Perspectives on Negation and Polarity Items (Linguistik Aktuell Linguistics Today)

i(3x)Fx I- (Vx)-.Fx

10

JAY D. ATLAS

ip a

-

I- -i(p v q)

(Vx) Fx I- -<3x)Fx and justify ihc other condition
p v -»q I- -i(p a q)

xH x I- -
the four DeMorgan relations, one will re ject the Intuitionist account of that negative sentential prefix. Furthermore, since Zwarts (1996: 187) accepts both: a

No? aUknights roh and kill ||- Nat alt knights rob or not all knights kill

.

and the downwards monoionic:

Not all knights rob or nor all knights kill \ - Not all knights rob and kill

b

.

while the Intuitionist rejects (a) Zwarts must reject the Intuitionistic account ,

of 'not all N1 and of not everyone "

' .

The Intuitionistic account rejects the anti-multiplicativity of not everyone and "It is not the case that' and accepts the anti-addilivity of 'no one : it is a conceptually more restrictive account of negation and denial and negative NPs. So I shall treat anti-addilivity as a core notion of negation and denial, and I shall rank anti-additive NPs as more focally negative than antimultiplicative NPs. Interestingly we reach the same conclusion about the ranking of the negativity of anti-additive and anti-multiplicative NPs that I did in Sections 3 and 4 of this essay, though for quite dillerent reasons. This means that Zwarts s hierarchy-diagram is upside down: though the set of "

'

'

Intuitionist theorems is a subset of the set of formulae of Classical theorems.

DeMorgan negation is not a more negative negation: DeMorgan negation is a conceptually less focal negation than an anti-additive negation (on the Intuitionistic interpretation of negation). Com eptual negativity docs not track Classical logical strength. And surely it is linguistically satisfactory that the anti-multiplicative answer Not everyone' to the question 'Who enjoyed the party? is less negative in this sense than the anti-additive 'Not anyone* or No one'. In terms of the traditional Square of Opposition, this means that '

'

the anti additive contrary 'No S is P' of 'All S is P1 is more focally negative than the anti-multiplicative contradictor)' lNot all S is P1 of lAll S is P1. But thai is just what one should pre-theoretically think.

NEGATIVE QUANTIFIER NOUN PHRASES

Fred Sdmmen on negation

6

.

The philosophical logician Fred Sommers (1982) is not an Iniuilionist; he's an Aristotelian, but he goes even further than the Iniuilionist. He does not believe lhal there are any underlying multiplicalive or ami multiplicative NPs in the Square of Opposition. All S is P

No S is P

(No S is non-P) Some S is P (

Nol All S is P

Somr Jf YX AvAfA WV ana

h- m« an nmgms tou 01 not an KMgfiKS khi

and the downwards monolonic;

Not all knights rob or not all knights kill I - Not all knights rob and kill

b

.

while the Iniuilionist rejects (a). Zwaits must reject the Intuitionistic account of 'not all N1 and of not everyone The Intuitionistic account rejects the anti-multiplicalivity of not everyone and It is not the case that* and accepts the anti-additivity of 'no one : it is a conceptually more restrictive account of negation and denial and negative NPs. So I shall treat anti-additivity as a core notion of negation and denial, and I shall rank anti-additive NPs as more focally negative than anti multiplicative NPs. Interestingly we reach the same conclusion about the ranking of the negativity of anii-addilive and anti-multiplicative NPs that 1 did in Sections 3 and 4 of this essay, though for quite dilferent reasons. This means lhal Zwarts s hierarchy-diagram is upside down: ihough the sel of '

'

.

'

'

'

Iniuilionist theorems is a subset of the sel of formulae of Classical theorems.

DeMorgan negation is not a more negative negation; DeMorgan negation is a conceptually less focal negation than an anti-additive negation (on the Intuitionistic interpretation of negation). Conceptual negativity does not track

Classical logical Strength. And surely it is linguistically satisfactory that the anti-multiplicative answer Not everyone' to the question Who enjoyed the party? is less negative in this sense lhan the anti-additive 'Not anyone' or No one'. In terms of the traditional Square of Opposition, this means that '

"

'

the anti-additive contrary LXo S is P1 of'All S is P1 is more focally negative

than the anti-multiplicative contradictory

lNot all S is P1 of

that is just what one should pre-theoretically think.

11 S is P1 But .

12

JAY D. ATLAS

(he case that p1 is not one in which the negative expression is a syntactical operator mapping sentences into sentences. So, though all the DcMorgan relationships are satisfied, Sommer& s analysis of 'it is not the case that p1 is not that of a sentential operator, and he makes the answer to the question Is '

"

it is not the case that" a DcMorgan negation?" depend on a metaphysical

theory of slates of alTairs and on classical Double Negation/

1

Sommers s hierarchy, parallel Ip Zwarts's, is:

not(?) (DcMorgan) NoN

O

(anti-additive) few V (downwards monolonic)

i nor (?) (DeMorgan) '

with question marks on the positions of DeMorgan not for he otters no guidance in assessing the negativity of a negation satisfying DeMorgan s 7 relationships. What is highlighted by Sommcrs s discussion is his tacit assumption of classical Double Negation I - if' corresponding to a Gentzen Elimination Rule: - -HfAp. Besides Contraposition. I have taken a Gentzen Introduction Rule (*p/-'-Hp) to be essential to the meaning of sentential negation. '

,

'

,

Indeed on Gentzen's own view the Introduction Rules were the ones that

characterized the meanings of the connectives. Likewise 1 take the Elimina tion Rule to be a secondary characterization of negation, but without it

Sommers cannot justify the DeMorgan relationships for t is not the case that p',Just as the Intuitionist. without it, cannot justify and does not wish to justify - all of the DeMorgan relationships (on the Intuitionistic interpretation of the connectives). Relationship (DM2a>, the one essential to antimultiplicativity, is not Intuilionistically justifiable. Interestingly both the Aristotelian Sommers and Brouwerian Heyting give up anti mulliplicativity and DeMorgan negation.

13

NtGATIVU Ql'ANTIFlER NOUN PHRASES

For my purposes the morals of this discussion of Sommers's (1982) Term Logic and of Inluitionislic negation arc these:

(Ij

Anti-multiplicative NPs. e.g. 'not oven N1. not everyone', are analyzed away (Sommers) or arc Intuilionislically unjustified.

(2)

7

.

There is no principled reason yet evident why all of the DeMor gan relationships make an expression more rather than less focally negative than anti-additive or downward monotonic NPs.

VerificaUonisni and the meanin}: of negation

I wish to pause here to emphasize the philosophical point of the scepticism that 1 have just manifested on behalf of the Aristotelian and Brouwcrian traditions. For if anti multiplicativity is just an epiphenomenon (Sommers), and if satisfying all of the DeMorgan s relations can not make any negation more negative than anti-additive negative expressions, since the latter are focal negatives in the same sense in which a certain red hue is a focal red color. Formal Semanticists of natural language ought to seriously rethink their accounts of the logical negativity of linguistically negative NPs (see Atlas 1997: Taylor 1995). In their analyses of reasoning in ordinary language, Michael Dummelt '

(1978b,

1993b> and his students Neil Tennant (1987:85) and Michael

Luntley (1988) have olfcred a conceptual analysis of negation according to which a denial of [p] is necessary for an assertion of the negation ot p1 and .

denial is given a verilkationist account. For Tennant a denial of 'p' has the force of 'l have good reason to believe there is no warrant for p1 (analogous to a modal formula D-iDp) and not merely the weaker 'l have no reason to

believe that you have any warrant for p1 (tDDp). Denial, on this view, does not justify either classical Excluded Middle or classical Double Negation. On

Tennant s view of our ordinary reasoning with ordinary language, classical

Double Negation fails. There is no anti-multiplicativity for 'it is not the case that p!, and so the four DeMorgan s relations describe no natural language in '

which meaningful deductions can occur. In particular 'not all N1 does not entail 'Some N are not1. On Michael Luntlev's (1988: 117 32) view denial is the even stronger 'I have good reason to believe that there can be no warrant lor p] ( - Op), and, of course, the same Inliulionistic consequences follow.

14

JAY D. ATLAS

The veriticationisl account sullices to justify the Introduction Rule for double negation, thus meeting Gentzen's requirement for a characterization of the meaning of the negation symbol, but it is not classical negation. This is not the place for a full critical discussion of these Veriticationisl views, but let me jusl mention that for purposes of Speech Act Theory, a philosopher of language or a linguist will have to confront these verificalionist analyses of Denial, at least to the extent that one lakes seriously ,

Searle's (1969:66) Preparatory Conditions on asserting 'p1. e.g. "S has "

evidence (reasons, etc.) for the truth of p and his Essential Condition on asserting 'p1 (viz. "Counts as an undertaking to the eU ecl that p represents an actual state of affairs ) For Dummett. Tennanl. and Lunlley all believe that nothing could satisfy the Essential Condition unless il met the kinds of '

.

conditions that they have laid down in their analyses of asserting

'

-

-

p1:

on

their views a strong version of the Preparatory Condition (S has evidence for the truth of p) is a necessary condition for the fullillment of the Essential Condition (counts as an undertaking to the ellect that p represents an actual state of alfairs). Thus the concept of truth is essentially connected to the concept of evidence, and so the concept of meaning is essentially connected to the concept of evidence (Atlas 1978). A Semantical Realist will deny thai claim, but it is a serious, non-trivial claim about linguistic meaning and about the capacities of the human mind (Atlas 1978; 1989: 125 36).

8

.

The Neo-Zwartsian hierarchy

In Zwarts's (1998) view the only negative NP that is even a candidate for being both anti-additive and anti-multiplicative, and so being a DeMorgan negative NP. is the alleged negative Proper Name. If Not John were antimultiplicative, il would satisfy: '

a

.

b

.

Not John mourns ami moans \ - Not John mourns or no! John moans Not John mourns or noi John moans \ - Nor John mourns and moans

If 'Not John1 were anti-additive, it would satisfy: c

.

d

.

Not John mourns or moans ||- Nor John mourns and not John moans

No! John mourns and not John moans {-Not John mourns or moans

NEGATIVE QUANTIFIER NOUN PHRASES

15

I find these sentences troublesome because in my speech the VP negation sentence is ungrammatical in American English. *Atol John Joes not complain (so I have no test for Not John' being either a consistent NP or a "

complete NP (Zwarls 1998)s) while the afirmative is at best unacceptable. ,

Not John complains. 1 do accept the stressed statements (a) John murdered the dowager? Not JOHN!, (b) Invite anyone you w ant! {Only:But} not JOHN! I also accept sentences with conjoined NPs like (c) Jane but not Max com plained, (d) Not Max hut Jane complained, though the former is more felicitous than the latter except when "Max is in focus: (e) Max complained, didn 't he/ Not MAX hut JANE complained. I conclude, at least for my dialect of American English, that there are no DeMorgan negative Noun Phrases in English. Negative NPs are only downwards monotonic. anti-multiplicative, or anti-additive, and they are structured in the following simple hierarchy of decreasing negativity: -

'

jVo animals

(anti-additive) Not all animals

I unti-multiplicative) Pew animals (downwards monotonic)

This is the neo-Zwartsian typology of negative NPs that I promised at the beginning of this essay. By contrast, does Zwarls's (1996) original hierarchy now strike one as a descriptively adequate, decreasingly negative hierarchy of negative NPs? Not Dumho

(DeMorgan negation) No animals

Not all animals

(anti-additive)

(anti-multiplkative)

Few animals

(downwards monotonic)

16

JAY D. ATLAS

I do not think so. If one is a Dummothan about Denial or a Sommersian

about ordinary language negative Noun Phrases, my hierarchy of negative Noun Phrases becomes the even more basic: No animals

(anil-additive)

i Few animals

(downwards monoionic)

If one asks what is essential to the concept of the logical negativity of linguistically negative quantiiier NPs. the answer seems lo be: one form of downward monoionicity with anli-additivity. i.e. anti-additivity alone. But it mailers how downward monoionicity Is expressed. If Contraposition is as essential to sentential negation as I take it to be (and Contraposition is derivable from a negation introduction rule capturing the notion that if a selfcontradiction is derivable from a sentence, the negation of the sentence follows a version of a principle of non-contradiction), what is essential is downward monoionicity expressed only in the anti-multiplicative form: (DM-AM) QF v QG l-0(F and G)

and the non-downward-monoionicity pan of anti-additivity in the form:

(AA)

9

.

QF a QG l-0(F or G),

Consistent negative noun phrases and the quantifier hierarchy

There are the apparently negative quantifier NPs. e.g. 'neither N1. 'none of the n N1, 'none of the N' (Zwarts 1998). the so-called "consistent" negative NPs. that, like Proper Names, satisfy the condition that their Predicate

Negations, viz. 'Ofnot VP)!. entail their Sentence Negations, viz. 'not Q(VP)!. Thus they are the NP analogue lo the modest Double Negation ' p |- -r-Hp1. or lo Non-contradiction additive 'no N1 and

'

(cA-np. hence ihc lerm 'Consistent9. (The anti the anti-multiplicative 'not all N' do not meet this -

-

condition.) Where in the hierarchy of negativity for negative quantilier NPs shall we put these negative, consistent NPs?

17

NEGATIVE QUANTIFIER NOUN PHRASES

Table 1. Consisteni Noun Phrases (Zwarts 1998, Table 4) most N

theN[SO\

the majority of the N

the N (PL]

at least n oj the k N (n> k/2)

neither S

exactly n of the k AT (n 91 k/2)

in me of the n N tn>0)

at most n oj the k N (n <

none of the more than n N i n>0)

2)

'

both N

ntwe 0/ the no more than n N (n>0)

thenN \n>0)

none 0/ the N

the more than n N 0)

proper names

no mure than n S 0)

M OATI U PROPKR NAMES

t

My answer is: Nowhere. The consistency of these NPs suggests that wc think of these consistent negative NPs as Proper-Name-like, i.e. as functors (singular erms or collective terms) rather than as classical quantilier NPs (Atlas 1989: 119-24: Atlas and Levinson 1981:52-5).

For my suggestion that consistent, negative NPs are functor-like I see only two difficulties Though it is not in Zwarts s Table, ew N1 might be construed as a consistent, negative NP: Few As are not B ||- // is no! the case that few As are B. If few means less than half, it clearly is a consistent NP. As I indicated in my comments on Sommers (1982:370) in Note 7,1 do '

'

not believe that

'

few

does mean

less than half. But there is still the

question whether lfew N1 is a consistent NP even if that is an inaccurate paraphrase of 'few N1. In my view, if few As are in the complement of IIBII. ,

it docs not follow that it is false that few As are in IIBII. So 1 do not take '

few N1 to be a consistent NP. Thus the hypothesis that consistent, negative NPs

are functor-like remahtly negative quantilier NPs. e.g. 'neither N1 'none of The merely dowr N1 (Zwarts 1998), the so-called 'consistent" negative .

seem unlike a singular Names, satisfy the condition that their Predicate

is not quite synonynn VP)1, entail their Sentence Negations, viz. 'not Q(VP)1. of these partitive exp analogue to the modest Double Negation ' l - -np'.or to defend their funcU

'

-

CA-Kp)

1 .

hence the term 'consistent'. (The ami-

my proposed hypothe Ihc anti-multiplicative 'not all N1 do

not meet this

NPs are functor-like (the hierarchy of negativity for negative quantilier NPs

gative, consistent NPs?

18

JAY D. ATLAS

10. Complete Negative Noun Phrases and the Quantifier Hierarchy

Finally, there is the class of complete NPs that satisfy the condition that their Sentence Negations entail their Predicate Negations. Zwarts (1998) lists these four classes of complete NPs: Table 2. CompU-u- Soun Phrases (Zwarts 1998, Table 5i at least half of all A'

at most halt of all H

PROPER NAMES

NUi.UI 1> PRon k nami.s

The negative NPs are in the right hand column: 1 have already eliminated NEGATIVE pROPtR NAMES from consideration. The discussion just above suggests the elimination of the merely downwards monotonic 'at most half of all N1 So (the weak version of) my hypothesis is that either consistent or .

complete negative (non-partitive) NPs are semantically functor-like more like singular terms or collective terms than like classical Quantifiers and should be so treated.

11. Implications for language acquisition Thus consistent negative NPs in Frans Zwarts's and Ken Dro/.d's cases of

parallel quantification in their research on child language, e.g. Now efthe detectives saw diree birds, are not best treated as cases of classical quantification at all but as having negative NPs that play the conceptual role of '

singular collective terms in the child s mind (Atlas and Levinson 1981:52-3, n

17).9 The concepts of "basic level" and "prototvpical" category terms from

.

Cognitive Linguistics suggest the following argument: a

.

b

c

.

.

The conceptually focal negative quantifier NPs are logically anti-additive quantifiers. (The claim defended in this essay.) Hypothesis: Atlas's notion of "conceptually focal" is co-extensive with Rosch's (1978) and Lakolfs (1987) notion of "prototypical" (see also Taylor 1995). Once a psychologically "basic level" semantical category negative quantifier NPs is tacitly recognized by a language learner, a class of

NEGATIVE QUANTIFIER NOUN PHRASES

proloiypical cases becomes psycholinguisiically salient

19

the anti-

additive NPs.

d

.

Hence the anti-additive NPs will be learned earlier and more easily by the language learner than other negative quantifier NPs.

This argument suggests a heretofore unexplored Bridge Principle between a properly in Formal Semantics and a properly in Cognitive Linguistics and Language Acquisilion. between the Logic and the Psychology of Language (see Atlas 1997).

The conceptual paradigm of logical negativity for linguistically negative quantifier Noun Phrases is the anti-additive Noun Phrase. I would hypothesize that a child would learn the anti-additive NPs earlv. and lhal anti-

multiplicative NPs would be learnt only after the anti-additive NPs. I would further hypothesize lhal a non-downwards monotonic NP that satisfies the other, characteristic DeMorgan condition (DMlb) of finite closure under disjunction for anti additivity would be acquired after the acquisition of the protolypically negative cases of anti-additive NPs rather than before: e.g. only Dumbo1 would be acquired after the anti-additive NPs. In other words. acquisition does not proceed by learning first the NPs that satisfy first one.

then two. then three, and finally four DeMorgan conditions. If this were the case, one would expect the sequence of acquisition to be (Jew animals, only

Dumho. no animals) or {only Dumho. tcu animals, no animals). Neither sequence turns out to be the one by which children acquire the negative quantifier NPs. Rather once denial (No!) or sentential, main Verb Phrase negation (not) has been acquired, when the language learner is ready to acquire negative quantifier NPs. the prototypicar (Rosch 1978: Lakoil 1987; Taylor 1995) negative, quantifier Noun Phrases are the anti-additive NPs. and they should. I predict, be acquired first. These implications of the philosophical analysis of the logical negativity of linguistically negative quantifier Noun Phrases are open to empirical confirmation or refutation by studies in language acquisition. "

Notes

L

It is wnnh recalling thai Conlraposition is derivable Irom Ihe relation expressing a negation introduction mle capuiring the notion that if a self-contradiction. c.g.O= I. is derivable from a

sentence, the nccation of the sentence follows - a version of Ihe bask principle ot Non-

JAY D. ATLAS

Coniruduiinn. My discussiOD of sentential ncpalian will be lincuisliculiy beside the point if, like L Horn (I9K9I in the last chapter of his brilliant treatise A Natural History qfNegation, one .

does no? ihmk that there is sentential ncpation m natural !an?uai:cs. Strauson . 1950) famously

took such a view. My reply to Slrawson is in Atlas (1974. 1977, 1989): m\ reply to Horn is in Atlas < 1994) "Is There Sentence Negation in Natural Language?" It is also worth remarking that the formula expressing (MDN> is both classically and Inluitionisiically valid. 2

.

I.

A

2

A-* B. BI-nA

.

. -iB. A|- B

(MP)

I.

(Cp>

And. having already derived modest Double Negation, one can easily derive the traditional Modus Tollens: (MTT» 1

2 3

.

,

>

A

A

>B.-Bj-A.

(MP)

. B, A -B

A -* B,A&--«

L

A

2

. B,

B l- A

>y Conditionalizalion one can derive: A 0 1

.

3

.

.

5

.

6

.

.

5

.

v\ v -iBI-A - -B A - - B j-B -A

.

8

.

. -A.

IMT-)

B -* -.Al--»(B a -nA)

Premiss)

BaAI-Ba-

modest DM

B a - v\ |-

A

(B a -

(modest DN)

A

B a A|--"(B a -t-A)

(3.4. Transitivuvi

(B a -t-iA)|-.(B a A)

(5. Cp)

v\ v -»B I--' lB a A)

(0.1 J.6. Transilivityl

-

(B a A>lk (A a Bi

(Premissl

-

.

B - -B

iPremissi

-

7

9 4

.

2 4

.

.

(DM (Cp)

.

So.-A v -iB|-

(A a B)

(7.8 Transitivity)

The superscnpicd upper brackets j* and ']' arc Quine's (19S11 quasi-quolation marks.

For a critical discussion of this well-known and widely accepted hypothesis, and the counter-

example 'Only Proper Name1, see Atlas < 1991b. 1993. 1996). 6

.

Actually if one adopts Sommers's delinition of

v q)1 and accepts classical Double Negation.

satisfying the De.Morgan relationships is trivial: a - (-'p a |-(-*p a - q), .

b c

d 7

.

.

.

.

(-"p a ~*q) l--

p a - q),

-Hp

p a t-i q).

a q) j-

-"(-r-i p a -ri q) |- -np a ql.

Sommers (1982:370) analyzes 'Few S are M as 'There are less S that arc M than S that are not M1, or as 'Some S arc M and most S are Ml M'. The latter analysis for 'few S1 might be more appropriately phrased by the non-monotonic 'Some but not most S1. For Sommers 'few S1 is '

'

non-monotonic. surely an incorrect analysis. Sommcrs s rirst paraphrase less S" is not English.

one would have to say: 'There ate fewer S thai aie M than S that are not Ml Of course this makes '

the eompjiaiise form fewer logieallv pmnitivc. jjiJ it raises doubts alnnit Ihe aOCttraqi of the

paraphrase: the paraphrase dtvs not seem intuitivelv lo me to express 'Few S arc M'. 8

.

A Noun Phrase is consistent iff the following schema is valid: 1= NPiNEG VP) -* NEC (NP VP). That is. sentences with consistent Noun Phrases arc ones in which a predicate negation 1 entails a sentence negation, e.g. neither N m»ne of the N A Noun Phrase is complete ilT the '

.

following schema is valid: 1= NEG(NT Vi'i

'

.

. NP iNEG VP). That is. sentences with complete

Noun Phrases arc ones in which a sentence negation entails a prcdicate negation, e.g. :at most

NEGATIVE QLANT1RER NOl'N I'llkASI S

lull ui M Nrj For it dixussion uf the standordh unexplained consequences of the standard vieu that Proper Names are both consistent and complete, see Atlas I l*»W: 114>-24). 9

.

In rvmarls during the discussion of Ken Dro/d's and F-rans Zwarls's paper Dclenninants of Scope and Nepation in the Language oi Children and Adults" at the Conletence on Perspectives on N.-.-..ii'M y uhuli ir.i> . -.v'. v . - presented Sebastian l.ohner also expressed a similar doubt aN >ut the treatment of these NPs as classical quantihcr&. .

References

Atlas, J.D. |y74. "Presupposition. Ambiguity, and (lenerHiily: A Codi t») the Ku.vsellStruwson Debate on Refemng."' Claremont: Pomona ('
Alla.s. J.D. 1978. "On Presupposing." Mind K7: 396-111 Atlas. J.D. 19X1. "Is 'not' logR-al?" PrtHeedinsi of iht llth intrrnaiionalS\nifh>siuni tm Muliiple-Valued Logic. New York: The Institute ol Electrical and Electn>nics l ngmeers. 124-2X. Atlas. J.D. I9MK. "What are Negative Existence Statements About '" Unguistus and rhdusophx 11:371-93. -

.

Atlas. J D I9K9. Philosophy wUktut A/nhif-uitx. Oxford: C larendon l»rr*s.

Alias. J.D. l*WIa. "Resless 'The Limits to Debale. A Revised Theory ol Semantic Presupposition". Noel Burton-Roberts, t'ambndge: Cambridge I'mv. Press 19S9." iHind and luinKiMgr b: 177-92. Atlas. J.D. 1991b. "'Topic.'Comment. Presupposition. Logical l orm. and 1 Stress Implicalurcs: The Case of Focal Particles »»/i/v and «i/.to."' Journal of Sfinamus 8: 127-17.

Alias. J D. PW The Importance of Being Only": Testing the Nco-Oncean Versus Neo-Entailment Paradigms." Journal <»! Srinaniu s I0;3(»I-IH. Alias. J I). 1994 "Is there sentence negation in natural language.' Alias Kuls Vou Not. Neither Do 1: Some Remarks on Fred Sommers's Term Logic and Larry Hom"s Extended Term Logic' Piomer Colloquium on Negation and Polarity. I'niversity ol

Cinmmgen. The Netherlands. 21-22 June 1994, Sponsored by the NWO Piomer Proicci "Reflections of Logical Patterns in Language Structure and Language Use ". Alias. J.D. 1995. "A Revised Typology for Negative (icnerali/cd (Juanlitiers". MS. University ol (Jromngen. The Netherlands. June 1995. Atlas. J.D. 1996. ""Only" Noun Phrases. Pseudo-Negative Generalized (Quantifiers. Negative Polarity Items, and Monulonictty." Journal of Svntanucs 13. #4:265-329. Alias. J.D. 1*)97 "Negative Adverbials. ProdHypical Negation and the DeMorgan Taxonomy "' Journal of Sfnumtus 14:.M9-67. Alias. J.D. and Lcvmson. S.C. I9SL "It-Clefts. Inlormativeness. and LogK'al Form; Radical Pragnulics i Revised Standard Version I." in P. Cole led). Radical Praitmaiui .

.

New York: Academic Press. 1-61.

22

JAY D. ATLAS

Bwwise, J. and Cooper. R. 1981. "Generalized Quantthcrs and Natural Language." Linguistk s and Philosophy 4:159-211>. Bcnaccrraf. F. and I'ulnam. H. (eds) 1983. Philosophy of Matht'imttiis. Second Ldilion. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. Brouwer. L.K.J. I9S . "Consciousness. Philosophy, and Malhematics." In Bcnaccmif, P. and Putnam. H. (eds). Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 90-%. Dummctt. M. Il>78a. Truth ami Other luugnuis. Cambridge. Massachusetts: Harvard Umv. Press.

Dummctt. M. JOTXb. "The Philosophical Basis of Intuitiomslic Logic.'' In Dummctt 1978a, 215-47. In Benacerraf, P. and Putnam. H. 1983, 97-129.

Horn. L.R. 1985. "Metalinguistic Negation and Pragmatic Ambiguity." Language 61: 121-74.

Horn. L.R. 1989. A Natoiral History of Negation, Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. LakolT. G. 1987, IKMiien, Fire, andlkmgfimis Things. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.

Luntley. M. I9KH. Language. Logic, and Experience: The Cose for Anti-Realism. LaSalle. Illinois: Open Court. Quine. W. V.O. 1981. Mathematical U/gu . Rev. l£dn. Cambndge. Massachusetts: Han ard Univ. Press.

Rosch. E. 1978. "Principles of Calegonzalion." In E. Rosch and B. Lloyd (eds). Cognition and Categonzation. Hillsdale. NJ: Erlbaum. 27-4S.

Searle, J.R. I%9. Spee
Tennant. N. \9X7. Anti-Realism and Logic. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Zwarts, F. 1996. "A Hierarchy of Negative Expressions." In H. Wansing <ed). Negation: A Notion in Focus. Perspectives in Amdytical Philosophy, 7. Berlin: Walter de Gmytcr Pp. 169-94.

Zwarts, F. 1998. "Three Types of Polanly.'" In F. Hamm and E. Hmnchs feds). Phiral Quantification. Dordrecht: Kluwer, l77-2.iS.

On the typology of negative modals Johan van der Auwera

Universir}' ofAntwerp

1

.

Introduction

The point of this paper is to elucidate some aspects of the semantics and the lexicalizabilily of combinations of markers of negation and modality, for short negative modals across languages. In $2 I dwell a bit longer on the notion of a negative modal and in §3 I present the cross-linguistic basis of this study. §4 is a general characterization of the semantics and pragmatics of modality, including negative modality. In §5 I deal with one important parameter: to what extent do languages allows modal lexemes that are specialized for combining with negation? §6 contains the conclusions. "

"

,

2

.

Negative modals

In this study I will primarily study elements that one could call " auxiliaries". that is. grammaticalized expressions of modality that have or had a verbal status or that function in paradigms in which the majority of the markers have or had this status. Because the focus is on semantic and lexical issues.

I will not dwell on the morpho syntactic properties that one would want to associate with auxiliarv status, and which are well-known to differ from one

language to the next. A further restriction is that I will study only expressions of necessity and possibility. Of course, given the focus of this paper. I will concentrate on the negations of necessity and possibility, and here

24

JOHAN VAN DtR AIJWERA

I will not be restrictive

the term "ncgalion" will encompass both external

negation, with negation having scope over modality, and internal negation. with negation in the scope of modality. To express negative modality, one typically needs two markers, one for negation and one for positive modality. To a certain extent, therefore, a study of negative modals is a study of negative collocations. Thus one would want to find oui why one and the same French possibility ('0 ) marker pouvoir can combine with negation ( O to yield Op' bui also '<>-' p". '

'

-

(1)

French a

.

Tu ne / av/* manger de la viande. you not can not eat of the meat You can't eat meat.'

Op* Tu peuxne /wa manger de la viande. you can not not eat of the meat .

-

b

.

You can not eat meat/

"

But it is not onlv the collocations themselves which are of interest. In French

(1) the building blocks are the same, it is only the syntax that signals the diX rence in semantic scope. But the building blocks may diX?r. Consider the English collocations in (2).

(2)

English a

.

John must nor cat his soup today. .

'

p b

.

John need nor cat his soup today.

sap' In the collocations must nor and need nor the necessity (" *) verbs are diXerent, and it is this diXcrence that signals the scope diXzrence. To a certain extent, therefore, the study of negative modals is a study of the choice of positive modals. Sometimes, however, the negative modal does not involve any collocation. The negative modal is expressed with a negative lexeme, such as the transparent univerbations (contractions) niusrnr and needn'r in English, the

much less transparent Russian neVzjo in (3) there is no lexeme V:ja any or the rather more, but one can still analyze neVya as meaning Op' '

-

'

25

ON THE TYPOLOGY OF NEGATIVE MODALS

opaque Bengali nei in (4)

mi is supposed to derive from the negation rid

and ache be\ but this analysis does not make clear whether this combina '

'

tion is to be taken as ' -ip or as the equivalent '-»<> p' (see §5.3). Russian (cf. Weidner 1986: 192)

(3)

Mne neV ja igraf. to.me noi.possible play I may not play.' Op.

-

(4)

Bengali (Kidman 1981:99) dariye khe-te nei. standing eat notis One shouldn't eat standing up.' Op' ip or '

'

-

Obviously, if one is dealing with one-word negative modals, one would want to analyze the parts of these modals and one ends up doing morphology. To conclude this reconnaissance: die study of negative modals involves syntax (the study of collocations), lexicology (the study of lexeme choices) and morphology (the study of the composition of negatively modal univerbalions).

3

.

Typology: Samples and clusters

In recent years typology has shown an increasing sophistication with respect to language coverage. This happened along two lines. On the one hand, newsampling methods have been proposed and, more importantly, they have also been applied to various issues - the method thai stands out, also in terms of the number of applications, is the "Amsterdam method (Rijkholl*, Bakker, Hengeveld and Kahrel 1993). At the same time, there has been un increasing awareness that samples are not suflicienl, and that one also needs research on what I here call language clusters", i.e. collections of languages that are genetically related and/or geographically adjacent the awareness is most visible in die set-up and in some of the results of the so-called i-urotyp project, which was an attempt to do typology on the genetico-geographical cluster of European" languages (see van der Auwera ed. 1998). The cluster approach has the following advantages. First, in a cluster genetically related "

"

"

"

"

2h

JOIIAN VAN DEIR AUWERA

languages will tend to be similar. If these languages despite the over-all

similarity happen to differ in the details, the small differences might be indicative of the various stages ofdiachronic processes, which one might no longer be able to reconstruct if the languages are too far apart, as they lend to be in world-wide samples.1 Second, the cluster also contains colcrritorial languages. When one studies these and one includes a reasonable amount of languages that are genetically related but not coterrilorial, one can document areal convergence, again something which world-wide sampling will miss. Third, the languages best studied tend to be genetically and geographically very specific, viz. genetically Indo-European and geographically European. Samples have often been marred by an (Indo-)European bias and have their samplers apologize for this. By separating samples and clusters, one can keep one s sample-based studies methodologically pure, and profit from the knowledge on (Indo-)European languages in a cluster-based study and thus make a virtue of necessity. Note that a cluster trivially but not uninterestingly also bears on world-wide issues. Any phenomenon attested in the cluster allows for the claim that the phenomenon is possible in human language and the cluster invites one to try to falsify any claim to the elfect that something is either necessary or impossible. In the cross-linguistic study of modality the basic works might include. in chronological order. Dohmann (1974), Palmer (1986). Bybee. Perkins and Pagliuca (1994), De Haan (1994/1997). Palmer (1995). Hengeveld (in print). and van der Auwera and Plungian (I99H): precious statements can also be found in Horn (1972, 1989) and Van der Wouden (1996a. 1996b). Of these the one that is methodologically most satisfactory is Bybee. Perkins and Pagliuca (1994), as it consistently generalizes over a sample of the world s languages. It does not, however, address the issue of negative modals. A work that is partially sample-based and that specilically deals with negative modals is De Haan (1994/1997), albeit that the major hypotheses in De Haan (1994/1997) are only based on a small and random selection of languages. This paper is cluster-based, and the cluster is shown in (5). '

(5)

{Indo-tfEuropean) cluster (/i = 29) huh'European: Slavic:

Belorussian. Czech.

Bulgarian.

Polish.

Serbian/Croatian. Sorbian, Ukrainian

Russian. Slovak,

ON Tllli TYPOLOGY OF NEGATIVE MODALS

French,

27

Romainc:

Catalan,

Italian,

Germanit:

Portuguese, Spanish Danish. Dutch, English. German. Icelandic. Swedish

Celtic:

Welsh

IndolnmUin

Uralic:

Bengali. Hindi. Marathi. Punjabi. Romani Hungarian

Dravidiam

Kannada. Tamil

The languages are mostly Indo-European and when not then still geographically adjacent as European (Hungarian) or Indie (Kannada. Tamil). For each of the languages in the cluster. 1 have collected information on how the modal meanings are expressed. The data come from grammars, specialist articles, and informants. The data are not complete and bound to be more reliable for the languages that have been studied better, as e.g. English or German. The sources will be identified only for the examples that are actually used in the paper,

4

.

4

.

Semantics

1 Cognitive and lexical semantics

When one studies meaning one should make a distinction between whal I here call "cognitive" and '"lexical" semantics. In cognitive semantics one studies concepts, i.e. meanings that are in some way related to expressions. but the exact relation is of no concern. One can study, e.g.. what it means to say that it is not necessary that not p. In lexical semantics, one studies meanings in as far as they are expressed directly in lexical items and idiomatic collocations. Relevant here are. for example, the existence of the English items must and need and the idiomatic phrases ntlisf not and need not. but one does not look at the phrase it is not necessary that not ... The latter is English, but it has not been conventionalized into an idiomatic phrase. With respect to the cognitive semantics of modality, we did not have to wait till modem typological work. Modality has long attracted logicians and philosophers of language loo. And in this work they typically do not merely

28

JOI1AN VAN DHR AUWERA

abstract from the specificity of any modal expression, they also abstract from the specificity of the language which they use for illustration and which they intuit" about. They profess to be talking about human language as such. i.e. about univcrsals. Let me give three examples to show that this kind of work dilFers from the lexical semantics of modality, whether universalist or not. First, it has been generally accepted since Aristotle that necessity and "

possibility are interdefinable in the way noted in (6).

(6)

a. b

.

Dp Op

b b

-.O-'p -iD-ip

This may well hold for any language: in any language one may be able to express the equivalences in (6) by using the words or phrases for possible necessary and 'not'. However, as noted independently by Wunderlich (1981:41) and Horn (1991:97), with a foreboding in Dohmann (1974:66. 72). languages can be found to exploit the Aristotelian equivalence in the construction of conventionalized expressions for p\ but not for 0 P . I can illustrate this point with Bengali. '

.

'

"

'

(7)

Bmgaii (Dasgupta 1980:114) 0 na hese pat h na. he not laughing could not He couldn't not laugh." He couldn't help laughing.' / "He had to laugh.* "

Second, nobody in his/her right mind would doubt that necessity is dillcrenl from possibility. (8)

Op

Dp

Nevertheless, one does not have to look hard for languages that have modal words that do not distinguish between possibility and necessity. One example is Danish ma. which is shifting from a possibility to a necessity sense.

(9)

Danish (ct Davidsen-Nielsen 1990:187) Nu

mi)

du

foruclle.

now may/must you tell Now you may/must tell a story.' This process is not at all exotic. It happened in English, Dutch and German loo. with the cognates of nul. but there the process ended half a millennium ago.

ON Till: TYPOLOGY OF NEGATIVE MODALS

29

A dinerent type is illustrated with the German "modal passive".

(10)

German (ct Drosdowski 1984: 106) Wesensprobleme shul mil den Mitleln der Onlologie zu problems.of.being are with the means of.the ontology to loscn. solve

Problems of being are to be solved with the means of ontology.' Problems of being can/must be solved with the means of ontology/ And yet another type is found in the Swedish "acquisitive" modal /W 'gel'. (11)

Swedish (Wagner 1976: 56) Lasse ftir kora blL Lasse gels drive car Lass gels to drive the car." Lasse may/must drive the car\ "

Third, possibility is not the same as impossibility. (12)

OP

-

-Op

Still, the cluster documents two cases of an expression being vague between possibility and impossibility. One is the case of varieties of spoken American English not distinguishing between can and omY. The other case concerns varieties of Romani that reinterpreted the original impossibility particle nasri into a possibility marker through associating negativity with a free standing originally optional negative element and reinterpreting the .// part of naSti as a subjunctive element (Boretzky 1996). Of course, saying that the cognitive and the lexical semantics of modality are dilferent is not the same as saying that they are not related. In S4.2 1 will supply some important elements of the cognitive semantics of modality, in §4.3 I will do the same for the lexical semantics and 1 will then also connect the two perspectives. 4

.

2 Cognitive semantics

The basic relations between possibility and necessity, as in (6). can be represented with geometric figures or "maps". One most commonly tinds a square, as in the Aristotelian Square of Oppositions" (cf. Horn 1989:6 21) or "

"

"

3(1

IOHAN VAN DER AUWERA

in die Duality Square" (Lobner 1985. 1987. 1990), but one also finds triangles and hexagons (Horn 1990). The basic problem, one that Aristotle already struggled with, is that possibility allows two readings. The possibility thai is captured in (6) and therefore also in the Aristotelian and Duality squares is entailed by necessity. (13)

Dp

->

Op

But there is another sense, one which allows people to say (14) and which suggests the equivalence in (15k

(14)

John may be there and he may not be there.

(15)

Op

=

0-P

The possibility sense of (14) and (15) must truly be different from the one of the squares, as the demonstration adabsurdum in (16) shows. (16)

Dp Op /

.

= = =

p

-0-p 0-p -Op

(= (6.a)) (=(15))

(17) is a partial typology of the soluiionsM to the problem described: (17)

The geometry contains A only one possibility type. i.e. a the one characterized by (13), and yields a square and a one has no theory about the possibility character ized by (15) (e.g. Aristotle: Bcch 1951: 10) p one has a theory about the possibility characterized by (15) (e.g. Horn 1989) b the one characterized by (15) and yields a triangle (implicitly Jespersen 1917) B both possibility types, and a one also represents the contradictory of ihc possibility characterized by (15) and one oilers a hexagon (e.g. .

.

.

.

.

.

.

Blanche 1969r b

.

one does not represent the contradictory of the possibility characterized by (15) and one oilers a three-layered square (e.g. implicitly Hintikka I960)

31

ON THE TYPOLOGY OF NEGATIVE MODALS

In van der Auwera (1996) 1 proposed a B.b.-iype solution, in particular, a three-layered scalar square, which furthermore combines the better proposals of all parties concerned. To avoid confusion, the two possibility readings are £ivcn ditFerent symbols: < stands for 'possible' in the sense of (6) and < 13). and for "possible in the sense of (15). '

'

*

(IS)

Modality's three-layered scalar square

p. -"O ~,p

-* p.

-

.

p

-

-

.

«p

<>-'P

.

--p. --Op

*

-

The representation in (18) is a square. Like the Aristotelian and Duality square it represents the interdetinability of necessity and possibility ((6)). But unlike the Aristotelian and Duality - squares. (18) has three layers. and thus conforms with Jespersen s (1917) tripartition of the modal field as '

well

as

'

with Hintikka s

'

(1960) reconstruction of Aristotle s views on '

modality. But (18) is also scalar, and as such it allows some of Horn s insights on the scalar nature of modal concepts and of scale-induced implicatures. In particular " p is a scalar Quantity-1 implicature of Op . So much for the relation between possibility and necessity. There is one more factor which 1 would like to present as belonging to the cognitive semantics of modality and thus in abstraction of the means languages employ to express modality. This is the fact that modality can function at dillercnt levels" or thai it can target dilierent "dimensions". Possibility, for example. can take shape at the level or in the dimension of a participant s ability to do something, a participant s being permitted to do something or a speaker s weak commitment to the truth value of the proposition expressed In Palmer s (1979) terms, the possibility can be dynamic ". " deontic" and "cpitemic (see also Bybee. Perkins and Pagliuca 1994 and van der Auwera and Plungian 1998). This variation is beyond the scope of this paper. '

"

'

'

'

.

'

"

"

32

JOHAN \AN DIM Al'WER \

43 Lexical .u-nuuuu s

How do languages cover the semantic held of nu)dalii\ * Let me mention three general pri >crlies.

Pint, 11 one may be allowed to abstract trom the middle field p. -» p and focus on the four comers, one can see that every comer can be lexicalizcd in two ways, either in terms ol posMhihty or in terms d Deoesa t\ One can thus imagine two extreme systems. One system would be highly eGOnomicil: it tacicaluees each of the corners in terms of either necessity or possibility. The other extreme would be a system that allows each comer to be lexicali/.ed in terms of both Decesnt) wul possibilit\ Either system is unattested and it turns out that real systems hover between economy and FBdunduncy. Explanations for why this is so are manifold. The reason whylull redundancy is impossible has already been touched upon: no language seems to K able to lexicah/e possibilm in terms <>l iuxcssun. i.e. the exploit the Aristotelian equivalence in (6.b). Of course, this impossibihtv is itself in need of explanation. Second. because of its scalanty . the modal held is at the mercy of Griccan dynamics and more importantly, implicaiures can conventionalize. make the expression vague between the original literal meaning and the conventionalizing implicature and later oust the original meaning. This happened for French ncposfalhir. for example, first drawn attention to by *

v

Tobler (IH82).

(19)

Frau h (Hom 1989:261 -2621

II iw faut pas que tu

meuiBS

it not must not that you die U is not necessary that you die."

"

You mustn't die."

1 subscribe to Horn's (lt>X :26l 2621 deacriptKNl and explanation. In the CoUfteemh oeotlBy, Horn claims, the two interjirctations existed, but nowada\s '

only the C p reading survives, although the negation syntactically still goes uith the modal. This development makes sense. Hom argues, in a scenario of p originally having the p reading as a Quantity-2 implicature. '

-'

'

.

'

'

-

-

.

.

"

also known as an Tnformativcness (Atlas and Levmson 1981) or ' Relation"

(Hom 14>84) implicature. This is the process whereby the less informative statement. -Hp implicates the stronger, more informative one. . -.p'. *

,

33

ON THE TYPOLOGY OF NEGATIX L MODALS

The more the conventionalization advances, the more we can speak about a

modal expression being vague or ambiguous betw een tw o adjacent meanings

,

the areas shaded in (20).

(20)

.-. p' implicates " -.p' p. -< O p

~*

p. p

-

Op. -' -.p

Dp*--Op

-

In modern French we see that the implicature has eliminated the earlier meaning, and we now have an expression whose syntax suggests "". p but which actually means p German diuk-n. originally a specialized '-. p* marker (see §5.2) *

'

'

"

.

