Paths to Peace
Paths to Peace domestic coalition shifts, war termination and the korean war
Elizabeth A. Stanley
stanford universit y press Stanford, California 2009
Stanford University Press Stanford, California © 9 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University All rights reserved No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University Press. Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Stanley, Elizabeth A. Paths to peace : domestic coalition shifts, war termination and the Korean war / Elizabeth A. Stanley. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ---6269-4 (cloth : alk. paper) . Korean War, 1950–1953—Peace. . Korean War, 1950–1953—Diplomatic history. 3. War—Termination—Decision making—Case studies. 4. Coalitions—Case studies. I. Title. ds921.75.s73 9 951.904'.21—dc 2009007182 This book is printed on acid-free, archival-quality paper. Typeset at Stanford University Press in ⁄. Minion
For John
Contents
Acknowledgments xi Abbreviations xiii
Part I: The Domestic Politics of War Termination 1 Old Baldy 3 2 Domestic Coalition Shifts in War Termination 19
Part II: The Korean War 3 4 5 6 7 8
The Korean States: Powerless Players in the Forgotten War 65 The Soviet Union: Outlasting Stalin’s Preferences 91 The United States, Part 1: Trapped by the NSC-68 Mindset 120 The United States, Part 2: Trapped by Voluntary Prisoner Repatriation 150 China: Trapped by a Hawkish Ally 178 Interacting Domestic Coalitions in Bargains for Peace 210
Part III: Testing and Extending the Argument 9 Domestic Coalition Shifts in War Termination since 1862 239 10 War Termination in Theory and Practice 272 Epilogue 303 Appendixes A. Interstate Wars Included in the Post–World War II Dataset 305 B. Domestic Governing Coalition Shifts since World War II 308
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contents
Notes 313 Bibliography 339 Index 383
Maps, Figures and Tables
Maps 1.1 Map of the Old Baldy Area 5 3.1 The Korean Peninsula, Showing Lines of Advance, 1950–53 66
Figures
1.1 Unloading Logs for Bunker Construction at the 2nd Infantry Division Supply Point on Old Baldy, October 1, 1952 4 2.1 Paths by Which Belligerents Change Expectations 50 2.2 Paths to War Termination 52 2.3 How Changed Expectations Create Bargaining Space 56
Tables 2.1 Summary of the Five Information Obstacle Dynamics 43 8.1 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5
Domestic Coalition Shifts in the Korean War 222 Cross-Tabulation of War Duration by Coalition Shifts 249 Cross-Tabulation of War Duration by Coalition Shift Direction 249 Cross-Tabulation of War Outcome by Coalition Shifts 250 Cross-Tabulation of War Outcome by Coalition Shift Direction 251 Replicated Hazard Analysis of Bennett and Stam (1996) and Goemans (2000a) 252 9.6 Hazard Analysis with Domestic Coalition Shifts 258 9.7 War-Level Analysis of Domestic Coalition Shifts since World War II 261 9.8 Hazard Analysis of Coalition Shift Directions 264
Acknowledgments
Completing a book about war termination is tough business. Like the wars themselves, recent experience suggests that such books, once begun, are very difficult to end—lasting much longer and costing much more than the author expected at the outset. This endeavor, which began as a Ph.D. thesis and has since gone through repeated changes, would not have been possible without the support of many wonderful people. My mentor at Harvard, Stephen Peter Rosen, and Iain Johnston, Theda Skocpol and Stephen Walt provided very useful early thoughts and recommendations. Financial support to conduct this research and revise the manuscript came from a graduate research fellowship from the National Science Foundation, a post-doctoral fellowship from Harvard’s John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies and a junior faculty research leave from Georgetown University. I am especially grateful to my colleagues and students at Georgetown for helping me see this project through to completion and to Georgetown’s Security Studies Program for providing the financial support for research assistance, from Saltanat Berdikeeva, Mindy Chan, Hailey Hoffman, Unyoung Lee, Ethan Marsh, Alexis Pierce and Michael Stanisich. I thank the many participants of various seminars and conferences where I have presented portions of this manuscript over the years, including the American Political Science Association, the International Studies Association, Harvard’s Olin Institute and Georgetown’s Department of Government and Center for German and European Studies. I have benefited greatly from the comments these presentations elicited.
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acknowled g ments
I also thank a number of friends and colleagues who read and provided insightful suggestions regarding earlier versions or portions of this manuscript, or supported me in other valuable ways: Gary Bass, Audrey Slesinger Beldio, Nora Bensahel, Beth Blaufuss, Risa Brooks, Michael Brown, Dan Byman, Victor Cha, Audrey Kurth Cronin, Colin Dueck, Robert Dujarric, Bernard Finel, Ben Fordham, Page Fortna, Bob Gallucci, Hein Goemans, Lori Gronich, Kristen Gunness, Lise Morjé Howard, Tim Hoyt, Macartan Humphreys, Dominic Johnson, Gary Kaplan, Charles King, Greg Koblentz, Mark Kramer, Alan Kuperman, Brad Lee, Phyllis Jacobson-Kram, Becky Johnson, Suzanne Neilson, Mariellen O’Hara, Olya Oliker, David Post, Jenny Lind Press, Kristen Quigley, Dani Reiter, Tim Rosenberg, George Shambaugh, Jeremy Shapiro, Sara Sievers, Jennifer Sims, Naunihal Singh, Jack Snyder, Al Stam, Monica Toft, Barbara Walter, Kathryn Weathersby and Jeremy Weinstein. I am especially indebted to Kristin Goss, Brent Mitchell and Tammy Schultz for reading the entire draft of earlier versions of the manuscript and providing critical moral support along the way. I am humbled by the debt I owe to my colleague and friend John P. Sawyer for helping me complete the quantitative analysis in Chapter 9 and for listening to me refining my argument, over and over again. His generous and invaluable support was absolutely essential for completing this project. I thank Geoffrey Burn, my editor at Stanford University Press, for his extra ordinary efforts to help me bring this book to publication. I also thank Jessica Walsh and John Feneron for their detailed assistance. I owe a great deal to my undergraduate mentor at Yale, the late Lt. Gen. (Ret.) William E. Odom. In many ways, he is largely responsible for my serving as a military intelligence officer in Korea in 1993—when I first developed an interest in this war—and for my becoming a political scientist after my service in the US Army. I am sad he was unable to see me finally complete this book. Special thanks go to my parents, Deane and Cissie, and my sisters, Alison and Karalyn, for their love and encouragement throughout the process. I also thank Finley and the late Duffy for providing important lap-warmth and love during many hours at the computer. Finally, my deepest gratitude is to my partner, John Schaldach, whose love makes my life more meaningful and balanced, and whose contribution to this book is impossible to describe. This book is dedicated to him. E.A.S
Abbreviations
AFT AIC CCP CIA COW CPV CWIHP DOD DMZ DPRK FRUS GAC GDR GRU JCS KGB KI KMT KWP MAC MGB NATO
Accelerated failure time Akaike Information Criterion Chinese Communist Party Central Intelligence Agency Correlates of War (dataset) Chinese People’s Volunteers (Chinese army in Korean War) Cold War International History Project Department of Defense Demilitarized Zone Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) Foreign Relations of United States (See author: U.S. Department of State) Government Administration Council German Democratic Republic (East Germany) Soviet Military Intelligence Joint Chiefs of Staff Soviet Committee for State Security Soviet Committee of Information Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalists) Korean Workers’ Party (Communist Party in North Korea) Soviet Military Administrative Council USSR Ministry of State Security North Atlantic Treaty Organization
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NMC NPKA NSC ODM PH PLA POW PRC ROK SPC TVC UN UNC US USSR
abbrev iat ions
National Material Capabilities (dataset) North Korean People’s Army National Security Council Office of Defense Mobilization Proportional hazards People’s Liberation Army (Chinese army) Prisoner of war People’s Republic of China Republic of Korea (South Korea) State Planning Commission Time-varying covariate United Nations United Nations Command United States Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union)
part i
The Domestic Politics of War Termination
1
Old Baldy My insides felt like a thousand butterflies were still jumping around in there, and my legs felt like rubber. My mind was still seeing the picture at the top of Old Baldy as the shells burst among us, and hearing the sounds of Chinese bugles blowing as they came charging into our lines. . . . We would bleed and die for an ugly old hill that to the men in the trenches wasn’t worth throwing lives away for, just so we could see Chinese movement to the north. . . .
—Corporal Rudolph W. Stephens, 23rd Regiment, 2nd Infantry Division (1995: 114–15)
Old Baldy is a mountain in central Korea, currently located within the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea. Old Baldy is no longer bald. Like many hills in Korea, it is covered with relatively young deciduous trees and evergreens, all grown in the last fifty years. Old Baldy earned its name during the Korean War, when intensive shelling obliterated all the trees and foliage on the hillside. At that time, Old Baldy’s landscape looked like the surface of the moon, with many old craters from artillery and mortar rounds that had fallen there (see Figure 1.1). As Jerry Ciaravino, who fought there in 1951, remembers, “You knew why it was given that name. It was a big mountain of dirt with no greenery. There was just so much thrown at it that it was just dirt on the top. You were just glad to come back down after you were up there” (Nisbet and Moore 2002: 5). Similarly Corporal Stephens observes, “I believe the only things living on Old Baldy were men in the trenches” (1995: 141). Despite its hard-won name, Old Baldy had no strategic value. There were no natural resources buried inside it, no major communications lines it overlooked, no major industrial center anywhere nearby. In fact, Old Baldy’s only real value—a dubious one, at that—was height. At 266 meters, it was the tallest hill in the immediate area, dominating the terrain to the north, west and south, and it provided a good look-out over another infamous Korean War mountain, Pork Chop Hill. As such, the belligerent that controlled the crest of Old Baldy controlled the tactical situation in the valley below (see Map 1.1). Except for this view down, Old Baldy was not important—not to Korea, and not to the ultimate course of the Korean War. Yet, for this view down, from July
the d omest ic p olit ics of war ter minat ion
f i g . 1 . 1 . Unloading Logs for Bunker Construction at the 2nd Infantry Division Supply Point on Old Baldy, October 1, 1952. Source: Photo by SFC Charles M. Roberts. Available at Wikimedia Commons, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:M39-AUV-Korea19521001.jpg.
1951 until July 1953, China and the United States fought so hard for this blasted, barren hill that, at the peak of the fighting, more than 1,500 men died there every week. During that time, the two sides also faced off in the negotiating tent, ultimately signing an agreement in 1953 that looked remarkably similar to the one proposed two years earlier. Old Baldy changed hands eleven times during the Korean War, with units on both sides suffering massive casualties—often in fierce hand-to-hand combat. As Stephens recounts, the Chinese troops fought with “human-wave attack[s]. . . [they] were dying like flies as they came on. They had the troops to throw away, and they would sacrifice them to win the battle” (1995: 119; also Hermes 1966: 293–95). As a result, as Ming Rose (1999) recalls, “the enemy was killing so many Americans that they had to be piled up like cordwood. Photographs of them were so gruesome that they could not be shown back home.” Indeed, units were sometimes reduced to one-sixth of their normal fighting strength. For example,
old baldy
m a p 1 . 1 . Map of the Old Baldy Area. Source: Wikimedia Commons. http://commons. wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:Old_Baldy_Area.gif
in a particularly costly battle in March 1953, both sides expended 130,000 rounds of ammunition in one night, killing 300 Americans and 800 Chinese (Hermes 1966: 395; Allen 2002: 1).1 The fighting on Old Baldy was not unusual. For two years, from July 1951 until July 1953, this “war of the hills” was waged all around the 38th Parallel while negotiations to end the war stagnated.2 These battles represented some of the most intense fighting in one of the most agonizing and miserable chapters of the Korean War and the casualties were staggering. While no complete tally of battledeaths exists for Old Baldy, numbers for neighboring hills highlight the costs. For example, the United States and South Korea lost 6,400 men in the battles of Heartbreak Ridge and Bloody Ridge, while the Chinese suffered 10,000 killed in the battle of White Horse Hill. In between these costly battles, fighting tapered off to patrol clashes, raids and ambushes for possession of outposts in no-man’s land. Adding to the misery were the bone-numbing cold, the relentless rain, the inadequate food rations, the pounding artillery duels, the invariable sleep deprivation and the inevitable fear. Holding these hills was no walk in the park.
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To put the costs into perspective, US statistics show that 45 percent of its casualties—22,000 killed, 63,200 wounded—occurred during the “war of the hills” (Foot 1990: 208). The United Nations Command, of which US troops were a part, overall suffered 125,000 wounded and 60,000 killed during this period. Likewise, the Chinese and North Koreans suffered 234,000 killed (Hermes 1966: 500; Hatchimonji 2002). Old Baldy is the quintessence of stalemated war. For two years, China and the United States suffered massive casualties, week after week, even while both governments knew that they would not win the war. Moreover, these casualties happened even though both governments knew that they wanted to end the war and knew that they should. From a strategic view, the losses make no sense—neither side thought that holding this terrain was vital to its strategic interests. This being the case, why did Chinese and American soldiers huddle under devastating exposure to 130,000 artillery rounds in a single night, as the Americans tried to push the Chinese off Old Baldy for the sixth time—long after their own governments had decided that the Korean War was bound for a stalemate? This book is about why those men died. While this story about Old Baldy may seem overly detailed for such an insignificant piece of land, it is instructive nonetheless. If—as most variants of the bargaining model of war assume—“battle-deaths” are a major driver for altering belligerents’ calculus in bargains to end war, then recounting the Old Baldy story reminds us of the human faces behind this anonymous “battle-death” count. One of the biggest puzzles about war is why events like those that occurred on Old Baldy can happen. Why did those governments decide to throw away 294,000 lives fighting for strategically meaningless terrain features, as the conflict seesawed from one hill to the other? What could make this magnitude of loss acceptable? We can look at Old Baldy as a series of battles that were senseless, irrational and quite possibly inexplicable. But this book argues that what happened on Old Baldy during the Korean War was not irrational—at least in the sense that social scientists use that term—nor was it unique. What happened on Old Baldy happens in many wars, and it is explainable. In fact, there is a solid theoretical explanation for this seemingly irrational behavior. This book develops and tests that explanation. In the case of Old Baldy, men continued to die on that hill until other men lost power, thousands of miles away, in Moscow. More generally, this book will demonstrate that the key to ending a war often comes down to changing the composition of the domestic governing coalitions in the states that are fighting it. Old Baldy may make no sense from a strategic viewpoint, but it does from the vantage point of domestic politics.
old baldy
Domestic Coalition Shifts in War Termination Throughout history, shifts in governing coalitions have critically affected war termination. For example, the execution of the Athenian democratic ruler Cleophon and the ascendancy of the pro-Spartan oligarchs in BC 404 led to Athens’ surrender to Sparta, ending the 27-year Second Peloponnesian War. Similarly, the death of Russian Empress Elizabeth in January 1762 led her Prussophile successor, Peter III, to immediately recall Russian armies who were occupying Berlin and conclude the Treaty of Saint Petersburg by May—ending the fighting between Russia and Prussia in the Seven Years’ War. During World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 brought Vladimir Lenin and the Bolsheviks to power, who accepted the harsh terms of Brest Litovsk to make a separate peace. The next year, riots in Germany ushered in a new government that then negotiated the final war armistice, as Kaiser Wilhelm II fled to Holland. In the Chaco War, Bolivian President Salamanca was determined to continue at all costs, despite the high command’s decision to end the war. His arrest by the military and forced resignation in November 1934 was the major turning point in the war. The generals placed Vice-President José Luis Tejada Sorzano, who was known to favor peace, in power, and the war ended the next spring. During World War II, France and Italy surrendered shortly after changes in their governing coalitions, in 1940 and 1943 respectively. This phenomenon extends to non-interstate wars, as well. A classic example is the ending of the Wars of the Roses and the installation of the Tudor Dynasty: Richard III died in the Battle of Bosworth Field and Henry VII united the warring factions to end the war. More recently, the leader of the rebel group National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), Jonas Zavimbi, was killed in an ambush by government troops in February 2002. Less than six weeks after Zavimbi’s death, a cease-fire was signed, ending the 27-year-long Angolan civil war. Similarly, in Sierra Leone, both sides reached a settlement after Foday Sankoh, the leader of the rebel group Revolutionary United Front, was arrested. Comparable patterns can be observed in extra-systemic wars, such as Charles de Gaulle and Mikhail Gorbachev coming to power in France and the Soviet Union and ending their wars in Algeria and Afghanistan, respectively. Scholars working on issues related to war termination have noted this phenomenon, albeit anecdotally. For example, H. E. Calahan—who argues a change in the relative power among belligerents brings peace—observes that “it seems fair to conclude that a change of regime for the vanquished comes close to being a condition precedent to the making of peace” (1944: 209). James Smith—who argues war ends with an international bargain—notes that “it may indeed be the case that the only way to salvage something from the ruins of war is to have the
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leader of a particular nation resign” (1995: 106). Among domestic politics scholars, Robert Rothstein concludes that “because it is unlikely that the officials currently in charge can make the necessary changes in policies with which they have become identified, new personnel seem imperative” (1970: 74), while Michael Handel suggests “the termination of a long and stalemated war is frequently preceded by a drastic political change in leadership in the country of one of the belligerents” (1978: 26).3 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and his colleagues (1992) similarly argue many states in interstate wars experience violent regime changes before the war ends. Finally, in the landmark study of this phenomenon, Fred Iklé (1991) classifies elites in each belligerent state as “hawks” and “doves” and asserts the hawks may need to leave the government before the state can settle. In short, the empirical record includes many examples of domestic governing coalition shifts leading to war termination, and many scholars from different theoretical perspectives have noted this tendency. However, no one has previously attempted to explain the causal mechanisms of this phenomenon in a generalizable manner or to test the argument over a broad group of cases. In this book, I introduce a new theory about shifts in domestic governing coalitions, a state’s elite foreign policy decision-making group. Moreover, I test this theory with detailed historical case studies of the Korean War and quantitative analysis of all interstate wars since 1862. While this book focuses on interstate wars as classified by Singer and Small (1994), Chapter 10 suggests ways this argument could also apply to civil wars. d omest ic coalit ions and inter nat ional bargains for peace
War termination is a political bargain struck between belligerents to dispense with further combat (Bennett and Stam 1998; Filson and Werner 2002, 2004; Goemans 2000a; Pillar 1983; Powell 2002, 2004; Reiter 2003, 2009; Slantchev 2003, 2004; Smith and Stam 2004; Wagner 2000; Werner 1998, 1999; Wittman 1979). As bargaining models about war termination suggest, belligerents will settle a conflict only after they develop an overlapping bargaining space, often modeled at the point at which both sides can agree upon their relative strength. Scholars have often posited a Bayesian rational updating process by which each side updates its expectations about the war and thus changes its bottom line to create an overlapping bargaining space.4 Sometimes wars are short because this bargaining space develops quickly, usually because the battlefield illustrates belligerents’ relative strength in a very compelling manner. Conversely, wars are long because this bargaining space develops more slowly, for example when the battlefield becomes stalemated, belligerents cannot credibly commit, relative power is ambiguous or the issues at stake are indivisible or highly salient.
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While the Bayesian model assumes the war-ending change in expectations occurs when incumbent leaders change their minds, my research suggests that in many wars, this change in expectations results from a change in the foreign policy leadership itself. Thus, my theory extends the Bayesian model by fleshing out the domestic political aspects of the bargaining model of war. I present a new theory about shifts in domestic governing coalitions and thereby refine the domestic mechanisms for explaining the international bargains that end war. As such, this analysis very consciously builds on a much wider literature within international relations about “two-level games,” one level being domestic and the other international (Putnam 1988; Tsebelis 1990; Snyder 1991; Mayer 1992; Fearon 1994; Schultz 1998; Smith 1998; Milner and Rosendorff 1996, 1997; Partell and Palmer 1999). It also accords with recent scholarship that examines the two-level dynamics in continuing or ending enduring interstate rivalries (Colaresi 2004, 2005; McGinnis and Williams 2001; Mor 1997; Schultz 2005). In this way, the explanation provided in this book is more complete and thus more powerful than previous attempts to generalize about and predict war termination. Like any other social system, war termination is a given end state that can be reached through multiple causal pathways.5 The domestic coalition shift theory provides an alternative causal pathway to war termination beyond the standard Bayesian bargaining models—and accounts for more than a third of interstate war endings since 1862 and 41 percent since World War II. The prevalence of this alternative causal pathway suggests my theory provides greater explanatory power than other forthcoming scholarship that argues for the insignificance of domestic politics in war termination decision-making (Reiter 2009: chapter 1). For sake of comparison, Reiter’s alternative causal pathway—in which states pursue absolute victory to overcome credible commitment problems in the war termination process—accounts for only 22 percent of war endings in the post–World War II period.6 Thus, the domestic coalition shift theory, which includes and expands on the Bayesian model, greatly improves our understanding of war duration and war termination. d omest ic coalit ion shifts in overcoming obstacles to peace
The decision to go to war is a conscious policy choice. However, in order to win, leaders need to implement policies which prepare their militaries, their businessmen and their populations for the hardships and deprivations of war. They frequently need to demonize the enemy to whip up public support, mobilize their militaries and set their economies on a war footing. Enacting these policies is necessary for a state to win on the battlefield, but they make it extremely difficult to simply “turn off ” the decision to go to war. The very policies that might
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make a state effective in preparing for and fighting a war are the ones that preclude an easy end to that war. Indeed, unless the resulting battlefield situation is so compelling that the outcome is obvious to all sides, leaders may find it virtually impossible to extricate their states from these “sticky” policies and the war itself. This book suggests three reasons why a war, once entrenched, is difficult to end. These reasons fall into one of three categories—preference obstacles, information obstacles and entrapment obstacles. • A preference obstacle occurs when leaders do not want to end the war. This happens when leaders receive private benefits from continuing the war, or when fighting the war helps leaders stay in power. • An information obstacle occurs when leaders do not know they should end the war. In this case, the Bayesian updating process does not occur because leaders (1) receive poor quality information, (2) do not necessarily share the same information, (3) use different indicators to assess the war or (4) have personal cognitive or (5) organizational biases that prevent them from using all available information. • An entrapment obstacle occurs when leaders want to end the war but cannot. This happens when leaders face political entrapment from a domestic constituency or external allies. These three obstacles to peace can occur in tandem, although they may not all be present at the same time or have an equally powerful effect. The longer a war goes on, the more the dynamics of “sticky” policies kick in. Because of these obstacles, leaders find it more difficult to shift policies and strategies related to fighting and ending the war as quickly as the Bayesian approach would suggest. In these longer wars, belligerents become “stuck” and a change in expectations is needed to produce a war-terminating bargaining space. This book argues a major source of such change is a shift in belligerents’ domestic governing coalitions. In other words, policies a state enacted to wage war effectively become sticky, and the state will often require a coalition shift to get them unstuck. A coalition shift allows different political actors—with different constituencies, political interests and assessments of the war—to take power. This, in turn, may lead to a shift in the war policy, from continuing it to ending it.7 In other words, domestic coalition shifts can help to overcome the obstacles to peace and thus permit the war to end. While most other empirical studies of interstate war duration and termination have focused only on wars that ended conclusively (Bennett and Stam 1996; Goemans 2000a; Reiter and Stam 2002; Reiter 2009),8 my model accepts the possibility of ambiguous war outcomes and theorizes explicitly about stalemates.
old baldy
Given the increased prevalence of stalemates in the modern era and the dearth of theory about ending these kinds of wars, my model broadens the literature’s current findings by explicitly including them. The longer the war goes on, the less likely the relative power among belligerents will be clearly illuminated on the battlefield. As a result, Bayesian updating is more difficult and belligerents are more likely to need domestic coalition shifts to overcome stickiness in expectations and achieve peace.9
Methods of Analysis To test causal hypotheses about how shifts in domestic governing coalitions influence war termination, this study uses two methods of analysis: detailed qualitative case studies and quantitative analysis. Using mixed methods helps to compensate for some of the weaknesses of the respective methodologies. The detailed case studies in this book demonstrate that my theory accurately identifies the causal dynamics that determine outcomes, while the quantitative analysis demonstrates that the patterns predicted by the theory actually occur over a broad class of cases. Therefore, the two methods provide different and complementary bases for causal inference (Bennett and George 2005: 208, also chapters 2 and 10). While quantitative analysis is useful for identifying correlations among variables to explain the duration of wars, it cannot fully address all of the causal mechanisms outlined in my argument. As Curtis Signorino (1999) and others have argued, the statistical models commonly used in international relations generally do not capture the structure of strategic interaction and interdependence very well. Because actors anticipate the decisions of other actors when they make their choices, the decisions between actors are interdependent and not independent, as many statistical estimators require. Moreover, statistical techniques can only measure actual observed events, not the unrealized potential outcomes that leaders considered but ultimately did not choose. Finally, many of my variables of interest—most notably, the three obstacles to peace—cannot be adequately proxied in a quantitative analysis. Process-tracing in qualitative case studies is particularly well suited to avoid these pitfalls (Van Evera 1997: 64–67; Bennett and George 2005: chapter 10; King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 226–28; George and McKeown 1985: 34–41; George 1979). There are four reasons why process-tracing is particularly useful in tandem with statistical analysis. First, the process-tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal process between the independent variables and the outcome of a given dependent variable. Process tracing requires that intervening variables
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be connected in particular ways, and this makes it a powerful tool for inference. In testing theories through process-tracing, all of the intervening steps in the empirical case must be as predicted by the hypotheses for the theory to pass. Indeed, process-tracing in one case can be enough to test the theory if its unique predictions are empirically validated. In other words, process tracing allows us to evaluate certain and unique predictions, which provide strong tests of a theory (Van Evera 1997: 31, 76; Bennett and George 2005: chapter 10).10 Second, process tracing is particularly important for generating and assessing evidence on causal mechanisms. Given my theory’s focus on stickiness in Bayesian updating, process-tracing is necessary for evaluating its causal mechanisms. To know whether the three obstacles to peace exist and a coalition shift is a cause of war termination, I need to (1) measure the obstacles directly, (2) assess how battlefield information (and the opposing side’s diplomatic behavior) gets interpreted by the domestic coalition, (3) show how the existing coalition’s decisions about war policy lag behind the war trends that would seem to warrant a war policy change and (4) show that coalition shifts provide the “shock” that brings Bayesian updating back into line with war trends. In short, process-tracing allows us to find out what decision-makers knew when, and whether and how that information was translated into a change in war policy. This minimizes the measurement error on key variables of interest. Third, process tracing allows us to compare competing explanations simultaneously. Although two explanations may predict the same outcome, the logic of the arguments may require different paths to that outcome. In fact, process tracing encourages us to be sensitive to the possibility of “equifinality”—the presence of alternative causal pathways. Only case studies allow a comparison detailed enough to differentiate between two explanations and evaluate their relative importance. As Andrew Bennett and Alexander George argue, “Case studies employing process tracing are particularly useful as a supplement in large-N statistical analyses, which are likely to overlook the possibility of equifinality and settle for a statement of a probabilistic finding regarding only one causal path at work” (2005: 215). Because war termination is characterized by equifinality, processtracing is indispensable for comparing alternative causal pathways in the cases. Finally, process tracing is particularly useful for obtaining an explanation for “deviant” or “outlier” cases that are not well explained by existing theories (Bennett and George 2005: 215–16; Becker 1998: 192–96). Process tracing of deviant cases offers an opportunity to develop contingent generalizations that identify the conditions under which alternative outcomes occur. To some degree, sticky wars and stalemated battlefields are “deviant cases” from the perspective of existing theories of war termination: while Bayesian models accept the updating
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process can take time, the reasons for the lag are under-theorized. Stalemates are also understudied in the empirical research about interstate war termination, as most empirical studies have focused on wars that ended conclusively.11 Therefore, process tracing within such “deviant cases” can help us enrich the general theory for explaining the process by which all wars end. In sum, process tracing can complement and ameliorate some of the methodological issues with quantitative analysis. Certainly, case studies about the decision-making process require a great deal of data, which creates practical limitations on how many case studies can be completed and limits the findings’ generalizability. Luckily, this weakness is directly addressed by the quantitative analysis, which bolsters the findings’ scope. histor ical case studies
This book examines the theory’s causal mechanisms in the three primary belligerents of the Korean War: the Soviet Union, the United States and China. I have limited the qualitative work to these “primary” belligerents, as they were the most important in making decisions about prosecuting and ending the war. (Chapter 3 will discuss why neither North nor South Korea qualifies as a “primary” belligerent.) Given the importance of the strategic interaction in understanding how an overlapping bargaining space develops in the war termination process, it was critical for me to examine belligerents in the same war. This allows me to control for other realpolitik variables and the strategic interaction among belligerents. Beyond the justification presented in the previous paragraph, there are five reasons for this case selection. First, and most importantly, these cases are strongly associated with the independent variables of interest—the three obstacles to peace and domestic coalition shifts. Such “extreme value” cases can teach us the most, because the variables’ effects should stand out sharply against the background of the case more clearly (Van Evera 1997: 79–80). The variables’ effects are also unlikely to be produced by measurement error or other causes. Such cases offer particularly strong tests because the theory’s predictions are certain and unique. Each of these three cases has a different predominant obstacle to peace, which allows me to explore the dynamics of each obstacle more carefully. In addition, coalition shifts in the three cases vary in terms of shift direction (hawkish, dovish and neutral) and the reason for the shift (exogenous and endogenous shifts).12 Moreover, because some of the belligerents experienced multiple coalition shifts, there is sufficient within-case variation. Thus, these cases provide ample evidence of and variation on the independent variables in my argument. Second, and relatedly, because of the extreme values on the independent variables of interest, these cases provide a “most likely” test for the domestic coalition
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shift theory and a “least likely” test for the alternative standard bargaining models of war (King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 209–10; Eckstein 1975). Because the Korean War is a stalemated war, it meets the scope conditions for the theory, making it likely on a priori grounds that the case will support the theory. Therefore, it would be easy to discard my theory if it did not explain this case. In contrast, the Korean War is a hard case for standard bargaining models. Not only was there power symmetry between the two sides—the UN Command and the Communists—but the final armistice terms accepted in July 1953 were virtually the same as those proposed at the start of negotiations in July 1951. As the discussion of Old Baldy highlighted, why did the belligerents wait so long to make the peace given that the battlefield was stalemated throughout these two years while casualties continued to mount? Third, the three primary belligerents provide variation on regime type, an important variable in recent scholarship about war duration and war termination (Bennett and Stam 1996, 1998; Filson and Werner 2004; Fortna 2004b; Goemans 2000a; Reiter and Stam 2002; Slantchev 2004). As Chapter 2 will explain, the domestic coalition shift theory should apply to all regime types, because all leaders answer to some constituency. However, while regime type is not important for my argument, it is a variable of interest for comparing it to alternative arguments, especially Goemans’ (2000a). Indeed, these cases are useful for testing the relative power of competing theories, because as Part II will show, the theories often make opposite predictions (Van Evera 1997: 83). Fourth, by choosing case studies from the Korean War, I am making an empirical contribution to the literature by examining an important, yet relatively understudied war. The Korean War has been dubbed “the Forgotten War” for good reason. To the extent that the war receives any attention, scholars have generally focused on its dramatic first year—the war’s outbreak, the Inchon landing, the Chinese intervention and the Truman-MacArthur controversy. With the exception of Rosemary Foot’s work (1990), very little scholarship about the last two years of the war—the forgotten part of the forgotten war—exists. Moreover, very few studies have examined all of the belligerents together, taking account of the two-level dynamics that are central to my theory. For this reason, this book examines all of the major combatants in the war, even the secondary belligerents—North and South Korea. In other words, creating a satisfactory explanation of this historically significant, understudied case is in and of itself an important goal. Finally, while the Korean War is a “deviant case” from the perspective of the Bayesian approach, it resembles current situations that are interesting from a policy perspective. As Stephen Van Evera argues, a theory tested in a case that re-
old baldy
sembles current policy-problem cases will more often “travel” to the second case, and thus, “policy prescriptions deduced from the first case can more safely be applied to the second” (1997: 83). Obviously, stalemated wars have policy-relevance today, because of the US’ ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. More generally, recent scholarship on war termination documents a marked increase in interstate wars ending in stalemate since World War II (Dunnigan and Martel 1987; Fortna 2004b; Pillar 1983; Smith 1995). The Korean War also resembles current and future wars in that belligerents on both sides fought as part of international coalitions. Thus, examining this war provides traction for understanding which factors may be most relevant for explaining war termination in the future. quant itat ive analysis
While the case studies focus on the “deviant” case of a long stalemated war, the quantitative analysis tests the domestic coalition shift theory in all interstate wars since 1862, using two different datasets. I initially use war-level datasets—from Bennett and Stam (1996), Goemans (2000a) and the Archigos project (Goemans et al. 2009)—to establish the theory’s viability over a wider sample of wars, interstate wars from 1862 to 1990. Then, I use a new belligerent-level dataset, which I specifically constructed for this purpose, of the interstate wars from 1945 to 2006. The Archigos dataset allows me to test the effects of changes in heads of state in all interstate wars since 1862. Given the limitations of its coding—explained in Chapter 9—the Archigos data is suggestive but not overly conclusive. While we need to move to a finer-grained measure of coalition dynamics to truly test the model’s effects—one that not only measures multiple coalition shifts within belligerent states but also measures shifts’ effects more accurately over time—the supportive results obtained from analyzing these data increase our confidence in my theory’s robustness. Given the high degree of empirical detail necessary to code domestic governing coalition shifts, the data needed to test my argument empirically are quite extensive. Because information about domestic governing coalition composition and the timing of coalition shifts in wars after World War II is significantly more accessible, I selected this sub-sample of all interstate wars to conduct a more detailed probe of the argument. Theoretically, there should be no difference in the fundamental decision-making processes during wars before 1945, as the findings from the Archigos dataset demonstrate. However, there are some features of the post–World War II environment that make these wars stand out as a cohesive sub-sample for a more nuanced analysis of the domestic coalition shift theory. As already noted, scholars have observed a
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marked increase in interstate wars ending in stalemate in the post–World War II period (Dunnigan and Martel 1987; Fortna 2004b; Pillar 1983; Smith 1995). This increase in stalemates may be driven by structural factors in the international system—the presence of nuclear weapons, the strength of the United Nations and its role in bringing interstate wars to settlement before a decisive victory and the dampening effect of bipolarity during the Cold War—as well as the global increase in democracies. Moreover, these wars occurred during the era of fast communications and round-the-clock news coverage. As a result, they are most similar in terms of strategy, doctrine and technologies to wars fought today. As the 1918 Signal Corps Manual argued, “. . . The art of war has not changed with the passage of years, but it is true that the science of war has changed enormously” (White 1918: 3; also Gray 2006). Thus, to examine which factors are most relevant for explaining war duration and termination in the future, it may be most useful to study recent wars, with the most theoretical and policy relevance to today.
Overview of the Book This book is divided into three parts. The next chapter, which completes Part I, lays out the book’s theory. After reviewing the existing literature about war termination, it explains the theory and presents hypotheses to be tested in subsequent sections of the book. Part II, divided into six chapters, traces the theory’s causal mechanisms in detail through the case studies of the Korean War. Chapter 3 briefly introduces readers to the timeline of the Korean War and explains why the Soviet Union, China and the United States were the most important belligerents in decisions about prosecuting and ending it. Chapter 3 also illustrates, with mini-case studies, North and South Korea’s insignificance in their respective side’s decisions about the war. In the process, it demonstrates how their domestic coalition shifts are unimportant for explaining the war’s ending. The next four chapters examine the argument’s causal mechanisms in more detail in the Soviet Union, United States and China. Chapter 4 traces Soviet decision-making during the war through the lens of the preference and information obstacles. The chapter argues Soviet leader Joseph Stalin did not want to end the war because he was benefiting from it without assuming many of its costs. Indeed, while moderates opposed this war policy, they were relatively powerless to change its course as long as Joseph Stalin remained in power. When Stalin died unexpectedly in March 1953, these leaders took control of the country and quickly enacted their long-held but dormant preference to end the war. Chapters 5 and 6 trace US decision-making during the war through the lens
old baldy
of the information and entrapment obstacles. These chapters explore the Truman Administration’s “NSC-68 mindset,” a set of assumptions about the US-Soviet relationship within which it perceived the Korean War. Fearing Soviet aggression worldwide, the Truman Administration used the Korean War to embark on a massive Cold War rearmament effort and justify its globalist agenda to Congressional and public constituencies. Likewise, believing it needed to stand firm on principles in Korea, it adopted a policy of voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war (POWs). The threat inflation that resulted from selling mobilization stoked hawkish constituencies for an all-out victory in Korea; hence, any efforts to move towards a negotiated settlement increased calls of Truman being “soft on Communism.” Moreover, fearing any escalation would provoke global war, the Truman Administration believed it could neither abandon the POW policy nor escalate the war to bring the Communists to terms. It was only with President Dwight Eisenhower’s inauguration in January 1953 that these obstacles were lifted and the United States could change course towards ending the war. Chapter 7 traces Chinese decision-making in the war through the lens of the entrapment obstacle. Unlike the domestic entrapment in the US case, Chinese leaders were trapped by an external ally—Stalin. This chapter argues that as the war’s domestic costs became apparent, the Chinese government’s policy goals shifted to modernizing and creating a planned economy. A domestic governing coalition shift in the summer of 1952 led the Chinese leaders to want to end the war by compromising on POW repatriation policy. However, these leaders also needed Stalin’s support for Chinese modernization and industrialization, and Stalin was unwilling to end the war. Thus, China was trapped until Stalin’s death. After these belligerent-level chapters, Chapter 8 brings attention to the strategic interaction between the belligerents in the war termination bargaining process. While some observers might view Stalin’s death in March 1953, and the resulting coalition shift in the Soviet Union, as solely responsible for breaking the negotiating logjam, this explanation is too simplistic. Instead, this chapter argues the timing of the war’s end depended upon the strategic interaction of all three domestic coalition shifts in the Soviet Union, the United States and China. This chapter extends the theory with two mechanisms by which domestic coalition shifts can affect the creation of an overlapping bargaining space, and it suggests these mechanisms are likely to operate in tandem when opposing sides both experience coalition shifts at about the same time. In other words, this chapter returns to the bargaining models of war and demonstrates why strategic interaction paired with analysis of domestic governing coalitions leads to the most complete explanation for why, when and how interstate war ends.
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Part III tests the argument beyond the Korean War and teases out its theoretical and policy implications. Chapter 9 tests the argument with quantitative analysis, using war-level datasets of interstate wars from 1862 to 1990 and my newly constructed belligerent-level dataset of interstate wars since World War II. This chapter provides significant support for the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 2; it shows that including domestic coalition shifts in quantitative models of war duration and termination provides more explanatory leverage than existing models. This chapter also examines what effect the direction of the coalition shift (i.e. hawkish, dovish or neutral) has on war termination. The analysis in Chapter 9 enhances confidence that the patterns predicted by the theory actually hold over many cases, and it reaffirms that not all wars end by the Bayesian causal pathway that has dominated the bargaining model of war. Paired with the detailed Korean War cases, this analysis increases the generalizability of this book’s findings. Finally, Chapter 10 summarizes these results and draws out the larger theoretical and policy implications of the argument. This chapter addresses potential ways to extend the research, such as explicitly modeling third-party intervention and extending the analysis to civil wars. Moreover, while this book examines obstacles to peace, the underlying logic is obviously much broader. War termination is only one specific manifestation of a more general phenomenon—major policy change. Indeed, the shift from continuing a war to ending it can be conceived as the most difficult policy change imaginable. Thus, the chapter concludes with general policy recommendations, based on the research findings, for leaders making decisions about prosecuting and ending war—as well as leaders approaching any major policy change.
2
Domestic Coalition Shifts in War Termination
Ending war is a tough business. Historical evidence suggests that wars, once begun, are very difficult to stop. They generally last much longer and cost much more than belligerents expect at the outset. As a result, wars frequently last well beyond the point where a rational cost-benefit calculation would dictate they end. This chapter will try to show that there is a causal link between the difficulty of ending wars and the fact that they are started and ended by politicians. Ending wars requires settling with the enemy as well as at home. At a theoretical level, the question of war termination remains largely unanswered. While a growing literature about bargaining in war has made significant inroads in our understanding, the mechanisms that link domestic politics to the international bargains are still underspecified. Very few theories of war termination adequately encompass both levels of analysis in their explanations. In contrast, this chapter argues the longer the war, the harder it is to end it, because domestic obstacles to peace become institutionalized over time. By focusing on these obstacles, this chapter explains domestic-level impediments to the international bargains that end war. In this chapter, I present two pathways for interstate war termination, building on Bayesian models. As Bayesian models suggest, interstate wars can only end once all belligerents develop similar expectations about the war. Bayesian models suggest that a lag in updating can delay war termination, but they do not explain how states get beyond this lag—why some states get bogged down in updating their expectations while others can update very quickly. In contrast, I look more carefully at this lag and theorize about how states get beyond it. I outline three
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obstacles to peace, as well as coalitional dynamics, which can lead governing coalitions to be unable to end the war—even when such a change is necessary or desirable. As a result, a governing coalition may become so immobile that ending the war is only possible by replacing the incumbent coalition entirely. Thus, while Bayesian models assume the change in expectations necessary to produce an overlapping bargaining space occurs when incumbent leaders change their minds, I argue that in many wars, such change in expectations results from a change in the foreign policy leadership itself. This chapter is divided into three sections and a conclusion. The first section synthesizes the existing war termination literature to provide the theoretical context. It highlights how my theory builds on bargaining models of war by adding domestic coalition shifts—a variable often mentioned but largely undeveloped in theories of war termination. The second section describes my approach, laying out the domestic obstacles to international bargains for peace and how those obstacles can be overcome with domestic coalition shifts. The third section examines what effect the direction of the coalition shift (e.g. hawkish, dovish or neutral) has on the theory.
The Theoretical Context Existing literature about war termination can be grouped into three categories— realpolitik, domestic politics and bargaining models. Of these, bargaining models of war have made the most significant inroads in our understanding. I build on this literature by refining the domestic mechanisms to explain why each side decides to come to the bargaining table. Specifically, I advance a key variable—the effect of domestic coalition shifts—that the literature has mostly ignored and remains largely underdeveloped. realp olit ik arguments: “ the vanquished makes peace ”
The oldest argument for ending war is power. Scholars in this group argue that a change in relative power among belligerents brings peace (Calahan 1944; von Clausewitz 1976; Randle 1973; Hobbs 1979; Beer and Mayer 1986; Timosheff 1965; Coser 1961; Kecskemeti 1958). Realpolitik arguments are by nature rationalist. They assume belligerents can make the necessary cost-benefit calculations about when to terminate a war. Because these scholars view war as having only two outcomes—victory or defeat—war ends when the loser gives up and accepts the more powerful winner’s demands. As H. A. Calahan noted in the first book to describe this argument: “War is pressed by the victor, but peace is made by the vanquished” (1944: 18).
d omest ic coalit ion shifts
However, this approach begs two crucial questions, answered by more recent bargaining models below. First, when is the losing party vanquished enough to give in to the winner? Realpolitik arguments cannot explain why war ends now and not at some other time. Second, why do winners stop then as well? These arguments assume the “winner” will not raise his demands once he realizes his advantage; thus, the argument would only seem to hold with unconditional surrender—when the winner has already been offered everything. Most wars obviously end long before that point. Indeed, most wars end without a clear-cut winner and loser. Lewis Coser recognized this explicitly: “Most conflicts end in compromises in which it is often quite hard to specify which side has gained relative advantage” (1961: 352; emphasis added). One reason is that victory may actually be conceived in many different ways,1 and a “winner” on one dimension may be a “loser” on another. Thus, it may be extremely difficult to determine who the “vanquished” is. d omest ic sent iments for peace
A second group of arguments looks inside belligerent states to explain why wars end. These scholars argue that a change in one side’s domestic sentiment about the war brings peace. They examine various mechanisms within the state to explain war termination, based on their view about which domestic institution or group monopolizes the policymaking process—public opinion, bureaucratic politics or elite behavior. While these scholars focus on domestic mechanisms for peace, they tend to ignore the other side completely. Nonetheless, they highlight how ending a war requires building and sustaining a domestic consensus for peace, and this process takes time. Public Opinion Scholars who have examined public opinion’s role in war termination have focused mostly on democratic regimes, and in particular, the United States. Research on public opinion has suggested that in democracies, public support for war declines monotonically with battle-deaths (Gartner and Myers 1995; Gartner and Segura 1998; Gartner, Segura and Wilkening 1997; Mueller 1985, 1994). While some scholars have challenged what Burk (1999) calls the “casualties hypothesis,” the basic logic underlying it—that the collective public is “rational” and will support the war if the benefits outweigh the costs—remains the dominant view (Randle 1973: 432–33; Page and Shapiro 1992; Wittkopf 1990; Larson 1996; Croco 2008; Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler 2005–6; Kull and Ramsay 2001; Kull and Destler 1999). In contrast, other scholars find little evidence that citizens make such cost/benefit calculations when evaluating a war. Instead, they argue the public cues on elite views about the war in order to evaluate war performance (Zaller 1992; Berinsky 2007).
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Alternatively, they argue public opinion is prone to elite manipulation (Snyder 1991; Mansfield and Snyder 1995; McGinnis and Williams 2001; Mor 1997; Colaresi 2005; Gibbs 1995; Baum 2003: 44–45; Johnson and Tierney 2006: 67–75). Because leaders, elites and the media can manipulate public opinion, it may be this manipulation that has stronger explanatory leverage for explaining war termination than public opinion itself. Bureaucratic Politics Scholars who use bureaucratic politics to explain war termination argue that the struggle to end war is subordinated to a country’s internal politics (Allison 1969: 717–18; Halperin 1970; Sigal 1988; Rose 1994). Each domestic group has different interests that influence its decisions regarding war termination. For example, the military services view war termination from the perspective of maintaining their autonomy and growing their budgets, while civilian political leaders are more concerned with post-war domestic political implications. In contrast, the general staff in the nation’s capital will view its role as compromising between military and civilian views (Halperin 1970). As Leon Sigal argues, officials want “to end the war in a way that best serves their organizational interests. The stands they take on the war abroad depend on the stakes they see in the battle at home” (1988: 23). This perspective highlights that the process of ending a war can often create compromise decisions that are suboptimal and slow to develop. Elite Behavior Scholars who argue for the primacy of elite behavior in explaining war termination assume that governing elites want to remain in power (Rothstein 1970; Iklé 1991; Bracken 1992; Armstrong 1994; Smith 1995; Mendelson 1998). In general, these scholars argue that elite disagreement about war policy leads to war’s end. These arguments link directly to the role of public opinion, because elite disagreement may catalyze public interest in ending war, as well. The most influential scholar in this group is Fred Iklé (1991), who classifies elites as “hawks” and “doves” struggling to influence their state’s war policies. Iklé attributes the difficulty of war termination to the gross asymmetry in wartime political power between hawks and doves. Hawks have a far easier time blocking any settlement than do doves trying to achieve one. However, beyond asserting that hawks may need to leave the government before the state can settle, Iklé provides no mechanism for understanding when and why the doves finally overrule the hawks. Overall, the domestic politics approach leaves three questions unanswered. First, what type of domestic sentiment change is enough to bring peace? Second, when does the change in domestic sentiment have to happen? Third, can a change in domestic sentiment in only one state be sufficient to end the war? In
d omest ic coalit ion shifts
general, these arguments suggest some important variables for explaining war termination, but by only looking within one side, they generally ignore the strategic interaction inherent in settling with the enemy. t wo- or more-sided bargains for peace
A third group of scholars argues that a change in the international bargaining space brings peace (Wittman 1979; Fearon 1995; Schelling 1980; Morrow 1989; Pillar 1983; Wagner 1993, 2000; Smith 1995; Craig and George 1995; Werner 1998; Bennett and Stam 1998; Filson and Werner 2002, 2004; Goemans 2000a, b; Powell 2002, 2004; Reiter 2003, 2009; Slantchev 2003, 2004; Smith and Stam 2004). These rationalist models highlight the interactive nature of war, that it takes two or more sides to end it. Moreover, they address the theoretical problem of enforcement in an anarchic realm. They explain how and why the stronger side makes a credible commitment not to raise further demands and exploit his bargaining advantage in the future.2 Most bargaining models of war focus on information dynamics. In this approach, war is caused by uncertainty about the distribution of power between the belligerents or the costs of fighting, and the war itself is an important source of information for overcoming this uncertainty (Slantchev 2003, 2004; Powell 2002, 2004; Filson and Werner 2002, 2004; Morrow 1989). Because states have incentives to conceal private information about their ability to wage war, both sides may be optimistic at the same time and lead themselves into war. However, at least one belligerent must be wrong about these estimates. Wars end when both sides’ expectations about military victory converge enough to create an overlapping bargaining space—what Slantchev (2003, 2004) calls the “principle of convergence.” Belligerents continuously update their expectations throughout the war, based on observed battle outcomes, rejected diplomatic offers and unreasonable demands from the other side. Many bargaining models conceive of this updating process in mathematical terms, in accordance with Bayes’ rule (Morrow 1994: chapter 6). Given the uncertainty inherent in war, battlefield outcomes and the adversary’s diplomatic behavior help belligerents understand their adversary’s “type.” For example, winning a battle will lead a belligerent to believe he is more powerful than the other side, causing him to incrementally increase his demands. In contrast, a battlefield defeat will lead him to incrementally lower his demands. Similarly, belligerents will assume weaker (or cost-sensitive) opponents will settle sooner and accept worse terms than stronger (or cost-tolerant) ones. Accordingly, belligerents “screen” their adversary’s type through a diplomatic offer designed so that weaker opponents would accept it, while stronger ones would
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reject it. A rejected offer will lead a belligerent to believe he is facing a “stronger type” and thus lead him to incrementally decrease his demands (Slantchev 2004; Filson and Werner 2002; Powell 2004). In practice, this Bayesian updating process may not be as precise as these models predict, and information dynamics cannot provide a complete account of war termination behavior. While Bayesian models accept that this updating process can take time, the reasons for this “lag” are under-theorized. Gartner (1997) argues that states may choose to change their military strategy rather than offer diplomatic concessions, when faced with unpleasant news from the battlefield. Thus, the information updating is not immediately reflected in bargain-converging behavior. Reiter (2009: chapter 11) posits that credible commitment fears may delay war termination, even as uncertainty is being reduced. More specifically, he argues that fears of adversary non-compliance in an agreement, fears of signaling weakness to the other side, and “leader patience” can account for the inefficiency in Bayesian updating. Surprisingly, only one scholar has theorized about domestic politics as a source of this inefficiency, even as Bayesian formal theorists have flagged it as a possible cause. For example, Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner admit their model assumes an attacker can “effortlessly revise upward or downwards her demands,” but a “leader responsive to domestic political concerns, however, is likely much less flexible” (2002: 832). The domestic politics version of the Bayesian argument filters battlefield conditions through cost-sensitive democratic constituencies, who then pressure leaders to change war policy. In turn, this pressure on the leaders causes them to change their expectations about the war (Filson and Werner 2004; Bennett and Stam 1998; Slantchev 2004). However, this argument does not model the lag in the Bayesian updating process that we often see empirically. In contrast, Hein Goemans (2000a) begins to account for lags in Bayesian updating, but only in losing “semi-repressive and moderately exclusionary” regimes, i.e. oligarchies. Goemans argues oligarchs’ expectations about personal punishment after the war serve as a brake on updating their expectations during it. If accepting settlement terms appears to have nasty personal consequences, these leaders as individuals can rationally prefer to continue fighting if there is a chance they can get terms that prevent their punishment. Thus, losing oligarchs can prevent the state from updating war expectations and creating an overlapping bargaining space to end it. While the inclusion of regime type is an improvement on bargaining models that exclude domestic politics entirely, this emphasis focuses attention on the differences between regime types and away from variation within regime types. In the process, such arguments conceal very important domestic political expla-
d omest ic coalit ion shifts
nations for lags in Bayesian updating. For example, by treating all democrats as similarly cost-sensitive and all oligarchs as similarly afraid of political survival, these arguments ignore that different leaders within each regime type face different constraints, based on their governing coalition’s particular obstacles to peace. In other words, it is not appropriate to assume leaders of each regime type will all behave the same way.3 By ignoring variation among leaders within the same regime type, these arguments miss domestic constraints that can explain lags in Bayesian updating. They also ignore the effect of leadership changes in overcoming such lags. In sum, given their ability to account for strategic interaction, I am not rethinking the underlying logic and information dynamics of Bayesian bargaining models. Instead, I build on them by elucidating the underspecified causal mechanism about when and how the overlapping bargaining space opens up. As Robert Powell notes, future efforts to use informational asymmetries to explain war “have to explain why it takes so long to resolve the informational asymmetry” (2004: 345). Accordingly, I look more carefully at the lag in the Bayesian updating process and theorize about how states get beyond it. While Bayesian models assume this change in expectations occurs when incumbent leaders change their minds, my research suggests that in many wars, this change in expectations results from a change in the foreign policy leadership itself. In the process, my theory addresses two other shortcomings in these models. First, most bargaining models do not allow for actors’ goals or interests to evolve during the settlement process. If preference is given, why do actors’ sentiments change during war? Instead, as I will argue, preferences during war appear to move over time in response to several issues, including a state’s “sunk costs” and the information gained from the process of fighting and negotiating.4 Moreover, new leaders often come to power with different preferences and policy goals, which can lead to a new calculation of the costs and benefits of continuing the war. For example, Sarah Croco (2008) argues that “culpable” leaders—those whom the public can clearly link to the decision to go to war—face “settlement costs,” while “non-culpable” leaders can distance themselves from the original war decision and thereby become immune to such costs. Thus, culpable and nonculpable leaders face different utility functions and preferences about continuing or ending the war. Second, and more importantly, my model includes and addresses an entire class of wars—protracted stalemates—that most bargaining models cannot explain and typically exclude from analysis. As Bayesian models indicate, leaders update their preferences as information is revealed through fighting, as long as the battlefield provides clear information. In stalemated battlefield situations,
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this information may be non-existent, limited or ambiguous or leaders may be unable to act on clear information. These wars are empirically too common to be simply ignored as irrelevant: recent scholarship on war termination documents an increasing number of stalemates in the post–World War II period (Pillar 1983; Dunnigan and Martel 1987; Smith 1995; Fortna 2004b). My model acknowledges this fact and accepts the possibility of ambiguous outcomes to war. Indeed, this ambiguity is a key reason why existing leaders have difficulty changing expectations and often require a leadership change to end the war. Thus, my model adds breadth to the current literature by theorizing more explicitly about lags in the updating process that can lead to protracted stalemates.
Domestic Coalition Shifts in War Termination My model focuses on domestic coalition shifts, an intriguing domestic political variable that has been noted by scholars from all three theoretical perspectives (Calahan 1944: 109; Kecskemeti 1958; Rothstein 1970: 74; Handel 1978: 26; Allison 1969: 718; Iklé 1991; Craig and George 1995: 232–33; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1992; Smith 1995: 106; Randle 1973: 444; May 1973: chapter 5; Staudenmaier 1985). Similarly, Bennett (1997) and Goertz and Diehl (1995) examine regime change in ending enduring interstate rivalries. Despite all of these references—many quoted in Chapter 1—domestic coalition shifts have thus far not been addressed in a systematic fashion. The fact that so many scholars, from so many theoretical perspectives, have mentioned regime change preceding war termination suggests it is an important component in the process. These references about domestic coalition shifts point to a critical, yet underdeveloped, variable for explaining when and why wars end. None of these scholars have examined the variable and its causal mechanisms in a rigorous and generalizable manner as this book does.5 In contrast, I make the domestic coalition shift hypothesis explicit by operationalizing and tracing its dynamics. I retain the idea that war termination is a bargaining process between two interacting sides, but I refine the domestic mechanisms to explain why each side decides to come to the bargaining table. In this way, my explanation is more complete, and thus more powerful, than previous attempts to generalize about and predict war termination. t wo-level games in st icky wars
As with most other major decisions in the international realm, ending a war is a two-level game (Putnam 1988; Tsebelis 1990; Schelling 1980; Mayer 1992; Fearon 1994; Schultz 1998; Smith 1998; Milner and Rosendorff 1996; Partell and Palmer 1999).6 Leaders of the belligerent states must not only settle with the opposite
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side, but they must also “settle” with their domestic constituencies at home or else be removed from their leadership position. Bargaining at the international level affects bargaining at the domestic level, and vice versa, if only to constrain the “win set” of acceptable settlement terms. Therefore, to be persuasive, an account of the war termination process must look at both levels and the interaction between them to answer the questions of how, when and why wars end. Bayesian models of war termination have mostly focused on the international level game. When incorporating domestic politics, the Bayesian model suggests that battlefield information leads domestic constituencies to reevaluate the war and pressure their leaders to change war policy. This constituent pressure, along with the leaders’ own reevaluation of the war, leads the incumbent leaders to change their war expectations, thus producing an overlapping bargaining space and eventually war termination. While Bayesian models suggest that a lag in updating can delay war termination, they do not elaborate on how states get beyond this lag. By fleshing out the domestic-level game and developing an alternative causal pathway of domestic coalition shifts, this chapter provides an account for Bayesian updating in protracted conflict. Bayesian models appear to best explain wars with a large power imbalance between the opposing sides. In these wars, updating occurs rather quickly, because the battlefield compellingly illustrates the belligerents’ relative strength. As a result, such wars are often short. In contrast, Bayesian models are less effective for explaining longer wars, where realpolitik factors are not enough to manifest clear battlefield outcomes. As Branislav Slantchev (2004: 816) argues, “parity in observable capabilities makes informational problems more severe,” which can lengthen the war. Wars can be long, for example, because the battlefield becomes stalemated, belligerents lack commitment credibility, relative power is ambiguous, or the issues at stake are indivisible or highly salient. In contrast to the straightforward updating behavior usually observed in short wars, long wars tend to be characterized by “sticky” policies. Leaders find it more difficult—for the reasons discussed below—to shift policies and strategies related to prosecuting and ending the war as quickly as the Bayesian approach would suggest. Here, war does not necessarily end when the decision-maker wants it to or should want it to. Rather, belligerents invest political capital in the policies of prosecuting the war and these policies become stuck in a positive feedback loop. Thus, in longer wars, failure of realpolitik factors to produce a bargaining space and political capital sunk costs make it harder and harder to end it. Because wars can become stuck, like Vucinich and Teachman (1993) and Slantchev (2004), I argue that war has negative duration dependence—the longer the war, the harder it is to end it.7 For this reason, the probability that a war
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will end after its second month is far higher than it will after its 24th month. My argument contrasts with those that suggest war has no duration dependence (Bennett and Stam 1996) or positive duration dependence (Filson and Werner 2002). However, Filson and Werner (2002) exclude domestic politics from their formal model entirely and do not test the model empirically. Bennett and Stam (1996) only include aggregated regime type variables that average, for each war, all belligerents’ scores for “institutionalized democracy” and “competitiveness of participation.” In other words, their models do not capture the sticky domestic dynamics that lead war to have negative duration dependence. H realpolitik: The greater the power imbalance between the two sides, the quicker the war. H negative duration dependence: The longer the war has already lasted, the harder it is to end. coalit ion p olit ics
The decision to enter, prosecute or end a war is a political decision—the vector product of many different domestic interests. Thus, rather than characterize each belligerent state as a unitary actor, it is useful to model the actor in these political processes as a domestic governing coalition. A coalition has been defined as “the joint use of resources to determine the outcome of a mixed-motive situation involving more than two units” (Gamson 1964: 5). This definition highlights that coalition policymaking is a collective activity that exercises power by organizing and applying resources to achieve certain ends (Hinckley 1981: 6). Coalitions form the backbone of most decisions and actions of the state; indeed, it is coalitions that make human activity “political.” All leaders must create and maintain coalitions to accomplish anything productive, from raising taxes to ending war. Coalitions form when different actors join together to achieve a common purpose. Minimum winning coalitions—those with the fewest members necessary to control the policymaking process—are preferable, because they require fewer resources and fewer compromises (Riker 1962). However, many factors can lead to larger-than-minimum winning coalitions, including ideology (Axelrod 1970; De Swaan 1973; Hagan 1993); domestic pressures for inclusivity (Hula 1999); uncertainty (Koehler 1972); and crisis situations, like war (Hagan et al. 2001: 203; Gamson 1964). Indeed, the greater the environmental hostility, the more internally cohesive the coalition is (Bennett 1980). The converse should also be true: during a “limited” war, the less threatened a nation feels, the less cohesive its governing coalition will be. A governing coalition’s ability to commit to or change policy depends heav-
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ily on the effective number of veto players (Cox and McCubbins 2001; Tsebelis 1995, 2002; Hagan et al. 2001). Stephan Haggard and Mathew McCubbins define a veto player as “a person, group or faction who, through their control of an office, post, or branch of government, can reject any proposed changes to existing policy” (2001: 5). As the number of veto players increases, the less likely a single individual or faction can control policy and the more likely divergent interests become involved in political decision-making.8 The more veto players and the greater the distance between their policy positions, the more difficult it can be to change policy. In contrast, sustaining a policy will be much easier (Tsebelis 1995, 2002; Cox and McCubbins 2001). The distributive effects of policy depend on the number of veto players, as well. The more veto players, the more policies enacted will benefit targeted groups or constituencies, instead of the general public. This occurs when veto players are able to demand—and receive—side payments in the form of narrowly targeted policies (Cox and McCubbins 2001). Only groups that are both necessary to a coalition’s success and in a position not to cooperate can demand and receive such side payments (Lamborn 1991: 63). These dynamics can produce two pernicious policy results. The first is “logrolling,” where each coalition member or group gets what it most wants in return for tolerating the unpleasant effects of policies backed by other coalition members (Snyder 1991: 44; Riker and Brams 1973; Hagan et al. 2001: 176; Snyder and Diesing 1977: 351). The second is “squaring the circle,” where coalitions explain away antithetical policy positions. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder argue this can lead coalitions to sweep “tough tradeoffs under the rug, pretending that contradictory policies actually make sense or cannot be avoided” (1995: 32). Alternatively, the coalition can blame other states for the policy contradictions it brought upon itself. These coalitional dynamics help explain policy inertia and highlight the obvious relationship between policy stability and domestic coalition shifts. When a policy is functioning because of a coalition agreement, changing the policy requires renegotiating that agreement (Snyder and Diesing 1977: 351). Likewise, the less control a coalition member has over policy choice and implementation, the less willing he is to take political risks to change it. Thus, larger coalitions with more veto players are unlikely to take political risks to change policy (Lamborn 1991: 63–66). For these reasons, policy stability can lead governments to be unable to change the status quo, even when such changes are necessary or desirable. In fact, a government with policy stability may become so immobile that policy change is only possible by replacing the incumbent government (Tsebelis 1995: 321).
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d omest ic gover ning coalit ions
All states are governed by a “domestic governing coalition,” i.e. the elite foreign policy decision-making group in each state. I adapt Margaret Hermann’s concept of an “authoritative decision unit,” as the actors who “if they agree, have both the ability to commit the resources of the government in foreign affairs and the power to prevent other entities within the government from overtly reversing their position” (2001: 56).9 The important consideration here is not just a member’s vote but the resources he can bring to the coalition, such as his official position, personal prestige, recognized expertise and influence within the government. Coalition-building inside the governing coalition recognizes that making foreign policy involves many actors, including contending leadership factions, executive bureaucracies and separate institutions like the legislature and the military. Where there are disagreements among these actors, the resulting policy will reflect the agreements and side-payments that were necessary to gain the policy’s approval (Hagan 1993; Snyder and Diesing 1977; Salmore and Salmore 1978; Steinbruner 1974). In addition, a domestic governing coalition’s members are constrained by broader societal interest groups and other political “patrons,” such as (1) dissenting actors in the regime’s ruling group or party, (2) other political parties in the legislature, (3) military and paramilitary groups, (4) groups reflecting regional or ethnic interests, (5) economic sectors, (6) military-industrial-scientific complexes, (7) public opinion, (8) the media and (9) other interest groups and non-governmental organizations (Snyder 1991; Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Hagan 1993; Fordham 1998). Bueno de Mesquita and his colleagues (1999, 2004) argue that the size of these power-base groups has a strong causal effect on the regime’s decisions about war. Who these constituencies are will vary by regime type: public opinion, the media and opposition groups may have more effect in democracies, while the military, party apparatus or some external ally may be the relevant audience in authoritarian regimes (Peceny et al. 2002).10 From the perspective of the governing coalition members, the primary dynamic in these broader relationships is retaining the support base to remain in power. Thus, coalition-building at this level focuses on maximizing political support, blocking opposition that may be competing for political dominance, and if necessary, adjusting policy to make it compatible with domestic realities. All leaders will depend upon some constituency to stay in power, and different coalition members may answer to different constituencies. Even apparent dictators can be removed if they no longer promote the interests of their selectorate (Morgan and Campbell 1991).11 With an issue as salient as war, all leaders must worry about domestic politics and be careful not to become radically out of sync with their constituency.
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In this book, I concentrate more on the first kind of coalition-building, within the governing coalition. Leaders are more sensitive to challenges from within the regime than from the wider society, for three reasons. First, the political power and authority necessary to allocate resources and implement policy reside in the governing coalition. Second, dissenting coalition members hold veto power— they are directly able to block policy initiatives, while the external opposition’s veto power is more diffuse. Even if some internal veto players do not actually participate in particular decisions, other coalition members must take care not to alienate them, because they are essential to the coalition retaining power. Finally, coalitions with permanent divisions or factional politics are much more vulnerable to external opposition. For example, actors in a divided governing coalition may try to strengthen their power by aligning with important external actors, thereby increasing the latter’s influence over policy (Salmore and Salmore 1978; Snyder and Diesing 1977; Hagan 1993). I follow Joe Hagan et al.’s (2001) framework for coalition decision rules, the general procedures and norms that coalition members recognize as structuring their interactions. Decision rules clarify how the group makes decisions and stipulate what constitutes an authoritative consensus. Hagan and his colleagues differentiate three kinds of coalition decision rules. The first (rare) category (“unit veto model”) occurs when political necessity or formal voting rules require unanimity among all members. Because any single actor can block the initiatives of all others, the possibility of side payments and the existence of a shared policy orientation are important mediating variables. The second category (“anarchy model”) occurs in coalitions with few, if any, established rules or procedures for making decisions. Here, important mediating variables are predominant actors or actors with exclusive control over resources necessary to implement policy— such as a military’s monopoly over the use of force. Between these two extremes is the third category (“minimum connected winning coalition”). This model applies when the governing coalition is regulated by established voting rules that permit a majority to agree on and implement a particular course of action. Key mediating variables here include pivotal actors and the willingness among coalition members to bargain and logroll. d omest ic coalit ion shifts
As explained above, coalition-building dynamics are an important cause of policy stability, and a shift in the domestic governing coalition may help to overcome policy inertia. I define a “domestic coalition shift” as either (1) a consequential change in the identity of the decision-makers or (2) a substantive change in the type of government. The first is similar to Hagan’s definition of a significant
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regime change, when “one set of leaders is replaced by another, even though the state’s structures remain fixed and the overall structure of the political system is unaltered” (1994: 143). Specifically, such changes in major decision-makers include changes in the actual or nominal head of state, cabinet membership, political parties in a parliamentary governing coalition and junta membership. Notably, this definition excludes changes that involve only military leaders, unless a military leader also holds a cabinet-level post or membership in the ruling junta (and thus serves in a political role in the decision-making process). The latter definition resembles the comparativists’ “regime change,” i.e. a change in the type of regime. Either type of shift can produce a significant change in policies as new members bring new resources, styles, perspectives, interests and preferences to the leadership coalition. Regime type may influence the baseline frequency of these coalition shifts. It is difficult to know exactly how pre-existing election cycles will line up with the timeline of a war, and new elections may not always lead to a new coalition (e.g. the same governing coalition may be reelected). Certainly, democracies are more likely to experience relatively frequent coalition shifts by nature of their institutional structure. Recent work about elections and the use of force in the United States suggests the absence of an electoral cycle effect in US use of force decisions, except when the economy is performing poorly (Gowa 1998; Fordham 2002). However, more broadly, Kurt Gaubatz (1991, 1999) shows that both presidential and parliamentary democracies usually get into their wars early in their electoral cycle, when electoral pressures are lowest. Both findings imply that democracy is not the underlying mechanism driving coalition shifts during war.12 Certainly, regime type appears to have some effect on war duration. For example, Dan Reiter and Allan Stam (2002) argue that democracies are associated with short wars, because they choose to participate in wars they expect to be short (“the democratic selection effect”). Moreover, as many authors have noted since Kant, democratic leaders are more sensitive to the costs of war than other regime types (Bennett and Stam 1996, 1998; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Doyle 1983; Filson and Werner 2004; Gaubatz 1991, 1999; Levi 1997; Maoz and Russett 1993; Reiter and Stam 1998, 2002; Schultz 1999; Stam 1996; Wagner 2000). Research on public opinion has suggested that in democracies, public support for the war declines monotonically with battle-deaths (Mueller 1985, 1994; Gartner and Myers 1995; Gartner and Segura 1998; Gartner, Segura and Wilkening 1997). The dominant view is that the collective public is casualty-sensitive and will support war only as long as the benefits outweigh the costs (Page and Shapiro 1992; Wittkopf 1990; Larson 1996).13 This implies that democracies fight shorter wars because as casualties and other war costs mount, democratic governments be-
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come more likely to offer concessions in reaction to the war’s waning popularity (Bennett and Stam 1998; Filson and Werner 2004; Slantchev 2004). As Reiter and Stam note, “public consent is like an hourglass: when war starts, the hourglass flips over and democratic leaders know they must win before the sand runs out” (2002: 178). In other words, there are two arguments for why democracies should be associated with shorter wars. The “selection effect” stipulates that democracies choose to fight only those wars they expect will be short. The “cost sensitivity” argument stipulates that democracies settle more quickly than other regimes in response to the war’s waning popularity. If we assume that the democracy variable is capturing both arguments, then including coalition shifts allows us to begin teasing these two mechanisms apart. Why? Because coalition shifts are associated with leaders’ responses to cost-sensitivity, but coalition shifts are not related to the selection effect. The selection effect happens long before the war begins and thus has no relationship to coalition shifts during the war. In contrast, one way democratic leaders respond to cost sensitivity is through coalition shifts. Changing the composition of the government can both signal to the public that it is “doing something” and put in place a government capable of enacting policies that will staunch the costs of war. Because coalition shifts are silent about the selection effect and only capture one aspect of cost-sensitivity, I still expect democracy to be significantly linked to shorter wars. However, because coalition shifts can partially explain cost-sensitivity, a model that includes both regime type and coalition shifts will be better specified than one with regime type alone. Indeed, a model that includes both variables can help us weigh the relative importance of the two mechanisms for explaining why democracies are associated with short wars. Accordingly, the regime type variable should no longer capture the effects of the coalition shift mechanism, so I postulate that it should have less explanatory power when coalition shifts are included in the model. H regime type: Regime type should have less explanatory power when coalition shifts are included in models of war duration and termination. st icky wars and obstacles to peace
There are many reasons why a war, once entrenched, is difficult to end. I argue that these reasons fall into one of three categories—preference obstacles, information obstacles or entrapment obstacles. Essentially, domestic leaders do not want the war to end because the benefits outweigh the costs, they do not know it is in their interest to end the war when the costs start to outweigh the benefits or they want to end the war, but cannot. These three obstacles can occur in tandem,
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although they may not all be present at the same time or have an equally powerful effect. As will be explained below, the dynamics of the domestic governing coalition itself exacerbate the obstacles as well. These obstacles make it more likely belligerents will need a domestic coalition shift before the war can end. By removing these obstacles, domestic coalition shifts may produce the necessary conditions for war to end. The preference obstacle is already well-documented in bargaining models of war; even in rationalist models, if decision-makers do not want to end the war, a bargaining space cannot develop. In contrast, the information and entrapment obstacles interfere with the Bayesian updating critical to making decisions about continuing or ending a war. Preference Obstacles With preference obstacles, domestic coalition members may not want to end the war, for four reasons. First, leaders’ personal stakes may be very high, because their personal reputation, domestic political standing or physical or financial security is attached to continuing the war. If accepting the terms of settlement appears to have nasty personal consequences, leaders can prefer to continue fighting if there is a chance they can get terms that prevent personal punishment—such as losing office, exile or death (Goemans 2000a; Croco 2008). Alternatively, most of the benefits of war—including career advancement, protection from foreign economic competition, operational autonomy, larger budget slices or boosted revenue streams—are disproportionately concentrated in specific groups, such as the military and military-industrial-scientific complexes (Mansfield and Snyder 1995: 25; Snyder 1991: 32–35, 49–52; Davis and Huttenback 1986). Coalition members receiving such concentrated benefits often distribute the war’s costs (taxes and casualties) widely across the population. By pushing war costs off onto others while garnering concentrated perks for their constituents, these coalition members may have no interest in ending the war.14 Second, and relatedly, fighting the war may help leaders stay in power, especially when non-constituents are the ones directly bearing the war’s costs. Such “diversionary wars” can occur when the state is experiencing democratization or leaders face domestic political problems, such as unrest or economic downturn. In these situations, the governing coalition may want to continue fighting to enhance its legitimacy, demonstrate strong leadership, deflect attention away from divisive domestic problems or discredit domestic opponents (Levy 1988, 1989; Hagan 1993; Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Richards et al. 1993; Smith 1996). In other words, the latent “function” of fighting an external adversary is domestic social and political solidarity (Simmel 1898; Aho 1994). The Argentine junta’s decision to fight the Falklands War exemplifies this dynamic. Third, leaders may perceive that the costs of military inaction are higher than
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the probable costs of continuing the war, such as when the country has been invaded and the only alternative to fighting is losing sovereignty. If the adversary has such high aims, leaders may believe fighting is the only option. Relatedly, although examples seem rare, international considerations could lead coalition members to want to continue fighting, even if they expect to lose, to impress third states with their level of resolve (Jervis 1988: 677). Finally, continuing the war may help leaders in a broader conflict by providing information about the adversary’s military or draining his resources in a tangential fight. Stalin’s motives for continuing the Korean War are an example of this dynamic, as Chapter 4 will explain. Preference obstacles are most problematic when the governing coalition includes members with an unwillingness or psychological inability to criticize their colleagues who hold the hawkish position. These dynamics are actually information obstacles, operating in tandem with the preference obstacle. In coalitions with a power imbalance, where potential critics are less powerful than the hawks, they are often unwilling to express their criticism for fear of perceived penalties that could result—ranging from humiliation to death (Fisher 1969; Schelling 1982; Smith 1995; Iklé 1991: 60–61). The fear of being branded a “traitor” can lead coalition members to falsify their true war-terminating preference in order to preserve their jobs (Kuran 1997; Sigal 1988: 29). Thus, they put their personal preferences above ending the war or changing war policy. The less control a coalition member has over policy choice and implementation, the less willing he is to take personal political risks to change it (Lamborn 1991: 63–66). In contrast, in coalitions with relative power balance, potential critics may be psychologically unable to express their criticism. This resembles Irving Janis’ “groupthink” phenomenon, where “subtle constraints, which the leader may reinforce inadvertently, prevent a member from fully exercising his critical powers and from openly expressing doubts when most others in the group have reached a consensus” (1972: 3). The preference obstacle can also occur in situations where potential critics are willing to speak out, but they lack the necessary power to overrule the hawks whose preferences are creating the obstacle. In these cases, potential critics inside the coalition may be willing to share their criticism, but more powerful hawks are unwilling to listen and may take action to prevent such criticism from arising again. Unlike the unwillingness described above, which is based on coalition members’ fears about expected penalties, here coalition members actually suffer for their dissent. Certainly, the two are related: potential critics are more likely to suppress their doubts and dissent after a leader has reacted negatively to criticism by humiliating, chastising, exiling or killing some of the critics (Smith 1995).
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Information Obstacles With information obstacles, domestic coalition members may not know that they should end the war. In this case, the rational updating process does not occur, because they (1) receive poor quality information, (2) do not necessarily share the same information, (3) use different indicators to assess the war or (4) have individual or (5) organizational biases that prevent them from using all available information. Information obstacle dynamics contrast to the assumptions of Bayesian updating models, reviewed above. Poor Quality Information. First, coalition members may receive information about the war that is ambiguous, incomplete, biased, conflicting or faulty (von Clausewitz 1976: 191; Iklé 1991). Poor-quality information is common during war, even as leaders are bombarded with data—especially in the era of the internet and instantaneous, round-the-clock news coverage. Although reliable intelligence collection and analysis is difficult under any circumstances, it can be near impossible during war. For example, ambiguous information can result when (1) the belligerents’ advantages and disadvantages counteract each other, (2) there are many strategic options still available for decision-makers to try, in the hopes that another strategy might work better and (3) the battlefield itself is ambiguous, such as when a state is winning its air campaign but losing its ground battles. Poor quality information interacts with other aspects of “friction” during war, including unpredictability in the strategic interaction with the enemy and coordination with allies. For example, adversaries often send ambiguous signals to each other during the process of reaching a negotiated settlement (Quester 1970; Jervis 1976, 1989; Smith 1995; Snyder and Diesing 1977). Coordination with allies can also add layers of complexity, including different languages and cultures and the lack of interoperability in battlefield command and control systems (Bensahel 2007). Given such ambiguity, it is perhaps not surprising that even when governments obtain knowledge of the enemy’s war plans and intentions, leaders often fail to take advantage of it or distrust it because of contradictory reports (Iklé 1991). For example, the United States was unable to take advantage of having deciphered Japanese codes before the attack on Pearl Harbor.15 Poor-quality, ambiguous information can lengthen war in three ways. First, as Bayesian models suggest, ambiguous information requires more rounds of “screening” the opponent with diplomatic offers and battles, in an effort to identify his “type” (Powell 2004; Slantchev 2004; Filson and Werner 2002, 2004). Second, the more ambiguous the information, the more likely leaders will rely on prior beliefs, guesses and schemas and the more likely incoming information will be interpreted to conform with desires and expectations (Snyder and Diesing 1977: 310–12; Rosati 2000). For example, coalition members may interpret
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ambiguous information optimistically, leading them to assume their current war policy is having the desired effect and thus encourage them to continue fighting. Finally, relying on guesses can provide easy opportunities for self-deception. Judgments about the enemy can consciously or unconsciously allow decisionmakers to avoid unpleasant truths, such as the prospect of a prolonged stalemate or defeat. When guesses and predictions get blended in with known facts, it can lead decision-makers to treat the predictions (and their underlying assumptions) as certainties, rather than directing attention to the possibility that the prediction might be wrong. As will be seen below, this dynamic can be complicated by effort justification and other psychological biases in decision-making. Exposure to Different Information. A second reason updating may not occur as Bayesian models predict is because different coalition members may be exposed to different information. At least three dynamics can impede the flow of information. First, given the information asymmetries of the principal-agent relationship, the executive is likely to have some information that is not available to all of his advisors (Downs and Rocke 1994). Similarly, military leaders in the field often have information not available to civilian coalition members at home (Halperin 1970; Feaver 2003). Different coalition members may have differing access to classified intelligence information based on their clearance and “need to know.” Most generally, information monopolies can keep information about the war from the public and sometimes even other parts of the government, especially legislatures (Snyder 1991; Colaresi 2005; Gibbs 1995; Page and Shapiro 1992). Clearly, in the midst of war, those who have access to the flood of raw data have plenty of room to manipulate information and misinform others. As Lord Asquith, British Prime Minister in the early years of World War I, once quipped, the military in the War Office “kept three sets of figures, one to mislead the public, another to mislead the cabinet, and a third to mislead itself ” (quoted in Iklé 1991: 97). Second, coalition members will usually have access to detailed information that originates in their own agency, while only seeing the “sanitized” or synthesized results of such information from sister agencies. To use an example from the US government, the secretary of state will be able to see raw data from foreign opinion polls and cables from US embassies abroad, while the director of National Intelligence is more likely to see raw intelligence information and monitor the dialogue that captures the various nuances in analysis across the intelligence community’s 16 member organizations. In contrast, the secretary of defense is more likely to see only summary reports of such data. Finally, problems with information flow can be aggravated by organizational or structural pathologies in the decision-making process. Organizations and bureaucracies’ formal and informal power structures, standard operating proce-
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dures and internal culture can affect how information is processed and filtered (Allison and Zelikow 1999; Simon and March 1993; Cyert and March 1992; Perrow 1986). For example, it can be difficult for decision-makers within an organization to discuss or even conceive of alternatives that are not culturally sanctioned (Weick 1995), and hierarchical chains of command can thwart information flow. Similarly, unpopular policies can make decision-makers feel like they are under siege, which can lead to closed decision-making procedures that thwart information flow (Janis 1982; Janis and Mann 1977; Anderson 1985). Moreover, there is an inverse relationship between information flow and coercion in a political system. The more centralized and coercive the system, the less likely it is that factual, honest information will reach the top, as officials may hide facts or their true preferences to preserve their jobs (Apter 1965; Kuran 1997).16 Exposure to different information can lengthen war in four ways. First, coalition members can use differing information access to manipulate other coalition members to their policy position. For example, hawkish coalition members can selectively share information that suggests the state is performing well, while hiding information it is not, thereby keeping dovish coalition members on board to continue fighting. Second, this dynamic can also work outside the coalition, as well. Coalition members’ information monopolies can allow them to manipulate public opinion or other actors without information access. If coalition members want to continue the war, they can selectively share information (“spin the story”) to lead others to accept their interpretation of events (Snyder 1991; Mansfield and Snyder 1995; McGinnis and Williams 2001; Mor 1997; Colaresi 2005; Gibbs 1995; Baum 2003: 44–45; Johnson and Tierney 2006: 67–75). Third, organizational and structural pathologies to information flow—such as preference falsification in coercive regimes—can breed confusion and ignorance and generate inefficiencies in decision-making, which can delay a war-ending decision. This dynamic is clearly linked to the self-suppressing tendencies of potential critics in the preference obstacle. Finally, within the coalition, access to different information can lead coalition members to draw different conclusions about war performance, and if their assessments collide, it can create gridlock and policy stability. This final dynamic relates directly to indicators and metrics. Different Indicators and Metrics to Assess the War. A third reason updating may not occur as Bayesian models predict is because different coalition members may use different indicators to assess the war and thus reach different assessments. Indicators are cognitive shortcuts actors use to cope with complexity (Gartner 1997; Johnson and Tierney 2006; Rosati 2000). While most Bayesian models assume all belligerents use a common combat performance metric to update their beliefs, this approach argues that different states—and different coalition mem-
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bers within states—use different indicators to assess war performance (Gartner 1997). This “dominant indicator approach” focuses on sudden and dramatic changes in the quantitative indicators on which decision-makers rely—such as combat deaths, gains in terrain or leader popularity polls. Because different coalition members often rely on different indicators, they can reach different assessments of the same situation, i.e. when one indicator suggests that a policy is performing well, while another suggests that the policy is performing poorly.17 Not every coalition member will be tracking the same indicators, so new information coming in may not cause all coalition members to change their war policy assessments simultaneously. Indicators not only lessen the cognitive load for decision-makers during the war, but—given their quantitative focus—they can also create a false impression of certainty, for three reasons. First, while quantitative indicators may be based on facts, the process of collecting the data on which they are based is often plagued by measurement error. For example, recent debates about the number of Iraqi non-combatant casualties highlight complications in gathering such statistics. Moreover, decision-makers usually sweep over assumptions that indicators implicitly hide so the indicators can provide aggregated estimates. Unfortunately, some common ways of judging military success—such as territorial gains or improvements in current force ratios—are insufficient or even misleading indicators for guiding the conduct of war (Iklé 1991: 19). Yet coalition members, especially government bureaucracies, continue to rely on them to avoid explicitly articulating “political” judgments about preferences, war aims and risk. As a result, they treat indicators as objective facts that proxy for broader estimates, while ignoring the measurement errors and underlying assumptions inherent in the proxy process. Finally, coalition members often choose self-serving—rather than objective—metrics that corroborate their beliefs, expectations and desires (Johnson and Tierney: 2006: 42; Dunning and Cohen 1992). Different indicators and metrics can lengthen war in two ways. First, if different coalition members rely on different indicators that diverge, their assessments about the war may collide and lead to policy gridlock. As a result, the coalition becomes unable to update its expectations and agree on whether and how to change war policy. Second, because progress in war is often ambiguous, coalition members can choose from a wider range of indicators to assess war performance. This makes it easier to choose self-serving, optimistic metrics that bolster their expectations and assessments about war performance. In theory, if all indicators lead to pessimistic assessments of the current war policy, this could shorten the war. In practice, however, this rarely occurs, because coalition members try to find other metrics that “tell the story” they want to hear.
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Individual Biases. A fourth reason updating may not occur as Bayesian models predict is because coalition members may have individual biases that prevent them from processing war information. Here, information reaches the leaders, but they are unable to absorb and respond to it as Bayesian models would predict. Whether or not the information itself is biased, individual leaders are subject to cognitive, affective and learning biases. Cognitive biases arise from the way the brain copes with information processing constraints, especially when faced with complex problems.18 Affective biases arise from emotional states, such as desire or fear, especially when people feel threatened. These processes may be particularly important when the best option is uncertain or when decision-makers experience physiological or emotional stress.19 Learning biases arise in applying past experiences to shape perceptions of current or future events.20 Individual biases can lengthen war in at least five ways. First, in “belief system defense,” coalition members often take data that supports their expectations at face value, while ignoring, discounting or rejecting information that does not fit with favored or well-established beliefs (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Jervis 1976: 181–87; Nisbett and Ross 1980: 167–91; Fiske and Taylor 1991; Snyder and Diesing 1977: 310–29). Central or “core” beliefs are protected more strongly than “peripheral” or instrumental ones (Kaufmann 1994: 563). Delusional leaders may be particularly prone to this tendency, as are challengers with the most at stake (Byman and Pollack 2001: 137; Kaufmann 1994: 579). Thus, hawkish leaders may miss important cues that it is time to settle. Second, individuals often see their own behavior as driven by situational constraints, while seeing others’ actions as more voluntary or dispositional. Individuals are also likely to see their own behavior as reasonable, while overestimating the hostility of others. Applying this “attribution bias” to ending war, coalition members may read malicious intent into others’ behavior, furthering the spiral of suspicion and reinforcing hawkish tendencies to escalate or continue the war (Zimbardo 2008: 7, 212; Jervis 1988: 688–90; Kahneman and Renshon 2007). Third, individuals not only recall success more easily than failure, but they also avoid recognizing the likelihood of failure. They tend to give themselves credit for creating success, while blaming outside forces as the cause of failures (Janis and Mann 1977: 81–106; Kaufmann 1994; Johnson 2004; Johnson and Tierney 2006). An important consequence of this “success bias” for war termination is that coalition members with a large stake in the war policy’s success will be slower to acknowledge evidence the state is losing than those without such a stake. Moreover, this bias suggests coalition members will weigh battlefield victories more heavily than defeats, leading to over-optimistic evaluations of war performance and prolonging the war (Smith 1995: 22).
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Fourth, coalition leaders may incorrectly remember or misunderstand historical events or use history in biased ways (Levy 1994; Johnson and Tierney 2006). For example, leaders can apply historical analogies in simplistic ways, thus hiding important differences between the historical and current situations and drawing misleading conclusions (May 1973; Khong 1992; Schacter 1995). More maliciously, “learning bias” dynamics can interact with information monopolies and allow coalition members to manipulate public opinion. If coalition members want to continue the war, they can selectively draw on history to spin current events or demonize the enemy, thereby leading others to accept their hawkish interpretation. Finally, individual biases become particularly potent during the process of “effort justification,” a common characteristic of sticky wars. Effort justification occurs when individuals who have expended a lot of effort to achieve some goal increase the value of attaining that goal—even if a rational cost-benefit calculation would suggest that persisting now is unwise. In sticky wars, leaders who began the war frequently become so personally invested that they cannot change expectations. As a leader comes to believe his policy is necessary, he is likely to believe it can succeed, even if that belief requires distorting information. The greater the commitment to a goal, the stronger the bias is (Kaufmann 1994; Jervis 1988: 693). By having “too much invested to quit,” leaders may continue investing in policies that are unwarranted, hoping to justify or regain previous investments (Teger 1980; Smith 1995: 74; Croco 2008; Milburn and Christie 1990: 238). Paradoxically, while such “commitment biases” can help leaders avoid the painful truth that the current war policy is unsuccessful, they reinforce leaders’ personal responsibility and commitment to the current policy. This can create a vicious cycle, as leaders continue to justify their effort despite logical or cognitive inconsistency. Paired with “belief system defense” discussed above, effort justification is a strategy for reducing cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1957; George 1980; Jervis 1976; Kiesler, Collins and Miller 1983; Johnson and Tierney 2006). This discussion about effort justification points to a very important feature of the information obstacle: often the reason that leaders do not know to end the war is because they choose not to know. These biases highlight how that choice can be consciously or unconsciously fueled by a reluctance to confront painful facts. Environments with poor-quality information, reduced information flow and uncertainty—such as those during wartime—enhance this human capacity for denial. In other words, the previously discussed information obstacle dynamics can interact with and heighten the effects of individual biases. Organizational Biases. A final reason updating may not occur as Bayesian models predict is because governing coalitions may have organizational or group
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decision-making biases that prevent them from processing war information. For example, small, cohesive policymaking groups under stress can be vulnerable to “groupthink,” where the desire to minimize controversy compromises the quality of discussion. As a result, the group can ignore or misinterpret crucial information; ignore or discount alternatives to the preferred policy; or persist in policies even when confronted with feedback they are risky or not working well (Janis 1982; Hart, Stern and Sundelius 1997). Similarly, individuals may evaluate risk differently when they are in groups than when they make decisions alone—especially if the group is small or predominantly male. With the “risky shift” dynamic, groups are likely to make riskier decisions than individuals. Decision-makers may not want to let their compatriots down or be perceived as the “wet blanket” in the group.21 Both dynamics exemplify aspects of “preference falsification,” when an individual misrepresents his true desires under perceived social pressure (Kuran 1997). Alternatively, organizations’ and bureaucracies’ formal and informal power structures, standard operating procedures and internal culture can affect how information is processed and filtered (Halperin 1974; Allison and Zelikow 1999; Simon and March 1993; Cyert and March 1992; Sigal 1988; George 1980; Vertzberger 1998; Perrow 1986; Weick 1995). Weak states tend to have especially active bureaucracies that can inhibit the policymaking process (Skidmore 1996; Friedberg 1988). War can create organizational neuroses, such as the inability to evaluate information and assess policy in an effective way (Van Evera 1999). Organizational biases can lengthen war in at least three ways. First, they can magnify the war-lengthening effects of individual biases by providing additional motivations for effort justification and belief system defense. Second, organizational biases can magnify structural problems with information flow, thereby generating confusion and creating decision-making lags and inefficiencies. Third, organizational biases can magnify the self-suppressing tendencies of potential critics. For example, as discussed with the preference obstacle, it can be difficult for decision-makers within an organization to discuss or even conceive of alternatives that are not culturally sanctioned (Weick 1995). As these five information obstacle dynamics illustrate, coalition leaders may not update their expectations as Bayesian models would predict. Although information updating pathologies are usually associated with authoritarian leaders, these dynamics also exist in democracies, as the US case in the Korean War will illustrate. All governments, regardless of regime type, experience information obstacle dynamics, which produce subsequent complications for decision-making and policy assessment. Table 2.1 summarizes how the five information obstacle dynamics can lead to longer wars.
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table 2.1 Summary of the Five Information Obstacle Dynamics Information Obstacle
Poor Quality/ Ambiguous Information
War-Lengthening Effects
More rounds to “screen” opponents’ “type” More reliance on prior beliefs, guesses and schemas—leading to overoptimistic interpretations of information More opportunities for self-deception
Exposure to Different Information
More opportunities to manipulate other coalition members or constituents to a hawkish position More confusion and inefficiencies in decision-making Greater likelihood of conflicting assessments of war performance— leading to policy gridlock
Different Indicators & Metrics to Assess the War Individual Biases
Greater likelihood of conflicting assessments of war performance— leading to policy gridlock Greater likelihood of coalition members choosing self-serving metrics that “tell the story” they want to hear Greater likelihood of absorbing information that supports expectations, while ignoring, discounting or rejecting information that does not (“belief system defense”) Greater likelihood of reading malicious intent into adversary’s behavior (“attribution bias”) Over-optimistic evaluations of war performance (“success bias”) Misapplication of historical analogies to manipulate constituents or draw misleading conclusions (“learning bias”) Effort justification (“commitment bias”)
Organizational Biases
Group-level effort justification and belief system defense Greater likelihood of structural problems with information flow More confusion and inefficiencies in decision-making Greater likelihood of self-suppression among potential critics in the coalition
Certainly, some Bayesian accounts allow for slow updating, as ambiguous information requires more rounds of “screening” the opponent in an effort to identify his “type” (Powell 2004; Slantchev 2004; Filson and Werner 2002, 2004). Moreover, under Bayes’ theorem, if different coalition members had been exposed to different prior information, it could lead to differences in updating in response to new information (Edwards, Lindman and Savage 1963). Nonetheless, Bayesian models predict coalition members’ information sets should eventually converge, especially if they are engaging in frequent policy discussions. Bayesian models also predict coalition members will change their beliefs, or at least question them, when they encounter refuting evidence. Finally, Bayesian models would predict that, once confronted with such disconfirming data, coalition members will actively search for additional information to resolve that inconsis-
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tency (Kaufmann 1994: 565). In short, Bayesian models predict a relatively linear function between actors receiving new information and changing their expectations or beliefs. In contrast, these five information obstacle dynamics would not predict such a linear relationship. While Bayesian models predict information convergence across the coalition, the information obstacle predicts differing rates of learning and updating among coalition members. While Bayesian models predict belief changes after coalition members encounter disconfirming data, the information obstacle predicts self-deception, denial, a lurch towards more self-serving metrics or no response at all. Finally, while Bayesian models predict coalition members will seek out more information after learning disconfirming data, the information obstacle predicts a failure to search for more information, policy gridlock, spin-doctoring to manipulate the public or effort justification. In other words, the information obstacle predicts beliefs remain sticky until some critical point is reached, when they collapse and get replaced by new expectations (Snyder and Diesing 1977: 329). As we shall see below, that critical point may require a coalition shift. As Chaim Kaufmann argues, “Change only occurs when a particular experience is too salient to be ignored, too unambiguous to be discounted, and so squarely in conflict with the prior belief that it becomes consistently cheaper to abandon the belief than to try to resolve or to tolerate the inconsistency” (1994: 563). In short, unlike Bayesian models, the information obstacle would suggest that information updating occurs according to a step function, if it occurs at all. Entrapment Obstacles With entrapment obstacles, domestic coalition members may want to end the war but cannot. Entrapment can occur when the leaders’ hawkish constituencies want to continue the war, and the leaders must acquiesce to remain in power. If leaders know they will likely lose power if they end a war, they can rationally choose to continue it (Downs and Rocke 1994; Goemans 2000a, b; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Chiozza and Goemans 2004; Croco 2008). In other words, anticipating removal from power can cause the leaders to continue fighting and prolong the war. Leaders can face this political entrapment from a domestic constituency or from external allies. Internally, entrapment may result from having to answer to hawkish constituencies or, more benignly, from having “spun up” the population to mobilize for war (Russett 1990; Mueller 1985). Unless the war ends quickly, leaders must enact policies—such as demonizing the enemy and mobilizing the armed forces—to ease the process of waging war. These policies require that leaders expend political capital. The more political capital leaders expend, the more they convince
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their constituents that fighting the war is the right thing to do. Enacting these policies is necessary for winning on the battlefield, but these policies make it extremely difficult to simply “turn off ” the decision for war. The very policies that make a state effective in preparing for and fighting war are the ones that preclude an easy end to that war. Paradoxically, an intolerant, hawkish constituency may actually be the result of the leaders’ propaganda efforts. Many scholars have argued that public opinion is prone to elite manipulation (Snyder 1991; Mansfield and Snyder 1995; McGinnis and Williams 2001; Mor 1997; Colaresi 2004, 2005; Gibbs 1995). In this view, elites have a monopoly over national security information and “expert” opinion, and the population generally accepts elites’ interpretations of events (Zaller 1992; Berinsky 2007). Such manipulation may act as a “push” towards a particular way of thinking, which may either augment or counter the “pull” of pre-existing beliefs or salient events like battlefield defeat (Johnson and Tierney 2006: 67–75). For example, leaders often demonize and exaggerate their conflict of interest with the enemy. After all, it is easier to raise armies, money and morale if a conflict is pitched as a Manichean struggle against evil than as an effort to obtain a marginally better set of peace terms. Framing the war in simple, emotionally compelling terms increases the likely level of domestic support for the coalition’s war policies (Armstrong 1994; Pillar 1983; Rothstein 1970; Baum 2003: 44–45). During major wars, actors often shift to a “mythic perception” of reality, in which simplistic notions like good and evil and “us” versus “them” take precedence (LeShan 2002). Yet while manipulating perceptions helps to sustain the war effort, it hampers making peace. Once established, enemy images are highly resistant to change, further undercutting compromise with the other side (Eldridge 1979; Levy 1996; Frank 1982; Keen 1986; Olweean 2002; Aho 1994, 1998; Iklé 1991; Smith 1995; Mor 1997). As the conflict wears on, this enemy image is reinforced by continued public statements and forceful propaganda. This creates, as Bryant Wedge argues, a “striking tendency to perceive only those items which would sustain the enemy image and be blind to evidence that would contradict such views” (1990: 104). Whether or not leaders come to believe their own rhetoric about the enemy—a process called “blowback”—it can make it difficult for leaders to make more conciliatory or cooperative statements about the other side. The decision to use propaganda to inflate the threat makes de-escalation unlikely. Even if the governing coalition wants to deescalate, other political challengers can capitalize on negative enemy stereotypes and accuse the coalition of “being soft” on the adversary (Colaresi 2004, 2005; Snyder 1991; Vasquez 1993; Van Evera 1984). In short, by demonizing the enemy and using threats to centralize power, leaders can get caught in their own propaganda traps.
