Partitions The partition of the Indian subcontinent, the collapse of the Soviet Union and erstwhile Yugoslavia, the reu...
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Partitions The partition of the Indian subcontinent, the collapse of the Soviet Union and erstwhile Yugoslavia, the reunification of Germany, the continuing feud between the two Koreas, the Irish peace process, the case of Israel/Palestine and the lingering division of Cyprus have together fuelled new thinking on the strategy and acts of partitioning countries, states, nations and continuities. They have also given rise to a huge body of literature. However, studies of partitions have usually focused on individual cases. This innovative volume uses comparative analysis to fill the gap in partition studies and examines crosscutting issues such as: • Violence • State formation and state building • Regional politics • Union and regional unification • Peace policies • Transitional strategies • Geopolitics • Historical experiences of decolonization and transition Forms of violence and violent transition are worthy of analysis in their own right; the impact of various forms of violence on current politics, such as ethnological and territorial conflicts or religious pogroms, is not confined to a locality that witnesses the partition of polity – its impact is global. And as there is a strong link between partition, local violence and globalization, there is a real need for cutting-edge comparative framework that goes beyond area-centric readings but is gender sensitive, and sums up the experiences and implications of partition. This book will be of great interest to historians, political scientists, philosophers, policy-makers, international relations experts and peace building institutions and practitioners, and political scientists. Stefano Bianchini is Director of the Institute for Eastern and Central Europe at the University of Bologna, Italy. He has a Master’s Degree in Democracy and Human Rights from the Universities of Sarajevo and Bologna, and is the Director of the Institute for Studies on East Central and Balkan Europe at the University of Bologna. Sanjay Chaturvedi, a Leverhulme Fellow of the University of Cambridge, is Reader and Chairman in Political Science at the Punjab University, India. He is the author of Polar Regions: a Political Geography; and co-editor of Rethinking Boundaries: Geopolitics, Identities and Sustainability. Rada Iveković is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Saint Etienne, France. Her former affiliations include University of Paris 8 (Vincennes à Saint-Denis), and the University of Zagreb, Yugoslavia. Ranabir Samaddar, described by a reviewer as ‘India’s Boswell’, is Director of the Peace Studies Programme at the South Asia Forum for Human Rights, Kathmandu. He
was the founding editor of Refugee Watch, and has written the three-volume set A Biography of the Indian Nation, 1947–1997, and Paradoxes on Nationalist Time.
Frank Cass Studies in Geopolitics Series editors: David Newman, Ben Gurion University of the Negev and John Agnew, University of California, Los Angeles
Changes in the world political map, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and forces of globalization, have led to the renewed interest in the studies of the dynamic processes that are causing the reconfiguration of territories and states. For some, the world of nation-states has come to an end, and the globe is experiencing deterritorialization as we move into a ‘borderless’ world. For others, the territorial component of state structure remains an important part of global politics, as new states are formed and new boundaries are erected. National identities are re-emerging at local and regional levels, while the traditional state-system, based on the Westphalian model, is undergoing dramatic changes. Frank Cass Studies in Geopolitics seeks to examine these changing patterns of world politics. Scholars from related disciplines, such as International Relations, Political Geography and International Law, will present diverse perspectives on both the contemporary and historical dynamics of the world political map. Attention will also be given to the practitioners of geopolitics, past and present, scholars and diplomats, and their respective influences on global political change. Titles in the series include: Landlocked States of Africa and Asia Edited by Dick Hodder, Sarah J. Lloyd and Keith McLachlan, School of Oriental and African Studies, London Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernity David Newman, Ben Gurion University of the Negev A special issue of the journal Geopolitics Geopolitics at the End of the Twentieth Century The Changing World Political Map Edited by Nurit Kliot, Haifa University and David Newman, Ben Gurion University of the Negev From Geopolitics to Global Politics A French Connection Edited by Jacques Lévy, Reims University A special issue of the journal Geopolitics
The Changing Geopolitics of Eastern Europe Edited by Andrew H. Dawson and Rick Fawn, University of St Andrews A special issue of the journal Geopolitics Constructing Post-Soviet Geopolitics in Estonia Pami Aalto, University of Tampere, Finland The Marshall Plan Today Edited by John Agnew and J. Nicholas Entrikin, UCLA Geopolitics of Resource Wars Philippe Le Billon, University of British Columbia A special issue of the journal Geopolitics September 11th and its Aftermath The Geopolitics of Terror Stanley D. Brunn, University of Kentucky Partitions Reshaping States and Minds Stefano Bianchini, University of Bologna, Italy; Sanjay Chaturvedi, Punjab University, India; Rada Iveković, University of Saint Etienne, France; Ranabir Samaddar, South Asia Forum for Human Rights, Kathmandu.
Partitions Reshaping states and minds
Stefano Bianchini, Sanjay Chaturvedi, Rada Iveković and Ranabir Samaddar
First published 2005 by Frank Cass 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Frank Cass 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Frank Cass is an imprint of the Taylor and Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to http://www.ebookstore.tandf.co.uk/.” © 2005 Stefano Bianchini, Sanjay Chaturvedi, Rada Iveković and Ranabir Samaddar All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-33453-1 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-415-34802-1 (Print Edition)
Contents
1 2 3 4
Notes on authors
ix
Foreword STEFANO BIANCHINI, SANJAY CHATURVEDI, RADA IVEKOVIĆ, RANABIR SAMADDAR
x
Introduction: the infamous event RANABIR SAMADDAR Partition as a form of transition RADA IVEKOVIĆ Partitions: categories and destinies STEFANO BIANCHINI The undefined acts of partition and dialogue RANABIR SAMADDAR The excess of geopolitics: partition of ‘British India’ SANJAY CHATURVEDI Conclusion STEFANO BIANCHINI
1
Index
11 40 78 106 138
146
Notes on authors Stefano Bianchini is a Professor of East European History and Institutions at the University of Bologna, Italy, and the Director of the Centre for Studies on East Central and Balkan Europe there; he is also the central coordinator of the Europe and the Balkans International network, and author among others of La Question Yougoslave (Paris: Castermann, 1996) and Sarajevo, Le Radici dell’odio. Identità e Destino dei Popoli Balcanici (Rome: Edizioni Associate, 1996). He is also the co-editor of three well-known volumes in English: From the Adriatic to the Caucasus – The Dynamics of (De)stabilization (Ravenna: Longo, 2001), State Building in the Balkans (Ravenna: Longo, 1998) and The Yugoslav War, Europe and the Balkans – How to Achieve Security (Ravenna: Longo, 1995). Sanjay Chaturvedi, Reader in the Department of Political Science, Punjab University, Chandigarh and the Co-ordinator of the Centre for the Study of Geopolitics there, is a specialist in political geography and author of The Polar Regions: A Political Geography (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1996) and co-editor of the volume, Rethinking Boundaries: Geopolitics, Identities and Sustainability (Delhi: Manohar, forthcoming). He is also on the editorial board of the journal Geopolitics, published by Frank Cass, London, and has contributed to various reputed journals including Third World Quarterly, Ocean Yearbook and the Journal of Economic and Social Geography. Rada Iveković is a philosopher. She is an Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy, University of Paris 8, and author of Orients: Critique de la Raison Postmoderne (Paris: Editions Noël Blandin, 1992) and Autopsia dei Balcani. Saggio di Psico-politica (Milano: Raffaello Cortina, 1999), also published in German as Autopsie des Balkans. Ein Psycho-Politischer Essay (Graz: Droschl, 2001). Ranabir Samaddar, Director of the Peace Studies Programme at the South Asia Forum for Human Rights, Kathmandu, and earlier a Professor of South Asian Studies at the Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, Calcutta, is the author of a three-volume study of post-colonial nationalism in South Asia, Whose Asia is it Anyway: Nation and the Region in South Asia (Calcutta: Pearl Publishers, 1996), The Marginal Nation: Transborder Migration from Bangladesh to West Bengal (Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999) and the three-volume A Biography of the Indian Nation, 1947–97 (Delhi: Sage Publications, 2001). He is also the editor of the well-known volume Reflections on Partition in the East (Delhi: Vikas, 1997).
Foreword The present book is the outcome of a joint research project, Partitions Compared and Lessons Learnt: Issues in the Politics of Dialogue and Peace, which was carried out in Paris, within the framework of the International Program for Advanced Studies at the Maison des Sciences de l’Homme (MSH) and the Columbia University Institute for Scholars at Reid Hall. The project was conceived in a planning meeting in Paris in October 2001 through deliberations among the noted historian Eric Hobsbawm, Maurice Aymard and Jean Luc Racine (both from MSH), Rada Iveković (University of Paris 8) and Ranabir Samaddar (Peace Studies Programme, South Asia Forum for Human Rights). Rada Iveković was the coordinator of the core team, which consisted of four researchers, authors of the present book. The members of the core team, who worked together for over three months from October 2001 to January 2002 on the themes of the study, drew up principles of comparing cases and experiences of partitions and dialogues, organized meetings and seminars, and prepared draft essays and finally a plan for a publication. While in Paris, the core team had regular meetings with other scholars, benefiting from the active contribution, among others, of Sia Anagnostoupoulou (University of Cyprus), Natasha Avtonomova (Academy of Sciences, Moscow), Etienne Balibar (University of Nanterre), Paula Banerjee (University of Calcutta), Urvashi Butalia (feminist historian and publisher, Kali for Women and Zubaan), Marie-Claire CalozTschopp (University of Geneva), Fabio Ciaramelli (University of Naples), Ghislaine Glasson Deschaumes (Director, Transeuropéennes), Daho Djerbal (Algiers University and the journal Naqd), Goran Fejic (diplomat, former UN official and economist), Maurice Goldring (University of Paris 8), David Goodman (University of Sydney), Ali Guenoun (University of Paris 1), Dick Howard (State University of New York), Ivan Iveković (American University in Cairo), Christophe Jaffrelot (CERI), Danielle Haase Du-Bosc (Columbia University Institute at Reid Hall, Paris), Radha Kumar, (Council on Foreign Relations), Giacomo Marramao (University of Rome 3), Rama Melkote (Osmania University), Ritu Menon (feminist historian and publisher, Kali for Women), Julie Mostov (Drexel University, Philadelphia), Jacques Poulain (University of Paris 8), Francesco Privitera (Alma Mater, University of Bologna), Jean-Luc Racine (MSH), Paolo Rumiz (journalist, Trieste), Jacques Rupnik (CERI), Elias Sanbar (Chief Editor, Revue d’Etudes Palestiniennes), Martine Spensky (University of Blaise Pascal, Clermont-Ferrand), Eleni Varikas (University of Paris 8), Sana Villavicencio (University of Buenos Aires), Chantal Mouffe (London University), Ernesto Laclau (University of Essex) and Oren Yiftachel (Ben Gurion University). Furthermore, and besides the sponsorship and the assistance provided by MSH and the Columbia University Institute for Scholars, a crucial collaboration for the achievement of the results included in the present volume came from (1) the University of Paris 8, where a three-year research and teaching project ‘Les partitions comparées – Une approche
d’anthropologie de la communication’ initiated by the Department of Philosophy was taking shape; (2) the association and the journal Transeuropéennes, which published a special issue on the topic (19/20, 2001) and triggered discussion on the theme; that special issue of the journal was subsequently reprinted in India by Oxford University Press in 2003 as a book edited by Ghislaine Glasson Deschaumes and Rada Iveković, Divided Countries, Separated Cities. The Modern Legacy of Partition; and (3) the School of Political Science, Alma Mater Studiorum, University of Bologna, Forli Campus, and their Institute for East Central and Balkan Europe. Methodologically, the aim of involving so large a group of both individual scholars and institutions stemmed from the deep belief of the core team that only a wide scientific dialogue and intensive interactions would represent a potentially effective pathway able to offer a broad set of insights, appropriate for producing a collective and common research programme on partitions. In fact, thanks to this approach, it was possible to include into the researches of the core team the following issues: (1) a genealogical study of a political technology by which the modern state along with the patriarchal self appears in international politics in many parts of the world; (2) a study of the problems of transition; (3) a study of the durability of the technique and the form of partition, its reproductive capacity and its character of hosting co-existent time; (4) a study of a very conspicuously modern form of political violence and civil war; (5) a study of the relation of space, territory and power, or a site of many political meanings; and finally (6) a study of the interrelation between two political technologies, namely, partition and dialogue. As a result of this networking activity, the core team maintained the contacts with all the participants of the project, even when the research period in Paris was over. In the following months, the core team was able to meet again, concluding the book and presenting the main results of the research in international conventions, meetings and conferences in Europe and in the US. In the end, the core group thanks all those who have made the research possible with their own generous contributions, and the present book a reality. In this respect, the authors first thank MSH, for the scientific impetus given to the project and the hospitality offered to the book’s authors, as well as the Columbia University Institute for Scholars at Reid Hall, where the group worked as Reid Hall fellows making use of its excellent work facilities. The journal Transeuropéennes brought out a special issue on partitions that sparked debates and discussions on the theme leading to the group research. We remain indebted to the journal for its encouragement and constant companionship for the work. The Department of Philosophy at the University of Paris 8 conducted a three-month seminar for students on diverse aspects and experiences around the theme. Our thanks go to the members of the faculty, the students and other participants, and to the lecturers who undertook the trouble in participating in the series. The University of Bologna, particularly the Institute for East Central and Balkan Europe and the ‘Europe and the Balkans International Network’, remained a constant source of support and encouragement. The collective, Convergences Palenstine/Israel, in which some journals collaborated with the IFHR and the LDH-France, and of which Transeuropéennes was an initiator and a member, had also been a source of support and encouragement. Our debt is also to the radio programme France Culture: it organized a discussion on the work when it was complete. Finally, and not the least, our deep obligation remains to all who joined
our meetings, gave us ideas, shared their expertise, helped us with fresh insights, and dropped in to provide encouragement, and to those who could not come but maintained links with the programme. Thanks to all of them, the subject of this volume has been elaborated and defined, although – it is evident – only the authors are fully responsible for its content. Stefano Bianchini, Sanjay Chaturvedi, Rada Iveković, Ranabir Samaddar
Introduction The infamous event Ranabir Samaddar At a time when the battle cry of dividing societies is making itself heard again through the demands for partition in a most zealous way, resuming the frenzy of what had been its mission always, namely, creating a heavenly identity at a point of fundamental divergence and rupture, as only God can testify, and therefore no dialogue can assuage, it will not be out of season to speak of some of the necessary things – this time in a milieu of political correctness sanctified by the god of identity, and linked to the idea of nation that has brought about a revolution in our political sense only comparable with the revolution in knowledge associated with the name of Copernicus. Possibly it can be said that, as a result of this discovery, it has become extremely difficult, if not almost impossible, and to think of the existences of other heavenly bodies beyond what this God has attested, and to think of political existence without the centre that this revolution has brought about. The commentaries of partition therefore often emanating from within the world of nation are only subsumed at a later stage within that world, and critiques emanating from outside that world remain very often unable to reach the dense clusters below – a strange case of void, as the void is filled up only by renewed emptiness. Why is it then, we must ask from as many possible ways, that writings of partition have to be bound by nationalist reasoning and have to move only in a closure? This volume is an attempt to understand that closure, the determining nature of that reason, the compelling character of the void, and the existence of nation in multiple or heterogeneous time that generates divisions and ruptures through which the nation dies and re-emerges, raising the prospect or the spectre of its demise only to belie it. The reasons that compel a nation to be partitioned in the form of the partition of the state are the reasons that guarantee the renewed life of the nation. This also ensures the near-permanent imprisonment of the critiques of partitions within nationalist reasoning. While this volume goes into the specifics of such a situation from several angles, we may anticipate here its one fundamental feature. The national space is certainly not a harmonious space produced by and mediated by multiple dialogues – it is a contentious space. Yet, we cannot be satisfied with telling only that it is a contentious space leading to divergences, ruptures and renewed formation of the nation-body. We must enter into the specifics of the dialogic situation and watch closely the dynamics, in as much as we must see, as this volume tries to, the specifics of the contention. In itself dialogue seems to involve a renunciation of force and a triumph of reason, and philosophy has always placed its hope on the merits of reason as alternative to force. The hope is that most serious maladies are also cured through dialogue, persuasion, communication, or some unity or understanding achieved by responding to appealing ideas and techniques. If this is the reason of all the modernist thinking of all times (we should not forget that all ages have their respective modernity), what is the specificity
Partitions: reshaping states and minds
2
added to this in the time of the nation and in the world of nations? That time ensures that verbal dialectics will never challenge the truth that has appeared to the dialogists in the form of a nation – a truth that, by its nature, can assure them and propose to them that they can continue their exchange and correspondence with the fundamental intention of advancing to new existences within the nation-form, whose very limits they remain unaware of, and therefore the limits of their advance. This is the act of a sleepwalker. The voices of dialogue will be therefore heard for a time whose duration will remain at the discretion of the agency called the nation. In particular, it will soon become apparent that the truth of nation, by remaining above the discussants and by refraining from becoming a party to the contest or getting involved in any way, has influenced most forcefully the conversation with the aid of what we may call for want of better words the ‘constraints of truth’. These constraints then run counter to the desired end of the dialogists. The dialogists may have started with a variety of ideas of justice and rights, and about how to reconcile them, may have other interests and sympathies, that is to say interests in and sympathies for others, and yet, ironically at a moment when the dialogue seems be getting intense, the dialogists have been depersonalised, all expressions other than those congealed in the truth of the nation under which they are labouring have gone, and dialogue has reached a stage of impassability, because the nation-space in which the dialogue is progressing has reached a stage of impassability. Partition is the occasion when the participants to a dialogue have been robbed of all characteristics, their identities completely effaced, all expressions deprived, and an apathy has been brought about in the participants about all other existences, and the truth has appeared in an oracular form where any interpretative intervention about this truth becomes quite meaningless in the background of this apathy. The politics of partition played out under the regime of that truth seems to suggest to the dialogists to take upon themselves all the sins of nationhood, the satisfactions of suffering, and the thought of being freed through a passion or a new faith in the birth of a new body – the nation. It is not that there is no critique then of this absorbing scenario congealed in the act of partition, but, most of the time produced from the nation-space that has produced the partition also, the critique is confined to the ‘constraints of truth’. This failed or blocked dialectic of nation/partition, or dialogue/partition, therefore, raises the question, namely, can one critique nation from within? Will an ethno-logic or geo-logic or cosmo-logic that criticizes nationalist reasoning (it may seem ironic, but is perfectly natural that cosmo-logic brings about partition in the name of a rational solution to the nationalist conundrum) be enough as critique, or sufficient as a representative of newer notions of justice? Or, is this a case where, irrespective of where-from the critique has originated, or even though it has originated from within, the critique has to be one from outside, and has to force the truth of nation to face its own constraints and accept the prospect of its own dissolution? In other words, can a critique of partition be anything other than political, in the fullest sense of the term? So here in studying partitions, we are actually at a sensitive frontier between the truth of nation and the political knowledge that critiques it in theory and practice – a formulation that at first sight may seem absurd in face of the celestial revolution that this discovery of the idea of nation has brought out. Yet the fact that the historical truth of the birth of nation is still a sufficiently burning question for us, as the opening essay of this volume tells us, suggests the need to be aware that at that sensitive frontier a shift is
Introduction: the infamous event
3
taking place. It is remarkable how little studies of nations in the past, engrossed as they were with cultural ingredients of nationalism, had attended to the issues of the institutional formation of boundaries, borders, partition, ethnicity and territory – as if these were separate registers – and therefore how little ethno-logic, geo-logic or cosmologic that fed into the nationalist logic, which is the logic of partition also, were considered in accounting for the historical truth of nationalism. The political historian Oren Yiftachel has rightly taken to task the chroniclers of nationalism for not taking seriously ‘territory as the kernel of the nation’. And it does not escape our eyes, how today emphasis has turned into a study of institutions and practices of boundary making by which a nation dies and is reborn. If yesterday the dynamics of unity (the constitution of the space) was the theme, today it is dynamics of division (the fault-lines in that space). The renewed interest in partition has come against this background. Partition being the nationalist resolution of a nationalist problematic, it could not have been otherwise. The increasing political knowledge of the closed world of the truth of nation now demands that the entire historical story of state formation be reopened, and that somewhat humorous formula that no citizen is supposed be ignorant of how his/her state came into being be investigated. Yet, in view of the long history of partitions it will be naive to assume simply that partition is the birth story and end story of nations often couched in a language of violence, and that it is only a nationalist resolution of a nationalist problematic. As the long essay by Stefano Bianchini in this volume reinforces the point, partition in modern times is connected to the interaction between statehood and nationhood. In other words, in partition we find in absolute clarity, nation as a problem for the state. Partition not only confronts us with the issue of how a nation becomes a fully empowered political society, but, more importantly, how a state can become a state on the basis of nationhood, with what minimum or maximum of nationhood it emerges as a state. Of course, as Bianchini shows in his very detailed study, determining this degree is a historical question, and not a matter that waits for a one-time rational answer. Here again, we are faced with the intractable question in politics: how do we define transition from one form to another? The lead essay by Rada Iveković connects with the following historical study of Bianchini by putting forth at the outset of the volume the difficulty inherent in viewing partition as a form of transition, while partition remains a form of transition. The important implication of her argument is that transition is transgression, and if there is any doubt as to the political implication of this formulation, readers will be advised to connect Rada Iveković’s argument with the geopolitical account written by Sanjay Chaturvedi, and seek out in Chaturvedi’s complicated story of the interplay of various logics in the annals of partition, which produces in his words the ‘excess’, the implication of the issue of transgression. Partition is ‘transgression’; it is an ‘excess’. Apart from the policy implications of the interplay that Chaturvedi narrates in exhaustive details, the implications of this argument in terms of political theory are significant. Again, we need not anticipate the themes here. We can restrict ourselves to a few remarks at this stage. Transition is transgression. What will be in barest outlines the implication of this? Partition in contemporary experience presents the truth of nation as a process of nature – a truth that was for long lingering in the shadows and hiding under various guises, until partition has brought the opportunity to claim the truth as ‘natural’, to which only God can attest, and therefore which is futile to contest, and which thus presents to the subjects
Partitions: reshaping states and minds
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the sole option to inherit it. In the light of partition the nation emerges as a mystic entity, which then carries to the limits of consciousness the individuality of nationhood – the individuality that is possible only through statehood. Yet, in this, what is lost, what is transformed or what is gained? The nation of course gains political sovereignty, though as the two essays here of Stefano Bianchini and Ranabir Samaddar point out the, such sovereignty is often impoverished. What is transformed is equally significant – the quality of democracy. Nation loses its federal character, and its dialogic space dramatically narrows down. On the sands of a dwindling democracy the successor states gain their individuality. Everywhere, as the experiences of Israel–Palestine, the Indian subcontinent, former Yugoslavia, or many other polities marked by partition tell us, the nation suffers in terms of its democratic quality. Built on partition, which is the other name for permanent fissure because of its capacity and function to reproduce partition as a mechanism of ‘final solution’ of the problem of difference, the state empties itself, not always dramatically, indeed many a time gradually, of objects, beings and spaces identified with federality, dialogue and democracy. Partition as a form of transgression performs two simultaneous functions – it prescribes the sole manner of discovering the political sacred, the particular form of politics that will henceforth rule and be worshipped; it removes at the same time all objects and spaces that do not belong to that sacred sphere, or at least drives them underground. Democracy has to search henceforth for non-national forms. Partition as transition poses challenge to democracy in its historical journey, more than it does to the nation-truth. The nation, one can argue, has suffered a split, but as truth it gains. The state, again one can argue, has suffered in terms of sovereignty or governing capacity, but as recipient of legitimacy it has profited. But democracy, as a space for deliberation, dialogue, and as federal organization of a political society, only loses. Its loss is double. It loses in terms of capacity; it also loses its ‘natural form’, which is the nation, and henceforth it has to make back-breaking efforts, whose end we have yet to see, towards gaining non-national forms. Transgression is thus an action that involves the limit – that narrow space where it displays in a flash its passage, its origin and its career. The extremely short duration of the action actually congeals the repeated trials by the nation to fly into statehood without suffering any diminution, to dispense with democracy by taking democracy to its furthest possible limit. This book speaks of these limits and few others, and the obstinacy, violation and exhaustion entailed in crossing the limits that remain unsurpassable. These are not therefore black and white stories on nationalism or modern statehood, but accounts of possibilities and impossibilities of modern political forms, and the sovereignty of political experiences of these possibilities and impossibilities – experiences that the profound silence that follows an act of partition cannot kill or deny. Everywhere the critique of partition arises from within after a lapse of time, when the act of transgression has passed into history, and political experience has regained its sovereignty. Again, one can see the way or the time that it has required in Israel (thirty-five years) or in the Indian subcontinent (nearly fifty years) for political criticism to emerge. Partition as an infamous event, much like the lives of Foucault’s ‘infamous men’, can only be known in shafts of light provided by on one hand the nation-truth which periodically denaturalizes itself, and on the other hand by political experience that exercises its sovereign capacity only after lapse of time and in sudden bursts.