.

,

underwent a similar development, but at the stage of the retention of the erstw hile -.p implicature. the inlerdelmabiliiy of neoessit) and possibility '

allowed niiht iliirfcn. by now

C p

,

'

->

.

to be reinterpreted as * " Op

-

and

dUrftn itself as 'Op*- Wb thus see a development from a necessity to a possibility marker (cl. Bcch 1951: 14 16: Valentin 1984: I9>. The opposite also occurs. It is happening with Danish mil already .

illustrated in (9). and happened before with its Bnglisb, Dutch, and German cognates. The process ma\ again involve the conventionalization of a Quantity 2 implicature. very much the mirror image of what we have seen

with French iw pas falloir and German nichldUlfon, (21)

0 P* implicates * p' p, 0 -n>

~*

Op. -- -'P

p. -

.

-ip

p. O P -'

-

-.p. -0 p

The third general property of the lexical semantics of modal systems is that lexical coverage is dependent on the level or dimension. A simple example is furnished by English can. While in the deontk sense it renders service lor 0 P*- *0 "1P' as well as for -.0 P'- »n the epistemic sense, it only serves to express '-'Op Note that 1 only discuss present tense am; the '

'

-

distribution of n>uUI is different.

34

JOHAN VAN DIIR AUWERA

(22)

English You van dance.

Dcontic

'

OP'

You ian tun dance.

Deontic

.

.

O-P

.

You cannot dance.

Dcontic

'

He can be home now.

"

He can not be home now.

Epistemic Epistemic Epistemic

a

.

b c

d

.

c

.

f

(23)

.

He cannot be home now.

'

Op' OP' -

'

.

'

O-P

Op'

-

English can Deontic (tin

p. -0-p Op. -o-p -

.

p, o-p

-.p.

-

-

Op

Epistemic can

p.-"O-p

-* Op. -. -p

*-

-

5

.

5 1 .

p.O

-

p

*_

p- -p

-

n-p

.

Op

-

Lexicalization

Introduction

Against the background sketched in the preceding sections, I investigate one particular parameter of variation: to what extent do the cluster languages employ lexemes that are specialized for negative modality.1 In dill erent '

terms, to what extent is negative modality lexicalized in its own right? Leaving out of account double negative cases such as Bengali (7) as well as ( hypothetical) cases of one and the same lexeme serving negative modalities based on both possibility and a necessity (e.g. both '-. p* and .->0p >. . am left with six imaginable cases.

ON THE TYPOLOGY OF NEGATIVn MODALS

(24)

35

A language uses a modal that is specialized for a

b

.

c

Dp

-

.

-.p p -<>p 0-p --Op -

.

d

.

e f

.

'

and

-.p

and O-'p

52 .

Lexical items spccilicallv serving '-. p' are well represented in the cluster languages. They include English need (as in (2b)), German brauchen (as in (25)), Dutch hoeven. and Danish behove, and precisely because these languages are some of the best-studied in the world, the phenomenon has attracted the attention of linguists (especially Schmid 1966; Horn 1989: De Haan 1994: Van der Wouden I996a,b).

(25)

German a Er brauchi das nU ht zu tun. .

he need

that not

to do

He needn't do that.'

b

.

*Er brauckl das zu tun.

As Van der Wouden (1996a) shows, the phenomenon is attested outside of Europe, too. He mentions Mandarin and for within Europe but outside of my cluster, he adds Greek and I can add Cantonese (Matthews and Yip 1994:234) and Kashmiri (Hook and Koul 1985:270).

One thing that is interesting about specialized '-' p' modals is that it constitutes a dillerence between modals, on the one hand, and quantifiers and conjunctions, on the other, a point made by Horn (1989: 260> and Van der Wouden (1996a). The claim is to be seen against the background of ac-

counts, both quadrangular and triangular, stressing cognitive semantic similarities between necessity, possibility and their negations and. respecliNc ly. "air. 'some* and their negations, as well as "and', 'or' and their negations. These accounts are largely correct. However, they have to be able to cope with the fact that quantifiers and conjunctions never seem to have specialized forms corresponding to the p forms, that is. specialized not '

36

JOIIAN VAN DER AUWERA

'

all

and

not and" forms, whereas modals. of course, sometimes do. The

accounts ollcred by Horn and Van der Wouden do not explain this diller '

ence. nor do they indicate whether the dill erence is to be stated at the level of cognitive or lexical semantics. In van der Auwera (1998) I argue that it is a cognitive semantic dilFerence, which becomes visible if one supplies quantiliers and conjunctions with three-layered scalar squares of the type shown in (18).

Of course, while it is true that some languages have special ' Z p" modals. it is also true that probably more languages do not have them and that special '-. p modals would thus be relatively marked constructions. Horn (1989:260 - already 1972:244) relates the markedness of '-iDp' modals to that of 0p, modals: *

-

,

(26)

in general, we find that any language containing a lexicali/ation of

also contains a lexicali/ation of

but not vice versa:

furthermore, if either of the resultant forms is more fullv lexical-

ized (in terms of lack of productivity, as with (....|), and/or freer in its distributional and semantic potential, it will always be |~0"

not

In the context in which this implicational universal occurs, both in 1989 and in 1972. Horn discusses univerbations. like English needn 't and t an 't. and he finds support for (26) in the fact that, for example. French has an adjective impossible, but it does not have an adjective innevessaire. My (Indo )

(European) cluster offers further support for the correctness of (26). Russian. for example, has a univerbali/ed -.Op modal, illustrated in (3), and Romani had the impossibility particle nasti, briefly mentioned in $4.1. but neither language has one-word p modals. Continuation may also come from Bengali neL As 1 will argue in §5.3. though it may mean ' -'p' in modem Bengali, it may have meant Cp1. So possibly older Bengali had a univerbalized p modal, but then it may have had a univerbalized Op* modal as well. viz. n-ar < mh/uo- 'not-can' (Singh 1976:302). There is. however, another interpretation. One could take (26) to be a statement about the lexical components involved in Dp1 modals. indepen dent of whether they univerbalize. Trivially, the fact that some languages '

"

.

'

"

.

'

"

-

'

'

"

.

'

-

"

have a lexical item specialized for the '-« p' modal tells us something about the lexicalizability of the -' p modal, and one could compare that to the ,

lexicalizability of the

modal. This interpretation thus makes sense and

37

ON THE TYPOLOGY OF NEGATIVH MODALS

I am in fact not the first to advance it il is implicit in Van der Woudon (19%a). Now, if we do take (26) in this sense, it is easily falsified. German. for example, has brauchen as a specialized -. p' . but it lacks a specialized iOp modal, and the point can be made with Dutch hoeven or Danish 1

'

-

behove as well.

Specialized '-' p' modals are negative polarity items, by definition. According to Horn (1989:260) negative polarity "partially" explains why English allows a contracted needn't form, meaning '-. p The argument is that univerbation, though normally restricted to values, can here apply to a p value as well, because the negative polarity status of need precludes any ambiguity and the construction is therefore free to undergo contraction 1 see three problems with this explanation. First, it is unclear what Horn s hedge partially refers to. The claim and the argument occur in Horns discussion of the difference between modal systems, on the one hand, and quantifier and conjunction systems, on the other. So maybe partially refers to the fact that Horn does not explain why there is no attested case of a negative polarity item used for not air or not and Second. Horn's explanation is geared lowards explaining why need not may contract, not why English. German, Dutch etc. allow a specialized item, need in the case of English, in the expression of ' -"Dp' in the first place. Third. the argument presents the negative polarity status of need-Mkc items as a barrier to a " -»p' interpretation. However, it is a very weak barrier or, in other words, the negative polarity may diminish or disappear. As adumbrated already in connection with (19). Horn {1989:261 262) has convincingly shown, in Gricean terms, how *-»np' expressions may get ' -.p' readings. The point that is relevant now is that -. p expressions that employ a need-Wke element are no exception to this drift. It happened with German diirten. a verb that lost its '-iDp' reading, and it is possible for '

'

-

'

"

"

.

'

"

"

"

"

'

'

'

.

'

German bnuuhen (Scallidi-Abate 1973:27) and with Dutch hoeven (Van der

Wouden 1996a). which usually mean '-«Dp' but can also convey 'H-ip'. Mv
means

'

'

-

(27)

.

English You needn't do that.

It is furthermore unlikely thai univerbation hinders this process. Diirfen was probably univerbalized no less than needn t if one may judge from the '

,

38

IOHAN VAN DtR AUWERA

orthography (nedOrfSen) of the examples in Bech (1951: 14 16). and we know that dUifen completely lost the original sense. '

I conclude that Horn explains neither the possibility of specialized iD p modals. such as English need or German hnmchen. nor the possibility '

-

'

of univerbation, as in Enelish needn t As to the first issue, however. Horn .

has furnished what 1 take to be an essential ingredient of the desired cxplana tion. vi/. the Gricean drift from p into " -'p\ '".Dp* expressions easily generate »p implicatures, which process either renders them vague or gives them a new meaning, with the implicature ousting the original mean'

,

'

-

ing/ Particularly in case of a full semantic change, there is a certain need for '

a new -. p expression. Of course, this need may not be very strong. A modal system may well function without any specialized p expression (see note 5). Still, the least one can say is that the relative need for renewal is higher for a '-' p' meaning than for a " -
"

-

'

'

'

-

"

"

conjunction systems

and that in order to achieve this, a special

'

"

'

-

p

modal constitutes a sensible strategy. Another strategy is to employ an ordinary necessity modal. This is seen in English, too. The necessity modals include must, have to. and need to. Combining negation with these modals yields »p in the first case but "tD p% in the second and the third. '

'

-

(28)

English He must do that.

a

.

a

.

He has to do that.

b

.

'

b

He must not do that.

.

c

.

t

c .

He does not have to do that. He needs to do that. He doesn't need to do that.

Of course, English has a specialized p' modal as well, which only highlights the more general point about the salience of the '". p' meaning. German illustrates this in a different way. The basic German modal miissen is in modern usage rather like English have to and need to and thus diiierent from its cognate must: German miissen once conveyed " -.p'. like English must, but it nowadays prefers the -' p reading and leaves . p' to be '

39

ON THE TYPOLOGY OF NEGATIVE MODALS

expressed indirectly through the scmantically equivalent

" "

.

Op' (Bech

1949:30 31, 1951:8). (29)

German a

.

Er mufi das tun. he must that do He must do that/

b

.

Er mufi das nicht tun. he must that not

do '

(preferred reading) He needn t do that/ (preferred reading) '-' p ErJ
c

.

he mav that not

'

do

He may not do that." 0pk (= 'D-p')

-

German illustrates not only that '-

p, is directly and relatively unambigu-

ously expressed in two ways {nicht brmu hen and nicht mttsseir), but also demonstrates that a ' -'p" expression can drift into '-
'

'

-

'

sufficient But note that the facts in (29) also furnish evidence supporting "

the Grice-Hom drift: the "-"Op expression serving ' -.p\ nicht diirfen. is none but an old i p expression. Yet a third strategy to express '-. p' in a relatively unambiguous and ,

-

direct way is to express it in a positive way and to combine it with negation '

lo yield necessity. This is found with Swedish deontic siippa "avoid (30)

Swedish (Werner 1986:97) a

.

Du slipper betala. you avoid pay You avoid paying." You don't have to pay.' Du slipper hue betala. you avoid not pay You don't avoid paying.' You have to pay.' "

*

b

.

"

'

.

39

ON THE TYPOLOGY OF NEGATIVE MODALS

expressed indirectly through the scmantically equivalent

*

" -

»<> p (Bech

I949:3ti 31. 1951:8).

(29)

German a

.

Er mufi das tun. he must that do He must do that/

b

.

Er mufi das nichl tun. he must that not

do '

(preferred reading) He needn t (preferred reading) -» p ErJa//das nicht tun. he may thai not do He may not do that.'

do that/

,

c

.

-

op' <= n-tf)

German illustrates not only that '-Dp' is directly and relatively unambiguously expressed in two ways (nkhf hrain hen and nicht mSsseir), but also demonstrates that a 'D-*p' expression can drift into "- p\ the opposite of the Grice-Hom drift from '-. p into MH" . So German mBssen shows that an explanation of the relation between iDp and p' that would solely appeal to a need for renewal in connection with a Grice-Hom drift is not sullicienl. But note that the facts in (29) also furnish evidence supporting the Grice-Hom drift: the -'Op expression serving " -.p\ nicht diirfen. is none but an old p expression. Yet a third strategy to express p' in a relatively unambiguous and direct way is to express it in a positive way and to combine it with negation to yield necessity. This is found with Swedish deontic slippa "avoid '

'

'

-

'

,

-

'

'

.

(30)

Swedish (Werner 1986:97) a Du slipper belala. you avoid pay You avoid paying." You don't have to pay.' b Du slipper inte betala. you avoid not pay You don't avoid paying.' You have to pay.' .

"

.

"

'

40

JOHAN VAN DER AUWERA

One can also think of Latin necesse, containing the negalivizer m'- and a

meaning arguably expressing

'

p icf. Dohmann 1976:66).

As to the second problem, the possibility of having a one-word form.

for '-.Cp', I argued against any explanation that focuses on need being a negative polarity item. Remember, however, that Horn also relates the possibility of one-word forms for '-'Op to lhe possibility of one-word forms for '-' p'. This. I believe, is on the right track. There is a fair measure of Op' is a cognitivcly more central value cross-theoretical agreement that than " -. p 7 I find it plausible to think that univerbation will more readily '

needn t

,

'

"

.

*

.

function for the more central modal value than for the less central one.

53 .

ID -»//

Of the two possible collocations involving necessity and negation that may employ a specialized modal, it is Cp' that has attracted most attention. This docs not mean that there are no specialized modals for p\ The cluster contains two candidates. The first is Bengali ttei, which was illustrated in (4). '

"

-

(4)

fi

fl//(Klaiman 1981:99)

darivc

khete net.

standing eat not.is One shouldn't eat standing up/ i p or '-"Op" '

'

"

-

Nei is supposed to be a univerbation of a negation and a form of the be" verb ache. This does not as such make clear whether the construction should

be treated as meaning " -.p' or "-'O P . We have indeed seen with German (10) that 'be' constructions can mean either. As I have argued in van der Auwera (in print) the evidence is not conclusive, but all in all the ' -ip' view seems to win out. In support of the p hypothesis is the fact that the assumed positive component is reported to have a necessity use in Zbavitel (1970: 16) and Masica (1991:381). Other sources or native speakers consulted could not conlirm this use. but this does not. of course, prove its (earlier) non-existence. Also, there is uncontroversial proof of a necessity use of another be verb. viz. ho-, and there is no proof of any possibility use of '

'

-

.

'

a

be' verb. If the assumed positive component expresses necessity, then word order rules suggest that nei should mean p\ It does not mean this. however, at least not in modem Bengali, but we have an implicature hypothesis "

'

-

.

ON THE TYPOLOGY OF NEGATIVE MODALS

41

which could derive the modem *G- p meaning from a supposed earlier iCp meaning. Invoking Gricean pragmatics makes crosslinguistic sense. but in fact it also makes Bengali sense for it has to be assumed to be at work in the interpretation of the positive necessity modal mi anyway witness the vagueness in (31). '

'

'

,

(31)

Bengali (informantsi aj or para cai no. today his studying must not Today ho needn't study/ or Today he mustn't study/ or '-. p' .

-

So perhaps net is an erstwhile -' p' modal turned into a ' -'p, modal

,

The second candidate is German diirfvn. not in its modem sense, but at

the stage where it combined with negation and meant -»p\ coming from » p and going to p\ Note that at the " -.p* stage diirfen was restricted to negative environments, but while this kind of restriction normally amounts to claiming that we are dealing a negative polarity item, it does not in this case, for the modal has wide scope (cf. Van der Woudcn 1996a) '

'

-

.

54 .

.-» // and 'O-y)*

If speciali/ed " -.p' modals exist and if they come from specialized '-" p* modals, then we are bound to find modals that are speciali/ed for a cooccur rence with negation, but are vague between .-' p and ' -.p'. Again, German diirfen must be taken to have had this status once, and it is a potential for any specialized '-*Op modal. Tamil ycet}om otters a further illustration. '

(32)

Tamil (Asher 1982:168: Dc Haan 1994: 117>

nil ate ccyya Viwijam. you that do '

'

must .not/need .not

You musing do that/ or "You needn't do that/ "

p

or

p*

55 .

I have earlier (§5.2) referred to the cross-theoretical consensus about the central status of the

'

Op' meaning and used il to help explain that it will

42

JOIIAN VAN DKR AUWERA

more readily allow univerbalions than «< p\ A good example of a univerbation is Russian nelz ja. illustrated in (3). "

-

'

' -

»<> p

'

(3)

Russian (cf. Wddner 1986: 192)

Nine neVzjo igrat' lo.me not.possiblc play I mav not plav' Op" .

-

The predecessor of -/';/ possible' was an independent word, and its cognate still is in Slovak (Schwanzcr 1978: 155). The cluster also evidences non-univerbalized specialization. One type employs a verb (originally) meaning dare and it is marginally found in Russian. '

(33)

Russian (cf. Weidner 1986: 124-125)

Nikto tie sweet ego rugaf nobody not dares him scold Nobody dares to scold him" "

Nobody can scold him1 In Russian the context seems indeed obligatorily negative, but this is not the case for the Serbian/Croatian cognate (Kalogjera 1985:205). suggesting a scenario of a dare" verb losing its negative polarity. Another type, attested in Hindi and in Bengali employs an originally acquisitive verb, with a development from "not gel" to "not manage" to cannot' . (34)

Hindi (McGregor 1977: 134) maim banaras nuhim jane paya 1 Banaras not go managed I didn't get/manage to go to Banaras." "

i couldn't 20 to Banaras/

The negative polarity is strong, but not quite obligatory. The same is true for a third type, the modal passive also mattestcd in Hindi and possibly also in earlier Bengali (van der Auwera in print). The subtype shown in Hindi (35) employs an auxiliary originally meaning "go". "

"

,

-

ON Till: TVI'OUK .V (»1

(35)

43

M,(-\ll\l. MUDALS

Hindi (Davim 1982; 159) baccom ko is tarah bigani nohfm jata. children lo this way spoilt not going. One should not spoil children like this." Op' '

-

So in all. the cluster exemplilies four types of specialized '-"Op" modals.

Many of the details remain to be worked out modal passive is rather mysterious

especially the negative

but at least this much is clear: lan-

guages employ a variety of special means to express -'Op evidence lor the central cognitive semantic status of the 56

'

,

which is further

p

"

modal.

.<>-/'.

.

*

i* not a central modal. Apart from the po>Mhilit\ that Bengali /;<./ is a specialized 0 ""P" modal <see §5.3 ). I have found specialization only in one clear case. viz. the English univerbation Hiivhin i "

p

.

*

'

.

(36)

English He w/ ?/i//i / have done il. '

.

But mightn't seems marginal, and Horn (hW) HM). lor instance, wouldn't OCept n lor American English. Interestingly. nia\n i seems marginal in all '

Englishes I suppose that the possibility of mlghtHl is due to forces of analog\ in contraction is generally possible with modals. (ii) niiglu is a modal, (ini hence might would allow contraction too. 57

.".O/*'«m/*<> "V**

.

I have no examples of a construction that is specialized for both '-.Op' and p Given the marginal status of specialized 'Q-
"

.

-

6

.

Conclusions

In this paper 1 supplied some general considerations on both the cognitive and lexical semantics of modals and of negative modals in particular.

44

JOIIAN VAN DIM AVW liH \

Against this background I investigated, in a cluster of 29 languages of Europe and India, the existence of modals that are specialized for occurrences with negation. It was shown for these languages that they regularly have specialized modals for both >Qp and '-" p*. In the case of '-.Op . e constructions found in the cluster show manifold origins, arguably testifying to the central cognitive status of "-.Op . There is no connection between modals specialized for OP* an
'

'

-

.

for '". p'. 1 demonstrated that languages have a certain need to express this meaning in an unambiguous and direct wa\ and that such expressions have a certain need for renewal, as they may drift towards np meanings. There is a clear connection between modals specialized for "-' p' and the ones "

'

the latter derive specialized for p rea-son modals may specialize for both .

-

from the former

'

and for this

*

and , ->p . Let me stress again that thi stiid\ was based on a cluster ol langua M. It can show certain phenomena to be possible in human language (e.g. a specialized p modal i. but it cannot show what is impossible or necessary (e.g. the fact that I have no case of a modal specialized for both P' and '0 ".p* does not show that it is impossible). Because the cluster contains closely related languages, it allows statements on scenario's of semantic change (e.g. the change from p to -. p* with the three stages documented in. respectively. English must. Southern Dutch moewn and German miissen). but it di>es not allow any statement on whether any such scenario is common among the languages of the world. .

."

.

p

'

'

-

*

'

-

.

Symbols

possibility Cat least possible if not necetiaiy' |

0

"

possibility ( only possible such that not p* is possible too) '

,

necessitv 0

negation

-

<

entailment *

* .

. .

. . .

idiomatic .-!..>>. translation

literal gloss/translation

ON THE TYPOLOGY OF NUGATIVE MODALS

45

Acknowledgments Thanks arc due to ihc Science Foundation Mandcrs tor i\s Krtdiei I oor Haveners, lo Ferdinand

dc Haan for his hospitality and to Vladimir Plunpian for his comments.

Notes 1

.

2

.

1 owe the idea to Stasscn (1997:8), but Stasscn docs not himself separate cluMen* and samples. He works with oik sample, which purposely ovcrreprcscnls certain groups and areas. In terms of the layered nu>del in ilS). this extra notion would combine layers I and 2 hul exclude 3.

3

.

The equivalence of p' lind -9". which was a factor in the remlerpretation ot durfen. may have been a bctet in the rcinterpaMatkm of mussen. Ux>. Sec Bcch (1951: !8» and. for further references and an evaluation of both analyses. Gamon »1984:156-158).

4

.

In my view, the vacueness characterizing '-.Dp' expressions ls not found with "- Op" expressions. In this respect. De Haan (1994; 135-145) dilTcrs in opinion. This is a divcrcencc of opinion on the data themselves and because of this it is dilTicull to comment on IX' Haan s '

theoretical conclusions, also when they pertain to need l>pe modals. 5

.

In Southern Dutch we see a cognate, woeten. which is dilferent still. When it combines with negation, the result is vague between -. p and C- p". '

(i)

Southern Dutch a

.

Hii moel dal docn. he '

b

.

musi that do.

He must do that".

Hijwor/dal mVf doen. he '

must that not do

He mustn't do that.' I He needn't do that.' "

' -

*

p

/ '-.Op'

Possibly Southem Dutch thus evidences an in-between stage in the development from between a p to '-tap". '

'

-

6

This is not to deny that there may be subtle dilTerenccs (sec Brunncr 1979).

7

In terms of the three-layered modal square in 08) this is shown by the fact that ' O p' delines both one of the three layers and one of the four comers of the square, while ' Up' defines

.

.

only a comer. In term of the triangular model

represented, whereas

'

' -

"

p is.

.

'

' -

'

p

is so non-central that it is simply not

46

JOIIAN VAN DIIR AUWERA

References

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Alias. Jay David and Stephen C. Levinson. 1981. '//-clclls. informaliveness and logical

lorm'. In Peler Cole (cd), Radualpragmatics. New York: Academic Press, 1-61. Bech. Gunnar. 1949. "Das semanlische System der deulschen Modalvciba". Travaux du Cvn lc Linituisliqut' dc Copenluijtue 4: . -46. Bech. Gunnar. 1951. "Grund/.iigc der semanlischcn IZnlwicklungsgeschichlc der hochdeutschen Modalverba". Del Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab, Historisk-

filohgiske Meddeletser M. 6:1-28. Blanche. Robert. 1969. Smn nirt's intelU't tiu-IU's. Essai surTorganisation systemaiiqiu' dvs concepts. Pans: Vrin. Borcl/ky, Norbcrt. 19%. "Zu den Modaha in den Romani-Dialcklcn"- Zeitschhft fiir Balkanalogie M: 1-27. Briinner. Gisela. 1979. "Modales 'mchl-brauchcn' und "nichl-musscn"'. Linguistische Bc/ichte62:*l-9$.

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Davidscn-Niclsen, Niels. 1990. Tense and momt in Engtish. A comparison with DanishMcrWn: Moulon de Gruyler.

Davison. Alice. 1982. "On the fomi and meaning of Hindi passive scnlenccs". Lingua 58: 149-179.

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Hintikka. K. Jaakko J. i960. "Aristotle's dillerent possibilitiesM. Inquiry 3: 18-28. Hook. Peter Edwin and Omkar N. Koul. 1985, "Mixlal verbs of obligation in Kashmiri".

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.

Horn, Laurence R. I9S1). A natural history of negation. Chicago and London: The UmvcrMly ol Chicago Press.

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,

Anneliese. 19H6. Die russischen Olwrsetztitigsaquivalente der deutschen

Modaiverhen. Versuch einer logisch-semantischen Charakteristerum*. Miinchen:

Sagner. Werner, Otmar. 19X6. "Neuerc schwedische Modalverbcn und ihrc deutschc Entsprechungen Hans-Peter Naumann w ith Magnus von Platen and Stefan Sondcregger <ed), festschriftJiir Oskar Handle, /son 60. GcburSstag am II. Januar 1986* Beitriige zur nordischen Philologie 15 Basel: Helbmg und Lichenhahn. K9-l()6. Wunderhch Dieter. 1981. "Modalverben im Diskuni und im System". In Ingcr Rosengrcn (ed), Sprachc und Pragmafik. Lander Symposnun I9H0. Lund: Gleerup. 11-53, Zbavitel. Dusan. 1970. Non-finite verbalJonns in Bengali. Prague: Oriental Institute. "

.

.

Metalinguistic sentence negation in child English Kenneth F. Drozd

Negation is one of the first functions to appear productively in children's spontaneous speech and has been a central topic in English language acquisition research for at least three decades (Klima and Bellugi 1966: Bloom

1970/1991: McNeill

1970: Volterra and Aminucci

1979: Keller-

Cohen, Chalmer and Rentier 1979: Pea, 1980. 1982: De Villiers and De Villiers 1981: Ito 1981: Choi 1988: Radford 1990: Pierce 1992: Hummer.

Wimmer, and Antes 1993: Deprez and Pierce 1993. 1994: Drozd 1993. 1995. 1996). One negative construction which has figured prominently in this research is prishnthntial NEGATION (examples in (1)) consisting of an utterance-initial, nonanaphoric1 negative morpheme (usually no, much less often 001 or never) followed by a shntiince. consisting of an overt subject and (copular) predicate. (1)

Presentential Negation No the sun shining No Mommy doing No Mommy cut it No Leila have a turn

No I sec track

Not Fraser read it

Not you coming Not I do it

Not me naughty Not that clock upstairs

No that's a cake

Standard functional analyses of these negatives classify them as rejections. prohibitions, and truth-functional denials. In this paper, 1 argue that many of these presentential negatives are negative cxclamatives used to express metalinguistic negation (Horn 1989). This analysis is of interest to descriptive developmental linguists because it argues for revising the established set of functional categories of child language negation to include metalinguistic

KLNNimi I. DROZD

negation, a use of negation not considered in previous analyses. The analysis is especially important to theoretical research in the area of child language negation because it suggests that children are not only aware of the conversational and conventional implicala conveyed by previous utterances in discourse but can apply negation at the metalinguistic level to cancel these implicala much in the same way that adults do. This analysis undermines the standard treatment of presentential negation as a primitive, uniquely childlike

negative construction as well as the assumption that there is stage-like development from presentential negation to internal sentence negation, an assumption which has become a central explicandum for current acquisition theories (e.g., Radford 1990) and developmental theories of negation in particular (e.g.. Pierce 1992: Deprez and Pierce 1993, 1994). The paper is structured as follows. In the first section 1 introduce metalinguistic sentence negation as a functional category of negation and discuss criteria for assigning a child's presentential negative to this category. In the second section. I present a functional analysis of the presentential negatives in child English. In the third section, I discuss the ramifications of this analysis for current standard theories of negation in child English.

Metalinguistic and exclamative sentential negation What we know about the discourse-semantic functions of child language sentence negation is based largely on the functional analyses conducted byLois Bloom and her colleagues (Bloom 1970/1991: Bloom and Lahey 1978). Although various and sometimes more detailed functional taxonomies can be found in the literature (De Villiers and De Villiers 1979: Ito 1981: Choi

1988), the "core* categories of polite' rejection, imperative rejection iprohi bition), and iruth-functional denial have survived largely intact. I list standard definitions and paraphrases in (2). as well as some typical classifications.

(2)

Rejection Object, action or event either existing or imminent in context is opposed (Bloom 1970>. a

.

Polite rejection Involves things the child docs not want to do or to have Paraphrase: I don 't want X (Bloom and Lahey 1978)

MUTALINGLIST1C StNTENCE NEGATION IN CHILD ENGLISH

51

Nicholas (1:11 l:5)No mummy do it Gloss: 1 don't want Mommy to do it (Bloom 1991) b

.

Impenuivi' njectim Involves events the child does not want another person to do

Paraphrase: Don t S/Mustn V X (Bloom and Lahcy 1978: De Villicrs and De Villiers 1979) ( Eve 1:9) No Mommy giving baby Sarah milk Glo ; Mommv mustn't give babv Sarah milk (De Villiers and Dc Villiers 1979) (Eve 1:9) Not Fraser read it Gloss: Eraser mustn't read it (Dc Villiers and De Villiers 1979) (3)

Denial Negation of the truth of a statement made bv someone else

(Bloom and Lahey 1978) Paraphrase: It is not true that S Adam (2:4) No the sun shining Gloss: the sun isn't shining (De Villiers and De Villiers 1979)

Nina (2:0) No Mommy doing Gloss: Mommy's not doing (Deprez and Pierce 1993) Adam (2:4) No a boy bed Gloss: The boy's not in the bed (De Villiers and De Villiers 1979) For expositor) purposes. I shall refer to polite rejection, imperative rejection. and denial, as rejection, prohibition, and (truth-functional) denial, respectively. The majority of presentential negatives are classified as denials and rejections across studies, with very few tokens classified as prohibitions. There have been no reported uses of presentential negation to express noncxistence. although children use other kinds of negation quite often to express this meaning (I return to this fact below). As the paraphrases and glosses suggest, presentential negation is typically described in terms of truth-functional internal sentence negation. Such descriptions have fed the now well-established perspective that presentential negation is a child s own invention (Brown, Ca/den and Bellugi 1969). primitive (De Villiers and De Villiers 1979) or otherwise unique to child language (Pierce 1992: Deprez and Pierce 1994). However, presentential '

52

KKNNLTli 1

DKn/D

negatives arc. at face value, examples of syntactic external scnlencc negation. Since (syntactic) external sentence negation also appears in an colloquial English in the form of exclamative sentence negation, e.g.. No w ay Hove wi/ and internal sentence negation is normally assumed to have, semantically. wide- or sentential scope, we might begin with the assumption that children s presenteniial negatives are modelled on external sentence negation in adult grammar. To this purpose, building on a suggestion by Horn (19X9:443.462). I investigated the hypothesis that presenteniial negatives are metalinguistic uses of exclamative sentence negation. '

.

'

Hot n *s theory of metalinguistic negatit >n Horn (1989:377) proposes that external sentence negation has two uses. It can be used descriptively, taking a proposition p into a negative proposition mil-p. or as a metalinguistic operator expressing the meaning I object to U where U is an utterance or utterance type. In its descriptive use sentence negation applies to what is said or explicated in the truth conditions for the

.

.

sciuuilv. and iIuin aU ecis '

the tnilfa vakie tA the sentence fHbni 1992 163).

In contrast, metalinguistic negation applies at the utterance level as "a device for objecting to a previous utterance on any grounds whatever, including the conventional implicata or conversational implicata it potentially induces, its morphology, its style or register, or its phonetic realization (Horn 1989:363). and may or may not induce a change in truth value (more on this "

belowi. Examples are given in (4) ((4b e) are Horn's (1989:370 371: (13a) (I4b.c). and (I6d)).

(4)

.

a.

She's not UNWISE. She's downright FOOLISH!

b

.

SOME men aren't chauvinists - ALL men arc chauvinists.

c

.

1 didn't manage to trap two monGEESE. I managed to trap two monGOOSES.

d e

.

.

It's not STEWED BUNNY honey, it's CIVET DE LAPIN.

He didn't call the IPOLIS]. He called (he [POliS].

All of these negatives have the following properties. Each involves the use of contrastive intonation with a final rise on the olfending \vord(s) (in caps). Each is typically followed with a rectilicational tag in which the olfending item is replaced by a more appropriate one. Each is felicitous only as a

METAUNOUISTIC SENTENCE NEGATION IN CHILD BNOUSH

53

response to an utterance another speaker has just said, implied, or implicitly accepted (Horn 1989:423) or as a mid-course' correction of an earlier utterance by the same speaker i Hom 1989: 374- 375). Metalinguistic negation also imposes restrictions on polarity licensing, the distribution of the COOCf sive hm conjunction, and negative incorporation (Horn 1989: Chapter 6). aspects which I am not concerned with here. Although metalinguistic negation applies generally to express utterance level objection, it may apply more specifically to implicatures derived via two patterns of inference. Under the Q-based inference pattern, based on Grice's (1975) lirst Quantity Maxim, the descriptive value conveyed by a speaker s use of a scalar term like warm, it s lower bound value af U-ast warm, can be interpreted by an addressee in context as an invitation to infer "

"

'

'

that for all the speaker knows, the upper bound value hoi does not apply. since the speaker could have used the stronger term but chose not to (Horn 1992; 164). Under these conditions, the addressee uses the lower bound value to

implicate the upper bound value, creating a "two-sided" reading of the sentence

including the scalar term, as shown in (5) (Horn's (1992: 163, Example 1 >. (5)

One-sided leading

Two-.Mded reading

at least 3

exactly 3

at least some

some but not all

It's possible she'll win

at least possible

possible if not Certain

Maggie is patriotic or quixotic

and perhaps both

but not both

It's warm out.

at least warm

but not hoi

Scalar predication a

.

Max has three children

b You ale MMM of the coolaeft. .

c

.

d e

.

.

Metalinguistic uses of negation can then apply to cancel the implicated upper-bound readings. (6)

a.

Max doesn't have THREE children. He has four.

b

You didn't eat SOME of the cookies. You ate all of them!

c

It's not POSSIBLE she ll win. It's certain!

.

.

d e

.

.

Maggie isn't patriotic OR quixotic. She's both! It s not WARM out. It s hot!

In these examples, the scalar terms can be plotted on semantically-based scales which determine asymmetric entailment relations between stronger and weaker terms in the scale (e.g.. hot entails iMDIIf). However, the contrasting terms in (4) can also be treated as scalar, if we plot them as ordered values

54

KlSNNEITl! V. DROZD

'

on pragmatic scales, which are defined by background knowledge or beliefs about the world (Horn 1989:240: Fauconnier I975>. We treat, for example. the terms hunny stew and civet de lupin in (4d) as weak and strong scalar terms, respectively, in a pragmatic scale of appropriateness. A speaker s use of the weaker term may then invite the addressee to infer the upper bound reading via Q implicature. which may then be cancelled by metalinguistic negation, as in (4d). Under the R-based inference pattern, based on Grice's Relevance Maxim, a speaker's use of a semanlically nonspecific form can be "filled in by an addressee who recognizes that some particular stronger or more informative meaning may have been intended" (Horn 1989: 195), as por trayed in (7) (Horn 1989: 196,346: Atlas and Levinson 1983: Hamish 1976). For example, a speaker's use of the semantically nonspecific term married. in (7c), may implicate via "inference to the best interpretation' (Atlas and Levinson 1981: Levinson 1983) a stronger, stereotypical meaning married to each other which has become, by convention, part of the literal meaning of '

the term. Similarly, indirect speech acts like Con you close the wind&W? have become conventions for conveying more specific commands (7e). (7) Form a

.

Slcrcoiypical Reading

Chris had a drink

b Mike ate the cake .

c

.

d

.

e

.

Chris had an alcoholic drink Mike ate the whole cake

Chris and Mike arc married

Chris and Mike are married to each other

BlUno broke a fuigcr Can you close the window?

BmtlO broke his own finder Close the window.

An addressee who has inferred a stereotypical conventional meaning from the use of a nonspecific term may then use negation lo object lo the use of the nonspecific term when it is known that a stronger form holds. (8)

a.

Chris didn't have a DRINK

that was a Shirley Temple

(Horn 1989:90) b

Mike didn't eat the CAKE. There's still a piece left.

c

Chris and Mike aren't MARRIED. Chris is married to John

.

.

and Mike is married to Liz. d

.

Bruno didn't break a FINGER. He's still got his original ten.

METALINGUISTIC SENTENCE NEGATION IN CHILD ENGLISH

55

Imporlamly. only implicata which have "become convemionali/ed as part of the literal meaning of an expression

"

are defeasible (Horn

1989:388).

Although secretaries are often female, the term KCMUny does not have a stereotypical meaning female secretary, as shown by the following infelicitous utterance (based on Horn 1989:390). I use

(9)

to indicate infelicity.

*My SECRETARY isn't on vacation. He's male.

Metalinguistic uses of exclamative scntcm e negation From a developmental perspective, the hypothesis thai prcsenleniial negation is used to express metalinguistic negation is not the strongest hypothesis available since it only claims functional continuity between child and adult language, leaving aside the question of syntactic continuity. Drozd (1995) investigated the stronger hypothesis that children's prescntential negatives are metalinguistic uses of exclamative sentence negation. In adult colloquial English, EXCLAMATIVE si NTENC E NEGATION can be defined as the combination of an idiomatic word or phrase, e.g.. Nt> waw like hell, the hell, yeah right, /m eye, Mlcoakies* nonsense, with a sentence (defined above), e.g.. Ltke hetl Al and Hilary arc married. Al and Hilary are married, my eye. I restrict the discussion to exclamative sentence negation with utterance-initial negative idioms, since these resemble the children s prescntential negatives. Exclamative sentence negation is a morphologically and syntactically marked form of negation which is typically, if not always, used to convey objection. As such, it is. perhaps, an inherently metalinguistic type of negation. Like the metalinguistic negations in (4), (6) and (8), exclamative sentence negation occurs naturally to object to previous utterances on any grounds whatever via the cancellation of Q- and R-based implicatures '

"

"

((10) (12)).

(10)

a. b

.

Like hell she's UNWISE. She's downright FOOLISH! No way SOME men are chauvinists ALL men are chauvinists.

c

.

d

.

Nonsense I managed to trap two monGEESE. I managed to trap two monGOOSES. The hell it's STEWED BUNNY honey, it's CIVET DE LAP1N.

e

.

Like hell he called the [VOLIS]. He called the |POLiS|.

56

KKNNIiTl I 1-

(11)

a

.

Like hell John has THREE children. Ho has lour!

b

Yeah right you ate SOME of the cookies. You ale all of (hem!

c

.

The hell its POSSIBLE she'll win. It's certain!

d

.

.

(12)

Dkn/D

e

.

a

.

b

.

c

.

Like hell Maggie is patriotic OR quixotic. She's bothl Bullshit it's WARM out. It's hot!

Like hell Chris had a DRINK that was a Shirley Temple Nonsense Mike ate the CAKE. There's still a piece left. No way Chris and Mike are MARRIED. Chris is married to John and Mike is married to Liz

d

My eye Bruno broke a FINGER. He's slill got his original ten.

e

Like hell I will!

.

.

Metalinguistic exclamative negation does not involve the use of the conlras tive fall-rise intonation contour characteristic of metalinguistic internal sentence negation, although it typically occurs with stress on the initial negative phrase. Nor is it necessarily followed by a reclificational tag like the metalinguistic use of its internal counterpart. However, it does typically, if not always, consist of an echoic response to something just said, implied.

or implicitly accepted. More specifically, the oflending utterance or utter "

ance chunk in exclamative sentence negations must be echoed up to deixis as the complement to the negative phrase (Dro/d 1995). Deictic terms like "

/

.

here, and this may be replaced with their respective counterparts yon,

rhcrc. and thai in the echo and constituents like names and VPs can be

replaced wilh their corresponding proforms. e.g., he and do, e.g.. A: Youfirst kissed me in front of the Topkapki Palace. B: Like hell I did!). But more substantial additions or modifications of the target utterance are prohibited. e.g..

Like hell I kissed you (*on the lips) there (*lasi year)!

Importantly, like metalinguistic internal sentence negation, metalinguistic exclamative negation does not negate the truth value of the sentence it occurs wilh. Like metalinguistic negation, it neither inhibits PPls like still

(13a) nor obligatorily triggers NPIs like any (13b) (Horn 1989:397 402). (13)

a. b

.

Like hell I still love you! Like hell I abhor some politicians!

Exclamative objections typically do not induce negative inversion, a standard criterion for descriptive negation.

M ETA LINGUISTIC SENTENCE NEGATION IN CHILD ENGLISH

(14)

57

a- *Likc hell is she UNWISE She's downright FOOLISH! b ??No way are SOME men chauvinists ALL men are chau.

.

vinists. c

.

"Nonsense did 1 manage to trap two monGEESE. 1 managed to trap two monGOOSES.

d

*

The hell is it STEWED BUNNY honey, it s CIVET DE

.

LAPIN. *

e

(15)

.

Like hell did he call the [POLLS). He called the [POLISj.

a. *Like hell has John THREE children. He has four! b Yeah right did you eat SOME of the cookies. You ate all of *

.

ihcm! *

c

.

d e

(16)

The hell is it POSSIBLE she ll win. It's certain!

*

Like hell is Maggie patriotic OR quixotic. She's both!

*

Bullshii is it WARM out. It's hot

.

.

a. "Like hell did Chris have A DRINK

that was a Shirley

Temple b c

.

.

Nonsense did Mike eat THE CAKE. There's still a piece left. ??iNo way are Chris and Mike MARRIED. Chris is married lo John and Mike is married to Liz

f

* .

e

.

My eye did Bruno break A FINGER. He's still got his

original ten. *Like hell will I (close the window)!

And exclamative negative idioms can occur with descriptive negative markers, an unexpected result if both negative markers are used to express descriptive negation. (17)

Like hell Bill isn't a workaholic.

Presentcntial negation in child EnglLsh2 Transcripts of children's spontaneous speech are notorious for not providing enough information on their own to investigate theoretical predictions. However, the hypothesis that children use presentcntial negation to express metalinguistic exclamative negation gives us two clear and testable prcdic lions. First, if the hypothesis is right, (hen presentcntial negatives should be

58

KIINNirm I-. DRO/.D

'

characteristically echoic, it metalinguistic, and characteristically echoic up to deixis. if exclamative. Moreover, it should be posMble given sulliciently informative tranNcriptions. not only to reconstruct a felicitous context for an ohkcium reading, or more specifically, for a Q or R based reading of the negation, but to show that replacing the child s presentential negative with an exdamali\e sentence negation paraphrase preserves the logic of the discourse and the apparent intentions of the children. These prediction-, n satisfied, would make a particularly strong case lor the metalinguistic exclamative account, since characteristically echoic up to deixis metalin'

guistic objections constitute an extremely specific negitian type. To investigate these predictions. Drozd 11995) conducted a computerized

search through the ChiLDES transcripts of 123 children1

lor their sentence

negations. Of the 123 children. 13 produced a total of H) clear examples oi prcsenkntial nofnevei negation and 6 clear examples of presentential not

negation with interpretable contexts
'

up to deixis and 85% were interpreted as consistent with metalinguistic exclamative interpretations paraphrases. '

Presetuentitil no nt'gahon

A representam t sample of the presentential no neftfh cs in context are given in (IS i 1241 i see Drozd (1995) for a description of the remaining examples). Presentential no nexaiive*

(IK)

Adam*:. 41 Mother;

Mother;

You go U>ok out the wnulow and tell me if U s raining. No! Raining! Is it raining? Car ... raining outside. Raining, raining. Oh no. raining (= Oh no. it is raining, kfdi Oh no. it s not raining'?

Adam;

No not ruining

Adam: Mother; a

.

Adam;

b

.

d

.

"

MITALINGl'ISTIC SENTENCE NEGATION IN CHILD ENGLISH

e

Moihcr:

Well, is the sun shining?

f

Adam:

No the sun shining

Mother:

The sun's not shining? Oh no. the sun shining.

