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THE

N.

W. HARRIS LECTURES

FOR

1907

%\)t i^. Wi. •were

founded

in

l^arris;

ilectureg

1900 throug-h the generosity of Mr.

Norman Wait Harris of Chicago, and are to be given annually. The purpose of the lecture foundation is, as expressed

by the donor,

" to

stimulate scientific

research of the highest type and to bring the results of such research before the students and friends of Northwestern University, and through them to the

By

is

meaut

scholarly investigation into any department of

human

world.

the terra 'scientific research

'

thought or effort without limitation to research in the so-called natural sciences, but with a desire that such investigation should be extended to cover the whole field of

human knowledge."

PERSONALISM BY

BORDEN PARKER BOWNE

BOSTON AND NEW YORK HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY 1908

COPYRIGHT

1908

BY BORDEN

P.

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Published February rqo8

BOWNE

PREFACE the last century,

M. Comte, the

founder of French positivism,

set forth his fa-

Early mous

in

doctrine of the three stages of

thought.

Man

cal stage,

when

human

begins, he said, in the theologiall

phenomena

are referred to

things or beyond them. After

wills, either in

a while, through the discovery of law, the

ment of will, is

caprice

and

arbitrariness,

ruled out, and

men

or metaphysical stage.

nomena by

ele-

and thus of

pass to the second,

Here they explain phe-

abstract conceptions of being, sub-

stance, cause,

and the

like.

But these meta-

physical conceptions are really only the ghosts

of the earlier theological notions, and disappear

upon

criticism.

When

this is seen,

thought

passes into the third and last stage of develop-

ment, the positive stage. Here all

men

give up

inquiry into metaphysics as bootless, and

content themselves with discovering and registering

the

sequence

uniformities

of

coexistence and

among phenomena. When

this is

PREFACE

vi

done we have accomplished

all

that

is

possible

in the nature of the case. Metaphysics

is

ruled

out as a source of barren and misleading sions,

and science

is

illu-

installed in its place as a

study of the uniformities of coexistence and

sequence which are revealed in experience. In this view Comte was partly right and

By

partly wrong.

explanation

Comte under-

stood causal explanation, and he was quite right in pointing out that explanation in terms of

personality

He

the one with which

is

was equally right

metaphysics

is

men

begin.

in saying that abstract

only the ghost of the earlier per-

sonal explanations. Later philosophic criticism

has shown that the conceptions of impersonal

metaphysics are only the abstract forms of the self-conscious

life,

and that apart from that

life

they are empty and illusory. Comte was equally right in restricting positive science to the investigation

and

coexistence

and sequence

registration of the orders of in experience.

he was wrong in making caprice and

ness essential marks of will, and equally in rejecting all causal inquiry.

The

But

arbitrari-

wrong

history of

PREFACE thought has judged

vii

his doctrine in this respect.

Causal inquiry, though driven out with a fork, has always come running back, and always It only

will.

remains to give the causal doctrine the

form which

necessary to free

is

it

from the ob-

jections of criticism.

The aim

of these lectures

critical reflection

to

show that

brings us back again to the

personal metaphysics which

We

is

Comte

rejected.

agree with him that abstract and imper-

sonal metaphysics

is

a mirage of formal ideas,

and even largely of words, which begin, continue,

and end

in abstraction

and confusion.

Causal explanation must always be in terms of personality, or

we return to

it

must vanish altogether. Thus

the theological stage, but

we do

so

At last we have learned the and we now see that law and will

with a difference. lesson of law,

must be united

Thus man's his latest

;

in our

earliest

thought of the world.

metaphysics reemerges in

but enlarged, enriched, and purified

by the ages of thought and experience. In war the success of a campaign seldom

depends solely upon sheer

flighting

and

direct

PREFACE

viii

assaults

upon the enemy's

It often

position.

depends equally, and even more fundamentally,

upon

seizing

sitions

and holding

certain strategic po-

which may command the enemy's com-

munications, or threaten his rear, or

make

his

position untenable. Intellectual campaigns are

subject to the same law.

They

commonly

are

decided at points quite remote from the apparent battlefield, and without any " thunder of the captains and the shoutings." These are

the strategic points that decide the day.

and have

They

command

lie

in our epistemology

metaphysics — subjects little

the field and

which seem to

or no practical bearing, yet out of

them are the

Our notions

issues of intellectual life or death.

of

knowledge and

its

nature,

our conception of reality and causality, our

thoughts respecting space and time,

two great intimidating phantoms, —

— the

these are

the things that decide our general

way

of

thinking and give direction to our thought

even in morals and looking doctrine

and soon there

is is

Some

relig'ion.

put forth

in

an ajrnostic

harmless-

epistemology,

chill in

the air

PREFACE that

is

ix

fatal to the highest spiritual faiths of

the soul, or some seusual blight and mildew

spread over the fairer growths of our nature.

Space and time are made supreme laws of existence,

and determinism and materialism and

atheism are at the door. This g'eneral fact explains the

form of the campaign. The " thun-

der of the captains and the shoutings " are omitted, in order to deal with the questions

which both experience and

reflection

show

to

be the really strategic points in philosophic discussion.

BORDEN February

1,

1908.

P.

BOWNE.

CONTENTS I.

II.

COMMON

SENSE, SCIENCE,

AND PHILOSOPHY

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

1

54

HI.

PHENOMENALITY OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD

111

IV.

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY

159

THE FAILURE OF BIPERSONALISM

217

THE PERSONAL WORLD

268

V. VI.

PERSONALISM COMMON

SENSE, SCIENCE,

AND

PHILOSOPHY Common

has always

sense

thought rather

meanly of philosophy, either as losing in abstract verbiage

itself

which makes no connec-

tion with reality, or else as falling into dan-

gerous and destructive errors.

Aristophanes,

wishing to deride philosophy, represented Socrates as floating in the clouds

and uttering a

deal of nonsense, which was supposed to be philosophical.

And we

are all familiar with

the formula which refers to "science," that is,

philosophy, " falsely so-called," and which

couples " philosophy and vain deceit " in a

way

not

intended

to

be

complimentary.

Goethe expressed the same opinion when he made Mephistopheles say, " A speculating fellow

is

like a beast

in circles

by an

on a blasted heath led round

evil spirit,

while

all

about are

;

PERSONALISM

2

pastures fair and green."

Milton

is

even more

pronounced, for he mentions philosophizingas one of the pursuits of hell. devils

One group

of

described as holding high debate over

is

" Fixed fate, free will, foreknowledge absolute,

And found no

Much

end, in wandering mazes lost."

of this popular opinion

is

due to

ig-

norance, but the warmest friend of philosophy

must admit that there

is

also

much

in the his-

tory of thought to justify the popular view.

Philosophers themselves are not always clear as to their

own meaning, and have

often spoken

a language "not understanded of the people."

Nonsense and pernicious errors mingle

in

about

equal proportions in philosophical literature.

Many

a navigator has sailed away over the

misty seas of speculation and never come back

and many an ambitious climber, imitating the "Excelsior" youth, has climbed out of sight

and never returned

to earth again.

Fogbanks

have often been mistaken for land, and islands of mist have passed for solid continents.

A

fearful proportion of philosophical discussion at best

is

barren and often pernicious.

Prob-

COMMON

SENSE, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY

3

ably nine tenths of the treatises on this subject

might be burned up without any

loss to the

world, and with some small gain to the fuel

Could the good Caliph Omar return to

pile. life

and make a bonfire of our philosophical

literature, as it

he did of the Alexandrian library,

would not be an unmitigated calamity.

And

this

is

no judgment

of

outsiders

The

merely, but of philosophers themselves. ever-recurrent

agnosticism

outbreaks of skepticism and

among them remind

us of the

instability of the philosophical structure

just

now

;

and

the pragmatists, distantly echoing

Kant's doctrine of the primacy of the practical reason, are pointing out

what sorry

the traditional philosophy

and more

is,

stuff

in sor-

row than in anger, as in true friendship bound, are inflictins"

numerous "

faithful

It is not surprising, then, that

wounds."

common

sense

should propose to throw philosophy, along

with physic, to the dogs and have none of

We should less

it.

might well conclude, then, that we let

philosophy alone, as at best a use-

science.

Unfortunately this cannot be

;

PERSONALISM

4

done. Every one has a philosophy of some sort, wittingly or unwittingly. Every one has some

notions about reality, the nature of things, the

meaning and outcome of and these constitute

life,

and the

his philosophy.

like

Monsieur

Jourdain in Moliere's play, as you remember, talked prose

all

his life without

knowing

it,

and many persons do the same thing with For

philosophy.

philosophy

is

an

simply

attempt to give an account of experience, or it

is

a man's

way

of looking at things.

The

common-sense man

finds a lot of bodies about

him

series of

in space

in time, his

and

and a

in these

philosophy. The

he

changes going on

rests as final.

That

is

materialist conceives that

the world of experience can be explained by

molecules and atoms, endowed with forces of attraction

and repulsion which work forever

through space and time. That phy.

The

agnostic holds that

is

his philoso-

we can know

nothing beyond phenomena. The causal power

behind

is

forever hidden. That

is

his philoso-

phy. The theist holds that the order of things

can be explained only by an intelligent cause

COMMON back of

That

is

all

SENSE, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY

appearance and manifestation.

and commonly he by

it

But every one has a

his philosophy.

philosophy of some

men

5

the less he

sort, implicit or explicit,

is all

is

the more controlled

aware of

could and would

let

its

presence. If

philosophy alone I

sometimes think I should be willing to have

them do

so

;

for there

is

a great deal of false

We might even

and pernicious philosophizing. say that strait

way

the gate and narrow

is

the

that leadeth to philosophical insight,

and

is

few there be that find gate and broad the sophical confusion

there be

who go

it;

way

and

while wide

is

the

that leads to philo-

destruction,

But

in thereat.

and many

we

since

must have a philosophy, whether we

will or

we get the best. If we do not sow good seed the enemy will sow tares, and by and by we have to reap the tares that have been sown. The whole system of not,

it

is

important that

naturalistic thought, with its materialistic atheistic tendencies, is but the

crude metaphysics of

and

outcome of the

common

sense,

and

can be permanently overthrown only by

it

dis-

PERSONALISM

6

crediting that metaphysics. So long as space

and time and matter and force are openly or tacitly

assumed to be the standard

realities,

or the standards of reality, there will always

be a root of bitterness in our speculation

which

annoy

up again and again

spring

will

to

us.

It is not, then, a question of

having or not

having a philosophy, but of having a good or a bad one. tical

And

this question is of great prac-

importance, for, while a good philosophy

may not have much positive value, a bad one may do measureless harm. Nations may be paralyzed, and individuals may be wrecked, by a

fatalistic

and

sense philosophy of a peojjle spiritual

and

pessimistic philosophy.

may tend

aspirations

philosophy

may

to

mildew the

cast discredit

of

man.

upon

An

all

A life

the

agnostic

paralyze both the mental

and

men thwarted and impenetrable darkness. The

moral nature and leave despairing

in

most destructive errors that have devastated

humanity have been rooted

many

in philosophy,

and

of the worst aberrations of religion run

COMMON

SENSE, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY

7

back to some philosophical doctrine as either their source or their justification. reflection

portant ter if

shows that philosophy

affair.

It

double

a

stars, or if

error in our theory of the

we mistook the order of

strata,

or

blundered in the

atomic weights of some of the elements it

little

no unim-

is

would not be a serious mat-

we made an

the geological

And

would be a very serious matter

if

;

but

we went

astray in those fundamental conceptions of life, its

sophy

worth and destiny, with which philo-

deals. It

would be a serious matter

philosophy reached a conception of

life

if

and

the world which was incompatible with those

high faiths of humanity by which hitherto nations have nourished themselves into great-

men have nobly lived and bravely Would it, then, make no difference to

ness and died.

personal

life

or to civilization

replace these faiths

we should

if

by materialism or atheism?

Could we safely exchange our Christian philosophy for that of India ? just as well

to restrict

if,

all

Would

with the agnostic,

life

go on

we decided

thought to things seen and

tern-

PERSONALISM

8

poral,

and forbade any reference

and eternal

These questions answer them-

?

Mr. Spencer

selves.

to the unseen

in his last work, " Facts

and Comments," seems not

have weakened

to

in his agnostic conviction, but he advises the

much about agnostimany who have

skeptic not to say too

cism ;

as faith

is

a comfort to

no other support. Such considerations show that philosophy indifference. It it

is

not a matter of practical

may not " bake bread

has been said, " but

dom, and immortality

;

gives us God, free-

it

We

it

we may add,

" and,

gives even the bread which

a savor

for us,"

it

would not otherwise

it

does not bake possess.

need, then, a sound philosophy at least

as a kind of intellectual health officer

business

it

is

to keep

down

whose

disease-breeding

miasms and pestiferous growths, or as a moral police

whose duty

it

is

to arrest those dan-

gerous and disturbing intellectual vagrants

which have no

visible

means of support, and

which corrupt the people. This negative function

A

is

very important.

great crop of errors readily springs up on

COMMON

SENSE, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY

9

the plain of sense and mechanical thought.

In this way sensualism, materialism, atheism, like weeds, are sure to

grow

unless there be a

philosophy of higher character to keep them

down. These lower philosophies tend to usurp possession of the mind; and in their presence

the higher faiths of the soul soon wither and

And

perish.

pelled

by

these lower views cannot be dis-

authority, but only

by a careful

examination of their philosophical foundations.

and

Then they

fatuity.

are seen in their baselessness

philosophy has the

Positively,

function of formulating and systematizing

\y

and experience

life

so as to bring out into clear

consciousness our aims and principles. It must close

up the ways of

error

ways of progress. With

and open the high-

all its

shortcomings,

philosophy deserves well of humanity in this respect. It has driven

away nightmares and

enabled us to see visions.

Only a good philo-

sophy can displace a bad one.

The generation

just passed

illustration of the practical

losophy.

had abundant

importance of phi-

That was a time of great develop-

;

PERSONALISM

10

ment

in the physical sciences

and

in the

com-

mercial application of science to our control

o£ nature. There were great generalizations in physics, such as the conservation of energy,

and the

correlation of the physical forces

and equally great generalizations in biology. The application of scientific method to historical

study, also, and the ever-widening dis-

covery of law, leading to the belief in versal reign, had great influence.

crowded upon us and new

demanded.

The

uni-

its

New

interjjretations

facts

were

old mental equilibrium

was

broken up and the new one had not yet been established.

lution

went

The new wine to the

of science

and evo-

head and produced many

woes and more babblings.

It

was a matter of

course" that at such time religion should to be imperiled.

new

To

the passive

truth seems dangerous

until

seem

mind even it

has be-

come familiar. All who had any grudge against religion loudly proclaimed its baselessness, and

many who were

interested in religion were

profoundly disturbed by the new order. Everything^

seemed to be

in

solution.

The foun-

COMMON

SENSE, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY

tains of the great deep were

11

broken up. The

elements melted with fervent heat, and some things passed away with a great noise. Natural-

ism came to the front with a mechanical philosophy, and commercialism tended to fix

all

eyes on gain as even better than godliness.

The

produced a feeling that we could

latter

do just as well without religion as with

and the former found no place for

it.

It

it,

was

proclaimed by many, and feared by more, that the high hopes and dreams of humanity

were

baseless.

found

out,

The

truth about

man had been

and the truth was that instead

of being a child of the Highest he

the

highest

the

merely

animals, having

essen-

the same history and

tially

birth,

Man

of

is

destiny as they,

—

hunger, labor, weariness, and death.

was viewed as simply an incident

in the

condensation of dispersed matter, or the cool-

ing of a fiery gas.

For a time the

religious world

dition of stampede it

became

was

and panic, but

in a con-

after a while

clear that the difficulty lay not in

the facts themselves but in the philosophy

by

PERSONALISM

12

which they were explained. The great source of the disturbance of that time, apart from the horror of change natural to the passive

mind, was the lack of any adequate philosophic equipment. The new facts were interpreted on the basis of a crude sense-realism, and this

view has always had a tendency to materialism

and atheism. But now that we have a better critical

apparatus the

peared.

We

now

are

quietness with

the

threatening, and

difficulties

have disap-

able to live in peace

and

once thought so

facts

we look back on

that period

of panic only to wonder at the superficiality that caused

it.

We

smile at the naive dog-

matism and the extraordinary logic

of

the

movement. Had we had a generation ago our present philosophical equipment there would have been no flurry over evolution, the transformation of species, the reign of law, and the

many

other things which were supposed to be

fatal to

man's higher

had was part of the

faiths.

price

The storm we

we paid

for being

philosophically unprepared. It is clear, then, that

philosophy is practically

COMMON

SENSE, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY

important. It

13

not necessary, of course, that

is

everybody should be a philosopher, any more than that everybody should be a physician or a lawyer, but just as

it is

important that these

professions should be represented in the com-

munity so that tages, so

it is

may

all

share in their advan-

equally important that philoso-

phy should be represented

in the

a community, and without curity against

all

manner of

\y

vagaries

itself

when not

But

vision.

of

intellect

it

conditions

is

if

no

superstitions

se-

and

grovel or

fall

into

subject to critical super-

equally clear from a survey

that

need to bring forth ance,

is

Religion, conscience,

intellectual aberrations.

and even

thought of

there

it

philosophers fruits

their science is to

themselves

meet for repentreceive general

Some improvement in this direction may be hoped for from the pragmatists' criti-

respect.

cism.

We

principles

need to pay more attention to

first

and

out-

to practical bearing

come. Mr. Huxley

who was

tells

of an

told to drive fast.

Irish

and

cabman

Without waiting

to inquire where he was to go, he drove off

PERSONALISM

14

furiously.

When

the passenger asked

where he was going he

replied, "

him

Oi don't

know, yer hanner, but annyway Oi 'm drivin' fast." One is often reminded of this good man in reading current philosophical literature.

Philosophers themselves by no means always clearly understand their

own

aims, and the

teachers of the science are sometimes confused as to

its

meaning and contents.

It

cannot be

doubted that a great deal of time and strength is

wasted in philosophical study because of

misdirection and failure properly to analyze

the problems. Teachers often lose themselves in details

into the essen-

Even distinguished occupants philosophical chairs sometimes come under

tial

of

and reach no insight

this

questions.

condemnation. They are experts in the

bibliography and biography of the subject.

They

are full of information on the editions

and the commentaries, and

know

in short

seem to

everything about philosophy but phi-

losophy

itself.

The

scholastics distinguished

" knowledge of the thing " from " knowledge about the thing," and the

latter is

what we

COMMON

SENSE, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY

when we

too often find

former.

The

and unity

to the

15

are lookino- for the

principle

which gives meaning

whole

missed altogether, and

is

is " unprin" cipled and superficial in consequence. There

any

is

criticism

which may be made

abundant knowledge of

we come

details,

to the subject itself

some naive and

uncritical

but when

we often

dogmatism or

haps no idea whatever; and sometimes

find perit

is

even held to be a mark of especial mental breadth to have no system at '-^/inability to

all

;

as

if

the

think organically and consistently

were a sure sign of greatness. Such philosophers are strong on the history of philoso-

phy. They remind us that we can understand

a thing only by studying a

man

its

evolution.

As

if

could write edifyingly upon the his-

tory of a subject which he did not himself

thoroughly understand read to ject of

result

much

;

or as

if

a

man

could

edification the history of a sub-

which he knew nothing.

would be barren

The only

superficialities in the

work and a fluency of speech without understandinof in the reader.

PERSONALISM

16

When we

are dealing with concrete insti-

tutions, legishxtion, etc., there is truth in the

claim that they must be historically studied for their complete understanding

we

;

but when

are dealing with the formal truths of in-

be understood in and

telligence, they are to

through themselves. ability

Any

student of average

can be made to see the truth of the

binomial theorem by reflection upon the proof offered,

and he can equally well learn how to

apply the theorem by inspection of

In neither case

is

any

for insight, though in itself.

But a

its

historical study

it

terms.

needed

might be interesting

history of mathematics as an

introduction to mathematics would not tend to edification. Equally inverted pedagogically is

the history of philosophy as an introduc-

tion to philosophy. itself to

Either

it

must confine

worthless platitudes which will enable

the student to talk without understanding, or

it

must be as

unintelligible as a history

of the higher mathematics would be to one

who had never studied algebra. While, then, we must always have the highest respect

COMMON

SENSE, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY

for the historical method,

17

manifestly ap-

it

plies to

some things better than

things,

and we must not allow a mechanical

to

some other

repetition of formulas to obscure this fact.

The men who have helped philosophy forward have seldom been

graphy of the

men

learned in the biblio-

but

science,

men who

grap-

pled with the problems themselves. Descartes,

Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant are ^4ions. 'as

Hobbes

said that

some of the

if

illustra-

he had read as

much

stall-fed philosophers of his

time he should have

known

as

little

as they.

Again, philosophers, from failure to keep in touch

with

reality,

have often run into

barren elaborations of obvious commonplace

which might well

common

sense.

justify

Here

logic

the

contempt of

reminds us that

explanations which leave matters as dark as

ever lose from that fact

all

reason for exist-

ence. Philosophers sometimes forget this

and

in their theoretic zeal for their formulas un-

wittingly give obsession.

A

awful examples of theoretic distinguished philosopher fur=

nishes us with illustrations.

PERSONALISM

18

How of us try

does a child learn to write ?

To most

sufficient to say that

he must

seems

it

and

But the distinguished phi-

try again.

losopher gives a more elaborate account, as follows

"

:

—

What he

[the child] actually does

use his hand in a great

many

possible

near as he can to the way required

ways

cesses It

is

made

as

and from

after excessively varied and numerous

he gradually selects and

to

movements, and

excessively produced

these

;

is

trials,

fixes the slight suc-

in the direction of correct writing.

a long and most laborious accumulation

of slight functional selections from overpro-

duced movements."

The next

selection is

still

more profound,

and illuminates a deeper mystery. " Selective thinking

accommodation

to

the

is

the result of motor physical

and

social

environment, this accommodation taking place in each case, as all

motor accommodation does,

from a platform of mination ical

'

earlier

^

systematic deter-

or habit. In the sphere of the phys-

environment as such, the selection

is

from

COMMON

SENSE, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY

19

overproduced movements projected out from the platform of the habitual adaptations of the members brought into play of the social environment

;

in the sphere

consists in the

it

accommodation of the attention, secured by the overproduction of motor variations projected

from the platform of the habitual attention complex.

The

presentations from which the

selected motor variations issue are believed, or called ^^

^

true,'

while the organization which the

motor complex gradually attains holds the data

C^of knowledge in relations of theoretical and " ' analytical

validity.'

Fortunately ests

on a

less

life

can go on in

These operose and

main

inter-

stilted elaborations of

monplaces remind one of the

by

its

complicated platform than

Swift, who,

man mentioned

thinking that the ordinary

method of being measured

for a suit of clothes

was too crude, had himself surveyed for a as

much more

measurement of intricate

this.

com-

scientific.

lines

calculation,

suit,

After an elaborate

and angles and much a result was

reached

which could have been gained directly and

PERSONALISM

20

more

effectively

by a moment's use of a tape

line.

So, then, two things are plain

the

first,

:

importance of philosophy, and, second, the very general confusion which attaches to the subject, not only in popular thought, but also

in the

The

minds of supposed experts themselves.

first

step out of this confusion

in seeking to reduce

it

and help

must

lie

to a better

understanding of the problem by looking for

some starting-point which

common

mon ground

for

phers of

schools,

may

all

will serve as a

sense and

com-

philoso-

something on which

all

agree as a point of departure.

We

common ground

find such

lowing postulates

:

—

First, the coexistence of

personal and

social world in

with which

all

in the fol-

persons.

which we

It is a live,

speculation must begin.

and the neighbors are

facts

and

We

which cannot be

questioned.

Secondly, there all

is

a law of reason valid for

and binding upon

all.

This

is

the supreme

condition of any mental community.

COMMON

SENSE, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY

Thirdly, there

is

21

common expewhere we meet in

a world of

rience, actual or possible,

mutual understanding, and where the great business of

life

goes on.

These conditions commend themselves as absolutely necessary in order to give any ra-

and they

tional standing to our investigations,

cannot be questioned by any one without

immediate and obvious absurdity. If any one should doubt the coexistence of persons and

assume that he was the only being

^t

in existence,

would not be worth while to argue with

him.

And

if

any one should doubt that the

laws of thought are essentially the same for different persons

he could not rationally pro-

pose to argue with any one

else, for his

argu-

ments could only show what was reasonable for himself,

and

this

by hypothesis need not

be rational for any others. Again, questioned the world of this experienced

to

in

any one

experience,

world in which we

and meet one another

and

common

if

all

live

mutual understanding

which we have to adjust ourselves

direction of our lives, he also

in the

would shut him-

PERSONALISM

22 self off

from any

with others. It

is

intelligible

communication

only, then, as

we assume and

admit these general postulates that our discussion could have any rational standing. If,

however, any one chooses to deny them we

have no objection.

We

only insist that he

shall

keep the peace and not disturb the

of us

by

rest

his inconsistent outcry.

It is well,

however, to note that these facts

do not admit of being speculatively deduced or demonstratively established. If they need

demonstration

it

cannot be given. They

in-

volve some very deep mysteries and carry us into the depths of metaphysics, the philosophy

of the infinite and

relation to the finite.

its

But, on the other hand, they do not need demonstration, being so cogently forced upon us that any skepticism regarding

them can never

be more than verbal. In dealing with them of course

we must be

them than the

careful not to find

more

in

facts themselves necessitate, or

not to impart into them a system of crude metaphysics, as ginal datum.

if this

were a part of the

But when

this condition is

ori-

duly

COMMON

SENSE, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY 23

regarded the facts themselves are not open to question. Every system of whatever kind has

which there

to beo'in with somethino; behind is

no

SToinof

and which In our

ally accepted.

is

to

be uncondition-

human thinking we must

begin by admitting the points in question. It is also well to bear in

here a

common ground

mind for

that

we have

intelligent

all

thinkers, whatever their philosophic theories

may

be.

Hume

and Berkeley and Mill would

accept these postulates as readily as Reid and

Hamilton and the most dogmatic of '\^ general. For

Hume

matter was substantially

nothing in theory for Berkeley ;

only

;

for Mill

of sensation,"

the same to

it

it

was an idea

was a " permanent

— but

them

realists in

practically

as to every

possibility

matter was

one

else.

They

had to adjust themselves to material things

and

their laws,

and had precisely the same

kind of experience as their

The

differences

among

realistic

neighbors.

the philosophers do

not concern the facts of experience or any-

thing which they can be shown to imply for possible

experience.

The

differences

begin

PERSONALISM

24

The

with the philosophic interpretations. are interpreted by

facts

diiferent schemes of meta-

physics, or perhaps the possibility of interpretation is denied, thus

producing different phi-

losophies; but the facts themselves cannot be practically questioned without insanity, or even

with

Agnosticism, idealism, nihilism,

it.

leave exjDerience untouched,

ence they is

all

agree with

all

and for experi-

common

sense.

There

an order of experience which we do not

make but and

to

find,

with which we have to reckon

which we must adjust ourselves in In this conviction of com-

order to live at

all.

mon

philosophers agree, whatever

sense

all

reasons they

may

give for

Thus we secure an able problem.

We

it.

intelligible

and manage-

have the world of persons,

the laws of reason, and the world of experience,

or the world of

world of

life

and history for our

the just claims of nized.

that

we

perception, and the

Common

common

sense

data,

and

sense are recog-

has always

claimed

are not living in a world of illusions,

but in the real world, and this we not only

COMMON admit but

SENSE, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY

The

affirm.

25

basal facts, therefore,

for philosophy are the personal world, the

common reason, and the world of experience. With this living, aspiring, hoping, fearing, loving, hating, human world, with its life and and hopes and

history

must begin.

We

are in a personal world from the start,

and

and

aspirations, philosophy

all

our objects are connected with this world

in

one indivisible system.

And

experience stands absolutely in O-

and struggles

fears

and ories

is

its

world of

own

right,

independent of our metaphysical the-

it is,

and

it,

We

may have

various

but the experience

itself is

concerning

theories about

what

this

it.

its

contents are revealed only

in life.

This personal beginning of

all

speculation

should be emphasized, as oversight of the fact has led to some of the great aberrations of philosophy.

In particular naturalism begins

with matter and force under the conditions of space

and time, and

at once

soluble dualism in our theory,

we have an

and

in-

also a strong

tendency toward materialism and the elimina-

PERSON ALISM

26

tion of personality altogether.

Such

errors are

avoided when we recognize the primacy of the personal world from the start.

and force of naturalism are a tions broken rience,

This matter

pair of abstrac-

from the system of

living expe-

and probably having only an abstract

existence.

Returning now to experience, and confining our attention for the present to the physical world,

we

point out

first

that

we speak

of the

system of experience instead of the world of things, as that it

many

is

a phrase which carries with

questionable

metaphysical impHca-

The order of experience cannot be questioned, but when we import into it the notion

tions.

and impersonal substances under-

of material

we have already transcended

lying

it

ence.

Here

break

off.

is

where the

They

all

perience, its laws, tions

we may form

idealistic

experi-

systems

agree on the data of ex-

and the

practical expecta-

for our guidance, but they

find neither proof of the existence of these

substances nor any use for them, supposing

them

to exist.

By

experience, then,

we mean

— COMMON

SENSE, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY

27

the world of objects, so far as they can be the subjects of a real or possible experience,

we imply nothing beyond metaphysics. possible

But

is

How

this

and

by way of

the order of experience

is

a matter for later inquiry.

after yielding thus far to the scruples

of the idealist, we must next point out in the

name

of

perience

common is

sense that this world of ex-

real in the sense of

being trust-

worthy, or something which can be practically

depended upon.

It is not illusion, as illusion

;means somethino^ which does not

fit

into the

ystem of common experience on its own plane,

and

is

therefore a fancy or

phantom

of the

individual, like the visions of a fever patient.

But of

all

that

common

we

find or can find in the order

experience

and

is

accepted as

real,

that there

no help for it.

common

is

to

be unhesitatingly

for the very

And

good reason

this is all that

sense means by reality in general,

something which

is

there for all and which

can be depended upon.

But these terms,

real

and unreal, are

ex-

ceedingly vague, and their meaning deserves

•

PERSONALISM

28

some further

They

specification.

are so far

from having a single meaning, that the same things

may be

called real

same time, according finite

may

things

and unreal

to our standpoint.

at the

Thus

be called real on their own

plane of finitude, and unreal as contrasted with

some basal and absolute is

existence.

But there

no contradiction, for the unreality of the

finite is

ence,

only a denial of

and

this gives it

its

eternal self-exist-

a temporal and phenom-

enal character in comparison with the eternal.

But

real

and unreal are proper contradictions

when applied in a given class or on a given plane. Thus unreal appearance in space is such

only

only because

it

does not

fit

into our general sys-

tem of space experience but when ;

fit

and

is

it

does thus

consistent with the totality of space

experience,

it

is

real in the only intelligible

sense of the word.

To ask whether the

of space experience

is

totality

real or illusory is to

confuse ourselves by mixing two realms.

The

reality of space experience lies in its validity

for experience. It

is

possible that this real ex-

perience might be looked upon as only phenom-

COMMON

SENSE, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY 29

enal from a deeper metaphysical standpoint,

but that would in no way modify the reality of the experience, but only the interpretations

which we might draw from

As matter is real,

that

is,

and trustworthy, and not

valid

This point

illusory.

it.

of experience, then, experience

is

to be emphasized, as

confusion here has led to not a few philosophical errors

Some

and some

religious aberrations.

philosophers, especially in the Orient,

deciding that only the self-existent

is real,

«eted to rule out all finite existence

and

pro-

exjDe-

rience as illusion; but all they are justified in

doing

is

to say that finite existence

and expe-

rience are not real in the sense of absolute eternal existence.

They may

real as experiencing subjects

objects.

ing up

It

would

lead

to

Oriental thought

in

and

yet be entirely

and experienced a great if

clear-

these terms

were clearly defined and consistently applied.

maia would disappear forthwith. manner some persons among our-

Considerable

In like

selves have

thought

unreality of pain

it

a sufficient proof of the

and disease

to call

them un-

PERSONALISM

30

not substantial. In

real, that is,

tliis

sense, of

course, they are unreal, but they remain very

forms of experience notwithstanding; and

real

in dealing with

we

them

as

physics.

Suppose we decide that hunger and

As

cold are illusions. as insistent

ger

such they remain just

and peremptory as before. Hun-

may be an

illusion

and food may be an

sion and cold may be an effective

way

hunger and sions

of

known

dealing with the illusions,

as food

and clothing and shelter

so on,

and

it is

just as hard

just as necessary to get these

name

illu-

but the only

illusion,

cold, is to apply certain other illu-

and warmth and and

forms of experience

any way by our meta-

are not helped in

of illusion as under any

under the

other

name

whatever. Berkeley did not find his butcher's bill or grocer's bill in

any way changed by

his

metaphysical theory; and in general this world of experience, real or possible,

is

not modified

by our metaphysical notions about

we go

Even

if

to the extent of utter nihilism, life itself

ought not

own

it.

to

be affected. Thus,

selves illusions

and our

life

if

an

we

call

our

illusion, life

COMMON

SENSE, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY

remains just what as is

it

it

31

was before, and inasmuch

now as illusion there why it might not con-

goes on fairly well

no assignable reason

tinue as illusion and even pass into better

and

better forms of illusion. It might be possible, therefore, for one to fall

back upon experience

and ignore the metaphysician the understanding' that

and that

But

it is

if

life itself is

what

not modified by what we

it is

call

it.

experience be thus undeniable, what

need of philosophy in any

if it

case, or

have?

tion does philosophy

seem as

altogether, with

It

what func-

might almost

were a species of psychological

vermiform appendix, without any remaining function,

and only a

seat of

dangerous

in-

flammations.

In reply

it

must be

said that there

might

well be beings the contents of whose experi-

ence should be perfectly plain and open to thought, so that nothing would be needed but to describe their laws.

and

We

register those contents with find,

however, in our own case

that experience, while fundamental and also

PERSONALISM

32

true on

its

own

plane,

Our experience upon

it

we

not necessarily

is

such that when we reflect

is

find ourselves unable to rest in

and are compelled by the to

final.

go beyond

it,

necessities of

not for

worthiness, nor for

its reality

it

thought or trust-

truth, but for its ex-

its

planation and understanding.

For

instance,

the visible heavens are something whose truth is

but on the other

not to be questioned;

hand, when we compare the phenomena of the visible

heavens we find that we cannot rest

in them, but

must go beyond them to the

astronomic heavens as their only adequate explanation.

We find here

experience and itgelf

its

the true relation of

interpretation. Experience

must be accepted as unconditionally

trustworthy.

If

it is

not so

on which to build. Here

is

we have nothing

the dilemma of

systems of traditional phenomenalism.

all

They

begin by denying the truth of experience, and then seek

from the untrue experience to

deduce something which

is

to

be called true.

In that case we are seeking to infer trustwor-

thy conclusions from untrustworthy premises,

;

COMMON

SENSE, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY 33

something which logic correct order

is

to recognize the truth of expe-

rience, so far as it goes,

ence

may need

The

will not permit.

but to see that experi-

interpretation, as in the case of

the visible and astronomic heavens again.

Brother Jasper made considerable merri-

ment years ago by

insisting

that

sun

the

moved, for he said he had seen the sun on one side of the

house in the morning and on the

and

other side of the house in the afternoon, as the house

had not moved the sun had

moved, and therefore the sun does move. Now, in BrothietJasper's original contention he

had

a fact which astronomy could not ignore and

one which astronomy was bound to explain, under penalty of seeing

its

theory condemned

and the proof of the astronomic theory on the fact that Jasper's fact,

it

rests

includes not only Brother

but a great

many

other facts of

which Jasper had no knowledge; but Jasper

was right as

to his fact.

that his fact admitted,

He

only failed to see

and indeed demanded,

another explanation.

Now

in

this respect

Brother Jasper very

PERSONALISM

34

well represents the position of

respecting experience. It

experience

that

by

rightly persuaded

is

it

proceeds to explain this

which may be

certain assumptions

doubted. In this

common

sense

way the

crude metaphysics of

produced, at which

is

sense

something which can be

is

depended upon, and fact

common

critical

philosophy has always taken offense. Reflection,

however, shows

when

critically studied, does not allow us to

rest in it

in

for

experience,

this

as final, but requires us to

it

its

that

ultimate explanation. If

mind we

shall see that

it is

go beyond

we bear

possible to hold

at once the trustworthiness of experience also the necessity of transcending

We

and

it.

may, then, speak of experience as true

or false according to our standpoint, but

must be very careful lest

this

in

applying these terms

We

they lead us into error.

untaught

rustic in

some sense

in a world of illusion.

heavens as

final,

we

He

see that the

lives continually

takes the visible

and has no suspicion of the

astronomical heavens.

He

takes his experience

of material things also as final, and has no

COMMON

SENSE, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY 35

suspicion of the truths which physical science

He

reveals concerning them.

continuous gigantic

is

living, then, in

illusion, in this sense, that

his eyes are holden, yet not in the sense that

His experience

his experience is false.

so far as is

it

is

true

goes, but his interpretation of

mistaken. Or

we might say

it

his experience is

very Hmited and hence admits of an interpretation

which would be seen to be inadequate

the experience were more extensive. cycle of scientific truth

is

if

The whole

hidden from him,

not contradicting anything that he knows, but, because he knows so httle, lying entirely beyond, his horizon.

If,

however, his experience

should enlarge, he would not find his old

good many of

truths contradicted, but a

old limited notions would disappear, and

his

many

other notions would receive proper limitation.

This astronomical illustration

duced as being perfectly

is

not intro-

parallel to the meta-

physical interpretations of philosophy, but serves to

show

at once true

at least

and not

us to go beyond

it

for

how

experience

self-sufficient, its

it

may be

requiring

interpretation.

PERSONALISM

36

Returning again to experience we discern that

it

has certain contents and ways of being

and happening, and

this leads to the partition

of territory between science and philosophy.