Introduction: the infamous event
5
As an event, partition can only lend itself to empirical study. Precisely because as an ensemble of experiences it is inexhaustible, empiricism is the only way to know the event, and in this case, probably as in many others, empiricism becomes a great creator of concepts whose force enables us to go beneath one mask after another in the event of partition – masks of politics that invariably constitute this event. Therefore, in drawing our attention to the amazing variety of forms of partition and in that context alluding to ‘interpretative categories’, Stefano Bianchini is making a fundamental point, namely, that the meaning of partition depends on context, being an event that represents a flux that plays upon nation, state, ethnicity, great power politics, democracy, self-determination, identity and the incorporeal political truths. The eternal quarrel about what is partition is nothing but the symptom of a fundamental process, whereby the act of interpretation in politics has been grafted on to the very existence of the political being – Paul Ricoeur would have said, a case of marriage of hermeneutics and phenomenology. Instead of asking, on what condition can the political subject understand the event, Bianchini’s essay asks, what kind of political being is one whose existence consists of eternal attempts to understand the event. Almost surreptitiously, Bianchini has changed the terms of discourse. He has presented us through tight drawing a map inhabited by subjects of partition, earlier inhabited by subjects of nation. In this way, he has carried forward some earlier works, for instance of Robert Shaeffer (Severed States – Dilemmas of Democracy in a Divided World, 1999), Metta Spencer (ed., Separatism – Democracy and Disintegration, 1998), and T.G. Fraser (Partition in Ireland, India and Palestine, 1984). From here will begin a long and inexhaustible story: partition as the other of nation, which must undergo fracture again and again to recompose, and the theatricality of the recomposition as the other of the banality of governmentality. (Our debt to Foucault and limits of the concept of governmentality are obvious here.) Hopefully this volume will not only indicate the need for a wider study of partitions, but a change in the terms of the discourse of studies of nationalism – from a study of ideas to a study of institutions, from a study of spirit to a study of practices of space-making, and from a study of imagination to a study of the interplay of territory, time and ethnicity. The implication of this shift will be a move away from the meta-theories that attempt to describe and explain nationalism and almost always falter when faced with the enormous diversity of polities operating under the title of ‘nation’. Oren Yiftachel tells us, rightly, that, in view of this diversity, it may be more fruitful to treat ‘nationalism’ as a broad shell – akin perhaps to the terms ‘society’ or ‘state’ – and explore in depth the concrete practices that are subsumed by the term. But by this token, dare I suggest, the implication of these four studies goes further, for further they prod us along this line to think further, that there cannot be any meta-theory or meta-history of partition. This too, as the other of nation, splits itself again and again in the world of the practices of space making. Another important and in this context relevant suggestion of Bianchini’s essay, also brought out in great detail by Chaturvedi in the particular study of the Indian partition, is that in this schizophrenia of the moment, which I have described also as the theatricality of recomposition of the nation, we have not only a breaking of bounds of codes and territories, but a molar form that carries strong traces of molecular partitions, such as neighbourhood partition, village partition, city partition, community partition, family partition, gender partition, and even partition of political parties and organizations – a proliferation of molecular partitions that work themselves out in interaction, skipping
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from one point to another, before resonating together and resuming their life in the infamous event of partition. Partitions are based on principles, readers will find Rada Iveković arguing, the first of which is the division of humankind. The geography of partition is not therefore that of a mountain amid plains, but of ‘a thousand plateaus’. The long shadow of partitions in the last century will be here to stay with us for a long time. We can briefly state some of the reasons. The attempts to overcome the marks, laws and logic of partition will require more time and space than the global politics of our time is willing to allow at present. What kind of politics of the subject is this that nobody is willing to shoulder its responsibility, yet everybody seems to accept it as the form of a resolution of a very fundamental problem, that of the political subject? The question is acute because many partitions are ‘long partitions’, as the historian Eric Hobsbawm once put it in front of the research group whose collective product is this volume. As we say, the longer a dispute the more intractable it is, and we can add, more complicated is the history of responsibility. Shorter partitions are amenable to revisions. A determined effort from outside can in some cases undo it. Or, with the collapse of one successor state in its war with the co-successor state, the partition may be over. The issue of responsibility for every infamous thing linked with partition and that follows partition will be exhausted with victory of one successor (think of the massive corruption and scandal associated with Kohl administration in West Germany in its war against East Germany, or CIA’s war against Patrice Lumumba, now nothing but dead stories; stories of violence in building a state are finally dead stories), though such eventuality will pass off as reunification. One may even call it as restoration. But long partitions are sterner stuff. They are not only products of long history; they make long history. Long partition helps a nation to solidify by enabling the latter to create a permanent other. The most recent round of Balkan partition shows how creating a non-national or multinational but nonimperial state in today’s world is an extremely difficult enterprise. Indeed, the short histories of bi-national or multinational states show the paradox of the situation – these are the cases where, contrary to the nationalist common sense; a state is failing not because it is not congruent with a nation, but because the search for congruency is always failing here. Such search is almost doomed to failure, and again contrary to nationalist common sense; the state in cases like this cannot create a durable nation. In other words the state cannot be a ‘nationalizing state’; a state cannot be congruent with a nation. The implication of this rigmarole is that repeated partitions mark the long career of statehood, and not nationhood. These are the cases where one partition quickly leads to another, and the state seems to live in concentric circles joining and rejoining everything that goes with statehood, namely law, citizenship, territorial divisions, rights and obligations. The complexity is more. In short partitions the vivisected nations refuse to reconcile to partitioned existence; these are the cases where the state longs for a united nationhood as its basis. Standing the common wisdom on its head, one can say that in short partitions, such as Vietnam and Germany (probably Korea would also join the list), the nationalist journey succeeded; whereas in long partitions nation fails the state, because the project of harmonizing nation with the state becomes impossible, because of the continuous reproduction of political fissures within that stops the state from achieving nationhood. This is when the task of building the state through creating otherness becomes a serious
Introduction: the infamous event
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business. This is also when the issue of responsibility gets blurred in the long history of the politics of otherness. The third essay of the volume begins with a brief discussion on how the politics of otherness is linked with partition, and a suggestion as to how we can gain from Linda Colley’s work on Great Britain. The point is significant, for, while the act of partition may in one case be of extremely short duration, in terms of a swelling politics of otherness (buttressed by governmental techniques), which makes partition potent and living long after it has been over, we can cast such a case as belonging to ‘long partitions’. Obviously, in identifying these two types, there is no cast-iron division; lines are blurred in many instances. The ‘length’ of a long partition is not merely a matter of time or duration (which will be always debatable), but more of the scope of play of the politics of otherness. The Irish experience with which Samaddar begins is significant. Like most narratives of national beginning, the modern story of British and Irish identities began on a mirror stage, which helped forge through ages the notion of a protoBritish English nation against the colonized Irish. Historians of otherness like Richard Kearney and Linda Colley tell us that the story of otherness goes as far back as the fourteenth century, and both (English and Irish) narratives, while reflecting the settler– native contradiction, masked a whole mix of successive migrations of the Vikings, Scots, Celts, Anglo-Normans, etc. Laws were constructed to mark out two distinct peoples, and the fantasy of Protestant purity characteristic of Cromwell’s age was succeeded by disenfranchising Irish Catholics en masse in favour of planter Protestants. It would take two hundred years after the failed rebellion of 1798 for Ireland and Britain to mutually renounce this long journey of hostile otherness and agree to a beginning of cohabitation. The long asymmetry of the colonizers and the colonized resulted in partition, and, though efforts to turn the wheels of history have started, it would require nothing less than a hard and long persistence in renouncing the past – if not as long as the history of separation, at least long enough to say that it will need the collective goodwill of an entire generation, and, besides the prudence of the once colonized, the unlikely compassion of the one-time colonizer. Reading national identities as contingent, relational and as interaction between several different histories is the best way to understand how long partitions work, and how a counter-history of accom-modation, which equally belongs to the zone of desire, can be put in the form of narrative. It is also possible then to see how, counter to the political history of partition, the political history of accommodation at every level is characterized by a specific desire to achieve a new subjectivity. The strategic benefit of an imperial power is not merely commercial, economic and political, but enormously psychic as well. The departing imperial power, leaves to the decolonized almost a permanent liability in form of an organization of rule, which rests, similar to the era of the departing power, on a conception of nationhood that is imperial and reflexive. The story of imperial nation does not end, even though we tend to believe that it came to a close in the three decades following the end of the Second World War; it renews its journey in the emergence of split nations whose drama we are just beginning to witness. Sixty years is too short a period to see the end of the play of estranged voices caricatured through imperial demands of a nation on its neighbours, on its subjects and on its constituents. The main difficulty here, it seems to me, is that decolonization, which carries within it the chronicles of long partitions, does not offer us any historical truth of responsibility.
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Contrary to current wisdom in which the great powers of today would like us to believe, it is not truth, but responsibility, which paves the way for the reconciliation that lies at the heart of any project of doing away with the legacy of partitions. Acknowledgement of responsibility, developed ironically in the non-essential areas of international law, is an undeveloped historical practice of powers that now want a change in the rules of the game. The most real and the most grotesque example of disowning responsibility for partition is of course Israel and the international community that has backed it since its birth. Long partitions hide or almost erase any mark of accountability or responsibility from formal political life, so much so that people come to accept the line handed down by the rulers that establishment of responsibility is an irretrievable proposition, and that therefore the people have no other way than to reconcile to the game of partition/dialogue/partition/split-nationhood. The way responsible government was introduced by colonial powers in the erstwhile colonies was a shameless charade of responsibility, as the history of British colonial rule in India teaches us. Each introduction of responsible rule – the Morley–Minto Reforms, the Montague–Chelmsford Reforms, the Simon Proposals, the Government of India Act of 1935 and the Independence Act of 1947 – introduced divisions and furthered them, and each of these Acts successfully hid or avoided the imperative of responsibility. We are witnessing a similar process in Palestine, and in many areas on earth today, where in the name of self-rule Bantustans are being created, and, like the carcass of a dead dog being thrown into the cleaning truck, the old decomposing state is being thrown out – it is said, to usher in responsible government. The story of partition is linked to this horror drama almost everywhere, most pronouncedly in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Depletion of sovereignty, introduction of constitutionalism from outside and partitioned state – the troika of home rule is thus marching ahead. In this long chronicle, the vanishing traces of responsibility for making enmity the permanent feature of our lives are becoming increasingly difficult to recover. One instance from the recent history of Palestine will make clear the point about erasure of the notion of responsibility by the event of partition. Israel has long denied its responsibility for the events of 1948 – the Nakbah that forced the Palestinian population away from Palestine at the point of Israeli guns. However, today, when recognition of the wrongs done to the Palestinians in 1948 is finally dawning, and when evidences of destroyed old cities, as in Haifa – once-beautiful buildings, and remnants of covered markets, mosques and churches – are uncovered, Israeli politicians are openly advocating a new ‘transfer option’, and saying that they do not understand what Nakbah means, that there was no judaization of the formerly Palestinian villages and neighbourhoods, and that there was no disaster, no catastrophe, no Nakbah. Therefore catastrophe is not alone in visiting partition’s victims – the erasure of any trace of catastrophe by administrative, military and cultural means accompany the disaster; to be precise they follow it. It has been in this way that the issue of the return of refugees of 1948 and thereafter was sidelined in the Oslo agreement and it has today removed any chance of speaking of accountability and working for reconciliation. Indeed, as an Israeli historian tells us, the Nakbah had been so efficiently kept off the agenda of the peace process that, when it suddenly appeared on it, the Israelis felt as if a Pandora’s box had been prised open in front of them. The worst fear of the Israeli negotiators has been that Israel’s responsibility for the 1948 catastrophe may become a negotiable issue. Therefore, in the Israeli media and parliament, the Knesset, a consensus has been reached that no Israeli negotiator
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would be allowed even to discuss the right of return of the Palestinian refugees to the homes they had occupied before 1948. Though there are cracks in the denial that pervades textbooks or school syllabus or public broadcast, the politics of ethnic cleansing has gone too deep, first by cleaning textbooks of any Palestinian trace – trace of the disaster, the infamous event. The same thing in a different way has happened in the Indian subcontinent where the public mind has been trained to shut down on the issue of responsibility for the genocide of 1947. Since one-sided accounts may be unbelievable, the strategy is one of creating silence about accountability. This indeed as governmental strategy is necessary since partitions and unities go hand in hand. The Palestinian partition solidified various types of Jews into Jew, various types of Muslims into Pakistani or Hindus into Indian, or, as Rada Iveković argues, Balkan partition unified Europe. In her words, the Balkans fell to partition in the 1990s, while Europe de-partitioned itself. Europe came to unite more substantially over and around the dismembered body of Yugoslavia. Had political Europe preceded the breakdown of Yugoslavia, the latter may not have happened. Europe made itself through successive moves regarding the Yugoslav quagmire, each decision over the latter being a further step towards the gradual constitution of a common European will. The great law about infamy is that, even though it may contain long periods whose traces have vanished under the labyrinth of happenings, strategies, and moves and counter-moves, infamy is finally an event that looks like a battlefield, which may have all kinds of preparation behind it, but illumines by itself without any reference to the planning rooms of generals and colonels. And, ironically, because it is an event unto itself, it dissuades political critique that threatens to go beyond narrative and its metaphors. That is why how to write about partition is linked to the agenda of political understanding of one of the crucial issues of our time. Those who think that by verbal or stylistic command they can dispense with politics in narrating partition can be ultimately dispensed with by it. This book therefore not only attempts four times to work round the theme, but in four different ways also to capture the politics of partition, which is, we can say, what remains after cultural, civilizational, ethnic and psychological explanations have exhausted themselves. The task of criticism here is a kind of halfway house between two forms of existence – the given or the banal and the outside or the exceptional. In mediating between the two, criticism of a political event inevitably creates a new discourse, which like the criticism that gives birth to it is half-real. The dialogue between the event and its criticism is the strangest, as the authors of this volume show in different ways – first, when criticism appears alongside the event and then is submerged in it, and then, when the event is final, settled and has reached a stage of non-negotiation, suddenly criticism reopens it. In that sense we must qualify what we said earlier about the internality and the externality of criticism. Criticism of partition is no longer a form of external judgement, which confers value on the event after the event and pronounces its own value. To critique it, as we show, is to question the conditions of its possibility as an event that has turned out to be inseparable from the experiences of the age in which the event has taken place. The usual complaint, therefore, is true that such criticism is no longer capable of judging; but then we have to remember that it no longer judges. It delves into conditions of possibility. It is in this sense that the last century could be called the century of partitions. As many writings in the last twenty years on the conditions of nation–truth and partition – borders, boundaries, divisions, circular spaces, friendships,
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enmities, killings, genocide, responsibility, publics and leaders, citizenship, territoriality, globalization and universality – testify, the history about this truth is opening up within history, already moving beyond value towards a strangely different and therefore unpredictable kind of affirmation. As the philosopher tells us, when we sleep night does not bother us; night also sleeps. Maurice Blanchot had added that we have to have the experience of bottomless deep sleep in order to put the ghost of night to rest. It is the deep experience of a strangely different voyage – so deep that it makes the infamies of the past irrelevant for us – that puts the nights to rest. Faith in such experience is not mysticism, but, were it to be so, what does it matter? The nation-truth’s gift to us; we who all had been its children, is partition, which we are unable to accept; it is a struggle in which we are engaged but whose finality is eluding us; a struggle still unknown to become an adequate description, since it is as familiar as it is foreign. Beyond genocide is thus not only a moral act; it is grounding in different experience that political struggles sometime lead people to. For want of better words, we may say it is an experiential act in happiness of trying to lead a different collective life. The heart of the aporia, it seems to me, lies in the following fact: there is as yet little alternative to sovereignty as the form of democracy, while democracy requires both selfdetermination and federality. Therefore we are presented with a closed world where sovereignty, borders, self-determination, democracy and federality allow us only tantalizing glimpses of new forms of political existence that will combine a new system of rights and the incipient forms of justice with classical attributes of citizenship – in other words, a new way of combining membership in historical communities with newer forms of association. The possibility of breaking out of the closed world is in fact the biggest challenge to democracy – more than to anything else. For, on the one hand, customs unions, free-trade areas, global trade regimes, unhindered rights of powerful democracies to intervene anywhere (The Foreign Affairs magazine expectedly salutes the interventionist democracy as the ‘reluctant imperialist’), and establishment of political unions by cartels are the factors dragging the unwilling nations or people and enticing the rest to the eldorado of unity and prosperity; on the other hand, with the spread of mass democracy people are demanding self-rule. This is the classic democratic paradox – partition is the combination of imperial and democratic politics. Absurd? Yes, but true. How to reconfigure and redefine democracy that will allow citizenship federality and rights with justice is the biggest question on the solution of which will depend whether the long century of partitions that still continues will come to an end. Readers will notice that the authors of the essays in this volume have all approached that contingency of the future with uncertainty, because, as I have tried to explain here, the future of the political subjecthood is now at a crossroads.
1 Partition as a form of transition Rada Iveković If Rwanda was the genocide that happened, then South Africa was the genocide that didn’t. M. Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers, p. 185
Speaking about partitions and transitions implies a modern Western episteme, which may be inadequate in the sense that it applies to other parts of the world Western criteria. It is self-understood, for example, that it is the Western type of modernity that is being globalized, and that is not wrong in a self-critical Western perspective. The following chapter is consciously written in the latter manner, while raising nevertheless some problems regarding the order of discourse. I have a general uneasiness about the term and the idea of ‘transitions’, which is not so much the difficulty or perhaps the recurrent emptiness of its many definitions, but rather its conceptual context. It presupposes the ‘end of history’ (transition to what?).1 Where do we locate, in the sense of a discipline, an area, a theoretical framework, thinking about transitions and, for that matter, also thinking about partitions? We are in an interdisciplinary composite field of research, and from the philosophical point of view I take it as a challenge that the term(s), or should I say the concept(s), of both transition and partition resist not only classification, but also serious theorization. I shall raise some of the problems connected with these terms, and I shall argue that protracted partitions are themselves meant to be transitions to a would-be non-partitionable state in the same way as a war is waged with the purpose of ending all wars. The debate usually goes in the direction of how to formally satisfy some international norms in institution building, in the implementation of democracy or of human and minority rights, etc. Needless to say that the norms come from international advicegivers. What remains largely undiscussed in pragmatic politics are the principles, premises and presuppositions of these discussions. What also remains non-transparent is the linkage between the conditions of the language on transition, and the conditions that brought a country to the situation it is in. It is difficult to take one’s distance from a logic when that logic is inherent in the language. Through partitions, ethnocracies have lately been established to end Socialist partitocracies, but have often themselves become partitocracies in their own right at best.2 Partitions perform a regional political reconfiguration through achieving independence for new states. They often institutionalize inequality (an injustice), whether inner or outer, or both. They usually settle for a transition period or a ‘temporary’ arrangement during which further partitions may happen or drag on. The partition may be thought of as temporary, and therefore entails the prompt recognition by neighbours and
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accomplices in the divorce. What we loosely call ‘transitions’ accompany post-partition situations. Partitioned states (and their respective political elites) after 1989, through willed secessions, have aimed at securing sovereignty for themselves, but paradoxically have achieved less of it than the parent-state had.3 The excess of geopolitics (as elaborated by Sanjay Chaturvedi in his contribution to this volume) results in a deficit of autonomy. Today, it is concerned more and more with the control of virtual fluxes and of new technologies of communication. The concept of sovereignty linked originally to the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and peace precedes and roots not only the concrete state, but also the idea of nation-state. However, that treaty was important because it changed the face of Europe and curtailed the authority of the empires and of the Pope. It gave some states more authority than others. Subsequent states were organized along those lines of sovereignty. It also contributed to the development of the idea of individual freedom and consciousness. The idea of sovereignty, which was meant to ensure and fix the (nation)state, remains a permanent threat to it because it tends to descend upon even ‘lower’ levels of identification and destabilizes the state from within. Also, as put forth by Alain Brossat, ‘it is supported by a founding violence establishing a right’.4 On the other hand, since an excess of sovereignty may easily lead to war, higher offices, such as the League of Nations and the United Nations, were soon conceived. The Nürnberg Tribunal, after the Second World War, accorded high legitimacy to the idea of international justice. Today, while an International Penal Tribunal, with all its underlying ideals, is still waiting to be established, international justice has been dealt with by the Tribunal for War Crimes in the former Yugoslavia (the Hague Tribunal), by the Tribunal for Rwanda, and sometimes even by national justice giving itself international competence. Partitioned histories of transitions When speaking of partitions or transitions, we really speak of recurrent doing and undoing of states, nations, identities and also of international configurations and reconfigurations. How a particular state is constituted (often through partitions of other states or nations) will depend, in different degrees, on how the community is integrated. The nation (constituted by the state or constituting it) is also a community to start with, and in modernity it is preferable to have it develop into an integrated society (with public space and democracy) in order to provide a solid basis for the state. I take community to be the immediacy of hierarchy and threat of violence, and society to be its possible cultural, symbolic and historic mediation. What actually holds the nucleus of the community together, and triggers the process of transforming a communal nation into a societal and political one, has been a matter of debate. It might be understood in terms of the ‘common’, or in the sense of Roberto Esposito’s astute comment that the common is precisely the other.5 It is as much as we give ourselves common ‘others’ that we constitute our identity, which is assembled around a unifying verticality (and masculinity). Ultimately, since the ‘other’ has to be eliminated, community arises around death. It is also about avoiding dying which, ultimately, means maintaining power. The association needs dissociation. What we experience as partitions and transitions are but segments of much longer processes. Hobbes shows the way here, since the ‘Leviathan’ discards any natural links, which need to be institutionalized and replaced by a contract in
