongs (of course, the Nationalist government has provided decades of financial support to tongs in return) despite the fact that the communists took over China in late 1949. The Nationalist government lost to the independence-advocated and anti-China Democratic Progressive Party government in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections in Taiwan.

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Because of this great political transformation, there has been a tendency that after 2000, some tongs started to change their political attitude and attempted to establish a patron-client relationship with the Chinese communist government. This implies that if any tongs, which usually look like legitimate nonprofit organizations, get involved in illegal businesses such as gambling, prostitution, or human smuggling and trafficking, they might use the special funds received from the communist government to cover up or even to perpetuate those illegitimate businesses, as they did during the Nationalist government era. Ideology-Directed Triads As previously mentioned, following the 2000 presidential election in Taiwan, parts of modern tongs have become supporters of the Chinese communist government. On the other hand, there are tongs that still consider the Nationalist party as the only legitimate government of China and Taiwan. Such jingoistic tongs manifest the third attribute of modern Triad societies, namely extremist nationalism. Extreme nationalist tongs may have something to do with the underground economy or illegal behaviors, just like some nonideological tongs. But what really makes them notorious among liberal Americans, Chinese, and Taiwanese Americans who are pro-Taiwanese independence is that under the auspices of the Nationalist government, these ideology-directed tongs became involved in political murder, intimidation, interethnic assault, and other political crimes of the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. These connections with Nationalist statesponsored crimes faded away gradually after the mid-1990s. However, there is no evidence that radical nationalist tongs have lost their power or influences in Chinatowns. Criminal Triads The fourth and final category of modern Triad societies or tongs is that compared to the tongs that are involved in organized criminal activity simply on a case-by-case basis, some Triad tongs have become stable elements of the so-called black society (i.e., criminal world). Triad societies or tongs engaging in crime or vice are not new to law enforcement

authorities in America. As early as 1882 when the Chinese Exclusion Act was implemented, some Triad members and tongs were already deeply involved with tong wars, gambling, prostitution, and opium use. This phenomenon seems to be closely related to the emergence of American Chinatowns. American Chinatowns and Criminal Triads According to Iris Chang, Jeffrey Scott McIllwain, and John Kuo Wei Tchen, the formation of Chinatowns is an epitome of social injustice of American society. That is, the appearance of Chinatowns is a manifestation of anti-Chinese racism because American media of the nineteenth century generally portrayed Chinese immigrants as weird, corrupt, uncivilized, or even wicked people with unique customs and behavioral styles. With such a

Police examine the body of a Hip Sing Tong member in Chinatown, New York, in 1924. The shooting death was, allegedly, the result of a gang war among rival Tongs. (Corbis) 73

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stereotypical image, numerous Chinese immigrants in the 1800s were isolated from Caucasian Americans and could not be Americanized (for single Chinese males, one of the leading obstacles of Americanization was the difficulty in marrying white women). Without the opportunity to be assimilated into the host society, most nineteenthcentury Chinese immigrants could not move and instead stayed in given districts of certain cities. Chinese enclaves within large cities in turn became environments of Chinese criminality because social isolation, to a considerable extent, turned Chinatowns into de facto self-governed communities where Chinese affairs seldom, if ever, were arbitrated by white law enforcement agents. On the other hand, self-governance offered some tongs and related Chinese underground elements chances to perpetuate criminal behaviors (such as con games, murder, extortion, loan-sharking, etc.). During and after World War II, the media began describing Chinese Americans as a model minority because of the prominent wartime performance of many Chinese Americans. Nevertheless, Chinatowns to a varying extent are still marginalized places in American society. Such nonmainstream and closed statuses pave the way for criminal Triad societies, street gang-connected tongs, or Chinese street gangs to victimize Chinatown residents on a regular basis. References Chang, Iris. The Chinese in America: A Narrative History. New York: Penguin, 2003. Chin, Ko-Lin. Chinatown Gangs: Extortion, Enterprise, and Ethnicity. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Dai, Xuan-Zhi. Zhong Guo Mi Mi Zong Jiao Yu Mi Mi Hui She (Chinese Secret Religions and Societies). 2 vols. Taipei, Taiwan: Commercial Press, 1990. Dillon, Richard H. The Hatchet Men: The Story of the Tong Wars in San Francisco’s Chinatown. New York: Coward-McCann, 1962. Kaplan, David E. Fires of Dragon: Politics, Murder, and the Kuomintang. New York: Atheneum, 1992. Ma, L. Eve Armentrout. Revolutionaries, Monarchists, and Chinatowns: Chinese Politics in the Americas and the 1911 Revolution. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990.

McIllwain, Jeffrey Scott. Organizing Crime in Chinatown: Race and Racketeering in New York City, 1890–1910. Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2004. Miller, Stuart Creighton. The Unwelcome Immigrant: The American Image of the Chinese, 1785–1882. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969. Miscevic, Dusanka, and Pete Kwong. Chinese Americans: The Immigrant Experience. Westport, CT: Hugh Lauter Levin Associates, 2000. Murray, Dian H. The Origins of the Tiandihui: The Chinese Triads in Legend and History. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994. Tchen, John Kuo Wei. New York before Chinatown: Orientalism and the Shaping of American Culture, 1776–1882. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. Tong, Benson. Unsubmissive Women: Chinese Prostitutes in Nineteenth-Century San Francisco. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994.

Organized Crime in Australia: Drug Trafficking and Human Smuggling Robert Hanser and Nathan Moran Drug Trafficking Drug problems in Australia revolve more around the demand for what are typically referred to as soft drugs within the variety of illicit drugs that are trafficked. Consumer demand for these soft drugs (i.e., marijuana and amphetamines) continues to increase, and these drugs are mostly grown or manufactured in Australia. However, the use of harder drugs (such as heroin and cocaine) does not seem to be the major drug concern in Australia, and these drugs are seldom produced within the borders of the country. Despite this, Australia does serve as a transit point for certain drugs leaving one country and destined for another. Indeed, heroin from the Golden Triangle (Southeast Asian manufacturers) bound for the U.S. drug market may first make a brief stop in Australia while in transit. Likewise, Australia has been known to serve as a transshipment point for cocaine from South America (notably Colombia) that is destined for arrival in Southeast Asia. This is particularly true in areas of Southeast Asia that cater to licit and illicit tourist demands for fun and pleasure.

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Therefore, it is due to the strategic geographical location of Australia that many drugs tend to pass through these borders. Thus, illicit drug use has been noted as a growing problem among the Australian population. From the available arrest and conviction records and from various forms of survey research, it is clear that the most frequent drugs of choice in Australia are marijuana and amphetamines. Likewise, these two drugs tend to be grown or produced by the native population of this country, although on occasion some may be trafficked from neighboring New Zealand. Anecdotal evidence coupled with arrest data points to the likelihood that cocaine, smuggled in from South America and the United States, is a growing concern. However, the use of cocaine and arrests for cocaine continue to remain low in comparison with other illicit drugs in Australia. Seizures of cocaine in Australia remain low in comparison to seizures of the drug on an international basis. Lastly, problems with heroin consumption are noted as a problem in Tasmania, but this is largely confined to this area and is not seen as a major problem throughout the remainder of the continent of Australia due to effective controls to prevent growth in trafficking of the licit opium crop. Cultivation and Production Cannabis is the only illicit drug known to actually be cultivated in Australia. Crop yields have not decreased despite the increased eradication efforts of Australian law enforcement agencies. Furthermore, Australian law enforcement officials continue to report increased sophistication among growers who use indoor and hydroponic methods of growing marijuana. The manufacturing of amphetamines has also been noted to be on the increase, although this actually pales in comparison to the production of marijuana. While heroin is not a primary drug problem in Australia, the trafficking of the drug through Australia has increased among Asian-based criminal groups. This trend is expected to continue as demand for these types of drugs increases in other areas of the world. The primary source for heroin trafficked through Australia continues to be the Golden Triangle area

of Laos, Burma, and Thailand. Ecstasy consumed in Australia is primarily imported from Europe, with some shipments transiting Asia prior to arrival in Australia. South American cocaine trafficking organizations are utilizing the improved transportation and commercial links between Australia and South America to facilitate the smuggling of cocaine. From Australian arrest records, it is clear that couriers from South America are intercepted at international airports on a routine basis. Cannabis It has been estimated that approximately 226,000 Australians use cannabis at least weekly and that on average these users consume roughly 10 grams per week, with a total annual consumption of about 120,000 kilograms. Furthermore, at a price of $450 per ounce (the typical street price), this amounts to an annual business of approximately $1.905 billion in revenue. Further still, it has been estimated that roughly 90 percent of the total cannabis market (108,000 kilograms) can be attributed to the local production of the drug within the borders of Australia itself). Thus, the trafficking of cannabis from other origins consists of only a small portion of the total marijuana drug trade. To this day, cannabis remains the most popular illicit drug in the country, and the vast majority of all drug-related arrests are concerned with cannabis offenses. This is course not at all surprising, because of the popularity of the drug in Australia and since the vast majority of this drug is grown within the borders of Australia. Although most of this drug is grown internally, Australian officials still remain vigilant in attempting to thwart potential importation of cannabis. Heroin There are approximately 3,360 frequent users of heroin in Australia. When considering calculations based on average weekly consumption rates for different frequency levels of user, it has been estimated that an annual consumption figure of 350 kilograms at 80 percent purity is trafficked in Australia, mainly in and around the area of Tasmania. At street prices of $500 a gram, this adds up to roughly $699 million that is circulated around this 75

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A crew member from the North Korean ship Pong Su is escorted to a plane in Sydney on April 23, 2003, as he is extradited to the state of Victoria to face charges of drug smuggling. The ship was boarded by armed forces off the coast of New South Wales and escorted to Sydney harbor after allegedly unloading heroin in Victoria. (Reuters/Corbis)

aspect of the illicit drug trade. From this figure, it can be seen that the amount of money generated from the heroin industry amounts to well less than half of that generated from the marijuana trade. It is generally thought that most heroin entering the country arrives by courier via commercial airline flights. Likewise, crews on commercial shipping and oceangoing yachts have been found to be involved in the importation of heroin. This distribution process is thought to resemble a pyramidshaped organizational scheme in which importers sell kilograms to wholesalers who cut the purity of the drug by 50 percent prior to selling the product to dealers as ounce measurements. From this point, these dealers cut the heroin to street purity and sell it in 5 and 10-gram bags to small-time deal-

ers who often are also users of the drug. These lower-end dealers then sell to users in half grams, grams, and smaller single-use dosages. Most of the heroin consumed in Australia is produced, in rank order, in the Golden Triangle (the intersection region of Burma, Laos, and Thailand), the Golden Crescent (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran) and the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. Hong Kong is a major transshipment port for Australian heroin imports from Southeast Asia, as are Malaysia and Singapore. Vietnam is also emerging as a transit country. Cocaine Data on cocaine use is very unreliable from within Australia. It is estimated that roughly 6,600 persons are cocaine users who consume more than once a

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month. It is generally thought that the cocaine trade is much less organized in Australia than the heroin trade. Trafficking of this drug typically occurs through small amounts arriving via the mail or carried on commercial flights for personal use. Otherwise, the trafficking of this drug is virtually nonexistent in Australia, at least according to official government and other research-based sources. Amphetamines Data-based research is currently not sufficient to provide estimates of the number of amphetamine users in Australia. Generally, many law enforcement officials and researchers in Australia contend that the trade in amphetamines has been most closely associated with biker groups. Furthermore, the majority of amphetamines are largely produced in Australia in illegal and covert laboratories as opposed to being imported into the country. Law Enforcement Efforts Australian law enforcement agencies continue aggressive counternarcotics efforts. The responsibility for such efforts is divided among several agencies including the Australian Federal Police (AFP), the Australian Customs Service (ACS), and the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) as well as various state and territorial police services throughout the country. The AFP and other Australian law enforcement agencies continue to have close working relationships with U.S. agencies including the DEA and the FBI. During the past decade, the AFP has seen an increase in liaison activities in an effort to focus on transnational crime including drug trafficking, terrorist activities, and people smuggling.

involvement of organized crime groups. The involvement of these groups is of concern not only from a criminal justice perspective but also from a human rights perspective. There is the concern that the involvement of organized crime groups may increase the likelihood that situations of human smuggling will be elevated to situations more correctly described as human trafficking. Most undocumented workers in the Australian sex industry have entered that industry voluntarily. In other words, these women are willing contenders who have identified the sex industry as a lucrative option. Indeed, official reports and survey-based research indicate that there are very few cases of women having been deceived about the nature of the work they will undertake in the Australian sex industry. Rather, the issues of deception and coercion are more likely to arise in relation to the terms and conditions of their employment. Law Enforcement Efforts In 2003, the Australian government announced a $20 million initiative to combat both the smuggling and the trafficking in persons. Most officials in Australia contend that while there is a distinct difference between smuggling and trafficking of persons into Australia, the actors engaged in both activities tend to be one and the same. Because of this, some of the initiatives developed are designed to handle both sets of illegal immigration issues with the thought that many of those targeted will fall into both areas of criminal activity. Indeed, Australia is one of the few countries that has actually criminalized illegal immigration, and the government there has pursued many aggressive measures pertaining to both human smuggling and trafficking. Some of these initiatives include the following:

Human Smuggling From the available information on people smuggling and trafficking to Australia, it appears that overstaying is by far the most common method of entering and working in the country illegally. Human smuggling is a far less common practice, with unlawful entry by air being the most frequently practiced method, followed by unlawful entry by sea. Human smuggling to Australia appears to be increasingly sophisticated in nature, suggesting the

1. A twenty-three-member AFP mobile strike team to investigate trafficking and sexual servitude was established in 2003. 2. Immigration officials have been assigned to the Australian embassy in Bangkok to investigate human smuggling and trafficking in Southeast Asia. 3. There has been an effort to increase cooperation among countries in the regions of Southeast Asia 77

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and Oceania to combat human smuggling and trafficking. 4. There is collaboration between the numerous agencies (such as the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs) to provide better oversight and detection of human immigration and consequent smuggling. 5. Reintegration assistance measures have been instituted for smuggled and trafficked victims who are returned to source countries in Southeast Asia. 6. A policing program specifically designed to address the smuggling and trafficking of women for sexual servitude has been developed.

Conclusion Drug trafficking is a growing business in Australia, but it would appear that this is mainly true with softer drugs rather than more addictive and problematic drugs such as cocaine or heroin. Furthermore, most of the drug problems in Australia are associated with marijuana that is grown within the borders of the country. Thus, any true trafficking problem that might exist in Australia is either restricted to that within the borders of the country or is largely restricted to the heroin trade in the vicinity of Tasmania. With respect to human smuggling, it has been found that this is seldom an occurrence that is unwilling on the part of the person smuggled. The typical stereotype of victimized women and children being brought into the country against their will, particularly for the sex trade, is less a smuggling issue and more a trafficking issue. Both of these occurrences are considered to be rare in Australia. Nevertheless, the Australian government does take the matter seriously, particularly when involving the sex trade industry, and numerous initiatives have been established to combat the problems related to human smuggling.

Criminology, 2001, http://www.aic.gov.au/ research/drugs/. Brockett, L., and A. Murray. “Thai Sex Workers in Sydney.” Pp. 191–202 in Sex Work and Sex Workers in Australia, edited by R. Perkins, G. Prestage, R. Sharp, and F. Lovejoy. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 1994. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2005. David, F. Human Smuggling and Trafficking: An Overview of the Response at the Federal Level. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2000. Human Trafficking.org. Australian Government Commits AUS$20 million to Anti-Trafficking Initiatives. Washington, DC: Academy for Educational Development, 2004. McCusker, Rob. The Worldwide Fight against Transnational Organized Crime: Australia. Technical and Background Paper Series, No. 9. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2004, http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/tbp/ tbp009/. Schloenhardt, A. Organized Crime and Migrant Smuggling: Australia and the Asia-Pacific. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2002. Sutton, A., and S. James. Evaluation of Australian Drug Anti-Trafficking Law Enforcement. Melbourne: Australian Centre for Police Research, 1995.

Organized Crime in the Balkans and Implications for Regional Security Daniela Irrera Introduction and Overview A new curtain is falling across eastern Europe, dividing north from south, west from east, rich from poor and the future from the past. As Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic sprint into the future of democracy and market economics, Romania and Bulgaria slide into

References Australian Institute of Criminology. Drug Seizures by Australian Customs Service, 1984/85–2002/03. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2001, http://www.aic.gov.au/research/drugs/. ———. Illicit Drugs and Alcohol: Drug Use Statistics. Canberra: Australian Institute of

Balkan backwardness and second-class citizenship in the new Europe. R. C. Longworth, Chicago Tribune, October 1994

The above quotation describes what happened in parts of Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Since

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then, the Balkans have been characterized worldwide as a region of backwardness, poverty, mystery, and illegality. Since the 1500s, domination and submission have conspired to make these people ethnically and religiously fragmented, obligating them to live together in a state system that was periodically altered but without allowing them selfdetermination. An interminable period of oppressive totalitarian regimes and state-run economies condemned these countries to suffer political, economic, and social disruption. Yet within Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkan region represents a strategic area, dividing West from East and Occidental Christian and Protestant societies from Orthodox, Slavic, and Muslim communities. The Balkans has always been at the center of international politics: regarding the Versailles accord in World War I, the Yalta division in World War II; the Iron Curtain during the communist period; and its subsequent period of political and economic transition. For this reason, and in order to assure peace and stability in the region, European states along with the United States have tried, with little success, to establish several long-standing political administrations. In the 1990s, weakness and disintegration of state institutions affected all postcommunist societies around the region, but the Balkans also suffered from ethnic fragmentation and instability, making the situation there even more problematic. Civil wars between Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians led to brutal and bloody conflicts calmed only slightly by the Dayton Agreement of 1995. Subsequently, the Kosovo War (1999) and the Macedonian Crisis (2001) reconfirmed that this area urgently needed a political, economic, and social assist beginning at the local level and addressing the most critical problems. The difficult transition process, the economic crisis, and above all the sanctions against Yugoslavia because of its part in Kosovo War instigated alternative activities: the trafficking in drugs and prostitution and the smuggling of weapons, people, and stolen cars along what is known as the Balkan Route. Organized crime groups, first based in Serbia, Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia, effected these profitable transfers. In order to remain in power, local politicians and administrators tolerated these groups.

Organized crime has now become the most treacherous blight in the Balkans, afflicting every aspect of the state system. The most pernicious result is that crime had permeated the whole society, making democracy, stability, the rule of law, and economic progress impossible to achieve. The response to this problem, of course, should be global, not individual, and should aim to provide regional security. But in order to achieve this, any international consortium or agreement set to combat organized crime must take into account the historical context of the region or else it is destined to fail. Clearly, these countries are not homogeneous. Throughout history, they have presented peculiar characteristics that in various ways had contributed to the rise of organized crime many years earlier. To resolve the problem, both the heterogeneity and the individual structural factors of these states must be taken into consideration. Such an approach appears to be the only possible means to ensure peace and stability in the Balkans and, as a consequence, in all of Europe. Organized Crime in the Balkans The strategic geographical position of the Balkans and its long and troubled history have condemned the region and its people to become a sort of causeway between two different parts of the world. They have always been considered as a crucial piece in a controversial puzzle. Several times, they have had to adapt their civilizations, languages, and religions for a greater good in order to conserve longstanding peace and stability. In order to understand why this region has fallen into such a troubled state—that of an organized crime hegemony—it is necessary to review its history and political development. Historically, the building of the Balkans into nation-states was always externally driven without allowing its people to achieve self-determination. Because of the many different dominations throughout history, its ethnic constituents became fragmented: Serbs are orthodox and Slavic; Slovenians and Croats are Catholic and more open to the influences of Europe; the people living in Montenegro have their own identity and have always suffered from Serbian domination; Bosnians are Muslims, and their identity is linked to the former 79

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Ottoman system; Albanians are partly Muslims, partly Catholics; Kosovo has an Albanian majority and a Serbian minority; and Macedonians are mostly Muslims, with an Albanian majority and a Greek minority. The disparities are not only religious but are also found in language, custom, mentality, and political perceptions. In 1918, the Versailles Peace Agreement focused on the most numerous ethnic groups and gave birth to the Kingdom of the Serbs, Slovenians, and Croats (SHS) that included Serbia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Croatia, Vojvodina, and Kosovo. It was an odd arrangement that according to French and British aims was supposed to ensure a formal guarantee of political stability. The product was a multiethnic state ruled by the Karadjodjevic monarchy (Serbs) but supposedly made up of representative bodies. In practice, however, the Serbian national model was a hegemony, and although Slovenia and Croatia were the wealthiest and most productive members, everything was directly controlled by the central power in Belgrade. There was no chance for either minority or ethnic groups to be represented or to respond. With the help of foreign investments from Western countries and a strong police and intelligence system, Serbian leaders succeeded in enforcing order and containing ethnic tensions until World War II. During the Cold War, the Balkan region fell on the eastern side of the Iron Curtain. Although communist regimes were ideologically identical in Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the new East Germany, Yugoslavia, which replaced the SHS, continued to remain the principal and crucial member in international policymaking. It was a communist regime, ruled by the Communist Party and by a strong leader, Josip Broz, known in the West as Marshal Tito. At any rate, following the collapse of the Berlin Wall nothing changed in practice. The state was a Federal Republic, and the provinces continued to exist and were given formal autonomy, but political and economic power was still centered in Belgrade. Tito was the voice. Although he was a communist, he was not loyal to the Soviet establishment and wanted to create his own politics, a Yugoslav communist state not tied to one of the two blocs, West-

ern or Eastern. For these reasons, France, England, and even the United States considered him to be a perfect choice as Balkans leader. Under him, in fact, Yugoslavia became a nonaligned country, maintaining stability and unity in the area while remaining independent of Soviet influence, and again ethnic differences were brought under control. Already during this difficult period, rudimentary illegal activities existed. Because of great poverty, people were buying basic goods and food on the black market, thus assisting in the formation of criminal networks. Criminal groups were tolerated by institutions already affected by corruption. The intelligence service, the Kontraobavesajna Sluzba (KOS), was aware of the existence of illicit activities and was in fact directly involved in them. The effectiveness of the system was, of course, due to Tito’s ability to rule the state, but when he died in 1980, everything changed. The new party leaders and, in particular, Secretary Slobodan Milosevic assumed a more aggressive stance toward minorities, promoting a brutal Serbian nationalism. With the collapse of the Berlin Wall some years later, existing internal tensions and violence escalated. When the international context changed, the United States and Europe altered their perception of the Balkan problem: with communism removed, it was no longer necessary to maintain and nourish a strong Yugoslavia. The Republic exploded with ethnic revivals and nationalism, restrained for too many years. In 1992, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina declared their independence, causing a bloodthirsty war spattered with old terms such as “genocide” and new ones such as “ethnic cleansing.” With the Dayton Agreement, signed in 1995, President Bill Clinton’s administration and the newborn European Union (EU) established a new state system in the Balkans: many small, independent, ethnically homogeneous countries. Among these were Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia, which should have been aided in developing democracy and the rule of law, and BosniaHerzegovina, which should have been assisted by an international peacekeeping unit to monitor the local situation. This choice of state system proved to be totally ineffective and inadequate to face new as well as old problems. Milosevic remained president

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Nikica Jelavic, an alleged organized crime boss, sits between guards during a trial in Zagreb, Croatia, on October 17, 2000. Coatia put 17 alleged gangsters on trial in October of 2000 for a multitude of charges including racketeering, murder, drug trafficking, and abduction. (Reuters/Corbis)

of a smaller state, including only Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Vojvodina, but the state was excluded from participation in international organizations, and its economy was seriously damaged by United Nations (UN) sanctions. An area weakened by the transition process, privatization, and civil wars, the Balkans represented a free zone for every kind of illegal activity by old criminals with new sophistication. Drugs, weapons, prostitution, people, cigarettes, nuclear material, and stolen cars were easily run along the so-called Balkan Route, going from East to West European countries and passing through Macedonia, Kosovo, and Serbia. Corrupt bureaucracies, institutions, and intelligence systems helped to expedite illicit activities along these networks. Belgrade and Milosevic’s establishment was at the core of this entanglement, yet he did not act alone. In Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania—everywhere in the area—local criminals, who grew stronger with

the black market during the communist regimes, exploited wars and sanctions to increase their activities and routes. They used their old links with politicians and intelligence agencies to infiltrate the state system, criminalizing every institution. Serbia remained as the crucial zone of power. The subsequent civil wars in Kosovo and Macedonia and the consequent political crises show how organized crime was ruling the region, while the corresponding peace agreements mindlessly replayed the peacekeeping intervention model, failing to take into account the structural problems of the region at the time. This failure is why it is possible to affirm that organized crime in the Balkans is an outcome not of globalization but rather of internal elements, structurally and historically linked to the process of building nation-states and abetted by contemporary inclinations. Any attempt to bring peace and stability to the region should start from the knowledge 81

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that to fight organized crime requires addressing not only the legal and judiciary systems but, first of all, institutional reform and political transparency and issues of the rule of law, economic development, and social and ethnic identity. Regional security will not be accomplished without serious scrutiny and a modification of the entire system. Implications for Regional Security The need to find a long-standing settlement in the Balkan region was always of crucial importance on the European agenda and, although the United States was involved several times, Europe continues to be the favorite and more appropriate political agent to entrust with the task of bringing stability to the area. With the Dayton Agreement, the Balkan States began their difficult dialogue with the EU. Even before that time, they benefited from Association Agreements and Partnerships, but the transition process, ethnic struggles, and civil wars contributed to worsen the situation and to undermine the existence of mutual confidence. Thus, dialogue became characterized by numerous conflicting local interests and attitudes. Slovenia, which was always the most European province of the Federal Republic, initiated negotiations with the EU very early and applied for and was granted membership, while the Westernized Balkan regions of Albania, Croatia, Kosovo, Bosnia, Serbia, and Montenegro as well as Macedonia responded differently. Croatia was the most developed, Bosnia was under UN administration, Albania was living out its difficult transition process to democracy, and Serbia and Montenegro continued to be ruled by the old leadership. Thus, they presented several kinds of developmentally different local situations. Nevertheless, organized crime as well as political corruption and illegal economies had become a common problem. The EU adopted a regional approach that, considering ethnic dimensions and political responsibilities (above all, in the case of Milosevic), could offer financial support and assistance. Following the war in Kosovo, this approach needed to be more fully implemented. In 1999 the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe was launched to establish an effective comprehensive strategy to tackle regional problems. The

pact had the task of amplifying outcomes from the previous period by underlining the role of local politics and actors assisted by Western financial backing. Now involved in supporting local governments are many actors, including international organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); financial institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; civil society (such as nongovernmental organizations); civil rights associations; media; students; and the EU member states. They are working on three major concerns: human rights and democratization, economic development, and security. Yet from the beginning, the pact did not include all Westernized Balkan countries. Some of them, such as Serbia and Montenegro, did not meet the prerequisite social and political conditions for inclusion. Nevertheless, Albania and Macedonia, which were benefiting from financial aid, were also affected by corruption and organized crime. The following step in the EU strategy, the establishment of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), may be considered as a preferred means to assimilation into the EU. It is backed up by the assistance program CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization) that replaced earlier initiatives, and it aims to strengthen institutions and the rule of law in order for countries to prepare for application for EU membership. In November 2002 during an international conference on organized crime in London, the involved actors stressed the need to implement this process and outlined how it might be enacted at the regional level. During that time, the EU identified vital goals and instruments for ensuring regional security in the near future: • To strengthen legal systems with financial support for training judges and prosecutors. • To upgrade police capacity by enhancing management, recruitment, and career development. • To improve border management by increasing the border control capacity of police and other customs services. • To promote asylum and migration policies by respecting EU and international standards.

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It is clear that the recent cruel past suffered by the Balkan countries has taught their European donors that they must face a sort of perverse Chinese-boxes game. In other words, when they find a solution to a problem, another even more dangerous problem is uncovered. And when they think they have found and tested a successful resolution to that problem, they realize that the solution is satisfactory for some countries but not for others. And on and on it goes. Even though organized crime has become a transnational issue acting in a global dimension, in the Balkans it continues to present some peculiar aspects not found elsewhere. Therefore, it is not possible to apply a standard anticrime plan or policy model, even the most effective one. In order to attract European support, some countries such as Serbia and Albania have developed democratic systems only as a formality while maintaining an illegal underworld. For this reason, it seems more appropriate to act on a caseby-case basis, remembering that in order to achieve regional security, it is necessary to have a totality of peaceful, transparent, and democratic states. Creating these many peaceful states in the Balkan region is an arduous international challenge.

entire state system, contaminating political parties, institutions, economic players, intelligence operations, and the police force. The EU, the agent of greatest potential responsibility in this situation and the Balkans’ natural speaker, can now determine, this time definitively, in which direction the Balkans should change. Enacting programs of anticorruption and police training under local governments, which are themselves criminal and corrupt, will never achieve state security. These important measures should be part of a comprehensive strategy that begins, first of all, with institution building and establishing the rule of law at the national level. But constructing political and economic entities should go beyond using outside countries as models and should be designed with a full awareness and understanding of the structural systems in the Balkan countries. Stabilizing the Balkans is a long and arduous task but one that appears to be the only way to win a lasting peace for this area. Serbia, the crucial link in every historical period, is an effective place to begin.

Conclusions The Balkans, especially the Western part, is usually designated as one of most illegal and criminal parts of the world. The fact that it contributes greatly to transnational drugs, weapons, and people smuggling is well established. Yet most of the problems from which it suffers are directly linked to the process of building modern nation-states and to the roles and functions imposed on the region by the international community since 1918. This difficult heritage of exploitation combined with a people of ethnic diversity and disparate political and economic visions has caused an explosive mixture. Thus, it would be a great mistake to argue that current challenges and disruptions to state sovereignty only come from illegal groups external to the main body of the society. Traditions of organized crime have provided a continuing threat to the development of state sovereignty in this region. Because of weakened conditions in the area over the years, organized crime has been able to infiltrate the

References Banac, I. The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988. Barkey, K. Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to Centralization. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994. Braun, A. Small-State Security in the Balkans. London: Macmillan, 1983. Coleman, C., and J. Moynihan. Understanding Crime Data. Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1996. Heyman, J. M. C, ed. States and Illegal Practices. Oxford: Berg, 1999. Hobsbawm, E. Bandits. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969. Holsti, K. The State, War, and the State of War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Komlenovic, U. “Crime and Corruption after Communism: State and Mafia in Yugoslavia.” East European Constitutional Review 6(4) (Fall 1997), http://www.law.nyu.edu/eecr/vol6num4/feature/ index.html. Lendval, P. Eagles in Cobwebs: Nationalism and Communism in the Balkans. London: Macdonald, 1969. 83

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Longworth, R. C. “Bulgaria, Romania Resist the Pull of the West.” Chicago Tribune, 10 October 1994. Miletitch, N. Trafics et crimes dans les Balkans. Paris: PUF, 1998. Serbia after Djindjic, International Crisis Group Balkans Report No. 141, 18 March 2003. Panebianco, S., and R. Rossi. EU Attempts to Export Norms of Good Governance to the Mediterranean and Western Balkan Countries. Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 53, October 2004. Todorova, M. Imagining the Balkans. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Vickers, M. The Albanians: A Modern History. London: Tauris, 1999. Vukovic, S. “Corruption in Serbia.” South East Europe Review 1 (2002): 135–146. Xhudo, G. “Men of Purpose: The Growth of Albanian Criminal Activity.” Transnational Organized Crime 2(1) (1996): 1–20.

Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Political-Criminal Nexus James Scaminaci III Genocide, other war crimes, nonvoluntary population movements, and the partitioning of BosniaHerzegovina (hereafter Bosnia) are a product of political-criminal power structures utilizing ethnonationalism to legitimize their political and economic power, exploit public revenues and enterprises for political party or personal enrichment, camouflage their impoverishment of Bosnia’s citizens, and maintain their electoral support. The attempted wartime partitioning of Bosnia by Slobodan Milosevic’s Yugoslavia and President Franjo Tudjman’s Croatia plus varying postwar efforts by Bosnia’s nationalist parties to prevent the establishment of a functioning and legitimate central government—governing institutions working according to the rule of law, accountability, and transparency— and the return of around 2 million displaced persons and refugees to their prewar homes represent a continuing effort to deny Bosnia’s existence as a multiethnic, multicultural society. The war in Bosnia, which lasted from April 1992 to December 1995, was a combination of external aggression from Serbia and Croatia and a civil war, with extensive external military, intelligence, finan-

cial, and ideological assistance instrumental in initiating, prolonging, and intensifying the conflict. The three dominant nationalist parties in Bosnia—the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ-BH), and the Bosnian Party of Democratic Action (SDA)—partitioned the country into competing ethnic power structures, each complete with its own military, intelligence service, police, paramilitary groups, judiciary, payment bureaus, pension systems, and public enterprises. All elements of the power structure contributed to the financial and political sustainability of the nationalist parties as well as facilitated electoral and social control over the citizens. The development of these power structures began during Josip Broz Tito’s rule, when Yugoslavia’s State Security Service (SDB) and the Yugoslav People’s Army’s (JNA) Counter-Intelligence Service (KOS) used criminals to liquidate the regime’s opponents overseas and carry out drug smuggling for state profit. Efforts to circumvent the United Nations (UN) arms embargo against Yugoslavia further solidified this relationship. During the war, there were considerable illegal oil and other smuggling operations between Croatia and Yugoslavia as well as collaborative smuggling operations by criminal and military networks controlled by the three nationalist parties. In the postwar era, ethnic-based paramilitary units transformed into organized criminal gangs, maintained their pattern of interethnic and international cooperation, and continued to provide financial support to the nationalist parties in exchange for political protection. According to the European Union’s (EU) November 2003 Stabilization and Association Agreement assessment of Bosnia, organized crime now poses a “major obstacle” to EU integration. The U.S. State Department’s 2003 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report stated that Bosnia had emerged as a regional transshipment and storage center and was increasingly involved in the production of synthetic drugs. Bosnian drug traffickers were linked to organized crime in Albania, Russia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Italy, and Germany, and drug trafficking funded corrupt government officials, ethnic hardliners, and organized crime groups. The State

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Department’s 2001 narcotics report cited “substantiated links between the narcotics trade and the parallel institutions that undermine the rule of law in Bosnia.” The war ended in December 1995 with the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace, also known as the Dayton Agreement. The agreement established a very weak state-level central government, and two entities—a unitary Republika Srpska (RS) and a Federation—further decentralized into ten essentially ethnically partitioned cantons and an autonomous Brcko District belonging to neither entity. The central government had very few characteristics of a modern state, lacking, for example, control over the three militaries, and was dependent upon the entities for financial support. In 2002, the central government accounted for just 2 percent of all government expenditures, while the Federation accounted for 75 percent. Bosnia is characterized by political fragmentation; lack of uniform laws, regulations, and standards; weak controls on all public spending; actual or attempted political interference in all aspects of the judicial system; an extensive socialist bureaucracy with wide discretionary authority; very high tax rates; and porous borders. These factors have fostered endemic corruption, widespread customs, and tax evasion; the growth of a gray economy; high unemployment and poverty; lack of funds for salaries, pensions, and infrastructure; and significant obstacles to foreign investment. In the postwar era, each of the nationalist parties has opposed the rule of law and efforts to control organized crime and corruption. The nationalist parties, but especially those in the RS, have sought to prevent the establishment or weaken the competency of state-level institutions such as the State Border Service, the State Information and Protection Agency, an Indirect Tax Administration for a Value Added Tax, an Intelligence and Security Agency, and the partially internationally staffed Court of Bosnia and Prosecutors Office. After the establishment of these institutions, suspicion exists that the nationalist parties have sought to hinder their effectiveness by staffing key positions with party loyalists. Throughout the postwar era, the nationalist parties have resisted professionalizing

and training police, prosecutors, and judges as well as removing political control over the entire law enforcement and judicial systems that would enable investigations and court cases to proceed against politically sanctioned murders, organized crime, high-level corruption, war crimes, and terrorism. Only after a series of intelligence scandals did the nationalist parties agree to merge the three intelligence agencies (secret police) that had collected intelligence on intraethnic and interethnic opponents as well as the international community. For the nationalist parties, the rule of law as well as accountability and transparency in all public revenues threatened their never-ending cash flows, opaque expenditures, and endemic corruption. International law enforcement officials in late 2002 estimated that Bosnia loses between 300 million and 600 million konvertible marks (KM) annually in customs revenue due to fraud and bad management, while Dani magazine, citing sources from the state prosecutor’s office in late 2004, reported that Bosnia lost 1 billion KM in customs revenue. An estimated 3 billion KM are laundered through fictitious firms. The Office of the High Representative’s (OHR) Special Audit of Republika Srpska and Federation governments in 2001 revealed systemic problems related to the inability of control systems to prevent fraud and corruption, including illegal or vague government decisions, government decisions not published in the Official Gazette, and missing or fraudulent documentation. OHR’s Special Audit of the three public electric utilities for the year 2001 revealed lost revenue due to mismanagement, conflicts of interest, theft, or neglect of 266 million KM. The World Bank’s 2002 Public Expenditure and Institution Review found very weak controls on all government expenditures. The World Bank could not estimate the true size and scope of subentity expenditures and payment arrears, could not estimate the functional allocation of municipal spending, and found a complete lack of internal audit mechanisms and virtually no control over public procurement, an estimated 7 percent of gross domestic product. Tax-free zones were virtually unregulated, and military veterans were exempt from paying customs duties on imports. A 2004 audit of the country’s tripresidency revealed 85

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overspending for dubious expenditures amounting to 25 million KM, a poor role model for all government agencies. Transparency International’s (TI) 2004 National Integrity Systems Study concluded that while significant OHR-driven or -imposed reforms had been enacted, parliamentary oversight committees, Supreme Audit, and other regulatory or investigative agencies were understaffed, underequipped, still subject to political influence, or illprepared to combat endemic corruption. TI’s 2004 Corruption Perception Study found that corruption is the second most important problem facing Bosnia, that political parties are the most corrupt institution in Bosnia, and that the nationalist SDA, SDS, and HDZ-BH are by far the most corrupt political parties, in that order. Milosevic’s project to commit genocide against the Bosnians and to partition Bosnia utilized the Serbian Orthodox Church, scientific and cultural organizations, print, television and radio media, and the JNA, the SDB, the KOS, and organized crime gangs. The Serb Democratic Party, founded and headed by Radovan Karadzic, was created, guided, financed, and armed by the SDB prior to the war. The JNA also armed the SDS and Bosnian Serb paramilitary groups. Similarly, the Republika Srpska Army (VRS), police, and intelligence service were an extension of their counterparts in Milosevic’s Yugoslavia. Indictments at The Hague against Milosevic, Karadzic, and their subordinates clearly demonstrate the institutional linkages between the two political-criminal power structures. In the postwar era, SDS efforts to protect Karadzic, General Ratko Mladic, and other Hague indictees from being captured cost Bosnia participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Partnership for Peace Program in 2004. Press reports suggest that military intelligence, the civilian intelligence service (OBS), and the police are key components of Karadzic’s protection. In March 2003, the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) discovered that a VRS intelligence unit, in conjunction with the OBS, was spying on the international community, political opponents, and the Federation. In April 2004 OHR blocked the SDS from receiving public funding, and in July 2004 OHR made public an audit of the SDS that

German protesters from the Society for Threatened Peoples International take part in a vigil with survivors of the 1995 Srebrenica massacre during a demonstration in front of the War Crimes Tribunal September 26, 2002, in The Hague, Netherlands. (Getty Images)

revealed widespread fraud and violations of the election law. High Representative Paddy Ashdown suggested that there could be little confidence that the SDS was not financing Karadzic’s physical protection. In a related effort to reduce Karadzic’s protection, in June 2004 Ashdown dismissed fifty-nine RS officials including members of the SDS Main Board, SDS mayors and other municipal-level officials, and officials from public enterprises, the police, and military intelligence. Karadzic’s financial support is believed to come from customs and tax evasion schemes conducted by the RS Customs Administration and by public enterprises and private companies involved in oil, timber, cigarettes, and alcohol imports as well as from sweetheart privatization deals. Tudjman sought to partition Bosnia using his own military forces and the subordinate HDZ-BH and Croat Defense Council (HVO) forces. The Hague indictee Mladen Naletilic Tuta’s Convict Battalion operating in Mostar and the larger

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Herzegovina area was the most notorious. The close relationship among political party, government, and private business is exemplified by the case of the Hercegovacka Bank, founded in 1998. More than 60 percent of the bank’s initial capital came from Croatian government funds intended to pay HVO salaries. All of the main officials involved in creating the bank came from the HDZ-BH, including the Bosnian Croat member of the tripresidency and the Federation minister of defense. Several of these high-level officials also sat on the board of directors of companies that were shareholders in the bank and that had received the largest amount of loans from it. Additionally, eleven of the top fifteen suppliers to the HVO, accounting for 55 percent of the HVO’s expenditures in 2000, had shares in or were controlled by the bank. In late 2000 the HDZ-BH undertook an unsuccessful effort to create a third entity using the Hercegovacka Bank as the financial backbone. The bank was seized by the OHR in April 2001, numerous financial irregularities were discovered, and as of 2004 court cases against several former high-level HDZ and HVO officials are pending. In March 1999 Jozo Leutar, the Bosnian Croat deputy interior minister of the Federation, was assassinated by a car bomb in Sarajevo. Six perpetrators were charged with murder, including General Ivan Andabak, a high-level member of Tuta’s Convict Battalion. Andabak had previously been arrested (but not tried) in Rijeka, Croatia, for importing several hundred kilograms of cocaine. Andabak and the others were acquitted despite the testimony of two protected witnesses. The acquittal prompted press speculation that justice had been subverted either through bribes, intimidation, a faulty investigation, or a fraudulent indictment. More importantly, Leutar’s murder, like those of high-ranking RS police inspectors investigating Karadzic’s corruption, signaled that organized crime and ethnic hard-liners were above the law. In October 1999, the SFOR conducted an unannounced inspection of the Bosnian Croats’ National Security Service (SNS) and uncovered evidence that the SNS was prepared to conduct illegal intelligence collection operations against the international community, including International

Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) investigators, and had the ability to engage telephone and credit card fraud. The origins of the SDA are rooted in the intellectual movement of Young Muslims founded in 1941, a pan-Islamist group influenced by the Cairo-based Muslim Brotherhood. Eight of the SDA’s founders were drawn from the Young Muslims, but the party was ideologically and culturally heterogeneous with regard to the role and practice of Islam and the question of a Bosnian or Muslim identity, while the vast majority of Bosnians are secular in outlook and eagerly consume Western culture. Several of Alija Izetbegovic’s inner circle convicted with him in 1983 for endangering socialist Yugoslavia were on the board of directors of the Third World Relief Agency (TWRA) or otherwise supported TWRA’s fund-raising and arms smuggling efforts. TWRA, a Sudan-based Islamic nongovernmental organization (NGO) headed by Fatih al Hassanein, a friend of Izetbegovic since 1970, was linked to Sudan’s National Islamic Front (NIF)—another name for the Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan—led by Hasan al Turabi, a longtime friend of Hassanein. In 1991 Turabi gave refuge to Osama bin Laden, while Sudan received considerable financial and terrorist training support from Iran. Bin Laden and al-Qaeda are believed to have contributed millions of dollars to TWRA, and TWRA is believed to have been instrumental in bringing the mujahideen into Bosnia. Unrecognized at the time, the Bosnian model of al-Qaeda’s jihad was developed using mujahideen (as trainers and shock troops), Islamic NGOs, front companies, banks, logisticians, and moneymen. The TWRA and the group of Bosnians associated with it reportedly received up to $2.5 billion between 1992 and 1995 from Islamic sources, and the money was spent in unaccountable ways due to inadequate record keeping, according to Dani and Slobodna Bosna investigative reports in November 2002 and September 2003, respectively. More importantly, the TWRA provided the postwar (1996) funding (4.7 million German marks) to the Foundation to Aid Muslims in Bosnia that, in turn, formed the Bosnian Investment Organization (BIO), a company representing the top inner leadership of the SDA. BIO owned or 87

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was a joint owner of several other companies involved in air transport, trucking, tourism to Saudi Arabia, oil, import and export, and weapons and explosives manufacture. The key Bosnian participant in the TWRA, the Foundation to Aid Muslims in Bosnia, and BIO was Hasan Cengic, convicted in 1983 along with four others for visiting Iran for the fifth anniversary of the Iranian Revolution and charged in 2004 with abuse of office while serving as the Federation’s deputy defense minister in 1996. At that time, he reportedly authorized his company, BIO, to produce explosives, ammunition, and weapons. In October 2004, the state prosecutor seized TWRA documents in Una Sana Canton as part of an investigation into the links between the TWRA, members of the SDA, and bin Laden. Iran was a major provider of weapons, ammunition, humanitarian assistance, and financial support as well as military and intelligence personnel. In February 1996, the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) raided an Iranian terrorist training camp at Pogorelica in central Bosnia. Explosive devices hidden in childrens’ toys as well as other terrorist-related items were seized. The Iranians reportedly trained 1,400 Bosnian operatives at Pogorelica and other camps during the war, 5 of whom were arrested in April 1996 for the attempted assassination of Fikret Abdic. The Pogorelica camp was linked to the SDA-controlled intelligence service, the Agency for Investigation and Documentation (AID). Post 9-11 investigations of Islamic charities possibly linked to al-Qaeda, the Pogorelica terrorist training court case, the continuing controversy over the unsolved September 1996 murder of AID’s Deputy Director Nedzad Ugljen, the revelation of the existence of AID’s Seve assassination unit, continuing investigations into the fraudulent provision of postwar Bosnian citizenship and passports to more than 700 mujahideen, the conviction of an SDA-linked general for smuggling weapons to Kosovo, the discovery of a huge covert SDA-linked weapons cache in Mostar, and the suspected SDA use of the Federation Intelligence and Security Service (FOSS) to wiretap the former FOSS director Munir Alibabic and prominent members of the political opposition Social Democratic Party have

been major SDA embarrassments and called into serious question the SDA’s support for the rule of law. References Andreas, Peter. “The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia.” International Studies Quarterly (2004): 29–51. Hajdinjak, Marko. Smuggling in Southeast Europe: The Yugoslav Wars and the Development of Regional Criminal Networks in the Balkans. Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2002. Kovac, Janez. “NATO Westar Operation Reveals Bosnian Croat Spy Net.” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Balkans Crisis Report 104, 21 December 1999. Magas, Branka, and Ivo Zanic, eds. The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1991–1995. London: Frank Cass, 2001. Popov, Nebojsa, ed. The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2000. Rausche, Adrian. “International Direct Intervention Responses to Clandestine Political Economies: The Hercegovacka Banka Case Study.” Paper presented at the Conference on the Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace, Thomas J. Watson Center for International Studies, Brown University, 6 May 2003. U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute. “SFOR Lessons Learned in Creating a Secure Environment with Respect for the Rule of Law.” Carlisle, PA, May 2000, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ army-usawc/sfor_rule_of_law.doc. U.S. Institute for Peace. “Lawless Rule versus Rule of Law in the Balkans.” December 2002, http://www.usip.org.

The Jogo do Bicho: Brazil’s Illicit Lottery Amy Chazkel In the early 1890s, the Brazilian government gave permission to the privately owned Rio de Janeiro zoo to operate a raffle that was designed to supplement the zoo’s insufficient income. Each entry ticket to the zoo had a randomly selected animal printed on it and gave the patron a chance to win a cash prize. Each day, the zoo’s owner, the wealthy land developer, entrepreneur, and former baron João Baptista Vianna Drummond, personally

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selected the lucky animal. Soon, though, booking agents in the city center began to sell tickets to win the raffle at the zoo. Thus, the clandestine lottery called the animal game—or, in Portuguese, the jogo do bicho—was born in Brazil’s capital city. State law enforcement soon lost control of the raffle at the zoo. Within a decade, the game had become a cultural phenomenon that pervaded Brazil, with thriving networks of booking agents, dealers, and players. Surges of political and criminal repression throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century failed to prevent Rio’s residents from playing, discussing, and writing songs and stories about the game. Certain aspects of the jogo do bicho that characterized the illicit lottery in its earliest years remain virtually unchanged today. Players of the jogo do bicho still exchange a small amount of money—a quantity of their own choosing—for a chance to play one of the several varieties of the game. The lottery is still based on a list of twenty-five animals, each corresponding to a number or set of numbers. The roughly alphabetical list of animals associated with each number remains unchanged from the end of the nineteenth century: 1 = avestrúz (ostrich), 2 = águia (eagle), 3 = burro (donkey), 4 = borboleta (butterfly), 5 = cachorro (dog), 6 = cabra (goat), 7 = carneiro (sheep), 8 = camelo (camel), 9 = cobra (snake), 10 = coelho (rabbit), 11 = cavalo (horse), 12 = elefante (elephant), 13 = galo (rooster), 14 = gato (cat), 15 = jacaré (alligator), 16 = leão (lion), 17 = macaco (monkey), 18 = porco (pig), 19 = pavão (peacock), 20 = peru (turkey), 21 = touro (bull), 22 = tigre (tiger), 23 = urso (bear), 24 = veado (deer), and 25 = vaca (cow). The manner of selecting these numbers, however, has undergone several changes. Although it began as a raffle at the zoo, in the clandestine form that it then took the jogo do bicho became a side bet on the legal lottery by the mid-1890s. In its most common form, the player selects either an animal or a number; each animal corresponds with four sets of twodigit numbers (dezenas). The last two digits of the winning number of the (licit) federal lottery would determine the day’s winner. From the late twentieth century when the game ceased to be linked to the legal lottery up to the present day, those who

run and fund the jogo do bicho (bankers, or banqueiros) operate a clandestine drawing to select the winning number each day. Whatever the means of determining them, the numbers and animals that form the basis for the jogo do bicho have long fed a rich folk tradition aimed at divining the outcome of the game by looking for signs in the experiences, sights, and chance occurrences of daily life, such as the license plate on a passing car, the death of a famous person, or the appearance of a stray dog at one’s doorstep. An elaborate system of dream interpretation and translating hunches into winning animals and numbers provides many Brazilians with a widely shared source of fun and sociability as well as an aspiration of acquiring wealth. Criminalization From its inception in the early 1890s to the present day, the jogo do bicho has been one of Brazil’s most ubiquitous cultural practices. It has also been, nearly from the beginning, against the law. Although thousands in all of Brazil’s cities ended up in jail for playing and especially dealing in the jogo do bicho, its legal status was always ambiguous in its early decades. Officials at the national and municipal levels never agreed on whether to criminalize or simply to regulate this lottery. The Brazilian Penal Code of 1890, which was in effect when the jogo do bicho was invented, had several articles that banned all games of chance not specifically permitted by the government. Yet as a misdemeanor that in many ways was indistinguishable from its legal counterpart, the licensed and permitted lotteries both public and private that flourished at that time, the jogo do bicho fell into a category of crime that was difficult both to define and to prosecute. Despite this legal ambiguity, throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries those who played, dealt, and banked this illicit lottery were routinely arrested and processed through the Brazilian judicial system. Repression was usually arbitrary and sporadic, as police campaigns to stamp out the jogo do bicho every few years resulted in waves of arrests. Police crackdowns occurred in 1907, 1913, 1917, 1926, and 1933. The supplement to the new Penal Code passed in 1940 89

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that enumerated misdemeanor infractions mentioned the jogo do bicho by name and definitively criminalized it. Law Number 6259, passed on 10 February 1944, reinforced the new Penal Code’s ban on this clandestine lottery. In keeping with the tradition of seeking signs of the outcome of the daily jogo do bicho number in noteworthy daily events, folklorist Hugo Pedro Carradore reports that for an entire week after the passing of this legislation, the most frequently played combination of jogo do bicho numbers in Brazil was 6259, the number that corresponds with the law. Despite the definitive national-level ban on playing and selling the jogo do bicho in the early 1940s, local governments legalized the animal game from time to time, both de facto and de jure. For example, according to Carradore, the São Paulo state government, under Ademar de Barros (1941– 1945), decided to regulate instead of expressly prohibit the game. Those who banked the game were obliged to pay a certain amount of their proceeds to the state government. One lottery shop could only be established one hundred meters from another. Under this arrangement, anyone over eighteen years of age could legally play the jogo do bicho. Changing Structure and Meanings of the Animal Game Brazilian conventional wisdom about the origins of the jogo do bicho—reinforced and spread by folklorists, scholars, and everyday people—emphasizes the lottery’s origin as a clever financial scheme to keep the Rio de Janeiro zoo afloat, which then became a criminal practice because of the avarice of both the urban masses and corrupt police. While this popular conception of the jogo do bicho’s origin does contain some truth, additional contextual knowledge provides a more complete picture of how it developed into the enormously popular but illicit practice that it remains to the present day. The jogo do bicho was not just an innocent moneymaking scheme gone awry but rather was part of a truly revolutionary moment in the cultural and social history of the Brazilian city in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The jogo do bicho was a part of the early development of the urban entertainment industry. Significantly, the

game’s first financiers were also instrumental in organizing and funding the movie, popular theater, and popular entertainment industries. In addition, the many shopkeepers and street vendors who then sold tickets for the game were also part of the changing structure of the Brazilian city. The jogo do bicho developed as part of the growth of the urban petty commerce and, relatedly, the illicit and semi-illicit markets for goods and services now known as the informal sector. Those who study the history of the jogo do bicho have observed that this illicit lottery underwent a process of transformation beginning around the 1920s. First, the jogo do bicho increasingly came to be associated with the urban poor and working classes. Second, the jogo do bicho went from being sold by small, independent sellers who banked the game themselves to being sold by more centralized, specialized, and modern vendors and financed more centrally by entrepreneurs. Finally, in the middle of the twentieth century, the jogo do bicho fell increasingly under more systematic and effective police persecution. These changes gradually but dramatically altered the way the game had worked during the first two decades of its existence. In 1893 when Drummond effectively lost his monopoly on betting on the outcome of the animal raffle, the jogo do bicho had begun to decentralize in both spatial and organizational terms. In other words, it fanned out geographically and, as described above, was played at innumerable, varied sites throughout the city. For the most part, those who sold tickets to the jogo do bicho were not specialists in this trade. Rather, they were primarily shopkeepers, retail clerks, and artisans and workers in a variety of trades who sold these illicit lottery tickets as a means of supplementing their income. In the Brazilian capital city where the game originated, the jogo do bicho grew to conform to the city’s patterns of industrial growth and urbanization, spreading throughout the city and especially into the working-class suburbs. Toward the middle of the twentieth century, however, the jogo do bicho continued to disperse throughout the city but also began to centralize in terms of its organizational structure. Gradually, dry goods sellers who sold jogo do bicho tickets on the side and banked

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their own lottery businesses gave way to sellers who exclusively dealt in jogo do bicho tickets and, increasingly, were banked by someone else (a banqueiro) who also financed other vendors. Historian Felipe Santos Magalhães’s research reveals that by the 1940s, the tendency of successful vendors (bicheiros) and banqueiros to expand their businesses and competition between different bankers led to the concentration of jogo do bicho capital in the hands of ever fewer bankers and the division of certain small but growing sections of the city into individual banqueiros’ turf. As the sale of jogo do bicho tickets centralized, the general consumption of these tickets as well as their cultural meanings became increasingly restricted to the popular classes and the urban underworld. When the Rio de Janeiro police carried out a census in 1913 of the jogo do bicho vendors, they did not report any places to purchase the illicit lottery in the better-off South Zone of the city. As the research of sociologist Marcelo Pereira de Mello demonstrates, Rio’s middle sectors had already distanced themselves from the sellers of the jogo do bicho by that decade. Despite the jogo do bicho’s uncertain legal position and its consistent popularity across all socioeconomic classes, those who dealt in the clandestine lottery had already accumulated the stigma of criminality by the 1920s because of nearly three decades of police harassment. The increasing pace of criminalization of the jogo do bicho after the mid-1910s can also be traced to such changes in the urban landscape as the growth of suburbs and the increased spatial differentiation of classes in the city. Probably above all, the development of the jogo do bicho was the result of the unofficial partnership between those who banked and sold tickets to this lottery and the police. Although police corruption is notoriously difficult to document, the occasional official denunciations and police investigations into the involvement of renegade police officers in the jogo do bicho in accepting protection money demonstrate what appears to have been pervasive police involvement in the jogo do bicho from the earliest years of the twentieth century to the present day.