Things hang together events

in certain ways,

come along together according

tain rules.

to cer-

These uniformities of coexistence

and sequence admit described and

of

being studied and

registered without

to metaphysics.

scheme, be

and

reference

Whatever our metaphysical

it realistic

or nihilistic, things do

or idealistic or agnostic

hang together

in expe-

rience in certain ways. In the outer world of

perception, in the inner world of mind,

and

in the social world of history, there are certain

orders of likeness and difference, of coexist-

ence and sequence, and concomitant variation

among

the facts of experience. These are re-

vealed only in experience, and whether

them or

not,

we

like

and whether we can make any-

thing out of them or not, they are undeniably there. If there be

any question as

we make

established. If

we would know

of chemical change,

and the

fact

is

to the order

the experiment

COMMON

SENSE, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY 37

the arrangement of the geological strata,

we

look and see. Things occur and happen and

hang together

in certain

king's oxen and

all

Some

alter this fact.

ways, and

the king's

men

all

the

could not

ecclesiastical authorities

once took offense at the doctrine of the earth's

motion and denounced

it

with

all their

might;

but the world kept right on moving after texts

had been quoted and anathemas had been uttered against

it.

The knowledge

of these uniformities

is

of

the utmost practical value for the guidance of

our

lives.

When we

are *^e can find our

have learned what they

way from point

in the world of experience.

to point

We avail ourselves

of our knowledge to reach desired effects

by

arranging their antecedents, or to escape un-

by removing

desired effects

Our is

their antecedents.

entire control of the inner

and outer world

reached in this way, and the knowledge thus

reached

is

the

sum

knowledge, as

of practical wisdom. This

said,

can be gained only by

observation and experiment. reflection

upon

No amount

of

ideas will enable us to deduce

PERSONALISM

38

a priori any of these facts. In this work also

we

are independent of metaphysics except in

the most general sense.

We

need not have a

theory of gravitation to discover that certain

changes can be formulated in the law of the

We need

not have a theory of

magnetism

to notice that a cer-

inverse square. electricity or

tain set of physical

changes have such and

such laws. Hydrogen and oxygen

may be

in

themselves things or phenomena or nothings, yet

we know

we

call

that a certain measure of what

oxygen and hydrogen

will

form a certain amount of what we This matter

may

unite to

call water.

be highly mysterious in

its

innermost essence, but for practical purposes

we know how will

to deal with

it,

and know what

happen vmder circumstances open

servation

and experiment. And, as

order of experience remains even to

call

things

nothings, for

if

the

to ob-

said, this

we decide hydrogen

nothing and the oxygen nothing would unite to form the water nothing, and as well off as ever, no better

we

still

are

and no worse, for

our metaphysics. This knowledge of the con-

SENSE, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY 39

COMMON

and laws of experience

tents

gun by common

is

originally be-

sense. The spontaneous and

humanity has got

unreflective experience of

To

together a good deal of information.

on

this

range

work with greater

is

precision

carry

and wider

the work of science. Science has pro-

common

perly no principles beyond those of

sense observation and

trial.

It

only applies

those principles more thoroughly and invents

more accurate methods of observation and experiment, but scientific methods move along the

lilies

science

of

common

is full

And

sense.

this

work of

of beneficence, and every intel-

ligent person should wish

success.

it

can find any reason for objecting to every one must recognize in beneficent forms of

human

it

No

one

it,

for

one of the most

activity. It is the

great source of our mastery over nature, and

must go on

until that mastery has

been vastly

extended, leading to the casting out of old

forms of disease, the better guidance of the putting off cles of steel, call

life,

of human drudgery upon mus-

and the subjection of what we

the forces of nature to

human

service to

PERSONALISM

40

a degree hitherto undreamed

of, a

degree of

"which our present control of nature gives only

work science

the faintest suggestion. In this

has inalienable rights, and no philosopher or theologian

may

molest or

make

it

afraid. It is

in this work, too, that science does invaluable service, for it is just this

things

hang together

in

knowledge of the way an order of law that

gives us our control of nature ilization possible.

We cannot

importance of science in

But

its

this field is limited.

and makes

civ-

overestimate the

own

field.

If these spatial

and temporal

facts with their various uniformi-

were

known, an important question

ties

all

would remain untouched. This

is

the question

of meaning and causal interpretation, and this

question the mind insists upon asking. After we have found that things exist and hang together in certain ways in space and time, we

next need to the cause cesses.

and

is

is

What it

know what they mean, and what that underlies the cosmic

pro-

is the nature of the causality,

moving toward any goal? This

question belongs to philosophy. Nothing that

COMMON

SENSE, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY

41

science does or can do even tends to answer it.

Science discovers, describes, registers the

facts

philosophy interprets them. It seeks to

;

penetrate to the hidden seat of the power that underlies the world

and

meaninof that animates

to detect the secret

it.

Both the

scientific

and philosophic inquiry are equally necessary for the full satisfaction of the

human mind,

but their codrdinate rank has not

been recognized.

The

positivists rule out the

They hold

causal inquiry altogether.

we^i^n do

is

always

that all

to register the orders of coexist-

ence and sequence in space and time.

beyond that to the

is

fruitless.

The

agnostics

same conclusion by a somewhat

road.

The

bound

to

causal inquiry

is

All

come

different

one that we are

make, but one that we can never an-

swer. Practically, then,

we must be

positivists,

with, however, a sense of the omnipresent mys-

tery

upon which

all

which they proceed.

things depend and from

Common

distinguish the questions at causality,

there

is

but finds

it

in

all.

sense does not It believes in

sense objects,

and

When

this

no mystery about them.

PERSONALISM

42

view

is

carried out

it

gives us the familiar nat-

uralism of materialistic and atheistic thought.

But a more

critical

of these views. tivism

philosophy declines any

Time has judged both

posi-

and agnosticism, and the human mind

has rejected them.

Common

sense remains on

the surface and has no suspicion of the depths of the problem.

These depths

critical reflec-

tion seeks to reveal or to sound.

But here the objection may be perience

is

raised

:

if

ex-

to be unconditionally accepted there to be little

need for any puzzles

over the causation in

the case, for things

would seem

about us are manifestly causal, and so what

need

is

there to

describing

and

go beyond those things, simply

them not only

in their temporal

but also in their causal

spatial relations

relations ? This leads to the insight that the

question of causality

is

more mysterious than

very is

much deeper and

commonly supposed.

This appears from the study of physics as well as from abstract metaphysical reflection.

A first thought, is

of course,

is

that causality

given in immediate experience of things ; but

COMMON

SENSE, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY 43

since the time of

obsolete

Hume

this notion

has been

among practiced thinkers. There

course no question that causality

is

is

of

in play in

the production of physical changes, but where the causality

is

be conceived

is

aged.

Common

to be located

reflection

it is

a problem not so easily sense locates

themselves, but as

and

and how

new

it

to

man-

in the things

facts are discovered

upon them

is

extended this

is

seen to be an impossible view. Thus, take this

desk at which I stand. It

is

easily described

in tferms of experience, and in such terms there is

no mystery about

But when

it.

I proceed

to ask concerning the nature of the material

of which

it is

composed I soon find myself be-

ginning to grope. The wood, according to the physicists cules,

and chemists,

composed of mole-

is

which in turn are built of atoms, and .

nowadays these atoms themselves seem to be systems of particles

when inquiry

is

still

more minute. And

continued we are told of

deeper mysteries, of vortex rings in

an

still

ether,

with other dark sayings, the result of which is to

show that the things about us are not

PERSONALISM

44

substantial things, but rather processes of an

energy beyond them

;

and

at last

we

are led, in

the words of Mr. Spencer, to recognize " the

one absolute certainty that he [man] in the presence of an Infinite

Energy, from which

all

is

things proceed."

ever true this conclusion

may

ever

and Eternal

How-

be, the facts

adduced serve to show that the problem of causation has deeper mysteries in at first suspected.

that causation sical it,

is

We

are

still

in play as the

changes, but

it

than we

sure, as said,

ground of phy-

we seem compelled

to locate

not in the phenomena themselves, but in

the basal energy beyond them on which they

depend and by which they are coordinated. This inquiry takes us into the depths of metaphysics.

Thus we

see a

sense, science,

way

of harmonizing

common

and philosophy. They are not

mutually contradictory or indifferent realms,

but rather mutually supplementary aspects of the mind's effort in the attempt to understand

itself

and

its

experience. All conflicts

between them, then, are entirely the outcome

COMMON

SENSE, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY 45

of misunderstanding and ignorance.

Common

sense and science must discover the facts, their contents, their spatial

and temporal

laws, other-

wise philosophy has nothing to work upon after science has

;

done

but,

on the other hand,

this

work, the higher interpretation remains

necessary, and without fully satisfy all

Each inquiry in its

own

its

field,

the

mind cannot

tendencies and come

justified

is

it

to rest.

and highly important

and each must recognize the

coordinate importance of the other. Science,

we have

said, studies the laws of

coexistence and sequence

among

the facts of

experience, and leaves their interpretation to

philosophy.

A

entific field,

however, must be made in this

certain extension of the sci-

may undertake a certain kind interpretation in its own field of space

way. Science of

and time without going into the metaphysical field

which belongs to philosophy. The

nomical

illustration,

given, serves to

astro-

which we have already

show

need not go beyond

this.

his

The astronomer own spatial phe-

nomena and the laws which obtain therein

PERSONALISM

46 in

order to reach

sions.

his

astronomical conclu-

Proceeding on the experience of the

variation of the apparent size of bodies ac-

we can infer from phenomena how they would

cording to their distance, the given spatial

appear from another point of view, and in this

way we may

pass to affirm the astro-

nomical heavens as the way in which the system would look

if

vision. If the visible

rent

we can argue

we extended our

space

heavens are only appa-

to their

appearance

distances from us were diminished.

if

their

Passing,

then, in imagination, back and forth in space,

we can form some conception system and

sidereal

so doing

we

use no

of the great

mighty spaces. In

its

new

principle,

but only

apply the familiar laws of space and space appearance.

And

thus, in general,

nomena

interpreted

by

we

their

find that phe-

own laws

give

a hint of past conditions and also point to future

things

conditions.

we can

From a given

state

of

infer the past state of things

or look forward to a future state of things.

COMMON

SENSE, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY 47

in accordance "with the laws observed to hold

among; them.

Thus we can read back the

geological history of our earth to some ex-

and

tent,

also its

biological

From given

astronomical history.

and

strata,

forms

history, or its

erosions

and from a succession of

fossil

and from various

astro-

in these strata,

nomical data, we can do somewhat in the

way

of reading back into the past of the sys-

tem. In-Nlike manner, from the present conditions, laws,

and tendencies, we can

infer

something respecting the future. But in

all

of these cases the inference remains within

the phenomenal realm, or

nomena

of space and time,

no new metaphysical

among

the phe-

and they involve

principle

simple recognition of those

beyond the

phenomena and

their observed laws. In this sense, then, sci-

ence not merely discovers and describes and registers the facts of experience, but infers

from them many other

it

also

facts as existing

elsewhere in space, or in past or future time. It is to scientific

be observed, however, that this

inference

is

hypothetical and can-

PERSONALISM

48

not claim to have the certainty of the facts of experience which can be verified in experience

probability

and

jected. But,

measure of

has a certain

It

itself.

not to be gratuitously

is

on the other hand,

it

re-

can never

lay claim to be assured matter of fact, as rests

upon

which are far

certain assumptions

from being necessary

it

This inferred

truths.

knowledge of the past assumes that we know all

the determining circumstance^j^that the

order of

change

is

new

manifestation of a or within occurs

;

and that no

constant,

force from without

and as

this is

something

we never can know, we are not entitled to be dogmatic. Of course the reasoning in such cases may be sound, but the premises may be open to doubt. For example valley

is

it.

If a certain

being cut away at a fixed

can readily calculate

form

:

Or

if

how long

it

we

rate,

has taken to

the delta of the Mississippi

is

extending a given distance every year, we

can by simple division

been

in

forming.

Or

tell if

how long

it

has

a certain peat-bed

has a given thickness and has been deposited

COMMON

SENSE, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY 49

one inch a year, we can

easily tell

how long

the deposition has taken. In such cases, as said, the reasoning

may be

exact, the

math-

ematics perfect, but the conclusion depends

upon the assumed truth of the premises.

It

in the case of our peat-bed that

we

might be

should find at the bottom of the bed, say a

Roman

shoe, or coins of the date of

tus Csesar, in which case,

if

Augus-

our mathematics

had given us a million or two of years as the quotient,

we should know

that, while the

mathematics was right, the inference

itself

was wrong. Again, we can never be sure that there

might not have been manifestations of unsuspected forces, bringing about new conditions

which would make our reasoning instance,

if

invalid.

there were a number of beings

For liv-

ing in a world of oxygen and hydrogen, they

might conceivably learn the physics of gases very thoroughly, and they could infer that the gases would contract with cold or expand with heat, but they

would not have any hint of

what would happen

if

an

electric spark should

;

PERSONALISM

60

pass through. In that case there would be a

sudden manifestation of unsuspected chemical properties, resulting in very different physical

and chemical properties which would

in the

water vapor

these

hypothetical

If

result.

beings should survive the process, they might

then proceed to study the physics of water

vapor and become dogmatic again as to what

was possible on the tinuity;

and

basis of the law of con-

their reasons

would be valid

the vapor cooled below a certain point,

until

when

there would be another break of continuity

and the

result

set of hitherto

would be water with another unsuspected properties.

And

lived

and should once

more grow dogmatic about

continuity, their

if

the speculators

still

conclusions might be justified until the water

was cooled down

to

32 degrees Fahrenheit,

when another wonder would happen. water would pass into

ice, in

the law of continuity, and properties would appear.

that

The

bold defiance of

still

a

new

set of

This serves to show

we must be somewhat

careful not to be

too dogmatic in our inferences from the pre-

COMMON

SENSE, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY

sent state of things, for what trated here in the large

small tial

all

the time.

we have

may take

51

illus-

place in the

Indeed, the system of spa-

changes and successions, based upon purely

kinematic considerations of the composition of motions, tions

is

continually suffering modifica-

from the dynamic realm, conceived either

as the nature of the elements or as

some en-

ergy outside of them and working upon them.

To what

extent this

is

possible in general

is

known

to

of course unknown, but enough

warn us

ag^ainst a confident

is

doo-matism based

on the supposed law of continuity. self-confident dogmatist

has already manifested

knows

Only the

that the system

all its essential

poten-

tialities.

Logic makes the further suggestion at this point to the effect that no

moving system can

ever give an account of

origin

system of law

is

given

its

it is

;

for

when a

logically possible

to read the system backwards, but the back-

ward reading sent

in

any actual

such a case does not reprefact,

have been the fact

if

but simply what would the system had existed

PERSONALISM

62

through that time. Every such system, then, has what if

may be

called a virtual past. Thus,

we should suppose

the solar system created

outright, the equations positions

moment

which express the com-

and motions of the planets

at the

of creation could be read backward,

but the backward reading would refer to a

The same

virtual past, not a real one.

is

true

for any order of law in a changing world. It

admits of being read backward, and there

whereby we can distinguish the

no sure

test

virtual

from the

real

past.

Our

analytic

thought naturally assumes that the simple

ments preceded compounds but ;

logical precedence,

turning

it

is

ele-

this is only a

and we find no warrant for

into a temporal relation. If there

have always been chemical elements, for

all

we can say they may always have been chemically

active

and chemically united

in

any

order of complexity. Dogmatizing on origins is

logically a very perilous business. It gener-

ally

ends in mistaking the simplifications of

analysis for the original forms of existence.

Wisely, then, did Mr. Mill say even of the so-

COMMON

SENSE, SCIENCE, PHILOSOPHY 53

called laws of nature that

we should

confine

our affirmations to a " reasonable degree of extension to adjacent cases." Science, then, has the world of temporal

phenomena

spatial

ne-

that this world has

its

its field

and possibly of purpose, and the

real reason for all spatial

festation

and temporal mani-

must ultimately be sought

world of power.

And

beware of

all

in

the

and

its

implica-

from

us,

we need

as this

tions are very largely hidden to

;

and impicturable world

roots in an invisible

of power

it is

for

remember

cessary to

but

and

dogmatism respecting either

past or future which

is

far

removed from our

practical interests.

Our

first

step toward

the personal inter-

pretation of experience consists in the insight

that

we

are in a personal world

and that the sophy

and

is

first, last,

from the

and only duty

start,

of philo-

to interpret this world of personal life

relations.

Any

other view can only lead

to the misleading abstractions

and aberrations

with which the history of thought abounds.

II

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

How is

experience possible ? This

tion with which

is

the ques-

Kant inaugurated a new

in philosophy. Before his time there

era

had been

two views respecting the origin of knowledge.

One was that

Mind

is

all

knowledge

is

from experience.

purely passive in knowing, and impres-

sions are

made upon

mous metaphor this school as

it

fa-

both doctrine and argument ever

since the time of Plato.

mere reading

from without. The

of the tabula rasa has served

off of

Knowledge, then,

is

a

what the mind passively

receives. The other view was that the mind may know many things independently of ex-

perience.

The former view had been reduced

to absurdity

had run

by Hume, and the

into a barren formalism in the

of Leibnitz's disciples. ficial.

latter

The

view

hands

Both views were super-

empirical school had never decided

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

55

what experience means when the mind terly passive,

Locke

to

and they had fomid

it

is ut-

easy with

deduce many rational principles from

a passively received experience.

Hume

But

came and showed that such an experience must become a vanishing phantasmagoria, which perishes as fast as articulate

it is

behind

born and leaves nothing

it.

we do

Since, however,

have an articulate experience,

it is

plain that

the question of the origin of knowledge

is

sub-

ordinate to the deeper question respecting the origin of experience itself.

out that experience

is

If

it

should turn

a product of our rational

nature, the folly of seeking to deduce reason

from experience would be manifest. Hence the

How

is

known. Experience

is

epochal significance of the question, experience possible?

Kant's answer

is

well

not something given ready-made from without,

but

is

actively constructed

Experience

is

by the mind within.

possible only through a certain

constitutive mental activity, according to principles

immanent

way the raw

in the understanding. In this

material of sense impressions,

m

PERSONALISM and discontinu-

which

in themselves are fleeting

ous,

built into a rational world of experience.

is

This insight was Kant's great contribution to philosophy, and criticism, a

remains, in spite of all

it

permanent possession of

reflective

thought.

This result finally vacates the traditional empiricism which views the

mind

receptive in knowledge. articulate nihilism to

as only passively

Hume showed

the in-

which the doctrine must

come when made consistent, and Kant showed that actual experience this result

in a

is

a mental product. In

he had been forestalled by Hume,

somewhat left-handed way,

sion that there

is

in his admis-

much in thought which cannot

in an experience of the passive type, he ascribed therefore to a " mental which and

be found

propensity to feign." it

is

When

carefully studied,

turns out that this "propensity to feign" a very active faculty in

tween cism

Hume and Kant is

deprived of

tional support. It

of superstitions.

all

Hume's system. Be-

the old sense empirivisible

now belongs

means

of ra-

to the family

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE The principles

of

knowing

manent laws of mental

now endeavor

57

are primarily im-

activity.

This we must

to bring out into clear vision, as

the great difficulty in popular philosophizing

and lie

the strengfth of traditional naturalism

all

in the apparent

so that

makes

seems to be no problem at

it

it

immediacy of knowledge, This

all.

easy to believe that a great system of

things can exist and be activity of

any rational and

This assumption

is

the

spiritual principle.

the corner-stone, and indeed

the whole foundation, of sophizing.

known without

mechanical philo-

all

Hence the need

of

making

this

activity evident.

Knowleds'e of course cannot be defined except in terms of

itself,

from that which

is

neither can

it

be deduced

not knowledge. There must

always be a certain unique and immediate character to

but

knowledge which can

itself.

rest

on nothing

In some sense, then, there

swer to the question. sible? for there

is

How

is

is

no an-

knowledge pos-

nothing deeper or other

than knowledge by which to explain the study of knowledge

may

it.

Still

reveal certain con-

PERSONALISM

58

ditions

and implications which are unsuspected

by unreflective thought and which have profound significance for philosophical theory. This fact gives us our next subject of inquiry.

We

do not aim to

sible, in it

how knowledge

tell

is

pos-

the sense of giving a recipe by which

might be compounded from that which

is

not knowledge, but in the sense of studying the conditions and implications of the process.

And,

first

of

all,

knWmg

we must make

clear

the problem and our starting-point.

A fundamental distinction in knowing is that between the " all

me " and

the " not-me."

other things or persons as

my

I place

objects in

changeless antithesis to myself as conscious subject.

But inasmuch

as this

"not-me"

in-

cludes my fellow men, the " me " is soon enlarged

by

their addition,

and then the

antithesis be-

comes the " us " and the " not-us."

We human

beings become the " us," the subjects, and the cosmic order with whatever else there

may

be

becomes the "not-us." Then the "not-us" breaks up again into the cosmic order, so far as it is

an object of

scientific study,

and

its

cause.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE If

we could

ledge on

made

all

attain to clear

"me

too sharp an antithesis between

" and the "not-me," the " us " and

the " not-us."

many

This objection

own meaning, and

us, it

still less

Whatever monism

concrete possibility.

can do for

due to the fact

monism without any very clear

conception of their its

is

persons have contracted the habit

of talking about

of

know-

very likely be objected by some that

we have made

that

definite

we should have

great progress in philosophy.

It will

the

and

of these points,

59

can never confound us with one

another so as to identify Jesus and Judas, or

make Mr.

Spencer's critics the authors of his

philosophy. fact of

Whatever universal elements the

knowledge may contain or imply,

concrete process knowing ual, a

is

gathering by the "

respecting the " not-me"

;

necessariljnndivid-

me"

of information

and any other method

of treatment will result in confounding tinctions

and

as a

all dis-

telling us, perhaps, that the sub-

ject of the universal experience is the

same as

the subject of the particular experience

—a

PERSONALISM

60

dark saying, to which unfortunately no key has

been furnished, not even for teachers. In addition, we must note that our knowing in its very nature implies

of a content which ing.

Knowing

is

being in the sense

the object of the

know-

as an act never ends in itself

as a psychological fact. It always relates itself to a content

make but

which the knowinof act does not

reproduces.

There

is,

then, in

th^

very idea of our knowing a presupposition of

something existing apart from the knowing as a mental event,

and

this,

indeed,

is

the very

essence of the idea. This fact has always been

overlooked by empiricists,

who have thought

the only problem of knowledge was to group particular sensations sciousness, their

own

and when

in

the individual con-

this has

been done to

satisfaction they have supposed that

the problem of knowledge was solved. In fact,

however, they have not even seen the problem, to say

nothing of solving

tional

mechanism worked

it.

If their associa-

perfectly,

it

would

only give sensations associated in some particular consciousness,

and could never give

,

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE anything beyond

it.

61

Solipsism would be the

only result. This outcome

is

escaped by the

ambiguity of the term sensation, which means primarily an unqualified and particular impression in the individual sensibility,

then, without warning,

is

and which

transformed into a

symbol or revelation o£ a world of things ing beyond

itself.

But

this is

exist-

something very

different. If the sensations are only affections

of the sensibility, they never carry us

themselves; but

if

beyond

they point to and reveal a

world beyond them, we have something more than sensationalism. All the apparent success of sensationalism rests upon this ambiguity, as

Green has shown with such thoroughness

in his Introduction to

Assuming, then,

Hume. world of things other

this

than myself, in the sense that they cannot be identified with myself,

How

is

we have the

question.

a knowledge of such things possible?

Knowledge

is

conditioned both by the na-

ture of the subject and

by the nature

object. In order that a thing

of the

may be known,

the subject must act in certain ways and the

PERSONALISM

62

object must be of a certain nature. If the subject

remained passive and

be no knowledge; and as to admit of

no

inert, there

the object were such

if

rational construction, again

there could be no knowledge. activity of the

would

subject

first.

We consider the How

is

know-

ledge possible as a subjective apprehension of objects other than the

knowing subject?

The general answer to this question is our human knowing of other than purely jective states

sub-

must depend upon some form of

interaction between the

me."

that

"me" and

the "not-

This "not-me," so far as yet appears,

might conceivably be the world of things about us, or it

might be an all-embracing impersonal

energy, or

whom we

it

might be a supreme

all

Common

depend.

course, assumes that the interaction

apparent objects and

spirit

sense, is

ever, loses its plausibility as soon as

jects.

of

between

ourselves, for there seems

to be nothing else in sight. This view,

to see the

upon

how-

we come

phenomenality of the world of ob-

Then we

find ourselves shut

or the other of two views

;

up to one

but for our present

n

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE purposes

makes no

it

difference

63

what view we

take of the " not-me." Whatever

it

be

it

can-

not give us ready-made knowledge, or do anything;

but furnish a stimuhis to our own mental

activity.

reaction

In is

all interaction

between things the

but an expression of the agent's own

nature, for the manifestation of which other thing's

but furnish the occasion.

mental reaction which we

call

Hence the

knowledge can

be looked upon only as an expression of our

mental nature according to principles immanent in itself.

But this statement

is

too abstract for

easy understanding by the unpracticed reader,

and we must attempt a more concrete explanation.

Common

sense begins by taking knowledge

for granted. In the beginnings of mental de-

velopment knowledge

Things are

there,

is

and are

as a matter of course.

not even a problem. reflected

Of

by the mind

the complex and

obscure processes and postulates of cognition,

spontaneous thought has no suspicion, and

knowledge woidd have always been taken as a matter of course had not experience revealed

PERSONALISM

64 difficulties

Men

and contradictions

our thinking.

in

stumbled at an early date upon these

difficulties

and skepticism was awakened, and

thus thought was gradually forced to consider its

own methods and

sibility of

to inquire into the pos-

knowledge

did not receive

its full

itself;

but the problem

and adequate statement

Kant. From his time

until the time of

epl§>-^

temology has been a leading department of philosophy.

Common

sense supposes that

know-

ledge arises without any process of mystery,

but epistemology shows that the matter ceedingly complex. is

The

existence of things

by no means the same

of them,

and

reflection

ex-

is

as our

makes

knowledge

plain that

if

things existed precisely as they appear to us the knowledge of

mind by

its

own

tents of things

them could

arise only as the

action reproduces the confor thought.

Knowledge

is

nothing which can be imported ready-made into a passive mind, but the

construct knowledge for

most readily

mind must actively

itself.

We

see this

in the case of conversation or

any

form of mutual understanding between per-

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE sons. In sueli cases

65

no ideas pass from one mind

into another, but each

mind

for itself con-

structs the other's thought,

and thus appre-

hends and comprehends

This

dently the case in

all

it.

self-evi-

is

personal communion, and

every one would see the absurdity of any other supposition.

Thoughts are not things

exchanged or handed along. They

to

be

exist only

through thinking, and to perceive another's thougfht

is

to think

it

equally expresses the fact in

know

things

is

But

for ourselves. all

this

knowing. To

to think them, that

is,

to

form

thoughts which truly grasp the contents or

meanings of the things. The things do not pass ready-made into the mind. Indeed they

do not pass into the mind at

all,

but upon oc-

casion of certain action

upon the mind the

mind unfolds within

itself

the vision and know-

ledge of the world.

And

this

it

does, accord,

ing to the physiologist's report, without pattern or copy,

and

in

consequence of certain

nervous changes of which moreover

it

knows

nothing directly and commonly knows nothing whatever. This being the case,

it is

manifestly

PERSONALISM

66 idle to

think of knowledge as impressed on a

passive mind, or as carried ready-made into

the mind.

The knowledge

originates within,

and the laws and forms of knowledge must primarily be the laws and forms of thought itself.

Just as

teacher's little

as ideas pass

little

mind

from the

into the pupil's mind, just'as

do they pass from things without into

the knowino; mind.

This matter

but

is

plain

common sense

has

enough upon its difficulties.

reflection,

We ven-

ture therefore another illustration. Suppose a

man who had office

lived all his life in a telegraph

and who had

to get all his information

respecting the existence and nature of an external world

by the

clicks of the instrument.

»The clicks are like nothing but

They resemble

neither the

themselves.

things

they are

supposed to represent, nor the thoughts they are supposed to evoke.

But

if

under such

cumstances the man did read them back the external world,

have the key

it is

cir-

into

manifest that he must

in himself, as only thus could

he pass from clicks to meanings.

But

this

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE illustration

and

scurity

perception.

67

hardly even adumbrates the obdifficulty of the actual process of

The

mean nothing

sense clicks left to themselves

it is

;

only as they are

made

the

bearers of a rational content that they acquire

any

Sensations at best in their

significance.

perceptive

relation

are

only

symbols,

the

meaning must be furnished by the percipient mind. This conclusion must stand even on the supposition that

we simply apprehend

or read

things in sense perception without modification.

But most of our

objective

knowing

The world

not perception, but interpretation. as

it

for sense

is

world as

it

is

is

very difi^erent from the

for thought. In looking at a

picture the colored surfaces in the sense.

The meaning^

and is

outlines are

in thoug'ht. In

reading a book the printed page sense.

The

sio^nification

only in thought. to read

is

is

is

in the

in thouoht,

and

One who does not know how

would look

in vain for

meaning

in a

book, and in vain would he seek to help his failure

by using

eye-glasses.

The same

is

true

PERSONALISM

68

knowledge of the world. That

also for our

which

is

which

is

ting,

fleeting,

in sense is very different in thought.

shows that

The

sense world

discontinuous.

it is all

from that is

flit-

Epistemology

an inarticulate, phantasma-

goric flux or dissolving view until thought

brings into

its

it

rational principles and^^fixes

The

and

interprets

it is

articulate, is already a

it.

permanences and

sense world, so far as

thought world.

identities

are products of

The complex system

thought.

whereby

it

is

of

relations

and articulated

defined

Its

is

a

thought product, which can in no way be given

The

to sense.

far-reaching inferences of

sci-

ence whereby our spontaneous thought of the

world

is

so profoundly transformed, are some-

thing which exist for neither eye nor ear, but for thought only.

The world

from the world of sense

of science differs

as widely as the con-

ceptions of the astronomer differ from the algebraic signs by Avhich he expresses them.

At

first

glance this

plain

man

of

common

is

a hard saying for the

sense.

He

is

perfectly

sure that the things he sees are really there,

;

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE as he

and there

sees them,

and he

69 is

not

aware of any of these processes of which we speak. But the question now is, not whether the things be there, but there for us ; and

when

even the " plain

man

how they come

this distinction is

have been dreamed of in

made

in this matter than his philosophy.

By

consent the last term on the physical

common

side of the perceptive process is

nervous change, and this impression

When

be

" can be made to see

more things

that there are

to

with

nothing

these facts are

plain that a

is

some form of

but a fleeting

abiding

remembered

it

about

it.

becomes

permanent and rational world can

be reached from these antecedents only as the

mind

upon them and by laws imma-

reacts

nent in

itself

proceeds to build up the rational

The

order of experience. tinuous impression

is

flitting

and discon-

interpreted into a con-

tinuous and abiding world only by a perma-

with

nent

self

and

if this

its outfit

of rational principles

were taken away there would be

only an inarticulate flux of impressions with-

out rational contents.

PERSONALISM

70

Some

further illustration

illuminating

in

thought

is

so quick

to overlook

it

matter.

this

may be useful The work of

and subtle that

altogether and

to

it is

easy

take

the

products of thought as original data antece-

Thus

it

seems self-evident

sensation, at least,

is

something which

dent to thouofht. that

may be But

given without any rational activity.

this is true only for the fleeting

temporal

impression, and not for the sensation as any-

thing rationally articulate. But the temporal impression it

is

itself is

fixed into

nothing for intellect until

an abidinof meaning;.

curring, the impression

the

divisibility

number

of

is

As

oc-

dispersed through

time into an

of parts each of which

is

indefinite

external to

every other and different from every other.

But thought cannot grasp any such thing as this unless

it

be able to

elusive

fix this

van-

ishing flow into a single and permanent meaning,

and only thus does the impression become

anything for thought. Similarly with regard to recurrence of sensations, this

as a psychological

is

and temporal

impossible fact.

Past

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE sensations can recur as recur. Recurrence fixes its

and

is

experience

identifies

little as

71

past time can

mind

possible only as the

into

abiding meanings

those meanings in successive

phases of the sense flow

;

and apart from

this

synthesis and identification by the mind, the

sense flow would have neither fixity nor per-

The

manence nor recurrence of any kind. same

is

sations thinofs. if

true for the discontinuity of our sen-

and the continuity of the world of The sensations are discontinuous, and

they were

all,

tinuity in things

there would be equal discon;

but the mind interprets the

discontinuous sensations into a world of continuous things on

and apart from

its

own

rational warrant,

this interpretation there

would

be no framework nor systematic connection at all in the world of experience. is

Thus

manifest that without this synthetic

interpretative action of the

be no world whatever for

And now

it

and

mind there could

us.

to complete the paradox,

it

must

be said that no one can ever perceive any world but the one he makes. I can perceive another's

PERSONALISM

72

thought only on condition that I think that thought

and the thought

;

so far as I think

can never be other than mine. I

may have

sure conviction in connecti^n^with

it

it

the

that

it

reproduces the content of another's thought,

but

it

can exist for

me

only as

it

becomes

my

own thought, the product of my own thinking. In the same way and with equal evidence the world I perceive

When

is

the world I construct.

we are looking at a series of moving we

pictures

see a great

The

not there.

many

things that are

up to the

train rolls

Passengers leave or enter the cars.

form

and

The

plat-

thronged with persons hurrying to

is

fro.

Yet

this

beholder's mind.

busy scene

in all perception.

And

may

all

in the

sees are the

the same

is

true

These "constructs " are

any one can possibly have it

is

The things he

things he constructs.

though

station.

be that they

all

in consciousness,

all

carry with

them

a reference to existence beyond the percipient consciousness. This reference constitutes their objectivity,

and makes them

for others also

;

possible objects " "

nevertheless the

construct

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE itself, is

73

with of course this objective reference,

the only possible content of the percipient

and

consciousness,

this

" construct " must

always be the mind's own product. the object what

any nearer

to

be

may, we never can come

it

it

And

than this " construct "

will

bring- us.

These considerations show how exceedingly complicated the perceptive process

utterly mistaken those per-

who speak

of an immediate knowledge

of reality as

But

ever.

upon

and how

analysis,

sons are

is

if

it

involved no process what-

would be a mistake to infer any

it

doctrine of idealism from these facts.

They

belong to the process of perception, but

this

process itself never decides as to the reality of

the object perceived. in

Reflection

any case perception must

that

is,

arise in this

way,

through a reaction of the mind against

action upon

it

the world for

so as to build It is

itself.

carries with

tent existing apart

it

up or construct

not merely and only

a construction by the mind,

which

shows that

it is

a construction

a reference to the con-

from the perceptive

act.

PERSONALISM

74

All thinking has this objective reference. claims not to produce

It

but to reproduce a

content existing ap^it from the knowing act itself.

Furthermore,

if

we should pass

to an

on the strength of

idealistic affirmation

this

reasoning the immediate consequence would

be solipsism, for

just as true of the neigh-

it is

bors as o£ things, that our knowledge of them is a

mental construction. Primarily our thoughts

of our neig-hbors arise within our

own minds

as a mental interpretation of our sense experi-

ence,

and

if

we

are to deny any kind of an

existence to things on account of the process,

we must

equally deny the neighbors for the

same reason.

Any

must

upon the process of perception,

rest not

tenable idealism, therefore,

but upon an analysis of the product of perception.

That

is,

we must examine our

objects

with the aim of seeing which of them, or

much

of them,

is

to be

proper existence and

how much

only phenomenal existence, that for intelligence.

To

sense qualities

found

is

of is,

illustrate: the

to

how

viewed as having

them has existence

world of

have only phenom-

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

75

enal existence, not because of the process of perception, but because a study of

them shows

that they have no meaning apart from lect

with

Thus

its

far

intel-

function of sensibility.

we have spoken

of knowledge as

conditioned only by the nature and activity of the subject.

But

it

nature of the object factor.

posing

We its

manifest that the

also

a determining

have spoken of the mind as im-

laws and forms upon experience and

thus reaching objects this is

is

is

;

but

it is

manifest that

only part of the matter.

For unless

the objects themselves were harmonious with these laws

and forms, the

be imposed upon them.

latter

could not

It is manifest that I

can understand another person's speech only as I think his thought for myself, but

it

is

equally manifest that I cannot understand his

thought unless there be some thought to Or, again, in the interpretation

understand.

of an inscription which I might discover, I

can interpret self,

and

tation

it

it

is

only as I have the key in myequally evident that interpre-

presupposes that the inscription has

PERSONALISM

76

rational meaning.

It

would be hopeless to

at-

tempt to understand random scratches. The

same

is

signs

true in the interpretation of the sense

by which we reach the knowledge of

The mind must have the key

nature.

in

it-

self,

but there must also be an objective order

and

fixed

meaning

interpretation.

ing

to

Otherwise we should be (^ek-

understand mere noises or random

scratches,

thought

as the presupposition of

which would be absurd.

is

carried out

it

When this

implies an objective

rational order parallel to our subjective think-

As

ing.

speech implies a mind at both ends

of the process, so knowledge under our hu-

man

conditions equally implies a

ends. is

mind

at both

Noise becomes speech only as thought

expressed in

it,

and understood through

it.

So the affections of sense become knowledge only as they are the media for expressing and transmitting thought beyond them.

And

here

it

might occur to some uncon-

vinced empiricist to return to his claim that the sensations are ask,

what

is

all.

For, after

all,

he might

there in experience but the sense

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE and what

content, actual or possible,

is

77

there

that cannot be expressed in terms o£ sensation, real or expected, or

How of

conceived as possible ?

can motion be expressed except in terms

changing sensations, and how can

dis-

tance and size be figured except in sensational

terms ?

Such questions,

if

seriously asked,

would

show loyalty and determination rather than insight into the problem.

They would not touch

the question respecting the form of experience at all

;

and

this is

one of the matters at issue

between empiricism and apriorism. The spatial

and temporal form, and the tity, substantiality,

and

sense experience at

all

relations of iden-

causality are not in the

as a

mere

affection of

the sensibility. Bearing this fact in mind, the questions only imply a certain phenomenalistic doctrine of sense objects. Applied to persons

they lead straight to solipsism

;

for other per-

sons could be reduced to groups of tions, real or possible, in the

my

sensa-

same way and with

the same right. Finally, as applied to sense objects, they reach

no " common to

all,"

which

PERSONALISM

78

the presupposition of a mutually intelligible

is

experience. Mr. Mill, working along this line,

defined matter as a " permanent possibility of sensation," but left us in very great uncer-

tainty as to

manent

its

whereabouts. If

time and space,

in

like a reality instead of a

it

it

were per-

would be very

mere

possibility. If

be said to exist only in consciousness we

it

are embarrassed,

many

consciousnesses, and

which one

it

can be any

on

all

remembering that there are

has

its seat,

we need and

common system

this view.