.

.

g

,

(19)

Nina (2;l)

a

.

h

(20)

.

b

c

Do you let Leila have a turn on your bicycle

Nina:

No.

Mother:

No you don't? Yeah.

Nina:

No.

Mother:

You just let Nina rides it?

Nina:

Nina:

Uhhuh 1= yes). Oh. I bet you let Leila have a turn loo. Does Maggie push you? Umhum (= yes). No Leila have a turn.

Mother:

No.

Mother:

.

.

Mother; Nina:

What > Mommy doing? No Mommy doing (Nina brings whistle to David. David and Linda laugh)

Nina:

David turn. David turn.

Peter {2:1) a

.

b

(22)

.

Mother:

Nina (2:0) (Mother takes the whistle) a

(21)

Adam:

59

.

Lois:

PWcr

Do you want me to cut it? No Mommy cut it.
Nathanial (2:7) Mother:

Ifs not ice-cream.

Nathanial: What's this? a

.

b c

.

d e

f

.

,

.

.

Mother;

That's your glass. 'Bai' knocked your glass oil Ooh. king Nathanial (mockingly, kfd).

Nathanial; No king Nathanial

Mother:

Is Nathanial a king?

Nathanial: No Nathanial a king? Mother;

What is Nathanial?

Nathanial; No king Nathanial.

'

.

611

KHNNEIT1!

(23)

DROZD

Adam (2:3)

(24)

Mother:

Did you see the truck?

Adam:

No I see truck

Peter (2:3)

Mother:

Thafs a cake. We're gonna have it for dinner.

Peter:

No that's a cake.

Mother:

Yeah it's a cake. I just wanted to show it to you.

With the exception of (23) and (24). the negatives in these contexts are easily interprctable as metalinguistic exclamalives, as predicted. In (18). Adam appears to use No the sun shining to convey that he didn't intend the meaning that his mother is attributing to his earlier utterance Oh ho, raining. in this example. Adam replies positively to his mother's question (ISa) Is it raining.' with Oh no. raining {18b) (Adam uses Oh no in other contexts to express surprise or recognition of an imminent negative situation, not to express negation (Dro/d 1995)). The mother s following clariticational question Oh no. its not raining?*' (18c) indicates that she misunderstood Adam's (18b) as a negative (perhaps as Oh. it's not raining). This licenses the Q-based inference that for all the mother knows, Adam did not mean that it was raining. Adam immediately attempts to cancel the implicature using the metalinguistic negation (IXd) no not raining, conveying the meaning / '

"

didn 't say nor raining '. The mother's clarificational question (18e) suggests that the matter is not settled, leading Adam to utter the rectitkalional no the sun shining. The force of Adam s negative is also clearly conveyed by the exclamative objection paraphrase Like hell the sun (is) shining (...I said no raining ) This scenario suggests that Adam may be using no as an exclamative objection marker in this case. The prescnlcnlial negatives in (19) to (22) can be construed as examples of metalinguistic negations of R-based implicatures in each case, there is evidence that the adult speaker has triggered a pragmatic narrowing by appealing implicitly to the addressee s ability to recognize that the speaker '

''

"

"

"

.

"

'

has sufficient social motivation to avoid the more direct utterance' (Horn

1989: 352)". In (19). the mother's / bet you let Leila have a turn too (19a) is naturally interpreted as an indirect speech act conveying the narrower request Let Leila have a turn too which the mother may not have wanted to assert directly. Nina obtains this meaning via an R-based inference. Having just expressed her unwillingness to share her bicycle (Mother: Do you let Leila

METALINGUISTIC SENTENCT: NUGATION IN CHILD ENGLISH

61

have a turn on your bicycle? Nina: No), Nina is aware of her mother's attempt at coercion and objects, cancelling the implied meaning with the prcscntcntial negative No Leila have a turn in (1%). which is paraphrasable as e.g.. Like hell Leila have a turn. In (21), Peter is attempting to cut his bologna with the wrong side of his knife. Lois's Do you want me to cut it? is straightforwardly intcrprelablc as an indirect speech act conveying the command, e.g., Letme cut it! Peter's No Mommy cut it is interpretable as an attempt to cancel Lois's intended

message, e.g.. Like hell Mommy cut it! In (22). Nathanial utters three negatives, all of which can be interpreted as metalinguistic exclamalives. The discourse in (2 la) indicates that the mother is making fun of Nathanial (nickname Bai'). calling him a king because he's throwing his muscle around (knocking glasses oil' the table). Nathanial is unw illing to accept this appellation and uses No king Nathanial which can be interpreted as an objection to the name calling itself or to the '

way it was said* e.g.. Don t call me king Nathanial [Oooh king Nathanial '

'

appears to be used in a mocking way). Nathanial s subsequent negations in (22d) and (22f) arc interpreted similarly as echoic attempts to cancel the mother s attempt to label him in a negative way (Catherine Snow, the mother '

participating in this discourse, agrees with this interpretation (p.c.)). The context in (20) supports the claim that Nina uses No Mommy doing to object to her mother s What s Mommy doing. Here. What s Mommy doin / is uttered its the mother is attempting to take a turn blowing the whistle '

'

'

when Nina intended David to have the next chance (Nina: David turn. David '

turn.). Here, the mother s question is interpreted as conveying the more '

'

narrow meaning It s Mommy s turn, which can be retrieved via the R Principle. The force of Nina's negative is consistent with the paraphrase Like hell Mummy doing or No way Mommy doing. This example differs slightly from the others in that the meaning 1 claim is implied by the mother s use of What s Mommy doing/ is clearly not specifically tied to a conventional use of any particular part of the question uttered. I propose that the mother s use of What s Mommy doing/ to implicate It s Mommy s turn is similar to the use of I ve had no breakfast today to implicate "that the speaker is hungry and wishes to be fed" (Rccanati 1989:326, cited in Horn 1992: 176). The important claim 1 am making is that the negation of an implicature is indeed Nina's intention in uttering her presentential negative. '

'

'

'

'

'

'

62

KliNNETU V. DROZD

Other cases like (23) and (24) are echoic up to deixis but could not be

clearly assigned a metalinguistic interpretation due to poor contexts. (23). for example, is compatible with either a metalinguistic or a truth-functional denial interpretation. Both of these examples were classified as consistent with a metalinguistic exclamative interpretation in Dro/.d (1995). Four nonechoic examples were also found, (25) (28). The first four lines '

of discourse in (25) and the final line in (26) did not appear in Drozd s (1995) examples (22) and (23). I add them here for expository purposes. (25)

Eve (1:9) Mother; Eve: Mother:

Eve: Mother:

Eve:

(26)

(27)

Nina (2:0) Mother:

You don't want me to have it?

Nina:

No. No. No Iamb have it. No lamb have it.

Mother:

You don't want the lamb to have it either?

Nina:

No. No lamb have a chair either.

Iris (3:2) Iris:

(28)

Sure... she's thirsty and hungry just like Eve. No Mommy giving baby Sarah milk Why not? Why? Why not? Why not? She's hungry ... No Mommy giving baby Sarah milk

Open the |unintelligible speech). Yes? No me got him.

Nina (2:1)

Mother: What are you doing with it? (Nina throws puppet on the floor) Oh.

Nina:

No my play my puppet. (Nina takes toys olf her shelf. She starts throwing some of them) Play my toys.

Dro/d proposed that of the four negatives in these contexts, only the one in

(28) No my ptay my puppet*, could be considered consistent with a metalinguistic paraphrase 1 object to U\ even though it is not echoic. In addition, it

can be replaced felicitously with the exclamative No way my play my puppet ("No

'

"

way I m playing with my puppet ) The other three, being neither echoic up to deixis nor clearly interprclable as consistent with a metalinguistic paraphrase, were left as counterexamples. .

MEIAUNGUISTIC SENTENCE NEGATION IN CHILD ENGLISH

<<}

However. I want to reconsider the classification of the remaining (25) and (26) as metalinguistic exclamatives. At the outset, we should not refuse to consider these examples as metalinguistic or exclamative based solely on the observation that they are not echoic (up to deixis). Often, nonechoic negatives like (29) succeed as metalinguistic negation. Following Horn (1992: 170) (29) is read initially as contradictors but is reread as a metalinguistic negation conveying irony or surprise.

(29)

Around here, we don't LIKE cofTee, we LOVE it. (Lauren BacalL TV commercial for High Point decall einated coffee) '

Nonechoic exclamatives can be used in a similar way.

(30)

S: A:

I saw Henry cycling in the rain to work this morning. No way he could have wrecked his new car so soon!

Now. De Villiers and Dc Villicrs (1979) classified Eve's nonechoic negative in (25) as a rejection (see (2)). However, the exclamative paraphrase No HW? Uommy giving baby Sardh milk is felicitous in this context. It can be considered metalinguistic since it expresses objection to the mother s previous utterance. Sure... shes thirst}' and hungryJliSl like Eve. which may be inter preted as a indirect way of convincing Eve that the baby should be fed. triggering an R-based inference to a narrower meaning, e.g.. Lei Mommy give baby Sarah milk. Nina's No lamb have it in (26) seems like a descriptive negation in the context of the first two lines of discourse. However. Nina s following A' lamb have a chair either, which can be interpreted as a confirmation of her former negative, is readily interpretable as a metalinguistic exclamative (Drozd 1995:600). suggesting that both are. in fact, metalinguistic. Thus. 1 would like to propose that 95 of the presentential no examples are consistent with a metalinguistic exclamative reading, revising my previous proposal of 85 . '

'

'

Presentential not negation

In contrast to the no negatives. Drozd found that only half of the presentential not negatives were echoic up to deixis and only 33% consistent with metalinguistic exclamative interpretation paraphrases. A representative sample with context is given in (311 (34).

(>4

KLNNimi I . Dkn/D

Prcscntcntial not negatives (31)

(32)

(33)

Eve (1:9) Colin.

Will 1 read it or will you read it?

Eve:

Eve read it.

Colin:

Oh. Eve's going to read it?

Eve:

Not Fraser read it.

Colin:

Eraser's not going to read it?

Eve:

Eve read it.

Katie (3:2) Father:

You press the button.

Katie:

No. not not I do it.

Father:

You don't wanna press the button

Carl (3:0) Adult: Carl: Adult:

(34)

He's naughty. Like you? Not me naughty. You're not naughty... aren't you?

Nina (2:2)

Mother: Shall we build something else with your blocks or shall we put them away? Nina: No. Not man up here on him head. Mother: You putting the man on the dog. on the horse's head?

These examples pose difficult problems for analysis, since there arc not many of them and their form is consistent with either a contraslive NP negation of the NotNPhutNP sort, (contraslive) external sentence negation. or exclamative negation. For example, the Not in Eve s AW Fraser read it in (31) can be read as applying to the subject NP, i.e.. Not Fraser hut Eve or as contrastive external negation. Not Fraser read it", 'Eve read it", both of which are suggested by Eve s Eve read it in the last line of discourse. In any case, this negative, as well its the Nina s negative in (34). seems to be neither echoic up to deixis nor intcrprelable as an opposition to an implicature associated with a previous utterance. On the other hand. Katie s Not I do '

"

'

'

'

it and Carl's Not me naughty can be classified as metalinguistic exclamalives, although they may also be instances of NP negation.

METALINGUISTIC SENTENCE NEGATION IN CHILD ENGLISH

65

Discussion

The metalinguistic exclamalive analysis I have argued for is only interesting from a developmental point of view if it can give us a more enlightening perspective on the meaning and/or form of presenlential negatives and on the negation system of the child. 1 have argued that children s presentential no negatives are characteristically used lo express metalinguistic exclamative sentence negation, while presenlential nor negatives do nol seem to be characteristically used lo express ihis function, although it is dillicull to make a definitive claim based on the spontaneous speech samples alone. I use the term presentential negation henceforth to refer only to the no cases. The metalinguistic exclamalive analysis helps explain several observed '

"

"

properties of presenlential negation. First, the rarity of presentential negation in the data can be attributed to the rarity of metalinguistic exclamative uses of negation generally. Second, as mentioned above, developmental studies typically classify presenlential no negatives as rejections and denials. Presentential nonexistence statements have never been reported, despite ihe fact that nonexistence is one of the first negative functions to emerge across child languages (Bloom 1970: llo 1979: Choi 1988). Bloom s categonal definitions don'l give us a clue as to why this should be the case. However, this generalization can be captured naturally if we reclassify presentential no polite rejections and denials as metalinguistic exclamative negations (see below). Two other questions are more dillicull for this analysis to handle. One '

'

concerns the use of no. Whv would a child use no. raiher than not. don t or ,

an exclamative idiomatic phrase like no mix as the exclamative negation marker? Secondly, it is commonly observed that a child will utter presentential no/not negatives before she learns lo use internal sentence negation. Once internal sentence negation becomes productive in a child's speech. presentential negation apparently disappears iBellugi and Klima 1966: Bellugi 1967: Brown. Cazden and Bellugi 1969). This observation has become, in fact, one of the leading factors underlying the assumption that presentential and internal sentence negation are derivationally related. If presentential negation is evidence of a mature grammatical construction, as I suggested above, then why would a child stop using it? In response to the first question, a child might use no as the exclamalive marker for several reasons. As a single word utterance, it is used often in colloquial English to express objection or dissatisfaction. A child might

66

KENNETH V. DROZD

simply be modelling her use of exclamative negative morphemes on adult uses of negative morphemes and judge no to be the best morpheme to use to express objeclion. Children may not be templed to choose auxiliary not as an

exclamative negation marker because they have already learned the distributional properties of noi as an internal sentence negation marker (Stromswold 1990). If not is understood as a productive marker of internal descriptive sentence negation, it may not be available as an exclamative negative marker, the set of which is restricted to idiomatic expressions in adult colloquial English. Children use i/OftV productively, but there is some evidence that they have dillicully with sentence negation involving do-suppori. Drozd (1996). for example, reports that no appears unexpectedly in pre verbal position following a subject, e.g., / no know, only when Jrj-suppon is required. Ate does not supplcte not or ni in other auxiliary environments. This would help explain the unavailability of don) as an exclamative negation marker. Children may not use exclamative idioms in this position because ihey are rarely modelled in the input and/or they are often not socially acceptable. In response to the second question, the conclusion that presentential negation disappears is coherent only under the theoretical assumption that presentential and internal sentence negation constructions are derivationally related. The metalinguistic exclamative analysis suggests that this assumption is unlikely. Rather it suggests that presentential negation is a legitimate negative construction in its own right (see more below). Thus, one equally viable alternative assumption is that children retain the syntactic construction underlying their presentential negatives throughout development but begin to use metalinguistic uses of internal sentence negation and/or exclamative negation with the appropriate negative idioms when they have more control over the use of negative constructions in discourse (see Dro/d (1995) for some supporting evidence). The important point I am making here is that although no might gradually disappear as a presentential negative marker, the syntactic construction underlying presentential negation is grammatical. though perhaps marked. In remainder of this paper. I want to address how this analysis interacts

with two important issues which consistently arise in discussions about the meanings of child language negation.

MUTALINGUSnC SENTENCE NEGATION IN CHILD ENGLISH

67

Rejet lion, dcnml. andmetalinguistU negation In response lo my metalinguistic exclamativc analysis, one might still argue that presentential negatives are used to express rejection, prohibition, and denial (Jordens 1996: L. Bloom ip.c.)). This position is not without merit. There is experimental evidence that children as young as two years old can

spootaneously deny false statements using no and allirm true ones (Hummer. Wimmer and Antes 1993). And it is well-established that the use ol negative utterances to express rejection and denial is pervasive in early child languag es (e.g.. Pea I9S2). Why should we believe that presentential negation is either metalinguistic or exclamativc? Moreover, there are other ways of capturing the meanings of presentential negatives and their echoic properties. One might attribute their echoic nature not to a property of metalinguistic or exclamativc negation but to the well-established fact that child language is highly imitative (L. Bloom. (p.c.)). Moreover, although many presentential negatives are consistent with metalinguistic exclamative readings, they are also still consistent with rejection, prohibition, and denial readings. The {don t Mam X paraphrase, for example, is felicitous in contexts (19) (21 ( and (25). (26). and i2f
(35)

Adam (2:3)

Mother; Did you see the truck? Adam:

(36)

No I see the truck

Adam (2:10) Mother: Where are the other blast-offs? Adam;

No dat blast-off

One might simply argue that presentential negation is used to express a heterogeneous set of negative meanings, not only metalinguistic exclamative negation. But there are reasonable counterarguments to these possibilities. First, although child language is undoubtably highly imitative. Dro/.d (1995) hits shown that internal sentence negations including no, not and Jon'i are

not characteristically echoic up todcixis like the presentential negatives. And presentential not negatives arc not characteristically echoic up to deixis cither, as I showed above. Thus presentential no negatives do appear to form

a distinct type of sentential negative, as the metalinguistic exclamative analysis would predict. Second, although it is possible that presentential negatives are functionally heterogeneous, it is likely that the definitions of rejection and denial typically used to categorize negative ullerances actually reflect metalinguistic negative meanings, suggesting there is little if any functional heterogeneity. The standard definition of rejection, for example (see (2)>. is defined in terms of "opposition a meaning very close in spirit if not identical to the objection meaning of metalinguistic exclamation. What is misleading is the I don i wanr X paraphrase for rejection, which represents only one. truth "

,

functional sense of opposition.4 As a general category, metalinguistic exclamative negation is at least on equal footing with rejection as a viable representative of the opposition meaning (Drozd 1995. fn.l). it has also been argued that the / don i want paraphrase is appropriate because it captures the negative modal meaning, rather than an opposition meaning, intended by the child. For example. Hoekstra and Jordens (1994) argue on the basis of Jordens' diary notes that Jordens' daughter Jasmijn in Stage 1 (19-23 months) used presentential or preverbal Dutch nee ( no ) as a negative '

'

'

desiderative modal in utterances like Neepoes vlees ( No pussy cat meat'= I don't want the pussy cat to have meal (Hoekstra and Jordens 1994: 130)). Their evidence for this claim is (1) that the child's intended meaning is congruent with the 1 don t want paraphrase. (2) that there are no negated desiderative verbs in Jasmijn's speech at (and presumably before) age 1:10 '

(p. 132). and (3) that nee occurs in complementary distribution with other amalgamated negative modals like kannic ( can t ) and magnie ( may not ) '

'

'

'

during Stage 1. Jordens (1996) argues further thai there is no reason to assume that child English presentential no is any dilferent from child Dutch '

nee. I find Hoekstra and Jordens evidence dubious at best. Jordens' diarv

notes (1 thank Peter Jordens for making his diary data available to me) do not include contextual or discourse information, making it dillicult to evaluate whether Jasmijn actually intended to use negation to express desiderative modalitv. Furthermore, even if the Dutch desiderative verb '

wUlen ( to want ) and its negated counterpart willen niet did only emerge in

Jasmijn s speech after age 1:10 as these authors claim, this would not constitute evidence that willen nier and the earlier uses of nee are related.

f

Moreover. 1 ind no evidence of complementary distribution of nee and the modals kannic and magnie in presentential position in Jasmijn s speech. '

MEIAUNGUISTIC SENTENCE NEGATION IN CHILD ENGLISH

W

Jordens' notes do include examples of Jasmijn s presentential and preverba! nee* but there are no examples of presentential kannielt) and magnied). Finally. Hoekslra and Jordens do not mention apparent counterexamples to the complementary distribution claim for preverbal position, e.g.. Paanl kanniet nee valle ( Honse cannot no fall ) (Jasmijn, 1:9). Thus, these data do suggest, as Jordens claims, that there is no dilference between child Dutch presentential nee and child English presentential no. However, there is no evidence for Hockstra and Jordens claim that either of these morphemes are used as negative desiderative modals by children when they occur in presentential position. Hence, these proposals pose no threat to the metalinguistic exclamative analysis. The standard denial categor)* seems more clearly distinct from the metalinguistic exclamative negation category. However, it has been used to '

categorize instances of presupposition cancellation, assumed here to be a metalinguistic function. De Villiers and De Villiers (1979:60). for example.

categorize (37) as a truth-functional denial but also a denial in which 'a child denies the proposition posed or presupposed by a question* (De Villiers and De Villiers 1979:60).

(37)

Nicholas (1:1L 2:5)

(Nicholas is wearing a shirt he has earlier said was bought by Ester) Peter: Did Nana buy you that shirt ? Nicholas: No Nana bought it. If we assume that Nicholas is denying a presupposition here, it is no surprise that his negative, like the negatives in (19) (24i. is echoic up to deixis and consistent with a metalinguistic exclamative paraphrase. One reason it is often dillicult to tease apart the meanings of these negatives is that they manifest syntactic external negation, which suggests a metalinguistic exclamative interpretation, but are consistent with truthfunctional denial paraphrases. One way to account for this ambiguity, given the metalinguistic exclamative analysis, is to assume that metalinguistic negation is tnith-funclionally heterogeneous (Horn 1989:484 490.1992: 184. fn.l5>. Horn proposes that metalinguistic negation entails the truth of descriptive negation when the focus of negation is a truth condition of the sentence previously uttered. However, no enlailment relation exists when the focus is a conventional implicatum. The dill'erent applications of meta-

70

KI.NM.ni 1. DKOZD

linguistic negation can be traced to the grammaticality of the because lags in sentences like (38) (40). According to Horn, the rectification headed by because in (38) (Horn's 1992: fn. 15 (ii)) is licensed because the focus of the negation in this example is the existential presupposition that there exists a king of France, a necessary condition for determining the truth of the antecedent clause. The foci of negation in (39> and (40) are not truth conditions but conversational scalar (39) and conventional (40) implicatures.

the negation of which does not disturb the truth of the affirmative sentence. In these cases, the because clauses do not go through. (38)

The king of France is not bald because there is no king of France

(39) It's not WARM out because it's hot! (40) Chris and Mike aren't MARRIED because Chris is married to John and Mike is married to Li/

This notion may be applicable, in particular, to the ambiguous examples (23). (24). (26>. and (37). One might assume that the descriptive import ascribable to these negatives is derivable from the application of metalinguistic negation to a truth condition of the previously uttered sentence.

Thedretical implications Theoretical analyses of child language sentence negation and its development have been dominated by Transformational-Generative theories of syntax and its developments since the 1960s (but see Bowerman 1973 and Braine 1976 for alternative accounts). The metalinguistic account of prcsentential negation presents a legitimate challenge to these theories. The earliest of the modern theoretical analyses portrayed prcsentential no/nor negation as evidence of an early stage in the development of internal sentence negation (Klima and Bellugi 1966: Bellugi 1967: McNeill 1970). The stage-like development from prcsentential to internal sentence negation has been portrayed in a number of ways by developmental syntacticians. Pierce (1992:60) and Deprez and Pierce (1993. 1994:62) proposed that prcsentential no/not negatives consist of a negative morpheme in the specifier position of NegP. one phrase in the inflectional complex IP of a sentence, followed by a VP, including a VP-internal subject. The later emergence of internal sentence negation is portrayed in terms of the acquisition of subject case-marking, which triggers subject-raising from Spec VP to SpeclP.

MUTALINGl"ISTIC SENTENCE NEGATION IN CHILD ENGLISH

IlP IspclP Np. I

71

lv VDUi

Radford (1990:153), in contrast, assumes that the grammars of young children do not include functional categories like IP and portrays presentenlial negation as small clause negation (see Lebeaux 1988 and Weissenbom. Verrips, and Bcrman 1989 for similar claims) and internal sentence negation as phrasal negation within a small clause, as in (42).

(42)

[yp no/not |vr NP VP]) - (vp |NP1 |v. no/no! [vp VP||1

The metalinguistic exclamative analysis suggests that two assumptions underlying these theories are unlikely. The first, which 1 call the si.m.LTiON assumption, is that presentential no and nor arc suppletive alternants. The metalinguistic exclamative analysis suggests that presentential not negatives are neither characteristically echoic nor characteristically consistent with metalinguistic exclamative interpretations like presenleniial no/never negation. severely undermining this assumption. The second assumption, which I call the derivation assumption, is that presenteniial negation is an early, ungrammatical, derivational variant of internal sentence negation. The validity of this assumption is already called into question by the fact that presentential negatives are never reported as expressing nonexistence. Although children often use (elliptical) existential constructions to express nonexistence, e.g.. There is no milk. There is not milk, presentential nonexistentials like No there is milk or .\ o there is milk have never been reported. If presentential and internal negation were simply derivational variants, then we might expect, ceteris paribus. similar functional uses However, if we buy into the Derivation Assumption, we can conceive of 9 possible ways development might occur, given two values for negative morpheme {no and not) and two for syntactic position (presentential and internal). These are portrayed in (43). '

.

(43)

a. b

.

c

.

d

.

e

.

f

.

g.

// // presentential -> no/not internal z/ /myrpresentential -> m>-internal /w/m>/-preseniential not internal mj-presentential no/not internal / /-presentential no/not internal / -presentential -> / -internal m>-presentential m>/-inlemal

72

KliNNETH F. DROZD

h

.

i

.

m>/-presentential -> A /-intcmal // presentential w -intemal.

If presentential no and not negatives are formally and functionally distinct, as I have suggested, then (43a), (43b) and (43c), are ailed out. (43d), (43f). and (43g) can also be ruled out since, as reported above, no and not internal sciucnce negations arc not characteristically echoic up to deixis like presentential no negatives (Drozd 1995, 1996). This leaves (43c), {43h) and <43i). If we accept the metalinguistic exclamative analysis, then presentential not is likely to be used for NP negation rather than sentence negation. This would rule out the remaining derivational possibilities. However even if presentential not were a sentential negation marker and (43e), (43h) and (43i) were viable possibilities, the derivational assumption would be restricted to describing only these cases, which comprise a small minority of all presentential negatives (Deprez and Pierce 1994:61). The metalinguistic exclamative analysis seems to do a better job at describing why children use presentential negation without invoking a derivational assumption. Assuming that presentential not negatives are ,

instances of NP negation, the analysis predicts that we should find a functional distinction between presentential no and internal sentence negation based on the position of the negative morpheme rather than its form. Presentential no negation, but not internal sentence negation, should be characteristically metalinguistic exclamative (echoic up to deixis. convey metalinguistic negation). And this is exactly what the data are telling us. If the Suppletive and Derivational Assumptions are unlikely to be true, then it is clear that the syntactic analyses of child English sentence negation described above cannot work. If presentential negation is not related lo internal sentence negation, for example, then there is no reason to assume

that presentential no occurs in IP (Deprez and Pierce), or as an adjunct to VP (Radford). If children are indeed using presentential negation to express metalinguistic exclamative sentence negation, then the most likely generative syntactic analysis would be that presentential no occurs in CP in child English, which is presumably the position for exclamative paraphrases like no w ay and like hell in adult colloquial English. One possible representation for No Mommy doing, for example, would be (44), in which no appears in the head of CP.5 (44)

[SpcvCP lr |c no 1 [,p lSp:c |p Mommy Ij |vp U I

'> lllllll

METALINGUISTIC SENTENCE NEGATION IN CHILD ENGLISH

73

Pierce (1992:58) and Dcprez and Pierce (1994:61 621 argue against a CP analysis specifically for presentential no negatives on the basis that it makes two false predictions: (I) lhal no as a sort of negative operator unique lo child grammar, rather than as a variant ol the adull negator not - should only surface in sentence-initial position, and (2) that the child s grammar should generate sentences in which Neg is positioned lo the left of modals and auxiliaries (Pierce 1992:58)" '

The first of these predictions makes sense if we assume only two situations are possible: (1) that presentential no uniquely suppletes the adult negator nor, or (2) that presentential no is an operator unique to child grammar (i.e. is nonadultlike). Under these conditions, the CP analysis incorrectly predicts the absence of actual preverbar negatives like (45). (45)

(Peter 2:2)

I no want go home However, neither situation seems likely. First, there is no reason to assume that no may only supplcle not in preverbal position, as Deprcz and Pierce suggest. As Drozd (1996) argues, no suppletes a number of negative morphemes in child English including not in preverbal position (but only when
74

KI'NNHTII 1. l>ki)/[)

the rarity of such constructions is predictable on other grounds. For example.

as is well known, both auxiliary and modal verbs are not productive in early child languages (Brown 1973). Moreover, modal verbs often emerge in child

languages lirsi as unanalyzed negative forms (e.g., canV) before their positive forms (Bellugi 1%7; Brown 1973: Hoekslra and Jordens 1994). Thus, a CP analysis like (44) seems to be a legitimate syntactic alternative to current accounts.

Notes I

.

Nonanaphoric uses oi utterance-initial negative markers apply negation to the conslituem Ihe marker oocun with, as with cxclamatives e.g.. A: Venezuela lies to the south o} Brazil. B: Sonsense Venezuela lies to the south ot Brazil. Anaphoric nccation rctcrs to ihe application of an utterance-initial negative morpheme to a previous utterance (A: Bolivia lies north of Brazil. B: So. it doesn't)

1

.

A cmsslinguisiic study pt prcsentcntiaJ negation is beyond Ihe Reope of this paper. However, it should be noted that prcscnicnual negation has also Nrcn reported m languages like child Dulch (Hockstra and Jordens 1994). child German tWode 1977; Park 1979, 1981: Weissenbom. Vcmps. and Herman 1989) and child Polish (Smoc/yhska 19851. Metalinguistic analyses oi the data presented in these studies is al-mosi impossible, since none <»f them include detailed discourse contexts or discourse analyses. However, researcheri" notes suggest that ungrammati-

cal prcscnlential negation is similar Iciusa child languages.

01 the studies mentioned, only Park (1981:91-93) pmvides any discourse contextual information. Of the 5 uses of nonanaphoric presentenfial negatives reported by Paric in the

speech of his onl> subject Kathrin (Phase 2:25-26 months), only one is presented with previous discourse information
"

Mother: Kathnn:

Das wirdja dick (That gets fat Sein dick Bahy ('No lat Baby")

)

Two t>thers. Nein Auto kaputt t'No car bmken'l and Xein Bahy Pimpelmaus (*No baby "

pimpelmaus book) air claimed to have followed utterances in which the XPs in the child s '

negatives were mentioned, e.g.. i\ein Auto kaputt was a response to the mother s question regarding whether the car was broken. These may or may not he echoic. The fourth. Nein diese M< sser .Xuau. interpreted as 'No this knife hurting' is said as Kathnn is cutting pudding with a knife atkr the mother has said

'

She needs no knife lor pudding 'lGcnnan utterance not given). This token is likely lo be at least partially echoic. All four of these negatives are analyzed as descriptive denials. The fifth is interpreted xs desiderative wiihout more detailed '

comment. Afajfl Btitsch Hunger f.No uncle hunger ) meaning "Kathryn did not want to give him "

more toy pudding (p.93)).

Other reports, at best, only mention in passing that presenienlial negatives express ivjecuon or denial. Smoczyhska reports her subject Basia s use of the ungrammalical tin Polish) '

iNoc* Subj* V) \hrm.c.2.,SieBasia<rpi ('No Basia sleeps") to express Bloom's rejection and

MEIAUNGUISTIC SENTENCE NEGATION IN CHILD ENGLISH

75

denial meanings. This lorm also appeared in Y/N questions. Hockstra and Jordens analyze the Dutch presentential negatives <>l Jordens daughter Jasmijn all as m<xlal. rather than opposm- /iJ

rejections, but this analysis has pmblems <see discussnm below). A more detailed analysis of crosslinguislic child language negation is obviously needed to determine the metalinguistk '

status of children

i

.

s presentential negatives.

Fhc Child Language Data Exchange System (ChiLDESl iM.KWhinney and Snow 1985) consists ol lormatted transcripts of both diary studies and recorded spontaneous speech of children and their convercationaJ partners. The data for this study were taken from the English

corpora within the database yscc Drozd (1995) for details). 4

.

Another problem with the standard rejection category, as with other categories, is that there is

no general consensus or standard criteria for deciding what exactly the negative morphemes in children

'

s rejections are supposed to stand in for. Under some accounts, no replaces another

negative morpheme. Bloom (1991:143), for example, claims that Nicholas s tl;l 1-2:5) Mo mummy do it is a reduced vemon of a more complex multiclausal construction in which no '

'

replaces don i and the main clause subject and desiderative verb arc deleted, i.e.. [If don i fwwuj Mommy (jo} do n (deleted items in squaa* brackets). Others like Hoekstra and Jordens '

'

(1994) <see below) assume that Dutch net- (

no

> replaces the entire phrase Idon

'

i w ant. Neither

of these analyses have much support. For example, in addition to standard and well-known arguments against reduction analyses of the son proposed by Bloom (e.g.. Brown 1973;

Bowerman 1973). Bloom's analysis fails to consider the ditferent presuppositional properties tBoIinger 1977). Nor docs it respect a child s choice of negaii%e morpheme nor '

of no and don t

'

her choice of syntactic position. Therefore, we have no clue as to why the child may have made such choices. In analyses like these, it seems like a useful paraphrase has been implicitly assumed to count as evidence for missing elements. In contrast, the metalinguistic exclamative analysis gives credit to the child (1) for picking out a morpheme (no) that expresses (metalinguistic) exclamative negation in the input ie.g.. as a single word utterance or HP no iuiv. I and '

(2) for putting the morpheme in the right position for expressing metalinguistic exclamative negation. 5

.

1 have placed no in C position to capture the fact that metalinguistic exclamative negation docs not occur with subject-auxiliary inversion, under the assumption that auxiliary inversion

involves head-t<»-head movement oi the auxiliary fmm I position to C position. I have chosen

to make IP the complement of COMP under the assumption that when CP appears in child language it is wcllfonned (Wetssenborn 1994). One might choose to flesh out the complement to COMP in t44i in any number of ways t»r investigate alternative proposals for the structure of CP.

References

Atlas. Jay David and Stephen Lcvmson. I9SL "//-Clefts. Inl'onnativcness. and Logical Form". In R Colc.cd. Radu al Pragnuitu s. New York: Academic Press. 1-61. Bellugi, Umila. 1967. The AiquisiiionojNegation. PhD. dissertation. Harvard University.

Bloom. Lois. 1970. Language Development: Form and Funciion in Emerxing Gram//uvrv.Cambridge: The MIT Press.

Bloom. Lois. 1991. Language Development From Two to Three. Cambridge University Press.

76

KKNNimi I. DROZD

BI
Bowcmian. Melissa. 197. . Barfy Semantic Dweiopmait: A Cntss-Ungtasiic Study With SpetM Reference to Finnish. Cambndgc: Ounbridge University Press. Brainc. Martin D.S.. 1976. Children's First Word Combinations. Monographs of the Society for research in child language development 41. Chicago: Chicago Umvcrsiiy Press.

Brown, Roger. 1973- A First Language. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Brown Roger. Courtney Ca/den. and Ursula Beilugi. 1969. "The Child's Grammar From I to III". In J.P. Hill led.) Minnesota Symposium oj Child Fsu hology: Volume2. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Choi. Soonja. 19SK. "The Semantic Development ol Nc alion: A Cruss-Linguislic Longitudinal Study". Journal of Child Language 15:517-531. Dc Villicrs. Jill G. and Peter Dc Villicrs. 1979. "Form and Function In the Development of Sentence Negation Papers and Reports on Child Language Development "

.

17:5-14.

Deprc/.. Vivian and Amy Pierce. 1993. "Negation and Functional Projections in Early

Grammar." linguistic Inquiry 24:25-67. Depre/, Vivian and Amy Pierce. 1994. "Crosslmguislic Evidence lor Functional Projec"

tions in Early Child Grammar

.

In H. Clahsen (ed) Generative Perspectives on

Language Acquisition: Empirical Findings, Theoretical Considerations, and Cross' linguistic Comparisons. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: Benjamins. 57-K4. Dn>/d. Kenneth.F. 1996. The Syntax and Semantics of Xo in Child English. Paper presented at GALA 1997. Edinburgh. Dmzd. Kenneth. F. 1995. "Child English Pre-Sentential Negation as Metalinguistic Exclamatory- Sentence Se aUon". Journal of Child Language 22:5S.MilO,

Dmzd. Kenneth F. 1993. A Uniftcation Cafegorial Grammar of Child English Negaiion, PhD Dissertation. Univereity of Arizona. Tucson.

Fauconnier. Gillcs. 1975. "Pragmatic Scales and Logical Structures". Linguistic Inquiry 6: 353-375.

Greenfield. Patricia. M. and J.H. Smith. 1976. The Structure of Communication in Barhf Language Development. New York: Academic Press. Gnce. H. Paul. 1975. "Logic and Conversation". In P. Cole and J. Morgan (eds) Syntax and Semantics HI: Speeih Acts. New York: Academic Press. Hanush. Robert. 1976. "Logical Form and Implicature". In T.G. Bever. J.J. Kat/.. and D T Langendocn. eds. An integrated Theory of Linguistic Ahilitx. New York; .

.

Crowell. 464-479.

Hoekstra. Teun and Peter Jordens. 1994. "From Adjunct to Head". In T. Hockslra, and B D Schwartz (eds.) ijinguage Acquisition Studies In Generative Grammar. Amsterdam: Benjamins, pp. 119-149. Horn. Lawrence R. 1989. A Natural History o/ Negation. Chicago: Chicago University .

.

Press

MUTALINC.UIST1C SENTENCE NEGATION IN CHILD ENGLISH

Horn, Lawrence R. l1

77

. "The said and Ihc unsaid". In C. Barker and D Dowiy (cds)

SALT II: Proceedings from slw Secohd Conference on Semantics ami Unguistic

Theory, Ohu> State Wbiking Papers in Linguisiics No. 40. Cidumbus: Ohio Stitc Umversay. 163-192 Hummer. Pcler. Hein/ Wimmer and Gerlniud Anlcs. 1993. "On the Origins oi Denial

Negation". Jourhai ofChild Language 20:607-618. Ingram, David and Willkim Thompson. 19%. "Early Syntactic Acquisition in German:

Evidence For the Modal Hypothesis", limguage 72:97-120. Ilo, Kalsutoshi. 19HI. "Two Aspects of Negation in Child Language". In P.S. Dale and D

.

Ingram (cds.). Child Language: An InU'nnitionu! Perspective. Baltimore: Park

University Press. 105-113.

Jordens, Peter. 1996. "Negation in Child Language". Paper presented at the Structure of Learner Language Conference. Porto.

Keller-Cohen. Deborah. Karen C. Chalmer. and Jane E. Remlcr. 1979. "The Development of Discouise Negation in the Non-Native Child In E. Ochs and B. SchiclTcim "

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<eds.>. Dexelopmenuil Prawmuics. New York: Academic Press. Klima Edward S. and Ursula Beliugi. 1966. "Syntactic Regularities in (he Speech oi Children". In J. Lyons, and Roger J. Wales icds) Psychoiingmsiu Papers. Edinburgh: Edinhurgh University Press.

Levinson. Stephen. 1983; Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lust. Baibara, Marganla Suner. and John Whitman (cds). 1994. Heads, Pwjections. and LearnahUitx. New Jersev: Lawrence Erlbaum.

MacWhinney. Brian and Catherine Snow. 19H5. "The Child Language Data Bxcbange System". Journal of Child Lunxuage 12: 271-296. McNeill, David. 1970. The Acquisition of Language. New York: Harper and Row. Paric. Tschang-Zin. 1979. "Some facts on negation: Wode's four-stage developmental theory of negation revisited Journal of Child Language 9: 147-151. "

.

Paric, Tschang-Zin, 1981- The Deveiopmeni of Syntax in the Child With Special Reference la German. Innsbruck: AMO.

Pea, Roy. I9K0. "Logic in Early Child Language". Studies in Child Language and Multilingualism. New York: The New Yoric Academy of Sciences. 27-4.V Pea. Roy. 1982. "Origins of Verbal Logic: Spimtancous Denials by Two- and Three-Year Olds. Journal of Child Language 9:597-626. Pierce. Amy. 1992. Language Anpnsition and Syntactic Theory: A Comparative Analysis

ofFrench ami Bhgiish Child Grammars. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Radford. Andrew. PWO. Syntactic Theory and the Acquisition of English Syntax. OxUnd Blackwcll.

Smoc/ynska, Magdalena. I9S5. "The acquisition of Polish". In D.I. Slobm (cd> 77 ' Crosslmguistic Stud\ of Lntguage Acquisition. Volume I: The Data. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Slromswold, Kann J. 1990. U'arnahility and the Acquisition of Auxiliaries. Ph.D. dissertation. MIT.

78

KliNNETH F. DROZD

Volicrra. Virginia and l;ranccsca Anlinucci, 1979. "Ncgalion in Child Language: A

Ptagmatk Study. In E. Ochs and B. SchiclTchn (cds) Developmental Pra matks. New York: Academic Press. Weissenbom

Jiirgcn. I994. "Constraining the Child's Grammar: Local Wcll-Formcdness in the Development of Vert> Movement in German and French". In B. Lust. M. .

Suner and J. Whitman (cds.). 2I5-24K. Wcisscnbom

.

Jiirgcn. Maaikc Vcmps. and Ruth Berman. 1989. Negation as a window on

the structure of early child language, ms., hfijmegea and Tel Aviv. Wodc

.

Hcnning. 1977. "Four early slates in the development of LI negation". Journal of

Childlanguag* 4: K7-I02.

Lexical sensitivity in negative polarity verbs Gabriel Falkenberg**-

Four classes <»l negative polanty verbs in German Ibesidcs NPl-modals) arc distinguished by their semantic and syntaciic properties: abstenlives, allrac-

livcs. pnvalivcs and ±carc-veibs. Relevant factors identified arc factivity and counlcrtactivity, gencndi/cd implicalurc as a lexical process, and litotes. Abstenlives and altractives arc semantic mirror-images of one another, and share with ±carc-verbs ihe import of a conveyed alTcclivc altitude. An attempt is made at elucidating the semantic mechanism by which it is the modal of possibility that comes to cluster together with verbal NPl-phrases.

Introduction

I report here some lindings of a study of a rather neglected area of negative polarity items (NPIs) in German, namely negative polarity verbs. Compared to negation reinforcers (like Engl. at all. whatsoever. Dutch am de dood.

Germ, iiberhaup!. gaf), polarity-sensitive indelinites (like Engl. ever, any, Dutch enig. Germ, je. jemals) and scalar particles (like Engl. even, Dutch ook maar. Germ. (ein)mal. aiuh nur), this is a group of NPIs that has not received much attention in any language so far. From the literature one might easily gain the impression that there exist only a handful of these items (lirsl and foremost the modal hrauchen. like Engl. need. Dutch hoeven). the rest being idioms. But in fact, the number of NPI-verbs and

verb clusters is surprisingly large, and repays careful scrutiny.1 It is known that NPI-verbs may violate some requirements that other NPIs observe, i.e. precedence and c-command at surface structure (Hoeksema 2000): a number of current approaches to negative polarity faces serious problems simply in capturing these verbs, let alone in describing and explaining their peculiar behaviour. A closer look at them might therefore be rewarding.

GABRIEL PALKENBERGt

SII

The main inicresl behind my descriptive undertaking is the so-called (Israel 1996:622)

Sensitivity Problem: What is it that makes certain words and phrases sensitive to the presence of triggers? (and how is this to be represented lexically?) The particular hypothesis that I pursue is that NPI-vcrbs do not share one single property that makes them susceptible to negative polarity, but that they fall into natural subclasses whose semantic and syntactic behaviour is to be explained separately. So far I have been able to identify four subclasses of NPI-verbs (besides the well-known brauchen/need cases, which I deliber-

ately ignore here, in the main).2 They will be called: -

-

-

verbs of abstention verbs of attraction

verbs of privation impersonal "care"-verbs.

(Note that these terms denote verbs without their licensers: verbs or whole verb clusters in construction

with their licensers will

"

be called

NPI-

"

phrases ) I will comment on the behaviour of these verbs in the order given above. One additional problem that will concern me is the tendency of many of these not only in German, but in Dutch. English and other languages as well to form idiom clusters together with the standard modal of possibility. As a simple diagnostic for NPIs I regard the non-wellformedness of declarative sentences containing the item but no negator (or other downward entailing operator), the well-formedness of declarative sentences containing the item together with a negator (or another lexical trigger), and the wellformedness of simple yes/no-interrogatives or the protasis both containing the item (but no lexical trigger): .

(1)

a.

Er braucht zu kommen 44 He need come

b

c

.

.

Er braucht nicht'selten/kaum zu kommen

He need not/seldom/hardly come* Braucht er morgen zu kommen? '

Need he come tomorrow?*

LliXICAL SENSITIVITY IN NTGATlVIi POLARITY VERBS

d

.

