PERSONALITY^GUIDED PSYCHOLOGY BOOK SERIES THEODORE MILLON, Series Editor Personality-Guided Therapy for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder George S. Everly Jr. and Jeffrey M. Lating Personality-Guided Therapy in Behavioral Medicine Robert G. Harper Personality-Guided Forensic Psychology Robert J. Craig Personality-Guided Relational Psychotherapy: A Unified Approach Jeffrey J. Magnavita Personality-Guided Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy Paul R. Rasmussen Personality-Guided Behavior Therapy Richard F. Farmer and Rosemery O. Nelson-Gray Personality-Guided Therapy for Depression Neil R. Bockian
Personality-Guided Therapy for Depression Neil R. Bockian
Series Editor Theodore Millon
AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSOCIATION
WASH I N G T O N ,
DC
Copyright © 2006 by the American Psychological Association. All rights reserved. Except as permitted under the United States Copyright Act of 1976, no part of this publication may be reproduced or distributed in any form or by any means, including, but not limited to, the process of scanning and digitization, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Published by American Psychological Association 750 First Street, NE Washington, DC 20002 www.apa.org To order APA Order Department P.O. Box 92984 Washington, DC 20090-2984 Tel: (800) 374-2721; Direct: (202) 336-5510 Fax: (202) 336-5502; TDD/TTY: (202) 336-6123 Online: www.apa.org/books/ E-mail:
[email protected] In the U.K., Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, copies may be ordered from American Psychological Association 3 Henrietta Street Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU England Typeset in Goudy by Stephen McDougal, Mechanicsville, MD Printer: Edwards Brothers, Ann Arbor, MI Cover Designer: Berg Design, Albany, NY Technical/Production Editor: Harriet Kaplan The opinions and statements published are the responsibility of the authors, and such opinions and statements do not necessarily represent the policies of the American Psychological Association. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Personality-guided therapy for depression / by Neil R. Bockian. p. cm. — (Personality-guided psychology) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-59147-410-8 (alk. paper) 1. Depression, Mental—Treatment. 2. Personality disorders—Treatment. I. Title. II. Series. RC537.B58 2006 616.85'2706—dc22 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A CIP record is available from the British Library. Printed in the United States of America First Edition
2005037362
Dedicated with love to my wife Martha— my personal antidepressant and my favorite personality type.
CONTENTS
Series Foreword
ix
Preface
xi
Acknowledgments
xiii
Chapter 1.
Introduction
3
Chapter 2.
An Overview of Depression and Theoretical Models of Its Relationship to Personality Disorders
13
Chapter 3.
Depression in Paranoid Personality Disorder
41
Chapter 4.
Depression in Schizoid Personality Disorder
63
Chapter 5.
Depression in Schizotypal Personality Disorder . . . .
91
Chapter 6.
Depression in Antisocial Personality Disorder
109
Chapter 7.
Depression in Borderline Personality Disorder
135
ChapterS.
Depression in Histrionic Personality Disorder
169
Chapter 9.
Depression in Narcissistic Personality Disorder . . . .
187
Chapter 10.
Depression in Avoidant Personality Disorder
209
Chapter 11.
Depression in Dependent Personality Disorder
227
Chapter 12.
Depression in Obsessive-Compulsive Personality Disorder
247
vu
Appendix A: Emotion List—2
267
Appendix B: Expression of Personality Disorders Across the Domains of Clinical Science
271
References
273
Author Index
305
Subject Index
313
About the Author
325
viii
CONTENTS
SERIES FOREWORD
The turn of the 20th century saw the emergence of psychological interest in the concept of individual differences, the recognition that the many realms of scientific study then in vogue displayed considerable variability among "laboratory subjects." Sir Francis Galton in Great Britain and many of his disciples, notably Charles Spearman in England, Alfred Binet in France, and James McKeen Cattell in the United States, laid the groundwork for recognizing that intelligence was a major element of import in what came to be called differential psychology. Largely through the influence of psychoanalytic thought, and then only indirectly, did this new field expand the topic of individual differences in the direction of character and personality. And so here we are at the dawn of the 21st century, ready to focus our attentions ever more seriously on the subject of personality trait differences and their impact on a wide variety of psychological subjects—how they impinge on behavioral medicine outcomes, alter gerontological and adolescent treatment, regulate residential care programs, affect the management of patients with depression and posttraumatic stress disorder, transform the style of cognitive—behavioral and interpersonal therapies, guide sophisticated forensic and correctional assessments—a whole bevy of important themes that typify where psychologists center their scientific and applied efforts today. It is toward the end of alerting psychologists who work in diverse areas of study and practice that the present series, entitled Personality-Guided Psychology, has been developed for publication by the American Psychological Association. The originating concept underlying the series may be traced to Henry Murray's seminal proposal in his 1938 volume, Explorations in Personality, in which he advanced a new field of study termed personology. It took its contemporary form in a work of mine, published in 1999 under the title Personality-Guided Therapy.
The utility and relevance of personality as a variable is spreading in all directions, and the series sets out to illustrate where things stand today. As will be evident as the series' publication progresses, the most prominent work at present is found with creative thinkers whose efforts are directed toward enhancing a more efficacious treatment of patients. We hope to demonstrate, further, some of the newer realms of application and research that lie just at the edge of scientific advances in our field. Thus, we trust that the volumes included in this series will help us look beyond the threshold of the present and toward the vast horizon that represents all of psychology. Fortunately, there is a growing awareness that personality variables can be a guiding factor in all spheres of study. We trust the series will provide a map of an open country that encourages innovative ventures and provides a foundation for investigators who wish to locate directions in which they themselves can assume leading roles. Theodore Millon, PhD, DSc Series Editor
SERIES FORWORD
PREFACE
The science and practice of clinical psychology have undergone a dramatic and exciting process of change in the past century. Following Freud's explorations of the unconscious, the dialectic swung to the antithesis, the behavioral revolution of Thorndike and Watson and, later on, Skinner. Filling in the vast space since then have been many approaches. Objectrelations theorists have examined the functioning of the ego, and interpersonal theorists have studied how relationships with others impact human psychology. Client-centered, humanistic, and existential therapists as well as logotherapists have focused on human experience and questions regarding life's meaning. Systems-oriented theorists have helped us to understand dyads, families, groups, and organizations and have developed new and innovative intervention strategies. Cognitive and rational—emotive therapists have discovered a wealth of techniques designed to help the individual use reasoning to feel better. With each new theoretical innovation, the discipline of clinical psychology has found new ways to be helpful and to reach more individuals. Efforts at integration have become increasingly important. There were theoretical manuscripts integrating, for example, individual and family approaches (e.g., Wachtel & Wachtel, 1986) or psychodynamic and behavioral approaches (Arkowitz & Messer, 1984). Millon's (1969/1985) biopsychosocial model makes the case that biological, psychological, and social factors contribute to a person's overall adaptation; this approach had a substantial impact on the field. Previous efforts at integration focused mostly on the level of theory— that is, the effort was to find commonalities in different theoretical approaches or to add the strengths of one to another. With Personality-Guided Therapy (1999), Millon added the notion that the best way to integrate theories was to focus at the level of the person. Simply put, psychodynamic, behavioral, cognitive, family, humanistic, and other theories can all be used to describe XI
a single individual. From that perspective, it becomes apparent that a given individual has unconscious conflicts and behavioral tendencies and cognitions and family dynamics and experiences of conditions of worth, all of which contribute to his or her current functioning. In line with the biopsychosocial perspective, it becomes equally obvious that biological and sociological phenomena also have a substantial impact on the person. The best available picture of an individual at any given moment is a collage of all of the concepts and images contributed by each perspective. The purpose of this book is to provide a comprehensive understanding of the person with clinical depression. By taking into account personality, as represented by the personality disorders in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text revision; American Psychiatric Association, ZOOOa), treatments for depression are refined and made more appropriate. Along the lines of the growing and healthy interest in positive psychology, we (the author and the series editor) are also mindful to take into account strengths and positive aspects of the person. From a scientific standpoint, we see this book as part of an ongoing process. There is a synergistic flow between clinical practice and science (Soldz & McCullough, 2000). Practice leads to insights that generate hypotheses to be tested scientifically; research then informs clinical practice (Anderson, 2000). Like the developers of process-experiential therapy (Elliott, 2000) and transference-focused psychotherapy (O. F. Kemberg, Selzer, Koenigsberg, Carr, & Appelbaum, 1989; Yeomans, Clarkin, & Kernberg, 2002), we envision practice and research mutually enhancing one another, leading to many confirmations—and just as many surprises—along the way. Ultimately, our goal is to operationalize the approach and test it in randomized clinical trials. In the meantime, we invite the reader to join us in exploring this promising new approach.
PREFACE
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I thank the many people who made this book a possibility. First and foremost, I thank the series editor, Theodore Millon, who asked me to write the book. Ted, your faith and confidence in me have consistently exceeded my expectations of myself and inspired my best work. The dedicated and talented editors in the American Psychological Association Books Department have done a wonderful job of shepherding this project to fruition: Susan Reynolds guided me through the opening phases, and Linda McCarter has been a steadfast support for some 2 years. I also thank several gifted clinicians, my former students Don Castaldi, Mark Johns, Suzanne Richter, Michelle Rodgers, and Kelly Vinehout, all of whom provided case material; their contributions considerably enhanced the quality of this volume. In addition, I thank the anonymous reviewers, who provided feedback that dramatically improved the quality of the book while simultaneously improving the economic welfare of the coffee industry. The librarians at the Illinois School of Professional Psychology Chicago Campus deserve high praise, especially Qi Chen, who added several books to the library collection at my behest, and Fay Kallista, who tirelessly tracked down articles and interlibrary loan materials. The members of the library staff at the Adler School of Professional Psychology, Karen Drescher, Arlene Krizanic, and Michael Zellner, also provided a number of articles, some of them on an expedited basis; to them I owe my thanks as well. Hundreds of current and former students have contributed to this book through their participation in my countertransference study, their completion of their clinical research projects in areas related to this work, their questions and comments in class, and their homework assignments; from them, I have learned more than can be imagined. I appreciate the efforts of my current students and future colleagues Julia Smith and Ellyn Turer, and of former student Virginia Doyle South, who provided feedback on the initial draft. In addition, I thank Danielle Merolla, Erica XIII
Moore, and Dominika Prus, who proved to be worthy assistants during the time-pressured final phase of preparing the manuscript. My parents, Fred and Sandra, and my uncle and aunt, Alan and Barbara Brodsky, provided encouragement, emotional support, and that most precious support of all—babysitting! Special thanks go to my brother Jeffrey for what must be the most memorable portion of my writing. When a longplanned vacation together bumped up against my first draft deadline, he adapted his SUV into a traveling office, and I wrote two full chapters on the round-trip drive between Los Angeles and Death Valley. I also thank my sister-in-law, Kari, who supported our dusty adventure. I am grateful to my wife, Martha, for taking on extra responsibilities while I wrote, despite her own rapidly burgeoning career and growing opportunities. Finally, I thank my beloved children, Chaya and Yaakov, who groaned each and every time I needed to work on the book and never became the slightest bit acclimated to my need for additional time; may we always yearn to spend our moments together.
xiv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Personality-Guided Therapy for Depression
1 INTRODUCTION
Depression is a thorny problem to treat. In many cases, treatment is ineffective from the start. Even when client and clinician meet with early success, relapse frequently follows. Given that millions of people suffer from the disorder, improving treatment for depression is a major priority. The premise of this book is that those individuals who have depression and either fail to make progress or experience relapse often do so because of deeply rooted, enduring patterns in numerous areas of their lives that conspire to undermine healthy and satisfactory adjustment. Personality shapes how the individual exists in the world. It is the riverbed upon which the person's emotional life flows. In order to change the direction of a complicated depression, one is well advised to intervene at the level of personality. More specifically, the very nature of the depression itself and the reason the person has become depressed is explicitly related to the individual's personality style or disorder. For example, where the person with a dependent style mourns being abandoned, the person with an antisocial personality configuration agonizes over feeling confined. Such considerations have implications for treatment. Intervention must not only address different issues but different communication styles. Thus the nurturing, supportive approach that would endear one to the dependent client would elicit denigration from the antisocial. 3
To be sure, as we have known for many years, many straightforward cases of depression are successfully treated in 20 sessions or fewer (A. T. Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). Such cases are not the focus of this volume; rather, my focus is those cases that have "complications" and are likely to either fail or to relapse. Research supports the commonsense notion that individuals who have both personality disorders (PDs) and depression have more problematic recoveries (Ilardi, Craighead, & Evans, 1997). This volume provides conceptual guidelines on how to be effective in these difficult cases. Depression is influenced by behavioral problems, such as poor social skills, as well as by beliefs of personal inadequacy and ineffectiveness. Unconscious phenomena such as repression or intrapsychic fragility can impact both mood and behavior. Most depressions also involve interpersonal problems, such as family difficulties, conflicts, or withdrawal. Biological predispositions often contribute to the difficulties of depression. Personality theory serves as an excellent conceptual framework through which to understand how these various factors interact synergistically to produce problems. Similarly, personality theory provides a framework to understand many strengths an individual has that facilitate long-term recovery. It is well known that PDs are also difficult to treat. They are, by definition, long-standing and deeply ingrained. A depression may make a PD more difficult to treat, particularly in the case of those with "internalizing" personality styles who tend to be hard on themselves or intropunitive (e.g., avoidant or obsessive—compulsive) or those who are already slow and passive (e.g., schizoid or dependent). On the other hand, depression may facilitate treatment among those with "externalizing" personality styles, who might otherwise be hesitant to engage in treatment (e.g., are narcissistic or antisocial). As with the notion presented above, that taking personality into account will facilitate the treatment of depression, 1 assert that taking depression into account can improve the treatment of PDs. The aim of this volume is to provide practitioners, researchers, and students with a theoretical framework from which to approach the individual who has depression embedded within the context of a particular PD or style. Because it is based on the integration of well-grounded approaches, the current volume provides ideas that will be useful for clinicians. I am equally hopeful that the text will provide fertile ground for testable hypotheses for researchers. Indeed, this volume marks one important step in an ongoing scientific journey. Eventually, personality-guided therapy must be subject to randomized clinical trials (RCTs) to determine whether it lives up to its promise of increasing success rates and reducing relapse rates of individuals with complicated depressions. This volume is a step toward developing a treatment that is defined with sufficient precision to be manualized and thus subject to RCTs. In addition to RCTs with manualized interventions, efficacy studies with naturalistic designs are necessary to see how the therapy functions in the "real world." 4
PERSONALITY-GUIDED THERAPY FOR DEPRESSION
THERAPIST EMOTIONAL REACTIONS: COUNTERTRANSFERENCE Although it is beyond the scope of this work to cover countertransference in a comprehensive manner, looking at all of the available literature (a project of that magnitude is worthy of a book in its own right), I will make some comments on therapist emotional reactions to people with each of the PDs. Rather than exhaustively review the literature, or leave out countertransference entirely, I have chosen to report some of my own experiences, an abbreviated review of the literature, and the findings of a research project that I have undertaken for the past 7 years. Although these findings are not yet published, there have been a few presentations based on these data (Agor, Smith, & Bockiari, 2005; Bockian, 2001, 2002a, 2002b), as well as several clinical research projects (Agor, 2005; Kim, 2004; Mullen, 2004; Rodgers, 2004; Rusten, 2002; D. L. Williams, 2005). In the study, graduate students in clinical psychology were shown film clips of individuals with PDs. They were then asked to rate their emotional reactions on the basis of a 136-item adjective checklist (see Appendix A). Participants in the study also gave descriptions of the meaning of the adjectives that they endorsed. The data I am reporting came from approximately 900 such forms collected from about 250 participants. Throughout the text, this study is referred to using the presentation in which the largest portion of the data was presented (Bockian, 2002a). For the purposes of this book, the most important finding is simply the mean of the participants' ratings of their emotional reactions to the film clips. However, it is noteworthy that manipulation checks suggest that the films are adequate prototypes of the PDs they are supposed to represent. Mean ratings of the prototypicality of the film clips, and how well they represent the PD they portray, are approximately 7.5 to 8.0 on a l-to-10 scale. The main drawbacks of the research paradigm are that (a) it is not clear how similar participants' reactions would be to real clients with whom they were interacting, as opposed to film clips; (b) it is not clear how their reactions would evolve over time, as opposed to seeing just a 5- to 10-minute segment of an intake session; and (c) it relies on conscious reports entered on a self-report instrument, thus banking on the self-awareness and accuracy of the participants. The main strength of the paradigm is that the stimulus is constant, so that reactions can be aggregated across clinicians. I routinely use two strategies to deal with feelings that I have toward clients, including positive feelings, but especially negative feelings. The first step is to become aware of the nature of the feeling itself. The emotional reaction typically occurs as a "felt sense" (Gendlin, 1978)—a vague, diffuse, nonverbal feeling. I also often experience a somatic response. Identifying these experiences and then labeling them ("oh—I'm bored!") is something I find to be useful, not only in recognizing the problematic pattern in the client (e.g., schizoid PD), but also in finding ways to "sit with my feelings." INTRODUCTION
5
The process of paying attention to one's own reactions is a useful exercise, one that can be conceptualized under the rubric of mindfulness (Epstein, 1995; Kabat-Zinn, 1990, 1994). Mindfulness, which is derived from the vipassana school of Buddhist meditation, is a form of self-awareness that can be practiced on a regular basis. For therapists, engaging in regular mindfulness practice is a way of managing one's personal stress while improving one's self-awareness (Bockian, 2001, 2002b). Once the feeling has been labeled, one can simply sit with it—sitting with unpleasant feelings has deep roots in mindfulness practice. One often finds that when one is "fully present in the moment" the discomfort itself dissipates. As a client of mine once put it, "When I'm rushing around, trying to run my business, I feel like I'm going to explode. But when I stop, and return to my breath, and focus on what's happening right now, it's never that bad." Thus, sitting with boredom, just for this moment, is never that bad. One can also explore the feelings using thought records, a technique taken straight out of cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT). Once practiced, it can be done during the session, while one is still paying attention to the client. This approach may be incompatible with a client-centered approach, or the mindfulness approach above, because it entails multitasking, and thus one is not fully present with the client. From a CBT perspective, however, I believe this would be an acceptable, and even encouraged, approach (see A. T. Beck, Freeman, 6k Davis, 2004; Ellis, 2001). As I thought about some bored feelings I had when watching a filmed simulation of a client (Fidler, 1989), I would reflect to myself, I'm feeling bored. What is the situation? He's talking about his dinner in response to the question about what he is thinking about. What is the thought connected to that boredom? He is answering my questions in ways that do not connect to other people. I don't really care about what he is going to have for dinner. 1 am interested in how he will plan his life out, what he will do now that he lost his job, and so on. I then become aware of another feeling, a slight feeling of irritation, connected to the thoughts "he should be planning out his future, he is wasting valuable time with the counselor, who is trying to do career planning with him." Once the thoughts and feelings are connected, they become rather easy to challenge. What is the client's understanding of the purpose of the sessions? Has he been educated appropriately about the reason for the referral? What does he need, from his perspective? Another direction I routinely go in when examining my emotional reactions is to imagine what it would feel like to be that person, dealing with someone who felt like I did. What if everyone—or many people—felt that way about him? What would it be like if others found me boring because I did not have intense reactions to things, or irritating because my responses were
PERSONALITY-GUIDED THERAPY FOR DEPRESSION
"off or inconsistent with expectations? Such thoughts tend to lead me toward a more empathic stance. I will then check out the validity of my assumptions by asking about his interactions with others and how others respond. Implicitly, then, I am suggesting that countertransference is generally extremely useful in helping clients. Of course, countertransference can also be so difficult to manage that it can damage the therapeutic relationship. In the chapters that follow, I outline some commonly reported countertransference reactions as well as some common pitfalls to avoid. PERSONALITY-GUIDED THERAPY Millon's personality-guided therapy (POT) approach is more than sequencing different therapies. The concept of catalytic and synergistic effects in therapy has important implications for treatment. The chapters of this book are organized to provide different approaches and findings based on theory-driven modalities. However, I hope to capture the essence of PGT in the case studies: simultaneous integration of the entirety of the person, including personality, diversity, and other unique factors, along with properly timed sequential interventions drawn from a variety of theoretical sources. From the standpoint of PGT, the treatment of PDs and depression does not constitute two separate processes. Within the medical model, on which the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text revision [DSM-IV-TR]; American Psychiatric Association, ZOOOa) is largely based, diseases can be separately diagnosed and treated. Thus, the individual with cancer and depression may receive radiation therapy for the cancer and pharmacotherapy for the depression, and the treatments may not react with one another. In PGT, the treatment of the PD tends to resolve the depression, and vice versa; the disorders are not truly separable. This becomes clear in many of the case studies. There is a fine example in chapter 6, in which the person has depression and antisocial PD. The client was depressed because of his hopelessness about ever being released from prison and because of his frequent placements in solitary confinement precipitated by his violent behavior. The intervention, in a sense, directly targeted the PD. The client needed to better understand his relationship to authority and how his conceptualizations overly constricted his options and choices, especially regarding his violent behavior. Once he became more in control of his violent behavior, he was no longer placed in solitary confinement, and his chances of release improved; consequently, his depression began to resolve. Treating "the depression" (e.g., with techniques that addressed typical depressogenic cognitions, such as assessments that he was worthless, "must" statements, and so on) would not have been effective, because such thoughts were too distant from the client's experience. The depression had to be treated in the INTRODUCTION
context of the person. Throughout the text, there are many sections in which I discuss methods for understanding and resolving PDs; the reader should be aware that these conceptualizations and interventions address, directly or indirectly, the individual's depression as well. The integration of well-established treatment modalities in a systematic fashion is one of the central features of PGT. In this regard, Millon (1996, 1999) has provided a guiding, comprehensive theoretical framework that integrates the work of most if not all of the major theoretical perspectives into a coherent system. It is reminiscent of the well-known Indian parable of the blind men investigating an elephant: One, grasping the leg, proclaims that the object is a tree; a second, feeling the trunk, declares it is a snake; a third, handling the tusk, believes that the elephant is a spear, and so on. The blind men then take to arguing among themselves about the true nature—or even the proper description—of the elephant (Saxe, 2002). The main point is that taken one by one, none of the descriptions adequately captures the nature of the elephant. The pointless squabbles that have permeated our discipline regarding "who is right"—psychodynamic versus behavioral perspectives being frequent competitors for this conceptual space—are, from this perspective, irresolvable. Both perspectives contain partial truths. Although highly innovative, perhaps even revolutionary in its comprehensiveness, the PGT approach has been implicit in graduate clinical psychology training. Whenever a question on a comprehensive examination has demanded that a student describe a case using more than one theoretical perspective for a client with a PD (i.e., the student could choose from among psychodynamic, client-centered, interpersonal, cognitive, family systems approaches, etc.), then an aspect of PGT was involved.
THE STATUS OF RESEARCH ON PERSONALITY-GUIDED THERAPY There is always tension about when to release scientific information. On the one hand, appropriate caution must be taken to show that a treatment has efficacy. On the other hand, to delay means that individuals who may benefit from a new treatment are denied that opportunity. PGT is a new treatment. Although its origins can be traced in various ways to Millon's writings over many years (e.g., Millon, 1969/1985, 1981, 1996), it was launched in 1999 with the publication of Millon's PersonalityGuided Therapy. To the extent that it is built on other approaches (such as cognitive-behavioral therapy, psychodynamic therapy, etc.), various aspects of the treatment are scientifically well established. It is fair to say that at this point, the treatment is in an exploratory phase, with a rich base of theory but with few empirical data. Case studies embedded in books on the topic are the only data extant that are specific to this approach (Everly & Lating, 2003; 8
PERSONALITY-GUIDED THERAPY FOR DEPRESSION
Farmer & Nelson-Gray, 2005; Harper, 2003; Magnavita, 2005; Millon, 1999; Rasmussen, 2005). Of course, as noted above, the long-term goal of the present endeavor is to lead to a manualized treatment with randomized clinical trials. Our approach is similar to that of Kernberg and his associates in the development of transference-focused psychotherapy. Initially, the group presented innovative treatment ideas based on psychodynamic theory and case material (O. F. Kernberg, Selzer, Koenigsberg, Carr, & Appelbaum, 1989). Later, the treatment was manualized (Yeomans, Clarkin, & Kernberg, 2002) and subjected to a randomized clinical trial (Clarkin, Levy, Lenzenweger, & Kernberg, 2004).
A NOTE ON MEDICATIONS A number of medications are available to treat depression; these interventions are addressed in chapter 2. PDs per se cannot be treated with medications. However, underlying dimensions, such as impulsivity and psychoticism, are amenable to medication treatment. Medications for the relevant PD will be discussed in each chapter (chaps. 3-12). One study merits consideration here, because it addressed a mixed sample that included various PDs; to avoid repetition, I review the study here and allude to it briefly throughout the text. Ekselius and von Knorring (1998) examined 400 participants with major depression whom they randomly assigned to treatment with one of two antidepressants, sertraline or citalopram, both SSRIs. A 24-week course of treatment was completed by 308 participants (i.e., 145 with sertraline, 163 with citalopram), of whom 189 (61%) had a concurrent PD. No other treatments were provided (e.g., no psychotherapy). The researchers examined 10 PDs: paranoid, schizotypal, schizoid, histrionic, narcissistic, borderline, avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive, and passive-aggressive, using a structured interview. The examiners reported that they excluded antisocial and self-defeating PDs, though they did not provide an explanation for this; they did not mention aggressive-sadistic PD. Although participants were randomly assigned the different medications, the study lacked a nontreatment control group. Because they used a structured interview pre- and posttreatment, the researchers had a dimensional measure (number of criteria met) and a categorical measure (whether the person had or did not have a disorder). In the sertraline group, there was a decrease in the number of PD criteria met for each one except schizoid. There was a decrease in the percentage of individuals diagnosed with PDs with both medications. In the sertraline group, paranoid, borderline, avoidant, dependent, and obsessive-compulsive PD criteria were less common posttreatment. (Schizoid diagnoses actually increased significantly, but this was accompanied by no significant change in number of criteria met, a finding that is admittedly difficult to reconcile.) In INTRODUCTION
9
the citalopram group, there were decreases in paranoid, histrionic, borderline, avoidant, dependent, and obsessive-compulsive diagnoses. Differences between the two medications were mostly nonsignificant, except that citalopram was superior to sertraline for obsessive-compulsive PD. Most other studies, which are reviewed in later chapters, looked at medication treatment for a single disorder. Ekselius and von Knorring's (1998) approach, to give a medication and measure the impact on a number of PDs, is somewhat more efficient, in that multiple comparisons can be made simultaneously (i.e., we can see that a medication has a positive effect on many PDs, with implications that a medication may be better for one disorder than another). The study is inconclusive, however, because there was no comparison group, so we do not know for sure what would have happened without treatment. Given the slow rate of spontaneous remission of PDs, and positive findings in controlled trials with SSRIs for borderline PD and social phobia (see chaps. 7 and 10, respectively), the most likely conclusion is that the medications had at least some effect. Effect size was not formally measured but appeared to be moderate. On average, there was a remission rate of approximately 25% ("any PD" went from 59.3% to 45.5% in the sertraline group and from 63.2% to 44.8% in the citalopram group). Remission rates exceeded 50% for borderline PD (either medication), dependent PD (either medication), and histrionic PD (citalopram). The decrease in the number of criteria met for each PD ranged from 0 to 1.3; the mean decrease was less than 0.5 for Cluster A, about 0.6 to 0.7 for Cluster B, and about 0.6 to 0.8 for Cluster C, depending on the medication. The largest change was for borderline PD (sertraline = -1.2; citalopram = -1.3). Using multivariate statistics, the authors illustrated that the decreases in PD symptoms were not a function of improvement in depressive symptoms. As will be illustrated throughout the remainder of this volume, however, medication research on PD populations constitutes a hodgepodge of case studies; open-label studies; and small, brief, randomized controlled trials. Although statistically significant effect sizes have been found with many medications for many problems associated with PDs, effect sizes are consistent with using medications in an adjunctive role. Noted Soloff (1997), Medication effects are modest, at best. GAS scores in the 1989 Soloff et al. haloperidol vs. amitriptyline trial improved 14 points, to an average of 55, in the most responsive group (HAL). Similarly, the average HAMD score fell from 26 to 16 in the HAL group, still symptomatic for most drug trials in depression, (p. 339) Even for borderline PD, which has been studied more than all other PDs combined, the research base is woefully inadequate (Soloff, 2000); how much more so for other PDs, many of which lack even a single empirical study? The lack of research on the use of medications for individuals with PDs is most unfortunate. Available studies suggest high rates of medication ]0
PERSONALJTY-G UIDED THERAPY FOR DEPRESSION
use in individuals with borderline PD (see Zanarini, 2004), and it is reasonable to speculate that individuals with other PDs also receive medication at rather high rates. The clinician should not complacently assume that medications that treat Axis I disorders are also beneficial for individuals with the Axis I condition in the context of a PD. A cautionary tale is the use of benzodiazepines and tricyclic antidepressants in the treatment of individuals with borderline PD; the limited available research suggests possible disinhibition and an iatrogenic increase in impulsive aggression following use of one or both of these classes of medications (see chap. 7). Understandably, studies that assess medications for their effect on depression usually exclude PD cases, but this strategy leaves us even deeper in the dark regarding the impact of antidepressants on individuals with a PD in conjunction with a depressive disorder. I join others in the field (e.g., Coccaro, 1998; Soloff, 2000) who have called for more research in the use of medications with individuals who have PDs.
THE STRUCTURE OF THIS VOLUME To develop an integrative understanding of depression and PDs, I first looked at the research on depression itself (chap. 2). Questions regarding the epidemiology as well as the effectiveness of current treatment modalities are explored. The chapter ends with a discussion of theoretical models of the relationship between PDs and depression; I implicitly draw on these models throughout the remainder of the text. Chapters 3 through 12 cover the relationship of depression to each of the 10 PDs of DSM-IV-TR. In each of these chapters, I begin with an illustration of the phenomenon, often drawn from the arts, film, or everyday experiences. Next, I cover theoretical and empirical material from a biopsychosocial perspective, leading to three major subsections. The biological section looks at hereditary factors, neuroanatomy, neurochemistry, and medications. The psychological section considers theoretical and empirical contributions from numerous important perspectives: psychodynamic, cognitive—behavioral, client-centered and humanistic, family systems, and group therapy, with a separate section on strengths-based conceptualization and intervention. The degree of coverage is based on the available literature, so some sections are brief or absent from some chapters. The social section includes considerations of diversity such as race and ethnicity, gender, socioeconomic status, and religion. Finally, a section on treatment planning, including a case example, illustrates the integration of the various perspectives into a personality-guided approach. The demographics of all case examples have been modified to protect the privacy of the clients. Many are composite cases, which combine elements of treatment for more than one client. At the end of the section on psychological approaches in chapters 3 through 12, I asked colleagues who contributed cases to share their insights INTRODUCTION
11
as well. I have integrated the findings of selected scientific studies and theoretical manuscripts. The studies were chosen because they are directly related either to depression or the specific PD under review. Because "countertransference" is conceptualized broadly for the present purposes (i.e., to include any emotional response of the therapist), it is included in its own section rather than subsumed within the psychodynamic area. It is beyond the scope of this book to look at PDs and depression in children. Some excellent resources are available in this regard. Paulina Kernberg and her associates have provided a well-reasoned approach with rich, illustrative case material (P. Kernberg, Weiner, & Bardenstein, 2000). In addition, the reader is directed to Stanley Greenspan's developmental, individual-difference, relationship-based model. Greenspan's approach to children, although developed in the context of autism, may have potential to treat children as early as infancy to prevent PDs, or to remediate PD symptoms in children. Greenspan noted how various kinds of rigidity in early childhood may "sow the seeds" for character pathology (1997, p. 322). Although these assumptions require further testing, I believe that Greenspan's approach has potential for any child who is tending toward a PD and urge the interested reader to examine one or more of Greenspan's writings (e.g., Greenspan, 1997; Greenspan & Wieder, 1998) and the Interdisciplinary Council on Developmental and Learning Disorders Web site (http:// www.icdl.com). Finally, Nadine Kaslow and her associates have done an excellent review on the status of various approaches to treating depression in children (Kaslow, McClure, & Connell, 2002). Each chapter is largely independent of the others. Chapters 3 through 12 are arranged alphabetically within each DSM-IV-TR PD cluster (i.e., Clusters A, B, and C). With the exception of the first two (i.e., this introduction and the overview of depression), concepts and data from which are woven throughout the book, the chapters draw content only minimally from one another. I recommend reading chapters 1 and 2 first, but thereafter chapters may be read in any order.
12
PERSONALITY-GUIDED THERAPY FOR DEPRESSION
2 AN OVERVIEW OF DEPRESSION AND THEORETICAL MODELS OF ITS RELATIONSHIP TO PERSONALITY DISORDERS
Before describing the personality-guided therapy (PGT) approach to treatment, it is important to review current theories of depression, as well as the various established treatment modalities and their efficacy. In this chapter I describe the phenomenology and epidemiology of depression; then 1 enumerate the relevant treatment approaches according to the biopsychosocial model. Biological theories focus on the role of the neurotransmitter norepinephrine (NE) and serotonin in depression, and treatments include pharmacotherapy and electroconvulsive therapy (ECT). The psychological theories and interventions section considers cognitive-behavioral, interpersonal, psychodynamic, family systems, and group approaches. The section on social concerns addresses issues of diversity, such as gender, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status in understanding the person with depression. Next, I review possible relationships between depression and personality disorders (PDs) as enumerated by theory. These models of relationships, which attempt to sort out the chicken-and-egg relationship between Axis II 13
and Axis I psychopathology, are potentially useful in both research and clinical settings. For the researcher, understanding the various possible Axis I-Axis II relationships (e.g., whether a PD generally precedes a depression, or the converse) is of obvious theoretical interest, having implications not only for treatment but also for developmental theory as well as for possible refinements in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text revision [DSM-IV-TR]; American Psychiatric Association, ZOOOa) taxonomy. Considering the possible relationships of depression to PDs (e.g., the possibility of lingering effects of one or the other disorder) may help the clinician to think more flexibly in understanding the client's perspective.
PHENOMENOLOGY OF DEPRESSION Depression, especially in its most severe form, can be an agonizing disorder. William Styron (1992) brought his literary genius to bear on the issue of his own depression in his memoir Darkness Visible. He noted, The argument I put forth was fairly straightforward: the pain of severe depression is quite unimaginable to those who have not suffered it, and it kills in many instances because its anguish can no longer be borne. The prevention of many suicides will continue to be hindered until there is a general awareness of the nature of this pain. Through the healing process of time—and through medical intervention or hospitalization in many cases—most people survive depression, which may be its only blessing; but to the tragic legion who are compelled to destroy themselves there should be no more reproof attached than to the victims of terminal cancer, (p. 33)
He later attempted to describe the nature of the pain itself: What 1 had begun to discover is that, mysteriously and in ways that are totally remote from normal experience, the gray drizzle of horror induced by depression takes on the quality of physical pain. But it is not an immediately identifiable pain, like that of a broken limb. It may be more accurate to say that despair, owing to some evil trick played upon the sick brain by the inhabiting psyche, comes to resemble the diabolical discomfort of being imprisoned in a fiercely overheated room. And because no breeze stirs this caldron, because there is no escape form this smothering confinement, it is entirely natural that the victim begin to think ceaselessly of oblivion, (p. 50)
Finally, in a memorable quote regarding suicidal ideation, he stated, Yet in truth, such hideous fantasies, which cause well people to shudder, are to the deeply depressed mind what lascivious daydreams are to persons of robust sexuality, (p. 53)
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PERSONALfTY-GL/IDED THERAPY FOR DEPRESSION
Although his rather supportive views on suicide are not likely to be widely shared in the mental health community—nor do I support them—Styron's compelling portrayal of major depression clearly conveys its agonizing quality. There are five forms of depression listed in DSM-IV-TR that differ in intensity; chronicity; and, to some degree, etiology. Major depression, the most severe form, is characterized by depressed mood much or all of the time as well as vegetative symptoms such as disturbance of sleep, appetite, and libido. Dysthymic disorder is similar to major depression but is of lesser intensity and is, typically, longer in chronicity. DSM-IV-TR requires a minimum of 2 years to make a diagnosis, though individuals can have the disorder for many years. Adjustment disorder with depressed mood indicates a reaction to an identifiable situation with depressed mood, in excess of what would be expected within a given culture. There are also two disorders in the appendix of DSMIV-TR, with criteria provided for research purposes. One is minor depression (similar to major depression but less severe), and the other is recurrent brief depression (with multiple depressive episodes that last from 2 to 13 days). The painful nature of depression is made all the more compelling when one considers its high frequency in the population. The problem of depression ripples out to families, businesses, and society at large. To understand the scope of the problem, the next step is to examine the frequency of the disorder; further, by looking at the financial cost of the problem, we can obtain a crude estimate of the overall impact of depression.
EPIDEMIOLOGY OF DEPRESSION The National Comorbidity Survey Replication (NCSR) used face-toface household surveys performed between February 2001 and April 2003. The nationally representative sample consisted of 9,282 English-speaking participants who were at least 18 years of age. In their sample, 16.6% had had major depression and 2.5% had had dysthymic disorder at some point in their lives. This translates into approximately 33 million people in the U.S. population who had experienced major depression, 6.6 million of whom had had major depression within the past year. Projecting out to the future, the researchers estimated that by age 75, 23.2% would have had major depression, and 3.4% would have had dysthymic disorder. The median age of onset for any mood disorder (including bipolar I and II, though these account for a relatively small proportion of those with mood disorders) is 30 years old, which is much older than that for anxiety disorders (11 years), substance use disorders (20 years), and impulse control disorders (11 years). Female gender and marital disruption are risk factors for major depression (Kessler, Berglund, Demler, Jin, & Walters, 2005).
AN OVERVIEW OF DEPRESSION
15
Depression rates appear to be rising. According to the original National Comorbidity Survey (NCS) conducted from 1990 to 1992 (Kessler, 1994), 15.8% of respondents met the criteria for major depression. It must be noted, however, that somewhat different criteria were used in the two studies, with the NCS using criteria from the revised third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III-R; American Psychiatric Association, 1987) and the NCSR using criteria from the fourth edition (DSMIV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Although the reported depression prevalence rates are quite high, Kessler et al. (2005) noted that the procedure used for the NCSR likely underestimated the actual prevalence of mental disorders. Interviews were done in a community setting, thereby eliminating some populations that are likely to have a high prevalence of disorders (e.g., the homeless or institutionalized). In addition, participants routinely underreport embarrassing behaviors. Lifetime prevalences were based on current risk factors; because the prevalence of mental illness is rising, it is likely that younger participants' lifetime risks were underestimated. The NCSR also demonstrated that depression is inadequately treated. The researchers found that only 56.8% of those with major depression and 67.5% of those with dysthymia received treatment of any kind; of those, only 37.5% (major depression) and 40.7% (dysthymia) received at least minimally adequate treatment (Wang, Lane, et al., 2005). Using evidence-based treatment guidelines, Wang, Lane, et al. (2005) defined minimally adequate treatment as appropriate medication prescription with at least four follow-up visits with a physician, or, for nonpsychotic patients, at least eight sessions with a psychiatrist or another mental health professional (e.g., a psychologist, social worker, or counselor). Overall, then, roughly three fourths of those who had depression did not receive even minimally adequate treatment. Those under the care of a mental health specialist (psychiatrist, psychologist, etc.) were far more likely to receive minimally adequate care than those under the care of a general medical doctor (52.0% vs. 14.9%). The comparable figures from the original NCS, which was conducted a decade earlier (1990-1992), indicate that only 45.8% received any treatment and that of these, 48.2% received minimally adequate treatment; thus, 78.2% failed to receive minimally adequate treatment for a mood disorder (Wang, Demler, & Kessler, 2002). Typically, there is a 6- to 8-year delay between the onset of symptoms and initiating treatment (Wang, Berglund, et al., 2005). For mental health disorders as a whole, there is a trend toward increasing treatment rates, but still only a minority of those with mental health problems receive services. In the 1980s, for example, estimates indicated that 19% of those with mental health disorders had received treatment in the past 12 months; the comparable figure was 25% in the 1990-1992 survey and 33% in the most recent survey, conducted in 2001-2003 (Wang, Berglund, et al., 2005). These disturbingly low figures are exacerbated when one con16
PERSONALITY-GUIDED THERAPY FOR DEPRESSION
siders that fewer than half of those treated received minimally adequate treatment; for example, in the most recent survey, treatment was minimally adequate for only 32.7% of those receiving care for a mental health condition. The most underserved are older adults, racial and ethnic minorities, people with low incomes, the uninsured, and those who live in rural areas. Wang, Lane, et al. (2005) concluded tersely, "Most people with mental disorders in the United States remain either untreated or poorly treated. Interventions are needed to enhance treatment initiation and quality" (p. 629). The estimated financial cost of depression as of 2000 totaled approximately $83 billion per year, an increase of nearly 8% from the 1990 estimate ($77 billion, inflation adjusted). The total figure for 2000 consisted of $26 billion (31%) for direct treatment expenses, $5 billion (7%) for costs associated with suicide, and a staggering $52 billion (62%) in workplace costs ($37 billion from absenteeism and $ 15 billion from reduced productivity while on the job; P. E. Greenberg et al., 2003). Even these enormous figures are an underestimate, because they do not account for accidents, turnover, or the impact on coworkers. Simulations have indicated that 45% to 90% of direct treatment costs are recovered in a single year through worker productivity gains; it is reasonable to expect that all of the treatment cost, or perhaps even more, could be recovered if a longer window were used (Kessler, 2002).
THEORIES OF DEPRESSION AND THEIR ASSOCIATED TREATMENTS How does a person become and remain depressed? And how does he or she recover? Biological, psychological, and social factors are essential in gaining a comprehensive understanding. Starting with the smallest unit of analysis, I explore biological factors such as neurochemical and neuroanatomical phenomena. Moving outward to a broader domain, I examine psychological aspects of depression, including intrapsychic and interpersonal manifestations. Finally, at the macro level, I integrate societal and cultural issues, such as gender role and ethnicity. Biological Factors There is a significant genetic component to depression. Sullivan et al. (cited in Wallace, Schneider, & McGuffin, 2002, pp. 174-175) conducted a review and meta-analysis of twin studies on major depression. Over 212,000 individuals were studied. Results indicated that 58% to 67% of the variance was attributable to specific environmental effects, 31% to 42% to genetic factors, and a mere 0% to 5% to shared environment among siblings. According to Thapar and McGuffin (cited in Wallace et al., 2002, p. 177), AN OVERVIEW OF DEPRESSION
17
heritability estimates (the degree to which a trait is inherited) 1 were higher (79%) for children and adolescents, which suggests that when depression starts early in life it may be a more biological condition. The largest and best available adoption study, by Wender et al. (cited in Wallace et al., 2002, p. 176), indicated a sevenfold higher likelihood of depression among those who were biologically related to a depressed person versus those who were not. A variety of biological factors are critical in depression. Under stress, NE becomes depleted, which has been associated with learned helplessness behaviors in animal studies (e.g., decreased exploratory and consummatory behaviors) and is believed to be related to learned helplessness cognitions in humans (e.g., powerlessness and hopelessness). Medications that directly enhance NE levels lead to improved functional efficiency. It is interesting to note that serotonin'enhancing medications (which do not directly effect NE) also enhance NE levels, suggesting that indirect interventions can help restore NE balance. Because of the popularity of SSRI medications, most psychologists are aware that serotonin (5-HT) depletion also increases depressive symptoms. The hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical (HPA) axis, which mediates human stress responses such as the fight—flight response (W. B. Cannon, 1915, 1929/1963) and the general adaptation syndrome (Selye, 1956/1978), is also implicated in depression. Sustained elevations in cortisol lead to impaired HPA feedback inhibition and can cause the death of cells in the hippocampus. In samples of depressed individuals, 40% to 60% have elevated levels of cortisol. Increased dopamine activity, which may be induced by excessive cortisol, appears to be crucial in cases of psychotic depression (Thase, Jindal, 6k Rowland, 2002). Excess cortisol is associated with increased severity of depression, weight loss, insomnia, and increased suicidality (Thase et al., 2002). Research has yet to determine, however, if these biochemical changes cause depression or are a result of it. It is probable that causality is complex and circular; it seems reasonable to assume that similar to the relationship between temperament and the development of PDs, biological predispositions interact with environmental circumstances, enhancing or initiating biological processes related to depression. In addition, if depleted NE and serotonin are sufficient to explain the occurrence of depression, then why do antidepressant medications take weeks to produce mood changes, even though neurotransmitter levels are increased within hours (Thase et al., 2002)? Although the mechanism of action of the medications described below is presented using explanations based on neurotransmitter theory, along the lines of standard psychopharmacology texts (e.g., Stahl, 1996), the reader should be aware that there are other, and at this point unknown, reasons for the efficacy of antidepressant medications. 'The most common metric, labeled h2, is based on the difference between the frequency of a trait in fraternal versus identical twins.