This

also

know in how there

to

of experience at

difficulty recurs in all

phenomenal systems, and there

is

no removing

we plant behind the phenomenal tem, sensational or otherwise, a Supreme until

it

telligence it

which manifests

his

sys-

In-

thought through

and thus founds that objective unity of the

system of experience which all

is

presupposed in

our knowing.

But place

this doctrine of

knowledge

as taking

through our own " constructs " can

the question as to the valid" ity of knowledge. May not these " constructs

hardly

fail to raise

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

79

be really only shadows of our own minds, rather than true apprehensions of

Looked

at abstractly this possibility cannot

be denied, but the question

means without confusion.

It

apprehension of reality as fectly clear notion,

We

case. self,

reality?

which

speaks of a true this

if is

by no

itself is

were a per-

by no means the

must remember that experience

with ourselves as having

sure reahty in the case this be a true

;

it, is

it-

the only

and to ask whether

apprehension of reality

not

is

self-evident in its meaning. Surely, before

seek to

know any

we we

other reality than this

should show that such reality exists.

But whatever

reality there

plain, as said, that our arise in this

way

;

and

may

knowledge of it is

be,

it

is

must

it

equally plain that

our knowledge of anything in the heavens

above or the earth beneath must consist in seeing

how we must

think

about

Our

it.

thought cannot become the thing, neither can the thing pass bodily into our thought.

We

can only think about the thing and see

we and

reach any result which

satisfies

if

our reason

PERSONALISM

80 fits

into the system of experience so as to har-

monize with

it.

In that case we have the only

positive proof possible of the validity of

know-

ledge.

Now

the

validity of

first

fact that meets us here

is

the

our personal knc^^vledge, or our

mutual understanding- of one another. If we should attempt to justify this knowledge by

any insight into the process we possess we should never succeed. But the knowledge verifies

itself.

In spite of the obscurity of the

process and the impossibility of any demonstration that this process

must

result in valid

knowledge, we contrive to be quite sure of one another's existence standing.

We

and of our mutual under-

find the

same thing extending

that

and

this

shows

our conceptions are valid there

also.

also into the field of experience,

Whatever mystery attaches

to the process of

knowledge and whatever verbal doubts may be raised about itself

within

its

it,

the knowledge vindicates

own sphere by

of our apprehension and by experience.

But

its

the clearness consistency in

this discharges the skeptical

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE doubt for that

it

all practical

purposes by showing

has no foundation in our personal

and experience, and stract

81

is

life

therefore only an ab-

doubt without any concrete grounds.

Any further

question that

may arise must

with the contents of experience

It

itself.

deal

may

be that reflection on these contents would lead

many

modifications of popular notions in

order to

make our spontaneous thought con-

to

sistent

with

itself

;

but there would be no

scepticism in such a result.

But

this

doubt has

played such a role in modern philosophy that

we must consider it. The distinction of appearance and reality in common use is a familiar one and occasions no embarrassment of any sort, as

it lies

entirely

within the sphere of sense experience.

Thus,

a straight stick looks bent when one end thrust into the water.

A large thing looks very

small at a great distance.

The mountains look

when seen through a haze, and lends many an enchantment. When blue

is

seen from afar

it

is

distance

a house

has a certain appearance,

which varies constantly as we approach

it.

In

PERSONALISM

82 all

these cases

common

appearance from the

sense distinguishes the

reality,

rectify the appearance

hut proceeds to

hy referring

it

report of other senses or by comparing

our total experience of the object. of a house it is

to

if

it

with

The reality

not the visual presentation, but

a building of a certain size which

come

The

is

to the

we moved

reality of the

we would

in a certain direction.

bent stick

is

the stick as

it

appears when drawn from the water and handled and measured, etc. In such cases, then, reality

and appearance are contrasted, but the

contrast carries with at least for

common

it

no doubt or

sense. It

difficulty,

would of course

be very embarrassing for a theory of pure sensationalism, as in that doctrine a varying

sensation would

But out

mean a

of the Kantian theory of

ledge a series of ,

different object.

difficulties

know-

emerged which

tended to confirm agnosticism respecting real things and to limit us simply to a knowledge of appearances or phenomena. This doctrine

we now have

to consider. It has played a great

role in all philosophy since Kant's time

and

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE is

83

very far from being entirely clear in

meaning

as well as

sound in

its

its

foundations.

Kant's general claim was that the laws of

thought or categories of the understanding, as he called them, are valid

nomena and

He

selves.

only for phe-

are not valid for thino-s in them-

said their only function consists in

giving form to our sensations, and that apart

from these sensations they are

Now,

the sensations

affections of sense

entirely empty.

themselves

are

simply

which have nothinof corre-

sponding to them apart from the mind.

In

that case, being subjective in their nature, no possible arrangement of

other

than subjective.

them can make them

The

categories

are

merely principles of arrangement of this subjective material,

and by consequence the ap-

parent knowledge, or the seeming knowledge, is

only a knowledge of appearances or phe-

nomena, and cannot claim

to

have existence

beyond the range of human experience. This

and

is

it is

ing and

Kant's famous doctrine of

by no means clear even

still less

relativity,

in its

mean-

satisfactory in its logic.

We

PERSONALISM

84 shall find that

Kant is here under the influence

of sundry untenable notions.

In clearing up the doctrine of

all

that

Ka^t has

it

is

plain first

failed to consider the

position in his doctrine of the plurality of persons,

which he everywhere assumes. As we

have before pointed out, any doctrine of perception which rests upon an analysis of the process only

must end

make the world

in solipsism.

Hence

if

we

of things subjective presenta-

tions because the

knowledge of them

arises

through our mental construction, we must do the same thing with the world of persons, for

the knowledge of them has an equally subjec-

Kant

tive character.

"us" without transition.

He

passes from

telling us

"

" to

me

how he makes

really begins with

merely with the individual

self,

" us,"

the

— not

but with the

whole collection of individual human beings,

— and

gets an experience valid for us

all in

exceedingly obscure ways. But what Kant did

not do the

critic

must do, and we must inquire

into the relation of these

many minds

to

one

another in a system of phenomenal knowledge.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

To begin

with,

it is

85

not clear in what sense

other minds can be called phenomenal to me.

Phenomena

are appearances,

and only

accommodated sense can minds be pear at

If,

all.

in

an

said to ap-

however, we make other minds

phenomenal on the strength of our theory of knowledge,

it

would

really

communion vanishes

know

seem that personal

altogether.

For we can

these other minds only through our

thought of them, and that thought

is

said to

give us merely appearances, which, moreover,

do not appear. Thus

all

contents of other con-

sciousness vanish entirely

from our knowledge.

But Kant never considered his theory

this application of

and had no doubt whatever of the mutual understanding in as

possibility of

in-

timate a sense as any one would care to affirm.

But Kant knowledge not

affirms

so

the

much

phenomenality of

of other minds as he

does of " the mind," or " the Ego." Even our

own minds

are

of ourselves tries to

is

phenomena, or our knowledge

phenomenal only. This Kant

make out by showing

that

we have no

proper knowledge of the transcendental or

PERSONALISM

86

ontological

Much

self,

of this

is

but only of the empirical

self.

own

the-

a deduction from his

ory of knowledge, rather than a demonstration

on the basis of experience. The transcendental ego, in

from the

distinction

living, con-

scious, active self of experience, is a fiction, like all the other less

"noumena," and

and worthless as they. Kant

" paralogisms "

is

as base-

finds various

in rational psychology,

makes out

of which, however,

none

his case.

rational psychologists of Kant's time

had

The laid

claim to a knowledge of the nature of the soul

which they

really did not possess.

For the

dis-

proof of this knowledge no doctrine of phe-

nomenalism

is

needed, but solely a criticism of

the arguments offered.

work was of

all real

well done.

This part of Kant's

But

his general disproof

knowledor'e of the thinkino- self did

not satisfy Kant himself apparently, as we find

from the modifications made

edition of the " Critique."

He omits a large part

of the argumentation of the

second and says, "

It

in the second

first

edition in the

would be a great, nay,

even the only, objection to our Critique

if

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

87

there was a possibility of proving apriori that all

thinking beings are by themselves thinking

substances

;

that as such (as a consequence of

the same argument) personality

is

inseparable

from them and that they are conscious of existence as distinct from

all

their

matter, for

we

should then have made a step beyond the world of sense and entered into the field of noumena,

and

after that

no one could dare to question

our right of advancing further, of settling in it,

and

as each of us

possession of

it.

positions apriori as

we maintain

sible

.

.

is .

favored by luck, taking

Hence

synthetical pro-

would be not only admissible, in reference to objects of pos-

experience, but would be extended to

things in general and to things by themselves,

a result which would put an end to the whole of our Critique

and bids us leave everything

we found it." Here that Kant would have

liked to admit a real

knowledge of the

but he fears that to

as

admit

seems pretty clear

would undermine the whole of the

it

Critique,

mitted.

self,

it

and of course that could not be per-

Hence he allows himself some exceed-

PERSONALISM

88

ingly doubtful reasoning in support of his re-

knowledge of a noumenal

jection of the

But on the other hand what self

would be which

mena appearing

to

is

phenomenal

a

had other pheno-

in turn it

something

The

gether undecided by him.

fact

is

is

upon the itself

as

self

we have

phenom-

not an appearance to somebody It is possible to

a logical impossibility.

upon things

left altois

A

here a very distinct contradiction.

enon which

self.

phenomenal only

which views these

phenomenal

in the

but to look

;

phenomena as

same sense

Where

gether impossible.

look

there

is

alto-

is

no perceiv-

ing subject there can be no phenomena

;

and

when we put the subject among the phenomena, So, then, Kant's

the doctrine itself disappears.

doctrine of phenomenalism with regard to the self

must be withdrawn. Of course many ques-

tions

we

may be asked

respecting the self which

are not able to answer, but the self itself as

the subject of the mental

experiencing

life

itself as living,

same throughout

its

and knowing and

and as one and the

changing experiences,

the surest item of knowledge

we

possess.

is

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE The Kantian doubt,

then,

the world of external things

;

89

must be Kmited to

and

here, too, its

meaning and application are by no means obvious.

any

It is clear in the first place that

doctrine series of

phenomenalism which

of

affirms a

unknowable noumena behind phenom-

ena is in unstable equilibrium. For phenomena are the immediate fact, ate for us

and

if

they do not medi-

any valid knowledge of noumena,

the latter are philosophically worthless and logically unaffirmable.

that experience jects, is

we

For we must never forget

itself,

with ourselves as

the primary fact

affirm

beyond

this fact

This makes

its

sub-

and anything which

;

must be for

its

ex-

it

strictly impossible to

affirm anything to which

no laws and forms of

planation.

thought apply. only to

If,

then, the categories apply

phenomena the noumena disappear

altogether.

For these forms include space and

time, unity

and

plurality, cause

and

effect,

substance and attribute, reality and negation,

and so

forth.

Hence the thing

in itself

is

in

neither space nor time, is neither one nor many, neither cause nor effect, neither substance nor

PERSONALISM

90

attribute, neither real nor unreal.

such a thing

Manifestly

nothing, either in thought or

is

existence.

To

this result

any doctrine which denies the

application of the categories of thought to reality

must certainly come. The thing

or things

in

themselves, must

in itself,

be brought

within the range of thought or must go out of existence.

As soon

we remember

as

that

these things are affirmed solely for the sake of

making experience tiness of this

intelligible to us, the

emp-

kind of agnosticism immediately

Accordingly the agnostic soon finds

appears.

himself compelled to apply some of the categories of thought to his

The most pear in

unknowable

reality.

naive illustrations of this fact ap-

Mr. Spencer's manipulation of

Unknowable.

When

he

is

dealing with

his reli-

gion and theology he will hear of no affirmation whatever respecting the

Unknowable, but

when he has once imposed upon them the

in-

junction of perpetual silence, he soon begins to

know

a great deal about the Unknowable.

It forthwith appears as

one and eternal and

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE causal,

and moreover we are told that the

nesses

and changes among things point

nesses

and changes

itself,

91

so that

in the

fundamental

like-

to likereality

from the former we can get a great

deal of information respecting the latter. led to Mr. Mill's

This

remark that in this way we seem

able to get a " prodigious

amount of knowledge

respecting the Unknowable."

Contradictions

of this kind are necessary in the nature of the case.

The thing which

the world of sarily

to

life

is

invoked to explain

and experience must neces-

stand in causal relations to

it

and admit,

some extent, of being known thereby. Returning now to the Kantian view,

plain that

it

mainly

rests

on a naive assump-

tion of uncritical thought. all

it is

For common sense

things except our individual ideas are ex-

tra-mental.

They

exist apart

from our con-

sciousness and are supposed, as a matter of course, to exist apart

from

all

consciousness.

This gives us a world of things in themselves.

When

next epistemology shows that we can

grasp these things only through the thoughts

we form

of them, and further points out the

;

PERSONALISM

92

exceedingly complex and obscure nature of the processes of knowledge, all

we then seem

to have

the conditions for a doctrine of agnosticism.

The mind sphere,

is

now

clearly limited to the

and things

beyond that sphere

exist

we can know only phe-

hence, manifestly,

nomena and can never reach things selves. first

Here the assumption

and undeniable

and then thought which

it

is

thought

is

is

in

them-

that things are

in their extra-mentality,

challenged to

know them,

manifest thought can never do

under these conditions.

But the

way out

true

such problem as

is

to

isfied.

But a

show that no

common

deny individual

could secure this

to

here proposed exists.

extra-mental existence

means

is

common

By

sense really

illusion,

and

if

it

sense would be sat-

truly extra-mental existence, in

the sense of something beyond thought and

independent of it, is

it

and

in

no way amenable to

an impossible conception. If we assume

that the world of thing's oris^inated in thouo-ht

and expressed thought they would be homogeneous with thought, and there would be no

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE apriori reason

why we

should not

93

know them.

This theistic suggestion brings the world of things within the thought sphere and assimilates the

problem of knowledge to that of

mutual understanding among persons. In that case

things are indeed

independent of our

thinking for their existence, but they are not

independent of

all

thinking.

They

lie

within

the thought sphere, and that impassable gulf

between the thought world and thing world, into which the agnostic tumbles, does not exist.

This theistic suggestion Kant nowhere recognizes in his epistemology, although festly puts

it

mani-

an entirely different aspect upon

the question.

It

makes the thought sphere

all-embracing, but within that sphere

it

dis-

tinofuishes between the finite knower and the

world of things, thus leaving the antithesis

between them as

At

it

exists for

common

sense.

the same time by making the world of

things the expression of thought,

it

leaves

them open to our apprehension and understanding. This is

is

fast leading us.

the result to which idealism

And when we combine

this

PERSONALISM

94

with the fact already men-

theistic suggestion

tioned, that nothing whatever can be affirmed

which does not stand

in articulate rational

relation to the world of experience,

we

see

how empty any doctrine of absolute agnosmust

ticism

Indeed,

be. this

whole doctrine of phenom-

enalism must be

accord with the

phenomena,

if

revised

to

bring

into

it

demands of thought. By

the term

is

more than another word

to be anything

for fact,

we must

understand those things which exist only in

and for

intelligence.

They

are not

phantoms

or illusions, nor are they masks of a back-

lying reality which

them

;

is

trying to peer through

they are simply what they purport to

be in experience. At the same time they have

no extra-mental well

have

world of ception.

an

existence, although they

may

extra-human

The

existence.

sense qualities illustrates the con-

These have no existence

in

space

apart from intelligence.

They

effects in the sensibility,

and would disappear

if

the sensibility were away.

are really only

If the ideahty

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE of space and time be allowed, then

95

that

all

appears in space and time, the whole physical

world in short,

the same time

phenomena

it

is

At

only phenomenal.

is

to be noted that these

are not illusions, but have their

They have the

special type of reality.

reality

of being forms and factors of our experience,

and our knowledge of them and practical dealing with them make up the great bulk of

life.

things

Noumena, on the other hand, themselves, are to be

in

altogether as myths.

The

nomena and noumena there

is

rests

or

out

ruled

antithesis of phe-

on the fancy that

something behind phenomena which

we ought

to perceive but cannot, because the

masking phenomenon thrusts

itself

between

the reality and us. Phenomena, however, are

not the masks of anything, but so far as cognition goes they are

They

to be.

are effects of something, which

possibly be

other

what they seem

sense

known through th^m, and are

they

to

may in

no

be spoken of as

masks, or even as manifestations of a hidden reality.

The only

intelligible

and permissible

PERSONALISM

96

question concerns not their nature but their causality.

What

the power at work which

is

produces the phenomenal order? This

an

is

and the only permissible

intelligible question,

one at this point.

When that

it

this question is raised

we

see at once

can never be solved in picture terms.

Metaphysics shows that true substantial

exist-

ence can only be conceived under the causal form. For the explanation of the world we

need an agent, not a substance. With insight

all

this

thought of describing the agent

terms vanishes. Causes are

static or picture

revealed in their deeds only. look, they act.

in

They do not

Thus the question

ledge becomes this

:

of

know-

Can we know anything

of the invisible power behind the phenomenal

system, or rather which produces the phe-

nomenal system

?

nothing in picture

Of course we can know form, but can we know

anything in any way

we must know, altogether; but

it

or

?

the

may be

Something indeed thought that

vanishes

we can only

form such general notions as that

it

must

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

97

be causal and unitary and permanent, and

must content ourselves with de-

for the rest

the

scribing

orders of

quence among the products of

On

other

the

hand,

and

coexistence

is

it

its

se-

activity.

possible

that a

study of these products should reveal pur-

and character

pose, plan,

in this unpicturable

power. Only a study of the facts can decide this point

but

;

power be

possible,

And

know.

such a knowledge of this

if

if

we have

we

all

care to

should prove impossible,

it

it

would be because of the ambiguous indications of the facts,

and not because the

real

things in themselves are hidden by masking

phenomena.

Thus we

set aside the

Kantian agnosticism,

or at least the agnosticism based

system. there

is

At a

relativity

the same time

good of

upon Kant's

we point out

knowledge.

A

thorough-going

limitation of the catesrories to our jectivity ends, as

we have

human sub-

seen, in the denial

of independent objectivity altogether.

same time there

that

deal of value even in Kant's

is

At

the

a large element of such

PERSONALISM

98

The practical

subjectivity in our thinking. plication of the categories

only and ience.

is

ap-

largely formal

relative to our intellectual conven-

The

unities

and

and substan-

identities

human thought and speech are mostly our own products. They tialities

result

which appear

our

in

from the application of the categories

of thousfht to the fluent and

unsubstantial

manifold of sense, and have only relative validity.

Thus the

unities

we

are mainly formal. This spatial

and temporal

is

find in experience

the case with

all

unities; for these can

have only conceptual existence. Reality, or substantiality, also,

is

largely formal

and

rel-

ative in its application.

Most of our substan-

tive conceptions present

no

real

thinghood, but

only processes or phenomena or activities to

which the mind has given a substantive form, but which are never to be mistaken for things. Light, heat, electricity, magnetism, and a great

multitude of abstract nouns are illustrations. Identity, too,

We

find very

is

few

more often formal than

real.

real identities in experience,

where certainly most things are

in perpetual

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE change and is

flow. In all such cases the identity

formal, imposed

convenience and

Our

fact. tive,

99

by the mind for expressing no

its

own

ontological

classifications also are largely rela-

not representing any eternal ideas or vergroupings, but solely conven-

itable cosmic

iences and points of view of our own.

They

are relative to our sensibility or to our purposes,

and can

lay no claim to be looked

upon

as any abiding part of the cosmic furniture.

They

are

what Herbart would

call ''accidental

views." In calling attention to this fact, thus

shutting off the hasty dogmatism of the pre-

Kantian period, Kant has done a great service of lasting value. Hereafter

not dogmatically but

we have to proceed,

critically, in

seeking to

eliminate the purely relative and accidental

point of view.

There

is

another limitation of knowledge

springing out of phenomenalism which great value.

This

is

is

of

the claim that the cate-

gories of thought have no application apart

from ^he objects of a rience.

real or possible expe-

This does not imply any things in

PERSONALISM

100

themselves to which the categories

may not

be appHed, but only that experience, real or possible, is the field of their fruitful applica-

This

tion.

ence we

is

perfectly valid

mean the whole

when by

experi-

of experience, not

merely the sense experience of the outer world

but also the inner experience of the conscious self.

this.

With this understanding the The categories in themselves

forms of

doctrine

is

are simply

mental arrangement and merely

prescribe the form in which experience

be ordered when

it

is

is

to

In this respect

given.

they are like the rules of grammar, which prescribe all,

how we

shall

speak

Living speech, then,

grammar, but

definite

at

no

specific

is

not merely

and when there

meaning the grammar itself moves

a vacuum.

Kant,

is

meanings expressed

accordinof to orrammatical rules,

in

we speak

but which in themselves have no concrete

contents.

is

if

All experience, according to

real only

through some given

and apart from such

facts

is

fact,

empty. Thus we

might talk of sensations of a

class

we have

never experienced, as the sensations of a tenth

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE sense

but

;

learned

it

it is

101

plain that such talk, however

might

be,

would be formal and

empty, as there would be no concrete sensation to give significance or substance to our

words. In the case of real sensation, on the contrary, there

is

an actual experience which

gives content to our reflection. Until the actual

experience there

is

is

given there

is

no security that

anything whatever corresponding to

our formal phrases given we have no cepts, but we

;

but when experience

is

longer simple logical con-

have something lived and realized.

Now Kant said that the

categories are applied

only to such sense experience and otherwise are empty. Here he

made

the mistake of limit-

ing experience to the physical sensations and did not extend his doctrine to the data of consciousness. it

self-

When this limitation is removed

then becomes

strictly true that the categories

have simply the function of forming and expressing some matter which

is

directly experi-

enced or which can be assimilated to experience,

and apart from that

relation they are

formal and empty. They must always be brought

PERSONALISM

102

into contact with experience in

order to acquire reality, or to

make

represent any possible object

Thus

if

we

some way in sure they

thought.

for

talk of the categories of being,

unity, identity, causality, substance, etc., in

abstraction from any given experience, they

are utterly vacuous, so that

we cannot

tell

whether there be any corresponding fact or not

;

and

it is

only as

we

find these categories

realized in living self-experience that they ac-

quire other than a formal meaning, or pass for

anything more than purely verbal counters.

They

are

grammar when

like

there

speech, or rules for saying something there

is

is

no

when

nothino- to be said.

Thus, take the category of being. Suppose

we ask what we mean by be found that

means

it

experience, or else scious

life.

abstraction

Any

it

At

it.

last it

would

either objectivity in

means

just our

own

con-

other conception passes into

and emptiness.

Similarly

may mean the formal meaning or it may be taken

with

identity. This

identity

of logical

to

mean

a continued existence through a period of

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE time.

In the latter case, which

is

103

supposed to

be the metaphysical meaning, we really do not

know by

speculation whether such a thing

be possible or not. Successive existence identity,

is

not

and changeless existence cannot be

found. Here again

we have

experience. Identity

is

back upon

to fall

given as the

self-equal-

ity of intelligence throughout experience, and

any other conception destroys

manner unity

also

may be

In like

itself.

purely formal, as

when we call a thing one but when we come to ;

real unity only experience can tell us it

be possible and what form

There can be no

it

real unity in

whether

must take on.

anything

exist-

ing in space and time, for in that case everything would be dispersed in infinite bility.

We

find the

divisi-

problem solved only

the unity of a conscious

self,

which

is

in*

the only

concrete unity that escapes the infinite disper-

and

sion of space

we attempt impersonally

manner when

to think causality abstractly

we

finite regress,

means of

time. In like

and

find ourselves lost in the in-

and

telling

if

we escape

it

whether there

we have no is

anything

TERSONALISM

104

corresponding to our ideas or not.

It is abso-

lutely necessary to find in experience some-

thing that will insure that our ideas have some

corresponding concrete existence; or

else

are simply shuffling verbal counters, as

we we

we

when

speak of sensations of the tenth sense, or are indulging in a calculus of imaginary

quantities.

In the

latter cases there

certain formal grammatical

and

a

logical con-

sistency in our utterances, but there .tact

may be is

no con-

with reality. In the case of causation

escape this mere conceptualism only as

we

we find

in the self-conscious causality of free intelli-

gence the meaning of causality and the assurance that

it

represents a fact.

This view might well be called transcendental

empiricism,

in

traditional sense empiricism.

that

all

from the

distinction

The meaning

is

thought about reality must be rooted

in experience

and that apart from experience

we never can be tions represent

sure whether our concep-

any actual fact or

not.

The

categories themselves are not something which

precede the mind and found

its

possibility.

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

modes of mental operation.

They

are rather

They

are the forms which the

its

105

mind

experience, but the

mind gives

to

not to be under-

is

stood through them. Rather they are to be

understood through the mind's living experience of

An

itself.

important bearing of this result upon

speculative thought should be noticed. Expla-

nation largely consists in classification is,

;

that

in gathering similar things into groups or

series.

Such explanation always remains on

the surface and leaves the mystery of things

No amount

absolutely untouched. cation gives us

new

any

of classifi-

insight. It merely puts the

fact into a familiar class or refers

a familiar law

but

;

as mysterious in

Thus when the

it

nature as ever.

a body or the floating

of a ship or the rising of smoke to the law of gravity,

to

leaves the fact itself

its essential

fall of

it

we get no

the nature of gravitation.

We

is

referred

insight into

simply see such

facts to be cases of a familiar kind, but the

kind

itself

as ever.

in

its

inner nature

Whenever we transcend

is

as

opaque

this type of

;

PERSONALISM

106

explanation we pass into the causal

and here again we get no

but only

real insight

superficial classification, unless

come upon something which

is

realm

we somewhere capable of real

explanation so as to give us rational insight.

And

this

we

find only in the case o£ free intel-

ligence. This

is

the only causality of which

we have any knowledge and the only causality which really explains. Hence either we must content ourselves with superficial tion, or else

we must

classifica-

find in free intelligence

the only principle of causal explanation.

This result introduces great simplicity into speculative thinking

and vacates a great deal

of speculation as formal

and empty.

When

our conceptions cannot be verified in spatial

and temporal experience nor consciousness, they reality

and

realized in self-

make no connection with

are to be unconditionally rejected

as fictitious or barren.

When,

then, any

new

speculative explanation of any fact whatever offered us,

we

is

ask. Is the explanation classifica-

tory or causal? If the former, we point out that it

remains on the surface and really explains

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE we point out

nothing. If the latter,

107

that

it

equally explains nothing unless the conception

of causality admits of being verified in

merely formal. If

it

ment, then into the

mob

self-

something actual and not

consciousness, as

does not meet this require-

with

fire

it,

along with the

of verbal theories which have confused

and deluded the human mind from the beginning.

By

this time, probably,

fear that there

is

not

we may begin

much

basis

objective knowledge, or possibly

when

so

much

is

arises whether, after all,

all

we

;

them altogether them

different

to be. This

spond

are not li\ang in

dogmatic

if

fictions.

we knew

we shoidd not

find

from what we think

an absolute system of

which our thoughts ought

in order to

we

thought springs out of the

illusion that there is

reality to

that

and the query

the midst of illusion, and whether things as they really are

for

left

we may think

made phenomenal,

are not grasping reality at

to

be true. This

For us the

is

to corre-

one of the

real can never

be primarily anything but the contents of

PERSONALISM

108

we may

experience and whatever

them.

Back

we

of experience

infer

find

from

no truly

real of the noumenal type, but we infer or

affirm a cause

which

is

founding and maintain-

ing the order of experience. this order

be true

is

To ask whether

really meaningless, unless

we suppose some absolute system

of impersonal

and

this notion is

reality

back of experience

baseless.

When

this is seen the only permis-

becomes

sible question

;

this

:

Does our

experi-

ence exhaust the possibilities of experience and consciousness ? universe itself

From

is

a theistic standpoint the

no proper

static existence,

but

only the divine thought finding realization

through the divine

will,

and that thought for

us must find expression in the order of our experience.

But

it

is

quite credible that our

present experience does not exhaust the contents of that thought

and

so does not exhaust

the possibilities of experience. If further possibilities

should unfold

truer experience, but a

we should not have a more extensive one.

Our present experience is of a certain certain contents

and

limitations,

type, with

and

it is

en-

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE tirely possible tliat there

109

should be other beings

with different types and contents of experience. It

is

equally possible that

shall pass into a

new order

we

ourselves

of experiences, in

which case we should have no right to say that the present order is

not

and

all

false,

is

but merely that

it

In Hke manner the new

final.

order would not be rightly described as more true than the present order, but only as perhaps

higher and richer in content, giving a fuller

and more abundant

life.

may be any number of each of which

and

all

is

universes of experience,

relative to its

own

subjects,

of which are embraced in the thought

or plan of the Infinite

they

In this sense there

all

Mind and Will on which

depend.

Thus we dispense with the extra-mental verse of unreflecting thought.

That view arises

from confounding extra-human with mental.

We

uni-

extra-

equally dispense with the unknow-

ables of agnostic systems. These systems have

a crudely structive

realistic

losric.

We

foundation and a self-dealso set aside those anti-

climactic notions of transfigured realism

which

PERSONALISM

110

attempts to define reality apart from

intelli-

gence and ends by presenting- us with a

set of

barren and worthless abstractions as the truly real,

while the whole system of living experi-

ence

is

excluded from reality altogether.

static universe

disappears,

which eludes knowledge equally

and

in its place

we have the known

world of experience which points to

gence as

its

The

source.

intelli-

Thus we conserve the

sense of reality and validity in knowledge,

and

at the

same time recognize the

cism.

We remain w4iere we began, in the world

results of criti-

of personal experience, and with the strength-

ened conviction that

this

world can never be

explained on any impersonal plane.

The world

of experience exists for us only through a rational spiritual principle

duce

it

for our thought,

by which we repro-

and

it

has

its

existence

apart from us only through a rational spiritual principle

on which

nature of which

it

it

depends, and the rational

expresses. This

step toward personalism.

is

our second

Ill

PHENOMENALITY OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD. In our is

last

we saw how complex knowledge. The object be-

lecture

the process of

comes an object for us only through a constructive activity of our own whereby we constitute the object for consciousness. this fact in itself, while

But

preparing the way for

phenomenalism, does not establish

it.

We

have now to consider the phenomenality of the physical world. This

is

the next step in

the estabHshment of personalism.

For spdntaneous thought

all

sense objects

exist as they seem, veritable substantial things

in space

turns

and

them

time. Later reflection, however,

into

phenomena, that

is,

into

things which exist only for and through intelligence. It

must be noted, however,

in ac-

cordance with our previous discussion, that this does not turn

them

into illusions or de-

PERSONALISM

112

lusions. It allows

them

still

to

be

way, but finds that their reality

is

not a sub-

and independent existence, but rather

stantial

consists in their being

our

real in their

common

forms and factors of

experience.

We

have seen that

there are two kinds of reality, phenomenal and ontological.

former

is

Only the

real

latter is substantial

for and

in experience

thought shows that

flective

it is

;

;

the

but

re-

properly phe-

nomenal, existing only in and for intelligence.

Spontaneous thought, again, has no doubt that space and time exist as veritable things of

some

sort.

Indeed,

it

generally regards

as the most undeniable of thing-s.

them

Thinos

in

the ordinary sense might conceivably be nonexistent. is

now

We

filled

can conceive that space which

might be void, and that time

in

which events occur should be empty, but the void space and time would

common

still,

according to

sense, exist, the space in its boundless

extension and the time in

For the present we allow

its

continual flow.

this belief to stand,

and point out that even then many of the things which

we suppose

to exist in space

and

PHENOMENALITY OF PHYSICAL WORLD

113

time cannot so exist apart from the mediation

In this way we

of intelligence.

may

possibly

accustom ourselves to the thought that

this

world which is known only through intelligence

through and for intelligence.

also exists only

We

shall see that very

many

things which

we

suppose exist apart from intelligence would really disappear if intelligence

were away.

Conceive a musical symphony.

we might

say the

and

It

time.

limits,

At first

sight

exists in space

inclosed within the walls of

is

the room and

symphony

lies

between certain temporal

and therefore has temporal and

existence. This, however,

is

superficial

;

spatial

for the

symphony, apart from the synthetic and unifying action of intelligence, really cannot exist in

any assignable

articulate

and

anything

sense. It exists, as

intelligible,

only for the com-

poser and performer on the one hand, and for the audience on the other.

space and time

it

As something

would consist of

air

in

waves

mutually external and without unity or connection.

The corresponding sounds

are also

mutually external as spatial or temporal events.

PERSONALISM

114 If, then,

one were bent on finding the sym-

phony within the walls of the room, and should proceed to chase the mutually external waves in space

and the successive waves

and forth throughout the

in time

back

and the time of

hall

the playing, he would soon become aware that the symphony, apart from the unifying action of consciousness which unites the

many and

the successive into one, would be something strictly non-existent for intelligence.

real the

sounds

waves or the coexistent and successive

may be

they are united

and

However

unifies

in themselves, in a

them

it is

not until

consciousness which grasps

all in

one complex musical

apprehension that the symphony exists or can exist.

All that can take place in space or time

in connection with such

music

is

but the means

for

making the musical conception pass

act

and revealing

the audience

;

it

into

to other consciousnesses,

but the symphony

itself exists

primarily for the composer or performer, and secondarily for the audience, and

all

else is

but a means for mediating the thought of the

composer for the hearers.

PHENOMENALITY OF PHYSICAL WORLD Probably phony.

We

all

would admit

this for a

might say there

115

sym-

nothing sub-

is

stantial in a piece of music, and hence we can it

as anything abiding or exist-

ing objectively.

But the same must be ad-

hardly regard

mitted for anything whatever that has existence successively, that

is,

in time.

such successive thing, in itself,

is

its

Every

made up

of

mutually external existences, and these attain

any abiding existence only through the

to

activity of

some non-successive being which

is

able to unite the successive existences into the

thought of something fixed and permanent.

Every such successive thing must be phenomenal, for, like the

and through

exist only for

we

symphony,

it

exists

and can

intelligence.

Or

if

prefer to say the thing exists, then the

claim

is

This we

that

it

now

exists only

through intelligence.

proceed to show.

Experience shows only two kinds of permanence, fixity of meaning and permanence of the thinking subject. ness, or identity of

The

first is

meaning, and

logical sameis

absolutely

PERSONALISM

116

necessary to any thought whatever.

If the

meaning of things could change from moment to

moment, no thought would be

Sensation

itself,

as

we have

seen,

is

possible

the

flowing

as anything

articulate only as

impression

fixed into an abiding

is

of which the impression

may be

manifestation, while the

meaning

the bearer or

meaning gives the

significance of the impression. fixed

possible.

Without such

meaning even the simple sensation van-

ishes into an inarticulate

impression, about

which nothing whatever can be larly in the case of

said.

Simi-

any changing or develop-

ing thing, we form some conception which gathers up

all

the phases of the thing into

one thought which expresses the true nature of the thing.

If

it

were impossible to express

the nature of the thing, however changing,

by some abiding conception, then we should need a new thought for each new phase of the thing;

and as the thing

is

incessantly

changing, we should need an incessant stream of

new

conceptions, with the result that

we

should lose the thing altogether in the mul-

PHENOMENALITY OF PHYSICAL WORLD

117

would

be

tiplicity

of

which

conceptions

affirmed.

This formal or logical sameness, as the su-

preme condition of thought, the law of identity

:

A

formulated in

is

equals A, which

that everything, whatever

it

may

means

be, fixed or

changing, must admit of being conceived in such a way as to be an abiding object or have

an abiding meaning for this, as said, it

But

it is

plain that this formal sameness

such, does not

The

and cannot

changing.

The

the object

is

fixed

is

fixed meaning, as exist in space

there everything

for

Without

vanishes altogether.

only for intelligence.

time,

intelligence.

is

meaning

is

and

flowing and

simply what

for intelligence, but the thing

conceived of as temporal never at any instant realizes that fixed

meaning.

The meaning

is

only successively translated into the temporal

form, and never really exists except for the

mind, which by means of

it

masters the flow-

The symphony again illustrates The symphony never exists in time,

ing succession. the fact.

and never can

so exist except for a non-tem-

PERSONALISM

118

poral consciousness. In the same

way the

flow-

ing world of change exists for us only through the system of changeless ideas, and these are impossible and meaningless apart from

Thus

gence.

intelli-

intelligence appears as the su-

preme condition of the existence of those things which seem to us independent of

all

intelli-

gence. If the things themselves are really processes in space

and time, they become any-

thing articulate for us only through the ideas

by which we

fix

the processes into a meaning.

But, on the other hand,

it is

plain that these

processes could not be grasped through these ideas unless they were really the expressions

of ideas. It would be incredible that

things by

know them

;

we should

ideas essentially unrelated to

and as the ideas by which the things

are constituted are independent of us, there

must be a supreme thinsfs

intelligence behind

which makes them the bearer or

pression of the ideas.

We

the ex-

cannot understand

noises unless they are informed with thought,

and they can be informed with thought only as there

is

a thinker at the other end.

In the

PHENOMENALITY OF PHYSICAL WORLD

119

same way things can be grasped by thought only as they are the products of thought.

The same problem reappears

in the debate

between nominalism and realism, and

this also

admits

only of an idealistic solution.

realist

rightly holds

that

The

the particular

is

nothing except as the expression of an idea,

and the nominalist rightly holds that the idea is

nothing apart from concrete

realizfi^tion.

A

pure particular, without any universal element,

would disappear

entirely

from thought

;

and

a pure universal, with no local habitation or

name, would

float in the air

with

There can be no living experi-

reality.

without contact

ence without both elements, and there can be

no experience apart from an immanent

intel-

ligence.