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order to prevent a possible disintegration. But Locke’s idea of a tabula rasa exposes the binary and also the language distance and matrix. Its ‘void’ is unrepresentable, or unthinkable, yet it is ‘represented’ as the tabula rasa. From this zero point can we start counting or writing? Yet it is difficult to think of this ‘before’, as an unbearable anchorage of ‘Being’, visualized as ‘Naught’. Likewise, the sovereign state still needs other ‘sovereignties’ to confirm its contradicting itself, whereby a tacit commonality is acknowledged, like Gutenberg’s ‘empty page which has propagated itself through the whole world, or like the screen. A support that doesn’t count, for example a wrapping paper sold along with the merchandise, is not seen.’6 The Hobbesian logic being somehow circular through the dichotomy, later thinkers (Rousseau, but more so Kant) try to deconstruct it. Kant passes from the inner dimension of will to the outer, transcendental dimension of law, and abandons the philosophical brooding about origins. He now looks ahead, though without illusions, because the categorical imperative has no guaranteed contents or form. We have endless duties, never fulfilled, and the prescription of law gives an ideal which is in principle non-realizable: subjectivity itself is problematic, boiling down to individual differences, plagued by the fact that there is no safe and uniform connection between the practical and the theoretical reason. Have we moved much ahead of Kant even today? Continuity still relies not on so many discontinuities. The most striking one (but culturally invisible) is the discontinuity of the masculine lineage made a continuity through the Father’s name while decomposing the female continuity on which it feeds in order to recompose itself. Not only filiations, but also the states, though different, have the same origin. Two options in the constitution of the nation, and eventually of the state, will soon appear in Europe and will ultimately have a bearing on the configuration of statehood and nationhood in the whole world: the ‘naturalistic’ concept of the nation, upheld by Herder and by the Romantics, and having its ultimate possible and extreme historic consequences, though not as a fatality, in the Nazi project;7 and the French Revolution concept of a republican, secular and democratic nation. Both essentialize the ‘woman’, but not quite in the same way. The first nations in Europe have appeared together with modern states, which makes some contemporary authors (B. Anderson, E. Gellner and others) think that the nation is a modern product and that there is a radical shift from some very different premodernity. Alas, these authors have usually not gone into the study of how nation, statehood and citizenship apply to women, both theoretically and practically. Indeed, the move is not so radical and modernity uses ‘pre-modern’ devices in order to fulfil its ‘modern’ predicament. Likewise elsewhere, where in some cases nation-states are older than in Europe (as in the Americas) – they were established by Creoles and settlers who emancipated themselves from the European crowns because of their early capitalist economic interests, but without the local population, which was as good as non-existent for them. The Indios, in this case, were included as slaves and workers in a subordinate way (like women), and not given citizenship, although the latter was thought of as universal.8 This is how big divides were inbuilt in ‘modern’ institutions, preparing divisions along lines which were constructed in a complex way from the beginning, and at the same time class, ethnic or ‘racial’, religious, linguistic and gender divisions were also created. The complexity of these intertwined socioeconomic cleavages may sometimes take a long time before it is expressed as political. When it is not, it may turn to violence. This is also how a forgotten past may prepare future
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partitions and transitions. This doesn’t happen only in the Third World, but also in the Old World, and since the end of the Cold War in certain inner decolonizations of Europe (of the ‘European’ minds), by a return-effect of post-colonialism to where it all started – are more or less contemporary processes. But discourses other than the Western one are not bereft of a self-questioning capacity. If only we were used to speculating with concepts from these other universes, we would see that they have a usually neglected critical and political potential. Śruti (the order of hearing /of/ the Word, or Revelation) and darśana (the order of seeing, and thus of possible representation) are two different epistemes, operating together in a manner comparable to ‘pre-modernity’ or ‘tradition’ and ‘modernity’ as a result of a hegemony negotiated between ‘lower’ classes and castes and the elites in ancient India. There is a tension between the two. With the Hindu popular reconfiguration or breakthrough into Brahmanism, at the time of the appearance of the order of darśana and in vernacular movements, we witness an autochthonous opening for the political.9 Indeed, sight/ viewing is both political and aesthetical, and it opens wide the question on representation in both spheres, as well as the question of its limits. However controversial, this could be seen as a type of early modernity. I am leaving aside the important question of how to define modernity, and have myself gone by different definitions in the past. The current question of modernity raises immediately the question of the relation to the West and to colonial powers, since it is Western modernity that it being globalized and universalized. But if we reject the usual essentialization by which some societies are considered intrinsically pre-modern and traditional and if we agree that our global (post-)modernity today creates new premodernities and ‘new traditions’, then the problem raised by this tension is much older and has the potentiality of emerging any time in history anywhere. The Taliban themselves are not some anachronistic pre-modern feature; they are, among other things, a desperate response to the challenge of Western modernity, an attempt to cope with it or to counter it through an intervention in both the order of hearing and that of seeing. From the latter they eliminate women completely, thus amputating themselves of a vital part of humanity. But one could argue that even theirs is a form of modernity. It will be useful to insert a comment on Hegel and the constitution of the state through the status he gives to the citizenship of women. According to Hegel, the family (and, in our sense, the community) is the locus par excellence of the ‘divine law’, where the sister is equal to the brother before being married but where, otherwise, masculine and ‘universal’ seniority prevails ‘naturally’, which means parents over children and the husband over the wife.10 Since the individual is real and substantial only as a citizen, says Hegel, when he is referred only to the family, he or she doesn’t represent anything. The real substance, which is absolute spirit, is the people.11 The latter, at the level of concrete existence, is involved in the ‘human law’, but at the state of the universal it has to do with custom (ethnicity), because any universality is custom. The family is the site of the selfconsciousness and awareness whose goal is the individual and where the links are not those of love, but of habit. The human law has as its contents the total people,12 while the divine law comprehends the individual behind reality and assigns it to pure abstraction. The relationship between a man and a woman as one between husband and wife is ‘natural’ and has in itself no reality (except in the child), and yet the family (as well as marriage) is something customary. In the customary sphere, the sister reigns unperturbed until marriage. After it, the sense of life of a woman is to take care of the universally
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abstract (the husband as such, the child as such, any: the office of a husband or of a child), because she is in charge of the continuity of the community. The individual sense is added without distinction to this superior sense that gives her universal responsibility. In the husband, on the contrary, as in the state, the two are separated, in that he is a citizen and owns that which the woman doesn’t have (though she serves him!) – the selfconscious power of the universal. He grants himself the right to desire and act in public, while the woman is deprived of the recognition by others. So, the brother ‘passes from the sphere of the divine law in which he lived, to human law. As for the sister, she becomes, or the woman remains, the directing office of the household and the guardian of the divine law’.13 So, it is after all paradoxically women who reconstruct, by their continuity and at each generation, the masculine discontinuity for them and for the community as a whole, because absolute freedom, says Hegel further, is this completely abstract self-consciousness, which eliminates in itself all the differences and even the existence of any difference. So, absolute liberty is its own object, and its flip-side is death. We think we are back at a symmetrical dichotomy, but it is not so, because the dialectics of the lord and the slave allows the reversal of the system – in favour of the slave, yes, but not so apparently in favour of the woman who still remains a Being-forthe-other, even though femaleness remains the eternal irony of the state wanting at the same time (justice) to ‘bring back to the universal the Being-for-itself that has strayed from the equilibrium’ and although she is in a way a ‘people’s government’ wishing for a justice she cannot achieve, being reduced to an unresolved singularity. A woman remains limited through divine law to singularity and has no superior recourse. As opposed to the slave, she cannot turn upside down her subjection. The equality of a woman as sister is secured in Hegel’s system. One could think that the equality of the man as brother is so too. But the image is not secular. A man is completely and always turned towards the public sphere. And if, in the relationship of the two (within the limits of the parental family?) there is no advantage of his over the sister, the equality ends there. Outside her brother, in rapport with whom she can be a juridical subject in heritage and in principle only, a woman is the equal of no man. If she doesn’t marry, she becomes again his junior. Not only is the state in Hegel (and in any patriarchy) established upon the subordination of women, and thus theorized and justified, but the unity of the state is also built upon inner cleavages, divisions and upon possible, if not probable, (future) partitions – partition as a matter of principle, the first of which is the division of humankind. The point of non-return from violence As Mahmood Mamdani points out, the events in Rwanda did not have to take a bloody turn, and also the record of independent Rwanda was rather impressive until the eighties.14 One could say the same of Yugoslavia, whose dismemberment was part of a general systemic breakdown of the dichotomy of ideological division of the world and of Europe. The Balkans fell to partition in the 1990s while Europe de-partitioned itself. Europe came to unite more substantially over and around the dismembered body of Yugoslavia. Had political Europe preceded the breakdown of Yugoslavia, the latter may not have happened. Europe made itself through successive moves regarding the Yugoslav
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quagmire, each decision over the latter being a further step towards the slow constitution of a common European will. The integration of Europe is complemented by partitions. It proceeds through a gentle ‘expansion’ to the East – gentle, not in the sense that it doesn’t provoke violence, but in the sense that most countries and populations to the East wish to be included and see it as a solution to their problems and as escaping poverty. In this sense it doesn’t appear to be a conquest. Geographic and imaginary Europe has no clear ‘natural’ border to the East and is not a separate continent from Asia towards which it slowly progresses. The process consists of (1) the dismemberment of the USSR, of Czechoslovakia and of Yugoslavia (at its outer border, as Europe is progressing eastwards); (2) a series of partitioned nations with or without a referent state, some prospectively within Western Europe (these, then are considered regional problems only), some in the East; for Europe, this means both internal fractures, as well as further delimitations to the East; and (3) the events after September 11, 2001, and the American war on Afghanistan, which are precipitating this process, but are also enhancing a supplementary de-subjectivization of Europe, losing sovereignty within the international configuration. At the same time, the ‘New’ Great Game around Afghanistan, the scramble over oil and other resources in Central Asian Republics, and the Russian war in Chechnya are causing reshuffling and the questioning of European boundaries more to the East, rather sooner than could have been expected after the Balkans crisis, while the partitioning of the latter, at the time of writing this chapter (2002), is still not finished. In addition to this, the American and Russian wars in Central Asia and on the borders of the Indian subcontinent may also be new partitions in the making. The ‘war on terrorism’ defends US hegemony, while reproducing terrorism and a binary. The main question that arises from the new configuration is who will be sovereign, who will be subjected? Foucault’s categories of discipline and biopower could profitably be applied here to larger units than individuals. The dislocation of Yugoslavia was not really more of a inevitability than the violence in Rwanda, yet both took place. Neither India in 1947 nor Yugoslavia in 1991 was doomed to be partitioned. What makes it look like ‘destiny’ is the retrospective viewpoint from the only scenario, among the many possible, that has become reality, plus the nationalist discourse on all sides and the received histories. Once the new names are given and the new states established, the logic of identity, self-determination and sovereignty takes over. There is an element of ‘self’-foundation here, by which a ‘right’ is acquired and self-assigned through partition and through accessing a name. This works inasmuch as in times of homogenization and violence no one interrogates the relationship between the state (in the making) and the population. Even though things are done in the name of the people, they are neither asked nor heard. Sovereignty is also declared in their name. Hegemony is then the negotiated and hierarchical balance of power-sharing that prevents sheer unmediated violence. The point of non-return of violence or of a failed power-negotiation is the type of violence which involves the breach or the definition of citizenship. Who will belong to the nation and under what conditions, and who will not (degrees and gendering of citizenship)? As Max Zins has shown in his paper, ‘The 1947 vivisection of India: the political usage of a carnage in the era of citizen-massacres’,15 in order to construct a nation and a state, citizens have to be counted as living bodies, and, if possible, the citizenship numbers of the ‘others’ have to be diminished, which means citizens
Partition as a form of transition
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eliminated and bodies ‘cut’. In the case of women, a symbolic dimension is added. Religious (Northern Ireland or Yugoslavia), linguistic (Belgium), historic (everywhere) or ‘ethnic’ arguments are instrumentalized with these aims in view (state and nation building), but are not in themselves essential. The gender divide is used in these matters as an ‘archetype’ and model for various other forms of inequality, building on the general consensus, which has it that women are ‘naturally’ subordinated. This is also why, more than on any other, partitioning violence, be it expressed in ethnic or religious terms, is inscribed on and cut into women’s bodies, territorialized as symbolic borders (India/Pakistan, Rwanda, the Balkans). Gender power relations and symbolic values reconfiguration are operated in order to achieve a new gender regime, which will be at the basis of power. The point of irreversibility of a partition under way seems to be reached through the cancellation of the question of citizenship, or, in other words, through violence that ‘cuts out others’ from ‘our’ nation and from shared citizenship in the making of the state. Violence as a possibility, not a fatality, is then at the core of political action or is itself political. Sovereignty While some areas and countries are treated as non-sovereign (Chechnya, Afghanistan, Kosova), while the sovereign countries of Russia and the US exercise a disciplining power of life and death over them, some others resist. ‘Transitional’ countries are those that have the least sovereignty. Those who resist more stubbornly and at the same time outgrow or escape, by their size, movement, organization, quantity or menace, a shape which can be disciplined, are those who fall under a global ‘planetsize bio-political power’. The globalizing world order controls (and also provokes) flows of population, refugees, deportees, expatriates and transnational industries, and closes northern borders to the immigration it itself entails, in the manner of bio-politics: as normalization, often medicalization (AIDS; anthrax; artificial limbs for mine-injured Afghans, etc.), and the directing, organizing (partly through centralization), institutionalizing of the life power of various populations. ‘Inner processes’ are also pushed by international agency or what seems to be a historic agenda. Under the guise of the making of the European Union, or of the activity of the ‘international community’, or finally as the will of the US, they have given a push to this or that possibility between the many open scenarios at the turning point, the point zero. In terms of international politics, it is all a question about the right to selfdetermination of a country; in other words, of sovereignty. But should it be state sovereignty? Or that of the people?16 This right to self-determination (of future states, meanwhile nations, more or less ethnic) was necessary and had been largely recognized in anti-colonial struggle. It is connected with a democratic principle (without being a guarantee for it, unfortunately). But can the right to self-determination be still posed in the same manner since the end of the Cold War? It seems not. Whether we have to do with a pluri-national state or with a ‘pure’ nation-state (should it be anything but imaginary) should seem indifferent at least in principle provided the same social and economic minimum, the same justice, the same living conditions, the same opportunities
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be guaranteed to everyone, in an egalitarian concern. That is what distinguishes a welfare state from a less fortunate country, but at the price of heavy protectionism (because welfare benefits couldn’t be shared with everyone without lowering the living standard of the beneficiaries17 of a welfare state). Europe is such a protectionist construction. Meanwhile, from the Balkans example, Europe has learnt at least this lesson (several wars too late) – that a concrete agenda for integration (i.e. for entering the rich boys’ club) may be the best way to prevent other wars, because these wars cost more than developing and integrating those countries in the long run. The result is that there seems to be no alternative to the integration of Europe, which marches to the East (where it is to meet, sooner than expected, China and the US), although including some only means excluding others and leaving them more and more brutally to their wars. In spite of its aura, the welfare state excludes both internally and externally. Its importance lies in the fact that, in a welfare state which is also a ‘state of law’, one is able to refer to that right to equality in public matters. The partitions, once achieved, in the quest of a ‘pure’ national state, in numerous cases of pluri-ethnic or pluri-national societies, generally don’t solve the problems, but reproduce and multiply them (by the number of states) in time and in space. As the example of the Indian subcontinent has shown, partitions often precipitate and replace negotiated political solutions through a preliminary and potentially violent consensus. Once allowed, they tend to be reproduced in a process of infinite fragmentation. One of the first conceptualizations of India’s partition was, characteristically, called the ‘Balkans project’.18 The Government of India Independence Act of 1947 had anticipated that each of the over 500 princely states should decide after independence whether or not to accede to India. As further history goes, only two turned problematic for quite different reasons, but both conditioning a merger with further divisions: Hyderabad and Kashmir. For all, independence came with partition before any choice could be made. The logics of partition The opposite and the antidote of an ongoing partition may not be unity (preserved) in itself, but effective universal democracy – a democracy non-qualified by religion, ethnicity, language, etc., since democracy can have no qualifications or pose conditions without limiting the access to some. The contemporary type of democracy under the conditions of general ethnicization, of state non-sovereignty, of massive desubjectivation, of deportations or prevented migrations and of globalization, at the same time, is not exempt from further dislocations and it even reproduces ‘religious’, ‘ethnic’, ‘cultural’ and similar fragmentations. The paradox is that wanting democracy now often promotes ethnocracy, because of the worldwide processes of transformation of the demos into an ethnos, which run parallel to greater integrations and as their part. It is also the case because the dimension and the aim of civitas (the political living together and sharing by individuals within the ‘city’ or the state – something of ‘civilization’) is lost sight of. The latter is what makes Will Kymlicka think that the West could teach Third World and formerly socialist states how to deal with them.19 But is ethnocracy a fatality? In spite of its progress, nothing proves it is. Yet democracy for some may not be so for others. Even as the Greeks invented it, it was never meant for all and it always involved a
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more or less (in)visible hierarchy and unequal citizenship rights. Democracy is a concept flawed at its core; indeed, it only exists in the form of a project to be realized in the future, all its concrete realizations being insufficient. The (near-)failure of the socialist, post-colonial and welfare states in fulfilling their own proclaimed aims is also the inability of different concepts of democracy to take root, none of them being satisfactory. The notion of democracy now increasingly includes guaranteeing minority rights. Maybe we should be reminded that, while differences have to be taken care of, they are nothing in themselves20 – being relational, they usually imply some hierarchy. Managing the differences doesn’t mean that difference can itself be the project. Difference is neither democratic nor anti-democratic. It shouldn’t imply inequality, and shouldn’t be used to enforce and support injustice (as a ‘proof’). The concepts of ‘difference’ (and ‘identity’) and of ‘inequality’ (and ‘equality’) are not of the same order. The concepts of ‘difference’ and ‘identity’ should be disentangled from a normative meaning they acquire through received and unquestioned value-systems (as ‘unequal’ and ‘equal’), as they are simply existential or refer to an experiential order of constructs. The concepts of ‘inequality’ and ‘equality’, on the other hand, refute or accept, but in any case acknowledge, a social, political, etc. prejudicial ‘difference’ that is harmful to some while privileging others. Therefore, difference can be neither a programme, nor an agency (subject), but it can be a sort of criterion in the articulation of a plurality of individual interests put in common in view of a project of construction of a society, of a civitas. Democracy is fragile by definition, and the concept of difference doesn’t in itself solve anything. It asks to be negotiated. These periods of negotiation are also transitions. They may take particular forms and try to introduce new kinds of political societies. This was particularly visible after the dismantlement of Yugoslavia, which was, in each of the successor states, also an attempt to build a ‘new’ society on new foundations. The workers’ control-socialist framework was discontinued, and a ‘new old’ continuity established with a pre-socialist (rather imaginary) capitalism thought to have existed once. Henceforth, the socialist interregnum was thought to have been a mere interruption in a ‘natural’, capitalist course of events. The social and political project was thus also ‘naturalized’ (with the best prospect to fail again), as much as the concept of the nation and as gender, its instrument. Although the socialist project had in itself been a form of modernity, the new nationalists and ethnocrats in the Balkans made it sound as if there was but one modernity: capitalist and Western. This partly explains why all sides resorted uninhibitedly and overnight to new racism. The former Yugoslavia had been non-aligned and pro-Third World. Since this was now officially out, nothing restrained the projection towards the inner or outer ‘other’ of all our evil thoughts. This is also the reason of the great success of the Huntingtonian thesis about the clashes of civilization, which suits perfectly the ethnocratic mind in this part of the world. In this way partitions, and especially protracted partitions, reshape not only the boundaries, the size of the country and the definition of the nation, but also and especially the minds. They reshape them with regard to identities, to the ‘higher office’, which will be recognized by all, and with regard to loyalty, to the gender relation and to power in general. The minds have been reshaped in a short time over the transition decade so as to fit smaller stately units (all claiming sovereignty), so as to construct rather a communal ‘ethnically’ or ‘religiously’ or ‘linguistically’ (or all) defined society. They have constructed communities rather than societies. Homogenization was a tool against Yugoslav identity. Individual freedom
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versus the community has not increased – on the contrary – and especially not so for women, the first to be caught within a process of purposeful re-traditionalization. ‘New old’ communities have made their appearance. Reshaped minds let go easily of a common past, and the second generation gets appropriately to learn only a onedimensional history. So has the international community sealed for a long time as realistic (and thus made real the impossible), a total confusion about names, by which one unit (the most numerous) was given the right to usurp the former common name and identity (‘Yugoslavia’). It means uncertainty and fear for the very people of Serbia-andMontenegro regarding their borders (since the ones of the country are much narrower since the series of partitions than the ones suggested by the name that has been kept), while at the same time legitimizing their hopes of making both coincide again in the future under their hegemony. Many minds are legitimately set on this. This new framework and new concrete conditions then change the ‘mindscapes’. But the mindscapes are also to a large extent still the same, inherited from a nonrecognized common past. Moreover, the logics of division and separation, though multiple and specific in each case, are shared. Inherent in all those logics is the self-renewing capacity of partitions reproducing the processes of identification and of exclusion and thus extending into a transition. It is the partition’s very attempt to achieve adequacy and identity for whoever is the subject (agency) that condemns them to produce the different from which the subjects will want to demarcate themselves – in order to reproduce the same. When negotiating the political comes to a dead end (as seems to be the case in 2001/2002 for Israel and Palestine), violence is the outcome. Massacres are the result of impossible attempts to perfectly match borders with ‘ethnic’ identity. Negotiations can highlight the difficulty of matching one type of logic, say, religious, with another type, say, territorial; this matching cannot be democratically done without renouncements on all sides. Time is essential here – peace and avoiding partitions takes time. When no time is given, it is war. War means the immediacy of a result wanted and imposed ‘now’21: it will be partition now (and a state, power), rather than negotiations over a long time and a sharing of power in a hypothetical future. In the shaping of minds (as much as of territories and states) we see new walls appear that separate ‘us’ from ‘them’, usually to start with through reconfiguring the gender divide.22 We thus have a flattening of both the historic and the temporal dimensions in favour of a ‘rendering contemporary’ of parallel ethnicities and would-be ethnocracies. To stick together in the new configuration in a perfect new unity (‘we’ are now Croats or Serbs rather than former Yugoslavs) will then require ever new mobilization and fuite en avant. The new unity will be thought of at the same time as old, very old, ur-old. Many virtualities are here turned into facts. But the logics or techniques of the state and of the people in achieving this may not be the same. On the part of the latter they may not be voluntary. And the full adequacy, as much as full democracy, as much as the full nation, is never quite achieved. The incompleteness of the project is necessary particularly for those who are subordinated in citizenship: women, and other relatively disfavoured categories. It is through resisting the citizenship of women23 (or of the ‘others’, the minority, or of foreigners) that the hegemony is maintained and made efficient.