81

Fiills er wirklich zu kommcn braucht. so... In case he reallv need come. ..."

1

.

Abstentive predicates

The first group of negative polarity verbs contains verbs and verb clusters

governing /-inlinilival clauses:3 (2)

Predicates of abstention a

.

anstehen

b

sich enthallen kcinnen

c

.

hesilate' '

'

to refrain from

sich entmuligen lassen

lei oneself be discouraged'

d

ermiiden

tire of

e

erwiirtea'abwarlen konnen

can wail

umhin konnen

can avoid

.

.

.

f

.

g

vcrfehlen

h

sich zuriickhalten konnen

-

.

'

.

4

fail"

can restrain oneself

"

In the following sections. I discuss some properties of abstentive predicates, all of which select animate grammatical subjects. I I .

Used transitively, not governing a second infinitive, some of these predicates can occur out of NPI-contexts, loo. with only a slight change in meaning. Thus one can say: (3)

b.

Er enthielt sich (der Stimme)

He abstained (from voting)' d

.

Er crmiidete sic He made her tired'

g

.

Er verfehlie das Ziel

He missed the target'. (Cf. Edmondson (1983:55) on ihe "divided categorial loyally" of German hraucben.) Incidenllv. some of the predicates under (2> can have a borderline non-NPI-use governing the infinitive, but only contrasiivcly and under ellipsis:

S2

GABRlliL l Al.Kl NUKRC.t

(41

h.

ER konnte sich He could

nicht /.uriickhaltcn. sic zu kiisscn.

himself not

hold-buck.

her to kis>.

aber ICH konmc but

1

could

HE couldn't restrain himself from kissing her. but I could'was able to h

"

.

*

"Er konmc sich nicht ZURUCKhalicn. sic ni kiisscn. aber ich

KONNTE/ konnte mich ZUROCKhaltcn -

He couldn't RESTRAIN himself from kissing her. but I COULD/could RESTRAIN mysdl

One reason for the well-formedncsN of (4h) >ccms to be that ellipsis appears to ignore poLiiii\ Ncnsm\ ii\. not only here but with nonverbal NPIs as well: <>i

Neither of those solutions will cost us anything, but this one will Icost us something. * anything |.

Focus coostntCtUMUi apart, the syntactic property of governing a / inlinitival phrase and the related one of 2-marking a dependent proposition is clearly tied to abstentives in their specific NPI-use. The following is a general fact about three of the four groups of NPI-verbs to be considered in this paper (excepted are the privative verbs I: They are non-NTIs if used transitively. and NTIn it ihcy govern a infinitival complement (never the other way round). I will contribute something to a possible explanation of this fact later (in §4). i: .

An interesting property of NPI-predicates ol abstention is (hat they do not seem to permit other NPIs in their infinitival complements: (6)

.i.

"Er konnte sich nicht /.uriickhaltcn. auch He could

self not

withhold.

nur

even

cin Wort zu sagen. one word to speak. He couldn't e r frain from speaking even one word.' b

.

'kh kann nicht umhm. ;in/unehmen. dab auch

I

can

not

around, to assume,

ein Buch gelesen w urde. one book was

read.

that even

nur

LIIXICAL SENSITIVITY IN Nl-GATIVK POLARITY VERBS

v;

The added NF Is (primed in bold type) are within the scope of a negator, by which they can. in principle, be licensed even from a higher clause. However, the combination of a negator with a verb of abstention in the matrix clause as in (6) creates rather unfavourable circumstances for NPIs to occur in the

complement. This is, contrary to first impression, not easy to explain. One might speculate that the litotes destroys the semantic basis for NPI-licensing, since (in non-negative concord contexts) two negations cancel each others out, yielding an aflirmativc statement. But we will see that this explanation falls short, since other NPl verbs do permit, in otherwise identical circum stances, non-verbal NPIs in their complements (sec §2.3). 13 .

Approximate non-NPI counterparts of the predicates under (2) are given in:

(7)

a.

/.ogem '

to hesitate

'

b

.

beherrschen (konnen) to control oneself

"

c

.

den Mut verliercn to lose heart

'

d

.

1

'

miide werden

to tire/get weary of

"

e

.

J

,

die Geduld haben '

f

to be patient sich veranlaBl/gezwungen sehen to feel compelled/obliged'

.

'

g

.

versiiumen "

to fail to do

"

h

.

sich beherrschen (konnen)

to stop oneself from/to control oneself.

"

The English phrases here are sometimes only glosses, as some of the English verbs cannot govern an infinite phrase. In English, verbs of abstention anyway do not seem to have the clear NPI-character that their German counterparts show.

S4

14 .

GABRIEL PALKENBERG1

Some descriptive semantics

The corresponding pairs in (2> and (7) are semantical

minimal pairs in that

the members of each pair are near-synonymous, with the essential qualification thai the first member has something extra in its distribution that requires MM licensing. The following points are worth noting. All NPI-phrases involving predicates in {2> arc factive or veridical in the following sense; (For simplicity, we will assume here that the licenser is a negator.) Any such sentence of the form '

(8)

a.

A + NEG + NPI Verb (PAST) + Verb Phrase (INHNITIVI )

logically entails a sentence of the form: '

a

.

A + Verb Phrase (PAST).

(The letter A stands for the grammatical subject denoting an animate creature.) Thus, the sentence (9h) logically entails (91 ): (9)

h.

Er konnte sich nichl zuriickhalten. sic zu kiissen

He couldn't restrain himself from kissing her' '

h

.

Er kiiBte sie He kissed her'

and likewise for the other predicates under (2). The import of what I have called the entire NPI-phrase (i.e. the abstendve predicate plus its trigger) may be paraphrased roughly as 'feeling some

strong INCLINATION or affective urge / toward doing Verb Phrase\ it being understood that this inclination was causally ellicacious for the situation denoted by Verb Phrase (the situation denoted can be an event, a process. maybe even a slate). In other words: It would have been very diilicull for A to withstand the lendencv to do what he did.

How does this semantic import come about? By the usual Griccan mechanism of generalized implicature, 1 assume: If someone is said not

simply to be doing something, but not abstaining from doing it. there must be a reason for this roundabout way of putting it. One reason at hand is that the person spoken about is strongly drawn lo it. has a strong inclination or urge towards doing what he did. and this is just what is being implicated. So the abstentive NPI-phrases have roughly the common reading:

LHXICAL SENSITIVITY IN NEGATIVE POLARITY VERBS

(10)

85

Scmanlic import of entire abstcnlive NPl-phrases:

3 (the doing of Verb Phrase) A note on pragmatics may be in order here: The part of the meaning of abstenlive NPI phrases given in (10) seems to be responsible for their evaluative use, since another available selective paraphrase of whole utterances containing them is of the following structure: (11)

Pragmatic import of abstenlive NPI-phrases:

[A + Verb Phrase] & (P (the doing of Verb Phrase by A)], where P is some evaluative property such as INAI'PROPRIATU- STUPID, PAINFUL. D1STRHSSING, TACTLESS, TIRING. ClC,

15 .

Lieensing

The predicates under (2) are by their very nature scope-insensitive, i.e. they have, being predicates, no scope, just like the modal bratuhen (or their analogues in other languages like need, falloir.potrzehujec. etc.). This means that they are not to he analysed as quantifiers, a claim which 1 have no space

to defend here. Licensers of abstentives are semantically weak (in the sense of Zwarts 19%). i.e.. downward monotonic.

In contrast to hrauchen. however I where the licenser may be in a higher clause, e.g. Ich glauhe nicht. dafi jemand meint. dap du zu gehen hramhsr). abstentive NPIs appear to require clause-mate licensers: (12)

a. - Ich glaube nicht, daB er ermiidele sie mit Beweisen I

believe not

that he tired

her with tokens

seiner Zuneigung zu uberschUtten of-his alfection

to shower

I don't believe thai he got weary of showering her with '

tokens of his alfection b

.

'*Ich glaube nicht, daB er sich I

believe not

enthalten konnte. zu essen.

that he himself withhold could

to eat

I don't believe that he could refrain from eating' However, ill-formed sentences such as these clearly improve when NPIs such as jentals ever which accept long-distance triggering are inserted as "

"

clausematcs of the NPI-verb:

GABRIIZL FALKUNBHRG:

(13)

Ich glaubc nichl daB cr jemals crmiideic sic mit Beweisen seiner Zuneigung zu ubcrschullen. i don't believe that he ever tired of showering her with tokens '

of his aU ection

'

This phenomenon might be described as a boosting ellect of long-distance NPIs on neighbouring non-long-distance NPIs (in this case, NPI-verbs). I confess that I do not. at the moment, understand the interaction of the factors at work here.

The observation above that some NPI-verbs such as brauchen accept non clause-malc licensers and others such as the abstcntives do not (or do

only under very special circumstances) supports the view that the licensing relation for NPIs, even for subtypes of NPIs. is not uniform within a given language, but varies with subtypes of NPIs. 16 .

Most of the verbs under (2) have a tendency to cluster together with their licensers into idiom-like phrases involving the modal konnen. Wc will come back to this conspicuous tendency later, since it is not limited to abstcntives (see §5). It is exemplified even more clearly by the following, second group of NPI-predicates.

2

.

Predicates of attraction

The second group of negative polarity predicates covers verbs and verb clusters with a dill erent basic meaning from the ones in (2) but also governing zu-Hifinidval clauses: '

(14)

Predicates of attraction a

.

ausslehen konnen '

b

.

can abide

"

dulden brook, stand for'

"

c

.

d

.

sich entbloden

be ashamed'6 sich getrauen to trust oneself, to dare

*

LI-XICAL SENSITIVITY IN NTGATIVE POLARITY VERBS

e

.

haben konncn can stand

'

f

87

'

leiden konncn

.

'

can bear, can stand

'

g

.

es iibcr sich bringcn can bring oneself to es libers Hcrz bringen '

'

h

.

have the heart'

'

i

sich uberwinden konnen

.

can brine oneself to

'

j

'

sich dazu verstehen konnen

.

'

k

.

can agree to verlragcn

tolerate, sulfer

L

'

zulasscn '

allow

All predicates in (14) select animate subjects. As can be seen from the English translations given, many verbs and verb clusters of attraction are

NPFs in English its well (e.g. cm abide, can bear, can bring oneself, can stand, can rake, have the heart, put up with, as well as brook and perhaps dare). This appears to distinguish atlraclives from abstentives (§1.3). 21 .

Like the abstentives. however, predicates of attraction can sometimes occur transitively out of NPI-contexts, with only a slight change in meaning. Thus one can say:

(15)

f.

Er kann sie gut leiden He likes/is fond of her"

T

.

Sie vertragt viel She can stand/take a lot'

S8

GABRIEL FALKHNBHRG .

22 .

Approximate non-NPI counterparts of NPl-predicates of attraction are: (16)

a.

aushalten konnen to bear/stand

b

.

'

lolcriercn, es zulassen '

to admit, tolerate

'

c

.

d

.

sich trauen '

to dare, have the courage to

'

c

mogen '

to like/love to

sich trauen/wagen

t

.

'

to trust oneself to. to dare to

g

.

sich ein Her/ fassen und ... to take hcarf

'

h

.

sich uberwindcn und ... '

'

to overcome one s inclination

'

i

sich einverslanden crkliiren mil

.

to agree to crtragcn

j

.

'

to bear/endure k

.

'

geslalten. erlauben to allow, permit '

'

.

23

An interesting property of NPI-predicatcs of abstention is that they do permit other NPIs in their complements: (17)

Er konnte es nicht ubers Her/, bringen. auch nur ein Wort zu sagen.

He didn't have the heart to say even a single word'. This fact rules out the easy way of explaining the non-occurrence of NPI s in clauses dependent on higher "double-negation" constructions that we mentioned earlier (§1.2). since here we have a clear case where litotes in

LEXICAL SENSITIVITY IN NEGATIVE POLARITY VERBS

89

ihc higher clause is compatible with an additional NPI in the infinitive complement. Thus the negator nh hr seems to do double licensing duty here, triggering the neighbouring NPI-clusier ttben Her: briHgen as well as the scalar NPI unit ouch nur in the dependent clauM 24 .

NPI phrases involving predicates of attraction in (14) are. in contradistinction to those of abstention, either COUNTIiRi.u IIVE uuuifactive> or else

afaclive (nonfaclive). For simplicity, let us again assume in what follows that the licenser is a negator, not one of those other downward monolonic items. Phrases inolving (I4d. g k) are counterfactive: Any such sentence of the form (18)

a.

A + NEG + NPI-VW* (past) + VnhPhra.sc ijnhnjnm *

logically entails a sentence of the form: a . A + NEG + Verb Phrase (PAST). Thus, the sentence

(19)

Ich getraute mich nicht. mcin Friihstiick ni beenden I did not dare to finish my breakfast'

logically entails (19 )

Ich beendete mein FrUhsliick nicht

I did not linish my breakfast1

'

and likewise for the other examples except (14c). The rest of the NPI-phrases (14a, b.e f. 1) are afactive: note the invariably habitual sense of these. The import of attraction NPI phrases, be they counter or afactive. may

be paraphrased roughly as 'feeling some strong repulsion or allective counter-urge ./ against doing Verb Phrase, it being understood that this repulsion was causally eflicacious for the non-occurrence of the situation denoted by Verb Phrase. (The non happening of events can surely have causes.)8 In other words: It would have been dillicult for A to overcome the

tendency to abstain doing from what he did abstain from doing. This semantic import is. again, assumed to come about by the usual Gricean mechanism of generalized implicature: If someone is said not simply to be not doing something, but not to be attracted towards doing it, there

90

GABRIUL FALKI-NBHRCm

must be a reason for this round-about way of putting it. One reason at hand is that the person spoken about is strongly drawn away from it, has a strong disinclination or counter-urge not to do doing what he did not do, and this is just what is being implicated. The attraction NPl-phrases then have roughly the common reading: (20)

Semantic impon of entire attraction NPI-phrases:

3 (the doing of Verb Phrase),

-

Clearly, the two groups of NPl verbs hitherto discussed, i.e. (2> and (19). turn out to be semantic mirror-images of one another. We will avail our selves of this symmetry later, in an attempt at explaining the specific tendency of NPI-verbs to cluster and form idioms (sec under 26).

3

.

Predicates of privation

A third subgroup of negative polarity predicates consists of those expressing a lack (in German mostly with the prefixes ent- or er* and governing the

genitive case):9 (21)

Predicates qfpriyation a

.

b

.

cntbehren (impersonal) lack, be devoid of10 entheben (impersonal) '

absolve c

.

entraten konnen '

can dispense with entschlagen to relinquish '

d

.

"

e

.

sich ent/ichen to withdraw from

'

f

'

ermangeln

.

Mack'

g

.

sich erwehren konnen

to be able to ward oft

This morphologically and semantically quite uniform group is not productive in German anymore: hence the archaic style of some of the predicates,

91

LEXICAL SLNSITIV1TY IN NLGATIVE POLARITY VERBS

especially (21c) and (d) which are on the verge of dying out. Thai the prefix ent- was once reversalive in these examples is no longer fell by speakers of modern German. The common semantics of NPl-predicaies of privation is simply: (22)

- HAVE (M. S

)

.

n

By negating this (if, as we again assume, the licenser is a negator) and via double negation elimination we get the core semantics of the NPl-privatives plus trigger:

(23)

Semantics of entire privative NPl-phrases: have (M, N

)

.

With all three groups of NPLpredicates so far discussed (2, 14, and 21) we discern an original LiTOTifS-consiruction i.e. a pragmatically preferred.

roundabout way of expressing an afiumative state of alfairs by means of double negation (cf. van der Wouden 1997: §111.3) that has evolved into a full-blooded grammatical constraint: the non-verbintegral pait of the double negation is turned into an NPI-licenser. Put more generally: a non-verb integral downward monotonic element is turned into an NPMicenser. Details remain to be explored and are a fascinating topic for further diachronic study.

4

.

Verbs of care

A last group either to be 2-marking a complement.

of NPI-verbs consists of impersonal verbs (with the meaning troubled', 'to bother' or to like', 'to care') governing and personal object (accusative or dative) and a propositional Provisionally, I call them impersonal ±cfliv vcibs:

'

(24)

"

-

a.

itch"

jucken

[it does not itch me that S = 1 don t care that S| '

b

kummern

c

kral/.en

.

.

bother' '

scratch

'

scheren

concern

e

schmecken

taste

verschlagen

matter

.

f

.

.

|similar to itch, cf. a above 'i

d

'

'

(Compare Engl. mimlh arethather. Dutch kunnen schelen. and many other related verbs and verb clusters.) Some of these arc originally verbs denoting

92

GABRIMl. IvVLKhNHKKCM

physical sensations
extended sense to express repulsion or concern. There are quite a number of these mctonymic NPl-verbs in German, especially in colloquial speech and in dialects.

As with abstentives. NPI phrases containing verbs expressing repulsion <such as 24a. c) are factivc: but. those containing verbs expressing personal concern (such as 24b. d. e) are either factive

unlike the otherwise

scmantically related attractives ($2) or else counterfaclive or afactive depending on the specific complementizer {dqfi/wenn}. This is one of the reasons why I have so far refrained from subsuming the verbs in (24) under the first two groups of NPl-predicates, another reason being their dilfcrent syntactic form. But comparing these verbs to our first two groups of abstentives and attractives. we find the same general semantic import expressed here, namely |± inclination /]. I state this only as a fact to be explained: Of the four groups of NPl-verbs presented in this paper, three the still productive groups have as their semantic import an aFFECTIVI- ATTITUDE of inclination or disinclination. (This is clearly related to the fact that they generally

.

2-mark

an animate subject and a propositional complement and. presumably. ,

related to their mtensionality as well.) But the theoretical significance of this fact and the related polar structure of subgroups of NPI-predicalcs (abstentives versus attractives. +can versus -care verbs etc.) needs to be further ,

investigated in relation to the mechanism of negation and polarity in general.

5

.

Conclusion

The remarks on licensing from §1.5 carry over to the other classes of NPI-predicates: All of them are scopeless and require weak clausemale licensers. (In some cases, as in (I4f). licensing from a higher clauses is also permitted: and there are ill-understood examples like (13>) Clausemaleness seems to constitute one of the reasons why licensers and their licensees tend to fuse or cluster into compact, idiom-like constructions here, especially if one particular lexeme in the group of licensers gams predominance in use (Only when a lexeme becomes fully integrated into the NPI it licenses and no other negative or downward monoionic licenser is possible - as perhaps in Ichkannmn nu ht kaum/* st hwer hi'lfen.aher 'I cannot help myself, but" .

LEXICAL SENSITIVITY IN NLGATIVE POLARITY VERBS

93

the whole construction has to be counted as an idiom. In nearly all of the w

German examples discussed here, on the other hand, there is a fair amount of lexical variability in the licensing unit. The line between fully idiomatic. partly idiomatic and nonidiomatic items is, of course, not always easy to draw.)

To conclude my paper. I come back to the puzzling nature of the interaction of NP1 verbs with the modals. Adding a modal of POSSIBILITY is often connected with something turning into an NPl-phrase. as we have seen (of. examples 2b. e-f. h: 14a, e-f. i-k; 21c. g). Consider also: (25)

a.

Es schadet, wenn du...

It does no good, if you Es kann nur/nichls schaden. wenn du ... "

'

b

Es kann schaden, wenn du ... Ich entschloB mich, zu warten

.

I decided to wait' kh konntc mich nicht entschlieBen. zu warten I could not decide to waif *

c

.

Ich konnte mich entschlieBen, zu warten Ich sah es mil an. wie ...

I stood by and watched how Ich kann es nicht liinger mit ansehen! 1 can't stand by any longer and watch that!* Ich kann es linger mit ansehen "

Ich kann das nicht ab (coll.) 1 can't stand that' Mch kann das ab.

Of the NPI-predicates listed in the appendix, nearly a third are verb clusters containing the standard modal of possibility (in German, the verb kiinnen). Since this is a general fact about cluster and idiom formation in German, as well as in Dutch and English, it needs a general answer. First, I outline an answer for class (2), the abstentives, drawing on the partial insights achieved earlier: second. 1 sketch a solution including the other classes. In all cases, the explanation attempted will be given in purely semantic terms. There is no litotes involving an abstentive without the semantic import of inclination (via the Gncean mechanism as shown in §1.4). This imporl of inclination is interpreted as nhcessity ("he had to', she must have', as we say about one who is strongly drawn towards something), and re-expressed

94

GABRIEL FALKILNBERG:

'

not possibly not relying on the familiar equivalence expressed as C p <=> 0 P
as -

,

"

'

,

resistance or hate:

(26)

Generalized implicature (->): abstain (= -* do)

"

.

-

.

be inclined

be attracted ~> be -.inclined.

Disinclination is interpreted as necessity (of something negated) and reexpressed as not possibly using another equivalence familiar from modal logic: -.p = -"0 PIn the case of privalives (21). negation is already integral to the verb meaning: apart from that, the same reasoning as above applies to these predicates, on condition that they are personal (impersonal verbs like (2Ia-b, f) are by their nature excluded from this modal clustering process). '

'

,

Acknowledgments The research reported here was supported by the German National Research Society (Deutsche l oischungscemeinschafO.SFB 2S2 (Thcorie des Lcxikon&l. For comments and discussion. 1 am indebted to Werner Abraham, Joachim Jacobs, Bill Ladusaw. Jurgen Pafel, Dieter Wunderlich, I

-

Mr.s Avaris. .....J L-..k I .< ck-jn..i M v.bMi I j!--

.

-wc DK .:

the ttbgervatkHM In DHtCh

Thanks go to Colin Foskett for checking my English.

Notes l

.

1 lu\e appended an alplubetie list at the end of this article of all the German Vttfltt and verb dtttta discussed ih mentioned here, comprising some fifty items, h is not diblMd to he complete.

LHXICAL SENSITIVITY IN NTGATIVH POLARITY VERBS

2

.

'

)5

F<>r ihcsc. compare Ednumdson (1 9SJ)C EhiflWy 1191U): Lau ilWi. van dcr Wowkn un .

appear). 3

.

Some ol ihc examples following in Ihc text are drawn from work* at liieraiurc. I have added traaslations ol my own: it is to Nr kepi in mind however, thai in translatinc NPIs Ihcir special polarity flavour is usually lost. ,

4

.

It was pointed out lo me that in Dutch, the Ivhaviour ol the related pair Mf uo>\JrH:Yt'rnuH'ien is exactly the reverse ol ihc German counterpart: in Dutch. Ihc former is an NfM. ihc latter not: Hei vermocMSe mij tniel) Der Zanherheri> te Ic/en It did mrt) exhaust me to read TJw Mnw Shnmuun

Elia werd met xxmk de Heer te pnj/en l lijah kept on pndsing the Lord' EUfl werd moe dc Hcer tc prijzen <m>nidiomatic: 'got weary oi l Blijah g(»i tired of praising the Lord". .

'

This indicates how subtly dilfereni the mads to grammaticuh/ation
.

For a more general discussion of lactivity
factivity and counlcriactivity (relcvanl here in $1A} is also given there. 6

.

Although this verh originally belongs to the group of attraction predicates, it has somehow ended up in the Bnrt gmup tabstentives). since the NPI-phrase |M nuht entbUnlen :u is now clearly t activc in the sense of (8). and also has the pragmatic import given in (III: in both it '

would be unique within the gmup ol attractives

.

7

.

Compare preceding footnote. We have not included the countertactive (15ml in our summary description either, since it is the onlv altraclion NPI-verb that may lake a non-animalc grammatical subject.

8

Rcadeni who are inclined to doubt this may consult Vcrma/en U985).

9

One verb excluded here, governing a (/ -complement. is vrrhehlen in conceal", its second participle exists only either with a negative prclix: unwrhohlrn 'unconcealed, undisguised. open or else together w ith the downward monotonic ham 'hatch': nut kaum vvrhohlencr

.

.

'

Sthadenfmuie "with barely concealed glee".

10. EntMimt as well as thttangtln (fi arc also possible without ;ui NPMicenser. co-nccunng instead with an universally quantilicational cleiiKnt like jeder "any" or allf 'ttt'lDoi fiuhehn ivdn GrwulUw That is without any foundation'. Das erwanxeU alien xesumkn Stemihenrerstamies That shows a complete lack of common sense". '

11.

Examples of these may nowadays be found in highbrow academic writing. particularl> by authors slavishly imitating the literary style ol one of the founders of the Pranklun School of Critical Philosophy.

12. I have excluded here impersonal predicates with the meaning lo be useful' and "to be lobhgatory governing a prx>posiiional complement such as in et andrrt. hrin i, hilft. macht, "

nut:/, etc. nn hn

.

wenwdap... or in ts gchi nkht an. kommt gar nii hi in Fra e. ktmimt gar nicht

in die Tiae.dafi... (some of which are NPI-idioms). Ultimately, it seems that the> would have to be merged w ith the gmup <24) above. That list is not complete

.

GABRIEL FALKENBERG1

Appendix A list ofGerman NPI-prcdicatcs
5

abwaitcn konncn * is\ 2

1.0

ansiehen + iNf 2

1.0

cs iinden + daikwenn

I. Joi>tmne 12

ausstehen konncn +iN»2.,da&,wenn

2.0

brauchen + isil

0, I.I. 13

cs bringi + daB/wenn

4, foodMCc 12

dulden + iM-i daC/wenn

2.0

entbehren (imp.) 4 iQBH

3, loointnc 10

skfa entblodcn + isil

2.0, lootmne 6

skh enthaltcn konncn + ini2

1.0

cs enihebt * akk + OtN

3

skh entmutigen lassen + im 2

1.0

emratcn konncn + gi.n

2t

entschlapcn + gkn

3

skh entSchKcBcn konncn . im2

5

sich enizichcn + uai

?

emwehrcn (sec under crwchien) crmangcln + GEK

3, loolnotc 10

ermuden + IN 2

1.0. 1.5

crwarten konncn + im 2

1.0

sich cnvchrcn konncn + GEN

3

cs fchll vie! + daU/und

3. fooCDQte 9

cs gehl an + daB/wcnn

4, lootmne 12

sich gctraucn + ink2

2.0. 2.4

hahen konncn + iNi-2<'daB/\venn

2.0

cs hilfl + dalVwcnn

4. footnote 12

cs juckl - akk + daU'wenn

4

cs kommt in FragC + d;ili

4. footnote 12

es kommt in die Tule + daB

4. footnote 12

cs krai/l + akk + daB-vvcnn

4

cs kumn>en

4

akk + daB/wenn

iciden konncn * iM2Avenn

2.0. cf.2.1

cs macht + daB.wcnn

4, footnote 12

cs ma anschen konncn + wic

5

cs nuui + daB/wenn

4, footnole 12

schaden konncn + wenn

5

sich schercn urn + akk

4, footnote 13

os sebert * akk + daB/wenn

4

cs sduneckl + oai + daLVwcnn

4

LEXICAL SENSITIVITY IN NEGATIVE POLARITY VERBS

cs ubcr sich bringcn + ini 2

20

os ubcrs Hen briniron + inf2

2 0 2.3

sich ubcrwimJcn konncn + im2

20

sich da/u vcrsiehcn konncn

20

97

.

.

ini 2

.

.

.

umhin konncn + IKP2

10

vcrfchlcn + im 2

I O.cf I.I

.

.

.

vcrhchlcn + daii

3 toolnoic

cs venchlfigl + DAI + daB/wcnn

4

cs venragen + iM2 wcnn

2 0 cf.2.1

cs zulass-cn + im2. iLiO

20

sich zuruckhaltcn konncn + ink2

1 0 1.2. 1.4

,

'

'

.

.

.

.

.

References

Dulllcv. P.J. ll>l)4. Need & dare: ihc black sheep of the modal family. Uu ua 94. 213-41

EdnKmdsoh. J.A. 1983- Polariascd auxiliaries. In: i:. Hcny/B. Richard (Eds.). Un uistu categories: AiLxdiaries and related puzzles I. Dordrecht: Rcidel, 49-68. Ealkcnberg. G. I*)*)?. Sinn. Bedeutun$. Iniensionalitdt: der Fregesehe UV if. Tubingen: .

Mohr.

Hockscma. J. 20(KK C-commund. scope and (he Iri gerihg <>l polarity ilcms. In: L. Horn/Y. Kato (Eds) Negation and Polarity Syntactic and semantic perspectives. Oxford: Oxford Univereilv Press. 115-146.

Israel. M. I996. Polanly sensitivity as lexical semantics. Linguistics and Philosophx W, 619-66.

Ladusaw, W. A. 1996. Negation and polarity items. In: S. Lappm (Ed.). The llandlyintk of contenifwrary semantic theory. Oxford: Blackwell. 321-41, l cnz. B. 1997. Wie brauchen ins dcutsche Modalverb-Systcm geriet and wclche Rollc cs darin spicll. BeiirSge zur Geschichte derdeuischen Sprache andLuerajur 11S.. . 19% .

11997). 393-422. B. 19S5. Negative acts. In B. Vermazca'M.B. Hintikku (Eds.). Essays on

Vermazen

.

Davidson: Actions and events. Oxford: Clarendon. 9. -104. Wouden

.

\V«>udcn

.

T. vjn der. 1997, ftegattye conie.xis. London: Rimtledge. T. van der. To appear. Three modal verbs. To appear m the proceedings of the

conference The Cicrmanic Vert).

Zwarts. F. 19%. A hierarchy of negative expressions. In: H. Wansmg (Ed.). Negation: A notion in focus. Berlin: de Gruyter, 169-94

Varieties of polarity items and the (non)veridicality hypothesis Anastasia Giannakidou

Ri/ksuniversiteit Gronm vn

Overture

The literature on polarity items (Pis) assumes thai Pis form a more or less homogeneous class of expressions whose distribution is restricled by condi-

tions which must appeal to some kind of polarization (negation or afirmation) for wellformedness. Any, for example, can occur in a negative sentence but is excluded in its aliirmative counterpart as we see in (I): (11

a. b

.

I didn't buy any books. M bought any books.

Although the situation in \ I > may be interpreted in favor of a distributional constraint on any based on (negative) polarity, there are grammatical occurrences of this item which do not support a polarity-based generalization. This is illustrated in (2) where my is found in an interrogative, an

imperative, and in the scope of a modal and an inlcnsional verb: (2)

a. b

.

c

.

d

.

Did you find any interesting books? Pick any apple! He might come any moment now. I insist vou allow anyone in. w

w

The environments in (2) are clearly non-polar, yet my is grammatical. In order to account for any and remain faithful to the polarity generalization at the same time, we must invoke lexical ambiguity between a polarity sensitive

100

ANASTASIA GI AN N A KI DO U

and i\ free choice any. as in Ladusaw (1979). Carlson (1981). and argue thai although both anys are expressions of limited distribution, only the former is subject to a polarity dependency. Alternatively, we may envision any as a uniform lexical paradigm whose distribution does not involve polarity at all and seek the licensing potential elsewhere, as is done in Kadmon and Landman (1993). Horn and Lee (1994). Dayal (1995), and Zwarts (1995) among others. Crucially, either way of dealing with the issue entails giving up the idea that Pi-dependencies must be conceptualized as merely relating to negation or allirmaiion. and whicliever avenue wc may choose to account lor any. we must implicitly assume that there are instances of limited distribution expressions which do not involve negation or allirmation in any obvious sense. In this paper I build on the supposition that the set of limited distribution phenomena grouped under the label "polarity need not be conceptualized as involving polarity in the sense of negation (or downward entailment) or allirmation. by discussing the constraints on the distribution of certain Pi-paradigms in Greek. Polarity sensitivity will be treated in terms of lu ensing and anti-liceming dependencies, and four distinct paradigms of Pis will be identified all of which will be argued to be semanlically dependent on the property of nom eridicahty. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 I lay out the basic tools of the theory of polarity sensitivity 1 will be assuming. In Sections 2, 3 and 4 I present the Greek data and draw the proper distinctions among the "

,

ditferent classes. In Section 2 1 discuss affective polarity items, in Section 4 1 focus on the negative dependency to veridicality involved in free-choice items and view it as a submanifestation of the broader nom endu al dependency. and tinally in Section 4 I discuss mood alternation in restrictive relative clauses as another manifestation of polarity. Finally, in Section 5 I

suggest that anti-locality effects in Pl-licensing may be given a semantic treatment as cases of multiple sensitivity.

L

General framework

Central to the recent research on the semantics of quantitkational phrases

(QPs) is the issue of QP-interpretation: in particular, the questions of what drives QP interpretation and what determines the scopal behavior of various types of QPs. A substantial part of the relevant literature seems to agree that

POLARITY ITEMS AND THE (NON)VERIDICALITY HYPOTHESIS

101

COOStraintS on the inlerprclalion of QPs pose rcslriclions on ihcir distribulion (cf. Farkas 1985. 1997: Beghelli and Slowell 1997 and Szabolcsi 1997). In Giann;ikidou (1997. 1998. 1999). 1 capitalize on this insight and apply it to the analysis of Pis. Among other things, the theory I propose subsumes a particular view on the licensing (or ami-licensing) of Pis and on the issue of scope. I summarize the main points below. I

.

I LU ensinf; and anii-IU ensing

Polarity sensitivity is a heterogeneous domain of various types of semanru-

dependencies. We can envision Pis as sensitive expressions, dehned as in (3): (3)

Definition 1 (Polarity item). A linguistic expression a is a polarity item ill" (i) The distribution of a is limited by sensitivity to some semantic property (3 of the context of appearance, and (ii) is uionlvcridicality or a subproperty thereof.

The repertoire of Pis includes various kinds of sensitive expressions: negative polarity items, free choice items, positive polarity items (PPls). and mood alternation in relative clauses. In Giannakidou 1998 I argued that these polarity dependencies are all manifestations of sensitivity to (nonjveridicality. It is impo. ible to reproduce the whole array of facts and the discussion in the present paper, but I will try to provide an adequate description of the empirical and theoretical motivations for the (non)veridicality turn. Sensitivity in Pis is the source of limited distribution: sensitive expressions are semantically deficient": they cannot be interpreted in every environment, but only in those environments which fulfill their interpretative demands. As sensitive expressions. Pis are thus dependent on semantic features of the context for grammalicality. This is the view of sensitivity encoded in the definition of SEMANTIC DBPENDENGY given in (4): "

(4)

Definition 2 (Semantic dependency) A linguistic expression a is semantically dependent on a property 3 ilf a can be properly interpreted only if a certain relation R holds between a and something with the property p.

A similar intuition is voiced in Tovena's (1996) claim that sensitivity determines the licit interpretations for Pis in various contexts. R can be

102

ANASTASIA GIANNAKIDOl'

viewed as a positive or as a negative relation. Positively. R can be regarded as an attraction relation in which case sensitivity and the ensuing semantic dependency, are reduced to a licensing requirement. Negatively. R can be envisioned as an AVOIDANCE or allergy relation. In this case, semantic dependency should be encoded as an anti-licensing requirement. Either relation is taken to hold in the context ol appearance c. Below. I illustrate the general schemata for both types of conditions: "

"

(5)

Definition 3 (Licensing) (i) A polarity item a is said to be "licensed" by a property (3 ilF as proper interpretation in a context r requires that /f(a.p) hold in r, for some relation /?. (ii) (i is the licensing semantic property or the expression earn ing this property.

(6)

Definition 4 (Anti-licensing) (i) A polarity item a is said to be "anti-licensed" by a property p ill ot's proper interpretation in a context c requires that R{ct$) not hold in <, for some relation /?. (ii) p is the anti-licensing semantic property or the expression carrying this property.

(The intuition that a polarity dependency may come as a positive or as a negative dependency goes back to (at least) Ladusaw 1979, and Progovac 1994.) Licensing expresses a mz/Af condition, and it makes a positive prediction as to where the PI should occur. Pis that are licensed by nonvcridicality are expected to occur in a context as long as the context is nonvehdical. Greek nonvehdical items are Pis of this kind (to be discussed in Section 2).

Ami-licensing, on the other hand, expresses a mrisf not condition and il makes a negative predication as to where the Pis should ruM occur. Pis that are anti-licensed by veridicality are predicted to be ungrammatical in a context if this context is veridical. Naturally. Pis anti-licensed by veridicality will be grammatical in nonveridical contexts. Unlike with licensed Pis however, the negative dependency involved in anti-licensed Pis does not allow us to predict that these Pis will occur grammatically in all nonveridical contexts. Rather, it is expected that there will be nonveridical contexts where licensed Pis will be grammatical and anti-licensed Pis will not be. This .

captures precisely the distributional dilferences between any, which is

POLARITY ITHMS AND Till: iNl)NiVllklDICALITY HYPOTHESIS

103

characterized as a PI anti-licensed bv veridicalitv and Greek nonvcridical

items (see Giannakidou 1998. 1999 for details).

Anti-licensing conditions can generally be useful for cases where amilicensing contexts may be seen as a natural class while those in which the PI actually occurs may not. An anti-licensing analysis can be proposed, for instance, lo account for the restrictions on positive polarity items (PPIs). Apart from PPIs. which I will not discuss in this paper, an anti-licensing condition must be invoked for free-choice items (FCIsi, based on vetidicatity as 1 will suggest in Section 3. Note that a legitimate interpretation of sensitivity allows for the possibility of multiple sensitivity, it is thus possible to find Pis that arc licensed by some property and anti-licensed by another, In Section 5 I will suggest that it is plausible lo invoke such an analysis for

Pis that exhibit anti-locality effects with negation. Negative polarity items (NPIs) are understood as a proper subset of Pis. ie .

.

as Pis licensed by antiveridicality.1 Stronger varieties of negative polarity

can also be observed concerning NPIs that are licensed solely by negation (hyperslrong NPIs: e.g. n-words in Serbo-Croatian, see Giannakidou 1998).

Eventually, Pis licensed by downward entailmem (DE) are also predicted to exist, yet it is not easy to find a paradigm that would tit that description in the languages that have been investigated so far. Such Pis should be grammatical in the scope of negation and DE DPs like few students, but ungram matical in interrogalives (which are arguably, at least in a semantics along the lines of Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984. 1997. nonmonotonc). As a general hint, the (non)veridicality hypothesis should not be viewed in opposition to negation and DE-based theories, but rather as an extension and refinement of these.

Finally, it is assumed that Pis encode sensitivity features. Sensitivity features are semantic features, part of the lexical representation of Pis. and

they represent the semantic deficiency" of these items. Sensitivity features are present in the lexical semantics of Pis at leasl at an abstract level and they may. but need not. correspond to syntactically active features. In some cases, they are indeed realized as morphological features (for instance with FCIs and subjunctive relative clauses), in other cases as phonological features (as emphasis on NPIs: cf. Section 2). Attraction of the PI to the context requires compatibility of features between the PI and the context for the proper interpretalion of the PL On the other hand, anti-licensing should be viewed as incompatibility of features. In this case, the proper interprelation

KM

ANASTASIA GIAN N A KI DO U

ol the PI requires that ihc item be interpreted outside the context which posNCs-cs the harmful property. Sensitivity is thus understood as agreement or disagreement in terms ol semantic features. Nonsensitive expressions do not contain sensitivity features and are free to occur (and be properly interpreted! anywhere. "

12 .

.S'(

Licensing involves semantic scope along the lines of (7):

(7)

Comtiiion on Pl lu i-nsing (i) A polarity item a is licensed iff (a> the context provides some expression z which supplies the semantic property p cTs proper interpretation depends on. and (b) a is found in the semantic scope of c. (ii> c is said to be the triiiger of a.

lYiggen are the licensers. Naturally, there arc dillcrenl classes of Pis. being licensed by dilfercnt sets of triggers. Crucially, be-in-the-scope-of is a

requirement on licensing but not on anti-licensing: in fact, for anti-licensed items an anti scope condition may be in order." (7) entails that Pis are always interpreted inside the scope of their licensers and it also voices the particular choice to build semantic and not

syntactic scope into the definition of licensing. Semantic scope is understood .

s m (Si (of. inter alia Farkas 1997);

(H)

Senuiniic scope An expression a is in the semantic scope of an expression iff the interpretation of a is afFected by the semantic contribution of p.

In the case of scopal interactions between nominal or adverbial quantifiers. the predicate Iw uffci ted is understood as 00 Mining. In the case of Pis. he

affected must be understood as some sort of semantic connection. For instance, minimizers such as t;nr a damn are interpreted inside the semantic .

scope of negation having thereby their interpretation affected: they are interpreted as negative. Likewise, for the other cases of NPIs and Pis. I assume, quite uncontroversially. that in the standard case semantic scope maps onto direct syntactic scope in terms of c command, i.e that linguistic expressions have semantic scope over their c command domain.

POLARITY ITEMS AND TIlll iNON)VER1DICALITY HYPOTHESIS

105

It follows then from the sensitivity condition that Pis may occur anywhere within the c-command domain of their triggers. Given thai there exists the option of mverse scope illustrated in (9) (cf. May

1977: Beghelli and Stowcil 1997: Szabolcsi 1997: Farkas and Giannakidou 1996). (9)

Inverse scope An expression a is said to have imerse scope over an expression

jS iff a has scope over ji and />

'

c-commands a in s-structure.

which describes the interpretation of every hook in (10) when it scopes over the c-commanding some student and is interpreted as in (10 ) '

.

(10)

Some student read every book.

(1()')

Vx (book (x)

3y (studenti>) a read(yjc)))

it can be postulated that licensed Pis can never take inverse scope with respect to their trigger: (111

Ban on the inverse scope of Pis Pis can never take wide scope with respect to their triggers.

(11) is not a valid ban on the scopal possibilities of anti-licensed Pis. It must be emphasized that not all Pis behave uniformly as regards surface syntactic scope. Emphatic NPIs in Greek may appear occasionally in a surface position outside the c-command domain of their licensers, as in (12): (12)

KANENAN +(cihen) idha.

nobody not i saw nobody.'

saw. 1 sg

For more detailed discussion of the constraints on leftward placement of Pis see Giannakidou 1997: also Hoeksema 2()(H).

2

.

Affective polarity items in Greek

The term AFFECnyE, coined in Klima (1964). is used to refer to dependencies related to negation. Artective dependencies in Greek come in two varieties: as sensitivity to antiveridicality and as sensitivity to nonveridicalily. Only items subject to the former dependency are strictly speaking NPIs.

106

ANASTASIA GIANNAKlDOl'

Items subject to the latter dependency 1 will call non-\i riou .u. ITEMS '

(NVls).

Emphatic items of the KANENAS series are typical instances of

NPis. Nonemphatic indelinites of the kanenas "anyone" series are NVIs. The two paradigms, which are distinguished only by emphasis as first observed in Veloudis 1982. are illustrated in (13):

(13)

'

kanenas/KANENAS

anyone, anvbodv'no-one. nobodv

'

*

any N-singularino H singular

kanenas N/KANENAS N

tipota'TIPOTA

an) thing/nothing

pote. POTE '

'

'

c\'CTh\e\cr '

anvwhere/nowhere

puthena/PUTHENA katholu/KATHOLU

"

at all/not at all

'

Emphatic and nonemphatic items occur in apparent NEGATIVE concord

structures, i.e. they co-occur with sentence negation. In fact, emphatics are grammatical only in the presence of negation as we see in the examples below (and w iihou!). I will not address the issue of negative concord here as

ii is not relevant for the present purposes. Although both paradigms are allowed under negation, only the nonemphalics are grammatical in questions <polar/constituent with information or rhetorical readings), the antecedent of conditionals, the restriction of universal quantifiers, in subjunctives, in the scope of modals and in imperatives, to mention just some of the possibilities (cf. Giannakidou 1994. 1997. 1998 for the exhaustive list):

(14)

Dhen idha {kanenaivKANENAN}. not saw. 1 sc; anybody'nobody I didn't see anybody/

(15)

Pijes went.2sG

{pote/ POTE} sto ever

Parisi?

in-the Paris

Have you ever been to Paris?' (16)

Pjos pije who wenlJsc;

{pote/+POTE} sto ever

Parisi?

in-the Paris

Who has ever been to Paris?'

(17)

Andhis tin llektra {pulhena/*PUTHENA}, if see.2sc; the Electra anywhere na tis pis na me perimeni. SUBJ her sav.2sG SUB] me waitJSG

If you see Electra anywhere, tell her to wait for me/

PI H.ARITY ITEMS AND THE .NON)VERIDl( AUTY HYPOTHESIS


Oli dm

gaorixUB {tipot;t"TIK A} sxotika mc

all who kno\v.3i,i. anything as

about

107

tin llcktra.

with the Electra.

milisun.

na taik Jpt

Everyone who knows anything ab*)ut Electra let them speak.'