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Similarly, leaders can shape perceptions about success on the battlefield, but in the process talk themselves into a corner. Authoritarian leaders can shape perceptions through strict control of information—one way that the entrapment and information obstacles can interact. Yet even democratic leaders can manipulate perceptions of battlefield success, because people usually know less about foreign affairs and are more willing to defer to a leader’s interpretation of events, at least initially (Johnson and Tierney 2006: 70–75; Colaresi 2005: 25–29; Page and Shapiro 1992; McGinnis and Williams 2001; Baum 2003: 44–45). However, raising expectations of victory can create a dilemma. The political costs of failure are higher after a leader builds public support by touting war performance (Baum 2003: 285). As Johnson and Tierney argue, “Sooner or later the public will expect visible results” (2006: 73). Leaders can get stuck in a balancing act between conveying that the mission is currently successful, while simultaneously lowering expectations about the long struggle ahead. In short, mobilizing the state for war can make it difficult for leaders to back down without losing domestic political legitimacy. Entrapment can create unpleasant psychological and political effects for leaders. Psychologically, backing down from a publicly defended position may cause leaders to appear weak or lose face or pride (Smith 1995: 74). Politically, backing down from a publicly defended position can damage a leader’s bargaining reputation internationally (Jervis 1988). While rallying the public for the war can maximize credibility with the adversary, the leader is likely to pay a domestic political price—a domestic audience cost—if he backs down (Putnam 1988; Fearon 1994; Schultz 1998; Smith 1998; Baum 2003). Leaders also risk being driven from power by constituencies that have come to expect the position to be defended at any cost (Colaresi 2004, 2005; Croco 2008). These mechanisms of entrapment are especially problematic in weak states with strong societal pressures (Skidmore 1996; Armstrong 1994). If leaders decide not to cut their losses and move towards ending the war, entrapment can have three effects. First, the governing coalition may decide it will lose power if it makes peace and thus it adopts a high-risk strategy for prosecuting the war. This is the “gambling for resurrection” argument (Downs and Rocke 1994; Goemans 2000a, b; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Chiozza and Goemans 2004; Croco 2008). Alternatively, leaders can succumb to the “sunk cost paradox,” effort justification and other psychological aspects of entrapment (Maoz 1990; Jervis 1976; Craig and George 1995; Randle 1973; Smith 1995; Iklé 1991). In theory, rational actors do not let sunk costs influence their decisions, because doing so would not be assessing the situation exclusively on its merits. In practice, however, leaders
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often treat sunk costs as invested capital on which the public demands a return or show a tendency to feel bound by earlier war policy decisions (Fisher 1969; Albert and Luck 1980; Jentleson et al. 1992: 306; Mitchell 1981: 180–81). Third, because trapped leaders find it so difficult to cut their losses, dislodging them from this position may require a large exogenous shock, such as a major battlefield defeat or third-party intervention on the other side (Stein 1982: 234; Gartner 1997; Mor 1997). People pay more attention to, and are more influenced by, salient events like exogenous shocks. Salient events can register as large changes in leaders’ war metrics. They can also have a disproportionate effect to their actual impact in context, because people see salient events as symbolic of the bigger picture (Johnson and Tierney 2006: 63; Kaufmann 1994: 563; Nisbett and Ross 1980: 40–45). Thus, events like a US Ranger being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu can help “wake up” a coalition from its impulses to justify effort, treat sunk costs as investments or engage in other behaviors of entrapment. Because different coalition members answer to different constituencies, they may feel trapped at different times. During a war, different parts of the power structure have varying commitments to the military effort. As the war continues, groups benefiting from the war are likely to obtain additional influence in the governing coalition and promote the war’s continuation. The more important a constituency’s role in the war effort, the greater the share of the state’s resources it can legitimately claim as its own, and thus the greater the private benefits it may be drawing from the war (Lamborn 1991: 62–63; Iklé 1991: 60; Snyder 1991). A coalition member who answers to such constituencies has the hardest time going against his supporters. Unless he can convince his constituency to change its mind, he will be trapped. This differing rate and type of entrapment can lead a minority faction in the coalition to want peace but not be able to make it, unless it is powerful enough to remove the hawks and create a sustainable governing coalition. While some coalition members will feel trapped by their domestic constituencies, others may be trapped by commitments to allies or external coalition partners. Externally, entrapment may be the result of having hawkish allies or patrons. If an ally intervenes on a belligerent’s behalf, it is difficult to deescalate after that intervention without disappointing the ally. Leaders may decide that they value the ally’s support during or after the war so much that they are willing to stay in the war for the ally’s sake—as the Chinese case in the Korean War illustrates. In addition, war aims often expand as statesmen make promises to win new allies.22 Finally, parallel to the unintended consequences of domestic mobilization, demonizing the enemy and mobilizing allies can make it harder for leaders to back down without losing international stature. Conveying weakness may
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create a reputation as a weak bargainer, which might be exploited by others—the current adversary as well as potential future opponents (Jervis 1988: 693). In both cases, although the governing coalition may have realized it is not going to obtain its initial goals, a radical change in strategy is not politically possible without admitting failure—which politicians loathe to do (Pierson 1984). As a French politician noted, in response to his generals’ suggestion concerning a cease-fire in Algeria: “But that would be capitulation. And it would show that we had been wrong for seven years” (quoted in Rothstein 1970: 69). Because sudden departures from previous policy raise serious questions about the wisdom of having pursued it for so long, entrapment puts leaders in a no-win situation. They realize that they cannot win, but they cannot afford to quit at once (Maoz 1990). The result in both situations is the same: decision-makers may want to settle but cannot because they feel trapped. Two caveats are in order. First, the dynamics of entrapment may seem similar to self-suppressing potential critics in the preference obstacle. In both cases, a coalition member wants to end the war but cannot, but there are distinct differences between them. With entrapment, he suppresses his desire to end the war because he fears penalties from a hawkish domestic constituency or an external ally. With the preference obstacle, however, the potential critic suppresses his desire to end the war because he fears penalties from a more powerful coalition member. In other words, an entrapped coalition member fears penalties from below or outside the coalition, while a self-suppressing coalition member fears penalties from above and within the coalition. Second, while Bayesian updating predicts a relatively linear function between new information and revised expectations or beliefs, the entrapment obstacle predicts coalition members may use new information to update prior beliefs but feel unable to act on those new beliefs. Alternatively, because entrapment dynamics can interact with the information obstacle, coalition members with a large stake in the current policy’s success may be slower to acknowledge evidence that the policy is failing. Thus, while Bayesian models would not predict any correlation between interests and assessments, the interaction between entrapment and information obstacles predicts the greater the interests at risk, the stronger the potential bias. One way to think about the interaction is this: If the psychological commitments and domestic political constraints of entrapment provide the motive, then the complexity and uncertainty of information during war provide the opportunity for psychological biases to persist. The logic of entrapment can motivate a leader’s reluctance to confront painful truths, and this can help coalition members choose not to know they should end the war. One implication is that the longer war continues and the more trapped a leader perceives himself to be, the more individual and organizational biases can impede Bayesian updating.
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overcoming obstacles to peace
While the three obstacles to peace certainly contribute to the “stickiness” observed in long wars, the dynamics of the domestic governing coalition itself exacerbate them. Coalitional dynamics help explain policy inertia. When a policy is functioning because of a coalition agreement, changing the policy requires renegotiating that agreement (Snyder and Diesing 1977: 351). Likewise, the less control a coalition member has over policy choice and implementation, the less willing he is to take political risks to change it—unless the current policy’s failure is expected to generate more risk (Lamborn 1991: 63–66). Finally, a few actors may have controlled war policy initially through discrete decisions in the early days of the crisis. However, the longer the war continues and its policies become institutionalized, the greater the opportunity for a wide range of actors—including those outside the governing coalition—to participate in the policymaking process (Fordham 1998: 21). Thus, in addition to the three obstacles to peace, policy stability can lead governing coalitions to be unable to change the status quo, even when such changes are necessary or desirable. When new information shows that no policy change can meet all of the current coalition members’ political and psychological constraints, the coalition has two choices: stay the course or loosen the constraints. Various constraints will be ranked differently by different coalition members, and each may become spokesman for the constraint most important to him. To loosen the constraints, there are two possibilities. First, the veto player with the largest ideological or policy distance from the coalition majority may be overruled or removed from the coalition. Alternatively, it may be the weakest coalition member who loses out—either by having his payoff reduced or, more likely, being expelled. Which outcome obtains depends on whether there is a “pivotal actor” in the coalition—such as a strong head of state—and what his constraints are (Snyder and Diesing 1977: 396; Tsebelis 1995; De Swaan 1973). In general, these strategies for loosening constraints are only possible when the coalition core is strong enough to do the overruling or expelling. Otherwise, the policy cannot be revised and the coalition will stay the course. In these cases, a government with policy stability may become so immobile that policy change is only possible by replacing the incumbent government entirely (Tsebelis 1995: 321). These dynamics can help explain the rigid bargaining positions observed in war-ending negotiations at the international level, where a belligerent’s behavior lags behind what a pure Bayesian updating model might predict. Regardless of the length of the war, the overlapping bargaining space necessary to end it can only develop when at least one side changes its expectations about the costs and benefits of fighting. This change could theoretically occur if
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47% 2.1
INPUT
Battlefield outcomes/ Diplomatic offers
the d omest ic p olit ics of war ter minat ion F I LT E R S
Preference Obstacles Information Bayesian updating
RESOLUTION Stickiness re s o lve d
(l by res ess o olv fte ed n by )
Change in decision-makers (coalition shift) Attitude change (within existing coalition)
OUTCOME
Change in expectations (dove or hawk direction)
f i g . 2 . 1 . Paths by Which Belligerents Change Expectations
one (or more) of the belligerents’ existing governing coalitions either (1) changes its attitudes about the war or (2) changes its composition to include more appropriate expectations (see Figure 2.1). The former is the Bayesian updating model. However, a change in attitudes is not very likely because of coalition dynamics and the three obstacles identified: the coalition may have a private benefit from continuing a costly war, may not know its expectations should change, or cannot afford to admit it has changed its expectations. War ends when these obstacles are lifted. The decision to end a war forces policymakers to choose among basic policy goals. The more unfavorable the outcome, the more deeply these choices will cut into fundamental interests and threaten to divide the domestic coalition. Those officials who are identified with the initiation of the war or its early conduct are apt to fear that they would undermine themselves as leaders if they consider any conclusion to the war that did not achieve their principal war aims—unless they are successfully able to redefine the cause and thus what constitutes “victory.” At the same time, those who favor a negotiated settlement must attack—implicitly or explicitly—those who led the nation to war (Iklé 1991). Various proposals for ending the war will thus appear as either threats or opportunities, according to the individual decision-maker’s perspective. Thus, to resolve these conflicting motives, unless a war’s battlefield situation clearly shows the belligerents’ relative strengths in a short period of time, it is unlikely that the governing coalition that started and invested significant political capital in prosecuting a war can end an unsuccessful one. Policies that a state enacted to better wage the war become sticky, and will often require a coalition shift to get them unstuck. The coalition shift allows different political actors—with different interests, assessments of the war and constituencies—to take power. This, in turn, can lead to a change in war policy, e.g. from continuing it to ending it.23 The new leaders may have not only a new calculation of the war’s costs and benefits, but also a new conceptualization of them. Because it introduces new ac-
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tors, a coalition shift may overcome obstacles to peace and thus permit the war to end. Clearly, this argument contrasts with Bayesian models that assume updating will happen automatically as new information is revealed through battlefield outcomes and diplomatic offers, or that new ideas about war policy will inevitably find their way into the government as leaders change their minds. Instead, I argue new ideas need exposure within the governing coalition, and such exposure often comes with significant personnel changes in the main institutions of power.24 This may be, in fact, the most important way that regime type affects changes in war policy, because democracies are more likely to experience an uninhibited circulation of elites.25 The realities that make a change in attitudes among the existing coalition unlikely are directly addressed by a change in that coalition. Where coalition members place different values on policy priorities, a coalition shift allows one faction to remove members whose preferences created gridlock. Where the rational updating process is not even among all coalition members because of information obstacles, a coalition shift allows one faction to be removed or replaced, facilitating the flow of information and removing spurious inputs. Where coalition members face entrapment, a shift removes the entrapped element. In this manner, domestic coalition shifts provide the procedural opportunity for leaders to toss out those who are against making peace. It also allows the new coalition to distance itself from the decision that brought the state into the conflict, thereby presenting it with more options regarding the future course of the war and enlarging the potential bargaining space. There are four other practical effects as well. First, if the war was not “won,” a coalition shift would allow scapegoats to be identified and removed.26 Second, a shift could provide the previous leaders a “golden parachute” so that they will not be physically or politically harmed after the settlement (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 15–47; Shin 1994: 161–63; Mansfield and Snyder 1995: 36–37). Third, a shift could be necessary for stabilizing the domestic political scene after the settlement; i.e. to make the peace, leaders must include the loyal opposition. Fourth, bringing in a new coalition may also be the best way for the state to rebuild its international reputation (Croco 2008: 28). These four practical effects are not mutually exclusive. Figure 2.2 summarizes the domestic coalition shift theory. To remind the reader, the gray rectangle delineates the standard Bayesian model. In the pure Bayesian model, leaders of a state perceive changes in the battlefield situation (or the adversary’s diplomatic behavior), which causes a change in their expectations about the war. The domestic politics version of this argument filters battle-
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2.2 -- 61%
T h e D o m e s t i c Co a l i t i o n Sh i f t Mo d e l exogenous circumstances
3
coalition shift
battlefield situation
2 pressure on governing coalition
constituency reevaluation
in ers ge ak an -m ch ion cis
de
1
attitude change
change in expectations about war
war termination
attitude change
B aye s i a n Mo d e l f i g . 2 . 2 . Paths to War Termination
field conditions through domestic constituencies, who then pressure leaders to change their war policy—which causes them to change their expectations. Both Bayesian variants assume the change in expectations occurs when incumbent leaders change their minds (“attitude change”). However, as Chapter 9 will show, in many wars—41 percent since World War II, for example—this change in expectations results from a shift in the domestic governing coalition (“change in decision-makers”). It is worth noting that domestic coalition shifts may be produced in a number of ways, both endogenously to the war and exogenously. While endogenous shifts are influenced by the battlefield situation, this does not mean they have no causal weight in explaining war termination. In some wars, the necessary updating of war aims cannot happen without an endogenous shift, which makes the shift a necessary intervening variable to ending the war. Theoretically, there are two kinds of endogenous shifts (labeled as Arrows 1 and 2 in Figure 2.2). Endogenous shifts may be a response to changes in the domestic constituency’s perceptions about the progress of the war that are not shared by the existing domestic coalition (Arrow 1). These may be cases where the coalition has become so immobile that policy change is only possible by replacing the incumbent government entirely. Such shifts often include changes to the head of state through political processes such as coups, revolutions, regime changes or elections that replace
d omest ic coalit ion shifts
the governing coalition from the outside. An example of an Arrow 1 shift is the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. The new Communist leader, Vladimir Lenin, subsequently accepted the harsh terms of Brest Litovsk to make a separate peace and end Russia’s participation in World War I. Arrow 1 shifts do not necessarily require that all domestic constituencies are ready to end the war. It is important to recognize that domestic constituencies are likely to have their updating impeded by the obstacles to peace, as well. Some constituencies, such as the military or industrial groups, may be gaining private benefits from continuing the war (preference obstacle). Other constituents will lack access to information about the war and come to believe the elite’s interpretation of events (information obstacle). Finally, many constituents will have internalized negative enemy stereotypes and be intensely distrustful of the adversary (entrapment obstacle). Thus, updating among the different domestic constituencies is likely to be as uneven as among the coalition members themselves. Alternatively, endogenous shifts may be a response to changes in part of the existing coalition’s perceptions about the progress of the war and the pressure placed upon the coalition members by their constituencies (Arrow 2). These endogenous shifts are less likely to include head of state changes; rather, they are likely to result from heads of state recalibrating their governing coalitions to remove veto players who are stuck by the three obstacles. A common Arrow 2 shift among losing states is to remove hawks in the existing domestic coalition to allow the remaining doves to make a “bad” peace. For example, Menachim Begin and other Gahal Party ministers opposed to peace resigned from the Israeli national unity government in August 1970, thereby allowing Prime Minister Golda Meir to accept a negotiated settlement to end the 17-month Attrition War the next day. Finally, exogenous shifts (labeled as Arrow 3 in Figure 2.2) may include the death, illness or incapacitation of a coalition member or changes in the coalition composition for purely domestic political reasons, such as economic crises or political scandals. For example, Stalin’s death in January 1953 allowed the Communist states to offer crucial concessions necessary to end the Korean War. While exogenous coalition shifts occur for reasons that have no relationship to the war, their effect on war policy can be the same as endogenous shifts. Either way, the coalition shift can be the breaking of the dam that releases the forces of change. Importantly, my model excludes domestic coalition shifts that are forced upon a state by its external enemies. This is consistent with the “domestically-instigated regime change” approach in Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1992). Excluding these “victor-imposed” shifts helps guard against the possibility that the causal arrows are reversed—that the end of the war is leading to coalition shifts, rather than vice versa.
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The white box around the domestic coalition shift model highlights how this alternative causal pathway to war termination builds on the Bayesian model. Domestic coalition shifts can explain how states get beyond the lag and stickiness of long wars. However, domestic coalition shifts are neither necessary nor sufficient for getting beyond these lags, because we cannot know a priori how much each shift will change the belligerents’ expectations and what effect the strategic interaction with the opposing side will have. Theoretically, a domestic coalition shift in any belligerent could produce the bargaining space. However, realistically, the power differential between allies in multilateral wars is not always equal. Thus, a coalition shift in the state that has the most responsibility for or influence on its side’s decisions about war policies (the “primary belligerent”) is more likely to affect war termination. Most wars have only one primary belligerent on each side, but some wars have more than one primary belligerent on each side—especially when there are great powers fighting together.27 In sum, the longer a war goes on, the less likely the relative power among belligerents will be clearly illuminated on the battlefield. As a result, Bayesian updating is more difficult, and it is more likely belligerents will need domestic coalition shifts to overcome stickiness in expectations and achieve peace. Belligerents that appear to be losing or stalemated may be more likely to experience coalition shifts, because they are most in need of updating their expectations about the war’s costs and benefits. All domestic coalition shifts, but especially those among primary belligerents, are expected to hasten the war’s end. H shift: The longer the war, the more likely a domestic coalition shift is needed to end it. H loser: Domestic coalition shifts are more likely among “losing” and “stalemated” states. H primary shift: Domestic coalition shifts in primary belligerents will have a greater effect towards hastening the end of the war than shifts in other belligerents.
Extending the Model: Coalition Shift Directions Now that I have explained the role of domestic coalition shifts in ending war, in this section I return to Iklé’s concept of “hawks” and “doves” to examine what effect, if any, the direction of the coalition shift (e.g. hawkish, dovish or neutral) has on the theory. Like scholars who examine the role of hawks and doves in interstate rivalry termination (Mor 1997; Colaresi 2004, 2005; Schultz 2005), I seek to expand the framework laid out by Iklé (1991) to explain interstate war termination.
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As a reminder, Iklé argues war ends when one belligerent’s doves in effect ally themselves with the other side’s doves and get their respective governments to agree to stop fighting, over the opposition of hawks on both sides. He attributes the difficulty of war termination to the gross asymmetry in political power between hawks and doves in wartime: hawks have a far easier time blocking any settlement than doves have trying to create one. Whenever hawks on either side refuse an opportunity to settle, they reinforce the insistence of the other side’s hawks to continue fighting. By contrast, he argues, doves can only move their states towards settlement when they have clear signals that enemy doves will do the same. Although Iklé’s approach provides a useful attempt to characterize different groups within a governing coalition, it provides few generalizable propositions. My model, which I nuance here to consider the direction of governing coalition shifts, attempts to fill this void. In this section, therefore, I postulate about what effect coalition shift direction has on war duration. In relation to war termination, domestic coalition shifts can be in one of three directions. A “hawkish” shift is one in which the new coalition promises to take actions that move away from ending the war, such as expanding the military scope of war, mobilizing additional resources towards war or rejecting compromise offers. This category includes increasing battlefield activities to pursue “peace with honor,” because while peace may be the stated objective, the coalition is still planning to take escalatory actions. A “dovish” shift is one in which the new coalition plans to take actions that move towards ending the war, such as reducing the military scope of war, reducing resources for the war in favor of other domestic or foreign policy aims, or offering peaceful settlement terms or compromises. This category includes scapegoating previous leaders, as a means to save face while accepting peace. A “neutral” shift is one in which the new coalition intends to maintain the status quo and carry on the same policies vis-à-vis the war as the previous coalition. It is important to note that the direction of these shifts is dependent on the ex ante intent of the new coalition rather than any subsequent policies pursued by it.28 Initially, a coalition may shift in a more hawkish direction. For example, during the initial mobilization for the war, the governing coalition is likely to spin up the public with a “rally round the flag” effect (Mueller 1985; Russett 1990)— causing coalition members who were initially against the war to adopt hawkish positions for political expediency or leave the coalition. As John Vasquez argues, hostility from the adversary helps to “create a constituency for hardliners” and reinforce the hawks’ position within the government (1993: 199; see also Colaresi 2004, 2005; Snyder 1989; Hagan 1993). During the high-threat environment of war, hawks have an easier time selling their policies than doves. While the “rally”
2.3 -- 61 %
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A Hawkish change
A Dovish change
Side A’s bargaining position
B Dovish change
Overlapping
Side B’s bargaining position
bargaining space
f i g . 2 . 3 . How Changed Expectations Create Bargaining Space
effect itself is short-lived, the hawkish shifts it often engenders can be precisely what lead to the obstacles that cause the war to get sticky. Moreover, as the war goes on, if many strategic options are still available, coalition members may feel obligated to try alternative strategies on the battlefield to see if another one will work better. Such reasoning would cause the coalition to try more escalatory policies (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004), which may cause any remaining dovish coalition members to leave the government. Of course, trying more options extends the war. Eventually, if these other options do not bring success, hawks may be delegitimized, which can lead the coalition or domestic constituencies (or both) to reevaluate war policy. This can result in a shift in a dovish direction. Figure 2.3 demonstrates how these domestic level shifts can affect the creation of an overlapping bargaining space with the other side. There are two mechanisms by which domestic coalition shifts can lead to the creation of an overlapping bargaining space between belligerents. The first mechanism occurs when the new governing coalition modifies its own bargaining position vis-à-vis other belligerents. In contrast, the second mechanism occurs when the coalition shift direction provides information for decision-makers on the opposing side to update their expectations and thus change their bargaining position. first mechanism: a coalit ion shift leads to a new bargaining p osit ion
The first mechanism occurs when the new governing coalition modifies its own bargaining position vis-à-vis other belligerents. While the new bargaining position may be affected by beliefs about the adversary, it may also be completely independent of any consideration of the adversary’s behavior. Thus, this mechanism operates unilaterally and independently of strategic interaction with the adversary. In this mechanism, because hawkish coalition shifts may lead a state to take actions that move away from ending the war, we would expect them to be asso-
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ciated with lengthening the war. Hawkish shifts, therefore, should occur early in the war and be associated with prolonging wars. Similarly, because dovish coalition shifts may lead a state to take actions that move towards ending the war, we would expect them to be associated with shortening the war. Dovish shifts, therefore, should occur temporally close to the war’s end and greatly enhance the probability of the war ending. Unlike hawkish and dovish shifts, neutral shifts are not intended to lead to a change in war policy; thus, their relationship to the overlapping bargaining space at the international level may not be as clear. Neutral shifts are frequently exogenous shifts. For example, leaders can leave for institutional reasons completely orthogonal to the war, such as serving the maximum number of terms in office or fulfilling a term of service as an interim (“acting”) leader. Alternatively, neutral coalition shifts can result from consequences in other policy areas, such as poor economic performance or a political scandal. Neutral shifts can also arise independent from the war for very random reasons, such as death, sickness, assassination or retirement. For these reasons, we would not expect neutral shifts to be clustered at any particular time in the war. Although a coalition shift occurs, the new coalition—which often includes a predetermined successor or members of the same political party—does not intend to change its predecessors’ war policy. However, neutral shifts do bring new leaders, who may have a new way of looking at the war. While the new governing coalition intends to carry on with the same war policy, in practice it may look at the war’s costs and benefits differently and may want to free up resources and political capital to pursue other policy goals. Thus, like interstate rivalry research which conceptualizes regime change as a political “shock” that may cause the rivalry’s end (Goertz and Diehl 1995; Bennett 1997), I argue neutral shifts have the potential to bring to power leaders who will end the war—even if they intend to maintain the status quo. As Scott Bennett argues, “The occurrence of a shock at least raises the possibility that the contract range will expand, while in the absence of a shock the contract range remains unchanged” (1997: 1205, FN 2). In other words, since neutral shifts at least offer the possibility of change, there is a greater chance that a neutral shift may bring the war’s end. Indeed, since the new leaders by definition came to power for reasons not related to the war policy, they could view the war as a distraction. As a result, they may end up taking actions that move towards ending the war in order to focus on other things.29 Thus, we would expect neutral shifts to be associated with ending the war, but not as quickly as dovish shifts. H hawk: Hawkish coalition shifts will occur early in the war and be associated with prolonging the war.
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H dove: Dovish coalition shifts will occur late in the war and be associated with shortening the war. H neutral: Neutral shifts will shorten the war, but not as quickly as dovish shifts. Because war is a strategic interaction, coalition shifts on both sides may be necessary to create an overlapping bargaining space. How many coalition shifts will be necessary to create the overlapping bargaining space depends entirely on how much distance exists between the reservation prices of the two sides.30 If the two sides’ reservation prices are not very far apart, then a dovish coalition shift on one side may lead the new coalition to change its reservation price enough to bring an overlapping bargaining space within reach. However, if the distance between the two sides is greater, coalition shifts in more than one belligerent may be needed. During sticky wars that endure for many months or years, multiple coalition shifts may be necessary to dislodge the obstacles to peace and create the overlapping bargaining space. These multiple shifts could theoretically occur in multiple belligerents or within one belligerent over time, each shift moving that belligerent’s reservation price closer to the others’. second mechanism: a coalit ion shift leads to a new bargaining p osit ion on the opp osing side
A second way that coalition shifts can work to create an overlapping bargaining space between belligerents is through signaling. This mechanism is clearly related to the strategic interaction between the opposing sides, because actions that one side takes are directly linked to the other side’s response. In this mechanism, the direction of the coalition shift communicates to belligerents on the opposing side, conveying information about the first side’s future intentions and likely bargaining position. For example, if the new governing coalition campaigned with a platform to end the war, it might help doves on the other side move their own state towards peace. Alternatively, if the new governing coalition campaigned to escalate its war aims, it might help the other side recalibrate its understanding of the costs necessary to fight an adversary with a renewed will and a greater willingness to commit resources to win. While Bayesian models have yet to include this source of signaling, domestic coalition shifts can provide information for updating beliefs, just as battle outcomes and diplomatic offers do. In fact, the direction of a coalition shift reveals information about the adversary’s “type”: hawkish shifts suggest that the adversary is strong or has a high tolerance for war costs, while dovish shifts suggest that the adversary is weak or cost-sensitive. Certainly, signaling is vulnerable to manipulation, deception or bluffing (Jervis
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1989; Dixit and Skeath 1999: chapter 12). However, following Jervis (1989), I argue that domestic coalition shifts are “indices” rather than “signals.” Signals are statements or actions which actors use to influence the receiver’s image of the sender, and they can be easily manipulated. In contrast, indices are statements or actions “that carry some inherent evidence that the image projected is correct because they are believed to be inextricably linked to the actor’s capabilities or intentions” (Jervis 1989: 18). As a result, most observers believe indices cannot be manipulated or used for deception, and they often rely heavily on them when signals are suspect. Indeed, Jervis (1989: 34) includes domestic events, such as elections, as an example of an index. Therefore, if a belligerent looks to its adversary’s domestic coalition shift, it may believe the information being communicated is very credible. With this in mind, say, for example, that Belligerent A experiences a dovish coalition shift. Seeing this shift, Side B may surmise that A will probably lower its demands, especially if the new government campaigned on a platform to end the war or to redirect its policy focus and resources to other issue areas. Alternatively, if A’s new governing coalition campaigned to escalate its war aims, seeing this new hawkish coalition take power might help B realize war costs are likely to escalate. If they are capable of perceiving and learning from this information, it can even lead them to change their own bargaining position. Thus, with this second mechanism, a domestic coalition shift can lead the other side to change its bargaining position. For this reason, hawkish shifts may signal to the opposing side that the costs of the war will dramatically increase in the future. This could cause the other side to sue for peace, thereby shortening the war. In contrast, dovish shifts may indicate weakness, so we might expect the opposing belligerents to push for even more concessions beyond what the new coalition is willing to give—causing the war to lengthen. Because neutral shifts by definition are not related to the war, they are less likely to provide information to the other side. Thus, we would not expect them to operate through this second (signaling) mechanism. H hawk*: Hawkish coalition shifts will cause the other side to sue for peace and thus shorten the war. H dove*: Dovish coalition shifts will cause the other side to push for more concessions and thus lengthen the war. H neutral*: Neutral coalition shifts are unlikely to provide information about the war to the opposing side and thus should not affect the war’s duration through the second mechanism. Given the ambiguities inherent in international signaling, we would expect the second mechanism’s effect to be less powerful than the first’s. Moreover, the
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second mechanism can only work when the information obstacle is not blocking the opposing side’s rational updating process. Nonetheless, these alternative predictions reinforce the importance of accounting for strategic interaction in models of war termination. Given the theoretical validity of both sets of predictions, I will return to them in Chapters 8 and 9, to weigh their relative importance empirically.
Conclusion War termination is a bargaining process between two interacting sides. While bargaining models of war suggest that wars end after an overlapping bargaining space develops, my argument suggests how, when and why it develops. This approach offers real insights about the timing of war termination, including the under-theorized category of protracted wars, which bargaining models have had little success in explaining. I have presented two alternative pathways for interstate war termination, building on Bayesian models. While Bayesian models suggest that a lag in updating can delay war termination, they do not explain how states get beyond this lag—why some states get bogged down in updating their expectations while others can update very quickly. In contrast, I look more carefully at this lag and theorize about how states get beyond it. In this way, my explanation is more complete than previous attempts to generalize about war termination. Its major theoretical contribution is its attention to domestic coalition shifts as an important mechanism for why states come to the bargaining table to end interstate war. Ending war requires settling with the enemy as well as at home. This chapter has suggested three reasons why a war, once entrenched, is difficult to end. A preference obstacle occurs when leaders do not want to end the war. This happens, for example, when fighting the war helps leaders to stay in power or gain other benefits. An information obstacle occurs when leaders do not know they should end the war. In this case, the rational updating process does not occur, because leaders (1) receive poor quality information, (2) do not necessarily share the same information, (3) use different indicators to assess the war or (4) have personal cognitive or (5) organizational biases that prevent them from using all available information. An entrapment obstacle occurs when leaders want to end the war but cannot. This happens when leaders face political entrapment from a domestic constituency or external allies. While the logic of these three obstacles is distinct, they can often occur in tandem. For example, leaders that hold strong preferences are also likely to fall victim to information processing biases to reinforce pre-existing beliefs. Similarly, the psychological commitments and domestic political constraints of entrapment can make leaders reluctant to confront
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painful truths, thereby creating ample opportunities for the various dynamics of the information obstacle to take hold. In addition to the three obstacles, policy stability can lead governing coalitions to be unable to change the status quo, even when such changes are necessary or desirable. Indeed, a governing coalition with policy stability may become so immobile that policy change is only possible by replacing the incumbent coalition entirely. For all of these reasons, wars do indeed become sticky: the longer the war, the harder it is to end it. Thus, while Bayesian models assume the change in expectations to produce an overlapping bargaining space occurs when incumbent leaders change their minds, I argue that in many wars, such change in expectations results from a change in the foreign policy leadership itself. The longer a war goes on, the less likely the relative power among belligerents will be clearly illuminated on the battlefield, and the more likely belligerents will need domestic coalition shifts to achieve peace. A coalition shift allows different political actors—with different political interests, assessments of the war and constituencies—to take power. This, in turn, can lead to a shift in the war policy, from continuing it to ending it. A coalition shift helps to overcome the obstacles to peace and thus permits the war to end. All domestic coalition shifts, but especially those among primary belligerents, are expected to hasten the war’s end. Finally, the last part of this chapter extended the model to consider what effect coalition shift directions have on war duration. I outlined two mechanisms by which domestic coalition shifts can affect the creation of the overlapping bargaining space at the international level. The first mechanism suggests coalition shifts can lead the new governing coalition unilaterally to change its own bargaining position vis-à-vis other belligerents. In contrast, the second mechanism suggests the direction of a coalition shift serves as an index to belligerents on the other side, conveying information about the first side’s future intentions and likely bargaining position. Given the ambiguities inherent in international signaling and the potential for information obstacles to block the opposing side’s ability to learn from coalition shifts, we would expect the second mechanism’s effect to be less powerful than the first’s. The next part of the book will examine these dynamics in the Korean War.
part ii
The Korean War
3
The Korean States Powerless Players in the Forgotten War
The Korean War is often dubbed the “forgotten war” (e.g. Blair 1987)—wedged between the sheer global magnitude of its predecessor, World War II, and the American domestic ordeal of its successor, Vietnam.1 In studies of the war, scholars have generally focused on its dramatic first year—the war’s outbreak, the Inchon landing, the Chinese intervention and the Truman-MacArthur controversy. Despite a recent revival of interest, as nations commemorated the war’s 50th anniversary and as Soviet and Chinese archival materials supplement the story,2 very little scholarship about the last two years of the Korean War exists. These years are the forgotten part of the forgotten war.3 However, study of the war’s last two years brings to light a tragic picture. When the Korean War finally ended in 1953, total casualties were estimated at 1.5 million killed and 3.6 million wounded (Kang 2005: 196). The tragic irony is that the final armistice terms the United Nations Command accepted in July 1953—after 575 meetings—were little different from those they proposed at the start of negotiations in July 1951 (Foot 1993: 193). Given that the battlefield situation remained relatively constant throughout these two years, why were these terms not accepted two years earlier? The six chapters in Part II will try to answer this question through case studies of the war’s primary belligerents—the Soviet Union, the United States and the People’s Republic of China—and a detailed examination of the strategic interaction between them. This chapter sets the stage for the discussion in three ways. First, it provides a brief background on the war, with key dates in the armistice process. Second, it explains my decision to include the Soviet Union as a primary belligerent, even
m a p 3 . 1 . The Korean Peninsula, Showing Lines of Advance, 1950–53. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Map #802191 (1993). Data sources for lines of advance: McMahon (2003: 54); Hickey (1999: xiv–xv); Chen (2001: 86).
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though it was not a declared participant in the war. Third, it explains the decision to exclude the two Koreas as primary belligerents: although the war was fought on their soil, neither Korean party had much weight in its respective side’s final decision about when and how the war was ended. The chapter concludes with mini-case studies of the Koreas to demonstrate that although both states experienced domestic coalition shifts during the war, these shifts did not affect the international-level strategic interaction. In contrast to the primary belligerents, whose domestic coalition shifts are hugely important for explaining when, how and why the war ended, the Koreas’ powerlessness meant that their domestic politics are less relevant to war termination.
Overview of the War The Korean War began on June 25, 1950, as the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) surged south across the 38th Parallel. On June 30, US President Harry S. Truman authorized the use of US ground troops to support the South Koreans.4 One week later, at the United Nations’ Security Council’s request, General Douglas MacArthur was appointed commander of all UN forces fighting against the North Koreans. During that summer, the North Koreans pushed their way down the peninsula, eventually pinning UN forces into a small area around the southeastern port of Pusan (see Map 3.1). By the fall, the United States had brought enough forces into the region to change the balance. On September 15, MacArthur conducted a successful amphibious landing at the port of Inchon, west of Seoul and deep behind enemy lines, enabling UN forces to break out of the “Pusan perimeter” and push rapidly northward (Stueck 1995: 85–87; Hickey 1999: 72–81). On September 30, South Korean troops crossed the 38th Parallel into North Korea, and American troops followed one week later (Goulden 1982: 233–45; Matray 1979: 72–81). Fearing for its own security, China gave warnings that it would intervene if the UN continued its advance north. On October 18, Chinese leader Mao Zedong issued orders for the Chinese “volunteer” forces to “resist the attacks of US imperialism” (Stueck 1995: 99; Foot 1985: 85). Chinese forces entered North Korea on October 19 and fought intermittent battles, eventually breaking off contact with UN forces on November 16. MacArthur continued his drive northward towards the Yalu River, launching “the end-of-war offensive” on November 24. That same day, the Chinese counterattacked with hundreds of thousands of soldiers, thoroughly routing the UN forces (Zhang 1995: 95–115). Two days later, MacArthur announced that his forces faced an “entirely new war” (Rees 1964: 157). Indeed,
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in two days, November 30 and December 1, UN casualties exceeded 11,000 (Foot 1985: 101). The new Communist offensive pushed southward again across the 38th Parallel on January 1, 1951, and by late January, had pushed the UN back south of Seoul. With the new war’s full dimensions clear, Britain and India pressed the United States to begin negotiating a cease-fire, based on a deal that would include admitting China to the UN and abandoning Taiwan (Stueck 1995: 138–42). On January 13, the United States agreed to the British- and Indian-sponsored UN cease-fire proposal. However, on January 17, China rejected this proposal, arguing this would only give UN forces breathing space (Foot 1990: 29). In April 1951, Truman dismissed MacArthur for speaking out publicly to preempt a US statement about its willingness to settle. The new UN ground commander, General Matthew Ridgway, revived the UN side’s battlefield fortunes as the Communist offensives in April and May stalled out. By June 1951, the battle line had more or less stabilized and each side began to realize that moving beyond a stalemate would be extraordinarily costly. On June 23, Soviet UN Ambassador Jacob Malik suggested in a radio address that both sides agree to an armistice at the 38th Parallel (Stueck 1995: 208; Rees 1964: 262). Armistice negotiations between the UN Command, China and North Korea began on July 10 in the Korean town of Kaesong. To contemporary observers, agreement seemed only a matter of time: “The Joint Chiefs thought the talks would last about three weeks, but being military men they also had to be realistic. It might take as long as six weeks to get an armistice” (Rees 1964: 285). By the end of July, the belligerents agreed on the armistice talks agenda: 1. Adoption of an agenda; 2. Fixing a military demarcation line to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition of a cease-fire; 3. Concrete arrangements for realizing an armistice, including the composition, authority and functions of a supervising organization; 4. Arrangements relating to prisoners of war (POWs); and 5. Recommendations to the belligerent governments on both sides (Vatcher 1958: 33–34, 38–43; Joy 1955: 18–29; Hermes 1966: 26–31; Goodman 1978: 14–22; Bailey 1992: 76–77; Ridgway 1967: 202). That it took the negotiators several weeks to agree upon an agenda foreshadowed future frustrations. On August 24, using as a rationale the latest in a series of “incidents” around the negotiating area, the Communists broke off formal negotiations (Stueck 1995: 227–35; Foot 1990: 42–50; Goldhamer 1994: 76–82; Boose 2000). Formal talks resumed in October 1952 in Panmunjom. The next
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few months were very productive, so that by March 1952, all items were resolved except for agenda item 4—prisoners of war (Foot 1990: 53, 74–76: Collins 1969: 338–39). In effect, POW repatriation stalled the talks for an additional 15 months. In January 1952, the UN Command had proposed non-forcible (voluntary) repatriation for prisoners of war (Joy 1955: 178). In contrast, the Communists insisted that all prisoners must be returned, even those who did not want repatriation. By March, the Chinese negotiators hinted that they might accept some compromise solution: a UN screening of the prisoners and subsequent removal from the lists of those who would violently resist repatriation (Bailey 1992: 94). This Communist concession came after the UN team had suggested such a screening would result in the return of 116,000 Communist prisoners—including almost all Chinese POWs (Rose 1994: 291–92). In early April, therefore, the UN screened prisoners. The results shocked everyone: only 70,000 of the 132,000 agreed to return, including only 5,000 of the 21,000 Chinese prisoners (Bernstein 1983: 281–84). When the UN presented these figures on April 19, the chief Communist negotiator, “struggling to conceal his shock and outrage, immediately moved for a recess” (Bernstein 1983: 284; Foot 1990: 99). On April 28, the UN delegation offered a package proposal about prisoners, airfield reconstruction and Soviet membership on the neutral nation commission. On May 2, the Communists officially agreed to forgo Soviet membership in exchange for the ability to rebuild airfields. With this agreement, the POW issue became the only remaining issue in contention (Foot 1990: 102), and on May 7, talks broke down because of it. The remaining eight months of the Truman Administration saw little progress in the negotiations. Over the summer, the UN Command increased its air campaign, and on September 28, it delivered its final offer on the prisoner of war issue. On October 8, this offer was rejected, and the UN announced an indefinite recess to the talks (Boose 2000). There was no movement on negotiations until March 30, 1953—three weeks after Soviet leader Joseph Stalin died—when the Communists conceded on POW repatriation. The previous month, UN Commander Mark Clark had proposed an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners, and on March 27, Chinese premier and foreign minister Zhou Enlai agreed, adding that such an exchange “should be made to lead to the smooth settlement of the entire question of POWs, thereby achieving an armistice in Korea for which people throughout the world are longing” (Hermes 1966: 412; Foot 1990: 167). Three days later, Zhou publicly proposed that POWs unwilling to be repatriated should be transferred to a neutral state (Chen 2001: 112).
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Armistice negotiations resumed on April 26, and by June 8, the Communists agreed to the principle of voluntary repatriation. On June 18, South Korean President Syngman Rhee—in a last-ditch effort to undermine the negotiations—unilaterally ordered South Korean guards to release 25,000 North Korean prisoners resisting repatriation. During the following month, Communist troops launched an offensive at ROK positions (Zhang 1992: 140; 1995: 243), while Eisenhower’s Administration offered Rhee various carrots to secure his agreement to honor the armistice (Allen 1994: 106; Keefer 1986: 286–87; Kotch 1983: 239–59; Goulden 1982: 640–42; Kaufman 1986: 328). The armistice ending the Korean War was finally signed on July 27, 1953. By the time the armistice was signed, about three million civilians were killed in the North and the South, and many more became refugees. Total battlefield casualties for both sides were 3.6 million wounded and 1.5 million killed (Kang 2005: 196). US casualties numbered more than 157,000, including 54,200 dead; South Korea suffered more than 1.3 million casualties, including 415,000 dead. Other UN casualties numbered more than 16,000, including 3,100 dead. Communist casualties were estimated at more than 2 million (Kaufman 1999: 15; Foot 1990: 208). Sadly, the last two years were extremely costly for all belligerents. Had the war ended two years earlier, when armistice negotiations began, the United States would have been spared 45 percent of its casualties—22,000 killed and 63,200 wounded. While Communist statistics are less certain, at least 234,000 Chinese and North Koreans would have lived had the war ended in July 1951 (Foot 1990: 208; Hermes 1966: 500; Hatchimonji 2002).
Including the Soviet Union as a Primary Belligerent The Soviet Union was not a declared participant in the Korean War, and for this reason, it is often excluded from Korean War histories or quantitative analyses of war. For example, Bruce Cumings—one of the preeminent “revisionist” historians of the war—argues that the Soviet Union played a small role, because Soviet influence over North Korea was “flimsy.” In his estimation, North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung could have acted independently of Moscow during the war, because it “was by no means reliant solely on Soviet arms” (Cumings 1990: 447).5 Similarly, many quantitative datasets used in international relations scholarship, such as the Correlates of War, exclude the Soviet Union because it neither was a declared participant nor suffered enough battle-deaths to qualify for inclusion as a belligerent.6 Indeed, skeptics might wonder how useful the Soviet case is for theorizing
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about war termination. How often does a state have almost complete control over war decisions, reaping benefits without incurring the costs of fighting? Four states in other interstate wars since World War II had this dynamic operating to some degree: France and Britain in the Sinai War (1956), Greece in the Cyprus War (1974) and Syria in the Lebanon War (1982). Thus, 15 percent of the interstate wars since World War II involve states controlling war decisions without committing large numbers of ground forces to the war. Moreover, this dynamic is quite common in civil wars, where an outside patron to one of the civil war factions supplies arms and effectively controls war decisions. For example, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic played a central role in Bosnian Serb war decision-making during the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s. Likewise, the United States used its role providing arms to the mujahedeen to influence war policy during the Soviets’ war in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Finally, regardless of how “representative” the Soviet case is, including it allows me to examine the dynamics of the preference obstacle (see Chapter 4) and thoroughly explore the empirical record of all belligerents in the Korean War. I contend the Soviet Union was a primary belligerent in the war for three reasons. First, although the Soviet Union did not fight on the ground in Korea, it provided massive quantities of armaments and supplies and significant numbers of military advisors to the Chinese and North Koreans. The North Korean army was formed with Soviet occupation forces’ weapons and equipment (when the Soviets withdrew in 1948), and the Soviets continued to provide all weapon upgrades and ammunition before and during the war. Before the war, the Soviets also supplied sufficient equipment for six infantry divisions, three mechanized units, eight battalions of border troops and combat aircraft (Zubok and Pleshakov 1996: 55; Shrader 1995: 65–66; Whiting 1960: 42–43; Griffith 1967: 344–45; Simmons 1975: 191). Richard Thornton argues this pre-war buildup “doubled the number of North Korean planes, tripled its infantry divisions, more than doubled and possibly even quadrupled the number of tanks and massively increased the NK[P]A’s artillery and mortar capability” (2000: 110). In terms of advisors, since December 1946, North Korean units had regularly assigned Soviet advisors. When the war broke out, the Soviets also sent technical advisors to help maintain and operate Soviet-supplied arms and equipment. There were roughly 10,000 Soviet and Soviet-bloc anti-aircraft artillerymen, advisors and technicians in North Korea at the time of the armistice, and the Soviets also staffed field hospitals (Hermes 1966: 283–84; Shrader 1995: 92; Ognev 1993: 58). As Chapter 4 will detail, evidence also suggests the Soviets planned the North Korean invasion (Stueck 1995: 31; Thornton 2000: 110–11). Yu Song-Chol, who served as Kim Il-Sung’s Russian translator, argues the draft invasion plan
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was “prepared directly” by the Soviet military advisory group, headed by Lt. Gen. Vasiliev.7 Vasiliev passed the plan to Kim Il-Sung, who passed it to Kang Kon, the chief of the NKPA general staff, who in turn passed it to Yu and instructed, “You translate this and set up plans” (Yu 1993: 152; Chu 1993: 116; Thornton 2000: 110). Once the North Koreans invaded, however, Stalin ordered the Soviet advisors to pull back from the front lines (Im 1993: 138). The Soviets provided most of their military aid to the Chinese after the Chinese People’s “Volunteers” (CPV) intervened in Korea in October 1950. Although the Soviets sent 3,000 military advisors and technicians to China in April 1950,8 they did not provide Soviet armaments and materiel until August 1951. Thereafter, both the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the CPV in Korea were reorganized and re-equipped with modern Soviet equipment. The Soviets equipped 64 Chinese infantry and 22 air divisions, and they also provided 80 percent of the ammunition used by Chinese forces in Korea—3 million tons of military materials and 250 thousand tons of ammunition (Hao and Zhai 1993: 162; Shrader 1995: 66; West 1993: 9; Futrell 1983: 245). In February 1951, Moscow agreed to build factories to repair and service aircraft in China. China converted these factories to make new aircraft, so that by the end of the war, its air force had more than 3,000 planes, including advanced MiG jets. The Soviet Union also transferred technology for producing seven kinds of small arms, including machine guns (Jung and Halliday 2006: 361). However, this “military assistance” to China was not free but came with many strings attached, as Chapter 7 will detail.9 Second, the Soviet Union engaged in an intense air war with UN forces for more than two years (Halliday 1993; O’Neill 1996). Although information about the Soviet air war in Korea was tightly guarded as a “state secret” throughout the Soviet era, some 26,000 Soviet airmen fought in the Korean War and claimed to have destroyed 1,309 UN aircraft. Two Soviet air divisions were sent to defend the Yalu River in November 1950, and in March 1951, a division of the Moscow Air Defense District was deployed to Manchuria. The Soviet aircraft bore North Korean markings. The Soviet pilots were required to wear Chinese uniforms and trained to use Chinese and Korean phrases on the radio, but during crisis, they often reverted to Russian. They were also prohibited from flying over enemy territory, to avoid being taken prisoner if shot down. Moreover, Stalin ordered the Soviet air force to train Chinese pilots as quickly as possible to replace Soviet air crews. The Soviets sent their best pilots to train the Chinese: while it typically required at least 300 hours of training to fly a jet aircraft, the Soviet instructors adapted a 60-hour course to teach the Chinese to pilot a MiG-15 (Zhang 1995: 177; Lobov 1991: 5; Zaloga 1991: 76; Edwards 2000: 68–69; Weathersby 1993c: 437–38;
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1996; 2002: 19–20; Hao and Zhai 1993: 162; Junji 1991: 21–23; Smirtchkov and Vetalyayev 1991: 25, 29; Park 1996a: 207–10; Volkogonov 1993; Petrov 1994b: 62). Third, the Soviet Union played a central role in formulating diplomatic strategy for the Communists during the war, and thus drove decisions about prosecuting and ending the war. Stalin had final say in decisions about military and diplomatic strategy, regularly corresponding by telegraph with Chinese and North Korean leaders. Stalin himself negotiated with Mao and Kim Il-Sung over the amounts of various supplies to be delivered, their delivery schedule and the terms of payment. Although the Chinese were responsible for operational management of the war after November 1950, Stalin closely followed events on the ground and periodically intervened with specific instructions. Most importantly, Mao and Kim requested and received Stalin’s instructions prior to any significant diplomatic or strategic moves (Weathersby 1996, 1998; Chen 2001: 59; Sheng 1995: 309; Shen 2003–4; Thornton 2000: 380; Goncharov et al. 1993: 42). Indeed, as Chapters 4 and 7 will show, Stalin’s sway over Mao and Kim was a major factor in the war continuing. Perhaps because Kim’s overly optimistic projections about quick victory were soon proven wrong, Stalin frequently intervened with and overruled the North Korean command—usually siding with the Chinese. Recent archival evidence shows Stalin often arbitrated between North Korea and China, intervening to “help” them establish a combined command structure under Chinese control and phase offensive campaigns per Chinese military advice. Stalin even interjected to place the Korean railroad system under Chinese control, over Kim’s objections concerning Korean sovereignty (Shen 2003–4; Weathersby 1996; 1998: 91; Chen 2001: 59; Sheng 1995: 309). Stalin also intervened with the Chinese, reserving Sino-Soviet affairs for himself among top Soviet decision-makers. Until his death, Stalin dealt personally with all problems, big and small, between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists (Li 1992: 61; Goncharev et al. 1993: 14–15; Zubok and Pleshakov 1996: 56; Petrov 1994a: 5; Shi 1993: 70, 88–89). In sum, the Soviet Union is included as a primary belligerent in the war because it bankrolled the Communist war effort with materiel and advisory support, provided most of the pilots for the Communist air war and—most importantly— played a central role in formulating decisions about prosecuting the war. Therefore, any analysis of the war termination process must include the Soviet Union.
Excluding the Korean States as Primary Belligerents If the last two years of the Korean War have received scant treatment in popular histories and scholarly analysis, then the role of the two Korean states in these
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accounts has been virtually non-existent. Recent scholarship, based on newly opened archives, is starting to piece together the domestic political story for both Koreas, but the process is far from complete.10 Undoubtedly, as additional information gets released and Korean scholars’ work becomes translated, our understanding of the Korean states’ perspectives will be strengthened. Yet, even if the historical account were more complete, North and South Korea still do not qualify as primary belligerents in the Korean War. Although the war was fought on their soil and both sides suffered tremendous civilian and military casualties, neither Korean party had much power in its respective side’s decisions about when and how the war ended. Their respective powerlessness provides an ironic parallel: while North Korea wanted to end the war much sooner, South Korea wanted to fight on much longer, but both were overruled by their respective side’s more powerful primary belligerents. Clearly, without their great power patrons, neither Korean state had the capacity to wage this war. The NKPA existed almost entirely because of Soviet arms and advisory support; it seems unlikely it could have launched the invasion without that assistance. Similarly, after the North Korean attack, the ROK army would have been decimated and pushed off the peninsula if not for US assistance. After the UN’s successful amphibious landing at Inchon in September 1950, it was the North Korean’s turn to be almost overrun—until China intervened to save it. Therefore, both Korean states were materially powerless and depended heavily on their patrons. Part of this relative powerlessness resulted from the way North and South Korea were perceived by other states in the conflict. All three primary belligerents viewed the Korean states as pawns in a Cold War battleground. For example, in her social constructivist account of the war, Jennifer Milliken (2001) argues US officials typified North Korea as a “Soviet satellite state”—equating North Korea with Eastern European states “whose governments were under complete Soviet domination and control, and which therefore acted as ‘puppets’ in Soviet courses of action” (2001: 49). In the same way, US officials typified South Korea as a “bona fide client state”—equating South Korea with Japan and West Germany, states “fully ‘under US protection’ and dependent on US backing if it was to combat Communism successfully” (2001: 51). Conversely, China framed the conflict as a “US war of conquest in Asia” with the United States planning to conquer the entire Korean peninsula and extend US imperialist domination in Asia. Thus, the Chinese typified South Korea as a “US-backed ‘reactionary puppet regime’,” while framing North Korea as a “brother country” carrying out “a revolutionary struggle for national liberation” (Milliken 2001: 117). While Milliken does not examine Soviet framing of the Korean actors, Stalin’s dismissal of North Korea’s interests and losses—detailed below—suggests the Soviets had a similar perspective.
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Typifying the Korean states this way effectively eliminated them from the strategic interaction between the two sides in the war. Neither North nor South Korea was perceived as an independent actor, with its own interests and decision-making processes. As a result, both Koreas were almost irrelevant to the international-level bargaining process. For example, given its understanding of North Korea as a “Soviet satellite state,” the United States missed the possibility to interact directly with the North Koreans or exploit differing interests and perspectives in the Communist camp. In sum, North and South Korea were powerless in their respective side’s decisions and actions in two ways: not only were they materially powerless, as their forces were incapable of waging war without their larger patrons’ help, but the way the three primary belligerents conceived of them as client states rendered them politically powerless as well. Within this perceptual context, even if the Korean states had been more powerful materially, it is unlikely they could have influenced their respective side’s war policy. The rest of this chapter provides a brief overview of the wartime domestic politics in both Korean states to demonstrate their relative insignificance for explaining when, how and why the war ended. north korea
With the exception of its idea to launch the war, North Korea was never central to Communist decisions about war policy. Indeed, after getting Soviet support to launch the attack in April 1950, the North Koreans consistently forfeited the driver’s seat in military and diplomatic strategy to the Soviets and the Chinese. As noted previously, the Soviets planned the invasion, and Stalin supervised high-level diplomatic and military strategy decisions. Then, after the Chinese intervened to save Kim Il-Sung from failure, they handled operational and tactical decisions, first on the battlefield and then in the armistice tent. By December 7, 1950, the day after Chinese troops recovered Pyongyang on their southward offensive, Kim ceded command to CPV military commander Peng Dehaui (Shen 2003–4: 13–14; Suh 1988: 122). By this point, Kim’s depleted 75,000 man army was outnumbered 6:1 by the CPV. As Jung and Halliday argue, “Mao had taken over Kim’s war” (2006: 359). Furthermore, although North Korean Nam Il was the titular head of the Communist negotiating team for armistice negotiations, the North Koreans had no real power. Behind the scenes, the Chinese established a “negotiation direction group,” led by Vice Foreign Minister Li Kenong and Qiao Guanhua, the head of the Foreign Ministry’s public information bureau. Reluctantly, the North Koreans agreed that this group, which communicated daily with Beijing, would direct the negotiations (Stueck 1995: 224; Chen 2001: 99). As Shen Zhihua put it, “the
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way the Chinese, backed by the Soviets, forced the North Koreans to accept their views left a shadow on the heart of Kim Il-Sung” (2003–4: 19). In other words, once the larger states got involved in the war, the North Koreans held little sway in Communist decisions to prosecute and end it. The DPRK regime was led by Kim Il-Sung, the chairman of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP). When the KWP was created in 1949, merging the Communist parties in both North and South Korea, it brought together three factions: (1) the Soviet/Manchurian faction, led by Kim Il-Sung, which included Koreans who had lived for extended periods in the USSR before 1945 and the “Kapsan” guerilla fighters during Korea’s Japanese occupation; (2) the South Korean faction, led by Pak Hon-Yong, which had operated primarily in South Korea until 1948;11 and (3) the Yenan faction, led by Kim Tu-bong and Mu-Chong, which had fought with the Chinese Communists (Stueck 1995: 22; Park 1995: 242–43; 1996b: 108; Simmons 1975: 23–24). After the KWP’s creation, the Soviet faction controlled the military’s highest ranks,12 while the Yenan faction was a majority in its secondary tiers. Nonetheless, Pak Hon-Yong’s experience in South Korean politics quickly catapulted him to the second leadership position; he became KWP vice chairman, first deputy premier of the government and foreign minister. As a result, the South Korean faction assumed almost half of the KWP politburo and central committee seats (Park 1995: 243–44; Park 1996b: 261; Thornton 2000: 111).13 There has been some debate about which leader—Kim Il-Sung or Pak HonYong—was responsible for the June 1950 attack. Some observers argue the war resulted from a power struggle between the two leaders, with Pak launching the attack to eclipse Kim and the Soviet faction (Simmons 1975: 105–9; Suh 1988: 120–21). Certainly, Pak was in a pivotal position to influence the decision, given his near-monopoly of information on conditions in the south, and Stalin was persuaded by Pak’s estimate of overwhelming South Korean support for the invasion (Petrov 1994b: 65; Shin and Shin 1993: 106). However, more recent scholarship suggests Kim was the driving force behind the invasion, with Pak’s support. Both leaders attended all of the meetings with Stalin to request Soviet assistance for the invasion. Moreover, while Pak provided data about guerilla activities and spy penetration in the south, Kim had other sources of information that supported Pak’s assessments (Park 1995: 245; 252; 1996: 264–66; Kim 1996: 267–69).14 The only high-ranking North Korean leader who opposed the invasion was Choe Yong-Gon, the defense minister and NKPA commander, who was consequently left out of the invasion planning (Park 1995: 258; Kim 1996: 287–304; Thornton 2000: 111–12). The day after the invasion, North Korea experienced the first (hawkish) shift in its domestic governing coalition. On June 26, 1950, Kim Il-Sung created a seven-
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man Military Committee to coordinate the war effort and direct all government functions during the war. He also streamlined the chain of command to bypass Defense Minister Choe. Because of Choe’s support in the army, Kim was unable to remove him from his official posts. However, the de facto chain of command now ran from Kim Il-Sing to Vice Premier and “battlefield commander” Kim Cha-ek to NKPA Chief of Staff Kang Kon (Park 1995: 259, 261–66; Yu 1993: 153; Thornton 2000: 111–12). In addition, the Military Committee was vested with authority “to mobilize ‘the entire forces of the country’ and all citizens, organs of power, political parties and social organizations were ‘obliged to submit themselves completely’ to it” (Nam 1974: 85). Besides Kim Il-Sung, the Military Committee included three other members of the Soviet faction—Vice Premier and Industrial Minister Kim Cha-ek, Defense Minister Choe and Chong ChunTaek—and two members of the South Korean faction—Foreign Minister Pak and Vice Premier Hong Myong-Hui. The seventh member was Interior Minister Pak Il-U, the only representative of the Yenan faction (Kim 1975: 177; Nam 1974: 85). After North Korea’s initial battlefield success, only to be pushed back north towards the Yalu River in the fall, China intervened and took over war policy decision-making. Two weeks after China pushed UN forces back south of Pyongyang, the KWP Central Committee on December 21 held its third joint plenum. There, Kim publicly admonished military leaders, provincial party bosses and eight major party leaders for North Korea’s poor war performance. Of those criticized, the highest ranking included Yenan faction leader Mu-Chong, Soviet faction member and Vice Defense Minister Kim Il, and the KWP party organizer, Kim Yol, a Soviet-born Korean.15 During his speech, Kim Il-Sung fired all eight major party leaders from their positions and expelled them from the party. He reserved his strongest criticisms for Mu-Chong, accusing him of refusing to defend Pyongyang during the retreat north and committing “barbarous atrocities” against the Korean people (Kim 1975: 178–79; Nam 1974: 87–88; Suh 1988: 122–23; Lim 1982: 198, 204–5; Simmons 1975: 186).16 Kim Il-Sung’s scapegoating of subordinates at the joint third plenum is the second North Korean domestic coalition shift during the war. While it may appear to be a dovish coalition shift, as he tried to shift blame for the military defeats onto others, Kim did not scapegoat these leaders intending to change war policy towards ending the war. Instead, on closer examination, it appears the major purpose of the change was to eliminate his rival Mu-Chong, the Yenan (Chinese) faction leader. Given China’s recent intervention to save North Korea from complete collapse, Kim Il-Sung worried that this faction, now supported by China’s military, would become a greater threat to his leadership. Eliminating this faction’s leader was the easiest way to avoid that outcome, while publicly
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criticizing leaders from all three factions allowed him to deflect attention from this purpose (Kim 1975: 179). Indeed, shortly after the plenum, every other expelled party leader was reinstated, albeit often to different positions. Only Mu-Chong was permanently expelled, stripped of military rank and imprisoned (Kim 1975: 178–79; Suh 1988: 123; Lim 1982: 198, 205; Nam 1974: 88).17 As Joungwon Kim argues, the purge “shifted the onus of defeat from Kim Il-Sung and the Soviet Union, while maintaining the fiction that it was the South that had initiated the war, and it prevented the Yenan faction from being able to team up with the Chinese to claim that they had ‘saved’ the nation” (1975: 179). Therefore, because this coalition shift was predominantly about Kim Il-Sung consolidating his power and minimizing the Yenan faction’s influence, it is coded as neutral. The third North Korean coalition shift occurred on January 31, 1951, when Vice Premier, Industrial Minister and battlefield commander Kim Cha-ek died. Kim Cha-ek was one of Kim Il-Sung’s longtime friends and “number two man” in the Soviet faction, but the circumstances surrounding his death are unclear. Some authors claim he was killed in a bombing raid, while others argue he died of carbon monoxide poisoning after a late-night visit with Kim Il-Sung (Kim 1975: 179; Lim 1982: 208–10). Given the exogenous nature of this shift, it is also coded as neutral. In early June 1951, as the fifth Communist offensive stalled, Kim traveled to Beijing and then Moscow to argue for continuing the offensive, but Mao and Stalin overruled him again. The Communist leaders reached the “consensus” that they would now work for an armistice through negotiations, with the goal of restoring Korea’s prewar status quo (Chen 2001: 97–99).18 After Soviet UN Ambassador Malik’s June 23, 1951 speech, arguing for armistice negotiations, “widespread resentment against the Soviet Union grew within the KWP” (Simmons 1975: 200, 209). Without the ability to fight alone, however, the North Koreans had little say in the matter. Throughout that fall, the North Koreans increasingly realized their interests were not identical to those in Beijing or Moscow. As a result, Kim Il-Sung publicly criticized the foremost Soviet Korean, Ho Ka-I, at the KWP Central Committee’s Fourth Plenum in November 1951,19 and recalled North Korea’s ambassador in China. A new replacement did not arrive in Beijing until March 1952 (Simmons 1975: 209, 211). By January 1952, the North Koreans began indicating they were ready to end the war. North Korean territory had been devastated by the war, and a severe flood in July 1951—the worst in 40 years—had ravaged the military’s logistical system, rail and road infrastructure and agricultural land. As a result, there was famine among the civilian population (Zhang 1995: 165, 172). On January 22, For-
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eign Minister Pak told Chinese military commander Peng he thought “the Korean people throughout the country demand peace and do not want to continue the war.” That month, Peng estimated 10 percent of the North Korean population was starving, and “the majority of the peasant population will be able to subsist only until April-May.” Moreover, the DPRK had collected “too large a percentage” of the previous year’s grain yield as an in-kind tax. In his February 8 telegram to Stalin relaying these conversations, Mao added that Kim had bluntly told him that Kim had “no desire to continue the war.”20 Similarly, Razuvaev, the Soviet ambassador to North Korea, reported to Moscow in March 1952 that “when Kim was discussing the reasons for the deadlocked negotiations with [DPRK negotiator] Nam Il, he advocated signing the cease-fire agreement and turning over all unsolved problems to a political meeting for further research.” According to Kim, “delaying negotiations was not beneficial, because the US Air Force was continuing to inflict damage on the DPRK. He does not see the rationale behind continuing the debate over POWs, because this debate is now leading to great losses.” Razuvaev reported that Kim had instructed Nam Il “to get a clear sense of the Chinese attitude on this question” and suggested making concessions on the POW problem “in the name of [PRC negotiator] Li Kenong.”21 Stalin’s response to North Korea’s hardship was not particularly sympathetic. In a terse April 1952 cable to Kim, he said: “It became known to me that the Korean people are in need of bread. We have in Siberia 50,000 tons of prepared wheat flour. We can send this flour as a gift to the Korean people. Telegraph your agreement.”22 Given such “enthusiastic” support from the Soviet patron, it is not surprising that around the same time, Defense Minister Choe Yong-Gon told the North Korean military staff: Unless the USSR makes a definite promise to intervene in the Korean War, the only alternative is for North Koreans and Chinese to come to terms with the UN. An armistice will permit the communization of South Korea from within. . . . The Soviets plan to keep Asians fighting Americans while the Soviets sit back and talk about Soviet peace. They do not care about the unification of Korea; they merely invested material and professional aid in order to pin down UN forces and weaken US strength. (Simmons: 1975: 215, emphasis added)
By July, Kim worried that because of the stalemated battlefield, armistice negotiations could be drawn out indefinitely. Kim moaned that the UN “almost without suffering any kind of losses constantly inflicts on us huge losses in manpower and material values”—noting that in one 24-hour period of “barbaric bombing” on Pyongyang (from July 11 to 12), 6,000 North Koreans had been killed and wounded. Urging Stalin to approve offensive military operations to
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revive the negotiations, Kim argued that the Communists desperately needed “to move decisively towards the soonest conclusion of an armistice.”23 Similarly, in correspondence with Mao, Kim argued forcefully for active military operations so the enemy would cease its “furious bombardment.”24 Telegrams of this kind continued throughout 1952 and 1953. Nevertheless, North Korea was consistently bypassed in tactical and strategic decisions on the battlefield and in the negotiating tent. The over-riding truth was that a protracted war helped Soviet and Chinese interests, so they did not adopt the North Korean position. As Jung and Halliday put it, “Mao had hijacked the war, and was using Korea regardless of Kim’s interests” (2006: 362). Nam Il was the North Korean representative at armistice negotiations, but his presence was almost entirely for the UN negotiating team’s benefit. Telegrams among the Communist leaders clearly demonstrate that Mao and his subordinates were in charge of armistice negotiations (Chen 2001: 99). For example, during POW repatriation discussions in early 1952, the Communists were willing to give ground on Korean prisoners, but they refused to show flexibility on Chinese prisoners who did not want repatriation (Stueck 1995: 270–72). Moreover, although Chinese leaders traveled to Moscow during this time to discuss settlement terms, the North Koreans were not included.25 As Chapter 7 will explain, when Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou met with Stalin in the fall of 1952, both leaders mentioned the North Koreans’ plight, but only as evidence for their own preferences, not actually to take the North Korean viewpoint into account. As Stalin remarked dismissively in those discussions, “The North Koreans have lost nothing, except for casualties.”26 Finally, even after the Communist concession about POW repatriation, North Korea was unable to influence the armistice’s timing. After South Korea unilaterally released prisoners in June 1953 to sabotage the agreement, North Korea pushed to sign the agreement anyway. However, CPV Commander Peng, with Mao’s support, overruled Kim Il-Sung once again to launch a new military campaign to punish the ROK army, extending the war an additional six weeks (Shen 2003–4; Chen 2001: 116). In sum, although the war was being fought on its territory, the DPRK suffered until the armistice in the role of invisible junior partner. If anything, the North Korean experience provides an extreme example of a secondary belligerent entrapped by its more hawkish external allies in a war it no longer wanted to fight. While the North Korean governing coalition experienced shifts during the war, they had little effect on the Communists’ decisions about prosecuting and ending it. With the exception of the initial hawkish coalition shift, North Korea’s coalition shifts had no effect on decisions to prosecute and end the war. Although Kim
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Il-Sung used the battlefield situation to justify changes in the governing coalition, this merely provided convenient cover for consolidating his rule and sidelining rival factions.27 Thus, given North Korea’s relative insignificance in Soviet and Chinese war policy decisions, there is little relationship between North Korean domestic coalition politics and the strategic interaction at the international level. south korea
If China and the Soviet Union basically ignored North Korea’s pleas to end the war sooner, the United States had to rein in South Korea for attempting to prolong it. Led by President Syngman Rhee, the ROK government remained consistently more hawkish than its US patron. Although the United States held the upper hand in the relationship, because South Korea depended on US support for its survival, the United States felt more constrained by Rhee than the Communist great powers felt by Kim, for two reasons. First, because the UN was fighting for the ROK, the United States felt more constrained by international opinion—and thus deferred to its client more in public—than the Communist great powers did. More generally, as the South Korean case shows, it may be easier for hawkish secondary belligerents to act as veto players to settlement than for dovish secondary belligerents to compel more powerful hawkish allies to settle. Despite this, there is still little relationship between South Korean domestic politics and the international bargaining process. Like Kim Il-Sung, Rhee used the ongoing war effort to affect domestic politics—not to enhance the war’s prosecution but to provide cover for consolidating his rule and sidelining rivals. Rhee was elected president when South Korea gained independence in August 1948. Over the next two years, Rhee faced intense pressure from a variety of sources, including Communist-instigated army and mass rebellions and more powerful opposition parties who controlled the National Assembly. These parties, including the Korean Democratic Party and the Democratic Nationalist Party, held more seats in the National Assembly but lacked commensurate representation in Rhee’s cabinet and thus tried to undermine his rule. Rhee’s external support from the United States also declined during this time, as the US and ROK governments clashed over economic policy and US defense commitment to South Korea. In some ways, Rhee was caught between a rock and a hard place: while the United States helped Rhee remain in power, its demands in exchange for that support undercut his internal powerbase and furthered dependence upon the United States. For example, the United States wanted Rhee to increase taxation to curb inflation, but this would have increased the power of the National Assembly opposition parties. As Rhee refused to accede to some of these
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demands, the United States began phasing out its support, so that by January 1950 the American defense perimeter in Asia excluded South Korea (Kim 1975: 116–30). In many ways, therefore, the Korean War came at precisely the right time for Rhee. Not only did the war re-cement US support, but Rhee benefited directly from the growth of the Korean army, which provided a new organizational base of support and a new funding source. In exchange for looking the other way as senior military officers diverted American military aid, Rhee’s new political party (the Liberal Party) used some of these diverted funds to consolidate control at the local level (Kim 1975: 133–35). The war considerably enhanced Rhee’s power and prestige, and as James Palais argues, Rhee “used the opportunity to obliterate the Left by force” (1973: 324). The South Korean government experienced six domestic coalition shifts during the war, with Rhee consolidating his power throughout. All shifts are coded neutral, as the new coalition in each case intended to maintain the same war policies. The first shift occurred after the National Assembly passed a resolution demanding the dismissal of Prime Minister and Defense Minister Shin Song Mo and Home Minister Cho Pyung Ok. Chang Myon, the first ROK ambassador to Washington, replaced Shin as prime minister on November 23, 1950, but Shin retained the defense portfolio (Stueck 1995: 108). During this time, as UN forces advanced north towards the Yalu River, the UN debated how to create a unified national government in Korea. US officials wanted to hold elections to fill the 100 empty National Assembly seats designated for the northern areas, since the assembly had just been elected for a two-year term that spring and Rhee was sure to balk otherwise. However, other countries, especially Britain, wanted to hold national elections as a way to depose the internationally unpopular Rhee. Rhee tried to preempt this possibility by announcing he was assuming “temporary civil control” over the entire country. Before the UN reached its final decision, however, the Chinese counteroffensive rendered the debate moot (Stueck 1995: 108–10). The second ROK coalition shift occurred in the spring of 1951, in response to two domestic political crises: (1) the Kochang incident in February 1951, in which a ROK army battalion massacred 500–1,000 civilians suspected of being Communist guerillas, and (2) the Citizens’ Army incident in March 1951, in which National Defense Corps officers embezzled more than 2.3 billion won and thousands of tons of rice, “driving nearly 1 million soldiers to the verge of death from starvation and disease” (Kang 2005: 198; see also Stueck 1995: 213). The National Assembly got wind of the massacre and started an investigation, followed shortly thereafter by similar international press inquiries. Over the next few weeks until
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May 16, as details of the twin scandals came to light, a wave of cabinet members resigned or were dismissed—including Vice President Yi Si Yong, Defense Minister Shin Song Mo, Interior Minister Cho Pyung Ok, and Justice Minister Kim Jun-Yun. While these scandals certainly were related to the war, Rhee did not intend to use their dismissals to change war policy. Such intentions would have signaled a dovish shift. Instead, he used the occasion to install appointees who had served in the Japanese regime and were “mere instruments of the president” (Stueck 1995: 213; Pak 1980: 141). Nonetheless, the new vice presidential selection reflected the toll these scandals had on Rhee’s popularity: the new vice president, Kim Song-Su, was the leader of the opposition Democratic National Party (Pak 1980: 145). While this domestic turmoil was unfolding, the Communist offensives near the 38th Parallel were beginning to stall. In response to rumors of impending cease-fire negotiations, the ROK government launched a massive effort to mobilize the public to resist stopping the war short of the Yalu River. Mass protests occurred in Pusan, the temporary seat of the government, and the usually hostile National Assembly unanimously passed a resolution to continue fighting for an “independent and unified country.” At the end of June, the ROK cabinet announced that a cease-fire must include a Chinese withdrawal from Korea, the disarming of the North Korean Communists, a UN guarantee that no third party would assist North Korea militarily or financially, and recognition of “the national sovereignty and territorial integrity” of the Republic of Korea. Rhee promised the United States he would not make any more provocative statements to the press, but he threatened “drastic action” should the UN try to stop him from unifying the country. Perhaps for this reason, the United States decided to include a ROK representative in the UN team for the armistice negotiations (Stueck 1995: 215; Zhu 1998: 242). Over the next year, as the armistice negotiations eventually resolved every issue except POW repatriation, Rhee continued to build his Liberal Party, financed by the diverted army funds, so that by early 1952, 93 members of the National Assembly had been persuaded to join. Unfortunately for Rhee, however, these assembly members refused to endorse Rhee’s preferred form of government (a presidential system). Instead, they favored a parliamentary government, which would assure their own appointments to cabinet posts. Outside of the assembly, the Liberal Party’s base was formed by combining Yi Pom-Sok’s Youth Corps with remnants of Rhee’s National Society party. Rhee had appointed Yi as home minister during the May 1951 coalition shift in exchange for this support. The Liberal Party performed very well in local-level elections in February 1952, thanks to the Youth Corps’ support and Yi’s control of the local police, which publicized the Liberal
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Party and hampered electioneering by opposing groups (Kim 1975: 135–36). Because this election had no effect on the governing coalition, however, it does not count as a shift. Although Rhee had finally created a political party with local roots, he still had no control over the hostile National Assembly. This was becoming a problem, for Rhee’s first term of office was to expire in 1952. According to the constitution, the new president was to be elected by the assembly, and it was clear he would not be their choice. Thus, in November 1951, Rhee introduced constitutional amendments to permit the president to be elected by popular vote and to create a bicameral legislature. Both measures were designed to increase Rhee’s power and weaken the legislature, the first by removing the legislature’s power to elect him and the second by dividing and expanding the assembly to make it easier to control (Palais 1973: 314). As expected, because constitutional amendments needed two-thirds’ support from the assembly, the proposals did not pass. However, neither did the assembly’s own proposal for creating a parliamentary system. About this time, the governing coalition experienced its third neutral shift, when Prime Minister Chang Myon resigned to run in the upcoming presidential election.28 He was replaced by Chang Taek-Sang, who was appointed to conciliate the anti-Rhee assemblymen (Kim 1975: 137; Pak 1980: 102, 107). The fourth neutral coalition shift occurred when Rhee declared martial law in May 1952. That month—just as the armistice negotiations broke down over POW repatriation and riots in the UN POW camps implied inhumane treatment of Communist prisoners—Rhee re-introduced his constitutional amendments with a number of concessions to parliamentary advocates to secure their support. The Liberal Party, in virtual control of the local governments around the country, also began stirring up popular support for the amendment about direct presidential election. Petitions of support for the “right of the people” to elect the president came pouring in from local assemblies, and mass demonstrations (probably organized by Home Minister Yi’s Youth Corps) surrounded the National Assembly building in Pusan, demanding the assembly pass the amendment. The bureaucracy, still loyal to Rhee, cooperated by closing schools and shops to allow for the demonstrations. As the demonstrations got rowdy, on May 25 Rhee declared martial law in the temporary capital of Pusan and 22 surrounding counties. Under cover of martial law, Home Minister Yi then ordered the army to “detain” 47 assemblymen on suspicion of having received funds from the Communist Party. These assemblymen were held at the assembly until they voted through Rhee’s amendments on July 4. Afterwards, the charges against most assemblymen were quietly dropped (Kang 2005: 198; Stueck 1995: 277; Kim 1975: 137–38; Pak 1980: 102–11; Henderson 1968: 167–68).
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The South Korean domestic political crisis sparked a wave of international protest. Coming directly after the POW screening debacle, the crisis constrained the UN’s ability to present itself as the innocent party in the process of ending the war. US and UN leaders, including President Truman, tried to persuade Rhee to restore constitutional government, but he insisted that a plot existed to overthrow him and that foreigners should stay out of the ROK’s internal affairs. Rhee’s behavior, as well as the conditions in the Koje-do POW camp, eliminated the possibility of expanded UN military action to bring the Communists back to the bargaining table. Other UN members were simply too critical of Rhee to sign on for escalating the conflict (Stueck 1995: 277–78; Pak 1980: 105). In this way, the fourth ROK coalition shift did reverberate into the international bargaining process. On July 4, 1952, the National Assembly—surrounded by the police—finally held a stand-up vote to allow direct elections of the president. On July 18, Rhee announced the presidential election would be held on August 5, leaving the opposition with only 18 days to campaign. As a result, the Democratic National Party (DNP) did not even try to run a candidate against him (Kim 1975: 139; Pak 1980: 187). As Chi-Young Pak argues, “the consequences of the 1952 constitutional crisis dealt a fatal political and psychological blow to the opposition forces. After the unsuccessful constitutional struggle, the DNP and other anti-Rhee groups lacked the vigor, decisiveness and harmony they needed to be effective in the popular presidential election” (1980: 110–11). The fifth neutral coalition shift occurred with Rhee’s re-election as president on August 5. During the short campaign season, Rhee sacked his loyal home minister, Yi Pom-Sok, to distance himself from Yi’s decision to use the police in securing passage of the constitutional amendments. Rhee also refused to back Yi’s vice presidential candidacy, endorsing instead Ham Tae-Yong, a Christian minister from North Korea. Not surprisingly, Rhee won the election with 72 percent of the popular vote, while Ham won with 41 percent (Pak 1980: 188–89; Kim 1975: 138–40).29 Once again, Rhee used the ongoing war effort for personal gain, to consolidate his own rule rather than to influence war policy itself (Palais 1973: 325). As this summary of South Korean domestic coalition shifts shows, Rhee’s domestic political maneuverings had almost nothing to do with the ongoing war effort. All six neutral shifts helped Rhee consolidate his power, not wage the war more effectively. (The final ROK neutral coalition shift occurred October 6, 1952, when Prime Minister Chang Taek-Sang retired and was replaced by Paik Too-Chin.) None of these shifts occurred with the new coalition intending to change war policy. Throughout the war, Rhee remained hawkish about prolong-
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ing it until he could unify Korea under his control. Instead, Rhee believed South Korea was not well represented in armistice negotiations and seldom consulted. Towards the end of negotiations, therefore, Rhee’s government protested and mounted several domestic demonstrations against the UN Command’s proposals (Hermes 1966: 426–27; Zhu 1998: 242). After the March 1953 Communist concession on POW repatriation, Rhee tried even harder to assert his hawkish views. He wanted the United States to continue the war or if that were not possible, to offer a mutual security pact to the ROK. In contrast, the United States hoped to avoid a formal commitment. In conversations with US policymakers, ROK officials threatened to expel UN forces that refused to fight back north to the Yalu River or to remove ROK troops from the UN Command. At home, Rhee launched a campaign to mobilize support for continuing the war, including pro-unification editorials in South Korean newspapers and mass rallies in Seoul, Inchon and Pusan. On April 2, 1953, the National Assembly unanimously passed a resolution opposing an armistice without unification (Stueck 1995: 316–17; 2002: 189–90; Hermes 1966: 426–27; Zhu 1998: 242). While US officials believed most South Koreans wanted peace, they remained wary of Rhee’s unpredictable nature. Moreover, because ROK army units manned two-thirds of the front line by this point, Rhee’s perspective had some weight with the US decision-makers. In addition, the US Republican right wing (especially in Congress) echoed Rhee’s hawkish views, and President Eisenhower felt constrained by both. Thus, in late April, the UN commander, Gen. Mark Clark, gave in to Rhee’s demand for a representative at the armistice negotiations who would report directly to Rhee, and the US ambassador to Korea, Ellis Briggs, advised a mutual security pact might be necessary to gain Rhee’s acquiescence (Stueck 1995: 317; 2002: 190). Perhaps most significantly, largely because US officials feared Rhee’s reaction, they did not inform him of their final negotiating offer before it was presented on May 25 to the Communists at Panmunjom. This proposal was obviously not satisfactory to the South Koreans: it failed to release anti-Communist POWs immediately after an armistice, and it permitted Communist officials and Indian troops—which Rhee did not consider neutral—into ROK territory to supervise and question those prisoners. More symbolically, by not sharing the proposal with Rhee until virtually the moment it was presented to the Communists, it was “a humiliating reminder of America’s refusal to treat South Korea as an equal partner in the war” (Stueck 1995: 331). When Clark outlined the proposal to Rhee, Rhee told him, “I am deeply disappointed. Your government changes its position often. You pay no attention to the view of the ROK Government” (Clark 1954:
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268–69). About this time, the US government also authorized Clark, in the event of internal ROK instability, “to take whatever other steps you deem appropriate to safeguard the integrity and security of your forces.” Clark took this to mean that “if the present ROK government cannot be forced to accept the armistice terms,” he could establish a more “amenable” regime (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 1153). After presenting the final offer to the Communists, Eisenhower offered on June 7 to negotiate a mutual security pact promptly after the armistice was signed. He also offered economic assistance to rebuild Korea. But these moves to placate Rhee came too late. Rhee enhanced his ability to take actions independent of the UN, such as placing all ROK military units under the Ministry of National Defense, rather than the army, whose chief was strongly pro-American (Bernstein 1978: 38–47; Kotch 1983: 239–59; Stueck 1995: 316, 330–39; 2002: chapter 7). On June 18, in a last-ditch effort to undermine the negotiations, Rhee unilaterally ordered South Korean guards to release 25,000 North Korean prisoners resisting repatriation. Rhee claimed in his press release that “most of the United Nations authorities with whom I have spoken about our desire to release the prisoners are with us in sympathy and principle” (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 1199). Interestingly, although the Communists sent a pointed letter to the UN Command asking it to rein in the ROK, their response was relatively mild, suggesting how ready they were to conclude the armistice. The Communists directed most of their propaganda solely at Rhee and his government, rather than the United States or UN. Moreover, the Chinese military launched directed attacks against South Korean units, pushing ROK forces back six miles. During this offensive, ROK forces suffered 14,000 additional casualties, according to UNC figures (Stueck 1995: 338–39; Zhu 1998: 247–52; Foot 1990: 186–87; Clark 1954: 292). Obviously, Rhee’s decision to release the prisoners unilaterally postponed the armistice by several weeks, increasing casualties by tens of thousands. Yet playing this veto card was not irrational. Over the next few weeks, Rhee extracted a number of concessions from the United States to secure his agreement to honor the armistice (Allen 1994: 106; Keefer 1986: 286–87; Kotch 1983: 239–59; Goulden 1982: 640–42; Kaufman 1986: 328; Zhu 1998: 252–53; Stueck 2002: 191–93). As UN Commander Clark put it, Rhee “knew that no matter what happened we could not, after three years of war, after all the blood and treasure we lost, let Korea go to the Reds by default because of a quarrel ‘in the family’” (Clark 1954: 272). William Stueck argues that Rhee shrewdly “took care to prevent the crisis from escalating out of control” by leaving provocative comments to his foreign minister and “positioning himself to mend fences” (1995: 338). Rhee derived substantial advantages from his last-ditch spoiler actions. First,
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he got the United States to insist at Panmunjom that no Communist or Indian officials or troops attached to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission would operate in South Korea. Moreover, both the ROK and US governments agreed to withdraw from the post-armistice political conference after 90 days if no concrete progress was made (Clark 1954: 287–88). Second, he received a mutual defense pact, long-term economic aid and US support for expanding the ROK army, navy and air force (Zhu 1998: 252). More symbolically, he forced the United States to bargain openly with him about these issues, thereby increasing his prestige at home. Finally, he set the stage for future interactions with the United States, ensuring the more powerful ally would no longer take him for granted. In a letter to Eisenhower on the day the armistice was signed, Rhee thanked him “for the statesmanlike vision with which you have brought the relationships of your powerful nation and of our weaker one onto a basis of honest mutuality and two-way cooperation” (quoted in Stueck 1995: 338–39). In sum, while South Korea experienced a number of domestic coalition shifts during the Korean War, these shifts had almost no effect on the war termination process. The one possible exception was the 1952 constitutional crisis, which may have eliminated the possibility of expanded UN military action to pressure the Communists in the negotiating tent, because other UN members were too critical of Rhee to sign on for escalating the conflict. (However, as Chapter 6 will demonstrate, at that point, the US governing coalition was unwilling to escalate much anyway.) Given South Korea’s relative insignificance in UN decisions about prosecuting and ending the war, Rhee’s domestic political maneuverings had little to do with the ongoing war effort. All six neutral shifts helped Rhee consolidate power, and none brought to power a new coalition intending to change war policy. If South Korea’s domestic politics had any effect on when, how and why the war ended, it was expressed in the last two months of the war, when Rhee unilaterally released North Korean POWs. This last-ditch effort to undermine the armistice delayed the agreement by six weeks and affected the details surrounding treatment of non-repatriated POWs.
Conclusions While some scholars focus on battle-deaths as the major determinant of a belligerent’s role in a war, this chapter has argued for a more nuanced coding of belligerents’ importance in decisions about prosecuting and ending war. This chapter has explained my decision to include the Soviet Union—and conversely, to exclude the Korean states—among the primary belligerents of the Korean War. While the Soviet Union was not a declared war participant, it bankrolled the
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Communist war effort with materiel and advisory support, provided most of the pilots for the Communist air war and—most importantly—played a central role in formulating war policy. In the Korean states’ case, although the war was fought on their soil, North and South Korea were powerless in their respective side’s decisions and actions. Not only were they materially powerless, as their forces were incapable of waging war without their larger patrons’ help, but the way the primary belligerents viewed them as client states rendered them politically powerless as well. Within this perceptual context, even if they had been more powerful materially, it is unlikely they could have influenced their respective side’s decisions about how to fight and end the war. While both Korean states experienced domestic coalition shifts during the war, there was almost no relationship between these shifts and the international bargaining process. Both Kim Il-Sung and Syngman Rhee used the ongoing war effort to affect their domestic political scenes. However, changes in their respective governing coalitions were intended to provide cover for consolidating their rule and sidelining rivals—not to enhance fighting or ending the war. Ironically, if the Korean parties had any discernible effect on the war’s prosecution and termination, it appeared at the very beginning and very end: North Korea was certainly responsible for launching the war, while South Korea delayed the timing of the armistice by six weeks. Thus, given their relative insignificance in their respective side’s decisions, there is little relationship between Korean domestic coalition politics and strategic interaction at the international level. This analysis has two wider implications. First, the ROK case suggests that hawkish secondary belligerents may inherently have more power than dovish ones. While Rhee was not any more powerful than Kim in his side’s war policy decisions, his last-ditch veto allowed him to extract a number of concessions from the Eisenhower Administration. Compared with Kim’s unsuccessful pleas to end the war sooner, this suggests it may be easier for hawkish secondary belligerents to act as spoilers to settlement than for dovish secondary belligerents to compel more powerful allies to settle. Second, this chapter demonstrates that how belligerents are framed often affects how much power they have in the decision-making process. The primary belligerents viewed the Korean states as clients, pawns in a Cold War battleground—to some degree creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. Typifying the Korean states this way effectively eliminated them from the strategic interaction between the two sides. Neither North nor South Korea was perceived as an independent actor, with its own interests and own decision-making processes. As a result, they were almost irrelevant to the international level bargaining process. For example, it never occurred to the United States or other UN actors that they could interact
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directly with the North Koreans or exploit differing interests and perspectives in the Communist camp. Yet such differentiation among the various actors in the other side’s coalition could have held the potential for a faster termination of the war. We will return to this idea in Chapters 8 and 9, when we explore the role that secondary actors can have in signaling to the other side.
4
The Soviet Union Outlasting Stalin’s Preferences
The next four chapters examine the dynamics of the three obstacles to peace— and the role of domestic coalition shifts in lifting them—among the primary belligerents in the Korean War. It may seem counterintuitive to begin with the Soviet Union, because its domestic coalition shift—a result of Stalin’s death in March 1953—occurred last of the various belligerents’ coalition shifts during the war. But removing Stalin and his preference for prolonging the war were essential for ending it, because while the other primary belligerents were ready to settle sooner, the Communist side remained constrained by Stalin. Therefore, first understanding the Soviet dynamics provides an important context for considering the US and Chinese cases. As Chapter 2 explained, not every belligerent will necessarily experience all three kinds of obstacles. Remember that a preference obstacle occurs when leaders do not want to end the war; an information obstacle occurs when leaders do not know they should end the war; and an entrapment obstacle occurs when leaders want to end the war but cannot. While the logic of these three obstacles is distinct, they can often occur in tandem. For example, as the Soviet case demonstrates, leaders who hold strong preferences are also likely to fall victim to information processing biases or organizational pathologies that reinforce preexisting beliefs. The Soviet Union under Stalin provides strong evidence of the preference obstacle, with “supporting” hindrances from the information obstacle. This chapter argues Stalin did not want to end the war, because he was benefiting from the war without assuming many of its costs. While other leaders in his governing
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coalition valued other preferences more highly, Stalin’s record of squashing opposition, through numerous leadership purges, led those who opposed his war policy to self-suppress out of fear of punishment. Even the information that Stalin and other leaders received about the war was tailored to support Stalin’s known preferences; thus, information obstacle dynamics exacerbated the preference obstacle. When Stalin died unexpectedly in March 1953, these other leaders took control and quickly enacted their long-held but dormant preferences, leading them to end the war. In other words, the domestic coalition shift removed the stickiness of Stalin’s preferences and allowed the war to end. The rest of this chapter is divided into six sections. The first section explains the Soviet governing coalition, suggesting that while Stalin was the preeminent decision-maker, there were two factions within his government. The second and third sections explain the Soviet decisions to support the North Korean invasion and draw out the war. The fourth section explains how information processing dynamics in the Soviet regime exacerbated the effects of this preference obstacle. The fifth section describes the Soviet domestic coalition shift that resulted from Stalin’s death and the actions the new coalition took to end the war. Finally, the sixth section examines some alternative explanations for Soviet behavior.
The Soviet Governing Coalition If the ideal type of “dictator” has ever existed empirically, Joseph Stalin would certainly be a strong contender for the role. Responsible for the death of 27 million Soviet citizens during World War II, numerous purges and imperial conquest of vast swaths of territory, Stalin was ruthless, autocratic, suspicious and vindictive. By most accounts, Stalin had the final power in all decisions in the Soviet Union, both on foreign and domestic matters (Stueck 1993: 114; 1995: 32; Zubok 1992: 5; Medvedev 1989). Yet Stalin was not purely the absolute dictator that conventional wisdom would have us believe. In the face of the tremendous task of governing an empire as huge as the Soviet Union, even Stalin’s power was curtailed by his own physical limitations and his dependence upon the complex bureaucracies necessary to run a planned economy. As Ronald Letteney argues, “Stalin’s necessary reliance upon subordinates must have meant that there was room in the shaping of policies for their influence” (1971: 5). Although Stalin worked hard to ensure that other leaders could never amass enough information and power to overthrow him, there were factions among the elite decision-makers in the Soviet Union. Stalin remained on top by strictly controlling information and purging or demoting rivals whose influence became too threatening, but the factions existed, nonetheless.
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There has been some debate about the role of other leaders in foreign policy decisions. On the one hand, Nikita Khrushchev argues that Stalin “jealously guarded foreign policy . . . as his own special province” and that “the rest of us in the leadership were careful not to poke our noses into these matters” (1974: 188–89, also 191, 355–57). Moreover, Kathryn Weathersby contends that archival documents reveal the absence of “debates” about foreign and domestic policy decision-making. She notes that “in the hundreds of [Central Committee and Foreign Ministry] files I have examined, I have never seen a document indicating a policy debate of any kind” (1993a: 6). For example, the Politburo sponsored no public conferences about national security until 1983, and no substantive debates on strategy, analogous to Eisenhower’s 1953 “Solarium” exercise, were held until the July 1988 Scientific and Practical Conference (Zubok: 1992, FN 20). On the other hand, William Stueck contends Stalin made foreign policy choices in light of how they would influence his personal power at home. Perhaps because of this insecurity, he allowed a good deal of internal debate on foreign policy (1993: 115). Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov argue Stalin “often drew the ministers of defense, armament, and security, as well as senior intelligence officials” into his decision-making circle; the top three, four or five—always including Vyacheslav Molotov—would serve as members of ad hoc working groups for certain foreign policy issues (1996: 84). Even more broadly, Ronald Letteney argues “factionalism within the Soviet leadership was an element of major significance during Stalin’s reign,” with the Soviet Politburo divided into two cohesive factions with respect to foreign policy (1971: 25; also Ra’anan and Lukes 1990: 14). These two perspectives probably conflict less than it might appear: while Stalin probably did not sponsor “policy debates” as democracies would conceive of them, informal debates within Stalin’s inner circle certainly occurred. Stalin was not operating completely alone. Given Stalin’s paranoia, however, these discussions were probably not written down—especially evidence of dissent. The Soviet leadership was divided into two factions—hardliners and moderates—each with its own general political philosophy, worldview and foreign policy prescriptions. The factions competed not only for promotions, but also for domestic resource allocation and influence over policy decision-making. While the factions were most visible at the Politburo level, they extended down to middle-level bureaucrats and local administrators, easing the policy implementation process. Each faction used different journals to expound their views: the hardliners used Pravda (the official newspaper of the Soviet Communist Party) as their mouthpiece, while the moderates used Izvestiia (the official organ of the Soviet government) as theirs. Usually, the military press and the Communist Informa-
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tion Bureau seconded hardliner positions, while Soviet trade union publications, such as Trud, faithfully reflected the moderates (Stueck 1993: 115; Ra’anan and Lukes: 1990: 15–19; Letteney 1971: 26–27). The hardliner faction believed capitalist states were inherently hostile and aggressive; they advocated for continuing past militant policies. They argued worldwide Soviet pressure on the United States would cause it to retreat to the Western hemisphere. The hardliners included former foreign minister Vyacheslav Molotov, Stalin’s leading ideologue Mikhail Suslov, Chief of Heavy Industry Lazar Kaganovich, and Marshal Klement Voroshilov, the Politburo’s “military man.” It is not surprising these men represented broader constituencies within the military and heavy industry. In their speeches, Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov frequently stressed the need for “vigilance,” which in Soviet-speak was synonymous with priority for heavy industry and defense spending. Stalin tended to side with the hardliners, perhaps because Molotov and Voroshilov were his closest personal relationships within the Politburo. In fact, from 1949 until his death in 1953, Stalin sided mostly with the hardliners against the moderates on foreign policy questions and took actions to check the influence of the moderate camp (Letteney 1971: 30; Snyder 1991: 230–31). In contrast, the moderate faction argued the Soviet Union needed to reduce international tension, because Soviet pressure strengthened the Western alliance.1 The moderates asserted that Soviet conciliatory moves would make it more difficult for the United States to maintain and consolidate its alliance; hence, they promoted limited cooperation with the capitalist West (“peaceful coexistence”). They believed the contest between the Communists and capitalists would be decided by long-term economic competition rather than by any immediate military conflict. Accordingly, they advocated shifting resources from heavy industry and the defense sector towards internal development, light industry and consumer spending, to support economic development over the longer term. The moderates included former foreign trade minister Anastas Mikoyan, chief of the secret police Lavrentii Beria, and Stalin’s heir apparent Georgii Malenkov—the only man in late 1949 besides Stalin to sit on all three of the top Soviet councils: the Party Secretariat, the Council of Ministers and the Politburo. The moderates sought a constituency for these views among the urban middle class, technical intelligentsia and managerial elite (Ra’anan and Lukes 1990: 14, 28; Letteney 1971: 27–30, 36, 188, 208; Stueck 1993: 115; Snyder 1991: 231–32, 245–46; Nicolaevsky 1975: chapter 3).2 During 1949 and the first half of 1950, the two factions appeared to be fairly evenly matched. Their efforts often seemed to neutralize each other, so that the Soviet government took few foreign policy initiatives. By the time of Stalin’s 70th
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birthday celebration in December 1949, the two camps compromised on some of the outstanding issues in foreign policy—setting the stage for the subsequent decision to support Kim Il-Sung in the Korean War. In the compromise, the hardliners accepted the line of “peaceful coexistence” over the long run, while moderates agreed in the short run to intensified “vigilance.” In concrete terms, this meant the Soviet leadership acknowledged communism and capitalism would coexist in Europe for an extended period of time, implying the need for a more moderate line vis-à-vis the United States in Europe. However, there would be no concomitant rearrangement of domestic economic priorities away from military production and heavy industry, since “vigilance” was necessary to build up East European militaries. After this compromise, there was a notable decline in the factional debates in the Soviet press (Dunmore 1984: 125; Letteney 1971: 213–18). Despite the existence of these factions, Stalin was a very suspicious person, bordering on paranoid. Stalin was concerned about his deputies’ power. By the time the Korean War began, Stalin had a “genuine weariness” but realized “that a man in his position cannot really retire, that one cannot be a part-time despot” (Ulam 1973: 705; also Mastny 1996: 12; Nogee and Donaldson 1992: 88; Zubok and Pleshakov 1996: 22–25; Taubman 1982: 197; Stueck 1993: 14; Alliluyeva 1967: 196–200; Khrushchev 1974: 244). Stalin’s superior information network only fed his worst fears and a sense of isolation (Zubok and Pleshakov 1996: 24; also Medvedev 1989: chapter 8). Moreover, there has been debate about Stalin’s psyche and its influence on Soviet politics in his last years.3 Given the extent of his ruthlessness, and the likelihood his actions did create true enemies, his paranoia certainly had a rational component. As will be discussed further below, frequent purges and juggling of high-level personnel, combined with tight control over access to information, helped him bolster his position of power. Nonetheless, Stalin’s suspicious worldview and paranoid nature permeated the coalition’s decisions and created a culture of fear, which made it difficult for others to speak out against him.
