Party rivalry and political change in Taisho Japan

PARTY RIVALRY AND PO L I TICA L CHANGE IN TAISHO JA PA N

HARVARD EAST ASIAN SERIES 35 The East Asian Research Center at Harvard Universi ty administers research projects designed to further scholarly understanding of China, Korea, Japan, and adjacent areas.

Party Rivalry and Political Change 1n Taisho Japan Peter Duus

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS, 1968

© Copyright rg68 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College All rights reserved Distributed in Great Britain by Oxford University Press, London Li brary of Congress Catalog Card Number 68-21972 Pri nted in the United States of America

TO MY PARENTS

ACK N OWL EDG M E N TS

This book owes much to my teachers at the University of Michigan and at Harvard University who led me through my first encounters with modern Japanese history. They brought to my notice the peculiar way in which parliamentary government adapted itself to the Japanese environment and they roused my interest in studying this phenomenon further. I am par­ ticularly grateful to Professor Albert Craig of Harvard University, who supervised the doctoral. dissertation on which the book is based. He has been a constant and perceptive critic, and for his pains has had only the dubious satisfaction of reading the manuscript in nearly all of its revisions. At various stages the manuscript was also read by Professors Robert Bellah, Tetsuo Najita, Edwin 0. Reischauer, Irwin Scheiner, Benj amin Schwartz, and Stanley Spector. All made valuable suggestions about both form and content. I am especially indebted to Professor Naj ita, who shared with me his considerable knowledge of late Meij i politics and with whom discussion and disagreement proved a constant source of ideas. In the editing of the final manuscript Mrs. Olive Holmes worked long and hard to bring order where chaos reigned. My wife, Masayo, also proved an invaluable assistant and stern taskmaster in the preparation of the notes, bibliography, and glossary. I would also like to express my thanks to Mr. Okamoto Taro, who kindly granted permission for the use of drawings by his father, Okamoto �ppei, as illustrations in the text. The original research on which the book is based was supported by a Ford Foundation Foreign Area Training Fellowsh ip, which enabled me to spend two years in Japan. A summer faculty research grant from Washing­ ton University provided financial assistance for the writing of the final version. To all of the above, and to the many others who helped me in less direct ways, I would like to express my appreciation for the generosity with which they gave me their time, advice, and encouragement.

vi

CO N T E NTS

INTRODUCTION 6

THE GROWTH OF PARTY RESPECTABILITY II

THE ORIGINS OF TWO-PARTY POLITICS

28

III

THE RIVALS : KATO KO MEI AND HARA KEI

50

IV

ROOM AT THE TOP

83

v

VI VII VIII IX

X

THE CRY FOR REFORM : THE POPULAR CHALLENGE

1 07

THE CRY FOR REFORM : THE PARTY RESPONSE

133

THE PARTIES IN DISARRAY

162

THE TRIALS OF RESPONSIBILITY

1 88

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN POLITICS AND REFORM

2 14

CONCLUSION

236

NOTES

252

BIBLIOGRAPHY

283

GLOSSARY

3 05

INDEX

311

vii

TAB L E S Experience o f Seiyukai party leaders 2

Composition of party rank and file

I5

3

Proportion of Diet members with prefectural assembly or business expenence

I6

4

Election expenses

Ig

5

Election offenses

20

6

The development of capital investment and manufacturing capacity, I g i 3 - I g i 8

I22

7

Factory workers by indus try, I gog- I g I g

I 23

8

Number of labor organizations, membership of labor organiza­ tions, and proportion of organized workers by industry, I g 2o- I g 26 I 2 4

g

Wages, prices, and labor disputes, I g i 4- I g i g

IO

I 25

Government expenditure, I gog- I g 2 2

CHART The disbursement of bribery money of candidate N

viii

22

PARTY RIVALRY A ND POLITIC AL CHA N GE IN TAISHQ JAPA N

Democracy is the worst possible form of govern­ ment, except all the others. WINSTON CHURCHILL

Politics is a j ungle-torn between doing the right thing & staying in office-between the local interest & the national good-between the private good of the politician and the general good. JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY

The deepest significance of political parties is that they tend to the creation of new elites, and this restores to the notion of representation its true meaning, the only real one. All government is by nature oligarchic, but the origins and train­ ing of the oligarchs may be very different and these determine their actions. The formula 'Government of the people by the people' must be replaced by this formula 'Government of the people by an elite sprung from the people. ' A regime without parties ensures the permanence of ruling el ites chosen by birth, wealth or position. MAURICE DUVERGER

I NTROD U CTIO N

T

he Victorian West was a fickle mentor for Meij i Japan . Although most Westerners held the unshakable conviction that the "lesser breeds without the law" would someday remake themselves in the Western im age, they often regarded the Japanese attempt to pursue Western ways with a measure of skepticism. No matter how hard the Japanese tried to prove they were on the road to "civilization and enlightenment," there were always carping foreign critics who j udged their efforts superficial. Such com ment was com­ mon when the doors of the Imperial Diet opened in r 8go marking the beginning of a limited constitutional government in Japan. Kaneko Ken taro later recalled that at the time "certain European people ridiculed the idea of Japan's adopting a constitutional government saying that a constitutional government is not suitable for an Asiatic nation, and is only adapted to the cool-headed peoples of northern Europe . " 1 It was less than a generation since the Japanese had abandoned their feudal "despotism ," and there was reason to believe that they could not shed their old habits of min d so quickly.2 Gunboats and frockcoats were easy enough to borrow, but what of repre­ sentative institutions? This early Western pessimism was not borne out by the events of the succeeding decades. To be sure, as Western skeptics continued to point out,

1

I NTRO D U CT I O N

the Diet never played the same role in Japanese politics as Parliament did in England. There was no reason to assume that it should have. Just because parliamentary institutions originated in the West it did not mean that they had to operate in the same way when transplanted to Japan. As one scholar has pointed out in a similar connection, "We would think it absurd were the Chinese, who invented spaghetti, to insist that the Italians eat it with chopsticks. " 3 Rather, what is striking about Japan is the rapidity with which she assimilated the techniques of representative government and parliamen­ tary politics. Public elections, parliamentary debate of national issues, the accession of publicly elected representatives to high government office-all were part of the Japanese political scene long before most non-Western countries (and even a Western country such as imperial Russia) attempted them . Even today, except for those countries that were formerly part of the British Empire, few of the "emerging nations" have shown the remarkable adaptability of the Japanese in this respect. Many of these developments went beyond the expectations of the Meij i oliga.-chs, who created the new structure of representative institutions. Their conception of the Diet's role was a limited one. They had de�ided to establish a popularly elected national assembly primarily in order to create a sense of national unity and to convince the West of Japan's "enlighten ment." Even Ito Hirobumi, the least conservative of the oligarchs, never seems to have thought that the Diet should have a more positive role than that of providing the people with a political education. Consequently, the Meij i constitution and its attendant legislation limited the powers of the Diet and circumscribed the ability of its members to exercise any sort of control over policy or administrative decisions of the government. The Diet was intended to assent to the cabinet's decisions, not to question or oppose them . Indeed, the whole idea of political opposition, especially organized opposition, was itself suspect, since at best it was disruptive of a harmoniously functioning society, and at worst seditious. Given this attitude on the part of the oligarchs, the task of enlarging the political role of the Diet fell mainly to its members. It was they, after a ll, who had the most at stake in such a development. Organizing themselves into political parties from the beginning of the new Diet, they began to press for the establishment of "normal constitutional government," by which they meant cabinet responsibility to the House of Representatives. At first the tactics of the parties were militant and combative because the oligarchs

2

formed a series of " transcendental cabinets" intended to be above politics and responsible only to the emperor. But gradually the men in the parties began to realize that their interests were served better by compromise than by defiance. If the institutions shaped by the oligarchs could not be altered they had to be accepted and used instead . During the first two decades of the Diet, the parties slowly traded oratorical heroics on the floor of the House for the less dramatic and often more sordid task of achieving power and advantage by manipulating the institutional structure to their own ends. This slow but perceptible change in the spirit of the parties was reflected in the change of terms used to describe them . In the 18go's and early 1goo's, while engaged in futile opposition to the oligarchs, they had been called the "parties of the people" (minto) . But as they became more and more involved in the struggle for effective power, newspapers and journals referred to them as the "established parties" (kisei seito) , a usage that was all but universal by the Taisho period. The implication was that the parties had shed their role of protest against the old establish­ ment, the Meij i oligarchs and their proteges, only to become a new establish­ ment of their own. Curiously enough, though much attention has been devoted in both the West and Japan to the creation of the constitutional structure within which the parties operated and to their early confrontation with this structure, relatively little interest has been shown in the "established parties" during the years of the Taisho period when they had seemingly mastered it. This is a lamentable gap in the historiography of modern Japan, since it was during this period that Japan finally seemed to be moving in the same direction as the "cool-headed peoples of northern Europe. " In hindsight, it is easy to say that such a development was of little significance, since it failed to stem the " inevitable" rush of Japan toward fascism and agression, but it was by no means clear at the time that representative institutions and representative government were bound to fail . On the contrary, even a cursory reading of the right-wing tracts of the 19 2 0 's indicates that their authors very much feared that these institutions were only too well entrenched . It might not be too farfetched to suggest that had the political parties not become "established" but instead remained a peripheral element in the Japanese scene, the "inevitable" trend toward fascism might never have occurred. In the pages that follow I will examine the new developments in Diet politics during the years between 1912 and 19 2 7 . Any periodization is.neces-

3

I NTRO D U CT I O N

sarily arbit rary, and many may quarrel with the terminal dates I have chosen, but there were a number of important trends that give these years histo rical unity . First of all, it was during this period that the "established parties" achieved a decisive measure of control over the cabinet. At the outset of the period the influence of the parties on governments in power was already noticeable, but it was still covert in character. Although the parties supported the incumbent premiers from r g r 3 to r g r 8 and in return received assistance from them at election time, party leaders had to assume subordinate positions in the cabinet or even go without a ministerial post at all . The party leaders accepted this situation, which they regarded as only temporary, because they were confident that the day of party cabinets was imminent. Patience had its rewards. Party control over the cabinet finally became overt with the appointment of Hara Kei , president of Seiyukai, as premier in r g r 8 . Admit­ tedly, Hara's appointment did not mark a clean break with the past, but it did establish a precedent and strengthened the belief of the other party leaders that the emergence of party cabinets was part of the " trends of the times . " In 1 9 2 5 , with the appointment of Kato Komei as premier, a new step was made toward the establishment of "normal constitutional govern­ ment," and by 1 9 2 7 many felt it reasonably safe to assume that party control over the cabinet was imbedded in Japanese parliamentary practice. Secondly, the Taisho period was marked by the emergence of "two large parties," the Seiyukai and the Kenseikai. One of the characteristics of the prewar Japanese political parties often pointed out by both critics and casual observers was their constant tendency toward factionalism and splintering. A quick glance at a chart showing the formation of parties in the Diet from r 8go onward does indeed convey an impression that the Diet members grouped and regrouped themselves aim lessly. But such an appearance is deceptive. The constant changing of party names, the perpetual defection of party members, and the persistent recurrence of party mergers masked a tendency of the House of Representatives to divide itself into two camps, each with a relatively stable leadership group and a growing sense of party lineage and continuity. By the r g zo's, the two large parties had squeezed smaller third parties into political oblivion. Moreover, in contrast to the parties of the r 8go's, which had regarded themselves as allies more than as competitors, the two "established parties" were quickened by a strong sense of partisanship. Although the idea of party rivalry had been weak when the

4

parties faced a com mon enemy in the oligarchs and their proteges, it became strong when party government seemed to be around the corner. Finally, the emergence of party cabinets and two-party rivalry coincided with the appearance of a new set of national problems. During the Meij i era, the main task of the men in power had been to meet the real or imagined threat of the West. The overriding concern of the oligarchs was to create the prerequisites of national "wealth and strength " that would enable Japan to stand as an equal partner of the Westerners in the international community. By the Taisho period, however, Japan had become a great power, and domestic issues were becoming more compelling than foreign problems. The country was beginning to feel the social and political dislocations created by her industrial revolution instead of the anxieties of a backward nation fighting its way into the modern world . Because the parties bore an increasing measure of responsibility for the affairs of state, it was they who were most directly faced with this new challenge. They found this difficult to do, not only because most party members had a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, but also because the early struggles of the parties had given their leaders little chance to pursue anything but their own partisan interests. Nevertheless, there were men within the parties who realized that there was a need to correct the abuses of the society through a program of moderate reform . Although most of the new problems remained unsolved in spite of their efforts, the willingness of these reform elements to make even limited and tentative beginnings of solutions suggests that the "established parties" might have moved farther in this direction but for the mounting national crisis of the 193o's.

5

I THE GROWTH OF PARTY RE SPE CT ABI LITY

M ost conventional histories of the political parties in prewar Japan begin

with the formation of the parties of the jryuminken (lit., freedom and popular rights) movement in the 187o's and 188o's and trace their growth into the Seiyukai and the Minseito of the late 192o's. Implicit in this schema is the assumption that not only was there organizational continuity between the jryuminken parties and the "established parties," but that both were sustained by similar motives and goals. No interpretation could be neater-or more misleading. The parties of the late 19 2o's were a far cry from their predeces­ sors. By 1930, save for a few prodigies of longevity like lnukai Tsuyoshi and Ozaki Yukio, nearly all the old participants of the jryuminken movement had either died or retired from politics. More important, the parties of the late 19 2 0 's played a very different role in the political world. They were as unlike their predecessors as a successful middle-aged man is unlike a rebellious adolescent. Without understanding this difference, it is very easy to make

6

the mistake of j udging the "established parties" by the standards of the jiyuminken parties. Functionally speaking, the jiyuminken "parties" were not parties at all, but political associations intended to mobilize a national protest movement against the Meij i government. They remained outside the charmed circle of officialdom with no institutional access to control of the government and without any formal constitutional means to express their discontent. Hara Kei , writing in the late 1 8go's, aptly characterized them as "parties in prepa­ ration" (jumbi seito) ,1 able to speak, but not to act, on questions of national policy. Their unity was negative, spawned by protest against the hambatsu (lit., clan faction) government. As a consequence, they gathered into their ranks many brands of discontent. There were frustrated ex-samurai who found themselves left out of the newly formed bureaucracy ; there were former government officials who parted company with their colleagues on matters of policy, such as the Korean question or the creation of a constitutional system of government; there were young intellectuals whose encounters with the "new knowledge" of the West convinced them that authoritarian govern­ ment was wrong; there were well-to-do members of rural society who chafed at the intrusion of new organs of local government in the provinces, at the invasion of " foreigners" sent from Tokyo to govern them , or at the exaction of new taxes and levies that seemed to profit the countryside but little. But all the participants of the jiyuminken parties, whether moved by populist resentment or stifled ambition, were l t!ss interested in getting into power themselves than chasing the hambatsu rulers out. Being organizations devoted to protest rather than to the pursuit of power, the weapons of the jiyuminken "parties" were those of agitation and education. A few members of the movement were frankly conspiratorial, interested in open revolt. These firebrands on occasion attacked police stations and incited riot, but the maj ority of those in the jiyuminken associations contented them­ selves with organizing petitions, disseminating the literature of Western liberalism, publishing local newspapers and journals, and traveling on speak­ ing tours in the countryside in hopes of organizing local political associations. Because these early "parties" had as little access to political power as most protest movements, they were organizationally weak and vulnerable to defections. National "party " headquarters tended to be ephemeral and short-lived. The " parties" were really decentralized federations, highly au­ tonomous local units loosely tied to a few national leaders, rather than unitary centralized organizations with internal bureaucracies, fund-raising machinery,

7

I

THE G R OWTH OF PARTY R ESPECTABI LITY

and disciplinary powers. The local branches of the Jiyuto, for example, in most cases sprang up more or less independently as self-generating sprouts rather than branches from some larger trunk. The " parties" lacked internal cohesion and frequently fell apart at the top. All this changed with the promulgation of the Meij i constitution and the , convening of the Diet in r 8go. For the first time there was a constitutional nucleus around which a disciplined organization could coalesce. Moreover, parties were no longer highly suspect political associations, but organizations that, though not specifically recognized in the constitution, were free from the disabilities of surveillance and repression. The minto of the first decade of the Diet were more nearly parties in the sense we understand them , organizations dedicated to th � pursuit of political power within the constitu­ tional framework. They found themselves in the position of being able to exercise some influence, albeit largely negative, on the policy of the nation. The old spirit of protest and resistance remained strong at first, not only because of continued hostility toward hambatsu rule, but because many members of the new parliamentary parties had been activists in thejryuminken protest movement. Gradually, during the r 8go's, many within the minto began to realize that they were no longer petitioners hammering futilely on the gates of the oligarchic redoubt but were already within the walls and would some day find seats in the council chambers of their old antagonists. Parliamentary control of the cabinet and party rule no longer seemed a pipe dream. It was merely a matter of time before both were realized. By the early r goo's as the parties became accepted as an inevitable part of the political process, they began to succumb to respectability, the malady of the mature and successful. The men who had j oined the parties in the days of fiery declarations and dramatic contretemps with the Meij i govern­ ment were no longer an asset. Political forthrightness was less at a premium than the careful cultivation of strategic political connections and the building of a strong electoral base (jiban) . The parties became more cautious as they became more secure. As a consequence, during the years following the turn of the century, there began to emerge a new type of party tactics, a new type of party leader, and a new type of party membership. ACCOMMODATION WITH THE HAMBATSU Fundamental to the change in the character of the political parties was the abandonment of the politics of protest. The role of political gadfly may have

8

been morally satisfying for the "popular parties" but it gained them little. From a negative point of view, it was obvious that the unrelenting criticism and opposition to the oligarchs provoked them to counterattack, as Yamagata Aritomo did in the election of I 8g 2 , by using bribery and police intimidation to break the back of party opposition. It was also clear that the continuation of frontal assult on the hambatsu in the Diet was bad tactics in the long run as well . One of the first people to realize this was Kono Hironaka, earlier a firebrand of the jiyuminken movement who had been jailed by the Meij i government for h i s alleged resistance t o local authorities in Fukushima prefecture. Kono did not propose to retreat before the power of the oligarchs but suggested it was better to outflank the enemy than to charge head on into their ranks. He later recalled his state of mind in the early I 8go's as follows: 2 What was the way to overthrow [the hambatsu]? The ordinary method was to face them straight on, and fight and fight with one's bare hands until the last battle was won and they were completely wiped out. But going about it this way meant that . . . sacrifices would be great, and that one could never be certain of achieving one's goal. If one hambatsu cabinet were overthrown , another would appear ; when that was overthrown there would be still another. Wiping them out completely was therefore not easy. If during [the struggle] , we became tired of fighting and lost heart, this might bring about unforeseen failure and might make trouble for the future. For this reason such methods must be avoided ; . . . instead of dividing the political world horizontally with the hambatsu and the parties fighting one another as previously, [the tactics should now be] to divide the political world vertically, draw the leaders of the hambatsu into the parties, and by tearing [the hambatsu leaders] from their roots, open the way for a situation in which two large political parties would oppose one another. The idea is clear: the best way of wresting control of cabinets from the oligarchic generation was to divide them by j oining them . Under the influence of Kono's ideas, indeed through his negotiations with Ito in I 895 , the parties began to establish alliances with the oligarchs with an eye to exercising increased control over the government. The detente between the parties and the oligarchs was made possible in large measure by the pressing need of the government following the Sino-Japanese war to finance its "postwar endeavor" (sengo kei'ei) , a program of heavy arms spend-

9

1

THE G ROWTH O F PARTY R E S P ECTABI LITY

ing in preparation for a possible conflict with Russia. Control of the Diet was essential to the passage of ever burgeoning budgets, and the oligarchs were willing to share a measure of power with the parties in order to achieve it. The parties were not averse to giving this support, since in return they could extract from the oligarchic premiers concessions on policy, appointment of party members to ministerial and other high bureaucratic posts, the granting of economic privileges and advantages to party members, and on occasion even party funds.3 Between 1 895 and I goo, there were three formal party-oligarchic alliances-between Ito and the Jiyuto in 1 895 , between Matsukata Masayoshi and the Kaishinto in 1 89 7 , and between the Kenseito (formerly the jiyuto) and Yamagata Aritomo in 1 8g8. But despite the mutual profitability of such alliances, they tended to break down rather quickly, usually because the o ligarchic premiers were willing to abandon the parties once they had used them. The problems of the party-oligarchic alliances are best illustrated by the last of them , established between Yamagata Aritomo and the Kenseito. In November 1 8g8, Hoshi Toru , the skillful but devious leader of the Kenseito, agreed to persuade his party to support the Yamagata government's legislative program in the Diet, if the government in its turn would prepare the founda­ tion for putting the party's platform into effect and help in expanding the party's local strength . As a result of the agreement, ten important government bills passed the Diet, including a much opposed increase in the land tax, a tax on sake, and a tax on personal income. Yamagata's success was accom­ plished by a substantial advance of money to Hoshi to bring his party into line. According to some reports, Hoshi received at least ¥ 1 0o,ooo (perhaps more) to use in holding the Kenseito together and to build its local strength as well as to buy Diet votes for the land tax increase.4 All this was perfectly legal, since at the time there was no law that prohibited Diet members from accepting government money. But the alliance broke down once the Diet was over. Yamagata, successful in putting his financial legislation through the House of Representatives, immediately turned tables on his party allies by issuing an Imperial Ordinance revising the Civil Service Regulations to reduce the accessibility of party members to the higher echelons of the bureaucracy. This made it clear to Hoshi and the Kenseito leadership that Yamagata, though he was willing to make short-run concessions, had not abandoned his desire to keep government free from party influence. A more stable accommodation between the parties and the oligarchic

10

generation began in r goo when Ito Hirobumi consented to become president of the Seiyukai, a new party recruited not only from the bureaucracy and the business world but from the ranks of the "popular parties" as well. Admittedly, Ito's participation in the organization of the Seiyukai was in­ tended to make management of the Diet easier and to put an end to the laborious negotiations necessary to gain party support in the House of Rep­ resentatives. He was less interested in promoting party rule than in achieving political peace through the formation of one large party that would serve as his tool in the Diet. Nevertheless, the formation of the Seiyukai did mark a split of the hambatsu into two wings : those like Ito and Inoue Kaoru who admitted the necessity of making concessions to the parties and those like Yamagata and Katsura Taro who still regarded the parties as suspect and exerted every effort to thwart them. The former party men who j oined the new party-men like Hoshi, Matsuda Hisamatsu, Hayashi Yuzo, and Kataoka Kenkichi, all veterans of the "parties" of the r 88o's-realized this, and indeed had quite consciously cultivated a tie with Ito after the Kenseito broke with Yamagata.5 They were intent on establishing the kind of "vertical alliance" previously suggested by Kono. By recruiting Ito to serve as party president, the new alliance would be a permanent one and the new party could ride to power on Ito's coattails. By wooing Ito from his fellow oligarchs, the party men could smooth the path to party rule. By the end of the Russo-Japanese War, the relationship between the parties and the hambatsu leaders had entered a new phase. On the one hand, the older members of the hambatsu, those who had participated in the Restoration, began to step aside from direct participation in government, contenting themselves with positions of honor while they exercised only informal control on the affairs of state. Ito, never enthusiastic for the details of party business, nor even very much concerned with the fortunes of the party, resigned from the Seiyukai to become president of the Privy Council and eventually gover­ nor-general of Korea. Yamagata continued to remain actively interested in politics, but to carry out his wishes he relied more and more on his proteges in the military and civil bureaucracies, men like Hirata Tosuke, Katsura Taro and Oura Kemmu. At the same time, the Seiyukai, which had gained its initial impetus under the patronage of Ito, began to develop a considerable amount of independence in its actions. The party came under the control of men who were less interested in serving the oligarchs than in replacing them. The slow withdrawal of the oligarchs from the forefront of politics enabled

11

1

THE G R OWTH OF PARTY R E S P E CTABI LITY

the leadership of the Seiyukai to establish the party in a new relationship with the government. No matter who was made premier the Seiyukai main­ tained friendly relations with the cabinet. This new development in the politics of accommodation with the hambatsu culminated in 1 904 when Hara Kei and Katsura, still regarded as a protege of Yamagata and a leading member of the hambatsu, agreed on a peaceful transfer of power without resort to genro consultation. Saionj i Kimmochi, the Seiyukai president, became premier, without having been selected by the oligarchic leadership. When Katsura returned as premier following the Saionj i cabinet, he found himself forced more and more to rely on Seiyukai support to get desired legislation through the Diet. From r go6 until r g r 5 , the Seiyukai was in effect a kind of " most favored party" which supported nearly every cabinet that came to power. Finding this situation little to his taste, Katsura decided to form a new party of his own as Ito had. The formation of this party marked the final accommodation between the parties and the hambatsu. Though Katsura's party, the Doshikai, like the Seiyukai came under new leadership shortly after its founding, it too began as an attempt to ally one wing of the parties with one wing of the hambatsu. It was no longer possible to make a clear division of the political world between the parties on one side and the hambatsu on the other. These lines of battle, so clear-cut in the early r 8go's, were being redrawn. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PARTY MEMBERSHIP As tactics of the parties changed, so did the character of their membership. To describe the change briefly, there was an attrition of "protestors" within party ranks and a concomitant growth in the number of " respectables. " In part, this reflected the dying of enthusiasm among those who had been fiery idealists in their youth, but more important it indicated that party politics was becoming attractive to a new type of person. Men who might have found it uncomfortable to sign a petition calling for the establishment of .consti­ tutional government in the r 88o 's were beginning to make their way into the world of the parties. Indeed , they were ultimately to dominate it. Those who had participated in the political associations of the jiyuminken period had usually been young. They risked persecution, imprisonment, and government harassment with little promise of monetary or material reward .

12

Enthusiastic, they were willing to commit themselves totally to a career in politics simply for the sake of their ideals. Few of them had any other aim in life than politics. Many of these men found it difficult to adj ust to the new tactics of accommodation with the oligarchic generation. Those of them who did not leave politics sank into increasing obscurity and impotence. At the same time, both the leadership and the rank-and-file of the parties came increasingly into the hands of men who entered politics from successful careers in other professions, usually from business, but often from journalism , the free professions, and the civil bureaucracy. Such men had usually not participated in the jiyuminken protest movement nor taken the same risks as the early political activists but rather found in politics a diadem to crown success in other fields. They generally entered the parties in middle age, with little experience in local politics and a less poignant yearning to defeat the forces of hambatsu authoritarianism. Concerned primarily with the honor, prestige, and concrete economic advantages that participation in the parties seemed to promise, they accepted the institutional framework established by the Meij i constitution and worked pragmatically within it. There con­ tinued to be enthusiasts in the parties, of course, but they were gadflies who often found themselves isolated unless they sought out the patronage of an established political figure. The shift of party control from the hands of the old jiyuminken activists to younger men with reputations achieved in other fields was perhaps most striking in the party leadership. The two stalwart party leaders of the I 88o 's and the 1 8go 's, Itagaki Taisuke and Okuma Shigenobu, left the parties by the early I goo's. Itagaki retired from the party movement after the formation of the Seiyukai. Okuma continued to serve as president of the Kenseihonto until 1 906, but he was finally forced from his post by a powerful faction within the party which felt that his continued association with the party was more of a hindrance than an asset. Like ltagaki he seemed a man with little prospect of becoming premier and hence was useless as a party leader. These two heroes of the jiyilminken period were succeeded by men recruited from the national business and bureaucratic elites. Apart from Saionj i , who became president of the Seiyukai at the suggestion of Ito, the successive presidents of the party were Hara Kei, a former government official and newspaper editor who had enj oyed the patronage of Inoue Kaoru and Mutsu Munemitsu ; Takahashi Korekiyo , ex-President of the Bank of Japan ; Tanaka Giichi, a military bureaucrat and " political

13

THE G ROWTH OF PARTY R E S P ECTA B I LITY

general. " (The Seiyuhonto, which split from the Seiyukai in 1 9 24 , was under the presidency of Tokonami Takej iro, a former official in the Finance and Home Ministries. ) After the death of Katsura Taro, a military bureaucrat and protege of Yamagata, the Doshikai came under the leadership of Kato Komei, a former Foreign Ministry official. His successors as head of the Kenseikai and Minseito were Wakatsuki Reijiro and Hamaguchi Yuko, both former Finance Ministry officials. Except perhaps for Hara, who earned his spurs as party leader by astute promotion of the Seiyukai's interests, all these men became party leaders either because they were potential candidates for the premiership or because they were able to raise funds for their parties. The same trend was perhaps less pronounced in the middle range of party leadership, where control over party business and connection with local politics were of some importance. But at this level, too, the influence of the jiyuminken enthusiasts declined as the numbers of those with business and bureaucratic backgrounds increased ; experience and connections in the bureaucracy and in the business and financial centers of Tokyo and Osaka were as important as experience in local politics. Table I shows the changing composition of the Seiyukai. The statistics indicate two trends which confirm the changing nature of party membership: the marked decline in party leaders having experience either

TAB LE 1 . Experience of Seiyukai party leaders (by percentage of total number of leaders).a I 900- I 904

I 90S- I 9 I I

I 9 I 2-I9I 6

I 9 ! 7 - I 92 0

Prefectural assembly members

74

47

37

24

Presidents of prefectural assembl ies

22

I8

I3

9

Higher officials in the central government

3

II

I7

I6

I n busi ness o r with business connect ions

38

42

48

so

Experience

Source: Masumi J unnosuke, "Nihon seito shi ni okeru chiho seij i no shomondai," Kokka gakkai zasshz� No. 76 ( 1 963), p. 38. Party leaders include the party president, party directors (somu), party secretaries (kanji), as well as parl iamentary directors ( innai somu) and parliamentary secretaries (lnnai kanji). •

14

the prefectural assemblies or as presidents of prefectural assemblies; the marked increase in the proportion of party leaders with experience as higher officials in the government (koto kanrz) or with business connections. Those with local political experience, of course, continued to serve important functions in party housekeeping and in exercising discipline over the rank and file, but their influence over the inner circle of party leadership was usually less than that of those entering the party from the national business or bureaucratic elites. Finally, we can discern similar trends in the composition of the party rank and file. First of all, the average age of Diet members rose, an indication that participation in the parties was less the business of ardent young men than of those with an established position in society.

m

TAB LE 2. Composition of party rank and file (by number and percentage of members) .a Age of Diet mem bers

I 890 election

3 I -39 years old 40-49 years old over 49 years old

I 36 (40) I I4 ( 34) so ( 1 7 )

I 924 election 45 I6I 258

( 1 0) (35) ( s 6)

Source: Shimura Gigaishi, ed., Kokka taikan, (Tokyo, 1 954), p. 649· •

Percentages rounded to the nearest whole number.

The average age of Diet members in 1 8go was 4 2 years and four months; in 1 g 2 3 , 5 1 years. The contrast is even more revealing if we look at the distribution of Diet members by age groups in the 1 8go and 1 9 2 4 elections. Nearly half the members of the First Diet were under 40, whereas in 1 9 24 nearly half were over so . By the early 1 9 2 o 's, as one writer pointed out, the "gray heads" outnumbered the "dark hairs" on the floor of the Diet.6 A second trend indicating the increased participation of "respectables" in politics was the growing number of party members with business con­ nections. From the figures in Table 3 we may draw at least two conclusions. ( 1 ) The overall number of Diet members with business experience or business connections increased , particularly after 1 908. Curiously enough this election was also marked by a great influx of " new men" elected for the first time to the Diet ; perhaps this was a consequence of the wartime prosperity during the Russo-Japanese War. In any case the figures indicate that business, both

15

TH E G R OWTH O F PARTY R E SPECTABI LITY

TABLE 3 · Proportion of Diet members with prefectural assembly or business experience (by percentage of total number of Diet members) . Experience of Diet members

1 902

1 903

1 904

1 go8

1912

1915

1917

1 920

1924

1 92 8

Prefectural assembly members

6o

61

66

35

44

42

37

38

35

32

Company executives or other business experience

41

47

47

56

59

51

56

56

55

51

Prefectural assembly members and i n business

34

36

35

35

36

34

32

33

33

28

Source: Masu mi, Kokka gakkai zassh1� No. 75 ( 1 962), p. 435 ; No. 76 ( 1 963), pp. 42-43.

provincial and national, was more and more a route to the Diet. ( 2) The importance of business as a route to the Diet is confirmed by the second trend, a marked decline in the nu mber of those whose main route into the parties was through local politics and election to the prefectural assembly ; even among those who did enter the Diet from the prefectural assemblies, the proportion with business connections was increasing. It should perhaps be added that during the same period, the proportion of ex-officials in the Diet remained at a constant proportion, about 10 percent ; many of these men were ex-provincial governors who ran for the Diet from the prefectures they had presided over. The parties were not flooded with ex-officials, but those who did enter the party tended to occupy positions in the upper echelons of leadership. THE STRENGTHENING OF PARTY DISCIPLINE The accommodation with the hambatsu and the increasing "respectability" of the party membership brought the parties closer and closer to their coveted goal of power. But as the parties became stronger within the structure of power the individual members of the parties grew weaker in their ability to maintain political independence. Party discipline became rigid. In the Diet, party members voted according to the " party decision" (togi) , rarely if ever breaking ranks to express dissent. In 19 20 Ozaki Yukio, one of the few remaining free spirits in the Diet, complained that Japanese political

16

parties were military in their qrgariization. They stressed moderation and discipline at the expense of freedom of conscience and insisted on drill-like unity with no one out of step.7 By and large, the party decision was made by the party president or the small circle of intimates around him. In both the "established parties" the president was aided by a party board of directors (siimu) and a chief party secretary (kanjichii ) , who consulted with him on important matters. Whatever dissent existed within party ranks was resolved outside the Diet so as to maintain a fa<;ade of unanimity when issues came to a vote. It is customary to account for this increase in party discipline by citing the peculiar strength of in-group ties in Japan, but it was also in large measure the result of organizational necessity. Participation in the decision making of any political group, as Robert Michels has pointed out, tends to be concentrated in the hands of a minority of leaders. The incumbency of the party leaders, their familiarity with party affairs, their prestige, and their constant association with one another give them coherence as a decision­ making inner circle.8 In the case � f the Japanese parties, the tendency toward internal oligarchy was reinforced by the way in which leaders were recruited. The formal leadership of the party was almost entirely in the hands of the party president, who, though he doubtless consulted the men immediately around him, was likely to choose men whose views tended to coincide with his own. The party president also had the final say in most matters of high policy, and indeed the character of the party president usually shaped the character of the party in action. All this is not to say that intra-party controversy or debate was dead. Quite the contrary, both of the "established parties" were frequently beset by intramural haggling over party policy, over tactics, and over the selection of party candidates for election. The Doshikai, and later the Kenseikai , for example, constantly wrestled with the problem of internal debate and on several occasions seemed to totter on the edge of party fission. But usually the advantages of united action weighed the balance against the drawbacks of disunity. One astute observer of American politics has observed that "unity is first and last the principle of most professional politicians and it is seldom that they dishonor it. " 9 Certainly the Japanese case bears this out. The party rank-and-file were willing to accept the party decision for a variety of reasons. Most obviously, effective action outside the confines of a party was impossible. An isolated and independent Diet member was to

17

I

THE G ROWTH O F PARTY R E S PECTAB I LITY

all intents and purposes impotent. Votes in the Diet were not influenced by a single persuasive voice, but by the force of number. Koizumi Mataj iro, a strong advocate of universal suffrage at a time when his party was opposed to the measure, described the necessity of conforming to party discipline: 10 As an individual I was an enthusiastic advocate of universal suffrage, [but] as a party member I had to be neither for it nor against it; there was a contradiction between my position as an individual and as a party member. However, I did not dare bolt the party for that reason. This was because under a constitutional government, however excellent one's principles or political views, it is difficult to put them into effect without the formation of parties. One could get things done by exerting informal pressure on the party leadership, not by asserting one's independence on Diet votes. At the same time, those party members in the Diet who had no strong views on particular issues tended to remain docile in order to secure advancement and advantage. The party leadership not only influenced the distribution of posts within the party, but also selected official party candidates and frequently supplied them with campaign funds. The recalcitrant party member who was on bad terms with the party leadership could have little hope of getting on in the political world. The increase in party discipline in voting had concomitant effects on the conduct of the Diet. Speeches in the House were less a means of persuading others and battering down opposition by eloquence than a vehicle for expounding the party's position. Many were wont to lament the decline in the speech-making skills of politicians. But if oratory underwent a decline, the art of heckling did not. At times a speaker of one party could hardly make himself heard above the shouts and catcalls of the opposition. Normally disapproval confined itself to name calling and ridicule, but occasionally it assumed even more interesting forms. By the 1 9 2 0 's fights and physical violence became a normal part of Diet debates. Precautionary measures were adopted in response to this. The seats of the two major parties were separated on the floor of the House of Representatives by an aisle down the middle of the chamber. It became customary for the largest and strongest members of each party to sit along the edge of this no-man's land in the event tempers flared . The nameplates of the Diet members, originally movable, were nailed to the desks, because they made handy and exceedingly damaging imple-

18

ments of offense. 1 1 The hardening of internal party discipline seems therefore to have been accompanied by a decline in the decorum of the Diet. THE INCREASING COST OF POLITICS The growing "respectability" of the party membership and their docility was reinforced by a marked inflation in the cost of politics. Although a few Diet members were elected time and time again on the strength of their reputations and strong local connections, for most Diet members elections were highly competitive and extremely costly. Few men enj oyed an "iron jiban" in the way that Inukai Tsuyoshi or Hara Kei did. Success in becoming a Diet member depended increasingly on the amount of money a candidate spent on his campaign. Just when this inflation of election expenses began is hard to say, but that it was very probably under way by the end of the Russo-Japanese War is clear from the officially reported election expenses set forth in Table 4· AI though no expense figures are available for the years I go8 and I g I 2, we TABLE 4· Election expenses. Item

1915

1917

1 92 0

1 924

Total reported campaign expenditure (in yen)

4,976,672

5 .344 .7 1 4

2 1 ,8 2 3, 1 9 1

2 1 ,9 1 0,689

Average reported campaign expenditure per candidate (in yen)

8,158

8,494

24,248

1 9,829

Total number of reported campaign workers Average number of campaign workers per candidate Total number of campaign offices Average number of campaign offices per candidate

1 908

1912

70,543

1 09,654

1 9 1 ,770

2 29,347

382,705

407.544

141

1 94

314

365

425

369

3,629

6,ooo

8,371

9,186

1 4,668

1 7,3 1 0

7

II

14

16

16

15

Source: Shugiin jimukyoku, comp., Shugiin giin senkyohii keisei riyusho (Tokyo, 1 92 5 ), pp. 1 88, 194. 2 20.

19

I

THE G R OWTH OF PARTY R ESPECTABI LITY

can j udge from the increase both in the number of campaign workers and in the number of campaign offices that the increase in election expenditure after 1 9 1 5 was part of a general trend that had begun in 1 908. How much this inflation might mean to an individual Diet member might be j udged from the case of Seki Naohiko, who was a successful candidate in nine elections from 1 890 to 1 9 2 4 ; in his first campaign in 1 890 he spent ¥ 2 ,500 , but by 1 9 2 0 , despite a firmly established reputation as a politician, his expenses had risen to ¥ 1 6,ooo .12 Part of the increased election expenses went to defray the legitimate costs of campaigning. As the electorate expanded, it became less and less possible for a candidate to campaign on the strength of his family or local reputation, as many of the early Diet members had. Consequently, there was an in­ creasing need to employ more extensive publicity tactics. There were printing expenses for pamphlets, leaflets, handbills, posters and signs, and printed letters of recommendation; there were envelopes and postage fees, newspaper and magazine advertising, rent for office space and public halls ; there was also money for the transportation of campaign workers, the expenses of hiring jinrikisha and riding on trains, resting places for voters on the day of polling, telegrams and calling cards to be sent to constituents; and finally, of course, there were considerable expenses for entertaining local men of influence at teahouses and restaurants to put them in a friendly state of mind. But much of the increased election expenditure went into the direct buying of votes. There had probably always been a certain amount of election bribery ; certainly the government had resorted to this tactic in the infamous election of 1 89 2 . But bribery does not seem to have become a widespread practice until the end of the Russo-Japanese War. The figures in Table 5 , though they represent only reported cases, indicate that the rise i n election TABLE 5· Election offenses. Offenses

1 908

1912

1915

1917

192 0

1 9 24

Total number of reported election offenses

1 ,4 2 7

3.47 2

M3 7

2 3 ,208

5.393

1 4 ,363

Total of reported cases of bri bery

1 ,338

3,329

7,278

2 2 ,932

5 , 266

I 3 ,986

Source: Sekiguchi Tai, Senkyo tokuhon, (Tokyo, 1 936) p. 1 4 1 .

20

expenditure was paralleled by a rise in the number of election offenses ; doubtless, if all cases of bribery were included in the statistics, the correlation would be even greater. An official Ministry of Justice report on a survey of election offenses made the following comment on the period I goS- 1 9 2 4 . 13 Premeditated [election] offenses became conspicuous; bribery came to be carried on systematically and routinely by members of prefectural , town, and village assembly members, and other honorary officials and men of influence (yuryokusha) . . With each election, the intensity of competition between factions and parties rose . . . and the [parties] threw around great amounts of money, tens of thousands of yen for a single candidate. So-called election brokers appeared everywhere, . . . lining their pockets while helping with the bribery ; the cry [against] " the corruption of elections" and [for] "the purification of elections" became strong among politicians and educators. .

By the end of the 1 9 2 0 's, an astute political reporter could describe a typical candidate's election tactics as follows : 14 The way to get elected is to establish a jiban by gathering together the local men of influence (yuryokusha) in one's election district, that is, city and town assemblymen, prefectural assembly members, and others, to give them large amounts of money, and have them persuade the voters. Of course, campaigns have also been conducted by means of speeches and [campaign] literature, but that is of secondary importance in the actual election battle. Money trickled down through the vanous levels of a politican's personal connection, usually finding its way into the hands of voters who , by and large, were indifferent as to the outcome of the election ; the following chart illus­ trates the flow of "persuasion . " In any case, whether a candidate conducted h i s campaign by conventional methods or by bribery, the financial resources required to be successfully elected were far beyond the means of the average man, and much greater than the annual salary of a Diet member. The inflation of election costs therefore reinforced the other trends within the parties-the rising number of businessmen, the increasing importance of fund-raising ability as a quali­ fication for party leadership, and the greater control of the party leaders over the rank and file. It also led to hesitancy on the part of party governments

21

22

¥2 2 0 unnamed individual

¥ 1 ,500 Former Prefectural Diet member I assemblyman

¥250 town assemblyman

School committee members and village assemblymen

Village head

¥5o unnamed individual 1 00 unnamed i ndividual

¥ 1 ,500 Prefectural assemblyman ¥2 ,500 Village head

¥35 village head 6o village head 45 town head 45 town head 95 town head 65 village head

¥ 1 ,000 Unnamed individual

¥s oo Town head

¥2 , 2 00 Prefectural assemblyman

¥6o village assemblyman 5 0 village head 50 county assemblyman/ village head 40 village head 70 village head 50 town head/ head of agri-

¥200 Prefectu ral assemblyman

H Prefectural assembly member

N

Prefectural assembly member/ candidate for House of Representatives

The disbursement of bribery money of candidate N ( 1 9 1 5 election ; Osaka-fu rural district).

23

Source: Masumi, Kokka gakkai zasshz; No. 76 ( 1 963), p. 47, note.

7 ·5 rg rg ro r2 50 50 50 50

30 27

¥300 70 40 20 70

unnamed person village head village head village head town assemblyman/ town official town assemblyman village assemblyman/ county assemblyman village head village assemblyman village assemblyman village assemblyman village assemblyman village assemblyman village assemblyman village assemblyman village head

¥50 village head 1 40 village head

cultural association 5 0 unnamed person go village head 3 0 county assemblyman/ village head 5 0 village head 40 county assemblyman/ village assemblyman 7 0 village head 1 50 village head 5 0 village yuryokusha 45 village head 50 village head 40 village official 40 villag� head/ village official r oo county assembly­ man/village assemblyman go village head/ village official

1

TH E G R OWTH O F PARTY R ESPECTABI LITY

to hold elections ; during the years from 1 8go to I 9 I 2 when oligarchic control over the cabine t was strong there were I I elections, or about one every two years ; from I 9 I 2 to I 93 2 when party control over cabinets had increased, there were far fewer, only seven in 2 0 years, or about one every three years. At the same time, relations within the parties were beginning to depend increa singly on the disbursement of money by certain party leaders, princi­ pally for election expenses but in some cases for personal expenses as well, to create loyal subordinates among the rank and file ; this probably did not become an extensive practice until the 1 93o's, but symptoms of this tendency were already evident by the end of the Taisho period .l5 THE PARTIES AND PUBLIC OPINION Ironically, as the parties gained in strength and respectability, their public image steadily deteriorated . Although the mass of the population remained largely indifferent to the partisan struggles which raged in far-off Tokyo and cast their ballots for the parties with no more (or less) enthusiasm than they paid their taxes or answered conscription summonses, the politically informed and articulate began to regard the parties with increasing distaste. With some anxiety, Nagai Ryutaro, a reform-minded member of the Kenseikai, remarked Ill I 9 2 3 ,16 It is a grave fact for the future of parliamentary government in our country that we can discern a trend toward a loss of confidence in parliamentary politics not merely among anarchists, radicals, and their ilk, but even among the educated classes who believe in constitutional government. Confidence in the parties was waning among those where it should have been the strongest. Nagai himself once told his wife and children, "You know, the world of politics is like a town where frauds, thieves, and pickpockets gather. That's where your father works. " He urged his son not to follow in his footstepsY In large measure, the decline in public confidence was reflected in the attitude of the press toward the parties. Until the I 8go 's, most newspapers had frankly and openly been the organs of the jiyuminken political associations. Newspapermen were, more often than not, apprentice politicians. But as the parties became more and more enmeshed in the established political structure,

24

the alliance between journalism and the party movement wore thin. By the beginning of the World War, the chief organs of public opinion-the great metropolitan dailies (such as the Tokyo A sahi Shimbun) and the monthly journals catering to the educated classes (such as Chua Koron)-�r�_ com­ mercial ventures staffed by writers who pursued a course of journalistic independence. Editorialists who thirty years before might have echoed the stand of one of the major parties were now inclined to take a more detached view. One Japanese scholar has suggested that the newspapers and journals of opinion tended to become anti-privilege and anti-establishment because most reporters, and indeed many readers, belonged to the emerging white­ collar class, which was educated and informed but not part of the ruling elite. True or not, it is clear that the newspapers began to criticize politics from the standpoint of the "people," and in a sense many newspaper reporters became tribunes for what they conceived to be the interests of the masses. 18 At its mildest, the new climate of public opinion was marked by apathy toward the game of party politics. To many critics, it seemed a mere mechanical struggle for power, devoid of any changes in policy. The politicians seemed more interested in getting into office than in getting things done once they were there. Not untypical were the comments of an anonymous editorialist m Chua Karon who wrote : 19 I have lost interest in the practical politics of Japan. I have likes and dislikes of individual politicians, but as far as the parties are concerned I have none. Of course, I j udge the good points and bad points of particular [party] policies and aims. But, from the broadest point of view . . . even though the pronouncements and actions of party X and party Y, or party president A and party president B seem different at a glance, the dissimilarity is not a great one ; consequently the drama of cabinet changes or the struggle for political power is far less interesting than the struggles of the Minamoto, the Taira, and the Fujiwara or than the rise and fall of Nobunaga, Hideyoshi , and Ieyasu. How could there be an urge toward intense partisan commitment when it was hard to distinguish the differences among the parties? But many critics of the parties were far more indignant than apathetic. The involvement of the parties in getting votes, raising money, and compromising with the nonparty elites had not left them above reproach, especially for those who regarded the parties solely as vehicles for the ex-

25

1

TH E G R OWTH OF PARTY R ESPECTAB I LITY

pression of public opmwn. Yoshino Sakuzo, perhaps the most prominent defender of parliamentary government in prewar Japan, would not even accord them the status of being parties in the " true" sense. Writing in 1 9 2 2 , h e said, 20 I think that at present in japan there is not a single [group] we should truly recognize as a political party in the strictest sense. There are groups which style themselves as political parties, but in reality they are com­ pletely cut off from the conscience of the people. His words were constantly echoed and re-ech oed in the editorials and articles of political commentators in the 1 9 2 0 's. The catalogue of complaints was a long one. Generally they might be summarized as follows: ( 1 ) The parties lacked fixed programs; instead of pursuing fundamental principles, they were guided almost exclusively by considerations of expediency in the struggle for power. ( 2 ) The parties com­ promised away the advantages of the people in their dealings with the bureaucrats, the military, the genro, and other nonparty elements; instead of providing leadership in government, they docilely submitted to the in­ fluence of men who could in no sense be regarded as representatives of the people. (3) The parties were far more sensitive to the demands of special inter­ ests than they were to the needs of the people as a whole ; party members worked to secure benefits for their local constituencies or their businessmen backers, not to promote the national welfare. (4) The overriding concern of Diet members with winning office, building local jiban, and raising election funds resulted in endemic corruption in the parties. It will be immediately obvious that aside from the charge of corruption, these complaints of " party abuses" simply described the techniques by which the parties attempted to entrench themselves in the structure of power. Such practices were necessary to party survival. If the parties abandoned their pursuit of power, they lost their function in the institutional structure ; if they did not rely on pork barrel and influence peddling, they would lose their strength locally ; if they did not spend large sums of money at election time and accept contributions from business, they would not be able to win votes ; if they did not compromise with nonparty elements they could neither get into office nor accomplish anything if they achieved power. Those who refused to accept the necessity of these tactics, as we shall see, were doomed to impotence. The "established parties" were caught in the perennial dilemma of those who enter into the world of politics. They were likely to be damned

26

if they accepted tactical necessities but were threatened with impotence if they did not. Yet i t should be emphasized that public criticism of the parties did not imply an inevitable decline of the parties from power. The exposure of skulduggery in high places is always more pronounced in societies that, like prewar Japan, tolerate an openness in public political debate and criticism. For years the parties attacked each other's malfeasances before the country. Charges of " party abuses" were the stock-in-trade of party rhetoric at least from the time of the Russo-Japanese War, but this did not impede the parties from eventually becoming the dominant force in politics. And even in the r g 2 o's, the most outspoken liberal critics of the parties limited their attacks largely to the men in the parties; they did not attack the idea of parties as such, nor did they deny the necessity for the existence of parties in a par­ liamentary system. Pessimism about the parties was widespread but not absolute ; there were always those who felt that the reform of the "established parties" was still possible. Few outside the radical right and the radical left regarded the temporary malaise of the parties as complete bankruptcy of the parliamentary system. Of course, distrust of political parties was not limited to Japan. In the United States, where the existence of political parties has never been threat­ ened, public attitudes toward political parties have been tinged with sus­ picion, not to say hostility, on more than one occasion. In r 879, for example, a college student named Woodrow Wilson expressed the sentiments of many of his fellow citizens when he wrote, "We are ruled by scheming, incompetent, political tradesmen whose aims and ambitions are merely personal, instead of broad-minded, masterful statesmen whose sympathies and purposes are national and patriotic . . . Eight words contain the sum of the present degradation of our political parties : No leaders, no principles; no principles, no party. " 21 Such fulminations about the corruption and j obbery of political parties are probably endemic in any representative system, since politicans who are invariably involved in the task of vote-getting and pursuing office often seem more concerned with the mechanics of achieving power than with the ends for which they propose to use it. But criticism alone is not enough to topple a party regime, nor discredit it entirely. The American party system survived Hayes, Garfield, and Arthur, and even its youthful critic Wilson managed to make his peace with it. It is only when political parties lack the institutional means to defend themselves against nonparty competitors or against political violence that their existence is imperiled.

27

II THE ORIGI N S OF TWO - P ARTY PO LIT I C S

M any Japanese politicians i n the early 1 goo's expressed the belief that a

two-party system was the inevitable concomitant of constitutional govern­ ment. The feeling was particularly strong among the minority parties in the Diet. One faction of the Kenseihonto declared in 1 908 that the only way to "promote the full development of constitutional government" was to "bring about the opposition of two large parties." The j ustification for this view was not simply that the Japanese Diet should blindly follow British example, but that a two-party system would serve useful political functions. It would permit debate on both sides of any political question, it would give the public a choice of alternative leaders and programs, and it would permit such alter­ natives to be reflected in the transfer of power from one cabinet to another. With the Diet divided into many small factions and parties, the Kenseihonto members declared, it was "not truly possible to give full play to popular opinion ( kokuron) . " 1 Yet it was obvious to many observers at the time that such rhetoric belied the realities of party behavior in the Japanese Diet.2 Diet members did not

28

band together in parties to promote a particular set of views or policies, much less to give expression to " popular opinion." What brought them together was the elementary perception that in unity there was strength. With few exceptions, the parties in the Diet were in their origins tactically rather than ideologically cohesive. They were formed to exercise political leverage through the force of number. It was only when a party achieved such cohesiveness that it began to adopt positions on policy, and these policy positions did not necessarily reflect "popular opinion" nor even the opinions of the indi­ vidual party members themselves. Policy was the egg, the party the chicken . Such being the case, the emergence of a two-party system in the Diet was not the consequence of an idealistic urge to give free play to "popular opinion," but rather the result of competition for power among the various parties in the Diet. The principal stimulus to the emergence of two-party politics in Japan was the extraordinary growth in strength and influence of the Seiyukai during the second decade of parliamentary government. Though it experienced internal difficulties in the years immediately after its formation, the Seiyukai since its organization in 1 900 had managed to maintain its position as the largest party in the Diet. Exploiting its maj ority, the party began to entrench itself as the paramount political group in the House of Representatives. It struck bargains with Katsura Taro, the hambatsu premier; it engineered the selection of its own president, Saionj i Kimmochi, to head the cabinet; and it began to make further inroads on the strength of the other parties in the House. By becoming powerful, the Seiyukai created enemies. Those who envied its position and found themselves frustrated by it, as well as those who castigated the party's accom modation with the hambatsu, began to mount movements to check the restrain its power. The simplest was to do this was to rally the rest of the House of Representatives into an anti-Seiyukai party which would have the numerical strength to compete with it. The culmination of these movements came in 1 9 1 3 with the organization of the Doshikai under the banner of Katsura Taro . The new party was a kind of countervailing force spawned by the expansion of Seiyukai power. Ironically, it also resembled the older party in that it represented a marriage of convenience between a representative of the hambatsu on the one hand and the Diet members on the other. More striking was its long-run significance. The Doshikai was to become the nucleus of both Japan's later second parties, the Kenseikai and the Minseito. Aspirant politicians who could

29

II

TH E O R I G I NS O F TWO-PARTY PO LITICS

not or did not wish to make their peace with the Seiyukai had the new option of joining another large party without risking political impotence. The formation of the Doshikai therefore laid the base for the two-party politics of the Taish o period . T H E EXPANSION O F SEIYUKAI POWER The tone of Diet politics radically altered following the organization of the Seiyukai in 1 900. During the 1 88o 's and early 1 8go's, it had been relatively easy to equate the political "ins" with the hambatsu and the political "outs" with the party politicians. But the organization of the new party under the aegis of Ito had cut across the old lines of conflict once and for all. Many of the party politicians who had rallied to Ito's banner now had access to political influence on a basis far more permanent than the temporary alliances of the late 1 8go's had provided, and the number of those who could be regarded as "outs" were the members of the Kenseihonto, the other small parties in the Diet, and a handful of stubbornly independent men who refused to join any organized group in the Diet. During the early I goo's, the Seiyukai increasingly monopolized access to the cabinet and the bureaucracy and, as such, was well on its way to establishing its hegemony in the Diet as well . The upsurge in the Seiyukai's fortunes was n o t immediate. It can best be dated from the formation in 1 906 of the Saionj i cabinet, which came into being largely as a result of the efforts of Saionj i 's able lieutenant, Hara Kei . A n astute tactician, Hara, like Kono Hironaka a n d Hoshi Toru before him, realized that his party's power depended on its ability to strike compromises or bargains with the nonparty elite that controlled the cabinet. Yet unlike his predecessors, who had had to deal directly with the oligarchs, Hara only faced one of their proteges, Katsura Taro. Moreover, unlike the "popular parties, " the Seiyukai possessed an initial advantage in having a majority in the Diet. Hara was quick to exploit both these circumstances to expand his party's powers by extracting concessions from the hambatsu. His first opportunity came with the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. Shortly before the Diet session of 1 905 , Katsura found himself in some difficulty. Not only was he having trouble financing the war effort, but the army's campaign in Manchuria had begun to bog down . To weather this storm domestically Katsura realized he would have to have strong support in the Diet. Naturally, he turned to the Seiyukai.

30

In December 1 904 Katsura met with Hara to propose an arrangement which would be to their mutual benefit. He told Hara that he intended to remain premier for the duration of the war, but he said that after it was ended he would form a cabinet in consultation with Hara if he decided to remain premier, or if not, he would recommend Saionj i as his successor. The quid pro quo was that the Seiyukai give him Diet support in the meantime. Hara agreed to these proposals but insisted on two conditions : first, that Katsura try to get the support of the Kenseihonto as well as the Seiyukai; and second, that Katsura should not only refrain from opposing a Saionj i cabinet once it was formed , b u t that h e should give it full support. The resulting compromise assured Katsura of Diet backing during the remainder of the war and guaranteed Hara that the Seiyukai would exercise more direct control over the government once the war had ended. Katsura persuaded the genro to agree to this arrangement, though Yamagata Aritomo, never one to retreat from an old position without taking up a new one, insisted that it be understood that Saionj i was to be recom mended not as head of a party, but as an individual of a caliber appropriate to serve as premier. Because it was the substance rather than the forms of power that most interested Hara, the bargain was readily struck, and in January 1 906 Saionj i became premier.3 The circumstances under which the new cabinet was formed made it something less than a " party cabinet. " Not only did Saionj i announce publicly that he took office as a private individual rather than as a party leader, but the composition of his cabinet also reflected the need to compromise with the hambatsu leaders. Only two portfolios were held by Seiyukai men, the other six being neatly rationed between three "Satsuma men" and three "Choshu men . " But the compromise did open the door for a further expansion of Seiyukai influence. Hara had been able to establish a working relationship - with Katsura, and he had also created a base from which to enlarge the party's influence over the bureaucracy and the local electorate. During the next five or six years, the Seiyukai was to succeed in making itself a semi-per­ manent government party, working to support whichever premier was in power, its own president or Katsura, the representative of the hambatsu. In part, the success of the Seiyukai in the years following 1 go6 lay in the ability of Hara Kei to extend party influence over the prefectural bureaucracy as home minister under both the Saionj i cabinets. Using his ministerial appointment powers, Hara almost immediately on taking office began to ease

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out of office many of the older, stodgier prefectural governors and replace them with young and able underlings whom he promoted to new positions of responsibility. During the first Saionj i cabinet, he reshuffled about 7 5 prefectural government posts, a perso nnel change unprecedented since the beginning of the Home M inistry. Most of the older officials who were retired or relieved of office had owed their rise in the bureaucracy to Yamagata during his service as home minister from 1883 to 188g . Even after Yamagata had resigned, these men had constituted a bureaucratic faction that regarded the oligarchic leader as their patron. Hara's goal seems to have been to break the power of this hambatsu-connected group by replacing it with younger men who had not been admitted into the charmed circle of Yamagata's favor. The result, though not dramatic, was to create a new group of officials in the local government apparatus, linked to the patronage of Hara and the Seiyiikai rather than to the oligarchic generation. Within the central ministry as well , Hara created a personal following consisting of men like Tokonami Takej iro, Mizuno Rentar6, and Kobashi lchita, all of whom eventually resigned their official posts to become members of the Seiyiikai.4 The groundwork was laid for an increase of Seiyiikai influence over local politics through the use of the Home Ministry bureaucracy. The growth of intimate ties with the cabinet in power also aided the expansion of Seiyiikai power in other ways. As a party leader, Hara was anxious to gain the support of local men of property and reputation (meiboka), who were in a position to command votes and exercise other types of informal influence within their localities. The easiest way to accomplish this infusion of "respectables" was to make the Seiyiikai a protector and promoter of local economic development.5 Hoshi Toru had been one of the first Japanese politicians to realize that men could be persuaded to give a party support if it served their economic interests. Indeed, he had engaged in a rudimentary form of "influence peddling" in order to command Diet majorities. But it took the Seiyiikai under Hara to discover the usefulness of " pork barrel" legislation. Increasingly influential as it was in the decisions of the Diet and the local bureaucracy, the Seiyiikai was able to exercise considerable control over national expendi­ tures on local public works, irrigation projects, harbor improvement, school building, bridge and road construction, and local railroad lines. By using, or at least promising to use, party influence for spending on such local projects, the party began to build its local strength . As one scholar has pointed

32

out, while Hoshi bought Diet members, Hara and the Seiyukai began to buy whole election districts by catering to the economic interest--a:nd provincial pride of local constituents.6 It might be appropriate to cite j ust one example of how the Seiyukai used its new position to build local strength. The town of Sakada-machi in the Shonai region of Yamagata prefecture had long been a stronghold of anti-Jiyuto and anti-Seiyukai sentiment; its Diet representative was a member of the Kenseihonto and its prefectural assembly members belonged to an anti-Seiyukai faction. At the same time, there was a long-standing hope in the town, shared by members of all political factions, for the construction of a railroad line through the town which would link it with the rest of the prefecture and the coast. The Seiyukai, exploiting this local issue, began to expand its influence in the town by promising to translate this hope into realization. In 1 909 the prefectural assembly, which was dominated by the Seiyukai, passed a resolution in favor of a railroad line across the prefecture. The prefectural governor, who had been promoted by Hara from a minor post in Nagasaki to the governorship in 1 go6 and who was regarded (perhaps rightly) as a "running dog" of the Seiyukai, made a special trip to Tokyo to lobby for the construction of the line. Needless to say, the local Seiyukai branch exerted its efforts as well. At a meeting held in Sakada-machi in January 1 9 1 0 to discuss methods for lobbying for the line, the head of the local Seiyukai branch told those assembled that it would not be possible to construct the desired line without relying on the power of the Seiyukai. After a round of conversations at a local tea house and other continued efforts, the industrious branch leader enlisted goo new Seiyukai members in Sakada­ machi, won the cooperation of the anti-Seiyukai faction in the prefectural assembly at least on the railroad question, and persuaded one of the local Diet members, formerly a member of the Kenseihonto and the Kokuminto, to leave the opposition and become an independent in the Diet. The party never managed to capture control of all the town's seats in the prefectural assembly, but there is little question that the party's stock had risen consider­ ably as a result of its ability in influence the government.7 Needless to say, what happened in this small area of Yamagata prefecture happened elsewhere as well. A natural concomitant of the Seiyukai's increased influence over the machinery of government both at the national and local level was its ability to maintain and increase its strength in the Diet. Other things being equal ,

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a voter had more to gain by casting his ballot for a Seiyukai candidate than by voting for those of rival parties. The Seiyukai majority therefore grew steadily. By the election of I go8, it finally captured an absolute maj ority in the House of Representatives. In the 1 909 Diet it held I 93 seats; in I g i O and I g i i , 204 seats; and i n I 9 I 2 , 207 seats. At the same time, its strength was gaining in the prefectural assemblies as well. In I g I I , for example, the prefectural assembly elections returned Seiyukai maj orities or pluralities in 30 prefectures, while opposition parties were able to gain maj orities or plu­ ralities in only I I prefectures.8 In the decade or so since its formation, the Seiyukai seemed to have checked effective opposition at the polls. All the elements that contributed to the Seiyukai's success reinforced one another. Its initial strength in the Diet made it necessary for the premier to rely on its support ; its intimate ties with the cabinets of the early I goo's enabled it to exercise increasing influence over the prefectural bureaucracies and to enact " pork barrel " measures in the national Diet ; its success in building local support thereby led to a further expansion of its Diet strength and made the party all the more indispensable to whoever held the premier­ ship. Yet, in spite of the accelerating momentum of the Seiyukai bandwagon, its position was not unassailable. Were its political rivals in the Diet to band together in a large party of their own and were they then to seek the patronage of a figure as influential and prestigious as Ito or Saionj i , the Seiyukai's advance toward a one-party system would be checked . Slowly but surely, in the teahouses frequented by the Diet politicians during the " political season," this is exactly what was taking place. ANTI-SEIYU KAI MERGER MOVEMENTS The expansion of Seiyukai power naturally aroused emotions among members of the other parties in the Diet who now found themselves sinking into increasing impotence. Those who were not indignant that the Seiyukai was striking bargains with Katsura, the minion of the hambatsu and long-standing enemy of the parties, were moved by the more palpable disappointment that they might be missing out on a good thing. The old animus toward the high-handedness of the oligarchs began to be tempered by a new hostility toward the Seiyukai. The political frustration of the smaller parties in the Diet set in motion movements to merge into a rival organization that could compete with the Seiyukai on its own ground. Indeed the question of an

34

anti-Seiyukai merger was such a constant issue during the years after r goo that some began to speak of it cynically as a kind of "yearly ritual" (nenju no gyojz).9 There were three main elements in the House of Representatives besides the Seiyukai. The strongest of these was the Kenseihonto. Led by Okuma, most of its top members and many of its rank and file had been associated with the Kaishinto, the Rikken Kaishinto, and the Shimpoto, the Okuma­ connected parties of the r 88o's and r 8go's. In some respects, both its leader­ ship and membership retained the spirit of the militant " popular parties" and constituted the rump of that tradition. The second element was a series of small "clubs" or "associations" made up of independent Diet members who did not wish to cast their lot with the older parties. Some of these independents were free-spirited political mavericks who felt that "every man should be his own party," but others were simply trimmers who were interested in offering their support to the highest bidder. Consequently, these small groups were ill-equipped to maintain organizational unity, and the names and numbers of their associations changed almost from Diet session to Diet session . Finally, there were also a series of " loyalist" parties, which traced their origins back to the Kokumin Kyokai organized in r 8g 2 by Shinagawa Yaj iro and Saigo Tsugumichi . The " loyalist" parties were derisively called "bureaucratic parties" (kanryoto) , not so much because their membership consisted of ex­ officials, but because they habitually supported hambatsu cabinets. By the early r goo's they were regarded as being in the pay, both literal and figurative, of Katsura. Despite the obvious political advantages of an anti-Seiyukai merger, these three rather disparate elements did not find it easy to unite. The main obstacle to their political union was that the old spirit of protest continued to confound the new spirit of compromise. Many of the older Diet members, particularly those who had been involved in thejiyuminken movement and the Diet politics of the early r 8go's, were unwilling to join hands with those who had on occasion given willing support to hambatsu cabinets and with those who were less interested in constitutional issues than in obtaining political influence for private ends. While the Seiyukai steadily expanded its parliamentary strength , the opposition was plunged into a dreary series of abortive negotia­ tions, party splits and recombinations. The principal figure in obstructing the formation of an anti-Seiyukai party was lnukai Tsuyoshi, a man in whom the passions of the r 88o 's and the early

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1 89o's had never really subsided . As a leader of the Kenseihont6, the strongest of the smaller parties in the Diet, he ardently opposed any policy that implied the continuation of hambatsu influence on the government. lnukai was nev­ ertheless astute enough to realize that a mere frontal assault by weak and divided parties would not be enough to drive the oligarchs and their proteges out of power. His long cherished project was to unite all the minto in the Diet in a concerted attack on any government controlled by the hambatsu. This had been his consistent aim since the days of the Daido Danketsu when he had worked for the cooperation of the old Jiyiit6 and Kaishint6 elements in preparation for the opening of the Diet. He had also been active in organizing the Kenseito, which united the overwhelming maj ority of the Diet into a single party. Even after this had broken apart, he continued to work for the cooperation of the newly formed Seiyukai and Kenseihont6 against the Katsura cabinet in 1 90 2 and 1 90 3 . He realized there was unity in strength, but he did not wish to break the solidarity of the " popular" elements in the Diet by "vertical ties" with the oligarchs or by j oining with those Diet members who had worked in the hambatsu interests in the 1 89o's.l0 lnukai, whose stubbornness and forthrightness could inspire intense, almost religious loyalty, made many enem ies as well. His cause was also weakened by the unwillingness of the Seiyiikai leadership to abandon its comfortable accommodation with Katsura for a quixotic attempt to turn out the hambatsu once and for all. Consequently, within his own party, the Kenseihont6, there curdled an opposition group which attempted to oust lnukai from all influence over party policy and to work for a union of the smaller parties of the Diet into an anti-Seiyiikai merger. This group, soon known as the " reform faction" of the Kenseihont6 , rallied around Oishi Masami, who like lnukai was a veteran of jiyuminken days and a politician of considerable prestige. The " reform faction" argued that the Kenseihont6 should build its tactics on the assumption that the Seiyiikai, not the hambatsu, was its principal enemy. It was, after all, the Seiyukai and not the oligarchs whom the party fought at the polls. Because the party could not hope to compete with the Seiyukai alone and unaided , it had to gather all the non-Seiyukai factions into one group and seek assistance from Katsura in return for cooperation in the Diet. Opposition to the hambatsu was all well and good , but not when it meant raking the Seiyiikai's chestnuts out of the fire.11 Internecine debate within the Kenseihont6 slowly eroded the party's solidarity to the point where the two factions within the party established separate headquarters. Oishi, a longtime friend of Inukai, even refused to receive him as a guest.

36

But the need for a merger became increasingly urgent after the elections of May r go8, conducted under the supervision of Hara, the Seiyukai home minister. Not surprisingly, the Seiyukai came within three seats of an absolute majority, and by the time the Diet opened the following winter it had managed to gain four additional Diet members to assure its absolute control of the Lower House. Merger proposals now began to spring from several other of the smaller factions, all of which, like the Kenseihonto, had suffered considerable losses in the election. Even men like lnukai were now willing to admit the necessity of some kind of anti-Seiyukai merger, but there still remained the question of who was to participate in it. Those who aimed principally at building a new political force capable of competing with the Seiyukai wished to include not only the Kenseihonto and several smaller groups of independent Diet members but also the Daido Club, the current " loyalist" party. The lnukai faction, as well as a number of men in the other small parliamentary groups, naturally opposed an alliance with men whom they regarded as lackeys of the hambatsu. The ill feeling was mutual. The men of the Daido Club, for their part, were unwilling to join any merger that overtly condemned or attacked the hambatsu as lnukai wished it to. Consequently, instead of a "big merger" of all the anti-Seiyukai groups, there took place in I g I o two "small mergers." The Daido Club joined with a number of businessmen elected in I go8 to form the Chua Club under the leadership of O ura Kemmu, the " loyalist" workhorse, while the Kenseihonto in immediate response gathered most of the rest of the unattached Diet members into the Kokumint6.12 Many anti-Seiyukai politicians regarded these "small mergers" as tem­ porary expedients. They continued to hope for and work for the formation of a new and larger party to rival the Seiyukai. Particularly active was the so-called "Tosa faction" of the Kokuminto. These men- O ishi Masami , Sengoku Mitsugu , Kataoka Naoharu, a n d Tomita Kojiro-tried t o soften their party's attitude toward the Katsura government, probably in hopes of inducing the premier to take the leadership of a new party. When lnukai pressed for an alliance with the Seiyukai in r g r I to attack Katsura for his handling of the Kotoku incident and the history book controversy, they counseled caution. They even urged lnukai to ally with Katsura openly if the premier agreed to accept the principle of party government and to enact certain constitutional reforms that would reduce the power of the hambatsu on the government. In I 9 I 2 , after a new election brought an even greater Seiyukai maj ority, clandestine negotiations for a merger of the Kokuminto

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and the Chuo Club were begun. It was no surprise that when Katsura announced his intention to form a new party in January 1 9 1 3 , there were many ready to flock to his bannerP THE CONVERSION OF KATSURA The coalescence of the anti-Seiyukai opposition into a single party had been hindered not simply by the opposition of diehards like lnukai, but by the lack of a powerful figure to lead it. There would be little object in forming a new party unless it had at its head a man with some chance of coming to power. Such a person appeared in the figure of Katsura Taro, " the tiger of bureaucracy," a man long regarded as one of Yamagata's staunchest followers and consequently an advocate of continued hambatsu rule. In the late 1 89o's he had been an intransigent opponent of party government. In 1 898 he had opposed Ito's plan to form a new party, and when Ito had recom mended instead that Okuma and Itagaki be asked to form a cabinet, Katsura had backed Yamagata's stand against the idea and supported his argument in favor of suspending the constitution (kempo chushiron) . 14 Yet in January 1 9 1 3 , a month or so after he had taken office as premier for the third time, Katsura announced his intention to form a new political party. How had Katsura come to the point of planning to form a party of his own? It was not idealism that moved him, but the very practical lesson he had learned during his two previous ministries; a completely " transcendental" cabinet with no party support in the Diet was not workable. He had succeeded in staying aloof from the parties during most of his first ministry, but during his second ministry he had been forced to bargain and compromise with the Seiyukai, a vexatious and unsatisfactory expedient, which weakened his position while strengthening theirs. He told Irie Kan 'ichi shortly before he announced his intention to form a new party : 15 Until now I have organized cabinets and made use of the political parties, but because of this it has turned out that I have no choice but to carry out only 7 0 percent or 8o percent of the policies I have in mind and to make concessions on the other 20 percent or 30 percent. But, if I can now organize a party myself and keep it under control, I will be able to put into effect everything that I have in mind and can carry out my ideals for the sake of the nation .