These formal also,

common

hand over

to

identities

of

sense woidd be fairly ready to

phenomenalism. Classes as such

have only conceptual existence is

is

classification,

;

but the case

thouofht to be different with thing's. There in

them a

substantial identity, which

re-

mains the same through change. In addition

;

PERSONALISM

120

to the formal fixity of meaning-, there

is

also

a real sameness of being. Here, then, we have not merely the identity of logic, but also the concrete and substantial identity of things

and this, common sense holds, cannot be argued

away

into

any shadowy phenomenality. This

brings us to consider the problem of change

and

identity in impersonal things. »

On

this point there

have been two posi-

tions since the earliest times in philosophy.

One

school, the Eleatic, has held to identity

and permanence

and has excluded

in things

change from their existence Heraclitic,

has

maintained

change and has found

it

;

the other, the

the

reality

impossible to dis-

cover any permanence in existence. penetrates into being flow.

of

itself,

so that

Each school has been able

Change

all

things

to convict

the other of irrationality, but on the impersonal plane neither school has been able to set its

own house

reason and

in order so as to satisfy

log^ic.

In criticism of the Eleatic view,

it is

plain

PHENOMENALITY OF PHYSICAL WORLD

121

that the changing world of experience, which is

the fact immediately given, can never

any

possibility

bring us to a world of change-

less existences in

any

of the term

if

;

for

literal

it

could never be brought to the

any assignable relation

We

world.

it

world. seeks

it

from

and we could never make any use the explanation

for

changing

could never logically reach

that world, of

and absolute sense

there were a world of such

changeless character, into

by

the changing

of

The common-sense view of the matter to make a kind of division of labor in

the case of the thing, putting the permanence or identity into

some back-lying

core,

and put-

ting the change into the activities or qualities of the thing. These are supposed to change,

while the permanent core simply abides and

maintains this

view

its identity. is

But

it is

altogether impossible

be no change in things, there reason

why

monotony and an

is

;

for

if

there

no assignable

there should be any changes in the

activities of things or

to

manifest that

among things. The

identity of substance

equally rigid

monotony and

rigid

must lead

identity of

PERSONALISM

122

activity or manifestation of

whatever kind. But

since the actual world

a world of change

is

and motion, we cannot, reasoning backward by the law of the sufficient reason, come to anything unchanging, and in that sense perma-

Common

nent.

sense

it is

certainly incorrect in finding

that permanence in

and

perfectly correct

must be something per-

in saying that there

manent, but

may be

some

rigidly changeless

identical substance.

But, on the other hand, the disciple of universal

change has failed to inquire what the

perception or existence of such change would

demand.

Manifestly

the thinking subject

things changed,

all

if

among

the rest, the no-

tion of change could never arise as this

change

is

;

for

it is

only

projected upon and con-

trasted with an abiding

background of some

kind, possibly the self-consciousness of the

thinking subject, that even the conception of

change

is

possible.

We

have already seen

that the formal identity of

sary in order to think at

meaning all;

is

neces-

and now

it

appears that in some way an identity of the

PHENOMENALITY OF PHYSICAL WORLD subject

is

equally necessary in order to

123

make

even the conception of change possible.

Thus

it

appears that the only identities we

can find in the thing; world are the formal identities of logical

meaning, and when we

attempt to find anything more in the way of

we look

concrete identity in the thing world for

it

All that

in vkin.

we come upon

is fixity

of form or process, and the only concrete identity

we can

find anywhere turns out to be the

But

unity of the conscious subject. tity is

this iden-

not to be viewed as any rigid core of

being, but rather as the self-equality of intelligence through

its

which we discover

experience, and the change is

not a successive running

off of events in abstract time,

but

is

rather

and only the form under which the

self-equal

intelligence realizes its conceptions

under the

relation

of

succession.

On

the

impersonal

plane this problem of change and identity admits of no solution. stract identity,

We

cannot find the ab-

and we cannot find the abstract

changes when we look for them.

We

have

simply a world of experience in which the same

;

PERSONALISM

124

ideas

and forms remain

valid,

and through

which the conscious subject remains as the only fixed point to which everything, both

permanence and change, has to be referred. Self-consciousness this field,

is

the origin of ordinates in

and whenever we transfer the prob-

lem to the impersonal world of space and time

and abstract

principles,

we soon

find

it

eluding

us or vanishing in insoluble contradictions. Similar reflections on the problem of causation, as metaphysics shows,

to regard the

so-called

would compel us

world of things as

merely processes of an energy not their own such processes, then, would be necessarily phe-

nomenal. tiality,

Having

in themselves

no substan-

they would become only phases of an

activity

beyond them. As such they would

have only the permanence of a process which is

essentially successive,

and as such, again,

they can exist only for intelligence these supposed substantial things

our symphony. idea

is

;

that

become

is,

like

In the symphony a musical

successively unfolded,

and

of that idea and the continuity of

in the unity its

manifes-

PHENOMENALITY OF PHYSICAL WORLD

125

tation through the activity of the performer

and the

receptivity of the audience the sym-

phony has

its

abstraction it

only existence; but in

itself, in

from the idea and the performer,

breaks up into an inarticulate and chaotic

mass of sounds. In the same way impersonal things are reduced to processes in which a

phenomenal form may be maintained or an idea continuously or successively manifested,

but which nevertheless exists only in and

through the continuous process and the abiding meaning, and in abstraction from these they also became meaningless and as empty of significance as the

symphony would be

abstraction from the performer

in

and the audi-

ence.

These considerations serve to show that telligence plays

no small part

in-

in the existence

of those things which we regard as existing

independently of intelligence in time.

Upon

analysis

we

posed core of being or

mon

sense relies in

stuff

its

matter, and in place of

fail to

space and

find the sup-

upon which com-

picture logic in this it

we

discover simply

PERSONALISM

126

the idea, the process, the succession, which

needs intelligence to sum with meaning-, so that

and

intelligible .

it

it

up and inform

it

becomes anything

articulate for us.

This result would be valid for the world of

things in space and time, even

if

we supposed

space and time to be themselves real existences as

common

sense views them.

Even then the

things of experience could be helped to real existence only through a constitutive thesizing

But

intelligence.

there

and syn-

are

many

reasons for saying that space and time themselves are only carries with

it

phenomena, and that of course

the phenomenality of everything

that appears in them, that ity of the

is,

the phenomenal-

whole system of objective experience.

This view, however, seems so great a para-

dox as it

to border

on the

limits of absurdity if

does not transcend them. Nevertheless,

a view to which

we

the view to which reflective thought generally coming. explain

it,

so as to

it is

seem to be shut up, and

We

is

quite

will seek, therefore, to

remove something of the

PHENOMENALITY OF PHYSICAL WORLD

127

paradox and help ourselves to a better understanding" of

what

it

means.

And, first of all, we must distinguish between phenomenal and ontological reality

in the case.

For experience, space and time are perfectly valid as forms or laws of the same.

We

can-

not have experience of a certain type which non-spatial, neither can

into

we have

is

experience

which the temporal form does not enter.

Phenomenally, then, space and time are that ence,

is,

real,

they are valid in and for our experi-

and there can be no thought of deny-

ing this validity. In this sense, spontaneous

thought

is

quite correct in maintaining the

reality of space

and time; but when on the

other hand they are taken to be something

independent of experience, lying beyond and

behind experience as

common

its

pre-condition, then

sense has wandered into metaphysics

and has hypostasized the conditions of

experi-

ence into independent existences. In this

way

the two great phantoms of space and time have

been produced, which have exercised so pernicious an influence in the history of thought.

PERSONALISM

128

To common

sense

it is

at first sight incred-

ible that this

view should ever be held by any

one, because

it

would seem that we are im-

mediately aware of ourselves as in space and time.

And

therefore only a person insane or

irredeemably frivolous would think of arguing

about their existence ence

itself is so

and moreover the

;

exist-

manifest, so obvious, so unde-

niable, that there is

no mystery about

no question as

to its reality.

So indeed

seems, but

it

of

first

all

it,

and

episte-

mology points out that space and time, however real they

become

may be

themselves, cannot

in

real to us except as they are principles

of thought or principles

immanent

mental operation. For us space, like things, exists only through our

construction, tion,

however

spatial

is

real

that

it

might

be,

The primary

we

relate

other

own mental it

would not

fact epistemo-

our objects in the

and temporal form because of the space

and time law immanent all

all

our

and apart from that construc-

exist for us at all.

logically

in

in intelligence

;

and

our experiences or intuitions respecting

PHENOMENALITY OF PHYSICAL WORLD

129

space and time must be understood from the side of the

space,

mental law. Thus, with regard to

we have no

original intuition of an

existing space which

we

all-embracing, but

is

one and

relate all

infinite

and

our objects of

common scheme in which a certain kind we can find our way from any one to any in a

other by a continuous and homogeneous process.

Hence we regard space

as one.

Again,

this synthesis applies to all objects of a cer-

we cannot conceive any lying beyond its range. Hence

tain kind, so that

such objects as

we regard

space as all-embracing.

Finally,

the synthesis admits of no exhaustion, but rather provides for indefinite repetition.

As

we cannot exhaust number by counting, so we cannot exhaust space by any progressive synthesis. Hence we regard space as infinite. But the

unity, the infinity,

and the all-em-

bracing character of space depend entirely

upon the nature

of the space law.

They

are

but the results of the inexhaustibility and universal applicability of the space law within its

own

sphere.

PERSONALISM

130

The same

is

true for the unity and eternity

of time. There

is

no immediate apprehension

and

of time as anything one

eternal, but the

time law by which we relate the objects of experience to one another and the conscious self

admits of no exhaustion, and hence time as eternal

;

we regard

but the unity and eternity of

time, like that of space,

mean only the

one-

ness and inexhaustibility of the synthetic law

by which we law,

relate objects.

Now, given

we should have temporal and

spatial ex-

perience, whatever the independent fact be.

Or we should have temporal and

experience

if

this

might spatial

there were no objective space

and time whatever. in every vivid

Illustration of this occurs

dream. The dream time and

space have nothing in

common

with the time

and space of waking experience.

They

are

simply the form of the dream, the form which the

mind

when

itself

gives to

its

the dream breaks

dream objects; and

up and vanishes, we

do not suppose that the space in which the

dream occurred

is left

over for later dreams,

but the space and time vanish with the dream

PHENOMENALITY OF PHYSICAL WORLD experience, as simply the space

131

and time of

that experience.

That

this is the ease with the

dream expe-

We

see that the

rience every one will admit.

space and time relations of the dream have

nothing in

and time

common

relations,

with our waking space

and we

also see that those

space and time relations are instituted by the

mind

in its

dream

activity such that the ob-

jects often stand out for us with

ness of waking experience.

have a clear

all

the vivid-

In such cases we

illustration of the fact that the

mind can build

for itself an experience in the

space and time form out of

its

own

resources

without any corresponding space and time in existence.

But the same general view must be

taken of our so-called real space and time.

They

are really only the form of our outer

and inner experience. They tions

among

consist of rela-

the objects of experience, and

we should conceive

if

the experience itself to be

canceled there would be nothing left behind

corresponding to space and time, so that

in-

stead of being veritable somewhats in which

PERSONALISM

132

things exist and events occur, they are rather

and only the forms of experience and have their heing only in

and through intelligence

itself.

The general reason

for this conclusion

the fact that as soon as

is

we break space and

time from their connection with experience as its

form, and regard them as something inde-

pendent of all

it

which contains experience, then

manner of contradictions emerge

and existence

itself is

made

at once

impossible.

Thus

in the case of space, the general law of space,

when space existing,

is

conceived of as independently

would be the mutual externality of

points and parts. Every point and part side of every other point distinction of points

end, the

and

part,

is

out-

and the

and parts admits of no

result being that

space, conceived

of as independently real, admits of indefinite division,

and

are in space division,

in that case the things

would likewise admit of

and

which

indefinite

in that case, again, being itself

would be dispersed into endless

plurality with-

out unity through the endless divisibility of

;

PHENOMENALITY OF PHYSICAL WORLD

133

space. Thus, conceive a cubic foot of space. It

has in

no unity except the formal one

itself

which we give

it

but in

we make

itself, if

the cubic foot

is

by calling

a cubic foot

it

the cubic inch a unit,

not one but seventeen hun-

dred and twenty-eight, and each cubic inch

same condition

in the

no

;

unity, but plurality

without end.

If,

is

and, again, there can be

and mutual externality

however, we conceive a sub-

stance to exist in a real space of this kind, the

same

fact applies. If there

were a cubic foot

of such substance, then the parts in the seventeen hundred

would

also

and twenty-eight cubic inches

be mutually external, and these

again could be divided indefinitely; and thus

once more we lose ourselves in the divisibility.

These

mutually external

could be no true units, as each would side of every other,

parts

lie

out-

and they could be held

together and held apart only as part

infinite

we make each

the centre of attractive and repulsive

forces of

some

sort,

scribe to every other

whereby each should preits

place

;

and thus again

the supposed unitary being would disappear

PERSONALISM

134

in

an indefinite plurality, to which no limit

No

could be assigned.

unit could be found,

because in the nature of such a process there is

no unit

possible.

The nature

of the sjDace

law forbids any unit in such a case. ever,

we regard space

If,

how-

as only phenomenal,

we

then have to continue our divisions only so far as experience

may

indicate.

We

are not

required to affirm an infinite extension and divisibility of space,

sion

and

but an indefinite exten-

divisibility of

the space law

phenomena

itself, like

;

for while

the law of number,

contains no provision for stopping, ajDplication, as in the case of

its

concrete

number, must

always depend upon the nature of experience

and not upon the abstract law case, as

mies,

Kant showed

we

itself.

in the first

In that

two antino-

escape the impossibilities involved in

the notion of a finite or infinite space or a finite or infinite divisibility of space.

Similarly in the case of time, the notion of

time as the form of our experience simple

and

Berkeley has

level it,

I

is

perfectly

to every intelligence. As may make an engagement

1

PHENOMENALITY OF PHYSICAL WORLD to

meet a person

tain time,

and a

cer-

and every one understands what

this

at a certain place

means. But when I abstract from these tions of concrete experience sider space lost ties.

135

and time

and begin

in themselves,

and embrangled

rela-

to con-

then I

am

in inextricable difficul-

Berkeley added that the consideration

of this abstract time led

thouofhts" of his

own

him

to

"harbor odd

existence.

In the case of time these "embranoflino;" difficulties

appear in the fact that time

itself,

considered as a real something flowing along, is

full

of

contradictions.

ception of time puzzles

is

Indeed

this con-

the chief source of those

by which, to use another phrase of

Berkeley's, speculative thought in

all

ages has

been so "miserably bantered." As specimens of the "bantering," consider the difficulty in the notion of a standing or flowing time. If

time stands, then time as a whole exists, that is,

past and future coexist.

idea disappears.

we can form

But

if

Thus the time

time as a whole flows,

as little idea of this as

a moving space.

An

we can

infinite space that

of

moved

PERSONALISM

136

to the right,

and

left

a spaceless void on the

would be no more absurd than a moving

left,

Such a time must move out of

time.

itself in

the past and leave a timeless void behind

and

it

or

it

itself

—

it,

it,

must move into a timeless void before

must move into all

itself

and telescope

of which notions are impossible.

Again, supposing time to be substantially

real,

rather than a form of experience,

clear

that

things can exist only in

They cannot

exist in the past

exist in the future.

it

is

the present.

and they cannot

But on the other hand

they cannot exist in the present, for the present

is

only the timeless plane of separation

between the past and the future. If we should conceive the present it,

either

itself to

we should have a

the present, or

have duration in

past

we should deny

of the temporal flow.

But

if,

and future

in

the continuity

on the other

hand, the present has no duration, then things

cannot exist at

all.

plain to us that

we

seeking to

Results like these are on the

make time and

make

wrong track

in

space independent

somethings apart from experience. They are

PHENOMENALITY OF PHYSICAL WORLD rather the forms of that experience. their

meaning only

ence,

and considered

137

They have

in relation to that experiin abstraction

from that

experience they become simply the portentous

phantoms of unreflective thought, and,

like all

phantoms, they disappear upon investigation.

What was said of the finitude or infinitude of space may be repeated respecting time. If time were a veritable existence, we should have to resrard

it

as either finite or infinite

caseis different

The time

but the

when time is made phenomenal.

law, indeed,

makes no provision for

beginning or ending, but tion

;

its

concrete applica-

must always depend upon the nature of

experience and not upon the abstract law

On

the

basis of

experience

itself.

we can af&rm

neither the finitude nor the infinitude of the

temporal

series,

but must confine ourselves to

what we find in experience. Hence to the claim that space and time infinite,

and

must be

either finite or

finitely or infinitely divisible, the

claim out of which

Kant developed the first two

antinomies, the reply

is

that as forms of expe-

rience they are neither finite nor infinite,

and

PERSONALISM

138

that experience finds no occasion to decide for

one or the other of these alternatives.

To

this result

thought assuredly comes but ;

some further exposition is needed to bring into clearness.

out

For we and all things seem to be

so manifestly in space

ment against

it

it,

and time that any argu-

however irrefutable

be in logic, would

still

it

might

produce no conviction.

This thou«;ht rests to some extent on the over-

made between reality. As we

sight of the distinction already

phenomenal and ontological have so often

said, there is

no thought of deny-

ing the phenomenal reality of space and time,

but only their ontological existence.

we are asked. Are things

in space

If,

then,

and time? we

answer. Yes, or no, according to the standpoint.

Things are

and time

in space

and time

as

having space

relations in our experience.

They are

not in space and time as something independent of experience, and which would be there

experience were away.

For the

rest,

the

if

diffi-

culty in accepting the view rests on the failure to observe the relativity in the spatial

and tem-

poral judgment which arise from the limitations

PHENOMENALITY OF PHYSICAL WORLD of the

139

judging subject. The whole matter a different aspect from this stand-

takes on point.

In the previous lecture, when speaking of the relation of our mental forms to the independ-

we pointed out

ent object,

that these forms

cannot be arbitrarily imposed upon the object,

but that the object for

itself

must have an af&nity

some forms rather than others

otherwise

;

the connection of thought and thing would be

purely a

random

one.

But we cannot

see the

square as round, or the crooked as straight, or

change the forms and positions of things at pleasure.

And,

phenomena

in general, in order that spatial

shall

appear as they are and where

they are, there must be something in the dy-

namic relations of the system which demands

The

just this order

and no

tions, then, are

not arbitrarily imposed upon a

system which

is

other.

indifferent to

them

space rela-

;

they are

rather the translation into intuitional forms of the unpicturable

The same

is

dynamism

of the system.

true for time relations also.

We

cannot reverse the time order so as to make the

PERSONALISM

140

antecedent the consequent, or put yesterday

Here

after to-day.

phenomenal,

is

is

whicli, while

an order

also fixed

;

and

this fact

be understood only as the time relation nected with a deeper dynamic this

relation.

dynamic standpoint both the

is

can con-

From

spatial

and

the temporal judgment in their concrete application are greatly modified,

and

their rela-

tivity is placed in a clearer light.

We

note this

first

in

the case of space.

When we attempt to locate the percipient mind in space,

we

find

impossible to do

it

so.

The

unity of the mental subject will not unite

with the spatial form of existence. Nevertheless

we have in our

experience the antithesis of

here and there, and space depend upon

it.

cal judgment there is

whole matter

But

lies

all

concrete judgments of

In the purely geometri-

nothing concrete, and the

within the spatial intuition.

in concrete experience the matter

is differ-

ent, and the position of the person himself be-

comes the origin of

all

space judgments.

The

subject establishes himself in a central here, in antithesis to an all-surrounding there. Into this

PHENOMENALITY OF PHYSICAL WORLD itself enters to

judgment the organism able degree,

141

a not-

and the here of the subject cannot

be determined as a point in objective space, as that would eliminate the subject altogether.

On

the contrary, the here

is

determined by the

subject's immediate activity. Instead of saying

the proposition

we must literally reverse and say we are where we im-

mediately act.

No other

we

act

where we

are,

definition of presence

or location can be given.

In that case our

presence, or our here, becomes relative to the ranofe of our

immediate action.

act as immediately

beyond the sea length,

as

and

If

effectively

we could on things

we do upon things

we should be

as present

at arm's

beyond the sea

as we are in our immediate neighborhood. Or if

our organic activities embraced the whole

earth as immediately and intimately as they

embrace what we

call

our body, we should be

present to the earth in the same sense as

we

Thus we

see

are

now

present to the organism.

that concrete presence

is

nothing that can be

geometrically determined in an absolute space,

but

is

rather a function of our dynamic rela-

;

142

PERSONALISM

tious. It is the

dynamic

mines the space

relation that deter-

And we

relations.

that presence in sj)ace

is

namic range. Immediate action on

immediate action sence. is to

all

presence

is

things

is

omnipre-

But neither presence nor omnipresence

be conceived as

filling

a spatial volume

by a limited or unlimited bulk. this

also see

relative to our dy-

dynamic point of view, being

quires an entirely

new meaning.

in space as existing

somewhere

void or in a void of any kind

Now

from

in space ac-

We

are not

in a boundless ;

but we are in

space as limited in our dynamic range and as able therefore to things. It

is

this

work only mediately on most dynamic relation and

limita-

tion

which underlies our

And

so long as the limitation continues, so

spatial experience.

long we shall have the corresponding spatial limitation in experience.

The

ideality of space

therefore does not permit us to transcend space in experience, but

it

does enable us to dismiss

the great phantom of an all-embracing void.

But only the

infinite

and absolute being can be

said to transcend space in the sense of limita-

PHENOMENALITY OF PHYSICAL WORLD

143

On the other hand, while space relations obtain among the objects of experience, the

tion.

totality of things

does not exist in space at

but rather and only in the ness and will. of the world,

gence less

is

If

we

infinite conscious-

ask for the place

will

we must say the Divine and

that place,

all,

IntelH-

this in turn is space-

but establishes space relations.

And

the

system of things spacelessly and unpicturably

depends on the spaceless and unpicturable

God.

Much

the same thing

time judgment. There that

is

relative to

our

is

is

to

be said of the

a great deal here also

human

limitations,

for understanding the ideality of time

necessary to bear this in mind.

and it

is

Time can be

interpreted only from the side of experience,

and more

especially

self-consciousness.

from the standpoint of

Experience,

we have

seen,

cannot be in the present as a separate point of time, but rather the present

We

is

in experience.

cannot define the present as a point in

an independent time, and

if

we could

it

would

be simply the plane of separation between past

PERSONALISM

144

and

future,

and existence would be made im-

The present of

possible.

experience

simply a

is

relation in self-consciousness

which gives the

origin for all time measures

and judgments,

and the range of

this present

depends solely

upon the range of the apprehending of the mind.

The

activity

present, therefore,

fixed measure, but

is

relative to our

is

no

mental

power. Epistemology shows that to introduce a real objective succession into thought would destroy

it.

Subject and predicate must be

simultaneously grasped in one or they fall asunder

begin.

The

timeless act,

and thought cannot even

present of experience therefore

not in some independent time, but special relation in consciousness.

is

is

only a

The person

who can

grasp only a few things has a small

present

one who can grasp many things has

;

a larger present

things

;

and one who can grasp

all

has an all-embracing present or a

changeless now.

This bringing of the present, with the

re-

sulting time judgment, into relation to activity

greatly modifies the subject.

Supposing time

;

PHENOMENALITY OF PHYSICAL WORLD an independent

to be all in

with

fact,

the past, for as soon as its

our experience it

occurs

In that case what we

date.

present consciousness becomes a

things

which no longer

would lead

to

145

exist.

it

passes

our

call

memory

of

This result

some grotesque inferences

if it

were duly analyzed. Fortunately the fact

We call those things

otherwise.

we

possess in a certain

sciousness

;

and

if

we

is

is

present which

immediacy of con-

possessed

all

our expe-

riences in a similar immediacy, the whole ex-

perience would be present in the same sense.

There would

still

be a certain order of arrange-

ment among the

factors of experience

could not arbitrarily be modified, but

members of the

series

to consciousness.

who could

If

all

the

would be equally present

now

there were a being

retain all the facts of his experience

in similar immediacy,

and

which

he would have no past

further, if such being were always in full

possession of himself so as to be under no law

of development and possessing no unrealized potentialities,

he would also have no future, at

least so far as his

own

existence might be con-

PERSONALISM

146

cerned.

and

his

His present would be all-embracing,

now would be

eternal.

Taking up once more the question, Are we in

time? we see that

has several meanings

it

and the answers must vary it

to correspond.

If

means. Are things and events in a real time

which flows on independently o£ them ? the answer must be. No. If

it

means. Does our expe-

rience have the temporal

must

be. Yes.

If

form? the answer

we further inquire concern-

ing the possibility of transcending temporal limitation,

it is

clear that this can

be affirmed

only of the Absolute Being, for only in

Him

do we find that complete self-possession which the transcendence of time would mean. this sense temporality

is

In

a mark and measure

of limitation.

We may

be helped to some extent in the

reception of this view

if

we remember

the

large element of relativity in our time judg-

ment

in

any

metaphysics,

case.

Without going deeply

we can

see that

if

rate were modified our estimate of time

be profoundly affected.

into

our present time

might

We can easily conceive

PHENOMENALITY OF PHYSICAL WORLD the present rate to be so modified as to

147

make

a day seem a thousand years or a thousand years a day.

The

life

of an ephemeron might

be stretched out into ages, or the slow motions of the hills might be

made

shifting of the clouds. Or,

away the

to

if

seem

like the

we should think

various periodicities of experience,

which are

no

of

necessities

thought, the

changes of day and night, the movements of the seasons, the alternations of rest and labor, sleeping and waking, youth and age, to tell

how much would be

judgment.

left of

it is

hard

the time

In fact nothing would be

left

except our conviction of antecedence and

se-

quence among the factors of our experience,

and our estimate of

this

would have

in

it

a large element of relativity. Thus, suppose a

mind were engaged which is

it

in a process of

thought

could conduct without weariness,

it

hard to see what temporality such a process

would have or ;

activity into

if

a

in

any

which the element of weariness

did not enter, again to tell

mind were engaged

it

would be

fairly difficult

what the temporal element would meau

PERSONALISM

148

The

for the working mind.

relation of ante-

cedence and sequence would remain, but that

would be only the form of the

activity

and

would not implicate the agent any more than the temporal form of a romance or drama would implicate the author.

Thus we

see that the space

and time of

experience are very different from the space

and time of the geometrical and numerical intuition,

and that they are very largely

tive to ourselves.

rela-

This relative element must

of course be eliminated from the divine relation to space

and time. Immediate action on

all

things means spatial omnipresence, and com-

and

self-realization

mean

temporal omnipresence.

The Absolute

there-

plete self-possession

fore cannot be included in any necessary

and

successive development without speculative disaster

;

and any temporal

relations

we may affirm But if

must be limited to the cosmic system.

we attempt

to view this system as the projec-

tion of a corresponding temporal system in

the divine consciousness, to the infinite regress

we commit

and end

in

ourselves

an impossible

PHENOMENALITY OF PHYSICAL WORLD dualism.

The

successive can exist only for the

non-successive

;

and

cient intelligence

non-successive.

Supreme

149

is

self-possessing, self-suffi-

the only thing that can be

But we

are not to think of this

Intelligence as a rigid

monotony of

being, but rather as the perfect fullness of

life,

without temporal ebb or flow. Until we reach

thought must remain in unstable

this view,

equilibrium.

The

and the changino; regress

unmediated

the infinite

is

;

and we

;

fall

back from

which alone explains anything,

some impossible impersonal mechanism.

But we must bear porality for lute

permanent

yawns for us

personality, into

antithesis of the

in

God means

self-possession

limitations

mind

that this non-tem-

essentially his abso-

and lack of our human

which grow out of our dependence.

Otherwise we shall eliminate

God from

cosmic movement altogether, and put of

all

relations of

finite spirits.

than the

out

sympathy with the world of

Then the

first.

Him

the

We

last

end would be worse

escape this result by re-

membering that our problem

is

to explain the

world of experience, and this cannot be done by

PERSONALISM

150

affirming a staticably immovable and intellectually

a

monotonous being, but only by positing

self-sufficient, self-possessing,

intelligence, which, as such, finite

these considerations,

how completely phenomenal

tem of objective experience thing running

by

superior to our

is

temporal limitations.

Now, gathering up see

all-embracing

itself,

but

off in

is

an

is.

we

the whole sysIt is

not some-

infinite space

and time

rather a great mental function

depending upon self-consciousness and the synthetic activity of intelligence.

But

as

we

have said before, things are not thereby rendered

illusions.

They remain

factors of experience, only

that intelligence itself

is

still

undeniable

we have discovered

the great constitutive

factor and condition of this experience.

are

still real,

Things

but real for intelligence ; and those

outlying things in themselves, the

noumena

of

Kant's philosophy, or the unknowable of other systems, are to be looked

upon

as fictions of

unclear thought. The thought sphere is allembracing, and beyond it is nothing. Of course this does not

mean simply

the thought of the

PHENOMENALITY OF PHYSICAL WORLD finite individual,

the cosmic

A the

but cosmic thought, on which

movement

final

151

itself

depends.

word may be added respecting

ontoloo-ical character of

mechanics and

Metaphysics shows that

mechanical science.

neither matter, force, nor motion has any such existence as

common

sense attributes to them.

Mechanics, then, must be looked upon as at

and a good

best only a science of phenomena,

part of

it

must be viewed as of the nature of

a device for calculation.

The compositions and

decompositions of forces and motions, the analysis of

motion into abstract laws, the break-

ing up of complex facts into simple ones, are to be looked

upon as devices of method, and

They are

not as some actual process in reality. purely relative to ourselves, as degrees of the allels of

circle,

much

or the meridians

the geographer.

of course perfectly valid.

of the assumed data of concrete facts

;

is

and

par-

Considered as an ab-

stract logical system, the science of is

so as the

mechanics

The manipulation

entirely independent

but when

it

sets

up

to be

an

PERSONALISM

152

account of what

actually going on in space

is

and time, we then have

to point out the mis-

At the same time we

take.

also insist

upon the

practical value of the science, for as a matter

phenomena have

of fact

gether, vary together,

according to

laws.

They come

to-

and succeed one another These laws are largely

rule.

and temporal, and admit of geometric

spatial

and numerical expression. Every such expression is valuable if it helps us to a knowledge of the order of phenomena, and especially

As

gives any practical control of them.

they are useful

if

if it

said,

they help us; but consid-

ered as veritable transcripts of reality, they are

only hypostasized abstractions.

They do not

dynamism

of the system.

give us the essential

The

true efficient causality lies in a realm into

which science as such has neither the the power to penetrate. science

must always be

scriptive.

way, and maids this

;

In this it is

field it

one of

but when

it

call

nor

It follows, then, that

classificatory

and

de-

has absolute right of

life's

most useful hand-

claims to be more than

and becomes metaphysical,

it

is

pretty

PHENOMENALITY OF PHYSICAL WORLD

153

sure to err and stray from the way, and some-

times

falls into

it

terialism

the pernicious errors of ma-

and atheism.

Of course on

this

itself is process,

view nature is phenomenal,

and for

existing only in

and

it

Nature

intelligence.

has continuity only for

its

causeand for the observer. In some sense, then,

we may

say that nature

one instant

to

never the same from

is

another, —

as in a progressive

piece of music the performance

varying. In one sense

and

it

is

continually

may be called

in another sense not the same,

the same

but

it

really

has sameness and continuity only for the per-

And

former and the audience.

it

continually

takes on the form which the musical idea calls for,

and hence

thing

else.

is

This

continually becoming someis

the general view which

take of the natural system. continuity only for server,

its

As

process

it

we has

cause and for the ob-

and the continuity

consists simply in the

continuity of the laws according to which the process moves, underlies

it.

and the unity of purpose which

In the strictest sense a moving

world has no continuity

in itself,

but only for

PERSONALISM

151

Apart from

the observing or producing mind. this

mind, nature, supposing

it

to exist at

all,

would be but the mirage of vanishing phantoms, each and

all

perishing in the attempt to

be born. But granting the observer and the

phenomenal world, the only continuity possible would be the continuous

and purposes of the as events

would

similar they

process.

differ

might

validity of the laws

New phenomena

from the

be, as another

old,

however

day

is

a

new

day, notwithstanding the likeness to old days

but all the phenomena, new and old

alike,

;

would

be comprehended in the same scheme of law

and

relation,

and

this fact constitutes the unity

and continuity of the system. sist,

It does not con-

then, in any rigid identity and

monotony

of the facts of the system from everlasting to everlasting, but in a subordination of

and

old alike, to the

be conceived

new

same laws.

may be pointed out general view many systems may as possible. Our human world,

In the next place that on this

all,

when we look

at

it

it

carefully, has after all a

large element of relativity.

We

look upon

its

PHENOMENALITr OF PHYSICAL WORLD

155

contents and rightly view them as objective,

human wills. But when we inquire into its contents we find that they largely consist of our own sense life

that

is,

as independent of our

put into rational forms, yet in such a way that

we should conceive

if

dropped out

it

might be exceedingly

sense qualities distances, all

and the of

and

;

ours as being objectively

that

we

so,

however

human world of founded, we must be not after

it

human world only and are not able to affirm

existence for beings

to our-

this

nevertheless query whether

a certain

relative

find nothing left that

could be called a world

much we may regard

and the

resistances

which are

and we should

difficult

Take away the

what would remain.

to tell

selves,

the sense element

all

of such a sort

it

to

who might be

have any differently

constituted from ourselves in -their sensuous nature.

The world

of ether, for instance,

not adjusted to our senses, and

it

has there-

fore only a theoretical existence for us.

cannot make anything out of

beyond a somewhat obscure

it

is

We

for ourselves,

assistant of our

PERSONALISM

15G

optical equations;

many

and, on the other hand,

of our solid things seem to be practi-

cally transparent for various influences

which

we seem

by no

to detect.

It

is,

therefore,

means an impossible thought that the things which are others,

be vacua for

solid for us mig^ht

and the things which are vacua for us

might be

solid for others.

This leads again to the surmise, mentioned in the last lecture, that there

may

be widely

different systems of reality for beings differently constituted, or for the in different stages of their in this

who

are

same beings

development. Being

world means nothing^ more than bavins:

a certain form and type of experience with certain familiar conditions. Passing out of this

world into another would mean simply, not a transition through space, but passing into a

new form and type

of experience differently

conditioned from the present

;

and how many

of these systems are possible, or to what extent this

change might go,

us.

Of course

these

is

altogether beyond

many systems would

be objectively founded

;

that

is,

all

they would be

PHENOMENALITY OF PHYSICAL WORLD

157

rooted in the will and purpose of the Creator

and they would

also be

one in the sense that

the creative purpose would embrace

one plan

in

;

;

them

all

but they would not be one in the

sense of being only phases or aspects of one ab-

They would be

solute reality.

stages in God's

unfolding plan, but not aspects of a verse.

This

static universe is

Apart from the

stract thought.

the only reality

is

static uni-

a phantom of abfinite spirit,

God, and his progressively

unfolding plan and purpose and work.

Thus we

find reason,

affirmations in

man

world

;

first,

for limiting our

any concrete sense

to our hu-

and, sec6nd, for keeping open the

door of possibility.

As we have

the

said in

previous lecture, the possibilities of consciousness seem unbounded.

We have

only a simple experience, and us to think that we

may yet

of experience in which

new

only a dream. But yet the

way open,

is it

it is

now

permitted to

pass into

new

types

possibilities of con-

sciousness shall be realized. as positive conception

here and

Of

course, so far

concerned, this

may be

for dreaming

is

is

well to keep

sometimes a

PERSONALISM

158

useful iruish

t5

exercise,

provided always we

distin-

what we dream from what we know.

For common sense the world of things something which, for the present at exists

by

itself

that this world in

least,

without any assistance from

But upon

intelligence.

is

is

reflection

it

appears

a function of intelligence

such a way that apart from intelligence

it

has neither existence nor even meaning. Space

and time existence and

self-conscious existence

exhaust the possibilities for us. conception

is

Any

other

purely verbal and without any

corresponding thought. ^But space and time existence

is

phenomenal only, existing only

for and through intelligence. of personaHsm

is

Thus the claim

being estabhshed.

IV

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY The

world

may be

considered from the stand-

From

point of contents and meaning.

this

point of view a world of rational contents

and meanings leads us reason behind

all

it

to affirm a

as its

supreme

essential

source

and abiding condition. The meanings we are

really

there

for

intelligence,

are there only through intelligence.

find

but they

But the

world must be regarded also from the standpoint of causality.

It is

also a

It is

it

is

deed.

not merely an idea,

not merely a pre-

sentation to us which ends in

itself, it is also

a revelation of the cosmic

activity of the

Supreme Will. Some

idealists

would seem

have held the former view, and

it

to

must be

admitted that as a psychological possibility it

cannot be disproved

;

at the

same time the

total impression of experience is such that it

PERSONALISM

160

The world has

cannot be allowed.

and

an existence apart from us.

mic activity

is

God's cos-

not confined to producing pre-

sentations in us, but

rather directed to pro-

is

ducing the great cosmic order

Him

thus has existence for relation to us.

a history

itself,

which

apart from

its

Thus the world becomes not

merely a thought, but a thought expressed in act.

God's idea

It is

Both elements

;

it

is

also

God's deed.

are necessary for the full ex-

pression of our thought respecting the world.

Of

course,

world

if

any one chooses

to say that the

only a presentation in us and

is

is

no

great system of activity apart from us, no logical

sufficient

against

him.

necessary

;

injunction

be issued

can

But no injunction would be

simple

contact

with

experience

would soon dispose of the notion. This insight introduces us to the question of causality.

We

have now to extend our

personal interpretation of the world into the field of

causality,

by showing that

egory also vanishes

in

this cat-

contradiction

raised to the personal plane.

By

until

causality in

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY the

161

proper sense we mean dynamic deter-

There

mination.

a logical determination

is

of ideas and relations which

Such

is

not dynamic.

the case with the premises which

is

determine a conclusion, or with the sides of a figure which determine the angles. There is

nothing dynamic here. But

it is

otherwise

with antecedents and consequents, or with

concomitant variations there

is

among

more than a time

existence or sequence; there tion of

causal.

things.

relation is

Here of co-

also a rela-

dynamic determination which we This we

now proceed

call

to examine.

This notion of causality on examination proves so

difficult

that

both the idea and the

many have

fact.