(19)

Eipi/.o na emine {kanena/ KANENA) komati hope.lsti subj leftJst. any piece I hope there is a piece left*1

(20)

Prepi

na

episkeltis {kanenan/-KANENAN} jatro.

mustJsti SliBJ visit

am

diKior

You should visit a doctor."

<2I)

Pijene

se {kanenaa'-KANENAN} iath.

go.lMi'.2s(. to

any

doctor

Go to a doctor!"

NVI-environmenls have the property iiomfnJu
Delmitioo 5 (Nonveridical item)

A polarity item a is an NVI ill it is licensed by a mmvi'iitlUol operator.

(23)

Definition 6 (Negative polarity Item)

A nonveridical item a is h negativepokuity Uetli ill it is licensed by an onu wrulical operator.

Operator"* in the above definitions should be understood as semantic operator. The notion of veridicality appears first in Moniague t 1969), and it is understood as pertaining to existence. In Zwarts (1995) and in my own work, (non)veridicality is not linked to existence but to the availability of a truth cntuilmcnt. Roughly, an operator is nonveridical ill it does not preserve the truth of the proposition it embeds: Of* p > p. Adverbs like possihh and '

mtnial verbs are typical nonveridical operators: (24)

4

a.

Paul has possibly seen a snake. + Paul saw a snake.

b

Paul may hit Frank.

.

Paul hit Frank.

108

ANASTASIA GIANNAKIDOl'

Other nonvcridical environments include negation, nonassertive speech acts (questions, imperatives, exclamaiives), the protasis of conditionals, the scope of strong intensional verbs like wiaa and hope, the ruturc, the habilual, and the restriction of universal quantihers. Most of these environments are not DE. NVIs are grammatical in all those environments. A word of caution is in order here regarding any. A/jj is not an NV1 according to Definition 5, as there arc nonveridical environments, i.e. some (but not all) complements of strong intensional verbs, e.g. uwif, where any is not grammatical: (25) *! want to buy any bookis).

In this, any contrasts with noncmphatics which are grammatical in these constructions. Giannakidou |199H, 1999) explains the ditferencc between my and NVIs by proposing that any is a PI ami licensed by veridicalily. As I mentioned already, anti-licensing is a must not condition, so the constraint on any is that it must not be found in veridical environments in order to be grammatical. The empirical reflex of this conceptual distinction between licensing by nonveridicalily and anti-licensing by veridicality is to be found in the distributional diU'ercnccs between Greek NVIs and any. For more details see Giannakidou (1998, 1999), and the discussion on FCIs in Section 3.

Antiveridical operators form a subset of the nonvcridical (see also Zwarts 1995). Antiveridical operators are "negative" in that they entail the falsity of the proposition they embed, so Op p -> -»p holds. Negation is a prototypical antiveridical operator, as we see in (26). Without is also antiveridical as we see in (26b):

(26)

a.

Paul did not see a snake.

-i [Paul saw a snake]

b

Paul talked without looking

-i [Paul looked at mej

.

at me.

Hence negative assertions are antiveridical and so are assertions containing

without. These are the NPI environments par excellence. Finally, an operator may be veridical ill' Op p > p holds. Veridical operators entail the truth of their complement. The adverbs yesterday and actually, and the assertion operator are typical examples of veridical operators, as we see in (27):

(27)

a. b

.

Yesterday. Paul saw a snake. Paul actually hit Frank.

Paul saw a snake. Paul hit Frank.

I'OI ARITY ITHMS AND Till: i NUN AIIRIDKWLITY 11VPOTIULSIS .

ASSERT Paul saw a snake.

c

.

109

Paul saw a snake.

Since afliiroative unembedded assertions are veridical, NVIs are unacceptable in them.

In these environments, noncmphatics receive the usual existential (nonnegative) interpretation regular indefinites do, the only dillcrcnce being that nonemphalics can never be interpreted with wide scope. Note that the contexts allowing for noncmphatics include the contexts which allow for cmphatics as a proper subset. I will assume here, following Giannakidou (1997. 1998) that emphasis conveys lexical information and that emphatic

and noncmphalic Pis form two lexically distinct paradigms.5 Greek is not the only language where NVIs are attested. Comparable expressions are jemals ever in German, vreo "any" in Rumanian, ooit in Dutch (cf. Zwarts 1995), and some non-specific indefinites in Ossetic and Russian documented in Haspelmath (1997). Finally, an analysis of any as an NVT, like the one in Zwarts (1995). is also conceivable, though facing a number of empirical problems, one of which I just mentioned above. "

3

.

"

Free-choice items

Greek exemplifies the FC-paradigm reproduced under (28): (28)

opjosdhipote (N) otidhipole oposdhipote opotedhipote opudhipote

'anyone, anybody' anything anyway whenever wherevci '

'

'

'

Morphologically. FCIs can be decomposed into three parts: opjbs free relative who dhi indeed' (emphatic particle from ancient Greek), and the nonemphatic pote ver (cf. English whatsoever), -dhipote is the locus of the free choice semantics. I present the distribution of FCIs first, so as to justify that FCIs form a PI-paradigm distinct from NVIs. and then 1 explain the distribution by appealing to the sensitivity specification of free choice in 3.2. '

,

'

no

3 1 .

ANASTASIA GIANNAK1DOI"

Distribiaum of FCIs

FCIs arc grammatical in most of the environments nonemphalics are. yet the

overall distribution of the two paradigms ditFers in several important aspects. Like (non>cmphatics, FCIs are not licensed in aflirmative episodic sentences (29) but are indeed accepted in. inter alia, the antecedent of conditionals, the restriction of universal quantifiers, subjunctives, in the scope of modals and in imperatives: (29) *Xlhes

to apojevma slis

dhio. idha

vestcrdav the afternoon al-the two. saw.lsci

{opjondhipoie/kanenan-KANEN AN}. anvbody/anvbodv/nobodv '

Yesterday at two o'clock I saw anybody/

(30)

An dhis tin Dektni opudhipote. na tis pis na if see.2SG the Electra anywhere. SUBJ her say.2sc; si.bj me perimeni. me waitJsc

if you see Electra anywhere, tell her to wait for me."

(31)

OH osi gnonzun otidhipole sxetika me tin ipothesi, all who know.3pi. anything about with the case, as

milisun.

PKT talkJpL

Every one who knows anything about the case let them speak/

(32)

I Dectra epeminc na aliso opjondhipote na perasi mesa. the Electra insisted.3s(i that let. 1 st; anyone subj pass in Electra insisted that I allow anyone in/

(33)

Boris

na

danistis

opjodhipote vivlio.

can.2sG si bj borrow.2sG anv

book

You may borrow any book/ (34)

Pare opjodhipote milo. take.2sG any apple Take any apple/

Unlike nonemphalics. however. FCIs are accepted in NP-comparatives and generic sentences as is illustrated in the examples below (where almost modification on any is used to identify the FC-use: cf. Carlson 1981):

POLARITY ITEMS AND THE (NON)VERIDICALITY HYPOTHESIS

(35)

I

Hccira ircxi

grigorolera apo {opjondhipote. kanenan)

the Electra runJst; faster slin

111

than anybody

taksi lis.

in-the class hers

Electra is more intelligent than (almost) anybody in her class/ (36)

{Opjadhipote/ Kamia} ghata kinigai pondikia. any cat hunt.3sc; mice (Almost) Any cat hunts mice.' '

On the other hand, there arc constructions where noncmphatics are grammatical but FCIs are not. Episodic negation and intcrrogatives arc such constructions: (37) *1 Roxani dhen idhc otidhipotc. the Roxanne not saW.3SQ anything Roxanne didn't see almost anything.' (38) *Idhes opjondhipote? saw.2SG anybody . Did you see almost anybody?" '

From the preliminary data presented here we can conclude two things. First, FCIs form a class of Pis distinct from that of noncmphatics. Second, the distribution of Greek FCIs is not identical to the distribution of FC any. a dirterence which is considered in more detail in Giannakidou (2000).

Table 1 provides a partial illustration of the contrastive distribution of FCIs and noncmphatics. Considering the dala described in the literature on e.g. Hungarian, Spanish, Catalan and Serbian/Croatian, we can take it that FCIs in these languages exemplify a similar distribution (see among others Progovac 1994: Toth 1996: Bosque 1996 and Quer 1998; Dutch FCIs may be somewhat dillerent. see Rullmann 1995): The environments in Table I can all be characterized as nonveridical. so, we

may conclude that both paradigms exemplify dependency to nonveridicality. This conclusion is immediately supported by the following data, which showthat both FCIs and NVIs are excluded from veridical contexts such as the

complements of perception, commisive, epistemic, assertive, dream/fiction and factive verbs (for an extensive discussion on the veridicality of these verbs see Giannakidou 1997, 1998, 1999).

112

ANASTASIA GI/\NNAKlDOU

Table 1. ComparmiYf distrihittion of lUHietnphalics iiiul FCIs hminnments

FCIs

NVh

Inlcirogativcs

*

OK

Condidanals

OK

OK

Rcsinciion ol V

OK

OK

UhkIuuscs

OK

OK

S-comparalivcs

OK

OK

Superlatives Future particle

OK

OK

OK

OK

Stibjunclivei

OK

OK

Imperatives

OK

OK

Hubituuls

OK

OK OK

OK

Disiunctions

OK

Qenerics

OK

NP-c«mparalivcs

OK

(39)

a. "Akusa

tin Ilectra na

psithirizi

{tipota/otidhipotc}

heard.Isg the Electra si bj whisperJsc; anythiiig ston

Andrea.

in-the Andreas *

I heard Electra whispering anything to Andreas.' I heard Electra whispering something lo Andreas.' *Anagastika na fero {kanenan/opjondhipote} was forced.lsti si bj bring. Ist. any lilo mu sto parti. friend my in-the party . I was forced lo bring any friend(s) of mine to the party." I was forced lo bring some friend(s) of mine to the party.' *0 Pavios katafcrc na agorasi {kanena/otidhipote} '

'

b

.

'

c

.

the Paul spiti

sti

managed.3sc. si bj buy3sa any thalasa.

house in-the sea

Paul managed lo buy any house by the sea.' Paul managed lo buy a house by the sea.*

*"

(40)

a. "O Pavios pistevi the Paul

oli akusc

believe Jst; that heard.3st.

POLARITY ITEMS AND Tilt (NON)VERIDICALITY IIYmTIIESIS

113

{kancnan'opjondiptiic} thorivo. any noise . Paul believes that he heard any noise.* '

Paul believes that he heard a noise.*

'

b

.

.Onireftika

on irthe

{kanenas/opjosdhipote}

dreamt.Is<. that cuoeJflG

am

idravlikos.

plumber I dreamt that any plumber came." I dreamt that a plumber came."

.'

"

c

.

Ilectra

"I

ipc

oti akUM

{kanenaa opjondipotc '

the Klcctra said.3sci that heard.3st.

an\

thorivo. noise .

"

Electra said that she heard any noise.* Eleclra said that she heard a noise.'

'

d

.

M Ilectra xarike pu irthe the Electra was-glad Jso that came.3s
{kanena-s/opjosdhipotc} filos any

tis.

friend hers

Electra was happy that any Mead of hers came by.* Electra was happy that sonic friend ol hers came by."

"'

'

We see that the ungrammaticalitv carries over to am. which is to be expect

ed under the assumption that am loo is sensitive to nonveridicahty. Crucial ly. although we are dealing with sensitivity to nonvendicalily with both FCIs and NVIs. there is a set of environments that distinguish each paradigm as a distinct PI paradigm. The distinct distribution arises as a result of the

disdBGl sviisiiivny specification of the items I elaborate on this by showing next thai I CIs are excluded from veridical contexts, and certain nonveridical

ones like negation and questions because their sensiimu requirement is no! met in these contexts.

32 .

How sensitivity restricts distribution m //
The literature on PC any more or less lakes it for granted that FC-interpretation implies universal quantification (cf. Horn 1972: Ladusaw 1979: Carlson l Xh.

114

ANASTASIA GIANNAKIDOU

In Giannakidou (1998) I show that FCIs are not universal but existential

quantifiers, and that the universal-like flavor of statements with FCls is a byproduct of the nature of free choice quantihcation. I summarize here the

main features of that analysis.6 I assume that FCIs are indefinites which encode the property of free choice. Free choice requires variation
'

,

one alternative to the other.

(41)

Sensitivity in FCIs i FC existential quantifiers must be evaluated wrt a set of .

i-altematives

ii.

.

A world w" E M(x) is an i-altemative wrt a ill" there exists some world w

"

E M(x) such that {a]

.

* [cxj

.

-.

Two i-altcmatives w' and w" are worlds agreeing on everything but the value assigned to the FCI a. M(x) is the set of worlds representing the epistemic status of some individual, in the case of unembedded assertions, the speaker s: MB(s) (see Giannakidou 1998. for details). Hence, i-altematives are epistemic '

alternatives relative to an individual.

I illustrate how this proposal works with two examples. Consider (42) first, with a FCI in a comparative clause. Given standard assumptions about comparatives as relations between individual and degrees mediated by maximality. its meaning is as in (43).

(42)

(43)

I Ana trexi grigorotera apo opjondhipote stin taksi lis. the Ann runJsG faster than anybody in-ihe class hers Ann runs faster than anybody in her class.' 3d (fast (d) a run (Ann.d) a d > max (Xd (run (anyone in her '

'

class, d ))))

POLARITY ITHMS AND TIU: . N( ).\ i\ LRIDIC ALITY HYIWUllSIS

115

Ctmsider nou the i alternatives in (44) and an orderme ol decrees d' < d" < d d

'"

~

such that the degree d' to which Roxanne runs is smaller than the degree to which Clco runs and this, in turn, is smaller than the degree d" to

.

which Theodora runs:

(44)

a. b

.

c

.

i-alt,: person-in-class-of-Ann ( m = Roxanne 3d' jfast (d ) a run (Roxanne, d')| i alt:: pcrson-in-cluss-of-Ann (x)«C1m 3d" |fast (d") a run tCleo. d i| i-alt,: person-in-cluss-of-Ann < x I = Theodora 3d'" (fast (d" ) a run (Theodom, d"')]

Given these allernatives. sentence (42) says thai Ann's degree of running is itcr than the maximal degree ol running to which an individual considered in the i alteinatives runs. In other words. Ann runs faster than even

Theodora. The universal interpretation of the PCI is thus illusive: it is not inherent to the FCI itself, but rather, it is due to the maxtmality operator present in the comparative. The same can be said about the universal-like flavor of FCIs in generic sentences: it is due to the presence of the generic operator. In the absence of an operator inducing universal-like elFects. the FCI is interpreted as a regular existential quantifier. To see this, consider the occurrence of a FCI in an imperative.

(45)

Dialekse opjodhipote tiio: opjo thelis. pick.imp.2st. any card: whichever want Js(. Pick any card; whichever you want.' "

Consider now the set of i alternatives in (4M:

(46)

a.

i alt,: card (x) = card,

IMP |pick (you. card, )| b

i-alt2: card (x)= card,

c

i-alt,; card (x)=card,

.

IMP |pick (you. card, )| .

iMf |pick (you. card I] Duilfksf opjtxihi/MHe filo Pick any card" is an inv itation to take some card. be it card,. card:. or card,, but not all of them. If one take; more that one card, one has presumably not understood what the permissive imperative meant. How does evaluation with respect to i-altematives rule out FCIs from alHrmative episodic, negative and interrogative sentences' The common

116

ANASTASIA GIANNAKIDOU

feature of these sentences is that they arc episodic, i.e. their logical representation involves existential closure of an event variable e (cf. Davidson 1967:

Parsons 1990: Kratzer 1995). as is shown below for (29), (37), and <38). respectively: stands for the question operator, (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1997):

(29')

3e |3x (person (x. e) a saw (I. x, e))]

(37')

-3c |3x (thing (x. e) a saw (Roxanne. x, c))|

(38')

?3e |3x (book (x, e> a bought (you, x. e))|

Hence the ungrammatical cases form a natural class in terms of event closure. Episodicity in this sense will always block the possibility of invoking i-allematives in virtue of its blocking variation for the arguments of the event. In an episodic context, the FCI is forced into a non-varying existential interpretation, and this consequently makes it illicit. So veridical contexts are bad for FCIs because they are episodic, and nonveridical contexts like questions and episodic negative sentences are equally bad because they are episodic too. Thence the proposed analysis of FCIs derives their restricted

distribution in a simple way: FC indefinites must avoid episodic domains. because episodic domains do nol satisfy the free choice requirement on variation FCIs are then anti-licensed by episodicity, and we can stale this in .

the condition in (47 >:

(47)

Anti4ic&*sb*g offree choice items A free choice item a is not licensed in a sentence S if S is episodic.

(47) predicts the right distribution not only for Greek FCIs but also for their Spanish and Catalan counterparts: cualquier 'anybody' (Spanish), qualsevol anybody (Catalan). Crucially, (47). by requiring that FCIs be in a non episodic domain, implies a positive specification of the grammatical environment: there must be an operator which binds the e variable. Hence habitual. generic, and modal operators are. inter alia, required to ensure nonepisodicity and to allow for the free choice interpretation of FCIs. '

'

4

.

Mood alternation in relative clauses

Subjunctive (restrictive) relative clauses (SRs) in Greek provide another class of Pis. The dependent character of SRs was originally discussed in Farkas

POLARITY ITEMS AND Till. .NONlVIiRlDICAU l V HYPOTHESIS

117

(19X5) for Rumanian, where it was emphasized that it is sensitivity of these to intensionality that makes them dependent and consequently restricts their distribution. Farkas's generalization for the distribution of SRs is given in (48): < 48)

'

t urkass generalization

Subjunctive relative clauses are grammatical ill" they modify DPs which arc interpreted inside the scope of intensiona] operators.

l arkas c.ills SRs intensumal di'sn iptiims. In what follows, I will agree with the hypothesis thai SRs are Pis crosslinguistically: I will propose, however, following Giannakidou (1998). that it is not the intcnsional versus extenIional contrail that is relevant lor the restricted distribution of SRs. but

lather, the availability of a certain existential entailmcnt. This, in turn, will be shown lo cocielate with scope. 4 1 .

Disuihutum

SRs may modify indefinite DPs of various forms: singular mdclinites. bare NPs. and Pis such as emphatics and FCIs. Here. 1 present their (partial)

disiribution when modifying singular indelimtes: us wc see. some of the English translations involve modal verhs: Sexaiion

(49)

Dhen idha not

enan andra Ipu

MW.lSO a

man

na

forai

kokino kapelo.l

lhat si hj wear .Vst. red

hai

I didn't see a man wearing a red hat." Condltionah

(50)

An dhis if

kapjon

sec.2m. someone

|pu

na

forai

kokino kapelo|....

thai si hj wear.3sci red

hat

It \oii see someone wearing a red hal....' Strong intensional verbs

(51)

I Cleo protine na vro kapjon Ipu na the Cleo proposedJsc SUBJ fiacLlSG sonKone that SUBJ me voithisi.)

nw help.3sG Cleo suggested that 1 find someone who will help me." "

118

ANASTASIA GIANNAKlDOl'

Modal verbs

(52)

Prepi na grapso mia crgasia |pu na ine pano apo muslJsG subj write.ls<J an essay that si hj is more than 15 selidhes.]

15 pages ! have to write an essay which has to be longer than 15 pages.'

fmperatiyes (53)

Fere mu ena vivlio |pu na exi ble kalima.] bring.2SG me a book that SUBJ have.3s(i blue cover Bring me a book that has a blue cover/

liUenosati\es

(54)

Idhes kanenan [pu na me thimate?] saw.2s(; anyone that subj me remember.3SG Did you see anyone who remembers me?'

In these constructions, DPs modified by SRs have narrow scope readings, in a way to be made precise in 2.3.2. On the other hand. SR modification is

barred in inter alia afirmative sentences with extensional verbs, comparatives. and in the scope of intensional verbs like believe, and dream (charac tcrized as weak intensional in Parkas 1985. 1992: here I use the term merely as a descriptive label). Here are the relevant examples:

Affirmative extensional (55)

Roxani

idhe

enan andra |pu

the Roxanne saw.3sci a

man

na

exi

that subj have.3SG

pola lefta.) much money Roxanne saw a man that had a lot of money/

Comparatives (56) *I

Cleo trexi

taxitera apo andres [pu na

the Cleo run.3sG faster

than men

exun

that SUBJ have.3PL

proponithi sklira.j trained '

hard

Cleo runs faster than men who have had hard training.1

Weak inrensional verbs

(57)

Roxani pistevi the R,

oti

idhe

enan andra [pu na

believe.3sc; that sa\v.3s<; a

man

that subj

POLARITY ITEMS AND TIUL iNONlVERIDlCALITY HYPOTHESIS

cxi

pola

119

Icita.l

haveJsc; much moncv

Roxannc believes lhal she saw a man that had a lot of money/

(58) "1

Ana onireflikc

oti filise

enan andra (pu na

the Ann dreamt Jsg that kissed Jsg a

man

that SUBJ

exi musi.| has beard Ann dreamt that she kissed a man who has a beard.

'

The fact that SR modification is excluded in generic contexts and With Weak intensional verbs is quite unexpected under Farkas's generalization, since these contexts are intensional. On the other hand, negation, which is not strictly speaking intensional, u a licenser of SRs. As regards the PI picture we may single out SRs as Pis distinct from NPIs (emphatics). NVIs (non-

emphatics) and FCls. The comparative conlrastive distribution of all para digms is given in Table 2 below (from Giannakidou 1998). The dcpenden cies we observe here are all manifestations of sensitivity to nonveridicalily. As I mentioned above, the distinct distributions arise as a result of the fact

that the Pis have distinct sensitivity features. 42 .

Entailment ofexistence

We have already observed that subjunctive modification is excluded in the scope of intensional verbs like believe and dream, and that it is allowed under negation, which is not strictly speaking intensional. These facts suggest that Farkas s generalization cannot be the real explanation of what regulates mood choice in relative clauses. In this section. I propose that subjunctive modification will be allowed only if we don t know whether the object denoted by the DP exists. If we know that such an object exists, we '

'

are forced to use an indicative relative (for the same intuition, see Veloudis

1984 and Quer 1998). Sensitivity to strong intensionality can be shown to follow from this.

The basic observation is that SRs can modify indefinite DPs in the scope of intensional verbs like look for and nann in the scope of an extensional verb like see, SR-moditication is illicit. The contrast is illustrated in the sentences below:

120

ANASTASIA GIANNAKIDOL'

Table 2. Fmrr paradigms qfpolariiy items in Creek Environments

mas

Ids

Ncgalion hefore-clduscs

OK

%

OK

OK

OK

OK

*

OK

withota-clduscs

OK

OK

OK

OK

*

OK

Ycs-na-'consiitucni questions

OK

Conditionals

-

tk

OK

OK

Kcsinclion ol V

OK

OK

OK

OK

OK

»

S-comparalivcs

OK

OK

*

Superlatives

OK

OK

«

Fulurc

OK

OK

OK

Modal verbs

OK

OK

OK

Strong mlensional verbs

OK

OK

OK

Imperatives

OK

OK

OK

Hubiluais

OK

OK

Disjunctions

OK

OK

¥

Generic s

OK

¥

Phrasal
OK

Weak intcnskmal verbs

*

(59)

1

Roxani theli

the R.

na

pandrefli

*

¥ *

{enaa/ lon} andra pu

want Jsg slbj manyJSG a/ thc

man that

na exi pola lefta. subj have Jsg much money Roxanne wants to marry a man who has a lot of money.' (60) .!

Roxani

idhc

the Roxanne saw,3SG

{enan/ton} andra pu a/the

man

na

exi

thai SLBJ have.3sG

pola lefta. much money Roxanne saw {a/the} man that had a lot of money." In (59), the SR pu na exi pola lefta who has a lot of money' modifies the indefinite enanandm "a man'. Definite DPs like ton andra 'the man' are not '

modifiable by SRs. which is lo be expected under Farkas s generalization: definites are interpreted outside the scope of the intensional operator. In (60) on the other hand, modification by the SR is barred, the reason being, under

POLARITY ITEMS AND THE (NON)VERIDICALITY HYPOTHESIS

121

ihe intensionality hypothesis, that the indelinitc enan wuhu is in the scope of idhe 'saw' which is extensional.

DPs modified by SRs necessarily take narrow scope with respect to the intensional operator and are only interpreted de dicta, a tact which also supports the dependent character of these clauses. (59) has only the narrow scope interpretation for the indelinite that we see in (59 ) and the existence of a man who meets the relative clause requirement is not guaranteed. '

(59 )

WANT (R, (3x |nian (x) a has-a-lot-of-money (x) a marry (R. x)|))

In the absence of no. the sentence in (59). given now as (61). would have only the wide scope interpretation in (61 )* where it is entailed that the man with a lot of money that Roxanne wants to marry exists. '

(61)

I Roxani theli na pandrefti enan andra pu na the R. wantJsg sl-bj marryJsc; a man that subj exi pola lefta. have Jsg much monev m

Roxanne wants to marry a man who has a lot of money.'

(61')

3x [man (x) a has-a-lot-of-money (x> a WANT (R. marry (R. x))]

Wide scope and the ensuing de re interpretation is the only possible option for DPs modified by indicative relatives. The crucial contrast appears to rely on the availabilitv of an existence entailmcnt. and this in turn translates into

scope: de re. wide scope interpretations entail existence, but de dk io. narrow scope interpretations do not. This explains why it is easy to get SRs with intensional predicates in the first place, but not with uncmbedded nonmodal/ nonintensional clauses, where existence is by default guaranteed. The sensitivity feature of SRs lies precisely here: the existence of an object meeting the joint requirement of the DP and the relative clause is nol implied. Sensitivity to strong intensionality is a by-product of this. 1 provide Ihe relevant condition in (62). where "Op stand for 'operator': this Op must not be veridical (hence just like with FCIs, we are dealing with anti licensing by veridicality): "

(62)

Sensitivity in subjunctive relatives {Op (DP + Subjunctive Relative Clause) VP] has a truth value

122

ANASTASIA GIANNAKIDOL

ilFil is not known whclher the followms is true:

3x |NP(x) a Subjunctive RcIativeCIau.se (x)) Note that the use of a SR does not imply noncxislence. Modification by SR merely indicates ignorance as to whether an object exists. When this knowledge is available, an indicative relative is used instead. These clauses, then. are also sensitive expressions: they are associated with an existence enlailment: (63)

Sensitivity m imiU otn e relatives

\Op (DP + Indicative Relative Clause) VP] has a truth value ill' the following is true: 3x [NP(x> a Indicative Relative Clause (x)l It is because of the existence enlailment lhal indicative modification gives rise to wide scope reading only. SRs will be ungrammaiical in contexts where existence is guaranteed. Aliirmalive unembedded assertions, are such cases, and as we saw (in (60))

subjunctive modification is not permitted there. Likewise, embedded veridical clauses, i.e. the complements of cpistemic and dream/fiction verbs also exclude subjunctive moditication, because existence of the decisive individual is entailed in the embedded model of the attitude subject. If Ann believes or dreamt that she kissed a man with a beard, then a man with a beard

definitely exists in her view of the actual world, or in some fictional reality corresponding to Ann s dreams (more details see Giannakidou 1998). '

5

.

Multiple sensitivity: Pis subject to anti-locality effects

As I noted in Section 1, ihe particular view of polarity I am assuming

predicts that we may find Pis which are multiply sensitive fcf. Van der Wouden 1994. 1997). In this section 1 suggest that we may handle Pis

known to be subject to anti-locality effects as such. Progovac (1994) identifies the class of /-Pis reproduced under (64) in Serbian/Croatian:

(64)

itko

anyone* anything anywhere '

ista

ikud ikad

'

'

ever

POLARITY ITEMS AND THE (NON)VERIDirALITY HYPOTHESIS /-Pis

123

are licensed by superordinatc negation (65) and in other environments for instance in questions, conditionals and the complements of negative predicates, which are not strictly speaking negative but nonveridical {nor upward emailing in Progovac s terms: examples and glosses from Progovac 1994):

.

'

<65)

a.

b

.

Milan Mnc) tvrdi [da Marija poznaje itkoga]. Milan not claim Js<; that Mary knows anyone Milan docs not claim that Mary knows anybody.1 Da li Milan voli itkoga/4 nitkoga? that Q Milan love.3SG anyone/noonc Docs Milan love anyone?'

/ Pis are interpreted as regular indefinites, just like Greek noncmphatics. Unlike these, however, /-Pis are not licensed by local negation. This is evidenced in (66):

(66) *Marijc ne poznaje itkoga. Mary not knowJsci anyone

Progovac oilers an account of the anti-locality requirement on /-Pis within the binding theory: i-Ph are pronominal elements, therefore subject to Principle B which requires that they be locally frce. Yet the attested anti-locality elfect is not necessarily an argument in favor of a syntactic account: rather, it can be more readily explained in terms of multiple sensitivity (for some arguments against the binding approach see Hoeksema 1996, and Horn and Lee 1995). /.Pis can be thought of as multiply sensitive items licensed by nonveridicality and anti-licensed by antivcridicality. Under this assumption, and given that the class of antiveridical contexts is a subset of the class of nonveridical

contexts, /-Pis are expected to appear in nonveridical contexts which are not antiveridical. E.g.. the complement of a negated verb is indeed nonveridical

but not antiveridical: by notsaying thai p I am not committed to the truth of p but 1 am also not committed to the falsity of it. In this reasoning, the antilocality cll'ect follows directly from the semantic conditions on licensing. This hypothesis can be extended to Pis which exemplify similar anti

locality effects in other languages {vala-Ph in Hungarian: see Toth 1996. and similar Pis in Slavic languages, e.g. Russian //7w-pronouns). Crucially, these items have a distribution otherwise identical to that of NVIs, i.e. they occur in standard nonveridical contexts like the subjunctive after intensional verbs, the imperative and with modals without FC-readings.

124

6

.

ANASTASIA GIANNAKIDOl'

Conclusion

In this paper 1 presented four classes of Pis in Greek and suggested that the constraints on their distribution can be successfully staled in terms of a theory of polarity which allows for licensing and anli-licensing mechanisms and for sensitivity to (non)veridicaliiy. Crucially, it was shown that sensitivity to (non)vcridicaliiy docs not impose identical distribution for the relevant Pi-paradigms. On the contrary, in the general framework assumed in the paper, diversity is expected as long as Pis have distinct sensitivity specification; Given the complexity of the issues involved, what i presented here was merely a summary of the facts and a brief sketch of their analysis. Even in this perfunctory way. however. I hope to have shown that the (non)veridicality hypothesis can provide a fruitful and rich enough framework for an insightful analysis of the variation involved in polarity dependencies both within a given language and crosslinguislically.

Acknowledgments The matcna! discussed m this paper is a very brief overview of the theory of polunty I proposed in my PhD thesis GitlUllkktoa (1997) and in Giannakidou 11998). The iwo studies. (hough both defending the position thai inon)veridkdUty must be an essential ingredient of a

comprehensive theory of polarity, differ in perspective: the former emphasizes Ihc issue of sariaii -n in IM-licensinp; the lattei unpacks (he issue ol whal imdcri.cs this \ .:H,.{.,>a- .md .irpues

ihat ii is (nonKcridkaluy. In ihe Workshop Perspectives o/i NegatioHn which was held in August 1996.1 delivered a paper in the spirit of Giannakidou 11997). but in ihc present article I have updated the discussion lo the extent this was possible so that my more recent thinkinc of the issues is reflected. Naturally, the acknowledgements found in Giannakidou 1997. 1998

carry over to the present work. I would also like to lhank the organizers of Perspectives on Nexarion for organizing such a line woiicshop. and the audience of the workshop for their comments.

Notes

L

In earlier wivk and in Zwarts (1993). the property of anu-vendnafity is referred lo as oYeridkaliiy In Giannakidou ( 1998). I abandoned "avendicalily". as it assigns the wrong logical content to the property the lerm is intended lo refer to: a-vendical means 'without veridicality propcnies but the intended property is 'the opposite of veridical". Anuveridiculutyi expiesses this meaning. I follow here ihe terminology ol Giannakidou (1998). '

'

.

,

'

,

POLARITY ITEMS AND THE rNON)VERIDICALlTY HYPOTHESIS

2

.

125

In Giannakidou (1998), I weakdn the claim ihal all cases of licensing Involve scope, and arcuc that ihcrc arc instances of licensing that do not involve a bc-in-thc-scopc-of relation. In

particular. I abandon the ban on the inverse scope of Pis we sec in (11 >. as there arc licensed

NPIs- the emphatic NPIs mentioned in Section 2 - which must lake scope over their licensing negation for their proper inicrpretalion. Licensing is a semantic and not a syntactic relation. hence the mapping of licensing onto a scope condition is not as straightforward as oik might

tend to think it oik is driven by a sfttiactk underManding ol licensing. 3

.

4

.

In Giannakidou (IWS. 1999) I use the term "airedive PI" as synonymous to "NVT. I am considering here only proposiiumal operators, but determiners and quanliliers also have (non)veridicaliiy properties. In (act, these are the only types thai have such properties (sec Giannakidou 1998 lor discussion).

5

.

Consider, m this connection, that there are two other cases in Greek where emphasis appears lo grammaticalize distinctions which are lexical in other languages:
(it) POUlpdli too'.' veiy'. The existence of such cases independent of the emphaliWnonemphalic distinction serves as an ai umcm against a focus analysis of the involved emphasis. For detailed arguments as to why the emphasis involved should not be treated as locus see Giannakidou (1997. 1998). 6

.

A more elaborated analysis of free choice is found in Giannakidou (2000). which I do not

consider in the present paper.

References

Beghclli. Filippo and Tim Stowcll. 1997. Dislribulivity and negation: the syntax of each and nrrv. In Anna Szaboksi
B*>squc. Ignacio. 19%. La polandad modal. Ms. University of Madrid.

Carlson. Greg. 19SI. On the distribulion ol frcc-choicc any. Chicago UngUfSiicsSociety (CLS) 13: University of Chicago. Chicago. Davidson. Donald. 1967. The logical form of action sentences. The logic crfdedshn and action, cd. by N. Rcschcr. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Reprinted in Davidson I9K0, Essays on Action and Events. Oxford. Clarendon Press. Dayal. Vcnccta. 1995. Licensing any in non-negalivcnon-modal contexts. Semantics and

Unguistics Tlwory tSALTt VL Cornell University. Ithaca, NY. Farias Donka F. 19S5. Intcnsional Descriptions and the Romance suhjunenve nunui. Garland New York.

Farias. Donka F. 1992. On the semantics d subjunctive complements. In Romance Languages and Modern Linguistic Theory. Paul Hirschbuehler ct al. (Eds.). 6 -104. John Bcn|amins.

Farkas. Donka F. 1997. Evaluation indices and scope. In Anna S/abolcsi (ed). Whys oj Scope Taking. Kluwcr. Dordrecht.

ANASTASIA GIANNAKIDOl"

Farkas. Donka and Anaslasia Giannakiduu. IW6. How clause bounded is the scope ol univcrsals? Samimus and UnguisUe Theory (SALT) VI, . 5-52. Cornell University. Ithaca. NY.

Giannakidou. AnaMasia. 1994, The semantic licensing of NFIs and the Modem Greek

subjunctive. Language and Cognition 4. Yearbook oi the Research Group for Theoretical and Experimental Linguistics: 55-68. University of Groningen. Giannakidou. Anastasia. 1997. 7'/ iMiidseupe of Polarity Items. Dissertaiu)n, University of Groningen. Giimnakidou. Anastasia. IWS. Polarity Sensittx tty as (Non)veridital Dependency. Amsterdam: John Bcnfamins.

Giannakidou. Anastasia. I<)99. Aflecdve dependencies. To appear in Linguistics and Philosophy 22:367-421. Giannakidou. Anastasia. 2(HK). The meaning of free choice. Ms. University of Groningcn.

Gmcncndijk. Jerocn and Martin Stokhol. 1984. Smdies in the semantics ofquestions and the pragmatics of answers. FhD thesis, l.'niv ersily of Amsterdam. Grocncndijk. Jeroen and Martin Stokhol. 1997 Questions. In J. van Benthem and A. ler

Meulcn (eds). Handbook of Logic and Language, Elsevier Science Publishers. Amsterdam: 1055-1124.

Haspdmath. Martin. 1997. indefinite. Promnms. Oxford University Press. Heim. Irene. I9K2. The Senutntics oj Definite and Indefinite NPs. Dissertation. UMass. Amhersl.

Hockscma. Jacf»b. 1996. Review of Progovac IW-X. Studies in lumgaage 10, I: 196-207. Hoeksema. Jacob. 20(>0. Triggering, scope and C-command. In: L. Horn and Y. Kato (cds.). SU*gation and Polarity. Syntactic andsemanth perspe University Press. Oxford. 115-146.

Hom, Laurence. 1972. On the Semantic Properties of Uygical Operators in English. Dissertation. UCLA.

Hom. Laurence and Y.S. Lee. 1994. Any as an indehnuc plus even. Ms. Yale University. Hom. Laurence and Young-Suk Lee. 1995. Pmgovac on Polarity. Journal oj Linguistics 31:401-424.

Kadmon. Nirit and Fred Landman. 1993. Any. Linguistics and Philosophy 15:35.1-422. Klima. Edward S. 1964. Negation in English. In The Structure of Language, cd. by Jerry Fodor and Jerold J. Katz. 246-323. Englewood Cliffs. Prentice Hall. Kratzcr, Angelika. 1995. Stage-level and individual-level predicates. The Generic Hook. G Carlson and F. J. Pcllctier (Eds.). Chicago University Press. 125-176. Ladusaw. William A. 1979. Polarity Sensitivity as Inherent Si ope Relations. PhD ihcsis, .

UT Austin.

Lahiri. Utpal. 1995. Negative polarity items in Hindi. Semantics and Linguistic Theory (SALT) V. Cornell University Press. Ithaca, NY. May. Robert. 1977. The Crammar of Quantihcatitm. PhD thesis. MIT. Montague. Richard. 1969. On the nature of certain philosophical entities. The Munist 53: 159-94.

POLARITY ITEMS AND THE (NON)VIiRIDICALITY HYPOTHESIS

127

Parions. Terence. 19l>0. Events in the Svmimticsof En iish.Asmdyin subatomic semantics. MIT Press. Cambridge. MA.

Progovac. L jil|ana. 1994. Positive and Negaiive polarity: ahmdin approach. Cambridge University Press.

Qucr. Josep. PWX. Mtunl at she interface. Drssertation. University oj Utrecht. Dislribulcd by Holland Academic Graphics.

RuUmann, Hoi/e. 1995. Two types of pob

items NELS 26: 335-350.

S/abolcsi. Anna
Tolh. Ddtkp. 1996. Negative p<»laruy items in Hungarian. Ms. University of Tilburg. Tovena. Lucia. 1996. Issues on Polarity Sensitivity. PhD thesis. University of Edinburgh. Tovcna. Lucia and Jacques Jaycz. 1997. Any as a Fiman Quanliljer. Proceedings ot the Nth Amsterdam Colloqunim. 1LLC, University of Amsterdam. Yannis. 1982. Negation in Modern Greek. PhD thesis. University of Reading.

Vcloudis

.

Vcloudis

.

Yannis. 1983/1984. The sub)unclivc in relative clauses. Glossolofia 2-3:

11-135.

1994. Negative Contexts. Dissertation. University of Groningcn. Ton van der. 1997, Negative Contexts. Collocation. Polann and Multiple Negation. Routledgc. London. /warts. Frans. 1995. Nonveridical contexts. LingaistieAnalysis 25. 3 4: 286-312. Wouden. Ton van der

.

Wouden

.

Scalarity and polarity A study of scalar adverbs as polarity items Jack Hocksema and Hotze Rullmann

L

Introduction and overview

Many languages have adverbial polarity items which serve as scalar panicles, pointing at end-points of pragmatic scales. For instance, the italicized expressions in (1) are English negative polarity items serving as focus adverbials for connectives) modifying expressions which denote scalar endpoints. (I)

a.

She cannot stand Fred, much less his brother.

b

Nobody understands me. least of all my father. If you so much as lift a finger. I'll scream.

.

c

.

This may seem hardly surprising- since the literature on polarity items assigns a central role to notions of scalarity in the semantic analysis of polarity sensitivity (cf.e.g. Fauconnier 1975a, b, 1979: Ladusaw 1979: Vandeweghe 1980 81: Krilka 1990. 1991, 1995: Kadmon and Landman 1993: Lee and Horn 1994: Israel 1996. 199S: Rullmann 1996, 1998),

However, most of the literature on polarity items is devoted to indefinites, such as English any and ever, and their counterparts in other languages. Indefinites are endpoints on a semantic scale witfa universal quanliliers on the opposite end (Horn 1989) and the ranking is one of semantic implication. Indefinites are natural candidates for polarity items, and indeed many languages have polarity items among the indefinite pronouns and detemiiners (Haspclmath 1997). Scalar particles, on the other hand, often exploit pragmatic scales representing real-world rankings. Consider English even, for instance. A

130

JACK HOEKSEMA AND UOT/Al RULLMANN

sentence such as (2) below presupposes a scale of individuals, ranking according to how likely it is that they will enjoy the food, with Peter at an extreme end of the scale:

(2)

Even Peter liked the food.

Indireclly. by means of an implicalurc. sentence (2) makes a universal claim:

everybody who is more likely than Peter to have like the food also liked it. The ranking of individuals which (2) assumes is nonlinguistic in nature, and depends on real world factors, such as assumptions about Peter, the food. and the occasion on which the food was served.

It is well-known that scalar particles such as even may be or become polarity items (Konig 1991). Besides the examples in (1) from English, there are Moroccan Arabic fuim (Benmamoun 1997). Dutch oakmaar and zeifs main (Zwarts 1981: Vandeweghe 1980-81). Finnish edes (Konig 1991). German ouch nut (Kiirschner 1983), and Spanish siqtiiera, among others. We do not know nearly enough about these various expressions to be able to oiler a unified theory of polarity sensitive scalar adverbs. However. even from a hasty inspection of the literature, considerable variation in behavior emerges. There is variation in the set of possible triggers, as well as in the syntactic configurations where the items may show up. as well as in the focus expressions they combine with. In this paper, we will examine this variation within one language. thereby keeping fixed the general syntactic structure of the clause. We will do so by studying the differences between Dutch ook maar. an adverbial collocation of ook too. also and ntaar just, only, merely*, and Dutch zdfs maar, likewise an adverbial collocation, this time of zfitfs even and the aforementioned maar. Many of the notable ditferences between these two expressions are not categorical but gradual. This makes it somewhat dillicult to use introspective judgments, because these do not concern a straightforward yes/no decision task, but subtle and variable preferences for one combination over another. Instead, we will rely on an extensive corpus study. in which we see these preferences reflected in actual usage. As an added bonus, the corpus investigation, which was based on texts from a 200 year period, also enabled us to establish some ongoing changes which appear to us to point towards gradual specialization among the two adverbial combinations. The plan of this paper is as follows. In wSection 2 we discuss the notion of pragmatic scales and scalar inferences. In Section 3. we discuss polarity "

'

'

'

SCALARITY AND POLARITY

131

items denoting endpoints on pragmatic scales, so-called muiuuizcrs and maximizi'ts. In Section 4. we discuss two types of scales that play a role in scalar inferences. In Section 5 we compare the Dutch scalar adverbials intk nuun and zflfs nuuti and relate our findings to the distinctions made in Section 4. In Section 6 we present an empirical investigation on the basis of a corpus of more than 4000 occurrences. In Section 7. wc extend our findings to German, by making a comparison with a (smaller) corpus investigation of muh nut. which is a close counterpart to Dutch Ottk nuuu. In Section s. \\c lake a look at English SO much OS and even. Section 9 contains our conclusions.

2

Sculcs and scalar adverbials

.

togOMtk Kales in the sense of Fauconnier (1975a.b) model certain kinds of

"

pragmatic inferences Pragmatic implications in Fauconmcrs sense are not necessarily logically valid, but play an important role in everyday understanding. One of Fauconnier s examples is: "

.

'

(3)

Tommy will not eat the most delicious food.