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He hoped that the organization of a new party of unswerving loyalty to him would relieve him of the necessity to make concessions. Katsura's motives were not untinged with personal ambition. The formation of a new party promised not only a solution to his problems as a premier but also a guarantee of his future as a politician. Katsura had been growing increasingly independent of Yamagata since the days of his first ministry. He began to act more and more on his own j udgment and consulted Yamagata less and less. Yamagata frequently complained to his intimates that Katsura wouldn't listen to him or accept his views.16 Yamagata was not one to tolerate such independence from his proteges any more than in his rivals, and doubtless this prompted him in r g r 2 to shunt Katsura to a higher office in order to remove him from the center of affairs. Just as he had had Ito appointed president of the Privy Council in order to force him to sever his tie with Seiyukai, Yamagata managed to have Katsura made keeper of the Privy Seal and grand chamberlain, an appointment to the gloomy interior of the palace where he could ally with no one more dangerous than fusty household officials and the court ladies. This cooling of relations with Yamagata was doubtless the result of Katsura's realization that the genro were growing old and their influence was bound to wane. As they withdrew from the political scene, some new method for selecting cabinets would surely have to emerge and the chances were that this method would be the regular institutionalization of party government. "The genro until recently seem to have held the center of political power, but they are growing old and falling into a decline . . . The time for the establishment of party cabinets is approaching, and when it comes, it will be impossible to face the political situation to come without a party at one's command . " 17 With a party behind him, Katsura would have a weapon for the present and a hedge against the future. It was a guarantee that he would not be left behind when the new age in politics emerged and it made him less vulnerable in his relations with Yamagata. Indeed, there is some suggestion that Katsura tried to hasten the advent of the new era. On the day of his inauguration as premier for the third time, he urged Yamagata to " retire to a different occupation and take a rest . " 18 Did the old man smile at the impertinence? Katsura had begun to make tentative preparations for his new party after the resignation of his second cabinet in August r g r r . He had apparently been approached indirectly by elements within the Kokuminto sometime

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during that ministry but had not responded in a concrete way. But at the time of his resignation, according to one account, he had told the emperor of his intention to organize a "national party" (kokuminteki seito) , a " model political party" that would unite the hearts of all the people behind the throne. He also began to make less august overtures to the Kokuminto discontents and he asked to meet Kono Hironaka for an exchange of views. Before he put his intentions into effect he planned to take a trip to Europe, in part to carry on discussions with Russian statesmen and in part to visit Germany, the scene of his student days, but he also wished to study the organization of political parties in Europe, especially in England . He told Wakatsuki Reij iro, who was to accompany him on the trip, that although he understood the English parties superficially, he wished to see for himself what kind of support they enjoyed, what the inner workings of the parties were, and how it was that the Liberals and the Tories came to power. He wanted to meet English politicians directly and talk with them.19 The projected trip came to a halt in Moscow where the news of the death of the Meij i Emperor caught up with the travelers. On his return to Tokyo Katsura was met by Terauchi Masatake, who informed him that he had been appointed to the posts of keeper of the Privy Seal and grand chamber­ lain. This meant the end of the project to form the new party because it would not be appropriate for a person so intimately connected with the throne to soil his feathers in the unseemly cockpit of parliamentary politics. There was anger and disappointment among Katsura's intimates and among the Kokuminto dissidents at this attempt to "cage the tiger. " 20 But before the year was out, the keeper was to let the tiger loose again. The fall of the Saionj i cabinet as a result of the refusal of the army to provide a minister of war found a startled Yamagata turning once more to Katsura to head the government. It was a last resort for Yamagata, who could find no one else willing to take the job, but for Katsura it was a renewed chance to carry out his plan. On December 1 7 , 1 9 1 2 , the day he received the imperial mandate to form a cabinet, Katsura visited Yamagata and told him of his intention, if necessary, to take a direct hand in the formation of a new party. He did. not intend to leave the matter to subordinates such as Oura and Goto Shimpei because he felt they would not be able to handle the job as effectively as he. Yamaga m did not object· but warned him to proceed with caution; Katsura promised to "lay mature consideration upon mature consideration. " The next day he called in O ura and told him to go to work on the formation of a new party.21

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It seems likely that Katsura did not intend to orgamze the new party formally until the Diet had been dissolved . Then with elections to face, politicians would be more inclined to rally to the banner of a party led by the premier himself. But events moved too fast for him. The fall of the Saionj i cabinet had unexpectedly given rise to the so-called first Movement for Constitutional Government (kensei yogo undo) . Begun in the rooms of the Koj unsha, a private club in Tokyo, it was initially organized by a number of prominent liberal journalists who felt that because the selection of a new cabinet would coincide with the beginning of a new imperial reign, the moment was opportune to end oligarchic interference in government and institute " normal constitutional government. " With the backing of certain businessmen who belonged to the Koj unsha and with the assistance of certain veteran party politicians such as lnukai Tsuyoshi and Ozaki Yukio, they sponsored a series of public meetings and rallies which touted the slogans: " Destroy the hambatsu" and " Fulfill constitutional government . " In a sense it was a revival of the party spirit of the 1 89o's. The appointment of Katsura instead of a party leader to the premiership added fuel to the movement, for it seemed the genro were acting in absolute disregard for public sentiment and that Katsura, using his connections with the imperial court, had connived to fulfill his insatiable political ambition by becoming premier for a third time. The Movement for Constitutional Government, though potentially an­ noying to Katsura, did not constitute a major threat to him as long as it remained a purely popular movement. But shortly before the opening of the Diet in 1 9 1 3 , the leadership of the Seiyukai , who had initially been cool toward participation in an extra-parliamentary movement, decided to throw the weight ot" their party's strength behind the anti-oligarchic, anti-Katsura movement. On January 1 8 , 1 9 1 3 , the party formally decided to join with the other parties in the Diet to propose a no-confidence resolution directed at the Katsura cabinet.ZZ It was this that forced Katsura's hand. On January 1 9 he sent hurried word to Yamagata that he was going to announce publicly his intentions of forming a new party ; its actual inauguration would wait until a later date, but he felt the need to act quickly in making his plans known.23 It is not hard to guess why Katsura felt constrained to act so precipitously. The Diet was to reconvene the day after the announcement and it promised to be a troublesome session. Katsura doubtiess hoped to rally support in the Diet by opening the door to all comers who wished to follow him. He

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hoped to check the mounting opposition by laying down the cudgel and dangling the carrot in front of them. The chance to cloak themselves in Katsura's patronage would doubtless, he thought, split the party movement and bring the majority over to him. He told Hayashida Kametaro that he expected not only the Chuo Club and the dissident elements within the Kokuminto to join, but he also anticipated So Diet members from the Seiyukai would join too. He could thereby muster a majority in the House of Representatives and was optimistic that anti-Seiyukai feeling in the House of Peers would assure support there. Hayashida, with more perspicacity than tact, told him he would be lucky to get eight from the Seiyukai let alone So and that he could expect few outside the old reform faction of the Kokuminto to j oin him. Hayashida was right. Katsura had greatly over­ estimated his own appeal and underestimated the astuteness of the Seiyukai leadership.24 Hara was prompted to bring the full resources of his party behind the Movement for Constitutional Government by sponsoring pro­ vincial rallies and demonstrations under Seiyukai auspices. Instead of tiding Katsura over the crisis, the announcement of the new party had only made things worse for him. THE FORMATION OF THE NEW PARTY No maxim applies more aptly to the formation of Katsura's new party, eventually to take the name of Doshikai, than the time-honored observation that politics makes strange bedfellows. From the standpoint of " principles," its membership was a motley group. In its ranks were men who had fought the rise of the parties by fair means and foul as well as those who had suffered from the early government repression of the parties ; there were men who had belonged to the Jiyuto and men who had belonged to the Shimpoto ; there were men who had never belonged to a party before and men who had spent their whole lives in party politics. Yet all were able to make their peace with one another, for they were united by three things: political ambition, antipathy to the Seiyukai, and the hope that the leadership of Katsur� would enable them to find expression for both of these. The nucleus of Katsura's new party was a group of bureaucrats or ex­ officials, who were to dominate the party, serve as its principal leaders, and provide most of its ministerial candidates when it came to power. Bureaucrats were indispensable to any party, not only because of their personal connec-

42

tions outside the Diet, but because they were men of knowledge and talent. It was they who knew the business of running a government, drafting legislation, and formulating detailed party programs. Their function within the party was not unlike that of the lawyer in Anglo-American political systems. AI though only a handful of bureaucrats j oined the Doshikai in I g I 3 , less than a dozen, they were to exercise influence out o f all proportion to their number. In building his new party, Katsura tried to get as much support as he could outside the Diet. Indeed it seemed as though he were trying to build a faction of his own in the same way that Yamagata had. He tried to woo some of Yamagata's other proteges, like Den Kenj iro and Hirata Tosuke, and attempted to enlist the support of a number of imperial appointees to the House of Peers. But these men were little prepared to engage in a venture that seemed both rash and shaky .25 Hirata was willing to admit that the organization of a new party might be inevitable, but it seemed unwise for Katsura to undertake it while serving as premier; it seemed too much of a tactical expedient. But, though unable to detach any of Yamagata's old followers, he did manage to bring a number of his own cabinet members into the party ; as he told Egi Yoku, these were " men whom I can have resign at any time at a single word . " 26 He needed men he could rely upon not to make deals with his old mentor. Whether he invited all his cabinet ministers to join is not certain, but five of the civilian cabinet members finally entered the party . Save for Kato Komei , whose entry into the party we will deal with in the next chapter, all these men had been close associates of Katsura during his second ministry. Goto Shimpei, whose first patron had been Itagaki Taisuke, was a man so given to shifting his allegiances that he had become known as the "wandering star of Japanese politics"; rising first as a reformer of Japan's public health system and later as an expert in colonial affairs, he found himself in Katsura's orbit when he took office as transportation minister in I go8; he was one of the men whom Katsura took with him on his trip to Europe. Oura Kemmu, whom Katsura affectionately called a "fighting dog," had been associated with Katsura much longer; he had served in both Katsura's previous ministries and had played a major role in organ­ izing the Daido Club and the Chiio Club to support Katsura in the Diet. Less known were Wakatsuki Reij iro and Nakakoj i Ren, both of whom had risen through the regular system of bureaucratic recruitment to become vice

43

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TH E O R I G I N S O F TWO-PARTY POLITICS

ministers in the second Katsura cabinet and ministers in the third cabinet. Wakatsuki was perhaps more experienced in dealings with affairs of state since he had been in fact (if not in name) finance minister in Katsura's second cabinet ; like Goto he had accompanied Katsura on his European trip. Both Wakatsuki and Nakakoj i seem to have entered the party principally at the behest of Katsura. None of these four men were following any strong con­ victions when they joined the party but did so primarily because of their personal affiliation with the premier. There were three other younger men-Hamaguchi Yuko, Egi Yoku, and Nagashima Ryuj i-who were acting less out of a sense of personal obligation than out of a calculated decision to abandon promising official careers for membership in the new party. All three were graduates of the law faculty of the Imperial University, had qualified in the higher civil service examina­ tion, and had risen steadily in the bureaucracy through ability, personal connection, and good fortune. All three were regarded as men of promise by their seniors who had entered the Doshikai; Egi who had attracted the attention of Goto and Katsura was chief cabinet secretary, Hamaguchi was sought after as vice minister by both Goto and Wakatsuki, and Nagashima had become Katsura's son-in-law on graduating from the university.27 All three had arrived at points in their careers where they could go no further simply on the basis of technical qualifications or ability ; they were faced with the possibility of retirement with the fall of the cabinet or the chance of advancing their careers if they consented to join the new party. The balance of power within the state seemed to be swinging in favor of the parties and now was the time to move with this trend.28 Because Hamaguchi later became a prominent figure in the Kenseikai and ultimately president of the Minseito, the circumstances of his decision to enter the party are of special interest. As a youth, he kept himself aloof from the party movement at a time when his native Kochi was seething with political passions and intrigues. An earnest but colorless young man, he had studied hard and found a useful niche in the Finance Ministry. Had he wanted to, he could have resigned from official duties and pursued a career in business.29 But he .hoped instead to continue to be of service to his country by remaining in government work. In 1 9 1 3 , the best way to do that seemed to be by joining a party. He told of his deciswn in his Reminiscences: Immediately after the fall of the Katsura Cabinet, I decided after long deliberation to enter the Doshikai at the invitation of Count Goto

44

Shimpei. The power of the political parties had after all developed markedly of late. The bureaucratic politicians [kanryo sey.ika, by whom he presumably meant the hambatsu politicians] had exercised themselves desperately to prevent the parties from taking over the government. They did so by means of " political compromise" (dakyo selj"i) and "mutual understandings" (joi togo) . But this was like stuffing one's ears to steal a bell [ that is, self-delusion ]-it was tantamount to proving that without the power of the parties government could not be carried on. Not only that, but since the evils of " political compromise" and " mutual under­ standing" were unexpectedly greater than direct government by the parties, the people were past endurance. There was [also] a very strong desire within the parties to cast off the masks of " political compromise" and "mutual understanding" . . . and appear openly in the operation of the government . . . The death knell of bureaucratic government under the name of "mutual understanding" or " political compromise" had to be rung, and the development of responsible two party government had henceforth to begin. This was Katsura's reason for organizing the party, he said, and it was his analysis of the situation as well. He was therefore predisposed toward entry into the cabinet, but it was the specific circu mstances of the cabinet resignation that prompted him to do it.30 At the end of seventeen or eighteen years of official life, and at an age of over 40 [44 at the time] , though [I felt] it might be beyond my abilities at first, I wished to serve my country as a party politician. That was the purely rational aspect of my reasons for entering the Doshikai. But aside from that, since I had shared the fate of the cabinet as Vice Minister of Transportation, if I did not rise as a party politician in the future, that was that [that is, the end of his career.] However, if I did [become a politician] I thought it natural from the point of reason and from the point of human feelings to enter the Doshikai. Perhaps had he not been selected as vice minister and had not become a bureaucratic ronin, he might have ended his days with a comfortable pension and a seat in the House of Peers. Not all these bureaucrats remained members of the party. Goto, Nakakoj i , and Nagashima left after the death of their patron, Katsura. B u t those who did remain tended to stay closer to one another than they did to those who

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TH E O R I G I N S O F TWO-PARTY PO LITICS

entered the party as Diet members. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to set up too rigid a distinction between the interest of the bureaucrats and those of "party men " ; the tw9 were mutually complementary. As Egi put it shortly after the formation of the D6shikai :31 It is a mistake to think that the government cannot be carried on without the parties, but it is also mistaken to think that one can carry government without the bureaucracy. The dilution of party enthusiasm of the early days was compensated for by the infusion of " men of talent" who tried to run honest and orderly govern­ ment, a task which professional politicians often neglected. Although the ex-officials dominated the leadership, the rank and file of the party was necessarily drawn from the membership of the House of Representatives. For the Diet men, entry into the Doshikai did not mean embarking on a new career but rather making an old career more promising. They were prompted primarily by the desire to achieve the long-sought anti-Seiyukai union, which prom ised to break the monopoly of the Seiyukai over Diet politics and to end the political isolation and frustration of the smaller parties. The organization of the new party meant the final achieve­ ment of the "big merger" first proposed in 1 908 and 1 9 1 0 . The new party drew its strength from two main elements i n the Diet. The first was the Chuo Club, under the loyal leadership of Oura and his lieutenant, Adachi Kenzo. Not surprisingly, the Chuo Club entered the new party e n bloc with little or no hesitation. The rest of the Doshikai's strength came from the Kokuminto, about half of whose membership left their party to join Katsura's new group. Unlike the members of the Chuo Club, which was really a Katsura claque, the Kokuminto members faced a more complex choice, and it may be instructive to analyze why they finally decided to choose Katsura over other alternatives. The internal conflict that had been brewing for so long within the Kokumint6 finally came to a head in mid-January 1 9 1 3 , when the party had to decide whether to commit itself to the Movement for Constitutional Goverm:nent and ally with the Seiyukai in an attack on the Katsura govern­ ment or whether to establish friendly ties with Katsura, as many of the party leaders had wished to since ti1e formation of the party in 1 9 1 0 . lnukai , of course, favored the former course of action ; he was prominent on the plat­ forms of the rallies against the Katsura government and was already earning

46

a name as a " god of constitutional government," but those party leaders who had favored a "big merger" and an alliance with Katsura took advantage of his absence at an anti-Katsura rally in Osaka to draft a party program that made a strong attack on the Seiyukai. Indeed, in December I 9 I 2 Kataoka Naoharu had already offered his assistance to Katsura in forming a new party. When lnukai returned from his speaking tour he rallied the general party meeting behind him to reject the platform drawn up by Kataoka and Taketomi, had the party back a strong platform attacking the hambatsu, and managed to have Kataoka expelled from the party. This was the last straw for those party leaders who favored a big merger; they decided to make a final break with lnukai and his policy of intransigent opposition to the hambatsu. Two days after lnukai had succeeded in reestablishing his control over the party, five party leaders-Oishi Masami, Taketomi Tokitoshi, Minoura Katsundo, Shimada Saburo, and Kono Hironaka-all veterans of the jiyuminken parties resigned from the Kokuminto.32 The dissident Kokuminto leaders were now free to join the new party, but none of them had yet met with Katsura. This was arranged through the mediation of Sengoku Mitsugu , a former executive in the Mitsubishi railroad interests, who acted at the prompting of Toyokawa Ryohei, a long-time member of the Mitsubishi banking interests. Both Toyokawa and Sengoku had been friends of O ishi from the days when all three were associated with the Mitsubishi Commercial School. The premier met with the dissident Kokuminto leaders at Sengoku's house. Not all of them were convinced of the sincerity of Katsura's intentions and some objected to Katsura's past financial policies. But Katsura, a man of great charm and skill in negotiating, managed to reassure them on both points. He would accede to their demands on policy and would devote the remainder of his life to building the party ; he would ask nothing of the Kokuminto leaders but their support. With these assurances, they agreed to participate in the new party.33 For the other Kokuminto members, entry into Katsura's party was not so easy, but during the next few days about 40 of them decided to join the new party. The Kokuminto did not split along the lines of the old "reform" and "anti-reform" factions. Indeed, over half the party's Diet members had been newly elected in I g I 2 and could have had very little connection with the old controversy. Doubtless the question of personal ties to one or the other of the party leaders played some part in the decision of some to leave the party or to remain in it, but most of those who left the Kokuminto

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seem to have done so as members of a prefectural bloc.34 The reason for this, as Fujisawa Ikunosuke suggested later, was the desire not to split the party jiban within a single prefecture.35 There were ties of obligation and friendship among party members of the same prefecture ; furthermore, be­ cause the election district was coextensive with the prefecture, there were also advantages in not splitting the pool of votes and the web of local connections that the party had shared in the past. Admittedly, the motives of the various individual members will remain obscure, but it seems likely that they were very much influenced by a desire to avoid unnecessary competition for votes among themselves. Conversely, those who remained within the Kokuminto consisted mainly of men elected from lnukai's own home district of Okayama or men with particular personal ties to lnukai . The case of Niigata prefecture illustrates the process by which individual Kokuminto members decided to bolt the party. Shortly after Katsura an­ nounced his intention to form the new party, the Kokuminto Diet members from Niigata, Akita, and Hyogo met to discuss the best course of action. They decided that the best policy would be to leave the party and rally to Katsura's banner. A number of them, however, feeling that it would be best not to act without consulting their supporters within their constituencies, wished to return to their prefectures to discuss the matter. The Niigata delegation, however, argued that since the Kokuminto elements within the party would eventually dominate the new party, it would be best not to fall behind those from other prefectures in climbing on the bandwagon lest they later be at a disadvantage in party affairs ; it was far better to risk offending their local supporters than to risk missing out on the chance to become founding members of the new party. As a consequence, the Niigata members of the Kokuminto resigned from the party as a group, informing their local supporters later.36 However tangled the skein of motives that prompted men to join Katsura's new party, there was little doubt that the principal mission of the new party was to put an end to Seiyukai hegemony in politics. A pamphlet that the new party issued shortly after its formation proclaimed this in no uncertain terms: 3_7 The reason the Seiyukai is swayed by selfish motives in its relations with others and has become corrupt within is that there is no strong party to rival it . . . The people, even though they are oppressed by

48

the expanding Seiyiikai, have no means to appeal to another organiza­ tion and demand reform . . . Therefore we have come to feel beyond any doubt that there is an urgent demand for two large parties. The new party was to provide the people with a choice that they were not able to enj oy during the years of the Katsura-Seiyiikai ententes. Yet whether the Doshikai would survive very long was a question that occasioned some doubt in 1 9 1 3 . The party had been organized in less than two weeks' time and commanded a mere go-odd members in the House of Representatives. There was tension between the ex-officials who were new to the party activity and the former Kokuminto leaders who had devoted their lives to it, and rivalry among the ex-officials as well. At first, all that seemed to hold the party together was their common allegiance to Katsura, without whose abrupt and final decision to organize his own Diet following, it might very well not have come into being. For this reason, there was much speculation that the new party would collapse when it became known in the summer and early fall of 1 9 1 3 that Katsura was suffering from a serious il lness, and indeed there was much debate among the leading members of the party over what course to pursue when Katsura finally succumbed to a fatal case of stomach cancer in October 1 9 1 3 . Events were to prove, however, that the centripetal forces that brought the party together-the long-standing frustration of the smaller parties in the Diet, the resentment against the power of the Seiyiikai, and the desire for office-were more important in keeping it together than the mere force of Katsura's personality. Its members realized that outside such a large party a politician was powerless to aid his constituency, put his convictions into effect, or achieve ministerial office. As one party official commented in July 1 9 1 3 , the anti-Seiyiikai merger had been pending for several years and would have come into being even if Katsura had not come to power. The new party, he said accurately if vaguely, was the result of a "natural trend within the country . " 38

49

Il l THE RIVALS : KATO KO M E I AND HARA K E I

Although the passing o f Katsura did not bring an end to the Doshikai,

it did mean a change in the leadership of the party. Katsura's successor was Kato Komei , a newcomer to Diet politics who had joined the new party in the spring of 1 9 1 3 after much hesitation. By coincidence, a few months later the Seiyukai acquired as its new president Hara Kei, who had been responsi­ ble for much of the Seiyukai's success since the Russo-Japanese War. The congruence of the two events signified the end of the so-called " Saionji-Kat­ sura era" in which power had passed back and forth between these two lieutenants of the oligarchs. The new rivals, Hara and Kato, who replaced them , were of a different generation . Too young to have fought in the struggles of the Restoration, they had served as subalterns in the campaign to build a new state in the Meij i era. Now they had come to the forefront of the politica:I world, confident, as Hara once told a friend, that they were the ones who would bear the burdens of the state in the future.1 The generation to which both Kato and Hara belonged was a short one, born between the mid- 1 84o 's and the early 1 86o's, but from it sprang most of the men who dominated the politics of Taisho Japan. It included not only

50

the new party leaders, but also ranking bureaucrats like Goto Shimpei and Den Kenj iro, and parliamentary heroes like Ozaki Yukio and lnukai Tsuyoshi . What was common t o all was their coming of age in a period of enormous social fluidity, when political success depended neither on the accident of birth as it had in Tokugawa Japan, nor on the impersonal recruitment of the university-civil service examination route as it did after the last two decades of the Meij i era. Indeed , the biographies of the men of the Kato-Hara generation have a Horatio Alger quality to them. They tell inspiring tales of young men, perhaps born of samurai stock but beset by youthful penury and uncertainty, who rise to positions of fame and fortune, propelled by an ambition to serve their country and a faith in the possibilities of "self-help." These biographies also reveal , however, that the success of this generation did not depend simply on personal character or ability, for many who possessed both doubtless went to their graves after leading lives of useful but unrecorded obscurity. Nearly all the men of this generation rose at first because of their access to Western knowledge. By choice or by chance, nearly all of them left their birthplaces in the provinces to go to the new capital at Tokyo, where oppor­ tunities abounded in the proliferation of private academies and government schools founded there, to study a foreign language, the key to the "new knowledge" (shinchishiki) , the ideas and technical know-how locked in Western books. Given the fact that many of them were sons of samurai, for whom both education and political office were a natural goal, it is not difficult to understand their fever to learn. As the demand for officials, business execu­ tives, and technical experts boomed in the mid-Meij i period, it was these young men with their Western training who were best equipped and qualified to fill the new posts. Yet success in reaching the very top depended on more. It depended on being noticed by the men who were already there, by the oligarchic genera­ tion, the men of r 868 who had gone on to dominate the world of Meij i as government ministers, as leaders of the early parties, or as business tycoons. Because the recruitment of political talent was not fully institutionalized until the r 8go's, personal connections and personal favoritism remained the factor that separated the moderately successful from the very successful. Without a powerful patron, the ambitious young man, even if armed with his "new knowledge, " could not aspire to the top posts in government. As a result, the Taisho generation of political leadership constituted not only a new

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national elite, unfettered b y loyalties t o their own local provinces a n d per­ sonally identified with the growth of a strong and enlightened central gov­ ernment, but also one selected by the oligarchic generation themselves. Although the new generation were indebted to the oligarchic generation for their rise in the world, by the early 1 900's many of them had become impatient of the continued interference of the oligarchs in politics. Those who had found their way into the favor of Yamagata, men like Oura and Den, were perhaps comfortable under the continued presence of the genro, but those who had chosen the path of party activity like Kato and Hara felt this impatience poignantly. Unlike their contemporaries who had joined the parties in the 1 88o's, however, both Hara and Kato had certain greater advantages in achieving the expulsion of the older generation from influence. They represented a new kind of hybrid, the official become party politician, usually not given to outspoken or even overt opposition to the oligarchs, but no less committed to this end than the party veterans. They were in a better position to do so, in part because of their influential connec­ tions in the official world, and in part because of their influential connections in the business world. Kato and Hara shared the common goal of wresting leadership of the country from the oligarchs, but they were political competitors as well. Their competition and the ways in which each conducted himself as a political leader were to influence the course of party history profoundly. The shaping of party policy, the selection of party tactics, the cohesiveness of the party, the ability of the party to achieve access to the cabinet, and even the ultimate achievement of party cabinets, all were affected by the character of the party leaders. Without understanding the background, political style, and person­ alities of these two men, it will be difficult to understand the nature of party rivalry in Taisho Japan. KAT O KO MEI : THE BUREAUCRAT AS PATRICIAN Although Kato Komei was the younger of the two men, it might be best to begin with a sketch of his career because in many ways it was more conventional than Hara's. Kato's rise in the world was made possible by the events that followed 1 868. The Meij i Restoration, the collapse of the old society, and the creation of a new state provided Kato with opportunities that he never would have enj oyed in Tokugawa Japan. Until he j oined the

52

Doshikai in 1 9 1 3 , he built his life around rising in the bureaucracy that had come into being in the 1 88o's. Very probably to the end of his life he was more comfortable in that milieu than in the rough-and-tumble world of party politics. Having spent half his life in the diplomatic service, he had no time to develop the conventional political virtues necessary to advance his party's fortunes. As a result, though a man of considerable intelligence and ability, he remained cold, blunt, and aloof, lacking the heartiness of his predecessor, Katsura, and the political astuteness of his rival , Hara. For a man who rose so high in the world, Kato's origins were relatively humble. He was born in 1 86o as Hattori Sokichi, son of a retainer of Owari han, a bakufu domain. His father was a minor functionary, a magistrate's clerk (daikan tedai) of relatively low samurai rank, but his family was better off than others of similar status, since the duties of the post, which included tax collection, were apparently lucrative.2 His mother came from the family of a Shinto priest, long settled and highly respected in its area. Kato, a second son, was separated from his parents early in life. At the age of eight, he went to live with his fat � er's parents, of whom he was a favorite grandson, in the castle town of Nagoya, where opportunities for schooling were better than in his birthplace. A few years later, at the age of thirteen, he was adopted by Kato Buhei, a distant relative of somewhat higher status, but he spent little of his life with his step-parents, who died soon after his adoption. In any case he was a product of that strata of pre-Meij i society where samurai shaded slowly into commoner, a strata that was accustomed to the deference of the mass of the peasantry but that did not participate in the direction of domain affairs. Coming of age at the dawn of the Meij i era, Kato, like many of his contemporaries, was anxious to make the best of the new opportunities it offered . Since he was a second son and since his ties to his natural family were weak, it was not surprising for him to seek broader opportunities than his birthplace provided . Fortunately, he was a bright boy. Though big and clumsy in build and so slow at most games that his friends called him " the ox," his mind was quick and retentive. At the terakoya and later at the han academy, he excelled at the traditional schooling in Chinese learning, but he soon yearned to study the subjects necessary for success in the new society. In 1 87 2 he began his pursuit of the "new knowledge" at a school for Western studies in Nagoya. His favorite subject was English, and indeed he outstripped his teacher in its mastery. Finding the instruction inadequate, there grew in

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h i m , a s there d i d in most ambitious boys of h i s generation, a desire t o go to Tokyo, the new capital, where opportunities both for an education and for a career were far greater than in Nagoya. His real father had little interest in sending him to school there, but Kato's uncle, who saw the boy had talent, finally persuaded him otherwise. In 1 8 7 3 , barely turned thirteen, Kato set off to the city to seek his fortune. The expectations of his uncle were not betrayed, for Kato, a dogged and enthusiastic student, soon proved his mettle. He found himself on the educa­ tional escalator that the government had created to recruit talent. Shortly after arriving in Tokyo, he passed the entrance examination for the govern­ ment-run Tokyo Foreign Language School (later to become the University Preparatory School or Daigaku Yobimon) , and upon successful graduation there, he entered the Tokyo Kaisei Gakko, which was soon incorporated into the newly established Tokyo University. In 1 87 7 , he became a first-year student in the law faculty of the university, where he studied English law and graduated at the head of the class in 1 88 1 . Not only was he a beneficiary of the government's attempt to create a new class of national leaders, but he was one of its most promising members.3 As we shall see, his path so far had been far smoother than that of his contemporary, Hara. Upon graduation, however, Kato took an unconventional step, ironically one that was to be the making of his fortune. Instead of taking a government post, as most university graduates did, and indeed as most of them had been trained to do, he decided to enter business in the employ of the Yubin Kisen Mitsubishi Kaisha, then the leading private shipping firm in Japan and the nucleus of the Mitsubishi interests. Though his motives are somewhat obscure, his choice of a business career proved to be a profitable one. He soon attracted the attention of Iwasaki Yataro and his rise in the company was swift. At Iwasaki's expense, he was sent to England where he improved his mastery of English and acquired a considerable admiration for the people and society of the country.4 On his return after Iwasaki's death in 1 885 he was put to work on the merger of the Mitsubishi Company with a government-operated shipping concern. The following year, as the choice of Iwasaki's mother and brother, he became the groom of Iwasaki's eldest daughter, Haruj i . He had surely made a wise choice on graduation. His wife's dowry was later said to amount to ¥3 ,ooo ,ooo , which bore a yearly interest of ¥ 1 5o,ooo.5 In 1 886 Kato embarked on the official career that might have been ex­ pected of him six years before. His horizons had been broadened by his trip

54

abroad, and he was feeling confined in the new Mitsubishi Shipping Com­ pany, where success both within and without the company depended in­ creasingly on currying favor with others.6 His ascent in the official world was to be j ust as swift as it had been in business. His assets now included his personal ability as well as good connections, not the least of which were his in-laws. His main ambition was to carve a name for himself as a diplomat. His English was good and his travel abroad had probably whetted his appetite for the work. Largely through the intervention of Mutsu Munemitsu, for whom he had served as interpreter and translator in England, he entered the Foreign Ministry.7 When Okuma, who was closely connected with Iwasaki and the Mitsubishi interests, became foreign minister, Kato served as his private secretary, acting as interpreter and helping with plans for treaty revision. But when O kuma resigned, Kato found himself without a job. After a brief period of inactivity, he entered the Finance Ministry, probably through the introduction of Iwasaki Yanosuke. He held several posts at the bureau chief level, but he returned to the Foreign Ministry once more in 1 894 when Mutsu Munemitsu became foreign minister under the Ito cabinet. In November of that year, his assets paid a rich dividend . In part because of his official experience and his mastery of English, but probably more because he could afford to foot the entertainment bills, he was appointed minister to England . He was only thirty-five years old. The clerk's son had come a long way. In 1 900 Kato found himself-at a new fork in the road, in some ways similar to the one Hamaguchi was to face a decade or so later. He could choose between continued service as a neutral, nonpartisan bureaucrat, or he could enter the new party that Ito was planning to organize. Through his connection with Mutsu and his service as minister to England, he had won Ito's attention and good will, and in the summer of 1 900 Ito invited him to serve as foreign minister in his next cabinet. A few months later, in August, Inoue Kaoru, Ito's chief agent in organizing the Seiyukai, invited Kato to join the new party and to serve on its organizing committee. Kato declined to do either, j ust as he had declined previous invitations to join the Shimpoto, but he did say that once he was appointed foreign minister under Ito he would join the party if necessary. His reasons for not j oining reflected in part a distaste for party activities and in part a desire to continue his as yet unimpeded success as a diplomatic

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official. H e felt h e h a d neither the connections n o r the complaisance that a party politician required . He had no kobun (political proteges) as did the former Jiyuto men who entered the party and consequently his leverage within the party would be weak. Further, were he to enter the new party, he would have to give up his bureaucratic post, run for the Diet, and cultivate as many political allies and clients as possible but, he wrote in his diary, he did "not intend to rise by such means. " Finally, he seems to have felt that diplomats should remain aloof from the parties in order to maintain the independence and continuity of foreign policy.8 But what need was there for him to launch upon the uncertainties of the new party, the rough-and­ tumble fray for votes and connections, when he was so well established in Ito's good graces and virtually assured of a position as Ito's foreign policy adviser now that Mutsu was dead? None at all. Although for the next few years Kato remained aloof from direct membership in the Seiyukai, he was counted as a protege of Ito and maintained a friendly neutrality toward his party.9 In 1 90 2 Kato had his first taste of life as a politician dependent on the polls rather than on a powerful patron. The experience, which he met reluctantly, left him so disappointed with all the intrigues and hardships involved in running for office that he never again stood as a candidate for the Diet. As former foreign minister with the reputation for being one of the chief architects of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, Kato received invitations from over ten constituencies to become a candidate in the 1 90 2 election. He refused all of them because he disliked the corruption and jobbery involved in an election campaign and because he did not relish the irksome task of canvassing the voters. Despite his refusal to invitations from two factions in Kochi prefecture, he was elected to a Diet seat from that prefecture, and finally accepted the office with reluctance. During the general election the following year, he once more refused to serve as a candidate from either Kochi, or his home province of Aichi. But in January 1 903 Ito asked him to stand as a compromise neutral candidate in Yokohama. He did so, but he lacked skill as a campaigner and found himself the object of the invective eloque.nce of his opponent, Shimada Saburo. He lost in the polling but got a seat in the Diet anyway when one of the successful candidates accepted a seat in another constituency. He was bitterly disappointed by his failure in the Yokohama election, and in 1 904 he remained firm in his refusals to stand for the Diet, tired of the frustrations of elective office.

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As a member of the Diet, Kato maintained independence from any party, but he acted as a friendly neutral toward Ito and the Seiyukai. In 1 90 2 he told Hara he would vote with the Seiyukai on routine matters but that he felt he had to follow his conscience when questions of principle were involved. His sympathies lay with the parties rather than the hambatsu. He worked for a rapproachement of the minto factions against the Katsura government. It was partly through his efforts that Ito met with Okuma in late 1 90 2 to arrange a cooperative opposition ' against Katsura in the q th Diet, that negotiations were held between the Seiyukai and the Kenseihonto to minimize competition in the 1 903 election, and that the alliance between Ito and O kuma was renewed in December 1 903 . His motives in encouraging this cooperation , may have reflected personal loyalty to his two patrons as well as a hope that he might become foreign minister in a joint O kuma-lto cabinet, but he also must have been prompted by personal and political antagonism toward the hambatsu. By 1 904 the bright young man, now in his mid-forties, faced a temporary eclipse. His most recent essay at the polls had left him leery of further attempts in that direction. His mentors had been removed from the center of politics, Ito by his promotion to the Privy Council, Okuma by his increasing isolation from the genro and impotence as a party leader. Because he was cut off from any party connection, he sought a new means to advance his political career by purchasing a newspaper, the Tokyo Nichi Nichz; with money borrowed from his brother-in-law, Iwasaki Yaroku, and from the Mistubishi banking executive, Toyokawa Ryohei. He hoped to use the paper as a platform for his views and as a means to gain in public support what he lacked in political proteges. It was not a successful enterprise. Kato with his great admiration for things English , an admiration that battened on his service as minister there, made the paper a dreary model of the London Times. It printed no photographs of unmarried women and refused to carry adver­ tisements of books and medicines of a dubious nature. It was to be a j ournal aimed at the educated classes, bristling with information and news, eschewing shoddy sensationalism . At the time of its purchase the paper had had a circulation of about 45 ,000 , which rose during the Russo-Japanese War to 6o ,ooo . But then it faltered, and reached a low of 2 3 ,000 in 1 90 7 . Kato , whose eye for typographical errors was as strong as his business acumen was weak, initially took such a meticulous interest in the daily editorial work that his subordinates called him the "nitpicking boss" (urusai shachO) , but he lost

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interest a s the paper's fortunes floundered. He turned direct supervision o f editorial affairs over t o other hands and eventually sold the paper in 1 908. Far from making kobun or creating public support, it was as much a disap­ pointment as his unsuccessful venture at the polls had been. In 1 go6 he enjoyed his second brief term as foreign minister under the Saionj i cabinet. His entry into the new government was a natural consequence of his association with Ito and Hara and of his prior friendly neutrality toward the Seiyukai . But he soon resigned under complicated circumstances. The ostensible reason had nothing to do with his post as foreign minister. He resigned on the grounds of opposition to the proposed railroad nationalization program. At the time it was suggested he did so because the Mitsubishi interests, which had invested heavily in railway lines in Kyushu and else­ where, opposed the plan. He denied this at the time and later, and the reasons he gave for his opposition, well grounded in liberal laissez-faire ideas, were not unreasonable.10 But he may also have resigned because he found his responsibilities as foreign minister were to be circumscribed by the influence of the army and the genro, who in opposition to Kato's views wished to maintain occupation rights in Manchuria even after Japanese troops were withdrawn . His successor as foreign minister later suggested that this was his reason in resigning. In any case, whether he found himself unable to agree with the cabinet on domestic policy or on foreign policy, it was on a point of principle that he based his resignation. The form the resignation took reflected this. In the past, ministers of state customarily resigned on the grounds of health, but Kato stated his reasons in full, and according to one account, this pleased the emperor. 11 Ill health, political disappointments, isolation from his old friends in the Ito circle and the Seiyukai marked Kato's political isolation for the next two years. He was rescued from it by aid from an unexpected quarter. On the suggestion of the foreign minister, who was an old friend of Kato, Katsura appointed him as minister to England. This was something of a surprise, since Kato's relations with the premier had not always been good. Kato disliked Katsura not only because he was a staunch member of the hambatsu, but because Katsura had injured his not inconsiderable self-esteem in 1 902 by awarding him only an Order of the Sacred Jewel for his services as foreign minister under Ito, when Kato thought he deserved an Order of the Rising Sun, first class. As a Diet m ember he had tried to rally the parties into an alliance against Katsura and had voted with the Kenseihonto for a resolution

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to impeach Katsura, and as owner and chief editorialist of the Tokyo Nichi Nichi he made bitter attacks on the financial and foreign policy of the Katsura government. Had it not been for the foreign minister's intervention and Kato's suitability for the post, he might not have been appointed . A rapproachement between the two men, however, began in the fall of r g r r after the end of the second Katsura cabinet. It was due more to change in Katsura than in Kato. Despite the initial reluctance of both to meet with one another, Kato for reasons we have noted , and Katsura because he felt Kat6 to be too willful and uncooperative to be of use to him, they finally got together through the good offices of Yamamoto Gombei. The meeting proved unexpectedly cordial. Kato 's estimation of Katsura changed when he heard of Katsura's intention to resign from active military service and organize a political party. He also found Katsura's views on foreign policy to his liking. Whatever Katsura's reaction, he proposed to Kat6 that he become foreign minister when Katsura next formed a cabinet. Kat6 accepted , ready as ever to advance his career and his principles.12 When in December r g r 2 , Kat6 in London received a telegram from Katsura asking him to serve as foreign minister, he immediately departed for home. Arriving in the midst of the parliamentary crisis, but perhaps unaware of the instability of the government, he agreed to enter it. He did so, as usual, on conditions. He asked and received Katsura's assurance that the premier would back the foreign minister in any disagreements with the army ; otherwise, said Kat6 , he would be left in the same fix he had been in during the Saionj i cabinetP But Kat6, now assured of the free hand to conduct foreign policy as he pleased, was to serve for less than a month. In mid-February the government resigned and Kat6 found himself at a new turning in the path. Was he to choose bureaucratic neutrality as he had in r goo or was he now to commit himself to uncertain venture of Katsura's new party? Kato-did not enter the new party with the same alacrity as the other high level bureaucrats. As before, when he had faced a new step in his career, he acted with a sense of independence and a prudence that bordered on vacillation. Those who worked hardest to get Kat6 into the party were the members of the former "Tosa faction" of the Kokuminto, especially O ishi Masami and Sengoku Mitsugu, who enlisted the aid of Toyokawa Ryohei in their efforts. Their motives in urging him to j oin were varied . One reason, of course, was his connection with the Mitsubishi interests and his own

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personal wealth, both of which were considerable assets t o any party. But there were other sources of funds, other men of substantial means within the party-Sengoku, Goto Shimpei, Kataoka Naoharu, Machida Chuj i , Kodera Kenkichi , t o name b u t a few-and this alone could n o t have made him so overwhelmingly attractive.14 Equally important was his eligibility as potential premier. He enj oyed a considerably more favorable reputation than either Goto or O ura, and even than Hara. O ura was a suitable sergeant-major but too closely connected with the hambatsu to quiet misgivings of the former minto members in the Doshikai, and Goto, whatever he may have thought about the matter himself, was held to be too impulsive, too free with grandiose schemes, and too little inclined to follow his plans through to make a suitable head of the government. Kato was regarded as having a prudent and bal­ anced view of matters. An anonymous writer in Chua Karon commented : 15 Baron Kato appears always to work toward the long view of the general situation and to have in mind a long-range overall policy. This contrasts with Mr. Hara, who often moves with circumstances, and popularity among informed opinion must accrue to Baron Kato. Baron Kato [has] not yet announced his . . . policy and has not yet exercised leadership . . . but what he has to say will certainly be worth listening to. Finally, one can imagine that O ishi was anxious to have him as an ally within the party to counterbalance the influence of the Katsura-controlled bureaucrats and the old " loyalist party " elements. It was probably caution that kept Kato from joining the Doshikai at the outset. A man inclined to " test a stone bridge before crossing it," he wished to assure himself that the new party was not an organization hastily or haphazardly pulled together. It would hardly do to enter the party and then have it dissolve under him. He felt the party could be put on a firm basis only after three or four years' work and did not wish to join unless this were the general sentiment within the party. He may also have had misgivings about his ability to get along with other participants in the party, like O ura, whom . he contemptuously referred to as a "police politician" (keisatsu seijika) . 16 At the beginning of April, Kato formally joined the party at the invitation of Katsura but only after he, had agreed with Oishi on one condition-that the party "not resort to blind action and rash behavior in order to achieve

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power. " By this, his biographer suggests, Kato meant intrigue, bribery of Diet members, and the selling out of political views, practices that had so far been common in the tactics of the partiesP He also meant that the party should not rush headlong into an attack on the Yamamoto cabinet, with whose members Kato had ties of friendship and obligation. Kato must have had misgivings at first not only about men like Oura, but also about such well­ known hotspurs as Shimada Saburo and Kono Hironaka, who were known for their headlong attacks on goverments they opposed. If caution kept Kato from joining the party immediately, it was ambition and, to a lesser extent, idealism that pushed him into it. He had been champing at the bit for some years, especially after his resignation from the Saionj i cabinet, and was anxious to crown his career with some greater achievement.18 He now had no powerful mentor to assure him political advance. Joining the party was now not a hindrance to his advance, as it might have been had he j oined the Seiyukai in I goo , but rather offered the most promising alternative path upward. Indeed, he may have had some intimation that he was to become vice-president of the party and consequently Katsura's successor to the leadership.19 But it is also true that he had a great admiration for the British parliamentary system and regarded it as the ideal toward which the Japanese system should move. That he hesitated to commit himself to a party in 1 900 was in part out of a desire not to jeopardize his career as a diplomat and also because he realized the Japanese Diet and parties did not operate as regularly, as impeccably, as incorruptibly, and in as gentlemanly a fashion as the English Parliament and parties. His hesitation was not due to any intellectual or ideological rejection of the idea of party government. Once he had cautiously assessed the situation, he must have realized that joining the new party offered an excellent opportunity to wed his ambitions to his ideals. Kato's entry into the party had the effect of strengthening it. With the growing evidence of the seriousness of Katsura's illness, there was widespread uneasiness among the provincial members of the party about its future. In July, Goto Shimpei, one of the senior figures in the party, announced, "If any misfortune befalls Prince Katsura, the new party may collapse totally. Its life depends solely on its founder. " 20 By October he was ready to abandon the project completely. Never a strong believer in the necessity or desirability of party government, Goto saw the parties primarily as an instrument for managing the Diet and as a means of fostering the political education of

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the people, b u t with Katsura's death h e felt there was little point in continuing to build the party. In a document circulated to the other party leaders in October, Goto suggested there was little hope that the new party could overturn the absolute maj ority of the Seiyukai. It could expect to expand its powers substantially only if it could raise a large sum of capital­ according to one account, he suggested ¥I ,ooo,ooo-and only if it resorted to methods that were not ordinary or commonplace. (This was perhaps a veiled suggestion that it would be necessary to suborn the members of other parties to increase the new party's Diet strength.) Rather pessimistically he concluded that it would perhaps be best to dissolve the party and give up the venture.21 Kato opposed this view. He said it was impossible to raise the ¥ I ,ooo ,ooo ; furthermore, it had been Katsura's intention to build party strength slowly, without resorting to "unconstitutional intrigue ; " and finally it would not do to leave the party half-completed without finishing the work Katsura had begun. Oura, Kono, and Oishi backed Kato, and Goto an­ nounced his intention to leave the party .22 The departure of Goto left Kato as the principal candidate to assume the party presidency. Though at first he deferred to O ura, who was senior to him both in age and party experience, it was finally agreed that Kato should take over the presidency of the party and that O ura would undertake party business so as to leave Kato unburdened by such work.23 Since Kato also enj oyed the support of the former Kokuminto leaders, O ishi and Kono, his position seemed fairly secure at first. Because the new Doshikai president had not been given to making public announcements on domestic politics in the years before I 9 I 3 , as the Chilo Koran had suggested, his political convictions were an unknown quantity. Yet some of his views seem certain. First of all, it is clear that he firmly opposed the continuation of hambatsu rule and oligarchic interference in politics. His whole career from I 900 through I 9 I I substantiates this, and even his rap­ prochement with Katsura did not come until Katsura changed his views rather than Kato his. A great deal of this anti-hambatsu sentiment can be accounted for by his desire that the Foreign Ministry be given full inde­ penden �e in the determination of foreign policy. This desire had lain behind one of his conditions for entry into the first Saionj i cabinet-that all responses to foreign envoys should be made through the foreign minister himself-and it may have been one of his reasons for leaving it. He made it a condition of his entry into the third Katsura cabinet as well. In I 9 I 3

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he urged Katsura to bypass the genro in resolving the parliamentary crisis, and to this end, using an English precedent, he suggested direct negotiation between Katsura and Saionj i to call a political true. The stratagem failed but the motive behind it seems clear. In June 1 9 1 3 , on return from China, where a generation of young revolutionary leaders was emerging, he com­ mented that by contrast Japan was a country ruled by old men .24 He felt frustrated and constrained by the continuing power of the Meij i leadership, and his conduct as foreign minister under the O kuma ministry, as we shall see in the next chapter, was an attempt to break their hold over one area of national policy. It also seems certain that Kato genuinely favored the achievement of responsible party government and the regular alternation of power between two major parties. In later years, his critics were quick to point out that such a point of view would naturally appeal to the leader of a minority party . Doubtless his role as party leader reinforced this view, but there is good reason to suppose that he had come to his position much earlier. He was, first of all, an anglophile. "Next to a Japanese," he once said , " I would rather be an Englishman. " 25 In a series of interviews with the jiji Shimpo in 1 9 1 2 , he expressed views that showed great admiration for the English system of government and the high standards of politics there. He spoke highly of the orderliness and decorum of the House of Commons, where no violence, no interruptions, no heckling, and no outbursts of disorder upset the progress of debate. He praised what he called the "samurai-like attitude" ( bushiteki na taido) of English politicians. 26 In the summer of 1 9 1 3 , he gave a statement of his views on political parties to the Kokumin Shimbun: 27 Scholars have various opinions about the advantages and disadvan­ tages of parties, but political parties are something which has sprung up naturally with the progress of the world. Since the representative system has been established, it is inevitable that like-minded men band together in organized groups and that government be carried on by the opinion of the majority. Just as a monopoly is bad in anything, so too one party, when it monopolizes power for a long time, naturally stagnates and gives rise to abuses ; we must therefore aim at the advancement rifthe nation 's fortunes �y the confrontation of two parties and their mutual indefatigability and assiduity. [Italics are Kato's.] That is why I approve of Prince Katsura's new party and . . . I hope to contribute my small part [ to it] . . . In

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the present state of things, even though perhaps there may temporarily arise several parties, I hope as much as possible that, as in England, the opposition of two large parties and their mutual abrasion (si5gi5 no sessa) will contribute to the state. The rationale for the value of parliamentary government is implied if not stated-no one can have a monopoly on what is best for the state-but Kato for all his intellectuality was speaking as a practicing politician and not as a philosopher. He was further well aware that for purely practical, not just theoretical, reasons party government was becoming an inevitability. In a speech at the Teikokuza in Osaka in November r g r 3, he set forth the following views :28 The genro may have been important, and the bureaucracy once necessary, but now they belong to the history of the past, and the Emperor needs a new and more reliable organ of entrusting the national administration. In my opinion, nothing but a political party cabinet can meet the Imperial need and the whole nation recognizes it. Several years later, he described the motives behind the formation of the Seiyukai and the Doshikai as follows : 29 From the beginning of our constitutional government until the present time [ r g I 7 ] , the most distinguished men of politics . . . realized from the practical point of view it was not possible to carry on government without a political party as a base. In Prince Ito's Seiyukai and Prince Katsura's Doshikai everyone understood the meaning of this . . . it was not simple idealism. There was no legal or constitutional provision that the cabinet be organized by the head of a political party, but he felt this was the "true meaning of consitutional government" (kensei no hongi) and "a matter of course." Respon­ sible party government was for him a natural and practical form of govern­ ment, one that worked very well in England , and one that he hoped would work better in Japan than it had heretofore. Although he admired and respected party government in principle, as a goal to be worked toward, he was well aware of the need for improvement of the situation as it then existed in Japan. The whole problem was not simply a matter of establishing party government. There also had to be parties qualified to run a government. As we have already seen, he did not like to

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engage personally in the conniving and intriguing required by the practice of party politics in Japan. He furthermore believed that there were boundaries beyond which the parties should not go in order to achieve power. Perhaps more than any other party leader of his generation, and perhaps later ones, he had a notion of the necessity of responsible opposition. As he told the Doshikai members in January r g r 4 : 30 There is generally no question that a political party is necessary to seize political power; however, there is a [proper] procedure for attaining power. It is not at all . . . a [proper] procedure to attain power for the first time without the lapse of the proper time, effort, and study. Even though in opposition, not only have we many tasks to undertake, but we must also awaken to the fact that we have an extremely important responsibility. In England , they even honor the opposition with the name "His Majesty's Opposition." I earnestly hope for the patience and indus­ try of you gentlemen in remembering the significance of the opposition party is great and its role important. Kato tended to take a jaundiced view of those who had spent most of their careers in party politics. Such men, he seemed to feel, lacked both the knowledge necessary to run the government and a sense of devotion to the greater good of the nation. His speeches during his early years as party president constantly reiterate the need to reform and improve the quality of the men in the parties. His views in the matter were neither egalitarian, populistic, nor even democratic. The way to improve the parties was not to make them more popular or closer to the people but to attract the "better sort of people" in to politics. He put forth this view at a branch meeting of the Doshikai in Tokyo in r g r 6 . He expressed gratification that an increasing number of businessmen and academicians were taking part in the city's politics ; he welcomed the participation of middle class elements in politics ; their previous reluctance to do so was most regrettable. He continued :31 I am one of those who hope to strengthen the Doshikai with people of the upper classes. It is a matter for debate why men of integrity have not taken part in the parties up to now, but to put the matter simply, even though we may concede the sincerity of the people who were active in the parties [ previously] , as the number of people who made politics their livelihood increased , their spirit deteriorated and eventually col-

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lapsed ; they lost a l l sight of the national interest and placed a l l their emphasis on individual desire for profit . . . The reason that men of integrity do not associate with the parties is not their fault, but rather is the fault of the parties. This was but an extension of the remarks he had made at the inaugural meeting of the Doshikai in November 1 9 1 3 ; referring to the Seiyukai he said : 32 In our nation's politics there is a party [ the Seiyukai] which now controls the maj ority in the House of Representatives, [but] in spite of its splendid principles and platform, in its actual practice it ignores these and works industriously for only one section of the people or for the trifling advantage of one district and seems to have forgotten the true public interest of state and society . . . Consequently, . . . [ it] is not fit to be entrusted with the future affairs of state. Furthermore, even should they attempt to improve themselves, they will find this very difficult because of their past and the force of circumstances. Because of this we cannot but feel the need to gather together men of talent within the country, and based on the true opinion of the people, organize this new group. But although he staked his future on the development of the political parties, Kato remained a man molded by his pre-party experience. In per­ sonality and character he had all the earmarks of a bureaucrat, save a penchant for flattery and ingratiation . He was rigid and tenacious, haughty and blunt, direct rather than subtle, and fastidious to the point of punctilio about the "correctness" of his position. If there was any one quality about him that struck people, it was his arrogance. The brilliance of his success in the world seems to have transformed the perseverance and the sharpness of tongue of his youth into the aloofness, superciliousness, and sarcasm of his middle age. "He was an arrogant man," said Wakatsuki in later years, "who seemed to think there was no one as remarkable (erai) as himself. " 33 Why shouldn't he have? Minister to England at 35, foreign minister at 40, author of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and sought after as the lieutenant of Okuma, Ito, and Katsura, had he not cut through the crowd of his peers? At times he seemed con vinced he had done it all himself. "My present peerage and positi on," he told a young reporter in 1 9 2 3 , "are not things I have asked

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for. " 34 Modesty was not one of his political virtues, nor, as we shall see, did he have many others. His approach to politics was thoroughly rational and intellectual. "He regarded talent as the principal consideration in his use of people, and he treated politics in a businesslike fashion (jimuteki ni) . " 35 Proper channels had to be observed, responsibilities clearly defined, and policy decisions achieved by a careful balance of the pros and cons. He acted always on principle, or perhaps, on rules. If he thought himself correct on an issue, he would yield only when argued down on a strict point of logic or theory. Those who liked him, and many who did not, agreed that he was not a man to change his mind for personal reasons, whether out of friendship or pressure ; he would yield to reasoned argument but rarely to inftuence.36 This is not to say he never faltered or vacillated , for he did, but all too often his refusal to concede on a point, or at least to give the appearance of doing so, won him only antagonism. A crown of thorns on the head of his party, he fairly prickled with notions of what ought and ought not to be done, but often he lacked a sense of knowing how best to go about it. Because of his arrogance and intellectuality, he lacked the qualities which capture the popular imagination. He was "aristocratic" (kizokuteki) and "smelled like a bureaucrat" (kanryo kusai) . More at home behind a desk than behind a podium, he was never a great success as a public speaker. His train of thought was lucid and deliberate, occasionally peppered with heavy­ handed sarcasm,37 but the delivery was sometimes difficult to understand and lacked exhortatory fire. Direct rather than eloquent, it is doubtful whether he really ever moved anyone.38 Indeed, he frequently said his speeches were not intended for the japanese at all, but for the English and Americans, whom he wanted to show how the opposition party felt about policy, especially about foreign affairs, and how the opposition differed from the government party in posture toward the powers.39 His ineptness as a political campaigner sometimes reached apocryphal proportions. Once, according to a later story, at the end of a long speech made in support of one of his party's candidates, he astonished the audience and horrified the candidate by recom mending they vote for the man put up by the opposition-he had forgotten the name of his own party's candidate and spoke the first name that came to mind.40 He seemed oblivious to the idea that popular support was either necessary or useful, whether inside or outside his party. He disliked newspaper reporters and rarely granted interviews to them ; it took time away from his work, he

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said, and it was tedious t o repeat the same thing over and over again. He was equally aloof to the lesser lights in his own party, whom he refused to see without an appointment or a letter of introduction.41 According to Konoe Fumimaro, who respected Kato very much , he did not let party loyalty color his judgments of men-"He spoke extremely well of a good man even though he were in the Seiyukai, and he roundly disparaged persons for whom he had no admiration even if they were Kenseikai men . " 42 In this he differed completely from Hara, whose view of politics was more narrowly shaped by his intense involvement in his own party. HARA KEI : THE BUREAUCRAT AS POLITICIAN In contrast to Kato , whose career was marked by humble beginnings over­ come by brilliant early successes, Hara's youth was far more erratic and filled with uncertainty. Ironically, this was partly because his social origins were more distinguished than those of Kato and because he stood more to lose by the passing of the old society. No less ambitious than Kato, and certainly no less reluctant to seek an official career, he did not follow the same orderly road to get there. Although Kato owed his rise in the world to the Meij i revolution, Hara succeeded i n spite of the fact that the old order had been destroyed . If Kato had carefully mounted a staircase, Hara had to clamber up a greasy pole. Perhaps as a result, he proved to be a far more assured, far more open, and far more skillful political leader than Kato, for whom everything had been easy but learning how to win friends and influence people. Hara sprang not from the lower strata of the 'samurai class, but from its upper reaches. His father was the adopted son of a karo (han elder) of Morioka han, a tozama domain in the northwest of Japan, and his mother came from a samurai family which received a stipend of 300 koku of rice. AI though Hara's father was more interested in study than in han politics, he nonetheless belonged to the small group of upper samurai who dominated the adminis­ tration of the domain and formed its social pinnacle. Hara Kentaro, later to change his first name to Kei , was born the second son, the middle child of seven. Ironically, he was a "child of a calamitous year" (yakudoshi no ko) , since it was said to be unlucky for a child to be born in his father's forty-fourth year. In his early childhood , h9wever, there was little to suggest either future calamity or future prominence. In every respect he seems to have been

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completely normal. Tall for his age, bashful, fond of teasing and extraordin­ arily healthy, he was a handsome but retiring boy, who made few friends and showed little inclination to take part in the mock battles of his playmates. In his studies his memory was good, but he showed no talent for calligraphy at the terakoya and left no strong impression on his teachers.43 Although it is difficult to imagine he would have cut a striking figure in the world, there is little doubt that his future would have been secure and comfortable had it not been for the unexpected collapse of the Edo bakufu in 1 867-68. The Meij i Restoration disturbed the tranquility of Hara's early life, not only because it meant the collapse of the political and social order on which his family's fortunes rested , but also because Morioka-han was one of the few domains that rallied to the defense of the bakufu after sovereignty had been restored to the emperor. It was branded an "imperial enemy" and its defeat in the short civil war of 1 868 resulted in disgrace for the mem bers of the han and its leadership. The accidents of his birthplace therefore marked Hara from the beginning of the Meij i period as an outsider, but more important it imbued him with a youthful antipathy for the Meij i leadership. Though his family received a government stipend, it was much reduced when compared to the family's previous income. Moreover, the atmosphere in which Hara came to adolescence was charged with resentment against the new government at Tokyo, dominated by the leaders from Satsuma and Choshu and dedicated to the destruction of the ancien regime. At the han academy, which Hara entered sometime between 1 868 and 1 8 7 0 , one of h i s teachers, later a member of the Kaishinto, delighted in harangu ing against the leaders at the new capital and advocated the carrying out of a genuine imperial restoration by the men of the northwest. The old han loyalties were slow to die. Fortunately for Hara, the former daimyo of Morioka, though he had moved his residence to Tokyo , decided to establish a school there to assist the former members of his han to rise in the new world of Meij i Japan . Two Englishmen and a graduate o f Keio Academy were hired to instruct the students in English, the language that offered a key to the "new knowledge" from the West. The sixteen year old Hara was one of those fortunate enough to be selected to enter the new school , and in 1 8 7 2 , a year before Kato made a similar journey, Hara sailed south for Tokyo.44 Unlike Kato, however, he was not to find his fortune there so readily. Although Hara arrived in Tokyo fully determined to suffer whatever hardships lay ahead of him, a family mishap placed a considerable stumbling

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block in h i s path toward success. Because Hara's father died in 1 85 6 , his mother had had to make certain sacrifices to finance her son's education. She mortgaged the family home and moved into one room with the younger children . A robbery at home put his family in more serious financial diffi­ culties, and rather than continue to accept money from his mother to pay his fees at the daimyo's school in Tokyo, Hara decided to strike out on his own. It was not an easy task because he had no resources other than a determination not to fail. Unlike Kato, who at first received money from his family and later a scholarship from the government, his path was therefore rather erratic. Like many of the young ex-samurai in the early 1 87 o 's, he found that the Christian missionaries offered an open and easy road to education and success. In 1 87 2 , he entered a theological school opened by a French Catholic priest at Tokyo. He was eventually baptized as a Christian with the name of David Hara in 1 87 3 , shortly after the proscriptions of the religion were lifted , but his motives for choosing the school were probably less spiritual than practical. The school provided not only free instruction, but also free room and board, an ideal haven for a young man without funds or friends of influence. It is hard to assess what intellectual or psychological impact his experience there had on his later life, but it is reported that he continued to attack the new government and lament the passing of the Tokugawa. More important, however, he did acquire a knowledge of French, an asset that was to stand him in good stead. By the mid- 1 8 7o's, the government had organized a large number of technical and professional schools in Tokyo to train an educated elite to maintain the new state. Because most of them provided stipends for students during their years of study, Hara finally decided to leave service with his missionary teachers and enter one of them . He failed to qualify in the examinations for the school set up by the Foreign Ministry and failed to enter the new Naval Training School at Tsukij i , but he was markedly suc­ cessful on the examinations given by the Ministry of Justice's new School of Law in 1 87 6 . The curriculum of the school was to be centered on the study of French law, and Hara with his knowledge of the language managed to place second among 1 ,ooo applicants. The impressions he made on his classmates at the government school give intimations of the. man Hara was later to become. In contrast to the prevailing style of early Meij i students (including Kato) , who prided themselves on roughness and indifference to outward appearances, Hara was well-behaved,

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neatly dressed, and decorous in attitude. Older than most of his fellows because of his late start, he seemed at times like an elderly man. But he was also stubborn and fond of argument, given to stating his views quietly but refusing to budge from them . It was this latter characteristic that got him into difficulty in r 8 7g, when he became involved in a dispute with the head of the school , a former Satsuma man, who expelled four students over a protest about the quantity and quality of the school's food. Along with several other students, with whom he formed a " League of the North," Hara personally petitioned the minister of j ustice for a redress of the principal's action and indeed succeeded in persuading him to admonish the principal to act more moderately in dealing with the students. The triumph was short-lived . The principal had his revenge by later ordering sixteen of the students, including Hara, to leave the school. It was a serious blow, because Hara was now twenty-four years old, without a profession, and without a diploma.45 Perhaps had Hara finished law school, he might finally have entered the bureaucracy and worked his way up as many of his classmates were to do, but instead, lacking connections for entry into the official or business worlds, he turned to the one remaining route upward for an ambitious young man. In r 87g, through the good offices of a friend from the days of his study at the han school in Morioka, he began work as a reporter for the Yubin Hochi Shimbun, his main duties being the translation of articles from a French newspaper in Yokohama. Within a year or so, however, his prose began to appear on the editorial pages, and from these writings we have some inkling of the views he was to carry with him for most of his life. Two things strike the reader of these early editorial writings. First of all , Hara was very much interested in the debate over the establishment of a constitutional regime that was raging over the country at the time, and he also had very definite views on the subject. Characteristically, he chose a moderate position, somewhere between the young radical theorists attracted to Itagaki's camp and the arch-conservatives in the Meij i government. He felt a constitutional regime was not only inevitable but necessary for Japan. To those who held that a constitution would infringe the kokutai and threaten the traditional institutions of the country, he answered that extending "liberty and popular rights" was a means of supporting the imperial institution. As he wrote in implicit criticism of obscurantist opponents of constitutional government: 46 The so-called " loyalist retainers" (kinno no shi) know only the loyalty

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of defending the Imperial House ; they do n o t know that defending it lies in the ideas of liberty and popular rights (jiyuminken) . I think that so-called "loyalty" will not suffice to defend the Imperial House if there is absolutely no liberty or popular rights . . . You so-called " loyalist retainers " ! If you earnestly desire to defend the Imperial House, take up our views on liberty and popular rights. Hara accepted the view that a distinction had to be made between the kokutai ( the national polity) , which was enduring and unchangeable, and the seitai (the political structure), which could be changed with the times. Extend­ ing to the people the right of participating in the political process would involve only a change in the seitai and would not involve a change in the kokutai. Very probably what he had in mind was a political system which would strike a balance between the powers of the emperor and the rights of the people, a kind of constitutional monarchy that would compromise the needs of both the people and the throne, avoiding the perils of despotic or autocratic rule and promoting the internal harmony so necessary to build a strong Japanese nation.47 In sum, his views were probably not so very different from those of the moderate members of the Meij i government, or at least closer to theirs than to those even of the Okuma camp. Despite his early resentment of the Meij i government, it is clear from his Hochi editorials that he had not been driven to radical opposition to the new regime. At the same time, however, it is equally clear that he did not feel the new regime was above reproach . He criticized in moderate and balanced tone many policies of the Meij i leaders-the repression of the government opposition, the tendency to cast aside all the institutions or' the old society in the name of "progress," and the overcentralization of government power. But perhaps most interesting for its later implications was his view of the role that the men of I 868 had played. Comparing them to the men who had carried out the French Revolution (as Kita lkki was later to do) , he suggested that their role had been largely destructive. They had succeeded in destroying the old status quo, but they lacked the knowledge and experience necessary to construct a new society . In highly veiled terms, he suggested that the men of the Restoration should step aside to allow those with the necessary skill and knowledge to build new laws and institutions to come to the fore to complete the transformation of Japan. It was an appeal that was to character­ ize the rest of his life, in deed : if not in word.48 The political crisis of I 88 I m:uked as much a turning paint in the life

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of Hara as it did in the political history of the country, for it ultimately led to his entry into the official world, an ambition he had evidently harbored since his entry into the government's law school . The crisis brought about a change in the management of the Hochi Shimbun, which was bought by Okuma Shigenobu shortly after his resignation from the government. With Okuma came his braintrust, including the young graduates of Keio like Ozaki Yukio, lnukai Tsuyoshi, and Minoura Katsundo, all of whom took over top positions on the staff of the newspaper. Within a month of the change in management, Hara, who had remained on the lower staff, offered his resig­ nation on the grounds of health. The real reason, however, was his feeling that the principles of the new men on the paper "veered toward radicalism" and that their views did not accord with his own. But equally important, the decision of the government to promulgate a constitution and to establish a national assembly impressed Hara very much, for in effect it meant the adoption of the kind of reforms Hara had been calling for as an editorialist in the Hochi. The task before the people and the officials was to work together in order to put the new political system into practice. Shortly after resigning from the Hochi, Hara therefore took the job of chief editor of the Taito Nippo, an organ of the pro-government Teiseito, which had been organized with the backing of lto Hirobumi, Inoue Kaoru, and Yamada Akitoshi . He felt that he could continue to make his own views known and that on the whole his views accorded with the goals of the paper.49 Hara's new job afforded him what he lacked before, the all-important access to the leading officials of the Meij i government without whose patronage he could not hope for official preferment. He had already made the acquain­ tance of Nakai Hiroshi, a middling-rank bureaucrat, who was said to be Satsuma by birth but Tosa in thought. Partly through Nakai and partly through a chance meeting, Hara came to the notice of Inoue Kaoru, then minister of foreign affairs. When the Taito Nippo stopped for lack of funds in 1 882 , Inoue offered him a post in the Foreign Ministry, which Hara decided to accept. It was a decisive step, for Hara, who only a few years before had been an ambitious but penniless victim of the Restoration settlement, now became the protege of one of the leading oligarchs. In 1 88 3 , he cemented his relation with the government elite by marrying the daughter of Inoue's wife by a previous marriage to Nakai, a personal relationship as advantageous as it was complex . For the next eight years, Hara moved steadily up the bureaucratic ladder, serving as consul at Tientsin (where he met Ito during his negotiations with

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L i Hung-chang), a s secretary t o the Japanese legation in Paris, a s private secretary to Inoue, and eventually as councillor (sanjikan) in the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce under Inoue. Hara's decision to become an official and to accept the patronage of Inoue was a natural one for a young man of his talents and background, but it did not imply an enthusiastic allegiance to the Meij i oligarchy nor an indifference to the budding liberalism of mid-Meij i . It reflected a determination to succeed in politics in spite of his background as an outsider and in spite of the continued Satcho domination of government. Characteristically, rather than struggle with the hambatsu head on, he had chosen to use hambatsu patronage as a stepping-stone toward his own future. Although Hara never seems to have felt uncomfortable as a kobun of Inoue, the relationship between the two men was never intimate. It is significant that he found a patron much more congenial to his temperament in Mutsu Munemitsu , who became his superior as minister of agriculture and commerce in r 8go . The two men, Hara and Mutsu, were separated by twelve years of age, but they shared pasts that had much in common. Both were outsiders in a government that was dominated by the men of Satsuma and Choshu . Just as Hara came from a han that supported the bakuju in its last days, so Mutsu was a former samurai of the Kii han, one of the shimpan domains. In the immediate post-Restoration period, Mutsu had been active in the move­ ment to overthrow the new government. He had been j ailed in r 87 7 for participating in a conspiracy with the militant wing of the Risshisha, who had wanted to use the occasion of the Satsuma Rebellion to rise against the Tokyo government. The failure of the plot had convinced Mutsu that the hambatsu were firmly established and that, since' it would be impossible to overthrow them from without, it would be far better to influence them from within. His attitude toward the men in power was therefore similar to Hara's -a recognition of the need to cooperate with the hambatsu in the short run to reduce their influence in the long run . It is not surprising to find that from r 8go on, Hara linked his fortunes with those of Mutsu. When Mutsu resigned as minister of commerce and agriculture in r 8g 2 , Hara resigned as well. A few months later, when Mutsu became foreign minister, Hara followed him back into government, eventu ally rising to the post of vice-minister in r 895 and minister to Korea in r 8g6. As other young men had attached themselves to Ito, Yamagata, or O kuma, so Hara had found a suitable mentor in , Mutsu.50

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By the late r 8go's, Hara had reached an official position not so very different from that of his acquaintance, Kato Komei, yet there was an important difference between the two men. Hara was less enamored of life as an official than Kato and more interested in plunging into the world of party politics. Even though a bureaucrat, he had not kept himself ignorant of the struggles that wracked the Diet in the r 8go's. Indeed, during the first Diet, Hara had been at Mutsu's side on the government dais, fetching copies of the official transcript of debate and writing drafts of government replies to interpolations. According to his later account, he had originally hoped that the government would behave in a proper "constitutional " fashion after the opening of the Diet, announcing its policies and programs, and organizing party support in the Diet to put them into effect. But the early years of constitutional government disappointed him. The government failed to create a body of "king's men" in the House of Representatives, and they seemed to regard the men in the "people's parties" as "public enemies" (kokuzoku) . When the power of the Home Ministry was used to crush the opposition in the election of I 8g 2 , Hara was much opposed to these strong­ arm tactics and agreed with the policy of Mutsu who ordered the officials of the Ministry of Commerce and Agriculture to maintain complete neutrality toward the candidates up for election. At the same time, it must be noted, Hara held no particular brief for the minto either. Rather than attack the cabinet on substantive issues, they seemed to strike out blindly and irrespon­ sibly, purging themselves of the accumulated grudges and resentments of the I 88o's by opposing simply for the sake of opposition. As Hara wrote in I 89 7 , "The parties attacked anything o f the government's simply because i t was the government's, without consideration for what was good or bad, or for what was advantageous and disadvantageous to the state . " 51 His attitude toward the struggle between the transcendental cabinets and the parties was "a plague on both your houses," since the rivalry between them seemed to hinder the development of the Diet as an effective instrument for formulating national policy. Hara had a chance to make his views known when he resigned from official life in I 89 7 , a year after Mutsu had left government service for reasons of health . He briefly entertained the idea of becoming a Diet member from Morioka City, but no invitation was forthcoming from the Jiyuto, which controlled the city politically. Instead he became editor of the Osaka Mainichz� a position which enabled him to comment extensively on the politics of the

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day, especially o n the problem of party-cabinet relations. His position was essentially neutral, siding neither with the hambatsu, nor with either of the maj or parties. Rather he counseled the need for adopting the kind of "politics of compromise," which he later tried to put into effect as leader of the Seiyukai.5 2 Hara's outlook on the question, typical of his approach to all problems, was based on pragmatic considerations, by a canny appraisal of what was possible, without much concern for what was logically, theoretically, or ideally desirable. First of all, he does not seem to have felt that the political parties were theoretically necessary to achieve the "perfection of constitutional government." Ideally, he pointed out, "it would be much more splendid to be able to perfect constitutional government without political parties than to perfect it with them . " But circumstances dictated otherwise. Political parties had arisen in Japan as they had in other countries, and there was no question that somehow they had to be accommodated in the poli tical process. Writing m 1 8g8 , he commented as follows : 53 In reality, the political parties of today are not like the imposing parties that we can see so well in Europe and America ; by comparison, they have still not been able to break out of the first stages [of development] ; however, it is clear that today we have reached the point where one can not disregard the political parties and still hope to carry on politics . . . This is no longer the time to discuss whether political parties are necessary to constitutional government or not. What is required today is to make the political parties develop as much as possible as parties should and to make them bring about genuine party cabinets ; it is essential to be determined that party cabinets are inevitable in the near future. Whether party cabinets were permissible or not was a dead issue-from a practical point of view they would soon be a necessity. Similarly, he seems to have felt that the political parties should not engage in negative assults on the governments in power but should struggle with one another to secure "political power," by which he meant the power "to assist the emperor in matters of general importance and to take responsibility for the administra­ tion of government." By 1 8g8, therefore, Hara envisaged the emer­ , gence in the near political fu ture of "normal constitutional government,"

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in which the emperor reigned , the cabinets ruled , and the political parties struggled with one another for control of the cabinet.54 The question remained, however, as to j ust how this political future was to be brought into being. Hara does not seem to have felt that it could be achieved by leaving matters in the hands of the Kenseito or the Shimpoto, both of which showed marked signs of internal corruption, an inclination to strike compromises with oligarchic premiers for the sake of political advantage, a frequent deficiency of political common sense, and, most regret­ tably, a lack of vision of their national responsibilities. He seemed to feel that what was necessary was a " reform" of the existing parties, which would enable them to pursue their legitimate role in national politics. Not sur­ prisingly, therefore, Hara was not only willing and eager to participate in the formation of the Seiyukai in r goo, but he was also informally active in its organization and the gathering of both political and financial support for it. He did not share Kato's misgivings about entry into the new party because he was not so enamored of a career in the diplomatic service, nor was he particularly interested in remaining a newspaper editor. For Hara, the new party offered promise for his own career and for the political future of the country. It promised to remedy the deficiencies of the constitutional system of which he complained, the irresponsibility of the minto as well as the obstinacy of the Yamagata faction within the hambatsu. It was the logical way to reform the parties, and also a means of breaking the hambatsu monop­ oly on the government. Moreover, his conversations with Ito had led him to believe that a post would be open to him in the cabinet, and doubtless this also gave him a strong motive to join.55 Hara's decision to join the Seiyukai gave the last two decades of his career a consistency that his earlier life had lacked. No longer did he follow an erratic path, scrambling about for a new route upward and searching for a new patron. His lot was cast with the Seiyukai, and he was determined to build its powers in order to have it build his future for him. Hara's main advantages as a new party politician were his close ties with Ito and Inoue, both of whom had marked him as a man of promise, and his popularity in his home province of Morioka. By December r goo Hara was made a member of the party's board of directors, and he was chosen to replace Hoshi Toru as minister of commerce and a griculture when the latter resigned beca use of his involvement in a bribery scandal . The appointment to the cabinet was not merely a personal triumph. It

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was a victory for h i s native province. Hara was the first cabinet minister from the northeastern part of Japan. After the Ito cabinet resigned in June 1 90 1 , the normal course of action for Hara as a former minister of state would have been to seek imperial appointment to the House of Peers, but as a member of the Seiyukai and as a man determined to succeed as a party politician, Hara chose instead to run for a seat in the House of Representatives. The move was unusual. The only other persons ever to run for a Diet seat after serving in the cabinet were Mutsu Munemitsu, Hara's old patron, and Kat6 Komei, who became a Diet member in the elections of 1 90 2 . In contrast to Kat6, however, Hara was not elected in spite of himself, but actively sought and won a seat from his old home town , Morioka City, by a vote of 1 75 to 95· It was the beginning of Hara's " ironjiban, " since he had clearly become a local hero. In 1 903 only five votes were cast against him, in 1 904 only one, and in 1 908 none. 56 Despite his advantages, however, Hara did not enjoy as great a popularity with his party colleagues as he did with the founders of the Seiyukai or with his constituents. His entry into the party seemed opportunistic. Owing to a desire not to involve his newspaper in politics, Hara had not become a member of the organizing committee of the Seiyukai, and despite his informal efforts to get it going, he j oined it formally only after he had formally resigned from the Osaka Maim.chi. But more important, Hara was a newcomer to the world of party politics, lacking either the experience or reputation of such stalwarts of the jiyuminken movement as Masuda Hisamatsu and Haseba Junk6. Because of his associations with the Taito Nippo and his service with the government in the 1 89o 's when he had appeared on the government's benches, he was not fully trusted by the former party men "who joined the Seiyukai. He was no less an outsider in the party movement than he was in the hambatsu government. Moreover, his personality was still rather abrasive. Pugnacious­ ness and argumentativeness had characterized his relations even with Mutsu, though then it had been tempered by a warmth between the two men. When he spoke his mind, he spoke it freely, and when he made a remark it was not a proposal, but a conclusion or a decision.57 Were he to succeed as a party leader, he would have to make himself useful before he could make himself popular. In the long run, Hara's rise to the presidency of the Seiyukai depended primarily on his skills and astuteness as an organizer and administrator, who devoted his whole-hearted effo�t to building up party strength. He brought

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to his party work the skills of a former official. Where others abhorred the drudgery of party administration, Hara seemingly delighted in it, bringing to it a penchant for hard work and an attention to detail. He often remarked that he " liked politics better than his three meals a day . " 58 Hara's first job in the party had been as supervisor of the party's accounts, a post for which he was especially selected by Ito and Inoue who wanted an honest and reliable man, and he continued to exercise control of the party finances. So careful and precise was he in disbursing money that he wrote a voucher even when he parcelled out as little as ¥5 . Saionj i later com­ mented,59 " Hara was a man who liked money. He wasn't stingy and he knew how to spread it about well, but he liked to be close to money-counting and putting the notes neatly in packages, j ust as we enj oy books and paint­ ings." He also took an important step in securing funds for party work by becoming vice-president of the Furukawa Copper Company in 1 905 through the introduction of Okazaki Kunisuke. But money alone was not Hara's concern. He was also a tireless campaigner at election time. Because his own constituency was relatively secure, he spent much time giving speeches, attend­ ing rallies, and meeting politicians in the populace to garner support for the Seiyukai. As a result of his persistence and his diligence, by 1 905 or so Hara had become with Saionj i and Masuda Hisamatsu, one of the triumvirate who dominated the formulation of party policy. Saionj i as president was the nominal head of the party, and Masuda was the most popular among the party rank and file, but Hara was the work horse organizer and administrator who built the party's prerequisites of power and widened its power vis-a-vis Katsura and the hambatsu. There is no need to recapitulate Hara's tactics in expanding party power. What does bear comment is his maturation as a political leader, for in r g r 4 , when Hara finally became president o f the Seiyukai, h e had benefited from his experience in party politics in a way that Kato had not been able to. Hara's struggle to make himself the principal figure in his party and to make his party a key feature of the political landscape had left him much better equipped to operate in the context of Japanese party politics than the anglophile Kato, who neither struggled to create the party he led nor fought his way to its head. In their general attitudes toward the political situation in Japan, the two men were similar in view. Both opposed the continued domination of politics by the hambatsu, both looked forward to the establish­ ment of responsible party cabinets, and both hoped for support from the

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established a n d respectable elements in society. Yet in the realm o f tactics and personal leadership, they were worlds apart. Although argumentative and stubborn in his early days, Hara had gradu­ ally mellowed during the course of his rise in the Seiyukai.60 The abrasive bureaucrat gradually became the out-going oyabun, the political boss par excellence who worked to knit a skein of personal ties and friendships within the party he led . He made it a practice to have dinner with notable party members individually every month, not only to exchange views with them, but to test their capacities and learn their idiosyncracies. He also took great pains to establish a personal rapport with the party rank and file as well as its leaders. Whenever he received a meishi (calling card) from a visitor he had the habit of looking intently at the person's face, then back at the card , committing both to his memory. He had a prodigious capacity to recollect names and faces of his party's members and astonishingly detailed knowledge of their backgrounds, their views, and their local political strength and connections. 51 But equally important, he was magnanimous with them. Never aloof, he kept his door always open to visitors, no matter how inconsequential their position in the party. He was open-handed with money and used h is generosity to advantage in creating personal loyalty. Whenever a member came on the pretext of discussing political matters but really to get funds, Hara never left the petitioner unsatisfied . Commenting on Hara's generosity at election time, Ozaki Yukio once remarked, "If you asked for ¥ 1 0 ,ooo , he gave ¥ r s ,ooo ; if you asked for ¥2o,ooo , he gave ¥3o,ooo ; he usually gave more than he was asked for. " 62 At New Year's time as well, he always stayed at home ready to give handouts to party members ' who might find themselves hard pressed in settiing year-end accounts. As a result of his upward struggle within the party, Hara had learned to practice the art of political persuasion in a fashion that Kato never did. His speeches were no more exciting or inspiring than Kato's, but he had learned that in politics it was more important to win friends than to win arguments. Hara tried to maintain cordial relations with everyone whether he disliked an individual personally or disagreed with his political views. He knew that good will was an indispensable asset. Whenever a visitor left him, whether he had come on a trivial errand or whether he had exchanged heated words with the Seiyukai leader, Hara would always accompany his guest to the genkan to see him off with a par6ng cordiality. His office was filled with forged wall hangings and trashy objects d'art, gifts from people whose taste he may

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not have liked , but whom he did not wish to offend.63 He knew that he far outstripped his rival, Kato, in his ability to command personal allegiance. "Kato's attitude seems to be like Ito's," he once said referring to Kato's disdain for the party rank and file. "If he doesn't work hard and get hold of his party members one by one as individuals, it will do him no good . " 64 Hara's ability to persuade others lay not simply in his skillful handling of their feelings but in his willingness to temper his arguments to suit the individual and to tailor his policies to meet the circumstances. He was not inclined to press for measures he did not think likely to meet with success lest he invite needless hostility by championing a cause that was bound to fail. Where Kato was rigid in his policy views, Hara was flexible. Kato pointed out the contrast in later years himself when he told Hara's biographer of a conversation with Hara over the question of nationalizing the railways in 1 906. Hara, then home minister, came to persuade Kato to change his mind in opposing nationalization. His efforts appeared to be of no avail. Finally, playing his last card, he said to Kato, "Well, anyway, why not give it a try? If it doesn't work out well , why not correct it later? " Rather stiffly, Kato replied, "The difference between you and me is j ust that way of looking at things. " 65 In short, Kato had thought out his position logically and would not budge from it, whereas Hara, more flexible and pragmatic, was willing to adopt a policy that he might later have to abandon. Most ironically, in contrast to the arrogance of Kato , the humble clerk's son, Hara lacked aristocratic pretensions one might have expected of him. Although he tried to win honors as well as office for his party followers and indeed succeeded in having several Seiyiikai members made the first political party politicians ever appointed to the House of Peers, he refused titles for himself. He was so self-effacing in this respect that Yamagata often wondered rather suspiciously why Hara refused a peerage. Despite his origins in the upper samurai class, he was determ ined to retain his seat in the House of Representatives where he could stay in touch with his fellow party members. His style of life was also simple and frugal for a man in his position.66 He obviously never wanted for personal financial security or comfort in his later life, but his worldly possessions hardly compared with those of the husband of an Iwasaki heiress, and his modest, dark dwelling in Shiba was no match for Kato's rambling Western-style mansion in the fashionable Shimo -ichi­ bancho section of Tokyo. But in the largest sense, the main difference between the two men was that

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Hara h a d prepared himself much better for the environment of Japanese politics and fully accepted the demands it placed upon him. He was free with money and favors for his followers, taking little for himself; he was properly deferential to his elders, though willing to take advantage of them; he wanted to get things done, but knew he could not neglect his relations with other people in the process. By contrast, Kato remained in many ways alien both to Japan and to the Japanese style in party politics. He modelled himself not on the traditional oyabun, but on the example of patrician gentility he must have encountered among the Edwardian upper classes. He preferred the stance of the reserved, reliable, and aloof English gentleman, perhaps pure but somehow lacking warmth. Whatever personal satisfaction he may have derived from this stance, it was soon to become evident that he could have avoided a large measure of frustration had he profited from a decade in party politics as Hara had.

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D espite their many differences, Hara and Kato shared a common set of

problems as party leaders-how to reduce the influence of the genro in politics and how to establish party control over the cabinet. Such problems did not ad mit of an easy solution, for the aging survivors of the oligarchy were loath to rel inquish their hold over the state, which they had so painstakingly created. The old men had suffered something of an eclipse following the Russo-Japanese War when the transfer of power between premiers had been negotiated directly between Katsura and the Seiyukai. But in r g r 2 they once more had emerged as the men primarily responsible for the selection of the premier. The genro, on the whole, were still disinclined to entrust the reins of government to the leaders of political parties. Instead, their ideal remained that of"transcendental government," rule by men who stood apart from party connections and could carry out policies that served the interests of the nation as a whole and not just one part of it. They wanted to perpetuate the benevolent bureaucratic authoritarianism they had practiced during the early years of modernization.

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Of all the genro, the most influential and the one who clung most firmly to this ideal was Yamagata Aritomo. To the end of his life Yamagata possessed a consuming interest in politics and a voracious appetite for political manip­ ulation. "Transcendental government" very much suited his style in politics. Unlike Ito and Okuma whose expansive personalities and flamboyant tastes won them a general affection, Yamagata was never a popular man. With­ drawn and retiring in character, aesthetic and patrician in his personal tastes, he was overbearingly aristocratic in his political views and tactics. 1 Like most such men, he was a skilled master of the "court politics" that characterize bureaucracies. Rather than build political strength by attracting a popular following, Yamagata instead recruited a loyal group of followers upon whom he relied to follow his advice and suggestions even when he himself did not hold formal political office and whom he rewarded with high office, official decorations, and peerage appointments. With an extensive network of kobun in the House of Peers, the Privy Council and the Court, and in the army, he en­ joyed a personal power that was unrivalled by the other genro. He sat like a watchful spider in the midst of the web he had spun so carefully, sensitive to every twitch in the net, scurrying forth whenever the threat of a domestic or international crisis joggled a strand. But, for Yamagata, the most important strand of all was his link with the premiership. His intense attachment to the ideal of " transcendental government" was in large measure the consequence of his desire to have one of his proteges occupy this highest seat of office. Yet time and circumstance were working to loosen the hold of Yamagata and the other genro on politics, for " transcendental government" was be­ coming less and less effective. All the genro w�re old men in 1 9 1 4 , most of them in their seventies and constantly beset with the ills of old age. It was evident to all but the most obtusely loyal fol lower that in time human mortality would accomplish what the parties had sought for years-the end of genro influence. Yamagata had his personal following, but the genro had not been able to produce a set of political heirs able to assu me the same role in politics that they had. The strength of the oligarchic generation lay in their enormous prestige and extensive connections as makers of the Meij i state, but they were powerful as individuals not as an institution. The very personal nature of their power meant they could not bequeath it to their proteges. Unlike many nations that have modernized more recently, in Japan there was no orga11ized authoritarian elite to perpetuate the oli­ garchic techniques of rule.