The Soviet Decision to Support the War Since the spring of 1949, when Kim Il-Sung and his foreign minister, Pak HonYong, visited Moscow, Kim had begged Stalin for his blessing to initiate a “reunification of Korea.” This started as Kim’s war, and he gained Soviet approval only after persistent appeals—including at least 48 telegrams. Stalin initially feared such a war could result in direct military conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. However, on January 30, 1950, Stalin said that while he still had “reservations” about the North Korean invasion, he “did not object in principle”
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and would “assist” Kim Il-Sung in the matter of unifying Korea by military means (Weathersby 1995: 9; also 1993a; 1993c: 429; 1995: 2–3; Stueck 1993: 119; Simmons 1975: 32; Zubok and Pleshakov 1996: 55; Taubman 1982: 212–13; Volkogonov 1993; “On the Korean War” 1993: 15; Khrushchev 1993: 62; Hao and Zhai 1990: 100; Kim 1996: 251–55; Park 1996a: 133–55).4 This section argues Stalin’s change of heart was advocated by the hardliners since mid-1949 and implemented over the moderates’ objections. The Soviet decision to support the North Korean invasion departed from its original post-war policy towards the Korean peninsula. From 1945 until early 1950, Soviet policy in Korea was to maintain a balance of power by prolonging the peninsula’s division and thus protect Soviet strategic and economic interests. By retaining control over North Korea, Stalin could protect Soviet borders and ensure unimpeded access to economic resources there. Although Stalin had no interest in seeing the peninsula reunified, Kim used Stalin’s “doublespeak” of offering Soviet “commitment” to unification and independence to push for the literal meaning of the Soviet proclamations (Weathersby 1993a: 17; 1993b; 1993c; 2002). In early 1950, however, the Soviet leadership decided to support Kim Il-Sung’s invasion, for five reasons. The underlying motive in all five reasons was clearly Soviet self-interest. As Sergei Goncharev, John Lewis and Xue Litai argue, “Simply put, Kim Il-Sung was merely a pawn in Stalin’s grand chess game. . . . Only if that war would promote his larger schemes would he agree to it” (1993: 142). First, many scholars argue the Soviet relationship with the Chinese Communists drove the decision. Stalin used the war to maneuver China into conflict with the United States, removing the possibility of friendly relations between them and subordinating China to the Soviet Union (Ulam 1992: 81–82; Thornton 2000: 380). Even more personally, Mao rose to the top of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) through a series of struggles with rivals, many of whom were considered Stalin’s chosen leaders. Thus, Stalin was insecure about a Chinese leader perceived to be not under his control (Swank 1953: 15–37; Jo 1993: 273; Thornton 2000: 25; Jung and Halliday 2006: 331–72). To provide some background, Soviet behavior towards the Chinese Communists certainly left them reason to be wary, and thus it is not surprising they wanted to avoid dependence on the Soviet Union. Under the post–World War II Yalta Agreement and the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty worked out with the Chinese Nationalists (Kuomintang, or KMT), the Soviet Union had secured buffer zones around the Soviet periphery, including Outer Mongolia and sections of Manchuria and Xinjiang. Stalin realized this arrangement could only hold if the KMT remained in power; thus until the eve of the PRC’s creation, he continued to sup-
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port the KMT during the Chinese civil war. For example, in January 1949, Stalin tried to persuade Mao to accept Soviet mediation to end the war with a divided China—Stalin’s optimum outcome. When this failed, he sent Mikoyan to meet the Chinese leaders in person to try to convince them to allow the KMT to escape across the Yangzi River and establish two Chinas (Murray 1995: 2–7; Thornton 2000: 27–28). Instead, the Chinese Communists successfully drove the KMT to Taiwan and established the People’s Republic in October 1949. During this time, the CCP sent numerous signals about renegotiating the Sino-Soviet Treaty on a more equitable basis. In the winter of 1949–50, Mao and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai traveled to Moscow to hammer out a new treaty with Stalin (Petrov 1994a: 14–18; Chen 1991; 1994: 78–85; Mastny 1996: 88–91; Zubok and Pleshakov 1996: 58–62; Jung and Halliday 2006: 343–49). Stalin, of course, was reluctant to give up the Changchun railroad, ports and naval facilities he had secured in Manchuria after World War II. While the February 1950 “Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance” outlined a more comprehensive bilateral relationship (including security guarantees) than similar Soviet agreements with Eastern European states, Stalin was able through secret protocols to protect his interests, nonetheless. As Jung Chang and Jon Halliday argue, “The published treaty was a formality. The essence of the treaty was in secret annexes. . . . Mao went to great lengths to conceal how much the treaty gave away” (2006: 348). For example, one clause gave the Soviet Union exclusive access to all industrial, financial and commercial activities in Manchuria and Xinjiang, while another gave it a monopoly on all of China’s “surplus” strategic minerals for 14 years (Gaddis 1997: 72; Goncharev et al. 1993: 110–29; Jung and Halliday 2006: 348–49).5 With friends like these, it is no wonder Mao sought to preserve some degree of independence, which he hoped to accomplish through diplomatic relations with the United States and other Western countries. During his visit to Moscow in December 1949, Mao sent a cable home to CCP Vice Chairman Liu Shaoqi and Zhou, authorizing them to proceed with establishing relations with capitalist countries. While the cable specifically addressed approaching the Burmese government to sever its relations with the KMT and establish relations with the CCP, Mao’s guidance was more general: “this procedure for the talks is absolutely necessary and we must act in this way toward all capitalist countries . . . this way the initiative will always be in our hands” (quoted in Goncharev et al. 1993: 238). Some scholars argue Mao assumed the Soviets were reading his cables and used this lever to pressure Stalin into signing the new Sino-Soviet Treaty. However, in the process, this cable triggered Stalin’s “worst fear”—that Mao would establish relations with the United States—and Stalin’s subsequent decisions in Korea
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should be viewed in this context (Thornton 2000: 46; Jung and Halliday 2006: 346). Whether or not this claim about the cable’s significance is correct, China’s eventual entry into the Korean War clearly forestalled friendly Sino-American relations—an outcome to Stalin’s benefit. A second, related reason for agreeing to support the North Korean invasion stemmed from Stalin’s insecurity about his position as head of the international Communist movement, given the potential rivalry with Mao for that role in East Asia. This was a relevant concern because in addition to Kim Il-Sung’s desires, Ho Chi Minh was seeking Soviet and Chinese support in his Indochinese war against the French. Stalin was worried about being upstaged by the Chinese in Korea and East Asia more generally, which would weaken Stalin’s position as leader of the Asian Communist camp (Zubok and Pleshakov 1996: 61; Gaddis 1997: 72; Jung and Halliday 2006: 350–51; Weathersby 1993b: 27; Shulman 1963: 141; Letteney 1971: 310; McCagg 1978: 309–10). Third, Soviet hardliners and Kim Il-Sung convinced Stalin that the United States would not intervene, triggering Stalin’s opportunistic tendencies. Kim and the hardliners argued the United States had not used force to prevent a communist victory in China, and US Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s January 12, 1950. public speech had excluded Korea from the US “defense perimeter.” The Soviet ambassador to Pyongyang, Terentii Shtykov, backed Kim’s claims and helped him persuade Stalin of the validity of Kim’s assessments (Goncharev et al. 1993: 133; Letteney 1971: 307–8; Gaddis 1997: 72–73; Weathersby 1993c: 433; Stueck 1995: 69; Petrov 1994b). At his April 1950 meeting with Kim, Stalin acknowledged that “information coming from the United States” indicated a prevailing mood not to interfere. Stalin may have learned—through his British spies in Washington—about the classified December 1949 change in US strategic policy for the Far East, which included Japan and the Philippines in the US defense perimeter but excluded the Asian mainland (Gaddis 1997: 72; Weathersby 2002: 11–12). Fourth, Soviet hardliners and Kim also expressed confidence about the prospects for Korean unification, stressing the magnitude of potential armed partisan opposition to Syngman Rhee’s regime in South Korea. Starting in mid-1949, the hardliners began emphasizing the need and desire to reunify Korea under North Korean leadership and suggested Rhee’s regime was not strong enough to stop reunification. By the following spring, Pravda claimed South Korean partisans, during February 1950, had carried out more than a thousand military operations, which the ROK government failed to stop (Letteney 1971: 312–13, 316). Similarly, in their meeting with Stalin that same month, Kim and his foreign minister Pak predicted that an uprising of 200,000 South Korean Communists would support the Korean People’s Army during the invasion (Kim 1996: 268; Goncharev et al. 1993: 143–44).
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Finally, in yet another similarity between their views, Soviet hardliners and Kim argued a North Korean attack could buttress against South Korean and Japanese aggression. Before the Soviet foreign policy compromise in December 1949, the hardliners argued the United States was preparing South Korea and Japan as “military springboards” for aggression aimed at the Soviet Union and Asian “national liberation movements.” Now, the hardliners imputed a US-Japanese threat to Soviet interests in Asia to justify their plans for Korean reunification (Letteney 1971: 314, 319–21). Obviously, this line of argument contradicts the previous argument about US non-intervention if North Korea invaded the South. The hardliners were arguing it both ways: while they asserted the US position in Asia threatened Soviet interests, demanding aggressive action, they simultaneously implied the United States was indecisive and could easily be forced out of Asia. As these five reasons suggest, the hardliners were a significant force behind Stalin being persuaded to back Kim’s plans to unify Korea by force. In addition, there appears to be at least one domestic political reason for the hardliners’ pushing for war: a desire to maintain the Soviet’s internal focus on heavy industry and military production—despite the December 1949 foreign policy compromise. The hardliners needed “to maintain sufficient international tensions to justify the sacrifices of the population inherent within a program of increased ‘vigilance’ under conditions of peaceful coexistence” (Letteney 1971: 44). Finally, the decision to support Kim’s venture could have resulted from coalitional log-rolling over twin decisions about Korea and Yugoslavia. While the Soviet leadership rejected the hardliners’ scheme for invading Yugoslavia to bring Tito back in line—the moderates’ preferred position—it agreed to support the North Korean venture (Letteney 1971: 287). This way both factions “won” something. Thus, Stalin threw his support behind the hardliners, as their views complemented his own, and he gave Kim Il-Sung the green light. The moderates objected to this plan, dissenting to the war policy through speeches and journal articles. For example, the moderates did not impute any aggressive intentions to South Korea and argued the weak Rhee regime should be given more time to deteriorate. They minimized the aggressive intent of the American occupation in Japan, explaining it primarily in economic rather than military terms. They asserted the KMT’s defeat in China made the United States more determined to remain in Asia and cautioned it might intervene in Korea. They also argued, through a series of Izvestiia front-page editorials, that peace was needed to build communism and “socialism does not need war as proof of its historical superiority” (Letteney 1971: 45, 312, 314, 319, 329, 333). Nonetheless, the moderates were overruled on Korea, while their positions on other issues (like Yugoslavia) prevailed. Cynical observers could argue the moderates’ conciliatory line was perhaps the only real option in Western Europe,
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anyway—in light of the Marshall Plan’s success, the failure of the Berlin blockade and the formation of an independent West Germany and NATO (Gaddis 1997: 72). To some degree, then, perhaps Stalin had no choice but to agree with the moderates’ perspective in Western Europe. However, the moderates’ disagreements about the Korean War did not end with its outbreak, as the next section details.
The Preference Obstacle: The Soviet Decision to Prolong the War To return again to the domestic coalition theory, a preference obstacle occurs when members of the governing coalition do not want to end the war, either because they receive private benefits from continuing the war or fighting helps them to stay in power. Preference obstacles are most problematic when the governing coalition includes members who are unwilling or unable to criticize their hawkish colleagues who want to continue the war. In coalitions with a power imbalance, where potential critics are less powerful than the hawks, they are often unwilling to express their criticism for fear of expected penalties. The fear of being branded a “traitor” can lead coalition members to falsify their true war-terminating preference to preserve their jobs. The less control a coalition member has over policy choice and implementation, the less willing he is to take personal political risks to change it (Lamborn 1991: 63–66; Kuran 1997; Sigal 1988: 29). Alternatively, they may be willing to speak out but lack the power necessary to overrule the hawks whose preferences are creating the obstacle. In these cases, even if potential critics try to speak out, the more powerful hawks are unwilling to listen and may take action to prevent criticism from arising again, by humiliating, chastising, exiling or even killing some of the critics. Such actions are more likely to lead any remaining potential critics to “self-suppress” their doubts and dissent. To preview the rest of this argument in the Soviet case, after siding with the hardliners to support the war, Stalin remained reluctant to risk provoking direct military conflict with the United States. Until the Chinese intervention, Stalin consistently took steps to prevent such escalation, while simultaneously cajoling China into battle—either because the cautious opportunist believed such intervention would not cause global war or he had more Machiavellian designs to stop Mao from having his cake and eating it, too. By the time the war bogged down in mid-1951, Stalin had orchestrated the situation so that he was not bearing the war’s costs directly, yet gaining plenty of benefits from it. While the moderates opposed this war policy, they were relatively powerless to effect its change until after Stalin’s death.
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orchest r at ing the north korean invasion
Despite his decision to support Kim’s attack, Stalin remained reluctant to risk provoking a military conflict with the United States. He therefore made it very clear to Kim that the Soviet Union would not send troops to his assistance. As Stalin told Kim in April 1950, “If you should get kicked in the teeth, I shall not lift a finger. You have to ask Mao for all the help” (quoted in Jung and Halliday 2006: 354; also Weathersby 2002: 12; Thornton 2000: 107–8; Gaddis 1997: 74; Volkogonov 1991: 540). Stalin also insisted Kim consult with Mao in person before the attack. By handing over the “final decision” to Mao, Stalin tried to minimize his involvement in the war. Kim informed Mao of his intentions on May 13, five weeks before the planned invasion—Mao’s first direct knowledge of the attack. With “little room to voice objections to the fait accompli presented by the Koreans,” Mao agreed to provide assistance but warned Kim about possible Japanese or American intervention (Weathersby 2002: 13; Park 1996a: 195; Gaddis 1997: 78; Wolff 2000: 25; Kim 1996: 264).6 Soviet military advisors drafted the invasion plan, participated in reconnaissance and planning at the divisional level, and supervised the staging of troops from June 12 to 23. In early May, the Soviet advisors discarded the North Korean invasion plan and wrote a more aggressive one, which was translated into Korean and kept among the Soviet-born Koreans “to keep Mao ignorant of their plans” (Thornton 2000: 110; also Weathersby 1996: Document 14). According to Gen. Yu Song-chol, who translated the plan, Soviet advisors drew up the plan in about three days without consulting the Koreans: “They did everything themselves. They did not study the terrain and did not know it. . . . Because of that, they made a lot of mistakes” (quoted in Goncharev et al. 1993: 150). Despite the Soviets’ elaborate involvement in planning, Stalin pulled back all of the Soviet advisors from the front lines before the campaign began. As Khrushchev recounts in his memoirs, when he asked Stalin why, Stalin replied: “It’s too dangerous to keep our advisors there. They might be taken prisoner. We don’t want there to be evidence for accusing us of taking part in this business. It’s Kim Il-Sung’s affair” (Khrushchev 1974: 370; Stueck 1995: 36). Two weeks after the invasion, Kim asked Stalin to return Soviet advisors to the front; Stalin agreed but instructed they pose as Pravda correspondents so as to avoid appearing involved (Volkogonov 1993: 29; Weathersby 1993c: 434). Richard Thornton attributes a more nefarious purpose to Stalin’s haste to get the North Korean invasion underway and to remove Soviet support for the offensive. He argues Stalin was trying to preempt Mao, who was simultaneously preparing for an amphibious assault against the KMT on Taiwan. Mao was try-
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ing to attack Taiwan before the Korean War, and Stalin wanted to obstruct Mao in achieving a victory over the KMT. Even more ambitiously, Stalin wanted to guard against a Sino-American rapprochement, which required prodding China into conflict with the United States. This necessitated the North Korean assault failing. As Thornton argues, The ways in which the Soviets devised and executed the war plans, allocated the NKA’s weapons mix, and parceled out logistical support ensured failure. . . . The responsibility for failure was Stalin’s, not Kim Il-Sung’s, whose troops fought tenaciously, but in vain. Yet within Stalin’s failure lay the seeds of a greater success—a Sino-American conflict that would crystallize the structure of global politics for the next two decades. (2000: 227–28; also 113–18; 229)
Whether or not this was Stalin’s ultimate objective, Nikita Khrushchev agrees about its effects: If we hadn’t refused [Kim] aid in qualified personnel to assess the distribution of forces and to direct operations, there’s no doubt that North Korea would have been victorious. I think if Kim had received just [one] more tank corps, or two at the most, he could have accelerated his advance south and occupied Pusan on the march. The war would have ended then and there. (1970: 370)
Similarly, Stalin’s last-minute decision on June 21, to modify the offensive plan from a local operation at Ongjin peninsula to an attack across the whole front line, “greatly increased the likelihood of [American] interference” (Weathersby 2002: 15). After the United States intervened, Stalin tried to distance the Soviet Union from responsibility for the invasion (Zubok and Pleshakov 1996: 65; Jung and Halliday 2006: 355). Even more importantly, when the United States moved its Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait in response to the North Korean attack—an act Mao pronounced as tantamount to a declaration of war—Stalin prevented the Soviet representative from attending the UN Security Council meeting that put the Korean “police action” under UN Command. In this way, Stalin “effectively precluded any formal declaration of war by either the Chinese or the American side and so avoided activating the Sino-Soviet treaty” (Goncharev et al. 1993: 215). As Jung and Halliday argue, “if Stalin decided not to use his veto [in the UN Security Council meeting], it can only have been for one reason: that he did not want to keep Western forces out [of Korea]. He wanted them in, where Mao’s sheer weight of numbers could grind them up” (2006: 354, emphasis in original).
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conv incing the chinese to intervene
By October 1950, Stalin turned to China to send its promised troops, continuing to rule out a direct Soviet intervention. The North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) faced total defeat after the UN Command’s successful amphibious landing at Inchon. On September 29, Kim sent Stalin a cable pleading for direct military assistance, but 70 minutes after receiving it, Stalin urged the Chinese leaders to immediately send their “volunteers” instead. Stalin told Mao the situation in Korea was grave and without Chinese support, the Korean Communist regime would collapse and need to establish a government in exile in China (Wolff 2000: 26; Weathersby 1993c: 452–54; 2002: 17; Hao and Zhai 1990: 109; Zhang 1992: 95; Pollack 1989: 217; Stueck 1995: 104–5). He asked Mao to dispatch troops to Korea but did not mention what support the Soviet Union would offer China in return.7 Mao demurred, contending that Chinese intervention would “provoke an open conflict between the USA and China, as a consequence of which the Soviet Union can also be dragged into war.”8 Stalin tried again to pressure the Chinese to intervene. He first reassured Chinese leaders that “the USA, as the Korean events showed, is not ready at present for a big war” and nor was Japan “capable of rendering military assistance to the Americans.” However, Stalin warned, “If a war is inevitable, then let it be waged now, and not in a few years when Japanese militarism will be restored as an ally of the USA.”9 A few days later, in his October 10 meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou, Stalin also threatened that if the Chinese would not intervene, he was ready to order the NKPA to evacuate. Stalin proposed China accept the main NKPA forces and their weapons into Manchuria, and the Soviets would take the “disabled and wounded” and Koreans of Soviet origin. “Both of us have to share this heavy burden,” he told Zhou. “I suggest that we tell Kim Il-Sung about our advice, which is to withdraw” (quoted in Thornton 2000: 342; see also Goncharev et al. 1993: 189–92; Gaddis 1997: 80–81; Jung and Halliday 2006: 358). Stalin also reneged on his bid of combat air support, which he had promised the Chinese leaders in July. While offering Soviet airplanes and tanks to China, he now stipulated they could only be used to train Chinese troops and categorically forbade their use at the front. In addition, Stalin argued Soviet air support would not be possible for at least two and a half months after China’s intervention (Jung and Halliday 2006: 358; Sheng 1995: 303–4; Chen 1991: 29–30; Hao and Zhai 1990: 111; Khrushchev 1993: 65–66; Weathersby 2002: 19–20). As Goncharev and his colleagues argue, “only after Stalin was certain that the Chinese were fully engaged in the fighting did he secretly introduce fighter planes and send his troops to China” (1993: 216–17). In other words, Stalin continued to avoid direct confrontation
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with the United States, while convincing China to do its “dirty work” at bargain prices. prolong ing the ar mist ice negot iat ions
Although Stalin had instructed Soviet officials soon after the war began to respond positively to peace overtures, after China intervened, he told officials that pursuing negotiations was wrong (Weathersby 1996). After the Chinese campaign removed the threat of an American advance on Chinese and Soviet borders, Stalin focused instead on the benefits he received from a longer war. In a telegram to Mao on June 5, 1951, Stalin argued that “the war in Korea should not be speeded up, since a drawn out war, in the first place, gives the possibility to Chinese troops to study contemporary warfare on the field of battle and in the second place shakes up the Truman regime in America and harms the military prestige of Anglo-American troops.”10 Although we do not have Mao’s reaction to Stalin’s enthusiastic backing of this “training opportunity,” it was apparent that a longer war suited Stalin’s interests. The three Communist allies had different views about the armistice negotiations. When the talks began in July 1951, the North Koreans did not want an armistice, but without the ability to fight alone, they had little say in the matter.11 As Chapter 7 will explain, until the summer of 1952, the Chinese viewed armistice negotiations as another tactic in the ongoing conflict—a tactical maneuver, not a strategic policy shift. But for the Soviet Union, armistice negotiations were only useful as long as they prolonged the war. As a result, Stalin and the hardliners consistently maintained a hawkish stance towards the negotiations. After the initial opportunity for a negotiated settlement collapsed in August 1951, Stalin considered it in the Soviet interests for the war to continue, as long as UN forces did not advance into North Korea again. Russian documents indicate Stalin’s main concern was to ensure the Communist side did not give the impression of weakness in the negotiations, since the Soviet Union could only benefit from a stalemated war (Gaddis 1997: 108–9; Weathersby 1998: 102; Taubman 1982: 221). Thus, after the negotiations started, Stalin instructed Mao to continue “using flexible tactics in the negotiations,” but at the same time, “pursue a hard line, not showing haste and not displaying interest in a rapid end to the negotiations.”12 As Chapter 3 explained, several times after January 1952, the North Koreans begged Stalin for peace. Yet each time Stalin advised Kim to hold on. A stalemated war provided the Soviets with four benefits. First, it tied down American forces, which hindered US efforts to engage militarily in Europe, drained US economic resources and caused domestic political problems for Truman. Tying down US troops in Asia could also alter the balance of power in Eu-
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rope (Jung and Halliday 2006: 353; Zubok and Pleshakov 1996: 70). Second, it created a rift between the United States and its allies over tactics in the Korean War (Nogee and Donaldson 1992: 107). Third, it provided the Soviets with an excellent opportunity to gather intelligence on US technology and military organization. Not only could it field test its new equipment against American technology, but it could gain information from US prisoners of war (Jung and Halliday 2006: 353; Lashmar 1996; Weathersby 1998: FN 4; Jolidon 1996–97). Finally, it created hostility between China and the United States and tied China more firmly to Moscow through dependence on Soviet military and economic assistance. The Korean War also helped to solidify hostility towards the West and impose a Stalinist political ideology and structure at all levels in China (Hamrin 1994: 97; Thornton 2000; Zubok and Pleshakov 1996: 70). In short, because the Soviets were not deployed in the ground war, Stalin was able to push the human costs of the war onto his allies. As a result, from Stalin’s perspective, there was no reason to end the war. It was clearly Stalin’s preference to delay the war’s end, and he consistently took steps—within his own coalition (explained below) and in his interactions with the Chinese (explained in Chapter 7)—to ensure this preference prevailed. the p owerlessness of cr it ics in the sov iet gover ning coalit ion
Not all Soviet leaders agreed with Stalin’s support of a prolonged war. Although Soviet factionalism had been muted during the first months of the war, it reemerged in late 1950. The moderates stressed how the United States was benefiting economically from the war, and they displayed a restrained and sometimes even favorable attitude towards the UN. Moreover, starting in the fall of 1950, moderates indicated they believed that Soviet interests would be served by a negotiated settlement. Specifically, articles in Izvestiia appeared more concerned than those in Pravda about the dangers inherent in an intensified arms race as a result of the Korean War. They also worried the West would launch a preventative war somewhere else. In contrast, hardliners emphasized discord among the states fighting as part of the UN Command and were harshly critical of the UN itself. Like Stalin, hardliners clearly indicated they opposed a negotiated settlement. Specifically, articles in Pravda stressed the West’s untrustworthiness and blamed world tensions during the Korean War on US policy. Pravda articles also called for increased vigilance rather than a curtailment of the arms race, as Izvestiia did (Letteney 1971: 336–39). While the moderates opposed prolonging the war, the evidence suggests they were relatively powerless to change that policy as long as Stalin remained in
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power. First, given Stalin’s extensive history of purging rivals and subordinates who disagreed with his policies, a culture of fear permeated the leadership circle. As a result, the moderates probably “self-suppressed” to some degree. Many of these leaders had direct personal experience with—and indeed, helped orchestrate—Stalin’s capricious personnel changes, and thus they knew the potential consequences of disagreement. For example, two moderate leaders, Beria and Malenkov, owed their careers to Stalin. Both men benefited from the purges and staged political trials of the 1930s; Malenkov had even helped to implement the Great Terror for Stalin. After the purges ended, Malenkov and Beria became Stalin’s top lieutenants, with Beria controlling the internal security forces and surveillance apparatus and Malenkov the Central Committee apparat and Communist Party cadre selection—critical instruments in Stalin’s absolute hold on power. Indeed, the power to appoint is the power to control, a concept known in the Soviet system as nomenklatura (Ra’anan and Lukes 1990: 27–28, 41, 106; Zubok and Pleshakov 1996: 141–43; Ra’anan 2006: 8–9). Given their roles in this powerful machine, Beria and Malenkov knew the potential consequences of disagreeing over policy, perhaps better than anyone. In addition, Beria and Malenkov also might have had the most to lose, in terms of influence and political power, for disagreeing too much. Was opposing some war in Asia worth the cost of losing these positions in the leadership circle? Conversely, some moderate leaders had direct experience with the other side of Stalin’s personnel policies. For example, in March 1949, Anastas Mikoyan was relieved of his duties as minister of foreign trade, although he remained a Politburo member and deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. The truth is that Stalin’s purges did not end with the Great Terror. The 1949–50 purge of Communist party leaders in Leningrad and Moscow, the 1952 “Kremlin Doctor’s Plot,” and Stalin’s frequent juggling of high-level personnel over the last years of his rule suggest a never-ending quest for security in his regime (Taubman 1982: 203; Alliluyeva 1967: 61, 193, 208; Khrushchev 1974: 245–61, 278–81; Hahn 1982: 118–29, 136–49; Ulam 1973: 705–14; Mastny 1996: 75–76; Zubok and Pleshakov 1996: 144–45; Kostyrchenko 1995; Vaksberg 1994: 247–78; Brent and Naumov 2004: chapter 8; Nicolaevsky 1975: 110–14). Moderate leaders were also strongly influenced by Stalin’s major “cleansing” in Czechoslovakia. When top Czech Communist officials were hanged in Prague as “spies” in December 1952, “Molotov, Mikoyan, Beria and Malenkov knew very well that the same would have happened to them, had Stalin lived longer” (Zubok and Pleshakov 1996: 145; also Medvedev 1989: 795–96; Ra’anan 2006: 3, 11–12). Indeed, in the last months before his death, Stalin was preparing for another round of high-level purges (Taub-
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man 1982: 197–98; Simmons 1975: 227; Garthoff 1953: 28; Mastny 1996: 161; Hahn 1982: 136, 141–43, 149, 156; Medvedev and Medvedev 2003: 38). For both of these reasons, moderates certainly understood and probably feared the consequences of speaking out, which could have led them to “self-suppress” their dissenting views. Second, Stalin took actions to curtail the moderates’ power vis-à-vis war policy. During the war, Stalin decreased the influence of two moderates, Malenkov and Beria, by bringing Khrushchev to Moscow from his post as Ukrainian first secretary. Khrushchev quickly emerged as Malenkov’s competitor on agricultural policy (Hahn 1982: 137; Dunmore 1984: 125; Ra’anan 2006: 9; Azrael 1966: 105–8; McCagg 1978: 307). As Khrushchev remembers it: “One of the reasons Stalin had called me back to Moscow was to influence the balance of power in the collective and to put a check on Beria and Malenkov. . . . I was constantly running up against Beria and Malenkov” (1970: 250). Moreover, in Stalin’s last months, he diffused Beria’s and Malenkov’s influence by establishing rotating chairmanships of various institutions (Ra’anan 2006: 12–13). As James Richter contends, “Not only did Stalin pit the members of his inner circle against each other to ensure that they did not conspire against him, but in addition he compartmentalized, manipulated, and terrorized the various components of his regime to eliminate the possibility of any organized resistance” (1994: 31). The third reason that the moderates had difficulty changing policy is that Stalin gradually excluded his top deputies. While there were few formal membership changes in the Politburo, the Secretariat or the Council of Ministers, Stalin held meetings less frequently, with only four meetings convened in 1952, fewer than any other year. Moreover, Stalin turned increasingly to his personal secretary, Aleksandr Poskrebyshev, and to junior party members, whom he could use against his colleagues in the Politburo. These second-tier leaders had few ties to Malenkov and Beria: “that these men were being used by Stalin against his leading deputies is suggested by the retaliation against them after Stalin died” (Hahn 1982: 145–46, also 136–37; Mastny 1996: 140; Medvedev and Medvedev 2003: 36; Khrushchev 1970: 281, 308–9; Ra’anan 2006: 8). Fourth, starting in 1951, Stalin removed Beria’s protégés from his main power bases, the internal security bureaucracies and the Georgian party organization, and replaced them with people hostile to Beria. Stalin also directed Poskrebyshev to withhold certain reports from Beria. As Peter Deriabin, a former Soviet counterintelligence officer, argues, “Beria was upset and could see his power slipping away and probably felt he was being set up by Stalin to be blamed for internal problems in the future” (quoted in Ra’anan and Lukes 1990: 32; also Dunmore 1984: 125; Medvedev and Medvedev 2003: 38, 41–42; McCagg 1978: 307). Indeed,
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Stalin implicated Beria in the alleged “Kremlin Doctors’ Plot,” a group of Jewish doctors accused in 1952 of killing Andrei Zhdanov (Zubok and Pleshakov 1996: 144; Hahn 1982: 107; Brent and Naumov 2004: chapter 8; Medvedev and Medvedev 2003: 1–2, 18–23; McCagg 1978: 307; Nicolaevsky 1975: 110–14). By 1952, Stalin had “compelling reasons” for getting rid of Beria, because as security chief he controlled an important instrument of terror—and thus, power (Mastny 1996: 160). Many authors argue Beria especially was being targeted as Stalin began preparations for a new round of purges in the last months before his death (Simmons 1975: 227; Garthoff 1953: 28; Mastny 1996: 161; Hahn 1982: 136, 141–43, 149, 156; Medvedev and Medvedev 2003: 38; Nicolaevsky 1975: 113–14). Finally, Stalin surprised his deputies at the 19th Party Congress in October 1952 by reorganizing the party’s central institutions to minimize the influence of his top deputies. These institutional changes constitute a neutral governing coalition shift, since change in the coalition’s composition was intended to sideline rivals, not to change war policy. At the congress, the first in 13 years, Stalin abolished the old 12-member Politburo and created a Central Committee Presidium, with 25 members and 11 candidate members. Stalin selected Presidium members without consulting other Politburo members, and he included some of Malenkov’s obvious enemies. By admitting more junior leaders and increasing its size, Stalin diffused the Presidium’s influence and rendered it less suitable for making top-level policy decisions. The Central Committee also lost influence in policymaking through a similar increase in size (Hahn 1982: 147; Garthoff 1953: 2–3, 5–12; Medvedev and Medvedev 2003: 2, 36–43; Khrushchev 1970: 279–80; Azrael 1966: 108). In further decisions between November 1952–January 1953, Stalin also removed some top deputies from the Council of Ministers, while assigning a group of leaders different signature authorities and rotating chairmanships. These decisions effectively created the structure for a diffused “post-Stalin pseudo-collective leadership” (Ra’anan 2006: 10–14).13 Each of these actions implies that Malenkov, Beria and other moderates had become quite dissociated from Stalin’s policies at the end. Indeed, some authors have even suggested that by December 1952, Malenkov and Beria were planning Stalin’s overthrow or murder (Mastny 1996: 163, 168–69; Brent and Naumov 2004: chapter 10; Medvedev and Medvedev 2003: chapter 1; Ra’anan 2006: 5–7).14 In light of Stalin’s tendency towards secrecy, it is even possible that the moderates did not participate actively in Soviet decisions related to the Korean War. Regardless, the evidence demonstrates a power imbalance existed in the Soviet governing coalition. Whether the potential critics of Stalin’s war policy were unwilling to express their criticism for fear of expected penalties, or whether they did speak out but simply lacked the power necessary to overrule Stalin, the result was the same. Stalin did not want to end the war, and Stalin’s preference prevailed.
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How the Information Obstacle Exacerbated the Preference Obstacle Information processing dynamics exacerbated the effect of Stalin’s preferences in two ways. First, and most importantly, because Stalin viewed information as power, he strictly controlled other coalition members’ access to it. Controlling information allowed Stalin to control his subordinates. For example, declassified archives show that, among the Soviet coalition members, only Stalin communicated by telegram with the North Koreans and Chinese during the war. Stalin alone received personal communications from his ambassador in Pyongyang and the Soviet military forces and technicians there to assist Kim. This suggests Stalin had access to information from the front that he could keep secret from other leaders. Moreover, Stalin had many personal channels of “special information,” with the intelligence services reporting the best information directly to him. Similarly, Stalin shrouded the rationale behind his decisions in secrecy. No individual was allowed to know the whole picture—just pieces of it (Ra’anan and Lukes 1990: 32; Chuyev 1991: 334–35; Jeon 1996–97; Zubok and Pleshakov 1996: 86). As Vladimir Petrov argues, While Mao sometimes shared his reasoning with his close associates, Stalin consistently hid his, often forbidding them to keep minutes of the more sensitive conversations he had with foreign leaders. . . . Obsessed with security, he used various assumed names and informed others on a need to know basis only. (1994a: 5)
Thus, other coalition members did not necessarily have access to as much information about the war as Stalin, which certainly impeded full discussion of policy options among the leaders. Stalin’s practice of jealously guarding information trickled down into the Soviet intelligence system, as well. Soviet intelligence analysts competed for the ear of Politburo members, which not only prohibited a smooth coordination of information flowing to top leaders, but also hindered analysts in synthesizing information effectively. Paradoxically, intelligence collection and analysis under Stalin was both highly centralized and severely stove-piped. After centralizing all foreign intelligence departments in 1947 under one umbrella agency, the Committee of Information (KI),15 Stalin eventually decided interagency rivalry in intelligence would serve him better. Thus, in November 1949, he transferred military intelligence to the General Staff. By November 1951, he returned civilian intelligence to the Ministry of State Security (MGB, the KGB’s predecessor) and disbanded the “large” KI for a “small” one (Zubok 1992: 3–7; Andrew and Gordievsky 1990: xi). Officially affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the small KI had its
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own budget and direct communication lines with the Kremlin. Like the large KI, its main task was reducing disinformation, not forecasting or commenting on alternative policy options. Lacking many of the senior career officials who had been “borrowed” from the MGB and GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence) for the large KI, the small KI was younger and less experienced. While the small KI’s officers were entitled to receive foreign intelligence information, in practice the MGB and GRU withheld information, especially human intelligence. This left the small KI with embassy reports and open sources, such as newspapers, official announcements, documents and communiqués (Zubok 1992: 8). These organizational pathologies in the intelligence system not only reinforced Stalin’s tendencies towards secrecy, but in practice they meant Stalin had few other advisors with whom he could double-check his understanding of the facts—since these others leaders did not have access to the information. With such an avalanche of information directed exclusively at him, Stalin certainly did not have the time to digest it. Inundated with raw, unanalyzed data, Stalin was able to pick and choose among the data, paying attention to information that conformed to his pre-existing beliefs and preferences and disregarding information that did not. Thus, Stalin’s preferences were reinforced by the information he received, allowing him to manifest many of the common psychological biases discussed in Chapter 2. As a result, “Stalin was both overwhelmed and ignorant at the same time. . . . Often Party leaders’ decisions were not the result of an analytical process—sorting out facts and factors and choosing the optimal mix—but of heuristic reasons, based on selected events or even momentary moods” (Zubok 1992: 3). As Zubok and Pleshakov contend, “it was not the intelligence that led him. On the contrary, it was Stalin’s mind that employed and directed the intelligence . . . his superior system of espionage fed Stalin’s worst fears” (1996: 24). Second, given the regime’s culture of fear and history of coercion (e.g. Medvedev 1989), it is not surprising that information processing in Stalin’s regime exemplified the inverse relationship between coercion and information flow. The information Stalin and other leaders received about the war was tailored to support and reinforce Stalin’s known preferences and beliefs. For example, in May 1949, when the hardliners were trying to make the case that South Korea was planning to launch an attack on the North, Soviet Ambassador Shtykov used intelligence information out of context to conform to the hardliners’ preferences. In his May 2 report, Shtykov noted accurately that ROK forces were being expanded with US assistance and that Rhee’s government was taking steps to increase its combat readiness. However, Shtykov “failed entirely to note the disparity in aims” between Rhee and his US patron, which at that time was trying to disengage from Korea. As Weathersby put it, “instead—perhaps out of an un-
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derstandable impulse towards self-protection—he merely repeated Stalin’s own conclusions, adding supporting detail.” In other words, despite having an extensive intelligence network that would have known of the sharp divergence between American and South Korean intentions, “Shtykov did nothing to correct his boss’ misperceptions” (2002: 5). Similarly, declassified small KI documents suggest that the authors clearly tailored their conclusions to the existing Soviet policy guidelines. The conclusions of the most important classified documents match closely, sometimes verbatim, major articles and editorials in Pravda, the official organ of the Communist Party’s Central Committee and the mouthpiece of the hardliners (Zubok 1992: 2). One of the reasons why analysts presented what Stalin wanted to hear is that he was quite specific about the intelligence information he sought and directed his subordinates to obtain only that information. According to one knowledgeable KGB source, “We almost never went out looking for information at random. Instead, orders to look for certain specific things would come from above . . . our agents abroad were directed to find out at all costs. This highly authoritarian style produced excellent results” (quoted in Zubok and Pleshakov 1996: 24). Ironically, the Soviet Union had especially deep penetration with its early Cold War espionage activities, leading to better information than that available in the West. However, this intelligence was not used to see the situation clearly but to reinforce Stalin’s existing beliefs (Andrew and Gordievsky 1990: 469; Watts 1990). Even had Stalin been more receptive to objective information, the system did not select for open-minded thinkers who could provide honest, balanced perspectives. As Georgi Arbatov writes in his memoirs, by the 1950s, even the brightest young Soviet minds had been “clogged and blunted by the long years of Stalinism” (quoted in Zubok 1992: 2). Stalin’s paranoid, xenophobic and ideological nature spread down the bureaucratic hierarchy. After the Great Terror, the guiding criterion for selecting new bureaucrats, diplomats and intelligence officers was “honesty”—Molotov’s word—which Zubok and Pleshakov translate as “the absence of independent thinking and unquestioning loyalty to Stalin and his regime” (1996: 23, 88). Thus, information processing pathologies in the Soviet regime exacerbated the preference obstacle. By jealously guarding information, Stalin was able to keep those who might disagree with his preferences in the dark. Moreover, because Stalin was inundated with raw data, he could focus on that information which conformed to his pre-existing preferences and disregard that which did not, without other coalition members’ opinions being voiced as a corrective. Finally, much of the information Stalin and other leaders received was tailored to support Stalin’s known preferences, rather than to provide an accurate picture
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about the war. Paired with Stalin’s actions to mitigate the moderates’ influence, these information dynamics leave little reason to wonder why Stalin’s preference to prolong the war prevailed so successfully.
The New Soviet Governing Coalition: Outlasting Stalin’s Preferences There was no movement in the Communist position until after Stalin’s death on March 5, 1953. His death unleashed a radical change in the Soviet approach to the Korean War. As Weathersby argues, “despite the great uncertainty and anxiety within which the new collective leadership operated, it nonetheless moved immediately to bring an end to the war in Korea” (1998: 108). Indeed, it is remarkable they could take such decisive action within ten days of Stalin’s funeral. The leadership troika that emerged was—by the very nature of all trios—an awkward, dysfunctional structure prone to in-fighting and power grabbing. Nonetheless, these new leaders took control of the country and quickly enacted their long-held but dormant preferences, leading them to end the war. When Stalin died, the question of succession had not been on the agenda. All of Stalin’s last minute-maneuverings, from the planned purge to the massive reorganization of state structures at the 19th Party Congress, meant a decision about his successor was wide open, since he had added new blood to mitigate the effects of his previously chosen top deputies (Garthoff 1953: 26, 42; Ra’anan 2006: 12–13; Medvedev and Medvedev 2003: 34–44). As Zubok argues about the months after Stalin’s death, “Stalin’s former lieutenants, the oligarchs of the regime, mauled and bruised each other, seeking to change the power balance by appealing to the party and state elites, heads of the central [Communist Party] apparatus, secretaries of regional party committees, leaders of powerful branches of the economic, military and security structures” (2000, emphasis added). That these new leaders could agree to act decisively to end the Korean War only reinforces what a high priority they assigned to a settlement. The new Soviet leadership was led by the troika of Malenkov, Beria and Vyacheslav Molotov.16 Stalin’s “mantle” was divided among them “so that no one would be able to wear it whole” (Mastny 1996: 171). Malenkov became the chairman of the Council of Ministers, Stalin’s formal successor as head of state. Malenkov also assumed the role of Communist Party first secretary, but as other aspirants joined forces to diminish his power, he was relieved “at his request” within six days and the position was formally abolished. Beria assumed control of the interior ministry and merged it with MGB, essentially returning to his power base in the security services. Molotov, who had lost almost all real power
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in 1949 when he left his post as foreign minister, returned to that position. Nikita Khrushchev controlled the central party apparat and by September 1953 also revived the position of party first secretary (Goldgeier 1994: 21–22; Zubok and Pleshakov 1996: 154–54; Larson 1997: 42, 57; Hahn 1982: 104–9; Garthoff 1953: 6, 13, 17, 19, 32; Richter 1994: 31; Nogee and Donaldson 1992: 115; Taubman 1982: 231; Ra’anan 2006: 15–28). Within 24 hours of the announcement of Stalin’s death, the new leaders discarded his painstaking October 1952 reorganization of the party organs. On March 6, they reduced the newly created Presidium to ten members and four alternates, and they relieved the junior leaders on which Stalin had relied during his last year. They also restructured state institutions, with Presidium members assuming direct control over key ministries, as had been the practice from 1945 to 1949. In this manner, they shifted the policymaking functions from the party to the state and consolidated the chief instruments of power directly into the hands of the old Politburo members. In other words, the new leaders essentially voided Stalin’s bureaucratic maneuvering. Further changes—including a public repudiation of the alleged “Kremlin Doctor’s Plot” and the Georgian party purge, both of which had sullied Beria—were announced over the next few weeks. As Garthoff modestly observed two months later, “it should be noted that a certain degree of flux has prevailed” (1953: 36, also 17–20, 37–38; Larson 1997: 42; Nogee and Donaldson 1992: 115; Volkogonov 1991: 575; Ra’anan 2006: 22–27; Azrael 1966: 122–24). Again, the fact that so much bureaucratic jockeying and subterfuge was occurring makes it all the more remarkable that they could simultaneously take actions to end the Korean War. The new leaders had wanted to end the war for a while. As noted, Beria and Malenkov led the moderate faction, which advocated more conciliation towards the West and had supported a negotiated settlement in Korea. Although militant Molotov had always supported a hard line towards the West, even he “believed that Stalin should never have approved the North Koreans’ plan to reunify their country” (Larson 1997: 45). Moreover, this new troika “were seriously concerned that the new Republican administration . . . might escalate the war,” and they looked differently at information about US potential use of atomic weapons in Korea (Zubok and Pleshakov 1996: 155; Mastny 1996: 164). The major foreign policy goal of the new troika was to avoid a Soviet-American conflict; the new leaders quickly expressed interest in disarmament and détente with the United States. They wanted to curtail military and industrial programs, so as to free resources for neglected domestic programs and agriculture. They were also more focused towards Europe and the growing crisis in the German Democratic Republic (Azrael 1966: 125–26; Mayers 1986: 113; Zubok
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and Pleshakov 1996: 148; Stueck 1995: 327; Richter 1994: 35, 37; Larson 1997: 45).17 The new troika quickly began easing international tensions, a policy that continued even after Beria’s ouster later that year. Beginning in April, hardline policies were relaxed in the GDR.18 By May, the new leaders restored diplomatic relations with Israel, Yugoslavia and Greece and dropped territorial claims to Turkey. In June, they supported a new Hungarian leader, Imre Nagy, in his embarking on a “New Course” prioritizing consumer goods (Richter 1994: 34; Hahn 1982: 157). Part of their different worldview came from their previous government experiences. For example, Beria and Malenkov had been in charge of constructing several military industrial complexes, for atomic weapons, cruise missiles and air defense systems. Beria, especially, had a deep history administering atomic research and development. One result of this background is that for Beria and Malenkov, “the Cold War was first of all an arms race. . . . Beria was the first among the Kremlin leadership to recognize that the Bomb provided the ultimate answer to all problems of security and international policy” (Zubok and Pleshakov 1996: 149; also 141–42, 153; Goldgeier 1994: 2–5). Just as US President Eisenhower’s reliance on massive retaliation mitigated the need to fight Communists on the ground in the Korean War, the Soviet leaders’ focus on the arms race may have lessened their need to back Asian Communists in the war, as well. Because of these other policy priorities and their different conceptualization of the costs and benefits of prolonging the Korean War, the new Soviet leaders moved immediately to end it. First, at Stalin’s funeral on March 9, Malenkov emphasized “the possibility of the prolonged coexistence and peaceful competition of two different systems, capitalist and socialist.” Then, in a March 15 speech to the Supreme Soviet, Malenkov unveiled a “peace initiative.” He declared, “There is not one disputed . . . question that cannot be decided by peaceful means on the basis of mutual understanding of interested countries,” and singled out the United States as among those countries to which this statement applied (Folliot 1956: 12–13; Thornton 1982: 239; Zubok and Pleshakov 1996: 155; Mastny 1996: 172; Stueck 1995: 308). Finally, on March 19 the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution to end the war, with attached letters to Mao and Kim Il-Sung. As Weathersby notes, “in tortuously convoluted language reflecting the great psychological difficulty of altering the policy pursued by Stalin,” the resolution declared that the Soviet Government has reached the conclusion that it would be incorrect to continue the line on this question which has been followed until now, without making those alterations in that line which correspond to the present political situation and which ensue from the deepest interests of our peoples, the peoples of the USSR, China and Korea . . . (1996: Document 111)
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The resolution went on to outline statements that the Chinese, Korean and Soviet governments should make to indicate their willingness to resolve outstanding issues and reach an armistice agreement. We shall return to the Communist actions that resulted from this domestic coalition shift in Chapter 8. In sum, since the majority of the new leaders had argued against the war from the start and disagreed with the decision to prolong it, it is not surprising that once in power, they would want to enact these long-held but dormant preferences. What is remarkable is that they could take such decisive action towards ending the war within ten days of Stalin’s funeral. It speaks volumes to the noncontroversy of this major policy shift among Stalin’s successors and to the relative powerlessness they must have felt under Stalin’s rule.
Alternative Explanations This section briefly examines four alternative explanations for Soviet behavior in the Korean War. The first alternative explanation, most different from the one advanced here, is that Stalin was an absolute dictator. This explanation assumes that Stalin alone was responsible for all war decisions, because other members of the Communist Party were irrelevant to decision-making about the war. Yet, as the empirical evidence in this chapter demonstrates, Stalin did not make decisions about and implement policy alone. The foreign policy compromise in December 1949 is a direct result of Stalin mediating between two ideological factions and marginally siding with the hardliners. Moreover, in choosing to support Kim Il-Sung’s venture, Stalin overcame his personal concerns about potential US intervention in large part because of the arguments for war advanced by the hardliners. Finally, because the Soviet Union was led by a troika after Stalin’s death, this explanation does not speak to Soviet behavior during that time. For these reasons, this explanation is less nuanced for explaining Soviet behavior during Stalin’s rule than the domestic coalition theory. A more generalized version of the first alternative explanation would focus on regime type to explain Soviet behavior. For example, Goemans (2000a) argues dictatorships will rationally update their preferences about the war and settle as soon as the costs of prolonging the war outweigh the benefits. Goemans argues dictators will behave like unitary rational actors—even when they are losing— because they have sufficient capacity to repress potential opposition and thus need not worry about personal punishment resulting from defeat in war. The Soviet Union is usually coded a dictatorship during Stalin’s rule and an oligarchy after his death. However, with Goemans’ non-standard coding rules, he would consider the Soviet Union a dictatorship during both periods.19
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Thus, using his coding, Goemans would predict the Soviet Union would behave rationally during Stalin’s rule, and it did. However, Stalin did not continue a losing war because he could repress potential opposition and thus need not fear personal punishment for losing. Instead, Stalin continued the war because the majority of its costs were being borne by other states, and indeed, Stalin had explicitly orchestrated the conflict so that was the case. Thus, while both Goemans and I would predict Stalin rationally to choose to continue a losing war, we differ about which factors were most important in his cost-benefit calculation. What drove the Soviet decision to continue the war during Stalin’s rule was not the regime type, but the fact that the majority of the war’s costs were not being borne by Soviet decision-makers. Using Goemans’ non-standard regime type coding, the successor regime’s behavior accords with Goemans’ theory. Given its decision to end the war promptly, because the costs outweighed the benefits from their perspective, the successor regime behaved as a rational unitary actor would. In contrast, standard regime type coding would classify the troika as an oligarchy, in which case its behavior would not support Goemans’ theory. (Goemans argues oligarchies in a losing war will gamble for redemption in an attempt to turn the battlefield around, in order to stave off personal punishment after defeat.) Regardless, the domestic coalition theory better explains how the troika’s cost-benefit calculation differed from Stalin’s—and for at least two members of the troika (Malenkov and Beria), had even differed before the war began. The new leaders viewed a prolonged war as a cost they did not want to bear in light of other policy priorities, in line with their different conceptualization of the war’s costs and benefits. A third alternative explanation, advanced by Stalin’s biographer, Dmitrii Volkogonov, is that Stalin had decided to end the war on February 28, but that night, he suffered the fatal stroke that killed him on March 5. Stalin had dinner that evening with Malenkov, Beria, Khrushchev and Bulganin. To recount Volkogonov’s entire argument: As usual, they discussed a wide range of topics. Bulganin gave an account of the war in Korea, confirming Stalin’s view that the situation had reached a stalemate. He decided he would tell Molotov the next day to advise the Chinese and North Koreans to “try to get the best deal they could in the talks,” but in any event to try to bring the armed conflict to a halt. (1991: 570)
Although Volkogonov conducted detailed archival research for his study, he does not offer any references for the assertion in this passage. Moreover, besides this passage, Volkogonov includes only two paragraphs about the Korean War in the entire 600-page biography (1991: 540–41). Thus, not only is it impossible to assess
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whether Stalin actually said this, but the miniscule role the Korean War plays in Volkogonov’s account makes it difficult to evaluate the merits of this assertion. Given the evidence available today, there is no way to confirm or deny Volkogonov’s account. If Volkogonov is right, Stalin had changed his mind and decided to end the war, which would suggest the preference obstacle was about to be lifted. However, it is impossible to tell if this counterfactual may have come to pass. What we do know is that Stalin took no actions to end the war before his death. Therefore, even if his expectations had changed, they did not produce the war’s end. Without a reference, we cannot know for sure how Volkogonov knows this “fact” he reports. Presumably, it must have been from the other men present at the dinner—and these men were precisely the ones who wanted to end the war, anyway. It is certainly possible that these men, who assumed power after Stalin’s death, said that Stalin said this. Then it would not look so drastic for them to be going against his wishes. It was in their interest to have it seem like Stalin wanted to end the war, because it provided justification for them to enact their own longheld but dormant preferences for ending the war. Fourth, Jung and Halliday build on Volkogonov’s account to argue that Stalin had decided to end the war because he felt “unremitting pressure” from Mao to share nuclear technology and did not want to. In their depiction of events, President Eisenhower “suggested in his State of the Union address [on February 2, 1953] that he might use the atomic bomb on China. This threat was actually music to Mao’s ears, because he now had an excuse to ask Stalin for what he wanted most: nuclear weapons” (2006: 368). Jung and Halliday argue that after this speech, Mao dispatched his top nuclear scientist, Qian San-qiang, to Moscow. In their words, Mao’s message boiled down to this: Give me the Bomb, so that you will not be drawn into a nuclear war with America. This confronted Stalin with a serious dilemma, as Russia had a mutual defense pact with China. Stalin did not want to give Mao the Bomb, but he was worried about Eisenhower. It was under this unremitting pressure—from Mao as much as from the West—that Stalin, it seems, decided to end the Korean War. (2006: 368)20
Jung and Halliday’s account is speculative and somewhat misleading. As Chapter 8 will explain, Eisenhower did not make nuclear threats in his State of the Union address. US nuclear threats did not occur until May 1953—and it remains unclear whether those threats were ever even received by the Communists. The only threat Eisenhower made in this speech was his announcement that the US Seventh Fleet would be removed from the Taiwan Strait. Therefore, while Mao may have wanted nuclear technology and sent his nuclear scientist to Mos-
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cow, the evidence does not support the assertion that Mao credibly threatened to draw the Soviets into a nuclear war with the United States unless China received atomic weapons from Stalin.
Conclusions This chapter has explained the Soviet role in prolonging the Korean War. The Soviet Union under Stalin provides strong evidence of the preference obstacle, supported by the information obstacle, as reasons for prolonging the Korean War. Stalin did not want to end the war because he was benefiting from it without assuming many of its costs. A stalemated war provided the Soviets with four benefits. First, it tied down American forces, which stalled US efforts to engage militarily in Europe, drained US economic resources and caused domestic political problems for Truman. Second, it created a rift between the United States and its allies over tactics in the Korean War. Third, it provided the Soviets with an excellent intelligence-gathering opportunity. Finally, it created hostility between China and the United States, tying China more firmly to Moscow through dependence on Soviet military and economic assistance. After siding with the hardliners to support the war, Stalin remained reluctant to risk provoking direct military conflict with the United States. Until the Chinese intervention, Stalin tried to prevent such escalation, while simultaneously cajoling China into battle. Whether this was because he believed such intervention would not cause global war or because he wanted to stop Mao from establishing friendly relations with the United States and becoming the bulwark of Asian communism, Stalin’s priority was taking care of Soviet interests. By the time the war bogged down in mid-1951, Stalin had orchestrated the situation so that he was not bearing the war’s costs directly, yet gaining plenty of benefits. Thus, he consistently took steps—within his own coalition and in his interactions with the Chinese (explained in Chapter 7)—to ensure this preference prevailed. While the moderates opposed this war policy, they were relatively powerless to effect its change as long as Stalin remained in power. Stalin actively curtailed their influence by excluding, rotating and demoting the moderates and by strictly controlling information. Given the culture of fear, the moderates also “self-suppressed” to some degree. Information processing pathologies in the Soviet regime exacerbated the preference obstacle. Not only was Stalin was able to keep those who might disagree with him in the dark, but much of the information leaders received was tailored to support Stalin’s known preferences, rather than to provide an accurate picture about the war. For all of these reasons, it was not until Stalin’s death that the moderates
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could finally enact their preferences and end the war. The fact that they decisively moved to end the Korean War in less than ten days after Stalin’s funeral speaks volumes to the non-controversy of this decision among Stalin’s successors, as well as to the fact that it was Stalin who kept the war going. These new leaders took control of the country and quickly enacted their long-held preferences, leading them to end the war. In other words, the domestic coalition shift dislodged the stickiness of Stalin’s preferences and allowed the war to end.
5
The United States, Part 1 Trapped by the NSC-68 Mindset
If the Soviet Union under Stalin exemplifies the preference obstacle to ending war, then the United States under President Harry S. Truman provides strong evidence of the two other obstacles, information and entrapment. Chapter 2 explained that an information obstacle occurs when leaders do not know they should end the war. The information obstacle hinders Bayesian updating, impeding the ability to use all available information and update expectations. With the information obstacle, such rationalist updating does not occur, because leaders (1) receive poor quality information, (2) do not necessarily share the same information, (3) use different indicators to assess the war or (4) have individual or (5) organizational biases that prevent them from using all available information. In contrast, the entrapment obstacle occurs when leaders want to end the war but cannot. Entrapment can occur when leaders’ hawkish constituencies want to continue the war, and the leaders must acquiesce to remain in power. Leaders can face this political entrapment from a domestic constituency or from external allies. This chapter examines domestic entrapment, while Chapter 7 will consider entrapment by an ally. Information and entrapment obstacles can occur in tandem, as Korean War decision-making in the US governing coalition demonstrates. Entrapment dynamics can lead decision-makers to become “too invested to quit” and thus process information so as to justify a course of action despite evidence against it. For example, they can ignore, discount or reject information that does not fit with favored or well-established beliefs, while taking at face value data that does. The psychological commitments and domestic political constraints of entrap-
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ment can provide the motive, while the complexity and uncertainty of information during war can provide the opportunity, for psychological biases to persist. In other words, the logic of entrapment can make leaders reluctant to confront painful truths, causing them to choose not to know they should end the war. Unfortunately, the longer the war continues and the more trapped a leader perceives himself to be, the more information obstacles can hinder rational updating. This chapter examines the interacting dynamics of information and entrapment obstacles, at the macro-level, in US decisions about prosecuting and ending the Korean War. The Truman governing coalition embodied what I call the “NSC-68 mindset,” a set of assumptions about the US-Soviet relationship within which it perceived the Korean War. The NSC-68 mindset not only blinded the governing coalition to information that may have helped it end the war sooner, but also drove a domestic mobilization effort from which it was difficult to back down. Fearing Soviet aggression worldwide, the Truman Administration used the Korean War to embark on a massive Cold War rearmament effort and justify its globalist agenda to Congressional and public constituencies. However, winning support for this mobilization required building a coalition with moderate Republicans and Asia-lationists, leading Truman to overturn previous Asia policies and inadvertently draw China into the war. Furthermore, because it believed the only course was to conduct a limited war in Korea while preparing for the global war expected in Europe, the Truman coalition got caught in a dilemma. The threat inflation that resulted from selling mobilization to the American people stoked hawkish constituencies for an all-out victory in Korea; hence, any efforts to move towards a negotiated settlement renewed calls of Truman being “soft” on Communism. This chapter lays out half of the US story in the Korean War, discussing the interacting dynamics of entrapment and information obstacles at the macro (strategic and philosophical) level. Chapter 6 will examine those dynamics at the micro (operational and policy) level, in the US decision to adopt a policy of voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war (POWs). However, it was only with a domestic governing coalition shift—the election of President Eisenhower—that entrapment and information obstacles at both levels were lifted and the United States could change course towards ending the war. While Eisenhower retained the same war aims that Truman had espoused, his governing coalition brought different actors—with different constituencies, worldviews and conceptualizations of the war—that left them freer to consider an expanded palate of strategic options. Notably, as a Republican, Eisenhower could more easily accept terms Truman could not, while placating the hawkish Republican right wing with other policy issues.
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This chapter is divided into two sections and a conclusion. The first section explains the US governing coalition during the Truman Administration, as well as the wider domestic political context in which it operated. The second section outlines how the NSC-68 mindset developed and became entrenched during the North Korean attack, deepened with Chinese warnings as the UN Command advanced north, and blossomed in the “entirely new war” that resulted from the Chinese intervention. It also examines the Truman Administration’s responses to these events, in light of the domestic environment. Chapter 6 will discuss the voluntary POW repatriation policy, the Eisenhower coalition shift and alternative explanations for US behavior during the Korean War.
The United States Governing Coalition The Truman governing coalition relied heavily on a departmental approach to solving problems, with Secretary of State Dean Acheson playing a dominant role in foreign policy decision-making. Before the Korean War, the governing coalition adopted a Europe-first internationalist approach to containing Communism, relying on moderate Republican internationalists to help push these policies through Congress. To sell these programs to Congress and the public, the Truman governing coalition inflated the Soviet threat and relied on anti-Communist propaganda, but this decision had longer-term political implications that eventually constrained Truman during the Korean War. w ithin the t ruman gover ning coalit ion
When the Korean War started in June 1950, Truman had been president for more than five years but was rarely involved directly in the foreign policymaking process. Truman relied more on regular government organizations—the cabinet departments, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National Security Council (NSC)—in foreign policy decision-making than his predecessor had. Truman was aware he lacked formal foreign policy training and thus was willing to rely on advice from others. With no foreign policy specialists on his personal staff, he usually deferred to recommendations from his cabinet officers on issues of national security: Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Secretaries of Defense Louis Johnson (until September 1950), George C. Marshall (from September 1950 to September 1951) and Robert A. Lovett (from September 1951 to January 1953). As a result, these officials had great influence over policy (Stueck 1995: 137; Truman 1955: 13–17; Acheson 1969: 730–31; Crabb and Mulcahy 1991: 80; Donovan 1984: 81–83; Leffler 1992: 363; Sterling 1998: 349). Truman’s decision-making style reinforced this distinctive departmental ap-
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proach to problems. He organized the policymaking process in terms of functional expertise, with himself playing the role of “chairman of the board, hearing sundry expert opinions on each aspect of the problem, then making a synthesis of them and announcing the decision” (George 1980: 151). His widely quoted motto—“The buck stops here”—reflected his firm conviction that he was in charge of American foreign policy and the ultimate decision-maker. Yet his decisiveness sometimes bordered on impulsive, often leading to premature cognitive closure—as the POW policy discussion in Chapter 6 will show (Crabb and Mulcahy 1991: 78–79). As Henry Wallace has noted, Truman “seemed eager to make decisions of every kind with the greatest promptness. Everything he said was decisive. It almost seemed as though he was eager to decide in advance of thinking” (quoted in Larson 1985: 146–47). Truman’s decisiveness, paired with his desire to administer the government through the cabinet, had important implications for information processing in his governing coalition. As Richard Neustadt argues, [Truman] did not seek as avidly . . . for bits of information unrelated to the day’s affairs. . . . Truman did not often try to fit the pieces into patterns, or to speculate about their implications, or to make connections between something learned in one context and something done in another. Characteristically, he concentrated on the here and now in terms befitting a decision machine, looking for what was to be decided, looking at what bore directly on the case, and tending to dismiss all else as interesting but irrelevant. Moreover, while he dealt with the decision next in line, the ones already processed and the ones that might come after were not often on his mind. . . . Just as in the case of information, Truman usually let other men’s initiatives time his decisions for him. The issues that existed were the issues [his advisors put] on his desk. (1990: 145, emphasis added)
Hence, unless specific information was brought to Truman as part of a particular decision “package,” he was unlikely to know and consider it. Moreover, those with the greatest access to Truman—Acheson and, during his tenure, Marshall—tended to dominate the policy process. Their preferences (and biases) significantly influenced which information Truman received and which policy options were considered (Neustadt 1990: 148). Among Truman’s subordinates, Acheson dominated Korean War policymaking and served as a powerful veto player in the coalition. Truman’s relationship with Acheson was extremely close, and Acheson’s views received priority in policy deliberations, usually winning out when advice was divided along department lines (Foot 1985: 28; James 1993: xi; Sterling 1998: 350). Nonetheless, Truman sometimes overruled him because of domestic political pressures. With many Congressional critics, Acheson was not well liked outside the executive branch, and McCarthyist
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attacks on his department decreased his ability to help sell Truman’s policies to the public (Hogan 1998: 276; Foot 1985: 30–31; Hamby 1990: 565–66). Acheson was part of the East Coast liberal internationalist and financial elite (Schulzinger 1984; Isaacson and Thomas 1986). Thus, not surprisingly, his major preoccupation was Europe, especially relations with Britain—perhaps because his major foreign policy conditioning had been in Western Europe. For example, during his tenure as secretary of state, Acheson spent more time with the British ambassador than with all other ambassadors combined. Acheson regarded Europe as the center of gravity in the struggle with the Soviets. Like Truman, he had little understanding of China and considered policymaking towards China an imposition (Smith 1972: 144–45; Sterling 1998: 350; Tucker 1983: 174). In addition to his European bias, Acheson believed Truman was under-spending on national security. He disliked Truman’s decision to subordinate the defense budget to his domestic economic agenda (Hogan 1998: 276). By early 1950, Acheson had assembled an impressive group of policymakers at State who shared his perspective, including Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk and Paul Nitze, the new director of State’s Policy Planning Staff. If anything, Nitze and Rusk advocated a more globalist perspective for containing Communism than Acheson’s Europe-first viewpoint (Snyder 1991: 270–71). For example, Rusk’s experiences in Asia during WWII predisposed him “to believe the US had ‘an obligation to stand’ not just in one part of the world but everywhere it might be called upon to do so” (Foot 1985: 32). Similarly, Nitze—the architect of NSC-68 discussed below—believed the Soviets has aggressive intentions for global domination that required greatly increased foreign aid and military spending to contain (Fordham 1998: 43; Donovan 1982: 158–60; Pierpaoli 1999: 21; Pemberton 1989: 128–31; Rearden 1993: 193). As Hogan notes, Every bone in Nitze’s body ached with suspicion of the Soviet Union. . . . Given Acheson’s own geopolitical vision, it is clear that he picked the right man to join him on the front line . . . against the president and others who were trying to balance the needs of the welfare state against those of the warfare state without throwing the budget into permanent deficit. (1998: 294)
Clearly, Acheson assembled a team to make the case for a more aggressive, extensive (and expensive) plan to combat Communism globally. While Acheson’s plan for increased security spending mirrored the preferences of the uniformed Pentagon, their focus was more Asia-centric. This Asia-first perspective made sense, given their desire to extend the US military’s occupation of Japan into an “Asian strongpoint” and “a reliable set of bases that could be used for air attacks on the Soviet Union in a major war” (Snyder 1991: 269). The military members of the Truman coalition included (1) JCS Chairman General Omar
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Bradley, (2) the service chiefs—General J. Lawton Collins (Army), General Hoyt S. Vandenberg (Air Force), and Admiral Forest Sherman (Navy)—and (3) the UN forces commander—General Douglas MacArthur (until April 1951), General Matthew Ridgway (April 1951–May 1952) and General Mark W. Clark (after May 1952). While Truman generally believed military leaders provided advice with the least partisan motivations, he had a long-standing fear of “political cliques” in the military. He also reportedly had strong antipathy towards the “flashy” MacArthur (Neustadt 1990: 148; Donovan 1977: 141–42; Truman 1956: 50–51, 59–60, 422–27; Nelson 1985). Two characteristics of these military officers are important for decisionmaking in the Truman governing coalition. First, until his April 1951 dismissal, MacArthur held a preeminent role in the coalition—albeit somewhat as a loose cannon. While ostensibly subordinate to the JCS, MacArthur’s seniority, public prestige and tremendous support (and idolization) from Congressional conservatives gave him an important political base from which to exert power. As a result, it was difficult for other coalition members to control and rein him in (James 1993: Chapter 2; Stueck 1983: 65). Second, because these military decisionmakers had formative experiences during the world wars, they tended to view the Korean conflict as a first step towards another global war. Not only did they try to duplicate the successful WWII bombing campaigns against Japan and Germany, but this worldview inclined them to treat Korea as a major test of the US’ ability to contain Communism everywhere. Most decision-makers in the Truman governing coalition viewed the Soviet Union with profound distrust, as a “wily adversary,” unpredictable, opportunistic and prone to taking risks. This outlook made it difficult for Truman and his advisors to acknowledge Soviet behavior that could be interpreted as moderate or cautious. Certainly, memories of events in the 1930s and 1940s shaped their belief in the danger of appeasing aggressors and the importance of America’s reputation for standing firm (Snyder 1991: 281; Blum 1982: 13; Foot 1985: 32–33; Sterling 1998: 349). As George Kennan later said, Truman, Acheson and other advisors “could not free themselves from the image of Hitler and his timetables. They viewed the Soviet leaders as absorbed with the pursuit of something called a ‘grand design’—a design for the early destruction of American power and for world conquest” (1972: 91–92). Leaders in the Truman governing coalition believed the Soviets had a grand design for world domination, with the United States as the primary obstacle on that path. Therefore, the United States and the Soviet Union were locked in a war of nerves, freedom fighting tyranny (Spalding 2006: 183–89). Despite his staunch anti-Communist worldview, Truman struggled to imple-
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ment liberal reforms in domestic policy—especially his Fair Deal agenda, which he unveiled in January 1949—and this drove his budget priorities before the Korean War. A legendary fiscal conservative, Truman was reluctant to increase military spending. He was more concerned with the national debt, which stood at $252 billion at the start of his second term, and by 1950, he came close to balancing the budget by downsizing the military. To reflect this priority, in March 1949, he replaced the hawkish James Forrestal with Louis Johnson as defense secretary, giving a big boost to the “economizers” in the governing coalition (Donovan 1984: 77; James 1993: 14; Sterling 1998: 349–50; Donovan 1982: 53–65). Like Truman but unlike the uniformed leaders in his department, Johnson was determined to hold the line on military growth and spending (Hogan 1998: 273; Tucker 1983: 201). Thus, in the year before the Korean War, Truman’s governing coalition was evenly matched with conflicting policy priorities. On the one hand, Truman, Johnson and some of the coalition’s economic advisors wanted to balance the federal budget. On the other, Acheson, his influential deputies and the uniformed Pentagon wanted to increase national security spending to fight the global Soviet threat. the broader d omest ic p olit ical context
Setting the stage for the wider domestic political environment requires some background about US foreign policy coalitions in the early Cold War period. Grand strategy in the early Cold War resulted from coalition-making that cut across the Democratic and Republican Party lines. Instead, the most important factional cleavage was between internationalist and nationalist/isolationist perspectives, complicated by the fact that different actors emphasized different global regions as most important to US strategic interests. Thus, while most internationalists focused on Europe as central in the global fight to contain Communism, some had a more global perspective. Similarly, many nationalists had an Asia-First mentality. By 1949, the Asia-Firsters often joined forces with traditional isolationists in criticizing Truman’s foreign policies, leading some scholars to group them together as “Asia-lationists” (Caridi 1968: 120; Snyder 1991: 264–73, 280–81). The Europe-first liberal internationalist faction drew from internationally oriented business and law communities and the government’s executive branch. Acheson and Marshall were key advocates of this perspective, as was Republican Senator John Foster Dulles, who eventually became Eisenhower’s secretary of state. Europe-first internationalists spanned both political parties, with Republicans hailing mostly from the East Coast. Internationalists mostly held a realpolitik perspective on American international commitments, with a tiered
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approach of “core” and “peripheral” interests. Given their perspective, “core interests” resided in Europe, seen as central to containing the Soviet Union, while “peripheral” interests included much of Asia (except the major industrial centers in Japan). In the late 1940s, internationalists had favored a reduction in American tariffs, contingent on other states’ reciprocity, to boost trade with Europe and help rebuild European post-war economies (Frieden 1988; Schulzinger 1984; Isaacson and Thomas 1986; Ferguson 1983; Divine 1967: chapter 1; Snyder 1991: 264–65, 281–83). In contrast, the nationalists and isolationists resisted free trade, expensive foreign aid policies and global military commitments, considering these policies to be an expensive tax burden and excuse for big government. Before World War II, this perspective manifested as isolationism, but after World War II, it assumed an anti-UN, anti-Europe, Asia-first anticommunist unilateralist flavor, preferring stand-off air power to military ground commitments and alliances. During the Korean War, this perspective appeared as the Asia-lationists. Hailing from both sides of the aisle, well-known isolationists included Massachusetts Senator Joseph P. Kennedy and former President Herbert Hoover, who advocated building a Fortress America-style “Gibraltar in the Western Hemisphere.” But the most important isolationist was Ohio Senator Robert Taft, the leader of the Republican Party’s “Old Guard” right wing in Congress and Eisenhower’s main rival in the 1952 Republican presidential primary. More generally, this faction found support in import-competing industrial sectors, agriculture (except cotton), small business and the rural “heartland” of the country. Accordingly, many Congressional Republicans in this group hailed from Midwestern and Western states, while Democrats came from the South (Doenecke 1979; Snyder 1991: 266–67, 283–85; Rieselbach 1966: 106–20; Graebner 1956). This conservative coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats also dominated domestic affairs in Congress. In their desire to preserve their region’s racial order, Southern Democrats aligned with Republicans on many issues—the civil rights agenda, opposition to strong national labor unions and policies related to housing, education, taxes, scientific research, economic planning and military manpower. Thus, this coalition strongly opposed Truman’s Fair Deal domestic agenda (Reinhard 1983: 65; Friedberg 2000: 43–45; Hamby 1990: 361–86, 488–508; Savage 1997: 165–67; Hartman 1971: 134–35, 155–56). The Europe-first internationalist perspective dominated early Cold War foreign policy, focusing especially on economic containment in Europe. The cornerstone policy was the 1947 Truman Doctrine, to provide economic assistance to Greece and Turkey so as to prevent them from being absorbed into the Soviet Communist camp. The Truman Doctrine became the primary building block
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of containment and post-war liberal internationalism, including the European Recovery Plan (Marshall Plan), tariff reductions to increase trade with European allies and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Truman Administration not only exaggerated the Soviet threat to build Congressional and public support for these policies, but also used ideological, anti-Communist rhetoric suggesting the United States was the only nation capable of stopping tyranny’s encroachment on liberty and freedom everywhere (Freeland 1972; Spalding 2006: chapter 3). One important implication of this Europe-first priority was less attention to China. During the Chinese civil war, the Truman Administration began a gradual dissociation from the Chinese Nationalists. In 1949, after Chiang KaiShek and the Chinese Nationalists (KMT) fled to Taiwan, Acheson—mimicking Britain’s pragmatic perspective—pushed for US recognition of the new Chinese Communist government. Both Truman and Acheson saw the KMT’s fall as a potential solution to the political problem of recognizing China, because it would minimize accusations of abandoning an ally. Thus, from 1949 until the Korean War began, the Truman coalition asserted the KMT’s fall could not have been prevented. In August 1949, the State Department’s White Paper on China blamed Chiang’s downfall on internal failures in the KMT movement, not the inadequacy of American military and economic aid. By January 5, 1950, Truman announced the US government neither intended to acquire special concessions in Taiwan, nor would it intercede to prevent a Communist takeover from mainland China. The next week, in a speech at the National Press Club, Acheson excluded Taiwan and South Korea from America’s defense perimeter in Asia (Tucker 1983: 174–94; Reinhard 1983: 67–68; Blum 1982: 215). The decision to inflate the threat and rely on anti-Communist propaganda to sell its Europe-first internationalist agenda had longer-term implications that constrained the Truman governing coalition during the Korean War. In fact, by 1948, Truman had already been concerned about the anti-Communist rhetoric’s fever pitch and believed it needed to be tamped down (Freeland 1972: 335). Because the internationalist/isolationist cleavage crossed party lines, however, Truman could not count on party-line support for either his domestic or Europe-first internationalist agendas—even when the Democrats controlled both chambers of Congress after 1948. On most issues, he needed votes from moderate Republicans to offset the nationalist Southern Democrats. Hence, moderate Republicans, like Senator Arthur Vandenberg, had pressed Truman to justify his foreign policy in terms of an ideological struggle against Communism (Snyder 1991: 280). However, systematically exaggerating the Soviet threat to mobilize support in
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Congress for authorizing containment commitments opened the door for the opposition—and ultimately constrained the Truman governing coalition—in two ways. First, it sowed the seeds for Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy’s antiCommunist investigations of the US government bureaucracy, which exposed Alger Hiss and whipped up paranoia about domestic insecurity. Acheson’s public support of Hiss led to denunciations and accusations of treason.1 Second, it allowed Truman’s opponents to accept the most extreme view of the Communist threat and accuse the Truman Administration of “losing China” after Chiang KaiShek and the KMT fled to Taiwan in 1949. Having used global anti-Communist rhetoric to sell their policies towards Europe, it was almost impossible to keep that rhetoric from being directed globally. As Rosemary Foot argues, the Truman Doctrine sales job allowed the China lobby “to capitalize on the global rhetoric to promote their demands for military assistance” (1985: 44; also Hagan 2001: 32; Freeland 1972: 344–60; Reinhard 1983: 67–68; Snyder 1991: 288–90). In fact, these two constraints were related: throughout 1949, Republicans consistently charged that Truman’s China policies resulted from “subversive” influences in the State Department that were compromising US interests in Asia. During the Korean War, these attacks blossomed into calls for Acheson’s dismissal, while Democratic Senator Pat McCarran used his seat as chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee to investigate everyone connected with the China policy. These investigations gutted State of most of its China analysts during the Korean War (Hamby 1990: 565–66; Freeland 1972: 344). Both constraints—McCarthyism and conservative attacks about having “lost” China—provided fodder for opposition accusations that the Truman Administration was “soft on Communism.”
The NSC-68 Mindset: Information and Entrapment Obstacles at the Macro Level From the outset, the Truman governing coalition dealt with the Korean War within the wider Cold War context. Assessments of aggressive Soviet intentions colored the coalition’s decision-making process, while the conservative opposition’s attacks for having “lost” China significantly constrained its choices. The Korean War’s timing, three months after NSC-68, vindicated many of the policy document’s predictions and created distinct cognitive frames through which all subsequent information about the war was considered. NSC-68 also provided the impetus for a massive Cold War mobilization process, which became inextricably linked in the public’s and in Congress’ mind with the war effort. NSC-68 was a policy document used by Truman coalition members to mobilize the president’s and the public’s support for an expensive global policy of
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containing Communism. Behind its mobilizing prose, however, were myths, ideology and worldviews that framed the way its proponents interpreted events in the Korean War. To distinguish these beliefs from the document itself, I refer to them as the “NSC-68 mindset.” In fact, these beliefs may have had very little substance in the document itself. As the evidence in this section demonstrates, the NSC-68 mindset eventually trapped the Truman governing coalition in two interacting ways. First, it constrained how coalition members perceived information about the war and limited the range of strategic options they were willing to consider. Second, the NSC-68 mindset also affected how they pitched mobilization policies—for both the Korean War and the wider Cold War rearmament effort—to Congress and the American people. Thus, even when they avoided internalizing their own myths, they found themselves politically entrapped by their rhetoric (Snyder 1991: 41–42). nsc-68: containing the communists
NSC-68 was a systematic reappraisal of US military capabilities and a policy reassessment for how to counter the Soviet Union. Truman ordered the study after a series of international crises in 1949–50—including the September 1949 Soviet atomic detonation, the October 1949 establishment of the Communist People’s Republic of China and the German Democratic Republic, the February 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance and the beginning of McCarthyism during the Alger Hiss trial (FRUS 1950, 1: 141–42). Nitze and his team completed NSC-68 in April 1950, portraying Communism as a coordinated global movement and arguing that “the Soviet Union . . . seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world” (FRUS 1950, 1: 256). Significantly, the study predicted the Soviet Union might begin undertaking “piecemeal aggression” or “wars by proxy.” NSC-68 argued the Soviets would be able to launch a preemptive strike against the US—with a reasonable prospect of winning—by 1954, the “year of maximum danger.” As a result, it called for more foreign aid, greater military assistance to US allies, more investment in propaganda and information campaigns, increased intelligence capabilities and a massive expansion of the conventional and nuclear stockpile—with 1954 as the target date for completing the nuclear buildup. Such extensive measures were necessary, because as NSC-68 asserted, “a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere” (FRUS 1950, 1: 240).2 Although Acheson took no direct part in writing NSC-68, his influence and thinking permeate the document (Rearden 1993: 166; McLellan 1976: 169). As Acheson later noted, “in dealing with the Soviet Union, the most useful negotiation was by acts rather than words. . . . From all this came insistence upon repair-
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ing weaknesses and creating ‘situations of strength’ and, as a means to them, the NSC-68 program” (Acheson 1969: 378). The report not only accepted Acheson’s contention that “the Soviet Union has one purpose and that is world domination” (FRUS 1950, 1: 207), but it also reflected his belief that building “situations of strength” would require significant funding and this report needed to make that case. Moreover, Eastern internationalist elites shared Acheson’s perspective on the importance of increased foreign aid and military spending.3 Representatives of this group reviewed early drafts of NSC-68 and supported its efforts to increase the national security budget. Of the six consultants asked to review early drafts, five came from Eastern financial and academic institutions (Fordham 1998: 44–45; Nitze 1989: 98–99). NSC-68 may have intentionally simplified and overstated the threat in order to rally support for its recommendations (Snyder 1991: 271–72; Christensen 1996: 125–27). Nitze himself stated that the document was aimed at the general public and suggested parts of it be declassified and shared with the American people. Edward W. Barrett, a public relations expert working with the NSC-68 drafters, called for a “psychological ‘scare campaign’” to mobilize public opinion around the new national security imperatives (quoted in Gaddis 1982: 108; see also Hogan 1998: 300). As Acheson later admitted, “If we made our points clearer than the truth, we did not differ from most other educators and could hardly do otherwise” (1969: 374–75). The public effort by Acheson and others to mobilize the American public around higher foreign policy expenditures paid off. By May 1950, support for military assistance to Europe was at “an all-time high” (61 percent) and accompanied “by the high salience of international communism and a strongly heightened sense that America would soon be at war” (Christensen 1996: 127). But the most important sell-job was directed at Truman himself. As Acheson observed in his memoirs, “The purpose of NSC-68 was to so bludgeon the mass mind of ‘top government’ that not only could the President make a decision but that the decision could be carried out” (1969: 374). NSC-68 was “in essence, a battering ram with which its authors hoped to shatter the existing budget ceiling” (Friedberg 2000: 107–8; also Snyder 1991: 271–72). NSC-68 contained no cost estimates—an intentional omission, according to Acheson—but the suggested figure for defense alone ranged from $45 to $50 billion, which would triple the defense budget (Christensen 1996: 123; Acheson 1969: 377; Fordham 1998: 57; Gaddis 1997: 76). In effect, Acheson and the NSC-68 drafters were trying to change the nation’s fiscal ideology. Instead of making balanced budgets the priority, they were advocating a new rule: determine national security requirements first and then adjust fiscal policy to meet those demands (Pierpaoli 1999: 9). Acheson and the NSC-68
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drafters found common cause with Leon Keyserling, Truman’s chief economic advisor since late 1949. Pushing for an economic agenda that stimulated growth, Keyserling was willing to back NSC-68 and deficit spending in national security, because he thought budget deficits would benefit the US economy (Snyder 1991: 272; Friedberg 2000: 108–11; Pierpaoli 1999: 22). At least initially, however, Truman refused to accept the report’s premise. When Truman received it in April 1950, he passed it to the NSC, asking for further study of its assumptions and—most importantly—for cost estimates. In the meantime, NSC-68 was shelved. Fiscally conservative Truman knew its implementation would be prohibitively expensive and would thus force a retrenchment from his economic policies (Gaddis 1982: 91–93, 113; Pierpaoli 1999: 26; Wells 1979: 123–31; Christensen 1996: 126; Pollard 1985: 239). Paradoxically, the most vociferous critic of NSC-68 was Defense Secretary Louis Johnson, the economizer. In addition to philosophical differences about increasing military spending, Johnson believed he had been cut out of the NSC68 policymaking process (Etzold and Gaddis 1978: 384; Donovan 1982: 158–60; Rearden 1993: 164, 167; Acheson 1969: 373–74; Leffler 1992: 358). George Kennan and Charles Bohlen, leading Soviet experts at State, also disagreed with NSC-68’s militant line, mostly because they preferred to base prognoses of Soviet behavior on intentions rather than capabilities. Kennan especially disagreed with the report’s zero-sum worldview and the assumption the Soviets intended to pursue competition with the United States through war (Bowie and Immerman 1998: 20; Foot 1985: 39; Leffler 1992: 357–58; Kennan 1972: 92; May 1993b: 94–96). the nsc-68 mindset meets the north korean at tack
The North Korean attack vindicated many of the assumptions underlying NSC-68 (Rearden 1993: 159; Leffler 1992: 361; Weathersby 1993a). The outbreak of fighting just two months after NSC-68’s completion could not have coincided better to ensure its approval, given its prediction of greater Soviet bellicosity, including “piecemeal aggression” and “wars by proxy.” The North Korean attack confirmed these predictions and promoted NSC-68’s analysis and rationale for increased defense expenditures. As Ray Cline, then a CIA analyst who worked on NSC-68, later said, It was the Korean War that projected us into the NSC-68 world. We were not absolutely convinced as a matter of policy about the need for containment, deterrence, build-up of military forces, nation-building, alliance-building—those are the concepts that this paper stood behind. It was the Korean War that did it. (1998: 63)
From the Truman Administration’s perspective, the North Korean attack was started at Soviet behest. According to State’s intelligence office, since the “North
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Korean government is completely under Kremlin control,” there was “no possibility that the North Koreans acted without prior instruction from Moscow.” This memorandum concluded: “By choosing Korea as the area of attack, the USSR was able to challenge the US specifically and test the firmness of US resistance to Communist expansion” (FRUS 1950, 7: 148–49, emphasis added). In effect, US decision-makers converted North Korean actions into Soviet actions, eliminating North Korea as an independent actor in the interaction (Milliken 2001: 50). The NSC-68 mindset had two implications for how the Truman coalition framed the attack and possible US responses. First, it led them to view the Soviet Union as seeking to “test the resolution of the US” in its defense guarantees and making “a direct challenge to the free world and US leadership thereof ” (FRUS 1950, 7: 148, 169–70). This framing suggested the Soviet Union was testing US leadership; if the United States failed to meet this “test,” the Soviets would make other aggressive moves. Thus, if the Soviets succeeded in Korea, it could not only encourage further Soviet aggression, but also damage US prestige, cast doubt on US leadership and perhaps even destroy the United Nations (Milliken 2001: 53; George 1955: 220). As Acheson put it, “To back away from this challenge, in view of our capacity for meeting it, would be highly destructive of the power and prestige of the United States” (quoted in McGlothlen 1993: 81). Likewise, the US ambassador in Moscow telegraphed that a failure to act in South Korea’s defense would lead many Asian states to undertake a “fundamental reconsideration of [their] orientation” in the Cold War (FRUS 1950, 7: 199). The second framing prompted by the NSC-68 mindset was that the Soviet Union was already fighting a war of conquest of Asia. In this view, the Soviets were already initiating a plan for regional or global military takeover, so other Soviet (or Soviet satellite) attacks could follow “at increased tempo regardless of Western interests and reactions” (quoted in Milliken 2001: 55; see also FRUS 1950, 7: 557–59). This framing projected potential harmful effects of a much greater magnitude: loss of control of Asia, weakening Western defenses of Europe and general global war. Understandably, this interpretation was more alarming to US decision-makers and compelled them to take actions to deter the wider war the Soviets were already perceived to be launching. the t ruman coalit ion ’ s resp onse to the north korean at tack
In retrospect, the Korean War served Acheson and the NSC-68 drafters quite well—after all, here was the proof of Soviet evil intentions to dominate the world. From the perspective of the schematic thinking represented by the NSC68 mindset, the massive military assault on the US client state in South Korea by
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the Soviet satellite state in North Korea clearly constituted a challenge the United States must answer. No matter that a few months ago South Korea had been excluded from the American defense perimeter. To some degree, as Cumings argues, “Truman and Acheson needed to interpret the North Korean attack as part of a global challenge to justify reversing their Asia policy” (1997: 31). Given the first NSC-68 mindset framing, there was a general consensus among the Truman governing coalition about the need to respond in force. Hedging against the second NSC-68 mindset framing, however, they agreed the initial response should be limited. Coalition members feared the North Korean attack was only a feint to test the willingness of the United States to confront Communist aggression, and a prelude to the main assault, expected to come in Europe (Trachtenberg 1988–89: 18–32). Thus, initially Truman’s war aims were to restore the status quo ante bellum. Acheson played a leading role in early war decision-making in June 1950: he advocated providing air and naval support to the Korean theater, increasing military aid to Indochina and the Philippines, and moving the US Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait—a decision with huge consequences for Chinese decisionmaking, as we shall see in Chapter 7. Acheson was also behind Truman’s decision not to get a Congressional resolution in support of committing US troops to Korea, which influenced domestic battles later in the war. Military leaders backed Acheson’s proposals about the Taiwan Strait, because they wanted to keep the conflict localized on the Korean peninsula. They were less enthusiastic about committing overstretched US combat forces on the ground, but they were forced to concede as South Korean troops continued to fall back (Rose 1999: 191; Freeland 1972: 349; Foot 1985: 62; Tucker 1983: 196–97; Paige 1968; Thornton 2000: chapter 8; Milliken 2001: chapters 2–3). The “rally round the flag effect” was tremendous. After the intervention, Truman’s approval rating jumped 9 points from June to July, and 81 percent of Americans favored committing US troops to the war. The war instantly coalesced support around Truman who had been under attack for both his foreign and domestic policies. Republican conservatives, Asia-firsters and most isolationists all applauded Truman’s decision to go to war, noting that Truman was finally following advice in Asia that Republicans had been urging for years. Even Senator Taft endorsed the action, creating such surprise that Truman’s press secretary exclaimed, “My God! Bob Taft has joined the UN and the US” (quoted in Doenecke 1979: 191; also Reinhard 1983: 68–69; Tucker 1983: 198; Caridi 1968: 37–38). Within a few weeks, however, the Republican right wing began to undermine the united front that had been built in June. On July 6, Senator Taft began calling for attacks north of the 38th Parallel to occupy the southern part of North Korea,
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or—better yet—to reunify the peninsula by force. Other Republicans criticized Truman for not asking Congress for a declaration of war. Moreover, Asia-Firsters asserted the Truman Administration’s previous Asia policies had rendered the nation ill-prepared for war. As Nevada Senator George Malone argued, “It all fits into a pattern—we deliberately lose Manchuria, China, Korea and Berlin. We follow the pattern of sometimes unrelated events—but it all adds up to losing strategic areas throughout the world” (quoted in Caridi 1968: 55). With the impending midterm elections in mind, the Republicans wanted to deny the Truman governing coalition’s willingness to aggressively handle the situation (Foot 1985: 69–70; Reinhard 1983: 69; Doenecke 1979: 192–93; Judd 1950: 54–55; Donovan 1984: 84–86; Caridi 1968: 73). In other words, as entrapment dynamics suggest, opposition leaders quickly started outbidding the Truman governing coalition with threat inflation and calls for more hawkish war policies. This external pressure was soon followed by calls for more aggressive action from within the governing coalition itself. By mid-July, shortly after being named UN forces commander, Gen. MacArthur began considering the possibility of crossing the 38th Parallel to occupy and unite all of Korea. He also began planning for the amphibious landing at Inchon, deep behind North Korean enemy lines. The Joint Chiefs agreed it made no military sense to halt at the 38th Parallel, and they advocated moving forward to a more defensible position. John Allison, the director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, was decidedly hawkish, advocating as early as July 1 to advance to the Manchurian border and then hold UN-supervised elections. On July 22, he was placed in overall charge of studies on future Korean policy, where he was able to influence other coalition members, including Acheson, Nitze and Bohlen, for the northward advance. This internal and external pressure for escalation led to more hawkish war policies. By September 1, the Truman coalition agreed to authorize the use of force above the 38th Parallel as long as it could be carried out without Chinese or Soviet intervention (Collins 1969: 83; Foot 1985: 71–73). The decision to intervene in the Korean War had two wider policy effects that set the stage for later entrapment. The first relates to Taiwan. Earlier in the spring, before the North Korean invasion in June, the Republican right wing had opposed an economic aid package for South Korea. To get the measure passed, the Truman governing coalition agreed to placate the Congressional China lobby and extend an earlier aid appropriation to Chiang Kai-Shek through June 30. This Administration-sponsored decision implied a connection between South Korea and Taiwan, so that “when war broke out in Korea, protection of Taiwan appeared compulsory” (Tucker 1983: 197; also Snyder 1991: 292; Freeland 1972: 342). While Truman and Acheson supported using the Seventh Fleet to neutral-
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ize the Taiwan Strait, they never intended this emergency measure to become permanent (Tucker 1983: 200; Foot 1985: 64). Yet, after the war broke out, parts of the governing coalition and a variety of domestic constituencies wanted to link Taiwan policy more tightly to the Korean War. Within the coalition, Defense Secretary Johnson, the JCS and Gen. MacArthur all advocated coastal bombing to keep the Chinese Communists from invading Taiwan, while Rusk at State collaborated with Dulles to create a “two Chinas” policy. Most significantly, in July MacArthur took an unauthorized trip to meet with Chiang in Taiwan, during which they signed a joint communiqué about common security concerns in Asia. Chiang also offered to contribute troops to the UN forces fighting in Korea. In August, MacArthur wrote a public letter— again without clearance from the JCS or any civilian leaders—to the Veterans of Foreign Wars, arguing again for the strategic necessity of preserving Taiwan. (Truman ordered the letter to be officially withdrawn.) More broadly, the China lobby and Asia-lationists called for increased ties with Chiang as an indispensable ally in this global war against Communism. They also pointed to MacArthur’s unilateral efforts to assert the Truman Administration was not doing all it could to fight Communists in Asia (Schnabel 1972: 68; Doenecke 1979: 194; Tucker 1983: 198–201; Freeland 1972: 351–52; Blum 1982: 215; Foot 1985: 65–66). As a result of these pressures from within and outside the coalition, Truman and Acheson had to abandon their goal of recognizing the PRC diplomatically. As Nancy Tucker argues, “If the American people must resist communist expansion and fear communist subversion, they could not be expected to condone policies flexible enough to initiate relations with a communist giant like the People’s Republic of China” (1983: 198). Moreover, by August, Truman felt compelled to approve a $14 million military assistance package to strengthen KMT defenses. Thus, because of its globalist agenda, the Truman coalition became increasingly involved with preserving Chiang’s regime (Tucker 1983: 201; Freeland 1972: 349– 50; Caridi 1968: 11). The second wider effect of the Korean intervention was that Truman reluctantly authorized the Cold War rearmament and mobilization effort that Acheson and the NSC-68 authors had been advocating. On July 19, Truman sent Congress his first message about the war, requesting $11.6 billion in supplemental military funding for the rest of the fiscal year, signaling his determination to strengthen the NATO alliance, and requesting authority to ensure adequate supplies for military and civilian use were available. This request, which became the Defense Production Act of 1950, was approved—although Republicans resented the greatly increased executive control over the economy. Congress also authorized a substantial across-the-board tax increase for an additional $5 billion in
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annual revenues. Moreover, Congress granted additional standby control powers over prices and wages, which Truman later invoked in January 1951 (Donovan 1984: 78; Pierpaoli 1999: 33–35; Friedberg 2000: 116, 120; Caridi 1968: 65–68). By mid-September 1950, Truman pushed out the last of the economizers, Defense Secretary Johnson, and replaced him with George C. Marshall. As the domestic coalition theory would predict, this hawkish coalition shift early in the war helped the Truman government mobilize to wage the war more effectively. Three other events about this time also signaled the hawkish strategy shift. First, Truman formally approved NSC-68. Second, on September 11, Truman approved NSC 81/1, a new strategy which recommended reunifying Korea if it could be accomplished without risk of war with China or the Soviet Union—in effect increasing US war aims. Finally, on September 15, MacArthur successfully conducted the amphibious landing at Inchon, turning the tide of the war (FRUS 1950, 7: 712–21; Stueck 1995: 63; Pierpaoli 1999: 30; Hamby 1990: 547; Pollard 1985: 240; Leffler 1992: 377; Schnabel 1972: 200; Truman 1956: 359). With this hawkish coalition shift, Truman accomplished two things. First, he removed the last veto player who opposed mobilization. Second, Truman hoped Marshall’s presence as a non-political elder statesman would defuse partisan attacks on his foreign policies. Unfortunately, Republicans used Marshall’s nomination hearings to air long-held grievances about Truman’s Asia policy, and over the next year until his resignation, Marshall was subjected to the same McCarthyist denunciations as Acheson. Indeed, for the upcoming midterm elections, the Republicans had settled on a campaign message of “Liberty against Socialism,” focusing on domestic security and anti-Communism in Asia. In September, Congress overwhelmingly passed the Internal Security Act of 1950, clearly a ploy to exploit the popularity of McCarthy’s anti-Communist paranoia. The strategy paid off, as Republicans gained 28 seats in the House and five in the Senate, leaving the Democrats with narrow majorities in both chambers (Freeland 1972: 352–53; Reinhard 1983: 65–67; Caridi 1968: 64, 90–103). the nsc-68 mindset meets chinese intervent ion
The United States adopted NSC-68 as the UN Command was improving its battlefield fortune. After MacArthur’s successful amphibious landing, Asialationist calls for Korean reunification intensified, while the press also supported an expanded war policy. Moreover, a Gallup poll in early October showed 64 percent of Americans would view halting at the 38th Parallel as appeasing the Communists (Whelan 1990: 223; Sterling 1998: 369; Foot 1985: 70; Caridi 1968: 73). Crossing the 38th Parallel raised the possibility China could intervene, but the temptation to exploit the great victory at Inchon, plus the desire to accomplish
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the long-standing UN political goal of reunifying Korea, caused policymakers to underestimate that possibility (Caridi 1968: 80; George 1980: 71; Neustadt 1990: 114–22). Thus, at the United States’ urging, on October 7 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution for the UN Command to reunify Korea militarily, as UN forces crossed north of the 38th Parallel. Because of the NSC-68 mindset, the Truman coalition initially thought the North Korean attack might be a feint to lure US forces away from a more vital area like Europe, where a follow-on Soviet attack was planned. Now, months later, there were no indications of a Soviet attack, so some officials argued direct Soviet entry into the hostilities was unlikely. Moreover, NSC 81/1’s analysis predicted some Soviet reaction—use of military force, attempts to reach settlement, or a hands-off policy—by the time US forces crossed the 38th Parallel (Milliken 2001: 123; Foot 1985: 74–75). Because no Soviet action occurred, coalition members assumed the Soviet Union had adopted a hands-off policy, as NSC 81/1 had suggested it might. Thus, as Neustadt argues, “With the military opportunity before them and with diplomatic dangers out of sight, the men [Truman] leaned on for advice saw little risk of any sort” (1990: 114–15). In this way, the NSC-68 mind-set predisposed them to interpret information according to their pre-existing beliefs, as the information obstacle would suggest. Thus, Truman’s coalition went along with MacArthur’s plans to continue north, even as some began to worry about Chinese intervention. One major problem is that, given the NSC-68 mindset, coalition members did not seriously separate Chinese intentions from those of the Soviets, despite Chinese warnings and available intelligence information to the contrary. As Chapter 7 will explain, starting on September 26, China provided at least three warnings about US intervention north of the 38th Parallel, in diplomatic meetings, public speeches and domestic newspapers. Moreover, US intelligence reports indicated Chinese troops were massing in Manchuria near the Yalu River. Cables from American embassies abroad, including London and Moscow, also reported an impending Chinese intervention (Sartori 2005: chapter 2; Heichal 1984: 94, 97; FRUS 1950, 7: 1061–96; Cohen and Gooch 1990: 169; Stueck 1983: 219, 224). Despite these clues, there were several reasons US decision-makers misperceived Chinese intentions to intervene. First, CIA analysts believed China had limited interests in the region. Moreover, many analysts agreed with MacArthur’s intelligence officer Gen. Willoughby that the auspicious time for intervention had passed. Thus, China was unlikely to intervene or at most would try to protect its hydroelectric complexes along the Yalu River and industry further north. The JCS concurred with the CIA’s conclusions and ordered MacArthur to refrain from bombing within five miles of the Manchurian border (FRUS 1950, 7: 117–21, 915, 933–34, 1025–26, 1101; Stueck 1995: 106, 111; Schnabel and Watson 1979: 262).