The Jogo do Bicho in Contemporary Brazil The contemporary jogo do bicho is famously characterized by its absorption in and involvement with the culturally and financially important business of Rio de Janeiro’s Carnival celebrations. The relationship between the jogo do bicho and Rio’s carnival samba organizations (samba schools, or escolas de samba) developed gradually but was finally consolidated in the late 1980s. As the samba schools increasingly turned into large business enterprises in the last quarter of the twentieth century, they came into the embrace of the jogo do bicho. Although not all of Rio de Janeiro’s samba schools are affiliated with the jogo do bicho, many came to be financed by the illicit lottery’s banqueiros and managed under the same administrative hierarchy. The relationship between samba schools and jogo do bicho sellers and bankers was initially based on the interests of individual patrons, people from within the jogo do bicho organization with an interest in the samba music played at Carnival. This relationship eventually became more depersonalized and institutional. During the period from the 1960s to the late 1980s, samba schools and the jogo do bicho organization came into close contact with each other as institutions, rather than just acting together through ad hoc contact, because of their proximity and shared public. The contemporary jogo do bicho organization is also commonly understood to be involved with the urban drug traffic in Brazil. The level and degree to which this connection exists is not known and has not been formally studied. The jogo do bicho’s lasting importance in Brazilian (especially urban) daily life has long fascinated not only foreign commentators but also Brazilians. Popular depictions of the animal game comment on not only its underworld of urban gangsters but also its persistence despite constant persecution, its general acceptance despite the stigma of its illegality, and the consistently smooth functioning of the game and legendary honesty of its bicheiros. Such classic films as Amei um Bicheiro (1952) and plays such as Boca de Ouro (1960), adapted to the screen by illustrious filmmaker Nelson Pereira dos Santos in 1963, and O Rei de Ramos (1979) as well as short stories and chronicles authored by both famous and 91

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The alleged leader of clandestine gambling activities in Brazil, Carlos Ramos, also known as Charlie Waterfall, talks with the press as he arrives at the Federal Police building on March 1, 2004, in Brasilia, Brazil, to testify regarding his involvement in a bribery scandal of Rio and Brasilia governors. Ramos is reputed to be a major figure in jogo do bicho (game of the animal) numbers game. (AFP/Getty Images)

unknown writers depict jogo do bicho players, vendors, and bankers and the world of which they are a part. Today, players can still make bets on thousands of street corners throughout Brazil as well as on the telephone and the Internet. Although public suggestions to legalize the jogo do bicho occasionally arise, both buying and selling remains a misdemeanor crime that is punishable by fines and/or a prison term. References Bretas, Marcos Luiz. A guerra das ruas: Povo e polícia na cidade do Rio de Janeiro. Rio de Janeiro: Ministério da Justiça, Arquivo Nacional, 1997.

Carradore, Hugo Pedro. Folclore do jogo do bicho. São Paulo: Tribuna Piracicabana, 1979. Chazkel, Amy. Laws of Chance: The Jogo do Bicho and the Making of Urban Public Life in Brazil, 1880–1968. Durham: Duke University Press, forthcoming. DaMatta, Roberto, and Elena Soárez. Eagles, Donkeys and Butterflies: An Anthropological Study of Brazil’s “Animal Game.” Translated by Clifford E. Landers. South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006. Herschmann, Micael, and Kátia Lerner. Lance de sorte: Futebol e o jogo do bicho na belle epoque carioca. Rio de Janeiro: Diadorim, 1993. Magalhães, Felipe Santos. “Ganhou leva . . . do vale o impresso ao vale o escrito: Uma histório social do jogo do bicho no Rio de Janeiro (1890–1960).”

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Unpublished PhD diss., Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 2005. Mello, Marcelo Pereira de. “A história social dos jogos de azar no Rio de Janeiro, 1808–1946.” Unpublished MA thesis, Instituto Universitário de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro, 1989. Salvatore, Ricardo D., Carlos Aguirre, and Gilbert M. Joseph, eds. Crime and Punishment in Latin America: Law and Society since Late Colonial Times. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001.

Transnational Crime in the Caribbean Region Virginia Wilson The Caribbean is made up of twenty-five countries that encompass hundreds of islands stretching from the southern point of Florida to the northwest of Venezuela. Due to the islands’ location between the United States and South America, the Caribbean has a significant amount of transnational crime, particularly in drug trafficking and money laundering. Trafficking and Money Laundering In terms of drug trafficking, the Caribbean generally acts as a transshipment zone from the originating country to the consuming country. South America, a major producer of illicit drugs, and the United States, a major consumer of illicit drugs, are both close to the Caribbean islands. Transnational organized crime groups employ several common criminal methods throughout the region. Airdropping involves an airplane dropping bales of drugs to the water or land below. The drugs are then retrieved by traffickers, who use high-speed boats if the shipment lands in water. Traffickers also use legal and illegal airstrips, which are made on roads or in remote fields. Loaders are used to unload the airplanes while the plane is still moving on the runway to protect the pilots from arrest. Many items such as car interiors, suitcases, live and dead animals, and people have been used to smuggle drugs. Many of the islands are also used as staging areas for different drug trafficking operations. Because of the geography of the islands, all of

the countries use maritime vessels, particularly high-speed boats, to smuggle drugs into the area. Cocaine and marijuana are the major illicit drugs smuggled into and out of the Caribbean. The U.S. State Department’s 2004 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report identified the Bahamas, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic as major transit points for the shipment of South American narcotics to the United States and other markets. Cocaine is by far the most profitable drug trafficked in the Caribbean. The primary route for cocaine trafficking is through Jamaica and Haiti, followed by routes through Puerto Rico, the Bahamas, and the Dominican Republic. Secondary movement of cocaine is through Puerto Rico and into the United States or to the United States and Europe via the eastern islands of the Caribbean. Colombian heroin has limited movement and is generally not consumed in the Caribbean. Jamaica is a significant source for marijuana, although Colombia has recently become a major competitor in the marijuana trade. The Caribbean provides an alternate route for synthetic drugs, or club drugs, such as MDMA (ecstasy) into the United States from Europe. The Caribbean is considered a tax haven for many companies and money launderers. The area endorses itself as an offshore center, requires little or no tax burden, has very strict bank secrecy laws that provide customer confidentiality, has a large financial and banking center, offers low incorporation fees, offers free movement of currency into and out of country, and has few laws that criminalize money laundering and other financial crimes. Proceeds from drug trafficking are routinely laundered through many Caribbean countries. Some of the countries in the Caribbean have free-zone areas in which goods can be held and then shipped without an additional import or duty tax. Offshore banking is significant in Aruba, the Bahamas, Curacao, and most British independencies. The technology revolution has greatly increased the offshore financial activities, especially in the areas of communications and telecommunications. Many nonbanking institutions such as jewelry stores, casinos, and travel agencies are also used in money laundering. 93

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An armored van waits at the airport to unload a shipment of money on August 21, 2000, in Nassau, Bahamas. The Bahamas’ financial district rivals the country’s tourist industry for its contribution to the national economy. (Getty Images)

Arms trafficking is growing rapidly in the region and is both interregional and intraregional, with many of the firearms coming from South America. The arms are usually traded for drugs as payment and are kept in the country or region. Most of the arms involved are AK-47s, and gun running is directly involved with the drug trade. Of all the countries in the Caribbean, Haiti is the most heavily involved in the arms trade. Human trafficking is the third most lucrative business in the world, behind arms and drug trafficking. Many people are lured by the promise of a career or marriage, and many end up being abused, exploited, or forced into labor. Many governments in the Caribbean currently claim that the problem is small, although a large increase may be seen due to the developing tourism industry and labor markets. According to the International Organization for Migration, the Dominican Republic has lost more than 50,000 women in the past fifteen years

to human trafficking, and between 20,000 and 50,000 Haitians are illegally living abroad. Crime in the Caribbean: An Overview The twenty-five countries in the Caribbean have various problems in regard to organized crime. Anguilla. A British territory located in the northeastern part of the Caribbean, Anguilla is known as a minor drug transshipment point and an offshore banking center that is vulnerable to money laundering. Antigua and Barbuda. Located in the eastern part of the Caribbean, Antigua and Barbuda are known as a drug transshipment point and a major offshore financial center. There are about eighty Internet gambling sites and twenty-six offshore banks in the country. Aruba. Located in the southern part of the Caribbean close to Venezuela, Aruba is a territory of the Netherlands. It is known as a drug transship-

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ment point (especially for cocaine) and a major offshore financial center with accompanying money laundering. Bahamas. Located in the northernmost part of the Caribbean close to Florida, the Bahamas acts as a major drug transshipment point (cocaine, marijuana, ecstasy) and offshore financial center with money laundering. There are about 400 offshore banks and 100,000 international business companies. Barbados. Located in the southeastern part of the Caribbean, Barbados is known as a drug transshipment point (cocaine) and major offshore financial center with money laundering. British Virgin Islands. Located in the northern part of the Caribbean, the British Virgin Islands is a British territory that is known as a drug transshipment point (cocaine) and offshore financial center. Drug trafficking is prevalent between the British Virgin Islands and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Cayman Islands. Located in the western part of the Caribbean, the Cayman Islands are British territories that are known as a minor drug transshipment point (cocaine and marijuana) and as a major offshore financial center notorious for tolerating money laundering. Cuba. Located in the northwestern part of the Caribbean close to Florida, Cuba is a minor drug transshipment point (cocaine). Dominica. Located in the eastern part of the Caribbean, Dominica is known as a drug transshipment point and a growing offshore financial center and money laundering area. Dominican Republic. Located in the central part of the Caribbean next to Haiti, the Dominican Republic is known as a drug transshipment point (cocaine, heroin, ecstasy) and as a money laundering area. Human trafficking is also a major concern for the country. Grenada. Located in the southern part of the Caribbean, Grenada is a drug transshipment point (cocaine and marijuana) and growing offshore financial center and money laundering area. Guadeloupe. Located in the eastern part of the Caribbean, Guadeloupe is a French territory known as a drug transshipment point (cocaine, ecstasy) and offshore financial center and money laundering area.

Haiti. Located in the central part of the Caribbean next to the Dominican Republic, Haiti is known as a major drug transshipment point (marijuana, cocaine, heroin) and money laundering area. Arms trafficking is also a concern for the country. Many Haitians flee their country to the Dominican Republic and other islands. Jamaica. Located in the western part of the Caribbean, Jamaica is known as a drug transshipment point (marijuana, cocaine, heroin) and money laundering area due to a flourishing drug trade. Martinique. Located in the eastern part of the Caribbean, Martinique is a French territory known as a drug transshipment point (cocaine and marijuana). Montserrat. Located in the eastern part of the Caribbean, Montserrat is a British territory and is known as a drug transshipment point (marijuana and cocaine) and offshore financial center that is vulnerable to money laundering. Navassa Island. Located in the western part of the Caribbean between Jamaica and Haiti, Navassa Island is an uninhabited U.S. territory. No major transnational crimes occur on the island. Netherlands Antilles. Located in the southern part of the Caribbean close to Venezuela, the Netherlands Antilles is a Dutch territory that is known as a drug transshipment point (cocaine and heroin) and major offshore financial center with money laundering. The country also has large free-zone areas. Puerto Rico. Located in the north-central part of the Caribbean, Puerto Rico is a U.S. territory that is known as a drug transshipment center (marijuana, cocaine, heroin, ecstasy) and a major money laundering area. Saint Kitts and Nevis. Located in the eastern part of the Caribbean, Saint Kitts and Nevis is known as a drug transshipment point (cocaine) and an offshore banking center that is vulnerable to money laundering. Most financial crime is concentrated on Nevis, which has more than 19,000 offshore companies. Saint Lucia. Located in the southeastern part of the Caribbean, Saint Lucia is known as a drug transshipment center (marijuana, cocaine, heroin) and a growing offshore financial center that is vulnerable to money laundering. 95

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Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. Located in the southern part of the Caribbean, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is known as a drug transshipment point (marijuana, cocaine) and a growing offshore financial center that is vulnerable to money laundering. Trinidad and Tobago. Located in the southeastern part of the Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago is known as a drug transshipment point (cocaine, heroin) and as a money laundering area due to the drug trade. Turks and Caicos. Located in the northern part of the Caribbean, Turks and Caicos is known as a drug transshipment point (marijuana, cocaine) and money laundering area due to the drug trade. U.S. Virgin Islands. Located in the northern part of the Caribbean, the U.S. Virgin Islands is a U.S. territory that is known as a drug transshipment point (marijuana, cocaine). References Bordenave, S., and D. Davis. “Small Arms Demand and Violence in the Caribbean: Focus on Haiti.” Draft paper presented at the Regionalism, Regional Security and Civil Society of the Greater Caribbean in the New Global Environment Seminar, 25–27 February 2004, http://www.afsc .org/latinamerica/PDF/smarmeng.pdf. Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook, 2005, http://www.cia.gov. Griffith, I. L. Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty under Seige. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1997. ———. The Political Economy of Drugs in the Caribbean. New York: St. Martin’s, 2000. International Organization for Migration. “IOM in the Caribbean,” October 2002, http://www .iom.int/documents/publication/en/caribbean3 .pdf. Klein, A., M. Day, and A. Harriot. Caribbean Drugs. New York: Zed, 2004. Smellie, A. “The Illegal Trade in Firearms and Its Impact on the Drug Trade and Money Laundering in the Region,” n.d., http://www.cfatf .org/eng/typoexe/illtrad/index.pdf. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. September 2003. Drug Enforcement Administration. Drug Intelligence Brief: The Drug Trade in the Caribbean; A Threat Assessment, September 2003, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/intel/ 03014/03014.pdf.

Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean Robert D. Hanser, Nick Wakeley, Meghan K. Smith, and Walonda Wallace Introduction Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean are all fairly well known for their share of political instability and continued warfare. These characteristics have created a region of the world that is witness to innumerable acts of desperation among the poor and downtrodden on the one hand and overt acts of exploitation from victimizers on the other. This means that it often may be difficult to discern between the victim and the perpetrator in these cases, and this is particularly true when organized criminal activities such as human smuggling (as with the illicit sex industry) or drug trafficking (for more affluent consumers in the United States) are concerned. Moreover, the activities of organized crime groups in this area of the world are becoming more diversified and now simultaneously resemble the acts of drug-running outfits, orga-nized paramilitary guerrilla rebels, and primary terrorist factions all at the same time. Thus, these groups are no longer onedimensional in their mode of operation, and they are less amenable to any simplistic single form of analysis. There are three primary areas of criminal activity now common to organized crime groups in Latin America: drug trafficking, human smuggling (including the illicit trade), and terrorism. The drug trafficking industry is fairly common knowledge among scholars, practitioners, and laypersons alike. Human smuggling, including the illicit sex trade, is common to many underdeveloped areas of the world and thus may not be a surprising development (although its proximity to the United States may be somewhat surprising). However, the third activity consists of a blending between the incomegenerating activities of these criminal groups and their nefarious links to groups that perpetrate acts of terrorism. Drug Trafficking in Latin America Organized crime is typically most involved with generating profits by providing illicit goods and services to meet the demands of a given consumer

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population. Because the United States is an avid consumer of illicit drugs, it is only natural that many of the less-developed countries in Latin America have experienced a strong tendency among its criminal entrepreneurs to fulfill this demand. Indeed, the drug trade is one of the most lucrative operations for criminal syndicates in the regions of Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. According to J. Farrar, “Central America, Mexico and the Western Caribbean have become the principal corridor through which transnational drug trafficking groups move some 92 percent of the South American cocaine shipments that enter the United States.” Central America is one region that is heavily affected by the drug trade because of its easily penetrated borders, lack of adequate law enforcement, and lack of well-trained law enforcement officials. Due to the low risk of detection by enforcement officials, the graft and corruption of those officials, and the political instability of many countries in Central America, this region has been found to be ideally suited as a primary corridor by which the trade can be conducted. In fact, seizure data indicate that Central American countries are increasingly being used by international drug traffickers as transit points for transporting illicit drugs, especially heroin and cocaine, from South America throughout the United States and Canada, with much of this trafficking occurring along the Atlantic Coast. Oftentimes the organized crime groups establish bases of operation in Central America that act as way stations for further drug product transportation. From the large seizures of drugs and the testimony of apprehended offenders, it is becoming increasingly clear that traffickers use the Central American region as a major transit point for further drug transportation. Likewise, Caribbean countries are increasingly being exploited by illicit drug traffickers as transit points as well, and this is particularly true with many of the island nations throughout the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. Interdiction efforts continuously encounter a steady flow of illicit drugs being trafficked by air and sea in the Caribbean. Not only has the drug trade brought illicit products into this region, but it has also brought

increased levels of violence. Violence related to drug trafficking has been a continual problem in this region, and law enforcement must continuously contend with these dangers both on land and at sea. Within the Caribbean region, certain points may serve as drop-off points for sale, particularly when the drugs are carried via air. Much of the drug trade through the Caribbean is conducted by aerial transportation using personal aircraft that is contracted by the drug trafficking organization (which is typically interlinked with cartels and such organizations in South America and Mexico). Frequently, dead bodies from conflicts between drug traffickers are encountered in various island nations of the Caribbean, their origins being rooted in squabbles over the conditions of the trade that occur when parties meet at obscure landing sites of small personal aircraft. The Mexican drug cartels are major suppliers of illicit drugs and receive substantial profits from the drug trade. D. L. Bender estimates that “Mexican drug rings smuggle between $10 billion and $30 billion worth of narcotics annually.” In other words, these Mexican organized crime groups, or cartels, clear more than $10 billion a year from transporting drugs into the United States. Indeed, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration estimates that approximately 92 percent of the cocaine sold in the United States in 2001 came through the U.S.Mexican border, compared with 77 percent in 2003. One key reason for this rampant trafficking is the well-known corruption that exists within the Mexican system of law enforcement. Human Smuggling and Trafficking and the Illicit Sex Trade in Latin America It is important to distinguish between smuggling and trafficking. In a general sense, smuggling refers to instances when the victim is an accomplice to one degree or another. Typically there is no force used to encourage the victim to make the illegal transit across national borders. This does not mean that crimes are not perpetrated against these victims, but it simply denotes the fact that the victims often give initial consent to their illegal passage across international borders. Trafficking, on the other hand, implies that no consent is given on the 97

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Policemen unload over 2,000 kilograms of cocaine at Juan Santamaria airport in Alajuela, Costa Rica, on April 24, 2005. The drugs came into the country by boat from Colombia and were seized in Playon de Camay, near the border with Nicaragua. (AFP/Getty Images)

part of the victim and often entails some degree of force that transports the victim against her or his will. Each of these activities has been reported to occur in Latin America, particularly with respect to entry into the United States. However, the issue of trafficking has been noted to be most problematic when pertaining to children who are victims of the illicit sex trade. Indeed, it has been reported that hundreds of young girls are taken to virtual slave markets in the vicinity of Mexico City for use as child prostitutes who service a demand generated by foreign visitors of the city. These children are systematically raped and intimidated into compliance and then are bought by pimps, who then transport them across the border into the United States. As a result, Mexico has been noted to be routinely frequented by pedophiles due to the despera-

tion of many of the street children in impoverished areas of the country and the lax federal, state, and municipal laws and enforcement. Currently, attention has been given to this concern, and authorities and advocacy groups are working to stem this illicit industry. But the demand continues to intensify from foreign visitors, and this in turn provides a lucrative criminal venture for human traffickers in this region of the world. On the other hand, the issue of human smuggling into the United States through the U.S.Mexican border region has also been noted to be an active organized criminal trade. The criminal actors are frequently referred to as coyotes and often smuggle desperate individuals from Central America into the southwestern United States. Most frequently, those escorted and smuggled by coyotes

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are young women, particularly women from Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. These women are frequently charged $10,000 to $20,000 for their entry, and they are then forced to work in bars and nightclubs as exotic dancers or prostitutes until this fee is paid in full. Naturally, many abuses (often beatings and rapes) often happen to these women, and threats of deportation or harm to their families in their own country of origin typically will keep them compliant. The smugglers are often fairly rough on their human cargo and have been notorious for their violence and willingness to kill noncompliant women. On some occasions, women are left for dead in the desert regions of the U.S. Southwest. Likewise, women who become pregnant due to their victimization through rape or forced sexual servitude have often been made to submit to unwanted abortions, sometimes under barbaric conditions. Investigations by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement divisions have uncovered numerous smuggling rings in the U.S. Southwest and in the state of New York. Often, the perpetrators are from the nations of El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Mexico, and their range of operations can be quite extensive so as to include routes of operation that cover numerous countries throughout the region. These networks will tend to include ringleaders who often own many of the domiciles where the women are hidden and imprisoned as well as the bars and nightclubs where they are forced to ply their trade. Recruiters are specialized members of these networks who locate young and attractive females in war-torn or povertyridden locations of Central America, lying to the women about their job prospects in the United States so as to entice them as willing (albeit naive) accomplices into the smuggling activity. The smugglers or coyotes conduct the actual work of transporting their human victims through the Mexican desert into the United States and also work within the United States to smuggle these women from state to state. Enforcers are responsible for imposing the rules and working conditions upon the victims as well as collecting the smuggling fees. It should be pointed out that the members of these networks are frequently female, meaning that the

perpetrators do not represent a gendered type of grouping. Many of the criminals arrested, convicted, and sentenced among these organized crime operations are female and may even be spouses of the male criminal actors involved in the smuggling operation. The coyotes are likewise responsible for the smuggling of male victims as well. Many of the men seeking to enter the United States do so under the hope of securing employment (although it is illegal employment) that is superior to what they could obtain in their own country of origin. Many desire to save the money for their families in their native countries and are employed in the migrant farming industry in various areas of the United States. These men may seek the aid of a smuggler since security has become increased along the U.S.Mexican border. However, many are given deceptive accounts of the conditions that surround their smuggling experience. As a result, many die of suffocation, starvation, and other abuses that occur in the process of the smuggling activity. One organized human smuggling ring operated out of El Paso, Texas, and often solicited U.S. truck drivers (paying them handsomely and providing other incentives) to illegally smuggle people inside their interstate eighteen-wheeled rigs. This organized crime ring is thought to have processed as many as 500 undocumented immigrants a week from El Paso to northern Texas and beyond. Aside from the human smuggling that seems to be inherent among many organized crime syndicates around the world, there is some evidence that the syndicates operating in Central America and Mexico may have connections to extremist groups from the Arabic Middle Eastern area of the world. Indeed, Senator John Cornyn, chairman of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Citizenship, has noted that Arabic literature and materials have been discovered in areas of Texas near the Mexican border where many human smuggling rings have been known to operate. This has led to a call for improved border security within the United States and has heightened concerns that such smuggling operations may become fully enmeshed with extremist group efforts from abroad on a recurring basis. Given the 99

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The bodies of nine people line the Tuxtla Gutierrez road where a cargo truck carrying more than seventy Central American illegal immigrants collided with a trailer in Chiapas, Mexico, on April 26, 2006. (Pablo Virgen/Corbis))

recent discovery of Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) operatives in various areas of Central America, this concern may not only be understandable but also a bit past due. Extremist Group Interconnections The ETA, otherwise known as the Basque Separatists or Fatherland and Liberty group, has been around since the 1960s and 1970s with, according to Graham Turbeville, “a long history of involvement in drug trafficking to generate operational funds or money for weapons purchases in both Latin America and Spain.” Indeed, it was found that the ETA has used legitimate business fronts for its organized trafficking of drugs and weapons in the Santa Rosa region of Managua, Nicaragua. One such facility in Managua was dubbed the “Taller

Santa Rosa Arsenal.” Inside the facility were a number of illicit goods including hundreds of passports from various countries. The trafficking of these passports provided a lucrative exchange and also gave ETA members the ability to infiltrate nearly any nation. Furthermore, it has been reported that the ETA has been responsible for widespread kidnapping rings that run throughout Latin America. According to Turbeville, the ETA uses “ransom money to finance its operations” in order to further finance their terrorist acts that are routinely carried out in Spain and their own Basque country. The ETA is likewise involved with weapons trafficking, and this business thrives considering the warfare that has occurred in El Salvador and other surrounding countries. Among the weapons trafficked, various guns, grenades, C-4

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explosives, and even varieties of surface-to-air missiles have been reported. Evidence found from this and other such raids on ETA operations in Latin America indicate that this group has been active in this region for twenty years or more. In the 1980s, many of the ETA members fled to Spain, while some members decided to take multiple trips back and forth between Spain, France, and Latin America. In 2001, Spanish law enforcement estimated that roughly 500 members of the ETA fled to various locations in Latin America. Most of these members sought a temporary vacation from their active membership but were considered to still be on reserve should the need for aid to their fellow members again present itself. According to Turbeville, “More recent 2004 estimates suggest that some 130 ETA members are located in Latin America, specifically, though precise numbers are clearly lacking and change with comings and goings.” Turbeville further notes that “in addition to Nicaragua, they have been particularly associated with Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela, Uruguay, the Dominican Republic, and several other states in the regions.” As Turbeville notes, Mexico is considered to be the “ETA’s country of choice in regard to establishing it’s major financial and logistical networks.” Spanish law enforcement officials estimate that there are eighty members in Mexico and believe that the majority of these are involved in the clan’s financial and logistical networks. The Mexican government insists on capturing these members who are residing in their country. A successful seizure in Oaxaca that was handled by the Mexican government during the summer of 2003 resulted in lots of ETA material including some twenty-five ETA activity-related videos, ETA operational and chemical weapons manufacturing manuals, documents related to the organization, and bank receipts. Also found were weapons, explosives with detonators, false documents, and illegal banking operations such as money laundering. Currently, the Mexican government is continuing to track down the remaining ETA members who are residing in Mexico. According to Turbeville, “They have also recruited Mexican citizens to help in their work.”

Venezuela was once home to as many as thirty Basque ETA criminals, and the Spanish government is attempting to exile these members from the country. However, due to help given to the ETA from the administration of Caesar Chavez, it is more difficult for the Spanish government to move forward. After the Santa Rosa arsenal explosion, the ETA’s logistics head-in-charge “Paticorto” retreated to several places such as Costa Rica and Colombia. He was assumed to have established contact with one of Colombia’s biggest insurgencies, the National Liberation Army (ELN). The ELN helped Paticorto in order to acquire weapons and training. According to Turbeville, “It is asserted in a number of sources that the association with the ELN served as the basis for establishing collaboration with the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia), a move linked to planned growth in FARC’s urban operations requirements.” Present ETA members in Colombia are easily compared alongside the Real Irish Republican Army (Real IRA) and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (Provisional IRA). The ETA has made close ties with the IRA, several politicians, associates from Lebanese and Libyan training camps, and some right-hand men in the weapons and arms market. In regard to the ETA’s future, it would appear that newer recruits are entering at a younger age and with less initial experience. This can be a boon or a bane for many such organizations. On the one hand, the lack of prior organized socialization makes the recruit more malleable to intensive indoctrination of group norms and activities. On the other hand, this means that ETA will have to invest more time and energy in developing new recruits for success as warriors of terror. Furthermore, this ensures that older members will continue to be of vital importance to the logistical and managerial aspects of this paramilitary group. The ETA remains a highly militarized, disciplined, and determined group, but the changing nature of new recruits and the new operational environment— centered around organized criminal activity—may have unanticipated consequences. Given the organized and militarized nature of this extremist group, it is likely that continued influence will 101

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extend throughout the region, further connecting the interrelationships among organized crime syndicates and extremist group activities). This development has been noted in other areas of the world (i.e., Southeast Asia and the Middle East) and is also very similar to the connections of FARC and the organized drug trade operating in Colombia. Thus, it may well be that the ETA is a likely candidate for further law enforcement attention when combating organized crime activity and is likely to warrant military intervention since it presents an added threat to the national security of the United States and other nations in the region. Conclusion Organized crime is an area of crime that is growing. Perpetrators need funds and groups to help them with their illegal activities. Many organized crime groups attract followers and extremists who want to be heard and want to fight for what they may believe in. Thus, gangs and extremist groups are formed. These groups are greatly linked to crime, especially organized crime, while they fight for their beliefs and commit crimes for their groups. However, they need funds for their acts, and the illicit sex and illicit drug industries are ideal for these organizations to truly benefit from and make huge profits. Although this problem is worldwide, the Caribbean, Mexico, and Central America are being transformed into a regional haven for a variety of organized crime syndicates, guerrilla military factions, terrorist groups, drug cartels, and human trafficking outfits. It is likely that this area of the world will continue to provide more than its fair share of crime and human misery to the global scene for several decades to come. References Bender, D. L. The War on Drugs: Opposing Viewpoint. San Diego: Greenhaven, 1998. Davis, Joyce M., and Nomi Morris. “World Governments Take Steps to Stop Sale of Women into Sex Industry,” 6 January 2001, http://groups .yahoo.com/group/hlf/message/1506. Farrar, J. State Dept. Official Discusses Central American Drug Trafficking. Washington, DC:

Office of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2004, www.usinfo.state.gov. Gilot, L. “Human Smuggling Was Big Business for El Paso Brothers.” El Paso Times, 16 June 2003. Hanser, R. D. “Immigration and Crime in Europe.” Criminal Justice International 18(62) (2002): 7–8, 25. ———. “The Prison System of Spain.” Criminal Justice International 18(60) (2002): 11, 28–31. Human Events Online. “Tex. Senator Shown Evidence of Arab Personal Effects at Mexican Border,” 22 November 2005, http://www .humaneventsonline.com/article.php?id=10427. Inciardi, J. A. The War on Drugs: Heroin, Cocaine, Crime, and Public Policy. Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield, 1986. Moran, N., and R. Hanser. “Terror for Profit: The IRA-FARC Connection.” INTERSEC 14(2) (2004): 44–47. Rosales, Jose Nahun. “Second Human Smuggling ‘Enforcer’ Pleads Guilty; Admits Young Honduran Women Forced to Work in N.J. Bars,” 22 November 2005, http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ nj/press/files/ros1122_r.htm. Schaffer Library of Drug Policy. America’s Habit: Drug Abuse, Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime. President’s Commission on Organized Crime, 1986, http://www.druglibrary.org/ schaffer/govpubs/amhab/ahmenu.htm. Turbeville, G. H. “ETA Terrorism, the Americas, and International Linkages.” Criminal Justice International 20(81) (2004): 4–10. Willamette World News. “Mexico Deputies Seek Crackdown on Child Sex Tourism,” http://blog .willamette.edu/centers/llc/worldnews/mexico/.

The Central Asian Republics Mark Galeotti Introduction The Central Asian Republics (CARs)—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—created by the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 understandably resent the outside world’s assumption that the so-called ’stans are essentially identical. In Soviet times, after all, the region was known as Central Asia and Kazakhstan because the latter, with its greater level or urbanization and sizable Russian population, was consid-

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ered very different from the others. However, their organized crime problems do share striking similarities, not least in the extent to which they are shaped by three common issues: political instability or illegitimacy, endemic corruption, and trafficking of various illegal commodities, especially drugs. Organized crime in the region as a whole does not fit the same pattern as in Russia or the West. Instead, what passes for organized crime is dominated by so-called clans. In some cases, these are essentially kin groups. In others, they are clans in a more figurative sense, political cliques that tend to cohere around a particular individual, family, or local elite. These are often relatively crude in their structures and even their operation. They depend for their success and security not so much on high levels of tradecraft as on their effective autonomy or connections. They are often heavily involved in racketeering and embezzlement, but this typically takes place behind an official facade. For example, businesses are encouraged to support specific charities, political groups, and other front organizations to avoid harassment from police and tax authorities. The main overtly criminal activities undertaken by these gangs relate to smuggling, primarily but not exclusively of drugs. Common Problems All five CARs are essentially artificial states, their borders drawn during the Soviet era. It is not enough to say that the borders do not reflect the ethnic and geographical realities on the ground. They were deliberately drawn to create divided and unruly states in order to deter hopes of independence. When independence was essentially thrust upon them, they were left with Soviet-era leadership struggling to adapt to a new political environment and a host of unresolved ethnic, political, and socioeconomic dilemmas. Furthermore, these states were all impoverished, their economies having been planned to operate as part of a wider Soviet Union and unprepared for the loss of central subsidies and protected markets. The existing political elites moved quickly to create new bases for power, and the result has been a partial and distorted transition away from the Soviet model. While all the CARs are nominally

democracies, in practice most are heavily dominated by small cliques of officials and their families and allies, generally known as clans. Likewise, the shift from the planned to the market economy has been used as an opportunity to enrich the old elites, who were allowed to snap up lucrative businesses at artificially low prices. Some are more corrupt and some less so, but the result has generally been that the CARs are dominated by narrow elites, often with little real political legitimacy, at least outside their own home regions. Combined with extreme poverty (as of 2005, the average monthly income in the region was $10–15) and resurgent interethnic and religious tensions, this has also created instability throughout the region. In some cases, this has taken purely political form. In others, this has meant outright civil war, such as the one that wracked Tajikistan during 1992–1997. In the twenty-first century, though, terrorism associated with Islamic extremism is an increasing problem and one that both contributes to and is worsened by the strength of organized and transnational crime in the region. Although the region is no stranger to political and religious extremism, there is evidence of growing links between local militant groups and such global networks as al-Qaeda, including the rise of trademark tactics such as suicide bombings (the first being made in Uzbekistan in March 2004). Some groups seek political change, while others seek regional secession. There are also growing calls for the formation of a single Moslem Caliphate of Greater Turkestan, uniting the Turkic peoples of the region including those of China’s Xinjiang Province. Whatever their aims or inspirations, most of these insurgent and terrorist groups are turning to the narcotics business for funds, whether charging criminals tolls for moving drugs through areas they control or involving themselves directly. After all, Afghanistan’s emergence as the world’s main source of opiates has had a dramatic effect on the regional underworld. Furthermore, narcotics are produced in the Chu and Fergana Valleys (the first of which cuts from Kazakhstan into Kyrgyzstan, the second from Uzbekistan into Kyrgyzstan), the mountainous regions of Leninabad and Gornyi Badakhshan (both in Tajikistan), and Surkhandarya 103

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One of the alleged Tashkent bombers speaks at his trial in June of 1999. On February 16, 1999, six bombs were detonated in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, targeting government buildings and killing sixteen people. The Uzbek government charged 22 men in the attack and sentenced six to death. It is widely speculated that the men’s confessions were extracted by torture. (Corbis)

(in Uzbekistan). Thus, drug production and trafficking is explicitly transnational and rooted in regions already hard to control where ethnic identities run against artificial national borders. Furthermore, the huge profits generated by drugs have created extensive and secure networks for moving and laundering money, which the terrorists are also able to use. This is certainly true of the bestknown terrorist organization in the region, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which, despite its title, operates throughout the CARs. The destruction of its base of operations in Afghanistan has simply forced it to operate increasingly covertly rather than relying on open force of arms, including buying, refining, and trafficking heroin. The Opium Trade Opium has been grown and trafficked across the region for centuries, but with the rise of heroin use,

this became an increasingly important trade. Afghanistan is the world’s main source of opiates. In 2004, for example, opium was grown in 206,000 hectares, producing 4,000 tons of opium, most of which was converted inside the country into 400 tons of illegal morphine and heroin. Traditional trafficking routes through Iran and Pakistan came under pressure beginning in the late 1990s, and as a result Central Asia became an increasingly important route into Russia and Western Europe. Despite improving cooperation within the region and also an increasingly serious approach on the part of most of their governments, the CARs will be unable in the foreseeable future to prevent drug trafficking. A kilogram of heroin costs around $1,000 on the Afghan border, $10,000 on the Kazakh-Russian border, $25,000 when packaged for retail sale in Moscow, $30,000 as a bulk wholesale item in Western Europe, or fully $130,000–

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150,000 when sold on the streets of Europe. As long as there are such lucrative markets, the traffickers will have the incentives and resources to ensure that they continue to exploit them, even if that means paying ever-greater bribes, finding new routes, or even arming terrorist and separatist movements. A raid launched by the IMU in Kygyzstan’s Batken region in 1999, for example, appears to have been made not for political reasons but at the behest of drug smugglers eager to clear government forces away from profitable routes. Seizure rates are no more than 5–10 percent of the opiates flowing from Afghanistan, and despite extensive international pressure and assistance, rising quantities of intercepted drugs appear to reflect growing levels of trafficking rather than greater successes by the authorities. Furthermore, the trade is strengthening and galvanizing local organized crime gangs, contributing to a culture of endemic corruption among law enforcers and creating illegal routes that can then be expanded to carry other commodities. All five CARs are source countries of both illegal migrants and victims of human trafficking. Kazakhstan in particular is also a transit country, and weapons appear to flow freely to insurgent groups within the region. Kazakhstan Kazakhstan has been one of the most stable of the CARs and also managed the transition from the Soviet era relatively smoothly. Northern Kazakhstan, which still has a significant ethnic Russian population, is the only substantial part of Central Asia in which organized crime demonstrates a modern network-style structure, although most local gangs are actually linked into larger combines in Russia itself. Other than this, its underworld is dominated by clans based in particular communities and regions, protected by their political leaders in central and local government. It also has a relatively low crime rate, albeit one that has increased steadily, especially in and around the capital city of Astana. Kazakhstan is a drug-producing and trafficking state. Marijuana and ephedra grow wild on more than 1.2 million hectares of southern Kazakhstan, especially in the Chu Valley, which is arguably only

partially under central government control. Thus, almost all marijuana in Central Asia comes from Kazakhstan. However, its main role is as a drugtransit country. Since 2000, the proportion of Afghan heroin passing through Central Asia grew to around a third, of which almost three-quarters moves through Kazakhstan at least at some point. Despite adopting a major antinarcotic program in 2000, President Nursultan Nazarbayev has admitted that it might take twenty years for Kazakhstan to control the problem. Smuggling of every kind appears rife and organized. As well as locals, Kazakh gangs traffic Uzbeks and other Central Asians to Russia, Turkey, and beyond for both sexual exploitation and forced agricultural and construction labor. Likewise, when Uzbekistan increased its customs dues and partially closed its border with Kazakhstan in 2003, Kazakh gangs swiftly exploited this, smuggling relatively cheap goods across the border. Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan weathered the storm of the 1990s better than most of the CARs, as crime levels remained relatively low and open discontent was avoided. However, it is also one of the poorest postSoviet states, and over time its situation worsened steadily as the inherited infrastructure crumbled and prices of imported oil and gas rose. This contributed to a growing organized crime problem dominated by drug trafficking, both for domestic purposes and, above all, through trade of Afghan opiates. After all, it borders onto China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan and is characterized by the kind of rugged terrain and poor roads that make detection of drug traffickers problematic. The isolated mountain passes on the Chinese and Tajik borders have become especially heavily used by traffickers, as they are snow covered for up to four months of the year, and what border posts exist are often without electricity and are staffed by underpaid and demoralized officers eager to be bribed. Thus, the southern and southwestern regions of Osh and Batken have become thoroughly penetrated by traffickers. The city of Osh has become one of the key turntables for drug shipments brought in 105

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by road and then sent by road and air on to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan for through-shipment to Russia and beyond. By 2005, dealing, moving, growing, or processing raw opium had become the main livelihood for perhaps half the population of the city and its environs, and despite periodic purges (in 1995, the city’s police chief had to transfer or dismiss his entire drug squad and replace them with only those men he felt he could trust, a mere twenty-nine officers), corruption remains endemic within local law enforcement. The result has been a growing crisis in law enforcement. In 2005, staff at the central Criminal Investigation Department formally petitioned parliamentary assistance, claiming that they could not cope with the challenge of fighting organized crime. For the foreseeable future, this challenge seems set only to grow. Tajikistan Tajikistan was torn by civil war during 1992–1997, leading to a near collapse of law and order. The crime rate doubled in the first quarter of 1993 alone, with the number of murders increasing ninefold and the number of armed robberies tenfold. After the formal end of the fighting between the government and the Unified Tajik Opposition, the country was left with a weak economy (even by 2004, 80 percent of the population was living below the poverty line), and the central government’s grip on the much of the country remains limited. The civil war was essentially clan-based, fought among the northern-based Khodzhent (Leninabad) clan, the southern-based Kulyab clan, and the easternbased Badakhshanis. During the fighting, warlords and militias turned to crime—and drugs in particular—to finance their wars. Even though the war is over, many gangs continue to smuggle Afghan opiates across their hard-to-secure common border. The country’s cotton crop is also heavily criminalized, with cotton smuggling second only to the drug trade in Tajikistan’s criminal economy and with a largely northern-based cotton mafiya maintaining links with its much more powerful counterparts in Uzbekistan. In a vicious circle, this has also deprived the state of tax revenue it needs both for economic reconstruction—Tajikistan is one of the poorest countries in the world—and law enforcement.

Although for at least its first decade of existence the Tajik government was unable or unwilling to tackle organized crime seriously, by 2004 there was evidence of a growing political will to deal with the problem. That year, Tajikistan joined Interpol, and Interior Minister Humdin Sharipov admitted for the first time the failings of the police, especially in analyzing and combating organized crime. And in one of the highest-profile cases of its kind, Ghaffor Mirzoyev, former head of Tajikistan’s Drug Control Agency, was arrested and charged with murder, corruption, and involvement in drug trafficking. However, a lack of resources will severely limit the government’s efforts for the foreseeable future. Turkmenistan By 1999, Turkmenistan had become a virtual dictatorship under its colorful and self-aggrandizing President Saparmurat Niyazov, and a combination of extreme poverty and high levels of immunity enjoyed by corrupt officials have helped to encourage organized crime, so long as the gangs are linked with members of the ruling elite. It is unclear whether Niyazov turns a blind eye to high-level corruption or is simply unaware of it. In December 2003 he claimed that there was no crime in his country, three months after criticizing his minister of interior for being excessively cautious in fighting crime. Turkmenistan shares borders with Afghanistan and Iran and must therefore contend with flows of processed heroin or raw opium from Afghanistan as well as routes leading into and out of Iran. This has also fueled a growing domestic drug problem, albeit one underreported by the authorities. In 2004, the Ministry of Health claimed that 15 percent of the population used illegal drugs, but other estimates put the figure as high as 25 percent. In part this may represent a culture of suppressing bad news, or it may be due to links between senior figures within the Turkmen government and the heroin trade. Uzbekistan Like Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan has an essentially authoritarian political system, dominated by President Islam Karimov and his allies, something that

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has facilitated corruption. This has invigorated domestic gangs, although they tend to be relatively small organizations, controlled by or beholden to corrupt officials and local grandees. They are involved in a wide range of activities, from racketeering to cotton and oil smuggling. However, the most lucrative single activity is drug trafficking. Uzbekistan was once an opium-producing country, but a sustained government campaign as well as the difficulties in competing with Afghan growers largely eliminated domestic producers. Instead, it has become a major transit country, with traffickers moving opiates across Uzbekistan’s southern borders, especially in the Kashkadarya and Surkhandarya provinces (touching on both Tajikistan and Afghanistan), then to Kazakhstan for shipment to Russia and Europe. Karimov’s intransigent position has contributed to the rise of terrorism, motivated both by political frustration and Islamic militancy. The IMU has posed a challenge to the state since the late 1990s, especially after U.S. troops were stationed in the country in 2002, and has been joined by other political Islamic groups. As in Tajikistan, insurgency, terrorism, and organized crime became quickly intertwined, with underground movements turning to drug smuggling to raise funds and engaging the services of criminals to procure weapons, documents, and intelligence. Given that the main gangs all have links with the regime, this has meant that smaller groups previously locked out of the most lucrative criminal businesses have begun to gain a foothold thanks to their terrorist links, raising the prospect of an underworld struggle between those supportive of the regime and those opposed and mirroring the wider political struggle. References Galeotti, Mark. “Cross-Border Crime and the Former Soviet Union.” IBRU Boundary & Territory Briefing 1(5) (1995): 1–25. Gleason, Gregory. Markets and Politics in Central Asia. Londoon: Routledge, 2002. Makarenko, Tamara. “Crime, Terror and the Central Asian Drug Trade.” Harvard Asia Quarterly 6(3) (2002), http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/academic/ intrel/research/cstpv/pdffiles/HAQMakarenko3.doc.pdf.

Olcott, Martha Brill. Drug Trafficking on the Great Silk Road: The Security Environment in Central Asia. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2000. Redo, Slawomir. Organized Crime and Its Control in Central Asia. Huntsville, TX: Office of International Criminal Justice, 2004.

Child Sex Trafficking in Cambodia Roe A. Roberts and Chris Bain Introduction Child sex slave trafficking is a lucrative industry. The United Nations (UN) estimates that human trafficking is the world’s third-largest criminal enterprise. U.S. intelligence agencies state that trafficking puts $US9.5 billion into the coffers of organized crime each year. As a result, about 1.2 million children worldwide are forced into a life of sexual slavery each year, and this problem is particularly acute in Cambodia, which is a source, a destination, and a transit point for child sex slaves. One-third of Cambodia’s sex workers are under age eighteen. and many are smuggled in from Vietnam. In 1996, the Cambodian Interior Ministry stated that 5,000–6,000 children were enslaved in brothels in and around Phnom Penh. By 2005, the government estimated that there were 30,000 sex workers in the country, with an average age of fifteen. Local charities suggest that the average age is closer to twelve, as brokers are buying nine-yearold girls, having them cook and clean in brothels until they get a few years older, then offering them to clients as so-called cherry girls. In 2003, Svay Pak, a shanty town located on the fringe of Phnom Penh, had twenty brothels lining its main street. Pimps freely offered girls or boys depending on the customer’s preference, and $500 would buy a sixyear-old for a week. Historical Background Cambodia’s child sex trafficking grew out of the chaos created by the long civil war in the 1970s and 1980s. Millions died, families broke apart, poverty abounded, and criminal predators exploited the resulting chaos. The UN’s entry into the country 107

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helped end the war but not the sex trade. In fact, it expanded to serve the needs of UN troops stationed in Cambodia. After the UN left, the growing tourism industry fueled the trade. The widespread availability of child sex slaves made Cambodia a favorite tourist destination for pedophiles from around the world. In 2004, ECPAT-USA estimated that American tourists accounted for 38 percent of Cambodia’s child sex trade. Thus, the growth in Cambodia’s child sex trade is due in large part to the lucrative tourist industry. However, another factor—the HIV/AIDS epidemic—has also spurred its growth. Children orphaned or abandoned by parents with AIDS are left to the mercies of sex traffickers. Also, men who once hired adult workers for sex now hire children, who’ve had few or no sex partners, due to their fear of contracting HIV from the adult workers, and the younger the child the better. As a result of the epidemic, 70 percent of young girls rescued from Cambodian brothels have HIV. If not rescued, these children become too ill to work and are abandoned by the brothel owners. A Growing International Problem Children become sex slaves in a number of ways. Some parent’s sign work contracts with brokers who travel from village to village. These parents sign the contracts thinking that their children are being hired for legitimate work only to condemn them to a life of sexual slavery. Once the contracts are signed, it is almost impossible for the children to escape due to debts created by the contract and the shame of returning to a society that rejects them. In some instances, parents or other relatives knowingly sign these contracts for their own financial benefit. As demand has increased for child sex slaves, there has also been an increase in kidnappings. Hagar, a nongovernmental organization (NGO) in Cambodia, blames the increase in kidnappings on the Thai government’s efforts to curb prostitution. Pierre Tami, a Hagar director, says that when forced from Thailand, organized crime sought out another place in which to operate, and that place was Cambodia. Many times, these abducted children are sold in the West as prostitutes or mail-order brides. The U.S. Central Intel-

ligence Agency (CIA) estimates that 50,000 young Asian women and girls are illegally smuggled into the United States each year. Cambodia passed stricter laws in 2000, but the threat of conviction and penalties didn’t deter traffickers, as authorities were either unwilling or unable to effectively curb this escalating crisis. Officials openly admitted to having lost control of a situation in which senior police and military officers control the sex trade and successful prosecutions are rare. Police openly accept bribes, evidence is allegedly misplaced before trials, brothels are tipped off before raids, and pimps slip out of their handcuffs on the way to court. Although an occasional case draws international attention and a harsh sentence, in the majority of cases prosecution rarely occurs, and when it does offenders are given light sentences. The situation has become so extreme that in 2004, armed assailants kidnapped eighty-four children and women from a shelter run by Agir pour les Femmes En Situation Précaire (AFESIP, Acting for Women in Distressing Situations), a Cambodia NGO for victims of the sex trade. The Cambodian government committee investigating the attack did such a poor job that U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher publicly questioned Cambodia’s commitment to sincerely address human trafficking crimes. International Cooperation There are glimmers of hope. While Cambodia had done little to stop the trafficking, recently more arrests are being made, and Svay Pak’s brothels have been shut down. Internationally, most East Asian countries have signed a treaty, the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The UN’s Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) included articles setting out the responsibilities of governments to protect children from the abuses of the child sex trade. UNICEF is working with local governments to review legislation and is supporting rescue efforts aimed at reuniting children with their families. The United States, NGOs, and the UN have been working to curb those parts of the multibillion-dollar sex tourism industry that promote child sex traffick-

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Young Vietnamese prostitutes are detained by Cambodian police during a brothel raid in Phnom Penh on October 11, 1997. (AFP/Getty Images)

ing. In the United States, the 2003 Protection Act’s child sex tourism provision was used to convict Michael Clark, who paid young boys $2 for sex in Cambodia. Since then, more Americans have been charged under the act. A 2004 report stated that the synergy created by the cooperation between these groups is starting to produce positive results. References Anon. “Cambodia: Child Sex Trade Booming.” Women’s International Network News 22(3) (1996): P48. Boucher, Richard. “U.S. Criticizes Cambodian Inaction in Shelter Attack.” U.S. State Department News, 19 February 2005, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p =washfile-english&y=2005&m=February&x= 20050219142924SAikceinawZ0.7409021&t=xarchi ves/xarchitem.html. Central Intelligence Agency. “Trafficking in Persons Report.” Released by the U.S. Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, 2004, http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2004/ 33191.htm.

Crawford, Emily. “Therapist Travels to Cambodia to Fight Effects of Sex Slavery.” Albuquerque Journal, 16 April 2005. Farrell, Michael. “Global Campaign to Police Child Sex Tourism.” Christian Science Monitor, 22 April 2004. Hansen, Chris. “Children for Sale.” Dateline NBC News, 5 January 2005, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/ 4038249/. Marks, Kathy. “British Sex Tourists Turn Killing Fields of Cambodia into Paedophiles’ Playground.” The Independent, 5 January 2003, http://www.vachss.com/help_text/a2/british_ sex.html. McClelland, Susan. “Sad Little Girls.” MacLean’s 116(47) (2003), http://www.macleans.ca/world/ global/article.jsp?content=20031124_70039 _70039. Munthit, Ker. “Tide Turns against Foreign Sex Offenders in Cambodia.” Associated Press, 29 March 2004, http://www.cambodia.oggham .com/?p=375. Pettifer, Jennifer. “Cambodia’s Child Sex Shame.” BBC Radio 4’s Crossing Continents, 3 November 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/ crossing_continents/3975965.stm. 109

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Silverman, Victoria. “Hagar, an NGO, Helps Human Trafficking Victims in Cambodia,” 2003, http://usinfo.state.gov/gi/Archive/2004/Jun/17448703.html. UNICEF. “Children on the Edge, Protecting Children from Sexual Exploitation and Trafficking in East Asia and the Pacific,” 2002, http://www.unicef.org/vietnam/childse.pdf.

Organized Crime in Eastern Europe Kelly Hignett The term “Eastern Europe” has always been more than purely a geographical term, also often containing economic, cultural, and political meanings. After World War II, the term was most commonly used to refer to those European countries that fell under the control of the Soviet Union and established communist regimes. Today, as many of the former Eastern bloc countries are reintegrated with Western Europe through their inclusion in organizations such as the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the term “Eastern Europe” has become less clearly defined and subject to interpretation. However, the term remains commonly used, in its broadest sense, to refer to the grouping of European countries that were part of the Sovietdominated socialist bloc until 1989: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and the former Yugoslavia. One of the major developments in organized crime in recent years has been the increasing use of East European countries as an operating base for both indigenous and nonindigenous criminal organizations. Recent EU documentation classes organized crime in East European states as being “on the frontline” of the fight against organized crime, despite a second report admitting that “significant intelligence gaps still exist” in knowledge about organized crime in the East European region. The Evolution of Organized Crime in Eastern Europe During the Cold War, the geopolitical East-West divide across Europe meant that the countries of Eastern Europe were largely isolated from their

Western neighbors. As a result, organized crime in Eastern Europe is often considered to be a recently emergent problem, with the first international concerns voiced in the early 1990s. However, the roots of organized crime in most East European countries can be traced back to the socialist era with the development of a criminal subculture in society, concealed in the criminal-political nexus that existed under socialism. The first recorded examples of organized crime in most East European states date from the 1970s. By the late 1970s, all East European countries had a flourishing black market that provided the ideal environment for criminals to make large profits through the supply of illegal goods and services on an extensive scale. By the 1980s, many gangs were also involved in small-scale smuggling operations, organized burglary, and the illegal production of drugs and alcohol. These early criminal groups were certainly primitive compared to modern organized crime. However, they did display many characteristics commonly associated with organized crime in terms of their structure and operations. Police reports suggest that by the late 1980s, a number of gangs with Mafia-style structures had emerged in most East European countries. In addition, despite the strict border controls in place, there is evidence of rudimentary small-scale, cross-border connections by the late 1980s, particularly between East European and Russian criminal organizations. However, it was the collapse of socialism across East Europe in 1989 and the subsequent postsocialist transition that provided the opportunities for organized crime to modernize and expand operations. During the transition period the potential benefits of participation in organized crime increased, while the risks were negligible in comparison. The early 1990s saw a veritable explosion in organized crime across the East European region due to political transition, social upheaval, chaotic economic conditions, weak law enforcement, a permissive legal framework, unprotected borders, and porous financial systems. Extensive privatization programs in most East European states presented criminals with an opportunity to invest proceeds from their illicit activities in the

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legal economy. This combination of circumstances influenced the dynamics and structure of organized crime in the region, and the result was that organized criminal operations in East Europe became more complex and professional and, as a result, were perceived as a serious threat. The postsocialist transition also gave criminals the opportunity to expand their operations. The rapidly changing economic climate presented many opportunities for criminal activity, and many gangs became involved in tax evasion, import-export scams, and large-scale money laundering. The relaxation of border controls after 1989 also made it easier for trade and travel across state borders, which enabled East European organizations to establish working relationships with criminal gangs based outside the region. The states of Eastern Europe were ideally situated for incorporation into European smuggling routes, acting as a natural channel between Western Europe and Asia. The central East European states (such as Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) provided numerous routes into Western Europe, while the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) provided easier access to the Scandinavian countries. This made the countries of Eastern Europe attractive to numerous gangs from outside the region. By the mid-1990s, intelligence reports suggested that criminal organizations from Arabic countries, Africa, Asia (especially China), Colombia, China, Turkey, the former Soviet Union, and various West European countries (including the Italian Mafia) were all operating either directly on East European territory or in conjunction with domestic gangs. Today, according to Interpol, most of the well-known criminal organizations have established operations in Eastern Europe. In addition, various East European criminal groups are known to be active in numerous countries, with operations spanning three continents. East European Organized Crime Today East European organized crime has proven to be both flexible and adaptable, and by the close of the 1990s many criminal networks operating in Eastern Europe had developed a sophisticated and profes-

sional approach to their activities. In many cases, East European organized criminal groups have graduated from acting as service providers to actually controlling operations. Intelligence received from law enforcement agencies in many East European countries indicate that until recently, criminal organizations were largely structured along the traditional Mafia paradigm, with a centralized, hierarchical structure and clear levels of membership. However, recent reports indicate a shift toward looser criminal networks and cellular organizations, which allows for greater flexibility particularly in terms of international operations. Data concerning the composition of criminal organizations seems to support this trend. Whereas in the early 1990s most groups detected in East European countries were overwhelmingly composed of domestic criminals, today an increasing number of organizations are known to have mixed ethnic membership, while some are composed almost solely of nonindigenous members. Many East European criminal organizations have a reputation for violence, and throughout the 1990s criminal turf wars were reported in almost all East European countries as rival gangs fought for influence. Today, the underworld in most East European countries appears to be more stable, although score settling does still occur. Most gangs have retained their capacity for violence, especially those from the former Yugoslavia, who are particularly associated with violent conduct and intergang warfare. A further defining characteristic of East European organized crime today is the diversity of markets in which the criminals are involved. The most popular criminal activity for East European organized crime today is drug trafficking. In the 1990s, many East European states were incorporated into the Balkan Route used to smuggle heroin from Afghanistan into Western Europe and Scandinavia. Today it is believed that Turkish and Albanian groups are the primary suppliers of heroin to Western Europe, but the inclusion of so many East European countries as smuggling routes means that the suppliers often work in conjunction with ethnic East European criminals to organize transit. Meanwhile, the illegal production of drugs is 111

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Bulgarian anti-terrorist police secure containers with 2,058 kg of drugs before incineration in a furnace at the Aleksandrovska Hospital in Sofia on December 14, 2004. Bulgaria is one of the countries on the so-called Balkan route for smuggling drugs from Asia to Western Europe. (AFP/Getty Images)

increasing, with laboratories discovered in many East European states, and Poland was recently named as the second-largest supplier of amphetamines to the European market. Increased drug seizures in East European states suggest that those states are becoming increasingly attractive as markets for drug traffickers rather than simply as smuggling routes. In a similar vein, many East European criminal organizations are also involved in human trafficking and illegal immigration. East European countries play a dual role as both source and transit countries in the transportation of human cargo to the West. Again, this is an activity that generally requires cooperation between criminal gangs from Eastern Europe and from outside the region. Other popular activities for East European organized crime include the smuggling of alcohol, cigarettes, and oil; extortion; and prostitution. Vehicle smuggling

and arms smuggling were popular activities in the early 1990s, particularly during the wars in the former Yugoslavia. However, these activities have decreased in recent years due to more effective border controls and lower profitability, although a significant number of cases are still uncovered every year. All East European criminal organizations are also involved in money laundering to some extent, and there have been a number of high-profile financial investigations involving East European banks in recent years. Fighting Organized Crime in East Europe East European authorities were largely unprepared for the explosion of organized crime after 1989. However, significant progress in combating organized crime has been made in recent years. Most East European countries have launched programs aimed at reducing and preventing organized crime.