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Furthermore, even those men who had enjoyed the patronage of the genro were more and more unwilling to undertake political leadership of the country, or at least to undertake it as spokesmen and executors of the genro's will. As has been already pointed out, Yamagata's most promising protege, Katsura, had begun to break away from his mentor's influence after the Russo-Japanese War, pursuing an independent course in policy formulation and also adopting political tactics, such as compromise with the Seiyukai and the formation of the Doshikai, that would have been anathema to Yamagata. At the same time, as became abundantly evident in the cabinet crises of 1 9 1 2 , 1 9 1 3 , and 1 9 1 4, there were few other men bold enough to lead the government. The discipline of the nonparty elites, which had been more or less maintained during the days of direct oligarchic rule, was beginning to crumble. In 1 9 1 2 , the independent action of the army had upset the formation of the Saionj i cabinet ; in 1 9 1 4 the failure of the House of Peers to pass the budget had brought down Yamamoto Gombei ; and the refusal of the navy to provide a minister in 1 9 1 4 kept Kiyoura Keigo out of office.2 But most important of all, no prospective candidate for the premiership could feel confident enough to serve as premier without party support in the House of Representatives. The premiership carried with it the burden of compro­ mising with the parties as well as with the nonparty elites. It was a post which only the foolhardy or those with a keen sense of political balance were likely to covet. The task of the party leaders was to take advantage of the natural attrition of genro influence in order to accelerate the advent of party cabinets. Because the tactics of " frontal assault" had long since been discarded as an effective technique for expanding party influence, success had to depend on other approaches. First of all, it was essential for the party leaders to win the favor and confidence of the "cabinet makers" with the aim of becoming the government party and placing party members in key ministerial posts. Much of the early success of the Seiyukai had been due to the fact that its first president, Ito, was himself a genro and that his successor, Saionj i , despite (or perhaps because of) his personal flaccidity and inertia, had been trusted and respected by Yamagata as well as by Ito. It was essential that the younger men, Hara and Kato, establish the same kind of relationship were the parties they led to enjoy a similar success. Ultimately, of course, winning the con­ fidence particularly of Yamagata meant playing the game of court politics; it meant currying favor, smoothing over potential sources of tension, avoiding

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offense to the genro, and winning their personal friendship. At the same time, it was also essential for the party leaders, when their party was established as a government party, to use this position to build ever larger Diet majorities. As the Seiyukai had already shown , it was difficult to dislodge a party if it could control the House of Representatives. Obviously, this task was relatively easy once a party had become involved in a cabinet because a pro-government party rarely lost an election. Elections did not determine party influence, they merely confirmed it. Unlike the United States and England where the transfer of power was institutionally linked to the electoral process, voting in Japan was totally plebiscitary in nature. As Hara had pointed out in 1 898, the cabinet was not organized because it had a majority in the Diet; rather, once it was organized it was able to create such a majority. With varying degrees of success, both the Seiyukai under Hara and the Doshikai under Kato followed these tactics in pursuit of their ultimate goals -the elimination of genro influence and the establishment of party cabinets. What resulted during the years between 1 9 1 4 and 1 9 1 8 was a period of covert party government. Although neither party leader served as premier, both Kato and Hara began to wield greater and greater influence on national policy. This new phase of party-cabinet symbiosis resembled both the party­ -cabinet alliances of the late 1 89o's and the accommodations reached subse­ quently between the Seiyukai and Katsura, but it was not without its element of novelty. The new element, of course, was the existence of a viable second party, the Doshikai ( later to become the Kenseikai), which could rival the Seiyukai in political influence, financial back ing, and Diet strength. Covert , party government was accompanied by the development of a covert two­ party sy�tem as well . As a result, the " politics of compromise" that had emerged in the early 1 9oo's became immensely more complex because the parties were now competing not only with the genro but with each other as well. THE OKUMA CABINET : AN ALLIANCE OF CONVENIENCE The event that set in motion the covert two-party system was the elevation of Okuma Shigenobu to the premiership in the spring of 1 9 1 4 , for it enabled the Doshikai to serve as a gov �rnment party. The decision to recall this hearty and loquacious hero of the early party movement to public service reflected

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the desperation of the genro in their search for premiers amenable to their guidance. If not exactly an appropriate figure to head a " transcendental gov­ ernment," he seemed in 1 9 1 4 the best answer to the dilemma of the genro. It was not an easy choice. Although Inoue Kaoru had strongly backed Okuma as a successor for Yamamoto Gombei, the other genro, particularly Yama­ gata, at first were not particularly enthusiastic about the idea. Okuma was selected only after two other attempts to form a cabinet failed. Tokugawa letatsu , the prestigious but inexperienced descendant of the shoguns, had the sense to decline the office, and Kiyoura Keigo, one of Yamagata's own per­ sonal followers, failed to form a cabinet owing to the refusal of the navy to provide a service minister.3 Failing to secure either of these men as a potential figurehead, Yamagata reluctantly agreed to ask Okuma. The motives that prompted the genro to accept Okuma as premier were probably twofold. Assuming that Okuma proved agreeable to genro policy on the question of increasing the military budget and expanding the army by two divisions, he was more likely to be successful in managing the Diet than a figure who had been connected with the hambatsu in the past. After all, the Movement for Constitutional Government of 1 9 1 2 - 1 3 and the Siemens Incident of 1 9 1 4 had both demonstrated that continued hambatsu rule only invited popular antagonism and parliamentary uproar. A man with Okuma's great popular appeal and connections within the party movement would be more able to carry out the genro program than one of their own proteges. But perhaps more important was a desire to launch a counterattack on the Seiyu­ kai, which had steadily encroached on the old hambatsu areas of influence, had used its power to overthrow Katsura, and had recouped its position as " most favored" party by supporting the Satsuma-linked Yamamoto cabinet. Yama­ gata as well as Ito's old protege, Inoue Kaoru, felt that the Seiyukai had be­ come far too powerful, too independent, too pursuant of its own ends.4 In this respect, the views of the genro coincided neatly with those of Okuma and the Doshikai. The coincidence of these views is best illustrated by the following dialogue between Okuma and Inoue the day they discussed the possibility of an Okuma cabinet. After considering the substantive issues of policy, Okuma expressing general assent with Inoue's proposals, the conversation went on like this:

Inoue: In other words, you seem to be in agreement with my views. Well then, since it's come to the point that we need to entrust the cabinet to

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a man with real authority, it seems we'll be troubling you [ to do the job] . But since our policy aims are important ones, I needn't say that you should not use men as cabinet members because their public reputations are good or bad, especially since there are abuses by the parties not only at the center [of the government] , but also in the provinces-but above all, the tyranny of Seiyukai is truly alarming. Okuma: Hah ! The Seiyukai is like a parasite, and if it is kept from power it will quickly die. The Seiyukai has become too wise in the ways of the world (waruzure shite iru) . . . So far it has spread its party strength by power and economics (kenryoku to keizai) , but if it's now separated from power, it will be difficult for them to maintain their strength. Added to that, the newspapers are all on my side . . . popular sentiment (kokumin min 'i) belongs to my adherents. That's why the Seiyukai will be thrown into turmoil if it is separated from power. Hara will have reason to be upset. After some further talk, Inoue concluded, "In short, if we don't launch a strong attack on the Seiyukai, it will be bad for the nation. " 5 The intention was clear; whatever else the Okuma cabinet was to do, it began with a deter­ mination to end the ascendancy of the Seiyukai. It seems certain that the genro, as well as Okuma, felt that the new cabinet should be based on a Diet coalition of the anti-Seiyukai parties in the House of Representatives. Given the antipathy of the older men for the Seiyukai and the methods it had pursued in expanding its power, it was only natural to use the other parties as a foil to curb its strength. The leaders of the Seiyukai's , rival parties, Kato , Ozaki Yukio, and lnukai Tsuyoshi , all had personal ties with Okuma and were no less anti-Seiyukai in their outlook. But the forma­ tion of the coalition was not without its difficulties, for the antagonisms that divided these men were as intense as the antipathy they shared toward the tactics of Hara and his party. Okuma approached Kato for support first, for the practical reason that the Doshikai was the next largest party after the Seiyukai and for the personal reason that Okuma had originally wished Kato to serve as premier in his stead . After the maj ority of the Doshikai agreed to support Okuma, Kato, in customarily inept fashion, filled the key ministerial posts ( Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Home Affairs) with ex-officials from his own party. lnukai and Ozaki were offended (or at least claimed to be) at being overlooked in the distribution of choice posts and made their feelings known to both Okuma and the press. lnukai , still stinging from the blow that

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the formation of the Doshikai had dealt his party in 1 9 1 3 , would probably have refused to enter the cabinet in any case, but Ozaki, who coveted the highly strategic Home Ministry, finally consented to j oin when Oura, the former "fighting dog" of the hambatsu, agreed to relinquish the post.6 The political ambiguity of the Okuma cabinet is reflected in contemporary and subsequent interpretations of the ministry's significance. The common view, held by many journalists at the time, as well as by later historians who have sought to demonstrate the weakness of the political parties, characterized it as a front for the genro who attempted to use it as a tool for their own purposes. Others have seen it as essentially a "Kato cabinet," in which the Doshikai president was the central figure in selecting its members, in deter­ mining its policy, and in guiding the faltering hand of Okuma. Both views are accurate to a degree, since in reality the genro and the Doshikai leadership were locked in a not always comfortable tandem. If it is true that the genro were out to make use of Okuma, it is equally true that Kato and the Doshikai took advantage of their position as a government party to increase Diet strength and to press for independence of genro control over the formulation of national policy. In the short run, both the genro and the Doshikai had as much to gain as they had to lose from the ministry. The congruence of their interests was best illustrated by the election of 1 9 1 5 . Unless the pro-government factions held the majority in the House of Representatives, it would be impossible to vote increased military expendi­ ture and to increase the army by two divisions. When the government's budget was defeated by the Seiyukai and the Kokuminto in December 1 9 1 4 , the decision was made to go to the polls with the intention of delivering the Seiyukai a resounding defeat. The outcome was pleasing to all concerned, for it finally broke the absolute maj ority of the Seiyukai, which it had enjoyed since 1 908. Its strength was cut in half by the loss of 79 seats. Although the election did not result in a corresponding victory for the Doshikai, it left the pro-government parties fully in control of the House of Representatives. The tactics that contributed to this result were neither new nor were they especially precedent making, but it might be useful to consider them as an example of how beneficial the position of government party was to a political party. Most obviously, the pro-government parties enjoyed a monopoly over the help provided by the machinery of state itself, the bureaucracy, and official funds. Although the techniques of this type of "government inter­ ference" are necessarily obscure, we catch a glimpse of them from rumors and gossip that reached the Seiyukai leadership. In his diary Hara reported

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that government candidates received official funds, some of it said to be from the Imperial Household Treasury. Because Oyama lwao, a genro and intimate of Yamagata, was lord keeper of the Privy Seal, this allegation might well be true. But the Home Ministry employed other methods for inducing voters to support the slate of pro-government candidates. It issued reports predicting the probable outcome of the election, a technique indicating whom the government favored and whom it had given up for lost. In the more heavily contested areas, police officers visited the houses of voters asking them how they were going to cast their ballots ; in some cases, they were said even to have told voters to support specific candidates and distributed bribery money. At the same time, the government authorities exercised great care, under the name of "supervision," to see that the Seiyukai campaign workers were confined to strictly legal activities, arresting those who gave the slightest hint of engaging in skullduggery. Police officers regularly stationed themselves at the Seiyukai campaign offices and trailed campaign workers about but seemed to overlook, or at least treat lightly, any misdeeds committed by government party campaigners.7 These techniques were not new, nor was this the last time they were to be used ; the Seiyukai had been and was to be equally culpable in the elections it managed . The second factor that contributed to the defeat of the Seiyukai was the lavish use of money by the government and the pro-government parties. Whether much more was spent in this election than in previous ones is diffi­ cult to say , but it seems likely large sums were employed by the govern­ ment and the Doshikai. The money was said to come from several sources: the Iwasaki, Mitsui, Okura, and Yasuda interests among others. Inoue exer­ cised his considerable influence and connections in the financial world to persuade businessmen to stop giving support to the Seiyukai and to back the government parties instead. He even convinced Noda Yutaro, a powerful Seiyukai leader, not to run. Hara reported that the government was giving candidates from the Doshikai and other pro-government parties about ¥5 ,000 per candidate, larger amounts in certain highly contested areas ; votes, he wrote, were being bought for ¥3-5 , and in some places, notably Kanazawa City and Maebashi City, they were going as high as several tens of yen. Miki Bukichi recalls being invited at the time of the election to the premier's house where Okuma, whom he hardly knew personally, welcomed him like an old friend and handed him ¥3 ,ooo ; Kawasaki Katsu recalls receiving money directly from Shibusawa Eiichi , and said that others did too.8

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Money would have been useless had it not been spent well, and m uch of it would have been wasted had the candidates not been selected with care and useless competition eliminated. This was particularly true, since there were three government parties rather than a single one. Some means had to be found of assuring that they did not fight one another as well as the Seiyiikai. This work fell largely to Shimooka Chiij i , the vice-minister of Home Ministry, and to Adachi Kenzo, who earned his sobriquet as "god of elections" (senkyo no kamisama) in this contest. During the election Adachi was put in charge of interviewing aspiring candidates, estimating their chances of winning (not an easy task, since many were complete amateurs without any fixed local support or jiban) and deciding whether they should run or not. He recalled interviewing about soo aspirants, some of whom were so intent on being selected as candidates that they carried knives to strengthen the persuasiveness of their arguments. Adachi, noted for his canniness, carried a blackj ack in his pocket j ust in case differences of opinion could not be resolved amicably.9 By careful selection of candidates much of the competi­ tion that had probably weakened the non-Seiyiikai parties in the past was eliminated . But the one factor that had as much influence as anything else in winning a government maj ority was Okuma's own prestige.10 The final results of the elections exceeded even Oura's most optimistic estimate, and so it seems likely that more was involved in the Seiyiikai defeat than mere money and official interference. The r g r s election has been accurately called an " Qkuma boom," in which the premier enjoyed a personal popularity and made a personal commitment to electioneering that no head of the cabinet before him had. The sources of his personal popularity were many. Not only was he one of the heroes of the jryuminken movement and one of the earliest leaders against the hambatsu, but for many years he had been in retirement from political life and the unpopular compromises that went with it. A favorite with the press, he enj oyed the liberty of commenting on public affairs without facing the embarrassing necessity of squaring his words with deeds. Frequently he was so anxious to please and to avoid giving hurt to anyone, he issued oracular and contradictory pronuncements supporting both sides of the same question . 1 1 During the election he put into practice campaign techniques that were novel for the head of the government and different in quality if not in intent from other types of "government interference. " In dissolving the Diet,

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Okuma announced the government's intention to "appeal to public opinion" in the coming election, a novel departure from previous dissolution decrees, which had usually been phrased as punishments of unruly Diets.12 Okuma and his cabinet ministers also took to the campaign trail . l3 This too was an innovation. Okuma made a whistle stop campaign along the Tokaido and Hokuriku lines. His train stopped at every maj or station, and Okuma, his great j aw wreathed in smiles, greeted crowds of assembled voters with a speech from the window of his coach . Okuma and Ozaki, both famed as orators, recorded speeches on phonograph records, which were sent to candidates all over the country. Letters of recommendation for candidates were signed by cabinet ministers, and on the morning of election day, in some areas the voters found telegrams from the prime minister at their doors asking for their support . 14 Some historians have suggested that the election of r g r s marked a turning point in the history of electioneering practices because of the enormous amounts of money used and because of the inj ection of Anglo-American style campaigning techniques. Because the latter tactics were used only intermit­ tently in subsequent elections and not fully established until the late r g 2 o 's, it is difficult to agree completely with this assertion. But certainly in its wedding of the older practices of election j obbery with the new style of public appeal, the election was a harbinger of things to come. Because the parties could not be certain of winning votes by employing either technique exclu­ sively, they continued to use both at once. THE PARTING OF THE WAYS: KATO VERSUS THE GENRO The Doshikai reaped many benefits from the r g r s election. Not only did it make considerable gains in parliamentary strength, but internal feuding within the party had subsided. At the outset of the ministry, owing to Kato's impolitic selection of Okuma's key cabinet ministers, there had been move­ ments to oust Kato from the party presidency or to form a new anti-Seiyukai merger in order to reduce his influence in the party, but this internal dis­ sension melted away now that good fortune shone brightly on the party. However, there were still clouds on the horizon, for the genro were begin­ ning to cool in their attitude toward the Doshikai. Even before the election had taken place, Yamagata was beginning to have second thoughts about his earlier intentions of destroying the power of the Seiyukai. In November

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I 9 I 4 he confided to Hara that he did not wish " the destruction of one despotic majority [in the House of Representatives] merely to replace it with an­ other. " 15 A few months later, he admitted that he did not believe that the Doshikai could be much of an improvement over the Seiyukai . Had Kato been able to dispel these misgivings, he might have been able to sustain his marriage of convenience with the genro, and the Doshikai might well have achieved a position of ascendancy in the Diet such as the Seiyukai had enj oyed down to the formation of the Okuma ministry. But once again his rigidity and undiplomatic conduct, coupled with his views on the proper method of handling foreign policy and his private vision of how the constitu­ tion should operate, ran afoul of his role as a party leader. The gains made at the polls were to be jeopardized by his clash with the genro over the formulation of foreign policy. The genro had been initially uneasy about Kato's involvement in the Okuma cabinet. His relations with them had been remote and in Yamagata's case somewhat tinged with hostility since his first term of service as foreign minister. As we have already seen he had persistently worked for the inde­ pendence of the Foreign Ministry in the determination of foreign policy and had earned a reputation for prickliness and uncooperativeness. Less than a week after the formation of the Okuma cabinet, Inoue was already expressing to Okuma feeli ngs of distrust about Kato, whom he felt "rather too blunt" and disinclined to make concessions to others. He told Okuma that he didn't want a second Seiyukai on his hands and warned that Kato's "narrowness and bureaucratic attitude" might inj ure the harmonious relationship between the premier and the genro .16 Kato 's actions as foreign minister only confirmed these initial suspicions. First of all, he put an end to the practice of circulating secret diplomatic documents to the genro. This had been a custom in the Foreign Ministry since I 8g8 , and Kato had chafed against the practice when he was foreign minister in the Ito cabinet. He suffered the continuance of the practice because of lto's pressure, but now that he enj oyed much greater political independence under Olmma, he abolished the custom and instead adopted the practice of dispatching appropriate officials to explain matters to the genro upon their requestP Kato's independence manifested itself further in the decision to enter the World War against Germany on the side of the Allied Powers. He did not report to the genro on the negotiations surrounding the declaration of war and informed them of the ultimatum to Germany only after he had

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sent it. 18 The genro were angry because they had not received requests for consultation and advice and because they regarded the move as one fraught with danger for the country. In September 1 9 1 4 the genro met with Okuma to straighten matters out. They drew up and signed a document which provided that Kato as foreign minister was to carry out the policy opinions on which the genro and the premier had agreed , that the premier was to decide the larger goals of foreign policy and the foreign minister to carry them out, that important documents were to be circulated to the genro, and that in the future the genro were to be consulted on all important negotiations with foreign coun­ tries. Then, j ust to make sure there was no question of who was at fault, the document stated that, since Okuma "admitted with sincerity" that Kato was excessively "bureaucratic" in his conduct of business and that Okuma's own negligence was responsible for the lack of communication between the genro and Kato, all "past feelings and events" would be for­ gotten .19 There was no question that the genro regarded it as their right and privilege to peer over the government's shoulder in the determination of the affairs of state. The alienation between the genro and Kato seemed temporarily patched over,20 but the wound was broken open anew with the negotiations on the treaty with China, the so-called "Twenty-one Demands." It seems likely that Kato began the negotiations after consultations with the genro and probably with their support, but his conduct of the affair brought him under their heavy criticism .21 The details of the negotiations have been dealt with exten­ sively elsewhere, but several things should be noted about Kato's handling of them. He had explained the content of the proposed demands to the genro only in a general way ; he did not give specific details of the documents sent to the Chinese government. The genro learned of the contents of the demands only when the Yuan government leaked their content to the world. Further­ more, Kato had invited the suspicions and distrust of the American and British governments by not informing them of the content of section V and thereby gave the Yuan government a lever for resisting the demands. The enmity of the Anglo-American powers was something Yamagata in particular wished to avoid at all costs, and he must have been infuriated . Had Kato planned to anger the genro intentionally he could not have succeeded better. He ignored a memorandum that Yamagata sent to him in April r g r s and did not bother even to visit or discuss the matter with

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him.22 He also insulted Matsukata, who complained that the Japanese minister in China was inadequate and proposed to go to Peking himself to carry out the negotiations. Matsukata made his plan known to Okuma indirectly, but Kato refused to countenance the proposal because he feared that Matsukata would exercise too much initiative, would not follow the foreign minister's instructions, and would obstruct Kato in his conduct of the negotiations. Finally he irritated Inoue by refusing to listen to the sug­ gestions of Ariga Nagao, an ex-bureaucrat then serving as adviser to Yuan Shih-kai_23 The tension between the foreign minister and the genro, which mounted almost as high as the ill feeling between Japan and China, came to a climax in May. Negotiations had proceeded to a point where it had to be decided whether or not to send the Chinese government an ultimatum. On May 5 , r g r s , the cabinet met with the genro a t Okuma's official residence. Yamagata was filled with icy wrath. "Things have taken a fine turn, haven't they?" he began . Bitterly he asked whether Kato and Wakatsuki had followed the advice in the memorandum he had sent them in April. Then he went on, with ill-concealed annoyance, "It may be troublesome, but since matters have come to this pass, how would it be for the foreign minister to go to Peking to clear matters up." Everyone sat silent in the room. Finally Yashiro Rokuro, the navy minister and a close friend of Kato, spoke out. It would not be wise for the foreign minister to go , he said, since it was better that he remain in Tokyo during such a crisis. Yamagata turned on him quickly and shouted, "Bah ! That's a quibble ! " ( "Sore wa rikutsu ja. ) Matsukata, a sour expression on his face, sat looking on, saying nothing but nodding his head in agreement with Yamagata. Kato changed color. The old men did not like to be crossed .24 Although the ultimatum was finally sent and acquiesced to by the Chinese government, the whole affair had made Kato persona non grata to the genro.25 They were not willing to force the cabinet to a crisis over the question, but they constantly urged Okuma to get rid of his troublesome foreign minister. Kato, who must have sensed the awkwardness of his position, took the opportunity to resign in July r g r s when it became known that Home Minister Oura had been involved in the bribery of a number of Seiyiikai Diet members. Kato's resignation did not, however, rriean a break between the Doshikai and the Okuma ministry. Not only did the party continue to support Okuma's legislative program, but a number of Doshikai leaders replaced those who had resigned with Kat6.26 From the standpoint of "normal constitutional "

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government," the English model so beloved of Kato, the situation was anomalous, but it did allow Kato to extricate himself from an impossible political position and still enj oy the status of leading a pro-governmen( party. Kato's clash with the genro was to drag itself across his path for the next ten years, but neither Kato nor the rest of the party leadership seemed to have abandoned hope that Kato would someday become premier. Death would soon overtake the genro, hopefully opening the way to party rule. But even before that there was still a chance . In the summer of 1 9 1 6, Okuma began to lobby with the genro to have Kato named as his successor. In late March 1 9 1 6 and again in june, he approached Yamagata with the suggestion that Kato be made the next premier. On the first occasion, Yamagata met him with a polite rebuff, but on the second he was more blunt in his reply. He said that Kato was hardly qualified to be foreign minister, let alone premier, and suggested instead that one of his own proteges, Terauchi Masatake, be selected. Frustrated in this attempt, Okuma sent a memorial directly to the emperor expressing his desire to resign on the grounds of health and adding his hope that an imperial mandate to form a cabinet would be bestowed on Kato and Terauchi together. He evidently hoped to circumvent the genro in the decision.27 To strengthen Kato's position as Okuma's possible successor, the Doshikai initiated efforts to form a new anti-Seiyukai merger. As usual, the motive behind the project was tactical. Though there had been little enthusiasm among the parties in 1 9 1 4 and 1 9 1 5 when the idea had been mooted , now that Okuma seemed ready to resign and to entrust the reins of power to Kato, the advantages of a newly enlarged. party were quite obvious. If the Doshikai could merge with the other pro-government parties, it could occupy an absolute majority in the House of Representatives, the very weapon that Hara had used so successfully to build the Seiyukai's power. With the prospect of facing a hostile lower House before them , the genro would doubtless think twice about nominating a supra-party figure to the premier­ ship and might well agree to the selection of Kato. But the move was a gamble. If the merger failed to secure an absolute majority, the new party would be meaningless tactically. That many members of the other two parties, the Chuseikai and the Koyu Club, felt the venture risky was reflected in their hesitation to j oin with Doshikai . There were many businessmen in the Koyu Club, for example, who ' did not wish to cast their lot with the new

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party when they could not be sure Kato was coming to power. Others, like Shimooka Chuj i , felt it would be best to retain a free hand so that they could strike bargains with whatever government succeeded Okuma.28 But after three months of tedious and delicate negotiations, the new party, called the Kenseikai, was finally formed in September r g r 6. The organization of the Kenseikai, however, did not succeed in repairing the damage done by Kato's handling of the Twenty-one Demands crisis. Head of the maj ority party in the Diet or not, Kato still remained unacceptable to the genro , and in particular to Yamagata. Although Okuma in a last minute maneuver again attempted to nominate Kato directly to the emperor upon tendering his resignation, the genro were still sufficiently powerful to circumvent this petition.29 Instead, Terauchi Masatake, a kobun of Yamagata, was named to succeed Okuma as premier. It was clear that the genro were determined to make one more attempt at "transcendental government." Now that the Seiyukai's power had been broken temporarily, they did not intend to tolerate the growth of a new majority party with a leader even more intractable than Hara. The countervailing force had to be countervailed . THE RESURGENCE OF THE SEIYUKAI The formation of the Terauchi cabinet, in the words of one eminent Japanese historian, was "the last trump card of the absolutists. " 30 In a sense, it was reversion to "transcendental government" because the new premier, a former general and a protege of Yamagata, had no party connection. But the ever resourceful Yamagata tried to resurrect it in the guise of kyokoku itchi (national unity) cabinet. The term was an old one. It had first been used to describe the moratorium on political conflict between party and party, between Diet and cabinet, and between the hambatsu and the people during the Sino­ Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars when the " nation rose as one" to meet the threat of external danger. Superficially, the situation was similar in r g I 7 , since the country was a participant in the World War, but Yamagata was as much interested in resolving his impasse in domestic politics as he was in achieving national unity in the face of foreign threat. Under the facade of national unity (kyokoku itchz) , the military services, the House of Peers, and the political parties might be induced to bury their differences and cooperate to support the cabinet. At the same time, of course, it would postpone the appointment of a party premier.

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During the Okuma ministry Yamagata had from time to time toyed with the idea of forming a kyokoku itchi cabinet with himself as premier and supported by all the parties and factions in both houses of the Diet, but it is doubtful that he entertained the possibility very seriously.31 Though he might have counted on support from the Seiyukai, it was unlikely that he could have secured the backing of either lnukai or Kato, both of whom objected strenuously in public to the continued interference of the oligarchic generation in politics. Furthermore, though he was at ease in the behind­ the-scenes negotiations by which he maintained his influence, he had never enjoyed the public and open confrontations with opposition that was neces­ sary to defend government policy in the Diet. In any case, he was not unaware of the repercussions that his reemergence as premier would have on the press and public opinion. He could hardly anticipate a fervid public welcome after seeing the uproar that Katsura's appointment had caused in r g r 2 . Instead Yamagata chose to remain in his spider's castle at Odawara and had his lieutenant Terauchi made premier. The Terauchi cabinet proved no less a failure from Yamagata's point of view than Okuma's had . Like Katsura, Terauchi showed considerable independence of mind. Shortly before he took office, he told Yamagata that he was over sixty years old, no longer a child, and that he could not possibly follow Yamagata's guidance in every particular of state business. Yamagata promised to let Terauchi have a free hand in political matters but from the day of Terauchi's accession to office the old man was constantly peering over his shoulder, querulously complaining about his choice of ministers, and sulking when not consulted on major policy decisions. He even warned Terauchi against behaving in a "military fashion," acting first and reporting later, a comment no less ironic from the lips of the field marshal than his earlier objections to Kato's "bureaucratic behavior. " 32 More significant was Terauchi's failure to achieve kyokoku itchi in practice. Kato not only refused to furnish a Kenseikai representative for the new cabinet but began a belligerent and open verbal assault on both the govern­ ment and the genro. Partly Kato reacted from personal pique at being excluded from office by the obstructionist tactics of the genro and partly from the provocative appointment of his old rival, Goto Shimpei, to the Home Ministry. At the inaugural meeting of the Kenseikai and throughout the fall and winter, he made direct attacks on Terauchi and oblique attacks on the genro. He vigorously denounced the idea that a kyokoku itchi cabinet would

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do away with opposition and produce national unity. He proclaimed it was a "basic principle of constitutional government" that the head of the party should organize the cabinet and lashed out at " those who do not shed the outmoded view that the parties are traitors and enemies of the nation. " 33 Turning more bitter in January 1 9 1 7 , he castigated " government carried on by the dictatorial decision of a small group of men" and said that some politicians "ought not have rights greater than those of other Japanese because they are from Choshii." He also backed those within the party leadership who wished to propose a no-confidence resolution against the government in the Diet. Although without legal force, such a resolution would seriously embarrass the premier if successful, and the Kenseikai with its absolute maj ority was in a position to secure its passage.34 In short, Kato was adopting the minto tactics of the early 1 8go's. Because the Kenseikai proved intractably opposed to the cabinet, Terauchi was forced to abandon the idea of rallying all the parties to his support and instead gradually began to rely more and more on the support of the Seiyukai. Hara had initially played a rather cagey game. He adopted a policy of "strict neutrality" toward the cabinet, promising to support it when the party agreed with Terauchi, oppose it when it did not. Such a policy, he wrote in his diary, was a "nuisance, but if we are skillful, it will benefit the party. " 35 "Strict neutrality" eventually proved to mean that the Seiyukai served as a government party in very much the same way the Doshikai had served as the government party under Okuma. It waxed stronger under Terauchi until it was nearly restored to its old strength . The process began with the 1 9 1 7 election, which Terauchi called in order to forestall the successful passage of the Kenseikai's no-confidence resolution. The election strategy devised by Home Minister Goto Shimpei was aimed at establishing a pro-government majority of about 200 seats or more, but at the same time he hoped to achieve the " triangular party system" so long advocated by Yamagata. By giving government aid to the Seiyukai he expected it to win about 1 50 or 1 60 seats. The remaining portion of the government's majority was to be made up of about 50 or 6o "neutral " or pro-government candidates. These neutral candidates, usually local men of substance invited to stand for office by the government, were expected to be above partisan considerations. It was also hoped they would form a bloc in the Diet that would prevent either the Seiyukai or the Kenseikai from securing an absolute maj ority. The "unnatural maj ority" of the Kenseikai

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would be destroyed , yet control of the House would be kept from the hands of Hara.36 While Den Kenj iro, a Yamagata protege who was serving as minister of transportation and communication, set out to organize the so-called "neutral" candidates, Goto approached Hara and Takahashi of the Seiyukai with an offer of direct financial aid from the government to help defray the party's election expenses. Hara, playing the coy mistress, did not want to sell his favors too cheaply and wished to avoid a connection that was unnecessarily com­ promising. He refused the offer on the grounds that it would " dishonor the history of the Seiyukai and increase the psychology of dependence among party supporters." But this refusal to accept financial support did not prevent Hara from negotiating with the home minister the selection of constituencies for "neutral" candidates so as to reduce the competition for votes between the government and the Seiyukai , nor did it prevent certain Seiyukai candi­ dates from accepting money from the government, albeit without Hara's consent.37 Perhaps the cooperation between the government and the Seiyukai was not so marked or obvious as that between the Okuma cabinet and the Doshikai, but the nature and purpose of the cooperation was the same. The government needed the Seiyukai's support in the Diet if it were not to find itself consistently stalemated there, and the Seiyukai could not hope to retrieve its losses of I 9 I 5 without some measure of government favoritism at the polls. The flaw of the arrangement, from the standpoint of Terauchi and of Yamagata, was that it created the conditions for the resurgence of Seiyukai strength. Because the "neutral candidates" made a poorer showing than anticipated, the destruction of the Kenseikai maj ority resulted in a reciprocal resurgence of the Seiyukai. It jumped in strength from I I I seats to I 6o seats, establishing it as the largest party in the House of Representatives. As a consequence Terauchi found himself less and less the master of a "national unity" cabinet and more and more circumscribed by a growing partnership with Hara, who commanded the plurality in the Diet that could defeat any government measure in combination with the recalcitrant Kenseikai. It was not the "neutral" third party but Hara who held the balance of power, and it was he who drove the bargains not Terauchi. He used his plurality to pass legislation he favored and defeat legislation he opposed. In I g i 8 , for example, by threatening to withdraw Seiyukai support for all proposed government legislation, including an Industrial Mobilization Bill, Hara was able to force

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Terauchi to withdraw a bill revising the electoral law.38 Indeed, Terauchi was now so dependent on Hara that he considered it far more important to placate the party leader than his erstwhile mentor, Yamagata. And Hara confidently noted in his diary, "Yamagata and I are the makers of the cabinet. " 39 THE CAPITULATION OF YAMAGATA The last trump had been played, but Yamagata had lost the trick. By the beginning of r g r 8 , it was also clear he was losing the game. The Terauchi cabinet had illustrated all the difficulties of sustaining " transcendental govern­ ment" without resorting to direct oligarchic rule. The parties were too self­ confident to be docile pawns of the premier, the attempt to create a neutral "third party" had failed, and even Yamagata's own protege proved no less impatient of genro interference than the party leaders. To compound these difficulties, Terauchi, whose health was failing, was anxious to lay down the burdens of office. Yamagata, in a quandary as to a possible successor, tried to postpone the inevitable by asking Terauchi to stay on in office, but Terauchi was reluctant to do so. The stage was being set for Yamagata's acquiescence to the appointment of a party premier. Yamagata's decision was precipitated in August r g r 8 by the outbreak of the rice riots, a massive and largely spontaneous popular outburst against the inflation of rice prices. The riots, which spread over the country with alarming speed during the first two weeks of August, placed the cabinet in a difficult position not so much because they represented popular discontent with the government but because they gave the parties an issue with which to embarrass the government. The Kenseikai , joining with most of the press, ca!led for the resignation of Terauchi and the formation of a new ministry headed by a party leader in accord with the dictates of " normal constitutional government. " 40 Were the Seiyukai to join the anti-government chorus, Tera­ uchi's position in the coming Diet would be untenable. The parties might use the outbreak of the riots as the occasion for impeachment or no-confidence resolutions and perhaps even for some sort of public demonstrations.41 The premier had to go , but there remained the question of who was to replace him. Yamagata had run out of men willing or able to head " transcendental cabinets. " He tried to induce Saionj i to accept the office, since his position

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as a quasi-genro , his experience as premier, and his friendly ties with the Seiyukai made him a l ikely candidate . But Saionji had blanched at the proposal when Yamagata approached him, and protested a general physical debility.42 A similar response came from Hirata Tosuke, another of Yama­ gata's proteges. As for other senior officials whose names appeared in press speculations, Yamagata found them all wanting in some respect. Kiyoura Keigo, tho ugh he did not actively seek the office , was apparently willing to serve, but because of the debacle that resul ted from his earlier attempt to form a cabinet in 1 9 1 4 , Yamagata had good grounds to doubt his abi lity to pull support for a cabinet together. Ito Miyoj i, a privy councillor who had long sat on the sidelines of active poli tics, was frequently mentioned as a possibility, but Yamagata fel t he lacked sincerity and was not of a caliber to assume office. Perhaps the man whom Yamagata would have most l iked to see assume the office was Oura Kemmu, but he was in poor health and had been thoroughly discredited by the Diet bribery scandal of 1 9 1 5 .43 Who then was left? Certainly not lnukai Tsuyoshi, whose political life had been consumed by his opposition to the hambatsu, nor Kato Komei, who had forfeited Yamagata's favor more recently. The only possibility remaining was Hara Kei, whose personal relationship with the leading genro had grown increasingly cordial since 1 9 1 5 . In his early days in the Seiyukai, Hara fought a duel of wits and power with Yamagata, probing every rift and chink in the hambatsu 's defenses, determined to rid politics of his influence, but as we have seen he had mellowed considerably after his accession to the presidency of his party in 1 9 1 4. Not only was he surer of his control over the party , he was also certain that the final disappearance of hambatsu influence was only a matter of time. The old guard, he felt, were bound to destroy them­ selves.44 In the meantime, since he had always thought there was more to be gained fro m the conciliatory policy than from direct opposi tion, he began to work his deft and easy charm on Yamagata, occasionally threatening in his tone, but more often lending a tolerant ear to the old man's monologues. He even catered to the old man's ambition by suggesting the formation of a genro cabinet with Yamagata at its head. His relatively cooperative attitude toward the Terauchi ministry and his willingness to join the extraordinary Council on Foreign Affairs also helped to dispel Yamagata's distrust of him. He cautioned party members not to attack the genro publicly, particularly Yamagata, since this might give rise to unnecessary offense.45 Indeed , by 1 9 1 8 so friendly had the relationship' between them become that Yamagata fre-

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quently remarked to his intimates that he and Hara were agreed on m ost questions of policy .46 But though he seemed to trust Hara as an individual Yamagata still had misgivings about nominating him as premier. Hara's apparently unshakable determination to build an absolute majority in the House of Representatives ran counter to Yamagata's desire to keep any single party fro m gaining control of the Diet. He was also afraid that Hara in power would differ from the conciliatory Hara he had come to know in the past few years. No matter how si ncere and earnest the leadership of the Seiyukai m ight be, lesser men in the party, once it came to office, m ight "cloak themselves in the tiger's prestige" to commit "abuses and acts o f tyranny" as the Seiyukai had in the past. Such men might use the authority of the government to advance their own interests, political or o therwise. If it were possible to hold the party in line and to improve its discipline, an absolute maj ority was all wel l and good, but Yamagata was afraid that things had not reached this stage yet.47 Although Hara might view affairs the same way as Yamagata, or at least be inclined to heed Yamagata's views, as party leader he might also be constrained to alter his views or sell them short because of pressure from the party , j eopardizing the rapport already establ ished with the genro.48 As Yamagata m ulled over these considerations, for more than a month the poli tical world lay in an agony of expectation, waiting for the final decision. While the Kenseikai clamored for party government, Hara wai ted patiently, intending to create the impression that he was anxious for a "harmonious" transfer of power unmarred by disorder or partisan intrigue in the wake of the rice riots.49 Yet, as he told one of his followers, he was prepared to lay aside the velvet glove. If Terauchi did not soon resign he was determined to go to Tokyo himself to launch a public attack on the government, calling it to task for its failures and demanding its resignation on the grounds of irresponsibility . If the cabi net did resign but was succeeded by another "bureaucratic cabinet," Hara was willing to "attack it with all my strength , if necessary allying with Kenseikai to do so. " By establishing an all iance with his fellow party he fel t it might be "possible to wipe out the bureaucratic group and bring about a complete revolution of the political situation." He did not relish the use of these "ultimate methods, " but were " transcendental government" to continue there m ight be no choice but to use them.50 Ultimately, Yamagata proved unwilling to risk a confrontation, and failing

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once more to persuade Saionj i to assume office, he finally consented to have Saionj i nominate Hara for office . There was no practical alternative, but his remaining doubts may wel l have been dispelled by the arguments that Saionj i used to convince him that such was the best course o f action. I t will be helpful to recapitulate these arguments, since they shed interesting light on the motives that lay behind Yamagata's capitulation. First of all, Saionj i told Yamagata that if too much more time elapsed before Hara were asked to form a cabinet, there was the danger that members of both the Kenseikai and the Seiyukai might join together to force the leadership of both parties to drastic action. Secondly, as Yam agata had admitted countless times, Hara's views were not different from his own, and it was likely that Hara would be receptive to Yamagata's instructions (oshie). Finally, in an appeal that was both devious and consoling he argued that the appo intment of Hara might mean only a temporary establ ishment of party rule. Because Kato and his party had already failed under Okuma, he argued, if Hara with his party were to fail as well, it would be possible to make a case for the revival of " transcendental cabinets" at a later date . But if the parties, denied access to power, were to lose hope and to ally with each other to surmount the crisis, the chances of establishing a transcendental cabinet in the future would vanish ; after Hara would come Kato, and after Kato, someone else. In short, Saionji was suggesting that if Yamagata did not make a timely concession to the parties, the political world would soon become their oyster.51 To be sure, Saionji m ay have pursued this line of argument to soothe Yamagata's apprehensions, but that he felt it necessary to pursue at all indi­ cates how far the appointment ofHara was from final acceptance of party gov­ ernment as a constitutional principle. The selection of Hara was a pragmatic one, made possible by Yamagata's trust of the party leader as an individual and by his realization that not to choose him would be politically disastrous. Yamagata was no less distrustful of the parties than he had been twenty years before, but because there was no one with sufficient power and will to take the rei ns of government, he had no al ternative but to appoint Hara . It may be objected that it was precisely Hara's control over the Seiyukai, with its plurality in the House of Representatives and its strong local electoral base , that made him both powerful enough and willing enough to qualify as premier. Even admitting this to be so, it was one thing for Yamagata to recommend Hara because he ha d de facto power, but quite another to nomi-

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nate him because he felt it right that the elected representatives of the people ought to control the cabinet and exercise the power of the state. On the contrary , as should be abundantly clear, Yamagata chose Hara in spite rif the fact that he was party leader. Had there been an alternative there can be little doubt he would have taken it. In any case, it was equally clear that there was no guarantee that the leader of the opposition party would succeed the Seiyukai in power. Indeed, it almost seemed as though the Hara cabinet were established to preven t this. In looking back on the years of covert party government from the establish­ ment of the Okuma cabinet to the fall of Terauchi, it is clear that political conflict was far more complex than it had been a decade or so before. The struggle was not simply that of " the parties versus the genro" or of " party versus party ." Rather it was a three-way struggle among the genro led by Yamagata, the Seiyukai led by Hara and the Doshikai-Kenseikai led by Kato. As such it is difficult to j udge by stereotyped models of poli tical conflict based on Western experience. Recent critics of the parties, for exam ple, have sug­ gested that the parties should have co mbined forces to make the genro accept the necessity of party cabi nets. Such a suggestion ignores the explicit and implicit rivalry that had already existed between the parties. The party leaders did not act out of a sense of common interest but were inspired by the desire to promo te the interests of their own fol lowing. In theory , common effort was all wel l and good, but in practice recourse to such "ultimate methods" (as Hara put it) was likely to be far less effective in promoting party interest than in seeking a cordial relationship with the genro. At times, as the elections of Ig I 5 and I g I 7 amply demonstrated, the parties were not unwilling to use the influence of the genro or their proteges in the cabinet in their struggle with one another. Conversely, of course, this meant that the genro saw themselves as using one party against the other. But the seemingly fratricidal tactics of the parties were not as detrimental to the rise of party influence as it might seem . The party leaders felt that, in the long run, time favored their eventual accession to power. Poli tical organiza­ tions did not suffer the inconveniences of human mortali ty as the genro did, and in any case, both Kato and Hara expected to outl ive the old men. "Transcendental government" was bound to be defeated in the long run, if only because the genro were getting o lder and feebler. In the meantime, each party wanted to be strong enough so that when the genro finally decided to appoint a party premier, it would control a Diet majority that would force

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the genro to pick its own leaders. The pursuit of a Diet maj ori ty naturally had greater priority than the waging of a common battle against the genro . Such calculations, of course, proved correct. Although Yamagata's nomi­ nation of Hara as premier did not mark his acceptance of party cabinets in principle and though he regarded i t only as a temporary expedient until something else ( though it is hard to say what) could be arranged, the appoint­ ment of Hara did set a precedent, though not a guarantee, for the subsequent establishment of party cabinets. It must be admitted, however, that the emergence of overt party rule m ight not have taken place when it did had it not been for the peculiar talents and character of Hara Kei . The doctrinaire and stubborn Kato , impatient for the institutionalization of party rule and too independent to engage in personal intrigue and cajolery of the genro , could never have accompl ished it in Yamagata's lifetime. Indeed, his frus­ trations had led him to revive the older tactics of assaulting the genro verbally in public and in the Diet. But Hara, older and more experienced in the intricate necessities ofJapanese pol itics, knew that appeals to " public opinion'' were far less effective than his astute cultivation of relations with Yamagata. It was through personal influence that he pried grudging approval from the old man. Whether his tactics were beneficial to the development of the parliamentary system in the long run is, to be sure, a matter of dispute, but there is no question they yielded rich dividends for his party in the short run .

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v THE CRY FOR REFORM : THE POPU LAR CHA L LE NGE

For those who

had long advocated party cabinets and the strengthening of Diet control over government policy, the appointment of Hara Kei as premier lightened skies that had been a murky gray. For the first time, the premier was a "commoner, " who held a seat in the House of Representatives rather than in the House of Peers ; for the first time also, all the members of the cabinet, save the military service ministers, belonged to the maj ority party in the Diet. The long struggle with the ol igarchic genera tion seemed to have ended in triumph for the parties, at last able to exercise open and overt control over the government and its policies. Despite the apparent resolution of the constitutional question, however, the optim ism that greeted Hara's government was not unalloyed, for it remained to be seen whether party government in practice would be any better than rule by " transcendental cabinets." The catalogue of "party abuses" (tahei) was too long in 1 9 1 8 to admit of much confidence in the new cabinet. A not untypical reaction was that of the Chua Karon: 1

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The Hara cabinet h a s been born. We d o n o t hesi tate t o welcome it enthusiastically as the first cabinet to make i ts appearance under the spur of the trends in the country . . . We deem that the poli tical world of Japan has returned for the first time to i ts proper path with the appearance of the Hara cabinet . . . However, we do not welcome the Hara cabinet because we have confidence in the personal views of the [Seiyukai] president, nor because we agree with the policies of the Seiyukai . On the contrary , we regret that there are all too many of its past actions which must be deplored . . . [ But] now the people are hastening to make the goals of administration accord with trends in the world and do not feel that they have time to discuss the past sins of the Seiyukai . We wonder whether or not the Hara cabinet will be careful to repay the magnanimity of the people and not to betray their expecta­ tions. W inning power was only half the battle. Having conquered the genro , the parties still had to overcome residual popular doubts as to whether they were fit to rule the country. The problem of popular co nfidence was particularly im portant in 1 9 1 8 because both the government party and its Diet opposition were confronted with the emergence of a new atmosphere in public opinion. More by coinci­ dence than by causal connection, the advent of the Hara cabinet was accom­ panied by a rising demand for widespread political, social, and econo mic reform . Not si nce the 1 88o's had there been such evidence of popular dis­ co ntent with the status quo. The myth of social harmony and the sense of national purpose that had mobil ized the nation's energies in the Meij i period were showing signs of rift and schism under the im pact of the burgeoning capitalist order. "There is a sense of increasing tension, of contagious unrest," commented one foreign observer, " . . . which is giving food for anxious thought to the nation's leaders . " 2 It was apparent that modernization had created as many problems as it had solved , and i t was also apparent that the rulers of Japan had not yet attem pted to cope with the problems of an industrial ized society. To many observers, politics seemed to lack "direction or purpose, and they cried out for a "reconstruction" of the country lest it once again fall behind the advanced nations of the world. The cry for reform was a city-bred phenomenon. In this respect it differed from the political unrest of the 1 87 o's and 1 88o's, which had been buoyed up by populist resentment engendered by hardship in the countryside. Here

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and there a few sparks that fell from the cities kindled discontent in the villages, but it would be a m istake to regard the new atmosphere of opinion as a spiritual levee en masse that affected the humblest peasant. The bulk of the population, still engaged in agriculture, remained bound by the folkways and economic pressures that kept them passive spectators in the game of national politics. The demand for reform came largely from certain lim ited, yet critical, segments of urban society-a group of young liberal intellectuals and j ournalists, a handful of professional poli ticians, rad ical students embarking on a novel course of poli tical action, and the newly emergent working class movement. Their plea for reform spread fro m the major metropolitan centers at Tokyo in the east and the Kansai urban­ industrial complex in the west to the more remote provinces largely by means of the press and j ournals of opinion. But the main arena of debate remained the big city . The reformers were all agreed that Japan should undergo some sort of "reconstruction." At first their demands were diffuse, at times even chaotically so. They wanted to cure an immense number of ills produced by a variety of social and economic dislocations, some the temporary result of the war, some the permanent features of an industrial society. But by r g r g the disparate forces that advocated reform had coalesced into a clamorous, insistent, and unprecedented political movement-the movement for uni­ versal suffrage-that was to dominate domestic poli tics during the first years of overt party government. The would-be reformers found the suffrage question an issue on which all could join hands, for by enlarging popular controls on the affairs of state it promised to hold the key to more widespread and sweeping change within the country. The suffrage movement posed the parties a form idable domestic challenge by raising the question of both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of party rule. If the parties refused to put universal suffrage into effect, it would not be difficult to challenge their credentials to rule in the name of all the people. On the other hand, if they did accede to the demand , the parties could with some j ustice tout themselves as representatives of popular interests. The response of the parties to the uniVersal suffrage movement, and more generally to the demand for "reconstruction," was therefore of critical importance to the future development of party politics in Japan, for it could determine the answer to the question implied by the Chiii5 Karon edi torialist-whether or not the parties' sins of the past were to be forgotten and forgiven.

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THE POST-WAR MOOD The demand for reform was buoyed by a wave of optimism, which in retrospect may be difficult to understand. It was, first of all , prompted by the discovery of a " mass awakening" in Japan. Though this term has perhaps been cheapened by i ts currency as a catchword for later historians, it was already in wide use fro m the end of the First World War. It rested on the notion that the common people of the country, who for years had deferred silently to the demands placed on them by the state and by their social betters, were beginning to experience a newly quickened awareness of their rights as citizens and human beings. Yoshino Sakuzo had discerned an "awakening of the people" as early as 1 9 1 4 . Looking back on the H ibiya riots, which protested the Portsmouth Treaty in 1 905 , on the first Movement for Con­ stitutional Government in 1 9 1 2- 1 3 , and on the demonstrations over the Siemens scandal in 1 9 1 4 , he found in them evidence that those outside the government and outside the "established parties" were filled with a burgeon­ ing desire to participate in politics in a way they had not before . He sensed an imminent shift of political power within the country fro m the hands of the oligarchy, the military, and the bureaucracy into the hands of the people and their representatives. He was aware , of course, that these so-called demonstrations of public discontent were often engineered out of partisan motives by the patriotic societies and professional party politicians and that they were perhaps not the most desirable form for public participation in politics to take . Yet that he chose to interpret them as the stirrings of a new force in poli tics indicates the nature of the optimism that lay behind the discovery of the "mass awakening. " 3 Although many might have disagreed that these earlier demonstrations reflected any rice-roots sentiments, few could doubt that the popular pro test movements that occurred in 1 9 1 8 and 1 9 1 9 were the product not of partisan agitation but of felt grievances among the common people. During the rice rio ts of August 1 9 1 8 , over 70o,ooo persons in 36 cities, 1 29 towns and 145 villages smashed the shops of rice merchants, attacked the homes of the well-to-do, and rampaged in the streets for nearly two weeks. These disturb­ ances were largely spontaneous, touched off by pent-up anger at the exor­ bitant price of rice. The main participants were farmers, fishermen, factory workers, miners-the hoi polloi-not gangs of soshi (strong-arm men) and coolies mobilized by partisan political groups. The following year brought

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a tremendous increase in the number of strikes and labor disputes, and eyen in the countryside, long regarded as the bastion of public order and con­ servatism, tenancy disputes began to erupt with disconcerting frequency. It was no longer possible to assume that the people were the patriotic subjects, loyal soldiers, and docile taxpayers they had been in the Meiji period . As the Osaka A sahi Shimbun, one of the principal supporters of political and social reform , pointed out in connection with the rice riots : 4 It is a fact that the attitude of the maj ority o f o u r people i s com pletely different from their attitude when they have met with so-cal led hardships in the past. Up to the present, when the state (kokka) has resorted to military force abroad , . . . the Japanese people have set aside their own needs and waxed wildly enthusiastic for the state. Even if they did not wax enthusiastic, their eyes saw only the state in relation to the outside world, not as it affected themselves. Now, however, while the authorities are clamoring about the great crisis overseas, the people them selves are not asking "What will become of the country? " ; they have risen to cry out, "What will beco me of us?" Even though the authorities and the politicians out of power may close their eyes to this, it is an open and undeniable fact. If we ask the reason for this . . . , it is that the maj ority of the people have fallen into circumstances too straitened to hope for honor or for glory. The people, once the mainstay of the "strong country" and the "rich state ," now seemed to have developed a new sense of self-interest. Appeals to duty and to love of country , it seemed, could no longer contain the aspirations of the common people as individuals. Economic difficulties were real, not simply the product of journalistic imagination, and they were particularly acute in the cities, where the emer­ gence of middle-class hardship and labor unrest was clearly manifest. As a resul t of wartime inflation, m any city inhabitants found themselves faced with the problem of making ends meet. A survey of clerical workers showed that their expendi tures had risen from a base index of r oo in r gog to 3 2 0 i n r g r g . During the same period incomes had risen t o a n index of only 2 2 7 . I n terms o f income increase , unskilled manual workers, carters, coolies, and the like seem to have done better- their wages rose from an index of r oo in r gog to 494 in r g r g ; but the increase was illusory because the price of rice, which occupied an important part of working class budgets, increased

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about fivefold in the same period.5 It was no wonder that they should complain about their lot in life. These developments within the country seemed confirmed by events abroad . Three months after the rice riots had subsided, the European war ended in a victory for the democratic powers. For those who anticipated democratic reform within Japan, the armistice m arked the symbolic defeat of absolutism and m ilitarism at home as wel l as abroad. At the beginning of the war, l iberal partisans of the allies had pointed out that the ability of the English and French to resist the much-touted strength of German militarism for as long as they did was clear proof that a democratic political system did not necessarily imply national weakness. The outcome of the war indicated that quite the reverse was true. The establishment of constitutional republics following the collapse of the Austrian and German monarchies only co nfirmed what the victory had made clear-that the model on which the oligarchs had built the Meij i state was defunct. Revolutionary change in Russia had a similar impact. The February Revolution taught the same lesson as the political upheavals in Germany and Austria, and even the Bolshevik Revolution at first seemed to many of the reform elements in Japan a victory of the Russian people against their autocratic past.6 The whole of the civilized world seemed on the verge of a new era in which political regimes based on mili tarism, authoritarianism, and conservatism would give way to more democratic, more peaceful, and more progressive regimes, whose goals would be humani tarian. The " mass awakening" in J apan seemed to be taking place against the background of a similar movement in the rest of the world. The new era was to be international. Adm ittedly , there was concrete evidence to support the optimistic mood that lay behind the "mass awakening," yet the important thing to remember about the phenomenon was its confidence and sense of promise. In the heady days fol lowing the World War, Japan and the rest of the world looked far different from the way it was to look twenty years later when the " inevitable trends" that then seemed so unmistakable had been deflected in unfo reseen directions. Yet, as is so often the case when men see " inevitable trends," they were really making sel f-fulfilling prophecies, true because those who perceived the "mass awakening" and the "new trends in the world" would make them true. Perception and action were shaped by what one wanted to happen, rather than by what was likely to happen.

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THE NEW LIBERALS AND "DEMOKURASHII" The leading exponents of the "reconstruction" of Japan, and the men who argued its case most vociferously , were a new generation of liberal intellectuals whose characteristic political outlook differed m uch in tone and emphasis from that of their seniors. Born around I 88o, this new generation had come of age during the first two decades of parliamentary government and reached their late thirties and early forties by the end of the First World War. Like the older liberals they were typically attracted neither to business nor the bureaucracy but to the free professions that trenched on the world of politics­ journalism , scholarship, and the law. Only a few of them eventually became full-time professional politicians, but all were in some degree writers or publicists. The most prominent perhaps was Yoshino Sakuz6, a professor at Tokyo University, whose books and whose essays in Chua Koran gave the views of the new liberals their most coherent expression. But there were many other less known figures-professional j ournalists like Baba Tsunego and Ishibashi Tanzan, academicians like Oyama Ikuo and Fukuda Tokuz6, lawyers turned independent pol itician like Kiyose lchir6 and Imai Yoshiyuki , professors and j ournalists like Nagai Ryutar6 , Uehara Etsuj ir6 , and Nakano Seigo, who entered into the rough-and-tumble of partisan politics. The older generation of liberals, those already active in politics by the early I goo's, had seen the struggle of the parties against the hambatsu, the military, and the bureaucracy as the paramount question of the day. They had fo ught to loosen the hold of the oligarchic generation on the state and to bring about the fruition of the principles of parl iamentary government. Their goals had been most dramatically stated in the I9 I 2 - I 3 Movement for Constitutional Government-the el im ination of genro interference in politics, the reduction of the special privi leges of the mili tary in government, and the establishment of party-controlled cabinets. The newer generation of li berals, too young to have been anything but bystanders in this earlier struggle, took these goals for granted . Indeed , during the early Taish6 period , when they were becoming active politically, these issues seemed on the verge of resolution. The new liberals did not attack the rule of the hambatsu so much as they attacked the social and political institutions that the oligarchy had nurtured so carefully. The slogans of the new liberals were not "protection of the consti tution" (kensei

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)'iJ.go) o r "destruction of the hambatsu" (hambatsu daha) , but rather "democracy" (demokurashii or minponshugz) and " reconstructio n . " Although the new liberals never constituted a highly structured o r organ­ ized group, some of them did begin to band together at the end of the war. Late in 1 9 1 8 , Yoshino Sakuzo, Fukuda Tokuzo, Nitobe lnazo, Oyama Ikuo, and a number of other prom inent young scholars and teachers j oined to form the Reimeikai. The motives that prompted its organization are read most easily not in its well-known declaration of pri nciples but in the invi­ tations it issued to interested parties. The feeling was expressed that Japan, like the rest of the world , was on the verge of a great change, the nature of which had been made clear by the recently ended war. The wartime conflict had been the struggle of liberalism, progressivism, and democracy against authoritarianism , conservatism, and militarism. The former forces had won, and "for the first time the peoples of the various co untries of the world hope to enter upon a truly civil ized way of life through thei r shining victory and peace . " But in Japan, there were still "eulogists of autocracy and touters of mili tarism," obstinately embedded in conservatism , who looked with con­ tempt upon the rights of free expression and thought and who attem pted by il legal and irrational means to repress them . The crucial task therefore was to prevent those forces of conservatism fro m inhibi ting or holding the new forces back. There was a need to insure that Japan kept in step with the tides of progressivism in the world, that it did not fall behind in the great transformation that had taken place, and that it be assured of making its own national contribution to the progress and uplift of mankind. As the name of the new society indicated , the Reimeikai aimed at bringing about the "enlightenment" of the Japanese people, a change in public opinion that would mark the first step toward ending the domination of the co untry by the conservative "privileged classes" and the governments that pro tected their interests. As befitted a group of "bookish men , " the society was more interested in discussion than in political action. "The members of this associa­ tion," ran the Rei meikai 's statement of policy , "will carry out a program of patriotic propaganda which is based on the assumption that ideas should be fought by ideas, and opinions by opinions, and all members will exert their efforts by pen and tongue . We expect all mem bers wil l chal lenge con­ servative thought. " The group had no formal contact with the pol itical parties, the labor unions, or other political organizations, and avoided sullying its hands in concrete political activity. Its main organized effort was the

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holding of a senes of lectures on current topics for which admission was charged and the publication of the lectures in a small magazine. The group was small and exclusive , and indeed snobbish enough to deny membership to Hasegawa Nyozekan, who had the m isfortune to be a practicing journalist rather than a scholar.7 In 1 9 1 9 , the Kaizo Domeikai , a somewhat less-known group that was more oriented toward political action, was organized by Baba Tsunego , Nagai Ryutaro, Nakano Sei g o, and a number of other young newspapermen and journalists who had attended the Paris Peace Conference. Like the Reimeikai , the Kaizo Domeikai, was not organized to promote any particular ideology but rather sprang from the feeling that it was time to " lower into the grave the era of left-over old men and to build a Japan of the young, whose spirits abound fully and whose bodies burst with vitality . " These young men, who at first had called themselves the Riseikai (the Voice of the Badger Society) after the name of their meeting place in Paris, returned to Japan with two complaints. One was that the Japanese pol itical system and political parties were in a state of stagnation ; the other was that the " bureaucratic diplomacy" of the Japanese delegation at the Peace Conference had been excessively pusillanimous. They pledged themselves to move Japan off the dead center on which it had seem ingly come to a halt. Not everyone in the Kaizo Domeikai was quite agreed on how to bring about a "reconstruction" of Japan-some wished to work with the labor movement, others to reorganize the "established parties," and still others wished to confine their activities to propaganda and political education. After their return to Japan, however, they did attem pt to undertake a more active course than the Reimeikai . First of all, they managed to recruit several young Diet members fro m each of the maj or parties to join the organization, apparently in the hope of influ­ encing the parties from within. Secondly, they drafted a program of concrete measures they wished to achieve, ranging from the enactment of universal suffrage through the reform of the colonial administrations to the "abol ition of bureaucratic diplomacy . " Clearly, they intended not merely to stimulate discussion, but to produce concrete results in the world of politics.8 The real strength of the new liberals, however, lay not in their organiza­ tions, but in their role as publicists. It was they who defined the issue of reform and shaped opinion about it. At first the two most influential organs through which the new liberals spoke were the Chua Karon, in which Yoshino Sakuzo published articles and commentary continuously from 1 9 1 5 or 1 9 1 6 , and the

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Osaka A sahi Shimbun, which h a d led the journalistic attack o n the Terauchi government's attempts to repress public opinion in the name of national unity. But beside these older and established publications, both of which had come under liberal editorial leadership during the course of the war, there appeared a rash of new magazines, perhaps with more limited circulation and influence, but no less significant as platforms for moderate reform . The three most important of these new magazines were Kaizo, Kaiho, and Warera, all of which were founded in r g r g with intention of providing cri tical com­ mentary on the status quo in Japan. All adopted the policy that no view was too dangerous to be heard, and all represented a new kind of "alienated journalism ," attached to no particular party , commi tted to no particular fai th, yet determi ned to spread the gospel of reform. A casual survey of the writings of the new liberals in the j ournals of opinion shows that though they lacked a common program or even a common theoretical base, they did share a number of common views. Perhaps the most fundamental was the hope that there would emerge in Japan a "new politics" that would reflect the needs and aspirations of the common man more faithfully than politics had in the past. The o lder theoretical debates on the nature of the constitution, albeit not completely shunted aside, loomed less im portant than the immediate practical problems the country was facing. "The new view of politics," wrote Oyama lkuo, "does not trifle with empty catchwords such as 'universal rights' or 'natural rights' or ' freedom and equality' which were the keynote of li beral views (minkenron) after the Korean expeditio n ; it demands poli tics which touch on the immediate needs of the people . " 9 The new liberals, o f course, advocated an increase i n the popular partic­ ipation and popular control over government as part of the "new politics," but they were interested in changing the aims of government as wel l. Ends were no less im portant than means. Their view was put succinctly by Uehara Etsuj ir6 : 10 Democracy and reconstruction-the European war has given birth to these universal bywords . . . At the present time, all of the European powers have achieved in outline political structures based on democracy . However, the postwar cry for reconstruction is an attempt to put their economic and social systems on the same basis as their poli tical structure . We cannot hope for the realization o f democracy simply b y a recon-

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struction of the political structure. We can hope for its realization only through the democratization of the industrial economy and social struc­ ture . . . The realization of postwar reconstruction and democracy is a problem even more compelling for our own country than for the European countries. Many of the new liberals advocated measures that went far beyond mere political democratization. They urged the adoption of a more vigorous social wel fare policy , the lightening of popular tax burdens, official recognition of trade unions, a more flexible and democratic educational system, the abolition of formal distinctions between kazoku, shizoku, and heimin, and so forth . Often their demands for social and economic reform were less specific and more utopian than their demands for political reform, but their intention was less to shape a unified program than to sound a call to arms. The shape of the "new politics" was epitomized by the concept of minpon­ shugi, a word first used in a modern context by Kayabara Kazan, but established and popularized as a liberal slogan by Yoshino Sakuzo . For Yoshino, the concept meant two things : first, that the ultimate ai m and purpose of exerci sing political power should be the welfare and advantage of all the people, not just of a privileged few; second, that ultimate j udgments on the exercise of political power should lie with the people themselves. Many have suggested that Yoshino's idea was merely a revival of the old Confucian notion that the actions of the ruler should guarantee the well-being of his people, but it was far more than this. As Yoshino elaborated the idea of minponshugi he made it clear that the union between the actions of the state and the wishes of the people was not to be achieved by some mystical, intuitive process of identification, but rather was to be achieved by the mechanical and institutional processes provided by parliamentary government. H is notion meshed neatly with the new liberal demand for both "reconstruction" and " democracy" by suggesting that government should be both for and of the peopleY Most of the new liberals had li ttle confidence that the existing political parties would be able to bring about the emergence of " new politics . " Having witnessed the growing accom modation between the parties and the oligarchic generation , the gradual decline of enthusiasm in the parties and the inclina­ tion of pol iticians to support the status quo, they were less incl ined to identify the parties with the people than many of their seniors had been. As Nagai

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Ryutaro pointed o u t , although the parties claimed t o represent the will o f the people, they often betrayed the people's demands. He asserted that " those who know whom the Diet represents would not hesitate to declare the true opinion of the people lies outside the Diet . " 12 The parties were not repre­ sentative of the people; they usually subordinated national interest to their own partisan interests ; they failed to adopt clear and open positions on issues ; they were captives of the propertied classes, the well-to-do and the pluto­ crats-such were the complaints. "If the poli tical parties do not maintain a close tie with the livelihood and thought of the people," said Oyama lkuo, "they will be unable to fulfill their proper function completely." 13 Yet at the same time, the new liberals were not always confident in the ability of the masses to govern themselves. Their reaction to the "mass awakening" was often ambivalent. Hidden behind their welcome for the new stirri ngs of popular unrest and participation in politics was the uneasy feeling that these new developments were not without their dangers. If the "awak­ ened people" should not be able to satisfy their demands within the existing institutional framework, constjtutional government, which they valued no less than the older liberals, m ight be pl aced in j eopardy rather than fulfilled. Furthermore, should the people's desire for political participation exceed their capacity for making rational poli tical j udgments, they might become sus­ ceptible to demagogues and agi tators, perhaps from the existing political parties, but equally likely from alien philosophies to extremism. The new liberals, averse to radical changes in political society , were anxious lest the people pervert the new rights that were to be granted them and dissolve into a mob rather than a public.14 STUDENT ENTHUSIASTS If the new li berals had misgivings about the direction the "m ass awakening" might take, there was another group of "spokesmen of the people" who did not. These were the student activists whose enthusiasm seemed to know few bounds and whose yearning for com mi tment to the cause of the people was at times so intense as to be erotic in flavor. Like the new liberals, the students were a new element in politics and indeed their participation in the "mass awakening" marked the emergence of student protest as a famil iar phenom­ enon in national politics. There had always been an incipient tradition of student protest in Japan,

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but until the Taish6 period i t had been limited by and large to the private universi ties, particularly Waseda, where the example and early ideas of Okuma exercised considerable influence on the students and atmosphere of the university . The novelty of student radicalism at the end of the World War was its appearance at the i mperial universities, particularly at Tokyo University . Then as now, the national universities were geared to recruitment of a national elite. Stress was on high marks and achievement rather than enthusiasm and fervor. To some it seemed almost as though an individual 's worth was j udged by his examination scores, not by his sinceri ty or compas­ sion for others. From the beginning of the war, however, there was a growing number of students who chafed in this academic straight jacket and sought to break away fro m the conventional path to success. They did not wish to become "flunkies of the zaibatsu and the bureaucracy. " They were beginning to think for themselves instead of regurgitating lecture notes and were beginning to take more interest in the problems of their own society than in the textbook knowledge necessary to pass the examinations for entry into the bureaucracy or large business firms.15 Why these students made their appearan �e in this period is fascinatingly obscure. Perhaps one reason was that from the end of the Meij i period, opportunities for upward mobility in government and business were declining. In the early and middle years of the Meij i period a university graduate had been almost assured of swift and dramatic success in the world, but now he was less and less a privileged individual with a guaranteed future than a member of an intellectual working force, a learned proletariat.16 The genera­ tion of students emerging in the Taisho period may also have been a more diverse group than those of the Meij i period, fewer and fewer coming from a shizoku background with its traditions of service and separateness, more and more coming from rural hamlets or from the families of city shopkeepers. As such, they may have been less docile in their acceptance of aspirations that reflected the traditional interests of the shizoku class in governmentY Finally, we can not discount the influence of certain teachers at the imperial universities, in particular Yoshino Sakuz6 at Tokyo and Kawakami Haj ime at Kyoto, who by force of personality and by an approach to scholarship that dealt not simply with formalistic theories but with contemporary realities inspired in students interests other than those of conventional success. Whatever the origins of this discontent with the goals of conventional students and this concern over the social and political status quo in Japan,

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both were crystallized into activity a t the end of I g I 8 , following hard both on the rice riots and on the signing of the armistice. At Tokyo Imperial University several students of Yoshino Sakuzo and a number of recent graduates who had already taken jobs in j ournalism or the bureaucracy formed the Shinj inkai. At Waseda, the Minjin Domei was founded several months later in February I g i g . The students who formed these groups did not have an ideology or set of beliefs, no common framework of discourse, only a common mood. Encouraged and excited by the events of I g i 8 , they were in a state of ferment, receptive to new ideas, but uncertain and undis­ criminating in their search for answers. 18 The importance of these groups was not so much their intellectual sophistication as their emotional momen­ tum. Theirs was not a reasoned argument, but a cry of rebellion, a yearning for change, an indignation at social wrongs. They were imbued with a vague but confident optimism that the world was on the verge of a great change, an optimism much less tempered than that of the new liberals. Akamatsu Katsumaro, who later moved in and out of the Communist party to become a chauvinist publicist, recalled, "We were stirred by the extraordinary present­ iment that, perhaps on the morrow, the curtain would rise on a great trans­ formation of society . " What the change would be and how it would come were not so clear, but its advent seemed certain. The whole world was moving "exultantly, at a gallop, without hindrance . " "Ahead . . . was only the ideal human society. If one but reached out a hand . . . it would be delivered immediately. " 19 Like the new liberals, the studen ts had lost hope that change would come about voluntarily by the action of the ruling classes. They had a heroic and romantic conception of themselves as an idealistic and youthful elite who could "rise completely above social considerations and connections, and above class conceptions," uniquely equipped to speed the transformation of society through the emancipation of the underprivileged and the downtrodden. As one student proclaimed ,20 At this moment of dawning enlightenment who will undertake the task of Japan's reconstruction? What of the privileged classes who are now in the position of leading the country? What of the educated classes, the bureaucrats, the military cliques, the party politicians, the capitalists, and the university professors? Their past and present condition are the most eloquent proof that they are not qualified for the task . In practice, their past is too corrupt, too gross, too wanting of ideals to hold the

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confidence of the people. We have already lost hope in the ruling class. Those who lead in reconstruction . . . must be the youth themselves with their purity of conscience, their splendid intellect, their enthusiasm of temperament. It was no longer possible to leave matters to their elders. For the students, the "mass awakening" probably had a greater psycholog­ ical than political importance. They were really shishi in student uniform. Their interest lay in deeds not in words, in action not in thought, in a yearning to move among the common people, to share their aspirations, and to help achieve their hopes. To a much greater degree than the "new liberals" the students were in search of a movement, an opportunity to fulfill the heroic role they saw for themselves in the transition from the old world to the new. The almost revivalistic atmosphere of the student movement can be j udged from a passage in Aso Hisashi's autobiographical novel, Reimez� where he describes one meeting of the Shinj inkai .21 Agitated, K. suddenly rose to his feet. "Brothers ! The masses are waiting for us. We must this moment cast aside everything. We must cast aside every sort of pleasure. Yet in spite of this, what are we doing now? Oh God ! Forgive us. " Having shouted this, he dropped to his seat like a shot and burst into a flood of tears. Everyone was extraordinarily tense. As though in sympathy they began to shout and cry. No wonder that Yoshino later commented that the students granted "equal, nay higher esteem, to energy than to truth. " 22 For them the new liberals' apparent faith in the efficacy of debate was tepid when compared with the heady opportunities of personal involvement. Many must have found emo­ tional catharsis in the sought-after struggle for " the cooperation of all freely emancipated classes" and the destruction of the "outmoded illusions of the bigoted . " THE WORKING CLASS ORGANIZATIONS In the final analysis, it was the emergence of labor unrest that gave urgency to the new demands for " reconstruction." Neither the new liberals nor the student enthusiasts would have made much of an impact with their demands for change had there not been stirrings of political activity among the working classes as well. The "anxious thoughts" of the men in power would hardly

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have been anxiOus without concrete evidence that a new mood was afoot in the factories as well as in newspaper offices, university lecture halls, and student lodgings. It was there that the "mass awakening" became social reality rather than rhetorical flourish. The spurt in strength and activity of the working class had been catalyzed by the impact of the World War on Japan. The temporary withdrawal of Western competition from markets in South and East Asia and the increased demand of the allied powers for Japanese munitions, shipping, and commodi­ ties now unattainable from Germany stimulated the growth of Japan's foreign trade and the expansion of domestic industrial production. To fill the orders that were suddenly flooding Japan, to build the machinery necessary to produce goods to meet the new demand, and to construct the merchant fleet necessary to carry these goods to the buyer, there was a tremendous increase in the number of business enterprises, in the amount of capital investment, and in the capacity of the industrial plant in Japan. (The magnitude of this increase can be seen in Table 6.) This was the era of the narikin, the new rich whose fortunes were made, if not overnight, at least within a short space of years. Beneath this prosperity for the few, however, there occurred a social change of great long-run significance-the rapid expansion of the urban industrial working class. The total number of factory workers increased dramatically during the war years, from 948 ,200 in I 9 I 4 to I ,5 2 o ,ooo in I 9 I 9 , an increase of about 6o percent. More important than the gross figure was the changing composition of the labor force. First of all, the most marked increase had TABLE 6. The development of capital investment and manufacturing capacity, I9 I 3 - I 9 I 8. H o rsepower of

To t a l n o m i n a l To tal n u m ber

N u m ber o f

N um bcr of power

power prod ucing

Year

capi t a l ( i n

o f compa nies

b i l l i o ns of yen)

factories

producing machi nes

m a c h i nes

I9I3

I 5 ,406

15,81 I

1 9 ,084

I , I 2 2 ,5 9 7

I9I4

I 6 ,858

q ,o62

I 8 ,845

9 I 6,828

I9I5

q , I 49

I 6 ,8o9

I 9 ,99 I

I ,065 ,7 2 4

19I6

1 8,2 1 9

3 .453

I 9 ,299

2 5 ,646

I ,065 , 7 2 4

I9'7

I 9 ,696

4,778

2 0 ,966

3 2 ,603

2 , 095 ,588

I9I8

2 3 ,0 2 8

7 ,8 3 2

2 2 ,39 I

4 I ,559

2 ,0 0 1 ,763

3 ,054

Source: Kakuj i ro Yamasaki and Gotaro Ogawa, The Effect of the World War upon the Commerce and Industry ofJapan ( New Haven, 1 9 29), pp. 2 2 0 , 2 2 1 .

122

TABLE 7 · Factory workers by industry, r gog- r g r g (percentages in parentheses).

Category Total number Textiles Machine and tools Chemical Food and drink M iscellaneous Electrical and metal refining

I9I4

I 909 8oo,6oo 486,500 63 ,800 77 ,8oo 88,700 79.700

( 1 00) ( 6o.8) ( 8.o) ( 9·7) ( I I.I) ( 9·9)

3 ,900 (

0.5)

948 ,200 567,500 98,6oo 93 .400 77 ,6oo I O I ,400

I9I9

( 1 00) ( 59·9) ( I o.4) ( 9.8) ( 8.2) ( I 0. 7 )

9,500 (

Index o f increase, I 9 I 4- I 9 I 9

1 .0 )

I ,5 20,400 839.300 244,300 1 7 7 ,6oo 99,200 I 36,6oo

( 1 00) ( 55 . 2 ) ( I 6. I ) ( I J .7) ( 6.5) ( 9.6)

23, I OO (

1 .5 )

I 60.3 I 48·9 247·8 I 90. I I 2 7 ·9 I 34 · 7 242 · 7

Source: Mori Kiichi, Nihon rodo..-ha kaiky1l jotaishi (Tokyo, I 96 I ) , I, 242.

been in the number of male workers. Throughout the war and afterwards, over half the factory labor force continued to be employed in the textile industry, where the percentage of female and minor workers was high, but the most marked expansion of the factory labor force had come in heavy industry, which produced the industrial supplies and equipment that sup­ ported the boom-machine tools, ship building, chemicals, and metal refining. ( See Table 7 .) Secondly, the male labor force in the expanding heavy indus­ tries tended to have a social character different from the largely female labor force in the textile industry. It was older, probably better educated, and tended to be recruited less from the countryside than from the cities. It was also on the whole better paid and less subject to the paternalistic supervision and discipline that was common in the textile industry. The cotton mills usually recruited from farm villages a large number of young women, usually unmarried, who worked for a few years before succumbing either to marriage or tuberculosis (happily, usually the former) . These young women were housed in dormitories, convenient not only for keeping wages low and providing protection for the inexperienced country girls, but also for exer­ cising supervision over the workers. By contrast, in the sector of heavy industry, relations were more impersonal, the dormitory system was hardly employed at all, and the workers were more able to do as they liked during their free time. It is therefore not surprising to find that the labor movement made its greatest gains among the male factory workers employed in heavy industry.

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T H E POPU LAR CHALLE N G E

As seems t o have been the case in other industrial societies, the umon movement gained its initial strength not among the most exploited but among a " labor aristocracy," which was economically, socially, and intellectually better off than the rest of the working class. The more extensive scale of the individual plants and the less paternalistic system of worker discipline in heavy industry also made organization of the workers easier. Because precise statistics on the structure of labor union membership are not available before the early r g 2 o's it is difficult to assess with accuracy the degree to which workers were organized in each industry, but several sets of figures indicate TABLE 8. Number of labor organizations, membership of labor organizations, and proportion of organized workers by industry, r g 2 o and r g 2 6 .

C ategory"

c

A + C

A

B

N u m ber of labor

To tal n u m ber

N urn ber of labor

organization

workers

or workers

organ izations

mem bers

orga n i zed

Percen t a ge o f

Machine and tools

2 2 2 ,366

82

40, 1 2 5

I 8.o

C he m i cal

I 4 I ,769

67

g,047

6.4

Tex t i l e

7 I 2 ,6 2 0

go

6 I ,643

8.6

Mining

4 3 3 ,843

94

5 2 , I 35

1 2 .0

C ategoryb

c

A

B

N u m ber of l a bor

A + C

To t a l n u m ber

N u m ber of labor

orga n i z a t i o n

Percen tage of

of workers,

orga nizations

mem bers,

orga n i zed

Oct. I 9 2 5

Dec. 1 9 2 6

1 92 6

workers

Mach i n e and tools

3 2 0 ,3 7 4

9 7 ,085

30·3

Chemical

1 7 3 ,8 8 1

g ,5 o 6

5 ·4

Tex t i l e

9 3 8 ,842

20

I I ,7 0 0

1 .2

Food and d r i n k

I 69, 539

I3

4,888

2 .8

Gas and electric

ss ,ooo

4

3 ,0 7 4

5 ·5

67 , I 6g

95

1 5 ,3 9 3

2 2 .g

3 1 0 ,000

8

7 ,g66

2.2

E lectrical and metal refi n i n g Mining B u i l d i n g and publ ic works Transpor t a t i o n Com m u n i c a t i o n M isce l l a neous Tot a l

7 36,8oo

38

3 ,904

0.5

9 2 3 ,000

6o

1 07 , 2 2 6

I 1 .6

65 1 2 3 ,346 284,739

Source: Rodo nenkan henshujo, ROdo nenkan (Tokyo, 1 920). Data as of December 1 9 1 9. " Source: Shuichi Harada, Labor Conditions in Japan (New York, 1 92 8 ) , p. 1 75 . Data as of December 1 926. •

124

TAB LE g. Wages, prices, and labor disputes, 1 g 1 4- 1 g 1 g . Year

Price index

Living expense indexa

Wage index

Real wage index

Nu mber of labor dispu tes

1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919

1 00.0 1 02 .0 1 2 2 .0 1 54·0 2 0 2 .0 248.0

1 00.0 9 2 ·5 1 00.6 1 2 3·7 1 74 · 3 2 1 6.9

1 00.0 99· 1 1 0 1 .9 1 1 6.7 1 53·3 2 1 7 ·9

1 00.0 r o8 . 2 ! 05 . 1 98·4 92 ·3 ! 0 2 .3

so 64 1 08 398 417 2 ,388

Source: Mori, p. 260, for wage and price statistics. Kindai rekishi jiten (Tokyo, 1 g5g), p. gog, for labor dispute statistics. Money spent by laboring households on food, shelter, heat, ligh t , and clothing. a

that the organization of workers was most successful in the industries which profited by the wartime boom. (See Table 8 . ) Labor discontent accompanied the increased activity and organization of labor. The number of labor dispu tes, the number of workers involved in labor disputes, and the duration of disputes all grew at an increasing rate after the beginning of the war. The principal problem for the labor class was the rising cost of living, the result of an inflation that was exacerbated by the accumulation of Japan's specie reserves, the increase in the circulation of currency, and the relative scarcity or stagnation in the production of consumer goods to meet increased spending power. Wages did not keep pace with this rise and the consequence was the outbreak of strikes for higher pay, partic­ ularly during 1 g q and 1 g 1 8 . But the wave of labor unrest reached tidal proportions in 1 g 1 g when the summer brought a record-breaking number of strikes and labor disputes. ( See Table g . ) But more important for our consideration was the politicizatior: of the labor movement. In part, this was stimulated by the participation of both new liberals and student enthusiasts in the working-class organizations. Much of it also resulted from a new mood among the more articulate workers, some of whom had left the workshop to devote themselves to full-time organiza­ tional work. Labor's turn toward politics was most striking in the case of the largest and strongest working-class organization, the Yuaikai . Founded in 1 g 1 2 , the Yuaikai had from its beginnings been under the domination of moderate middle-class intellectuals like Suzuki Bunj i , who believed that labor could make its greatest gains by education, mutual aid, self-help, and coopera-

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T H E POPU LAR C H A LL E N G E

tion with employers. They assumed, for both practical and theoretical reasons, that the interests of labor and capital were not fundamentally opposed, but mutually dependent. Antagonism between the two would be to the economic advantage of neither. During the course of the war, however, there was a growing feeling not only among these moderates but also among those who moved up into positions of leadership from the ranks of the workers and from the university lecture rooms that employers were interested in " the coopera­ tion of capital and labor" only in order to assure industrial peace and continued profits. Harmonization and self-improvement, however useful they might have seemed in the prewar period when repression of working class activities was severe, now appeared to be mere cant.23 This feeling became pronounced by the war's end. Shortly after the rice riots in Ig I 8 Suzuki pointed out that one of the lessons to be learned from these disturbances was that the workers could expect little or no help from the political parties. Instead of taking steps to improve the conditions of the masses, the parties had merely used the riots to make loud denunciations of the Terauchi government for its inadequacies. Rumor even had it that one party opposed the abolition of the import duty on foreign rice in order to protect the interests of the landowners it represented. "This state of things is intolerable," he continued, "as the interests of the masses are sacrificed for the few who have the right of voting. " 24 The following year when Hara's home minister, Tokonami Takej ir6, in cooperation with a number of leading industrialists such as Shibuzawa Eiichi, organized the Kyochokai ( the Harmony Society) in order to promote the " harmony of labor and capital," Suzuki refused to participate unless there were official recogni­ tion of labor's right to organize and to employ tactics such as strikes.25 "What workmen are crying out for," he wrote in his reply to the invitation to join, "is neither consolation nor money, but no less than the acquisition of the rights to which they are j ustly entitled . " 26 Labor needed the power to organize itself and to fight independently for its own interests. The demands of the Yuaikai and of the labor movement in general began to broaden from strictly economic issues involving worker-employer relations to questions with political implications as well. From the beginning of I g i g , labor organizations began to agitate not only for higher wages or better factory conditions, but for specific legislative measures. Early in the year, the Yuaikai held rallies demanding the legal recognition of trade unions and the abolition of restrictive provisions of the Police Regulations of I goo , particularly Article I 7 , which were regarded as a legal obstacle to the organiza-

126

tion of unions and the holding of strikes. By March an extraordinary general meeting of the Yuakai called for the legal recognition of four basic working­ class rights-the right to live, the right to org�e, the right to strike, and the right to vote-all of which involved the action of the Diet, rather than the action of individual employers.27 An important stimulus of this shift to specifically political demands was the inclusion of certain "basic rights" of labor, embodying guidelines for government policy toward labor throughout the world, in the Versailles Peace Treaty. The working-class movement in Japan could draw on international public opinion to buttress its demands in the same way that the new liberals and the students did. In August 1 9 1 9 the declaration of the Yuaikai's annual general meeting reflected this. "The world is being reborn," it asserted. "It moves ever forward leaving Japan behind. Therefore, we the producers of Japan make this declaration to the world. The workers of Japan will also live in the spirit of the League of Nations and its Labor Convention, and we will not shirk the martyr-like struggle to assure that the world may be governed by peace and freedom and equality . " 28 More specifically, the new program of the organization, which converted itself into a general federation of trade unions under the name of Dai Nihon Rodo Sodomei Yuaikai, drew heavily on the draft of an international labor convention that was to be proposed at the coming International Labor Conference. Of its twenty articles, beginning with the "recognition that labor is not a commodity" and ending with the "democratization (minponka) of the educational system," thirteen were taken from the draft convention.29 But the new program included a number of items that were peculiarly applicable to Japan. Perhaps the most significant of these was the demand for universal suffrage. As Suzuki had already realized , labor's needs would go unheeded unless the "awakened masses" found a political mechanism for making their wants known . "Universal suffrage is not an academic question," he had said, "it is a practical question and must be carried out as speedily as possible. " 30 By August 1 9 1 9 most of those who urged a "reconstruction" of Japan were in agreement with him. THE UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT Nearly all the elements who demanded a "reconstruction" of Japan realized that short of revolution, the path that was most likely to lead to reform was an expansion of the electorate. Since the beginning of the Diet, the right

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T H E POPU LAR C H ALLE N G E

t o vote for members of the House o f Representatives had been limited to by tax-paying qualifications. The oligarchs did not wish to entrust the suffrage to those who did not pay taxes, partly because they felt that the levying of taxes was the principal function of the House and partly because they felt that those without property were less likely to exercise sound political j udgment than those who held it. The resu lt, of course, had been to keep the House of Representatives, and hence the political parties, under the sway of the rural landlords and the urban well-to-do. A major renovation of the political and social system was not likely to come about as long as this "privileged class" dominated politics, since they were more concerned in protecting their own interests than in responding to the needs of the mass of the people. It is not surprising, therefore, that the new liberals, the student activists, and the working-class movement plunged headlong into a popular movement to bring about the establishment of a universal suffrage law. The issue, of course, was not a new one. There had been a miniscule uni versa! suffrage movement since the Ia te I 890 's, when a n urn ber of socialists, ex-members of the popul ist wing of the jryiiminken movement, and one-cause radicals banded together to a form a League for the Promotion of Universal Suffrage. These early suffragists, some of whom were Diet representatives, succeeded in introducing a series of universal manhood suffrage bills in the Diet beginning in I 90 2 , and in I 9 I I such a bill had even passed the House of Representatives. But these efforts attracted little attention. Public opinion was more excited about the yet unresolved struggle between the parties and the oligarchic generation than it was in democratizing the political institutions established by the Meij i constitution. There was little or no active support in the press when the universal suffrage bills were introduced and no protest when they were defeated . Neither was there any organized mass participation in the movement-no rallies, no demonstrations, no riots.31 But by the winter of 1 9 1 9 a new universal suffrage movement began to gather force, sustained by the postwar growth of the demand for "reconstruction." Not only were there a few small demonstrations in Tokyo and Osaka, but articles and editorials debating, and usually advocating, the passage of universal suffrage began to fill the pages of the leading daily newspapers and monthly journals. The Chua Karon serialized two long articles by Yoshino Sakuzo, and a flood of books and pamphlets by others soon followed . By the end of the year, a popular movement was going full force. The arguments of the memb�rs of the universal suffrage movement, both

128

in the press and in the streets, reflected a wide range of concerns, all of which revolved around the demand for a general reform of the political system, and more particularly the democratization of institutions of representative government which it embodied . The most universal argument was the obvious one-that universal suffrage was necessary to make the Diet and the parties more responsive to the needs and demands of the people as a whole. Limita­ tions on the right to vote, ran many articles, was the main reason why the activities of the Diet often bore little relation to movements in public opinion. Despite the outward trappings of free elections and representative institutions, the Japanese political system was still far from being a government of the people. As one lead ing suffragist pointed out, under the existing electoral laws, the proportion of persons with political rights was not much different from what it had been in the Edo period. Before the Restoration, about 6oo ,ooo or 7oo ,ooo samurai had dom inated a population of about 2 0-30 million ; at the end of the World War, there were about r ·5 million voters in a population of 53 million. The proportion of the politically privileged was the same ; the tax receipt had replaced the sword as a sign of privilege. This was hardly representative government.32 A similar feeling was echoed in many of the working-class manifestoes demanding universal suffrage. The working class, or at least its leadership, were offended at the inj ustice of an electoral system that depended on the mere "power of money," and not on "muscle, brains, and j ustice. " 33 It was patently unfair to deny voting rights to the workers who were no less a mainstay of national wealth and strength than the employers, the farmers, and the peasants. The factory laborer produced the country's goods in time of peace and fought in its armies in time of war; it was not right that the vote should be denied him simply because he paid no taxes. A manifesto of the Kansai Labor Alliance for Universal Suffrage declared :34 Are we not producers? Do we not enrich mankind? If . . . wealth is the sole standard in politics, we ought to be the first to participate. At present, the right to vote is given to property owners and consumers, but not to us, the producers. We cannot tolerate this situation . The plea was more impassioned than a simple appeal to the principles of democracy, but essentially the indictment of the political system was the same. Many of the suffragists also felt that universal suffrage would have the

129

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TH E PO P U LA R CHALLE N G E

effect of putting a n end t o electoral corruption and other abuses o f the voting system. If the number of voters were increased to include all adult males, the bribery of voters, the solicitation of party support through promise of pork barrel legislation, the intimidation of voters by police and minor local officials, and door-to-door canvassing would become prohibitively expensive, both in time and money. Uehara Etsuj iro placed high hopes on this effect of suffrage reform.35 In Japan, the so-called political parties are all bound together by personal ties and connections, emotions, or individual personalities . . . [They J are organized principally by personal connection or private advantage. If the right to vote is extended broadly . . . the foundations of the existing political parties will be destroyed of their own accord. The organization of each party will reform itself. There is no other way to reform the parties fundamentally. If . . . the right to vote is extended to [all those who reach their majority regardless of property or wealth J it will become impossible to fight elections as previously by means of personal ties, connections, or bribery. Universal st.. ffrage would mean not only more representative government, but more honest parties and cleaner government ; the pocketbook would become less effective as a political weapon than open principles and pro­ grams. On the question of how the passage of universal suffrage would affect the political role of the masses, however, there was a fundamental split in the suffrage movement. Many of the new liberals regarded the measure as a means of protecting the country against social disorder and of assuring the continued stability of parliamentary government. If repressed too long, the discontent of the people might fester into extremism, extra-parliamentary violence, and tactics of "direct action. " Few of the new liberals believed that a popular revolution was imminent, but universal suffrage did seem to provide a "safety valve" for this popular discontent ; reforming parliamentary govern­ ment would therefore strengthen it. Yoshino Sakuzo's defense of universal suffrage presented this argument in a rather subtle and abstract form. In­ spired by contemporary European theories of the state, he rejected attempts to j ustify universal suffrage on the grounds that it was a "natural right" or that it would provide a means for increasing the power of the propertyless classes. Rather, he argued , it would promote social solidarity. Universal

130

suffrage was of mutual advantage to both the people and to the state. The citizens, he said,36 . . . demand the inherent right to participate in determining the will [of the state] because [they] have the right to material and spiritual guarantees in order to fulfill [their] positive responsibilities toward . . . the state and because the state attempts to decide their destiny . Further, it is both advisable and necessary for the state to promote the material and spiritual fulfillment of all the individuals who make up the state and act in such a way that they will work voluntarily for the sake of the nation. Despite the crabbed rhetoric, it is clear that his views were not so different from those who argued more directly that universal suffrage would provide release for pent-up popular dissatisfaction and protect the public in the long run. The working-class organizations and many of the student enthusiasts who participated in the movement, however, interpreted the potential long-run effect of universal suffrage somewhat differently. For them it would serve less as an instrument for promoting social consensus and social solidarity than a means of expressing class interests and achieving class goals. Many of the working-class suffragists, for example, hoped that the extension of voting rights would enable labor to exercise an immediate and direct influence on legislation that affected the workers' interests. A Kawasaki shipyard worker, writing in the Yuaikai journal , took as an example the question of abolishing article 1 7 of the Police Regulations of 1 900. The wording of the article was regarded by many as making the organization of trade unions illegal and hence was a long-standing complaint of the socialist movement and the moderate labor leadership. Yet little had been done about itY The government has cleverly quibbled with words and done nothing. Since the majority of the members of the Diet are of the capitalist class, there are few among them who exert efforts for the revision of [the Police Regulations] . In such circumstances it is very difficult for us to carry out our intentions. Therefore we wish to elect our own representatives . . . and bring about a reconstitution of the Diet. Clearly such a point of view suggested the need for an expansion of the suffrage and also im plied the necessity for political representation that specifi-

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TH E POPU LAR C H A L LE N G E

cally catered t o the interests of labor. Although never suggested explicitly by the labor leadership, there was in this view the germ of a rationale for building up separate "proletarian parties" to compete with the "established parties. " This idea began to have greater appeal by the mid- I 9 2 0 's, but even in I 9 I 9 an old suffragist like Sakai Toshihiko was sanguine enough to suggest that the universal suffrage movement might provide the opportunity for the formation of a labor party or even a socialist party in Japan.38 Indeed, in December, a number of Yuaikai-affiliated labor organizations inaugurated a Japan Labor Party, which took as its two main goals, the enactment of universal suffrage and the destruction of "capitalist political parties. " 39 Despite the general unity of the suffragist movement in I 9 I 9 and 1 9 2 0 , there were therefore elements of ambiguity within it that might later lead to a split in its ranks. Whether such a split were to emerge, however, still depended on the response of the parties to the issue. Whether the participants were to accept the idea of political consensus created by participation of the whole population in the political process or whether they were to choose the path of extra-parliamentary tactics for achieving class ends largely depended on the will ingness of men like Hara and Kato to accept the inevitability and necessity of universal suffrage.