18
PERSONALITY^ HIDED THERAPY FOR DEPRESSION
Medications A variety of medications have been shown in double-blind studies to ameliorate depression, (e.g., I. M. Anderson, 1998; Rudolph, 2002; Storosum et at, 2001). Historically, the first antidepressant medications developed were monoamine oxidase inhibitors (MAOIs). Drugs formerly used to fight tuberculosis were found to have an unexpected antidepressant effect. Scientists then isolated the effective compound and formulated the medications specifically as antidepressants. This discovery led to the first biological theory of depression, the monoamine hypothesis. The theory was that depletion of monoamines leads to depression. This was supported not only by the action of MAOIs (which, as their name implies, block the action of monoamine oxidase, the enzyme that breaks down monoamines, a group of neurotransmitters that include serotonin and NE, and increase the availability of monoamines) but also by findings that drugs that reduced the amounts of monoamines lead to depression (Stahl, 1996, p. 112). MAOIs, then, work by blocking the action of (inhibiting) monoamine oxidase. With less monoamine oxidase breaking down monoamines, more monoamines are available to the neurons. This increase in monoamines, the theory indicates, decreases depression. Widely used MAOIs include phenelzine (Nardil) and tranylcypromine (Parnate). Tricyclic antidepressants (TCAs) are so named because the original medications had a three-ringed chemical structure. As with MAOIs, the antidepressant qualities of TCAs were discovered while they were being used to treat another disorder, in this case schizophrenia. Though the medication was ineffective for schizophrenia, clinicians noticed during the clinical trials that their patients were becoming less depressed. TCAs quickly became popular because they were effective and the side effects were not as troublesome as those of the MAOIs. Tricyclics are still widely used but are declining in popularity because SSRIs tend to have fewer side effects. Most TCAs are available in generic form and are relatively inexpensive, which can be a big advantage in some circumstances. TCAs work by blocking the action of the reuptake pump for serotonin and NE. Because the neurotransmitters are not reabsorbed by the neurons, they remain in the synapse, the space between neurons. (Neurotransmitters leave a neuron, enter the synapse, and potentially cause the next neuron to fire.) The extra neurotransmitters in the synapse, per the monoamine hypothesis, lead to a decrease in depression. Common tricyclic compounds include amitriptyline (Elavil), desipramine (Norpramin), doxepin (Sinequan), and imipramine (Tofranil). With SSRIs, the basic mechanism of action is to block the reuptake (reabsorption) of serotonin back into the neurons, thereby leaving more serotonin available in the synapse. As with TCAs, the increased availability of synaptic monoamines underlies the antidepressant effect. SSRIs and other newer antidepressants are generally used first because of their improved side-
AN OVERVIEW OF DEPRESSION
19
effect profile relative to the older TCAs. Commonly used SSRIs include citalopram (Celexa), fluoxetine (Prozac), paroxetine (Paxil), and sertraline (Zoloft). A number of relatively new antidepressants do not fit conveniently into any of the previous three categories (MAOI, TCA, or SSRI) and impact serotonin and NE through various mechanisms of action. Drugs in this "novel" category include amoxapine (Asendin), bupropion (Wellbutrin), maprotiline (Ludiomil), venlafaxine (Effexor), mirtazapine (Remeron), nefazodone (Serzone), and trazodone (Desyrel). Antidepressant medications have generally been found to have approximately equivalent effects on symptoms as short-term psychotherapy, with combinations of psychotherapy and antidepressant medications generally having somewhat improved efficacy (I. W. Miller & Keitner, 1996). For longterm relapse prevention, it is now known that long-term medication maintenance is often required (Gitlan, 2002). Antidepressants typically take several weeks to alleviate symptoms, although elevated levels of serotonin are available in the synaptic cleft within a few hours. Scientists have concluded that the effects of antidepressants occur as a function of complex interactions at the intracellular level. Thase et al. (2002) noted, "It is now clear that the synaptic effects of the TCAs, MAOIs, and newer antidepressants only serve to initiate a sequence or cascade of effects that culminate within cell nuclei, at the level of gene activity" (p. 201). A detailed explanation of mechanisms of action is beyond the scope of this review, but the curious reader is encouraged to peruse Stahl (1996) and Gitlan (2002). SSRIs are currently the frontline pharmacotherapy for depression in the United States. Their relatively benign side-effect profile and easy, usually once-daily, dosing encourages high compliance. Equally critical, and more so in some cases, SSRIs have much lower lethality than TCAs in overdose and are thus difficult to use as instruments of self-destruction. If one SSRI is ineffective or cannot be tolerated, most prescribers will switch to another SSRI and then, if necessary, to another drug class. The "novel" antidepressants all have different chemical structures, properties, and side-effect profiles; in essence, each is its own drug class. Some of these medications are sedating (e.g., nefaxedone and trazedone) and they may also encourage weight gain (e.g., mirtazepine), which can be therapeutic in cases that include insomnia and anorexia. The older tricyclic medications are rarely firstline medications because of unpleasant side effects (e.g., dry mouth, sedation, postural hypotension, weight gain, blurry vision, and constipation) and high lethality in overdose. They may be prescribed when cost is a consideration and, of course, when other medications have been ineffective. MAOIs are generally a third- or fourth-line treatment because of unpleasant side effects (e.g., weight gain, sexual problems, and insomnia) and dangerous interactions with foods that contain tyramine (e.g., wines and aged cheeses). Although better known 20
PERSONALITY-GUIDED THERAPY FOR DEPRESSION
for treating bipolar disorder, lithium can be useful in some cases of unipolar depression. It tends to be used rarely because of its narrow therapeutic window and its toxicity, and, thus, the requirement for routine blood work. Dysthymic disorder responds to medications in a way that is essentially identical to major depression, so the above considerations apply to both equally (Gitlan, 2002). Electroconvulsive Therapy ECT has been considered a safe and effective treatment for depression for nearly 2 decades (American Psychiatric Association, 1990; Enns & Reiss, 2001; National Institutes of Health, 1985; Pagnin, de Queiroz, Pini, & Cassano, 2004; UK ECT Review Group, 2003). Understandably, there are fears among some in the general public. The idea of passing an electrical current through the body can be frightening; further, popular depictions of the inappropriate use of ECT and images of the procedure prior to the introduction of adequate sedative medication may enhance the concerns of a potential beneficiary. Ken Kesey's One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest (1962/2002) and its extraordinarily popular film adaptation (Zaentz, Douglas, & Forman, 1975) portrayed ECT (without sedation) as a punishment—or even torture— used against a spirited and nonconforming patient. Such images may frighten potential patients who could benefit from an appropriate use of ECT. Psychoeducation for the client and, potentially, the family, is extremely important in cases in which ECT is the best option. Memory problems are the main side effects associated with treatment (American Psychiatric Association, 1990). For severe depressions in which several medications have been ineffective, ECT remains an important intervention. Summary and Conclusions Regarding Biological Factors Biological factors play an important role in depression. The disorder is heritable, and a number of biological models of depression have considerable scientific support. Nonetheless, those who argue that depression is a purely biological "disease" and that the best treatment is medication are flying in the face of a massive amount of data. Current scientific studies cannot validate any of the proposed biological models (e.g., serotonin depletion) as causes of depression; rather, they may be effects. As noted above, genetic studies have shown that nearly twice as much variance is accounted for by environmental factors as by genetic ones. Medication has not proved to be better than psychotherapy for treating depression; in fact, overall, studies seem to suggest that for all but the most severe depressions, psychotherapy has better efficacy (American Psychiatric Association, 2000b). Despite the existence of several classes of medications and several medications within most classes, approximately 35% to 40% of individuals do not respond to medication treatment. Data are fairly consistent with the commonsense hypothesis that psychotherapy and medications work synergistically (I. W. Miller & Keitner, AN OVERVIEW OF DEPRESSION
21
1996) and that long-term follow-up with medications and psychotherapy help prevent relapse, which is otherwise likely (Boland & Keller, 2002). Gitlan (2002), summarizing his review of psychopharmacological treatment of depression, concluded, Although antidepressants are consistently effective and the newer agents are safer and better tolerated than the older agents, the pharmacotherapy of depression still leaves much to be desired. As a first goal, it must be acknowledged that no antidepressant has been shown to be more effective than imipramine, the first agent released over 40 years ago. (p. 377) Psychological Factors Millon (1996) listed eight domains of functioning that should be considered when making a comprehensive psychological assessment, namely (a) expressive acts, (b) interpersonal conduct, (c) cognitive style, (d) selfimage, (e) object representations, (f) regulatory mechanisms, (g) morphological organization, and (h) mood and temperament. These domains roughly correspond to the major "orientations" within psychology. Expressive acts and cognitive style relate to the cognitive-behavioral school of thought. Interpersonal conduct is most closely associated with interpersonal and family systems thinking and interventions. Self-image—how one sees oneself—is relevant to all therapeutic schools of thought but is perhaps most closely associated with a client-centered approach. The next three domains are associated with psychodynamic thinking. Object representations relate to object relations theory, and regulatory mechanisms refer to Freud's ego defense mechanisms. Morphologic organization, which refers to psychic cohesion within the mind, is most closely associated with self psychology and the notion of fragmentation (Kohut, 1971, 1977; Wolfe, 1989). Finally, the mood and temperament domain refers primarily to the biological components of emotionality (mood) and personality traits (temperament). The psychology subsections of the remaining chapters in this volume cover Millon's domains, with some variations depending on the relevance to particular disorders. Of the eight domains, seven are psychological, and one is biophysical. Each of the psychological domains are considered with reference to cognitive-behavioral; client-centered, humanistic, experiential; psychodynamic; family systems; and group therapies. Below I discuss each in turn. Cognitive-Behavioral Conceptualization and Interventions Beck and his associates noted that depression is related to cognitive distortions (A. T. Beck et al, 1979). Cognitive distortions are styles of thinking that reliably produce problematic, depressogenic thoughts. For example, overgeneralization is the tendency to see one event as more representative than it really is (e.g., I'm incompetent at one thing, which means I'm incom22
PERSONALITY-GLTOED THERAPY FOR DEPRESS/ON
petent at everything). Dichotomous thinking, which is especially relevant to borderline PD, is the tendency to view everything in all-or-none terms (e.g., I'm either perfect or I'm worthless). Catastrophizing is the tendency to interpret events as being much more problematic than they really are (e.g., the student who becomes suicidal when she earns her first C; her thoughts may be, "Now I'll never get into graduate school, I'll never get a good job, and my parents will hate me"). When such thought patterns are corrected, then the depression tends to lift. Individuals with depression are likely to have a variety of depressogenic thoughts. Common thoughts among individuals with depression are, "If I try to do it, I'll just mess up"; "If I ask her out, she'll turn me down"; and "No one likes me." Underlying such automatic thoughts, especially for individuals with PDs, are core beliefs of helplessness, unlovability, and worthlessness (J. S. Beck, 2003). Often, feelings of worthlessness are reducible to one or both of the other two categories (e.g., I am worthless because I am incompetent and/or unlovable). Schemas of helplessness fit with Seligman's wellknown and well-established learned helplessness model, which can be conceptualized in a purely behavioral fashion (Seligman, 1975), and the reformulated version (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978), which includes helpless cognitions. In addition to the belief "I am helpless," clients may express this concept with beliefs of inadequacy, incompetence, and inferiority. The belief that one is unlovable relates to poor self-esteem and is clearly related to depressive thinking; typical core beliefs may include "I am unlovable," "I am ugly/undesirable," and "I am unwanted." A variety of behavioral interventions can also be helpful in alleviating depression. Communication skills training and assertiveness training can help clients to get their needs met more effectively. Linehan (1993) framed mindfulness meditation as a learned skill and made it a module in her dialectical behavior therapy program. In some cases, skills training can be used to help the person feel—and be—more competent, thus undermining feelings of helplessness. Physical exercise has been shown to relieve depression (Craft & Landers, 1998; Hays, 1999) and has obvious health benefits. The clinician, however, must suggest an exercise program very astutely or the chances of success are minimal. Unless the client neither watches television nor reads newspapers, he or she has undoubtedly been bombarded by messages about why we should all be exercising more. A generic, information-based approach about the benefits of exercise generally will not lead to behavior change. At best, a half-hearted "I know I should exercise more" will emerge; in such an instance, the therapist is risking being seen as an authority figure who is disappointed with the client's performance. Instead, it is essential to focus extensively on motivation. I generally do not even broach the subject of exercise for several sessions, sometimes many sessions. I like to see the depression lift partially so that I have some credibilAN OVERVIEW OF DEPRESSION
23
ity built up and motivation is not quite so difficult for the client to muster. When I do bring up exercise (unless the client does first), the discussion is embedded in the context of the client's goals. Perhaps the client's goal is to feel better, physically or emotionally (many are not aware that exercise has proven antidepressant effects, so psychoeducation can be helpful in such cases). Perhaps he or she has a goal of being healthier for another person. Often, weight loss is a goal. I have clients write down their goals and why exercise would help. Once the motivations are clear and adequate—if the motivation is not adequate, then we defer—then we can discuss specific strategies, such as the type of exercise and how that fits into the client's goals and needs. Prochaska's "stages of change" model (Prochaska et al., 1994) is extremely useful for assessing whether the client is ready for an exercise program. For the precontemplator who has no interest in an exercise program, the therapist can provide information that exercise helps depression lift and that at some point it would be useful to consider an exercise program. For the contemplator, more in-depth discussion can help the person to become aware that exercise may be worth it. During the preparation phase, one can develop specific strategies with the client, such as selecting the exercises to use, scheduling workouts, and discussing preference for exercising alone or with others. During the action phase, continued focus on motivation will remain important. Strategies such as making charts of progress toward a goal (e.g., losing a certain amount of weight or walking a certain number of miles) can be very motivating. Setting goals such as walking, running, or biking for a cause near to the person's heart can also be a great motivator; for example, setting a goal of completing a 5-mile walk for breast cancer can be motivating if the client knows someone who has or had the disease. There are books available for adjunctive bibliotherapy for exercise (e.g., Exercising Your Way to Better Mental Health, Leith, 1998; Move Your Body, Tone Your Mood: The Workout Therapy Workbook, Hays, 2002). Outcome data show clearly that cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) is effective. Over 80 research studies have shown that CBT is superior to placebo treatment, and it is superior to medications for all but the most severe depressions (American Psychiatric Association, 2000b). The Interpersonal Approach Coyne (1976) proposed an interactional model of depression. In contrast to work by psychodynamic theorists (e.g., Abraham 1911/1986; Freud, 1917/1986) and Beck's emerging cognitive theory (e.g., A. T. Beck, 1967), Coyne emphasized people's accurate perceptions rather than their distortions. He observed that depressed individuals have a tendency to seek reassurance. Initially, caring others in the environment wholeheartedly provide such reassurance. However, convinced that these individuals are responding
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PERSONALITY^ HIDED THERAPY FOR DEPRESSION
to his or her manipulations, the person with depression persists. Other people eventually become annoyed and send mixed messages; they provide comfort, but, in contrast to their prior, genuine encouragement, they are at least in part responding only to the demands for reassurance. A vicious circle ensues, in which demands for reassurance are met with increasing, but hidden and explicitly denied, annoyance on the part of the significant others while the person with depression becomes increasingly frustrated and perhaps hostile. As opposed to fantasized or early object loss, as emphasized by Freud, many people in the person's life are genuinely avoiding him or her in the present. If intervention occurs at this point, there is a mixture of cognitively distorted perceptions of worthlessness and accurate perceptions of real abandonment and insincerity within the depressed person's social network. The "excessive reassurance seeking" hypothesis has received research attention over the years and has generally been supported (Benazon, 2000; Coyne & Downey, 1991; Joiner, 1994; Potthoff, Holahan, & Joiner, 1995; Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, & Pelham, 1992). Similar to Coyne, and building on themes developed by Harry Stack Sullivan and other theorists, Gerald Klerman, Myrna Weissman, and their associates developed interpersonal psychotherapy (IPT) in the 1970s (Weissman & Markowitz, 2002) as a time-limited treatment for major depression. Outcome data for IPT have been impressive; the treatment has consistently been better than placebo, has been about as effective as cognitive-behavioral therapy for most clients, and has been more effective than CBT for more severely depressed patients (for a review, see Weissman 6k Markowitz, 2002). IPT uses an unabashedly medical model approach to treatment: "In IPT, depression is defined as a medical illness, a treatable condition that is not the patient's fault" (Weissman & Markowitz, 2002, p. 406). This approach helps to reduce guilt and feelings of inadequacy on the part of the patient and facilitates a natural alliance of client and therapist against the depressive symptoms. IPT focuses on interpersonal problems in the person's current life, such as complicated bereavement, role transitions, and interpersonal deficiencies. The therapeutic relationship is designed to be positive, optimistic, and collaborative. Relatively little transference distortion is elicited in this approach, and investigation of transference phenomena is not routinely part of the treatment. The IPT therapist assists clients in pursuing their interpersonal goals. Events in clients' lives are consistently linked to their mood and symptoms. Emotionally intense events in their interpersonal lives are reenacted and role-played, and options for making different kinds of choices are considered. The treatment is designed to be brief and typically takes approximately 12 to 16 sessions. Monthly follow-up sessions provide some protection against relapse, although Weissman and Markowitz (2002) suggested that biweekly relapse prevention sessions may be more effective and should be researched.
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Client-Centered, Humanistic, and Existential Therapy Process-experiential therapy (PET) helps individuals with depression by providing them with an opportunity to focus on their internal experience. The therapeutic relationship is characterized by empathic attunement and collaboration. Although the therapist and client collaborate on goals, the relationship issues are always considered primary. Noted L. S. Greenberg, Watson, and Goldman (1998), "A form of synchrony occurs where the experience of leading and following disappears in a collaborative flowing together, as in good dancing or improvisational jazz" (p. 234). L. S. Greenberg et al. (1998) described four markers of problematic experiential states that are useful in understanding and treating depression. The first is problematic reactions, or a feeling of being puzzled by one's own emotional or behavioral responses to situations. The second is an inability to get a clear sense of one's experience. The third is a split sense of self, in which one part of the self is critical of or coercive toward the other part. Finally, individuals with depression often have "unfinished business" related to an earlier part of their lives, usually involving themes of separation, loss, or other unresolved issues. The inability of a person to get in touch with his or her own experience is treated with empathic attunement and encouragement to focus on his or her experience. The felt sense (Gendlin, 1996) is often a key concept in this regard and refers to subtle emotional and bodily experiences that can be used as doorways to deeper aspects of the self. The felt sense is something that we all experience. A good example is "that feeling that I forgot something," which, if examined even superficially, is a bodily and cognitive experience integrating thoughts ("I forgot something" and "this is bad") with somatic phenomena (e.g., a tightening in the abdominal muscles and a churning feeling in the stomach). In individuals with depression, the felt sense that something is wrong can be explored, often leading to the uncovering of feelings and thoughts that have been deeply buried under years of neglect or the exploration of thoughts and feelings that were regarded as too frightening to consider. Splits in the self, such as the critical self that berates the bad self, can be integrated using "two chair" techniques. The critical self can speak to the "bad" self, which can then, by switching chairs, answer back. Typically, the critical self can be seen for what it is—a cruel, narrow-minded bully who does not take the full picture into account. The "bad" self, meanwhile, is generally the holder of kindness, softness, and compassion and is seen to have good qualities. As the split between good and bad becomes transmuted into a split between aspects of the self that are all necessary for a completely functioning individual, the path to reintegration has been paved. L. S. Greenberg et al. (1998) described the case of "Jan," a highly self-critical, perfectionistic, and depressed woman who had unfinished business around
26
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trying to please her mother. An initial reintegration occurred in rather dramatic fashion during a two-chair interaction: Therapist:
What do you want from her (to the critic) ? [Encouraging expression of need]
Client:
I want to feel I am OK. I want to be more like her, to feel more confident.
Therapist:
[Noticing a shift in her posture and face] What are you feeling now? [Facilitating negotiation]
Client:
1 feel that the two sides have suddenly merged. It is as if the stronger person came over here and sat with me and said you're OK. (p. 245)
Unfinished business, similarly, can often be addressed through "empty chair" techniques, in which the client addresses the individual who is no longer available. L. S. Greenberg et al. (1998) argued that PET benefits from looking at aspects specific to depression rather than maintaining a strict antilabeling stance: One might. . . question the need for a differential treatment of depression, given that a therapeutic relationship characterized by attitudes of positive regard and genuine concern, as well as a form of responding that is empathic and experience centered, is helpful for different types of problems and diagnostic groups. . . . We have observed both in practice and research contexts that, during treatment of depressed people, specific types of in-session problem states or markers of underlying determinants come up more often or with greater significance, and these are embedded within specific types of depressive themes. More specifically, we found that selfcritical splits, embedded within themes of failure and lack of self-esteem, and a variety of types of lingering unresolved feelings or unfinished business with significant others, embedded within themes of dependence and loss, characterize the in-session issues that formed the focus of our treatments of depression, (p. 229)
Congruent with cognitive therapy, L. S. Greenberg et al. (1998) observed that people with depression have beliefs that they are worthless, powerless, and bad and that they experience feelings of helplessness. As with Beck's notion of "core beliefs" that are activated by current experiences, L. S. Greenberg et al. noted, "In our model, the core depressogenic weak/bad self-scheme is activated by a current emotional experience of loss or failure" (p. 232); such a notion also relates to self-psychological notions that psychopathology emerges from a damaged sense of self. Similar to the interpersonal school, they noted that social disruptions and losses elicit depressive mood. PET differs from other approaches in its focus, like all humanistic and client-centered approaches, on the natural holistic and organismic aspects of the person. The therapist focuses not only on verbal and cognitive schemas but also on bodily
AN OVERVIEW OF DEPRESSION
27
sensations such as the felt sense of an experience and subtle emotional experiences that are difficult to label. The primary mode of intervention, which is to remain empathically attuned and promote the client's attention to his or her moment-to-moment experience, differs from other approaches. Research on humanistic psychotherapy for depression has been encouraging. There is a growing body of literature on PET. Elliott, Watson, Goldman, and Greenberg (2004) reviewed 18 research studies on PET, 6 of which addressed depression. All 6 of the studies reported a positive impact on depression, with effect sizes ranging from 0.50 to 2.49 standard deviations, which represent a medium to very large effect; the mean effect size is 1.36, which is large (see Cohen, 1988). To put these findings in perspective, a brief discussion of effect size is in order. Cohen (1988) noted that an effect size of 0.8 is sufficiently large to be obvious, such as the difference, for example, between the heights of 13- and 18-year-old girls. Seen another way, a difference of this magnitude indicates that 85% of those treated are better off than those who are untreated. Three of the studies were randomized trials comparing PET to other therapies (person-centered in two studies, CBT in the third). In all three cases, PET was superior to the other conditions (a mean difference of 0.38 standard deviations, a medium-sized difference). On the basis of these studies, PET qualifies as an empirically validated treatment for depression. Ward et al. (2000) conducted a fairly large (N = 464) randomized study of client-centered counseling, CBT, and routine physician care for depression. Participants were provided with 6 to 12 sessions of psychological treatment. The study demonstrated that both psychotherapies resulted in greater reductions in depressive symptoms and more rapid remissions in depression than routine physician care, but the therapies did not differ in effectiveness from one another. Psychodynamic Therapy Psychodynamic psychotherapy is the oldest form of psychological treatment, dating back approximately 100 years. In his essay "Mourning and Melancholia," Freud (1917/1986), in his astute manner, compared the phenomenon of normal grief to the state of melancholy that we now call depression. Before considering this comparison, it is worth noting that Freud's description of melancholia, which included feelings of dejection, poor self-esteem, loss of sex drive, and appetite and sleep disturbance, was in its essence identical to a description of major depression. In addition, Freud believed that some depressions were "constitutional" (biological) and did not abide by the psychic mechanisms he described. Freud noted that melancholia differed from grief primarily in the selfdenigration and self-esteem problems of the individual with this condition. Rather than arguing, as Aaron T. Beck did later (A. T. Beck et al., 1979), that such beliefs are irrational and problematic, Freud indicated that these self-attacking statements contain more than a grain of truth: 28
PERSONALITY-GUIDED THERAPY FOR DEPRESSION
He also seems to us justified in certain other self-accusations; it is merely that he has a keener eye for the truth than other people who are not melancholic. When in his heightened self-criticism he describes himself as petty, egoistic, dishonest, lacking in independence, one whose sole aim has been to hide the weaknesses of his own nature, it may be, so far as we know, that he has come pretty near to an understanding of himself; we only wonder why a man has to be ill before he can be accessible to a truth of this kind. (Freud, 1917/1986, p. 51) With this rather backhanded compliment, Freud thus anticipated the "depressive realism" hypothesis by many years. Freud then rioted, however, that the attack on the self is invariably an attack on others, which is then redirected toward the self. The wife who proclaims that she is unworthy and cannot imagine how her husband would stay with her is really indicating her anger toward her husband and suggesting that he is inadequate in some unspecified manner. Abraham (1911/1986) extended the argument, seeing depression as a combination of defenses against underlying sadistic hostility. He suggested that the conscious experience ("I hate myself) consists of hostile feelings transformed through projection ("I hate you" becomes "you hate me" and, finally, "you hate me because I am defective"). As he noted, "In every one of these cases it could be discovered that the disease proceeded from an attitude of hate which was paralysing the patient's capacity to love" (1911/1986, p. 36). Freud hypothesized, in a rather tentative manner, that the constellation of phenomena thus observed in depression pointed to a coherent developmental pattern. He suggested that the person experiences a loss of love. Rather than withdrawing libidinal energy and attaching it to a new object, the ego withdraws the libidinal energy into the self, the narcissistic ego. The energy is then used to form an identification between the ego and the lost object. This transformation, then, is regressive in its essence; specifically, the regression is to the oral-sadistic phase, in which the merger with the object is accomplished through incorporation. This explains not only the primitive aggression associated with depression but also the phenomenon of suicide. Because the individual is identified with the object of his rage, it is possible for him to consider his own, or "its" (i.e., the object's) destruction. As noted by Freud, It is this sadism alone that solves the riddle of the tendency to suicide which makes melancholia so interesting—and so dangerous. So immense is the ego's self-love, which we have come to recognize as the primal state from which instinctual life proceeds, and so vast is the amount of narcissistic libido which we see liberated in the fear that emerges to a threat to life, that we cannot conceive how that ego can consent to its own destruction. We have long known, it is true, that no neurotic harbours thoughts of suicide which he has not turned back upon himself from murderous impulses against others.... The analysis of melancholia now AN OVERVIEW OF DEPRESSION
29
shows that the ego can kill itself only if, owing to the return of the object cathexis, it can treat itself as an object—if it is able to direct against itself the hostility which relates to an object and which represents the ego's original reaction to the external world. (Freud, 1917/1986, pp. 56-57) Thus the blurred identification between the self and the object, which is a function of the regression to a very early stage of life, allows the self to become a target of "murderous," that is, self-destructive, impulses. Thus the themes of anger turned inward, and the precursors of the depressive realism hypothesis, are present in Freud's early work on depression. Unfortunately, the empirical data supporting the psychodynamic view of depression (e.g. group designs and controlled studies) are limited (Coyne, 1976; Hollon, Thase, & Markowitz, 2002). Nonetheless, the rich history of theory and case studies is a deep well of clinical wisdom and has strongly influenced the field. Family Systems Therapy The relationship between marital problems and depression is substantial. According to a meta-analysis by Whisman (cited in Beach 6k Jones, 2002, p. 423), the correlation between depression and marital quality was -.66. Family theorists generally focus on the bidirectional nature of causality, noting that depression creates stress in the relationship and stress worsens depression, thus setting off a downward spiral. There are well-established marital and family treatments for depression using behavioral marital therapy, cognitive—behavioral marital therapy, emotion-focused therapy, and insightoriented marital therapy (for a review, see Baucom, Shoam, Mueser, Daiuto, & Stickle, 1998). According to studies by Patterson and by Patterson, Reid, and Dishion (both cited in Beach & Jones, 2002, p. 426), parent management training is effective for childhood depression. Interpersonal therapy, reviewed above, has been modified for use with couples and is called "conjoint marital therapy" (see Foley, Rounsaville, Weissman, Sholomskas, & Chevron, cited in Beach & Jones, 2002, p. 428). Available evidence suggests that the effect of marital therapy on depression is equivalent to that of individual therapy (but no better); however, it reduces marital distress more than individual treatment (Beach 6k Jones, 2002). In studies in which marital distress was not an issue, marital therapy did not confer any measured advantage. Thus, the evidence is consistent with the commonsense conclusion that marital therapy should be used in cases in which there is marital distress as well as depression; if there is no marital distress, then in most cases it would be more convenient for the depressed person to enter individual treatment. Parent training decreases symptoms in depressed children and in depressed parents simultaneously. If parent-child relationships are contributing to family stress or depression, it is an important treatment. In addition, 30
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parent training may be a less threatening way to enter treatment for families in which there are both marital distress and parent-child problems (Beach & Jones, 2002). Group Therapy A meta-analysis of 48 studies of group psychotherapy (McDermut, Miller, & Brown, 2001) showed that group psychotherapy has a substantial impact on depression. The overall effect size of treatment is 1.03; that is, the treatment group, on average, had scores 1.03 standard deviations lower than corresponding control groups, which is a large effect size. The efficacy of group treatment of depression is comparable to that of psychotherapy in general (effect size = 0.68; M. L. Smith & Glass, 1977) and individual psychotherapy for depression (effect size = 1.22; Steinbrueck, Maxwell, & Howard, 1983). CBT (e.g., Kush, 2000; Peterson & Halstead, 1998; Pidlubny, 2002) and IPT (see Klier, Muzik, Rosenblum, & Lenz, 2001; MacKenzie, 2001) have been adapted to group modalities. It is most likely that a combination of factors within the group process combine to reduce depression. Individuals can acquire new skills, such as assertiveness or problem solving, which can help them function more effectively. Cognitive-behavioral groups help clients learn to challenge their irrational or distorted beliefs. Process-oriented groups help the person to confront relationship issues in the here-and-now, a very powerful form of learning. Other available group therapies for depression include multimodal therapy (Rice, 1995), narrative therapy (Laube & Trefz, 1994) and reminiscence therapy (Bachar, Kindler, Schefler, & Lerer, 1991). Few comparisons have been performed contrasting different types of therapy. One study (Hogg & Deffenbacher, 1988) found that process group therapy and CBT were equally effective in reducing depression, and no differences were found in mechanisms of action. Group therapy has several advantages relative to individual therapy. In skills-training groups, there are opportunities to practice with peers rather than just with the therapist. In addition, during the presentation of new information, others in the group may think to ask questions that an individual may not have thought to ask. In process groups, opportunities arise that cannot occur in individual therapy, such as feedback from multiple individuals simultaneously. Perhaps the primary advantage of group psychotherapy is that it provides similar efficacy at a lower cost. Estimates suggest that group psychotherapy saves 25% to 92% of the cost of care relative to individual therapy, depending on the size of the group (see McDermut et al, 2001). Of course, group therapy is not always preferable. Individual treatment offers greater privacy, which may allow some clients to open up more. It also may help to prepare clients for group treatment. Although McDermut et al. (2001) concluded, logically, that group therapy should be the frontline treatment for depression on the basis of cost considerations, for clients with PDs exactly the reverse may be true. Many individuals with personality disorders AN OVERVIEW OF DEPRESSION
3]
are not ready for group treatment until their symptoms have partially remitted. For example, clients with paranoid and avoidant PD are often too interpersonally defensive and uncomfortable to function in a group; some individuals with narcissistic PD are unable to share attention with other group members; some individuals with schizotypal PD would come across as so strange that the group would reject them, furthering their depression. For many individuals with PDs and depression, the appropriate course of action is to provide individual treatment first; group treatment can then be used to make further progress on interpersonal and intrapsychic material. Group treatment can also be a relatively low-cost way to continue treatment for clients who require long-term work.
SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND DIVERSITY Epidemiological studies in different countries have found large differences in prevalence of depression; presumably, these differences are at least partially due to differences in culture. At the times the surveys were done, depression ranged from a high of 19.0% in Lebanon to a low of 1.5% in Taiwan. The United States is intermediate, with different prevalences found in the NCS (Kessler, 1994), which surveyed participants from 1990 to 1992, and the Epidemiological Catchment Area study (Weissman, Bruce, Leaf, Florio & Holzer, 1991), which surveyed participants from 1980 to 1984. There were differences in methodology that may account for some of the differences in the findings. The NCS had a larger and more representative sample, used DSM-IV rather than DSM-IIJ-R criteria, and investigated more extensively for indications of depression than did the Epidemiological Catchment Area study. It could also be, however, that the prevalence of depression in the United States increased during the decade or so that separated the surveys. One finding that is fairly consistent is that Asian countries, such as China, japan, and Taiwan, have lower rates of depression than Western countries such as the United States, Canada, and Germany. Differences in social support may play a large role in these variances; Western culture, with its emphasis on individualism, may produce more isolation and loneliness than Eastern sociocentric cultures. In addition, Eastern cultures tend to make less of a distinction between mind and body than Western cultures; thus, what may emerge as depression in the West could be a somatic or somatization disorder in the East. Ethnographic approaches reveal a number of depression-like syndromes in other cultures that may have vastly different meanings than those attributed in the United States. For example, pena in highland Ecuador is associated with many symptoms of depression, such as "crying spells, poor concentration, anhedonia, social withdrawal, poor personal hygiene, sleep and 32
PERSONALITY-GUIDED THERAPY FOR DEPRESSION
appetite disturbance, gastrointestinal complaints, and heart pain" (Tsai &. Chentsova-Dutton, 2002, p. 470). Personal loss is generally the precipitant of pena, as it often is with depression. However, according to Tousignant and Maldonaldo (cited in Tsai & Chentsova-Dutton, 2002), pena is an appeal for payment or social reciprocity, for the incurred loss. Unlike depression in the United States, which is viewed as individual psychopathology, pena is part of the social balance in highland Ecuador. Similarly, in New Guinea, the Kaluli people are highly emotionally expressive. Grief reactions, akin to what we might view as sadness or depression in the United States, are integrated into the culture through ceremonies, rituals, and "scripted" social interactions. These expressions then become part of the social negotiations within the culture, which help individuals to get their needs met. This appears to have a strong protective effect against depression in that culture (Scheflielin, cited in Tsai & Chentsova-Dutton, 2002, pp. 469-70). As Castillo (1997) observed, In a society with dominance hierarchies, individuals at the low end of the social scale have a stigma or impaired identity imposed upon them by dominant groups. The moral career of these stigmatized individuals is compromised in interpersonal relations. The term moral career refers simultaneously to the moral status and the morale of the individual. The moral status of individuals is an indication of their perceived value in society—that is, whether they are "good" or "bad" persons as judged by the cultural definitions of morality within the context of the social dominance hierarchy. . . . When moral status is compromised in this fashion, the individual's morale or sense of self-esteem can also be negatively affected. (Goffman, 1963, p. 42)
The consequences of stigmatization fit in well with Abramson et al.'s (1978) revised learned helplessness model. The consequences of being the "wrong" race, gender, ethnicity, social class, religion, or sexual orientation are often internalized by individuals as a feeling or belief that in fact there is something wrong with them. Because these demographic characteristics are immutable or difficult to change and impact a many areas of their lives, they see their predicament as stable and global (Castillo, 1998). Thus, individuals from stigmatized or disadvantaged groups are generally more prone to depression. There is a powerful argument that the traditional social roles of women, as described, for example, by J. H. Williams (1987) and Skeggs (1997), have a significant impact on depression. Because of women's traditionally subordinate role in our culture, they are more prone to anxiety, depression, and feelings of helplessness than men. Similarly, submissiveness and fear of abandonment are more consistent with women's social role than men's. Castillo (1998) noted that women in the United States are more likely than men to experience discrimination, harassment, and poverty. Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson, and Grayson (1999) studied a community sample of over 1,100 adults AN OVERVIEW OF DEPRESSION
33
longitudinally and affirmed that "chronic strain, low mastery, and rumination were each more common in women than in men and mediated the gender difference in depressive symptoms" (p. 1061). Further, her study demonstrated that this pattern led to a vicious circle, in that depressive symptoms led to increased rumination and decreased mastery over time. These notions are consistent with the findings of a study by Lynn Collins (1998), which linked social status to the development of psychological symptoms. Collins showed her classroom students (the research participants) a film of the Stanford prison experiment (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973). Collins put together a list of symptoms of mental disorders and had participants rate how characteristic these symptoms were of men, women, "prisoners," and "guards." What she found, as demonstrated in the ratings, was that the prisoners exhibited symptoms of depression, anxiety, and helplessness— symptoms traditionally more prevalent in women. Conversely, the guards displayed aggression, arrogance, and other symptoms of antisocial and narcissistic disorders—diagnoses given predominantly to men. What was especially ingenious about this study was that because both the guards and the prisoners were male neither gender roles nor biological sex could explain the group differences. In addition, because of randomization, explanations based on personal variables (their upbringing, family dynamics, trauma history, etc.) were ruled out. The likeliest explanation for the differences in symptoms between the prisoners and the guards is that their assigned social roles influenced their identities and behaviors. This theory fits with data that show that the prevalence of depression is relatively high among, for example, gay teens and the poor (Herrell et al., 1999; Otis & Skinner, 1996; Simons et al., 2002; van Heeringen & Vincke, 2000). However, awareness of the difference in prevalence between men and women in most mental disorders is potentially confounded by differential rates of help-seeking behavior. Women are more likely to seek psychological help for most conditions, especially for depression and anxiety. For men in our culture, asking for help is seen as a sign of weakness or dependence; for women, asking for help bears no such stigma (Tannen, 1990). It is probable that some of the difference between diagnosis rates for men and women is due to women's greater comfort in going for help, especially with a mental health issue, though it is difficult to estimate the precise magnitude of that effect. In addition, differential rates have been found not only in clinical samples, but also in epidemiological studies (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2002); these differences are more difficult to explain on the basis of self-selection for treatment. On the other hand, a study of over 2,000 referred and 1,100 nonreferred adolescents found that among mental-health-referred, but not nonreferred, adolescents, rates of depression were higher in girls than in boys (Compas et al., 1997). The authors suggested that these gender differences were apparent in only a small subset of adolescents. Further research is needed to clarify the impact of gender and the reason for the impact. 34
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People from other cultures may have vastly different experiences of distress that are shaped by their culture. Guilt, self-denigration, existential despair, and suicidal ideation have been found to be less prevalent or absent in non-Western cultures. Conversely, somatic symptoms are more pronounced in other societies. The World Health Organization Collaborative Study, which examined depression in five different countries (Canada, India, Iran, Japan, and Switzerland) found that feelings of guilt were more than twice as prevalent in the Swiss sample than in the Iranian one, and somatization was twice as high in the Iranian sample as in the Canadian one (see Sartorius et al., and Thornicroft & Sartorius, both cited in Castillo, 1998). Sociocultural upheaval can also lead to depressive symptoms. For example, the rate of completed suicides in Micronesia underwent an eightfold increase from 1960 to 1980, a period of rapid modernization accompanied by the breakdown of traditional religious and social organizations (Desjarlais, Eisenberg, Good, & Kleinman, 1995, cited in Castillo, 1997). A striking example of the difference in meaning of distress in different cultures was illustrated by Kabat-Zinn (1994): In our society, one might speak of an epidemic of low self-esteem. In conversations with the Dalai Lama during a meeting in Dharamsala in 1990, he did a double take when a Western psychologist spoke of low self-esteem. The phrase had to be translated several times for him into Tibetan, although his English is quite good. He just couldn't grasp the notion of low self-esteem, and when he finally understood what was being said, he was visibly saddened to hear that so many people in America carry deep feelings of self-loathing and inadequacy. Such feelings are virtually unheard of among the Tibetans. They have all the severe problems of refugees from oppression living in the Third World, but low self-esteem is not one of them. But who knows what will happen to future generations as they come into contact with what we ironically call the "developed world." Maybe we are overdeveloped outwardly and underdeveloped inwardly. Perhaps it is we who, for all our wealth, are living in poverty, (pp. 162-163)
In part, the Dalai Lama's perspective may reflect the difference between sociocentric and egocentric cultures. In the West, the concept of individualism permeates. We are encouraged to pursue our goals and maximize our potential; we believe in the concept of individual rights, including the right to pursue happiness. If one is not pursuing happiness, then, in Western culture, one is behaving pathologically. In sociocentric cultures, the well-being of the group is considered paramount, with individual needs being secondary. Within such a context, low self-esteem is far less comprehensible because the emphasis is not on the self in the first place. Sadness occurs, of course, but it is more likely to be a shared experience rather than a personal failing. AN OVERVIEW OF DEPRESSION
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STRENGTHS OF PATIENTS WITH DEPRESSION In my experience, individuals with depression tend to have a variety of positive qualities. Many are introspective and in touch with their feelings. I have found them by and large to be responsible—willing to take ownership of their own feelings and their impact on others. To the extent that they go overboard in that regard, it is generally easier to help depressed individuals reduce their guilt and bring their oppressive superegos into balance than it is, for example, to help poorly socialized individuals restrain their ids and develop a sense of social responsibility and guilt. Individuals with depression are generally eager to get well, which serves as a great motivation in therapy. Some studies found that depressed individuals are more realistic in their predictions than nondepressed ones, who were excessively optimistic (for a review of this research, see, e.g., Dunning & Story, 1991). This counterintuitive finding spawned a generation of research, which has generally indicated that depressed individuals are more realistic under contrived laboratory conditions but not in more realistic circumstances (Dunning & Story, 1991; Pacini, Muir, &. Epstein, 1998). Although these theories are subject to ongoing research, tentative initial conclusions suggest that depressed individuals (more than nondepressed participants) make overly optimistic estimates at the beginning of such studies, when they are under relatively little stress. Then, impairments associated with depression interfere with goal completion. Cognitive distortions similar to those noted by A. T. Beck et al. (1979), such as beliefs that one is incompetent, play an important role. Helplessness beliefs (Seligman, 1975) impair efficacy and thus render optimistic predictions inaccurate. Vicious circles (Millon, 1996), in which individuals with depression underestimate the effort required to complete a task and then initially fail, leading to further giving up, also play a role, and, similarly, positive efforts made by nondepressed individuals that are then rewarded lead to goal attainment. At this time, the depressive realism phenomenon should be considered primarily a laboratory occurrence of limited clinical utility.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERSONALITY DISORDERS AND DEPRESSION Seven models are most frequently cited as underlying the relationship between PDs and depression (Dolan-Sewell, Krueger, & Shea, 2001). With the exception of the independence model (which, if true at all, is not relevant to the material addressed in this volume) and perhaps the "scar" model (which does not appear to have elicited PD or depression-related studies at this time), all of the other models are implicit in conceptualizations that appear throughout this book. Each model is considered below, with some 36
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examples of how the model relates to specific depression-PD interactions that are addressed later on. Independence Model The independence model indicates that there is no relationship between Axis I and Axis II conditions. If the rate of comorbidity does not exceed the rate of chance occurrence predicted by the base rate of the disorders, that would count as supportive evidence for the independence model. For example, if a PD occurred in 10% of the population and major depression in 20% and if the comorbidity of the two disorders was 2%, that would support the independence model. In certain areas, limited support is available for the independence model. For example, a study by Petersen et al. (2002) showed that treatment-resistant depression was not related to the presence of a PD. However, for the most part, the comorbidities between depression and PDs exceed chance levels. Shea, Widiger, and Klein (1992), in their review of the literature, noted that high rates of comorbidity for PDs and depression are the norm. Citing nine studies, Shea et al. noted that in samples of depressed participants, 23% to 87% of the participants have had PDs; in most of these nine studies, the PD rate is 30% to 40%. Similarly, in the six available studies of the rates of depression in samples of individuals with PDs, the range was approximately 24% to 87%. These rates clearly exceed the amount of overlap one would anticipate on the basis of the prevalence of each disorder taken separately. Common Cause Model The common cause model applies if there is a shared element between the two disorders that causes both. The cause can be biological, psychological, environmental, or sociological. For example, a chemical imbalance in the serotonin system may underlie both depression and impulsive behavior (e.g., as seen in borderline PD; see Soloff, Kelly, Strotmeyer, Malone, & Mann, 2003; Soloff, Meltzer, Greer, Constantine, 6k Kelly, 2000). Thus, an individual with either disorder would be at risk for the other. Thus SSRIs, which are antidepressants, are useful in treating borderline PD (Rinne, van den Brink, & Luuk van Dyck, 2002). Similarly, sexual abuse may be a risk factor for both borderline PD and depression (Rose, Abramson, Hodulik, Halberstadt, & Leff, 1994; Zanarini, Gunderson, Marino, Schwartz, & Frankenburg, 1989). Techniques that facilitate healing the emotional trauma of sexual abuse would, according to this model, reduce symptoms of both disorders. Spectrum and Subclinical Model Like the common cause model, the spectrum model views one disorder as a milder version of the other disorder; in this case, the Axis II disorder AN OVERVIEW OF DEPRESSION
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would be a milder version of the Axis I disorder. There is good evidence that schizotypal PD and schizophrenia have a "spectrum" relationship, and although the evidence is not quite as strong, it appears that paranoid and schizoid PDs are part of the same spectrum (Siever, 1992). Regarding a relationship between depression and PDs, depressive PD—which is not discussed elsewhere in this volume because it is covered in the appendix of DSM-IVTR—is probably related in a spectrum fashion to major depression and dysthymic disorder. There are theories that borderline PD lies on a spectrum with bipolar disorder, based on shared features such as affective instability. Although proof of this connection is lacking, the theory led to experiments with anticonvulsants and lithium to treat borderline PD; however, this approach has had mixed success (see the section on medications in chap. 7, this volume). Predisposition—Vulnerability Model There is a possibility that having one disorder will predispose an individual to getting another disorder. In this regard, PDs, which are seen as developmentally based and having broad implications regarding the person's functioning, would be more likely to form the context into which the depression would fit. However, it is also possible that childhood depression would predispose an individual to develop a PD. A study by Daley, Hammen, Davila, and Burge (1998) is illustrative of this point. It demonstrated that the presence of a Cluster A or B PD predicted later depression in a sample of late adolescent women. The causal path consistent with Daley et al.'s analysis was that individuals with Cluster A and B PDs generated larger numbers of stressful life events, which in turn increased the likelihood of depression. The vulnerability model fit better than the pathoplasticity model (discussed below); PD did not increase the risk of depression in response to stress. Complications-Scar Model Like the vulnerability model, the complications model presumes a sequential relationship between two disorders. In this theoretical configuration, a second disorder develops in the context of the first. The first disorder remits, but the other disorder continues on, exacerbated by the effects of the original comorbid disorder; it is as if the remitted disorder left a "scar" that complicates the recovery from the lingering disorder. An example would be an individual with borderline PD who then develops depression and, after intensive treatment, no longer meets the criteria for borderline PD but is still more vulnerable to depression as a consequence of having had borderline PD. In such an instance, residual borderline PD symptoms may be the causal factor that increases the vulnerability to depression. I am not aware of any 38
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studies that support the validity of this model in specific PD-depression pairings, though it remains a theoretical possibility. Pathoplasty-Exacerbation Model In this model, the principal hypothesis is that the presence of one disorder will influence the course of another. The effects can be additive (pathoplasty) or synergistic (exacerbation). For example, depression likely increases the tendency of individuals with avoidant, schizoid, and schizotypal PDs to socially withdraw, which can then further exacerbate both conditions. A number of studies support the notion that PDs interact with depression. For example, llardi, Craighead, and Evans (1997) found that the length of remission of unipolar depression was over 7 times longer among clients who did not have PDs compared with those who did. In another study, an interaction of personality style and life events predicted depression. Specifically, the researchers predicted and found that self-critical patients were at high risk for depression relapse if they experienced adverse achievementrelated events, and dependent individuals were vulnerable to depression if they experienced negative interpersonal life events (Z. V. Segal, Shaw, Vella, & Katz, 1992). A study of the impact of PDs on cognitive therapy outcome showed that outcomes were independent of PD status but that specific paranoid and avoidant beliefs predicted poorer outcomes (Kuyken, Kurzer, DeRubeis, Beck, & Brown, 2001). Psychobiological Models In the psychobiological model, shared biological mechanisms underlie depression and PDs (though presumably different PDs will have different associations with depression). Evidence of the validity of this model is growing. For example, a recent study of 720 child and adolescent twins showed that 45% of the covariation in depression and antisocial PD were attributable to common genetic factors (O'Connor, McGuire, Reiss, Hetherington, & Plomin, 1998). Such psychobiological models are a variant of the "common cause" model discussed above, and thus the biological example given in that section applies here as well (i.e., serotonin problems in individuals with depression and impulsive PDs).