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Changes in domestic law have recognized the existence of new forms of criminality, and specific measures have been adopted in the fields of illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and serious economic crime. Specialized law enforcement units trained to combat organized crime have also been formed, and border controls have been strengthened across the region. Many East European states have also been required to strengthen their legislation and take action against organized crime as a prerequisite for membership in the EU. In recent years, there have been many positive developments in fighting organized crime in the East European region, and a number of high-profile Mafia trials have taken place in some East European countries (notably Poland and Hungary). The countries of Eastern Europe have also made bilateral and multilateral agreements on fighting organized crime and sharing information with a variety of countries outside the region. Given the international nature of organized crime in the region and the scope of criminal activities in terms of type and territory, there is a need for increased international cooperation if attempts to prevent East European organized crime are to succeed. As the states of Eastern Europe become more integrated with the West, organized crime in these states is increasingly viewed as a European rather than a regional problem. References Council of Europe. Organised Crime Situation Reports (1996–2004), http://www.coe.int/ defaultEN.asp. Europol. European Union Situation Report on East European Organised Crime. The Hague, Netherlands: Europol, 2001, http://www.europol .europa.eu/index.asp?page=publar2001. ———. Europol Annual Report, 2000. The Hague, Netherlands: Europol, 2001. ———. Europol Annual Report, 2003. The Hague, Netherlands: Europol, 2004. ———. Threat Assessment: The Impact of East European Crime on the EU. The Hague, Netherlands: Europol, 2000. Hignett, K. “Organised Crime in East Central Europe: The Czech Rebublic, Hungary and Poland.” Pp. 70–83 in Global Crime Today: The Changing Face of Organised Crime, edited by

Mark Galeotti. Abingdon, Oxford, UK: Routledge, 2005. Holyst, Brunon. “Organized Crime in Eastern Europe and Its Implications for the Security of the Western World.” Pp. 67–93 in Organized Crime—Uncertainties and Dilemmas, edited by Stanley Einstein and Menachem Amir. Chicago: Office of International Criminal Justice, 1999. Savona, E., and S. Adamoli. “The Impact of Organised Crime in Central and Eastern Europe.” Transcrime, Working Paper No. 7, September 1996.

Europe: Central Europe, Eastern Europe, Western Europe, the Baltic States, and the European Union Kelly Hignett The Evolution of Organized Crime in Europe Organized crime is by no means a new phenomenon in Europe. The clandestine nature of organized crime, a lack of reliable data, and gaps in intelligence make it difficult to accurately assess the full scope of organized crime in Europe today. Analysis of the evidence that is available, however, suggests that European organized crime has become increasingly widespread and sophisticated, with European states used as both transit routes and target markets for organized gangs operating in their territory. As such, the issue of organized crime and its impact on security and stability has become increasingly politicized in many European states in recent years. Today, transnational organized crime is considered to pose a clear problem for most European countries, with intelligence reports stating that organized crime should be considered a significant threat to European security. Two key developments influenced the rise of organized crime in twentieth-century Europe. The first development was the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, an event that led to the removal of the geopolitical East–West divide across the European continent that had been in existence since the aftermath of World War II, and, similarly, the independence 113

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of the Baltic States—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—and their return to Europe following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, events that led to the redefinition of Europe both geographically and politically. The second development was the closer integration of European states through the evolution of the European Union (EU). The emergence of new opportunities as a result of these changes was realized by criminal groups based both inside and outside of the new Europe. Therefore, contemporary criminal development in Europe has clearly been shaped by the increasing influence of nonindigenous criminal networks, and as a result, organized crime in Europe today demonstrates immense variance in terms of numerical and ethnic composition, organizational structure, operational methodology, and the scope and scale of operations. While some gangs concentrate their efforts solely on involvement in a particular market or territory, most have shown signs of increasing diversification. In addition, the development of strategic alliances among criminal networks in a variety of European countries and with organizations operating outside of Europe has led to the further dissemination of organized crime across the European region. European Integration: Opportunities for Organized Crime The EU is a treaty-based institutional framework that defines and manages economic and political cooperation among its member states. Today, twenty-five European countries have full membership status in the EU: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. A further five countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, and Turkey) are currently candidates for future accession to the EU and are at various stages of preaccession negotiations. The process of European integration leading to the EU began in the 1950s. The Treaty on European Union was signed in 1993 and aimed to facil-

itate even closer political and economic relations among member states. The full impact of transnational organized crime in the EU remains unclear, as significant intelligence gaps still exist. However, the latest figures identify that more than 4,000 criminal groups, consisting of an estimated 40,000 total members, are known to operate on EU territory. It is clear that both indigenous and nonindigenous criminal organizations are increasing operations throughout EU member states and also establishing strong links with other groups operating outside of the EU area. The importance of the recent enlargement of the EU into East-Central Europe and the Baltic States (the largest single round of enlargement to date, increasing membership of the EU from fifteen to twenty-five member states) in May 2004 has also impacted upon the development of organized crime in Europe by increasing the opportunities available to gangs seeking new criminal markets, as new members have been targeted as source, transit, and destination countries for gangs operating in the EU. This internationalization of European organized crime has clearly been influenced by the strengthening of the EU. In recent years, there have been further moves toward the pooling of sovereignty and lowering of internal borders between EU member states. The creation of the Single European Market in 1993 aimed to further European economic integration by enabling the freer movement of goods, services, people, and capital between EU member states, thus creating a single space of mobility for EU citizens to live, travel, and work in Europe. In addition, fifteen of the twenty-five members of the EU are currently signatories of the Schengen Acquis (1985), which allows for the freer movement of peoples between EU member states through the abolition of internal border controls. These same policies, designed to allow greater European integration by encouraging the freer movement of goods and peoples across European borders, have also been utilized by criminals to forge cross-border links and expand their operations in terms of both markets and territory (for example, the introduction of the Single European Market in 1993 led to a dramatic increase in commodity smug-

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gling), thus providing opportunities for the development of closer working relations among criminal organizations operating within Europe. Many established criminal networks seized on the development of closer relations between West and East European states (and the Baltic States) after 1989 as an opportunity to set up shop and gain freer access to the EU trading zone, while the eastward enlargement of the EU provided a wealth of opportunities for the criminal gangs established in the accession states. Since the revolutions of 1989, many East European criminal networks have established themselves as a serious force in the international criminal hierarchy, and according to Interpol, by the mid-1990s “every gang making big money in drugs, guns, prostitution and extortion” had established a base of operations in Eastern Europe. This freer movement of people within the European area has also increased migration flows between EU member states, which have created opportunities for criminal gangs to establish links with communities based outside of their home territory. Europe Today: A Criminal Melting Pot Most European countries can trace the historical development of domestic criminal organizations. Today, however, it is evident that both indigenous and nonindigenous crime networks increasingly span the whole of Europe with their operations. For example, Arabic, Colombian, Nigerian, Russian, Turkish, and Vietnamese groups operate throughout Europe while retaining strong links with their countries of origin. While some organizations with an operating base in Europe conform to the more traditional model of organized crime (strongly hierarchical, centrally controlled, and ethnically closed) such as Italian Mafia groupings or Albanian clans, other organizations increasingly operate as looser interconnected criminal networks. Thus, organized crime in Europe today encompasses a broad variety of individual groups, including Jamaican Yardie gangs in the United Kingdom, Chinese Triads extorting money from businessmen in Chinese communities across Europe, Belgian white-collar criminals involved in

organized fraud against EU legislation, Dutch gangs controlling amphetamine production, German groups involved in illegal immigration, Polish gangsters transporting stolen cars from Germany to Russia, and Latvian gangsters smuggling cigarettes from Ukraine into the Baltic and Nordic states, to name but a few examples. All of these groups show some variance in terms of size, organizational structure, mode of operations, and activities undertaken. The influx of nonindigenous criminal organizations into European territories has had a clear impact on the European underworld. Some gangs, such as Chinese organizations, used the traditional method of criminal expansion into European territories, that of using émigré communities to establish operations outside of their country of origin. Other organizations, however, most notably those from the former Soviet Union and the Balkan states (principally Albania), attempted to move in and take over markets or territories in other European states by force. This led to upheaval in the previously established status quo in many areas. The East European states in particular were rocked by a series of violent turf wars between criminal gangs in the mid-1990s, while virtually all European states have recorded an increase in assassinations and violent incidents connected with organized crime since the early 1990s as a result of struggles for influence between rival gangs. While the influx of nonindigenous criminal organizations may lead to conflict in the shorter term, the longer-term result has been that of increasing cooperation between many criminal groups. An examination of the composition of organized crime networks currently known to be active in Europe highlights the increasingly international nature of organized crime. This trend is reflective of the evolution of organized crime on a global scale. In recent years, European states have been fully utilized as a crossroads by numerous criminal groups. For example, Turkish and Chinese networks are now known to operate in the majority of EU member states. Russian-based criminal networks were quick to expand their operations into Eastern Europe and the Baltic States in the early 115

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1990s and have also established themselves in many West European countries. In many cases, however, foreign-based criminal organizations subcontract operations to local criminal groups in European territories. For example, Chinese Triads overseeing the illegal immigration of Chinese nationals from Beijing to London may use contacts in Chinese émigré communities in European states to organize stages of transit. However, they may also establish a working arrangement with domestic European criminal networks in their chosen transit countries, as subcontracting part of the operation to local groups will decrease the risk of detection and prove mutually profitable. Criminal Activities Organized crime groups based or operating in European countries are currently engaged in a broad variety of criminal activities and markets, including drug smuggling; arms trafficking; illegal immigration and people trafficking; cross-border smuggling in commodities such as antiques, alcohol, cigarettes, cars, oil, and even nuclear materials; extortion; bribery; fraud; counterfeiting; and money laundering. Although the trafficking and supply of drugs currently remains the largest illegal market in Europe, organized crime involvement in illegal immigration and human trafficking is rapidly increasing, and this trend looks set to continue. Despite this diversity, however, some common traits can be identified, and the increasing interlinkage between criminal networks operating in Europe means that from a general perspective, organized crime is viewed as a common threat to all European states. Intelligence suggests that today criminal networks often view the EU as a single target market for their activities, and this requires EU members to cooperate closely if they are to ensure their own security, and that of their neighbors, against organized crime. Drugs Europe acts as a transit region, destination market, and producer of illicit drugs. Drug trafficking remains one of the most profitable markets for organized crime to develop operations in Europe, particularly since the opening up of Eastern

Europe and the Baltic States as transit points for drugs en route to Western Europe and the United States. Source countries for drugs transported into Europe include Afghanistan, Colombia, Jamaica, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, and South Africa. Colombian cartels supply the majority of cocaine to Europe, working with local European-based groups in countries such as Italy, Poland, and Spain, to ensure transport and distribution across Europe. Turkish and Pakistani groups control the trafficking of heroin from the Middle East and Central Asia through Eastern Europe and the Balkans, again working with local criminal networks. According to Interpol reports, as much as 80 percent of the heroin on Western European markets today is believed to enter Europe via one of these Balkan Routes from the East. Cannabis from Morocco is primarily trafficked to European markets via Spanish ports. Since the early 1990s, there has also been an increase in synthetic drugs smuggled out of Western Europe as a result of operations between criminal networks in countries such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and Britain. There is largescale manufacture of synthetic drugs in European states such as the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Britain, and Poland. (Today, Polish-produced amphetamines account for more than 25 percent of the European market, second only to the Netherlands in terms of production.) Because of its central geographical location, Germany serves as a major transit point for criminal organizations involved in smuggling operations, particularly in the trafficking of drugs and illegal immigrants from East to West and the smuggling of cars and synthetic drugs from West to East. There is also a large European market in the smuggling of cigarettes, dominated largely by Italian and Albanian gangs often working with Russian or Ukrainian networks, with numerous known trafficking routes extending across Europe. Vehicle Theft and Smuggling Since the early 1990s there has been substantial development in the trafficking of stolen vehicles by European criminal organizations. It is currently estimated that around 80 percent of cars illegally

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smuggled through the East European region are stolen from West European states and are en route to Serbia, Russia, Ukraine, and Central Asia. Criminal networks involved in this market demonstrate considerable levels of organization, professionalism, and specialization, with alterations to vehicle license plates and supporting documentation often occurring en route and the majority of stolen vehicles having already been transported out of the country before their theft is even registered. Recent statistics suggest that the European market for stolen vehicles is now in decline. However, it is worth noting that in cases where organized vehicle theft does occur, criminals are resorting to more violent methods, with the practice of carjacking on the increase across Europe. Arms Smuggling Europe has also increased in significance as a center for arms smuggling in recent years. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact treaty organization after 1989 provided European criminals with a ready market in weaponry, explosives, and ammunition. In addition, the breakup of Yugoslavia and the subsequent Balkan wars of the early 1990s increased the demand for illegal weapons in the region. The increase in criminal gangs in many European countries has led to increased competition between organizations, leading to the outbreak of fighting over markets and territories in recent years, and this has led many criminal gangs operating in Europe to seek to arm themselves at a higher level. In addition, many weapons trafficked through the European market are transported on to other continents, either to countries under UN arms embargos or countries such as Colombia, where rebel groups seek a steady supply of arms, which they often exchange for cocaine that can then be sold on the European market. Money Laundering Most European criminal organizations are involved in money laundering to a greater or lesser degree. Traditional European centers for money laundering include Luxembourg, Switzerland (due to its tradition of bank secrecy), and the United King-

dom. However, developments in many East European states after 1989 have also led to increased criminal interest in Eastern Europe as a base for investment and money laundering. A variety of criminal organizations, both domestic and foreignbased, were able to invest in businesses during the privatization programs taking place across Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. In addition, a lack of financial regulations to protect the East European banking system led to a number of suspicious transactions, and by the mid-1990s Hungary was considered to have become the third-largest money launderer in Europe. Organized criminal involvement in large-scale fraud against EU regulations has been documented in a number of states, such as the reportedly widespread involvement of criminal organizations in defrauding EU agricultural policy. In addition, the introduction of a new European currency, the euro, as the principal currency for twelve EU member states in 2002 also raised concerns that this would provide new and easier opportunities for counterfeiting, fraud, and money laundering, particularly in the transitional stage of currency changeover. Illegal Immigration and People Smuggling Illegal immigration is currently one of the most worrisome aspects of organized crime in Europe. Human smuggling was the fastest-growing criminal market at the beginning of the twenty-first century, second only to drug trafficking in terms of profit. Hundreds of thousands of immigrants enter the EU states illegally every year, with current estimates suggesting that as many as 75 percent of migrants entering European states illegally are aided and abetted by criminal organizations, and this figure is believed to be increasing. The main illegal migration flows in Europe run from East to West, with the countries of the EU constituting a major destination for many migrants. Organized illegal immigration in Europe is often controlled by gangs based outside of the region, with Chinese, Russian, and Turkish gangs believed to dominate the market. As outlined above, however, illegal immigration often involves alliances between different criminal groups, and many of the organizers subcontract transit of their cargo to local European 117

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groups at various stages along the way. The trade in illegal immigration can generate large profits for the criminals, but several human tragedies have served to politicize this issue in European states. In one case, the bodies of eighteen illegal immigrants were discovered hidden in a Hungarian lorry that had been abandoned across the border in Austria. In another recent tragedy, fifty-eight illegal Chinese migrants suffocated to death in the back of a container lorry in the English port of Dover. In a related market, some European criminal organizations are involved in the trafficking of human beings. The trafficking of women within Europe has increased considerably since the early 1990s, and many victims are forced into the sex trade, often also controlled by organized crime. Many women from East European countries are discovered each year working as prostitutes in Western Europe, with the Netherlands and Germany being popular destinations. Networks uncovered include the trafficking of women from Poland, Bulgaria, and Romania into Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands. The European gangs involved in illegal immigration and human trafficking often employ professional methods to gain entry to European countries, and the use of forged passports and documentation is increasing. The recent expansion of the EU to include several East-Central European countries and the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania raised concerns about the consistency of border security across Europe. Since the political changes of the early 1990s, there has been a marked increase in the level of illicit traffic through both Eastern Europe and the Baltic corridor. Despite measures taken to improve border controls across Europe, several areas remain a cause for concern. The borders between the Czech Republic and Germany, Hungary and Ukraine, and Poland and the Former Soviet Union remain problematic, and there continues to be a high level of illegal traffic through the Baltic States and into the Nordic countries. Significant advances in border security have been made in recent years, but with several new EU members now protecting the external borders of Europe, concerns over border security remain.

Fighting Organized Crime in Europe The increasingly international nature of organized crime across Europe means that Europeans are beginning to recognize the necessity of working together to actively fight crime, and the recent politicization of many issues linked to organized crime (such as illegal immigration, gun control, and value added tax fraud) in many European states have pushed organized crime to the forefront of the political agenda. The EU is developing an institutional framework for fighting organized crime in member states and encourages the cross-border exchange of information and policing to fight organized crime, both within the EU itself and with neighboring countries. For example, there is a significant Russian Mafiya presence in the EU, so the engagement of Russia in the fight against organized crime in the EU is essential if measures are to prove effective. A joint EU–Russian Action Plan on combating organized crime was signed in 2000. The EU is taking a serious approach to combating organized crime in the territories of its member states. The third pillar of the EU treaty allows for cooperation in justice and home affairs (including cooperation in judicial matters, law enforcement, and border control), and this incorporates the fight against organized crime. EU policy documents state that a cooperative and proactive fight against organized crime at both the national and European levels is a priority in ensuring the security of its member states. Significant advances in legal harmonization between EU member states have already been made, although loopholes still exist, making further developments desirable. In addition, accession candidates are required to meet a number of criteria (including criteria relating to policing, border control, and the fight against organized crime and corruption) before they become eligible for membership in the EU. High levels of organized crime have recently been outlined as causing particular concern in relation to Bulgaria’s application to become a member of the EU. In 1993, the European Union Ad Hoc Group on Organized Crime adopted a working definition of what constitutes organized crime, although this has not been formally adopted by EU members on a

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European Union justice and interior ministers in the Redouten room of the Hofburg castle during an informal meeting in Vienna on January 14, 2006. The ministers examined whether to give more operational independence to Europol amid concerns that the policing body’s work is unfocused and may overlap with other agencies. (AFP/Getty Images)

national level, and thus European states currently hold a variety of nationally accepted definitions of what exactly constitutes organized crime, with several states lacking any precise legal definition. In 1996 an EU action plan on organized crime was officially adopted. The Amsterdam Treaty on the European Union, which came into force in 1999, provides a legal framework for accelerating efforts made at the EU level to strengthen law enforcement and judicial cooperation. In October 1999, the Tampere European Council adopted an all-embracing approach to reinforce the fight against serious crime that included a number of new initiatives designed to foster closer police cooperation between member states. In March 2000, the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted a millennium strategy in the field of prevention and control of organized crime that contains thirty-nine detailed recommendations in various fields and set

target dates to implement them. All EU member states have also signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The EU has also set up an institutional framework designed to assist with the fight against organized crime in all member states. The establishment of Europol in 1995 was the first real attempt at creating a European police organization and aimed to improve the effectiveness of cross-border cooperation between domestic law enforcement bodies in EU member states. Europol facilitates the crossborder exchange of information; provides expertise, technical support and operational analysis; and produces strategic reports and crime analysis on the basis of information collated from member states. Europol remains understaffed and has no executive powers, however, the effectiveness of Europol depends largely on the extent of operational cooperation between the law enforcement 119

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agencies of member states, which is not always forthcoming. The European Police College, established in 2002, aims to provide training in combating organized crime to law enforcement officers across EU states and increase levels of cross-border cooperation within Europe. This is a welcome development if the member states of the EU are to implement a truly effective program against organized crime. The majority of European countries have signed the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, adopted in 2000. In addition, many European countries have signed additional bilateral or multilateral regional agreements to work together in fighting crime. Other organizations have also been established, such as the Task Force on Organised Crime in the Baltic Sea Region, established in 1996, that includes representatives from Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia, Sweden, and the EU. Cooperation across state borders is often problematic, however, and in many cases the authorities find that they are playing catch-up with the criminals, who remain one step ahead. Recent reports all highlight the need for further research in order to identify and understand organized crime in Europe. Additionally, greater coordination between governments and law enforcement agencies in the exchange of information, legislative reform, training, and restructuring of personnel is needed if European states are to mount a serious and united challenge to organized crime.

References Adamoli, S., et al. Organised Crime around The World. Helsinki: HEUNI, 1998. Gateway to the European Union, Informational Website.“Organized Crime,” http://europa.eu/ scadplus/leg/en/s22008.htm. Europol. EU Organised Crime Situation Report (2000). The Hague, Netherlands: Europol, 2001, http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page =publications. Europol. Europol Annual Report (2000). The Hague, Netherlands: Europol, 2001, http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page =publications. Organised Crime Situation Reports. Strasbourg:

Council of Europe, http://www.coe.int/T/E/ GENERAL/portailEN_indexA-Z.asp?charac=O. Europol. Threat Assessment: The Impact of East European Crime on the EU. The Hague, Netherlands: Europol, 2000. Heijden, T. van der. “Measuring Organized Crime in Western Europe,” 1996, http://www.ncjrs.org/ policing/mea313.htm. Hignett, K. “Organised Crime in East Central Europe: The Czech Rebublic, Hungary and Poland.” Pp. 70–83 in Global Crime Today: The Changing Face of Organised Crime, edited by Mark Galeotti. Abingdon, Oxford, UK: Routledge, 2005. Sands, J. Europe in the Age of Globalization: A Hotbed of Transnational Organized Crime? ECPR SG Organised Crime, September 2002, http://members.lycos.co.uk/ocnewsletter/SGOC09 02/sands.html. Task Force on Organized Crime in the Baltic Sea Region informational website: http://www .balticseataskforce.ee/.

Gang Crimes: Latino Gangs in America Robert Hanser and Nathan Moran Street Gangs Latino gangs have spread to various areas of the United States including Chicago and cities in the Southwest, Florida, and New York. In fact, the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS) estimates that roughly 47 percent of all gang members are Latino in cultural or racial orientation. Furthermore, in states such as Arizona, it is reported that fully 62 percent of all gang members are Latino in demographic orientation. Other areas of the Southwest report similar levels of Latino gang involvement. In trying to understand the development of Latino gangs, it is important to keep in mind the unique cultural demographics involved with the Latino American population. The acculturation process for many Latino American immigrants has been shaped by the economic deprivation that many early Latino American immigrants endured when first coming to the United States. This is particularly true among those Latino Americans who immigrate illegally into the United States. Indeed, it has been found that many first-generation Latino

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American immigrants are not fluent in English. This creates a schism between this generation and their children, who quickly learn English from within the school systems. For these youths, much of the socialization process then occurs among peers rather than within the family, and this has created a social identity for these youths that provides them with alternative values unique to their own demographic group. J. D. Vigil refers to the notion of cholo culture, which is derived from Mexican Spanish to refer to persons of lowly or marginal social status. With Anglo and Latino American characteristics being intermixed, this cholo orientation becomes internalized in the streets. Specifically, Vigil notes that many Mexican American youths find a sense of belonging within this subculture since their experience as fluently bilingual biculturals is essentially normalized. Thus, the cholo culture reflects a poverty-ridden, unguided process of street socialization and identity that is intertwined with much of the Latino American gang subculture. Indeed, it is this cholo culture that is purportedly the groundwork of the Latino subculture. It is for this reason that many adolescent Latino males join gangs during their progression into manhood. The gang provides a set of guidelines for these youths to follow as they search for meaning and belonging amid a world of deprivation, misunderstanding, and alien culture. These youths from the cholo culture are already socialized to the street and are thus perfectly socialized for later membership within a street gang. This is particularly the case for young males raised in female-dominated households. These youths lack a stable male role model and therefore purportedly turn to those models available within the gang family. As in other cultures that face this gender dilemma, the street gang has formalized a gang initiation ritual to help newcomers take on a new “tough male” identity. As Vigil notes, the effects of gang association produce a range of corollary behaviors that immerse the youths into criminal activity that is reinforced by the subculture. The use of any variety of drugs, the ownership of firearms, and the development of a mind-set referred to as locura (quasi-controlled craziness) all coalesce to produce a volatile and

explosive youth who must provide public displays affirming this mind-set and attitude to gain and maintain respect among the gang family. The gang subculture itself has values and norms that guide and direct gang members. The protection of barrio territory and family honor is crucial to the youthful male gang member’s standing in the subculture. This sense of machismo is central to the gang member’s sense of integrity and self-worth within this value system and will be defended against slight or dishonor with little regard for the consequences that can ensue. Various forms of dishonor and disrespect are the primary sources for many gang conflicts, drive-by shootings, and sexual assault of females related to the target of the insult within a Latino gang. Among Latino gangs, various hand gestures, signs, and symbols are common. Graffiti use and the tattooing of symbols of gang identity are common and are acts that affirm the members’ loyalty, and they also can be used to denigrate the reputation of a rival gang. Indeed, the very attire, as well as style of talking and walking are all strongly influenced by gang membership. Young members frequently display differing cultural norms from older members, which can also be reflective of the differing levels of acculturation within the broader society. Naturally, these differences in norms are also simply a product of the natural life-cycle aging process. Many Latino gangs target local schools as a recruiting platform for new members, and these gangs may hold parties where new members go through a variety of initiation rites into the gang. These entry rituals are likely to be quite violent. Prospective members may have to undergo beatings, while potential female gang members may be gang-raped as part of their initiation. Regardless of the age of the gang member, nicknames are given to all new members, and they are expected to apply those nicknames (along with the barrio gang name) in graffiti on walls. Furthermore, these members will frequently tattoo their given name on themselves to increase identity and solidarity with the membership. Among gangs in general, including Latino gangs, there has been a emergence of so-called gang nations. This is actually just an informal term used to 121

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“Cholo,” a US-born citizen of Salvadoran heritage, shows off his Mara Salvatrucha-13 (MS-13) tattoos and hand signs on January 23, 2006, in Durham, North Carolina. MS-13 is a street gang formed by refugees of El Salvador who fled the country’s civil war during the 1980s and 1990s. (Getty Images)

describe gangs that are large enough to have multiple subgroups with a variety of related members, sometimes stretching across multiple areas of the United States. Over the past few years, law enforcement officials have referred to gangs such as the Surenos and Nortenos, both from California, and the Mexican Mafia of California, Texas, and Florida as genuine gang nations. These officials note that both of these Latino gang nations consist of several smaller sets that share common symbols and loyalties. Because of this, it may well be that members of different sets may not even recognize one another even though they are both members of the same gang nation. It is thus through the use of signs and insignia that are common to members throughout the gang nation that they may be able to positively identify their common loyalties in gangland affiliation. These same Latino gang nations have also been found within Texas prison populations.

Among these gang members, it is most common that members will circulate back and forth between prison terms and periods of release when they are back on the streets. In metropolitan areas such as Los Angeles, Miami, and San Antonio, this is very common. Furthermore, the prison culture and the existing Latino prison gangs tend to further import the street gang values, with prison gang mentality and allegiances being transmitted back into society through members who are released. This creates a constant recycling of Latino gang members who alternate their criminal careers from the street to the prison and back to the street. Because of this, no discussion on Latino gangs in America would be complete if it did not provide a discussion on Latino prison gangs. Inmates are expected to remain members for life, maintaining their prison gang contacts after their release. A released inmate who has joined a

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prison gang can be a negative influence if he reestablishes contact with his former street gang members. In Texas, law enforcement officials report that certain prison gangs recruit young members directly off the streets. Some law enforcement officials report that prison gangs are taking over street gangs as a means of expanding their drug trade. For example, among prison gangs such as the Mexican Mafia, dues are collected from each member with the intention that this money is to be sent to fellow gang members who are confined in prison to ensure that their incarceration is as comfortable as possible. In fact, released and paroled prison gang members have been known to be involved in a wide array of crimes that either supplement potential drug addictions or serve utilitarian purposes dictated by gang leaders. Some of these crimes might include home invasions, assaults, burglaries, robberies, murder, murder for hire, and witness intimidation. Prison Gangs While there are numerous Latino prison gangs, perhaps the most influential gang (particularly in relation to street gangs) is the Mexican Mafia. Similarly, prison gangs are gaining prominence as organized criminal groups, and the most notable among these is the Mexican Mafia. This prison gang has been found in at least ten different prison systems throughout the United States and has members outside of prison confines that carry out the orders of ranking leaders still incarcerated. A number of sources confirm that the origin of the Mexican Mafia started during the 1950s at the Duel Vocational Center in California. During this time, a group of youths from an urban Los Angeles street gang were incarcerated within this juvenile institution. These youthful street gang members joined for protection within the institutional setting to emerge into the prison gang that they are today. The Mexican Mafia is now largely made up of convicts and ex-convicts who by the 1960s had obtained control over prison heroin trafficking and other illicit inmate activities such as homosexual prostitution, gambling, and protection rackets. The Mexican Mafia has had a long and influential relationship with outside street gangs and oper-

ations. In 1966 the Mexican Mafia began to move its operations outside of the prison environment and had organized Latino gangs in East Los Angeles to confront the various African American gangs (such as the Bloods and the Crips) that had gained notoriety in that city. The Mexican Mafia is influential with other street gangs and may often exert control and dominance over these smaller gangs. However, it often works out that these members simply become subsumed within the larger organization. The existence of direct members and affiliates of the Mexican Mafia being in the community and in the prison has resulted in the crosspollination of the Mexican Mafia. This crosspollination is said to occur when the gang has developed such power and influence as to be equally effective regardless of whether its leadership is inside or outside of the prison walls. In fact, some cases in Texas have involved members who have directed terror campaigns from their prison cells as a means of controlling the drug trade by Latino street gangs. Furthermore, the wives, girlfriends, and relatives of the Mexican Mafia are held in high regard because of their support in drug transactions, financial activities, and mail-forwarding operations. These networks with extended family are likewise enmeshed with street gang members outside of the prison walls. In fact, the street gang members may be an added source of protection for the extended family inside the prison walls, and as noted earlier, these same members may eventually be incarcerated, only to be replaced by new street gang members and older members who are paroled. Thus, there is a strong interrelationship between many community family members and both the street gang member and the prison gang member, making membership in both nearly seamless for the hardened Latino gang member. Central American Latino Gangs Immigrating into the United States One fairly recent development among Latino gangs in the United States is the increased representation of gangs and gang members from nations in Central America. During the past decade, gangs have migrated across Central America into Mexico to 123

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ultimately settle within the United States. This migration has occurred due to military targeting of these gangs in their native nations of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. Their arrival in the United States has generated a new wave of crime in many Latino neighborhoods in Los Angeles and other areas of California. It is estimated that roughly 70,000 to 100,000 members exist within the boundaries of Central America and Mexico. Due to this, top officials in Honduras and El Salvador have called the gangs as serious a threat to national security as terrorism is to the United States. Military and police personnel in these two countries have incorporated numerous aggressive strategies to combat these gangs. As a result, thousands of gang members are fleeing north, moving with and preying on the waves of illegal migrants who travel to the United States, which is likewise taking aggressive measures of its own to deport thousands of gang members on immigration violations. Since its exodus from members’ native countries of origin, the Mara Salvatrucha has expanded into Alaska, Oregon, Texas, Nevada, Utah, Oklahoma, Illinois, Michigan, New York, Virginia, Georgia, Florida, North Carolina, and even Canada. Due to the social problems that plagued their Central American homelands, Central Americans began to immigrate to the United States and flocked to the Los Angeles area. Many of these immigrants were members of violent gangs that had terrorized citizens of El Salvador during the chaos that had ensued in that country. However, when Salvadorans migrated into predominantly Mexican American communities located in and around Los Angeles, they found that they were not readily accepted and were also frequently targeted by Mexican gangs. Thus, the Mara Salvatrucha formed as a means of protection and quickly gained a reputation for being well organized and extremely violent. The two largest Central American gangs in the United States are the Mara Salvatrucha and the Mara 18, and both of these gangs originated on the streets of Los Angeles. Recently, the United States has bolstered immigration enforcement, and this has resulted in the deporting of tens of thousands of Central American

gang members back to their countries of origin. During the mid-1990s it was reported that roughly 40,000 criminal and illegal immigrants were deported annually. This has only resulted in further expansion of criminal enterprises in countries such as Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico. It has also resulted in an increased and diverse membership among these gangs as the Mara Salvatrucha increasingly recruit new members from within countries other than El Salvador. Another result is that gang members now range in age from roughly eleven years old to forty years old. One development that generates increased concern is the fact that these gangs have formed alliances with several drug cartels and human smugglers. Their connection with human smuggling has drawn the attention of border security officials in the United States who fear a possible alliance between these gangs and extremist groups seeking access into the United States. As these gangs become more diversified and as they form stronger footholds within the various nations south of the United States, this could easily be an eventual likelihood. Given the sheer number of illegal immigrants who enter the United States along the southern border, prevention of gang immigrants seems to be virtually impossible. As a result, the Mara Salvatruchas and the 18th Street gang (Mara 18) have become two of the fastest-growing Latino gangs in the United States and are forming into a growing security threat to the United States, Mexico, and Central America with a presence that is likely to become more prevalent in years to come. Conclusion Latino gangs in the United States are spreading in influence and represent a large proportion of overall gang activity throughout the nation. Many of these gang members have gravitated toward gang membership due to acculturation difficulties and economic challenges presented in the United States. As part of the evolution of Latino gangs, operations have extended from the streets to networks with organized crime syndicates while likewise infiltrating many of the prison systems of the nation. Indeed, the membership between Latino prison gangs and street-based Latino gangs may be

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quite blurred, as they are frequently one and the same. Lastly, an increase in immigration from numerous Central American countries has led to an influx of immigrant gangs from these countries. These gang members are more ruthless than ever and bring with them seasoned experience from their tenure as guerrilla fighters during periods of revolutionary instability within these nations. In total, it would appear that the presence and influence of Latino gangs in America is likely to be permanent and that this influence is likely to grow in years to come.

References Abadinsky, H. Organized Crime. 7th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2003. Attorney General of Texas. Gangs in Texas 2001: An Overview. Austin, TX: Office of the Attorney General, 2002, http://www.oag.state.tx.us/ AG_Publications/pdfs/2001gangrept.pdf. Buentello, S. Personal Interview at TDCJ-ID Administrative Annex. Huntsville, TX: Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division, 2001. Garcia-Preto, Nydia. “Latino Families: An Overview.” Pp. 141–154 in Ethnicity and Family Therapy, 2nd ed., edited by M. McGoldrick, J. Giordano, and J. Pearce. New York: Guilford, 1996. Horowitz, R. Honor and the American Dream: Culture and Identity in a Chicano Community. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1983. Huff, C. R., ed. Gangs in America. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996. National Criminal Justice Reference Service. “Gangs—Facts and Figures,” 2005, http://www.ncjrs.org/spotlight/gangs/facts.html. Shusta, M., D. R. Levine, P. R. Harris, and H. Z. Wong. Multicultural Law Enforcement: Strategies for Peacekeeping in a Diverse Society. 3rd ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2005. Thompson, G. “Shuttling between Nations, Latino Gangs Confound the Law.” New York Times, 26 September 2004, http://www.sawers.com/ deb/nytimes%20gang%20article.htm. Vaquera, T., and D. W. Bailey. “Latin Gangs in the Americas: Los Mara Salvatrucha.” Crime and Justice International 20(83) (November/December 2004): 4–10.

Vigil, J. D. “Learning from Gangs: The Mexican American Experience.” ERIC Digest, No. EDORC-97-1 (1997): 1–6.

International Organized Crime and Its Impact on U.S. National Security Ron Hanser, Jeffrey P. Rush, Deborah L. Pace, Joel M. Keyes Introduction The reach of organized criminal activity extends well beyond the domain of any one city, state, or nation. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines organized crime as a continuing criminal enterprise involving conspiracy, an organized structure fed by fear and corruption and motivated by greed. While the most well-known example of organized crime is that of the Italian Mafia, organized crime as defined by the FBI is significant and is fueled by not only the corruption of government officials but also by society itself. Society must either accept (or at least tolerate) or ignore organized crime for it to continue. Indeed, it is various members of society who allow organized crime to exist through their demand for the goods and services provided by organized crime. The Transnational Nature of Organized Crime Since 9/11, the transnational nature of organized crime has taken on new importance as we begin to assess and investigate the extent to which organized crime might be related to terrorist groups. Indeed, Illir Gjoni suggests that organized crime constitutes a threat to democracy, in particular a serious threat to new democracies and subsequently to the national security of the country. While Gjoni is writing specifically about Albania, it is not unreasonable to suggest that organized crime is a threat to all democracies (including the United States). Furthermore, organized crime is an even greater threat to countries that are in transition to more democratic practices. Indeed, these countries are at a heightened risk of security compromise due to the fact that many common forms of protective infrastructure may not be entirely in place. This has 125

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been found to be true in many East European countries and even more so among many African nations that have attempted to incorporate democratic reforms. The global nature of this concern becomes clearer when one considers that there is a current international shift toward the democratization of many nations. Advocates for this shift toward democracy claim that a democratic state will ultimately overcome tyranny and terror that are instigated at the hands of the government. Ironically, however, a country seeking to overcome the tyranny and terror of the state by becoming democratic might be more susceptible to the terror and tyranny of organized crime. If this tyranny and terror are denied and ignored and a response thereto is delayed (the DID syndrome), the new democratic state could find itself being undermined by its own citizens, and the security of other countries could be compromised by this significant criminal and security threat. Some of the criminal activities associated with organized crime include money laundering, drugs, weapons trading, human trafficking, murder, and bribery. While these crimes clearly have a significant effect on the nation in which the criminals live, in a post-9/ll world all of these crimes have a transnational effect that could compromise the security of other countries. As organized criminals gain a foothold in a country, their quest for money, power, and influence could move them into any number of alliances, schemes, or other associations, each of which is designed to make the organized crime group more money. Might some of these groups have the national security fervor of Tony Soprano, the lead character of HBO’s The Sopranos? Absolutely. There have been reports of many incarcerated Italian Mafia types here in the United States ratting out other inmates with ties to the Muslim faith. Furthermore, many gangsters would not knowingly become involved in terrorism against the United States. The problem, of course, is twofold: (1) many gangsters (i.e., organized crime groups) are simply ignorant as to the groups they are associating with or where the money is ultimately going, and (2) some of these groups are simply unconcerned with the ultimate affiliations that their actions may support.

Within the United States, one emerging transnational organized crime threat is that of Mara Salvatrucha 13, or MS-13. Shelly Feuer Domash tells us that “this plague that came to Long Island from El Salvador by way of the streets of Los Angeles follows the same migratory patterns as the Salvadoran immigrant community that it preys upon, fanning out across the United States from ethnic enclaves in California.” MS-13 has been identified in the California, Alaska, Oregon, Utah, Texas, Nevada, Oklahoma, Illinois, Michigan, New York, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, Florida, and Washington, D.C. Additionally, there is really no question that MS-13 members move relatively freely from Central and South America and Mexico to the United States and back. Furthermore, there are unconfirmed reports that MS-13 has been recruited by al-Qaeda to transport al-Qaeda members across the southern border. Apparently al-Qaeda has reached out to MS-13 due to its expertise in human trafficking and in getting people across the border. It is not too much of a reach to think that if people can be easily smuggled, so too can weapons, bombs, and the like. Transnational Response In a post-9/11 world, there is no question that how we do policing must change. This change must occur at every level: local, state, and federal. We must also realize that some groups are so ingrained in ideology and individuals that simply arresting or killing the leader will not cripple the organization as it might have once done. We must think outside of the box and imagine things that perhaps have never before been thought of. We must use all of the resources available to us in the fight against organized crime, especially its transnational nature. The FBI lays out four criteria in its battle against organized crime: • We must employ a methodology that yields maximum impact with our limited counter-organized crime resources; • We must pursue targets which have direct ties to significant national and international criminal enterprises and systematically dismantle those enterprises;

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• We must remain flexible enough to pursue regional organized crime groups conducting significant racketeering activity; and • We must ensure that our targets are permanently dismantled or significantly disrupted.

The FBI identifies the agency mission as being tasked to “eliminate criminal enterprises which pose the greatest threat to the American society.” State and local law enforcement should establish similar criteria for their part in the fight against transnational organized crime and its relationship to issues of national security. Federal law enforcement must also realize that this is a fight that they cannot engage in on their own but rather one that will require partnering with local, state, and private law enforcement. Law enforcement at any level is not necessarily known for the ability to be innovative in the various fights against the criminal element. In many cases, attempts at innovation have brought scorn and ridicule to the agency, thus ending any attempt at innovative policing strategies. Again, in a post-9/11 world innovation must be the watchword for policing. It is imperative that policing eternally evolve to maintain the level of safety necessary for the changing levels of criminality.

final deliberations: “the grand strategy of preventive war, the grand strategy of active deterrence and containment, and the grand strategy of cooperative multilateralism.” These same strategies can be thought of in the context of law enforcement and its role in battling the transnational threat of organized crime: How can law enforcement go about preventing transnational organized crime, what can be done to prevent and/or contain the transnational organized crime threat, and what strategies can be developed to increase national and transnational cooperation in the battle? Conclusion The Stanley Foundation report suggests eight strategies. Of the eight strategies proposed, it is the eighth one, “to transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century,” that is most relevant here. Clearly, all levels of public and private law enforcement must transform to meet the challenges of the transnational organized crime threat. Agencies must work hand in hand utilizing technology, intelligence, and communication to successfully combat transnational organized crime individually and its connection to global terrorism.

The Stanley Foundation Report A report provided by the Stanley Foundation Independent Task Force on strategies for U.S. national security determined that there were three basic questions that must be addressed on the matter of national security. These questions are: • What should the U.S. do with its historically unprecedented global power? • What is the likely future position in the world 10 to 15 years from now and how should the United States go about influencing that position? • How can the United States ensure its own national security while at the same time create a stable, just, and sustainable global system in the 21st century?

Chairman Larry Korb proposed three broad grand strategies or strategic viewpoints that brought the contending arguments together under three conceptual areas and focused the group’s

References Domash, Shelly Feuer. “America’s Most Dangerous Gang.” Police, February 2005, http://www .policemag.com/Articles/2005/02/America-sMost-Dangerous-Gang.aspx. Federal Bureau of Investigation. “Organized Crime,” http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/orgcrime/ocshome.htm. Gjoni, Illir. “Organized Crime and National Security: The Albanian Case.” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2004, http://www .stormingmedia.us/79/7922/A792224.html. Korb, Larry. Strategies for U.S. National Security: Winning the Peace in the 21st Century. Muscatine, IA: Stanley Foundation, 2003, http://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/03stanleyfound .pdf. Sharansky, Natan, Ron Dermer, and Anagoly Shchransky. The Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror. New York: Public Affairs, 2004. 127

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Crime and Corruption in Japan: The Yakuza Robert Hanser and Nathan Moran Much of the growth of Japanese organized crime, typically referred to as the Yakuza or Boryokudan, has occurred during the years that followed World War II, when the number of Yakuza grew to large proportions, with members divided among numerous splinter gangs throughout the nation of Japan. With the growth in membership and the splintering of that membership, it was simply inevitable that interrivalry and gang warfare would ultimately emerge. Since the end of World War II, five specific periods of development occurred that have led to the contemporary Yakuza organization of today. The traditional sense of public mystique surrounding this criminal organization is being replaced with a sense of public disdain within mainstream Japanese culture. This has led to increased friction between the Yakuza and the Japanese society and more intensive efforts from police. Almost in reaction to this increased resistance at home, the Yakuza have expanded their operations beyond the Japanese homeland to the global market, although they are still definitely active in Japan and still provide illicit goods and services to Japanese citizens. Confusion Period: 1945–1950 The immediate post–World War II period is marked in history as a time of lawlessness and anarchy coupled with a great deal of economic deprivation. During this period, not only was the upperworld of mainstream Japanese society in a state of social disarray, but so was the underworld. Immediately following World War II, the street gangs (known as gurentai or street hoodlums) began to struggle with the older, more established gangs over gambling profits, territory, and monopolies. It was also during this time that the number of organized crime groups began to rise, in terms of both the size and number of groups. According to M. T. Shikita and Shinichi Tsuchiya, the Boryokudan began to develop “various rackets such as street hawking, black markets, gambling, group robberies, and strong-arm protection.” During this period, the police countermeasures to the Japanese underworld’s struggle for survival was minimal

because of allied occupation in Japan and budgetary issues that severely limited the funds available to police agencies to perform their job effectively and efficiently. This struggle was for gambling, prostitution, and drug profits. Conflict Period: 1951–1963 Out of the confusion period rose the conflict period, a full eight years longer than the confusion period. The conflict period was a time in which the Boryokudans began to rise to power and prosper in Japan. (In terms of organized crime, the term “prospering” means that the group is earning money and is gaining insulation from the government via political corruption.) It is estimated that by the end of this period, there were 5,216 organized gangs in existence with more than 184,000 members throughout Japan. Shikita and Tsuchiya have indicated that membership in the Boryokudan during this period reached a postwar high. The rise in the potential to make significant monetary gains during the conflict period created and enhanced existing tensions between Boryokudan organizations. This time of conflict is analogous to the confusion period fighting between the gurentai and the older established gangs. It was during this time that the gurentai gained control of the streets and targeted businesses to establish networks of criminal enterprises. Emerging gangs during this period had to help develop protective institutions to limit competition in gambling and prostitution while continuing to fight centuries-old turf battles. It was the forming of alliances and the growth of Boryokudans that led to the police period. The Police Period: 1964–1970 In response to the gang wars of the conflict period, the police were pressured from a number of sources into quelling the illicit activities of the seven largest Boryokudan organizations. During 1964–1970, public opinion in Japan of the Boryokudan dropped to the point that there was a great deal of pressure placed on politicians who, in turn, placed pressure on the police to ameliorate the wars between the various gangs that were causing the most social disruption.

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A Japanese gangster, or Yakuza, shows off his tattoos at the beach in 1955. Large, elaborate tattoos are a Yakuza tradition that survives today. (Getty Images)

The police attempted to intercept the various Boryokudans gaining power through the suppression of illegal gambling and prostitution. The police also began to use public relations techniques to stigmatize Boryokudan activities as being inherently antithetical to the Japanese value system, a value system that is deeply ingrained in the people of Japan. During this public campaign against the Boryokudan, three groups dissolved completely: the Sumiyoshi-kai, the Kanto-kai, and the Kinsei-kai. As will be seen in the discussion of the reorganization

period, the members of these groups did not absolve themselves from a life of crime. Rather, they joined other larger and more established groups that were more resistant to police and societal pressure. The Reorganization Period: 1971–1980 Between 1971 and 1980, the Boryokudans began to reorganize and rise to power yet again. This reorganization is largely marked by the pact in 1972 between the Yamaguchi-gumi and the Inagawa-kai. This pact had been engineered by Yoshio Kodama, 129

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who was originally the godfather of Tokyo’s powerful Inagawa-kai, and was made with Kazuo Taoka, the godfather of the Yamaguchi-gumi. This deal was sealed in Taoka’s home through a traditional sakazuki ceremony that included a blood brotherhood sworn over the consumption of Japanese saki. This Yamaguchi-Inagawa alliance created a Yakuza conglomerate that controlled all but four of Japan’s prefectures. The Reformation Period: 1981–1988 Two noteworthy points should be mentioned regarding the development of the Yakuza during this period. The first was the death of Masahisa Takenaka, the head of the Yamaguchi-gumi, who was gunned down by rival Yakuza. The second was the death of Yoshio Kodama of the Inagawa-kai who died of a stroke in 1984. These developments ultimately resulted in a general peace agreement that led to the Inigawa-kai joining with the Yamaguchi-gumi but only with the added clause that the Inigawa-kai’s members must be accepted into the Yamaguchi-gumi and must also be allowed in all decision-making processes. Once these two groups had successfully merged, the Yakuza became a highly structured and well-managed organized crime faction. Thus, after the reformation period, the Yamaguchi-gumi became, and remain today, the largest and most sophisticated Koiki Boryokudan in Japan (that is, sophisticated in terms of hierarchal stability as well as its ability to withstand pressures from the public, law enforcement, and gang warfare). International Cooperation: 1988–Present Japanese police have had to adopt a strategy of international cooperation to fight this burgeoning global threat. Indeed, it has been noted that the Yamaguchi-gumi have expanded their operations, causing much concern to other countries and forcing Japanese policymakers to consider a new paradigm on crime: transnationality. Boryokudan assets have now been traced to gambling casinos, the pornography trade, real estate businesses, night clubs, restaurants, souvenir shops, and travel agencies. These assets have likewise been extended to locations throughout the world rather than being

restricted to the confines of Japanese society. In addition, there have been several attempts among the Yakuza to establish legitimate businesses as well (using proceeds obtained illicitly). However, these attempts have had mixed success at best due to numerous police crackdowns on the Yakuza. Major Criminal Enterprises of the Yakuza Of all the criminal industries that the Yakuza are involved in, perhaps the most notorious and lucrative are the sex-related businesses that are designed to accommodate the Japanese working male. The Yakuza control prostitution rings throughout Japan, commonly holding young women from other Asian countries captive to serve as indentured servants and comfort workers. The Yakuza have been known to work closely with the Chinese Snakeheads and have been involved in the smuggling of women from the People’s Republic of China into Japan to work in the sex industry. According to A. Bruno, the Japanese euphemistically refer to prostitution as “selling spring,” and Japanese customers are noted for having a taste for very young women and adolescent girls. One of the methods by which the Yakuza cater to this demand is through the purchase of unwanted female children from Snakeheads in China. The law in China restricts couples to only one child, and many couples prefer to have a male child. The Yakuza work in close cooperation with Chinese Snakeheads to smuggle Chinese immigrants into Japan. Often these immigrants are young girls and/or women who are forced work in various bars, restaurants, and nightclubs until they are old enough to be employed as prostitutes. Many of these young girls working in this industry come from rural towns in the Philippines. They may be told that there are respectable forms of employment in Japan, only to find that they have been misled once they arrive in Japan. With no family and no protective oversight, these girls and women are typically forced to work in strip clubs and to engage in prostitution under the watchful guard of their Yakuza pimps. Over time, it is often the case that these women do succumb to the demands of their captors, particularly since the money is far superior to what they could earn in their home country.

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The Yakuza have also been instrumental in arranging the infamous sex tours frequented by Japanese business travelers. These sex tours are popular in East Asia, and the Yakuza organize vacation tours to cities such as Bangkok, Manila, Seoul, and Taipei, where Japanese and Western businessmen can be seen with prostitutes of differing nationalities. Likewise, the Yakuza at least partially control a large pornography market in Japan that includes a substantial amount of child pornography, and this has resulted in serious governmental sanction with respect to this type of crime largely due to international pressure on Japan. In recent years, a growing drug problem has emerged in Japan, with the primary drugs of choice being amphetamines and methamphetamine. The Yakuza produce these drugs in hidden laboratories throughout Japan, the Philippines, and Korea. The Yakuza have likewise extended their drug trafficking operations to Hawaii and Australia, although the markets have not been reported to be as lucrative in Australia as they are in other areas of the Pacific region. The Yakuza are often the source of media attention in Hawaii because of their involvement in methamphetamine trafficking, gambling, and prostitution throughout the Hawaiian islands. In addition, the Yakuza have been reported to be involved in cocaine transportation to Japan, as the demand for this drug has seen an increase in the Yakuza’s nation of origin. During the past two decades, the Yakuza have sought to generate illicit income by intervening in private disputes with violence. During the years of rapid expansion in Japan when urban land prices continued to increase, some Yakuza intervened in real estate deals as a means of making money through the modification of these transactions. Once the economic boom in Japan ended, these Yakuza threatened corporate executives with violence as a means of cutting any potential losses that might ensue. Eventually, many Yakuza were implicated in unlawful lending practices and the unlawful disposal of worthless bonds. These tactics also extended to various forms of corporate extortion and blackmail. Over time, the money-making ventures and forms of corporate crime associated with the Yakuza have grown quite complex and sophisticated.

Anti-Yakuza Public Climate It would appear that Japanese organized crime is following a trend that is somewhat similar to that found in the United States. Many of the traditions of the Yakuza seem to not have control of members as they once did. Indeed, it has been noted that in many police prefectures throughout Japan, calls are made much more frequently from Yakuza gangsters and family members who wish to leave their life of organized crime. Furthermore, there have been complaints from some Yakuza that traditional rules are no longer obeyed, and it is likewise reported that more Yakuza are willing to break rank and even disclose information against their brethren. To further add incentive, more than sixty Japanese companies have created opportunities for reform of prior Yakuza members by offering them career-track jobs. This and other developments have resulted in an erosion of many of the old-time obligations and sense of strict loyalty. It would also appear that the older rituals and customs of the Yakuza are occasionally sacrificed if a member can make more money in the process of committing disloyal acts that provide shortcuts to financial gain. Reported in-fighting and double-crossing have led to frequent intragang warfare among members. This has also resulted in the unintentional killing of innocent bystanders in the process. The killing of ordinary citizens is typically considered taboo among the Yakuza gangster subculture. With recent occurrences being shown in the media, there has been much greater public consensus against the Yakuza, and it is reported that this public consensus has had a serious negative impact on the organization. What was typically considered unthinkable is increasingly becoming more commonplace given this public consensus. Community members now provide phone information to police, who successfully raid dice and gambling dens. Indeed, the Ichiri Ikka suffered a blow to their public face when common citizens of Hamamatsu staked out the gang’s main building. This building was taped by CCTV, and the tapes were provide to police. This and other evidence resulted in the expulsion of the Ichiri Ikka from the community, which resulted in public humiliation and embarrassment 131

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for the gang. The Ichiri Ikka responded with violence to the community, and this simply served to further entrench the community against the Yakuza. Conclusion The Yakuza have had a long and far-reaching history in Japan. This organized crime syndicate has developed throughout several historical stages that have reflected the slow consolidation of these criminals into an organization similar to today’s modern corporation. In the process, the Yakuza have maintained a distant rapport with law enforcement and political figures within the Japanese government. Currently, the Yakuza seem to be losing popularity with the Japanese mainstream public, and the once famed rapport with the police and the community is open to question. As a result, the Yakuza have found incentive to turn toward the global scene and markets that stretch beyond Japan. This has proven profitable but has also drawn attention from a number of nations. By all accounts, it would appear that the Japanese Yakuza have become one of the most effective and efficient organized crime syndicates to emerge on the global scene, and it is highly likely that this syndicate will continue to thrive in the transnational sector for many more years to come.