This

is

denied

generally

due to some exigency of system. The empiricists

have studied to reduce the idea to

we really mean invariable sequence, and if we think we mean more than this, it is due, as Hume succession, saying that by causality

said, to

" a mental propensity to feign." This

claim, of course, results

from their empirical

PERSONALISM

162

According

docti'ine.

to that, sensation

only original mental fact, and out of later

conceptions are built.

sensation has in

it

no

But

as

causality, but

the

is it

all

simple is

only

a simple impression in the sensibility, there is

no way of reaching the idea of causality

from

their data. Accordingly,

it

must be

re-

duced to invariable sequence, because their system

provides

for

nothing

else.

Again,

some rationalists have taken offense at the as

not fitting well into their logical

scheme.

Logic, simply as an order of inclu-

idea

sion

and

exclusion, or the relation

of*

pre-

mises to conclusions, makes no provision for

dynamics, and equally no provision for time in

any form. Accordingly,

rationalists of this

kind have their own manifest troubles with the idea, and conclude before long that the idea must be ruled out altogether.

Any

ra-

tionalistic

theory must do this that seeks to

construct

a

theory

including; the will. alists also

of

The

intelligence

without

traditional intuition-

have seldom been clear as to the

form of the

idea,

and have

oscillated con-

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY

163

fusedly between power and will and other

conceptions even more abstract.

Because of

such confusion and the practical barrenness of the question in the concrete, vised us, as

we have

Comte ad-

seen, to give

up causal

inquiry entirely as useless in any case. agnostics also

we

as one

are

recognize the causal

bound

to

The

inquiry

make, but one we

can never answer. Practically, then, we must

be

positivists, as

a

ever,

which fer

all

sense

of

we have

said, with,

omnipresent

how-

mystery on

things depend and to which

we

re-

whenever we get into speculative trouble.

Common

sense, however, has

the case.

It believes in causality

no

difficulty in

and

finds

permanently in sense objects, and there

mystery about them or their

We

is

it

no

activities.

must agree with common sense as to

the necessity of affirming causality, and no theorist has ever escaped this necessity.

those

who deny

causality always

assume

Even it

in

one place or another. Thus the thoroughgoing empiricist, who, like

to nothingness

Hume,

reduces causality

and unconnected succession,

PERSONALISM

164

own view by

forthwith proceeds to deny his explaining

how

our later ideas arise, or are pro-

duced by their antecedents. Of course on that theory this

is

hopelessly inconsistent, for no-

thing arises from anything, or

is

due

to any-

thing; but certain things were, and certain other things are; but in the sense of a deter-

mining connection nothing is because anything was, but everything simply

is, is

for no reason

whatever. This inconsistency, as said,

is

one

that no empirical system has ever succeeded in avoiding, and, if

it

should avoid

it,

at once

our thought system would become a curious

which the influence of

sort of apriorism in

experience vanishes entirely, and any insight

which we may have or acquire

is

not to be

referred to any past experience, but stands

absolutely in

its

own

right. It is further plain

that on such a view the system of objective

thought would perish altogether, for in that case things,

ferent

if real,

would be mutually

indif-

and non-existent. Events would be

groundless, and experience would

der into chaos.

Our

fall

asun-

perceptions, too, could

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY

165

never be related to a real world in any way,

and would be only groundless phenomena

in

the individual consciousness. Thus perception

would perish

solipsism, and being itself would become only the momentary and vanishin

ing presentation. Nihilism would be the end.

We

conclude, therefore, that the idea and

fact of causation cannot be dispensed with in

any philosophical system.

At

the same time, however,

it

is

manifest

that this does not decide the form of the idea

and the

location of the causality. Causality as

the ground of cosmic changes

is

to be affirmed

beyond any question, but whether

it 'is

to

be

located in the things of sense perception or in

some power beyond them,

And

whether

it is

not yet apparent.

is

to be conceived as imper-

sonal power or as living active intelligence also remains to be decided. ity of the sense

The phenomenal-

world has a profound bearing

on the location of causaHty and also on

its

meaning.

But the subject

itself is so

complex that we

need to distinguish the factors that enter into

PERSONALISM

166 it lest

we

lose ourselves in confusion.

we

tion to the validity of the idea,

In addi-

have, as

have just seen, the question of form and

and we have

tion,

also a use of the

we

loca-

word

in

popular speech and inductive science which

must be noted ical

we would have

if

problem clearly before

the metaphys-

us. If

we

divide

of

all,

causal-

we may conquer. Let us distinguish, then, ity in

dynamic or productive

may

first

the inductive sense from causality as

be called causality

efficiency.

The

first

in the scientific sense,

the second causality in the metaphysical sense.

A

large part of our speech into which the

idea

of

causality apparently enters

is

con-

cerned only with inductive causality, and this is

really a question of

phenomenal

relations

merely, and does not touch the question of causality at

As

all.

We

illustrate the distinction.

a matter of fact,

we

find that events

occur under certain conditions.

When the con-

ditions are fulfilled the event appears. call

We may

the total group of conditions the cause,

and upon occasion we may

call

any one of the

i

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY conditions the cause.

The complete cause and

the only adequate one Nevertheless,

if

the group were given with the

member the cause of its

the whole group.

is

we should

exception of one member,

low

167

call that

the event which would fol-

addition to the group.

Any

event with

complex antecedents would have only one adequate cause, but as

many

might

it

also

be said to have

causes as antecedents.

Or any one

of

these might upon occasion complete the group

and then be viewed

as the cause. This

ality in the inductive sense. It

do with

efficiency,

is

caus-

has nothing to

but only with the order in

which events occur. In other words, we find

when we look

into experience an order of con-

comitant chanofe and an order of invariable succession. is

When we

have change here, there

change yonder, fixed

in

kind and in degree.

This for practical purposes

may be

interaction of the things, but

it is

called the really only

the fixed order in which these concomitant

changes occur together. Similarly, in the case of succession

we

find that

when

certain ante-

cedents are given, certain consequents result.

PERSONALISM

168

And

this

in fact,

we may

it is

But,

call causation, again.

merely the fixed order in which

events succeed one another.

That the study of

way

this order, or the

in

which things hang together in the order of change,

upon

of the utmost importance,

is

inspection.

wisdom

lies in

The

is

plain

chief part of practical

our knowledge of

it.

This study

must be pursued inductively, and not speculatively. It

can be prosecuted on any theory

of metaphysics,

and need not concern

itself,

except in the most general way, about metaphysics at

all.

The phenomenal

conditions

under which events occur, are quite

distinct

from the metaphysical agency by which they are brought about,

by themselves. By

we make

and they may be studied

insisting

on

this distinction

a field for inductive study unembar-

rassed by metaphysical scruples,

and we

also

rescue the metaphysical problem from the con-

fusion which results from confounding the empirical

and the metaphysical points of view.

It is further plain that

this

needed for science and practical

is all

life.

that

is

We may

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY well believe that there tioD in play, but

some hidden causa-

is

we do not need

cal purposes. Neither

it

for practi-

do we observe

It is

it.

a thought problem, and not a problem for duction. In electricity

169

in-

we need not have any

theory about the metaphysics of electricity.

We

need only to know that certain changes,

which we

call

electric,

other changes which

follow upon certain

we may produce, and

that they in turn result in

When we know this all

that

of what

we need we

call

may be never so may be, we know of sequence

is

still

other changes.

law of succession we have

for the practical application electricity.

The thing

itself

mysterious, but whatever

it

in experience that the order

such and such, and then by

producing the antecedents we get the conse-

The power at work finds out for itself how to produce the consequents, but we need to know only the actual order and law of quents.

change. Similarly in chemistry,

we need have no theory of the elements themselves or no deep metaphysics. We need only to know

that things which

we

call

chemical bodies

may

PERSONALISM

170

be SO manipulated that certain other things will result.

we need

that

all

Given to

knowledge, we have

this

know

for the complete de-

velopment of chemistry as a practical science.

So

also in astronomy,

of gravitation in

its

we need have no theory

metaphysical nature.

We

need only to know that the acceleration of bodies takes place according to the formulated law of gravitation. Given this,

able to construct our equations

we

are

and find the

whereabouts of the planets without any theory

whatever of a metaphysical nature. still

is

believe, or indeed

may be

causality in the case, but yet sense does not

reveal

it

theory of

or locate it

it.

We

do not need any

for practical purposes.

doubt the underlying causality for itself to is

We may

sure, that there

how

know the

to

do the work.

rules according to

Without

will find out

We

need only

which the work

done. Milton had an angel leading the earth

around the sun. The astronomer could get along just as well with the angel as with some theory of central forces, provided of course the

angel brought his accelerations and motions

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY under the law of the

relative masses

171

and the

inverse square of the distance. In that case

the astronomer could locate the angel as well as the planet,

and would be quite

indifferent

whether the planets were moved by angels or

by

central forces of whatever kind, since all

he needs to know

is

that the motions take place

according to the law as formulated. Similarly in mechanics the causal idea

is

needless. This

has long been thought to be a dynamic science, since one department of

it

dynamics nevertheless

has been reduced to

;

it

bears the

title

a set of equations of relation, from which

of

all

properly causal relations have been eliminated.

And

this is rightly

regarded as a great ad-

vance by the masters of the science, so that there

is

no longer anything dynamic whatever

in science, cal,

whether observational or theoreti-

but simply a study of the way in which

phenomena hang together der of law.

Of

in the observed or-

course, as said, this does not

deny the idea of causation, but simply locates it

in another realm.

PERSONALISM

172

We

now

dynamic

pass to causality in the sense of

said,

The

efficiency.

necessity of affirming

stringent, and, as

we have

no theorist has ever succeeded

in long

a causal ground

is

maintaining a denial of easy to as

we

fix

But

it.

is

it

not so

the form and place of that ground

mig-ht at

first

think.

siofht

The

tradi-

tional intuitionalist has been very strenuous in maintaining the reality of causation, against

Hume and little

all

but he has been a

his disciples,

hasty in locating the causality he affirms,

and quite unclear as ticular,

to

he has located

meaning. In par-

its it

with

assurance

all

between the physical antecedent and the physical

consequent.

Under the

influence of his

crude realism, he has regarded both of these as things in real space and time ; and as he could see nothing else in the neighborhood, of course

the antecedent must

Hence

this realism

become the

has had no end of causes,

of which the existence

But

as soon as

efficient cause.

is

never to be doubted.

we come

to distinguish be-

tween phenomenal and ontological to reflect

upon the

reality

antithesis of the

and

phenome-

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY and the

nal

real, this

173

dogmatic assurance be-

gins to be shaken. It

possible antecedent

is

to reflection that the cause

things of perception, but

found

is

it is

in the

equally possible

that these things are only phenomenal processes of an energy

beyond them and mani-

festing itself in them, in which case the causality is

no longer

in

them but elsewhere. This

the conception which physicists themselves

is

now

largely hold,

and

to

which physical

covery more and more lends it

will

itself.

dis-

This view,

be seen, does not question the reality

of causation in the case. It only questions location

and the form

That

it.

we

in

in interaction

really see

its

which we conceive

and causal sequence

no causality but only change

according to rule for which we affirm and seek causality,

Hume is

is

a

commonplace

and Kant.

We

since the time of

may be

sure that there

causality in play, but whether in the things

themselves or beyond them

is

not plain. This

brings us to consider the notion of efficient causality, its

We

form and

location.

have seen in the previous lecture

how

PERSONALISM

174 difficult it is to

We

connect being at

all

with time.

there found that no being that has

existence successively

its

and without any non-

temporal principle can be said properly to exist at all.

It is a flow in

which nothing flows

and nothing abides. The same applies to causality. In the universal flow we have a causing which nothing causes, and a continual changing for which no abiding ground can

in

be discovered. This view makes

all

thought

impossible. There are no abiding subjects and

no abiding predicates, but only a vanishing razzle-dazzle in the place of both.

tion

some further puzzles emerge

In addi-

in the case

of causality, arising from the relation of the past to the present and the future in any

system of mechanical and

realistic

thought.

First, it is plain that if the future is to

the product of the past or

by the

past,

in the past. comins!"; the ishes,

If

it

must

in

Otherwise

is

be

to be explained

some way be included it is

a groundless be-

law of connection and reason van-

and experience faUs hopelessly asunder.

we could exhaustively think the past without

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY finding the future in necessitated less

and

;

what

being

by it, the future would be groundon the other hand we find the

if

future in the past, just

in the sense of

it,

175

this

we

are at a loss to

know

means. The future was not in

the past, in the sense of being present there,

and yet must have been

in the past in the

sense of being necessitated

by

it

or

grounded

could never have risen out

in

it.

Otherwise

it

of

it.

Now how

can these things be ?

Manifestly this problem

is

not a fictitious

one, but arises necessarily out of the attempt to think causality in

relation

to

time.

We

cannot allow the future to be independent of the past w^ithout dissolving all connection so that thought itself would perish

we make

;

but when

the future dependent on the past

are

bound

for

it,

and

to

make some

it is

we

provision in the past

not easy to see just what this

will be.

Here we help ourselves by a word which

in

one form or another has been with us since the time of Aristotle illustration

;

and no more striking

can be found of the ease with

PERSONALISM

176

which problems can be verbally solved

to our

though the solution

really

entire satisfaction,

solves

The word

nothings.

potentiality.

The

in

the

many

to a great

is

no questions remain

And must

in

it

after

and

this

it

is

pronounced.

makes more

This potentiality

solves.

some way have been an actual deter-

mination of the real plain nothing.

some

;

so satisfying that

yet manifestly this solution

problems than

is

present and future were not

in the past actually, but potentially

word

case

sort,

It

;

otherwise

it

would ex-

was, then, an actuality of

and yet not an actuality of a

actual type.

But how

strictly

to represent the differ-

ence between a potential actual and an actual actual

is

something quite beyond

us.

If

we

have recourse to description and say that potential

means only that future conditions

develop out of past conditions, we see at once that " develop out of " in a strict sense has

the same

difficulties, for

how can

out which was in no sense in ? But only that

new

that if

come

we mean

conditions temporally follow old

conditions, then

we

affirm

mere succession

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY and miss the idea

177

ground and connection

of

altogether.

aim were only to talk without very

If our

much thinking, then probably the

best

method

would be to write or pronounce the word potentiality

and

sible gravity,

and consider the problem as

sufficiently solved

ing we

derivatives with all pos-

its

;

but

in addition to talk-

if

also desire to think,

we might

well in-

quire whether this notion of potentiality re-

presents any real thought whatever, or

then under what form

We

shall

it

must be conceived.

said in our second lecture.

out that

all

some things

recall here

do well to

if so,

We

there pointed

these terms of the understand-

ing in themselves are only forms of thought

which leave it entirely undecided whether there be any concrete reality corresponding to them,

and we

we

find

said that they

have application only as

some concrete experience which

trates them.

illus-

Otherwise they are abstractions

without any real content, or they are formal principles

which

float in the air until

concrete experience

tells

us what

some

their actual

PERSONALISM

178

meaning it is

is.

Now

clear that

in the case of potentiality

when we

are thinking on this

problem of the relation of past and future,

we must provide potentiality.

for this fact which

we name

But when we thus name

we

it

have not yet found the form under which is

to be conceived,

and the further

fact

is

it

that

on the impersonal plane nothing whatever can be found which shows us that the fact

any way thinkable. There in experience

ter

and

it is

in the

in

nothing whatever

which indicates

problem contained solution,

is

is

to us that the

word admits of any

not until

we bring

the mat-

up from the plane of necessity and imper-

sonal causation to the personal plane that

we

get any hint that the problem can be solved at

all.

Potentiality

is

a clear notion only on

the plane of freedom. Here

it

means the

determination of the free agent. It

is

self-

the fact

that the free agent can do or not do, that he

has therefore various possibilities open to him,

and these we may speak of

as potentialities.

Here the problem

is

we

and permissible meaning to

find a possible

solved in experience, and

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY But on the plane

the words. it is

pure opacity.

at once real

It must

and not

of the necessary

be something which is

real, actual

Unless we can master

179

this,

and not actual.

the alternative

is

to

refer all motion, progress, development, evolution,

to a

supreme self-determination which

ever lives and ever founds the order of things.

In that case the past future, tial

is

not potential of the

any more than the summer

poten-

is

of the winter, or the setting of the sun

is

moon; but both

potential of the rising of the

past and future are phases of a

movement

which abuts on freedom, and of which the successive phases are but implications

festations of the one thought

and meaning

which

of the whole. This

is

and maniis

a

the law

meaning

of potentiality that finds illustration in experience,

and

is

understood through experience.

In any other sense

it

eludes us altogether,

and

only expresses a problem for which on the impersonal plane

we can

find

no

solution.

In popular thought mechanical and tional causality are differentiated

by

voli-

their re-

180

PERSONALISM

lation to time.

The former

is

pushed out of

the past, the latter looks toward the future.

This

is

ward

form of

essentially the

causality, the great

look.

ends which

mark

before

;

hence,

the for-

it is

called final

which looks toward

causality, or a causality

ends. In mechanical causality

mines what

is

self-moving toward

It is causality lie

intellectual

of which

what was

deter-

is; in volitional causality free in-

which are to be and

telligence chooses things

works for their

realization. It is

conceptions that

we have

between these

to decide.

But before proceeding

to the discussion

we

point out in passing that the inductive argu-

ment

the power behind

for intelligence in

phenomena

rests chiefly

on

this

on things. Mechanical causality resultant of past conditions,

forward look in itself is a

and has no

ence to future ends. Everything

and nothing the

is

movement

purpose. is

But

is

refer-

product

in final causality

toward ends which are to be

reahzed, so that the present

is

determined with

reference to the future, and this

is

possible

only as causality becomes free and purposive.

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY The future

as

present. This

such

cannot

181

determine the

possible only as the future

is

results exist as present

conceptions in con-

sciousness for the realization of which intelli-

gence

acting.

is

causality said

is

for

;

it

Apart from intelligence

literally preposterous, as

final

Spinoza

turns the effect into a cause of

It is plain, too, that this inductive ar-

itself.

guriient

depends solely upon the relation of

present and future, and not upon any details of method.

Historically

largely proceeded

ception of method,

or worthless

when

the

argument has

upon some particular con-

and thus has seemed weak the conception of

method

changed. Hence the doctrine of evolution has

seemed to many to weaken the argument for purpose in nature. In

who

fact,

however, for

all

see in the antecedent stages of evolution

a preparation for things to come, or the earlier phases of a progressive movement, the facts of evolution become the most impressive of

all

the inductive arguments for purpose in the

world

;

for in that case the entire

movement

in its great outlines has the forward look,

and

PERSONALISM

182 is

thereby marked as rooting in the causality of

intellio-ence.

And the aro^ument becomes more

impressive than the argument from detailed

marks of

special contrivance,

by

as

much

as its

boundless range in space and time transcends the petty extensions and durations of the traditional discussion.

We return now to the main

question of mechanical or volitional causality.

Mechanical

thought

for

causality

spontaneous

the great type. Such thought

is

is

busy mainly with material and mechanical objects,

and hence

its

conception of causality

necessarily takes on a material

and mechanical

form. Thus mechanical causation tends to be-

come the great

type,

not the only type, of

if

causation, while volitional causality

upon

And

as something portentous if it

be allowed at

made by some

all,

is

looked

and anomalous.

the attempt

is

often

doctrine of determinism, or voli-

tional necessity, to reduce

form. This conception

is

it

to the

mechanical

manifestly dependent

on the notion of an independently existent time, which

law of

all

is

supposed to be the supreme

other existence.

The things

that

;

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY

183

were, were the causes of the things that are

and

all

causality

is

from the past

to the future,

as a kind of universal parallelogram of forces

according

to

which

their consequents,

determine

and so the stream goes on

When

unceasingly.

antecedents

this is connected with the

space form, material and mechanical causation

seems to be the only possible type of causality.

Thus

the great space and time phantoms are

seen to be the source of the mechanical conception.

But when we

recall the ideality of

space and time, this view at once begins to lose its self -evidence.

Indeed, this ideality reduces

every doctrine of mechanism to phenomenal significance,

and deprives

it

of all claim to

represent the essential dynamics of the world. Its value Kes entirely in its practical

ience,

and

it

must never be allowed

date us into supposing that of existence.

We

it is

conven-

to intimi-

the real fact

might, then, set the mechan-

ical doctrine aside

without further discussion;

but there are certain confusions in the doctrine, it is

even on

its

own temporal

basis,

which

worth while to point out. In this way we

PERSONALISM

184

may

succeed in loosening our dogmatic faith

in the chimera.

A

Httle reflection soon reveals that this

chanical causality

notion

sential nature

by

its

is

at first sight

it

seems to be.

By

The

effect

cannot be given

antecedents are given, and

they are given

its es-

supposed to be conditioned

it is

antecedents.

until the

me-

far from being the easy

it is

given.

But

when

this involves a

pair of contradictions, neither of which can be

removed. In such a scheme, and assuming the

independent reality of time, the whole of causal events

same

instant.

must coexist or run

series

off in the

For unless we make the gro-

tesque assumption that empty time does something,

we must allow

that

when

the dynamic

conditions are completed the effect

is

there

without delay. Hence in the mechanico-temporal series, as soon as the dynamic antece-

dents are given the consequents are given, and their consequents in turn are given,

to the

end of the

series, so

and the end temporally

member

and so on

that the beginning

coincide. This

of the antinomy.

is

one

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY The

member

other

185

consists in the infinite

regress which this conception of causality involves.

On this view everything refers to some-

thing behind

Hence the

it,

real

and

on

so

in endless regress.

ground of everything

lies

be-

yond and below the horizon and can never be reached. Thus the law of causation

itself

disappears. There can be no causality on this

view without a this

first,

and on the other hand

view forbids us ever to find a

can be no

first

any moment

moment

there

is

first.

in time, for

There

back of

an indefinite number

of moments. Likewise there can be no

first

in

a mechanical order of conditioned causality,

without assuming something non-mechanical

beyond

it.

The

causal

idea

demands com-

pleteness in the series of conditions,

never can plane.

No

and

it

be completed on the mechanical first

day or

first

by any regress along the

night can be found series of

days and

nights as such, for each day has a preceding

night and each night a preceding day.

In the very old days, when animals had the gift of speech, the cat waited

on the owl to

PERSONALISM

186

know what philosophy replied,

The owl

"Philosophy considers such questions

Which was first, the hen or the egg?'' Why," said the cat, " that question admits

as this

"

deals with.

:

" Of course not," rejoined the

o£ no answer." owl,

"and

thanks.

for that I give the gods very great

For only consider

philosophers have to do

if

:

what would we

the question were

settled?"

This fable well of reaching a

first

illustrates the impossibility

by any regress

in a condi-

tioned series, or a series of conditioned bers.

We

mem-

can indeed describe the temporal

relations of the hens all practical

and eggs, and

this serves

purposes; but the hen-and-egg

series

can never be explained in this way. Re-

gress,

however long continued, does not even

tend to explain

it.

It is like

seeking to sup-

port a chain by adding extra links to the upper end, yet without providing any hook for the

support of the whole.

This

is

the second

member of the antinomy. But here it may occur

to us that there

DO more need

dynamic

to affirm a

first

is

than

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY to affirm a temporal first

there

is

time

itself is

unbeoun.

unbegun, causality

This

calls

;

also

attention to

difficulty in the notion of

and

187

since

may be

a curious

an independently

existing time. There certainly can be no first

any mo-

in an independent time, for back of

ment whatever nite

But no

in a

temporal series an indefi-

number of earlier moments could be found. if

there be no real

real second, or

first

The

in the infini-

conclusion would be that is

relative to experience

and we could never

relate it to the infinite

We

have simply another

the time of experience only,

equally

measures are purely

and have no significance

tude of time.

is

any other number, with the

result that all finite time relative

there

time of abstraction.

argument for the phenomenality of experienced time,

and the non-existence of

ent time, which

is

this self-exist-

but the phantom shadow

of the temporal process abstracted from experience.

Not

cessity of a

in this

way can we

dynamic

first,

escape the ne-

that

is,

act which refers us to

no other. In

every truly causal act

is

a dynamic

a dynamic this sense first.

The

PERSONALISM

188

true cause

is

never to be sought at the unattain-

able beginning of an infinite series, but

immanent throughout the power by which

come

to pass ;

all

and

things exist and

all

this cause is as near

active in the last as in the

To

is

rather

the living

series, as

events

and

as

first.

the infinite regress, then, and the result-

ing failure of the causal idea we are certainly shut up

if

we adopt

a temporal

and

ception of the hen-and-egg type.

egg

series

hen or egg and-egg

The hen-and-

demands explanation

any particular hen or egg is

;

linear con-

as

much

as

and no particular

really explained until the hen-

series is also

accounted for

— which

it

never can be by any endless regress. This

is

so manifest that the general effort has been

to

exchange the linear causality for an abid-

ing cause, which was and

is

and

asfe to asre, so that

this cause abides

we have no

from

and

in this

also, as

to come,

succession of causes, but only one

cause throughout the series of

seem

is

way

effects.

We

to escape the infinite regress,

we have only

to refer effects to this

cause without further specification.

We

may

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY also drop the

human

ible

is

a

too susfSfestive of the coarse machines

little

of

word mechanical, which

189

contrivance to apply to this invis-

and unpicturable energy; and instead of us rather speak of necessary causality in

it let

distinction

from

find the fixed

volitional causality.

and abiding one

.Thus we

in the

chang-

ing and passing many.

This looks well until examined, and

it

cer-

tainly sounds better than the previous putting;

but

it

really

shows good intentions rather than

insight into the problem. In fact, it

once more the attempt of

we have

common

in

sense

to find something which abides through the

world of chang-e. It allows that a succession of causes as distinct things would never do,

but

it

is

quite clear that an impersonal cause

might well

exist as

one and the same from

everlasting to everlasting, and produce a great variety of effects without identity.

There

is

losing

its

proper

in the view, however, the

common-sense oversight of the dialectic in the metaphysics of change and identity. In discuss-

ing that problem, we found in the

last lecture

PERSONALISM

190

that on the impersonal plane no identity can

be discovered.

We came to the phantasmagoric

flux of Heraclitus, which

is

both thought and thing. impossibility of

is

We

also

making any use

of rigid identity, in case

view before us

the destruction of

all

saw the

of the world

we found

In the

it.

and

this is overlooked,

it

assumed as a matter of course that both

change and identity can be united in the

possible,

But when

this is seen to

be im-

we no longer have one cause

or one

impersonal.

being, or indeed ^ny cause or being whatever,

but simply a causing in which nothing causes

and nothing

is

movement

caused, and a

which nothing moves and nothing

We

is

in

moved.

have a kind of metaphysical vermiform

peristalsis, or peristaltism,

in

which nothing

along from nothing to nothing,

worms

itself

and

mistaken for something on the way.

is

A

moving body without continuity and identity would not be a moving body, but only a

phenomena

and

suc-

if

there

were no observer, not even this could

exist.

cession of optical

The impersonal changing

;

cause

is

in this case.

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY Its unity self, is

in the flow

and identity are not

but in the observing mind

removed, there

addition,

it

is

is

191

;

it-

and when that

nothing articulate

left.

In

clear that the view does not

escape the infinite regress this causing is in time

assumes that

if it

for instead of an

;

nite series of conditioned causes,

we have an

infinite series of conditioned causings,

which points to an

infi-

earlier causing,

each of

— and we

are no better off than before.

All that notions

is

we bring away from

these crude

the conviction that causality

be af&rmed, but that

it

cannot be conceived in

the mechanical and temporal form. gestions of uncritical

must

common

The

sug-

sense prove to

be only phrases which contain a problem rather than a real solution. In every mechanical doctrine of causality every present its

change finds

causality in an infinite regress,

which can

never be completed and in which thought perishes.

In volitional causality we trace the

act to the personal purpose

and

volition,

and

there the regress ceases.

Another

difficulty in the

mechanical notion

PERSONALISM

192

Whenever we think

is its

tautology.

ality

on the plane of mechanical necessity, we

of caus-

find ourselves forthwith reduced to motions

What may

which contain no progress.

be

called the law of the logical equivalence of

cause and effect in

thought which

at

is

necessary schemes of

all

The

once confronts us.

to explain an effect in such a system

must always be the cause which contains the effect. If

would not explain hand,

it

cause

contains

tautologous,

it

did not contain

But

it.

in principle

if,

it, it

on the other

then the explanation

it,

because

the

explanation

contains the very fact to be explained.

is

itself

If

we

could think the cause exhaustively without finding the effect provided for in

not explain the effect

;

but

if

we

it, it

would

find the effect

already provided for in the cause, then the effect is

indeed explained, because the explain-

ing cause already contains hopeless deadlock of

along causal

lines,

by any device of

all

and

it

it.

all

is

the

mechanical thinking can never be escaped

logic whatever.

that the net result of

This

Thus we

such thinking

is

see tau-

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY The

tology and infinite regress.

193

logical equi-

valence of cause and effect in such a scheme takes

all

there

is

progress out of

In such a system

it.

nothing new, but only an unfolding of

alleged eternal potentialities, of these potentialities

and the notion

we have already

seen to

be hopelessly obscure and contradictory. Thus once more the notion of mechanical causality

shows is

itself as entirely

what

causality

come positivists

unmanageable. If this

means we might

as well be-

at once, for surely there is

no

more barren business conceivable than this. Time and strength are wasted, and expenses are not paid.

And

this is not all, for a further difficulty

emerges.

No change

of

for in such a scheme.

any kind

is

provided

If the connection of

antecedent and consequent

is

purely logical,

the premises and conclusion must coexist, and all

things are there at once and forever.

on the other hand, there

is

If,

some dynamic prin-

ciple which passes from form to form,

we

can-

not explain this without making the change all-inclusive

;

and then

all

things flow.

If

we

PERSONALISM

194

we

think to rest the change on necessity,

are

not helped, for the necessity of change means a changing necessity.

mained

rigidly the

If

the

necessity

same throughout the

re-

series,

no reason for any change whatever could be

The change,

found.

the necessity

itself,

means another

then, must penetrate into

and a changing necessity

necessity,

and once more our

unity breaks up into indefinite plurality. There is

no way of connecting the multitudinous ne-

cessities

with any principle that unites them

and makes them

possible, or prescribes the order

of their manifestation.

In some

way

the

many

must be referred to the one, and change must be referred to the changeless, but this can never

be done on the mechanical and impersonal plane.

The only one we can

intelligence,

find

is

unities

find

is

the unitary

and the only changeless we can

the self-equal intelligence.

and

All other

identities vanish into plurality

the Heraclitic flow.

There

is,

and

then, no one

changeless necessity which explains

all

things,

but an infinitude of necessities with nothing to coordinate them.

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY

And

here again

ourselves once

more that

well to remind

this is not a ques-

inductive science or

of

tion

may be

it

195

common-sense

experience, but solely of consistent thinking.

Nothing that we have said has any bearing on the study of succession and concomitant variation,

which

ence.

Neither does

is

the great field of practical

ation, but only its

we bear think

it

this

it

sci-

concern the fact of caus-

form and nature. Unless

we might

constantly in mind,

sufficient to say causality

is

there any-

way, and hence our objections are unavailing. Diogenes, in reply to Plato's arguments against motion, simply got up and walked. So here

may

say the problem

the answer to this

thus solved, for

is

is

it is

solved by walking.

that the problem

is

we

But not

really not the question

whether there be causality, but how we shall conceive

it.

It is a question

between two com-

peting conceptions of causality, the mechanical or the volitional.

As we have

only the order of change explanation

is

is

so often said,

given.

Its causal

a problem for thought, and the

explanation must be self-consistent.

There

is

PERSONALISM

196

no doubt that causality conceive

it is

is

there, but liow to

we view

the problem. Shall

it

as mechanical or volitional, necessary or free,

blind

or

These are questions for

seeing ?

thought to

solve,

and the value of competing

solutions

is

to be

found

the facts

and

Thus we causality

is

to the

way

see that the

hard.

their

in

adequacy to

demands of our

reason.

of mechanical

Instead of being a manifest

seemed to be the

intuition, as at first

case,

it

rather turns out to be a perfect nest of contradictions

and

ality is the

Volitional caus-

impossibilities.

only causality of which we have

Of mechanical causation we have no experience whatever, and when we attempt experience.

to think

it

and note

difficulties into

which

its it

implications

and the

brings us in connec-

tion with the problem of time, the infinite regress, the barren tautology, flux,

we

and the Heraclitic

see that the notion itself

of difficulties as to be worthless,

otherwise possible.

But with

ality the case is different.

is

if

so full it

were

volitional caus-

Here we have the

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY causality of conscious intelligence

and

sesses

directs

cause that can

itself.

which pos-

Here we have a

make new departures without

— a cause

losing itself in the infinite regress, that was

not

and that

also

is,

— a cause that does

temporally behind the process, but

lie

immanent

in the process as the abiding

on which

it

which

197

in

forever depends.

Here

is

is

power

a unity

the oneness of consciousness can

posit plurality

and remain unity

still.

Here

is

an abiding power which can form plans, foresee ends,

and

Here

a cause which in the

is

direct itself for their realization. self-equality

of intelligence remains identical

changes which '

originates

it

and

across the

directs.

And

this is the only conception that

meets the de-

mands

not only the

of the causal idea.

only conception of which crete experience,

of which

all,

not shatter on

but its

sure that it is

con-

;

it

represents any

the only one that does

own

and the only one that intelligence itself

we have any

and the only one, therefore,

we can be

actuality at

It is

is

inherent inconsistency really compatible with

for, as will

appear later on,

PERSONALISM

198

an important and essential function in

will is

what we

intellect.

call

conceived

Intellect,

simply as a logical mechanism of ideas,

something that

totally incompatible with

is

rational thought,

is

and lands us

in the midst of

antinomies worse than those of the Kantian system.

This brings us to the question of freedom, a matter which has been very

much misunder-

stood by most speculators.

These have

cussed time,

it

from the standpoint of the

dis-

reality of

and with various mechanical analogies

and metaphors

in their minds,

and without

any suspicion of the emptiness of mechaniMotives have been'

cal causality in general.

treated as mechanical forces of one kind or

another, which

on a dynamic mined.

The

may be quantitatively compared

scale

and

great time

their resultant deter-

phantom has

lent its

misleading suggestions further to confuse the matter, and so

it

dogma with many

has come to be an accepted that freedom itself

siderable affront to reason,

so much

is

a con-

so that the

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY pure reason tic

and

;

left to itself is

199

always determinis-

belief in freedom, if held at

all, is

maintained only for moral or sentimental reaThis, however,

sons.

ception, as

Freedom

we have

itself

a fundamental miscon-

is

seen and shall further see.

has the deepest speculative sig-

nificance for reason

and

science, as well as for

morals and religion. Concrete problems can never be safely con-

Many a proposition may

sidered in the abstract.

seem self-evident when abstractly taken, which looks very different when put into concrete form.

And many when

ideas are mutually contradictory

abstractly compared, which harmonize

admirably when concretely realized. This

is es-

pecially the case with the doctrine of freedom.

The

difficulties in it

have largely arisen from

an abstract consideration, which puts asunder things that belong together. then,

dom

must be

to decide

first

what we mean by

care, free-

we succeed in vindifreedom, we may dispense with

in the concrete.

cating a real

Our

If

the abstract freedom of the closet speculator.

By freedom

in our

human

life

we mean the

PERSONALISM

200

power of

plans, purposes, ideals,

We

realization.

dom

life,

work

for their

is

in-

but simply this power of

self-direction in living

actual

to

form

without relation to

itself

telligence or desire,

freedom

and

to

do not mean an abstract free-

by

existing

stract

power

self-direction, the

men and women. Ab-

realized only as one aspect of

and must always be discussed in its

concrete sig'nificance.

With is,

we recur

appears error. is

this

understanding of what freedom

to its speculative significance.

first

in its bearing

That problem

This

on the problem of

lies in this fact.

First, it

plain that unless our faculties are essentially

truthful, there

an end to

is

thinking; but, secondly,

it

all is

trustworthy

equally plain

that a large part of thought and belief

roneous of life

;

is er-

hence the question arises as a matter

and death

for rational thought,

how

to reconcile the existence of error with faith in the essential truthfulness of our faculties.

Freedom

is

the only solution which does not

wreck reason

itself.

sentially truthful

If our faculties are es-

and trustworthy, but may be

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY carelessly used or willfully misused, then

201

we can

understand how error should arise without

compromising the truthfulness of our faculties.

But on any other

basis error

and necessary, and reason

is

becomes cosmic

overwhelmed

in

skepticism.

This matter has never been adequately considered

by

losophers.

necessitarians, or generally

by

phi-

They have been content

to

take

knowledge for granted, and have

failed to see

that any philosophic theory must develop doctrine of knowledge out of

and

to see that

many

theorizing,

the case with sitarian,

own

resources,

theories are suicidal

therefore are fatal to the

—

its

first

its

and

condition of

trust in reason itself.

Such

all is

neces-

all materialistic, atheistic,

and mechanical schemes of thinking

in general. In

any such system the distinction

between truth and error disappears, and one notion

is

as

good

as another while

since all alike are equally necessary.

lasts,

it

Hence

to find his

way into the prob-

lem of freedom will do well

to consider first of

any one wishing

all

the relation of freedom to intelligence

itself,

PERSONALISM

202

and the

collaj)se of rationality

involved in the

system of necessity. Necessity, on the other hand,

supposed to be a perfectly clear and This view

notion.

is

commonly

is

self-evident

pretty sure to arise in the

early stages of reflection, but deeper study dispels

it.

The only

necessity sity

is

clear conception

rational necessity, that

which attaches

in logic

we have

is,

of

the neces-

to the relation of ideas, as

and mathematics

but this necessity

;

is

not found in experience, whether of the inner or outer world.

and

The elements

of experience

their connections are all contingent as far

as rational necessity goes

;

that

is,

we cannot

deduce them from ideas or connect them by any rational bond.

any,

is

The

necessity, then, if there

be

metaphysical, and this logic finds to be

an exceedingly obscure notion, and one which eludes any positive conception.