132

VI THE CRY FOR REFORM : THE PARTY RE SPO N SE

w ith signs of popular unrest growmg m

the country, especially in the capital at Tokyo, the professional politicians could scarcely ignore the new cry for reform . The liberal demand for "reconstruction," the increase in working-class organizations, the rising number of labor disputes, the spread of radical ideas among the students and workers, the rice riots-all prompted discussion and debate within the Diet, in party headquarters, and in govern­ ment offices. The politicians now began to speak of a whole new complex of issues that had hardly been raised in the Meij i period-the "social prob­ lem ," " the livelihood problem ," and most ominously, the " thought problem . " Even Yamagata a t his villa i n Odawara constantly sought the opinions of visitors on these pressing new problems. If the prevailing mood of the would-be reformers was optimism, the prevailing mood of the politicians was concern. The politicians, whether in the parties or in the bureaucracy, were not seized with an intense fear of imm inent revolution, as some latter-day his­ torians have suggested . After all, in contrast to the late r g 2 o 's, there was still no substantial organized left wing in Japan at the end of the World War

133

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T H E PARTY R E S PO N S E

and certainly n o explicitly revolutionary organization such a s the Communist party, which only emerged several years later. But the " mass awakening" and its attendant phenomena did generate much uneasiness. For one thing it challenged the belief of the more conservative that the Japanese people were naturally passive and that Japanese society was naturally harmonious. For those who felt that the copy-book virtues of loyalty, obedience, and patriotism had made Japan a great power, the country's future seemed jeopardized by the emergence of disruptive elements in society, who cham­ pioned private concerns or class interests over public interest and national unity. The "mass awakening" implied the spread of a pernicious new type of individualism alien to Japanese tradition. Nakakoj i Ren, erstwhile member of the Doshikai, and minister of commerce and agriculture under the Terauchi cabinet, spoke the need for "balance and harmony" in the face of the growing economic difficulties of many within the country. "There is no need to think only of the freedom and advantages of each individual. We must be concerned for society as a whole, and for that reason we must aim as much as possible at balance and as much as possible at harmonious adj ustment. We must hope for the stability of the whole people . . . It can not be helped if one group of people [within society] is discontented and lacks freedom." 1 Similarly, Hiranuma Kiichiro, commenting on the rice riots, predicted that such "regret­ table social phenomena" would continue to occur if " the sentiment of the whole Japanese people regarding themselves as members of one great family" were not properly maintained .2 But concern over the new stirring of the people was not simply a matter of nostalgic attachment for "the Japanese way of life" or the revitalized Confucian virtues. Many felt it was also a matter of economics. A docile population, willing to work for minimal wages without complaint, could keep Japan competitive in the world economy, but strikes, lagging production, and higher wages meant falling profits and a possible crisis of Japan's position in the world market. Social peace, and more particularly industrial peace, was a prerequisite for the country's economic health. Moreover, though there seemed no immediate threat of revolution, a population kept in a state of economic repression was an ideal breeding ground for radical agitators spreading foreign philosophies of violence and "direct action. " The situation might become more serious if the "propertyless classes" were cut off from free participation in the political process as well. These were practical prob­ lems, not sentimental ones.

134

Whatever the sources of their concern, the politicians were faced with the task of responding to the popular pressures for reform. The question was of particular importance to the men in the parties for it was they who were apparently to bear the burdens of rule at the end of the war. What is striking for us is that the "mass awakening" and the demand for "reconstruction " reshaped the nature of the rivalry between the two major parties. Before 1 9 1 8 , the Kenseikai and the Seiyukai seemed cut from the same mold, both born out of tactical considerations and hence devoid of any strong ideological coloring or any pronounced difference in programs. But from the end of the war, the two parties seemed to be veering in somewhat different directions. While the Hara cabinet remained relatively unresponsive to the new trends in public opinion, the Kenseikai, in opposition, began to press for political democratization, social reforms, and remedial legislation to inoculate the country against future popular unrest. In part this difference stemmed from the contrasting character of Hara and Kato as political leaders, but it sprang as well from the fact that the Seiyukai was in power and the Kenseikai was not. The difference between the two parties was perhaps more one of degree than essence. The Kenseikai in opposition did not wish to kick over the traces of existing political and social order, nor did the Seiyukai in power intransi­ gently oppose all change. Party rivalry was neither as intense as the conflict between the jiyuminken movement and the oligarchy in the 1 88o's or the parliamentary struggles between the Socialists and the Liberal-Democrats in the 1 95o's. But to admit this does not mean that the differences between the Kenseikai and the Seiyukai were any less significant. The dynamic of politics in a stable parliamentary system is the struggle over small differences, not over fundamental assumptions. Japan may not have been dramatically re­ formed in the Taisho period, but that there was any change at all resulted largely from the existence of even a modicum of programmatic rivalry between the two parties. THE POLICY OF THE HARA CABINET The main reason that the Seiyukai proved less responsive to the "mass awakening" was that Hara's vision of politics remained circumscribed by his early experience as party leader. Despite the precedent established by his nomination to head the cabinet, he had no intention of opening a new era in Diet politi::s. Indeed, shortly after he beca:ne premier, he told Maeda

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Renzan, later his biographer, that he was not overly optimistic about what he might accomplish. "I am thankful for the welcome I've received," he said , "but if [people] expect too much of me, they'll be disappointed . . . I think if I had been selected ten years earlier I would have been able to do a lot, you know. But when you get older, various circumstances in one's surround­ ings become complicated-there are involvements everywhere-to put it in the worst light, you can't move freely because of personal entanglements. If you expect too much, you'll be disappointed. " 3 Maeda surmised, probably correctly, that Hara was worried lest Yamagata interfere with his policies and plans, as the old man had interfered with other premiers in the past. But Hara's remarks also reflected his inclination to let sleeping dogs lie. No bold crusader, Hara was reluctant to inject new issues into politics or take up debate on new problems. He seems to have regarded his tenure in office not as an opportunity to strike out in new directions but to accomplish his long-sought goal of reducing hambatsu influence over the government and replacing it with that of his own party. In this respect, he was rather successful. Partly by legal reforms and partly by personal maneuvering, he reduced several remaining pockets of hambatsu resistance to party influence. He managed to open a number of high-level bureaucratic posts to free appoint­ ment and hence to political patronage ; he established a working alliance (a so-called "vertical alliance" ) with the Kenkyukai, the largest faction in the House of Peers and Yamagata's chief instrument for exercising influence there ; he secured the cordial friendship, if not the personal allegiance, of many of Yamagata's younger proteges like Tanaka Giichi and Den Kenj iro ; and he attempted finally to eliminate the gun system, which he had long regarded as a local buttress of hambatsu power. All these measures, most of which he had pursued since his days as home minister, reflected his paramount concern for securing and maintaining his own party's power.4 Although Hara achieved some degree of success in subtly but perceptibly reducing the remnants of hambatsu influence in the political world , his other policies did not depart very strikingly from those that had been pursued by the oligarchic generation. He shared their concern for the attainment of national "wealth and strength ," the slogan of the post-restoration government. For Hara, Japan was primarily a country pitted against a potentially hostile world community rather than one whose most serious problems were internal. But for the fact that he regarded Japan as an equal of the Western nations, many of his speeches and writings might seem to have come from the brush

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of Ito or Yamagata. "To stand forth among the Powers is not easy," he told his party in 1 9 2 0 . "To uphold the so-called dignity of a great nation can not be accomplished with ordinary determination . . . Facing outward, we must aim at the ever growing development of national strength ; and within the country, we must exert ourselves for the ever growing fulfillment of national strength. " 5 But what must have struck a responsive chord when Japan was struggling to catch up with the West now had a stale ring to it. To the extent that Hara had a clear-cut program of national policy, it was embodied in the so-called "positive policy" that he outlined in October 1 9 1 8 , shortly after taking office. Its four planks were a continuation of the economic policies that the Seiyiikai had enunciated since the close of the Russo-] apanese War-" the strengthening of national defenses," "the strength­ ening and improvement of educational facilities," "the development of trans­ portation and communication," and "the encouragement of trade and indus­ try . " 6 So blandly unexceptionable were these as policy goals that one is inclined at first to dismiss them as empty political rhetoric, but in fact they reflected both Hara's conception of the role of government and his more partisan concern with building his own party's strength. Since the Meij i era, government had traditionally assumed an important role in economic development. Despite the abandonment of direct govern­ ment enterprise in the 1 88o's, the state continued to exercise substantial influence, both intentional and unintentional, on the development of the economy. For Hara, no less than for many of his contemporaries, it was only natural that government should spend heavily on building the infrastructure of the national economy. His economic views, at least as they are reflected in his public utterances, were so baldly simple that it is difficult to remember they merely reflected this basic concern. At the same time he was well aware that government participation in economic development could be exploited to party advantage. He was a man who appreciated the fact that appeals to private advantage were a powerful weapon in politics. He once told Kataoka Naoharu that "if you don't give men official position or money they won 't be moved . . "7 And when a well-known liberal newspaperman, Baba Tsunego, urged him to work for clean politics that did not depend on the use of money, he replied, "How can such a foolish thing exist? Doesn 't everyone want money? Go ahead and make a society that doesn't want money, then I'll show you politics that don't depend on money." The "positive policy" provided Hara and his party with a cornucopia of economic morsels to lure .

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financial and electoral support. The Seiyukai had at its disposal everything from government contracts for military supplies to local land reclamation projects to distribute in return for votes and contributions from local poli­ ticians and businessmen. In practice, the "positive policy" meant bigger budgets and a bigger national debt. The bigger budgets were not simply the result of wartime inflation but reflected plans for more extensive government expenditure on armaments, the construction and repair of railroad lines, the improvement of irrigation works and harbors, the building of schools, the construction of a more widespread network of telephone and telegraph lines, and the sub­ sidization of road improvement and repair. The figures in Table 1 0 illustrate the magnitude of this increase in expenditure after Hara's accession to power. Total expenditure in the general account under the 1 9 1 9 budget, the first prepared under the Hara cabinet, was half again as large as the first budget under Terauchi in 1 9 1 7 · The three subsequent budgets prepared by the Seiyukai government were nearly twice as large. Although some of the new expenditure (particularly military expenditure) was financed by tax increases and by stoppage of appropriations to the public debt sinking fund, most of the new government construction programs, whether railroads, schools, or telephone lines, were to be financed by the TAB LE 1 0 . Government expenditure, 1 909- 1 9 2 2 (in millions of yen).

Year

Total expenditure in the general account

H o m e Ministry expenditure on harbor improvement, and road construction and repair

Expendi ture on rai lroad construction

I gog I9I I I9I3 I9I5 I91]

533 585 574 583 735

4 IO 9 7 8

Ig I8 9 I2

I9I9 I 92 0 I 92 I I922

I ,I 7Z I ,360 I ,490 I ,430

I8 37 3I 4I

35 59 58 68

Sources: The figures on Home M inistry expenditure on harbor improvement and road con­ struction and repair are taken from M asumi, (Kokka gakka i zasshi, No. 75 ( 1 96 2 ) , pp. 436-437 ; the rest are compiled from Meiji Taislzo zaiseishz, I, passim.

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issuance of public bonds and the raising of public loans. The probable reason for this was the sensitivity both of public officials and of party men toward raising taxes, an issue that had more than once brought about a Diet dis­ solution during the years before the Russo-Japanese War.9 In any case, it was a happy expedient for providing new benefits to the taxpayers without their having to pay for them-at least in the short run. The increase in the issue of public bonds was therefore no less dramatic than the increase in expenditure. Legislation provided authorization for the issue of ¥ 2 0 r million in new public bonds in 1 9 1 9 , ¥30 1 million in 1 92 0 , and ¥305 millipn in 1 9 2 1 . 10 The increase in government expenditure had the important side-effect of helping to expand Seiyukai power. Not only could the party claim it was working for the expansion of the national economy as a whole, it could hold out the promise of a share in this increased expansion to entice local citizens to support the party. From the outset of the cabinet, Seiyukai members approached local village leaders, businessmen in provincial cities, and some­ times even the local members of rival parties with the promise of specific economic benefits in return for entry into or support of the Seiyukai. 1 1 To be sure, similar practices also prevailed in prefectural assemblies, where governors sympathetic to the Seiyukai used their power over the local economy to strengthen areas that supported the party, but a large-scale program of government-financed construction gave the local party members immeasurably stronger weapons. In any event, the "positive policy " merely represented a continuation of the pork barrel politics that the Seiyukai had used for expanding local power in the early 1 9oo 's. Moreover, it tied the party to the type of constituency that had grown up since the early days of the Seiyukai-local yuryokusha, landowners, bankers, and businessmen. In contrast to its readiness to cater to local business and economic interests in the name of "national wealth and strength," the Seiyukai remained slow to react to the changes in the cities. Again much of the responsibility l ies with Hara, who tended to discount the importance of the "mass awakening," at least as it was perceived by the liberals, the students, and the working-class leadership. Reading through his diary and public papers, one might get the impression that popular unrest hardly existed at all, or at least that it was of no serious proportion. He told the party rank and file in January 1 9 2 0 that h e was skeptical o f the country's having undergone any significant change since the war. 12

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[ Some people] are inclined to assert that there has occurred a great spiritual and material change in our country. Naturally we recognize that. It is a fact that there has been some degree of change. However, as I have said before, it is not change such as there has been in the various countries of Europe. Admittedly, there was much j ustice in this view, but for Hara it was an excuse to ignore the demand for reform . Because he did not regard the social and economic changes that accompanied the war as having great importance, what need was there to formulate a response to them? At times Hara regarded the mood of his liberal � n d radical critics with some irritation. He was disturbed by, and occasionally contemptuous of, the overly abstract ideas of what he regarded as xenophile intellectuals. On one occasion he likened those who were moved by foreign ideas to malleable lead and those who opposed any change at all to inflexible stone ; his own mineralogical preference was iron "which demonstrates the best harmony between conservatism and progress. " 13 Hara showed his distrust of the intellectuals most conspicuously in the case of Morito Tatsuo, a Tokyo University professor who published an analytical essay on the anarchist thought of Kropotkin. Not only did he agree to the indictment of Morito for the publication of his article, but he privately expressed the view that people who propagated such ideas ought to be dealt with in a vigorous fashion. "The way university professors and others have shown off recently by senselessly advancing extreme and dangerous views is undesirable for the state ," he wrote in his diary, when he first heard of the incident.14 And somewhat later he added, "I think it fearful for the future of the country when university professors do so much that is irresponsible and heedless of the foundations of the state . " 15 Similarly, he showed littly sympathy for the growing working-class move­ ment and it s demands. In the Diet session of 1 9 1 9 , there was heavy pressure from the labor organizations and the new liberals as well as from the opposi­ tion in the Diet to abolish article 1 7 of the Police Regulations and set up legal machinery for the regulation of labor union activity. Hara's response was that there was no need for such legislation even if, as many of his opponents argued , the working-class movement should turn to extremism. "I do not think," he said, " that labor unions will become immediately dangerous. If there is any fear that they will become dangerous, or if there

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is any plan to make them dangerous, they will, of course, be brought under control." As long as the workers were moderate, there was no need for alarm, and all he proposed was to continue to "exercise vigilance." 16 Similarly, the vice minister of the Home Ministry announced in the summer of I 9 I 9 that he welcomed the development of "sound" working-class organizations that would devote themselves to "mutual cultivation" and the "improvement of craftsmanship" and assured the public that the government had no intention of using article I 7 to repress labor organizations as long as their demands were "appropriate" and their method "moderate." 17 It is apparent that the Hara government regarded the problem of labor relations primarily as a matter of internal security and that it would intervene only when the public order was threatened. Although Hara frequently expressed the pious hope that the labor problem could ultimately "be solved by the cooperation of the state, the capitalists, and the workers, " 18 the mounting labor unrest in the late summer of I 9 I 9 made such a prospect dim indeed. Rather than attack the unrest at its source the government turned more and more of the tactics of "control" and repres­ sion to deal with the labor problem. From the end of I 9 I 9 , it made every effort to combat the growing number of strikes by the enforcement of article I 7, by encouraging employers to fire or refuse to reemploy striking workers, and by arresting labor organizers and agitators.19 The government was particularly sensitive to strikes that occurred in critical industries. When a major strike broke out at the Yawata Steel Works in January I 9 2o, though some attempts were made at official mediation between the strikers and the mill's management, the main involvement of the government was to dispatch police and kempeitai units to bring order to the city. The following month, during a slowdown strike of streetcar workers in Tokyo, the government employed similar tactics. It called up the kempeitai on the ground that there were reservists among the workers, ir arrested one of the Communications Union leaders and fired 500 of the striking conductors and drivers.20 By the end of his ministry, doubtless as a result of his frustrations in keeping the labor organizations under control, Hara showed less and less sympathy for the workers. In late I 9 2 1 , he remarked to Yamagata that though the working class was prospering and though its members were even able to buy expensive goods they continued to demand higher wages and carry on "disturbances. " Although the government attempted "rigorous control" of such activities, "faint-hearted capitalists" gave in to these demands in order

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to achieve temporary peace. He admitted to Yamagata that he had no idea of how to deal with this problem, and Yamagata answered that he could not think of any solution either.21 Both men, it is not hard to conclude, were behind the times. There was little to be expected in the way of reform or "reconstruction" from the Hara government. Caught up in the game of besting the hambatsu and expanding Seiyiikai power, Hara remained a captive of his past. Too old and too canny to learn new political tricks, Hara used tactics and policies as premier that were little different from those he had pursued in expanding Seiyukai power in the early r goo's. In his moment of triumph, Hara found himself with little clear notion of how to improve on the oligarchic brand of rule, except perhaps to spend the government's money in larger portions. Shying away from new issues, his style was Walpolean, not Gladstonian. If there were to be a champion of popular causes among the "established parties," it could only be the Kenseikai. THE KENSEIKAI AND THE DEMAND FOR REFORM In contrast to the Seiyiikai 's generally negative response to the postwar problem of unrest, the Kenseikai adopted a position that was more flexible and more responsive to the growing demand for reform. Admittedly, this was as much a matter of tactics as of conviction, for it was the habit of the opposition party in Japan to seize upon weak spots of government policy in order to drum up support. The temptation of a party to take an "extreme position" when out of power was not new, nor was it confined to the Kenseikai . In r g q , when Hara found himself out of power, he had let his intimates know that if the genro and the Okuma cabinet sought to destroy his party, the Seiyiikai , "as a matter of self-protection," would have "no choice, but . . . to take an extreme position regarding the abolition of taxes, and the revision of press and election laws. " 22 The Kenseikai leadership, though perhaps not so cynically motivated , was certainly less constrained by the "personal entanglements" of which Hara complained when he became premier. The tactical position of the party, though it may not have been the sole or even decisive influence on the formulation of party policy , at least enabled the party to advocate a bolder course than it might have had it been in power. At the same time it seems equally clear that whatever their tactical position

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there was a predisposition on the part of the Kenseikai to take the demands for reform more seriously than did Hara or his subordinates. The former government officials like Kato, Wakatsuki, Hamaguchi , and Egi, who domin­ ated the party leadership, had come late to party careers. On the whole, they were more sensitive to national problems than party concerns and less inclined than Hara to sacrifice what their expertise dictated as proper policy to partisan interest. There were also many old-style jiyuminken members among the party elders such as Ozaki Yukio, Shimada Saburo, Taketomi Tokitoshi, and Kono Hironaka, whose instinctive reaction was to propound the need for change and reform. And finally, many of the younger men in the party, such as Nagai Ryutaro, Tomita Koj iro, and Tanaka Zenritsu, belonged to the generation of new l iberals who stood at the head of the reform move­ ment. From the closing days of the Terauchi ministry, there began to appear in the rhetoric of the Kenseikai politicians the notion that Japan needed a new approach in domestic politics. It was based on the feeling that Japan was beginning to face problems similar in kind, if not in degree, to those of fully industrialized countries of the West. Their attitude contrasted strongly with the more conservative voices in the bureaucracy, who yearned for a resuscitation of the old values of Japanese society. "The key to modern politics," wrote Wakatsuki, "is not simply the preservation of social order (shakai chitsujo) ; we must exert our efforts to bring about the advance and increase of the people's well-being. " 23 A policy of social and political reform was necessary to ease the social dislocations created by the rise of an increas­ ingly urbanized and industrialized population. As yet, Japan still lagged far behind the West in this respect. The Kenseikai leadership was apparently no less quick to draw conclusions from the victory of the democratic powers in the World War than the new liberals and the students. The outcome of the war, wrote Tomita Koj iro, depended not on the size and strength of each country's standing army, but on the efforts of the people as a whole ; governments that ignored the will of the people or sacrificed their liberty either collapsed from within as had the tsarist regime in Russia or were defeated by governments that had the power of public opinion behind them and were thus able to create a sense of national unity among the common people. The trend within the world, he continued, was now toward "governments based on the will of the peo­ ple. " 24 The object lesson for Japan was obvious. As Taketomi Tokitoshi

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pointed out, the political situation in Japan was still behind the rest of the world. Although time was slowly destroying the Germanophile hambatsu and power was shifting to the Diet, the popular base of government was still limited. Unless the mass of the people were accorded some greater degree of influence, they would regard even cabinets responsible to the Diet as little better than the previous absolutism of a small number of " privileged politicians. " 25 The Kenseikai leadership began to speak of the need for demokurashii or minpon hon'i or even minponshugi as the guiding principle for national policy. They were quick to point out that though these terms were new, they reflected the time-honored principle that "the people are the foundation of the nation. " Why should Japan hesitate to keep abreast of the democratizing tendencies in the rest of the world, asked Tomita Koj iro, when it had always adhered to this notion in the past? Since the foundation of the Japanese state, "the joint rule of the sovereign and the people" (kunmin dosei) and " the people as the foundation of the state" (kokumin hon'i) had been the principles that embodied the spirit of the state. Both ideas had been confirmed by the Charter Oath in r 868 . If politics became the prerogative of a privileged minority, then the unity of the people and the sovereign could not be achieved. One could expect neither harmony in politics, an advance in national welfare, nor the continued support of the majesty of the emperor without such unity.26 Furthermore, many of the Kenseikai leaders resisted the argument that democracy was a "dangerous idea . " Those who held to this view were indulg­ ing in a dangerous idea themselves, since repression or resistance to democratic ideas could only have the effect of excacerbating them .27 Whether for his­ torical reasons or for practical reasons, the increase of popular influence on the conduct of governmental affairs should not be avoided. If the Kenseikai leadership was sensitive to the " trend of the world" toward democracy, they were equally aware of the " mass awakening" within Japan. Most of them seem to have felt that the new stirrings of social unrest, whether it took the form of rice riots or industrial strikes, sprang from economic causes. As Kataoka Naoharu put it, " the livelihood problem is the whole of the social problem . " 28 The acute rise in prices, the decline in the purchasing power of wages and salaries, and the chronic shortage of national food supplies had all unsettled the possibility of a decent and stable livelihood for many within the country. The problem of the "popular livelihood " was, moreover, thrown into stark relief by the wartime boom, which had promoted the overall growth

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of the economy without providing an equitable distribution of the profits the boom had produced . Why should capitalists and business, asked Taketomi, be allowed to monopolize wartime profits that resulted less from their own wisdom or the acuity of their managers than from a fortuitous turn of events in world politics and world trade? There was a need for the state to correct the worst abuses of the system of private property and to prevent the unequal distribution of wealth that resulted from free competition.29 Perhaps not many within the party would agree with his notion that there was a need to establish a means of sharing profits between capitalists and workers, but it was surely a sign of the mood of the Kenseikai leadership that even a party leader as thoroughly embedded in the business community as Kataoka Naoharu remarked that in the future it would not do " to leave the question of supply and demand to a free structure which is based on the principle of self-interest. " 30 It was urgent that the government use its powers to alleviate the widespread economic hardship by a judicious intervention in the market economy and by undertaking a "social policy" as many countries in the West had . The problem of economic hardship was worrisome not simply because it created immediate social unrest but because it could affect the future trend of "popular ideas . " One of the recurrent themes in the speeches and writings of Kato and other Kenseikai leaders was the need to give "proper guidance to the people's thought" (kokumin shiso no zenda) . Extremism and radicalism were spreading abroad, particularly in Japan's continental neighbor, Russia. Unless something were done to ameliorate the "livelihood problem " it would exacerbate the "social problem" and the "thought problem" as well. As Hamaguchi pointed out, "Though the means of giving proper guidance to [popular] ideas are relatively easy in cases where the living conditions of the people are good, we must say that, in contrast, proper guidance of popular ideas is indeed difficult in today's situation when threats to the people's livelihood are great and psychological tranquillity is continually on the wane. That is to say, if some kinds of radical ideas were to penetrate the fissures in popular living conditions one cannot imagine what disorder would arise from the standpoint of public morality . " 3 1 In sum, it was impossible to think of inoculating the country against radicalism without giving attention to developing a "social policy" that would provide guarantees for social wel­ fare. The new attitude of the Kenseikai was outlined in a speech Kato made

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t o h i s party in January 1 9 1 9 . He began b y pointing o u t that a s a result of the victory of the allies in the war there were indications that a great change was going to take place in the public sentiment in every country throughout the world. One of the most striking consequences of the war was that " the power of the masses ( minsku) [was] increasing and the power of those who were formerly regarded as the privileged class ( tokken kaikyu) [was] being eliminated or . . . being given to the power of the people in general ( ippan jimmin) . " Though Japan was remote from the center of this upheaval in ideas and had not felt its influence very markedly, such ideas were soon bound to penetrate the country and the Japanese people too would be awakened from their long slumber. Therefore, concluded Kato, "in order to preserve the essense of our kokutai and the majesty of the imperial family . . . we must bend every effort in the [spirit of] cooperation and accord to give proper guidance to the thought of the people and bring about a healthy development of public sentiment. " In order to achieve this proper leadership, he indicated the need "to extend to the people as much freedom and as many rights as possible while encouraging in them the notion of duty and the spirit of cooperation . . . Statesmen should pay very careful attention to these and assure that there is always a balance between them . " 32 Turning to specific policies, Kato outlined his party's own program for the postwar era. In contrast to the four planks of Hara's "positive policy," which were all variations on the theme of national "wealth and strength," he called for measures that spoke more directly to the immediate problems of post-war Japan-the institutionalization of constitutional government, an extension of the suffrage and respect for civil rights, stabilization of the people's livelihood, a solution to the labor problem, and the improvement of education.33 Such measures would serve " to give proper guidance to popular ideas," protecting Japan against more drastic change in a way that a stagnant, obscurantist view would not. It is clear from both his general comments and his specific recommendations that he was hoping small con­ cessions would be sufficient to avoid future upheavals that might affect the kokutai or damage the economy. Certainly he felt that a policy of concession to the demand for reform was far preferable either to repression or empty appeals for "moderation" and "harmony." Whether such an attitude was "liberal" or "conservative" depends on one's own construction of those murky terms, but the important thing is that it differed in quality from that of Hara.

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From the winter of r g r g , as the popular demand for reform gathered momentum and the symptoms of social and economic dislocation became more pronounced, there emerged a series of marked policy contrasts between the two parties. Enj oying the luxury of opposition, but equally prompted by concern for the future of the country, the Kenseikai advocated positive and constructive measures to alleviate the sources of popular discontent. While the Seiyiikai government pursued its policy of heavy spending on railways and other public works in order to build national strength, the Kenseikai advocated retrenchment in government expenditures to relieve the tax burdens of the middle and lower classes; whereas the government re­ mained disinclined to provide mechanisms to alleviate the problem of disputes between labor and capital, the Kenseikai advocated the legalization of trade unions and trade-union tactics such as picketing as well as a comprehensive law to regulate the organization and activity of trade unions ; whereas govern­ ment was slow to move in the direction of shaping a policy of national social welfare, the Kenseikai began to advocate a variety of novel measures such as a national health insurance program and a national unemployment insurance program. But the most important contrast of all was the way in which both parties reacted to the rising demand for universal suffrage. To understand how both tactical considerations and basic perceptions about the "mass awakening" interacted to define the policy positions of the rival parties, it will be useful to explore this particular issue in some detail . THE PROBLEM O F ELECTORAL REFORM When Hara came to power in r g r 8 , the problem of electoral reform had been an issue pending for some years. The growth and redistribution of the population had made necessary both an increase in the number of Diet seats and a reapportionment of Diet seats in many districts. But, more important, there was a growing feeling that the old tax qualification of ¥ r o was out­ moded and that the electorate should be expanded in response to rising educational and economic standards within the country. The Seiyiikai , the Kenseikai, and the Kok 1,1 mint6 had all introduced electoral reform bills under the Terauchi cabinet, but because none of these passed owing to a peculiar compromise between the cabinet and the Seiyiikai, the issue remained alive under the new premier.34 In r g r g , all three parties again introduced electoral reform bills in the Diet. None of the bills provided for the immediate enact-

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ment of universal manhood suffrage, though the demand for it was beginning to be heard outside the Diet. The leadership and the mainstream of all the parties insisted that it was still too early to contemplate such a dramatic expansion of the suffrage and that universal suffrage was "premature." 35 Nevertheless, the Kenseikai and the Seiyukai did approach the problem of electoral reform in somewhat different ways. The Seiyukai , under Hara's leadership, seemed more concerned with the effects of reform on the electoral strength of the party. Unlike other types of reform legislation, changes in voter qualifications, the size and redistribution of electoral districts, and the regulations governing campaign procedures were all intimately linked with the political strength of the party, and it was only natural that this should be a matter of concern . The Kenseikai leadership also realized this, but at the same time they seemed to have been more sensitive to the broader, long-range implications of electoral reform as well . For the Kenseikai, the crucial question seems t o have been the degree to which the electorate should be expanded . Although the party's bill did not abolish tax-paying qualifications on the right to vote, they were more gen­ erous in this respect than the Seiyukai's. Whereas the government proposed to lower the tax qualification from ¥r o to ¥3 , the Kenseikai bill not only lowered it to ¥2 but also extended the franchise to those who had completed a middle school education or its equivalent and who demonstrated the ability to "earn an independent livelihood. " The Kenseikai proposal departed from the old notion that "real property" (kosan) bred "real purpose" or steadfastness of mind (koshin) . In the Diet debates, the Kenseikai argued that a · person's political j udgment was likely to be "steadfast" if he had had adequate education and that there was no reason to restrict the right to vote solely on the basis of tax paying. A well educated man was as likely to become a sound citizen as one who held property and paid taxes. Moreover, as one Kenseikai representative pointed out, reliance solely on the tax qualification gave undue representation to rural areas because the principal direct national tax was the land tax. "Under the government's bill," he said, "five or six out of every r oo people in rural districts would have voting rights. In the urban districts it would amount only to two or three out of every r oo . . . . Needless to say, an expansion of the franchise must be balanced equally in every part of the country . " The Kenseikai was proposing to redress the balance in favor of both the educated ' and the citv dweller.36

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A number of Kenseikai members, however, felt that their party's bill did not go far enough . Though doubtless it was fairer with respect to urban-rural distribution of voters, there was little practical difference between the Kenseikai's bill and the Seiyukai 's with respect to the absolute size of the electorate ; the former would have enfranchised perhaps soo ,ooo more voters than the latter.37 There appeared within the Kenseikai ranks a universal suffrage faction, which wanted to eliminate the tax qualification rather than simply reduce it and open the electorate to all adult males. The nucleus of this faction was a group of a dozen or so Diet members that included liberals of the older generation (like Ozaki Yukio, Shimada Saburo, Kono Hironaka, and Kato Seinosuke) and those of the new generation (like Nagai Ryutaro and Suzuki Fuj iya) . Not surprisingly, many of these men either were from urban constituencies or were habitual residents of Tokyo rather than of more rural areas. In r g r g they pressed for the presentation of a universal suffrage bill by their own party and began to appear on the platforms of universal suffrage rallies outside the Diet. The motives of the suffragists within the Kenseikai were several. Some, impatient with the characteristic caution and moderation of the party leader­ ship, wished to seize on a potentially popular issue to build party support . They argued that the Kenseikai should break its lockstep with the other parties and take the lead in advocating universal suffrage, perhaps in advance of the people themselves.38 But for the most part, they were moved by the same concerns as the new generation of liberals-the desire to make govern­ ment more truly representative of public interest, to clean up electoral cor­ ruption, and to provide a "safety valve" for popular discontent. The older men seemed most concerned over the rising wave of anti-parliamentarism. Ozaki Yukio was frank in admitting to the crowds he addressed that he hoped universal suffrage would divert the labor movement from the use of "direct action" for political ends. The economic problems of labor might be solved by strikes, he said, but " if one follows the path of direct action to its ultima ratio, one arrives at anarchism. Needless to say, I do not advocate that . " 39 In the same vein, Shimada Saburo suggested that universal suffrage was a means to avoid social a'ld economic conflict between the rich and the poor and an extension of the franchise was a way to uphold public peace and order.40 But despite the protestations of the suffragist faction, the party leadership adopted a gradualist position that was not so very different from that of the

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government. Representatives of the leadership told t h e party's Political Affairs Investigation Committee that they were not opposed to the enactment of universal suffrage but they felt it was still premature. Complete abolition of tax qualification was ideally the eventual goal of electoral reform, but under the present circumstances the time was not yet ripe for it. Despite claims to the contrary, it was doubtful that there was any great demand for universal suffrage among the people. (The great suffrage demonstrations had not yet taken place during the internal party debate on the question.) Besides, continued the leadership's representatives, though all the people were philo­ sophically, legally, and constitutionally equal as human beings, many of them were not yet qualified to exercise the political j udgment necessary for a voter. The old qualifications on the right to vote were admittedly outmoded, but the electorate should be expanded only to include those whose property gave them a stake in government or whose education qualified them to exercise mature political j udgment.41 In short, they felt that the Kenseikai's own r g r g bill was quite adequate to the requirements o f the situation. These views naturally reflected the attitude of Kato, who felt that the country was not yet ready for universal suffrage. As he confided to Egi Yoku, "I think it is too early to move there in one j ump. Isn't there some need for preparation in the meantime? " 42 But although the Kenseikai debated the question of universal suffrage, little was heard of the matter within the Seiyukai. It seems likely that Hara, though like Kato he took the position that universal suffrage was still "premature," was less concerned with the issue of voter qualifications than he was with the districting provisions of the party's electoral reform bill. He told his home minister, Tokonami, that he was flexible on the question of voter qualifications but that there was to be no compromise on the districting question.43 As might be expected, the latter question was more intimately linked with the Seiyukai's fortunes than the former. Hara was anxious to put an end to the so-called large election district, the boundaries of which were coextensive with the prefectural boundaries and which returned anywhere from four ( Miyazaki prefecture) to sixteen (Tokyo prefecture) Diet members. The large district system had been insti­ tuted by Yamagata in r goo in order to promote the growth of a " triangular party system," in which a " loyalist party" would hold the balance between the "popular parties. " Although the Kenseikai bill provided for no alteration in the siz� of the district, the Seiyukai bill proposed to put into effect the small or single-member election district.

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The introduction of the small district had been a long-standing goal of Hara since h is days as home minister under the second Saionj i cabinet. Ostensibly his reasons were twofold. First of all, he had argued with Yamagata that the small district system would prevent those who agitated the lower classes ( by which he presumably meant the socialists) from growing in political strength ; though they might be able to accumulate enough votes within a single district to obtain a Diet seat under the large district system, this would be virtually impossible under the single member district. Secondly, he suggested that the small district would make the supervision of elections easier and would operate to reduce the use of corrupt practices in elections.44 But privately, he had other reasons as well . Under the large districts, members of the same party competed with one another, sometimes inadvert­ ently, but sometimes deliberately, and the result was to weaken the party. By contrast, under the small electoral district, the party would have only one candidate who would compete only with the rival party. Moreover, it seems likely that Hara hoped that the small district system would prevent the growth not only of socialist parties but of all minority parties, including other "established parties." The small district system would work mainly to the advantage of a party that had been able to maintain a maj ority or plurality in the Diet over a long period of time, and the Seiyukai was the only party with such an advantage in r g r g .45 The Seiyukai bill introduced the small district system and it also gerry­ mandered the districting schedule in favor of the Seiyukai. Although the small districts in the Seiyukai bill were allegedly apportioned on the basis of one Diet member for every r 5 0 ,000 persons, this principle of distribution was altered in crucial localities to give the Seiyukai an advantage. In areas where the electoral support of the Seiyukai was traditionally strong, the principle of one member per district was observed, but in areas where the Seiyukai was weak a single district returned two" or three members. The purpose behind this was simple enough : in areas where the Seiyukai was weak or in areas where the vote was likely to be divi4ed evenly with the opposition, the Seiyukai might have a chance at winning an extra seat with a successful runner-up.46 No wonder then that lnukai commented on the possible effects of the r g r g electoral law, "If this bill passes, we must realize that the next decade will be Hara's (Hara no tenka) . " 47 Hara was willing to lower the barriers to voter qualification, but he was anxious that the new members of the electorate should not slip from the Seiyukai's net. Because the Seiyukai was the government party and held a plurality in

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the House of Representatives, it is not surprising to find that its bill succeeded in passing the Diet in 1 9 1 9 . The issue was not closed, however. For a variety of reasons, the Kenseikai was little inclined to accept the 1 9 1 9 electoral law as a final solution. Indeed , though the Kenseikai leadership had adamantly opposed universal suffrage in the 4 I st Diet, the party began to move in the direction of supporting such a measure toward the end of 1 9 1 9 . It did so out of anxiety both for the future of the party and the future of the country. As Fuj isawa Ikunosuke pointed out two decades later, the idea of universal suffrage gained considerable popularity within the party after the passage of the Seiyukai's electoral reform bill .48 Not only were the districting pro­ visions of the new law weighted heavily in favor of the Seiyukai, but the government party would surely argue to the new voters that they shonld cast their ballots for the party that enfranchised them . Moreover, it was also clear that the Seiyukai was industriously exploiting its position as government party to win over local support with promises of pork barrel measures and local government construction projects. There was little doubt that should the government call a general election under the new electoral law, the Kenseikai would suffer considerable losses. Little would be lost by urging a further revision of the electoral law, and perhaps something might be gained in the way of popular support by advocating universal suffrage. At the same time, the "safety valve" argument put forth by the small suffragist faction within the party was beginning to take on more poignant meaning as popular unrest within the country became more pronounced. Though there had been few suffrage demonstrations while the Kenseikai's 1 9 1 9 bill was being debated within the party, extra-parliamentary pressure had gained considerable momentum during the last month or two of the Diet session. After the Diet had ended in the spring, labor unrest had begun to take a turn for the worse and violent strikes broke out with increasing frequency as the summer wore on. Kato in particular was concerned over this turn of events. As he later explained , he felt that the "change in ideas" had accelerated during the course of the year. " Especially from around August and September 1 9 1 9 , this tendency became pronounced , and . . . voices raised to demand the suffrage grew with increasing intensity. When I saw this turn of events, I felt it inescapable that we should extend [the suffrage] on our own initiative rather than be forced to, and privately I had decided on universal suffrage. " 49 It is difficult to determine precisely what events in

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August and September 1 9 1 9 Kato made reference to. He may have been thinking of the Yuaikai 's turn toward a more militant program with its demands that japan comply with the provisions of the proposed international labor convention and that it enact universal suffrage. In any event, Kato's decision to support universal suffrage seems to have come in some measure as a response to the extra-parliamentary demand for reform. There is no reason to doubt that his decision to support universal suffrage sprang from the feeling that it was " the most effective policy from the standpoint of giving proper guidance to popular ideas and from the standpoint of harmonizing class interest. " 50 In October 1 9 1 9 , Kato made it known within the party that he would not obj ect to proposing a universal suffrage bill in the 1 9 20 Diet if the members of the party were in favor of it. 51 He was not convinced , however, that advocating universal suffrage would be to the partisan advantage of the party. He was apprehensive of alienating that segment of public opinion which still thought universal suffrage premature. By this, he meant not so much the genro or the bureaucrats as the substantial middle class and business elements he wished to draw into politics. His wife's cousin, Iwasaki Koyuta, a leading Mitsubishi executive, for example, strenuously opposed universal suffrage and warned Kato against advocating it.52 Kato also wondered if becoming a "popular party" by adopting the universal suffrage plank would be sufficient compensation for the loss of this element of support. Popular enthusiasm for universal suffrage might be only temporary ; should the movement suddenly lose its momentum, as the Movement for Constitutional Government had in 1 9 1 3 , the party might be left alone on the field of battle. 53 To the end he was unsympathetic to the participation of Kenseikai mem bers in the popular rallies and demonstrations. He even refused to give an inter­ view to student enthusiasts who visited his home to lobby for universal suffrage.54 In any case, he said, "it is a mistake to think that the newly enfranchised will always remember those who advocated universal suffrage or will show respect for them . " Echoing the words of Derby in 1 867 he said the decision to support universal suffrage was a " leap in the dark" but that it should be decided on the basis of national interest rather than partisan advantagt>.55 Whether or not they shared these qualms, the rest of the Kenseikai leader­ ship, prompted by the public announcement of Kokuminto's intention to propose a universal suffrage bill, finally drafted a bill that provided for the

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enfranchisement in 1 9 2 5 of all "males 2 5 years of age or over who earn an independent livelihood. " The universal suffrage faction, some of whom had threatened to bolt the party if its leadership continued to view universal suffrage as "premature," were not entirely content with this version of the bill. They objected to the " independent livelihood" provision and wished the new qualifications put into effect immediately ; the leadership con­ ceded the latter point but remained firm in refusing to change any other part of the bill.56 On January 2 2 , 1 9 2 0 , the announcement of the Kenseikai bill settled the issue within the party at least temporarily. THE UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE QUESTION IN THE 4 2 ND DIET ( 1 920) The stage was now set for the drama's denouement. Outside the Diet the suffragist organizations were making preparations for demonstrations, resolu­ tions and petitions, and direct lobbying within the Diet building itself. The opposition parties-the Kenseikai , the Kokuminto, and the Innai Jikkokai, a small group of independent suffragists-were ready to present universal suffrage bills in the Diet; separately these were bound to fail, but if the three groups were to j oin forces behind a single bill and gather support among the rest of the uncommitted Diet members a universal suffrage bill might be passed . Should this happen, Hara, who lacked an absolute maj ority in the Lower House, would have no. alternative but to dissolve the Diet. At the end of January, the tension began to mount. As soon as the Kenseikai had decided on the final form of its bill, suffragists within the Diet began to entreat their colleagues and the leadership of the opposition parties to support a unified suffrage bill.57 They were assisted by the representatives of suffrage organizations, some of whom had come from the Kansai area and the provinces to strengthen those in the capital . Peti­ tioners began to appear everywhere, visiting uncommitted Diet members at their homes, accosting members of the cabinet and leaders of the opposition parties in the corridors of the Diet, pushing their way into the waiting chambers and reading room of the Lower House. Some of them wore the happi coat of the common laborer. So annoying was the steady flow of enthusiasts that the Seiyiikai, in order to put an end to the pestering, forced through special rules limiting the size of petitioning delegations and confining interviews to restricted areas of the Diet building.

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There was activity m the streets as well , for the leaders of the popular suffrage movement felt that pressure had to be exercised outside the Diet as well as within. lmai Yoshiyuki, one of the "gods of universal suffrage, " pointed o u t that i n almost every country of Europe universal suffrage had been enacted only after the people had expressed their demands through demonstrations ; the right to vote had to be fought for, not passively accepted from the government.58 This sentiment was put even more concisely by one worker at a suffrage rally in r g r g : 59 "We know that if we do not demand [universal suffrage] it will not be given to us; we know that if it is given to us, it will have no value for us; therefore, we rise up to demand it ourselves. " The street demonstration, which gave a concrete sense o f participation to those involved in the suffrage movement and provided a means of political expression for those who lacked a constitutional or institutional entry into the political process, became the main weapon of the suffrage movement. A few small demonstrations, more in the nature of rallies, had taken place when the Diet opened at the end of December, but they soon began to increase in scale, frequency , and violence. The most dramatic one was held on Kigensetsu , the anniversary of Jimmu Tenno's accession, a day perhaps symbolic of new beginnings. The crowds were enormous-5o ,ooo according to one account, r oo ,ooo according to another. Three parades of workers, about 2o,ooo from 58 different organizations, wound their way from Ueno, Shiba, and Take-no-dai to Hibiya Park, commingling with spectators and passers-by along the route of the march . Policemen posted at intervals of five meters or so stood watching in the cold as the demonstrators filed past, their voices raised in song. " Punch him ! That'll teach him ! Old Hara Kei ! " ( Utteya.' Korase ya.' Hara kei o . . . ) Enthusiasm ran high. The trampling of the marchers' feet stirred billowing clouds of dust in Hibiya Park. Many were perspiring with excitement and exertion despite the biting February wind. Inside the Hibiya Music Hall, a group of speakers, some of them members of the Kenseikai suffragist faction ( Miki Bukichi, Tanaka Zenritsu , and Koizumi Mataj iro) , harangued a crowd that spilled out the doors. The police assigned to supervise the demonstration began to grow nervous. Finally, strengthened by reinforcements from precinct stations all over the city, they decided to order the dissolution of the meeting. At 4 o'clock a phalanx of 70 officers fo oced their way in with loud shouts ordering the crowd to disperse. Their voices rang harsh on ears tingling with suffragist eloquence. They were met with cries of "Tyranny ! Tyranny ! " Pandemonium broke loose. Plain-

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clothesmen tried to seize those who resisted, but rescuers from the crowd pulled them free. A rhythmic chant began to swell-" Waa, waa; yosshi, yoi! " The hall was fi i led with shouts of abuse a n d insult; threats a n d angry cries were echoed by the ominous clink of the swords in the police officers' scab­ bards. For a moment it seemed as if the H ibiya riots of 1 905 were to be enacted anew. But the police, sensing that discretion was the better part of valor, decided to withdraw from the hall after a parley with the sponsors of the rally in the hopes that persuasion might accomplish what force could not. Most of the crowd drifted away, but many tempers were still high. Roused by a cry of "Down with the Seiyukai ! " a large group marched off toward the Seiyukai headquarters in Shiba Park, following an automobile that proudly flaunted a red banner. The front gate was shut tight, guarded by soshi and police officers rushed from a nearby station, but it opened to admit four representatives from the crowd who demanded entrance. The rest of the demonstrators, impatient and uncertain, remained milling about outside ; several of them were arrested and a Meij i University student who galloped up to the scene on horseback was pulled from his mount by the authorities. An hour passed, and still the representatives of the crowd did not emerge ; it was said that they had left by the rear exit. But finally the gates opened and out staggered one of them , his face streaming blood from a beating at the hands of the Seiyukai soshi. The government party was not inclined to make concessions. With nothing more to do, the rest of the crowd dispersed, trickling off into the deepening gloom of the evening.60 Demonstrations became a daily occurrence during the next week and a half, but within the Diet the prospects for a unified suffrage bill seemed dim. The Kenseikai leadership was reluctant to strike the " independent livelihood" clause from its bill and the Kokuminto and Innai Jikkokai refused to tolerate its inclusion. Even when the Kenseikai leadership agreed to make the wording of the clause more specific, the other two parties refused to alter their position. Part of this was due to inflexibility, but behind this inflexibility may also have lurked the fear that Hara might dissolve the Diet if a compromise were reac hed .61 It was an apprehension that proved to be well-grounded . Alth ough Hara was n o t worried that a universal suffrage b i l l would pass the House of Representatives, the "commoner premier" had decided to dissolve the Diet on the issue. In part he did so out of a desire to consolidate his position in the Lower House. Ever since the defeat of r g r s , he had been obsessed with the idea of recovering the absolute majority he had lost then.

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An election conducted under the 1 9 1 9 election law would surely achieve this. Although a dissolution would have come eventually anyway, Hara had special reasons for calling new elections on the issue of universal suffrage. In principle, Hara had no objection to the measure ; indeed he was probably not averse to the idea that some day the Seiyukai would sponsor such a measure. But he felt that universal suffrage should come only after a gradual extension of the vote rather than in response to an agitated public opinion. He found the present agitation annoying rather than dangerous and felt it was much overinflated by the press. But there was a chance that public opinion could take a turn for the worse, particularly when those who argued against limited suffrage attacked the existing social and political system as unj ust and unfair: Furthermore, even if the measure were defeated in the current Diet, the opposition would have another year to whip up the people on the issue, to carry on a more violent movement in next Diet, and to face elections in Apri l 1 9 2 1 in the guise of champions of the people. The most sensible alternative would be to forestall this turn of events by calling an election im mediately. Responsible public opinion would return a Seiyukai majority , which would prove the people did not want universal suffrage ; the opposition would be robbed of its thunder and the Seiyukai would enjoy a free hand in the Lower House .62 As usual, Hara had happi ly found a way to reconci le party interest with his co nception of the national interest, though it remained to be seen which benefited more.

THE AFTERMATH There is no question that the defeat of the universal suffrage bills in the 1 9 2 0 Diet imbedded the universal suffrage issue i n a morass o f partisan politics .and intensified the rivalry between the two "established parties. " Facing the certain prospect of a setback in the general elections that would follow the dissolution of the Diet, the Kenseikai now had less to lose than ever before by advocating a cor.1plete abolition of the tax qualifications on voting. In the campaign of 1 9 20 and in the Diet session that followed it, the Kenseikai mounted its strongest attacks against the government on the suffrage issue. In July 1 9 2 0 , for example, Nagai Ryutaro in what was perhaps the most famous Diet speech of the Taisho period accused the Seiyukai premier of making the Diet "an organ for the perpetration of class despotism" by his defeat of universal suffrage.63

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In Japan today and in the world today, there are still those who insist on autocratic class rule-in the West, there is Nicolai Lenin of the radical Russian government, in the East there is our own Premier, Hara Kei. [Applause and uproar] Hear me out ! The class which raised up Lenin is the working class ; in Premier Hara's case, it is the capitalists. Though the classes which support them may differ, both are bereft of the great spirit of democracy. It is difficult to imagine a Kenseikai member making a similar speech two years before. The language of radicalism, if not its spirit, had become part of the party's political vocabulary. At the same time, members of both the Kenseikai and the Kokumint6 began to assume the dominant role in the leadership of the extra-parliamen­ tary suffrage movement. It was now men like Ozaki Yukio and Kono Hironaka who led the suffrage parades and demonstrations through the streets of Tokyo. Indeed , by 1 9 2 2 Kenseikai participants in the anti-government protest had refined their techniques to the point of supplying blank pro­ suffrage petitions for interested persons to send in to the government. Rather more disingenuously, a year later the promoters of a suffrage rally announced, "the chief feature of the meeting will be the vilification of the local Seiyukai party . " 64 Yet the Kenseikai's attempt to make political capital out of the universal suffrage issue did not succeed in making it a more popular party than the Seiyukai. For one thing, the motives of the party leadership were called into question by the so-called " Five Precious Articles" incident. Sometime in March or April 1 9 2 0 , Egi Yoku, who was a legal adviser to the Uchida Steamship Company, approached the president of the company, Uchida Shin'ya, with the suggestion that he make a financial contribution to the party. When Uchida replied that he disapproved of the violent suffrage demonstrations in the Kansai area in which Ozaki Yukio and Shimada Sabur6 figured prominently, Egi commented that he was sure Kat6 also opposed any illegal popular demonstrations. Kat6 confirmed this shortly afterward in a direct interview with Uchida, but on April 20 delivered a speech in Osaka advocating universal suffrage. On Apri l 2 2 , Uchida sent a letter to Kat6 stating he would make a contribution to the Kenseikai provided the money would be used to support "sound elements" in the party and not to assist Ozaki and Shimada. In a letter three days later, Kat6 repl ied that

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he would accept this condition and shortly thereafter Uchida's brother-in-law delivered the Kato ¥5o,ooo , referred to as "five precious articles" in Kato's cautious correspondence. The Seiyukai got wind of this transaction from Uchida himself and in I 9 2 I made it known to the press partly to discredit Kato and partly to divert attention from the South Manchurian Railway scandal and several other incidents involving Seiyukai leaders. The Seiyukai alleged that Kato had told Uchida he was using the universal suffrage issue to obtain popular support and that in fact he was completely opposed to the suffrage movement. Kato , of course, vigorously denied this and further­ more made public his correspondence with Uchida. Whatever the truth of the matter, the incident cast considerable doubt on the Kenseikai's motives in taking up the issue.65 More important in driving a breach between the Kenseikai and the m ass organizations that had partici pated in the universal suffrage movement was the defeat of the suffrage bill in I 9 2 0 . To a large extent, the suffrage issue had been a test of the "established parties' " willingness to reform both themselves and the political system. Hara's decision to defeat the bill seemed to indicate that the party in power was unwilling to turn over a new leaf. Popular demands had been sacrificed once more to the interests of the party. For some, the decision forfeited any hope that the parties could serve as instruments of reform , but more ominously it strengthened the hand of those who advocated radical solutions to the problems of the masses. It may have been coincidental that the first May Day celebration in Japan was held only a few months after the defeat of the suffrage bill, but it was surely no accident that though the banners at the May Day parade demanded the abolition of Article q, the prevention of unem ployment, and the guarantee of mini­ mum wages, they carried no universal suffrage slogan .66 The leadership of the working-class movement, save for moderates like Suzuki Bunj i and Kagawa Toyohiko, began to despair of pursuing their political goals within the framework of parliamentary institutions. In I 9 2 I , for example, the Kanto branch of the Rodo Sodomei attempted to strike the demand for universal suffrage from its program on the grounds that involve­ ment of workers in the suffrage movement would sap thei r revolutionary vigor, would lead labor back to a pol icy of compromise and accommodation with capi tal , and would destroy the nascent class consciousness of the worki ng class. Instead, the Kanto branch proposed that the Sodomei should call instead for the use of the general strike as a tactic of labor action. The Kansai

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branch of the federation, under t h e leadership of men like Kagawa , resisted this effort, but in 1 92 2 the demand for suffrage was struck from the Sodomei 's program . Even among the suffragist faction of the Kansai branch, disillusion­ ment with the parties and distrust of the Kenseikai's motives led them to resolve not to cooperate with " professional politicians" in demonstrating for universal suffrage. If they were to continue an active movement for universal suffrage, they would act only in concert with other working-class organiza­ tions, whose sincerity could not be questioned.67 The breach between the established parties and the budding labor movement was apparently com­ plete. Those within the movement who preferred parliamentary action to "direct action" fel t more and more strongly that the masses, if they were to be represented in the Diet, would have to form their own "proletarian parties" rather than rely on the Seiyukai and the Kenseikai . What happened in the labor movement happened in the student movement as well . Almost simultaneously with the failure of the suffrage bill, the Sh injinkai began to assume a new, more radical character. The change was perhaps symbol ized in February 1 9 20 when the society's j ournal changed its name from "Demokurashii" ( Democracy) to " Senku" (Vanguard . ) The new name reflected new interests and a new outlook of the students. The magazine carried articles that argued against student co mm itment to the suffrage movement as well as those that described in glowing terms the ideas of European anarchist and syndicalist thinkers. The new generation of Shinj inkai members was concerned less with the political democratization of Japan than with a vaguely formulated yet intensely held desire to "go to the people. " For some this meant involvement in the working-cl ass movement as agitators and organizers ; for others, the formation of Marxist study groups.68 Indeed , the Socialist League, formed in December 1 9 2 r , included many of the former student activists in the suffrage movement of 1 9 1 9 and 1 92 0.69 It would be as wrong to see the whole of the student movement suddenly plunged into radicalism as it would be to interpret the new developments in the labor union movement as a com plete turn to anarchism and syndical­ ism . There continued to be suffragist student groups, yet like the moderates within the labor movement they too were determ ined to stand aloof from the Diet opposi tion to the Hara government. In November 1 9 2 3 , for example, one student suffragist organization resolved it would be solely " a movement of the students themselves" a n d unl ike the "corrupted (daraku shita) student

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political movements of the past" would not allow i tself to be used by " the political parties or by ambitious men. " 70 Purity of motive in advocating universal suffrage was as important to them as the likelihood of its final passage. The emergence of the universal suffrage issue, the rise of the popular suffrage movement, and the response of the parties to both set the pattern for the politics of the r g2 o 's. The Seiyukai, under the intensely partisan leadership of Hara, had opted not for reform but for the pursuit of party interest. Possibly the Kenseikai, had it been in power, might have done the same, but in opposition it was more likely to seize on the issue as a means of attacking the government. Advocacy of universal suffrage, however, did convert the party or its members into "champions of the common man." Men like Ozaki Yukio and Nagai Ryutar6 might have felt themselves to be such, but the image of the party was hardly affected. The party had had its chance to capture popular sentiment in r g r g , but by m id- r g 2o it was too late. The lassitude of the Kenseikai 's response, the obviously partisan fashion in which it took up the issue, and the revelation of Kato's corre­ spondence with Uchida had cast considerable doubts on its motives. The Kenseikai and the Kokumint6 may have captured the initiative in the suffrage movement, but they had lost its original supporters. The political energy and involvement that had grown out of the "mass awakening" were not absorbed into parliamentary pol itics. In a sense, those who had advanced the "safety valve" argument in favor of universal suffrage were vindicated . In the absence of constitutional routes for the articulation of the political interests and demands, the participants in the "mass awakening" now sought other more radical means for achieving their ends.

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H

ad Hara Kei lived his natural span of years, the 1 9 2o's might have become, as lnukai feared , "Hara's decade. " The master politician would probably have continued to nibble away at his rivals' strength, making the Seiyukai the only party capable of forming a cabinet . Although in the long run he might not have been able to end' the alienation between the parties and the reform-m inded elements in Japanese society nor to stem the rise of radicalism on both right and left, there is l ittle doubt he could have maintained considerable degree of political stability in the short run. Unexpectedly, however, Hara met a prem ature end. On November 4, 1 9 2 1 , as he was entering Tokyo Station to embark for a speaking tour in the Kansai region, a demented youth plu nged a knife into his chest. His death was a shock, not sim ply because of its suddenness but because he was the first premier to die at the hand of an assassin. Even Yamagata shed tears for him. If he did not love Hara, at least he had come to feel that there was no one else as capable of running the country. A few months later, in February 1 92 3 , the old man himself was dead , lamenting to the end the untimely deilth of the Seiyukai leader.

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The passing of these two men from the scene had a considerable i mpact on the political world. If the opponents of party government had lost their most powerful advocate in Yamagata, the parties lost their most astute tactician in Hara. The rapport that they had established with one another was also gone and with it the measure of political peace it had provided. The result of their deaths was a period of political confusion and uncertainty. Part of the problem was that Saionj i , now the principal genro, inheri ted Yamagata's old dilemma. He had no precept to guide him in the nomi nation of premiers. Hara's accession to office in rg r8 had been a personal triumph, not a signal for the institutionalization of party government. Saionj i had to search for a man who, as he constantly reiterated, could "stabilize the political situatio n . " In practical terms, this meant someone able to perform the precarious balancing act that Hara had managed with such aplomb. There were many who had pretensions to the premiership but few with unassailable credentials. The range of choice was still not limi ted to the leaders of the two maj or parties. A handful of senior civil and mil itary officials who had risen under the patronage of the oligarchic generation were also available. So too were the leaders of the factions in the House of Peers. The decision was therefore not easy to make. The parties and their leadership were far from being in a healthy condition following the death of Hara . The opposition, of course, had been reduced to impotence by the expansion of Seiyukai power under the "com moner premier." The Kokuminto had dwindled to a handful of ardent disciples of lnukai, and the Kenseikai , now less than half its original strength, was wracked by inner uncertainty over what new course to fo llow. The Seiyukai garden was tangled as wel l. Even though Hara had been successful in immobilizing his rivals, he had died too suddenly to assure the continued success of his own party . He had been the keystone of the party 's strength, holding together antagonistic elements within the party in harmonious balance and carefully maintaining cordial connections with the genro, the House of Peers, and many nonparty senior officials. With his death, the Seiyukai hegemony slowly collapsed, in part because of increasing internal dissension, in part because the party was not able to maintain a successful and united "foreign policy. " Because the Seiyukai was rent by internal dissension and because its opposition was so weak, Saionji was understandably reluctant to nom inate a party leader to the prem iership. Perhaps the parties might have compen-

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sated for the genro's loss of confidence in party leadership by fomenting popular protest movements to put pressure on the men who decided the fate of cabinets. But the likelihood of this was small. The parties, on the whole, were regarded with indifference, and often hostility, by the political activists in the mass movements and by the m aj ority of those who commented on pol itics in the press. After the failure of universal suffrage, public opinion, whether expressed on the editorial page or in the streets, was not likely to be stirred by the plight of the parties. Their reputation, even including that of the moderately reformist Kenseikai , remained unenchanced as a result of the Hara cabinet. Not only had the pro mising turn in the direction of reform in the immediate postwar years been aborted, but the latent distrust of the parties had been confirmed by the revelation of a rash of party scandals in I 9 20 and I 92 I . As if these difficulties were not enough , the reluctance of the genro to select a party prem ier suggested that the parties were not only corrupt and unprincipled, but weak as well. As a consequence, on the few occasions when the Kenseikai attempted to generate some sort of "popu­ lar movement," they met with dismal failure. The result of all these circumstances was a bleak interl ude in the history of party poli tics, a period of two years in which three "transcendental cabinets" were appointed , in which the senior bureaucrats and the leadership of the House of Peers seemed as powerful as the leaders of the parties and in which the sessions of the Diet were tumultuous, disorderly , and unpro­ ductive. Yet the parties, despite the lack of genro support and the failure of popular backing, did manage to reestablish themselves in power. They were able to do so, however, only when their leadership, partly out of frustration at being kept from office and partly out of a desire to settle internal party difficul ties, finally decided to adopt the only tactical option left open to them , a tactic that had not been adopted since the emergence of the two parties-a united front against the continuation of nonparty cabinets. Inspired by the success of the Seiyukai in ousting Katsura in I 9 I 3 , they organized a new Movement for Constitutional Government, which paved the way for the reestablishment of party government. The movement was not a popular one. It failed to generate the enthusiasm that characterized the first Movement for Constitutional Government, let alone the mass appeal of the universal suffrage movement. But in spite of this it did demon­ strate the effectiveness of the parties in intim idating the new genro.

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SAIONJI AND THE TRANSCENDENTAL CABINETS , 1 92 2 - 2 3 The mantle o f power that Yamagata had wrapped s o closely about him fell mainly on the frailer shoulders of Saionj i Kimmochi. The contrast in personality between the two men could hardly have been greater. Saionj i was not only the " last genro, " h e was the most reluctant one. A n indolent man, passive by nature, he had no taste for intrigue and manipulation as the old field marshal had. Well aware that he had neither the "moral influence nor the power of Prince Yamagata," he would doubtless have preferred his last years at his villa in Okitsu , quietly savoring the pleasures of senescence as he had enthusiastically tasted those of youth . But the aging voluptuary could not shirk his sense of duty. Although he knew the respon­ sibility was a heavy one, he accepted the role as the emperor's chief adviser on the selection of cabinets . 1 Against his will, he found himself the most important, though not the most powerful, figure in Japanese politics. Despite his later apotheosis as a great liberal statesman, Saionj i was decidedly ambivalent in his attitude toward party government. Though not unalterably opposed to the idea of party rule as Yamagata had been, his actions gave little evidence that he regarded party cabinets as either necessary or desirable. It is true that as a former president of the Seiyukai and a personal friend of Hara and other Seiyukai leaders, he was sympathetic toward his old party. Indeed he had helped persuade Yamagata to appoint Hara as premier in r g r 8 and constantly told visitors that he regarded the Seiyukai as the more "patriotic" of the major parties. But this did not im ply commitment to party cabinets as a matter of principle. He once remarked to Matsumoto Gokichi,2 People speak of the "pure theory of constitutional government" (kensei junriron) or the "normal course of constitutional government" (kensei no jodo) , and they say that if the Seiyukai cabinet breaks up the Kenseikai should produce a premier, and that if the Kenseikai fails to do so , the Kokuminto should. But I think that even though we speak of a " Seiyukai cabinet," it is not the Seiyukai 's-it is His Imperial Majesty's. In what books are this "pure theory" and this "normal course" written about and in what countries are they practiced at present? Sometime in the near future I intend to cali in some scholars and ask them about this.

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He may have been twitting Matsumoto , no friend of the parties, but it seems clear he did not approach the selection of cabinets as an exercise in applying a particular theory of government. Saionj i was guided by purely pragmatic considerations. He recommended men in whom he felt personal confidence and who seemed capable of controlling the Diet and the other high organs of government. Relying on the best information he could obtain, usually gleaned from the press or from reports of informants such as Matsumoto and Harada Kumao, his choice was guided by considerations of a man's personal character, his reputation, and his bases of power. He took the role of an objective bystander, who, after gathering a vague and unsystematic consensus, picks the candidate who seems most appropriate at the moment. Before 1 9 2 4 , this meant men who were "above party " ; between 1 924 and 1 93 2 it meant men in the parties ; and after 1 93 2 , when his role diminished conspicuously, it meant men who were best equipped to prevent military terrorism and to control army insub­ ordination. His first opportunity to exercise a decisive influence on the choice of a premier came with the death of Hara. Although Yamagata wished Saionj i t o take office himself, Saionj i refused. It was n o t simply that h e had no ambition for office. He knew that he was going to be Yamagata's principal successor as genro and did not wish to compromise himself by forming a government. Instead, he recommended Hirata Tosuke, who also refused on the ground that he feared his opinions, like those of Terauchi, would collide with Yamagata's. As in 1 9 1 8 , there seemed to be no choice but to recommend a member of the Seiyukai, the controlling party in the House of Representa­ tives. Besides, as Saionj i later explained, to turn a party out of power because its premier had been assassinated would set a bad precedent and perhaps invite further violence.3 With the consent of both Yamagata and Matsukata, he decided that the most appropriate person was Takahashi Korekiyo, the incumbent minister of finance, who he felt was "not really a member of the Seiyukai" and whom he perhaps thought least likely to subordinate national interest to party interest.4 Takahashi, as we shall see, was a poor substitute for Hara. Not only did his program meet with serious difficulty in the Diet, particularly in the House of Peers, but he was unable to maintain unity within his party. On the contrary, if anything, his actions only served to heighten dissension within the cabinet and the party. Saionj i hoped to prolong the life of the government

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order to avoid a cabinet crisis that might force him to recommend as premier either Kato or lnukai, neither of whom he particularly liked. His plan was to have Den Kenj iro, a former protege of Yamagata, whom he had long thought a suitable successor to Hara as premier, enter both the cabinet and the party. But Takahashi's clumsy attempt to put this proposal into effect only served to speed the downfall of the government. Two of Takahashi's ministers, Nakahashi Tokugoro and Motoda Haj ime, refused to agree to a reorganization because they knew it was they who would have to step down from office, and despite last minute efforts to patch things over, Takahashi finally tendered his resignation in June 1 9 2 2 .5 The failure of Takahashi as prem ier was a m atter of distress to Saionj i because h e had been the person principally responsible for Takahashi 's appointment and because he was hard pressed to suggest an appropriate successor. Had his choice been governed by the "principles of constitutional government," Kato would have been the logical candidate. But Saionji had inherited from Yamagata (and probably from Hara as well) the feeling that Kato was not suitable to beco me premier. Indeed he was apprehensive lest Takahashi reco mmend Kato to the emperor as his successor.6 He thought that the appointment of Kato , whose diplomacy in r g r s was responsible for much of the current hostility to Japan abroad, would lead to difficulty in foreign relations. Furthermore , Saionj i felt that Kato lacked the necessary ability to control the membership of his party and that as in the case of the universal suffrage issue he was often pushed into positions he did not support by those in the party who wished to stir up public opinion for partisan purposes.7 In any case, even if Saionj i had trusted Kato's abi lity as a potential premier, the Kenseikai lacked sufficient strength in the House of Representatives to co ntrol it. Saionj i 's solution to this dilemma was evasion. In the midst of the crisis, shortly after hearing of Takahashi's intention to resign, he took to his bed, suddenly stricken by an illness that was probably more political or psycho­ logical than physical in origin .8 This left the burden of the decision with Matsukata, who, after conferring with both Kiyoura Keigo and Yamamoto Gombei , decided to recommend the navy minister, Kato Tomosaburo. Kato , though not a Satsuma man, enjoyed the confidence of the Satsuma l ineage admirals in the navy and had further won high praise both at home and abroad for his conduct as Japanese delegate to the Washington Conference in r g 2 r . It also seemed likely that he would be acceptable both to the factions m

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the House of Peers and to the parties. But Kato, who lacked any overt assurance of support in the Diet, was reluctant to take office. Matsukata, sensing this uncertainty , again with the advice of Kiyoura decided to have in reserve an al ternative candidate with assured support in the Diet. The choice this time was Kato Komei. He invited Kato to his house and told him that if the navy minister did not accept office , as seemed likely at the time, he would recommend the Kenseikai leader instead. For a moment, it seemed that despite the general distrust of Kato's ability, he m ight become prem ier by default.9 But the Kenseikai was kept out of the government by an unabashed power play of the Seiyukai. Word of Matsukata's plan to recommend the Kenseikai president if Admi ral Kato did not accep t office reached Tokonami Takej iro, a Seiyukai leader, by way of Kiyoura Keigo 's son . 10 The Seiyukai leadership held an emergency meeting and decided to offer Kato Tomosaburo the unconditional support of the Seiyukai in the House of Representatives if he agreed to become prem ier. Kato, thus reassured and urged to accept office by a stream of Seiyukai emissaries, finally let Matsukata know he was willing to serve. In no small measure, the Seiyukai 's j ealousy of i ts advantageous posi tion prevented what might have been the first transfer of power from one party cabinet to another. Had Hara l ived he might have done the same, but it seems certain he would have driven a harder bargain than his successors who did not even insist on the appointment of Seiyukai ministers of stateY The Kato Tomosaburo cabinet ended a year later when the premier succumbed to stomach cancer. After consul ting with Hirata and Matsukata, who was in increasingly feeble health, Saionj i secretly decided to choose Yamamoto Gombei , a former premier and a man with friendly connections in the Satsuma clique, the House of Peers, and the Seiyukai. Internal dis­ sensions within the Seiyukai and continuing distrust of Kato precluded the choice of a party leader to the premiership, but Saionj i seems to have hoped that Yamamoto would be able to form a kyokoku itchi cabinet, which could rally the support of tl' e parties and of the factions in the House of Peers. Such a cabinet would be able to effect a policy of retrenchment and to assure that the general election in May 1 92 4 would be held under as fair circum­ stances as possible, without bias toward any party.12 Yamamoto, in accor­ dance with the desires of both H irata and Saionj i , invited the participation not only of the three party leaders-Kato , Takahashi, and lnukai-but also of powerful ranki ng bureaucrats like Goto Shimpei, Den Kenj iro, Hiranuma m

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Kiichiro , and Okano Keijiro and two leaders of the Kenkyiikai, Aoki Nobum­ itsu and Kuroda Nagatoshi . Of the party leaders only Inukai accepted . The kyokoku itchi plan had to be abandoned, and instead Yamamoto formed a "cabinet of talents " (jinzai naikaku ) , which it was hoped could provide sounder government than Saionj i felt the parties would . 13 The cabinets of Kato Tomosaburo and Yamamoto Gombei, often regarded as a puzzling break in the trend toward the institutionalization of party government, reflected Saionj i 's uncertainty as to just what the nature of the Japanese constitutional system was meant to be. It was obvious that though he did not object to party cabinets in princi ple as Yamagata had, he did not feel the party leaders should fill the office of premier as a matter of right. Rather he measured the party leadership by the same standards he measured other potential candidates-by thei r ability to rally support in the Diet and to secure cooperation of the senior bureaucrats and the House of Peers. Clearly he found both Kato and Takahashi wanting as individuals, Kato because of his pol icy views and Takahashi because of his ineptness as a poli tician. Yet Saionj i 's reluctance to nominate either man had the effect of further weakening their political positions. As was perpetual ly true in the party poli tics of prewar Japan, the weakness of the party leadership invariably bred factionalism within the parties. When it seemed likely that the leadership could not secure office, the pursuit of which was the chief function of the party, infighting broke out within both the Seiyiikai and the Kenseikai . Cut adrift from the stable mooring that access to office provided , they cast about for new anchorages and new berths. DISSENSION IN THE SEIY U KAI The Seiyiikai's troubles had begun with the death of Hara. Thei r mam difficulty was the lack of a leader popular or astute enough to hold together antagonistic elemeri"S within the party. Although there were a num ber of men with legiti mate claims to the party presidency, the genro's decision to make Takahashi premier automatically resolved the question. Takahashi 's ineptness did little to smooth the ruffled feathers of those who were bypassed , however. As Koizumi Sakutaro pointed out, their discontent was like that of the daimyo after the death of Hideyoshi . Their chieftain gone, the former vassals struggled among themselves to replace him. The internecine fight weakened Saionj i 's confidence in Takahashi , making him reluctant to recom-

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mend the Seiyukai leader for the premiership again. This in turn only served to further undermine his position within the party. Trapped in this vicious circle, Takahashi and his supporters were struggling with the dilemma of how to mai ntain party unity and still restore the party 's fortunes. Ultimately it proved i mpossible to resolve. Unlike Hara , whose whole life and energy were absorbed by the party , Takahashi was indifferent to his role as party leader. The position had come to him largely through the force of circumstance rather than through active pursuit. A man who had earned his reputation as a financier and had risen in banking circles to become president of the Bank of Japan, it was by necessity rather than by choice that he had entered the Seiyukai in 1 9 1 4 when l:e accepted office as finance minister i n the first Yamamoto cabinet. Hara, who had struck a bargain with Yamamoto to give the cabinet Seiyukai support, insisted that all the civilian members of the cabinet be party members, so Takahashi , along with Yamamoto Tatsuo and Okuda Gijin, consented to j oin.14 He got along well with Hara, who found him easier to rely on as a financial expert than Yamamoto Tatsuo, and through his con­ nections in banking ci rcles he was able to raise money for the party . His accession to the presidency of the party was largely due to Saionj i's desire to have him made premier; indeed, there is some evidence that Saionj i indi rectly urged the rest of the Seiyukai leadership t o elect h i m a s Hara's successor to the party presidency. Takahashi was reluctant to take over as the party's top leader, but because it was felt that a premier from the party had to be party president as well, he accepted the one office with the other. He knew he was ill qualified for the j ob. Hara had been meticulous in his concern for party affairs. He knew everyone by face and name and also made it a point to study each one's background and political strengths and weak­ nesses. Takahashi, by his later admission, had no interest in such things. "I hardly knew who was who and who looked like what," he said. "I was the least appropriate person to become president of a political party and the thought did not occur to me to succeed Hara . " 15 A man of personal charm with a colorful career that had earned him no small measure of general popularity, he nevertheless lacked the gifts necessary to salve hurt egos and to allay frustrated ambitions. It cost the Seiyukai dear. Takahashi 's first misstep was his attempt to reorganize his cabinet in early 1 9 2 2 . This ha
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were formally expelled from the party. They were reinstated a few months later, but slowly the party began to harden into a " headquarters faction" and "anti-headquarters faction," which were later called the "anti-reform faction" and "reform faction . " Because the issue at stake was Takahashi's suitability as party leader, the real division was between a pro-Takahashi group and an anti-Takahashi group. Those who supported Takahashi-Noda Yutaro, Okazaki Keisuke, and Yokota Sennosuke-probably did so more out of concern for party unity than out of personal loyalty to Takahashi. All of these men were "party men" ( tojin) , whose political careers and successes were inextricably bound with the expansion of the Seiyukai's power. Okazaki and Noda were veterans of the party's early days, the former being a protege of Mutsu Munemitsu and the latter an activist in the Jiyuto. Yokota, a younger man, had begun his career in Hoshi Toru's legal office and had later become one of Hara's most trusted lieutenants. The anti-Takahashi faction, on the other hand was united by a personal dislike of Takahashi and by frustrated ambition. With one exception they were men whose initial successes in life had been won outside the world of politics. Nakahashi was a private businessman of considerable means, who entered the party late in his career; he was on good terms with Motoda Haj ime, a veteran of the "loyalist" parties of the 1 8go 's. Both were at odds with Takahashi over the question of cabinet reorganization. Yamamoto Tatsuo, who tended to side with them, had been on opposite sides in a factional struggle in the Bank of Japan. Furthermore, he was li ttle inclined to follow anyone's lead but his own , and he regarded hi mself as Takahashi 's senior. It is very likely that he had harbored aspirations of becoming party president hi mself. The remaining figure of i mportance within the party was Tokonami Takej iro , a former Home Ministry bureaucrat whom Hara had brought into the party and whom he had used in his negotiations with the House of Peers and other nonparty elements. Like Yamamoto , Tokonami had also probably aspired to be party president, but unl ike Yamamoto, who apparently was a rather strong-headed person, Tokonami's character had an inherent slip­ periness that kept him allying first with one side then with another. He was an ambitious poli tical chameleon. On the problem of reorganizing the Takahashi cabinet, for example, he had at first favored reorganization and finally, after momentarily supporting the idea of a general resignation, had decided it would be best to continue with the cabinet in its present form .16

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Fundamentally an opportunist, he either preserved a position of neutrality or threw in his lot with the anti-Takahashi forces. The cleavage within the party manifested itself not only in competition for the control of the party's formal organization (for example, for the appointment of men to fill the posts of party director) but also in disagreement on questions of policy and tactics. The party was kept from splitting, however, by the continued hope that Takahashi might succeed Kato Tomosaburo as premier. But when Yam am oto Gombei was selected instead, the voices of the discontented grew louder. The party president lacked the genro's con­ fidence, they said. The anti-Takahashi faction began a movement in Septem­ ber 1 9 2 3 to oust Takahashi 's supporters from dom ination of the party 's board of directors. Takahashi managed to stem this crisis temporarily by promising to resign from the party presidency after the election scheduled for May 1 9 24 . Again in December, a new dispute broke o u t within the leadership over the question of whether or not to support the budget proposed by the Yamamoto cabinet. The anti-Takahashi faction argued it would be best to remain friendly to the government because cooperation was a Seiyiikai tradition and because opposition might cost the party its majority. This dispute was also resolved by a compromise. Nevertheless, mutual hostilities within the party remained strong and the newspapers carried rumors of an imminent spli t.17 It was an ironic tribute to Hara's skill as a leader that within two years of his death, the party whose power he had so skillfully built by the force of his political acumen and personality seemed on the verge of collapse. THE DILEMMAS OF THE KENSEIKAI Whi le the Seiyiikai was bei ng split by a "scramble for the best pillow" among the party leadership, the Kenseikai was facing no less serious troubles of its own. The main lines of friction within the smaller party , however, were not horizontal-between leader and leader-but, vertical-between the leader­ ship and the rank and file. Internal dissension and dispute sprang less from personal hostil ities and antagonisms (though these were of some importance) than from disagreement over how to revive the party 's flagging fortunes. The Kenseikai suffered even more acutely than the Seiyiikai because of its divorce from power. Kato was consistently by-passed for the office of prem ier, and after the I 920 election the party 's strength had dwindled to less than a quarter of the seats in the House of Representatives. As a consequence, there was

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much soul searching, particularly among younger members of the party, over the best tactic to refurbish the party. Those who diagnosed the party's maladies were by no means united in suggesting remedies. Many continued to hold out hope for a new anti­ Seiyukai merger as a means of restoring party strength. Others hoped some­ how to " popularize " the party by committing it to a reformist position on policy questions and by taking the leadership in popular movements. Finally, there were those who rankled at Kato's attitude and style of leadership and felt that the party's fortunes could be improved only if he were eased out of the party presidency. But because their counsels were so divided and, paradoxically, because the party was already so weak numerically, the dissident elements within the Kenseikai never brought the party as close to a split as the Seiyukai came. It survived its internal disputes intact and able to exploit the temporary difficulties of the Seiyukai. The most pressing internal debate within the Kenseikai before the death of Hara centered on the inclusion of the "independent livelihood" clause in the party's universal suffrage bill. Inserted at the insistence of those within the party leadership who did not wish to enfranchise persons lacking in sufficient social responsibility to earn their own bread, this proviso denied suffrage rights to those unable " to earn an independent livelihood." 18 The strong suffragists within the Kenseikai objected to it on the grounds that it ran contrary to the spirit of universal suffrage and that it would be difficult to enforce administratively. But equally aroused were those who had hoped for a merger of all the pro-suffrage elements in the Diet. The idea of an anti-Seiyukai merger had taken on new life since the formation of the Hara cabinet; there had evidently been so me exploration of the idea during the universal suffrage debates of I 9 2 0 . The " independent livelihood" clause was, of course, a hindrance to such a merger because it was unacceptable to the Kokuminto and the other suffrage groups. Many within the party cooperated with the other suffragist groups in the planning of popular demonstrations, and a few seemed prepared to bolt the party if the question were not resolved . 19 Ozaki Yukio, Shimada Saburo, and Tagawa Dakichi, all old-style liberals, left the party in I 92 I as a protest against the party 's position. The sprouts of dissension nourished by the livelihood clause and the merger movement began to wither at the end of I 92 1 . One reason was that in the summer of that year, Kato finally decided that the arguments against the inclusion of the cl ause were more co mpelling than those in favor of i t ; the

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rest of the party leadership agreed to eliminate it and in the I 92 2 sessiOn of the Diet the Kenseikai supported a j oint universal suffrage bill with the Kokuminto and the other pro-merger elements.20 But more important, there were many in the pro-suffrage faction of the Kenseikai who did not regard a merger as feasible. M iki B ukichi, for example, argued that there was too much hard feeling between the Kenseikai and the Kokuminto for them to join amicably in one group. Many in the Kenseikai felt that the Kokuminto had betrayed it in the proposal of a no-confidence resolution against Terauchi in I 9 I 7 , and lnukai was not l ikely to accept a subordinate position in a new party nor to get on agreeably with Kato whom he held responsible for the disruption of the Kokuminto in I 9 I 3 . Furthermore, said Miki, a merger was unnecessary to revive the party 's fortunes because if it were to succeed the Seiyukai in office it would not be difficult to secure a majority for the party once again.21 There nevertheless rem ained a handful of i rreconcilables within the party who refused to abandon the merger idea even though the party leadership made concessions on the "independent livelihood " question and the l ikelihood of putting a merger into effect seemed dim. Doubtless they were prompted by dislike of Kato and the difficulty of staying in the party after stirring up so m uch acrimony . Seven of these irreconcilables proposed an anti­ Seiyukai merger to the party leadership in March I 92 2 , but when the idea was rej ected they formally declared they were severing ties with the party . A few days later they began to negotiate with Ozaki and Shimada, the Kokuminto, and the Independent Club to form a new group of Diet members who would attempt a " reform of the political world." In September this group organized itself as the Kakushin Club, the core of which was really lnukai's personal following, with an admixture of other political strays.22 But the main reason the Kenseikai remained intact in I 92 I and early I 92 2 was the expectation that the party would succeed the Seiyukai in power. To many it seemed that the battle for party government had been won with the appointment of Hara as premier and it was merely a question of time before Kato would follow him in office. It would hardly do to split the party when victory seemed so near. Hopes of coming to office were particularly strong at the beginning of I 9 2 2 when the Takahashi government seemed on the verge of collapse,23 but this optimistic mood was scuttled in June with the appointment of Kato Tomosaburo. Frustration turned im mediately to anger. For the first time in the party's history the highest leadership, including

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Kato, consented to participate directly in a " popular" movement, designed to stir up public opinion and perhaps revive the party 's fortunes. There had always been those in the party who fel t that i t shoul d try to capture popular support by participating in extra-parliamentary movements. In 1 9 1 3 m any of the former Kokuminto members who j oined the Doshikai wished to throw party support behind the popular anti-tax movement, but the idea of "going to the people" became even more appealing after the emergence of the universal suffrage issue. The arguments in favor of party participation in popular movements were both practical and idealistic. One view was that it was impossible to beat the Seiyukai at its own game. As one young party mem ber pointed out: 24 The Seiyukai has for a long time in the past made the government its private possession and has built a web of personal connections in every direction . . . The bases it has built by conspiring with special interests are strong. It is therefore profitless for strategists of the Kenseikai to compete with the Seiyukai on these grounds. The path which the Kenseikai ought to take is to gather i ts political cohorts by fair and square means and directly take the side of the masses. Instead of relying on conventional methods for coming to power, the Kenseikai should take the side of the bulk of the population. For others, party involvement in popular movements was a way of democ­ ratizing politics and improving the lamentable condition of party politics. This argument was advanced mainly by those who had participated in the suffrage movement, men like Suzuki Fuj iya, whose position was not far from that of the new liberals. A popular movement for him was not inci ting the peo ple to arson and riot but the sponsori n g of popular demonstrations whose "ultimate purpose must be to capture the minds of the people. " 25 We are now in a state of affairs where the free will of the people is suppressed at election time by the power of money and o f the state; it . has no room to expand. Some powerful politician in the opposition must rouse himself, begin a popular movement, destroy the false party [that is, the Seiyukai ] , carry on true party poli tics, bring about the fruition of constitutional government (rikken seijiyushu no bi) , and take the leader­ ship of the people (kokumin no omomuku tokoro o shido suru) . The popular

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movement is the only method left to the people. Men who care for their country must gird their loins for the effort and decide to act with resolve. In either case i t was wrong for the party leadership to sit quietly waiting for the plum to plop into i ts lap. The struggle for power should not be waged without an appeal to the people. In practice attempts to capture "popular" support by espousing "popular" causes and representing "popular" demands meant the staging of rallies and demonstrations. Kat6 , with his exaggerated desire for decorum in politics, looked askance at such activities. He rarely deigned even to participate in the electoral campaigning of his party 's candidates, spoke infrequently in the House of Peers, and hardly ever co ndescended to address a public audience . H e h a d once expressed h i s admiration for the orderliness and discipline o f mass demonstrations i n England, b u t h e deplored the excesses t o which they seemed to go in his own country. The appointment of Kat6 Tomosabur6 and the unscrupulousness of the Seiyukai in offering him support, however, tempo­ rarily unsettled this Olympian aloofness. When Takahashi resigned on June 6, 1 9 2 2 , the Kenseikai was absolutely determined that Kat6 should succeed him. On the following day a meeting of all the highest party officials but Kat6 resolved that if a "neutral cabinet" or a reorganized Takahashi cabi net were now selected to take over the government the Kenseikai would " undertake a general mobilization of the whole country . . . and carry out a movement for constitutional government (kenseiyogo undo) as though our lives depended on it." 26 Kato's interview with Matsukata on June g, however, promised to render this al ternative unneces­ sary . Because Matsukata had told him that Kat6 Tomosabur6 was not likely to accept office , it must have seemed to Kato that he was sure to be selected. To prepare for this, as he later told Miura Gor6 , he had felt i t necessary to have several days to discuss the matter with the other leaders of the party as well as with important members from all over the country.27 Telegrams were sent to the provinces summoning the chiefs of prefectural branches and prefectural assembly members to Tokyo, very likely in anticipation of such discussions.28 But suddenly , in the m idst of the excitement, when the Seiyukai offered unconditional support to Kat6 Tomosabur6, the Kenseikai and its president were left in a position that was embarrassing and ludicrous, like that of a country beau who finds his girl has run off with the traveling salesman.29 Out of anger and embarrassment at his rebuff by the genro Kat6 readily

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agreed to go along with the party leadership's determ ination to m ake a " popular" issue out of the establishment of an "abnormal cabinet. " 30 On June r 2 , the day after Kat6 Tomosabur6 accepted office he agreed with the rest of the party leadership "to strengthen the unity of the party both at the center and in the provinces . . . , to tread the great path of constitutional government to the very end, and, together with men of like mind, to start a great popular movement."31 Resolutions protesting the appointment of the Kat6 Tomosabur6 cabinet and castigating the action of the Seiyukai poured in from the prefectural branches of the party. The party was girding its loins for a popular movement. The Kenseikai 's Movement for Constitutional Goverment was anything but successful as a mass movement. Rallies and "people's meetings" to "protect constitutional government" were held in Tokyo, Kobe, Osaka, and Kyoto throughout the remainder of June and July. Kenseikai orators ham­ mered away at the "unconstitutionality" of the Kato cabinet, the betrayal of popular hopes for continued party government, and the perfidy of the Seiyukai in supporting the new government. Even Kato made an unprece­ dented appearance on the platform of a public rally in Tokyo . But there was little public response. Although a number of newspaper reporters were prominent in the movement the press in general took l ittle notice of it. In Osaka several pro-suffrage organizations held meetings to attack the govern­ ment, but aside from this there was very li ttle general public participation. Very few seemed to lament the fate of the Kenseikai or of "normal consti­ tutional government." Turning to the people was a policy easy to advocate (especially in retrospect), but in practice it did very little but relieve the pent-up frustrations of the Kenseikai membership. How was it possible for any party to secure "popular" support when the vast majority of the people were indifferent to politics and those who were not were hostile to the parties themselves? 32 Although Kato's willingness to have the party sponsor a Movement for Constitutional Government may temporarily have restored the confidence of many party members in his leadership, this abortive effort did little to enhance the possibility of his becoming premier. Neither did any other participation by Kenseikai members in other similar movements. Far more sensible under the circumstances was to attempt a personal rapprochement between Kato and the genro . Kato had always been as reluctant to mend his fences in this quarter as he had been to stomach the idea of party

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participation in popular movements, but finally at the urging of his confidants both inside and outside the party-men such as Wakatsuki, lzawa Takio, and possibly Shimooka Chuj i-he began to make overtures first to Miura Goro , who was regarded as having considerable influence with the genro , and then visited Saionj i himself. Other Kenseikai leaders pleaded the Kenseikai's cause with H irata, Miura, and the principal members of the Kenkyukai. 33 All this activity proved to be of no avail. Saionj i did not change his opinion of Kato or of the advisability of putting the Kenseikai in office. Instead Kato was bypassed once again in favor of Yamamoto Gombei, who was selected for the same reasons that dictated the choice of Kato Tomosaburo the year before. Not surprisingly , merger senti ments kindled anew. As usual an anti­ Seiyukai alliance for the formation of a new party was a tem pting antidote for chronic political weakness. It seemed doubtful that Kato would be made premier automatically in accordance with " the normal course of consti tu­ tional government. " Even Kato himself was discouraged. He told friends that he felt he was last on the genro's list.34 Not unnaturally, some of those who now pressed for a merger simply wished to get rid of Kato as party president and entice Goto Shimpei, the incumbent home minister, into the party ; ,indeed Goto hi mself was said to be behind the movement.35 Perhaps a larger number within the party saw merger less as a means of easing Kato out of his position than simply a means of increasing the party 's numerical strength in order to com pete with the Seiyukai. For them , the party 's perpetual relegation to the opposition was due not so much to Kato 's unpopulari ty with the genro as to its relative weakness in the Diet. Seki Kazutomo, for example, argued that it would be advantageous for all the opposition parties and factions to merge in a si ngle group in preparation for the general elections coming in May 1 924. The Seiyukai , at present weakened by internal disputes and bereft of public confidence, was not likely to do well in the coming election, but if the rest of the parties were to remain divided and work at cross purposes as they had in 1 92 0 , they would lose their chance to capitalize on the Seiyukai's weakness.36 Outside the Kenseikai , however, there seems to have been less enthusiasm for a simple anti-Seiyukai merger than for the formation of a new political party capable of " reforming the political world " in preparation for a "new era" in politics.37 This school of thought was strongest in the Kakushin Club, ' which had been formed with the intention of expanding into such a party .