References Abadinsky, H. Organized Crime. 7th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2003. Albanese, J. Organized Crime in America. 3rd ed. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson, 1995. Bruno, A. “Criminal Enterprises.” Courtroom Television Network, 2005, http://www.crimelibrary .com/gangsters_outlaws/gang/yakuza/4.html ?sect=25. David, F., and P. Monzini. Human Smuggling and Trafficking: A Desk Review on the Trafficking in Women from the Philippines. Vienna, Austria: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 2000. Huang, F. Y., and M. S. Vaughn. “A Descriptive Analysis of Japanese Organized Crime: The Boryokudan from 1945 to 1988.” International Criminal Justice Review 2 (1992): 19–57. Kaplan, D. E., and A. Dubro. Yakuza: Japan’s Criminal Underworld, expanded ed. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.

Moran, N. R., and R. D. Hanser. “Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs and the Japanese Yakuza: An Historical Analysis and Theoretical Application.” Caribbean Journal of Criminology and Social Psychology 7(1 & 2) (2002): 150–178. Poulin, R. “Globalization and the Sex Trade: Trafficking and the Commodification of Women and Children.” Canadian Women Studies 22(3–4) (2003): 38–43. Reischauer, E. O. The Japanese Society: Change and Continuity. Cambridge: Belknop Press of Harvard University Press, 1988. Shikita, M. T., and Shinichi Tsuchiya. Crime and Criminal Policy in Japan from 1926 to 1988. Tokyo: Japan Criminal Policy Council, 1990. Takemura, N. “Organized Crime: Japanese Mobsters.” Pp. 44–67 in Encyclopedia of Criminology, edited by R. A. Wright and J. M. Miller. New York: Routledge, 2005.

The Relationship between Politics and Organized Crime in Latin America André Moysés Gaio It is easier to buy a Member of Congress than to elect one. —Marcos Camacho, Leader of the Primeiro Comando da Capital, São Paulo, Brazil

The establishment of the military dictatorships beginning in the 1960s was certainly the most important stimulus to the onset and development of organized crime in Latin America, for it generated the institutional conditions criminals needed to operate freely. Inspired by the principles of the Cold War, the military and civilians who composed the ruling authority of the dictatorial political regimes concentrated on political repression of various strata of the populations of the countries they perceived as subversive. Therefore, the scattered criminality—or incipient microcriminality— received little attention. The absence of the rule of law encouraged the springing up of criminal organizations. The lack of accountability mechanisms also allowed the leaders of the new dictatorships to start plundering state resources and transferring them to banks in other countries, especially in Switzerland.

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Since the only means of legitimation in the search for popular support found by the dictatorships was economic growth, the welfare policies, the search for standards of quality for the social policies, the provision of security for people, as well as the increase of individual income were completely ignored. Only the growth of the gross domestic product mattered. Such growth, when it did happen, was financed by illegally incurred unpayable foreign debts. This mechanism of financing economic growth ran out when the socalled debt crisis took place in the beginning of the 1980s, which brought about two basic conditions for the proliferation of organized crime: poverty and the nearly complete disorganization of the institutional structure of the state, highlighting the fact that some had not yet completed the necessary tasks for the creation of a modern state, configuring what we may call quasi-states. Since some dictatorships lasted until the late 1980s, the results of twenty years of such practices were dramatic. Being specialized in political repression, the police forces had not yet developed investigative skills or an intelligence agency, whereas the judiciary branch, when it was not suppressed by the generals, became politically aware. The inspection capacity was negligible, and there were no special laws concerning the practice of organized crime. Following the fall of the dictatorships were periods of complete social disorganization, income concentration, and unstable governments, conditions that favor the development of organized crime. In countries such as Bolivia, frequent accusations that drug trafficking was under the control of the presidency by generals such as Hugo Banzer and Garcia Meza demonstrate that organized crime was already institutionalized. However, in countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, and Peru, poverty, the widespread practice of corruption, and institutional conditions that were completely adverse to crime control were enough to propel the articulation of organized criminality. The case of Mexico is different from the ones mentioned above, especially due to the fact that it did not have the experience of a military dictator-

ship or a critical institutional rupture. But it received a powerful stimulus to the practice of corruption due to the monopoly of power in the hands of the Institutional Republican Party (PRI), which in the 1980s did not have any significant adversaries who questioned its power. The literature on corruption in Mexico during the rule of the PRI is extensive, and the growth of criminal organizations there certainly received strong stimuli from the Mexican political authorities. Colombia has played a distinctive role in the process of development of organized crime, more specifically of mafia-type organizations. Such distinction is important precisely because mafia-type organizations are those in which the politicalcriminal nexus is established. The Italian Penal Code, Article 416 bis, draws a precise concept of mafia or gangster association: “The illegal association is of mafia-type when the participants take advantage of the intimidating power of the association and of the resulting conditions of submission and silence (omertà), to commit criminal offenses, to manage or control, either directly or indirectly, economic activities, concessions, authorisations, public contracts and services, or to obtain unlawful profits or advantages for themselves or for others, or with a view to prevent or limit the freedom to vote, or to get votes for themselves or for others on the occasion of an election.” Any definition of organized crime shall take into account some characteristics of the groups: durability, continuity, hierarchical, complex, violence (or the threat of it), corruption, number of people, etc. The relationship between organized crime and politics is tenuous, and therefore the distinction between the former and mafia associations must be made. For more than six decades, Colombia’s economy has been based on the dependence on the production of the coca leaf and its transformation into cocaine (sold in the international market) and a political life marked by the resolution of conflicts through the systematic use of violence, by killing its opposers, by high homicide rates, and by the constitution of paramilitary groups that have been fighting a civil war for decades. As a result, Colombia was and still is a strong stimulus to the establishment 133

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and strengthening of criminal organizations in Latin America and other regions. The formation of the Cali and Medellin cartels favored the emergence of unprecedented relationships between cocaine dealers and politicians. The financing of presidential and parliamentary campaigns, besides the dealers themselves appearing as candidates, has altered the structure of the groups, changing their status from criminal organizations to mafia-type organizations. Organized Crime and Democracy In 1984, the same year that the military dictatorship in Brazil came to an end, there was a sign that something new was happening. It “snowed” in Rio de Janeiro. This expression, which gained popularity, meant that a combination of Brazilian and Colombian drug dealers spread a great deal of cocaine in that city—and at very low prices—in a country that consumed little of that drug. The strategy, in the medium run, resulted in an explosion of demand from Brazilians and the development of groups such as the Comando Vermelho (Red Command)—associated with Colombian and Paraguayan groups—and the jogo do bicho (Brazilian version of the numbers racket), which has become involved in the traffic of drugs. Both had considerable influence in the politics of the state of Rio de Janeiro. Corruption and Politics Corruption in the higher levels of public offices was a scene that was many times repeated. Several presidents—Alberto Fujimore (Peru), Carlos Salinas (Mexico), Fernando Collor (Brazil), Carlos Andrés Perez (Venezuela), and Carlos Menem (Argentina)—were removed from office due to serious accusations of corruption or were sued after the termination of their mandates. The accusations of illicit enrichment of such politicians usually reduced investigations to mere individual or small-group misappropriations. Few investigations, with the exception of the Brazilian and Mexican cases, made connections between the former presidents and the mafia or other criminal organizations. In the case of former Brazilian president Collor, the investigation was able to bring to light the involvement of Paulo César Farias (trea-

surer of the presidential campaign and an influential personality during his mandate) with the trafficking of cocaine and with money laundering in association with the Italian Mafia (’Ndrangheta) and the Colombian cartels. Globalization and National States It is true that globalization has provided organized crime and mafia associations with new opportunities to operate. The many operations performed disclosed—and still do—a concentrated operation involving Colombian, Brazilian, Paraguayan, and Argentine drug dealers. The presence of the Russian and Italian Mafias conducting business in association with the Latin American groups is widely known and has expanded into several operations: drug trafficking (cocaine, marijuana, heroin, and smart drugs), purchasing of government companies, illegal slot machines, arms trafficking, and kidnappings. The precariousness of the sovereignty of the countries of this region also becomes clear by the establishment of tax havens, especially in Paraguay and Uruguay, accountable for the laundering of money from criminal organizations. Brazil and Argentina also demonstrate certain fragility in the control of dirty money. Globalization, however, becomes more dramatic when we analyze it as an internalization process of global trends. The adjustment that each country makes of impulses produced in other regions is what we perceive as the decisive dimension of the globalization process. In different degrees and dynamics, the countries of the region started assimilating processes of social disintegration (a consequence of the employment crisis), reduction of the social policies of welfare, loss of the efficiency of the structure of the state, crisis of the classical schemes of political representation, etc., that originated from other contexts. In all Latin American countries, the growth of the informal economy is already a serious problem. In this sector, low wages, absence of social protection, and a feeling of not belonging to society have become powerful stimuli to participation in crime. In Brazil, where such a trend has its most worrying configuration (almost 50 percent of the workforce has informal jobs), the figures show that in Rio de

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Jaime Paz Zamora (left), Carlos Menem (middle), and Fernando Collor de Mello; presidents of Bolivia, Argentina, and Brazil respectively, at a summit in Argentina in 1992. Menem was arrested in 2001 for arms trafficking, Zamora was accused of sheltering a drug trafficker, and Collor de Mello was impeached amid a bribery scandal since this photo was taken. (Reuters/Corbis)

Janeiro alone the drug trade employs about 200,000 people. The problem replicates in Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Bolivia. When an institutional recovery of the theme of criminality was noticed by many countries of the region with the creation of laws and institutions to combat both microcrime and macrocrime, the ineffectiveness to enforce new laws and the absence of resources for the operation of the new institutions became evident. The feeling that the classical mechanisms of political representation are ruined favors a social dynamic that stimulates the legislative branch’s controlling attempt to satisfy the interests of specific groups, including organized crime. The institutional recovery of the fight against crime, how-

ever, fructified and forced a change in the operational strategy of criminal organizations. In Colombia, the end of the cartels promoted the formation of small groups that trade smaller quantities of cocaine to avoid being apprehended by law enforcement agencies. In Brazil, the trafficking of drugs is also linked to smaller organizations, although a new gang, Primeiro Comando da Capital (First Command of the Capital), started off inside the penitentiary system and has attained some success in its operations. It is a larger group based in São Paulo and has thousands of members. Presently, the nexus between crime and politics has a peculiar dynamic: it is deprived of any ideology or long-term project; operates both at the local and regional levels (towns and states); has amassed 135

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the police, the judiciary, the executive branch, private companies, and criminals in the same illegal schemes; and searches less for the protection of groups (although this still is of some importance) than the attainment of benefits through rigged public bidding and distribution of benefits. Eventually, the state itself becomes criminal. The concepts of corruption and white-collar crime are inadequate to describe and explain the dynamics of a state whose components—of various spheres—occupy themselves with the plundering of public assets and the sale of judicial sentences on an unprecedented scale, while the members of parliament negotiate their positions and police forces ally with drug dealers and criminals. Today, there is no mafia-type group operating to control the executive branch of the states of the region. Politics has turned into the demise of ideology, and delinquency has become a routine. References Camacho, Marcos. Statement before the House of Representatives of Brazil. Parliamentary Inquiry Commission, 6 August 2006. Peralva, Angelina. Violência e Democracia. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2000. Ryan, Patrick J. Organized Crime: A Reference Handbook. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1996. Soares, Luiz Eduardo. Violência e política no Rio de Janeiro. Rio de Janeiro: ISER, 1996. Thoumi, Francisco E. Illegal Drugs, Economy and Society in the Andes. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003. Zaluar, Alba. Integração perversa: Pobreza e tráfico de drogas. Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2004.

North America Don Liddick Transnational organized crime is a significant threat to the economic and political security of the United States and Canada. Some groups, such as the American Cosa Nostra and outlaw motorcycle gangs, are indigenous to the United States but have become so expansive that they are transnational in scope. Other criminal gangs, such as the Russian Mafiya, the Japanese Yakuza, and the South Amer-

ican drug cartels, are foreign-based but maintain a significant presence and influence in the United States and Canada. La Cosa Nostra The most significant indigenous transnational crime organization in the United States is the American Mafia, or La Cosa Nostra. Italian American organized criminals have operated in the United States since the 1880s, when the first significant wave of Italian immigration to America began. Italian American criminals in that era ran a variety of rackets, including extortion, labor racketeering, prostitution, and illegal gambling. The prohibition of alcohol in the 1920s greatly increased the illicit wealth and power of Italian American gangsters and resulted in a centralization of sorts that came to be called La Cosa Nostra, a network of crime families featured in some two dozen American cities. By the time of the televised congressional Kefauver Committee hearings in 1951, the government, the law enforcement community, the media, and the general public increasingly viewed organized crime as synonymous with Italian American organized crime families. The now infamous meeting of organized criminals in Appalachin, New York, in 1957 and the testimony of mob turncoat Joe Valachi in 1963 brought the Mafia into full public view and were the basis for the conclusions of President Lyndon Johnson’s Task Force Report on Organized Crime in 1967. The task force concluded that organized crime was virtually synonymous with La Cosa Nostra. While the corporatelike and monolithic features attributed to the Mafia are an exaggeration, the various crime families have nevertheless remained a significant source of organized crime in the United States. The criminal activities of the American Cosa Nostra have been quite diverse, including the provision of illicit goods and services and racketeering in business and industry. Industrial racketeering by La Cosa Nostra involves the systematic restraint of trade, the pillaging of union benefit funds, and the laundering of illicit revenue through otherwise legitimate business and financial institutions. Although a wide range of commercial activities are negatively impacted by organized crime, the prob-

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Joseph Valachi, former murderer and member of the Cosa Nostra crime organization, being sworn in before the Senate Rackets Committee in Washington to testify to his involvement with organized crime and narcotics in 1963. (Getty Images)

lem of industrial racketeering has been especially severe in those economic zones concerned with construction, waste management, the protection of the environment, and the shipment of goods. Tight regulation by the state has also provided the opportunity for La Cosa Nostra families to make huge profits in those businesses that cater to human pleasures: gambling, prostitution, pornography, and drugs. La Cosa Nostra’s control of air, rail, and water freight terminals provides additional billions of dollars in easily pilfered cargo. The extent of the Mafia’s theft, fraud, and extortion is far-ranging and has reached into the area of white-collar crime. Italian American organized crime families have infiltrated Wall Street, driving up stock prices, cashing out early, and extorting money from brokers and traders. Authorities estimate that La Cosa Nostra families control perhaps two dozen brokerage firms and influence many others. The principal

transnational dimensions of La Cosa Nostra have traditionally involved the importation and trafficking of heroin in the United States. Powerful legislative tools such as hefty penalties for drug trafficking and court-authorized electronic surveillance led to numerous prosecutions of Mafia figures in the 1980s and 1990s. Still, the predicted demise of La Cosa Nostra has failed to materialize. Moreover, transnational organized crime in the United States involves far more than the American Mafia. In the 1980s and 1990s, numerous transnational crime groups developed significant criminal operations in the United States, including African American, Latino, Chinese, Jamaican, Korean, Vietnamese, Japanese, Nigerian, Colombian, and Russian networks. Russian Mafiya gangs are particularly active, with some thirteen to fifteen gangs operating throughout the United States. Russian gangsters perpetrate a variety of crimes on U.S. soil, including telecommunications fraud, money laundering, insurance fraud, and fuel racketeering. Chinese Triad societies in Hawaii, Seattle, San Francisco, New York, and Boston traffic in heroin and smuggle cars, electronic equipment, and people. It seems obvious that the law enforcement attack against La Cosa Nostra, while impressive, has not seriously limited organized crime in the United States. Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs Outlaw motorcycle gangs are a continuing organized crime threat in North America. The number of gangs operating in the United States is unknown. The U.S. Marshal’s Service has estimated their number at 800, while the Pennsylvania Crime Commission has suggested that the number is more like 200–400. Most gangs are small, local, and unorganized, but a few have evolved into large criminal organizations that are international in scope. Outlaw motorcycle gangs participate in numerous organized crimes, including murder for hire, prostitution, the operation of massage parlors, international white slavery, kidnapping, burglary, gun running, insurance frauds, loan-sharking, motorcycle and automobile theft, gambling, truck hijacking, arson, forgery of government documents, extortion, the fencing of stolen goods, theft 137

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from U.S. military bases, assault, rape, and, most notably, narcotics trafficking (especially methamphetamine, cocaine, and steroids). In 1986 the President’s Commission on Organized Crime estimated that 40 percent of the entire U.S. methamphetamine supply was controlled by outlaw motorcycle gangs. Other sources have estimated that the larger well-organized groups earn up to $1 billion a year from their various criminal endeavors. The largest and most sophisticated groups operating today are the Hells Angels, the Outlaws, the Pagans, and the Bandidos. All but the Pagans have international memberships, while the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has estimated that the Hells Angels have more than sixty chapters in thirteen countries. Other noteworthy clubs operating in the United States include the Avengers (located primarily in Michigan, Ohio, and West Virginia), the Gypsy Jokers (Pacific Northwest), the Hessians (Las Vegas, Nevada), the Dirty Dozen (Arizona), the Vargos (California), the Sons of Silence (Colorado), and the Warlocks (Delaware, New Jersey, and southeastern Pennsylvania). Asian Gangs Organized crime originating in Asia has a significant impact on the North American continent. Japanese Yakuza gangs smuggle amphetamines and firearms from the United States to Japan. (Strict gun controls in Japan transform a $100 American handgun into a product worth $1,200 in Japan.) The principal impact of the Yakuza on the United States is their purchase of legitimate businesses to launder and repatriate their illegally earned revenues. A Yakuza affiliate, the Rondan Doyukai Company, is believed to have purchased shares in the Dow Chemical Company, Chase Manhattan, IBM, General Motors, Bank of America, and Atlantic Richfield. Japanese gangs have acquired interests in or purchased import-export, real estate, restaurant, and oil lease businesses in Hawaii and Los Angeles and have reportedly established themselves in such cities as Denver, Las Vegas, Vancouver, and San Francisco. Chinese Triad groups with a presence in the United States are the Sun Yee On, 14K, Wo Hop To, Wo On Lok, and Leun Kung Lok. These groups are especially prevalent in the

Pacific Rim, with a strong presence in Hawaii, Seattle, and San Francisco. Triads are also prevalent in the eastern cities of New York, Boston, and Toronto, where they control the eastern Asian heroin trade, with annual profits more than $200 billion. Other principal transnational criminal activities include the smuggling of weapons, cars, boats, electronic equipment, and people. The smuggling of illegal aliens into Europe and North America nets an additional $3.5 billion per year for Triads. Russian Mafiya The Russian Mafiya is active in most large American cities. Since the mid-1970s, Brighton Beach, New York, has been the traditional base of Russian organized crime in America, but the FBI has identified Russian crime groups in Boston, Chicago, Miami, Cleveland, Philadelphia, Seattle, Denver, Minneapolis, Dallas, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and San Diego. In 2001 some thirteen to fifteen crime groups with international ties to Russia or other former Soviet Republics operated in the United States, with perhaps 600 members. Russian crime groups in America are involved in telecommunications fraud, the cloning of cellular phones, money laundering, and medical and insurance fraud. Fuel racketeering is a prominent Russian organized crime scam that results in the loss of $2 billion annually in U.S. federal and state gasoline taxes. Russian gangs have also targeted U.S. banks and financial institutions. In 1999, two companies were charged with laundering $7–10 billion in criminal proceeds and legitimate funds through institutions such as the Bank of New York on behalf of Russian tax evaders. Russian criminals have been implicated in the white slave trade, the dumping of toxic wastes into tankers carrying gasoline to be burned in automobiles, and the attempted delivery of tactical nuclear weapons and surface-to-air missiles to U.S. buyers. In one case, investigators in South Florida discovered the intended sale of a Russian submarine to Colombian drug traffickers. Drug Cartels Some of the most significant transnational organized crime groups affecting North America are drug trafficking organizations centered in Colom-

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bia and Mexico. Some 300 Colombian trafficking organizations operate within the United States. The decimation of the infamous Medellin cocaine cartel merely led to the rise of Cali-based and Mexican trafficking organizations. During the 1990s, the Cali organization produced and distributed 80– 90 percent of the cocaine imported into the United States. If the Cali cartel, with revenues of $8 billion per year, were a legitimate corporation, it would be the top-grossing firm in the world, exceeding companies such as Exxon, General Electric, Philip Morris, and IBM. Law enforcement pressure has precipitated changes in the South American drug trade in recent years, including the rise of independent trafficking groups in Peru, Bolivia, Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay; a shift in supply routes to Mexico, Venezuela, and the eastern Caribbean; and a transition in production to other countries such as Brazil. In addition, Colombia has now become a major source of heroin entering the United States. The shift in cocaine trafficking routes through Mexico in the late 1980s also facilitated the growth of the Mexican Federation, a group of drug trafficking organizations consisting of the Gulf, Juarez, Sonora, and Tijuana cartels. The Mexican Federation controls almost all of the heroin, cocaine, and marijuana production, smuggling, and distribution in Mexico and the western United States. A fifth group, the Amezqua Organization, controls the growing methamphetamine trade. Sicilian Mafia The Sicilian Mafia is the most powerful of the Italian-based transnational crime groups and supplied the structural model adopted by Italian American/La Cosa Nostra crime groups in the United States. The Sicilian Mafia operates in more than forty countries, including the United States and Canada. The FBI concluded that the infiltration of the Sicilian Mafia into the United States occurred primarily from the late 1970s onward, with about 3,000 members operating primarily in northeastern and mid-Atlantic states by the early 1990s. Consisting of approximately 180 families or clans, the Sicilian Mafia has accumulated most of its political and economic power from the vast prof-

its generated through trafficking in heroin. After law enforcers broke up the infamous French Connection in 1972, forcing French Corsicans who controlled the U.S. heroin market out of business, the Sicilian Mafia stepped in to fill the void. By 1981 the group was smuggling six tons of heroin into the United States annually. At present, the Sicilian Mafia is thought to be responsible for $750 million worth of Southeast Asian heroin entering New York City each year and remains one of the principal heroin suppliers to U.S. consumers. African-based Groups African criminal enterprises impacting the United States are predominantly Nigerian. However, the FBI notes that some criminal groups operating in North America are based in nations such as Liberia and Ghana. The FBI has identified a transnational African organized crime presence in cities from coast to coast but concludes that they are most prevalent in Atlanta; Baltimore; Washington, D.C.; Chicago; Milwaukee; Dallas; Houston; New York; and Newark. The U.S. State Department estimates that as much as 40 percent of the heroin smuggled into the United States is imported by Nigerian criminal gangs working as subcontractors for the Russian Mafiya, the Chinese Triads, Colombian cartels, or the various Italian criminal groups. Nigerian gangs use U.S. dollars to buy heroin from source countries such as Myanmar, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. Then, both drugs and firearms are smuggled over land and through ports to South Africa and on to New York City and various European cities. Sales revenues are used to buy luxury products such as cars, electronics, and watches that are shipped to Nigeria for resale in the lucrative black market. Nigerian organized criminals are also involved in cocaine trafficking, credit card scams, bank fraud, insurance fraud, ivory smuggling, the manufacture and use of false identifications, and advance-fee frauds. A common fraud, called 4-1-9 schemes after the section of the Nigerian penal code implicated, involves a deluge of letters, e-mails, and faxes proposing fictitious business opportunities in exchange for an advance fee. Scams such as these are estimated to cost Americans some $250 million every year. 139

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Jamaican Gangs Beginning in the mid-1980s, groups of Jamaican nationals established a presence in the United States and formed criminal gangs called posses. There may be as many as forty posses in at least eighteen different American cities. The Jamaicans are vertically integrated in the United States as importers, wholesalers, distributors, and retailers of both cocaine and marijuana. The posses are particularly violent, and some groups such as the Dog, Jungle, and Okra Slime train in guerrilla warfare. Eight hundred drug-related murders were attributed to Jamaican gangs in the period 1984–1987 alone. The Shower Posse is the largest of the Jamaican gangs, with a significant presence in Miami and New York City. Posses are also involved in money laundering and the smuggling of illegal firearms. Organized Crime in Canada The impact of transnational organized crime is no less in Canada. A 1998 Organized Crime Impact Study commissioned by the solicitor general of Canada found that the Canadian illicit drug market is between $7 billion and $10 billion each year, securities fraud and telemarketing scams cost Canadians at least $5 billion each year, between $5 billion and $17 billion is laundered each year, as many as 16,000 people are smuggled into Canada each year, the counterfeiting of clothes and pharmaceuticals may cost Canadians more than $1 billion each year, and the illegal smuggling of tobacco, alcohol, and jewelry may result in the loss of up to $1.5 billion in government tax revenues. Canadian officials and researchers agree that the last decades of the twentieth century witnessed the proliferation and increasing sophistication of organized crime in Canada. Organized crime groups have infiltrated and use Canada’s marine ports as conduits for illicit drugs, tobacco, alcohol, gems, firearms, cigars, jewelry, animal parts, and illegal migrants. The illicit tobacco and alcohol market in Canada is supplied by cross-border smugglers as well as domestic criminals. Drug trafficking in Canada involves Asians, Italians, outlaw motorcycle gangs, and, to a lesser extent, Iranians, Romanians, Lebanese, and

Jamaicans. Colombian-based cocaine trafficking groups are well established in Canada as well. By the late 1990s, the hydroponic cultivation of marijuana had reached unprecedented levels. Much of this marijuana is exported from British Colombia to the United States. Outlaw motorcycle gangs are the principal actors in a thriving illicit chemical trade (mostly PCP, methamphetamine, and LSD), while Asian syndicates with ties to Hong Kong, Taiwan, China, and Vietnam control the heroin market. Asian-based organized crime groups are very active in Canada and are involved in narcotics trafficking, the smuggling of illegal immigrants, and the theft of computers, computer components, electronic goods, and luxury automobiles. Home invasions, prostitution, gambling, shoplifting rings, kidnapping, extortion, commodity smuggling, the traffic in cigarettes and liquor, insurance fraud, contract murders, and the production and distribution of counterfeit currency, software, pirated videos, manufactured goods, and credit cards are also common activities. The Asian groups are based in Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton, Toronto, and Montreal but are expanding into smaller cities and rural areas. Much of the increase in violence associated with Asian-based criminal activity can be attributed to Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian street gangs. In addition, several Chinese Triads are active, including the Luen Kung Lok and 14K, as well as Dai Huen Jai, or the Big Circle Boys, centered in Toronto and British Columbia. The Lotus Gang, comprised of Canadian-born Chinese, operates in Vancouver, has ties to the Hells Angels, and is involved in cocaine and heroin trafficking, credit card fraud, extortion, and the cloning of cellular telephones. Fukienese crime groups emerging in Toronto are involved in the smuggling of migrants from Fuchow in China into Canada and the United States. In Quebec, more than 350 Asian-based criminals are divided into thirty-five gangs, most of which are national or international in scope. Asian organized crime activity in Montreal is controlled by Vietnamese or ethnic Chinese born in Vietnam. East European-based organized crime groups first appeared in Toronto in the mid-1990s. Since that time, Canada has experienced a proliferation of criminal gangs originating from the former

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Soviet Union and the former communist states in Eastern Europe. Russian gangs are present in every part of Canada. The East European-based organized crime groups have forged alliances with other major organized crime groups in Canada, are transnational in nature, and are most active in Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton, and Halifax. Toronto in particular seems to be an integral center for criminal gangs from the former Soviet Union. East European-based organized crime groups are most prominently involved in prostitution, tobacco and weapons smuggling, immigration fraud, the importation of illegal drugs, the theft of vehicles for export, gas tax fraud, and money laundering. Internet scams such as credit card skimming, e-commerce site hacking, and fraudulent credit card purchases are also common. The presence of Russian-based organized crime in Canada has produced significant damage in the country’s financial sector. The establishment of shell companies and money laundering in order to move capital out of Eastern Europe increased significantly in 1998. Italian organized criminals in Canada are associated with one of three organizations: the Sicilian Mafia, the ’Ndrangheta, or the American Cosa Nostra. The Sicilian Mafia is considered to be the most powerful of the three and maintains ties to other Sicilian clans in Canada, the United States, Venezuela, and Italy. The main Sicilian organization is the Caruana/Cuntrera family. The three major Italian-based organized crime groups participate in joint ventures with all the major criminal entities in Canada, including Asian and East European-based gangs, outlaw motorcycle gangs, South American groups, and domestic criminal organizations. The Italian-based crime gangs are most prominently involved in drug trafficking, illegal gaming (sport betting, video lottery terminals, and backroom casinos), extortion, loan-sharking, and money laundering. Criminal organizations flourish in certain Canadian aboriginal communities, especially on the U.S.-Canadian border where the smuggling of liquor, tobacco, and firearms is prevalent. In September 1997 the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples seized machine guns and semiautomatic

weapons from a reservation that was part of a black market operation that sold firearms, explosives, drugs, cigarettes, and alcohol. Violence and political unrest on the reservations is an ongoing problem. Aboriginal street gangs in the provinces of western Canada are growing and are developing alliances with other organized crime groups. The most powerful aboriginal street gang, the Manitoba Warriors, is involved in drug trafficking and prostitution. Canadian authorities believe that aboriginal groups will continue to consolidate their control of prostitution and illicit drugs in urban centers such as Winnipeg. Since 1996, when Canadian authorities estimated that the country hosted thirty-six outlaw motorcycle gangs with some 1,200 members, the number of chapters has increased dramatically. Outlaw motorcycle gangs are involved in money laundering, murder, theft, counterfeiting, loansharking, extortion, prostitution, strip clubs, the illegal sale of alcohol, and the traffic in illegal firearms, stolen goods, alcohol, and cigarettes. The Hells Angels is the largest and most powerful of the motorcycle clubs. The expansion of Hells Angels chapters throughout Canada has been significant. The 2001 Annual Report from the Organized Crime Agency of British Columbia observed that Canada had a total of thirty Hells Angels chapters (up from just eleven in 1996) with some 500 members. Canadian law enforcement officials and intelligence gatherers have noted that outlaw motorcycle gangs commonly forge alliances with other biker gangs and organized crime groups, especially Asian and Italian-based syndicates. A biker war between the Hells Angels and the Rock Machine that began in 1994 has resulted in more than 100 homicides, 124 murder attempts, 9 missing persons, 84 bombings, and 130 incidents of arson. Despite some law enforcement successes, outlaw motorcycle gangs in Canada are expected to continue their expansion. References Albanese, Jay. Organized Crime in America. 3rd ed. Cincinnati: Anderson, 1996. Beare, M. E. Criminal Conspiracies: Organized Crime in America. Toronto: Nelson, 1996. 141

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Criminal Intelligence Service Canada. “2003 Annual Report on Organized Crime in Canada,” http:// www.cisc.gc.ca/. ———. “2004 Annual Report on Organized Crime in Canada,” http://www.cisc.gc.ca/. ———. “2005 Annual Report on Organized Crime in Canada,” http://www.cisc.gc.ca/. Godson, Roy, ed. “International Crime Threat Assessment.” Trends in Organized Crime 5(4) (2000): 32–144. Lyman, Michael D., and Gary W. Potter. Organized Crime. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997. Organized Crime/Drug Branch, Criminal Investigative Division. An Introduction to Organized Crime in the United States. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993.

Arms and Drug Trafficking: The Case of North Korea MiRang Park It is not a new issue that North Korea has been involved in international drug dealing. In the 1990s, North Korea’s economic output fell by more than 50 percent, and in 1999 the country had one of the lowest gross domestic products in the world. In a country that is economically and politically isolated from the rest of the world, drug dealing seems to be more dangerous because of the possibility that statesponsored drug trafficking by North Korean officials may serve as a desperate attempt to pursue financial gain as well as international political power vis-à-vis state support. In addition, the fact that key governmental officials, including a diplomatic officer and an army officer, have been implicated in drug dealing has drawn international attention. Historical View of Drug Dealing Historically, because drugs threaten people’s mental and physical health through narcotics addiction, drugs have been used as a means of economic expansion and a war weapon against an adversarial country. Also, narcotics addiction has led to economic distress and corruption in society. Examples such as the Opium Wars between China and England in the 1700s can be found throughout history.

Historical View of Drug Dealing in North Korea In the early 1970s, North Korea purchased opium from Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, and Lebanon. North Korea tried to promote the merchant trade that smuggled drugs into third world countries. From the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, North Korea began opium poppy cultivation in the northern province of Hamkyong-do and in the mountainous regions, producing and smuggling the cultivated opium in a state-sponsored operation. As a result of the collapse of the East European bloc in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the exportation of arms began to decline, and financial difficulties became much more of a burden. North Korea has subsequently selected to enlarge its international drug smuggling operations by increasing the area of cultivation with the blessing of its government. In the early 1990s, Jong-Il Kim christened the project of cultivating the poppy as White-Bellflower and started concentrating a national effort to cultivate drugs and export opium mainly to bring in foreign currency. White-Bellflower is directed by Kim and accomplished with Division 39, a largely unpublicized trading network and slush fund that was set up during the mid-1970s to fund Kim’s political career. In recent years, North Korea has strengthened its smuggling apparatus by associating with the Yakuza in Japan, the Triad in China, and the Mafia in Russia. According to William Bach, director of the Office of Asia, Africa, and Europe, “Since 1976 there have been at least 50 arrests and drug seizures involving North Koreans in more than 20 countries around the world.” Drug Market in North Korea North Korea has produced and sold many types of drugs, including opium, cocaine, and Philopon (methamphetamine), although the output of opium is especially huge. According to the U.S. Department of State, it is presumed that North Korea cultivates the poppy on 4,200–7,000 hectares and produces 30–40 tons of raw opium per year. Also, the Department of State believes that North Korea has expanded the cultivation area and increased opium production. The total area was expanded to 7,000 hectares in 1995, and opium productivity has

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Policemen stand guard at a check point in Niigata port, Japan, on August 24, 2003, one day before the arrival of the North Korean ship Man Gyong Bong-92. Some 1,500 police officers were mobilized to greet the ship amid protests as the ship is suspected of smuggling drugs and missile parts. (AFP/Getty Images)

increased from three tons in 1992 to thirty tons in 1993, forty tons in 1995, and more than fifty tons in 1998. In recent times, Philopon production, which is easy to produce and has a high profit margin, has decreased. Also, we could infer the market size of North Korea through a comparison with the total official amount of export and the amount by international drug smuggling. N. Green argues that the amount of export by international drug smuggling in 2001 exceeded the official total amount of exports of North Korea in that same year. North Korea has carried out on a national scale the production and illicit sales of drugs through governmental officials such as diplomats and businessmen stationed overseas in order to address the

country’s severe food shortage since the latter 1970s. The suspicion that North Korea has been involved in drug dealing under government direction has been exemplified in the following cases. During 2003, there was one major heroin trafficking incident linked to North Korea. The 4,000-ton trader Pong Su, a vessel owned by a North Korean enterprise, was seized by Australian Federal Police (AFP) and other Australian security forces in midApril after apparently delivering 125 kilograms of heroin to criminals at an isolated beach near Lorne, Australia. Another incident with a North Korean connection occurred in June 2003 in Pusan, South Korea, where customs authorities seized 50 kilograms of methamphetamine from a Chinese vessel 143

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that had stopped at the port of Najin, North Korea, before arriving in Pusan. According to a 2004 report by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the Pong Su seizure and numerous drug smuggling incidents linked to North Korea over the past several decades may “reflect official involvement in the trafficking of illicit narcotics for profit, and make it highly likely, but not certain, that Pyongyang is trading narcotic drugs for profit as state policy.” In another instance, which occurred in July 2002, Taiwanese police seized and searched a Taiwanese ship and found 79 kilograms of heroin. It was soon revealed that the ship transported heroin to the sea area of North Korea. Among those who dealt secretly in drugs was a naval officer, ranked as a brigade commander. In this case the North Korean military’s complicity in drug smuggling was exposed. Also, in February of the previous year, two North Korean diplomats were caught entering Russia with 70 kilograms of cocaine, and an official of the North Korean Consulate General in China was arrested by Chinese security police for attempting to sell 9 kilograms of opium with the help of certain Korean Chinese residents. In February 2000, Japanese police arrested a North Korean trader because he smuggled methamphetamine, the source of Philopon, into the country. The amount of methamphetamine seized was 250 kilograms. It was the largest amount confiscated since Japan has supervised international drug crime. There are numerous additional cases of North Korean government officials’ involvement in drug dealing, including diplomatic as well as military officials. In October 1998, a councilor of an embassy of North Korea was arrested in Berlin, Germany, for carrying heroin produced in North Korea. In July of the same year, two North Korean diplomatic officials were arrested for carrying Rohypnol, a benzodiazepine, in Egypt. Also in January 1998, seven councilors of an embassy of North Korea conspired and tried to smuggle 35 kilograms of cocaine into Russia. As seen in the above drug smuggling cases, key governmental officials residing in foreign countries served as middlemen by providing a link between the production and sale of illicit drugs, tempted easily toward individual and national profit.

As stated previously, because the only means to lift North Korea’s economic circumstances are weapons exportation and drug trafficking, it is natural that a symbiotic relationship between the military and drugs would exist. However, it is hard to quantify the nature of this relationship. The only clue to understanding the military’s role is assumptions set forth as a result of investigations conducted by the U.S. government. A Use of Expenditure North Korea began with a small-scale drug market that gnawed at the previously established drug market in the Golden Triangle area (i.e., the borderland of Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand). As a means to earn foreign currency by the government in the late 1970s and as a means to overcome financial difficulties and the severe difficulties of obtaining food due to the collapse of East European socialism in the late 1980s, the North Korean government rushed into the drug business in earnest. Also, because the government failed to find alternatives to solve its financial difficulties in the middle of the 1990s, abandoning the temptation of the highly profitable drug market became increasingly difficult. Moreover, from the late 1990s, it is alleged that Kim has used drug money for operating expenses for the Labor Party, clandestine operations against South Korea, operating expenses for weapons and technology, expenses of diplomatic officers in foreign countries, and terror support. Given North Korea’s dire economic circumstances, it is difficult to determine if drug dealing and arms smuggling can be reduced or eliminated in the immediate future. References Akers, Ronald. Drugs, Alcohol, and Society: Social Structure, Process and Policy. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1991. Abadinsky, Howard. Drugs: An Introduction. 4th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Thomson, 1997. Anon. “Australia Links Heroin Triad to North Korea.” Criminal Justice Periodicals 10(11) (2004): 3. Green, N. “Asia-Pacific: Dealing Drugs.” Harvard International Review 26(1) (2004): 3. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law

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Enforcement Affairs. “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2003,” 1 March 2004, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2003/. Kwon, J. H., and D. J. Kwak. “Tens of Thousands of Drug Addicts in Pyongyang.” Daily NK, 19 August 2005, http://www.dailynk.com/english/ read.php?cataId=nk01500&num=255. Lee, Jaeseung. Production of Drugs in North Korea. Naegok-dong, Seoul: National Intelligence Service, Republic of Korea, 2000. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee. Testimony of William Bach, Director, Office of Asia, Africa, and Europe, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State, before the Financial Management, Budget, and International Security Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 20 May 2003, Washington, D.C. Solomon, Jay. “In North Korea, Secret Cash Hoard Props up Regime.” Wall Street Journal, 14 July 2003. Spaeth, Anthony. “Kim’s Rackets.” Time, 2 June 2003, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ article/0,9171,455850,00.html.

Drug Trafficking in Northern Ireland Matthew H. Callahan Introduction Unlike the rest of Great Britain, Northern Ireland did not suffer from a discernable drug problem or harbor a thriving drug culture until the arrival of ecstasy in large quantities in the 1990s. Since that time, the frequency of drug use in Northern Ireland has increased, forcing legislation concerning the classification of drugs as well as increased penalties for possession and distribution. Northern Ireland’s unique political climate and static social norms created by a conservative Catholic Church have spared the citizens much of the more dangerous Class A drug abuse seen in other parts of the United Kingdom. The sectarian politics that shaped Northern Ireland’s culture also created the paramilitary terrorist organizations that until recently waged a constant war of differing political ideologies against one another. With the peace process bringing the disarming of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) as well as cease-fires by its Unionist counterparts—

the Ulster Defense Association, the Ulster Volunteer Force, and the more radical splinter group the Loyalist Volunteer Force—the threat of terrorist violence in Northern Ireland exists to a lesser degree than in years past. These terrorist organizations, however, are amorphous entities, and the fund-raising and political rallies that had sustained their budgets in the past are now being replaced with organized criminal activities. Truly, all the paramilitary organizations are involved in organized crime to differing degrees, but according to the investigations of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), all are involved in some form of organized criminality not related to their politically motivated terrorism. A 2001 study of organized criminal threats in Northern Ireland notes that of the seventy-eight individual criminal gangs known to operate in Northern Ireland, forty-three have links to either Republican or Loyalist paramilitary organizations. Of that number, more than twothirds of these gangs are involved in dealing narcotics. Given this degree of interconnection, a study of drug trafficking and narcotics sales in Northern Ireland invariably deals with the expansion of paramilitary groups into organized crime. With more than half of the known gangs operating in Northern Ireland maintaining some sort of ties to the paramilitary terrorist organizations, it is not surprising that the PSNI has focused a large amount of its antidrug policing on the larger terrorist groups. While all the paramilitary organizations publicly support an antidrug message, they all supplement their incomes through the sale of narcotics on some level. The PSNI has found that of the two overarching groups, it is the Loyalist terrorist groups that have more ties with the drug trade than do their Republican counterparts. From these investigative findings, it seems that both groups are not involved in large-scale international drug trafficking and sales. PSNI interviews on the street level confirm this and show that a local distributor may in fact be Irish and working for or through one of the paramilitary organizations and that his supply of drugs came from a criminal organization not specifically tied to either Ireland or their native terrorist groups. These Irish terrorist groups, both Loyalist and Republican, are involved in the street145

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level sale of drugs such as cocaine, heroin, ecstasy, and cannabis. The paramilitary organizations are using their arms and revolutionary political connections to import drugs from other criminal organizations, mainly in Eastern Europe, via Spain and the Netherlands. Drugs are also smuggled through Great Britain and over the common border with the Republic of Ireland, which has more than 300 crossing points. Republican Paramilitary Organizations and Drug Trafficking The PIRA, founded in 1969, is the largest and bestfunded Republican paramilitary terrorist organization and operates in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The PIRA has been involved in and has loosely observed a cease-fire since the mid-1990s and recently has put its arms beyond use. Publicly, it is staunchly antidrug, leading and funding community-based initiatives. In addition to this public message, several known drug offenders, both users and dealers, have been targeted over the years by PIRA punishment squads and as a result have been severely injured or killed for dealing drugs and exhibiting other antisocial behavior in neighborhoods that the PIRA claims to protect. The criminal aspects of the PIRA are mainly involved in robberies (the PIRA was responsible for the £26 million bank robbery in Belfast in 2006) as well as cigarette and fuel smuggling across the Republic of Ireland border. In an effort to both observe the cease-fire and still police the neighborhoods it wished to control, the PIRA created the cover group Direct Action Against Drugs (DAAD) in 1995. While not involved in the sale of drugs, DAAD did have an impact on the drug trade in Northern Ireland in the mid-1990s. After Easter 1995, the cover group killed drug dealer Micky Mooney in Belfast, and in September of that year another alleged drug dealer was killed. Between December 1995 and January 1996, DAAD killed five more drug dealers. Because most of the drug dealers killed by this group were considered small time by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC, precursor to the PSNI) and because PIRA involvement in narcotic sales was not unheard of, most of those in Northern Ire-

land law enforcement were led to believe that these killings of drug dealers around Belfast were not acts of vigilante justice but rather of the PIRA removing small-time dealers who either opposed the group or refused to pay their protections fees. The Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA), founded in 1986, and the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), founded in 1997, are both splinter groups of the PIRA. Neither observe the ceasefires of their progenitor or engage meaningfully in the peace process. Because of both groups’ dissatisfaction with PIRA leadership and direction, the CIRA and the RIRA are extremely political minded, preferring to remain active terrorists. Because of their smaller sizes, these two groups are involved in organized crime and drug trafficking to a much lesser extent than other Republican paramilitary groups. There is some evidence to link the RIRA with overseas drug trafficking, although this is limited. Still, both groups maintain small protection rackets that do include franchising urban areas to drug dealers in order for them to operate. The Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), founded in 1975, and the Irish Peoples’ Liberation Organization (IPLO), founded in 1986, represent the most heavily involved Republican paramilitary groups in organized crime, specifically drug trafficking. The IPLO was a splinter group of the INLA and was founded after an internal feud. The IPLO immediately began attacking the INLA membership. Belying its organized crime connections, the IPLO was at one time led by Gerald Steenson, a Belfast underworld figure. In 1992, the PIRA attacked and effectively eliminated the IPLO in a series of punishment shootings, reportedly because of drug trafficking, killing one member and wounding dozens of others. The INLA is still active in criminal enterprises and is heavily involved in the drug trade in Northern Ireland. Loyalist Paramilitary Organizations and Drug Trafficking The Ulster Defense Association (UDA), founded in 1971, is the oldest and largest of the Loyalist paramilitary organizations. The UDA controls much of the organized crime in the Loyalist areas of Ulster.

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An Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) color guard flanks the coffin of slain leader Gino Gallagher at Belfast, Northern Ireland on February 1, 1996. The INLA has been rife with internal violence and is reputed to be deeply involved in the drug trade. (Bian Little/AP/Wide World)

Its protection rackets have existed nearly as long as the organization itself. It is deeply involved in drug trafficking from the street level to wholesale purchase, and its leadership (notably Johnny “Mad Dog” Adair and Jim “Doris Day” Gray), called Brigadiers, live lavish criminal lifestyles off these illegal profits. The UDA has been involved in a series of feuds with the other Loyalist paramilitary organizations in addition to its terrorist activities against the Republicans. The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), whose present incarnation was founded in 1966, and the Red Hand Commandos (RHC), founded in 1972, have fewer members than the UDA (particularly in the case of the RHC, which only has perhaps a dozen members). The UVF and the ultramilitant RHC splinter faction still make a considerable impact on crime in Northern Ireland. Both of these organizations are heavily involved in crime, and most of their criminal income comes from the trafficking of narcotics in the Ulster region. An event illustrating the divisiveness of this organization occurred in early 2005. Mark Haddock, a leading UVF figure, was shot by members of his own organization in an

attempt to silence him. Haddock had recently been named as a participant in the 1997 murder of Raymond McCord. McCord was allegedly a drug courier for Haddock and the UVF and was murdered to prevent knowledge of the drug trafficking from surfacing. The Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), founded in 1996, is a Loyalist paramilitary groups and is perhaps the most heavily involved in organized crime and drug trafficking. It has been linked to two large drug seizures. In 2003 one of the largest seizures of drugs in Northern Ireland captured £2–3.5 million of LVF ecstasy and cannabis ready for distribution. The second seizure occurred in 2005, also of ecstasy and cannabis, where £125,000 was taken in Holywood. The LVF had a long-standing feud with its parent organization, the UVF. Among the reasons for this were conflicting interests in the Ulster drug trade and a number of attacks and murders that took place during 2004–2005, with the LVF getting the worst of it. In response to this, the LVF publicly abandoned its political goals and now devotes its resources wholly in the drug trade and other aspects of organized crime. 147

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Conclusions Aside from the feuding paramilitary organizations, other smaller criminal units do operate within Northern Ireland. Of these organizations, some do traffic narcotics, although none disburse them on the level of the larger paramilitary groups or the organizations directly under their protection. This level of cooperation presents difficulties for law enforcement, as even supposed enemy organizations have been known to put aside political differences when profits can be made. Catholic, and supposedly Republican, drug dealers make protection payments to Loyalist organizations in order to operate. In at least one case, the Independent Monitoring Commission found that a Loyalist group was paying another Loyalist organization £250 per week in order to trade drugs in its territory. This type of cooperation presents difficulties not only for local law enforcement but also for international law enforcement agencies. In 2002, three PIRA members were arrested in Colombia on weapons charges. The subsequent investigation turned up trade links between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the PIRA. The PIRA would train members of FARC in certain types of weapons (notably mortars) and in exchange was paid in cash or narcotics (the main income of FARC is from narcotic sales). In continental Europe, other trade links between the PIRA and the Spanish Basque Fatherland and Liberty Association (ETA) were identified in turn. There, narcotics were used again as currency, with the PIRA not necessarily distributing them. Instead, the PIRA traded expertise and training to the ETA for narcotics and in turn traded narcotics to criminal groups in the Balkan region for arms. Corrupt Croatian military figures in particular facilitate this Balkan link of narcotics and weapons trades. While investigators point out that narcotics and arms sales can occur separate from each other, the climates and conditions that allow one promote the other. Although Ireland’s drug culture may be a more recent phenomenon than the existing cultures in the United States or Great Britain, the involvement of highly motivated and organized paramilitary groups makes the trafficking, sale, and use of narcotics an exponentially more complicated issue.

The Independent Monitoring Commission notes that organized crime in Northern Ireland is a serious issue given the extent of paramilitary involvement, and the number of task forces and organizations in the region designed to combat drug trafficking and organized crime shows that the respective governments of the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom understand this. The Organized Crime Task Force and agencies such as the Asset Recovery Agency and Criminal Assets Board combine efforts to locate and seize the paramilitary organizations’ illegal wealth. References Curtis, Glenn E., and Tara Karacan. “The Nexus among Terrorists, Narcotics Traffickers, Weapon Proliferators, and Organized Crime Networks in Western Europe.” Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, December 2002. Coogan, Tim Pat. The IRA. New York: Palgrave, 2002. English, Richard. Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. “The Illegal Drugs Trade and Drug Culture in Northern Ireland: Interim Report on Cannabis.” House of Commons, Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, 6th Report of Session 2002–2003, Vol. 1. “Independent Monitoring Commission Reports,” Nos. 1–7, April 2004–October 2005. “Irish Terrorists Not Linked to International Drug Trafficking.” United States General Accounting Office, Office of Special Investigations, GAO/05100-18R, September 2000. Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Ireland.