CONCLUSIONS Perhaps what is most important to consider is that these models are not mutually exclusive, and they often overlap. We do not know for certain what the relationship is between PDs and depression, but it is likely complex. StayAN OVERVIEW OF DEPRESSION
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ing with the PGT principle that integration occurs at the level of the person rather than at the level of theory, we can safely conclude that most or all of these models refer to at least some of the people, some of the time. Throughout the remainder of the book, reference will be made to these models when they fit the available data.
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3 DEPRESSION INPARANOID PERSONALITY DISORDER
The phenomenology of paranoid personality disorder (PD) is powerfully portrayed in the poem "Paranoid," written by Lisa Ochenduszko (2003) and published on the Internet. The poem is reprinted only in part, but each stanza is complete and the ellipses are in the original. In the deepest recesses and corridors of my mind, You play there . . . You run freely, gaily In my mind you make the fantasies, hollowed out screams, fearful cries . . . Denied In my mind where you hunt your prey, Your hunger ravished, eating me. . . . Destroyed In my mind or what is left of my mind, you reign as supreme. Ideal dictatorship. . .. Paranoid. . . .
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This gifted writer has portrayed the pain, emptiness, and fear that dominate the life of the person with paranoia. The frightening image of being destroyed, as if devoured from the inside, represents the internalization of the sadism to which the person was presumably subjected. The poet portrays a person who sees evil in others and has difficulty setting a boundary to keep it out ("In the deepest recesses and corridors of my mind, / You play there ... / You run freely"; "In my mind you make the fantasies").1 Although real abuse presumably occurred, in theory, there are also instances in which it is the person portrayed by the poet who feels anger or hate and then projects it onto an otherwise innocent person; this projection occurs outside of conscious awareness. Glimpses of projection appear several times in the poem. Is the feared individual able to truly "run freely" in the person's mind and to create fantasies? Or do the fantasies come, at least in part, from within? The fear of being controlled by another and the exhaustion from the defensive efforts, both so movingly portrayed, capture the essence of paranoid PD. According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text revision [DSM-IV-TR]; American Psychiatric Association, 2000a), "Paranoid Personality Disorder is a pattern of distrust and suspiciousness such that others' motives are interpreted as malevolent" (p. 685). Guarded and either hostile, fearful, or both, they are among the most difficult groups to treat with psychotherapy. Their very modus operandi—trust no one—is so contrary to one of the necessary conditions of psychotherapeutic treatment that treatment often grinds to a halt after just a few sessions. There is more hope that the individual with both paranoid PD and depression will stay in treatment because the depression is distressing and increases the client's motivation to persist in treatment. It is important to distinguish paranoid PD from paranoid (delusional) disorder and from paranoid schizophrenia. Sometimes they co-occur, as in the case example at the end of this chapter, but not always. In general, I have found that people with paranoid schizophrenia and delusional disorder (but without paranoid PD) are remarkably trusting. As I have listened to elaborate tales of Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mafia, and Central Intelligence Agency conspiracies that ensnared the beleaguered client, I have often waited for the other shoe to drop—to hear the dreaded, "How do I know that you're not part of the conspiracy?"—but it never happened. Often I have found individuals with paranoid schizophrenia to be too trusting, because their psychosis often interfered with logical thinking that would have helped them to set appropriate boundaries. Nor did people with delusional disorder ever consider me part of the conspiracy. Such is not the case with individuals with paranoid PD. By definition, it is extremely difficult to establish trust. 'The poet has said in a personal communication that she was writing not about herself but about a loved one.
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EPIDEMIOLOGY In Pepper et al.'s (1995) dysthymic disorder sample, 11% had paranoid PD. In another sample of depressed clients, approximately 22% had paranoid PD (Fava et al, 1995). In a sample of 249 depressed outpatients, 5% were diagnosed with "definite" and 18% with "probable" paranoid PD (Shea, Glass, Pilkonis, Watkins, & Docherty, 1987). In a sample of 352 clients with both anxiety and depression, approximately 17% had paranoid PD, as diagnosed by structured interview (Flick, Roy-Byrne, Cowley, Shores, & Dunner, 1993). Zimmerman and Coryell (1989) studied a community sample of 797 individuals that included 143 individuals who were diagnosed with PDs. Among individuals with major depression, 1.7% met the criteria for paranoid PD. Thus the range is approximately 2% to 22%. Likely reasons for the wide range include natural sample variation, inpatient versus outpatient status, different definitions of depression (e.g., dysthymic disorder vs. major depression), and changing criteria—-for example, some studies used criteria from the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III; American Psychiatric Association, 1980), and others used criteria from the revised third edition (DSM-III-R; American Psychiatric Association, 1987). In regard to the converse question, among those with paranoid PD, 28.6% met the criteria for major depression (Zimmerman & Coryell, 1989). WHY DO PEOPLE WITH PARANOID PERSONALITY DISORDER GET DEPRESSED? Individuals with paranoid PD have thought patterns that generate both anxiety and depression. The fear that others cannot be trusted and that others are actively undermining one's efforts leads to anxious hypervigilance. Under such circumstances, many get worn out and sink into feelings of hopelessness and pervasive cynicism. Additional failures related to depression symptoms (such as slowed mental processing, motivational difficulties, etc.) are further attributed to external forces, such as others' malevolence. "I would be fine if not for so-and-so's interference" is a common theme. This conceptualization is consistent with the predisposition-vulnerability model, in that the paranoid PD places the person at risk for depression. It also suggests the exacerbation model because the depression and paranoia intensify one another (see chap. 2). HOW A PERSON BECOMES AND REMAINS PARANOID: THEORIES OF PARANOID PERSONALITY DISORDER AND THEIR ASSOCIATED TREATMENTS For individuals with comorbid depression and paranoid PD, it is hard to imagine a satisfactory resolution of Axis I symptoms without a concurrent PARANOID PERSONALITY DISORDER
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reduction of pathology on Axis II. The depression is likely to be tinged with anger, and difficulties with trusting a health care professional would strongly interfere with therapeutic progress in any modality. Thus, to treat the depression, trust must be established—that is, the paranoid personality pathology must recede, at least to some degree. Major theories of understanding and treating paranoid PD are presented below, with an emphasis on the individual with comorbid depression where feasible. Biological Factors Paranoid PD is part of the schizophrenia spectrum (Siever, 1992). For example, a study found that paranoid PD was twice as likely to occur in schizophrenic probands than in nonpatient controls (Baron, Gruen, &Ranier, cited in Nigg & Goldsmith, 1994). Paranoid PD appears to be intermediate between schizotypal and schizoid PDs in its genetic association to schizophrenia (for a review, see Nigg & Goldsmith, 1994). DiLalla, Carey, Gottesman, and Bouchard (1996) found that the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory Paranoia scale had a heritability estimate of 28%. Livesley, Jang, and Vernon (1998) found that suspiciousness scores had a heritability of 32.5%. In their study of the heritability of personality disorders in children and adolescents, Coolidge, Thede, and Jang (2001) found that the heritability estimate for paranoid PD was 50%. As with other personality disorders, then, paranoid PD appears to be moderately heritable. To my knowledge, there are no substantiated theories on the neurobiology of paranoid PD per se. As part of the schizophrenia spectrum (Siever, 1992), and to the extent that it is related to paranoid schizophrenia, paranoid PD involves the functioning of the dopaminergic systems. In Cloninger's theory (Cloninger, 1987), paranoid PD would presumably represent the high extreme of the "harm avoidance" dimension. Cloninger (1998) has shown that high harm avoidance is related to specific activities in the brain, such as higher levels of activity in the right amygdala (a part of the limbic system, important in processing emotions) as well as the right orbitofrontal cortex and the left medial prefrontal cortex (parts of the frontal lobes that are involved in executive functions such as planning). I know of only one empirical evaluation of medications for paranoid PD, the Ekselius and von Knorring (1998) study discussed in chapter 1. The selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors sertraline and citalopram appeared to be helpful in decreasing paranoid PD symptoms among the 84 individuals in their sample with paranoid PD. The remission rate for paranoid PD after 24 weeks of treatment was 43% for the sertraline group and 30% for the citalopram group. The sertraline group had a mean decrease of .5 criterion pre- to posttreatment; the corresponding figure for the citalopram group was .7 criterion. Unfortunately, because there was no medication-free compari44
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son group, the results of the study are inconclusive; however, given the generally persistent nature of personality disorders, the finding is noteworthy and warrants further investigation. In the absence of additional studies, it is worthwhile to consider the clinical observations provided by Joseph (1997). He divided paranoid PD into symptom clusters that are amenable to intervention with medications. Paranoia and ideas of reference can be treated with antipsychotics, such as risperidone or olanzapine (which he preferred), or other drugs, such as haloperidol, fluphenazine, or chlorpromazine. He noted that dosages are "approximately one-tenth to one-fourth of what is used for treating florid paranoia and psychoses" (p. 27). In his experience, such medications are quite effective in reducing paranoid ideation in people with paranoid PD. Joseph argued that symptoms such as such as rigid thinking and preoccupations with others' loyalty can be considered obsessional features and treated with selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors such as fluoxetine, sertraline, orparoxetine. Vigilance, guardedness, and tension may respond to anti-anxiety agents such as lorazepam, alpraxolam, and clonazepam. Anger, excessive emotional sensitivity, and irritability are a cluster of symptoms that can be treated effectively with serotonergic antidepressants or tricyclic antidepressants, with bupropion also being somewhat effective. Constricted affect, social withdrawal, and social anxiety can be conceptualized as being similar to negative symptoms of schizophrenia; Joseph noted, "They are likely to respond to low doses of risperidone or olanzapine, and, paradoxically, to serotonergic antidepressants and bupropion" (p. 30). In most cases, then, his treatment consists of long-term use of a low-dose antipsychotic and a serotonergic antidepressant, with short-term administration of a benzodiazapine. Although reasonable, Joseph's theoretical assumptions, as well as his assertions of the efficacy of particular medications for use with this population, require empirical verification. Randomized clinical trials with any medication proposed for this population are essential. Psychological Factors In the biopsychosocial model, the psychological level refers to the individual and his or her intrapsychic and interpersonal world. Important areas to consider include the person's learning history, thoughts, feelings, unconscious motivations, and relationships. Various schools of thought emphasize different aspects of the person's functioning and will be described in turn below. Millon's Theory According to Millon (1969/1985, 1981, 1996), paranoid PD is a severe "dysfunctional variant," rather than a basic personality type in its own right. Paranoid PD occurs when a personality disorder deteriorates. The basic patPARANOID PERSONALITY DISORDER
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terns that typically underlie paranoid PD (and Millon's labels for the subtypes) are narcissistic (which becomes the fanatic paranoid), sadistic (malignant), obsessive—compulsive (obdurate), avoidant (insular), and passive— aggressive-negativistic (querulous). In Millon's theory there is no developmental background that is specific to the disorder; it depends on the subtype. It is a "common endpoint" theory, in which many developmental beginnings, shaped by experience, lead to the hypervigilant mistrust seen in paranoid PD. The seeds of paranoid PD find fertile soil in narcissistic psychopathology. There is an inevitable set of beliefs that undergirds the paranoid thinking seen in this disorder: In order for someone to be undermining me, I must be important; in order for them to feel threatened by me, I must be very powerful; in order for them to feel jealous of me, I must be very special.
The arrogance that lurks just beneath the surface presentation often drives and fuels the paranoid thinking; the gratification derived from the grandiosity props up and maintains the defense, and the externalization and blame protect the person from self-reproach and further reinforce the pattern. What turns narcissism to paranoia is cold, harsh reality that fails to gratify even a modicum of the need for validation. A person with paranoid PD's perception of his or her talents and abilities are miles apart from the perceptions of others. If such individuals could simply accept their limitations and focus on activities they do adequately well, all would be copacetic; however, such is not the case. Narcissistically driven, they continue to push, feeling the constant sting of rejection. Filled with blame and condemnation, their accusations and conjectures drift further and further from reality into a quasidelusional or fully delusional form. People with avoidant origins are among those who are more constitutionally prone to paranoia. Typically shy and hypersensitive from the beginning, they consistently perceive rejection from an early age. Like their less pathological avoidant counterparts, insular paranoids were subject to harsh parental deprecation. Unlike the avoidant, however, the future paranoids found no safe quarter; withdrawal was insufficient, and persecution seemed to follow them. They lacked natural sophistication and cleverness as defenses, and thus every sling and arrow hit its mark; eventually, they came to view everyone as a potential torturer. The querulous paranoid has an originating background similar to the passive-aggressive-negativistic pattern. Millon (1996) noted that the querulous paranoid is a variant related in part to a basic negativistic pattern. These paranoids often evidence irregular infantile patterns and an uneven course of maturation, traits that often promote inconsistent and contradictory parental management. Their characteristic irritable
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affectivity may be attributed to low neurophysiological thresholds of responsivity. (p. 719) As is the case for others with basic personality patterns who deteriorate to a paranoid level of functioning, increasing mistrust is precipitated by agonizing disappointments and rejections. Fundamentally ambivalent on the selfother dimension, querulous paranoids are pushed to rely increasingly on themselves, and their resentments of others grow ever deeper. Ultimately, they become "sullen, resentful, obstructive, and peevish, openly registering feelings of jealousy, of being misunderstood, and of being cheated" (Millon, 1996, p. 720). Like individuals with sadistic PD, malignant paranoids have backgrounds of parental harassment and animosity. They acquire hostile behaviors, which are reinforced by peers (who give in to them) and parents (who inadvertently reward hostility with attention or purposefully cultivate an aggressive approach to life). Poverty may encourage a "survival of the toughest" adaptation. Millon (1996) noted, Anticipating resentment and betrayal from others, future malignant paranoids moved through life with a chip-on-the-shoulder attitude, bristling with anger and reacting before hostility and duplicity actually occurred. Resentment and antagonism were projected. Dreading being attacked, humiliated, or powerless, they learned to attack first, (pp. 717-718) As with other paranoids, harsh reality, rejection, and humiliation push them to engage in increasingly extreme defensive maneuvers. They become more angry, hostile, and hypersensitive, seeing others as more and more treacherous. Eventually, they trust almost no one and often take on delusional, persecutory beliefs. Regardless of its origin, a variety of vicious circles maintain the paranoid pattern. Perhaps most powerfully, suspicious mistrust breeds suspicious mistrust. The guarded presentation of individuals with paranoid PD elicits the belief that they are hiding something. Failure to reciprocate small trusting gestures, such as self-disclosure, by others short-circuits the rapportbuilding and trust-enabling process. Their proclivity to discharge hostility in brief bursts leads to numerous interpersonal difficulties. As noted by Millon (1996), Trapped in a timeless web of deceit and malice, their fears and angers may mount to monumental proportions. With defenses down, controls dissolved, and fantasies of doom running rampant, their dread and fury increase. A flood of frantic and hostile energies may erupt, letting loose a violent discharge, an uncontrollable torrent of vituperation and aggression, (p. 721) Obviously, the targets of such aggression typically become more actively opposed to and angry with the person with paranoid PD who attacked them.
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Finally, the delusional or quasi-delusional reconstruction of reality by persons with paranoid PD further worsens their social situation. Their suspicions often cross the line into actual accusations or, in more extreme cases, physical assault. This pattern elicits the feared animosity and vengeance that generally were not there prior to their own attacks on others. I recall an extremely paranoid client whom I knew (but never treated) when I was working at a Veterans Administration hospital who seemed to have all of these perpetuating factors. He never made any friends or even strong acquaintances on the unit. To my knowledge, he never opened up or shared any personal information with anyone. I learned from staff that in his job as a subcontractor for a private detective, he was to sit and watch people, all day long, to see if they engaged in unseemly or illegal activities. This client also had antisocial PD and, for example, would rent furniture and never pay a dime until the company came to repossess it; it is my understanding that he was also involved in the illicit drug business. He met his end by being shot to death. I do not know the circumstances, but I would suspect that his antisocial and paranoid behaviors played an important role. Regardless of the particular subtype, depression in the person with paranoid PD often reflects a sense of exhaustion—battle fatigue from a war that will not end, a surrender to the implacable foe. Once it begins, the depression itself leads to further exhaustion and hopelessness. Although this feeling of depletion is painful, it also signals the need for change and provides the impetus for growth. Cognitive-Behavioral Conceptualization and Interventions The superficial manifestations of paranoid PD are obvious— hypervigilence, suspiciousness, and mistrust. However, cognitive theory connects these surface behaviors and beliefs to a more treatable underlying selfesteem deficit: The paranoid individual's intense vigilance and defensiveness is a product of the belief that this is necessary to preserve his or her safety. If it is possible to increase the client's sense of self-efficacy regarding problem situations so that he or she is reasonably confident of being able to handle problems as they arise, then the intense vigilance and defensiveness seem less necessary. This should result in some decrease in vigilance and defensiveness that could substantially reduce the intensity of the client's symptomatology, making it much easier to address his or her cognitions through conventional cognitive therapy techniques, and making it possible to persuade him or her to try alternative ways of handling interpersonal conflicts. Therefore, the primary strategy in the cognitive treatment of [paranoid PD] is to increase the client's sense of self-efficacy before attempting to modify other aspects of the client's automatic thoughts, interpersonal behavior, and basic assumptions. (A. T. Beck, Freeman, & Davis, 2004, p. 125) 48
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For depressed clients with paranoid PD, there would typically be even greater sensitivity to threats to self-esteem. Feelings of fatigue and hopelessness can make it feel as if their usual defensive efforts are too draining, thereby tempting them to withdraw. For the client in therapy, such attempts at withdrawal have been unsuccessful, and the person may feel damaged and vulnerable. It is often easier, more efficacious, and more comfortable, then, for the client to build skills than to decrease problematic behaviors directly. Often, competing behaviors (differential reinforcement of other behaviors) can "squeeze out" the ineffective behaviors without the need for the client to use behavioral inhibition. "Don't be so suspicious," whether the message is explicit or implicit, is an ineffective approach because it requires behavioral inhibition and it does not provoke a behavior for which to provide positive reinforcement. Instead, increasing skills such as assertiveness and interpersonal communication will naturally provide contrary evidence to the client's suspicions. It is also important to work with the client on his or her cognitive interpretations, because individuals with paranoid PD routinely twist data to fit their preconceptions. Helping individuals learn Socratic dialogue, by which they she can question the evidence themselves, is an important step. It is not, however, the first step. Of all the personality disorders, and, most likely, of all the disorders in the entire DSM-IV-TR—with the possible exception of autistic disorders and reactive attachment disorder—paranoid PD presents the largest and most persistent barricade to forming a therapeutic alliance. By definition, there are profound difficulties trusting others that must become part of the therapeutic process. It is not being overly pessimistic to say that in many cases this barrier is insurmountable. Nonetheless, there are strategies to improve one's odds of success. Beck and his associates (A. T. Beck et al., 2004; A. T. Beck & Freeman, 1990) have suggested that the therapist accept the client's mistrust and ask the client to allow the therapist to build trust through actions. Most clients with paranoid PD will find that this approach will fit with their worldview, because they tend to persistently scan others' actions to determine if they are trustworthy. In addition, it is wise to start with behavioral techniques, because cognitive techniques require too much trust and self-disclosure; once a solid therapeutic alliance is formed, cognitive techniques can be introduced. Above all, within the cognitive-behavioral therapy model, it is essential to maintain a collaborative stance. Regularly checking in with clients and making sure they understand and agree with the treatment plan is a strong safeguard against potential therapy-ending misunderstandings. Finally, giving clients increased control (e.g., more homework and less frequent sessions) can help them to preserve their autonomy, which is often a prerequisite to continuing treatment. The basic cognitive-behavioral therapy relationship, which is problemfocused and less intimate than many other forms of treatment, is generally a PARANOID PERSONALITY DISORDER
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good fit for the client with paranoid PD. However, without special attention to the relationship hurdles of paranoid PD, the therapy is likely to fail. Beck and his associates (A. T. Beck et al, 2004; A. T. Beck & Freeman, 1990) have paid attention to such issues from a cognitive perspective, as alluded to above; however, the cognitively oriented therapist would be wise to peruse writings from other theoretical perspectives as well. Gabbard (1994) provided a balanced, practical, and insightful review of countertransference phenomena, written in language that is accessible to the nonpsychodynamically oriented practitioner (see the sections in this chapter on psychodynamic therapy and countertransference). Cognitive techniques can also address the quasi-delusional suspiciousness associated with paranoid PD. For approximately the past 10 to 15 years, an extremely exciting literature has been developing in the treatment of psychotic disorders using cognitive therapy. A number of research studies have demonstrated substantial reductions in delusional beliefs. This area is just now beginning to mature, with literature reviews, overviews, and books emerging to connect formerly scattered and isolated reports (Gould, Mueser, & Bolton, 2001; Haddock et al., 1998; Kingdon & Turkington, 1994). For many years, the prevailing wisdom in the field has been, "You can't talk someone out of his delusions," a saying that I still believe is largely true. However, you can train someone to talk himself out of his delusions. The primary technique, as alluded to above, is the application of Socratic dialogue. "What is the evidence for your belief?" as in all Socratic dialogue, is a basic question, but it does not go quite far enough (the delusional paranoid always has a plethora of such evidence on hand). An important extension is "What would count as evidence that your belief is incorrect?" Of course, a strong relationship must exist before such a question can even be raised. However, introducing the possibility of disconfirmation removes the delusion from the realm of tautology and places it within the empirical world. In addition to empirical disconfirmation strategies through Socratic dialogue, thought records can be introduced to work on the motivational schemas that support the beliefs. For example, the person with paranoid PD likely holds the belief, "By scanning the environment, I help myself to feel safe." Using thought records, one may determine that the more such individuals scan the environment, and the more they ruminate about safety, the less safe they feel. When the empirical and emotional pillars supporting the delusion are sufficiently weakened, the delusion itself often collapses. We lack empirical data to know for sure, but theory would indicate that the client's depression is tied to the exhausting excessive vigilance and grinding social isolation. Finding some safety within the therapeutic relationship, and ultimately beyond, is likely to provide feelings of relief as well as an antidepressant effect. Relief from depression would then enhance social functioning, promoting a positive spiral of affective and personality functioning. 50
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Client-Centered, Humanistic, and Existential Therapies Patience, validation, and unconditional positive regard are a prerequisite for developing a relationship with someone who has paranoid PD. It is worth noting, however, that the ordinary level of warmth conveyed by a client-centered therapist is likely to be seen as threatening and a form of deceitfulness, so a more businesslike approach is probably more effective at first. Ultimately, however, over an extended period of treatment, a warm relationship could be extremely healing to the depressed person with paranoid pathology. Psychodynamic Therapy According to Melanie Klein (1946/1996), paranoia is part of the normal process of development. She described the "paranoid-schizoid position" as an early developmental stage. Splitting is the primary defense mechanism used. Terrified that warm and loving feelings will be overwhelmed by hateful and aggressive feelings, infants split off and project their emotions. Too young and immature to experience the mother as a whole person, they concretely experience the mother's breast as their principal attachment. When milk flows out, they experience the "good breast," which symbolizes love and nurturance; when the breast is dry or does not gratify them, they experience it as the "bad breast," which is evil and frustrating. Stuck in this position, persons with paranoia split off and project their hostile feelings onto others, who are then seen as persecuting them. This analysis implies that the person with paranoia will reexperience the anxiety that was relieved by the projection if forced to reintegrate the projected affect; it is consistently noted clinically that individuals with paranoid PD are loathe to acknowledge their own aggressive feelings toward others. It also suggests that an important part of the phenomenon of paranoid PD is excessive early frustration relative to warm nurturance and gratification. A further implication of the paranoid-schizoid position is that the individual tends to have fleeting and unstable object relations. Months of establishing trust can be undone in an instant if the therapist (or any individual) commits a perceived injustice; the client is likely to see this as "proof that the therapist had malicious intent all along. In addition, the individual is unable to maintain a detached, observing stance. The thought that someone is trying to undermine him or her is its own proof; there is no hypothetical "as if" (e.g., "It is as if he is trying to undermine me"). Instead, slights are viewed as real and malicious rather than perceived. Perhaps the most damaging barrier against establishing relationships for the person with paranoid PD is projective identification. Projective identification has three components: (a) projection of an unacceptable impulse onto another while continuing to experience the impulse (in the paranoid patient, the projected impulse is usually aggressive); (b) viewing the individual PARANOID PERSONALITY DISORDER
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onto whom the impulse is projected as controlled by the projected impulse, and thus frightening; and (c) attempts to control the person, often in a way that provokes the feared behavior. A hypothetical example of projective identification and its capacity to undermine relationships was given by Gabbard (1994): Patient: Therapist: Patient:
I'm really angry with you because I've been sitting in the waiting room for half an hour. You told me to be here at 9:30 today. No, that's not true. I said 10 A. M. You said 9:30.
Therapist:
(a little louder and more forcefully) I said 10 o'clock. I wrote it down in my book.
Patient:
You're trying to trick me! You won't admit that you're wrong, so you try to make me think that I'm the one who's wrong.
Therapist:
(louder still) If I were wrong, I would admit it. On the contrary, I think you are the one who won't admit to being wrong, and you attribute that to me.
Patient:
I'm not going to take this harassment. I'll find another therapist! (pp. 424-425)
Projective identification involves the need to control others. But why this need? Deep down, people with paranoid PD have terrible self-esteem, believing that they are weak and ineffectual. Just as a weaker army uses a preemptive strike to capitalize on the element of surprise and maximize its effectiveness, people with paranoia believe that they are always in danger of being overwhelmed and destroyed by a superior force. Their grandiosity, then, is defensive and compensatory in nature; rather than reflecting a high selfopinion, it is a manifestation of precisely the opposite. To counter the destructive force of the projective identification, the therapist must, paradoxically, be totally open to it and accepting of it, allowing himself or herself to become a container for the negative affect. Gabbard (1994) gave an example of a better way to handle the prior situation: Patient:
I'm really angry with you because I've been sitting in the waiting room for half an hour. You told me to be here at 9:30 today.
Therapist:
Let me see if I understand you correctly. Your understanding was that you were to see me today at 9:30 instead of 10 o'clock?
Patient: Therapist:
Patient: 52
You said 9:30. I can certainly see why you might be angry at me then. Having to wait for someone for 30 minutes would make most people angry. You admit that you told me to come at 9:30?
PERSONAL/TY-G VIDEO THERAPY FOR DEPRESS/ON
Therapist:
Frankly, I don't remember saying that, but I'd like to hear more about: your recall of that conversation so I can find out what I said to give you that impression, (p. 426)
Thus, handling the client involves a persistently nondefensive, empathic, and supportive stance. Note, too, the businesslike and matter-of-fact approach taken by Gabbard above. Excessive warmth, as mentioned previously, is likely to breed suspicion and mistrust. Group Therapy Individuals with paranoid PD are not good candidates for processoriented group therapy at first. Their proclivity to elicit hostility and rejection from others is generally too strong, and they are likely to be scapegoated or otherwise rejected by the group. Rather, some progress should first be made in individual therapy; once the client is a bit more comfortable and trusting, then group approaches can be used. A psychoeducationally based skills group, however, could be considered earlier in treatment.
COUNTERTRANSFERENCE Theory and clinical observations suggest that countertransference is often a major obstacle to treatment of people with paranoid PD. Gabbard (1994) noted that "exasperation and impatience" (p. 426) often result from the relentless scrutiny by such clients. Therapists are also often tempted to burst the clients' bubble of grandiosity. Of course, to do so would typically rupture the therapeutic alliance as well. As indicated previously, projective identification requires special handling to avoid premature termination. The person with depression and paranoid PD presents the additional problem of feelings of hopelessness that can be induced in the clinician. If the therapist begins to feel hopeless, he or she must find rays of light in the darkness of the client's predicament; if this is not possible, then supervision or peer consultation is imperative. Throughout treatment, the wisest course of action is continued empathy and validation. Gabbard's (1994) illustration of how to handle projective identification, reviewed in the earlier section on psychodynamic therapy, provides an excellent illustration of how to remain empathic under trying circumstances. What little empirical research is available is consistent with clinical wisdom in the field. Graduate students who viewed a film of a therapy session with an individual simulating paranoid PD (without depression) indicated that they felt frustrated, guarded, perplexed, and fearful. The client's lack of trust, distant and suspicious demeanor, and failure to comply with an apparently reasonable request pulled forth the frustrated and confused feelings, while the client's thinly veiled hostility elicited fear and defensiveness (Bockian, 2002a). PARANOID PERSONALITY DISORDER
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In treating persons with paranoid PD, I have found it helpful to remind myself that their guarded style is usually well grounded in their experience. Many people with paranoid PD have been severely betrayed and/or sadistically abused. As the old joke goes, just because you're paranoid does not mean that they're not all out to get you.
SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND DIVERSITY Individuals with certain disabilities, especially deafness, may have symptoms that would indicate paranoid PD in a hearing person. For the young child who has never had hearing but is raised in a hearing environment, watching others communicate in a manner that is inherently foreign often leads to feeling isolated and alienated. In addition, lacking many ordinary social cues, such children often believe that others are talking about them. In reality, in a culture in which difference is not well tolerated, the other children probably are often talking about them, and perhaps making fun of them, thus lending credence to suspicious feelings. The disparity between minority and majority culture was brought to the forefront during the O. J. Simpson murder trial ("Behind the Verdict," 1995). Simpson, an African American, was accused of murdering his White ex-wife. Polls in the United States showed a striking and consistent pattern: Most Whites believed Simpson was guilty, whereas most African Americans believed he was innocent. Even more interesting, a majority of African Americans (60%) believed that police often frame innocent people, com' pared with less than a fourth of Whites (Streisand, 1995). The perception that Simpson was framed gained credibility when the defense showed that one of the key witnesses, police officer Mark Fuhrman, had made racist comments that he had denied under oath. The jury, having seen an officer apparently lie under oath to help secure a conviction, experienced "reasonable doubt"—what else had the state done? Where did they get the evidence? How was the evidence safeguarded from tampering? Under a cloud of such suspicions, Simpson was acquitted. It is interesting, however, that Simpson was later convicted in civil lawsuits, thus revealing some room for interpretation regarding his innocence (MacNeil/Lehrer Productions, 1997). In short, members of minority cultures who may have been targets of racism or are intimately connected with those who have been should not be viewed as paranoid when they evidence mistrust of mainstream institutions (see Whaley, 1998). Immigrants are also at high risk for being mislabeled with paranoid PD (American Psychiatric Association, 2000a). Faced with language and other barriers and at times with hopelessly arcane immigration rules, the immigrant may become hostile or suspicious; such circumstance-related behavior should not be confused with a character disorder. Most subcultures within 54
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the United States are more sociocentric than the extremely autonomyfocused mainstream culture. However, minority experiences with racism are likely to engender a certain degree of healthy mistrust of the establishment. The potential impact of culture should not be underestimated. Castillo (1997) discussed Swat Pukhtun culture—a society in which the average male carries a gun, people are genuinely dangerous to one another, and women are kept at home as much as possible to prevent infidelity. Many people in Swat Pukhtun culture would meet the criteria for paranoid PD if judged by U.S. norms, but in fact their response to their situation is adaptive.
STRENGTHS OF PERSONS WITH PARANOID PERSONALITY DISORDER The suspiciously oriented mind is well suited to certain kinds of activities. Counterterrorists, for example, must be able to think like a terrorist, to remain hypervigilant, and to imagine possible deceptive plots that may occur. A bright and creative colleague of mine, warm and sensitive like most psychologists, nonetheless has such a cognitive proclivity. After the tragedy of 9/11 occurred, he shared with me the fact that for years, when he flew, if the pilot stepped out of the cockpit, his heart would jump into his mouth. He confided to me that he could not help but imagine the innumerable dire consequences to which the plane is subject in such moments. Had government officials or airline executives been so "paranoid," tragedy may have been averted. Another acquaintance of mine is able to imagine details of any possible contingency and make adequate preparations. For example, attacked while walking alone in a large city, he was able to frighten off his assailants because he was appropriately prepared and trained. The enormous dividing line between these healthy variants and the person with paranoid PD is the realistic nature of the planning and the lack of what cognitive therapists would call "personalization." Neither of these individuals imagines, as part of their planning or thinking, that such potential attacks are aimed specifically at undermining them; rather, they are trying to be prepared in the event of unlikely, but possible, negative human interactions. Frankly, they are the two people in the world with whom I feel most safe.
TREATMENT PLANNING: SYNERGISTIC TREATMENT The first step in creating catalytic sequences that will help the client is to establish a therapeutic bond. As noted throughout the chapter, doing so is often problematic; a patient and nondirective approach provides the greatest likelihood of success. Within a safe therapeutic relationship, cognitive techniques can help the client to challenge firmly held beliefs about others' maPARANOID PERSONALITY DISORDER
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EXHIBIT 3.1 Therapeutic Strategies and Tactics for the Prototypal Paranoid Personality STRATEGIC GOALS Balance Polarities Reduce polarity Increase polarity Counter Perpetuations Stop provocations of rejection Modify rigid minidelusions Undo self-protective withdrawals TACTICAL MODALITIES Alter inviolable self-image Moderate irascible mood Reorient cognitive suspiciousness Note. From Personality-Guided Therapy (p. 693), by T. Millon, 1999, New York: John Wiley & Sons. Copyright 1999 by John Wiley & Sons. Reprinted with permission of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
licious intents. Behavioral techniques such as skills training can help the client to feel a greater sense of self-efficacy and thus a reduced need for hypervigilance and defensiveness. Interpersonal conceptualizations have obvious relevance, in that the client's main issue is often mistrust of others; helping the client to become aware of the patterns that maintain his or her negative mood and isolating behaviors can be very helpful (see Exhibit 3.1). Such interventions must be carefully timed; introduced too early, they will provoke defensiveness. I find that the ideal timing for helping clients to break out of such patterns is when they express frustration and ask, directly or indirectly, how they can get better. Clients who are depressed are more likely to be able to seek help in such a manner than the nondepressed person with paranoid PD. Medications can be helpful if the client becomes anxious or excessively hostile. If the client's family either participates in maintaining the behavior or bears the brunt of the client's hostilities, family therapy can help to correct those imbalances.
CASE EXAMPLE: JEAN Jean was a 15-year-old girl when her therapist, Kelly Vinehout, first saw her. The client was Caribbean American, the therapist Caucasian, and both were deaf. An incident of petty theft brought Jean to the attention of authorities. She was referred for treatment to a residential group home for the deaf and hard of hearing. Jean had a deaf sister and several hearing brothers and sisters. Her mother was addicted to drugs. Little was known about the 56
PERSONALITY-GUIDED THERAPY FOR DEPRESS/ON
father, except that he had been in and out of prison and had not been involved with the family for many years. Jean was extremely suspicious and mistrustful, far beyond what could be expected on the basis of normative deaf development or deaf culture. Her paranoia seemed to have been profoundly shaped by isolated traumatic events as well as ongoing social reinforcement. Her first memory was of being about 3 years old and being torn away from her family by the government under the auspices of the child protection division. Jean's fears were then fueled by her older sister's suspicions that the authorities were going to take away everyone in the family, put Mom in jail, lock up all the children, and so forth. With little guidance available from trustworthy adults, Jean was interpreting the world through her 3-year-old eyes and those of her frightened 4-year-old sister. The children were placed in the custody of her grandmother, who was told to not allow contact with the children's mother. However, because the mother lived close by, the children were able to sneak over for visits. This experience encouraged the belief that deceit is an ordinary part of human interactions. For Jean, raised in a home in which the mother was affectionate but routinely neglectful and poorly equipped for parenting, the seeds of paranoia fell on fertile soil. They were watered and nourished by social and interpersonal difficulties at school. Although she attended a school with deaf peers, Jean still did not fit in. Fearful when not in control, she attempted to dominate her social interactions. Although sometimes there is a submissive child around who can form a stable relationship with such a person, this did not happen for Jean; her thinly veiled hostility made it all the less likely that any of her relationships would succeed. Other children would occasionally tease her for being "bossy," not a particularly cruel barb in the world of grade school, but experienced as an infuriating and wounding slur by hypersensitive Jean. All of her relationships in school ultimately failed, leaving her isolated and lonely. On the basis of the nonverbal behavior she observed in the first session, Dr. Vinehout interpreted Jean's stealing, symbolically, as an attempt to secure desperately desired love and affection. Dr. Vinehout turned her attention to Jean's interpersonal relationships. Jean had unusually diffuse boundaries for a girl her age. Hearing children often learn about relationships in a variety of indirect ways—overhearing conversations among older children on the bus ride home, overhearing conversations among adults, and so on. In normative deaf development, children are unable to learn about such matters indirectly and thus rely on direct instruction. Jean's mother and siblings did not provide good role models, and nobody taught her about relationships. Jean tended to be intrusive in gathering information from others and guarded about sharing. Thus she helped to protect herself by minimizing her need to trust others and by gaining information that would help make others more predictable; however, few peers would tolerate that kind of inequity. PARANOID PERSONALITY DISORDER
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Further, she confused sexuality, affection, and affiliation. Jean was not yet sexually active, but Dr. Vinehout was concerned that her neediness and confusion left her vulnerable to sexual exploitation, which would have cemented her already rigid and paranoid world view. The first goal in treatment was to help Jean to understand appropriate boundaries in relationships. Dr. Vinehout used kinesthetic modeling, with a great deal of modeling and role-play, to help Jean develop more appropriate behaviors. After approximately three sessions, Jean's transference emerged in a rather direct way. The conversation went something like this (translated from the original sign language): jean:
Your hair smells just like my mother's.