On one of its readings, this sentence has quantiticational force, and expresses that Tommy will not eat any food whatsoever. This quantiticational. or universal, reading. Fauconnier argues, comes from a pragmatic implicature. The most delicious food is. under normal circumsiances. most likely to be eaten. Someone who does not want it. simply wants no food at all. To be sure, this sentence can also be interpreted in a more literal fashion. Perhaps Tommy is on a diet, or he has taken religious VOWl that allow him to eat only the plainest food. Or he simply has a ditlerent opinion about what is delicious than the speaker. Under any of these circumstances, sentence (3) will not have a universal implicature. The universal force of (3) depends quite clearly on the presence of negation. Remove il. and the universal force disappears: (41

Tommy will eat the most delicious food.

This sentence is simply a statement about what Tommy will do with the most delicious food. Nothing is said or to be inferred about any other kind of food. This has to do with the scalar nature of the inferences. From an

132

JACK MOliKSIiMA AND HOTZE RULLMANN

inclination to eat food type x we may infer an inclination to eat food type y, il y is higher on a scale of lastiness {on the plausible but defeasible pragmatic assumption that people prefer the more tasty food>, but not vice versa. Put somewhat more formally, the scale is based upon a propositional. SCHEMA P(x) such that for any x, and X2 we have: PU pragmatically implies P v*)

just in case x, is lower than or equal to x2 on the scale. In (3), the propositional schema is based upon the open proposition Tommy will not eat .v. Universal readings come about when an expression A in a sentence S denotes the lower endpoint of the scale associated with the open proposition which we get when the expression is replaced by a variable (using standard logical notation, we can write this as S|A/xl, the result of replacing A in S by x). Such lower endpoints can be expressed by superlatives, but also by other expressions which are conversationally or conventionally linked to the endpoint of a scale. Consider a sentence like (5): (5)

Even the Pope would find this scene acceptable.

Given what we know or conventionally believe about the Pope, sentence (5) might be taken to express universal acceptance. In (5). the Pope is used as a convenient lower endpoint on a scale of permissiveness. The scalar adverb even plays an important role in (5). It marks its focus as lower endpoint. as the least likely candidate to satisfy the propositional schema x w ould find this scene (uceptahle. Note that by adding negation here, we reverse the scale, and we get the odd elfect of seeing the Pope at the pinnacle of permissiveness:

(6)

Not even the Pope would find this scene acceptable.

Before ending this section, we need to address one more issue regarding pragmatic scales and even. Is il the case that even picks out an absolute endpoint on the scale (as assumed by Karttunen and Peters (1979) and

Fauconnier (1975a, b)). or is it suflicienl to say that it locates a point towards the end of the scale (roughly the position of Francescolli (1995) and Kay (1990))? We are inclined to favor the latter position, in light of examples such as those in (7). due to Kay (1990):

(7)

a.

Not only did Mary win her first round match, she even made it to the semi-finals.

b

.

Ed has two children, and Fred may even have three.

SCALARITY AND POLARITY

133

In any context, presumably, the finals would be the endpoint of a scale of the leasl likely round for Mary to have made would be the finals, and not the semi-finals. Similarly. '

rounds, and not the semi-finals. Pul diU erenily.

three is not the maximum number of children one can have. We will assume

then that even and other scalar particles require a focus partner denoting some value sulliciently close to the lower endpoint on a scale, and that all points higher on the scale are pragmatically implicated.

3

.

Minimizers and maximizers

Besides superlatives and expressions marked with scalar adverbs like even, natural languages have a number of ways to mark in more or less conventional ways lower endpoints of scales. One group of expressions is known as minimizhrs in the literature on polarity items: expressions denoting a minimal quantity or extent or degree. For instance, the statements in (8) arc all equivalent: (S)

a.

Fred did not understand anything of what 1 said.

b

Fred did not understand the least bit of what 1 said.

c

Fred did not understand even one thing of what I said.

.

.

d

.

Fred did not understand one iota of what 1 said.

In (8b -d). we are ranking amounts of information. If Fred did not understand even a minimal amount of the information provided by then presumably he did not understand anything. Hence (8b ~d) are equivalent to (8a). In (8b). we have an example with a superlative, in (8c). an example with a scalar adverb. and in (8d), an example with a conventional minimizer. one/an iota. Some times, we can redundantly combine these scalar markings, and in so doing doubly mark the fact that we are dealing with scalar endpoints: (9)

Fred did not understand even/so much as one iota of what I said.

Conventional scalar endpoints may be strict polarity items, like one iota. In that case they only show up in negative clauses and a few other contexts. such as conditional and interrogative clauses. Other expressions are used both as polarity items with quanlificational force, and as regular indefinites. This is, for example, the case with a thing, a word, a penny.

134

JACK IIOEKSEMA AND HOTZE Rl'LLMANN

(10)

a

b

(11)

a

a

John said a word.

.

John did not hear a thing. John heard a thing.

.

b

(12)

John did not say a word.

.

.

John did not pay a penny. John paid a penny.

.

b

.

The negative sentences have two uses or senses, whereas the corresponding positive ones are not ambiguous. Sentence (10b) may be a little bit odd. but it stales that John said a word. (10a) could be the denial of (l()b) (maybe John did not say one word, but two. or he managed to say only part of a word), but a more common reading is the one where it does not simply deny that John said a word, but makes the stronger claim that he did not say

anything. Similarly for (10a) and (lla>. In each example we have a noun which may conventionally serve to denote some minimal amount or extent. It is important to stress here that the endpoint of the scale is conventional. and should not be taken literally. Thus, in order to express that we did not spend anything, we might either say that we did not spend a cent, or that we did not spend a nickle. or a dime. Surely a dime is less minimal than a

cent or nickle, but for the purposes of conversation, this dillerence need not be important. All three coins denote lower endpoints on a money scale, but the granularity of the scale may vary. Similar remarks could be made about centimeters and millimeters, or about words, syllables and letters. They are all conventional minimizers. even if some are more minimal than others.

The conventionality of minimizers is best illustrated by the many idiomatic expressions in this class, such as a redeem, a Chinaman s chance, a hill ofbeans etc.1 Their relation to the endpoint of a pragmatic scale is now conventional and arbitrary. We also point out that translations of minimizers are by no means always conventional minimizers in another language. Thus while a word and a tlung arc both commonly used as minimizers in English, only a word has a counterpart in Dutch which is likewise used as a minimizer. compare: %

(13)

a.

Niemand geloofl er

b

nobody believes there a word of Nobody believes a word of it' Niemand deed een ding.

-

.

nobody

did a

thing

Nobody did a thing'

een woord van.

135

SCALARITY AND POLARITY

" ?*£Ik kon

c

geen ding /.ien. 1 could no thing see I couldn't see a thing'

Minimizers are not the only kinds of polarity items with scalar characteristics. There is another, rather less well-known, class of expressions conventionally denoting a maximal (or at least, very high) degree or quantity (cf. Von Bergen and Von Bergen 1993: Van der Wouden 1994). We may call them maxinuzers. Some English examples of this type are given below: (14)

a.

I wouldn't hurl her for the w orld.

b

I cannot for the life of me understand his motives. He would not work there /o/ all the tea in China.

.

c

.

d

.

e

.

f

.

They wouldn't touch it with a ten-foot pole. The guy couldn't spell to save his life. Wild horses could not drag me to that party.

Note that these examples lose their idiomatic sense as soon as negation is removed. Note also that a good many of these expressions depend on the presence of can. This modal may support scalar inferences to contexts otherwise lacking them. For example, if someone can t lift the lightest weight, we may pragmatically infer that he cannot lift any weight. If on the other hand he did not lift the lightest weight, it does not follow in any way that he did not lift any weight. Similarly for many of the examples in (14). If wild horses cannot drag you somewhere, nothing can. on the assumption that "wild horses denotes by convention a maximum of strength. But if wild horses did not drag you, why. something or someone else might have. The maximizers in (14) therefore work only in certain contexts, especially modal ones with can or will/would. The same is true for the comparable Dutch examples are listed in (15): '

"

(15)

a.

Zij konden het met de beste wil van do wereld niet they could it with the best will of the world not begrijpen. understand

b

.

They could not understand it at all' Daar krijgen ze me met geen lien paarden heen. there get they me with no ten horses to They won't drag me there, not even with ten horses'

136

JACK HOEKSEMA AND HOTZE RULLMANN

c

.

Hi] was voor de duvcl en zijn ouwc moer he

was for

the devil and his

old

niel bang.

mother not afraid

He was afraid of no-one" Some German maximizers are heim besten Willen with the best will', a close

counterpart to ihe Dutch nwi de besfe wil van de wtnld, ton die Wclr for the *

and these counterparts to touch with a Ixirgepole.mit der Beifizanxc anfassen to touch with the pincers mit der MistgaM anfassen to touch with the pitchfork Perhaps one could object here that the obvious dillerences in size between pitchforks and pairs of pincers do not qualify the latter as maximizers. However, the relevant distinction here appears to be between touching something w ith the bare hands and touching it with some appliance: so not touching something with some appliance means: not even touching it indirectly. The size of the appliance is then of minor importance. Elements which combine only with minimal endpoints such as Dutch oak maar or German ouch nw\ do not combine with these polarity-sensitive maximizers: world

,

'

"

,

'

.

,

(16)

a. *Niemand kon

hct ook maar met de beste wil van de

nobody could it wereld begrijpen. world

even

with the best

will of

the

understand

Nobody could understand it, not even with the best of intentions' b

.

"Niemand konnte es auch nur

nobodv

could

beim besten Willen

it even with the

best

will

vcrstehen. understand

Nobody could understand it. not even with the best of intentions'

It is important to note that items which would appear to be opposites on a scale, such as remotely and approximately, may both be used as minimal endpoints for the purposes of focus adverbials. The reason behind this

seemingly schizophrenic state of affairs is that different scales are conventionally associated with this expressions. Remotely is a minimal endpoint on

a scale (closely

remotely), whereas approxnnately may also be used as

a minimal point on a scale (exactly, approximately). Compare:

137

SCALARITY AND POLARITY

(17)

a. b

.

Ted was not even remotely interested. Fred did not even approximately know the answer.

In Dutch, wc therefore lind items denoting distance, like inde versle verte in the furthest distance as well as expressions denoting closeness, like hi/ henadering |by approximation! approximately*, in combination with ooknuuu. '

,

4

.

Two types of scales

An interesting fact regarding the scales associated with minimizers was noted by Fauconnier (1975b). While usually pragmatic scales for superlatives arc associated with open propositions P(x) derived by substituting x for the superlative in a sentential frame, minimizers may also give rise to a scale associated with an existential statement. Fauconnier s examples arc: '

(18)

a.

Martha didn't hear even the loudest noise.

b

Martha didn't hear even the faintest noise.

.

Strange as it may seem, both sentences have universal force, expressing something roughly equivalent to (19)

Martha didn't hear any noise.

This is not expected if both (iXa.b) are associated with the same scale. However. Fauconnier argues that they are not. in I ISa), the scale is associated with the open proposition Martha can t heai x. If Martha cannot hear the loudest noise on some scale, she cannot hear any of the lesser noises either. we may infer pragmatically. Note, however, thai (I8a) presupposes the existence of noises. Sentence (18b). on the other hand, appears to give rise lo another scale, of noises existing within Martha s hearing range. They '

could be said lo be associated with the open proposition then isn tx '

'

(where

x ranges over sounds or noises). If ihcre isn t even a slight noise, then we infer there aren't any louder noises either. As a consequence, (I8b) expresses that Martha did not hear any noises, not because she was unable to (as (18a) appears to suggest) due to deafness or distance lo the source of the noise, but because there weren't any. So whereas example (18a> functions as a universal statement with an existential presupposition, (18b) lacks this presupposi lion. Il appears, then, that we must distinguish between proposition-related

I3K

JACK IIOEKSUMA AND HOT/l. Kl I IMANN


(ISbi have superlatives modified by even, only (18b) allows for the substitution of so nuu h os for even:

(20)

'

a.

.Martha didn t hear so much as the loudest noise.

b

Martha didn t hear so much as the tannest noise.

.

This diU'crcnce cannot be explained by the polafit) >ciisiii\ ity of so much as aione: both (2()a) and (20b) are negative sentences. The relevant factor is. clearly. the fact that the fanuc.st muse denotes the bottom of an existential scale.

whereas tlw UnuU si noise does not. It denotes the bottom of a p-related scale.

The examples in (21) show the effects of polantv lensitivity: (2!)

a. b

.

Even the faintest noise bother> Maltha. 'So much as the faintest noise bothers Martha.

Without the presence of negation, even is admissable. but s<> much as is not. In the next section, we look at two Dutch counterparts of so much as.

5

.

Oak maar and zelfs maar

The adverbial expression ook maar has been well-studied in the Dutch literature on negative polarity items (cf. Seuren 1976; Vandeweche 1980 81.

Zwaita 19S1, W(>. 1 98 Hockscma 1983: Hodcstn 1991: Kas 1993:

Rullmann 1994: Rullmann and Hockscma 1997: Van der Wouden 1994.

1997). A central issue in this work is the fact that ook maai appears to select

a smaller set of environments than, for instance, evtl and any in English. Zwartt . I' SI) noted that n-words are good triggers for ook moor, but that certain other triggers are not: (22)

a.

Niemand zal ook maar ids

bereiken.

nobody will even anything achieve Nobody will achieve anything whatsoever' "Weinigen zullen ook maar iets bereiken. '

b

.

few

will

even

anything achieve

Few will achieve anything whatsoever'

'

139

SCALAR1TY AND POLARITY

c

.

*Niel iedercen zal

ook maai iets

bereiken.

not everxone will even anything achieve Not everyone will achieve anything whatsoever' '

To account for these observations, Zwarts proposed lhal ook maar is sensitive to the presence of the logico-semantic properly oi anti additivity: (23)

Amiiulditivity. A function f is anti-additive just in case f(a v b) = f(a) a f(b)

Anti-additive expressions (i.e. expressions denoting anti-additive functions) are characterized by the fact that a disjunction in their scope in equivalent to a wide-scope conjunction. In the case of negation, one of the so-called De Morgan laws which govern the logical relations between the boolean connectives in fad directly states that it is anti-additive:

(24)

-(pvq) <

(-p) & hq)

For expressions such as nobody, anli-additivity predicts the equivalence of (25a) and (25b): (25)

a. b

.

Nobody ate or drank. Nobody ate and nobody drank.

Few and not all, on the other hand, are not anti-additive because there is no

such equivalence among the sentences of (26) and (27): (26)

a.

Few ate or drank.

b

Few ale and few drank.

a.

Not all ate or drank.

b

Not all ate and not all drank.

.

(27)

.

The inference from the a-sentences to the b-sentences is valid, but the

converse is not. This is clearest, perhaps, in the case of not ail. If everybody ate or drank and nobody did both, then (27b) may be true but (27a) is false. In the case of few, it also helps to ihink of a situation where the eaters and the drinkers form disjoint sets. Even if either set is relatively small (hence supporting the claim that few ate and that few drank), their union may be too large to also count as small and the statementjeiv ate or drank may be false. All anti-additive expressions are downward-entailing in the sense of Ladusaw (1979). This notion can be dctined as follows:

140

JACK HOEKSEMA AND HOTZE RULLMANN

(28)

Do\vn\K'ardcn!aihn\>: "

a function f is downward entailing ill l'(p vq) entails f(p)Af{q). for any p. q.

It is now easy to see thai downward-entailingncss is a necessary but not sullicient condition for anti-adduivity. Few and not all are downwardentailing, but not anli-addilive. In the literature, they arc some times called weak triggers, as opposed to anti-additive expressions, which are termed strong triggers. Weak triggers may licence polarity items such as any, according to Ladusaw s theory, but are not acceptable as triggers for ook moat, if Zwarts account is correct. Now compare (22) to (29) below: '

'

(29)

a. b

.

c

.

Nobody will achieve anything. Few will achieve anything. Not all will achieve anything.

According to our (noncontroversial) judgments, Ladusaw's theory makes

correct predictions concerning the licensing of any by weak triggers. One of '

the goals of this paper is to test Zwarts theory against a corpus of about 3300 occurrences of ook maar. The main goal, however, of this paper is a detailed comparison of ook maar and zelfs maar. Unlike ook maar. its nearequivalent zvlfs maar has not been studied very extensively, presumably because it is less common than ook maar (the latter expression is about 3 limes as frequent overall). To gain a first impression of the dill erential behavior of ook maar and zelfs maar, consider the question in (30) and its three possible answers: '

(30)

Q:

Kan Jan vijf meter ver springen? Can Jan jump 5 meters?' At: Ja. Ik denk dat hij zelfs ZES meter ver kan springen. yes I think thai he even six meters far can jump Yes. I think he can even jump as far as six meters' A2: Nee. Ik denk met dat hij zelfs maar VIER meter ver kan '

no

1

think not thai he even

four

meters far can

springen. jump. No. I don't think he can jump even FOUR meters'

A3:?Nee. Ik denk niel dat hij ook maar VIER meter ver kan no

I

think not thai he even

four

meters far can

141

SCALARITY AND POLARITY

springen. jump. No. I don't think he can jump even FOUR meters' A4: Nee. Ik dcnk met dal hij ook maar EEN meter ver kan '

no

I

think not that he even

one

meter far can

springen. jump. No. 1 don't think that he can jump even ONE meter/ While answers Al,

A2 and A4 are perfectly acceptable. A3 is less than

perfect. A possible explanation for the contrast between A2 and A3 is

Ul:l:c u v: b\ the iwo perspectives or. the presuppositioii ol i wpu sketched in Section 2 above, in particular the dittcrcnt opinions regarding the issue of whether even picks out relative or absolute endpoints. On a numerical scale the natural numbers in their usual order. I is an absolute endpoint. but 4 is not. Data such as (30) might therefore suggest the following hypothesis: .

(31)

Hypothesis Zi'lfs maar is associated with a relative presupposition, whereas

ook maar is associated with an absolute presupposition (i.e. concerning an absolute minimum on a scale), In other words: whereas ook maar carries the presupposition in (32), corre sponding to the presupposition proposed by Rooth (19S5) for negative occurrences of even, the adverbial zeifs maar has the one in (33). In these definitions, a represents the element in focus. F is the focus frame (i.e. the context of the focus element minus the triggering element, here represented as the negation sign -i)s x ranges over points on the scale and > denotes the relation is more likely than* or. if one prefers. Fauconniers relation of pragmatic enlailment. which defines the scale. '

(32)

3x[x*a & -F(x)l & Vx[x*a -> F(a) > F(x)|

(33)

3xlx*a & -F(x) & F(a)> F(x)|

For instance, the relevant presupposition for answer A3 in (30) would be as in (34), with F=he-can-jump x-mcters and a = 4:

(34)

3x(x#«4 & - he-can-jump-x-metersl

142

JACK HOtKSEMA AND HOTZE RULLMANN

This presupposition is in conflict with our general knowledge of the world: if someone cannot jump four meters, it does not follow he cannot jump any distance at all. Consequently, the perceived intuitive oddness of A3 has a pragmatic basis. Note, however, that hypothesis (31> does not always make hard predictions. The notion of a pragmatic scale is vague in many contexts. There is not always an objective criterion for deciding which elements are on the scale and what the endpoinls on this scale are. Sometimes, one would like to construct a scale on an ad hoc basis, given what seems to be the intention of the speaker. Consider minimizers with the numeral two. Pre theoretically, they should not exist, since 2 is not a minimal amount in the same way that 1 is. Yet various languages have them. Thus consider an English example like (35): (35)

My niece doesn't care two straws about it.

Apparently, it is of no significance here that one straw is even less than two straw s. We are invited to interpret two straws here as minimal on some scale of degrees of concern. Given this, it need not surprise us to find examples of oak maar + numerals other than one. e.g.: (36)

En eigenlijk het ergste was dal dc vrouw noch de moedcr and actually the worst was that the wife nor the mother ook maar twee woorden Spaans sprak even two words Spanish spoke And the worst thing, actually, was that neither the wife nor the mother spoke so much as two words of Spanish '

Such examples make it fairly difficult to evaluate hypothesis (31) in a simple and straightforward way. Is it refuted by examples such as (36) or do

we have to view two words of Spanish as sufficiently minimal to serve as the absolute endpoint on some scale of linguistic knowledge? In favor of the latter perspective, we note that examples such as (36) do not improve when we replace two by three or some other number higher than one. Numerals in minimi/ers are almost always one. sometimes, but rarely, two. or a half, and never, it seems, three, five or nine.

The vagueness inherent in the notion endpoint on a scale' makes it particularly useful to do a corpus study. Even if it is hard to make precise predictions about grammaticality of ook maar and zelfsmaar on the basis of hypothesis (31). we expect to find dilfercnt tendencies in use if this hypothesis

143

SCALAR1TY AND POLARITY

is anywhere near the truth. According to this hypothesis sentences with moor are characterized by the presupposition that the constituent in focus denotes the endpoinl of a scale. Because presuppositions must be uncontro versial to speaker and hearer alike, the use of ookmaar will be more easily accepted when the focus constituent denotes a conventional endpomt. Clearly conventional endpoinls are idiomatic minimizers and minimizing superlatives

{a jot. a mowbairs chance in hell, rlw least bit. the slightest inkling, give Q '

tinker s

damn, hurt u jh. sa\ boo to a noose, lift a finger, sleep a nink). as well as indefinite determiners and pronouns {an\. ever) which are standardly viewed as minimal elements on a scale of quantifiers (Horn 19S9). When the focus element is not so clearly a scalar endpoinl the hearer must do some accommodation. Consider for instance the following example: .

(37)

Aan niemand in Verrieres heb je ook maar een kaartje to nobody in Verrieres have you even a postcard geschreven; written

You haven't written so much as a postcard to anyone in Verrieres'

While postcards do not strike us as natural endpoints on some scale of writings in the context of postal interaction, where postcards would be compared with letters, postcards would rank as minimal. As for zelfs maar. our hypothesis (31) predicts that it does not seek out conventional endpoints or minimizers, even though such expressions are not incompatible with it Instead, we expect to find more combinations with definite NPs or proper names, or verbs and other predicates. As Vandeweghe < 1980 81) noted, zelfs maar is preferred in the final conjunct of a disjunction: ,

(38)

Niemand is rijk of zelfs maar/ook maar welgesteld. nobody is rich or even well-olF

Out off context, well-off would hardly count as a minimal element on a scale of financial comfort. The disjunction, however, sets up a context where only two levels are directly compared, and for the ordered set {rich, w ell-off), welloff qualifies as the minimal element. On a fuller scale of financial situations. well of) would not, of course, count as the absolute minimum: poor, destitute or penniless would be better candidates for that status, but we could still postulate a relative presupposition, given that w ell off is ranked below rich,

144

JACK IIOEKSEMA AND HOTZE RULLMANN

At this point we might reconsider our hypothesis (31). According to this hypothesis, zelfsnmar has a relative presupposition and ookmaar an absolute presupposition. As a plausible alternative, we might consider the following hypothesis: (39)

Oak mam is used primarily for conventional minimizers and zclfs

maar for conversational (scontextual) minimi/.ers. In the case of disjunctions, we could view the disjuncts as the elements on an ad hoc scale, constructed for ihe purposes of the conversation. In addition to example (38) above, consider the following: (40)

Een schat van een man, maar hij had nog nooit van zijn leven een pyramide. Maori, eskimo. papoea of zelfs maar de Sint Bavo

kerk in Haarlem gezien.4 A sweet man. but he had never in his life seen a pyramid. Maori, eskimo, papua. or even the St. Bavo church in Haarlem' The scale is one of items someone is likely to have seen. The St. Bavo church in Haarlem might count as more likely to have been seen than the Egyptian pyramids or Maoris. The contextual nature of the ranking is obvious. Had the author of (40) been from Egypt or New Zealand, the St. Bavo-church would not have been considered minimal.

It is not cleiir that there is an easy choice between (31) and (39). Both hypotheses are relative simple and have some plausibility, but it is not clear that we can empirically distinguish them. In each case we rely on contextu-

al information for zclfs maar: under hypothesis (31), zelfs maar points at some element on a scale which is less than (more minimal than) some other

elements (which elements we are talking about is determined by the context), while under (39) it points at the absolute minimum of an ordered set that is given contextually. More significant is perhaps the fact that (39)

isolates conventionality as a minimize as a crucial feature of expressions accompanied by ook maar,

SCALARITY AND POLARITY

6

A corpus study of ook maar and zelfs maar

.

6

.

145

1 Description of she corpus

In order to study our hypotheses about ook maar and zelfs maar, we collected over 4300 occurrences of ook maar en zelfs maar. Our database is composed of material from two types of sources. 926 occurrences were collected from various electronic corpora made available by INL, the Institute for Dutch Lexicology in Leiden, the so-called 5 million word corpus, the 27 million word corpus and the 38 million word corpus, as well as the Dutch material on the CD-ROM produced by the European Corpus Initiative. These corpora contain mainly contemporary newspaper and magazine texts, as well as some books and TV newscast texts. The other type of source was manual collection from books, newspapers and the Internet by Hocksema. carried out over a seven-year period. Manual collection was especially important to get material from older sources, which arc

not yet readily available in electronic corpora.5

As we will show below,

usage patterns of ook maar and zelfs maar have shifted considerably in recent times. According to our data, the current division of labour between the two expressions was considerably less clearcut at the beginning of the 20th century, and has evolved gradually. 62 .

Triggers

The first question we address here is whether there are differences among the triggers responsible for the licensing of ook maar and zelfs maar. In Table 1. we present the main results of our investigation. Some dilferences stand out immediately, such as the large dilference in the Category "scope of negation Zelfs maar is far more common in the scope of negation than ook maar. This dilference can be explained away as the result of a strong blocking effect that concerns direct (clause-mate> negation. As pointed out in Van der VVoudcn (1994), ook maar and zelfs maar are not permitted if preceded directly by negation: "

.

(41)

a. *Jan sprak niet ook maar een woord. Jan spoke not so much as a word

146

JACK HOEKSIZMA AND HOIZE RULLMANN

Table J. Triggering contextsfor ook maaru/n//.clfs maar ook maar

context

N=.

l.<

conditional clause

zelfs iiuuir NaI003 6%

scope of geen no scope of n-word scope of negation complement of negative predicate "

8

12'*

I4«

I3«

12

19%

11%

13%

restriction of universal quantifier

7%

2%

/v/w-clausc

»

5%

question

5%

5%

"

mffawf-ctause

12%

«)lhcr

13%

6

b

.

*Jan heefl niel zclfs maar geaarzcld. Jan has

not so much as hesitated

If we replace nU't not' by another trigger, e.g. nooil never", the resulting sentences arc fully grammatical: (42)

a. b

.

Jan sprak nooit ook maar ecn woord. Jan spoke never so much as a word Jan hecft nooit /elfs maar geaar/eld. Jan has

never so much as hesitated

Also, when negation docs not directly precede ook maar/zelfs maar.. there is

no blocking effect. (43)

a.

Jan heeft niel met ook maar iemand gesproken. Jan has not with so much as anyone spoken

b

Jan heeft niet

.

Jan has

met hem

zelfs maar setelefoneerd.

never with him so much as

telephoned

Van der Wouden (1994) attributes the ungrammaticality of sentences such as (41a,b) to positive polarity. Positive polarity items are ungrammatical in the scope of direct negation, but not necessarily in the scope of other negative elements such as n-words. This would then explain the dillcrence between <41a,b) and (42a.b). However, this account does not explain why the sentences in (43a.b) are acceptable. Adjacency does not usually play a role

147

SCALARITY AND POLARITY

in the grammar of positive polarity items, and so the question remains whyit should play one here. We suggest that the blocking elFect is the one familiar from morphology, where we often find that one way of expressing a meaning may block another one. e.g. morphological expression may block syntactic expression. In this case, we presume that niet + ookmaar/zeljsmaar is blocked by a special form, nitt cens. which has the same meaning 'not even In this use as a focus particle, eens is solely to be used with sentential negation, never with n-words or other triggers. Although sequences like nooit eens exist, they involve the use of eens as a temporal adverb, and can be glossed as never once Niei eens is always a unit, the elements of this expression must be adjacent, and this, in our view, accounts for the observa*

.

"

"

.

tion thai only ook maar/zelfs maar arc blocked only when adjacent to negation. Given that ook maar and zcifs maar are equally blocked by directly preceding negation, why do we find a big dilfcrence in frequency with negation? The answer is simple: as we will sec below, zelfsntaar is particularly common in the second disjunct of a disjunction. When the trigger is negation, the result is a sequence of the form niei X ofzelfs maar Y not X or even Y\ In this context, met and zelfs maar are not adjacent, and consc quently. there is no blocking ell ect. We can verify this claim directly byinspecting our corpus once more. If we only consider those occurrences of zelfs maar which are not in disjunctions, the percentage of occurrences triggered by niet drops from 19% to 10*#. or about equal to what we found '

for ook maar.

In the same way. it appears that the considerable ditlerences in the category of ivjY//oH/-clauses (i.e. finite and infinitival clauses introduced by the preposition zonder without ) can be explained by the fact that zelfs maar '

is very common in disjunctions. While about 2096 of all occurrences of ook maar and zelfs maar taken together are triggered by without, for disjunctive contexts with either ook maar or zelfs maar the percentage is a mere 8%. Disjunctive contexts exhibit a strong preference for negation and n-words as triggers. Why this is so. we do not know, but it seems to be independent of the behavior of ook maar and zelfs maar. for we noted a similar elfect with n/j-polarily items such as wie dan ook whoever, anyone : in disjunctive contexts negation is far more common as a trigger than elsewhere. Table 1 does not tell us much about the theoretically interesting issue of whether Zwarts (1981. 1986, 1998) anti-addilivity hypothesis is supported '

*

us

JAC K HOUKSliMA AND HOTZt RULLMANN

by the corpus da!a. As it turns out, the hypothesis is not fully confirmed. Certain classes of triggers were absent according to prediction, such as '

negated universal quantifiers like nicr iedenen not everybody (at least as triggers of oak maar), but other types of triggers, such as weimg Mittle. few nauwelijks hardly' and Zfilden seldom' did show up, and even a few '

.

positive occurrences. Some examples are given in (44) for ook ntoor and (45 ) for zelfs moan (44)

a.

Maar hij heeft weinig vertrouwen dat Shamir ook maar een

duimbreed toegecft. b

.

Bui he has little faith that Shamir will give in even an inch" Hot is toch nauwelijks voorstelbaardat joumalisten (...| zich daaraan ook maar iels gelegen laten liggen.' For it is hard to imagine that journalists would care anything at all about that Wij bleven aldoor hopen dat de tsaar (X)k maar de geringsle concessie zou doen aan het volk1 '

c

.

We kept on hoping that the czar would make even the slightest concession to the people *

d

.

Ik wou dat er op mij ook maar iemand zo verliefd was.9 I would that anyone at all |lit.: even anybody) were so in love with me/

(45)

a.

Ze wemelen van de verrassende invallen. niet altijd even coherent of zelfs maar bcgrijpelijk. maar wel steeds barstend van het leven. van oorspronkelijkheid en inventiviteit. They teem with surprising ideas, not always very coherent or even intelligible, but always brimming with life, with

originality and inventivity b

.

10

'

Naluurliik is van het zeer omvangrijke oeuvre dat zoo mocst onislaan. lang niet allcs supcrieur of zelfs maar goed Of course within the vast collection of work that had to

originate in this way, not nearly everything was superior or

even good c

.

'

11

Binnenin krijgen ze echter zelden een hoofdrol of zelfs maar een nil. '

Inside they rarely get a leading part or even Ijusl] a part.'

149

SCALAR1TY AND POLARITY

d

U denkl, dal ik anti-kommunist ben. of kommunisl, of zelfs

.

maar iemand die bet lets kan schelen.13 You Ihink that I am an anti communist, or a comnnmisl. or even someone who care about ihis e

'

De Foxlerricr is levendig. snel in bcwcgingcn, doordringend van uildrukking. allijd klaar om in le gaan op zelfs maar de

.

gcringslc uitdaging.14 The Fox terrier is lively, fast in his movements, expressive.

always ready to respond to even the slightest challenge.

'

We can interpret these findings in two ways: (A) There is variation among speakers, some of whom are strict while others are more relaxed in their use of the two expressions. (B) The restriction to anti-additive contexts is not absolute, but a strong preference. Our corpus data do not allow us to decide the issue here. More feasible is a comparison of ook maar and zelfs maar. As we see in Table 2 below, all classes of non-anti-additive environments are more common with zelfs maar.

in spite of the fact that zelfs maar is the less common variant by fan Tublc 1. Non-antt'iHidiU\ v lomexis for ook maar om/zelfs maar

context

ook maar

stopc of negated universal scope of weimg, minder, nu-i veei

zeljs maar

0

7

4

12

8

H

0

5

14

19

Icw'htllc. less, not much'

scope of ntiinvt'lijks/witper hardly" scope of Zftden seldom positive occurrences .

'

'

From the summary in Table 3. we see that neither expression has a strong tendency to show up in non-anli-additive contexts. The diHerence

between the two expressions is highly significant, however. The x2 value is 81.2. p< 0.001. Our conclusion is that the anti-additivity requirement of Zwarts (1981) and subsequent work holds more strongly for oak maar. but is not absolutely obeyed by either expression in our corpus. The positive occurrences of ook

150

JACK HOEKSEMA AND HOT/H RULLMANN

Table . Summary non-anu-addmvc

anti-acklilivc


26

3287

zelfs nuutr

51

952

mmn that wc noted all occur in nonvcridical contexts (cf. also Zvvarts 1995: Giannaludou 1997. 1998). Such contexts are delined as follows:

(46)

Nonveridicdity A context X

Y of a sentence S is nonvcridical just in case XSY docs not imply S.

Hence from the truth of the embedding statement we may not conclude the truth of the embedded statement. Typical examples of sentences in nonveridical contexts, besides straightforward negative occurrences, are complements to "opaque verbs like hope, wish etc.15 The occurrences of ook mam in <44c.d) are licensed within such contexts. While this kind of licensing is marginal and not always acceptable, these examples show that we cannot entirely eliminate this possibility. "

63 .

Focus constituents

The main dillerences between ook nmar and zelfs mam are located in the

sets of expressions which they take as focus constituents. While there arc no absolute dillerences. there is major variation in preferences. Table 4 below lists the major classes of focus constituents and for each of the two adverbials, the percentage of occurrences of that adverbial with these types of focus constituent.

The majority (64%) of occurrences of ook maar are combinations w ith indefinite noun phrases of various kinds, whereas the largest group of occurrences of zelfs maar are combinations with predicates. Among the group of indefinites, there are major differences between indetinite pronouns and enig. which almost exclusively combine with ook maar. and other indelinitcs. which arc less exclusive, although they likewise prefer ook maar. Definites clearly prefer zelfs maar. but superlatives pattern with indetinites. rather. This makes sense, since the superlatives in question are of the

151

SCALAR1TY AND POLARITY

T.iblc

4. Focus amlitluMs of uok maar ami /ell's maar

focna tonslitucnl type

ook nmar

adverbial

-

t

t-n

'

'

-

a

.

7% m

17%

( N

22% 6%

"

emg any + N indclinitc pronoun "

// < maar

1%

+ N

one

"

«

17'r

definite NF een

-

,

19%

bare nnun

0 V*

superlative predicate

9%

..

.

5%

8% 1'i

l...-!

5',?

minimi/cr kind, which is indefinite also in other respects, as we can see. for instance, from the fact that they appear in existential sentences, both in Enslish and in Dutch:

(47)

a. b

.

There wasn't the slightest disturbance all night. Er was nict hei geringste gcvaar. There wasn't the least danger'

Note that most other superlatives are not indefinite:16 <4S)

a. *There was the biggest student in my class. b .There were the brightest students. .

c

.

"There are the darkest stars.

Unlike the triggering data, the focus constituent data show great variation over time. The preference exhibited by predicates for zel/s maar over ook maar can be shown to have emerged gradually in the course of this century, cf. Table S.17 We take this to mean that the current division of labour between ook

maar and zelfs maar has gradually developed. The two expressions were originally very similar in meaning and distribution, bul have slowly drifted apart. The preference of predicates for zt'lfs maar can be explained most readily by our hypothesis (39k predicates are, on the whole, not conventional (minimal) endpoints on a scale. They can be endpoints on a conversational

scale: e.g. when we pragmatically contrast doing something with trying to do

J 52

JACK HOEKSEMA AND HOTZE RULLMANN

Table 5. UnuTftinft preffrfiut-/or :elfs ntaar wilh predicates

pen«>d

r rclts nuiar

N

1S(K)-I1>.M)

40**

6.*

I1).H>-I960

46*

83

IW -I X)

65%

203

something, or considering to do something. In English, a common minimizing predicate is begin to, as in. say. That docs not even begin to make sense. In Dutch, the counterpart of this predicate, beglmen fe, is not often used in this way. which suggests, once more, that there is some arbitrariness in the set of mimmizers.

Table 4 does not make a distinction between minimi/.crs and other

nouns. When we do this, further important dillerences between ook maar and :elfs maar are revealed.

Table 6. Indefiniu- mimmizers ami mmminimrt is

fftt V + nummi/er

eert * n
nokmaar

zel/s maar

yi%

9%

48%

52%

(N = 629) (N = 203)

While minimizing inderinites show a strong preference for ook maar other Indefinite noun phrases introduced by een a do not. There is also another elfect to be noted: minimizing expressions are generally more frequently preceded by the focus adverbials tmk maar and :elfs maar than other expressions. The difference between the raw frequencies 629 and 203 becomes even more striking if one bears in mind that the vast majority oi noun occurrences in any corpus does not belong to the minimizing cla.sv Even larger elfects can be noted for adverbials. Some adverbials. such as in het minst in the least*, een heetje 'a little bit*, enigszins 'in any way. slightly have the character of nunimizers, while others, such as vaak

.

'

'

'

*

,

*

often

.

wwJ

well*, and so on. do not have this character. Wo see this

diirerence reflected in the distribution of ook maar and :elts maar:

SCAI.AR1TY AND POLARITY

153

Table 7. Adverbial minm&en and mmmmimircrs

adverbial minimi/.er

(N=5K9)

adverbial nonmimmi/cr

(N=38)

oak imiar

Zflts maar

21

79*

Among detinites. a distinction can also be made between minimizers and nonminimizers. Most commonly, they arc nominalizalions of verbs which tend to be used as minimizing predicates, e.g. de schijn van "the semblance "

of

from the verb scMJnat: {49)

We moeten probercn om zclfs maar de schijn van schuld tc vermijden. Wc must try to avoid even the semblance of guilt"

On the whole, detinites clearly prefer zelfsmcun. but these minimizers also combine well with i>(>k maar.

Finally, wc should consider the special case of disjunctions. As we mentioned above, zelfs maar is preferred over ook maar as a focus adverb on the tinal disjunct of a disjunction. Disjunctions arc very common hosts for polarity items. This effect has become virtually absolute in recent times, as Table 8 shows.

Table s. Growing preftrenceforzdfsmaar in disjunctkms ,

period

N

'i 'fits nuiur

IXOO-I930

61

62

1930-1960

92

63

IWiD-1 WO

116

74

1990-1998

247

Just as wc saw in connection with Table 5. it turns out that the current

di\ ision of labour between the two expressions was less clearcut originally. and has become ever more pronounced in the course of the 20th century. Disjunctions form the strongest evidence in favor of the hypothesis in (39):

154

JACK HOEKSEMA AND UOT/M RULLMANN

because they involve an explicit comparison of elements, we can construct an ad hoc scale based on just the compared elements. Such scales need not be conventional, such as the typical scales associated with minimizers. but may depend entirely on pragmatic considerations, and knowledge of the world. 64 .

C i tmwunui rvquirements

The famous c-command restriction on polarity items, originally proposed by Klima (1964) in terms of the equivalent notion ini nnstnu tion w ith, has been adopted for Dutch by Hoekslra (1991 >. The primary evidence for c-command restrictions comes from the distribution of ook moar. Other polarity items tend to have a freer distribution (cf. Hoekscma 2000). .

However, even in the case of ook moot, the c-command requirement is not absolute. In our corpus, we found 14 occurrences of ook ntaar in positions not c comnumded by negation, or about 4 in every KKK) occurrences. Some examples are given in (50):

(50)

a.

Van een ook maar bij benadering ecrlijke of

an

even

re motel v

fair

was geen sprake.19

rechlspleging

administration of justice WAS no question There was no question of an even remotely lair administration of justice Een ook maar enigs/.ins bevredigende analyse kan men an even slightly satisfactory analysis can one *

b

.

bovenstaande moeilijk nocmen.20 the above

hardly

call

One can hardlv call the above an even remotelv satisfactorv

analysis

'

In the case of zdfs maar, the number of violations is significantly higher. both absolutely and relatively: 38 in a total of 1003. Examples are given in (51):

<5I)

a.

Een pad. of zelfs maar een spoor, is nergens tc bekennen.21 A path, or even a trail, is nowhere to be seen/

b

.

Spong vindt dal /.ells maar een spoortje /elfgenoegzaamheid (

| misplaatst is"

...

"

Spong finds even a trace of complacency to be misguided'

S( ALAklTY AM) ['(Jl.ARITY

155

The larger number of violations with zeljs maar can be ascribed to a single factor: out of 38 violations. 27 occur in disjunctions. Disjunctions have the unusual properly of receiving narrow scope with respect to negation even in topic or subject position where they are not c commanded by negation: (52)

a.

b

.

Appels of peren wil ik niet. apples or pears want 1 not 1 want neither apples nor pears' Leeuwen of beren eten geen sla. lions

or bears cat

no

lettuce

Neither lions nor bears eat lettuce'

It is this property, which is entirely indepem of polarity licensing, which in our view explains the larger amount of zelfs moar occurrences in positions not c commanded bv negation.

An overarching factor, which includes the above-mentioned elfcct of disjunction, is embedding. Almost all c-command violations involve embed-

ded occurrences of ook maar and zelfs maar. These expressions can be embedded within a topicalized clause (Hoekstra 1991). but also within topicali/ed PPs or NPs. as we see in (SOa.b). In each case, the embedding expression has narrow scope with respect to negation. In Hoeksema and Klein (1995) it is argued that ook maar indefinites take wide scope, which renders sentences like (53) ungrammatical. but in embedded contexts, they have the scopal properties of the larger embedding constituent. (For a broader discussion of embedding ell'ects and a pragmatic factor which explains these elFects. we refer to De Swart (1998).) (53) *Ook maar lets nieuws zei hij niet. even anything new said he not He didn't say anything new at all' While it might appear that the violations of c-command are too rare to take seriously, we would rather draw a diU crent conclusion. First of all. most triggers of polarity items do not engage in scope ambiguities and never give rise to c-command violations. This is the case with questions, conditional clauses, comparatives, restrictive relatives of universal and superlative noun phrases, complements of negative predicates, etc. In all of these cases. entirely clauses are marked as hosts for polarity items, and it does not matter where these items appear whether it be in subject position, object position, '

,

156

JACK HOEKSEMA AND HOIZB RULLMANN

as an adjunct, or elsewhere/ Only negation and negative quantisers or adverbials give rise to c-command violations. If we restrict ourselves to those cases only, the percentage of violations must be tripled for oak maor and doubled for zelfs maor. If we also consider the necessity of embedding contexts for violations, we will have lo conclude that the violations are not

at all marginal, in spite of their infrequency. If they are rare, it is because

they depend on a constellation of effects which itself is relatively uncommon. but not because they involve violations of principles of grammar. Another point worth making here is that connectivity etfects with pseudoclefts and other predicative constructions also militate against the idea that a c-command requirement holding at surface structure explains the distribution of polarity items like ook nuiar. As noted for instance in Heycock and Kroch (1999). the u'//-clause of a pscudocleft may contain the trigger for a polarity item in the focus position outside of that clause: (54)

He bought lots of textbooks: what he didn't buy was any good novels.

Here is an example illustrating this point for zelfs maor. (55)

Maar wal

but

in die

inventaris' ontbreckt. is zelfs maar een

what in that inventory' lacks.

is even

an

poging om de boodschappen van hel station le vergelijken2

"

attempt lo the messages to compare But what is lacking in that inventory' is so much as an attempt to compare the messages '

At a more abstract semantic level, the relevant part of (54) can be represented as a single clause, in which the polarity item is properly c-commanded by its trigger: (56)

He didn't buy any good novels.