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Edmund Clubb, head of State’s Office of Chinese Affairs, dissented from this consensus; he thought China might intervene because of broader ideological concerns (Whiting 1991: 106–8; Foot 1985: 80). Second, US decision-makers assumed the Chinese military was not very effective. Extending their assumption about a Soviet hands-off policy in Korea, they assumed Stalin would provide no Soviet air or naval support—without which they believed the Chinese could not decisively intervene (FRUS 1950, 7: 933–34; Schnabel 1972: 201; Stueck 1983: 219). As Acheson asserted, “it would be sheer madness for the Chinese to enter the Korean War” (quoted in Zhang 1992: 84). More importantly, while intelligence analysts had a fairly complete picture of the organization and equipment in a Chinese division, they explicitly compared the Chinese to the North Koreans and noted their lack of artillery, heavy weapons and transport. As a result, they came to view the Chinese forces as a second-rate North Korean army, instead of a different kind of enemy altogether (Cohen and Gooch 1990: 176–77; Zhang 1992: 102). Third, and perhaps most importantly, MacArthur considered Chinese intervention remote, as he told Truman during their October 15 meeting at Wake Island. As Truman recounts, MacArthur told him flatly “that if any Chinese were to enter Korea they would face certain disaster but he did not expect them to try anything that foolish” (1956: 373; also Leffler 1992: 378; FRUS 1950, 7: 948–60). Truman appears to have tied himself to MacArthur’s interpretation of events. As he remarked, “you pick your man, you’ve got to back him up” (quoted in Neustadt 1990: 122). After the Inchon landing, MacArthur’s influence was at its peak. Indeed, because the JCS had doubted the Inchon operation right up to its execution, they were even less inclined after its brilliant success to question MacArthur’s judgment than before (Collins 1969: 141). Thus, given the predominant view of China’s narrow interests and ineffective capabilities, tactical intelligence was forced to fit MacArthur’s belief that he could defeat the Chinese. MacArthur did not want the Chinese to enter the war, so his intelligence officer made it his job to underestimate the Chinese presence and convince everyone they would not intervene. Willoughby “was accustomed to telling MacArthur what the general wanted to hear, and he sympathized with his boss’s determination to march on to complete victory in Korea” (Stueck 1995: 112). For example, Willoughby may have knowingly falsified intelligence reports, setting an upper estimate of 60,000 Chinese soldiers in Korea when in fact more than 200,000 were already there. Because CIA’s intelligence work in Korea occurred in cooperation with Willoughby, “all the information from China was one and the same” (Heichal 1984: 94; also Marshall 1953: 213; Spanier 1959: 105; Edwards 2000: 81; Sterling 1998: 379; Andrew 1995: 189–90). In addition to these information obstacle dynamics, domestic political entrap-
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ment was starting to have an effect as well. Polls at the time revealed proponents for escalation had increased to more than 30 percent, three times the number who wanted to pull out (Sterling 1998: 389). Similarly, press coverage of the war remained glowing and editorials advocated uncompromising anti-Communist positions; almost every major newspaper had endorsed the decision to cross the 38th Parallel (Foot 1990: 70). MacArthur was promising the war would be over by Christmas; any alteration to existing policy—including a pull-back to the “waist” of the peninsula advocated by the Brits—would not permit the war’s quick end and would have a “catastrophic effect” on public opinion (Foot 1990: 27–28; Sterling 1998: 388; James 1993: 199–200). The result was a classic case of leaders becoming “too invested to quit” and thus interpreting information so as to justify a course of action despite evidence against it. The Truman governing coalition chose not to know that its northward advance was about to turn sour. Several scholars describe the Truman coalition at this juncture as desperate to reestablish its prestige in the Far East and to rectify its domestic reputation as “soft on Communism”—making it insensitive to intelligence suggesting Korean unification was unrealistic. Despite China’s repeated warnings, the Truman coalition was inclined to dismiss them as bluff. In short, “the administration’s wishful thinking encouraged grossly defective information processing” (George 1980: 75; also Huo 1989: 192; Lichterman 1963: 596; Tsou 1963: 567–69; de Weerd 1962: 451–52; Rees 1964: 110). As Alexander George and Richard Smoke argue, A reversal of policy was so unpalatable to the administration that it was unwilling to face up to the necessity for modifying its war objective before it was too late. . . . it reduced US receptivity to indicators of the growing threat of Chinese intervention. Washington’s reluctance to accept information that challenged the premises and wisdom of its policy strongly encouraged its tendencies to misread the frame of reference with which Peking perceived events in Korea, to misinterpret available information and to underestimate Peking’s motivation and willingness to take risks. (1974: 190–92, emphasis added)
In sum, facing a military opportunity and the chance for domestic political benefits, the Truman coalition assumed diplomatic dangers away, avoiding available information that the UN’s advance to the Yalu River could have nasty consequences. The NSC-68 mindset simply did not allow for the possibility that China and the Soviet Union might have different interests and goals in the war. Therefore, once convinced the Soviets would not intervene, the Truman coalition assumed it was free to unify the peninsula militarily. By publicly committing itself to the goal of Korean unification, it also set the stage for further entrapment by hawkish domestic constituencies. As Richard Barnet bluntly argues, it was “one
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of the clearest cases where fear of a domestic political backlash drove a critical strategic decision” (1990: 313). Thus, the Truman governing coalition chose not to know that it needed to stop its offensive and start taking actions to end the war. the nsc-68 mindset meets “ an ent irely new war ”
Given such misperception, it is not surprising that the Chinese intervention was a massive strategic surprise. Upon comprehending the scale of the attack, MacArthur famously cabled Washington that “we face an entirely new war” (FRUS 1950, 7: 1237). UN troops suffered 11,000 casualties in the first two days and were in full-fledged retreat (Foot 1985: 101; Sterling 1998: 397). After having written off the potential for Soviet intervention entirely, now the pendulum swung abruptly the other way: the Truman coalition immediately assumed the Soviets were behind the Chinese counterattack (Donaldson 1996: 61). The Chinese intervention became yet another vindication for the assumptions and analysis of NSC-68; in this view, the Soviet Union so clearly controlled China that Rusk decried China’s sacrifice for its “foreign masters” as the “ambitions of the Communist conspiracy” (quoted in West 1993: 22). Because the NSC-68 mindset could not conceive that China and the Soviet Union might have different interests and objectives in the war, the Chinese intervention had to be an indication of a new phase in the Soviet-directed campaign. For example, State’s Office of Chinese Affairs now asserted China “was definitely on the Moscow line and the possibility of reorienting Peking away from Moscow was ‘negligible’” (quoted in Foot 1985: 102). His earlier prediction of Chinese intervention confirmed, Clubb now emphasized Chinese actions as part of a Soviet strategic design. China’s intervention in Korea was “largely meaningless,” he argued, unless it was “regarded as a component of a global Communist plan” (FRUS 1950, 7: 1292). Returning to the NSC-68 mindset’s second frame, CIA Director Walter Bedell Smith argued the Soviets’ presumed backing of Chinese intervention indicated a greater Soviet readiness to initiate a third world war, especially “if they can bog us down in Asia” (quoted in Merrill 1997: 107). Or, in Acheson’s words, “this aggression was ordered by the Kremlin” (quoted in Chang 1990: 76). In such an environment, the Truman coalition decided the best way to show US steadfastness was to “hold the line” in Korea. If the Soviet Union had a global master plan and could begin a global war when it wanted, then the United States had no alternative but to stand firm and protect its allies. Gen. Charles L. Bolte, the Army’s operations chief (G3) and the only major official in Washington to visit Korea since the Chinese intervention, argued firmness would deter further “aggression,” whereas timidity or withdrawal would produce the opposite result
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(Stueck 1995: 118). Rusk argued that abandoning South Korea would set a poor “example of what it means to be a friend of the US” (quoted in Foot 1985: 109). Acheson agreed if the US left Korea, “all Asians would hurry to make the best deals they could” with the Soviet Union and Communist China (FRUS 1950, 7: 1383). Moreover, Marshall and the JCS emphasized that US prestige would suffer if Korea had to be abandoned (FRUS 1950, 7: 1293–94, 1311, 1324, 1335–36, 1345– 46). If “holding the line” was given, there was considerable debate within the governing coalition over the next two months about whether to widen the war further into China. The most extreme proponent of this course of action was MacArthur, who argued that the US should either evacuate completely from Korea or widen the war into China. He proposed moving north of the 38th Parallel again, blockading the Chinese coast, bombing China’s industrial centers, supply bases and communications network, accepting Chiang Kai-Shek’s offer to send 30,000 troops from Taiwan and backing a KMT counterattack onto the Chinese mainland. In other words, MacArthur rejected the premise that the United States was still waging a limited war and suggested using every means at its disposal to win. MacArthur’s views found vocal support from the Republican right wing and Asia-lationists in Congress, whose pressures for escalation had only intensified since China’s intervention (MacArthur 1964: 379; Freeland 1972: 356; Caridi 1968: 116). While not as extreme as MacArthur, the three service secretaries and the JCS all supported retaliation against China to some degree (Merrill 1997: 379–81). Even Marshall agreed there was “heavy popular pressure for the United States to do something” and the United States could not afford to wait for the United Nations (FRUS 1951, 7: 93–94). Despite that consensus, Acheson proved a very powerful veto player during these debates and swung Truman to his position. Invoking the NSC-68 mindset’s second frame, Acheson believed a wider war with China would provoke an armed response from the Soviet Union, probably on a global scale. Moreover, he blocked wider dissemination of subordinates’ views that diverged from his interpretation that Chinese intervention was part of a Soviet master plan. These officials—Kennan, Rusk, Phillip Jessup and Walworth Barbour at the US embassy in Moscow— argued the Soviets might gain more from non-involvement and noted there was little evidence of Soviet intention to intervene (FRUS 1950, 7: 1603–4; Foot 1985: 125–26). Acheson suppressed these views, because they conflicted with his Europe-first preferences: fighting a wider war with China would not only diminish US ability to fight the Soviets, but also divert US resources from Europe (Leffler 1992: 383–90). Instead, Acheson argued a general lack of international confidence
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in US leaders was already slowing European defense plans and promoting neutralist sentiments there. As he asserted, “We are fighting the wrong nation. . . . We are fighting the second team, whereas the real enemy is the Soviet Union” (FRUS 1950, 7: 1326). Acheson’s views were also supported by Nitze, Clubb and the CIA (Foot 1985: 117–23). Acheson almost single-handedly blocked any real discussion of retaliation against China, with his most important obstruction occurring at a NSC meeting on January 17, 1951. As a result, Truman delayed a decision on recommendations from the JCS and MacArthur and returned them to the NSC staff for further consideration—effectively stopping all momentum that had been building in the Truman coalition for retaliation against China. Instead, records from the meeting highlight how much Truman adopted Acheson’s perspective. The minutes noted “any actions undertaken by the US should be in furtherance of this [NSC68] concept.” Moreover, “because of the present military unpreparedness, action which might precipitate global war should be avoided. Further, those actions which would alienate our supporters in our over-all effort against the USSR should also be avoided” (Merrill 1997: 392–96, emphasis added). In sum, the NSC-68 mindset melded with Acheson’s Europe-first preferences to effectively stop all momentum within the governing coalition for escalating the war against China. Influenced again by the two frames of the NSC-68 mindset, the governing coalition believed, on the one hand, that it had to “hold the line” in Korea. On the other hand, powerful coalition members also believed any major increase in military pressure could turn the Korean conflict into global war; thus, it needed to focus on rearming and preparing for the war that might be coming in Europe. In other words, after the Chinese intervention, the NSC-68 mindset created twin constraints on the Truman coalition’s strategic choices— holding the line in Korea while avoiding global war—that remained in place for the rest of his administration. Thus the NSC-68 mindset served as a filter on the information that guided policy formulation. In turn, the policies interacted with political dynamics to entrap Truman. the coalit ion ’ s resp onse to the “ ent irely new war ”
Two weeks after China’s intervention, the National Security Council approved an amendment to NSC-68 to accelerate US and NATO rearmament efforts: the expected “year of maximum danger” was moved forward to 1952, and thus rearmament efforts to meet that threat needed to be completed by that date. The next day, Truman declared a State of National Emergency—something that did not happen in either World War II or the Vietnam War—and announced he was
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beginning “total mobilization” and establishing a new rearmament agency, the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM). This move had the psychological and political effect of demonstrating that Truman was doing something about the situation in Korea. By publicly announcing the stepped-up rearmament efforts right after the devastating Chinese counterattack two weeks before, Truman indelibly linked the Korean War and the NSC-68 rearmament efforts in the minds of Congress and the public (Donovan 1984: 132; Friedberg 2000: 120–22; Pollard 1985: 241; Merrill 1997: 287–94; Pierpaoli 1999: 46, 117). The mobilization effort was impressive, but quite interventionist. Truman’s proposed budget for 1951, unveiled in January, revealed that nearly 69 percent of $72 billion in federal expenditures was earmarked for national security. Moreover, he proposed increasing the annual rate of defense spending from $20 billion to $50 billion by the end of 1951. To manage this massive rearmament effort, between December 15 and February 1, the Truman Administration established 19 new government agencies. The rapid mobilization and rearmament schedules badly distorted the economy, sparking a firestorm of inflation that ultimately forced Truman to issue mandatory wage and price controls in January 1951. Moreover, it eventually unbalanced the federal budget, led to across-the-board tax increases, raw material shortages and economic dislocations and encouraged the growth of the military industrial complex. By the spring, relations between Truman and Congress grew strained as Congress tried to limit his emergency and mobilization powers and stall tax increases. All of this, in turn, created acrimonious debates between liberals and conservatives over how best to distribute the nation’s resources, with the public and Congress both fretting openly about the long-term consequences of mobilization (Hogan 1998: 315–65; Pierpaoli 1999: 43–55, 65–68, 71, 83; Friedberg 2000: 117–22; Hamby 1990: 577). Opposition to mobilization received voice through the “Great Debate” in Congress (December 1950 through April 1951)—fueled by Asia-lationist critique of Truman’s December 19 decision to deploy troops to NATO without Congressional consent. Republicans were outraged by the choice to beef up security in Europe “while American boys were on the run in Korea” (Reinhard 1983: 71; also Caridi 1968: 126; Donovan 1984: 146). Fiscal conservatives joined in, arguing Truman’s commitments to NATO combined with the Korean War could bankrupt the nation. The debate was a last-ditch effort by Congressional conservatives to reverse the decision to implement the military buildup proposed in NSC-68, and the Korean War only stoked their latent hostility to a Europe-first containment approach (Pierpaoli 1999: 57–58). To be sure, the Republicans were being contrarian, at the same time advocating for an all-out escalation against China and a complete withdrawal from
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Korea. The root of this inconsistency was their belief that, as Senator William Jenner put it, Truman “blundered, tricked and betrayed us into a war” (Reinhard 1983: 69; also Caridi 1968: 114–16). For example, in January 1951 Taft argued that stationing four US Army divisions in Europe would goad the Soviet Union into war; three months later, during the MacArthur hearings, he and many followers believed that the Soviets would tolerate US bombing near its Asian borders in an expanded war (Doenecke 1979: 205). These inconsistencies in the Republican right wing and Asia-lationist opposition to Truman’s war policies—simultaneously calling for American withdrawal and passionately associating themselves with MacArthur’s “no substitute for victory” philosophy—continued through the 1952 presidential elections (Caridi 1968: 175–82). Despite these partisan attacks, the Truman governing coalition held to its policy. The need to strengthen the NATO alliance and thus prepare for the “real” war ahead compelled it to focus on containing the Korean War. Holding the line in Korea not only demonstrated resolve to the Soviets, but as Truman and Acheson explained to British Prime Minister Clement Atlee, “any public compromise or conciliation with Beijing would destroy the momentum” of the rearmament and mobilization under NSC-68 and thus undercut American assistance for its European allies (Christensen 1996: 185). In other words, preparing for a feared potential Soviet attack took precedence over responding to the actual Chinese intervention that was pushing the UN forces back south across the 38th Parallel. In the Truman coalition’s view, a limited war was the only way to juggle the Korean challenge with the risk of global war with the Soviets. As Army Chief Gen. Collins summarized, “Since the United States is not now prepared to engage in global war, and will not be ready before July 1, 1952, we should take all honorable means to avoid any action that is likely to bring Russia into open conflict with the United States prior to that date” (quoted in Trachtenberg 1988–89: 26). Therefore, in March 1951, the State Department distributed a draft text on UN policies in Korea, including a statement on its willingness to settle. State sent MacArthur a copy of the statement before releasing it to the press; he preemptively issued a cocky statement of his own, telling the Chinese to surrender or be destroyed. This insubordination was the direct cause for MacArthur’s dismissal on April 11 (Truman 1956: 467–69; Caridi 1968: 143–45). However, MacArthur was no longer supporting the governing coalition’s priority to prepare for the general war thought to be coming in Europe—and thus was out of step with its policies more generally. As the coalition member with preferences furthest away from the majority’s, changing war policy would be easier without his constraints on the coalition.4 As his successor at the UN Command, Gen. Matthew Ridgway, later argued,
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By the time the MacArthur hearings before Congress started in May 1951, the Truman coalition had passed NSC 48/5, a major review of its Asia policy, which returned to Truman’s initial status quo ante bellum war aims and advocated Korean reunification by political rather than military means. War strategy was modified to confine and terminate the conflict: the United States should “seek to avoid the extension of hostilities in Korea into a general war with the Soviet Union” (FRUS 1951, 7: 439–42). This emphasis on the risk of precipitating general war, if the United States tried anything other than the current restricted course of action, was also a major plank in the Truman Administration’s arguments at the MacArthur hearings. The NSC-68 mindset echoed throughout this testimony. Administration spokesmen argued that (1) limiting the scope of fighting in Korea would give the United States time to build up its own strength and (2) MacArthur’s proposed war escalation not only could not guarantee the war’s end but would also likely draw the Soviets directly into the war, while simultaneously estranging the United States from its allies (Rees 1964: Chapter 15; Foot 1985: 136). It was an “impressive show of solidarity”—all the governing coalition’s former proponents of a wider war with China toed Truman’s line (Acheson 1968: 529). The public remained more hawkish than the Truman coalition, in part reflecting the political fall-out from MacArthur’s removal. The general had returned to the United States as a great national hero and presented a dramatic address to Congress: “The ovation was akin to an eruption; the Congressional eulogies that followed were as overheated as lava from Vesuvius” (Hamby 1990: 562). Threequarters of the American public favored continuing operations, compared to only 14 percent advocating the United States “pull out now.” US casualties now exceeded 60,000, and MacArthur’s contention that limited war would only bring stalemate resonated with a war-weary public. As a result, roughly 45 percent also favored escalatory measures, such as bombing Manchuria and assisting Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists in returning to mainland China. Fully 60 percent wanted to give Chiang’s forces all the help they needed to attack Chinese Communists, and one-third even favored launching a general war against China (Schwarz 1994: 10, 14; Stueck 1995: 182–84; Foot 1985: 156; 1990: 139; Sterling 1998: 431). Paired with
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the calls for escalation from Congressional Asia-Firsters, the domestic political environment could have supported the Truman governing coalition taking more escalatory measures against China, but it no longer actively considered them. The Truman governing coalition tried to respond to these hawkish domestic constituencies, combating the partisan attacks for being “soft on Communism” in Asia while remaining true to its more European-centric NSC-68 rearmament effort. For example, in March 1951, Truman agreed with a JCS recommendation to create a military assistance advisory group to aid Chiang in Taiwan. Later, he approved $300 million in military aid to the KMT and announced that Taiwan was sharing equal priority with Western Europe for arms shipments. Finally, on May 18, Rusk announced diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, asserting the United States “believe[s] it more authentically represents the views of the great body of the people of China, particularly the historic demand for independence from foreign control” (quoted in Caridi 1968: 121). These policy choices—a far cry from the previous spring’s plan to cut ties with the KMT and recognize the PRC—reflect just how trapped the Truman governing coalition had become. Unfortunately, the complete lack of understanding about Chinese interests or capabilities that the Truman coalition exhibited in its race to the Yalu River continued to haunt the United States for the next two years. Before the Chinese intervention, most US analysts had scoffed at the Chinese forces as a “second rate North Korean Army” rather than a force with its own capabilities, strengths and weaknesses. Now, after facing “an entirely new war,” the Truman coalition assumed the Soviets were behind the Chinese counterattack, if only to tie down US forces while preparing to launch the “real” war in Europe. Given their monolithic understanding of Communism, US leaders focused more intensely on Moscow’s motivations for escalating the war indirectly than on possible Chinese motivations as a separate actor. Trapped by the two frames of the NSC-68 mindset, the Truman governing coalition believed, on the one hand, that it had to “hold the line” in Korea. On the other hand, it believed that any major increase in military pressure could turn the Korean conflict into global war; thus, it needed to focus on rearming and preparing for the war that might be coming in Europe. These rearmament efforts became indelibly linked in Congress’ and the public’s mind with the Korean War, which is not surprising, since the NSC-68 mindset drove the logic for both. As a result—and quite ironically—the Truman coalition stopped pressing militarily just at the point when the Chinese offensive campaigns in Korea were stalling out and the Chinese military forces were at their weakest.
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Conclusions This chapter has examined the interacting dynamics of information and entrapment obstacles in US decisions about prosecuting and ending the Korean War. While Truman had emphasized the economic aspects of containment before June 1950, the Korean War and the resulting mobilization instigated the militarization of Truman’s containment policy. It also led to the reversal of many aspects of the Truman Administration’s pre-war Asia policy, in order to placate domestic constituencies to ensure support for its Europe-focused mobilization. Having used global anti-Communist rhetoric to sell its policies towards Europe since 1947, it was almost impossible to keep that rhetoric from being directed towards containing Communism in Asia during the Korean War. As Richard Freeland argues, “In the short period between the Truman Doctrine speech and early 1951 . . . the Administration had been led, against its will and policy, but according to the logic of its rhetoric and politics, to a full application of the Truman Doctrine in Asia” (1972: 358). At the macro level, the “stickiness” of the Truman coalition’s war policies resulted from its NSC-68 mindset and the policies pursued in response. Although the NSC-68 mindset predated the war, the North Korean attack vindicated its assumptions and created two cognitive frames through which all subsequent information about the war was interpreted. On the one hand, the NSC-68 mindset led Truman’s coalition to view the Soviet Union as seeking to test US resolve. Thus, it was unable to disengage completely from Korea because it believed the war was a major test of its ability to contain Communism everywhere. On the other hand, the NSC-68 mindset led Truman’s coalition to view the Soviets as already pursuing global domination, creating a belief that any military escalation could turn the Korean War into World War III. Thus, the NSC-68 mindset not only blinded the governing coalition to strategic alternatives that may have helped it end the war sooner, but it also drove a domestic mobilization effort that ultimately became very unpopular, leading to accusations of the “imperial presidency” (Schlesinger 1973; Donovan 1984: 167; Pierpaoli 1999: 160–94; Donovan 1982: 382–91). This chapter has explained the chronological story of US decision-making in the Korean War through the American decision to seek a negotiated settlement in the spring of 1951. Within the broader war policy narrative, it has highlighted many domestic challenges the beleaguered Truman faced—including the political irritants of mobilization, McCarthy’s assaults and the Republican right wing’s politically expedient strategy of simultaneously calling for all-out war against China and immediate withdrawal from Korea. All of these challenges contin-
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ued throughout Truman’s tenure. For example, the mobilization’s wage controls eventually led to labor strikes and in March 1952, Truman even seized the nation’s steel mills. McCarthyist attacks eventually led Secretary of Defense Marshall to resign in September 1951, after being investigated for his role in “losing China” during his tenure as secretary of state. The Republicans honed their oppositional strategy into a foreign policy platform for the 1952 presidential election. Thus, it is not surprising that Alonso Hamby, Truman’s biographer, writes, “Few presidents have been as harried as Harry Truman during his last two and half years in office” (1990: 583). Chapter 6 continues this narrative, starting in July 1951 with the armistice negotiations. While this chapter has focused on the interacting dynamics of the information and entrapment obstacles at the macro (strategic) level, Chapter 6 delves into them at the micro (policy) level with the US decision to adopt the POW voluntary repatriation policy.
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The United States, Part 2 Trapped by Voluntary Prisoner Repatriation
The previous chapter laid out the interacting dynamics of the entrapment and information obstacles in US decision-making in the Korean War at the macro level, using the framework of the “NSC-68 mindset.” Vindicating its fears about an imminent Soviet drive for world domination, the North Korean attack prompted the Truman coalition to embark on a massive Cold War mobilization effort while fighting a limited war in Korea. However, building political support for this strategy required winning over moderate Republicans and Asia-lationists through expanded war aims—increasing military aid to Taiwan, shelving plans to recognize China diplomatically and launching a ground offensive to reunify the Korean peninsula—all policies which directly drew China into the war. Subsequently, facing “an entirely new war,” the Truman coalition was trapped in two ways. First, it was trapped by its beliefs—embodied in the NSC-68 mindset—that holding the ground in Korea was critical while rearming to prepare for the “year of maximum danger.” These beliefs not only blinded it to differing interests and objectives among its Communist adversaries, but eclipsed strategic alternatives that may have helped it end the war sooner. More importantly, the Truman coalition was trapped by domestic constituencies. Because it believed the only course was conducting a limited war in Korea while implementing a massive mobilization at home, the Truman coalition was caught in a dilemma. On the one hand, the Korean War helped it secure necessary Congressional and public support for its massive Cold War mobilization plan. On the other hand, the threat inflation that resulted from selling mobilization to the American people stoked hawkish constituencies for all-out victory in Korea. In the hey-day of
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McCarthyism, any efforts to move towards a negotiated settlement renewed calls of the Truman governing coalition being “soft on Communism.” Nestled within this broader entrapment was the US decision to adopt a policy of voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war (POWs), which exemplified information and entrapment dynamics at the micro (policy) level. The Truman Administration adopted the POW policy prematurely, without considering the effects such a position would create. Subsequently, the Truman coalition became “too invested to quit” and thus it systematically ignored unpalatable information suggesting this policy would conflict with other, more important, policy preferences. By the time it became aware of the policy’s full implications, it was too late to back down without signaling “weakness” to the Communists and incompetence to the domestic audience. Beleaguered by partisan attacks and domestic political crises—many resulting from the Cold War mobilization effort—Truman could neither abandon the POW policy nor escalate the war to bring the Communists to terms. It was only with a domestic governing coalition shift—the election of President Eisenhower—that entrapment and information obstacles at both levels were lifted and the United States could change course towards ending the war. While Eisenhower retained the same war aims that Truman had espoused, his governing coalition brought a different worldview—and a different conceptualization of the war—that left it freer to consider an expanded palate of strategic options. Notably, as a Republican, Eisenhower could more easily accept terms Truman could not while placating the hawkish Republican right wing in other issue areas. This chapter completes the analysis of US decision-making in the Korean War, in three sections and a conclusion. The first section examines the micro-level dynamics of the information and entrapment obstacles in the US decision to adopt the voluntary POW repatriation policy. The second section returns to the macro-level perspective to explain how the new Eisenhower coalition was able to overcome the obstacles to peace that hindered the Truman Administration to end the war. Finally, the third section examines some alternative explanations for US behavior during the Korean War.
Voluntary Repatriation: Information and Entrapment Obstacles at the Micro Level The Korean War armistice negotiations began in July 1951, and after a short recess that autumn, resumed and quickly resolved many issues. The talks were so productive that by February 8, 1952, Acheson presented Truman with a memo-
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randum that opened: “It now appears likely that the prisoners of war issue will shortly become the sole remaining fundamental issue in the Korean armistice negotiations” (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 44). From that point on, disagreement over POW repatriation took center stage and single-handedly held up negotiations for 15 months. What caused POW repatriation to become such a hindrance to the process? As Chapter 5 argued, after the Chinese intervention, the NSC-68 mindset created twin constraints on the Truman coalition’s strategic choices—holding the line in Korea while avoiding global war—that remained in place for the rest of Truman’s time in office. This macro-level world-view filtered down into its micro-level policy decisions, like the POW voluntary repatriation policy. This section argues that the Truman coalition did not want to compromise on the POW policy, because it believed that standing up to the Soviets on the issue of voluntary repatriation would fight the moral crusade against Communism and help deter a future war. At the same time, however, it did not believe it could escalate militarily to pressure the Communists in the negotiating tent, for fear of sparking World War III. In other words, these two constraints were a policy-level version of the NSC-68 mindset dilemma. voluntary repat r iat ion and the infor mat ion obstacle
The United States began armistice negotiations with a one-for-one prisoner exchange policy. This policy was strongly supported by Acheson, who argued against the Department of Defense’s preferred voluntary repatriation policy. The Army’s chief of psychological warfare, Brig. Gen. Robert McClure, first raised the issue of voluntary repatriation, arguing for both its humanitarian and propaganda benefits. McClure predicted many Chinese and North Korean POWs would be severely punished, sentenced to slave labor or killed on their return, as Soviet citizens had been after World War II. Thus, McClure argued voluntary repatriation and the prospect of asylum might induce Communist soldiers’ defections in this and future wars, while repatriating all Communists now could hinder future psychological warfare operations. After a Defense Department July 1951 study endorsed McClure’s ideas, the JCS and new Defense Secretary Robert Lovett agreed (Foot 1990: 87–88; Hermes 1966: 136–37; Stueck 1995: 244–45; Rose 1994: 307; Bernstein 1983: 276). Acheson unequivocally rejected the idea in September, arguing the only exceptions to forcible repatriation should be prisoners who helped the UN Command (UNC) and South Koreans who had been forcibly impressed into the North Korean Army. Acheson suggested the UNC could release these prisoners preemptively before an armistice and thus still abide by the Geneva Convention (FRUS
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1951, 7: 857–58; Bernstein 1983: 277).1 Acheson’s response led Lovett and the JCS to revert to their former position of a one-for-one prisoner exchange, until all UN prisoners were home, and then the return of remaining Communist POWs in the UN Command’s possession. (In effect, they argued for a staggered all-for-all exchange.) This policy would probably have remained in effect if not for Truman’s sudden interest in the problem. As Chapter 5 explained, Truman placed the fighting in Korea in the context of the “struggle between freedom and Communist slavery.” Focusing on Communism’s moral and spiritual dangers, Truman argued faith and ethical action were integral to any victory in the Cold War. By September 1951, he explicitly called for an international religious campaign against Communism—the Campaign of Truth. Linking America’s founding and its religious heritage, Truman argued that “at this time of international peril and uncertainty we should look back to these beginnings and rededicate ourselves to those ideals.” Thus, the same month Acheson rejected the voluntary repatriation policy, Truman was reinforcing his interest in defending “the spiritual values—the moral code—against the vast forces of evil that seek to destroy them” (quoted in Spalding 2006: 213, 215, 217). In line with these ideals, on October 29 Truman told Acting Secretary of State James Webb that he was against the one-for-one POW policy, because it was not “equitable” and might lead to harm for those prisoners who had surrendered and cooperated with the United States. Webb pointed out that the time might come when voluntary repatriation would be the last outstanding issue and thus hold up the settlement. Truman acknowledged this fact, but said he would only agree to an all-for-all prisoner swap if the UNC received “some major concession that could be obtained no other way” (FRUS 1951, 7: 1073; Ferrell 1980: 250–51). There is little indication from this conversation that Truman had reflected on the POW policy’s ramifications—both its first-order effects on the Korean War armistice negotiations and its second- and third-order effects on other policies. The conversation highlights Truman’s natural inclination to make decisions rapidly, leading to premature cognitive closure (Larson 1985: 146–47; Sigal 1988: 211; Foot 1990: 89). Truman’s “strong personal interest” in POW policy reopened the debate in Truman’s government.2 During this debate, most uniformed and civilian defense officials argued for keeping the all-for-all POW exchange; notable exceptions were Lovett, his deputy and the air force secretary, who were uncertain about the policy. In contrast, most of the State Department—including Acheson, who reversed his position after hearing about Truman’s October comments—argued for voluntary repatriation. However, there were four State officials who bucked their
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colleagues’ support for voluntary repatriation. Presenting their views to Acheson, these officials raised some serious objections, including that the Administration (1) did not know the full size of the POW problem and that the Communists might break off negotiations over it,3 (2) had not considered the impact of additional casualties on allied and domestic opinion if negotiations broke down over the issue,4 (3) could not tell which POWs would want to be returned, because of internal camp politics5 and (4) had refused to consider whether the Communists would reprise against US prisoners if the United States refused to return Communist POWs.6 Acheson, knowing Truman’s preference, disregarded his subordinates’ objections to voluntary repatriation. Instead, he worded his February 8 policy proposal to Truman so that it would resonate and have the maximum appeal: Any agreement in the Korean armistice which would require United States troops to use force to turn over to the Communists, prisoners who believe that they would face death if returned, would be repugnant to our most fundamental moral and humanitarian principles . . . (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 43–45)
In this proposal, Acheson did not present his subordinates’ objections, so Truman never fully considered the policy’s implications and possible trade-offs. Instead, by approving this memo, Truman and Acheson effectively defined voluntary repatriation as an irrevocable moral principle. As Acheson later put it, “Thus, we took our basic position, from which we afterward never wavered. The execution of the decision did not proceed as planned. Circumstances unforeseen and embarrassing intruded” (Acheson 1969: 653). Truman’s intervention and Acheson’s reversal on POW policy catalyzed a consensus; all key members of the Truman governing coalition except Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Fechteler fell in line behind it. In the United States, all major newspapers and most Congressmen supported the policy (Bernstein 1983: 283; Caridi 1968: 179–80; Rose 1994: 291; Foot 1990: 92). At the February 27 meeting to approve the policy, the Truman coalition swept aside possible evidence that its decision could mean stalemate and significantly prolong the war. For example, Acheson told Truman that he consulted key allies and “none . . . indicated any disagreement with our position on this question” (quoted in Bernstein 1983: 281). Actually, most Western allies had mixed feelings about the policy but lacked enough confidence in opposing arguments to argue strongly against Truman (Foot 1990: 92). Even more importantly, two days before the decision, two officials returned from a trip to estimate the number of Communist prisoners unlikely to elect to return home. On February 25, Gen. Hull (Vice Chief of Staff of the Army) and U. Alexis Johnson (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs)
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told Truman that the UNC expected only 15,900 of 132,194 Communist prisoners would violently resist repatriation. The resisting POWs included 11,500 Chinese. Accordingly, Hull and Johnson acknowledged that “qualitatively as well as possibly quantitatively, the problem of CCF [Chinese] POWs and possible Communist reactions thereto was much more difficult than that of Korean POWs” (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 58–59; also Bernstein 1983: 275; Goodman 1978: 252). It is unclear from notes of the February 27 meeting whether these numbers played any role in the voluntary repatriation policy decision. In March 1952, as POWs became the last contentious issue in armistice negotiations, the US negotiators used Hull and Johnson’s February estimates to propose that POWs unwilling to return home be removed from the lists and all others repatriated. This proposal would have allowed the United States to achieve its aims while protecting the Communists from having to endorse the principle of voluntary repatriation.7 Unfortunately, when US negotiators made this offer, the February estimates were no longer accurate and more recent information was ignored. This more recent information suggested those numbers were at best wildly inaccurate and at worst too optimistic, because it would be virtually impossible to get an accurate screening and allow prisoners to make a genuine choice about repatriation. It also suggested that many more than 15,900 POWs would resist repatriation. Yet this information—from at least four sources, cited below—was ignored. First, more than a month before Truman adopted the voluntary repatriation policy, Frank Stelle of State’s Policy Planning Staff argued the UN camps embodied a “reign of terror.” Stelle argued Chinese prisoners especially believed the camps were “violently totalitarian,” implying that getting an accurate count among them would be impossible (quoted in Foot 1990: 125). Second, since early February, the US embassy in Korea had reported to Johnson that it would be impossible to count POWs accurately, for organizational and political reasons. These reports noted fear among prisoners intimidated by the brutal pro-KMT quasi-police who ran the camps and implied the number of non-repatriates would be very large (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 98–99; Foot 1990: 125). Third, the UN camps had already observed much violence, starting with disturbances in September 1951 and escalating to full-scale riots in the compound on Koje-do island by February 1952.8 Although these riots were not publicized, the UN Command, JCS and Johnson knew about them (Hermes 1966: 237–40; Ridgeway 1967: 208–9; Foot 1990: 118). This escalating pattern of violence reinforced the embassy reports that Communist prisoners were afraid and would probably not respond accurately in the repatriation screenings. There were many reasons for this violence. The overcrowded camps—some held five times the
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number they were designed to contain—lacked adequate sanitation, lodging and heating. Moreover, medical problems—especially digestive diseases, dysentery, malaria and tuberculosis—were rampant, often caused by the “inferior grains” that replaced two-thirds of the rice ration (Foot 1990: 110; MacDonald 1986: 135; Kaufman 1999: 63–64). Because of these conditions and shortfalls in guard capacity,9 the UNC authorities also sanctioned quasi-official police organizations among the prisoners, which operated like private armies (Foot 1990: 112). As one general involved with UNC camp administration understated, there were “many unsatisfactory aspects to the situation on the [Koje-do] island” (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 98–99). Fourth, and most importantly, UN Commander Matthew Ridgway informed the Joint Chiefs in mid-March that the number violently resisting repatriation “while admittedly highly conjectural” would be at least 73,000—not 15,900 as had been estimated in February (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 92). Hearing Ridgway’s numbers, the Joint Chiefs proposed reopening the whole question of voluntary repatriation. In a State-JCS meeting on March 19, State officials disagreed and argued instead that Truman considered the February 27 decision to be the “final position on the POW question” (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 97, 100). Then, in another State-JCS meeting two days later, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Vandenberg specifically asked about using Ridgway’s newer estimate in the negotiations. In reply, Johnson ignored the newer information and repeated the February numbers: “between 3,000 and 4,000 Koreans and 11,000 Chinese who would not want to be repatriated. [Johnson] personally, although he was obviously in no position to question the estimates, felt that the Chinese figure might be high” (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 113). Johnson directed the JCS to use the February numbers, which they instructed UN negotiators to do. In Johnson’s memoirs, he admitted receiving information in March about camp conditions from the US embassy in Korea and revised repatriation figures from Ridgway. However, he did not acknowledge having any opportunity to reopen discussions about the POW policy. Instead, Johnson argued that while the military largely ignored the embassy reports “because they came from outside the chain of command,” he was “able to make good use” of them in “private talks with Chiefs” (Johnson 1984: 148). It is unclear from the documentary evidence whether Acheson and Truman knew at this time about Ridgway’s numbers or Johnson’s unilateral decision to use the February numbers instead.10 On April 1, UN negotiators used the February estimates to tell the Communists they expected 116,000 of the 132,000 Communist prisoners would return home. The Communists assented, and polling began. As Ridgway had predicted in March, the 116,000 estimate was too high. Instead, on April 12, Ridgway reported that of the roughly 104,000 polled, about 75,000 (including 14,126 Chinese)
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would resist repatriation. Moreover, there were an additional 44,000 who refused to be screened (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 144; Goodman 1978: 343, 346). The screening process also reinforced earlier information that most POWs refused repatriation because of the violent tactics of the pro-Chiang quasi-police before and during the screening. The Truman governing coalition was shocked, not least because it had never talked about what to do if many Communists, and especially Chinese, refused repatriation. Everyone agreed that “the Chinese Communists present our most difficult problem,” because by now the UNC understood Chinese delegates controlled the Communist side in the negotiations. Admiral Fechteler suggested repatriating the 44,000 who refused screening, to plump up the Communist numbers, but State’s Policy Planning Staff Director Nitze argued “we might have lost our moral position and be compelled to forcibly repatriate many POWs” (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 146–47). UN negotiators suggested rescreening POWs, especially the Chinese, but they were overruled. Immediate re-screening would admit that something had been remiss in the first poll (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 156; Goodman 1978: 354). On April 19, when UN delegates informed the Communists that only 70,000 prisoners could be returned, the Communists were understandably outraged and moved for a recess. The next day, the chief Communist negotiator charged the United States with a breach of faith: “You flagrantly repudiated what you said before” (quoted in Bernstein 1983: 284; also Goodman 1978: 367–69; Rose 1994: 292). Recognizing the screening results made an armistice unlikely in the near future, yet unprepared to back away from its position, the Truman coalition instructed UN negotiators to present a “package proposal” that bundled the prisoner question with two other disputed issues. This was a blatant ploy to save face; as the Joint Chiefs had cabled Ridgway on March 20, If it becomes necessary to recognize that total impasse has been reached, it would be to our advantage that Commies be forced to reject our proposals on several grounds and thereby emphasize their intransigence. . . . The package deal seems to us to have the advantage of having such recess occur with 3 items rather than merely the 1 issue of POWs. (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 107)
The UNC put forward the package proposal on April 28, but on May 2 the Communists agreed to trade concessions on the two other disputed items: The Communists agreed to stop insisting the Soviet Union serve on the neutral armistice supervisory commission, in exchange for building new airfields in North Korea after the armistice. As a result, prisoner repatriation formally became the last remaining issue, and on May 7, the talks broke down. That day, Truman told the American public that
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Reiterating the moral stance he expressed with the Campaign of Truth and using language suggesting he was already trapped by effort justification, Truman drew a line with this speech for the policy of voluntary repatriation. voluntary repat r iat ion and the ent r apment obstacle
It is important to remember that during this time, Truman was in the midst of the domestic steel crisis. Facing election year pressures not to abandon one of the Democrats’ most important constituencies—organized labor—Truman seized the nation’s steel mills in April 1952 and now faced angry opposition on the Hill and among the wider business community.11 After Truman’s all-time low approval rating in January 1952 (23 percent), the steel crisis eroded most of the remaining public support for the war and the economic stabilization policies associated with the Cold War rearmament effort.12 Adding insult to injury, the US Supreme Court ruled the seizure unconstitutional on June 2—with only two of Truman’s four court appointees supporting him—leading to a massive 53-day strike that Truman had hoped to avert in the middle of an election year. The steel crisis provided Republican critics with further evidence that Truman’s mobilization policies were askew, while they continued to argue the Communists were using armistice negotiations as a screen for their own massive military buildup behind the 38th Parallel (Caridi 1968: 182, 191–92; Pierpaoli 1999: 160–77; 192; Hamby 1990: 594–97). As a result, the public and Congress continued to link economic stabilization to the Korean War—a misperception that the Truman coalition could not dispel. The same day as Truman’s righteous speech about the morality of voluntary repatriation, the Koje-do POW camp commander, Brig. Gen. Francis Dodd, was kidnapped by prisoners when he entered a compound to discuss complaints about the screening process. This kidnapping was the beginning of wider public knowledge about POW camp conditions, prisoner riots and the UN’s screening problems. In an effort to save Dodd’s life, the general who took over made a statement acceding to most of the prisoners’ demands, legitimizing reports of brutality and intimidation that surrounded the polling. During this time, information about the Koje-do riots was leaked to the press (Hermes 1966: 245–50; Ridgway 1967: 211; Foot 1990: 119).
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The unexpected poll result—and the particularly large number of Chinese who refused to go home—prompted the State Department to send two officers to interrogate Chinese prisoners. These officers concluded most POWs refused repatriation because of the pro-KMT quasi-police’s violent tactics before and during the screening (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 360). For example, two interpreters in the Chinese camps apprised UNC leaders about mock screenings the quasi-police conducted: “Those [who asked to be returned] were either beaten black and blue or killed . . . the majority of the POWs were too terrified to frankly express their real choice. All they could say in answer to the question was ‘Taiwan’ repeated over and over again” (Goodman 1978: 355; Bernstein 1983: 285). All of this information, with additional embassy reports about camp conditions, was passed to Acheson and Nitze in a memorandum on May 20—which Acheson marked as having seen (Rose 1994: 321; Foot 1990: 126). Thus, two weeks after Truman’s speech about the morality of the POW policy, it was clear—up to the level of Acheson—that the official POW screening was severely compromised and possibly even conducted unethically. Yet the POW policy remained unquestioned. Not only did it fit with Truman’s larger view of the US moral crusade against Communism, but in the midst of the domestic steel crisis, the beleaguered Truman governing coalition was saving its deflated political capital for mobilization concerns. Thus, the remaining eight months of Truman’s tenure saw little progress in the armistice negotiations. After some limited re-screening during the summer, the UN increased its estimate of potential returnees from 70,000 to 82,000. Shortly thereafter, the Communists dropped their demand from returning all POWs to returning 100,000—as long as that figure included all Chinese prisoners. But the deadlock persisted, because both sides stuck by their new demands and refused to change their positions on the principle of voluntary repatriation (Bernstein 1983: 293). After Truman’s May 7 speech, a rough consensus developed domestically about the necessity and rectitude of the voluntary repatriation policy. No mainline US politician—Republican or Democrat—objected and very few newspapers raised doubts (Bernstein 1983: 287). Instead, Chiang Kai-Shek’s Republican supporters immediately moved to ensure Truman would not waver. As Senator Knowland stated on the Senate floor, “I hope that the Government . . . is not going to consider turning over a single captive soldier . . . who has surrendered under those guarantees” (quoted in Foot 1990: 100). Congressmen waved copies of the UNC’s surrender leaflets (dropped by the millions over North Korea) and exhorted the “promises” the United States could not repudiate if it wished to maintain its moral standing around the world. The POW policy received further support after
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the Communists released names of UN prisoners under their control, listing only about 30 percent of the 11,200 Americans who had been captured and leading to fears the others had died or been murdered in the Communist camps (Foot 1990: 140–41; Caridi 1968: 180). While some domestic dissent of voluntary repatriation existed in 1952 among wives of American POWs and soldiers who had fought in Korea, it never achieved much traction. The dissent was uncoordinated and always counteracted by Administration officials and Congressional supporters of the policy. Moreover, those parts of the public who were against the war in general—radicals, pacifists and pragmatists—did not generally raise the POW issue (Mantell 1973: 210–11, 269–71). However, more significant dissent about voluntary repatriation existed abroad. Even before the US adopted its policy, many allies had been uneasy about pursuing it, although their objections did not reach the American public (Bernstein 1983: 287; Foot 1990: 100). Some of the allies’ objections were muted after Britain supported the policy, but the screening results and Dodd’s kidnapping after the Koje-do riots suggested to them the screening had been illegitimate. During the summer, allied objections to voluntary repatriation became more prevalent. As the Australian prime minister noted, “If the allied choice lay simply between a continuation of the war and acceptance of forcible repatriation . . . [I] would have no hesitation choosing the latter” (quoted in MacDonald 1986: 145). Allied objections to the POW policy were soon followed by their negative reactions to the new UN punishment bombing campaign, started in May 1952, which focused on attacking North Korean civilian morale. This Douhet-style “air pressure” strategy consisted of three operations: (1) a concerted attack on North Korea’s five hydroelectric power facilities, (2) incendiary raids on North Korea’s capital, Pyongyang and (3) firebombing attacks on 78 North Korean towns with Communist supply and maintenance depots. These large-scale bombing operations occurred on a regular basis over the summer (Foot 1985: 177–78; 1990: 136–37; Pape 1996: 161; Futrell 1956: 98–99; 1961: 449–51; Schnabel and Watson 1979: 843–44, 847; Crane 2000: 117–22). While these punishment bombing raids were extremely popular in the United States, they produced negative reactions in friendly and neutral countries. European critics feared these attacks, especially those against the power plants on the Yalu, might drive China to break off negotiations and widen the war. Britain was especially upset about not being informed beforehand. Despite Acheson’s apologies, Britain believed that consultations had been deliberately omitted for fear that the allies would raise objections (Acheson 1969: 657; Foot 1985: 179). The Republican opposition seized on this small crisis with the allies as further proof that they were “ungrateful” and “uncooperative” (Caridi 1968: 181).
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Allied objections to the bombing campaigns, voluntary repatriation and POW screening all contributed to State Department officials assessing US war policy by this point as unsuccessful. Complicating matters, the allies objected to ROK President Syngman Rhee’s ongoing constitutional crisis (see Chapter 3). Allied and world opinion served as State’s policy assessment metric, and the metric suggested policy performance was poor. As a result, State officials began to search for ways to meet allied objections and move closer to settlement—even if this meant compromising on the principle of voluntary repatriation. Thus, Assistant Secretary of State for UN Affairs John Hickerson suggested the UNC “cautiously but promptly” follow up on two Communist proposals to conclude the armistice on the basis of the Geneva Convention, with prisoners not wishing repatriation handled afterwards (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 345).13 Nitze and the Policy Planning Staff advocated seizing any opportunity to exchange prisoners “with or without formal agreements” (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 262–63). Most ironically, Johnson—who withheld key information in order to achieve the voluntary repatriation policy in the first place—argued the POW question should be decided after the armistice (Foot 1990: 132). Other proposals discussed by State officials included presenting the case to the International Court of Justice, capturing more prisoners, juggling the figures or working for a settlement outside the current negotiations (Foot 1985: 175). In September 1952, two proposals for changing the POW policy—one from the Progressive Party’s presidential candidate and the other from the president of Mexico—reopened a debate about war policy within the Truman governing coalition.14 Predictably, as the indicator approach to war policy would suggest, most State officials found these proposals attractive, while military officials did not. State officials pointed to allies’ reactions as a reason for backing these proposals and deferring the question of non-repatriates until after the armistice was signed (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 463–65, 482–89). In contrast, civilian and uniformed Defense officials pointed to new UNC assessments that bombing was “having a material effect on the civilian morale in North Korea. . . . [and] apparently undermining . . . their ability to wage and support a war” (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 466; also 469–70, 506–7). Thus, meeting with Truman on September 15, Lovett argued that responding to those proposals would be a “sign of weakness” that “would un-do much of the advantage currently being gained by increased military pressure.” DoD opposed deferring the POW question until after the armistice and instead favored advancing a final negotiation offer that, if rejected, would lead to an indefinite recess of the talks (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 513). Given Lovett’s framing, Truman quickly gave his support to the military position—without even hearing the detailed views of the State officials (who were
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not present at the meeting)—because he feared appearing weak and indecisive (Foot 1990: 145). The cumulative effect of the Republican right wing’s attacks for being “soft on Communism” had taken its toll. Hence, Truman said he “saw no real prospect of getting an armistice other than to persist in our course of action and increase the military pressure in so far as possible” (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 513–14). While Acheson had not weighed in on this debate, he agreed with his subordinates that the United States had to respond to the Mexican proposal to show other UN members it “had exhausted every reasonable effort to obtain an armistice.” If the Communists rejected the Mexican proposal—which Acheson thought likely—the United States at least would have built “the best possible platform” for unilaterally recessing the negotiations (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 524; Foot 1985: 182; Bernstein 1983: 300). However, by the time Acheson discussed this with Truman on September 24, he must have learned about Truman’s preferences expressed to Lovett. As a result, Acheson pushed neither for a presidential statement responding to the Mexican proposal nor for leaving non-repatriates for negotiations after an armistice. Instead, he tilted towards the DoD’s preference for increasing military pressure and argued “the time has come to recess the armistice negotiations.” Perhaps Acheson saw the writing on the wall. In any case, Truman reiterated his support for increased military pressure and a continued hard line on the POW policy: “unless we wipe the slate clean, an armistice will do no good . . . [because] we cannot give in on principles” (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 534, 537). As a result, on September 28 the UN negotiators offered three final variations on the voluntary repatriation policy, which the Communists rejected—as expected—ten days later. UN negotiators recessed the talks indefinitely. At a press conference that same day, Acheson reiterated that the United States would “not compromise on the principle that a prisoner should be forced to return home against his will” and any weakened resolve on this issue “would constitute an abandonment of the principles fundamental to this country and the United Nations” (quoted in Foot 1990: 150). Hence, Acheson again linked the prestige and reputation of the Truman Administration with voluntary repatriation. In the process, the Truman governing coalition lost any remaining maneuvering room: there was no option left but to recess negotiations, step up bombing and hope for a settlement. In response, on October 6, Chinese forces began one of their largest attacks since armistice talks began in July 1951; October’s fighting produced the highest UNC casualties in a year—just in time for the US presidential elections (Stueck 1995: 291). Although this was definitely “too little, too late,” the Truman coalition had no other options. Public support for continuing negotiations had been declin-
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ing steadily since late 1951, with most Americans wanting “stronger steps” if the Communists did not agree to an armistice on UN terms (Foot 1985: 220; 1990: 172). On the one hand, because the Administration was so wholly identified with a limited war policy, extending hostilities too much beyond bombing would have led to the charge that Truman was simply “electioneering.” While not running for reelection himself, Truman had personally orchestrated selection of the Democratic candidate, Adlai Stevenson. Although Truman campaigned vigorously for Democrats throughout October, he deliberately stayed away from Stevenson to allow him to distance himself as much as possible from “Truman’s War” (Hamby 1990: 600–614). At the very least, escalating now would have caused Republican critics to lambaste him for failing to follow MacArthur’s lead nearly two years earlier. On the other hand, after so publicly tying his governing coalition to voluntary repatriation, Truman saw no possibility for retreat and little room for compromise on that issue, either (Foot 1985: 220; Stueck 1995: 264). While the record suggests Truman had strong normative commitments to the voluntary repatriation policy, others in his coalition advocated the policy without adequately considering its full ramifications. We cannot know whether Truman could have been convinced to change his mind on voluntary repatriation, but knowing how much influence his advisors had on other policies suggests he might have been swayed had they made strong arguments for a different policy. The entrapment seems all the more tragic, because information about the difficulties associated with voluntary repatriation had been available before Truman had made his decision and publicized it. Ironically, the same State officials who fought initially for voluntary repatriation were the very ones willing to search for a compromise during the last eight months of Truman’s tenure. Finally, the Truman coalition’s stance about voluntary repatriation became irrevocably wedded to the NSC-68 mindset it had internalized. The Truman coalition did not want to compromise on POW policy, because it believed standing up to the Soviets on the issue of voluntary repatriation would fight the moral crusade against Communism and help deter a future war (Bernstein 1983: 288). As Truman argued, voluntary repatriation was “vital as a symbol of the strength and determination of the West. Firmness now would be the only way to deter new actions in other portions of the world” (Truman 1956: 358). At the same time, the Truman coalition could not escalate militarily too much, because it believed the Communists were capable of challenging us in a similar way in many places, and . . . if they chose, plunge us and the world into another and far more terrible war. Every decision I made in connection with the Korean conflict had this one aim in mind: To prevent a third
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With such boundaries on the spectrum of possible policies, increasing conventional bombing was the only option the lame-duck Truman governing coalition felt it had. In sum, the US decision to adopt the POW voluntary repatriation policy demonstrates at a micro level the interacting dynamics of the information and entrapment obstacles. Truman adopted the voluntary repatriation policy prematurely, based on his beliefs about the moral fight against Communism but without fully considering its effects. Subsequently, information suggesting the policy would lead to an impasse in armistice negotiations and undermine the United States’ ability to “hold the moral high ground” was systematically ignored. In other words, the coalition chose not to know this policy would significantly prolong the war. The end result was an information obstacle in which Truman staked his—and the nation’s—reputation on voluntary repatriation, which led to entrapment dynamics, as well.
The New US Governing Coalition: Eisenhower’s Election While Truman stood firm on the repatriation policy—simultaneously juggling the domestic political fall-out from the steel crisis and the international effects of the prisoner screenings, POW camp riots and Rhee’s constitutional crisis—the Republican presidential primary was heating up. General Dwight D. Eisenhower faced off against his right-wing opponent, Ohio Senator Robert Taft, the leader of the “Old Guard” isolationists and Asia-Firsters in Congress. When Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot Lodge filed Eisenhower’s name in the New Hampshire primary in January 1952, Eisenhower had neither Republican credentials nor embodied the isolationist perspective of the Republican majority. In fact, he epitomized a continuation of the Truman Administration’s Europefirst internationalist strategy. Eisenhower’s candidacy—supported by the Eastern internationalist Republicans who had been defeated in three successive presidential elections—infuriated Taft and Taft’s right-wing base of Asia-lationists. The antipathy ran both ways. As Eisenhower said bluntly during the primaries: “I’m running because Taft is an isolationist. His election would be a disaster” (quoted in Doenecke 1979: 218). Not surprisingly, the Republican National Convention was bitter, with Taft supporters packing the agenda and controlling the foreign policy platform and Lodge unveiling a last-minute “fair play” amendment to block disputed delegates from voting (Reinhard 1983: 84–89; Doenecke 1979: 221;
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Caridi 1968: 217–21). Regardless, Eisenhower easily won the nomination, and most isolationists eventually supported his candidacy. Truman’s failure to end the Korean War contributed significantly to Eisenhower’s election. Although Truman announced in March 1952 he would not seek reelection, “Truman’s War” proved to be too big a hurdle for Stevenson to overcome.15 While Eisenhower did not offer an explicit war-ending strategy during the campaign, voters believed he would find a way to end the war successfully.16 In fact, the only Republican alternative proposed replacing US soldiers on the line with ROK troops (Caridi 1968: 230; Immerman 1999: 68). Nevertheless, Eisenhower steadily built his campaign so that by October, he sold himself as the “man who had virtually ended one war [World War II] and could surely terminate another” (Caridi 1968: 224). Americans believed him, delivering him a landslide election, with 55 percent of the popular vote (as opposed to Stevenson’s 44.3 percent) and an electoral count of 442 to 89. The Republicans rode his coattails into narrow majorities in both chambers of Congress, their first time controlling the executive and legislature in 20 years (Caridi 1968: 243; Reinhard 1983: 96). Eisenhower campaigned that his first priority would be to end the war. After the vicious Republican primary, Eisenhower slowly co-opted much of Taft’s hawkish foreign policy platform, including “massive retaliation” and “liberation” (discussed below). Thus, while in June Eisenhower upheld containment and backed armistice negotiations, by October he accused the Democrats of having “lost” China and favored bombing along the Yalu River and “liberating captive nations” (Doenecke 1979: 224). The climax of Eisenhower’s increasing focus on Korea was an October 24 speech, repeated twice in the next week, in which he pledged to go to Korea. Building on his military reputation, Eisenhower carefully cultivated the idea that only a new perspective, embodied in a new administration, could win the war. In his own words, he argued that a coalition shift was necessary: The first task of a new Administration will be to review and re-examine every course of action open to us . . . to bring the Korean War to an early and honorable end. . . . For this task a wholly new Administration is necessary. . . . The old Administration cannot be expected to repair what it failed to prevent. [The new Administration will] forego the divisions of politics and . . . concentrate on the job of ending the Korean War—until that job is honorably done. That job requires a personal trip to Korea. . . . I shall make that trip. . . . I shall go to Korea. (New York Times, October 25, 1952: 8, emphasis added)
Without supplying details, Eisenhower nurtured the impression that only a Republican Administration and a Republican Congress could honorably end the war (Zhang 1992: 12–21; Caridi 1968: 209–45).
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how the eisenhower coalit ion shift overcame t ruman ’ s obstacles to peace
Until resigning his post as NATO commander in June 1952, Eisenhower served as part of the Truman governing coalition and personally agreed with its Europecentric, internationalist strategy for containing Communism. Indeed, the major impetus for his candidacy was to block Taft’s isolationist vision from becoming a reality. Given his similar strategic perspective, how was Eisenhower able to end “Truman’s War”? Although Eisenhower did not shift US war aims, he did shift the strategy for achieving them. Like Truman, Eisenhower did not intend to reunify the peninsula, and he maintained the policy of voluntary repatriation (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 1062; Bernstein 1983: 303).17 The Eisenhower governing coalition agreed with Truman that voluntary repatriation could help prevent future conflict with the Soviets because it could encourage defections elsewhere in the Communist bloc. As Dulles argued in 1953, “soldiers in these armies who want freedom will be more apt to desert and surrender . . . the Red Armies [will] become less dependable and there is far less risk that the Communists will be tempted to use these armies for aggression” (quoted in Gaddis 1987: 176; also Foot 1990: 161, 198–99). However, while Eisenhower retained the POW policy, he implemented a macrolevel (strategic) shift in how to contain Communism. This shift helped him avoid the dilemma of the NSC-68 mindset—how to hold the line on POW voluntary repatriation while avoiding military escalation and global war. Thus, as the domestic coalition theory would predict, Eisenhower’s coalition could overcome Truman’s obstacles to peace, in four ways. First, as a Republican, Eisenhower was freed from the worst of Truman’s entrapment from the Republican right wing. Soon after the election, he took steps to placate Taft’s supporters, including (1) a publicized meeting with MacArthur to hear the former commander’s hawkish plan for ending the war and (2) his promised trip to Korea to meet with UN Commander Clark, as well as the commander of the US military advisors in Taiwan, who joined them there (Ambrose 1983b: 30–35; Stueck 1995: 305). More importantly, on February 2, he announced in his State of the Union address that he was withdrawing the Seventh Fleet from the Taiwan Strait. This opened the possibility for Chinese Nationalists to attack mainland China and—more importantly—mollified the Republican right wing. After the speech, Eisenhower left the chamber arm-in-arm with now Senate Majority Leader Taft. More generally, Eisenhower actively built bridges with this constituency, telling his subordinates to treat Taft with “presidential deference” (Doenecke 1979: 231; Reinhard 1983: 102, 108; Caridi 1968: 259).
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Second and relatedly, Eisenhower decoupled the Korean War effort from Cold War mobilization and rapidly set about dismantling Truman’s highly unpopular mobilization infrastructure and economic controls. In the State of the Union address, Eisenhower announced the end to all price and wage controls and his plan to liquidate immediately most mobilization agencies Truman had created to rearm for the Cold War. The decision to eliminate the economic controls clearly was “bowing to pressure from business and other Republican-oriented groups that had helped him get elected,” because by that point 61 percent of the public favored continuing them (Pierpaoli 1999: 219). Thus, while Truman had intended the mobilization to be permanent, Eisenhower took it apart. To be sure, Eisenhower could do this because of the impressive rearmament legacy that Truman left him—with a defense budget roughly three times and a military buildup roughly five times as large as they were in June 1950 (Friedberg 2000: 125). Nonetheless, dismantling Truman’s “garrison state” allowed Eisenhower to decouple Cold War mobilization from the Korean War, thereby meeting political constituents’ needs and buying himself leeway for ending the war. Third, the public and the press gave the Eisenhower coalition significant leeway for ending the war. In February 1953, 70 percent of Americans gave Eisenhower a favorable foreign policy rating, compared with 30 percent for Truman the previous September. Polls also showed 62 percent supported “stronger steps” should the Communists not agree with the UN’s armistice terms. As Sterling argues, “with the ‘stronger steps’ undefined in the poll, US officials could consider public support for a wide array of options, including nuclear weapons” (1998: 459; also Foot 1990: 160, 172; Mueller 1985: 80). In other words, American public opinion was sufficiently mixed to allow Eisenhower freedom of action. Likewise, the press gave Eisenhower maneuvering room to solve the stalemate, with some papers questioning the risks of an expanded war while others argued escalation would break the stalemate (Foot 1990: 172; Sterling 1998: 459–60). In short, Eisenhower believed he had a “mandate from the American people to stop this fighting” (quoted in Foot 1985: 219). As long as he settled the war relatively quickly, it would remain “Truman’s War.” Because Eisenhower had built up the expectation during his campaign that he would end the war soon, the public both looked for and expected decisive action. Finally, the new Eisenhower coalition came to power with a different conceptualization of the war’s costs and benefits. Although the Eisenhower coalition shared the Truman coalition’s views about the Soviet Union and its expansionist intentions, they parted ways significantly in terms of strategy for dealing with this threat (Foot 1985: 33; Holsti 1970; Smith 1974; Mayers 1986: 111–12; Divine 1981: 22; LaFeber 1991: 148). While the Truman coalition retained faith in its NSC-68
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mindset until the end, the Eisenhower coalition advocated a policy of nuclear “deterrent power” as a more economical alternative to Truman’s “treadmill policies” of containment. Eisenhower’s secretary of state, John Dulles convinced Eisenhower that “only reliance on nuclear weapons would make containment work over the long haul at a reasonable cost” (Gaddis 1997: 107). As Dulles argued in his famous Life magazine article, instead of trying to defend the “25,000 miles . . . of the free world’s frontier with the Soviet world” on the ground, the United States needed to develop the will and organize the means to retaliate instantly against open aggression by Red armies, so that, if it occurred anywhere, we could and would strike back where it hurts, by the means of our own choosing. (Dulles 1952: 148–49, emphasis in original)
Thus, the Eisenhower coalition did not believe Communism must be faced on the ground in every limited war—like Korea—that promised to crop up. Rather than relying on limited wars and the expensive ground forces of containment, the Eisenhower Administration chose to rely on “massive retaliation”—threatening to respond with nuclear weapons to deter any Soviet-sponsored aggression (Donaldson 1997: 92; Bowie and Immerman 1998: 67). As Eisenhower told the public, “We have adopted a new principle. . . . Rather than let the Communists nibble us to death all over the world in little wars, we will rely in [the] future on [our] massive mobile retaliatory powers” (quoted in Ambrose 1983b: 336). Eisenhower and Dulles had a qualitatively different view of nuclear weapons than their predecessors. They frequently discussed nuclear weapons, both publicly and privately, as though they were “just another weapon in the arsenal” (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 977; also Keefer 1986: 277; Pape 1996: 159; Foot 1985: 204–5). Dulles argued the Soviets had convinced much of the world that atomic weapons must be set apart from all others as a “special category,” but this was a “false distinction”; the sooner it was exposed as such and the taboo on atomic weapons removed, the better (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 769–70). In the Eisenhower coalition’s view, nuclear weapons were not seen as the means of last resort, but readily usable instruments of American policy. For them, relying on nuclear weapons was not only economical, but quite necessary, if the United States were to pursue its policy objectives without expending too many resources (Calingaert 1988: 197). The new policy perspectives of “deterrent power” and “liberation” were matched by the increasingly hardline views of the military members of Eisenhower’s coalition.18 As already noted, UN Commander Clark and the JCS had increasingly argued for military escalation in Korea over the summer and fall of 1952. To a large degree, this greater willingness to escalate resulted from
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the resurgence of American military power in late 1952 and 1953. The military mobilization begun in 1950 under the auspices of NSC-68 was finally showing results—especially in the nuclear weapons area. As a result, by January 1953, the same JCS that had been so cautious in 1950 now advocated nuclear escalation if that was what was needed to end the Korean War (Trachtenberg 1988–89: 28, 30). This shift in views resulted from the United States’ successful military buildup— not simply because Eisenhower was in charge. Regardless, the JCS’ more hawkish position helped Eisenhower create a coalition that supported escalation to end the war. This willingness in principle to use nuclear weapons had two major implications for ending the Korean War. First, unlike Truman’s coalition, Eisenhower did not believe the Soviets needed to be countered on the ground everywhere around the globe. Nuclear deterrent power obviated the need to take a direct stand in limited wars. Second, the Eisenhower coalition had a much more detached attitude about the European allies (Trachtenberg 1988–89: 38). After all, allies are not as important if you do not plan to fight every war on the ground and are less concerned with basing troops on allies’ soil. For both reasons, the Eisenhower coalition was freer to consider expanded military options. Without the partisan attacks from the Republican right wing, the politically unpopular mobilization campaign and the constraints of the NSC-68 mindset, the Eisenhower coalition had more leeway to end the war. In sum, while Eisenhower retained Truman’s war aims, the domestic coalition shift brought different leaders—with different constituencies, different worldviews and different conceptualizations of the war—that left them freer to consider an expanded palate of strategic options. the eisenhower coalit ion ’ s st r ateg y for ending the korean war
Although Eisenhower did not shift US war aims, he did shift the strategy for achieving them. The Eisenhower coalition believed it would need to escalate militarily in order to convince the Communists that US objectives were not negotiable. Although Eisenhower preferred to end the war peacefully, he was willing—as he details in his memoirs—to consider a major offensive, including “strikes against the supporting Chinese airfields in Manchuria, a blockade of the Chinese coast and similar measures.” In addition, he would build up US and ROK force levels and ammunition stocks in Korea. Finally, in an effort to prevent an expanded war from becoming “overly costly,” he was prepared to use nuclear weapons on “strategic targets in North Korea, Manchuria and on the Chinese coast” (Eisenhower 1963: 179–80). This section summarizes Eisenhower’s hawk-
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ish strategy shift to set the stage for Chapter 8, which will explore the strategic interaction between this shift and Communist behavior. The Eisenhower coalition did not switch its strategy until May 20. In April 1953, the National Security Council presented a study, commissioned in October 1952, which outlined six alternative courses of action that the United States could pursue in Korea. The study did not offer any new alternatives but reexamined all policy options—including those rejected by Truman. The first three options maintained Truman’s “limited war” restrictions on US forces, while the last three options lifted those restrictions and proposed action beyond the Korean peninsula and against Chinese territory. Five of the six options permitted the use of nuclear weapons. The report concluded that if nuclear weapons were used, “the Communists would recognize the employment of these weapons as indicative of Western determination to carry the Korean War to a successful conclusion” (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 845–46; also Foot 1985: 203–4, 208–9; Foot 1990: 163–64; Sterling 1998: 455–57). The Joint Chiefs endorsed a combination of the three options lifting current restrictions, including a UN advance to the “waist” of Korea and a reduction of China’s future aggressive capabilities in Korea and the Far East more generally (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 1062; Foot 1985: 206–7; Foot 1990: 163–64). In the JCS’ view, none of these courses of action could be successfully carried out without using nuclear weapons, “in considerable numbers in order to be truly effective” (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 1014). Eisenhower agreed with the Joint Chiefs’ recommendations. He believed that in order “to keep the attack from becoming overly costly, it was clear that we would have to use atomic weapons” (Eisenhower 1963: 180; see also Zhang 1992: 124–25). In May, he announced it was time for the United States “to consider the atomic bomb as simply another weapon in our arsenal” (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 977). Therefore, at a May 20 NSC meeting—despite expressed concerns about possible Soviet retaliation against Japan, local retaliation against UN forces in Korea and the “disinclination” of allies to agree—Eisenhower stated that “he wished the rec ord to show that if circumstances arose which would force the United States to an expanded effort in Korea, the plan selected by the Joint Chiefs was most likely to achieve the objective we sought” (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 1067–68).19 In other words, on May 20, the Eisenhower coalition endorsed a hawkish shift in American strategy for ending the war. There were four ways this change in strategy manifested. First, at that meeting, the Eisenhower coalition formally approved contingency plans for using nuclear weapons, something Truman never did. If the war could not be ended soon, they agreed that it would be necessary to “expand the war outside of Korea” and “to
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use the atomic bomb” (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 1065). Second, Eisenhower granted UN Commander Clark—for the first time—the authority to terminate, not recess, the talks if the Communists refused the UN “final offer” to be presented on May 25 (Foot 1985: 204). Third, the United States resumed its punitive conventional bombing of the previous summer, but escalated to attack North Korean irrigation dams and destroy the country’s rice crop (Blechman and Powell 1982–83: 591; Foot 1990: 166; Pape 1996: 162–64; Futrell 1961: 626–27; Rees 1964: 381–82; Hermes 1966: 461; Jackson 1973: 156–57). Finally, the Eisenhower coalition tried two diplomatic channels to signal to the Communists a growing willingness to escalate. These included conversations between (1) Dulles and Indian Prime Minister Nehru, in which Dulles said “if armistice negotiations collapse, the United States would probably make a stronger . . . military exertion and that this might well extend the area of conflict,”20 and (2) US Ambassador to Moscow Charles Bohlen and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, in which Bohlen emphasized “the extreme importance and seriousness of the latest UNC proposals” and made it “clear these represent the limit to which we can go” (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 1103; Zhang 1992: 125). Chapter 8 will examine the strategic interaction between these threats of escalation and Communist behavior in the war termination process. Accordingly, one of the most prominent alternative explanations for the war’s ending—that Eisenhower’s nuclear threats compelled the Communists to settle—will be taken up in Chapter 8.
Alternative Explanations This section briefly examines six alternative explanations for US behavior during the Korean War. First, Bayesian bargaining models about war termination do not explain US behavior in prosecuting and ending the Korean War. The Korean War belligerents ultimately settled for terms essentially the same as those they could have obtained two years earlier, while the battlefield remained relatively static. With neither a significant change in the battlefield situation nor the belligerents’ war aims, why the delay? And, given the delay, why then the resolution? The Bayesian updating process discussed in Chapter 2 misses the rich complexity of US domestic politics during those intervening two years, which raised a relatively trivial issue—the POW repatriation policy—to a 15-month debate. The US case study provides ample evidence of leaders’ reluctance to confront painful truths after committing to particular policies—from advancing to the Yalu River to committing to POW voluntary repatriation—so that they did not know or chose not to know they should change those policies. Once they became aware of their policies’ full implications, they felt trapped and unable to back down
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without admitting failure. These dynamics are not compatible with the relatively linear relationship between exposure to new information and updated expectations that the Bayesian model predicts. Second, Hein Goemans’ (2000a) approach hardly fares better in explaining US behavior. As Chapter 2 explained, Goemans argues war duration varies by regime type; in democracies, following the logic of Bayesian updating, leaders should end a war once costs outweigh the benefits. Yet, as the first alternative explanation showed, that logic does not explain the Truman governing coalition’s behavior. Third, building on the Bayesian model, Dan Reiter (2009: chapter 5) argues the United States pursued absolute victory in its advance to the Yalu River because it feared any limited settlement would lead to another North Korean attack on South Korea. Reiter argues the United States pursued absolute victory before China intervened in the war, because it wanted to solve the Communist “commitment problem” and expected absolute victory would be possible at low cost. However, after China entered the war, the expected costs of absolute victory were now much higher—potentially fighting a nuclear World War III—and US leaders did not see this as a price worth paying for long-term South Korean security. Thus, the United States abandoned its high war aims and, presumably, its strategy to solve these commitment fears. Reiter acknowledges the last two years of stalemated war demonstrate the “inefficiency of combat” for providing information for Bayesian updating, but he argues the commitment dynamics—together with Bayesian information dynamics—provide a comprehensive account of US war termination behavior. Reiter’s explanation, while parsimonious, does not completely capture the dynamics of American behavior in the war, for two reasons. First, Reiter correctly notes the United States gradually moved from its initial (June) war aims of status quo ante bellum to its high (October) war aims of reunifying the Korean peninsula by force under non-Communist rule. But his argument misses the major driver for this change. As Chapters 5 and 6 have argued, the Truman governing coalition feared Soviet aggression from the beginning of the war, not just after China intervened. In other words, the potential costs of fighting a nuclear World War III existed in both phases of the war. If this was the case, then why was this price acceptable before the Chinese intervention but not after? Certainly, China’s intervention and the “entirely new war” highlighted an actual—rather than merely an expected—increase in costs. But the account is incomplete. The missing piece, of course, is that the Korean War vindicated NSC-68’s predictions of Soviet “grand designs” for global domination through “proxy wars.” Fearing Soviet aggression, the Truman coalition used the Korean War to embark on a massive Cold War rearmament effort and justify its globalist
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agenda to Congressional and public constituencies. However, winning support for this mobilization required building a coalition with moderate Republicans and Asia-lationists, leading Truman to overturn previous Asia policies—thereby returning South Korea to the US security perimeter, increasing military aid to Taiwan, shelving plans to recognize China diplomatically and launching a ground offensive to reunify the Korean peninsula. Indeed, Reiter admits that the first public call after the June 1950 invasion for crossing the 38th Parallel and seizing part of North Korea came from Senator Robert Taft—the Republican right-wing Asia-lationist who had attacked Truman for “losing” China and being “soft on Communism” (Foot 1985: 69). In other words, the causal mechanism that best explains the gradual increase in war aims from status quo ante bellum to absolute victory is domestic coalition-building dynamics, trying to win support for broader Cold War rearmament before “the year of maximum danger.” Significantly, Reiter’s account contains no discussion of NSC-68 and its profound effect on the framing of the Korean War in the wider Cold War context. Second, as Reiter himself argues, information dynamics (Bayesian updating) does not explain the two years of stalemate while the armistice negotiations dragged on. Yet, neither do the commitment dynamics central to his argument, at least not fully. Reiter offers two ways that commitment concerns shaped the UN negotiating position from July 1951 to July 1953. First, he argues commitment concerns affected UN demands for the location of the border at the end of the war. However, the location of the demarcation line was determined by February 1952, fully 17 months before the war ended. Second, Reiter argues the UN was concerned an open POW exchange might exacerbate the commitment problem by shifting the balance of power in favor of the Communists, leading the United States to hold out for voluntary repatriation. Certainly, POW voluntary repatriation single-handedly held up an armistice settlement for 15 months. However, as the evidence in this chapter shows, besides McClure’s initial argument that the prospect of asylum might induce Communist soldiers to defect in future conflicts, commitment concerns played virtually no role in the US decision to adopt and maintain that policy. In sum, Reiter’s argument fails to capture the full complexity of US behavior in the war. A fourth alternative explanation focuses on regime type, specifically that democratic leaders are more sensitive to the costs of war than other regime types (Bennett and Stam 1996, 1998; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992; Doyle 1983; Filson and Werner 2004; Gaubatz 1991, 1999; Levi 1997; Maoz and Russett 1993; Reiter and Stam 1998, 2002; Schultz 1999; Stam 1996; Wagner 2000). Public opinion research has suggested that in democracies, public support for war declines with battle-deaths (Gartner and Myers 1995; Gartner, Segura and Wilkening 1997;
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Mueller 1985, 1994), and specifically in the Korean War, some scholars have found a statistically significant relationship between casualties and decline of US public support (Gartner and Segura 1998). However, the pattern of Korean War public opinion seems more complex than this. After an initial spike of public support, as the “rally round the flag” thesis might suggest, the American public and press supported the advance to the Yalu River (Christensen 1996: 152). Predictably, after the Chinese intervention, there was a steep drop in public support. However, it stabilized thereafter at a moderate level until the end of the war—even as casualties continued to escalate (Mueller 1985: 50–51). As John Mueller, the first scholar to examine the public opinion argument rigorously, notes, More striking than the drop in support caused by the Chinese entry is the near-absence of further decline for the remaining 2½ years of the war. From early 1951 until the end of the war in the summer of 1953, basic support for the war . . . remained largely constant—this despite the continually mounting casualties and despite a number of important events. (1985: 51, italics in original)
Indeed, as these chapters have shown, sections of the public remained more hawkish than the Truman governing coalition, consistently supporting “stronger steps”—such as escalating militarily to “roll-back” China—than the leaders themselves. Thus, to argue democracies are more cost-sensitive than other regime types does not adequately explain US behavior during the Korean War. The evidence suggests Truman was trapped more by a hawkish constituency than a dovish one. Gideon Rose (1994) advances a fifth alternative argument, that Truman was not truly entrapped by his voluntary repatriation policy. Had the Truman coalition wanted to, Rose argues, it could have generated support for forcible repatriation instead, because public opinion was “confused, fluid and manipulable” (Rose 1994: 330–31). For example, State’s Office of Public Opinion Studies had July 1952 data demonstrating there was “virtually no sentiment in favor of making ‘concessions’” in the armistice negotiations. However, when the public was “faced with the emotionally persuasive argument of returning all POWs for the sake of getting US prisoners back,” 31 percent favored returning all Communist prisoners immediately and an additional 40 percent were in favor if it were necessary to bring US soldiers home. Only 20 percent said they would never return the non-repatriates (Foot 1990: 140–41). Thus, according to data at the time, public opinion permitted the Administration’s stand on POWs but did not require it. Moreover, as this chapter discussed, there was some domestic dissent over the voluntary repatriation policy—albeit nebulous and marginalized. US allies never fully supported the policy, either. Hence, had Truman wanted to reverse himself,
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and had domestic political entrapment been the only dynamic at play, he might have successfully maneuvered to co-opt his critics and change his policy. However, the Truman governing coalition did not try these tactics—largely because these tactics did not conform to the macro-level beliefs that drove the coalition’s understanding of the war. In the end, the voluntary repatriation policy became irrevocably wedded to the NSC-68 mindset the Truman coalition had internalized. On the one hand, it did not want to compromise on the POW policy, because it believed that standing up to the Soviets on this issue would help deter a future war. On the other hand, it did not want to escalate militarily too much to compel the Communists to accept voluntary repatriation, for fear of provoking World War III. Whether or not the Truman governing coalition was politically entrapped by the POW policy, it was certainly entrapped by the NSC-68 mindset. In other words, the voluntary repatriation policy alone cannot explain the stickiness in the Truman coalition’s decisions about prosecuting and ending the war. Finally, Barton Bernstein (1983) argues the Korean War continued so long because Truman, acting alone, was unable or unwilling to change his position on voluntary repatriation. Bernstein suggests had Truman changed his mind or been replaced, the war could have ended. To some degree, Bernstein’s argument is similar to the domestic coalition argument—that changing key leaders can change a “sticky” policy—but it differs in focusing completely on one individual, Truman. As this chapter has shown, Truman’s personal views about POW policy certainly affected how that policy was initially selected and then how information calling the policy’s wisdom into question was systematically ignored. Yet Truman was not the one ignoring this information, because he never received it. We cannot know what Truman might have done had he received the adverse information. The important point is that Truman never received it, because other coalition members believed he did not need to. Thus, other coalition members’ obstacles are important in understanding the policy’s “stickiness.” Moreover, the need to remain firm on the POW policy was reinforced by the entire coalition’s NSC-68 mindset, which exhorted remaining firm to contain the Communists everywhere, in every way. Notably, when the war began, Acheson and Defense officials (both civilian and military) embodied the NSC-68 mindset much more than Truman—eventually convincing him to prioritize the Korean War and mobilization above his domestic policy agenda. To a large degree, then, other coalition members were responsible for reinforcing Truman’s bias towards standing firm, no matter the cost. Once that stand was taken, it was very difficult to back down. Most importantly, Bernstein’s argument misses the crucial fact that Eisenhower retained Truman’s position of voluntary repatriation, yet was able to end the war.
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Thus, as with Rose’s (1994) argument, Bernstein’s narrow focus on the voluntary repatriation policy alone is not enough to explain the stickiness in the Truman coalition’s war policy. While Eisenhower retained the POW policy, he changed the US policy on nuclear deterrent power and thus felt free to escalate the war, if necessary. This decision allowed him to overcome the twin constraints of the NSC68 mindset—holding firm in Korea while avoiding global war—that trapped Truman for so long.
Conclusions This chapter, paired with Chapter 5, has examined the interacting dynamics of information and entrapment obstacles in US decisions about prosecuting and ending the war. While the previous chapter examined these dynamics at a macro (strategic) level, this chapter explored them at the micro (policy) level, in the US decision to adopt the POW voluntary repatriation policy. This policy single-handedly held up armistice negotiations for 15 months, and thus was an important part of the “stickiness” in ending the war. When Truman adopted the POW policy, it embodied his view that ethical action was integral for combating Communism’s moral and spiritual dangers. Yet, he adopted the policy without fully considering its second- and third-order effects. Subsequently, entrapment dynamics led his governing coalition to become so invested in the policy that some coalition members systematically ignored information suggesting it would conflict with other policy preferences—such as ending the war. By the time the Truman governing coalition became aware of the POW policy’s full implications, it was too late to back down. Beleaguered by partisan attacks and domestic political crises—many resulting from the Cold War mobilization effort—Truman could neither abandon the POW policy nor escalate the war to bring the Communists to terms. It was only with a domestic governing coalition shift—the election of President Eisenhower—that entrapment and information obstacles were lifted and the United States could change course towards ending the war. While Eisenhower retained the same war aims that Truman had espoused, his governing coalition brought different actors—with different constituencies, different worldviews and different calculations of the war’s costs and benefits—that left them freer to consider an expanded range of strategic options. Without the partisan attacks from the Republican right wing, the politically unpopular mobilization campaign and the constraints of the NSC-68 mindset, the Eisenhower coalition had more leeway to end the war. Thus, the peace Eisenhower eventually won was “indistinguishable” from
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what Truman could have probably garnered, “except that it was achieved without the accompanying howls of the GOP” (Reinhard 1983: 107). Eisenhower could agree to terms that Truman could not, because he was less vulnerable to attacks from the Republican right wing and could placate hardliner critics of the armistice in other issue areas, by eliminating economic controls and dismantling Truman’s mobilization infrastructure. Finally, because Eisenhower had built up the expectation during his campaign that he would end the war soon, the public both looked for and expected decisive action. As long as he settled the war relatively quickly, it would remain “Truman’s War.”
7
China Trapped by a Hawkish Ally
This chapter returns to the Communist side to trace Chinese decision-making through the lens of entrapment. As the US chapters demonstrated, an entrapment obstacle occurs when leaders want to end the war but cannot. Unlike the internal entrapment in the US case, however, the Chinese governing coalition was trapped by an external ally—Stalin. While the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) shared Communist roots, their relationship was hardly intimate as both tried to maneuver to their advantage. As Chapter 4 detailed, Soviet behavior towards the Chinese Communists before the Korean War certainly left reason for the Chinese to be wary, and thus it is not surprising they were looking to avoid dependence on the Soviet Union. Yet, to some degree, it was precisely because of the Korean War that such dependence developed and ultimately trapped China in a war it no longer wished to fight. This chapter argues that although opponents to the Korean War initially existed in the Chinese governing coalition, ultimately the Chinese leaders reached a consensus to intervene. But the war effort was very costly, both in economic and human terms. As the war’s domestic costs became apparent, the Chinese governing coalition experienced a dovish shift in the summer of 1952, which led to a policy shift towards wanting to end the war. Although it appears China was willing to settle in August 1952, it was prevented from settling by its ally and patron, Stalin. The new governing coalition tried to convince Stalin to support crucial concessions about voluntary repatriation to achieve a negotiated settlement, but Stalin was unwilling. In large part because of the war, China was now extremely dependent upon Soviet military and economic assistance for both fighting the
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war and developing its own industrial base. As a result, China was trapped: unable to pursue a real war-ending strategy until the Soviets gave it permission. It was not until after Stalin’s death that China was finally able to make the POW policy concessions it had been advocating since the previous summer. Admittedly, we do not yet have any direct evidence of Mao’s views in 1952. Where the process tracing is inconclusive, because data is unavailable, we can only make provisional conclusions. Nonetheless, evidence shows the economic elites whose influence increased with the summer 1952 coalition shift clearly supported an early end to the war. Similarly, Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai evidently discussed war-terminating options with Stalin that fall. While some scholars argue Mao wanted to continue fighting as late as 1953, these same scholars argue foreign policy outcomes never diverged from Mao’s preferences. Therefore, while we lack a “smoking gun,” it is reasonable to argue—given the evidence available today and presented in this chapter—the dovish coalition shift in the summer of 1952 helped shift Chinese war policy towards ending the war. This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section explains the Chinese governing coalition. The second section explains its decision to intervene in the Korean War. The third section describes Chinese mobilization efforts and outlines the staggering domestic costs of its intervention, as well as the shift in the governing coalition that spurred China to want to end the war. The fourth section details China’s entrapment obstacle as Chinese leaders unsuccessfully tried to get Stalin to support concessions that would bring the armistice in reach. Finally, as in the previous case studies, the fifth section examines some alternative explanations for Chinese behavior.
The Chinese Governing Coalition From 1950 to 1953, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) shared a “basic leadership consensus” to consolidate power and recover economically, thereby leading to a socialist transformation and planned economy. Led by Mao Zedong, the regime had a predominantly stable and unified leadership; during the war there were no leadership purges.1 From 1945 to 1953, the five-man Secretariat was clearly ranked Mao, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De and by 1950, Chen Yun (Teiwes 1990: 18; Chang 1975: 204). This leader stability created consistent expectations lower down the hierarchy. There were four reasons for this essential unity in leadership and decision-making. First, there was substantial elite consensus about the need to consolidate the new regime and the desire to follow the Soviet model. When the CCP created the People’s Republic in October 1949, it faced some serious challenges. The Chinese economy
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and financial structure were in terrible disrepair from the 12-year civil war and a rash of floods and droughts that affected about 40 million people. The CCP leadership’s first efforts were therefore directed at relieving famine, stabilizing commodity prices, checking inflation, balancing the budget and restoring basic transportation and communications (Gurtov and Hwang 1980: 27; Teiwes 1993: 86). Second, the leadership shared a generational worldview about foreign and domestic policy. The elites believed China was unique and important in international relations, but worried that foreign and internal enemies were trying to subvert the fragile regime. Thus, they wanted to exert strong state control, limit partnerships and maintain distance in foreign relationships. In short, they viewed foreign and domestic threats—and foreign and domestic policy—as indelibly intertwined (Hamrin 1994: 80; Kirby 1994: 13–29; Gurtov and Hwang 1980: 17). Third, Mao’s leadership of the CCP was undisputed. Mao’s prestige was enormous, in large part because of his crucial role in leading the Chinese Communists to win the civil war and establish the PRC. This status was amplified by the authoritarian traditions of the international Communist movement and Confucian beliefs, which translated into a political culture of submissiveness at all levels of the CCP. Many cadres—particularly from rural areas—adopted a deeply reverential attitude of “loyalty to the monarch” (Teiwes 1993: lxiii). Finally, because of his preeminent position, Mao could afford to govern through the principle of collective leadership. He used his prestige to persuade others to support his views and build a consensus. While reserving the right to insist on his own way, Mao’s general approach was to encourage broad discussion in order to reach a consensus position. It is true that group norms to avoid conflict encouraged leaders to take leaves of absence (i.e. illness, holidays) rather than formally dissent. Nonetheless, Mao avoided harsh rebukes of dissenters and—especially in areas such as industrial policy, where he acknowledged his own inadequacies—he would concede to contrary views favored by a majority, despite his own reservations. In turn, this allowed him to play the final arbiter of policy disputes: by pursuing consensus politics, Mao could secure the majorities required by the principle of collective leadership (Teiwes 1990: 17–20; 1993: lxv, 86–87; Chang 1975: 188–89).2 For these reasons, the CCP Politburo and its Standing Committee were more involved in decision-making than has been popularly understood. These bodies approved all decisions, at least formally. When policy disputes arose, they usually appeared because different leaders with different portfolios maintained divergent perspectives. As Parris Chang argues, “Despite Mao’s enormous power, policy was significantly influenced by debates and conflicts among leaders” (1975: 2). When top leaders appeared divided, Mao would use alternative bodies—enlarged
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Politburo sessions, conferences and enlarged Central Committee plenums with members and nonmembers—to make major policy decisions (Chang 1975: 184; Jung and Halliday 2006: 356). For example, Mao resorted to such fora during the debates before China’s intervention in the Korean War. Under Mao’s influence, the CCP apparatus and generalists (rather than “experts”—i.e. knowledgeable officials and professionals) took charge of the policy process. They implemented policies through mass campaigns rather than through functional bureaucratic agencies, using state institutions as a “transmission belt” to cloak decisions with legality. This “campaign approach” allowed CCP leaders to mobilize and concentrate efforts on achieving a defined objective at a given time, breaking through bureaucratization tendencies. However, this approach inadvertently created problems, because top leaders could not always control the forces they unleashed. As the domestic mobilization campaigns during the Korean War demonstrated, lower-level cadres tended towards excess in implementing policies, often taking a policy line too far (Chang 1975: 180–85; Jung and Halliday 2006: 318–23). Although the CCP worked through collective leadership, power was concentrated among a few people and the regime was run in a highly centralized fashion. Therefore, “ultimate power and decision-making were concentrated in the hands of a small group of leaders and were subordinated to the changing results of factional struggles. Political issues, although they did exist, often were obscured by factional and personal alignments” (Bergere 1997: 268). These personal alignments influenced the timing and shape of policy implementation. For example, they were important in the summer of 1952 in helping the new coalition to win over Mao to change China’s Korean War policy. There were two factional groups in the CCP decision-making structure. The first group was military elites, who during the regime’s formative years enjoyed great power and a high degree of regional autonomy. During the civil war, when People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops took over an area, they abolished the Chinese Nationalist (Kuomintang, or KMT) government institutions and set up military control councils—usually led by local PLA commanders—as provisional organs of the new regime. In early 1950, these councils were synthesized into five Great Regions with parallel party, military and administrative structures run by the same leaders.3 PLA generals also controlled many of the regional and municipal administrations. In addition, the military elites comprised half of the CCP Central Committee in 1950 and had three seats on the Politburo—significantly higher than Red Army representation in the early Soviet regime.4 Finally, PLA leaders were highly represented in party and state bureaucracies (Fang 1998: 60–61; Thornton 1982: 231–32).