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Young suffragist liberals like Nagashima Ryuj i and Nakano Seigo had hoped the club would make a break with the "established parties, " adopt a program representing the interest of all the people instead of special vested interests, and capture the hearts and votes of the masses who would be enfranchised by universal suffrage. lnukai, the central figure in the club, favored a merger project but was opposed to a mere reshuffling of old faces. For him the new party should be built on the basis of new principles and demands.38 Oishi Masami, who offered his services as midwife for the new party, felt that the proposed new party should " take as its foundation new political forces" and "proceed with determination to stand side-by-side with the majority of the people . " 39 M uch of this was stale sloganeering, but for lnukai and others "building on new political forces" meant working for universal suffrage and representing the interests of the new voting public it would enfranchise.40 The merger movement, which began in late October I 92 3 , enj oyed co n­ siderably more support within the Kenseikai than the previous effort had in I 9 2 I and I 92 2 . Among the proponents of the merger were men like M iki Bukichi, who had opposed the idea the year before, and key figures in the highest party leadership-Wakatsuki, Sengoku, and Minoura Katsundo­ seemed favorable as well. Sengoku offered to use his connections with lnukai and Oishi to facili tate the merger. Wakatsuki said he was willing to accept the "general trend" or opinion within the party and would agree to a merger if that is what the party membership wanted .41 Encouraged by lack of overt hostility on the part of these important party leaders, the pro-merger elements within the party arranged to have a formal merger proposal presented to the party leadership by representatives of the Koshin Club on November 2 0 . The merger movement foundered on the question o f who was t o lead the new party. Those who favored merger included those who saw it as a means of improving Kato's chances of becom ing premier as well as those who wished to get rid of him. The latter proposed a deliberative system of leadership similar to the committee of party directors who had led the Doshikai in I 9 I 3 and wished to relegate Kato to the status of party director or else to an honorary advisory position. Kato threw cold water on these plans at a meeting of the highest party leadership on November 2 2 . He said he had no objection to a merger as such and that he was willing to follow the decisions of the party membership on the question of whether to form a new party . But, he added , if the leadership of the new party were to take the

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form of a group or council of leaders rather than a single president, then he would not be willing to maintain his "present relationship" with the party . If the new party were to be headed by a group of (say) five directors of which he was only one, when he would exert only one fifth of his present efforts. This was a veiled hint that unless he was to be the leader of the new merger he would either go into semi-retirement or cut off his share of financial support to the party.42 Although this threat dam pened the enthusiasm of many of those who were amenable to the merger, the Kenseikai drew up a rough merger proposal that envisaged Kato as party chairman. Of course, the proposal was not acceptable to Inukai . He told the Kenseikai representative, who visited him with it, that he, Kato , and O ishi should serve as "supervisors" to the new party , leaving the party affairs to younger men. He also flatly refused a request to "assist" Kato , that is, to serve in a position subordinate to him .43 This attitude dimmed all hope of a harmonious merger and on Decem­ ber 2 the Kenseikai leadership formally rej ected the merger proposal. A few diehards in the rank and file, such as Miki Bukichi , continued to press for an anti-Seiyukai merger, but by the middle of December their pro test had dwindled and died.44 There was no telling when a new merger movement might revive, however. THE MOVEMENT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT It might well be asked at this point why both the Kenseikai and the Seiyukai did not eventually fragment and pave the way for the continuation of " transcendental cabinets" ad infinitum. Given the divisiveness of both parties at the end of 1 9 2 3 one could hardly have been optimistic about the prospects of either or, indeed , about the future of party government itself. It was all very well to decry the organization of "abnormal cabinets" (hentai naikaku) and to call for a return to " normal constitutional government," but it was quite another problem to put teeth into these slogans. Had the Yamamoto cabinet stayed in power, both parties might well have floundered along until the general election scheduled for the spring of 1 9 24-the Seiyukai in hopes that the genro would pick their leader as premier after the balloting was over and the Kenseikai in the hope that the Seiyukai would split into two weak factions. But the fall of the Yamamoto in December 1 9 2 3 , and the subsequent appointment of yet another nonparty cabinet under Kiyoura

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Keigo shattered all hopes that party government would come about auto­ matically. The formation of the Kiyoura cabinet led the two parties to seize on the only practical alternative left to them , the formation of an alliance to protest the choice of a nonparty premier and to demand the return to the establishment of party cabinets. The result was the Movement for Constitutional Government of 1 92 4 . Cooperation between the two parties was a tactic that h a d n o t been mooted since the days of the Terauchi cabinet, but at the end of 1 9 2 3 it had attrac­ tions both for the leadership of the Kenseikai, who had rejected the notion of an anti-Seiyukai merger, and to the Takahashi faction of the Seiyii.kai , which feared a split that might weaken its position in the Diet. The main initiative for such cooperation seems to have come from outside the parties, however. In late October and early November 1 9 2 3 , Miura Goro, an unex­ pected supporter of party government, urged both Takahashi and Kato to pave the way for the final establishment of party government by the issuance of a joint statement clarifying the significance of political parties and the necessity of party cabinets. Both Kato and Takahashi seemed agreeable to the idea and willing to have Miura arrange a meeting between them at an appropriate time in the near future. But Miura made no immediate move to do so.45 More concrete negotiations between the two parties were stimulated by the efforts of Okazaki Hisaj iro, a former Doshikai member, who made rounds of top leaders in both parties in late November with the suggestion that they undertake some kind of j oint effort to establish party cabinets again.46 Most of the Kenseikai leadership seemed amenable to the idea of a Kenseikai­ Seiyukai alliance, but both Takahashi and Yokota, although not opposed to the suggestion, held to the view that " transcendental cabinets" were going to end in the near future and that the Seiyukai was willing to wait out the interim without taking any action to force an end to them . Nevertheless, probably because both sides wished at least to keep open the possibility of cooperation, Adachi Kenzo and Okazaki Kunisuke held a series of meetings at the beginning of December to discuss the possibility of starting a movement to overthrow the Yamamoto cabinet and put an end to nonparty govern­ ment.47 Significantly enough, in discussing the form the alliance should take, Okazaki, one of the enthusiasts in 1 9 1 2 - 1 3 , suggested that he "would like to fire the opening shot in the way the Seiyukai did years ago," by starting a Movement for Conscitutional Government.

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These negotiations for a party alliance might not have materialized but for the occurrence of a new cabinet crisis .. On December 2 7 , 1 9 2 3 , a young anarchist named Namba Daisuke unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate the prince regent.48 The Yamamoto cabinet, split by internal dissensions and facing an unmanageable Diet, took responsibility for the incident by resign­ ing. Once again the genro were faced with the vexing task of choosing a new premier. Saionj i was still reluctant to recommend either Kato or Takahashi because he distrusted their abilities and because he wished the 1 9 24 elections to be fair and impartial without government interference against either party. At the same time, realizing from the experience of the Yamamoto cabinet that a government would have to have some support in the Diet, Saionj i hoped that the new cabinet, though necessarily " neutral," would "respect" the Seiyukai and obtain its assistance in carrying out the government program. Very likely he hoped for the same kind of relationship that had existed be tween the Kato Tomosaburo government and the Seiyukai. It also seems likely that he hoped the Seiyukai would win in the 1 924 election.48 In picking a man for the premiership, however, Saionj i was at a loss. He would have preferred to ·appoint Den Kenjiro, had Den not been rendered inappropriate by his service as minister of commerce and agriculture under Yamamoto. Following instead the suggestion of Hirata Tosuke, he recommended Kiyoura Keigo, about whose abilities he knew very little but whose previous attempt to form a cabinet in 1 9 1 4 had proved a dismal failure. W ith Matsukata's additional approval, Kiyoura received the imperial man­ date on the first day of January 1 9 24. The new year could hardly have gotten off to a worse start. Kiyoura, surprised at the honor and reluctant to take office, entrusted the task of picking cabinet ministers to Arimatsu Eigi, a member of the Privy Council and the House of Peers. Arimatsu, whose plan was to construct a "cabinet of talents" or a "semi-party cabinet," hoped to get representatives from the House of Peers, from the Kenseikai and from the anti-Takahashi wing of the Seiyukai to serve as Kiyoura's ministers. He succeeded only in bungling the attempt. Kiyoura, almost ready to give up the whole effort, dispensed with Arimatsu's services and relied instead on the leadership of the Kenkyukai to select his cabinet's ministers. The young men in control of the Kenkyukai leadership, particularly Mizuno Naoshi, were only too happy to use this opportunity to exert the power of their faction. The result was neither a "cabinet of talents" nor a "semi-party cabinet" but a "cabinet of peers," all

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of whom were representatives of the major factions in the Upper House of the Diet. It was an unprecedented development. The general reaction outside the House of Peers was one of disappointment or disgust. The Tokyo news­ papers, as a gesture of contempt, refused to issue the customary extra editions covering the inauguration ceremony. Even Matsumoto Gokichi, the faithful errand boy of Yamagata and now of Saionj i , dismissed it as a "cabinet of flotsam and j etsam" (yoriki naikaku) .50 It was not surprising that the reaction of the parties was even more violent. The formation of this "cabinet of peers" opened the way to achieving an alliance between the Kenseikai and the Takahashi wing of the Seiyukai to carry on a Movement for Constitutional Government. The younger hotspur members of both parties were angered at Kiyoura's appointment, but more important, these emotions were shared by the leadership of the Kenseikai and part of the leadership of the Seiyukai as well. Takahashi and Yokota had further reason to be angry. Arimatsu had attempted to split the Seiyukai by offering cabinet posts to members of the anti-Takahashi faction ; Yokota had told Matsumoto Gokichi of his intention of starting a Movement for Constitutional Goverment as early as January 2 . The main stumbling block i n the way o f cooperation, however, continued to be the reluctance of the anti-Takahashi faction to oppose the Kiyoura government. Nakahashi argued that it was not likely Kiyoura would last very long in office and that it would be to the party's advantage to avoid pre­ cipitate action ; the party should support the government rather than inflame public opinion against it. This time the conflict within the party proved impossible to resolve. Tokonami, Nakahashi, Motoda, and Yamamoto Tatsuo resigned from the party, taking their followers with them to support Kiyoura. Soon afterward , they formed a new party, the Seiyuhonto, which staunchly supported Kiyoura. Takahashi , on the other hand, not only issued a strong public statement attacking the House of Peers for exceeding its proper func­ tions by participation in the formation of a cabinet, but as a beau geste resigned his own peerage and promised to stand as a candidate for the coming election to the House of Representatives.51 The way was now open for the cooperation of the three anti-government parties, the Kenseikai, the Seiyukai, and the Kakushin Club, in a Movement for Constitutional Government. On January 2 0 , a meeting of the leadership of the three parties agreed " to establish the party cabinet system," " to hold in check the tyranny of the privileged authority" (that is, the House of Peers),

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"to adopt a united course of action in the future to achieve these aims," and "in accordance with the foregoing, to disavow the Kiyoura cabinet. " Con­ cretely the " united course of action" meant the holding of popular rallies to protest the establishment of the government and the presentation of a no-confidence resolution in the House of Representatives, both of which were aimed at rousing public opinion. Curiously enough, the slogans adopted by the parties went beyond the customary demands for the overthrow of the incumbent Kiyoura government and the establishment of the "normal course of constitutional government. " They also accused the House of Peers, the " privileged class," of "exacerbating class struggle" and inviting the further "unsettling of the people's ideas" by their irresponsible participation in the cabinet. The parties borrowed the words of the new generation of liberals and the leftwing, if not their music. But as a popular movement, the second Movement for Constitutional Government had little more success than the Kenseikai's abortive effort of 1 9 2 2 . As Kojima Kazuo later commented, "Although sentiments in favor of ' protecting rhe constitution' were rather strong within the Diet, this was not the case outside it. " 52 In part this may have been because of the caution of the party leadership, who feared that in light of the recent assassination attempt on the prince regent, it would be unwise to overstimulate popular emotions. But far more important was the fact that many people could not take the movement as seriously as the participants in the 1 9 1 2 - 1 3 movement did, nor could the parties inspire as much fervor as the universal suffrage issue had. Kiyoura was a has-been , not a potent symbol of the hambatsu as Katsura was in 1 9 1 2 , and Saionj i , the genro of 1 9 24, could hardly b e seen as an influence on politics as sinister as Yamagata. The issue of the parties versus the hambatsu had given way to the issue of the parties versus the people. It was no longer possible to see the parties as the representatives of popular interests rwr party government as an unmixed blessing. Neither the press, the working-class organizations, nor the student move­ ment showed much interest in the parties' effort. A few suffrage organizations in Osaka participated in rallies as they had in 1 9 2 2 , but the main force of the labor movement, which had increasingly come under the influence of anti-parliamentary philosophies after the failure of the universal suffrage bill in 1 9 2 0 , remained hostile or indifferent. The press, always eager to attack "unconstitutional" practices, was generally cynical. The drift of many edi­ torials suggested that the parties would eventually have a falling out and

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pursue their own interests once the immediate end of overthrowing Kiyoura was accomplished . This had happened in 1 9 1 3 and m ight happen again.53 Many wondered why the parties had not started a similar movement before ; its timing suggested that they were less interested in the establishment of party government as a matter of principle than in overthrowing Kiyoura as a matter of tactics. 54 This cynicism was not without j ustification, for it is clear that the parties had an eye on the coming election in their attempt to stir up public opinion against the government and the House of Peers as well as against the Seiyiihonto. The discussion between the Kenseikai and the Seiyiikai leader­ ship reflected less concern for constitutional theory and political j ustice than for the immediate tactical goals of their alliance. The representatives of both parties were primarily interested in election tactics and the possibilities of forming a coalition government after the election was over. Though they did not reach agreement on the latter question, the former was resolved with comparative ease. It was to the joint interests of all to cooperate in putting up candidates for the election in order to prevent needless competition between members of the parties. Yokota Sennosuke proposed that the chair­ men of the election committees in both parties make general plans for all districts. For example, in areas where Seiyiikai and Kenseikai candidates had in the past competed for a single Diet seat, the two parties could cooperate to bring about the election of the stronger of the two candidates ; or in areas where the Seiyiihonto put up a particularly strong candidate the two parties could support a joint candidate to oppose him. The Kenseikai 's chief election manager, Adachi Kenzo, was agreeable to these arrangements. There was probably no doubt the three opposition parties would be able to capture an absolute maj ority in the election, as indeed they did. There was relatively little government interference in the balloting, not only because the government followed Saionj i's wishes on the matter, but also because the prefectural governors, well aware that there was soon to be a change in cabinets, could not afford to alienate any single party for fear that it might mean removal from office. But more surprising, the party most benefited by the election was the Kenseikai, which gained 48 new seats to become the plurality party in the Diet. All the other parties, including the Seiyiikai and the Kakushin Club, lost substantial strength. As the returns came in, the Kenseikai headquarters was adin with shouts of "banzai . " As one observer noted, it was like New Year's, Obon, and the festivals all rolled into one.

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Even Kato's normally dour countenance was wreathed in smiles. Only Adachi remained calm. "It's not so strange that we've won," he said. "It's only natural. " 55 It is hard to know what Adachi meant by his remark, but it is not difficult to account for the Kenseikai 's gains in the election. Its relative success can probably be best accounted for by the split between the Seiyiikai and the Seiyiihonto rather than by the popularity of its program and leadership. The popular vote of the Kenseikai was 8 7 2 ,5 3 3 , and the combined popular vote of the Seiyiikai and the Seiyuhonto was I ,396,394 ; similarly, the Seiyiikai and the Seiyuhonto together captured 2 I 3 Diet seats, and the Kenseikai won only I 5 2 . Had the Seiyukai remained intact, it would have continued to hold its maj ority. Admittedly, many of the Kenseikai's seats were newly won, but again these might not have been gained at all without the Seiyukai split and the Kenseikai's policy of cooperating with the Seiyukai at the polls. The Kenseikai and the Seiyukai competed primarily with the Seiyuhonto rather than with each other. In only about a third of the districts where the Kenseikai won did it face competition from Seiyiikai candidates ; in about half, there was no Seiyukai competition at all ; and in the rest of these districts, the party seems to have benefited from the split because the combined popular vote of the Seiyiikai and the Seiyuhonto, though larger than the popular vote of the Kenseikai , was divided among too many candidates for both parties to win a seat. In districts where the Kenseikai lost seats it had held previously, it lost them mainly to the Seiyiihonto and small party candidates ; in only about a third of these districts did it lose to the Seiyiikai .56 Cooperation between the newly allied parties was not perfect, but it seems to have been substantial. The main significance of the I 9 2 4 Movement for Constitutional Govern­ ment was that it made imperative a return to the "normal path of consti­ tutional government" that had seemingly begun with the appointment of Hara as premier. But in no sense was it a "popular" movement. Prompted primarily by the disarray of the "established parties" in I 9 2 2 and I 9 2 3 , it was almost purely an affair of the professional politicians. The goal of the movement, and its effectiveness, lay not in the mobilization of public opinion, as the I 9 I 3 Movement for Constitutional Government had, nor in the expres­ sion of grievances by the disenfranchised, as the universal suffrage movement had, but rather in the cooperation of the two rival "established parties" on the matter of election tactics. Far from being the product of widely felt

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popular grievances, it was born out of the realization that a united front of the parties was the only viable tactical instrument left to the party leader­ ship when it became clear that they could not count on the confidence of the genro to smooth their path to power. Had either Kato or Takahashi been as capable of ingratiating themselves to Saionj i as Hara had been in winning over Yamagata, the movement might never have taken place at all. Ironically, however, by excluding the party leaders from power, Saionj i had succeeded in uniting them , and their union taught him an unmistakable lesson-that the parties would not tolerate another nonparty cabinet. Indeed, the cabinet which emerged from the movement, appointed as it was as the result of party pressure, was more nearly a true party cabinet than Hara's had been.

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VIII THE TRIALS OF RE SPO N SIBILITY

W

alter Bagehot once observed that an opposition party, on coming into power, is like a speculative merchant whose bills become due. The merchant could no more afford to forget his bills than a new prime minister could forget his promises that "the state of things is so-and-so, and if you give us power we will do thus and thus. " Such precisely was the situation of the Kenseikai in 1 9 2 4 . Out of power since its organization, the party had advo­ cated a wide range of policies without facing the pitfalls that execution places in the path of the best laid plans. With Kato's appointment as premier in 1 9 24 , it c� mld no longer enjoy such impunity. Even though Kato had always insisted that the party should never advocate measures it would hesitate to put into practice, he was to find that even carrying out "responsible" policies proposed by the party was a vexing and uncertain venture. It was much easier to right the country's finances, give "proper leadership" to public opinion, and condemn the forces of reaction and conservatism from the opposition seats than from the government's dais.

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The Kat6 cabinet is interesting from two points of view. On the one hand, it was as close as the Taish6 era came to producing an effective reform-minded cabinet that sought to do more than maintain itself in power or act as a complacent caretaker of national "wealth and strength. " Its record of legis­ lative accomplishments, when contrasted with those of other cabinets of the era, was certainly striking. Fulfilling the promise it first made in 1 9 2 0 , it carried out the passage of universal suffrage ; it succeeded in achieving a modest reform of the House of Peers ; and had Kato not died in office it might also have succeeded in passing a labor union law. None of these successes were particularly dramatic, nor did they elicit wild public enthusiasm. Indeed, quite the reverse was true. Yet when all else is said and done, without the accomplishments of the Kat6 cabinet, the legislative landscape of the 1 9 2 0 's would appear bleak indeed. At the same time, however, though the cabinet succeeded in translating into law some of the program which the Kenseikai had formulated while in opposition under the Hara cabinet, Kat6 had to meet the many problems that all premiers encountered, plus some peculiar ones of his own. At times faced with conservative resistance in the House of Peers and the Privy Council, at times under pressure from his own party and its allies in the House of Representatives, at times victim of his own caution (and gentlemanliness), he found himself wedged in by the necessity to compromise. Although his program illustrated what the "established parties" might be capable of when they turned to the problem of reform, the concessions he had to make in getting this program enacted indicates the unwieldiness of the political apparatus within which he had to maneuver. The Kat6 cabinet, in short, makes clear why it was that the realm of the politically possible was circum­ scribed by boundaries much narrower than that of the politically desirable. THE FORMATION OF THE KATO CABINET After the 1 9 2 4 election there seemed little choice for Saionj i but to swallow his misgivings about Kat6 and nominate him as premier. It seems likely that he had hoped that "fair and equitable elections" would return a Seiyukai majority and make it possible to restore the party to power, but his choice of Kiyoura to administer them had been self-defeating. The Seiyukai split too evenly for either half to win in the polling. A number of nonparty notables-Got6 Shimpei, Tanaka Giichi, and Ogi Tokichi-were all rna-

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neuvering to have another "neutral cabinet" organized ,1 but in v1ew of Kiyoura's experience it seemed unlikely that public opinion or the parties in the House of Representatives would have tolerated this. There was also a flurry of intrigue to upset the Kenseikai plurality in the Diet and to drive the alliance of the three parties apart. There were secret negotiations for a merger between the Kakushin Club and the Seiyukai, for an alliance between the Kenseikai and the Seiyuhonto, and perhaps most threatening of all, for a reamalgamation of the Seiyukai and the Seiyuhonto. But the leaders of the three-party alliance saw little need to take such proposals seriously, since they had already agreed during the week following the election to press for the formation of a coalition government.2 Though Saionj i continued to hold out the possibility of forming another "neutral cabinet" in the future, for the moment the choice of Kato, the leader of the plurality party in the House of Representatives, seemed unavoidable. Hirata concurred in Saionj i 's choice, and when Kiyoura resigned in early June, Kato was called to the palace to receive the imperial mandate. Despite his persistent dislike of lnukai and his determination that the Kenseikai would make no concession on policy that it had long advocated , Kato immediately invited Takahashi and lnukai to join his government. He argued that for the sake of constitutional government and for dealing with the present political situation it would be best to continue the alliance formed in January. If neither of the two j oined, he was prepared to form a purely Kenseikai government and to call for new elections if the Diet resisted his program.3 His plan was to assign three portfolios to the Kenseikai, two to the Seiyukai, one to the Kakushin Club, and one to a member of the House of Peers. He offered Takahashi any post in the cabinet but the two most powerful offices, the Home Ministry and the Finance Ministry, which he wished to reserve for his own party. Takahashi apparently misunderstood Kato's offer to mean that he could take any post, for he returned to Kato's house later in the day with the demand that he be made finance minister and that the Seiyukai be given three portfolios instead of two. Kato refused to alter his position, which he considered fair in light of the relative strength of the three parties in the House of Representatives. After further hurried consultations, both lnukai and Takahashi agreed to join the cabinet on Kato's terms. There was little reason not to. Although both men might suffer some damage to their prestige, there was little advantage to letting the Kenseikai form a government by itself and risk the chance of facing a dissolution of the Diet if they did not continue to cooperate.4

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The Kato cabinet was thus finally organized according to Kato's original plan for a coalition government. Its hard core was a group of Kato's closest advisers, all of whom were ex-bureaucrats or at least experts. Wakatsuki and Hamaguchi, both former Finance Ministry officials, filled the Home and Finance Ministry posts. Shidehara Kij uro, a career diplomat who like Kato had married one of the Iwasaki daughters, was made foreign minister. The railroad minister was Sengoku Mitsugu, a man trained as an engineer, who had risen first as an executive in the Mitsubishi railroad interests and who was said to be the chief pipeline between the Mitsubishi fortune and the Kenseikai. This group was rounded out by Egi Yoku, the chief cabinet secretary, upon whom Kato relied heavily for policy suggestions as well as for negotiations with nonparty elements. The other ministers were chosen to strengthen the coalition. Takahashi became minister of agriculture and commerce, Yokota became minister of j ustice, and lnukai became minister of transportation. The final civilian ministry went to Okada Ryohei, an independent imperial appointee in the House of Peers, who had left the Kenkyukai in 1 9 2 2 in order to oppose the Takahashi government. (It might be noted in passing that quite by accident the cabinet included five men who had served or were to serve as premier.) The difficulties facing the new cabinet, however, were legion. In the first place, Kato had been in declining health for some years. In 1 9 2 2 while vacationing at his summer home in Karuizawa, he had fallen down the stairs, sustaining a back injury that weakened his legs. The following year he came down with a respiratory ailment that kept him in bed for a month. From then on his physical condition began to deteriorate. His ill health was further aggravated by the gruelling campaign tours he made in April and May 1 9 24, jolting down country roads to make unwonted personal appearances in support of Kenseikai candidates. His whole demeanor now showed signs of strain, his posture was stooped, and his speeches before the Diet were delivered in a voice that was low and lacking in vigor. His photographs as premier show a face sagging with the lines of fatigue and weariness, wanting in spirit and self-assurance. A medical examination revealed a heart weakness, a malady that was kept secret from all but his closest ministers-Wakatsuki, Sengoku, and Hamaguchi-and his doctor urged him to rest on weekends. Though he publicly assured the party in july 1 9 2 4 that his doctor pronounced him in fine condition, there can be little doubt that his flagging energies and apprehension for his health reinforced his inherent caution. His grip was weakening at the very moment he could least afford it.5

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Kato's position as premier was all the more delicate because his cabinet was a coalition of the three parties that had cooperated in the second Movement for Constitutional Government. Lacking an absolute maj ority in the House of Representatives and committed to cooperation with the other parties by the Kenseikai's participation in the movement, Kato was forced to rely on the support of both the Seiyukai and the Kakushin Club. This not only jeopardized the longevity of the cabinet, it also forced on Kato and the Kenseikai compromises that otherwise might not have been made. There were several seeds of potential discord among the coalition parties. The Kenseikai's policy priorities differed from its temporary partners. Kato was bent on passing a universal suffrage bill and effecting a major retrenchment of governmental finances. Both, of course, were policies the Seiyukai had consistently opposed in the past. Furthermore Kato was relatively unenthusi­ astic about Seiyukai demands for a reform of the House of Peers. Aside from potential disagreements over policy, however, the Seiyukai was constantly under the temptation to disrupt the cabinet in order to return to power. The possibility of a reunion of the Seiyukai and the Seiyuhonto always hovered on the political horizon, causing the Kenseikai leadership no small amount of anxiety .6 Although Yokota and Takahashi seemed willing to support the Kato government at least temporarily, there were others in the Seiyukai who worked to frustrate the government's policy in hopes of forcing a resignation. When Yokota died in February 1 9 2 5 , cooperation between the coalition parties was seriously jeopardized . Those in the Seiyukai who wished to reunite with the Seiyuhonto attempted to disrupt the cabinet by forcing it to adopt more extensive reform than it could possibly get through the Diet. There were intramural party cleavages as well between the rank and file of the parties, on the one hand, and the party leaders and cabinet members, on the other. In part this cleavage grew out of the government's attempt at a retrenchment program that threatened to sacrifice pleas for pork barrel legislation to cuts in government expenditure. It was hard for many members of all the government parties to pursue cabinet policy when this meant halting railroad construction projects, building fewer roads, and decreasing govern­ ment expenditure on a host of government projects in local constituencies. There were also disagreements over ideals as well as interests. The government often seemed to be drafting its plans for revision of the electoral law and �or the reform of the House of Peers with an eye to satisfying the minimum demand for change. Where many government party members felt it should

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be vigorous and uncompromising the cabinet seemed to have its eye on the lowest common denominator. The protest of certain Seiyukai members over the tepidity of reform measures was not entirely disingenuous, but many of the younger liberals in the Kenseikai and the Kakushin Club genuinely felt their cause was being betrayed. The caution of the government on the reform questions sprang in large measure from the need to conciliate and mollify hostile elements in the Privy Council and the House of Peers. The Privy Council proved the more tractable of the two, but the House of Peers with its power to defeat any government proposal was not so easily managed . The peers were particularly sensitive to the government intentions on the question of peerage reform. Because it was not likely that they would cheerfully lay their heads on the block at the convenience of the government, Kato sought to approach them by entreaty rather than frontal assault. In intention his tactics were little different from Hara's "vertical alliance" with the Kenkyukai, but his position was immeasurably weaker in view of dissension within the leadership of this faction and the urgency with which peerage reform was forced upon him. In the final analysis, his dealings with the peers proved to be his most troublesome problem. Had Kato been content to adopt Hara's Walpolean approach to politics, had he attempted to mend his political fences before raising controversial issues, he might have enjoyed a more tranquil ministry. But being more concerned with the formulation of policy than adept at manipulating power, he tried to overreach his limited resources. From the beginning he made it clear that as the sole recipient of the Imperial Mandate he would not be willing to make concessions on the three major planks of the Kenseikai platform-administrative and financial retrenchment, the passage of uni­ versal suffrage, and the "enforcement of official discipline. " In practice, this proved more easily said than done. That the accomplishments of his ministry were limited was due less to a failure of intention than to failures in execution. For all his pains, he was to learn that a premier's lot is not a happy one. THE RETRENCHMENT POLICY If the Seiyukai attitude toward the public finances had been a "positive policy," the Kenseikai's point of view was consistently negative. The leader-

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ship of the Kenseikai, particularly its leading financial expert, Hamaguchi, was dominated by an extremely conservative fiscal philosophy. Budgets should not only be balanced, they should be kept as small as possible. The way to do this was to reduce government expenditure to the minimum consistent with necessary commitments for administration and defense, to make a concomitant reduction in the popular tax burden, and to avoid increasing public indebtedness through public borrowing or the issuance of public securities. Hamaguchi summarized the kernel of this policy in a speech that the staunchest Coolidge Republican would have applauded. 7 Financial retrenchment is really a t t h e heart of a l l the troubles in our financial world. I believe it is of vital importance that we carry out a retrenchment and readjustment of government finance both at the national and local levels and thereby ease the pressures on the private economy. At the same time we must strive to establish a firm basis for future economic development by wiping away entirely the spirit of frivolity and luxury which has overwhelmed the people since the period ot wartime prosperity, to cultivate the excellent customs of self-denial and frugality in response to the government's policy, and to aim at the accumulation of capital through diligence and strenuous effort. The government was to teach by example, discouraging extravagance and unsound expansion of investment by tightening its own belt. The origins of this viewpoint antedated the formation of the Kenseikai. Both Hamaguchi and Wakatsuki, as top officials in the Finance Ministry, had participated in the administrative and financial retrenchment program of the second Katsura cabinet. The purpose then had been to strengthen public confidence in the government's credit and to maintain the market price of government bonds, both of which were weakened by a sudden increase in government indebtedness to finance the Russo-Japanese war. Wakatsuki had continued the policy as finance minister under the Okuma cabinet, keeping expend iture at a minimum and avoiding the raising of public loans. But as a consequence of the recessions that followed World War I, the Kenseikai began to j ustify retrenchment less because of its effects on public credit than because of the salutary influence it would have on the private sector of the economy. The Kenseikai argued that free spending by the . government, especially the Seiyiikai government, had an inflationary effect that kept Japanese goods at a price level disadvantageous on the world market

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and threatened popular living standards. Expanded government expenditure also meant high taxes for the average man. In order to remedy this lamentable situation, the Kenseikai proposed to contract expenditure by the government, the largest single consumer in the country, in order to stop inflationary trends and to set an example for private consumption and enterprise. The surplus created by cutting administrative expenses and postponing or discontinuing "unproductive" enterprises of the government was to make possible cuts in excise taxes on necessary articles of daily consumption. At the same time, it could also be used to build up a reserve of monies as a hedge against inflation, to produce funds for supplementing the salaries of elementary school teachers, and to finance certain welfare policies such as health and unem­ ployment insurance. The use to be made of the government's surplus was excessively optimistic, perhaps calculated with an eye on the ballot box rather than on the abacus, but the demand for retrenchment itself was not inspired by political considerations.8 The Kato cabinet began work on' its policy of frugality and retrenchment almost immediately. The attempt to encourage popular habits of thrift began with an increase of tariffs on foreign luxury goods passed in the extraordinary session of the Diet and an ordinance issued by the home minister to all prefectural governors to raise local amusement taxes. The government also began a propaganda campaign with the establishment of a Committee for the Encouragement of Thrift and Diligence. Four "Thrift and Diligence Weeks" were to be celebrated every year and posters began to appear in downtown Tokyo rousing passers-by with the slogan, " Let's be frugal ! Let's work hard ! Let's save a lot ! " The practical effects of this frugality campaign were probably negligible, since there were few people aside from the very rich whose habits of thrift and economy could have an appreciable effect on the economy,9 but at least it had the advantage of being politically mnocuous. This was not the case at all when it came to cutting back on government expenditure. In early September an ad hoc committee set up by the govern­ ment to study financial and administrative retrenchment produced a budget pmposal that would result in a saving of ¥28o ,ooo,ooo less than the previous annual budget, or a reduction of about r 7 percent. The proposal was met by grumblings within the lower ranks of the bureaucracy where demands for increased expenditure customarily began with the section chiefs who submitted appropriation requests. But these complaints were not as important

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as objections raised within the cabinet. Both the military service ministers, Ugaki Kazunari and Takarabe Takeshi , obj ected to a cut of ¥so ,ooo ,ooo in naval expenditure and ¥3o,ooo ,ooo in army expenditure. Far more ominous for the stability of the coalition, however, were the complaints of Takahashi , Yokota, and lnukai , who urged that the government adopt a more "positive" retrenchment program. By this they meant that instead of cutting the budget so drastically, the government should aim instead at fostering future sources of revenue such as water control projects, harbors, and rail­ roads, in short, the whole arsenal of economic benefits that the Seiyiikai had previously exploited so successfully to spread party influence. This reflected the sentiment of rank-and-file members of all the government parties, in­ cluding the Kenseikai. Retrenchment threatened existing local support of Diet members, and it also meant that many of them would have to renege on promises and pledges they had made to their constituents over the years. During September many local party members appeared in the capital to petition against cutbacks or postponements of local public works. 10 The cutback in arms expenditure also touched on the local interests of garrison towns, which faced a considerable economic setback were they to lose the military units stationed there.U For the first time, Kato was confronted with the problem of how to deal with demands for pork barrel legislation . The objections of the military services and the lower bureaucracy were apparently more easily placated than those of the party rank and file. On October I I , I 9 24, the cabinet finally agreed to a retrenchment proposal that would reduce the budget by ¥ 2 5 6,ooo,ooo, about ¥ 2 4 ,ooo,ooo less than the original proposal, but still a considerable retrenchment. Administrative expenses were to be reduced by the abolition or amalgamation of many government sections and bureaus, the release of 2 0 ,000 officials from their duties, and the cutback of certain committees and investigative commissions. The army was to be reduced by four divisions and the funds thus saved were to be applied to reequipping it with newer and more modern weapons; in addition 2 ,000 officers were released from duty and the period of required military service was shortened to cut costs. The navy was to lose a number of obsolete vessels, training ships, reserve vessels, and other equipment. Hamaguchi also got Kato to agree to whittle requests for ¥2 7 o ,ooo ,ooo in new appropriations by ¥4o ,ooo,ooo which after a fight in the cabinet was �aised to ¥so ,ooo ,ooo .12 But feelings began to run high within the party rank and file over the

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question of cutbacks in the expenditure on local projects. The mam bone of contention was the question of railroad construction. Legislation under the Seiyukai cabinet had authorized long-range plans for the construction of a great many new lines, most of which were local branches. The new railroad minister, Snegoku Mitsugu, was convinced that a far wiser policy would be to finish construction only on uncompleted major trunk lines. He wished to curtail completely construction of extravagant or unnecessary lines, particularly those he felt were proposed mainly in order to advance the interests of local politicians. Furthermore, because the cabinet's new policy was to avoid the raising of public loans, construction would have to be financed out of the profits of railroad operation rather than from the issuance of public securities. Rather than devote the major portion of this income to construction, Sengoku felt it would be far more economical and efficient to spend the money on the repair and improvement of existing lines. In either case, this meant less money for local railroads.13 A few days after the cabinet had decided on the general plan for retrench­ ment, Sengoku announced his own program for railroad retrenchment. Its major features were : ( r ) postponing the completion of the existing plan for railway construction until 1 93 6 ; ( 2 ) postponing construction work on 44 of S r proposed new lines until 1 9 2 7 ; (3) cutting the annual expenditure on con­ struction from ¥7o ,ooo,ooo to ¥3o ,ooo ,ooo ; and (4) increasing annual ex­ penditure on repair and improvement from ¥r so ,ooo ,ooo to ¥r ,2oo ,ooo,ooo. The proposal naturally alarmed members of all parties, including the Kenseikai, who felt there would be considerable local repercussions of such a sweeping cutback in railroad construction. Almost immediately Diet members began to put pressure on Kat6 to have Sengoku liberalize this plan to spend more on railroad construction, to spend less on improvement and repair, and to authorize the use of public loans, railroad profits, and other funds to finance it. Kat6 explained that he believed in following the advice of his ministers on matters within their sphere of competence and in placing national interest above party interest, but the discontent was not so easily mastered. He therefore had to try to extract concessions from Sengoku and Hamaguchi , both stubborn men. They agreed to raise annual expenditure on construction to ¥4o ,ooo ,ooo but no more. Though the Kenseikai was willing to accept this figure, it fell short of the Seiyukai demand for at least ¥so ,ooo ,ooo on construction. Yokota, incensed at Sengoku's rigidity, insisted the question was not merely one of railroad policy but touched on the

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coalition itself. The dispute that had begun as a tussle between the govern­ ment and the parties that supported it now threatened to divide the two major parties in the coalition.14 Kato, who was more sympathetic to his ministers than to the demands from the parties, finally proposed a compromise agreeable to all. He announced at the end of November: ( I ) that the annual expenditure on railroad construction would be ¥46,ooo,ooo in I 9 2 5 , I 9 26, and I 9 2 7 and not less than that after I 9 2 7 ; ( 2 ) that construction would be continued on a number of the 44 lines that Sengoku had wished to curtai l ; (3) that the construction plan would be completed as soon before I 936 as possible; and (4) that if financial conditions warranted in the future a public bond issue to finance construction might be floated in the future.15 The main concession was the increase in the annual expenditure, the rest of Kato's announcement being vague promises rather than concrete plans. One can well imagine that grumbling persisted, especially in the Seiyiikai, which was beginning to feel that the cabinet was really the Kenseikai's rather than that of all three coalition parties. The party rank and file were less successful in extracting concessions from the government on a proposal to increase the central government's contri­ bution to local compulsory education from ¥4o,ooo,ooo to ¥6o ,ooo,ooo . The education minister had agreed to this proposal, aimed at raising the salaries of elementary school teachers without placing a strain on local finances, but owing to the general retrenchment plan he was forced to reject the request. Not only was this a disappointment to party members who for years had been making public and private promises to increase national subsidies to local education, there also began movements in the provinces to lobby for such an increase. Hamaguchi , however, remained adamant. The Seiyuhonto, attempting to capitalize on the rift between the cabinet and its party support, introduced a resolution in the 50th Diet supporting such an increase and a bill to put it into effect. To allay the discontent of his own party members and of the Seiyukai members who complained they were getting little out of the coalition, Kato agreed with Takahashi and lnukai to defeat the Seiyuhonto bill unanimously and to announce the government's intention to consider such an increase the following year. Hamaguchi had won this point, but only at the expense of increased ill feeling among the parties. 16 . The budget finally passed by the House of Representatives in early February I 9 >:5 amounted to ¥I ,5 24,40o,ooo , a reduction of about ¥g I ,ooo,ooo

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or 6 percent of the 1 9 24-25 budget. This was considerably less than the ¥256,ooo ,ooo originally agreed upon by the cabinet and less than the econo­ mies that had been effected by the governments of Takahashi and Kato Tomosaburo in 1 9 2 2 and 1 9 2 3 P For all the heat generated by the budget controversy within the coalition parties, the government's actual accomplish­ ments were scant indeed. Kato's support of Hamaguchi against the demands of party interest exacted a high price-growing discontent in the Seiyukai. As if this were not enough, the budget was to meet further difficulties in the House of Peers, which attempted to use it as a counter in its bargaining with the government over the issue of peerage reform . UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE AND THE PEACE PRESERVATION LAW Although the fight over the retrenchment had been hottest within the ranks of the government and its supporting parties, the government's universal suffrage bill was pushed and mauled from all directions. The passage of the bill was perhaps the policy to which the Kenseikai had committed itself most strongly. Indeed, Kato went so far as to call it the " mission" of the cabinet. Failure to pass universal suffrage, with which the Kenseikai had tried to identify itself since 1 9 2 0 , would have been a serious embarrassment for the government, but tactically it was a ticklish problem, since a suffrage bill had to have the assent of the government parties and of the Privy Council and the House of Peers. This subjected the bill to a constant process of amendment and reamendment. The suffrage enthusiasts tried to pass as liberal a bill as possible, while conservative elements in the Privy Council and House of Peers tried to emasculate it as much as possible. The amendment process also became a tactical weapon for certain elements in the Seiyukai who were attempting to bring down the government and a lever for the House of Peers, which tried to use it as a counterfoil to the government on the issue of peerage reform . Kato's political abilities were seriously taxed as he tried to knot this bag of demons. The original drafting of the government's universal suffrage bill proceeded with relative ease. The "safety valve" argument in favor of universal suffrage had been gaining currency in the past few years. There was a growing feeling among the most conservative that the passage of universal suffrage might serve to placate a popular discontent that otherwise would seek means of expression more vio:ent than the ballot box. The Yamamoto cabinet had

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spoken of its readiness to enact universal suffrage in 1 9 2 3 . Even the ultra­ conservative constitutional theorist, Uesugi Shinkichi, agreed that failure to pass such a bill would mean continued social conflict and would make the peo ple hostile toward their homeland.l8 The main difficulty encountered in negotiations between the three government parties centered not on the ex­ pansion of suffrage qualifications to include all adult males, but on the question of districting. There were many within the Kenseikai and the Kakushin Club who wished to replace the small district introduced by the Seiyukai electoral law of 1 9 1 9 with the old large district system (coextensive with the prefecture) , which gave advantages to smaller parties. It was finally agreed, however, to adopt the middle-sized district returning three to five members, a compromise between the two extreme views. Adachi , entrusted with the task of drawing up the districting schedule, produced a proposal that drew district boundaries on the basis of population distribution and geography rather than on the basis of advantage to the Kenseikai alone. Prevented by the need for cooperation from gerrymandering the districts, he was able to produce a draft that was j udged fair by the Seiyukai leader­ ship. 19 The government's troubles began when the government submitted the draft bill for approval by the Privy Council. Here the old question of whether or not to add an "independent livelihood " clause cropped up again. Though Kato had declared in May that adding such restrictions to the suffrage would run counter to the intention of universal suffrage,20 the government draft bill agreed upon by the three parties did include a clause excluding from the suffrage "persons who received assistance at public expense (kohi no kyftjo) for their livelihood . " This was aimed specifically at indigent persons on public rel ief rather than at those who depended on parents or relatives for support. The members of the Privy Council, however, perhaps because they knew of Kato's previous stand on the question of an " independent livelihood " clause or perhaps because they wished to obstruct the bill without seeming to do so overtly, sought to broaden this clause by amending it to read " persons receiving public or private assistance (koshi no kyftjo) for their livelihood . " Although Kato was willing t o accept certain other amendments made by the Privy Council,21 he balked at this one, fully aware of the stir it would cause in his own party and possibly in the rest of the coalition. The dilemma was solved by personal persuasion and a dictionary. Kato and Wakatsuki met with the president and vice-president of the Privy Council, both of whom

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were personal acquaintances of Kato, and agreed to alter the word kyujo to kyujutsu ( that is, from "assistance" in the general sense to "assistance" in the specific sense of aid to the indigent). The compromise retained enough of the Privy Council's original wording to allow it to save face, but had the effect of restoring the government's original intentions.22 By this time, however, the Seiyiikai, aggravated by the controversy over the budget, began to act less in the interest of the coalition and more in the interest of returning to power. Yokota, the key figure in the Seiyiikai who had supported the coalition, died in February, and Takahashi, now sick in bed, was himself a lame duck, not expected to continue long in the party presidency. Both had wished to continue the coalition, but other leaders in the party wished to bring it to an end. Koizumi Sakutaro, who was engaged in negotiations to bring Tanaka Giichi in as a new president for the Seiyiikai, approached Koj ima Kazuo, lnukai's right-hand man, with the suggestion that they try to overthrow Kato on the universal suffrage question.23 What he probably had in mind was to embarrass the government by objecting to the Privy Council amendments and to insist on a more progressive bill. This would have the dual effect of inciting the House of Peers and the Privy Council against the government, perhaps forcing a resignation , and of gaining the Seiyiikai the reputation of being a forward-looking party.24 Were the cabinet to fall, the way would be open for a reunion of the Seiyiikai and Seiyiihonto and for a return to power. Though probably a minority within the party, the anti-coalition faction was probably able to exploit discontent at the government attitude toward pork barrel legislation and Kato's unwilling­ ness to propose a vigorous peerage reform program. The Seiyiikai now insisted on a series of amendments that would restore the bill more or less to the form originally agreed on by the three government parties.25 The general trend of opinion within the Kakushin Club was to support the Seiyiikai amendments. The Kenseikai itself was divided between those who agreed to the proposed Seiyiikai amendments on their merits and those who felt that it would be best to pass the bill in the form amended by the Privy Council in order to assure its passage through the House of Peers. The dispute over the proposed Seiyiikai amendments dragged on to the end of February. Kato had no success in persuading the Seiyiikai leader­ ship to withdraw the amendments, so he finally decided to accept most of them . At the same time, he reached a further agreement with Konoe Fumimaro that the House of Peers restore the bill to the form approved by

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the Privy Council and that any differences between the peers and the represen­ tatives could then be resolved in the meeting of a joint committee of the two Houses.26 It proved easier to deal with the "absolutists" than with his own allies in the House of Representatives. The bill that finally passed the House of Representatives was a compromise between the Privy Council amendments and the Seiyukai amendments, but it met with further resistance in the House of Peers. Although the notion of universal suffrage ran counter to the inherent conservatism of many of the peers, who would have preferred limiting the vote to heads of households, the leadership in the House tried to obstruct its passage simply to force concessions on the question of peerage reform. Like the budget, it had become a pawn in the tactical game. The peers delayed action on the measure until the closing day of the Diet session. Kato, determined that the bill pass at all costs, took the unusual step of petitioning the emperor to extend the Diet to allow time for final action on the bill. It finally passed the House of Peers, but with amendments that had to be either accepted by the House of Representatives or reconciled with its demands. The compromise between the two Houses did not come easily. Kato was forced to petition for another extension of the Diet session, and j ust as the time was nearly used up, a compromise was finally achieved . On the one hand, the peerage members of the j oint committee were subjected to pressure from Saionj i and probably also from Mizuno Naoshi , one of the principal leaders of the Kenkytikai. On the other, Okazaki Kunisuke, a Seiyukai leader who shortly afterwards became a new member of the cabinet, proposed an acceptable wording for the controversial disqualifying clause. The House of Peers was successful in raising voter residence requirements from six months to one year, in excluding heads of hereditary peerage families from parti­ cipating in House of Representative elections, and in making alterations in such procedural matters as absentee voting. The main concession won by the House of Representatives was the provision that successfully elected candidates not be held legally responsible for election offenses perpetrated by their campaign managers. But both sides made concessions on the dis­ qualifying clause, which, following Okazaki's suggestion, now denied the right to vote to "persons who receive public or private assistance or relief for their livelihood on account of poverty." 27 Despite the many amendments, the principle of universal suffrage was left uninfringed . All adult male citizens over the age of 25 who had resided in

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their electoral district for one year and who were not disqualified because of indigence were given the right to vote. The electorate was increased fourfold, from about 3 ,ooo ,ooo voters to about 1 2 ,5oo ,ooo. But had the compromise not been reached in the joint committee, Kato would have been forced to dissolve the Diet or to submit a general resignation of the cabinet; Adachi, Hamaguchi, and Wakatsuki had frequently urged him to do so anyway.28 But because he was reluctant to face the physical rigors and financial burdens of a new election, he reserved this drastic action as an ultimate weapon. Had he used it to threaten the Seiyukai previously, however, he might have brought them into line sooner. Instead he sought to resolve differences by negotiation and cajolery. One point that requires further clarification is the connection between the universal suffrage bill and the Peace Preservation Law that passed the Diet in February 1 9 2 5 . Some have argued that the Peace Preservation Law was part of a conscious "carrot and stick" policy ; the vote was to be extended to the working class, the peasants, and the mass of the people, but the exercise of their new right was to be circumscribed by repressive legislation. Others have suggested more specifically that the government was forced to propose a " thought control" law in order to mollify conservative elements in the Privy Council and the House of Peers.29 During Diet debates it was alleged that the Privy Council had passed a resolution that read in part : 30 Since putting universal suffrage into effect will _result in a worsening of dangerous ideas, the government must establish and put into effect laws and regulations for the rigid control [of dangerous ideas] and must exert itself to prevent evil abuses and practices. Both explanations have an element of truth, but it would be too much to say that the Peace Preservation Law was in any literal way a "precondition" for the passage of the universal suffrage bill ; it would be more accurate to say that it was a long-pending piece of legislation, the passage of which was precipitated by Kato's need to smooth the way for other measures. The ultimate inspiration behind the law was, of course, concern over the "thought problem ," which had become increasingly urgent since the war. Especially after the failure of the universal suffrage bill and the onset of hard times in 1 9 2 0 , anti-parliamentary and anti-capitalist ideas began to gain currency in the labor movement, in the tenant movement, and in intellectual circles. The apparent capture of the country's largest labor organization ( the

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Nihon Rodo Sodomei Yiiaikai) by a syndicalist faction, the public formation of the Japanese Socialist League, and the clandestine organization of the Japanese Communist party were symptomatic of a radicalism that, if not immediately harmful, was potentially dangerous. Those in positions of respon­ sibility began to worry about a solution to the problem . Work apparently began on a law for the control of radicals and subversives under the Seiyiikai cabinets. Hara Kei felt there was a need for more stringent regulations to supplement existing laws.31 At the end of 1 9 2 1 or beginning of 1 9 2 2 , anti-subversive legislation, drafted under the supervision of two top Ministry of Justice officials, Hiranuma Kiichiro and Suzuki Kisaburo, was introduced in the Diet by the Takahashi government as the Law for the Control of Radical Social Movements. The government, alleging that the number of persons cooperating with foreign colleagues to propagate radical ideas had increased recently and that existing laws were inadequate to control them, stated that the bill proposed was aimed at suppressing those who wished "to turn the country Red " (waga kuni o sekka suru) and at pre­ venting such people from establishing ties with radical elements abroad (presumably in the Soviet Union) . Quite predictably there was considerable opposition to the law in the press, in academic circles, and in the labor movement. More significant was the opposition in the Diet. The Kenseikai and the Kokuminto attacked the bill alrriost as a matter of reflex, and anti-government elements in the House of Peers objected to it strenuously. It eventually passed the upper House, but the government decided to let the bill die a natural death lest debate on it hinder more pressing legislation in the House of Representatives.32 The feeling that such a law was necessary did not die so easily, however. The police, who were nervous enough to dispatch men to investigate an organization with the sinister name, Rotary lnternational ,33 continued to exercise close scrutiny on the propagation of "dangerous ideas." They used existing laws to suppress the Japanese Communist party in July 1 9 2 3 , and under an emergency ordinance issued by the government after the Tokyo earthquake, they made a more extensive roundup of alleged radicals, includ­ ing the anarchist, Osugi Sakae, who met a cruel death at the hands of a sadistic police officer. Not surprisingly, work again began on an anti­ subversives law when Suzuki Kisaburo became minister of justice under the Kiyoura cabinet. Kiyoura himself spoke of the need to bring under control " those who dare to speak and act in a fashion that upsets public peace and

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order and contravenes the law of the land . " But the Kiyoura government fell before it could translate this draft into legislation.34 The Kato cabinet was thus heir to a project that had originated some years before in the ranks of the professional bureaucracy. It did not accept in toto the proposed draft of anti-subversive legislation. In July 1 9 2 4 , Wakatsuki, the new home minister, said that a " thought control" bill was under con­ sideration in his ministry but that its content would differ from the one proposed in 1 9 2 2 .35 The main objective to the Law for the Control of Radical Social Movements in the House of Peers had been the vagueness of its wording; i t was a shotgun not a stiletto . The same was true of the draft drawn up by the Home Ministry and Justice Ministry in 1 9 24, which was aimed at those who advocated " the denial of the state, alteration of the national structure, and so forth , which illegally revolutionizes the system established by the constitution" and at those who sought " the illegal revolutionizing of the laws and discipline of society . " Wakatsuki tried to make the draft more specific. He revised it to apply only to those who advocated revolutionary changes in the national structure (kokutai) or the poli tical system (seitm) and those who denied the system of private property. ( Because it was difficult to say what constituted a revolutionary change of the political system, this clause was dropped from the bill as it finally passed .)36 The legislation had been long pending, but the question remains of why the government did not take steps to put it in the legislative mill until the beginning of the 50th Diet. Undoubtedly it was intended to mollify con­ servative elements in the Privy Council and the House of Peers who feared that the passage of universal suffrage and the resumption of relations with the Soviet Union would increase the opportunities for radical agitators to spread their subversive ideas among the people. Kato's biographer calls it the "passport for passage of universal suffrage and the ratification of the Japanese-Soviet Treaty. " 37 Kato himself was probably not worried that an expanded suffrage would lead to the radicalization of the masses, but he did express apprehension lest the resumption of relations with the Soviet Union provide the occasion for legal entry of agents of the Third International into Japan.38 The government might eventually have proposed a Peace Pres­ ervation Law anyway, but these other two government measures required its immediate passage. In any case, it is evidence of the general feeling for the need of such a law that only a handfu l of Diet members voted against it.

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The main criticism that can be made of the Peace Preservation Law was that it was superfluous and that it was liable to be interpreted with excessive zeal by the police ; like most repressive legislation, the main danger lay less in how it was worded than in how it was applied. There seems little reason to doubt that the bill was, as Wakatsuki repeatedly stated, aimed solely at the repression of communism, anarchism, and other extremist forms of radicalism. It was not intended, as he said, to abridge freedom of speech or expression, to hinder scholars in their study, to suppress "serious-minded " (majime) social movements, or to outlaw or place restraints on the labor movement.39 In fact, the Kato government never had recourse to the law, but in more zealous hands, it became an instrument for �epression. This was a lack of foresight on the part of the Kenseikai leadership, not an error of deliberate commission. PEERAGE REFORM The issue that proved to be the most troublesome for Kato was the reform of the House of Peers. Unlike universal suffrage and financial retrenchment, both of which were long-standing demands of the Kenseikai, peerage reform first became the object of widespread public discussion during the second Movement for Constitutional Government. It was the special project of the Seiyukai, particularly of Yokota Sennosuke, who sought to translate the general disgust with the formation of the Kiyoura ministry into an issue and a slogan that could garner support in the coming election. The grievances against the House of Peers were, of course, long standing. Constitutionally the Upper House could block or obstruct any legislation passed in the Lower, a power that was usually of nuisance value but on occasion could force a cabinet resignation. Hara had attempted to circumvent the dangers of facing a hostile House of Peers by establishing his "vertical alliance" with the Kenkyukai, but this only had the effect of accelerating the " politicization" of the House of Peers. On the one hand, party struggle in the Lower House had begun to affect the peers. Not only were there peerage factions such as the Doseikai and the Koyu Club, which were directly linked with the Kenseikai and the Seiyukai, but the whole House itself split into a pro-government and an anti-government coalition during the Takahashi ministry. The peers no longer stood above unseemly party strife but were plunged iDto the midst of it. At the same time, certain members of the House

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of Peers, the more ambitious imperial appointees and the young hereditary peers who had overthrown the old leadership of the Kenkyukai in r g r g , attempted to compete with the political parties in the formation of cabinets. The culmination of this tendency toward the active involvement of the House of Peers factions in politics was, of course, the Kenkyukai 's participation in the formation of the Kiyoura cabinet. There were few reformers, if any, who demanded the abolition of the House of Peers. Needless to say, this was a practical impossibility. Rather, most felt it should be made a secondary force in politics and that its main role (as originally intended by the drafters of the constitution) should be to serve as a check or restraint on the rasher impulses of the popularly elected House of Representatives. As Yoshino Sakuzo pointed out, this would have to be achieved primarily by the growth of custom rather than by legislation, but there were certain changes that might be made without reducing the powers of the House by law. Most proposals for reform did in fact center around changing the composition of the House. It was hoped thereby that the preponderant power of the hereditary peers would be diminished, the hold of the leaders of the peerage factions over the rank and file could be reduced, and those who held seats in the House by virtue of mere wealth or birth could be replaced by members who in some way or other were more repre­ sentative of the general populace. The idea of add ing representatives from functional or professional groups was one of the more ingenious suggestions. Changing the composition of the House would thus obviate the need for more extensive surgery to break the hold of its entrenched leadership and induce it to abandon its obstructive tactics.40 Kato was leery of undertaking such reform . He was not opposed to the idea in principle but was concerned with the question of timing and degree, when and how much the present system should be changed. He felt that peerage reform was not as urgent as either universal suffrage or financial retrenchment and that it should not be attempted until these planks of the Kenseikai program had been put into effect. Since he needed the cooperation of the peers to achieve both these goals, he could ill afford to offend them by insisting on a maj or change in either the powers or the membership of the House. His public statements on the matter at the outset of his cabinet were suitably ambiguous, hinting at the need for an " improvement" ( not a reform) of the House of Peers but promising little concrete action other than a "careful study" of the matter. At the same time, he attempted to build

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an understanding with the Kenkyukai, still the most powerful faction in the House of Peers. The day following the formation of his cabinet he met with Konoe Fumimaro, recently elected to the leadership of the faction and generally regarded as a young man with a future, to request the support of the Kenkyukai in the coming Diets. Konoe relayed the message to Aoki Nobumitsu, who with the agreement of Mizuno Naoshi , said that the faction would proceed on the principle of "benevolent neutrality" (koi zezehihishugi) .41 According to Konoe, this neutrality meant that the Kenkyukai would not oppose Kato if Kato did not oppose them. It would not be hard to interpret this as a veiled warning against drastic peerage reform. Caught between the demand for peerage reform within the ranks of the government parties and the unwillingness of the peers to let anyone dabble in their affairs, Kato began to feel the vise tighten on him less than a month after the cabinet was organized. In the extraordinary Diet session, the reform elements within the parties sponsored the passage of a resolution calling for an "improvement" of the House of Peers. They also produced a proposal for reform that attempted to reduce the numerical s � periority of hereditary peers and to place the House of Peers on equal legal footing with the House of Representatives. The number of hereditary peers was to be reduced from 2 1 5 to 1 00 ; imperial appointees were to remain at the number of 1 2 5 but to be limited to a six-year term of office ; the highest taxpayers were to be replaced by 94 members elected by city, town, and village assemblies for a term of five years. The provision of the Regulations Governing the House of Peers which stated that alterations in the organization or powers of the House could be affected only by a resolution of the House itself was to be abrogated; and the Diet Law was to be amended to establish a time limit on debate of the budget in the House.42 This proposal, though it did not require a constitutional amendment, went far beyond what the House of Peers was likely to tolerate. Perhaps incensed at the effrontery of the House of Representatives' demand for reform , the Kenkyukai immediately made trouble for the government in the Diet.43 Allying with the Koyu Club, they refused to pass the govern­ ment's proposals for a new luxury tariff and for the establishment of a system of parliamentary vice-ministers. It is impossible to say whether the intent behind this was to bring down the government or merely to frighten it, but in either case Kato was hard pressed to resolve the crisis. Finally, perhaps because of the efforts of Mizuno Naoshi and perhaps because of intervention

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by Saionj i , the peers relented and passed both pieces of legislation.44 But there can be little doubt that the episode made Kato act even more gingerly on the reform question.45 Although work had begun on both financial retrenchment and universal suffrage by the beginning of the fall, Kato continued to vacillate and pro­ crastinate on the peerage reform issue. In October, after Saionj i had urged Kato to take advantage of the strong public opinion in favor of reform by carrying out some kind of change in the House of Peers, the cabinet set up a committee to investigate the problem. It proved to be of little use either in deciding on concrete proposals or in obtaining an understanding with the House of Peers on the matter.46 Finally, on the eve of the 50th Diet in December, Kato was finally forced by pressure from the government parties, especially from the Seiyukai, to announce that the government intended to present a peerage reform measure in the coming Diet session.47 The task of drafting the government's proposal was done by Yokota with some assistance from Egi Yoku. Though extremely moderate in tone, both Takahashi and lnukai agreed to it. The gist of the proposal was as follows :48 I . Amendment of the Regulations Governing the House of Peers to change the total number of mutually elected hereditary counts, viscounts, and barons from 1 66 to 1 50 ; to replace the highest taxpayers with two members to be elected from every prefecture by those paying over ¥ 1 00 in direct national taxes; to limit the imperial appointees' term of office to seven years ; to add to the number of imperial appointees a number of high officials ( like the prosecutor general, the presidents of Imperial Universities, and so on) as ex officio members and ten members to be mutually elected from certain public bodies (like the Imperial Academy, the National Astronomical Society, and so forth) ; and to lower the age limit on membership in the House from 30 to 2 5 . 2 . Amendment o f the Diet Law t o limit deliberation o f budget bills i n the House o f Peers t o 2 1 days from the beginning of debate. 3 · Amendment of the regulations concerning the mutual election of heredi­ tary peers to the House by changing the form of balloting from a multiple entry ballot to a limited entry ballot and to eliminate voting by proxy. The purpose behind this last proposal was to reduce the numerical super­ iority of the hereditary peers, to eliminate the House's power to obstruct the passage of the budget, and to loosen (rather than break) the hold of the faction leaders in the House over the rank and file members. Far more timid

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than the original proposal by the reform faction in July, it nonetheless failed to win the support of the peers themselves. Although there had been a small number of peers who advocated a modicum of reform in order to escape the backlash of aroused public opinion,49 the maj ority sentiment in the House was against any but the most innocuous change. Indeed, though certain pro-Kenseikai imperial appointees, such as lzawa Takio, urged the House to accept this relatively lukewarm reform rather than risk a more drastic change, the factions in the House almost im mediately formed a "study group," which consisted mainly of persons felt to be hostile to the government.50 To prevent the government from pressing its reform proposal too vigorously, the House, as already noted , began to adopt tactics of obstruction and delay on the budget and the universal suffrage bills. Kato found it difficult to circumvent this resistance. First of all, he tried to persuade the Mizuno Naoshi faction of the Kenkyii.kai to accept some kind of reform. The Kenkyii.kai leadership was split. Those surrounding Aoki Nobumitsu were interested in a reunion of the Seiyii.kai and the Seiyii.honto and were willing to frustrate the government in order to achieve it, whereas those surrounding Mizuno wished to continue the policy of "benevolent neutrality" and accept Kato's reforms as long as they were not excessively radical. Mizuno apparently felt that cooperation with the government was the best way to minimize the effects of reform51 and was willing to agree to universal suffrage. He did not want to bring public opprobrium on the Kenkyii.kai by opposing both attempts at reform. Secondly, although at first he felt it best not to involve the genro, Kato finally tried to have Saionj i exercise h i s influence o n the leadership o f the Kenkyii.kai .52 Saionj i was most anxious that Kato continue in power because he needed to find a suitable successor, and to that end he hoped Kato would get most of his legislation through the Diet. 53 But this tactic was ineffective at best and at worst incensed certain peers who called the attempt to use genro influence "extremely unconstitutional" and "most improper. " Instead of threatening, Kato had chosen to cajole. The result was that the peers whittled away the proposal to alter the membership of the House almost completely. Kato's main tactical failure was his unwillingness to use reform of the regulations governing the mutual election of hereditary peers to the House. These regulations, established by imperial ordinance, could be changed at the discretion of the government without the approval of the House

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of Peers. They were also the principal means by which the leadership of the peerage factions maintained their power. Had Kato threatened to alter them he might have been able to force greater concessions not only on peerage reform but on the rest of his program. Only a limited number of hereditary peers in each rank below marquis could hold seats in the House. A seat in the House of Peers was much sought after by many of the hereditary peers, who had little in the world but their name and status; they were anxious to enjoy the material advantages of a seat in the House with its annual salary of ¥ 2 ,000 and its free railroad passes. Election, however, depended on approval by the leaders of the election organizations (senkyo botai) formed by each rank of hereditary peers. Every hereditary peer was given a ballot on which he could write as many names as there were members to be elected ; in the count rank, for example, which elected 20 members, each count could write 20 names on his ballot; those whose names appeared on the greatest number of ballots were elected . Had the ballot been single entry or limited multiple entry, five or six counts might get together to elect one of their number, but under the multiple-entry ballot, an individual could be elected only with the votes of a maj ority of his fellow counts (of whom there were about 1 oo ). In practice, the leaders of the election organization sent a list of recommended candidates out to all members of the particular rank, who automatically voted for the names on this slate. Aspirants for a seat therefore had to obtain approval of the small group of leaders who controlled the election organiza­ tion and who also served as leaders of the factions themselves.54 Had Kato chosen to alter this system of election by exercise of the cabinet's discretion he could have posed a serious threat to the leadership of the House, but instead he repeatedly promised not to. By giving such assurances, he doubtless hoped to persuade the leadership in the Hou'se of Peers of his rea­ sonableness, but instead it must have been interpreted as a sign of weakness. The attempt to alter the composition of the membership having been diluted by compromise and the proposal to alter the mutual election regu­ lations having been conceded, the plan to limit the House of Peer's powers over budget debate was lost by failure to compromise in the Diet. Alteration of this aspect of the peers' power required assent of both Houses because it required amendment of the Diet Law. The House of Peers finally agreed to the government's original proposal to limit the period of debate to three weeks, but it added the proviso that in the event of urgent necessity, the House could prolong this period up to seven days by resolution. The House of

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Representatives struck this from the bill , and though it was restored by agreement in the joint committee of the two Houses, the House of Repre­ sentatives once more voted it out. Since the two Houses were unable to achieve agreement, the bill failed to become law. Peerage reform , for all the trouble it had caused with the rest of the government's program, proved to be a dismal failure. It was no longer legally necessary for the number of hereditary peers to exceed the number of imperial appointees ; the number of count, viscount, and baron members had been slightly reduced ; the electorate that voted for the highest taxpayers had been expanded somewhat ; and a number of new members were to be elected from the Imperial Academy. But the practical effect of these changes was negligible. The House continued under the control of the leaders of its factions and it continued to exercise its obstructive role. True enough, leaders of the House of Peers could no longer compete with the parties in the Lower House to form cabinets, but this was the consequence of practice not of reform. THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE FIRST KATO CABINET Kato's battles had been bloody but not decisive. The coalition was m parlous condition, and the press reactions to his accomplishments were anything but favorable. Retrenchment had proved to be negligible in its extent, the passage of universal suffrage had been qualified by the exclusion of the indigent from the vote and by the Peace Preservation Law, and peerage reform had been thoroughly emasculated. Perhaps equally important was the damage Kato's reputation had suffered . Although his strong point had in the past seemed to be his willingness to state his views publicly and defend them forthrightly, his conduct as premier had been marked by vacillation, hesitation, and a notable lack of vigor in dealing with both universal suffrage and peerage reform . Furthermore, despite his long-established insistence on "normal constitutional government," he had repeatedly bargained with the leaders of the House of Peers and he had attempted on several occasions to use Saionji's influence as a weapon. He had won the epithet of compromiser, as Katsura and Hara had, without enjoying their success.55 Admittedly, the cards had been stacked against him from the beginning, but there is no question he failed to exploit two of his tactical advantages. One was threatening to dissolve the Diet, or failing that, submission of a general resignation of the cabinet in order to bring the Seiyukai into line.