Connectivity effects in pseudoclefts are incompatible with c-command requirements holding at surface structure or at the fairly surfacy level of Logical Form" invoked by May (1977). Linebarger (1981). Progovac (1994) and various other studies. They are not incompatible, however, with the idea that semantic scope, rather than c-command, predicts the distribution of polarity items. To conclude this section: both ook maar and zelfs maar exhibit c-com "

mand violations. The fact that such violations are far more common with

157

SCAl.ARITY AND POLARITY

zelfs maar is a direct result of an independent difference among the two expressions, which is that Zfilfs maar is stmngly preferred in disjunctions. Disjunctions may have narrow scope with respect to negation even when they asymmetrically c-command the negative expression. From this conclusion. we draw an empirical prediction: if ook maar had not had competition from zelfs maar. it would have yielded more c-command violations. We can directly test this prediction by looking at German. The German counterpart to oak maar is auch mo . This expression shows a word by word correspondence: auch is the cognate and grammatical counterpart of ook. and nur is the counterpart of Dutch maar. There is no expression in German corresponding to zelfs maar. In the next section, we will take a look at the German data, and verify our prediction.

7

.

German: The case of auch nur

In order to study the distribution of German auch nur. we collected a total of 413 occurrences from the Mannheim Corpus of German, various newspapers and journals on cd-rom. the German part of the cd rom of the European Corpus Initiative, the World Wide Web. and from a number of books and newspapers. The number of occurrences is large enough to allow comparison with the Dutch data, but not large enough for diachronic investigation of ongoing changes. When we compare the German data with the Dutch data. we find that auch nur has some of the characteristics of zelfs maar. rather than ook maar. For example, predicates are frequently focus conslituenls ofauch nur. The percentage (28%) is lower than that of zelfs maar (50%), but higher than the percentage for ook maar. This is roughly what one would expect, in a language where the opposition between zelfs maar and ook maar is neutralized.

Another difference, which we did not expect or predict, is the virtual absence of indefinite pronouns as focus constituents with auch nur. If we collapse the ook maar and zelfs maar data, we find that 14% involves combinations with indefinite pronouns, in particular lets something/ anything In German, indefinite pronouns make up about 1% of all focus constituents. In this respect. German resembles English, rather than Dutch. English indefinite pronouns, in particular any, resist modification by even or so much as. We will return to the point in the next section. In Table 9 below we present our main findings for German. '

*

.

158

JACK HOEKSEMA AND HOTZE RULLMANN

Table l). Foms amstuuvnts wish auch nxxr (N -413}

Focus type

%

adverbial

22

bare noun

2

detinue noun phra.se

6 M

ein + noun

1

indclmile pronoun

predicate

superlative

7

other

2

In our tabulations wc did not make a distinction between occurrences of ein as an article and occurrences as a numeral. In Dutch, the dilVerence

between numeral and article use corresponds to a dillerence in vowel quality, which is often represented orthographically: een is the numeral, cen or /i the article. In German, the dillerence is one of stress only, and is not represented in the spelling. Given the fact that our data are from written '

texts, it was not feasible to make the distinction which would have en-

hanced detailed comparison. Typical occurrences of auch nur that would have to be translated as zelfs moat in Dutch are given in the next examples. In the first example, the focus constituent is a predicate, and this constituent is the second member of a disjunction. In the second example, we have a focus constituent denoting a number

higher than 1, i.e. something which is not a minimi/er in an absolute sense.25 (57)

a.

Ein rebellischer oder auch nur bemerkenswert

a

rebellious

or

even

particularly

undisziplinierter Soldat bin ich nicht gewesen26 b

.

undisciplined soldier have I not been i wasn't a rebellious or even particularly undisciplined soldier' Ausserdem halt Neumann es fiir unverniinftig /u besides

considers Neumann it as unwise

glauben. dass em 38-Quadralmeter-Gotteshaus believe that an 38 square meter church ausreiche.

um auch nur

would suffice to

100

so much as 100

to

159

SCALAR1TY AND POLARITY

Gemcindemilgliedcr aufzunchmen. members of the congregation hold. '

Besides. Neumann finds it unwise to believe that a 38

square meter church would suffice lo contain even 100 congregation members. '

Example (57a) also illustrates that German auch nur allows for violations of the c-command requirement on polarity licensing. Among the 413 occurrences of auch nur that we collected, we found 15 violations of c-command.

which is a little under 4%. This corresponds exactly with the 3.8% we found

for zfijs mam . Inspection of the individual violations reveals lhal the same factors that we identilied for Dutch (embedding in larger consiituenls and in particular embedding in disjunctions) are operative in German for licensing auch nur in non-c-commanded positions. As regards the triggers of auch nur, the picture is similar to what we found for Dutch, with the same classes of triggering environments, and even about the same percentages of total usage for each environment. As in Dutch, anti additive contexts are far more prominent than non anti additive contexts, but the latter do exist: we found occurrences trigger by wenig few', kamn 'hardly', m// only', negated universals. and even some cases of positive occurrences in nonveridical or generic contexts. An example of triggering by a negated universal is given in the next example: (58)

Langst nicht alles, w as unter DOS und Windows by far not all w hat under DOS and Windows Lorbeeren sammelt, isi unter Unix cinzusetzen oder

laurels

gathers, is under Unix available

auch nur sinnvol. even

or

2'

useful

By no means all that gathers laurels under DOS and Windows can be used or is even useful under

'

Unix

We counted 11 occurrences of auch nur in non anti additive environments,

or about 2J% of all occurrences, which is. as expected, in between the 0.8% we found for ook maar and the 5.1'* for zelfs inaar. A more complete comparison of our Dutch and German data is given below in Table 10. w here we have collapsed our data for ook maar and zelfs maar,

160

JACK IIOEKSEMA AND MOTZIi RULLMANN

Table 10. Triggering trm ironiiii-nis for auch nur<Woi>k inuar/zcll's maar

cnvironmcnt/lriggcr

Gennan

Dutch

as soon as

1

1

before

%

4

03

1

.

tomparalivc conditional

15 OS

few/Hide fumtt}

11 03

1

03

negated universal

1

01

negation negative predicate

12

13

11

11

20

2i

n-word

.

03

1

question

6

5

loo

3

2

positive occurrences

(generic or nonvendical)

universal y.illioul other

8

.

6

6

18

20

1

2

English: even and so much as

English has two polarity-sensitive focus adverbials meaning even, one of which is the negative-polarity use of even itself (Rooth 1985: Rullmann 1997). the other being so much as (Heim 1984). We will follow here the line of reasoning in Rooth (1985) that there is a special use of even in negative contexts, leading to ambiguities such as the one in (59) where

If you do that even twice, you will be punished severely. 1

twice

could be read as being near the low end or near the high end of a scale. Wilkinson (1996) has argued against lexical ambiguity of even. opting instead for scopal ambiguity. We are not convinced by Wilkinsons arguments and refer to Rullmann (1997) for a rebuttal. When we look at trigger sets and focus conslilucnls for even and so much as, we find some major ditlercnces. In Table II below, we compare focus constituents for the two expressions: Most striking in this table is perhaps the virtual absence of indelinite

SCALAR1TY AND POLARITY

161

Table 11. Focus Constituenis oj even and so much as

Type of tocus consliluent

EVEN (N = SOl)

SO MUCH AS (N = 141)

adverbial nonmimmizer

2

0

adverbial minimj/er

8

"

a + nonmimmizer

9

24

a + mimmizer

2

15

a stoigit

1

4

superlative

2

0

deiimte noun phnac

5

4

one

2

2

bare noun

2

.i

65

50

predicate

pronouns such as anyone or ever. If we adopt the proposal in Lcc and Horn (1995) that any is inherently scalar, hence in its lexical semantics encodes the meaning of even, we could view the conspicuous absence of any and "

ever as a blocking effect. More precisely, it would be a blocking etlect of the economy kind, which rules out double marking of meaning. Many languages show instances of such blacking elVccts. for example languages which do not permit double negation or negative concord (where one negation could receive multiple exponents) such as classical Latin, or double marking of inflectional categories, such as plurality or the comparative. Of course,double marking is not universally ruled oul.oreven generally within a given language. Thus standard Dutch would be a clear case of a language permitting double marking among focus adverbials while resisting negative doubling, for instance. While the very expressions we have looked at in Dutch, ook maar and zelfs maar are themselves combinations of two focus

adverbs, we can even have more. e.g. the three-decker adverbials ook zelfs maar. zelfs ook maar in combination with expressions which themselves are already scalar in nature, such as idiomatic minimizers. This seems to stem from a more general tendency in Dutch to pile up particles. Here is a naturally-occurring example: (60)

Maar de hoge Noren in Oslo weigerden zelfs ook maar but the high Norwegians in Oslo refused even also but

met ons te praten.

'

with us

to talk

9

i u k hulksi-:m.\ and nor/.i. ki i i m \nn .

Bui the high-ranking Nonvcguins in Oslo refused to even talk with us.

"

If we assume blocking for English nrn am ainl similar combinations involving indelimtes. this account should not be extended too far. In panicular. we would not want to rule out evrn + minimizing superlatives, or indeed the redundant but grammatical combination of adverbials even so much as. The blocking principles at hand. then, while insiaiui.iuon> of a general

tendency to bar redundancy, must be quite parochial, pertaining to particular combmalions of focus adverbs and scalar indeflnites

Apart from indefinite pronouns, w hich as wc have seen do not constitute I sigmlicant category of focus constituents for either evt'ii or so mm h as. there are also some notable dillerences among the two expressions, such as the absence of adverbial focus constituents for so much as. Indeed, some of

the most common collocations with polarity sensitne even are conspicuously absent with w much as:

(61)

a. Fred was not evea so much as remotely interested. b Ernie was not even/'so much as mildly funny. .

Note that the dillerences w e find between cm-u and so much as are dilferent

from the ones we found for Dutch ttok maarizelfs maar. While there are some dillerences related to the minimi/er nonminimi/er distinction (so mm h '

<m occurs signilicantly more often with minimizing noun phrases), this factor does not appear to be as important as it is in the Dutch ease. As regards the triggers lor even and .w» minh as. our hndings are summarized in Table 12. Again we see some remarkable ditlerences among the two expressions. The largest dillerence seems to lie in the much more prominent position of without as a trigger lor so much as. We do not have an explanation lor this

difference, but we think it may explain some of the minor asymmetries in Table II. Given that without is a preposition, we ma> safely conclude it introduces a bias towards focus constiiuents qf the category noun phrase. If

we remove all cases triggered by w ithaut from the Iff WMrilflf-lt lint

we see .

the percentage of predicates jump from 50% to 60%. which is virtually the same as the percentage we found for even (64%). and the percentage of nonmimmizing indelimtes drops from 24% to 14%. much closer to the 9% we found for even. Other dillerences did KM dimmish, however, when we

SCALARITY AND POLARITY

163

Table 12. liiggeringatvimiunaia o/cven and so much ;is environment

£V£W(Ns301)

SO MUCH AS (Nb141)

51

26

12

21

barely!hardly

0

1

before

7

1

conditional clause

5

13

/ew/hille

1

0

negative predicate

9

5

question

t

I

superlative

0

1

mo/ n-word

universal

1

i

withoul

2

26

controlled for the strong collocational effects imposed by without* We note that just as in the case of ook maar zelfs moot and auch nur, we found some occurrences in non-anti-additive contexts. Some examples are: .

(62)

a.

Becky hardly so much as spoke to himM)

b

(Tlhere was little thai was even distantly related to familiar

.

flavours51

Of some interest is also the following example, from a corpus of internet postings, of what appears to be a positive occurrence of so much as. Possibly. this case is related to the purpose clause contexts mentioned in Footnote 11. (63)

One moment she is pretending to be shocked that Batman would dare hit a woman, the next striking out at him for so much as daring to hesitate.

We conclude that the set of environments of so much as and even is verv

similar to the trigger sets of ook maar. zclfs maar and auch mo. There is considerable variation in the extent to which each environment contributes to

the overall distribution of each polarity item, but the sets of environments themselves are very similar, crosslinguistically.

164

9

.

JACK HOEKSEMA AND HOr/IZ RULLMANN

ConcluMons

Corpus data confirm the hypothesis that oak maar, in contradistinction to Zelfs maar, is associated primarily with scalar endpoints. Ook maar occurs in our corpus material far more often than zelfs maar in combination with expressions denoting the lowest endpoint on a scale, such as the indefinite pronoun iets anything noun phrases introduces by wn 'one'. eMg 'any\ superlatives of the minimalist kind (involving het minste the least or he! germgste the slightest ) and indefinite noun phrases headed by a noun of the minimizer category. Zi'ffs maar on the other hand is used relatively often when the focus constituent is less easily interpreted as a scalar endpoint or is not conventionally used as such, as in the case of delinite noun phrases and predicates. In addition to this, zelfs maar is preferred if the focus constituent is the final member of a disjunction. We also noted that ook maar and zelfs maar have drifted apart, and that the current clearcut division of labor between the two elements is fairly recent. We consider this a case where two originally synonymous and equivalent focus adverbials have specialized in dilferent domains. An hypothesis, due to Zwarts (1981), according to which ook maar is licit only in so-called anti-additive contexts, turned out to be not entirely correct, although the number of exceptions was quite low. We did. however, note a significantly higher percentage of non-anti-additive contexts for zelfs '

*

,

1

'

'

"

"

'

maar. We also tested another claim in the literature, viz. Hockstra s (1991)

claim that ook maar exhibits a strict c-command requirement on the trigger ing relation. Again, the claim turned out to be not entirely correct, since we found that embedded occurrences of ook maar can be lopicalized or appear in subject position. We also noted a signilicantly larger percentage of c-command violations for zelfs maar In a section on the German counterpart .

to ook maar/zelfs maar. we found that this expression likewise permits violations of the anti-additivity and c-command requirements. Finally, we

compared our findings for Dutch and German with English, which like Dutch, but unlike German, has two focus adverbials meaning "even" in negative contexts, even itself, and so much as. Just as in Dutch, we found important differences in the sets of focus constituents which combine with these two adverbials, but these dilferences appear to be of a dilferent nature and do not resemble the ook maar zelfs maar dichotomy.

165

SCALARITY AND POLARITY

We want to conclude this paper by reiterating a methodological point. There are some intuitively clear dillerences between wk maar and zelfs macu. However, it is not feasible to study these difFerences in the usual way by introspection-based grammaticality judgments. While oak maar is clearly

preferred in some contexts, and zelfs maar in others, these preferential dilFerences do not in most cases amount to clearcut grammaticality dill'erences. In such cases, corpus data provide a relatively clean way lo study these dillcrences which, although subtle, are also quite robust and signili cant, and show change in progress.

Acknowledgments The rcscurch for ihii paper was earned out us part ol of the research project "Reflctlions of Logical Patterns in Language Struclure and Lanpuape I'se." sponsored by ihc Pionier program of the Dulch Orpani/ation for Sckntitic Research (NWO) and the University of Gronincen. We are grateful to these sponsors, as well as lo our collaborators in the project. Henny Klein. Charlotte Koster. Victor Sanchez-Valencia, Sjwikje van der Wal and Ton van der Wouden. and CO Jay Atlas, Anastasia Giannakidou. Eric Jackson, Larry Horn. Bill Ladusaw and Frans Zwans. for stimulating conversations and comments. We arc indebted to Larry Horn lor his detailed

comments on an earlier version bl this paper.

Notes l

.

Olten. minimton form combinations wilh just a lew predicates. Thus, a hill of fteans combines '

with the adjective wonft or the verbal expression ammmno. and a China/nan s

chom e with

predicates like have or stand. It is therefore possible to view the larger combinations, e.c. worth a hill ot foans as the actual polarity items. Altemalivcly. one could view a hilt ol heans as a minimizing polarity item denoting the endpoint of a scale of worth. Hence tmly predicates

denoting 'worth' may combine with this item, including e.g. mean: Bui six months from now, it '

won

2

.

t mean a hill of beans {(torn an Internet posting!.

The dilTerences in type of scale must be related to the fact that maximizing superiatives such

as theloudestnoise are delinites. whereas minimizing superlatives arc indelinitc in nature, as is evidenced by the fact that they may appear in existential sentences (cf. 44 below). 3

.

4

.

5

.

Hugo Claus. Suiktr. reprinted in Acht ioneehtukken. De Bezigc Bij. Amsterdam. I%6. Willem Frcderik Hermans. Onittrprojessorcn. De Bezigc Bij. Amsterdam. 1975. Very recently, several CD-ROMs have become available wilh classical Dutch literature from the

Middle Ages and the early modern period. However, these CD-ROMs do not contain material from the 20ih century
166

6

.

7

.

8

.

9

.

JACK HOEKSIiMA AND HOTZE RULLMANN

From the INL 38 million word corpus. INL 27 million word corpus. Dt Volksknmi.l-4-my

Mr. A. Rootfucrt. Vlimmen contra VUmmen, rcphnt. Bruna. UtrcchL'Anlwcrpcn. 1971. p. 552.

10.

De TelfRraaf. 21-5-1997.

11.

J.C. Blocm. Verzawctdeheschouwm en. A.A.M. Slols. "s Gmvcnha c. 1950. p. 101.

12.

Qe Staudaani. 21 -9-1995.

IV

Harn1 Muhsch. Ilei stenen bruidsbed. 25th pr. De Bczisre Bij. Amsterdam. 1976, p.75.

14.

From a uebpagc on dogs. Hwwjtigijil/homfcn.

.

15. Purpi se clauses also appear to be nonvendical contexts lor opk waar'zelfs maar. Some examples, taken Irom Manm Bnl and Dirk van Wcelden. Arbt-idsvitaniimn, Dc Bc/igc Bij.

Amsterdam. 1991. 416. and from Dc Volkskranl. 26-5-1998. respectively: (i)

Om <x>k maar ices

for even bedevaan

van de uitstraling van ecn meestcrwerk tc vnclen was cen

anything of the appeal

of a

master piece to feel

was a

vereist.

pilgnmage necessary

In order to fee! the least bit of the appeal of a master piece, a pilgnmage was called for' un

In de negentiende eeuw moestje cen minimum aan belastinc betalen [...| om in the mneteenih centun* had you a minimum of tax pay in order to zclfs maar le mogen even

slemmen

be allowed to vote

In ihe 19th century, one had to pay a minimum of taxes in order to even he allowed to "

vote

16. Besides minimizcr superlatives, such as the fattff, the sti htrst. the only superlatives acting as indetinites are the idiomatic cases the weirdest, ihe StoORgtSl etc.: (i)

There were the weirdest people m my class.

These cases are special because they are not strictly speaking superlatives. They can be paraphrased as nonsupcrlalives:

til)

17.

There were very weird people in my class.

The increase in the value of N for each period probably reflects an overall increase in frequency of the focus expressions ookmaar and zclfs/mar. Note however, that we have not controlled for the size of our corpus for each period. This is hard to do. since Ihe older occurrences are not

from electronic corpora, but from pnnled texts. The larger numbers for the I990vs are partly due lo Ihe availability of large electronic corpora, such as newspapers on cd-rom and the world wide web.

IS.

The change in progress is still going strong at the moment. II we divide our data for the I990's

into pre-1995 and 1995-1998. we gel 6

zfifsmmr for Ihe earlier period and 75% ztlfs maar

for the later period. We conclude from this signiticant ditTerence in such a short time-frame thai the rate of change is currently at Us peak. 19.

Jan Greshoir. in llet Wuicrland. 26-9-1959.

20.

Gilles Dorleijn in Nedcrlandsc Lettericundc, 2-4. p. 377.

SCALAR1TY AND POLARITY

167

21.

Willcm Frcdcrik Hermans, Naot nicer slapen. 15lh cd.. p. 77.

22.

Trowu . 2-5-1997.

23.

An important exception should be made here for items which appear in what one might call

islands for outside fkensmg. Consider for instance the differcnee between reslrietive and apposilive relatives in the following examples:

(i) (iii

I never imagined meeting anyone who would ever eat worms. *l never imagined meeting wx>rmcateni. who would ever eat worms.

We have a--thing to say about such effects here, except to note that they do not line up with island effects known from the study of wh-movement (cf. Ross 1967). For instance, m the case

of wh-movement, all relative clauses are islands, and the distinction between (p) and (ii) would not be predicted. Hence we see no reason to pursue the idea of LF-moven>cnt of polarity Hems

to pnsilions where they are clausemates of their triggers, as proposed in Pmgovac (19*14). 24

De\\)lkshamA\-A-{Wl.

25.

This example is rather exceptional. Mom common is the numeral rurr as u focus constituent in combinations with muh nur. cf.c.g. (i)

So sehr es mir aber im Gedachtnis lebendic war. gelang es mir ditch nie. mil der Siimme auch nur zwci Tone davon nchug /.u treffen.

cited from [a cd-rom edition of] Fran/ Grillpar/er. Dcrarme Spielmann. Cf. also our discussion of example (.Ml in the main text.

26.

Gunther de Bruyn. ZwischenlnlaiK - Eine Ju end in Berlin. Fischer Verlag. I9W. 2(12.

27.

Coniputer-yjeifung I99.i~1994 (cd-rom edition).

28. As a matter of fact, it is possible to lind some occurrences of so nuwh as any on the World Wide Web. bul these were mainly from older texts, such as bible translations, suggesting thai

the option of adding focus adverbials to any existed more freely in early modern English. For example, the follow ing are lilted from internet editions of Thomas Hobbes. Ltviaihan (1651), John Locke. An Essay Concernmjt the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government '

(1690). and Matthew Henry s bible commentaries (1706): (i)

In the other places which he allegeth nut of the Old Testament, there is not so much as

any show or colour of proof. (ii)

yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession

(lii)

there shall be none left, no relation, no friend, no. not so much as any parish oflicers to take care of their wives and children

However, here is a modem one that was posted in a newsgroup on May I. WT:

(iv)

My family and I had spent the day in St. Joe Bay
As regards men any. the World Wide Web offeni rather more occurrences, as might be

expected, but the focus of even in the majority of cases docs mrt appear to be any itself. Consider for instance the follow ing samples: (v)

GOD is too big for any one religion (or even any collection of religions I to dehne

accurately.

168

JACK HOEKSIZMA AND HOTZK RULLMANN

(vl)

arc Ihcnr even any rish in ihis lake worth looking for?

In (be ease of (v), the focus of tven appears to be the nominal phrase coUenion o) religions,

and in (vQ il is the modilier \\ orth iookingtor. A particularly clear ease b provided by ihc following wu -text: "

Well. OK. there pn>bab!y wasn ! anyone who had been waiting for a lonp lime for my new web page. Heck, there probably wasn t even anyone who had been wailing for a

(vn»

'

shon time ....

Here the only element that can be stressed is tor a shon (im\ If we loae focus on any. combinations with m/Ol do not seem tiM> good:

(viii) John didn't say even anything.

UW

'

Thai doesn't bother c%en anyone.

"

An exception to Ihis form disjunctive ivcurrences: Fred d
Greenpeace magazine, no 3. 1993 (part ol the INL 38 million word corpus).

30.

William Thackeray. Wmm Fair. Wordsworth Classics. Ware. 1992. 720.

31.

The Times. 29- -19*)l.

References

Bcnmamoun. Elabba-s 1997. 'Licensing of Negative Polanty Items in Moroccan Arabic/ Smural Language ami Ungnistie Theory 15, 263-287.

Bcrgcn. Anke von and Klaus von Bcrgen 1993. Negative Polaritdt m Englttchen. Tubingen: Narr. Fauconnicr, Gilles 1975a. "Polarity and the Scale Principle." In: R.E. Grossman, L.J. San and T.J. Vance eds.. Papers from the Eleventh Regional Meeiinx of the Chicago

Unguistic Society. Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society. Fauconmcr. Gilles 1975b. 'Pragmatic Scales and Logical Slrxiclurc.* Linguistic Inquiry b. 353-375.

Fauconnicr. Gilles 1979. "Implication Reversal in a Natural Language.' In: Franz

Gucnthncr and Siegfried J- Schmidt eds.. Formal Semantics and Pragmaticsfifr Naturallanguages. Dordrecht: Reidei, 2S9-30I. Fillmorc. Charles J.. Paul Kay and Mary Catherine O'Connor I9KH. "Regularity and Idiomaticity in Grammatical Constructions: The Case of Let Alone.* Umguage 64. 501-538.

Foolen, Ad 1993. De betekenis van partikels. Fen dokumentalie van de stand van het onderzock met hijzoiuiere aandacht voor maur. Doctoral dissertation. Katholieke Universitcit Ni|megen.

Francescotti. R
169

SCALAR1TY AND POLARITY

Giannakidou. Anastasia ll>97. The Umdsvape of Polariiy hems. Doctoral dissertation. RijkMinivcrsilcit Groningcn. Giannakidou. Anastasia 1998- Polarity Sensitivity as (SUmiveridii id Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Ben|amins. Haspelmath. Martin 1997. huletuute Pronouns. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hcim. Irene I9H4. "A Note on Negative Polarity and Downward lintailingness/ In:

Charles Jones and Peler Sells eds.. Proetedilfgs of NELS 14. Amherst: GLSA. University of Massachusetts at Amhersl.

Heycock, Caroline and Anthony Kroch. 1999. "Pseudoclell ConiKctivity: Implications for the Interface Level/ Unguistu Inquiry 30-3, 365-.W. Hoeksema. Jack ll>K3. "Negative Polarity and the Comparative/ Natural Language and Linj tiistu Theory 1,403-L*4. Hoeksema. Jack, to appear. "Negative C-Command

Polanly

hems:

Triggering.

Scope

and

'

.

Hoeksema. Jack en Henny Klein 1995. "Negative Predicates and Their Arguments."

Linguistic Analysis 25, 14 -1 SO. Hoekslra. line 1991. Ucensin Conditions on Phrase Structure. Doctoral dissertation. Rilksuniversileil Groningen. Horn. Laurence R. 1989. A Satwal History of Negation. The University of Chicago Press. Chicago. Israel. Michael 1996. 'Polarity Sensitivity as Lexical Semantics/ Lo2i*uistics and Philosophy 19,619- 66. Israel. Michael. 1998. The Rhetoric of Grammar: Scalar Reasoning and Polarity Sensitivity. Doctoral dissertation. L nivereity of California at San Diego. Karttunen. Lauri and Stanley Peters 1979. "Conventional Imphcature/ In: Ch.-K. Oh and D A Dmneen eds.. S\nta.\ and Semantics. Volumt- II: Pn supposition. New York: '

.

.

Academic Press.

Kas. Mark 1993. Essays on Boolean Functions atid Negative Polarity. Doctoral disscrtalion, Rijksumversiteit Groningen. Kay. Paul 1990. "Even/ Ungumtcs and Philosophy 13,59-111. Klein. Henny and Jack Hoeksema 1994. 'Bar en bijster: Een onder/oek naar twee 75-SK. polaritcitsgevoelige adverbia/ Crammafi JT Klima. lidward S. 1964. "Negation in English.' In: J.A. Fodor and J.J. Kalz eds.. The Structure of Language. Englewood ClilTs: Prentice Hall. '

Kiinig, Ekkehard 1991. The Meaning of Focus Particles: A Comparative Perspective. London: Rout-ledge. Knllca. Manfred 1990. "Polanly Phenomena and Alternative Semantics/ In Martin Slokhof and Leen Torenvliel, eds., Pntceedings of the Seventh Amsterdam Colloquium, AnLslcrdam. ITLL Institute for Language. Logic and Information. 277-302. Knlka, Mantrcd 1991 "Some Remarks on Polarity Items/ in: Ditmar ZaelTercr. ed.. St inantu Universals and Universal Semantics. Fons. Dordrecht. I50-1S9.

KnlVa. Manfred 1995 "The semantics and pragmatics of polarity items/ m Unguistic Analysis 25. 1-49.

170

JACK HOBKSEMA AND HOTZI: Rl'Ll.MANN

Kurvchncr. NVillricd ll>XA. SmJicn zur ,VVu im Ihutuhcn. (iunlcr Narr Vcrlag. Tubingen. LaduMW. William A. 1979. Polarity Sensirivit\ As Inhereni Stop*- Ht-latiims. Di>ctural dissertation. University of Texas at Austin. l andman. l-rcd and Ninl Kadmiin 1993. .

Any'. UHgtbHet mul I'hittmipln 16-4, 35.1-122.

'

Lee, Y<»ung-Suk and Laurence Horn 1994. Any as Indciimlc plus Even. Manuscript. Yale I'mversity. Linebarger. Marcia I9XI. The Grammar of Xegativr Polarity. D
Technology.

Puurdckoopcr, RC 1979. 'Oak maar iemanJ.' l)e ineiiwe utalgids 72.429-44X. I,n)g<»vac.

Ljiljana 1994. Negative ami Positive Polarity. A Uitulnix Appiimi h. Cambridge; Cambridge L'niversily Press. RiHith. Mats 19X5. A&Hthlton With Focus. I octoral dissertation. L'niversily of Massachusetts at Amheml.

Rullmann. Hot/c 1994. "Dc ambiguiteit van comparatievcn met mimler.' Tabu 24. 79-IUI. Rullmann. Hot/e 199ft. .Two Types of Negative Folanty Items.' In: Kivonu Kusum<»to eds. Pntceedings oj theNttrth-Eastern Unguistu s Sot ten. ShLS Jft. (il-SA. l'niversily of Massachusetts at Amhcrst. .**S M>0. Rullmann. Hol/e lt>97, 'Even. Polarity and Scope. MS. I nivcrsity of Alberta. Rullmann. Hol/e and Jack Hoeksema. 1997. -De distnbulic van i>ok maai and relfsmaar: ecn corpus-sludic. Sederlandse Taalkumle 2-1. 2XI-.M7. '

Sanchez. Valencia. Victor. Ton van der Wouden and Prans Zwarls 1994. 'Polanty. *

vendicalilv. and temporal connectives. In: Paul Dckkcr and Martin Slokhof eds.. ProeeetliiiRs of the Ninth Amsterdam Cfdloquium. Amsterdam. 5X7-6(16. Scuren. Pieter A.M. 1976. Uch«>: Ben studie in negalie. In: Ciccrl Kocloed and Arnold Kvcrs eds.. Umen \an taallheoreliseh (mder:oek: Een hundel artikelen aangehoden

aan prof. dr. II. Sehulnnk. Cironmgcn: T)eenk Witlink. Vandewcghc. Willy 19X0-19X1. Ook maar X.' Studia Germanu a Ganden.ua 21. 15-56. Wilkinson. Karma I99.L "Towards a L'nihed Semantics of Even: A Reply to Rooth.' In: I'lpal I-ahin and Adam Zachary Wyncr eds.. Pro< eedm .t from Semaniies and IJnguislu Theory III. Dcpartmenl ot Modern Languages and Linguistics. Cornell l'niversily. Wilkinson Karma 1996. "The Scope of Even' Natural Language Semantics 4. 19.1-215. Wouden. Ttm van der 1994. Negative Contexts. D
SCALARITY AND POLARITY

171

Zwuts, Frans 19H6. Categorialc Crammufuo en Aigebntfsche Se/nannek. DiKtorai disscrtulion. Rijksunivcrsitcu Gn>ninj:cn.

Zwarts, Frans 1995. "Nonvcridical Contexts." LinguisticAnatysis 25, 286-310. /warts, Frans I99S. Three types oi pularily.' In Fnl/ Hamm and Erhard Hmrichs. cds.. Plitraliry and Quanti/it tuio/i. D
Flaubert triggers, squatitive negation, and other quirks of grammar Laurence R. Horn Yaff I 'nivt'isin

1

.

Polarity licensing as a quirk of grammar

Negative Contexts ": it is no coincidence that this title of the first paper to oiler a taxonomy of the phenomenon of negative polarity (Buyssens 1959) was later reprised for the most comprehensive descriptive and theoretical "

treatment of this phenomenon (van dcr Woudcn 1994/1996). These works. like other major signposts on the long and winding road travelled between the two iKlima 1964. Fauconnier 1975 et seq.. Ladusaw 1979. Linebarger IWO et seq.. Hoeksema 1986. Kadmon & Landman 1993. Progovac 1994. Israel 1996) have consistently taken the most fundamental problem in polarity research to be the determination of the character and membership of the class of negative contexts. LadtUMW (19%: 32611 ) defines this as the i k I nsor QUESTION: "How can the class of licenses for a polarity item be delimited?" (Ladusaw s other basic questions concern the marking of '

.

.

licensees, the structural and'or semantic relations between licensor and

licensee, and the grammatical status of clauses containing unlicensed items.) For Israel
IS a negative context?

Building on the insights of earlier scholars into the nature of scalar

predication and scale reversal icf. Fauconnier 1975) and the propert\ of monotonicity within the formal theory of generalized quantiliers (cf. Barwisc cV:

174

LAURHNCll R MORN

Cooper I9XI). Ladusaw (1979| identiticd ihc set of cnvironmcnis licensing ncgalivc polarily items (NPIs) with the semantic notion of downward entailment. the properly of licensing inferences from sets to subsets, from the general to the specific. Ladusaw thus provided content to the (-faU ective) feature Klima Il964i was forced to associate arbitrarily with NPI-inducing contexts. Positive polarity items
thai trigger NPIs.1 At the same lime. Linebarger (1980) was pursuing another explanatory track, using a modified design of Baker's (1970) twin-engine model, including a local condition for core cases of polarity and a more intricate pragmatic generator driven by Gricean implicaturc for the residual cases. Linebarger (1987. 1991) has olFcred successive revisions of her theory over the years to address the problems posed by an insufliciently restrictive nature of the implicature-based approach, while Progovac (I994i has argued for her own conligurational account based on a generalization of binding theory (sec Horn & Lee 1995 for a critical evaluation). Meanwhile, others including Heim (1984). Krifka (1992). Kadmon & Landman (1993). Lee & Horn

(1994). Israel (1996). and the members of the Groningen school of negative polarity (Hoeksema 1983. 1986. 1994: Jackson 1995: Rullmann 1995: van der Woudcn 1994: Zwarts 1995

1998) have sought to refine and extend the theory of downward-entailing contexts to deal with the shortfalls with and apparent counterexamples to Ladusaw s theory raised by Linebarger and others. One constant in these substantively distinct accounts of the syntax semaniics. and pragmatics of polarity has been the recognition that despite the expectations induced by truth in labelling laws, negative contexts - and indeed negative polarity per se cannot be based on negation alone: rather a full treatment must identify the traits shared by the range of licensing contexts. This observation sometimes escapes the perception of otherwise competent lexicographers such as those employed by the OED. who seem at times to be reasonably well aware of the relevant distributional constraints on the distribution of certain items (NPIs in our terms) but remain unable to accomplish any more general account than a list: negation, conditionals (typically with no distinction between NPI-friendly antecedents and NPI-hostile consequentsi comparatives, questions.2 Occasionally labels are appended, the most felicitous being non-assertivk as wielded by Quirk et al. (Quirk (.V (Irccnba um 1973. Quirk et al. 1985: Greenbaum & Quirk 1990: Greenbaum 1996). .

'

,

,

.

FLAUBERT TRIGGERS. SQI ATITIVE NEGATION

175

Non-assertive items (e.g. the any series of indeliniles) are limited to occurrence in non-assertive contexts, including those listed above, as well as morphological negatives, words negative in meaning but not in fonrT (cf. Klima s category of IMHERBNt negation): vWJ m. rar ely, hauliy, barely, linle, few, prevent, too, There is no indication that the compilers of such grammars are aware of the theoretical work enabling a systematic account of "

what either non-assertive items or non-assertive contexts have in common.

Thus, although Quirk el al. (1985: §10.62) list "emotively coloured expressions like lift a finger, sleep a wink, hat an eye, say a thing, give a damn as "

a category of non-assertive items, they fail to recognize the minimal-quantity nature of such expressions or to be aware of the substantial body of work describing this crosslinguistically robust phenomenon, dating back to Pott (1833:410-1 b and Schmerling (1971) (see Horn 1989:452 3 for additional

examples and discussion).4

And while Quirk et al. (1985: §10.61) reckon

within their inventorv of non-assertive contexts

"

restrictive relative clauses

modifying generic noun phrases where the clauses have conditional meaning". their taxonomic approach misses the generalization suggested by Fauconnier (1975) and formalized by Ladusaw (1979). but first mooted in somewhat earlier work.

What we can call vertical inference (as in Alnwick's and Billingham's treatises in De Rijk 1982. inter alia: cf. Sanchez 1994 for elaboration) is

captured by the following rules:5 There is a valid consequence from an inferior to its superior without negation or a term having negative force. There is a valid consequence from a superior to its inferior with a preposed negation or distributive term. In addition to various overt and implicit negations, including comparatives and exclusives like only, the set of terms with "negative vim" (termini habentes vim negationis) includes the restrictor of universals. Similar inferential mechanisms are found in Ockham and date back to anonymous authors of the late 12th and early 13th centuries. The central idea is that expressions with the force of negation block upward inferences and allow downward ones within their scope. Thus a position like that of the restrictor of universals licenses inferences from superior to inferior, from set to subset: if all humans are rational, then all women (but not necessarily all animals) are rational: but a position like that of the predicate or nuclear scope of "

"

176

LAURI-NCE R. HORN

universals licenses inferences in the opposite, upward direction: if all humans speak a complex language, it follows that all humans speak a language, but not that they all speak a complex Indo-European language. Ironically, the lirsl authoritative definition of non-assertive or NPl-friendly contexts was developed within an analytical framework that never addressed the patterning of NPIs. While the label "non-assertive" is appropriately suggestive of the relevant semantic properties of the class of NPMicensers, the lack of anyexplicit content to the label makes it hard to see why weak modals like may or might, which certainly remove any assertive commitment from a proposi-

tion. fail to license NPIs outside the free-choice any class (*He nun everlifi a finger to help). Indeed, depending on one s understanding of assertivity. '

even M/Vvr-class assertion qualifiers may incorrectly be predicted to serve

as triggers.6 Further, while Quirk el al. (1985:391) note that V/m in its stressed form occurs in matter whichAvho/what

"

" -

"

assertive territory with the meaning "it doesn't it is never explained why - or even noted that -

such uses are largely restricted to contexts involving certain modals (may,

can. generic will) but not others (should, musf. future wiU)? This is another area in which collaboration between the authors of the descriptive works under discussion and the scholars who have been slaving away in the attempt to characterize such natural language phenomena (see especially Kadmon & Landman 1993. Haspelmath 1993 and Horn 2000 on free-choice indefinites) would be especially fruitful. Beyond the specific quirks of the particular approaches to "non-assertive licensing discussed here, it must be acknowledged that there is no fully satisfying explanation ... available" in any framework to the problems posed by the licensor question (Ladusaw 19%: 326). This is especially glaring in the case of one intriguing subclass of licensors in which negation is so inherent and non-overt as to not show up at all. "

"

2

.

Now you see (hem - no. you don't: Flaubert triggers '

L artislc doil clrc dans son iicuvrc ccMnme Dicu dans la creation, invisible cl

tout-puissant: qiTon 1c scnl partoul, mais qu on nc k voic pas/ (Gustavo Flaubert, letter lo Mademoiselle Leroycr de Chanlepie. 1K Mar. IS5?) '

As God in the deist universe and the author in the Flaubcrtian novel, so is

negation in one particularly interesting sentence-type: everywhere present yet

FLAUBERT TRIGGERS. SQI ATITIVIL NEGATION

177

nowhere visible. The Flauben trigger is an extreme case of the phenomenon

most clearly identified in the work, of Linebarger (1981, 1987. 1991): operators that are not downward entailing in Ladusaw s sense, such as the classically non monotonic exactly n. may trigger NPIs in the presence of a '

discourse-plausible negative inference, as in (la) (1987:373): (I)

a. b

.

Exactly four people in the whole world have ever read that dissertation: Bill. Mary, Tom. and Ed. Everyone who is NOT Bill. Mary. Ed or Tom has not ever read that dissertation.

c

.

Exactly 345.992 people have ( vever) logged on to my web site.

Linebarger argues that it is the pragmatic saliency of the upper bound in (la), the relation between (la) and its implicaturc in (lb>, that licenses die

NPI ever here (cf. the corresponding versions with Only four people ... or Surprisingly, as fe\\'as four people ...». When the corresponding implicaturc is less salient, as in exactly n assertions with larger absolute or relative nt no

licensing is possible: thus ever is effectively ruled out in examples like (lc).v Other non DE triggers from Linebarger's collection include after and ihc

locus of only. The latter conslmclion

exemplified in Only people who

have ever had a debilitatmR disease themselves < an appreciate what an ordeal this was (Linebarger. op. cil.) - is particularly problematic: sec Israel (1995) and Horn (1990: Appendix) for a closer look al this det lent hear malgre ltd '. "

Note in particular that both the focus of only and the restrictor of not all are upward entailing environments (as opposed Ed the nuclear scopes of these operators, which are indeed DE), yet both contexts license al least the more

liberal NPIs like any and ever: (21

a. b

.

Only those who ate any of the contaminated squid became ill. Not all those who ale any of the contaminated squid became ill.

But in these cases, at least there is an arguably negative (although not DE) clement nearby.10 True Flaubert polarity is cxemplilied by these items from the collection in Horn (1978: I53>: underlining is added for the triggers, or more accurately the facilitators, of the NPIs.

(3)

a.

San Francisco is beating anyone these days as often as the Atlantic City Seagulls

178

LAURHNCli R. HORN

beat the Harlem Globetrotters.

(San Francisco Chronicle] b

.

c

.

A fat lot of good THAT ever did me. She seemed to think 1 might be betraying sisterhood by showing that it was ever any dilFerent. 1L. Wolfe, on women s role as victim rather than instigator of adultery)

d

Small thanks vou ?ei for THAT, either.

e

I'm anything but happy with THAT analysis, either. (J. McCawIey. lecture] The tone (of Germaine Grcer s attack on manufacturers of vaginal deodorants] wasn t light-hearted, which might have jusliticd touching the subject at all.

.

.

f

.

'

(C. McCabe. San Francisco Chronicle] g

.

I thought she was a friend of yours. Thai s why 1 ever even noticed her.

I Dorothy Parker) To appreciate (3a)- it must be understood that the Globetrotters are renowned for winning every exhibition game they play. As often as here thus conveys never, recalling the popular Latin use of the phrase ad kalendas Graecos as a colorful way of signalling never based on the recognition of the fact thai the Greeks didn t use calends in their reckoning. The ever in (3b) is triggered by the ironic a fa! lot of (- "no'), while that in (3c) is more indirectly linked to the covert negative in the non-DE predicate betray. (Acceptability vanishes if we substitute support for betray here.) The Klima-diagnostic either in (3d) and (3e) is licensed by the negativeimplicating (or entailing?) small thanks and anything but l essentially conveying "

*

,

'

not at all

'

'

,

as with the standard inherently negative adverbs hardfy,scarcely).

The last two examples open another can of beans. The relevant paraphrases here involve only: thus, columnist McCabe is claiming that a lighthearted tone would have been the only thing that might have Justified touching the subject of vaginal deodorants at all. while humorist Parker '

'

convevs that the narrator s belief that the referent was the addressee s friend

is the only reason she ever even noticed her. These subterranean Flaubertian only s are in fact epidemic. A particularly subtle instance occurs in a columnist s take on the purported decline of the species Post-Sensitive Man: '

'

FLAUBERT TRIGGERS, SQt'ATlTIVE NEGATION

179

Sensitive Man as portrayed in pi>pul;ir culture was always a caricature, of course. Bui the signs of his discrediting have been building, along with male confusion. (We speak of those heterosexual men, mainly m their .U>s,40s, and 50s. who ever gave a thought to any of this.) (Erik Eckholm, ' Hear Them Roar', New York Times, S May lOW: emphasis added)

It should be recognized that the relevant environment. We speak (only j of.... is not DE. as indicated by the failure of (4a) to entail (4b)

<4)

a.

We speak [only] of those heterosexual men who voluntarily read a book by a feminist in the 1970s.

b

.

We speak lonly) of those heterosexual men who voluntarily read a book by a radical feminist in the 1970s.

Assuming the viability of the generalization in Horn (1996:29) that only weak NFls are permitted in non-DE focus-of-o/i/v environments, we would expect the construction in Eckholm s parenthetical to be equally restrictive. '

and indeed it is. even when the Flaubertian ohly comes out of the closet:

(5)

a. *We speak (only) of those heterosexual men who subscribed to so much as the most basic tenet of the feminist credo. b

.

*Wc speak (only) of those heterosexual men who have read a single word of Kate Millett.

As <5) shows, real hair-on-lheir-chest NPIs (as opposed to the wimpy any and ever) are ruled out in this context.