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The second group was civilian elites, who had been leaders of the underground party organizations in the formerly KMT- or Japanese-controlled “white areas.”5 Civilian elites were generally better educated, and therefore they assumed high-level administrative positions when the Communist regime came to power. For example, Liu Shaoqi was appointed vice chairman of the Central People’s Government Council, and Zhou Enlai became foreign minister and the premier of the Government Administration Council, or GAC (Fang 1998: 62–63). Because Mao had been part of the military faction, he deliberately populated the CCP Central Committee with civilian elites in 1945, to reflect the diverse constituencies of the party (Teiwes 1990: 15). Nonetheless, these factions served to reinforce the centralized, unified leadership, for three reasons. First, because of the long civil war, the CCP’s party and military organizations were quite intertwined, so that there was a blurring between civil and military bureaucratic interests. Second, because the regime was not yet institutionalized, informal ties were very important. Most leaders had been soldiers during the civil war and did not become civilians until after the PRC’s creation in 1949. Consequently, their informal networks cut across bureaucratic divisions and fragmented bureaucratic authority. They reached consensus through bargaining and personal ties (guanxi). Third, as with the Soviets, CCP elites feared political purges and persecutions, although no purges actually occurred during this period. Thus, while factional support helped ensure political and career survival in a system without reliable legal procedures, even the factions would only dissent from the group consensus so much (Fang 1998: 11–12; Bergere 1997: 268). Turning more specifically to decision-making during the Korean War, foreign policy decisions were highly centralized and compartmentalized from other functional areas. Mao was actively involved in guiding foreign policy and reunification policy (involving Taiwan and Hong Kong), in directing relations with the United States and the Soviet Union and in addressing regional crises. Mao alone received foreign ministry papers from Zhou Enlai for decisions, although Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and Peng Zhen received informational copies. Likewise, Mao remained the final arbiter of Chinese strategy in Korea. Peng Dehuai, the Chinese military commander in Korea, regularly submitted his battle plans to Mao for approval. In some cases, Mao himself wrote directives dictating the scope and objectives of operations (Chen 1992: 28; Pollack 1989: 223; Hamrin 1994: 80, 83; Li and Tracy 1992; Li et al. 1992: 63–86). Mao also placed his son, Anying—killed in the war—on Peng’s staff in Korea as a Russian interpreter, in part to watch over Peng’s actions (Zhang 1993: 15).
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The Chinese Decision to Intervene in the Korean War Why did the Chinese decide to intervene in the Korean War? China was still recovering from the civil war, faced a long list of domestic challenges and was not well situated for war with the most powerful country in the world. Moreover, at least initially, most Chinese leaders were against intervention. However, the US decision to cross the 38th Parallel, coupled with Stalin’s threat to let North Korea completely collapse (right on China’s border), triggered Chinese fears about its internal security. Ultimately, the Chinese governing coalition decided the Korean War was inextricably linked to China’s internal security and thus intervention was necessary. As its first priority, the Chinese governing coalition wanted to protect the PRC from external threats to concentrate on establishing the new regime. Most importantly, it wanted to end the civil war by capturing Taiwan, where the KMT had escaped, and it needed Soviet support to do it. Therefore, in June 1949, Mao reluctantly argued for aligning with the Soviet Union. In his words, “we are keenly aware that we must lean to one side in order to achieve and consolidate victory” (quoted in Hao and Zhai 1993: 145). Meetings between Chinese and Soviet leaders that fall and winter, including Mao’s two-month trip to Moscow, culminated on February 14, 1950, with the “Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance” (Goncharev et al. 1993: 76–129; Chen 1989: 187). Although Stalin snubbed Mao during the tense visit,6 and the agreement’s terms disproportionately benefited the Soviets,7 the Chinese Communists were willing to “secure their flank” to focus on internal issues—the first one being a Taiwan invasion. While Mao planned the Taiwan invasion in early 1950, Stalin tried to preempt Mao’s attack by hastening Kim Il-Sung’s invasion. As Chapter 4 explained, if Kim invaded South Korea before Mao started his attack, Mao would be unable to invade Taiwan. Thus, Chinese leaders were “deliberately kept in the dark on the details of the North’s preparations, including the timing of the attack” (Goncharev et al. 1993: 213; also Thornton 2000: 110–13, 229; Wolff 2000: 25; Kim 1996: 264; Hao and Zhai 1993: 148; Spence 1990: 526; Zhai 1993: 178; Gaddis 1997: 75).8 The outbreak of the Korean War was a fatal blow to Mao’s plans for Taiwan. The Chinese leaders backed the North Korean invasion in principle and knew they could not refuse to support Kim in light of their treaty with the Soviets. However, Mao explicitly warned Kim about possible US or Japanese invasion (Gaddis 1997: 78; Zhang 1992: 93; Weathersby 2002: 13; Goncharev et al. 1993: 214). US ground intervention in South Korea, increased military aid to Indochina and the Philippines, and the US Seventh Fleet’s deployment into the Taiwan
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Strait triggered Chinese fears that the United States would intervene in China’s internal affairs. Given their beliefs equating internal and external threats, it is not surprising the Chinese leaders linked American “imperialism” in Asia with support for the “reactionary” KMT that still threatened the PRC’s internal stability. Facing potential conflict now in two directions at once—Taiwan and Korea—the Chinese were worried that North Korea would be defeated, allowing the United States to control the entire peninsula and then attack China (Chen 1994: chapter 4; Milliken 2001: 114–17; Christensen 1996: 157–60; Goncharev et al. 1993: 215; Hao and Zhai 1993: 101, 149). Thus, a few weeks after the war began, China prepared—on its own initiative—for the possibility of intervention on the Korean peninsula. They dispatched Chinese diplomats and intelligence officials to North Korea to establish better communications with Kim Il-Sung and to observe the fighting directly. They redeployed and reflagged more than 250,000 troops, who became the backbone of the “Chinese People’s Volunteers” (CPV)—the Chinese army in Korea. Chinese military commanders stationed air defense units south of the Yalu River to defend major bridges against possible US air attack. Finally, the CCP launched the first of its mass mobilization campaigns during the war, the “Resist America, Aid Korea” campaign, with “beating American arrogance” as its central slogan (Chen 2001: 11, 88; Pollack 1989: 216; Nie 1988: 748–49; Stueck 1995: 52, 65; Jung and Halliday 2006: 318). chinese reluctance to intervene
Despite these preparations, it was not a foregone conclusion that China would inevitably intervene. Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai told Stalin in July that Chinese forces would have to enter the war if the United States attacked north of the 38th Parallel. Chinese officials gave three warnings between September 26 and October 3 to try to forestall this event.9 China genuinely sought through diplomatic means to prevent the United States from invading North Korean territory (Milliken 2001: 144–45, 150; Sartori 2005: 22–25; Zhang 1992: 94–95; Goncharev et al. 1993: 175).10 Indeed, at least initially, the majority of the Chinese governing coalition was against intervention. Between September 30, when the North Koreans approached the CCP for assistance,11 and China’s final decision to intervene on October 18, there was a flurry of deliberations among the Chinese leadership. The CCP Politburo held several meetings to debate the issue,12 and even Mao vacillated.13 The reasons cited against intervention need describing in detail, as these factors influenced how coalition members assessed the war’s costs and benefits and assumed greater importance when the governing coalition shifted in the summer of 1952.
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Most coalition members who participated in the early October debates believed it was unwise to send troops to Korea.14 Many leaders were logical opponents to intervention. For example, GAC Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai and Finance Minister Chen Yun had designed a policy to balance the budget and control inflation by curtailing military and administrative expenses; Zhou even led the PLA demobilization effort. Rao Shushi presided over the tentatively recovering East China region that owed its improved economic circumstances to stable relations with Western industrialists and merchants. Similarly, Northeast region leader Gao Gang did not want war, because his region would become the staging base for the Chinese military intervention (Weiss 1981: 82; Huo 1989: 224). (Conversely, as will be seen below, some scholars argue Mao supported the war precisely for this reason, as it would break up Gao’s political monopoly in Manchuria.) The opponents to intervention listed four reasons. First, intervening in Korea would damage Chinese reconstruction. After decades of destructive war, China needed rehabilitation to deal with its huge fiscal deficit, high unemployment and agricultural and industrial recovery. Moreover, sending troops into Korea might cause discontent at home (Milliken 2001: 151; Keith 1989: 46; Gurtov and Hwang 1980: 55; Weiss 1981: 81; Huo 1989: 218). As Central-South region leader Lin Biao argued, the consequences of going to Korea after the debilitating civil war could be even worse than “igniting a fire to burn oneself ” (quoted in Zhang 1993: 7). Second, many outlying areas and offshore islands (including Taiwan) were not yet liberated, with one million KMT troops and bandits still moving freely about. These forces harassed and raided local councils, sabotaged economic projects, assassinated officials and resorted to guerilla warfare. In addition, some leaders worried a Korean intervention would divert scarce resources flagged for the Taiwan invasion and thereby postpone it (Paul 1994: 103; Gurtov and Hwang 1980: 31, 55; Hao and Zhai 1993: 154; Zhai 1993: 189; Milliken 2001: 151; Chen 1994: 182). Third, American war resources seemed inexhaustible, in terms of both military power and industrial reserves. Opponents pointed to US air supremacy and superior weaponry, and they argued the United States might bomb China’s cities and destroy its industrial base. Moreover, because the Chinese lacked air cover or control of the seas, they would have to fight without protected logistical supply trains. Even if the PLA was numerically superior, most of its forces were pinned down with domestic counter-insurgency efforts (Huo 1989: 215; Zhai 1993: 188; Zhang 1995: 80–81; Hao and Zhai 1993: 154; Jung and Halliday 2006: 356; Chen 1994: 182, 185; Milliken 2001: 152). Finally, after decades of war, many PLA cadres and soldiers were longing for peace and unwilling to fight in another major operation. The PLA had not taken
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“proper leave” or conducted training exercises in more than four years, and commanders were worried about getting bogged down in another protracted war (Zhang 1993: 11; Hsiung 1970: 172; Gurtov and Hwang 1980: 55; Zhai 1993: 189; Nie 1988: 735; Huo 1989: 214–15). In contrast, Mao was inclined to enter the war. Mao’s “People’s War” strategy for protracted war, with “man” beating “weapons,” had been very successful against the KMT, and he believed weak forces could defeat materially stronger enemies. In the policy debates, Mao emphasized conflict with the United States was inevitable and of the possible battlegrounds—Indochina, Taiwan or Korea—Korea was geographically and logistically best suited. Moreover, China’s entry into the war would not only strengthen the CCP’s control over the Chinese state and society, but allow China to reassert itself internationally (Zhang 1992: 89; 1995: 23, 29, 85; Sheng 1995: 301; Hao and Zhai 1993: 155; Paul 1994: 94; Stueck 1995: 99; Milliken 2001: 160–61; Chen 1994: 211–23).15 More parochially, while not a firstorder issue for Mao, other scholars suggest Mao favored military intervention to undermine Gao’s “independent kingdom” in Manchuria. Given his long-standing ties to Stalin, Gao was one of Mao’s rivals; the Korean War would allow Mao to move large numbers of troops through the region and thus break Gao’s military monopoly there (Petrov 1994a: 10; Fang 1998: 64; Gittings 1967: chapter 6; Schur mann 1966: 267–72; Whitson and Chen-Hsia 1973: 94).16 While Chen (2001: 90) characterizes Mao as unshakably determined to intervene in Korea, other scholars and participants depict him in a far less decisive light. In most accounts, Mao nervously deliberated for three days and nights before deciding there was no alternative to Chinese intervention (Noriyuki 1993: 164; Hao and Zhai 1993: 161; Gittings 1974: 183; Pollack 1989: 219; Zhai 1993: 199; Usov 1993: 251; Gurtov and Hwang 1980: 55; Zhang 1995: 78; Wang 1975: 206–7; Weiss 1981: 83; Sheng 1995: 304; Li et al. 1992: 73–74). The triggering events appear to have been the US decision to cross the 38th Parallel on October 7 and Stalin’s threat to order North Koreans to evacuate into Manchuria (Christensen 1996: 162, 164; Mansourov 1995–96: 114–15). The day after the UN Command crossed north, Chinese leaders decided to enter the war, and Mao established the CPV force (Li et al. 1992: 68–69; Zhang 1993: 17). However, in a meeting with Zhou on October 10, Stalin reneged on his July promise to provide air support. Stalin believed China was delaying intervention deliberately to get more Soviet assistance. Thus, he called China’s bluff by threatening to give the Korean peninsula entirely over to US control and order the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) to evacuate into Manchuria (Thornton 2000: 342; Goncharev et al. 1993: 189–92; Gaddis 1997: 80–81; Jung and Halliday 2006: 358).17 After Stalin withdrew Soviet air support, Mao reversed the decision to inter-
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vene and hosted another round of debate. Nonetheless, Chinese leaders finally agreed that even without Soviet air support, intervention was necessary. Linking foreign and domestic threats, they worried about the physical security of the new regime. In their view, the Korean War was inextricably linked to China’s internal security, because it would increase “reactionary” uprisings at home and encourage the KMT to fight back to the mainland. In other words, they worried about perceptions of China’s weakness and believed that China needed to appear strong to deter these threats. Moreover, should China stand by and let North Korea be defeated, China would face a hostile great power on its border and thousands of North Korean troops and their weapons streaming into Manchuria (Thornton 2000: 343; Zhang 1993: 23; Hao and Zhai 1993: 152; Zhai 1993: 185–86; Paul 1994: 92–93; Milliken 2001: 151). As a result, they “had to proceed even without Soviet air cover in order to save, not North Korea, but China” (Goncharev et al. 1993: 216). Thus, on October 18, Mao finally ordered Chinese troops to cross the Yalu River and intervene.
The New Chinese Governing Coalition and China’s Willingness to Settle The previous section outlined four reasons why many Chinese leaders were against intervening in Korea: (1) intervention would harm Chinese reconstruction efforts and might incite domestic discontent, (2) the homeland was still not liberated, with roughly a million KMT troops and bandits still moving freely about and the KMT still controlling Taiwan, (3) the Chinese military was technologically inferior to the US military, and the United States had more industrial resources to mobilize for a long war and (4) the PLA was exhausted from decades of fighting and unwilling to fight another major war. These four factors did not magically go away after Chinese troops crossed the Yalu River. Instead, as this section demonstrates, these factors persisted and assumed greater importance when the composition of the governing coalition shifted in the summer of 1952. chinese intervent ion
While the initial Chinese counterattack was devastating and UN forces fell back quickly, within a few weeks the Chinese forces were feeling the toll of heavy fighting, inferior equipment and logistical problems. By December 1950, CPV Commander Peng Dehuai wanted to halt for lengthy preparations before renewing the offensive. Peng was concerned about logistical supply lines stretching down the peninsula and lack of air cover for Communist troops. For example, by the time the CPV reached the 38th Parallel, its closest logistical depot was more
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than 190 miles away. These depots had no radio communication capabilities and were staffed primarily with soldiers lacking logistical experience. Moreover, transportation was inefficient and cumbersome. Rail was mostly destroyed, so Chinese trucks carried supplies after dark, often with headlights off, traveling on average 20 miles per night. CPV forces on the western front had fewer than 300 trucks for almost 300,000 troops. Chinese soldiers also lacked basic supplies, like shoes, ammunition and food (Stueck 1995: 358; Jung and Halliday 2006: 360; Zhang 1995: 167–68; Yu 2001: 17).18 The Chinese fought with “human-wave tactics,” to exploit their superior numbers, but casualties were extremely heavy. Prolonged and severe combat weakened CPV morale, while the number of political cadres to enforce discipline was waning. Chinese front-line disintegration manifested itself in uncontrolled retreat, desertions and group surrenders. Despite a trip back to Beijing, to explain the situation in person, Peng was overruled in his desire to slow the offensive. While Mao revised his estimate of the war’s length upwards to two years and developed a new policy of “rotational warfare,” he wanted to press on (George 1969b: 10, 167; Chen 1992: 34; Jung and Halliday 2006: 360; Zhang 1992: 112; Chen 1992: 34–35; Mastny 1996: 121; Stueck 1995: 177; Sheng 1995: 312). The Communists prepared for a large-scale offensive in April-May 1951 with twelve armies, which they believed would be the campaign to determine the war’s fate. How right they were. The “fifth campaign,” as the Chinese called it, lasted 50 days; the CPV suffered 85,000 casualties (wounded and killed). Moreover, during the campaign’s last days, UN forces encircled the CPV’s 180th Division, 60th Army, and the majority of the unit—about 5,000 soldiers—was captured (Yue 1998: sections 16–17; Zhang 1995: 152). CPV commanders called the 180th Division’s capture “the most serious loss of the CPV on the Korean battlefield” (quoted in Chen 1992: 38). When the fifth campaign failed to push UN forces further south, the Communists decided to pursue a negotiated settlement. As a result, by June 1951, the Chinese coalition’s new objective for the war became restoring Korea’s physical and political prewar status quo. The Chinese governing coalition formally agreed to a new policy called “negotiating while fighting,” which Peng described as “painting a picture with two brushes at the same time” (Zhang 1992: 129; Nie 1988: 641; Mastny 1996: 124; Chen 1992: 39; Paul 1994: 95).19 At the same time, the CCP republished Mao’s famous 1938 article “On Protracted War” (Zhang 1992: 112). Thus, until the summer of 1952, the Chinese viewed armistice negotiations in Korea as one tactic in the ongoing struggle with the United States that would long outlast the Korean conflict. In other words, armistice negotiations were a tactical maneuver, not a strategic policy shift, to alleviate the burden of fighting in Korea.
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mobilizat ion for war
When China intervened in Korea, the new Chinese regime had accomplished little with its reconstruction programs. The nation desperately needed land reform, industrial and agricultural growth, a functioning currency, legal policies and dependable social programs. The CCP wanted to respond, but a number of the gradual reforms planned in 1949 were either scratched or rushed into implementation because of conflicting priorities with the war. The five campaigns of the Chinese offensive until June 1951 and the subsequent attrition strategy of “negotiating while fighting” required great sacrifice for a nation in need of reconstruction and rest. Initially, the Chinese governing coalition took several actions to mobilize the populace and spin up support for the expected hardships ahead. As Chapter 2 suggested, during the initial months of war, leaders will often take steps—such as demonizing the enemy and mobilizing the armed forces and industry—to ease the process of waging war. The Chinese governing coalition took several such actions to wage war more effectively. In the process, they also “sought to solidify CCP control by eliminating independent power and prestige of old elites” (Teiwes 1993: 85). First, Mao and Peng very carefully managed information reaching the wider public. For example, the day after issuing orders for CPV troops to cross the Yalu River, Mao instructed the five regions’ political commissars that “no open propaganda about what we are doing should appear in our newspapers; only highranking cadres of the party will be notified of the actions undertaken, so that they can be prepared in planning their work arrangements.”20 Similarly, in a telegram to the director of the General Information Bureau and Xinhua News Agency, Mao ordered news articles to be based on Xinhua’s own field reporting or on “internal information in Beijing.” Reports received from the Soviet news agency “should not be transmitted at all.”21 In addition, reports from foreign news agencies could not be published in Cankao Xiaoxi—an internally circulated paper carrying foreign news reporting—for four to five days.22 Mao also drafted press releases himself, praising the Communist troops and demonizing the enemy (Stueck 1995: 144). For example, in a People’s Daily report published December 5, Mao wrote that the NKPA and the CPV have struck devastating blows at the enemy forces. . . . The enemy forces on both the eastern and western fronts are running for their life with extreme anxiety and in great panic. The enemy forces inside the city of Pyongyang are committing monstrous crimes, slaughtering the people and burning down the city electric power plants and supply warehouses. (quoted Li and Tracy 1992: 79–80)
Second, the Chinese government launched a comprehensive effort to mobilize war-weary CPV troops and prepare them for combat. For two months before the
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intervention, they primed troops with ideological education, focusing on China’s Communist kinship with North Korea, China’s just cause and the “paper tiger” nature of the American imperialists. As General Du Ping, who served as the director of the CPV’s political departments, explained, they taught the troops that China and North Korea were as closely related as lips and teeth. If the lips [China’s neighbor] were gone, the teeth [China itself] would get cold. To help the neighbor was to help ourselves. We did not set fire to ourselves, but it was the enemy who had already set flames of war to our doorway. This war must be fought; the American imperialists were forcing us. (2001: 68)
Soldiers were also briefed by former KMT soldiers who had fought with Americans in Burma during World War II, to prove US troops were not invincible and could be defeated. Du argues this indoctrination campaign “established a ‘dare-to-fight’ and ‘must-win’ faith” among the troops (2001: 68–69). While initial indoctrination did not focus enough on the “unfavorable conditions” the Chinese soldiers found in Korea, the ideological education was continually refined throughout the war. For example, starting in January 1951, Du’s organization published Zhiyuanjun Bao [Volunteers Newspaper], to “strengthen both patriotism and internationalism” and “disseminate ideas of hate, spite and condescension toward the American imperialists so as to strengthen our soldiers’ confidence in winning the war” (Du 2001: 91–92, emphasis added). Third, the Chinese government set the economy on a wartime footing in order to collect—sometimes by force—necessary war resources. Waging the war was expensive: the Chinese force consumed 5.6 million tons of goods and supplies during its intervention, including the loss of 399 airplanes and 13,000 vehicles. To gather the necessary revenue and supplies, the CCP implemented several mass mobilization campaigns. In January 1951, the CCP launched a donation campaign to purchase “gifts” for the CPV, but it only collected 5 trillion yuan—onetenth of actual Korean War costs for that year. It also stimulated savings through government bonds by deliberately keeping consumer goods in short supply. A few months later, the CCP started a “patriotic bumper crops” movement that required all peasants to increase agricultural production. They also took emergency measures to monopolize grain purchase and marketing—a first step towards a central planning system. The middle class was hardest hit by these taxation and donation campaigns. For example, almost 70 percent of the total collected in the Shanghai area was given by “industry and commerce,” the euphemism for bourgeois groups (Li et al. 2001: 6; Hamrin 1994: 85; Weiss 1981: 180; Spence 1990: 533–35, 545; Zhang 1995: 200–202).
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Much of this mobilization occurred through mass campaigns. Since October 1950, the Chinese “Resist America—Aid Korea” campaign had blanketed urban centers with its “beat American arrogance” slogan. In November 1951, this campaign spread to rural areas, calling for “patriotic pacts” to raise production and establishing special efforts to care for families of CPV servicemen. During that winter, the CCP also launched two campaigns to ameliorate economic problems and internal disorder: the Three Anti Campaign (opposing corruption, waste and obstructionist bureaucracy) and the Five Anti Campaign (opposing bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts and stealing state economic information).23 Rearmament efforts increased further in January 1952, when the CCP proclaimed a policy of “total mobilization” with the goal of “winning victory, resisting the United States and aiding Korea.” This New Year’s proclamation called for agricultural collectivization, industrial production increases, an intelligentsia remolding campaign and a widening of the Three Anti-Five Anti campaigns (Teiwes 1993: 85; Chang 1975: 209; Zhang 1992: 131; 1995: 200–202, 223; Spence 1990: 533–37; Weiss 1981: 94–95, 101–3, 149; Stueck 1995: 275). To spur the populace on, Chinese leaders blatantly resorted to demonizing the enemy beyond its “beat American arrogance” slogan. In October 1950, to whip up anti-American sentiment, the People’s Daily alleged the United States had ordered a foiled assassination plot against Mao.24 More significantly, in February 1952, the CCP announced the United States had used bacteriological weapons over North Korea and Northeastern China—a propaganda campaign that recently declassified Russian archival documents demonstrate was a Communist hoax (Leitenberg 1999; Weathersby 1999; Jung and Halliday 2006: 369–70). This movement against “germ warfare” was the most intensely xenophobic campaign of the war. The CCP staged mass demonstrations against the “US criminal acts of spreading disease germs” and organized a “people’s investigation group” to collect evidence in North Korea. They also launched a “patriotic health and epidemic prevention campaign” (Zhang 1995: 183–85).25 As Shu Guang Zhang argues about these mass campaigns, CCP leaders “worried that they would not be able to sustain such a patriotic fever through the end of the war, given that KMT remnants were not yet eliminated, the future of Tibet was not settled, and pro-American elements within and outside the Party were not totally suppressed” (1992: 131, emphasis added). In sum, given how costly the war effort was and how much the Chinese people needed a rest after decades of war, it is not surprising the Chinese governing coalition took such actions to mobilize the nation to wage war more effectively.
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the d omest ic costs of war
At their height, these domestic mobilization campaigns were ruthless and extreme; roughly three million people died as a result. In Beijing alone, some 30,000 sentencing and execution rallies were held, attended by nearly 3.4 million people. Likewise, factory workers held mass tribunals to denounce and punish their corrupt capitalist employers, some of whom were killed for their crimes, and peasants attacked ordinary landlords when genuine despots did not exist (Schram 1976: 247; Jung and Halliday 2006: 318–19; Weiss 1981: 125; Spence 1990: 535–39). While excessive violence and killing were not the official policy, “there was tolerance for such expressions of the people’s outrage in view of their own long suffering, and a reluctance to ‘blame them too much’ if they went too far” (Shue 1975: 17). The governing coalition preferred to let the campaign go too far and then rein it in. As a result, throughout most of 1951, a real climate of terror reigned throughout the country. Certainly, these mobilization campaigns were only partly to extract materiel support for the Korean War. They were also a systematic attempt to consolidate the Communist regime by undermining armed resistance in the countryside and inducing long-term social order. Yet, at least through the “rumor” mill—how most Chinese expressed their real sentiments, given the preference falsification that was rampant after such terror—the campaigns were actively linked to a perception of Russian extortion for the war effort (Jung and Halliday 2006: 320). The other human cost to the war’s mobilization was within the military, although away at the front, they were less visible to the Chinese people. More than three million Chinese participated in the Korean War, the largest foreign war in Chinese military history. According to Chinese statistics, a total of 2.3 million Chinese soldiers fought in the war. As many as 25 infantry armies (73 percent of the PLA’s infantry forces), 16 artillery divisions (67 percent), 10 armored divisions (100 percent), 12 air force divisions (52 percent) and six security guard divisions fought in Korea. In addition, more than 600,000 Chinese laborers entered Korea, as part of the CPV’s logistical support services, to operate supply depots, transport troops and supplies and construct highways and railroads. Chinese casualty statistics are also sobering: 1.1 million casualties, including 152,000 dead and 4,000 missing in action. UN intelligence statisticians put Chinese losses far higher: 1.5 million casualties, with between 300,000 and 400,000 dead. An official Russian document even puts Chinese dead at 1 million (Li et al. 2001: 6, 246, FN 6; Jung and Halliday 2006: 372). Jung and Halliday argue that Mao consciously embarked on the Korean War with such a quid pro quo in mind, sacrificing Chinese lives in battle to industri-
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alize at home. “What Mao had in mind boiled down to a deal: Chinese soldiers would fight the Americans for Stalin in exchange for Soviet technology and equipment” (2006: 352). They argue Chinese leaders repeatedly used the war to get Soviet support for building a domestic arms industry. For example, shortly after the Chinese decision to intervene, China’s navy chief was sent to ask for assistance in building the navy. In December 1950, China sent a high-level mission with a similar request for its air force, and in February 1951, Moscow agreed to build factories in China to repair and service planes. In May 1951, Mao asked Stalin to provide blueprints for weapons being used in Korea and assistance in building factories to produce them. While Stalin initially stonewalled, in October he finally agreed to transfer technology for seven kinds of small arms (Jung and Halliday 2006: 361). Although Stalin offered military aid to support the Chinese intervention, he initially stipulated the equipment could only be used for training and not on the frontlines. Thus, China entered the war using old weapons captured from the Japanese and KMT. Former CPV troops, in interviews years later, expressed resentment over how slowly modern arms arrived from the Soviet Union. They recalled using Soviet-made guns and weapons during the war but said these weapons did not arrive until late 1951. Moreover, except for artillery and combat aircraft, the CPV’s weapon supply “mainly depended upon China itself ” (Huo 1989: 78–79). In addition to military supply and logistics to support the CPV in Korea, China also provided support for the NKPA and the North Korean population. Given these many needs, the financial costs of the Korean War were staggering. In 1950, military expenses related to the war constituted 44 percent of the government’s budget; in 1951, 52 percent; and in 1952, 28 percent.26 Although military expenditures consumed a smaller fraction of the 1952 budget, that budget was larger, as economic development finally took root. Thus, the absolute magnitude of war expenses increased. Military spending and arms-related industries beyond the war effort accounted for 61 percent of the budget during this time, while education, culture and health shared only 8.2 percent (Jung and Halliday 2006: 374). Although groaning under the weight of these consistently high costs, China handled these expenses predominantly on its own. For example, while China spent 93 trillion yuan ($4.1 billion) on the Korean War during the 1950–53 fiscal years, it only received 21.5 trillion yuan ($950 million) in Soviet loans during that period.27 Moreover, the Chinese people were told that equipment from the USSR used in China’s industrialization was “Soviet aid,” implying it was a gift, but in fact it was paid for with Chinese food exports (Jung and Halliday 2006: 374).28 Although the CCP hiked taxes and found other ways to extract money from the
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economy, the war effort consumed whatever increases the government could squeeze from its rudimentary industrial base. For example, government revenue grew in 1951 by 56.4 trillion yuan, through a 13.6 percent increase in agricultural taxes, a 95.6 percent increase in industrial taxes and a 250 percent increase in state enterprise profits. Sadly, however, the Korean War consumed 50 trillion of it (Weiss 1981: 65). After the war, Mao admitted some of these difficulties. In September 1953, he argued that Chinese troops had gained military experience and showed that “US imperialism is not terrifying, nothing to make a fuss about.” However, he also confirmed that the “agricultural tax” to support the war effort had been “a shade on the heavy side” and that “some people raised an outcry” as a result and “wanted us to give up the war” (Mao 1977: 115–20). the new chinese gover ning coalit ion
By the spring of 1952, Chinese forces possessed sufficient arms and equipment to sustain the stalemate, but economic distortions, missed industrial production targets, domestic unrest and a famine demonstrated the inherent weaknesses in the Chinese mobilization strategy. The previous summer, CCP Vice Chairman Liu Shaoqi had balked at the consequences of industrialization and the war effort: “We cannot develop heavy industry first,” because it “consumes a tremendous amount of money with no returns . . . and the only way available to us is to raise the money by depriving our people. . . . Now people’s life is very miserable” (quoted in Jung and Halliday 2006: 377). In June 1952, Vice Premier and Finance Minister Chen Yun argued industrial stagnation at the height of the Three Anti Campaign was having adverse effects. Chen even predicted that “we will, one day, be unable to provide what we need in Korea” (quoted in Zhang 1992: 131). Regional leaders made similar comments. For example, Li Fuchun and Gao Gang argued the Three Anti-Five Anti campaigns pushed production drives far behind schedule; by June 1952, only 22.4 percent of the year’s target for capital construction in the Northeast, the most industrialized region, had actually been accomplished (Weiss 1981: 104, 127–28). In short, while the mobilization campaigns helped sustain the war, they cut away most of the economic support for domestic industrialization. Given so many opportunity costs from waging the Korean War, the Chinese governing coalition realized it was time to focus on economic reconstruction. The principal task was to build a national government to spearhead industrial development after decades of war. The CCP needed to build new economic ministries and staff them with senior leaders to direct and manage the increasingly heavy administrative workload. Thus, in the summer of 1952, a number of PLA
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leaders were asked to relinquish their military posts, relocate to Beijing and serve full-time as central party or government officials (Fang 1998: 61). Starting that summer, five regional military leaders moved to Beijing: • Gao Gang, from the Northeast, was appointed chairman of the State Plan-
ning Commission (SPC). He also ran the Ministries of Heavy Industry, Number-One and Number-Two Machinery, Fuel Industry, Construction Engineering, Geology, Light Industry and Textile Industry. • Rao Shushi, from East China, was appointed director of the Central Committee’s Organization Department. He also ran the Labor Ministry. • Deng Zihui, from Central-South, was made first vice-chairman of three major committees—the Finance Committee, the Economic Committee and the SPC. He also ran the Ministries of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Conservancy and, later, the Central Committee’s Rural Work Department. • Deng Xiaoping, from the Southwest, became vice premier of the Government Administration Council (GAC). He also ran the Ministries of Railways, Transportation and Postal and Telecommunications. • Xi Zhongxun, from the Northwest, was appointed GAC secretary general and vice chairman of the Culture and Education Committee (Fang 1998: 62; Teiwes 1990: 21). All of these men were powerful military leaders who were serving, at the time of their transfers, as either political commissars or military commanders or both. As the list suggests, each of China’s regions was involved with the new postings. As a result, key CCP members moved to Beijing and became important members of the decision-making group.29 The new emerging leadership was concentrated institutionally and organizationally in the sphere of economic management. These rising leaders—together with Finance Minister Chen Yun, Chen’s deputy Li Fuchun and GAC leader and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai—were a closely cooperating group of economic decision-makers.30 This group of economic decision-makers, including well-established Secretariat leaders and rising stars in the party leadership, formed the core of China’s new coalition making decisions about the war. Assembled together in Beijing, with a new mandate for economic growth and government centralization, they became increasingly influential in the Chinese governing coalition. Some—Deng Xiaoping, Deng Zihui and Xi—had not participated in the original decision to enter the war, and thus were new members of the decision-making coalition. Others—Zhou, Chen, Gao and Rao—had been included in the initial debates, but they had all opposed intervention. These leaders brought an interesting mix of personal perspectives and profes-
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sional expertise to the problem of the Korean War. On the one hand, having spent time in key regional leadership posts, they were very aware of the human and societal costs imposed by prolonged participation in the war. On the other, their expertise in managing economic recovery and industrialization clearly showed them the opportunity costs of waging war instead of rebuilding and modernizing the nation. By valuing centralized economic planning and industrialization more than the war effort, these leaders had a different vision of the war’s costs and benefits. Economic centralization created “new bases of power for key CCP leaders and new patterns of interaction within the top echelons of the Party and state” (Teiwes 1990: 20). Their increasing influence in Mao’s decision-making coalition helped spur China towards ending the war. Certainly, Mao remained at the helm of the government. However, having decided to shift priority to economic development, he assembled a new governing coalition with expertise in this issue area. Together, these leaders articulated arguments against fighting the war and thereby influenced Mao to change the war policy. These leaders had different judgments about the war, due to the different nature of their expertise and bureaucratic portfolios. Since the summer of 1951, Zhou Enlai had asserted the two fundamental problems facing China—“enormous financial tension” and “the acute lack of technical cadres”—were exacerbated by the Korean War. As Zhou argued, “If the war ends, then China will quickly escape from this situation . . . however, so long as the war goes on, it will be hard to solve this problem and it will be a fundamental constraint on Chinese industrialization.”31 Zhou’s perspective was shared by Agricultural Minister Deng Zihui and Finance Minister Chen Yun. As economic officials, they knew China’s economic realities better than anyone and “became more sensitive to objective limitations.” As a result, they “tended to be more cautious” about China’s ability to fight the war while building the economy (Chang 1975: 177). During this time, the CCP began planning for its first Five-Year Plan along the lines of Soviet-style centralized planning. There has been some speculation that the plan was actually written in Moscow, because it was first publicly announced there in October 1952, and only two months later mentioned publicly in Beijing (Weiss 1981: 130; Schurmann 1966: 171–72). Certainly, the Chinese followed their Soviet mentors’ techniques for rapid industrial growth: a focus on heavy industry, high rates of savings and investment, a bias towards capital-intensive methods and institutional transformations in agriculture. Moreover, thousands of Soviet technical advisors came to China to help with factory building, industrial planning, hydroelectric power development, railway network extension and urban architecture (Spence 1990: 544). As Lawrence Weiss argues, the Korean War
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played a major role in restricting China’s strategic alternatives to reliance on the Stalinist model of industrialization and also encouraged the Chinese to move down the road paved by the USSR at a far greater speed than had been envisioned by all but the most ardent advocates of Sovietization prior to October 1950. (1981: 136–37, emphasis added)
Paradoxically, Soviet behavior towards the Chinese Communists before the war gave Chinese leaders reasons to want to avoid depending on the Soviet Union, yet to a large degree it was precisely because of the war that such dependence developed. As Robert Simmons suggests, China was caught in a paradox: she wished to end her involvement in a war that had become stalemated militarily and was a tremendous drain on her economy; yet, to exit from that war, she had to win the assent of her powerful neighbor, who was the only country equipped to help her in the about-to-be announced First Five Year Plan. (1975: 223–24)
In sum, by the summer of 1952, Chinese leaders not only had become aware of the domestic costs of the prolonged war, but they were ready to shift their focus towards industrializing and creating a centralized, planned economy. A new group of leaders—with economic expertise and a different conceptualization of the war’s costs and benefits—assembled in Beijing. Their increasing influence in Mao’s decision-making coalition helped spur China towards wanting to end the war. As a result, confronted with the pressing need to achieve dramatic progress with industrialization, Mao and his colleagues approached Stalin for massive, long-term assistance and relief from the war.
The Entrapment Obstacle: Constrained by a Hawkish Ally During August-September 1952, China’s top economic officials trekked to the Soviet Union to negotiate massive Soviet support for Chinese industrial development, while simultaneously seeking to end the costly Korean War. An armistice would naturally liberate vast amounts of domestically generated revenue for industrial development, and China was ready to divert its funds in that direction. Virtually all of China’s first-rank industrial planners—including Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, Li Fuchun and Liu Shaoqi—spent extended periods in Moscow during the fall of 1952.32 During these visits, Zhou met with Stalin three times to discuss China’s proposed strategy for ending the war and support for industrialization. Russian transcripts of these discussions between Zhou and Stalin reveal that China was more eager to reach an armistice agreement than it had been before. Zhou’s dual
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aims were to achieve an armistice in Korea as quickly as possible while maximizing Soviet economic and military assistance to his ravaged country. In contrast, Stalin continued to press for extending the war, implicitly linking Soviet economic assistance to China’s continuing the war. Providing Soviet arms and economic assistance were a means to manipulate the Chinese into advancing Soviet interests (Shrader 1995: 66; Gittings 1967: 126–27). Yet both leaders never stated these goals so clearly and sometimes even seemed to be contradicting them. Warily circling the issue of a negotiated settlement, both leaders tried to avoid open disagreement without compromising their individual aims. During their first conversation on August 20, Zhou opened by noting North Korea had been willing to settle the war for some time.33 In response, Stalin lectured Zhou about the United States’ supposed military flabbiness. As Stalin sneered, “It’s been already two years and USA still has not subdued little Korea. What kind of strength is that?”34 Zhou then suggested that if the United States makes some sort of compromises, even if they are small, then they [the Communists] should accept. If America does not agree to return all POWs and proposes a smaller number, then they should accept the offer, under the condition that the question of the remaining POWs will be resolved under mediation by some neutral country, like India, or the remaining POWs transferred to this neutral country until the question is resolved.35
Stalin countered by proposing if the US were to retain a percentage of Communist POWs, the Communists should do likewise until a final solution was accepted. If this proposal was unsuccessful, then they could resort to mediation. Zhou replied by repeating Stalin’s suggestions as the first two of three alternative strategies: (1) “announce from the beginning that they will hold the same percentage of South Korean and American POWs as the percentage of North Koreans and Chinese held back by America,” (2) “resort to mediation by a neutral country” or (3) “sign an armistice agreement by putting off the POW question and resuming its discussion afterwards.” Since the first two alternatives were parroting Stalin, it seems likely that the third option—signing an armistice first and resolving the POW policy afterwards—was Zhou’s real preference. However, without reaching any decision about which of the three strategies to pursue, the discussion moved towards Soviet military assistance to China. During that discussion, Zhou argued inconsistently that “China is preparing for the possibility of another 2–3 years of war” in order to secure Stalin’s support for weapons and materiel.36 The same dynamic appeared again in their next conversation about the war on September 19.37 Stalin informed Zhou that the Soviet UN delegation would reject a Mexican proposal concerning POW exchange, since it conformed to the
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American negotiating position. With characteristic crudeness, Stalin dismissed Chinese and Korean casualties, noting the North Koreans “lose nothing, except for their men.” In response, Zhou returned to his third strategy from August 20—delaying the POW question until after the armistice—by asking “whether comrade Stalin considers it possible to support this position.” Stalin retorted that he wanted “the return of all POWs. This also concurs with the Chinese position.” When Zhou then suggested sending the POWs to India, Stalin tried to dissuade him by cautioning that “the Americans will not want to deliver all the POWs, that they will want to keep some captives, with the intention to recruit them” as spies. Zhou persisted, trying to get a specific strategy nailed down, and suggested they “cease fire and resolve the issue of POWs later.” Zhou reminded Stalin that he also agreed with this, as long as both sides did not agree about the percentage of POWs to be withheld. But Stalin would not commit. As he ambiguously answered: “this can be considered as one of possible scenarios, but America is not likely to agree to it.”38 In other words, Zhou was unable to gain Stalin’s support for China’s interest in compromising on the POW question, by transferring non-repatriates to a neutral country. Nor did Zhou succeed with his proposal to conclude the armistice first and settle the POW question later. The inconclusive outcome of both conversations was a victory for Stalin, which may be why he agreed to equip 60 more CPV divisions and provide ammunition, artillery and new fighter jets. Zhou’s visit ended without clear agreement on a war-ending strategy. Ultimately, China’s need for Soviet economic assistance to prosecute the war and develop China’s industrial base outweighed China’s willingness to implement a warending strategy without its ally’s support. As Zhu argues, “it was Stalin’s desire to continue the war and Mao felt pressured to comply with it” (1998: 209). Or as Mastny argues, “despite the appearance of Beijing’s agreeing with Moscow in taking an intransigent position against [an armistice], Stalin was the one who stalled, while the Chinese were seeking ways to achieve it” (1996: 148). In short, China was trapped. Zhou’s negotiations with Stalin came at a time when China’s domestic situation was desperate, which certainly hindered China’s bargaining leverage. After Zhou’s return to Beijing, the full extent of the concessions that junior partner China was willing to make for Soviet assistance became clear.39 For example, while Stalin had previously agreed to return Port Arthur to China in 1952, during Zhou’s visit the terms were altered to stipulate that the Soviets would remain at Port Arthur until they signed a peace treaty with Japan (an unlikely event in the short term). Stalin even orchestrated the Chinese concession so Zhou was required to request continued Soviet presence in the port (Gurtov and Hwang 1980:
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56; Simmons 1975: 219). Moreover, Stalin may have required that Gao Gang—the Northeast region leader who had a special relationship with Stalin—be named head of the new State Planning Commission to supervise and implement the First Five Year Plan. Significantly, both decisions—Soviet occupation of Port Arthur and Gao Gang’s role as SPC chief—were reversed by the new Soviet governing coalition shortly after Stalin’s death (Weiss 1981: 215). the wait ing game: o ctober 1952–march 1953
After the Zhou-Stalin meetings, China tried once more to end the war. On October 31, 1952, Zhou publicly signaled Chinese interest in transferring prisoners to India or some other “neutral zone.” In a meeting with the Indian ambassador, to discuss a war-terminating Indian resolution under UN consideration, Zhou admitted some of the Chinese POWs in the UN camps “might not want to go back to China and since they were under orders of [KMT leader] Chiang Kai-Shek they could go back to him” (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 590). Moreover, Zhou expressed interest in the Indian resolution, which resembled one of the formulae he had allegedly put forward to the previous Indian ambassador in June 1952.40 Unfortunately, the Soviet UN delegation “preventively torpedoed” the idea (Mastny 1996–97: 23; 1996: 148). As it became clear the United States and other nations were coalescing around the Indian resolution, which China tentatively supported, the Soviet UN delegate stepped in and rejected the plan because it had become the “camouflage for horrible American policy” and was now “nothing but a slightly veiled American draft.” Soon after, China told India it agreed with Moscow that the resolution was unacceptable. Indian diplomats believed the Chinese had been subjected to Soviet pressure and that, had they been left to themselves, they would have endorsed the resolution (Foot 1990: 156; Stueck 1995: 303). On December 17, Mao warned Stalin that US President-elect Eisenhower was “currently carrying out preparations for military actions that will take place after he comes to power.” He informed Stalin of a new PRC effort to mobilize an additional 250,000 troops to compensate for China’s terrible war losses, and in exchange, he requested more Soviet armaments. Ten days later, Stalin replied, “it is fully possible that these plans will be changed by the Eisenhower government in the direction of less tension on the front in Korea,” but “you are acting correctly when you count on the worst and proceed from the probability of an attack by the Americans.” Then, “taking into account the situation you speak of in your telegram,” Stalin offered: “with great difficulty we can deliver to you in 1953, besides the arms and ammunitions for 20 divisions [already] earmarked . . . approximately one-fourth of the quantity you stated in your telegram.”41 By
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advising the Chinese to prepare for a new US attack, Stalin again argued for prolonging the war—while only offering to provide one quarter of the arms Mao had requested. There was no movement in the Communist negotiating position until after Stalin’s death on March 5, 1953. His death prompted a radical change in the Soviet approach to the Korean War, to China’s and North Korea’s profound relief. On March 19—less than ten days after Stalin’s funeral—the Soviet Council of Ministers adopted a resolution to end the war, with attached letters to Mao and Kim IlSung. The resolution provided guidance about statements the three Communist governments should make to indicate their willingness to resolve outstanding issues and reach an armistice agreement. Chinese leaders saw Stalin’s death as the opportunity finally to end the war. Zhou traveled to Moscow for Stalin’s funeral and for meetings with the new Soviet leadership.42 According to a 1966 Soviet Foreign Ministry internal history of the Korean War, when Zhou discussed plans to end the war, he “urgently proposed that the Soviet side assist the speeding up of the negotiations and the conclusion of an armistice.”43 On March 21, Zhou met with the new Soviet leadership to discuss war-terminating strategy, producing a Communist consensus that “the Chinese and North Korean side was now in a position to conclude the war on the basis of reasonable compromises with the enemy.”44 On March 27, the Communists agreed to the UN suggestion that sick and wounded prisoners be exchanged. Three days later, Zhou publicly proposed that the POWs unwilling to be repatriated should be transferred to a neutral state “as to ensure a just solution to the question of their repatriation.”45 This statement mirrored the proposals Zhou had put forward to Stalin in August 1952. In making this substantial concession, Zhou expressed Chinese willingness to “take steps to eliminate differences on this question so as to bring about an armistice in Korea” (quoted in Zhu 1998: 234; Stueck 1995: 309). Following the same script, on April 2, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov talked about the need for peace in Korea and associated the Soviet Union with its allies’ actions (Mastny 1996: 172– 73). Significantly, the Soviet Union, “which had previously always been the state to announce important decisions from the communist side,” now followed Zhou’s declaration with Molotov’s endorsement (Simmons 1975: 234). Zhou’s statement was a major Communist concession—the largest the Communists made during the war—and it reopened the door to an armistice. Negotiations on resolving the POW issue resumed in late April, and the armistice was signed in July. Given its decision to “lean to one side” while consolidating its rule after the long Chinese civil war—on top of the staggering costs of its Korean War intervention—the Chinese governing coalition was extremely dependent upon Soviet
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military and economic assistance. China needed this assistance both for fighting the war and developing its own industrial base. Thus, despite its preference to end the war and concentrate on internal economic development, it could not end the war until the Soviets gave it permission. It was only after Stalin’s death that the Chinese were finally free to act as they wanted and make the crucial concession on POW repatriation that led to the war’s end.
Alternative Explanations As in the other case studies, this section briefly examines alternative explanations for Chinese behavior in the Korean War. I have argued the Chinese governing coalition wanted to end the war starting in the summer of 1952, but could not because it was trapped by its hawkish ally, the Soviet Union. There are four potential alternatives to this argument. The first alternative explanation, most different from the one advanced here, is that Mao alone was responsible for decisions about prosecuting and ending the war. A version of this argument is advanced by Jung and Halliday—in a chapter entitled “Mao Milks the Korean War”—who assert Mao went to war specifically to become a military superpower by extorting a domestic arms industry from Stalin. They argue Mao wanted to use his “millions of expendable Chinese” to get Stalin to provide “his twin key demands: turf [control over the Southeast Asian Communists] and arms industries” (2006: 363). In their view, Mao wanted to keep the war going to get “the Bomb,” but Stalin did not want to provide nuclear technology (2006: 368). Mao only ordered the end of the war on May 12, 1953, after the new Soviet leaders “recommended” Beijing drop its accusations about the United States having engaged in biological warfare. In their words, Mao could see that getting the Bomb from Russia was out of the question for now, as the new Kremlin was bent on lowering tension with America. So he recalled his nuclear delegation from Moscow, and settled for the arms projects [91 new factories] that the new Kremlin leaders had offered. He ordered his negotiators in Korea to accept voluntary repatriation of POWs, which had been on the table for over eighteen months. (2006: 371)
Jung and Halliday’s account is somewhat misleading. While Mao may have “ordered his negotiators in Korea to accept voluntary repatriation of POWs” on May 12—they cite Zhou’s papers for this date—the crucial concession about POW repatriation had already happened, on March 30. Although they concede the new Soviet leaders had “told [Z]hou they had decided to end the war” on March 21 (2006: 369), nowhere do they mention the critical Communist POW concession on March 30. On May 7, the Communist negotiator Nam Il had al-
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ready outlined the concrete proposals on which the final armistice was based. By then, both sides had already narrowed the issues down to who would serve as the neutral power holding the non-repatriates, and where and for how long they would hold them (Stueck 1995: 314). Therefore, this May 12th document they cite refers instead to a tactical-level decision about the wording of the armistice agreement. Moreover, Jung and Halliday’s account of the August-September 1952 conversations between Zhou and Stalin is not balanced. They argue Zhou’s visit was “transparently aimed at enabling Mao to become a major power and a rival to Stalin,” and they cite those parts of the transcripts that focus on Chinese requests for Soviet assistance with armaments and industrialization (2006: 363–66). However, they never mention the POW discussions, which comprise the majority of the transcripts of the first and third meetings. They also never mention that the Communist concession on March 30 mirrored the proposals Zhou had put forward to Stalin in these meetings. Finally, as the empirical evidence in this chapter demonstrates, Mao made decisions in a consensual manner, even if he may have had the final word. There is ample evidence, from a variety of sources, about the coalition politics at play in China’s decision to enter the Korean War. Not only did the Chinese governing coalition engage in a vigorous debate about the intervention over many days, but Zhou may have even falsely characterized his October 10 discussion with Stalin about Soviet military support to tip the decision towards his preference for non-intervention. Coalition politics continued in the summer of 1952, when the coalition changed its composition to include members with expertise in industrialization and centralized economic planning. Once assembled in Beijing, the new governing coalition—including many leaders who had opposed intervention from the start—had enough collective clout to articulate arguments against fighting on and thereby to influence Mao to change the war policy. The second alternative argument comes from Goemans (2000a) who analyzes the role of regime type in war termination. In Goemans’ argument, dictators and democrats should engage in a rational cost-benefit calculation to end wars they are losing, while oligarchic leaders will choose high-risk strategies in wars they are losing to gamble for their own political redemption. Because China is classified as a dictatorship during the war,46 Goemans’ theory would predict China to act as a unitary rational actor and end the war as soon as the costs outweighed the benefits. Given the evidence presented here, that point probably occurred sometime in the summer of 1952. However, China remained at war for another year, which suggests Goemans’ argument does not hold. The only way Goemans’ argument could work is if we include China’s alliance with Stalin—and the mate-
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rial support the Soviets provided for the war and industrialization—as benefits in China’s cost-benefit calculations. However, Zhou’s trying to get Stalin’s support to end the war suggests the Chinese leaders did not believe these benefits outweighed the costs, but instead felt trapped. That Zhou had to make further concessions to Stalin to assure continued assistance—allowing the Soviets to keep Port Arthur and appointing Gao Gang as SPC chief—implies the costs were outweighing the benefits. Giving Goemans’ theory the benefit of the doubt, let us assume the difficulty is with China’s classification rather than the theory itself. Changing China’s classification from a dictatorship to an oligarchy brings different predictions. Once the war stalemated, Goemans’ theory would predict the oligarchy to undertake high-risk strategies to end the war successfully so as to protect the leaders’ personal political fortunes. Yet this did not occur, either. After the war stalemated, the Chinese did not embark on high-risk military strategies in the war; instead, they settled down for a protracted conflict of “negotiating while fighting.” They used most of their military resources to build extensive tunnels and other defensive systems to protect their soldiers. And in the summer of 1952, when a new group of leaders took charge to enact policies for economic development and industrialization, they acknowledged the war’s costs were impinging on this new policy focus and that it was time to shift priorities to end the war. A group of leaders worried about how defeat in the war would hurt their own political fortunes would not have done this. In short, regardless of which regime type we use to classify China during the war, Goemans’ argument does not seem to explain the Chinese case. A third alternative explanation would argue China was not trapped by its hawkish ally; rather, completely independent of the Soviet Union, China did not shift its war policy until it announced the POW repatriation concession in March 1953. One variant of this argument could be that China shifted its war policy in response to President Eisenhower’s election and alleged nuclear threats; this alternative explanation will be addressed in Chapter 8. A second variant of this argument, made by Chen Jian (2001), is that China was not willing to concede on the POW policy until late March 1953. Chen admits that “Stalin’s death might have contributed to this reversal, but it was more an outgrowth of Beijing’s existing policies based on Chinese leaders’ assessment of the changing situation than a reflection of altering Soviet directives” (2001: 115). Chen points to two documents to assert that “Beijing alone was responsible for its unyielding attitude over the POW issue” (2001: 114). The first document was Mao’s telegram to Stalin in December 1952, which I cited above. In Chen’s reading of this telegram, the Chinese leaders “expressed that ‘the armistice ne-
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gotiations had encountered a deadlock’ and that ‘operations in Korea could be intensified in a given period in the future (say, a year).’” As a result, the Chinese leaders “were willing to wait to see what would happen after Eisenhower” became president, because they believed Eisenhower would probably launch a new offensive. Chen then makes a leap in logic to argue that “the implication was that Chinese policy could change after that time because the military situation in Korea would by then certainly have turned in [China’s] favor” (2001: 114). Even more importantly, Chen does not mention the second half of Mao’s telegram, which requested more military assistance from Stalin. Rather than implying an unyielding Chinese negotiating stance, it seems much more likely that Mao highlighted the negotiation deadlock and Eisenhower’s likely military escalation to build a case for more military assistance from his hawkish ally. The second document Chen cites to assert China’s unyielding stance on the POW issue was a February 19, 1953, cable from Qiao Guanhua to Zhou, which summarized the Chinese negotiation team’s analysis of the battlefield situation at that moment. In Chen’s account, the report observed that “there existed little possibility that the United States would initiate major military offensives on the Korean battlefield.” Moreover, Eisenhower’s decision to “unleash” KMT leader Chiang Kai-Shek in the Taiwan Strait “was designed to place more pressure on China rather than to allow [Chiang] to attempt amphibious operations against the Chinese mainland.” As Chen parenthetically notes, “(In other words, the Chinese negotiators believed that the Chinese/North Korean forces had achieved a relatively favorable position on the Korean battlefield.)” (2001: 115). Qiao argued if China proposed an unconditional reopening of negotiations under these circumstances, the United States might take it as an indication of Chinese weakness. Therefore, the report suggested China should do nothing and wait for the Americans to take the next initiative. Chen argues Mao agreed with Qiao’s recommendation (2001: 115). This second document certainly shows an unyielding stance at the tactical level. However, hawkish tactical moves are not necessarily incompatible with a more dovish strategic preference of wanting to end the war. Notably, at this point, Stalin was still in power and had not yet given China the green light to seek a negotiated settlement. If Chen is correct, that China adopted a more conciliatory policy about the POWs in late March “based on Chinese leaders’ assessment of the changing situation [rather] than a reflecting of altering Soviet directives,” then something must have changed between Qiao’s February 19 telegram and Zhou’s two concessions in late March. But the battlefield was not changing, and only one change occurred on the negotiating front: on February 22, UN Commander Mark Clark proposed an exchange of sick and wounded POWs. Conceivably, this proposal
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could be interpreted as the Americans making the first move to restart negotiations for which Qiao wanted to wait (Stueck 1995: 306). This leaves us with two choices for Chen’s account to hold. The first choice is that this UN proposal was enough of an American initiative to allow China to respond without “appearing weak” to the Americans, in which case why did they wait five weeks? The second choice is that China wanted to respond sooner but could not, because they were still being trapped by Stalin. In short, Chen’s explanation for the March 1953 change in Chinese policy, independent of its Soviet ally’s behavior, is lacking. On the whole, Chen’s entire recounting of Chinese decisions to initiate, prosecute and end the war is more “militant” than mine. As explained earlier, Chen’s portrait of Mao in the Chinese decision to intervene in Korea is more decisive and imposing than that of other scholars and underplays the role of the coalition debates about intervention. Moreover, Chen minimizes the August-September 1952 discussions between Zhou and Stalin; in his view, the two leaders agreed completely on continuing the war. Finally, Chen’s account does not discuss the trade-offs that the Chinese leaders were facing on the home front. He devotes very little space to the mobilization campaigns and no space at all to debates about industrial and agricultural development and internal security issues. As a result, his interpretation of Chinese decision-making in the Korean War appears to take fewer decision criteria into account. By focusing so heavily on Mao, it undersells the importance of coalitional constraints in the decision-making process. Finally, a fourth alternative explanation would argue China was trapped by its ally, but this entrapment occurred at a different time. Specifically, Lim (2002) argues that China did not adjust its war aims downward until after Stalin had died. In her estimation, Stalin’s death “removed Soviet support for any Chinese attempt to continue the stalemate in order to gain better terms at the armistice” and “pressured Chinese leaders to agree to return to negotiations” (2002: 122, 11). In many ways, this argument is similar to the entrapment obstacle explained in this chapter: China’s war policy was determined in large part by calculations about Soviet financial, military and political support. However, it differs in its understanding of why China was trapped. In Lim’s view, China needed to bow to pressure from the new Soviet leaders, even though it wanted to continue the war, because otherwise it would lose Soviet support. To make this argument, Lim cites a telegram from Mao to Zhou on March 19, quoted in Chinese sources, in which Mao intended to refute UN Commander Mark Clark’s proposal to exchange sick and wounded POWs.47 After Zhou’s March 21 meeting with Soviet leaders, however, Zhou agreed to Clark’s offer. Her conclusion is that the new Soviet leaders pressured the more hawkish Chinese to lower their aims and return to negotiations.
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Mao may have intended to refute the UN’s proposal to exchange sick and wounded POWs, but this telegram alone does not seem to be enough evidence to assert China’s war position at this point was more hawkish than the Soviet Union’s. To look at Mao’s intention another way: because Mao sent this telegram the same day that the Soviet Council of Ministers issued its resolution to change Soviet policy towards ending war, it is possible the Chinese leaders were not yet aware that their Soviet entrapment was over. If Mao still believed the Soviets wanted to continue the war, then the tactical decision to refute the proposal to exchange sick and wounded prisoners makes sense—given the Soviets had not allowed the Chinese to propose similar moves earlier. More importantly, however, the telegram explicitly referred to the tactical-level decision in the context of stalled armistice negotiations. As with the February 19 cable, Mao’s intention for this hawkish tactical move—refuting the proposal to exchange the sick and wounded—is not necessarily incompatible with a more dovish strategic policy— wanting to end the war. The more important evidence against both Lim’s and Chen’s accounts seems to be Zhou’s March 30 concession, when he publicly proposed POWs unwilling to be repatriated should be transferred to a neutral state. This strategic-level concession is exactly what Zhou tried to convince Stalin to support the previous fall. Thus, while Lim may be correct that Chinese calculations changed after Zhou met with the Soviet leaders on March 21, I would argue the information revealed in that meeting helped convince the Chinese that the Soviets would support them in making the larger dovish policy shift they preferred. Admittedly, we do not yet have any direct evidence of Mao’s views in 1952, and thus the coalition argument laid out in this chapter is somewhat provisional. Nonetheless, the evidence shows the economic elites whose influence increased with the summer 1952 coalition shift clearly supported an early end to the war. Similarly, Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai evidently discussed war-terminating options with Stalin that fall. While this section has highlighted how some scholars believe Mao wanted to continue fighting as late as 1953, these same scholars argue foreign policy outcomes never diverged from Mao’s preferences. Therefore, although we lack a “smoking gun,” it is reasonable to argue—given the evidence available today and presented in this chapter—the dovish coalition shift in the summer of 1952 helped shift Chinese war policy towards ending the war.
Conclusions This chapter has provided another look at the entrapment obstacle, in which leaders want to end the war but cannot. Unlike the internal entrapment in the
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US case, however, the Chinese governing coalition was trapped by an external ally—Stalin. The role of allies in changing belligerents’ cost-benefit calculations has not received much attention in the war termination literature. This chapter takes a first step towards filling that gap by tracing how the Soviet Union constrained China’s decisions about prosecuting and ending the war. This chapter illustrated four key points. First, the PRC entered the war because its leaders perceived threats to its internal security. Second, China’s domestic situation was dire, because it was still recovering from its civil war and faced a long list of domestic challenges. In addition, the war effort was very costly. About three million Chinese troops and laborers entered Korea to fight and provide logistical support for the war—suffering as many as 1.5 million casualties, including more than 300,000 dead. At home, about three million people died during the ruthless domestic mobilization campaigns, initiated in large part to support the war effort. The Korean War’s financial costs were staggering as well, with military expenses related to the war comprising 44 percent of the Chinese government’s budget in 1950, 52 percent in 1951 and 28 percent in 1952. While the CCP hiked taxes and found other ways to extract money from the economy, the war effort consumed whatever increases the government could squeeze from its rudimentary industrial base. Third, given these tremendous war costs, the Chinese governing coalition decided in the summer of 1952 to focus on economic reconstruction. As a result, key CCP members moved to Beijing and became important members of the decision-making group. These rising leaders—together with economic policymakers already in the governing coalition—brought an interesting mix of personal perspectives and professional expertise to the problem of the Korean War. Having spent time in key regional leadership posts, they were very aware of the human and societal costs imposed by prolonged participation in the war. Furthermore, their expertise in managing economic recovery and industrialization clearly showed them the opportunity cost of waging war instead of rebuilding and modernizing the nation. By valuing centralized economic planning and industrialization more than the war, these leaders had a different vision of the war’s costs and benefits. Their increasing influence in Mao’s decision-making coalition helped spur China towards wanting to end the war. Fourth, although China was willing to settle in August 1952, Stalin prevented it from doing so. While the new governing coalition tried to convince Stalin to support crucial concessions about POW repatriation to achieve an armistice, Stalin was unwilling. Paradoxically, in large part because of the war, China was now extremely dependent upon Soviet military and economic assistance both for fighting the war and developing its own industrial base. As a result, China was
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trapped. It was not until after Stalin’s death that China was finally able to make the POW concessions it had been advocating since the previous summer. This chapter concludes the three detailed case studies of decision-making in the Korean War’s primary belligerents. These four chapters have focused on the domestic coalition shift theory’s effects at the domestic level. The next chapter turns to the strategic interaction between the belligerents and explores the effect of domestic coalition shifts on the negotiating process at the international level.
8
Interacting Domestic Coalitions in Bargains for Peace
Now that we have examined decision-making within the individual belligerents of the Korean War, in this chapter we return to the strategic interaction between them. While the analysis up to this point may seem as if the only domestic coalition shift that mattered was Joseph Stalin’s death in March 1953, coalition shifts in the other belligerent states also played a role in the strategic interaction to end the war. Certainly, had the Chinese shift not occurred the previous summer, it is unlikely Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai would have appealed to the new Soviet leaders, right after Stalin’s funeral, for their support about the crucial POW concession that led to the war’s end. Less apparent, however, is how much President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s inauguration in January 1953 affected Communist cost-benefit calculations about the war. After successfully campaigning on a platform to end the war, Eisenhower came to office less constrained about the possibility of escalating than his predecessor. Thus, one important alternative explanation for the timing of the war’s end that still needs investigation is whether Eisenhower’s nuclear threats affected Communist calculations and caused the war to end. This chapter addresses these issues by examining the strategic interaction of the domestic coalition shifts in the Korean War, because actions taken by one side are directly linked to the other’s response. This discussion not only completes our understanding of the timing and terms of the Korean War armistice, but it also allows us to theorize more clearly about the role that domestic coalition shifts on opposing sides play in creating an overlapping bargaining space between belligerents. To do this, I return to the direction of the coalition shifts (i.e. hawkish,
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dovish or neutral) and look at the two mechanisms by which a domestic coalition shift can affect the creation of an overlapping bargaining space. This chapter is divided into three sections and a conclusion. The first section extends the theoretical discussion of coalition shift directions from Chapter 2 and theorizes about the strategic interaction of coalition shifts in the Korean War. The second section begins to examine this strategic interaction with one of the most famous alternative explanations for the war’s end—that Eisenhower’s nuclear threats caused the war to end. While the evidence does not support this particular argument, it does suggest domestic coalition shifts can provide information for decision-makers on the opposing side, thereby influencing when the war ends. Therefore, the third section examines the opposing side’s reactions after each belligerent’s domestic coalition shift. This analysis suggests that the Communist side may have been more sensitive to the signaling inherent in US coalition shifts than vice versa. However, such signaling seems to have the most explanatory leverage when coalition shifts on opposing sides are viewed through the lens of strategic interaction. Specifically, I argue the hawkish shift that brought Eisenhower to power was given more weight in Communist calculations because of the dovish shifts that occurred on the Communist side. Simultaneously, Eisenhower’s decision not to expand US war aims may have been the result of the Communist dovish shifts as well. Finally, the conclusion draws generalizations about the role that interactions between domestic coalition shifts play in war termination. While the findings from this one case are certainly not conclusive, they suggest that analyzing the interactions between shifts on opposing sides are a fruitful line for future research on war termination.
Coalition Shift Directions and the Interaction Between Shifts on Opposing Sides As Chapter 2 explained, there are two mechanisms by which domestic coalition shifts can lead to the creation of an overlapping bargaining space between belligerents. The first mechanism occurs when the new governing coalition modifies its own bargaining position vis-à-vis other belligerents. This mechanism is similar to unilateral escalation or de-escalation in interstate rivalries (Mor 1997; Colaresi 2004, 2005; Schultz 2005). It is important to note that this first mechanism operates unilaterally, independent of any strategic interaction with the adversary. In contrast, the second mechanism is clearly related to the strategic interaction between the opposing sides, because actions that one side takes are directly linked to the other side’s response. The second mechanism occurs when the coalition shift direction serves as an “index” for decision-makers
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on the opposing side to update their expectations about the war and thus change their bargaining position. It is important to remember that for the purposes of coding, the direction of coalition shifts is dependent on the ex ante intent of the new coalition, rather than any subsequent policies pursued by it.1 first mechanism: a coalit ion shift leads to a new bargaining p osit ion
The first mechanism occurs when the new governing coalition modifies its own bargaining position vis-à-vis other belligerents. While the new bargaining position may be affected by beliefs about the adversary, it may also be completely independent of any consideration of the adversary’s behavior. Therefore, this mechanism operates unilaterally and independently of strategic interaction with the adversary. In the first mechanism, hawkish coalition shifts may lead a state to take actions that move away from an overlapping bargaining space and ending the war. Hawkish shifts, therefore, are more likely to occur early in the war and, when they occur alone, be associated with long wars (H hawk). Similarly, dovish coalition shifts may lead a state to take actions that move towards an overlapping bargaining space and ending the war. Thus, we would expect them to be associated with hastening the war’s end (H dove). Neutral shifts are not intended to lead to a change in war policy, but they do bring new leaders, who may have a new way of looking at the war’s costs and benefits. Since the new leaders by definition came to power for reasons not related to the war policy, they could view the war as a distraction. Thus, they may end up taking actions that move towards an overlapping bargaining space and ending the war in order to focus on other things.2 As a result, we might expect neutral shifts to be associated with ending the war, but not as quickly as dovish shifts (H neutral). Unlike hawkish and dovish shifts, we would not expect neutral shifts to be clustered at any particular time in the war. With this first mechanism, the number of coalition shifts that will be necessary to create the overlapping bargaining space depends entirely on how much distance exists between the demands of the two sides. Until their demands become compatible, belligerents will not create an overlapping bargaining space. If the two sides’ demands are not very far apart, then a dovish coalition shift on one side may lead the new coalition to lower its aims enough to bring an overlapping bargaining space within reach. However, if the distance between the two sides is greater, coalition shifts in more than one belligerent may be necessary. During sticky wars that endure for many months or years, multiple coalition shifts may be necessary to create the overlapping bargaining space and dislodge the obstacles to peace. These multiple shifts could theoretically occur in multiple bel-
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ligerents or within one belligerent over time, each shift moving that belligerent’s bargaining position closer to the others’. As the previous chapters have suggested, primary belligerents are most important in their side’s decisions about prosecuting and ending war. Thus, we can imagine primary shifts will be likely to work through the first mechanism, changing their own side’s bargaining position. In contrast, secondary belligerents may not have as much influence in changing their side’s war policy, and thus secondary shifts may not operate through the first mechanism.3 second mechanism: a coalit ion shift leads to a new bargaining p osit ion on the opp osing side
The second mechanism through which coalition shifts can lead to an overlapping bargaining space between belligerents is through signaling. This mechanism is clearly related to the strategic interaction between the opposing sides, because actions that one side takes are directly linked to the other side’s response. Here, the direction of the coalition shift serves as an index to belligerents on the other side, conveying information about the first side’s future intentions and likely bargaining position. Remember that indices are behavior believed to be inextricably linked to an actor’s capabilities or intentions and “beyond the ability of an actor to control for purposes of projecting a misleading image” (Jervis 1989: 18). Thus, while international signaling is often ambiguous, domestic coalition shifts are less likely to be discounted as manipulative or deceptive than other kinds of signals. Why do domestic coalition shifts operate as indices? After a leader spends political capital campaigning or otherwise building support among his constituency for an intended war policy, he is likely to pay a domestic political price if he does not follow through on those intentions. According to the theoretical logic of domestic audience costs (e.g. Fearon 1994; Schultz 1998; Smith 1998), this vulnerability should enhance the leader’s credibility with the adversary. Certainly, leaders may misunderstand indices because they want to, because “basic strategy suggests they come out better that way” (Quester 1970: 30; see also Jervis 1989). Nonetheless, because of domestic audience costs, domestic coalition shifts are “costly signals” for leaders to send (Kydd 2000). As long as the adversary can “overhear” the policy statements used to build constituency support, the new coalition’s behavior before taking office—or immediately afterwards—reveals information about its underlying political incentives and intentions. Certainly, for the index to provide information to the other side, political competition and policy debate must take place at least somewhat in public, so that the positions of contending parties can be observable to foreign
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states (Schultz 1998). However, while domestic audience costs are most common in democracies, they exist in any regime where a leader can be removed from power through constituency retaliation (Smith 1998). Indeed, empirical research shows that foreign policy performance affects domestic political survival in all regime types (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson and Woller 1992). As Alastair Smith notes, “Leaders are able to send credible messages because they mortgage their domestic political survival on their ability to honor their commitments” (1998: 632). The direction of the coalition shift helps to signal information about the new governing coalition’s “type” (Morrow 1994: 221). This information may lead decision-makers on the opposing side to update their expectations about the war and change their bargaining position as a result. Thus, with the second mechanism, hawkish shifts may signal to the opposing side that the war will escalate and its costs will dramatically increase, causing the opposing side to sue for peace and thus hastening the war’s end (H hawk*). Dovish shifts may indicate weakness, so the opposing belligerents will push for even more concessions, thereby prolonging the war (H dove*). Because neutral shifts by definition are not related to the war, they are less likely to provide information to the other side. Thus, they should not affect the war’s duration through the second mechanism (H neutral*). There are three reasons to expect the second mechanism will be less powerful than the first in creating an overlapping bargaining space. First, the second mechanism can only work when the opposing side’s decision-makers are capable of perceiving and learning from the information conveyed in the coalition shift direction. Whether a message is perceived as intended depends not only on its clarity and plausibility, but also on how it fits with the recipient’s prior beliefs. Messages that are inconsistent with the recipient’s beliefs are less likely to be perceived as the sender intended (Snyder and Diesing 1977: 286; Jervis 1988: 692). Thus, the second mechanism cannot work if the information obstacle is blocking the governing coalition’s updating process. Second, if domestic coalition shifts are to serve as an index, belligerents must be paying attention to the domestic political processes in states on the opposing side. Given all of the other things that leaders must track during war, they might not give the other side’s domestic politics much attention. Finally, although domestic coalition shifts are “costly signals,” international signaling still has the potential to be garbled in transmission (Snyder and Diesing 1977: 323). Therefore, given the ambiguities inherent in international signaling, the second mechanism’s effect is expected to be less powerful than the first’s. Because primary belligerents are most important in their side’s decisions
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about prosecuting and ending war, primary shifts may send the most noticeable signals to the other side. Therefore, we can expect primary shifts will operate through the second mechanism as well as the first. In contrast, because secondary belligerents may not have as much influence in changing their side’s war policy, secondary shifts may be more likely to work through the secondary mechanism than the first. Dovish secondary shifts, in particular, may convey weakness, vulnerability or internal strife in that side’s international coalition, which may lead the opposing side to press for more concessions. On the other hand, the opposing side may disregard hawkish and neutral secondary shifts, supposing they will not have much effect on that side’s future intentions and bargaining position. In general, however, secondary shifts are less likely to work through either mechanism than primary shifts. inter act ions bet ween the t wo mechanisms and bet ween coalit ion shifts on opp osing sides
How can we be sure that these two mechanisms will not cancel each other out? In other words, if Side A experiences a dovish coalition shift and thus lowers its demands (first mechanism), what prevents Side B from gleaning information from A’s dovish shift and thus raising its demands (second mechanism), thereby keeping an overlapping bargaining space out of reach? As just explained, the second mechanism is likely to be less powerful than the first, which suggests that they will not cancel each other out. Moreover, as bargaining models of war explain, agreements will be self-enforcing at terms where both sides perceive the marginal benefits of additional demands as less than the marginal costs of fighting to achieve those demands. Agreements can be self-enforcing even for the stronger state, because it may perceive additional benefits are not worth the costs of fighting necessary to achieve them. Therefore, whether B will raise its demands in response to A’s dovish shift depends on two things: (1) whether it identifies and learns from the information inherent in A’s dovish shift and (2) how its governing coalition perceives the war’s costs and benefits, as well as the marginal costs and benefits of fighting on for additional demands. Although it seems likely that the first mechanism will be more important than the second, there is one situation where the two mechanisms are likely to operate in tandem. This occurs when opposing sides both experience coalition shifts at about the same time. This strategic interaction between opposing sides’ coalition shifts requires an additional level of theorizing. For example, what happens if Side A experiences a dovish shift while Side B experiences a hawkish one—as occurred in the Korean War? The interaction between opposing sides’ hawkish and dovish shifts is one of six possible permutations of the interaction of opposing
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sides’ coalition shifts.4 Because this particular interaction occurred in the Korean War, this chapter will theorize about its dynamics and then observe how they played out throughout this case study. Before turning to the hawkish-dovish interaction in more detail, it is important to include a few preliminary ideas about the other permutations. We can expect wars with dovish coalition shifts in belligerents on both sides to be more likely to end quickly, as both sides are more likely to lower their war aims and want to settle. Likewise, wars with hawkish shifts in belligerents on both sides will be more likely to continue, as both sides are more likely to expand their war aims and escalate fighting. The effects of dovish-dovish and hawkish-hawkish interactions are especially likely if the coalition shifts occur in both sides’ primary belligerents. Less clear are the effects of various permutations with neutral shifts (i.e. neutral-hawkish, neutral-dovish and neutral-neutral). On the one hand, neutral shifts bring to power new governing coalitions that do not intend to change war policy. Thus, we might suppose the other side’s shift would drive any potential changes to the bargaining space through the first mechanism. So, for example, if Side A experiences a neutral shift while Side B a hawkish one, we might expect A would not change its bargaining position while B moves further away from a bargaining space (first mechanism). On the other hand, since neutral shift coalitions by definition come to power for reasons not related to war policy, they might view the war as a distraction. As a result, they might be particularly open to information inherent in the other side’s shift and thus change the bargaining space through the second mechanism. Continuing the example, Side B’s hawkish shift might signal to Side A that the war is about to become very costly and lead A to lower its aims in order to focus on other things (second mechanism). Because of such complexities, further theorizing about these other permutations is needed. While these other permutations are beyond the scope of this book, the fact that the hawkish-dovish plausibility probe tested here works suggests this is a fruitful area for future research. inter act ions bet ween haw kish and d ov ish coalit ion shifts on opp osing sides
This section theorizes more carefully about the interaction between hawkish and dovish coalition shifts on opposing sides—as occurred in the Korean War. Because of the first mechanism, we would expect A to lower its demands after its dovish shift, while B would raise its demands after its hawkish shift. However, if B does not perceive additional benefits to be worth the costs of fighting to achieve them, it may decide not to raise its demands. Instead, it may decide to risk co-
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operation, prompted by the information inherent in the other side’s dovish shift. To explain this prediction, I draw on two-level game models of enduring rivalry termination and cooperation (Mor 1997; Kydd 2000; Schultz 2005). Kenneth Schultz (2005) argues that when trust is low but continued conflict is costly, cooperation in interstate rivalries is most likely to be initiated by a government with a hawkish reputation but moderate preferences. Schultz argues that moderate hawks are likely to initiate rivalry termination successfully for two reasons. First, domestic constituents are more likely to approve of a peace deal endorsed by a hawk than one endorsed by a dove. This logic accords with Bayesian arguments about the value of biased information sources: if a biased source gives advice against his bias, you are more apt to believe him (Morrow 1994: 170; Calvert 1985). Second, a moderate hawk can signal his moderation to the adversary by cooperating, since a hardline hawk would not cooperate. In contrast, Ben Mor (1997) argues that a well-timed diplomatic initiative or symbolic action from the other side may be enough to overcome rivalry deadlock caused by a hawkish constituency and bring the rivalry closer to reconciliation. Specifically, he argues that a peace initiative “can affect leadership and public preferences by providing evidence of the opponent’s peaceful intentions”—convincing them that settlement is feasible and reinforcing moderate views within the state (1997: 205). For example, Mor points to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s 1977 visit to Jerusalem as sparking a reversal in Israeli public opinion to eventually support withdrawal from the Sinai. Similarly, Andrew Kydd (2000) argues the dovish side can signal its peaceful intentions with “costly signals” designed to persuade the other side of its trustworthiness, since an untrustworthy opponent would find them too costly to send. For example, he points to Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet “new thinkers” that wanted to deescalate superpower rivalry to concentrate on domestic reforms. As Kydd argues, “This difference in preferences between them and previous leaders enabled them to send signals that previous Soviet leaders would have been unwilling to send, and hence these signals were persuasive to Western publics and leaders” (2000: 326). In the terminology of this book, the Soviet coalition shift that brought Gorbachev to power—as well as the new coalition’s behavior—provided reassurance to the other side, eventually leading to full cooperation. Applying both of these logics to interstate war termination after Side A experiences a dovish shift and Side B a hawkish shift, we might expect B to be willing to settle—rather than raise its war aims—if its shift brought to power a moderately hawkish governing coalition. Moderates prefer to cooperate only if they expect the other side will as well; thus, whether a moderate prefers cooperation or defection depends strongly on its beliefs about the adversary (Schultz 2005: 9). Because
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A has experienced a dovish coalition shift, B leaders may be more willing to move towards ending the war because they believe A wants to settle, as well. This is even more likely when A’s behavior after its dovish shift includes “costly signals” of peaceful intentions. Thus, if B’s new governing coalition is moderately hawkish and expects that continued conflict will be costly, it may be willing to forgo fighting for additional demands to take advantage of A’s dovish shift. However, even if B initiates settlement, it would still be in its interests to convey the “good” information inherent in its hawkish shift—i.e. a willingness to escalate if its demands are not met. After all, credible transmission of this information would work to B’s advantage (Dixit and Skeath 1999: 416): A is likely to see B’s settlement offer as a sincere “final offer”—one that, if refused, is likely to lead B to escalate. As Schultz argues, “A hawk that cooperates reveals itself to be moderate, which means it can be trusted to reciprocate cooperation but it cannot be exploited” (2005: 5). To summarize this special case of interacting coalition shifts: the first mechanism would predict that Side A would lower its demands after its dovish shift, while Side B would raise its demands after its hawkish shift—unless it does not perceive the costs of fighting for those additional demands to be worth their benefit. In that case, B is more likely to take advantage of A’s dovish shift to initiate settlement or accept an offer from the other side if (1) continuing the conflict is expected to be costly, (2) its new governing coalition is only moderately hawkish or (3) A undertakes some well-timed initiatives to signal its peaceful intentions. Interestingly, therefore, part of B’s calculation depends upon the second mechanism and its expectation that A’s dovish shift will increase A’s willingness to settle. If B initiates settlement and an overlapping bargaining space gets created, it is likely to be to B’s advantage, since the “good” information inherent in its hawkish shift should lead A to take its offer seriously. Indeed, the second mechanism would predict that Side A will accept B’s offer, knowing that if this offer were refused, B’s hawkish shift could lead to war escalation and a dramatic increase in war costs. Thus, in the special case of interacting coalition shifts on opposing sides, it appears that the two mechanisms for creating an overlapping bargaining space work in tandem. The next two sections examine this argument in the case of the interacting coalition shifts in the Korean War.
The Role of Eisenhower’s Nuclear Threats in Ending the War Casual observers might point to the hawkish US coalition shift in January 1953 and the Eisenhower coalition’s subsequent nuclear threats as a perfect example of the signaling described in the previous section. This explanation for the end of
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the Korean War—made by the Eisenhower Administration itself—is that Eisenhower’s nuclear threats caused the Communists to agree to the armistice terms. There has been great debate about the effectiveness of Eisenhower’s nuclear coercion in bringing about the end of the Korean War.5 While the evidence does not support this particular argument, it does suggest domestic coalition shifts can provide information for decision-makers on the opposing side, thereby influencing when the war ends. Shortly after the armistice was signed, members of the Administration (including Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles) claimed that “a series of subtle and calculated moves” had been taken to convince the Communists that the United States might go nuclear if an armistice was not reached (Foot 1990: 176–77; Eisenhower 1963: 179–81; Joy 1955: 161–62; Freedman 1983: 85). For example, when Eisenhower’s chief of staff, Sherman Adams, asked the president how an armistice was finally reached, he answered, “Danger of an atomic war. . . . We told them we could not hold it to a limited war any longer if the communists welched on a treaty of truce” (Adams 1961: 102). Despite such contentions, Eisenhower and others have overstated the efficacy of these nuclear threats. As Chapter 6 explained, the Eisenhower Administration did discuss the possibility of using nuclear weapons in Korea, as part of its endorsing a shift in the American strategy for ending the war. In a meeting on May 20, the National Security Council formally approved contingency plans for using nuclear weapons (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 977). Moreover, the Eisenhower coalition tried two diplomatic channels to signal to the Communists a growing willingness to escalate the level of violence. These included conversations in late May between (1) Dulles and Indian Prime Minister Nehru, in which Dulles said “if armistice negotiations collapse, the United States would probably make a stronger . . . military exertion and that this might well extend the area of conflict,”6 and (2) US Ambassador to Moscow Charles Bohlen and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, in which Bohlen emphasized “the extreme importance and seriousness of the latest UNC proposals” and made it “clear these represent the limit to which we can go” (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 1103; Zhang 1992: 125). However, in retrospect, the nuclear threat did not cause the crucial Communist concessions about the POW voluntary repatriation policy that paved the way for an agreement. On March 27—long before the Eisenhower coalition changed its strategy and began to send nuclear coercion signals—the Communist team agreed to an exchange of sick and wounded POWs. Three days later, Zhou conceded that non-repatriates should be handed over to a neutral third party after the armistice. This latter concession was by far the biggest the Communists made
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throughout the settlement negotiations. In fact, the only signal that Eisenhower had sent by this date was his State of the Union announcement to move the Seventh Fleet from the Taiwan Strait. Indeed, as Gaddis argues, the Eisenhower coalition’s “most explicit [nuclear] warnings came after the armistice, and in the context of how it would respond to a violation” (1997: 108, emphasis in original). Indeed, it seems very unlikely the Communists were coerced by nuclear threats, for three reasons. First, although Chinese analysts carefully monitored and analyzed American press reports and debates about nuclear weapons, Chinese leaders believed that the United States had greatly exaggerated nuclear weapons’ destructive capabilities and that properly designed underground shelters would be an effective defense. Chinese leaders also denied that a nuclear strike could succeed against such an undeveloped and vastly populated country as China (Ryan 1989: 156; Foot 1990: 178–79; Chen 2001: 111). Second, Chinese documents reveal that China considered four options for the Eisenhower Administration to escalate militarily: (1) a large-scale offensive at the front, (2) intensive air raids on strategic areas in North Korea and Manchuria, with a naval blockade of China’s coastline, (3) the use of atomic weapons and (4) amphibious attacks on both sides of the Korean peninsula behind Communist front lines. The Chinese leaders rejected the first two options and argued the US would not launch nuclear weapons due to world opinion and the deterrent of Soviet retaliation. Instead, they concentrated their energies on extensive preparations for possible amphibious attacks (Zhang 1992: 132–37; 1995: 233–36; Zhai 1994: 126–28; Lim 2002: 125; Gaddis 1997: 108; Lewis and Xue 1988: 15). Thus, these first two reasons suggest that the nuclear threats were not credible. Most importantly, when asked years later about their reaction to American nuclear threats in Korea, “Chinese officials denied even having heard of them” (Gaddis 1997: 108; see also Zhang 1992: 133, 150; Holloway 1994: 335). Rosemary Foot argues it is highly unlikely that Dulles’ ambiguous threats ever made it via Nehru to the Chinese government. Nehru denied his supposed role as a conduit for these messages (Foot 1990: 177–78). As William Stueck argues, “Nothing has surfaced in China or the Soviet Union to confirm that its leaders received any threatening messages of this kind” (1995: 329). However, even if nuclear threats were neither credible nor clearly communicated, the record clearly shows the Eisenhower coalition’s threats to escalate did have some effect on ending the war. A careful tally of events suggests the Communist leaders were paying attention to the hawkish US domestic coalition shift and the possible escalation that might result. Chinese documents clearly suggest that authorities in Beijing monitored Eisenhower’s campaign statements for
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more aggressive strategies in Korea and started making military preparations in response. As will be seen below, these hawkish intentions played into the Communists’ March 30 concession on POW repatriation and paved the way for armistice negotiations to resume under the general framework of the Communist proposal. After the Communist concession, negotiations narrowed down to who would serve as the neutral power, where and for how long they would hold the nonrepatriates, and what would happen to the ultimate hold-outs (Hermes 1966: 423).7 On May 7, Communist negotiator Nam Il outlined the concrete proposals on which the final armistice agreement was based. During the bickering about these last details, the Eisenhower coalition adopted its new strategy on May 20 and presented its “final offer” at Panmunjom on May 25. Shortly thereafter, Dulles met with Nehru, and Bohlen with Molotov, to signal the finality of the UN offer. The evidence suggests Bohlen’s conversation with Molotov did play into Communist calculations: on June 3, Molotov stated that although the outcome of the negotiations did not depend on Moscow, he could say that “the path to the successful conclusion of the armistice agreement has been mapped out” (quoted in Foot 1990: 177). The next day, the Communists accepted the bulk of the UN “final offer,” and on June 8, initialed a final agreement on the POW issue. In sum, the evidence does not support the argument that Eisenhower’s nuclear threats played an important role in ending the war. In retrospect, it seems more likely this argument was advanced by the Eisenhower Administration to prove the success of its “massive retaliation” strategy. After all, if nuclear threats ended the Korean War, there would be no need for a national security strategy that involved fighting limited wars—a very valuable “fact” to set the stage for Eisenhower’s “New Look” strategy adopted later that year. What the evidence does suggest, however, is that domestic coalition shifts can provide information for decision-makers on the opposing side and thereby influence when a war ends. It is clear that Communist leaders were paying attention to the hawkish US domestic coalition shift and the possible war escalation that might result. Therefore, the next section will examine this argument more explicitly.
Coalition Shift Directions as Signals in the Korean War The first section of this chapter suggested two ways that domestic coalition shifts can help create an overlapping bargaining space between belligerents. The first mechanism occurs when the new governing coalition changes its own bargaining position, while the second mechanism occurs when the coalition shift provides information for the opposing side to update its expectations and thus
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Country
Date
North Korea
6/26/1950
Hawk
Direction
Kim Il-Sung creates 7-man Military Committee that directs all policy decisions during war
Details
USA
9/19/1950
Hawk
George C. Marshall replaces Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson, the last economizer to be pushed out of Truman’s Administration
South Korea
11/23/1950
Neutral
Acting PM Shin Song Mo replaced by Chang Myon, Shin remains Defense Minister
North Korea
12/21/1950
Neutral
Mu-Chong, Kim Il, 7 others expelled from KWP at Third Joint Plenum
North Korea
1/31/1951
Neutral
Vice Premier and battlefield commander Kim Chaek dies
South Korea
5/16/1951
Neutral
Vice Pres. Yi Si Yong, DM Shin Song Mo, Interior Min. Cho Pyung Ok, Justice Min. Kim Jun-Yun resigned/relieved because of KoChang massacre and National Defense Corps embezzlement scandal
USA
9/17/1951
Neutral
Robert A. Lovett replaces Secretary of Defense Marshall
South Korea
4/24/1952
Neutral
PM Chang Myon resigns, with plans to run for president, replaced by Chang Taek-Sang
South Korea
5/25/1952
Neutral
President Rhee declares martial law, arrests 45 National Assembly opposition members
China
8/1/1952
Dove
Institutional leadership directly below Secretariat of the CCP Politburo is greatly expanded
South Korea
8/5/1952
Neutral
Rhee restructures gov’t with constitutional amendments to consolidate power, reelected in first direct presidential election, drops Interior Min. Yi Pom Sok
South Korea
10/6/1952
Neutral
PM Chang Taek-Sang replaced by Paik Too-Chin
USSR
10/16/1952
Neutral
At the 19th Party Congress, Stalin abolished the 12-member Politburo and created a Central Committee Presidium with 25 members and 11 candidate members, to minimize influence of his top deputies
USA
1/20/1953
Hawk
President Eisenhower sworn into office
USSR
3/5/1953
Dove
Stalin dies, replaced by troika of Lavrenty Beria, Georgi Malenkov, Vyacheslav Molotov
change its bargaining position. One way to test this second mechanism is to observe whether the opposing side does, in fact, change its behavior in response to a coalition shift. Certainly, the clearest way to test the mechanism’s effect would be to observe if the opposing side’s leaders refer to the shift in their deliberations and subsequent behavior change. Therefore, this section examines the opposing side’s reactions to each coalition shift in the Korean War, observing whether the actors explained their behavior change in light of that shift.