The International Arm of Russian Organized Crime: Russian Mafiya Kelly Hignett Introduction The emergence of the Russian Mafiya has been recognized as the major development in transnational organized crime in recent years and has added a new dimension to global crime in the last decade. Since establishing themselves as a major force in the international criminal hierarchy, the

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Russian Mafiya has shown a particular ability and willingness to operate outside its home territory. The phrase “Russian organized crime” is generally used to refer to criminal groups from all territories of the former Soviet Union, encompassing criminal gangs originating from territories such as Armenia, Belarus, Chechnya, Georgia, and Ukraine in addition to Russia itself. International Reach Current evidence suggests that Russian criminal organizations have formed extensive links with criminal organizations based outside of Russia in Europe, North and South America, the Middle and Far East, and North Africa. Russian-based criminal organizations are known to be involved in criminal activities with many of the major international crime groups, including Chinese Triads, Colombian drug cartels, the Sicilian Mafia, Japanese Yakuza, and Turkish drug traffickers. According to intelligence sources, these alliances have become a major feature in the development of transnational organized crime in the past few years. Latest intelligence suggests that 200–300 Russian Mafiya groupings, of varying size, are actively operating in almost seventy countries across both the Western and Eastern Hemispheres, and many Russian godfathers are known to have established a permanent base abroad. Russian organized crime groups are involved in a broad range of activities across the full criminal spectrum. With a clear involvement in traditional criminal activities (e.g., drug smuggling, extortion, and prostitution), they are also actively engaged in a wide range of legal or semi-legal businesses that often act as a cover to launder the proceeds from their illicit activities. The increasingly transnational nature of Russian-based organized crime means that many Russian criminals have now invested in businesses and properties outside of Russia, and this has provided further opportunities for these criminals to expand their influence outside of their home territories. After the collapse of communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russianbased criminal organizations were quick to expand their operations outside of the domestic market. In

some cases Russian criminals used the traditionally favored method of territorial expansion, that of targeting and infiltrating Russian émigré communities, and this provided a secure base to establish connections. However, much of the initial Mafiya expansion also focused around those countries or regions where Russian criminals had previously established contacts (for example, in Eastern Europe, where the Red Army had been stationed during the Cold War, providing a preliminary contact base). In other cases where this was not possible, Russian gangs took over markets by force, leading to violent turf wars between rival criminal gangs. Russian organized gangs are still known for their ability to use violence to establish control today. However, since their initial expansion in the mid1990s, evidence suggests that in many cases Russian gangs have moved away from using violence as a first resort in favor of establishing cooperative alliances with rival gangs on a strategic basis. The result of this change in tactics was a further expansion in Russian Mafiya influence as transnational links strengthened and new markets opened up, providing Russian organized crime with new opportunities on a global scale. As Russian criminals have been able to buy into foreign properties and businesses in recent years, this has encouraged the further building of networks with criminal gangs in these states and has enabled the Russian Mafiya to cast its net even farther afield. Russian Mafiya expansion into the states of Central Asia opened up the possibility of extending networks into the Asian market, through the Caucasus, and into the extensive drug markets in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Turkey. From the early 1990s, Russian Mafiya groups began establishing alliances with Chinese Triads, although many Chinese gangs were wary of forming close working relations with Russian criminals. Russian Mafiya influence in Eastern Europe provided these gangs with a gateway into Western Europe and the European Union (EU) member states, and there has been evidence of Russian criminal activity on some level in almost all European countries since the mid-1990s. Russian gangs have also established a clear presence in the 149

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United States and Canada, and evidence suggests that in recent years the Russian Mafiya influence in Latin America and the Caribbean has increased. The extensive international reach of Russian organized crime today can be clearly illustrated by the wealth and influence of the Solntsevskaya group. Originally based in the Moscow suburb of Solntsevo, the Solntsevskaya network is today believed to incorporate more than 5,000 members who are engaged in worldwide operations spanning four continents, and the network is widely regarded as the most powerful criminal organization originating in the former Soviet Union in terms of its wealth and influence. Principal activities of gang members include working in drug production, smuggling, and distribution; the illegal trafficking of antiques, arms, and cars; illegal trading in oil; prostitution; extortion; fraud; economic crime; and money laundering. The Solntsevskaya gang is known to be involved in the transit of South American cocaine into Europe and North America and is believed to have established strong links with drug cartels in Latin America and with a variety of criminal organizations operating across Europe. Russian Mafiya Groups in the United States The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) believes that there are 5,000–6,000 criminals from the former Soviet Union active in the United States today, and clear evidence of Russian crime operations has been uncovered in fourteen U.S. states. Recent FBI reports have identified almost twenty Russian crime groups operating in the United States, the activities of which are believed to center primarily around such major U.S. cities as San Francisco, Los Angeles, Miami, Chicago, and New York City. The Brighton Beach area of New York has long been a focus point for U.S. law enforcement efforts against organized crime, as the district contains one of the oldest and most prominent Russian émigré communities in the United States. The extent and activities of Russian crime in this area has been well documented, and in 1992 the Tri-State Joint Soviet Émigré Organised Crime Project was founded to identify the extent of Russian organized crime in the regions of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. The best-known organization operating in

the Brighton Beach area was the Odessa group under the leadership of Evsei Agron, a Soviet émigré who extorted tens of thousands of dollars from the Russian communities of Brighton Beach before being shot outside his apartment. U.S. law enforcement officials have also uncovered a clear working relationship between Russian and Italian criminals in the United States, and Russian Mafiya groups based in the United States have formed alliances with Colombian drug cartels since the early 1990s. Many Russian gangs involved in the drug trade have an operating base in Miami, which provides a convenient gateway between Mexico and the United States. The FBI has even uncovered plans by Russian groups operating in America to use a Russian submarine to smuggle cocaine from Colombia to the United States. As criminals from the former Soviet Union become more assimilated into American society, they are investing in legitimate businesses, but in many cases these businesses act as a front for money laundering operations. U.S. banking and financial institutions have also been infiltrated by Russian organized crime, as illustrated by the financial scandal in 1998–1999 that involved connections between Russian criminals and $10 billion laundered through the Bank of New York. The United States considers the expansion of Russian organized crime to be a direct threat, and in recent years the U.S. government and law enforcement have offered international assistance to other states in preventing and controlling the influence held by Russian gangs. In recent years, several high-profile Russians suspected of leading and participating in criminal organizations have been arrested in the United States or barred entry into America altogether. Strategic Alliances in Europe Russian and European Organized crime groups have also created a variety of strategic alliances and transnational networks. There has been evidence of Russian criminal activity on some level in almost all European countries since the mid-1990s. Russian gangs are known to have established particularly close working relations with criminal organizations in the Balkan region (particularly Albania), Greece,

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Germany, Italy, and Poland. It has been estimated that Russian criminals are responsible for up to one-third of the total crime committed in Germany. Both Cyprus and Switzerland are popular destinations for illicit cash and money laundering. More than 2,000 Russian companies are operating in Cyprus, and it is estimated that Russian criminals have now replaced Colombian cartels as the major criminal users of Swiss bank accounts. London is also a popular destination for Russian criminals to launder money and purchase property. Many Russian gangs are keen to establish a presence in the EU and have been targeting member states and states seeking EU membership with this end in sight. Recently, much attention has been devoted to Russian Mafiya activities in Central and Eastern Europe. Law enforcement and intelligence have recorded a Russian criminal presence in the region from the early 1990s, immediately following the collapse of communism in the region in 1989. By the late 1990s, even Russian officials were publicly accepting that many Central and Eastern European states were acting as a headquarters for Russian organized crime. Following extensive gang warfare in Russia in the 1990s, many criminals fled to Eastern Europe, where their Soviet-era contacts made it easy for them to establish bases in cities such as Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw. The establishment of a Russian presence in Eastern Europe also provided these criminals with a gateway to Western Europe and the European Union. Russian gangs involved in drug smuggling have forged alliances with their Turkish counterparts, and the popular Balkan Routes for drug trafficking through Eastern Europe, into Western Europe, and on to the United States. Conversely, Russian gangs are also involved in smuggling stolen cars from Western Europe that are then transported eastward. Many are bought and sold in Russia itself, while others travel on into Central Asia. Operations in Asia In recent years, Russia has also increased in importance as a channel for illicit drugs from Central Asia and the East, and this is another significant element of Russian participation in international

organized crime. Drugs are trafficked from the Golden Crescent (Iran, Pakistan, and particularly Afghanistan) and the Golden Triangle (Burma, Laos, and Thailand). The latest available intelligence suggests that more than 1,500 drug trafficking gangs are working inside and outside Russia, with Russian groups acting actively as buyers and providers in the drug market both inside and outside Russian territory. Trade routes pass through Russia and continue on into Europe and even to North America. There is further evidence of Russian organized crime extending the scope of its activities into Asia to include large-scale fraud, gambling, and prostitution. There are at least 5,000 Russian prostitutes operating in Thailand alone, many of whom arrive through networks controlled by Russian gangs, and evidence suggests that some Russian gangs have established a presence in Vietnam and Sri Lanka. Many Russian gangs also operate in alliance with Chinese criminals, with people trafficking and illegal immigration as popular collaborative activities. Many Russian criminals have also targeted Israel, with Russian crime estimated to have invested around $4 billion in the Israeli economy and more than thirty suspected Russian criminals under surveillance by the Israeli police. The Caribbean and Latin America More recent evidence suggests the increased establishment of Russian criminal groups in the Caribbean, often working in cooperation with drug cartels based in Central and South America. Interpol reports suggest that Russian criminals in Latin America and the Caribbean have become involved in drug trafficking, arms trafficking, and money laundering, often forming working alliances with indigenous gangs. According to the FBI, the Russian Mafiya has opened a number of front companies and set up an increasing number of banks in Caribbean offshore centers in order to launder the proceeds from these illegal activities, which amounts to millions of dollars. The lack of transparency and inefficient monitoring of the banking systems of many Latin American and Caribbean states has left them particularly vulnerable to penetration by Russian money launderers, and the 151

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dubious practice of a number of the smaller states in the region of selling citizenship has further enabled Russian crime groups to establish themselves in the region. In addition, weak political infrastructure and a culture of corruption in many Latin American states provided a comfortable environment in which to establish operations for criminals who had flourished during similar conditions in the Soviet Union. A variety of reports since the mid-1990s have been concerned with growing Russian organized crime involvement in other Latin American states such as Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Chile. Russian criminals also have an active presence in Mexico that enables them to directly control the smuggling of drugs across the border into the United States. A variety of Russian gangs are involved in a wide range of illegal activities in Mexico, including trafficking in drugs, arms, and people; prostitution; kidnapping; fraud; and money laundering. In addition, many Russian criminals are operating to provide domestic criminal and guerrilla groups with illegal arms, which threatens economic growth and regional stability. Conclusion Today, the threat posed by the increasing reach of Russian organized crime is recognized by the international community, and many states today are taking this threat very seriously. Although Russian organized crime has clearly established a presence outside of the Russian borders, its international contacts and strategic alliances do not signal the emergence of a vast, centrally directed Russian criminal empire. Many Russian international criminal networks appear to be alliances of convenience operating on a short-term cooperative basis, although this does not lessen the potential threat they pose. The increasing internationalization of Russian organized crime is reflective of the general increase in transnational alliances between criminal gangs and the globalization of criminal markets. References Finkenauer, James. “Russian Organized Crime in the United States.” American-Russian Law Institute, http://russianlaw.org/roc_us.htm.

Finckenauer, James, and Elin Waring. Russian Mafia in America. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1998. Galeotti, M. “The Russian ‘Mafiya’: Consolidation and Globalisation.” Global Crime 6(1) (February 2004): 54–69. ———, ed. Russian and Post-Soviet Organized Crime. Aldershot, Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2002. “The Rise and Rise of the Russian Mafia.” BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special _report/1998/03/98/russian_mafia/70095.stm. Rosner, Lydia S. “The Sexy Russian Mafiya.” Pp. 28– 32 in Russian and Post-Soviet Organized Crime, edited by M. Galeotti. Aldershot, Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2002.

Organized Crime in South America Robert Hanser and Debra R. Robinson The structure of organized crime in South America functions along a transnational framework. This transnational aspect permits those countries engaging in various forms of criminal enterprise to transcend national borders and elude government control. Enabled by governmental and socioeconomic instability, organized criminal activity continues to proliferate and infiltrate other nations in the surrounding locale at a disturbing rate. Corruption and violence are common occurrences and serve as significant impediments to legalistic and judicial intervention in South American countries such as Venezuela, Colombia, and Chile. The complex networks integral to present-day organized criminal enterprises facilitate global access for their rapidly expanding illicit activities. As B. Stanislawski and M. Hermann note, these criminal organizations have evolved from past hierarchal structures with “a small cadre of leaders at the top” to more diverse network based groups “whose functions and activities are more dispersed.” The criminal activities cover a wide range of activities including arms trading, drug trafficking, money laundering, fraud, extortion, smuggling, multinational auto theft, bank fraud, counterfeiting, murder, bribery, and corruption. These activities allow organizations to amass enormous wealth and international power. South American orga-

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nized crime groups also engage in collaborative partnerships (such as that observed between Colombian cartels and Russian criminal organizations) to facilitate the fluidity and continuity of their respective illegal enterprises. The Institute for National Strategic Studies cited in its 1999 report that due to the enormous wealth and influence of some of these groups, such as those in Colombia, they are considered “a state within a state.” A highly lucrative global drug trade presents a significant contributing factor to the wealth and international influence exercised by crime cartels in these countries. Although a number of the prominent leaders have been removed by imprisonment, extradition to the United States, or death, their absence has failed to significantly impact the global drug market. The vast and expansive nature of the international crime network ensures the continued production, trafficking, and selling of illegal narcotics. Colombia Those countries having the highest levels of organized criminal activity in South America are Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, and Argentina. Control of the cocaine industry has historically been dominated by drug cartels in Colombia. Organized criminal groups operating out of Colombia have access to the most high-level communications technology and are also outfitted with radarequipped aircrafts, munitions, and numerous workers who oversee the entire trafficking process from the cultivation to the international transporting of the contraband. According to a report in the Schaffer Library of Drug Policy, they are the “largest, wealthiest, most sophisticated organizations” engaged in cocaine trafficking. Since the 1970s, Colombia has served as the home base for some of the most notoriously violent and intricately organized criminal enterprises in the world. What began as small indiscriminate cocaine smuggling operations grew into an international drug trafficking empire. Because of the astounding profits, the mid-1970s saw the formation and rise of the Medellin cartel. The Ochoa brothers (Fabio, Jorge Luis, and Juan David), Jose Gacha, and Pablo Escobar were the masterminds

behind the criminal enterprise and led the Medellin cartel to become the premier drug trafficking outfit to originate out of Colombia. Escobar was an extremely violent and power-hungry individual and, according to a PBS Frontline report, is reputed to be culpable in the murders of “hundreds of government officials, police, prosecutors, judges, journalists and innocent bystanders.” Fierce power struggles between the Colombian government and the Medellin cartel resulted in the subsequent dismantling of the group. Gacha fell prey to the Colombian police, and the Ochoa brothers surrendered in the 1990s in exchange for lenient sentences. Escobar was eventually slain by Colombian police after many lengthy clashes. Following the dismantling of the Medellin cartel, the Cali cartel rose to prominence and power. Covert machinations by the Cali cartel are reputed to have contributed to the eventual downfall of the Medellin cartel. The Cali group drew its sights on Escobar, secretly providing the Colombian police and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) with information concerning his whereabouts and criminal activities. The cartel also formed People Against Pablo Escobar (PEPES) and beleaguered his homes, businesses, and lieutenants in his organization. During this time, the Cali cartel was also gaining a more secure foothold in the cocaine smuggling business. They employed terrorist techniques utilizing cells in the hiring of employees, made use of sophisticated communications equipment, and engaged the services of internationally recognized lawyers to monitor the movements of the DEA and U.S. prosecutors. This group also exercised significant political clout secured through the bribing and campaign financing of top Colombian government officials. However, during the mid-1990s, leaders of the Cali cartel were arrested and sentenced to prison terms ranging from ten to fifteen years. It is thought that they may have received sentencing deals similar to that of the Ochoa brothers. Also, the DEA believes that these members continue to engage in criminal enterprises from their prison cells. The dismantling of these two major crime alliances has resulted in the formation of smaller 153

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Hermilda de Escobar (second from right), mother of Medellin drug cartel kingpin Pablo Escobar (portrait) walks with friends and relatives to Escobar’s tomb on December 2, 1994, to celebrate the first anniversary of his death. Escobar was killed in a shootout with Colombian police in Medellin. (AFP/Getty Images)

and more fragmented criminal groups, allowing for greater control and networking potential. According to a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, these organizations frequently employ the services of guerrilla groups such as Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) that aid the drug smuggling process by “supplanting themselves as the middlemen between the farmers and the cocaine processing labs owned by the cartel bosses.” FARC also exercises a significant amount of territorial control in Colombia. This territory was initially obtained under the guise of utilizing it for the formation of a demilitarized zone, but it has instead been used for cultivating narcotics and staging assaults against the Colombian military. Of equal concern for the government is the ongoing collaborative alliance between FARC and the Russian Mafiya. The Russian Mafiya has used

this relationship to create an arms pipeline to Colombia, equipping FARC with weapon caches and other supplies to aid in its war against the Colombian government. The weapons range from assault weapons to military helicopters to surfaceto-air missiles. The U.S. government has also uncovered evidence supporting the suspicion that this alliance is an arms-for-drugs trade, with cocaine shipments smuggled back to the Russian Mafiya for distribution and sale. In addition to working relationships with the Russian Mafiya, FARC has been noted to have also developed an extensive working relationship with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) that involves both weapons trafficking and military training. Military training camps that utilize IRA technical consultants have been noted to exist deep within the jungles of Colombia. The training that FARC receives provides the organization with a level of military

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expertise and weapons knowledge that tends to exceed that of the common soldier in much of Colombia’s current national military. There is also mounting evidence that FARC’s reach has extended to the U.S. borders. The arrest of a FARC member in Mexico has convinced the Mexican and U.S. governments of a Colombian link to the Tijuana cartel. This collaboration is also believed to be an arms-for-drugs trade agreement. The U.S. government acknowledges that the “defeat of FARC” will not result in the obliteration of drug trafficking out of South America but rather the proliferation of other groups waiting to assume their position. One such group might be the Carlos Castano organization, a paramilitary group that funds its operations by way of extortion and the provision of protective services to drug-processing facilities in northern and central Colombia. Moreover, the DEA reports that this group is also suspected of having direct involvement in cocaine production for exportation out of Colombia. Peru The country of Peru is located in the western portion of South America and is bordered by Ecuador and Colombia to the north, Brazil and Bolivia to the east, and Chile to the south. The bulk of illegal narcotics supplied to the United States are smuggled from Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Colombia. The coca plant is cultivated in these countries, and the majority of the raw product is processed and converted to cocaine in laboratories based in Colombia. This factor allows Colombian drug cartels to retain domination of the cocaine trafficking market. However, intensified enforcement efforts by Colombian police have resulted in some drugprocessing operations being relocated to other South American countries such as Bolivia and Peru. According to a report by the DEA, cocaine production in Peru decreased by an estimated 68 percent from 1995 to 2000. This can be attributed in part to Peru’s air-interdiction program, which resulted in the closure of the cocaine airbridge between Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. Subsequently, the price of coca decreased, taking the profit out of cultivation. However, replanting

efforts detected in previously abandoned fields prompted speculation that coca leaf cultivation is resuming. The Republic of Peru is also a source country for the trafficking of women and children for sexual exploitation and forced domestic labor. A U.S. State Department report on trafficking in persons in Peru noted that most victims are transported internally from rural to urban areas and are forced to work as prostitutes in bars, nightclubs, and brothels. Those trafficked outside of the country for sexual exploitation are typically transported to Western Europe, primarily Spain and Japan. Those victims designated for forced labor are transported to neighboring countries such as Ecuador. It is also noted in the report that drug smugglers and terrorist groups often hold captive entire families residing in rural areas for the purpose of forced “agricultural labor” in remote areas of the country. The Peruvian government does not currently have a comprehensive law against trafficking, but according to the U.S. State Department report, its penal codes encompasses “trafficking-related crimes such as slavery, pimping, sexual exploitation of children, and forced labor.” The government continues to thwart sexual exploitation of minors but is hampered by the laggardly legal system, resulting in low prosecution and conviction rates. Moreover, the report states that while there is no evidentiary support for the allegations of government involvement in trafficking, some individual officials have fallen under suspicion for “tolerating” sexual exploitation of minors through prostitution, unregulated brothels, and migrant smuggling. Brazil Organized criminal activity in this country has extended beyond that of narcotic trafficking, with only a few groups engaging in its practice. The DEA reports that with the exception of some cannabis grown in the northeastern region that is typically for domestic consumption, there is minimal evidence of illegal drug cultivation in Brazil. The Brazilian government has most recently been forced to contend with more sophisticated crimes such as credit card fraud, intellectual property theft and smuggling, and automobile trafficking. At the 155

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116th International Training Course (ITC) on Transnational Crime, it was noted that credit card fraud has become a significant problem in Brazil. The fraud is carried out through the cloning of credit cards, which is mostly accomplished overseas due to ready availability of the required equipment. The sale of such equipment is banned in Brazil. Money laundering is also cited as a growing activity utilized by organized criminal enterprises in Brazil. ITC researchers note the difficulty in ascertaining the extent of the money laundering due to its illegality and the lack of available statistics. However, they supply a rough approximation of 2–5 percent of the global gross domestic product as being composed of “dirty money.” The International Mafia, based in Brazil, is reputed to have utilized “ghost beneficiaries, front and fictitious companies” for their money laundering operations. The piracy and smuggling of intellectual property has become a growing concern. According to an article by V. Rodrigues in Brazzil magazine, Luiz Correa, the national secretary of public security, states that piracy is no longer viewed as a social issue by the government but rather is a “product of organized crime.” He further adds that it is not indigent to Latin American countries but instead is a global concern. The primary items pirated in Brazil are CDs, cigarettes, and watches. According to data secured from the Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property (Adepi), “phony” products account for approximately 45 percent of videotapes and DVDs sold, and an estimated 70 percent of computer components are either pirated or smuggled contraband. An estimated 40 percent of cigarettes consumed in Brazil arise from the black market. In addition, approximately one-fifth of the drugs sold in Brazilian pharmacies are produced illegally. A survey conducted by the British consulting firm mi2g and cited in a 2002 report indicates that Brazil has become the world’s premier exporter of Internet crimes such as identity theft, credit card fraud, and piracy violations. Intellectual property crimes are speculated to cost the Brazilian government an estimated US$67 billion in uncollected taxes and significantly impacts economic development through a loss of 1.5 million jobs as a result of

piracy and smuggling. Government officials report that organized crime and international terrorist groups are responsible for black market goods circulated in the country. A 2005 report by Interpol states that due to the expansive geographic area and complex “operating environment,” policing is difficult. Subsequently, these difficulties facilitate the involvement of organized and transnational crime groups in a wide spectrum of intellectual property crimes. Another lucrative smuggling operation is the transporting of stolen automobiles. According to a report by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, automobile trafficking has become a “booming business,” and Iguacu Falls in Brazil is cited as one of two principal centers for transshipments of stolen vehicles, with the other being Ciudad del Este. They are also transit points for the smuggling of narcotics and arsenals. Argentina According to the 2005 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Argentina is not considered a significant drug-producing country but instead is a transit country through which much of the cocaine flows from neighboring Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia destined for Europe. Argentina is also designated as a transit country for the smuggling of Colombian heroin to the U.S. East Coast, with New York the primary destination. While not a major drug-producing country due to its advanced chemical-processing facilities, Argentina is considered the premier manufacturer of precursors needed to produce cocaine and heroin. Argentine officials acknowledge that drug trafficking has become a growing concern. The majority of cocaine and marijuana enter Argentina through Bolivia by way of the remote and rugged border with Salta and Jujuy. These narcotics are also smuggled across the river bordering Paraguay and the provinces of Misiones and Corrientes. Commercial aircraft are utilized for the trafficking of heroin and some cocaine. The DEA cites that based on intelligence reports, the most substantial volumes of narcotics are smuggled from Argentina through the use of containers by way of Argentina’s maritime port system.

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The Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) uses x-ray technology to check the interiors of seaport containers. Container ships have been identified by the CBP as a serious weakness in securing U.S. borders against narcotics smuggling, human trafficking, and terrorism. (Department of Homeland Security/James Tourtellotte)

Due to membership in Mercosur (the Southern Common Market established by the 1991 Treaty of Ascuncion), Argentina is prohibited from opening and inspecting sealed containers from another member state that pass through the country without direct intelligence notification concerning a specific container. Those countries considered full members of Mercosur include Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela, while Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru maintain associate memberships. These South American countries comprise a significant number of those geographic locales purported as drug trafficking portals. Subsequently, those uninspected containers are considered by government officials to be high trafficking threats. Money laundering has also been cited as a growing problem among Mercosur member countries. According to a 2001 report by the Center for

Transnational Crime and Corruption, increased activity can be partly attributed to the need for Colombian and Mexican cartels to launder drug money. It is also noted to be due to a proliferation of offshore banking establishments in Latin America and the Caribbean. Money laundered through Mercosur countries is harder to detect due to it being filtered through legitimate enterprises such as banking institutions, shell companies, and brokerage exchanges. The government’s response was the establishment in 2000 of the South American Financial Action Task Force (GAFISUD) whose primary function is the coordinating of operations to monitor and prevent money laundering in South American countries. Smuggling Methods Despite aggressive efforts by the U.S. and other governments toward the detection, monitoring, 157

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and halting of drug trafficking, smugglers continue to find new and innovative methods to transport the illegal drugs. According to a report by the U.S. National Narcotics Intelligence Consumer Committee, traffickers have hidden cocaine in the walls of cargo containers, concrete lamp posts, bulk cargo, live animals, and the stomach of human couriers, with these human mules known to ingest up to fifty “fingers” or cocaine-packed condoms. A 2000 report by the U.S. Customs states that they are being “challenged daily” due to the growing number of innovative mechanisms being devised to conceal and smuggle illegal contraband. Traffickers have concealed drugs in propane tanks, engines, food products, electronic games, and computer parts. Narcotics are also being sewn into clothing, wigs, and the lining of luggage and are hidden in the soles of shoes. U.S. Customs also reports that human carriers have been induced by drug smugglers to “endure painful surgical implants to conceal narcotics in their legs, abdomen, and stomach.” Law enforcement and intelligence agencies report that an estimated 65 percent of the cocaine shipped to the United States is transported across the Central America–Mexico corridor, with fishing vessels utilized for bulk shipments. The most significant amounts of drugs shipped from the coastal regions are produced in the south-central area of the country as well as other less-cultivated regions in the northern third of Colombia. Prominent smuggling groups based in Cali, Medellin, Bogotá, and other locales organize the majority of these drug shipments. Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti are the primary transshipment destinations for Colombian cocaine smuggled via the Caribbean. However, due to instability of the government and economy, Haiti has increasingly become the transshipment point of choice for cocaine destined for the U.S. East Coast. Challenges The rapid growth of organized and transnational crime in South America has significantly impacted the region’s development. In fact, there is no region of the world that has not evidenced the influence of organized crime. It has weakened economic devel-

opment potential, undermined the credibility and power of the government, and eroded social capital. It has spread globally, resulting in the corruption of political, social, and economic systems. A report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies states that a partial solution is the empowering of “domestic legal institutions” and vital social organizations in those countries burdened with the effects of organized criminal activities. The Institute for National Strategic Studies notes that better coordination, more resources, and comprehensive long-term planning would significantly improve law enforcement capabilities for fighting organized crime. It will also require proactive policies that identify anticrime initiatives, antidrug operations, and improved intelligence-gathering and reporting systems.

References Cilluffo, F. The Threat Posed from the Convergence of Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking, and Terrorism. Center for Strategic & International Studies before the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, 2000, http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/ congress/2000_h/001213-cilluffo.htm. DEA Congressional Report. “DEA Targets International Organized Crime,” 2 March 2001, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct030201 .htm. DEA Report. “Drug Trafficking in the United States,” 2001, http://www.policyalmanac.org/ crime/archive/drug_trafficking.shtml. Hudson, R. Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America. Library of Congress, 2003, 32–63. Institute for National Strategic Studies. Transnational Trends: New Threats? United States Department of State, 1999, 245–260. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. U.S. Department of State, 2005, http://www .state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2005/. International Training Course, 116th. Current Situation of Organized Crime in Trafficking Stolen Vehicles, Card Fraud, Money Laundering and Major Transnational Organized Crime Groups, 2000, 222–227. Interpol. “Interpol and Brazil Co-host AntiCounterfeiting Conference, Target Is Transnational Counterfeiters in South America.” Media Release,

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13 June 2005 http://www.interpol.int/Public/ ICPO/PressReleases/PR2005/PR200521.asp. Moran, N., and R. Hanser. “Terror for profit: The IRA-FARC Connection.” Journal of International Security 14(2) (2004): 44–47. PBS Frontline. “Drug Wars,” http://www.pbs.org/ wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/. Rodrigues, Valtemir. “In Brazil, Piracy Is Now Organized Crime and Not a Social Issue.” Brazzil, 26 June 2005, http://www.brazzilmag.com/ content/view/2964/2/. Schaffer Library of Drug Policy. “America’s Habit, Drug Abuse, Drug Trafficking, and Organized Crime,” 1986, http://www.druglibrary.org/ schaffer/govpubs/amhab/ahmenu.htm. Shelley, L. Money Laundering, Organized Crime and Corruption. Center for Transnational Crime and Corruption, 2001, 1–12. Stanislawski, Bartosz, and Margaret Hermann. “Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism, and WMD.” CIDCM Conference, University of Maryland, 15 October 2004. U.S. Customs Today. “The Constant Change in Concealment Methods,” July 2000, http://www .customs.ustreas.gov/custoday/jul2000/conceal .htm. U.S. Trafficking in Persons Report. “Human Trafficking and Modern-day Slavery, Republic of Peru,” 2004, http://gvnet.com/humantrafficking/ Peru.htm.

Organized Criminal Activity in South America’s Tri-Border Region Adam Dulin The South American cities of Ciudad del Este (Paraguay), Puerto Iguazu (Argentina), and Foz do Iguaçu (Brazil) comprise a territory known as the Tri-Border Region (TBR). Although the cities are close in proximity, either the Paraná or the Iguaçu Rivers separate each city. The TBR is the largest free-trade zone in Latin America and serves as a bridge for three nations. This area also serves as a tourist attraction where travelers can see the Iguazu Falls. Prior to the 1940s, the TBR was sparsely populated land, home to indigenous people and wildlife. During the early period of exploration, when Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay sought to profit from the region’s vast natural resources, attention

was focused on the region’s timber supplies. By the mid-twentieth century, tourism was recognized as a new base of economic activity. During the latter part of the twentieth century, new jobs in the region served as a catalyst for internal migration of people seeking work. What followed was a drastic increase in the region’s population. For example, the population of Foz do Iguaçu more than tripled during the 1970s and 1980s. Accompanying the unexpected increase in inhabitants were many problems, including lack of basic amenities such as running water and electricity. Additionally, the omnipresent and multifaceted criminal economy flourished in the area. International migration also matched the increase in internal migrants. Of particular interest, many Lebanese and Chinese settlers started businesses in the TBR. The TBR gained infamy in 1994 when the bombing of a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, was linked to foreign militants operating in the region. However, organized crime has been a part of the region for much longer. Boosted by porous borders and lax security checks, people who wish to make money illegally can choose from a variety of activities that occur daily throughout the region. The TBR is a haven for easy money. Contraband Smuggling Small-time contraband smugglers, also known as sacoleiros, carry a wide variety of contraband, such as drugs and cigarettes, through the TBR. Drug trafficking accounts for a large proportion of the crimes committed by teenagers in Foz do Iguaçu. However, drug routes in Latin America can change quickly. Due to a concentrated effort to reduce the flow of drugs in the TBR, drug trafficking may have declined. Drug-related arrests on the border of Puerto Iguazú have decreased since 2000, indicating that enforcement efforts in the region may have displaced the criminal activities to other areas. A more chronic problem in the area is the influx of cigarettes. A pack of cigarettes that cost $1 in Paraguay will cost around $2.50 in Argentina due to higher tax rates. Cigarette smuggling in the TBR is very profitable. As reported by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) on 22 February 2004, during one month in 2004, more than 11,000 car159

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tons of cigarettes were intercepted in the TBR before reaching wayward points in Argentina. Many terrorist groups in Europe and North America have financed operations through the illegal importation of these items, including the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and Hezbollah (Party of God). The latter is believed to have a presence in the TBR. Money Laundering Even though Ciudad del Este only has a population of 300,000, the city has more than fifty-five different banks and foreign exchange shops. Many of the banks serve as a conduit for money laundering operations. The United States estimates that $6 billion a year in illegal funds are laundered there, an amount equivalent to 50 percent of the gross domestic product of Paraguay. A 1996 study by the U.S. government estimated that $20 billion is laundered through Brazil annually. Many of the laundered proceeds come from the drug trafficking and contraband trade. Former Paraguayan General Lino César Oviedo is believed to be in control of a Paraguayan cartel that has amassed a fortune through money laundering in Ciudad del Este. Oviedo allegedly gained $1 billion through these operations. Part of the money may have been invested in properties he owned in the TBR. Product Piracy Latin America is the world’s third-largest market for illegal duplication of CDs, videos, and cassettes, according to the International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition. Illegal production of these products is centered in Brazil and Argentina, whose governments have toughened their intellectual property laws but nonetheless need to make further improvements to combat the proliferation of illegal multimedia. Paraguay’s Ciudad del Este serves as a regional center for pirated goods. Large shipments of pirated products from Asia are routinely destined for the city, a point from which other markets, particularly Brazil, are easily reached. The flourishing economy of pirated goods in the TBR has a far-reaching and damaging impact on

other countries. For example, a 1998 estimate by the International Intellectual Property Alliance claims that lost revenue from patent and trademark infringements in Argentina and Brazil costs U.S. companies $500 million annually. Economic concerns have not gone unnoticed. The trade representative of the United States has routinely subjected Paraguay to special monitoring for unacceptably high levels of intellectual property theft. Despite persistent complaints, counterfeit and pirated products saturate the TBR. Extortion There is a fear of repercussion among TBR residents when it comes to discussing the crime problem that surrounds them. On more than one occasion, residents who openly discussed such issues have faced threats, including death threats. Even those who earn their livelihood illegally fear for their safety if they openly discuss criminal activities in their communities. It is common knowledge in the TBR that Chinese residents are forced to buy goods from other Chinese merchants who are part of organized crime groups attempting to create monopolies. Chinese organized crime members from Mainland China and Taiwan have also forced Chinese merchants to pay protection taxes, a forced revenue that earns some groups $30,000 each month. Lebanese individuals with possible ties to foreign terrorist groups have also used extortion. In 2001, the Paraguayan intelligence services, while collecting information on the activities of Lebanese citizens living in the TBR, reportedly found evidence implicating Assad Ahmad Barakat for fraud and death threats. The businessman was allegedly forcing Lebanese citizens to contribute to the Hezbollah terrorist group. Gunrunning Large consignments of military weaponry are routinely smuggled into Brazil from Paraguay and Argentina. Typically, weapons that are smuggled through the TBR’s Puerto Iguazu are of Belgian, German, local, and U.S. origin. At least 11,000 military weapons, including rifles, machine guns, handguns, and grenades, have been smuggled into

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Brazil since 2001. However, as with other estimates of criminal activity in Latin America, a more realistic estimate regarding the number of smuggled weapons may be much higher. In fact, weapons originating from domestic sources, including weapons stolen from military depots, may never be reported as stolen. Well-established terrorists and organized crime groups are known to participate in gunrunning schemes in the TBR. One organized crime group known as the Local Connection, purportedly composed of politicians and former soldiers, has prospered from smuggling weapons into Brazil. The Local Connection reportedly operates without fear of reprisal due to the public stature of its leading members and is organized like the traditional Italian Mafia, with small subgroups that answer to a regional boss. Weapons traffickers are able to command a high price for weapons in the TBR. One shipment of American-made weaponry such as the Colt M-16A, which is present in the region, may result in a net gain of $4,000 for a weapons smuggler. A shipment of local weapons, such as Bersa 9mm pistols (Argentinean), is worth around $1,300. Terrorism and Organized Crime in the TBR The TBR offers terrorist groups the ideal environment for financing activities abroad. Not only does the region have a sizable Lebanese and Palestinian diaspora, but it also has a reputation for lax security. The possible presence of terrorist groups has not passed unnoticed by domestic and foreign governments. According to the U.S. State Department’s 2001 Patterns of Global Terrorism, various forms of organized crime such as drug trafficking and the sale of pirated goods have been a part of the region’s economy for many years. However, the presence of international terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas has also been noted in the region, particularly for the purposes of financing terrorist operations. Brazilian security agencies claimed that the financial aid offered in 2000 by groups in the TBR to Islamic and Middle Eastern terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad totaled $261 million. An investiga-

tion begun in September 2001 also determined that a group of forty-two Arabs in Ciudad del Este shipped approximately $50 million abroad, mostly to Lebanon, during the 1997–2001 period. It is believed that these funds were derived from arms trafficking and other illicit activities. Hezbollah has reportedly had a presence in the TBR for more than a decade. Besides using the TBR for financing of terrorist activities abroad, the Lebanese terrorist group has also reportedly staged terrorist attacks in South America from the region. Attacks that the group may have perpetrated include bombings that occurred in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1992 and 1994 against Jewish targets. Conclusion The TBR has been a scene of organized crime for many decades. What makes the region particularly interesting is the presence of numerous forms of crime and actors: a criminal mix influenced by people from different cultures, lured to the TBR for monetary reasons. From juvenile crimes such as drug and cigarette smuggling to large-scale weapons smuggling operations, the crimes committed in the region do not occur in a vacuum but rather have far-reaching ramifications. The problems in this region are further compounded by the possible presence of terrorist groups. References Coker, Dale. “Smoking May Not Only Be Hazardous to Your Health, but Also to World Political Stability: The European Union’s Fight against Cigarette Smuggling Rings That Benefit Terrorism.” European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law & Criminal Justice 11(2003): 350–377. Ferradás, Carmen Alicia. “Environment, Security, and Terrorism in the Trinational Frontier of the Southern Cone.” Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 11 (2004): 417–442. Godoy, Roberto. “Brazilian Daily Outlines Gunrunning Operations.” O Estado de Sao Paulo, 9 May 2004. Hudson, Rex. Terrorist and Organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 2003. International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition. International/Global Intellectual Property Theft: Links to Terrorism and Terrorist Organizations. 161

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Washington, DC: International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition, 2003. “International Crime Threat Assessment.” Trends in Organized Crime 5 (2000): 32–145, http://www.fas .org/irp/threat/pub45270index.html. Madani, Blanca. “Hezbollah’s Global Finance Network: The Triple Frontier.” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 4(1) (January 2002), http:// www.meib.org/articles/0201_l2.htm. Mendel, William W. “Paraquay’s Ciudad del Este and the New Centers of Gravity.” Military Review 82 (2002): 51–58. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. “Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001,” 21 May 2002, http://www .state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2001/. Wagner, C. “Brazil: Argentine Crime Group ‘Local Connection’ Said to Have Ties to Terrorists in TriBorder.” Zero Hora (Porto Alegre), 10 November 2002.

Turkish Organized Crime: Heroin Trafficking and Money Laundering Operations Mark Galeotti Introduction Turkish organized crime, for decades the dominant force in the wholesale supply of heroin and other opiates to Europe, is also a clear example of how business opportunity transcends political and ethnic division. After all, it embraces members of both the Turkish state and the Kurds rebelling against them, and while distinctive in its traditions, defined by close-knit clans or families, it is still able to evolve swiftly and also work closely with other gangs and communities, from Italians to Albanians. Origins and Organization Organized crime in Turkey has long and strong historical and cultural roots, especially in regard to the international drugs trade. Opium has been grown there since the eighth century, and Turkey became a key European supplier of the drug in the nineteenth century. In the 1970s, the Turkish government bowed to mounting international pressures and began a heavy-handed campaign to eliminate the domestic production of opiates. This was a substantial challenge: as of 1971, 40 percent of Turkish

farmers were cultivating poppies as their main or subsidiary crop, while whole regional economies were dependent upon opium production. To a large extent the campaign was successful, but the groups involved in the narcotics industry simply abandoned production and concentrated on the trafficking of opiates from the Golden Triangle (Burma, Laos, and Thailand) and especially the Golden Crescent (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and, later, post-Soviet Central Asia). They have also made full use of the opportunities provided by the long-running Kurdish insurgency in eastern Turkey. Turkish organized crime is dominated by a handful of clans or extended families. Some sources suggest twelve and others put the figure as high as twenty, but the higher figures probably err in counting lesser branches of major groups as separate gangs. After all, these are often amorphous structures, especially at the edges, where semiautonomous gangs and individuals may even have links with more than one of the major clans. All are dominated by a senior baba (head of family) and his immediate allies and kin, but they are no longer organized strictly or even primarily by bloodline. Instead, they are increasingly inclusive and fluid in their structures, adopting useful new recruits regardless of kinship and abandoning pyramidal hierarchies for a compartmentalized network of semiautonomous cells. The Turkish gangs originally relied on ethnic and family links among immigrants and temporary laborers in other European countries (especially West Germany) for their distribution networks. Since the late 1980s, though, they have increasingly simply sold on to local groups or subcontracted distribution, concentrating on the wholesale trade. They have also turned increasingly toward recruiting or working with other ethnic communities (including Albanians) for their operations abroad. A further complication is the presence of overtly political factions for whom narcotics trafficking was originally adopted as a vital source of revenue, even if in many cases it soon became the end rather than the means. Behind their political rhetoric, many of these groups either came to resemble the genuinely criminal groupings or actually became incorporated within them. The Kurds, a

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people living in eastern Turkey, northern Syria and Iraq, and western Iran, have since 1984 been fighting an often bitter war for independence or autonomy. The Kurdish guerrillas of the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK, Kurdistan Workers’ Party) have traded in drugs to fuel their operations. In practice, the PKK has largely managed to avoid losing its political identity and is not so much directly involved in the trade as in charging rents to gangs for the use of PKK-held territory on which to grow opium, operate site-processing facilities, or transport drugs. Narcotics have reportedly also been trafficked by Turkish Marxist revolutionary groups as well as progovernment (or at least anti-PKK) elements. The main Kurdish narcotics traffickers appear to come not from the PKK but instead are Kurdish leaders and militias co-opted by the government as local auxiliaries and informants. Many took advantage of their new role to engage in extortion and drug trafficking. The right-wing Grey Wolves terrorist faction has also been implicated in the narcotics trade. Turkish organized crime thus works with and plays off a whole array of political factions and figures, from the PKK to the extreme Right. Narcotic Trafficking Turkish organized crime is an extremely active international force, especially in Europe. It was identified as working in twelve of the fifteen countries surveyed for the European Commission’s 1996 Europol 155 document and primarily trafficking heroin and other opiates with related activities such as money laundering. Turkish organized crime operates in alliance with both major organized crime syndicates and numerous street-level gangs. This too has evolved over time. Between the 1950s and 1970s, morphine base from Turkey and Lebanon was converted into heroin in and around Marseilles by Corsican groups. Some was trafficked in Europe, much (through the so-called French Connection) shipped to North America. In the 1970s Turkish domestic production declined, but its role as a transshipment point continued. Perhaps more importantly, the Turks developed closer links with the Sicilian Mafia, and processing moved to Palermo. Since then, there has been a diversifi-

cation of the European narcotics industry, and new players have entered the scene, including the Apulian Sacra Corona Unita and Calabrian ’Ndrangheta in Italy as well as Russian and other East European groups, but the Turks still dominate the wholesale heroin supply to the continent. At its peak in the early 1990s, up to 85 percent of the heroin in Europe had been processed in or had traveled through Turkey: some 4–6 metric tons each month. While new routes, especially through Russia, began to emerge in the 1990s, even by 2005 this figure was still around 70–75 percent. The drugs arrive from Asia either across the land border with Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, and Syria or by sea from or via Syria and Lebanon. Despite the increasing role of Russian routes, most heroin handled by the Turks still flows through the former Yugoslavia, moved either by land up into southeastern Europe or smuggled by fast boat across the Adriatic into Italy. While old routes were briefly disrupted by the civil wars that wracked the Balkans at the end of the twentieth century, these conflicts actually proved a blessing for the criminals. The ensuing anarchy created lawless areas for them to operate in, while impoverished police forces and political elites became especially vulnerable to corruption. It also unleashed Albanian gangs from both Albania itself (which exploded into civil wars in both 1990 and 1996) and the ethnically Albanian Serbian province of Kosovo. After all, while the Turks have strategic alliances with major European criminal cartels as well as their own distribution networks within the 2 million Turkish expatriates within the European Union, a key asset for the Turkish gangs since the 1990s has been its so-called Albanian Connection. The Albanians provide both couriers and distributors with a reputation for efficiency, discretion, and ruthlessness such that they have quickly become key agents, and by the turn of the millennium they may have handled 75 percent of Turkish heroin during at least some stage of its trafficking. Money Laundering and Reinvestment The global narcotics trade is lucrative, and organizations involved in it are faced with the need to launder substantial amounts of money. Turkish organized 163

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Istanbul Governor Muammer Guler (left) and the city’s police chief Celalettin Cerrah pose for photographers next to the one metric ton of heroin seized by police in the city in January of 2004. (AFP/Getty Images)

crime is heavily involved in this, especially given the lack of effective money laundering legislation in Turkey until 1996, which even then was only brought to international standards in 2005, as well as the existence of a virtually institutionalized money laundry operation in Turkish-occupied northern Cyprus. The criminals have invested heavily in the latter, especially in casinos and other gambling centers and in a banking system grossly disproportionate to the island’s needs. The territory has also become used by Italian, Russian, and other criminals not only for money laundering but also as a safe haven and as a neutral ground for meetings. Much of the revenue from heroin trafficking is reinvested in genuinely or overtly legal businesses. Germany has emerged as second only to Turkey as a magnet for Turkish criminal profits, much reinvested in government bonds, property, businesses, and the tourism and leisure industries. If anything, Germany’s appeal has only increased as Ankara

slowly begins to make progress in combating money laundering. However, as money laundering options began to become more limited, many Turkish gangs began to reinvest their profits in other criminal operations instead. By 2003, the Turks were playing a growing role in smuggling illegal migrants into Europe and in people trafficking. By the late 1990s, Turkey had also become second only to Italy in the level of kidnappings in Europe. Turkish organized crime is thus a powerful and ambitious force within the European underworld, primarily thanks to its key role as the continent’s wholesale supplier of heroin. It lacks the sophistication and breadth of operations of, for example, the Sicilian Mafia but has been helped by the considerable protection it has enjoyed within Turkey, especially with its vital money laundering haven in northern Cyprus, and is in the middle of a process of diversification fueled by heroin profits.

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References Galeotti, Mark. “Turkish Organized Crime: Where State, Crime and Rebellion Conspire.” Transnational Organized Crime 4(1) (Spring 1998): 25–41. Sariibrahimoglu, L. “The Crash That Shook Turkish Security to the Core.” Jane’s Intelligence Review 10(4) (April 1998): 8–11. Xhudo, Gus. “Men of Purpose: The Growth of Albanian Criminal Activity.” Transnational Organized Crime 2(1) (Spring 1996): 1–20. Zurcher, Erik. Turkey: A Modern History, rev. ed. London: Tauris, 2004.

Child Trafficking in West Africa Georgios A. Antonopoulos Introduction Although child trafficking has been a phenomenon with a long history in West Africa, it became the epicenter of a serious debate in the 1990s. According to Article 3(a) of the Protocol on the Trafficking of Human Beings supplementing the United Nations (UN) Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, trafficking is “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring, or receipt of persons, by the means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.” Contributing Factors It should be noted, however, that when it comes to children, an activity of exploitation is considered as trafficking even when there is consent by the child. There are estimates by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working in West Africa that the number of trafficked children in the area each year is 200,000. However, the exact number is largely unknown due to the hidden nature of this trade, the lack of legislation about trafficking in a large number of West African countries, and practices and traditions in West Africa that reinforce trafficking itself and the underreporting of trafficking cases.

There is a constellation of factors that play an active role in the flourishing of trafficking of children in West Africa. The most important factor is poverty. It is striking that 78.5 percent of the population in Ghana, 85.8 percent of the population in Burkina Faso, and 90.6 percent of the population in Mali, three of the most important source countries for trafficked children, live on less than US$2 a day. In addition, there is a very strong colonial tradition of slavery in West Africa. Other factors involve the inadequate educational, vocational, and economic opportunities for children in rural (and urban) areas of West Africa, the demand for cheap labor, ignorance of the dangers associated with trafficking on the part of the parents, and the absence of legal, enforcement, and judicial frameworks against child trafficking. The truth is, however, that all of the above factors constitute a very complex nexus of child trafficking in the area. Major Trafficking Routes According to the UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, in general terms there are two major trafficking routes in West Africa: (1) from Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Mali to the Côte d’Ivoire and (2) from Togo and Benin to Nigeria, Cameroon, and Gabon. This does not necessarily mean that the destination countries cannot be source or transit countries. A child from Burkina Faso, for instance, can be trafficked to the Côte d’Ivoire and from there to Nigeria. Moreover, a child from Nigeria, which is largely considered a destination country, may be trafficked to neighboring countries. It is also common for a number of children primarily from Nigeria to be trafficked to a number of European countries (especially Italy) or the Middle East and introduced into prostitution. Moreover, there are a large but unknown number of trafficked children from rural areas to cities in the same country (internal trafficking). Basically, trafficking patterns follow the patterns of migration. The trafficked children are introduced into prostitution; begging on the streets of large cities; various petty crime activities; domestic servitude; and labor in factories, restaurants, agriculture (specifically cocoa, cotton, rubber, and rice plantations), fishing, and construction and mine sites. Some of the labor sectors in which children are 165

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Diarra Yacouba, 15, poses for a photo on June 28, 2001, in Logbogba, Côte d’lvoire. Yacouba, who is from Mali, was a victim of child labor trafficking and worked on the cocoa plantations for a year before a friend found him and helped him regain his freedom. (Getty Images)

introduced show how well this form of organized crime is linked to the licit economy and that each benefits from the goods and services provided the other. There are also a number of children sold as soldiers in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Methods of Recruitment and Control There are different methods of recruitment of trafficked children that are sometimes organized by groups associated with other illicit trades. These methods include: 1. Abduction. 2. Bonded placement or fostering. Networks and individuals who are involved in the trafficking of children in West Africa take advantage of the extreme poverty and the traditional practice of poor families sending children to more affluent individuals or families as a way to facilitate the upbringing and education of the sold children and

the children who stay with the family. After some time, the children are no longer cared for but are put into exploitative conditions, primarily domestic servitude. 3. Marriage proposition. This is a method of recruitment that is precipitated by a very important factor: the cultural context in relation to marriage in West Africa. Girls are eventually sold to tribal chiefs throughout the whole region to become their brides. 4. False promise of work prospects. The children are promised work in the city or country of destination, but instead of entering the promised sector of employment they are forced into hard labor, prostitution, or criminal activities. This is one of the most popular ways of recruiting children, who are later introduced into the commercial sex scene in Europe. Mamas, who are ex-prostitutes, many times facilitate the recruitment of girls for prostitution. 5. Exploitation by parents and relatives.

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Apart from the fact that when children are trafficked they do not have anyone else but the traffickers to “protect” them and that the children when trafficked to countries where they do not enjoy citizenship are in a state of illegality, there are other methods that the traffickers of children use to control their victims. These methods include beatings, deprivation of food and sleep, imprisonment in houses and other lodgings, threats, constant surveillance, and forced sex with a large number of clients when the children are introduced into the commercial sex scene. In addition, there is a very interesting way of control of the trafficked children that is also applied to trafficked adults from West Africa: the threat of witchcraft practices against the victims or their families. There are cases in which Nigerian children (as well as women) were made submissive under the threat of Voodoo practices enforced on them by sangomas. It is estimated that a trafficker can earn as much as US$30 a month for each child trafficked. Due to the fact that we are not in the position to know the exact number of trafficked children in West Africa, the exact number of trafficked children who are introduced in every labor sector, or the practices that are associated with a specific labor sector, especially prostitution, it is impossible for us to know the exact amount of money that the traffickers get. However, the estimated amounts, just as with the numbers of trafficked children in West Africa, are certainly an underestimate. The effects of child trafficking are enormous for the children. Initially, the children are not treated as such, something that negatively affects their upbringing. Their education prospects are severed, and they endure problems of health associated with hard labor, malnutrition, and maltreatment. Many children involved in prostitution suffer from HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases. Research by the UN in Benin in the late 1990s revealed that the children who escaped trafficking networks were likely to suffer from feelings of alienation by their families and native countries or cultures. The effects of child trafficking are also enormous for the children’s families and the countries of origin of the victims, who lose their most important asset: their youths.

Conclusion West Africa is a region in which there are relatively little developments in relation to trafficking. This is, as mentioned earlier, one of the reasons that this trade flourishes in that particular corner of the world. There are some clear steps that should be followed by the international community and, of course, by the countries affected by child trafficking. First, there is a great need for the rich countries to reduce the economic differences between the industrially advanced world and West Africa and to eradicate poverty. Second, the establishment of strong legal, judicial, and enforcement frameworks in relation to human trafficking in West Africa is an imperative. All countries in West Africa have signed the international conventions against trafficking. However, not all countries have passed national legislation on trafficking. Even when legislation exists, enforcement is weak and inadequate. Third, there is a huge need for more campaigns informing the public about the dangers of irregular migration, both internal and external. Organizations such as UNICEF, the International Labour Organization, and Anti-Slavery International have been organizing public awareness projects and establishing reception centers in the region, but a lot more can be done. Finally, given that we know relatively little about this trade, additional research on every aspect of child trafficking, and specifically of its social organization, should be conducted. References Agbu, O. “Corruption and Human Trafficking: The Nigerian Case.” West Africa Review 4(1) (2003): 1–13. Aronowitz, A. A., and M. Peruffo, “Trafficking in Human Beings and Related Crimes in West and Central Africa.” Pp. 394–414 in The Blackwell Companion to Criminology, edited by C. Summer. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004. Astill, J. “The Terrible Truth about the Ship of Slaves.” Guardian, 21 April 2001. International Organisation for Migration. “New International Organisation for Migration Figures on the Global Scale of Trafficking.” Trafficking in Migrants Quarterly Bulletin, Geneva, IOM No. 23, 1 April 2001, http://www.iom.int/jahia/ Jahia/pid/8/EN/tm_23.pdf. 167

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Olateru-Olagbesi, B. “Brief Overview of the Situational Analysis of Human Trafficking in West Africa.” Paper presented at the 7th African Regional Conference on Women, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 6–10 October 2004. Ruggiero, V. “Criminals and Service Providers: Cross-National Dirty Economies.” Crime, Law and Social Change 28 (1997): 27–38. Salah. R. “Child Trafficking in West and Central Africa: An Overview.” Paper presented at the 1st Pan African Conference on Human Trafficking, Abuja, Nigeria, 19–23 February 2001. UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre. Child Trafficking in West Africa: Policy Responses. Florence: UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre, 2002.

United Nations. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. Vienna, Austria: United Nations, 2000, http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dc atoc/final_documents_2/convention_%20traff_eng .pdf. United Nations Economic and Social Council. “Child Trafficking in West and Central Africa.” Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery, 24th session, Geneva, 23 June–2 July 1999. World Resources Institute. “Economic Indicators— Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali,” 2003, http:// earthtrends.wri.org.

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Section II Criminal Enterprises and Sources of Financing Frank Shanty

Advances in communications and computer technology and the easy access to international markets in the post–Cold War world have provided the criminal entrepreneur with a wide range of lucrative and illegal financial opportunities. As the movement of money, goods, and people across national and international borders continues to expand, licit as well as illicit enterprises are reaping the benefits and the fruits of globalization. Organized crime is an evolving threat to state, regional, and international security. The activities of these organized criminal groups span legitimatesector enterprises as well as illegal activities such as the illicit production and distribution of narcotics and precursor chemicals, the trafficking of women and children, forced labor, consumer-driven crimes, and a host of illegal financial enterprises ranging from securities and health care fraud to product counterfeiting operations and tax evasion schemes. There are many definitions of organized crime and of what exactly constitutes a criminal enterprise. Basically, a criminal enterprise forms to generate revenue by engaging in illegal activities and providing goods and services in competition with its legal counterparts or in direct violation of existing statutes in the case of illegal commerce or services. Essentially, according to R. Thomas Naylor, “organized crime is associated more with market-based offenses—the production and distribution of illegal goods and services to willing consumers.” Twenty-first-century criminal activity often involves elected or appointed public officials as well

as private business establishments. The lure of huge profits or a one-time big payoff often entices those entrusted with the responsibilities of ensuring public safety and security to accept bribes, favors, or other forms of compensation to look the other way or to actively take part in the illegal venture. Law enforcement and other regulatory agencies are finding it extremely difficult to thwart the activities of these well-organized and well-connected criminal networks. Due to the transnational dimension and scope of the problem, many agencies are illequipped to launch a truly effective assault on some of the more sophisticated criminal operations. State legislative initiatives and bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements are designed to address some of the issues inherent in adopting a comprehensive approach to the global crime problem, but these attempts at achieving consensus often fall short at the implementation phase regardless of the initial good intentions of state participants. According to Michael Woodiwiss, “today’s illicit global economy involves trading in anything from hazardous waste to human body parts, and the Internet has multiplied opportunities for fraud. . . . The world now needs a comprehensive and objective inquiry into criminal problems associated with both legal and illegal markets.” Cooperation between national as well as international enforcement agencies is a prerequisite to effective and collective action. This is often difficult to achieve since domestic laws, priorities, and resources vary between states. To compound this problem, agencies within a specific country are often unable to 169

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coordinate and consolidate their resources or establish a protocol for effective intelligence sharing. The entries addressed in this section provide the range of activities currently engaged in by organized criminal groups. The variety of activities covered should impress upon the reader the truly global dimension of this problem and the need for a concerted and comprehensive international effort to combat it.

References Evans, John. “Criminal Networks, Criminal Enterprises.” International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, 1994, http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/ netwks94.pdf. Naylor, R. Thomas. Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002. Woodiwiss, Michael. “Transnational Organized Crime: The Global Reach of an American Concept.” Pp. 13–27 in Transnational Organized Crime: Perspectives on Global Security, edited by Adam Edwards and Peter Gill. New York: Routledge, 2003.

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Bribery and Corruption of Police Officials Robert Hanser and Jessica I. Welch Recently, there has been much attention paid to the corruption of police and their deviant behavior. However, police corruption is not a new problem and dates back to the establishment of the first organized local police forces. While corruption has been a persistent problem for law enforcement, the nature of police corruption has varied over time. Historically, police corruption involved such lowlevel and passive activities as bribery schemes and nonenforcement of the law. Today, the prominent issues at hand are police brutality and drug-related police corruption. A sampling of recent episodes of corruption since 1990 in the police departments of three major cities—New York City, Los Angeles, and New Orleans, located in vastly different regions of the United States—demonstrates that corruption is alive and well in all corners of the nation. These cities, when taken together, provide a good cross section of the United States in terms of both police agencies and corruption sampling. Corruption in each of these cities has been known to consist of brutality, bribery, and extortion. New York City Throughout New York City’s history of policing, its department has repeatedly been rocked over the years by high-profile police corruption scandals. The Mollen Commission reported that the most prevalent form of police corruption in New York City is

police committing crimes in connection with the illegal drug trade. Between 1992 and 1996, federal and city investigations and prosecutions led to the convictions of thirty officers for primarily narcotics-related offenses. In 1993 during eleven days of corruption hearings, a parade of New York police officers testified before the Mollen Commission about dealing drugs, stealing confiscated drugs funds, stifling investigations, and beating innocent people. The New York City Law Department reported that police misconduct, described as assault/ excessive force, assault, and shootings by police, cost city taxpayers more than $44 million for fiscal years 1994 and 1995). The city paid approximately $70 million in settlement or jury awards involving claims alleging improper police actions between 1994 and 1996. Two of the largest amounts paid during this period were a 1994 verdict costing $7.5 million and a 1995 pretrial settlement, at the time the largest in its history, of $16.6 million. Unlike prosecutions of police for drug-related incidents, grand juries often decline to indict officers of brutality-related charges, choosing to believe officers accounts of events. Between 1992 and 1995, ninety-four cases were decided, with nineteen leading to prosecution. In 1996, five of twenty-two cases decided were prosecuted. Perhaps the most flagrant abuse of police power occurred during the period 1985–1990. During this time two New York City police detectives, Louis Eppolito and Stephen Caracappa, became involved with the Luchese crime family and were operating as Mafia hitmen. In March 2005 following the 171

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retirement of both men and a lengthy investigation, the two former police officers were arrested and charged with various crimes under the RICO statute. In April 2006 they were convicted of racketeering, eight counts of murder, and obstruction of justice. Both men are currently serving life sentences. Los Angeles When speaking of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), one can hardly refrain from mentioning its entanglement in drug-related offenses and highly publicized incidents of police brutality. Between 1991 and 1996, the office of the city attorney reported that the city paid $79.2 million in civil lawsuit judgments and awards and pretrial settlements against police officers. Unfortunately, criminal prosecution of police for alleged brutality is extremely rare in Los Angeles. According to the Internal Affairs Group’s commander, at most one officer a year is prosecuted for an on-duty abuserelated incident. Between 1993 and 1995, besides the four officers involved in the Rodney King incident, there had been two other prosecutions of LAPD officers. However, in regard to drug-related corruption, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported that twenty-seven sheriff’s deputies and one police officer had been convicted by 1994 for skimming millions of dollars of drug money while members of an elite narcotics unit, and the department became embroiled in a far-reaching corruption scandal centered around the antigang unit of the department’s Rampart Subdivision. By 2003, more than one hundred falsely obtained convictions had been thrown out, twenty LAPD officers had left active duty, and three officers were convicted of conspiring to frame innocent people. The LAPD is now under a federal consent decree to implement reforms and changes. A federal judge ruled in May 2006 that the department has made progress in eliminating racial discrimination and corruption, and he extended the consent degree by three years. New Orleans The police department in New Orleans, Louisiana, has had more than its share of corruption and bru-

tality. The U.S. Justice Department reported in 1991 that New Orleans had the highest ranking of citizen complaints of police brutality in the country. In addition, at least 50 of the 1,400-member force has been arrested since 1993 for felonies including homicide, rape, and robberies. Likewise, prosecutions of police brutality are rare considering the number of complaints filed by citizens. Of the 819 cases of police brutality considered between 1992 and 1995, 9 were prosecuted. In 1996, of the 80 cases decided by federal prosecutors for federal districts containing New Orleans, none were prosecuted. In drug-related cases, 11 police officers were convicted of accepting nearly $100,000 from undercover agents to protect a cocaine-supply warehouse containing 286 pounds of cocaine. More recently, the New Orleans Police Department has received much media attention since the Hurricane Katrina incident, which may unveil more corruption and add to its already brutal track record. Conclusion Police corruption is still today a major concern and is not limited to one geographical region. Yet while police corruption is a major concern, it seems to be only a major concern of the residents of the abovecited cities. These three cities were consistent in both drug-related corruption and police brutality, but there is noticeably little prosecution for either. The future may look promising with the consent decrees in place and more training occurring now, but unless these departments and all others hire diverse ethical people and prosecute offenders, corruption will continue to be a major concern. References General Accounting Office. Report to the Honorable Charles B. Rangel, House of Representatives, Law Enforcement: Information on Drug-Related Police Corruption. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1998. Human Rights Watch. Shielded from Justice: Police Brutality and Accountability in the United States, 1998, http://www.hrw.org/reports98/police/. Los Angeles Police Department. Official website, http://www.lapdonline.org. “NY Police Were Mafia Hitmen.” RINF Alternative News, 7 April 2006, http://www.rinf.com/ columnists/news/ny-police-were-mafia-hitmen.