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A new election would have been a risky undertaking for all the parties, but the Kenseikai , as the plurality party whose leader was premier, would surely have enj oyed a substantial advantage. Furthermore, in view of Saionj i 's anxiety over the lack of suitable successors for Kato, it was not unlikely that Kato would have been reappointed premier even if he had resigned. He also threw away his power to coerce the House of Peers by threatening to alter the mutual election regulations. By settling for peaceful compromise instead of a show of strength he lost momentum and prestige. Had Hara been in a similar position, he might have been more willing to use threats in order to extract concessions from his opponents. Kato himself seemed a beaten man at the close of the Diet. His speech to the Kenseikai membership was defensive, larded with self-pity at the heaviness of the burdens he had borne, and petulant at the carping of the press. The universal suffrage law and the retrenchment budget, he said, were a matter for congratulation ; the peerage reform question had been an extra burden piled on from behind but had been "in some measure a success" ; a n d the Peace Preservation Law could hardly b e called an "evil law," since all it attempted to do was protect private property and the national structure (kokutai) .56 It was not a convincing rebuttal. Might there not have lurked with Kato a sense of guilt and disappointment, a rankling doubt that there was much truth in the criticism levelled against him? Perhaps if his initial position had been stronger, his health better, and his policy goals less ambi­ tious, his performance might have been more creditable, but his wife's com­ ment some years after his death reveals his sense of disappointment. To be premier, she said, may have been the goal of his life, but he was far more happy when he was minister in London.57

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hatever criticisms might be made of Kato's achievements in the 5oth Diet, there is no question that for the first time since the suffrage debate of 1 9 20 politics was enlivened by the debate of issues, rather than by a simple struggle for power and advan tage. Compromise was made to serve the ends of policy not simply of ambition. During the remainder of its tenure of power the Kenseikai government continued to propose a legislative program of moderate reform -revision of the tax system to alleviate the burden of taxation on small incomes, the extension of suffrage reform to include local government bodies, modest improvements in educational facilities, and the introduction of labor union legislation-aimed at the welfare of the middle and lower classes, a program considerably more purposive than Hara's limited goal of expanding Seiyukai power. But this moderate program neither made an impact on the public nor established the Kenseikai as the champion of the people. Part of the reason for this was the relapse of party politics into trivialities and aimkssness. What struck the public eye was not the sincere but colorless

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efforts of Kat6 to pursue a program of moderate reform. Rather it was the Byzantine maneuverings of the party leaders to seize power and hold it, the exposure and counterexposure of political scandal, and the continual public name-calling and mud-slinging between the parties that made the headlines. The subordination of issues to trivia resul ted from the continued division of the Diet among two parties of roughly equal strength ( the Kenseikai and the Seiyukai) and a third smaller party (the Seiyuhont6) whose votes could give either of the other two a maj ority. Yamagata's " triangular party" system had come into being, but there was no one to manipulate it. This balance of power might not have become a problem had the Kenseikai , the Seiyukai , and the Kakushin Club continued to maintain their coalition, but the tem­ porary allies soon had a falling out. The coalition collapsed in mid- 1 9 25 largely because the Seiyukai saw a better opportunity to refurbish its own position by making a break with Kat6. The ensuing political uncertainty was exacerbated by the lack of any unity of purpose (save a desire to come to power) on the part of the Seiyuhont6 and by the timidity of the Kenseikai leadership in facing an election. The balance of power was so precise that all three major parties were locked in a state of immobility. The deadlock might have been broken had the government chosen to call new elections, but the recent passage of the universal suffrage bill had made this an uncertain venture. How would the newly enfranchised voters cast their ballots? There was no way of telling. A bolder man than Kat6 might have cast caution aside in a gamble that the new electorate would support the government that had enfranchised them, but the Kenseikai leader, who in 1 9 2 0 had pointed out that the new voters might have short memories, was not willing to take the risk. It was not surprising that many observers con­ cluded that the parties, for all their willingness to eliminate the tax qualifi­ cations on voting rights, were still afraid of the public.1 It was difficult for the Kenseikai to create an image as a reform party under such circumstances. As usual, the penchant for politicking seemed to triumph over the desire for reform. As had been the case so often in the past, the difficulties of the parties were resolved by tactical realignment in the Diet rather than by an appeal to the public. The instability, immobility, and uncertainty of party politics were finally put to an end by the organization of the Minseit6. As before, the motives behind party formation were those of power, not of policy. The organization of the new party lay in tactical necessity rather than in pro-

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grammatic unity. The result was the final achievement o f a " normal" two­ party system in which the Diet was divided between two parties equal at the polls, on the floor of the House of Representatives, and in the sub rosa negotiations for the formation of cabinets. But paradoxically, the two party system emerged at a time when few outside the parties placed high hopes in the future of government by the "established parties." The opportunity to capture popular enthusiasm, if such a chance had existed at all in the early I g2o s, had long since been forfeited . The mass of voters were probably indifferent to the parties, and those that were not distrusted them; the same was true of the intelligentsia. At the moment the success and effectiveness of the parties seemed assured, the legitimacy of their right to use their power was being called into question. '

THE BREAK-UP OF THE COALITION The coalition on which the Kato cabinet rested was, like most coalitions, a shaky one. Its formation had been dictated by the circumstances of the Movement for Constitutional Government and by the inability of the Kenseikai to manage the Diet without Seiyukai support. By the beginning of 1 9 2 5 , however, its appeal was wearing thin for the Seiyukai. Many of the younger members of the party felt that the Seiyukai was too junior a partner in the alliance and that the Kenseikai reaped most of its benefits, both in policy and personnel matters. They began to urge the party leadership to revive its fortunes and to return to its old position of predominance in the political world, and increasingly the party leadership gave heed to this counsel. Well aware that the days of the alliance were numbered, certain figures within the Kenseikai headquarters, particularly Egi and Sengoku, were beginning to urge that their own party begin to take precautionary measures. Egi, for example, wanted to terminate the coalition completely and form a cabinet made up solely of Kenseikai members, an aim that may also have reflected his desire for a ministerial post.2 It was merely a question of time before one of the two partners made an overt move to end the alliance. The initiative was not to come from the Kenseikai, however. Despite his discouragement at the end of the soth Diet, Kato still felt there was much he wanted to do as premier. Not only did he wish to continue the retrench­ ment policy, he also wanted to put into effect or expand a number of welfare policy measures (such as reduction of excise and consumption taxes, the

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passage of national unemployment and health insurance laws, and the enactment of legislation to legalize and regulate trade-union activities) . Moreover, he was concerned with other long-range problems of the country, such as immigration, the growth of a population surplus, and the maintenance of acceptable popular living standards, which required some solution. All his projected policies were necessary and useful to the national interest, but none, he felt, could be achieved without continuing the coalition. He therefore resisted the counsel of Egi and Sengoku to end the alliance. If the cabinet were reorganized solely of Kenseikai men, he reasoned , it would have difficulty in managing the Diet where it lacked an absolute majority. The obvious alternative of dissolving the Diet and calling a general election was an equally risky proposition. Although Adachi was a skillful election manager for the party, Kato felt that "the god of elections" had had no experience with elections held under universal suffrage and there could be no certainty that the Kenseikai would be able to increase its strength substantially. He was little inclined to adopt a tactic simply to destroy the rival parties, and there were the additional problems of his deteriorating health and the difficulty of obtaining "provisions" (that is, funds) for a new election campaign.3 Whereas Kato hoped to mark time on the tactical problem, the Seiyukai was refurbishing its political fortunes. Its most immediate problem was the lack of a leader sufficiently prestigious to guarantee a return of the party to power. Takahashi, who had originally accepted the office only as an interim leader, was quite obviously a lame duck, without much support within the party and without much interest in continuing the job. Moreover, the incum­ bent party leaders, Yokota, Noda, and Okazaki did not feel sufficiently confident to replace him. The position required a man with a national reputation and with access to the cabinet makers. Takahashi suggested the possibility of Ito Miyoji, Den Kenj iro, Goto Shimpei, and Tanaka Giichi, all of whom had achieved prominence in the military and civil bureaucracies and who had long been mentioned as possible candidates for the premiership. The final choice was Tanaka, an engaging and apparently forceful man, whose friendship with Hara and whose taste for good fellowship may have swung the party leaders in his favor.4 There were many within the party who had doubts about his suitability, particularly because he was a military man, but finally in April r g 2 6 , after a respectful pause following the close of the Diet, the principal leaders of the Seiyukai unanimously voted him their new president.5

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The appointment of Tanaka gave rise t o a movement for the merger o f the Kakushin Club a n d the Chiisei Club, a small businessman's group, with the Seiyiikai. If all the members of both the smaller parties were to join the Seiyiikai, it would once more become the largest party in the Diet. With Tanaka, a man of sufficient reputation to become premier, as its president, its chances of succeeding the Kenseikai would be immeasurably enhanced . As usual, merger found its main impetus in tactical considerations rather than in unity of policy. The merger movement, led principally by Akita Kiyoshi and Hamao Shohachi, did not appeal to everyone in the Kakushin Club, however. It found favor with many of the provincial Diet members of the Club, who enjoyed secure jiban regardless of their party connection, but some of the Tokyo delegates, who had fought Seiyiikai candidates in countless elections, disliked the idea of j oining with their old rivals. Not only did they bear a long-standing grudge against the Seiyiikai, but many of them feared losing their Diet seats if a merger were to take place ; a number of them also had close ties with the Kenseikai .6 With the Kakushin Club thus divided, the attitude of lnukai , its unofficial leader, was crucial . Since the Kokumint6 split of 1 9 1 3 lnukai's lot had been one of increasing impotence and frustration. His supporters had dwindled to a handful of the faithful, and though still healthy, lnukai at 70 was beginning to feel himself without the physical vigor necessary for fund raising and electioneering. Personally he could have had little further ambition, but being a man with considerable "human feeling" (ninja) , he was worried about the future of the political comrades who had stood by him for so many years. He was therefore inclined to favor merger. He knew that a small group such as the Kakushin Club could attract neither money nor electoral support. "To support a political party you need money," he said. "Our Kakushin Club is not able to raise it. " 7 The obvious solution was to find shelter in the ranks of the Seiyiikai, which was able to raise sufficient funds for its candidates at election time. Inukai also seemed to cherish the hope that the "renovation of the political world ," which had been the original goal of the Club, could best be achieved by infiltrating an established party and reforming it from within. The "new political force," the mass of voters newly enfranchised by universal suffrage, would gradually begin to make their weight felt in the political world by returning Diet members who would represent their interests. A small party like the Kakushin Club could not hope to attract the new voters, but a large

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party like the Seiyukai could. lnukai was able to convince himself that the Seiyukai would change character under the influence of the reform elements who entered it from the Kakushin Club and become more representative of the masses. Merger was not only tactically advantageous, it was a positive step toward reforming party politics.8 Perhaps because of lnukai's persuasiveness the merger of the Kakushin Club with the Seiyukai and the Chusei Club finally took place in early May 1 9 2 5 , about a month after Tanaka's accession t o the Seiyukai presidency. Because certain members of both the smaller groups refused to join, however, the Seiyukai, though it now surpassed the Seiyuhont6 in strength, still remained second in the Diet to the Kenseikai . Nevertheless, the party, fortified with a new president and an infusion of new members, now began to think of its future, reflections that boded ill for the continuation of the coalition. It remained only to find grounds for a break with the government and the Kenseikai . The issue that immediately came to hand was the question of tax reform. Along with its policy of financial and administrative retrenchment aimed at checking and reducing government expenditure, the Kenseikai had long advocated a reform of the tax system so as to reduce the burden of taxation on middle-class and working-class incomes. The purpose was to pass on to the general public the savings made by government retrenchment and to restructure the incidence of taxes in order to reduce public taxes on con­ sumption goods.9 The proposal was j ustified largely as a measure of "social policy," relief for those with small incomes, but it was also a sound policy to advocate in view of the expanded electorate. The Seiyukai, however, had other ideas for tax reform . Since early 1 9 2 3 i t had been advocating the transfer o f revenues from the land tax t o the use of local legislatures and local administrative units in order to bolster their finances. The motives behind this proposal were primarily, if not exclusively, political . Since the onset of recession in early r 9 2 0 , landlord organizations such as the Teikoku Nakai had been demanding government assistance or relief for agriculture. In 1 9 2 3 when the Kat6 Tomosabur6 government proposed a policy of financial retrenchment (partly inspired by the reduction in naval expenditure made obligatory by the Washington Naval Treaty), all three major parties came up with proposals to pass on to the people the benefit of savings in government expenditure. The Kenseikai , consistent with its previously announced policies, advocated simple tax reduction : the reduction

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o f the land tax b y 2 percent, t h e abolition of excise taxes o n cloth a n d shoyu, and abolition of the business tax. Within the Seiyukai , however, Yokota suggested that the party should take a different approach to the question. If the Seiyukai were to propose a somewhat larger reduction in the land tax, say 2 .5 percent or 3 percent, it would be obvious that they were simply imitating the Kenseikai ; he suggested instead that the party should advocate the transfer of land tax revenue to local government. Despite objections by Yamamoto Tatsuo, Tokonami, and other members of the anti-Takahashi faction, " transfer of the land tax" became official party policy . The Seiyukai proposal was quite obviously an act of political one­ upmanship. It was vague on specific details, such as the questions of whether the land tax revenue would be transferred to the prefectural level or lower and whether the right to collect the tax would be given to local authorities or remain in the hands of the national government. Not surprisingly, the Kenseikai attacked the idea as irresponsible. But owing to the need for extraordinary financial measures to provide rel ief for the damage done by the Tokyo earthquake and the emergence of the second Movement for Consti tutional Government, no more was heard of the Seiyukai proposal until the summer of 1 9 2 5 . 1 0 The deterioration of cordial relations between the Kenseikai and the Seiyukai prompted the latter to resusci tate its old proposal, despite the general dubiety with which it was regarded outside the party. Anxious to shoulder aside the uncomfortable harness that yoked it to the Kenseikai , it could claim with some legitimacy that its traditional policy was fundamentally at odds with Hamaguchi's proposal for tax reform . But that the real issue was the continuation of the coalition rather than the tax reform itself is evident from the fact that Tanaka had already decided to have the Seiyukai ministers resign from the cabinet before the details of Hamaguchi's plan had even been presented in a formal cabinet meeting; he was determined to proceed in this direction even should the Kenseikai form its own single party cabinet and call for new elections.U The break finally became overt at the cabi net meeting of July 29, when Ogawa and Okazaki, the two Seiyukai ministers in attend­ ance, raised objections to Hamaguchi's tax reform proposal . After a long debate, which dragged on the next day, Okazaki finally stated the Seiyukai's point of view : "It runs counter to the [ policy of ] cooperation to have drafted a Kenseikai-colored tax reform proposal in complete secrecy and to try to drag the Seiyukai into agreement. Is it not clear that there is a want of

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sincerity compared to the days when the universal suffrage bill was drafted? " Ogawa, with the statement that there was n o further need for discussion and that he was opposed to Hamaguchi, walked out of the meeting. A cabinet crisis was clearly at hand.12 Had the Seiyukai ministers merely resigned at this point, Kato could simply have appointed replacements from the Kenseikai and continued in office , but the Seiyukai leadership was determined to commit "double suicide. " Ogawa and Okazaki, after consul ting with the party leadership, refused either to agree to Hamaguchi's proposal or to resign, hoping thereby to force Kato to resign. There were some in the Kenseikai who suggested that Kato petition the emperor to remove the two recaldtrants from office , but Kato, hesitant to the very end about form ing a minority party government, chose instead to submit a general resignation to the regent. Rather than give the customary reason of age or ill health, he stated that he conld no longer continue in office because of internal cabinet disagreement over policy. For Saionj i , the fall of the Kato cabinet posed once more the vexing problem of constructing a new government. On the one hand, the idea of forming a nonparty government was a risky venture; there were few nonparty politicians capable of heading such a government, and it was unlikely that the parties or the public would tolerate the idea. On the other hand, none of the parties was sufficiently strong to exercise absolute control over the Diet. The Seiyukai and the Seiyuhonto formed a tempo rary alliance in hopes that one or the other would be selected to succeed Kat6 ,13 but there was no guarantee that a bargain struck so quickly would last very long. The Kenseikai, though the largest party , lacked the absolute maj ori ty necessary to carry out its program unchallenged in the House of Representatives. Faced with this crisis, which he had long been apprehensive would co me, Saionj i decided to have Kato continue in office. Although he did not regard Kato with any great respect, his old distrust toward him had dissipated and he felt that Kato was preferable to either Tokonami or Tanaka . He was particularly annoyed by Tanaka, who despite Saionj i 's earlier admonitions had adopted a "rash " course of action, and he had nothing but contempt for the Seiyukai 's attempt to return to power by breaking up the coali tion.14 Kato at least seemed straightforward and it was certain that he was worki ng for the good of the country . Perhaps he felt, as Matsumoto speculated, that Kato was "of a bureaucratic turn" (kanryohada), able to distinguish between his position as a party leader and his responsibilities as premier. As such, he

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would b e able t o subordinate party interest t o h i s conception of national interest and would be unwilling to give undue weight to party considerations in government decisions. 15 In any case, the premier was asked to stay in office and the three Seiyukai ministers were replaced by three Kenseikai leaders -Egi Yoku, Hayami Seij i , and Kataoka Naoharu. THE PARTY DEADLOCK, 1 9 25 - 1 92 7 The break-up of the coalition foreshadowed the main trend o f the next two years-the slow tri umph of poli tics over reform. Although Kato had the intention of pursuing further legislative programs of reform and although he had the taci t backing of the genro , he no longer enjoyed the r:ertainty of Diet support. The House of Representatives was divided more or less evenly among the Kenseikai and its two rivals, the Seiyukai and the Sei­ yuhonto. To create a majority, the premier would have to dissolve the Diet and call for new elections or negotiate a new coalition. The only other choice was resignation. As Kato, and his successor, Wakatsuki, struggled with the tactical impasse, the Kenseikai government gradually lost its legislative momentum . Its program was sacrificed bit by bit to the necessities of ma­ neuver. The Kenseikai leaders worked with the constant awareness that their posi tion was precarious. By the end of 1 9 2 6 , the only fact that m ade the survival of the government possible was the inability of the opposition to come to terms with each other. Kato procrasti nated in dealing with the problem of his Diet backing until the fall of 1 9 2 5 , but by then it was clear that he would have to make some sort of choice. The majority sentiment within the party leadership, and possibly within the party as a whole , favored new electio ns; even an outsider like Matsumoto Gokichi advised Kato to "use the frightful [threat] of dis­ sol ution like a tiger" in order to bring the Diet into line. Indeed, the party was probably now in a better posi tion than ever before to win an electio n. But Kato continued to be hesitant about using this weapon. The precar­ iousness of his health, the problem of raising funds, his disl ike of placi ng party interest above national interest, uncertai nty as to whether the Kenseikai could win a maj ority or not, and the difficulty of predicting the consequences of the tremendous expansion of the electorate , all made him prefer the al ternative of com promise in the Diet to carry out his policy . But by the end of October, as the opening of the Diet grew close, he began to feel that

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dissolution of the Diet might be the only solution to his problems.16 Sengoku Mitsugu , who was close to Kato, suggested that there was another possibility as well-to form a new coalition or at least strike some sort of bargain with the Kenseikai 's erstwhile enemy, the Seiyiihonto. Fortunately for the Kenseikai there were strong reasons why the leadership of the Seiyiihonto would be willing to accept such overtures. Despite i ts initial advantage as the government party under the Kiyoura government, the Seiyiihonto , now long divorced from power, proved to be the least stable of the three m aj or parties. Its leadership had been uni ted principally, if not solely , by common opposi tion to Takahashi and the men around him. But with the resignation of Takahashi from the party presidency and the death of Yokota, his strongest lieutenant and supporter, the road was open to reconci liation with the Seiyiikai . One faction in the party, which included Nakahashi Tokugoro, wished to merge once more with the Seiyiikai now that its leader was Tanaka . Indeed, it was probably the activity of this group that made possible the temporary alliance of the Seiyiikai and Seiy­ iihonto on the day the Kato cabinet fell. Even after Kato was reappointed, this group, encouraged by certain powerful members in the House of Peers (Suzuki Kisaburo, Mizuno Rentaro, Ogi Tokichi, and Yamanashi Hanzo), continued to favor this course of action. Ranged against them were those who wished to support the Kato government. Chief among these was Yamamoto Tatsuo, who had been a personal friend of Kato from the days when both were rising young executives in the Mitsubishi company and whose views on financial policy were perhaps closer to Hamaguchi's than to those of the Seiyiikai. There were also a substantial number of Seiyiihonto members who had been elected for the first time in 1 9 24 in competition with Seiyiikai candidates and who therefore feared that merger with the Seiyiikai might cost them a chance to run again. The Satsuma faction, a loose group of high civil and military officials, disliked the fact that the Seiyiikai was now headed by a Choshii man and they began to put pressure on Tokonami to support the Kato government. Tokonami himself, who had once harbored ambitions of becoming Seiyiikai president, was also little inclined to serve as a subordinate to Tanaka, and though he treated the merger question with his habitual sl ipperiness he did not seem eager to rejoin his old party .17 Certain mem bers of the Kenseikai leadership, hoping to capitalize on this split within the Seiyiihonto, in late October began to sound out Tokonami

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and other leaders of the party on the possibility o f a n all iance, perhaps even a coalition government, between the two parties in the coming Diet. The Seiyuhonto leadership was at first noncommital ; in early December, the party issued a statement, drafted with studied ambiguity, that assured the Kenseikai it had no intention of proposing a no-confidence bill in the coming Diet but asserted that it was not considering an alliance with the Kenseikai . By the end of the month it was clear that some kind of understanding had been reached by the two parties. The Seiyuhonto broke off its negotiations with the Seiyukai over the apportionment of commi ttee chairmanships in the Diet; the Seiyuhonto instead agreed that a Kenseikai man should head the chair­ manship of the crucial budget committee, which would pass j udgment on the tax reform proposal. The strongest advocates of a reunion with the Seiyukai , angered at this, bolted fro m the Seiyuhonto and eventually rej oined their old party. But it now seemed certain that Kato would be able to get through the Diet by maintaining a working cooperation with the remainder of the Seiyuhonto without having to resort to a dissolution . 18 Although the main motive of the Seiyuhonto in cooperating with the Kenseikai was to avoid a dissolution of the Diet, it also exacted terms for its cooperation. The government was forced to make certain concessions on its proposal to reduce the land tax by I percent and to raise the tax exemption level to ¥200. The Seiyuhonto proposed instead to exempt all self-cultivating farmers from the land tax, whatever the size of their holdings, and to appro­ priate ¥4o,ooo ,ooo from the national treasury to help defray the local ex­ penses of compulsory education. Wakatsuki arranged to compromise these differences by having the Kenseikai abandon its plan for land tax reduction and the Seiyuhonto agree to reduce its demand for compulsory education expenditure to ¥3o,ooo ,ooo ; in effect, this meant that the money which would have been cut from the government's income by the tax cut was appropriated to compulsory education.19 Less certain, however, is whether Kato made any further promises to the Seiyuhonto in order to secure its cooperation. Wakatsuki, and perhaps Kato himself, in the course of the negotiations may have intimated that the premier would resign after the close of the Diet and would use his good offices to have Tokonami or Yamamoto Tatsuo appointed as his successor. Kato seems to have hinted his intention to resign to Saionj i in early December, j ust at the time when Wakatsuki Wf!S negotiating with Tokonami.20 But whether such assurances were in fact given or not, Tokonami seems to have felt that

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they had been and on several occasions afterwards complained bitterly that his expectations had been betrayed by Wakatsuki. As was true of so much of the maneuverings between the parties during the following year, it is difficult to tell who was lying and who was not, but there is no doubt that Wakatsuki's alleged "bad faith" toward the Seiyuhonto led to a cooling of relationships between the two parties after the close of the 5 1 st Diet.21 Whether or not Kato would have resigned after the close of the Diet is a moot question, for in January r g 2 6 he finally fell victim to his ill health. Although he was urged to rest when he came down with a cold in the middle of the month, Kato refused to do so because he knew his cabinet's position in the Diet was weak. Under the pressure of work, his condition quickly grew worse. His voice was so feeble during the interpellation after his administrative speech in the House of Representatives that it could hardly be heard beyond the recorder's desk. Unable to remain in his seat on the government dais, he finally had to be helped into his waiting automobile. A week later, on January 2 8 , he died in his bed .22 Kato's end was as symbolic of his political career as Hara's had been. Whereas Hara had been cut down on his way to a provincial party rally by a half-crazed assassin incensed at the corruption of the Seiyukai, Kato died in harness, putting forth his last effort to get his program through the Diet. If Hara's death had temporarily interrupted the trend toward party government, then Kato's temporarily ended the trend toward reform . With Kato gone, Saionj i decided to nominate Wakatsuki as his successor. This decision had its precedent in the appointment of Takahashi to replace Hara in 1 9 2 r . Because the Diet was in session and the cabinet not yet unpopular, he felt it best not to change horses in mid-stream. Though Saionj i had no high estimate of Wakatsuki's ability a n d though h e d i d n o t feel that the cabinet would last long, he did think that Wakatsuki, as a former vice­ minister of Katsura, would be skillful enough to get through the Diet session by compromise if by no other means.23 In many respects, Saionj i 's assessment was correct. Wakatsuki, in contrast to Kato, was an amiable man with no strong personal antagonisms, a gift for setting others at ease, and an ability to bargain and compromise. But although these assets had made him a good lieutenant for Kato (and earlier for Katsura) , they did not prove sufficient to sustain the momentum that Kato's recalcitrance and stubbornness had given the party. Where Kato had some degree of vision in politics, Wakatsuki had none. Moreover, as an

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individual, Wakatsuki quite simply lacked determination. A s o n e astute political commentator later remarked, "If politics is struggle and if there is no aim in struggle other than victory, then Wakatsuki's personality is not suited for politics . " 24 He was always too willing to stop short of complete triumph. If he was able to maintain the Kenseikai in power for another year it was primarily because neither the Seiyukai nor the Seiyuhonto were in a position strong enough to dislodge it. After the close of the Diet, Wakatsuki sought to establish the temporary alliance with the Seiyuhonto on a more permanent basis by offering to form a coalition government. Because Wakatsuki had continued to serve as home minister after he became premier and because Sengoku Mitsugu, angered at Wakatsuki 's failure to support him on a bill to complete an important link in the Chuo trunk line, had made known his intention to resign as railroad minister, Wakatsuki had two posts available to offer to the Seiyuhonto. Both Yamamoto Tatsuo and Motoda Haj ime favored the idea of a coalition, but misunderstandings over the distribution of posts prevented a coalition from coming into being. Using the leadership of the Kenkyukai as go-betweens, Wakatsuki offered the Seiyuhonto two posts, that of railroad minister and one other; though he did not make it clear to Tokonami at first, he apparently had the Finance Ministry in mind as the second post. Tokonami assumed he was being offered the powerful Home Ministry, a portfolio he had held previously and could use to revive the electoral strength of his party ; because many within the party still held out hopes that the Seiyuhonto would be able to form a single-party cabinet of its own, Tokonami insisted that the Seiyuhonto would join the government only if it got the Home Ministry. Within the Kenseikai , however, those who saw Hamaguchi as the future president of the party wanted him to switch from the Finance Ministry to the Home Ministry ; Wakatsuki therefore could not agree to Tokonami's terms. The coalition scheme thus fell through .25 The refusal of the Seiyuhonto to join the Wakatsuki cabinet left the political world in a state of uncertainty even greater than during the previous summer. As before, the only choices open to the government appeared to be resigna­ tion, which it would prefer to avoid, or an election, which would probably require huge sums of money to finance without any guarantee it would win a majority sufficient to control the House of Representatives. The opposition parties, the Seiyukai and the Seiyuhonto, were in an equally ticklish position. A cabinet resignation would, of course, be preferable to an election, but since

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neither of the two parties controlled a majority, there was no certainty which of their presidents, Tokonami or Tanaka, would be selected as Wakatsuki's successor. The only solutions were a compromise between all three parties, both in and out of power, or a merger of the Seiyuhonto with either of the larger parties. That both were tried was a tribute to the tactical resource­ fulness, if not the statesmanship, of the leaders of the three parties. In the summer of r g 26, the Seiyukai began to cast about for an issue with which to embarrass the government. It was not only anxious to return to power but was perhaps goaded by charges made in the previous Diet by Nakano Seigo, a Kenseikai member, that its president, Tanaka, had misap­ propriated secret service funds while he was war minister under the Hara cabinet and that he had accepted a large political contribution from a Kansai businessman in return for promises to work for his advantage. It could little afford to exploit the so-called Matsushima incident, which involved the attempt of certain land speculators to bribe the government to authorize the relocation of a brothel district in Osaka to a plot of land they owned, be­ cause the former Kenseikai minister of transportation and a leader of the Seiyuhonto as well as a director of the Seiyukai itself were implicated ; the Seiyukai, were it to publicize the incident, would only reflect discredit on itself as well. But the Seiyukai could attack the government with little damage to its own reputation on the Boku Retsu case. Boku Retsu , a Korean radical, and his japanese wife, Kaneko Fumiko, had been arrested in the general round-up of subversives after the Kanto earthquake and had been tried and convicted of high treason. The case raised two " issues" of decided triviality. The first was a "questionable photograph" of the couple in a pose of casual intimacy, which was taken by the preliminary trial j udge probably as a means of inducing them to confess; the second was the subsequent reduction of their sentence from the death penalty to imprisonment without term. Though at worst this incident revealed questionable judgment on the part of minor officials rather than major misdoing, the Seiyukai, supported by radical patriotic organizations, attacked the government's actions as an affront to the imperial dignity and prej udicial to popular trust in the propriety of j udicial proceedings in the country. Certain members of the Seiyuhonto urged Tokonami to make common cause with the Seiyukai in bring ing down the government on thi� rather innocuous issue. Though at first reluctant to do so, Tokonami finally decided

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t o j o i n in the attack and in early September both h e and Tanaka reported to Saionj i that a bill to impeach the government in the coming Diet would be inevitable. Tanaka was anxious to broaden the alliance between the two parties into more complete cooperation on policy matters or as he put it in more military language, "a complete offensive and defensive alliance . " But Tokonami, though angry enough at Wakatsuki to wish his downfall, was not willing to go that far. After further negotiations in late November, the two parties set up ad hoc joint committees to discuss the Baku Retsu problem and also " the relief of economic difficulties" and " the restoration of official discipline . " Despite the public protestations of both Tanaka and Tokonami that this temporary cooperation was not aimed simply at overthrowing the government, it was obvious to all that both parties intended to propose a no-confidence bill in the coming Diet, which would force the m inority government either to resign or call new elections.26 There were many in the Kenseikai who were willing to meet this attack head on simply by dissolving the Diet. Adachi, one of the more vigorous supporters of this tactic, went so far as to sound out Saionj i's views on the matter. Saionj i , who had posed no objection to the idea of dissolution when he first learned of the opposition party plans, was positively in favor of dissolution on the eve of the Diet.27 But Wakatsuki was hesitant to do so. Despite Adachi's confident predictions of a Kenseikai election victory, Wakatsuki felt as Kato had that there was no certainty of this at all. Further­ more, unlike Kato, Wakatsuki was bereft of a ready source of funds for the election ; he was on bad terms with Sengoku Mitsugu, who was said to be the main go-between for soliciting contributions from the Mitsubishi interests because of his failure to support Sengoku's railroad bill in the previous Diet and because of the failure to form a coalition with the Seiyuhonto, a project that Sengoku had enthusiastically supported. Wakatsuki put the problem very succintly in his memoirs :28 I was a party president who could not raise money . . . In an election you must use money. If you have money you generally win an election, but I didn't have any. If you ask what a party president without money does . . . , he avoids a dissolution of the Diet at all costs. Not surprisingly, faced with this uncomfortable situation, he resorted to striking a compromise with the opposition.

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The resolution of Wakatsuki's difficulties was the so-called " meeting of the three party leaders, " at which the premier met with Tanaka and Tokonami to call a temporary truce to political in-fighting in the Diet. Ostensibly what happened was this. The Diet session began on January r 8 , 1 9 2 7 , with strong attacks by the opposition on the government; after two more days of inter­ pellation, the Seiyukai and the Seiyuhonto introduced no-confidence reso­ lutions attacking the government for its handling of the Boku Retsu affair, deploring the government's failure to remedy the deepening financial crisis and calling into question Wakatsuki's personal veracity. This seemed the moment for Wakatsuki to resign or to call for new elections. Instead the Diet was recessed for three days, and a conference between the three party leaders was held. According to newspaper reports, they reached agreement that the opposition parties withdraw their no-confidence bills, that all three parties approve the budget with only minor amendments, that there would be no more discussion in the Diet of the Boku Retsu affair, the Osaka brothel scandal, or Tanaka's alleged speculations in order " to put an end to so-called mudslinging and elevate the dignity of the Diet," and that the three parties would endeavor in other ways to get through the Diet session as peacefully as possible. The reasons for the truce, as set forth in a joint statement by the three leaders, was a desire to begin the new reign of the Showa Emperor with " fair and open politics" and " to strengthen the confidence of the people in the Diet . " In fact, however, this unwonted display of sweetness and light was an elaborately stage-managed maneuver to rescue all three parties from what had promised to be an embarrassing situation-the choice between an election that no single party could hope to win or a change in cabinets, which could not guaran tee a stronger government. The original idea for the co mpromise seems to have been that of Matsumoto Gokichi, a man with no official standi ng, who had established himself in the poli tical world as a messenger boy and information gatherer for both Yamagata and Saionj i . Matsumoto was anxious to avoid a dissolution fo r a number of reasons. He seems gen­ uinely to have wanted to avoid sullying the onset of the new reign by a continuation of the trivial and inconsequential political struggles between the parties. But he had other practical reasons as wel l. In the first place, he feared that if an election were held under the Kenseikai government, espe­ cially with Egi Yoku as minister of justice, interference would occur on an unprecedented scale; this would besmirch the con stitution, and it would

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lead t o the prevalence o f irreparable abuses a t a time when popular thought was extremely unstable. Furthermore, the Seiyiikai was bound to lose in such an election, and though he was not a partisan of that party, he felt that Tanaka was far more acceptable as a premier candidate than Tokonami and that it would therefore be best to avoid weakening the party.29 Although Saionj i was dubious about the possibility of arranging a compromise to ward off dissolution and maintained that "from the highest point of view" (which lamentably no one seemed to take) dissolution was best, Matsumoto enlisted the aid of the Kenkyiikai leadership to work out a compromise.30 The negotiations to arrange the compromise began in the first week of January 1 9 2 7 . Wakatsuki, who for reasons already indicated wished to avoid a dissolution, agreed to resign in May or June if he were able to get through the Diet session without trouble. This was a crucial concession, for it meant the Kenseikai would lay down its burden of power without being forced to do so by a no-confidence resolution. Tanaka also agreed to compromise, though apparently not simply on the promise of Wakatsuki to resign ; indeed, he agreed to the scheme before he was informed of Wakatsuki's intentions. He was inclined by training and temperament to heed the patriotic appeal not to upset the beginning of the new imperial reign, and he had been constantly warned by Saionj i not to resort to "rash action" to overthrow the government, lest he find himself and his party bypassed at the next change of cabinets. Only Tokonami seemed intractable at first; he railed against Wakatsuki , complaining that Wakatsuki was a liar and that he had reneged on his promise ·to have Tokonami appointed premier after the s r st Diet. But his vindictive attitude was overcome by the efforts of Aoki, Mizuno, and others, who perhaps pointed out that he had little to gain from a general election, which would surely be called if he did not agree to compromise. When finally agreement was obtained from all three leaders, a detailed timetable of the events already narrated-the anti-government interpella­ tions, the proposal of the no-confidence bills, the recess of the Diet, the party leaders' meeting, and the subsequent withdrawal of the no-confidence bills­ was worked out in the greatest secrecy. Wakatsuki did not even tell his own cabinet ministers, and not unnaturally both Adachi and Hamaguchi, the two principal Kenseikai men in the cabinet, were surprised and angry when they heard of the decision. Events proceeded exactly according to plan and the crisis was circumvented.31

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THE FORMATION OF THE MINSEITO Although the three party leaders' meeting enabled the government and the opposition to avoid the embarrassment of a cabinet crisis and though it en­ abled the government to pass its budget safely , the compromise hardly added to their prestige. If the opposition had made a bad impression by the pettiness of its attack on the government, the cabinet in turn appeared ineffectual and aimless for having struck a bargain in order to avoid an election. But more important, the meeting left the basic cause of political uncertainty unresolved. The balance of power among the three parties had to be overcome. It was the quest to put an end to this balance that finally led to the formation of the Minseito by the merger of the Kenseikai with the Seiyuhonto. After the passage of the budget in early January 1 9 2 7 , Adachi , still anxious to keep the Kenseikai in power long enough to hold an election and to win the party an absolute majority, began negotiations with Sakakida Seibei to establish a new alliance between the Kenseikai and the Seiyuhonto. They came to the conclusion that because the three parties were balanced in strength, it would be difficult to secure a stable political situation no matter which party formed a cabinet ; even if the Diet were dissolved, it was not certain that any single party would achieve an absolute majority ; the best policy therefore would be to form an alliance between the two parties to give Diet support to Tokonami in the event that he was appointed as Wakatsuki 's successor. The critical question, of course, was whether Saionj i would consent to Tokonami as premier. Although this was not likely in view of Saionj i 's often repeated expressions of contempt for Tokonami, the Seiyuhonto leader thought that his chances were good . Perhaps this optimism was due to assurances allegedly given Sakakida by Adachi ,32 who said he had ascertained that Saionj i would nominate Tokonami ; or perhaps it was due to Tokonami's belief that his close connection with Makino Nobuaki , the lord keeper of the Privy Seal, would assure him of the job. Whatever the reason, Tokonami agreed to go ahead with the alliance. The terms of the agreement reached by the two parties at the beginning of March 1 9 2 7 were stronger than the admittedly temporary ties the Seiyuhonto had previously formed with the Kenseikai and the Seiyukai . Both parties agreed to form a "strong alliance" in order to secure a stable political situation , to establish a joint Political Affairs In vestigation Comm ittee to

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make agreements on important policy measures, and " to agree on each other's jiban in the next election in anticipation of victory by the candidates of the allied parties." The latter two provisions, if honored, would make the alliance at least as close as that of the three parties in the second Movement for Constitutional Government, in fact, as close as they could get short of merger.33 Perhaps the alliance would have gone no farther had Tokonami succeeded Wakatsuki as premier, but such did not prove to be the case. When the Kenseikai government finally fell in mid-April after the Privy Council, for a variety of reasons, failed to approve its plan to bail the Bank of Taiwan out of financial difficulties by an emergency ordinance,34 Saionj i bypassed the Seiyuhonto leader. As before, Saionj i continued to waver between the idea of nominating a party leader to succeed Wakatsuki or, depending "on time and circumstances," of appointing a nonparty figure to head a "neutral cabinet" with some support in the Diet. If the cabinet were to be " neutral ," he felt the premier would have to be a man with a reputation abroad, who perhaps had served as a cabinet minister several times or who had been colonial governor in either Korea or Taiwan ; but the only person he seemed to consider suitable among nonparty figures was Den Kenj iro , a former kobun of Yamagata, now a member of the Privy Council. How seriously he con­ sidered the possibility is hard to determine, but it is certain he was prepared to adopt it if it seemed necessary.35 Of the two opposition party leaders, there was no question he preferred Tanaka ; admittedly, he did not regard the Seiyukai president as ideal nor did he approve of the "rash" activities of his party, but he felt him a better man than Tokonami .36 At the fall of the Wakatsuki government, Makino Nobuaki , on whom Tokonami had probably been counting to exert influence in his favor, relayed a message to Saionj i that "according t o t h e normal course of constitutional government" it would be proper to appoint Tanaka as prem ier. Saionj i agreed and power once again returned to the Seiyukai.37 The selection of Tanaka prepared the way for the final consummation of the merger between the two opposition parties because the bypassing of Tokonami by Saionj i indicated that Seiyuhonto did not have a promising future as an independent party. The formation of a new party by a merger offered advantages to both groups in view of the fact that an election was bound to be held by the Tanaka government. A merger would create a party with an ab<>olute maj ority in the House of Representatives, and this surely

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would be a considerable asset at election time. A few members of the Seiyuhonto leadership, particularly Motoda Haj ime and Kawahara Shigesuke, opposed the merger, as did many members of the Kenseikai, but the consensus of the top leaders in both parties was in favor of it. The only question that remained to be settled was who was to be the new party's president? It was unlikely that the Kenseikai would tolerate Tokonami as president because he represented the smaller of the two merging parties. But Wakatsuki was equally unsuitable, not only because of personal unpopularity within his own party, but because, as we have already seen, he was a "party president who could_n 't raise money." The obvious candidate was therefore Hamaguchi Yuko, who enj oyed an excellent reputation both within and without the party and whose candidacy was supported by the all important money raiser for the party, Sengoku Mitsugu. Although at first reluctant to serve because of poor health, Hamaguchi was finally prevailed upon to serve. That difficulty settled , the new party, the Rikken Minseito, came into being in early June 1 92 7 . Few observers harbored il lusions about the motives behind the formation of the new party. As �n the cases of the Doshikai and the Kenseikai, the organization of the new party was precipitated by a change in cabinets, conceived with the aim of achieving an absolute majority in the Diet, and intended to secure a competitive advantage in a coming election. The tactical purposes of the merger were all the more striking because the Kenseikai and the Seiyuhonto stood at the opposite wings of the political spectrum . "Of all the bourgeois parties," wrote Yamakawa Hitoshi , "the Seiyuhonto was the most blatantly conservative and had traded on its conservatism . The Kenseikai , at least in its days in opposition, . . . was the party which advo­ cated the extension of the suffrage and sought the votes of the commercial and industrial classes ; it was relatively-and only relatively-a progressive bourgeois party. Why then did these two parties, each on the opposite extremes of the bourgeois parties, gather to gether under a banner which displays a modicum of newness, and why were they able to do so? . . . The answer is simple ; it goes without saying that it was the surest means and the shortest path to taking power next. " 38 The Jiji Shimpo was even more specific and more succinct in its appraisal : "That the merger talks were settled quickly was the result of the stimulus of the unexpected appearance of the Tanaka cabinet ; if power had passed to a [party] other than the Seiyukai, such a sudden turn of events would not have occurred. " 39

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Despite its obviously tactical inspiration, however, the organization of the Minseito did seem to hold some promise for the future. Its formation promised to end the " most petty and evil politics" that had accompanied the division of the Diet into three parties of more or less equal numerical strength. The compromises, temporary alliances, and imperfect unions that had been forced on the Seiyukai and the Kenseikai by the fickleness of Tokonami ceased to be necessary. No longer could the Seiyuhonto twist the two larger parties by the tail. More important, however, the formation of the new party not only ended the political uncertainty that had plagued the parties since 1 9 2 5 , i t marked the opening of the path toward normal two-party politics. Assum­ ing that Saionj i continued to nominate party premiers, he now had to make a choice between only two possibilities. The Jiji Shimpo saw the formation of the new party as an opportunity to institute " the excellent practice of opposition between two large parties." "We rejoice at the merger of the Seiyuhonto and the Kenseikai into one large party as a step forward. We believe that with the opposition of two large parties, one in power and one in opposition, not only can we expect a stabilization of the political situation, but also the groundwork has been laid for the automatic transfer of power. " 4° From now on, it seemed likely that the cabinet would rotate between the two parties as it did in England . Beyond this, the nature of the new Minseito program seemed to indicate that the alternation of parties in power would mean an alternation in policies as well . The name of the party itself struck many as significant. Whereas parties had called themselves "associations" (kai) in the past, the new party was to be called a " party of popular government" (Minseito) . Moreover, its platform was striking in its freshness and its commitment to forward-looking policy. The new program, first of all, made explicit the party's commitment to the parliamentary system and to democratic politics. It set forth a demand for the " firm establishment of Diet-centered politics (gikai chushin seiji) under the sovereign power of the emperor, in which the demands of all the people are centralized in the imperial Diet by means of universal suffrage. " Govern­ ment was not only to embody the "general will of the people" (kokumin no soz) , but it was also to be responsible to the people. Second , the platform promised to support diplomacy based on " international j ustice," which would lay the foundation for world peace. Third, it promised " to increase the efficiency of industry by rationalization, to end the instability of popular livelihood in both city and country by basing distribution on social j ustice,

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and to root out the sources of class struggle by establishing the principles of social cooperation (shakai kyozon) . " Fourth, in order to give "proper guidance to ideas, " it proposed to "equalize opportunities for education" and create an educational system for the people. And finally, it pledged itself to democratize · the internal organization of the party by "establishing the principle of the public election of party officials, by placing trust of party members in the party officials, and by making responsibilities clear. " The goal of this was to make sure the party acted in accordance with the "general wil l of the party members . " 4 1 The Minseito, in sum, had taken as its goals many of the demands presented a decade or so before by those who wished to bring about a "reconstruction" of Japan. There was little doubt that "?he new platform was drafted with an eye to the new electorate that had been created by universal suffrage and would shortly cast its ballots for the first time. For some this attempt to capture the votes of the new voting masses seemed one more expression of the cynicism of the politicians in the "established parties. " Baba Tsunego remarked that the Minseito was bbund to fail in its appeal for popular support, since "a sixty-year old lady, no matter how she powders her face does not look like a lass of eighteen. " 42 The accumulated disgust of the masses was not likely to be dispelled by such obvious strategems. But others were willing to see the formulation of such a program as being as much a step forward as the emergence of two large parties. Aso Hisashi, long distrustful of the parties himself, interpreted the " repainting of the [Minseito's] signboard " as the harbinger of a great change in the political world .43 In the past, the established parties . . differed neither in their ideo­ logical stands nor with respect to principles and policy. Now, however, . . . the ideological positions of established parties are defining their differences. While the Seiyukai is showing its conservative coloring, the Minseito . . . is showing a liberal coloring . . . It is difficult to deny the fact the Japanese political world is advancing beyond the opposition of two bourgeois parties centering only on the meaningless exchange of political power. To the extent that two-party opposition involved the exchange of power as well as competition on substantive issues, the foundations for " normal" constitutional government had been laid. How long it would last was another question, but it is indicative of the strength of the "established parties" that no political commentator in 1 9 2 7 thought to raise it.

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T

he first generation of Japanese liberals assumed that a poli tical party was founded upon and held together by common principles. Okuma Shigenobu gave this view a classic statement in his memorial on constitutional govern­ ment in I 88 I . The members of po litical parties, he wrote, "come together because of a general agreement on principles of policy (shisei shugi) " ; the rise and fall of political parties "depends on whether their principles of policy capture the sentiments of the public"; consequently party struggles are "battles of principles of policy." 1 Implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, the idea of party was contrasted with that of faction, a group whose members were held together not by common principles, but by the pursuit of private or personal interests. More often than not, this led to the lament that in Japan there were no true parties, but only factions, indifferent to the interests of the state and heedless of the demands of the public. Such was the source of Ozaki Yukio's oft-quoted dictum, " Here in the Orient we have had the conception of a factio n ; but none of a public party . " 2 The distinction between party and faction, o f course, was neither new nor original with the Japanese liberals of the Meij i era. One can find it as far back as the writings of Ou-y � ng Hsiu.3 But it was doubtless Edmund Burke who inspired the Japanese . In his pamphlet Thoughts on the Cause of the Present

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Discontents, he had defined a party as a "body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest, upon some particular principle on which they are all agreed . " By contrast, factions, he said , were "knots and cabals of men who have got together without any publicke principle, in order to sell their conj unct iniquity at the higher rate." For Burke, as for men like Ozaki, this definition was less an empirical category than a moral one ; it was a statement of not what parties actually were, but what they ought to be. Burke hoped for an end to the domination of the House of Commons by factions or "connections" that were held together by marriage, \ friendship, and bribery. Similarly, when Ozaki attacked the "established parties" for partaking of the nature of factions (in the Burkian sense) , his goal was reform. He wished to "purify" Diet politics by the creation of " true" parties, bound by the cement of principle, and indeed much of his political career after his break with the Kenseikai was devoted to this end. Yet Ozaki was no more successful <JlS a reformer than Burke, for both failed to realize that there was more to a political party than a parcel of ideas. The Burkian definition of a political party, though persuasive in its sim­ plicity, is no surer guide for the student of politics than it is for its practi­ tioners. It is difficult to maintain a rigid distinction between " party" ( based on principle) and "faction" (based on material or personal interest) because most political parties partake of the nature of both.4 Rarely does a political party come into being simply because like-minded men decide to embark on a joint course of action. Even the Jacobins, whom we usually associate with a rigid ideological viewpoint, had their origins in a group of Breton deputies to the Estates General who at first clubbed together simply because they all came from the same region.5 Doctrinal parties, though they have existed , seem to be the exception rather than the rule. But more important, the Burkian distinction leads us to ignore the fact that the critical functions of a political party, whatever the motives behind its formation, are related to the pursuit, attainment, and exercise of political power. Whether a man j oins a party to fight for a particular legislative program, to win a ministerial post, to secure profitable government contracts, or simply to satisfy a sense of self-importance, he does so because he realizes that the organizational strength of a party provides him with the means to fulfill these private aspirations. The majoritarian principle that lies behind both the elective process and the conduct of decision making in a represen­ tative body makes this inevitable. Minobe Tatsukichi, who had a rather more

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detached view of politics than Ozaki, put this very succinctly. "The parlia­ mentary system is a system of maj ority rule," he wrote. "Under the rule of the maj ority, numbers govern . . . The power of an individual, no matter how excellent that individual may be, is extremely weak, and it is not possible for him to put his views into practice. To make one's views powerful under a system of majority rule, it is absolutely necessary to rely on the power of a group. " 6 The group, of course, is a political party. Most men in the Diet realized that parties were formed for the reasons Minobe described . Although Ozaki could claim there was no concept of " public party" in the Orient, and more particularly in Japan, it is clear that in their political function the "established parties" were not so different from their counterparts in the West. Like professional politicians in England and the Uni ted States, those in Japan knew that the party organization provided a vehicle for the pursuit of power and a means to put that power to their individual ends. If we wish to delineate the peculiarities of party politics in the Taisho period, we must not measure them against some ideal model but instead examine their response to the special features of their social and institutional setting. We must raise questions that can be answered from historical evidence, not by moral assertions. Otherwise it will be all too easy to slip, as Ozaki often did, from analysis to polemics. THE TWO-PARTY PATTERN Perhaps the most obvious question to raise is why there emerged a two-party pattern in Diet politics. Though common to England and the United States since the early nineteenth century, biparty politics are a rarity outside the Anglo-American democracies. What prevented Japan from developing multiparty politics on the model of France or Germany? What were the factors that militated against the formation of a large number of small parties on the basis of ideological , regional, or class differences? There were, I think, three basic reasons that Japan moved in this unusual direction. First of all, the electoral system was of the type usually associated with the development of a two-party pattern. Since the inception of representative institutions, the Japanese had adopted the simple-plurality single-ballot system of voting such as was used in the United States and England . No attempt was made to introduce the system of proportional representation that sustained the multiparty system in Fra nce. In order to win a Diet seat in

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a given electoral district, a candidate had to receive a plurality or maj ority of the ballots cast at election time. Parties were not assigned seats in the Diet in proportion to their total popular vote either in a local district or in the national constituency. This made it difficult for a small party to secure Diet seats unless its voting support\ was concentrated in a circumscribed locality. Admittedly, the effects of this type of voting system were diminished under the large electoral districts that were in operation from 1 900 to 1 9 1 9 . The candidate of a small party or even an independent candidate could win a Diet seat if he had sufficient backing within a single prefecture. But the introduction of the small district in 1 9 2 0 throttled the smaller parties that ' had survived under the large district system. A vote for a small party or an independent became a "wasted vote . " This effect of the small district on voting behavior has been described very succinctly by V. 0. Key in his analysis of the American party system. 7 In a single member district only two parties can contend for electoral victory with any hope of success; a third party is doomed unless it can manage to absorb the following of one of the two major parties and thereby becomes one of the two parties itself. Parties do not thrive on the certainty of defeat. His description of the American case is certainly borne out by the Japanese. After 1 9 1 9 , the number of independent Diet members declined sharply, and the members of the small parties found it convenient to merge with one of the larger parties in order to enj oy the financial and electoral strength such a party could offer at election time. Such, for example, were the motives behind lnukai's decision to disband the Kakushin Club and enter the Seiyukai in 1 92 5 , and such were the reasons that the Seiyuhonto mem­ bership was quickly reabsorbed into the Seiyukai or the Kenseikai before the onset of the 1 9 2 8 general election. The small district system made the prospects for reelection outside either large party very slim indeed . Secondly, the emergence of a two-party pattern was made easier by the homogeneity of the Japanese electorate before 1 9 2 8 . Although the electoral system was not conducive to the proliferation of small parties, a multiparty system might nevertheless have been sustained by irreconcilable cleavages within the electorate based on class, religious, geo graphical, or economic

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differences. Yet a l l these sources of potential divisiveness were conspicuously absent in the voting public. Social division existed , of course, but given the property restrictions on the suffrage down until r g 2 8 , such divisions had no opportunity to find expression within the framework of parliamentary politics. Because all the voters were propertied and because property was commonly landed property, there was little likelihood of a tenants' party or a working-class party orga­ nizing itself in the Diet to oppose the interests of the middle and upper classes. Those among the urban working classes or the landless peasantry who had developed a sense of class antagonism or class interest sought expression of their views by extraparliamentary means, either through popu­ lar demonstrations or through the formation of mass organizations because otherwise there were no constitutional channels for political participation open to them. It was not until the mid- r g z o 's, when the passage of universal suffrage seemed imm inent, that there emerged effective movements to orga­ nize parties explicitly dedicated to achieving the goals and interests of the "propertyless classes" ( musan kaikyu) . "Class parties" were difficult to or­ ganize if all the voters belonged to the same class. At the same time, because the electorate was propertied and also pre­ dominantly rural in character, a marked urban-rural split did not emerge in the Diet. Any party that sought to achieve a majority in the House of Representatives had to cater to the bulk of the voters in the countryside or in provincial towns where many of them lived. Conversely, no party could hope to base its support exclusively on the cities, since the number of votes to be won there could not guarantee a Diet maj ority. It is often alleged that the Seiyukai was the party of the countryside, and the Kenseikai (as well as the Minsei to) was the party of the city, but such generalizations are difficult to substantiate from the voting statistics. If one looks at the areas that each represented it is obvious that the margin of difference between the two was not great. Just before the first universal suffrage election in r g z 8 , for example, one observer calculated that about 86 percent of the Seiyukai Diet members were elected from rural election districts but that about 75 percent of the Kenseikai Diet members represented similar areas.8 Significantly, the only parties that drew disproportionately large support from city districts and the major metropolitan areas of the country were the Kakushin Club and the Jitsugyo Doshikai, both of which were extraordinarily weak when compared with the two major parties.

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The predominantly rural character of the electorate may also have pre­ vented parties from developing along strong regional cleavages. The economic interests of all rural areas did not vary greatly. Landlords, provincial business­ men, and local bankers in Kagoshima, by and large, sought the same things from the government as those of Aomori. They wanted railroad lines, irri­ gation works, new roads and schools, the improvement of harbors, the sta­ tioning of local army garrisons, and the like, and they were willing to support whichever party promised to deliver them through political log-rolling and pork barrel legislation. Because the arena of electoral competition was never larger than the prefecture and because the interests of all prefectures (save for the metropolitan ones) were relatively uniform , economic regionalism never had an impact on Japanese politics as it had in, say, American politics. The third and final precondition for the emergence of a biparty system was the relative homogeneity in outlook of the men who made their careers in party politics. Political success, indeed any sort of success, in Taisho Japan depended on the possession of certain basic views. No one who hoped for election to public office in Taisho Japan could question the appropriateness of the imperial institution or suggest the need for republican forms of govern­ ment. Neither could he attack the notion of private property, suggest the need to abolish capitalist institutions, or express doubt as to whether Japan should protect its "special rights and interest" on the Asian mainland. Similarly, it would not have made sense for a party politician to call into doubt the suitability of party government for Japan or to inveigh against the idea of party cabinets. Men like Goto Shimpei, who held the latter view, found rather quickly that it was not compatible with participation in a political party. Professional politicians therefore operated within a well­ defined consensus that did not admit of sharply defined ideological differ­ ences, and such differences played little or no role in the formation of parties. All this is not to say that there were no differences of opinion among Diet members or between parties on matters of policy, but usually such differences touched on how best to preserve shared values rather than on more fundamen­ tal issues. In the debate on electoral reform in r g r g and r g 2 o , for example, no spokesman for either party absolutely opposed the extension of the suffrage nor was there much discussion of female suffrage. Rather, debate centered on the problems of the timing and extent of such reform , and even here the range of difference was modest. It was a case of " small differences within a larger similarity" (daido shoi) .

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These three factors-the electoral system, the homogeneity of the electorate, and the homogeneity of the elected-all militated against the pulverization of the Diet into small parties. But the main question still remains: Why did "two large parties" finally emerge? The answer should be clear from the cases of party formation considered in the preceding pages. Because differences in class, economic interest, and political values among the Diet members were minimal, cleavage within the Diet was determined primarily by the com­ petition for control of an absolute majority in the House of Representatives. Parties were not alliances of local caucus groups formed at the grass-roots level but coalitions of Diet members coming together under the impetus of tactical goals. The overriding consideration in organizing a party was that of number, and because the formation of an absolute maj ority was the primary object, it made sense to organize large parties rather than small ones. As I have suggested; the first and most successful of these large coalitions of Diet members was the Seiyukai . But its very success gave the other disparate elements in the Diet an urge toward unity. In reaction to the rise in strength of the Seiyukai, there emerged a series of second parties, beginning with the Doshikai and ending with the Minseito, all of which were aimed at matching and besting the Seiyukai in the competition for votes, for Diet seats, for funds, for patronage of the genro, and for influence over the government. Such an interpretation may strike some as too mechanical. It may be objected that if the pursuit of power was the only consideration that brought the Diet members together in parties, it was only natural that they splinter and fragment when their party was out of power. To this, one can reply that although the pursuit of number and power was the main motive which brought parties into being, there were other factors that kept them together as organizations. Perhaps the most important of these was the expectation of the party rank and file that the party president, though out of power temporarily, had a good chance of some day becoming premier. For example, this motive accounts for the solidarity of the Kenseikai during its " ten lean years. " It was only in 1 9 24, when Kato had been bypassed three times for the premiership, that factionalism threatened the party. But significantly enough, the solution proposed to retrieve the party's fortunes was not to disband the party or defect to the Seiyukai, but rather to organize a new anti-Seiyukai merger and n;place Kato with a new leader. Moreover, and this is matter that is likely to remain tantalizingly obscure, no matter how

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dim his prospects of becoming premier might be, a party leader could continue to hold his party together if he were able to raise funds. To revert to the internal troubles of the Kenseikai in 1 9 24, it was Kato's hint that he might cease to supply "provisions" to the party were he eased from the leadership that brought the merger movement to a final halt. A major party split was possible only if the leaders of the dissident or anti-headquarters faction had financial backing of their own. Although it is not possible to document this, it seems likely that the leaders of the Seiyukai faction that split off to become the Seiyuhonto in 1 9 24 had such funds at its disposal . One can also surmise that party solidarity began to rest more and more on a growing sense of party identity among its members. In-group ties, sustained partly by the distribution of funds and partly by personal friend­ ships, gave rise to a sense of party loyalty and in turn promoted the growth of a party self-image. It is nearly impossible to document such an assertion, but now and then we get a glimpse of subjective feelings of the party members toward their party. Arima Yoriyasu, for example, decided to join the Seiyukai partly because he felt that in contrast to the leadership of the Kenseikai, who tended to be cool and impersonal, the members of the Seiyukai had a strong sense of giri and ninja; he wrote that though he wouldn't hesitate to go to Adachi or Kato on some bit of straightforward business, he felt he wouldn't be able to approach them for a loan he didn't want his wife to know about. By contrast, he said he would feel no such constraints with Takahashi or Tokonami, and much less so with Noda Yutaro, all leaders of the Seiyukai.9 Very probably such subjective attitudes strengthened the allegiance of other men to their parties. THE EMERGENCE OF PARTY CABINETS A second important question that can be raised is how the "established parties" were able to secure control over the cabinet. The Meij i constitution made no provision for party cabinets, and though the party politicians were united in their feeling that party rule was both desirable and necessary, this feeling was not shared by the other elites in Japanese society. The high­ ranking civil officials and military officers who regarded themselves as dedi­ cated "servants of the emperor" looked upon the vote-grubbing party poli­ ticians, backed by the moneybags of selfish business interests, as unfit for positions of responsibility. Moreover, in contrast to England and the United

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CONCLUSION

States, both of which had long observed the practice of subordinating military officials and civil bureaucrats to the control of popularly elected officials, the Japanese party politicians had to contend with exactly the opposite tradition. How then were they able to secure the formation of party cabinets? Perhaps basic to the parties' success in this respect was the diffuse dis­ tribution of power under the Meij i constitution. Far from being a monolithic "absolutist" state, the governmental structure created by the Meij i oligarchs was a truncated Leviathan. To be sure, all legal power ultimately rested in the hands of the emperor, who in theory ruled as well as reigned , but outside of a few passionate academics like Uesugi Shinkichi and the lunatic fringe of the mystical right wing, most politicians were well aware that he was rarely, if ever, able to exercise it. In every act of state, from a declaration of war to the award of a decoration, the emperor relied on the "advice and assist­ ance" of his ministers or of men like the genro who exercised considerable informal power. The emperor was not too powerful in law, he was too weak in practice. In the absence of a central unifying force within the state, the power to make and carry out decisions was divided not in Montesquieuean fashion, but among an autonomous military high command , an independent professional bureaucracy, the leaders of the House of Peers, the Privy Council, and the parties in the House of Representatives. While the oligarchs lived , they managed to hold together this welter of competing elements by a kind of '' government by crony. " But once they had passed from the scene, the problems created by the fragmentation of power within the state became acute. The political leaders who emerged in the Taisho period were divided not simply by policy differences, but by different bases of power and in some cases by radically opposite philosophies of government. The result was a continual struggle for control of the cabinet. The parties possessed several advantages in this struggle. First of all, the oligarchs had not created any single group of political heirs capable of succeeding to their mantle of prestige or their extensive personal connections. None of the oligarchs' proteges had an indisputable claim to head the government, or even to assume all the functions that the oligarchs had performed . Consider the effect of Yamagata's death on the political scene. His function as genro was taken over largely by Saionj i ; his role as behind­ the-scenes manipulator of the House of Peers was inherited by no one and the House disintegrated into factional conflict ; the same was true of the army where Yamag ata had exerted consid erable influence even during the First

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World War; his own personal proteges-men like Den Kenj iro, Hirata Tosuke, and Kiyoura Keigo-either made their peace with the parties or sank into political obscurity. No one person was able to plug into all Yamagata's old connections. The state builders, in short, were not followed by a generation of custodians as prestigious or powerful as they had been. Even Saionj i felt himself to be far less powerful than the older genro . Because there was not an obvious set of political heirs or an institutionalized system for recruiting them , the parties were able to compete on an equal footing with the other political elites in Taisho Japan. Second, the parties did not have to contend with a sense of national crisis that might have made it easier for their rivals to come to power. The Taisho period was one of peace. With the signing of the Portsmouth Treaty no major international crisis threatened the country until the late 1 9 2 0 's and early 1 930 's. Participation in the World War was only token, and the Siberian expedition touched no obvious national interest and generated no widespread concern. It was difficult to convince anyone that these were extraordinary times which required extraordinary leadership of a kind that the parties were not equipped to provide. Nor was there any temptation on the part of the parties to agree to a political truce as they had in 1 894 and 1 904. Though some attempt was made to justify the appointment of Terauchi in 1 9 1 7 , and later the three "transcendental cabinets" of 1 9 2 2 , 1 9 2 3 , and 1 9 24, by appeals to "national unity," the parties were not willing to accept the notion that there was any real mandate for nonparty prem iers. Indeed, it was the appointment of Kiyoura Keigo as a man "above politics" on the heels of the attempted assassination of the emperor that led to the eruption of party anger in 1 9 24. Finally, as a result of the relative tranquillity of foreign affairs, control over the House of Representatives emerged as the key to assuring cabinet stability and the uninterrupted formulation of policy. Despite its relatively weak constitutional position, the consent of this body was necessary to expe­ dite governmental legislative programs in normal times, and more important, it was necessary for the approval of the national budget. To get things done, a premier had to have some measure of support in the House and the parties were willing to exploit this situation to enlarge their own influence. Further­ more, though its power to redress grievances against the cabinet was weak, the House of Representatives could cause a govern ment serious embarrass­ ment by passing no-confidence resolutions or resolu tions callin g for the

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removal of certain ministers, including the premier himself. These resolutions had no legal force, but no premier could relish the thought that they might pass the House of Representatives. It was such threatened resolutions that brought the resignation of Katsura in r g r 3 and that prompted Terauchi to dissolve the Diet in r g r 7 . By the mid-Taisho period, few potential nonparty candidates for the office of premier remained , and those who did normally sought the support of one of the major parties, or perhaps both of them, before agreeing to organize a cabinet. Despite these advantages, all of which made the appointment of party premiers possible, the final decision still lay in the hands of the genro. This meant that the personal inclinations of the cabinet makers remained a crucial factor in the emergence of party government. The tactics and personality of the party leaders, however vexed and irritated they might be by the continued interference of the oligarchs, had to be tempered to meet the character of the genro. While Yamagata still lived, the threat of obstructionist tactics or open public attacks on the genro were likely to achieve little ; rather it was of the utmost importance to cultivate a friendly and cordial relationship with the old man. For this reason, it was Hara rather than Kato who became the first party premier, and even Hara was successful only because Yamagata was looking for a temporary expedient. When only Saionj i was left, matters became much easier for the parties because the last genro lacked the interest or determination of Yamagata to maintain the principle of " transcendental government." He was also more sensitive to outside pressure. His decision to nominate Kato , whose views and reputation he personally regarded with mistrust, came largely as a result of the second Movement for Constitutional Government, which made it clear that the parties were not likely to counte­ nance another nonparty government. In spite of this, however, he continued to hold out for the possibility of appointing a " neutral cabinet" headed by a nonparty premier, and it was only the lack of a suitable candidate that kept him from doing so. In any event, it is clear that without major institu­ tional reform the continuation of party government had to depend on the development of precedent, as the English cabinet system did, and precedent needed the nourishment of time. THE USES OF POWER This brings us to one final question : To what ends did the parties use their power once they had achi eved it? First of all, and most obviously, both parties

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were compelled by the desire to maintain or increase their Diet strength to build local electoral support. In this they were largely effective. Success at the polls was a natural corollary of their growing control over the cabinet, not merely because "the government never lost an election" but because access to influence over national budgets strengthened their ability to cater to local economic interests. Although the "established parties" had neither highly articulated or bureaucratized local organizations, they were nonetheless able to mobilize the votes of the relatively apathetic voting public. It is difficult to say how much party identification or interest in campaign issues affected the electorate, but it is clear that voters were readily influenced by the candidates' personalities or reputation, by pressure from local yuryokusha, or by vote-buying. The parties were not popular in the sense that they aroused widespread public enthusiasm, or even respect, but it is clear that they were " popular" in the sense that they monopolized the support of the voting public. The local supremacy of the "established parties" at election time by the end of the I g 2 o 's faced no serious challenge from either the right-wing or left-wing political organizations. Even after the passage of universal suffrage, which undermined the homo­ geneity of the voting public, the " proletarian parties" did not succeed in establishing a significant hold on the electorate. At best, in the late 1 93o's, the proletarian parties were unable to win more than about 10 percent of the total popular vote. Even had their leadership not been divided by incessant doctrinal and tactical disputes, it is unlikely that they could successfully have competed with the Seiyukai and the Minseito. Their constituency was mainly urban, but the majority of the voters continued to remain in the countryside. There the " proletarian parties" made little headway against the older parties. The peasantry were inherently distrustful of the "Reds," and the " pro­ letarian parties" could neither raise the vast sums necessary to campaign in the countryside nor break the ties between the rural voter and the local yuryokusha. The right-wing radicals by and large regarded the crass job of winning votes as unnecessary. Theirs was the psychology of the putschist who bypasses the regular legal and constitutional cham1els in the pursuit of power. They pinned their hopes not on mass support but on the strategic use of "direct action. " Ultimately, of course, it was the radical right that did most damage to the parties, but ironically, what successes they achieved were due largely to their sense of frustration at the local strength of the parties. They knew

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that they could n o t w i n m an election fight a n d never bothered t o cloak themselves in constitutional propriety as the Nazis did in Germany. It was perhaps a testament to the electoral strength of the parties in the 1 9 2 0 's that the right resorted to terrorism on the one hand and to pressure on nonparty elites on the other. But when one turns from the matter of vote getting to the question of public policy, it becomes far less easy to generalize about the parties because each reacted differently to the responsibilities of power. For the Seiyukai under Hara, domestic policy consisted mainly of promoting the policy of "national wealth and strength" that had been begun by the oligarchs. A man of great political acumen but limited political vision, he was never able to transcend his early experience as party leader. His mind was always concerned with the fate of his own party, and he failed to understand that the Japan of his youth and middle age was very different from the Japan he governed as premier. By contrast, the Kenseikai under Kato proved far more sensitiv <; to the growing pressure of articulate public opinion for a greater democratiza­ tion of the political system and for a program of social amelioration . In part this was a matter of historical accident because the Kenseikai was in opposi- 1 tion when this public demand became most vocal. But it also reflected the character of Kato's leadership and background and the existence of reform­ minded elements within his party. Even given the consensus within which the parties operated , it was possible to advocate some measure of change and reform . Yet-and here I must make a value j udgment rather than an analytical one-it seems plain that the legislative landscape during the years of overt party rule was a relatively barren one. Aside from the passage of universal suffrage in 1 9 2 5 , the one major landmark of the period, it is difficult to discern any large political or social changes wrought by the parties, even by the reform-minded Kenseikai. Admittedly, there remains much to be studied in the period-particularly in the realm of social legislation-but one takes away the impression that even when the parties made promises of reform they were often unable to fulfill them. Despite its goal of passing a law to regulate the activities of labor unions, for example, the Kenseikai never succeeded in accomplishing more than the repeal of Article 1 7 of the Police Regulations of 1 900. If this impression is accurate, and I believe that it is, one must ask why the parties did so !itt!� when there was so much that might have been done.

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One key to the sluggishness of the parties, even when they were inclined to undertake a major legislative program such as that of the Kato cabinet in I 9 2 5 , was the nature of the institutional structure. By dividing the powers of decision making among so many competing elements, the oligarchs had forced anyone who assumed power to adopt the tactics of compromise, often to the detriment of decisive action. The parties had exploited this peculiarity of the institutional arrangements in order to achieve power, but they found themselves confounded by it once they were in office. Consider, for example, the difficulties Kato faced in attempting to achieve the passage of universal suffrage. Quite aside from the problem of achieving a consensus within his own coalition, he had to meet conservative resistance in the Privy Council and the House of Peers. It was only by his resort to an unprecedented prolongation of the Diet session that he managed to get the bill passed at all. In this respect, the tactical problems of a party premier in Japan were far more complex than those of an English prime minister, who (after I 9 I I at any rate) could be relatively sure his legislative program would pass if he had control of a majority in the House of Commons. Perhaps the problems of a Japanese party premier were more analogous to those of an American president, but even so the checks and balances of the American constitution were far less stultifying than those of the Meij i constitution. The American president, after all, did not have to clear major legislation with the Supreme Court, as the Japanese premier had to secure the approval of the Privy Council. If this is so, why was it that the party leaders, once they were in office, made little or no attempt to alter this cumbersome institutional structure. One reason was the practical difficulties of doing so. During the years from I 9 2 I to I 9 2 6 , constitutional amendment was legally impossible because the country was under the rule of a regent. Even had this not been the case, a conservative minority in either House could have stopped the amendment process by refusing to ' • ttend the debates or by refusing to vote for the measure. Judging from the strong resistance in the House of Peers to as tepid a measure of institutional reform as Kato's peerage reform bill, it appears quite unlikely that they would have accepted a constitutional amendment or any other legislative proposal that would alter the system even more drastically, But whatever the difficulties of the amendment process, the party leaders seem to have been averse to such boldness. Indeed, they do not seem to have

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felt that institutional change was appropriate. Once when Baba Tsunego suggested to Hara that in order to resolve a conflict with the Privy Council he should side with the public and confront the councillors with the power of the people behind him, the premier expressed shock. "That's a frightful argument," he said. "To ride the popular tide and confront the Privy Council-that's revolution. I can't agree to that. " 10 Similarly, in the debates on the Peace Preservation Law, when Home Minister Wakatsuki was asked whether it would be permissible under the law to advocate the abolition of the house of Peers and the Privy Council, he replied that it would be but that he did not favor either measure.U The fact of the matter is that the party leaders seemed to feel that it was easier to manipulate the existing constitutional structure than reform it. The cultivation of strategic personal connections, the striking of bargains and alliances with nonparty elites, and the delicate arrangement of compromises seemed as effective in getting things done as a formal alteration of legally constituted institutions. Hara, of course, was the past master of this technique, but even Kato, who was far less able as a tactician and far more rigid in his notions of what constituted proper constitutional practice, made fumbling attempts to cultivate the genro, tried throughout his ministry to win over the leadership of the factions in the House of Peers, and sought to soothe the ruffled feathers of the privy councillors. Compromise was the easiest way to get things done. Once the oligarchs were gone, the "absolutist" elements did not always resist overtures from the parties and were often willing to make concessions provided the price was not too high. It is not surprising then that the party leaders, confident that the techniques of manipulation would continue to prove as effective as those of reform, were little inclined to stir up unneccessary difficulties by mooting major constitutional changes. This was the central weakness of the "established parties" at the end of the Taisho period. They were tactically effective, but strategically vulnerable. They had achieved hegemony in the struggle for the control of the cabinet but had neither reduced the powers of their competitors significantly nor created legal imperatives or sanctions for the perpetuation of party rule. For this reason, it is difficult to make any conclusive assessment as to whether the parties "succeeded" or "failed. " In some respects, they did both. If their achievements are measured against the liabilities they had had to overcome or even against the goals th�t the men in the parties had set for themselves, they can be judged successful. But it is equally clear that this success was

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not sufficient to sustain the parties in power when an atmosphere of national crisis overtook the country in the early 1 930's. Ironically, the parties were victims of their limited achievements, for the methods by which they secured and maintained their power prevented them from consolidating their position. One can hardly condone the "established parties" for failing to undertake major institutional reform, yet one can understand their hesitation to do so. Today the "established parties" find few defenders either in Japan or in the West. It is far easier to analyze their errors and point out their short­ comings. Yet when one compares the rule of the parties with that of the generals and bureaucrats who succeeded them , it is clear that, whatever their blemishes, the leadership of the party politicians was far less disastrous for the country. The parties may have committed sins of omission and made mistakes in j udgment, but they did not lead the country to aggression , war, and destruction. Takahashi Korekiyo showed much insight when he wrote in 1 9 2 8 , " Party government is run-of-the-mill government; we cannot wish it to be the very best, yet it can not be the very worst either." 12 It was hardly an enthusiastic endorsement of representative government and certainly not one to send men to the barricades, but in its restraint, in its pragmatism, and in its complacence, it is perhaps the most fitting epitaph for the "estab­ lished parties" of Taish6 Japan.

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N OT E S

NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION I . Quoted i n George Akita, "The Meij i Constitution in Practice : The First Diet,"

Journal of Asian Studies, 2 2 . I :42 ( November I g6 2 ) . 2 . Cf. Herbert Spencer's remarks in a letter to Kaneko Kentaro quoted i n Nagai M ichio, " Herbert Spencer in Early Meij i Japan," Far Eastern Quarterly, I 4 . 1 :58 ( November I 954) . 3 · Michael Moerman, "Western Culture and Thai Way of Life," A sia, I : 3 3 ( Spring I g62 ).

NOTES TO CHAPTER I 1 . Hara Kei zenshu (The collected works of Hara Kei ; Tokyo, I 92 9 ) , I, 3 3 7 · 2 . Kiino Banshu den (The biography of Kono Hironaka ; Tokyo, I 9 24 ) , I I , 2 8g-2gg . 3· For an example of the type of rewards a party might extract from an oligarchic cabinet see Maeda Renzan, Hara Kei den (The biography of Hara Kei ; Tokyo, I 943), I, 3 7 8 . 4· Ibid., p p . 386-387 ; Hattori Shiso, Kindai Nihon jimbutsu seij'ishi (A history of men and polit ics in modern Japan ; Tokyo, I 95 8 ) , I, 2 3 0 - 2 3 8 ; Hara Kei nikki (The diary of Hara Kei ; Tokyo, I 950- I 95 I ) , II, 254-256, Nov. 8-2 7 , I 8g8. 5 · Hat tori , I, 230-238. 6 . " S hoso giin sohyo" (An evaluation of young Diet members), Kensei kiiron, 3 . I :56-57 ( January I 9 2 3 ) , Suzuki Fuj iya, "Seij i n i kokorozasu seinen e" (To young men interested in politics), Kensei kiiron, 2 . 8 : I 5 - I 8 (August I 9 2 2 ) . 7 · Ozaki Yukio, " Sengo n o rekkoku t o kori tsu seru Nihon" (The postwar powers and isolated Japan), 3 . 2 : I 3- I 5 Kensei, III, 2 ( February I 9 2 0 ) . 8 . Robert Michels, Political Parties ( New York, I 959), passim. g. Richard Rovere in The New Yorker ( Mar. 2 I , I 964) . I o. Koizumi Mataj iro, Fusen undo his hi (The secret history of the universal suffrage movement ; Tokyo, I g2 8 ) , p. 8 . I I . Arima Yoriyasu, Seikai diichuki (A record o f wanderings in the pol i tical world ; Tokyo, I 95 I ) , pp. 38-4 1 . I 2 . Seki Naohiko, Shichiju-shichi nen no kaiko ( Recollections of seventy-seven yea rs ;

Tokyo, I 93 3 ) , p. 3 7 . I 3 · Shihosho j i m ukyoku, Shihii kenkyu: senkyo zaihi n o kenkyu toku n i baishu n i tsu ite ( J udicial studies: A study of ' electoral expe nses, especially with respect to briber y ; Tokyo, n . d . ) , p . q .

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NOTES TO PAG E S 2 1 -28

I 4. Baba Tsunego, Seikai jimbutsu fokei, (Views on figures in the political worl d ; Tokyo I 93 I ) , pp. 338-339. I 5 . Okazaki Kunisuke, Kensei kaiko roku. ( Recollections of constitutional politics ; Tokyo, I 935) , pp. I 7 7 - I 8o . Takahashi in response to the question of why there were few people strong enough to stand up to the military and the right wing com mented : "The reason is money. The spirit within the parties has changed considerably. In making use of Diet representatives, the man himself or his personality is not used as the standard. [Instead] people say ' I gave out that money' or 'Who gave out that other money? '-there seems to have sprung up the notion that with money a man becomes free. "It was in the period of the Tanaka cabinet that money was used indiscriminately at the time of general elections . . . It was said that when you went into Tanaka's reception room there were always one or two hundred yen notes which had fallen under the desk. That's how much money was thrown about. "The Seiyiikai was not like that before . At the time of the O kuma cabinet Hara Kei was party president and I was head of the Election Commi ttee. When the time came for raising money for the general election, Yamamoto Tatsuo and I were given the job. However, since both of us disliked going to others in order to get money, we gave as much as possible out of our own pockets and let it go at that. " However, all the money we made went into Hara's hands. Then Hara individual ly handed out election funds to appropriate candidates for the election. Many of the party leaders complained abou t this but Hara did not listen . . . They said it was no good to create a party [of kobun] within the party . . . "The l argest amount of money Hara gave directly to a candidate was 7 ,ooo yen he gave to one person-then there were one or two to whom he gave 6 ,ooo yen . Politics didn't cost much then. Consequently, money didn't talk a s much in the political world then as it does now [ I 934] . " Baba Tsunego, Seikai jimbutsu hyoron (Comments on figures in the pol itical worl d ; Tokyo, I 93 5 ) , pp. I I 6- I I 8 . I 6. Nagai Ryiitaro, "Shakai seigishin no kakuritsu e" (Toward the establ ishment of social j ustice) , Kensei koran, 3 . 3 : 5 3-54 (March I 92 3 ) . q . Matsumura Kenzo, Nagai Ryiltaro (Tokyo, I 959), p . 2 29 . I 8 . Ishida Takeshi, Kindai Nihon seiji kozo n o kenkyil (A study of t h e political structure of modern Japan ; Tokyo, I 959) , pp. I 95- I 9 7 · I 9 . Chilo koran, 40 . 2 : 2 ( March I 9 2 5 ) . 20. Yoshino Sakuzo, " Saikin seihen hihan" (A critique of t h e recent cabinet change), Chilo koran, 3 7 . 7 : I I 2 Ouly I 9 2 2 ) . 2 I . Quoted i n James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy: Four Party Politics in A merica ( Englewood Cliffs, N .J . , I 963), p. I 2 0 . NOTES TO CHAPTER II I . Declaration of the " reform faction" of the Kenseihonto in I 908 quoted in Shiba Sadakichi, Rikken Minseito sh i (The history of the Minseito ; Tokyo, I 934), I, 200.

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NOTES TO PAG E S 28-42

2. Cf. Asada Koson, " Seito shuryo to shite no Katsura Ko" ( Marquis Katsura as a party leader) , Taiyii, 1 5 . 2 :4- I 6 ( February I gog). 3 · Maeda, Hara Kei den, II, 63-65 ; Hara Kei nikki, IIA, 205- 2 0 7 , Dec. 8, I 904 ; Lawrence A. Olson, J r . , "Hara Kei : A Political B iography," Ph.D. thesis ( Harvard, I 954 ) , pp. I 70- 1 7 2 . 4· Maeda, Hara Kei den, I I , go-g8 ; Kuribayashi Teiich i , Chihiikankai n o hensen ( Changes in the world of the provincial official s ; Tokyo, I 930), pp. 93- 1 03 , I 2 2 - I 26. 5 · Maeda, Hara Kei den, II, I 65- I 66. . 6. Masumi J unnosuke, "Nihon seito shi n i o)<.eru chiho seij i n o shomondai " ( Several problems concerning local pol itics in the history of Japanese political parties ) , Kokka gakkai zasshi, 7 6 : 3 2 ( 1 963). 7 · Ibid., pp. 33-35 ; Yamagata-ken gikai s h i hensan iinkai, Yamagata-ken gikai shi ( A history of the Yamagata prefectural assembly; Yamagata City, I 95 I ) , pp. I 9 2 - I g6. 8 . Ono Yugo, ed . , Rikken Seiyitkai shi (A history of the Seiyukai ; Tokyo, I 9 24- I 943), III, 448-449 . g. Kokumin shimbun ( July I 8 , I 9 I 3), p. 3 · I O . Oka Yoshitake, Kindai Nihon no seijika ( M odern Japanese politicians ; Tokyo, I g6o) , pp. I 47- I 53 ; Uzaki Kumakichi, Inukai Tsuyosh i den (The biography of lnukai Tsuyosh i ; Tokyo, I 93 2 ) , passim. I 1 . Ibid., pp. I 94- I g6 ; O tsu Junichiro, Dai Nihon kensei shi (The constitutional history of Greater Japan ; Tokyo, I 9 2 7 - I 9 2 8 ) , pp. 6 I 4-6 1 7 ; Koj i m a Kazuo, Seikai gojitnen: Kojima Kazuo kaikoroku (Fifty years in the pol itical worl d ; Tokyo, I 95 I ) , pp. 2 4-3 I . I 2 . Details of the negotiations for a merger movement may be found in O tsu, VI, 460-468 ; Hayashida Kametaro, Nihon seitii shi (A h istory of Japanese political pa r ties ; Tokyo, I 92 7 ) , II, I 6 Iff. I 3 . Uzaki, pp. 2 24- 2 2 7 , 2 3 I -2 3 2 ; Adachi Kenzo, A dachi Kenzii jijoden (The auto­ biography of Adachi Kenzo ; Tokyo, I g6o), p. I I S ; Kataoka Naoharu, Kaisiiroku ( Recollections; Tokyo, I 933), pp. 3 I 8-3 I 9 . I 4 . O tsu, VII, I - 3 . I 5 . Ibid., p. I g . Cf. Katsura's other remarks quoted in ibid., p p . 2 0 , 26-28. I 6. Oka, pp. I 2 7- I 2 8 . 1 7 · Shibuya Sakusuke, Taketomi Tokitosh i (Tokyo, I 934) , p. I 5 2 . I S . O tsu, VII, I 6 . I g . Ibid., VII, I 3- I 5 ; Wakatsuki Reij i ro, Kofoan kaikoroku (The reminiscences of Wakatsuki Reij iro ; Tokyo, I 950), pp. I 75- 1 79· 2 0 . Ibid., p. I 84 ; O tsu, V I I , I 5 . 2 1 . Ibid., VII, I 5- 1 7 . 2 2 . For an excel lent treatment of the development o f the first Movement for Constitutional Government see Tetsuo Naj ita, Hara Kei in the Politics of Compromise, 1905 - 1 9 15 (Cambridge, Mass . , I 96 7 ) . 2 3 . O tsu, V I I , I g-2 0 . 24. Washio Yoshi tsugu, ed. , Inukai Bokudii den (The biography of lnukai Tsuyoshi ; Tokyo, I 9 3 8- I 939 ) , II , 3 3 - 36.

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2 5 . Masumi Junnosuke, "Taisho seihen to sono zengo" (The Taisho poli tical crisis and the events surrounding it), TOkyo toritsu daigaku hogakkai zasshi, 3 : 4 I D ( 1 963). 26. Egi Yoku den (The biography of E g i Yoku ; Tokyo, 1 939), p . 6 o . 2 7 . Biographical information on Goto, Nakakoj i , Wakatsuki, Egi, Hamaguchi, and Nagashima may be found in Wakatsuki , Kofoan kaikoroku; Egi Yoku den; Tsurumi Yusuke, Goto Shimpei (Tokyo, 1 93 7 ) , 4 vols. ; Shinobu Seisaburo, Goto Shimpei (Tokyo, 1 94 1 ) ; Aoki Tokuzo, Wakatsuki Reijiro: Hamaguchi Yiiko (Tokyo, 1 958) ; Sekine M i noru, Hamaguchi Yiiko den (The biography of Hamaguchi Yuko ; Tokyo, 1 93 1 ) ; Hamaguchi Yuko, Zuikanroku ( Reminiscences ; Tokyo, 1 93 1 ) . Additional information may be found by consulting the appropriate entries in Daijimmeijiten (Tokyo, 1 953- 1 955) ; Igarashi Eikichi, Taisho jimmei jiten (The Taisho biographical dictionary; Tokyo, 1 9 1 4) .