Dr. Vinehout: Oh, you wish you had a mom to take care of you. jean:
Yeah, I wish you were my mom.
Dr. Vinehout: I can't be your mom, because then I couldn't be your therapist. For the same reason, I can't be your friend. Here's how it's different.
Dr. Vinehout then went on to explain the therapeutic relationship and how it worked. This kind of directness and bluntness is common and expected in deaf culture. It is also an extremely effective style with troubled adolescents, deaf or hearing, who typically see adult circumlocutions as devious. This early interaction quickly established Dr. Vinehout as someone who was relatively trustworthy, although trust had to be continuously earned throughout the course of a 3-year therapeutic relationship. It is typical for individuals in long-term treatment for PDs to bring most of their quintessential relationship issues into the room as part of the transference—countertransference enactment. In Jean's case, not surprisingly, the central issue was trust. One example was that Jean often asked to see the director of the facility ("Dr. Jones") to try to secure a desired privilege (e.g., permission to buy a bicycle). Dr. Vinehout would write a note to the director, stating the request for an appointment with the director. In Jean's mind, this meant the appointment had already been scheduled. Dr. Vinehout tried to explain that it just meant she would leave a note. Jean would then be disappointed with, and angry at, Dr. Vinehout for failing to make the appointment. So, Dr. Vinehout began to write the note to the director and a reminder note for Jean about what she had committed to do. Still, Jean would believe that someone had altered the note. Jean then got a Palm Pilot, which allowed her to encrypt the note that she wrote to herself (e.g., "Dr. Vinehout will leave a note for Dr. Jones") with a password. The following exchange would ensue: Jean:
You said you'd make an appointment for me, and then you didn't!
Dr. Vinehout: Look in your Palm Pilot. What does it say? 58
PERSONALITY-GUIDED THERAPY FOR DEPRESSION
Jean:
"Dr. Vinehout will write a note to Dr. Jones, asking for an appointment."
Dr. Vinehout: Did it say I would make the appointment? Jean:
No.
Dr. Vinehout: Do you see? Jean:
No. All that means is that someone stole my Palm Pilot and changed the note.
Dr. Vinehout: But you made the password yourself. Even if someone took your Palm Pilot, they would not know the password. Jean:
Then 1 must have dreamt the password, and someone must have stolen it from my mind.
Dr. Vinehout: No. That is not what happened. That is what we call paranoid thinking. Nobody can go into your mind and steal your dreams.
This straightforward psychoeducational intervention, repeated numerous times over the years within the context of a deep and secure therapeutic relationship, slowly but surely decreased the number of frank delusions experienced by Jean. Dr. Vinehout also provided Jean with psychoeducation about being Caribbean American in a racist culture. They discussed racial oppression and how that might impact her. Jean was receptive to these discussions. Although confrontation was helpful in a couple of key turning points in the relationship, the key to the success of the treatment was nearly constant validation. Dr. Vinehout helped to place Jean's fears in the context of her genuine experiences, accepting the reality of her ongoing and painful rejection and, more important, unconditionally accepting her as a person. Given her interpretations of events, her painful and ambivalent feelings were understandable; working through such feelings constituted the bread and butter of the twice-weekly individual sessions. In addition to individual sessions, Jean participated in group therapy twice per week. Dr. Vinehout was one of the group therapists along with a male cotherapist. Jean's participation in the group was uneven. At times, she participated well, allowing the peer group to help her process her concerns, such as whether to stay on her medications. Often, however, she was resistant and disruptive, refusing to participate. Her relationship with Dr. Vinehout served to bind her to the group, but jealousy and possessiveness of Dr. Vinehout—for example, when seeing her connect with other clients and with the cotherapist—made the group anxiety provoking. Overall, the group experience was positive for her, but it was not the place in which she made the most progress on her paranoid thinking. Jean's depression was atypical, though the manner in which it was expressed was not unusual for an adolescent, particularly one with paranoid PARANOID PERSONALITY DISORDER
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PD. She was extremely sensitive to disruptions in her fragile relationships. Rather than becoming sad and anhedonic, Jean would act out. It was predict' able that the day after a perceived slight in therapy or in a friendship relationship she would act out in an aggressive way and get into trouble. Dr. Vinehout's countertransference was unusual in relation to a paranoid client, in part because she seems to have circumvented a fair amount of the projective identification directed her way by the client and because the client tolerated identification of paranoid thinking. Typical countertransfer' ence emotions are feelings of guardedness and defensiveness, to ward off the client's attacks. Dr. Vinehout felt herself pushing away from the client in an effort to set appropriate boundaries; having tapped into the neediness and loneliness underlying the guarded defensiveness, she now had to work hard to set appropriate boundaries and keep the relationship at a healthy distance. In addition to individual and group work, Dr. Vinehout also did family work with Jean's family of origin. She met with the grandmother, uncles, and siblings, focusing primarily on two issues: interacting and communicating. With Jean present, she informed the family bluntly that they needed to know more sign language if they wished to have a relationship with Jean. This intervention helped Jean feel validated, although unfortunately, it did not get the family to learn much more sign language. Dr. Vinehout also helped the family empathize with Jean (e.g., when you sit around and chat, she feels left out and believes you are talking about her). Dr. Vinehout also worked with the family on guidelines for home visits. Jean got no supervision when she was home, which was inappropriate. Although they could not implement suggestions, they did become more aware of why the government agencies were keeping the family apart, and Jean became more understanding and accepting that such a home environment would not be good for her. By the end of the 3 years of treatment, Jean was greatly improved. She was able to function in the residential facility. The frequency of her paranoid delusional episodes had decreased. She had friendly, though somewhat superficial, relations with several of the other residents. Her relationship with the therapist was deep and rich. Although there were still episodes of mistrust, such breaches had been repaired many times, and working through them rather than having the relationship shatter was the expected outcome. Unfortunately, for systemic reasons outside the therapy realm Dr. Vinehout and Jean had to terminate. The termination process followed a predictable course, with Jean unable to process that the relationship would end and an angry confrontation in the penultimate session ("You didn't tell me we had to stop!") despite six consecutive prior sessions of addressing the issue. During the final session, Jean refused to speak with or look at Dr. Vinehout. Dr. Vinehout wrote notes to Jean, outlining the progress Jean had made over the course of treatment, the pride that she (Dr. Vinehout) felt in Jean, and reminders of Jean's plan for the future. During this final session, which consisted of Jean, Dr. Vinehout, and a staff member sitting at the dining room 60
PERSONALITY-GUIDED THERAPY FOR DEPRESSION
table, Jean refused to read the notes. Two weeks later, Dr. Vinehout received a phone call from Jean, stating she had kept the notes and was sorry that she had refused to talk to Dr. Vinehout. In conceptualizing this case from the standpoint of personality-guided therapy, it was clear that addressing the client's paranoid PD was an essential and guiding principle of the treatment. Technically, the core of the treatment was based on client-centered principles of consistent validation of the client's experience. With some clients—for example, those without personality disorders—it is possible to maintain such a stance early in treatment and then enter into a problem-solving cognitive-behavioral format; such was not the case with Jean, nor is it likely to be the case with most individuals with paranoid PD. However, building on this affirmative and validating stance, cognitive and psychoeducational techniques helped Jean to reduce some of her cognitive distortions. Early in treatment, Jean's transference was enacted and became an opportunity to build clarity and trust. Role-playing, which can be considered either a behavioral or an experiential technique, was relied on heavily to prepare Jean for the world of dating and other interpersonal relationships. The focus of much of the treatment was helping Jean establish interpersonal relationships. In conceptualizing the case, Dr. Vinehout drew on the work of Sullivan (interpersonal), Winnicott (object relations; holding environment), attachment theory, and Herman (trauma theory). Dr. Vinehout described therapy as "dancing with the affect" of the client, drawing on the client's subtle nonverbal material as the drumbeat to the music; in that regard, her work reminds me of Virginia Satir's. Synergistically, validation formed the basis of a relationship with the therapist, which then in turn became a platform from which to address other relationship issues, catalyzing the upward spiral of one good turn leading to another. However, the case also illustrates the resilience of the paranoid pattern once set into motion. Despite 3 years of intensive treatment as a relatively young woman, the client still had a good deal of paranoid psychopathology that was interfering with her functioning. She was, nonetheless, much less depressed and generally was feeling and functioning much better.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Paranoid PD with depression is a difficult condition to treat because of problems establishing and maintaining rapport. However, in at least some cases, substantial improvements are possible. In the case of Jean, described above, a series of catalytic sequences led to considerable gains. First, the therapist established trust through bluntness and simplicity of speech as well as consistent, persistent use of physical evidence (e.g., the client taking notes in her password-protected computer). Rapport was never taken for granted, and relationship work was undertaken repeatedly. Cognitive techniques (chalPARANOID PERSONALITY DISORDER
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lenging distorted thoughts) and psychodynamic techniques (e.g., confronting the client's desire for the therapist to be her mother) led to gradual improvements in the client's functioning. Despite the "best practice" ideas and interventions reviewed above, many people with paranoid PD and depression will not be treated successfully. Many will not present for treatment, and others will not form a treatment alliance. Prognosis in such cases is guarded (pun intended). For purposes of personality-guided therapy for depression, empirical research explicitly targeting ways to establish rapport should be a priority, as well as establishing whether depression generally makes the treatment easier (e.g., because of enhanced motivation to relieve the depressive symptoms) or more difficult (e.g., with depression making it more difficult for the person to get mobilized).
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4 DEPRESSION IN SCHIZOID PERSONALITY DISORDER
A good illustration of a schizoid style of relating is shown in the portrayal of John Nash in the film A Beautiful Mind (Howard & Goldsman, 2001). Nash is a math professor, brilliant with numerical and visuospatial patterns, who seems to lack almost completely the capacity to relate to people in any way. He cannot empathize with his students when they have difficulty learning the material, nor can he discern what presentation style might help students to learn more easily or enjoy the material more. He seems to lack the desire to connect or explain. For example, in one scene, a student approaches Nash in his office with a question. He essentially dismisses her and returns to his work. After a few moments of working—a sufficient length of time to be uncomfortable—he looks up and simply observes, "You're still here." His awkward, self-absorbed style is striking, though it does not seem to bother him. Where a more narcissistic professor might disdain students for their "stupidity," the schizoid individual bears no such malice. To him, the needs of the students are merely an enigma—an enigma he may or may not be motivated to solve. Perhaps some of us have had teachers or professors who were similar—writing on the board, with their back to the class, absorbed in the material, and essentially oblivious to the people around them.
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Notably, even this prototype portrays the more sociable end of the spectrum. The choice to become a professor entails willingness to interact with others; more severely schizoid individuals, if employed, are often late-night security guards or night-shift doormen, back-room mail sorters, and employees at other jobs that entail almost no human interaction. The prototypical person with schizoid personality disorder (PD) has little desire for interpersonal contact, even with family members. Such an individual also has an impoverished cognitive style; that is, his or her understanding, especially of people, lacks richness and vitality. He or she is unable to process the numerous factors that impact people and views his or her own life in similarly simplistic terms. Impoverished cognitive style does not correlate with intelligence; a person with schizoid PD, can, like Nash, have superior abstract reasoning, visuospatial, and verbal abilities. Nonetheless, his or her inner emotional and relational world is simplistic and poorly developed. As noted above, people with schizoid PD are noted for their blandness, flatness, and the lack of desire to connect with others. According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text revision [DSM-IV-TR]; American Psychiatric Association, ZOOOa), "The essential feature of Schizoid Personality Disorder is a pervasive pattern of detachment from social relationships and a restricted range of expression of emotions in interpersonal settings" (p. 694). Considered part of the "schizophrenic spectrum" (Siever, 1992), schizoid PD overlaps with the "negative" symptoms of schizophrenia: flat affect, lack of motivation, and social withdrawal. Like individuals with schizophrenia, individuals with schizoid PD may underachieve in social, occupational, or academic arenas. EPIDEMIOLOGY Schizoid PD is a relatively rare disorder. Community studies indicate a low prevalence of schizoid PD. A review of nine epidemiological studies indicates a median prevalence estimate of 0.6% for schizoid PD (Mattia & Zimmerman, 2001). However, the disorder is approximately 9 times as common in treatment settings. A review of eight studies suggests a prevalence rate of approximately 5% in treatment settings, with the prevalence apparently a bit higher in inpatient than outpatient settings (Widiger & Rogers, 1989). DSM-IV-TR described schizoid PD as "uncommon" in treatment settings. This low prevalence has led to a relative paucity of research. As noted by Beck and Freeman (1990), "While there have been extensive theoretical musings about the nature of the schizoid individual, little clinical research has been done on this group. . . . This is not surprising, given the reluctance of schizoid individuals to seek treatment" (p. 122). Unfortunately, little has changed in the intervening 15 years. Thus, the base of clinical lore and inter64
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vention research is not very deep, and some areas require speculation to elucidate promising, if untested, treatment avenues. In samples of individuals with depression, approximately 0% to 3% have schizoid PD. Of the 116 individuals with major depression in a study by Zimmerman and Coryell (1989), none had schizoid PD, though it is worth noting that there were few individuals with schizoid PD in the entire sample (n = 7). In Pepper et al.'s (1995) dysthymic disorder sample, 2% had schizoid PD. In Fava et al.'s (1995) sample of depressed clients, approximately 3% had schizoid PD. In a sample of 249 depressed outpatients, none were diagnosed with "definite," and 2% with "probable," schizoid PD (Shea, Glass, Pilkonis, Watkins, & Docherty, 1987). Markowitz, Moran, Kocsis, and Frances (1992) studied a sample of 34 outpatients with dysthymic disorder; none had schizoid PD. Finally, in a sample of 352 clients with both anxiety and depression, approximately 3% had schizoid PD, as diagnosed by structured interview (Flick, Roy-Byrne, Cowley, Shores, & Dunner, 1993). Minimal data are available on the prevalence of depression in individuals with schizoid PD. Zimmerman and Coryell's (1989) study, mentioned above, included a community sample totaling 797 individuals, of whom 143 were diagnosed with PDs. Among the 7 diagnosed with schizoid PD, none met the criteria for major depression.
HOW DO PEOPLE WITH SCHIZOID PERSONALITY DISORDER GET DEPRESSED? Persons with schizoid PD may become depressed when their lifestyle is too remote and detached. They may have a desire for some degree of contact, to fit in meaningfully with others in some way. The sense that life is empty, with no real purpose, is depressing to anyone (Frankl, 1959); the person with schizoid PD, with his or her barren internal world, is prone to such thoughts. In the words of A. T. Beck and Freeman (1990), although usually comfortable with a detached lifestyle, these individuals may become depressed over their awareness that they are deviants who do not fit into society. . . . They may tire of being "on the outside, looking in." Further, their belief that life is meaningless and barren can lead to or exacerbate depression, (p. 129) At times, individuals with schizoid PD may also experience depersonalization, in which they can barely experience their bodies and feel like they are just "going through the motions." Such experiences may be depressing for the individual as well. Thus, schizoid PD likely creates a vulnerability to experiencing depression. As with other PD patterns, people with schizoid PD engage in coping strategies that tend to perpetuate, or even deepen, their original personality SCHIZOID PERSONALITY DISORDER
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psychopathology. For example, their proclivity to withdraw and remain detached reduces opportunities to learn new interpersonal strategies, thus decreasing the odds that the next relationship will be meaningful and fulfilling. In addition to simple lack of contact, their cognitive impoverishment regarding emotions leads to misinterpretation and oversimplification of others' emotional lives and further reduces the odds that they will have rewarding interpersonal interactions (Millon, 1996). Over time, these strategies and proclivities may lead to a deepening of the schizoid pattern, in some cases to levels that are intolerable even to the person with the disorder. Consistent with the "exacerbation" model (see chap. 2) the patterns associated with schizoid PD and depression "feed" one another, increasing the intensity of both. Schizoid PD and depression overlap in some of their symptoms. The flat, bland presentation of the person with schizoid PD parallels anhedonia in major depression. Lethargic and insipid, such individuals already near the level of psychomotor retardation and fatigue evidenced in depression. Thus there are three symptoms (anhedonia, psychomotor retardation, and fatigue) that are shared to some degree by the two disorders. Dysthymic disorder (which has similar symptoms to major depression but at a lower level of severity and higher level of chronicity) resembles schizoid PD even more closely. It could be that some features of depression and schizoid PD share a common cause, such as brain functioning associated with lethargy and anhedonia. However, in general, people with schizoid PD are not particularly prone to either anxiety or depression. Aloof, but unconcerned about it, the typical person with schizoid PD does not seek therapy. Thus, our focus on the depressed person with schizoid PD represents a unique, and more treatable, subset.
HOW A PERSON BECOMES AND REMAINS SCHIZOID: THEORIES OF SCHIZOID PERSONALITY DISORDER Biological Factors Millon (1981) asserted that schizoid PD, like all personality disorders, has biological underpinnings. He hypothesized that individuals with schizoid PD may have a lack of neural density in the areas related to emotionality, such as portions of the limbic system. He further speculated that there may be problems in the reticular activating system, which is related to the anergia and chronic underarousal of the person with schizoid PD. These neural deficits can be a function of genetics, environmental-biological factors (e.g., anoxia during the birthing process), or environmental-psychosocial factors (e.g., an understimulating social environment). Millon (1996) noted,
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What appears most distinctive about these individuals is that they seem to lack the equipment for experiencing the finer shades and subtleties of emotional life . .. Some interpret their interpersonal passivity as a sign of hostility and rejection; it does not represent, however, an active disinterest but rather a fundamental incapacity to sense the moods that are experienced by others, (p. 218)
The above quote implies the neurological deficits previously described. Millon (1981) conjectured further about how biological and psychosocial factors may interact to deepen the biological problem: Another frankly speculative hypothesis is that a substantial number of adult schizoid personalities displayed low sensory responsivity, motor passivity, and a generally placid mood in infancy and early childhood. They may have been easy to handle and care for, but it is likely that they provided their parents with few of the blissful and exuberant responses experienced with more vibrant and expressive youngsters. As a consequence of their undemanding and unresponsive nature, they are likely to have evoked few reciprocal responses of overt affection and stimulation from their caretakers. This reciprocal deficit in sheer physical handling and warmth may have compounded the child's initial tendencies toward inactivity, emotional flatness, and general insipidity, (p. 292)
This process may be further compounded if, assuming the schizoid tendency was inherited from one or both parents, the spontaneous and persistent expression of warmth from the parents may have been lacking in any case. Research suggests individuals with schizoid PD are more likely than comparison groups to have a history of neglect (Lieberz, 1989). Genetic Factors
Genetic studies in the phenomenologically similar autistic spectrum disorders may bear fruit for understanding schizoid PD. Asperger's disorder, the core feature of which is "severe and sustained impairments in social interactions" (American Psychiatric Association, ZOOOa, p. 80), seems especially closely tied to schizoid PD. There is strong support for a genetic basis of autistic spectrum disorders using twin studies (Bailey et al, 1995; Steffenburg et al., 1989), and research is ongoing to discover specific genetic markers (Auranen et al., 2002; Buxbaum et al., 2001; Liu et al., 2001). There is also evidence of an increased rate of schizoid PD in the parents of people with autism (Narayan, Moyes, & Wolff, 1990). Schizoid PD is heritable, apparently at similar levels to other personality disorders. Like an array of thoroughly studied normal personality traits (Loehlin, 1989), PDs typically have a heritability estimate of .40 to .60. Coolidge, Thede, and Jang (2001), in an investigation of personality disorders in 112 twin pairs ages 4 to 15, found that h2 for schizoid PD was .73; the range for all personality disorders was .50 to .81. A study by Torgersen,
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Onstad, and Skre (1993) found a heritability for schizoid PD of .29. Genetic factors accounted for approximately 50% of the variance in dimensional measures such as social avoidance (Livesley, Jang, Jackson, & Vernon, 1993), restricted expression, and inhibition and for 38% of the variance in affect constriction (for a review, see Jang & Vernon, 2001). Similarly, Eysenck's extraversion construct (of which schizoid PD would represent the extreme low end) is moderately heritable (Nigg & Goldsmith, 1994). Genetic studies have generally supported the notion that schizoid PD is part of the "schizophrenia spectrum" (Siever, 1992). However, although studies of schizotypal PD have consistently linked the disorder to schizophrenia, studies examining the genetic connection between schizoid PD and schizophrenia have been somewhat inconsistent (for a review, see Nigg & Goldsmith, 1994). It is likely that schizoid PD is related to schizophrenia but not as strongly as schizotypal PD; this conceptualization is consistent with Meehl's (1990) contention that cognitive slippage is the central component of schizotypy. Medications Despite a significant effort, I could locate no specific studies on medications for schizoid PD. A study by Ekselius and von Knorring (1998; see chap. 1 for a review) found that the antidepressants sertraline and citalopram, both selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, led to an increase in the diagnosis of schizoid PD, although there was no increase in the number of criteria met on a structured interview. I cannot explain this odd finding. The number of schizoid patients was so small (1 pre- and 6 postintervention) that one should be cautious in interpreting the results. There are some underlying dimensions or symptoms that may be amenable to psychopharmacological interventions. In the absence of further data, it is worth considering Joseph's (1997) speculations based on his clinical experience. He argued that schizoid PD is reminiscent of the negative symptoms of schizophrenia. Newer, atypical antipsychotics have the best efficacy with deficit syndromes; thus clozapine, olanzapine, sertindole, and risperidone would be the most likely to benefit people with schizoid PD. These medications may help the patient to become more sociable and emotional. Joseph conceptualized the anhedonic and low-libido features of schizoid PD as having biological underpinnings similar to those of the same symptoms in a person with depression; he recommended an energizing medication such as bupropion. As in cases of Axis I social anxiety, individuals with schizoid PD who experience anxiety in social situations may benefit from selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, monoamine oxidase inhibitors, or anxiolytics. Although Joseph's speculations were reasonable, they are not currently backed by scientific research. There is no substitute for appropriate empirical studies, ultimately leading to randomized clinical trials.
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Psychological Factors When considering the person's psychological functioning, important areas to consider include his or her learning history; thoughts, feelings, unconscious motivations; and relationships. The schools of thought described below (e.g., cognitive-behavioral, humanistic, psychodynamic, interpersonal, and family systems) emphasize different aspects of the person's functioning and will be described in turn. Millon's Theory According to Millon (1969/1985, 1981, 1996, 1999), individuals with schizoid PD represent the "passive-detached" type. They are thought to have a generally bland, passive nature, perhaps because of impoverished neurological substrates associated with emotion. These neural deficits in adulthood may have been caused by genetics or shaped by experience. The early experiences of people with schizoid PD are likely to be characterized as dull and colorless, although extreme withdrawal by caretakers could account for development of schizoid PD in a person who lacks a strong predisposition to the disorder. Severe difficulties in relating, such as reactive attachment disorder, that are frequently seen in children raised in neglectful or abusive orphanages exemplify the potentially profound impact of extreme environmental conditions (Hall & Geher, 2003; Wilson, 2001). At a less intense level, a temperamentally placid child, exposed to minimal "stimulus nutriment" (i.e., environmental stimulation; Millon, 1981), is at risk for developing schizoid PD. Excessively formal relationships with one's parents can have a similar effect. Deutsch (1942), describing the "as if" personality, gave the example of a child born to royalty. Raised by a variety of nannies, he had only brief and occasional contact with his parents. At that time, he was required to profess his love for them, whereupon he was dismissed. It is not surprising that this child manifested disturbed interpersonal relationships (Deutsch, 1942, cited in Millon, 1981, p. 294). The description of the person with schizoid PD in terms of Millon's domains is presented in Appendix B. Of the characteristics listed, "unengaged interpersonal conduct" and "apathetic mood/temperament" are the most salient features. Cognitive-Behavioral Conceptualization and Interventions Cognitive-behavioral therapists emphasize dysfunctional thought and behavior patterns that underlie disorders. Dysfunctional attitudes that are common to people who are categorized as having schizoid PD are listed in Exhibit 4.1. Such thoughts contribute to the individual continuing to live in a withdrawn, isolated manner. The clinician can explore for these and simi-
SCH/ZOJD PERSONALITY DISORDER
EXHIBIT 4.1
Attitudes and Assumptions Typical of a Person With Schizoid Personality Disorder * People are replaceable objects. Relationships are problematic. Life is less complicated without other people. Human relationships are just not worth the bother. It is better for me to keep my distance and maintain a low profile. * I am empty inside. * I am a social misfit. * Life is bland and unfulfilling. * Nothing is ever exciting. Note. Asterisks indicate items that suggest depression as well. From Cognitive Therapy of Personality Disorders (p. 128), by A. T. Beck and A. Freeman, 1990, New York: Guilford Press. Copyright 1990 by Guilford Press. Reprinted by permission.
lar thoughts and attitudes and then challenge them using Socratic dialogue (J. S. Beck, 1995) or disputation (Dryden & DiGiuseppe, 1990; Ellis, 1995). Dysfunctional thought records have been found to be helpful for people with schizoid PD (A. T. Beck & Freeman, 1990; A. T. Beck, Freeman, & Davis, 2004) and in depression (J. S. Beck, 1995). Not only do dysfunctional thought records challenge dysfunctional thoughts, but they also teach gradations in thinking, helping clients to overcome all-or-none thinking. Individuals with schizoid PD may believe they must always be alone, or that they never care about what happens. Dysfunctional thought records help to challenge those beliefs, often leading to awareness that such individuals do sometimes prefer to be with others or that they do sometimes care. Individuals with schizoid PD, almost by definition, lack social skills. Assuming they are depressed because they are too isolated, even given their rather minimal needs, then skill building may be extremely helpful. Liberman, DeRisi, and Mueser (1989) provided excellent guidelines, designed primarily for individuals with serious and persistent mental illness (e.g., schizophrenia and mental retardation) but adaptable to the person with schizoid PD. Excellent guidelines for couples are available in A Couple's Guide to Communication by Gottman, Notarius, Gonso, and Markman (1976); because the book is written in lay language, it can be assigned to the couple as bibliotherapy. Social skills can be taught using role-playing, in vivo exposure, and homework. Group social skills training has the obvious advantage of allowing practice with other clients rather than only the therapist. The client can also be assisted to attend to positive emotions. Individuals with either depression or schizoid PD will have a tendency to attend to negative thought patterns; an individual with both disorders will experience this even more. Homework assignments such as journaling at least one positive thought per week (at first) then per day (later on) will help the person to challenge automatic thoughts such as "life is bland and unfulfilling."
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Assertiveness training (Alberti &Emmons, 1978; M. Smith, 1975) can help depressed persons with schizoid PD to overcome their passivity and perhaps get some more of their needs met. A unique challenge with persons with schizoid PD is their perception that they have almost no needs. Selfawareness work would be useful, perhaps even essential in this regard. Meditation training (Kabat-Zinn, 1990, 1994; LeShan, 1974; Murphy & Donovan, 1997) and focusing training (Gendlin, 1978) are methods by which the individual can be taught to focus on feelings, perhaps gaining more richness to his or her rather impoverished internal environment. As discussed in chapter 2, exercise is a natural antidepressant. Naturally sluggish, depressed individuals with schizoid PD would benefit greatly from the energizing aspects of exercise, though for exactly that reason they may be unusually resistant. As always, motivation is the key. Patience on the part of the therapist is also critical; the suggestion should be well timed. One effective way to introduce the topic is to bring it up in a brainstorming session if the client asks, "What can I do about my depression?" If that does not occur, then at some point asking if the client is aware of how helpful exercise can be in reducing depression would help the exercise "precontemplator" to become a "contemplator." Sex therapy can also be useful for individuals with depression and schizoid PD. Most individuals with schizoid PD have weak sex drives, and in major depression sex can become not only uninteresting but even aversive (A. T. Beck, 1983). At such times, it is best to treat the depression and wait a bit before encouraging sexual behavior. When a clinician fails to assess the impact of depression on sexual feelings and behavior, it can have a negative impact on the therapeutic relationship, as illustrated by author William Styron (1992) in his book Darkness Visible. Styron, in the midst of a severe depression, was nearly suicidal, thoroughly anhedonic, and had great difficulties sleeping. His psychiatrist, pseudonymously referred to as "Dr. Gold," was switching medications to Nardil, after an unsuccessful trial of two other medications: Further, Dr. Gold said with a straight face, the pill at optimum dosage could have the side effect of impotence. Until that moment, although I'd had some trouble with his personality, I had not thought him totally lacking in perspicacity; now I was not at all sure. Putting myself in Dr. Gold's shoes, I wondered if he seriously thought that this juiceless and ravaged semi-invalid with the shuffle and the ancient wheeze woke up each morning from his Halcion sleep eager for carnal fun. (p. 60)
Of course, the psychiatrist was merely being ethical by informing the patient of potential side effects; nonetheless, Styron experienced the intervention as unempathic because, apparently, the physician had not sufficiently contextualized the discussion in light of the patient's ongoing experience. Keeping that cautionary tale in mind, sex therapy can be extremely useful in
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many cases in which the mildly to moderately depressed person with schizoid PD is in a relationship. Although not as interested in sex as others, individuals with schizoid PD often "don't mind" having sex, and those whose schizoid symptoms are sufficiently mild for them to be in a relationship are typically also sufficiently interested in the other person to go to at least some lengths to try to please him or her. Sex therapy can help enhance pleasure as well as sensitivity to the other person's needs—two areas in which the person with schizoid PD is likely to have problems. Several fine books are available for adjunctive bibliotherapy with sex therapy (e.g., Sexual Awareness [McCarthy & McCarthy, 1984] or The Gift of Sex [Penner & Penner, 1981]). Client-Centered, Humanistic, and Existential Therapies Client-centered, humanistic, and existential therapists eschew a diagnostic or labeling'based approach, and thus there is little, if any, clientcentered or humanistic literature specific to schizoid PD. Rather, in these approaches, the therapist would look at the ideographic aspects of the case. Nonetheless, a prototypical person with schizoid PD, coming from a background of relative neglect and often with stunted or excessively formal relationships with important others such as parents, represents almost a sine qua non of the thwarted actualizing tendency (Rogers, 1979). The clientcentered therapist would focus on creating the conditions for growth, a nonjudgmental space in which the client could explore his or her feelings, and on reengaging the actualizing tendency. If the client wished to, past relationships could be explored, which would then yield information about the conditions of worth to which the child was exposed. Client-centered therapy is somewhat passive by nature; the initiative must come from the client. Some individuals with severe schizoid PD have such problems with initiative that a modification of the therapy developed by Prouty (1994) would be helpful. Prouty labeled his approach "pretherapy" to indicate a process that would prepare a client for traditional therapy. However, his case studies suggest that the process has therapeutic effects (sometimes dramatic ones) in its own right. It was developed for individuals with severe communication problems, such as autism or severe mental retardation, and psychoses. Pretherapy uses concrete empathy, in which the therapist mirrors exact words and bodily movements to establish contact. The therapist can also simply make observations, which may help the depressed and severely schizoid client. For example, the therapist might observe, "You are sitting with your hands in your lap," or "You are remaining quiet," or "You are looking into my eyes." Such interventions can establish contact with a client with whom it is difficult to connect. Other, more dramatic techniques may be useful for the person with depression and schizoid PD. Gestalt therapy—for example, the empty chair technique—can be used to uncover any feelings regarding difficult relationships or feelings of neglect from childhood. Care should be taken not to over72
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whelm the client; unaccustomed to emotional arousal, the person could experience substantial anxiety. A solid therapeutic relationship should be established before using experiential techniques, which would thereby allow the therapist to provide support if the emotions do become overwhelming. Self-awareness techniques may be a direct and substantial form of healing for the emotional deficits of the person with schizoid PD. Mindfulness meditation (Kabat-Zinn, 1990) has been shown to be a powerful intervention to decrease depression (Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992), and participants have reported substantial improvements in their bodily and emotional selfawareness (e.g., Broadwell, 1998; Kabat-Zinn, 1990). Focusing (Gendlin, 1978) similarly induces increased body awareness, as well as self-awareness with regard to thoughts and feelings. For the depressed person with schizoid PD, these improvements can be invaluable. For clients who lack a sense of purpose, existential therapy (May, 1983b) or logotherapy (Frankl, 1983) can help in exploring the meaning of life. Based more on an attitude or philosophy than on a set of techniques, existential approaches consider the fundamental anxiety that one confronts to be existential anxiety—the awareness that our existence is finite and that there is always a threat of nonbeing or nonexistence. Frankl (1983) suggested that the client who presents with a sense of or fear of life being meaningless should be commended on having the insight and courage to confront that issue and told that many go through life "going through the motions," without ever contemplating life's meaning. The question, "What is the meaning of life?" is unanswerable; Frankl (1959) observed that it is like trying to answer the question, "What is the best color?" The answer, of course, is that it depends on the context and the person; each person must find his or her own meaning in existence. Other questions that help get at meaning in the client's life include Linehan's intervention, designed for suicidal borderline clients but broadly applicable in its underlying message. In the video Treating Borderline Personality Disorder (Linehan, 1995), a client stated that she was suicidal. Linehan replied, irreverently, "So, why don't you kill yourself right now?" For the existentialist, that is, in fact, the exact question. If life has no meaning, then why live? With the possible exception of, "Because I'm afraid it will hurt," virtually any answer addresses the meaning the client finds in life. If the client replies that it would be too painful for a relative or friend to bear, then she is living for love. If the client replies that she believes that therapy is worth a try and things may get better (as the client actually does in the video) then she is living for hope. And if she replies that she wants to live because there is one more thing she has to do, then she is living for commitment. Ultimately, commitment to something that one believes is more important— higher, if you will—than oneself is where many people find meaning. Bibliotherapy can stimulate clients in the search for meaning. Books such as Don't Sweat the Small Stuff (Carlson, 1997), The Mirack of MindfulSCHIZOID PERSONALITY DISORDER
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ness (Nhat Hanh, 1976), and Wherever You Go, There You Are (Kabat-Zinn, 1994) all are useful jumping-off points to encourage clients to look at life a bit differently. Simply assigning a client to read at least a few pages and then asking if there was anything that he or she found meaningful can lead toward the client's central concerns and hopes. Psychodynamic Therapy
In discussing schizoid PD, psychoanalytically oriented writers generally have emphasized anxiety rather than depression as more central to the disorder. Klein (1946/1996) believed splitting was the essential characteristic of the schizoid condition. In her view, in normal development the child experiences persecutory ideation, which is the projection of the child's innate aggression onto the mother or, more specifically, onto the part of the mother with which the infant has direct contact (the "bad breast"). Splitting, which Klein defined as the separation of conflicting self and object representations, is a defense against the anxiety generated by the persecutory ideation. The schizoid individual failed to resolve these conflicts and therefore remained with a narcissistic orientation, including the need to control others and the tendency to either cling to or withdraw from them. Thus the apparent absence of anxiety in the schizoid individual was an illusion; rather, as Klein (1946/1996) hypothesized, the anxiety is kept latent by the particular method of dispersal. The feeling of being disintegrated, of being unable to experience emotions, of losing one's objects, is in fact the equivalent of anxiety. This becomes clearer when advances in synthesis have been made. The great relief which a patient then experiences derives from a feeling that his inner and outer worlds have not only come more together but back to life again. At such moments it appears in retrospect that when emotions were lacking, relations were vague and uncertain and parts of the personality were felt to be lost, everything seemed to be dead. All this is the equivalent of anxiety of a very serious nature, (p. 21)
Fairbaim (1952) emphasized the early-childhood maternal relationship in the development of schizoid PD. He noted the following: (i) that in early life they gained the conviction, whether through apparent indifference or through apparent possessiveness on the part of their mother, that their mother did not really love and value them as persons in their own right; (ii) that, influenced by a resultant sense of deprivation and inferiority, they remained profoundly fixated upon their mother; (iii) that the libidinal attitude accompanying this fixation was not only characterized by extreme dependence, but also rendered highly self preservative and narcissistic by anxiety over a situation which presented itself as involving a threat to the ego; (iv) that through a regression to the attitude of the early oral phase, not only did the libidinal cathexis of an already internalized "breast-mother" become internalized, but also the 74
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process of internalization itself became unduly extended to relationship with other objects; and (v) that these resulted in general overvaluation of the internal at the expense of the external world, (quoted in Akhtar, 1987, p. 503)
As a result of these processes, these individuals take rather than give in their emotional lives. Further, emotional contacts exhaust them because they defend against their difficulties in giving by playing roles. Love itself is viewed as dangerous, a consequence of the early experiences noted above, and thus they defend against loving both themselves and others. Fairbairn (1952) further noted that those with schizoid personalities are drawn to the arts as a way of having indirect contact with others and showing the self but at a safe distance. O. F. Kernberg and colleagues (Clarkin, Yeomans, & Kernberg, 1999; O. F. Kernberg, 1967; O. F. Kernberg, Selzer, Koenigsberg, Carr, & Appelbaum, 1989; Yeomans, Clarkin, & Kernberg, 2002) included schizoid PD in a conceptualization of borderline personality organization. Like Klein and Fairbairn, Kernberg viewed splitting as the fundamental defense mechanism of the schizoid character type. Poor ego development leads to a chronic sense of unreality, which, combined with dispersal of affect, leaves the schizoid individual feeling chronically empty. Kernberg (1970) considered the schizoid personality to be a "low" level of personality organization, indicating that it is next to the psychotic range of functioning. Kernberg's "transference-focused psychotherapy" (Yeomans et al, 2002) uses the traditional analytic techniques of clarification, confrontation, interpretation, and technical neutrality. The sine qua non of his treatment, however, is analysis of the transference in the here and now. Although in his writings he generally emphasized confrontation over nurturing support, Kernberg artfully combined his confrontations with accurate and emotionally attuned statements. The following case appears, at least in this fragment, to involve a mixture of schizoid and dependent features—a person with "pure" schizoid PD as defined in DSM-IV-TR would not particularly expect or want the therapist to care. Nonetheless, the patient's startling self-absorption and lack of empathy and relationship skills are consistent with schizoid pathology. Therapist: Patient: Therapist: Patient:
Therapist:
I notice that you're making some marks on your pad whenever I speak. Yes, I'm counting how many times you talk. Why do you do that? It helps me know if you care about me. I count up the number of times you speak, and when I go home I compare that number to the last session. That's how I tell how much you're giving me. Does it matter what I say? SCHIZOID PERSONALITY DISORDER
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Patient:
Not so much. What really counts is how many times you tell me why you think I'm doing what I'm doing. Then I know you're really listening to me and concerned about me.