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Institution building and sovereignty: transnational or local justice? The problem with the new states will also be, among other things, institution building (and democratizing existing institutions), under the conditions of scarce or nonexistent state sovereignty, of growing inner fragmentation, of moving (or deported, migrant, refugee) populations, and of increasing numbers of ‘dispensable people’ everywhere (those who cannot even be exploited). Within other problematic institution-building efforts, justice is on the world agenda, and it is a problem even for the ‘developed’ countries, since the recent ‘de-sovereignization’ has produced an unprecedented proliferation of concern for human rights. There is no justice without a recognized higher authority. Such institutions are painstakingly being built through the establishment of the tribunals for war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, and through a future International Penal Tribunal founded in Rome. Indeed, they are needed because of the actual limitation of state sovereignty, which delegates their sovereignty to them. This new criminal justice is still in the making. The already existing tribunals should not only help in bringing justice to the areas they are competent for, but will serve as a pattern for the further building of the system and for the elaboration of an international criminal justice. An IPT will of course be better founded, as far as legitimacy is concerned, than the Yugoslav or Rwandan tribunals. The Hague tribunal was decided by the Security Council, which is a de facto limitation considering the scarce power of the UN, while the new IPT is independent from the UN, and decided by states – some 140 so far (counting on their sovereignty, and thus giving the individual states also a chance in cases where their criminals are arrested).24 The idea that human rights outgrow state borders has made its way. An international justice system would work towards transnational democracy, which is by now also needed in order to resist ‘deregulated’ globalization. A ‘global international community’ of states with only a relative and in some cases a practically non-existent sovereignty is now designed as a ‘diffused’ agency. However and unfortunately, though they are triggered from a concern with social justice, human rights are more often than not reduced to individual political rights in the perspective of liberal democracy.25 Yet the establishment of a concept of international justice necessarily brings to the fore the actual interdependence (both internally as well as internationally) between markets and human rights, and of the different agencies (public, private, civil), as well as the growing gap between civil and political rights on one side, and economic and social rights on the other,26 with ‘cultural (group) rights’ and ‘ethnic rights’ often shifting in status. Foucault interestingly distinguishes the classical type of sovereignty, giving the right over life and death and leading to disciplining individual bodies (in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries), from new forms (starting with the end of the eighteenth century) impregnated with biopolitics and with regulating techniques dealing with the population (and indeed, inventing it).27 The two become complementary. The sovereign’s absolute right over life and death is actually the field of (his) power. The subject is then in the sovereign’s hands, neither dead nor alive before the sovereign decides which. The exercise of (giving) death is ultimately decisive in that context. But the political configuration of the (Western) nineteenth century pays more attention to life as a process, and to the population as a whole. It is here that totalitarianism may (or may not) take root. Disciplining is not sufficient any more for this purpose (for the taming of economic and
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political resistances, of demographic explosion and of industrialization), so techniques of bio-political power are introduced. It is life itself that is the stake of these new techniques (not merely individual bodies). This implies the introduction of medicalization, insurance, securization, centralization, coordination, regulation, attention paid to birth rate and mortality, hygiene, care for the elderly, the handicapped and the ‘different’, with a view on the species and on the population as a whole for the sake of organizing work. The state now has to do with ‘the right to make live and let die’ its own population, while before it was all about ‘making die OR letting live’. Making die is removed beyond borders. Life is now ‘optimalized’ and made useful. The globalized world system – the international system of states – is itself a result of this. This new bio-political power also develops knowledge as its instrument, as well as institutions. The regulation of life itself (medical care, human rights, etc.) and not, any more, sovereignty over death now comes to the fore, though the two systems coexist. Death in large numbers is also the result of this system, as more and more human beings are now left without the scope of even exploitation, and are held as ‘superfluous’. But, says Foucault, imparting death now requires justification in principle. And that which allows killings (or war, or non-protection, etc.) he calls racism: ‘The deadly function of the state, when it functions on the basis of bio-power, can only be ensured through racism.’ ‘Racism is (…) introducing a cut, a section (coupure) within that sphere of life taken charge of by power: it is the cleft between that which should live and that which should die.’ Further, Foucault attributes to racism the ‘positive’ age-old and warring role of being the price for life (if we are to live, others must die).28 As a world system we are today in that situation. And it is in such conditions that some states suffering from the present crisis have to perform their transition from the socialist system towards a common denominator and a matching type of society, and others their transition from war to peace or from scarce, ‘pre-modern’ development. Transition and integration Transition countries want to be integrated – are invited to join a larger regional configuration – for example, the Yugoslav successor states into the European Union. Although this is in some cases rejected by traditionalists, transition is the way to Europe or the long waiting list for Europe. What is kept out of sight, here, is precisely that it is the only option under the circumstances, as long as these are not themselves questioned. And they are not. Yet the price for the integration of Europe has been the disintegration of its Eastern borders and the series of wars from the Balkans to Chechnya (which also had internal causes). The normalization of Europe is the permanent state of exception it creates. And in the nexus between exception and normalization, construction is violence. Could Europe have been negotiated differently? I tend to think that – as far as the violence part is involved, it could have, though I am not so sure about the disintegration/integration part. Also, in some cases, the violence itself becomes a cause in its own right (though it is a result in another chain of causality). As in the case of the former Yugoslavia, war itself – once it is there – puts an end to all efforts of regional integration and possible reconfiguration. But the war was itself not a fatality. Habermas proposes, indeed, a simple ‘constitutional patriotism’, giving up the idea of the nation as
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community in a larger sense, and he hopes for great integrations such as that of a postnational Europe. But the nation-state is only in crisis as much as is the state. For him, Europe would be united through a European Constitution (abhorred by the French Jacobins) and through a community of post-national states.29 It paradoxically means to transcend nationalism through such constructs as the Schengen Europe. Étienne Balibar is one of those philosophers who have reflected, under contemporary conditions, of the difficulties in the way of the integration of Europe after the Cold War (see note 16). Whose sovereignty will it be if there is no European demos? He eventually focuses on one or two main points: practically, the borders in question are those with Russia and with the Balkans (or: will Russia and the Balkans be in or out?), and with the Mediterranean, where the new Europe is itself the product of (its own) decolonization. In a broad sense, Europe is also a partitioned area, suffering from a constant displacement of borders both inner and outer. It is important to see the reciprocity of external and internal boundaries, where identity politics also play a growing role. Balibar doesn’t think, thought, that these are reducible to the effects of capitalism, but thinks there is in them something more fundamental: I shall develop further on the gender regime in this context. Balibar then speaks of the necessity to ‘democratize’ the borders, in the same sense in which he speaks about ‘civility’ and about the necessity to ‘civilize’ violence, since it is not possible to eradicate it.30 This makes the concrete task all the more difficult. Balibar is one of those who are also in favour of an opening of European citizenship to others: for example, for the Albanians from Kosovo at the peak of the crisis and for Algerians and others, but in any case for all those who live and work in Europe. Yet that is not the direction taken by Schengen Europe, which is based on closing borders. This is why Balibar criticizes Jürgen Habermas’s idea of a democratic Europe based on Schengen.31 Habermas thinks of how to make different ‘identities’ coexist and cooperate, thus taking them for granted, unsuspicious of the well-intentioned ‘consensus’ proposed. Giacomo Marramao, on the other hand, has been working on the conditions and stages necessary for the construction of a new Europe ‘beyond the Leviathan’,32 relying also on such work as Claus Offe’s.33 Europe should have an original new constitutional construction but without a state, and must have a multi-level system of government – federalism as well as a centralized state are now obsolete. We are in a post-Hobbesian order without an externality and a higher office.34 Both sovereignty and power are now dispersed and within. According to Marramao, Europe has to face two other systems of value in politics, economy and culture: the US and Asia. The old continent could have the advantage of being the first integrated non-identitarian global space. This leaves him with a question he, to our understanding, only displaced: how to convert into political value cultural differences in Europe. The three transitions Some features are shared by the two transitions – post-colonial (and Third World) on one side and post-socialist on the other – toutes proportions gardées depending on time and conditions. One is the international context where the new states are fitted; that is, a hegemonic configuration where the freshly partitioned states are lesser players. As much as colonial powers had determined the agencies in and of the countries they were leaving,
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some Western philosophers (not to speak about politicians) now give advice to Eastern European countries as to how to achieve ‘ethnocultural justice’ (Kymlicka, see note 19). ‘Transition’ is a word which has come back into usage after the dismantlement of the Berlin Wall, to denote what is now usually called ‘post-communist transition’. Before that, the term was first used to denote Latin-American transitions from dictatorships to democracy and post-colonial transition. The word is not a well-defined term, and it usually comprises some amount of triumphalism of Western capitalismrestoration. But the transitions are as many as there are countries, and they are basically three if we take it that three different systems loosely defined (capitalist, post-colonial or Third World, and post-socialist) are now undergoing it in different conditions. In the case of the former socialist bloc, we would rather speak of the European integration within the context of globalization than only of post-communist transition, which is indeed a limiting term for several reasons, not only because the Wall fell on both sides instead of merely on one of them, and because the whole Cold War dichotomy – East–West, communism–capitalism – received a blow. It is not as if communism alone had failed: the system of the communicating vessels equilibrium of a world system broke down. Also, the integration of Europe has its own larger framework, ‘globalization’. There is a resemblance in the different partitions and in the different transitions. The events of September 11 have added a new international context of reconfiguration, speeding up and escalating violence and threats, and precipitating the process. Differences and similarities between post-communist and Third World/post-colonial transitions The two transitions may be compared only after the Cold War, which was not only a European phenomenon and demarcation. The Cold War was rather brutal in the Third World. And in Europe the violence, mainly in Germany (Rote Armee Fraction), in Italy (Brigate Rosse and Black Violence), the generals’ regime in Greece, Hungary 1956 and Czechoslovakia 1968, and generally repression in communist countries were by no means small sideeffects of that system. The end of the Cold War coincided in form and also structurally with a new geopolitical, economic configuration of globalized neo-liberalism, which makes it difficult for developing countries of the Third World as much as for some of the former socialist countries to catch up (since that is what is now expected). The new resemblance of post-socialist transition is not with the first phase of post-colonialism. In the latter, nationalism was the agent of liberation and was legitimated all through the 1960s down to the same dividing line of more or less 1989, which was also decisive for Europe. Greater integration movements (Europe) and globalization at one end produce more and more disintegration, ethnicization, identitarian fundamentalism, etc. at the other end. They both impede free mobility and enforce mobility on threatened populations, war victims, etc.35 This is where there is a striking similarity between processes in the Third World today and tensions or war and violence within or among some ethnocracies36 in Eastern Europe. The main issues of civil war were expressed in terms of resistance to oppression and discrimination (victims of which were the poor and the indigenous population). Not that the conflicts have in themselves all of a sudden become ethnic, but the terminology has changed with globalization.
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The Cold War was also a strict division of two ideological blocks, a sort of partition or division in its own right, a freeze in terms of ideology and of mobility (the latter being limited within the sides; see Bianchini here). The world configuration since the end of the Cold War now favours major planetary integrations of capital, accompanied by a fragmentation on the local, social and geopolitical levels. In India, anti-colonial liberation nationalism legitimized a secular nation-building project, which is the equivalent of a non-racial project elsewhere. With its erosion over the past decades, which is globally contemporary with the end of the Cold War and locally with the liberalization of the economy by the state, various ethnic, communal, religious and sometimes fundamentalist projects have emerged. They are similar to those in Europe (including Western Europe, where particularisms have not always been integrated through happy regional and transnational adjustment); most European countries have some such examples. The complementarity is extended and goes on after the Cold War. Erosion of the socialist and post-colonial projects Following the Second World War, the socialist project and the project of the first postcolonial states share some features and ideals. They had in common how they respectively treated ‘nationality’ (or ‘ethnic identity’) and religion: both assumed a position of neutrality or equal treatment (secularism) of the state towards these realities. So India practised secularism with respect to religion, and Yugoslavia with respect to nation/ ethnicity. Another such project was Algeria. Both models (the socialist project, the first post-colonial non-racist and secular project) have so far failed in promoting and improving on their basic principles, as much as has the welfare state (of which both the other examples had elements). All three of these forms have shown weaknesses in the same field – the social and welfare. Also, each in a different way failed in translating the social, cultural and economic into the political and into democracy. This period starts with partitions for India and Pakistan, but ends in partition for the former Yugoslavia. In the case of the Great Lakes in Africa, partition or arbitrary borders dividing the population is the general post-colonial condition. In both cases – socialism and postcolonialism (in its first phase) – we have to do with forms of modernity, but it ends up among other things due to lack of real democratization and also of political reform. In a second phase (after 1989), post-socialism and post-colonialism coincide in further fragmentation, ethnicisms and nationalisms, religious fundamentalisms, etc., whereby the oligarchies of both try to preserve/ reshuffle themselves and to negotiate new hegemonies; all of it within a new worldwide process which now has at one end globalizing integrations, and at the other end identitarian fragmentations (which are really two aspects of the same). The erosion of the secular and non-racist project here corresponds to the erosion of the socialist project there. Claims for ethnic recognition are now fitted into a project of human rights and (liberal) democracy formally everywhere, but really emphatically so in areas of the Third World and of the former Eastern bloc. Both post-colonial transition (older, but now in a somewhat disillusioned phase) and post-socialist transition are capitalist transitions supposed to converge.
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The (nation-)state As for the inadequacy of the form of nation-state for Africa, it has been underlined by Mwayila Tshiyembe, who has also proposed the answer of multinational states as a possible solution for Africa: The multinational […] [p]ostnational state is articulated around the principle of unity in diversity. In this respect, it forms a federating space for nations, languages, religions, cultures, territories, norms for whom the state will have the charge of guaranteeing the survival. […] The problematique of the multinational state inscribes the African originality into globalization, which is a battlefield open to the frontal clash of cultures.37 Tshiyembe’s description of the ideal multinational state (nurturing Habermasian ideas about a voluntaristic and anticipated non-nationalistic ‘patriotic humanism’) resembles much the first Indian liberation pattern of a ‘secular’ state, or the anti-colonial ideal of a multinational, multiracial (non-racist) state of the first independence. But that type of state – the flagrant failures of which are the first and the second republic in Rwanda, and also the erosion of the Indian secular state in the face of rising fundamentalisms – is as much in need of reform as is the former socialist state or the Western welfare state. The multinational state is unfortunately not in itself a guarantee against partitions, wars, violence, nationalism, racism, ethnicization, etc., nor does it guarantee democracy. It all depends at which level of nominal integration the accent will be put – where the name will be fixed. Name-giving freezes identities, gives substantial international, makes visible and ‘legitimizes’ for all purposes. So Nehruvian India (a union of states with federal character) was constructed as one nation with no national divisions, but with a recognized religious plurality which nowadays turns also into ‘ethnic’ and religious claims, while Tito’s Yugoslavia was constructed as a multinational and transnational state, not as a nation. The partition in one case (Yugoslavia) and in the other case the shattering (India today, but there it all started through a partition in 1947/1948) happened exactly along the same lines (‘ethnic’ and ‘religious’).38 In the Balkans, the question of national, multinational or transnational identity is that which will decide about the status of future statal entities. It is partly also a matter of conflicting or different definitions of citizenship, for example for Albanians in the different countries, and it takes also partly the shape of territorial demands. I would like to point out Maurice Goldring’s assertion that partitions may not always be about territories (as in Northern Ireland) but may also be a matter of ‘conflicting definitions of citizenship’ (as in the Basque Country).39 The latter was the case in Rwanda for Tutsis and Hutus, in Kosovo and elsewhere. Giacomo Marramao asserts that the centralized state is now an exhausted possibility and improbable, since monolithic sovereignty has been shaken. In this sense, the nationstate has no future. Likewise, though not quite in the same way, for Habermas we should already be in the post-nation-state (or post-national) era. Will Europe be a state? According to Marramao, it should find some other kind of cohesion – no ‘superior’ office of sovereignty or of transfer of power (no Leviathan), but a reliance somehow from within on its own inner sources for legitimacy. Yet this can happen only if the
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geopolitical logic and the territorial logic are demobilized and made inoffensive and, ultimately, if identities are deconstructed, if violence is ‘civilized’ (Balibar) and if the identity principle and inertia of the same (in power) doesn’t persist.40 Relinquishing sovereignty is here not an outward fatality, but a need of the new reconfiguration. After the events of September 11, 2001, the process of reconfiguration of the world power-map is now very grossly precipitated through the American president’s ‘Goodand-Evil’ confrontation. Both the US and the alleged terrorists stick to the same binary construction, as if wanting a new world dichotomy. So far, China is not in the game, but, as before, it is probable that she would stand outside the divide, or might eventually become number two in a new couple. Significantly, the US talks to China as an equal (George W. Bush paid a visit at the early peak of the crisis), leaving Europe completely out as an agency: Europe indeed is out, having no common political will. This is repeated now on account of the Middle East. The new division is done in the name of ‘civilization’. ‘Civilization’ is an offence to the Third World in general, because it assumes the universality of the Western pattern and leaves others out. And, though the concepts of the First and Second World have been shattered, the same Third World is still out there.41 That peace and de-escalation are better achieved through a self-critical positioning and through dis-identification never occurs to those who retain power. Abrupt or gradual transition? Transition and justice We shall deal with only some aspects of transition in institution-building. A new type of international tribunal has appeared of late, but also international help and counselling in establishing local institutions able to deal with mass trauma. This is a necessity of globalization itself. The general framework is given by the globalization of capital itself. An international order beyond individual states (but in which some are more empowered than others) compels everyone within the rules of international capital. Human rights and particularly individual political rights are highly valued, and civil society is being promoted everywhere. But security matters, with increasing empowerment of police, ‘war against terrorism’, the closure of borders and the pressure on immigrants or refugees, are dealt with far away from public control in Western and Northern countries (law without the state, of sorts).42 At the same time, for and within countries where institutions are still to be built, such as South Africa, Burundi, the Balkans, etc., ‘transitional justice’ is being proposed. Partly, this concept seems to be complementary to the introduction of ‘reconciliation’ in places where too big a mass of the population may have been involved for it to be possibly put on trial.43 The definition of what is now called ‘transitional justice’ is related to the concept of transition in South Africa: ‘The Truth and Reconciliation Commission’, Alex Boraine writes, …should not be seen as a necessary evil, a second-best choice, when prosecution and general amnesty are politically problematic. It provided the only justice available in the context of a traumatic transition. The South African model is not an abdication of justice, it is a form of justice particularly suited to the uniqueness of the transitional context….44
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But Boraine also says elsewhere, and while dealing with the Balkans from his Center for Transitional Justice in New York, ‘So our approach is a much more holistic approach, where we do not deny the absolute necessity for justice when that is possible, but anybody must surely appreciate that full justice is never possible […]’. He says that, in his visits to the former Yugoslavia, he encountered widespread denial of the crimes committed against other ethnic groups, similar to the denial of whites in South Africa of the injustices suffered by blacks under the apartheid regime. By providing a major focus on victims telling their stories in public, Boraine says, an overwhelming body of testimony can counter the denials.45 Narration has a therapeutic effect too. Also, while social and political justice is desirable for all in the sense of equality, the conditions of even elementary equality are still not achieved, and an imperfect ‘transitional’ and provisional justice has to be implemented even in this regard, especially in post-conflict conditions. Transitional justice then also means delayed or incomplete justice, but it is at least a first attempt to bring impunity to a stop, and to introduce accountability for everyone. In a situation requiring ‘special’ transitional justice, we acknowledge as an ideal the modern concept of justice comprising equality. Yet this is done under restricted concrete conditions of inequality, i.e. under conditions of a nonWestern ‘imperfect’ democracy, where more developed Western welfare states are taken as the norm. The concept of ‘transitional justice’ has its limits at the outset as a Western ‘pro-otherhood’ concept: it cannot be imagined as universal, but as a necessary evil of deviation from a universal pattern yet to be achieved (but certainly promised). We have such situations in war-torn countries, in immediate post-conflict countries, in places where tribunals are not independent, where there is no free public sphere, etc. The expectations of transitional justice are not maximum, but rather minimum. Inasmuch as transition is a delayed democracy, transitional justice is delayed justice. At the same time, and paradoxically, one could argue that the whole world is permanently in transition. And in this global transition, higher, transnational judicial offices are sometimes gravely baffled, as is the case with President Bush junior’s decision that a military commission would try terrorism, especially in the case of foreign citizens, thus circumventing the Constitution.46 The concept of ‘transitional justice’ has been championed by some international NGOs working in areas of crisis (such as the International Crisis Grou,47 the International Center for Transitional Justice and others). ‘Transitional justice’ somehow forgot about the transition in the developed capitalist world, because that is the one giving the pattern to reproduce in the Second and Third Worlds. So, transitional justice is also the poor country’s justice, and the one to be applied when elementary social justice is still not available.48 Yet we can clearly see how judiciary power is being reconstructed, and has grown in independence with respect to executive power, at least in the cases of countries such as Italy and France over the past decade. Yet segmenting has been the approach adopted by the international community in its clumsy attempts at pacification of areas such as Rwanda or the Yugoslav space, which each function like a communicating vessel, producing partitions as a result. The ‘country by country’ approach as opposed to a more global (regional) approach and as opposed to an approach going into the causes (including the international causes, though the local ones are by no means slight) is bound to ensure the multiplication and spreading of the conflict, and sometimes its exportation. Many of the features in the two conflicts are
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strikingly similar, including what has been labelled genocide in Rwanda, unless of course one reckons that ‘genocide’ is something transcendentally different from ‘ordinary’ massacres and butcheries.49 Mahmood Mamdani, abandoning the usual ones while seeking new terms of justice, uses the terms survivors: ‘The notion of survivor seeks to transcend the bipolar notions of victim and perpetrator.’ Further: The difference between victor’s justice and survivor’s justice is clear if we look at the two major post-war paradigms of justice: deNazification and de-Sovietization. The former came into being at the onset of the Cold War. The latter marked the end of the Cold War. Simply put, the logic of de-Nazification is to blame the agent, that of de-Sovietization is to blame the system; de-Nazification requires identifying both victims and perpetrators. De-Sovietization is anchored first and foremost in the identity of survivors; it acknowledges victims, but no perpetrators. From this point of view, to identify individuals as perpetrators would be to demonize them. To pursue the logic of deNazification in contemporary Rwanda would be to identify the leadership of the genocide so as to hold it accountable. Such, indeed, is the purpose of the international court in Arusha and the local courts inside Rwanda. To pursue the logic of deSovietization would be to put emphasis, first and foremost, on the institutions of rule in Rwanda. Where survivors – victims and perpetrators from an earlier round of struggle – must learn to live together, ways must be found to reconcile the logic of reconciliation with that of justice.50 Can we seriously distinguish between a preferably de-Nazification or deSovietization approach? Opposing Nazism and Stalinism may be more accurate. Though it is not clear how he can treat as equal the Nazi system and the Soviet one, he argues that different principles of justice must be worked out in cases such as described by him: Survivor’s justice is different from revolutionary justice. It makes sense only in contexts where there have been few beneficiaries in the preceding civil war. I have already commented on the differences between South Africa and Rwanda on this score: one is struck by how few were the perpetrators of apartheid, and how many its beneficiaries,51 and conversely, how many were the perpetrators in Rwanda’s genocide and how few its beneficiaries. Where beneficiaries are many, reconciliation has to be social to be durable, which is the same thing as saying there can be no durable reconciliation without some form of social justice. But where beneficiaries are few, the key to reconciliation is political reconciliation. The prime requirement of political reconciliation is neither criminal justice nor social justice, but political justice.52 As a difference to Rwanda, individual responsibility of leaders and perpetrators, and also of many institutions, may be clearer on all sides in the former Yugoslavia, and the real beneficiaries are – all in all – few, if any at all. It is not clear at all that anyone has gained