It

can be nei-

ther sensuously cognized nor rationally appre-

hended, and the more we wrestle with the idea the worse our puzzle becomes.

found

it

We have already

impossible to do anything with the

notion without adding to

it

the further notion

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY of potentiality,

and what a necessary metaphys-

ical potentiality

possible to say.

it

might be we have found It

must be

in

it

im-

some sense an ac-

could never affect reality

tuality, or it

203

;

and yet

cannot be an actual actuality without ante-

dating itself.

two kinds of

We are driven, then

,

to distinguish

actuality, potential

and

actual,

without, however, the least shadow of insight into the distinction between

to do this

which

is

we have

to

impossible.

make

them and ;

in order

causality temporal,

Non-temporal causality,

on the other hand, would be motionless on the impersonal plane, and would lead to nothing.

Thus the

doctrine of necessity finds itself in

unstable equilibrium, between the groundless

becoming of Hume's doctrine,

in

which events

succeed one another without having any inner

ground or connection, and a doctrine of

free-

dom, in which the ground of connection and progress

is

to be found, not in

any unman-

ageable metaphysical bond which defies

all

un-

derstanding, but in the ever-present freedom

which

posits events in a certain order

forever administers

all

that

and thus

we mean by the

PERSONALISM

204

system of law, and founds

all

that

necessity in things.^ In addition,

we mean by

we

recall the

overthrow of rationality involved in

neces-

all

sary systems.

Some

traditional

misunderstandings con-

cernino; the meaninsf of

freedom must next

be considered.

supposed that free-

dom

asserts

First, it is

pure lawlessness.

This

sheer

is

Freedom everywhere presupposes a

fiction.

basis of fixity or uniformity, to give

meaning. perishes.

Without

Now

that

formity can coexist,

any

it

this,

of course, thought

this

freedom and uni-

is

something which can-

not be speculatively decided.

be given as real before

its

The

fact

must

possibility can

be

known. The abstract notion of freedom and the abstract notion of necessity are contradictory, just as the abstract notion of unity

and

pluralit}'^,

or simplicity and complexity,

a contradiction

is

no

;

but then abstractions have

jurisdiction in the case.

away from the abstract notions 1

For a

We

must look

to the concrete

fuller discussion, see the Author's Metaphysics, re-

vised edition.

;

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY facts, if

we would

lem. There

is

205

get any light on this prob-

no abstract freedom and no ab-

Turning now

stract necessity.

to experience,

find given a certain measure of self-con-

we trol

and a

The

certain order of uniformity.

former represents the only concrete notion of freedom

we

possess,

and the

latter repre-

sents the only concrete notion of necessity.

Anything beyond

and

this is abstract

ficti-

tious.

The

clearest

illustration

of

concrete

the

union of these antithetical elements in thought itself.

sent absolute

They

The laws

fixities

of

is

found

of thought repre-

mental procedure.

are the constants of the mental equa-

tion, representing

no legislation of the

but the changeless nature of reason.

will

They

admit, then, of no abrogation or rebellion

and

yet, while thus secure

from

tampering

all

and overthrow, they do not of themselves cure obedience. For this there act of ratification

by the

needed an

is

free spirit.

must accept these laws and govern

se-

The mind

itself in ac-

cordance with them. Only thus do we become

PERSONALISM

206

truly rational,

and that by our own

free act.

Thus we discover freedom and uniformity united in reality, or rather

we

discover reality

as having these opposite aspects. It

pounded of them manifests

we

as

if

is

not com-

they preexisted, but

itself in this antithetical way.

see that the assertion that

lawlessness

is

mistaken.

An

it

Thus

freedom means element of uni-

formity must always be allied with freedom,

even in the absolute being

we

see that this

;

same time

at the

element becomes controlling

only through freedom.

The make

We

further objection that freedom would

science impossible

is

equally superficial.

must remind ourselves once more of the

essentially practical nature of concrete science,

and

also of the hypothetical

character of

its

deductions. Science exists to help us to under-

stand and master our living experience, and

only so far as

it

does this has

or loo-ical foundation. this aim,

tism.

it

When

it

any

it is

real value

freed from

becomes simply a baseless dogma-

The debate

between empiricism and

apriorism also shows that neither school can

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY

207

answer the question whether experience can be depended upon. The very can do no more than show ciples represent

stiff est

apriorism

that certain prin-

our mental constitution and

determine the general form of our experience, but they give no security for the actual order of

Space and time are mental forms, but

life.

they do not decide what shall appear in space

and time. Causality but

it

is

a necessity of thought,

does not determine what events shall be

caused or what the method of causality shall be.

Thus all the laws

They

of nature are contingent.

are specifications under certain apriori

principles, but they are not necessary impli-

cations of any or

of them. Accordingly

all

Mr. Mill has told us th^ we may never erect

them

into absolute laws, but

must rather

limit

them to a "reasonable degree of extension to adjacent cases."

wisdom

This

We

in the case.

dogmatism about the

and hold our science if

we

is

really the

are to refrain

infinities

for

sum

what

and

it is

of

from

eternities,

worth.

And

are asked to explain the formula and

tell

what constitutes "adjacency" and what "de-

PERSONALISM

208

gree of extension"

is

swer must be found cal needs; that

in the

range of our practi-

our faith must be practical

is,

than speculative, and must

rather vasTue

"reasonable," the an-

become

and uncertain when the matter

and permanently removed from any

far

is

practical

interest.

Now

applying these considerations to the

make

claim that freedom would possible,

to

any

we

see

how

baseless

real science.

have so often

said,

it is

science im-

when

applied

Concrete science, as we

concerns

itself solely

with

being and happening among

the modes of

things and events, or with the uniformities of coexistence and sequence to be found in experience.

This work

is

entirely independent of

the question of freedom.

dom vacates no

science,

or physics or chemistry.

The

belief in free-

whether of psychology

As we have

seen,

any

actual freedom presupposes law and vanishes

without

it;

rienced law

We

and is

as

we have

also seen,

no expe-

incompatible with our freedom.

use the laws for the realization of our

purposes.

We

govern the world and ourselves

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY through the laws revealed laws

left

to themselves

of our plans

The

in experience.

would

realize

and products, but

209

none

just as little

could we ourselves realize them apart from the order of law. Freedom, then,

not opposed

is

to physics or chemistry or psychology or

any

other modest science which studies the laws of things and events, but only to some absolute "Science," that

is,

that speculative theory

which ignores the indications of experience

and the

practical

crete science,

gether in a

aim and foundation of con-

and seeks to bind

all

things to-

scheme of necessity; and

far

from being

and

illiterate

this, so

science, is only inconsistent

dogmatism, a pseudo-science and

an enemy of humanity.

The

abstract treatment of the subject has

led to the fancy that the free person indifferent to all considerations of

knowledge. If he regards them at that he is

is

must be

wisdom and all,

he shows

influenced by motives, and in so far

not free. This

is

pure abstraction. Suppose

there were a free person with experience of life's

meanings and insight into

its

values

and

I

PERSONALISM

210

There

oblig-ations.

to hinder

him

nothing- in his freedom

is

his acting rationally or to excuse

for acting irrationally; but

act does not find

its

how he

will

sufficient g-round in the

" antecedent phenomena " alone, but the mystery of self-determination.

also in

And

this is

something which cannot be mechanically analyzed or deduced as a necessary resultant

—

The attempt

to

can only be experienced.

it

analyze struct

it

it

contradicts

denies

it.

It

it.

The attempt

to con-

can only be recognized

as the central factor of personality, the condition of responsibility,

moral it

;

it

life.

and the

basis of the

Criticism cannot hope to construe

can only point

it

that the objections to

out as a fact, and show it

rest only

perfect understanding of thought

on an im-

itself.

Persons untrained in philosophic reflection will likely

think that this view makes a poor

foundation for science and philosophy, but they must be told that really

is

the best

and apart from

closet in-

it

foundation there

is

timidations

good enough, and

well

enough

it

is

;

in practice.

We

it

works

have no need to

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY

211

inquire what science as abstraction demands,

but rather what we human beings may demand,

And

or assume.

here

it is

plain that

we may

not assume anything beyond those practical

we

uniformities which

find verified in life;

and when we go beyond ing at our own

risk,

more hardihood the

we

this

are ventur-

and commonly with the

less

we know. There

is

no

security for anything in the notion of necessity,

as

we have

so often said

for as a matter of

the world be the expression of necessity,

fact

if

it is

one which

is

compatible with change, and

that being so, no one can it

;

may be compatible

tell

with.

how much change

No

the pure notion of necessity

more than

this,

may happen

is

seeing.

tells

upon

us anything

that whatever happens or

necessary, but

that will happen

and

—

reflection

we can

tell

From our point of

what

it

may be

only by waiting view, the reason

for the uniformity of things, or the progress of things, or the

coming or the going of things, and plan of

must be found

at last in the will

God. There

no better security than

is

any abstract speculative

this in

principle, for every

PERSONALISM

212

such principle helps us only by begging the question. Indeed, there rity, for intelligence is

uniformity of which

We

know

really

is

no other secu-

the only foundation of

we have any

that intellect in

its

self-conscious

activity can maintain uniformity

and when we

change;

experience.

throughout

thus assimilate the

world order to self-consciousness we have a sense of insight and satisfaction which

is

lack-

ing on any other view, apart from the fact that every other view simply begs the question.

Our confidence

in

the orderliness of

really of a semi-ethical

character,

nature

is

and so

far as its existence as a mental fact

concerned,

less

it is

a logical warrant than a

psychological expectation.

the whole scientific

We

its

give up, then,

apparatus, from mechanics

on, as anything ontological, for

is

and hold

it

only

practical value in mastering experience.

The fancy existence

that

it is

this view,

is

reality itself, the true

and dynamics of the universe, has

been definitely

Now

it

set aside.

not science proper that opposes

but dogmatism

;

and

this

dogmatism

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY

213

understands neither

itself nor its problems. " We, the people," have an interest in discov-

ering the practical uniformities in experience

" we, the people," are equally interested

;

in

vindicating the rational and moral values of life

— which

are also facts

of

experience

and "we, the people," are the only in the case,

From

and the

;

realities

final court of appeal.

this theistic point of view, as

was

pointed out in the second lecture, the universe is

no fixed and completed

static

fact,

but

rather a process in which the divine thought is

being progressively realized.

When we com-

bine this view with the subjectivity and relativity of

time,

we

are freed from

all

the

puzzles about the finitude or infinitude of the universe. it

Science

is

permitted to discover

all

can about the space and time relations of

events, all it

and philosophy is permitted

to discover

can about the power and purpose behind

events, but neither

is

permitted to erect the

forms of our experience into absolute ences which would possible.

The

make experience

exist-

itself

space and time laws, as

im-

we have

PERSONALISM

214

seen, contain

no provision for stopping, but

that decides nothing as to the space contents. decide,

On

this point only experience

and experience gives no

Similarly,

and time can

indication.

we cannot do much with the notion

of the universe as a " whole " or a " totality."

In a vague way we must believe that

all

things

have their place in the divine thought, but

when we go beyond

this

and analyze the no-

tion of a whole or totality as applied to the

system of things, the breathing is

we

fall

difficult

becomes

air

and

so thin that

and

flight impossible;

a prey to logical chimeras and verbal

illusions.

Mechanical causality vanishes with the

dependent existence of time, which damental condition. turability to

are spatially

it

when

its

is

in-

fun-

a certain pic-

objects

and temporally

completely disappears

made

There

is its

and events

separate, but this

when space and time

are

subjective. After that the doctrine be-

comes only a formal shuffling of verbal phrases,

and we have absolutely no means of showing that there

is

any corresponding

reality.

We

MECHANICAL OR VOLITIONAL CAUSALITY

215

have seen that any concept of the understanding must be formal and empty until some experience certifies

it

as real.

We

have no such

experience in the case of mechanical causality,

and hence, even it

if it

were a consistent notion,

could never be shown to be a fact.

Expe-

rience certifies only volitional causality as real,

and our thought of

causality

must be

either

that or nothing:.

And

be asked how such causality

if it

is

answer must be that the question

possible, the

The

itself is irrational.

basal fact, whatever

it

be, can never be construed in its possibility

that would character.

of the case

be a denial of

;

fundamental

its

All that can be done in the nature is

show

to

it

to

be a

fact,

fact that accounts for all other facts.

and a

Here we

come again upon our transcendental empiricism. Intellect explains everything but itself. It exhibits other things as its

exemplifying explains

its

itself.

own

It

only in living, but

by anything, being

own products and

principles

knows it is

;

but

it

as

never

itself in living

and

never to be explained

itself

the only principle of

•

216

PERSONALISM

explanation.

When we

by anything

else,

ples,

we

fall

attempt to explain

or even

down

by

own

its

to the plane of

it

princi-

mechanism

again, and reason and explanation disappear tog-ether.

But when we make

gence the basal

active intelli-

fact, all other facts

luminous and comprehensible, at possibility,

their source

When we

become

least in their

and intelligence knows

itself

as

and explanation. consider the world as an object

of knowledge,

we come

only tenable view.

to personalism as the

When we

the standpoint of causality,

consider

we come

it

from

equally

to personalism as the only tenable view.

THE FAILUEE OF IMPERSONALISM Impersonalism might

riglitly

be ruled out,

on the warrant of our previous studies.

We

have seen that when our fundamental philosophic principles are impersonally and

ab-

stractly taken, they disappear either in con-

empty verbalism. In

tradiction or in

thinking,

when

self-conscious

critically scrutinized,

and

all

we

our find

active intelligence the pre-

supposition not only of our knowledge but of

the world of objects as well. rest

We

our case and demand a verdict. Peda-

gogically, however,

tinue the case.

The

it

seems better to con-

naturalistic obsession is

not easily overcome, and

it

takes time to form

right habits of thinking, even is

might, then,

recognized.

The

when the

truth

present lecture, then,

devoted to showing somewhat more

is

in detail

the shortcomings of impersonal philosophy.

Impersonalism

may be reached

in

two ways.

PERSONALISM

218

The sense-bound mind

sees a great variety of

extra-mental, impersonal things in the world

about

and these very naturally bulk large

us,

iu thought.

Thus

things, with of course such

modifications of the conception as a superficial reflection

may

suggest, tend to become the

way naturalism mechanical way of thinking

basal fact of existence. In this

with

arises,

and

its

its materialistic

This

is

and

atheistic tendencies.

one form of impersonalism.

The

other

form

of

impersonalism arises

through the fallacy of the abstract. Uncritical

minds always attempt tion,

to explain the explana-

thus unwittingly committing themselves

to the infinite regress. Accordingly

come

when they

to living intelligence as the explanation

of the world, they fancy that they must go

behind even

this.

We

have the categories of

being, cause, identity, change, the absolute,

and the

like

;

and

intelligence at best

is

only

a specification or particular case of these more general principles. These principles, then,

lie

behind all personal or other existence, as

its

presupposition and source, and constitute a

THE FAILURE OF IMPERSONALISM set of true first principles,

nite

and concrete

from which

reality is derived

219

all defi-

by some

sort of logical process or implication. This is

a species of idealistic impersonalism. In orio-in it is

its

antipodal to naturalism, but in the

outcome the two often coincide. Strauss said of the Hegelian ideahsm that the difference

between

words

and materialism was only one of

it

and

;

this

ianism of the

left

was

certainly true of Hegel-

wing.

These two forms of impersonalism we have

now

to consider,

and we begin with natural-

ism.

As

is

the case with so

many

other terms,

naturaHsm may have two meanings. be a principle of

may be sense

and

may

method, and

it

a philosophic doctrine. In the former

it is

is

scientific

It

about identical with science

full

of beneficence.

itself,

By making

notion and fact of law prominent,

it

the

has given

us control over the world and ourselves, and

has freed the stition

human mind from

and ignorance. Nature

is

endless super-

no longer the

PERSONALISM

220

seat of arbitrary caprice;

and

life

swarms with omens, portents, and

must

no longer

devils.

read at length in the history of

ity to recognize

sense.

We

One

human-

our debt to naturalism in this

live in

peace and sanity where our

ancestors lived among; dans^erous and destructive obsessions, because a wise naturalism has

displaced the false supernaturalism of earlier times.

When,

ure of naturalism, of

we speak

therefore,

we do not mean

naturalism, for

scientific

this

of the fail-

the failure is

one of

humanity's best friends.

But

thing. This

and

it

naturalism

philosophical is

is

another

not a science, but a philosophy,

has to be subjected to philosophical

criticism in order to estimate its value.

general view realism,

and

is is

closely allied to

common-sense

indeed but a kind of extension

or refinement of

it.

As

naturally objective in

the untrained

its

mind

is

thinking, the things

and bodies about us are taken for realities as a

This

substantial

matter of course, and they tend

in advance of reflection to become the stand-

ard by which

all else

must be measured and

to

THE FAILURE OF IMPERSONALISM which

else

all

221

must conform. Things that we

can see and handle are the undeniable ties.

About them

reali-

there can be no question;

common

but things invisible are, for

sense,

doubtful; and as these things of sense experi-

ence by an easy generalization

may be gathered

under the one head, matter, and their ities

ascribed to the one cause, force, matter

and force come realities

to be the

supreme and basal

of our objective experience.

their realm

is

are in space

When

extended, they often come to be

viewed as the sole

as

activ-

realities.

But

these realities

and time, which are looked upon

undoubted

facts of a sort,

and when they

are combined with matter and force

we get the

fundamental factors of the scheme. Space and time furnish the scene; matter furnishes the existence;

and

force,

manifesting

motion, furnishes the causality. tors constitute nature, is

to

itself

These

in

five fac-

and from them nature

be construed and comprehended.

Mr.

Spencer presents them as the factors on which

an interpretation of the world must

rest,

and

according to him cosmic processes consist in

222

PERSONALISM

.

an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion. Here space and time are

and motion are expressed, and

implied, matter

as the backlying causality,

force,

stood said,

;

and

under-

interpretation of nature,

it is

in terms of these factors.

This

all

must be

is

might be called the programme of philosophic naturalism.

It

aims to explain

all

forms of experience, including ciety, in

the higher

life

and

so-

terms of matter and force working in

space and time under the forms of motion.

To what sistent

extent this

is

system we have

for a time

we

a coherent and con-

now

to consider,

and

shall limit our inquiry to

its

explanation of the objective world of bodies,

postponing any inquiry into life

and mind and

This system, as

its

explanation of

society. said, is allied in its begin-

nings with common-sense realism, and never gets entirely

may be made

away from in the

it.

Whatever changes

common-sense view

direction of transfigured realism,

monly holds on

in the

it still

com-

to the conception of an imper-

sonal order of things

;

and even when

it

trans-

THE FAILURE OF IMPERSONALISM

223

forms things themselves into phenomena or processes,

it still

affirms the existence of energy

under mechanical laws, producing a impersonal effects

series of

and moving from phase

to

phase according to the parallelogram of forces. It is

an attempt to explain the world by imper-

sonal

there

and mechanical is

principles.

Of course

no suspicion that transfigured realism

and phenomenalism are veritable Trojan horses for the theory.

This view was perfectly natural and almost necessary for spontaneous thought,

became a

little reflective

fold the implications of physics.

But

and sought

its

in this view

when

it

to un-

crude sense meta-

we have a double

First, the objects of experience,

abstraction.

which are given only

in experience

and which

analysis shows are conceivable only as functions of intelligence, are abstracted

from

all

relation to intellect as the veritable fact in itself is

as

which

much

is later

to explain intellect.

as if one should abstract

This

language

from intelligence and then adduce language as the explanation of intelligence.

The second

PERSONALISM

224

abstraction

is

that even in experience itself

only one aspect

is

and motion, and real.

All else

is

fixed on, that of extension

supposed to be the

this is

and subordinate,

accidental

but matter and motion are beyond any question.

The world

to experience,

is

of qualities,

except It is

fiction.

among

that gives life

ignored, and only the quan-

titative aspect is retained.

product of

all

There

But is

this is

another

no such world

the abstractions of physicists.

as little real as the forms of abstract

mechanics by which we represent the relations of

phenomena, without, however, pretend-

ing to reproduce the actual causality. Oddly

enough, there

is

a strong idealistic factor in

this naturalistic

mechanism. Looking at the

moving atoms with

critical eye,

quantitative distinctions

covered to

exist.

and

nothing but

relations are dis-

Qualitative distinctions and

relations are contributed

by the

spectator,

and

they are the chief part of the real problem.

According

to the theory, the fact

would be a

great multitude of elements falling apart and

together according to the laws of motion, but

THE FAILURE OF IMPERSONALISM tlien there

very

is

much more than

experience. Indeed, this all.

A

is

225

this in

not experience at

mind which could completely grasp the as they are in themselves

moving elements and not

would miss the

in the appearance,

most important part

in

the system, that

the whole world of sense qualities and

which we

of

Thus the most important part

live.

of experience

handed over

midst and enjoyment

the

in

tinctions,

is,

dis-

is

not explained at

all,

but

is

kind of subjective experi-

to a

ence somewhere in consciousness, while the theoretical stractions. fact.

nore

We it,

invert the true order of

discredit the real experience, or ig-

and triumphantly solve an imaginary

problem. ture,

Thus we

only to ab-

applies

explanation

As

pointed out in a previous

we are shut up by

to transfigured realism

lec-

this

way

of thinking

and

all

its fictitious

problems, with the result that the world

we

experience becomes more and more subjective, while the alleged real world becomes less and less accessible

and

ing. This result

less

and

we reach

less

worth know-

quite apart from

PERSONALISM

226

the phenomenality of the whole mechanical

scheme as shown in Lecture

A

further reflection on this view as

monly appears on

III.

its

own

in popular discussion

realistic

ground

it

is

it

com-

is

that

throughout

ambiguous. There are two entirely different types of explanation in logic, explanation by classification

and explanation by causality and ;

naturalism oscillates confusedly between them.

At

times

we

are told that explanation consists

entirely in discovering the uniformities of ex-

perience,

must

and that the ultimate explanation

consist in discovering the

most general

At

other times,

uniformity of experience.

however, the causal idea shuffles in and the attempt

is

made

to explain

must consider both types

by

causality.

We

in our criticism.

Explanation by classification always remains

on the surface. Things are grouped together

by means of some common factor of

likeness,

but we never get any insight into the inner nature of things in this way. Such explanation has only a formal convenience, but

we

never can reach causes or reasons by this road.

THE FAILURE OF IMPERSONALISM

We

227

merely unite similar things in groups or

series,

and thus rescue them from

lation

and

o'et

a common name

their iso-

for

them

Such explanation merely drops out the

all.

differ-

ences of things and retains the point or points in which they are similar,

and then regards

that as their true explanation.

How little

in itself helps us to insight

manifest upon

reflection.

We

may gather

is

all

living things

under the one head, organism, but •we

simply find a

common term

this

in this case

for a multi-

tude of things, which are not identified in any the classification, but simply brought

way by

under a simple head for purposes of logical convenience. Organism applies to every living

thing whether animal or vegetable, spore or tree,

microbe or elejjhant; and these

ences, which

differ-

are really the essential things in

the case, are simply dropped out of sight, and

we have

the one term, organism, by which

we

are to understand the multitudinous plurality

of living things. In the same

regard tion.

all

way we may

objects as cases of matter

But we get by such

and mo-

classification exceed-

PERSONALISM

228

ingly

little

The

information.

generalization

is

so vagfue as to include all tliincrs at the ex-

We get

pense of meaning practically nothing. very

little

valuable insight by classing

products of

human

all

as integrations of matter

and motion.

ter

all

and motion

come in

the

invention in the world as

machines, or by classing

be that they

all

living organisms It

may

under the head of mat-

some aspects of

their being,

but even then we have no valuable information. It

is,

indeed, possible that some sciences

would need to consider only the matter and motion aspect, just as a shoemaker might con-

men

sider

only as shoe-wearing animals, and

no harm would be done seen in

its

partial

and

this aspect

if

were

superficial character.

In some respects our human

life is

a case of

matter and motion, and in some other respects it is

not a case of matter and motion. There

may be

matter and motion in connection with

thought, but thought

is

not matter and motion.

If the naturalistic formula, then,, confines itself

that

simply to such classification, it

might be

in a

way

true,

it is

plain

and equally

THE FAILURE OF IMPERSONALISM plain that

it

would be

229

at best only a partial

view and might be worthless, inasmuch as

it

would leave all the differences of things, which constitute their special peculiarities

and the

leading problem in dealing with them, out of consideration, and merely find their explanation

which they should agree.

in

some one point

It

would be scarcely more absurd

decide to explain that they

all

in

all

human

if

we should

bodies by the fact

had noses and

ears,

and should

then leave out of consideration the multitudinous personal peculiarities whereby each

is

separate and incommunicable

constituted a individual. It

is

plain, then, that if the naturalistic ex-

planation

is

to

beyond these fication,

be of any use to us,

it

must go

superficial generalities of classi-

and must descend into the realm of

causation,

and

also give account of the specific

peculiarities or differentia of concrete things.

And

here difficulties begin to thicken.

Objects in space, large or small, can be pictured, istic

and

it

seems at

first

as

if

the natural-

view admitted of being really conceived.

;

PERSONALISM

230

We

can easily imagine a variety of bodies in variously

space

grouped and moving, and

these bodies might conceivably be very small, so as to give

vis

the molecules or atoms of

theoretical physics.

These also admit

in a

way

of being pictured in their spatial relations or

combinations; but when

we come

to

add to

these the notion of causality, so as to explain

the order of spatial and temporal change, find ofrave difficulties arisins-.

With bodies we can

the kind described, the only thing plain

amorphous masses

is

;

that

is,

we of ex-

with bare

lumps we can explain only heaps. Unless we assume a mover without, we must posit moving forces within

;

and unless these forces are un-

der some structural law, they will explain only

amorphous masses again. Simply pulling and pushing

in a straight line, as central forces are

supposed to do, make no provision for organization.

Assuming,

theiij

the existence of such

forces,

we have a double order of

spatial

change and one of a metaphysical na-

ture.

The former

the latter

is

is

facts,

one of

a changfe amonof thinsfs

a change in things.

The former

THE FAILURE OF IMPERSONALISM depends on the amonointo

thing's

latter.

All substantial changes

must be viewed as translations

phenomenal form of dynamic

things,

and the

relations in

spatial system can

be under-

stood only through the dynamic system. spatial

until

we

change explains

it is

231

itself

No

or anything else

referred to a hidden dynamism.

If

subtract a chemical element from a given

molecule no one can see the slightest reason in that fact for the resulting chemical change,

unless

we assume a system

tions within

of dynamic rela-

the elements themselves which

determines the form of their

and

interaction,

and

this

manifestation

system must be as

complex and various as the phenomena themselves.

If

we had

a great mass of type no one

would be dull enough would explain

literature,

ical expression.

literature in its

to suppose that that

It

even in

its

mechan-

might indeed be said that

mechanical form arises throusrh

the differentiation and integration of type; but

while this would be true expenses, for the

it

would hardly pay

work of the compositor can-

PERSONALISM

232

not be done by polysyllabic words. But

we

if

were determined to get along without the typesetter,

we should have

to

highly mysterious forces to their task.

endow the type with

if

they are to be equal

Plain pushes and pulls would

heaps or scattered

simply give us type in

about, as the pushes or pulls predominated,

and

this

would not meet the

have type which into the order if

will pull

case.

We

must

and push themselves

demanded by the thought. Thus

the type were to set up " Paradise Lost," they

would have

come

to be such that sundry type

to the front

the following order "

would

and arrange themselves :

—

in

Of man's first disobedience and the fruit Of that forbidden tree whose mortal taste Brought death

into our world

and

all

our woe,

Sing, heavenly muse."

other type must likewise march to their

The

proper positions in order to

But

in that case

work

is

it is

make up

the work.

plain that the idea of the

already immanent in the constitution

of the type, otherwise

we should be seeking

explain the orderly result tlings of the type.

That this

by the chance is

to

jos-

impossible every

THE FAILURE OF IMPERSONALISM

233

one can see in the case of typesetting. Every one sees here that the arrangement of the type is as

much

ence,

a part of the problem as their exist-

and that the existence does not imply

the arrangement.

But

if

we

insist

on making

the existence imply the arrangement,

we must

carry the arrangement into the existence in

the form of

''

subtle tendencies "

terious potentialities

" ;

and

and " mys-

these, in addition

to being of exceedingly elusive meaning, do

not illumine the problem at

darken

To complete

it.

but rather

all,

the parallel

we must

suppose that the type themselves were not originally given in their separate character,

but only an

indefinite, incoherent,

unknowable

homogeneity, which through continuous entiations

with

all

differ-

and integrations produced the type

their specific characters

and subtle

tendencies and mysterious potentialities. This gives us an idea, on the naturalistic basis, of

the necessity of a hidden

dynamism

for the

explanation of spatial grouping and also of

its

unmanageable complexity. This invisible dynamic system

is

overlooked

;

PERSONALISM

234

Such thought

altogether by spatial thought.

has only the atoms and the void as data, and it

can easily conceive the atoms as variously

grouped within

this void.

The

tion serves for this insight is

demanded

;

spatial imagina-

and nothing more

but when thought

clarified to

is

the point of seeing the necessity of forming

an unpicturable dynamism behind the system of spatial changes, then the dark impenetrability of

our physical metaphysics begins to Spatial combination

appear.

we experience

volitional causality

that

is

which

is less

than the former problem.

The

we can

is

fact

;

picture

but what

than the latter and more

an exceedingly is,

we

difficult

are simply using

formal counters here, and are unable to

whether there

is

sponding to them.

tell

anything whatever corre-

We

believe that there

must

be cause and ground, and then we suppose that the atoms themselves can be causes; but

when we attempt

to think the matter through,

then we soon find that we are applying the categories, as

Kant would

say, in a

region

where we have no experience, or rather no

in-

THE FAILURE OF IMPERSONALISM The

tuition.

result

is,

235

may be

our thought

in

a way formally correct, but we have no assurance that

it

represents any actual fact what-

This, then, shows first of

ever.

unpicturability

of

from the dynamic

naturalistic side

;

all

the dark

metaphysics

and remembering the

results of the discussion of the previous lecture,

we

physics

find reason for saying that this metaentirely fictitious.

is

It is

an attempt

to apj)ly the notion of causality under circumstances,

and

in a form,

which

it

is

impossible

for us to construe.

Can

life

and mind and morals and society

be explained on a naturalistic basis? These questions were eration, all

was,

warmly debated

but seldom understood. is

manifest as soon as

matter from a more

;

it is

naive

we look

phenomena

rather the problem

real account of

it

at the

The

explains

itself.

The

anything must be sought in

the world of power altogether, unless telligence

How

critical standpoint.

space and time world of

nothing

in the last gen-

;

we

and

this

raise

power to include

world eludes us in-

and purpose. The unpicturable no-

;

PERSONALISM

236

tions of the understanding, as substance, cause,

unity, identity, etc., elude all spatial intuition,

and vanish even from thought when impersonally taken.

Concerning life and mind and man,

permitted to look for

it is

all

the uniformities

we can find amono; their antecedents and concomitants, but this reveals

no

causality.

minded critic

is

only classification and

is

And any

fairly clear-

willing to have anything what-

ever discovered in the space and time realm for he real

knows that the only question of any

importance

sons

who

is

that of causation. Those per-

expect to find matter to be the

cient cause of

and those who fear

life,

be, reveal thereby such

it

sufii-

may

profound ignorance of

the true state of the problem that, while charity is

called for, they merit

tion.

Even

if

so-called spontaneous generation

proved to be a living things

no further considera-

fact, it

may

arise

would only mean that under other phenome-

nal conditions than those that generally obtain it

would not mean that " material causes " are

able of themselves to produce living beings.

The wonder would

lie

altogether in the phe-

THE FAILURE OF IMPERSONALISM

237

nomenal realm, and would leave the question of the

power

as soon as

at

we

sification

and

causality,

we

work

as obscure as ever.

Thus

distinguish the question of classjDatial

see

arrangement from that of

how

superficial naturalistic

philosophy has been. Classification has passed for identification, into things,

phenomena have been made

and sequence has been mistaken

for causality. This naive confusion has

made

speculation very easy.

But supposing

this

dynamic

difficulty in a

way removed, we next meet another arising

puzzle

from overlooking the distinction be-

tween concrete and exhaustive thinking- and symbolic

or

shorthand thinking.

In

other

words, popular naturalism assumes that we have the simple physical elements in simple spatial relations,

and that they are endowed with

tain central

forces of

cer-

no very comj^lex kind,

but such that they admit of producing a great variety of complications, thus passing

from the

simple to the complex and from the homo-

geneous to the heterogeneous. Every one recall at this point the current

will

formula of evo-

PERSONALISM

238

lution,

which claims to proceed from the

to the unlike,

from the simple

from homogeneity

This

complex,

to the

to heterogeneity,

continuous differentiations and

like

through

integrations.

only a specification in detail

difficulty is

of the tautology which inheres in every mechanical doctrine of causation, as pointed out in the last lecture.

This fancy

is

almost the

sum

of naturalistic

If the infinite complexity of

philosophizing.

the concrete problem, in spite of plifications

and

all

identifications of words, were

seen, naturalism would lose all credit. in question is sal,

and

rests

the sim-

The fancy

simply the fallacy of the univer-

upon mistaking the

cess for an ontological one, or

logical pro-

from mistaking

logical application for ontological implication.

The

class

term applies to every member of

the class, but the term

but

it

man

implies no one of them.

Thus

human being, imply any living human being

applies to every

does not

whatever. ulator,

it

But

this is

and he thinks

from complexity

overlooked by the specit

very possible to pass

to simplicity,

from heteroge-

THE FAILURE OF IMPERSONALISM neity to homogeneity, and in this

way he

239

suc-

ceeds in reaching some simple, almost contentterms, and these, which are really the last

less,

terms of logical abstraction, are supposed to be the

first

terms of real existence. Then these

terms, because very simple and vague and indefinite in themselves,

tions

and

excite

no

seem to

surprise.

raise

no ques-

They may

well,

then, be taken as original starting-points for

world building and similar cosmological exploits.

In this way, then, such abstractions as

matter and force are reached, and they take the place of the physical elements, which are the

only realities in the case. But in

simply forget the concrete facts. as complex

and multiform as

ever.

we

all this

They remain There

is

no

simple thing, matter, and no simple fact, motion, to

number

be distributed, but rather an indefinite of

moving things of various quantity

and quality and terious

dynamic

the concrete

we

logical concept

we

in the

most complex and mys-

relations.

When we

pass to

see the difference between the

and the concrete

reality,

and

also see that logical simplification does not

PERSONALISM

240

When,

affect the reality at all.

then,

we

re-

place the physical elements by the logical ab-

we do not reach anything incoherent or homogeneous. Each

straction, matter,

indefinite or

of these elements has

its

own

definite qualities

definitely related in a definite system of defi-

nite law.

There

is

no incoherency in the

real

system, and no progress toward greater coherency, except in relation to standards which

we impose upon

solar system as a standard,

nebulous period incoherent.

body

as a standard,

ent. If

ard, all

we take

we may

we take the we may call the If we take a solid

the system. If

we may

call a

gas incoher-

a mature organism as a stand-

call the

embryo incoherent. But

these cases the incoherency

assumed standard, and

is

is

relative to

in

an

non-existent for the

underlying nature of things and the system of law.

The homogeneity and

heterogeneity, the

coherence and incoherence, are relative to the speculator

and

his point of view,

and

in fact

are but shadows of himself.

We

may, then, admit the evolution formula

as a description of the order in which things

THE FAILURE OF IMPERSONALISM come along, such that the

earlier

241

forms were

simple and homogeneous and the later forms

more complex and

differentiated; but

we

can-

not admit that this represents any possible order of mechanical causality or any simplification of the concrete problem.

by

reduce our problem to lower

classification

terms. If

We can never

we begin with

the complex no logic

will enable us to escape into the simple

impersonal plane, and simple

if

we begin with the

we can never advance

Whatever we begin with, we retain,

however

on the

to the complex.

are compelled to

back we may reason. The

far

law of the sufficient reason compels us to find in the premises full

and adequate preparation

for the conclusion

and

;

if

the conclusion be

complex, then there must be corresponding complexity in the premises. tential rather

are compelled to

that

We may call it po-

we make our antecedents such

than actual, but

when they

all

the same

are exhaustively understood

they are seen to contain, even to the minutest detail, all that will

sion.

The

ever appear in the conclu-

logical equivalence of cause

and

PERSONALISM

242 effect in

to

which we

makes

this abso-

any necessary scheme

referred in the last lecture lutely necessary,

and hence makes

it

forever

impossible to look upon the evolutionary doctrine as valid in causation.

If

we suppose a

cause apart from the movement, which

is

suc-

beginning with

cessively manifesting a plan

the early and simple forms and then proceeding to higher

and more complex and differentiated

forms, we can understand that by assimilating it

to

our own intellectual

that the doctrine

is

life

;

but apart from

absolutely impossible.

We

are compelled on the impersonal plane to as-

sume everything

either actually or potentially

at the beginning, or, if there

ning, then to assume

The

it

was no begin-

from everlasting.

two conceptions of evolution, evolu-

tion as a description of the

phenomenal order

as a doctrine of causation, have

and evolution

never been sufficiently distinguished by the

rank and

file

of speculators in this

field.

They

have taken the phenomenal order for the '

causal order, tion as to

and have seldom

what

raised the ques-

their evolution really

means and

THE FAILURE OF IMPERSONALISM what

its

conditions

may

be.

243

Accordingly we

have the proposition to evolve the atoms, with all

the familiar formulas about passing from

the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, etc.

Nowadays

that the supposedly fixed elements

seem to be combinations of something simpler, this attempt is frequently

which

It is sug-

atoms of those substances

gested that the lie in

met with.

the same chemical group are per-

haps built up from the same ions, or at least

from ions which possess the same mass and electric charge,

and that the

differences

which

exist in the materials thus constituted arise

more from the manner of the

association of

the ions in the atom than from differences in

the fundamental character of the ions which build up the atoms. Well, here

same thing tive

— the attempt

by quantitative

failure to inquire

we have the

to explain qualita-

difference,

and the same

what the attempt

really pre-

supposes. If

we should conceive a

half-dozen bricks

placed one at each angle of a pentagon and

one at the centre, and should then conceive

PERSONALISM

244

an additional brick added so as

to

have one at

each angle of a hexagon and one at the centre,

we

see

no reason whatever for any particnlar

change of quality of the combination arising

from the addition of the new is all

brick.

And that

No

variations

that bare quantity can do.

of quantity contain any explanation of tative change, unless

we assume a

quali-

qualitative

system in connection with the quantity.