Therapist:
So it's very important that I care about you, and you've devised a scheme to answer that question for yourself. Can you see you're also treating what I'm saying as if it were worthless? (O. F. Kernberg et al, 1989, p. 115)
This fragment is an illustration of several key aspects of Kernberg's approach. Kernberg used both clarification and confrontation regarding the relationship between the therapist and the client (i.e., the transference) to push the client to integrate the split self and object relations implied in the interaction. Persons who have both depression and schizoid PD would presumably be those who have experienced and processed the object loss, at least partially, rather than splitting any negative emotions off completely. Depression generally entails the necessity of whole object relations. To the extent that they use neurotic defenses rather than splitting, they are more in touch with reality. Thus, although they experience more psychic pain, depressed persons with schizoid PD are likely functioning at a somewhat higher level. This conceptualization is consistent with clinical experience—individuals with schizoid PD and depression are more likely to profit from therapy than "pure," emotionally absent, prototypically schizoid individuals. In sum, the psychodynamic approach emphasizes that the superficial symptoms of schizoid PD are not to be trusted—that in fact the person's blandness is a defense against deeper anxieties. These anxieties are rooted in early trauma, particularly in relation to the mother, who is seen as withdrawing and abandoning. If one can, through appropriate analysis, resolve the inner conflicts and underlying anxieties, then the person will experience tremendous relief. The recommended treatment involves traditional psychodynamic techniques, such as technical neutrality, confrontation, and analysis of the transference. Depression, from a psychodynamic perspective, is likely to be rooted in object loss; in the case of the person with schizoid PD, a common scenario would be the withdrawal of the mother, whether because of her own problems with intimacy, physical illness, or mental disorder. Once the depression and the schizoid withdrawal are properly analyzed, the client will then become more mature, flexible, and related. It is apparent, however, that theorists from a psychodynamic perspective are talking about a somewhat different patient population. Akhtar (1987), in his review, noted the similarity of the psychodynamic interpretation of the schizoid personality and avoidant personality disorder. It could be that case studies of "schizoid" individuals reflect aspects not only of schizoid but also of avoidant and paranoid disorders. From Millon's perspective, it is certainly the case that the analysts are using the term schizoid in a different 76
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manner than he is. Millon (1996) noted that essentially, there is not much to analyze within the prototypical schizoid PD and focused on other techniques. That observation notwithstanding, it is also true that most people with PDs are better described as having admixtures of two or more personality disorders: schizoid-dependent, schizoid-avoidant, or schizoid-obsessivecompulsive. Although the person with "pure" schizoid PD may be unanalyzable, many of the schizoid subtypes would be analyzable. Thus the clinician must be careful about generalizing across different conceptualizations. Family Systems In this section, I conceptualize the situation in which the depressed person with schizoid PD is an adult and is either coming in for marital therapy with a spouse or for family therapy with his or her parents. The latter case occurs with some regularity for clients with other severe mental illnesses such as schizophrenia. The subsequent section, on children, includes family interventions in which the schizoid client is a child. There are several ways of viewing families in relation to schizoid PD: (a) The family behaviors or dynamics contributed significantly to causing the disorder, (b) the family is a victim of a primarily biological disorder and is coping with it as best they can, and (c) biology and family dynamics combined to produce the disorder (an interactionist perspective). Although the interactionist perspective is compelling, it is useful to note that all three models are partially correct and that each model will be the best explanation in a certain percentage of the cases. It is most likely that the family will view the second model—that "this is just the way he is and the way he always has been"—as the most accurate and useful. To the extent that the therapist uses one of the other two models, there is a risk of incongruence with the family, which could lead to premature termination or other problems. In cases in which there are clear biological signs, such as vegetative signs of depression and a strong history of schizoid behavior from early in life, emphasizing biological aspects of both disorders is likely to facilitate an appropriate and rapid bonding process with the therapist. In such cases, it is likely that the ultimate adjustment of the family will involve letting go of fantasies that the person with schizoid PD can be—or already is—in the average range of emotional sensitivity. The son who is disappointed with his depressed and schizoid father will feel better if he can accept his father's limitations. As mentioned previously, many clients are aware that biological factors contribute strongly to depression and will thus be comfortable with such a conceptualization. Few, however, are familiar with the concept of PDs, much less a biological component for a specific one. The risk of emphasizing biological considerations is locking the identified patient into the role of the "pathological one"; this can and should be undone by emphasizing the individual's strengths and relating to the family in a
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manner in which each individual's competencies—including those of the identified patient—are allowed to shine. The decision as to whether to share the diagnosis that the person has schizoid PD should be made on a case-by-case basis. Some basic psychoeducation, such as noting, "We now know scientifically that people are born with a wide range of abilities in sensing other people's emotions, getting emotionally involved, or getting excited about things," will suffice in many cases. In other cases, the label will provide a rallying point around which the family can get information, help, or support. If the label will disempower a family member—for example, if the person with schizoid PD is one of the parents—then it may be better to avoid using it. This stands in contrast to my approach to borderline PD, in which I virtually always share the diagnosis with the client. There is a great deal of information available on borderline PD, including several books that are written in lay language, numerous Web sites, and a national support organization. None of these are available for schizoid PD, so sharing the label does not have the same builtin practical advantages. In cases in which parents are bringing in their child with schizoid PD, sharing the diagnostic label, along with its similarity to autistic spectrum disorders, may allow the parents to tap into a crucially important social support network. A number of different patterns may emerge in a family system with parents and children in which the identified patient (the person with schizoid PD and depression) is one of the parents. From a structural perspective (Minuchin, 1974), the family is most likely to be disengaged. Boundaries are likely to be rigid between the identified patient and everyone else in the family. If the spouse has a similar character structure, then the entire family may be distant and disengaged. Marriages in which one partner has schizoid PD and depression may be dominated by feelings of being "together, but alone" (Moultrup, 1985). However, assuming the other spouse has a complementary personality, such as a more engaging temperament or dependent qualities, cross-generational boundaries may become blurred as the emotional needs of the parent are satisfied through the children. Thus, for example, the presence of a schizoid and depressed mother would encourage the oldest daughter to become parentified and provide caretaking for the other children; role reversal may also occur, in which the oldest daughter takes care of the father. If one or more of the children feel neglected, then there could be a variety of acting-out behaviors, potentially serving several functions within the family. The acting-out behavior may express rage over feelings of being neglected or may inject some purpose into the parents' lifeless marriage, thus keeping the family together. Paradoxical techniques are very powerful and should be used judiciously, but they can be effective in cases in which one spouse has schizoid PD and depression. "Prescribing the symptom" (Haley, 1963; L'Abate, Ganahl, & Hansen, 1986; Palazzoli, 1988) has been defined as telling the 78
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family to continue doing what it is already doing. If the family complies with the therapist, then they have taken a step toward collaborative work. On the other hand, if they change, then, by definition, they become unstuck. In most cases, the intervention is low risk; they are not likely to get worse from being instructed to continue their current behavior, and they may improve. The positive connotation technique, a particular form of symptom prescription, can be helpful in breaking through feelings of "stuckness" in a family (Palazzoli, 1988). Although using what is labeled a paradoxical technique, in fact the therapist is describing in an extremely straightforward fashion the function he or she believes the symptoms are playing in the family. The intervention stresses the role of each individual in the family in maintaining the family system. Thus, for example, consider a family in which there are a husband, wife, and two teenage children and in which the father has depression and schizoid PD. Consider the prototypical situation in which the wife is feeling overburdened and one or more of the children are beginning to act out, for example by breaking curfew. The therapist conceptualizes the problem as one in which there is isolation and distancing on the part of the father but poor differentiation of each member of the family, leading to painful maneuvering to attempt to establish acceptable levels of closeness with one another. The therapist might assign homework as follows: Dad, you should continue to complain about feeling depressed and continue to lie around the house as you have been doing for the past 3 weeks. This gives Mom an opportunity to feel strong and helpful and gives the children an opportunity to become more independent. This rather dramatic highlighting of the functions served by the symptoms encourages the family to consider other, less painful ways of getting their needs met. It sidesteps certain aspects of resistance because the therapist is not pushing for change. If the family "resists" and changes anyway, so much the better. If they stay the same, then they have done so at the request of the therapist and may be willing to try other experiments to resolve their problems; further, the reconceptualization of their problem, focusing on positive aspects of the symptoms, generally sparks fresh ideas for the kinds of changes to which they would be open. Family sculpture techniques (L'Abate et al., 1986; Satir, 1983) are also powerful and may be particularly helpful to the person with schizoid PD who has strong spatial abilities and spatial reasoning. Family sculpting has been defined as a method in which family members are asked to arrange one another as a living statue or tableau. Drawing upon their creative instincts, and using such nonverbal dimensions as distance, posture, visage, and gesture, the family members give concrete representation to their impressions of the family. (L'Abate et al., 1986, p. 166) SCHIZOID PERSONALITY DISORDER
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The sculpture may also be put in motion, which in many cases adds important information: Another choice at this point can be to have the sculptor put the whole sculpting in motion before verbally processing what has been sculpted. . . . With static sculpting one gets a sense of family boundaries and alliances but not the rules for traffic flow. With dynamic, or moving, sculptures one can see traffic flow and also have the chance to see action sequences repeated in time, producing a more dynamic representation of family stuckness and rigidity and family rules. (L'Abate et al., 1986, p. 180)
Reliving moments or sequences from the past or spatially representing relationship issues can be most enlightening to the client and may produce powerful insights. If even such a high-impact technique as family sculpture produces relatively little emotional impact on the person with schizoid PD, it may allow the client a clearer understanding of how his or her partner feels and thus lead to more appropriate or attentive behavior. Some people with Asperger's disorder describe a process of attending to another, consciously modeling their behaviors in order to be more accepted and acceptable (Willey, 1999). The passivity and lack of strong feelings of persons with schizoid PD can be an asset in this regard; being generally passive, they may not mind doing certain things differently, because it is "all the same" to them.
COUNTERTRANSFERENCE The literature on countertransference responses to individuals with schizoid PD is extremely limited. Giovacchini (1979) noted feelings of "existential terror," or a primitive fear of nonexistence that often led to feelings of hopelessness, with his schizoid patients (similar to modern schizoid and schizotypal PDs). Robbins (1998), referring to the "autistic position," discussed countertransference responses such as a feeling of vagueness and disconnection in response to the client's devastating isolation. Sadness, perhaps related to pity, also becomes prominent. Rosowsky and Dougherty (1998) noted how substantial feelings of disconnection, worry, and inadequacy occurred among individuals treating a man with schizoid and schizotypal traits who frequently fled his inpatient medical hospitalizations. A. T. Beck et al. (2004) noted that therapists may have a difficult time when clients have substantially different values from theirs. For example, the person with schizoid PD may have little interest in relationships; those of us who have chosen clinical psychology as a profession are likely to put relationships at a premium. A. T. Beck et al. recommended that therapists challenge their belief that their own way of looking at the world is the only valid one and to try to imagine the world from the client's perspective. 80
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In accordance with the observations above, research on graduate students suggests that they initially respond to individuals with schizoid PD with feelings of compassion and sympathy, but also pity and disconnection. Many respond with feelings of sadness or downheartedness, even when the client does not appear to be particularly depressed (Bockian, 2002a); perhaps this is related to the conflict in values discussed by A. T. Beck et al. (2004), which was reviewed above. Considerable anxiety is generated in some students, apparently because of concerns that they will not know what to say to the person and therapy will grind to a halt. Experienced therapists probably feel the same way at times, although 1 suspect many of us feel what the average person feels in response to people with schizoid PD: boredom (Millon, 1996). The dullness, the impoverished descriptions of others, and the satisfaction with a bland, colorless existence can lead to a subdued therapeutic environment, one that is nonetheless appropriate and received positively by the individual with the disorder. I also recall my work with people with brain injury. Often, other people would get angry with the person who was brain injured for being "lazy." It was clearly the case that some people with brain injury would become apathetic and unmotivated. It struck me that concepts with a strong moral valence, or ones that we might attribute to a person's self or even his or her soul, are mediated by the brain. A person who becomes apathetic after brain injury may not merely be "not trying"; it could be that the physiological apparatus that underlies motivation has been damaged. Certainly, this poses a challenge—perhaps an insurmountable one—to the physical or occupational therapist who is trying to help the person return to functioning. However, recognition of damage to the motivational system conceptually changes the therapy: Therapy consists of undertaking exercises that will help to repair the motivational system itself. In the United States, people place great value on "trying." Probably each and every one of the hundreds of millions of students who have passed through the public education system has heard, particularly in the younger grades, "Whether you do well or poorly, it's okay, as long as you tried your best." The ability to try is itself taken for granted as a lowest common denominator. If Millon's theory (Millon, 1981, 1996) about the brain structures and functioning of people with schizoid PD is correct, then their capacity to try, to be effortful, to engage in motivated behavior is itself reduced. Recognizing that the person is confronting an unusual biological challenge often helps the clinician to reduce feelings of frustration. Therapist emotional reactions can also be a wise guide regarding the therapeutic contract. Although it is often wise to reduce session length and frequency, if this is an inappropriate avoidance of a person who is truly distressed then such avoidance is a harmful countertransference that demands supervision or peer consultation. However, in many cases, it is part of an appropriate plan. Feelings of frustration can often help to guide me in this regard. The person with schizoid PD may have rather modest goals for imSCHIZOID PERSONALITY DISORDER
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provement, and change may be very slow. If the therapeutic goal in supportive or behavioral therapy, for example, involves interacting with others, and it takes the client 10 days or so to hook up with someone else, then a biweekly session will feel more fruitful to both parties than the more typical weekly sessions. Of course, there are therapies that involve no explicit or implicit demand to change (e.g., client centered and existential), and in psychodynamic therapy, there is so much material to cover from the past as well as so much to process in the transference that frequent, full-length sessions are appropriate. When working with someone with schizoid PD, collaborative goal setting is extremely important. It is all too easy to project our own needs or desires onto the person. We therapists were likely drawn to this field because we value relationships and have high levels of empathy with others. We likely see warm relationships with others as healthy, and the cooler, more detached relations of people with schizoid PD as problematic. We may therefore jump to conclusions about the nature of the problems of individuals with schizoid PD. We may view their isolation or lack of intimate relationships with others as devastating or pathological. The clients, however, may see things very differently. They may have little desire to interact with others, much less pursue close relationships. Thus we must carefully assess individuals and work with them to uncover their goals and motivations. Therapist lack of congruence with a client's goals can lead to premature termination and a negative attitude toward therapy.
SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND DIVERSITY Theoretical considerations would lead to the expectation that schizoid PD is far more frequent in men than in women. Current theory indicates that men are less related than women. Levant (1995) discussed "normative male alexithymia" to indicate the frequent observation that men lack words for feelings. Although we might expect high ratios of men relative to women, as in narcissistic or antisocial PDs, current prevalence data do not indicate these differences. According to the DSM-IV-TR, there are "slightly" more men than women with schizoid PD, and they appear to be more severely impacted by it (American Psychiatric Association, ZOOOa). Perhaps, then, passivity is more acceptable and less damaging to the feminine role than to the masculine. A man who is passive, noncompetitive, and underachieving may be deemed more unacceptable, given American culture's emphasis on male dominance and achievement. American culture may be more tolerant of passivity in women. Even within the female role, however, a woman with schizoid PD may experience pressure for not being sufficiently nurturing, assuming that she dates, marries, or has children; this issue is addressed in the case study below. 82
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Low socioeconomic status is generally a risk factor for psychopathology (Dohrenwend & Dohrenwend, 1969). There is a well-known association between schizophrenia and low socioeconomic status (Eaton & Harrison, 2001), which likely generalizes, at least to some degree, to the schizophrenia spectrum. The two main theories of the etiological impact of low socioeconomic status are social causation (e.g., that poverty increases stress levels, causing psychopathology) and social selection (i.e., that psychopathology impairs productivity and leads to poverty; Dohrenwend et al., 1992). In general, both factors work simultaneously (Johnson, Cohen, Dohrenwend, Link, & Brook, 1999). For example, an impoverished individual may become depressed in part because of his poverty. Because he is unable to afford treatment, his depression worsens, and he loses his job, leading to increased poverty. It should be noted that in some cultures, what DSM-IV-TR labeled "schizoid" is considered the highest state of being. The Buddhist monk (Foulks, 1996, p. 249) or Hindu yogi (Castillo, 1997) yearn to experience a state of inner emptiness, freedom from striving, a focus on the present, and a lack of "ego" (in the sense of individual identity and the pride that goes with it), and to be free from emotions and attachments. Such individuals engage in regular meditation practice to attain such a state. I doubt that many clinicians would confuse the practiced, refined state of tranquility of the Buddhist or Hindu cleric with the inner deadness of the depressed person with schizoid PD. However, members of the Buddhist and Hindu religions may accept or even value ways of being that a practitioner from a Western perspective may see as problematic. In addition, Castillo (1997) noted that an individual is more likely to be labeled schizoid if he or she has a "stigmatized moral career": There are a number of ways that a person with a stigmatized moral career can adapt to the social environment, thus structuring personality development. For example, stigmatized persons can accept their status and "act accordingly," that is, passively accept their low status. These persons will likely have low self-esteem. They accept society's definition of them as being inferior, flawed, incapable, unworthy, inadequate, unacceptable, and so on. They internalize this stigmatized view of themselves, literally structuring it into the neural networks of their brains. These neural networks then structure their cognition of the world, (p. 42) One can easily see the origins of depression in this conceptualization. Low self-esteem and beliefs that one is inadequate are part of the diagnostic criteria for major depression and dysthymic disorder. The passivity of the individual with schizoid traits makes this "accepting" adaptation likely. As implied in the analysis above, both depression and schizoid personality disorder would be more likely to develop in hierarchical societies such as the United States (Castillo, 1997, p. 100). Some cultures have more muted forms of expression than others. For example, individuals from Scandinavian cultures tend to be more reserved than SCHIZOID PERSONALITY DISORDER
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people in the United States. Thus Scandinavian families may have a greater tolerance for the reduced emotionality associated with schizoid PD. However, Scandinavians are as sociable as Americans, and the withdrawal of the individual from family and community life would be seen as problematic. Conversely, families from highly expressive cultures (e.g., Hispanic) may have a great deal of difficulty with the schizoid individual's lack of warmth and emotionality, and the schizoid behaviors may be particularly troubling to the family. DSM-IV-TR cautioned that there are several groups that may be erroneously labeled schizoid. Individuals who move from rural to urban areas may exhibit "emotional freezing" (American Psychiatric Association, ZOOOa, p. 695) for up to several months. Similarly, immigrants may be misperceived as cold or indifferent.
STRENGTHS OF PERSONS WITH SCHIZOID PERSONALITY DISORDER When one considers the person-environment match, it is not difficult to see that there are many aspects of schizoid PD that are adaptive to certain conditions. Individuals with a low need for stimulation do well at repetitive tasks or isolated jobs that would mercilessly bore most people. Institutionalized clients with restless temperaments grow agitated and desperate; the person with schizoid features adapts extraordinarily well to institutional life. Although living in an institution may not be considered ideal, for individuals with certain kinds of problems it is the setting in which they will spend a great deal of their time. It is a sad reality that the needs of institutions to provide minimal staff-patient contact and to have maximal patient compliance with routines that are generally rather dull favors features of schizoid, dependent, and obsessive-compulsive personality disorders. There are also personality strengths inherent in schizoidal features that fall within the "normal" or positive range of functioning. Being eventempered, steady, and calm are traits that stand one in good stead in many situations. A person with schizoid PD who improves in psychotherapy can be expected to retain these positive characteristics. As noted previously, advanced meditators achieve a state of inner peace through disciplined practice, attaining a state that bears some resemblance to the person with schizoid PD's natural way of being; the client could capitalize on that proclivity in therapy.
TREATMENT PLANNING: SYNERGISTIC TREATMENT Personality-guided therapy (PGT) treatment goals flow logically from the conceptualization of the client, per Millon's theory. Because the person 84
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EXHIBIT 4.2 Therapeutic Strategies and Tactics for the Prototypal Schizoid Personality STRATEGIC GOALS Balance Polarities Increase pleasure/enhancing polarity Increase active/modifying polarity Counter Perpetuations Overcome impassive behaviors Increase perceptual awareness Stimulate social activity TACTICAL MODALITIES Energize apathetic mood Develop interpersonal involvement Alter impoverished cognitions. Note. From Personality-Guided Therapy (p. 291), by T. Millon, 1999, New York: John Wiley & Sons. Copyright 1999 by John Wiley & Sons. Reprinted with permission of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
with schizoid PD is considered the passive-detached type, naturally, the goal is to balance the polarities by helping the client to become more active and more attached to others. Because the person is pleasure deficient, an additional goal is to increase pleasure. It is also important to undercut processes that tend to perpetuate the schizoid pattern. Vicious circles of the person with schizoid PD include (a) extreme passivity, which undermines the development of assertiveness and other appropriate skills; (b) lack of social awareness, which leads to unpleasant social interactions, thus further reducing opportunities to perceive social cues; and (c) the tendency to withdraw, which generally leads to further withdrawal. Thus, therapy should be geared toward reducing impassive behaviors, improving social awareness, and increasing social activity (see Exhibit 4.2). The long-term goals for depressed individuals with schizoid PD include increasing their activity level, enhancing pleasure, improving their social interactions and increasing their frequency, and bringing clarity to their vague cognitions so they can recognize their depression and cope with it more effectively (Bockian & Jongsma, 2001; Jongsma & Peterson, 1999). For the client with schizoid PD and depression, motivation will often be problematic; thus, the best initial interventions will be those that offer the best hope of rapid change. Behaviorally lethargic, people who have both depression and schizoid PD typically first respond best to cognitive interventions; they can challenge their negative thoughts and improve their mood while expending minimal physical energy. If the depression is not so severe that it precludes psychotherapeutic improvement, then it is best to wait for some psychological improvements to occur before introducing psychopharSCHIZOID PERSONALITY DISORDER
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macological interventions; the typical person with schizoid PD, who is not very psychologically minded, may be prone to attributing any gains made to medications and lose motivation to make psychological changes. Behavioral techniques could then be added, targeting specific social skills to improve (e.g., assertiveness), or specific antidepressive behaviors (e.g., exercise or reengaging in a favored hobby). Establishing these fundamental skills will generally be very helpful prior to attempting to repair the deeper interpersonal and structural problems the person encounters. Cognitive improvements, such as changing self-defeating thoughts, and adding skills, such as increased assertiveness, are likely to have positive interpersonal consequences. For example, the depressed person with schizoid PD may have the thought, "I am so worthless that no one would want to be with me," which may lead to neglecting a relationship ("It's just going to end anyway")- If these beliefs have been corrected with cognitive therapy, then the individual is likely to be more receptive to discussing relationship issues. Interpersonal interventions, then, can build on cognitive improvements, strengthening the person's relationships. Group and family interventions can either run concurrently with, or replace, individual treatment. As mentioned previously, group interventions have the distinct advantage of allowing the individual to practice social skills with peers. Family interventions can have positive motivational aspects as well because the therapist can provide support for beleaguered family members while supporting the client, and the family can help motivate the client to continue to come to treatment. Depth approaches, such as psychodynamic interventions, would generally be considered last because they tend to produce change more slowly and thus require greater motivation on the part of the client. The current therapist can implement psychodynamic interventions, though in some cases it would be wise to refer the client, thus allowing the transference to form anew.
CASE EXAMPLE: CANDACE AND LORENZO It is not a coincidence that most of the clients whom I saw who had schizoid PD also had histories of major psychopathology (e.g., schizophrenia or bipolar disorder). I saw them mostly when I was an intern working for the New York state psychiatric system. Their schizoid PD was never the reason that they saw themselves coming for therapy. However, in the case below, the severe Axis I psychopathology had been stabilized, leaving some Axis I depression and anxiety, and the underlying schizoid PD, as treatment issues. At the time I met her, Candace, a 42-year-old divorced White AngloSaxon Protestant woman, had had a long history of depression and schizophrenia. She had been hospitalized for schizophrenia on several occasions, but when I started seeing her as an outpatient, she was stable on medications and had not been in the hospital for a number of years. I saw her for approxi86
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mately 1 year, and she was not psychotic during that time. Candace's schizophrenia was treated with low-dose neuroleptics, and she had chronic anxiety, for which she took buspirone. She had chronic, vague feelings of sadness, which, when combined with her passivity, would meet the criteria for dysthymic disorder. Candace also met the criteria for schizoid PD. Although an intelligent woman—she had received a college education and worked as an editor—her descriptions of her relationships were quite impoverished. She had a 22-yearold daughter who was in college and whom she saw occasionally. When she would mention her daughter or say that her daughter was coming for a visit, she evinced neither excitement nor displeasure. This was her closest family relationship; she rarely mentioned her parents or other family members. Unlike most depressions, Candace's appeared to lack substantial interpersonal components. She did not describe being depressed because she felt unloved or unlovable, unwanted, or abandoned. She stated that she felt empty at times, and she also described feeling different from others. She had a history of suicidal ideation when she was in the psychiatric hospital suffering from schizophrenic symptoms. Her frightening delusions and hallucinations led her to feel hopeless that she would ever get out of the hospital or recover. Once she stopped having hallucinations, she stopped having suicidal ideation. The presenting problems at the time of referral were relationship difficulties between Candace and her boyfriend, Lorenzo. As is common in internship settings, I "inherited" the case from a prior intern, and Candace and Lorenzo were already in ongoing couples therapy; I continued, then, to see them as a couple. However, I was not insistent on seeing both members of the couple at once (Napier, 1978); if one person was sick and the other still came, I would see just that person. During those occasional individual sessions, we would refrain from talking about couple issues but rather would work on individual issues. With Candace, one of our better sessions on her depression occurred during one such session. Lorenzo was diagnosed with borderline intellectual functioning. His personality style was dramatic, and although he did not have a diagnosable personality disorder, he had features that were primarily histrionic and somewhat dependent. Lorenzo wanted much more from the relationship with Candace—marriage, as well as increased closeness and intimacy. Candace was satisfied with how things were and seemed a bit puzzled by Lorenzo's needs and desires. Thus there was a striking reversal of common American gender patterns in this case. Candace was the breadwinner, unemotional, and relatively alexithymic; Lorenzo, on the other hand, was more emotion focused and demonstrative. Candace came from a family that was formal in its structure. Dinner was eaten together at the same time each day, accompanied by polite, quiet conversation. Children were expected to be "seen and not heard." Achieve SCHIZOJD PERSONALITY DISORDER
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ment and education were emphasized. She stated that her parents cared most about her grades and that because she always did well in that area, her parents "didn't hassle her." Her meager social life was accepted as being "her decision." Lorenzo's Hispanic family was more demonstrative, openly displaying warmth and affection. There was no abuse in either family, although Lorenzo endured a moderate amount of teasing as a child. The manner in which Candace and Lorenzo were raised was consistent with their White Anglo'Saxon Protestant and Hispanic subcultures, respectively (Garcia-Preto, 1996; McGill & Pearce, 1996). However, although Lorenzo's histrionic and dependent features may have been normative within the context of an expressive, tightly knit Hispanic family, Candace's social withdrawal and aloofness were clearly beyond what would be considered appropriate within her culture. Candace's strengths included a general kindness—although not particularly empathic, she did try to be helpful to others, and she was never malicious. She was both consistent and patient with Lorenzo. She was bright, hardworking, and confident in her abilities as an editor. Though she was not warm or demonstrative, she took pride in her daughter's accomplishments and provided for the daughter's material needs. She coped very competently with her schizophrenia; she had excellent insight and was fully compliant with her medication regimen. It was interesting that the vast difference between Candace's and Lorenzo's IQs never became an issue. This was most likely because of Candace's nonstriving and "egoless" nature; she did not have a need for status that would have required her boyfriend to be highly accomplished. Candace also tended to express herself in a simple and straightforward fashion, and so Lorenzo had no difficulty understanding her. Lorenzo also demonstrated a variety of strengths. A warm and caring individual, he was able to be consistently affectionate with Candace. Without his persistence—or, put differently, if Candace were dating someone with a personality more similar to her own—the relationship likely would have drifted into isolation and separateness. Lorenzo was also able to take advantage of the programs offered through state and community facilities that provided him with work, activities, and independence. Candace was not completely detached. She preferred to have some company some of the time. She enjoyed spending time with Lorenzo but did not want him to move in and did not want to increase the amount of time they spent together (they would meet several times per week). In addition, therapy provided Candace with some measure of support that she seemed to appreciate. Treatment initially consisted primarily of cognitive interventions. Candace had beliefs such as "I am empty" and "I am odd and different" that led to feelings of depression. She was encouraged to challenge these beliefs and came up on her own with the notion that each person is unique, and who is to say what is acceptable or not? Unconditional positive regard on the part 88
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of the therapist arid Lorenzo's persistent affection were consistent reminders that she was an acceptable person. As for the belief that she was empty, her emotional reasoning (I feel empty, therefore I am empty) and her dichotO' mous reasoning ("I am empty" as opposed to "At times I feel empty") were challenged through Socratic dialogue. Over time, her belief was modified to "At times I feel empty, but I often feel fulfilled as a mother to my daughter, a girlfriend to Lorenzo, and in my job." Lorenzo had beliefs such as "Candace does not really love me or she would marry me"; "If we do not get married, that is terrible"; and "Candace must be more affectionate with me, or I cannot bear it." These beliefs were challenged against his experience and, gradually, were reframed as preferences, for example, "I would prefer it if Candace were more affectionate." The belief that Candace would marry him if she loved him was challenged, on the basis that Lorenzo would lose valuable disability benefits if the couple got married. Although marriage was highly preferable to Lorenzo, particularly given his religious upbringing, he was able to see that Candace's finances were stretched to the limit in supporting her daughter through college. After the most distressing beliefs were effectively challenged, the treatment approach shifted to become more interpersonally focused. During this phase of treatment, Lorenzo more frequently raised issues that were distressing to him. On a number of occasions, he would protest that unless Candace could be more affectionate, then perhaps they should break up. Candace was not ruffled by these threats, which did not seem to be particularly genuine. However, at least one form of affection could be improved. Sexual counseling with the couple enabled them to experience more warmth and intimacy. At that point, it became clear that Candace had reached the limits of her motivation, and probably her ability, to become warmer and more demonstrative. Although the words "schizoid personality disorder" were never used, the concept of "this is just how she is" was used as a way of discussing personality variables. As a way of helping Lorenzo to empathize, I noted that just as it was difficult for Lorenzo to reduce his desires, it was difficult for Candace to increase hers. Ultimately, it came down to a choice—"Can you accept her for who she is? Can you accept him for who he is?" They continued to stay together, and though ambivalent at times, they were more flexible, accepting, and realistic about both themselves and each other. The overall tone of the relationship had become warmer and more affectionate. Candace was less depressed, and Lorenzo was less angry and anxious. They recognized each other's strengths—that she was drawn to his emotionality and enjoyed his devotion to her, and he appreciated her patience and consistency. Although 1 did not then work with psychodynamic concepts in this case—for example by looking at unconscious motivations, early family relations, repetitions of prior patterns, and compensatory strivings—PGT prinSCHIZOID PERSONALITY DISORDER
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ciples indicate that such an approach would have been an appropriate step. Dynamically oriented therapy may have helped the couple gain further insights and enable them to achieve a better understanding of both the self and the other person (e.g., Ackerman, 1958). If it were not possible to switch from the current supportive mode to psychodynamic therapy—a real possibility, because the transference has already been shaped by supportive interventions—then an alternative would have been to add a psychodynamically oriented individual therapist for one or both members of the couple. I continued to see the couple throughout the remainder of the year, although the gains described above were mostly accomplished during the first 8 months. Given the numerous challenges that they faced—schizophrenia, depression, and borderline intellectual functioning—long-term supportive therapy was used for relapse prevention and to prevent hospitalization. After I terminated with the couple, they were transferred to a new intern.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Schizoid PD with depression can be difficult to treat because of low energy levels and motivation. With realistic expectations regarding recovery, prognosis is reasonably good. As illustrated by the case of Candace and Lorenzo, a series of synergistic sequences led to significant improvements. Establishing trust was not particularly difficult. Cognitive techniques (challenging distorted thoughts such as Lorenzo's experiencing Candace's reserve as personal rejection) and interpersonal-family techniques (e.g., sexual counseling) led to improvements in the couple's relationship as well as decreased symptoms in each individual. For purposes of PGT for depression, empirical research on catalytic sequences, beginning with examining potential motivational strategies, would be appropriate. Research on medications may be more important with this population than with others, because motivation for change is a key ingredient for success in psychotherapy, and the lethargy that typifies individuals with schizoid PD and depression needs to be countered.
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5 DEPRESSION IN SCHIZOTYPAL PERSONALITY DISORDER
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text revision [DSM-IV-TR]; American Psychiatric Association, ZOOOa) described schizotypal personality disorder (PD) as "a pervasive pattern of social and interpersonal deficits marked by acute discomfort with, and reduced capacity for, close relationships as well as by cognitive or perceptual distortions and eccentricities of behavior" (p. 697). Individuals with schizotypal PD are seen by others as eccentric, odd, or just plain weird. They have strange, loosely connected thoughts, superstitions, and, frequently, paranoia. They may believe that they have special powers, especially clairvoyance or extrasensory perception.
PHENOMENOLOGY: THE EXPERIENCE OF SCHIZOTYPAL PERSONALITY DISORDER Interpersonally, individuals with schizotypal PD are generally withdrawn. However, the social withdrawal can occur for different reasons. People with schizotypal PD can be thought of as belonging to one of two subtypes, as
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noted by Millon (1996, 1999)—a schizotypal-avoidant type (Millon's timorous schizotypal) and a schizotypal-schizoid type (the insipid schizotypal). The timorous schizotypal individual longs to be accepted but, fearful of rejection, actively avoids others. More dysfunctional than most avoidant persons because of the additional challenge of cognitive slippage, persons belonging to this subtype have likely experienced excessive actual rejection, especially in the form of teasing as a child. Like other avoidant people, they are highly prone to depressive and anxiety disorders. The insipid schizotypal person has a generally more comfortable time of it than the timorous type; for this individual, passive and detached, rejection by others does not wound. As with other schizoid persons, however, this can lead to a lack of motivation to change and a continued pattern of poor adjustment and underachievement. Individuals with schizotypal PD as well as depression, then, are more likely to be of the timorous sort—anxious, fearful, wanting connection with others but unable to attain it, and thus always feeling as if they are "on the outside looking in." Of course, social withdrawal is also associated with depression alone, so a person with either subtype of schizotypal PD with comorbid depression is likely to be quite withdrawn. The depressive thoughts are also often moderated, if you will, by the person's cognitive dysfunction. For example, in the case example at the end of the chapter, the client presented with quasi-delusional thoughts (e.g., Demons are stealing my clothing) rather than a more direct expression of dysphoric affect (e.g., "I feel helpless and vulnerable").
EPIDEMIOLOGY The prevalence of schizotypal PD, according to DSM-IV-TR, is 3.0% in the general population. According to a meta-analysis of nine communitybased studies by Mattia and Zimmerman (2001), the prevalence of schizotypal PD is 1.8%. At least one study (Maier, Lichtermann, Klingler, Heun, 6k Hallmayer, 1992) noted that schizotypal PD was diagnosed more frequently in men, although that hypothesis was not statistically tested. Approximately one half of individuals with schizotypal PD have a history of major depression (American Psychiatric Association, 2000a; Siever, 1992). Of the 116 individuals with major depression in a study by Zimmerman and Coryell (1989), 12.9% had schizotypal PD. In Pepper et al.'s (1995) dysthymic disorder sample, 4% had schizotypal PD. In another sample of depressed clients, approximately 3% had schizotypal PD (Fava et al., 1995). In a sample of 249 depressed outpatients, fewer than 1% were diagnosed with "definite," and 1% with "probable," schizotypal PD (Shea, Glass, Pilkonis, Watkins, & Docherty, 1987). Among individuals with major depression, 65.2% met the criteria for schizotypal PD. In a sample of 352 clients with both anxiety and depression, approximately 2.3% had schizotypal PD, as diagnosed by structured interview (Flick, Roy-Byrne, Cowley, Shores, & Dunner, 92
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1993). The range, then, is virtually none (fewer than 1%) to nearly two thirds (66.3%) of individuals with depression having schizotypal PD. Likely reasons for the enormous range include natural sample variation, inpatient versus outpatient status, different definitions of depression (e.g., dysthymic disorder vs. major depression), and changing criteria—for example, some studies used criteria from the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III; American Psychiatric Association, 1980), and some used criteria from the revised third edition (DSM-III-R; American Psychiatric Association, 1987). Further research clarifying the overlap of depression and schizotypal PD is warranted. There are fewer data on the prevalence of depression in a sample of individuals with PDs, although the findings are more consistent. Zimmerman and Coryell (1989) studied a community sample of 797 individuals, which included 143 individuals who were diagnosed with personality disorders. Among those with schizotypal PD, 65.2% met the criteria for major depression. A study that included 86 clients with schizotypal PD found that 66.3% had major depression (McGlashin et al., 2000). WHY DO PEOPLE WITH SCHIZOTYPAL PERSONALITY DISORDER GET DEPRESSED? Depression in people with schizotypal PD is likely to be precipitated by major cognitive problems associated with the personality disorder. The person with schizotypal PD is highly prone to feelings of depersonalization. As stated by Millon (1981), The deficient or disharmonious affect of schizotypals deprives them of the capacity to experience events as something other than flat and lifeless phenomena. They suffer a sense of vapidness in a world of cold and washed-out objects. Moreover, schizotypals feel themselves to be more dead than alive, insubstantial, foreign, and disembodied. As existential phenomenologists might put it, they are threatened by "nonbeing." (p. 413)
Anyone who persistently experienced such thoughts and feelings would likely experience depression and anxiety. Schizotypal PD and major depression with psychotic features can interact with negative synergy. As illustrated in the case study below, a woman whose clothing was being stolen or misplaced in a nursing home developed the delusion that demons were stealing her clothing. Her depression, which was in part related to the loss of control, stimulation, and freedom associated with living in a nursing home, rapidly deteriorated from an adjustment disorder to a major depression with psychotic features. Conversely, paranoid ideation can also be depressing. Although anger and self-righteous indignation can sometimes help the person with paranoid personality disorder to ward off depression, such is rarely SCHIZOTYPAL PERSONALITY DISORDER
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the case with the person who has schizotypal PD, who is likely to simply feel vulnerable, overwhelmed, and frightened. Although social withdrawal is pervasive among people with schizotypal PD, an excess of detachment is depressing. Most of us, even the more sociable among us, have experienced a desire for privacy after a period of intensive social interaction or a desire to "get out there" after a period of reclusiveness; similarly, the person with schizotypal PD has a threshold that produces discomfort when exceeded. For most people with schizotypal PD, considerable anxiety accompanies an amount of social interaction that most people would consider normal or even sparse, whereas depression is likely to ensue when isolation becomes excessive. Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory Scale 8, Schizophrenia, contains a substantial number of items that essentially measure social alienation. As in schizophrenia, social alienation is a major component of schizotypal PD. People with schizotypal PD were often odd or different from an early age and experienced substantial peer rejection as children. This feeling of being odd, different, or an outcast is often depressing and can lead to depression later in life. Social disengagement itself can predispose one to a generally poor adjustment and put one at risk for a variety of disorders, including depression. As noted by P. Kernberg, Weiner, and Bardenstein (2000), Teacher reports from the beginning of the Danish High-Risk Study (Olin et al., 1997) confirm that children later diagnosed with [schizotypal PD] were seen as passive and socially unengaged, hypersensitive to criticism, and nervously reactive to events; they did not show social anxiety until adulthood. This research suggests that social anxiety develops as a consequence of the passivity and hypersensitivity that reduces children's socializing opportunities. Their particular traits may also render them ill-prepared to acquire behaviors for mastering the challenges of adulthood for sexuality, intimacy, job, and autonomy and separation, (p. 231) Consistent with the "vulnerability" model of the relationship between Axis I and Axis II, there are several ways in which schizotypal PD appears to make the person more susceptible to depression when under stress (see chap. 2). In addition, to the extent that depression leads to further withdrawal and isolation, the two disorders intensify one another, consistent with the "exacerbation" model. The first of Millon's two subtypes of schizotypal PD, the insipid type, is mainly a mixture of schizotypal and schizoid features. In such cases, the person has extremely limited emotions and thus would be less prone to depression. The second type, the timorous type, is primarily a mixture of schizotypal and avoidant features. Such individuals present as touchy, overstimulated, and hypersensitive. They are prone to anxiety and depressive disorders. For the person with avoidant features, there is usually a strong desire to be ac94
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cepted by others and profound feelings of humiliation and rejection. For the individual who also has schizotypal features, this feeling of oddness, differentness, and rejection was typically reified through early experiences of persistent peer rejection. Often difficulties in clear and rational thinking and the tendency to slip into quasi-delusional and paranoid states only exacerbate depressive feelings and complicate treatment. HOW A PERSON BECOMES AND REMAINS SCHIZOTYPAL: THEORIES OF SCHIZOTYPAL PERSONALITY DISORDER Biological Factors Schizotypal PD shares with schizophrenia symptoms of oddness, eccentricity, and cognitive slippage. Meehl (1962, 1990) labeled this underlying dimension schizotaxia. Meehl's 1962 hypothesis that schizotaxia has a substantial genetic component has been supported by a variety of studies. Studies have also shown that schizotypal PD is biologically related to schizophrenia, thus justifying the conceptualization of schizotypal PD as part of the "schizophrenia spectrum" disorders (Siever, 1992). A number of studies have shown that schizotypal PD is at least moderately heritable. Genetic factors accounted for approximately 50% of the variance in dimensional measures such as social avoidance (Livesley, Jang, Jackson, &. Vernon, 1993), restricted expression, and inhibition and for 38% of the variance in affect constriction (for a review, see Jang & Vernon, 2001). Family studies have shown an increased rate of schizotypal PD (or its symptoms) in biological relatives of schizophrenics (vs. adoptive relatives), and, conversely, the rate of schizophrenia in relatives of individuals with schizotypal PD is higher than in the general population (for a review, see Tyrka et al., 1995). According to a review by Siever et al. (1998), studies have shown that individuals with schizotypal PD have a variety of cognitive dysfunctions that are similar to those of individuals with schizophrenia but lower in severity. Executive function, visuospatial working memory, verbal memory, and sustained attention are all impaired. Studies have shown that similar to individuals with schizophrenia, people with schizotypal PD have an excess of dopamine (Siever et al., 1991). Fukuzako, Kodama, and Fukuzako (2002) found phospholipid abnormalities in the left temporal lobe. A magnetic resonant imaging (MRI) and positron-emission tomography study demonstrated that a schizotypal PD group was in between a schizophrenic group and a normal control group in metabolic rates in the prefrontal area while performing a verbal learning task (Buchsbaum et al., 2002). Neuroanatomical Features
Like individuals with schizophrenia (though to a lesser degree), individuals with schizotypal PD have increased ventricular volume and asymmeSCHIZOTYPAL PERSONALITY DISORDER
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try relative to normal controls (Buchsbaum et al., 1997), research participants with other personality disorders (Siever et al., 1995), and research participants with a variety of non-schizophrenia-spectrum disorders (T. D. Cannon et al., 1994). Neuroanatomical differences include substantial (21%) decreased left Heschl's gyrus volume (Dickey et al., 2002), which is related to problems with logical memory. Similar to medication-naive schizophrenic subjects, a sample of individuals with schizotypal PD had reduced caudate nucleus size relative to matched non—psychiatrically disordered controls; reduced caudate nucleus size is related to problems in working memory (Levitt et al., 2002). An MRI study showed that temporal lobe size is smaller in individuals with schizotypal PD than in normal controls (Downhill et al., 2001); the authors interpreted their findings to indicate that gray matter loss in the temporal lobes, with intact white matter connectivity, relates to the psychopathological symptoms of schizotypal PD. The corpus callosum of schizotypal PD samples had reduced volume and a different shape from those of normal controls, suggesting reduced connectivity in the brains of individuals with schizotypal PD (Downhill et al., 2000). There is evidence that there are prenatal neurodevelopmental abnormalities, based on the discovery of minor physical anomalies that are known to originate prenatally, studied cross-sectionally in a group of schizotypal research participants relative to a nondisordered comparison group (Weinstein, Diforio, Schiffman, Walker, & Bonsall, 1999) and longitudinally in a schizotypal PD sample (E. F. Walker, Logan, & Walder, 1999). Using MRI and positron-emission tomography scans, Shihabuddin et al. (2001) showed that a sample of participants with schizotypal PD had reduced volume and increased metabolism of the putamen relative to both schizophrenic and control participants. According to the authors, "These alterations in volume and activity may be related to the sparing of patients with [schizotypal PD] from frank psychosis" (p. 877). A reasonable summary of the biological literature is that schizotypal PD is similar to schizophrenia but milder in degree. Medications Preliminary evidence has suggested that several dimensions of schizotypal PD can be addressed with medications. Schulz, Schulz, and Wilson (1988) provided a review of medications for schizotypal PD, including some older studies of pseudoneurotic schizophrenia (a forerunner of schizotypal PD). The authors reviewed three studies that contained pseudoneurotic schizophrenia samples: The study by Klein (cited in Schulz et al., 1988) was doubleblind and placebo controlled; the study by Hedberg, Houck, and Glueck (cited in Schulz et al., 1988) was double-blind but not placebo controlled; and the study by Aono et al. (cited in Schulz et al., 1988) was an open trial. As expected, neuroleptics decreased psychotic-like symptoms; surprisingly, they helped with depression as well. Also surprisingly, the effects of antidepressants were not limited to affective symptoms; indeed, in one study, the 96
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monoamine oxidase inhibitor tranylcypromine was more efficacious than triflurophenazine in reducing overall symptoms (Hedberg et al., cited in Schulz et al., 1988); in another study, imipramine reduced symptoms more than chlorpromazine (Klein, cited in Schulz et al., 1988). The Aono et al. (cited in Schulz et al., 1988) study demonstrated that the antidepressant amoxapine seemed to be effective for both psychotic and neurotic symptoms. Schulz et al. (1988) reviewed four later studies that examined the effects of neuroleptic medication prescribed in low doses, as well as antidepressant medications in their usual therapeutic dosage. Unfortunately for our present purposes, most of the samples were a mixture of individuals with borderline PD and schizotypal PD. The studies were modest in size (17-52 participants) but were either double-blind or single blind. The four studies taken together support the low-dose neuroleptic strategy, with at least one study demonstrating similar improvements in participants regardless of diagnosis (e.g., borderline PD, schizotypal PD, or both). Neuroleptics generally outperformed tricyclic antidepressants (which had equivocal results and made some participants considerably worse). Later studies defined schizotypal PD participants more precisely and used newer medications. Preliminary findings with atypical antipsychotics are encouraging. Scarciglia, Gherardelli, Tarsitani, and Biondi (2004) presented a case study that demonstrated a reduction in dissociative episodes using olanzapine. Keshavan, Shad, Soloff, and Schooler (2004) performed a 26-week open-label trial of olanzapine with 11 participants; they found significant improvements in psychosis, depression, and overall functioning. Koenigsberg et al. (2003) performed a 9-week randomized clinical trial of risperidone with 25 participants. As assessed by the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale, negative schizophrenic symptoms began to remit by Week 3, and a reduction in positive symptoms had occurred by Week 7. Newer antidepressants may also be helpful. One study has shown that depressive symptoms remit with fluoxetine treatment (Markovitz, Calabrese, Schulz, &. Meltzer, 1991); however, these results should be interpreted with caution because the study was uncontrolled, and the small sample (N = 22) was a mixture of individuals with borderline and schizotypal PDs. Jensen and Anderson (1989) found in their 39-day open-label trial that the tricyclic antidepressant amoxapine helped to reduce schizophrenia-like and depressive symptoms in the five schizotypal PD participants in their sample. It is not clear if amoxapine is superior to imipramine in treating schizotypal PD symptoms, if the high percentage of borderline PD individuals in the Soloff et al. (1986) study led to different results, or if Jensen and Andersen's (1989) miniscule sample (N = 5) was too small to detect iatrogenic effects. In all, the evidence above supports, albeit tentatively, Joseph's (1997) concise conclusion: Strictly from a symptomatic approach, schizotypal personality disorder can be considered a mild form of schizophrenia with the same characterSCH/ZOTYPAL PERSONALITY DISORDER
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istics except that psychotic thought, perceptual, and affective symptoms are mild; hence the personal, social, and occupational deterioration are proportionately less severe. . . . Since the difference is quantitative and not qualitative, the treatment employs similar medications, the primary difference being in the dose size. (pp. 58-59) Joseph (1997) provided a case illustration of a 50-year-old woman who had schizotypal PD and depressed mood. Her symptoms included poor memory, poor concentration, ideas of reference, obsessive ruminations, and insomnia. She was treated with fluoxetine, risperidone, temazepam, and psychotherapy. Noted Joseph, "The patient reported almost complete resolution of most symptoms, and felt that she should have started this treatment 25 years ago" (p. 62). Psychological Factors In the biopsychosocial model, the psychological level falls between the highly individual biological level and the large-scale sociocultural level. Psychological factors include the person's learned behaviors, beliefs, emotions, unconscious strivings, and interpersonal relationships. Several established lines of thought emphasize different aspects of the person's experience, and will be described in turn below. Millon's Theory Millon conceptualized schizotypal PD as a more severe, "decompensated" variant of the schizoid or avoidant PDs. Thus, in terms of Millon's tripolar theory, the person with schizotypal PD may appear to be passively detached or actively detached. In contrast to the less severe counterparts of the disorder, people with schizotypal PD also have instabilities on the painpleasure dimension. Where the person with schizoid PD has a deficiency in both pain and pleasure and the person with avoidant PD has an excess of pain sensitivity, the individual with schizotypal PD has weakness along the pain-pleasure dimension such that the two poles may reverse (pleasure is experienced as painful). As Millon (1999) stated, In essence, this signifies that none of the survival motives and aims of the schizotypal have a firm grounding. Rather, they are feeble in their intensity and focus, and can be easily reversed or distorted in their usual objectives and goals. The figure portrays their rather ineffectual existence, as well as the meaningless and eccentric character of their activities. Possessing little spark or drive, these individuals become increasingly estranged from social conventions, (p. 617) Thus, persons with schizotypal PD tend to drift in a downward spiral. Their social withdrawal leads to insufficient stimulation, lack of checks and balances on quasi-delusional thinking, and thus further autistic reasoning 98
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and social inadequacy. When life forces them to interact with others for survival, they easily become overwhelmed, to which they typically respond by "blanking out" or with a burst of poorly modulated aggression. At times, they become frankly psychotic. Any of these reactions furthers their social alienation and decreases the probability of stable, positive structures in their daily lives. The description of the person with schizotypal PD in terms of Millon's domains is presented in Appendix B. Of the features listed, cognitive disturbance and social withdrawal are the most prominent. Cognitive-Behavioral Conceptualization and Interventions Cognitive—behavioral therapists note the elevated importance of a sound therapeutic relationship with the person with schizotypal PD. Their proclivity to paranoid thinking and difficulties with social interactions can easily sweep away the therapeutic relationship early in treatment. Only after a therapeutic bond is established, through copious active listening and clearly understanding the client's point of view, can cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) technically begin. A recent and rapidly growing area in the cognitive-behavioral literature is the treatment of psychotic disorders using CBT. At this point, studies have debunked—or at least refined—the old saying that "you can't talk people out of their delusions." CBT has been effective in decreasing the frequency of delusions and the firmness of conviction with which they are held (Haddock et al., 1998; Kingdon & Turkington, 1994). The technique for doing so is to challenge a delusion just like any other belief, especially using thought records and Socratic dialogue. So although "you can't talk a man out of his delusions," one might say that you can show him how to talk himself out of them. Behavioral experiments, carefully structured so that they can provide evidence for or against a belief, are an integral and essential part of the treatment. In retrospect, much treatment for depression is similar. The belief of the bright but depressed college student that she is "stupid" is similar to a nonbizarre delusional belief. Thus methods that are used with quasidelusional and delusional beliefs will pave the ground for treating depressive ideation, and vice versa. Accustomed to trusting their feelings and intuitions, clients with schizotypal PD need to learn to evaluate evidence. Common thoughts experienced by people with schizotypal PD include believing they are dead, believing that they or someone else is possessed by the devil or evil spirits, and paranoid thoughts such as "1 cannot trust my mother." Instructing the client to gather the appropriate evidence and evaluating that evidence during the session can challenge such thoughts. A. T. Beck, Freeman, and Davis (2004) noted that common core beliefs among individuals with schizotypal PD include "I am different and abSCHJZOTYPAL PERSONALfTY DISORDER
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normal" and paranoid ideas such as "people are cruel." They may have ambivalence about these beliefs, on the one hand recognizing that they are a source of distress but on the other hand thinking that their beliefs keep them safe. Working through this ambivalence with a cost-benefit analysis and behavioral experiments can help the individual to make informed choices regarding behavior change. Client-Centered, Humanistic, and Existential Therapies
Client-centered therapy would be a natural fit for someone with schizotypal PD and depression. Feelings of alienation are likely to be prominent, and a consistent, empathic approach is a powerful remedy for such feelings. Existential therapy may also be extremely useful for depressed clients with schizotypal PD. As they grapple with feelings of emptiness and meaninglessness, a therapy that specifically addresses purpose in life could be a powerful antidote (Frankl, 1983; May, 1983b). For the clinician who is not specifically existentially oriented, assigning the client a book to read such as Don't Sweat the Small Stuff (Carlson, 1997), The Miracle ofMindfulness (Nhat Hanh, 1976), or Wherever You Go, There You Are (Kabat-Zinn, 1994) is a useful starting point. Simply assigning the client to read a few pages and then asking if there was anything that he or she found meaningful can lead into a productive discussion of how to find or create meaning in one's life. Psychodynamic Therapy
From the standpoint of psychodynamic theory, schizotypal PD is a somewhat more severe manifestation of schizoid personality phenomena. Please see chapter 6, this volume, for further discussion. Family Systems There is little if any literature on the family treatment of individuals with schizotypal PD. However, a variety of family interventions have been helpful for people with schizophrenia; many aspects of such treatments apply directly to schizotypal PD, and others can be used with minimal modification. Behavioral family therapy (BFT; see studies by C. M. Anderson, Hogarthy, & Reiss, and Falloon, Boyd, McGill, Razani, Moss, & Gilderman, both cited in Razali, Hasanah, Khan, & Subramaniam, 2000) involves family psychoeducation regarding schizophrenia, social skills training, and communication skills training, all of which are widely accepted and effective treatments for schizophrenia. For ethnic minorities, culturally modified family therapy uses culturally sensitive explanations of schizophrenia, medication, and social skills training and had better long-term effectiveness in a Malay population than BFT (Razali et al, 2000). Perhaps the most researched family intervention for schizophrenia is that described in the "expressed emotion" (EE) literature. High EE is charac100
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terized by a great deal of criticism of the identified patient, excessive involvement in the patient's life, and high expressed hostility. High EE has been shown to be a predictor of relapse (psychosis and hospitalization) in schizophrenia (e.g., see Hooley & Licht, 1997). Reduction of EE using family behavior therapy to reduce criticism, hostility, and overinvolvement led to dramatic reductions in relapse. BFT has been used successfully as an intervention in high-EE families (Falloon et al., cited in Razali et al., 2000; Hahlweg & Wiedemann, 1999); to the extent that a family with a person with schizotypal PD has high EE, BFT is likely to be helpful. Family theorists noted that double-bind communication patterns occurred in families with a schizophrenic member (Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson, 1967). Double-binds refer to messages that contain a directive at one level and a counterdirective at another level and that block escape. A classic example is the "be spontaneous" paradox. If a wife orders her husband to "be spontaneous," then if he acts in a spontaneous fashion he is doing so under her direction and therefore is not truly spontaneous; if he does not do so, then he is openly defiant. Watzlawick et al. (1967) hypothesized that the husband in this situation becomes psychotic to escape from the bind. Initially, Watzlawick et al. believed that double-binds from the parents caused schizophrenia in the child, but the theory was quickly modified to note the circular nature of the interactions, in which participants with and without schizophrenia would double-bind one another (see Burbach, 1996). Modern theorists have noted that a biological predisposition is necessary (but not sufficient) to cause schizophrenia, and the same can be said for schizotypal PD. When double-binds do occur, they are typically emotionally destructive, whether or not they cause psychosis. The way to break a double-bind is to address the underlying paradox through assertiveness and related means. For example, instructing the client to say, "When you tell me to be spontaneous, you put me in a no-win situation. I can't be spontaneous by command. How am I supposed to do that?" requires a response from the other person that will help to break the bind. The identified patient can also be instructed to own his or her experience and share it—for example, "When you order me to 'be spontaneous,' I feel trapped and manipulated." In this way, the context is shifted from a struggle for power to a discussion of feelings. A third way out is to directly confront the underlying power issue (e.g., "I understand you want me to be spontaneous, but that's not my goal"). This brings the power struggle out into the open where it can be directly addressed. Group Therapy Group social skills training can be especially helpful because the client can get feedback from peers rather than from the therapist alone. An important caveat for persons with schizotypal PD is that they must be socially appropriate enough to bond with the group and to avoid peer rejection. A former client of mine, "Pat," who had schizotypal PD, attended a group I ran. This SCHIZOTYPAL PERSONALITY DISORDER
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group, a psychoeducation group for individuals with spinal cord injury, rarely included individuals with severe psychopathology, and due to the heavy dose of structure in the group, rarely elicited excessively intense emotions. We were discussing anger management, and I asked about how various individuals handled their anger. One said he counted to 10; another, that he rarely got angry; and a third said he yelled. Pat noted that when he got angry with his brother, he ran him over with a car. The room fell into a stunned, tight silence. I began to wonder if Pat was not only schizotypal, but actually schizophrenic. I pulled Pat from the group and began to see him in individual therapy. The main theme of the brief therapy was reality orientation. Most group therapy clients of mine, however, including those with schizotypal PD, have not alienated themselves in this manner and have profited from the generally accepting and nonjudgmental tenor of the group.