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anything in that war, and all have lost (some at the hands of others, some at their own). Mamdani’s distinction between perpetrators and beneficiaries is not quite tenable in a theoretical sense, though it may be practically useful. Many are – indeed, whole populations – responsible in many a way without being guilty or even beneficiaries. There is a whole range of shades between perpetrators and beneficiaries, and everyone (even the guilty and the beneficiaries) are victims, sometimes merely of a gross miscalculation. The notion of survivor, the way Mamdani imagines it, tends to transcend the dichotomy of victim and perpetrator. But many perpetrators are survivors too. The notion of survivor could indicate towards a definition of new political subjects. But in order to achieve this, he himself has to enlarge and redefine the concept, because as it is, usually and officially, it is only ‘us’ who are victims, and ‘they’ who are the perpetrators. This is true also not only of the conflicts in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, but of the new post-September 11 configuration as well. In the case of post-genocide Rwanda where mainly Tutsis are in power, officially only Tutsis were victims. People see themselves as victims regardless of the fact that they may have been or become perpetrators in their turn (whether first victims or not). There have also been attempts at ethnicizing justice. Will Kymlicka has raised the issue of ‘ethnocultural justice’.53 He thinks that the liberal-democratic nation-building model requires rethinking the issue of minority rights, and these are now evaluated by ‘ethnocultural justice’, abandoning ‘ethnocultural neutrality’. He announced the outline of a ‘new liberal theory of minority rights’. However transparent such positioning, ‘ethnic justice’ and ‘ethnic logics’ have now prevailed in a lot of what is being done both at the national and at the international levels. In the manner of ‘excessive geopolitics’, which injects a territorial economy into practically all aspects of social, economic, cultural and political life, excessive ethnicization now reduces all different agencies, movements, stakes and problems to only one aspect: the ‘ethnic’, ‘religious’, ‘culturally differential’ identity-related issue. At the same time the securitarian issues have become one of the nationally and internationally most important factors.54 According to Kymlicka: ‘What we need, in other words, is a consistent theory of permissible forms of nation-building within liberal democracies.’55 Thus, according to him, the West, having to do with metics and immigrants, developed forms of multination federalism (except France and Greece), which lead to multiculturalism, but which is not suited to – or not attainable by – nonWestern countries. What is at stake in nation-building but also in the exercise of justice is how (and for whom) citizenship is conceived. Violence as the turning point An interesting variation is the case of Croatian nationalists describing (not right at the beginning, but soon after) mainly Muslim women, rather than Croat women, as victims of Serbian war rapes. This case is also still a very sensitive topic, because deconstructing the whole discourse about mass rapes in Bosnia-Herzegovina is still seen (in Croatia) as treason and as denying that there have been any rapes. Unfortunately, there is no way of denying rapes or their having been used as weapons of war. What can be analysed, however, is how the discourse about the rapes becomes itself part of the same ongoing war. It was first said that both Croat and Muslim women from Bosnia-Herzegovina were
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mass-raped by Serbs, but later the vindicators of the Croatian nationalist and statist cause insisted that Muslim women were raped.56 Why Muslim? By that time, not only was Serbia waging a war on a Bosnia-Herzegovina reduced to ‘Muslims’, but so was Croatia. Both were doing so, of course, through their various unofficial militias and local factions. Serbia and Croatia were fighting a war against each other in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and soon against the Bosnians too (who by that time had become identified as the Muslims). The official standpoint on women was then modified from a Croatian expansionist view about ‘Muslims’, a subaltern group, first allied with the Croats in defence against Serbian attacks, but then turned into enemies as a Greater Croatia was being carved out in Herzegovina much after the pattern of an already existing Greater Serbia. The Muslims were ‘those unable to defend their borders and their women’ (the definition of the enemy after this stereotype), and they should be conquered.57 Indeed, the Washington agreement, which was forced onto Bosnia and Croatia in 1994, froze a situation of fait accompli on the battleground (that of a Croatian supremacy – and this will get challenged only as the first democratic government comes to power in Croatia after ten years of Tudjman’s extreme nationalist power), but it also stopped the war (not the tension) between Croats and Bosnians. This enabled then the following process leading to the Dayton agreement in 1995, signed by Milosevic of rump Yugoslavia, Tudjman of Croatia and Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The international tutorship of the agreement gave these people, and especially the war criminals Milosevic and Tudjman, a second political life by giving them the power to decide for all. In a similar manner, though without a foreign agency, the presidents of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia proclaimed, at the end of 1991, the dissolution of the USSR (an act for which they had no legitimacy whatsoever).58 The real question is how to relinquish pretence to power linked to identity-building, and how to develop a discourse that is not in its turn warmongering and that can grasp both sides and at the same time outgrow the conflict. Unfortunately, those who can conduct a dialogue can also wage a war: there is no guarantee that a dialogue or negotiations will bestow peace and democracy. The Washington and Dayton agreements, meant to stop the war and to prevent partition, were treaties that in a way formalized and froze a de facto partition, transforming it into a durable administrative separation.59 This situation of ‘peace’ under control of the Union in the Balkans and elsewhere may be termed as transition. And, in terms of administration, of justice and of real life, ‘Thousands of people try to find their way daily through an immensely complicated labyrinth established by the three separate and very often conflicting legal systems in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).’60 The terms of the conflict used to explain it. Political v. ethnic conflict We have seen, in the Yugoslav case, as in other cases, how the language in which a political configuration is analyzed or criticized can limit its understanding, and how this language is more often than not informed and influenced in its very terms by the conflict it endeavours to describe and take its distance from. In short, the (political) language itself limits the political imagination of scholars and also of whole populations, by ethnicizing the concepts and denominations. This problem is of the same type as the
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question raised about the mainly Western perspective when speaking of modernity, and also as the tension mentioned between the order of seeing and that of hearing (the Word). While acknowledged events have been received and transmitted couched in terms that are themselves issued by the conflict, this violence of the discourse remains purposely invisible. That violence is governed by interests already dominant thanks to those conditions. I might propose a definition of violence – as being the reaction to the fact that ‘we’ are not self-generated, and being the attempt to compensate for it via the identity principle (i.e. sameness kept at any cost) and the struggle for (maintaining) power. We have here something very essential to the process that lies at the bottom of violence, of the ‘attraction of statehood’ and of the creation for this purpose of ‘identities’. Étienne Balibar is right in saying that ‘identity politics’ are much more fundamental than being simply the product of capitalism. This cannot be explained without introducing the concept of gender divide as ‘archetypal’ within a patriarchal setup. The will to power is an exacerbated self-centred positioning of a dominant subject unwilling to relinquish or share, and to whom power is even more important than life at the end of the day. Such subjectivity is constructed and self-established in a communitarian, patriarchal, vertical manner, essentially and by definition non-democratic. Its aim is full autonomy and sovereignty exercised by oneself, which, because impossible (since interdependence is the rule both of biology and of any culture), leads to the pretence to be born(e) of and by oneself, not by others. The ideal is here the origin in the same, which goes as far as denying mere neighbourhood with others. It is also, historically and within patriarchies, a masculine one, which links the males to power (if we had matriarchy, it could well be the other way round). All this refers to the circularity of the logos theorized along with its paradoxes by Hegel in his Phenomenology of the Spirit. What is this excess reproducing a ‘without’ past totality? It is an excess of self, presented as becoming: becoming oneself, a détour-return of self through the other. Power sits on propriety/property, which may include itself as object or subject. From here, politics is passion for those who are involved in it. It is therefore not surprising (quite independently from the gender issue) that sexuality, or eroticism, should be such a strong stake of power, which can go as far as taking a ‘religious’ form ‘sacralizing’, in its turn, the type of domination. Since otherhood assumes in culture, as one of its main figures, the ‘woman’ or other feminized and victimized categories, – owing life or anything to this other is felt as threat and alienation. In fact, it is outrageous for this mentality that it is women who should be giving birth and, moreover, birth not only to daughters, but also to sons. Namely, the only known ‘natural’ continuity in the reproduction of sameness is – women giving birth to girls. It is unbearable for those who claim exactly that as their motto – the ‘naturalness’ of the reproduction of the identical by the identical – that they should not be able to do it themselves. Violence (both physical and in the establishment of the predominance of a dominant unilateral and exclusive genealogy) is then the only resort, by which a social body can be cut to one’s convenience to reproduce the identical. This leads on one side to the exclusive patriarchal lineage, but on the other, in extreme cases, to a ‘culture of death’, which can be, indeed, historically, cultivated on a large scale. It is especially promoted at times of massacres and wars. These, intent on reconstructing power and putting it in ‘our’ hands, must therefore begin with the reconfiguration of the gender regime. This is usually announced much ahead, as it was in the case of the dismantlement of Yugoslavia and of the subsequent series of wars: women disappeared from public
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visibility and from egalitarian political involvement (mechanically promoted by socialism) at the same time as the first nationalist movements took shape. When this enterprise is particularly tough and violent, it can be seen that beyond the violence to others (killings) awaits self-violence: the suicide of a group, a nation or a country (independently of the fact that others will also readily give a hand). A vivid example were the Taliban, but any new social reconfiguration of power is. A great part of the Taliban’s political energy and ‘imagination’ was exhausted in the repression of women, which was also a sort of self-repression and deprived them of exchange and of the softer aspects of social and private life. In transition periods, the gender reconfiguration will particularly be taken care of and made to settle. After a while it will become a norm for quite some time, so as to allow for other inequalities to be built upon the analogy with and the general consensus about the subordination of all women to all men.61 A ‘tradition’ will have been established. Violently conflicting nationalisms are greatly profiting from the pseudotraditionalism permanently proposed by the transitional and yet ‘undecided’ mentality, because it helps them construct and claim through violence new ‘ancient’ roots in order to reorganize the declining patriarchy essential to the nationalist ‘project’: ‘Violence’, writes Radmomir Konstantinovic, serves the function of rendering real the problematic Ego, whose inner, psychic stage it links to the reality of the world. […] Violence, which is brutality brought to its peak, is the only way of creating a reality (stvaranja stvarnosti) which, though existentially absent, ‘ungraspable’, accepts to respond only to a big hit and, generally, only to greatness in anything: in words, gesture, position, defiance. The smaller the feeling of reality, the bigger the necessity for violence. With the strengthening of this feeling, the necessity for violence diminishes. Obviously, the ‘nonreality’ of the world is here nothing else but the non-reality of the subject […].62 ‘Non-reality of the subject’ means war. It means no public space, no political space, no time (for a process), no democracy and no citizenship. It means immediacy.63 It also means no time, as we saw before. But the non-reality of the subject is also the nonexistence of the citizen. It also means the possibility to eliminate, kill or massacre individuals or groups who are not considered citizens, or who are denied access to subjecthood and citizenships. They would then be only bodies, to be counted dead, if of ‘others’, or to be counted alive if ‘ours’, and in this case automatically thought of as citizens. Biopower intervenes before the definition of citizenship. The Yugoslav conflict, far from being irrational, as it was depicted, showed with precision that the partition could not be achieved without either violence or a gradual political process, and so also that the war was not a fatality. If it did occur, it is because the political process (which can also be described as the making of Europe) was speeded up, and entering Europe (euphemistically, the West, capitalism) was misunderstood as being possible overnight. Also, the regional aspect of the Yugoslav tangle was completely lost sight of. The war was, whether admittedly (Slovenia, Croatia) or not (Serbia), a claim to be in Europe, and, paradoxically, to have always been part of it. As in
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the case of Rwanda, the only salvation lay in politics, but, as in Rwanda, it was forcing and precipitating into war something that should have been a long process. The resistance to violence, to a dichotomous part of globalized capitalism, may come from yet non-identified and new subjects-agents. Says Samir Amin: These rejections could stem from cultural illusion, religious fundamentalism, ethnic aspirations or other forms. Nevertheless, taking into account the progressive potential of these struggles and the universal or potentially universal character, even if in fact they make no claims to be (one thinks, for example, of those who were present at the antiDavos forum, large movements which are both real, symbolic and diverse across the five continents…).64 Though it is difficult to imagine that fundamentalists may represent resistants to violence, some of the agencies we may not specially like or expect, which have come out as a result of various conflicts or of the new anti-globalization movements, or which represent intermediate identities, may contribute to building up the general resistance front of the future subjects. This includes possibly ethnicized and naturalized political subjects, responding to their distinct communities, sometimes the relict or reproduction from colonialism or from real socialism, not to speak of real capitalism. In the former Yugoslavia, indeed, a distinction was made between ‘nations’ (constitutive of the state and locally of the republic, with the formal right to secede) and ‘nationalities’, unofficially also considered as minorities until the ethnic vocabulary spreads with the dismantlement of the federal state (nationalities were non-constitutive, with no right to secession). This distinction – a euphemism which shows the constructed character of both identities as function of power and state – is still present in the first generation of constitutions of the now independent states, and has a hard time disappearing in favour of a more individual citizenship. ‘Nationalities’ have formally become subjects from objects, agents from non-agents. In the states of the Great Lakes, Africa, likewise, the reference of minorities to a Native Authority or customary law in regard of their ethnic citizenship gives each a communal (communitarian) character, and leaves those without such resort destitute in regard of ethnic citizenship, exercised collectively and as members of a group. But that, as well as the inherited and maintained colonial division of the population, be it on the basis of religion, nationality, race or ethnic group, does freeze, sometimes for good, identities and would-be political subjectivities into conflicting factions, separate constituencies, ethnic or religious (as opposed to civic) citizenship, ‘cultures’, parties and sometimes armies. Today, as the defeat of the Taliban is nearly achieved, and as all factions, ‘tribes’ and ‘ethnicities’ are invited to interact with a view of constituting a common and combined government representing all Afghans,65 the ethnic logic is not only adopted but also enforced and endorsed by the international community. Why does the ethnic logic? Because what is at stake is the sharing of power. The French specialist Olivier Roy says: ‘There is a growing awareness – except, of course, with the Taliban – that power must be shared and that the ethnic criterion will be dominant.’66 Yet the ‘ethnic criterion’ could never be said to be dominant in France without raising the problem of racism. With regard to power, then, women are no players, because they had no power to start with. They can be left out of the reconstitution of
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Afghanistan as they are no tribe. Also, the alternative to sharing power is only fighting for it. In the rough conditions of Afghanistan, everyone knows that life is conditioned by power. You are dead when you’ve lost it. The quality of power (for example, the level of democracy) is not a relevant problem under these conditions. Once again, we have the terms of the conflict not only ‘explaining’ it, but also taken as being the solution for it. Moreover, the Western, mainly American, intervention and dictation of the ethnic terms (taken and normativized from the Afghans themselves) as a solution, adds to it an impressive layer of constriction, because it repeats, adopts and enforces from outside that which was seen as being only an inner configuration. In India, to take another example, the distinct ‘Personal Rule’ of each religious community continues to govern private individual lives. This means that everyone’s life, property, land-status, marriage and kinship relations, etc. are regulated by Personal Rule even before being so by universal citizenship. It is particularly interesting and shocking because it is women, more than men, who are being differentiated by Personal Rule. Indeed, for them, citizenship is not altogether secular since it is underordained to religion and customary law. So an Indian Muslim woman may be repudiated by her husband without any substantiation, while a Hindu woman cannot be, etc. The citizenship of women is contingent on their religion even for some elementary rights. As a matter of fact, none is supposed not to belong to a religious community.67 A parallel could be made about women’s citizenship in the Yugoslav space and in the subcontinent: all elites anywhere – those of the ancient socialist regime and the new ethnocracies – were agreed on not really letting women exercise civic citizenship, or on subordinating them. Since the patriarchal consensus about the subordination of women to men was and still is fairly general in the Balkans, it was used in order to enforce its broader hierarchies – those that do not concern women only. In this sense, a gender regime operates as a sort of paradigm for other inequalities and as a model per analogy. Acknowledgement I thank Stefano Bianchini, Sanjay Chaturvedi, Goran Fejic and Ranabir Samaddar for reading and discussing my paper and for giving excellent suggestions for its improvement. They are in no way accountable for the lacunae of the present chapter. Notes 1 Thanks to Goran Fejic for the remark. 2 Ivan Iveković, ‘Nešto o državi i o nagodbama elita’ (‘About the state and about the deals between elites’), manuscript 2002. 3 Stefano Bianchini (q.v.) even speaks of extreme cases of quasi-states, such as Kosova, Transdniestria, Chechnya and Northern Cyprus. Some more could be added in BosniaHerzegovina, such as Republika Srpska or Herceg-Bosna (the latter was officially dismantled, but had been the Croatian nationalist ethnocracy in Bosnia during this last war), or maybe the parallel ‘Maoist People’s Government’ [Maoist Janasarkar] districts declared in Nepal, of which some are guerrilla half-administered or ‘jointly declared’. 4 Alain Brossat, ‘Pour en finir avec les prisons’, La fabrique, Paris, 2001, p. 46.
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5 Roberto Esposito, Communitas. Origine e destino della comunità (Torino: Einaudi, 1998). I am indebted to him for part of the following. 6 Michel Serres, Le contrat naturel (Paris: François Bourin, 1990), and Le tiers instruit (Paris: Bourin, 1991). 7 Klaus Theweleit, Male Fantasies, Vol. 2, trans. Erica Carter and Chris Turner, (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1978/1989), pp. 79–80. 8 An orientalist tradition has it that we never see anything coming from extraEuropean cultures as political; but a translation into political language is possible and necessary. 9 An orientalist tradition has it that we never see anything coming from extraEuropean cultures as political; but a translation into political language is possible and necessary. 10 G.W.F. Hegel, La Phénoménologie de l’esprit, trans. par Gwendoline Jarczyk and PierreJean Labarrière, (Paris: Gallimard, 1993). 11 Ibid., p. 409. 12 Ibid., p. 413. 13 Ibid., p. 417. 14 Mahmood Mamdani, When Victims Become Killers. Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), p. 145. 15 In Mushirul Hasan (ed.), The Unfinished Agenda, (Delhi: Manohar, 2002). 16 Étienne Balibar, Nous, citoyens d’Europe? Les frontières, l’État, le peuple, (Paris: La découverte, 2001). 17 Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, (London: Verso, 2000). 18 Unfortunately, I haven’t had access to this book: Dietmar Rothermund, Delhi agosto 15, 1947. La fine del colonialismo (Bologna: Mulino, 2000), p. 29, information by Anna Nadotti whom I thank. 19 Will Kymlicka, ‘Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe’, in W. Kymlicka and Magda Opalska (eds), Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported: Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe, (London: Oxford University Press, 2001). According to him, former theorists were blinded by ‘the myth of “ethnocultural neutrality”’ and thought that ethnocultural claims would disappear with Western liberal democracy, which they didn’t. 20 While my generation (1968) proclaimed ‘Long live the difference’, the same slogan was, at the same time, cherished by apartheid ideologists in South Africa. 21 Examples of this are Pakistan and Slovenia. The Slovenian secessionist slogan in 1990/1991 was ‘Europa zdaj’, ‘Europe now’. But ‘now’ meant war, among other things because Europe was not ready. Had Europe at that time had a project (which it now has for a series of Eastern countries) about the terms and the timetable of including the then Yugoslavia within a reasonably negotiated foreseeable time accompanied appropriately by reforms, the war may have been avoided. But that is another story. 22 Julie Mostov, ‘“Our women”/“Their women”: symbolic boundaries, territorial markers and violence in the Balkans’, Peace and Change 20, 4, pp. 515–529. 23 Full active citizenship of women is resisted by any system even nowadays. Suffice it to have a glimpse of the composition of a parliament in any country (only Scandinavia having a better score). The French Revolution, which proclaimed ‘universal’ suffrage for all, never meant to apply it to women who were deprived of it in the name of their particularity, and Olympe de Gouges paid for it with her life. It took until the end of the Second World War in France for women to accede to their ‘universal’ right, which means some 160 years. It is safe to say that the human rights of women lag some 200 years behind those of men. 24 Both rely on a concept of sovereignty, but differently interpreted: in the case of the Hague tribunal, it is the state’s duty to deliver their (war) criminals, but this demand on the state too is based on the idea of its sovereignty.
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25 Nenad Miscevic, ‘Prema globalnoj pravednosti’ (‘Towards Global Justice’), an introduction to a monograph on The International Criminal Court published in Croatia: Krapac i suradnici, Medjunarodni kazneni sud, Hrvatski pravni centar, Zagreb 2001. 26 Mireille Delmas-Marty, ‘La difficile naissance du droit de demain’, Le Monde, 2001, November 16, p. 16. 27 Michel Foucault, ‘Cours du 17 mars 1976’, in ‘Il faut défendre la société.’ Cours au Collège de France. 1976, (Paris: Gallimard, Seuil), 1997, pp. 213–235. 28 Ibid., pp. 228, 227. 29 Jürgen Habermas, Après l’Etat-nation, (Paris: Fayard, 2000); L’Intégration républicaine. Essai de théorie politique, (Paris: Fayard, 1996). 30 Étienne Balibar, La crainte des masses. Politique et philosophie avant et après Marx, (Paris: Galilée, 1997). In this short rendering of some problems raised by Balibar, I also relied on his presentation at the workshop on 9 December, 2001, ‘Nation, Partitions and Dialogue – Issues in the Politics of Peace Today’, organized as part of the international research project ‘Partitions and Dialogue – Issues in the Peace Questions Today’ (called informally ‘Partitions Compared’). In this debate, Ranabir Samaddar raised the pertinent question of the Western borders of Europe, i.e. America. 31 Habermas, Intégration républicaine. 32 Giacomo Marramao, Dopo il Leviatano, (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2001); also a chapter entitled ‘Europe after the Leviathan’. Tecnica, politica e costituzione, in Una costituzione senza stato. Ricerca della Fondazione Lelio e Lisli BassoIssoco, a cura di Gabriella Bonacchi, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2001). 33 Claus Offe and Martin Hartmann, Vertrauen. Die Grundlage des sozialen Zusammenhalts, (Campus, 2001). 34 Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri, Empire, (Paris: Exils Editeur, 2001). 35 Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization. The Human Consequences, (London: Polity Press and Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1998). 36 For a good definition of ethnocracies see Oren Yiftachel, ‘“Ethnocracy”: the Politics of Judaizing Israel/Palestine’, Constellations 6, 1999, pp. 364–391. 37 Mwayila Tshiyembe, ‘L’Afrique face au défi de l’Etat multinational’, in: Le Monde diplomatique 558, 47e année, September 2000, p. 15. 38 Rada Iveković, ‘From the Nation to Partition, through Partition to the Nation’, Transeuropéennes 19/20, 2001. 39 Maurice Goldring, ‘Partitions, Northern Ireland and the Basque Country’, paper for 9 December 2001 (see note 30 for details). 40 Rada Iveković, Geschlechterdifferenz und nationale Differenz, in Chantal Mouffe and Jürgen Trinks (eds), Feministische Perspektiven, (Wein: Turia and Kant, 2001), pp. 140–159. 41 ‘Pour Silvio Berlusconi, la civilization occidentale est “supérieure” à l’islam’ (Reuters), Le Monde 27 September 2001: Here is what the Italian prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, said on 26 September 2001 in Berlin: ‘We should be aware of the superiority of our civilisation (…), a value-system which brought to all the countries that have adopted it a large prosperity which guarantees the respect of human rights and of religious freedom.’ He then added: ‘that respect certainly doesn’t exist in Islamic countries’. 42 Flora Lewis speaks about a ‘strange presumption [by the US] that only citizens are entitled to benefit from the law. But reports that the Justice Department is looking for some territory outside the US to hold its military tribunals, such as the Guantánamo military base in Cuba, suggest that someone there realizes they can’t just rule out the judicial system (…).’, in F. Lewis, ‘Now Who Will Defend the Rule of Law?’, Herald Tribune, 7 December 7 2001, http://www.iht.com./ 43 I thank Goran Fejic for discussing these matters with me and explaining them. 44 Ford Foundation Report, ‘Peace & Social Justice’ – PSJ, Summer 2001: ‘What Kind of Justice? Experts probe the power of truth after political trauma’, by David C. Anderson
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(italics by me, R.I.), www.fordfound.org/publications. Boraine is the former deputy chairman of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 45 In Robert McMahon, ‘Yugoslavia: Expert discusses truth and reconciliation in Balkans’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 7 August 2001 (italics by me, R.I.), http://www.reliefweb.int./ 46 Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Contre les tribunaux militaires’, Libération, 21 November 2001:6. Flora Lewis, ibid. But constitutions themselves create exceptions and are flawed: B. Clavero, op. cit. 47 IGC: http://www.crisisweb.org/. 48 Josiane Boulad-Ayoub, ‘Justice’, http://www.mondialisations.org/, 26 February 2001. 49 Time and again we find some not wanting to acknowledge massacres or genocides that happened to others, or to compare them with those they suffered: ‘Our’ suffering and deaths are always magnified as compared to ‘theirs’. See Ranabir Samaddar, ‘Deaths in the Sky’, The Statesman (Delhi and Calcutta), 4 October 2001. 50 Mamdani, p. 273. 51 This statement by Mamdani also may be too hasty, but it is nevertheless poignant; it all depends on the definition of ‘perpetrator’ and ‘victim’. Are perpetrators only the torturers in prison? Or (almost) the whole White population inasmuch as they didn’t protest? Should we count, among the beneficiaries, also the Black population, which enjoyed, though separately, some elements of a ‘state of law’, and social benefits greater than the rest of Africa? 52 Mamdani, p. 39. 53 Kymlicka, ibid. 54 Marie-Claire Caloz-Tschopp, Les sans-Etat dans la philosophie d’Hannah Arendt. Les humains superflus, le droit d’avoir des droits et la citoyenneté, (Lausanne: Payot, 2000). 55 Kymlicka, ibid., italics by me (R.I.). 56 Catherine N. Niarchos, ‘Women, War, and Rape: Challenges Facing the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, Human Rights Quarterly 17.4, 1995, pp. 649–690. 57 The nationalist interpretation of Croatia as a victim and as the ‘wounded mother’s body’ was to be replaced by a somewhat ‘softer’ pattern: Croatia as a heroic victim, yes, but also a proper nation capable of protecting its women and its borders. The villains remained the Serbs, and it was only they, allegedly, who raped at war. This ‘nationalist feminist’ view was taken up also by some foreign feminists, such as Catharine MacKinnon or Andrea Dworkin; see, for example: In Harm’s Way. The Pornography Civil Rights Hearings, (Cambridge, MA. and London: Harvard University Press, 1998). Also, see Dworkin, Life and Death: Unapologetic Writings on the Continuing War Against Women, (New York: Free Press, 1997) and Intercourse, (New York: Free Press, 1997), and MacKinnon, Only Words, (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1993), as well as other writings of these authors. 58 Stefano Bianchini in this book. Also, K.S. Karol, ‘Le rêve brisé de Gorbatchev’, Le Nouvel observateur, 27 December 2002, p. 49. 59 Radha Kumar, Divide and Fall? Bosnia in the Annals of Partition, (London: Verso, 1997). 60 ‘Denied Justice: Individuals Lost in a Legal Maze’, an ICG Report (Bosnia), 23 February 2000, http://www.crisisweb.org./ 61 Colette Guillaumin, Sexe, Race et Pratique du pouvoir. L’idée de Nature, (Paris: Côtéfemmes, 1992). 62 Radmomir Konstantinovic, Filozofija palanke, (Beograd: Nolit., 1981), pp. 87–88. See two translations from this book into French: ‘Sur le nazisme serbe’, Lignes 6, October 2001, pp. 53–75; ‘Sur le style du bourg’, Transeuropéennes 21, 2001:129–139. 63 Fabio Ciaramelli, ‘La buona novella del desiderio nell’era globale’, Il manifesto, 26 June 2001. 64 Samir Amin, ‘An Internationalism for the 21st Century’, Counter Hegemony 3, 2000, p. 24. 65 Women are left out, since they do not correspond to the ethnic logic. It shows how much the latter prevails. No UN officials have called loudly for women to be taken into account in the
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construction of the new government, although some token women are on it: women medical doctors, we are told, although we are not informed about the profession of the men. For women, qualifications have to make up for being of the wrong gender. 66 Olivier Roy, ‘L’ONU vent aller trop vice’, interview in Liberation, 22 November 2001, p. 10. 67 Kumkum Sangari, ‘Politics of Diversity. Religious Communities and Multiple Patriarchies’, Economic and Political Weekly, 23 December 1995; Urvashi Butalia, The Other Side of Silence. Voices from the Partition of India, (New Delhi: Viking, 1998); Veena Das, Critical Events. An Anthropological Perspective in Contemporary India, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995); Radha Kumar, Divide and Fall? Bosnia in the Annals of Partition, (London: Verso, 1998); Interventions. International Journal of Post-Colonial Studies, Special Topic: ‘The Partition of the Indian Sub-Continent’, edited by Ritu Menon, vol. 1, no. 2, 1999; R. Menon and Kamla Bhasin, Borders and Boundaries. Women in India’s Partition, (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1998); Transeuropéennes 19/20, 2001, on ‘Partitions’.