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An unidentified bone lies in a ravine in Tijuana, Mexico, on October 15, 2000, where Mexican federal agents have been searching for the remains of three bodies allegedly buried by two Los Angeles police officers from the city’s Rampart subdivision. The police corruption scandal is the most serious in LAPD history. (Getty Images)

Schmalleger, F. Criminal Justice Today. 8th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2005.

Consumer-Driven Crimes: Drugs, Gambling, and Prostitution Hua-Lun Huang Typologies of Crime Classifying crimes and applying the typologies to the comparisons and analyses of criminal behaviors have been research foci for criminologists, sociologists, and victimologists for more than one hundred years. For example, based upon the ideas of atavism and born criminals, Cesare Lombroso, the founder of criminal anthropology and modern criminology, argued in 1893 that criminal women can be categorized into “prostitutes,” “insane criminals,” “epileptic and morally insane offenders,” and “hysterical offenders.” In the 1980s and 1990s,

Marshall Clinard and colleagues contended that crimes should be divided into nine groups: interpersonal, property, public order, conventional, political, occupational, corporate, organized, and professional crimes. Like Lombroso, Clinard, and other criminologists who advanced typologies of criminal behavior, Dean Dabney identifies eight different patterns of offenses: homicide, assault, rape, robbery, burglary, property crimes, public order crimes, and crimes within corporations and other organizations. Consumer-Driven Crimes Are Victimless Crimes Drug addiction, illegal gambling, prostitution, and other consumer-driven misdemeanors (such as homosexuality and abortion) generally are classified by liberal sociologists as crimes without victims. Two reasons are frequently listed to justify this classification. First, under normal circumstances, criminal 173

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behaviors such as abusively using drugs, unlawfully gambling, and secretly buying sexual services from prostitutes do not directly involve interpersonal violence or crimes against personal property. Instead, such behaviors generally include voluntary transactions and mutual agreements between consumers (i.e., drug addicts, gamblers, and johns) and service providers (i.e., drug traffickers, owners of gambling industries, and prostitutes). Because of these two features, drug addiction, illegal gambling, and prostitution, from the perspective of victimology, do not fit into legal definitions of crime. As an alternative, they should be deemed as regular businesses. Second, besides implying regular businesses, voluntary transactions and mutual agreements also entail the idea that people who are involved in the activities of drugs, unauthorized gambling, and prostitution do not assume civil and criminal responsibilities. This is because people who are engaged in these three activities usually will not be attacked or murdered and will not experience financial losses. This characteristic, obviously, is different from what the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) called index offenses (murder, sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, auto vehicle theft, and arson) and from other less serious interpersonal and property crimes (identity theft, fraud, shoplifting, or embezzlement, to name just a few), which are always associated with identifiable victims and the issue of restorative justice. Given that drugs, gambling (without official permissions), and prostitution do not cause evident damages to a society, these acts apparently belong to the domains of personal freedom, free will, and rational choice. All of these private domains suggest that drugs, (underground) gambling, and prostitution are victimless crimes that should not be criminalized. Consumer-Driven Crimes Are Deviant Behaviors For Edwin Schur and sociologists such as Martin Weinbert and Rubington and Patricia and Peter Adler, drugs, (unregulated) gambling, and commercialized sexual behaviors should be considered as voluntary transactional behaviors. Based on this theoretical viewpoint, they examine these con-

sumer-driven activities in the context of deviant behaviors. According to these sociologists of deviance or symbolic interactionists, human behaviors usually can be given different (or even conflictual) meanings on the basis of interpersonal interactions and communications or specific conditions of external environment. This means that except for some behaviors that are commonly viewed by human societies as delinquent or antisocial acts (such as treason and incest), human behaviors (including drug addiction, prohibited gambling, and prostitution) basically do not assume any universally acceptable or valid meanings. For instance, in economically advanced countries, girl infanticides are defined by the law as crimes and, as a result, assume the negative meaning of felony. However, in certain extremely impoverished rural areas of Bangladesh, China, India, and Pakistan, the same practices might be regarded by destitute parents as necessary means for survival. (In other words, positive meanings are given to the behaviors of murdering baby girls.) This situation may lead those parents who have killed their baby girls to neutralize their homicidal behaviors and to transform girl infanticides into acceptable local customs or norms. From the angle of symbolic interactionism, what Schur and sociologists of deviance advocated is the idea that almost all deviant behaviors are products of social construction. This logic, among others, implies two things. First, the defining characteristics of drug addiction, illegal gambling, prostitution, and other consumer-propelled misdemeanors are subjective definitions with arbitrary punishments, just like the designs and functions of houses, cars, toys, furniture, and numerous other commodities are subject to personal preferences and changes. Because of this artificial process, drug addiction, (forbidden) gambling, and prostitution are not crimes per se. On the contrary, it is the reactions of social members (particularly those who belong to the command class) that make these behaviors criminalized or decriminalized. So just like Howard Becker argues, a few people are always trying to create a “better” world for others. These “moral entrepreneurs” or “moral crusaders” normally “have strong humanitarian overtones.” With such an

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A female police officer leads a woman away during a raid of an entertainment center suspected of being a front for prostitution, drug trafficking, and gambling on July 18, 2006, in Shenzhen, Guangdon Province, China. According to state media, male and female prostitution, both of which are illegal in China, are nonetheless widespread. (Getty Images)

ambition to “improve” human societies, “moral entrepreneurs” (as if chaperons of the public) will usually advocate the idea that if social members “do what is right it will be good for them.” Second, in addition to questioning the fairness and soundness of the process of criminalization, Schur and sociologists of deviance also believe that drug abuse, (impermissible) gambling, prostitution, and other consumer-driven misconducts will be stigmatized more easily and more frequently than certain serious offenses (such as corporate or financial crimes and environmental pollution). With respect to this phenomenon, the following three processes identified by Daniel Dotter seem to be very useful for sociologists to analyze the variations of stigmatization: 1. The process of meaning-creation (or creating social definitions) is a practice that will allow peo-

ple (above all, the authority figures) to allocate disapproving, contemptuous, or even demonic meanings to any behaviors that are rejected by most people or will make the majority of people feel uncomfortable, such as demonstrating backstage behaviors in front-stage regions (e.g., reading pornography in the library), getting involved in animal sex, deserting from public safety-related positions (such as some New Orleans policemen who abandoned their jobs after the city was hit by Hurricane Katrina), and using fabricated documents or other discrediting information to gain jobs, admission to college, etc. 2. The process of boundary maintenance is a course that will enable members of mainstream society to share and safeguard the negative meanings given out to deviant behaviors. 3. The process of categorization is a path that will discourage normal people of conventional society 175

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from contacting with deviants or delinquents, which will cause the latter to be isolated, both economically and socially, from mainstream society.

Consumer-Driven Crimes and Social Harms Viewing drug addiction, illegal gambling, prostitution, and other consumer-driven misdemeanors as victimless crimes or harmless deviant behaviors is not a position shared by all sociologists. As a matter of fact, some sociologists have argued that drug abuses, (unlawful) gambling, prostitution, and other consumer-driven transgressions do cause harms to a society. Because of those harms (whether they are direct or indirect), consumer-driven misconduct, just like serious offenses, must be criminalized and controlled. In terms of social harms, the idea of the Van Dijk chain reaction is extremely helpful for the public to understand the ripple effects of consumer-driven misbehavior. First, according to the hypothesis of the Van Dijk chain reaction, many crime victims will become offenders because the experience of victimization may generate the desires to compensate or retaliate: a person who lost a $20 bill may try to “earn” the bill from others, a student who lost his textbooks may try to “borrow” the books from a bookstore, a hurricane victim who lost his furniture may try to “replace” them by looting an unguarded department store, a child who was sexually molested may become a child molester when he or she gets older, and so forth. Marcus Felson summarizes these linkages between victimization experiences and restoration attempts as follows: “1. A precrime situation leads to 2. Incident A, followed by 3. The aftermath of incident A, which creates the precrime situation for 4. Incident B, followed by 5. The aftermath of incident B, which creates the precrime situation for 6. Incident C.” If the idea of the Van Dijk chain reaction is applied to the evaluation of the possible impacts of consumer-propelled offenses, then the harms brought on by drugs, illegal gambling, and prostitution to a society will be obvious. For drug abusers, the precrime situations will include, but not be limited to, lacking time and energy to work (or find jobs) while facing the urgent need for money to buy drugs. These situa-

tions, in turn, may lead to interpersonal or property crimes such as robbery, auto vehicle theft, burglary, embezzlement, fraud, or larceny. For people who gamble illegally (especially compulsively), the precrime situations will include, but not be restricted to, the urgent need for money to pay back gambling debts, loans, or usuries. These situations, again, may lead to violent or property crimes such as extortion, auto vehicle theft, burglary, embezzlement, check fraud, or larceny. For prostitutes, the precrime situations will include, but not be confined to, spreading sexually transmitted diseases (particularly HIV) to their customers or undermining married customers’ families. These situations, in turn, will create severe public health problems to a society (e.g., in Sudan, Thailand, and some African and Southeast Asian countries, hundreds of thousands of prostitutes are HIV carriers). Such precrime conditions will also destabilize marriage and family relationships and turn some families into dysfunctional or broken homes (which are usually associated with poverty and violence). Dysfunctional or broken homes then become the main sources of runaways, throwaways, and juvenile gangs who are responsible for numerous cases of vandalism, drive-by shootings, drug dealing, arson, assault, and other violent and property crimes. In summary, from the angle of the Van Dijk chain reaction, drugs, (illicit) gambling, prostitution, and other consumer-driven misconducts are not merely related to individual fantasies or personal habits. On the contrary, these offenses, more often than not, will pave the way for certain people to become involved in crimes, particularly felonies. Given that innocent people might be hurt as well as the costs connected with such serious crimes (such as building new penitentiaries) will be shared by every law-abiding member of a society, consumerinduced offenses accordingly have to be penalized and regulated. References Adler, Patricia A., and Peter Adler, eds. Constructions of Deviance: Social Power, Context, and Interaction. 5th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2006.

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Becker, Howard S. Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance. New York: Free Press, 1966. Briggs, Freda, ed. From Victim to Offender: How Child Sexual Abuse Victims Become Offenders. St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1995. Clinard, Marshall B., Richard Quinney, and John Wildeman. Criminal Behavior Systems: A Typology. 3rd ed. Cincinnati: Anderson, 1994. Dabney, Dean A. Crime Types: A Text/Reader. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2004. Doerner, William G., and Steven P. Lab. Victimology. 4th ed. Cincinnati: Anderson, 2005. Dotter, Daniel. Creating Deviance: An Interactionist Approach. Lanham, MD: AltaMira, 2004. Felson, Marcus. Crime and Everyday Life. 3rd ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2002. Goffman, Erving. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Doubleday, 1959. ———. Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. 1963. Reprint, New York: Touchstone, 1986. Lombroso, Cesare, and Guglielmo Ferrero. Criminal Woman, the Prostitute, and the Normal Woman. Translated and introduced by Nicole Hahn Rafter and Mary Gibson. 1893. Reprint, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004. Meier, Robert F., and Gilbert Geis. Victimless Crime? Prostitution, Drugs, Homosexuality, Abortion. Los Angeles: Roxbury, 1997. O’Brien, Jodi. The Production of Reality: Essays and Readings on Social Interaction. 4th ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge, 2006. Rubington, Earl, and Martin S. Weinberg, eds. Deviance: The Interactionist Perspective. 9th ed. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2005. Schur, Edwin M. Crimes without Victims: Deviant Behavior and Public Policy, Abortion, Homosexuality, Drug Addiction. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1965. Schur, Edwin M., and Hugo Adam Bedau. Victimless Crimes: Two Sides of a Controversy. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1974.

Criminal Copyright Infringement: Pirating of Electronics, Music, and Computer Software Prapon Sahapattana The violation of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner by using copyrighted material is called copyright infringement, and the person who does

this act is called an infringer. Due to the development of digital technology, various types of copyrighted materials such as books, music, movies, and computer software can be stored in an electronic format. These materials that are kept in digital format are different from those formatted as paper, tape, and vinyl in that they can be transferred and distributed using less time and space. Computer software as well as books, music, and motion pictures in digital format can be transferred via a network, especially the Internet, that can reach receivers almost instantly. The materials that are recorded on compact discs (CDs) take little space, are lightweight, and are easy and fast to reproduce. The quality of the copies of these digital materials are virtually exactly the same as the original ones. Basically, owners of the copyrights have to invest a large amount of money, time, creative thinking, etc., in order to produce copyrighted works, whereas infringers of copyrights incur very little cost to reproduce the original works. There is, however, the small cost incurred for nonintellectual products such as material or media to store the work. Consequently, the prices of these illegal products are extremely low compared to the copyrighted products. Unauthorized reproduction and distribution of these illegal products is usually called piracy, and this term is commonly applied to the deliberate infringement of copyright both for commercial and noncommercial purposes. The profit gained from the trading of pirated products is large, and the protection against unauthorized use in different countries is not guaranteed but rather is determined by the laws of each country. Violations of digital copyrighted materials, especially music, computer software, and movies, continue worldwide. Music Piracy Music piracy can be found in three categories: simple piracy, counterfeits, and bootlegs. Simple piracy is the unauthorized copying of the original music recording for commercial profit. The package of pirated copies is usually not similar to the original one, and the pirated copies are frequently found in the form of compilations of an artist or a collection of a specific genre (for example, dance tracks). 177

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Counterfeits are the pirated copies in which packages are intended to be similar to the original in order to make buyers believe they are receiving an original product. Bootlegs are the recordings of music from live or broadcast performances for commercial purposes without permission of the copyright owners (i.e., artists, composers, and record companies). It is estimated that infringers sold 1.1 billion discs of pirated music worldwide in 2003, with a sales value of US$4.5 billion. These sales increased 4 percent from 2002. The global sales of illegal music discs from 2000 to 2003 show the increase in music piracy. The ratio of illegal to legal music copies sold also shows the increase of the global piracy rate from 2000 to 2003. The ratio was one to five in 2000, and when the illegal music copies sold comparatively increased, the ratio became one to three in 2003. The top ten countries that were blamed for failing to protect and enforce music copyrights were Brazil, China, Mexico, Paraguay, Poland, Russia, Spain, Taiwan, Thailand, and Ukraine. Online music piracy by home users also causes a large amount of loss, which causes serious damage to the music industry. Home music piracy causes copyrighted music record sales to drop by 20 percent every year. The leaders of online music piracy, KaZaA and Grokster, are estimated to be responsible for 2.6 billion downloads of copyrighted music files every month. Globally, these peer-to-peer networking programs have 278 million people signed up to participate. The primary reasons for the increased growth in the music piracy business are the development of the Internet, the widespread availability of CD-R or equipment for replication of CDs, and high-speed burners. Music can now be downloaded using peer-to-peer services. These services are freely available on the Internet. Moreover, the price of CD-R has dropped dramatically in the last six years, and it is possible for any computer home user to possess this technology, while a CD-R laboratory (e.g., rows of high-speed CD burners) is widely available for commercial use. Software Piracy Software piracy is the unauthorized copying or distribution of a copyrighted software program. When

a computer user buys a licensed software package, the program is licensed for use by one user or at one computer site at a time. The user is not the owner but rather a licensed user and is not allowed to give a copy to other people. Software piracy can be grouped into five categories. End-user piracy. In this category, a computer user does the copyright violation. This user might be a home user or a company employee who makes a copy or distributes the software without permission from the copyright owner. Client-server overuse. This occurs when the number of users using a copyrighted software program, usually within a local area network, exceeds the number allowed by the license. Internet piracy. Software is easy to distribute over a network, and if it is transferred via the Internet, the number of people who can receive the illegal copies of software is large. The common websites that make pirated software available include free-download websites, websites that allow the user to download illegal copies of software for the exchange of upload programs from users, Internet auction sites, and peer-to-peer networks. Hard-disk loading. This happens when the sellers of new computers load illegal copies of software onto the hard disks to increase the value of the products. Software counterfeiting. This type of violation is found in illegal commercial piracy. The copyrighted software is duplicated and sold with packages that are made to resemble the copyrighted products. It is estimated that more than US$50 billion was spent for commercial packaged software around the world to use on personal computers (PCs) in 2003, but the software that was installed in the same year was valued at almost US$80 billion. This means that about US$30 billion, or 36 percent, of pirated software was used in 2003. However, the software piracy rates around the world were lower in 2002 (39 percent) than in 1994 (59 percent). The trend of software piracy rates around the world from 1994 to 2002 also decreased. The rates from this period were as follows: 1994 (49 percent), 1995 (46 percent), 1996 (43 percent), 1997 (40 percent), 1998 (38 percent), 1999 (36 percent), 2000 (37 percent), 2001 (40 percent), and 2002 (39 percent).

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These rates were calculated from the volume of software pirated as a percent of total software installed on computers. The retail software revenue estimated losses to piracy throughout the world from 1994 to 2002 fluctuated from US$12 billion in 1994 to about US$13 billion in 2002. The top ten countries that had the highest software piracy rates in 2003 were China, Vietnam, Ukraine, Indonesia, Russia, Zimbabwe, Algeria, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Paraguay. At the other end of the spectrum, the bottom ten countries that had the lowest rates in 2003 were the United States, New Zealand, Denmark, Austria, Sweden, Belgium, Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Australia. There were many reasons behind the increase in software piracy, including the slowing down of economic conditions; the increasing number of computer users, especially home users and small business users; and the increasing availability of pirated software on the Internet, particularly from peer-topeer networks. Studies show that when the economy slows down, the rate of software piracy increases due to the decreasing power of users to purchase.

for transmission, transmitted, and publicly performed online, and these transactions are considered piracy if they are done without permission from the copyright owners. Digital motion pictures are easily compressed and uploaded for direct download to play on a computer. This downloadable format of digital movies is illegally offered and distributed to other users on the Internet. Moreover, they can be transmitted to users to view in real time, which is called streaming media. Generally, digital motion pictures in DVD are protected from being copied by using an encryption process, but unfortunately software to decrypt and make illegal copies of motion pictures onto a computer is widely available. The Asian Pacific region had the highest motion picture piracy rate in 2003, with 84 percent of the total seizures of pirated optical discs around the world, while China, Malaysia, and Taiwan are among the notable hubs for optical disc piracy in this region.

Movie Piracy For piracy in the movie industry, it is estimated that the U.S. motion picture industry loses, in potential revenue, more than $3 billion every year due to copyright violations. This does not include the loss due to the illegal downloading of movies from the Internet. Movie piracy in digital format can be found in two main categories. Piracy in hard goods. This includes the illegal sale, distribution, or trading of copies of motion pictures in various formats. The format that is a major threat to the motion picture industry is the one kept in optical discs, which includes laser discs (LDs), digital versatile discs (DVDs), and video compact discs (VCDs). In 2000, more than 20 million pirated optical discs were seized worldwide. Illegal copies of motion pictures are also found in other formats such as videocassettes. These hard goods are illegally sold on various websites, including online auctions and by using e-mail solicitations. Internet piracy. Motion pictures in digital format can be sold, traded, leased, distributed, uploaded

References American Federation of Musicians. “Online Music Piracy,” http://www.afm.org/public/departments/ leg_issues_05.php. Business Software Alliance. “Types of Piracy,” http://www.bsa.org/usa/antipiracy/Types-ofPiracy.cfm. Eighth Annual BSA Global Software. “Piracy Study: Trends in Software Piracy, 1994–2002,” June 2003, http://www.caast.com/resources/2003_global _study.pdf. First Annual BSA and IDC Global Software. “Piracy Study: July 2004,” http://www.caast.com/ resources/IDC_Global_Software_Piracy_Study _2004.pdf. IFPI. “Global Sales of Pirate Music CD Top 1 Billion; One in 3 Discs Is Illegal; Pirate Sales at US$4.6 Billion,” http://www.ifpi.org/content/ section_news/20030710.html. ———. “Music Pirate Sales Hit Record 1.1 Billion Discs but Spread of Fake CD Trade Slows,” http://www.ifpi.org/content/section_news/ 20040722.html. ———. “What Is Piracy?” http://www.dontbuycds .org/piracy.htm. Motion Picture Association of America. “AntiPiracy,” http://www.mpaa.org/piracy.asp. Business Software Alliance. “Seventh Annual BSA Global Software Piracy Study,” June 2002, http://www.bsa.org/resources/upload/BSA179

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Seventh-Annual-Global-Software-PiracyStudy.pdf. United States Copyright Office. “Copyright Law of the United States of America and Related Laws Contained in Title 17 of the United States Code 501,” http://www.copyright.gov/title17/ 92chap5.html. ———. “International Copyright,” http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl100.html. Webopedia. “Software Piracy,” http://sbc.webopedia .com/TERM/S/software_piracy.html.

Criminal Motor Vehicle Theft and Trafficking Georgios A. Antonopoulos In early December 1996, the attendees of an international conference held in Warsaw and organized by the United Nations (UN) recognized that the theft and trafficking of motor vehicles, including cars, trucks, and motorcycles, had increased in the 1990s and had proven to be a lucrative international business for the groups involved. There have been a number of reasons for the presence and flourishing of this trade. These include: 1. The demand for motor vehicles made in the Western world and simultaneously the inability of the people in poorer countries to afford these motor vehicles. 2. The collapse of the former Soviet bloc and the relaxation in border controls. 3. The ownership of motor vehicles in the industrially advanced and generally richer world, which has increased considerably. 4. The lack of legislation, the discrepancies and differences in legislation, lenient legislation in relation to motor vehicle trafficking in a large number of countries, inadequate law enforcement, and the generally low risks associated with the crime. 5. Corruption.

Modus Operandi Motor vehicle theft and trafficking groups are composed of a number of members who perform specific duties that may differ according to the context and time of the operations. There is usually an individual managing the whole operation. Moreover, each group usually has members who steal the

motor vehicles, mechanics who disassemble and assemble the vehicles and change vehicle identity, vehicle document forgers, drivers who drive the motor vehicles to other provinces or to the transit or destination countries, and sellers who many times are owners of legitimate motor vehicle businesses. In many instances, one individual may handle two duties. The motor vehicle theft and trafficking groups are generally cooperating individuals in various countries. However, there are a number of motor vehicle theft and trafficking groups that are organized along ethnic lines, some of them being very coherent. There are basically four ways of stealing a motor vehicle: 1. By duplicating the vehicle’s keys. Car attendees outside nightclubs are sometimes involved in the duplication of keys used for the theft of luxurious cars (Porsche, Mercedes-Benz, BMW, Audi) in Greece. 2. By stealing the motor vehicles from garages, car parks, or streets. 3. By not returning rental motor vehicles. 4. By robbing owners of their motor vehicles. This is a very popular practice on the roads and highways of Italy.

In cases where the vehicle stays in the country, the identity of the vehicle is changed, and it is introduced to the market as a secondhand car. In the case of trafficking the vehicle out of the country, there are a variety of methods. The stolen motor vehicles are driven to the borders and then into the transit or destination countries. This is a method of trafficking through borderlines with absent or inadequate control. Another way of trafficking motor vehicles is by disassembling and carrying them to the transit or destination country in other vehicles or even in luggage. In Nigeria, there are a number of chop shops where car mechanics, also known as supermechanics, can disassemble and assemble any car and reintroduce it to the market. A very popular way of trafficking stolen motor vehicles out of source countries is by transporting them by ship to the transit or destination country and finally by shipping stolen vehicles in containers among legal commodities. In a large number of cases, and specifically in those cases

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where a certain degree of sophistication is needed, fraudulent motor vehicle and driver documents are used. Up to one-third of Mercedes-Benz, Audi, BMW, and other luxury cars in the city of Kaliningrad in Russia had been stolen in the West. The major international trafficking routes of the stolen vehicles are: • From European Union (EU) member states and specifically Italy, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany to Eastern Europe and countries of the former Soviet Union. • From EU member states and specifically Greece to Southeastern Europe. • From EU member states to the Middle East and the Far East. • From EU member states, and specifically the United Kingdom and Spain, to Africa. • From Japan to Russia and countries of Southeast Asia. • From the United States and Canada to Central and South America, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa.

The reaction of the international law enforcement community to the theft and trafficking of motor vehicles, embodied primarily in the exchange of information on the issues and on specific cases, has been intensifying. The General Secretariat of Interpol, for instance, developed a stolen motor vehicle database including the national motor vehicle theft and trafficking records of more than eighty countries. References Antonopoulos, G. A. “Albanian Organised Crime: A View from Greece.” Crime and Justice International 19(77) (2003): 5–9. Europol. “An Overview on Motor Vehicle Crime from a European Perspective—January 2004.” Europol report, 2004, http://www.europol.europa .eu/publications/SeriousCrimeOverviews/2004/ OverviewMotorVehicleCrime2004.pdf. Gant, F., and P. Graborsky. “The Stolen Vehicle Parts Market.” Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice 215 (2001): 1–6. Gerber, J., and M. Killias. “The Transnationalization of Historically Local Crime: Auto Theft in Western Europe and Russian Markets.” European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 11(2) (2003): 215–226. Interpol. “Vehicle Crime,” 2005, http://www.interpol .int/Public/Vehicle/Default.asp. Parker, G. L. The Japanese Police System Today: A Comparative Study. Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 2001. Royal Canadian Mounted Police. “Organised Crime and Automobile Theft,” 1998, http://www .rcmp.ca.

The trend that can be observed is that the internationally trafficked motor vehicles follow the route from richer to poorer countries. Linkage to Other Criminal Activity Motor vehicle theft and trafficking represents a chain of criminal activities. Apart from the actual theft of the motor vehicle, the trafficking groups commit vehicle certificate forgery, threat and violence against owners of motor vehicles, corruption of law enforcement and customs officials, and money laundering. Motor vehicle theft and trafficking are also connected to a number of illicit trades. Intelligence units suggest that motor vehicle theft is committed to finance other criminal activities. Organized crime groups in Mexico steal motor vehicles and use them to transport drugs to the United States, and Albanian police informers have argued that a number of Albanian luxury car thieves were exchanging the cars with heroin and cocaine at the Greek-Albanian borders in the early 1990s. Finally, an arrested Lebanese ethnic group involved in theft and trafficking of motor vehicles in Canada brought to light the funneling of large amounts of money to a terrorist group in Lebanon.

Criminal Trafficking and Trade in Counterfeit Consumer Products Vesna Markovic Introduction Each year billions of dollars’ worth of consumer products are counterfeited and sold in markets worldwide. The expanding global economy and open international borders allow these items to be moved across borders with relative ease. Criminals take products with brand names and duplicate them, often without ensuring quality or safety, in an attempt to pass them off as the real product. Counterfeiters depend on brand loyalty in order to sell 181

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Chinese enforcement officers examine packets of counterfeit brand cigarettes seized from a warehouse in Shenyang in northeastern China’s Liaoning province on March 9, 2005. (AFP/Getty Images)

their knockoff products no matter what the price per unit. Many people are aware of counterfeit products such as designer apparel, watches, handbags, sunglasses, and other such accessories as well as CDs that can be found in flea markets for as little as $5. Counterfeit products include, but are not limited to, computer software, CDs, DVDs and other electronic goods and equipment; automotive parts; tobacco; cigarettes; alcohol; apparel; toiletries (shampoo, soap, perfume, etc.); and pharmaceutical products. A Global Problem It is believed that 5–7 percent of world trade is composed of counterfeit consumer products. Worldwide estimates range from $350 billion to $450 billion a year earned from the trafficking of counterfeit consumer products. The problem is more prevalent in certain regions of the world,

such as in China and parts of South America, but it also affects many countries worldwide. The Brazilian Federal Revenue Secretariat, for example, estimates that the amount of counterfeit products manufactured in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay alone nets $1.5 billion a year. It is not known how many products made it into the United States undetected. However, in 2003, U.S. Customs and Border Protection seized $94 million worth of counterfeit consumer products, a majority of which were manufactured and shipped from China: Product Cigarettes Apparel Handbags, wallets, backpacks DVDs, VHSs, and VCDs Consumer electronics

Value $41.7 million $14 million $11.5 million $7.3 million $3.8 million

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Watches Footwear Toys/Games Sunglasses Headwear Other goods

$3.4 million $2.6 million $1.5 million $1.3 million $1.3 million $5.7 million

Consumer product counterfeiting takes advantage of the global economy as well as exploits countries that are economically unstable by manufacturing and transporting products at minimal cost. There are several stages that occur between the process of making the products and the time they are available for public consumption. Some groups are involved in all stages of consumer product counterfeiting, while others specialize in capital, production, distribution, or the eventual sale of products. Products can be manufactured in one country and then shipped to another country. Also, the parts may be manufactured in one country and sent to another country, where they are assembled and possibly even shipped to a third country for distribution. In some cases, particularly in counterfeit apparel, knockoffs are produced in one country and shipped to their destination, where the designer labels are then sewn on to avoid detection during shipment. Counterfeiters like to use many countries as transshipment points in order to disguise the origination point of the shipments. The transshipment points often consist of countries with lax or lessstringent customs control. Products are sometimes shipped in cargo by themselves or hidden among legitimate shipments, and in some cases legitimate products, which are oftentimes stolen, are mixed in with shipments of counterfeit goods. The counterfeit consumer products are shipped via air, land, and sea. They are often shipped using different routes to avoid detection, although there are some central hubs, such as Antwerp, that are often used as transit points, and there are also areas in which warehouses are maintained to store inventory. The sale of counterfeit consumer products has expanded with the advent of the Internet. Some counterfeiters have created websites to sell their products directly to the consumer, while others use Internet auction sites to sell their counterfeit products. Some websites will offer wholesale prices on

brand name products that are counterfeits. Other more common avenues for the sale of counterfeit consumer products are flea markets, local stores, and street vendors. Street vendors and flea markets tend to mark down prices on counterfeit products depending on their quality, while some of the better-quality products are sold for near the price of the genuine product. Even though there is no quality control over the manufacture of counterfeit products, they are often still knowingly bought by consumers who are willing to sacrifice quality to avoid paying high prices for merchandise. Besides health and safety risks to consumers, companies suffer losses in revenue, which includes money spent to increase difficulty of counterfeiting their products (protection of logos by using 3D logos or holograms), loss in tax revenue for governments, and loss of jobs in certain industries. While many industries and governments suffer losses because of product counterfeiting, criminals not only reap economic benefits but are also at low risk of being punished. Penalties for counterfeiting often consist of fines and rarely lead to lengthy prison terms, which only serves to encourage this type of crime. Selling counterfeit products can be more profitable than the sale of drugs in many cases pound for pound, while the penalties for drug trafficking are more than twice as harsh. Conclusion Consumer product counterfeiting often works in conjunction with other types of organized criminal activities. Many routes used to ship counterfeit consumer products are already established routes that are often used for drug trafficking, arms trafficking, cigarette smuggling, and even human trafficking, although counterfeiters like to change routes to avoid detection. Money laundering is also a prevalent phenomenon in consumer product counterfeiting. Illegal profits from consumer product counterfeiting need to be given an appearance of legitimacy and are therefore laundered. References Hopkins, David M., Lewis T. Kontnik, and Mark T. Turnage. Counterfeiting Exposed: How to Protect 183

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Your Brand and Market Share. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2003. Phillips, Tim. Knockoff: The Deadly Trade in Counterfeit Goods. London: Kogan Page, 2005. Union des Fabricants. “Union des Fabricants Pour La Protection Internationale De la Propriété Industrielle et Artistique,” 2003, www.unifab.com. U.S. Customs and Border Protection. “U.S. Customs and Border Protection Announces Intellectual Property Rights Seizure Data,” 4 January 2004, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news _releases/archives/2004_press_releases/012004/ 01142004_5.xml.

Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime: The Rise and Evolution of International Drug Cartels Gary Potter Drug cartels are composed of independent drug trafficking organizations that have pooled their resources in order to cooperate with each other. Drug cartels are often incorrectly conceived of as single organized crime groups with thousands of members, wide geographical scope, and vertical control of the drug business from the point of harvest to the point of retail sales on the streets. Nothing could be further from the truth. Drug cartels are merely associations of many smaller organized crime groups into a loose confederation of business associates. Some of the syndicates in a cartel may produce raw materials. Others may have wellestablished modalities for transportation. Still others may have money laundering operations in place or may have important political and law enforcement connections to facilitate the creation of corrupt relations. Drug trafficking groups may decide to enter into a cartel relationship for any number of reasons. Most commonly, smaller independent syndicates enter into a franchise relationship with a larger, betterorganized, and more stable syndicate. Another reason for the creation of a drug cartel is to bring together traffickers with differing strengths in the various aspects of the drug trade. In this arrangement, each of the independent syndicates realizes that it has a weakness that is compensated for by

other syndicates. An organization with strong connections to the growers of a particular plant may need to align with another organization possessing skilled chemists to convert that plant into a highquality drug. Still other organizations may be skilled in smuggling, and yet other criminal networks may have access to buyers in another country. Occasionally, independent drug syndicates come together into a cartel because of a need for highly specialized services. For example, opium-growing warlords in the Golden Triangle (Burma, Laos, Thailand) of Southeast Asia established working relationships with various Chinese organized crime groups in Hong Kong and Taiwan because they needed to move their product to markets worldwide and needed to launder their profits, and a financial structure adequate to the task was not available in the Golden Triangle. In these cases, drug cartels provide references and contacts for the establishment of contractual arrangements related to specific tasks. Finally, a more contemporary form of drug cartel operations involves a simple exchange between independent criminal organizations in which a good or service is exchanged for another. An example of this is the relationship between Colombian cocaine syndicates and drug trafficking organizations in Mexico. The Colombians contract with the Mexicans to move their cocaine into the United States. In return for this service, Mexican organizations take half of the load they are smuggling as their fee and distribute it to smaller Mexican drug trafficking organizations in the United States for retail sale. Colombian Cocaine Cartels Colombian drug trafficking organizations handle 75 percent of the world’s cocaine. Colombia’s role as a cocaine producer is geographically determined. It shares borders with Peru and Bolivia, major coca leaf growers. In addition, Colombia is close to its major cocaine market, the United States, only a two and a half-hour flight from Miami. Finally, Colombia is the only country in South America with both a Caribbean and Pacific Ocean coastline, opening up a variety of options for maritime and air smuggling routes. Coca leaves are transported to Colombia from Peru and Bolivia along remote mountain trails.

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Leaves are delivered to hundreds of locations where the rudimentary process of converting them into coca paste is accomplished. The coca paste is then carried in light aircraft to cocaine-producing facilities in the Colombian interior, where it is processed into cocaine hydrochloride, the white crystalline powder, that, after being cut, is sold to cocaine users. Colombian cocaine cartels did much of their own smuggling in the 1970s and 1980s, using maritime shipping and both private and commercial aircraft. But by the 1990s, they had subcontracted the distribution of cocaine to Mexican drug traffickers. The cocaine was moved from Colombia to Mexico, where it was turned over to Mexican organizations for transport to the United States. By the 1990s, most cocaine entering the United States was coming through Mexico. Recently, Colombian drug cartels have made the smuggling process easier by adding chemical compounds to cocaine hydrochloride to produce black cocaine, which is undetectable by standard chemical tests or drug-sniffing canines. Some Colombian cartels continue to be active in the United States. These cartels establish cells in specific geographic areas. Typically, these cells are structured around familial relations or longtime friendships. This arrangement impedes attempts by investigators to infiltrate a cell. Cells are structurally compartmentalized with a well-defined division of labor. Each cell specializes in a different aspect of the cocaine trade in the geographic location where it is found. Some cells transport drugs. Some are responsible for storing cocaine for future sale. Some cells are engaged in money laundering and have no contact with the drug itself. Others are involved in the actual wholesale trading of cocaine to retail drug networks. Cells are made up of ten employees who have no knowledge about the membership, location, or activities of other cells. Cell structure is characterized by a chain of command in which the head of each cell reports to a regional director for the drug trafficking network operating with the cartel structure, and only to that individual. The regional director, in turn, reports to a designated individual in Colombia. Colombian cartels make use of the most sophisticated communications technologies. Particularly

A beagle with the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) is trained to detect contraband materials. The CBP is a branch of the Department of Homeland Security. (Department of Homeland Security/James Tourtellotte)

important are state-of-the-art encryption devices that translate communications into indecipherable codes. Encryption technology not only hides information about drug transactions but also hides financial information related to money laundering. The Medellin Cartel The first major Colombian cartel appeared in the mid-1970s, headquartered in Medellin and led by the Ochoa brothers (Fabio, Jorge, and Juan David), Carlos Lehder, Pablo Escobar, and Jose Rodriguez Gacha. The Medellin cartel dominated the cocaine trade in New York and Miami. The name “Medellin cartel” is somewhat misleading. The Medellin cartel was never a single drug trafficking organization but rather a loose organizational confederation of many drug syndicates operating out of Medellin. It was Lehder who introduced the idea of moving cocaine on small private aircraft from a transshipment point. In 1976, he bought a sizable portion of 185

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the Bahamian island of Norman’s Cay, only 225 miles southeast of Miami. He built an airstrip as a refueling spot for the aircraft that flew cocaine from Colombia and then on to the United States. The tendency of some of the Medellin cartel’s associates to use violence as a method of dispute settlement eventually led to the cartel’s downfall. Cartel members were responsible for the 1984 assassination of Rodrigo Lara Bonilla (Colombia’s minister of justice) and a subsequent attack on the Colombian Supreme Court. The Colombian government, in response, extradited Lehder to the United States in February 1987. He was convicted of cocaine trafficking and sentenced to 135 years in a federal prison, a sentence that was reduced in return for his cooperation in the prosecution of Panamanian dictator Manuel Noreiga. Medellin cartel violence continued, however, marked by the 1989 bombing of an Avianca commercial airliner that killed 110 people, among them 2 police informants. Additionally, Escobar also placed bounties of $1,000–$3,000 on police officers in Colombia. In June 1991, Escobar turned himself in to Colombian authorities but escaped confinement in July 1992. In December 1993, Escobar was shot to death by Colombian police at a residence in Medellin after a nationwide manhunt. Escobar’s demise, of course, did not lead to the demise of Medellin drug trafficking networks. Smaller, more decentralized, and more profuse networks have filled any gap created by the removal of Escobar and Lehder from the scene. The Ochoa brothers continue to be active participants in large-scale cocaine trafficking. The Cali Cartel In the 1980s, cocaine trafficking groups based in Cali, a city 200 miles south of Medellin, gained prominence in the cocaine market. The Cali cartel was not a single organizational entity but rather a confederation of syndicates sharing resources and cooperating with each other. Cali cartel members shunned publicity, avoided violence, and posed as ostensibly legitimate businessmen. They used sophisticated business techniques to manage their operations and avoid arrest. Thousands of contract employees were used as surrogates to handle the

actual cocaine trafficking. Every aspect of the business was insulated from other aspects. The leaders of the Cali cartel included the Rodriguez-Orejuela brothers (Gilberto and Miguel), Jose Santacruz-Londono, “Pacho” HerreraBuitrago, and Victor Julio Patino-Fomeque. Several Cali leaders were under indictment in the United States in the 1990s, but the Colombian constitution forbade their extradition. Under pressure from President Bill Clinton’s administration, the Colombians used information developed by U.S. investigations to indict the Cali cartel’s leadership in Colombia. Much like their brethren in Medellin, the old networks of the Cali cartel have reorganized as smaller, more diffuse and decentralized, and more prolific drug networks, still very much tied to the legitimate business community of Cali. Colombian Heroin Syndicates One reason that the Colombian cartels passed off much of their wholesaling business to Mexican drug organizations is the increasing Colombian role in the production and sale of heroin. Starting in the late 1980s and increasing in the 1990s, Colombian cartels have expanded into the growing and smuggling of high-grade heroin, supplying 65 percent of the U.S. heroin market. By growing their own opium, Colombian drug organizations have reduced their reliance on Peruvian and Bolivian coca leaf suppliers. The opium poppy grows exceptionally well along the eastern slopes of the Central Andean Mountains in Colombia. Opium growers in Colombia work under contract to a drug cartel. The cartel supplies the growers with seeds and agricultural supplies, and the grower agrees to sell the opium gum to the cartels. Chemists process the opium gum into morphine base and then into heroin. Because heroin is smuggled in small quantities, the methods for smuggling are virtually unlimited. Some smugglers use hollowed-out shoes or sew it into the lining of their clothes, some hide it in other shipments of commercial goods, and others simply swallow it after wrapping it condoms. The Colombian heroin trade is dominated by a series of new smaller drug cartels operating independently of the cocaine cartels. The Colombian

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heroin networks, unlike their cocaine trafficking counterparts, still direct most of their business to the United States. Contemporary Colombian Cartels At the new millennium, the Cali cartel no longer dominates the cocaine market. Law enforcement efforts against the Medellin and Cali cartels had the effect of further segmenting and decentralizing the drug trade in Colombia, making it harder than ever to control. A number of veteran drug traffickers who had operated under the aegis of the Cali cartel have become significant powers in their own right. As of 2002, much of the cocaine traffic in Colombia is centered in the northern Valle del Cauca region, of which Cali is the capital city. Cocaine traffickers in this region operate independently of each other and have passed some of the major responsibilities for cocaine smuggling and wholesaling on to drug trafficking syndicates in Mexico. Among the new drug organizations in this region are the Henao-Montoya syndicate, the MontoyaSanchez organization, and the Urdinola-Grajles network. These groups are closely allied with rightwing death squads and paramilitary units in the region under the control of Carlos Castano. In Cali, Victor Patino-Fomeque, a Cali cartel leader, continues to direct a drug syndicate from prison. The Cali-based Herrera-Vasquez organization moves large quantities of cocaine to the United States via Central America and Mexico. The Herrera-Vasquez organization also launders drug money destined for Colombia through Panama and Mexico. In Bogotá, “Juvenal” Bernal-Madrigal provides transportation services for Mexican Colombian traffickers. He is responsible for multiton shipments of cocaine and the transportation of large amounts of drug money from Colombia to Mexico. Finally, in Medellin, the Ochoa brothers are also back in the cocaine business. Mexican Drug Cartels Mexican drug syndicates have been trafficking marijuana and heroin for decades. In the 1990s they entered the cocaine market, first as surrogates for and then as partners of Colombian syndicates.

Mexico’s 2,000-mile-long border with the United States, much of which is in isolated rural areas with rugged terrain, makes it an obvious transshipment site for drugs. Its extensive coastal and inland mountain systems create perfect havens for growing marijuana and opium poppies. Additionally, there is an enormous flow of legitimate commerce across the U.S.-Mexican border every day. In 1999, 295 million people, 88 million automobiles, and 4.5 million trucks and rail cars entered the United States from Mexico. That volume of commerce creates many opportunities for drug smuggling. Mexico is also a haven for drug trafficking because of widespread corruption in its law enforcement and judicial systems and the lack of resources available to Mexican police. In the 1980s, Mexican drug syndicates acted as transshipment agents for Colombian organizations. By the 1990s, Mexican traffickers were paid 50 percent of each shipment. This arrangement allowed them to enter the wholesale cocaine business. By 1995, Mexican cartels dominated the wholesale cocaine market in the midwestern and western states. Mexican cartels are compartmentalized and have a vertical chain of command emanating from Mexico. Mexican cartels have surrogates throughout the United States who manage day-to-day activities. Unlike other drug syndicates that have insulated their home-base operations by granting greater autonomy to cells in foreign countries, Mexican syndicates still retain a system whereby Mexican-based leaders provide specific instructions to their foreign-based operatives on such issues as warehousing drugs, transportation services, and money laundering. Two-thirds of the cocaine sold in the United States is transshipped from Mexico. Cocaine comes into Mexico from Colombia by air or boat. It is transported by truck to repositories in Juarez or Guadalajara. From these repositories, cocaine is driven across the border, most commonly to Los Angeles, Chicago, and Phoenix. Surrogates in those cities have contractual arrangements with trucking companies to move the cocaine across the country to smaller warehousing facilities closer to the point of sale. Individuals working in these stash houses 187

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U.S. Customs Patrol Officers remove hundreds of pounds of marijuana in burlap backpacks from the desert near the Mexican border. (Department of Homeland Security)

guard the supplies and make arrangement for its distribution by wholesalers. Mexican cartels also play a large role in the U.S. methamphetamine market. They engage in the large-scale production of methamphetamine, operating clandestine laboratories in Mexico and California capable of producing hundreds of pounds of the drug. Mexican heroin makes up about 29 percent of the U.S. heroin supply. Mexican cartels produce six metric tons of heroin a year for sale in the United States. Because of crude refining methods, Mexican heroin is frequently dark in color and sticky or gummy (like tar), resulting in its name of black-tar heroin. Like many criminal organizations in the early stages of establishing control of an illicit market, Mexican syndicates engage in widespread violence. Examples include the 1998 killings of 22 people in Baja California Norte carried out by rival drug traffickers and the 300 people murdered in Tijuana in

1998, 75 percent of which were attributable to drug trafficking disputes. Major Mexican cartels include the ArellanoFelix organization, based in Tijuana, that moves multiton quantities of cocaine and marijuana and significant amounts of heroin and methamphetamine. The Caro-Quintero syndicate is based in Sonora and specializes in trafficking in cocaine and marijuana. The Juarez Cartel is heavily involved in the trafficking of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. The Amezcua-Contreras organization is based in Guadalajara. It is a massive methamphetamine trafficking syndicate and a major supplier of precursor chemicals to other methamphetamine syndicates. This syndicate controls much of the legitimate trade in chemicals in Mexico as well. Dominican Drug Organizations The Dominican Republic is one of the poorest countries in the world. Dominican drug traffickers

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began as retail cocaine dealers in immigrant communities in the United States. The most famous of these communities was the Washington Heights area of New York City. In the mid-1970s, Dominican immigrants moved into this community and began handling Colombian-supplied cocaine. Soon, their trafficking activities had spread into New Jersey, Connecticut, and some of the affluent suburbs of New York. In the 1990s, Dominican traffickers entered the wholesale cocaine market by offering Colombian suppliers a better deal than Mexican syndicates: a smuggling fee of only 25 percent of the load. Using drug distribution systems already established in immigrant communities, two major Dominican drug syndicates emerged. One, operating out of the Dominican Republic, provides stash sites for cocaine shipments. Cocaine is transported into the Dominican Republic in small boats or by airdrops. Dominican traffickers then smuggle the drugs into Puerto Rico in boats, repackage the drugs, and ship them to the continental United States in containerized maritime cargo ships or on routine commercial air flights. Once in New York City, the cocaine is distributed by a second syndicate of ethnic Dominicans that operates along the East Coast. Dominican syndicates rotate members in the United States. Typically, they move operatives in for a two-year stay and then retire them to the island.

able to work in close collusion with police, the military, politicians, and businessmen to spawn a massive drug and sex trade empire in the region. Drug trade profits are the source for most new commercial and business investments in the region. Heroin production is dominated by ethnic drugtrafficking armies operating mostly in Burma’s remote opium-producing region. The drug-trafficking armies had begun as insurgent groups, often supported by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). But over the years, these armies have primarily engaged in heroin trafficking and in other illicit and lucrative economic activities, including gem smuggling, illegal logging, and timber smuggling. As a result of its continuing political repression, the military regime in Burma has negotiated treaties with most of these armies that allow the regime to fight any social or political changes in the country in return for a carte blanche to drug traffickers. Ethnic Chinese criminal organizations and some Thai criminal networks act as brokers, financial backers, and transporters in the Southeast Asian heroin trade. Operating out of major regional commercial centers in Bangkok, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan and using a wide array of interchangeable front companies and legitimate businesses, Chinese and Thai criminal networks also arrange financing and transportation of drugs, routing drugs through many different ports—largely by commercial shipping—to their final destination.

Southeast Asian Heroin Cartels The opium-growing regions of Burma and Laos have made Southeast Asia the second-largest source region for the world’s supply of heroin. Cultivating the opium poppy is still the economic mainstay of the many hill tribes living in isolated, rural, impoverished areas of Southeast Asia. Heroin is often smuggled on fishing boats down the Gulf of Thailand and then transferred to the major international maritime shipping centers of Singapore and Hong Kong. In addition to Thailand, Cambodia is being increasingly utilized as a transshipment route for heroin. Massive criminal organizations, virtually immune from law enforcement interference because of widespread corruption in the governments and business communities of Southeast Asia, have been

References Eskridge, Chris. “The Mexican Cartels: A Challenge for the 21st Century.” Criminal Organizations 12(1/2) (1998): 5–15. Jackall, R. Wild Cowboys: Urban Marauders and the Forces of Order. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997. Kline, H. Colombia: Democracy under Assault. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995. Renard, R. The Burmese Connection: Illegal Drugs and the Making of the Golden Triangle. Boulder: Rienner, 1996. Schaffer, E. “Mexico’s Internal State Conflict over the War on Drugs.” Criminal Organizations 10(3) (Spring 1996): 14–16. Zabludoff, S. “Colombian Narcotics Organizations As Business Enterprises.” Transnational Organized Crime 3(2) (1998): 20–49. 189

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Fuel Racketeering, Motor-Fuel Tax Fraud, and Illegal Export Smuggling Joseph Serio As with other taxed products such as cigarettes and alcohol, motor fuel is a commodity that is manipulated, transported, and smuggled as part of criminal efforts to generate illicit profits through the evasion of taxes. Not limited to the United States, motor fuel is illegally moved across jurisdictions around the world, including Canada and Mexico. Major Fraud Schemes Motor fuel, which includes gasoline, diesel fuel, and kerosene, is transported from terminals and other storage facilities to market. Taxes are applied to the gasoline at the terminal when the motor fuel is being loaded into tankers. Nontaxable motor fuel is dyed at this point in the transportation chain. As the fuel moves through the terminal, the owner of the fuel becomes liable for payment of the tax. All persons eligible as owners of the fuel are registered with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) prior to taking possession of the fuel. Terminal operators must be registered with the IRS also. One common approach in defrauding the government of fuel taxes is called the daisy chain scheme, which, in its essentials, involves making it appear that the motor fuel has passed through a series of wholesale distributors before reaching the retail pump. Fuel sales are, in fact, paper transactions, and the fuel never moves from the storage facility until the last participant in the daisy chain sells the fuel to a retail outlet. At some point in the chain of transactions, one company, having a valid IRS fuel tax form, would raise the invoice price of the fuel when it sells the fuel to a company without the form, thereby giving the appearance of having paid the federal and state taxes as required by law. This company, commonly referred to as a burn company or butterfly company, is frequently little more than a mail box address whose purpose is to insulate all other daisy chain companies from detection by appearing to be responsible for the taxes. Each wholesale distributor appears to be invoiced by the company above it in the chain, with each invoice reflecting a slightly higher price per

gallon than the price paid by the seller. The price increases incrementally, giving the appearance of a series of legitimate transactions. This series of links in the daisy chain creates a phony paper trail used to divert investigators from the beneficiary operators of the fraudulent activity. The burn companies are designated as the taxation point for all companies in the chain. The front firms are later placed in bankruptcy. Motor fuel bootlegging takes the daisy chain idea a step further. Taxpayers scheming to divert tax payments into their own coffers take advantage of the difference in tax rates between jurisdictions. They simply move the fuel from the high tax rate area to the low tax rate area and pocket the difference. Given the tens of millions of gallons of fuel that are moved each day, the profits on this scheme are significant. A third approach to evading payment of motor fuel taxes is known as cocktailing. As the name suggests, this method of tax evasion entails mixing new motor fuel with old motor fuel or even other substances such as cleaning agents or unrefined fuel products. There are two reasons that this approach is attractive to bootleggers and smugglers. The lowgrade additives used to extend the motor fuel are not part of the official fuel-reporting system and are not taxed. The second reason is that some of the fluids used to extend the motor fuel are actually regulated waste materials. An individual may get paid by the government to dispose of the waste materials and, instead of disposing of them, uses them in the motor fuel, thus in essence getting paid twice. Investigations across the United States reveal the mixing of non-motor fuel petroleum products such as kerosene, jet fuel, and hazardous materials with legal diesel. For many years, elements of the motor vehicle fuel industry in several states have been invaded by various organized crime operations that seek to take advantage of legitimate fuel businesses as well as the motoring public by engaging in daisy chain operations, bootlegging, or extending motor vehicle fuel with inexpensive, tax-free, non-motor vehicle petroleum products. These non-motor vehicle petroleum components can be purchased from the refineries and then mixed with motor vehicle fuel and sold as motor vehicle fuel. The incentive for

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financial gain is high in that the components are relatively inexpensive compared to motor vehicle fuel, highway use taxes are not paid on these products, and sales taxes collected at the pump are not paid. The criminals simply disappear or change their names. The distribution operation resurfaces and operates with the same individuals using a different business name. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Russian and Italian organized criminal elements have been the most visible groups perpetrating these frauds, as portrayed in the media. However, this activity is engaged in by both large and small groups and is not dependent on ethnic identity or nationality. One major fuel component that is not subject to the tax at the terminal is aviation fuel. Most aviation fuel is a special grade of kerosene. The IRS allows undyed jet fuel to be removed from terminals without payment of taxes if it is determined that the fuel is destined for use as a fuel in an aircraft. This exemption is generally allowed if the buyer of the jet fuel at the terminal certifies in writing that the jet fuel will be used as a fuel in an aircraft. If the jet fuel is later diverted from aircraft use, the seller of the jet fuel at that time is liable for the taxes. The incentive to divert jet fuel from aircraft use is that the jet fuel can readily be used in on-road diesel trucks. The unscrupulous seller can add on a tax to the fuel sold to the buyer that the seller himself never paid to the government. In addition to daisy chaining, bootlegging, cocktailing, and diverting aviation fuel, some schemes are built on simpler, more direct approaches. For example, tax evaders may simply falsify records to show that taxes have been paid on fuel to state or federal governments when, in fact, the owed tax is pocketed. Smuggling is an approach sometimes employed to evade payment of any and all taxes.

of dollars annually for individual states. Businesses paying full taxes are at a competitive disadvantage when bootlegged products show up in the marketplace. This also adversely impacts the ability of many businesses to maintain business investments and job growth. With less than 200 fuel compliance officers, the IRS is tasked with performing all fuel compliance activities throughout the country, including inspection of 1,400 fuel terminals and periodic border checks. Understandably, authorities are hesitant to enforce strict adherence to inspection protocols, as any additional interruption in the flow of international traffic will be costly to both the United States and its neighboring countries. Inspection of a single truck, for example, can take time, as the transport manifest and cargo must be reviewed and, if necessary, a sample of the cargo analyzed to ensure that it matches the description on the manifest. In addition to border crossings, the existence of numerous official and unofficial ports means that smugglers and bootleggers have considerable options regarding the transport of the motor fuel, while the government has limited resources with which to address the problem. Although the exact magnitude of the problem cannot be determined, the illegal activities of organized crime are believed to inflict billions of dollars of losses on the U.S. economy in the form of lost tax revenue that would be earmarked primarily for highway repair and reconstruction. In one of the largest cases of fuel tax evasion in the country, one organized crime group netted $140 million in unpaid taxes. This activity is pervasive in the United States and across international borders.