We

can add elements to atomic groups or subtract

them

;

but unless the elements them-

selves stand in definite

dynamic

imply particular groups and

relations

which

qualities, to the

exclusion of other groups and qualities,

cannot deal with the problem at

atoms are not

in such relations, the

of course insoluble relations,

from the

start.

It

and

;

we assume

if

all.

we

If the

problem

is

they are in such

the fact to be explained is

then conceivable that

our present elements might be analyzed into other elements which might be called simpler,

but the thing which

is

not possible

is

by such

an analysis to escape from the complexity of the existing system, because

we should have

THE FAILURE OF IMPERSONALISM to trace into those antecedents

245

which are

to

produce the present complexity and difference the same complexity and difference in one

form or another. Moreover, in thinking the matter through

we should have

to inquire whether evolution

as such assumes anything or

not.

Does

it

begin with something vague, formless, and lawless, or does

it

tem and reign of determined in

its

begin with a definite syslaw, so that everything

place and

relation ?

is

In the

former case we can take no step whatever in the

way

of understanding anything. It would

be simply the notion of pure being, which nothing, and which,

if it

is

were anything, could

never be used for the understanding of experience.

tem of ject to

But

if

we begin with a

definite sys-

law, in which all the factors are sub-

the reign of law, then

never can introduce anything system, for

everything

the beginning

;

and

if

is

it is

new

plain

we

into the

determined from

there was no begin-

ning, everything was determined from everlasting.

In any mechanical system, under the

PERSONALISM

246

law of the logical equivalence of cause and effect, it is

forever impossible to

make new

de-

partures or to reach anything essentially new.

We

can only oscillate between the present

and the past

actuality

potentiality, potential-

we go back in our thought, the potentiality as we come

izing the present as

and actualizing

forward in our thought, but always so that

must remain a constant

potential plus actual

quantity.

matter there

thought

popular

In

is

a continual

about

oscillation,

this

for

the most part unsuspected, between the two points of view.

We

try to explain everything

by antecedents, and

so

by the aid of the

lacy of the universal as

fal-

we go backward we

succeed in reaching to our satisfaction some indefinite, incoherent

homogeneity. But logic

forthwith shows the emptiness of this notion

and the

impossibility of reaching

it.

Then we

begin again, mindful this time of the reign of law,

and assume an order of

to notice that as soon as

personal plane

law,

we do

and then

that,

fail

on the im-

we have determined everything

for all future time, so that nothing

new may

THE FAILURE OF IMPERSONALISM

247

hereafter be introduced without some irruption

from without.

No new

departures are

possible in a mechanical scheme.

The same

difficulty

appears when we work

forward instead of backward.

the question

Here again the naturalistic speculator has commonly been under the influence of sense bondage and has

assumed that what

tacitly

he could not see was not there, so that

differ-

ences which did not manifest themselves to the senses might be regarded as non-existent.

But

the same law which

we have been

makes

no developing thing can

clear that

it

referring to

ever be understood or defined by what

mentarily

is,

but only by

all

it

that which

moit is

to become.

It

can be explained, then, not by

reference to

its

crude beginnings, but only by

reference to the finished outcome.

Aristotle

reached this insight two thousand years ago.

When, as if

it

then, the biological speculator tells us,

were a very conclusive

fact, that the

embryos of many of the higher animals look alike in their earliest stages,

we are not so much

impressed as perhaps we are expected to be;

PERSONALISM

248 for,

however much things may look aUke,

if

they are under different laws of development

they are, to

earliest phases, unlike

that later appear. it is

reason, even in the

the eye of

with

all

the unlikenesses

The human embryo, when

undistinguishable by sight from the em-

bryo of a dog or sheep,

is

human

after all a

embryo, and not the embryo of a sheep.

It is

human development, passes into the human

already under the law of

and when form

it

quickly

this is not

something adventitiously taken

on through some verbal hocus-pocus about

and integration, but

differentiation

is

simply

the manifestation of the immanent organic laws

under which

it

holds

its

existence

and

its

de-

velopment takes place.

The whole

question of the transformation

of species has been equally confused in naturalistic discussion.

There are really two ques-

tions to be considered.

One

is.

Can

existing

organic forms be genetically traced to earlier

forms so that the

backward converge

lines of descent as

to

some common

the branches of a tree

all

meet

in a

we go

origin, as

common

THE FAILURE OF IMPERSONALISM The other

trunk ?

question

What

is,

are the

and what

individual things themselves,

249

is

the

power that produces them? The former question belongs to science, the latter belongs to

philosophy.

The former question has only interest,

answer

and philosophy

fall

out as

it

is

may, provided fact and

logic be duly regarded.

tance

is

a subordinate

content to have the

Its

supposed impor-

due to the implicit assumption of a

self-running nature which does a great

unintended things on

its

own

many

account, and to

the fancy that such genetic connection would

mean

identity of nature in the successive

mem-

bers of the series.

The second

question

real importance. first

is

the only one of any

In considering

it

we must

note the nominalism of the doctrine of

descent.

A

species as such

of individuals which

is

nothing but a group

more or

less closely re-

semble one another. In the case of the more

prominent living species we should probably

add the notion of genetic connection, but

this

PERSONALISM

250

would

iu

no way

affect the

nominalism of the

doctrine. If, then, the so-called transformation

of species took place, the objective fact, apart

from our

logical manipulation,

If individuals were taken

would be

this

:

from points widely

apart in a line of descent, they would be so unlike that

But

this

we should not

them together.

class

would not identify individuals, or

higher and lower forms.

The

fact

would be

way

a power producing individuals in such a

that they could be variously classified, possibly

on an ascending hiofher

and

scale

fuller life.

and

in adaptation to

In that case we should

have the familiar progress from the simple to the complex, all

the rest

;

from the low

but

it

would

to the high,

from

man

with

all those fearsome identifications of

the monkey,

etc.,

and

be entirely free

which have so infested the

popular imagination.

For one holding the

phenomenality of nature and the volitional character of there

is

all

so-called natural

causality,

nothing to excite alarm in any per-

missible doctrine of the transformation of species.

THE FAILURE OF IMPERSONALISM

251

We find naturalism, then, entirely in its right when

seeks to give a description of the

it

which things

phenomenal order according

to

have appeared, but we find

as a philosophy

it

exceedingly superficial and uncritical. Apart

from the

critical

doubts which we have discov-

ered in the previous lecture respecting mechanical causality in general,

lifting the

and the necessity of

problem of causation to the personal

plane in order to keep the Heraclitic flux,

we

from vanishing

it

in

find that this doctrine

vanishes in complete and barren tautology as

we

soon as

take

it

concretely and exhaustively,

and

in

a shorthand

This way of thinking

is

compelled to

instead of symbolically

way.

carry the present into the past, or into

chinery of whatever sort, in such a

empty

it

we make

ma-

as to

When,

a cross section

of the cosmic flow qr any part of

we

way

of all progress of any kind.

then, in such a scheme

its

it

anywhere,

are compelled to find potentially or actually

present

all

that ever will be

;

and

if

we choose

to carry the regress never so far back, the

necessity attends us;

and

if

at last

same

we reach

PERSONALISM

252

some nebulous period of dispersed matter or a fiery cloud,

upon the

even there, when we look around

situation with our eyes open,

compelled to find latent and potential will ever

we all

are

that

emerge in all the future through which

the system

may

endure.

In addition, when

naturalism becomes mathematical and seeks to

reduce

all qualitative

distinctions to quantita-

tive ones, it leaves the real

and

becomes a

world of abstract mechanics. it

world altogether,

pure abstraction

like

the

Like that world,

has only representative value, and

is

never

to be mistaken for the world of real existence.

These are the leading ism as a philosophy. difficulties of detail,

The

to enter.

but into these we forbear

doctrine

and judged by

its

difficulties of natural-

There are numberless

is sufficiently

convicted

doctrine of causaHty, and

the hopeless tautology and endless regress to

which

it is

sibility of

condemned, and

also

by the impos-

verifying as actual any of

its

lead-

ing conceptions. They must forever remain, at best,

mere conceptual forms,

to

which no

reality can be shown to correspond.

THE FAILURE OF IMPERSONALISM Naturalism It

may be

253

dismissed as a failure.

remains to show that impersonalism as

idealism

When we

equally so.

is

approach the

metaphysical problem from the side of knowledge,

it is

easy to overlook the fact of will and

causality in existence,

And

are only ideas. is

then, since the

an object of knowledge,

same way is

and conclude that things also

easy in the

it is

to reach the conclusion that

too

it

The next

only an idea or group of ideas.

thing

to eliminate the personal implication

is

from these

ideas,

and then we forthwith reach

mind

the conclusion that the

tion of impersonal ideas. is

mind

itself is

a func-

Thus impersonalism

once more installed. It

is

easy to see

how

epistemological interest

this view arises.

The

makes us unwilling

to

admit anything that cannot be conceptually grasped.

Accordingly

At

all-embracing.

that this view

is

impersonal idea

it

seeks to

the same time

ideas

is

clear

it

a tissue of abstractions. is

a pure fiction.

ideas are owned, or belong to

mean nothing

make

The

All actual

some one, and

as floating free.

We

have

al-

PERSONALISM

254

ready

the

that

seen

of

categories

various

thought, apart from their formal character as

modes

of intellectual procedure, get

and

significance only in the concrete

scious life of the living mind.

when considered

destructive or contradictory.

the type

we

are

now

become

The

real

self-con-

Apart from

real they

as

any

this, self-

idealism of

considering assumes that

these categories admit of being conceived in

themselves, and that they are in a measure

the preconditions of concrete existence, and in

such a way that we might almost suppose that a personal being

is

compounded

of being plus

unity plus identity plus causality,

etc.

Thus

personal existence appears as the outcome and

product of something more ultimate and fundamental.

The

fictitious

has already appeared.

mean by any we have find

When we

of these categories,

seen, that

them

nature of this view

we mean the

it

ask what we turns out, as

significance

to have in our self-conscious

life.

we In

the concrete the terms have no meaning except as

it is

ence.

abstracted from our

own personal experi-

The only unity we know anything about.

THE FAILURE OF IMPERSONALISM apart from the formal unities of logic, unity of the unitary self

;

and the only

we know anything about

255

is

the

identity

no abstract con-

is

tinuity of existence through an abstract time, it

simply the self-equality of intelligence

is

throughout

its

which we find ning

off in

successive

And

experience. is

the change

not an abstract change run-

an abstract time, but

is

simply the

form under which the self-equal

and projects the

telligence realizes its purpose realizing activity against the

background of

self-consciousness. Similarly for being

its

self

;

in the concrete

it

it-

means the passing ob-

ject of perception, or else like

in-

it

means existence

our own.

So much for the nature of the categories.

But

still

graver

difficulties arise

when we

in-

quire concerning the place of their existence

and the ground of

their

combination and

we suppose them

to precede

movement.

If

personality,

we must ask where they

The only

intelligent

would be that they

exist.

answer that can be given exist either in space

time, or in consciousness.

The former

and

supposi-

PERSONALISM

256

tion

would turn them into things, and then they

would dissolve away

in the dialectic of spatial

and temporal existence to the hypothesis,

;

which

the latter

contrary

that they are pre-

is

Thus they

conditions of consciousness. into

is

some kind of metaphysical

?2th

retreat

dimension,

where we cannot follow them because they

mean

nothing.

A

further difficulty emerges

when we ask

ground of grouping and movement of

for the

these ideas. If

we conceive

their relations to

be purely logical we should make immediate speculative shipwreck.

The

intellect

conceived

of as merely a set of logical relations

is

totally

incapable of explaining the order of experience, for logic

is

non-temporal. Conclusions

coexist with the premises.

There

or after possible in the case.

If,

is

no before

then, the uni-

verse as existing were a logical implication of ideas,

it

and

nal as the ideas. for change, but rigidly coexist.

with

all

contents would be as eter-

all its

There would be no room

all

their implications

In this view also

finite

would minds,

their contents, as implications of eter-

THE FAILURE OF IMPERSONALISM nal ideas, would be equally eternal

257

and

;

as

error and evil are a manifest part of these

contents,

follows that they likewise are ne-

it

cessary and

eternal.

Hence we should have

admit an element of unreason and ideas themselves

eternal

;

the

evil in

and by

this

to

time

the collapse of the system would be complete.

There

we

no escape from

is

this result so

long as

look upon the intellect as a logical mech-

anism of

ideas.

Only a

living, active, personal

and

intelligence can escape this fatalism cidal

sui-

outcome of the impersonal reason.

purely logical and contemplative intellect

merely gazed upon the

A

tliat

relations of ideas, with-

out choice and initiative and active self-direction,

would be absolutely

the order of

The our

life.

claim

everything

that

is itself

human

thought must unclear in

its

comprise

meaning. In

thinking of course there

of objects which

we do not make but

this dualism can never

thinking.

useless in explaining

But

this

is

a world

find,

and

be eliminated from our

world of objects

is

within the thought sphere by being

retained

made

the

PERSONALISM

258

product and expression of intelligence, and as such

it

is

open to apprehension and compre-

hension by intelligence. But

it

comes

self-knowledge of intelligence, there

to the is

when

always an element which mere conceptual

knowing can never adequately grasp.

We have

seen that concepts without immediate experi-

ence are only empty forms, and become real

only as some actual experience furnishes them

with real contents. Hence there in self-knowledge

is

an element

beyond what the concep-

tions of the understanding can furnish. This is

found in our living self-consciousness.

We

we not only

con-

conceive some things, but ceive,

we

also live ourselves.

This living

in-

deed cannot be realized without the conception,

but the conception

is

formal and empty

without the living. In this sense intelligence

must accept

itself as

as something given

a datum, and yet not

from without, but as the

self-recognition of itself

by

itself.

must always have a content for nition.

The

its

Intelligence

own

recog-

recognition would be impossible

without the content, and the content would be

THE FAILURE OF IMPERSONALISM

259

nothing^ without the recogfiiition. In this fact

the antithesis of thouo-ht and beino- finds recognition and reconcihation CD

must be

lived,

ter,

and

itself

cannot be discursively con-

it

strued. Thouo-ht

but the fact

^;

and act are one

in this mat-

neither can be construed without the

other.

In closing this discussion we

once

recall

more our doctrine of transcendental empiricism.

The meaning and must

finally

possibility of these terms

be found in experience

not in any abstract philosophizing.

itself,

and

When the

terms are abstractly taken without continual reference to experience,

any number of tions in our

it is

difficulties

easy to develop

and even contradic-

fundamental

ideas.

No

better

proof of this can be found than Mr. Bradley's

work on Appearance and work

Reality.

of great ability, but written

abstract

standpoint.

The

This

is

a

from the

result is

that

it

might almost be called a refutation of impersonalism, although such refutation was far

enough from Mr. Bradley's purpose. He all

finds

the categories and relations of thought

PERSONALISM

260

abounding

Inherence, predi-

in contradiction.

cation, quality, identity, causality, unity, space,

time, things,

and even the

swarm with

self,

Mr. Bradley seems to think

contradictions.

that these difficulties

are

all

removed

in the

absolute, but he fails to see that his logic

would pursue him even into the absolute, unless it

be personally conceived. Otherwise the

absolute strictly

is

simply a deus ex macJwia kept

behind the scenes, and worked only by

stage direction

But the do

from the manager.

difficulties

urged by Mr. Bradley philosophy; and

exist for all impersonal

they can be removed only as the problem raised to the personal plane,

terms in the

and we take the

meaning they have

Thus

perience.

identity

is

is

in living ex-

entirely intelligible

as the self-identification of experience in intelligence.

We

can

meaning according identical, but there

no

interest

identity.

is

easily

to

give

identity

which the soul

no loss

in this, as

is

a

not

we have

speculative or practical in such

Again, unity

is

entirely intelligible

as the unity of the self in the plurality of

its

THE FAILURE OF IMPERSONALISM Here again

activities.

in such a

way

any

is

for

lost,

;

we have no

defined in such a

volve contradictions or is

in-

They

of the other categories.

but philosophy

but

such a unity. The same

sort in

may be said may easily be

easy to define unity

as to exclude plurality

here also nothing terest of

it is

261

way

make them

as to in-

worthless,

not concerned over the fate

of such abstractions

know

cares only to

it

;

the forms the categories take on in living ex-

And

in discussing freedom, that

we pointed out many things which

when abstractly taken seem

contradictory prove

perience.

here

we

find, as

quite compatible in the concrete. Finally, the notion of the self can easily be

taken in such a are asked of

way

as to be worthless.

what use the

explaining the mental

life.

self

is,

after

We

all,

in

How does its unity

explain the plurality and variety of consciousness ?

sense is

no

And it

the answer must be that in some

does not explain

less necessary.

plurality

is

it,

and yet the unity

For the consciousness of

demonstrably impossible without

the fact of conscious unity. This unity does

PERSONALISM

262

not indeed enable us to deduce plurality, and

hence the plurality must be viewed as an

as-

pect o£ the unity, but not as an aspect of an abstract unity without distinction or difference,

but a living, conscious unity, which its

manifoldness and manifold in

Taken verbally

this

might

easily

is

oneness.

its

be shown to

be contradictory, but taken concretely fact of consciousness,

one in

and none the

it is

the

less so

because our formal and discursive thought finds

it

impossible to construe

eral the self less,

as all causes are

The law posed to

up

taken abstractly

to

demand

indeed worth-

on the impersonal plane.

tautology all

sup-

our explanations only

But the

abstractly taken. It

is

its

is

when impersonally

repeat the problem.

controlling

in gen-

causation, always shuts us

taken. In such cases

self is

is

And

of the sufficient reason, which

barren

midst of

it.

self is

not to be

the living self in the

experiences, possessing, directing,

both

itself

and them

;

and

this

not open to the objection of barrenness

and worthlessness, being simply what we experience

when we

say

me

all

or mine. This self

THE FAILURE OF IMPERSONALISM

263

can never be more than verbally denied, and even

verbal deniers have always retained

its

The language

the fact.

of the personal life

would be impossible otherwise.

On

of these accounts, then,

all

that impersonalism

is

we

affirm

a failure whether in the

low form of materialistic mechanism or in the abstract form of idealistic notions, and that personality

is

the real and only principle of

philosophy which will enable us to take any rational step whatever. intellects

persons,

nor abstract

We

wills,

are not abstract

but we are living

knowing and feeling and having

vari-

ous interests, and in the light of knowledge

and under the impulse of our

interests trying

to find our way, having an order of experi-

ence also and seeking to understand

it

and

to guide ourselves so as to extend or enrich

that experience, into larger

sonal

and

and thus

fuller

to build ourselves

and more abundant per-

life.

The metaphysics

of impersonalism

tainly impossible, but

it

may be

is

cer-

objected that

PERSONALISM

264

personalism

Some

objection. tional

a

itself

least equal

open to at

is

of these have

become

and conventional, and seem

word

this

to call for

in passing.

In cruder thought the attempt

made

tradi-

to solve the

always

is

problem by picturing, and

ends by confounding the person with the

physical organism.

Of course

show that personality

The more

possible.

it

is

easy to

as thus conceived

is

im-

significant objections arise

from an abstract treatment of the subject and to construe personaHty as the out-

an attempt

come

of impersonal principles.

tion can

But

abstrac-

do nothing with the question, as the

indications of living experience are the only

source of knowledge in this matter. Personality

can never be construed as a product or

compound fact. It

;

tion.

ror it.

can only be experienced as a

must be possible because

Whenever we attempt

as actual. this fact

it

we are trying

We

to

it is

given

go behind

to explain the explana-

explain the objects before the mir-

by the images which seem There

is

nothing

to exist

behind

behind the mirror.

THE FAILURE OF IMPERSONALISM

When we sonal Hfe

265

have Hved and described the per-

we have done

all

that

sane and sober speculation, I£

more we only

fall

is

possible in

we

try to do

a prey to abstractions. This

self-conscious existence

is

the truly ultimate

fact.

Of course our human and

limitations

various

existence, with its its

temporal form,

readily lends itself to the thought that personality develops out of the impersonal. If

we should allow case, we should

this to still

be the fact in our own

have to admit that the

impersonal out of which our personality develops has already a coefficient of personality as the condition

of the development.

essentially impersonal can never cal

process other

by any

The logi-

than verbal hocus-pocus, all,

be made the

sufficient reason for a personal

development.

which

is

But our

not logical after

existence does not really abut on, or

spring out

of,

an impersonal background;

it

rather depends on the living will and purpose of the Creator. far as

we may

And

its

successive phases, so

use temporal language, are but

PERSONALISM

266

the form under which the Supreme Person

produces and maintains the personal

finite

spirit.

The son

Supreme Per-

objections to affirming a

Many

are largely verbal.

of

them

are

directed against a literal anthropomorphism.

This, of course, self

is

a

man

of straw.

Man

him-

in his essential personality is as unpic-

turable

and formless

as

God. Personality and

The

corporeality are incommensurable ideas. essential

meaning of personality

self-consciousness, self-control, to

is

selfhood,

and the power

know. These elements have no corporeal

significance or limitations.

Any

being, finite

or infinite, which has knowledge and self-consciousness

and

self-control, is personal

;

for the

term has no other meaning. Laying aside, then,

all

thought of corporeal form and

tation as being

must

no factor of personality, we

and perfect

per-

in the Infinite

and

really say that complete

sonality can be

found only

Absolute Being, as only in that complete

limi-

Him

can we find

and perfect selfhood and

self-

possession which are necessary to the fullness

THE FAILURE OF IMPERSONALISM

2G7

of personality. In thinking, then, of the Su-

preme Person we must beware of transferring to

him the Hmitations and accidents of our

human

personality,

which are no necessary

part of the notion of personality, and think

only of the fullness of power, knowledge, and selfhood which alone are the essential factors of the conception.

Thus impersonalism appears If

failure.

of

its

none.

we ask

for the positive foundation

basal conceptions,

They

are

as doubly a

we

find that there

empty forms of thought

which no

reality can be

and upon

criticism they vanish altogether.

we next ask what into

the

shown

is

to

to correspond, If

insight impersonalism gives

problems of

experience,

nothing but tautology and

infinite

we

find

regress.

Such a theory surely does not pay expenses.

The

alternative

is

personalism or nothing.

VI

THE PERSONAL WORLD One

great

difficulty

in

bringing

popular

thought to better philosophical insight

bondage

its

to sense objects.

Things that can

be seen and handled are preeminently there

is

real,

and

always a tendency to think that only

such things are it is

lies in

real.

exceedingly

idealistic

In this state of mind

difficult for

any doctrine of

type even to get a hearing, as

seems so plainly absurd. this obsession

may

Some

relief

it

from

be obtained by pointing

how large a proportion of our human life is even now invisible and impalpable. In this way the sense-bound mind may be made more out

hospitable to the thought of invisible and nonspatial existence in general.

First of

all,

we

ourselves are invisible.

physical organism

is

only an instrument for

expressing and manifesting the inner the living self

is

The

never seen.

life,

but

For each person

THE PERSONAL WORLD own

his

and

all

They in

self is

others

269

known in immediate experience are known through their effects.

are not revealed in form or shape, but

deeds,

and they are known only

through deeds. In

this respect

formless and invisible as

God

in

and

they are as himself,

and

that not merely in the sense of being out of sight,

but also in the sense of not lying within

the sphere of visibility in any way.

What

is

the shape of the spirit? or what the length

and breadth of the soul? These questions veal the absurdity of the notion without

re-

criti-

cism.

Indeed, the most familiar events of everyday life have their key and meaning only in the invisible.

If

we observe

moving along the

a

street,

number

of persons

and consider them

only under the laws of mechanics, and notice simply what

we can

see or

could report, the effect gree grotesque.

A kiss

is

what the camera

in the highest de-

or caress described in

anatomical terms of the points of contact and

muscles involved would not be worth having in

any

case,

and would be

unintelligible to

PERSONALISM

270

most of

us.

And

all

our physical attitudes

and movements seem quite ridiculous whenever

we

consider them in abstraction from their

personal meaning or the personal

them.

What

behind

life

could be more absurd than a

prayer described in physical terms of noise and attitude, apart

from the

religious

meaning?

Or what could be more opaque than a tion

descrip-

of a scientific experiment in terms of

bodies and instruments, apart from a know-

ledge of the problem and of the unseen persons

who

are trying to solve it?

But the gro-

tesqueness in these cases does not exist for us,

because we seldom abstract from our knowledge of personality so as to see simply what sense can give.

These physical forms we

re-

gard as persons who are going somewhere or are doing- somethino;. it all

as its

There

is

a thoug-ht behind

meaning and key, and

seems to us entirely familiar. invisible

so the matter

Thus out

of the

comes the meaning that transforms

the curious sets of motions into terms of personality

and gives them a human

significance.

Indeed, our estimate even of the body

itself

THE PERSONAL WORLD depends largely upon hidden

life

of the

its

connection with the

A

spiiit.

271

human form

as an

object in space, apart from our experience of it

as the instrument

life,

would have

when is

it is

and expression of personal

httle beauty or attraction

;

and

described in anatomical terms there

nothing in

it

we should

that

secret of its beauty

and value

desire

lies in

it.

The

the invis-

ible realm.

The same

is

true of literature. It does not

books or

exist in space or time or

but solely in the invisible and

libraries,

non-spatial

world of ideas and consciousness.

A person

looking for literature in a book or in a library

would hopelessly because

all

err

and

from the way,

stray

that can be found there would be

black marks on white paper and collections of these

bound together

would be

all

would not be

in various forms,

that eyes could see.

which

But

this

literature, for literature has its

existence only in

mind and

pression of mind, and

is

for

mind

as an ex-

simply impossible and

meaningless in abstraction from mind. Similarly

with history.

Our human

history never

272

PERSON ALISM

existed in space

and never could

some

visitor

so exist. If

from Mars should come

earth and look at

connection with get any hint of

that goes on in space in

all

human

beings, he would never

its real significance.

He would

be confined simply to integrations and pations of matter and motion. scribe the masses

the

to

He

dissi-

could de-

and groupings of material

all this

he would get no sugges-

tion of the inner life

which gives significance

things, but in

to

it

all.

As

conceivably a bird might

a telegraph

instrument and

aware of the

clicks

become

sit

on

fully

of the machine without

any suspicion of the meaning or existence of the message, or a dog could see

all

that eyes

can see in a book yet without any hint of

its

meaning, or a savage could gaze at the printed score of an opera without ever suspecting

its

musical import, so this supposed visitor would

by an impassable gulf

be absolutely cut

off

from the

and

history.

real seat

significance of

The great drama

and

dislikes, its loves

and

strivings,

and

of

life,

with

human its likes

hates, its ambitions

and manifold

ideas, inspirations,

THE PERSONAL WORLD and

aspirations,

is

absolutely foreign to space,

and could never be space.

273

in

any way discovered

So human history has

its

in

seat in the

invisible.

Similarly with government.

ment does not Congress. It all

society

wills,

is

is

The govern-

exist in state-houses or halls of

a relation of personal wills, as

likewise a relation of personal

with their background of conscious af-

fection, ideas,

and purposes.

den realm that

we

live,

It is in this hid-

and love or

hate,

Wars

or disobey, and live in peace or strife.

have not existed in space, and real

They

are in the unseen.

ideas, of aspirations, of all

obey

battlefields

are the conflicts of

mental tendencies, and

the fighting that ever took place in space

was but a symbol and expression of the inner unpicturable is

strife.

And

true of the whole

hate, desire

and

life

this illustrates

of man.

Love and

aspiration, exaltation

pression, the whole contents of short, are invisible,

and the

what

and

human

spatial is

de-

life,

in

merely

the means of expressing and localizing this

unpicturable

life

;

it

has only symbolical sig-

PERSONALISM

274

nificance for the deeper life behind

All

it.

Martian visitor would miss, that

this our

he would miss man and

history

his

is,

alto-

gether.

Thus we life is

now

said, not

in the invisible realm,

and

that, as

merely in the sense of being out of

but as somethins^ that does not admit

sisfht,

in

what a large extent human

see to

any way of being pictured.

spatial

but in

phenomena

as a

It

may

use

means of expression,

itself it is strictly

unpicturable.

for this great world of reality,

if

And

we must have

a whereabouts, we must say that not space but consciousness

is its seat.

These things belong

not to a space world, but to the world of consciousness,

This

is

which

is

something very

the seat of the great

of individual

life

and of human

different.

human drama history.

This

would be the case on any view of space whatever, but

it is

self-evidently the case

when we

view space as subjective, for then the world of consciousness becomes the seat of

all

worlds,

not merely the world of history and personal relations,

but also and equally the seat of the

THE PERSONAL WORLD

275

world of space appearance and the world of It will be noted, however, physical science.

way denies the reahty of the human world. It merely relocates it. That that this view in no

world remains

all

as real as ever.

that

it is

was before and

just

that

it

We

have simply discovered

is

not to be thought of in phenomenal

terms of space and time, but rather in terms of

itself, in

and

the incommensurable terms of

feeling,

and love and

and

or dejection, and hope larly the space

world

this general view.

hate,

is

We

life

and aspiration

despair, etc. Simi-

not

made unreal by

simply mean that

not a self-sufhcient something by

itself,

it is

but

is

rather a means of expression of the underly-

ing personal

life

which

is

the deepest and only

substantial fact.

The more we mysterious our tion.

on

We

dwell upon this view the more life

becomes for the imagina-

see that our Hfe

in the invisible,

now

actually goes

and that space has only a

symbolical function with respect to this hidden life.

We

impress ourselves upon the spatial

system and manifest our thought and purpose

PERSONALISM

276

in

and through

it

appear.

but the actors never

it,

man, the space

far as concerns

So

world has the ground of many of

minations in the invisible v^orld of

thought and purpose, and ing on more and more our

In

superscription.

space world

constantly tak-

human image and man the

relation to

its

by man

for realization

harvests waiting to

hand

human

largely a potentiality, waiting

is

to bloom, but

is

deter-

its

it

grow and

flowers waiting

cannot be until

to the work.

The

There are

himself.

man

sets his

and fauna

flora

of the

earth are increasingly taking their character

from our is

will

and purpose. Even climate itself

not independent of our doings or misdoings.

So far as we are concerned, the space world

is

nothing complete and finished in

is

forever becoming; that which

And when we

recognize our

we

itself,

but

will it to be.

own

invisibility

and the symbolical character of space

as only

a means of expressing our hidden thought

and

life,

we

find a

growing

the view that there

is

hospitality toward

a great invisible power

behind the space and time world as a whole,

THE PERSONAL WORLD which

is

cating

its

using

for expressing

it

277

and communi-

purpose.

Unless,

appearances are

then,

deceitful in this case,

no impotent annex cal system,

but

is

it is

unusually

man

plain that

to a self-sufficient

is

mechani-

rather a very significant fac-

tor in cosmic ongoings, at least in terrestrial

He

regions.

is

an inhabitant of the

invisible

world, and projects his thought and

life

the great space and time screen which

we

nature.

But naturalism,

age, misses

all this,

in

its

on call

sense bond-

and seeks for man

in the

picture world of space images, where, in the

nature of the case, he can never be. this initial blunder,

in the system,

first

man becomes a

less

With

and

less

phenomenon, then an

" epiphenomenon," and finally he tends to disappear altogether. Meanwhile matter and

motion go on integrating and dissipating as

^3f V^ remains a constant The whole history of thought con-

per schedule, and quantity. tains

A

no more grotesque inversion of reason. world of persons with a Supreme Per-

son at the head

is

the conception to which

we

PERSONALISM

278

come

as the result of our critical reflections.

The world ture

of space objects which

no substantial existence by

is

still less

we

itself,

and

a self-running system apart from in-

telligence,

but only the flowing expression

and means of communication of those sonal beings.

It is

per-

throughout dependent,

remains in the relation of these to the Absolute Spirit.

in-

But a problem

strumental, and phenomenal.

finite spirits

This problem also has

from an abstract treatment, which has

suffered led to

na-

call

many

pernicious errors.

Metaphysics shows that we cannot explain the existence and community of the

many

without affirming a fundamental reality which is

truly one,

and which produces and coordi-

nates the many. of the

many

When we ask

for the relation

to the one, the imagination tries

to solve the problem

by some quantitative

conception, as that the

many

are

made out

of

the one, or are included in the one, as the parts are included in the whole.

tudinous

by the

suo['o;'estions

The

multi-

of this kind are set aside

insight that these quantitative ideas

THE PERSONAL WORLD

279

are incompatible with the true unity o£ the one. Metaphysics shows that the fundamental reality stuff,

must be conceived not

an extended

as

but as an agent to which the notion of

divisibility

When we

has no application.

fur-

ther recall that this agent must be regarded as self-conscious intelligence, the untenability

of any quantitative conception becomes evident.

The conception

many

of the

as

self-

made

out of the one, or as resulting from any fission or self-diremption of the one, or as being the parts of the one, parts,"

—

is

—

its

"internally cherished

seen at once to be

an attempt of

the uncritical imagination to express an unpicturable problem of the reason in the picture

forms of the spatial fancy. tions are continued,

the unpicturable

When

we reach

these reflec-

the result that

many must be

conceived as

unpicturably depending on the unpicturable one.

This result has been perhorresced by

many

able thinkers in recent times as committing

us to a destructive and pernicious pantheism,

and they have taken refuge

in

an impossible

PERSONALISM

280

Some have gone so far as to hold that the many have always existed, as the only means of rescuing finite personality. But

pluralism.

surely this

bath.

is

throw the child out with the

to

The dangers against which

these think-

and

their perni-

indeed

ers protest are

cious character

is

real,

Vedanta

clearly seen in the

no reUef in

philosophy of India. But there

is

such a despairing pluralism.

The way out

must be sought

our

in a careful scrutiny of

terms and a resolute adherence to experience itself in its

would be easy

It

the finite

to fall into pantheism at

by emphasizing the dependence of

this point

in

form of transcendental empiricism.

spirit,

or

by taking that dependence

an abstract and absolute sense.

We

must

guard against this by observing that words here can never be adequately defined by the dictionary,

are

but only by carefully noting the facts they

meant

our life at

to express. all critically,

Now when we

we come upon two facts.

First,

we have thoughts and

tions

which are inahenably our own.

have a measure of

consider

feelings

and

voli-

We also

self-control, or the

power

THE PERSONAL WORLD

281

Here, then, we find in our

of self-direction.

experience a certain selfhood and a relative

This fact constitutes our per-

independence. sonality.

The second

fact

that

is

we cannot

regard ourselves as self-sufficient and inde-

pendent fact

is

in

that

any absolute

we cannot

And a

sense.

further

interpret our life with-

out admitting both of these facts, and that to

deny either lands us sense.

in contradiction

Now our independence

means

experienced limited self-control

pendence means just of self-sufficiency.

just that

and our

de-

experienced lack

that

How

;

and non-

these two aspects of

experience can be combined in the same being

we cannot

tell,

any more than we can

tell

how

freedom and uniformity can be united in the

same

beings.

nevertheless.

But we

find

It is only as

abstractly that

we

what they may be

them thus united

we take the

them contradictory

find

in reality

only from experience.

ideas

We

;

can be learned

have no insight

whatever into real possibility or impossibility

which

will enable us to

decide one

the other apart from experience.

way

or

The depend-

PERSONALISM

282

ence, then, of the finite spirit, in the sense

of

non-self-sufficiency, does not prove its

its

nothingness or unreahty ence, as said,

and

;

this

depend-

must be interpreted by the

and not by the dictionary.

It is

mean only what we

to

find

it

facts

permitted to

mean

in living

experience.

The pantheistic

view, on the other hand, has

The problem

insuperable difficulties. ledge, as

we have before

we maintain

and the

is

but that

That

all

things depend

things and thoughts and activities

is

unintelligible in the first place,

the next.

self-destructive in

should

insoluble except

a necessary affirmation of thought,

all

are divine

is

the freedom of both the finite

infinite spirit.

on God

and

seen,

of know-

know our thoughts and

That God

feelings

and

should perfectly understand and appreciate

them

is

quite intelligible, but that our thoughts

and feelings are

his in

any other sense

psychological contradiction. insist

If,

is

a

however, we

on so saying, then reason simply commits

suicide. It

is

God who

thinks and feels in our

thinking and feeling, and hence

it is

God who

THE PERSONAL WORLD blunders in our blundering and

and

stupidity,

Thus

our thinking.

made

all

God who

stupid incur

contradicts him-

the multitudinous inconsistencies of

in

self

it is

is

283

divine,

error, folly,

and

sin are

and reason and conscience as

having authority vanish. In addition to these unity

itself

difficulties

the divine

What is God's relation thoughts to God as thinking

disappears.

as thinking our

the absolute and perfect thought ?

Does he

become limited, confused, and blind in finite experience, and does he at the same time have

perfect insight in his infinite life ?

Does he

lose himself in the finite so as not to

what and who he

is,

haust himself in the all

there

?

is

But

or does he perhaps exfinite so that

if all

and

is

infinite,

does this illusion of the finite arise at

in that perfect unity is

the finite

the while he has per-

fect knowledofe of himself as one

how

know

and perfect

light ?

all

There

no answer to these questions so long as the

Infinite

game. lusions,

is

supposed to play both sides of the

We

have a

and an

series of

infinite

unaccountable

il-

playing hide and seek

PERSONALISM

284 •with itself in

fuddlement.

a most grotesque metaphysical

Such an

infinite is

nothing but

shadow of speculative delirium. These

the

difficulties

we seek

can never be escaped so long as

to identify the finite

Their mutual otherness

necessary

is

escape the destruction of

lation.

we are

to

life.^

equally

demanded

religious relation

which we

is

have next to consider. Pantheism ligion,

if

infinite.

thought and

all

This mutual otherness

by the moral and

and the

is

not a

re-

but an inconsistent philosophical specuReligfion

demands the mutual otherness

of the finite

and

tion of love

and obedience may

infinite, in

order that the relaobtain.

love and religion seek for union, but

Both

it is

not

the union of absorption or fusion, but rather the union of mutual understanding and sympathy, which would disappear of the persons were removed.

or desirable cation with

longing after

if

the otherness

Any intelligible God or identifi-

him would vanish

if

we should

" confound the persons."

The extravagant

language of mysticism on

this point is the

'

See Author's Metaphysics, revised edition,

p. 102.

THE PERSONAL WORLD expression of religious desire, and

be

is

never to

literally taken.