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As we shall see, not every domestic coalition shift brought a discernable reaction from the belligerents on the other side. The evidence suggests that the Communist side may have been more sensitive to the signaling inherent in US coalition shifts than vice versa. It also suggests that coalition shifts mattered most in terms of creating overlapping bargaining space when they interacted with shifts on the other side. Specifically, the hawkish shift that brought Eisenhower to power seems to have been given more weight in Communist calculations because of the dovish shifts that occurred on the Communist side. Similarly, Eisenhower’s decision not to raise US war aims—despite the hawkish strategy change—may have been caused by the dovish shifts on the other side. Given how many domestic coalition shifts occurred among the belligerents in the Korean War, Table 8.1 provides a reminder of the timing of the shifts. For the sake of completeness, the domestic coalition shifts in North and South Korea are included in this table. However, as the evidence in Chapter 3 suggested, their coalition shifts do not appear to have had much effect on the primary belligerents’ calculations. This supposition is reinforced with the discussion below, which highlights how primary belligerents gave little notice to the secondary shifts—either on their own side or the opposing side. The primary belligerents’ shifts are in bold. us react ions to communist shifts
Given its NSC-68 mindset, the Truman governing coalition was not particularly adept at reading domestic politics signals from the opposing side. As Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrated, for much of the war, the Truman coalition interpreted all Communist action as originating from Soviet directives. As a result, they missed crucial warnings from China prior to its intervention and then treated evidence from the “entirely new war” after China’s intervention as vindication of a Soviet “grand design” for world domination. Similarly, in the negotiating tent, the UN team was not only less informed than its Communist counterparts but also unable to disaggregate different interests and objectives within the Communist camp. As Foot argues, “relatively little effort had been put into understanding the objectives of these Communist states [China and North Korea] and even less time given to a consideration of their primary goals in the armistice process” (1990: 70, emphasis added; also Goldhamer 1952: 263). Because the information obstacle was so prevalent among the Truman coalition, it is not surprising that the United States appears to have given little attention to the domestic coalition shifts among the Communist belligerents before Stalin’s death. Indeed, there is very little discussion of North Korean or Chinese domestic politics in US government analysis about the Korean War, let alone a mention of the shifts in these states’ domestic governing coalitions. The Truman
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governing coalition did observe and speculate about the Soviet Union’s 19th Party Congress in October 1952, but the results of this neutral coalition shift were not directly interpreted in light of the ongoing conflict in Korea (Stueck 1995: 290). To be fair, none of these shifts was as obvious or historic as Stalin’s death. Moreover, the internal processes of the autocratic Communist regimes were more opaque than US democratic domestic politics. As noted above, for the index to provide information to the other side, political competition and policy debate must take place at least somewhat in public to be observable to the other side. More importantly, given the NSC-68 mindset, Stalin was the leader that really mattered, since he was presumed to control the monolithic Communist camp. Because the Truman coalition was unable to perceive the three Communist states as independent actors, each with their own interests and objectives, it missed the opportunity to learn from cues that the North Korean and Chinese coalition shifts were providing. Thus, the opposing side’s domestic coalition shifts did not lead the United States to update its expectations about the war or change its own bargaining position as a result. However, Stalin’s death—and the resulting dovish shift in the Soviet governing coalition—did receive attention from Eisenhower’s Administration. After Stalin’s death, the Soviet emphasis on peaceful coexistence markedly increased, with front page coverage in elite US media (Stueck 1995: 308–9). As Chapter 4 explained, in a speech before the Supreme Soviet on March 15, the new Soviet leader Georgii Malenkov stated, “there is not one disputed or unsettled question that cannot be decided by peaceful means on the basis of mutual understanding of interested countries”—singling out the United States as among the countries to which this statement applied (quoted in Folliot 1956: 12–13). On March 21, a Moscow radio broadcast departed from the Soviet’s customary characterization of Germany’s defeat in World War II, framing it instead as the result of cooperation among the three allies—the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain. Making these verbal gestures more concrete, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov responded to a British request to help obtain the release of British and French civilians held in North Korea, and in early April agreed to help free 13 American civilians as well. By early May, Pyongyang released seven American civilians (Stueck 1995: 309; Foot 1990: 183). Moreover, in early April, a group of US newspaper editors—the first to be permitted to visit Moscow since World War II—received a warm welcome, guaranteeing front page coverage of these friendly gestures in the New York Times (April 5, 1953: 1). At the end of March, after Zhou proposed the Communists’ major concession on non-repatriates, the Soviets approached a Norwegian official, Hans Engen, for his response to Zhou’s POW concession and for Norwegian views on Soviet-
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American negotiations. The Soviet official suggested topics to be discussed at a US-Soviet summit, including the control of atomic energy and disarmament, and explicitly linked these broader questions to the end of the Korean conflict. Choosing to approach Engen was significant, because the Soviets had spoken with him in October 1950 about seeking an end to the Korean conflict after the Inchon amphibious landing. At the same time, the US ambassador to the United Nations reported to Dulles that he had received an indirect request for talks between Malenkov and Eisenhower (Foot 1990: 182). In response to these overtures, on April 14 the Eisenhower Administration leaked to the press that it favored reopening talks at Panmunjom and designating Switzerland as the neutral guardian of non-repatriate POWs (New York Times, April 15, 1953: 1). Two days later, Eisenhower delivered his “Chance for Peace” speech, in which he publicly acknowledged the shift in the Soviet governing coalition (and its resulting policy changes) and signaled back. As Eisenhower pointedly said, “recent statements and gestures of Soviet leaders” could only be “attested by deeds,” the first of which “must be the conclusion of an honorable peace in Korea.” Afterwards, both Pravda and Izvestiia devoted their front pages to an editorial reply and reprinted the entire speech inside (Stueck 1995: 312). How did the Eisenhower Administration perceive Communist behavior after the new Soviet governing coalition took power? The available evidence suggests it observed these gestures and concluded the Communists were eager to bargain (Stueck 1995: 311). For example, Soviet specialist George Kennan said the Soviet press coverage of Eisenhower’s speech revealed Soviet interest in reducing tensions with the United States. Kennan argued that if the United States wanted to take advantage of this conciliatory attitude to make progress on the armistice, it would need to help the Soviets offer inducements to China. Similarly, US Ambassador Bohlen reported from Moscow that the Soviets were “eager to support [Bohlen’s] statement regarding the importance of an armistice in Korea” (quoted in Foot 1990: 182). Finally, the US consul-general in Hong Kong, as well as the British foreign office, argued that the Communists’ March 30 concession about the POW policy had “arisen out of the need to consolidate the Communist bloc after Stalin’s death” (Foot 1990: 183). They recognized that this desire to consolidate the Communist bloc would require redirecting political energy and resources away from the war. Thus, the dovish shift in the Soviet governing coalition did provide information to the UN side about the Communists’ future intentions and bargaining position. The Eisenhower Administration was clearly aware that the Soviet dovish shift was leading the Communists to lower their demands in the armistice negotiations. What is interesting to see, however, is that the United States did
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not raise its demands in response. It is true that during this time the Eisenhower government began reviewing options for military escalation, eventually adopting a more hawkish military strategy and signaling to the Communists its willingness to escalate the war. Nonetheless, the Eisenhower governing coalition did not raise its war aims and move its bargaining position further away from an overlapping bargaining space. Thus, as least on the US side, the second mechanism did not have its predicted effect: the Soviet dovish shift did not lead the United States to press for more concessions and move further away from a negotiated settlement. What explains this curious outcome? Why did the Soviet dovish shift not lead the United States to raise its war aims in response? There appear to be three reasons why the United States chose not to profit from the bargaining “advantage” of the Soviet dovish shift. First, the Eisenhower coalition clearly recognized the Soviet dovish coalition shift and subsequent Communist behavior as signaling peaceful intentions. Obviously, Zhou’s concession on POW repatriation represented a major concession in the armistice negotiations. Moreover, the new Soviet leaders sent “costly signals” that Stalin would have been unwilling to send. Hence, these signals persuaded the United States that the Communists were anxious to bargain. Second, the Eisenhower coalition expected that continuing the conflict was likely to be costly, and it no longer wanted to bear these costs. A fiscal conservative, Eisenhower had largely been drawn to the nuclear deterrent strategy of “massive retaliation” precisely because it would allow him to cut defense spending. As Eisenhower notes in his memoirs, on the first day of his presidency he met with Budget Director Joseph Dodge to revise the budget downward to put the country on a “stronger financial footing” (Eisenhower 1963: 109–10). Expanding US war aims would require not only military escalation but also a prolonged war, which would drain US resources. Thus, as Treasury Secretary George Humphrey noted on May 1, if Eisenhower really wanted to reduce the budget deficit, “you have to get Korea out of the way” (quoted in Foot 1985: 223, emphasis in original). Finally, the Eisenhower coalition was only moderately hawkish. While the Republican right wing included hardliners, the majority of the coalition’s broader constituencies would not oppose cooperative movement to end the war. Internationally, the Eisenhower coalition recognized that neither neutral states in the United Nations nor US Western allies would accept overturning the armistice terms already agreed on or delaying the resumption of negotiations for much longer (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 894). Domestically, although American public opinion was sufficiently mixed to allow Eisenhower freedom of action, much of the press was already questioning the risks of an expanded war (Foot 1990: 172; Sterling
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1998: 459–60). Because Eisenhower had built up the expectation during his campaign that he would end the war soon, the public both looked for and expected decisive action. Eisenhower believed he had a “mandate from the American people to stop this fighting,” but he also knew he did not have a blank check. Thus, when Dulles proposed the United States attempt to secure a better agreement than the one based on the 38th Parallel, the president said he thought it “impossible to call off the armistice now and to go to war in Korea. The American people would never stand for such a move” (both quoted in Foot 1985: 219). In sum, because the information obstacle was so prevalent in the Truman governing coalition and domestic politics in the Communist states were more opaque, the United States did not give much attention to the domestic coalition shifts among the Communist belligerents before Stalin’s death. However, the Eisenhower Administration was clearly aware that the Soviet dovish shift was leading the Communists to lower their demands in the armistice negotiations. Nonetheless, the United States did not raise its demands in response, because—as bargaining models of war predict—the marginal benefits of additional US demands were less than the marginal costs of fighting to achieve them. As a result, neither the first nor the second mechanism from a US-only perspective explains US behavior: the United States neither raised its demands after its own hawkish coalition shift, nor raised its demands after receiving the signal inherent in the Soviet dovish shift. Instead, understanding how the overlapping bargaining space changed requires considering the strategic interaction of the domestic coalition shifts on both sides. communist react ions to us shifts
The Communists appear to have watched US domestic politics carefully during the war. Certainly, democratic domestic politics are more transparent for outsiders to observe and analyze. Only one of the US coalition shifts appears to have received attention and prompted reactions from the Communists. The Communists did not respond directly to the US hawkish shift in September 1950 or the US neutral shift in September 1951. (They also did not respond directly to any of the South Korean neutral shifts, given that President Syngman Rhee’s government remained consistently hawkish about its desire to unify the peninsula under Rhee’s leadership.) However, the Communists did respond to the US hawkish shift with Eisenhower’s inauguration in January 1953, leading the Communists to lower their bargaining position (second mechanism). This fact suggests the Communists were more able to apply the information learned from US coalition shifts after their own dovish shifts. One reason why the Communist side may have been more sensitive to the
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information inherent in the opposing side’s coalition shifts is that China placed great importance on the bargaining aspect of the war. Of the three primary belligerents, China seems to have most internalized the notion of war as a continuation of politics by other means. Moreover, Chinese strategic culture has historically placed great focus on information advantage and diplomatic action to defeat the adversary in war (e.g. Sun Tzu’s Art of War; Johnston 1995: chapter 3). Thus, China may have been most sensitive to signals from the other side that would affect the negotiating/fighting continuum. As Chapter 7 explained, the Chinese governing coalition viewed armistice negotiations as simply one tactic in the ongoing struggle with the United States, a policy it called “negotiating while fighting” (Nie 1988: 641). For example, the Chinese governing coalition provided both high-level attention and significant expertise to the negotiating process. Once armistice negotiations began in July 1951, Deng Hua, at that time still the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) vice-commander, and CPV Chief of Staff Xie Fang represented the Chinese in the armistice negotiations. Yet unlike the UN Command representatives, who lacked special training or diplomatic advisors to help, Deng and Xie were joined by political advisors and diplomatic specialists in the negotiating tent. These included two of Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai’s best aides: Li Kenong, first deputy foreign minister and the Central Military Commission’s intelligence chief, and Qiao Guanhua, director of the Foreign Ministry’s press bureau. Deng and Xie met every night with Li and Qiao, who would brief them on UN propositions. Li and Qiao would report to Zhou, who would immediately relay the information to Mao. Mao’s instructions for the next step would go back through Zhou, Li and Qiao to Deng and Xie (Zhang 1995: 218–19; Chen 2001: 99; Wu 1985: Chapter 3; Foot 1993: 196). This intensive process, with Mao involved on a daily basis, implies that the Chinese governing coalition placed great importance on the bargaining process. As such, it is likely China would be most sensitive to signaling and cues from the other side—which is what the evidence suggests. In addition, the Communists appear to have been savvier about differentiating among the various UN belligerents’ interests than the United States was about differentiating among the Communists’. The United States mostly treated the three Communist states as a monolithic bloc under direct Soviet control and could not even perceive that these actors might have different stakes and objectives in the war. In contrast, the Communists frequently noted differences in war aims and preferred strategy between the United States and its more dovish Western allies, on the one hand, and between the United States and more hawkish South Korea, on the other. For example, after Rhee unilaterally released more than 25,000 anti-Commu-
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nist North Korean prisoners on June 18, 1953, Chinese leaders believed it unlikely that the United States would support Rhee’s attempt to delay the final agreement, because the United States was under “tremendous pressures” at home and from Western allies. Thus, Mao argued the Chinese strategy should focus on “taking advantage of the contradictions between the Americans and the South Koreans.” CPV Commander Peng was happy to oblige, suggesting that China postpone the armistice for a month, “deepen the contractions among the enemies, [and] give Syngman Rhee’s puppet forces another strike by annihilating 15,000 puppet troops.”8 Thus, over Kim Il-Sung’s objection, Mao approved an offensive targeted specifically at punishing the ROK army on June 21 (Chen 2001: 116).9 After this decision, an editorial on June 23 in the Beijing People’s Daily stated simply that the incident “has delayed the signing of the Korean armistice agreement” (quoted in Stueck 1995: 339). Moreover, Beijing propaganda broadcasts during this time were directed almost solely at Rhee and his government and not at the United States (Clark 1954: 284). And although the Communist negotiators at Panmunjom had initially demanded the recapture of the released POWs, on June 29 the Soviet ambassador in Beijing told the Swedish ambassador there that this demand “should not be taken literally” (quoted in Stueck 1995: 339–40). On July 7, the Communists even agreed to resume talks, which reconvened on July 10. During this time, the Chinese launched their punishment campaign directed at ROK troops, who were pushed back six miles and suffered the bulk of the UN Command’s 14,000 casualties from this campaign (Foot 1990: 186–87). The Communists stopped the campaign unilaterally on July 20, and the armistice was signed seven days later. As this example demonstrates, the Communists were more skilled at differentiating among the various UN belligerents and their interests and objectives. When considered with the resources they committed to the negotiation process, the Chinese especially appear to have been very sensitive to receiving signals from the other side, as well as to sending targeted signals back. Using this logic, we might even suppose the Communists would be more likely to manifest behavior in line with the second mechanism, changing their bargaining position in response to all US domestic coalition shifts. Indeed, there was even another hawkish shift on the US side in September 1950, and so we might expect the Communists would have lowered their reservation price in response. But they did not. The second mechanism occurred after only one shift—Eisenhower’s hawkish shift. Why did the Eisenhower hawkish shift provoke a change in the Communist bargaining position, when the previous Truman hawkish shift did not? Some other dynamic must be present, and I argue the lens of the Communist dovish shifts made a difference.
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There was no discussion in the Communist states about the US hawkish shift in September 1950. Right after this shift, MacArthur successfully conducted his amphibious landing at Inchon and turned the tide in the war. Within one month, the UNC had crossed the 38th Parallel and was rapidly approaching the Yalu River. As UN forces marched north, the Soviet Union did take actions that suggested a willingness to settle, but it seems clear these actions were prompted by the UN military successes and rapidly shifting battlefield, not the previous month’s US domestic coalition shift. In October 1950, just before the United States crossed the 38th Parallel, the Soviets presented a cease-fire proposal at the United Nations and approached a Norwegian diplomat, Hans Engen, for negotiations outside UN channels. Engen believed the Soviets were seeking to avoid US occupation of North Korea—the Soviets told him so—in exchange for the possibility of eliminating an independent North Korean government. Thus, realpolitik factors, not the US domestic coalition shift, explain this change in war aims (Stueck 1995: 103). In contrast, the signaling inherent in the US hawkish shift with Eisenhower’s inauguration received preferred treatment after each Communist state experienced its own dovish coalition shift. Remember that the Chinese governing coalition experienced its dovish shift in the summer of 1952, when a new group of leaders took power with a mandate for industrialization and economic centralization. The dovish shift led to a change in the Chinese coalition’s conceptualization of the war’s costs and benefits—with a greater focus on its costs and a concomitant desire to end the war. As a result, the Chinese coalition was particularly receptive to information about the upcoming US hawkish shift and the expectation such a shift would increase war costs further. In contrast, the Soviets did not have the same reaction to the signaling from the impending US hawkish shift. Stalin was still in power and still wanted to continue the war, regardless of its costs, because the Soviet Union was not directly bearing them. After the Chinese dovish shift in the summer of 1952, Zhou Enlai directed his Foreign Ministry analysts to follow closely each public speech of US Republican presidential candidate Eisenhower. It seemed clear to the Chinese that “Eisenhower would be more aggressive in Korea” (Zhang 1992: 132; 1995: 317–18). Zhang argues Chinese leaders especially noticed Eisenhower’s promise of an “honorable” peace in Korea through “deeds” not “words,” and they believed that Eisenhower would definitely intensify the battlefield situation. Chinese leaders, particularly military commanders, predicted that Eisenhower would probably conduct amphibious operations, and Chinese intelligence indicated that UN forces were prepared for such maneuvers (Zhang 1992: 132–37; 1995: 233–36; Zhai 1994:
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126–28; Lim 2002: 125; Gaddis 1997: 108).10 In contrast, Chinese leaders considered a ground offensive and strategic bombing unlikely, because such measures had already been tried, and threats to use nuclear weapons not credible, because of US public and world opinion (Zhang 1992: 133). Eisenhower’s election led Chinese leaders to conclude that US war policy would become more aggressive. They carefully watched his post-election activities, including (1) his publicized meeting with MacArthur to hear the former commander’s hawkish plan for ending the war and (2) his trip to Korea in early December to meet with UN Commander Mark Clark as well as the commander of US military advisors in Taiwan, who joined them (Ambrose 1983b: 30–35; Stueck 1995: 305). Around this time, the United States was also conducting stepped-up amphibious training maneuvers off the North Korean and Chinese coasts (Clark 1954: 97–99).11 Thus, the Chinese military increased its preparations to counter possible amphibious attacks, which were anticipated for the spring (Zhang 1992: 132–37; 1995: 233–36; Zhai 1994: 126–28; Lim 2002: 125; Gaddis 1997: 108; Stueck 1995: 306–7).12 More importantly, on December 17, Mao cabled Stalin that US President-elect Eisenhower was “currently carrying out preparations for military actions that will take place after he comes to power.” Knowing the Soviet leader would only advise prolonging the war, Mao informed Stalin of a new Chinese effort to mobilize an additional 250,000 troops to compensate for China’s terrible war losses, and he requested more Soviet armaments.13 Mao’s telegram clearly shows he expected that an escalated war would mean increased war costs, in terms of additional troop mobilization and more combat deaths. Stalin waited ten days to reply to Mao’s expressed concerns, and his reply was diffident. He advised the Chinese to “count on the worst and proceed from the probability of an attack by the Americans” and only offered one-quarter of the aid that Mao had requested.14 While Mao’s message highlighted the US hawkish shift’s potential for an escalated war and increased costs, Stalin in effect shrugged. Unlike the Chinese leaders, who were viewing the war through the cost-focused lens of their recent dovish shift, Stalin did not care about the possible effects of escalation. After all, he had orchestrated the war so that he was gaining benefits while pushing the costs onto the Chinese and North Koreans. Thus, until Stalin’s death on March 5, 1953, this evidence suggests that the Chinese were more sensitive than the Soviets to the likely escalation and increased costs that would result from Eisenhower’s election. However, after Stalin’s death and the resulting Soviet dovish shift that brought the troika to power, the new Soviet coalition acknowledged the hawkish US shift and made a number of gestures towards conciliation.15 These gestures can be
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viewed both as “costly signals” resulting from the Soviets’ dovish shift as well as reactions to the US hawkish shift. For example, the Soviet press editorials after Eisenhower’s “Chance for Peace” speech not only responded to the new American president’s views but provided an assurance that the Soviets were willing to help do their part to resolve controversial issues like the Korean War. The most important Communist concession during the war was Zhou’s March 30 statement suggesting the POW issue could be resolved by turning over all non-repatriates to a neutral state. This major concession came a few weeks after Stalin’s funeral and the resulting Soviet dovish shift. Just as the Chinese dovish shift the previous summer made the Chinese coalition more likely to expect Eisenhower would escalate the war, the new Soviet troika now had the same frame of reference. The new Soviet leaders worried about war escalation and increased costs, and they looked differently at information about potential US use of atomic weapons in Korea (Zubok and Pleshakov 1996: 155; see also Mastny 1996: 164). Moreover, the new Soviet leaders were ready to shift their economic priorities away from the Korean War to help China implement its First Five-Year Plan, deal with unrest and food shortages in Eastern Europe, and free resources for neglected domestic programs and agriculture (Mayers 1986: 113; Zubok and Pleshakov 1996: 148; Stueck 1995: 327; Richter 1994: 35, 37). Given that Eisenhower’s expected escalation would not only increase war costs but also tie up resources that they wanted to shift to other areas, the new Soviet leaders perceived the signal inherent in the US hawkish shift differently than Stalin had. Thus, it seems both Communist states needed to be viewing Eisenhower’s hawkish shift through dovish lenses before they could lower their demands and concede on the POW policy. Both Communist states needed dovish lenses for the second mechanism to have an effect in creating an overlapping bargaining space. On balance, it appears that the change in the Communist bargaining position is mostly explained by the dovish coalition shifts in China and the Soviet Union. In other words, the first mechanism had a greater effect on creating an overlapping bargaining space. However, the US hawkish shift did increase the effect of these dovish shifts by influencing Communist calculations about the war’s costs and benefits. The Communists were more able to learn from the information conveyed by the US hawkish shift—and change their bargaining position accordingly—because of their own dovish shifts. The Chinese and Soviet dovish shifts made these governing coalitions not only more conscious of the war’s costs in general, but also of how those costs would likely increase in the future. Both coalitions talked about their expectation that Eisenhower would escalate the war, but such comments only happened after each coalition experienced its respective dovish shift. The dovish frame of reference led them to project an adversary
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with a greater willingness to commit resources and political capital to win. Thus, the Communists responded to Eisenhower’s hawkish shift by lowering their demands—the only time the second mechanism affected the creation of the overlapping bargaining space during the war.
Conclusions Ending a war is a two-level game and any account of the war termination process must look at both levels and the interaction between them to answer the questions of how, when and why wars end. Building on the domestic-level analysis of the Korean War belligerents, this chapter completes our explanation of the timing and terms of the war’s ending. In the process, it presents a more nuanced theoretical understanding of the role that domestic coalition shifts play in international negotiations to end war. It has also offered an explanation for the surprising finding that the country doing better tends not to increase its demands in ways that cancel out the war-terminating effects of a dovish coalition shift in the loser, as some rationalist theories might expect. This chapter outlined two mechanisms by which domestic coalition shifts can help create an overlapping bargaining space between belligerents. The first mechanism occurs when the new governing coalition changes its own bargaining position. The second occurs when the coalition shift provides information for the opposing side to update its expectations about the war and thus change its bargaining position. Given the ambiguities inherent in international signaling and the possibility of an information obstacle blocking information from the opposing side’s shift, we would expect the second mechanism’s effect to be less powerful than the first’s. However, the chapter suggested the two mechanisms are likely to operate in tandem in situations when opposing sides both experience coalition shifts at about the same time. Because the Communist primary belligerents experienced dovish shifts and the United States experienced a hawkish shift, the chapter theorized explicitly about this particular interaction between coalition shifts on opposing sides. Assuming that Side A experiences a dovish shift while Side B a hawkish one, the first mechanism would predict that A would lower its demands, while B would raise its demands. However, if B does not perceive the costs of fighting for those additional demands to be worth their benefit, B is more likely to take advantage of A’s dovish shift to initiate settlement or accept an offer from the other side if (1) continuing the conflict is expected to be costly, (2) its new governing coalition is only moderately hawkish or (3) A makes some well-timed initiatives to signal its peaceful intentions. If B initiates settlement and an overlapping bargaining space
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gets created, it is likely to be to B’s advantage, since its hawkish shift should lead A to take its offer seriously. Interestingly, therefore, part of both sides’ calculations depend upon the second mechanism and their respective expectations that A’s dovish shift will increase A’s willingness to settle and B’s hawkish shift will increase B’s willingness to escalate. Thus, in the case of interacting hawkish and dovish coalition shifts, it appears the two mechanisms work in tandem to create an overlapping bargaining space. This chapter’s plausibility probe examining the behavior of the Korean War’s primary belligerents provides support for this proposition. On the Communist side, the belligerents did lower their reservation price with a major concession about POW repatriation. This change in the Communist bargaining position was mostly caused by the two Communist dovish shifts (first mechanism) but also influenced by the expectation that Eisenhower’s hawkish shift would lead to war escalation and increased costs (second mechanism). It appears the hawkish shift mattered most because it was being viewed through the lens of the dovish shifts. Indeed, the Communists had not responded to the previous US hawkish shift in September 1950 by lowering their demands. In contrast, the Communist dovish shifts created a framing focused on costs—not only the costs of prolonging or escalating the war, but also the opportunity costs of not being able to pursue other policy priorities, given their projections about an adversary with a greater willingness to commit resources and political capital to win. In other words, the hawkish shift that brought Eisenhower to power was given more weight in Communist calculations because of the dovish shifts that occurred on the Communist side. This analysis accords with other scholarship about how doves look at escalation and risk (Leng 2000; also Snyder and Diesing 1977). In his study of recurring crises, Russell Leng (2000) suggests that how policymakers view the costs and risks associated with war “turns partly on their perceptions of the two sides’ comparative war-fighting capabilities . . . and partly on estimates of the costs of war.” While a hawkish worldview focuses on the risk of appearing weak, a dovish worldview is “more likely to focus on the risks of the escalation spiraling out of control” and the costs that would result (2000: 12). Given this focus on the costs of escalation, Leng argues it is not surprising that leaders with a dovish worldview will advocate conciliatory gestures, open lines of communication with the adversary and even unilateral concessions—such as the one about POW repatriation policy the Communists made in March 1953. While Leng argues the dovish worldview is fixed as part of leaders’ belief systems, this chapter has argued the dovish worldview can result from a dovish coalition shift, when leaders with more dovish preferences take power. But the effects of the dovish lens are the same.
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In contrast, the UN side’s behavior provides evidence of neither mechanism—when viewed monadically—because the United States did not change its bargaining position. It neither raised its demands after its own hawkish shift (first mechanism), nor raised them in response to the Communist dovish shifts (second mechanism). However, US behavior does support the argument about interacting coalition shifts on opposing sides. As Eisenhower’s calculations demonstrate, the marginal benefits of additional US demands were less than the marginal costs of fighting to achieve them. The Eisenhower coalition was only moderately hawkish and it expected continued conflict to be costly. Thus, it chose not to profit from its bargaining “advantage” by raising its demands—despite the Communists’ dovish shifts and signals of peaceful intentions. Instead, the United States held its demands constant but sent credible signals (albeit not nuclear ones) that unless these demands were met, it would escalate the war. As a result, the final armistice terms were much closer to the US bargaining position. This empirical finding accords with other research about hawkish constituencies in two-level games (Schelling 1980: 28–29; Milner and Rosendorff 1997). Leaders can use the constraint of a hawkish domestic legislature to extract an international agreement more in line with their interests. As Helen Milner and Peter Rosendorff explain, “The need for the hawkish legislature to ratify the agreement means that its hawkishness can be used by the executive to extract an offer it might not have gotten otherwise” (1997: 131). Milner and Rosendorff find that such a strategy only works for moderate ranges of hawkishness. When the domestic divisions grow too large, the executive loses in the international negotiation. While they advance this argument to explain outcomes in international political economy, it also appears to hold in the US case of the Korean War. Although Eisenhower himself was a moderate hawk, he was able to signal credibly to the Communists that he was constrained by hardliner hawks, at home and in South Korea. Eisenhower sent these signals—and the Chinese clearly received them—before the inauguration through his publicized meeting with Douglas MacArthur and his trip to Korea to consult with US commanders about military escalation in Korea and Taiwan. These moves not only placated the Republican right wing at home, but they signaled to the Communists that Eisenhower would not be able to back down from his negotiating position very easily. Likewise, as Chapter 3 explained, the Eisenhower coalition walked a fine line in trying to move the armistice agreement forward while pulling its resistant South Korean ally along. Although the Communists were well aware of the different interests and goals on the UN side before, they became especially cognizant of Eisenhower’s constraints when Syngman Rhee unilaterally released 25,000 POWs. Seeing these hawkish constraints on Eisenhower helped influence Communist expecta-
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tions about increased war costs should Eisenhower escalate. In other words, if the Communist concessions occurred in part because of Eisenhower’s hawkish shift, then these even-more-hawkish constraints on Eisenhower—the Republican right wing and Rhee—helped to motivate those concessions. On balance, the greatest explanatory power for the timing and terms of the Korean War armistice can be attributed to the Communist dovish shifts (first mechanism). However, the US hawkish shift did increase the effect of these dovish shifts by influencing Communist calculations about the war’s costs and benefits (second mechanism). The Communists were more able to learn from the information conveyed by the US hawkish shift—and change their bargaining position accordingly—because of their own dovish shifts. In addition, Eisenhower’s decision not to raise US war aims may have been a result of the peaceful signals after the Communist dovish shifts (second mechanism). Thus, the historical rec ord from the Korean War supports the proposition that in the case of interacting hawkish and dovish shifts, the two mechanisms can work in tandem to create an overlapping bargaining space. This chapter theorized explicitly about the interaction between hawkish and dovish shifts on opposing sides because this permutation existed in the Korean War. However, the hawkish-dovish interaction is just one of six possible permutations of the interaction of opposing sides’ coalition shifts. Moreover, one case study is certainly not conclusive. Further theorizing and empirical analysis of the other permutations is certainly needed. As mentioned previously, analyzing these other permutations is beyond the scope of this book. However, the fact that the hawkish-dovish plausibility probe accords with the empirical record of the Korean War suggests this is a fruitful area for future research. Finally, it is very difficult to disentangle the relative explanatory power of the two mechanisms. As this chapter pointed out, one way to begin to weigh their relative effects might be to differentiate between domestic coalition shifts in primary and secondary belligerents. Because primary belligerents are most important in their side’s decisions about prosecuting and ending war, we can imagine primary belligerents’ coalition shifts will be more likely to work through the first mechanism. In contrast, secondary belligerents may not have as much influence in changing their side’s war policy, and thus their coalition shifts may have more effect through the second mechanism. The next chapter allows us to begin to tease these two effects apart by presenting a quantitative analysis of interstate wars since 1862.
part iii
Testing and Extending the Argument
9
Domestic Coalition Shifts in War Termination since 1862
Up to this point, Part I presented a new theory about shifts in domestic governing coalitions and their role in ending interstate war. Part II traced the theory’s causal mechanisms through detailed case studies of the primary belligerents in the Korean War. In this chapter, I test whether this argument is generalizable beyond the “Forgotten War.” As the first part of this book suggested, there are many empirical examples of domestic governing shifts leading to war termination, and many scholars from different theoretical perspectives have noted this tendency. However, no one has previously attempted a broad quantitative analysis of this important argument, until now. This chapter tests the domestic coalition shift theory with a quantitative analysis of all interstate wars since 1862, using existing datasets (Bennett and Stam 1996; Goemans 2000a; Goemans et al. 2009) and a new dataset of post–World War II wars specifically constructed for this purpose. The analysis in this chapter draws on research conducted with my colleague John P. Sawyer (e.g. Stanley and Sawyer 2008); I am indebted to him for allowing me to use it here. This chapter’s findings corroborate and extend upon the empirical analysis of two similar arguments about the effect of leadership change on ending rivalries and conflict. First, in a parallel argument about interstate rivalry, Scott Bennett has argued that interstate “rivalry termination is expected when there is a change in leadership reflecting new preferences and new groups backing a leader” (1998: 1203). To test this argument, Bennett (1997, 1998) examined enduring rivalries between states from 1816 to 1992 and found empirical support for the hypothesis that a change in the leadership or political system of one of the rivals leads to a
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decrease in the duration of the rivalry. Second, Sarah Croco (2008) has argued that “culpable” leaders—those whom the public can clearly link to the decision to involve the state in an interstate war—will feel a greater pressure to secure a favorable outcome than “non-culpable” leaders. While culpable leaders face a greater likelihood of domestic punishment should they lose, new non-culpable leaders can distance themselves from the original war decision and thus gain more options for ending it. Croco examined all leaders who participated in interstate wars from 1816 to 1991 and found support for these hypotheses: non-culpable leaders are more likely to preside over poor outcomes and are less likely to be punished for these outcomes than culpable leaders. Taken together with the findings I present in this chapter, Bennett’s (1997, 1998) and Croco’s (2008) empirical results provide powerful support for the argument that leadership changes play an important role in ending a variety of interstate conflicts. This chapter tests my domestic coalition shift theory with quantitative analysis of all interstate wars since 1862.1 To briefly recap the coalition shift argument in terms of the testable hypotheses presented in Chapter 2: H realpolitik: The greater the power imbalance between the two sides, the more quickly the war will end. H negative duration dependence: The longer the war has already lasted, the harder it is to end. H regime type: Regime type should have less explanatory power when coalition shifts are included in models of war duration. H shift: The longer the war, the more likely a domestic coalition shift is needed to end it. H loser: Domestic coalition shifts are most likely among “losing” and “stalemated” states. H primary shift: Domestic coalition shifts in primary belligerents will have a greater effect towards hastening the end of the war than shifts in other belligerents. Extending the basic model to examine the effect of the direction of coalition shifts on war termination yielded some additional hypotheses. The analysis in Chapter 8 suggested there are two mechanisms by which coalition shifts can affect the creation of an overlapping bargaining space. The first mechanism, which is captured by the first three hypotheses, occurs when the new governing coalition changes its own bargaining position. H hawk: Hawkish coalition shifts will occur early in the war and be associated with prolonging the war.
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H dove: Dovish coalition shifts will occur late in the war and be associated with shortening the war. H neutral: Neutral shifts will shorten the war, but not as quickly as dovish shifts. The second mechanism occurs when the domestic coalition shift provides information for the opposing side to update its expectations about the war and thus change its bargaining position. This mechanism is captured by three alternative hypotheses: H hawk*: Hawkish coalition shifts will cause the other side to sue for peace and thus shorten the war. H dove*: Dovish coalition shifts will cause the other side to push for more concessions and thus lengthen the war. H neutral*: Neutral coalition shifts are unlikely to provide information about the war to the opposing side and thus should not affect the war’s duration through the second mechanism. As Chapter 8 explained, given the ambiguities inherent in international signaling, we would expect the second mechanism’s effect to be less powerful than the first’s. Moreover, the second mechanism can only work when the information obstacle is not blocking that side’s rational updating process. This chapter allows me to weigh the relative importance of these two mechanisms’ effects. This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section explains the methodology and operationalization of the model. The second section examines the hypotheses about domestic coalition shifts at the belligerent level with descriptive statistics. The third section tests the hypotheses with hazard analysis at the belligerent and war levels, while comparing the findings with existing empirical research on war duration and war termination. The fourth section provides a robustness check by examining each of the wars qualitatively. Then, after demonstrating the merit of the coalition shift argument, the fifth section examines what effect coalition shift directions have on the theory.
Methodology and Operationalization To test these hypotheses, I initially used war-level datasets from Bennett and Stam (1996) and Archigos (Goemans et al. 2009), to establish the theory’s viability over a wider sample of wars—interstate wars from 1862 to 1990. Then, I compiled a dataset of 78 belligerents in all but one of the 28 interstate wars between 1945 and 2006.2 In this analysis, because my argument pertains to domestic governing
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coalitions, each belligerent serves as the subject, rather than the war itself.3 Like Ireland and Gartner (2001), I use a monadic approach—looking at states individually rather than in dyads—to predict war hazard functions. Later, to account for the strategic interaction between belligerents and the lack of independence between observations in the same war, I examine the wars qualitatively with war as the unit of analysis. The data largely were derived from the Correlates of War Inter-State War Data v3.0 (Sarkees 2000), although I made a number of corrections to improve historical accuracy, limit belligerents to major combatants and bring it up to date.4 The data about domestic coalition shifts were culled from primary and secondary sources about the domestic politics in each belligerent state during the wars. I limit my analysis to major combatants, defined as all belligerent states which either suffered at least 5 percent of the battle-deaths on its side in the war or served as the patron supplying the majority of the war material resources consumed by its side.5 In addition, consistent with the qualitative case studies of the Korean War, I define a primary belligerent as the main decision-maker involved in that side’s decisions about prosecuting and ending the war. Most wars have only one primary belligerent on each side, but some wars have more than one on each side—especially when there are great powers fighting together.6 This role can theoretically change over the course of the war. For example, the United States was the primary belligerent on its side in the Vietnam War until it left in 1973, at which time South Vietnam took over. Given the high degree of empirical detail necessary to code domestic governing coalition shifts, the data needed to test this argument empirically are quite extensive. Because information about domestic governing coalition composition and the timing of coalition shifts in wars after World War II is significantly more accessible, I selected this sub-sample of all interstate wars to conduct a more detailed probe of the argument. Theoretically, there should be no difference in the fundamental decision-making processes during war before that time, as the findings using the Archigos dataset demonstrate. However, there are some features of the post–World War II environment that make these wars stand out as a cohesive sub-sample for the more nuanced analysis of the domestic coalition shift theory. Recent scholarship on war termination documents a marked increase in the number of interstate wars ending in stalemate in the post–World War II period (Dunnigan and Martel 1987; Fortna 2004b; Pillar 1983; Smith 1995). While most other empirical studies of interstate war duration and termination have focused only on wars that ended conclusively, my model acknowledges the increasing numbers of stalemates since WWII and broadens the findings of the current literature by including them explicitly. This
d omest ic coalit ion shifts
increase in stalemates may be driven by some structural factors in the international system—the presence of nuclear weapons, the strength of the United Nations and its role in bringing interstate wars to settlement before a decisive victory and the dampening effect of bipolarity during the Cold War. In addition, Fortna (2004b) suggests that the increase in democracies in this era may be driving more willingness among belligerents to settle for stalemates. model specificat ion
I follow the tradition set out by Bennett and Stam (1996) of using survival (or hazard) analysis techniques to test hypotheses about war duration and termination. One important feature of hazard analysis is that it can model the “duration dependence” of a process under consideration (Bennett 1999). In the context of war duration and termination, duration dependence measures whether the prospect of a war terminating at any given duration increases or decreases over the course of its lifetime. Hazard models focus on the hazard rate, which is the instantaneous rate at which events terminate at time t, given that they have survived until t. Hazard rates may vary over time, and thus one important use of hazard models is correctly identifying the duration dependence of a process. I evaluated different survival models and chose the Weibull model for theoretical and statistical reasons.7 I use the Weibull distribution for the baseline hazard, for three reasons. First, the Weibull model allows me to compare my results to previous models (e.g. Bennett and Stam 1996; Goemans 2000a, b). Second, it appears to be statistically appropriate for the data. 8 Finally, and most importantly, it allows me to test my theory that wars are negatively duration dependent. Because the domestic coalition shift theory tells us what kind of duration dependence to expect (negative duration dependence), there are strong theoretical reasons for choosing the Weibull based on the theory itself (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 1998: FN 5; Bennett 1999: 261; Cleves et al. 2004: 246). As Scott Bennett argues, “Because duration dependence has clear substantive implications, parametric duration models may actually be chosen specifically to test particular hypotheses” (1999: 261). A Weibull model approximates duration dependence through the duration parameter p. When p=1, there is no duration dependence. If the hazard rate is positive (p >1), the hazard rate increases over time and an event becomes more likely. In such cases, termination accelerates over time, and an event is more likely to end in each subsequent interval. If the hazard rate is negative (0
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dependent var iable: war dur at ion
The dependent variable is war duration, i.e. how long interstate wars last. The underlying dependent variable being analyzed is the hazard rate, the rate at which interstate wars terminate at a given point in time. As explained above, this dependent variable is analyzed in two datasets, Bennett and Stam’s (1996) dataset of interstate wars from 1862 to 1990 and my newly constructed dataset of interstate wars from 1945 to 2006. The dependent variable is also analyzed at two levels of analysis: belligerent level and war level. Disaggregating the data into many observations for each belligerent allows me to include time-varying covariates, which are variables that vary independently over the course of the war (Greene 1993; Lancaster 1990; Petersen 1986). The belligerent-level specifications treat each belligerent as an independent observation, which assumes that each state’s behavior is independent. Obviously, this is not true because war is a strategic interaction, and one side’s behavior affects the other’s. Unfortunately, this problem is unavoidable if I want to be able to examine the domestic coalition shifts in each belligerent state. In the models reported here, I use robust standard errors clustered on the war belligerent to compensate for the lack of independence between observations. I also tested the severity of this issue by using robust standard errors clustered on the war instead of the individual war belligerent. Estimating with robust standard errors clustered on the war takes into account the within-war connections over time (Beck 1996; Bennett 1998; Huber 1967; White 1980). In the war-clustered specifications, my key variables retain high levels of significance, while other variables and overall goodness of fit have reasonably high levels of significance. This indicates the monadic specification is reasonable. More importantly, the war-level models with Archigos data serve as a check on belligerent-level analysis, as does the warlevel qualitative analysis later in the chapter. independent var iables: coalit ion shifts
I test the theory’s causal mechanism first by using a dummy variable (Archigos) constructed from the Archigos dataset (Goemans et al. 2009). Archigos was coded 1 if any belligerent state on either side experienced a change in the head of state during the war (and 0 otherwise). This variable is constant for the entire war, for use in non-time-varying covariate (non-TVC) specifications with Goemans’ (2000a, b) losing mixed regime variable. There are 24 wars in which at least one belligerent experienced at least one change in the head of state during the war. I also used the Archigos dataset to construct a TVC dummy variable (Archlast) that was coded 0 until the final head-of-state change in any belligerent on either side
d omest ic coalit ion shifts
during the war, and then coded 1 thereafter. Archigos and Archlast are aggregated at the war level (rather than the belligerent level) to use in specifications that build on Bennett and Stam (1996) and Goemans (2000a, b). Both variables from the Archigos dataset allow me to examine in a very rough manner the effect of top leadership changes on war termination in a wider sample of interstate wars. However, these datasets have three serious weaknesses for testing the theory. First, changes in the head of state do not fully capture the kind of coalition shifts included in my model. Second, the yearly time-spans are too crude to capture the temporal impact of coalition shifts on war termination. Third, and most importantly, these dichotomous variables create an aggregation bias (Alt, King and Signorino 2001; Mitchell and Moore 2002). The Archigos variables treat as equivalent (1) wars in which only one head of state changes, (2) wars in which one state experiences multiple changes in its head of state and (3) wars in which multiple states experience a change in their heads of state.9 However, the possibility exists that the war-terminating effects of these three situations could be very different. As Alt, King and Signorino note, “We do not want the form in which the data happens to be collected to determine the substantive ideas we can explore” (2001: 22). Thus, I also test my theory’s causal mechanism by using a dummy variable (Shift) that was coded 1 for any belligerent on the day there is a consequential change in composition or type of a governing coalition and 0 otherwise. This method of coding allows me to observe multiple coalition shifts within each belligerent during the war and thereby ameliorate the aggregation bias. By including all coalition shifts throughout the war, I also avoid the sampling bias that would arise from focusing only on those shifts that bring to power the coalitions that are incumbent when the war ends. Thus, including multiple coalition shifts creates a harder test for the theory and decreases the risk of a tautology. I define a consequential change in the composition of the governing coalition to include changes in the head of state, party apparatus in one-party states, cabinet membership, political parties in a parliamentary governing coalition and junta membership. While this definition does not include changes purely in military leadership, some coalition shifts in the dataset involve changes in military leadership that occur at the same time as changes in political leadership.10 I define a consequential change in the type of governing coalition to be changes in regime type (i.e. the comparativists’ regime change). There are a total of 80 domestic governing coalition shifts (see Appendix B for a summary of the shifts). As explained in Chapter 2, my model excludes domestic coalition shifts that are forced upon a state by its external enemies (“victor-imposed shifts”). This is consistent with the “domestically-instigated regime change” approach in Bueno
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de Mesquita et al. (1992). Excluding these shifts helps guard against the possibility that the causal arrows are reversed—that the end of the war is leading to coalition shifts, rather than vice versa. In addition to the Shift variable, the 80 coalition shifts are also coded with a shift direction. Thus, there are three additional dummy variables (Hawk, Dove and Neutral): each variable was coded 1 on the day when a shift occurs in the hawkish, dovish or neutral direction, respectively, and 0 otherwise. I also created two dummy variables (Primary shift and Secondary shift) that were coded 1 on the day a primary or secondary belligerent, respectively, experienced a coalition shift during the war (and coded 0 otherwise). I coded these variables to test my assumption that primary belligerents’ coalition shifts should have a greater effect for hastening the end of the war than secondary belligerents’ shifts. There are 56 primary shifts and 24 secondary shifts. Finally, I created six additional dummy variables that interact coalition shift direction with the belligerent status (Primary hawk, Primary dove, Primary neutral, Secondary hawk, Secondary dove and Secondary neutral). These six variables are coded 1 on the day a primary or secondary belligerent, respectively, experienced a coalition shift in the hawkish, dovish or neutral direction (and 0 otherwise). independent var iables: cont rol var iables
I control for a number of competing variables that have been identified in the literature. First, I directly borrowed Bennett and Stam’s (1996) variables for strategy (OADA, OADM, OPDA), Terrain, interaction between strategy and terrain (Strategy*terrain), issue Salience, and Surprise. Unfortunately, inclusion of their data limits my examination to 55 out of the 78 belligerents in my dataset, because their data do not comprise the entire sample of interstate wars since World War II. I was able to impute terrain for all belligerents, but the remaining variables are difficult to replicate because there is an element of subjectivity in their coding. I also code variables from the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities Dataset 3.02 (Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972) in a similar fashion to Stam (1996) and Bennett and Stam (1996) for Balance of capabilities, Population, Population ratio, the Number of states in the war, the ratio of Military quality and total number of Military personnel. I draw on the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Dispute Datasets 3.02 (Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004) to code Prior disputes, which is discounted by the number of opponents in the war. My measure of regime type is similar to Goemans (2000a, b) but draws from the revised Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2004). I use their Polity2 variable, which fills in much of the missing data in the standard polity score. This variable ranges from a full autocracy (–10) to a full democracy (10). Using
d omest ic coalit ion shifts
the beginning and end dates included in Polity IV, I was able to code regime type on a daily basis for nearly all observations. In a departure from Goemans, I code regime type dummy variables using conservative cut-points of –8 and below for Autocracy and 8 and above for Democracy because there is a natural cut-point in the data above 7, which I mirror for purposes of symmetry below –7. Furthermore, I believe these extreme values will most embody regime-typespecific characteristics, giving the largest benefit of the doubt to regime type as an explanatory variable. I also replicate Goemans’ losing mixed regime (Losemix) variable both as he uses it and adjusted to include stalemated wars. This dummy variable is coded 1 for any war in which at least one of the losing belligerents is an oligarchy (“losing mixed regime”) and 0 otherwise.
Descriptive Statistics I recorded a total of 80 domestic governing coalition shifts in the 78 belligerents, coded in the hawkish, dovish or neutral directions. (For the coding, see Appendix B.) As predicted by the model, within the post–World War II sample, hawkish shifts tend to happen early in wars and dovish shifts towards the end. The 22 hawkish shifts occurred on average slightly less than one-third of the way through the war (mean = .29). In contrast, the 22 dovish shifts occurred towards the end (mean = .71). In fact, 86 percent of hawkish shifts occurred in the first half of their respective wars, while 82 percent of dovish shifts happened in the second half of their wars. Even more striking, 36 percent of dovish shifts occurred in the last tenth of their respective wars.11 The 36 neutral shifts appear to be fairly evenly distributed throughout their respective wars (mean = .47), with a slight skew away from the last third, and a large skew away from the last quarter, of the war. Examining the data more carefully, I discovered there were only ten coalition shifts (13 percent) that occurred during the third through fifth months (days 88 through 151) of their respective wars. Of these ten, only one was a dovish shift (day 114), as the Soviet Union began unraveling as a state and disengaging from the war in Karabakh. Certainly, there were many wars that ended during this period (11 belligerents) and many more that continued beyond this period (30 belligerents kept fighting past day 152). So, 41 belligerents could have experienced dovish shifts during this time but did not. Why? My hypotheses would suggest that it takes leaders a few months to mobilize their militaries and their societies (both materially and psychologically) behind the war. During this initial “rally round the flag,” domestic constituencies give their leaders a war policy “honeymoon” to implement their initial war strate-
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gies and see how these fare against the enemy. Simultaneously, I would expect any shifts during this time to be in the hawkish direction, after initial war plans have interacted with the enemy’s and come up short. In this case, the governing coalition may want to try new strategies or tactics, such as opening other fronts, mobilizing additional resources for the war or exhausting other coercive options. Each of these other strategies would lead the war to lengthen, as the leaders wait to see what effects the new war policy might have. The empirical data support this expectation: in fact, six of the ten shifts during this period (60 percent) were hawkish shifts.12 Thus, while shorter than an American president’s traditional 100-day honeymoon, this 68-day window appears to be the period during which war policies get entrenched. War Duration and Coalition Shifts The 27 wars in my dataset are divided into three duration groups, which I label (1) short wars (less than six months), (2) medium wars (6–18 months) and (3) long wars (longer than 18 months). Because some belligerents experienced multiple coalition shifts during a war, the following tables with cross-tabulations only examine whether a belligerent had at least one shift before the war ended. For belligerents that experienced more than one coalition shift, the tables include the shift direction of the last shift, as this shift is most important in terms of the domestic causal mechanisms for explaining war termination. As my hypotheses predict, the longer the war, the more likely a belligerent state is to experience a coalition shift.13 Table 9.1 shows that the data are significantly skewed in short wars towards no shift, and in long wars towards a shift. In medium length wars, the data are slightly skewed towards a shift. The χ² test demonstrates that this relationship is robust and statistically significant. By chance alone, we would expect to see only 29.5 short war participants with no coalition shift, but the data show that 40 short war participants (80 percent) did not experience a shift. As my theory suggests, belligerents in short wars are less likely to need coalition shifts because the Bayesian updating process can occur relatively smoothly as belligerents assess information from a dynamic battlefield. Those coalition shifts that do occur in short wars are more likely to be shifts among states that are losing or stalemated. Not only are these states more in need of updating their expectations about the war, but they may also need to toss out leaders who are against making peace or scapegoat those “responsible” for getting into the war in the first place. The data support these hypotheses: of the 10 belligerents who experienced shifts in short wars, eight were losers and two were stalemates. Even more strikingly, by chance alone we would expect to see seven long war participants experience a shift, but the data show there were actually more than double that. The table shows that all but two of the long-war participants (88
d omest ic coalit ion shifts
table 9.1 Cross-Tabulation of War Duration by Coalition Shifts Length
No Shift
Shift
Total
40 29.5
10 20.5
50 50
4 6.5
7 4.5
11 11
Short (observed) (expected) Medium Long
2 10
15 7
17 17
Total
46 46
32 32
78 78
Pearson χ2 = 27.1202, PR = 0.000
table 9.2 Cross-Tabulation of War Duration by Coalition Shift Direction Last Shift Direction Length
No Shift
Hawk
Neutral
Dove
Total
40 29.5
0 2.6
2 6.4
8 11.5
50 50
4 6.5
1 0.6
4 1.4
2 2.5
11 11
4 2.2
8 3.9
17 17
Short (observed) (expected) Medium Long
2 10
3 0.9
Total
46 46
4 4
10 10
18 18
78 78
Pearson χ2 = 33.9693, PR = 0.000
percent) experienced a coalition shift. One of these no-shift long-war participants was Ethiopia, a winner in its war with Eritrea (1998–2000). The other was Cambodia, a loser in its war with Vietnam (1975–79).14 Thus, half of these noshift long-war participants support the prediction that a winner is less likely to need a coalition shift to update its expectations than a belligerent that is losing or stalemated. A more sophisticated picture is seen in Table 9.2, which examines war duration in light of the direction of the shift. Table 9.2 reinforces the conclusion that the data are skewed in short wars towards no shift, and in long wars towards a shift. This table also suggests that medium length wars, if their belligerents experience a shift, are most likely to experience that shift in the neutral direction. The χ² test shows that this result is robust and statistically significant. Most importantly, this table begins to show the effect of dovish shifts in war termination.
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test ing and extending the argument
As in the previous table, we see that 80 percent of short war participants did not experience a coalition shift. What is interesting is that all but two short war participants that experienced a shift had one in the dovish direction. Similarly, the data in long wars are also biased overwhelmingly towards dovish shifts, supporting the hypothesis that the longer the war, the more likely a dovish coalition shift is needed to end it. More than half of the coalition shifts in long war participants were in the dovish direction. War Outcome and Coalition Shifts The hypothesis about war outcomes and coalition shifts suggests that losing and stalemated belligerents are more likely to experience shifts than winning states.15 Table 9.3 shows that this hypothesized relationship is robust and statistically significant. The data are skewed towards no shift among winners and towards a shift among losers and among stalemates. By chance alone, we would expect to see 17 winners without a shift, as opposed to the 24 we see in reality. In contrast, we would expect to see seven stalemates (13 losers) with a shift, as opposed to the 11 stalemates (16 losers) we see in reality. Expressed differently, only 16 percent of shifts were among winners (which comprise 37.2 percent of the population), while 84 percent were among losing and stalemated belligerents (39.7 and 23.1 percent of the population, respectively). A more nuanced picture emerges when we examine war outcome in light of the direction of each belligerent’s final coalition shift. Table 9.4 provides additional support for the hypothesis that losers and stalemates are most likely to experience dovish coalition shifts as their last coalition shift. Most strikingly, among losers that experienced a coalition shift, 63 percent were shifts in the dovish direction. Among stalemated belligerents that experienced a coalition shift, 55 percent were shifts in the dovish direction. table 9.3 Cross-Tabulation of War Outcome by Coalition Shifts Outcome
No Shift
Shift
Total
24 17.1
5 11.9
29 29
Stalemate
7 10.6
11 7.4
18 18
Lose
15 18.3
16 12.7
31 31
Total
46 46
32 32
78 78
Win (observed) (expected)
Pearson χ2 = 11.2180, PR = 0.004
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table 9.4 Cross-Tabulation of War Outcome by Coalition Shift Direction Last Shift Direction Outcome
No Shift
Hawk
Neutral
Dove
Total
24 17.1
1 1.5
2 3.7
2 6.7
29 29
Stalemate
7 10.6
1 0.9
4 2.3
6 4.2
18 18
Lose
15 18.3
2 1.6
4 4
10 7.2
31 31
Total
46 46
4 4
18 18
78 78
Win (observed) (expected)
10 10
Pearson χ2 = 12.1520, PR = 0.059
This correlative analysis provides qualified support for some of my hypotheses. The longer the war, the more likely a domestic coalition shift is needed to end it (H shift). Domestic coalition shifts are most likely among “losing” and “stalemated” states (H loser). In addition, it provides partial support for two hypotheses about coalition shift directions: hawkish coalition shifts occur early in the war (H hawk), while dovish coalition shifts occur late in the war (H dove). While these cross-tabulations show robust relationships as my argument would predict, they are insufficient proof of this book’s theory. Cross-tabulations are by nature bivariate, yet my argument is more complex than a simple correlation between two variables. Most importantly, the observations used to populate these cells are not independent, given that they describe belligerents on both sides of a war. Thus, for a more satisfying test of the argument, we need to turn to the multivariate hazard analysis.
Hazard Analysis Chapter 2 presented two alternative pathways for interstate war termination, building on Bayesian models. As Bayesian models suggest, interstate wars can only end once all belligerents develop similar expectations about the war and thus create an overlapping bargaining space. Bayesian models assume this change in expectations occurs when incumbent leaders change their minds. In contrast, the domestic coalition shift model argues that, in many wars, this change in expectations results from a change in the foreign policy leadership itself. Bennett and Stam (1996), Goemans (2000a) and Slantchev (2004) examine war duration in line with a Bayesian model of rational updating. However, none
— (0.51) (0.50) (1.42) (2.32) (2.87) (0.75) (1.22) (0.04) (0.54) (0.01) (0.01) (0.20) (0.52) (0.11) (0.05) — (0.05) (0.09) (1.16) 923.16 –124.828 78 78
BS1
— 2.76*** 3.20*** 6.29*** 10.99*** 5.06† –1.703* –4.76*** 0.124*** 0.707 0.007 0.0101 0.420* –0.203 –0.200† –0.100† — –0.008 –0.190* 2.252† 0.965
*** <.001, ** <.01 * <.05 †<.1 ††<.15
Chi Stat Log Likelihood Subjects Failures
Shift OADM OADA OADP OPDA Terrain Terrain * Strategy Balance of Capabilities Military Personnel Total Population Population Ratio Military Quality Salience Surprise Autocracy Democracy Losemix Prior Disputes States in War Constant P
table 9.5
— 2.48*** 2.45*** 4.05* 4.88†† –1.28 –0.226 –1.81 0.419*** –0.08 –0.007 0.0017 0.408†† 0.216 –0.275* –0.153** 0.614† 0.012 –0.184* 0.527 1.0359 — (0.74) (0.67) (1.65) (2.97) (3.99) (1.03) (1.28) (0.11) (0.74) (0.02) (0.00) (0.26) (0.61) (0.13) (0.06) (0.35) (0.06) (0.09) (1.30) 51.26 –107.991 69 69
G1
— 2.42*** 2.34*** 3.98* 4.61†† –1.48 –0.131 –1.7 0.424*** –0.489 –0.008 0.002 0.372 –0.209 –0.275* –0.15** 0.570† 0.02 –0.155† 0.484 1.0397
G2
51.78 –107.73 69 69
— (0.75) (0.69) (1.68) (3.00) (4.00) (1.04) (1.27) (0.12) (0.70) (0.02) (0.00) (0.26) (0.58) (0.13) (0.06) (0.30) (0.06) (0.09) (1.29)
1.76*** 1.83* 3.73*** 8.62*** 12.33*** 10.60* –3.281** –4.13*** 0.098 0.403 0.060** –0.002 –0.094 0.873†† –0.306†† –0.108 –0.087 0.008 –0.143†† 0.932 1.2523†
A1
54.18 –72.19 51 51
(0.36) (0.75) (0.84) (2.45) (3.62) (4.80) (1.28) (1.20) (0.12) (0.65) (0.02) (0.02) (0.32) (0.57) (0.21) (0.08) (0.32) (0.06) (0.09) (1.30)
Replicated Hazard Analysis of Bennett and Stam (1996) and Goemans (2000a)
–0.872* 1.550†† 1.913* 3.632* 6.986* 1.152 –0.591 –2.958* 0.124** 0.907 0.003 –0.015 0.635* –0.631 –0.372† –0.185* — –0.024 –0.247* 2.089†† 0.9346
A2
51.78 –84.37 54 54
(0.36) (0.98) (0.79) (1.77) (3.03) (3.96) (1.01) (1.51) (0.05) (0.68) (0.01) (0.02) (0.28) (0.73) (0.20) (0.09) — (0.08) (0.12) (1.37)
d omest ic coalit ion shifts
of these scholars examine the alternative causal pathway to war termination advanced here for overcoming lags and stickiness in the Bayesian updating process. Bennett and Stam’s (1996) and Slantchev’s (2004) models focus explicitly on the effect of realpolitik variables on Bayesian updating. In contrast, Goemans’ (2000a) model includes a variable that begins to account for lags in Bayesian updating—but only among losing oligarchies (mixed regimes). Goemans argues that losing oligarchic leaders’ expectations about personal punishment after the war serves as a brake on updating their expectations during it. Because losing oligarchs fear for their personal safety, they prevent the state (when viewed from a unitary actor perspective) from updating war expectations and thus creating an overlapping bargaining space to end it. In other words, using my terminology, Goemans postulates a private preference obstacle that creates a lag in the Bayesian updating process, but he does not explain how states overcome this lag. Slantchev’s (2004) model of endogenous war termination rests explicitly on Bayesian logic: he argues states update their beliefs continuously throughout the war based on battlefield outcomes and their opponents’ diplomatic behavior. Slantchev demonstrates in interstate wars from 1816 to 1991 that parity in military capabilities is associated with longer wars. Slantchev’s theory focuses on realpolitik variables without incorporating stickiness in the Bayesian updating process; thus, it is not surprising his realpolitik model is “decidedly better” at predicting short wars than long ones (2004: 821). Slantchev (2004: 819) also argues that the empirical hazard rate for wars in his dataset is decreasing, which lends support for my hypothesis that war has negative duration dependence. Interestingly, he puzzles over the Crimean War, a case where his two-stage model did not predict the correct outcome. At the actual duration of this conflict (28 months), his model predicts Russia should have won, when in reality Russia lost the war (2004: 827). This “anomaly” is best explained by the domestic coalition shift in Russia, when Tsar Alexander II assumed the throne upon the death of his father, Nicholas I—a variable omitted from Slantchev’s analysis. In contrast, my model would have predicted Russia’s decision to settle for a loss, despite its being favored by realpolitik factors. This example suggests the potential fruits of explicitly adding domestic coalition shifts to models of war duration and termination. Therefore, I began by replicating the hazard analysis of Bennett and Stam (1996) and Goemans (2000a, b), using their datasets, to establish a baseline comparison for testing the domestic coalition shift theory with the Archigos data. In the case of Bennett and Stam, using their entire dataset of 78 wars from 1816 to 1990, my results varied slightly in terms of the size of the constant, log likelihood and significance level of some variables, but the actual coefficients were nearly identical, as Model BS1 in Table 9.5 shows.
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In a similar manner, I replicated Goemans’ (2000a, b) model, i.e. Bennett and Stam’s (1996) non-time varying covariate (non-TVC) Model 5 with the “losing mixed regimes” dummy variable. Using a more stringent two-tailed test, my results varied in terms of lower significance levels for five independent variables—including “losing mixed regimes,” his theory’s major explanatory variable (see Model G1 in Table 9.5).16 I also discovered that while Goemans’ theory is silent about stalemated wars, he actually includes six stalemates in his analysis and groups them with winners.17 This is a problem, because the domestic political ramifications of a stalemated war more closely resemble losing than winning, especially for the state that initiated the conflict. Because he uses one dummy variable that groups all belligerents in each war together, he is unable to differentiate between the side that initiated and the side that attacked. However, because Goemans already includes two categories of losing, the stalemates could easily have been classified with the “small losers.”18 Indeed, stalemate captures the political essence of small loss much better than Goemans’ battle-death measure. There are two important problems with using battle-deaths as the measure for loss. First, because the variable is measured for the entire war, it is not temporally fine-grained enough for understanding the relationship between battledeaths and leaders’ expectations about “losing” over time. More importantly, the public opinion literature about battle-deaths and war opposition in democracies suggests that battle-deaths do not affect all regimes the same way. For regimes whose militaries are populated with disenfranchised conscripts, battle-deaths are unlikely to affect the leaders’ power base (except when the leaders’ power base is the military). In other words, to affect a leader’s decision calculus, war losses must relate to her core power base. Yet battle-deaths do not have a constant effect in this regard across regimes, even of the same regime type. Given my view that stalemates belong with “small losers,” to see what effect this theoretical re-conceptualization would have, I recoded the six stalemated wars as small-losing “mixed regimes,” because all six had oligarchies among the stalemated belligerents. With this stalemate recoding, the losing mixed regime variable becomes slightly more significant (from p=.082 to .057) but its coefficient decreases in magnitude (see Model G2 in Table 9.5). In other words, when stalemates are conceptualized as the domestic political losses they often are, the variable’s explanatory power decreases slightly. the effect of chang ing heads of state on war dur at ion
Bennett and Stam (1996), Goemans (2000a) and Slantchev (2004) examine war duration in line with a Bayesian model of rational updating. However, as noted above, none of these scholars examine my alternative causal pathway to
d omest ic coalit ion shifts
war termination for overcoming lags and stickiness in the Bayesian updating process. Therefore, to establish my theory’s viability over a wider sample of wars, I began by adding a variable that examines the effect of changing heads of state on war duration. Model A1 adds the non-TVC Archigos variable to Goemans’ specification with stalemates recoded as small losers, to give maximum weight to his “losing mixed regime” variable (see Table 9.5).19 Because the Archigos dataset begins in 1862, 18 wars from Goemans’ analysis drop out for lack of data. Model A1 demonstrates that changes in the head of state of at least one belligerent in a war are correlated with longer wars, and this effect is extremely statistically significant (p =.000). Because Archigos is constant throughout the war, it is unlikely this result means that changing the heads of belligerent states causes a lengthening of war. Rather, a more conservative interpretation would be that longer wars are more likely to have changes in the heads of belligerent states, because there is more time during which such leadership changes could occur. A less conservative interpretation— in line with Croco’s (2008) findings about non-culpable leaders—might suggest that longer wars are more in need of shifts to finally come to a conclusion. Either way, the non-TVC Archigos variable captures the effect of lags and stickiness in the Bayesian updating process and demonstrates how such lags can lead to longer wars. This may be one reason why Goemans’ losemix effect is neither statistically significant nor in the predicted direction; the Archigos variable is probably capturing Goemans’ theorized effect of losing mixed regime leaders’ private preference obstacle. Finally, as Bayesian models predict, Model A1 demonstrates that realpolitik variables which clearly illuminate belligerents’ relative strength on the battlefield are important factors for shortening the war. Model A2 examines the effect of changing heads of state on war duration in Bennett and Stam’s (1996) TVC data (see Table 9.5). Model A2 uses the TVC Archlast variable and removes Goemans’ non-TVC losing mixed regime variable. As the domestic coalition shift theory would predict, Model A2 demonstrates that the final change in any belligerent’s head of state during the war is associated with shortening the war (p =.016).20 Archlast’s coefficient means that the final change in any belligerent’s head of state is more than twice as likely to lead a war to end. Taken together with Model A1’s findings, this result suggests that longer wars are more likely to experience changes in belligerents’ heads of state, but in wars with such leadership changes, changing the head of state can help to bring about the war’s end. This finding corroborates Croco’s (2008: 71) empirical finding that non-culpable leaders in interstate wars from 1816 to 1991 are always more likely to preside over unfavorable outcomes than culpable leaders, because the new non-culpable leader feels less pressure to continue the war. As in Model
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test ing and extending the argument
A1, the realpolitik control variables are statistically significant with effects in the expected direction. While the regime type variables in this regression are statistically significant, the level of aggregation involved in coding these variables makes interpretation of their effect very difficult.21 Descriptive statistics about these heads of state that changed during the interstate wars between 1862 and 1990 adds an additional perspective to this analysis. In the 54 wars from 1862 to 1990, 44 percent had a change in the head of state in at least one belligerent sometime during the war, and 35 percent experienced this leader change in the war’s final year. More specifically, 33 percent of short wars (less than a year) experienced a change in the head of state of at least one belligerent during the war, while 38 percent of longer wars (more than a year) experienced this leadership change in the war’s final year. Thus, well over a third of all wars in this sample experienced a head-of-state change in relatively close proximity to the war’s end. These regressions and descriptive statistics suggest that the alternative causal pathway to war termination proposed by the domestic coalition shift theory matters. The Archigos data clearly suggest there is a substantial group of interstate wars for which the Bayesian updating process gets bogged down and requires some other mechanism to help belligerents to update their expectations and end the war. This alternative causal pathway clearly needs to be included in war termination models. While suggestive, this analysis does not really capture the political and temporal dynamics of domestic coalition shifts in the war termination process, because the data only examine changes in belligerent heads of state during year-long time spans. Thus, the analysis to this point is only a crude test of the domestic coalition shift theory. To truly test its effects, we need to move to a finer-grained measure of coalition dynamics—one that not only measures multiple coalition shifts within belligerent states but also measures shifts’ effects during shorter time spans. In short, given the limitations of its coding, the Archigos data is suggestive but not overly conclusive. Therefore, I turn to my dataset of interstate wars after World War II, which includes all domestic coalition shifts observed on a daily basis, to increase my understanding of this alternative causal pathway. complet ing the hazard analysis specificat ion: d omest ic coalit ion shifts
Because the Archigos data are not nuanced enough to adequately test the temporal and political dynamics of the domestic coalition shift model, I test my theory on the dataset of 78 belligerents after World War II. While I control for realpolitik variables in this sub-sample of wars, I do not include Bennett and
d omest ic coalit ion shifts
Stam’s (1996) variables for strategy, issue salience and surprise. Including their data would limit my empirical test to 55 out of the 78 belligerents, because their data do not comprise the entire sample of interstate wars since World War II.22 Similarly, I also must eliminate military quality because of considerable missing data in the National Material Capabilities (NMC) dataset. Thus, including those variables would force me to throw out almost a third of the wars in the post–World War II era and limit the generalizability of the findings for this time period. Moreover, while I include the regime type variables, I exclude Goemans’ non-TVC “losing mixed regime” variable, because the variable is inappropriate for time-variant data and thus unsurprisingly lacks statistical significance when included. In contrast to the replicated accelerated failure time (AFT) models presented above, I report findings using a hazard rate metric. The AFT’s emphasis on analysis time, which has a number of very useful functions, produces serious problems when estimating the effect of time-varying covariates.23 Instead, the hazard rate is most useful for gaining insight into the underlying risk process and how this risk is affected by changes in the covariates (Cleves et al. 2004: 209). In other words, AFT coefficients shed light on the time to failure, while the hazard rate metric explains the risk of failure. Moreover, because in STATA the model is first estimated with proportional hazards and then transformed into AFT, the additional estimation step can cause slight errors in the levels of statistical significance with smaller datasets.24 The reported coefficient is the ratio of the hazard for a oneunit change in the covariate, making interpreting hazard ratios a straightforward and intuitive process. Thus, hazard ratios are both more appropriate for TVC data and smaller datasets and make interpretation of the effects of covariates much easier. Because I needed to change the model specification to make best use of the entire post–World War II sample, I returned to the Archigos war-level dataset once again for comparison sake, to test the new specification on the larger sample of interstate wars from 1862 to 1990 (see Model A3 in Table 9.6). Although Model A3 still suffers from the problems identified above—it only observes changes in belligerent heads of state on an annual basis—it allows me to make some comparison with the larger sample of wars to the post–World War II belligerent-level models reported below. (Thus, I report these results using the hazard rate to ease the comparison to those models.) Model A3 demonstrates once again that the final change in any belligerent’s head of state during the war is associated with shortening the war; such leadership changes are 2.67 times more likely to cause the war to end, and this effect is extremely statistically significant (p=.000). Only three other variables have effects that are somewhat significant in this specifica-
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test ing and extending the argument table 9.6 Hazard Analysis with Domestic Coalition Shifts A3
Shift Primary Shift Secondary Shift Terrain Balance of Capabilities Military Personnel Total Population Population Ratio Autocracy Democracy Prior Disputes States in War P Chi Stat Log Likelihood Subjects Failures
B1
2.672*** — — 0.767
(0.728) — — (0.604)
1.596
(2.345)
64.146**
0.947††
(0.036)
0.833*
0.390†
(0.221)
1.007 0.774† 1.116†† 1.029 1.129 0.7101***
(0.010) (0.105) (0.075) (0.061) (0.100)
43.5 –94.7523 54 54
9.821*** — — 0.063**
B2
(6.351) — — (0.057)
— (7.137) (0.0001) (0.058)
61.092**
(97.131)
(0.070)
0.834*
(0.069)
5.066***
(2.448)
5.052***
(2.427)
0.952* 0.645 1.061 1.132** 1.555* 0.8236*
(0.021) (0.230) (0.305) (0.051) (0.323)
0.952* 0.642 1.059 1.130** 1.556* 0.8217*
(0.021) (0.229) (0.303) (0.051) (0.320)
58.76 –130.836 74 74
(101.629)
— 11.193*** 0.0001*** 0.065**
603.75 –130.574 74 74
*** ≤ .001, ** ≤ .01 * ≤ .05 †≤ .1 ††≤ .15
tion: Total population and repressive regimes reduce the likelihood of ending war by about two-thirds and one-third, respectively, while democracy increases the likelihood of ending war by 11 percent.25 However, given the highly aggregated nature of these regime type variables as noted above, their effects are probably not as straightforward as the variable coefficients would suggest. Finally, the p parameter for this model is statistically significant (p =.000) and less than 1, supporting my hypothesis that war is negative duration dependent. In Model B1, I applied the Model A3 specification to my belligerent-level dataset of all interstate wars since World War II (see Table 9.6). Because this dataset is at the belligerent level, my N increases to 74 belligerents.26 In Model B1, the ability to use more data makes a tremendous difference for the statistical significance of realpolitik and control variables, but the regime type variables now lack significance. As Bayesian models would suggest, the balance of capabilities between the two sides has the most dramatic effect for shortening the war: an unequal balance of capabilities is 64 times more likely to cause the war to end (p=.009). However, reaffirming the importance of the alternative causal pathway to war termination, the second largest shortening effect is domestic coalition shifts, which are 9.8 times more likely to cause the war to end (p=.000). Other realpolitik and control variables that have a statistically significant shortening effect include the total
d omest ic coalit ion shifts
population involved in the war, prior disputes between belligerents and the number of states involved in the war. In contrast, terrain and military personnel have a statistically significant lengthening effect on war—the more closed the terrain and the larger the military forces, the longer the war. Both regime type variables for democracy and autocracy are statistically insignificant. Finally, as with Model A3, the p parameter for this model is less than 1 (p=.018), further supporting the negative duration dependence hypothesis. To examine whether the inclusion of the coalition shift variable added significant explanatory power, I performed a log-likelihood ratio test against this model without coalition shifts. The test confirms this is indeed the case: including coalition shifts significantly improves the fit with a χ² of 5.47 (p =.0194). This hazard model adds to the earlier analysis in two important ways. First, it demonstrates that coalition shifts greatly enhance the probability of a war ending, suggesting that the alternative causal pathway for overcoming lags and stickiness in the Bayesian updating process has merit. Second, this hazard analysis bolsters the Archigos descriptive statistics finding that the longer the war, the closer the shift occurs to the war’s end, linking coalition shifts and war termination temporally. In Model B2, I tested my hypothesis that shifts in primary belligerents have a greater war-terminating effect than shifts in other belligerents, and I found this to be the case (see Table 9.6). Primary shifts have a large effect in hastening wars’ end: wars are 11.2 times more likely to end (p=.000). Interestingly, secondary shifts have a massive effect in the opposite direction, towards prolonging the war, which may indicate secondary belligerents become entrapped by their external allies. Expressed another way, secondary shifts are 10,000 times less likely to be associated with ending the war (p=.000). Balance of capabilities continues to have a very large war-shortening effect—now 61 times more likely to cause the war to end (p=.01)—confirming that the information revealed on an unequal battlefield helps decision-makers update their expectations about the war more quickly. Among other variables, total population, prior disputes and the number of states are again more likely to cause the war to end, while total military personnel and terrain again have war-lengthening effects. Finally, the p parameter remains less than 1 (p =.017). As with Model B1, to examine the explanatory power of the coalition shift variables, I performed a log-likelihood ratio test. This test confirms that including primary and secondary coalition shifts significantly improves the fit with a χ² of 5.99 (p=.0500). Some may argue that the return of duration dependence within the model is a sign of model under-specification as a result of dropping out the strategy and some realpolitik variables. I readily acknowledge there are very important vari-
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test ing and extending the argument
ables missing from this model, such as the political capital invested in the war policies by the governing coalition and the level of information filtering in from the battlefield. Fortunately, Weibull hazard models assign a role for time that incorporates these other variables, allowing us to analyze and make predictions despite the lack of perfect data. However, future research would undoubtedly benefit from including these and other control variables. If I could control for stickiness completely—for example, by including variables that fully capture the three obstacles to peace—we would expect the negative duration dependence to fall out (Bennett 1999: 262). However, because I cannot, the negative duration dependence provides strong evidence for the causal weight of coalition shifts in ending sticky wars.27 Wars will be sticky because of preference, information and entrapment obstacles, and as a result, belligerents will often need a coalition shift to become unstuck. In sum, fitting the model to the entire sample of interstate wars in the post– World War II era, I discover that domestic coalition shifts provide significant leverage for explaining war termination. As Bayesian models would predict, an unequal balance of capabilities between opposing sides has a major shortening effect on wars. However, the large, statistically significant effect for domestic coalition shifts suggests they can help states overcome the lags and stickiness that prevent efficient Bayesian updating when battlefield information is more ambiguous. This suggests that my theory, which includes and expands on the Bayesian model, adds immensely to our understanding of war duration and termination. Other realpolitik variables continue to have explanatory effects in the predicted direction, but the magnitude of these effects is smaller than the balance of capabilities and domestic coalition shifts. In terms of regime type, once the more granular effects of coalition shifts are included, regime type variables appear to have no explanatory power at the belligerent level. Thus, somewhat surprisingly, the analysis does not seem to indicate much of a democratic selection effect. Finally, contrary to Bennett and Stam’s findings, but in line with Slantchev’s, both belligerent- and war-level models provide strong statistical support that war has negative duration dependence. These hazard analyses provide significant support for my theory’s hypotheses. The greater the power imbalance between the two sides, the quicker the war (H realpolitik). Because of preference, information and entrapment obstacles to peace, the longer the war has already lasted, the harder it is to end (H negative duration dependence) and the more likely a domestic coalition shift is needed to end it (H shift). Moreover, domestic coalition shifts in primary belligerents have a greater effect towards hastening the end of the war than shifts in other belligerents (H primary shift). Finally, regime type has less explanatory power when coalition shifts are included in war duration models (H regime type).
d omest ic coalit ion shifts
Robustness Check: Qualitative Analysis at the War Level Treating each belligerent as an independent observation means that my model assumes each state’s behavior is independent. In reality, this is not true: war is a strategic interaction. To further compensate for this, I also examined the hypotheses qualitatively using each of the 27 wars after World War II as the unit of analysis (see Table 9.7). Table 9.7 examines each war in two ways. First, it describes when during the war domestic coalition shifts occurred. In two-thirds of post–WWII wars, at least one belligerent experienced a domestic coalition shift in the war’s second half, and in 52 percent of wars, at least one belligerent experienced a coalition shift in the last third. More relevant for my analysis—because it temporally links the coalition shifts more closely to war termination—in 12 wars (44 percent), at least one belligerent experienced a shift in the last 15 percent of the war, and in 8 wars table 9.7 War-Level Analysis of Domestic Coalition Shifts since World War II Shift Occurs in the Final Portion of the War War
50%
33%
15%
10%
5%
1%
Qualitative Check
First Kashmir Palestine Korea Russo-Hungarian Sino-India Vietnam Sinai Kashmir Six-Day Attrition Bangladesh Yom Kippur Cyprus Viet-Cambodia Ethiopia-Somalia (Ogaden) Uganda-Tanzania Sino-Vietnam I Iran-Iraq Falklands Lebanon Sino-Vietnam II Gulf War I Karabakh Indo-Pakistan Eritrea-Ethiopia Afghanistan Gulf War II
yes yes yes yes yes yes no no yes yes yes no no no
yes yes yes no no yes no no yes yes yes no no no
no yes yes no no yes no no yes yes no no no no
no yes no no no yes no no yes yes no no no no
no yes no no no yes no no yes yes no no no no
no no no no no yes no no yes yes no no no no
yes no yes no yes no no no no yes yes no yes no
yes yes no yes yes yes yes yes yes no yes no no
yes yes no yes yes yes no no yes no yes no no
yes yes no yes yes yes no no yes no yes no no
yes yes no yes yes no no no yes no yes no no
yes no no no yes no no no yes no yes no no
no no no no no no no no yes no yes no no
no no no yes yes no yes no yes no yes no no
66.67%
51.85%
44.44%
37.04%
29.63%
18.52%
40.74%
Total
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test ing and extending the argument
(30 percent), at least one belligerent experienced a coalition shift in the last 5 percent of the war.28 That 30 percent of wars experienced a coalition shift in the last 5 percent of the war suggests a strong temporal relationship in some wars between domestic coalition shifts and war termination—a finding that echoes the hazard analysis above. Most stunning, almost 19 percent of wars included at least one belligerent that experienced a coalition shift in the last one percent of the war. These wars include Vietnam (1965–75), Six-Day (1967), Attrition (1969–70), Karabakh (1991–94) and Eritrea-Ethiopia (1998–2000). Second, Table 9.7 summarizes a qualitative analysis of each war, coded by tracing the war termination process historically in each case. I examined whether battlefield conditions provided clear information for Bayesian updating or whether domestic coalition shifts were necessary to help belligerents overcome stickiness in the updating process. In this column, I code “yes” those wars where a coalition shift was important in helping a state to change its expectations towards creating an overlapping bargaining space with its adversary and end the war.29 In contrast, wars coded “no” include wars where the information revealed by the war allowed the Bayesian updating process to occur on its own. To give the Bayesian model the benefit of the doubt, this revealed information need not come only from actual fighting on the battlefield. For example, the Lebanon War (1982) is a great example of a war that ended because of Bayesian updating, but not because of tactical battlefield conditions. Here, “battlefield information” is more broadly construed. Massacres in the Palestinian neighborhoods of Sabra and Shatila, conducted by Phalangist troops aligned with Israel, led to international pressure on Israel and an Israeli domestic constituency reevaluation—both strong rebukes of the Israeli governing coalition’s war policy. This constituency pressure, in turn, led the Israeli governing coalition to change its expectations about the war and thus change its war policy towards ending it. Thus, the war termination process follows the Bayesian model, although Israel did not experience a defeat on the battlefield. Furthermore, in an effort to code most conservatively and not inflate the effect of domestic coalition shifts on war termination, “no” wars include some cases where a belligerent experienced a coalition shift, but that shift was not the deciding factor for helping the belligerent change its expectations. Thus, Lebanon is coded “no” in this qualitative analysis despite the Lebanese governing coalition experiencing multiple coalition shifts during the war. Other examples coded “no” despite coalition shifts include Egypt (Six Day War), Somalia (Ogaden War), Uganda (Uganda-Tanzanian War) and South Vietnam (Vietnam War). While these states did experience coalition shifts in close proximity to the war’s end, the determining factor in war termination was their clear defeat on the battle-
d omest ic coalit ion shifts
field, which made it relatively easy for them to update their expectations about the war. In each of these cases, the coalition shifts occurred after the governing coalition had decided it was ready to end the war. While these coalition shifts did not cause the change in expectations, they certainly changed the governing coalition’s ability to act on those expectations. They were procedural moves to help the governing coalition enact the decision to end the war. In other words, my coding here is extremely conservative, to make as hard a test as possible for the coalition shift theory. Nonetheless, even with this conservative coding to discount domestic coalition shifts in wars that probably ended because of the Bayesian updating process, almost 41 percent of wars ended because of the alternative causal pathway put forth by the domestic coalition model. In contrast, only 22 percent of these wars ended because of one side seeking an absolute victory to overcome commitment problems, as Reiter’s (2009) theory would predict.30 This war-level qualitative check on the hazard analyses reaffirms that not all wars end by the Bayesian causal pathway that has dominated the bargaining model of war. In sum, post– World War II wars—when examined qualitatively at the war level to account for strategic interaction between the opposing sides—support the theory presented here. Overall, when considered with the belligerent- and war-level hazard analyses using the Archigos and post–World War II datasets, these results demonstrate strongly that the patterns predicted by the domestic coalition shift theory hold over many cases and greatly improve our understanding of war duration and war termination.
Results of Domestic Coalition Shift Directions Having demonstrated the merit of the coalition shift argument through an empirical test of wars since 1862, in this section I examine what effect, if any, the direction of the coalition shift has on the theory. Chapter 8 presented two mechanisms by which domestic coalition shifts can affect the creation of an overlapping bargaining space between belligerents. The first mechanism—captured in the main hypotheses about coalition shift directions—occurs when the new governing coalition changes its own bargaining position. The second mechanism—captured in the alternative hypotheses—occurs when the coalition shift provides information for the opposing side to update its expectations and thus change its bargaining position. Given the ambiguities inherent in international signaling, we would expect the second mechanism’s effect to be less powerful than the first’s. The analysis in this section will extend Chapter 8’s findings. In this hazard analysis, I replaced the Shift variable with three dummies that
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test ing and extending the argument table 9.8 Hazard Analysis of Coalition Shift Directions B3
Dove Neutral Hawk Prime dove Prime neutral Prime hawk Secondary dove Secondary neutral Secondary hawk Terrain Balance of Capabilities Military Personnel Total Population Population Ratio Autocracy Democracy Prior Disputes States in War P Chi Stat Log Likelihood Subjects Failures
B4
19.25*** 0.000024*** 0.000021*** — — — — — — 0.06**
(12.48) (7.95e–6) (7.54e–6) — — — — — — (0.06)
— — — 20.29*** 6.88e–6*** 4.94e–6*** 7.06e–6*** 6.42e–6*** 9.58e–6*** 0.06**
59.75** 0.84* 4.96*** 0.95* 0.65 1.08 1.12** 1.53* 0.826*
(94.47) (0.07) (2.42) (0.02) (0.23) (0.31) (0.05) (0.33) (0.070)
57.97* 0.84* 4.94*** 0.95* 0.65 1.08 1.12* 1.53* 0.825*
1881.24*** –129.53 74 74
— — — (13.14) (2.69e–6) (2.03e–6) (6.91e–6) (3.52e–6) (7.65e–6) (0.06) (92.09) (0.07) (2.41) (0.02) (0.23) (0.31) (0.05) (0.33) (0.070)
2668.88*** –129.43 74 74
*** <.001, ** <.01 * <.05 †<.1 ††<.15
capture the coalition shift directions (Hawk, Dove and Neutral), leaving the category of no coalition shifts out of the specification as the baseline. Model B3 repeats the belligerent-level analysis from Model B1 with coalition shift directions (see Table 9.8). As we would expect, dovish shifts are 19.3 times more likely to cause the war to end. In contrast, hawkish and neutral shifts are extremely likely to cause the war to continue, with hawkish shifts having a greater prolonging effect. Expressed another way, neutral shifts are 41,667 times less likely—while hawkish shifts are 47,619 times less likely—to be associated with the war ending. All three shift direction variables are extremely statistically significant (p =.000). In terms of realpolitik variables, the balance of capabilities between the sides and the total population of the belligerents at war are both more likely to cause the war to end—59.8 and 5 times, respectively. The number of states involved in the war also has a marginal effect in causing war to end (1.5 times). In contrast, terrain and military personnel have a prolonging effect—16.7 and 1.19 times less likely to be associated with ending the war, respectively. As with the previous belligerent-level analyses, regime type variables are not statistically significant.
d omest ic coalit ion shifts
Finally, the p parameter is less than 1, once again providing support for negative duration dependence. Chapter 8 suggested that one way to tease out the relative effect of the two mechanisms by which domestic coalition shifts can affect the bargaining space would be to differentiate between coalition shifts in primary and secondary belligerents. Given the importance that primary belligerents have in their side’s war policy decisions, we can imagine primary belligerents’ coalition shifts would be more likely to work through the first mechanism—when the new governing coalition changes its own bargaining position. In contrast, secondary belligerents may not have as much influence in changing their side’s war policy. Thus, coalition shifts in secondary belligerents may have more effect through the second (signaling) mechanism—by providing information to the opposing side’s decision-makers to update their expectations and change their bargaining position. Model B4 repeats Model B2, substituting dummy variables for hawkish, dovish or neutral coalition shifts among primary and secondary belligerents in the wars (see Table 9.8). In this specification, all six shift direction variables for both primary and secondary belligerents remain extremely statistically significant (p=.000). As the theory would predict, a dovish shift among primary belligerents has a larger war-terminating effect than dovish shifts in general. Here, dovish primary shifts are 20.3 times more likely to cause the war to end (compared to 19.3 in Model B3). In contrast, all other shifts in all directions have a dramatic lengthening effect—even dovish shifts among secondary belligerents. Not surprisingly, primary hawkish shifts have the greatest prolonging effect: 202,429 times less likely to cause the war to end. This is followed by secondary neutral (155,763 times less likely), primary neutral (145,349 times), secondary dove (141,643 times) and secondary hawk shifts (104,384 times). The other control variables’ effects remain almost identical to those in Model B3. Once again, the p parameter is less than 1 (p=.04), confirming the finding that war is negatively duration dependent. As with previous models, to examine the explanatory power of the coalition shift variables, I performed a log-likelihood ratio test against these models without coalition shifts. These tests confirm that including coalition shifts significantly improves the fit. Model B3 has a χ² of 4.28 (p=0.0386); Model B4 has a χ² of 4.35 (p=0.0371). How do all of these findings stack up? For clarity, I summarize the findings from Models B3 and B4 together, examining them by each shift direction in turn. First, not surprisingly, dovish shifts in general are more likely to cause a war to end (H dove). This finding from Model B3 is not as tautological as it might seem, because shift directions are coded based on the new coalition’s ex ante intentions
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rather than the policies it enacts once in power (see Chapters 2 and 8). Dovish shifts should help produce the bargaining space necessary to conclude the war through the first mechanism—with the new governing coalition changing its own bargaining position towards peace. Obviously, whether an overlapping bargaining space is created depends upon whether the dovish shift produces a change compatible with the opponent’s expectations. Thus, if belligerent A experiences a dovish shift and lowers its minimal bargaining position, but that remains outside the range of belligerent B’s minimal position, the war may continue. Some might argue that a dovish coalition shift only occurs when the war is going poorly. Thus, the new dovish coalition is forced by war performance to lower its expectations rather than actively choosing to lower expectations and settle the war. However, my results about the non-tautological war-terminating effect of dovish coalition shifts are corroborated by Croco’s (2008: 75–76) test for the epiphenomenality of leader changes and war outcomes. Croco finds little evidence of such an epiphenomenal relationship in interstate wars from 1816 to 1991. Instead, she finds new, non-culpable leaders are not related, in any statistically significant way, to poor battlefield performance or to predecessors having been removed from power because of the war. While Croco’s measure for recent battlefield performance may be too precise and thus miss out on cumulative effects over the war’s duration, her finding buttresses my argument that dovish coalition shifts have an independent war-terminating effect that cannot be explained solely by war performance. When we differentiate between primary and secondary belligerents that experience a dovish shift (in Model B4), dovish primary shifts show the effect of the first mechanism. Dovish primary shifts have a larger war-shortening effect—20.3 times more likely to cause a war to end. In contrast, dovish secondary shifts have a war-prolonging effect, as they can lead the other side to push harder for more concessions. Expressed another way, dovish secondary shifts are 141,643 times less likely to be associated with the war ending. This finding accords with the signaling effect of the second mechanism and thus provides support for the alternative dovish hypothesis (H dove*). For example, in the Karabakh War, the independent province of NagornoKarabakh was a secondary belligerent fighting as a junior partner with Armenia. In June 1993, Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrossian traveled to the province to pressure its leaders to accept the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe’s peace plan that Armenia had recently endorsed. His visit prompted a fierce debate in the Karabakh Parliament. Although the hawkish speaker of the parliament, Georgy Petrosian, wanted to fight on, the majority of the parliamentary members wanted to accept the plan. Thus, during the debate they pushed
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Petrosian to resign; the deputy speaker, Karen Baburian, replaced him to allow the parliament to accept the peace proposal (de Waal 2003: 213–15; BBC World Broadcasts June 18, 1993; ITAR-TASS June 15, 1993). The signal inherent in this dovish secondary shift contributed to Azeri leaders on the opposing side deciding to escalate and push for further concessions—further prolonging the war for 11 months.31 Second, hawkish shifts in general are more likely to prolong the war (H hawk). In Model B3, we again see the first mechanism at play, as the new coalition after a hawkish shift takes actions that move it away from an overlapping bargaining space. Put another way, hawkish shifts are 47,619 times less likely to be associated with war’s ending. Extending Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2004) argument about democracies, there may be a “ramping up” effect from hawkish shifts for all regime types. In these situations, once leaders realize their initial strategies did not produce a victory, leaders shift additional resources towards winning. These hawkish shifts may take time to produce their effect and thus we would expect wars to be lengthened—assuming belligerents on the other side do not include this change in their decision calculus and decide to give up. Therefore, this finding also corroborates and extends Colaresi’s (2004, 2005) analysis about the effect of hawkish leadership changes in prolonging enduring interstate rivalries. When we differentiate between primary and secondary belligerents that experience a hawkish shift (in Model B4), both hawkish shifts continue to follow the logic of the first mechanism. However, primary hawkish shifts have almost twice the war-prolonging effect as secondary hawkish shifts. Put differently, primary hawkish shifts are 202,429 times less likely to be associated with the war’s end— in contrast to 104,384 times with secondary hawkish shifts. This finding makes sense, given the relative weight of primary belligerents in their side’s decisions about prosecuting and ending the war. We would expect primary hawkish shifts to have a greater war-prolonging effect. Yet even hawkish secondary belligerents can extend the war, if only temporarily, as we saw with South Korean President Syngman Rhee’s behavior in Chapters 3 and 8. Finally, the neutral category is admittedly somewhat problematic for my theory. Remember that neutral shifts bring new leaders to power without an intention of changing their predecessors’ war policy, but—by virtue of being new leaders—perhaps are capable of overcoming their predecessors’ entrapment and information obstacles. Thus, I had expected neutral shifts to be associated with ending war, but not as quickly as dovish shifts. The data show this is not the case: neutral shifts are strongly associated with prolonging the war. Primary neutral shifts are 145,349 times and secondary neutral shifts are 155,763 times less likely to be associated with the war’s ending.
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In trying to understand this empirical effect, I surmise that there may be three processes at work. First, my coding of neutral shifts indicates that the new domestic coalition has not substantially changed the underlying war decision-making mechanisms. Relatedly, many of the neutral shifts coded in the dataset involve changes in minor or peripheral members of the leadership cadre. This extends Croco’s (2008: 9) idea that a new leader can inherit his predecessor’s culpability for the war if the new leader is from the same party, junta, cabinet or family of the leader who started the war. Therefore, the new coalition may still be susceptible to information and entrapment obstacles, such as not wanting to bear the political brunt of taking over a “successful” war and leading the country to failure. Second, in a similar process, neutral shifts are frequently exogenous to the war effort, but the new coalition may not be able to avoid the previous coalition’s obstacles to peace. For example, leaders can leave for institutional reasons wholly separate from the war, such as serving the maximum number of terms in office or fulfilling a term of service as an interim (“acting”) leader. Alternatively, neutral coalition shifts can result from consequences in other policy areas, such as poor economic performance or a political scandal (as demonstrated by many of the South Korean coalition shifts during the Korean War). Neutral shifts can also arise independently from the war for very random reasons, such as death, sickness, assassination or retirement. Therefore, although a coalition shift occurs, the new coalition—which often includes a predetermined successor or members of the same political party—does not intend to change its predecessors’ war policy. Thus, it may remain trapped by the previous coalition’s obstacles to peace. Finally, as with dovish secondary shifts, the second (signaling) mechanism may be at work. If this is true, it would contradict H neutral*, i.e. that neutral shifts should not have any effect on war duration through the signaling mechanism. I had expected that neutral shifts would not be likely to provide information to leaders on the opposing side, because they occur for reasons exogenous to the war. Indeed, none of the neutral shifts during the Korean War led to reactions on the opposing side. However, the fact that neutral shifts are associated with prolonging the war leaves open the possibility that the signaling mechanism may be at work. For example, neutral shifts may indicate to the other side that a state is suffering from domestic political instability, which could cause the opponent to hold out for greater concessions. Further research with detailed case studies would help us better evaluate the importance of the signaling mechanism in neutral coalition shifts’ association with prolonging war. As this analysis shows, adding in the direction of domestic governing coalition shifts allows us to further contextualize the strategic interaction between two sides, as well as the process by which coalition shifts lead to war termina-
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tion. Certainly, correlation is not causation. Nonetheless, the data suggest that both mechanisms by which domestic coalition shifts can theoretically affect the creation of an overlapping bargaining space appear to have empirical support. Dovish primary shifts and all hawkish shifts work through the first mechanism, where the new coalition changes its own bargaining position. In contrast, dovish secondary shifts appear to work through the second mechanism, where the coalition shift provides information to the opposing side and leads it to change its bargaining position. Finally, although all neutral shifts are clearly associated with prolonging the war, it is unclear which mechanism (or something else entirely) is causing neutral shifts’ war-prolonging effect. Given their lengthening effect, neutral shifts may provide evidence of the second signaling mechanism, but the evidence here is inconclusive. Nonetheless, it is important to remember that domestic coalition shifts—regardless of direction—have a strong aggregate effect of shortening wars. The data provide especially strong support for primary belligerents needing a dovish coalition shift to create an overlapping bargaining space between the two sides. The magnitude of this variable’s coefficient accords with the hypothesis that shifts in these states will have a greater effect towards hastening the war’s end than shifts in other belligerents (H primary shift).
Conclusion The current quantitative literature has omitted a crucial variable for understanding the domestic politics of war duration and war termination: domestic governing coalition shifts. This chapter has incorporated that variable and tested an alternative causal pathway to war termination by building on Bayesian models. This alternative pathway appears to account for more than a third of war endings since 1862 and 41 percent since World War II. While Bayesian models suggest a lag in updating can delay war termination, they do not explain how states get beyond this lag—why some states get bogged down in updating their expectations while others can update very quickly. By adding domestic coalition shifts to realpolitik variables, I flesh out domestic political aspects of the bargaining model of war and explain how states can overcome stickiness and lags to Bayesian updating. My model also extends the analysis to include the ambiguous outcomes of stalemated wars, which are an increasingly prevalent feature of the post–WWII world. This chapter tested the domestic coalition shift theory with descriptive statistics and hazard analysis, at the war level for interstate wars from 1862 to 1990 and at the belligerent level for interstate wars since World War II. The empirical
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analysis provides significant support for my hypotheses. The greater the power imbalance between the two sides, the quicker the war (H realpolitik). Because of preference, information and entrapment obstacles, the longer the war has already lasted, the harder it is to end (H negative duration dependence), and the more likely a domestic coalition shift is needed to end it (H shift). Domestic coalition shifts are most likely among “losing” and “stalemated” states, as these are the states that are most often stuck by the three obstacles and are most in need of updating their expectations (H loser). Moreover, domestic coalition shifts in primary belligerents have a greater effect towards hastening the end of the war than shifts in other belligerents (H primary shift). Finally, regime type has less explanatory power when coalition shifts are included in war duration models (H regime type). This chapter also builds on the previous chapter’s discussion of how domestic coalition shifts affect the strategic interaction between belligerents. As Chapter 8 explained, there are two mechanisms by which domestic coalition shifts can affect the creation of an overlapping bargaining space. The first mechanism occurs when the new governing coalition changes its own bargaining position, while the second mechanism occurs when the coalition shift provides information for the opposing side to update its expectations about the war and thus change its bargaining position. This chapter has allowed me to extend Chapter 8’s findings and weigh the relative importance of these two mechanisms’ effects. In specifications that do not differentiate between primary and secondary belligerents, the data provide evidence of the first mechanism and support most of the hypotheses about shift directions: hawkish shifts generally occur early in the war and are associated with prolonging the war; dovish shifts occur late in the war and are strongly associated with bringing the war to an end. Contrary to my expectations, neutral shifts are also associated with prolonging the war. When we differentiate between primary and secondary belligerents, the evidence is more nuanced. Dovish primary shifts and all hawkish shifts work through the first mechanism. In contrast, dovish secondary shifts appear to work through the second mechanism. From this chapter’s analysis, neutral shifts’ relationship to the two mechanisms is indeterminate. Further research with detailed case studies would help us better evaluate why neutral coalition shifts are associated with prolonging war. In general, this chapter’s empirical findings suggest that the first mechanism is dominant, but they do not necessarily rule out the second (signaling) mechanism. This finding corroborates Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing’s study of crisis bargaining in 18 interstate crises from 1870 to 1970. While their research did not examine interstate wars, Snyder and Diesing found that decision-makers only oc-
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casionally tried to make assessments about the other side’s internal politics and generally did not change their international bargaining behavior as a result (1977: 516–17). Certainly, we can point to wars in which the signaling mechanism of domestic coalition shifts is important, as Chapter 8’s discussion about Eisenhower’s hawkish shift and this chapter’s discussion about the secondary dovish shift in the Karabakh War demonstrate. While statistical analysis helps to provide support for the generalizability of this theory, it is less well-suited for capturing the strategic interaction and signaling inherent in the second mechanism. Therefore, further qualitative research is needed to help us evaluate the importance of coalition shifts in causing the other side to update its expectations and change its bargaining position. Finally, in contrast to Bennett and Stam (1996), but similar to Vucinich and Teachman (1993), Slantchev (2004) and the literature about civil war termination, this chapter’s analysis implies that war has negative duration dependence. I have shown that wars do indeed become sticky and require a change in expectations to end. A major source of such change is a shift in the belligerents’ domestic governing coalitions. This empirical analysis, at the belligerent and war levels, shows that these shifts cause wars to end significantly sooner. Taken with the detailed process tracing of the causal mechanisms in the Korean War case studies, these results demonstrate strongly that the patterns predicted by the domestic coalition shift theory hold over a broad universe of cases and greatly improve our understanding of war duration and war termination.
10
War Termination in Theory and Practice
The transitions from war to peace are neither as inscrutable nor as senseless as they may at first seem. There are discernible patterns for the ways wars end, with identifiable obstacles and processes at work. While protracted wars may make no sense from a strategic perspective, they do from a domestic one. War is a two-level game, and thus understanding belligerents’ domestic politics is crucial for explaining what makes interstate wars continue and what finally makes them end. While bargaining models of war suggest that war ends when an overlapping bargaining space develops, my argument suggests how, when and why this space develops. My approach offers real insights about the timing of war termination, including the under-theorized category of protracted wars, which rationalist models have had little success in explaining. Its major theoretical contribution is its attention to domestic coalition shifts as an important mechanism for why states come to the bargaining table to end interstate war. Ending war requires settling with the enemy as well as at home. This book has argued there are three reasons why a war, once entrenched, is difficult to end. A preference obstacle occurs when leaders do not want to end the war. An information obstacle occurs when leaders do not know they should end the war. An entrapment obstacle occurs when leaders want to end the war but cannot. Because of these obstacles, leaders find it more difficult to shift war policies as quickly as rationalist approaches would suggest. This book has argued the longer the war continues, the harder it is to end it, because these domestic obstacles to peace become institutionalized over time. By focusing on these obstacles, this book has explained domestic-level impediments to the international bargains that end war.