Cross-border Activity Motor fuel fraud in the United States frequently involves multiple states and sometimes crosses international borders. The motor fuel tax disparity with neighboring states—and between the United States, Canada, and Mexico—encourages bootlegging across borders and results in lost revenues for the state concerned, amounting to tens of millions

References Committee on Finance. “Statement of Kevin M. Brown, Commissioner, Small Business/SelfEmployed Division, Internal Revenue Service, before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate,” 14 April 2005, http://finance.senate.gov/ hearings/testimony/2005test/kbtest041405.pdf. Committee on Ways and Means. “Statement of Joseph R. Brimacombe, Deputy Director, Compliance Policy, Small Business and Self Employed Operating Division, Internal Revenue Service, New Carrolton, Maryland,” 17 July 2003, 191

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http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?form mode=view&id=675. Department of Transportation. “Joint Federal/State Motor Fuel Tax Compliance Project,” 23rd Steering Committee Meeting, Washington, D.C., 7 October 2003, http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ policy/23scmin1.htm. Internal Revenue Service. “Excise Tax Fraud,” http://www.irs.gov/compliance/enforcement/article /0,id=117521,00.html. Laborers Network. “Mob Figures Sentenced for Roles in $77 Million ‘Red Daisy’ Fuel Tax Evasion Scheme,” http://www.thelaborers.net/LOCALS/ LU1001/pagano_sentencing_news_release.htm.

Gambling: Numbers and Bookmaking David Whelan Gambling involves wagering, or betting, on games of chance, the outcome of sports contests or other events. Its roots have been evident in the histories of almost every society. Over time, great arguments have developed over whether or not gambling has more to do with skill or more to do with luck. Even more controversy has been created over whether or not gambling is a crime, an immoral vice, or a social recreation. There are many forms of gambling, and its legal status in the United States has shifted over time, based on politics and public sentiment. In some states, legal gambling has taken the form of lotteries, casino gambling, and pari-mutuel wagering on horse racing, dog racing, jai alai, and (in the United States, only in the state of Nevada) college and professional athletic contests. Other varieties include bingo, card games and charitable gaming, slot machines, video games, and raffles. In other U.S. states, many forms of gambling have been prohibited by law and are considered illegal. Depending upon where state legislatures draw the line, the law has helped to distinguish gambling as a form of organized crime from gambling that is recreational in nature. In the United States during the nineteenth century, gambling and drinking were closely associated. Many people did not engage in one and not the other. During the Prohibition period, many gambling operations were shut down but were successfully moved to secret locations and maintained

through corruption. Organized criminal networks ran most of these activities. Gambling was legalized in Nevada in the 1930s, and through the influence of organized crime, casino gambling became popular in Las Vegas as early as the 1940s. In the mid-1970s, Atlantic City, New Jersey, started to build casinos after local voters gave their approval. Over the years, Las Vegas has had its share of problems with organized crime figures trying to infiltrate and ultimately own and operate their own casinos. New Jersey, in the middle of both New York and Philadelphia crime families, established widespread controls over the gaming industry that remain in place in an effort to keep organized crime out. Gambling casinos have moved far beyond their beginnings in Nevada and New Jersey. In 1988 the U.S. Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, which allowed Native American tribes to operate casinos on their land. Many other states have legalized riverboat gambling, and thousands of offshore Internet gambling websites provide online betting opportunities for anyone with a credit card, giving consumers a wide range of gambling choices. Gambling, with its long association with organized crime, is an area in which governments have not involved themselves very much. It is an activity that almost resists intervention. Playing the Numbers The numbers or policy game is nothing more than a lottery based on some system of selecting the winning numbers. It is a game rich in geographic, racial, and ethnic history in the United States. In the 1840s in New York City, the crimeinfested Five Points’ most popular form of wagering was policy gambling, private lotteries in which players tried to guess which numbers would be selected in a daily drawing. Historically, the number has been based on the total daily sales of the New York Stock Exchange, or, more recently, the total mutual handle of a local or designated racetrack. A total mutual handle is the entire amount of money bet at the racetrack that particular day and always appears in a daily

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Evidence from the Brooklyn, New York, District Attorney’s office for the arrest of ten men in an illegal sports gambling operation, including $300,000 in cash and sports schedules, March 26, 2006. The operation allegedly ran in excess of $45 million annually. (Ramin Talaie/Corbis)

newspaper. Typically, the last three numbers of the total mutual handle are the number. The exact system may vary in different locations, but the idea is to keep the game as legitimate as possible despite the involvement of organized crime bankers. In the numbers game, it is possible to play any number containing three digits or any combination of those digits. In either a straight bet or combination bet, the payout odds have remained the same for several decades, about 600 to 1. Simple math will prove that a ten-cent bet only pays $60. In any policy organization, there are several key players, including collectors, controllers, and bankers. Collectors, or policy writers, accept a player’s money, note the number, and turn in the bets to the controller. They are also responsible for paying off any winners. Controllers, often called route men, handle all bets and betting slips and work with a banker, or policy operator. The banker could either be an individual organized crime

member or a group of associates. The bank provides financial backing, determines odds, and compensates the collectors and controllers. While state lotteries have taken some business away from numbers operators, there is still big business in the small bets that are the foundation of policy gambling. The chance to get rich quick is appealing to those in poor neighborhoods who don’t have the funds for racetracks or casinos. Despite the fact that much of the money that is bet goes into the pockets of gamblers, many people trust the local numbers banker more than they trust the state, and the continued popularity of the game is based on the fact that it is easy and inexpensive. Making Book The list of people who make their living as gamblers begin with the bookmaker, or bookie. Bookmakers are involved in the business of taking bets but do not like risking their money. They run their operation 193

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much like a legitimate enterprise in that they want to make money without risking serious losses. The bookmaker agrees to take bets from potential customers. If they win, they are paid a certain sum of money. If they lose, the bookmaker keeps the amount of their bets. Since the bookmaker is running a business, the purpose in accepting bets is to make money, and they usually do. A bookmaker may specialize in either horse or sports bets, but the vast majority will take bets on any sporting event. With the introduction of offtrack betting, much of the bookmaker’s business is now related to college and professional team sports. However, there are still bookies who will accept wagers personally or by telephone. Many will operate from an outside location or a fixed inside spot. As part of a large organization, the bookmakers do not actually risk their own money in bookmaking activities but are merely an instrument of crime networks that have agents take the bets and make payoffs to the winning bettors when necessary. In order for everyone to come out ahead, local bookies will often lay off bets with one or more gambling operatives. This happens when a large amount of money is bet on a particular game. The bookmaker wants to spread out the amounts of money bet in order to guard against any large losses. In a large organized group, the bookmaker may be a network of several people or several groups of people. They may employ additional people to work for them in some capacity, for example, runners who bring the bets in or collectors who remind bettors when they need to pay up. The support and reinforcement of an organized crime group is usually a trademark of these types of operations. References Albanese, Jay. Organized Crime in Our Times. 4th ed. Cincinnati: Anderson, 2004. Anbinder, Tyler. Five Points. New York: Free Press, 2001. Barlett, Donald L., and James B. Steele. “Wheel of Misfortune.” Time 160(25) (16 December 2002): 44–56. Pace, Denny F. Concepts of Vice, Narcotics, and Organized Crime. 3rd ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1991.

The Global Sex Trade: Commercial Sex, Pornography, and International Sex Tourism, a Multibillion-Dollar Industry Rob D. Hanser, Walonda Wallace, and Kaine Jones The global sex trade has experienced meteoric notoriety as an industry of ill repute. The sex industry was, at one time, simply a fringe market industry that was seemingly more of a nuisance than a serious threat to public order, safety, and health. However, this industry has emerged as a major causal factor in a multitude of global social ills. Globally speaking, this industry operates on the purest of supply-and-demand principles, and the resources for meeting this demand, whether human or otherwise, is shifted from one location to another to meet market demand. On the other hand, if the supply cannot be shipped to the demand, a vigorous underground marketing system exists to entice the demand to come to the supply. It is as if the sex trade has assumed the identity of an ordinary and quite normal sector of the economy. Sex Trade Industrialization Throughout the last thirty years, the rapidly growing sex trade has become highly industrialized worldwide. This process of industrialization, in both the legal and illegal forms of activity, generates profit that amounts to billions of dollars. This has led to a market of sexual exchanges in which millions of women and children have become indentured into the industry to service the demands of a hungry and never-ending chasm of sexual desire and demand. Furthermore, tacit approval has been given for this industry since few, if any, government officials stepped in to intervene. Indeed, in many countries it has been found that the money generated by the general tourism industry alone is enough to substantially improve a nation’s economy. Having an active sex industry creates a multiplier effect in the standard tourist industry services (hotels, plane fares, restaurants, and so forth). Thus, this industry generates a substantial amount of revenue, both directly from the sex business itself and from the residual income from foreigners who visit these areas. Further still, legalities may not generally be an issue,

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because many of the activities may be legal in the host country. Sexual tourism involves travel to foreign countries for the explicit purpose of engaging in commercial sex acts. This has become one of the most profitable aspects of the tourism industry. For instance, in Thailand an average of 5.1 million sex tourists visit each year, and 450,000 local customers buy sex routinely within the country’s borders. The Southeast Asian sex industry began during the Vietnam War. During that war, U.S. servicemen were stationed not just in Vietnam but also in neighboring Thailand and the Philippines. During this time there was a predictable boom in prostitution activity, which established the need of infrastructure for the future development of the sex tourism industry. Government policies that encouraged this activity due to the economic benefits that were reaped contributed to the growth of this industry. It is from this point that the sex industry became firmly entrenched in this area, and once these economies became dependent on this type of revenue, the only answer was to bring the demand to the supply. Today the sex tourism industry has grown globally to include parts of Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. The common denominator for each of these regions where sex tourism occurs is that the area is remarkably poverty-ridden. In many cases the industry will utilize trafficked women and children to meet the demand created by the international market. However, the use of trafficked women into the area is for another reason as well: security of the commodity. Often the women trafficked into a given area will not know the native language of the area, and this serves to impair their chance for escape from the activity. Likewise, any visas or other identification can be removed, and there is almost no way that anyone can trace the women if they do not have sufficient time to talk and give details. Thus, those who are caught in this situation are socially isolated as well. Many sex tourism agencies and businesses will market themselves and even provide guides to customers. Travel packages can be arranged through the Internet. This growth and popularity of sex tourism is largely due to the opening of country borders, easier and more affordable access to trans-

portation, and the advent of the World Wide Web. Sex tourist industries thrive in areas where there is weak law enforcement, anonymity, and the freedom from social constraints found in most developed countries. Global Prostitution and the Trafficking of Women and Children The trafficking of women and children for prostitution and forced labor is one of the fastest-growing areas of international criminal activity and one that is of increasing concern. Most often, the route of trafficking has been from less-developed countries to industrialized and more affluent nations. Because trafficking is an underground organized criminal enterprise, it is difficult to get exact statistics on the extent of the problem. However, by all estimates it is thought that at least 800,000–900,000 individuals are trafficked each year. The majority of these victims are thought to still come from Southeast Asia, particularly Myanmar, India, Thailand, and Cambodia. The former Soviet Union is thought to be a growing source of trafficking for prostitution and the sex industry, and these individuals are found in the sex industries throughout Europe. While women and children are trafficked from other areas of the world, the activity is much lighter than in the areas just mentioned. Regardless, women and children trafficked for the globalized sex industry usually end up in large cities, vacation and tourist areas, or near military bases, where the demand is highest. Women and children who are trafficked into prostitution and pornography are usually involved in the most exploitative forms of these commercial sex operations. Sex trafficking operations tend to occur in highly visible venues such as street prostitution as well as in more underground locations such as closed-brothel systems that operate out of residential homes. Sex trafficking operations also occur in a mixture of public and private locations such as massage parlors, spas, and other fronts for prostitution. Women and children who may start off by dancing and stripping in clubs are often coerced into more exploitative situations of prostitution and pornography. Traffickers acquire their victims in a number of ways. Sometimes women are kidnapped outright in one country and taken forcibly to 195

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another. In other cases, victims are lured with phony job offers. Traffickers entice victims to migrate voluntarily with false promises of wellpaying jobs in foreign countries as au pairs, models, dancers, domestic workers, etc. Traffickers advertise these jobs as well as marriage opportunities abroad in local newspapers. Russian crime gangs have been reported to use marriage agency databases and matchmaking parties to find victims. In some cases, traffickers approach women or their families directly with offers of lucrative jobs elsewhere. After providing transportation and false documents to get victims to their destination, traffickers subsequently charge fees that ensure that the victim is indentured to their service indefinitely. While there is no single victim stereotype, a majority of trafficked women are under the age of twenty-five, with many in their mid to late teens. The fear of infection with HIV among customers has driven traffickers to recruit younger women and girls under the misperception that these victims will be too young to have been infected by a sexually transmitted disease. This is of course a false presumption but nonetheless generates a demand for this type of sex activity. In some areas of the world, the exploitation of children has occurred at a level that has been politically embarrassing. This has been especially true throughout various parts of Southeast Asia. Children in Cambodia, Thailand, India, and Myanmar have been found to be at particularly high risk of being exploited. In other areas of the world, trafficking of children for the sex industry has also been detected in various sections of Europe. Indeed, Russian, Ukrainian, Balkan, and Albanian groups have been found to be active in Greece and other areas of East and Southeast Europe. Much of this trafficking is the residue of war-torn Bosnia-Herzegovina and the instability of many East European nations following the fall of the Soviet Union. The number of women and children trafficked for sex slavery in and around the Baltic region is estimated to be 5,000–10,000 or more. The hotels, houses, and other businesses involved with this industry demonstrate how this form of organized crime is linked with the licit economy.

Global Pornography The worldwide flow of pornography has expanded at a phenomenal rate in the last few years. Some areas of the world have been found to be associated with the manufacture of pornography. In Asia, Japan has been identified as the most active area for the commercial production of child pornography. It is the production of pornography with adolescent subjects that seems to be most common. Japan also produces millions of erotic comics that are targeted at its youth subculture. These comics are available in vending machines in most Japanese cities. Japanese child pornography is thought to denote a certain interest in sex with Japanese girls, who are often depicted in school uniforms. The reasons for this cultural preference are not clear, but the prevalence of these portrayals among this type of pornography is undeniable. Japanese child pornography is distributed in Asia and throughout the world. This pornography is occasionally found and confiscated by law enforcement officials in California and also in Canada. Japanese child pornography also has been found to exist on the Internet. The Japanese Yakuza have traditionally controlled this and other segments of the Japanese sex industry. Another source of child pornography distributed throughout the world has occurred in various areas of Thailand, to which tourists travel in search of sex with minors. Until just a few years ago, a substantial part of the demand for this activity was generated by tourists from the Netherlands and Sweden who visited Thailand. Some of this type of erotic and illegal material has replaced that which has been generated in Eastern Europe. Child pornography criminal rings exist in numerous parts of the world, and the industry has generated strong public concern. Many cases have been detected in Europe and North America, demonstrating a sophisticated and far-reaching network of electronic technology that may or may not be linked to major organized crime syndicates in other areas of the world. Child pornography rings have been detected in Germany and the Netherlands, with arrests and extraditions being made to the United States. However, these activities are not always in league with syndicated organized criminal groups but rather typically consist of a handful of actors who work together as a

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matter of mutual convenience and necessity. This activity has been collaborative in nature with members who are in California and other parts of the United States. Thus, the business has been found to incorporate criminal members who work in tandem on both sides of the Atlantic. At this point, it is unclear as to the magnitude of this industry. Health Risks of the International Sex Industry Victims of the illicit sex industry are often subjected to cruel mental and physical abuse in order to keep them in servitude. These forms of abuse often include beatings and physical torture as well as sexual assault, forced drug use to ensure dependence, starvation, confinement, and seclusion. Once victims are brought into destination countries, their passports and other identification papers are often confiscated. Victims are forced to have sex, often unprotected, with large numbers of partners and to work unsustainably long hours. Many victims suffer mental breakdowns and are exposed to sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV. They are often denied medical care if they should become severely ill. A victim may simply be killed so that the criminal pimp will not risk law enforcement detection by taking the victim to a doctor. Because of this risk and the lack of even minimal medical care, the trade in women for the international commercial sex industry is considered a major public health threat. Many of the young girls and women who are abducted and trafficked have only limited knowledge of HIV prevention. These victims are not in a position to ensure that protective behaviors are employed during sexual activity with their clients, and thus these women are at an inflated daily risk of exposure to sexually transmitted diseases. Once they become infected, oftentimes their captor will then send them home, where they carry the infection into their family and community of origin. References Antonopoulos, G. A. “The Financial Exploitation of the Sexuality of Migrant Children in Greece.” Crime & Justice International 20(83) (2004): 19–22.

David, F., and P. Monzini. Human Smuggling and Trafficking: A Desk Review on the Trafficking in Women from the Philippines. Vienna: United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 2000. Hanser, R. “Immigration and Crime in Europe.” Crime & Justice International 18(62) (2002): 7–9. Miko, F. T. Trafficking in Persons: The U.S. and International Response. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2004, http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/ other/RL30545.pdf. Poulin, R. “Globalization and the Sex Trade: Trafficking and the Commodification of Women and Children.” Canadian Women Studies 22(3–4) (2003): 38–43. Singer, M. HIV and Other Risks of the Transnational Commercial Sex Trade: Assessing Social and Cultural Factors. New Haven, CT: Center for Interdisciplinary Research on AIDS, 2004, http://cira.med.yale.edu/research/project_page.asp ?projID=234. “Types of Sex Trafficking.” Polaris Project, 2003, http://humantrafficking.com/humantrafficking/Res earch_Tools/TopicSearch/Traffickers/Types_of _Traf.htm. Webb, D. “Thinking Globally, Acting Locally: A Trafficking Dilemma.” Crime & Justice International 18(62) (2002): 5–7.

The Historical Involvement of Organized Crime in Labor Racketeering Don Liddick Limiting competition in the business world by coercive means and extorting revenue generated from legitimate and illicit commerce is the prototypical organized crime activity. The impact on credit structures, distribution facilities, and industry in general is immense. The legacy of industrial racketeering is the systematic restraint of trade, the pillaging of union benefit funds, and the laundering of illicit revenue through otherwise legitimate business and financial institutions. The cost to consumers and the business community is immeasurable. Moreover, there appears to be no limit to the commercial activities preyed upon by organized criminals. A partial list of legitimate industries infiltrated by organized crooks includes advertising, appliances, automobiles, banking, coal, construction, pharmaceuticals, electrical equipment, florists, meat, 197

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seafood, dairy products, groceries, cheese, olive oil, fruit, garments, import-export businesses, insurance, liquor, news services, newspapers, oil, paper products, radio, ranching, real estate, restaurants, scrap metal, shipping, steel, television, theaters, and transportation. Impact on Trade and Labor Unions Labor racketeering involves the creation and control of employer trade associations and the infiltration of labor unions. Markets particularly susceptible to the racketeer are those where labor costs are significant competitive factors, the market is characterized by many undercapitalized firms that are vulnerable to labor strife, and the given industry is in a local rather than a national product market. Employer or trade associations are used by owners to restrain trade by limiting production, stabilizing competition, and raising commodity prices. If uncooperative owners attempt to cut prices, the racketeer steps in with convincing, albeit coercive, arguments to fix prices. Intimidation of union leaders and partnerships with corrupt trade unionists inhibit free trade, a process facilitated when organized criminals hold positions as union officials. As officials in union locals, extortionists control and exploit workers, collecting dues and stealing pension fund monies. Corrupt union officials typically sell out the rank and file by engaging in sweetheart contracts with employers, where savings from phony contracts are split between union officials and employers. On the other hand, owners are victimized by racketeers when they are threatened with a strike or picket to extract so-called strike insurance as the price of doing business. Industrial racketeering in the United States first developed in a significant way by the turn of the twentieth century. An early example of the restraint of trade was the newspaper wars that raged in many American cities. In Chicago, a circulation battle between the Tribune and the Examiner involved the hiring of underworld thugs to physically oppose delivery of newspapers. In those early years, racketeering was perhaps greatest on the New York City waterfront. The New York State Crime Commission uncovered criminality on the Brooklyn docks and concluded that organized criminals con-

trolled the waterfront from the 1930s through the 1950s. An indebted labor force was used to extort payoffs from the shipping firms, while the dockworkers were exploited by loan-sharks, gamblers, and corrupt union officers. Called the shape-up, only those workers willing to kick back a portion of their wages to the hiring boss were permitted to work on any given day. By controlling both labor unions and industries essential to the port, organized criminals steered contracts to mob-controlled enterprises that also conveniently served as money laundering vehicles for illicit proceeds from gambling, prostitution, and loan-sharking. In 1954 the New York State Waterfront Commission forced the expulsion of the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) from the American Federation of Labor (AFL). However, the ILA eventually prevailed over the new union, the International Brotherhood of Longshoremen, and reentered the AFL. After the infamous racketeer Albert Anastasia was murdered in 1957, his brother Anthony wielded great power in the ILA and consolidated the Brooklyn locals in conjunction with future crime bosses Vito Genovese and Carlo Gambino. From the 1960s through the mid-1970s, the power of the Waterfront Commission was largely circumscribed, and in 1978 a federal investigation revealed that New York City mobsters affiliated with the ILA had established themselves in the port of Miami. Of course, racketeering is in no way limited to waterfront industries. In the 1920s, Lepke Buchalter and Jacob Shapiro maintained complete control over New York City’s garment industry, extorting at least $15 million from garment manufacturers and associated industries. Buchalter also extorted union membership fees and monies from the flour-trucking and baking companies and established dominance over the fur industry, the shoe trade, the taxicab business, and the poultry market, often in partnership with infamous associates such as Bugsy Siegel, Meyer Lansky, and Lucky Luciano. Joseph “Socks” Lanza, who organized the Fulton Fish Market workers into the United Seafood Workers’ Union, collected tribute from every retailer and wholesaler at the Fulton Market. Racketeering in fish was an enterprise that enriched Lanza with $20 million per year and raised the price of fish nationwide. Despite a two-year

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Louis “Lepke” Buchalter, facing front, seated with Emanuel “Mendy” Weiss, and Phillip “Little Farvel” Cohen, who shield their faces, and Louis Capone, in a Kings County courtroom during jury selection in August of 1941. Buchalter was deeply involved in extortion of the Garment industry and Labor unions in the New York area. (Library of Congress)

prison sentence served for violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, Lanza maintained control of the Fulton Fish Market until his death in 1968. Industrial racketeering was in no way limited to New York City. In Chicago in the 1920s, some fifty rackets were openly flourishing in a diverse range of occupations and industries such as candy jobbers, garage owners, glazers, bootblacks, and physicians. By 1931, racketeering dominated by the Al Capone organization produced $200 million in illegal profits. Racketeering profits in other cities in this era included $100 million in Philadelphia, $75 million in Detroit, $50 million in Los Angeles, and $25 million each in Pittsburgh and Cleveland. One of the more notorious union infiltrations was that of the International Alliance of Theatrical,

Stage Employees, and Motion Picture Operators (IATSE). George Brown and William Bioff, with the backing of Frank Nitti, Lepke Buchalter, Lucky Luciano, Longie Zwillman, and other mobsters from midwestern and eastern U.S. power syndicates, took over the IATSE with the objective of extorting as much as possible from theater owners with the threat of strikes and shutdowns. The IATSE eventually won the right to represent 12,000 Hollywood employees, placing Bioff and his associates in a position to collect more than $1 million from the major Hollywood movie studios between 1936 and 1940. Another infamous racketeer in the 1930s was Arthur Fleggenheimer, a.k.a. Dutch Schultz. Schultz managed an extortion racket in the New York City restaurant industry 199

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from 1932 to 1936. Employers were forced to join the Metropolitan Restaurant and Cafeteria Association and sign contracts with one of two locals controlled by Schultz. Although the restaurant owners were forced to pay into the association, they ultimately saved money because sweetheart contracts were arranged and true unionization was thwarted. Consumers and the restaurant workers were the losers, as prices were fixed, wages were frozen, and the rank and file were exploited. The attractiveness of the scheme for the Schultz syndicate was that it also controlled the restaurant employers’ association in such a way that not only the workers but also the employers were victims of extortion. Industrial racketeering in recent years has expanded, while government efforts to suppress the restraint of trade has met with limited success at best. Modern racketeers, in collusion with government officials, have infiltrated numerous industrial sectors and overwhelmed the regulatory role of the government, most notably in the construction industry, the shipment of goods, and those economic zones involving the protection of the environment. Modern racketeering and organized crime are responsible for unsafe and overpriced buildings, spoiled food, higher prices on countless goods, exploited workers, and a poisoned environment. Other Industries Vulnerable to Racketeering An industry unable to break the grip of organized crime is garment manufacturing. Due largely to a decrease in overseas competition and a cheap supply of labor from illegal aliens, the number of garment sweatshops has rapidly increased in New York City. Trucking firms, many of which are controlled by organized crime, finance and set up sweatshops favored by 7th Avenue manufacturers. At the expense of exploited workers, including many children, trucking outfits elevate cartage rates, 7th Avenue jobbers produce clothing more cheaply, and retailers mark up clothing that has been produced with minimal overhead. Manufacturers cannot switch to trucking firms with lower rates because the market is controlled. Deregulation has ensured that 90 percent of trucking in the New York City region is not subject to Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) regulations.

The construction industry in New York City has been dominated by organized criminals since at least the 1920s. In 1922, the Lockwood Commission found extensive union extortion of builders and contractors and collusive arrangements among contractors and suppliers. The commission also reported that contractors and suppliers had substantially eliminated competition by forming cartels. Seventy years later, the New York State Organized Crime Task Force found that the New York City construction industry had not changed and concluded that the industry’s susceptibility to racketeer domination had not lessened. The infiltration of labor unions by racketeers, the structure of collective bargaining, the competitive market, and the high cost of construction delays were cited as causes. The construction industry is still characterized by extortion, bribery, theft from building sites, sabotage of construction sites, bid rigging, and various frauds related to billing, pension funds, tax evasion, and performance bonds. The scope of organized crime’s power is exemplified by the fact that for many years, any major construction project in New York City was subject to a 2 percent tax by organized racketeers. The most infamous and noteworthy example of organized crime’s infiltration of a labor union is the Teamsters. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, Stablemen, and Helpers of America was founded and given an AFL charter in 1898. The first Teamsters president, Cornelius P. Shea, was indicted for extorting money from team owners. Shea was followed by Dan Tobin, who controlled the union for the next forty years. The first significant infiltration of organized crime into the union may have occurred in 1941, when Jimmy Hoffa, at that time the negotiating chairman of the Central States Driver’s Council, called on racketeers to muscle Denny Lewis and the CIO out of Detroit. Although Dave Beck was elected president of the Teamsters in 1951, it was Hoffa and his supporters who were running the union by the mid1950s. By that time, Hoffa had developed relationships with many organized crime figures, including Morris Dalitz in Las Vegas, Sam Giancana and Paul Dorfman in Chicago, Nick Civella in Kansas City, and Tony Provenzano in New York. At this time,

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Jimmy Hoffa went from an impoverished childhood to the leadership of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, which he helped make the largest and wealthiest labor union in the world. Much of his success was due to his involvement in organized crime. He served several terms in prison, and disappeared in 1975. (Library of Congress)

Hoffa helped establish the Michigan Conference of Teamsters Welfare Fund and the Central States Health and Welfare Fund. Through Allen Dorfman, the son of a local union president and former Al Capone associate, the Central States Pension Fund became easy plunder for the mob. As administrator of the pension fund, Dorfman engineered the funneling of hundreds of millions of dollars to organized crime real estate investments in southern Florida, resorts in southern California, and hotels and casinos in Las Vegas. Attempts at Reform The McClellan Committee hearings, spearheaded by soon-to-be attorney general Robert Kennedy,

brought corruption in the Teamsters Union into the light in the late 1950s. Former Teamsters president Dave Beck was convicted in 1959 for violating federal income tax laws, while Hoffa was eventually convicted of jury tampering in 1964. Governmental reform efforts had little impact, however, as laborleasing schemes, phony contracts, and sweetheart deals continued to characterize union-employer relationships. Asset managers and service providers for unions paid themselves exorbitant salaries while billing for nonexistent or unnecessary administrative fees. Fund trustees drafted bylaws that ensured the accumulation of large cash reserves so that payments could be directed to organized crime businesses for fictitious services. Meanwhile, organized crime associates and friends were placed on the union payroll for no-show jobs. Racketeers in need of a loan for licit and illicit business ventures could always depend on the Central States “bank.” After Hoffa’s disappearance in 1975, the Teamsters came under close scrutiny by the Special Investigations Staff (SIS) of the Department of Labor as well as the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). A large number of questionable loans had been made to companies on the verge of bankruptcy, and $418 million in pension fund loans went to seven entities controlled by three men with organized crime connections. With the fraudulent manipulation of the Central States, Southeast, and Southwest Areas Pension Funds as their target, federal investigators equipped with the new Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) found themselves in a good position to break the hold that racketeers had over the Teamsters. Unfortunately, the opportunity to reform pension fund mismanagement and theft was largely squandered as the IRS refused to coordinate with the Department of Labor by unexpectedly revoking the pension fund’s tax-exempt status, and the Department of Labor undercut the SIS by ordering investigators not to pursue a third-party investigation. Ultimately, the government failed to attain an enforceable agreement, so when the fund’s taxexempt status was reinstated, the union’s board of trustees soon discontinued their cooperation and laid aside the intended reforms. 201

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Corruption in the Teamsters continued through the presidencies of Frank Fitzsimmons, Roy Lee Williams, and Jackie Presser. Williams would reveal that he deferred to mob power by stating that he dared not interfere with the affairs of powerful locals such as Anthony Provenzano’s Local 560 in New Jersey. Williams, Dorfman, and Chicago organized crime boss Joey Lombardo were convicted in 1982 of conspiring to bribe U.S. Senator Howard Cannon of Nevada for his influence in blocking or delaying the deregulation of trucking freight rates. A month later, Dorfman was murdered. Abuses in the Teamsters Union continued under the presidency of Presser, who eventually became an FBI informant. Presser’s information led to seventy convictions, and law enforcement successes against the Teamsters mounted in the 1980s. The first significant application of the federal RICO statute occurred in 1984 when Provenzano’s Local 560 was placed under a trusteeship. The Teamsters and the government also negotiated important consent decrees meant to direct the legal investment of pension fund monies. A recent Teamsters president, Ron Carey, was praised by some for cleaning up the union, yet his own reelection was invalidated in late 1997 by a federal overseer. Carey’s campaign manager Jere Nash and campaign consultants Martin Davis and Michael Ansara pled guilty to charges involving donation swaps with the Democratic National Committee (DNC). The scheme involved a diversion of money from the ailing Teamsters’ treasury to the DNC, the AFL-CIO, and various political advocacy organizations. In return, those groups would steer money back to the Carey campaign through an organization called, ironically, Teamsters for a Corruption Free Union. Carey was subsequently prohibited from running in the rerun election, and James Hoffa Jr. was elected to the Teamsters presidency in 1998. References Block, Alan A. The Business of Crime: A Documentary Study of Organized Crime in the American Economy. New York: Westview, 1991. ———. East Side-West Side: Organizing Crime in New York, 1930–1950, Somerset, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1983.

Jacobs, James B., Christopher Panarella, and Jay Worthington. Busting the Mob: United States v. Cosa Nostra. New York: New York University Press, 1994. ———. Gotham Unbound: How New York City Was Liberated from the Grip of Organized Crime. New York: New York University Press, 1999. Moldea, Dan E. The Hoffa Wars: The Rise and Fall of Jimmy Hoffa. New York: Spi Books, 1993. Neff, James. Mobbed Up: Jackie Presser’s High-Wire Life in the Teamsters, the Mafia, and the FBI. New York: Grove/Atlantic, 1989. Nelli, Humbert. The Business of Crime: Italians and Syndicate Crime in the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 1976. U.S. Senate Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce. Report No. 307. Kefauver Committee, “Third Interim Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime In Interstate Commerce,” 1951, Washington, D.C.

Illegal Gambling and Loan-Sharking David Whelan There are many people in various levels of law enforcement who believe that gambling is the basis of most organized crime income. Illegal gambling incorporates a variety of activities not approved by states or countries. The most common forms of illegal gambling in the United States are the numbers game (an illegal lottery) and sports gambling (wagering on college and professional sports contests). In the United States, each state regulates gambling. Typically, the common office and bar pools for events such as the Super Bowl (American football championship), World Series (American baseball championship), World Cup, or Final Four (college basketball championship) are perceived as purely recreational and insignificant to law enforcement. Crime occurs when a bookmaker, or third person, gets a percentage of the bets. Gambling laws are meant to discourage the organized criminal group from getting involved in this kind of activity. Sports Gambling Placing an illegal bet on a game is not something that is hard to do. Sports bookmaking operations, legal in Las Vegas, will take bets if someone makes

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them personally. It is estimated that $2.25 billion is spent on legalized sports bets. Money bet illegally on sports is estimated to be much higher. Internet gambling services, located on Caribbean islands, are a toll-free telephone call away. Any gambling website based in Europe allows someone to bet via the Internet. While there is no current federal law against making a bet online, taking a sports bet over the Internet is illegal. Making a bet this way is much easier and faster, which is why Internet gambling services have increased their revenues to an estimated $12 billion, with more than half of that revenue coming from U.S. gamblers. Illegal sports gambling is not new, and organized crime has its place in the history of sports swindles. Nearly one year after the heavily favored Chicago White Sox lost the 1919 World Series to the Cincinnati Reds, eight Chicago players were indicted after a grand jury investigation into rumors that the series had been fixed. The Black Sox Scandal was reportedly financed by organized crime. Between 1951 and 1995, the integrity of college athletics in the United States was shaken on five separate occasions by disclosures that student athletes had participated in basketball point-shaving schemes coordinated by organized crime members and associates. Point-shaving is winning by a small margin or losing by a greater margin than the established betting line point spread on a game. Point Spreads The basis of most sports gambling is the point spread, or line. A point spread is a handicap, in the form of points, added by oddsmakers, to the score of teams in games with high probabilities of predictable outcomes that are the object of betting. Simply stated, to make a football or basketball game more attractive to bettors, sports bookmakers in Las Vegas (where sports gambling is legal) establish a number of points, given or taken, on either of the teams involved. The points are added to, or deducted from, the team’s final score. Newspapers, magazines, Internet sites, and television and radio that focus on handicapping sporting events have assisted in making the point spread popular. Most major media outlets carry the latest

line, making this information immediately available. The final line is not usually made available until a day or two before a game because there are several variables that could possibly affect the outcome that might not be known until just before game time (e.g., injury reports, ineligible players, disciplinary action, etc.). The Loanshark Organized crime has moved to make loan-sharking a profitable business that complements illegal gambling and other criminal enterprises. The legal name for loan-sharking in the United States is “usury,” and the loan shark may also be known as a shylock. Loan-sharking is lending money to individuals and businesses at extremely high interest rates. It developed from the practice of salary lending in the late 1800s, when money was loaned against future salaries at excessive interest rates. The interest rate is now set by law to ensure that customers are not exploited by banks or other lenders, but the loan shark pays no attention to those rates for any type of loan, short- or long-term. In the annals of organized crime history, there have been loan sharks who operated independently but did not last long. The loan shark who is associated with an organized crime network has more credibility, more money to lend, and more ways to enforce collection of the debt. There is usually no collateral necessary to obtain a loan from a shylock, but there is always the fear of physical violence to secure payment. Money that is used for loan-sharking will usually flow from the upper levels of organized crime leadership to the street lender. The street lender pays a certain amount of interest per week for the organization money and then distributes or lends it to others for higher rates of weekly interest. Clients are normally acquaintances or those recommended by friends, since the nature of the business is often secretive. It is not unusual for a loan shark to accept stolen property as repayment for a loan, as long as the property has equal or greater value. Those who borrow money from a loan shark will usually do so because they have no other monetary source. Often, they are having difficulty in terms of their cash flow because of overwhelming gambling 203

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debt, business losses, family illness, divorce, or some other crippling economic misfortune. Conversely, there are illegal businesses, such as drug trafficking and bookmaking, that often require a dependable supply of available cash. The guaranteed success of the loan shark is found in weekly interest payments, known as vigorish or simply the vig. It is a lasting percentage in any gambling or loan-sharking activity, evident primarily in sports gambling in which players must bet a fixed percentage higher than they will be paid off if their bet is a winner. For example, vigorish is often set at 10 percent, so a bettor who wins a $10 bet receives $10, but a bettor who loses a $10 bet pays $11, which is the loss of $10 plus the $1 vigorish. The same type of arrangement is in place for those who borrow money from loan sharks. However, the interest can be compounded weekly or daily. Many borrowers will keep up the vigorish payments if nothing else and pay the principal at more suitable intervals. It is also possible to make weekly payments covering both principal and interest if the borrower chooses to do so. Simple economics will dictate that just paying the vig will spread out the amount of the original loan to the disadvantage of the borrower. There are those who believe that the mob’s influence in loan-sharking is vastly overstated. There is conflicting evidence to suggest that loan-sharking is the doorway to extensive amounts of organized criminal activity, including gambling, money laundering, receiving and selling stolen property, drug sales, prostitution, and racketeering. This illustrates how unlawful profits can be utilized in creating more illegal money, which allows organized criminal networks to thrive and continue to grow.

References Abt, Vicki, James F. Smith, and Eugene M. Christiansen. The Business of Risk: Commercial Gambling in Mainstream America. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1985. Albanese, Jay. Organized Crime in Our Times. 4th ed. Cincinnati: Anderson, 2004. Kenney, Dennis J., and James O. Finckenauer. Organized Crime in America. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1995.

Illegal Trading in Diamonds, Gems, and Precious Metals Daniel Mabrey In a world of floating currency rates, counterfeit goods, and sharp swings in inflation, transnational criminal organizations, just like multinational corporations, are always on the lookout for opportunities to protect the value of their financial resources. Transnational criminal organizations also need to transfer their assets in a way that is undetectable and leaves no audit trail or evidence of transactions. Some of the best assets for protecting the value of wealth and ease of value transfer are precious metals and gemstones. These two features make gold, silver, platinum, diamonds, and tanzanite highly desirable to transnational criminal organizations. Diamonds, Gems, and Precious Metals Gold and other precious metals have long been used by transnational criminal organizations for financial transactions that are untraceable by authorities. Gold is desirable because it can be melted, smelted, or deposited in an account with no questions asked; has no serial number; is hard to trace; can be converted to cash anywhere in the world; offers potential anonymity; and, most importantly, keeps its high value. Gold is especially preferred in countries whose currency is low in value or even worthless. Diamonds and gemstones are becoming more popular with transnational criminal organizations, especially groups from Israel and Belgium and groups that conduct activities in Africa. Precious stones such as diamonds, tanzanite, lapis lazuli, rubies, emeralds, sapphires, and tourmaline are of particular interest to transnational criminal organizations because they are lightweight, keep their high value, do not set off security alarms such as metal detectors at airports, can be easily transported, are difficult to trace, and are exempt from traditional monetary and financial controls. An added bonus is that the markets for these commodities are very closely knit, are hard to penetrate, and allow for small amounts to be sold with a minimum risk of detection by outside monitors.

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Financing Armed Conflicts and Terrorism Precious stones are regulated by international, regional, and national oversight bodies, but the immense value of these stones and their widespread presence throughout Africa have led to a secondary market free from regulation and quality assurance. In these secondary markets flow the majority of the precious stones that are illegally collected and sold by transnational criminal organizations, mercenary armies, warlords, and terrorist organizations. Many of these illegal diamonds are considered to be conflict diamonds, also known as blood diamonds, and are rough diamonds that are controlled or used by rebel groups or their allies to finance armed conflicts against political or social opponents, particularly in Africa. In Sierra Leone, a West African country, more than 75,000 deaths have been attributed to blood diamonds. Rebel groups in this region are known to have committed numerous atrocities, including amputations, rapes, kidnappings, and murders, in their competition for control over the diamond trade. Tens of thousands of people, including children as young as two years old, have had their limbs amputated by these rebel groups, and boys as young as seven years old have been abducted from their homes and forced to fight with the groups. Conflict diamonds, at their peak in 1999, constituted less than 4 percent of the world’s diamond sales, although it is unknown how many human rights violations and deaths the conflict has caused. Terrorist organizations in particular have invested in diamonds and jewels as a safer commodity than cash. Hezbollah has been involved with conflict diamonds and other jewels since its inception in the early 1980s. Hezbollah, along with Afwâj al-Muqâwmat al-Lubnâniyya (AMAL), used diamonds and other gems as a means of financial gain, buying the gems at cheap prices and reselling them in the diamond markets for a significantly increased price. Al-Qaeda has been involved with the illegal gem and gold trade since the mid-1990s. In 1998, following the bombing of two U.S. embassies in East Africa, the U.S. government froze approximately $220 million in gold that the Taliban had stored in the Federal Reserve System. After this, al-Qaeda

decided to liquidate its wealth and began using commodities to store its finances. The terrorist group used rough diamonds to raise funds for individual cells around the world, hide money targeted by financial sanctions, launder profits of criminal activity, and convert cash into valuable and easily transportable commodities. According to the United Nations (UN), al-Qaeda invested between $30 million and $300 million in precious metal and stone commodities. The group regularly used diamonds and gemstones as a medium for weapons and traded opium and heroin for gold. Al-Qaeda group was involved with Africa’s illicit diamond and jewel trade as well as Afghanistan’s emerald fields. Although it began using diamonds and other jewels as a means to make money, the group eventually used it as a means to hide its finances and would pay above-market prices on diamonds. In preparation for the 11 September 2001 attack, al-Qaeda spent more than ten months monopolizing the diamond trade and paid well over the asking price for the jewels to ensure that its finances would be safe. International Control Measures The increase in illegal trading in precious stones and metals has increased dramatically in the last fifteen years, and the international community is struggling to keep up with the level of trading and the associated criminal acts involved in these operations. Since 1998, there have been five major legal documents passed relevant to regulating and controlling the illegal trading of precious stones and metals. In 1998 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1173, a sanction against diamonds from Angola, and Resolution 1176, a sanction against diamonds from the Sierra Leone rebel group Revolutionary United Front (RUF). In 2000, two pieces of legislation were passed. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1306, which banned all countries from importing any rough diamonds from Sierra Leone until a certification process was designed with the Diamond High Council. The other piece of legislation passed in 2000, the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), involved forty-three participating 205

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countries (as of May 2002) that participated in a volunteer-only program to guarantee that member countries do not trade in or purchase conflict diamonds. All shipments that cross international boundaries are required to be transported in a tamper-resistant container and be accompanied by a government-validated Kimberly Process Certificate. The certificate is resistant to forgery with a unique number and includes information describing the shipment’s content. Only members of the KPCS can import and export diamonds with each other. In other words, nonmember countries cannot participate in the diamond trade with member countries. Although not perfect, the program has been considered a huge step toward validating diamond sales. The countries that make up the KPCS account for 99.8 percent of all global production of rough diamonds. All buyers and sellers must attach the following statement on all rough and polished diamond shipments: “The diamonds herein invoiced have been purchased from legitimate sources not involved in funding conflict and in compliance with United Nations resolutions. The seller hereby guarantees that these diamonds are conflict-free, based on personal knowledge and/or written guarantees provided by the supplier of these diamonds.” The KPCS was implemented following the public’s knowledge of the human rights violations associated with conflict diamonds. The KPCS has had difficulty in enforcement because it is completely voluntary and lacks government monitoring. In 2001, the United States passed the Clean Diamond Act, which strives to guarantee that all imported diamonds are from legitimate sources. The Tucson Protocol of 2002 outlines steps to determine what changes should be made to prevent possible abuses in the trading of tanzanite. It also suggested implementing a system of warranties in writing that the tanzanite bought, sold, cut, polished, set, or otherwise traded came from legitimate sources, and all traders should use this system of warranties to guarantee the sources of the stone. This warranty is similar to the warranty required by the KPCS. The Tucson Protocol has had some difficulty in its enforcement because it is completely voluntary and lacks government monitoring.

Conclusion The illegal trade in diamonds and precious metals will continue to be the commodity of choice for terrorists and organized crime groups for the foreseeable future because of the ease of acquisition and liquidity. These items provide a means for laundering money and transferring assets across borders. Given the success that terrorist groups such as alQaeda, the Taliban, and Hezbollah have had in the recent past, it is unlikely that current efforts will be sufficient to stem the illegal trade in diamonds and precious stones. References Campbell, Greg. Blood Diamonds. Boulder: Westview, 2004. Ehrenfeld, Rachel. Funding Evil: How Terrorism Is Financed—and How to Stop It. Los Angeles: Bonus Books, 2005. Farah, Douglas. Blood from Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror. New York: Broadway Books, 2004. Global Witness. “For a Few Dollar$ More: How al Qaeda Moved into the Diamond Trade,” 17 April 2003.

International Trafficking of Men, Women, and Children Sharon Anne Melzer International trafficking of men, women, and children continues to increase and globalize, resulting in the continued growth of organized crime and gross violations of human rights. This criminal activity has increased social costs, undermined and corrupted governments, broken down social systems, and damaged public health. With minimal risks, ample human capital, and profitable markets, human trafficking has become a substantial revenue source for organized crime. Victims enter into the trafficking rings by various methods, including kidnapping, being sold, and falling victim to deceptive recruiting practices and promises of employment in other countries. To combat the growth and globalization of this criminal activity, the international community has improved the effectiveness of international treaties and cooperation between states.

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Moreover, governments have begun to provide services for victims, launch public awareness campaigns, and place a stronger emphasis on the importance of criminal prosecution and punishment. Defining International Human Trafficking Trafficking in human beings is defined by the 2000 United Nations (UN) Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.” “Modern-day slavery” and the “white-slave trade” are additional terms associated with the trafficking of humans. However, human trafficking is not synonymous with human smuggling, which is the consensual movement of people across international borders that ends when individuals arrive in the destination country. Men, women, and children are trafficked for sexual exploitation, forced marriages, organ harvesting, or forced labor such as agricultural work, domestic servitude, maid services, factory work (sweatshops), and begging. Traffickers exploit children by forcing them to become camel jockeys or enter into military service, domestic servitude, forced marriages, pornography, or prostitution. Magnitude of International Human Trafficking The trafficking of humans, which is a form of organized crime, has become an estimated $7 billion industry for criminals worldwide and an epic concern for governments. The U.S. Department of State estimated that 600,000 to 800,000 humans are trafficked internationally each year. Several hundreds of thousands of additional victims are

trafficked within their own countries. An estimated 50,000 individuals are trafficked into the United States annually, and estimates place 200,000 to half a million of illegally trafficked sex workers in the European Union (EU) member states. The multibillion-dollar industry may be the thirdlargest source of revenue for organized crime. The profits have also led to the expansion in transnational organized crime, the weakening of domestic and international law, and the increased corruption of governments. Traffickers move victims from economically disadvantaged areas to more affluent countries, and no country is immune to trafficking rings and victimization. Asia, especially Southeast Asia, is the largest source for trafficking victims, and the former Soviet Union has become the second largest. Other source regions include Eastern Europe, the Caribbean, Latin America, and Africa. Destination regions include North America, Western Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. This multifaceted problem contributes to criminal activity, victimization, health concerns, and the breakdown of societies. With low risks and high profits, human trafficking is appealing to organized crime and stimulates criminal activities, such as money laundering, document forgery, drug trafficking, prostitution, and the corruption of governmental officials. While in the custody of traffickers, victims are susceptible to myriad human rights violations and are forced to participate in criminal activities. Moreover, trafficking has broken down social fabrics and structures. The separation of the child from the parent may harm the moral and nurturing development, and removal of family and community members may hamper the traditional flow of knowledge and culture that is passed down from one generation to the next. Additionally, trafficking activities may deprive a region of human capital or deprive an individual access to education, thus limiting his or her future opportunities. If the victim does return to his or her society, the society may ostracize the victim for activities, atrocities, and behaviors he or she may have committed. For example, families or communities may reject victims sold into child soldiering who return home with severe psychological traumas or violent behaviors, or who committed atrocities against their communities. 207

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Techniques Used by Traffickers The trafficking of victims involves recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, and receipt of a person. Recruitment occurs in a victim’s home country, often by people the victim knows or through advertisements promising work in other countries. There are four primary methods of recruiting female victims. First, recruiters and traffickers promise women means of legitimate employment working as, for example, nannies, dancers, or seamstresses. Second, women consent to working in labor and sex industries but are misled about the nature of the work or the working conditions. Third, recruiters simply abduct victims, sometimes by first drugging them. Fourth, husbands, parents, and relatives sell women and children to traffickers. Transportation of victims can occur by land, sea, or air and occurs internationally and domestically. Transporting victims across land and sea can be dangerous, inhumane, and deadly. Moving individuals by land may include walking over mountains or deserts for days or being locked in the back of cars and trucks. Sea transports include boarding unsafe boats, being smuggled in cargo containers, or being forced to swim across the border. Transporting individuals by air is more humane, but the costs and risks of detection are increased. Victims may legally enter the destination country with their own passports or illegally by using another person’s passport, perhaps the passport of a previous victim. Entering a country with a legitimate artistic or entertainer visa, so that the victim may work in the entertainment and hospitality industries, is another technique used. However, traffickers force the victims into the sex and labor industries. Regardless of the method of entry, once victims arrive in the destination country, the trafficker seizes their passports and restricts their freedoms. Transferring, harboring, and receipt of persons can occur when victims arrive in the destination country. Victims are held captive in small, crowded, and unsanitary conditions; sold to other persons; and forced into service. Throughout the process, victims are threatened, beaten, raped, tortured, and deprived of food, sanitation, medical care, freedom of movement, and basic human rights.

Traffickers use the threat of deportation to compel individuals into submission, avoid detection, and reduce the risk of contacting authorities for assistance. Furthermore, victims are often told that they need to repay debts or buy back their passports, for which they are usually charged exorbitant fees, before they can be freed. If victims are close to paying off the debt, traffickers may sell the victims to a new owner, forcing the victims to begin working off the new debt. Traffickers frequently rape females, especially those sold into the sex industries, as a means of preparing them for their expected services. However, virgins are spared from the initial rape because of their economic value. Victims of the sex industry experience severe physical and psychological traumas, are forced to serve multiple clients daily, and are exposed to HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases. If the victim becomes pregnant, she may be expected to serve clients well into her pregnancy or shortly after giving birth. Also, pregnant victims are sometimes forced to have abortions, which are usually conducted in an unsafe environment. Victims of the forced labor industry are exposed to long workdays and unhealthy conditions, and they are often forced to work every day. Victims who gain their freedom by purchase, escape, or rescue face more challenges, both within the destination countries and their home countries. Within the destination country, victims may be detained as illegal immigrants, may face deportation, may be denied appropriate medical and psychological services, may have difficulty obtaining official travel documents, and may have language barriers. However, repatriation could expose the victim to other hardships and dangers. Victims may be left at their home country’s border without support. Home countries may be in a state of civil war, may prosecute victims for illegal migration, or may not provide needed medical and psychological services. Traffickers may locate and recapture victims. Organized crime and traffickers may retaliate against victims and their families who have assisted in investigations or prosecutions. Families and communities may excommunicate victims, especially those forced into the sex industry.

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The International Community Numerous factors such as weak laws, the globalization of the world’s economy, civil and regional unrest, illiteracy, ignorance, the subordination of women in societies, and economic crisis facilitate human trafficking. Economics and the push-pull factor play an important role in this criminal activity: trafficking routes lead away from lessdeveloped countries and toward industrialization. High demands for labor in the manufacturing, pornography, prostitution, and domestic industries perpetuate the cycle of criminality and victimization. Globalization of the economy, increased demand for personal services, increase in unemployment of women, increase in open borders, and deregulations in movement of human capital, especially via the Internet, are other factors that have led to the increase of human trafficking. The international community has attempted to curtail human trafficking activities by sharing information, increasing cooperation between states, enacting laws domestically, and supporting international conventions and treaties. As early as 1904, international treaties and agreements were signed to combat white slavery, and in 1949 several agreements were combined into the United Nations (UN) Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons. In 2000, The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, which supplements the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, was adopted by the General Assembly. The protocol was intended to be a comprehensive weapon to combat trafficking and has three main purposes: the prevention of trafficking in persons, with specific attention toward women and children; protecting and assisting victims, with respect to human rights; and promoting cooperation among nations. The UN has taken additional steps to protect children through the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and through the UN Convention’s Second Optional Protocol, which prohibits the sale and sexual exploitation of children. The United States has taken a lead role in eradicating the trafficking in humans internationally and domestically by participating in international information sharing and media campaigns and has

passed the Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003, which amends the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. While the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery, law enforcement agencies have to rely on several criminal, immigration, and labor laws to confront human trafficking. The act consolidated many laws, and its purpose is to combat this problem domestically and internationally, establish protective measures for victims, and encourage the prosecution of traffickers. The law established the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons within the U.S. Department of State, which publishes the annual Trafficking in Persons Report. Information for the report is compiled worldwide, and the report serves as a diplomatic tool to encourage the international community to reduce this crime and increase cooperation. The European Union (EU) has created legislation aimed at eliminating the trafficking in humans and the sexual exploitation of children. The Treaty on the European Union (Title VI, Provisions on police and judicial cooperation in judicial and criminal matters) states that citizens within the member states shall experience a feeling of safety, especially within the areas of freedom and judicial systems, and this objective is met by combating crimes, especially the trafficking in humans and offenses against children. References Enck, Jennifer L. “The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime: Is It All That It Is Cracked Up to Be? Problems Posed by the Russian Mafia in the Trafficking of Humans.” Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 30(2) (2003): 369–394. European Union. “EU Legislation Being Adopted against Trafficking in Human Beings and the Sexual Exploitation of Children,” October 2005, http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/doc _centre/crime/trafficking/wai/doc_crime_human _trafficking_en.htm. Hyland, Kelly E. “Protecting Human Victims of Trafficking: An American Framework.” Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 16 (2001): 29–75. Miko, Francis T., and Grace Park. “Trafficking in Women and Children: The U.S. and International Response.” CRS Report for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 209

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2002, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/ 9107.pdf. Raviv, Tal. “International Trafficking in Persons: Focus on Women and Children—The Current Situation and the Recent International Legal Response.” Cardozo Women’s Law Journal 9 (2003): 659–670. Stoecker, Sally. “The Rise in Human Trafficking and the Role of Organized Crime.” Demokratizatsiya 8(1) (2000): 129–131. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. “Trafficking in Human Beings,” 2004, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/trafficking_human _beings.html. U.S. Department of State, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons. Trafficking in Persons Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2004.