COUNTERTRANSFERENCE The literature on countertransference responses to individuals with schizotypal PD is extremely limited. As discussed in chapter 4, this volume, on schizoid PD, Giovacchini (1979) noted feelings of "existential terror," or a primitive fear of nonexistence, which often led to feelings of hopelessness with his schizoid patients (similar to modern schizoid and schizotypal PDs). Robbins (1998) referring to the "autistic position," discussed countertransference responses such as a feeling of vagueness and disconnection in response to the client's devastating isolation. Sadness, perhaps related to pity, also becomes prominent. Students describing their emotional reaction to individuals with schizotypal PD checked off words such as curious, bewildered, weird, perplexed, disconnected, and pity. Such reactions are consistent with schizotypal pathology (Bockian, 2002a). The individual is eccentric and strange, and tends to elicit odd feelings from the therapist. Such feelings can go in the direction of feeling curious—for example, about the experience of the client or the meaning of the loosely connected ramblings—or the therapist may experience feelings of pity, seeing the person's strangeness as being fundamentally sad. Many people simply cannot relate to these clients' quasi-delusional statements nor to their stiff or awkward style; feelings of disconnection may then result. In working with individuals with schizotypal PD—or with a psychotic disorder, for that matter—I find it helpful to view their statements as metaphors, interpreting them as poems or allegories. For example, a client has a delusion that he is being followed by beings from another planet. The meaning of that will vary from person to person, but there are a number of likely scenarios: The person feels invaded, intruded on, but also important (important enough that the beings chose him as a target). Translating from the 102
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client's beliefs to the likely underlying meanings and understanding those underlying meanings generally shifts my emotional reactions from a felt sense of weirdness, and perhaps a bit of anxiety, to a sense of empathy. The underlying meanings are usually common, shared human reactions. Who among us has not felt intruded on at one time or another? Or wished that we were esteemed, or a bit more important than we probably are? Incidentally, as I look back on the days when I would directly share my insights with clients, I now consider this a clinical error on my part. Their beliefs were concrete— they were being followed by aliens! The most direct approach was to ask how it felt for the person to establish a sense of connection; it can be helpful to guess ("It must be frightening to you"). Unlike strange cognitive distortions, the underlying emotions are usually quite understandable. At that point, an empathic bond is generally readily established.
SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND DIVERSITY As noted by Rollo May (1983a) and Victor Frankl (1983), modern life leaves people vulnerable to the struggle to find meaning in their existence. Traditional societies, through their more intense community involvements and religious beliefs, are unlikely to engender the belief that life is meaningless (Castillo, 1997). In technological societies constructed of tens or hundreds of millions of people, the belief that society would go on pretty much identically whether one participates or not can lead to thinking that one's contribution is trivial and that there is no purpose in one's existence. American society's great strength is its valuing the potential of each individual, but this individualism comes at a cost: If each individual is going in his or her own direction, it is difficult to find secure collections of individuals sharing meaning systems. If this feeling of ennui is relatively widespread among healthy, high-functioning, and privileged members of our society, imagine how much more difficult life is for the individual with constitutional proclivities for cognitive slippage who is isolated from others; subject to peer rejection; and, in many cases, not highly productive at work.
STRENGTHS OF PERSONS WITH SCHIZOTYPAL PERSONALITY DISORDER A number of studies have found a positive connection between schizotypal personality and creativity (Cox & Leon, 1999; Kinney, 20002001; Schuldberg, 2000-2001). A surprising positive relationship was discovered between the Schizotypal scale of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory—III (Millon, 1994) and quality of life (Bockian, Dill, Fidanque, & Lee, 1999). On examining the data, Bockian et al. (1999) found that the SCHIZOTYPAL PERSONALITY DISORDER
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mean scores on the Schizotypal scale were very low. The most likely interpretation was that moderate scores on the Schizotypal scale were associated with the improvements in quality of life; hypothetically, this may be due to improved creativity. Imaginativeness and openness to alternative perspectives are likely to be strengths in many people with Schizotypal PD, especially those with a mild case. SYNERGISTIC TREATMENT Millon (1999) suggested modest goals for the individual with schizotypal PD, given their significant impairments. Establishing a relationship based on unconditional positive regard is essential as a foundation for other approaches and is healing in its own right. Often, practical advice and reassurance is warranted and can further deepen the trust in the relationship. Once the relationship is firmly established, cognitive interventions can decrease the quasi-delusional distortions the person experiences. Psychopharmacological interventions may be helpful as well in that regard and may also be useful in anxiety management with the timorous schizotypal subtype. As noted above, the client's eccentricities can elicit rejection, which can be iatrogenic; however, with adequate assessment and preparation, the group experience can be particularly healing in this population. Individuals with schizotypal PD often benefit from interpersonal contact that is nonthreatening and structured, as is often found in group interventions. Millon did not specifically recommend psychodynamic approaches as part of the synergistic sequencing; however, in this population, strong transference reactions can develop, which must be addressed. The porous line between reality and fantasy makes individuals with schizotypal PD particularly prone to distorted beliefs about the therapist. Further, the relative lack of outside relationships can heighten the importance of the therapeutic relationship. Psychodynamic theory is particularly useful in providing a conceptual map for traversing this potentially tricky terrain. Family interventions are often indispensable in creating a supportive structure that will allow the person to function outside of therapy. Millon's recommended strategic goals and tactical modalities are listed in Exhibit 5.1. CASE EXAMPLE: HOPE Technically, the case that follows would be diagnosed "personality change secondary to a medical condition [stroke]." That being said, the personality that resulted from the change would best be described as schizotypal PD. There was a substantial depression as well, which interacted with the schizotypal features to create a marked clinical presentation. To date, this client is the most prototypical example I have seen of someone with depression and schizotypal PD. 104
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EXHIBIT 5.1
Therapeutic Strategies and Tactics for the Prototypal Schizotypal Personality STRATEGIC GOALS Balance Polarities Stabilize erratic pain-pleasure polarities Stabilize erratic self-other polarities Counter Perpetuations Prevent social isolation Undo excessive dependency Reduce fantasy preoccupations TACTICAL MODALITIES Alter eccentric behaviors Reverse autistic cognitive style Reconstruct estranged self-image Note. From Personality-Guided Therapy (p. 627), by T. Millon, 1999, New York: John Wiley & Sons. Copyright 1999 by John Wiley & Sons. Reprinted with permission of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Hope was a 68-year-old divorced mother of six grown children. She grew up in an African nation and had been residing in the United States for approximately 40 years. A number of months before I began to see her, Hope had had a stroke or similar episode. This event led to her transition from community residence with her granddaughter to living in a nursing home. Christian throughout her life, following the stroke she became a Baptist and was "reborn." Since that time, according to her daughter, she was extremely religious. Her memory was somewhat impaired and thus some of the details in her history were sketchy. I had no difficulty connecting with Hope; unlike many people with schizotypal PD, she was interested in having a relationship with me and with her family members. I have often found that in nursing homes, because of the understimulating and often isolating environment, clients are eager for a relationship. Simply providing an opportunity to talk about her concerns established a comfortable therapeutic rapport. Hope's initial complaint to me was that she was seeing "devils," shadowy spirits that would hide in corners or under her bed. She claimed that they were stealing her clothes and otherwise tormenting her. Sadly, Hope's clothing was disappearing and needed to be replaced by the nursing home; staff believed that in fact the clothing was being stolen. Nonetheless, several diagnostic possibilities jumped to mind. Psychosis secondary to stroke and its attendant brain damage? Schizophrenia? Schizotypal PD? Atypical psychosis? Hope's voice was sad and pleading as she reported her story, and I felt a distinct cry for help. Paying attention to my emotional reactions to her, 1 SCHIZOTYPAL PERSONALITY DISORDER
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noticed that I felt sad, heavy, and helpless, and I experienced a strong urge to rescue her. This is a common gut reaction I have noticed within myself when I encounter a client with depression, especially if the person has a tendency toward dependency. With clients who are more classically psychotic (e.g., those who have schizophrenia), I often experience confusion and a struggle to create coherence. Hope, however, was more in the schizotypal range of functioning—she was having illusions, rather than frank hallucinations; she probably did see shadows or vague movements on the ground but interpreted them to be demons. Behavioral eccentricities emerged in the course of treatment, as will be seen below. I believed, then, that the best way to initially conceptualize the case was major depression with mood-congruent delusions in the context of schizotypal PD. Because the belief in spirits is common in Hope's African culture of origin, the content of her thoughts was not particularly bizarre (L. Black, 1996). Interpreted as if they were poems or dreams, the experiences she shared seemed to indicate feelings of vulnerability and helplessness as she wrestled with forces outside her control. I believed that the intervention I provided should help her to feel empowered and in control and should help to increase her feelings of independence. Working collaboratively with her, I directed her feelings of dependency and reliance toward her faith, as I believed that her reliance on God was a strength in this case. My initial intervention could be conceptualized as behavioral or as paradoxical. At one level, I was providing a simple directive, a homework assignment. At another level, I was placing her in a therapeutic double-bind, in which I challenged her to eliminate her symptoms within the framework of her interpretation of her experience; the model on which 1 was drawing was Ericksonian hypnosis. Within the session, I said to her, Hope, you and I both know that spirits such as the ones you describe feed on misery and find the presence of joy intolerable. If you bring about within yourself a feeling of happiness the devils will leave you alone. What are some of the things that make you happy?
The primary activities that gave her joy were praying and attending church. "That is great," I said to her, "because you and I both know that the devils are powerless compared with the overwhelming power of God." I suggested that she "pray for happiness and inner peace in addition to your usual prayers." In addition to assigning the client this homework, I contacted her family to see if they could help get Hope to some of her meetings. Over the course of the next few sessions (I was seeing her twice per week), Hope's mood rapidly improved, and the frequency with which she saw the "devils" rapidly declined. Staff reported—some with amusement and others with irritation—that Hope at times was praying in loud, fervent songs. She also began to preach, to no one in particular. She reported success in attaining joy, especially when she sang out to the Lord with all her 106
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heart. Within approximately 3 weeks she was delusion free. She was freely talking about her feelings, such as difficulties adjusting to the nursing home and frustrations regarding insufficient time with her family. It is worth noting that unlike her belief in spirits, her decision to pray loudly and preach from her bed would be considered eccentric or inappropriate within her subcultures (African American and Baptist), thus the schizotypal diagnosis. A variety of family and community interventions were also extremely helpful. I interacted with Hope's oldest daughter fairly regularly; she visited Hope about once every 2 weeks. I helped make arrangements for Hope to go to her religious meetings, working with lay leadership in the community and with her family. Still, Hope only got to go about once per month, though that made a huge difference in her life. At one point, Hope lost weight, was looking pale, and appeared to me to be dying. I checked with her physician, who confirmed that she was having difficulty staying hydrated and was not doing well; death at any time was not out of the question. Working with her oldest daughter, we arranged to have as many family members as possible come to visit. Her brother flew in from Africa to surprise her, and probably a total of a dozen family members came to visit. As the family members visited, I could see the life pouring into her body. She fully recovered and regained her prior level of health. Hope continued to wrestle with difficulties maintaining her grip on reality throughout treatment. Under stress, she would become delusional again, and, when more distressed, she would occasionally become frankly psychotic. She had a hallucination that a large, terrifying devil was standing menacingly at the foot of her bed, leaning over her in an intimidating and threatening manner. Repeating the intervention for her to pray and to engender joy in her life was helpful. The larger, more intimidating figure may have represented death, fused with guilt. At that time, she was having an erotic transference and may have had guilt about her sexual feelings. Thus, the therapy began to move into areas most thoroughly addressed by psychodynamic theory. 1 have noticed that strong transference reactions often occurred in my nursing home clients; their lives were often understimulating, and thus the therapy took on a higher level of prominence. Her feelings for me represented, at least in part, unresolved feelings that she had about a man she had wanted to marry but from whom she was kept apart, primarily for racial reasons. I also represented an idealized father image, because her true father was neglectful and philandering and was thrown out of the house by her mother. Over time, after gleaning a variety of meanings regarding her prior relationships, our bond became more reality based. We terminated more because I was leaving the setting than because of a natural termination time. Hope was in therapy with me for about 2 years, and probably could have gone on for at least a year more. Termination was done over a period of several months and ultimately went smoothly. SCHIZOTYPAL PERSONALITY DISORDER
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS As illustrated in the case of Hope, a personality-guided conceptualization, followed by a catalytic sequence of interventions, led to substantial improvements. The interplay of her depression and her vulnerability to quasidelusional ideas as a function of her schizotypal PD meant that both problems had to be treated simultaneously. After establishing rapport, an individual intervention based primarily on paradoxical techniques helped to improve the client's mood and decrease her quasi-psychotic experiences; indeed, one might say that the client's willingness to act in an odd manner (singing in a public setting) enhanced her recovery. Understanding of her culture and of what her experience meant to her was particularly critical in this case and shaped the nature of the paradoxical interventions. Family interventions, cognitive interventions to challenge her irrational beliefs, and psychodynamic conceptualizations to understand and ultimately confront issues in the client-therapist relationship (the transference-countertransference dynamics) were integrated in accordance with her schizotypal personality. Emphasizing her strengths helped to enhance her relationships within her family and led to long-term more positive functioning. Notably, medications were not necessary in this case; it is not necessary to automatically refer for medications in these cases, though, of course, medications should be used as a resource when indicated. Per the above discussion, I suggest that key areas for research include studies that look at the catalytic arrangement of interventions based on personality-guided principles. It may be necessary to evaluate subtypes independently (e.g., Millon's distinction between the schizotypal with avoidant vs. schizoid features). Medication research is important, not only to find more effective medication agents but also to assess which cases may not need medication intervention.
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6 DEPRESSION IN ANTISOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER
So apt at capturing the essence of human nature, Shakespeare illuminated the character of the scheming lago, who, speaking of Othello, declares, I follow him to serve my turn upon him: We cannot ail be masters, nor all masters Cannot be truly follow'd. You shall mark Many a duteous and knee-crooking knave That, doting on his own obsequious bondage Wears out his time, much like his master's ass, For naught but provender; and, when he's old, cashier'd: Whip me such honest knaves . . . In following him I follow but myself; Heaven is my judge, not I for love and duty, But seeing so for my peculiar end. (Shakespeare, 1972, pp. 1171-1172)
The bard delineated the hallmarks of what we now call the antisocial personality disorder (PD): being self-centered and manipulative. People with this disorder view the world as a savage place divided into exploiters and the exploited—and they choose and vigorously pursue membership in the former group. Although it is often tied to violent criminal behavior, especially on 109
the lower socioeconomic rungs, the passage illustrates how sociopathy can penetrate the highest social echelons. lago also has elements of narcissistic PD, as will be discussed in a later chapter.
PHENOMENOLOGY: THE EXPERIENCE OF ANTISOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER People with antisocial PD tend to be impulsive and tough. In more severe cases, conscience is entirely lacking; in virtually all cases, conscience is extremely deficient. As the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text revision [DSM-IV-TR]; American Psychiatric Association, ZOOOa) put it, The essential feature of Antisocial Personality Disorder is a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others that begins in childhood or early adolescence and continues into adulthood, (p. 701) Among those who are violent, most use violence instrumentally. There was an appropriate category in the revised third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 1987) for those who use violence for sadistic pleasure; however, with the elimination of aggressive-sadistic personality disorder in the fourth edition (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), the closest category in DSM-IV-TR is antisocial PD. People with this disorder are often, for example, manipulators, con men, or parasites who fleece others of their savings or live off others without any thought of reciprocation. Much of my experience with individuals with antisocial PD has been with drug dealers and substance abusers who sustained spinal cord injuries from their high-risk behavior (e.g., being shot during a drug deal or having a car accident while driving under the influence). Establishing rapport was a challenge, although I found this to be workable'within the hospital setting. In chapter 7, this volume, on borderline PD, I describe the case of an individual who had a mixture of borderline and antisocial features. The therapy went well, because we were able to control the contingencies shaping his behavior effectively; in that case, the behaviors generalized well postdischarge, and he changed his life in a positive way. In purer cases of antisocial PD, I have been able to achieve substantial changes using similar methods during clients' hospital stays, but few of these changes tended to be internalized, and my sense was that these clients were quick to revert to their old ways. Establishing rapport with this help-rejecting population can be difficult; methods to effectively establish a preliminary rapport are discussed later in this chapter. Individuals with antisocial PD often have a peculiar kind of empathy. Noted Millon (1996), "Antisocials tend to be finely attuned to feelings, moods, 110
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and vulnerabilities of others, taking advantage of this sensitivity to manipulate and control. However, they typically evidence a marked deficit in selfinsight and rarely exhibit foresight" (p. 464). Therapists often observe this phenomenon during therapy sessions, experiencing themselves a feeling of vulnerability and invasion when working with such clients. EPIDEMIOLOGY Community estimates indicate that antisocial PD occurs in approximately 3% of males and 1% of females. In clinical settings, the prevalence is approximately 3% to 30%, whereas in substance abuse and forensic settings the prevalence is generally even higher (American Psychiatric Association, ZOOOa). In a sample of depressed clients, approximately 3% had antisocial PD (Fava et al., 1995). Markowitz, Moran, Kocsis, and Frances (1992) studied a sample of 34 outpatients with dysthymic disorder; none had antisocial PD. In a sample of 249 depressed outpatients, none were diagnosed with "definite" and 2% were diagnosed with "probable" antisocial PD (Shea, Glass, Pilkonis, Watkins, & Docherty, 1987). In Pepper et al.'s (1995) dysthymic disorder sample, 4% had antisocial PD. Of the 116 individuals with major depression in a study by Zimmerman and Coryell (1989), 7.8% had antisocial PD. In a sample of 352 clients with both anxiety and depression, approximately 2% had antisocial PD, as diagnosed by structured interview (Flick, Roy-Byrne, Cowley, Shores, & Dunner, 1993). In the depressed samples reviewed, then, approximately 0% to 8% had antisocial PD. Beginning with the portion of the sample in which antisocial PD was reported, Zimmerman and Coryell (1989) found that 34.6% had depression. HOW DO PEOPLE WITH ANTISOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER GET DEPRESSED? Impulsive and acting-out behaviors tend to protect individuals with antisocial PD from depression. When they do get depressed, it is often because they have been constrained in some way, usually by the legal system. Individuals with other psychiatric problems, such as schizophrenia, may become depressed in inpatient psychiatric settings once their psychosis is in remission. On the spinal cord injury unit, some clients had fears of reprisals from others. To some degree, their fears were probably justified; others whom they had harmed may have been eager to pay them back. To some degree, these fears were also probably a projection of their own hostile feelings. Because they are impulsive and often have comorbid substance abuse, however, depressed individuals with antisocial PD are at high risk for suicide (Links, Gould, & Ratnayake, 2003). Unlike most PDs, which create a vulnerability ANTISOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER
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to depression, in the case of antisocial PD there is a unique Personality x Environment interaction (antisocial PD plus constraint) that increases not only the likelihood of depression but, more important, its lethality. Such a conceptualization is consistent with the "pathoplasty" model of interaction between the Axis I and Axis II conditions. Another unusual feature of antisocial PD is that the presence of depression appears to improve treatment outcomes, as reported by Woody, McLellan, Luborsky, and O'Brien (cited in A. T. Beck, Freeman, & Davis, 2004, p. 12); this is a kind of reverse "exacerbation" model of the interaction between antisocial PD and depression (see chap. 2, this volume, for a discussion of the theoretically possible relationships between depression and personality disorders).
HOW A PERSON BECOMES AND REMAINS ANTISOCIAL: THEORIES OF ANTISOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER Antisocial PD and its youthful counterpart, conduct disorder, are the most thoroughly researched of all the PDs with regard to causality. Research reviewed below provides detailed estimates of genetic versus environmental contributions. In addition, a considerable amount of theory has been generated in an effort to understand the thoughts and behaviors of this enigmatic group. Perhaps this is due to our natural fascination with the "criminal mind," or the cost to society, both economic and emotional, associated with antisocial acts. In addition to considering individuals with criminal behavior, this section will consider the broader issues associated with the active self-oriented person. Biological Factors The biological mechanisms underlying antisocial PD features, such as impulsivity and aggression, are related to serotonergic activity in the brain. Coccaro (1998) reviewed some 30 studies demonstrating a relationship between serotonin levels and impulsive aggression. Serotonin levels, as measured by cerebrospinal fluid metabolites, demonstrated an inverse relationship with impulsive aggression. Low serotonin levels were associated with, among other indicators of impulsive aggression, violent suicide attempts, impulsive arson, violent assaults, and lifetime history of aggression. Pharmacologic challenge studies demonstrated reduced response to serotonergic agents in individuals with impulsive aggression. Platelet studies suggested an inverse correlation between the number of serotonin-binding sites and impulsive aggression. Activity level in the frontal lobes, such as the orbital frontal region, has been shown in a variety of studies to be associated with impulsive aggression. Perhaps the most famous case is that of Phineas Gage, a 19th-century rail112
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road worker whose anterior and medial frontal cortex was damaged by a spike through his head. Gage underwent massive personality changes, most notably an increase in aggression and impulsivity. Since then, formal studies have documented that dysfunction and reduced levels of activity in the frontal region are associated with aggression, impulsivity, and criminal behavior (see Siever et al., 1998). Heritability
Nigg and Goldsmith (1994) reviewed studies that used the Psychopathic Deviate scale (Scale 4) of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. Studies of normal twins yielded a heritability of approximately 56%; similarly, a study of twins raised apart yielded a heritability estimate of 61% on the same scale (DiLalla, Carey, Gottesman, & Bouchard, 1996). Loehlin, Willerman, and Horn (1987) administered the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory to mothers who were giving up their children for adoption; years later, they tested the adopted children at about the same age as the mother when she was tested. The correlation between the scores was .27, which suggests a heritability of .54; by comparison, the correlations with adoptive relatives were negligible (.02, .07, and .01 for adoptive siblings, fathers, and mothers, respectively). A study using the Dimensional Assessment of Personality Pathology Callousness Scale yielded a heritability of 56%, whereas stimulus seeking had a heritability estimate of 40% (Jang, Livesley, Vernon, & Jackson, 1996). Studies of conduct problems have yielded heritability estimates of 61% (Coolidge, Thede, &. Jang, 2001) and 49% (Livesley, Jang, & Vernon, 1998), although surprisingly, a different study found a heritability estimate for conduct disorder of zero (Livesley, Jang, Jackson, & Vernon, 1993). A meta-analysis by McCartney, Harris, and Bernieri (1990) showed a higher interclass correlation for monozygotic twins (.49) than dizygotic twins (.29) on aggression. The sum of the evidence suggests that antisocial PD and antisocial traits are moderately heritable, as is the case with the other PDs. Medications Theoretical work reviewed above has indicated that serotonergic pathways in the frontal area are implicated in impulsive aggression, thus suggesting that selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors would be effective in reducing acting-out behavior. Studies done with individuals with borderline PD have borne out these predictions in open trials (Markovitz &. Wagner, 1995), uncontrolled studies (Silva et al., 1997), and a double-blind, placebocontrolled study (Rinne, van den Brink, & Luuk van Dyck, 2002). Such studies should be replicated with individuals with antisocial PD. Some preliminary investigations have been done with atypical antipsychotics for antisocial PD. Hirose (2001) presented a case study in which treatment with risperidone led to reduced aggression and impulsivity. ANTISOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER
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T. Walker, Thomas, and Allen (2003) studied 4 participants using quetiapine; like Hirose, they noted reductions in aggression, impulsivity, hostility, irritability, and rage reactions. In the absence of further studies, it is worthwhile to consider the clinical observations of Joseph (1997). He argued that antisocial PD can be conceptualized as falling along a number of dimensions, some of which are amenable to intervention with medications and others of which are not. Joseph noted that impulsivity may indicate attention deficit disorder or hypomania. As is well known, attention deficit disorder can be treated with stimulants (e.g., methylphenidate), bupropion, or various other medications, and hypomania responds to lithium, carbamazepine, sodium valproate, and so on. As discussed above, irritability and anger respond to serotonergic medications; if those medications are not effective, antipsychotics or benzodiazepines can be tried. Unfortunately, as Joseph noted, treatment is often unsuccessful; in part, this is due to the numerous symptoms of the disorder that medication cannot reduce. Criminal behavior, exploitive conduct, irresponsibility, and deficient conscience are, and may always be, beyond the reach of pharmacological intervention. He recommended working with patients, their families, and the courts to develop realistic expectations of what medications can and cannot do in these cases. That being said, Joseph noted that medications can be very helpful in some cases, especially if the antisocial features are intertwined with paranoid ideation; in such cases, antipsychotic medication can make an enormous difference. Although Joseph's (1997) recommendations are rational, his hypotheses are not a substitute for ongoing theory building and empirical investigations. Scientific studies must be performed to assess the efficacy of medications with antisocial PD. Until a solid base of randomized clinical trials of various medications has been created, the usefulness of various medications will remain in doubt. Psychological Factors The biopsychosocial model (Millon, 1969) indicates that a person's biological makeup, psychological experiences, and social (e.g., cultural, ethnic, and religious) environment all contribute vital information for understanding an individual. Each element of this model will be reviewed in the following sections. Millon s Theory According to Millon (1969, 1981, 1996, 1999), individuals with antisocial PD are the "active-independent" type. They are thought to have a generally active, impulsive nature, perhaps because of inadequacies in the "pain" center of the brain and densely branched neuronal networks in centers that regulate anger. These neural problems may have been caused by 114
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genetics or shaped by experience. The early experiences of people with antisocial PD are likely to be characterized by conflict. Noted Millon (1981), The primary experiential agent for this pattern is likely to be parental rejection, discontent, or hostility. This reaction may be prompted in part when the newborn infant, for constitutional reasons, proves to be "cold," sullen, testy, or otherwise difficult to manage. It does not take too long for a child with a disposition such as this to be stereotyped as a "miserable, ill-tempered, and disagreeable little beast." Once categorized in this manner, reciprocal negative feelings build up into a lifelong cycle of parent-child feuding, (p. 208) During infancy, from birth through 1 year of age, this hostile relationship is already beginning to take root. By early childhood, these children are already rebelling and, feeling unsafe, are relying on themselves for protection. As they mature into grade school and adolescence, they increasingly develop a deviant, outsider identity, distancing themselves from the counsel of others who may be older and wiser. Evidence from the Environmental Risk Longitudinal Twin study (Trouton, Spinath, & Plomin, 2002; see also Jaffee et al, 2004) supports and extends Millon's theory regarding the early manifestations of the antisocial pattern and the environmental sequelae. This study examined over 1,100 twins drawn from, a registry of over 15,900 twins born in England and Wales in 1994 and 1995. Families in which mothers were 20 years of age and younger were selected because maternal youth is associated with risk for problematic outcomes. Children were followed from approximately age 5 to age 7. Researchers found that corporal punishment was genetically mediated but that physical abuse was not, indicating that abuse was due to factors that differed among families. The genetically mediated factors that underlie corporal punishment, however, were also correlated with antisocial behavior. Overall, then, children with certain genetically mediated characteristics (e.g., oppositional, aggressive, and coercive behaviors) are more likely to be spanked; physical discipline, in turn, increases the risk of antisocial behavior. Abuse, however, is added on, coming more from other family factors (e.g., parental characteristics; Jaffee, Caspi, Moffitt, Polo-Thomas, et al., 2004). In terms of environmental risk factors, abuse has been shown by Cicchetti and Manly to be a risk factor for antisocial behavior (cited in Jaffee, Caspi, Moffitt, Polo-Thomas, et al., 2004). The longitudinal twin study quoted from below suggests in the strongest possible way that abuse plays a causal role. Jaffee, Caspi, Moffitt, and Taylor (2004) ruled out numerous alternative explanations to support their conclusion. They noted, We found that (a) physical maltreatment prospectively predicted antisocial outcome, (b) physical maltreatment bore a dose-response relation to antisocial outcome, (c) physical maltreatment was followed by the emergence of new antisocial behavior, (d) children's maltreatment vic-
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timization was not influenced by genetic factors, (e) the effects of physical maltreatment remained significant after controlling for parents' history of antisocial behavior, and (f) the effect of physical maltreatment was significant after controlling for any genetic transmission of antisocial behavior, although genetic factors accounted for approximately half of the association between physical maltreatment and children's antisocial behavior. (Jaffee, Caspi, Moffitt, & Taylor, 2004, p. 50)
Maternal negative expressed emotions are also a risk factor for later antisocial behavior and, on the basis of similar logic, also appear to play a causal role. Mothers who made negative comments (e.g., "she is horrible") and who had an overall negative tone (e.g., more negative comments than positive ones) were more likely to demonstrate antisocial behavior concurrently and prospectively, controlling for genetic factors; the researchers also statistically eliminated the possibility that the negative expressed emotions were purely a function of the effects of the child's behavior on the parents, using longitudinal analyses (Caspi et al., 2004). Scientists are beginning to identify genotypes that moderate the relationship between environment and antisocial behavior. One study, which followed participants from birth to adulthood, examined over 500 men at age 26. They found that a gene-impacting monoamine oxidase A had a moderating effect; high levels of this enzyme reduced the likelihood of antisocial behavior occurring in the presence of maltreatment (Caspi et al., 2002). A variety of factors serve to perpetuate the antisocial PD pattern. The person with antisocial PD's anticipation of distrust elicits genuine distrust from others, thus initiating a cycle of mutual misgivings. Their proclivity for being provocative elicits hostility from others, justifying their worldview that others are cruel and vindictive. Finally, their weak intrapsychic control leads to the direct venting of angry feelings or to impulsive behavior; thus, they are continually in difficult legal and interpersonal situations, perpetuating their view of the world as hostile and unjust (Millon, 1999). The description of the antisocial PD prototype in terms of Millon's domains is presented in Appendix B. Of the features listed, "irresponsible," "acting-out,'' and "impulsive" are the most salient. Cognitive-Behavioral Conceptualization and Interventions Individuals with antisocial PD are prone to a variety of automatic thoughts that flow from their cognitive schemas and core beliefs. Automatic thoughts include, "I cannot let him get the better of me"; "It doesn't matter, I'll just get high"; and "I'm going to get what I want (regardless of what happens to anyone else)." A. T. Beck, Freeman, and Davis (2004) described six categories of cognitive distortions that typify the antisocial prototype: 1. Justification—"Wanting something or wanting to avoid something justifies my actions." J 16
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2. Thinking is believing—"My thoughts and feelings are completely accurate, simply because they occur to me." 3. Personal infallibility—"I always make good choices." 4. Feelings make facts—"1 know I'm right, because I feel right about what I do." 5. The impotence of others—"The views of others are irrelevant to my decisions, unless they directly control my immediate consequences." 6. Low impact consequences—"Undesirable consequences will not occur or will not matter to me." (p. 175) As noted previously, most people with antisocial PD are prone to depression when they are constrained. For such individuals, their beliefs typically include thoughts such as "I am trapped," "I will never get out of here," "I've gone too far this time," "I can't possibly survive this horrible place long enough to get free." I have also seen similar thoughts in individuals with substance addiction; often, in a sudden burst of insight, they realize they are in a prison just as real as one with walls and bars. The chemical slave driver dictates their every behavior, from theft to prostitution to losing jobs to living on the streets. Perhaps they have tried drug rehabilitation and it has failed, or perhaps the thought of asking for help is worse than dying. A patient of mine (see the case example in chap. 7, this volume), while having such thoughts, injected his veins with battery acid in an attempt to die. I remember shuddering with revulsion when I heard about his choice of method, as if the only way to destroy himself would be to consume and obliterate himself from the inside out. The distorted beliefs of both the depressed and nondepressed individual with antisocial PD can be challenged using standard cognitive techniques, such as Socratic dialogue and thought records (J. S. Beck, 1995). Behavioral contracting is another technique that I have found to be helpful in my work with individuals with antisocial PD (Bockian, 1994). I have never used individual contracts (i.e., contracts that just involve patients contracting with themselves, such as agreeing to reward themselves for behaviors associated with quitting smoking). Instead, all of the contracts I have done have involved individuals with antisocial PD as they are involved in a system and details of how they would interact with one another. Most of these have been contracts to reduce or eliminate verbal or physical abuse. It is a fundamental tenet of behavioral contracting that everyone must think the contract is fair, which can be quite challenging when one party has issues of entitlement. Nonetheless, I believe I was always able to find common ground on which to agree. Even individuals with severe antisocial PD recognize that a hospital will not agree to allow them to abuse staff, particularly in writing. I always made sure that there was something in it for the patient. For example, in one case, the client was concerned that he was not ANTISOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER
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always given smoking privileges. As part of the behavioral contract, I scheduled in four smoking sessions per day. This provided a real incentive for him to participate in the process. In that case, a nurse complained that although the client was the abusive one, it was the staff who had to make all of the behavioral changes. Although that was not quite true—there were numerous behavioral consequences that were initiated by the patient's behavior— I could understand her point. Most of the behavioral changes were mediated by restructuring the patient's environment, which meant changing staff behaviors. I replied that she was right and that in a perfect world, the client's immoral and problematic behaviors could be changed in a direct way. However, the only way to change his behaviors was to change his environment— namely, our behaviors. Because we were the ones drawing salaries, and it was incumbent on us to rehabilitate the patient (including psychological rehabilitation) as part of our mission, we would have to go first. However, I reassured her that if about 100 years of behavioral theory had merit, then his behaviors should follow shortly. Once they did, I never had to deal with that complaint again when contracts were written for other clients. Individuals with antisocial PD tend to also be receptive to cost-benefit analysis interventions, which provide structured ways to look at long-term and short-term benefits of a particular action. Because they are interested in having their short-term needs gratified, there is an incentive to participate. By looking in a structured way at typical interactions, the client will often come to see how a little bit of planning can yield greater gratification in the long term (A. T. Beck et al., 2004; A. T. Beck & Freeman, 1990 ). Psychodynamic Therapy
Psychodynamic theory can be helpful in understanding the inner world of persons with antisocial PD. Their internalized objects are generally malevolent and perceived as hurtful and exploitive. Akhtar (1992), in his summary of a large psychodynamic literature, stated succinctly, Most psychoanalytic investigators agree that the core antisocial character results largely from a severely traumatized childhood, with much actual injustice being suffered by the growing child. Internalization of abnormal parental superegos or unconscious parental encouragement of the child's delinquency are other common background factors. Disappointment in primary objects, humiliation and suffering, internalization of abnormal norms, and/or corruption by parents are various factors that work with the child's own age-specific distortions and fantasy elaborations, (pp. 229-230)
These factors lead to a severe disturbance in the clients' internalized objects as well as in their interactions with others. Nonetheless, the use of psychodynamic treatment techniques in cases of true antisocial PD is generally futile. Millon (1999) noted that there are
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few intrapsychic mechanisms on which patient and therapist can draw in such cases. He concluded, There is a widespread pessimism as to whether intrapsychic therapy can produce significant changes within the antisocial . . . psychodynamic approaches tend to be difficult to undertake because antisocials are not apt to internalize therapeutic "insights" without external controls or interventions, even if they stay in treatment for more than a few sessions. If severe limits are put on the antisocial personality (such as in highly controlled incarceration settings), anxiety and depression may lead some patients to be more amenable to change. Almost any other treatment orientation would have a greater (if limited) chance at success given the antisocial's lack of insight and low tolerance for boredom or slowly progressive changes, (p. 480)
O. F. Kernberg, Selzer, Koenigsberg, Carr, and Appelbaum (1989) were more succinct, stating simply in a footnote that their treatment, which at the time was called expressive therapy, is contraindicated in cases of antisocial PD (p. 8). That Kernberg, who successfully opened the door for psychodynamic treatment of borderline and other severe personality disorders, was so blatantly pessimistic about treatment of individuals with antisocial PD is a powerful indication that other therapies should be used in such cases.