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As a result, in long wars belligerents become stuck and require a change in expectations to produce a war-terminating bargaining space. A major source of such change is a shift in belligerents’ domestic governing coalitions. Policies that a state enacted to wage war effectively become sticky, and the state will often require a coalition shift to get them unstuck. A coalition shift allows different political actors—with different constituencies, political interests and assessments of the war—to take power. This, in turn, can lead to a shift in the war policy, from continuing it to ending it. A coalition shift helps to overcome the obstacles to peace and thus allows the war to end. The rest of the book was then devoted to testing these claims. In Chapter 3, mini-case studies of the Korean states allowed me to test the hypothesis that domestic coalition shifts in primary belligerents will have a greater effect on ending war than shifts in other belligerents. As Chapter 3 explained, although the Korean War was fought on their soil, North and South Korea must be coded as secondary belligerents, because they were powerless in their respective side’s war policy decisions. Not only were they materially powerless, as their forces were incapable of waging war without their larger patrons’ help, but the way that the United States, China and the Soviet Union perceived them as client states rendered them powerless, as well. While North Korea wanted to end the war much sooner and South Korea wanted to fight on much longer, both were overruled by their respective side’s more powerful primary belligerents. Thus, while both Korean states experienced domestic coalition shifts during the war, there was almost no relationship between those shifts and the international bargaining process. Indeed, because of their powerlessness in the international level game, both Kim Il-Sung and Syngman Rhee used shifts in their respective governing coalitions to consolidate their rule and sideline rivals—not to enhance the war’s prosecution or termination. The next four chapters examined the dynamics of the three obstacles to peace—and the role of domestic coalition shifts in lifting them—among the primary belligerents in the Korean War. Chapter 4 demonstrated how the preference and information obstacles interacted in Soviet decision-making to prolong the war. Chapter 4 argued that Stalin did not want to end the war, because he was not bearing the war’s costs directly, yet gaining plenty of benefits. Given this auspicious cost-benefit calculation, it was clearly his preference to delay the war’s end. Stalin consistently took steps—within his own coalition and in his interactions with the Chinese—to ensure that this preference prevailed. While the moderates opposed this war policy, they were relatively powerless to effect its change as long as Stalin remained in power. Stalin actively curtailed the moderates by excluding them from decision-making and defusing their influence, and they also “selfsuppressed” to some degree. Information processing pathologies exacerbated the
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preference obstacle. By jealously guarding information, Stalin kept those who might disagree with his preferences in the dark. Moreover, much of the information Soviet leaders received about the war was tailored to support Stalin’s known preferences, rather than to provide an accurate picture about the war. For these reasons, it was not until Stalin’s death that the moderates could finally enact their long-held but dormant preferences and end the war. The fact that they decisively moved to end the war within ten days of Stalin’s funeral speaks volumes to the war-ending consensus among Stalin’s successors, as well as to the fact that it was Stalin who kept the war going. The domestic coalition shift removed the stickiness of Stalin’s preferences and allowed the war to end. Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrated how the information and entrapment obstacles interacted in US decision-making to prolong the war. These chapters explored the Truman Administration’s “NSC-68 mindset,” a set of assumptions about the US-Soviet relationship within which it perceived the Korean War. Fearing Soviet aggression worldwide, the Truman Administration used the Korean War to embark on a massive Cold War rearmament effort and justify its globalist agenda to Congressional and public constituencies. Likewise, believing it needed to stand firm on principles in Korea, it adopted a policy of voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war (POWs). The threat inflation that resulted from selling mobilization stoked hawkish constituencies for an all-out victory in Korea; hence, any efforts to move towards a negotiated settlement increased calls of Truman being “soft on Communism.” Moreover, fearing any escalation would provoke global war, the Truman Administration believed it could neither abandon the POW policy nor escalate the war to bring the Communists to terms. The US case demonstrates how the dynamics of entrapment can lead decision-makers to become “too invested to quit” and thus process information to justify a policy despite evidence the policy is not successful. It was only with President Dwight Eisenhower’s inauguration in January 1953 that these obstacles were lifted and the United States could change course towards ending the war. While Eisenhower retained the same war aims, his governing coalition brought different actors—with different constituencies, worldviews and conceptualizations of the war—that left them freer to consider more strategic options. Notably, as a Republican, Eisenhower could more easily accept terms Truman could not, while placating the hawkish Republican right wing with other policy issues. Chapter 7 demonstrated the dynamics of China’s entrapment by an external ally. The role of allies in changing belligerents’ cost-benefit calculations has not received much attention in the war termination literature. In contrast, Chapter 7 traced how the Soviet Union constrained Chinese decisions about prosecuting and ending the war. While most of the Chinese governing coalition initially
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opposed the war, it ultimately reached a consensus to intervene because of perceived threats to its internal security. Nonetheless, the war was very costly, both in economic and human terms. As these costs became apparent, the Chinese governing coalition experienced a dovish shift in the summer of 1952, resulting in a policy shift towards wanting to end the war. That autumn, the new Chinese coalition tried to convince Stalin to support concessions about POW repatriation to achieve an armistice, but Stalin was unwilling. Paradoxically, in large part because of the war, China was now extremely dependent upon Soviet military and economic assistance both for fighting the war and developing its own industrial base. As a result, China was trapped: unable to pursue a real war-ending strategy until the Soviets gave it permission. It was not until after Stalin’s death that China was finally able to make the POW policy concessions it had been advocating since the previous summer. Building on the domestic-level analysis of the war’s primary belligerents, Chapter 8 started to explore the effect of domestic coalition shifts at the international level, with a plausibility probe of the strategic interaction of the domestic coalition shifts in the Korean War. This chapter outlined two mechanisms by which domestic coalition shifts can help create an overlapping bargaining space between belligerents. The first mechanism occurs when the new governing coalition changes its own bargaining position. The second occurs as a result of the strategic interaction—when the coalition shift provides information for the opposing side to update its expectations about the war and thus change its bargaining position. Given the ambiguities inherent in international signaling and the possibility of an information obstacle blocking information from the opposing side’s shift, we would expect the second mechanism’s effect to be less powerful than the first’s. However, Chapter 8 suggested that the second mechanism may have more causal weight when domestic coalition shifts in both directions (i.e. hawkish and dovish) interact on both sides of the war. On balance, the greatest explanatory power for the timing and terms of the Korean War armistice may be attributed to the Communist dovish shifts (first mechanism). However, the US hawkish shift did increase the effect of these dovish shifts by influencing Communist calculations about the war’s costs and benefits (second mechanism). The Communists were more able to learn from the information conveyed by the US hawkish shift—and change their bargaining position accordingly—because of their own dovish shifts. In addition, Eisenhower’s decision not to raise US war aims may have been a result of the peaceful signals after the Communist dovish shifts as well (second mechanism). Thus, the historical record from the Korean War supports the proposition that in the case of interacting hawkish and dovish shifts, the two mechanisms work in tandem
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to create an overlapping bargaining space. Additional theorizing and empirical study about the interaction of coalition shifts is certainly needed. Finally, Chapter 9 tested the domestic coalition shift theory in empirical analysis of all interstate wars since 1862 and found significant support for its hypotheses. This empirical analysis showed that coalition shifts cause wars to end significantly sooner. The longer a war has already lasted, the harder it is to end and the more likely a domestic coalition shift is needed to end it. Domestic coalition shifts are most likely among “losing” and “stalemated” states, as these states are most often stuck by the three obstacles and most in need of updating their expectations. Domestic coalition shifts in primary belligerents have a greater effect towards hastening the end of the war than shifts in secondary belligerents. Moreover, regime type has less explanatory power when coalition shifts are included in war duration models. Finally, this analysis demonstrated that war has negative duration dependence: because of the three obstacles to peace, the longer a war has already lasted, the harder it is to end. Wars do indeed become sticky and require a change in expectations to end. A major source of such change is a shift in belligerents’ domestic governing coalitions, as domestic coalition shifts appear to account for more than a third of war endings since 1862 and 41 percent since World War II. Chapter 9 also examined how domestic coalition shifts affect the creation of an overlapping bargaining space in terms of the two mechanisms explored in Chapter 8. When primary and secondary belligerents are grouped together, the data provide evidence of the first mechanism: hawkish shifts generally occur early in the war and are associated with prolonging it, while dovish shifts occur late in the war and are strongly associated with hastening its end. However, when we differentiate between primary and secondary belligerents, both mechanisms seem to have an effect—as they did in Chapter 8. Dovish primary shifts and all hawkish shifts appear to work through the first mechanism, where the new coalition changes its own bargaining position. In contrast, dovish secondary shifts appear to work through the second mechanism, when the coalition shift provides information to the opposing side and leads it to change its bargaining position. Contrary to my hypotheses, all neutral shifts are associated with prolonging the war, and their relationship to the two mechanisms is indeterminate. Further research with detailed case studies would help us better evaluate why neutral coalition shifts are associated with prolonging war.
Theoretical Implications Beyond offering a more complete and generalizable explanation for interstate war termination, the domestic coalition shift theory presented here has six theo-
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retical implications and avenues for future research. These six implications range from narrow observations about bargaining models of war to broad ramifications about any major policy change. coalit ion shifts and the t iming and circumstances of the bargaining ag reement
While bargaining models of war generally argue war ends when an overlapping bargaining space develops, the domestic coalition shift theory suggests how, when and why it develops. As such, it offers insights about the timing of war termination, especially in wars with sticky policies. Wars become sticky and require a change in expectations to end, and a major source of such change—in at least a third of interstate wars since 1862—is a shift in belligerents’ domestic governing coalitions. The domestic coalition shift theory also offers insights about what the bargaining agreement between the belligerents will look like. In general, bargaining models inadequately predict bargaining outcomes, because they predict that actors will “split the difference” in an overlapping bargaining space, rather than tailor their bids to the rational incentives of the game. In contrast, my model implies that settlement terms should be closer to those preferred by a belligerent who experienced no shift or a hawkish shift and further away from those preferred by a belligerent who experienced a dovish shift. We would most expect this proposition to hold in the case of shifts among primary belligerents, as they are the ones with the most influence in their side’s decisions about prosecuting and ending the war. This supposition about what the final bargain should look like bears out in the Korean War. Because the two primary Communist belligerents experienced dovish shifts and the primary UN belligerent a hawkish shift, we would expect the final agreement to more closely resemble the preferences of the UN side—which is exactly what happened. The POW policy single-handedly held up an armistice agreement for 15 months, and in the end, the Communists conceded on the principle of voluntary repatriation. As a result, the final terms were closer to the UN’s bargaining position. In some ways, the fact that belligerents who experience dovish shifts should receive less favorable terms of settlement seems obvious, because it accords with a realpolitik model of war termination. However, even if this result is not surprising, its value is in showing when, how and why these terms come to be. Moreover, this finding should hold regardless of regime type. As such, it contrasts with Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner’s (2004) argument that democracies should receive less favorable terms of settlement than other regimes, holding other factors constant. They argue that because democracies have greater cost-sensitiv-
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ity, democratic regimes should accept less favorable terms, whether or not they initiate or win the conflict. Filson and Werner do not empirically test this gametheoretic model. However, at least in the Korean War, what the final bargain looked like is better explained by the coalition shift theory than by democratic cost sensitivity. The Communists clearly accepted less favorable terms than the United States on the major issue of contention—POW repatriation. The Chinese autocracy and Soviet oligarchy made this crucial concession after their respective dovish coalition shifts and in reaction to the US hawkish shift on the other side. The strategic interaction between hawkish and dovish shifts, as occurred in the Korean War, is only one of many permutations of coalition shifts occurring on opposing sides. While this logic appears to work well in the Korean War, the mechanisms for the strategic interaction of coalition shifts on opposing sides need additional theoretical and empirical study. As Chapter 8 explained, we can also imagine wars with dovish shifts in belligerents on both sides, presumably leading the war to end more quickly, or wars with hawkish shifts in belligerents on both sides, leading the war to be prolonged. Further theorizing about the effect of various permutations with neutral shifts (i.e. neutral-hawkish, neutral-dovish and neutral-neutral) is especially needed, because Chapter 9 showed indeterminate effects for how neutral shifts affect the overlapping bargaining space—at least given the current state of theory. Finally, further empirical work to examine the effects of all permutations, taking into account primary and secondary shifts, would be an important extension of the analysis here. coalit ion shifts, reg ime t y pe and war ter minat ion
The second implication of my argument is that regime type might not be as important for explaining war termination and other foreign policy decisions as previously assumed. Certainly, recent scholarship has successfully used regime type to explain a variety of outcomes about conflict, from the “democratic peace” to dispute settlement and war termination.1 That research argues while democracies are very likely to win initially, they are less likely to continue fighting and more likely to accept a draw as the war continues. Democracies should be associated with shorter wars, either because they choose short wars they can win, or they settle to get out of longer ones they cannot—even at less favorable terms than other regimes could achieve (Biddle and Long 2004; Clark and Reed 2003; Bennett and Stam 1996, 1998; Filson and Werner 2004; Slantchev 2004; Fortna 2004b; Reiter and Stam 2002). Conversely, oligarchies should be associated with long wars because these leaders fear personal punishment if they lose the war and thus gamble on redemption through success (Goemans 2000a, b). While the inclusion of regime type is an improvement on bargaining models
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that exclude domestic politics entirely, this emphasis focuses attention on the differences between regime types and away from variation within regime types. For example, by treating all democrats as similarly cost-sensitive and all oligarchs as similarly anxious about political survival, these arguments ignore that different leaders within each regime type face different constraints, based on their governing coalition’s particular obstacles to peace. By ignoring variation among leaders within the same regime type, these arguments miss domestic constraints that can explain lags in Bayesian updating and ignore the effect of leadership changes in overcoming such lags. In contrast, this book has argued regime type has less explanatory power when domestic coalition shifts are included in models of war duration and termination. The domestic coalition shift theory has suggested that all states, regardless of regime type, are governed by domestic coalitions that answer to constituents. Who these constituencies are will vary by regime type: public opinion, the media and opposition groups may have more effect in democracies, while the military, party apparatus or some external ally may be the relevant audience in authoritarian regimes. However, all leaders will depend upon some constituency to stay in power. Because Goemans (2000a) is the most significant empirical study to date about regime type and war termination, I have explicitly compared my model to his throughout this book. In each case, the domestic coalition shift theory explained the outcome more completely. Goemans predicts democracies and dictatorships formulate their war aims as unitary rational actors and will seek to end a war when costs outweigh the benefits. In contrast, oligarchs fear personal punishment after defeat and thus will prolong a losing war, even after the costs outweigh the benefits (when viewed from the unitary actor perspective). In the Korean War, however, Goemans’ argument cannot explain the behavior of the democratic United States, whose information and entrapment obstacles prolonged the war well beyond the point at which costs outweighed the benefits. Nor can it explain the behavior of the Chinese dictatorship, which continued fighting for an additional year after Chinese leaders recognized that costs outweighed the benefits and tried to convince Stalin to support concessions on POW repatriation. While Goemans’ argument can explain Soviet behavior under Stalin’s dictatorship, it does not fully explain the reason why that outcome obtained. What made Stalin continue a losing war was not the regime type (and Stalin’s capacity to repress any potential punishment for defeat), but the fact that the majority of the war’s costs were not being borne by the Soviet Union. More broadly, the empirical analysis in Chapter 9 allowed me to demonstrate that models that have relied on regime type alone have been mis-specified by not
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including domestic coalition shifts. As I argued in Chapter 2, once coalition shifts are included in models of war duration and termination, regime type should have much less explanatory power. Why? Because coalition shifts are associated with democratic leaders’ responses to cost-sensitivity, but coalition shifts are not related to the “democratic selection effect”—that democracies choose to fight only those wars they expect will be short. Because the democracy variable usually captures both arguments, including coalition shifts would allow us to begin teasing these two mechanisms apart. Interestingly, in the quantitative analysis at the belligerent level, regime type variables were insignificant once the more granular effects of coalition shifts were included. In contrast, domestic coalition shifts were 9.8 times more likely to cause the war to end, and the effect was extremely statistically significant (p =.000). Further research to tease out the relationship between regime type and coalition shifts is certainly needed. As Chapter 2 argued, regime type may influence the baseline frequency of coalition shifts. Certainly, democracies are more likely to experience relatively frequent coalition shifts by nature of their institutional structure. However, democracy is not the underlying mechanism driving coalition shifts during war (Gaubatz 1991, 1999; Gowa 1998; Fordham 2002), and variation in democratic institutions leads to variation in the likelihood of democratic leaders being replaced (Colaresi 2004; Croco 2008). Overall, we should expect states in which coalition shifts are more difficult and less likely—generally, authoritarian regimes—to engage in more protracted wars. Finally, regime type may have explanatory leverage for war termination precisely through its implications for changing leaders. One of the reasons coalition shifts can help to end a war is that the new coalition brings a new conceptualization of it. In other words, coalition shifts allow new ideas to gain exposure within the governing coalition, and such exposure comes from the “revolving door” as elites circulate through the main institutions of power. Like Sarah Mendelson’s (1998) argument about Soviet disengagement from its war in Afghanistan, coalition shifts allow new ideas to make their way onto the political agenda and become policies. In fact, this may be the most important way that regime type can cause changes in war policy. Democracies are more likely to experience an uninhibited circulation of elites between the government, business and academia— which increases the likelihood that new ideas will gain exposure within the new governing coalition. In sum, the relationship between regime type and coalition shifts during war remains a fruitful area for future research. In the meantime, these initial findings suggest domestic coalition shifts—not regime type per se— explains war termination: regime type may be a correlative, not causative, factor in ending war.
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coalit ion shifts and civ il war ter minat ion
Another important extension of this work would be to apply the domestic coalition shift theory to civil wars. Although this book has not systematically examined civil wars, its findings coincide, at least in part, with some of the literature about civil war termination. For example, recent scholarship argues that unless there is a quick military victory for either side, civil wars are less likely to end with military victory and more likely to end in negotiated settlement (Mason and Fett 1996; Mason, Weingarten and Fett 1999). Moreover, unless there is a quick military victory, civil wars tend to become sticky, as “time is potentially the rebel’s friend” (DeRouen and Sobek 2004). Rebels do not seem to mind waiting, as they appear to benefit from prolonged war, and expected duration does not appear to be a factor in initiating civil war (Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom 2004). As David Mason and Patrick Fett argue in their empirical analysis of intrastate wars since World War II, “The longer a war lasts, the more likely both participants are to estimate that it will continue for an even longer time” (1996: 552). These findings certainly accord with mine that war has negative duration dependence—the longer the war has lasted, the harder it is to end it. By definition, civil wars are not between belligerent states but rather between multiple sub-state warring factions—one of which might be the government—each with its own leadership (“governing”) coalition. Nonetheless, in terms of making decisions to prosecute and end war, warring factions operate like a state’s domestic governing coalition. Just like a domestic governing coalition, factional leaders answer to some internal constituency or external patron. Just like a domestic governing coalition, factional leaders are less likely to end the war by changing their expectations than by rotating leadership or splintering the faction apart. Moreover, civil war termination is also a two-level game: factional leaders must answer to their constituencies and patrons while negotiating with other factions to end the war. Therefore, the domestic coalition shift theory, when adjusted for the differing level of coalition, should also apply to civil wars. Empirically, this certainly has been the case. A classic example is the ending of the Wars of the Roses and the installation of the Tudor Dynasty: Richard III died in the Battle of Bosworth Field and Henry VII united the warring factions to end the war. More recently, the leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), Jonas Zavimbi, was killed in an ambush by government troops in February 2002; less than six weeks after Zavimbi’s death, a cease-fire was signed, ending the 27-year-long Angolan civil war. Similarly, in Sierra Leone, both sides reached a settlement after Foday Sankoh, the leader of the rebel Revolutionary United Front, was arrested. Comparable patterns can be ob-
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served in extra-systemic wars, such as Charles de Gaulle and Mikhail Gorbachev coming to power in France and the Soviet Union and ending their wars in Algeria and Afghanistan, respectively. Given the domestic coalition shift theory’s applicability to civil wars, what are its implications for civil war termination? The greatest difference between civil and interstate war termination seems to be the magnitude of the obstacles to peace. All three obstacles explained in this book seem to be more severe in civil war, implying that civil wars are more likely to become sticky and thus last longer than interstate wars. Empirically, civil wars on average do last longer than interstate wars: as data in the Correlates of War dataset show, civil wars since World War II endured on average 33 months, while interstate wars in that time period endured on average 17 months. Moreover, the average duration of civil wars in progress has increased steadily from two years in 1947 to about 15 years in 1999 (Fearon and Laitin 2003: 78). In terms of the preference obstacle, the stakes in civil wars are often higher and more binary, which make the costs of military inaction higher than the probable costs of war. Not only do the parties typically continue to live within the same borders after the war concludes, but defeat could mean the loss of existence. Such high stakes generally make compromise difficult and increase the “shadow of the future” (Licklider 1993, 1995; DeRouen and Sobek 2004). Conflicts that have “sons of the soil” dynamics are especially likely to see the preference obstacle, because these minorities want to preserve their declared home areas, no matter the cost (Fearon 2004). Moreover, rebel groups often fight to capture private benefits, like rents from resource endowments (Ross 2004a, b; Humphreys 2005; Rohner 2006; Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner 2008). As long as there is at least one faction that does not want to end the war, this faction can act as a veto player and block settlement. Like the theory advanced here, Stephen Stedman (1997) argues groups will spoil agreements in civil wars when they stand to lose out from the peace agreement or when they have extreme preferences that do not allow for compromise. Similarly, David Cunningham (2006) argues the more diverse the preferences among veto players, the longer the civil war will last. In terms of the information obstacle, civil war belligerents are frequently fighting guerilla campaigns, which deliver less clear-cut outcomes and more ambiguous information than traditional battlefields. One reason for guerilla tactics is that rebel movements are “fully conscious of the limits which they must avoid overstepping on pain of loss of support from the population” (Freymond and Hentsch 1973: 27). In addition, civil wars often have multiple veto players, which not only make negotiations more complex but can create information asymmetries that lead to bargaining breakdown (Cunningham 2006). Such veto players
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include not only the factions fighting within the state, but third parties that may intervene to assist them. Because third-party intervention is so common in civil wars, “the situation is often quite fluid, with shifting alliances altering the balance of forces between the domestic combatants” (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000: 619; Regan 2000). For all of these reasons, civil wars are often characterized by ambiguous information and uncertainty. In addition to poor quality information, factional governing coalitions are likely to experience other information obstacle dynamics. For example, factional governing coalitions are often extremely cohesive (Cunningham 2006), increasing the likelihood they could succumb to organizational biases in decision-making, like “groupthink.” Beyond that cohesive inner circle, rebel groups often operate in small, autonomous cells that may not even be in contact, which certainly hinders information flow. Finally, factional leaders are just as likely to fall prey to cognitive, affective and learning biases as other leaders. Finally, in terms of the entrapment obstacle, factional leaders must mobilize support from their domestic constituencies and external patrons in order to wage the war effectively. This mobilization is probably more taxing in civil wars, because rebel groups must recruit a fighting force and arm it. Moreover, because civil wars occur at home, they place an increased burden on society. Thus, in addition to demonizing the enemy, rebel factions often mobilize support by stoking grievances within the population against the government’s policies. These grievances can include ethnic identity issues, economic shortcomings and lack of political representation (Collier and Hoeffler 1999, 2004; Olsson and Fors 2004; Ross 2004a, b; Walter 2004). Even if the rebels are ultimately fighting for private gains, they often frame the conflict to their supporters as trying to generate public goods, such as equal political rights or economic redistribution (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; de Soysa 2002; Hegre 2004). Myth-making and elite manipulation using “symbolic politics” is especially problematic in ethnic intrastate conflicts (Kaufman 2001). Grievances and myth-making can become particularly sticky in civil wars: having promised the population the moon in order to spin up factional support, leaders can create unrealistic expectations about what they will deliver. As a result, they become entrapped and cannot change their policies. Likewise, the government can take a public position of “no compromise” with the rebels, especially when the government has demonized the rebel group, from which it is very difficult to back down.2 The severity of these three obstacles would suggest that civil wars are likely to be more protracted than interstate wars—and empirically, this is indeed the case. However, there is one final reason that the domestic coalition shift theory would predict civil wars to last longer than interstate wars. The findings of this book
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suggest that coalition shifts are often necessary to dislodge the obstacles and help a coalition change its expectations towards settlement. Yet, as David Cunningham argues, “insurgent groups tend to maintain the same leadership even over long participation in conflicts” (2006: 884). Jonas Zavimbi, for example, led UNITA for more than 30 years until he was killed in 2002. The rebel group ceased the armed struggle within six weeks after his death. Similarly, Foday Sankoh led the rebel Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone for ten years before his arrest that catalyzed the end of the war. Thus, given the relative stability of rebel group governing coalitions, and the concomitant decrease in the likelihood of coalition shifts, it is not surprising that civil wars on average endure longer than interstate wars. In sum, coalition shift dynamics in civil war factions probably follow the same logic as those in interstate war belligerents. Moreover, coalition shift dynamics would appear to be a major explanation for why civil wars are more protracted than interstate wars. Nonetheless, a systematic comparison remains an issue for future research. coalit ion shifts and inter nat ional coalit ions
The likely applicability of the domestic coalition shift theory to rebel factions highlights that coalition shift dynamics may occur with any kind of coalition, not just one within a domestic government. As such, a fourth implication of this book’s findings would be their applicability to international coalitions or alliances. Obviously, an international coalition is often comprised of members (states) that are actually coalitions themselves (domestic governing coalitions). This implies that the three obstacles to policy change can become nested and even stickier. While each individual state is subject to its own obstacles domestically, the international coalition is subject to additional obstacles as well. Like other coalitions, international coalitions are subject to the three obstacles described in this book. For example, different states may have different preferences, created in part by their different worldviews, strategic cultures, or objectives. In terms of the information obstacle, information flow is likely to be impeded by information asymmetries, intelligence sharing difficulties and redundant chains of command (i.e. Bensahel 2007). Coordination with allies can also add layers of complexity, including different languages and the lack of interoperability in battlefield command and control systems. Moreover, different states in the international coalition are likely to use different dominant indicators, because they may have different strategic cultures or objectives. Finally, as the North Korean and Chinese cases in the Korean War illustrated, entrapment dynamics can also be at play between allies.
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What would constitute a “coalition shift” in an international coalition? Since a shift is defined as a consequential change in the coalition’s composition, there are two ways shifts could manifest in an international coalition. First, one of the states in the international coalition could experience its own domestic coalition shift. This could bring new perspectives to the international coalition’s policies and bargaining positions. This is exactly what occurred after the Chinese and Soviet domestic coalition shifts in the Korean War. Alternatively, the international coalition could gain or lose state members. For example, during World War II, when Italy surrendered in 1943 to the Allies, the Axis coalition shifted in a hawkish direction as the remaining members no longer felt constrained by Italy’s desire for settlement. Obviously, the nested obstacles in domestic governing and international coalitions impede the ability to create overlapping bargaining space. They also significantly complicate the analysis. Clearly delineating these nested effects is another area for future research. third-part y intervent ion and d omest ic coalit ion shifts
This book has examined the role of allies and patrons in entrapping a domestic governing coalition, but its analysis could be extended to examine the opposite dynamic as well. In general, the role of allies and external patrons in changing belligerents’ cost-benefit calculations has not received much attention in the war termination literature. This book has begun to rectify that deficit by theorizing about external ally entrapment and tracing its dynamics in the Chinese case study. As that case demonstrated, external entrapment by Stalin changed the Chinese governing coalition’s cost-benefit calculation to prolong the war. Theoretically, however, the opposite effect should also be possible: external parties should be able to change a governing coalition’s cost-benefit calculation to shorten the war. Empirically, this has been the case—both with third-party intervention,3 and the lack of expected third-party intervention. For example, what finally caused Pakistan to come to terms in its 1965 war with India was the loss of expected support from its external patron China. Pakistani leader Ayub Khan believed China would open a second front to tie Indian forces down, and he traveled to China to meet his external patrons. To his surprise, Chinese leaders only offered support dependent upon Pakistan’s willingness to fight a guerilla-style “people’s war.” Pakistani leaders were not prepared for this, and thus they accepted the UN’s cease-fire offer three days later (Stanley 2002: chapter 7). Similar dynamics surrounded Serbia’s surrender in the 1999 Kosovo conflict, after Russia pressed Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to accept NATO’s terms. The timing of his capitulation suggests the importance he placed on Rus-
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sian support: One week after Russia backed NATO’s position, Milosevic accepted terms NATO had long offered (Gilligan 1999; Byman and Waxman 2000). It is clear a third party’s presence can help solve many of the obstacles discussed in this book. Third parties can uncover areas of mutual interest between the sides or offer side payments to encourage a domestic governing coalition to change its preference for continuing the war (Smith 1995: 171). Moreover, third parties can provide sufficient credibility and power to ensure that neither side reneges on the agreement (Lim 2002; Smith and Stam 2004; Walter 2004), supplying some insurance against the uncertainties inherent in the information obstacle. Third parties also can provide transparency and impartial information to mitigate the effect of decision-making biases, or help belligerents to reframe their understanding when they cannot clearly see the truth. Finally, third parties can convey proposals between the belligerents, helping them to avoid losing face with domestic constituencies and the other side. Third parties can also encourage the participation of moderates in the domestic policymaking process (Modelski 1961: 7), which can bolster dovish constituencies and diminish the influence of the entrapping hawkish ones.4 Therefore, another fruitful area for future research would be to theorize more concretely about the effect of third parties in helping belligerents to overcome their obstacles to peace. Because third parties can help existing governing coalitions reframe their understanding of the war and change their cost-benefit calculation towards ending it, we could expect wars with third-party interveners to have fewer domestic coalition shifts. At least anecdotally, that is the case. For example, the 1965 Indo-Pakistani and the 1973 Yom Kippur Wars both had extensive third-party involvement, and none of the belligerents in these wars experienced coalition shifts. Certainly, there are other theoretical reasons why we would predict these belligerents would not experience coalition shifts. Both wars were short (less than six weeks) and thus sticky war policies did not get entrenched. In addition, Israel’s clear battlefield victory in the Yom Kippur War provided enough information about the belligerents’ relative strengths to help them develop consistent expectations and an overlapping bargaining space. Thus, the variables discussed in this book are probably sufficient to explain the lack of domestic coalition shifts. However, both conflicts involved superpower patrons that refused to support aggressive policies and provided assistance in crafting cease-fire proposals. Moreover, the United Nations played an active role in both conflicts with “shuttle diplomacy” (Smith 1995: chapter 9; Stein 1980, 1982; Stanley 2002: chapters 6–7). Thus, it seems reasonable that third parties played some role in helping these states expand the range of possible solutions and overcome potential obstacles to
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peace. Further research to examine the role of third-party intervention in helping states overcome obstacles to peace without domestic coalition shifts would be helpful. In addition, large-N quantitative analysis to extend this anecdotal correlation between third-party intervention and the lack of domestic coalition shifts would buttress our understanding as well. d omest ic coalit ion shifts and major p olicy change
Finally, the three obstacles developed in this book—as well as the coalition shifts that often appear necessary to dislodge them—could pertain to a much wider range of policies than simply prosecuting and ending war. While this book has applied the three obstacles to war policy decisions, the underlying logic is obviously much broader. War termination is only one specific manifestation of a more general phenomenon—major policy change. Indeed, the shift from continuing a war to ending it can be viewed as one of the most difficult policy changes imaginable, because enemies have important psychological, sociological and political functions (Aho 1994, 1998; Mor 1997; Finlay et al. 1967; Kriesberg 1973). Thus, this book’s conclusions about the requisites for major policy change are applicable to many issue areas. The example of the United States’ difficulty in adopting a policy of universal health coverage illustrates how the three obstacles impede major policy change.5 Let’s assume that universal health care is a good thing, in order to trace the three obstacles’ dynamics in a different issue area. In terms of the preference obstacle, the previous governing coalition (the George W. Bush Administration) did not want to adopt a universal health care system, because it did not want to dedicate the financial and bureaucratic resources to create a universal coverage system. It valued other policy priorities more highly. Moreover, those individuals who are bearing the greatest costs of the current system, the uninsured, were not adequately represented in the Bush governing coalition. While they were nominally constituents, they were not a central constituency and thus in practice lacked influence. In contrast, other constituencies—notably, Big Pharma and insurance companies—not only have a vested interest in the status quo but also were major supporters of the Bush coalition. Thus, the costs of the current policy were not directly being borne by the governing coalition or its constituents. It is no wonder they did not want to change the policy. In terms of the information obstacle, there is a societal cultural bias in the United States towards free-market solutions. This cultural bias may have caused the Bush governing coalition to interpret information about the status quo in such a way that minimized its true costs or inflated its benefits. In a related manner, the free-market framing led the Bush coalition to select metrics that served
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its interests: choice of care, access/convenience and efficacy. In contrast, opponents used a different metric mostly ignored by the Bush Administration: the number of uninsured Americans. As this number rose, opponents pointed to the failure of the current policy. Finally, important information about the current system’s costs and benefits was hidden, because such information was not being gathered and analyzed. For example, many employers can no longer afford to provide adequate coverage and thus push greater health care costs onto their employees, who need to use more of their income to pay for coverage gaps. Yet these costs—and the information they could convey about problems with the current policy—remained mostly hidden to the Bush coalition. Regardless of whether someone is collecting these statistics, it seems unlikely the coalition tracked and learned from them. For these reasons, the Bush coalition may not have known it should change the policy. Finally, in terms of the entrapment obstacle, the Bush coalition was entrapped in four ways. First, it was trapped by constituencies who are benefiting from the status quo, such as insurance companies. Second, it was trapped by constituencies who have an ideological preference for free-market solutions and “small government.” This libertarian element of society either consciously or unconsciously wants to avoid government intervention in social issues. If they were to admit the free market is not working with health care, it might call into question the free market’s capacity to deal effectively with other areas of social policy. Related to this libertarian constituency is entrapment from a laissez-faire worldview the coalition members themselves may have held. Finally, the Bush coalition “demonized the enemy”—the enemy, in this case, being universal health care. It stoked fear and created expectations about what a universal coverage system would look like: long lines in the clinic, extended waits to get access to medical specialists, the inability to choose your own doctor, lower standards of care. This demonization helped mobilize support for the status quo from parts of the public that might have been willing to support a universal system. In the process, even if the Bush coalition had decided it wanted to change the policy, stoking such fear made it harder to back down and change the policy. This example suggests elements of all three obstacles—preference, information and entrapment—are at work in impeding a major policy change to universal health coverage in the United States. This example also highlights how much the argument advanced in this book accords with the public policy and comparative politics literatures, which have long argued that crisis is the key to major policy change. Absent such crisis, policy will change incrementally (i.e. Etheredge 1985; Goldmann 1988). If universal health care does occur in the United States, it will be because there is growing elite consensus that health care in this
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country has reached crisis proportions. But it seems likely that universal coverage can only happen once those elites take over the reins of power. As this book has argued, coalition shifts can allow new ideas to make their way onto the political agenda and become policies. It often takes a circulation of elites into the governing coalition for new ideas to gain exposure and provide the impetus for major policy change. Now that the United States has experienced a coalition shift, its effect on universal health care policy remains to be seen. As of this writing in November 2008, President-elect Barack Obama has promised to sign a universal health care plan into law during his first term in office.6 Obama made health care an important plank of his campaign, setting forth a plan to cover all Americans. For those who already have insurance, Obama promised they would keep their current plan but pay lower premiums. For those who do not have insurance, Obama promised a new public plan, with benefits similar to those federal employees receive, or a choice of private plan options through the national health exchange.7 Given the United States’ recent economic crisis and other high-priority items on the policy agenda (i.e. Iraq and Afghanistan), it is unclear if and how these changes will be implemented. Nonetheless, the theory appears to apply to this issue: a domestic coalition shift has lifted the obstacles to major policy change. Boiled down, the domestic coalition shift theory presented in this book suggests policy change requires personnel change. In other words, people are locked into a particular worldview or particular policy and cannot shift. In many ways, it is reminiscent of Max Planck’s dictum: “A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents die and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it.”8 Similarly, the famed economist Paul Samuelson (2003: 2) has argued that economic theory advances “funeral by funeral,” implying that scholars do not change and adopt a new paradigm but rather they depart the scene.9 This implication is profoundly depressing. If major changes in policy or in worldview are only possible with new people, then the world is likely to be perpetually stuck with ineffective policies or false understandings of reality. Happily, however, this is not necessarily always true. While the evidence in this book suggests most protracted wars require a change in personnel to dislodge sticky policies and effect a policy change, there are certainly cases where the existing governing coalition did change its mind and end the war.10 There is no doubt the three obstacles explored in this book are significant impediments to peace and to major policy change, more generally. Yet we also know that some leaders are capable of learning, reframing the situation and changing their minds (i.e. Holsti 1982; Hermann 1990). What is it that makes it possible for these lead-
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ers to avoid getting stuck by sticky war policies? What makes it possible for them to overcome the preference, information and entrapment obstacles? The rest of this chapter will explore policy recommendations to help an existing governing coalition overcome the obstacles to peace. As Samuelson puts it, “be wrong, but don’t stay wrong” (quoted in Gottesman et al. 2005: 102).
Policy Implications This book’s theoretical insights about the domestic-level impediments to peace have practical implications for policymakers. Because such difficulties plague all leaders, regardless of their regime type, understanding the obstacles to peace is essential for all statesmen. The domestic coalition shift theory can help policymakers better analyze their own coalitional dynamics, while watching for indicators the other side is ready to settle. Thus, the theory should not only assist policymakers in ending wars in a timelier manner, but also help constituents to understand the role coalition shifts can play in changing policy. Therefore, this chapter closes with some general lessons for leaders who want to avoid being caught by sticky policies. Given this book’s focus, these lessons are tailored to war termination, but they are applicable for any leader facing impediments to a major policy change—as the previous section explained. Moreover, these recommendations are customized for existing governing coalitions, because new coalitions are likely to face fewer impediments to peace. New coalitions typically experience a “window of opportunity” after taking power during which they are not associated with the existing war policy and have more leeway in making policy changes, such as ending the war. Clearly, there are substantial deterrents for leaders not to follow this advice. After all, this book has detailed many psychological, political and structural incentives to prolong conflict. That such war-prolonging incentives exist does not mean the following policy recommendations are wrong or naïve, but simply are very difficult to implement. These recommendations are grouped by the three obstacles to peace, with final categories pertaining to coalitional dynamics and the strategic interaction process. overcoming the preference obstacle
In some ways, it might seem as if there could be no recommendations for overcoming the preference obstacle. After all, if leaders do not want to end the war, how can someone else change their mind? However, there are three ways to work with this impediment. First, as Soviet behavior in the Korean War demonstrated, the preference ob-
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stacle can become entrenched when potential dissent is squelched—when potential critics are either unwilling or psychologically unable to express their dissent. Thus, wartime leaders should actively encourage—not penalize—criticism of their policies within their inner circle. One way to do this is to create institutional mechanisms for the “devil’s advocate” role. Rotating this role among different leaders in the governing coalition, so that all leaders have to play “devil’s advocate” at some point, could be particularly effective at overcoming the psychological inability to question the consensus of “groupthink.” The more the governing coalition can encourage dissent and expression of alternative views, the sooner it can see when the preference to continue the war no longer makes sense. Similarly, the preference obstacle can be especially potent when leaders only receive information tailored to support their known preferences, rather than providing an accurate picture of the war. Thus, leaders would be best served by creating an intelligence community that rewards a competitive intelligence process (“marketplace of ideas”) and publishes dissenting analysis. Leaders should give analysts enough autonomy to provide honest assessments rather than politicized reports of “what the boss wants to hear.” In addition, leaders and the intelligence community can institutionalize contact with impartial, outside experts to provide alternative perspectives (Mendelson 1998: 127). The more alternative ideas and honest information about the war get circulated among the governing coalition, the easier it is for potential critics to make the case it is time for the hawks’ war-prolonging preference to change. Finally, even in cases where all coalition members do not want to end the war, there may still exist the potential to create an overlapping bargaining space. A major reason for the appearance of unbridgeable divides between the two sides is that belligerents often fail to define their preferences and interests with any precision (Smith 1995: 124). People often take bargaining positions to achieve some objective or defend some vaguely defined interest. However, when the position becomes untenable, rather than letting it go and searching for a different way to meet the underlying interest, people often tenaciously cling to the position (Fisher and Ury 1981). Thus, when interests are vague or undefined, leaders run the risk of defending specific objectives—often dictated by military events—which may be completely unrelated to the underlying preferences that led to the war in the first place. In some ways, this is exactly what happened with the UN side in the Korean War, clinging to the POW voluntary repatriation policy. Therefore, leaders should constantly question whether prolonging the war is the best way to achieve the interests and goals underlying their desire to continue fighting. Leaders need to understand what they prefer and why. In sum, to overcome the preference obstacle, leaders should:
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• Encourage criticism of the war policy within the governing coalition, even if that criticism is not broadly publicized for fear of undermining mobilization. • Actively seek out alternative viewpoints through red-teams, “devils’ advocates” and outside expertise, including allies who may have different strategic cultures. • Create an intelligence community that rewards honest assessments and not politicized reports. • Define underlying interests as clearly as possible and maintain a focus on these interests, rather than on particular bargaining positions which are supposed to defend them. • Reassess these underlying interests often, in light of the changing tactical and strategic environment. • Structure the negotiation process around interests rather than positions, and be open to the possibility of having those interests met in unusual ways. overcoming the infor mat ion obstacle
Some of the recommendations for overcoming the preference obstacle also apply to the information obstacle. For example, creating institutional mechanisms for alternative viewpoints and honest intelligence assessments to be heard by the governing coalition can also mitigate the effects of individual and organizational biases. Accurate information may reside somewhere in the government bureaucracy; the trick is getting it to the right decision-maker at the right time. It is not enough that new ideas or correct information exists. What matters is developing the political (and organizational) strategies to get them noticed so they can affect policy choices. First, analysts and leaders need to be explicit about their assumptions—about the enemy, strategy, historical analogies and their general worldview. Indeed, the most fundamental assumption during war—usually unstated and unexamined—is that continued fighting will improve the outcome (Iklé 1991: 20). Analysts and leaders need to state all assumptions explicitly and debate them openly and honestly. When assumptions are not explicitly expressed, they remain hidden and unconsciously fuel information filtering so that leaders can avoid cognitive dissonance. Implicit assumptions drive cognitive, affective and learning biases. As the US case study demonstrated, implicit worldviews and assumptions can have an extremely powerful effect on how events are framed and information is interpreted. In contrast, when assumptions are explicitly expressed, they lose much of their power. Once out in the open, assumptions can be challenged and subjected to empirical scrutiny. It becomes possible to see: does the evidence really support
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this assumption? Or could it support an alternative way of explaining the events? In other words, framing is inevitable, but a lack of awareness of that framing is not. Similarly, analysts and leaders need to be explicit about places of uncertainty, ambiguity and prediction. Predictions and guesses provide easy opportunities for self-deception, so it is crucial that these uncertainties get flagged. Analysts and leaders need to direct attention to the possibility that the prediction might be wrong. Ideally, they will also state why they believe the prediction and what additional evidence would confirm or disprove it. When analysts slip predictions in, without explicitly marking them as such, consumers of their analysis are more likely to treat the predictions as certainty. Third, analysts and leaders need to choose indicator metrics that are appropriate proxies for the political goals they want to achieve in the war. Many common ways of judging military success, such as territory gained or current force ratios, are insufficient or even misleading indicators for guiding the conduct of war (Iklé 1991: 19). Leaders should be explicit about which indicators they are tracking and why. They should also try to explain, at least to themselves, how their chosen indicator relates to underlying political goals and interests. The more explicitly analysts and leaders explain why they are choosing a particular indicator, the less often they will default to self-serving metrics that reinforce psychological biases (Johnson and Tierney 2006: 42). Moreover, they should pick indicators that do not call for only quantitative assessments, or at least allow quantitative assessments to be put into context.11 Finally, leaders and analysts can familiarize themselves with some of the more common biases to human perception and decision-making. All humans are subject to these biases, and these biases are more prevalent when individuals are mentally, emotionally and physically stressed. These biases are also more powerful when leaders feel entrapped. A basic understanding of how human cognition and perception works—and the kinds of individual and organizational biases that can result—could go a long way to counteracting the biases’ effects. Awareness is a powerful antidote. Moreover, recognizing that all humans experience these biases helps to minimize self-judgment or blame by others. Instead, leaders and their organizations can begin to view these common biases as simply another constraint on the decision-making process, rather than a personal or organizational failure. In sum, to overcome the information obstacle, leaders should: • Be explicit about all assumptions, state them explicitly and debate them openly and honestly. • Be explicit about places of uncertainty, ambiguity and prediction.
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• Choose indicator metrics that are appropriate proxies for the political goals they want to achieve in the war. • Familiarize themselves with some of the more common biases to human perception and decision-making. Awareness can go a long way to counteracting the biases’ effects. overcoming the ent r apment obstacle
Of the three obstacles to peace, perhaps the stickiest is entrapment. There seem to be many ways into a trap, but the psychological biases and domestic political constraints that result seem especially deep-rooted and hard to shake. Nonetheless, there are some strategies available for leaders who wish to escape entrapment. Smith argues leaders can avoid entrapment by keeping war aims deliberately amorphous, at least in public. By deliberately blurring the reasons for fighting, Smith contends, leaders leave themselves freedom of action and room to maneuver—even allowing for major shifts in policy. However, Smith concedes that this “strategy is only effective preemptively . . . it is impossible to use once goals and aims have been clearly set and publicly defended” (1995: 95). More importantly, there are three other problems with this recommendation. First, at least in a democracy, it is especially difficult to mobilize the military to fight without providing it clear reasons for its potential sacrifices. Second, the military needs clear objectives for fighting in order to make strategic, operational and tactical goals congruent. Otherwise, the state runs the risk of sowing seeds for strained civilmilitary relations and strategic ineffectiveness. Finally, this recommendation has the potential to backfire, entrapping the leaders even more deeply. Elites and the public both recognize when they have been offered vague and shifting reasons for war. The longer the war continues, the more likely oppositional outcry against such “duplicity” arises—at least in a democracy. As a result, leaders can paradoxically find themselves even further constrained as their popularity declines and support for their war policy dwindles. In such situations, it becomes psychologically even more difficult for leaders to admit the previous policy was wrong. So, given the likely ineffectiveness of that first strategy, there are four other ways for leaders to avoid entrapment. First, leaders can try to mobilize for the war with less inflammatory language and demonization of the enemy.12 Rhetoric can be skillful and raise morale for waging war effectively without creating firm, inflexible commitments and “lines in the sand.” As in relationships, in war it is always better to “never say never.” Alternatively, leaders can try to reverse their initial propaganda/demonization campaigns by softening rhetoric, redefining the image and identity of the opponent and reframing the situation. Reframing the
war ter minat ion in theory and pract ice
situation requires sharing the governing coalition’s new clarity about the war’s costs and benefits with the public, such as by highlighting new factors that are influencing the decision-making process. Presumably, if the public understands the new context, they would make the same choice. While reversing propaganda campaigns can be tricky, it has been done. For example, the month before the end of the eight-year Iran-Iraq War, Iranian parliamentary leader (and acting commander in chief) Rafsanjani admitted recent Iranian defeats and the likelihood that Iraq would soon embark on another round of large-scale military operations. Then, he reframed the conflict: the real enemies were “the nasty superpowers…. [and] the people must assume that no one will lift a finger to help [Iran] in this world which is governed by evil powers” (quoted in Smith 1995: 93). By shifting the focus onto third parties, Rafsanjani was starting to pave the way for settling with Iraq. Second, either before the war (in the case of attackers) or soon after the war begins, leaders can plan for bringing the war to a close. While such plans are not likely to manifest exactly as predicted, engaging in this planning process can help the domestic governing coalition temper its “rally round the flag” policies. By consciously focusing on an “exit strategy” from the start, leaders are more likely to select strategies and policies that align with and further the political goals of the war. As the war in Iraq has demonstrated, post-conflict (“Phase IV”) preparation should be part of the planning process from the start. In the process, leaders are more likely to avoid strategies and policies that will unnecessarily incite the other side. Third, leaders can cultivate a public stance that negotiating while fighting is the best way to meet political goals. As von Clausewitz famously noted, war is a continuation of policy by other means. The more negotiations are presented as something natural and desirable during the war, the less likely the military and other domestic constituents will respond to peace talks by questioning the war effort (Iklé 1991: 86). By publicly acknowledging the benefits of negotiating while fighting from the beginning, leaders can avoid entrapment later on, once talks with the enemy have become unavoidable. In contrast, stubbornly opposing negotiations with the enemy early on, either in principle or in practice, sows the seeds for hawkish constituencies to accuse leaders later of backing down. This particular strategy recognizes the importance of creating expectations that leave room to maneuver, without deliberately blurring the war aims or providing vague reasons for fighting. Instead, it acknowledges honestly, from the start, that negotiating is an important part of the process of prosecuting and ending war. Finally, if the time has come to make peace despite objections from more hawkish constituents, leaders can always admit they—and the war policy they
296
test ing and extending the argument
were pursuing—were wrong. The more leaders can explain why they have changed their minds and need to change policy now, the more likely elites and the public will respect the decision. Paradoxically, because politicians generally loathe to admit failure—and thus rarely provide apologies for their mistakes— this strategy of honest humility has the potential to win over public support. For example, when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev publicly announced in February 1988 the decision to disengage from Afghanistan, he used the metaphor of a bleeding wound and argued that the withdrawal “was a reflection of our current political thinking, of our new, up-to-date vision of the world” (quoted in Mendelson 1998: 117). A few months later, at the 19th Party Conference in June, he took criticism of his governing coalition a step further, albeit indirectly: While drawing lessons from the past, it must be admitted that command administrative methods did not bypass the foreign policy field. Sometimes even the most important decisions were made by a narrow circle of individuals, without a collective comprehensive discussion of analysis, and at times without the proper consultation with friends. This led to an inadequate reaction to international events and the policies of other states and even to erroneous decisions. (quoted in Mendelson 1998:119, emphasis added)
While this strategy is decidedly risky from a domestic political perspective, it has one appealing by-product: it saves leaders from needing to expend resources and psychic energy for creating reasons to justify the current course of action. In other words, when you are in the proverbial hole, stop digging. In sum, to overcome the entrapment obstacle, leaders should: • Recognize that blurring the reasons for fighting or offering vague war aims may backfire with constituents as well as contribute to their own entrapment. • Try to mobilize for war with less inflammatory language and enemy demonization. Alternatively, try to reverse initial propaganda campaigns by softening rhetoric, redefining the opponent’s image or reframing the situation. • Plan for how to end the war as soon as it starts. Engaging in this planning process can help temper policies that would unnecessarily spin up domestic constituencies and incite the other side. It will also help keep war policy aligned with the war’s political goals. • Cultivate a public stance that negotiating while fighting is natural and even desirable. • Be willing to change their minds and acknowledge they are wrong. If the time has come to settle, leaders should explain why they have changed their minds and need to change policy.
war ter minat ion in theory and pract ice
overcoming obstacles in coalit ional dynamics
In addition to these recommendations for overcoming the three obstacles, this book’s analysis about coalitional dynamics suggest some lessons about coalitionmaking tactics in the process of ending war. Early in the war, leaders may gain great benefit from establishing coalitions that have stickiness, because such stickiness can underscore a belligerent’s credibility of commitment to adversaries and allies, through the logic of domestic audience costs. However, as the war continues, policy stability can lead governing coalitions to be unable to change the status quo, even when such changes are necessary or desirable. At this point, the stickiness has become maladaptive, and the coalition faces two choices: stay the course or loosen the constraints on the current policy. Different coalition members will have different constraints, based on their constituencies. To loosen the constraints, the veto player will either have to be overruled or expelled from the coalition. Empirical evidence suggests marginal policy changes are possible by overruling veto players, but major policy changes may require expelling the veto players (Snyder and Diesing 1977; Iklé 1991). Conventional wisdom suggests moderate hawks can be better peacemakers than doves (i.e. “it takes a Nixon to go to China”), and research about interstate war termination and enduring interstate rivalry termination concurs (Schultz 2005; Colaresi 2004; Cukierman and Tommasi 1998; Iklé 1991). As Chapter 8 argued, constituents are more likely to approve of a peace deal endorsed by a hawk than one endorsed by a dove, because when a hawk promises that a peace deal will keep you safe, you are more apt to believe him. Similarly, while doves may be perceived as exploitable, hawks who cooperate with the other side reveal themselves to be trusted to reciprocate cooperation but not defenseless. Therefore, a coalition that includes moderate hawks may have the best chance of concluding a negotiated settlement that will be accepted by the adversary as well as at home. Two recommendations flow from this. First, dovish leaders who want to make peace may be most successful by including moderately hawkish coalition members in their governing coalition—assuming moderate hawks are available. These moderate hawks can send the appropriate signals to domestic constituents that the settlement offer will not undermine national security, and they can also help counter extremist views that a peace deal is “selling out.” In addition, especially if they have an international reputation as hawkish, they can also play an active role in negotiations with the adversary, to signal interest in ending the war without being exploitable. In other words, dovish leaders who want to make peace need to send signals—at home and abroad—that they are not vulnerable and weak; including some hawks in the governing coalition can provide this insurance. In contrast, moderate hawkish leaders who want to end a war are less vulner-
298
test ing and extending the argument
able to appearing weak and exploitable, but they face a different concern: keeping their extremist constituencies in check so that they can make peace. Schultz (2005) suggests three factors that might help free moderate hawk leaders from the influence of hardline factions in their constituency base. First, in democracies, majoritarian electoral rules, rather than proportional representation, tend to empower moderates over extremists, because median voters are usually moderate. Similarly, if the moderate hawkish governing coalition enjoyed a sizable majority among domestic constituents or in the legislature, it may be less vulnerable to pressure from extremist hardliners. Finally, if there are other policy issues that bind the hardliners to the moderate hawk’s political party, the hardliners may not be able to credibly threaten to leave the party. Therefore, building on Schultz (2005), the second recommendation provides ideas for helping moderate hawks minimize pressures from their extremist wing while seeking peace. Certainly, moderate hawkish leaders could change electoral rules from proportional representation to plurality, but this scenario is highly unlikely during war. More likely, moderate hawks could include dovish elements in their governing coalition to increase the size of their governing majority and minimize pressure from hardliners. In addition, moderate hawks could also present peace deals as elections are approaching. While doves are most likely to succeed with peace offers early in the electoral cycle when their political standing is most secure, moderate hawks can boost their standing among moderate voters and thus build a larger base among domestic constituencies if they offer peace right before an election. For example, President Richard Nixon delivered three such peacemaking deals within months of the 1972 election, traveling to China and concluding the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with the Soviet Union (Schultz 2005: 24). Finally, moderate hawks can reinforce their ideological ties with hardliner hawks on other issues during the process of ending the war, to further bind these hardliner constituents to them and to minimize their capacity to defect to the opposition. For example, this last strategy was clearly employed by Eisenhower when he ended the economic controls and dismantled Truman’s unpopular mobilization infrastructure to placate the Republican right wing. In sum, to ease coalitional dynamics in the process of making peace, leaders should: • If they are doves: º Include moderately hawkish coalition members in the governing coalition, to minimize a signal of weakness and vulnerability to domestic constituents and the adversary. º Time peacemaking efforts early in the electoral cycle, when political standing is most secure.
war ter minat ion in theory and pract ice
• If they are moderate hawks: º Include dovish coalition members in the governing coalition, to increase the size of their majority among domestic constituents. º Reinforce ideological ties with hardliner hawkish constituencies on other issues besides the war, to minimize these hardliners’ ability to defect to the opposition. º Time peacemaking efforts before elections, to boost electoral standing with moderate constituents and build a larger domestic base for the peacemaking process. overcoming obstacles in the st r ateg ic inter act ion
Finally, this book’s analysis about the strategic interaction between belligerents also offers some lessons for leaders. First, a peace settlement, or any major policy change, will be the outcome of a process. Acknowledging the process—and the fact that it can be improved with practice, skill and expertise—is important (Pillar 1983: 240). Even if leaders do not want to end the war right now, they should already be planning for various contingencies and consider their own actions as part of a sequence, rather than in isolation. They should go beyond deciding what they would accept or reject today to think through subsequent moves and their consequences. They should imagine the other side’s potential reactions, to widen the scope of contingencies under consideration and minimize the possibility of being blindsided by the opponent or a policy’s unintended consequences. Second, because the negotiation process is a strategic interaction between two sides, the other side needs to be perceived as a multi-dimensional group of human decision-makers, not some two-dimensional Other. The opposing side’s governing coalition is also constrained by domestic politics, psychological biases, uncertainty and human emotions. Its decision calculus is just as complicated, and its leaders just as likely to make cognitive errors when tired and under pressure. In other words, the three obstacles to peace are likely to be impeding settlement for the other side, too. For example, in terms of the preference obstacle, leaders often fail to see their opponents’ interests. As Berenice Carroll notes, “We look at what people do, not what they are doing it for; we then imagine that we can devise techniques to control what they do, and we are always surprised when the techniques fail” (1970: 25). Leaders often discount what the opponent has said he wants, focusing instead entirely on his behavior. The ability to see the other side’s underlying interests, instead of simply its bargaining position, can certainly ease negotiations. While bargaining positions are almost always irreconcilable, the interests behind them often are not (Fisher and Ury 1981). Similarly, in terms of the information obstacle, leaders should recognize their opponents are also subject to misperceptions and biases. Just as leaders often
300
test ing and extending the argument
impute malicious intentions to their opponents, they need to recognize their opponents are doing the same thing. Therefore, leaders need to send messages as unambiguously as possible, to ensure information is not misperceived. The opposing side is most likely to have difficulty interpreting armed actions. Thus, to use military activity to send a message, it needs to be as unambiguous as possible. Finally, in terms of the entrapment obstacle, leaders should look for ways to help the opponent “save face.” Interestingly, actions to decrease entrapment at home can help the enemy avoid entrapment as well. As explained above, leaders can give themselves more maneuvering room by avoiding threats, “lines in the sand” and demonizing rhetoric. However, less inflammatory language also decreases the opportunity for enemy hawks to point to evidence of intransigence. Leaders should help the opponent avoid the appearance of backing down under pressure. Pillar suggests that “when fighting a major power, you may need to let it redeem its military reputation with a victory or two before it will come to terms” (1983: 249). More generally, as Smith argues, “not allowing [the] opponent to save face may make a belligerent look strong, but it will not end the war” (1995: 257). The third lesson of strategic interaction is that leaders need to recognize the opposing side is not monolithic. It may comprise multiple belligerents, with different worldviews, interests, objectives and ways of conceptualizing the war’s costs and benefits. Thus, leaders should differentiate among the other side’s belligerents and try to support dovish elements. These dovish elements can exist on the opposing side at two levels. First, some of the enemy states may be ready to settle; leaders can exploit this difference in the other side’s international coalition. For example, in the Korean War, had the United States been more aware of the differing interests and perspectives in the Communist side, it could have exploited them by interacting directly with those actors ready to make peace. Instead, by viewing North Korea and China as client states of the Soviet Union, the United States lost the opportunity to treat them as independent actors and craft proposals that would directly address their underlying interests and needs. Leaders can also support dovish elements within the domestic governing coalitions on the opposing side. Because the negotiation process is a two-level game, leaders can target their public statements, proposals and policies to appeal to the other side’s moderates and doves. Such behavior provides signals those leaders can use to bolster their influence in their domestic coalition. It may be that there is nothing leaders can do or say that will change the hardened perspectives of the opposing side’s hawks. But offering policies and proposals that appeal to the other side’s moderates and doves can drain wider support on the opposing side for the hawkish position. Certainly, this recommendation is difficult to implement in practice (e.g. see Synder and Diesing 1977). However, knowing something about the distribution of attitudes and influence in the other government can help in
war ter minat ion in theory and pract ice
devising a proposal that leads the opposing side to form a different majority coalition in line with your preferences. Finally, as Chapter 8 suggested, domestic coalition shifts on the opposing side can be a rich source of information, if leaders are paying attention. While the previous recommendation referred to sending signals, this recommendation speaks to receiving and learning from them. Dovish shifts in enemy governing coalitions can signal that at least part of the opposing side is more willing to negotiate, while hawkish shifts can signal the opposing side may be about to escalate and thus increase the costs of prolonging the war. In other words, leaders should not only be looking to the battlefield or diplomatic offers to provide information to update their expectations. Instead, leaders should be actively watching the opposing side’s domestic governing coalitions, to take advantage of the information that coalition shifts can provide. In sum, to ease the process of the strategic interaction, leaders should: • Recognize peace settlements are the outcome of a process and provide the process with resources and expertise. • Plan for various contingencies and consider the other side’s potential reactions, to minimize the possibility of being blindsided by the opponent or a policy’s unintended consequences. • Recognize enemy governing coalitions are human, too, subject to the same three obstacles to peace. • Try to perceive the other side’s underlying interests—instead of simply its bargaining position—and look for areas of mutual interest (to help the other side overcome its preference obstacle). • Send messages as unambiguously as possible, to minimize misperception (to help it overcome its information obstacle). • Look for ways to help the opponent “save face” (to help it overcome its entrapment obstacle). • Differentiate among belligerents on the other side and exploit differences in interests between them by interacting directly with those ready to make peace. • Target public statements, proposals and policies to appeal to moderates and doves on the other side, which can drain wider support for the enemy’s hawkish position. • Carefully observe the opposing side’s domestic governing coalitions and coalition shifts, as these can provide important information for helping to update expectations about the war’s future costs and benefits.
Epilogue
The Korean War is still not over. Since the 1953 armistice agreement was never followed by a peace treaty, the two Koreas are technically still at war. Crossing the 38th Parallel at an angle and about four kilometers wide, the demilitarized zone (DMZ) cuts the peninsula roughly in half and is the most heavily armed border in the world. More than a million troops maintain this uneasy truce, some with live rounds chambered in their weapons around the clock. When I was one of that million in 1993, as a military intelligence officer in the US Army, I traveled in the Chorwon Valley near the DMZ. I traveled to see where my grandfather had fought in 1952 as part of the “war of the hills.” I did not know which hill exactly he defended, or even which hill bore the name of Old Baldy. A few years later, looking at maps from the war, I realize I must have been very close to Old Baldy that day. I remember looking through binoculars towards the north, seeing swaths of undeveloped, verdant hills. What struck me most was the uniformity—all of the trees exactly the same age, height and girth. There are no old forests near the 38th Parallel. These are the forgotten hills of the Forgotten War. Nonetheless, with the passing of time, the land and participants are healing themselves. As archives are opened and theories advance, insight slowly emerges. We can look at what happened on Old Baldy and its surrounding hills as senseless, but there are definite reasons why these events occurred. There are discernable patterns for the ways that wars end, with identifiable obstacles and processes at work. Understanding the obstacles to peace is the first step to overcoming them.
appendix a
Interstate Wars Included in the Post–World War II Dataset
War
Country
Begin
End
Outcomea
Initiator
Belligerent Status
Changes from Correlates of Warb
First Kashmir
Pakistan
10/24/47
12/31/48
2
1
Primary
First Kashmir
India
10/24/47
12/31/48
2
0
Primary
Palestine Palestine Palestine Palestine Palestine Palestine Korean Korean Korean Korean Korean
Israel Egypt Iraq Jordan Lebanon Syria China North Korea South Korea USA USSR
5/14/1948 5/14/1948 5/14/1948 5/14/1948 5/14/1948 5/14/1948 6/25/1950 6/25/1950 6/25/1950 6/25/1950 6/25/1950
1/7/1949 1/7/1949 10/31/1948 10/31/1948 10/31/1948 10/31/1948 7/27/1953 7/27/1953 7/27/1953 7/27/1953 7/27/1953
1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
Primary Primary Secondary Secondary Secondary Secondary Primary Secondary Secondary Primary Primary
RussoHungarian RussoHungarian Sinai Sinai Sinai Sinai Sino-Indian Sino-Indian Vietnam
Hungary
10/23/1956
11/14/1956
3
0
Primary
Date/initiation/ outcome Date/initiation/ outcome Date Date Date Date Date Date Date/outcome Date/outcome Date/outcome Date/outcome State/date/outcome None
USSR
10/23/1956
11/14/1956
1
1
Primary
None
Israel Egypt France UK China India North Vietnam South Vietnam
10/29/1956 10/29/1956 10/31/1956 10/31/1956 10/20/1962 10/20/1962 2/7/1965
11/6/1956 11/6/1956 11/6/1956 11/6/1956 11/22/1962 11/22/1962 4/30/1975
1 3 1 1 1 3 1
1 0 0 0 1 0 0
Primary Primary Primary Primary Primary Primary Primary
None None None None None None None
2/7/1965
4/30/1975
3
0
None
USA India
2/7/1965 8/5/1965
1/27/1973 9/22/1965
3 2
1 0
Secondary until 1/28/1973, then Primary Primary Primary
Vietnam Vietnam Second Kashmir
None Date/outcome/ initiation
306 War
appendix a Country
Begin
End
Outcomea
Initiator
Belligerent Status
Changes from Correlates of Warb
Second Kashmir Six-Day Six-Day Six-Day Six-Day Attrition Attrition Bangladesh Bangladesh Yom Kippur Yom Kippur Yom Kippur Cyprus
Pakistan
8/5/1965
9/22/1965
2
1
Primary
Date/outcome/ initiation None None None None Date/outcome Date/outcome None None None None None Date
Egypt Israel Jordan Syria Egypt Israel India Pakistan Egypt Israel Syria Cyprus
6/5/1967 6/5/1967 6/5/1967 6/5/1967 3/8/1969 3/8/1969 12/3/1971 12/3/1971 10/6/1973 10/6/1973 10/6/1973 7/15/1974
6/10/1967 6/10/1967 6/10/1967 6/10/1967 8/7/1970 8/7/1970 12/17/1971 12/17/1971 10/24/1973 10/24/1973 10/24/1973 8/16/1974
3 1 3 3 2 2 1 3 3 1 3 3
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Cyprus
Greece
7/15/1974
8/16/1974
3
1
Cyprus VietCambodian VietCambodian Ogaden Ogaden Ogaden UgandaTanzanian UgandaTanzanian UgandaTanzanian Sino-Vietnam Sino-Vietnam Iran-Iraq Iran-Iraq Falklands Falklands Lebanon Lebanon
Turkey Cambodia
7/20/1974 5/1/1975
8/16/1974 1/7/1979
1 3
0 0
Primary Primary Secondary Secondary Primary Primar y Primary Primar y Primary Primary Secondary Primary until 7/18/1974, then Secondary to Greece Primary State/date/ initiation Primary Date/initiation Primary None
Vietnam
5/1/1975
1/7/1979
1
1
Primary
None
Cuba Ethiopia Somalia Libya
10/23/1977 8/1/1977 8/1/1977 3/8/1979
3/14/1978 3/14/1978 3/14/1978 4/8/1979
1 1 3 3
0 0 1 0
Secondar y Primary Primary Secondary
Date None None Date
Tanzania
10/30/1978
4/12/1979
1
0
Primary
None
Uganda
10/30/1978
4/12/1979
3
1
Primary
None
China Vietnam Iran Iraq Argentina UK Israel Lebanon
2/17/1979 2/17/1979 9/22/1980 9/22/1980 3/25/1982 3/25/1982 6/4/1982 6/4/1982
3/10/1979 3/10/1979 8/20/1988 8/20/1988 6/20/1982 6/20/1982 9/26/1982 9/26/1982
1 3 2 2 3 1 2 2
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
Primar y Primar y Primary Primary Primary Primary Primary Secondary
Syria China
6/4/1982 10/15/1986
9/26/1982 2/6/1987
2 2
0 1
Primary Primary
None None Outcome Outcome None None Date/outcome State/date/outcome Date/outcome Date/outcome
Lebanon SinoVietnam II SinoVietnam II Gulf War I Gulf War I
Vietnam
10/15/1986
2/6/1987
2
0
Primary
Date/outcome
Iraq Kuwait
8/2/1990 8/2/1990
3/3/1991 3/3/1991
3 1
1 0
Date Date
Gulf War I Gulf War I Gulf War I Karabakh Karabakh Karabakh Karabakh Indo-Pakistan Indo-Pakistan
Saudi Arabia UK USA Armenia Azerbaijan Karabakh USSR/FIS India Pakistan
1/16/1991 1/16/1991 1/16/1991 4/30/1991 4/30/1991 4/30/1991 4/30/1991 5/3/1999 5/3/1999
3/3/1991 3/3/1991 3/3/1991 5/12/1994 5/12/1994 5/12/1994 3/2/1992 7/17/1999 7/17/1999
1 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 3
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
Primary Primary until 8/4/1990 Secondar y Secondary Primary Primary Primary Secondar y Primar y Primary Primar y
Date Date Date Added Added Added Added Added Added
interstate wars p ost–world war ii War
aOutcome bMy
Begin
End
Outcomea
Initiator
Eritrea
5/8/1998
6/18/2000
3
1
Primary
Added
Ethiopia
5/8/1998
6/18/2000
1
0
Primary
Added
Afghanistan UK USA Iraq UK USA
10/7/2001 10/7/2001 10/7/2001 3/19/2003 3/19/2003 3/19/2003
12/22/2001 12/22/2001 12/22/2001 5/1/2003 5/1/2003 5/1/2003
3 1 1 3 1 1
0 1 1 0 1 1
Primary Secondary Primary Primary Secondary Primary
Added Added Added Added Added Added
Country
EritreaEthiopian EritreaEthiopian Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan Gulf War II Gulf War II Gulf War II
coding: 1=winner; 2=stalemate; 3=loser. coding for stalemates includes the COW categories of “yielding” and “compromise.”
Belligerent Status
Changes from Correlates of Warb
appendix b
Domestic Governing Coalition Shifts since World War II
War
Country
Date
Direction
Details
First Kashmir
Pakistan
9/11/1948
Neutral
Governor-General/President of Constituent Assembly Muhammad Ali Jinnah dies
Palestine
Egypt
12/28/1948
Neutral
PM Mahmoud an-Nuqrashi Pasha is assassinated and replaced by Ibrahim Abd al Hadi Pasha
Korean
North Korea
6/26/1950
Hawk
Kim Il-Sung creates 7-man Military Committee that directs all policy decisions during war
Korean
USA
9/19/1950
Hawk
George C. Marshall replaces Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson, the last economizer to be pushed out of Truman’s Administration
Korean
South Korea
11/23/1950
Neutral
Acting PM Shin Song Mo replaced by Chang Myon; Shin remains Defense Minister
Korean
North Korea
12/21/1950
Neutral
Mu-Chong, Kim Il, 7 others expelled from KWP at Third Joint Plenum
Korean
North Korea
1/31/1951
Neutral
Vice Premier and battlefield commander Kim Cha-ek dies
Korean
South Korea
5/16/1951
Neutral
Vice Pres. Yi Si Yong, DM Shin Song Mo, Interior Min. Cho Pyung Ok, Justice Min. Kim JunYun resigned/relieved because of KoChang massacre and National Defense Corps embezzlement scandal
coalit ion shifts since world war ii War
Country
Korean
Date
Direction
Details
USA
9/17/1951
Neutral
Robert A. Lovett replaces Secretary of Defense Marshall
Korean
South Korea
4/24/1952
Neutral
PM Chang Myon resigns, with plans to run for president, replaced by Chang Taek-Sang
Korean
South Korea
5/25/1952
Neutral
President Rhee declares martial law, arrests 45 National Assembly opposition members
Korean
China
8/1/1952
Dove
Institutional leadership directly below Secretariat of the CCP Politburo is greatly expanded
Korean
South Korea
8/5/1952
Neutral
Rhee restructures gov’t with constitutional amendments to consolidate power, re-elected in first direct presidential election, drops Interior Min. Yi Pom Sok
Korean
South Korea
10/6/1952
Neutral
PM Chang Taek-Sang replaced by Paik Too-Chin
Korean
USSR
10/16/1952
Neutral
At the 19th Party Congress, Joseph Stalin abolished the 12member Politburo and created a Central Committee Presidium with 25 members and 11 candidate members, to minimize influence of his top deputies
Korean
USA
1/20/1953
Hawk
President Dwight Eisenhower sworn into office
Korean
USSR
3/5/1953
Dove
Stalin dies, replaced by troika of Lavrenty Beria, Georgy Malenkov, Vyacheslav Molotov
RussoHungarian
Hungary
10/24/1956
Neutral
Imre Nagy replaces Andras Hegedus as prime minister
RussoHungarian
Hungary
10/25/1956
Neutral
Janos Kadar replaces Erno Gero as first secretary
RussoHungarian
Hungary
10/28/1956
Neutral
Party control turned over to caretaker Presidium
RussoHungarian
Hungary
10/30/1956
Hawk
Multiparty system announced
RussoHungarian
Hungary
11/3/1956
Neutral
Four-party government coalition created
Sino-Indian
India
11/7/1962
Dove
Defense Minister Krishna Menon and some top generals fired
Vietnam
South Vietnam
2/16/1965
Neutral
Phan Huy Quat replaces Nguyen Khahn as prime minister
Vietnam
South Vietnam
6/14/1965
Hawk
Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Cao Ky replace Pres. Phan Khac Suu and PM Phan Huy Quat
Vietnam
South Vietnam
9/3/1967
Neutral
Ky marginalized by Thieu following presidential elections
310
appendix b
War
Country
Date
Direction
Details
Vietnam
USA
2/29/1968
Neutral
Defense Secretary McNamara resigns, replaced by Clark Clifford
Vietnam
USA
1/20/1969
Hawk
President Richard Nixon sworn into office
Vietnam
North Vietnam
9/2/1969
Neutral
General Secretary Ho Chi Minh dies, succeeded by Le Duan
Vietnam
South Vietnam
4/21/1975
Dove
Thieu resigns, succeeded by Vice President Tran Van Huong
Vietnam
South Vietnam
4/28/1975
Neutral
General Minh takes power
Six-Day
Egypt
6/9/1967
Dove
President Gamal Abdel Nasser resigns
Six-Day
Egypt
6/10/1967
Dove
Nasser returns to presidency; military chief Amer, War Minister Badran and almost all 4star generals fired
Attrition
Israel
3/17/1969
Neutral
Golda Meir replaces Interim Prime Minister Yigal Allon
Attrition
Israel
12/15/1969
Neutral
Golda Meir re-elected in Knesset elections
Attrition
Israel
8/6/1970
Dove
Menachem Begin and other Gahal ministers resign from national unity government
Bangladesh
Pakistan
12/13/1971
Dove
Governor Malik officially severs ties with West Pakistan
Cyprus
Cyprus
7/18/1974
Hawk
Nikos Sampson takes power in a Greek-led coup against Bishop Makarios
Cyprus
Cyprus
7/23/1974
Dove
Sampson government collapses, replaced by Glafkos Clerides
Cyprus
Greece
7/23/1974
Dove
Greek junta collapses, Konstantinos Karamanlis becomes prime minister
VietCambodian
Vietnam
12/14/1976
Hawk
Hoang Van Hoan dropped from Politburo, purge of pro-Chinese party members
Ogaden
Ethiopia
11/11/1977
Neutral
Mengistu Haile Mariam executed Atnafu Abate and launched “Red Terror” campaign against dissidents
Ogaden
Somalia
3/10/1978
Dove
Mohamed Siad Barre executed six junta members and staff generals
UgandaTanzanian
Uganda
3/31/1979
Dove
Defense Minister Emilien Mondo joined the rebel Uganda National Liberation Front
Iran-Iraq
Iran
6/20/1981
Hawk
President Bani-Sadr is impeached and replaced by Prime Minister Rajai; Bahonar becomes prime minister
coalit ion shifts since world war ii War
Country
Iran-Iraq
Date
Direction
Details
Iran
8/30/1981
Neutral
President Rajai and Prime Minister Bahonar are assassinated; Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani becomes the interim premier
Iran-Iraq
Iran
10/29/1981
Hawk
Ali Khameini elected president, Mir-Hussein Musavi elected premier
Iran-Iraq
Iraq
6/11/1982
Dove
Saddam consolidates power with smaller government after failed peace offer to Iran during a special Baath Party Congress
Iran-Iraq
Iran
1/3/1988
Dove
Supreme Leader Khomeini creates a council that sits above the conservative clerics’ Council of Guardians
Falklands
Argentina
6/17/1982
Dove
General Galtieri resigns, replaced by caretaker military government under Reynaldo Bignone
Lebanon
Lebanon
8/23/1982
Dove
Bashir Gemayel elected to the presidency
Lebanon
Lebanon
9/14/1982
Neutral
Bashir Gemayel assassinated
Lebanon
Lebanon
9/23/1982
Neutral
Amin Gemayel assumes the presidency
Sino-Vietnam II
Vietnam
12/18/1986
Dove
Truong Chinh replaced by Nguyen Van Linh as general secretary, but retains presidency
Gulf War I
Iraq
12/12/1990
Hawk
Saddam Hussein replaces Defense Minister General Abd al-Jabbar Khalil Shansal with Lt. General Sa’di Tumah Abbas
Karabakh
Karabakh
8/10/1991
Hawk
Valery Grigorian, a top party functionary, assassinated
Karabakh
USSR
8/19/1991
Hawk
Coup against General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev
Karabakh
USSR
8/21/1991
Dove
Gorbachev restored when coup fails
Karabakh
Karabakh
8/22/1991
Hawk
Administrator Polyanichko withdrawn
Karabakh
Azerbaijan
9/14/1991
Neutral
Ayaz Mutalibov wins presidential elections; independence from USSR
Karabakh
Armenia
10/16/1991
Hawk
Levon Ter-Petrossian elected president
Karabakh
Azerbaijan
11/20/1991
Hawk
Parliament's power transferred to National Council
Karabakh
USSR
12/25/1991
Neutral
Gorbachev resigns
Karabakh
Karabakh
1/18/1992
Hawk
Declaration of independence and new parliament; Artur Mkrtchian becomes de facto leader
312
appendix b
War
Country
Date
Direction
Details
Karabakh
Azerbaijan
3/6/1992
Hawk
Mutalibov resigns; Yaqub Mamedov becomes acting head of state and appoints Rahim Gaziev as defense minister
Karabakh
Karabakh
4/14/1992
Neutral
Mkrtchian dies
Karabakh
Azerbaijan
5/9/1992
Hawk
Acting President Mamedov resigns
Karabakh
Azerbaijan
5/14/1992
Neutral
Mutalibov restored by coup
Karabakh
Azerbaijan
5/15/1992
Hawk
Mutalibov ousted in countercoup; Isa Gambar made acting head of state and Iskander Hamidov becomes interior minister
Karabakh
Azerbaijan
6/7/1992
Neutral
Abulfaz Elchibey elected president
Karabakh
Karabakh
8/15/1992
Hawk
Robert Kacharian takes over Karabakh Armenian State Defense Committee
Karabakh
Armenia
10/15/1992
Neutral
Ter-Petrossian appoints Vazgen Manukian as defense minister
Karabakh
Armenia
2/3/1993
Dove
Ter-Petrossian appoints new cabinet
Karabakh
Azerbaijan
2/20/1993
Neutral
Defense Minister Gaziev and military commander Surat Husseinov fired
Karabakh
Karabakh
6/14/1993
Dove
Parliament Speaker Petrosian resigns, replaced by Garen Baburian; parliament accepts peace plan
Karabakh
Azerbaijan
6/18/1993
Neutral
Elchibey flees capital
Karabakh
Azerbaijan
6/24/1993
Neutral
Heydar Aliev granted extraordinary presidential powers
Karabakh
Azerbaijan
6/30/1993
Hawk
Husseinov becomes prime minister
Karabakh
Azerbaijan
5/4/1994
Dove
Speaker of Parliament Rasul Guliev and Defense Minister Mamedov sign ceasefire while Aliev out of country
EritreaEthiopian
Eritrea
6/18/2000
Dove
Foreign Minister Haile Weldensae ignores government and unilaterally accepts peace deal
Notes
Chapter 1 1. For more information about the battles on Old Baldy, see “On Top of Old Baldy” (2002); 1st Cavalry Association (2002); Stephens (1995); “Overview of the Korean War” (2002); Hermes (1966: 285–96, 393–95); Leach (2002). 2. As Chapter 3 explains, the Korean War started in June 1950, and the first year was marked with dramatic movement up and down the Korean peninsula. By July 1951, the front lines settled back roughly where the antebellum border had been (along the 38th Parallel) and remained relatively stagnant for the next two years. 3. Other examples include Gordon Craig and Alexander George (1995: 232–33), who argue “often the move to terminate the conflict can gain momentum only though a change in leadership, whether through orderly constitutional methods or extralegal means.” Similarly, Graham Allison argues “surrender is likely to come as the result of a political shift that enhances the power of the latter group [that believes the war effort is futile] and adds swing members to it” (1969: 718). See also Randle (1973: 442); May (1973: Chapter 5); Kecskemeti (1958); Staudenmaier (1985). 4. Bayesian bargaining models assume that actors make optimal use of the information available to them, representing the process by which actors use new information to revise their beliefs with Bayes’ Theorem from probability theory. Bayes’ Theorem “explains how new information should be used to update beliefs about different states of the world. It weighs the ability of the new evidence to discriminate among different states and the strength of prior beliefs to arrive at updated beliefs” (Morrow 1994: 162). 5. For more on equifinality, see Bennett and George (2005). 6. Reiter (2009: chapter 3) defines absolute war outcomes as state death and/or foreign-imposed regime change. He argues absolute war outcomes occurred in 25 of 98 interstate wars from 1816 to 2001 (26 percent). However, one of the datasets he cites (Reiter and Stam 2002) includes 12 disaggregated wars for World War II, six involving the “absolute
314
notes to chapters 1–2
victory” of Germany over Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Greece and Yugoslavia. As these conflicts were clearly part of the larger conflagration and did not result in the end of World War II, it does not make sense to include them in this calculation. Removing these six conflicts leaves absolute war outcomes accounting for only 19 percent of war endings from 1816 to 2001. 7. To be sure, coalition shifts can also have the opposite effect, to toss out those who are hindering the war effort. Chapter 2 addresses such “hawkish” shifts. 8. Important exceptions include Bennett and Stam (1998) and Slantchev (2004). 9. As Chapter 2 discusses, domestic coalition shifts are neither necessary nor sufficient for getting beyond lags in updating expectations, because a priori we cannot know how much each shift will change belligerents’ expectations and what effect strategic interaction with the opposing side will have. 10. A certain prediction is an unequivocal forecast, while a unique prediction is a forecast not made by other known theories. The more unique and more certain the prediction, the stronger the test. 11. While other authors (i.e. Foot 1990) have written detailed case studies of stalemates, they have not explicitly tested generalizable propositions as I do here. 12. As Chapter 2 explains, exogenous shifts occur for reasons independent of the war, while endogenous shifts are related to war performance.
Chapter 2 1. For example, Berenice Carroll (1969) created a list of 15 different conceptions of victory, which fall into the four categories of (1) victory interpreted in a military sense, (2) victory as a relationship between the parties, (3) victory as a relationship between war aims and war outcome and (4) victory as interpreted in terms of gains and losses. More recently, Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney (2006: 25–26) outlined five different logics for defining victory, including (1) absolute gains, in which the actor gains in comparison to its antebellum position, (2) relative gains, in which the actor does better than the adversary on some dimension, (3) achieving core aims, in which the actor accomplishes something it finds important, (4) the price of peace, in which the actor is better off than if the conflict had not been fought, and (5) optimal policy, in which the actor achieves the best possible result of all the available policies. 2. Agreements will be self-enforcing at terms where both sides perceive the marginal benefits of additional demands to be less than the marginal costs of fighting to achieve those demands. The presence of potential intervening parties can make agreements selfenforcing even for the stronger state, because the stronger state can anticipate intervention and its consequences (Goemans 2000a: 32; Reiter 2009: chapter 3). 3. Croco (2008: 10–13, 40) makes a similar point. 4. In economic theory, sunk costs are costs that have been incurred and cannot be recovered. In war, the most salient sunk costs are casualties—the war dead cannot be recovered. In theory, rational actors do not let sunk costs influence their decisions, because doing so would not be assessing a decision exclusively on its own merits. In practice, however, actors often let sunk costs affect their decisions. 5. One recent exception is Croco (2008), who tests the argument that culpable leaders will feel more pressure to stay in the war than non-culpable leaders. Her argument, however, only applies to heads of state and not to governing coalitions.
notes to chapter 2
6. For information about two-level game dynamics in interstate rivalry termination, see Colaresi (2004, 2005); McGinnis and Williams (2001); Mor (1997) and Schultz (2005). 7. Some scholars who study civil war termination also argue war has negative duration dependence (Mason and Fett 1996; Mason, Weingarten and Fett 1999; DeRouen and Sobek 2004). 8. Cox and McCubbins (2001) point out that each veto player must have preferences that diverge from other parties for the veto to be effective—a dimension they call “separation of purpose.” If two parties have similar preferences, they do not present two different sets of interests to be satisfied and so only represent one veto player. 9. Hermann lists three types of authoritative decision units that could be responsible for foreign policy decisions: predominant leaders, single groups or coalitions of autonomous actors. Unlike Hermann, I believe predominant leaders are extremely uncommon. Almost all leaders make decisions through consultation with a small group of close advisors, and very few—if any—have the ability to stifle all dissent and opposition alone. 10. For more detail about how authoritarian leaders can rely on groups with special loyalties to the regime, see Andreski (1980); Quinlivan (1999); and Brooks (2004). 11. This extends Maoz and Abdolali’s (1989) and Hagan’s (1993) argument that all regimes share some features in terms of the ability of other actors to influence the decisions of the head of state. 12. A more nuanced finding, corroborating that regime type alone does not drive coalition shifts, argues that variation in democratic institutions leads to variation in leaders being replaced for poor management of war policy. Croco (2008) argues that “culpable leaders” are more likely to be removed in parliamentary systems, where elections can essentially come at any time, than in presidential systems, which usually change leaders according to a fixed election schedule. In contrast, Colaresi (2004) argues that leaders in presidential systems face a bigger hazard of being removed for unreciprocated cooperation in enduring rivalries than parliamentary systems. In general, however, the political processes of democratic states make it easier to bring to power new leaders than other regime types. 13. Some argue that casualty counts get mitigated in the public’s calculations when the perceived stakes are high (Larson 1996; Croco 2008). Others argue the public’s casualty tolerance increases when it believes in the rightness and ongoing success of the mission (Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998; Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Gelpi, Feaver and Reifler 2005–6; Kull and Ramsay 2001). Still others argue public support will remain robust if the public sees that other countries support the war effort and will help share its costs (Kull and Destler 1999). In short, each of these arguments proposes the public can engage in a simple calculation about the expected value of continuing the war. In contrast, other scholars find little evidence that citizens make such cost/benefit calculations when evaluating a war. They argue instead that the public cues on elite views to evaluate war performance (Zaller 1992; Berinsky 2007), or that public opinion is prone to elite manipulation (Snyder 1991; Mansfield and Snyder 1995; McGinnis and Williams 2001; Mor 1997; Colaresi 2005; Gibbs 1995; Baum 2003: 44–45). 14. Similarly, an operational level obstacle could occur if the governing coalition lacks control over its military forces. Here, the coalition may have the political will to end the war but be unable to assert its authority if the military wants to continue fighting (Smith 1995: 137–38).
316
notes to chapter 2
15. Some would argue that President Roosevelt chose not to use this information, because he was looking for a reason to draw the United States into the war. 16. Certainly, developing states that lack institutionalized intelligence agencies or national security bureaucracies may be less affected by information “stove-pipes” and pathologies resulting from different information exposure. Instead, these states may face grosser information obstacles simply from having no or poor-quality information. I thank Rebecca Johnson for this point. 17. For example, as Chapter 6 will explain, during the Korean War the US military looked at increasing damage from conventional bombing campaigns to assess positively its strategy of attrition warfare in ending the war. In contrast, Secretary of State Dean Acheson looked at the US allies’ increasingly negative reactions to the bombing to assess negatively the attrition warfare strategy. See also Gartner and Myers (1995). 18. The literature about social cognition and individual cognitive processes in decisionmaking is vast. For a good introduction to a variety of these arguments, see Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982); Fiske and Taylor (1991); Fiske (2002); Gladwell (2005); Jervis (1976); George (1969, 1980); Larson (1994); Vertzberger (1990); Gilovich, Griffin and Kahneman (2002); Rosen (2005); Johnson and Tierney (2006); Kahneman and Tversky (1979); Kahneman (2003); Festinger (1957); Glad (1990); Johnson (2004); and McDermott (1998). 19. For more information about affective biases, see Davidson and Irwin (1999); Davidson (2000); Öhman, Flykt and Lundqvist (2000); LeDoux (1996); Damasio (1994); Zajonc (1980); Schacter (1995). For an application of these models to international relations, see Rosen (2005); Johnson and Tierney (2006); Long and Brecke (2003). 20. For more information about learning biases, see Levy (1994); Johnson and Tierney (2006); May (1973); Khong (1992); and Schacter (1995). 21. Experimental research has provided mixed results about the “risky shift” effect. Early studies supporting the phenomenon include Wallach et al. (1964); Collins and Guetzkow (1964); Teger and Pruitt (1967); and Jamieson (1968). Subsequent research hypothesized the risky shift was merely a lab artifact and tested the concept in “real-world settings.” These later studies had mixed results, with risky shifts more often observed in small or predominantly male groups. See Clement and Sullivan (1970); Myers and Lamm (1975); Spector (1976); Butler and Crino (1992); Armstrong et al. (2004); and Ronay and Kim (2006). 22. Theoretically, because no two states have perfectly overlapping interests, when they agree to fight together, they either need to expand their war aims (logroll) or agree only to pursue “least common denominator” goals. Examples of such logrolling include the Sinai War and World War II. For example, part of the reason why Hitler agreed to invade Yugoslavia was to placate Italy. Moreover, when the United States agreed to fight with the Allies, they decided at the Atlantic Conference to expand war aims to seek absolute victory. More generally, there is significant evidence that wars with many belligerents tend to be long wars; most of this research argues this is caused by the cumulative resources brought to bear (Blainey 1973; Siverson and Starr 1991). My analysis offers another reason for why coalition wars are so protracted—a change in just one domestic coalition may not be enough to change its side’s war strategy or war aims. For a parallel argument about civil war termination with multiple veto players, see Cunningham (2006). 23. To be sure, coalition shifts can also have the opposite effect, tossing out those who are hindering the war effort. These kinds of “hawkish” shifts will be addressed below.
notes to chapters 2–3
24. My argument accords with Snyder and Diesing (1977: 329), who argue that new ideas usually result from “a change of regime, or a shift in the balance of power within a regime, not from individuals changing their minds.” Similarly, Mendelson (1998) shows that the Soviet Union did not disengage from its war in Afghanistan until a coalition shift brought Gorbachev to power and tipped the coalitional balance of power towards reform. It was only after this coalition shift that new ideas could make their way onto the political agenda and become policies. 25. I thank Arthur Stein for this important point. See Croco (2008) for a related argument. 26. These scapegoating coalition shifts are actually cases of Goemans’ (2000a, b) misspecified punishment of a leader before the war ends. Because he includes punishment one year before the end of the war in the quantitative test of his model, his coding seriously blurs the causal relationship between leaders anticipating punishment and their decisions to end the war: punishment before the war’s end could be exactly what precipitated it to end. Therefore, he may be capturing some of the effects of my mechanism of coalition shifts. 27. In the interstate wars since World War II, there are three wars in which there are multiple primary belligerents on the same side: (1) China and the Soviet Union in the Korean War, (2) Israel, Britain and France in the Sinai War and (3) Azerbaijan and the Soviet Union in the Karabakh War. 28. Therefore, a dovish coalition shift may not lead to dovish policies, because the new governing coalition may not actually follow through on its dovish intentions. Similarly, a hawkish shift may not lead to hawkish policies. More generally, coalition shift directions must be coded by ex ante intent. Otherwise, the argument would be completely tautological, with a dovish shift by definition causing actions that move towards ending the war. In contrast, coding for ex ante intent opens the possibility that the new coalition may not follow through with its stated intentions. This is part of the reason why not every dovish shift will automatically cause the war to end. (Another reason has to do with how wide the gap is between the two sides’ bargaining positions, as will be explained below). 29. This is a good example of how the distinction between ex ante intent and subsequent behavior really matters in the coding of coalition shift directions. 30. A “reservation price” is the maximum price a buyer is willing to pay to buy a good or service, or conversely, the minimum price a seller is willing to sell a good or service. In the context of bargaining during war, a belligerent’s reservation price is the minimum terms of settlement it will accept. A belligerent will not accept an agreement that leaves it worse off than the results it could obtain through unilateral actions (Hopmann 1998: 47–50; Goemans 2000a: 22–23). Chapter 3 1. Books are even titled with this bias in mind, i.e. Korea: The War Before Vietnam (MacDonald 1986). 2. Nonetheless, even this new information is overwhelmingly being used to refine the picture of China’s intervention (i.e. Thornton 2000; Zhang 1995; Chen 1994, 2001; Park 1996a, 1996b). 3. The most important exception is Foot (1990). For example, Blair’s (1987) book devotes only 5 percent of its 1,000 pages to the last two-thirds of the war, while Goulden’s
318
notes to chapter 3
(1982) 650-page study devotes only 15 percent to the same period. Even Hickey’s (1999) “balanced” study gives only 30 percent to those last two years. 4. For a discussion of the US decision to intervene, see Paige (1968). 5. When Cumings (1981) first made his argument in the early 1980s, it was an important corrective to earlier depictions of the war as merely a “proxy” battle in the Cold War. Cumings correctly returned analysis to the war’s domestic roots, treating it as the civil conflict it predominantly was. However, his argument about decision-making on the Communist side has since been discredited by evidence from the Russian, Chinese and Korean archives. This evidence shows the Soviets’ role as “bankroller” gave it a significant voice in Communist decisions about prosecuting and ending the war. 6. The Correlates of War includes all actors in interstate wars—militarized disputes in which the total number of battle-deaths exceed one thousand—that are recognized as independent nation-states and are either declared war participants or suffer at least 100 battle-deaths. In contrast, in the quantitative analysis in Chapter 9, I limit my analysis to all belligerent states which either suffered at least 5 percent of the battle-deaths on its side in the war or served as the patron supplying the majority of the war material resources consumed by its side. In addition, I define a primary belligerent as the main decision-maker involved in that side’s decisions about prosecuting and ending the war. Most wars have only one primary belligerent on each side, but some wars, such as the Korean War, have more than one on each side—especially when there are great powers fighting together (see Chapter 9, n. 6). 7. The Soviets effected a complete changeover of their advisory personnel in North Korea in May 1950, replacing the military advisors with individuals with extensive combat experience. 8. Jung and Halliday argue that China not only had to pay “huge salaries” to these Soviet technicians, plus “extensive benefits for them and their families,” but also had to compensate the Soviet enterprises for the loss of their service while they were deployed in China. Moreover, these Soviet technicians were exempted from Chinese legal jurisdiction (2006: 349). 9. Some scholars argue China was required to pay for these Soviet military supplies. China purchased some of its armaments with the $300 million loan signed as part of the February 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty; that entire loan was allocated for military purchases from the USSR. Moreover, throughout the war, China paid for Soviet assistance mainly with food (Weathersby 1996; Jung and Halliday 2006: 348, 374; Stueck 1995: 217). In contrast, Vladimir Petrov (1994b: 28) argues the deliveries were bought on credit at discount prices, but Soviet leader Joseph Stalin did not extract payment for them. The question of repayment was raised later by one of Stalin’s successors, Nikita Khrushchev, whereupon China paid about $2 billion. For further discussion of Soviet aid to China, all of which suggests Chinese discontent, see Chapter 7. 10. For example, the definitive work to date, a two-volume set by Myung Lim Park (1996a, 1996b), has yet to be translated from Korean and focuses almost exclusively on the war’s first year. I am indebted to Unyoung Lee for her research assistance in translating sections for me. 11. For an account of the Communists’ involvement in South Korea from 1945 to 1950, see Cumings (1981); McCune (1950); Suh (1967); Scalapino and Lee (1972); Park (1996b); Shin and Shin (1993: 101–4).
notes to chapter 3
12. For example, the Soviet faction controlled the invasion plans. Yu Song-Chol claims the 1950 invasion plan was drafted by the Soviets and then “redrafted in Korean” by himself and other Soviet-born Koreans (Petrov 1994b: 64; Thornton 2000: 110–13). 13. At the beginning of the war, the KWP politburo included Chairman Kim Il-Sung, Vice Chairman Pak Hon-Yong, Kim Cha-ek, Pak Il-U, Hu Gai, Kim Sam-Ryung, Kim Du-Bong and Hun Hu. Of these, only Kim Il-Sung and Kim Cha-ek were from the Soviet faction (Park 1996b: 276). 14. Scholars agree, however, that Pak eventually took the blame for the decision to invade (Park 1995: 257; Kim 1996: 269; Petrov 1994b: 65). 15. Other criticized leaders include Manchurian faction members Choe Kwang and Yim Chun-Chu, Yanan faction member Kim Han-Jung and South Korean faction members Ho Song-Taek and Pak Kwang-Hui. 16. Chen Jian argues that Lim Ŭn is a pseudonym of a well-informed North Korean dissident living in Moscow, and thus his recounting of the internal factional struggles deserves extra weight (Chen 1994: 262, n. 82). 17. Mu-Chong was later turned over to the Chinese and given asylum in China, where he died of an illness in 1951 (Kim 1975: 179; Simmons 1975: 186). 18. Jung and Halliday argue instead that Kim was ready to end the war in June 1951, but Stalin and Mao overruled him (2006: 361–62). However, given the widespread resentment against the Soviet Union in North Korea after the decision to start armistice negotiations, it is doubtful that North Korea was ready to end the war just yet. 19. The central issue in the confrontation between Kim and Ho was whether to build a mass Communist party (as Kim wanted) or an elite party in the style of the Soviet Union (as Ho preferred). As chairman of the Inspection and Organization Committees, Ho was responsible for differentiating between loyal and disloyal party members and led an extensive purge of 450,000 lower-ranking party members (of 600,000 total). At the Fourth Plenum, Kim ordered that most of them be reinstated (Suh 1988: 123–25; Kim 1975: 180; Nam 1974: 89–91). 20. Ciphered telegram, Mao to Fillipov (Stalin), February 8, 1952, conveying January 22, 1952 telegram from Peng Dehuai to Mao and February 4, 1952 reply from Mao to Peng (Weathersby 1996: Document 102; also Sandler 1999: 246; Zhang 1995: 209). 21. Razuvaev’s first quarter 1952 working report, cited in Shen (2003–4: 19). 22. Ciphered telegram, Politburo decision, with approved message from Stalin to Kim Il-Sung, April 14, 1952 (Weathersby 1996: Document 104). Kim’s “effusive” response: “The government of the DPRK is moved by your fatherly concern about the urgent needs of the Korean people. Your proposal . . . which we accept with endless gratitude, is one more expression of the selfless fraternal assistance of the great Soviet people to Korea. . . . A grateful Korean people wishes you, dear leader and teacher, many years of life and health for the happiness of mankind.” Ciphered telegram, Kim to Stalin, April 16, 1952 (Weathersby 1996: Document 105). 23. Ciphered telegram, Kim Il-Sung to Stalin, July 16, 1952 (Weathersby 1996: Document 106). 24. Ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Fillipov (Stalin), July 18, 1952, conveying July 15, 1952 telegram from Mao to Kim Il-Sung and July 16, 1962 reply from Kim to Mao (Weathersby 1996: 108). 25. The last meeting Kim attended about war policy occurred in June 1951, when he
320
notes to chapters 3–4
traveled to Moscow to meet Stalin with Gao Gang, the Chinese Communist Party leader in Manchuria. At this meeting, the Communists shifted tactics to “negotiating while fighting.” After the meeting, Stalin cabled Mao about the visit “with your representatives from Manchuria and Korea,” suggesting he viewed Kim—in Jung and Halliday’s words—as “Mao’s satrap” (telegram quoted in Jung and Halliday 2006: 362). 26. See “Record of Conversation between I. V. Stalin and Zhou Enlai, 20 August 1952” (1996–97: 12–14). 27. For example, in addition to the neutral shift in December 1950 which sidelined the Chinese faction, Kim Il-Sung used the war as an excuse to purge the South Korean faction from leadership positions after the war. Three days after the armistice was signed, 12 members of the South Korean faction, including faction leader Pak Hon-Yang, were indicted on three counts of treason: spying for the US and UN forces, killing Communist revolutionaries in the South and attempting to overthrow Kim Il-Sung by military force. While their trial was in progress, Kim Il-Sung held the sixth joint plenum of the Central Committee in August 1953 and restructured the party, expelling most of the South Korean faction (Suh 1988: 126–39; Kim 1975: 181–82; Lim 1982: 198–99; Nam 1974: 92–100; Simmons 1975: 148). 28. Chang decided ultimately not to run, although he helped undermine his personal rival Yi in the vice presidential election by campaigning for Ham. 29. Rhee continued to sideline Yi in May 1953, during the Liberal Party convention, when he personally intervened to get Yi removed from the vice party chairmanship. Apparently, Yi’s control over the Youth Corps was simply too threatening for Rhee’s domination of the Liberal Party and the government (Kim 1975: 140–41).