28. Cf. E g i Yoku, "Seij i to seito," Chiio koron, 28.8 : 2 8-36 ( July 1 9 1 3) . 29. Wakatsuki , Kofoan kaikoroku, p. 1 9 2 . Hamaguchi had had offers from the Sumitomo interests to become an executive. Goto had also tried to get him to enter the South Manchurian Railway Company while he was still a bureau chief in the Finance Ministry. 30. Hamaguchi Yuko, Zuikanroku, pp. r 6- r 8 . 3 1 . Egi Yoku , " Seij i to seito." 32. O tsu, VII, 23-24; Uzaki . 3 3 · Baba Tsunego, Seikai jimbutsu fokei (Views on figures in the political worl d ; Tokyo, 1 93 1 ) , p p . q6- r 8o ; Kataoka, p . 3 2 0 ; Shibuya, p p . 1 5 1 - 1 5 3 · 3 4 · For example, four o u t o f four members from Fukushima left the Kokuminto; four out of four left from Akita; five out of six from Hyogo ; three out of four from Saitama; three out of three from Koch i ; two out of two from Saga ; and so on. Almost all the Kokuminto members from the north and east of Japan joined the new party; the prefectures affected were Niigata, Fukushima, Akita, Iwate, Yamagata, Toyama, Ishikawa, Tochigi , Ibaragi , Chiba, and Miyagi . 35· Interview of Fuj i sawa Ikunosuke, Dec. 2 , 1 938. Typescript, Kensei Shiryo Hensanshitsu, National Diet Li brary, Tokyo. 36. N agaki Chiyoj i , Niigata-ken seito shi ( History of political parties in Niigata Pre­ fecture ; Niigata City, 1 96 2 ) , pp. 4 1 1 -4 1 4 . Only one member of the Diet from Niigata remained in the Kokuminto as the result of pressure from powerful supporters in his constituency; he eventually resi gned as a Diet member, however, since he was unable to make a complete break with other former Kokuminto members i n the prefecture. 3 7 · Rikken Doshikai soritsu j i m usho, Seikyo hokoku, (Tokyo, 1 9 1 3 ) , p. 8. 38. Kokumin shimbun Ouly r 8 , 1 9 1 3 ) , p. 3 ·

NOTES T O CHAPTER III

r . Maeda, Hara Kei den, II, 255 . 2 . Hattori Shigebu m i , Kato's real father, was also a man with an eye to business. In r 8 7 2 , he resigned his post as a prefectural official to embark on a business career

255

NOTES TO PAG E S 54-60

with savings and public bonds he had received at the time of the abolition of feudal status. He i nvested in a theater at Nagoya and apparently also rented houses there. According to Kato's biographer, he was able "to earn an upper middle class l iving and year by year amassed his weal th . " He was even elected a member of the first ward assembly (kukai) i n Nagoya. In I 883 he sustained a loss of ¥3o ,ooo when storms destroyed a land reclamation proj ect i n which he and several friends had i nvested. The family property wiped away, he returned to l i fe as an official, serving first as a tax collector in Tokushima and later as a court clerk at Osaka. Ito Masanori , Kala Komei, (Tokyo, I 9 29), I, I I 2 - I I 4. 3· Ibid., I, 8g- I 4 7 · 4 · While i n England, Kato worked for a time m the office o f a Liverpool wool merchant with the now famil iar name of James Bond . Bond was one of the earliest Japanophiles in England, and an appeal ing one at that. Every year he gave a banquet in honor of the emperor's birthday, serving the prominent men of the city such exotic dishes as misoshiru ( bean paste soup) . Ibid., I , I 67 - I 7 2 . 5 · " Seito no kanegura sagashi," Shin Nippon, Vol . 7 , No. 3 (March I 9 1 7 ) . 6 . Ito, I , I g i - I 94 · 7 . Ibid., I, 1 7 5 - 1 76. 8 . Ibid., I , 463-46 7 . g . Kato was a member of t h e Mikawayakai, a group of m e n w h o m e t every month or so at the Mikawaya in Akasaka. All were proteges of Ito or associated with the Seiyukai in its early days . A list of its members may be found in ibid., II, 6g 2-6g4 . 1 0 . The reasons Kato gave to the newspapers were essentially the same as those he gave in the cabinet meeting of February 1 7 , I go6: ( I ) The forced sale of the rai l roads, which had been under private ownership for 25 years, was an invasion of private rights ; the sale of the rai lroads would involve great inconvenience and a loss of profit for the owners ; this " trampling of human righ ts" was highly unlawful. (2) The flotation of a public loan of ¥4-50o ,ooo ,ooo to finance the purchase of the rai lroads was most unsound at a time when there was a large wartime debt out­ standing and a sinking fu nd was being established to bolster the national credit ; it would underm ine the confidence of foreign investors in the national cred it. ( 3 ) Public management of t h e rai lroads would probably b e less efficient than private management ; furthermore, the rai lroads would become a tool for the government party to use in expanding its local influence ; this would lead to an underm ining of constitutional government. Cf. ibid., I , 566; Wakatsuki , Kofoan kaikoroku, pp. g8- I OO . See also t h e remarks of D e n Kenj iro in Kensei kiiron, 6 . 3 : 2 0 (March I g 2 6 ) . I I . Cf. Tsurumi, pp. 654-659 ; Imai Sei ichi , "Taishoki ni okeru gunbu no seij i teki chii ni tsuite" (On the pol itical position of the mili tary in the Taisho period) , Pt. I, Sekai ( September I 95 7 ) , p. 7 ; Saionj i Kim moch i , Saionji Kimmoch i jiden (The autobiography of Saionj i Kim mochi ; Tokyo, I 949) , pp. I 4 I - I 42 . I 2 . Ito, I , 686-6g4. I 3 · Ibid., I , 6g8-70 2 . 1 4. Cf. remarks o f Koj ima Kazuo i n Koichi nenkai , Kojima Kazuo (Tokyo, 1 950) , p. 859 ; Washio, lnukai Bokudii den, I I , 36. I 5 . " Seikai no chushin j i mbutsu taran to suru Hara Kei Shi to Kato Dan " ( M r. ·

256

N OTES TO PAG E S 60-65

Hara and Baron Kato: Coming central figures in the pol itical world), Chilo koran, 28.4 :44 ( April 1 9 1 4) ; japan Weekfy Chronicle ( Apr. 1 7 , 1 9 1 3) . 1 6. Ito, I, 696 ; Kokumin shimbun Uuly 1 8 , 1 9 1 3 ) , p. 3 · I 7 . Ito, r . 7 28- 7 3 2 . I 8 . Kondo Misao, Kato Komez (Tokyo, I 959) , p. J 7 2 . I 9 . Cf. Kato's recollections i n Dura Kemmu den ( A biography o f O ura Kem m u ; Tokyo, I 9 2 6 ) , p. 2 7 0 . 2 0 . Japan Weekfy Chronicle ( J u l y 1 0 , I 9 I 3) , p. 6 7 . 2 r . T h e fourteen-point document, perhaps typical of G ot o ' s verbose schemes, appears in O tsu, VII, 64-68 . According to Kato's biography, the question of party finances had come under discussion with the party leadership earlier, shortly before Katsura's death . The problem probably discussed was short-run operating expenses, not a long-range " fight fund" of the type Goto proposed. Six or seven of the party leaders who had been selected to make arrangements for the formal i nauguration of the party met at Kato's house. M inoura and Taketomi were unable to attend. The q uestion of ways and means to carry on after Katsura's death was the topic of discussion. Kataoka Naoharu spoke in favor of continuing the enterprise, but for the present, the important thing was to raise money. If they looked to others for financial support, they would not be able to get anything done ; therefore they must raise money among themselves. He put it rather bluntly-"rebuilding the party kitchen" was the first order of business. He then made a list of all present with a suggested amount for each to contribute : himself, ¥ 1 0 ,ooo ; Kato, ¥2o,ooo ; Goto, ¥ 2 o,ooo ; O ura, ¥5 ,ooo ; Wakatsuki, ¥ 2 ,ooo ; O ish i , ¥ 2 ,ooo ; and the rest (unnamed ) , ¥ 2 ,000 each . Everyone agreed to t h i s proposal a n d t h e money problem w a s settled at least tem porari ly. Kataoka Naoharu, Kaisoroku ( Tokyo, 1 93 2 ) , pp. 343-345 . This made a minimum total of ¥6 I ,ooo , perhaps more, depending on how many con­ tributed ¥2 ,000 apiece. In any case, such an amount was a far cry from Goto's proposal to raise ¥ I ,ooo ,ooo. It seems likely that sums of this magni tude would be necessary only for elections and would certainly be in excess of anything necessary for the simple operating expenses of the party. 2 2 . Tsurumi, III, 504-507 ; Ito, I, 75 I -753 ; Wakatsuki, Kifuan Kaikoroku, pp. 204- 2 05 . Kato evidently paid particular heed to O ura's opinion on the question of whether to continue building the party. 2 3 . O tsu, VII, 62 -63 ; 24. Ito, 366-368, 705, 7 3 7 · 2 5 . Quoted in London Times Uan. 1 2 , I 9 2 0 . ) 2 6 . jiji shimpo ( Feb. 2 0 , I 9 1 2 ) . 2 7 . Cf. Kato's statement in Kokumin shimbun Uuly 9 , I 9 1 3 ) , quoted i n Ito, I , 739-740. 2 8 . According to the English summary given i n Japan Weekfy Chronicle ( Nov. 20, I 9 1 3) , p. 88 2 . It was not possible to check the content of this speech as reported . i � the Japanese press. 29. Ito, II, I 5o. 30. Ibid., I, 766. Araki Takeyuki points out that Kato never wished to commit the party to a position which would be em barrassing were it to come to power.

257

NO TES TO PAG ES 65-78

Cf. Araki Takeyuki , Kato Komei ron (A discussion of Kato Komei ; Tokyo, 1 92 5 ) , pp. s o-s r . 3 1 . Speech made on May 2 7 , 1 9 1 6 quoted in Tokyo asahi shimbun ( May 2 8 , 1 9 1 6) , P· 4· 3 2 . O tsu, V I I , 7 5 · 3 3 · Interview of Wakatsuki Reij iro, Mar. I 7 , 1 94 1 . Typescript, Kensei Shiryo Hensanshitsu, National Diet Library, Tokyo. 34· Interview of Kato in Kensei koran, 2 . 9 : 2 2 - 2 5 ( September 1 9 2 2 ) . 3 5 · Interview o f Kinoshita Kenj iro, July 9 , 1 940. Typescript, Kensei Shiryo Hensanshitsu, National Diet Library, Tokyo. 36. Araki, pp. 2 r -2 2 ; interview of Wakatsuki Reij iro, Mar. r 7, 1 94 1 ; i nterview of Adachi Kenzo, Dec. 29, 1 939. Typescript, Kensei Shiryo Hensanshitsu, National Diet Library, Tokyo. 3 7 · Here is an example of Kato's wit. At a party banquet, after the party secretary made an opening speech, Kato stood up and said, " Mr. Tanomogi 's greeting was very well done, but I think we'll give him a mark of about 75 percent, since he began before we had finished our coffee. " Araki, p. r 8 . 3 8 . Ito, I, 744· Cf. the description o f his speech t o the Osaka branch o f the Kenseikai on July 9 , 1 9 2 2 in Kensei koran, 2 .8 : 7 0-7 2 (August 1 92 2 ) . 39 · Interview o f Wakatsuki Reij iro, July 1 5 , 1 940. 40. Arima, Seikai dochuki, pp. 2 7-30. 4 1 . C f. Kato's remarks i n Kensei koran, 2 .9 : 2 2 - 2 5 ( September 1 9 2 2 ) ; Araki, p. 44· Kato refused to meet with provincial supporters of the Kenseikai when t hey visited Tokyo unless they had letters of introduction . 4 2 . Quoted in Yabe Sadaj i , Konoe Fumimaro (Tokyo, 1 95 2 ) , I, r oo . 43· On Hara's family a n d education, see Maeda, Hara Kei den, I , 3- r o6 ; Olson, pp. 26-2 7 . 44· Maeda, Hara Kei den, pp. r o6- r 2 6 ; Olson. p. 2 8 . 45 · Maeda, Hara Kei den, pp. 1 2 7- 1 86 . 46. Hara Kei zenshu, I, 4 2 -44. 47 · Ibid., I, 1 4- 1 9 ; Maeda, Hara Kei den, I , 2 00-206. 48 . Ibid., pp. 209-2 I 3; Hara Kei zenshu, I, 5-8. 49 · Ibid., I, r 8 r - r 8 2 ; Hara Kei nikki, I, 3 1 , Jan. 25, r 88 2 . 5 0 . Maeda, Hara Kei den, I , 3 2 0-32 3 , 339-344 ; Oka, Kindai Nihon n o seijika, pp. 98- r oo . 5 1 . Hara Kei zenshu, I , 3 3 7 -338 ; also see Maeda, Hara Kei den, I, 3 3 2 - 3 3 3 , fQr Hara's views on the early years of the Diet. 5 2 . Ibid., I, 34 1 -34 2 , 466-467 . 5 3 · Hara Kei zenshu, I, 390-392 . 54· Ibid. 5 5 · Olson, pp. 1 36- 1 4 1 ; for an interesting interpretation of Hara's political motives see Mitani Taiichiro, " Hara Kei to seito naikaku, " in Okochi Kazuo and , Oya Soichi eds. , Kindai Nihon ' o tsukutta hyakunin (One hundred men who made modern Japan ; Tokyo, 1 965) , pp. 65-7 2 . 56. Maeda, Hara Kei den, II, 4-6, ! 7 , 2 3 , 4 2 .

258

NOTES TO PAG E S 78-84

57· 58. 59· 6o . 6r. 62 . 63 .

Ibid., I, 4 I 4 , 450 ; II, 34-38, 48-5 3 ; Oka, Kindai Nihon no seijika, pp. I I 8- I 2 4 . Ibid., p. I 2 6 . Saionj i , p. qo. Also, Maeda, Hara Kei den, I, 40 I -408. Ibid., II, 3 7 5 ; Oka, Kindai Nihon no seijika, pp. I I 8- I 24 . Ibid., p. I 20 ; Maeda, Hara Kei den, II, I 65 , 2 2 5-259, 3 74-3 7 5 . Oka, Kindai Nihon n o seijika, p. I I g . Uchida Shin 'ya, Fusetsu gojunen ( Fifty stormy years ; Tokyo, I 95 I ) , pp. 6 o , 64 ; Hara Kei nikkz� VIII, 387-388. 64. Maeda, Hara Kei den, II, 255-256. 65 . Ibid., II, 85-8 7 . 6 6 . Masum i , " Nihon seito s h i ni okeru chiho sei j i no shomondai ," Kokka gakkai zasshi, No. 7 6 : I I - I 2 .

NOTES T O CHAPTER IV I . Cf. remarks of Watanabe Tsuneo, TOshu to seito ( Party leaders and political parties ; Tokyo, I g6 I ) , pp. 20-2 3 ; for details on the Yamagata clique, see Oka Yoshitake, Yamagata A ritomo (Tokyo, I g6 I ) , passim. 2. A brief summary of the cabinet crises of I 9 I 2 , I 9 I 3 , and I 9 I 4, will give some idea of the difficul ties in selecting a premier. In I 9 I 2 , after the war minister resigned from office, the genro at first attempted to have Saionj i stay on in office, but the prince, who had never relished the burdens of power, declined to do so. Matsukata, himself a genro, also refused. The genro then turned to possible candidates among their own proteges. But both H irata Tosuke, one of Yamagata's kobun, and then Yamamoto Gombei, a Navy man with considerable influence in the Satsuma faction, refused to serve. Finally, as a last resort, the genro nominated Katsura, who was only too glad to use the office to revive his political fortunes. In I 9 I 3 , after the fal l of Katsura, Saionj i , Matsukata, Yamamoto, and Hirata all refused to serve. It was only when Yamamoto succeeded in negotiating the support of the Seiyukai that he finally consented to undertake the premiership. In I 9 I 4, the search for a premier was even more frenzied. Yamagata at first recommended Tokugawa Ietachi , an aged political nonentity serving as president of the House of Peers ; he had the good sense to refuse. Yamagata then proposed a long list of possible premiers which included many who had been thought of in I 9 I 2 and I 9 I 3- 0 kuma, Kato, Kiyoura Keigo, Ito Miyoj i , Hirata, Terauchi, and Goto Shimpei. At the suggestion of Matsukata, t !o ey finally decided on Kiyoura, another of Yamagata's kobun, a man whose ambitions consistently outstripped his abilities and who was quite willing to accept. But Kiyoura was unable to organize a cabinet because the Navy would not provide a minister unless Kiyoura guaranteed that the budget would include an increase in naval appropriations. Unable to make such a promise, Kiyot;ra abandoned the effort to form a cabinet-as the popular sobriquet had it, "He sniffed the eel without tasting i t . " Once more the genro turned to a last resort, this time O kuma; though Yamagata at first obj ecte d, Inoue Kaoru

259

NOTES TO PAG E S 84-91

managed to argue him down. For details see Segai Inoue Ko den (The biography of Marquis Inoue ; Tokyo, 1 93 3 - 1 934), V, 284-285 , 290, 345 -348 ; Shinobu Seisaburo, Taisho seij"ish i (A pol itical history of the Taisho period ; Tokyo, 1 95 5 ) , pp. 1 47 - 1 5 0, q 6- r 8o , 2 I 2 - 2 1 4. 3· See note 2 . 4 · Washio, Inukai Bokudo den, II, 240. 5 · Segai Inoue Ko den, V, 356-358 . 6 . I t o , II, 2 -6, Kojima Kazuo later suggested t h a t t h e genro during their meeting with O kuma had a hand in picking Kato as foreign minister, O ura as home minister, and Wakatsuki as finance mi nister; cf. Washio, Inukai Bokudo den, II, 2 2 2 - 2 2 3 . But probably this amounted to no more than approval of suggestions by O kuma which in turn had been prompted by Kato. Kato had met with O kuma on April ro and I I and had had ample opportunity to suggest likely candidates for office. In view of Kato's dislike of genro interference, it does not seem likely that he would have kowtowed to their orders. It is true, however, that the genro suggested a general policy to be fol lowed irt forming a new government. For example, Inoue urged Kato to draw on as wide support as possible in forming the cabinet. He probably meant that the cabinet should include not only members of the anti-Seiyiikai parties in the Diet but also men from the House of Peers and the Yamagata faction. Kato agreed to do so, admitting that the cabinet, for all that was said about it, was not really a party cabi net . Segai Inoue Ko den, V, 359-360. For other details on the formation of the O kuma cabinet see Washio, Inukai Bokudo

den, II, 2 2 7 -2 30, 2 3 2 - 2 3 3 ; Tokyo asahi shimbun (Apr. 1 5 , r 6, I 9 I 4) ; Ito, II, g- I o ; Dura Kemmu den, passim. 7 · Hara Kei nikkz; VI, 2 36-2 3 8 ; Okazaki, p. I 5 7 ; Shi nobu Seisaburo, Taisho demokurashii shi (Taisho democracy ; Tokyo, 1 95 8 ) , I, 3 2 4 . 8 . Segai Inoue Ko den, V , 4 I 5 -4 I 6 ; Hara Kei nikki, VI, 2 3 7 ; Mi tarai Tatsuo, Miki Bukichz; (Tokyo, r g58), p. r 1 3 ; Sakaguchi J iro, Noda Taikon 0 den, (The biography of

Noda Yu taro ; Tokyo, r g 2 g ) , pp. 645-646. g . Adachi Kenzo, A dachi Kenzo jij"oden, (The autobiography of Adachi Kenzo ; Tokyo, r g6o) , pp. 1 40- 1 43 · r o . The O kuma Koenkai (The Association t o Support Prem ier O kuma) was the organization responsible for many aspects of the campaign . Headed formally by Takeda Sanae, the president of Waseda University, it m ade arrangements for O kuma's campaign tour, arranged for his speeches, mobilized crowds at rai lroad statimts, and sent out teams of campaign workers to help the election canvassing. It is difficult to find out exactly who belonged to the association, but we can get some idea of its potential strength from the report of an association ral ly held in Tokyo on February 1 7 , 1 9 1 5 . It was attended not only by many persons connected with Waseda, but also by the leaders and many of the members of the government parties ; all the Cabinet members save for the army and navy ministers ; the governor ' of Tokyo prefecture ; the mayor of Tokyo City; the president of the Tokyo City Assembly; the president of each ward assembly in Tokyo ; members of the Tokyo

260

NOTES TO PAG E S 91 -95

Chamber of Commerce, the Foreign Trade Association, and the Stock. Exchange. This was quite an impressive assemblage. O tsu, VII, 5 I I -5 I 2 . Of the 2 7 candidates who stood for election as members of the O kuma Koenkai , only I 2 succeeded in winning a Diet seat. On the eve of the 2 7 th Diet they j oined with several dozen independent Diet mem bers to form the Koyu Club, a pro­ government group. The new group was made up of former Waseda graduates and old proteges of O kuma who had succeeded in business or some other profession, as well as several men connected with O ura ( l ike Shimooka Chuj i and Kaneko Gen­ saburo ) . Most of the members of the Koyu Club ( 7 2 percent) had never been elected to the Diet before ; most of them ( 7 2 percent) also had some business connect ion. I I . A case in point was O kuma's atti tude toward the formation of the Doshikai and the conduct of the Movement to Protect Constitutional Government. He enthus­ iastically supported Inukai and Ozaki in their extraparliamentary campaign agai nst Katsura, yet at the same time gave public support to Katsura in the work of form ing the Doshikai. I 2 . Takahashi Seigo, Gendai no seito ( Contemporary pol i tical parties ; Tokyo, I 93 0 ) , pp. 366-367 . I 3 . Kato campaigned only in his home province of Nagoya, but Wakatsuki and Ozaki made campaign tours to many other areas . I 4. Okuma Ko hachiju gonen sh i (A history of Marquis O kuma's eighty years ; Tokyo, I 9 26), III, 2 1 7 - 2 2 8 ; O tsu, VII, 5 I 2 -5 I 3 ; Wakatsuki, Kofoan kaikoroku, pp. 2 2 7 ff. I 5 . Hara Kei nikki, VI, 1 7 2 , Nov. 4, I 9 I 4 ; see also ibid., VI, 2 2 I , Jan. I O , I 9 I 5 ; VI, 2 2 6-2 2 7 , Jan. 2 5 , I 9 I 5 . I 6 . Segai Inoue Ko den, V, 3 6 I -362 . q . Ito, II, 49· I 8. Shinobu, Taisho demokurash ii shi, I, 3 2 7-330; Segai Inoue Ko den, V, 374-376. I9. Ibid., pp. 389-390, Oka, Kindai Nihon no seijika, p. I 3 6 . 2 0 . T h e rapprochement was more apparent than real. Inoue publicly complai ned of Kato's action to the newspapers in December I 9 1 4· Segai Inoue Ko den, V, 4 I 0-4 I r . 2 I . Ishida Yoshio, " O kuma roko to taishi gaiko : iwayuru nij u ikka m andai o meguritte," O kuma kenkyu, Vol . 5 (October I 954), passim. 2 2 . Wakatsuki, Kofoan kaikoroku, pp. 2 2 I - 2 2 2 . 2 3 . Ibid., pp. 2 I 9- 2 2 I ; Ito, II, 26-28. 24 . Hara Kei nikkz; VI, 2 5 3 - 2 5 6 ; Ito, I, 2 3-2 5 ; Wakatsuki , Kofoan kaikoroku, pp. 2 2 3 - 2 2 6 ; Oka, Yamagata A ritomo, pp. I 4 2 - I 43 · 2 5 . On June 24 and 2 5 , Yamagata, Inoue, Matsukata, and O yama m e t with O kuma to discuss foreign affairs. The main points covered in the discussion were the following: ( I ) in order to prevent the anti-Japanese movement in China from becoming more intense, the best policy would be to remove from office the persons responsible for this state of affairs, that is, Kato; (2) on all major questions of foreign pol icy the cabinet should not decide matters by i tself without soliciting the opinions of the genro ; (3) as a result of the World War, Russia was asking Japan to enter into an alliance ; si nce this was a piece of great good fortune for Japan, she should consent to the negotiations. On every point, including the question of the Russian

261

NOTES TO PAG E S 95-99

alliance, the genro were absolutely at odds with the foreign minister. Ito, II, 44-50. 2 6 . Wakatsuki and Yashiro resigned because Kato did. Wakatsuki, Kofoan kaikoroku, p. 239. Sengoku, Hamaguchi, and possibly Adachi did so for the same reason. Shi mooka probably resigned because of his connection with O ura and his strained relations with Yamagata. For details of the resignation, see Shinobu , TaishO demo­ kurashii shz; I, 332 ; Oka, Kindai Nihon no seUika, p. I 4 3 ; Ito, II, 40-54 ; O tsu, VII, 66o-662 ; Segai Inoue Ko den, V, 42 0-42 3 . 2 7 . Shinobu, TaishO demokurash ii shi, I , 333-339 ; Ito, I I , 58-6 1 . 2 8 . Tokyo asahi shimbun (Aug. I 6, I 9 , 2 0, 2 5 , Sept. 7 , I 9 I 6) . Kato Sadakichi, for instance, was a member of the " busi nessmen's faction " ; he owned a company i n Manchuria and said he therefore wished to remain free of a n y connection w i t h a major party. Ibid. ( Sept. I I , I 9 I 6) . Shimooka may also have hesitated to join because O u ra and Yamagata opposed the merger idea. He was playing a double game, however. He sent a memorial to Yamagata praising Kato's character and ability, probably in hopes that Kato would be asked to form the new government. At various times Shimooka worked for a Kato-Terauchi cabinet, an extension of the O kuma cabinet, and a Kato cabinet based on a maj ority in the House of Representatives and support in the House of Peers. In short, he seemed to be working for any kind of cabinet that would be friendly to the Koyii Club. Sankokai, Sanko Shimooka Chuji den ( The biography of Shi rJ].ooka Chiij i ; Tokyo, I 930 ), pp. 1 08- I I I , I 2 7- I 30 . 2 9 . Shi nobu, TaishO seUishz; I , 2 79-285 . 3 0 . Hattori , II, 94· 3 1 . Oka, Kindai Nihon no seUika, pp. 1 45- I 46 . 3 2 . Matsumoto Gokichi , Taisho demokurashii ki no seiji: Matsumoto Gokichi seUi nisshi ( Politics during the era of Taisho democracy : The political diary of Matsumoto Gokichi ; Tokyo, I 959), Oka Yoshitake and H ayashi Shigeru, pp. 1 7 - 2 I ; Oka, Kindai Nihon no seij.ika, p . I 53 · 3 3 · Yokoyama Shotaro, ed . , Kenseikai sh i (The history o f the Kenseikai ; Tokyo, I 9 2 6 ) , pp. 25-2 7 ; Ito, II, 2 39 - 243. 34· Ibid., pp. 247-250. According to Adachi's account, Ozaki as well as Kato and the rest of the party leadership had hesitated to attack the cabinet for fear of a dissolution. Ozaki argued that the best policy would be to "surround the cabinet at a distance" and gradually close in on it. Subsequently, Ozaki went to Kyushu on a speaking tour. He soft-pedalled his anti-Terauchi theme in a speech at Nagasaki and did not get much applause. He changed his approach at Sasebo and increased his attacks on Terauchi at Saga and Fukuoka, this time drawing a l ively �esponse and much applause. By the time he had returned to Tokyo he was an advocate of a strong and radical attack on Terauchi . Adachi , A dachi Kenzo jij.oden, pp. I 50- I 5 3 · There was also strong sentiment in t h e rank a n d fi l e . O n e group of younger party members even proposed to petition the emperor directly to protest the "unconstitu­ tional " installation of Terauchi as premier. Yokoyama, Kenseikai shi, pp. 25-2 7 . For further details, see Adachi , A dachi Kenzo jij"oden; Tiikyo asahi shimbun Oan. I O- I 3 , I 5 , 1 7-20, I 9 I 7)3 5 · Hara Kei nikkz; VII, I 8 , Oct. I , I 9 I 6.

262

NOTES TO PAG ES 1 00-1 08

36. Shinobu, TaishO demokurashii shi, II, 380-384. 37· Hara Kei nikki, VII, passim. On February 9 , 1 9 1 7 , Hara met with Arimatsu Eigi, the chief of the Legal Affairs Bureau, to draw up an arrangement for election tactics. The agreement reached by the two men provided : ( 1 ) that the government and the Seiyukai consult on the selection of " neutral " candidates ; ( 2 ) that the Seiyukai give a list of the candidates it supported to the governmen t ; (3) that the government was not to give financial aid to candidates of the Seiyukai or those nonparty candi­ dates supported by the Seiyukai ; (4) that the government was to report to the Seiyukai any aid it gave Seiyukai candidates in contravention of the preceding; (5) that the government was to give no aid, tangible or intangible, to candidates who broke with the Seiyukai ; and (6) that because the Kenseikai would rely on money, that is, bribery, as its principal weapon, election practices would be rigorously supervised . Evidently the government was not able to abide by these conditions, since its aims of building up a " neutral " faction and its aims of abetting the Seiyukai often conflicted. 38. Japan Chronicle ( Mar. 28, 1 9 1 8) . 3 9 · Hara Kei nikkl; VII, 3 8 0 , Apr. q , 1 9 I 8 . 40 . Yokoyama, Kenseikai shi, p. I 2 4 ; Kimbara Sam on, "Nihon seito seij i no seiritsu o meguru mondaisei" (The nature of the problem surrounding the establishment of party government in Japan ) , Nihon rekishi, No. I 48 : 46-48 , 50-5 I (October I 96o) . 4 I . Shortly after Hara became premier, Maeda Renzan remarked that Yamagata had finally "opened his eyes" in nominating Hara for the office. Hara replied, "It was the rice riots, you know. If our party had carried on agi tation then, it surely would have been something. Even Yamagata realized that a bureaucratic cabinet would have been powerless. " Maeda, Hara Kei den, II, 336. 4 2 . Hara Kei nikk1; VII, 454 , July 2 0 , I 9 I 8 . 43· Matsumoto, entry of Sept. 8, q , I 9 I 8 , pp. 23-24. 44· Hara Kei nikk1; VII, 458. 45 · Oka, Kindai Nihon no seijika, pp. I I S - I q . Hara was able to handle mem bers of the oligarchic generation very wel l . Yamagata's reaction was probably not very different from that of Miura Gor6, who remarked, " Hara has done plenty of bad things, but he's not an insi ncere fellow like Kat6 or Inukai. He's friendly and a splendid fellow . " Matsumoto, June 2 3 , 1 92 1 , p. 1 05 . 46. Irie Kan'ichi, Yamagata Ko n o omokage (The image o f Pri nce Yamagata; Tokyo, 1 92 2 ) , pp. I 9 2 - 1 93 · 4 7 · Matsumoto, Oct . 8, 1 9 1 8 , pp. 32 - 33 ; Shinobu, TaishO demokurashii shi, I, 68- 7 0 . 4 8 . Hara Kei nikk1; V I I , 478-479, Aug. 2 0 , 1 9 1 8 . 49 · Ibid., VII, 459-460 , July 2 7 , 1 9 1 8 . 50. Ibid., VIII, 26-29, Sept. 2 5 , I 9 1 8 . 5 1 . Ibid. NOTES TO CHAPTER V 1 . Chua koron, 3 2 . I O " I (October 1 9 1 8) . 2 . ] . 0. P. Bland, China, Japan, and Korea ( New York, 1 9 2 1 ) , p. 1 7 7 .

263

NO TES TO PAG E S 1 1 0- 1 1 8

3 · Yoshino Sakuzo, " M i nshu teki j i i undo o ronzu" (On popular demonstrations) ,

Chua koran, 28.4 :go (April 1 g 1 4) . 4 · Osaka asahi shimbun (Aug. 2 2 , 1 g 1 g) . 5 · Bland, p p . 1 3g- I 40 . 6. In a later recollection Baba Tsunego remarked, "The European War seemed to mark the victory of democracy. When the empires i n Germany, Austria, and Russia fel l to pieces and victory lay with the democratic countries l ike England and America, throughout the world voices cried out for the omnipotence of democracy . . . I t was a time when even the Bolshevik Revolution was misunderstood as the victory of democracy . . . The talk of democracy grew ever more excited. " Baba Tsunego,Jijoden (Autobiography ; Tokyo, 1 g48) , p. 8 7 . 7 · For detai ls o n the organization and development of the Reimeikai, see Sakai Toshihiko, " Reimeikai to Yuaikai to Kaizo Domei" (The Reimeikai , the Yuaikai , and the Kaizo Domei) , Kaiho ( November I g i g) , pp. 1 4- 1 5 ; Kim ura H isaichi , " Reimeikai t o reimei undo" (The Reimeikai and the movement for enl ightenment), Yuben, I 0 .5 : 3 7 -5 I ( I g i g) ; Bernard S. Silberman, "The Poli tical Theory of Yoshino Sakuzo," Journal of Modern History, 3 1 .4 : 3 I 0-324 ( December I g5g) ; Wal ter Scott Perry, "Yoshino Sakuzo, I 873- I g3 3 : Exponent of Democratic Ideals in Japan , " Ph.D. thesis (Stanford , I g56) , pp. 1 o6ff. ; Kikugawa Tadao, Gakusei shakai undo shi ( A history of student social movements ; Tokyo, I g4 7 ) , pp. 58-5g ; Japan Chronicle Uan. 2, I g i g) , p. g . 8 . For details o n the Kaizo Domeikai, see Sakai ; japan Chronicle (Aug. I 4 , I g i g) , p. 2 7 2 ; Baba Tsunego, Gendai jimbutsu hyoron (Comments on contem porary figures ; Tokyo, I g3o), pp. 25-30 ; Nagashima Ryuj i , Seikai kakushin no setsu (Views on the reformation of the pol itical worl d ; Tokyo, I g 2 7 ) , pp. g4-g6, I 2 6- I 2 8 . The Kaizo Domeikai 's program included the fol lowing proposal s : ( I ) establishment of universal suffrage ; ( 2 ) abolition of the distinctions between kazoku, sh izoku, and heimin; (3) abo­ li tion of "bureaucratic diplomacy " ; (4) establ ishment of a democratic (minponteki) pol itical organization ; (5) legal ization of trade unions ; (6) "guarantee of the people's liveli hood " (kokumin seikatsu no hosho) ; (7) "social reform of the tax system " ; (8) " the emancipation of formalistic education " ; (g) reform of colonial ad ministration ; ( I o) reform of the Imperial Household Departmen t ; ( I I ) reform of the existing poli tical parties. g. O yama Ikuo, "Gendai Nihon ni okeru seij i teki shinka to sono shakaiteki haikei," (Political evolution in contemporary Japan and its background), Chua koran, 3 3 · I :20 Uanuary I g i 8) . I O . Uehara Etsuj i ro, Demokurashii t o Nihon n o kaizo ( Democracy and t h e reconstruc­ tion of Japan ; Tokyo, I g i g) , pp. I -6. I I. For detailed analysis of Yoshino's views on minponshugi, see Silberman, "Yoshino Sakuzo" ; Perry, passim; Hayashi Shigeru , Kindai Nihon no shisokatachi (Thi nkers of modern Japan; Tokyo, I g 6 I ), pp. I 07- I 6o ; Tanaka Sogoro, Yoshino Sakuzo (Tokyo, I g58). I 2 . Nagai Ryutaro, " I nnai no gikai to ingai no gikai " (The Diet within the Diet and the Diet outside the Diet) , Chua koran, 2 8 + I 2 5 (April I g i 4) .

264

NOTES TO PAG E S 1 1 8- 1 28

I 3 . Cf. O yama Ikuo, " Seitokai no kinj o to wagakuni kensei no zento" ( Recent condi tions in the world of pol itical parties and the future of our constitutional pol itics), Chuo koron, 3 2 . 3 : I 9 - 2 3 ( February I 9 J 7 ) . I 4 . C f. remarks b y Nagai Ryu tar6 in "Shingikaishugi o teish6 s u " (In advocacy of a new parliamentarianism), Chuo koron, 36. I :95 - I I I (January I 9 2 I ) . I 5 . C f. Tenko ( Ideological conversion ; Tokyo, I 96 2 ) , I, 98. I 6 . H atoyama Ichiro commented in his autobiography, "Despite the fact that at the onset of the Meij i forties ( I 907 - I 9 I 2 ) the fortunes of the country had come to a period of prosperous ascendance, one might make the observation that the stability of society was gradually making the scale of human beings smaller. The era of the mediocre man ( bonjin jidai) , which must naturally fol low the era of the hero, had come. The curtain was gradually coming down on men large in scale, the heroes of the disordered world of Meij i . " Hatoyama Ichiro, Watakushi no jijoden, ( My auto­ biography; Tokyo, I 95 I ) , p. 2 39 · 1 7 . Cf. t h e statistics cited in Karasawa Tomitar6, Gakusei n o rekishi ( A history o f students; Tokyo, I 95 5 ) , p p . I 63- I 67 . These figures are for high school students, but it is reasonable to assume there were simi lar statistical trends among university students as wel l . I 8 . T h e first issue of Demokurashii, t h e Shinj i nkai magazine, revealed a n enthusiastic eclecticism. The fol lowing is a partial table of contents ; "The Mission of the Young Educated Classes, " " Perpetual Peace, " " Popular Voting in Swi tzerland , " "The Road to the Emancipation of the Working Class," "The Principle of Suffrage Rights," "The First Principle of Democracy, " " Socialism and Social Movements," and " Russian Nihilism . " Subsequent issues carried articles on everyone from Abraham Lincoln to Rosa Luxembourg. See Kikugawa, pp. 73-75 . I 9 . Tenko, I, 70-74. 2 0 . Kikugawa, p . 75· 2 I . Quoted in Tenko, I, 86. 2 2 . Perry, p. 9 7 · 2 3 . F o r the early development of t h e Yuaikai see Matsuo Takayoshi, "Yuaikai no hatten katei" (The process of development of the Yuaikai) , Shirin, 40.6 : I 34- I 6 I (November I 95 7 ) ; Akamatsu Katsumaro, Nihon shakai undo shi ( A history o f social movements in Japan ; Tokyo, I 949) , pp. I 3 I - I 34, I 4 I - I 44 · 24. Japan Chronicle ( Sept. 2 6 , I 9 I 8) , p. 440 . 2 5 . Akamatsu, p. I 90. 26. Japan Chronicle (Aug. 2 I , I 9 I 9) , p . 2 7 5 . 2 7 . Watanabe Toru, Gendai Nihon rono undo sh i nempyo (A chronology o f labor and peasant movements in contemporary J apan ; Tokyo, 1 96 I ) , pp. 5 2 -5 5 . 2 8 . SOdomei gojunen s h i (Fifty years of t h e General Federation of Labor; Tokyo, I 964) , I, I o78- 1 079· 29. Akamatsu, pp. I 59- I 62 ; Okochi Kazuo, Labor in Modern japan (Tokyo, I 958) pp. 43-44· 30. japan Chronicle ( Sept. 26, I 9 I 8) , p . 440 . 3 1 . japan Weekry Mail ( Mar. 2 5 , I 9 I I ) , pp. 3 I 5-3 I 6 ; Sato Hiroshi , Democracy and

265

N OTE S TO PAG E S 1 29- 1 40

the japanese Government (New York, I g2o), p. 50. For the history of the early suffrage movement see Akamatsu, pp. I r o- I I I ; Sekiguchi Yasushi , Senkyo tokuhon (An election pri mer; Tokyo, I 936) , p. I 8 ; Hirano Yoshitaro, Minken undo no hatten (The development of the popular rights movement ; Tokyo, I 948), p. I 67 ; Hirano Yoshitaro, Nakamura Taihachiro den (The biography of Nakam ura Taihachiro ; Tokyo, I 938), passim. 3 2 . Imai Yoshiyuki , " Senkyoken kakucho undo no kyiimu" (The urgent need for a movement to expand suffrage rights), Shin Nippon, 7 . 6 : I 3- I 6 Qune I 9 I 7 ) . 3 3 · Shinobu, Taisho seiji shz; p p . 866-86 7 . 3 4 · Ibid., p p . 540-54 1 . 35 · Uehara, pp. I 54- I 5 7 · 36. Yoshino Sakuzo, " Futsii senkyo n o shomondai " (Various problems concerning un iversal suffrage), in Yoshino Sakuzo Hakushi minshushugi ronshu ( A collection of essays on democracy by Yoshino Sakuzo ; Tokyo, I 948) , II, I 84- I 85 . 3 7 · From a n article entitled, "Seikatsu t o futsii senkyo" (Universal suffrage and livelihood) , Rodo oyobi sangyo ( Labor and industry; April I g i g) , quoted i n Shinobu, Taisho demokurashii shi, II, 5 0 2 . 38. Ibid., I I , 540-54 1 . 39· Shinobu, Taisho seiji shz; p. 8 7 7 .

NOTES T O CHAPTER V I r . Nakakoj i Ren, "Doitsu no seihai " (The defeat of Germany) , Taiyo, 24. I 4 :8 I -8 2 ( December I g i 8) . 2 . Quoted in Japan Chronicle (Sept. 5 , I g i 8) , p. 338. 3 · Maeda, Hara Kei den, II, 3 65 . 4· Details o n the measures and tactics pursued b y Hara in his premiership may be found in ibid., II, passim; Hara Kei nikki, VII, VII, IX; Shinobu, TaishO seiji shi,

passim. 5 · Hara Kei zenshu, II, 908. 6 . Maeda, Hara Kei den, II, 3 68-369 . 7 · Kataoka Naoharu, Taisho ShOwa seiji sh i no ichi dammen (Tokyo, I 934), p. 2 ! 0 . 8 . Baba, Gendai jimbutsu hyoron, p. 3 5 · g . Cf. t h e remarks of Wakatsuki Reij iro, Kofoan kaikoroku, pp. 256- 2 5 7 . r o . Kobayashi Ushisaburo and Kitazaki Susumu, Meiji Taisho zaiseishi ( F inancial history of the Meij i and Taisho periods; Tokyo, I 9 2 7 ) , I , 400-408 . I I . Examples are described in Ando Otosaburo, Seiyukai zaiaku sh i (A h istory of the vices of the Seiyukai ; Tokyo, I g i g) ; Kensez; Vol . 2 , No. 7 ( August I 9 I g) . For a detailed treatment of what happened in one prefecture, O ita, see Nagano Kiyoshi, O ita-ken seito shi (A history of poli tical parties in O ita prefecture ; O ita City, I g 26), pp. 562-563, 597-60 7 , 664-665 . I 2 . Hara Kei zenshu, I I , go8 . I 3 . Ibid., I, I I 2 6- I I 2 7 . I 4. Hara Ke i nikkz; VIII, 45 3 , Jan. I 9 , I 92 0 . I 5 . Ibid., VIII, 458 , Jan. I 3 , I 9 2 0 .

266

NOTES TO PAG ES 1 4 1 - 1 47

I 6. Quoted in Shinobu, TaishO demokurashii shi, II, 5 2 1 . I 7 . O hara shakai mandai kenkyiijo, TaishO hach i nen Nihon rodo nenkan Oapan labor yearbook, I 9 I 9 ; Tokyo, I 9 2 0 ) , p . 848 . I 8. See, for example, Hara Kei zenshu, I, I I 26. I9. TaishO hach i nen Nihon rodo nenkan, pp. 853ff. 2 0 . O hara shakai mandai kenkyiij o , Taisho ju nen Nihon rodo nenkan Oapan labor yearbook, I 9 2 0 ; Tokyo, I 9 2 I ) , pp. 70-80 . 2 1 . Hara Kei nikki, IX, 4 7 7 -478, Oct. 2 I , I 92 1 . 2 2 . Ibid., VI, 8 3 , July 9 , I 9 I 4 . 2 3 . Wakatsuki Reij i ro, " Sengo no zaisei o ronzu" (A discussion of postwar finances), Kensei, 2 . I : 2 o Oanuary I 9 I 9 ) · 2 4 . Tomita Koj i ro, " Shiso oyobi genron mandai " (The problem o f ideas and public speech ) , Kensei, 2. I :50-53 Oanuary I 9 I 9) · 2 5 . Taketomi Tokitoshi " Sengo n o siisei to taiosaku " ( Postwar trends and how to deal with them), Kensei, 2 . I : 26-3o Oanuary I 9 I 9) · 2 6 . Tomita; Kataoka Naoharu, " Sengo n o dai kessan, " Kensez� 2 : 36-40 (January I 9 I 9) · 2 7 . Ito, II, 298-30 2 . 2 8 . Kataoka, " Sen go n o dai kessan, " Kensei, 2 : 36-40 . 29. Taketomi. 3 0 . Kataoka, " Sengo no dai kessan ," Kensei, 2 : 36-40 ; Kataoka Naoharu, "Yon daiseiko to wa nan zo ya" (What is the four-plank program? ) , Kensei, 2 . 9 : 30-35 ( December I 9 I 9) · 3 1 . Hamaguchi Yiiko, " Kokumin seikatsu n o kiki " (The crisis in the people's livelihood ) , Kensez� 2 . 7 : 2 8 (July I 9 I 9) . 3 2 . Ito, I I , 302-303. 3 3 · Ibid., II, 304. 34· In November I 9 I 4 the newspapers reported that the Home Ministry of the O kuma cabi net had under discussion a revision of the electoral law aimed at increasing the number of Diet seats i n proportion to population increases since I 900, at lowering the tax qualification of voters from ¥ 1 0 to ¥5 , and at proh ibiting the personal solicitation of votes. Cf. Kokumin shimbun ( Dec. I , I 9 I 4) ; Tokyo asahi shimbun (Nov. 30, I 9 I 4) . Nothing seems to have come of this, but throughout the remainder of the cabinet various legislative proposals for reducing election corruption were discussed within the Home and the Justice Ministries. Finally, in July I 9 I 6, Ichigi Kitokuro, the home minister, made public a draft bill which provided for an increase in the number of Diet seats and outlined stricter regulations for the supervision and control of elections ; there was no provision for expanding the suffrage, however. There were some members of the Doshikai , most of them former Kokuminto men, who wished that some provision be made for lowering the tax qualifications, but the party leadership did not wish to differ in its policy from the O kuma cabinet and agreed only to support the government proposal. The cabinet fell before the bill was presented in the Diet and no more was heard of the matter until the 40th Diet i n I 9 I 8 . See Osaka mainichi shimbun ( Apr. I 9 , I 9 I 5 ) ; Tokyo asahi sh imbun O u l y I 9 , I 9 I 6) ; Chugai shogyo shimbun Ouly I 9 , I 9 I 6) .

267

NOTES TO PAG ES 1 48- 1 50

In 1 9 1 8 the Terauchi government introduced a bill which, l ike the one discussed under the O kuma cabinet, provided only for an increase in the number of Diet seats and stricter control of elections. The three parties introduced bills which provided for lowering of the tax quali fication as wel l ; the Seiyukai , however, proposed to institute the small election district and to put into effect a provision that votes be counted at the place of polling rather than mixed and counted together with ballots from all over a single district. Both these innovations were, of course, designed to make the management of elections easier for the party. When i t became evident to the Kenseikai and the Kokuminto that their bills were not going to pass the Diet, they decided to throw their support behind the government bill. Because the Seiyukai did not have an absolute maj ority i t could not preven t this. Rather than resort to frontal opposition on the electoral reform issue, the Seiyukai pressured the govern­ ment into withdrawing its bill by threatening to vote against the government's other legislation , i ncluding the Industrial Mobil ization B i l l . Yokoyama, Kenseikai shz� pp. 76-80, 8 2 -84; Seki Kazutomo, "Gumbatsu seij i ron ( A discussion of m i l itary clique government ) , Kensei, 1 . 3 : 2 4 ( October 1 9 1 8) . The Japan Chronicle remarked that the episode had a Gilbert and Sullivan logic about it; the government, assured of the passage of its bill, had to withdraw i t for that very reason. Japan Chronicle ( Mar. 2 8 , 1 9 1 8) , pp. 499-500. 35 · Ibid. Oan. 30, 1 9 1 9) , p . 1 58 ; ibid. ( Mar. 6, 1 9 1 9) , pp. 353-35 4 ; Kondo, pp. 48-5 1 . 36. Shinobu, Taisho seijz shz� pp. 858-86 1 . 3 7 · Ibid., p. 85 7 . 3 8 . Cf. the attitudes expressed b y the members o f the Kenseikai ingaidantai (extra parliamentary association) in February 1 9 1 9 ; quoted i n Kensei, 2 . 2 . : 6 1 -62 ( February 1 9 1 9) . 3 9 · Ozaki Yukio, Ozaki Gakudo zenshu, (The col lected works o f Ozaki Yukio ; Tokyo, 1 95 5 ) , XI, 594-96, 598-6o 1 ; Shinobu, Taisho seiji shz� pp. 865 -866, 88o . 40. Japan Chronicle ( Feb. 1 3 , 1 9 1 9) , p. 238. During the debate on the question of electoral reform in the Kenseikai 's Political Affairs Investigation Board , the main arguments seemed to turn on the i rrationality of the tax qualification. First of all , it was argued that changi ng circumstances within t h e country had made tax qualifi­ cations on the suffrage both arbitrary and illogical . As originally conceived by Ito H i robumi , the tax qualification had been intended to restrict the vote to those with some understanding of political affairs, but because education had spread and the intelligence of the people had improved since his day, i t was absurd to j udge poli tical competence on the basis of tax payments. Furthermore, i f the right to vote was regarded as remuneration for the obligation to pay taxes, then the continued existence of tax qualifications was even more absurd . The whole of the people were not only obliged to pay indirect taxes on such daily necessi ties as food, clothing, and trans­ portation, many were also required to serve in the army under the compulsory copscription requirement ; there was no consistency in denying these men the vote. See Kensei, 2 . 2 : 34-40 ( February 1 9 1 9) . 4 1 . A detailed account of the debate o n suffrage reform within the Kenseikai may be found in ibid.

268

NOTES TO PAG ES 1 50- 1 57

42. 43· 44 · 45 ·

Ito, II, 330.

Hara Kei nikki; VIII, J 70 , Mar. 5 , I g i g . C f. Hara's remarks t o Yam agata in Hara Kei nikki, IV, 4 I 7 . M aeda, Hara Kei den, I I , 7 , I 55 - I 56.

46. Adachi K-enzo, " Senkyoho kaisei mandai " (The problem of reforming the electoral l aw) , Kensei, 2 . I : 6o-6 I Qanuary I g i g) . 47 · Koj ima Kazuo, Seikai gojunen: Kojima Kazuo kaikoroku, p. I 2 2 . 48. Interview o f Fuj isawa Ikunosuke, Dec. 2 , I 938. Typescript, Kensei Shiryo Hensanshitsu, National Diet Library, Tokyo. 49 · Ito, II, 333-335 · 5 0 . Shinobu, Taisho seiji shi, pp. 8g i -8g 2 . s r . Ito, I I , 338-339· 5 2 . Hara Kei nikki, VIII, 502, Mar. 5 , I g 2 o . 5 3 · I t o , II, 3 39-34 1 . 54· Ibid., II, 370-3 7 4 ; Hara Kei nikkz� IX, 247 , Mar. I I , I 9 2 ! . 5 5 · Ito, II, 343 · s6. Ibid., pp. 342 -343 ; Sasaoka Heisuke, O take Kan 'ichi sensei shOden (A short biography of C> take Kan 'ich i ; Tokyo, I 95 3 ) , pp. J 7 6ff. 5 7 . A total of I 9 I votes was necessary to secure an absol u te majority. The Seiyukai with its I 63 seats could defeat any of the opposition party bills separately, but were the opposition parties to band together they could muster I 72 votes and would need the support of only I9 uncomm i t ted members to get a unified suffrage bill through the Lower House. 58. Imai Yoshiyuki, " Senkyoken kakucho undo no kyumu" (The urgent need for a movement to expand suffrage rights) , Shin Nippon, 7 . 6 : I 3- I 6 (June I g q ) . 5 9 · Shinobu, TaishO demokurashii shi, I I , 5 4 I . 6o. This account is based on Sasaoka, pp. I 93- I g6 ; Hirota Shotaro, Fusen undo sh i oyobi fusen no kokoroe (The h istory of the universal suffrage movement and the understanding of universal suffrage ; Tokyo, I 9 2 5 ) , pp. 83-85 ; Koizumi Mataj iro, Fusen undo hishi (The secret history of the universal suffrage movement ; Tokyo, I g 28), pp. I 9- 2 5 . 6 r . Sasaoka, p p . 1 76-2 I 6 ; Fusen sanj u shunen kinenkai , Sanseiken kakuchoshiko (Historical summary of the expansion of the right to vote ; Tokyo, I 95 7 ) , pp. I 67 - I g8 . 62 . F o r Hara's meditations on t h e problem of universal suffrage and t h e dissolution of the Diet see Baba, Gendai jimbutsu hyoron, pp. 30-3 7 ; Okazaki, pp. I 64- I 65 ; Hara Kei nikki, VIII, 374, Nov. 3 , I g i g ; ibid., pp. 3 76-3 7 7 , Nov. 6, I g i g ; ibid., pp. 48 2 -483, Feb. I I , I g 2 o ; ibid., pp. 486-48 7 , Feb. IS, I g2 o ; and especially pp. 49 2 -49 3 , Feb. 2 0 , I g 2 o , which outl ines Hara's argument to the cabinet on the necessity of dissolving the Diet on the universal suffrage question. Shinobu Seisaburo, Ishida Takesh i , and others have taken a somewhat harsher view of Hara's decision to dissolve the Diet by suggesting that he was not only unalterably opposed to universal suffrage but that he fe ared its possible effects. This view is based in large part on Hara's statement to Yamagata on Octo her 2 I , I g 2 o , that a mistake i n the timing of universal suffrage would "wreck the country . " He said to Yam agata, "The danger of putting universal suffrage into effect is not in the towns and villages [ t Q._a t is, the countryside] ; it is

269

NOTES TO PAG E S 1 57-1 68

in the cities. Furthermore, from ancient ti mes revolutions have occurred in capital cities, and if universal suffrage were to take place suddenly, Tokyo would become an arena of disorder . "

Hara Kei nikki, IX, I I O , Oct. 2 I , I 92 0 ; ibid., p. I 3 I , Nov. I 2 , 1 9 2 0 . The forcefulness o f this statement derives less from Hara's fear o f revolution than from a desire to humor Yamagata. But both Shinobu and Ishida argue that

the main reason for the in terest of the pol iticians i n universal suffrage was the panic of the ruling class in the face of the " mass awakening" and both have seized on this statement to buttress their argument. 63. Quoted in Matsum ura, p. I 90 . 6 4 . Japan Chronicle ( Mar. 8 , I 9 2 3 ) , p. 338. It managed to collect I 2 ,ooo of these petitions according to Shinobu, Taishii seiji sh i, p. 9 2 1 . 65 . Details on the incident may be found in Japan Chronicle ( Mar. 24, I 9 2 I ) , pp. 40 2 -403 ; Itii, II, 368-374; Hara Kei nikki, IX, 248- 250, Mar. I 4, I 5 , q, I9, 2 0 , I 9 2 I ; Uchida, pp. 66-70. 66. Akam atsu, pp. 1 74- 1 75 · 67 . Ibid., p p . 2 0 2 -204, 2 I 3 -2 I 4, 238-239; Japan Chronicle (Apr. 7 , I 92 I ) , p . 4 7 8 ; Shinobu, Taisho demokurashii shi, II, 6 I 5 -6 I 8. 68 . On the transformation of the Shinj inkai see Henry D. Smith, "The Shinj i nkai ( 1 9 1 8- I 9 2 1 ) : The Making of an Intelligentsia," Papers on Japan, 3 : I 62 - 2 I 2 ( Harvard University, East Asian Rese\lrch Center, I 965 ) ; see also Kikugawa, passim. 69 . Akam atsu, pp. I 7 7 - I 7 8 . 7 0 . Kikugawa, p. 280. T h e decline of b o t h student a n d working-class interest in the suffrage movement is deftly analyzed in Ishida Takeshi, Kindai Nihon seiji kozo no kenkyu, pp. I 85- I 94·

NOTES TO CHAPTER VII 1 . Matsumoto, entry of June 2, I 9 2 I , p. 309. Ibid., Mar. 9 , 1 9 2 2 , p . I 4 2 . 3 · Harada Kumao, Saionji-Ko to seikyoku ( Prince Saionj i and the pol itical situation ; Tokyo, I 950- I 95 2 ) , I, 2 2 0 . 4 · For details of the selection of Takahashi as prem ier, see Matsumoto, Nov. 9 , 1 9 2 I , p. I 2 6 ; Oka Yoshitake, "Taishii demokurashii no kitei (The foundations o f Taishii democracy), Sekai, N o . J 7 I : I 92 ( M arch I 96o) . 5 · Matsumoto, Mar. 2 8 , 1 9 2 2 , p. I 4 7 ; Apr. 2 2 , I 9 2 2 , p. I 5 I ; Apr. 24, I � 2 2 , p. I 5 3 ; May 2 , I 9 2 2 , pp. I 54- I 55 ; Ish igami Ryiihei, Hara Kei botsugo ( After the death of Hara Kei ; Tokyo, I 96o) , pp. 2 2 -48. 6 . Matsumoto, Mar. 28, 1 9 2 2 , p . 1 4 7 . 7 · Hara Kei nikki, VIII, 58 I , June 3 1 , 1 9 2 0 ; Matsumoto, passim. 8. Ibid., June 6, 1 9 2 2 , p. 1 74 · , 9· Ibzd., July 2 2 , I 9 2 2 , p. I 94 ; I t ii , II, 399 , 405-40 7 . z.

I O . M aeda Renzan speculates' that Matsukata's proposal t o Katii Kiimei was merely a ploy designed by Kiyou ra to pacify Kenseikai discontent and to intimidate the Seiyukai into supporting Katii Tomosaburii. See Maeda Renzan, Rekidai naikaku

270

NOTES TO PAG E S 1 68- 1 73

monogatari (The story of the cabinets ; Tokyo, 1 96 1 ) , pp. 363-364. However, in view of the fact that Kiyoura had originall y recommended Katii Kiimei to Matsukata before he suggested Katii Tomosaburii, it is doubtful that Kiyoura was as Machi­ avellian as Maeda suggests. It is clear that Kiyoura realized the difficulty of running the government without support i n the Diet and that he originally recommended Katii Kiimei for this reason. See Matsumoto, J une 8 , I 9 2 2 , p. I 79 ; June I 2 , I 9 2 2 , p. I 85 . I I . Katii Tomosaburo apparently wished t o appoin t Tokonami a s home minister and have him assist i n the selection of other cabinet mem bers, but despite Tokonami's willingness to do so, the rest of the Seiyiikai leadership did not like the idea. For one thing, they feared that the participation of a Seiyiikai leader in the cabinet might prej udice the party's chances of returning to office at the next change of governmen t ; furthermore, if t h e party were to provide ministers, i t would want to provide more than the home minister, the only portfolio Katii was willing to give to the party. For details on the selection of the Katii Tomosaburii cabinet, see Matsumoto, pp. 1 7 2 - I 88, esp. I 84ff. ; Maeda Rekidai naikaku monogatari pp. 358-367 ; lshigami , pp. 58-59 ; Shinobu, Taisho sezj i shi, pp. w89- 1 09 r . I 2 . Matsumoto, Aug. I 8 , I 9 2 3 , p . 2 5 0 ; Aug. 3 I , I 92 3 , p . 2 5 5 . I 3 . F o r detai ls on t h e selection of t h e Yamamoto cabinet, see Matsumoto, p p . 245-260, e s p . pp. 2 5 7 - 2 60 ; Shinobu, Taisho seiji shz; pp. I I 04- I 1 08 . Although Katii refused to enter the cabinet, he was willing to support Yamamoto on policies that the Kenseikai had been advocating previously . I 4 . Takahashi Korekiyo, Zuisoroku ( Essays ; Tokyo, I 936) , pp. 2 I - 26. I 5 . Ibid., pp. I 2 - 1 3 . r 6 . Matsumoto, J une I 2 , I 9 2 2 , p. I 8 7 . I 7 . For the best treatment o f the internal difficulties o f the Seiyiikai see Ishigami , p p . r -86. I8. A memorandum prepared by the party leadership, probably in I 9 2 0 or I92 I , listed the fol lowing as disqualified under the " independent l ivelihood " clause : those receiving public relief, either national or local, on the grounds of poverty or the inability to earn their own living, except for government pensioners, those receiving care for war inj uries, and so forth ; those receiving assistance from private chari table organizations for the same reason ; tramps, beggars, and those without fixed employ­ ment ; those living with a brother or a father, but making no contribution to family income ; those depending on a father or brother for their livelihood without any other means of support. Undated memorandum entitled, " Dokuritsu seikei no igi" (The

independent livelihood clause), Kiino papers , 640 (64 7 ) , Kensei Shiryii Hensanshitsu, National Diet Library, Tokyo. I 9 . In November I 92 0 , the pro-suffrage elements in all the opposition parties formed the Seikai Kakushin Fusen Diimeikai ( League for Universal Suffrage and the Reform of the Pol itical World ) , the purpose of which according to its official announcement was "to overturn the status quo by means of universal suffrage, the reform of the political parties, and the establishment of a new cult ure which takes democracy as its base (minponshugi o kicho to shitaru shin bunka no kensetsu) . " Kensez; 3 . 7 :44 ( November I 92 0 ) .

271

NOTES TO PAG E S 1 74-1 79

2 0 . There is d isagreement as to Kato's position on the inclusion of the " independ­ ent livel ihood " clause. Wakatsuki suggests that Kato personally fel t that i t was j ustified and that his stubbornness in yielding on the question prevented its elimination from the bill. Cf. Wakatsuki, Kofoan kaikoroku, pp. 259-260 ; interview of Wakatsuki Reij iro, Dec. 20, 1 940, typescript, Kensei Shiryo Hensanshitsu, National Diet Library, Tokyo. Kato's biographer, on the other hand, suggests that Kato had had misgivings about the clause from the beginning, but defended it only because he fel t that the party decision on the matter should be respected. Ito, pp. 383, 385-389. 2 1 . M iki Bukich i , "Yato godo wa fuhitsuyo nari " (The merger of the opposition parties is unnecessary), Kensei koran, 1 .6 : 2 -4 ( May 192 I ) . For a similar argument see Odaki Tatsuo, " Seikai kakushin to godo mondai " (The reformation of the political world and the merger problem ) , ibid., 2 .4 : 3 2 -34 ( April I 92 2 ) . 2 2 . For details o n the formation o f the Kakushin Club, see Shinobu, Taisho demokurashii sh i, III, 75 I -763 ; Nagashima Ryuj i , Seikai kakushin no setsu, p. 1 79 ; Nagashima, Seikai hiwa ( Secret tales o f the political worl d ; Tokyo, I 9 2 8 ) , p p . 48-5 0 , I 7 3 - I 7 6 ; Washio, lnukai Bokudo den, II, 506-507 ; 549-55 I ; Koj ima Kazuo, /chi roseijika no kaiso (The recollections of one old poli tician ; Tokyo, I 95 I ) , pp. I 98-2o r . 2 3 . These hopes were clearly reflected in Kato's speeches. Cf. Ito, pp. 396-39 7 ;

Kensei, 5 . 3 :47-49 ( M arch I 9 2 2 ) . 2 4 . Odaki Tatsuo, " Inukai ,wa kensei n o yakubyogami" ( Inukai, the pol i tical god of the plague) , Kensei koran, 2 . 7 : 2 2 - 2 5 Uuly I 9 2 2 ) . 2 5 . Suzuki Fuj iya, " Seito seij i t o m i nshu undo, " Kensei koran, r .8 : I I - I 4 ( November I92 I ). 2 6 . Kensei, 5 . { : 33-35 U une I 9 2 2 ) . 2 7 . Ito, p p . 405-40 7 ; Matsumoto, June I o , I 9 2 3 , p. 2 30 ; M iura Goro, Kanju shogun kaikoroku (Tokyo, I 9 2 5 ) , pp. 538-54 2 . 28. Cf. Kensei, 5 .4 : 35 U une I 9 2 2 ) . 2 9 . Cf. M iura, p p . 538-542 . 3 0 . Cf. the bitterness of Kato's remarks on June 2 2 , I 9 2 2 , in Kensez� 5 . 4 : 2-3 Uune I922). 3 1 . Ibid., p p . 4 I -4 2 . 3 2 . For details o f the Kenseikai 's Movement for Const itutional Govern ment see Kensei, 5 + 7 - I I , 33-35 , 4 I -5 2 Uune I 9 2 2 ) ; ibid., 5 . 5 : 34-40 (August I 9 2 2 ) , Yokoyama,

Kenseikai shi, pp. 405-4 I 2 ; Shinobu, Taisho demokurashii shi, III, 7 4 2 ff. 3 3 · M atsumoto, pp. 2 2 0 , 2 2 2 , 2 2 8 , 2 3 2 , 2 4 2 , 248, 2 5 0 . 34· I t o , II, 434-435 · 35· Ibid., II, 440 ; Wakatsuki , " Sengo no zaisei o ronzu," pp. 2 7 6-2 7 8 ; Minato Kunizo, Hayami Seiji den (The biography of Hayam i Seij i ; Tokyo, I 9 3 2 ) , pp. 293-2 95 . 36. Seki Kazutomo, Kindai seiji no riso to genjztsu ( Ideal and reality in modern politics; Tokyo, I 9 2 5 ) , pp. 563-585 ; Ito, pp. 440-44 2 . , 3 7 · Tokyo asahi shimbun ( Nov. I 2 , 1 9 2 3 ) . 38. Ibid. ( Nov. I g , 2 0 , I 9 2 3 ) . ' 39· Ibid. ( Nov. 2 0 , I 9 2 3 ) ; Kensei koran, 3 . I 2 : 7 ( December I 9 2 3 ) . 40. Cf. t h e statement o f t h e Kenseikai's extra-parliamentary associa�ion ( ingaz

272

N OTES TO PAG E S 1 79-1 83

dantai) in Tokyo asah i shimbun ( Nov. 20, I 9 2 3 ) ; see also the statement of the pro-merger Diet members, ibid. ( Nov. 2 3 , I 9 2 3 ) . 4 1 . Minato, p p . I 6-2 I ; Tokyo asah i sh imbun (Nov. I 6, q , I 9 , I 9 2 3 ) . 42 . Ito, p p . 442 -449 . 43 · Tokyo asahi shimbun (Dec. 2 , 3 , I 9 2 3 ) . O ishi and Sengoku met Inukai on November 2 7 , suggesting that the party leadership take the form of a com mi ttee of party directors (somu iin) with Kato as its chairman ( iincho) ; they argued that Kato was head of the largest party and therefore entitled to the highest post. Inukai said that the feel i ng within the Kakushin Club would not permi t Inukai to be subordinate to Kato; he suggested instead that O ishi serve as chairman, but O ishi declined on the grounds that he had "other business. " Shinobu, Taisho demokurashii shi, III,

87 I -8 7 2 . 44 · Kensei, 7 . I :56 (January I 9 24). 45 · Miura, pp. 5 2 0-5 3 7 , 544-549 · 46. He visited Takahashi , Kato, Okazaki Kunisuke, Wakatsuki , Hamaguchi , Yokota, and Adachi in that order. 4 7 · The details of Okazaki's probings may be found in O tsu, IX, passim; Yokoyama, Kenseikai sh i, Appendix entitled, "Daini goken undo hish i , " pp. 4- I I , I 4- 2 0 . Though i nconclusive, the substance of the conversations between Okazaki Kunisuke and Adachi Kenzo is of some interest. Both men seemed in favor of cooperation. If the Seiyukai were to split, as was not unlikely, the party would stand to gain by joining in an alliance with the Kenseikai to achieve an absolute maj ority. As for the concrete form the alliance should take, Okazaki said he " would like to fire the opening shot i n the way the Seiyukai did years ago , " by starting a Movement for Constitutional Government. Both men seemed to agree that In ukai should not be invited to participate both because he got along badly with Kato and because he held a m inisterial post in the Yamamoto cabinet . Both also agreed that if the Seiyukai split, the two parties together would be able to secure an absolute maj ority in the coming election. They failed to reach any conclusion as to whether Kato or Takahashi should become premier i f the two parties formed a coalition government. Adachi suggested that both men receive the Imperial Mandate as O kuma and Itagaki had in I 898 or that Kato be made premier, but Okazaki insisted that Takahashi had priority for the office, not only because he was Kato's senior but because, having lost face on the reorganization question in I 9 2 2 , he would lose even more prestige if he were not appointed premier again. 48. For a fascinating account of the assassin, the son of a landlord and Diet member, see Shinobu, Taisho demokurashii shi, III, 874ff. 49 · Ishigami, pp. 96-97 ; Matsumoto, pp. 282 , 2 8 7 . 50. For details on t h e organ ization of the cabinet see Matsumoto, p p . 288-29 1 . The account in Shinobu, Taisho demokurashii shz� seems to rely largely on newspaper reports anc\ is filled with errors . It is interesting that on January 6, when the organi­ zation of the cabinet seemed to be going badly, Saionj i was considering the possibility of recommending Takahashi i f Kiyoura repeated his failure of I 9 I 4 . 5 r . For detai ls o f the Seiyukai split see Shinobu, Taisho seiji shi, p p . I I I g- I I 2 I , I I 36- I I 3 7 ; Takahashi Seigo, pp. 34-36.

273

NO TES TO PAG ES 1 84- 1 95

5 2 . Koj ima, !chi roselj"ika no kaiso, p. 2 I 4. 5 3 · This was the gist of Ozaki 's speech at the " Protect the Constitution" rally held in Osaka on January 30. 54· Shinobu, Taisho demokurashii sh i, III, 744-746, I I 5 5 ; Ishida Takeshi, Kindai Nihon selj"i kozo no kenkyU, pp. I 67 - I 7 3 · 5 5 · Kensei koran, 4 I 6 :55-56 U une I 924). 56. Statistics on the I 9 24 election may be found in Toyama Shigeki and Adachi Shizuko, eds. , Kindai Nihon selj"i shi hikkei (A manual of modern Japanese political history; Tokyo, I g 6 I ), pp. 205- 2 0 7 .

NOTES T O CHAPTER VIII I . Matsumoto, entry of June 2, I 9 24, p. 309 . 2 . Ito, II, 47 I -473 ; Shinobu, TaishO seiji shi, pp. I I 44- I I 4 7 ; Osaka mainich i shimbun

( May I 8 , 24, I 9 24). 3 · Wakatsuki, Kofoan kaikoroku, p. 280. 4· For details of the formation of the Kato cabinet, see Ito, II, 476-484 ; Shinobu, Taisho selj"i shi, pp. I I 44- I I 4 7 ; Wakatsuki , Kofoan kaikoroku, p. 2 8o ; Matsumoto, pp. 30 I - 3 2 3 , esp. pp. 3 I 4-3 2 2 ; Kojima Kazuo, pp. 905-9 1 0 ; Oka, "Taisho demokurashii no kitei , " p . I 95 · 5 · Ito, p p . 43 I , 438, 469 , 507-509 ; interview o f Wakatsuki Reij i ro, Mar. I 7 , I 94 I , typescri pt, Kensei Shiryo Hensanjo, National Diet Library, Tokyo. According to Wakatsuki's recol lection, Kato's " heart valves were bad . " In the midst of the 59th Diet session, he looked to Matsumoto l ike a sick man and complained of his poor health. Matsumoto, Mar. 5, I 9 2 5 , p. 379· 6 . Matsumoto, Oct . 2 9 , I 92 4 , p. 338 ; Nov. 3 , I 9 24, p . 345 ; Nov. IO, I 924, p. 345 ;

Osaka mainichi shimbun, Sept. I 4 , I 9 2 4 ; Osaka asah i shimbun, Sept. I 6, I 9 2 4 ; Osaka jlj"i sh impo, Sept. q, I 9 2 4 ; Maeda Renzan , Tokonami Takejiro den (The biography of Tokonami Takej i ro ; Tokyo, I 949) , pp. 795-798. 7· From a speech made by Hamaguchi in July I 9 2 4 ; see Hamaguchi Yiiko, " Shin naikaku no zaisei hoshin " (The financial goals of the new cabinet), Kensei, 7 · 7 = 2 7 Uuly I 92 4 ) . 8 . F o r comments of Kenseikai members a n d leaders on fiscal policy see t h e fol­ lowing: Wakatsuki , " Sengo no zaisei o ronzu ," pp. 30-3 6 ; "Chiho zaisei kyiisaisaku" (The policy of rel ief for local finances), Kensez� 4 . I :43-44 (J anuary I 9 2 I ) ; ibid., " Dairanpisha no zaika" (The evil of extravagant spending) , Kensei koran, 2 .5 :8- I I ( May I 9 2 I ) ; Hamaguchi Yiiko, " Senj i keizai seisaku o ronzu" (A d iscussion of wartime economic pol icy), Kensez� 2 . I :40-47 (January I g i g) ; ibid., "Tenbikishugi gyosei seiri saku, " Kensei, Vol . 2 , No. 6 Uanuary I 9 2 2 ) . Also usefu l are Hamaguchi's interpellations in the Diet, Yokoyama, Kenscikai shi, passim. The most succinct summary of the Kenseikai's fiscal pol icy is the policy statement drawn up b y Shimooka, Egi , Machida Chuj i , Hamaguchi, Hayami , and Wakatsuki , cited in Kensez� 5 . I :43-44 Uanuary I 9 2 2 ) . g . C f. the comments o f Yoshino Sakuzo in " Sessuru n i w a amari g a nai , hataraku

274

NOTES TO PAG E S 1 96-202

n i wa shigoto ga nai " ( Nothing to save and nothing to work at) , Chuo koran ( October I 9 24), p. I 24 . For details of the frugality propaganda campaign see Ito, II, 5 I 0-5 I 4 . I O . Abe Isoo, "Gunbatsu t o kanemochi n i taisuru kigane o yameyo" ( Stop humor­ ing the m il i tary clique and the wealthy) , Chuo koran, 39. I 2 :99- I 04 (November I 9 24) ; Ishikawa Hanzan, "Yosan hensei no arasoi" (The struggle over the preparation of the budget), ChUo koran, 39. I 2 :9 I -95 ( November I 9 24). I I. A case i n point was lnukai's own jiban, Okayama, which was scheduled to lose a division garrisoned in the town because of retrenchment . Though the Kakushin Club had been advocating arms reduction for years, a movement to keep the division in Okayama found many Kakushin Club members and Inukai supporters within its ranks. Ishikawa, pp. 9 I -95 · I 2 . Ito, II, 5 I 4-5 I 8 . I 3 . Kensez� 7 .9 : I 4- I 6 ( September I 9 24). Ito, I I , 5 24-5 2 8 . I 4. Ibid; Kensei, 7 . I o : 6o (October I 9 24) ; 7 . I I :56-58 ( November I 9 24) ; 7 . I 2 : 5 7 -6o ( December I 924) ; jiji shimpo ( Nov. I 7, I 9 24). I5. Kensez� 7 . I 2 :49 ( December I 9 24). I 6 . Ito, pp. 5 28-53 r . q . The passage of a supplementary budget brought the total budget to ¥I ,58o,462 ,ooo, a reduction of a mere ¥35 ,ooo,ooo over the I 9 24-25 budget. Kobayashi Uzaburo and Kitazaki Susumu, Meij i Taisho zaisei shi (Financial history of the Meij i and Taisho periods; Tokyo, I 9 2 7 ) , p. 424. 18. Cf. Ishida Takeshi, pp. I 9 7 - I 98 . I 9 . Adachi, A dachi Kenzo jijoden p p . I 99-20 1 . 2 0 . Kato Komei, "Warera minshii no seimu to tokken" (The political affairs and privileges of the masses ) , Kensei koran, 4.5 :4 ( May I 924). 2 r. Other amendments made by the Privy Council were ( I ) to raise the age of eligible candidates for election from 2 5 to 30 years of age ; ( 2 ) to deny the right to vote to those who had no fixed residence ; and (3) to deny heads of hereditary peerage families the right to stand as candidates or vote in the House of Representative elections. 2 2 . Ito, pp. 574ff; Wakatsuki, Kofoan kaikoroku, pp. 289-29 2 ; Shinobu, Taisho seiji shz� p. I 2 2 7 ; interview of Wakatsuki Reij iro, Dec. 2 0 , I 940, typescript, Kensei Shiryo Hensanshitsu , National Diet Library, Tokyo. 2 3 . Kojima Kazuo, pp. 9 I I -9 I 2 . 24. Ito, II, 540-542 , 587 ; Baba, Seikai jimbutsu fokei, p. 3 I 4 . 2 5 . T h e m a i n amendments proposed were : ( I ) to lower t h e age li mi t for candidates to 2 5 ; ( 2 ) to give the heads of hereditary peerage families the right to stand as candidates and vote in the House of Representatives elections ; ( 3 ) to reword the disqualifying clause; (4) to make the ballot counting district co-extensive with the electoral district ; (5) to eliminate provisions of the law which stipulated that suc­ cessfully elected candidates be disqualified for infractions of the election law per­ petrated by their campaign managers. 2 6 . Matsumoto, Feb. 2 7 , I 9 2 5 , p. 3 7 5 · 2 7 . For details of t h e passage of t h e universal suffrage b i l l , see Ito, p p . 5 74-594 ;

275

IOT ES TO PAG E S 203-2 1 0

Shinobu, Taisho seiji shi, pp. I 2 24- I 2 2 5 , I 240 - I 25 8 ; Okazaki , pp. I 67 - I 68 ; Koike Keizo, Okazaki Kunisuke (Tokyo, I 93 7 ) , p. 3 2 9 ; Takahashi Korekiyo, Zuisoroku, p. I 78 . 28. Matsumoto, Mar. 5 , I 9 2 5 , p . 38o ; Ito, I I , 596 ; Wakatsuki, Kofoan kaikoroku, P· 290. 29. For example, Delmer B rown, Nationalism in japan ( Berkeley, Calif. , I 95 5 ) , passim; Shinobu, Taisho seiji shi, pp. I 1 79- I I 8 I . 30. Quoted i n Ishida Takeshi, Kindai Nihon seiji kozo no kenkyu, pp. 2 0 I - 2 0 2 . 3 1 . Hara Kei nikkz� IX, 387 , July 3 I , I 92 I . 3 2 . Shi nobu , Taisho seiji shi, pp. 9 2 3-935 , 939; lzawa Takio den (Tokyo, I 95 I ) , pp. I 3 2 - I 39 · 3 3 · japan A dvertiser ( Feb. I 4 , I 92 4 ) , p. 6 . 34· Suzuki Kisaburo (Tokyo, I 95 5 ) , pp. 253-264 . 35 · jiji shimpo Uuly I 3 , I 9 24 ) . 36. Shiri.obu, Taisho seiji shz� pp. I I 9 I - I 2 2 0 ; Wakatsuki, pp. 2 9 7 - 2 9 8 , interview o f Wakatsuki Reij iro, Dec. 2 0 , I 940 . 3 7 . Ito, PP· 558-559. 38. Cf. Kato's speech on January 2 5 , I 9 2 5 , in Yokoyama, Kenseikai shz� p. 7 I 4. There has been one attempt to show that the Peace Preservation Law was ai med princi pally at remedying the deficiencies of the Soviet-Japanese Treaty of I 9 2 5 , which did not make adequate provision for preventing the entry of agitators and propa­ gandists from the Soviet Union. See Kobayashi Yukio, " Nisso kihon j oyaku goj o to chian ij iho" (The Peace Preservation Law and Article Five of the Japan-Soviet Treaty) , jimbun gakuhO, No. I O : I 33- I 64 ( I 959). 39· Shinobu, Taisho seiji shi; see also Yokoyama Shotaro, "Chian ij iho ron, " ( A discussion of t h e Peace Preservation Law) , Kensei koran, 5 . 2 I : I 4- I 8 ( November I 9 2 5 ) . 40 . Yoshino Sakuzo's suggestion for reform m a y b e found in Yoshino Sakuzo, Yoshino Sakuzo Hakushi minshushugi ronshu (A collection of essays on democracy by Yoshino Sakuzo ; Tokyo, I 948) , III, I 42 - 1 76. For similar views of Kenseikai members, see Saito Takeo, " Kizokuin kaikakuron ni tsuite" (On the debate over peerage reform ) , Kensez� 7 .9 : I O- I 3 ( September I 924) ; Ogawa Kenj iro, "Kizokuin kaikakuron" (A discussion of peerage reform ) , Kensei koran, 4 .8 : 2 ff (August I 924). 4 1 . Osaka jiji shimpo Uune I 2 , 1 92 4 ) ; Yabe, I, I 3 2 - I 33 · 4 2 . Shinobu, Taisho seiji sh z� p p . I 283- I 2 8 7 . 4 3 · There was a strong feeling among the peers that reform should b e undertaken at their own initiative, not as the result of pressure from the people or the government. Kensez� 7 . 7 : 3 6 Uuly I 9 24). 44 · Ito, pp. 503-505 ; Yabe, pp. I 33- I 34 ; Mizuno Naosh i shi o kataru (Talks about M izuno Naoshi ; Tokyo, I 93 I ) , pp. I 33 - 1 34· 45 · Ito, PP· 503-505 . 46. Tokyo asahi shimbun, Oct . 2 0 , I 9 2 4 ; Shinobu, Taisho seiji shz� pp. I 288- I 292 ; Ito, II, 564-566. 4 7 • Shinobu, Taisho seiji shz� pp. 1 29 2 - I 296. 48. Ibid., pp. I 30 2 - 1 303 ; Matsumoto, Feb. 2, I 9 2 5 , p . 366. 49 · The most enthusiastic and vocal reformer was Nakagawa Yoshinaga, who in

276

NOTES TO PAG E S 2 1 0-2 1 7

August I 9 2 3 had urged the leadership of the principal House of Peers factions to undertake some sort of reform lest a hostile and aroused public opinion demand a reduction of their powers or perhaps even abolition of the House. The gist of his proposal was to reduce the number of hereditary peers, eliminate the high tax paying members of the House, limit the terms of lmperial Appointees, and reform the m utual election regulations for the selection of hereditary peers to the House of Representa­ t ives . See O saka mainich i shimbun ( Aug. 4 , I 9 2 3 ) . Perhaps more significant was the attitude of Konoe Fumimaro, who, though he made no specific reform proposals, felt that the "politicization" of the House was a dangerous tendency and that the House should remain aloof from partisan struggles exercising its powers only on issues of great moment. Yabe, pp. 96-98, I 20, I 28- I 29. A group of peers formed a committee to investigate concrete measures of reform in February I 9 24, shortly after the forma­ tion of the Kiyoura cabinet . Ibid., p . I 3 I . 50. O saka asah i shimbun (Feb. 2 5 , I 9 2 5 ) . 5 1 . On t h e i nternal s p l i t o f the Kenkyukai, see I t o , II, 535-538 ; Matsumoto, Nov. I , I 9 24, pp. 339-340 ; ibid., Nov. I O , I 9 24, p . 345 ; Mizuno Naosh i 0 kataru, pp. I S6- I 62 . 5 2 . Matsumoto, Mar. I S , I 6, I 8, I 92 5 , pp. 385-38 7 . 5 3 · C f. Saionj i 's remarks in ibid., J a n . I 8, I 9 2 5 , p. 3 6 4 and Mar. I S , I 92 5 , pp. 383-384. 54· For the intricacies of the mutual election system , see Arima, Seikai dochu ki, pp. I I - I 4, 73-74, 96-97 ; Baba, Seikai jimbutsu fokez; pp. 5 I -53 ; Shinobu, TaishO seiji shi, p. I 3 I 8 ; Baba, Gendai jimbutsu hyoron, p. 42 2 ; Moriguchi Shigej i , " Kizoku giin no gosen hoho ni tsuite" (On the mu tual election methods of the members of the House of Peers) , Hogaku rongyo, I 3 . 2 : 8 2 -89 ( February I 9 2 5 ) ; Inada Shunosuke, " Kizokuin hakushidanshaku giin senkyo kisoku " (The election regulations for the counts, viscounts and barons in the House of Peers) , Hogaku shimpo, Vol . 34, No. 8 ( I 9 2 5) . 55· A fairly representative comment on the accomplishments of the Kato cabinet in the s oth Diet is the following article, " Shusho to bunsho ni taisuru fu man," Chua koran (Discontent with the premier and the minister of education) , 40 . 2 : I -7 ( M arch I 9 25 ) . 56. Ito, II, 6o i -6o 2 . 5 7 · Francis S . G . Piggott, Broken Thread: A n A utobiography ( Aldershot , I 950 ) , p . I 59 ·

NOTES T O CHAPTER I X 1 . Cf. Japan Chronicle (Jan. 7 , I 92 6 ) , p . I 4 . 2 . I t o , II, 2 6 o ; Egi Yoku den, p. 2 2 8 .