2 Partitions Categories and destinies Stefano Bianchini State partition is a very broad political category. Since the ancient times, historians have cited several examples of state partition, which have been provoked by different events, which took place under different circumstances, and which had different impacts. It should suffice to remind ourselves here of the partitions that characterized the fate of the great political constructions from Alexander the Great to the Holy Roman Empire, and from the Asoka Empire to the Djaghatai’s Khanat. In a sense, partition is a historical destiny, which has traditionally affected states when unable to survive their founder, to resist external attacks or inner rivalries, to preserve an efficient administration, or simply because they were divided among their heirs. In this perspective, partition sounds like an event, that simply requires an observation and a record. Nonetheless, state partition is a political phenomenon, which has increasingly occurred in modern times, following new patterns as long as a specific form of state has been established in Europe and spread worldwide as a lever for modernity, either through the communist experience or the process of decolonization, via colonization. This specific form is the nation-state, which is a dynamic, rather than a static construction of a political society. In fact, the nation-state has never been a stable pattern. On the contrary, it has continuously transformed itself in terms of elite selection, sets of values, institutional frameworks and sources of loyalties, since it emerged at the end of the eighteenth century. In this context, state partition shows a specific dynamics as a late phenomenon, stemming from the evolution of this modern political construction. There are no doubts that the industrial revolution and the predominance of the machine have deeply changed the role of state and the idea of politics, in terms of space, time and relations between rulers and ruled. As a watershed, the European changes at the turn of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries have rapidly made incomparable the political life and the social organization before and after them. Truly, forms of long-term continuity had an impact, sometimes even relevant, on the following events. Nonetheless, the quality and the following increasingly pressing rhythm of the changes have been as much radical as indisputable. In this framework, the nation-state has proved for two centuries to be the most efficient political construction, able to adapt itself to the rapidity of the changes and interpret them accordingly. This dynamic capacity has expressed a new political fact, in contrast with the pre-modern societies, which appear static when observed from a modern angle.1 Therefore, at the beginning of modernity, the nation-state represented, in Europe, the alternative to the pre-modern great empires (the Habsburg, the Ottoman and the Russian mainly); later, – in the other continents – to the colonial empires. At the same
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time, the nation-state absorbed, as continuity from the past, the most relevant legacy of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), by considering sovereignty as an absolute value.2 In this context, where the principle of sovereignty and the ‘revolutionary’ dimension of the nation-state met, liberalism and democracy encouraged radical changes in the public sphere, in terms of people representation and selection of ruling classes. The divine legitimization of powers was dismantled, universal suffrage was gradually introduced, and a compulsory educational system was created. As a result, even the dictatorships – when established – were forced to cope with the problem of consensus, while absolute monarchies disappeared. Admittedly, the appeals of rulers to people, which often sounds like a broad and generic category, have encouraged a search of factors for a more ‘efficient’ selfdefinition of a community. Within this process, ethnicity has gradually played a key role in determining loyalties, power legitimization and the sense of belonging. In other words, during the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, the modern nation-state has become a sovereign political society, requiring a form of legitimization from below with a crucial ethnic component.3 Therefore, sovereignty, people consensus (not necessarily expressed through democratic institutions, but which includes the controversial idea of self-determination) and ethnicity have emerged as the three main characteristics of the modern state. Nonetheless, how deeply ethnicity – as a determinant of nationhood – is relevant in a nation-state differs from country to country, with the exception of the ‘immigrant countries par excellence’ (namely the US, Australia and New Zealand), where ethnicity is not politically relevant in terms of nationhood. The melting pot is, in fact, predominant in countries of immigrants, although even here ethnicity plays a role, for instance, in determining racial dynamics, in spite of the fact that these dynamics are not connected to territory. In this evolving framework, however, state partition has increasingly taken place, and has been claimed and rejected, showing a strong mobilizing capacity and a great potential influence on the system of international relations. In conclusion, the dynamics of the modern political society require a specific attention to the phenomenon of the partition, by distinguishing it from apparently similar events of the pre-modern times. Then, the following attempt of systematizing a series of interpretative categories on state partition refers exclusively to the political experience nurtured by modernity.4 I Interpretative categories 1 Dividing without partitioning In the outlined context of the modern nation-state, the political category of partition embodies the political will of distinguishing a group from another territorially, by meeting group identities, group loyalties and power needs of the elites. However, this process should not be merely extended to any kind of separation, which has occurred for different historical or ideological reasons, even in the period of modernity. As an example, the concept of partition does not include separations stemming from ideological conflicts. In this event, in fact, opposite groups generally claim their legitimacy over the same territory. The distinction of sovereignties originates from
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contrasts concerning the ways in which society should be organized, and occurs when one part is unable to prevail on the other. However, both preserve the will of unifying the country in an undetermined future, perceiving the separation as a temporary effect. In this respect, the cases of China/Taiwan, the two Koreas and the two Germanys cannot be considered examples of partition, at least until their conflicting parties, although physically divided, claim sovereignty over the same territory.5 In other words, when a distinctiveness in the state-building process historically occurs, its meaning varies according to whether the parties consider the separation as a forced, but temporary event, or the ‘natural’ outcome of history and the achievement of a ‘historical dream’. In the former, territory is an irrelevant factor, because ideals and social issues predominate; in the latter, territorial claims have a different rationality, because they are understood as a substantial part of the process of redefining loyalties and the conditions for wielding power (see section2a). In this case, territorial claims are pursued by irredentism, which connects collective security to ethnocultural homogeneity. As a result, separation and partition mirror quite different political situations, although both are connected to a state-building process, embodied in the modern discourse. 2 Applied forms of partition State partition is not connected to incompatible visions of social organization (as in the case of capitalism and communism). Rather, the modern dynamics, which characterize this event, suggest that partition is a political conception, which refers both to statehood and nationhood. Nonetheless, these two categories do not necessarily coincide in terms of territory. Therefore, partition has to cope with nationhood and statehood by considering them either in strict connection, or separately. In conclusion, partition may refer to: a aims of territorial fragmentation of pre-existing political societies (empires and nationstates) or b ethnic groups territorially scattered in different nation-states. 2.1 Partitioned states, conflicting perceptions and interests When considering aims of territorial fragmentation of political societies in modern times, the main historical reference is to the collapse of (a) the great multinational dynasties, (b) the colonial empires and (c) the socialist federations. All these events were provoked and followed by a series of partitions, whose perceptions of, and aspirations to, statehood and nationhood have played a determinant role. In general terms, two kinds of subjects have claimed and pursued this political goal, interpreting and justifying it differently. The first subject (or group) is an inner one: in this case, its request for partition has been justified as a tool for getting independence (as, for instance, in the Pakistani and Croatian examples). The second subject, instead, is an outer one and it is generally identified with one or more great powers. Basically, the interest in encouraging partition is nurtured, in this case, by the will of weakening the enemy and, simultaneously, establishing a control over the separated territory from the partitioned country. This has been the case of Germany, which tried to penetrate East European territories by imposing the partition of the Russian Empire with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March 1918, and a sort of independence for Ukraine. Similarly, winners partitioned the German colonial Empire
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after the First World War in order to satisfy their own interests. Admittedly, because power politics pre-existed modernity, we have similar examples before modernity: one of them is the partition of Poland at the end of the eighteenth century. This partition, however, has been promoted by outer subjects. On the contrary, modernity has strengthened inner dynamics of partition, by connecting them to statehood and nationhood. 2.2 Partitioned nations Partition, however, may also refer to ethnic groups, territorially scattered in different nation-states. This case is different from state-partition, where the claim of independence is predominant. By contrast, partitioned nations contest the relation between ethnicity and territory. In other words, partitioned nations referred primarily to the lack of institutional and territorial unity of an ethnic group, while partitioned states referred primarily to the loss of institutional control over a territory by an existing political society.6 From their own perspective, the elites of partitioned ethnic groups claim a reconfiguration of state borders, following criteria and priorities that are different from those that historically have prevailed since then. Because this claim, if carried out, is achieved through a partition of other existing states, other ethnic groups might be partitioned or might change their social position unwillingly. As a result, such claims often give birth to tensions, wars and further partitions. Ethnic cleansing is a possible, and consistent, consequence of the efforts made by leaderships (or ‘ethnocracies’), aiming to establish territorial ethnic unities. Pursued either through violent tools or negotiations (as in the cases of the Yugoslav collapse or the Treaty of Lausanne, respectively), it has been historically, and legally, justified by the need to make the new geo-demographic arrangement irreversible, by avoiding opposite ‘ethnoterritorial’ claims from neighbouring countries.7 In the twentieth and the twenty-first centuries, different groups (political parties, cultural, religious and social movements, illegally armed bands, and youth and intellectual associations) have believed that the state-territory they belong to does not coincide with the territory where their own ethno-nation lives. Accordingly, they have claimed a geopolitical redefinition. East Central Europe is one of the areas where a chain of partitioned ethno-nations links the cases of Hungarians, Serbs, Croats, Albanians, Russians and Romanians. Similar situations can be noted in Asia and in Africa, as for Tamil, Pashtuni, Bengali, Somali, Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups. However, there are two different kinds of partitioned ethnic groups. The first one is based on scattered ethnic groups, which may rely on an existing nation-state, often defined as ‘motherland’. This is the case of Croats, Serbs, Hungarians, Russians, Romanians and Albanians, just to mention a few. The second is based on partitioned ethnic groups without any state territory, as in the case of the Basques and the Kurds or many ethnic groups in Africa. 3 The fragility of terminology The uncertainties of terminology in defining partition, as already observed while using separation and partition, are multiplied further when fragmentation, dissolution, disintegration, break-up and dismemberment are used.8 Understanding to what extent this
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plurality of words reveals different aspects of the same phenomenon, or is to be considered just a set of synonyms, is quite a difficult exercise, as one can note in the following examples. Dismemberment, in particular, is a very interesting word, widely used by scholars. The idea suggested by the term sounds strictly related to the bodies of human beings; dismemberment is, in fact, an organic image, which mirrors feelings of pain and sufferance, and suggests the idea of death. On the contrary, partition sounds more ‘neutral’ or ‘technical’ in terms of feeling, because it is connected to things that should be separated, in order to have a clearer, and maybe better, organized environment (or world). Truly, the concept of dismemberment was evoked in the literature in order to define the end of either the pre-modern great empires (the so-called great multinational dynasties) or socialist federations (Yugoslavia, the USSR and Czechoslovakia). Nonetheless, in the former case, the role played by external subjects and international events (the First World War) was crucial in provoking state dismemberment, while the legitimacy of partition was based primarily on the winners’ rights. On the contrary, in the case of socialist federations dismemberment starts as a process provoked by domestic dynamics, stemming from the inner collapse of communism. In this case, the legitimacy of dismemberment apparently lies in the communist constitutions, which recognize the existence of different nations (as ethnic groups) within the communist federative state. The discourse leads to self-determination and secession, namely two conceptions included in communist constitutions, even if in a declarative way only. No rules were established in order to make the right accessible. Lenin himself stated that secession was not in the interest of the working class.9 Nonetheless, the communist power-sharing system was based on territory, ethnic ratio and co-optation on ethnic basis (in both the Stalinist and Titoist systems); as a result, local ethno-interests have become increasingly relevant in the legitimacy of local elite, while communist ideology was loosing relevance. Therefore, ethno-nationalism – nurtured by communism – has become a source of state re-legitimization and state partition, regardless of the limited constitutional provisions. Again however, as for terminology, dismemberment is a word that has been used to point out a variety of state partitions, provoked both from outer and/or inner factors. To a certain extent, partition and dismemberment might be considered semantically different. An attempt at classifying the meaning of these two terms might be as follows: Partition refers to: (a) a violent or negotiated state fragmentation between two subjects (as in the cases of Sweden and Norway in 1905 or the Czech and Slovak republics in 1993) or (b) a state dissolution imposed by two or more outer subjects (as in Poland in the eighteenth century). Dismemberment refers to: (a) a most probably violent then negotiated state fragmentation, imposed by more than two inner subjects (as in the cases of Yugoslavia and the USSR in 1991) or (b) a state dissolution, which has been the outcome of the interactions of a plurality of both inner and outer subjects. This was the case with the Ottoman Empire, but also with the Austrian and Russian Empires.
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The variants (a) of both partition and dismemberment require the reference to the concept of state fragmentation, because at least the predominant part of the pre-existing state survives the territorial and demographic loss (see the cases of Sweden, the Czech republic, Russia, and Serbia-and-Montenegro through the FRY). The variants (b) of both partition and dismemberment require the reference to the concept of state dissolution, because the process ends with the complete destruction of the pre-existing state (as for the great multinational dynasties). However, this attempt at defining differences between these concepts has to cope with the variety of perceptions that characterize the subjects involved in the event. In fact, Yugoslavia is a term that refers to a complex area geographically extending from the Karavanke Mountains to Gevgelija. Many experts (personally I am among those) have interpreted the fact that Serbia-and-Montenegro declared the FRY in April 1992 as an attempt to ‘steal’ a political idea and a legacy shared by a plurality of subjects. In this case, we cannot speak of state fragmentation, but of state dissolution. Similarly, the term partition includes the concept of ‘secession’ (secession of one subject from another, following a process that is consistent with the political persistence of a part of the pre-existing state). Nonetheless, even in the case of dismemberment, the concept of secession has been used. Reference, in this case, is to either inner subjects, which claimed independence (as Slovenia or Lithuania), or those pretending to a monopolist legacy over the pre-existing state, despite its substantial dissolution (as in the case of Milosevic’s Serbia towards Yugoslavia). Still, state dissolution is a category that might also be applied to the USSR, because the state disappeared when Russia, Ukraine and Belarus decided to dissolve the Union.10 As a matter of fact, El’cyn claimed Russian sovereignty from the USSR since 1990, making it evident that Russia did not pretend to the legacy of the country (although this was not completely true later, when Moscow pretended to the preservation of control over nuclear power, the Crimean peninsula and the Black Sea navy). In other words, despite the fact that scholars might try to establish a semantic differentiation between similar conceptions, a clear distinction and a classification remain uncertain, mainly because the variety of local perception is so strong that it deeply influences both the terminology and its rationality. II The attractiveness of partition 1 The interaction of statehood and nationhood As mentioned above, partition and dismemberment in modern times are strictly connected to the interaction between statehood and nationhood. This interaction has become particularly attractive during the twentieth century. There are many reasons for it, and they require a systematic and broad analysis. Although such a goal cannot be achieved within the size of this chapter, some aspects will be explored here, focusing the attention on three main issues. The first deals with the ties that connect territory, people’s loyalty and the exercise of power; the second deals with morality, and in particular with the morality of nations’ equality; and the third deals with substantial interests of the
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ruling class in the access of resources. All these aspects significantly contribute to make attractive statehood and, consequently, the idea of partition. The nexus between territory, people’s loyalty and the exercise of power is particularly connected with the nationhood construction. The idea of a well-defined territory where the state exercises the highest authority is a product of modernity. The sacredness of the ‘space’ and the inviolability of boundaries have been emphasized in the modern mythology of the nation-state, whose origins have to be traced in Europe.11 In this continent, territory did not enjoy such an absolute consideration in politics during the Middle Ages. Although relevant, borders remained porous because of the difficulty of getting their control systematically and because different authorities had the possibility of exercising their power over the same territory, in spite of the fact that they were enjoying different degrees of limitations. In a sense, the relation between the ‘Prince’ (in Machiavellian terms) and the territory mirrored the fact that a piece of land, however large, was exploited by a hierarchical order of figures, from the Emperor to the peasant, who exercised a right over it and considered themselves ‘owner’ of it. This was the so-called ‘possession’, which was gradually substituted – starting from British enclosures – by private property, where the uniqueness of the owner became the rule. Similarly, the states – becoming international sovereign subjects after the decline of the Emperor–Pope consociation – got the unique ownership over their territory and tried to make them inviolable. In other words, the substantially parallel evolution from possession to property and from the Middle Ages to the modern system of states is helpful in understanding how the sense of territory gradually changed, according to the European influence worldwide. Meanwhile, the sources of legitimization modified and people’s loyalty became increasingly crucial for the stability of a state. Sense of belonging and both state and group (nation) identities were rapidly strengthened through the interaction between state and nation, in such a way that they became extremely powerful tools for homogenizing a group and making easier the control over it by the ruling class. Instead of the ancient slogan, Cuius regio, eius religio, the interaction between nationhood and statehood has transformed this political goal into a similar one, Cuius regio, eius natio or Cuius natio, eius regio. During the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century the interdependence of territory and nationhood was encouraged by other strong and efficient tools, such as political myths and symbols, which showed effectiveness in supporting the legitimization of the political powers. In addition, they contributed significantly in guaranteeing the political consensus in societies where the right to vote had to be recognized in a few decades for all adult members, regardless of gender, beliefs and race. Accordingly, this process has encouraged a gradual and consistent identification between ruled and rulers, in terms of political identity and, at the same time, of language, religion, culture, history and ethnicity.12 The idea that rulers should be the expression of the people offered a wide range of possibilities, according to the interpretation of the notion of ‘people’. The family transnational connection among monarchies was rapidly overthrown and the ruled–rulers identification increasingly strengthened. In this context, different outcomes occurred. The idea that sets of rules and codes have to be shared by a political society was differently interpreted, according to the relevance attributed to common rights or to a common culture. National revolutionaries, such as Mazzini and Kossuth, became aware,
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particularly after the failure of the 1848 revolutions, of the risks connected to extreme interpretations given to the idea of nation in terms of ethnicity. Concerns over a possible ‘matrioshka’ process, generating endless partitions, had emerged significantly already in the middle of the nineteenth century.13 Cultural homogeneity in nation-state politics traces back its origins to that period. It has a centurylong evolution, which began with Herder’s description of people’s bias as a value and goes on with the emergence of the idea of national missions, the spreading of social Darwinism and the implementation of imperialist policies. Within this framework of reference, two main exacerbating prospects developed: the Nazi one, with the homogeneity summarized in a well-known slogan, ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer, and the ethno-nationalist one, where ethnicity becomes the determinant of nationhood and, through this process, claims a statehood based on ethnic homogeneity. Nazism, as an extreme variant of nationalism, has significantly contributed to connecting the idea of belonging to a group with the need to separate it from the ‘others’, by emphasizing a racist approach. Although defeated at the end of the Second World War and rejected with disgust by humanity, its political praxis has primed far-reaching consequences by rooting the idea that minorities are a sort of ‘fifth column’ of neighbouring countries, which can use them for modifying state borders to their benefit.14 Ethno-nationalist variant has assimilated the belief that minorities are potentially a threat to inner state stability, while the nexus of the nation and the ‘Prince’ have encouraged those policy makers who are ethnonationalist oriented to arrogate the exclusiveness of representing nationhood. Consistently with these premises (connected with people’s loyalty and territorial inviolability), they require individuals to accept cultural homogenization within a community. For those who do not accept – for cultural, ethnic, religious or ideological reasons – this framework of reference, discrimination and unequal treatments are the consequences. In this case, discrimination does not concern only members of minorities who are included in a certain territory. It concerns also other categories of people, as for instance free thinkers and members of mixed marriages, who have difficulties in identifying themselves within the parameters offered by a preestablished grid of codes associated to a unique identity. As a result, diversity and ‘otherness’ have become factors of exclusion and inequality, consistent with the premises of the interaction between statehood and nationhood, where ethnicity is a determinant. The mechanism of partition begins for act exactly when a decision of identification is required for the population and this decision implies the acceptance of a unique identity. Families and individuals are forced to make a decision, which is not easy and often creates tensions, wars, exchange of population, ethnic cleansing, migration flows, brain drain and stateless people. In this context, even the categories of continuity and discontinuity take a dramatic, and simultaneously ironic, dimension. In fact, continuity is claimed and emphasized by nationalism as a crucial factor in state identity. The continuity of a community is presented to the population either by revising, if necessary, history, culture and arts, or by emphasizing the purity of language and the relations with one religion, as the pillars of the group identity. This continuity, however, nurtures a crucial source of discontinuity. By pursuing a historical and cultural continuity of a group – as a political determinant in defining a state, a territory and a loyalty – a simultaneous discontinuity is imposed on relationships with otherness. The influences of other groups (living side by side with a
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community) and streams, received and elaborated over time in terms of culture, religions, customs and techniques, are cut off and often rejected as an expression of contamination. In the long run, the interaction between nationhood and statehood has implied discrimination of the otherness and inequality of treatment between included and excluded. According to countries and local situations, policy makers and political institutions have adopted a wide range of measures that comprise specific discriminatory regulations, going as far as apartheid, violence, rape, ethnic cleansing and genocide.15 2 Equality and inequality in partitioning processes The relation between the aforementioned categories of discrimination, inequality, inclusion and exclusion is quite complicated, because their perception varies dramatically according to the sensitivity of groups and/or individuals. As an example, and despite a widespread belief, not only those who are not belonging to the mainstream feel themselves discriminated against; in addition to ‘minorities’, which have been commonly identified with the ‘rejected otherness’, we have also examples of those, being a majority, who feel themselves discriminated against. This is, in particular, the case of Serbian and Russian nationalists, who claimed at the end of the 1980s that their nation enjoyed a discriminated position respectively in socialist Yugoslavia and in the Soviet Union to the benefit of the other nations.16 Serb nationalists, for instance, complained of exclusion from economic or financial centres of powers, from leading positions in the Ministry of Interior, or an unequal treatment in Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia. Russian nationalists complained of the absence of a Russian communist party, the restrictions imposed on Russians in the access to their resources, and the discrimination against Russian cultural peculiarities to the benefit of either Central Asia and Caucasus or the westernization of the country.17 These perceptions are important in understanding the reasons why multinational states collapsed in the first phase of post-communist transition. Crucially, the decision made by policy makers of the most relevant – at least in terms of demography and politics – nations of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union to claim sovereignty both for Serbia and Russia, has made the dissolution of the two federations possible. The Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Science, the policy of Greater Serbia and the policy of sovereignty adopted by El’cyn in 1990 are an evident confirmation of it. Therefore, it is highly questionable whether the claims for independence of the Baltic States or Slovenia would have led to the dismemberment of the two federations, without the agreement and the active contribution of Russia and Serbia.18 In whatever manner the reasons of the collapse of these federations are interpreted, it is a matter of fact that self-victimization has played a key role in mobilizing people’s consent for claiming independence. Victimization, in fact, requires that misbehaviours should be amended. Therefore, according to this view, amendment can be guaranteed by the (re-)establishment of equality; and equality can be achieved only through statehood. In other words, if Latvians and Croats, as well as Serbs and Russians, feel themselves discriminated against as an ethnic community comprised within a broader political society, the ethno-nationalist discourse promises the achievement of fairness by creating separate states. As a result, discrimination and/or the perception of discrimination are good levers for encouraging and spreading the belief that group equality can be achieved
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only thanks to a distinguished state-building process. In these terms, separatists have interpreted self-determination as a democratic goal by itself, because they regard it as a guarantee for achieving either equality with otherness, or distinctiveness from otherness. In sum, collective emotions and expectations cooperate in making the state a magnet. Sense of being discriminated against and self-victim-ization strengthen consent to political self-determination, and contribute to rooting the idea that multinational coexistence is impossible, both at the domestic level and in the international arena. The failure of pre-modern great empires and communist federations in Europe sounds like a confirmation of this belief. In addition, partition/dismemberment is, apparently, an efficient tool for achieving protection and security, because separatists believe that a society founded on identical members (in cultural terms) makes serious conflicts impossible. Such an approach has also been presented, in the earlier phases of postcommunism in Eastern Europe, as a reference for making democracy work. In other terms, separatists claim that democracy can be obtained only when a society is culturally (which means ethnically) homogeneous: Germany and Poland have been often presented as clear examples of it.19 The thesis is clear and legitimizes violence: in fact, both Germany and Poland have achieved homogenization through drastic changes of borders, ethnic cleansing, forced migrations and genocide. As a result, however, Germany has not been homogenized: Berlin is currently the second Turkish city of Europe, while the process of absorbing Eastern Länder is far from completion ten years after the German unification. As for Poland, the situation seems currently stable, but the country has radically changed since the Second World War in terms of demography, territory and social structure. Then, according to this thesis, Milosevic, Karadzic and Tudjman should be considered heroes and not criminals, and the ICTY should not have been established. However, and regardless of the political ‘reading’ of this thesis, concerns emerge from the theoretical point of view when the attention turns to two issues that interact significantly in this reasoning. On the one hand, in fact, the idea that democracy can be carried out in homogeneous countries leads to the conclusion that homogeneity has to be established first and then democracy works. On the other, collective security and stability depends strictly on the level of homogeneity of a country. In the first case, democracy appears to be powerless in dealing with differences within a society and should be ‘suspended’ before the accomplishment of the basic conditions for its enforcement. In the second, the exclusion of otherness (including immigrants) is presented as a precondition for stability and meets the uncertainties of a society when crossed by deep social troubles. Therefore, the appeals to a high level of group self-identification become particularly attractive for wide strata of the population who are willing to accept it.20 In particular, a homogenized identity offers a convincing set of codes for groups unable to adapt themselves to the rapid changes of modernity, interdependence and innovation. By redefining the relation between ‘us’ and ‘them’, clearly perceivable borders are established and this makes uncertain population culturally confident of its own self. The fear of globalization and mobility is a powerful feeling, which encourages culturally unprepared people to believe that fragmentation is a factor of group protection. Thus, the way for imposing national homogeneity is paved through a process where group identity, territoriality and the morality of equality connect, regardless of the fact whether – or to what extent – the perceptions of the ‘self’ are founded in truth.