Chapter 4 1. The moderates nominally won out in the political struggle with hardliner Andrei Zhdanov over the treatment of the Soviet zone in Eastern Europe after World War II, although many of Zhdanov’s concepts were implemented after his death (Ra’anan 1983; Dunmore 1984: 115). 2. Jack Snyder (1991: 246) argues this strategy failed, because the middle class was subject to counter-pressures as employees of the military-industrial complex. 3. William Taubman (1982: 197–98) argues some of his actions during the Korean War—including preparations for another round of high-level purges—suggest Stalin was progressively losing his grasp on reality. Stalin’s daughter, Svetlana, said her father “saw enemies everywhere. It had reached the point of being pathological, of persecution mania . . .” (Alliluyeva 1967: 196–97). Nikita Khrushchev spoke of “the sickness which began to envelop Stalin’s mind in the last years of his life” (1974: 246). There is also some evidence Stalin had become mentally ill and disoriented, which made it difficult for him to decide “who was a friend and who a foe” (Mastny 1996: 140). 4. There has been some debate about whether Stalin told Mao (visiting Moscow at that time) about his decision, but recent evidence suggests Stalin did not (Hao and Zhai 1993: 148; Noriyuki 1993: 160; Heinzig 1998). 5. The Soviets offered China a $300 million loan, at 1 percent interest, to be spread over five years—about one-tenth of the amount Mao is rumored to have requested. The entire loan was allocated for military purchases from the USSR. China only got one third of the first year’s tranche on the grounds the rest was owed for past purchases. In addition,
notes to chapter 4
China agreed to pay salaries and extensive benefits for Soviet technicians and their families who came to work in China, while compensating the Soviet enterprises they left for the loss of their service. These Russians were exempted from Chinese legal jurisdiction (Jung and Halliday 2006: 348–49). 6. That same week, to underscore the role Stalin expected China to play in the Korean War, he cabled Mao to urge for a quick signing of the proposed Sino-Korean Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance (Weathersby 2002: 13). 7. Telegram, Stalin to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, October 1, 1950 (Mansourov 1995–96: 114). 8. Telegram from Roshchin in Beijing to Fillipov (Stalin), October 3, 1950 (Mansourov 1995–96: 115–16). 9. Letter from Fyn-Si (Stalin) to Kim Il-Sung (via Shtykov), October 8, 1950, citing the text of his reply to Mao (Mansourov 1995–96: 116–17). 10. Ciphered telegram, Fillipov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong, June 5, 1951 (Weathersby 1996: Document 65). 11. On June 2, Mao invited Kim to visit Beijing and discuss the new strategy, because Kim was very reluctant to abandon hope for a total victory. While Kim was there, the Soviet Union took the first steps towards opening negotiations. A week later, Kim and Gao Gang, the CCP Northeast Party Secretary with close ties to the Soviets, traveled to Moscow to discuss the situation with Stalin (Weathersby 1998: 95–96; Stueck 1995: 217). In contrast, Jung and Halliday argue that Kim was ready to end the war by June 1951 and traveled to Beijing and Moscow to convince Mao and Stalin to start negotiations (2006: 361). 12. Telegram from Stalin to Mao, November 19, 1951 (Weathersby 1996: 72). 13. Malenkov, Khrushchev and Nikolai Bulganin were removed from the Council of Ministers (the state institution) and named to rotate as chair of Communist Party Presidium and Central Committee meetings, while Malenkov, Nikolai Pegov and Mikhail Suslov were named to rotate as chair of Secretariat sessions. Pegov was in charge of “selecting and distributing” party and state cadres (nomenklatura power), while Beria, Mikhail Pervukhin and Saburov were named to rotate as chair of the Soviet State Council of Ministers (Ra’anan 2006: 12–13). Thus, while Malenkov and Beria still had roles in the leadership, these plans for rotating chairmanships and including other leaders clearly diffused their influence. 14. Stalin may have been poisoned with warfarin, a blood thinner also used as rat poison, with Beria the most likely suspect. While a cerebral hemorrhage is still the most straightforward explanation for Stalin’s death, Western physicians who have examined the Soviet doctors’ official reports of Stalin’s last days say similar physical effects could have been produced by a five- to ten-day dose of warfarin, which had been patented in 1950 and was being aggressively marketed worldwide at the time (Brent and Naumov 2004: chapter 10; Medvedev and Medvedev 2003: chapter 1). 15. Because the KI reported directly to then-Foreign Minister Molotov, vital information was often addressed to Molotov and Stalin exclusively, bypassing the Ministry of State Security (MGB) and Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU) chiefs completely. With such an avalanche of information directed at them, neither Molotov nor Stalin had the time to digest it. Their analytical burden was complicated by the fact that the KI’s function was merely to cull out disinformation, not to forecast or discuss options based on the data. Most importantly, the KI replaced independent intelligence bureaucracies (and their com-
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peting analytical perspectives). In general, political intelligence dominated KI products, to the detriment of military and diplomatic intelligence. 16. There has been some debate about whether the troika was really Malenkov, Beria and Khrushchev, with Molotov only in charge of the foreign ministry to confer “stature and legitimacy” (Ostermann 2000; Ra’anan 2006: 23). This debate is beyond the scope of this analysis; the new regime—with Khrushchev and Molotov as the third and fourth members of the “collective leadership”—was ready to end the Korean War. 17. As early as March 9, Soviet intelligence officials sent a pessimistic report from Berlin to point out the “worsening class conflict in the GDR” (quoted without source reference, Ostermann 2000). For example, food shortages in East Germany were so severe that by April 1953, they had to institute food rationing with Soviet support (Stueck 1995: 327). 18. A number of declassified party documents and memoirs suggest Beria was even ready to abandon socialism in East Germany. When Beria was purged later in 1953, his colleagues charged him with, among other things, advocating the creation of a unified Germany as a “bourgeois, peace-loving state” (Connell 1992: 17, 27; also Ostermann 2000; Larson 1997: 50–53; Nogee and Donaldson 1992: 115; Richter 1994: 36). 19. Most quantitative analyses use a Polity2 score of –7 or –8 as the cut-off for dictatorships (down to –10), but Goemans classifies a regime as a dictatorship if it has a Polity2 score of –5 to –10—although on his scale this appears as a score of 1 to 6 (2000a: 56). Because the Soviet Union had a Polity2 score of –9 under Stalin and –7 under the successor regime, Goemans would code it a dictatorship during both periods. 20. Jung and Halliday also speculate Mao may have even been behind Stalin’s stroke. They report that Stalin, at his last dinner, “connected the failure to keep Yugoslavia’s Tito in the camp with the Communists losing the chance to win in Korea.” After dinner, Stalin read some documents, including “a report that his attempt to assassinate Tito had failed.” From this, they speculate “Stalin had suspected Mao of being a Japanese spy in the past, and was viewing Mao as a potential Tito. His obsessive mind may have been revolving around Mao, reflecting that getting rid of Mao would be just as daunting a task as trying to finish off Tito. Mao may have helped cause Stalin’s stroke” (2006: 368–69).
Chapter 5 1. For effects of McCarthyism during the Korean War, see Reeves (1997: 327–29, 347– 48); Whitfield (1991: 9–10); Fried (1990: 113–19, 128–30); Rose (1999: Chapter 5). 2. NSC-68’s full text appears in FRUS (1950, 1: 237–92). See also Etzold and Gaddis (1978: Chapter 7); Hammond (1962: 267–378); Wells (1979: 116–58); Siracusa (1983); Donovan (1974: Chapter 4); Bowie and Immerman (1998: 19–23); Taubman (1982: 198–202); May (1993a); Spalding (2006: 180–90). 3. Eastern commercial and financial interests had the most to lose if a balance of payments problem prompted the Europeans to restrict trade with the United States or establish closer trading relationships with their colonies or Eastern Europe (Fordham 1998: 43). 4. Although he is an unusual case, MacArthur’s removal is not coded as a coalition shift, because he held a purely military role in the coalition and I exclude from my definition of “coalition shift” any changes in coalition composition that involve purely military leaders. However, MacArthur is an unusual case. At the time of his removal, the Republican Party was actively courting him as a possible presidential candidate. More important-
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ly, MacArthur fits the definition of a coalition “veto player,” in that the Truman governing coalition could not have deescalated the war in 1951 unless MacArthur was removed. To be consistent in my coding, however, I do not code MacArthur’s dismissal as a domestic coalition shift.
Chapter 6 1. This reaction contrasts to Acheson’s vigorous arguments in 1945, while under secretary of state, against forcible repatriation of Soviet POWs to the USSR. Such repatriation at the end of WWII led to numerous prisoner suicides and mass imprisonment and executions for most Soviet returnees, a traumatic experience for many Americans who had authorized and implemented the policy (Elliot 1982: Chapter 5; Solzhenitsyn 1974: 243–80). 2. In the interim, the UNC was instructed on December 7 to pursue one-for-one exchanges of those willing to return home, but allow those “expressing a desire not be exchanged . . . to remain under the jurisdiction of their captors” (FRUS 1951, 7: 1277). 3. In mid-January, a meeting of mid-level CIA, State and Army officials concluded the Communists would probably break off negotiations if the United States insisted on voluntary repatriation. These officials warned “the crucial psychological problem would arise when the issue had to be faced: is this issue important enough to resume the war and run the risk of world war?” (quoted in Bernstein 1983: 279). 4. Edward G. Barrett of Public Opinion Affairs suggested the Truman Administration did not know how big the POW problem was and had not considered public opinion and “moral factors against our leaving our own POWs in enemy hands indefinitely.” Moreover, it had not accounted for the “thousands of additional casualties” that would occur if negotiations broke down over POWs. In addition, allied opinion polls indicated they would not support voluntary repatriation if it “became the real choice between a cease fire and war” (quoted in Stueck 1995: 261; Foot 1990: 90). 5. Frank Stelle of the Policy Planning Staff argued against voluntary repatriation because it violated the spirit the Geneva Convention (Bernstein 1983: 280). Given the UN’s limited control over the internal working of the POW camps in Korea, Stelle argued it was “impossible . . . to tell who really doesn’t want to be returned as opposed to who has been coerced into saying they don’t” (quoted in Stueck 1995: 259). 6. Assistant Secretary of State for UN Affairs John Hickerson made this argument (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 38). 7. The Communists disagreed with voluntary repatriation on the grounds that (1) it violated the Geneva Convention, which called for the exchange of all prisoners of war immediately at the cessation of hostilities, (2) it was an attempt to retain the majority of the prisoners and coerce them to stay in South Korea or go to Taiwan and (3) it was a political issue and thus should not have been brought up at the military armistice negotiations (Foot 1990: 96–97). More generally, the Communists were concerned about the ideological illegitimizing effects on their regimes, both domestically and internationally, if Communist POWs did not choose to return home. 8. The Koje-do riot was prompted by segregating prisoners into those who wanted to remain in South Korea and those who wanted to return to the North; 77 prisoners were killed and more than 140 were wounded, while one US soldier was killed and four wounded. Another riot occurred on March 13, during which 12 prisoners were killed and 26 wounded. The Truman Administration, fearing Communist allegations that the UNC
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was unable to protect prisoners, decided to withhold information about the incidents until mid-May, when they were finally leaked to the press (Hermes 1966: 239–40; Foot 1990: 119). 9. As a medical orderly who served in the UN camps noted, “Anybody who couldn’t make it up on the line was sent down to do duty [in the POW camps] on Koje-do. We ended up with the scum of the [US] Army—the drunks, the drug addicts, the nutters, the deadbeats” (Hastings 1987: 308). Or, as Ridgway admitted, “The personnel we could spare to take charge of the camps were not of a quality to ensure the alertness needed” (Ridgway 1967: 206). With only one US military policeman for every 188 prisoners, the majority of the guards were South Koreans, who were overtly hostile to the North Korean prisoners (Foot 1990: 109). 10. Ironically, despite his role in blocking Truman’s opportunity to consider all of the available options, Johnson later remembered, “It is my opinion that Truman staked his position in spite of many strong and defensible recommendations to the contrary, and in spite of the evident effect failure to end the fighting would have on the upcoming national election. It was the greatest act of moral and political courage in a President to which I have been witness” (Johnson 1998: 190). 11. After the Wage Stabilization Board voted to give labor a generous wage increase in March 1952, the steel industry petitioned the Office of Price Stabilization (OPS) to increase the price of steel. OPS turned them down, but the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) argued they should get an increase. When Truman refused to back ODM Chief Charles Wilson in the price increase, he resigned. His acting replacement offered to increase steel prices marginally, but the steel industry said they would only accept such a minor increase with a concomitant decrease in labor’s wage increase. In response, the union went on strike. Truman and Lovett, worried about maintaining the flow of equipment to Korea, felt pressured to keep the steel mills operating. The easiest way would have been to invoke the Taft-Hartley Act, which allowed for an 80-day work injunction for national emergencies, but this would have supported Sen. Robert Taft’s economic policies as he was campaigning to become the Republican presidential candidate. It also would have sanctioned labor, a key Democratic constituency. Instead, Truman seized the steel industry and turned the de jure administration of the mills over to the secretary of commerce. The steel industry sued the government. After the Supreme Court found the seizure unconstitutional, Truman returned the mills to private companies’ management; immediately thereafter, labor struck for 53 days with no appreciable impact on fighting in Korea (Hamby 1990: 594–97; Pierpaoli 1999: 160–72). 12. It also severed the Truman coalition’s last linkage with the liberal business community, after ODM Chief Wilson resigned over the issue. 13. The first proposal came from the Soviet assistant secretary general at the UN, Constantin Zinchenko, to the US delegate at the UN, Ernest Gross. Zinchenko said the prisoners refusing repatriation could be decided later or dealt with by the Red Cross societies of China, North Korea and the United States (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 364–67). The second proposal, from Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou to the Indian ambassador, K. M. Pannikkar, recommended non-repatriates be sent to a neutralized area and interviewed by representatives of the four neutral nations in the armistice supervisory commission (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 340–41). There was subsequent evidence that Pannikkar’s reports might not have been valid (Foot 1990: 133).
notes to chapters 6–7
14. The Progressive Party candidate, Vincent Hallinan, suggested both sides should agree immediately to a cease-fire, exchange willing prisoners and negotiate about the others afterwards. The Mexican president offered a similar solution, with one major difference—the unwilling repatriates, rather than staying in POW camps in Korea (as Hallinan proposed), would go to neutral nations and be allowed to work until a post-armistice conference settled their status (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 488–89). 15. In fact, Truman never intended to run again, as he wrote in an April 16, 1950, memorandum for record (Donovan 1982: 392–93; 1984: 169; Hamby 1990: 599; Goulden 1982: 605; Truman 1956: 517–18). 16. There has been much debate about the importance of the Korean War in the 1952 election. Most contemporary pollsters thought it was the decisive issue: Lubell (1956: 265) argues “the frustrations over Korea were the most important single propellent behind Eisenhower’s sweep,” while Graebner (1956: 106) contends, “Korea was the Achilles heel in the Democratic record and the General exploited it skillfully.” Others argued domestic politics was the key issue, and that Eisenhower’s personality, not the war itself, helped him win (Campbell, Gurin and Miller 1954). For an election overview, see Caridi (1968: 209–45); Truman (1956: 498–505); Savage (1997: 191–201); McCoy (1984: 281–310); Donovan (1982: 392–401); Ambrose (1983a: Chapters 25–27); Kepley (1988: 133–50); Bowie and Immerman (1998: 70–80). 17. Ultimately, after the armistice was signed, the UN Command returned 75,801 prisoners to the Chinese and North Koreans in August-September 1953, while the Communists handed over 12,773 prisoners to the UNC (including 3,326 Americans). This left about 23,000 non-repatriates—22,604 Communist prisoners and 359 UNC prisoners—who were moved to the neutral zone to learn about their rights and make a final choice about where to live. Very few of these non-repatriates changed their minds after they were interviewed by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. Most of the 21,820 Communist prisoners who chose not to return home were transported to Taiwan or South Korea, while the 347 UNC prisoners who chose to remain in Communist regimes went to China or North Korea. This group included 21 Americans and one Briton who went to the PRC (Foot 1990: 190–98). 18. The same Joint Chiefs and their chairman, General Omar Bradley, remained in their posts until August 1953, after the armistice agreement was signed. 19. Dingman (1988–89: 80–85) depreciates the importance of the May 20 meeting, arguing Dulles was absent and Eisenhower’s comments were tentative. Bundy (1988: 242) disagrees, arguing this was a decision of “great gravity.” 20. FRUS (1952–54, 15: 1068). There is evidence Nehru passed this message on to other states, including Britain, but it is unlikely it got passed to the Chinese (Pape 1996: 166; Foot 1988–89: 104; Dingman 1988–89: 86).
Chapter 7 1. Indeed, there was remarkable leadership stability between the Seventh and Eighth Party Congresses, in 1945 and 1956, respectively: only a handful of Central Committee members apart from Gao Gang and Rao Shushi were not reelected in 1956, and the overall order among top officials changed comparatively little. Gao and Rao were purged in 1954 after they tried to undermine Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi (Teiwes 1990: 157–76; Jung and Halliday 2006: 377–81).
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2. In contrast, some other scholars depict a more tyrannical view of Mao (Jung and Halliday 2006: 356). 3. In the Northwest Region, Peng Dehuai—who served as the First Field Army commander during the civil war—became commander of both the regional military command and the military administrative council (MAC). His political commissar during the war, Xi Zhingxun, became first secretary of the region’s party bureau and vice-chairman of the MAC. In the Southwest Region, Liu Bocheng—who served as the Second Field Army commander during the war—became commander of both the regional military command and the MAC. His political commissar, Deng Xiaoping, became vice-chairman of the MAC. In the East China Region, Chen Yi—who served as the commander of the Third Field Army during the war—became commander of the regional military command. His political commissar, Rao Shushi, became chairman of the MAC and first secretary of the region’s party bureau. In the Northeast Region, Gao Gang—who served as the political commissar of the Fourth Field Army during the war—became the top leader of all three structures (party, military command and MAC). Similarly, in the Central-South Region, Lin Biao—who served as the Fourth Field Army commander during the war—became the top leader of all three structures. 4. For comparison, in 1921, the Red Army made up only 13 percent of the Soviet Central Committee and had only one seat on the Politburo (Adelman 1980: 119, 121). 5. The civilian elites included three subgroups: (1) the “129 group,” who participated in an anti-Japanese student demonstration on January 29, 1936, (2) the “prison” cadres, 61 CCP leaders released from KMT prison in 1936, and (3) the “underground” cadres in North China white areas who organized the workers’ movement there. 6. Stalin left Mao in virtual isolation for the two-month visit, starting with an “intentionally chilly” reception at the train station (Petrov 1994a: 15–16). During the visit, Stalin apologized for his treatment of the CCP during the Chinese civil war and offered Mao a list of Chinese Communists who had been secretly working as Stalin’s agents. Even this sign of “friendship,” however, cut both ways: Stalin was showing Mao he had penetrated the CCP’s command structure. Mao believed the list included some of Stalin’s actual opponents and omitted some of the true moles (Petrov 1994a: 14–18; Chen 1992: 78–85; Mastny 1996: 88–91; Zubok and Pleshakov 1996: 58–62; Jung and Halliday 2006: 343–49). 7. See Chapter 4 for details about these unequal terms. 8. Even Jung and Halliday, who argue Mao wanted the Korean War, concede, “Mao, it seems, was not told the exact launch day” (2006: 355). In a 1956 conversation between Mao and Soviet Ambassador Pavel Yudin, Mao said that “concerning the Korean question, when I [Mao] was in Moscow, there was no talk about conquering South Korea . . . afterwards Kim Il-Sung was in Moscow, where a certain agreement was reached about which nobody deemed it necessary to consult with me beforehand” (Heinzig 1998). 9. On September 26, during a dinner party with the Indian ambassador, Gen. Nieh Jung-chen said the Chinese government “will not sit back with folded hands and let the Americans come up to the border” (quoted in Zhang 1992: 94–95). In a public speech in Beijing on September 30, Zhou threatened to intervene and said, “The Chinese people absolutely will not tolerate aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors savagely invaded by the imperialists” (quoted in Farrar-Hockley 1990: 214). On October 3, Zhou told the Indian ambassador that “the American troops are attempting to cross the 38th Parallel and to expand the war. If the American troops actually do that, we cannot sit idly by without making a response. We will intervene” (quoted in Milliken 2001: 145).
notes to chapter 7
10. Jung and Halliday argue instead Mao wanted the war and “prepared the ground for going into Korea by pretending to give America ‘fair warning.’” Referring to Zhou’s October 3 meeting, they argue, “choosing this roundabout channel, using an ambassador whose credit in the West was minimal, when it would have been perfectly simple to make an official statement, suggests compellingly that Mao wanted his ‘warning’ to be ignored: thus he could go into Korea claiming he was acting out of self-defense” (2006: 357). However, Jung and Halliday do not mention the previous two warnings, which included a public speech. 11. On September 30, Kim Il-Sung approached Chinese ambassador Ni Zhiliang with an explicit request for Chinese assistance in the war, while DPRK Foreign Minister Pak Hon-Yong traveled to Beijing to meet CCP leaders in person (Zhang 1993: 5; Chen 1992: 17; Chen 1994: 172). 12. For detailed discussions of these debates, see Chen (1989: 188–91; 1992: 18–23; 1994: 171–89); Zhang (1995: 79–85); Stueck (1995: 98–101); Zhai (1993: 187–99); Gurtov and Hwang (1980: 52–56); Pollack (1989: 218–22); Huo (1989: 213–38). 13. Some scholars argue Mao, without others’ input, had decided by October 2 to intervene, citing a telegram he drafted to respond to Stalin’s October 1 intervention request. However, more recent evidence suggests Mao did not send this telegram because CCP leaders had not reached a consensus about intervening (Chen 2001: 56). There are multiple versions of Mao’s message to Stalin in the Chinese records, but none carry Mao’s office staff ’s signature, indicating the time it was sent (as most of Mao’s telegrams do), and the telegram is not found in the Russian archives. Therefore, it is unlikely Mao ever sent the message (Shen 1996–97). In contrast, a Soviet diplomatic telegram to Stalin argued Chinese leaders believed they “should not enter the war in Korea because open warfare with the United States would delay China’s economic development and create popular discontent” (Christensen 1996: 164; Mansourov 1995–96: 115–16). 14. The opponents included (1) Premier and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai, (2) CCP Vice Chairman Liu Shaoqi, (3) Vice Premier and Finance Minister Chen Yun, the Politburo’s most important economic policymaker, (4) East China region leader Rao Shushi, (5) Northeast region leader Gao Gang, (6) Vice Chairman of the Finance and Economics Committee, Li Fuchun, (7) nominal military chief Zhu De and (8) Central-South region leader Lin Biao, who had been Mao’s choice to lead the forces in Korea but declared himself ill and unwilling to assume the post. Initially, only Peng Dehuai, Mao’s second choice to lead the troops in Korea, and Nie Rongzhen, acting chief of general staff, sided with Mao (Huo 1989: 213–18; Petrov 1994a: 26; Zhang 1993: 14; Hao and Zhai 1993: 154; Weiss 1981: 80–81; Chen 1994: 281, n. 78; Jung and Halliday 2006: 356). 15. This explains why, at the same time as China intervened in the war, the CCP began the “Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea,” with “beating American arrogance” as its central slogan. The CCP also initiated a nationwide campaign to suppress “reactionaries and reactionary activities” in China’s cities and countryside (Chen 2001: 59; Weiss 1981). The war also provided Mao “a perfect chance to consign former Nationalist troops to their death” (Jung and Halliday 2006: 356). 16. Gao was one of the most important leaders in the early 1950s. As the Northeast region leader, he had special connections to the Soviets, because his region bordered the Soviet Union, and they were extensively involved in major industrial projects there until 1955 (Gurtov and Hwang 1980: 45). Moreover, his region was one of China’s most industrialized, providing basic munitions and war materiel. With Soviet help, Gao rebuilt fac-
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tories, carried out land reform and entered into relatively beneficial trading relationships with the USSR. In short, he obtained experience in running a planned economy—one reason why he was appointed in 1952 to run the State Planning Commission. As a result, the Northeast region often set the pace for national reforms; during the war, many mass mobilization campaigns began there before expanding nation-wide (Fang 1998: 73–74; Teiwes 1990: 47; Weiss 1981: 117–18). 17. There are at least two competing versions of what happened next. The first version draws on translator Shi Zhe’s memoirs and interviews with a Zhou aide. In this version of events, Stalin and Zhou decided to draft a joint communiqué informing the Chinese Politburo that the Soviets would provide military aid and air support only by mid-December. Just as Zhou sent the cable to Beijing, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov telephoned Zhou to tell him the deal was off. Zhou then telegraphed Mao again to relay that the negotiations had failed. Mao was reportedly furious at the Soviet “betrayal at a time of real crisis” (Chen 1994: 199–200; Milliken 2001: 165; Shi 1992, 1993). The second version of events is advanced by Mansourov, based on Russian archival documents and interviews with Soviet participants. In this version, Stalin and Zhou never agreed to a joint communiqué (and a copy has never actually been found in either Russian or Chinese archives), although they did agree to eventual Soviet military assistance. Instead, Zhou cabled Mao that Stalin did not object to the CCP Politburo’s decision not to send troops to Korea (Mansourov 1995–96: 103). In other words, Mansourov argues Zhou falsely told Mao that the negotiations had failed. As Milliken notes, “If Mansourov is right, we have a divided Chinese leadership and the Chinese negotiators using their control over information about the negotiations to falsely portray the Soviet Union as refusing to make any real commitment to supporting China”(2001: 165). Given the previous discussion about Chinese coalition members opposing intervention—and the fact that Zhou was among them—the analysis here seems to support Mansourov’s assertion. 18. As Peng told Mao on December 19, “The temperature has dropped to minus 30 degrees centrigrade. The troops are very run down, their feet are incapacitated by frostbite, and they have to sleep in the open. . . . Most troops have not received coats and padded shoes. Their padded jackets and blankets have been burned out by napalm. Many soldiers are still wearing thin cotton shoes, and some are even bare-foot” (quoted in Jung and Halliday 2006: 360). 19. Mao compared his piecemeal strategy of attritting UN forces while negotiating to “eating niupitang bit by bit.” Niupitang (“cow skin candy”) was a sticky candy very popular in Mao’s home province, Hunan. Since it always stuck together in one piece, you had to cut it up and eat it a little bit at a time. In the same way, attritting the UN forces with small successes would lead to a big victory (Mao quoted in Zhang 1995: 155). 20. Telegram, Mao to Deng Zihui, Tan Zheng and others, October 19, 1950 (Li et al. 1992: 75–76; Zhang 1992: 109). 21. Telegram, Mao to Hu Qiaomu, November 17, 1950 (Li and Tracy 1992: 73, emphasis in original). 22. Telegram, Mao to Hu Qiaomu, October 21, 1950 (Li et al. 1992: 78). 23. The Three Anti Campaign (sanfan yundong), conducted from late 1951 to mid-1952, was an integral part of intense mobilization efforts and the party’s key vehicle for dealing with problems created by consolidating CCP authority in China’s cities. The CCP tried to extend the campaign to rural areas, but it disrupted agricultural production and was
notes to chapter 7
abandoned there. In January 1952, the CCP started the Five Anti Campaign (wufan yundong), which was directed against businessmen/bourgeoisie and addressed the ideological remolding of the intelligentsia (Teiwes 1993: 85; Jung and Halliday 2006: 320–23). 24. Two foreigners, Antonio Riva (an Italian) and Ryuichi Yamaguchi (a Japanese) were charged with trying to kill Mao with a bomb during National Day festivities in October 1950. The People’s Daily alleged that the assassination had been ordered by former US assistant military attaché Col. David Barrett, who had actually left China months before. “Two decades later Zhou apologized, in a vague way, about implicating him, and invited him back to China. This was an indirect acknowledgment that the accusation was faked” (Jung and Halliday 2006: 321). 25. Chen argues Chinese archival evidence shows that in early 1952 both CPV commanders and CCP leaders “truly believed” the Americans had used bacteriological weapons (2001: 110). 26. “Record of Meeting between Comrades I. V. Stalin and Zhou Enlai, 3 September 1952” (1996–97: 14; also Zhang 1995: 163). These figures—which Zhou shared with Stalin to persuade him to support an end to the war—are slightly higher than those reported in two official financial reports by Bo Ibo and Deng Xiaoping in 1953 and 1954. In those reports, military expenses in 1950 constituted 41 percent of government expenditures; in 1951, 44 percent; and in 1952, 26 percent (Weiss 1981: 63–64, 67). 27. The Chinese spent for the war effort 5 trillion yuan in 1950, 50 trillion in 1951, 25 trillion in 1952 and 13 trillion in 1953. Dollar figures were calculated using 1952 official exchange rates. In contrast, Robert Simmons argues China borrowed at least $2 billion from Moscow to finance the war (1973: 165). 28. For additional discussion of Soviet aid to China, all of which suggests Chinese discontent, see Simmons (1975: 180–82); George (1969b: 183–89); Weiss (1981: 94–96, 100); Eckstein (1966: 141–42, 324); Zhang (1995: 238–39, 302–3); Stueck (1995: 217). 29. Deng Xiaoping was the first to be transferred, in July 1952, followed shortly thereafter by Xi. Gao was transferred in late 1952, followed by Rao and Deng Zihui in January 1953 (Teiwes 1990: 20–21). 30. Teiwes argues the crucial trio was Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun and Deng Xiaoping, who shared “close and supportive” relationships that facilitated coordination on economic policy (Teiwes 1990: 30). 31. N. V. Roshchin, “Memorandum of Conversation with PRC Premier Zhou Enlai on July 24, 1951” (translated in Wolff 2000: 42). 32. Zhou, Chen and Li arrived August 17. Zhou and Chen left September 23, but Li remained in Moscow until the end of the war. Liu arrived October 10 and did not return to Beijing until February 13, 1953 (Weiss 1981: 129; Simmons 1975: 218). 33. Zhou said North Korea “was ready to accept the offer” of the United States returning 83,000 POWs, because they “believe that the continuation of the war is not advantageous because the daily losses are greater than the number of POWs whose return is being discussed.” Zhou also said US bombing of an electric power station on the Yalu River “had an impact on Korean morale and on their efforts to accelerate the struggle to achieve peace.” As a result, “among certain elements of the Korean leadership one can detect a state of panic, even.” Later, Stalin said the North Koreans “need our help and support” for the “bread situation,” a comment suggesting North Korea faced famine as well. See “Record of Conversation between I. V. Stalin and Zhou Enlai, 20 August 1952” (1996–97: 12–14).
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34. “Record of Conversation . . . 20 August 1952” (1996–97: 13). 35. “Record of Conversation . . . 20 August 1952” (1996–97: 13). 36. “Record of Conversation . . . 20 August 1952” (1996–97: 13). 37. The third discussion, on September 3, focused entirely on Soviet economic assistance and advice on the PRC’s First Five Year Plan. 38. “Record of Conversation between Comrade Stalin and Zhou Enlai, 19 September 1952” (1996–97: 17–18). 39. During Zhou’s visit, a leading Soviet theoretician, Pavel Yudin, chose to comment at length on Mao’s intellectual contribution to Marxist philosophy in Pravda. Yudin found that there were no major theoretical propositions in Mao’s work and stressed Mao’s intellectual debt to Stalin. This could be interpreted as Stalin’s enforcing an ideological hierarchy in the Communist movement, especially because after Zhou’s visit, throughout the rest of 1952 and 1953, Stalin’s economic thought was glorified in China. Stalin’s October 1952 speech, “On the Economic Problem of Socialism in the USSR,” became required reading for all Chinese economic cadres, and in December 1952, the CCP launched a national movement to study Stalin’s work (Simmons 1975: 218–19; Weiss 1981: 130–31). 40. Apparently, Zhou had recommended to the Indian ambassador that non-repatriates could be sent to a neutral area and interviewed by representatives of the four neutral nations in the armistice supervisory commission (FRUS 1952–54, 15: 340–41). There was subsequent evidence the ambassador’s reports might not have been valid (Foot 1990: 133). 41. Mao to Stalin via Semyonov (the chief Soviet military advisor in Korea), ciphered cable, December 17, 1952, and Stalin to Mao via Semyonov, ciphered cable, December 27, 1952, both quoted in Weathersby (1996: Document 111); Zubok and Pleshakov (1996: 72); Mastny (1996: 166). 42. Zhou was “honored” as the only non-Soviet pallbearer (Gurtov and Hwang 1980: 57; Jung and Halliday 2006: 369). 43. This Soviet document also stated “by that time the Koreans also showed a clear aspiration for the most rapid cessation of military activity.” “On the Korean War, 1950–1953, and the Armistice Negotiations” (1993: 17). Like Zhou, Kim Il-Sung declared that he fully agreed with the Soviet proposal and supported it being implemented as soon as possible: “A further dragging out of the existing situation is not in the interest of the DPRK or the PRC, or of the entire democratic camp.” Ciphered telegram from Kuznetsov and Federenko in Pyongyang, March 29, 1953 (Weathersby 1996: Document 113). 44. Diplomatic History Institute, PRC Foreign Ministry, “Important Events in Zhou Enlai’s Diplomatic Activities, 1949–1975” (quoted in Chen 2001: 112; also Stueck 1995: 327). 45. Renmin Ribao, March 31, 1953 (quoted in Chen 2001: 112). 46. China is classified as a dictatorship, because its Polity2 score during the Korean War is –8. 47. Lim states that Mao’s March 19 telegram to Zhou was quoted in Feng Xianzhi and Li Jie, Mao Zedong yu kangmei yuancho [Mao Zedong and the War to Resist America and Aid Korea] (Beijing: Central Documents Publishers, 2000), pp. 117–18.
notes to chapter 8
Chapter 8 1. Thus a dovish coalition shift may not lead to dovish policies, because the new governing coalition may not actually follow through on its dovish intentions. Similarly, a hawkish shift may not lead to hawkish policies. In fact, coalition shift directions must be coded by ex ante intent; otherwise, the argument would be completely tautological, with a dovish shift by definition causing actions that move towards ending the war. In contrast, coding for ex ante intent opens the possibility that the new coalition may not follow through with its intentions. This is part of the reason why not every dovish shift will automatically cause the war to end. 2. This is a good example of how the distinction between ex ante intent and subsequent behavior really matters in the coding of coalition shift directions. 3. If secondary shifts have any effect through the first mechanism, it may be through secondary hawkish shifts. As Chapter 3 suggested, hawkish secondary belligerents (i.e. South Korea) may have more influence as veto players than dovish secondary belligerents (i.e. North Korea) have in compelling their more powerful allies to settle. Therefore, secondary hawkish shifts may be able to impede the creation of an overlapping bargaining space by blocking primary belligerents from lowering war aims (at least temporarily). It seems less likely secondary dovish or neutral shifts could lead to changes in their side’s collective bargaining position, although these shifts may lead the secondary belligerent to sue for a separate peace. 4. The other permutations are dovish-dovish, hawkish-hawkish, neutral-neutral, neutral-dovish and neutral-hawkish. 5. Those who believe nuclear coercion was responsible for ending the Korean War include Eisenhower, Dulles, Admiral Joy and Sherman Adams. As Dulles told British and French allies in December 1953, “The principal reason we were able to obtain the armistice was because we were prepared for a much more intensive scale of warfare” using atomic weapons (Donovan 1956: 116). And as Adams writes in his memoirs: “Although not as blunt and specific as MacArthur had suggested, it was indeed the threat of atomic attack that eventually did bring the Korean War to an end” (Adams 1961: 48). See also Joy (1955: 161–62); Rees (1964: 418–20); Eisenhower (1963: 179–80). For more recent, scholarly interpretations of the content and success of Eisenhower’s policies regarding nuclear weapons and the end of the Korean war, see Dingman (1988–89); Caridi (1968: 270); Calingaert (1988); Foot (1988–89; 1991: 425–29); Pape (1996: 165–73); Keefer (1986: 267–89); MacDonald (1986: 189); Betts (1987: 31–47); Friedman (1975); George and Smoke (1974: 239); Kaufman (1986: 319–20); Bundy (1988: 239–43); Chang (1990: 88–89); and Gaddis (1997: 107–8). 6. FRUS (1952–54, 15: 1068). There is evidence that Nehru passed this message on to other states. The Indian prime minister told a British diplomat that if the negotiating terms were rejected, the United States would “break off the negotiations and have recourse to dramatic action” (Pape 1996: 166). But, it is not likely the message got to the Chinese as intended; as the British diplomat continued: “I gathered the impression, however, that the Indians had not passed this on to the Chinese” (Foot 1988–89: 104; Dingman 1988–89: 86). 7. For a detailed discussion of the last months’ negotiations, see Zhu (1998: 236–55). 8. Telegram, Mao Zedong to CPV commanders and Chinese negotiating team, June
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19, 1953, and telegram, Peng Dehuai to Mao Zedong, June 20, 1953, both quoted in Chen (2001: 116). 9. For more detail about the Communists’ last offensive, in response to Syngman Rhee’s unilateral release of the prisoners, see Zhang (1992: 138–41). 10. One reason that Chinese military leaders believed amphibious operations were likely under Eisenhower was his experience commanding the Normandy operation in World War II (Zhang 1992: 133). 11. On January 23, the Chinese People’s Daily reported that Eisenhower was contemplating increasing the size of the South Korean army, blockading the Chinese coast, using KMT forces to launch raids on the mainland, bombing Manchuria and using atomic weapons (Foot 1990: 180). 12. Zhang argues the Chinese were surprised after Eisenhower took office that the amphibious attack did not occur as expected (1995: 233–34). 13. Mao to Stalin via Semyonov (the chief Soviet military advisor in Korea), ciphered cable, December 17, 1952, quoted in Weathersby (1996: document 110). 14. Stalin to Mao via Semyonov, ciphered cable, December 27, 1952, quoted in Weathersby (1996: document 111); Zubok and Pleshakov (1996: 72); Mastny (1996: 166). 15. These gestures were explained in the previous section. They will not be recounted fully here, but to remind the reader, they include Malenkov’s “peaceful coexistence” speech and Soviet assistance in freeing Western civilians held captive by North Korea.
Chapter 9 1. Certainly, correlation is not causation. However, paired with the findings in Part II, which traced the causal mechanisms through case studies, the empirical analysis is suggestive of a causal relationship. 2. I excluded the Football War (1969) because it lasted 100 hours and resembled a riot more than an interstate war. Also, it appears that civilian casualties were conflated with the official battle-death count to meet the COW standards for inclusion. I have also excluded the Israel-Lebanon War (2006) because it was below the battle-death threshold. All other changes from COW are noted in Appendix A. 3. Using each belligerent as the subject, instead of having the observation be the war, also allows me to examine regime type with more nuance than Bennett and Stam (1996), who average the “institutionalized democracy” and “competitiveness of participation” scores of all participants in each war and consider them as a group. As Goemans notes about their analysis, because of this aggregation, “the substantive implications for individual regime types may well be difficult if not impossible to assess” (2000b: 566). In their 1998 article Bennett and Stam address this problem by recoding repression and democracy for each side, but this improvement does not fully address my concern, because in multilateral wars, there will still be aggregation of the belligerents. 4. All such corrections are noted in Appendix A. 5. While the theory ought to argue for the inclusion of all belligerents, in practice this created such a high cost for coding that it was impractical to implement. The 5 percent cut-off was selected before any coding began, to ensure that I did not retrospectively select some coding rule to enhance my findings. In practice, most of the states excluded as a result of this coding rule were states that contributed small force contingents (i.e. a single battalion) to the UN Command in the Korean War and the Allied Coalition in Gulf War
notes to chapter 9
I. While some of these smaller force contributors may have suffered from ally entrapment, their domestic political situations were generally so inconsequential for the primary belligerents’ war policies that their exclusion from the quantitative analysis does not really limit its findings. In other words, given the onerous amount of additional data required to code these belligerents, excluding them was the best balance between efficiency and explanatory leverage. 6. In the interstate wars in this dataset, there are three wars in which there is more than one primary belligerent on the same side: (1) China and the Soviet Union in the Korean War, (2) Israel, Britain and France in the Sinai War and (3) Azerbaijan and the Soviet Union in the Karabakh War. 7. There are three reasons why the semi-parametric Cox model is a less appropriate model for these data. First, and most importantly, the Cox model does not allow me to test the hypothesis that war has negative duration dependence. Given the importance of this hypothesis to the domestic coalition theory, this reason alone should suffice, but there are also statistical reasons for Cox’s inappropriateness. Second, the Cox model must use an auxiliary function to handle multiple failures at the same time. Because a state cannot end or continue a war unilaterally, multiple simultaneous failures are an inherent quality of the belligerent-level data in the post–World War II dataset. In other words, for each war, there must be at least two tied observations of failure. Third, unlike parametric survival models like Weibull, the Cox model only compares subjects at times of failure. This is a critical difference when using time-varying covariate (TVC) data, because there is a lower probability that Cox will pick up variance unless it occurs concurrently with failure. This can produce a significant loss of data on instantaneous variables (like coalition shifts). Given the Cox model’s prevalence and general acceptance, however, I also applied it to the data for comparative purposes. I used a robust Cox with the Breslow method of tie-breaking, with robust standard errors clustered on each war belligerent. Overall, I find that the coalition shift variable generally remains significant and in the predicted direction. However, in some specifications, the substantive effect of coalition shifts is muted. In other specifications, Cox does not report standard errors for the coalition shift coefficients, making it impossible to judge the variables’ statistical significance. Finally, in some specifications, the Cox model does not report the Wald χ2 statistic or standard errors for other control variables. These missing results may stem from multiple simultaneous failures or from collinearity. Either way, they provide further evidence that Cox is the wrong model for these data. 8. Because both the Cox and Weibull models are proportional hazard (PH) models, I checked to see if the PH assumption is violated in the data (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 1998, 2001; Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004: 131–37; Cleves et al. 2004: 175–95). Although the Cox model is inappropriate for my data, there are much better developed tests of the PH assumption for Cox than for parametric models (Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2001: 986). These tests indicate possible minor PH violations in some of the control variables— terrain, balance of capabilities, prior disputes and regime type. Following Slantchev (2004: 819, n. 6), it appears the Weibull parameterization of time may resolve the covariates’ timevariant effects. The choice of the Weibull over the Cox is confirmed by the much better fit of the Cox-Snell residuals for the Weibull; in fact, using adjusted variables (from the PH diagnostics) for covariates identified as potentially violating the PH assumption actually makes the fit of the Cox-Snell residuals for the Weibull worse.
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To choose among the various parametric models and to test for the Weibull’s assumption of monotonicity, I ran a gamma model, the most generalized parametric model. Because kappa <1, the choice of parametric forms was indeterminate without seeing the baseline hazard in graphical form. The graph showed a sharp spike upwards in the data in the first few days, followed by a curve that is monotonically decreasing. In other words, the risk of failure—the likelihood that the war will terminate—is extremely high after the first few days of the war and then gradually decreases over time. This generally accords with my understanding that the longer the war lasts, the harder it is to end. Of course, this graph does not pass the Weibull’s assumption that the baseline hazard is always monotonically decreasing. However, after the initial spike, the curve looks remarkably similar to the Weibull distribution. Given how close to the beginning of the war this spike appears, I ran the gamma specification again and varied the time of onset of risk of failure. As I delay the onset of risk of failure by a few days, the initial spike disappears and the baseline hazard increasingly looks like a Weibull parameterization. Indeed, the graph for the onset of risk of failure at t=3 closely resembles the Weibull distribution. With the onset of risk at t=3, the χ2 tests for kappa and sigma demonstrate that I can conclusively reject the choice of an exponential baseline (p = .0059), but I cannot reject the choice of a log-normal (p=.3495) or Weibull (p= .6040) baseline. Because (1) the Weibull is even more insignificant than the log-normal, (2) the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is lowest for the Weibull specification of all of the models—and the lower the AIC, the better the model’s fit—and (3) the graph clearly resembles the Weibull distribution, I feel comfortable with this parameter choice. In other words, it is apparent that using data with daily observations is driving the initial spike that makes the baseline hazard non-monotonic. This non-monotonicity makes sense given the finely grained time scale. No war in the entire Correlates of War dataset has lasted fewer than five days. This fact may be explained by at least two reasons. First, from an empirical perspective, it may be extremely difficult for belligerents to reach the 1,000 battle-death threshold any sooner, without resort to weapons of mass destruction. The battle-death threshold is currently measured at 1,000 per year, rather than 2.74 per day. Therefore, we may be excluding cases that actually have levels of violence equivalent to a 1,000-per-year rate, but never reach the full 1,000 battle-death threshold. Were we to use a finer-grained battle-death measure, we might observe wars that would terminate in the first few days. Second, from a theoretical perspective, it generally takes some time for states to fully mobilize their military capabilities and commit them to combat. Until they are committed, it is not possible for the states to achieve a decisive battlefield performance, which could provide information to help belligerents update their expectations and terminate the war. Therefore, the non-monotonicity could be the result of the battle-death coding rules and initial war mobilization. A fully specified model of war termination should ideally include a theory for when the onset of risk of failure begins. However, because one does not yet exist, any attempt to account for such an onset delay would only be ad hoc. Certainly, I could have chosen to run the models with an onset of risk at t=3, but I would have no strong theoretical reason for doing so. Therefore, in this situation, the slight data misspecification from using the Weibull distribution is countered by my strong theoretical reason for selecting it. The Weibull model is the best choice for clearly testing negative duration dependence, and
notes to chapter 9
being able to test this hypothesis is a crucial part of the research design. In short, because the apparent misspecification from using a Weibull distribution is slight and the choice is theoretically driven, I feel comfortable using the Weibull model. 9. For example, there were 37 war-years in which changes in the belligerents’ heads of state occurred in the Archigos dataset; some of these war-years included multiple shifts within and across belligerents. Yet only 24 get included when using Archlast in the TVC data or Archigos in the non-TVC data. 10. For example, some military leaders also hold cabinet-level posts or are part of a ruling junta, such as Kim Cha-ek, the North Korean battlefield commander during the Korean War who was also vice premier. Such military leaders are actually serving in political roles in the decision-making process and thus count as part of the political leadership. 11. There were two dovish shifts (9 percent) on the day of termination of their respective wars and an additional seven dovish shifts in the final tenth of their wars. The dovish shifts on the last day of war include Egypt in the Six Day War (1967) and Eritrea in the Eritrean-Ethiopian War (2000). 12. In addition to the US hawkish shift when Truman pushed out the last “economizer,” Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, and replaced him with George Marshall (see Chapter 5), the five other hawkish shifts during this period include two in Karabakh (day 103 and 115, Karabakh War); USSR (day 112, Karabakh War); South Vietnam (day 128, Vietnam War); and Iraq (day 133, Gulf War I). 13. This finding might seem almost tautological, because longer wars have more time for a shift to occur. However, as will be seen in the hazard analysis below, the longer the war, the temporally closer to the war’s end the coalition shift occurs. This cross-tabulation merely sets the stage for that analysis. 14. Actually, Cambodia did experience a shift in its domestic governing coalition, when Vietnam ousted Pol Pot and replaced him with Samrin’s puppet regime (the People’s Republic of Kampuchea). Because this coalition shift was “victor-imposed,” it is not included in the dataset. 15. All of the belligerents that fight on the same side of a war are coded with the same outcome. Thus, every belligerent on each side wins or loses together. 16. Although he introduced a strong theory for predicting the direction of the difference from the null, there was insufficient past empirical evidence to justify the more powerful, less stringent one-tailed test. 17. He included Korea (1950–53), Second Kashmir (1965), Attrition (1970), Lebanon (1982), Iran-Iraq (1980–88) and the Second Sino-Vietnamese War (1985–90) because Bennett and Stam (1996) had included them. 18. In his definitions, a “big loser” lost the war and suffered more than one standard deviation above the mean of the natural log of battle-deaths per 10,000 people, and “small loser” lost with fewer battle-deaths. 19. I also ran the specification with Goemans’ “losing mixed regime” variable as he originally coded it, but it was even less significant there. 20. This specification includes the 51 wars in Model A1, as well as three wars Goemans had eliminated: Greece-Turkey (1919–22), India-Pakistan (1948) and Cyprus (1974). Like Goemans, however, I eliminate six of the disaggregated wars of World War II included in Bennett and Stam (1996).
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21. The democracy and repression variables used here are drawn directly from Bennett and Stam (1996), which average, for each war, all belligerents’ scores for “institutionalized democracy” and “competitiveness of participation,” respectively. 22. Their data do not include the First Sino-Vietnamese (1979), Viet-Cambodian (1975–79), Gulf War I (1990–91), Karabakh (Azeri-Armenian, 1991–94), Indo-Pakistani (1999), Eritrean-Ethiopian (1998–2000), Afghanistan (2001) and Gulf War II (2003). 23. Survival models generate predicted failure times by pretending that each observation of the TVC is a new subject that has had that value from time 0. Thus, the same subject will have n different predicted failure times for n observations of the covariate. It is technically possible to derive a prediction for subjects with a TVC, but the process is tortuous and must be repeated manually for each individual subject (Cleves et al. 2004: 211–22). 24. Email correspondence with Dr. Isabel Canette, STATA statistician, September 9, 2008. 25. Military population, while moderately statistically significant, has virtually no substantive effect. 26. The missing belligerents include the Gulf War II belligerents because of missing NMC data and Karabakh because of missing regime type data. 27. As Bennett (1998, 1999) points out, testing for the presence of duration dependence must occur at the same time as testing for the effects of the covariates included in the model. As a result, the best tests of both duration dependence and variable effects will come from testing a model that includes covariates and a duration dependence parameter. 28. Of course, different lengths of wars may limit the usefulness of these descriptive statistics. A shift may have the same temporal distance from war termination, but have a very different ratio. To illustrate, a shift two days before the war’s ending is 71.4 percent of the way through a 7-day war, but is 99.9 percent of the way through a 2,000-day war. 29. A domestic coalition shift in Greece in the first half of the war was critical in helping Greek leaders lower expectations and end the war. Thus, it is coded yes qualitatively, although no coalition shift appears in the second half of the war. 30. The wars I code as supporting Reiter’s theory include: Russo-Hungarian (1956), Vietnam (1965–75), Viet-Cambodian (1975–79), Uganda-Tanzanian (1978–79), Afghanistan (2001) and Gulf War II (2003). 31. Although the elected Azeri President Abulfaz Elchibey wanted to end the war, the Karabakh dovish signal provided additional grist for Azeri hawks and fueled a constitutional crisis in Azerbaijan. The hawkish commander of the Azeri military forces, Suret Husseinov, had begun an uprising a few weeks earlier against Elchibey, who fled the capital. After the Karabakh dovish shift, the Popular Front government invited another hawk, Heydar Aliev, to become parliamentary speaker with “extraordinary presidential powers.” The next week, Aliev appointed Husseinov to be prime minister, a hawkish coalition shift, and Azerbaijan escalated the war. Like the interactions in the Korean War, this example provides further evidence of how domestic coalition shifts can interact between opposing sides of a war.
notes to chapter 10
Chapter 10 1. It has become axiomatic in recent research about war that regime type—especially democracy—matters. Most obvious is the literature about the democratic peace, which Jack Levy (1988) has called the closest finding to “empirical law” in international relations. The empirical evidence for this claim—that democracies do not fight each other—is quite strong (Bremer 1992; Doyle 1983; Oneal and Russett 1997; Ray 1995; Russett 1993). When disputes do emerge, democratic dyads choose more peaceful processes of dispute settlement than other state pairings (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997; Dixon 1994; Mousseau 1998). Yet, democracies are not immune from fighting wars with non-democracies (Maoz and Abdolali 1989), and democracies are particularly likely to be targeted (Gelpi and Grieco 2001; Grieco 2001; Leeds and Davis 1999; Reiter and Stam 2003; Rousseau et al. 1996). Moreover, democratizing states are more war-prone during the democratizing process (Mansfield and Snyder 1995). 2. For example, the French government created a very public position of “no compromise” in its war with Algeria. This position not only hardened the conflict with the rebel Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN), but it also misled the French public, colonists in Algeria (pied noir) and the French army, who eventually saw any contemplated negotiation with the rebels as absolute and indefensible betrayal (Smith 1995: 82). Thus, it is not surprising that a French politician noted, in response to his generals’ suggestion concerning a cease-fire in Algeria: “But that would be capitulation. And it would show that we had been wrong for seven years” (quoted in Rothstein 1970: 69). 3. For a good introduction to third-party intervention in interstate wars, see Smith (1995); Grieg (2001). For third-party intervention in civil wars, see Modelski (1961); von Lipsey (1997); Hampson (1997); Walter and Snyder (1999); Regan (2000, 2002); BalchLindsay and Enterline (2000). For a comparison of both kinds of intervention, see Long and Brecke (2003). 4. Third-party intervention can create obstacles to peace, as well. For example, mediators with roles beyond helping belligerents come to a voluntary agreement of their own making can be accused of partiality and bias. A “pure” mediator who is perceived as biased is an obstacle to peace, as Count Folke Bernadotte was in the Palestine War and the United Nations was in the Iran-Iraq War (Smith 1995: chapter 8). 5. I thank John Schaldach for helping me develop this example. 6. Barack Obama, “Cutting Costs and Covering America: a 21st Century Health Care System.” Speech at the University of Iowa, May 29, 2007. Transcript available at http:// www.barackobama.com/2007/05/29/cutting_costs_and_covering_ame.php, accessed Nov. 15, 2008. 7. “Background Questions and Answers on Health Care Plan, Obama ’08.” Available at http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/Obama08_HealthcareFAQ.pdf, accessed Nov. 15, 2008. 8. Quoted at http://abundance.org.uk/science-advances-funeral-by-funeral-a-collection-of-quotions-on-obsticles-to-scientific-enquiry, accessed April 29, 2008. 9. I thank Arthur Stein for pointing out this similarity to me. 10. Similarly, there are also cases on the other side of this coin, where coalition shifts do not result in a policy change. As my coalition shift coding rule made clear, the new governing coalition may not always follow through on its stated intentions.
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11. For example, in the c urrent war in Iraq, the number of attacks on the Iraqi police forces increased. Did this mean they were ineffective? Not when these statistics were viewed within the context of the insurgency. The insurgents only started attacking the police when they became a threat to the insurgents; thus, an increase in Iraqi police deaths actually meant they were more—not less—effective. I thank Tammy Schultz for this example. 12. This recommendation points to a contradiction that often exists between leaders’ stated reasons for fighting (“it’s in the national interest”) and their private incentives for war. Since Kant, scholars have noted that war is rarely in the interests of the people risking their lives to fight. I acknowledge that demonizing the enemy is often the way leaders try to get around an open and honest discussion of the war’s cost-benefit calculation.
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Index
Accelerated failure time (AFT) models, 257 Acheson, Dean, 122, 123–24, 125, 128, 129, 139, 160; Cold War policies, 136, 145; as Europe-firster, 126, 133, 142; Asia policy, 130–32, 134, 135–36; POW repatriation, 151–52, 153–54, 159, 162 Advisors: Soviet, 71–72, 101, 109, 318nn7, 8 Afghanistan, 7, 71, 280, 282, 296, 317n24 AFT, see Accelerated failure time models Airfields, 69 Air force: Soviet, 72–73, 103–4, 139 Alexander II, 253 Algeria, 7, 48, 282, 337n2 Allies: entrapment to, 47–48 Allison, John, 135 Ammunition: Soviet supply of, 72 Angola, 7, 281 Anticommunism: and POW repatriation, 159–60; US, 124, 125–26, 127–29, 130–31, 153, 162, 274 Archigos project, 15, 255; dataset, 244–47, 257–58, 335n9 Argentina, 34 Armenia, 266–67 Armistice negotiations, 65, 68, 70, 78, 236; China and, 75–76, 188, 197–98, 200, 202, 204–5, 330n40; North Korea and, 79, 80; Norway and, 224–25; nuclear weap-
ons threats, 218–21; POW repatriation, 69, 151–52, 155, 157–58; South Korea and, 83, 86, 88; Soviet Union and, 104–5, 206–7, 225–26, 230; US public opinion on, 162–63 Arms suppliers: Soviets as, 71, 72 Asia, 133; US policy, 146, 148 Asia-Firsters, 126, 135, 147 Assumptions, 292–93 Athens, 7 Atlee, Clement, 145 Atomic weapons, 114, 130 Attrition War, 53 Azerbaijan, 317n27, 333n6, 336n31 Azeris: in Karabakh War, 267, 336n31 Baburian, Karen, 267 Barbour, Walworth, 142 Bargaining models, 14, 23, 313n4; coalition shifts and, 277–78; regime types, 24–25, 278–79 Bargaining positions, 292; coalition shifts and, 56–60, 212–18, 232–33, 277–78 Bargaining space, 8–9, 23, 49–50, 227; coalition shifts and, 56, 58, 213, 214, 215, 218, 265 Barrett, Edward W., 131 Battle of Bosworth Field, 7, 281
384
index
Battles: Korean War, 3–6 Bayesian models, 48, 269, 313n4; hazard analysis, 251–60; indicators and metrics in, 38–39; information obstacles, 42–44; updating processes, 23–25, 50, 51, 120, 172, 248, 262, 263, 279; war termination, 8–9, 19–20, 27 Begin, Menachim, 53 Belief system defense, 41 Bennett and Stam’s model, 251, 253, 255 Beria, Lavrentii, 94, 106, 107–8, 116, 321nn13, 14, 322nn17, 18; post-Stalin rule, 112–14 Biases: as information obstacles, 40–44, 293, 294 Biological warfare: accusations of, 202, 329n25 Bloody Ridge, 5 Bohlen, Charles, 132, 135, 171, 219, 221, 225 Bolivia, 7 Bolshevik Revolution, 7, 53 Bolte, Charles L., 141–42 Bombing campaign: US, 160–61, 164, 165, 171, 316n17 Bosnian civil war, 71 Bradley, Omar, 124–25, 325n18 Brest Litovsk treaty, 7, 53 Briggs, Ellis, 86 Bulganin, Nikolai, 116, 31n13 Burma: and CCP, 97 Bush Administration, George W.: on health care, 287–88 Cambodia, 249, 335n14 Campaign for Truth, 153, 158 Cankao Xiaoxi (newspaper), 189 Capital: expenditure as entrapment, 46– 47; political, 44–45 Case studies, 11–12; historical, 13–15 Casualties, 188, 314n4; Korean War, 4–6, 65, 68, 70, 141, 162; public opinion, 173–74, 315n13 CCP, see Chinese Communist Party Cease-fire negotiations, 68 Central Committee (CCP), 181 Central Committee (Soviet Union), 106 Central Committee Presidium (Soviet), 108, 113
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 122, 138, 143 Chaco War, 7 “Chance for Peace” speech, 225, 232 Chang Myon, 82, 84 Chang Taek-Sang, 84, 85, 320n28 Changchun, 97 Chen Yun, 179, 185, 194, 195, 196, 197, 327n14, 329nn30, 32 Chiang Kai-Shek, 128, 129, 135, 142, 146, 159, 205 China, 13, 16, 17, 47, 65, 72, 173, 278, 279, 326n9, 330, 330n46; coalition shifts, 230, 231–32, 273, 284; domestic governing coalition in, 178, 195–96, 325n1, 326n3; and Eisenhower’s policies, 218–21, 230– 31, 332nn10, 11, 12; and Korean War, 67– 68, 70, 74, 75–76, 79, 141, 317n27, 321n6, 327nn13, 15, 333n6; Korean War costs of, 192–94, 329n27; Korean War intervention, 138–39, 183–87; Korean War strategy of, 197–98, 200–207, 230–31; leadership elites in, 181–82, 195, 326n5; mass mobilization, 189–91; and North Korea, 75, 172, 327n11; nuclear weapons, 117–18; POW issues for, 69, 198–99, 324n13, 325n17; and Soviet Union, 73, 96–98, 100, 103–4, 179, 196–97, 201–2, 208–9, 232, 274–75, 285, 318nn8, 9, 320–21n5; and Stalin, 73, 96–97, 199–200, 285; and United States, 105, 122, 124, 128, 129, 142, 146–47; and Taiwan, 101–2 Chinese: as Korean War casualties, 4–5, 6; as POWs, 155, 156–57, 158–59 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 327n15, 328–29nn23, 25; first Five-Year Plan, 196–97; leadership in, 179–82, 195–96, 325n1; PLA leadership and, 194–95; Soviet Union and, 96, 97–98, 326n6 Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV), 72, 75, 184, 193, 328n18, 329n25; counterattack by, 187–88; mobilization of, 189–90 Cho Pyung Ok, 82, 83 Choe Yong-Gon, 76, 77, 79 Chong Chun-Taek, 77 Chorwon Valley, 303 CIA, see Central Intelligence Agency Ciaravino, Jerry 3
index Citizens’ Army incident, 82 Civilians: in Korean War, 70, 224 Civil wars, 7, 71, 183; termination of, 8, 281–84 Clark, Mark W., 69, 86–87, 125, 166, 168, 171, 231; on POW exchange, 205–6 Cleophon, 7 Cline, Ray, 132 Clubb, Edmund, 139, 141, 143 Coalition-building, 30–31 Coalitions: domestic, 7–11; foreign policy, 126–29; international, 284–85; politics of, 28–29. See also Coalition shifts; Domestic governing coalitions Coalition shifts, 301, 314n7, 316nn21, 23, 337n10; and bargaining positions, 212– 18, 277–78; Communist, 223–27; directions of, 54–58, 211–12, 263–69, 317n29, 320n27, 331n2; domestic, 51–54, 269–71; hawkish v. dovish, 233–34, 240–41, 275–76, 317n28, 331nn1, 3, 335nn11, 12, 13; hazard analysis, 256–60, 263; health care policy, 288–89; international, 284–85; multiple, 13, 31–33; North Korean, 76–78, 80–81; and overcoming obstacles, 50–51, 60–61; regime types and, 278–84; signaling and, 58–60, 221–33; South Korean, 82–88; Soviet, 91, 112–15, 118–19, 201, 206, 209, 317n24; third-party intervention and, 285–87; US, 121–22, 165, 218–21; and war duration, 248–50; war level and, 261–63; war outcome and, 250–51; and war termination, 239–40, 273; in Weibull model, 244–51; since World War II, 308–12 Cold War, 16, 94, 111, 150, 318n5; US policy, 126–29; US rearmament, 17, 121, 136–37, 143–44, 158, 172–73, 274 Collins, J. Lawton, 125 Committee of Information (KI), 109–10, 111, 321–22n15 Communism: US containment of, 124, 148, 173 Communists, 14, 87, 141, 211, 278; armistice negotiations, 68, 78; Korean War, 75–76; POW repatriation, 69, 70, 84, 156–57, 323n7; Soviet control of, 73, 178; and US coalition shifts, 227–33; and US nuclear
weapons threats, 218–21. See also China; North Korea; Soviet Union Compromise, 21 Constitutiences, 47, 288 Cost-benefit analysis, 301, 314n4; and information obstacles, 287–88 Cost sensitivity, 33 Council of Ministers (Soviet), 108, 321n13 CPV, see Chinese People’s Volunteers Crimean War, 253 Cyprus War, 71, 336n29 Czechoslovakia, 106 Datasets: Archigos, 244–47, 257–58, 335n9; interstate war, 305–7; war-level, 241–42 Decision making, 13, 32, 39, 80–90, 121; by belligerents, 16–17; Chinese, 180–81, 196, 197, 206–7; coalition shifts and, 211–12; information flow, 37–38, 283; information obstacles in, 293–94; internal politics, 270–71; Koreas, 74–75; North Korean, 76–80; Soviet, 73, 273; Truman Administration, 122–26, 134 Defense: Europe-first, 142–43; US commitment to, 81–82, 98, 128, 136–37, 143–44 Defense Production Act, 136–37 Demilitarized zone (DMZ), 303 Democracies, 280, 294, 337n1; terms of settlement, 277–78; war duration, 32–33 Democratic Nationalist Party (ROK), 81 Democratic National Party (DNP), 83, 85 Demonstrations, 84, 85, 86 Deng Hua, 228 Deng Xiaoping, 182, 195, 326n3, 329nn26, 29, 30 Deng Zihui, 195, 196, 329n29 Dependence: Chinese, 178 Dictators: as rational actors, 115 DMZ, see Demilitarized zone DNP, see Democratic National Party Dodd, Francis, 158, 160 Dodge, Joseph, 226 Domestic governing coalitions, 7–11, 30, 239, 315n14, 336n29; China’s, 179–82, 183–87, 188, 195–97, 201–2, 203, 274–75, 325n1; civil war termination, 281–84; Communist, 223–27; dynamics of, 297– 99; Eisenhower’s, 165–71; entrapment
386
index
obstacles for, 44–48, 294–96; hazard analysis of, 256–60; information biases of, 151–58; information obstacles for, 36–44, 292–94; and interstate wars, 241– 42; North Korea’s, 76–77, 80–81; overcoming, 49–51; policy change, 289–90; preference obstacles of, 34–35, 100–108, 290–92; shifts in, 9, 31–33, 51–54, 212–18, 221–33, 239–40, 268–71, 273, 275–76; South Korean, 82–88; Soviet, 91–95, 99–100, 112–15, 118–19, 231–32; strategic interactions, 299–301; Truman’s, 122–26, 133–47; US, 121–22, 133–47, 218–21, 230– 31; and war level, 261–63; since World War II, 308–12 Doves, 22, 301; coalition dynamics, 297–99; coalition shifts, 55, 57, 58, 212–18, 240– 41, 317n28 DPRK, see North Korea Du Ping, 190 Dulles, John Foster, 126, 166, 168, 171, 219, 221, 225, 227, 325n19, 331n5 Duration dependence, 336n27; negative, 27–28, 240 Effort justification, 41 Egypt, 262, 335n11 Eisenhower, Dwight, 17, 70, 114, 210, 325n19; “Chance for Peace” speech, 225, 232; China’s response to, 200, 204, 205, 230–31, 332nn10, 11, 12; election of, 164–65, 234, 325n16; hawkish shift, 229, 235–36; and Korean War, 121, 151, 169–71, 175–77, 223, 226–27, 274; nuclear weapons’ threats, 168, 218–21, 331n5; and South Korean politics, 86, 87, 88 Elections: Korean, 82; peacemaking and, 298–99; South Korean, 83–84, 85; US, 162, 163, 164–65, 204, 325n16 Elites: behavior of, 22–23; Chinese, 180, 181–82, 326n5; manipulation of public opinion, 21–22, 45, 283; US health care, 288–89 Elizabeth, Empress, 7 Enemies, 45, 287 Engen, Hans, 224–25, 230 Entrapment obstacles, 10, 53, 60–61, 176, 207–8, 272, 279, 284, 288, 300; China’s,
178–79, 197–202, 207–9; for domestic governing coalitions, 44–48, 283; Korean War, 120–21, 274–75; NSC-68 mindset as, 129–47, 223; POW repatriation as, 151, 158–64, 171–72; policy changes, 294–96 Eritrea, 249, 335n11 Espionage: Cold War, 111 Ethiopia, 249, 335n11 Europe: defense of, 142–43, 144–45 European Recovery Plan (Marshall Plan), 128 Europe-firsters, 126–27, 142–43 Expectations, 314n9; changes in, 49–50, 273; during war, 23–24 Extreme value cases, 13 Factions: civil war, 285 Factories: aircraft, 72 Fair Deal policies, 126, 127 Falklands War, 34 Famine, 78–79, 82 Fechteler, William, 154, 157 Five Anti Campaign, 191, 194, 328–29n23 Five-Year Plans: Chinese, 196–97, 232 Foreign intelligence: Soviet, 109–10, 113–14 Foreign policy, 9, 30; Soviet, 93, 94–95, 99; Truman’s, 122, 124, 125–26; US, 98, 126–29, 144–45 Forrestal, James, 126 France, 7, 48, 224, 282; Sinai War, 71, 317n27, 333n6 Gahal Party, 53 Gambling for resurrection, 46 Gao Gang, 185, 186, 194, 195, 200, 204, 319– 20n25, 321n11, 325n1, 326n3, 327–28nn14, 16, 329n29 Gaulle, Charles de, 7, 282 Geneva Convention: POW repatriation, 152–53, 161, 323nn5, 7 German Democratic Republic (GDR), 130; Soviet Union and, 113–14, 322nn17, 18 Germany, 7, 313–14n6 Goemans’ model, 251, 253, 254, 255, 279 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 7, 217, 282, 296, 317n24 Great Britain, 82, 124, 145, 160; Korean War, 68, 140, 224; Sinai War, 71, 317n27, 333n6
index Greece, 127; Cyprus War, 71, 336n29 Groupthink, 35, 42, 283 GRU, see Soviet Military Intelligence Guerilla campaigns: civil war, 282–83 Ham Tae-Yong, 85, 320n28 Hawks, 22; coalition dynamics, 297–99; coalition shifts and, 55–60, 212–18, 240– 41; entrapment bias, 44–45; information biases, 40–41; Korean war, 150–51, 169, 170, 174, 235–36; South Korea as, 228–29 Hazard models: Bayesian models, 251–60; domestic coalition shifts, 263–69; variables in, 243–47 Heads of state: changes in, 254–56, 266–67 Health care: US policy changes and, 287–89 Heartbreak Ridge, 5 Henry VII, 7, 281 Hickerson, John, 161, 323n6 Hiss, Alger, 129, 130 Ho Chi Minh, 98 Ho Ka-I, 78, 319n19 Hong Myong-Hui, 77 Hoover, Herbert, 127 Hull, John E., 154–55 Humphrey, George, 226 Ideology: coalition politics, 28 Inchon, 67, 103, 137, 230 India: Korean War negotiations, 68, 86, 88, 200, 324n13, 330n40, 331n6 Indicator metrics: information and, 293, 294 Indicators: information flow, 38–39 Indochinese War, 98 Indo-Pakistani War, 286 Industrialization: Chinese, 192–93, 194, 204 Information, 189, 316n15; coalition shifts and, 53, 301; information biases, 40–44, 139–40, 316n16; quality of, 36–37; Soviet control of, 109–12, 273–74 Information flow, 316n16; organizational issues, 37–38 Information obstacles, 10, 35, 151, 272, 274, 279, 316n16; civil wars, 282–83; domestic governing coalitions, 36–44, 53; major
policy change and, 287–88; policy change and, 292–94; POW repatriation, 152–58; Soviet, 109–12; strategic interactions, 299–300; United States and, 120, 121, 139–41, 176, 223–24 Insurgent groups, 284, 338n11 Intelligence community, 321n15; preference obstacles and, 291, 292 Interest groups, 30 Interests, 292, 301 Internal Security Act (1950), 137 International Court of Justice, 161 Internationalists: Europe-first, 126–27, 128 Intervention: third-party, 285–87, 337n4 Invasion plan: North Korea’s, 71–72 Iran-Iraq War, 295, 337n4 Iraq war, 295, 338n11 Isolationists, 127 Israel, 53, 262, 317n27 Italy, 7 Japan, 36, 76; US foreign policy, 98, 99, 124 JCS, see Joint Chiefs of Staff Jenner, William, 145 Jessup, Phillip, 142 Johnson, Louis, 122, 126, 132, 136, 137, 335n12 Johnson, U. Alexis: POW issue, 154–55, 156, 324n10 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 142, 325n18; Korean War, 135, 138, 139, 143, 168–69, 170; on POW repatriation, 152, 156; under Truman, 122, 124–25, 136 Kaesong, 68 Kaganovich, Lazar, 94 Kang Kon, 77 Kapsan guerilla fighters, 76 Karabakh War, 266–67, 317n27, 333n6, 335n12, 336n31 Kennan, George, 132, 142, 225 Kennedy, Joseph P., 127 Keyserling, Leon, 132 KGB, 111 Khan, Ayub, 285 Khrushchev, Nikita, 93, 102, 107, 113, 116, 318n9, 320n3, 321n13, 322n16 KI, see Committee of Information
388
index
Kim Cha-ek, 77, 78, 319n13, 335n10 Kim Il-Sung, 70, 72, 89, 114, 184, 229, 319nn13, 18, 22, 319–20n27, 321n11, 327n11; chain of command, 76–77; Chinese and Soviet power and, 75, 79– 80; leadership of, 77–78, 80–81, 319n19; and Soviet Union, 98–99, 101, 183, 201, 330n43; and Stalin, 73, 95–96, 103, 104, 109, 319–20n25 Kim Jun-Yun, 83 Kim Song-Su, 83 Kim Tu-bong, 76 Kim Yol, 77 KMT, see Kuomintang Knowland, Senator, 159 Kochang incident, 82 Koje-do island camp: POW riots at, 155, 158, 160, 323–24nn8, 9 Korean Democratic Party, 81 Korean Peninsula, 66 (map); reunification, 137, 138 Korean War, 35, 65, 234, 236, 279, 300, 303, 323n2, 317n27, 327n17, 330n40, 331n5, 333n6; casualties in, 4–6; China’s role, 178–79, 182, 183–94, 197–209, 230–31, 274–75, 327nn10, 11, 13, 328n18, 329n27; Communist coalition shifts, 223–27; decision-making in, 89–90; domestic coalition shifts during, 221–33, 273, 284; Eisenhower’s election and, 164–65, 210, 325n16; Eisenhower’s policies on, 165– 71, 176–77, 218–21, 226–27, 235; entrapment obstacles in, 120–21; hawkish constituencies, 150–51; North Korea’s role in, 75–81, 319n18; Old Baldy, 3–5; overview of, 67–70; players in, 13–15; South Korea’s role in, 81–88; Soviet Union’s role in, 70–73, 95–96, 97–108, 112–19, 290–91, 318nn5, 9, 319n12, 320n3, 321n6; terms of settlement, 277–78; Truman’s policies on, 123–26, 129–39, 140–47, 148–49, 151–64; US role in, 120, 132–33, 171–76, 316n17 Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), 76, 78, 319n13 Kosovo, 285 Kremlin Doctor’s Plot, 106, 108, 113 Kuomintang (KMT), 99, 181, 185; Mao’s
opposition to, 101–2; Stalin’s support of, 96–97; US and, 128, 129, 166, 184, 332n11 KWP, see Korean Workers’ Party Leadership, 27, 41, 133, 279, 284, 320n27; changes in, 151, 239–40, 254–56, 266–67, 313n3; CCP, 179–82, 195–96, 325n1, 326n3, 327–28n16; coalition dynamics, 297–99; entrapment obstacles, 44–46, 294–96; Kim Il-Sung’s, 77–78, 89, 335n10; Mao Zedong’s, 180–81, 202–7, 228; obstacles to war termination, 60–61; political capitals of, 44–45; postStalin, 112–15; as preference obstacles, 34–35; Rhee’s, 81–88, 89; Soviet, 92–95; Stalin’s, 105–8, 118; strategic interactions, 299–301; war termination and, 9–11, 314n5 Lebanon War, 71, 262 Lenin, Vladimir, 7, 53 Li Fuchun, 194, 195, 197, 327n14 Li Kenong, 75, 79, 228, 329n32 Liberal Party (ROK), 82, 83–84 Lin Biao, 185, 326n3, 327n14 Liu Shaoqi, 97, 179, 182, 194, 197, 325n1, 327n14, 329n32 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 164 “Logrolling,” 29 Losing party, 20–21 Lovett, Robert A., 122, 152, 152, 161, 162 MacArthur, Douglas, 67–68, 125, 135, 136, 137, 140, 230, 231, 235; on Chinese entry into war, 139, 141; insubordination and removal of, 145–46, 322–23n4; Korean War strategy, 142, 143 McCarran, Pat, 129 McCarthyism, 123–24, 129, 130, 148, 151 McClure, Robert, 152 Malenkov, Georgii, 94, 106, 107, 108, 116, 224, 225, 321n13, 322n16; post-Stalin rule, 112–14 Malik, Jacob, 68, 78 Malone, George, 135 Manchuria, 72, 96, 97, 138, 186, 319n15 Mao Anying, 182 Mao Zedong, 67, 102, 109, 189, 197, 329n24;
index and Kim Il-Sung, 80, 101, 321n11; and Korean War, 78, 79, 80, 104, 186–87, 188, 192–94, 202–7, 327nn10, 13, 15, 328n19; leadership of, 179, 180–81, 182, 196, 228; and North Korea, 75, 80, 103; nuclear weapons, 117–18; and Soviet Union, 96, 114, 201, 326n8, 330n39; and Stalin, 73, 97–98, 100, 103, 231, 320n4, 321n6, 322n20, 326n6, 328n17 Marshall, George C., 122, 126, 137, 142, 335n12 Marshall Plan, 128 Martial Law: in South Korea, 84 Massacres: in Lebanon War, 262; by South Koreans, 82 Media: Mao’s control of, 189 Meir, Golda, 53 Mexico, 161, 325n14 MGB, see Ministry of State Security MIG jets, 72 Mikoyan, Anastas, 94, 97, 106 Military, 315n14, 326n4; Chinese, 138, 139, 181, 192–93, 318n9, 328n18; mobilization, 294, 296; outside support of, 71–72; US, 104–5, 124–25, 126, 134, 168–69 Military aid: Soviet, 71, 72, 139, 193, 201–2, 318n9; US, 82, 173 Military Committee (DPRK), 77 Milosevic, Slobodan, 71, 285–86 Ministry of State Security (MGB), 109, 110, 321–22n15 Mobilization, 144, 181, 283, 294, 296; Chinese mass, 184, 189–91, 192, 327n15; Cold War, 150, 167, 169 Molotov, Vyacheslav, 93, 94, 106, 171, 201, 219, 221, 321–22n15, 328n17; and postStalin rule, 112–14 Moscow Air Defense District, 72 Mu-Chong, 76, 77, 78, 319n17 Mujahedeen, 71 Mutual security pacts: US-South Korean, 86 Mythmaking: in civil wars, 283 Nagorno-Karabakh, 266–67 Nam Il, 75, 79, 202–3, 221 National Assembly (ROK), 81, 82–83, 84, 85, 86
National Defense Corps, 82 Nationalists, see Kuomintang Nationalists (US), 127 National Security Council (NSC), 122, 170, 219 National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), 7, 281, 284 NATO, see North Atlantic Treaty Organization Negative duration dependence, 27–28, 240 Negotiations, 299, 337n4; Korean War armistice, 68–69; around underlying interests, 292, 317n30 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 171, 219, 220, 221, 331n6 Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, 88 New Look strategy, 221 Nicolas I, 253 Nitze, Paul, 124, 135, 143; NSC-68 program, 130, 131; POW repatriation, 157, 159, 161 NKPA, see North Korean People’s Army North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 128, 136, 144, 145, 285–86 North Korea, 6, 13, 67, 68, 198, 199, 224, 284, 300, 319nn18,22, 319–20n25,.323–24n8, 325n17, 329n33; Chinese support of, 172, 184, 190, 327n11; Korean War role of, 74, 75–81, 273; and Soviet Union, 70, 71–72, 88–89, 95–97, 98–100, 101, 102, 103, 230, 318n7, 330n43; US views on, 132–33, 223 North Korean People’s Army (NKPA), 67, 74, 98, 103, 193; Soviet support of, 71–72, 186 Norway: on armistice negotiations, 224–25 NSC, see National Security Council NSC 48/5, 146 NSC-68 mindset, 17, 121, 122, 124, 148, 152, 166, 167–68, 172–73, 175, 274; as entrapment, 129–47, 163 NSC 81/1, 137, 138 Nuclear technology: Soviet, 117 Nuclear weapons, 16, 114; China and, 117– 18; US threats of, 168, 218–21, 232, 331n5 Obama, Barack: on health care, 289 Obstacles, 10, 13, 60–61; overcoming,
390
index
49–54; in sticky wars, 33–48. See also by type Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), 144, 324n11 Ogaden War, 262 Old Baldy: battles on, 3–4, 6; casualties on, 4–5 Organizational biases, 41–42 Outer Mongolia, 96 Paik Too-Chin, 85 Pak Hon-Yong, 76, 77, 79, 95, 98, 319nn13, 14, 327n11 Pak Il-U, 77, 319n13 Pakistan, 285 Panmunjon, 68 Patronage: Soviet, 71–73; war, 71, 74 Peacemaking, 217, 301; and coalition dynamics, 297–99 Peng Dehuai, 75, 182, 187, 189, 229, 326n3, 327n14, 328n18 Peng Zhen, 182 People’s Daily (newspaper), 189, 191 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 72, 181, 185–86, 194–95 People’s Republic of China (PRC), 136; establishment of, 97, 130, 179–80. See also China Perception: manipulating, 45 Peter III, 7 Petrosian, Georgy, 266–67 Phalangists, 262 Philippines, 98 PLA, see People’s Liberation Army Planning process: for war termination, 295, 296 Policy change, 289, 337n10; entrapment obstacle and, 294–96; information obstacle and, 292–94; preference obstacle and, 290–92; United States, 287–88 Policy Planning Staff (US), 161 Politburo (CCP), 180–81 Politburo (Soviet), 107, 108, 109, 326n4 Politics, 283, 293; Chinese domestic, 194– 95, 203; coalition, 28–29, 51–52; domestic, 6, 7–11, 22, 24, 89, 158, 167, 223–24, 271; South Korean domestic, 81–86;
Soviet domestic, 92–95; US domestic, 139–41, 148–49 Pork Chop Hill, 3 Port Arthur: Soviet control of, 199–200, 204 Poskrebyshev, Aleksandr, 107 Power, 93, 106, 280; consolidation of, 77–78; war termination, 20–21 Predictions, 293 Preference obstacles, 10, 60, 272, 282, 287; domestic governing coalitions and, 34– 35; policy change and, 290–92; in Soviet Union, 91–92, 100–108, 273–74 Prisoners of war (POWs), 235, 324n13; camp conditions, 155–56, 324n9; Chinese and Soviet views on, 198–99, 200, 204, 208, 232; exchange of, 205–6, 219, 323nn1, 2; negotiations over, 69, 79, 80, 86, 226, 277, 325n14, 329n33; repatriation of, 17, 69–70, 86, 121, 151–55, 156–64, 171–72, 173, 175–76, 201, 202, 221, 234, 274, 275, 291, 323nn3, 4, 5, 7, 324n10, 325n17, 330n40; Koje-do riot by, 84, 323–34n8; US, 105, 160 Process tracing, 11–13 Propaganda, 45, 87, 93–94, 131, 191, 229 Progressive Party, 161, 325n14 Prussia, 7, 53 Public opinion, 21–22, 45, 217, 283, 315n13; on armistice negotiations, 162–63; and course of war, 247–48; on Korean War, 146–47; US, 139–41, 174–75; on war, 173–74; and war duration, 32–33 Purges: Stalin’s, 106–7, 108, 113 Pusan, 67, 84 Qian San-qiang, 117 Qiao Guanhua, 75, 205, 206, 228 Rafsanjani, Akbar Hashemi, 295 Railroads, 73, 97 Rao Shushi, 185, 195, 325n1, 327n14, 329n29 Razuvaev, V. N., 79 Realpolitik, 13, 27, 28, 240, 256 Rearmament: Chinese, 191; US Cold War, 17, 121, 136–37, 143–44, 147, 158, 172–73, 274
index Refugees: Korean War, 70 Regime change, 26, 32, 53, 313–14n6, 317n24 Regime types, 315n12, 337n1; and bargaining models, 24–25; and coalition shifts, 239, 278–84; and war duration, 32–33, 115–16, 203–4, 240, 246–47 Repatriation: as information obstacle, 152–58; of POWs, 69–70, 80, 86, 121, 151, 158–64, 171–72, 173, 175–76, 234, 274, 275, 277, 291, 323nn1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 325nn14, 17, 329n33, 330n40 Republican Party, 322–23n4; Eisenhower’s election, 164–65; Korean War policy, 134–35, 160; and Truman’s foreign policy, 127, 128, 129, 144–45, 162, 173 “Resist America, Aid Korea,” 184, 191 Revolutionary United Front, 281, 284 Rhee, Syngman, 70, 99, 110, 161, 227, 228– 29, 235, 236, 267; political maneuvering, 81–88, 89, 320n29 Richard III, 7, 281 Ridgway, Matthew, 68, 125, 145–46, 156, 157, 324n9 Riots: POW camp, 155–56 Risk evaluation, 42, 316n21 ROK, see South Korea Rusk, Dean, 124, 136, 141, 142, 147 Russia, 7, 253; and Milosevic, 285–86 Sabra massacre, 262 Sadat, Anwar, 217 Salamanca, Daniel, 7 Sankoh, Foday, 281 Second Peloponnesian War, 7 Security: internal Chinese, 183 Selection effect, 33 Serbia, 285–86 Seventh Fleet, 166, 183, 220 Seven Years War, 7 Shatila massacre, 262 Sherman, Forest, 125 Shin Song Mo, 82, 83 Shtykov, Terentii, 98, 110–11 Sierra Leone, 281, 284 Signaling: coalition shifts and, 58–60, 221–33, 271; dovish leaders, 297–98 Sinai War, 71, 316n22, 317n27, 333n6
Sino-Soviet Treaty (1945), 96, 97, 318n9 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance (1950), 183 Six Day War, 262, 335n11 Slantchev’s model, 251, 253 Smith, Walter Bedell, 141 Social policy, 288 Somalia, 262 Southern Democrats: and foreign policy, 127, 128 South Korea, 13, 70, 98, 99, 268, 320n27; hawkish posture of, 228–29; POWs, 70, 323–24n8, 325n17; role in Korean War, 74, 81–88, 273; US support of, 67, 128, 142, 172, 173, 332n11; US views of, 133–34 South Koreans, 76, 152, 324n9 South Vietnam, 242, 262, 335n12 Sovereignty, 35, 73 Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU), 110, 321–22n15 Soviet Union, 7, 13, 16, 69, 78, 201, 278, 282, 296, 317n27, 322n17, 333n6, 335n12; armistice negotiations, 206–7, 224–26; and China, 96–98, 178–79, 183, 193, 196–97, 203, 204, 206, 208–9, 274–75, 279, 285, 318nn8, 9, 320–21n5, 330n39; domestic coalition shifts, 91, 231–32, 247, 273, 317n24; governing coalitions in, 92–95, 118–19, 320n1, 326n4; information control in, 109–12, 273–74; and Korean War, 114–18, 138, 139, 141, 230, 290–91, 317n27, 318n5, 319n12; as Korean War belligerent, 65, 67, 70–73, 74, 75, 88–89; and North Korea, 79–80, 95–97, 98–100, 318n7, 319n17, 330n43; NSC-68 mindset, 130–31; and Port Arthur, 199–200, 204; post-Stalin governance, 112–15, 224; preference obstacles in, 91–92, 100–108; on POW exchange, 198–99, 323n1, 324n13; and US coalition shifts, 230, 232; US views of, 124–25, 128–29, 132–33, 145 “Squaring the circle,” 29 Stalin, Joseph, 16, 35, 179, 208, 230; and Chinese governing coalition, 178, 279, 285, 327n13; death of, 17, 116, 201, 206, 209, 224, 321n14; decision making of,
392
index
72, 73, 75; information control, 109–12, 273–74; and Kim Il-Sung, 79–80, 95–96, 99, 103, 319–20n25; Korean War, 100, 104–5, 117, 118, 184, 186–87, 273, 320n3; leadership of, 92–93, 94–95, 105–8, 115; and Mao Zedong, 97–98, 101–2, 193, 200–201, 231, 320n4, 321n6, 322n20, 326n6; and North Korea, 74, 79–80, 329n33; political preferences of, 91–92; support of KMT, 96–97; and Zhou Enlai, 197–200, 203, 207, 328n17, 329n26, 330n42 Standing Committee (CCP), 180 State of National Emergency, 142–43 State Planning Commission (PRC), 200 Steel crisis, 158, 324n11 Stelle, Frank, 155 Stevenson, Adlai, 163, 165 Strategic interactions: in governing coalitions, 299–301 Sunk cost paradox, 46–47, 314n4 Suslov, Mikhail, 94, 321n13 Syria, 71 Taft, Robert, 127, 134–35, 144, 164, 166, 173, 324n11 Taiwan, 68, 97, 147, 325n17; Mao and, 101–2; PRC plans to invade, 183–84, 185; US and, 128, 135–36, 173, 231 Taiwan Strait: US protection of, 136, 166, 183–84, 205, 220 Taxation: in China, 190, 193–94 Tejada Sorzano, José Luis, 7 Ter-Petrossian, Levon, 266 38th Parallel, 5, 303, 313n2; UNC crossing of, 137–38, 186, 230 Three Anti Campaign, 191, 194, 328–29n23 Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance (Sino-Soviet), 97, 130 Treaty of Saint Petersburg, 7 Truman Administration, Harry S., 17, 68, 85, 69, 104, 227, 272, 325n15, 335n12; Cold War mobilization by, 150, 274; domestic politics of, 148–49; foreign policy of, 126–29; governing coalition of, 122–26, 175–76; and Korean War, 67, 118, 121, 139, 174; NSC-68 mindset of,
129–47, 172–73, 223–24; POW policy, 151–57, 158–64, 175–76, 324n10; and steel crisis, 157–58, 324n11 Truman Doctrine, 127–28, 129 Tudor Dynasty, 7, 281 Turkey, 127 Two-level games: in “sticky” wars, 26–28 Uganda, 262 Uganda-Tanzanian War, 262 UNITA, see National Union for the Total Independence of Angola United Nations, 16, 82, 277, 286, 337n4; armistice negotiations, 68, 69, 162, 200, 221, 291; Korean War, 67, 70, 79, 145; POW camps, 155–56; and South Korean politics, 85, 88; Soviet views of, 105, 225 United Nations Command (UNC), 14, 65, 67, 86, 105; bombing campaign, 160–61, 165; casualties, 6, 68, 141, 162; and Korean War, 102, 103; on POW repatriation, 69, 152–53, 154–55, 323– 24nn2 , 8, 325n17; 38th Parallel crossing, 137–38, 186 United States, 13, 16–17, 65, 71, 75, 97, 98, 110, 186, 242, 274, 300, 322n3; and armistice negotiations, 162–63, 225–26; biological warfare accusations against, 202, 329n25; bombing campaign of, 160–61; and Chinese intervention, 138–39, 183–84, 185; Cold War rearmament in, 121, 136–37, 143–44, 147, 172–73; and Communist coalition shifts, 223–25, 226–33; domestic politics in, 148–49, 273; Eisenhower’s election in, 164–65, 325n16; Eisenhower’s policies, 166–71, 204, 210, 218–21; foreign policy of, 99, 126–29, 144–45; health care policy in, 287–89; and Korean War, 67, 74, 98, 102, 104–5, 118, 120, 138–39, 171, 175–77, 275, 279, 316n17; Korean War casualties, 4–6, 70; major policy changes in, 287–88; on nuclear weapons, 117, 232; on POW issue, 151–52, 159–60, 205–6, 323nn1, 2, 3, 4; public opinion in, 21, 174–75; and South Korea, 81–88; and Soviet Union, 94, 100; steel industry in, 158, 324n11;
index and Taiwan, 135–36; Truman’s policies in, 122–26; World War II and, 36, 316n22 US State Department, 145; POW repatriation, 153–58 US Supreme Court: steel industry nationalization, 158 Updating process, 279; in bargaining models, 23–25 Vandenberg, Arthur, 128 Vandenberg, Hoyt S., 125, 156 Vasiliev, Alexander, 72 Veterans of Foreign Wars: MacArthur and, 136 Veto players, 29 Vietnam: and Cambodia, 249, 335n14 Vietnam War, 242, 262 Voroshilov, Klement, 94 Wars, 313–14nn1, 6, 318n6, 332n2, 338n12; condition shifts, 250–51; costs and risks of, 34–35, 234, 301, 314n4, 329n27; datasets of, 332nn2, 3, 335nn17, 20, 336nn21, 22, 23, 26, 30; duration of, 248–50, 251, 253, 254–56, 267–68, 336n28; levels of, 261–63; multiple belligerents, 317n27, 332–33nn5, 6; policy change in, 289–96; public opinion on, 247–48; and regime type, 203–4, 278–84; stalemated, 15, 16, 25–26, 104–5, 242–43; “sticky,” 26–28, 281; termination of, 7–11, 164, 262–63; termination of, 19–20; Weibull model variables in, 243–47; after World War II, 305–7 (table). See also Civil wars; by name Wars of the Roses, 7, 281 Webb, James, 153
Weibull model, 333–35n8; coalition shifts in, 247–51, 263–69; hazard analysis, 251–60; robustness of, 261–63; variables in, 243–47 White Horse Hill, 5 Willoughby, Charles, 138, 139 Winning party, 20–21 Wilhelm II, 7 World War I, 7, 53, 316n15 World War II, 7, 313–14n6, 316n22 Xi Zhongxun, 195 Xie Fang, 228 Xinhua News Agency, 189 Xinjiang, 96 Yalta Agreement, 96 Yalu River, 67, 72 Yenan faction, 76, 77, 78 Yi Pom-Sok, 83–84, 85, 320nn28, 29 Yi Si Yong, 83 Yom Kippur War, 286 Youth Corps, 83, 320n29 Yu Song-Chol, 71–72, 101 Zavimbi, Jonas, 7, 281, 284 Zhdanov, Andrei, 108, 320n1 Zhiyuanjun Bao (newspaper), 190 Zhou Enlai, 69, 80, 97, 179, 182, 210, 228, 230, 232, 325n1, 326n9, 327n14, 329nn30, 32; armistice negotiations, 202, 224–25, 226; intervention in Korean War, 185, 327n10; leadership, 195, 196; POW exchange, 219, 324n13, 329n33; and Stalin, 184, 197–200, 203, 204, 206, 207, 328n17, 329n26, 330nn39, 42 Zhu De, 179, 327n14