Murder for Hire: Assassination and Contract Killings Robert D. Hanser, Walonda Wallace, and Kaine Jones Contract killing and murder share many similarities but at the same time are quite different from one another. With the act of murder, there is usually a perpetrator and a victim. A criminal act of murder is committed either through premeditation or in the heat of the moment. In contract killing, a criminal act of murder also occurs. However, in this case the instigator or solicitor (the person who wishes to have someone killed) solicits a third party to carry out the murder. In this form of murder, the contract killer as well as the instigator share in the culpability of the crime, although the motives for each may be quite different. Indeed, the truest form of contract killing is exactly that, a contract. Thus, it is as much a business transaction as it is a murder. In most cases, solicitors will not or cannot conceive any notion of why they share in the culpability of the murder or attempted murder. Often the solicitor’s (instigator’s) rationale is the argument that he or she did not physically commit the act and therefore is not culpable. In the eyes of the law, though, the solicitor is just as bad as the contract killer. However, solicitors do not see themselves as murderers. Rather, they see themselves as normal peo-

ple making a business deal and do not feel compelled to take responsibility for their actions. R. E. Blackshaw examined contract murders that were solicited and attempted (both successful and unsuccessful attempts). He discovered that the motives behind individuals who hire third-party persons to kill do not correlate with the expectations of mainstream society. The view of mainstream society is that most if not all contract killings are under the realm of a criminal network (the Mafia or some other sect of organized crime). Nonetheless, this is not at all the case. While there are a substantial amount of contract killings that are tied into some sect of the criminal underworld, it is not the main circumstance in which contract killings occur. According to Blackshaw, contract killers are solicited by an individual who is in an intimate relationship and is looking to resolve some dispute within the relationship such as custody issues, an unwanted love triangle, life insurance payouts, or property settlements. Cited Reasons for Contract Killing There are in fact several reasons found that pertain to why a person would hire a contract killer. Two main motives for why people contract out to a killer are dissolution of the relationship and money or financial gain. These two motives for contracting out to a killer are based on research performed by Jenny Mouzos and John Venditto in Australia. In their study, the most frequent motive for contract murders was dissolution of a relationship. The cases involving dissolution of a relationship generally entail an intimate partner who is overwhelmingly controlling of the other intimate partner. A present or former intimate partner in this case normally hires the contract killer. The motive of the instigator is to prevent the intimate partner from engaging in another relationship with another person. However, if the intimate partner has already entered into another relationship, the motive is vengeance. On the other hand, an intimate partner will solicit a contract killer to dispose of a present partner in order to be with another partner. Yet another reason for a partner to solicit a contract killer is to resolve custody issues that have arisen from the dissolution of the relationship.

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The second most frequent motive for contract killing involves money or financial gain. This usually includes a beneficiary arranging the murder of a third party in an attempt to accelerate the process of a payout from either a last will and testament or an insurance policy. The contract killer in these cases tends to require a higher payment compared to other motives, and oftentimes the contract killer is more experienced in his work. Methods of Effecting a Contracted Murder It would appear that there is a distinct and appropriate set of methods to employ when hiring a contract killer. According to Mouzos and Venditto, there were three methods in which an instigator (solicitor) and a third-party killer cross paths. The first method is the instigator proclaims that he or she is in need of a contract killer. In this method, there is usually an acquaintance or friend of the instigator who will play the role of middle man by seeking out the contract killer for the instigator and following through with the finalization of the contract. The second method entails the instigator seeking out a contract killer without the assistance of anyone and brokering a contract with a contract killer. The third method involves the instigator seeking out someone who is not considered to be a contract killer but is simply a violent criminal by nature and soliciting that individual into a contract to kill. The next issue in contract killing is of course the payment for the task at hand. It has been said that a price cannot be put on a human life. However, in the mind of a contract killer, that price ranges from as low as $500 to as high as $100,000. S. Piper and J. Black studied contract killers in Brushy Mountain State Prison in Tennessee. Through this research, a revelation became apparent pertaining to the disparate cost range of contracting out to a killer. There are a lot of nonviolent and violent criminals simply taking on the task of contract killing who are in fact not contract killers. Indeed, in a substantial amount of cases, they are not too familiar with the act of murder. It appears that the amateur contract killer will purportedly commit murder for the low-end rate and a professional contract killer will quote a much higher price. Piper and Black mention that the average contract killer is indeed an amateur and is

sometimes playing the role of a contract killer simply as a means to an end. For instance, Black met one contract killer who in the past was a drug dealer and was simply trying to get his finances in order to get back into the business of drug dealing. As in any business, there are professionals and there are amateurs. However, there appears to be no difference in the business of contract killing. Also, the perception of contracting as being solely a tool of criminal networks is proven to be false as well. Thus, contract killings may be generated by jilted lovers just as frequently as they are generated among organized crime members. It would appear, then, that contract killing is a crime that has no clear or mandatory associational boundaries. Rather, it is a crime that is appropriate when the confluence of perpetrator variables is conducive to this crime and when the target is seen as susceptible. References Black, Joey, and David Fisher. Joey the Hitman: The Autobiography of a Mafia Killer. New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 2002. Blackshaw, R. E. Criminological Aspects of Contract Assassination. Unpublished master’s thesis, La Trobe University, 1996. Carlo, Philip. The Ice Man: Confessions of a Mafia Contract Killer. New York: St. Martin’s, 2006. Mouzos, J., and J. Venditto. Contract Killings in Australia. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology, 2003. Piper, S., and J. Black. “To Die For.” Tennessee Alumnus Magazine 79(3) (1999): 1.

Nontraditional Organized Crime: Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs Don Liddick Outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMGs) are a continuing organized crime threat. Most gangs are small and unorganized, but a few have evolved into large transnational criminal organizations. Members of OMGs perpetrate many crimes, including the international traffic in women and children, organized prostitution, murder for hire, trafficking in guns, insurance frauds, loan-sharking, motorcycle and automobile theft, gambling, truck hijacking, 211

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Motorcycle gangs first appeared in the western United States following World War II. Many veterans returning from the War could not easily adjust to civilian life, and some bonded together to form clubs that engaged in various activities on the fringes of the law. Motorcycles became a symbol of their rebelliousness and outlaw spirit. In 1946, several biker groups raided the town of Hollister, California, bringing the gangs to national attention. Nevertheless, even the largest such gangs were virtually unknown outside of California until the late 1960s. Law enforcement provided renewed interest in motorcycle gangs in 1965 when the attorney general of California included the activities of the Hells Angels in his annual report. Increased media coverage and several popular Hollywood movies boosted the gangs into even greater prominence, and veterans returning from Vietnam provided new marginalized recruits. Motorcycle gangs, like other organized crime groups, cashed in on the increased demand for illicit drugs in the 1960s. Facilitated by drug trafficking, several OMGs had emerged as highly structured and somewhat disciplined criminal organizations by the early 1970s.

Los Angeles County Undersheriff William Stonich speaks at a news conference in Monterey Park, California, on December 3, 2003. Stonich announced that Federal agents recently raided Hells Angels motercycle hangouts across the West and made more than thirty arrests after a twoyear undercover investigation netting guns, illegal drugs, and stolen military explosives. (Stefano Palterea/AP/Wide World)

arson, forgery of government documents, extortion, the fencing of stolen goods, theft from U.S. military bases, and narcotics trafficking (especially methamphetamine, cocaine, and steroids). While many hundreds of groups operate around the globe, the largest and most sophisticated groups at present are the Hells Angels, the Outlaws, the Pagans, and the Bandidos. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has estimated that the Hells Angels, the most significant OMG, has more than sixty chapters in thirteen countries.

Organizational Structure OMGs are significant criminal organizations, partly due to their formal and hierarchical authority structure. Unlike organized crime in general, OMGs actually resemble formal organizations, complete with specialized units and written bylaws. Members pay weekly dues, and local chapters relinquish a percentage to the national headquarters of the given club. The largest gangs have a mother club that has authority over chapters in different regions. The president of the mother club is the national president and has authority over all members in all chapters. The vice president of the mother club takes over if the president cannot serve. Territorial or regional representatives handle problems that local chapters are unable to resolve. The formal authority structure continues with a national secretary-treasurer who handles the club’s money and is responsible for collecting dues from local chapters. The secretary-treasurer also records minutes of club meetings and drafts new club bylaws. Typically, there is also a position at the national level

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for an enforcer who makes sure that the president’s orders are followed. Local chapters have the positions of president, vice president, secretary-treasurer, sergeant at arms, and road captain. The sergeant-at-arms is the local equivalent of the enforcer. Road captains coordinate club runs and provide security for outings. Written bylaws govern matters such as membership, punishments for breaking club rules, and codes of behavior during outings. In addition to the formal authority structure and rules noted above, the most significant OMGs often have informal leaders emerge who may have as much functional power as elected officers. Similarly, the formal structure of the club may be separate from its economic structure, which tends to be decentralized. Illicit enterprises such as narcotics trafficking usually involve independent groups of OMG members and nonmember associates who operate autonomously in relation to the formal club authority structure. Each member of a motorcycle gang may have from four to ten nonmember associates who in turn have their own network of accomplices. Structurally, each club member may be a semi-independent operator of illegal activities, with his own gang of accomplices. Nonmember associates may be used to insulate club members from criminal involvement and are usually required to pay a percentage of their profits to official members as a kind of licensing fee. Criminal Activity Outlaw motorcycle gangs often compete with one another in the distribution of narcotics and the operation of other illegal enterprises. Gang wars are not uncommon. On the other hand, they have also been known to coordinate their criminal activities with other organized crime groups, including La Cosa Nostra. For example, the New York Hells Angels operated a night club in cooperation with the Gambino crime family, and Italian American gangsters in Cleveland have used Hells Angels members as contract killers. Cooperation between OMGs and other organized criminals is most prevalent in the realm of narcotics trafficking. In conjunction with Mexican drug cartels, OMGs in the United States are the single most significant state side distributors of methamphetamine.

A penchant for violent behavior is the trademark of OMGs and the source of the fear they generate. No crime or behavior can be too outrageous for club members. In addition, gangs have become more dangerous in recent years as the sophistication of their weaponry has increased. Police raids have resulted in the seizure of antitank weapons, plastic explosives, remote control detonators, and bulletproof vests. Although much of the violence is random and impulsive, other violence is instrumental and functional, aimed at the protection of drug territories, intimidating witnesses, and facilitating extortion or contract murders. The problems presented by OMGs are especially severe in Canada. The Hells Angels is the largest group, but others include the Outlaws, the Bandidos, the Rockers, the Evil Ones, the Red Devils, the Vagabonds, and Satan’s Guards. The gangs are involved in drug trafficking, money laundering, murder, fraud, theft, prostitution, telemarketing fraud, and trafficking in illegal weapons and contraband. Between 1994 and 2003, biker wars in Quebec alone caused 100 deaths, 84 bombings, 130 reported cases of arson, and 9 missing persons. Some of the chapters are well-organized and international in scope, with sophisticated security equipment and heavy weapons. They use puppet clubs and street gangs to gather information, provide security, and shield themselves from law enforcement. Originally the Pissed Off Bastards of Bloomington, the Hells Angels are the largest and most notorious of outlaw motorcycle clubs. A raid on Hollister, California, over the weekend of 4 July 1946 first brought the club to national attention. This event established outlaw biker traditions such as the annual Fourth of July run and the image of the onepercenter (pride in being on the margins of society). The Hells Angels are also well-known for their security stint at the Rolling Stones “Gimme Shelter” concert in Oakland in 1969. One club member stabbed and killed a concertgoer but was acquitted at trial. At present, the club has chapters all over the world, including the United States, Canada, England, Switzerland, New Zealand, and Australia. Some aging members of the Hells Angels have given up their cutoff jackets and Harleys for threepiece suits and Mercedes. Clubhouses in New York 213

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and California are large buildings or complexes guarded with surveillance equipment and military weaponry. The club insignia is a winged skull. Other major motorcycle gangs have essentially copied the Hells Angels in organizational structure and operating style. The Outlaws have forty chapters with about 400 members in the United States, Canada, and Australia. The group originated in Chicago in the 1950s but is now headquartered in Detroit. In the United States, members are found from Florida to New York and as far west as Oklahoma. The Outlaws are involved in numerous criminal activities including extortion, contract murder, car theft, and drug trafficking. In 1974, members of the Outlaws killed three Hells Angels, precipitating a feud between the two OMGs that is ongoing. The club mascot for the Outlaws is a skull over crossed pistons known as “Charlie,” copied from Marlon Brando’s jacket in the movie The Wild Ones. The Bandidos are the third-largest and fastestgrowing OMG in the United States but also have transnational dimensions. The group has at least 300 members and twenty-two chapters, with international posts in Australia and Marseilles, France. The gang was established in 1966 and began trafficking heroin in 1975. Presently the Bandidos are more heavily involved in cocaine and methamphetamine distribution. This OMG is bureaucratically structured with four vice presidents, one of whom serves as president. Activities are centered in Texas. Their mascot is the Frito Bandido. References Barger, Ralph, Keith Zimmerman, and Kent Zimmerman. Hell’s Angel: The Life and Times of Sonny Barger and the Hell’s Angels Motorcycle Club. New York: Harper Paperbacks, 2001. Criminal Intelligence Service (CIS) Canada. Annual Reports, http://www.cisc.gc.ca/webpage/index _b_e.htm. McGuire, Phillip. “Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs: Organized Crime on Wheels.” National Sheriff 37(2) (1986): 68–75. Potter, Gary W., and Michael D. Lyman. Organized Crime. 3rd ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003. Sher, Julian, and William Marsden. Angels of Death: Inside the Biker Gangs’ Crime Empire. New York: Carroll and Graf, 2006.

———. The Road to Hell: How the Biker Gangs Are Conquering Canada. Toronto: Knopf Canada, 2003. Veno, Arthur. The Brotherhoods: Inside the Outlaw Motorcycle Clubs. Crows Nest, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 2004.

The Relationship between Legitimate and Illegal Markets Clotilde Champeyrache From Watertight to Intertwined Markets Quite often, and particularly in the economic literature, legal and illegal markets are considered as two watertight spheres functioning like two closed circuits with their own rules and procedures and separated by a clear dividing line between the agents who abide by the law and those who do not. Starting illegal activities is supposed to be the result of an arbitration of individuals who are supposed to reject legality as a whole. Obviously, an economic actor cannot exert all his economic functions exclusively on illegal markets. A closer look at reality shows that legitimate and illegal markets, if they do not blend, mingle with each other and are strongly intertwined. Clear evidence of this assertion is given by the observation of the consumption patterns of an economy: even a superficial attempt to take them into consideration makes clear that we cannot compartmentalize the two spheres according to a mere legality/illegality criterion. In fact, the most blatant proof of entanglement of legal and illegal markets lies in the mere fact that criminals include in their consumption basket legal goods and services, and noncriminals do the same with illegal goods and services. Therefore, incomes—gained on legal or illegal markets— are not totally allocated within their sphere of origin, and legal and illegal markets are not completely autonomous. This phenomenon of intertwined spheres can be further exemplified through the crossing of two elements: the nature of production (legal or illegal process of production) and the type of use (once again, legal or illegal) that is made of the purchased good or service. We then obtain four categories of

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relationships, and two of them connect legal and illegal markets. On the one hand, indeed, when a legal good or service is produced it can be consumed in a legal way, such as in the case of food, housing, or clothes consumption, but also in an illegal way: legal chemical products can be used as components for terrorist weapons; a transportation service can serve to carry drugs, or any other illegal good, from one place to another. In these cases, legal goods are integrated to a process of production that takes place on illegitimate markets. On the other hand, goods and services banned by the law may be used by noncriminals as well as by criminals: counterfeited handbags, watches, and clothes are overtly used just in the same way as perfectly legal equivalent items would have been used. On the contrary, some illegal goods are also illegally used and consumed, such as in the case of forged identity papers. A Multiplicity of Interactions and an Increasingly Blurred Dividing Line The empirical elements described above can be generalized, systematized, and inserted in a more global scheme, which takes the shape of a classic Keynesian circuit but with two economic sectors: the legal one and the illegal one. Such a circuit aims at representing ex ante the monetary flows that circulate—as counterparts to goods and services— among the major macroeconomic aggregates: production, income, consumption, taxes, governmental spending, investment, and savings. G. M. Rey has elaborated a representation of such a circuit, even adding a third sector corresponding to the infiltration of criminals in legitimate businesses. Among the identified monetary flows, those going from the legal to the illegal sector and those going from the illegal to the legal sector are of high interest to our topic. As far as flows toward the illegal sphere are concerned, two categories emerge. First, part of the legal aggregate income (which also accounts for the produced wealth in the legal economy) flows to the illegal income. This occurs mainly through forced transfers whenever organized criminals resort to extortion on legitimate businesses. Second, part of the aggregate legal income is spent on

illegal goods consumption such as drugs, prostitution, gambling, etc. Three types of monetary flows take the opposite direction, entering the legal sector although coming from the illegal one. First, illegal production is partly dependent on the legal sector, as some intermediary goods necessary for the realization of illegal products are bought on legal markets. Second, the aggregate criminal income is not wholly spent on illegal markets for goods and services. It is also partly dedicated to legal consumption, as criminals, just like noncriminals, spend money for food, clothes, housing, and so on. Last but not least, part of the criminal income is also saved and invested on legitimate markets. This is a first step toward criminal infiltration in the legal economy. It also reflects the hardships encountered by criminals in terms of lasting and safe investment in illegitimate markets. Even highprofitability markets such as the market for drugs can become saturated, and there is a huge difference between investing in legal or illegal activities: only in the legal sphere will your investment be guaranteed and your property rights over it properly enforced. The final effect on the economy of all these interactions between legal and illegal markets is not easy to determine. Its global sign—positive or negative—will depend mostly on the following two factors. The first factor is the criminals’ propensity for legal consumption (i.e., the higher it is, the more it will compensate the leak in the circuit of the legal economy that illegality entails). The second consideration is the degree of integration that exists between the legal and illegal systems of production (i.e., the quantity and value of legal goods and services that are required in the illegal process of production). The more they are integrated, the more an increase in the production of illegal goods will entail a rise in the level of the aggregate demand for legal products and thus, rather paradoxically, a growth of the legal sector. Conclusion In a context in which an extension of the illegal markets can have positive effects on the functioning of legal markets, the dividing line separating 215

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legality from illegality seems more and more blurred. The devices adopted to fight against organized crime are harder to define and implement, and they may not even find the necessary social consensus to back this fight and make it more effective. References Hopkins, David M., Lewis T. Kontnik, and Mark T. Turnage. Counterfeiting Exposed: How to Protect Your Brand and Market Share. Indianapolis: Wiley, 2003. Naylor, R. T. Wages of Crime: Black Markets, Illegal Finance, and the Underworld Economy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002. Rey, G. M. “Relazione introduttiva.” Pp. 3–50 in Relazione della XI legislatura (9 marzo 1993–18 febbraio 1994), vol. 2, edited by Camera dei Deputati. Roma: Commissione parlamentare antimafia, 1995. Savona, Ernesto. European Money Trails. Abingdon, Oxford, UK: Routledge, 1999.

The RICO Statute: An Overview Catherine D. Griffis The Organized Crime Control Act became U.S. law on 15 October 1970. Title IX of the act is the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute. RICO provides extended penalties for criminal acts performed as part of an ongoing criminal enterprise and is intended to eliminate the influence of organized crime on interstate commerce. One of the first successful applications of the RICO statute came in the case of “Lefty Guns” Ruggiero and his Mafia associates. Ruggiero was later immortalized by Al Pacino in the 1997 film Donnie Brasco. History of RICO From its inception, the RICO statute was specifically designed to target members of the Mafia. The statute’s author, G. Robert Blakely, became obsessed with fighting crime at a very young age after seeing the 1931 movie Little Caesar. The film featured a character named Rico whose story was based loosely on that of real-life mobster Al Capone. While Blakely often stated that the movie

inspired him to become a crime fighter, he has never confirmed or denied whether the name was more than just a coincidence. Blakely went on to become one of the nation’s most well-known experts on organized crime. His career encompassed teaching posts at the law schools of both Notre Dame and Cornell University. He also held an office in the U.S. Department of Justice’s Organized Crime Division as well as served as chief counsel to the U.S. Subcommittee on Criminal Law and Procedures. Many experts contend that despite his long and distinguished career, Blakely’s greatest contribution to law enforcement was the RICO statute. Blakely’s statute holds that any person or organization who commits a combination of two or more crimes within a ten-year period can be charged with racketeering if the prosecution feels that those crimes were committed with a similar purpose or result. Racketeering is a general term for any crime committed under RICO, with the word itself based on the Mafia term “rackets” for business schemes. As a result, the general definition of racketeering causes RICO to cover a wide range of criminal activity. In total, thirty-five crimes (twenty-seven federal and eight state) fall under its domain. Individuals found guilty of racketeering can be fined upwards of $25,000 and/or sentenced to twenty years in prison. Thus, the RICO statute allows prosecutors to seek longer jail sentences for individuals charged with committing multiple crimes in pursuit of a single goal. In addition, the guilty party must forfeit all earnings and economic interest in any business considered to be part of the larger racketeering organization. Another key element of the RICO statute is that it makes no distinction between the guilt of an individual and the guilt of the organization with whom he or she is associated. Prior to the development of RICO, the criminal prosecution of organized crime was limited to the trial and conviction of single members of an organization. There was no way to go after an organization in its entirety. However, the RICO statute outlaws criminal enterprises, which are legally defined as any association of individuals that engages in racketeering activities. Therefore, if one member of an organization is

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found guilty of murder or bribery, any person found to be associated with the same organization can be prosecuted for violating the RICO statute. RICO’s provision against criminal enterprises destroyed one of the most popular defense options for Mafia bosses and members of organized crime groups. According to the statute, neither party can plead innocent due to the lack of physical involvement in a crime. Blakely’s motive behind the inclusion of the provision was the eradication of the merry-go-round effect of prosecuting single members of an organization. According to Blakely, the problem with targeting single offenders is that once the person is convicted, it is only a matter of time before he or she is back on the streets committing the same crimes. On the other hand, if the law targets the organization, then it removes the element of crime in the first place since the organization is the ultimate facilitator. RICO and the Mafia Despite the obvious advantages offered by RICO in the fight against organized crime, lawmakers failed to enforce it for almost a decade. A number of legal analysts were disappointed in the delayed implementation of the RICO statute, but the loudest demonstrations came from Blakely himself. He argued that the lack of interest in RICO stemmed from a lack of knowledge about the statute’s provisions. Blakely felt it was his responsibility to help the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other law enforcement agencies better understand the possibilities for prosecution presented by RICO, so he began lecturing at various institutions including the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia, and the U.S. State’s Attorney’s Office in New York. In 1979, Blakely created a summer training seminar for law enforcement at Cornell University. The seminar catered to agents at both the federal and state levels and was intended to create a cooperative learning environment. The larger hope was that federal and state agencies would understand that they could no longer work independently of each other in pursuit of organized crime. Another reason for the delay in RICO’s proper enforcement stemmed from the FBI’s lack of expe-

rience in new investigative techniques. J. Edgar Hoover’s administration encouraged agents to maintain a physical and moral distance from members of organized crime. This strategy made the FBI overly reliant on mob informants, who were often inaccurate and unpredictable. Agents had little knowledge of who the high-ranking members were in any organization. By 1970, the FBI was still using outdated investigative methods to infiltrate low-level gambling rings and had nothing but minor arrests to show for its efforts. The FBI was unable to make its first major arrest under the RICO statute until 1981 and the case of Ruggiero. The Ruggiero case stemmed from six years of investigative work by Joseph Pistone, an undercover FBI agent whose alias was Donnie Brasco. Pistone lived as Brasco from 1976 on, making friends with members of the Bonanno family including Ruggiero and another mobster named Sonny Black. The information that Pistone supplied to the FBI led to a RICO indictment of Ruggiero, Black, and several other members of Ruggiero’s crew. All the defendants in the case were later tried and convicted except for Black, who disappeared before the trial began. His body was found more than a year later near Staten Island. Authorities speculated that Black’s murder was revenge for his friendship with Pistone. In 1985, following the Ruggiero conviction, a number of other RICO indictments were handed down. The most notable of these convictions were those of Genovese family head Anthony Salerno, Gambino boss Paul Castellano, and Bonanno head Phillip Rasteli. New Uses for RICO While the 1980s marked one of the most successful periods of Mafia prosecution under RICO, it was also the era in which attorneys began testing the statute’s boundaries. Specifically, civil litigation lawyers discovered that Section 1964 of the RICO statute allows civilian claims to be filed by any person who suffers a financial loss as a result of a RICO violation. In other words, defendants convicted under RICO could be held responsible for making monetary reparations to their victims. Furthermore, any person who succeeded in establishing a civil 217

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J. Edgar Hoover founded the Federal Bureau of Investigation and served as its director for 49 years. (Yoichi R. Okamoto/Lyndon B. Johnson Library)

claim would automatically receive a judgment in the amount of three times the cost of actual damages as well as attorney’s fees. By the end of the 1980s, RICO became one of the most commonly asserted claims in the federal courts. RICO can be broadly applied to a number of civil cases due to its inclusion of mail and wire fraud as one of the thirty-five crimes covered in the statute. The breadth of activity that is prosecutable under mail and wire fraud is fairly extensive by most standards, and attorneys were quick to capitalize on the statute’s loophole. The federal courts and the U.S. Supreme Court attempted to limit RICO’s scope during the 1990s, but little has been accomplished. Today’s RICO carries less weight in Mafia prosecutions and is instead used to finan-

cially penalize individuals and organizations on a civilian level.

References Alito, Samuel. The RICO Racket. Washington, DC: National League Center for the Public Interest, 1989. Blakey, G. Robert. Rackets Bureaus: Investigation and Prosecution of Organized Crime. Washington, DC: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Assistance Administration, 1978. Floyd, John E. RICO State by State: A Guide to Litigation under the State Racketeering Statutes Chicago: Section of Antitrust Law, American Bar Association, 1998. Kelly, Robert J. The Upperworld and the Underworld: Case Studies of Racketeering and

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Business Infiltrations in the United States. New York: Kluwer Academic, 1999.

Trafficking in Persons and Human Organs Georgios A. Antonopoulos Introduction Recent years have seen the focus of the international community on the trafficking in persons and human organs despite the long history of the phenomenon. The human body has become a commodity just as with drugs, arms, and cigarettes. Currently, it is estimated that there are about 27 million people who have been trafficked for various purposes. Individuals are trafficked in Western Europe to work under exploitative conditions, teenagers from Pakistan are bought from their parents and sold in Persian Gulf countries where they work as servants, deliberately injured and mutilated children from Cambodia are used as beggars by traffickers, and in poor countries networks target individuals to buy and traffic one of their kidneys or their liver, skin, heart valves, corneas, tendons, arms, and legs. Article 3(a) of the 2000 United Nations (UN) “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children” states that “trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, or receipt of persons, by the means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.” It is difficult to determine accurately the scale of trafficking in persons and human organs in any context and have a clear picture as to the numbers of people or organs trafficked due to the nature of trafficking and the lack of antitrafficking legislation

in a number of countries, underreporting, and discrepancies in statistical reports. Moreover, in respect to human organs trafficking in particular, there is no available data on transplant sharing in some countries that are important to the human organs trade (e.g., South Africa). The Context of Trafficking in Persons and Human Organs There are three necessary elements for the trafficking in persons and human organs: supply, demand, and impunity. 1. Supply. Trafficking in persons (and human organs) must be seen as part of the wider migration nexus in the world. There are push and pull factors, with the push factors being very strong: poverty, armed political and religious conflicts, unstable political conditions, repression of minority ethnic groups, environmental degradation, and the low status of women in a number of countries. It is no surprise that the people and human organs trafficked follow the same routes as migrants, from poor to rich countries. 2. Demand. There is a large demand for cheap labor, for women from different counties for the prostitution scene, and for human organs due to the huge increase of kidney-transplant waiting lists since the early 1990s and the spread of transplant technologies that led to the scarcity of transplantable organs. 3. Impunity. In a great number of countries, there are no laws against trafficking in persons or human organs. In other countries where such laws exist, these are inadequate or are not rigorously enforced.

It should be noted, however, that the trafficking of persons in particular is also facilitated by the rigid legal framework that excludes a very large number of migrants from a number of transit and all destination countries. The Social Organization of Trafficking in Persons The trafficking in persons is committed by groups with varied coherence depending on their ethnic background. Members of the Albanian trafficking 219

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groups, for instance, tend to be strongly linked to each other and to a leader. There is a division of duties or roles in trafficking groups, although many times the duties that each member has to carry out differ from operation to operation, from time to time, and from place to place. Generally, these roles are: 1. The leaders. Not all groups have leaders, as there are many trafficking groups whose members associate and cooperate when there is an opportunity for quick cash only. 2. The recruiters. These individuals are concerned with the recruitment of cheap labor and with women and children for the prostitution scene. 3. The transporters. These individuals are concerned with transferring or at least assisting men, women, and children in reaching the destination country. 4. The scouters. These individuals are usually local people with the responsibility of providing specific information about investigations by the police, the port police, and the army. 5. The enforcers. These individuals are responsible for the safeguarding of the trafficking groups’ benefits. 6. The document vendors. These individuals provide the real or false documents necessary for the journey. 7. The corrupt public officials. The corrupt public officials are those who either provide assistance during the smuggling process (e.g., employees in embassies and consulates in source countries or employees of the authorities in destination countries) or others who are being bribed to turn a blind eye to the exploitation of persons (e.g., corrupt police officers).

There are various methods of recruitment that largely depend on the opportunities that exist for each trafficking network to recruit men, women and children: 1. Deception. This takes the form of either false promise of employment for men and women or false promise of marriage for women only. In some cases (e.g., child trafficking in Africa), deception may take the form of false promise of education. 2. Recruitment of prostitutes. This applies to women only. Not all women who are introduced to com-

mercial sex are deceived as to the sector of employment they are promised. The trafficking groups recruit prostituted women. However, what these women are not aware of is the degree of exploitation to which they will be subjected. 3. Purchase or rent from relatives, boyfriends, and friends. This applies to women and children. 4. Kidnapping or abduction. 5. Payment of debt. This applies to smuggled migrants who do not have the funds to pay prior to their journey and are therefore introduced to hard labor to pay off their debts to the smugglers.

Just as it is difficult to establish the exact total number of trafficked people in the world, it is difficult to establish the exact number of the trafficked people by country of origin. The majority of the victims of trafficking are young or generally healthy people from poor counties of Africa, Asia, South and Central America, and the former Eastern bloc who are either able to work long hours or introduced to the commercial sex scene. There are legal and illegal ways of transporting men, women, and children used by trafficking groups: on foot; by car, truck, or bus; by sea vessels; or even by plane. There are a variety of methods, both violent and nonviolent, with which the traffickers control their victims. These include confiscation of passports or other legal documents; threats; beatings; rape (when it comes to trafficked women and children); imprisonment in houses, apartments, and other lodgings; isolation; making victims dependent on drugs; deprivation of food and water; and continuous surveillance. There are also cases in which Nigerian trafficked women were made submissive under the threat of Voodoo practices enforced on them by Nigerian sangomas. The ultimate form of controlling the trafficked individuals is their sale from one trafficking group to another. This practice is advantageous for the trafficking business, as not only do the traffickers manage to avoid prosecution but they also prolong the debt bondage between them and their victims. There is some estimation as to the profits of the trafficking networks from this shameful trade. P. Monzini, for example, suggests that an individual or a group involved in trafficking of women and

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Chief kidney surgeon Dr. S.P. Trivedi of the Bombay Hospital is led by police from the city court in Bombay on January 22, 2004. Trivedi was arrested for interstate human organ trafficking, allegedly paying agents who would find impoverished donors willing to sell a kidney. (AFP/Getty Images)

children for commercial sex can make about US$122,000 from one woman in a year. However, this amount needs to be treated cautiously, as some forms of trafficking, and specifically the trafficking of women and children for commercial sex, are closely related to other sectors of the nighttime economy such as bars, clubs, and massage parlors. The Social Organization of Trafficking in Human Organs Similar to the trafficking of persons, there are a number of actors in the human organs trade. Apart from the buyers of the transplantable organs and the sellers, there are the brokers, the individuals who serve as intermediaries to the whole process, and, of course, the surgeons, transplant units, organs banks, and public and private hospitals

where the operations take place. There are cases, however, in which the roles are not clear or in which one individual has two roles. For instance, a surgeon may also be a broker. There are a variety of methods for the recruitment of donors, including formal and informal consensual contracts, coerced contracts, kidnapping or abduction, and murder. Theft of organs from individuals receiving routine operations, from executed or alive prisoners in China and from cadavers elsewhere in the world (e.g., Brazil) and without the consent of the relatives, is also commonplace. When there are consensual contracts, the donors are lured with money, housing, and other benefits; reduced prison sentences; or traveling documents and fares necessary for migration. Unlike the trafficking of persons to be introduced to hard labor or the prostitution 221

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scene in the transit or destination countries, the victims of trafficking in human organs need not be completely healthy. They can be undernourished or malnourished individuals and, according to N. Scheper-Hughes, many times may be “very dead” or in a “dead/not quite dead status known as brain death.” The vast majority of the trafficking in human organs victims come from poor countries of Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America. The countries that are major sources of organs are Romania, Moldova, South Africa, Ukraine, Peru, Cuba, Argentina, Brazil, Philippines, India, Russia, and China. The whole deal of a human organ transplantation including travel and accommodation arrangements can cost hundreds of thousands of dollars. However, the organ sellers get only a small part of it, although there are differences between countries. An American kidney seller, for instance, receives about $30,000, whereas an Iraqi seller receives as little as $750 to $1,000. The Relationship between Trafficking in Persons and Human Organs and Other Illegal Activities and Trades Trafficking in persons and human organs is interdependent on a variety of criminal activities integral to the trafficking business itself: deception, abduction, and sale or rent of human beings in the recruitment stage; falsification of legal documents, production of illegal documents, and illegal entry during the transportation stage; rape, illegal stay, and physical and psychological violence during the exploitation stage; and theft and murder. In addition, there are offenses committed in relation to the working hours and conditions, and there is also a relationship between trafficking in persons and corruption and money laundering. Finally, trafficking in persons is related to other illicit trades such as smuggling of migrants, drug trafficking, and firearms trafficking. In respect to human organs, trafficking is increasingly connected to heroin trafficking groups who see another arena for profit. Conclusion The trafficking in persons and human organs is an extremely serious issue and highlights the fact that the human body has become another commodity

exploited by individuals or organized crime groups. The introduction of a strong legal framework of trafficking in persons and human organs throughout the world and the upholding of this framework by a sensitized and determined law enforcement apparatus and the relevant governmental and nongovernmental organizations are needed. Very importantly, however, there is a huge need to reduce the economic differences between the poor and rich countries, which makes people either fall prey to individuals and groups who introduce them into exploitative working conditions, slavery, and prostitution or make them resort to desperate measures such as selling themselves or their body parts. References Antonopoulos, G. A., and J. A. Winterdyk. “Techniques of Neutralizing the Trafficking of Women: A Case Study of an Active Trafficker in Greece.” European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 13(2) (2005): 136–147. Chaudhary, V. “Argentina Uncovers Patients Killed for their Organs.” British Medical Journal 304 (1992): 1073–1074. Coburn, A. “Oi Sklavoi tou 21ou Eona” [The 21st Century Slaves]. National Geographic (Greek Edition) (September 2003): 40–63. International Organization for Migration. “New International Organization for Migration Figures on the Global Scale of Trafficking.” Trafficking in Migrants Quarterly Bulletin 23 (2001): 1–6, http://www.old.iom.int/documents/publication/ en/tm_23.pdf. Monzini, P. “Trafficking in Women and Girls, and the Involvement of Organized Crime, with Reference to the Situation in Central and Eastern Europe.” Paper presented at the 1st Annual Conference of the European Society of Criminology, Lausanne, Switzerland, 6–8 September 2001. Ruggiero, V. “Criminals and Service Providers: Cross-National Dirty Economies.” Crime, Law and Social Change 28 (1997): 27–38. Scheper-Hughes, N. “Commodity Fetishism in Organs Trafficking.” Body and Society 7(2–3) (2001): 31–62. ———. “The Global Traffic in Human Organs.” Current Anthropology 41(2) (2000): 191–211. ———. “The New Cannibalism: A Report on the International Traffic in Human Organs.” New Internationalist 300 (April 1998): 14–17, http://www.newint.org/issue300/trade.html.

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———. “Organs without Borders.” Foreign Policy (January/February 2005): 26–27, http://www .foreignpolicy.com/Ning/archive/archive/146/ PN146.pdf. ———. “Parts Unknown: Undercover Ethnography of the Organs-Trafficking Underworld.” Ethnography 5(1) (2004): 29–73. ———. “Rotten Trade: Millennial Capitalism, Human Values, and Global Justice in Organs Trafficking.” Journal of Human Rights 2(2) (2003): 197–226. United Nations. “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,” 2000, http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/ Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_2/ convention_%20traff_eng.pdf. Williams, P. “Human Commodity Trafficking: An Overview.” Pp. 1–10 in Illegal Immigration and Commercial Sex: The New Slave Trade, edited by P. Williams. London: Frank Cass, 1999. Zhang, S., and K. Chin. “Enter the Dragon: Inside Chinese Human Smuggling Organizations.” Criminology 40(4) (2002): 737–768.

Trafficking in Stolen Art, Antiques, and Cultural Property Edgar Tijhuis One of the most diverse and international types of organized crime is the trade in stolen art and antiquities. This trade includes both recognized articles that are known to have been stolen and unknown objects that are illegally excavated from archaeological sites. The way in which this trade is practiced varies considerably among different countries around the globe, and the type of perpetrators involved also varies accordingly. In general, the trade in stolen art and antiquities is sometimes linked with that in fakes in forgeries. A significant proportion of stolen objects are trafficked to various countries to be sold, and several legal instruments have been introduced in an attempt to counter this illegal trade. The Scope of the Problem The extent of the trade in stolen art and antiquities can only be roughly estimated from several key

sources of data. The private Art Loss Register records stolen and missing objects, primarily from Europe and the United States. Each year more than 10,000 objects are added to this database. Most thefts occur in domestic dwellings (54 percent) followed by museums (12 percent), galleries (12 percent), churches (10 percent), commercial premises (4 percent), public institutions (3 percent), warehouses and storage facilities (2 percent), and other places (3 percent). The art squad of the Italian police provides additional figures. Between the squad’s foundation in 1969 and 2001, it recorded 630,000 thefts. Stolen objects are recorded in a database that contains more than 1.1 million objects. Since 1969, 180,000 works of art and 360,000 antiquities have been recovered. Other cases further illustrate the extent of the problem. In Mali, a survey of 125 square miles found 834 archaeological sites, of which 45 percent had been looted, 17 percent badly. In Pakistan, a survey of Charsadda District showed that nearly half of the Buddhist shrines, stupas, and monasteries had been badly damaged or destroyed by illegal excavations. The Trade in Stolen Art and Antiquities The trade in stolen art can be divided into several categories. First, there is the theft of precious works of art from museums. Although this represents only a minor proportion of all thefts, it often involves works of art with significant artistic and monetary value. An example is the 1990 theft from the Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum in Boston. Among the items stolen were a number of famous paintings by Rembrandt, Vermeer, Degas, and Manet, valued at around $300 million. Second, there are thefts from churches, temples, and other religious places. Paintings, Buddha statues, religious icons, and other objects are stolen in large quantities. Third, there are thefts from libraries and similar institutions. Rare books, manuscripts, and prints cut from old books are the main objects involved. Finally, the fourth and largest category consists of thefts from private collections and galleries. This usually involves the theft of paintings and antiques. The trade in illegally excavated antiquities is at least as diverse as the trade in stolen art. Culturally 223

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rich countries are losing part of their cultural heritage to the art markets of countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, France, and Japan. Apulian vases from Italy, Nok statues from Nigeria, ceramics from China, and many types of antiquities from tombs in Peru are examples of the objects illegally excavated and trafficked to so-called market countries. Since the 2003 war with the United States, Iraq has become one of the most intensely plundered countries. Antiquities from hundreds of archaeological sites around the country are trafficked abroad to markets in Europe and North America. Since 2003, the Task Force to Fight Illicit Trafficking in Cultural Property Stolen in Iraq coordinates efforts to recover stolen objects from Iraq. Interlinked with the trade in stolen art and antiquities is the trade in fakes and forgeries. Fakes are works of art made to resemble existing ones, whereas known artists pass off forgeries as original works. Works of modern art are frequently faked or forged. However, old masters may also be forged or faked, as can be illustrated with the case of one of the best-known forgers, Eric Hebborn. His drawings infiltrated some of the world’s most prestigious museums for several decades. In 1996, Hebborn published a book in which he outlined his methods. A week after it was published, he was killed in Rome. Antiquities are faked and forged in all source countries. They are often trafficked to market countries together with authentic objects. The Criminals Involved in the Traffic of Stolen Art and Antiquities The types of criminals involved in the traffic of stolen art and antiquities are diverse. In some countries, professional and long-lasting networks of thieves, middlemen, and dealers can be found. Such networks, for example, traffic art and antiquities from Italy to Switzerland and other market countries. A similar situation exists with antiquities from Peru, trafficked to the United States. Furthermore, art and antiquities in French museums and castles are trafficked to Belgium and the Netherlands. Criminals who are not related to the illegal art trade often perpetrate large thefts from museums and private collections in market countries such as

Protesters rush the room where Sothebys intends to auction an ancient Chinese vase on May 2, 2000, at a Hong Kong hotel. The Protesters demanded that the sale of the vase, a very rare hexagonal ceramic which was looted during the 1860 Opium War, should be halted. Despite the interruption, the sale of the vase was completed for 19 million HK (USD 2.4 million) dollars. (AFP/Getty Images)

the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Scandinavian countries. As a result of their unfamiliarity with the art trade, these criminals are often caught and prosecuted. In African countries, loose networks of thieves and middlemen often sell stolen and illegally excavated objects to dealers from market countries in Europe. Many antiquities from Africa are destined for Belgium and France. Antiquities from Asia are primarily destined for the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Netherlands. International Legal Instruments Several international legal instruments have been adopted to counter the trade in stolen art and

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antiquities. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) adopted the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of an Armed Conflict in 1954. In 1970, the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property was adopted by UNESCO and provided a legal instrument against the illegal trade in general. Finally, in 1995, the Unidroit Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects provided uniform provisions of civil law to complement the earlier UNESCO treaties. In addition to international instruments of law, the United States assists a number of foreign countries through bilateral treaties. Cyprus, Italy, Mali, and Cambodia as well as a number of South American countries have entered into agreements with the United States. Within the European Union (EU), specific legislation has been adopted for the restitution of illegally exported art and antiquities between member states. All international and bilateral legal instruments depend on effective national legislation to define the kind of objects that are protected and the procedures that need to be followed in case of export or import of art and antiquities. There are also specialized law enforcement agencies to deal with this illegal trade. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), for example, has a specialized unit for art thefts. This unit

collaborates with both local and foreign law enforcement agencies. The most important foreign agencies are the art squad of the French and Italian police forces and the metropolitan police in London. The French art squad consists of more than 30 officers based in Paris. The Italian art squad is the largest in the world and includes more than 150 officers. Both the Italian and French police have their own databases that are used to trace stolen art in the same way as the private Art Loss Register. The art squad of the metropolitan police in London consists of 3 or 4 officers and focuses on the greater London area. Most other market countries for art and antiquities lack specialized law enforcement units to deal with the traffic of stolen art and antiquities.

References Atwood, Roger. Stealing History: Tomb Raiders, Smugglers, and the Looting of the Ancient World. New York: St. Martin’s, 2004. Brodie, Neil, Jenny Doole, and Colin Renfrew. Trade in Illicit Antiquities: The Destruction of the World’s Cultural Heritage. Oxford, UK: Oxbow, 2001. Conklin, John. Art Crime. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994. Schick, Jürgen. The Gods Are Leaving the Country. Bangkok: White Orchid, 1998. Watson, Peter. Sotheby’s Inside Story. London: Bloomsbury, 1998.

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Computer Intrusions and Intellectual Property Theft Vidisha Barua Computer intrusions and intellectual property theft encompass issues such as copyright and trademark violations, theft of trade secrets, computer hacking, theft of computer and high-tech components, and Internet fraud. Intrusion is an event of unauthorized entry or attempted entry to an information system. Intellectual property theft involves counterfeiting or piracy of intellectual property such as patents, trademarks, copyrights, service marks, trade dress, and trade secrets. Computer intrusions have facilitated the age-old crime of intellectual property theft by making it possible to transfer or copy files electronically and by intruding into the protected information of the intellectual property owners. Cybercrimes Computer intrusion plays a key role in the commission of cybercrimes in the world today. Earlier, with a limited number of computer systems monitored by certain institutes or corporations, it was not very easy to hack or intrude into a computer or information system. This has changed over the years, and today systems are well-connected and have become far more accessible throughout the world. This gives opportunities to hackers to access and manipulate data in any given computer system. Geographical distribution of systems also makes it difficult to regularly monitor access to each system and to authenticate legitimate users.

Intruders do not belong to one set category. While some operate individually, others operate in organized groups. They can operate either with a criminal intent or to gain access and spy into systems of national security or for economic gains through intellectual property theft. Still others, especially the individual intruders, do it generally for the thrill or challenge of breaking into or gaining access to somebody else’s computer system, and this could be a result of an obsessive-compulsive behavior. The organized groups, as opposed to the individual intruders, generally have a definite strategy and objective that could be either to disturb the national security or to reap economic gains. Intellectual property theft poses a clear danger to the economy and the health, safety, and security of nations. The increasing value of intellectual property coupled with the ease and low cost of copyright infringement have significantly increased the harsh consequences of intellectual property theft. Intellectual property rights violations, especially those involving the sale of counterfeit or illegally manufactured products, strike at the very foundation of international trade, destabilize the legitimate market, and cause momentous revenue losses to genuine and legitimate industries. Digitization and the Internet boom have further enabled the intellectual property rights infringers to effortlessly pirate, copy, and illegally distribute trade secrets, trademarks, copyrights, and logos. The United States is hard hit by counterfeiting and other forms of copyright, trademark, and patent infringements because it is the world leader in the

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creation and export of intellectual property, primarily in motion pictures, computer software, sound recording, and book publishing. The Motion Pictures Association of America (MPAA) and its international counterpart the Motion Pictures Association (MPA) on behalf of its member companies direct a comprehensive international antipiracy program. Established in 1976, the program actively pursues the implementation and strengthening of existing copyright protection legislation. It assists local governments and law enforcement authorities in the investigation and prosecution of piracy cases, initiates civil litigation on behalf of its member companies against copyright infringers, and conducts educational outreach programs regarding the harmful effects of piracy. The MPA/MPAA estimates that the U.S. motion picture industry loses in excess of $3 billion annually in potential worldwide revenue as a result of piracy. This figure does not include Internet piracy losses, as these are hard to keep track of. However, there is no doubt that Internet piracy causes untold damages to the motion picture industry. To battle the problem, in 2000 the MPA launched more than 60,000 investigations into suspected pirate activities and more than 18,000 raids against piracy operations in coordination with local authorities around the world. The MPAA/MPA directs its worldwide antipiracy activities from headquarters in Encino, California. Its regional offices are located in Brussels (Europe, Middle East, and Africa), Mexico (Latin America), Canada, and Hong Kong (Asia/Pacific). An International Concern According to International Intellectual Property Alliance estimates, in 2002 the U.S. core copyright industries accounted for an estimated 6 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product ($626.6 billion). The core industries are those that primarily produce and distribute copyright materials. These include newspapers, book publishing, recording, music, periodicals, motion pictures, radio and television broadcasting, and computer software (including business application and entertainment software). In 2002, copyright industries achieved foreign sales and exports estimated at $89.26 billion, surpassing other major industry sectors such

as chemicals and related products, food and live animals, motor vehicles, parts and accessories, and aircraft and other equipment sectors. With computer intrusions facilitating the infringement of intellectual property rights, the two issues are now addressed together by several governments. In the United States, the Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property (CHIP) program has met with considerable success. This complements the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) in the Criminal Division of the Justice Department. The CHIP program requires prosecutors to focus on all intellectual property right violations and cybercrimes. In addition, CHIP prosecutors are expected to develop public awareness programs and provide training to other prosecutors and law enforcement agencies regarding high-tech issues. Most countries have brought laws protecting intellectual property rights up to international standards, but given the complexities inherent in these laws, few are focusing as much as they should on enforcing them. The dimension of cybercrimes in intellectual property theft is relatively new, and not all countries have adequately addressed this issue so far. Intellectual property violations and computer intrusions are flourishing because of ineffective laws, weak enforcement, inadequate resources devoted to investigations and prosecutions, corrupt government officials, and uninformed or inadequately trained law enforcement officers. East and Southeast Asia are primary regions where intellectual property rights violations are flourishing. Ukraine, Israel, Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay are other countries where such illegal activities are doing well. References Albanese, Jay S. Combating Piracy: Intellectual Property Theft and Fraud. Somerset, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2006. Britz, Marjie T. Computer Forensics and Cyber Crime: An Introduction. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003. Collie, Byron S. “Intrusion Investigation and PostIntrusion Computer Forensic Analysis,” http://www.usyd.edu.au/su/is/comms/security/ intrusion_investigation.html#Def. 227

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Fernandez, Justin. Counterfeiting and the Theft of Intellectual Property. New York: Chelsea House, 2002. International Intellectual Property Alliance. “IIPA’s New Economic Study Reveals the Copyright Industries Continues to be a Driving Force in the U.S. Economy,” 7 October 2004, http://www.iipa .com/pressreleases/2004_Oct7_Siwek.pdf. Motion Picture Association of America. “AntiPiracy,” 2005, http://www.mpaa.org/piracy.asp. Poltorak, Alexander I., and Paul J. Lerner. Essentials of Intellectual Property. Indianapolis: Wiley, 2002. Tech Law Journal. “Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Violations,” 2005, http://www.techlawjournal .com/crime/20001228exc.asp.

Credit, Insurance, and Securities Fraud and Fraudulent Bankruptcies Vidisha Barua Credit, insurance, and securities fraud and fraudulent bankruptcies are all white-collar crimes. Whitecollar crimes are those crimes committed mostly in the course of a person’s occupation and especially by someone who already has access to money and is greedy for more. Edwin Sutherland coined the term “white-collar crime” to refer to those crimes committed by white-collar officials occupying high positions as opposed to the simpler crimes committed by blue-collar workers or street crimes. Credit Fraud Credit frauds mostly involve identity thefts in which the fraudulent person uses secret, privileged information of another to get credit. In case one loses a credit card or anything that has personal information on it, it is advisable to close accounts related to that information so that somebody else can not misuse it. Often, however, the identity thief hunts down personal information to commit credit fraud. It is important to place fraud alerts on credit reports and review these reports regularly so that any new accounts opened without the legitimate user’s knowledge can be detected. Insurance Fraud Insurance frauds can be of two kinds. The most common form is filing false insurance claims. This

drains the insurance industry of a lot of money. However, some insurance frauds are carried out by insurance companies themselves. This could include diverting premiums where funds meant to cover claims are used for other purposes, bribery of company officials, and misrepresentation of facts by insurance company officers, directors, employees, agents, and brokers for their personal gain or to prevent regulators from taking certain actions. The Coalition against Insurance Fraud (CAIF) in the United States has estimated that health care fraud alone costs Americans $54 billion a year. Securities Fraud Securities fraud involves a crime in which securities investing or trading laws have been violated. Security fraud mostly comprises of insider trading. It also involves manipulation of stocks and other fraudulent activities in the securities market. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 recognized insider trading as a crime. As defined by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), insider traders are stockholders, directors, officers, or any recipients of information not publicly available who take advantage of such limited disclosure for their own benefit. These frauds can only be carried out by insiders, those who are privy to privileged information, unless they give this information to an outsider who becomes a beneficiary of this information. Nevertheless, insider trading cannot be carried out without the cooperation of an insider. The SEC has determined that insiders have a fiduciary duty not only to refrain from trading on their private information but to disclose it as well. The Internet Fraud Complaint Center (IFCC), a joint project with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), has reported that most Internet fraud complaints originate from online auctions although the amount involved is not as much as that in securities fraud carried out in the financial markets. Internet fraud involving stock information, however, is the second most common form of investment fraud, amounting to losses of more than $10 billion a year in the United States. Fraudulent Bankruptcies Bankruptcy is a rehabilitation process to help those

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who have genuinely suffered losses due to frauds of others or because of situations beyond their control. However, this process is vitiated by those who try to take advantage of this system and abuse it by fraudulent means. Fraudulent bankruptcies represent a growing problem all over the world, causing huge losses to the economy. Fraudulent bankruptcies generally include bankruptcy filings that people do to escape personal liabilities. Sometimes people fraudulently sell their assets just before filing bankruptcy so that the assets cannot be liquidated. In other cases, people even succeed in concealing their assets. In the United States, an analysis of an FBI bankruptcy fraud investigations revealed that the most common scheme utilized in fraudulent bankruptcy filings indeed involved the concealment of a debtor’s assets. The concealment of assets encompasses approximately 70 percent of bankruptcy fraud in the United States. This prevents these assets from being liquidated and transferred to creditors to pay the debt. Corporations practice this on a larger scale. The company owner often transfers assets to family members or other businesses. This gives a false picture of the assets of the company and greatly affects the liquidation of debts. Despite several regulations and enforcement operations, the concealment of a debtor’s assets remains the most significant problem area within bankruptcy fraud worldwide. Besides concealment of assets, bankruptcy fraud also involves schemes to include petition mills, multiple filings, false statements, trustee fraud, attorney fraud, forged filings, embezzlement, credit card fraud, and bust-outs. Petition mills and multiple filings are the most common bankruptcy fraud schemes after concealment of assets. Conclusion Credit, insurance, and securities fraud and fraudulent bankruptcies involve a huge drain of the economy, and people need to be more alert to these frauds. Since these are not violent crimes, they are often given a callous treatment until a person or a corporation is affected. More proactive and quick reactive measures are needed to tackle this worldwide problem. It is easier in present times to carry on these activities across borders. Therefore, coun-

tries should come together to fight these frauds in a spirit of cooperation. References “Bankruptcy Fraud.” Federal Bureau of Investigation Economic Crimes Unit, http://www .fbi.gov/whitecollarcrime/bankruptcy_fraud/about. htm. Cho, Jang Y., and Michael K. Shaub. “The Consequences of Insider Trading and the Role of Academic Research.” Business and Professional Ethics Journal 10(4) (1991): 83–98. Coalition Against Insurance Fraud. “Annual Report 2004,” http://www.insurancefraud.org/annual _report04_set.html. “Internet Securities Fraud: Old Trick, New Medium.” 2001 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 0006, http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/ 2001dltr0006.html. Rosoff, Stephen M., Henry N. Pontell, and Robert H. Tillman. Profit without Honor. 3rd ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2004. “SEC: Next Please.” Economist, 24 January 1987, 27. “Securities Fraud.” InvestorWords.com, http://www .investorwords.com/4441/securities_fraud.html.

Foreign Economic Espionage: Theft of Trade and High-Tech Secrets Oliver Hemmerle Discussions of espionage usually start with the hint that intelligence is the oldest or second-oldest profession. Whereas this is usually a game of words, it is perfectly true for economic espionage, the theft of trade and of high-tech secrets. Transfer of technology is a driving force in the development of mankind, and this transfer becomes espionage when it is done without the consent of the owner of trade or technological secrets. The history of the human race could be seen as an ongoing story of legal and illegal forms of such transfer, with the illegal forms being labeled by the victimized party as theft or espionage. Commercial versus Political and Military Espionage Purely industrial espionage of one manufacturer stealing the ideas of another for the purpose of 229

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making a profit is different than the espionage committed by state-sponsored organizations to gain an economic, political, or military advantage of one nation vis-à-vis another nation. Industrial espionage can take place on a national or international level. The first case usually involves theft for commercial purposes, whereas in the second case the economic aspect is often surpassed by the political and military implications. To illustrate these theoretical concepts it might be useful to look