The metaphysical

relation of

itself

has no religious quality.

finite

things alike, and

plete lack of spiritual

as

285

it

is

dependence in

It applies to all

compatible with com-

sympathy and fellowship,

equally comprises both the

bad.

But while

relation,

it is

it

good and the

does not imply a religious

nevertheless a pre-condition of

There would be no religion in a world of sufficient beings. is

The

it.

self-

religious relation, then,

something superinduced upon the more gen-

eral relation of

dependence.

In general, the question of religion has a

much than

better standing in the intellectual world it

had years ago. The sensational

philo-

sophy long held that religion, as a late growth, is

to

be understood through

its

psychological

antecedents as a product of evolution.

Thus

was largely regarded as an adventitious excrescence upon human nature and without any

it

real significance for

held that

it

human

life,

and many

would be a decided gain for hu-

manity, and especially for the treasury,

if re-

PERSONALISM

286

ligion could be finally exorcised. In all this the essential

ambiguity of empirical and evolution

doctrine was completely overlooked, and

it

was

assumed as a matter of course that that which

was temporally

ment was the which

first in

psychological develop-

truly real, or the material out of

all later

developments were made. Ac-

cordingly, as the earlier phases of religion, like

the earlier phases of pretty crude,

all

things human, were

was supposed that these were

it

the true originals and essential meaning of

Now

religion.

all this

have come to see that

has passed away.

We

this historical study at

best could give only the order of temporal

development, without deciding whether there

was not some immanent law underlying the unfolding.

We

have equally come to see that

no development

is

possible without assuming

such a law, and that the true nature of a developing thing can be learned, not by looking at the crude beginnings,

but only by studying

the full unfolding of the finished product. If

we would know what consider

it

in its

intelligence

is,

we must

mighty works and not

in its

THE PERSONAL WORLD first,

blind gropings. So

what

religion

is,

if

we must

287

we would know

consider

it

in its

great historical manifestations, rather than in

the dim imaginings of undeveloped men.

On

all

these accounts religion has

be recognized as a great human

an invention of

humanity

fact. It is

priests or politicians, nor

unimportant annex of life, but in

come

itself.

Neither

it is is

it

to

not

an

deep rooted

something

that has significance only for the future life; for religion

is

clearly seen to

significance for this

life,

have profound

either for

good or

evil.

There are religions that debase and de-

file;

there are religions that industrially cripple

and

politically paralyze the people.

The

forces

make for evil or for obstruction have many cases incarnated themselves in the

that in

people's religion,

and there can be

little in-

dustrial progress, or social development, or political

improvement, until the grip of these

religions has been broken.

hand, religion

may be

And, on the other

a great source of pro-

gress, of illumination, of inspiration,

the

individual

and for

the

both for

people.

This

PERSONALISM

288

changed point of view

is

everywhere apparent

to one acquainted with the course of thought in the last twenty-five years. I never so fully

realized

it

before as I did at the World's Fair

in St. Louis. I attended there

an International

Congress of Arts and Sciences, the members of

which were scholars from ized world, fact that

and

I

all

over the

civil-

was greatly impressed by the

whenever religion was mentioned, or

whenever any question arose that indirectly bore

upon

it,

directly or

the references to re-

ligion were all of a friendly kind. It was taken

for granted as a great in

human

fact, as a fact

which human nature culminates, and as a

fact having the

same warrant as

other hu-

all

man facts.

It is to

therefore,

and with an open mind.

be studied sympathetically, This

is

indeed progress. It is

equally gratifying to note that the

Christian attitude also toward the non-Christian religions has greatly

changed

years. Christians themselves have

in understanding the truth

in recent

been slow

and glory of the

Gospel, the good news of God. For a long

THE PERSONAL WORLD time

it

was held that God was good only to

whom

those to

come, and that ally lost.

God

is

289

But

not

the Christian revelation had all

others were uncondition-

at last

we have

made good by

learned that

the Christian reve-

lation,

but only declared and shown to be

good

he has always been good

;

;

he has

always been the Father Almighty, ^nd has

always had purposes of grace concerning his children,

The

whether they knew him or not.

insufferable

blasphemy that condemned

the whole non-Christian world indiscriminately

has

utterly

disappeared

among

intelligent

The God who has been dealing past generations is the God of grace

Christians.

with

all

whom

our Lord has revealed, and they are

still

in his hands,

any

other.

whether in

Similarly, Christian

this

world or in

thought has changed

concerning the great outlying non-Christian

These

systems.

time to be

evil

also

were thought at one

and only

evil,

and without any

value whatever for their adherents. Accordingly,

it

was the fashion

to deride

and decry

PERSONALISM

290

these religions, to emphasize their shortcom-

ings and

faihires,

Christianity in

its

study has revealed

and

ideal form.

But further

how

all this

unjust

and now we have come great

oppose to tbem

to

was,

to believe that the

systems also had their

non-Christian

place in God's providential plan for men. possible to think of Confucius,

We

Men-

find

it

cius,

and Buddha, and many another

as veri-

Most High, and

as hav-

table prophets of the

ing done an important work for

whom

they wrought

;

among

the people

not indeed making

anything perfect, but preparing the way and

much

contributing

to the

organization and

development of the people. should not surprise, Christian, for

the Spirit is

is

we

still

less

this,

too,

offend,

any

are told that " a portion of

given to every man," that "there

man that comGod is no respec-

a light which lighteth every

eth into the world " that " ;

ter of persons,

accepted

but that in every nation he

God and worketh of him." With this

that feareth is

And

righteousness faith

and our

conviction that the world always has been in

THE PERSONAL WORLD the hands of God,

we

291

are not surprised but

rather delighted to find traces of divine guid-

ance and inspiration in other than Christian lands

and when we read the Sacred Books of

;

the East

Holy

we

rejoice to find indications of the

Spirit's presence.

This does not mean,

of course, that these systems are perfect or final;

far

on the contrary, criticism shows

from perfect they

are,

could build humanity into it

does

mean

that

God

how

and that they never its

best estate ; but

has not been absent

from the religious history of the

race,

and has

himself anywhere without a wit-

never

left

ness.

The sun does not envy

the stars, yet

they disappear in the brightness of

its

shin-

ing; so Christianity does not envy any of these lesser lights, but gathers all their

up into

itself

illumination so that they, too, disap-

pear in the brightness of

its

shining.

And

if

one should point to the aberrations of these other religions in disproof of this view, the

obvious remark

gone astray sinking

is

that Christianity itself has

in not a

now and then

few times and places, to as utter

supersti-

PERSONALISM

292

tion as could be

found in sorcery or incanta-

tion.

Any

one inclined to emphasize as decisive

the failure of the non-Christian religions to

reach their ideal might profitably reflect on the history of the Christian churches of west-

ern Asia and northeastern Africa, or on the religious rabble that gather

as restrained

by Turkish

and

fight, except

soldiery,

about the

church of the Holy Sepulchre. So, then, religion also experience,

is

and must receive

and interpretation

human

a fact of its

as belonging

recognition to

reality.

This fact preeminently leads to a personal conception of existence. Pantheism, as said, is

a philosophy rather than a religion, and

whenever

it is

held as a philosophy the need

of personality soon vindicates itself

form of polytheism.

We

by some

must now consider

the direction the normal development of religion

must

take.

Religion can begin with almost nothing,

but

it

can have a normal unfolding only un-

der appropriate conditions. Religion

is

no sim-

THE PERSONAL WORLD pie

and changeless thing, but

tion of our whole nature

and

it

293 is

a func-

varies with our

development. Intellect, heart, conscience, and will alike contribute to

our religious concep-

Hence when there

tions.

is

little

mental or

moral development the religious instinct can cling to a stick or a stone or

some low and

hideous animal.

But

lect is clarified

and conscience becomes reg-

as life unfolds

nant in our religious thinking,

it

and

then appears

that there are certain conditions that

be met by any religion that

is

to

the assent of developed humanity. all,

intel-

must

command First of

the object worshiped must be something

which said,

satisfies

when

As

the intellect.

intellect is asleep

I

have just

almost anything

can be made a religious object, but when tellect

done

is

its

awake and

work,

it

alert

in-

and thought has

then becomes impossible for

the intellect to worship any being lower than the Highest. fect,

and

When

Religion in idea aims at the per-

will

have the perfect or nothing.

our insight

ourselves with

is

scanty

we may content

very imperfect notions; but

PERSONALISM

294

when once

the larger vision comes, the older

conception must either be abandoned or must

be enlarged to meet the newer insight. This fact does

away with

flourish

only in the darkness of ignorance.

all

low superstitions

;

they

But when the mind has been nourished on the great truths of science, the great revelations of world study

sophical study,

mind

for that

it

and

historical

and

philo-

becomes simply impossible

to rest in

any of the forms of

polytheism and idolatry. Such a mind

make

the motions of religion for selfish or

other reasons, but

it

never really worships in

any temple where the god Highest. etc.,

No

may

And

if it

lower than the

is

be said that these images,

are but symbols, the answer

is

the same.

developed mind can find any worthy sym-

bol of the Hiofhest in animal forms and idolatrous rites and practices.

The

intellect stands

in such a temple either silent or scoffing, this is

and

equally true whether the temple be

Christian or non-Christian. Intellect has inalienable rights in religion

are not regarded, religion

is

;

its

and when they sure, sooner or

THE PERSONAL WORLD

295

later, to

grovel in abject and paralyzing super-

stition.

The

history of the Christian religion

furnishes abundant illustration.

And equally religious development must take the direction of affirming not only a supreme reason but also a supreme righteousness.

As

a matter of fact, humanity has been distressingly slow in uniting the ethical and religious

and

ideal,

historically there has

been a great

deal of religion that was either non-ethical or

immoral, the two factors, the religious and the ethical,

being brought into no

We

vital union.

see this in both the ethnic religions

and the

non-Christian universal religions, and

we

also

even in Christian lands.

people

who

seem to have

little

thought that their religion their conscience

and

should root and result in righteousness.

Mechanical devices of

ritual

and the

of verbal forms appear to be the religion.

in the

many and who

themselves to be really such,

makes any demands upon it

it

great

are nominally Christians

verily believe

that

A

see

They

differ

spirit of their

from other

repetition

sum of

their

idolaters, not

worship, but in the acci-

PERSONALISM

296

dent of

its

form. But there can be as genuine

idolatry with words

and phrases

or stone images. "

God

and in truth." " is

good

a

spirit,

;

He

wood

and they

him must worship him

that worship

what

is

as with

in spirit

hath showed thee,

man,

and what doth the Lord require

of thee, but to do justly, and to love kindness,

and

to

walk humbly with thy God ? " These

great words strike with

and

all

doom

all

immoral and mechanical

superstitions

religion. It is

manifest that nothing can claim to be the per-

which the religious and

ethi-

cal factors are not indissolubly blended.

The

fect religion in

failure to unite these

two factors

is

the great

source of the hideous and destructive aberrations that have defiled religious history

made many

and

religions the enemies of humanity.

All these must wither

away under the rebuk-

ing gaze of the develoj^ed

intellect

and con-

science.

And

not only must the object of worship

be supreme reason and supreme righteousness, it

must

also

be supreme goodness.

This

is

a

continuation of the somewhat negative con-

THE PERSONAL WORLD

297

ception of righteousness into the positive con-

ception of ethical love.

It is at

that

has

relisfious

short. If

thinkinsf

God is to be

this point

often est

come

of any religious value to

us and an object of real and adoring worship,

he must be supremely good.

This demand

has by no means always been understood,

and

in

consequence we find a kind of sub-

conscious effort in religious development to

God in connection with a world like this. The outlying religions have largely conceived God as indifferent and selfish. The gods of Epicurus were deaf or indifferent to human sorrow.

think a truly ethical thought about

The God

of philosophy has largely been of

the same sort, a kind of absolute metaphysical being, with

no active moral quality, or

moral at

an abstract and unreal way.

all,

Likewise the

in

God

if

of theology for a long time

hardly attained to any real active goodness,

such as the thought of ethical "love implies.

This God, too, was rather metaphysically conceived,

making

and

his holiness consisted

rules for

men and

mainly in

in punishing their

PERSONALISM

298

He

transgression.

was conceived largely after

the fashion of the medieval despot, and the

conception of any obligation on his part to

would have been looked upon

his creatures

almost as blasphemy. But to think

what

more

and profoundly

clearly

as to

demands, and with

love

ethical

now we have begun

thought the immoral,

selfish,

and

this

indifferent

gods have disappeared, and the God of theology, also, has been greatly modified.

We

see

that the law of love applies to

power as well

as to weakness, that the strong

ought to bear

the burdens of the weak and not to please

themselves

;

that the greatest of all must be

the servant of bearers.

and the chief of burden

all,

This insight has already wrought a

great change in our traditional theology, and

the end

is

not yet.

We

are

no longer con-

tent with an absolute being selfishly enjoying himself, or with a simply benevolent being

who

gives gifts to

Such a being

falls

men

at no cost to himself.

below the moral heroes of

our race, and even below the ordinary

woman who

live lives of

man and

devotion and sacri-

I

;

THE PERSONAL WORLD

We

fice.

299

cannot worship any being

below our human

of love

ideals

who

falls

and good-

ness.

but an extension of the same thought

It is

to

add that the

final religion

must be one that

has a worthy thought of man, and provides a

hun which

task for

will furnish the will

an adequate object and a supreme

We

with

inspiration.

might conceivably get along without any but when thought

religion,

is

once awake we

command our lives must be one which brings man also to his highest estate. We cannot believe in man without beUeving in God, and we cannot besee that a religion which

God without

lieve in

goodness did not

and

itself

and we

believing in man. God's

would disappear

mean our highest

our

if

to

is

life is

to

life

if

and blessing

end with the

are to be cast aside

the religion

visible scene

hke the worn-out

straw sandals of the coolies, then religion self collapses

God

is

;

the universe

a failure, too. It

on our part which It

is

is

is

not a

a failure,

it-

and

selfish interest

dictates thoughts like this.

rather the desire to think worthily of

PERSONALISM

300

God and

of his work,

we

so long as

and that

impossible

is

man

think worthily of

fail to

of his destiny in God's plan.

and

Here again the non-Christian largely

come short

:

religions have

they have not been able

to think consistently,

and

in

such a way as to

carry conviction, of the destiny of man.

and a

have wavered between annihilation

of undesirable existence, with

dreary round

no power to awe or Christianity

They

attract.

And

here again

a revelation of supreme signifi-

is

Looked

cance and magnificent audacity.

from the outside we are animals animals, having the

at

like the other

human form,

indeed, and

yet subject to the same general laws as the

animal world, pain, labor

—

birth

and death, hunger and

and weariness. But our Christian

faith holds that this

is

only the outward ap-

We

pearance, not the inward spiritual fact. are

now

the children of God,

yet appear what that

when he

we

shall

and

shall be,

life is

doth not

but we

know

appear we shall be like

him, for we shall see him as he

our

it

transformed.

is.

And

thus

We are not simply the

THE PERSONAL WORLD highest in the animal world,

more

image

it,

and

likewise,

more with him

to

and

made

go on forever-

made, as the old catechism

;

to glorify

God and

ever,

growing evermore

into

ever

to enjoy

him

into his likeness

for-

and

deepening sympathy and fellow-

ship with the eternal as

the unending years, until all

are also

essentially children of the Highest,

in his

had

we

301

the fullness of God."

Man

evolution.

is

we go on through we are " filled with This

making, he

is

is

the true

not yet

made. " All about

him shadow

still,

but, while the races flower

and

fade,

Prophet eyes

may

catch a glory slowly gaining on the

shade."

There

is

darkness enough in the valleys,

no doubt, but there hills

and a glow

is

in the

also a

gleam upon the

upper

air.

These are great dreams. dreams that speculation can

They

are

not

justify, neither

are they dreams that speculation can discredit.

They

are rooted in the spiritual nature

and

historical life of our race. If criticism denies

knowledge

it

equally overthrows unbelief, and

PERSONALISM

302

leaves all

room

for belief

if

This

folding- needs point that way.

This

service.

is

but a world of

and

religion

;

and

life

is

its

un-

no small

not a machine and dead world,

life

and

and personality and morals in such a world

it

is

per-

mitted to see visions and dream dreams, to

form

ideals

and

live in their inspiration,

and

beyond knowledge in obedience " high instincts " which have always to those been, and still remain, the " fountain hght " of to venture

all

our spiritual day.

Reference was made in the beginning to

Comte's doctrine of the three stages of human thought,

and the

— the

positive.

theological, the metaphysical,

Comte held

must disappear, and only the

first

two

remain.

He

that the last

was right as respects the abstract metaphysical, but we retain the other two. in respect to science,

We are positivists

and theologians

spects causation. This view conserves isfies all

field,

our essential

human

as re-

and

sat-

interests in this

and vacates a mass of impersonal

philo-

sophizing which criticism shows to be baseless,

THE PERSONAL WORLD

303

and which in experience has often proved

itself

be an enemy of humanity.

to

And now I wish, with for the repetition

it

expressions of apology

will involve, to consider

the practical bearing and application of personalism in dealing with our concrete problems.

The abstract method, with tions, has

its

resulting abstrac-

taken such hold of popular thinking

that no single exhortation will serve to root

it

out.

We

have again and again pointed out that

experience

is

first

thinking, and that

from experience to

it

we

and basal all

and must return

With this understanding,

see that science of the saner

type

is

in

ways of

and deeper

no way disturbed by our phenome-

We

know that there are ways of behavior among things, or being and happening among the facts

naUstic teaching.

various

and

theorizing must go out

as its basis,

for verification.

in all living

of experience, and that science has the function of investigating these, ing, describing,

guidance of

life.

and of discover-

and registering them for the This study can go on practi-

;

PERSONALISM

304

on the basis of any metaphysical scheme

cally

for even our metaphysics, while of use in un-

derstanding

make

life,

or modify

first lecture, if

agnostics

it

does not really in any

would not

of experience,

alter the

nihilists or

way

hang together

in

which

in the order

and would leave the

of life untouched.

way

pointed out in our

we should become

things actually do

work

As was

it.

practical

What would

really

follow in that case would be simply that

we could not

by

way

of speculation

but

life itself

and

their practical verifications in experience

would

still

with

its

interpret

life,

practical expectations

we should be practithan before. The only thing

remain, and

cally

no worse

that

is

off

forbidden by our general view

is sci-

ence as a dogmatic system, which, however,

is

not science, but merely a species of philosophy without foundation.

As was

said in treating of empiricism

and

apriorism, both doctrines leave a very impor-

tant question untouched, namely, whether the

order of

No

life

can be practically depended upon.

system of philosophy gives any answer to

THE PERSONAL WORLD this except a

305

dogmatic one, which simply mis-

takes the monotonies of dogmatic thinking for the fundamental laws of existence.

Our

view, therefore, leaves science in no worse plight

than

thought.

it

The

on any other scheme of

is

practical trustworthiness of hfe

be learned only from experience and

can

verified only in experience.

When

then our

affirmations respecting the order of nature

are far and permanently removed from any practical bearing,

they must become vague

and insecure. This insight must be regarded as a distinct advance in philosophical reflection.

Those dogmatic systems that deal with

the infinities and eternities never had any

proper foundation, as Kant taught us to

see,

and they were continual sources of theoretical onslaughts on the practical interests of It

At

is

life.

therefore something to be clear of them.

the same time

all fruitful practical

remains untouched. for the uniformities

science

We

may go on looking among things and events,

and applying the knowledge thus gained the control of

life,

with

all

to

practical confi-

PERSONALISM

306

Yet we must always remember that

dence.

the space and time world of phenomena roots in a mysterious world of power,

must therefore

refrain

and that we

from erecting our space

and time system into anything absolute and self-contained.

The

question of the warrant of knowledge

has never been conceived with perfect clearness.

The debate between

the empirical and

the apriori school has been carried on on the

assumption that the validity of knowledge

upon

absolutely depended

it.

This

is

only

partly true. There are two questions at issue

between these schools, idity of

knowledge

;

extent independent.

— the form, and the

and these two are

The

to

val-

some

empiricist seeks to

explain the subjective form of knowledge by

the

association

failure

is

of sensations, and here his

complete.

The

rationalist rightly

points out that the form of experience, even as mental fact its validity,

and without any reference

to

cannot be explained in this way.

Hume himself

could not account for this form

without assuming a very active " mental pro-

THE PERSONAL WORLD penslty to feign," that

307

without admitting

is,

Thus sensationahsm is cannot explain the form of know-

the rational nature. canceled

;

it

ledge and

still less

As between

the validity of knowledge.

But, unfortunately

side with the rationalists.

for our speculative peace,

the question of validity

is

turns out

it

;

for the apriori

doctrine itself has been used to appearances

Hume were far enough

so that

is

more nearly

is

a

weak faculty,

by way of speculation we can

is full

in

commonly recog-

Hume said that reason science.

Kant

of illusions

when

no knowledo^e or reason

Kant and

apart in their doctrine

metaphysics than

nized.

limiting

for

only.

of knowledge, but they agreed their

when

raised that the two

schools are not so far apart

knowledge

we must

the two schools, then,

attain to

said that the it

transcends

experience, so that a knowledge of things in

themselves, or other than appearances, ever denied to us.

But both

Hume

is

for-

and Kant

admitted that we cannot practically rest in this result,

but must

practical needs

and

fall

back on faith in the

interests of life.

Thus the

PERSONALISM

308

two men, who were antipodal

in their epistem-

ology, practically coincided in their metaphysics.

Again, Kant belabored Berkeley for his

subjective idealism, but here, too, the differ-

ence was rather epistemological than metaphysical

for Kant's

;

own

doctrine of pheno-

mena, when made consistent,

differs little

from

Berkeley's view. And, in general, as we have

do more than out-

seen, the apriorist can never line the general

forms of experience, without

giving any security for

and

But without

relations.

plain that to doubt,

concrete contents

its

knowledge

and

thus,

it

is

this security

it is

theoretically exposed

may be

said, skepticism

finally triumphs.

The answer

umph

is

that this

is

only a formal

of no practical significance.

versal skepticism

is

For a uni-

really none. It casts equal

doubt upon everything, and thus leaves beliefs in the

before.

same

The only

relation to

special doubt,

only dangerous skepticism

is

all

our

one another as

significant skepticism

which finds ground for

its

tri-

is

one

and the

one that discred-

the higher interests of our nature in the

THE PERSONAL WORLD name

of the lower.

But

to

309

doubt everything

doubt nothing. Such a doubt

is

practically to

is

only a question of the general trustworthi-

ness of hfe, and this question can be solved

only in living. Theoretically consistent,

and

practically

it

pretext for rejecting anything

it

is

always

in-

becomes only a

we

dislike.

For

the inferences that have been drawn from universal skepticism have generally been illogical

and

partisan.

One

tory of thought

is

of the

humors of the

the zeal with wdiich

his-

Hume's

doctrine has been played off against religion, in complete unconsciousness of the fact that

quite as effective against science.

it is

cases the true conclusion

speculation science ited,

But

;

we can

is

that

of

itself is discred-

we need not be concerned

terests,

by way

justify neither religion nor

but since speculation

life still

In both

remains with

at its failure.

all its

practical in-

and we are permitted to believe and

assume whatever this practical hf e may suggest or demand, and that without being molested

by

speculative philosophy. It

is

true that no-

thing can be speculatively justified, and just as

PERSONALISM

310

can anything be speculatively discredited.

little

Logic and reason being set aside as guides of our instincts remain and we

life,

them

if

we

As was we might even become

in metaphysics without belief or expectation.

may

live

by

pointed out in the

choose.

first lecture,

may

nihilists

changing any practical

For

life is as it is

and

well be worth living, whatever our meta-

physics ; and for

all

we can

say

life

may go on

through an indefinite variety of future forms, whatever our metaphysics. The fearsome con-

drawn by the skeptic are due

clusions

to the

attempt to reason after reason has been

dis-

credited.

We are

greatly helped in this matter

growing insight into the belief. cial

One

by the

practical nature of

of the superstitions of a superfi-

intellectualism has been the fancy that

belief should always

be the product of formal

logical processes. But, in fact, the great body

of our fundamental beliefs are not deductions

but rather formulations of life

has been the

o-reat

the constant test of

its

life.

Our

practical

source of belief and

practical validity, that

THE PERSONAL WORLD is,

of

its

truth.

Such

311

beliefs are less a set of

reasoued principles than a body of practical postulates life,

and customs which were born

which express

and

life,

in

which the fun-

in

damental interests and tendencies of the mind find expression

and recognition. In

the great organism of belief

grows out of

life itself.

It is

As soon

duct.

and

belief

that

it

is is

way

built up.

is

wrought out

action rather than in speculation, significance of

this

It

in

and has the

any other great natural proas

we bring the order

of life

under the notion of law, we see

has in a way cosmic significance.

It

no accident or whim of the individual, but

Thus the

rooted in the nature of things.

great catholic beliefs of humanity become expressions of reality of

itself,

and on any theory

knowledge they must be allowed

to stand,

unless there be some positive disproof. Their teleological nature

is

manifest.

They

are not

here for themselves, but for what they can help us

and

to.

They

are the expressions of life

also the instruments

itself.

This insight

is

by which

life realizes

a great advance upon

PERSONALISM

312

the method of rigor and vigor, which sought

formally to deduce whatever

At

last life

is

to be beheved.

and experience themselves are

in-

stalled as the great source of practical belief,

and we have

sufficiently recovered

from the

superstition of intellectualism to be able once

more and

to trust the order of life

spiritual instincts.

Science,

be

and our moral

we have before

classificatory

and

said,

descriptive,

must always

and can never

deal with the true causes and reasons of thing's. This,

we have pointed

out, is true even for

dynamical science, which many think gives the real agencies of the world.

It

should be added

as an implication of this fact, that the several sciences should deal with their various classes

of facts as they are given in experience, with-

out distorting them to other group. insc

What we

make them

fit

some

really desire is a deal-

with the facts in accordance with their

true nature, and not a wresting of the facts for

the sake of some all-inclusive generalization

which explains nothing. Oversight of the ative

rel-

and nominalistic nature of much of our

THE PERSONAL WORLD classification,

together with the unchastened

hankering after pleteness,

mind

to

is

313

totality

and systematic com-

perpetually leading the dogmatic

sweep

all

things together into some

vague but pretentious generalization which promises to

make

all

things one, but which

succeeds only by ignoring

all

the essential

characters of things.

This resolute adherence to experience

insisted upon.

In the mental realm

of such importance that

it.

In this realm

others there has been a tendency

all

to distort the facts, or to substitute else for

them.

paratively

little

work done

something

In fact there has been comproperly logical and scientific

in psychology.

A

truly scientific

procedure under the guidance of a logic

it is

we may be excused

for further dwelling upon

beyond

a

perfection which cannot be too

counsel of

much

is

would aim of course

psychological facts

to find

critical

what the

are without any admixture

of theory, and to determine their laws in their

own

terms.

This would give us at least the

psychological facts, and might also give us

PERSONALISM

314

some of the uniformities that obtain among them.

Unfortunately,

for

various

reasons,

another method has been largely followed.

The

result

is

that theories about the facts have

very largely been substituted for the facts, and various metaphors, drawn from the physical realm, have wrought no small damage. plain that language in this region

urative or metaphorical.

means of

We

must be

have no direct

by the use of physical

which never accurately represent the set forth as

the hope that others

mistaken for the

There

facts,

us.

But

figure itself

then confusion

really

but

facts, in

may understand

fact, is

figures,

symbols of the

when, as often happens, the

the door.

fig-

telling or describing our internal

states except

which we

It is

is

lieth at

no physical fact or

analogy that rightly represents any ual fact or process whatever.

intellect-

But by

identi-

fying the physical figure with the mental fact, it

becomes easy to mistake an exegesis of the

metaphor for a dealing with the

fact.

Thus

language has been a great source of aberration in psychology.

Another source of error closely

THE PERSONAL WORLD allied to this is the fact that

315

we tend

to think

of things under space forms and to substitute

This tendency

the body for the personality.

also serves to hide the mental facts

and when

in their true nature, it

it

is

from us finished

not infrequently bringeth forth materialism. of cerebral psychology serve

The mythologies

For errors of

as illustration.

sufBcient prescription

is

When

crete experience.

this

kind the

to adhere to the con-

the mental facts are

seen in their true nature, the impossibility of assimilating is

them

to

any kind of physical fact

at once obvious.

The same

prescription

must be observed in

dealing with the physical conditions of the

mental

life.

The

relations of

mind and body

can be described only in terms of concomitant

From an

variation.

causality between

physical

mental

states states,

states

are

There

is

inductive standpoint the

them

is

mutual; that

are accompanied

is,

by various

and conversely various mental

accompanied by physical

states.

a field here for study of these con-

comitant variations, a knowledge

of which

PERSONALISM

316

may have considerable practical value. But we must be equally careful here to confine ourselves to the data of experience

and not

proceed to romantic excesses of theory as has often been done.

A

misunderstanding of the

doctrine of the conservation of energy has led to

some very naive work on the part of psy-

chologists

and physicists aHke.

It

has been

we must never hold that the the body or that the body affects

thouofht that

mind

affects

the mind, because to do so would be to violate this great doctrine,

which

is

often mentioned

as the corner-stone of science. If

notion

in

earnest

it

we take

this

would imply that our

thoughts have nothing whatever to do with the control of our bodies, and that our physical conditions contain tal

states.

no reason for our men-

Of course the

scientific

doctrine

contains no warrant for any such romantic

nonsense as

this.

The

doctrine itself simply

af&rms a certain quantitative equivalence in the transformation of energy, and that only

on certain assumed conditions. tell us,

for instance, that there

It

does not

might not be

i

THE PERSONAL WORLD direction of our bodies from principle in interaction with

that to be decided

some

them

;

spiritual it

leaves

by experience. Within the

inorganic realm there

is

good reason for be-

lieving that this equivalence

thouo'h even here

317

is

maintained,

we must beware

of erectino^

the doctrine into an absolute principle. This

would be

to fall a prey to the uncritical dog-

matic desire for totality in the physical realm.

But whether our thoughts and purposes have any influence upon our physical

states is to

be determined by experience only, and in conducting experiments for deciding the matter almost any one cist. If

is

as wise as the wisest physi-

anything more than a small measure

of good sense were needed, sufficient evidence

would be found medical world

is

in the

now

emphasis which the

placing on mental states

as cause or cure of disease. Discounting, then,

the vagaries of continuity theorists,

look for such laws as we interaction of physical

make what

use

we can

may

discover for the

and mental of

we may

states,

them without

and

being-

disturbed by the conservation of energy. In

PERSONALISM

318

general we must maintain a somewhat agnostic attitude towards all speculation on this subject,

which goes beyond some few principles

which may be

verified in experience.

Such are

the laws of concomitant development, laws of habit, laws of health, laws of rest

and

repair,

general laws of the mutual influence of body

on mind and mind on body.

We

know

the

physical echoes the mental, and that the mental varies lie

open

with the physical. Laws of this kind

to investigation,

yond them

in the

way

but whatever

lies

be-

of abstract speculation

must be received with the utmost caution.

Not late is

to

form abstract theories but to formu-

and understand

the

first

and

must be done

last

this personal life of ours

duty of philosophy. This

in its

that this life as lived

motion is

is

nonsense.

own is

To

terms.

To

a case of matter and tell

us that this

explained by matter and motion

nonsense. This straction

is

is

life

equally

simply to introduce an ab-

from experience

of experience.

us

tell

We

as the explanation

must indeed be careful

recosmize the order of law which we

to

call na-

THE PERSONAL WORLD ture, it

319

but we must also be careful not to erect

into

any

self-sufficient existence or

on

own

power

account. For us

that does

thino['s

nature

only an order of uniformity, estab-

lished

is

its

and maintained by an

ever-acting Intelligence

and

ever-living

and Will. Nature

is

a function of the will and purpose of the everpresent God.

And this

uniformity, so far from

oppressing us or destroying our freedom, the absolute pre-supposition of

any freedom or rational

life

is

our having

whatever. It

is

a

fancy of dogmatic naturalism that a system of law shuts up everything to a rigid fixity

which can be modified only by irruption and violence

;

but this

is

true only for a fictitious

system, the product of the dogmatic imagination.

In actual experience we find an order

of law and

we

also find that order within cer-

tain limits pliable to our will

order of law

is

and aims. The

the one thing that founds

our control of nature, and by means of

we

many

things which

of law, left to itself,

would never

continue to bring to pass the system

it

accomplish. All machines of

human

invention

PERSONALISM

320

owe

their value to the order of law, but that

order alone would never have produced any

We

of them.

plant some wheels and shafting

at the foot of a waterfall,

gravity

grinding of flour, the lighting

looms, the of a city,

etc.,

have done

but gravity alone would never

The order

it.

position of after

and the force of

at our service for the driving of

is

it all,

of law

a pre-sup-

but we count for something

all.

This

is

the

way

the facts

and when we duly consider uniformity we

call

law

is

lie it

in

thought

itself,

in experience,

we

see that the

by no means incom-

patible with the self-direction

Even

is

we

call

freedom.

as we saw in

ing freedom, uniformity can as

little

discuss-

dispense

with freedom as freedom can dispense with uniformity.

The laws

of thought, which are

absolute uniformities of reason, do not insure right thinking without the self-control of the free spirit.

There

the laws, and there

is is

no no

without the self-control. life as

a whole

we

self-control without effective rationality

And

find the

in the

same fact

mental ;

there

THE PERSONAL WORLD

321

are laws which found self-control,

and there

is

self-control

which

realizes

itself

through

these laws. If there were no dependable order in our mental states, all self -direction, education,

mental development, mutual intercourse

would

cease.

When

it

comes to combination, the order of

law merely prescribes the outcome or ant of the component

factors. If

result-

magnets are

revolved under certain conditions, there will

be an electric current. If a lighted match be

touched to dry gunpowder, there explosion.

If a certain

given social conditions,

law it

is

will

will

be an

passed under

have certain

The consequences are at once uniform and conditional. The laws will apply consequences.

to all conditions scribe

how

if

they

arise,

but do not pre-

the conditions shall arise nor what

they shall be. In this respect they are hke the rules of grammar, which never

be

what

shall

said.

The system

is

said,

but only

how

it

tell

us-

shall

be

of law, then, as experienced,

no self-inclosed system, but one capable

of receiving modifications from without, yet

PERSONALISM

322

any violation of the laws. Thus for

•without

every believer in freedom there are mental states or acts

which cannot be deduced from

the antecedent mental states.

nature they

lie

beyond

By

their very

scientific explanation,

yet

when they have

to

the fundamental laws of mental action.

arisen they

become subject

So with our sensations, they cannot be deduced from the antecedent are excited from without.

state of

But

mind, but

after they

have

been excited they then combine according to certain

laws inherent in the nature of the

mind. Hence the integrity of the mental order does not consist in a self-inclosed continuity of mental states, but in the identity of the

mental laws which determine the combination

and succession of mental

produced.

The same must be

mical order.

Here, too, there

states,

however

said of the cosis

much which

cannot be explained by antecedent states of the system.

Human thought and purpose have

realized themselves in the physical world, and

have produced to itself,

effects

which the system,

left

would never have reached. But these

THE PERSONAL WORLD

323

interventions violate no laws of nature. effect

web

The

produced enters at once into the great

of law, and

is

combined with other

effects

common scheme. Hence

according to a

the

integrity of the cosmic order does not consist in

a self-in closed movement, but in the

subjection of

all its

factors to the

eral laws. It is only in

same gen-

this sense that

we

can speak of the continuity of nature. The continuity

is

not in any substantial something

called nature, but solely in the sameness of

the laws according to which nature istered,

realized

In the

is

and of the purpose which through strict

is

adminbeing

it.^

sense of the word, nothing what-

ever can be explained by the antecedent state of the system.

When we

have had experience

of the order the antecedents may often be such as to lead us to expect certain consequents,

but they are never such that we can deduce the consequents as any necessary implication.

Even the us,

familiar order of life

is

opaque

to

and we know not the ways of the power ^

See Author's Metaphysics, revised edition,

p.

267.

PERSONALISM

324

We

at work.

can as

little

phases from the earlier as later parts of all

powers

of real insight

is ;

first act.

going on in the

and

later

we can deduce

an opera from the

depends on what

ble world of

deduce the

It

invisi-

for even the

we must have

the

show

recourse either

to the empty notion of the " nature of things,"

or to the conception of purpose which

ing the power.

Temporal and

is

guid-

spatial antece-

dents explain nothing so long as we remain in the

phenomenal realm. Suppose two per-

sons of traditional ways of thinking, but one traditionally religious ally

irreligious,

and the other

tradition-

should discuss the question

whether a cold and rainy season, with resultant

bad crops, were a divine admonition lest

they forget.

They would

indefinitely over the

to

men,

wrangle

likely

adequacy or inadequacy

of the " antecedents," whereas the only real

question would be whether the event, taken in connection with all its circumstances, sug-

gested purpose on the part

of the

hidden

power.

Thus

I

have sought to explain and

illustrate

;

THE PERSONAL WORLD

325

what is meant by speaking of nature as a function of will and purpose, and to do it in such a

as shall conserve the interest of all sane

way

and sober science of the non-dogmatic type,

and

at the

same time provide for the higher

moral and spiritual interests of humanity. Nature

is

^M

not here for

its

V^ a constant

own

sake, or to keep

quantity.

must be sought

If

we

are in

cause of nature

a personal world, the final in the personal

and moral realm.

Criticism frees us from all the naturalistic night-

mares of necessity and a self-running material world, and allows us to trust our higher instincts once more. infinitely far

near,

and

in

God by the God who is infinitely whom we live and move and have But

our being.

for the practical realization

of this divine presence, logic

can do

little

any

character.

This

and concrete

real substance or controlling is

the case with

beliefs.

we may soon

and they vanish

and speculation

This behef must be lived

for us.

to acquire

tically

human

Philosophy replaces the

If

all practical

we ignore them

accost

them

prac-

skeptically

like a fading gleam.

Or we

PEKSONALISM

326

may

build

them into

life

and organize our

lives

around them, and they become " truths that

wake

to perish never."

ceive him, to

'^

To

as

many

them gives he power

the sons of God."

to

as re-

become

®be fiitoetisibe pre?? CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS .

U

.

S

.

A

THE IMMANENCE OF GOD BY

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A

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