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Crucially, in this reasoning, no one can predict when a process of partition/dismemberment can stop. Whenever a set of priorities contributes to the definition of a group identity, the rooting of a set of feelings as a discriminated group makes increasingly attractive the wish of state. The examples of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the 1990s seem to be a confirmation of this trend, as do the cases of Chechnya, Transnistria, Kosovo, Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia. Similarly, Cyprus, Kurdistan, Pashtunistan, Beluchistan, Kashmir, Assam, Punjab and Tamil Nadu are areas, to mention just a few, where state building remains attractive. In this context, national homogeneity nurtures and develops new homogeneities on behalf of the morality of equality and this process – in modern times – is strictly related to the growing relevance of ethnicity as a dominant factor of nationhood. As a result, the content of statehood changes, according to the interpretations given to the criteria adopted in establishing when a collectivity becomes a political subject. The aspiration to collective equality between groups is additionally strengthened by the increasing ability of the state to present itself as the distributor and the guarantor of rights. Citizenship and welfare have strongly contributed to growing the state capacity of penetrating into the society, and ruling and controlling it.21 The regulations that establish who, when and how individuals can enjoy fundamental rights – to property, work, healthcare, assistance, even mobility (by getting a passport) – strictly depend on the state, which may connect the access to these rights to a request for cultural loyalty. Generally, this is what happens immediately when a partition is carried out. The newly established state needs to declare its own property and where the property is. Within this space, individuals are treated as goods that belong to the ‘owner’, namely the state. Truly, individuals can freely decide otherwise and reject re-inclusion under these conditions. However, exclusion from the access to rights is the consequence and they have to face isolation, or move elsewhere and try to adapt themselves to new conditions abroad.22 By contrast, from a collective point of view, the newly established state appears to be efficient and consistent with the power management and the sense of group security. As a result, the nation-state remains politically attractive, and the morality of groups’ equality through its multiplication, via partition/dismemberment sounds acceptable to many policy makers and members of a collectivity. In the end, statehood – through nationhood, via ethnicity – may appear the winner of this process, whose attraction depends on the interaction of different needs, including the ethnic collective wish of being simultaneously equals to the ‘others’ and protected in their own difference. However, whether this perception of statehood is indeed the ‘winner’ is still to be seen, because the process of reshaping geopolitics and loyalties may have endless consequences. 3 Multiplying states or the attractiveness of purity The emotional dimension, as well as the interaction of statehood and nationhood, is not the sole factor that makes state multiplication attractive. In order to implement partition/dismemberment, a key role is played by the will, or the need of local elites to protect their position and their control over the available resources. In other words, partition and/or dismemberment become attractive when strong material interests of the local elites meet the moral expectations of group equality and the cultural vacuum of the population, in a context where democracy does not work or works badly. By local elites,
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we mean mainly policy makers, public administrators and intellectuals, while entrepreneurs do not seem to have contributed actively and predominantly in partitioning processes. At least, the experiences of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia offer evident examples of the role played by local and intellectual elite in encouraging fragmentation. Truly, one can argue that entrepreneurship did not exist in the communist world. However, technocrats were increasingly influential and wielded a significant control over the levers of power. Nonetheless, they have been generally pushed to the background by administrators and humanists who controlled two crucial fields for implementing partition: the territory and the mythology. Claims to history, to a long-term continuity of a community and to group equality are part of the symbolic effort of attracting consensus for the implementation of this alternative. In the political contexts where the bourgeoisie has been traditionally weak or absent, representatives of studies in philosophy, literature, philology, history of arts and history of the Middle Ages have repeatedly pretended to interpret the ‘consciousness of the people’, its sense of continuity and belonging. Their key role was however threatened by the increasing relevance of technocrats in the late communist societies. It was not a case that intellectuals of humanities were among the first to outline alternative political programmes to communist leaders in both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Consistently with primordialism, they appealed to emotions and a specific interpretation of cultural peculiarities in order to maintain an influential role over the population, mobilize it and develop an alliance with public administrators against technocrats. The ‘purity’ of culture and the purity of nation has been proposed to the population as a fundamental factor of collective protection, stability and security. In their turn, public administrators found the proposal consistent with their interests, which were solidifying thanks to the communist deregulation of politics.23 In fact, with the deregulation of politics in the 1960s and 1970s, European communist societies accomplished different degrees of devolution of the economic system, which had an unpredicted effect on the local administrators. Indeed, in a context deprived of democratic rules and mechanisms, local leaderships were encouraged by devolution to strengthen dependence on territory and local resources, in order to preserve power and get support from the population. Ideally, communism remained, in these conditions, the most powerful social glue. However, when communism collapsed, those societies where cultural plurality cohabited with economic devolution had suddenly to cope with a widely perceived sense of vacuum, while the functioning of democracy had still to be established.24 In these conditions, the call to purity offered a new opportunity of mobilizing the consent of the population, giving to the people the sense, or the illusion, that the cultural vacuum can be rapidly overcome. Meanwhile, a merciless struggle for reforms could start in order to define the lines of development and the source of power during the transition phase to democracy and market economy. Within this context, political leaderships generally identified their power basis with the control over local resources and their legitimacy with local group identities. The Czechoslovak case was only in part different from the Soviet and the Yugoslav in the sense that the alliance between administrators and intellectuals of humanities played a less devastating role than in the others. Indeed, the legacies of the Prague spring and the experience of ‘Charta 77’ allowed the dissent to follow different patterns of reference from the nationalist one. Therefore, sensitivity to ethno cultural contrasts had restricted
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opportunities to develop. This is why the decision of partition/ dismemberment has been more confined to the political/administrative sphere and the spreading of hatred has been contained.25 On the contrary, in Yugoslavia, in the Caucasus and in Moldavia the alliance between intellectuals of humanities and local administrators was established in a persuasive way. Accordingly, this event has proved how the interpretation of culture as a factor of separateness can be used for strengthening animosities, rivalries and violence. Instead, thanks to the legacy of Khrushchevism and the critical support to perestroika given by a significant part of the intelligentsia, Russia has suffered less than Yugoslavia from the alliance between administration and intellectuals, at least in terms of violence. In the end, the communist experience shows that nationhood and state dismemberment become extremely attractive, when the pre-existing deregulation of politics meets the collapse of ideological legitimization. Moreover, the fact that local material interests meet a society affected by a deep ideological crisis, when democracy is not functioning or is inefficient, makes the geopolitical reshaping of statehood/nationhood a powerful instrument in the hands of administrators and local officials. Meanwhile, intellectuals of humanities offer to them the key for achieving legitimization and controlling loyalties. In these terms, the process of partition/dismemberment seems to be connected to what extent statehood, nationhood and the will of the ruling class or the political elite (to preserve or establish their control over the access to the resources in a certain territory) mutually interact. In addition to that, there is room for the persistence of an ideological vacuum and the rooting of hopeless feelings in the population if democracy proves to be inefficient in the struggle against socially sanctioned phenomena, such as criminality or corruption. Especially in newly democratic countries, the uncertain situation in terms of security may open the doors to new clashes for reforms and the controls over the levers of power, which might imply a redefinition of territories and loyalties. In this context, leading political communities have to face further partition/dismemberment steps. As a result, the ‘matrioshka’ process confirms to be – under these conditions – an endless process. 4 Political destinies of partition The historical experience of the last two centuries shows that partition is an event that has far-reaching consequences. As a result, states threatened by partitions and successor states may have quite different destinies. Even the pattern followed in implementing partition is different, although violence is generally the rule. In other words, history shows that, with the exception of the examples of the kingdom of Sweden in 1905 and the federal republic of Czechoslovakia in 1993, partition is a violent event. This event is preceded by increasing sharp contrasts and implemented through bloodshed, wars (which often occurs repeatedly in the decades that follow the partition itself) and an increasing victimization of the civil population, rather than the military. In this context, and according to both the political experience and the pathways in action worldwide, it is possible to draw a map of the destinies that have or may have an impact on geopolitics, statehood and identities, by influencing or even upsetting the everyday life of individuals and families. The map may include the following destinies: a. States rejecting partition. History has plenty of examples of violent crackdown on claims and attempts at secession, which is considered the most ideological and substantial
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tool used for the accomplishment of a state partition. Resistance to partition is part of the ‘struggle for survival’ that existing political societies engage in. Sometimes, we have examples of a peacefully rejected partition: this is the case in Italy which avoided the secession of Sicily, after the Second World War, by granting a specific status to the island. On the contrary, Italy was unable to avoid peacefully the attempts at secession from Südtirol in the 1960s, when terrorism exploded, so that both crackdown and negotiation (with Austria) had to be pursued. By contrast, Nigeria and the fate of Biafra in the 1960s are a significant example of violent state behaviour to protect itself. Similarly, for the (Belgian) Congo and Katanga. Other cases are characterized by a long period of tensions and war, stemming from the fact that both resistance to, and attempts at, secession may last for decades, because no one is able to prevail. Amongst these cases, we can recall those of Sri Lanka and the Tamils, or of Ethiopia and the Eritreans. In the former, resistance has shown to be more successful; in the latter, secession has been achieved, at least in a long run. In other words, secession (or the fear of it) encourages resistance, but the outcome is unpredictable and depends on the balance of power, which is evolving, either domestically or internationally, according to the events. b. States dissolved by partition. This is the opposite case to the previous one. It occurs when a state is unable to resist partition and consequently dissolves. The Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia are the most recent examples. Actually, the latter peacefully disappeared, while the Soviet Union attempted to resist by using both negotiations and force. However, violence remained limited to a few episodes (the most relevant of these was the crackdown that occurred in Lithuania in January 1991). The negotiation was sanctioned by the Treaty of Novo-Ogarëvo, which was never signed because of the palace coup of August 1991. In the end, the USSR disappeared because its most relevant component, Russia, was interested in dismantling it. As for Yugoslavia, we can have two different interpretation of its dissolution, according to whether Serbian and Yugoslav interests are identified. If they are identified, Yugoslavia collapsed during a long and bloody civil war; if they are not, resistance has characterized the attempt of the federation to stop by the use of force the Slovene secession only. When the attempt failed, in a couple of weeks, the federation collapsed. The armed conflicts, which followed chronologically, should be interpreted in the light of the incompatible aims of the successor states and the prevailing trend of ‘matrioshka’-proliferating secessions (see section e). c. States partitioned into two subjects. This was the case in Sweden in 1905, when Norway became independent; or, again, this was the case in Czechoslovakia in 1993. Both were implemented peacefully. A similar destiny of partition might be predicted for Israeli and Palestine, in the event that UN decisions are carried out in the years to come. In this case, however, violence – instead of a peaceful agreement – is the rule that precedes a possible partition, as for the United Kingdom and Ireland in 1921. Similarly, partition and violence threaten the Philippines, which have to cope with Southern Muslim secession claims, while Cyprus, where a Northern Turkish republic was established in 1983, suffers from a constant low level of violence mainly along the entities’ borders. In Europe, another potential case of partition is that of Belgium, where the tensions between Flamand and Vallon communities threatened the stability of the state in the 1990s. d. States partitioned into more subjects. This is a case stemming from a variety of claims of independence nourished by different groups. These groups are generally withdrawing
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into broad-sized states or states where the authority is difficult to establish, either because of weak and discredited leaderships or because of a fragmented territory difficult to be controlled. One possible example of the former category of broad-sized states is China, threatened by the independent claims of Tibet and Sinkjang. In the latter category are Indonesia, which has to face claims from Irian Jaya and Timor, and Zaire-Congo after the Mobutu overthrow. Nonetheless, the variety of states that potentially may suffer from a similar destiny is broader than one may expect: in principle, in fact, both Spain and Great Britain – which are ‘strong’ states in terms of effectiveness and exercise of powers – may face challenges from Catalonia, Euzkadi, Scotland or Wales. e. Partitions generating partitions. Historically, this option seems to have been the most frequent one. In general, partitions were successfully achieved, although the use of force and different degrees of violence have characterized the event. The partition of Yugoslavia, for example, did not generate only a series of successor states. These states also suffered from similar processes of partition. Croatia had to deal with the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Bosnia-Herzegovina faced the creation of Republika Srpska and HercegBosna, as well as the project of Muslimanija. Rump Yugoslavia faced the issue of Kosovo and ran the risk of facing additional controversies with Vojvodina, Montenegro and Sandjak; Macedonia had to cope with the aspirations of Ilirida. Similarly, British India suffered from Indian and Pakistani partition; then, Pakistan suffered from Bangladeshi secession. Still, the fates of Kashmir, Beluchistan, Punjab, Assam and Tamil Nadu are on the agenda, although with a different capacity of influencing the context. In its turn, the democratic and developed Canada is threatened by similar prospects. The claim for independence from Quebec has encouraged Cree and Inuit populations of Quebec to claim independence, in the event that Quebec got it at the referendum, which was held in 1995. Since then, they stay firmly in their position. Another example that confirms how partitions can generate partitions is that of the Soviet Union. Its collapse has been followed not only by the emergence of fifteen successor states, but also by a new phase of partitions; Moldavia suffered from the secession of Transnistria and Gagauzia; Azerbaijan from NagornoKarabakh; and Georgia from Abkhazia and Ajaria. Russia itself had to cope with the independent claims of Chechnya, Daghestan, Bashkiria and, to a certain extent, even of Iacutia-Sakha. f. Partitions imposed by partitions. This is a specific case, which occurs when the will of partitioning a state generates the need for partitioning subregions. British India experimented with this trend when India and Pakistan had to establish their borders. The Punjab was partitioned, while Western Bengal was excluded from Eastern Pakistan (later Bangladesh). Similarly, the independence of Slovenia and Croatia has provoked the partition of Istria, while at the end of the Second World War the newly established Yugoslav federation split Sandjak into two parts, between Serbia and Montenegro. Similarly, many projects of partitioning Kosovo were discussed between Serbian and Albanian representatives in the 1990s, and the prospect is still on the agenda. g. Partitions generating international frameworks of states. This is the case of the British Empire, whose partition worldwide has generated the Commonwealth as a weaker form of links aimed at maintaining a certain degree of contacts (and, possibly, dependence) between the Centre and its colonies. A similar process characterized the Soviet collapse, when the three presidents of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine signed the Belovezhkaya Accords. Then, a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was set up as a new
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international regime aimed at liquidating the Soviet Union by consensus and preserving a connection among its constitutive republics under a possible Russian hegemony. h. Partitions generating different state aggregations. In this case, partitions do not divide states only, but operate as a geopolitical reshaping of the neighbouring countries, which are not necessarily affected by partition but can benefit territorially from it, by including partly or totally the newly partitioned area. As an example, the partition of the Austrian and Russian Empires in 1917–1918 made possible the unification of Polish lands and the creation of a Great Romania through the inclusion of Bessarabia and Transylvania in the Regat (the old kingdom). The supporters of a Great Serbia and a Great Croatia have actively pursued a similar goal during the twentieth century, as did the supporters of a Great Albania, by trying to carry out either the separation of Kosovo from Serbia or of Ilirida from Macedonia. ‘Partitioned nations’ without a state are other potential protagonists of similar outcomes. In this case, they need to rely on a series of secessions, which have to affect two or more neighbouring states in a region, in order to start a new process of aggregation. Kurdistan and Euzkadi are just two potential candidates of such a pathway. i. Hidden partitions. This case should be taken into consideration in principle, although there are no successful examples to be mentioned. The attempts at creating confederations are a sort of hidden partition, in the sense that they promote very weak ties by substituting pre-existing links. In fact, confederations configure a separation of two or more political subjects despite the preservation of a common ‘roof’, which is more a formality than a reality. A pre-modern example of confederation was the Holy Roman Empire. In modernity, a similar status has been claimed by the Sonderbund in Switzerland or by the Confederate States of the United States on the eve of the civil war. Similar prospects were nourished by Slovenia towards Yugoslavia at the end of the 1980s. In recent times, something similar to a confederation has emerged within rump Yugoslavia, whose constituent republics, namely Serbia and Montenegro, were de facto divided, in spite of the fact that common institutions still formally exist. The map of possible destinies that states might experience when partition is emerging as a substantial political event is wide indeed, and no one can predict how it should be implemented. We don’t have here any pretension of offering to the reader an exhaustive and systematic map of all the possible partitions worldwide. Instead, by reconsidering historical facts and potential claims, the aim is to explore the variety of ways out that partitions offer to the existing political societies. It is quite evident that, in principle, all countries may be threatened by such a phenomenon, but the outcome may not be the same. Still, ethnic and religious identities appear to be the most powerful levers of partitions, although they need to meet substantial interests of a political elite, in order to achieve the goal, as described in the previous paragraphs. In other words, should partition be pursued substantially, statehood must become attractive. At the same time, it has to be stressed that the outcome of a partition will not necessarily be the accomplishment of a sovereign state or an internationally recognized state. On the contrary, we have many examples of partitions that have generated pseudostates, namely states that enjoy very low, or any, international recognition. This is a quite different notion from that used by authors who studied the post-colonial world and referred to the lack of marks and merits of sovereignty, as emerged in Europe after the Westphalian Peace Treaty.26 By contrast, the main reference is here to a specific situation
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based on the existence of a high level of territorial control established by a local leadership, in spite of, or against, the decisions of the international community agencies. In this respect, Northern Cyprus is the most evident case.27 Other pseudostates have been recently created in Europe, and particularly in Kosovo, Transdniestria and Chechnya, where the isolation of the local ruling class, its need to preserve the power and the persistence of armed conflicts with neighbours have created a situation based on violence, as well as grounds for the development of criminality and illegal traffic in arms, drugs and bodies. Sometimes pseudo-states have not lasted long, as in the case of Southern Albania during the 1997 collapse, but their impacts have had far-reaching consequences in the wider regional context. Consequently, pseudo-states are also a potential destiny of a partition process, when this event, even if temporary, takes place in marginalized and destructured areas, where clashing international interests are low, or too dangerous for world peace (because they can provoke a nuclear confrontation between great powers). In the end, the map of the possible state reconfigurations through partition emphasizes the fact that its main lever is crucially represented by the nation-state; namely, a form of state which is considered – by the political elite and a significant part of the population – as a goal in itself. This goal has shown effectiveness in granting legitimacy to ruling classes in modern times. In addition, this goal is perceived as an expression of democracy, because it is connected to the idea of self-determination. As a result, the nexus of partition and democracy requires a specific investigation that needs to take into consideration the empirical dynamics that characterize the impressive and rapid changes that occurred in social, economic and cultural relations in the twentieth and the twentyfirst centuries. III Challenges for a changing world 1 Partition and democracy Robert K. Shaeffer, in the introduction to his book on partitions, says that ‘Great Britain partitioned Ireland, India and Palestine along ethnic lines, largely to solve problems associated with “decolonization”…’.28 It has to be noted that not one of the ethnic partitions promoted by Great Britain has been successful. On the contrary, they have generated new tensions and rivalries, which are still upsetting the agendas of the international community. It seems an irony that the country where democracy in the form of originated the Magna Carta (1215), and individual rights have been consistently developed since then, through the liberal thought and the idea of the civic nation, has ultimately decided to use ethnicity as a criterion for partition. To make the issue worse, many studies confirm that the United Kingdom has supported and constructed ethnic divisions in its colonies, before transferring the power to independence movements.29 The fact that a country where the individual rights are the rule has promoted ethnic collective rights worldwide is the first paradox. A second paradox concerns democratic countries as a whole, in the sense that they have no convincing and effective policies when partition is appearing on the agenda elsewhere. No strategies, for instance, have been prepared for preventing or, at least,
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managing either the Yugoslav partition, or the Ethiopian, either the Cypriot or the Palestinian, and either the Irish or the Indian. In few words, democracy seems to have no tools in facing partition. When the Yugoslav collapse began, a shared opinion in Europe (stimulated by partitioners) believed that partition was the only feasible solution to avoid war when two or more ethic or religious groups declare the impossibility of living together.30 According to this view, the risk of war was inherent in the resistance of the pre-existing state in permitting partition. As a result, the reasoning has attributed to the state the role of antidemocratic force and to the secessionists the role of democrats. Truly, the fact that Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were, at that time, still led by a communist leadership (although open-minded and promoting reform) helped in identifying the pre-existing state as an anti-democratic force. However, democracies in the West greatly underestimated the risk of the proliferation of ethnic claims of independence. Still, there are plenty of examples where (ethnic) secessionists do not recognize rights to their own minorities, oppose their claim to partition or provoke wars with neighbours in order to settle pre-existing territorial accounts. In fact, this happened. Nonetheless, the confusion between an anti-democratic political legacy and the idea that common institutions should have to be dismantled instead of being reformed the significantly contributed to spread of an oversimplified picture of ethnic secessionism as a democratic movement.31 Incidentally, it should be noted that only two peaceful examples of partition along ethnic lines occurred in the world during the twentieth century, so that Sweden and Czechoslovakia appear to be just the exceptions that confirm the rule. However, even in these cases the appeals to democracy require caution. In fact, when Norway and Sweden split after holding a referendum in 1905, the partition concerned a personal dynastic union, established in 1814 with quite different characteristics from those of the nation-state. As for Czechoslovakia, the country experimented with a peaceful secession without democratic performance. Actually, secession was carried out under a decision made by two political parties in a few weeks. These parties, which got a relative majority in their districts only, opted for the partition of the country once they had verified the incompatibility of their economic and social programmes. Without any electoral campaign in favour of or against the federation, and without holding a referendum (as required by the constitutional law no. 327/91), they mutually convened that the dismemberment was preferable, despite the polls revealing that the majority of both Czech and Slovaks opposed the dissolution of the state.32 It can be convincingly argued that, as we saw in the previous pages, limitations in the exercise of democratic rule and lack of democratic attitudes create a favourable environment for the accomplishment of claims for secession in the so-called multinational countries. The communist experience, irrespective of the Czechoslovak exception, has confirmed this assumption. The post-colonial world had a similar experience. In this case, countries with democratic traditions, for example the United Kingdom and France, did not root democracy in their colonies. Rather, through their imperial conduct, an authoritarian behaviour has characterized the administration of the colonies: in these contexts, animosities along ethnic or religious lines have been encouraged, when necessary, on the basis of the motto ‘divide and rule’.