3 · Matsumoto, entry of J u n e 2 I , I 9 2 5 , pp. 405-406; ibid., J u l y 2 3 , I 9 2 5 , p p . 4 I 2 -4 I 5 ; ibid., J u l y 2 6 , 1 92 5 , pp. 4 I 7 -4 I 8 . 4 · The whole question o f who originated the idea o f Tanaka's candidacy is shrouded in obscurity. The plan may first have been broached i n August or September I 9 2 3 when there was a movement under way to have Tanaka m ade premier. The idea seems to have been held by both men inside the Seiyukai and by men not

277

NOTES TO PAG ES 2 1 7-221

connected with the party ; both Kuhara Fusanosuke, a Seiyii.kai-connected business­ man, and Miura Goro supported the idea, though their motives can only be subject to speculation. For several versions of the proposal to have Tanaka enter the party, see Ishigami , pp. 2 3 2 -235 ; Tanaka Giichi denki (The biography of Tanaka Giichi ; Tokyo, I 958), II, 3 78-379 ; Maeda, Tokonami Takejiri'i den, pp. 795 -8oo ; Yamaura Kan'ichi, Mori Kaku (Tokyo, I 940), II, passim. 5· Noda told Matsumoto Gokichi that Tanaka was preferable to either Goto or Tokonam i , but somehow disliked his manner. More important was Saionj i 's attitude. When consul ted , he said he had no objection but sent word to Tanaka by way of Matsumoto that he ought not to take " unwarranted action" as president of the new party ; by this, he meant that Tanaka should not be in a hurry to take power and should not adopt rash measures to bring about the fall of the cabinet. Tanaka Giich i denkz� II, 3 7 9 · 6 . Koj ima Kazuo, !chi ri'iseijika kaikoroku (Tokyo, I 95 I ) , pp. 2 3 0 - 2 3 6 ; Kojima Kazuo, pp. 9 I 3 -9 l 4 , 9 1 7 · 7 · Seki Naohiko, p . 2 6 . 8 . Koj ima, 2 3 7 -44 ; Washio, lnukai Bokudi'i den, II, 66g-67 I ; lnukai to Maeda Hisataro, Dec. I 8 , I 92 5 , pp. 4 2 7 -4 2 8 ; lnukai to Hagami Hirom i , Jan. 2 7 , I g2 6 , pp. 430-43 I ; lnukai to Seki Hiro, May 7, I g2 6 , pp. 4 I 5-4 I 6, Washio Yoshi tsugu, ed . , lnukai Bokudi'i shokanshu (The collected letters o f lnukai Tsuyosh i ; Tokyo, I 940) . g . Yokoyama, Kenseikai shi, p . I 33 ; see also Hamaguchi's speech to the provincial governor's conference on April 2 I , I g 2 6 , in Kensei ki'iron, 5 .y6-7 ( May I g 26). IO. Nakazawa Benj iro, "Chiso ijo mondai o ronzu " (A discussion of the land tax transfer problem) , Chui'i ki'iron, 40.7 :49-54 (July I 9 2 5 ) ; Hamaguchi Yii.ko "Zaigen o tenka ni meij i seyu " ( Make public the source of funds) , Kensei ki'iron, 3 . 3 :40-45 ( M arch I 9 2 3 ) ; Shimooka Chii.j i , " H i chiso ij o ron " (Against the policy of transferring the land tax), Kensei ki'iron, 3 .g : 2 - I 3 ( September I 9 2 3 ) ; Sakaguchi, pp. 74 I -744· I I . Matsumoto, July I 8, I 924, pp. 409 � 4 I 0 . Admittedly the Seiyii.kai's suspicions of the Kenseikai's intentions had been increased by the secrecy wi th which Hamaguchi had drawn u p the tax proposal ; Okazaki complained that none of the relevant figures or documents had been circulated to Seiyii.kai mem bers of the cabinet and felt that whatever Kato's views on maintaining the coalition, his subordinate ministers were acting in a devious fashion. Ibid., July 24, I 9 2 5 , pp. 4 I 5-4 I 6 ; July 2 7 , I 92 5 , pp. 4 I 8-4 I 9 . Matsumoto speculated that the tax reform proposal was indeed the result of a plan by Hamaguch i , Wakatsuki, Egi, Adachi, Kata oka, and others to prevent the Seiyii.kai's land tax transfer pol icy from being put into effect and to gain popularity among voters ; he also fel t that Kato was probably not privy to this intrigue. Ibid., July 2 9 , I 92 5 , p. 4 2 3 . I 2 . I t o , II, 637 -64o ; Matsumoto, J u l y 2 9 , I 92 5 , p. 4 2 3 ; ibid., J u l y 30, 1 92 5 , pp. 425-4 2 6 ; Wakatsuki, K�fuan kaikoroku, pp. 2 99-300. I 3 . On July 3 1 , the leadership of the two parties met to discuss the possibility of a coalition; they issued an announcement that stated that the Seiyii.kai and the Seiyii.honto "share the same policies on important issues and hope they will be able to devise a way of allying with each other frankly and without reservation in order

278

NOTES TO PAG E S 221 -230

to settle the poli tical situation . " The ful l text may be found in Ito, II, 645-646. Telegrams were dispatched to Saionj i from both parties announcing the establishment of this rather amorphous alliance. Matsumoto, July 3 I , I 92 5 , p. 4 2 8 ; Aug. 3, I 92 5 , p . 43 1 . I 4 . Ibid., Mar. 2 0 , I 9 2 5 , p. 389 ; May 1 7 , I 9 2 5 , pp. 400-40 I ; July 2 5 , I 9 2 5 , p. 4 I 7 ; July 2 8 , I 9 2 5 , pp. 42 0-42 2 ; July 3 I , I 9 2 5 , p . 4 2 8 . I 5 . Cf. Matsumoto's comments, ibid., Aug. I , I 9 2 5 , p p . 4 2 8-429. I 6. Baba, " Kaisan o yoso shite," pp. I 04- I I o ; Matsumoto, Oct . 27, I 92 5 , p. 453 · I 7 . Maeda, Tokonami Takejiro den, p p . 806-82 6 ; Baba, " Kaisan o yoso shite " ; Tanaka

Giichi denkz; II, 4 I I -4 I 2 ; Matsumoto, Apr. 6, I 9 2 5 , pp. 395-396 ; ibid., July 3 I , I 92 5 , P· 4 2 8 . I 8 . I t o , II, 6 7 2 -679; Tanaka Giichi denki, II, 4 I 3 ; Maeda, Tokonami Takejiro den. I 9 . Hamaguchi opposed this on the grounds that it ran contrary to long-standing promises of the Kenseikai and that it was financially unsou nd, but Kato urged him to accept the compromise in order to assure the passage of the rest of the tax reform proposal and other government measures. Ito, II, 679-68 I ; Maeda, Tokanami Takejiro den, pp. 838-839. 20. Matsumoto, Dec. 5, I 92 5 , p. 436. 2 1 . Ibid., Feb. 28, I 92 6 , p. 5 5 2 ; Baba, Gendaijimbutsu hyoron, pp. 9 I -9 3 · Tokonami's biographer implies that Kato made such assurances; cf. Maeda, Tokonami Takejiro den, pp. 838-839. 2 2 . Ito, II, 686-7o6. 23. Matsumoto, Jan. 2 9 , I 92 6 , p. 4 7 7 ; ibid., Feb. I , I 9 2 6 , p. 478 ; ibid., Feb. I 4, I 92 6 , p. 48o ; ibid., Feb. 2 3 , I 9 2 6 , p. 482 ; ibid., Mar. 9 , I 9 2 6 , p. 485 . Saionj i seems also to have fel t that business wished to avoid a dissolution and hoped the government would continue to carry out its financial retrenchment plans. 24. Baba, " Kaisan o yoso shite," p. 3 I 3 . 2 5 . Yabe, I, I 46- I 49 ; Baba, " Kaisan o yoso shite," pp. 9 I -93 ; Baba, Seikaijimbutsu fokei, pp. I 8o- I 85 ; Maeda, Tokonami Takejiro den, pp. 850-854. 26. Ibid., pp. 8 7 2 - 8 7 8 ; Tanaka Giichi denkz; II, 42 2 ; TOkyo asahi sh im bun ( Dec. I 4, 2 7 I 92 6 ) . ' 2 7 . Adachi, A dachi Kenzo jijoden, pp. 2 I 7 -2 I 8 ; Baba, Gendai jimbutsu hyoron, p p . I 25 - I 2 6 ; Matsumoto, Sept. 2 9 , I 92 6 , p. 5 3 2 ; Oct. 2 6 , I 926, p. 5 3 9 ; Dec. I 2 , I 92 6 , pp. 545 -546. 28. Wakatsuki , Kifuan kaikoroku p. 3 2 2 . 2 9 . Matsumoto may also have hoped that his former patron, Den Kenj i ro, would have a chance of returning to office under a Tanaka cabinet because Saionj i had long favored such a course of action. 30. After the three party leaders' meeting was successfully over, Saionj i told Matsumoto that because i t was unlikely that the Seiyiikai and the Seiyiihonto would merge in the event of an election, dissolution would simply u pset the Seiyiikai 's chances of coming to power; therefore, the "higher poin t of view" notwithstanding, he agreed that comp;-omise was a better course of action than dissolution of the Diet . Matsumoto, Jan. 2 3 , I 9 2 7 , p. 554·

279

NO TES TO PAG E S 230-236

3 1 . For details of the flegotiations see Matsumoto, Dec. I 2 , I 926, p .546 ; Dec. 2 8 , 1 92 6, p. 548 ; J a n . 5 , 6, 8 , 2 2 , 1 9 2 7 , pp. 549-55 4 ; Tanaka Giichi denkz� II, 424-434. 3 2 . According to Tokonami's b iography, Adachi visited Saionj i and came back with assurances that Tokonami would be the next prem ier; he also said that Shidehara had visited Saionj i and had received the same idea. Maeda, Tokonami Takejiro den. Adachi denies that he visi ted Saionj i at this time, but the Matsu moto diary ind icates otherwise. It therefore seems likely that Adachi was lying to Sakakida. Adachi, A dachi Kenzo jij.oden pp. 2 24-2 25 ; Matsumoto, Feb. 1 5 , I 9 2 7 . 3 3 · Cf. Tanaka Giich i denki, I I , 436. 34· The details of the fall of the Wakatsuki government, due largely to reasons extraneous to the maneuvers of the parties, may be found in Matsumoto, Apr. q , 1 9 2 7 , p. 564 ; Tanaka Giich i denki, I I , 438-440, 548-5 5 6 ; Chitoshi Yanaga, Japan Since Perry, (New York, 1 949) , pp. 4 1 0 -4 1 2 ; Yoshihashi Takehiko, Conspiracy at Mukden, ( New Haven, 1 963), pp. I I - 1 2 . 3 5 · Cf. Matsumoto, Feb. 2 3 , 1 92 6 , p . 482 ; Mar. 9 , 1 9 26, p . 485 ; Apr. 1 9 , 1 926, pp. 49 1 -49 2 ; Aug. 2 0 , 1 92 6 , p. 505 ; Oct . 5 , I 92 6 , p. 5 3 4 ; Dec. 2 , 1 9 2 6 , p. 544· One can j udge Saionj i 's attitude from a conversation he had with Aoki Nobumitsu on March 3, 1 9 2 7 . He told Aoki that depending on the time and circumstances i t m ight be necessary to set up a " neutral cabinet . " When Aoki suggested several possible cand idates for a " neutral" premier, Saionj i ruled them all out but Den. Saionj i said that Yamamoto Gom bei , Saito Minoru, Kiyoura Keigo, Ito Miyoj i , and Uehara Yusuke were all unsuitable ; Hiranuma Kiichiro and lchiki Kitokuro were not well known abroad ; and Goto Shimpei, whom Saionj i characterized as being " like a chi l d ," was beyond consideration. Cf. ibid., Mar. 3 , 1 9 2 7 . 3 6 . Ibid., Sept. 2 1 , 1 92 6 , p. 5 2 8 . 3 7 . Ibid., Apr. 1 7 , I 9 2 7 , PP · 567 -568. 38. Yamakawa H i toshi, " Seihen kara umareta shinseito" (The new pol it ical party born from the cabinet change), Kaizo, 9 . 7 : 7 0 (July 1 92 7 ) . 3 9 · Quoted in Tanaka Giichi denki, I I , 702 -704. 40. Ibid. 4 1 . Shiba Sadakichi , Rikken Minseito shi (The history of the Minseito; Tokyo, 1 935) , II, 7 2 4 . 4 2 . Quoted in Tanaka Giichi denki, I I , 7 05 . 4 3 · Aso H isashi, " M inseito, Kakushinto shutsugen ni taisuru hihyo" (An evalua­ tion of the appearance of the Minseito and the Kakushinto) , Kaizo, 9 . 7 :90 (July 1 92 7 ) .

NOTES T O CHAPTER X 1 . Quoted in Takahashi Seigo, pp. 1 0- 1 1 . 2 . Ryusaku Tsunoda, et a! . , eds . , Sources ofJapanese Tradition, (New York, 1 959), pp . .689-690. 3 · William T. deBary, et a! . , eds . , Sources of Chinese Tradition ( New York, 1 960), pp. 446-448 .

280

N OTES TO PAG ES 237-251

4· Cf. Avery Leierson, Parties and Politics: A n Institutional and Behavioral Approach ( New York, I 958), pp. 45ff. 5 · Maurice Duverger, Political Parties ( New York, I 963), pp. xxvi-xxvii. 6. Minobe Tatsukichi, Gikai seiji no kento (An exami nation of parliamentary politics; Tokyo, I 934), p. 63. 7 · V. 0. Key, Jr. , Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (New York, I 948), p . 2 I 8. 8. Myoga Fusakichi, Nihon seito no gensei (The present state of pol i tical parties in Japan ; Tokyo, I 9 2 9 ) , pp. 2 3 7 - 2 3 8 . g . Arima, pp. 68 , 2 5 5 - 2 5 7 . I O . Baba, Gendai jimbutsu hyoron, pp. 3 I -3 2 . I r . Shinobu, Taisho seiji sh i, pp. I 2 0 I - I 2 0 3 . I 2 . Takahashi Korekiyo, Zuisoroku, p. 2 I 7 .

281

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"Kais an o yoso shite"

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m

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-

Vol. 2 , No . 6 (January 1 922 ). ------ "Zaigen o tenka

ni

me iji seyo" �;f >m, ;£ 1..., r

to

af]

;f;

t!: �

(Make !liblic the source of funci3 ); Kensei Koran, Vol . 3 , No. 3 (March 1 92 3). ------ "Shi n naikaku

no

zaisei hos hin" �fr �

flj

">

�::f itj;__ �

-1t

(The financial goals of the new cabinet); Kensei, Vol . 7, No . 7 (July 1924). ------Zuikanroku r� l� 4$.,. (Reminis cences ) . Tokyo , 1931 . Hara Kei nikki

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-$(_. (The diary of Hara Kei) .

9 vols . ;

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(The collected works of Hara Kei)�

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no mocho11 .Jl:_

� (1'\\0 blind guts

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ro

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(My autobiography). Tok)O , 1 951 . Hattori Shiso H&.. �r .Z .�.� .

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•

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f�

.

11Bukka monda i

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(On the problem of prices ); Kensei Koron, Vol . 1 , No. 7

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(A his tocy of Japanes e political par ties ) .

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8

4>-

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2 vols . ; Tokyo ,

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Nakamura Taihachiro• den

(The biography of Nakamura Taihachiro).

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ro

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�

univers al suffrage move me nt and the understanding of univers al suffrage). Tokyo, 1 92 5. Igarashi Eikichi JJ. t � Sit t

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(The Taisho biograp hi c al dictionary ) . Ike Nobut ake.

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Hyoden Takahashi Korekiyo

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(A critical biography of Takahashi Ko rekiyo).

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election

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(1925 ). lrie Kan 'ichi A.. 5:r.. 1

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Yama gata Ko no omokage cl!

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0

d)

'fl.

1ft

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'!!

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(After the death of Hara Kei) . Tokyo, 1 960 . Ishii Kin'ichiro -' .)t 1'- tp . 3.

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o

"Sanpa goken undo

no

ichi sokumen"

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(A history of students ) . Tokyo , 19 55. Kataoka Naoharu It � 1 ;_,t . "Yon daiseiko (!!] ;.,._ �.iq�

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wa nan zo ya"

(What is the fou r-plank program ? );

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(One side of the political history of the Taisho and Shaw a periods ) . Tokyo, 1 934 . Kato Fusazo /Jo ij.. h 111

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(The biography of Vis count Hirata Tosuke ) .

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''Warera minshu no seimu to tokken"

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.

fJ .$.-;fd:4;;-

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ro

�

t

61

cabinet cha.If; e and the attitud e of our party; Tokyo, 1 92 1 ) . ------Dai gojuichi gikai hokokusho

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/

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Kiyose Ichiro �� �J� - �? . "Kis ei seito no hokai katei to shite no dai gojuichi gikai" e.t � ;a.'{ d) � �tiJ!l.AI. r t, -t ., 1 JJ. -t - tj_� (The Fifty-First Diet considered as JRrt of the disintegration proces s of the established parties); Kaizo, Vol. 5, No . 4 {April 1924). Kobayashi Ushis aburo .

The Basic Industries and Social His tory

of Japan, 1 914-191 8 . New Haven, Conn. , 1 930. Kobayashi Ushis aburo .J.;#...B. ;. tr and Kitazaki Sus umu

H

J.� i1!

.

Meiji Tais hO zaisei shi e� ;:{; f:-.i£. M ifj(l_ (Financial history of the Meiji and Taish o per iod3 ). Kobayashi Yukio ijiho "

a

.J.

tj:.-f %

.

Tokyo , 1927 .

"Nis so kihon joyaku gojo to chian

'/ £.;f..� �� ..i � t ;{;4(: -� 11 }/;. (The Peace Preserva­

tio n Law and Article Five of the Japan-Soviet Tre aty); Jimbun Gakuho A._ j;,_ ":t �ll , No . 10 (1 9 59).

Koike Keizo . J. �e. M- ,a, .

Okazaki Kunisuke p.t] � .1fl -f�

Tokyo, 1 937 . Koizumi Matajiro

,J,

1"- "- ;k_ YF

Fusen undo hishi

{ J!.. il. fiJ ;{.;il.· ;(

(The secret history of the universal suffrage movement). Tokyo , 1928. Kojima Kazuo t � - f...fi .

290

Ichi ros eijika no kais o

-

;:f i!J;. 5f; '#,.

"'

r:eJ

�-

(The recollections of one old politician). Tokyo, 1 9 51 . ------Kojima Kazuo s eidan -I; j, -tj. ;·� tJl (Political talks with Kojima Kazuo ). Tokyo, 1 9 51 . ------Seikai gojunen: Kojima Kazuo kaikoroku if��J. t Jf : 7; _t - i.jl. ® fH� (Fifty years in the political world; The memoirs of Kojima Kazuo ). Tokyo , 1 9 51 . Kojima Kazuo .

Tokyo, 1 950.

Kokumin Shimbun W) L\ $fr "Kokuy\i tetsucb

f.ij

kensetsu oyobi kairyo keikaku" ill -1i 4�-'! 6) A_ 1j__

oo

1j._ 1r" e.J:... � ·H .$,

(Plan for the c onstruc tio n and repair

of the National Railway); Teikoku TetsudO Kyokai Kaiho

4 00

JA. i.! 1tfh � 4:- fl. , Vol. 2 0 , No. 3 (March 1 91 9). Tokyo, Kondo Mis ao � � rJ. . Kato Kome i �· i+.J> 6}J •

1 9 59. Kono Banshu den ;'"f 1tf .J+I1� (The biography of Kono Hironaka) . 2 vols . ; Tokyo , 1 924 . Kudo Take shige

..!.

ij.. i( i

Taisho kensei shi A. .i£

.

:f.

iJ!-.

::lt._

(The history of constitutional politics in the Taisho pe riod). Tokyo, 1930. Kumata Sojiro -��- llJ it: ;J:.. t r .

Kanju shogun juo dan :fi.�_A4t ;/!.t

�

M(# t� (Wide ranging chats with Miura Goro). Tokyo , 1 92 3 .

Kuribayashi Teiichi

�

dJ

#.. ..:f;f... �

-

Chihokankai no hensen :l:e. :;b"" ]

i � (Changes in the world of the provincial officials ).

Tokyo , 1 930. Lay,

A.. H.

"History of the Ris e of Political Parties in Japan, "

Trans actions of the As iatic Soc iety of Japan, Vol . 30 (December 1 902) . Leierson , Avery .

Parties and Politics:

An

Ins titutional

and

Behavorial Approach. New York , 1 9 58.

291

Maeda Renzan

-(.j Ill i1_ J..

"Kizokuin no shin keiko"

•

� -:;5* rt "'

�-fr 1i� {;;J (New tendencie s in the House of Peers ); Taiyo, Vol. 29 , No. 4 (April 1921).

------Tokonami Takejiro den

A-. ;k. fir

..::.

�f { i;. (The biography of

Tokonami Takejiro) . Tokyo , 19 39 . ------Hara Kei den ,&, Jtt 1 i\ (The biograp hy o f Hara Kei). 2 vols . ; Tokyo , 1943. ------Rekidi i naikaku monogatari Jf. 1-\' dq

P�j !:!In i%

(The story of

the cabinets ). 2 vols . ; Tokyo, 1 9 6 1 . Masumi Junnosuke 4t ";j;.

jf.

.z .trfl .

"Nihon s eito shi ron"

8

;$.. $.. ·:t

_t � (A dis cus s ion of the history of Japanese political parties ); Shiso .f. �� , No. 41 0 (March 1958). ------"Nihon s eito shi. ni okeru chiho seiji

m

shomondai" a � �j:_{.

J._ •• i; vt � � � JJ:.. ; 1; fJl � fo, _M (Several problems concerning local politics

in

the his tory of Japanese political parties );

Kokka gakkai zas shi 00

'fi-. '1 � Mi tt

, No. 7 3 (1 9 59 -1 9 6 0 ) ,

No. 7 4 (1 9 6 1 ) , No. 7 5 (1 9 62 ) , No. 7 6 (1 9 63 ) . ------"Taisho s eihen t o sono zengo" J\.. .il iY(. t

t

1i 1.!. (The

-!: ...,

Taisho political crisis and the events sur rou nding it); Tokyo toritsu daigaku hogaku zas shi

� :of: j;F .:d:. :K. ·1

;'-t "# � �.t·,

Vol. 3 , Nos . 1 -2 (1 9 62 ) , Vol. 4 , No. 1 (1963). Matsumoto aOkichi ;f� ;$. tiil'J i .

Taisho demokurashii ki no seiji:

Matsumoto aOkichi seiji nisshi f-. >f. i'-t 7 j ; - $.�

�

J.(_;'� : :f�..$- Jii•J

� � ;� a tt (Politics during the era of Taisho demo cracy: The

political diary of Matsumoto Gokichi ) , ed. Oka Toshitake and Hayashi Shigeru . Tokyo, 1959. Matsumura Kenzo :;f��t t.*· ..=

Nagai Ryii.taro .?K if i9p J.-. ilp .

Tokyo, 1 9 59. Matsuo Takayoshi ;fl.:-/t.

"> -*:-��-:11

292

�

Ji....

•

' 'Yuaikai

m

hatten katei" i. '! 4:.--

(The proces s of developm mt of

the

Yuai.kai);

Shirin (. t.,f.. , Vol. 50, No. 6 (November 1 9 57). ------"Taisho demokurashii

no seiji katei " ;k_;E. {Hj 5 -1,8 "' Jj__;�;!�J.

ki

(The political proces s in the era of TaisbO democ racy); Nihon shi kenky\i a�j:_J1f � , No. 53 (19 60). Michels , Robert.

Political Parties. New York, 19 59.

;f.. � "i . "Yato godo wa fuhitsuyo nar i" ff 1:_. ..{;-- (G) tit :f. j.· .fh•l (The mer ger of the opposition partie s is

Miki Bukichi

.3-

unneces sary); Kensei Karon, Vol. 1 , No . 6 (May 1 9 2 1 ) . Minato Kuniw

5� }p E.

Hay ami Seiji den �it, f jj 1i;. (The

•

biography of Hayami Seiji). Tokyo , 1 9 32 .

.J. ;l, ..gr J.. i

Minobe Tatsukichi

��f; 4) #' H

.

Gikai s eiji no kentO

1:A,4;:­

(An examination of parliamentary politics} .

Tokyo , 1 9 34 . Miki Bukichi

Mitarai Tatsuo 1..tr ..f ;Jt k,.fl:(f

;. ;f..

-A t . Tokyo ,

1 9 58 .

Miura Goro 3..

7� U ::ft

Kanju Shogun kaikoroku �>¥.. .fit ;j.;f .l

.

�� ,i;f._ {The memoirs of Miura Goro). Tokyo , Mizuno Naoshi o kataru 1J<... :ft _1 � -J% .?

C!J

1 92 5.

{Talks about Mizuno

Naoshi). Tokyo , 1 931.

A.. �/:- 5fi -fi 1* l1A. -Jii., � .§. JL 1; 54;.

Moriguchi Shigeji

o

•

"'

"Kizokuin giin no gosen hoho ni tsuite" " "' ,., . "'t

(On the mutual electio n

methods of the members of the Hou se of Peers); Hagaku rongyo

34;. .:J 14)- -t_ , Vol . Myoga Fusakichi

't 1t)- A

1 3 , No. 2 (February 1925).

i .

Nihon seito no gensei

8

� � {.

a"J

:J!l #- (The pres ent state of political parties in Japan). Tokyo , 1929. Nagai , Michio .

"Herbert Spencer in Early Meiji Japan, " Far

Eastern Quarterly , Vol. 14 , No . 1 (November 1 9 54). Nagai Ry\itaro 1i. # :J:Yp A if

.

"lnnai

no gikai

to

ingai

ro

gikai"

293

r :t �

�

tR� l' rt 9J-.. "' 11\. 4;:-. (The Diet within the Diet and the

Diet outside the Diet); Chuo Koron, Vol. 2 8 , No. 4 (April 1914). ------ "Shingikaishugi o teisho su " jfr

�j; � .:}.. � � ;tit •,£ 1

(In advocacy

of a new par liamentarism); Chuo Koron, Vol. 36 , No. 1 (January 1 921). ------"Shakai seigishin no kakuritsu e" :f.:!. 1- .il !;

..::.:

"l

�11

.Jt

"­

(Toward the establishme nt of social jus tice); Kens ei Koron , Vol. 3 , No. 3 (March 1 92 3) . Niigata ken seitO shi Jfr ;.� �- .1{-f:t

Nagaki Chiyoji ;k :f.. f 1-\ 5 �

� history of political par ties in Niigata pre fecture'). Tokyo , 1 935.

Nagano Kiyoshi -lz ff J�.f.

.

Oita ken s eitO shi :A 'lT � if� � .:(

(A history o f politic al par ties i n Oita prefecture ). Oita City , 1926.

-&_ .t fi

Nagashima Ryuji �

;l',iL

(vie

w

.

.::...

Seikai kakushin

m

se tsu .r.tl;¥:l/.fr

s on the reformation of the political world).

Tokyo, 1927 . ---- --Seikai hiwa .rJO'H·.i/.· ll (Secret tale s of the political world). Tokyo , 1 92 8 . Naito Juntaro 0! # 4 :i J..

fi_ l'IJl ;K t r

l!.

.

Shakaishugi to d ai

ni

kensei yogo undo

'� ::::. '! '*. :tfii ii_ ;_{ ti.J (Socialism and the Secom

Mov eme nt for Cons titutional Gov ernme nt) . Tokyo , 19 22. Najita, Tetsuo.

Hara Kei in the Politics

of

Compromise , 1 9 0 5-1 9 1 5.

Cambridge , Mas s . , 1 9 67 . Nakakoji Ren �t . J ·

�i-Mt, .

"Doitsu

m

seibai" � !k i!_ en Jl\ �

(The defeat of Germany); Taiyo, Vol, 24 , No. 14 (December 1 91 8) .

. Nakazawa Benjiro f �J.... .Jt >:Z i f

.

"Chis o i j o mondai o ronzu"

-te.AA -k i!r�.,Q£ 1� f (A dis cus sion of the land tax trans fer problem); Chilo Koron , Vol. 4 0 , No.

294

7

(July 1 92 5).

Nezu Mas as hi � -f· 1 t /.;

.

Hihan Nihon gendai shi .ftiA•J e,4\.1Jl._1-\ t

(A critical history of contempora ry Jap an). Tokyo , 1 9 58 . Odaki Tatsuo ·l· 5!i. � f...j .

� 9-ir

'i

"Seikai kakushin to gocb morrl ai" if;;., 1f­

� li) f.,, ;;{! (The re formation of the political world

and the me rge r problem); Kensei Koron, Vol. 2, No. 4 (April 1 922). ------"Inukai wa kense i

no

yakubyogami"

X -f Jot :{ J.� fi.. A :i� 171

(Inukai , the politic al god of the plague ); Kensei Koron, Vol. 2 , No. 7 (July 1 922 ) . Ogawa Kenjiro

d'

� '1 1-Jt ,;.:,_ ��

.

"Kizokuin kaikakuron"

e-K_ f � (A dis cussi on of peerage reform);

1 i*- f.t.

Kensei Kor on,

Vol. 4 , No . 8 (Augus t 1924). Ohara shakai zm ndai kenky\ijo :K [
9

� 1; {t/)

Jf 4�

(Japan labor yea rbook, 19 19). Tokyo , 1 92 0 . ------'Taisho ju nen Nihon rodo nenkan .:k._ ..iE. + Jf

a � � ff}J lf ,§�

(Japan labor yearbook, 1920). Tokyo , 1 921 . Oka Yoshitake fi)

�

J\

.

Kindai Nihon no seijika 1..6:. �\ a-4-. tiJ jfj:_;�

'lj..

(Modern Japanes e politicians). Tokyo , 1 960 . -- -- -- "Taisho demokur ashii no kitei" A j£ /{. 7 1 5- -

.,

� ft\

(The fourrl ations of Taisho demokurashii); Sekai, No. 17 1 (March 1 960). ------Yamagata Aritomo .l.t �U.;ij JJ]j Tokyo , 1 9 61 . Okazaki Kunisuke 1� J,� .$p §it;' . Kensei kaikoroku 1 1.( W ...l ,j* •

(Recollections of constitutional politics ). Tokyo, 1 9 3 5 . Okochi Kazuo . Labor in Modem Japan. Tokyo , 1 9 5 8 . Okochi Kazoo �;,- I1:J

-

Jj arrl Oya Soichi :):;._ t ..;1-:1: - .

Kindai

Nihon o tsukutta hyakunin .i.ft.1\ a.A;.,. k i•J , f: e A.. (One hundred men who made modem Japan). 2 vols . ; Tokyo , 1 9 6 5 .

295

Okm:m Kb hachiju-gonen shi ;k_ r� 1l_

/\.

t .l. Jf

:(_ (A his tory of

Marquis Okuma 's eighty years ). 3 vols. ; Tokyo , 1 92 6 . "Hara Ke i: A Politica l Biography , 11

Olson, Lawrance A. , Jr .

Ph. D. the sis ; Harvard University, 1 9 55 . Ono Yugo . J ' ft iii �

,

ed. Rikken Sei yllka i shi

..!l.

:[ if� �� ;(_

(A hi story of the Seiyllkai). 7 vols . ; Tokyo , 1 924 -1 94 3 . Ostrogorski, Moisei.

Democracy and the Organization of Political

Parties . 2 vols . ; New York, 1 9 22 . Otsu Jun'ichiro *. ;f

4 - tp .

Dai Nihon kens ei shi k a 4>.. :{ ;;.t_ :(_

{The constitutional history of Greater Japan).

10 vols. ;

Tokyo, 1 927 -1928. Our a Kemmu den J\.. ;;ff

,jf, -1\, 1-£.

(A biography of Oura Kemmu).

Tokyo, 1926. Oyama Druo :J\. J.. ;fjp J:... zento "

"Seitokai no kinjo to wagakuni kensei no

•

J'� t � mi..t;/( � .:ft OO

� �
in the wo rld of politic al parties and the future of cu r con­ stitutional politics ); Chuo Koron, Vol. 32 , No. 2 (February 1 917).

------"Gendai Nihon n i okeru s eijiteki shinka to sono shakaiteki haike i" J)L1\ a � • = I; � J., iJf... )� 6� if! 1-t. t -l "> .:/:!. � ��� (Political e vo lution

in

·W {

c o nte mporar y Japan and its backgrou nd);

chiio Koron , Vol. 33, No . 1 (Januar y 1 91 8) . Ozaki Yukio.

The Voice of Japanese Democracy. Yokohama , 1 9 1 8 .

Ozaki Yukio � J.� H lt:1i Nihon"

� i�}·j

li)

Y.

. "Sengo rekkoku t o koritsu seru

J�\. iL -ti: ij

a

� (The pos twar powe rs and

isolated Japan); Kensei, Vol. 3 , No. 2 (February 1920). ------Gakudo kaikoroku

� 1:

@ All ii. (The recollections of

Gakudo) . 2 vols . ; Tokyo , 1 9 51 -1 9 52 . ------Ozaki Gakucb zenshu Jt, 4

� 1' � .!/:

of Ozaki Yukio). 9 vols . ; Tokyo , 1 9 55.

296

(The collected works

Perry , Walter Scott.

"Yoshino Sakuzo, 1 87 3-19 33: Exponent of

Democ ratic Ideals in Japan, " Ph. D. the; is . Stanford Univers ity , 1 9 56. Broken Thread� An Autobi
Piggott, Francis S . G. Alder shot , 1 9 50. Pooley , A. M.

Japan at the Cross roads . New Yorl<: , 191 7 .

Rikken DOshikai soritsu jimusho Jr. Seikyo hokoku ii'K_ 5,t -f&._ -%

1-

raJ

.t 4.:-- -i·J .i1.

f ;;ft frfr

(Repo rt on the political situation).

Tokyo, 1 9 1 3. Saguchi Takashi 1l "' -lf

Nihon shakai hoken shi

t_ (A discus si on of social insur are e Saionji Kimmo chi � �

f!) f 1;::. �

•

in

a

-f.-# 1J:...,.(. . .f. ff

Japan). Tokyo , 1 9 57 .

Saionji Kimmochi jiden Jb JJJ 4"

� 1J {i;. (The autobiography of Sai onji Kimmochi). Tokyo ,

1949 .

Saito Takao �sl r! � .

j � I> _.,

v • "t

"Kizokuin kaikakuron ni tsuite "

i �� f.t e(

(On the debate over peerage reform); Kense i ,

Vol. 7 , No . 9 (September 1 924 ) . Sakaguchi Jiro :tft.. o

;..

�F

Noda Taikon den J'f lil.k�_.!1ii. (The

.

biography of Nom Yutaro). Tokyo , 1 92 9 . Sakai Toshihiko :J:� :f·l

� 11� -}

:t

A.:l �

)!

�

.

"Reimeikai to Yuaikai to Kaizo DOme i"

e;;,__ij_ fcJ

�

(The Reimeikai, the Yuaikai,

and the Kaizo nOmei); Kaiho � %j(,_ (Noveml:e r 1 9 19). Sanko Shimooka Chuji den

;.

4 r f.()

.t ;it; {i:;, (The biogra ,r.hy of

Shimooka Chuji). Tokyo, 1 9 3 0 . Sans eiken kakucho shiko

t .i-J:,.JI·! ¥.. 5U J-"1�

of the expansion of the right to vote).

(Histor ical summary Tok)Q , 1 9 57 .

Sas aoka Heisuke .\t- 1ffil -'!' �/) . Otake Kan'ichi s ensei shoden *-... tt

1 - A. 1. . J · 1� (A short biography of Otake

Kan1 ichi ).

Tokyo , 1 95 3 .

297

Sato , Hiroshi . Democracy and the Japanese Government. New Yo:rX , 1920.

Scalapino , Robert A. Japan.

Democracy and the Party Move ment in Prewar

Berkeley , Calif. ,

1 9 62 .

------and Masumi Junnos uke, Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan. Berkeley , Calif. ,

1 962 .

Segai Inoue Ko den t\t 9� # ..1: 1�--i� (The biography of Marquis Inoue). 5

vols . ; Tokyo ,

1 93 3 -1934 .

"Seikai m chushin jimbutsu taran t o suru Har a Kei Shi to Kato Dan" if{._� "'
28,

No.

4

(April

1 9 14 ) .

Kanju shogun kaikoroku

(The memoirs of Miura Goro). Tokyo ,

:MAlt 41 _'f �� 41-.

1925 .

"Seito no kanegura s agas hi " .J�rf � i" J.f .:Jt� (The political par ties ' sear ch for No.

3

treasury); Shin Nippon ifr a�. Vol.

a

7,

(March 1 9 1 7 ) .

Seki Kazutomo

rij :A:" �

"Gumbatsu seiji ron"

r:1

-f. /Uj U,;!; "t�

(A discus s ion of military cl ique gover il.l:m nt); Kens ei , Vol. 1 ,

No.

3

(October

------Kinda i seiji

m

1 91 8) .

riso to genjitsu � 1\ >E.t 5�

m

(Ideal and real ity in modern politic s). Tokyo, Seki Naohiko

lf

"'

0

Tokyo,

l!

1){_ '$

19 2 5.

fl] j

�

_,4�

(Recollections of s eventy-s even years).

Shichi ju-shichi nen no kaiko ..Jc + ...\::

193 3 .

Sekiguchi Yasushi Pl]

0

$,

. Senkyo tokuhon

(An election primer ). Tokyo , Sekine Minoru

M � B:.. '!;

.

Jt_f lfL.. J:_.

1 93 6 .

Hamaguchi YUko den ��

{The biography of Harmguchi YUko). Tokyo , Shiba Sadakichi � ;Jt.. 298

�j !l·

�

i .

r:�

-'fi f -f.Z.

1931.

Rikken Minse itO shi .:0: :f L\ iJ� .;t_ .(

(The his tory of the Mins eito) . Shibuya Sakusuke �� �{'f ..8,? . Tokyo , 1 934 ,

2

vols . ; Tokyo ,

1 9 34 .

Taketomi Tokitoshi � � st� .

Shiho ke nkyU: senkyo zaihi no kenkyli, toku ni baishu ni tsuite

iJ 5tMf ;( : J! f � t 6) ,ifJ 7t '

# I� f &4t 1 .: -" v • "(

(Judicial studies: A study of electoral expense s , espe cially with

re spect to

bribery). Tokyo , n. d.

Shimooka Chuji "f li) .!!; )� . "Hi chiso ijo ron" � � J.t {!1. J

1j._ � (Agains t the policy of transferring the land tax);

Kensei Koron, Vol. 3 , No. Shinobu Seisaburo 1i :k.. >t Tokyo , 1941 .

9

(September 1 923 ) .

tF

.::.

Goto Shimpei 1j,_ib,An--t

- - ----Taisho seiji shi :k. i1 .R ; f; :Z Taisho per iod) . Tokyo,

(A political his tory of the

1 9 55.

------Taisho demokurashii shi .*... .i1 :7'"-t � 1 5- - X (Taisho democracy). 3

vols . ; Tokyo ,

1 9 58 .

;Y # � i t.Uf (An evaluation of YOU!f; Diet Kens ei Koron :{ J� � �� , Vol. 3, No. 1

"Shoso giin sohyo" memb ers ); (January

1 f12 3 ) .

' 'ShushO to bunshO ni taisuru fuman'' ]" �B

t

� ;fa

• ==

.it j �

�

��

(Discontent with the Pre mier and the Minister of Education); Chou Koron, Vol .

40,

No .

2

(Mar ch

1925).

Silberman, Bernard S. , "The Democracy Mov e�re nt 1 9 1 6 -1 921:

in

Japan,

A History of a Social Movement. " Ph. D. t hesis ;

Univer sity of Michigan,

1 9 56 .

------ "The Political Theory of Yoshino Sakuzo , " Journal of Modern His tory, Vol. Smith, Henry D.

31 ,

No.

"The Shi njinkai

4

(December

(1 9 1 8 -1 921 ):

Intelligentsia, " Papers on Japan, Vol .

3

1 9 59).

The Making of an (Harvard Uni vers ity ,

East Asian Research Center , 1 9 65). Sodomei gojunen shi .ti fiJ _:: ..! t -lf f.._ (Fifty years of the Gene ral 299

Federation of Labor ). Tokyo , 1 9 64 . Sutton, Jos eph L . "A Politica l Biography of Inukai Tsuyoshi. " Ph. D. thes is ; Univers ity of Michigan, 1 954 . Suzuki Fujiya #.i ;t ± �� . ,JJ(_;:�

l!

fc.. t,. i{f!J

"Seito s eiji to minshu undo" J{ :t

(Party politics and popular movements );

Kense i Karon , Vol. 1 , No . 8 (Nove nb er 1 92 1) . ------"Seiji ni kokorozasu s einen e " J.(5-{;

•=

.t 1 � q.

"\

(To young

men who s et their hearts on politic s); Kens ei Karon, Vol. 2 , No . 8

(A� t 1 922). Suzuki Kis aburo den 41-;f.. .$

:::.

dp

•

Tokyo , 1 955 .

Saito Minoru � nl

Takahashi Korekiyo j; .f.fl Jt. �� Okada Keis uke [i) lfl /J. fr'- .

{-t;

1-

, and

Omoide o kataru .� · · j; i: H .?

(Talking abou t reminis cenc es ). Tokyo, 19 34 . ----- -Zuis oroku �J.. � ·H. (Es s ays). Tokyo , 1 9 3 6 .

Takahashi Seigo J1 tl)

5�

�

•

Gendai

oo

seito J,t1-\ "' il=k_ •t_

(Contemporary political par ties ) . Tokyo , 1930. Taketomi Tokitoshi if\' ;i �� -4:t . "Sengo no slis e i to taiosaku" � ii_ a>

� lJ ::! :tt �- l_

(Pos twar trends

ani

how

to

deal with them);

Kens ei , Vol. 2 , No. 1 (Januar y 1 9 1 9 ) . IIl

f

A;

'!' !1'3

]L

il p

Tanaka Giichi denki

-

-1 � � [.. (The biography of Tanaka Giichi).

2 vols . 0 1 9 60 .

Tanaka Sogoro

IB

•

Yoshino Sakuzo i ff 1 1 i!. , Tokyo, 1 9 58 .

Tenko .f� fOJ (Ideological convers ion). 3 vols . ; Tokyo , 1 9 62 . Tetsudosho 4� i!. ii

Nihon tetsudo s hi

a

k.. :i� il k (A history

of Japane s e railroads ). Tokyo , 1921. Tokutomi lichiro

1! &� - tip.

(A dis cus sion of the

his tocy

Taisho seikyokushi ron *.. .if J/zi, .( � of the political situation

in

the

Taisho per iod ). Tokyo, 1 91 6. Tomita Kojiro '&; .:&.._ -t

300

Ill

:f �;:. �P .

�.i) p.,, ;{.!

"Shiso oyobi genron mondl. i " .� .'*1· (The problem of ideas and expres sion);

J. 5:f9... -} . Kindai .tA 1\ a :f. >iJA t,o::·;f� (A manual of

Toyama Shigeki i.l .1. A .:tlt and Adachi Shizuko ...j; Nihon s eiji shi hikkei

modern Japanese political history). Tokyo , 1 9 6 1 . Tsurumi Yusuke 1iU_A;t .f;jf

Goto Shimpei

1j__;J. i.fr f

.

4 vols . ; Tokyo , 1 9 37 .

Turner , John E .

"The Kens eikai: Party Leader vs . Party Liberal , 1 1

Far Eastern Quarter ly , Vol. 9 , No. 3 (May 1 9 52 ) . Uchidl Shin'ya rtJ

111

H -tt. .

fi.l � .iJ. -t .if (Fifty

Fils etsu gojunen

stormy years ) . Tokyo , 1 9 51 . Uehara Etsujiro U !fl. i:JL

f"-t 'r 7

5 -t B _.$.. .,

tp .

;

Demokurashii to Nihon no kaizo

et.. i.!! (Democracy and the re const ruction of

Japan) . Tokyo , 1 9 1 9 . Ugaki Kazushige f �i - A_

.

Ugaki nikki 'f :l:j.

9

it, (The Ugaki

diary). Tokyo , 1 9 54 . Uzaki Kumakichi Jj, .lo� .�1 i

Inukai Tsuyoshi den }( -l 4t 1i<

.

{The biography of Inukai Tsuyoshi) . Tokyo , 1 932 . Wakatsuki Reijiro

Jt #,{A L * Bf .

"Sengo no zaisei o ronzu"

�f

i!_ "' R;t � 'f 1� f(A dis cus sion of pos twar finances ); Kensei , Vol. 2 , No . 1 (January 1 9 1 9). ------"Chiho zaisei kyuzais aku" �e._ -t �;t J_§;:_ ;Jj:..} �

1-._

(The policy

of relief for local finances ); Kensei , Vol . 4 , No. 1 (January 1 9 2 1 ) . ------"Dairanpisha

ro

zaika" k ;Jt.

l' j "' � 1.!

(The evil of extra­

vagant spending); Kensei Koron, Vol. 2 , No. 5 (May 1922). ------Kofuan kaikoroku 7; JilJ.t. lil ;J�#.. (The reminiscences of Wakatsuki Reijiro).

Tokyo, 1 9 50 .

Ward, Robert A . and Dankwart Rus tow .

Political Modern ization

in Japan and Turkey . Princeton, N. J. , 1 9 64 . Washio Yoshitsugu

�( /.t.J, j

, ed. Inukai BokudO den

;( .f<. A-.. 'f 1-i.

(The biography of Inukai Tsuyos hi). 3 vols . ; Tokyo, 1938-1939) .

301

;i( ...J: .:f.. 1 't �, .fl.

------Inukai Bokudo smkanshii

(The collected

letters of Inukai Tsuyo shi). Tokyo, 194 0 . Watanabe Toru ;Jl.Lll. 1R .

Gendai Nihon rono undo shi nempyo

l_t+\' e ;t... 1; J. t{ ftJ Jl !if :!_ (A chronology of labor and

peas ant moveme nts in contemporary Japan). Tokyo, 1 961 . Watanabe Tsuneo �J.!L 1"..!. /bj:t

Toshu to seito

•

{ i)

l::

� ?t

(Party leaders and political parties ). Tokyo , 1 9 61 . Weber Max.

Theory of Social and Economic Organization.

Glencoe , lll. , 1 9 64 . Yabe Sadaji � { f � 5 �

Konoe Fumima ro .i..ti:. .fit .:kJf' .

2 vols . ;

Tokyo, 1 9 52 .

t� -f--1. .� J-4: � 1.:- . �- 1!:, 4:- � (A history of the

Yamagata ken gikaishi he ns an iinkai J... -If} J Yamagata ken gikai shi J.. -1fj

Yamagata prefectural assembly). Yamagata City , 1 9 51 . Yamakawa Hitos hi .4 ''I :t8

"Seihen kara umareta shins eito "

�.(_ { IJ· .; :i. � "'-� .t!r ifJ;, t_ (The new political party born from

the cabinet change ); Kaizo , Vol. 9 , No . 7 (July 1 92 7 ) . Yamamoto Tatsuo J.. ;4.. i:1_ t:fi . Yamaura Kan 'ichi J.. ; jfj 1- .

Tokyo, 1 9 51 . Mori Kaku A ·t� . 2 vols . ; Tokyo,

1940 .

Yamazaki , Kakujiro

and

Ogawa Gotaro.

The Effect of the World

War upon the Commer ce and Industry of Japan. New Haven , Conn.

,

1 92 9 .

Yanaga , Chitoshi . Yokoyama Shotaro

Japan Since Perry . New York, 1 94 9 .

�� J.. A� A 8f

.

"Chian ijiho ron" ,·�.!/(; #J.:J!j ;t

1-iti (A dis cus s ion of the land tax trans fer ); Kensei Koron, Vol. 5 , No . 21 (November 1 92 5). ------ , ed.

Kense ikai shi

Tokyo, 1 9 2 6 .

302

1 if.t � :t_

(The hi story of the Kens eikai).

Yoshino Sakuzo

� ff 11 i.!

.

"Minshuteki jii undo o ronzu"

f\ �{lq :'f. !( i1_ 1..Q i -}� j" (On popular demons trat ions); Chuo Koron, Vol. 2 8 , No . 4 (April 1 9 14 ) . ------ "Hara naikaku

ni

taisuru yobo" !!f. lkJ fJ] t:= :i-j" j � -i -ij_ (My

demands from the Hara cabine t); Chuo Koron, Vol. 3 3 , No . 8 (October 1 91 8). ------"Ses suru

�P t .9

t=

nothing

ni

wa amari ga nai , hataraku

IJ; -1:- •J ?.!:'Ji

••

•

1tiJ <

t=

1J. 1-±

f 11:· �

ni ••

wa shigoto ga nai" (Nothing to save and

to work at); Chuo Koron, Vol. 39 , No. 11 (October 1 924 ).

------Yoshino Sakuzo Hakushi minshushugi ronshu "t !If 1 1 � i

t� -:!:

t\

ij; � j (A collection of essays on democ racy by Yoshino

Sakuzo) . 9 vols . ; Tokyo , 1948. Young, A. Morgan.

Japan in Modern Times . New York, 19 2 9 .

303

304

GLOOSARY

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309

310

I NDEX

Adachi Kenzo, 4 6 ; and the Doshikai, 4 6 ; as election manager, 9 1 , ! 85- 1 86, 2 1 7 ; drafts districting system, 200; urges calling of new elections, 203, 2 2 8 ; and the formation of the Minseito, 2 3 1 -2 3 2 Akamatsu Katsumaro, 1 2 0 Akita Kiyoshi, 2 1 8 Anti-Seiyukai merger movements, 34-38, 4647, 49, 88, 9 2 , 9 � 1 7 3- 1 74, 1 7 8- ! 80, 2 4 2 . See also Doshikai, Kenseikai, Minseito Aoki Nobumitsu, 1 69, 208-2 09, 2 1 o Ariga Nagao, 95 Arima Yoriyasu, 243 Arimatsu Eigi, 1 82 - 1 83 Army, 87, 1 96 Aso Hisashi, 1 2 1 , 235 Baba Tsunego, 1 1 3, 1 1 5, 1 37 , 235 Boku Retsu, 2 2 7 Bond, James, 2 56n4 Budget, 87, 89, 1 7 2 , 2 0 2 , 247 ; expansion under Hara, 1 38- 1 39 ; retrenchment under Kato Komei, 1 95- 1 99, 2 1 2, 2 I 3, 2 I 6 ; retrench­ ment under Kato Tomosaburo, 2 1 9 Bureaucrats : in party politics, I S , 4 2 -46, 505 2 ; in prefectural government, 3 2 ; and financial retrenchment, I 95 , I 96 Burke, Edmund: views on political parties, 236-2 37 Cabinet, see Kyokoku itchi cabinets ; Party cabi­ nets ; Transcendental cabinets Cabinets, formation of: from 1912 to 1914, 85, 259n 2 ; Okuma cabinet, 86-89 ; Terauchi cabinet, 96, 9 7 ; Hara cabinet, I 02 - 1 05 ; Takahashi cabinet, 1 66 ; from 192 1 t o 1932, 1 66 ; Kato Tomosaburo cabinet, 1 67- I 68, 1 74, q6; Yamamoto Gombei cabinet, I 68I 6g, q 8 ; Kiyoura Keigo cabinet, 1 6g, 1 8 1 , 1 8 2 - 1 83 ; Kato Komei cabinets, 1 8 7 , I go, 2 2 1 -2 2 2 ; Wakatsuki cabinet, 2 2 5 ; Tanaka cabinet, 2 3 2 Chua Club, 3 7 , 4 2 , 46 Chiisei Club, 2 1 8 Chuseikai, g6 Communist Party, �04

Constitution, see Meiji constitution Constitutional government, I , 64, 7 1 , 95-g6, gg, 1 1 3, 1 84 Dai Nihon Rodo Sodomei , I 2 7 , I 59, 1 6o, 2 04. See also Labor movement; Yuaikai Daido Club, 37 Daido Danketsu, 36 Democratic ideas, 1 1 4- 1 I 7 , 1 20- 1 2 I, 1 43- I 44 Den Kenj iro, 43, 5 1 , 52, 1 68, 245 ; in the Terauchi cabinet, 1 00 ; and Hara Kei, 1 36 ; a s candidate for premier, 1 67, 1 8 2 , 232 Diet, see House of Peers ; House of Represent­ atives Doseikai ( House of Peers), 206 Doshikai, 1 2 , 1 4, 2 9 , qg, 2 4 2 ; formation of, 1 2 , 38-49 ; internal dispute over future of, 6o-62 ; supports Okuma cabinet, 86-8 7 ; genro attitude toward, 93; reorganized, g697· See also Anti-Seiyukai merger move­ ments ; Kato Komei ; Kenseikai ; Minseito Economic difficulties, popular, I I I , 1 25 , 1 45, 1 49 Egi Yo k u, 43, 44, 46, 1 43 , 1 50, I 5 8, 2 2 9 ; role in the Kato Komei cabinet, 1 9 1 , 209, 2 1 6, 222 Election districting, 1 50- 1 5 1 , 200, 238-239 Election expenses, I g-24, go, 1 oo Elections : of 1908, 34, 38; of 1912, 34, 3 7 ; of 1902, 56; of 1892, 7 5 ; political significance of, 86; of 1915, 8g-g 2 , 1 05 ; of 1917, 99- 1 00, 1 05 ; of 1920, I 7 2 ; of 1924, I 68, I 85- I �6, I 8g. See also Election districting; ElectiOn expenses; Electoral techniques ; Electorate, character of; Pork barrel legislation Electoral reform, I O I , I 2 7 - 1 28, I 4 7- 1 48, I 5 I ­ I 5 2 , 1 99-203. See also Universal suffrage Electoral techniques, 20-24, 3 2-33, 48, 8g9 2 , I 85- 1 86, 247. See also Election expen � es ; Election districting; Pork barrel leg1slatwn Electorate, character of, 239-24 I , 24 7 Emperor, 244 Financial policy : of the Seiyukai, I 3 7- I 39, 1 4 7 , 2 I 9- 2 2 o ; of the Kenseikai, I 47 , I 93J gg, 2 1 9-2 20. See also Tax reform

311

I N DEX

Fuj isawa lkunosuke, 4 8 , 1 5 2 Fukuda Tokuzo, 1 1 3 Genro : and the constitution, 3 ; and political parties, 9- 1 0, 83, 1 65- 1 66 ; split among, 1 1 ; withdrawal from forefront of politics, 1 1 - 1 2 , 39 ; continued i nterest i n policy, 5 2 , 83, 26 1 n2 5 ; criticism of, 6 2 -63, 7 2 , 7 7 , 7 9-80 ; political role, 84-85 , 244, 246; and Okuma cabinet, 87-89, 9 2 -93 ; dilemma of, 1 0 1 , 1 63, 244- 24 5 ; declining i nfluence of, 1 02 , 1 36 ; Saionji a s the "last," 1 65 , 1 66, 1 6g, 1 87 , 245; and party cabinets, 1 65- 1 66 ; sup­ port for Kato, 2 2 2 . See also Ham batsu; Yamagata Aritomo Goto Shimpei, 40, 5 1 , 1 68, 1 89 , 2 q, 24 1 ; and the Doshikai, 43, 45, 6o, 2 5 7 n 2 1 ; in the Terauchi cabinet, 98, 99- 1 00 Hamaguchi Yiiko, 1 4, 1 43 ; reasons for joining the Doshikai, 44-45 ; views on social unrest, 1 4 5 ; as finance minister, 1 9 1 , 1 94- 1 99, 2 2 0-2 2 1 ; becomes president of the Minseito, 233 Hamao Shohachi, 2 1 8 Ham batsu: and jiyuminken movement, 7 ; and political parties, 8- 1 2 , 30, 35-36, 7 7 ; Katsura as representative of, 3 1 , 34, 38, 5 8 ; and "loyalist" parties, 35 ; opposition to, 35-36, 4 1 , 6 2 , 79, 87, 98-99, 1 0 2 , 1 1 3 ; and Hara Kei, 74, 7 7 , 78; and Oura Kemmu, 89 ; declining influence of, 1 0 2 . See also Genro; Yamagata Aritomo Hara Kei, 4, 1 2 , 1 9 , s o ; accommodation with Katsura, 1 2, 30-3 1 ; electoral success, 1 9 , 78, 8o-8 2 ; r o l e i n e x p a n s i o n of Seiyiikai power, 30-34, 1 3 7 - 1 39 ; early life and edu­ cation, 68-7 1 ; personality, 70-7 1 , 78, 2 6 3n45 ; political views, 7 1 -7 2 , 75- 7 7 , 86, 1 36- 1 38, 248; career in bureaucracy, 73-74, 78-79 ; relations with the oligarchs, 73, 74, 1 o2, 1 04, 1 36; entry into the Seiyiikai, 7 7 7 8 ; career a s journalist, 7 1 -7 3 , 75-76; a s a political leader, 79-82, 1 7 2 , 253n 1 5 ; con­ trasted with Kato Komei, 80-8 2 , 1 05- 1 06, 1 46, 246; on the 1915 election, 89-90 ; cooperates with Terauchi , 99- 1 o 1 , 1 0 2 ; rec­ onciliation with Yamagata, 1 02 , 1 04 ; selec­ tion as premier, 1 03- 1 05 ; significance of appointment as premier, 1 05 , 1 07 - 1 08 ; tac­ tics as premier, 1 36, 1 4 2 , 250; "positive policy" of, I 36- 1 39 ; attitudes toward popu­ lar unrest, 1 39- 1 42 , 2 0 4 ; tactics in opposi­ tion, 142 ; and electoral reform, I 50- I 5 I ;

312

Hara Kei ( Cont. ) and universal suffrage, 1 54, 1 56- 1 5 7 ; as­ sassination of, 1 62- 1 63 ; conservatism of, 250 Harada Kumao, 1 66 Haseba Junko, 78 Hasegawa Nyozekan, 1 1 5 Hayami Seij i , 2 2 2 Hayashi Yiizo, 1 1 Hayashida Kametaro, 4 2 Hiranuma Kiichiro, 1 34, 1 68, 2 04-205 Hirata Tosuke, 1 1 , 43, I 02 , 1 66, 1 68, 1 8 2 , 1 90, 245 Hoshi Toru, 77; and accommodation with Yamagata, 1 0 ; and organization of Seiyiikai, 1 1 ; tactics of, 30, 3 2 House o f Peers : political role of, 85, 206-207, 2 I 1 , 249, 250; and Hara cabinet, 1 36; and Kiyoura cabinet, 1 82 - 1 83 , 1 84 ; and Kato Komei cabinet, 1 89, I 93 ; reform of, 1 89, 1 9 2 ; objections to universal suffrage, 1 99, 2 0 1 -2o 2 ; objections to Law for Control of Radical Social Movements, 205 ; objections to peerage reform, 2 08, 2 I O, 249; reform of, 209-2 1 2 ; mutual election regulations of, 2 I 0-2 1 1 . See also Kenkyiikai House of Representatives : importance to cabi­ net, 2-3, 1 0, 85-86, 245- 246 ; parties in, 1 8- 1 9 ; controlled by well-to-do, I 28. See also Political parties lmai Yoshiyuki, 1 1 3 ; and universal suffrage, 1 55 lnnai J ikkokai, I 54, I s6 Inoue Kaoru, I I ; and Hara Kei , 7 3-74, 87 ; and the Okuma cabinet, 8 7 -88, 93 lnukai Tsuyoshi, 6, 1 1 , 5 1 , 73; electoral success, I 9 ; and anti-Seiyiikai merger, 35-38, 46-47 ; and Movement for Constitutional Govern­ ment (1912-1913), 4 1 , 46-4 7 ; antipathy to­ ward Kato, 88-89, 1 79- 1 8o ; and Yamagata, 1 0 2 ; and the formation of the Kakushin Club, 1 79 ; in the Kato cabinet, 1 90, 1 96, I 98 ; and the dissolution of the Kakushin Club, 2 1 8-2 1 9 Irie Kan'ichi, 38 Ishibashi Tanzan, I 1 3 ltagaki Taisuke, 1 3, 38 Ito Hirobumi : and role of Diet, 2; and politi­ cal parties, 1 0, 1 1 , 38; and the Seiyiikai, 1 1 , 30, 5 7 ; and Hara Kei, 7 3 - 7 4 ; as genro, 85 Ito Miyoji, I 0 2 Iwasaki Haruji, 54 Iwasaki Koyuta, I 5 3 Iwasaki Yanosuke, 55

Iwasaki Yaroku, 57 Iwasaki Yataro, 54 lzawa Takio, I 78, 2 I o Japanese-Soviet Treaty, 205 Jitsugyo Doshikai, 240 Jiyiiminken movement, 6-8, I 2- I 3, 24, 35, I 28, I 35 Jiyuto, 8 Kagawa Toyohiko, I 59, I 6o Kaishinto, 35 Kaizo Domeikai, I I 5 Kakushin Club: formation of, I 7 4 ; and anti­ Seiyiikai merger, 1 7 8- I 8o ; and political reform, I 78, I 93 ; and Movement for Con­ stitutional Government ( 1924), I 83- I 86 ; merger with Seiyiikai, I go; a n d Kato cabi­ net, I go; and universal suffrage, 1 78 ; and re­ trenchment policy, I g6 ; merges with Seiyii­ kai, 2 I 8-2 I g, 2 3 9 ; and electorate, 240. See also Kokuminto; Inukai Tsuyoshi Kaneko Fumiko, 2 2 7 Kaneko Kentaro, I Kataoka Kenkichi, I I Kataoka Naoharu, 3 7 , I 3 7 , 2 2 2 ; and forma­ tion of Doshikai , 4 7 , 6o; views on social unrest, I 44, I 45 Kato Komei, 4, I 4, 5 0 ; and formation of Doshikai, 43 ; personality, 53, 59, 6o, 66-68, 243 ; early life and education, 53-54; mar­ riage, 5 4 ; wealth, 54, 8 I , 2 4 3 ; diplomatic ca�eer, 55, 5 8 ; and Okuma, 5 5 , 5 7 , 88-8g ; and the Seiyiikai, 55-56, 5 7 ; electoral fail­ ure, 56; and Ito, 56, 5 7 ; as an Anglophile, 57, 6 I , 82, g6; and Katsura, 5 8 ; views on foreign policy formulation, 58, 59, 62-63, 93-94 ; enters Doshikai, 59-62 ; reputation, 6o, 9 3 ; becomes Doshikai president, 62 ; relations with the genro, 6 2 -63, 92-96, g8gg, 1 02 , 1 06, I 67 ; political views, 62-66, g8-gg, 248; as a political leader, 66-68, 93, gg, 242 ; contrasted with Hara Kei, 8o-82 , I 05 - I 06, I 46, 246 ; and the Okuma cabinet (1914-1916), 88-Bg, 92-9 7 ; and the Twenty­ one Demands, 94-96 ; opposition to the Terauchi cabinet, g8-gg ; rejected as premier, 1 0 2 , 1 06, I 67 , 1 7 6- I 7 7 ; views on popular unrest, I 45- I 46, 2 I 4-2 I 5, 2 4 8 ; policies in o p position, I 46- I 4 7 ; and universal suffrage, I 50, I 5 2 - I 53, I 58 - I 59, I 7 3 - 1 76, I 99-206; and " Five Precious Articles" incident, I 5 8I 59 ; faces opposition within the Kenseikai 1 75- I Bo ; becomes premier, I go ; poor health

:

Kato Komei ( Cont. ) I 9 I ; tactics as premier, I 93, I 9 7- I g8, 2002 0 2 , 2 I 2-2 I 3 , 2 I 5 , 2 5 0 ; and the retrench­ ment policy, I 94- I gg ; and the Peace Pres­ ervation Law, 203-206; and peerage reform, 206-2 I 3, 2 4 9 ; significance of first cabinet, 2 I 4 ; hopes for continued reform, 2 I 4-2 I 5 ; formation o f second cabinet, 2 2 0-2 2 2 ; death of, 2 2 5 Kato Seinosuke, I 49 Kato Tomosaburo, I 67- I 68, 1 76- I 7 7 Katsura Taro, I I ; attitude toward parties, I I ; accommodation with Seiyiikai , I 2 , 2 9 , 303 I , 38-39 ; forms Doshikai , I 2 , 2 9 , 39-42, 43-44, 47, 6 2 ; and Yamagata, 38, 39, 85 ; death of, 45, 49; and Kato Komei, 58-59 Kawahara Shigesuke, 2 3 3 Kawasaki Katsu, go Kawakami Hajime, I I 9 Kenkyiikai, I 36 , I 93 , 208, 2 I O Kenseihonto, 28, 30, 35-36, 5 7 Kenseikai, I 4, 1 7 , 2 9 , 8 6 ; formation of, g6-g7 ; and genro, gB, I 7 8 ; loses absolute majority, gg- 1 0o; attacks on Terauchi, gB, I o i ; at­ titude toward domestic reform, I 43- I 47 ; reform program of, I 46- I 47 , I 5 9 , I 64, I BB­ I Bg, 2 I 4, 2 I 6; and electoral reform, I 4 7, I 48- I 5o; universal suffrage faction within, I 49, I 55 , 1 7 3 - I 7 4 ; and universal suffrage question ( 1919), I 5o; supports universal suf­ frage, I 5 2 - I 54, I 5 7 - I 5 8 ; and "Five Precious Articles" incident, I 58- I 59, I 6 I ; weakness of, I 63 ; Saionj i 's attitude toward, I 67 ; in­ ternal dissension, J 7 2 - I 8o, 2 4 2 - 2 4 3 ; and "independent livelihood" clause, I 73- 1 74; and Movement for Constitutional Govern­ ment (1922 ) , I 7 7 ; and anti-Seiyiikai merger, q8- I 8o; and Movement for Constitutional Government (!924), I 83- I 8 7 ; victory in 1924 election, I 86 ; forms coalition cabinet, I 8g- I g i ; problems faced in power, I BB, I g i - I 93, 2 I 2-2 I 3 ; financial policy of, I 93I 95 ; and financial retrenchment, I 95- I gg; and passage of universal suffrage, I 99-203, 2 I 2, 2 I 3; and anti-subversive legislation, 204, 205-206; and Peace Preservation Law, 205-2 06 ; and peerage reform, 20 7-208, 209-2 I 2 ; reluctance to face election, 2 I 5, 2 q, 2 2 2 , 2 2 8 ; break-up of coalition with Seiyiikai, 2 I 6-2 2 I ; alliance with Seiyiihonto, 2 2 3 - 2 2 5 , 2 26, 23 I ; and meeting of three party leaders, 2 29-230; merges with Seiyii­ honto, 2 3 2- 2 3 3 . See also Doshikai ; Kat6 Komei ; Minseit6

313

I N D EX

Kenseit6, I O , 3 6 , 7 7 Key, V. 0., 2 3 9 Kisei seilii, 3 Kiyose lchir6, I I 3 Kiyoura Keigo, 85, I 02 , I 67 , 245 ; cabinet of, I 8o, I 86, 204-205 Kobashi lchita, 32 Kodera Kenkichi, 6o Koizumi Matajir6, I 8, I SS Koizumi Sakutar6, 1 69, 2 0 1 Kojima Kazuo, 1 84, 2 0 1 Kojunsha, 4 I Kokumin Kyokai, 35 Kokumint6 : formation of, 37; split within, 39, 4 2 , 46-47, 59, 2 1 8 ; and universal suffrage, I S 3 , 1 54, I S6, I 58, 1 74 ; weakness of, I 63 ; dissolved, I 7 4 · See also Kakushin Club; lnukai Tsuyoshi Konoe Fumimaro, 20 I , 208 Kono Hironaka, 1 43 ; and accommodation with the hambatsu, g- 1 0, 30; and formation of the Doshikai, 40, 4 7, 6 1 , 62 ; and univer­ sal suffrage, 1 49, 1 58 Koshin Club ( House of Representatives), 1 79 Koyu Club ( House of Representatives), g6, 26on 1 o Koyu Club (House o f Peers), 206, 208 Kuroda Nagatoshi, 1 6g Ky6ch6kai, 1 26 Kyokoku itchi cabinets, 97-98, I 68, 245 Labor legislation, I4 7 Labor movements : post-war growth of, I 2 I ­ I 2 5 ; politicization of, I 2 5 - 1 2 7 ; and univer­ sal suffrage, 129, I 3 I , 1 49, I SS. I S9- I 6o ; and politicians, I 33, I 34 ; a n d Hara cabinet, 1 40- I 4 1 ; i ncreased militance, I 5 2 ; and Peace Preservation Law, 2 03. See also Dai Nihon R6d6 Sodomei ; Suzuki Bunj i ; Yuaikai Law for Control of Radical Social Movements, 204 League for the Promotion of U niversal Suf­ frage, 1 28 Left-wing, 247. See also Communist Party; La­ bor movement; Law for Control of Radical Social Movements; Peace Preservation Law Machida Chuji, 6o Maeda Renzan, I 35- I 36 Makino Nobuaki, 2 3 I , 2 3 2 "Mass awakening," 1 I O- I I 2 , 1 1 8, 1 6 I ; viewed by politicians, I 3 3- I 34, I 3 9- I 40, 1 44· See also Labor movement ; New liberals; Student movement

314

Matsuda Masahisa, 1 I , 78, 79 Matsukata Masayoshi, I o, 95, I 66-I 67 Matsumoto Gokichi, I 6S- I 66, 1 83, 2 2 2 , 2 2 g23 I Meij i Constitution, 1 - 2 , 243-244, 249-250. See also House of Peers ; House of Represent­ atives; Privy Council Michels, Robert : views on party elite, 1 7 Miki Bukichi, go, 1 55 , 1 74, 1 79- I 8o Minjin Domei, 1 20 Minobe Tatsukichi, 2 3 7-238 Minoura Katsundo, 4 7 , 7 3 , 1 79 Minseito, 29, 44; formation of, 2 I S, 2 3 1 , 2 3 2233, 242 ; program of, 2 34-235. See also Doshikai ; Kenseikai Miura Gor6, 1 76, I 8 I Mizuno Naoshi, 1 8 2 , 2 0 2 , 208-209, 2 I O Mizuno Rentaro, 3 2 , 2 2 3 Morito Tatsuo, I 40 Motoda Haj ime, I 67 , 1 70, I 7 I , I 83, 2 26, 2 33 Minto, 3, 8, 5 7 , 75, 7 7 Movement for Constitutional Government (1912-191J), 4 1 , I I O, I 1 3, 1 53, I 8 I , I 84 Movement for Constitutional Government (1924), 1 64, 1 7 7 , 1 80 - 1 8 7 , 2 06, 2 I 6, 246 Mutsu Munemitsu, I 3, 55, 7 8 ; and Hara Kei, 74 Nagai Ryutar6, 24, I I 3, I I 5, 1 1 7 ; and universal suffrage, I 49, 1 5 7 - I 58, I 6 I Nagashima Ryuji, 44, 45, 1 79 Nakahashi Tokugor6, 1 67 , 1 70, I 7 I , 1 83, 2 23 Nakai Hiroshi, 7 3 Nakakoji Ren, 4 3 , 4 5 , 1 34 Nakano Seigo, 1 1 3, 1 1 5 , 1 79, 2 2 7 New liberals, 1 I 3- I 1 7 Nitobe I nazo, I I 4 Noda Yutaro, go, 1 7 I - 1 7 2 , 2 1 7, 243 Ogawa Heikichi, 2 20-2 2 1 Ogi Tokichi, 1 89, 2 2 3 Oishi M asami, 3 6 , 1 79- I 8o ; and anti-Seiyil­ kai merger, 36-38; and the Doshikai, 47, 59, 62 ; and Kat6 Komei, 59, 6o Okada Ryohei, 1 9 1 Okano Keijir6, I 6g Okazaki Hisajir6, I 8 I Okazaki Kunisuke, 79, I 8 I , 2 0 2 , 2 1 7, 2 2 0221 Okuda Gijin, 1 70 Okuma Shigenobu, 1 3, 35, 38, 5 7 ; cabinet of, 86-97 ; attitude toward Seiyukai, 88; and Kat6 Komei, 88-Bg, g6-g 7 ; and the 1915

Okuma Shigenobu ( Cont. ) election, go, g 1 -g 2 ; relations with the genro, g4, g6-g7 Oligarchs, see Genro Osugi Sakae, 204 Oyama Ikuo, I 1 3, 1 1 4, I 1 6, I I 7 Oura Kemmu, 1 1 , 3 7 , 5 2 ; and formation of Doshikai, 40, 43, 46, 6 1 -62 ; and Kato Komei, 6o, 6 2 ; in the Okuma cabinet, 8g; bribery scandal, g5 ; as candidate for pre­ mier, 1 02 Oyama I wao, go Ozaki Yukio, 6, 1 6, 4 1 , 5 1 , 7 3 , 1 43 ; on Hara Kei , 8o; in the Okuma cabinet, 88, g2 ; and universal suffrage, 1 4g , 1 58, 1 6 1 , 1 73 ; views on political parties, 2 36-238 Parties, see Political parties Party cabinets: emergence of, 4, 86, 1 05- 1 06, 1 86- 1 87 , 243-246; Kato's views on, 62-63 ; Hara's views on, 7 1 -7 2 , 76-7 7 ; legitimacy of, 1 0g ; institutionalization of, 1 63, 24g-2 50 Party mergers, see Anti-Seiyiikai merger move­ ments Party rivalry, see Two party system Peace Preservation Law, 2 0 3 - 2 06, 2 1 2 , 2 1 3, 248, 250 Peerage reform, see House of Peers Police Regulations of 1900, 1 2 6, 1 3 1 , 1 40, 1 4 1 Political parties : role in the Diet, 2 - 3 , changing character of, 3, 8; control over cabinet, 4; contrasted with jryiiminken movement, 67; accommodation with the hambatJU, 8- 1 2 , 45 ; membership of, 1 2 - 1 6, 24 1 ; leadership of, 1 3- 1 4, 50-5 2 , 248 ; and business, 1 5 - 1 6, go ; internal organization of, I 6- I g, 247 ; and elections, I g-24; public criticism of, 24-26, 1 07 - 1 08, I J 7- I 1 8, 1 40, 1 64, 1 841 85, 243; tactics of, 26-2 7 , 85-86, 1 42 , 1 75, 1 8 1 , 1 87 ; formation of, 28-2g, 64-65 ; and pork-barrel legislation, 3 2 - 3 3 ; " loyalist" parties, 3 5 ; Kat6's views on, 63-66; Hara's views on, 7 5- 7 7 ; and the genro, 83-86; cooperation between, 1 05 , 1 8 1 - 1 87 , 1 8g­ I g i ; differences in policy, 1 35 , 1 47 , 1 48, 24 1 ; weakness of ( 192 1 -1923), 1 63- 1 64 ; liberal conception of, 2 36-2 3 7 ; functions of, 237-238; cohesion of, 242-243 ; electoral supremacy of, 24 7 ; and constitutional struc­ ture, 248-250; assessment of, 250-25 1 ; finances of, 2 5 3n 1 5 , 2 5 7 n 2 1 . See also Party cabinets ; Two party system Pork-barrel legislation, 3 2 -3 3 , 1 3 7 - 1 38, 1 3g, 1 5 2 , 1 g2 , I g6, 20 1 , 2 4 1

Privy Council : and Kato Komei cabinet, 1 8g, 1 g 3 ; objections to universal suffrage, 1 99, 200-2 0 1 ; 2 0 2 , 24g; and Peace Preservation Law, 203 ; political role of, 24g; reform of, 24g-2 50 Railroad construction, 1 g7 - 1 g8 Reform sentiments, 1 08- 1 0g, 1 1 2 , 1 3g- I 40, 142 Reimeikai, 1 1 4- 1 1 5 Retrenchment program, see Budget ; Financial policy Rice riots, 1 0 1 , 1 1 0, 1 1 2 , 1 2 0, 1 26, 1 33 Saigo Tsugumichi , 35 Saionji Kimmochi, 1 2 , 2 g , 85 ; as president of Seiyiikai, 3 1 , 85 ; personality, 8 5 , 1 6 7 ; re­ luctance to become premier, 1 02 ; and the formation of the Hara cabinet, 1 03- 1 05 ; problem a s genro, 1 63- 64, 1 66, 1 6g ; atti­ tude toward party government, 1 65- 1 66, 1 6g ; selection of "transcendental cabinets," 1 6 7- 1 6g ; and Kato Komei, 1 67 , 1 go, 2 2 1 2 2 2 ; and peerage reform, 2 08-2og, 2 1 0; and Wakatsuki, 2 2 5 ; and Tokonami, 2 3 2 ; and Tanaka, 2 3 2 Sakai Toshihiko, 1 3 2 Sakakida Seibei, 23 1 Seiyiihonto, 1 4 ; formation of, 1 8 3, 243 ; sup­ ports Kiyoura cabinet, 1 83, 1 85 ; in 1924 election, 1 86 ; alliance with Kenseikai, I go, 2 2 3- 2 2 5 , 2 26, 2 3 1 ; alliance with Seiyiikai, 1 go, 2 2 1 , 2 2 6-2 2 8 ; and educational expend­ iture, 1 g8; dissension within, 2 2 3 ; and meeting of three party leaders, 2 2g-2 30; merges with Kenseikai, 2 3 I, 2 3 2 - 2 3 3 . See also Tokonami Takejiro Seiyiik � i, 1 o, 1 2 , 1 3, 2g, 5 7 ; formation of, 1 0I I , 78, 2 4 2 ; expansion of power ( 1905191 2 ) , 30-34; and Katsura, 3 1 , 34, 38; and the Okuma cabinet, 8g, 1 4 2 ; genro attitude toward, 8 7 ; supports Terauchi cabinet, gg­ I O I ; forms cabinet, 1 0 2- 1 05 ; "positive pol­ icy" of, 1 3 7 - 1 3g, 1 46, I g3 , I g6 ; and labor unrest, I 3g- I 4 1 ; and reform, I 4 2 ; and elec­ toral reform, 1 47 , I 48- 1 5 2 ; and 1919 elec­ toral bill, 1 5 1 ; defeats universal suffrage, 1 5 6- 1 5 7 ; dissension within, 1 63 , 1 67 , I 6g­ I 7 2 ; supports Kato Tomosaburo, 1 68, I 74, I 7 6 ; and the Movement for Constitutional Government (1924 ), I 83- 1 87 ; in 1924 elec­ tion, I 86; weakened by split, 1 86, I 8g; alliance with Seiyiihonto, 1 go, 2 2 I ; enters Kato cabinet, 1 go; and peerage reform, 1 g2 ;

\

315

I N DEX

Seiyukai ( Cont. ) and Universal Manhood Suffrage Bill, I g 2 , 20 I ; and financial retrenchment, I g6, I 97, I g8, 2 0 I -2 0 2 ; discontent with coalition, 20 1 , 2 I 2 , 2 I 6- 2 1 7 ; and peerage reform, 206, 2 09 ; merges with Kakushin Club, 2 I 82 I g ; acquires Tanaka as president, 2 1 7 ; break-up o f coalition with Kenseikai, 2 I 622 I ; and meeting of three party leaders, 2 2 9-230. See also Hara Kei Seki Kazutomo, I 78 Seki Naohiko, 20 Sengoku Mitsugu, 3 7 , 4 7 , 6o, 2 r 6 ; and Kato Komei, 59, 1 7 9, 2 2 3 ; as railroad minister, I g i , I 9 7-200, 2 26, 2 2 8 ; as party money­ raiser, 233 Shibusawa Eiichi, go, I 2 6 Shidehara Kij uro, I g i Shimada Saburo, 47, 56, 6 I , I 43 ; and urnversa! suffrage, I 49, 1 58, 1 7 3 Shimooka Chuji, g i , 9 7 , 1 78 Shimpoto, 35, 7 7 Shinagawa Yajiro, 35 Shinj inkai , I 20, I 6o Social welfare policy, I 1 7 , I 43, I 45 , I 47, I 94- I 95, 2 I 6-2 1 7 Student movement, I I 8- I 2 I ; and universal suffrage, I 3 I , I 56, I 6o- r 6 I Suzuki Bunji, I 25 - I 26, I 2 7 , I 59 Suzuki Fujiya, I 49 ; and universal suffrage, I 49, 1 75 Suzuki Kisaburo, 2 04-205 Tagawa Daikichi, I 73 Takahashi Korekiyo, 13, 243 ; becomes pre­ mier, I 66 ; problems as Seiyukai president, I 6g - I) 2 , I 8 2- r 84 ; personality, 1 70 ; and Movement for Constitutional Government (1924), 1 83 ; in the Kato cabinet, r go, I g2, I g6, I g8, 2 o I ; replaced by Tanaka, 2 q ; on party rule, 25 I Takarabe Takeshi, I g6 Taketomi Tokitoshi, 4 7 , I 43 ; views on social unrest, I43- I 44, I 45 Tanaka Giichi, I 3, I 36, I 8g ; becomes Seiyukai president, 20 1 , 2 1 7 ; involved in scandal, 2 2 7 ; cooperation with Seiyuhonto, 2 2 8 ; and meeting of three party leaders, 2 2 9-23 1 Tanaka Zenritsu, I 43, I 55 Tax reform, 2 I 4, 2 1 6, 2 I 9-220, 2 2 4 Teikoku Nokai, 2 I g Teiseito, 73 Terauchi Masatake, 40, g6; cabinet of, 97I O I ; relations with Yamagata, g8, I O I

316

Tokonami Takejiro, I 4, 3 2 , 243 ; policy toward popular unrest, I 2 6 ; and the "transcenden­ tal cabinets" ( 1922-1924), r 68 ; character, 1 7 I -r 7 2 ; tactics as Seiyuhonto leader, 2 2 32 2 4, 2 2 7- 2 2 9 ; and the meeting of the three party leaders, 2 29-23 I ; ambitions to be­ come premier, 2 3 I -2 3 2 Tomita Kojiro, 37, I 4 3 ; views o n social unrest, I 43, I 44 Toyokawa Ryohei, 4 7 , 5 7 , 59 Transcendental government, 83, I O I , 1 03, 1 04, I 07, 1 64, I 65- r 6g, I 8o, 245 Twenty-one Demands, 94-95 Two party system : emergence of, 4, 28-49, 2 I 5-2 I 6, 234, 235, 242 ; and party cabinets, 86, 1 05- 1 o6, I 86- I 8 7 ; and policy differ­ ences, 1 35 , I 47 , I 48 ; and the electoral sys­ tem 2 38-2 39; and the character of the elec­ torate, 2 39- 2 4 1 ; and the character of the Diet membership, 2 4 1 - 2 4 2 Uchida Shin'ya, I 58- r sg Uehara Etsujiro, 1 I 3, 1 1 6, I 30 Uesugi Shinkichi, 2 00 Ugaki Kazunari, r g 6 Universal suffrage : movement for, 1 09, I 27, I 2 8, 1 54, I 55- I 56, I 5g- I 6 I ; arguments in favor of, I 28- I 30; split in movement for, I 30-I 3 2 ; and the parties, 1 3 2 , r 64 ; debated by Kenseikai, I 49 ; proposed in 4 2 nd Diet, 1 5 3, 1 54 ; and "independent livelihood" clause, I 54, I 73 , 2oo; defeated in 42nd Diet, I 56- r 5 7 , I 64 ; passage of, I 8g, I gg203, 2 1 2 , 2 1 3, 249; approved by Privy Council, 200-2o i ; connection with Peace Preservation Law, 203, 2 0 5 ; creates new electorate, 203, 2 I 5· See also Electoral reform Wakatsuki Reij iro, I 4, 1 43 ; and Katsura, 40, 43, 44 ; and the Doshikai, 4 3 ; views on so­ cial unrest, I 43 ; and dissension within the Seiyukai, 1 7 8- I 8o ; as home minister, I g r , 200-2 0 1 ; views o n retrenchment, 1 94 ; and the Peace Preservation Law, 203-206; rela­ tions with the Seiyuhonto, 2 2 4-2 2 5 ; char­ acter, 2 25-226; difficulties as premier, 2 2 62 2 8 ; and the meeting of three party leaders, 2 2 9-23 I ; fall of cabinet, 2 3 2 Wilson, Woodrow : views on political parties, 27 Yamada Akitoshi, 73 Yamagata Aritomo, I o, I 5 I ; and the Seiyu­ kai, 3 I , 92-93 ; opposition to party cabinets,

Yamagata Aritomo

(Cont. )

Yamanashi Hanzo, 2 2 3

38, 83, 97-98, 246; political style, 84, 85, 98,

Yokota Sennosuke, I 7 I , I 8 3 , I 86, 2 1 7 ; i n Kato

antipathy toward Kato Komei, 93-96, g8,

cabinet, I 9 2 , I 96, 2 0 I , 2 06, 2 0 9 ; and land

I o 2 ; and the Terauchi cabinet, 97-I O I ; nominates

Hara

as

premier,

I O I - I OS ;

tax transfer, 2 2 o Yoshino Sakuzo,

people," I I o; and Reimeikai, I I 4; concept

Yamakawa Hitoshi, 2 3 3 Yamamoto Tatsuo, qo, I 7 I , I 83 , 2 2 0 ; and

minponshugi,

the

u s ; criticism of

I 4 3 ; death of, I 62 - I 63, I 65 ; and Takahashi

of

on

I I3,

parties,

cabinet, I 66; political roles, 244-245 Yamamoto Gombei, 59, 8s, I 68- I 69, I 8 2 Yashiro Rokuro, 95

26;

26,

anxieties about popular unrest, I 3 3, I 42-

" awakening of the

I I 7 ; and the student move­

ment, I I 9- I 2 0 , I 2 I ; on universal suffrage, I 2 8, I 30- I 3 I ; on peerage reform, 207

Yiiaikai, I 2 S- I 2 7 , I 3 I , I 3 2 , I 5 3 · See

also Dai

Nihon Rodo Sodomei ; Labor movement

conflict within Seiyiikai , 1 7 0- 1 7 2 ; relations with the Kenseikai, 2 2 3 , 2 2 6

317

HARVARD E AST ASIAN SERIE S

China's Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-huai (1844-1916) and Mandarin Enter­ prise. By Albert Feuerwerker. 2. Intellectual Trends in the Ch'ing Period. By Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. Translated by 1.

Immanuel C. Y. Hsi.i . 3· Ref orm in Sung China: Wang A n-shih (102 1-1086) and His New Policies. By James T. . C. Liu. 4 · Studies on the Population rif China, 1368-1953. By Ping-ti Ho. 5·

China's Entrance into the Fa mily of Nations: The Diplomatic Phase, 1858-1880.

By I mmanuel C. Y. Hsi.i. 6. The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China . By Chow Tse-tsung. 7. Ch'ing A dministrative Terms: A Translation rif the Terminology rif the Six Boards with Explanatory Notes. Translated and edited by E-tu Zen Sun. 8. A nglo-A merican Steamship Rivalry in China, 1862-1876. By Kwang-Ching Liu . g. Local Government i n China under the Ch'ing. B y T'ung-tsu Ch'i.i. I O. Communist China, 1955-1959: Policy Documents with A nalysis. With a foreword by Robert R. Bowie and John K. Fairbank. ( Prepared at Harvard University under the joint auspices of the Center for I nternational Affairs and the East Asian Re­ search Center. ) I I . China a n d Christianity: The Missionary Movement a n d the Growth of Chinese A ntiforeign­ ism, 1860-1870. By Paul A. Cohen. I 2. China and the Helping Hand, 1937-1945. By Arthur N . Young. I 3 . Research Guide to the May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China, 1915-1924 . By Chow Tse-tsung. I 4. The United States and the Far Eastern Crises of 1933-1938: From the Manchurian Incident through the Initial Stage rif the Undeclared Sino-Japanese War. By Dorothy Borg. I 5 . China and the West, 1858-1861: The Origins rifthe Tsungli Yamen. By M asataka Banno. I 6. In Search rif Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West. By Benj amin Schwartz. q . The Origins rif Entrepreneurship in Meiji Japan. By Johannes Hirschmeier, S.V.D. I8. Commissioner Lin and the Opium War. By Hsin-pao Chang. I g. Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1845-1895. By Frank H . H . King. 20. China's Wartime Finance and Inflation, 1937-1945. By Arthur N . Young. 2 1 . Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China, 1840-1937. By Chi-ming Hou. 2 2 . After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 192 1 -193 1 . By Akira Iriye. 23. Foundations !if Constitutional Government in Modern Japan, 1868-1900. By George l kita. 24. Political Thought in Early Meiji Japan, 1868-1889. By Joseph Pittau, S.J . 2 5 . China's Struggle for Naval Development, 1839-1895. By John L. Rawlinson. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33 ·

The Practice rif Buddhism in China, 1900-1950. By Holmes Welch. Li Ta-chao and the Origins rif Chinese Marxism. By Maurice Meisner. Pa Chin and His Writings: Chinese Youth Between the Two Revolutions. By Olga Lang. Literary Dissent in Communist China. By Merle Goldman. Politics in the Tokugawa Bakufu, 1 600-1843· By Conrad Totman. Hara Kei in the Politics !if Compromise, 1905-1915. By Tetsuo Najita. The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations. Edited by John K. Fairbank.

The Buddhist Revival in China. By Holmes Welch.