COUNTERTRANSFERENCE The client with antisocial PD, like the client with narcissistic PD, routinely rejects the therapeutic relationship. In such a circumstance, the therapy often stalls; the therapist often responds with feelings of helplessness. Ironically, despite such feelings, therapists may take excessive responsibility for the client's behavior, perhaps as a function of omnipotence fantasies. When the client acts out, the therapist may then feel responsible and thus guilty (Strasburger, 1986). Helpless feelings may also induce the belief that treatment is futile (Lion, 1978; Meloy, 1988). Many therapists see themselves as nurturing and kindhearted; such characteristics are often devalued by the person with antisocial PD. To the extent that the therapist accepts the client's feelings, the therapist experiences devaluation and invalidity, which produces feelings such as worthlessness, depression, anger, and shame (Strasburger, 1986). These clients' lack of emotional nuance and subtlety may also be disconcerting to therapists, disrupting their normal ways of relating and leaving them feeling unbalanced. Therapists will often reject, hate, or wish to destroy clients with antisocial PD because of their immoral behavior and the powerful reactions the clients elicit. In psychodynamic theory, one might say that the clinician's superego is activated against the id-driven behaviors of the client (Meloy,
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1988; Strasburger, 1986). For example, when a client has raped someone, the therapist may fantasize about the client receiving castration as therapy or the death penalty as punishment. Though this is not the venue to discuss the appropriate severity of punishment for crimes, it is clear that such fantasies represent great anger and likely hatred as well. The therapist must be comfortable with these emotions, which are not unnatural, and use them in the service of the therapy; consultation with colleagues can be important in such cases. Therapists often feel manipulated by individuals with antisocial PD; indeed, such clients can pull for special treatment. Therapists must understand their motives for "bending" their usual practices. Usually, changing one's standard practice is a bad idea, because therapists can inadvertently reinforce clients' erroneous belief that it is other people's inflexibility or misunderstanding that is the problem rather than their own dysfunctional behavior (A. T. Beck et al., 2004). One emotional reaction therapists often have to the antisocial client is fear of assault or harm. This is a realistic fear and should be honored. Existing data suggest that attacks on therapists are fairly common; for example, Guy, Brown, and Poelstara (1990) found that nearly 40% of psychologists have been physically attacked on one or more occasion. It appears that "serious" attacks (in which the psychologist misses 1 or more days from work) are rather rare, with 3% of psychiatrists and 1% of psychologists reporting such attacks (Reid & Kang, 1986). Several leading theorists have noted that therapists may defend against the anxiety of real danger by psychological denial (Gabbard & Coyne, 1987; Meloy, 1988; Strasburger, 1986). Lion and Leaff (1973) asserted that such beliefs and defenses are disturbingly common; they noted, "Denial is the most ubiquitous defense against anxiety generated by a violent patient. ... to face the issue of dangerousness is very threatening to the physician . . . the therapist's human vulnerability emerges" (p. 105). I know of several cases in which sociopathic clients have assaulted therapists. In one particularly disturbing case, a therapist who was in denial about the dangerousness of a patient used harsh confrontational techniques on a psychiatrically hospitalized and still unstable sociopathic man; to make matters worse, the therapist had a student with her. When the patient, who stood approximately 6 feet, 2 inches tall, became assaultive, the confronting therapist fled, followed by her student; the patient was able to catch, beat, and injure the student. It is essential to take appropriate measures to assure therapist safety, especially maintaining physical superiority (i.e., having sufficient staff of sufficient strength and with appropriate training to safely and quickly control a patient). Our discipline must confront denial in our students, our colleagues, and ourselves. Sometimes, this denial is related to a belief that our "special relationship" with a client is a sufficient safeguard. Instead, careful attention to verbal and nonverbal cues and awareness of the client's motivation and capacity for self-control are better indicators; in addition, sys120
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temic issues (e.g., safety protocols that are in place in a hospital or clinic) are key. With appropriate precautions, however, fear of assault need not and should not dominate the treatment or lead to intimidation of the therapist. Research on graduate students' responses to filmed vignettes of individuals with antisocial PD suggested that they initially respond to these individuals with feelings of curiosity, sadness, and pity; they also feel alarmed, irritated, fearful, afraid, and angry (Bockian, 2002a; see the description of the study in chap. 1, this volume). Informal discussions with the study participants have indicated that the pity they felt was mostly related to characteristics specific to the client portrayed in the film vignette (Wohl, 1996); he appeared to have a low IQ and, given his history of violence, rather meager prospects for the future, even if he were able to turn his life around. The person portrayed elicited somewhat more compassion than most, because he was treated, apparently successfully, and was making the film vignette as a way of thanking his therapists.1 Consistent with the literature reviewed above, the feelings of anger and irritation were generated by his sociopathic behavior, such as his violence, especially his violence toward women. Feelings of alarm and fear were realistic responses to the client's propensity for violence and extremely marginal internal controls. In reflecting on my own work with individuals with antisocial PD, there are a few whom I liked, but mostly I felt wary, guarded, and suspicious. Even with those who were "nice," I was generally waiting for the other shoe to drop, such as a request to collude against other members of the treatment team. I used to try getting in touch with their abuse history as a way of stoking my feelings of compassion; in my experience, this was worse than futile. All had been abused, and all responded with denial ("It wasn't so bad" or "I deserved it") or withdrawal from any of my expressions of compassion. Perhaps accepting compassion was interpreted by the client as a form of inferiority in a hierarchical relationship. It is also possible that despite my conscious efforts to avoid it, I would slip into feeling pity, from which most people shrink (whether they have antisocial PD or not). Instead, I now do the work internally. I imagine that the person was abused and is responding the best way he or she knows how. I pay attention to any somatic responses I am having, such as leaning forward, leaning back, or tightness in the stomach; usually, I experience tension of some kind when there are dominance issues (e.g., if I am being insulted or drawn into a power struggle). 1 then work hard to sidestep such conflicts, knowing from experience that they are futile; as noted in prior examples, I do this by providing suggestions and stating, "It is up to you if you choose to do what I suggest." I challenge my beliefs using cognitive techniques. For example, if a client then does not take my suggestions, I have thoughts such as, "He should do as I 'The interested reader can view the film clip of this discussion in the antisocial PD case on the video Diagnosis According to the DSM-IV (Wohl, 1996).
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suggest, his life is a mess, and that is his only way out of trouble." This belief can be challenged on numerous grounds: Getting out of trouble may not be his goal; he may consciously or unconsciously crave the structure of his present setting. Also, it really is his life, and it only affects me to the extent that I invest some part of myself in him; I need to return to neutral. What am I getting out of his doing what I suggest? Let it go. Further, what does the behavior mean to him? There are people who have sacrificed their lives for a cause. Patrick Henry is a hero for having given his life for his country. We admire him, because we admire his cause. To individuals with antisocial PD, any cause for which they are willing to give their lives invariably seems fool' ish to me, from my perspective, but to the person with the disorder, it is all important. (This dynamic can be found in the case example in chap. 7, this volume, on borderline PD. The patient literally risked his life by failing to comply with his routine medical care. Eventually, I understood that he be' lieved that to be under the control of another was worse than death. In his mind, he was behaving like Patrick Henry.) In such circumstances, one can challenge the meaning of control; for example, working through administrative channels to control the nurses' behaviors rather than cursing at them may be an acceptable substitute behavior. One can also challenge the client's black-and-white thinking that he or she must be in control of everything at every minute. Such a change would involve giving trust, something with which the individual has had horrible experiences. Such challenges to my beliefs help me to stay focused and recognize how difficult it is for that person to behave in a manner that would meet my expectations. In most cases, I am accustomed to reframing the belief that large changes can occur in therapy. Not to be unduly pessimistic, but I believe that a superego must be developed during a certain sensitive period. One cannot put yeast in the dough, leave it on a shelf for 25 years, put it in the oven, and expect to get bread. Thus, in the case of the individual with antisocial PD, I can be more satisfied with small changes. However, I do believe that if these small changes are sufficient to get the person into a dramatically different environment, great change can occur. For example, if the client gets into a stable relationship with a genuinely caring and drug-free individual, then the changes that can occur over long periods of time with a significant other providing corrective emotional experiences on a daily basis can be almost miraculous. In my clinical experience, life events outside of psychotherapy that unfold over a number of years are often crucial to the client's ability to make major changes.
SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND DIVERSITY Antisocial PD occurs approximately 3 times as frequently in males as in females (DSM-IV-TR, p. 704), a finding for which there are a variety of 122
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explanations. There could be genetic, hormonal, or other biological factors that account for the difference. Males, more than females, may be given messages that it is acceptable to express anger. In addition, there could be diagnostic bias. Many males are labeled antisocial who would probably be better conceptualized as borderline (Dutton, 1998; Hart, Dutton, & Newlove, 1993). If men with borderline PD express their rages by hitting others, if drug use is their form of impulsive behavior, and if they then get into drug-related legal problems, the behavioral line between borderline PD and antisocial PD becomes thin. Nonetheless, the underlying biological and psychological factors can be different, even diametrically opposed. Individuals with borderline PD are hypersensitive in a variety of domains; individuals with antisocial PD tend to be hyposensitive. The emotional force of an intervention that will merely touch a person with antisocial PD will be experienced by the person with borderline PD as a hammer blow. People with borderline PD may be prone to shame and guilt, unlike those with antisocial PD. Perhaps most important, individuals with borderline PD are relationship oriented and are more capable of forming a therapeutic alliance. My advice is that a clinician should carefully rule out borderline PD on any male diagnosed with antisocial PD. I have observed that failing to recognize borderline pathology in men with antisocial features has done a good deal of harm. Borderline PD is more treatable, and therefore misdiagnosis leads to lost opportunities for recovery. As noted previously, features of antisocial and narcissistic PDs were induced in randomly selected college-aged men in the famous Stanford prison experiment (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973). Collins (1998) extended this finding by having college student participants rate behaviors as either masculine or feminine; consistently, the guard behaviors (dominance, aggression) were rated as masculine, whereas prisoner behaviors (depression, anxiety) were rated as feminine. Because all of the participants were the same gender and were randomly assigned, the only plausible explanation for the differences in behavior was social role. Collins concluded that social dominance tends to elicit arrogance and oppressive behavior, whereas social status inferiority elicits feelings of helplessness, depression, and anxiety. Although not a conclusive study, Collins's findings lend weight to the notion that at least part of the explanation of the gender gap in antisocial PD is the impact of male privilege and patriarchy on mental functioning. The issue of masculinity is crucial when treating males with antisocial PD. The culture of psychotherapy promotes a number of values: introspection, vulnerability, processing feelings, self-awareness, and open communication. These are feminine-typical strengths. Male strengths include task focus, courage, expressing opinions, assertiveness, and team play (Bockian, 1999). Individuals with antisocial PD often have several of these strengths. The most important idea I try to keep in mind is that it is not necessary to change the client's masculine traits to have a good outcome. He does not ANTISOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER
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have to become sensitive, sentimental, or highly introspective. The research literature teaches us that androgynous individuals are no better adjusted than individuals who are highly masculine (Basoff & Glass, 1982; Choi, 2004; Whitley, 1983, 1985). Thus, it is incumbent on us to accept various aspects of the client's approach to the world that may not match our own. Instead, it is wise for the therapist to take advantage of potential masculine strengths to engage processes that are necessary for therapy. For example, honesty is essential. When the client says something honest that leaves him vulnerable, I acknowledge him by saying something like, "That took a lot of guts to admit that you made a mistake. Now we can get to work. Let's roll up our sleeves." Here, I engage courage in the service of honesty and vulnerability, task focus, and teamwork. An intervention I did with Doug, a patient with borderline PD (see the case example in chap. 7, this volume), was an attempt to gain honor among thieves, so to speak. He was breaking some rules on the unit and was saying he would not do it again. I asked him to "give me his word as a man" that he would no longer engage in the behaviors, which he did. When he repeated the behaviors (which I partially expected despite the hope that he would change), I said to him, in a surprised and disappointed tone of voice, "You gave me your word as a man, and then you broke it? It'll be quite some time before I trust you again." Doug had a mixture of borderline and antisocial features, so a "pure" antisocial might have responded differently, but after that intervention, he worked hard to earn my trust. I had provided him with a challenge and an opportunity. He could be a man; in an institution such as a hospital, one is treated like a child in many ways. He rose to the occasion. Antisocial PD is more likely to occur in cultures that are hierarchically arranged. Extremely common thoughts among individuals with antisocial PD include "I'm not getting my fair share"; "Why should he have it and not me?"; and "I want it, so I'm going to get it." Disparities in wealth and status provide targets for the antisocial agenda.
STRENGTHS OF PERSONS WITH ANTISOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER If they can be channeled for the good, many characteristics of antisocial PD are adaptive and even admirable. The ability to be charming and to create a sense of trust—if one follows through with trustworthy behaviors— constitutes an extremely important set of social skills. The aggressiveness of the antisocial person, when sublimated, is a positive trait. The "aggressive" athlete is usually admired above all others, and to call someone an aggressive businessperson or salesperson is generally a compliment. Subclinical or normal-range antisocial features are often present in some of the most successful people in our society. 124
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TREATMENT PLANNING: SYNERGISTIC TREATMENT In working with the depressed person with antisocial PD, it is extremely important to establish a therapeutic relationship. There are a variety of ways to do so, which have been outlined elsewhere (Bockian & Jongsma, 2001), though it should be noted that none of these strategies is entirely effective. Conceptually, I consider the client as having no superego, and thus I must work entirely through the ego and the id. Depression is a positive prognostic sign because it will provide motivation for the person to change. The depressed person with antisocial PD, unlike the "pure," nondepressed antisocial person, is confronted with the thought, "This ain't working." Perhaps he has gotten caught by the police doing something illegal and is now in prison, or perhaps he is court-ordered into treatment, or perhaps he is in a mental institution, and it bothers him. I then frame our relationship as one in which I am a consultant who will help the client to achieve his goals, within reason. On the spinal cord injury unit, I worked on numerous occasions with patients who were verbally or even physically abusive with staff. What I found fascinating was the underlying rationalization. The client usually framed the situation as one in which the nurse was not doing her job (e.g., by not bringing his water immediately or by insisting that he do something for himself). He would then experience something akin to an obligation to correct her shortcomings. (Presumably, this was a reenactment of his childhood experience through identification with the aggressor, though I rarely confirmed this assumption.) Once I ferreted out the meaning of the behavior, assuming that the client did interpret the problem as being that he was getting poor service, I would say something like the following to the client: Therapist:
You know, when you yell, scream, or curse at a nurse, the hospital labels that verbal abuse. And the hospital is required by law to provide an abuse-free environment for its employees. So the minute you start cursing out a nurse, the entire resources of the hospital will be directed at getting you to stop. No matter how high they have to escalate, they'll keep going. Is that what you want, to be battling the whole hospital?
Client:
That is so unfair. Why should I have to wait for 20 minutes just to get a glass of water? Why do I have to sit here with my f ing hair in my f ing eyes just because Jane [the nurse] is on her coffee break.7 And why don't they leave my brush where I can reach it? They do it just to piss me off. They're just trying to get under my skin.
Therapist:
It's true. It's not fair for you to have to wait a long time for your care. But cursing them out just gets you in trouble, and it doesn't get you what you want. Hey, do you really want to bust her?
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Therapist:
Client: Therapist: Client: Therapist:
Client: Therapist: Client:
Talk to Jill McDonald. She's the patient advocate. She talks to the chief of staff. Your complaint will go to Jane's bosses' bosses' boss. Does that really work? I've seen it work 100 times. That might be all right. How do I contact her? I'll tell her today that you want to see her. She usually sees patients within a day or two. By the way, you know you can have these nurses eating out of your hand, don't you? What do you mean? They became nurses in order to help people. They're a bunch of do-gooders. It's really easy to get them to do what you want. How?
Therapist:
All you have to do is throw in a couple of "thank you"s after they give you your care.
Client:
But that's their job! I shouldn't have to thank them for doing their job. They're getting paid for that.
Therapist:
You and I both know that people should do their jobs well whether they get thanked or not. I'm just telling you, that's what makes them tick. You have to stick with it a few times for it to work, but if you try it, you'll see. It's up to you; it doesn't make any difference to me.
Such an intervention, when combined with specific behaviors on the part of nurses, was successful with 7 of the 8 abusive patients that I saw on the spinal cord injury unit; the 8th patient was a person with multi-infarct dementia. The essential behavior on the part of nursing staff, when they were abused, was to state, "That is abuse. I will return when you can behave appropriately." The nurse would then leave the room. Thus the antisocial individual's desire for instrumental control was undermined. In the above intervention, 1 took into account a number of conceptual issues. One was to work within the client's worldview. In the us-and-them battle for control, I helped the client to see that he was isolated and badly outgunned (which was why we, the staff, had to present a united front). I then offered him a potentially powerful ally—the chief of staff of the hospital—who was more powerful than the entire force against whom the client was fighting. I validated the portion of the client's position that was reasonable (it was not right for him to have to wait an excessive length of time for treatment). By telling him to complain, I implied that he had just cause. Of course, it was not my call either way. If the client had asked me if I thought he was right—which none ever did—I would simply have shared this fact
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with the client (e.g., "What, I have to do Jill's job now, too? Talk to Jill, and see what she says. If you're still not happy, there are other things we can do"). In the entire process, the client was moving toward a position of working within and through the system rather than working outside of it. If that lesson sinks in—and it did in most though not all cases—it is the most powerful lesson of all. I also taught clients to "manipulate" in a sophisticated rather than a crude fashion. Many of us will say "thank you" to a nurse who helps us because, well, we actually feel grateful. This is too much to hope for in the early treatment of individuals with antisocial PD. In fairness to the clients, their upbringing was probably miserable and punitive, and thus to get to true gratitude will at a minimum take time or may never occur. If the client changes from manipulating cruelly and harmfully to kindly and productively, I'll take that deal. My slight derogation of the nurses was also strategic. To say that as a whole they were a good and kind group was so outside the client's realm of experience that it could not even be processed. That they were "a bunch of do-gooders" says the same thing, though it was framed by the client as indicating that they were suckers or manipulators. Nonetheless, the client received and integrated the powerful message that he could work with these people on their own terms; could get a certain amount of what he wanted; and the nurses would be so happy, they'd come back for more! The final piece of the intervention is among the most important. I withdrew my investment in the client's decision, keeping him in charge and maintaining my role as a consultant. If I had become an authority figure, our alliance would have been shattered. The overall functioning of the system was crucial in these instances. Jill McDonald (not her real name) truly was phenomenal at resolving conflicts and understanding the perspective of both parties. Nursing staff, with excellent uniformity, followed through on setting boundaries. It should be noted that as human beings, the nurses were responsive to ordinary reinforcements, and the clients' hostile behaviors did elicit passive—aggressive behaviors from some nurses. However, on the whole, the nurses really were goodhearted and responded well to a few "thank you"s. Poorly functioning systems with deeply entrenched hostility and political divisions may not have done so well with such interventions. In terms of catalytic sequences, then, I would recommend an integrated cognitive—behavioral/systemic approach as illustrated by the above when possible. Environmental contingencies, when controllable, can provide a context for behavioral change. Although accurate empathy and unconditional positive regard are building blocks for the relationship, warmth, at least in my experience, is not. A warm, sensitive male is viewed as weak by the typical person with antisocial PD and may arouse homophobia; I have found that being warm with them is tantamount to a request for premature termination. My experience base with these clients is almost exclusively in ANTISOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER
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EXHIBIT 6.1 Therapeutic Strategies and Tactics for the Prototypal Antisocial Personality STRATEGIC GOALS Balance Polarities Shift focus more to needs of others Reduce impulsive acting-out Counter Perpetuations Reduce tendency to be provocative View affection and cooperation positively Reverse expectancy of danger TACTICAL MODALITIES Offset heedless, shortsighted behavior Motivate interpersonally responsible conduct Alter deviant cognitions Note. From Personality-Guided Therapy (p. 474), by T. Millon, 1999, New York: John Wiley & Sons. Copyright 1999 by John Wiley & Sons. Reprinted with permission of John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
male-male relationships. Other arrangements are likely to elicit very different responses. I have female students who have acted warmly with male antisocial clients and obtained excellent results, though in all of the cases I can recall there was a rapid erotic transference that had to be resolved before further progress could be made. It is also noteworthy, then, that the procedure I have outlined may need to be modified for female therapists or clients. Guidelines for treatment goals were summarized by Millon (1999; see Exhibit 6.1). As noted, it is critical to balance the self-other polarity by shifting more toward others' needs and to decrease the "active" end of the active-passive dimension by reducing impulsive acting out. It is essential to block activities that perpetuate the antisocial pattern, such as clients' tendency to be provocative and their proclivity to view cooperation as problematic. The clinician needs to intervene to reduce shortsighted behavior, irresponsible conduct, and distorted cognitions.
CASE EXAMPLE: JOE At the time that he was seen by his therapist, Joe, a 25-year-old African American man, was incarcerated on charges of murder and home invasion. He was being held in secure custody, 23-hour lockup, in solitary confinement. At the time of the initial evaluation, Joe was extremely depressed. He had attempted suicide by hanging himself using his bedsheet; it was accidental that he was found and cut down. His suicide attempt prompted the refer-
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ral, though he had the full spectrum of symptoms that qualified him for a diagnosis of major depression: He was not eating and had lost weight, was lethargic and apathetic, and had feelings of hopelessness. Joe also clearly met the criteria for antisocial PD. He had a lengthy juvenile record (e.g., truancy, vandalism, and violent behaviors). Joe was a gang member and had moved up to a high level on the hierarchy. He thrived on the excitement and sadistic pleasure of the gang fights. He would continue to beat his victims after they were unconscious. Later on, Joe was involved in extensive criminal activity but was never convicted because he or his gang members were consistently able, through the threat of physical violence, to intimidate people into dropping the charges against him. Once that started to happen, Joe began to feed off the feelings of invincibility and power, and his grandiosity began to soar. Freed from what minimal constraints he previously had had, his behavior became increasingly daring. He developed a scheme to rob other gangs by dressing up as police, busting into their houses, and taking money and stolen goods; this activity was highly lucrative. His luck ran out when he decided to hit a major gang a second time; this time around they were prepared, and a gunfight ensued. Joe accidentally shot and killed a young child and was charged with the crimes for which he was presently incarcerated. Joe's older brother, younger sister, and his mother were also involved in gangs. His father, who had been absent from the home for years, was a pimp. His mother was killed in a gang fight. In his mind, his mother's gang did not retaliate adequately for her death. Plotting the best path for revenge, he dropped out of school at 16, joined a rival gang, and figured out the best way to hurt others. During his 1st year in the penitentiary, Joe wanted to attain the high rank that he had held in his street gang. To "prove his worth," he engaged in dozens of violent incidents, incurring multiple prison charges. He quickly became unmanageable within the institutional structure. Prison authorities cracked down and broke up the gangs within the prison. Their main weapon was the use of solitary confinement. Repeatedly placed in solitary confinement, Joe became increasingly morose. It was at this time that he attempted suicide and was offered treatment. The therapist, Don Castaldi, connected with him through empathy and validation. He provided the client with an opportunity to discuss his situation and vent his anger. From the client's perspective, it was easy to understand how difficult it was to be sent to solitary confinement so often. Dr. Castaldi would make statements such as, "I can imagine how awful it must feel to be sent to secure lockup"; "It is understandable that you are angry when you get sent to solitary so often"; and "It must be frustrating to get sent to solitary so often, while others do not." The key was to validate the feelings, not necessarily the cognitive interpretation of the inequities and "unfairness" that are a function of externalization of blame.
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Having established a working alliance, Dr. Castaldi set out to reframe the client's behavior and his role in the power hierarchy of the prison subculture. He asked the client, "You're a smart guy, but you're always the one getting pitched [put in solitary]. Why is that?" The client noted that others would start up with him, and he "had to show them who's boss." The therapist wanted to challenge the client's concrete and short-sighted notions of challenge and control and to highlight the consequence of getting "put in the hole" over the momentary power of winning the fight. He took a bit of a risk by using a confrontational and irreverent (Linehan, 1993) style. He stated, "Oh, so you're the entertainment." Enraged, Joe terminated the session. After about a week, however, Joe sent a message requesting another session with Dr. Castaldi. Joe asked what was meant by the comment about being the entertainment. Dr. Castaldi explained that some of the inmates were intentionally, though indirectly, provoking Joe by sending others to press his buttons. By responding predictably, Joe was turning over his power and allowing himself to be used, that is, manipulated like a puppet. Joe could not deny the accuracy of the description, and his worldview changed radically in that moment; he no longer wanted to dance to their tune. However, it was not clear to Joe how he could save face. He was able to internalize that not fighting was being strong and smart. This kind of "cost-benefit" analysis, which involved evaluating actions in terms of his personal gain and loss, was congruent with his personality style. He began to covet the instigator role instead, seeing if he could get others to dance to his tune. In fact, he was able to wrest some control in that manner. His fighting decreased substantially. And because other prisoners were not as easily provoked or sadistic as Joe, and were less damaging fighters, there was a dramatic reduction in the overall violence on the ward. Joe, working behind the scenes, gained power among the inmates. At this time, the staff sergeant began to communicate with Joe to get a feel for the emotional tone of the unit, which instigated a process of inmates' respecting one another's areas of expertise and power. Once he was no longer being sent to the hole and began feeling more in control, Joe's depression and hopelessness dissipated. Joe was now able to plan more effectively and think more abstractly. True, he was using his skills to be manipulative, but he was doing so in a manner that was causing far less social harm and personal distress. At this point, Joe was looking forward to his sessions and consistently was waiting to meet Dr. Castaldi at the appointed time. Dr. Castaldi noted, in retrospect, that he began to feel narcissistic gratification from treating this case. He felt himself getting drawn into being invested in certain outcomes, such as behavioral and attitudinal improvements. Here was this "impossible" client, with whom he was having astonishing "success." Other staff members in the prison were taking note of him, and his prestige was rising. Suddenly, but inevitably, the therapist's prestige on the unit was tied to Joe's behaviors. Subtly, this was shifting the dynamics 130
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of the treatment into an old and all-too-familiar pattern for Joe, someone using him for personal gain. Dr. Castaldi discussed the case with a colleague, who noted how much pressure to succeed this case was generating. Looking at the issues allowed Dr. Castaldi to get a greater sense of perspective. He focused on becoming more mindful and viewing Joe as a person rather than a "project," which helped him to regain his balance. Simultaneously, Joe was experiencing something of an identity crisis. No longer invested in creating an illegal empire, he was not sure what to do or who he was. He began to identify with the African American subculture and focus on issues of racial oppression. Other African American prisoners also started to pressure him about seeing a White therapist, which strained the therapeutic relationship with Dr. Castaldi. Joe began to feel conflicted about being open and vulnerable with his "oppressor." Dr. Castaldi, on the other hand, felt frustrated with Joe's distorted and separatist interpretation of Martin Luther King Jr.'s work and with Joe's focus on fighting racism as an excuse for violence. Joe increasingly asked difficult questions relating to Dr. Castaldi's assessment of him as a person. This culminated in the following exchange: Joe: Dr. Castaldi: Joe: Dr. Castaldi:
Joe:
You know, I could kill you if I wanted to. Yes, I know. Does that intimidate you? It would, but I know that you are working toward becoming a better you, and that killing me would blow everything you've worked toward, so that reduces my fear. If I'm frightened I can't do my best work with you, so I really kind of let it go. You said that so easily.
Dr. Castaldi:
Whether you can defeat me in a fight is not very important to who I am. It's just the truth.
Joe:
I've had to think about whether I could take someone or they could take me every day of my life. I can't even imagine any other way of thinking.
Dr. Castaldi's genuineness had an enormous impact on Joe, who suddenly realized that life could be very different. Dr. Castaldi's recognition and validation of Joe's physical strength seemed reassuring in that context. They were able to discuss the impact of racism and social class in a more productive and collaborative way so that Joe could integrate his own behaviors with the impact of racism and social class to create a more realistic picture of his life and his situation. He began to show remorse, demonstrating feelings for the young boy who had been killed by his stray bullet and acknowledging that he had stolen that child's opportunity to experience life. At about this time, other gang members were beginning to testify against him in court. Joe ANTISOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER
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began to state that he wanted to "honor the memory of the child" by turning state's evidence. Dr. Castaldi noted that there were several elements in his decision, including genuine feelings for the child as well as self-serving interests (e.g., avoiding life in prison). It was difficult to assess just how far Joe had come in developing a conscience or superego, but it appeared that he had developed at least a minimal or preliminary concept of and experience with guilt and remorse. His basic self-serving approach was still dominant, and as he appeared to be transitioning from a deviant to a more mainstream set of values and convictions, Dr. Castaldi was struck by how Joe was able to give up "the code," that is, the gang values that he presumably had held all his life. After testifying, Joe was transferred to another prison where he apparently served 5 years and was released; Joe had viewed testifying as "being in the spotlight" and had enjoyed the narcissistic gratification. At their last contact, Joe told Dr. Castaldi that he would miss their conversations; Dr. Castaldi said he believed that Joe had great potential and wished him the best. Dr. Castaldi believed that the main impact of therapy had been the opportunity for Joe to internalize a positive relationship as well as Joe's ability and decision to take advantage of this opportunity. Treatment had lasted approximately 1 year. In sum, then, Dr. Castaldi followed the principles of personality-guided therapy by modifying his approach to Joe on the basis of Joe's personality style. The initial connection with Joe was established through a relationship style that is possibly unique to the treatment of individuals with antisocial PD: The therapist was empathic and validating but not particularly warm or nurturing. The therapist then used cognitive and interpersonal techniques and theory, which helped the client to develop a different understanding of his relationships on the ward. His choice of how to deliver the message about how he was being "played" by other inmates, which was a gut-level therapeutic intervention, was consistent with dialectical behavior therapy (Linehan, 1993) and paradoxical communication concepts (Watzlawick, Weakland, & Fisch, 1974). Behavioral techniques are implicit in prison life, because there is a system of rewards and punishments to enhance compliance with ward routines. However, the impact of the behavioral consequences was entirely contingent on the client's conceptualization of the consequences; thus, in this case, cognitive work was essential in complementing the behavioral plan. Once the client did some basic reframing, however, the behavioral consequences began to have their intended effect. The second major turning point in the case, the client's confrontation of the therapist regarding the client's superior strength and the way the therapist handled it, is an excellent example of the powerful impact of therapist genuineness (Rogers, 1979). Psychodynamic thinking also impacted the analysis of this powerful transference response on the part of the client. His reaction to feeling vulnerable (i.e., to threaten, assert power, and take control) was met in a different and therapeutic way. Presumably, Joe was anticipating 13 2
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posturing, defensiveness, or power plays by Dr. Castaldi; when the latter reacted with honesty and empathy, it smashed his assumptions about the nature and potential of relationships. The amelioration of Joe's depression occurred naturally as a consequence of attending to the environmental and relationship issues that accompany antisocial PD. The Axis I and Axis II conditions were treated as a unified whole rather than as two separate conditions. As Joe's behaviors, cognitions, and relationships changed, the depression dissipated.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Treating the person with antisocial PD starts with some extraordinary challenges in establishing rapport, the difficulty of which is second only to the treatment of clients with paranoid PD. Clients with both depression and antisocial PD are usually somewhat more amenable to treatment because they want some kind of change, and the therapist may be able to help. Extreme bluntness and an appeal to the client's self-interest while making modest demands often suffice to establish a starting place; warmth and compassion, central with treating other disorders, is usually an error with this population. Synergistic and catalytic sequences for the person with antisocial PD can then follow. Cognitive and behavioral strategies aimed at securing desirable consequences are usually a good place to start. Once the trust is established, interpersonal strategies may be useful. Psychodynamic approaches are useful for conceptualization, and the skilled use of confrontation can be essential to success; it should be noted, however, that few individuals with antisocial PD have much patience for the thorough efforts required in many analytical approaches. As illustrated by the case of Joe, genuineness and transparency were keys to the client's breakthrough, as was an understanding of the transference and countertransference. Future research should focus on an empirical analysis of ways of establishing rapport in this population to validate the growing clinical lore on the topic; many therapeutic interventions fail because they cannot get past this first step. Brain research also seems to be a particularly promising avenue; findings may lead to early intervention strategies or medication interventions. Finally, the empirical analysis of the arrangement and integration of psychotherapeutic approaches, including synergistic and catalytic sequences, requires further empirical investigation.
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7 DEPRESSION IN BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER I Feel I feel the whirlwind twisting inside me a great tornado tears me apart. I feel the hate burning inside fire and darkness blackens my soul. I feel the fear squeezing my heart incredible terror separates me from the world. I feel the emptiness deep as a well the huge black hole forever swallows me. I feel the pain need to die. Insufferable punishment can no longer live. —Brooke Bergan
PHENOMENOLOGY: THE EXPERIENCE OF BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER It is difficult to convey the emotional distress experienced by individuals with borderline personality disorder (PD). The disorder has the dubious distinction of having the highest rate of suicidal and parasuicidal behavior of any PD. Poetry and artwork can help to convey the anguish of those with the disorder. The poem above is by a young woman who had borderline PD, Brooke Bergan; she was in high school when she wrote it.1
'I am delighted to report that Brooke now describes herself as completely healed, through a combination of psychotherapy and intensive prayer, and she is now a professional writer (Brooke Bergan, personal communication, August 8, 2005). She requested that the following poem be included here to provide a complete picture of her recovery: "To My Father, God: / "Let my days start in Your presence / for just an hour or two / or all day long, for all I want / is to remain in You. / "I've wandered over rocky roads / and always in the end / I've ended up back in Your arms— / my broken heart you mend. / "For in this life trials will come / but in and through them all / Your loving arms will draw me on / to Heaven where I belong."
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This poem illustrates the severe emotional dysregulation, the "swirling tornado" that consumes her, and the accompanying suffering, which she experiences or interprets as punishment. The fire produces burning (blackening) heat, but no light; it cannot push out the darkness. Fire and darkness coexist within her, representing the split she feels. She experiences hate, terror, and fear—her anger cannot protect her and perhaps only increases her feeling of vulnerability. In the end, everything is swallowed up by emptiness and the desire to end her pain through death. Her wildly fluctuating emotions lead to relationship disruptions, fueling abandonment fears that further her emotional dysregulation. Borderline PD was described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text revision [DSM-IV-TR]; American Psychiatric Association, ZOOOa) as follows: "The essential feature of Borderline Personality Disorder is a pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects, and marked impulsivity that begins by early adulthood and is present in a variety of contexts" (p. 706)
EPIDEMIOLOGY Borderline is the most frequent of all PDs. According to the DSM-IVTR, 30% to 60% of individuals within personality disorder samples have a borderline diagnosis. Borderline PD is estimated to exist in 2% of the general population, 10% of individuals seen in outpatient clinics, and 20% of inpatients (American Psychiatric Association, 2000a, p. 708). In a sample of depressed clients, approximately 16% had borderline PD (Fava et al., 1995). Of the 116 individuals with major depression in a study by Zimmerman and Coryell (1989), 6.9% had borderline PD. In Pepper et al.'s (1995) dysthymic disorder sample, 24% had borderline PD. In a sample of 249 depressed outpatients, 2% were diagnosed with "definite" and 8% with "probable" borderline PD (Shea, Glass, Pilkonis, Watkins, & Docherty, 1987). In a sample of 352 clients with both anxiety and depression, approximately 14% had borderline PD as diagnosed by structured interview (Flick, Roy-Byrne, Cowley, Shores, & Dunner, 1993). Thus the frequency of borderline PD in samples of individuals with depression ranges from 2% to 24%. Likely reasons for the wide range include natural sample variation, inpatient versus outpatient status, different definitions of depression (e.g., dysthymic disorder vs. major depression), and changing criteria (e.g., some studies used criteria from the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders [American Psychiatric Association, 1980], and some used criteria from the revised third edition [American Psychiatric Association, 1987]). Starting with borderline PD and looking at depression, a study that included 175 clients with borderline PD found that 70.9% had major depression (McGlashin et al., 2000). Zimmerman and Coryell (1989) studied a 136
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community sample of 797 individuals, which included 143 individuals who were diagnosed with PDs. Among individuals with borderline PD, 61.5% met the criteria for depression. According to a literature review on the frequency of comorbid conditions with borderline PD, 24% to 87% of individuals with borderline PD have affective disorders as well (Shea, Widiger, & Klein, 1992). WHY DO PEOPLE WITH BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER GET DEPRESSED? The reasons for depression among individuals with borderline PD are self-evident, because they are partially incorporated into the definition of the syndrome. Affective lability, which includes depressed mood, is one of the criteria for borderline PD. Consistent with the "psychobiological" model of the relationship between Axis I and Axis II, it may be that common biological factors partially underlie each disorder. The typical lifestyle of individuals with borderline PD only exacerbates the likelihood of depression. They deeply desire love and affection, but their erratic and unstable behaviors practically preclude the possibility of stable attachments. Although alcohol and illicit drug use may temporarily stave off painful affect, both the biological and psychological effects of substance abuse are depressogenic. Interpersonal dependency issues can be related to intense feelings of helplessness, which leads to depression (Seligman, 1975); in addition, clinging dependency can bum out relationships, leading to further distress. Individuals with borderline PD also have copious anger and rage, which can be directed against the self as a flood of recriminations (Millon, 1999). Thus borderline PD creates a vulnerability to depression, and further, each disorder exacerbates the intensity of the other. It is also reasonable to speculate that not only constitutional factors but also psychological events may predispose a person to both borderline PD and depression. For example, there is a relatively high rate of sexual abuse reported by individuals with both disorders (Danielson, de Arellano, Kilpatrick, Saunders, & Resnick, 2005; Freyd et al., 2005; Swanston et al., 2003; Whiffen & Macintosh, 2005; Zanarini, 1997).2 Borderline PD plus depression is a particularly dangerous combination. In one study, 92% of individuals with depression and borderline PD had a lifetime history of at least one suicide attempt. This rate was significantly higher than individuals with depression alone or with depression and a comorbid Axis II diagnosis other than borderline. Approximately 31% of the suicide attempts were rated as having a "severe" (e.g., cut throat) or "extreme" (e.g., coma) level of lethality (Friedman, Aronoff, Clarkin, Corn, &. Hurt, 1983). 2
See chapter 2 for further discussion of theoretical models of relationships between Axis 1 and Axis II disorders.