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In contrast to these backgrounds, the Western experience shows that democracy, at least, may help in containing tensions. This has been the case of Canada/Quebec, which has so far avoided partition, despite the persistence of a fluctuating degree of animosity between the Anglophone, Francophone and Native American communities. Spain, in turn, has been able to find a viable solution with the Catalan community, although the question of the Basque Provinces remains open and a request for holding a referendum has been raised by local Basque authorities.33 In sum, democracy is powerless when confronting partition claims. States mostly improvise the situation and act according to the existing balance of powers, despite the fact that international law restricts the access to the right of self-determination to the peoples subjugated to a colonial power, or under a foreign or racist domination.34 Crucially, partition lacks mechanisms that permit or reject this option democratically. Western democratic constitutions do not include the right of secession. A partial exception is that of Canada, where the answers of the Supreme Court to three questions submitted by the Canadian government in 1996 have given the floor to some basic rules to be followed in the event of partition. The Supreme Court, in fact, strictly connected the principles of democracy to the federal framework of the Canadian state. Consistent with this, the Supreme Court stated that a referendum does not offer a legal basis for a unilateral secession, but only a ‘clear orientation’ of the majority of the population in a province. The consequence of such a referendum, according to the Reference Jurisdiction of 1998, leads to a compulsory commitment of all parties of the federation to start negotiations on constitutional amendments in order to secede by constitutional means. Negotiations should concern topics such as federalism, democracy, constitutionalism, the rule of law and the respect of minorities, as well as the reconciliation of various rights and obligations. Nonetheless, the Canadian Court admits the possibility that negotiations fail: whether such an event would occur, the Court lacks the ability to offer viable alternative legal solutions. The issue involves politics and the willingness of the international community to grant or withhold recognition to a de facto secession. In conclusion, the Court significantly admits that ‘such recognition, even if granted, would not however provide any retroactive justification for the act of secession, either under the Constitution of Canada or at international law’.35 Still, the Constitution of the United States does not provide any legitimacy to other nations. Furthermore, the United States faced a civil war in order to prevent state partition in the nineteenth century. Switzerland experienced similar developments in 1847 at the time of the Sonderbund riot. However paradoxical it may sound, partition has been opposed militarily by countries that have made democracy part of their myths of legitimization and political praxis. This contradictory background is relevant in order to explain why democracy is powerless in treating the question of self-determination. Statehood and separation – or the right of preservation and the right of dismantling pre-existing orders – are conflicting. The democratic political praxis has a contradictory experience and democratic theories are largely unsatisfactory in dealing with the matter. President Woodrow Wilson, when drafting his Fourteen Points Address on 8 January, 1918, restricted significantly the right to independence to Poland only, whereas, so far, both Central Empires and the Entente nations have sought to encourage partitions not as a right, but instrumentally, in order to weaken the enemy and establish protectorates over
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the severed territories. Wilson’s statement caught the world by surprise and disappointed many allies, in particular the Czechs, Slovaks and Southern Slavs, who claimed independence. Nonetheless, his aim was to hinder the eventual attraction of the peoples of Central Europe to Bolshevism. For this reason he decided to compete with Lenin’s declaration on the ‘Rights of Peoples of Russia to Self-determination’, made on 15 November 1917, using his own terminology. In fact, Wilson did not want to dismember countries, including Austria, and, consistently with this premise, he restricted his formulation to the ‘opportunity for autonomous development’ of the other peoples (as in his Point 10). The fact that, ten months later, he was forced by the events to reformulate exactly Point 10 is a clear sign of the powerless effort made by him, in order to limit the implementation of this right.36 Since then, democratic countries adopted uncertain positions, sometimes supporting, sometimes opposing self-determination. It is a matter of fact that, when the negotiation for the Charter of the UN started, the proposal submitted to Dumbarton Oaks did not include any statement on self-determination. Its inclusion was connected to the need for facing the emergence of post-colonial independence and due mostly, if not exclusively, to the requests of the Soviet Union.37 Still, at the end of the century, facing the beginning of the Yugoslav secession war, it was the turn of the Prime Minister of Spain, Felipe Gonzales, to express doubts on the applicability of self-determination. Once again, his concern was mainly related to the risk of a ‘matrioshka’ process, namely an endless proliferation of state partitions.38 Like democratic countries, even the communist world, while proclaiming the right of secession, never established mechanisms for its possible implementation. This was consistent with the Lenin statement, which warned the working class to consider that the claim might not correspond to its interest, because a state needed a ‘minimum size’ for surviving. As a personality with a background largely rooted in the nineteenth-century political culture, the Bolshevik leader suggested a thesis, which had been expressed by Mazzini five decades earlier. This thesis still had validity; it mirrored an idea of state based on a self-capacity of production and consumption through protectionist policies. By the way, this experience – along with the internationally imposed isolation – significantly contributed to the construction of a communist protectionism in economics in the decades to follow. Ideologically, the communist Yugoslav position on self-determination was Leninist both in form and in content; and self-determination was mentioned by a short sentence in the constitutional introduction of 1974, just to stress that the will of the people had made the creation of Yugoslavia possible. No other details have been added. Czechoslovak constitutional law adopted a slightly similar approach in 1968: its introduction specifies that federal links are the expression of the rights of self-determination and equality between the two nations of the Czechs and Slovaks.39 As a result, however, communist constitutions did not provide regulations on self-determination at all. Meanwhile, the claims of self-determination, which stemmed from the decolonization process and emerged in the territories under the jurisdiction of the colonial empires, strengthened a worldwide perception that the process of colonies’ independence mirrored a democratization of international relations. This perception, however, was restricted – once more – to the administrative entities of the colonial empires, and openly rejected when claims of independence affected their integrity (as in many cases in Africa),
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because of the increasing concerns related to the risks of a ‘matrioshka’ process, as a legacy of the criteria used by great powers in drawing their colonial maps. Similarly, when communism collapsed, the Western world positively commented on the claims of independence of Slovenia, Croatia, the Baltic States and later Ukraine as expression of the freedom of people, who wanted to join the ‘democratic world’ and abandon the ‘Eastern autocracy’. The reaction was to a large extent instrumental to the political confrontation against communism, as Brzezinski pointed out in a conference in Stockholm in the mid 1980s; when commenting on Yugoslavia, he suggested following a double strategy based on support for local communism against the USSR and simultaneous support for the competing Southern Slavs’ nationalisms against local communism.40 Later, when Yugoslav communism became a bloody event and a chain of secessions with far-reaching consequences on the regional plan had been experimented with as a ‘matrioshka’ process, Western behaviour changed again and enthusiasms for self-determination froze. As in politics, the relationship between independence and democracy has not been solved in theory either. Different contributions related to liberal theory have tried to outline democratic rules and procedures for carrying out secession. These efforts are well known. They have been commented on and discussed extensively in academic journals, but the issue has remained controversial.41 In particular, the substantial problems of minorities within minorities, and that of population transfers, have challenged the efforts for a democratic, or liberal, theory of secession. The similarities, which emerged in the first half of the 1990s between the cases of Serbs in Yugoslavia, Serbs in Croatia and Croats in Serbian Krajina (just to make an example), and the chain of the Canada– Quebec– Cree and Inuit areas, have clarified how even democracy is powerless in facing the perspective of an endless process of statehood/nationhood. Furthermore, political praxis and theory in the democratic field have no answers about the rights of people who must adapt their national identity according to the triumphant partitioned solution. When India and Pakistan split, many individuals and family were compelled to accept Indian or Pakistan identity only. Any other identity was denied, although there were plenty of them in British India. Otherwise, people had to agree to become a minority or stateless. A similar destiny has been experienced by those who have declared themselves as ‘Yugoslavs’ and by ethnically mixed families of former Yugoslavia. Yugoslavs lost their identity when the state collapsed. They lost even the name of their identity because Milosevic stole the name of the country for political reasons and they did not wanted to identify themselves with his policy. At the same time, ethnically mixed families dramatically faced the situation, suffered from their own ‘inner’ partition, or were forced to flee the country or had to face tremendous efforts in order to save their stability.42 On these issues, democracy has dramatically failed in the 1990s. No ideas have been provided in order to protect the rights of this part of the population. In fact, their human rights have been denied and democracy was unable to protect them. Crucially, state partition/dismemberment is not only a question of rules. Democracy cannot be evoked only in relation to the procedures for dissolving a political community. The dramatic event of a partition shows that democracy is intimately connected to the ways in which a political society is constructed. These societies are required to manage differences because plurality is a norm in any context where individuals share a set of
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values and codes. In other words, the intensification of partition as a political phenomenon (following the pattern of the ‘matrioshka’ process) is compelling democracy to reshape a set of rules of conduct, representation and coexistence, which should be able to deal with the complexity of a society, granting equality of treatment. This challenge is a cornerstone for democracy in our time. 2 Sharing differences and secularizing relationships The question of democracy and plurality can also be seen from a different angle, connected with the compatibility, or incompatibility, between democracy and nation-state homogenization. To what extent, in fact, can the homogenization required by a nationstate interact with an increasing plural society, where multiple identities, interests and needs work simultaneously, without depressing or even violating them? To what extent can the respect of differences and the shared sense of belonging to a community be managed, before the dissolution prevails? When these questions arise, the main references of the nation-state and its legitimacy are deeply questioned, because this state form appears powerless in offering democratic solutions to them, without affecting its peculiarities. Conceptually, ‘homogenization’ means that one culture, one religion, one language and one history make a nation. This approach has been emphasized in political documents since the American Constitution of 1789 that ‘undermined the monistic interpretation of the people’s will’ as Gale Stokes admits.43 Since then, the predominance of a patriarchal set of values, based on a hierarchical structure of monistic (or homogeneous) categories, has informed the nation-state-building process. Nonetheless, democracy and the will of participation/inclusion in the institutional framework of a society have gradually challenged this reference. Individuals and groups, claiming the respect of their rights and their collective freedom of sharing sets of values, have become increasingly aware that nation and people do not coincide with the existence of the ‘one’. ‘One’ implies uniqueness, while the idea of ‘sharing’ implies the consciousness of a coexistence of both plurality and communality. Take, for instance, religion. Some prescriptions can easily be followed by the whole political society, but others are quite difficult to accept. If murder and theft are generally sanctioned and social solidarity may be supported, issues like divorce, abortion, offences against the body or food obligations are deeply controversial. In this context, it is practically impossible to identify democracy with the homogenization of a society to religious prescriptions. By contrast, democracy can easily be identified with a shared set of rules that permit the peaceful interactions of different religions and beliefs. A similar approach can be considered for identities. A state should not have necessarily one identity only. Individuals and groups have more identities and should have the right to express all of them. In addition, ‘outer’ subjects cannot establish hierarchical relations of identities on their behalf. Gender theories are strongly challenging, in this respect, nation-state homogenization as a product of a hierarchical male approach. Patriarchy has played a crucial role in this sense. The evidence – stressed by the feminist approach to gender relations and state construction – that differences in thinking, in the organization of labour and in the ways of conduct are related to the body has far-reaching consequences for the future reshaping of societal relationships.
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According to whether a body is prepared for receiving, at least temporarily, another life or not, the implications for the sense of ‘self’ and the sense of ‘other’ differ.44 Starting from this consideration, gender roles and gender relations in a society tend to be recast, with a significant impact on the perceptions of singularity and plurality. In fact, once both genders have the right to actively participate in the decision-making of a society on the basis of the recognition that they are different in views and needs but equal in rights, a crucial determinant of heterogeneity has been introduced in the existing set of rules and codes. At this point heterogeneity begins to play a new role as a determinant of a political society. Implications are far-reaching, because politics is expected to accept plurality as a wealth for their future, recast the contents of societal relationships and concentrate on the regulations that allow the interaction of differences to work with equal rights. As a result, how to manage differences within a shared set of rules, values and codes becomes a strong commitment for democracy. Heterogeneity, instead of homogeneity, emerges as a basic characteristic of a democratic state, where nationhood appears to be one, however important, but not unique component. Consequently, a crucial pillar of the nation-state (namely, the uniqueness of nationhood) becomes obsolescent in comparison with the democratic needs of a developed articulated society. In this context, gender theories appear to be better equipped than the traditional liberal theory to interpret the social changes that are characterizing the post-nation-state societies. They offer new insight in the relations between the singular and the plural, forcing the group to review beliefs, expectations, foci of identification and their cultural perceptions.45 The existence of multiple identities and their right to be expressed by individuals and groups, instead of accepting an imposed homogeneity, is one of the innovative approaches, which has emerged in the years when partition has extensively characterized the post-Cold War period. The search of the ‘pure atom’, which has obsessed Balkan nationalisms and religious fanaticism worldwide, is contrasted by a view that emphasizes social plurality and rights equality. The consideration has further implication for the codes that, opposing the ethnos to the demos, denote the common origin of a political community and attribute to it a determinant role in the distinction from otherness. Culture is among these codes. The partition process in Eastern Europe has systematically taken its first steps from culture and the will of protecting cultural specificities. The Balkan anthropologists of the beginning of the nineteenth century, the role played by the reading rooms (~itaonice, ~italnice, etc.) in the midst of that century, the creation of the Rada and Rukh movements in Ukraine in 1917 and, in the 1980s, of Pamjat in Russia, and the role played by the Serbian Academy of Science are just a few examples of it. In Asia the process was similar, in the sense that religion, in its claim for Hindu, Pakistani or Kalistan nations, has however informed culture. The basic argument in all these cases has been that different nations have different cultures. Then, a second argument has been added in order to justify the request for partition: this argument was based on the threats of cultural extinction suffered by a minority, which claims its own state in order to preserve it. In this view, culture is based on customs, traditions, a strong religious identification, a distinguished historical continuity, and a peculiarity of arts and handcrafts. Generally, this is a ‘constructed’ culture, often reduced to just folklore, and
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which erases all the components and the contributions that came gradually from the outer world. By contrast and consistently with the gender approach, culture is however a multiple product of the human experience in a certain territory. The ability of the performance is based on the degree of elaboration and the plurality of suggestions received and the syncretism, which is stemming from the elaboration itself. The culture of the Adriatic basin, which is considered one of the highest expressions of world culture, has been generated by a wide series of contributions. A distinction of these contributions is impossible, unless the regional culture itself is evicted and annihilated. Once again, a pillar of nation-state homogeneity is questioned, as the pretended uniqueness of culture, in a broad sense, might become a serious source of animosities, rivalries and even armed confrontations. In this framework, the secularization of the societal relationships in religion, culture and identities becomes a cornerstone for the survival of a society. Secularization allows the coexistence of differences, and encourages their interaction and a flow of communication in plural contexts. In these terms, secularization is not a new religion (as sometimes claimed, for example in France) or a tool for giving preferences to a belief at the detriment of another one. On the contrary, the secularization of relationships is a method of working that recognizes the plurality and deals with it, by building a mutual trust between groups and encouraging the identification of the rules for a common life. As a result, ‘sharing differences’ is not a paradox, but a pathway for recognizing differences and granting equal rights within a common framework of values and rules. In turn, secularization appears to be a crucial tool that allows relationships to work and hinders attempts to worship the uniqueness of religion, language, culture, identity and history as a pattern for priming endless, or ‘matrioshka’, partitions. 3 Sovereignty reshaped The process of partitioning countries is furthermore connected to sovereignty, which secessionists lay claim to. Their arguments are generally based on a right that should be ‘re-established’, since sovereignty has been extorted in the past from their nation by an empire or a neighbouring country, or simply because sovereignty can guarantee security and the protection of a – so far – threatened group. This claimed sovereignty is identified with its absolute principle, as it emerged in Europe after the Westphalia Treaty of 1648. Nonetheless, partitioned states enjoy in most cases a relative sovereignty, both because they are weaker than the previous political entities and because the exercise of sovereignty after the Second World War, but mostly after the Cold War, has been reshaped, shifting to different levels.46 In other words, the process of sovereignty containment is not only a question of balance of power that allows the US to enjoy a definitively higher degree of sovereignty than San Marino. Instead, it is a question connected, once again, to the changes that are occurring in societal relationships worldwide.47 In Europe, successor states of former socialist federations wield sovereignty in restricted forms, in comparison to the previous federations. As an example, Croatia or Serbia today are much less sovereign than former Yugoslavia and have to adapt themselves to the requests of international agencies (such as the World Bank or the
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ICTY) or the international community. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo are de facto international protectorates. However, even countries that did not face partition are enjoying a relative sovereignty: Romania and Bulgaria do not control their currency, since an international board has been established. Candidate countries to the European Union are dealing with negotiations that are based on harmonization, while twelve EU member-states have shifted their sovereignty to a supranational level with the establishment of the Euro. As for post-colonial countries, plenty of studies have distinguished positive from negative sovereignty and analysed the substantial limitations within which the newly independent states may act autonomously. Scholars have used the term of quasi-state in order to refer properly to this specific situation.48 Incidentally, it should also be noted that the nation-state did not exist yet, when absolute sovereignty emerged as a predominant category in international relations (1648). At that time, however, the main concern was connected to the need for avoiding new religious wars in Europe. The decision to put an end to the dual legitimacy of the Emperor and the Pope and substitute it with a balanced framework of sovereign states, whose ‘Prince’ received the legitimization directly from God, was at the origin of the absolute principle of sovereignty. However, when the nation-state emerged, sovereignty gradually assumed a new meaning, because the source of power legitimization radically changed. Appeals to the people, la patrie, or the nations have made sovereignty increasingly popular in connection with the ability of political leader-ships in getting loyalty from the population, in a context where economic protectionism was possible. This connection has been based on a search for cultural and identity homogenization, which was consistent with the needs of the industrial revolution and the sense of security.49 Since then, however, further radical social transformations have taken place. Ideological homogenization has generated Nazism and the Second World War, while communist attempts at homogenizing populations rapidly failed, with many phenomena of resistance, including dissent and the formation of an underground society. When communism collapsed, ethnicity – as a determinant of nationhood – sought to establish new forms of homogenization and provoke a chain of violent partitions. Meanwhile, political societies have become increasingly articulated and plural. Interdependence and mobility (as extensively discussed in the pages to follow) are playing an influential role in international relations. All these factors and the historical experience have increasingly clarified that state homogenization has become a factor of insecurity and instability. In the end, the changes that took place particularly in the second half of the twentieth century have initiated a process of reshaping the content of statehood and sovereignty. The former has been influenced by a growing plurality in terms of societal relationships, and the latter by the European integration, or attempts to shift power controls in smaller political units though state partition. In any case, the nation-state form has been significantly challenged and its exercise of sovereignty weakened. 4 From nation-states to networking societies Since nation-states have been established, the flow of social, economic and cultural relations in Europe (and in the world) has been drastically transformed, in terms of form
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and content. Mobility, in particular, has emerged as a key factor of innovation, labour organization and mutual knowledge. Truly, mobility has always characterized human relations, since prehistoric ages. By itself, mobility is not a new phenomenon, and it is inherent to the human nature. Also, the need to seize the control over lands wealthy of food and the increasing commercial interests have been the main levers of mobility for centuries. However, what has been changed in the last decades only is the degree of world mobility, in terms of intensification of cross-border and transnational relationships, with a mass dimension. Actually, over a long historical period, predominant agricultural activities have strongly encouraged the settlement of populations. A significant change took place at the time of the industrial revolution, when mobility was strengthened by the new inventions and the intensifying use of machines. In less than a century, from the end of the nineteenth to the second half of the twentieth century, the speed of moving increased more than thirty times, growing from the 25 km per hour of the horse-drawn carriage to the 800 km per hour of a plane. Nonetheless, the main flows of mobility took place within the growing nation-states and along the rural–urban line. In addition, emigration, for social or political reasons, and the will of conquest – stemming from power politics, or religious politics, or both – have characterized the cross-border and, since then, even ‘trans’national mobility. Within this framework, the nation-states operated up to the end of the Cold War. The Cold War itself powerfully contributed to maintaining settled populations, limiting the flows of mobility within the camps. The situation drastically changed when the Cold War was over. Capitalist–communist ideological contrasts were no longer able to contain mobility, as the iron curtain between the camps suddenly disappeared. A sense of openness spread worldwide. Meanwhile, economics were transforming and overcoming not only state boundaries but also continents, as transnational companies intensively restructured the system of production and labour organization. Along with this, new communication systems were making mobility possible both in physical and virtual terms. The worldwide growth of the internet gave relationships a new dimension, making them unbelievably faster, and more intense and effective. Entrepreneurs, executive leaders and officials; experts, professors and students; and tourists, even workers and heads of departments have started to move, along with the ‘traditional’ mobile personnel, as policy makers, diplomats, immigrants, traders and journalists. In turn, criminality has become an increasingly strong, well-rooted transnational phenomenon and the struggle against it has required the adoption of crucial transnational strategies.50 In this context, the ‘space’ (intended as a territory and a ground for action) of the modern nation-state has become too narrow. Its borders are increasingly crossed, physically or virtually, legally or illegally. As a result, mutual contacts, mutual knowledge and interdependence grow. Individuals worldwide create their own group of reference, or try to be included in other different groups, acting on different subjects. Therefore, networking is emerging as a new form of social relationship. Networks are both physical and virtual. People can meet or communicate in person or at a distance, or both. Most of these networks are transnational, crossing national boundaries and making them obsolete. As a result, identities transform. They may change, or multiply, or enrich. However, they do not stay and they differentiate themselves from structured national identities. Gradually, people involved in networks build a new sense of belonging, which
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is not a negation of the previous (national) one, but is not any more homogeneous, and/or consistent with it. As a result, social and cultural differences, which traditionally articulate a political society by strata within the context of a nation-state, take on a new dimension. They become increasingly transnational, linking the people involved in networks. Making state boundaries porous, social and cultural differences move boundaries from geopolitics to society. Consequently, divisions increase within nationstates and diminish within the members of a network. In other words, thanks to mobility and the needs of mobility expressed by innovation and development, the transnational networking of social relationships is crossing the system of relations established within the nation-state sphere in a variety of forms and contents.51 This change is substantially emphasized by the radical transformation of the systems of transport. High-speed connections and the increasing numbers of flights are overthrowing geography; cities, and particularly the most relevant cities of different countries, enjoy a growing closeness, despite their physical distance in kilometres or miles, while their relations with the countryside are weakening. A sense of distance and alienation between the urban centres and the province has often emerged accordingly. De facto, networking and transport are drawing new lines of social communication and separation. At the same time, these lines do not correspond to state borders and do not take care of existing boundaries. As a result, the pre-existing relations between flexibility and inflexibility, between included and excluded, move to different dimensions. They do not coincide necessarily with the state borders but, developing transnational ties, they create or may create new distinctions within nation-state societies. Simultaneously, they found a constraint in the existing state rigidities and have to adapt themselves to the still inadequate context. The complexity of these societal dynamics tends to generate four main consequences. First, innovation is increasingly dependent on it. Interactive relations are the lever for developing higher technologies, high cultural standards and an improvement in the quality of the life, although with different impacts worldwide. Second, by contrast, inequality within nation-states and in the world becomes more visible and primes increasing social and economic tensions, frustration, animosities and desire for revenge. Fundamentalisms of different origins trace back their origin in this context. It is not by chance that terrorism, as a military arm of these feelings, has tried to hinder mobility, forcing people to ‘stay home’. From the attacks on Italian railway stations or the French metro, to the bombs in planes or the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, it is evident that a common logic is directed against mobility and networking. Third, intercommunication increases cultural contamination or, if we want to use a less crude terminology, international métissage. It is a matter of fact that the flows of relationships influence the language, the cooking, the customs, the way of thinking and the way of looking at reality. Sharing cultural approaches is a new dimension of living together; it is a consequence of international cooperation and networking. As a result, interconnection is a pathway for dialogue and encourages new solidarities across the borders. In a sense, an elite is emerging from the system of contacts worldwide. The ‘new nomadism’ is a typical phenomenon of our time and still needs time to deepen the awareness of the ‘self’, although the process has already started and its impact on the future societal organization is quite difficult to predict.
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Fourth, and a result of the aforementioned trends, the access to development is increasingly connected to innovation and cultural interconnections. In other words, interdependence becomes the only way for inclusion in a developed world. By reaction, a fear of contamination – intended as a fear of loosing specificities – is growing in different countries of the world. The sense of insecurity that is emerging encourages groups of the population and religious personalities to claim protection from the state, or other possible subjects, against otherness. In their view, the ‘new nomadism’ is a way of losing roots and betraying the ‘real’ collective origins of individuals. In order to avoid this risk, they claim the re-establishment, or the protection, of the local peculiarities of the group by raising walls and, if necessary, by dividing societies, in search of the ‘pure atom’. The coexistence of these contradictory aspects is the outcome of a situation where new and old trends interact simultaneously, influencing the whole societal relationship. This paradoxical coexistence can be represented and summarized by the table below. Globalization, in this context, is a quite complex phenomenon, where a simultaneous interaction of different needs and expectations, foci of identification and beliefs, attractiveness and rejection of otherness take place. Consistently, both trends towards integration and fragmentation coexist because of the complexity of the changes that have just started. Furthermore, globalization is a process that occurs worldwide, but it is not connected to an existing form of state. Presumably, it will emerge in the years to come. Nonetheless, the unique form of state that currently exists is the nation-state. And the nation-state, however interpreted, is inadequate to face challenges connected to the increasing globalization of economic, social and cultural relationships. In other words, politics is powerless in tools and interpretative categories for understanding and leading global changes. By contrast, politics deals with tried and tested tools and interpretative categories, although they are connected with the past, rather than with the future. Within this contradictory framework, partition – as a political phenomenon – has been increasingly experimented with or has appeared attractive throughout the world since the end of the Cold War. Thus, partition should also be analysed extensively under this light. The fact that the state by itself is widely considered the only source of rights, able to guarantee and to distribute them, along with the feeling that specificities are threatened while meeting otherness, creates the conditions that generate partitions. Nonetheless, once a partition has been made, the new state is often unable to guarantee, in toto or partially, fundamental rights to its citizens, especially the protection of human rights, so that international agencies have to start to monitor, denounce to and possibly sanction the behaviour of local political leaderships. In some tragic cases, as in Yugoslavia or Rwanda, the United Nations has established international courts, because the local level was unable to guarantee justice. Even existing powerful nation-states have had to accept the idea that justice cannot be guaranteed exclusively at the existing state level. For example, the Court of Luxembourg of the European Union has increasingly intervened in the last decade in order to protect citizens against member-state discriminations. Similar anxieties, shared worldwide, have suggested starting the procedures for establishing an International Crime Tribunal (ICT) and more than forty countries have ratified it within a few years.52 At the same time, the attractiveness of innovation and new communication systems is extremely high, because they guarantee development and opportunities for a better future, encourage networking, and increase
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interdependence and the need to explore new state-building processes through integration. Nation-state societal trends
Post-nation-state societal trends
Absolute sovereignty
Globalization (relativity of sovereignty) Social and other (cultural, social, mental …) (inner) borders Transnational relationships and needsof transnational control over the resources Networking as a form of transnational of relationship along with inter-state relations Plurality of loyalties Plurality of cultures High and intense mobility (new nomadism) Production/development through mobility worldwide Coexistence within societies. Secularized relations for granting peaceful multireligious relationships
Territory and geographical (outer) borders Elites and the access to resources in a territory Nation-state as a monopolistic form international relations Uniqueness of loyalties Uniqueness of culture Settled populations and contained mobility Nation-state (and economic protectionism) Competition and coexistence among nations (idea and homogeneity’s requirements for a collectivity)
Paradoxically enough, partitioned states and political movements supporting partitions often claim their readiness to join globalization, once the new reconfigured state of their hopes has been established. In Canada, for example, Quebec sovereignists openly support NAFTA and continental free trade.53 In Croatia, Tudjman has always proclaimed his Europeanness and the wish to be included in the European integration process. Almost all European separatist nationalisms (in Slovakia, in Bulgaria, Kosovo, Catalonia or Scotland) have made similar statements, in spite of the fact that they interpret their feelings to the detriment of their neighbours and in order to exclude them. However, this paradox should be seen again in the light of the contradictions created by a fast-changing world. Partition seems in this context a convincing tool, able to guarantee the collective protection of homogeneous groups, while the ‘desperate’ need of development and growth encourages a quite opposite approach and the search of inclusion in integration processes.54 Still, contradictions are not over. When ‘no global’ protest against the WTO in Seattle spread worldwide (and particularly in Europe), sovereignists and political parties supporting partitions in Europe (for example in Croatia and Serbia) have joined them with the argument that globalization is a threat to the specificity and the ‘purity’ of (ethnic) nations. In particular, they argue that globalization is an attempt at destroying cultural differences that should be, instead, protected and perpetuated. In other words, they see the ‘no global’ movement as a confirmation of their position, namely a ‘spontaneous’ popular reaction to Americanization and the threats of otherness.55 Actually, they miss noting that globalization is a plural and multilateral, not singular and unilateral, process. Nonetheless, their argument is an interesting paradox, because it claims a legitimization of partition from a global approach, by affirming the global value
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of a right of secession, regardless of the fact that partitioners strongly oppose the implementation