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HOW A PERSON BECOMES AND REMAINS BORDERLINE: THEORIES OF BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER Biological Factors A number of biological factors have been shown to be related to incidences of borderline PD. Heritability
Borderline PD appears to be moderately heritable. In one study, a factor labeled "emotional dysregulation," which corresponds to borderline PD, had a heritability estimate of 52% (Jang, Vernon, & Livesley, 2000). Coolidge, Thede, and Jang (2001), in their sample of children and adolescents, found that the heritability of borderline PD is 76%. A study using the Dimensional Assessment of Personality Pathology found that affective lability has a heritability of 38.4%, and identity problems have a heritability of 39.7%. Silk (2000), in his review of the literature, estimated that the overall heritability of borderline PD is approximately 50% (pp. 66-67). Neurological and Neuropsychological Findings
Positron-emission tomography scans on several samples have demonstrated reduced activity in the brains of adults with borderline PD, particularly in the orbital-frontal region (Goyer, Andreason, et al, 1994; Goyer, Konicki, & Schulz, 1994). Studies by Soloff et al. (2000) with a sample of people with borderline PD demonstrated reduced response to the serotonin agonist fenfluramine relative to a placebo control. Using positron-emission tomography scans and magnetic resonance imaging, Ley ton et al. (2001) also found lower levels of brain activity near the frontal lobe area and differences in the serotonin-rich areas of the brain, concluding that low serotonin synthesis capacity in the relevant pathways of the brain may promote impulsive behavior in individuals with borderline PD. As seen in chapter 6, this volume, brain-scan studies have shown that individuals who have difficulty with impulse control and aggression have reduced levels of activity in their brains in a number of key locations. This effect held up whether one used lifetime history of impulsive-aggressive acts or current impulsivity on an assigned task to define impulsivity. Increases in aggression are associated with low level of activity in the frontal cortex as well as reduced activity in several areas within the limbic system. Although further research is necessary, these preliminary results imply that memory and integration of sensory and emotional material are implicated in the difficulties experienced by people with borderline PD. Similarly, studies using computerized tomography scans have demonstrated interesting neuroanatomical differences between individuals with and without borderline PD that correspond to clinical presentation. For example, J 38
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one study showed that when compared with controls, while controlling for overall brain volume, people with borderline PD had a 16.0% smaller hippocampus and a 7.5% smaller amygdala (Driessen et al, 2000). The hippocampus plays an important role in memory, and the amygdala relates to a variety of emotional processes. Neuropsychological studies of individuals with borderline PD also provide highly useful and suggestive findings. O'Leary and Cowdry (1994) reviewed four neuropsychological studies done on people with borderline PD. They concluded that people with borderline PD demonstrate difficulties with visual discrimination and filtering and difficulties with recall of complex material. There also appear to be problems in visuomotor integration and figural memory. Neurological examinations and electroencephalogram studies have shown a high rate of subtle neurological dysfunction in individuals with borderline PD (Zanarini, Kimble, & Williams, 1994). These problems are generally in the mild to moderate range and are diffuse; thus they are subtle and could easily be missed without testing. Individuals with borderline PD have been found to have difficulty with both verbal and visual memory, especially with regard to complex material. Difficulty with recall of complex material may make it difficult for people with borderline PD to learn from their experiences. We do not yet know whether individuals with borderline PD have difficulty with retrieval, recall, or both. Processing problems can also impact an individual's self-image. O'Leary and Cowdry (1994) noted that "such a memory deficit may contribute to difficulties borderline patients experience in maintaining a continuous sense of self and using the past to respond to present events and predict future consequences" (p. 147). Thus, brain functioning and learning style may contribute to many of the difficulties that we see in borderline PD. A number of the findings are consistent with borderline psychopathology. Poor filtering often leads to confusion, which may contribute to excessive dependence on others and poor boundaries. Diffuse neuropsychological dysfunction may be related to dissociation and other neurocognitive functions. Sluggish functioning of the serotonergic systems, imbalances in the cholinergic and noradronergic systems, anatomical deficiencies in the amygdala, and dysfunction in the limbic system may lead a person to be extremely vulnerable to impulsivity and affective dysregulation. Deficiencies in the hippocampus may contribute to memory problems. Many of the distortions people with borderline PD evince may be seen as a function of neurological dysfunction. Splitting, for example, can be seen as a problem of recall especially in evidence under conditions of high emotional arousal. A natural question is whether the neurological problems are primary and cause borderline PD, whether borderline behavior causes neurological impairment (e.g., through substance misuse and head injury associated with high-risk behavior), or whether the problem is best explained by a third variBORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER
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able (e.g., physical or sexual abuse, which leads to neurological impairment). At this time, there is insufficient evidence to answer the etiological question definitively. The various models are not exclusive, and any or all of them may be relevant in any given case. Medications
Medications that impact serotonin generally have had salubrious effects on individuals with borderline PD. Markovitz and Wagner's (1995) open trial investigation of venlafaxine with 39 patients demonstrated decreases in self-injurious behavior, somatic complaints, and Symptom Checklist—90 scores. Silva et al. (1997) did an uncontrolled 7-week trial of fluoxetine with 35 patients that showed decreases in depression, impulsivity, and overall psychiatric symptoms and an increase in Global Assessment of Functioning scores. Sertraline and citalopram appear to have decreased borderline symptomatology in an uncontrolled study (Ekselius & von Knorring, 1998; see chap. 1, this volume). Rinne et al.'s (2002) double-blind placebo-controlled study of 38 women demonstrated that fluvoxamine produces substantial decreases in rapid mood shifts, though aggression and impulsivity were not improved. Anticonvulsants have had mixed results, de la Fuente and Lostra's (1994) double-blind, placebo-controlled trial of carbamazepine with 20 inpatients showed no improvement on the Symptom Checklist—90, Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale, and an acting-out scale, and 2 participants in the medication group dropped out because of dramatic acting-out behavior (wrist cutting and physical violence). An 8-week, open-label trial (Stein, Simeon, Frenkel, Islam, 6k Hollander, 1995) of valproate with 8 patients found that there was overall improvement in about half the cases. Impulsivity, irritability, anger, anxiety, and rejection sensitivity showed modest improvements. Stein et al. (1995) concluded that valproate may have "limited efficacy" in treating borderline PD. Hollander and his associates (Hollander et al., 2001; Hollander, Swann, Coccaro, Jiang, & Smith, 2005, in two small randomized controlled trials with divalproex sodium, found decreased aggression, irritability, depression, impulsive aggression, and suicidality as well as improved global impression. In a study that was unique in that it focused on immediate effects, Philipsen et al. (2004) administered clonidine to 14 female participants and took ratings after 30, 60, and 120 minutes. There were significant decreases in inner tension, dissociative symptoms, and urge to commit self-injurious behavior; the effects were strongest after 30 to 60 minutes. Atypical antipsychotic medications have also shown promise in treating symptoms of borderline PD. Case studies have illustrated marked improvements in some individuals. Khouzam and Donnelly (1997) noted remission of extreme impulsivity and self-mutilation using risperidone, and Szigethy and Schulz (1997) found that a client with borderline PD and dysthymia responded to a combination of risperidone and fluvoxamine. Treat140
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ment with clozapine led to a dramatic decrease in self-injurious behavior after failed attempts with various other medications (Chengappa, Baker, & Sirri, 1995); similarly, a client with obsessive-compulsive disorder and borderline PD "improved considerably" with clozapine following failed attempts with numerous other medications (Steinert, Schmidt-Michel, & Kaschka, 1996). Cagno (2001) reported a case in which there were decreased psychotic symptoms, improved treatment compliance, and an improved "sense of purpose" (p. 344) in a client treated with quetiapine. Hilger, Barnas, and Kasper (cited in Markovitz, 2004) reported on 2 clients whose self-injurious behavior was eliminated at 6-month follow-up (Case 1) and 8-month follow-up (Case 2) following treatment with quetiapine. Self-injurious behavior was also reduced in 2 clients using olanzapine (Hough, 2001). Group designs have also generally demonstrated improvements using atypical antipsychotics. In an uncontrolled clozapine study with blind raters, Frankenburg and Zanarini (1993) found that there were global improvements in functioning and decreases in psychopathology. Chengappa, Ebeling, Kang, Levine, and Parepally (1999) used clozapine with 7 female inpatients and found decreases in self-mutilation, seclusion, use of as-needed anxiolytics, and injuries to staff and peers; in addition, global functioning ratings increased substantially. Another clozapine study investigated 12 borderline PD inpatients with severe psychotic symptoms; there were decreases in overall psychiatric symptoms and depression and improved global functioning (Bendetti, Sforzird, Colombo, Marrei, & Smeraldi, 1998). Parker (cited in Markovitz, 2004) treated 8 severe borderline PD patients using clozapine; hospitalizations were substantially reduced, leading to over $36,000 in reduced hospital costs per patient on average. Using risperidone with 15 borderline PD patients, Roca et al. (cited in Markovitz, 2004) demonstrated a reduction in impulsive aggression and a 13-point improvement on the Global Assessment of Functioning. An 8-week study of 9 patients with olanzapine demonstrated statistically significant improvements in many areas, including psychoticism, depression, interpersonal sensitivity, anger, global functioning, and overall symptomatology (Schulz, Camlin, Berry, & Jesberger, 1999). Bogenschutz and Numberg (2004) completed a randomized clinical trial of olanzapine. Forty participants were evenly divided between the drug and placebo conditions. Relative to the placebo condition, the olanzapine group demonstrated improvements on borderline PD symptoms and clinical global impression; weight gain was noted as a side effect. Zanarini and Frankenburg (cited in Markovitz, 2004) completed a double-blind, placebocontrolled study of olanzapine with 28 nondepressed women with borderline PD. Nineteen were assigned to the drug condition, and 9 were controls. The researchers found decreases in global symptoms and improvements in global functioning. On the basis of his review of the literature, Markovitz (2004) concluded, "There is a growing body of evidence to support the efficacy of the atypical antipsychotics in decreasing impulsivity, aggresBORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER
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sion, self-injurious behavior, and affective instability in [borderline PD]" (p. 93). Soloff (2000) recommended conceptualizing the individual with borderline PD as having difficulties that lie along four dimensions: cognitiveperceptual problems, affective dysregulation, impulsive-behavioral dyscontrol, and interpersonal psychopathology. Soloff constructed an algorithm of treatment recommendations on the basis of his comprehensive review of the literature. Cognitive-perceptual disturbances such as suspiciousness, paranoia, and thought disorder are treated primarily with low-dose neuroleptics, switching to an atypical neuroleptic if the former has inadequate efficacy and adding an SSRI or monoamine oxidase inhibitor for affective symptoms. For affective dysregulation, including depression, anger, anxiety, and lability, an SSRI is the first line of treatment; a low-dose neuroleptic can be added for anger, and clonazepam for anxiety. If these are insufficiently effective, other medications to try include valproate, lithium, or carbamazepine. Impulsive aggression, including bingeing and self-injurious behavior, is also primarily treated with SSRIs, followed by lithium, monoamine oxidase inhibitors, valproate, and carbamazepine, depending on the exact symptoms and response. The use of SSRIs for affective dysregulation and impulsivity was based on the theoretical work (presented above) on serotonergic insufficiency in people with borderline PD and other affective-behavioral dysregulation problems. Interpersonal psychopathology (problems in interpersonal relationships) is not directly treated with medications (except as it is impacted by the other three dimensions) and falls within the domain of psychotherapy (Soloff, 1998). Others who reviewed the literature reached similar conclusions (Coccaro, 1998; Hirschfeld, 1997). It should be noted that two studies have investigated the use of essential fatty acids as a form of treatment. Zanarini and Frankenberg (2003) did an 8-week double-blind randomized trial of ethyl-eicosapentaenoic acid versus placebo with 30 women with borderline PD. They found that the supplements decreased aggression and depression. A randomized controlled trial of essential fatty acids plus a vitamin and mineral supplement with 231 incarcerated young adults demonstrated that those in the active treatment group were approximately 26% less likely to be reported for antisocial behavior and had fewer rule violations than those in the placebo condition (Gesch, Hammond, Hampson, Eves, & Crowder, 2002). These nutritional supplements are extremely low risk compared with medications and have had promising results; further investigation is warranted. Although dramatic case studies are encouraging, it is not clear that the newer medications lead to improvements that are, on average, much better than those obtained with older medications. For example, Global Assessment Scale scores in Frankenburg and Zanarini's (1993) study of clozapine yielded approximately a 12-point improvement (from 31 to 43), which is similar to Soloff et al.'s (1989) 14-point improvement in their haloperidol 142
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group (from 41 to 55). Enough studies are available that meta-analysis should be considered to evaluate the costs and benefits of various treatments. All of the findings should be interpreted with caution: Medication studies of individuals with borderline PD are marked by high dropout rates, and large placebo effects are also often seen in controlled studies. Most of the studies reviewed are small and uncontrolled; even in this best-studied of PDs, the research on medications is woefully inadequate. Adequately sized randomized clinical trials should be conducted on each medication used with this group. Researchers and clinicians should be sobered by paradoxical findings with widely used medications: Individuals with borderline PD may not have the expected improvements and may even get worse with particular drugs. Psychological Factors Millon's Theory Borderline PD, in Millon's conceptualization, is a "dysfunctional," or extreme, variant of dependent, histrionic, and passive—aggressive PDs. As such, the etiology, including biological underpinnings and psychosocial experiences, is related to the subtype. The more dependent types generally have more sluggish temperaments and a history of being overnurtured (with the inevitable meta-message that the child is incompetent and requires care). The more histrionic types have highly active temperaments and were reinforced for performing for their parents and others. The passive-aggressive (negativistic) types tend to have moody, irascible temperaments and were raised with parental inconsistency. In all cases, repeated failures of their attempts to cope with the world have led to increasing desperation. Rather than flexibly adapting to the environment, however, the person with incipient borderline PD tends to recycle the same coping efforts but at a higher or more extreme level of intensity. Eventually, the individual engages in extreme behaviors much of the time. Overall, Millon viewed mundane, oftrepeated patterns in the environment (such as ongoing parental inconsistency) as more central to the development of PDs than dramatic but time-limited traumatic events (such as a single episode of sexual abuse). The fundamental feature, as seen in Millon's tridimensional model, is that there is ambivalence on all three dimensions (active-passive, painpleasure, and self—other), which emerges as a near-constant state of ambivalence and tension. This is not true of all people with PDs. The person with dependent PD can feel comfortable in an environment in which he is consistently nurtured and supported; similarly, the individual with narcissistic PD can feel comfortable if interacting with one or more admirers. Not so with borderline PD. A persistently nurturing other person will tend to elicit fears of engulfment; however, anything less than complete devotion at every moment elicits abandonment terror. Similarly, the person with borderline PD tends to alternate between passively hoping for attention and affection from BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER
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others and actively seeking to have his or her emotional needs met. Millon (1996) described this polarity conflict as signifying "the intense ambivalence and inconsistency that characterizes the borderline, their emotional vacillation, their behavioral unpredictability, as well as the inconsistency they manifest in their feelings and thoughts about others" (p. 660). The description of borderline PD in terms of Millon's eight domains is given in Appendix B. Of these domains, paradoxical interpersonal conduct, uncertain self-image, and split morphologic organization are most central and salient (Millon, 1999, p. 645). Psychodynamic Therapy
Psychodynamic formulations of borderline PD focus on a variety of developmental and constitutional factors that interact to form the disorder. The term borderline is derived from the conceptualization of Stern (1938) that there is a group of clients who seem to dwell at the boundary—the "borderline"—between psychosis and neurosis. It is important to note that Stern's initial interest in this area stemmed from the fact that there were people who seemed like they should be amenable to analysis who in fact did very poorly. Comparing psychoanalytic treatment with a necessary surgery, Stern stated, "A negative therapeutic reaction is nevertheless inevitable; in some, the reaction is extremely unfavorable, and, cumulatively, may become dangerous; patients may develop depression, suicidal ideas, or make suicide attempts" (Stem, 1986, p. 59). The word inevitable is chilling in this context; classical psychoanalysis is not recommended for this population. However, with some modest modifications from psychoanalysis, psychodynamic methods are effective. The theories described below draw primarily on object relations theory. Thus, the key issue is not the relationships with real people, such as the mother, but rather the individual's internal representation of the mother and, perhaps even more germanely, the relationship of various parts of the self (part'Self) to various parts of the other (part-objects). Thus, for example, the person with borderline PD may see him- or herself as a denigrated, abused self in relation to a sadistic, abusive other; both this self and this other are really part-self and part-object relations. O. F. Kernberg and colleagues used the concept of "borderline personality organization" rather than borderline PD (Clarkin, Yeomans, & Kemberg, 1999; O. F. Kemberg, 1967/1986a; O. F. Kemberg, Selzer, Koenigsberg, Carr, & Appelbaum, 1989). Borderline personality organization is conceptualized as a level of functioning rather than a categorical conception. Theoretically derived from the interplay of psychodynamic processes related to how the developing child handles an excess of aggressive libidinal energy, borderline personality organization includes features of not only borderline but also narcissistic, schizoid, schizotypal, paranoid, histrionic, antisocial, and dependent PDs (Clarkin et al., 1999; O. F. Kernberg, 1967/1986a). Excess aggres144
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sion can be caused by constitutional factors or by childhood frustration. The individual then defends against the aggressive impulses using splitting and related defenses. Splitting occurs in normal development as a way of experiencing the positive and negative aspects of significant others in the environment. Newborns coo in the presence of a warm, loving mother and wail when the mother is unable to immediately provide for their needs. In normal development, children at some point integrate whole views of others, so they recognize that the father who is nurturing at one time is still the same person as the one who is withholding at another. However, when children have a massive excess of aggressive libidinal energy, good internalized objects are at risk of being completely overwhelmed by negative object representations. In other words, if one were to see the other person, say the mother, as a whole, she would be invested with a massive amount of hostile, aggressive energy and a relatively small amount of loving, nurturing energy and hence would be seen as essentially all bad. Splitting, then, protects the fragile internalized good objects from being overwhelmed by the aggressive, malevolent bad object representations. Splitting, being the primary defensive operation to cope with excess aggression, elicits several other defensive maneuvers. Primitive idealization, one side of splitting, occurs when external objects are seen as all good. Omnipotent control is overvaluation of the self and is related to devaluation, which is deflation of others. As seen in chapter 3, this volume, on paranoid PD, projective identification is a three-part process: (a) projection of an unacceptable impulse onto another while continuing to experience the impulse; (b) viewing the individual onto whom the impulse is projected as under the sway of the projected impulse, and thus frightening; and (c) attempts to control the person, often in a way that provokes the feared behavior. An example of projective identification is the client who repeatedly and with thinly veiled hostility accuses the therapist of being angry with her; eventually, the therapist does in fact become irritated and angry, "confirming" the client's suspicions. Denial, according to Kernberg (see Yeomans, Clarkin, &. Kernberg, 2002), is not so much denial of the existence of a perception, thought, or feeling but rather the splitting off of the emotion so that the phenomenon is seen as emotionally irrelevant. Kernberg (see Yeomans et al., 2002) recommended the traditional analytic techniques of clarification, confrontation, interpretation, and technical neutrality (placing oneself equidistant from the id, ego, and superego in helping the client to resolve conflicts). The sine qua non of his treatment, however, is analysis of the transference in the here and now; in fact, he recently labeled his therapy transference focused psychotherapy, Transference focused psychotherapy has been manualized to promote consistent use in different settings (Yeomans et al., 2002). Masterson (1981) had a different perspective. Rather than emphasizing the child's internalized aggression, he saw the primary problem as the mother's BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER
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"libidinal withdrawal" from the child, frustrating the child's separationindividuation process. The most common pattern occurs when the mother discourages separation, instead encouraging dependency and clinging. The mother, according to Masterson, is generally a person with borderline PD herself who has her own problems with separation anxiety. The child's attempts to individuate provoke extreme anxiety in the mother, which in turn elicits caretaking behavior from the child. Another pattern is for the child to regress and cling to the mother, failing to individuate, thus gratifying the mother's emotional needs. Alternatively, the mother may withdraw, unable to handle the child's dependency needs. For Masterson, like Kemberg, the key to understanding the individual with borderline PD was understanding the part-self and part-object relations that compose the psyche. The mother is divided into two part-objects as a function of splitting. There is the rewarding object relations unit, which is the all-good object, and the withdrawing object relations unit, which is all bad (hostile, withdrawing, and rejecting). The child can defend against feelings of abandonment in one of two ways. The first way is to project the rewarding unit onto others (including the therapist) while internalizing the withdrawing unit. This leads to clinging subordination. The second path is to project the withdrawing unit onto others while the rewarding unit is internalized. Others are thus seen as hostile, critical, and distancing. The client avoids thoughts and feelings that interfere with this defense, primarily through denial, and psychotherapeutic progress once again grinds to a halt. Abandonment depression, and the defenses built around it, for Masterson, constitute the heart of borderline psychopathology. Masterson called this pattern the "borderline triad: separation-individuation leads to depression which leads to defense" (Masterson, 1981, p. 133). Like Kernberg, Masterson recommended confrontation as the path through which to break this stalemate. The purpose of the confrontation is to "render the functioning of the split object relations unit/pathologic ego alliance ego alien" (p. 136). That is, clients must experience their perceptions of others as partobjects (e.g., as entirely hostile, withdrawing, bad, or good), as something foreign and in need of repair rather than as a necessary and adaptive response to reality. Stated Masterson, "The clinging transference calls for the confrontation of the denial of destructive behavior . . . while the distancing transference calls for the confrontation of the negative, hostile projections, usually on the therapist" (1981, p. 137). Confrontation, when effective, thus increases anxiety, because clients become aware of conflicts that were formerly suppressed, denied, or defended against through acting out. When they recognize that these defenses are selfdestructive, they control their behavior, thus experiencing the abandonment depression. This promotes a healing cycle: "There results a circular process, sequentially including resistance, confrontation, working through the feel146
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ings of abandonment (withdrawing part unit), further resistance (rewarding part unit) and further confrontation, which leads in turn to further working through" (Masterson, 1981, p. 137). According to Masterson, borderline clients do not have transference in the classical sense, because transference requires whole-object relations. Instead, they engage in transference acting out. The concept is similar to Freud's repetition compulsion, in which events are repeated not in memory but in behavior. Just as the resolution to the repetition compulsion is interpretation, which releases repressed memories, the resolution to transference acting out is confrontation in the transference, which brings awareness of the meaning of the behavior. This allows the client to increasingly perceive the therapist as a whole object, which permits working through. As Masterson stated, "The more he invests in the therapist as a real object, the more he turns to therapy to work through his feelings of abandonment rather than to the rewarding unit/pathologic ego alliance to relieve them" (1981, p. 151). Masterson's and Kernberg's conceptualizations are similar in a number of ways, especially in the area of technique. Both emphasize confrontation, especially confrontation of the transference, as the path to resolution of borderline psychopathology. Both use rather traditional psychoanalytic techniques (e.g., technical neutrality). The main differences are their etiological assumptions, with Kernberg emphasizing excess aggression and Masterson emphasizing maternal unavailability. Cognitive-Behavioral Conceptualization and Interventions Cognitive-behavioral therapy for borderline PD is built primarily on the notion that people who have the disorder are prone to a variety of beliefs that are then logically related to their emotions. The acquisition of these beliefs and behaviors is generally thought to follow the principles of social learning (e.g., Bandura, 1977), reinforcement (e.g., Skinner, 1953), and associational learning (e.g., Pavlov, 1963). The relationship that is encouraged between client and therapist is that of teacher and student who engage in "collaborative empiricism" to shine the light of reason on the client's potentially irrational beliefs. Young's (1987) work with schemas, originally labeled "schema-focused cognitive therapy" (see also A. T. Beck & Freeman, 1990) and now known as "schema therapy" (Young, Klosko, & Weishaar, 2003) examines typical beliefs held by people with PDs, including borderline PD. Young explicated typical beliefs that persist in people with borderline PD. By educating clients about schemas, the therapist can align with the client against the maladaptive schema. Examples of schemas that typify borderline PD are listed in Exhibit 7.1. Beck and his associates (A. T. Beck & Freeman, 1990; A. T. Beck, Freeman, & Davis, 2004) have argued that dichotomous (all-or-none) thinking plays an important role in borderline PD pathology. The phenomenoBORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER
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EXHIBIT 7.1 Maladaptive Ways of Thinking Learned in Early Childhood by People With Borderline Personality Disorder Early maladaptive schemas Abandonment/instability Mistrust/abuse Emotional deprivation Defectiveness/shame Dependence/incompetence Undeveloped self Insufficient self-control/selfdiscipline Subjugation Punitiveness
Possible expression I worry that people I feel close to will leave or abandon me. I have been physically, emotionally, or sexually abused by important people in my life. Most of the time, I haven't had someone to nurture me, share himself or herself with me, or care deeply about everything that happens to me. I am unworthy of the love, attention, and respect of others. I do not feel capable of getting by on my own in everyday life. I feel that I do not really know who I am or what I want. I often do things impulsively that I later regret. I feel that I have no choice but to give in to other people's wishes, or else they will retaliate or reject me in some way. I'm a bad person who deserves to be punished.
Note. Based on the Young Schema Therapy Questionnaire, Short Form and Long Form, adapted from Cognitive Therapy for Personality Disorders: A Schema-Focused Approach (3rd ed., pp. 12-16), by J. E. Young, 1999, Sarasota, FL: Sarasota Professional Resource Press, and personal communication from the author, May 3, 2002. Reprinted by permission of Jeffrey E. Young. Reproduction without written consent of the author is prohibited.
logical parallel of the psychodynamic construct of splitting, all-or-none thinking is seen as having broad-reaching implications: Since dichotomous thinking can produce extreme emotional responses and actions and can produce abrupt shifts from one extreme mood to another, it could be responsible to a considerable extent for the abrupt mood swings and dramatic shifts in behavior that are a hallmark of BPD. (A. T. Beck & Freeman, 1990, p. 187) A. T. Beck and Freeman (1990) further noted that relationship issues with the therapist will be much more prominent for people with borderline PD than for those with other disorders. A. T. Beck et al. (2004) recommended some specific strategies for fostering a relationship with the person with borderline PD: The therapist actively breaks through the detachment of the patient, is actively involved in crises, soothes the patient when sad, and brings in him- or herself as a person. . . . This approach almost necessarily provokes difficult feelings in the patient, based on core schemas, which is good because these can be subsequently be addressed in therapy. Thus, this "reparenting" approach is considered an essential ingredient of the treatment, (p. 202) 148
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People with borderline PD are also likely to have intense emotional reactions that appear to be highly inappropriate to the situation. The structured, task-focused nature of cognitive-behavioral therapy tends to minimize what analysts would call "transference" with most clients; however, individuals with borderline PD are likely to have strong emotional reactions that are not a direct function of the therapist's behavior. From a cognitivebehavioral perspective, transference can be viewed as stimulus generalization from a previous relationship to the current one, or, as A. T. Beck and Freeman (1990) rioted, applying previously held general beliefs rather than responding to the therapist as an individual. The therapist must be prepared to help the client to unpack the meaning of these intense reactions based on prior experiences and strongly held beliefs. Other aspects of borderline pathology also interfere with the development of a productive cognitive-behavioral therapeutic relationship. Identity confusion interferes with setting goals, because the individual often experiences rapidly shifting agendas. The fear of intimacy can provoke discomfort, premature termination, or acting out even with the modest intimacy typically seen in cognitive-behavioral therapy. Fear of and anticipation of rejection can lead to premature termination. The establishment and continued maintenance of a positive therapeutic relationship provides the context in which the client can be provided with skills training in particular areas of deficit (such as assertiveness and other relationship skills) and encouraged to engage in behavioral experiments. The goal is to persistently identify the client's beliefs, particularly those that may be distorted or irrational, and challenge these beliefs against reality. Dialectical Behavior Therapy Theory
Perhaps it is fitting, given the paradoxical nature of borderline PD, that a treatment developed specifically to address it is, in its essence, designed to address paradox. According to Linehan (1993), dialectical behavior therapy is so named because Linehan saw the principal issues involved in borderline PD as the resolution of diametrically conflicting tendencies (thesis and diathesis) that must be brought to resolution (synthesis). Drawing on Zen Buddhism, Linehan viewed the synthesis as transcending the rational, similar to a Zen koan (paradox). The resolution to the polarities, rather than a rational solution, is an experience. The prototypical dilemmas are explained below. The Invalidating Environment. Before attending to the polarities underlying Linehan's model, it is important to address critical developmental precursors to borderline PD. One, according to Linehan (1993), is the "invalidating environment." Invalidation indicates that significant others are sending messages that one's feelings, thoughts, and perceptions are not real or do not matter. Such invalidation, according to Linehan, can contribute to the development of borderline PD. Examples include the girl whose interests in mechanical pursuits do not fit society's gender stereotyping and who is BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER
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punished or told her interests are bad or wrong; conversely, the boy who is told he should be able to control his emotions and that his yearning for nurturance is a show of weakness is also being invalidated. Consistent invalidation leads to confusion and poor self-esteem. As is emphasized below, borderline PD results when the biologically vulnerable individual is raised in a persistently invalidating environment. The concept of invalidation explains the finding that sexual abuse is common among people with borderline PD. Sexual abuse is the ultimate invalidation. The victim's well-being is irrelevant to the abuser, who is gratifying his or her needs. As described by Linehan (1993), Sexual abuse, as it occurs in our culture, is perhaps one of the clearest examples of extreme invalidation during childhood. In the typical case scenario of sexual abuse, the person being abused is told that the molestation or intercourse is "OK," but that she [or he] must not tell anyone else. The abuse is seldom acknowledged by other family members, and if the child reports the abuse she [or he] risks being disbelieved or blamed, (pp. 53-54) Emotional Vulnerability Versus Self-Invalidation. Returning to the polarity model, Linehan (1993)defined emotional vulnerability as ongoing and extreme emotional sensitivity, intense emotional reactions, and the experience of persistent negative emotional reactions. She compared this with the physical hypersensitivity of the burn patient: The net effect of these emotional difficulties is that borderline individuals are the psychological equivalent of third-degree burn patient. They simply have, so to speak, no emotional skin. Even the slightest touch or movements can create immense suffering. Yet, on the other hand, life is movement. Therapy, at its best, requires both movement and touch. Thus, both the therapist and the process of therapy itself cannot fail to cause intensely painful emotional experiences for the borderline patient.... it is the experience of their own vulnerability that sometimes leads borderline individuals to extreme behaviors (including suicidal behaviors), both to try to take care of themselves and to alert the environment to take better care of them. (p. 69) Linehan believed that emotional vulnerability is the core feature of borderline PD, with many of the other symptoms making sense as an attempt to cope with it. Excessive emotional arousal, such as feelings of depression, interferes with cognitive functioning and behavioral responses that would facilitate coping. Attempts to regulate painful emotions are the precursors of impulsive behaviors, such as drug or alcohol use and unprotected sex, which then lead to further problems. Attempts to modulate emotions through social interactions can lead to excessive dependency and concomitant fears of abandonment. Thus, emotional vulnerability becomes a focal point around which many borderline symptoms make sense. This tendency toward affective 150
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dysregulation is largely biological, whereas its counterpart, self-invalidation, is predominately learned. Self-invalidation indicates a tendency on the part of the individual to respond with shame, guilt, and intropunitiveness to environmental stimuli. Often, self-invalidation leads to depression. The combination of emotional vulnerability and self-invalidation leads to a vicious circle for clients. Unable to internally regulate their emotions, they turn to others to help stabilize their emotions. However, the extreme emotions of the person with borderline PD are beyond the empathic scope of the typical friend and even of many therapists. Isn't it natural enough, for example, if the individual is literally suicidal over a breakup with a lover of a few months, to say, "C'mon, now, pull yourself together, there are lots offish in the sea," and so on? When the individual repeatedly fails to respond to typical reassurances, others often get burnt out; frustrated; and, ultimately, rejecting. This pattern, noted in depression under the rubric of "excessive reassurance seeking" (see chap. 3, this volume), is exacerbated in the case of the person with borderline PD, who finds such responses powerfully invalidating. Although the helper may be attempting to convey the message, "You're fine, you just need some perspective," the message received is, "My feelings don't count, my reality is not real to you, you don't understand how bad I feel." The person with borderline PD may then make an extreme gesture, such as a suicide attempt, out of desperation ("I feel terrible and no one can help me") or in an effort to prove the severity of his or her despair ("You didn't think 1 was desperate, but I really was"). Thus, attempts to regulate emotions generally lead to further invalidation. The dialectical dilemma for clients, then, given their tendency toward black-and-white thinking, is to vacillate between recognizing their emotional vulnerability (thereby blaming others for their lack of understanding) or believing the messages from the invalidating environment ("You are fine, you just need to pull yourself together") and feeling guilty, shameful, and inadequate. Simultaneously, the therapist finds that it is difficult to avoid invalidating the patient. Linehan (1993) gave a number of examples: Common instances of invalidation include the therapist's offering or insisting on an interpretation of behavior that is not shared by the patient; setting firm expectations for performance over what the patient can (or believes she can) accomplish; treating the patient as less competent than she actually is; failing to give the patient the help that would be given if the therapist believed the patient's current perspective to be valid; criticizing or otherwise punishing the patient's behaviors; ignoring important communications or actions of the patient; and so on. Suffice it to say that in most therapy relationships (even good ones) a fair amount of invalidation is common, (p. 76)
Predictably—though uncomfortably, for the therapist—the patient responds to the invalidating (therapy) environment with anger, depression, BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER
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anxiety, or avoidance (including suicide attempts or dropping out of therapy). The patient can feel invalidated whether the therapist is aiming for change or for acceptance: In reviewing how a particular interaction went wrong or why some goal was not reached, if the therapist in any way implies that the patient could improve performance the next time, the patient is likely to respond that the therapist must be assuming that the patient has been wrong all along and that the invalidating environment is right.... On the other hand, if the therapist uses a non-change oriented tactic—listening to the patient or sympathetically validating the patient's responses—then the patient is likely to panic at the prospect that life will never improve. (Linehan, 1993, p. 77)
To resolve these dilemmas, the patient must learn self-acceptance, compassion, and self-soothing and accept gradual change, and the therapist must be keenly attuned to messages regarding invalidation and rapidly shift between validation and change strategies. Active Passivity Versus Apparent Competence. Active passivity is Linehan's eye-catching phrase that captures the phenomenon of demanding clinginess and neediness seen in people with borderline PD. It is something of a hybrid between the passivity of the dependent, who waits and hopes for support, and the activity of the histrionic, who provides entertainment in "exchange" for nurturance. The likely experiential history of people experiencing active passivity is a history of failure when they attempt to cope actively with situations (i.e., learned helplessness), presumably accompanied by at least some instances of soothing by others. Biologically hypersensitive individuals who lack the capacity to self-soothe, are unable to tolerate their current distress, and have a history of failing when they make active efforts to cope may desperately turn to others to rescue them. According to Linehan (1993), "A passive self-regulation style is probably a result of the individual's temperamental disposition as well as the individual's history of failing in attempts to control both negative affects and associated maladaptive behavior" (p. 79). Gender roles also contribute in that women tend to learn to use emotion-focused coping and see the "self in relationship" (Gilligan, 1988) within the context of a patriarchal culture. To the extent that people see rescue by other individuals as the only way to manage their lives, they will tend to experience frantic fear of abandonment. Apparent competence refers to the behavior of a person who is competent in some areas while behaving completely inappropriately at times. The individual's competence, for example, at work, may belie substantial deficits in other areas. Others are surprised, perhaps even shocked, when a person who appears to be a typical colleague suddenly has a "meltdown" or behaves inappropriately for no apparent reason. Linehan (1993) explained this phenomenon as occurring because of (a) a lack of stimulus generalization, (b) a failure on the part of the person with borderline PD to communicate his or 15 2
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her vulnerability clearly because he or she has learned to inhibit emotional expression as a form of coping, and (c) variations in competence based on perceived support (when people with borderline PD are with a supportive individual, or believe they are in a secure, supportive relationship, they do relatively well—which means that they will function deceptively well during therapy sessions). A leading advocate for people with borderline PD shared a story that illustrated the phenomenon of apparent competence perfectly. She was in her office, where a woman with borderline PD, who happened to be a physician, was raging at her. In the midst of the outburst, the physician's pager went off. She calmly went to the phone, called the hospital, and gave advice and a prescription for her patient. She then hung up the phone and resumed her tirade (V. Porr, personal communication, May, 28, 2003). Certainly, one could understand why many observers would conclude that the rage was not real or was put on for effect. However, according to Linehan's theory, such an interpretation would be in most cases both inaccurate and harmful. Rather, the individual with borderline PD exhibited apparent competence—the skills she had acquired to remain calm and cool in her role as physician did not: generalize to her interpersonal role with the advocate. In fact, she was in a state of substantial emotional dysregulation. Unfortunately, then, this apparent competence leads to a vicious circle, in which incompetence is seen by others as a lack of effort, "playing games," or manipulation; because this interpretation is different from the client's viewpoint, it perpetuates the invalidating environment. The dialectical dilemma for clients on this polarity is that to the extent they have difficulty regulating their own emotions and thus rely on others, the more ashamed they feel, because of our independence-oriented, dependency-shunning culture. Therefore, individuals attempt to inhibit their emotional responses, thus perpetuating the myth that they are able to regulate their emotions just like anyone else. When they inevitably fail to control their emotions, they swing from guilt (because they failed) to anger (because others do not understand). In either case, emotional dysregulation ensues, including extreme attempts at regulation (such as suicide attempts). The dialectical dilemma for therapists is that if they see only the client's competence, they will invalidate his or her true skill deficits. Further, by aligning themselves with the apparent competence they risk attributing failures to "resistance," which can undermine the therapeutic relationship. Alternatively, if the therapist aligns excessively with the active passivity—which is easy enough to clo by simply empathizing with the client—then the client will not optimally improve; the therapy may even become paralyzed. The best solution is to flexibly alternate support and challenge, going back and forth, in many cases, within a single session. Unrelenting Crisis Versus Inhibited Grieving. People with borderline PD tend to go from one crisis to the next. Linehan (1993) explained this as being caused by a combination of low stress tolerance and poor coping skills. BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER
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An initial problem may leave the person feeling overwhelmed; he or she then is unable to resolve the problem sufficiently. This emotional state makes further problems more overwhelming, leading to yet another crisis. This process becomes a vicious circle of unending crisis and feelings of desperation. Inhibited grieving "refers to a pattern of repetitive, significant trauma and loss, together with an inability to fully experience and personally integrate or resolve these events" (Linehan, 1993, p. 89). Studies show that approximately two thirds to three quarters of people with borderline PD have a history of being abused sexually; thus, a majority of people with borderline PD are coping with trauma-related symptoms (Linehan, 1993, pp. 52-53). The problem, as Linehan saw it, is that these individuals are unable to regulate their emotions well enough to handle normal grieving; if they were to process the loss they would "fall apart." The person with borderline PD fears processing emotions that were so overwhelming that he or she would become dysfunctional (e.g., curl up in a fetal position for hours)—and has, most likely, experienced such emotions. Therefore, like many people with posttraumatic stress disorder, the individual avoids contact with any reminders of the stressors, both external and internal. This strategy is only partially successful, because reminders are common in the environment (especially in interpersonal relationships), and mental representations based on the traumatic events influence many aspects of the person's life. What unfolds, then, is a chronic, partial grieving, with frequent emotional dysregulation. I recently supervised an evaluation of a case in which a client with borderline PD and a history of severe physical abuse (e.g., broken bones) described her experience with psychodrama treatment. As she relived and reexperienced her past, she became so anxious that she felt persistent panic and feelings of desperation. The ensuing panic disorder created significant disruptions in her functioning and required a variety of psychological and pharmacological interventions. Thus, in working through a traumatic past, the person with borderline PD may require substantial support to avoid an intolerable worsening of symptoms. The dialectical dilemma for clients is that they cannot avoid exposure to loss and trauma cues because there are too many (e.g., aspects of many relationships are partial reminders of abuse experiences). Further, they cannot inhibit their grief reactions indefinitely as they go from crisis to crisis. Their efforts to escape feelings of emptiness and desperation, such as drinking, speeding, unprotected sex, and so on, provoke further crises. Their coping strategies lead to a vicious circle of mood swings and impulsive behavior. The dialectical dilemma for the therapist, on the other hand, is, as noted by Linehan (1993), to balance his or her response to the oscillating nature of the patient's distress—sometimes expressed as acute crisis and overwhelming affect, and at other times presented as complete inhibition of affective responding. An intense reaction by the therapist at either extreme may be all that is needed to push the patient to the other extreme, (p. 93) 154
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To do so, the therapist is advised to help clients to process their grief, and encourage them to know that they can survive the inherent stress of doing so, while providing concrete grieving strategies or skills. Simultaneously, or in rapid alternation, the therapist must validate the client's persistent sense of crisis. Client-Centered, Humanistic, and Existential Therapies An important theoretical perspective within the client-centered and humanistic therapy domain is Margaret Warner's (2000) "fragile process." Given the antilabeling orientation of most humanistically oriented therapists, it is relatively difficult to find theoretical work on PDs from that perspective. However, assuming that Linehan's (1993) theory about the invalidating environment is correct, it is likely that a therapeutic approach based on validation and unconditional positive regard would be effective; the one outcome study I could find (Eckert & Wuchner, 1996) indicated results comparable to those of dialectical behavior therapy (Linehan, 1993) and transference-focused therapy (Clarkin et al, 1999). Warner defined fragile process as follows: "Fragile" process is a style of process in which clients have difficulty modulating the intensity of core experiences, beginning or ending emotional reactions when socially expected, or taking the points of view of other people without breaking contact with their own experience. Clients in the middle of a fragile process often feel particularly high levels of shame and self-criticism about their experience. (Warner, 2000, p. 145) Integrating fragile process with developmental theory, especially attachment theory, Warner (2000) hypothesized that individuals who are prone to fragile process are insecurely attached. Individuals with insecure attachment to adult figures find that high arousal leads to emotional overload and disorganization, which neither they nor their caregivers are able to soothe. As children they would thus often feel either fearful (because they could not be soothed) or angry (if they expected the caregiver to help and were disappointed or frustrated). As infants they would either constantly seek out attachments to find sustaining nurturance or self-protectively withdraw from others. The dilemma throughout life, then, is that if persons with fragile process (like persons with borderline PD) express their feelings, they are often misunderstood; if they withdraw, they feel empty. As Warner (2000) put it, Clients who have a fragile style of processing often experience their lives as chaotic or empty. If clients with high-intensity fragile process choose to stay connected with their experience in personal relationships, they are likely to feel violated and misunderstood a great deal of the time. When they express their feelings, others in their lives are likely to see them as unreasonably angry, touchy, and stubborn. These others are likely BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER
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to become angry and rejecting in return, reinforcing clients' sense that there is something fundamentally poisonous about their existence. Clients who continue to express their feelings are likely to have ongoing volatile relationships or a succession of relationships that start out well and then go sour. If, on the other hand, they give up on connecting or expressing their personal reactions they are likely to feel frozen or dead inside. Many alternate, holding in their reactions while feeling increasingly uncomfortable and then exploding with rage at those around them, (p- 152)
Warner (2000) noted that there are pitfalls for the therapist treating people with fragile process: The client may be able to talk about feelings of rage at the therapist and very much want them understood and affirmed. Yet, therapist comments to explain the situation or disagree with the client will be felt as attempts by the therapist to annihilate his experience, (p. 150)
So what is the proper intervention for persons with fragile process? Warner (2000) stressed that it is essential to try to understand them from their own perspective. One error that therapists frequently make with people in general, and especially those with fragile process, is to assume that they have words for their feelings. Often, they do not. People with fragile process often act out their feelings (e.g., by taking drugs, self-mutilating, or attempting suicide). If clients are struggling for words, therapists need to support them through it and avoid the temptation to guess or hypothesize about their feelings. A comment such as "something about that feels uncomfortable, but you're not quite clear what it is" is often effective and will allow the person with fragile process to continue to explore his or her experience (Warner, 2000, p. 153). If the therapist fills the space by putting words into the person's mouth, the client will often feel misunderstood—this being the core problem for people with borderline PD.
COUNTERTRANSFERENCE Several theorists have indicated that countertransference responses to individuals with borderline PD tend to be similar because of the powerful pull of the disorder. (Gabbard & Wilkinson, 1994; O. F. Kernberg, 1975, 1967/1986a; O. F. Kernberg et al., 1989; Meissner, 1988). Therapists frequently respond with feelings of worthlessness, depression, guilt, anxiety, and self-doubt when, because of the client's splitting, the therapist is devalued and rejected; such devaluation can also, understandably, lead to anger, rage, and a desire by the therapist to terminate therapy (Adler, 1985; Gabbard 6k Wilkinson, 1994; O. F. Kernberg et al., 1989; Meissner, 1982). As will be discussed later in the chapter on narcissistic PD (chap. 9, this volume), such 156
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feelings are generated as a function of therapists' narcissistic needs: Therapists are typically invested in being validated by clients' appreciation and by their progress in therapy. For similar reasons, when they cannot live up to their clients' magical expectations, therapists often feel frustrated, depleted, ashamed, and impotent and doubt their own competence (Adler, 1985; O. F. Kernberg, 1975; Meissner, 1982, 1988). Therapists may experience rescue fantasies or engage in rescuing behaviors in which the therapist gives the client increasing amounts of time and reassurance (Adler, 1985; Gabbard & Wilkinson, 1994). This is especially true with clients who are victims of sexual abuse. Gabbard and Wilkinson (1994) suggested that the rescuer role unfolds in a predictable pattern. Initially, therapists take extraordin