A covert only also seems to be lurking in the environments of (6): (6)

a.

In one of the two conversations that 1 ever had with Raven

McDavid. Jr. (this one in an elevator), he talked about feist

dogs ...

(Posting to American Dialect Society email list. 19Sept. 1996) b

.

I mean, talk about /noise/, after about two years on the Lin'

guist list. I m going to unsub because it is a complete waste of my time - maybe 1 on jsic] 1000 messages on it has /any/ conceivable interest (Posting to Outil e-mail list. 9 Sept. 1995) .

A somewhat diiTerent Flaubert license seems to have been issued for the

following context, in which David Mura laments the character Mike Yama gita in the movie Fargo": "

180

LAURHNCE R. HORN

(7)

The Japanese-American character has no relevance to Marge's investigation. He is there mainly for humor. The humor is based on his derangement and his obvious illusions that Marge or their acquaintance would ever find him attractive. ("How America Unsexes the Asian Male

"

.

New York Times 22

August 1996. C9)

Note the Linebargerian character of this example, in which the felicity ol the NPI licensed by a negative impiicature associated with illusion would be wiped out by the substitution of a nominal incompatible with this impiicature:

(7')

... his obvious { recognitioa/-hopc/*bclief/ misiaken belief} that Marge ... would ever find him attractive.

Another Times article provides an even more recherche instance of Flaubert triggering: here the licensing is backwards and into an island: (8)

Though the 235 pages of Bishop Rouet's discussion and the committee s report, called AIDS: Society in Question", broadly conformed to the church s emphasis on abstinence and its condemnation of most birth control, several experts in France and abroad found the bishop s assertion that condom use could ever be justified as an important break with the ollicial Roman Catholic position. ("French Bishop Supports Some Use of Con'

"

'

'

doms to Prevent AIDS". New York Times 13 Feb. 1996, A5)

Here again, the replacement of the licensing phrase with e.g. ...as entirely

consistent With ... would render the passage ill-formed. Although it diverts us away from the Licensor Question toward the Licensing Relation Question (Ladusaw 1996:326), it is worth noting that as far as island-broaching goes, (8) is left at the starting gate by a remarkable example contributed by John Lawler (p.c): (9)

I have also refuted your claim that |the development of the brain logically leads to the claim that (infants have any rights' at all||. (comp.ai.philosophy newsgroup. 5 Jan. 1995: bracketing added)

As Lawler observes, these deservedly boldfaced NPls arc doubly insulated, stranded on

"

an island situated in a lake located in another island

licensor is an inherent rather than overt negation to boot.

"

and their

FLAUBERT TRIGGERS. SQI ATITIVE NEGATION

My intuition is that the felicity of any in (9) is in fact improved bv the presence of the flanking at all. The same is true in the example in (10). culled from a qualifying paper by a Yale linguistics graduate student: (10)

For example, in i4Sa). the fact that the speaker received any money at all is the most important information, and the amount received is secondary.

The licensing is again backward, and so Flaubcrtian that it's hard to know what to underline.

If the at all in (9> and (10) facilitates the any. we have an instance of what John Lawler. Paul Neubauer. and 1 (in unpublished investigations during the 1971 California Summer Program in Linguistics at Santa Cruz) have dubbed SECONDARY TRIGGERING. In this phenomenon, an NPI with relatively restricted distribution fin neeks, until) which is normally blocked alter inherent negation is rescued from infelicity by the proximity of a more liberal NPI. Classic examples include the following, again from Lawler (p.c): (II)

'

a. . l doubt he's been here in weeks. b c

.

.

1 doubt anvbodv's seen him.

I'm surprised anybody s seen him in weeks.

More recently, Paul Postal and Haj Ross, again in unpublished (e-)work.

refer to the same phenomenon under the mbneof parasitk mm i RKitiiJUNO.

11

The fact thai at all serves as a secondary trigger of an\ in (9) and (10) is ironic, given that a few centuries back this adverbial was not an NPI at all. That is. as the OED (s.v. all, 9b) makes clear, the very first occurrences of at all simply signified altogether, wholly and occurred freely in allirmative '

1

contexts:

(12)

I thee conjure and command at all. 113501 My waverand |unsiablel wit. my cunning feeble at all. |1513] They were careless at all. they thought all things were cocksure. (1552|

But now. the OED observes (with the usual disjunctive and overly narrow stalement). at all is restricted to negative or interrogative sentences, or conditional clauses Even more narrowly, Jespcrsen (1917) seeks to establish the negative import of hardly by citing its co-occurrence with at all. which is only found with negative expressions.' '

.

"

182

LAl'RHNCE R. HORN

But is it? Van Dongen (1918) in fact complains that the OED statement must be expanded to deal with allirmative statements, but on closer inspection most of his examples feature the usual suspects: licensing by inherent negatives like cease, without, sumely. hardly, seldom, and their ilk, all involving (as he notes) concealed' or "implied' negation. More provocative are his examples in (13) (from van Dongen 1918:63-64). which arc Flaubertian in the same sense as our cases of (6). (7). (8>. and (10> above. (The

highlighting is mine, the Dutch equivalents van Dongen's.) (13)

a.

b

.

So the second Empire Masquerade was planned and debated a long time before it actually happened. That it happened at all (= Dutch: nog, tot h nog) was due |i.e. due only?| to the death of Maurice's great-aunt. His eves namnved in a little in a way thev had when he looked at things hard or was at all (= Dutch: ook maareven) in doubt.

c

.

So far as British words have entered into the English lan-

guage at all (= Dutch: nog. toch nog), they have been words such as gown and curd, which are likely to have been used d

.

by women. Perhaps binn (a manger) and dunn (dun-colored) ... may really have been adopted from the British language, but these are aU the Old English words for which this origin is

at all (= Dutch: enigszins) probable. e

.

The shipwreck in 'The Tempest", the thunder-smitten wandering of Lear, ... are so dillicult of theatrical accom plishment that Maeterlinck protests against their being enacted at all ODutch: ook maar in het minst).

Given what is now known about licensing, most of these examples can be assimilated to van Dongen s category of implied negation (on (13d). for example, see the discussion in Horn 1996: 18 on the relation between all the OVand the only CN). Van Dongen's case for the view that, contra the OED. the phrase at all ...occurs in allirmative sentences with the same meaning which it has in interrogative sentences and conditional clauses calls for the Scottish verdict of "not proven". There does seem to be a bit of variation on just which interrogatives can license at all, though. The following dialogue, from the 1913 novel The Irish '

'

,

FLAUBERT TRIGGERS. SQL ATITIVE NEGATION

183

Twins by Lucy Fitch Perkins (electronically cited by Barry Popik for a dirterem reason) would be impossible in most of the English speaking world of today. (14)

How old are you at all" '

We're seven", said the Twins.

Nor is this usage extinct in the Irish English of today. Jim McCloskey (p.O confirms that questions like those in (15) are perfectly fine in the Irish Republic, while at all is impossible in the corresponding aflirmalive declar'

atives (*We re seven at alii .

(15)

a. b

.

c

.

What will we do at all? How should we go about it at all? Is he there at all?

McCloskey observes that the adverbial in (14) and (15) cannot have its usual value to any exlenl\ but must instead convey I have no idea what the answer to my question is going to be While I haven't checked this out, one speculation is that Irish at all might serve the same function as the negative epistemic polarity items of the WH * Ae hell class in standard dialect (what the hell, who the fuck, when in the name ol all that's holy, why in Gods name. how in the world, ...j as alluded to in Horn (1972: 181). The relevant paradigms here include minimal pairs like those in (16). Note that expletive deletion would render all the examples impeccable, and that it's not the presence or absence of negation that dictates the constellation of stars, but '

'

.

the presence or absence of epistemic impoverishment.12 (16)

a. b

I { + kno\v/vdon't know} what the hell you're trying lo do. 1 wish I ('knew/*didn'l know} why in the world he would say such a thing.

c

I { remembcr/ know. forget'wonder} who the hell we

.

.

invited to dinner. d

.

{Td like to know/1*! wouldn't like to know} who the hell

you think you are. In any case, we see there is no reason to accept van Dongen's position that majority dialect at all has lost its status as an NPI. More recently. Labov (1972:74) draws a similarly hasty conclusion from the widespread acceptance by his informants of the attested example:

1S4

LAURENCE R. HORN

(17) There

'

These razor blades are going like holcakes. I hope there s any left. is\ Labov wriles, no tendency whatsoever to supply a negative

meaning to any after hope. We therefore observe that the movement of any into positive contexts is not limited to anxmon .' But in fact, contrary to the truly unlicensed dialectally acceptable occurrences of positive attynuor (

'

as in the locus classicus from D.H. Lawrence s HbfflM tn

'

nowadays )

'

-

Lovef "Sullering bores me any more", or the myriad examples discussed in Labov 1972 and Murray 1993 the any of (17) is indeed licensed, as are the van Dongen atoll s by inherent, implicated, or Flaubertian negation.1 Here. it is the speaker s fear that there are no razor blades left that provides the relevant ambience for the NPl. Although hope doesn t figure among Linebarger's cases of licensing via negative implicature, it well might have. '

'

,

'

A related variety of Flaubert-licensed NPIs will be touched on here before we close the discussion. Tom Murray (7 Jan. 1996) posted a query to the American Dialect Society e-mail List concerning the apparently non-NPl use of biulgc in his chairman s comment We may have to budge on that '

"

"

In response, one undeniable example of non-polarity Inu/ c was located in Madison, Wisconsin. But when Madison children complain "He budged" to signify that the perpetrator immorally stepped in front of them in line, they are invoking a dilferenl lexical item. The 'move' sense of hudxe does retain its NPl status, but its licensing may be by Flaubertian contexts like that of Murray's chairman. Here are some related intuitions reported to the list by Rudy Troike, Vicky Rosenzwcig, and Beth Simon: one

.

Havmp had to budge from lime to lime, as a dcparlmcnl head, when the Provotl pushed hard enough, 1 would say that (budge) is nol a negalivcpularity item but it clearly implies, when nol accompanied by the nc aiivc,

some rcsistaiKe to willing movcmcnl. so ihere is an inherent negative implication. It sounds as though all ihe uses ... have the same basic denotation: to move

unwillingly. 11 we say he linally budged", the implication remains that he'd rather have stayed put. "

Don't each <»l these "positive*' uses a>sume an object of resistance, even it passive resistance, and in that way. each has a negative flavor? It seems to me entirely natural he has to." Asain .

vi> somcthinf: like "1 expect he'll budi e il

there is the implication that one budges only pnidgmply.

FLAUBERT TRIGGERS, SQI ATITIVE NEGATION

Just as hoping that may having to budge suggests And on that note, we shall to the last of our sketches

3

.

185

relevantly implicate that one fears or expects ~. a minimal movement that one wishes to avoid. budge - however grudgingly - and move along of matters polarized.

Embraced by the squat: Squatitive negation and the Jespersen Cycle squat U.S.SUmg. jProb. f. slang to squat lo void excremeni| Nothing at all: (following a negative construction) anything. Orig. as second element of phr. (Utodly sqiua Iprob.f.U.S. slang doodle excrement]. My gal is red hot. Your gal ain't doodly-squat. Refrain from "(My Gal is) Red Hoi" rockabilly classic by Billy Lee Riley

In unpublished work. Haj Ross and Paul Postal (1995) have initiated the

formal exploration of a class of quasi-NPls they refer to as squatitives. Their Mist of suspects' includes (jacklshtt. crap, beans, zilch, diddley(shit).

dick, fuck all, bugger all. and of course (diddley) squat itself:14 they observe that the items difier in licensee strength and distribution. I shall perforce oversimplify within this rich domain and concentrate solely on {diddfy) squat, glossing over the details of the very interesting distributional data

under investigation by Ross & Postal.15 The key fact here, as recognized by the OED. is that squat can appear cither in the scope of a licensing negation as the equivalent of anything, or on its own as the counterpart of nothing. In the former case, as illustrated in '

the OED s memorable initial cite.

She ain't never had nothin'

noi even doodly-squat, and when she gits

uh chance tuh git holt uh sumpin de ole buzzard is gone on uh rampage.

(Zora Neale Hurston (1934). Jonahs Gourd Vine, cited in OED entry)

6

it is an NPI or if we prefer a concordial negative (see Ladusaw 1994 for the relation between the two): in the latter, it brings its own negative force to the party. I shall provide several examples of each type of context.

IS6

LAURENCE R. HORN

many drawn from a search of six weeks of Nexis citations, before examing the implications of squat for the diachrony of negation.

(18)

Licensed squar11 He went to Stanford on the GI Bill. He then looked into a career '

as a newspaper reporter but discovered writing didn t pay squat. The Tennessean. ("Tough Buy Jack Palance. an Artist at Heart "

.

18 Oct. 1996)

The designated hitter or DH: A player who is designated to bal for the pitcher, who. with rare exceptions, can t hit for squat. (Inside Baseball: A Non-Fan's Guide to the World Series, News-

day. 19 Oct. 1996) We re all professionals, we understand the season's over. We happened to be 15 3, that doesn't mean squat now. We need two victories to be satisfied. ("Argos Resting to Be the Best "

.

Toronto Sun. 4 Nov. 1996)

If you think a B-2 bomber Hying at 60,000 feet is going to mean diddly squat to people in this environment, you're wrong. What makes an impact is for them to be able to look out and see a gray ship ...ls ( Kulak Warns of Over-Reliance on Technology". "

Times Journal Defense News. 7 Oct. 1996)

You're being a pain in the ass ... You're on the other side, but you re in my oflice almost every dav. I ve given vou what 1 can. which may not be squat, but you re lucky you re not thrown out on your ear. (Police homicide sergeant to private detective, in Pamell Hall (1996), Trial, p. 145) '

'

'

(19)

'

Unlicensed sqiuxt All the talk of a resurrected Yeomen football program the past two seasons w ill mean squat if the team fumbles its opportunity to make the playolfs. ("York [Yeomen] Out to Slay Warriors "

.

Toronto Sun. 26 Oct. 1996) And il's not the kids who let us down - it's the veterans ...

There have been a couple of veterans who have done squat since they ve been here, to be honest. ( Lumberjacks Humbled in 5-2 Loss to Vipers". Cleveland Plain Dealer. 19 Oct. 1996) '

"

187

FLAUBERT TRIGGERS, SQUATFTIVE NEGATION

When the more sophisticated students complain that they are learning squat. I would direct the professor to remind them that tutoring builds the self-esteem of both tutor and tutce. (Wisconsin Slate Journal. 24 Oct. 1996)

The state is doing virtually nothing to prevent gambling addiction or help those caught it its trap. "Arizona has done diddly squat

" ,

says Henry Lesieur. a sociologist and national expert on

compulsive gambling. ( Gambling Taking Toll; Compulsive Bettors on Rise in Arizona". Arizona Republic. 6 Oct. 1996) "

My dad got 'em |football tickets] for free. He works at the university. They pay him squat so they give him perks. (Tommy on Third Rock from the Sun. NBC TV. 3 Nov. 1996)

Besides the topically and stylistically parallel sports-based environments that seem to randomly allow either NPI or unlicensed squa! contrast the respective first citations under (18) and (19) - the licensed versions were especially frequent in Nexis citations relating to the American political campaign

climaxing during the search period. These range from the Sacramento voter whose

one vote doesn

'

"

t count for squat the 18 year old Jacksonville voter who thinks it a nice gesture to let the peons of America vote, even though our vote doesn t stand for squat and an Austin voter who proclaims himself sick and tired of all these political incumbents promising they ll do this and that (andl when you look at their record they didn t do squat when they had the chance to a Republican candidate for Louisville city council who boasts I don't promise squat" and a Republican governor of New Jersey who objected to President Clinton s taking credit for getting two million people oil welfare because you haven t done squat: the states have done it But elsewhere we find a financial analyst complaining that all the moves to prop up USAir will mean diddlv-squat if you don t get the costs down as well as the sale advertised in note 14 or the observation by a poster to the rec.arts.sf.starwars.misc newsgroup (17 Feb. 1997) that box oflice means JACK SQUAT to me" (emphasis in original). "

,

"

'

"

,

'

"

'

"

"

'

"

'

"

.

"

"

'

,

"

The significance of the Janus-faced character of squat emerges in the light of the cyclical pattern wherein the negative marker in a given language is gradually weakened into a verbal proclitic, then reinforced by the accretion of NPI minimizers or indefinites, and ultimately replaced by its reinforcement

188

LAURKNCE R. MORN

(see Horn 1989: §7.1 and Bernini & Ramal 1996: Chapter 2). This process has come to be known as JtSPMRSiiN S cyclh:

The history «! negative expressions in various languages makes us witness the lolluwing curious fluctuation: Ihe original negative adverb is lirst wciikencd. then lound msuflkienl and therefore strengthened, generally through sonic additional word, and this in its turn may be felt as the negative proper and may then in course of lime be subject to the same development as the original word. iJespersen 1917:4)

The motivation for the cycle is evidently the tension between the semantic importance of negation and the phonological weakness of its morpho syntactic expression: The negative notion, which is logically very important, is ... made to be accentually subordinate to some other notion: and as this happens constantly.

the negative gradually becomes a mere proclitic syllable (or even less lhan a syllable) prefixed to some other word. The mcongruily between the notional importance and Ihe formal insignihcancc of the negative may then cause the speaker to add something to make the sease perfectly clear to the hearer. (Jespcrxcn 1917:5)

The rcinforccrs that serve cross-linguistically to fill this role of this some thing fall into two general categories. The first involves indefinites of either positive or negative morphological character within the scope of negation. The second category is exemplitied by minimizers. those "partially stereotyped equivalents of any iBolinger 1972: 121), expressions denoting small entities or negligible quantities from domains ranging from the culinary (a '

"

crumb) and physiological ia hair) through the monetary (a red cent) and material ia shred), to the linguistic ian iota): cf. Pott 1833:410, Horn 1989:452 53 for further examples and discussion. Indefinites and minimizers come to function as NPIs triggered by the negative marker they reinforce and eventuallv oust.19 Jespersen's cycle is illustrated by the history and pre-history of French negation which involves each category in turn. The weak proclitic negation of pre-classical Latin nedico I do not say is first reinforced by the indefinite amum "one (thing)', forming the preverbal particle non f< noemmt < ne tvnutnl, whence Classical Latin non dico, simple ne now reserved for use as a subjunctive negator and forms with incorporated negation, e.g. nescio \ do not know But Late Latin non now phonologically weakens "

'

.

1X9

FLAUBERT TRIGGERS. SQUATITIVE NEGATION

through successive shifts back to the original Proto-Indo-European form ne,

yielding Old French feo ne di. Although there remain several isolated constructions with the simple proclitic negation Uc ne peuxt Je ne saurais dire, n imporie) the standard negation undergoes anolher round of strengthen ing. this time involving the accrual of such minimi/ers as poim (< Latin punctum. a point ), lien (< raw> a \.\\\x\%).personne (
'

'

.

'

'

-

'

'

semantics and valence.

Breal (1898:200-2) refers lo the next stage of the process as CONTAGION: while pas.rien.personne. jamais.am un. and similar morphologically positive items originally served to reinforce the only genuine negative, to wit they eventually by their association with the word ne became themselves negatives to the point where they can now 'dispense with their companion1 and signify negation in their own right. This begins in verblcss contexts, e.g. Qui m la? - Personne ( Who goes there? Nobody ), pas d argent ( no money ) but then the contagion spreads to the previously healthy embracing negations of verbal environments. While ne is retained in the standard dialect Ue n aijarnais vue ceite ehose vs. une chose jamais vueh it is no longer a negative marker per se. but rather 'une marque de redon dance de la negation ... conditionnc par une autre term qui est le principal porteur de la valeur negative (Gaatone 1971:99). And in the colloquial '

'

'

,

'

'

'

'

,

"

language, this redundant marker gradually disappears (cf. Ashby 1981).20 The evolution of English not, like that of its Germanic cousins Ger.

tticht (< ne + tvickf) and Dutch niet, follows the other fork of the reinforcement protocol: an indefinite, used for post-verbal reinforcement of a weak proclitic net incorporates prefixal negation and comes to supplant the pre verbal element as the main conveyor of negative force (cf. Jespersen 1917, Marchand 1938. Joly 1972). As in Latin, the proclitic IE ne proved too weak to survive un accompanied in Old English, and the earlier It ne setge is strengthened into the Middle English A ne seye not. with embracing negation. The standard post-verbal reinforcer derives from nowihtinawiht ( nothing ) which in turn combines noina ( never, not at all", deriving in turn from an incorporation of proclitic ne onto ola 'always, ever') + wlht ( per '

,

190

LAURENCE R. HORN

son, creature, thing , cf. wight and not a whit). This double incorporation. eventuated (through double contraction) as noht/naht. and finally not. Presumably facilitated by contexts allowing both interpretations, the negative existential pronoun is reanalyzed as a simple adverb (I sowed nought > I sowed not), spreading into forms containing no semantic indefinite. Now the original intcnsifier or reinforcer is no longer perceived as emphatic, but reinterpreted as a simple marker of negation, and the vestigial proclitic is doomed to extinction. By the Elizabethan period wc find the simple / say not. This part of the cycle parallels that of French: (20)

OF: Jeo ne dis ModF (standard): Je ne dis pas ModF (colloq.): Je dis pas

OE: Ic ne secge ME: Ic ne seye not EModE: 1 say not

Most of the Germanic dialects underwent the same shift as English, the pre verbal particle (Gothic m OHG ni. Old Saxon ni/ne) undergoing reinforcement, and gradually replacement, by neg-incorporated indefinites (cf. Delbriick 1910. Coombs 1976). But English unlike German. Dutch, and colloquial French has not stopped here. The periphrastic r/o-supported negation of modem English, already attested in the 15th century, had become ,

standard by the 17th: I say not > I do not say. While post-verbal negation (like solitary pre-vcrbal negation in French) survives in relic expressions // hum not. She loves me not), and is standard in modal and other auxiliary constructions, the result in ordinary main verb clauses is formally akin to the status quo ante: Henceforth the negative panicle belongs to the verb again:

it returns to the place which it had left' (Marchand 1938: 19$).21 In principle, however, this resolution is but the first step in a new cycle. The movement of the new reinforced negation into a pre-verbal position (as with Latin non or the English do + n t), satisfies Neg FinU. the general tendency to express negation as early in the sentence as possible (cf. Horn 1989). but leaves the door open to a new round of phonologically-inspired weakening and semantically-inspired restrengthening. Indeed this next developmental stage is already underway. As Marchand (1938: 200-1) notes. the periphrastic pre-verbal negative in colloquial English may once again be realized as a proclitic, albeit one free of the negative nasal - I d wanna go. I dunno - while other instances of post-auxiliary negation may be signaled more by vowel quality, stress, and rhythm than by the presence of a segmental element (cf. also Jesperscn 1917:11). Thus, we distinguish Hecancome '

,

*

FLAUBERT TRIGGERS, SQUATITIVE NEGATION

191

from He cant come largely by rhythmic structure. When the modal is contrastivelv stressed, even this distinction tends to become neutralized.

leading to some rather extreme repair sequences: He can yes or hecm'i*? It lakes no Nostradamus to predict that as the new millennium proceeds. the leleological contingencies of communication will soon require the installation of a new round of reinforcements for negation. Our current dilemma was foreseen clearly by Jespersen (1917:11), who deeply troubled by the I d know. I d mind "negations" just discussed dreamed of a bright, unambiguous future when some new device of strengthening might be called upon to remedy such reductions. Fortunately, as the attentive (if not downright impatient) reader will have long since recognized. '

"

"

"

"

help is now at hand. For the SprachgefiiMA&k genie Itnguisfu/ue. casting about for a means

to make the negative more impressive as being more vivid or picturesque an addition "used more or less incongruously, no regard being taken to |its| etymological meaning (Jespersen 1917: 15). what reinforcement could be more apt than squat/ Note that our humble item has already descatoldgized22 from its status as an etymological drecative to a generalized minimalizer , see Jespersen op. cit. on the literal incongruity of e.g. Never got a sniff of any ticket: He doesn t care a snap of his strong fingers whether he ever sees me again: Who now cares a tinkers curse for Cheops/' (cf. 1 don't give a care, amply attested by Jack Hoekscma (p.c.)) whose range has extended (like pas) from its original core of verbal expres sions to a far wider group of predicate foci,23 now occurring freely (like older not and Fr. pas I in both concordial and neg free environments, as seen in (IK) and (19). All that remains is the extension of squat from a minimalsubstance nominal to an all-purpose negative adverb. To this elFect. it must be borne in mind that however silly our 20th century ears might find our descendants' negations in (21). the corresponding negations of the 20ih century French (seen in (22) with their erstwhile literal glosses) would have struck the ears of their ancestors its equally absurd, "

"

,

"

'

(21)

a. b

.

(22)

a.

1 {slept'didn'l sleep} squat last night. I didn't sleep last night' 1 (d')know you squat. I don't know you" {J'ai/Je n'ai} pas dor mi hier soir. I didn't sleep a step last night'

LAURENCE R. HORN

b

Jc (nc) vous connais pas. I don't know you a slop"

.

If the last best hope lor English negation resides in HgMft that is only just. Despite the considerable progress that has been achieved over the last two decades, the bad news is that we know squat about the proper treatnienl of ncgaUon and polarity. But then, by the Law of Excluded Middle, the good news must be that we don t know squat about the proper treatment of iK'.Mtion and polarity '

Acknowledgments The colkMion ol curios on displuv here is dedieulcJ to jack Hoekscma. without whose intercession I would know a lot less about polarit) than the s ual 1 do. It is Jack, alonj; with

his MMHpNI (Victor. Frans) and students (Ton. Hoi/e. Anastasia). \cht> jjels ihe credit and'or blame lor tri pennp m> re-entry into the weird world ol polarity by sponsoring Bill Ladusaw s and my participation in Ton van der Woudcn s pre-epithalamial defense dunnp the PIOMUR days and hij;h TABl' season of June IWA. Thanks to Georgia Green. Ton \an der Wouden. and Ja».k Hcvksenu lor comnK*nts on earlier \er»ions ul thi\ paper "

Notes

I

.

The (aisymnwtry between NPU and PPIs piovides one of the bruvhhres penodically erupting at the Innges ol the polanty wars. One reason for behevmp that at least some such asymmetry exists is the fact that PPIs often occur in the c-vommand domain ol nepaiion. particularly when

the netsalion is interpreted metahnguistically or echoically (cf Horn IffSi I.incbarger I S?. Canton l«)%>. Thus. Quirk et al. (1985:777) note that "vome positive clauses arc likely to be negative only in denials ol previous statements : they cite, inter alia, the examples in (il |herc and elsewherv. I add boldface to flag relevant polanly items): "

in

The) DON T drive {quite pretty rather! last '

Crucially, however, the corresponding NPIs do not in general occur in the scope ol what we might call echoic reatlirmalion: (in

.1

I IX)N T sometimes turn in my assignments late '

b

He ISN'T still living in Amsterdam.

.

'

b

c

.

* .

d

.

d

'He IS living in Amsterdam anymort She HASN'T already timshed her thesis.

.

c

l DO SO ever turn in my assignments on time.

'She HAS yet hmshed her thesis. He ISN'T far more capable than you arc.

'He IS al all capable.

('with NPI <mvm
FLAUBERT TRIGGERS. SQUATTTIVE NEGATION

193

NPIs that don'l come as a part ol a packaged set. including Ihe minimi/.ers. aren't loo bad in such denial contexts f You DID SO budge: I DID SO sleep a wink tasl mphii. but even these are

far Jrom impeccable, a iact often exploited for jocular eflect: '

Uti)

"Do you think I didn t know that you have a terrible marriage? Do you think it comes as a stunning surprise that you don t sleep with your wile? And do you think that with all my problems I give a damn about yours? ... Wei!. I added, "that's not precisely true. '

"

I do give a damn." (Susan Isaacs IW) After AU TJiese Years, p.234> ffV)

"U I get caught, they'll catch you loo." I explained in my honors English class voice. '"

Do you think I give a shit?" he yelled. He stood and kicked the couch ... "As a matter he continued. "I don't give a l f ying luck!". "When you're doing live to ten "

of fact.

"

you'll give a flying luckl ( Isaacs, op. cit.. p.251) 1 would submit that the discrepancy in licensing properties between NPIs and PPIs is tied to the fact that the conditioning factors for the occurrence of nhoativk polanty items arc POSRIVE in nature and vice versa (see Israel 1996:621 for nrlated commentan >. 2

.

It should be noted that the flagging ol polanty items is hardly an area in which lexicographers

cover themselves with glory. It is rare to lind a notation in the entries lor much or many to distinguish them from e.g. a lot by virtue of the fact that the former are. while the latter is not.

largely restricted to "negative" contexts.

i

.

CT.c.g. Quirk el al. < 1985: SI0J»9-S 10.62) for an elaboration of the diverse categories of NPIs "

qua NAIs". The role of the any series is sometimes assigned a special status, reflecting the "

some is specific, though unspecilied: any is nonspecilic top. cit.. §10.60). This would be a good start to unraveling the mysteries of NPI and free-choice indeiinites if it weren t for the further claim that some implies an amount or number known to the speaker; it often doesn t (Some of/ton k ft - / have no idea how many). A more explicitly semantic observation that

"

'

'

treatment based on existential entailment or veridicality (cf. Zwarts 1995) wxmld be more

helpful here than the ritual invocation of specificity, and no more dilTicult to explain in informal terms. 4

.

These arc the MiNiMIZGltS of Bolinger (1972). and like all collocation pattcras they may undergo bleaching and blending: OUR KVOLVISX; IDIOMS

When pressed on Ihe issue for example. Ms. Myers aid she did not think Mr. Clinton ,

should solkn his stance. Republican plans to balance the budget in seven years would "

'"

make older people and the disabled suflcr. she said, adding "I don't trust Gingrich

lanher than you can bat an eye." (New York Times article, cited in New Yorker 11 Dec; 1995) 5

.

The refercnee to "preposed negation" alludes to the well-known fact that it is only when

material falls within the scope of the relevant operator that (what would now be called] scale rcversal occurs: compare \on animal atrrit: ergo wm homo eurrii vs. Homo non airrit: ergo '

'

animal non t unit (see William of Sherwood s Syncatenorcmata. in O Donncll 1941:73). 6

.

Quirt; et al. might have in mind the notion ol assertive deiined and motivated in Hooper (1975).

but it would have been nice to say so. In any case, while Hooper's dctimtion would correctly remove the believe class from the ranks of NPI licensors, it would incorrectly admit modals. See now Giannakidou (1997) on the dilTerent properties of modal and belief-contexts in the licensing of NPIs.

194

7

.

LAURENCE R. HORN

More recently. Grccnbaum (l*

: 193) aliempls to argue thai the "emphatic" use of any outside

non-asicni%c contexts in e.g. u) in

The cat will attack ANYonc.

is sanctioned because "the negative lorcc is in the implied conlxast'". But this is hopeless without an account of what negative lorce is. why it fails to extend to cases with the wimv. menials (or no nuidals at all), why this cmphaiic use of NPIs is impossible in direct rebuttals like .//(. DOIiS SO eat any meat (see fooimuc 1). and why NPIs lor NAIsi outside the any class "

"

fail to allow such "emphatic"" uses: Ui)

"'The cat must attack imust have attacked) ANYonc.

tfil) *The cat attacked ANYone last night.

(iv) *Thc cat could ever attack you. (= could attack you at any time). 8

.

"The

artist must be in his work like God in Creation, invisible and all-powerful: let him be sensed everywhere, but let him not be seen. "

9

.

On cxaaly as licensor, see also Jackson (1995) and Israel < 19961. The pragmatic salience of DCjpttive implicata also plays a role in dctcrmminj: which NPIs will be triggered in which contexts even with DK licensing operators. This emetics in minimal pairs like these from Smith

UI970) 1975:5011): U» There weren t {3 people." 14.321 people) in the SpflftS Arena Who batted an eye when '

Wilt asked to be taken out of the game. Ui)

Not {10<*/*9OS} of the people in the Sports Arena batted an eye ...

Uii)

Not {evcrybody/4many people} in L. A. would lift a finger lo help a lady in distress.

A similar point applies to the triggering of strict NPIs like until in ihe contexts of (iv> vs. (v); cf. HonMl9}<9: }5J for discussion). yw\

(v) 10.

'

a.

I ll be surprised it they hire you until you shave off your beard.

b

Why are you getting married until you absolutely have lo?

.

a.

I'll be damned il I'll hire you until you shave off your beard.

b

Why gel married until you absniulely have to?

.

Restnctors of other non-universal determiners sometimes make congenial, though non-sirictlyDE. homes for NPIs. Two such detcrmmeni are tnv and most Id. Heim 1984, Jackson

1995: 198. Israel 1996:656-59*. as in the following example cited lor a dilTerent purpose by

Michaelis (1996:489): Since you've already bad-mouthed me on Ihe air. Til lake the blame for it But I think most of your listeners with any intelligence know that il wasn t me. (Mark Ibancz. KGO-AM San Frandsco 11/12/905 '

Heim 119S4) dclines a weaker relation of limited DE-ncss which extends to mo. and/w-initial

NPs. but not to the scope-<>t-«/i/v environment, which is in fact UPWARD entailing (cf. Horn 1996: Appendix).

IL

It may appear puzzling that the most liberal any should require the assistance of at all in examples like |9| and tlO). But the any here must be the stressed strong any. an operator especially consanguine with at ail (see Kntka 1992, Jackson 1995. and especially Krifka 1995:233-35 on the strong polarity items and the semantics of at all). Notice that a: all shares ihe widening and strengthening properties Kadmon & Landman 19931 of strong any, as seen "

"

FLAUBERT TRIGGERS, SQL ATITIVE NEGATION

195

in ihc following exchange Irom an episode ol a BBC series broadcast on PBS Mystery in early

!996; Hlly is a novice private eye and Lam- her erstwhile mcnu>r. EJIy:

You have no respect lor me at all. do you. Arc we talking professional respect? No. I mean AT ALL.

I arry: -

E3ly:

Like bare at all. strong any can ilsell surface in Flaubert contexts:

It didn't make any dilTerence how many of the cultures were positive. The fact thai any ol them [= even (as few as) one] were positive supported his theory. (Robin Cook (1996:362), Contagion: in fact, two ol the four cultures were positive)

12.

A subset ol the WHell-cbss explclives also occur in directive contexts a.* m Get the hell out ot

hrrtf or Sfua the fuek up! These expressions are in luct positive polarity items: Don 't shut the fuck up can only be interpreted as a command to let some miscreant speak. I?.

If. for some perverse reason, we seek a closer analogue lo positive anymore, we need not look far alield. David Dowty and Bill Ladusaw both report a sentence Iragmenl spoken by ihc mayor of Missoula. Montana and broadcast during National Public Radio s Morning Edition". 25 Jan. '

.'

1996 lhal went something like 'It seems that Ihc purpose of citizenship any longer is to ..." The usual polarity mavens. including Jack Hoeksema who linds it absent Irom his massive data

base, speculate that positive any longer, while pertiaps an innovation, is a logical spinofT limn the wildly successful positive anymore. A query on the American Dialect Society e-list following Dowty's citing turned up only one piece of corroborating testimony, a hesitant claim lhal positive any longer mishi be cxianl in southern Ohio.

14.

Sources dnfer orthographic ally as to squatilive rendering. There is no consensus on whether it's

diddty squat or diddley squat or on whether these two-word collocations arc mere properly

hyphenated compounds, as in the caption to a .Vnv Yorker cartoon (13 January 1997. p. 55) that depicts a middle-aged man holding open a newspaper and barking twi to his wife as she heads nut the door "

Ui

\ sec there's an excellent sale on diddly-squat at the ZUchtOwn Mali in Nowheresville.

New Jersey".

15.

As noted by these scholars, for example, squatitives tend to impose a locality condition on their licensor (when they have a licensor): lend not to appear as surface indirect objects or "3"s. as passive agents, as locatives or genitives: tend not to antecede pronouns or reflexives or to

conjoin with other promKins; and are subject to a variety of other restrictions about which I shall have squat lo contribute here. It s aisn worth mentioning *7i/w.wwi/lhal diddly-shit diftcm '

from its fellow drecatives in occurring not only as a poslverbal negative polarity tor negative concord) indelinite but also, via convcntionali/ation. as an attributive adjective with the sense of

"

'

trivial

or picayune': you can raise a diddly-shil - but hardly a diddly-squat - liiile

objeclicKi to my analysis.

16. NtHe the presence of the not eben in licensing position in the light of Pint's recognition (1833:4101 that mimmi/ers arc understood as evoking an explicit or implicit nkht einmal das "

not even

such NPls.

and of subsequent work by Fauconmcr (1975) and others on the scalar nature of

1%

17.

LAURENCE R. HORN

A varant <>l this construclian occurs in Ihc following lament of Orlando Magic coach Brian Hill, ollcrcd in a radio interview [A Dec. i'W)! after his team lied an all-time low SGOM lor a

National Baskctall Association game in losing to Cleveland 84-57:

(i)

We couldn't do diddly-poo otTensively.

It is not clear Irom this datum alone whether poo as negator occurs only as a diddly-polarity item. Unfortunately Coach Hill was not pressed by the reporters on whether he would be willing to concede that the Magic didn t do poo {tout court), or whether they DID do poo (as '

well as squat). Further research is clearly needed

.

18. Note ihc licensing of diddls-squat within the antecedent of a conditional. This is an exception to the general behavior of squatitives touched on by Ross ic Postal i IWj und empirically conhrmcd by Jack Hoekscma. whose extensive database includes 30 aocuncnoest of NPI shit licensed by overt negation or ttther n-words. mme with questions, conditionals, or other satellite

downward entailers. Tbus. while the simple DU-licensed mdehnites my and ever, as Hoekscma observes, do not. in any oi the dialects of Hnglish. seem to show the effects of the Jesperscn cycle and 'never mean NO or NEVER ... because they are not strongly associated with nc j-iiion (J. Hoekscma. p.c.). it is the squatitives that are Jespenicn-rccyclable. as we shall sec '

'

'

in some detail below.

19.

As Bolingcr notes, mmimizers must be distinguished from dimimshcrs: til Uii

'

I m not a bit tired. '

I

m not a liitk tired.

(minimi/j:r. = not at all tired)

[DIUINOHER. = very tiredl

Diminishers cither do not accept descriptive negation at all or do so only within an elevated or artilicial register. Some, but tas illustrated by a his) not all. minimizers are NPIs; diminishers

tend to function as PPIs. See Horn (19S9:4Q0ffl) lor related discussion. 20. Jcspersen (1917) offers a similar characterization of the process oi negative 'contagion*. instantiating the linal stage with (i>, from Maupassant: in

'

une famille oil I

argent complait pour ncn a family in which money counted for squat '

'

(The gloss is mine, not Jespersen's.)

21. See Z;inuitmi (1991. 1997i for much more on the distribution ol pre- and postverbal negation tfocusing on language varieties in Italy and adjacent areas! and their implications for syntactic them. A broader and more purely typological survey of Romance and Germanic negation is

provided by Bemini & Ramat. who note < 1996:42) that the three types, preverbal/embracing/ postverbal tin their terminology. NEGI/NEGZ'NEG. ). co-occur within a single language. Brazilian Portuguese:

(i)

EJe nao lala portugues.

tin

Ele nao lala portugues nao.

tiii)

FJe fala portugues nuo.

| '

He doesn t speak Portuguese

'

J

The situation in global French is also more flexible tahan in the standard language: as Bernini

Ramat (1996:35) observe, the French-based Creoles ol the New World effect one more turn of the Jespcseman wheel, with the negator /*r ( placed obligatory or optionally before the &

.

finite verb (e.g. Guadeloupe Creole Sa jhx \ o hi pen = Standard Colloq. Fr. O* vaut pas la peine '

it's not worth the trouble').

FLAUBERT TRIGGERS. SQI.ATITIVE NEGATION 22.

197

In this connection, it's worth comparing squal and its fellow drccaii%cs to ihc apparcnily inlinitc sencs of body part and related taboo-item minimi/ers in Dutch that have lost their etymological value and synchronically represent

(i)

"

"

zero semantics (Postma 1995):

Niemand be reep er ene {zak'bal'hoL'TilcKrti'sodemicier/duvcl} van. (lit.) "Nobody understood a {scrolum'ball.hokracsticle.'sodomite'devil) ol if

As Postma observ es, a similar history can he ascribed to H are) a fix and its analogues. Jack

Hoekscma tp.c.) has also called my attention to the existence in German of the ur-drecativc. viz. Dreck itself:

(ii)

Das geht dir einen Dreck an. that concerns you |dat] a shit (prt| That doesn't concern you at all' "

2V .

A quick survey of 33 random occurrences from my sample downloaded Jrom Nc\Ls cites. television sit-coms. and mystery novels reveals nine occurrences of squat with mean, six with

do. live with count for or its synonyms tstandfor. he worth, amount toi, three with know, two with pay, and hapax leginncna with care, have, pmtnise. see, and mn. The pmductivity of ihe construction in qucstum is eloquently illustrated by an example in which a difTcrenl talbcit semanticallv related) predicate governs an unlicensed (and otherwise unattestedl squatilive object, which is in turn negatne enough t** license its own NPI satellite: (il

His parents, he said, were at the opera, the ballet, the symphony, several nights a week. while understanding dogshit about any oi it. "

"

Sue Miller. While / Was Cone (1999). p.49. italics in original.

-

References

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Baker. C.L. (1970) Double Negatives. Linguistic Inquiry I: 169-186. Barwisc. Jon & Robin Cooper (1981) Generalized Quantifiers and Natural Language.

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Bernini. Giuliano & Paolo Ramal (1996) Sfjatn c Sc/itcnct's in the Languages of [Curope.

Berlin: Mouton dc Gruytcr.

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LAURUNCE R HORN

Dclhruck. B. 119KM Gemtanische Syntax I: Zu ih-n ncxatnrn Satzrn. Lcip/ifi: Tcubncr. MM Donpcn. W.A. M'MS) At all. ScnphtMogus 3:62-1. l auconmcr. Ciillcs (1975) Pblanty and the scale pnnciplc CIS it. 188-99. Gaalone. David (1971) f-tudc dcscnptivc du systcmc dc la negation cn lr.tnvais contcmporam. Geneva: Dniz. Giannakidou. Anastasia 11997) Hie Landu upe of Polarity. Items. I'hD disscrtalii)n. U. of Gnmin en. Greenbaum. Sidney (1996) The Oxford English Grammar. Oxford: Oxford U. Kress. Grcenbaum. Sidney 6l Randolph Quirk (1990) A Sttulent's Grammar of the English

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.

91-124. New

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199

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'

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On the monotonicity of polar adjectives Christopher Kennedy Northwestei n University

1

.

The nionotonicity properties of polar adjectives

Negative polant\ item licensing il> <4i and entailment patterns (5) (S> indicate that certain adjectives generate monotone decreasing contexts, while others generate monotone increasing contexts (Seuren I97K: Ladusaw 1979: Linebarger 1980: Sanchez Valencia 1998). ill

It is ditlicult/'easy for Tim to admit that he has fvtr been wrong.

(2>

It was foolish/*clever of her to even bother to lift a finder to help.

(3)

It is strange/*typical that any of those papers were accepted.

(4»

It's sad/*grcat that you even have to talk to on\ of these people at all.

(SI

'

It s

'

dmgpnyiU to drive in Rome. => 4= It s dangerous to drive

last in Rome.

(6)

It's sale to drive in Des Moines. =

<= It's sate to drive last in

Dd Moines.

(7)

It's strange to see Frances playing electric guitar. =* 4* It's strange to see Frances playing electric guitar poorly.

(Si

It s

'

common to see Frances playing electric guitar. «= It's common to see Frances playing electric guitar poorly.

Monotonicily properties arc one of several factors that have traditionally been used to classify gradable adjectives according to their "logical polarity" (in the sense of H. Klein 1996). Adjectives which license negative polarity

ClIklSTOPmiR KENNEDY

items and downward cniailmcnts in clausal complements, such as dificult "

and strange., are classified its negative while adjectives which do not license negative polarity items but do permit upward inferences, such as easy and common, are classiried as positive (see Seuren 1978 for early discussion of this issue). This paper addresses the question of how this distinction should be formally represented within a larger theory of the meaning of gradable adjectives. I demonstrate that the monotonicity properties of polar adjectives follows from an independently motivated representation of logical polarity as a sortal distinction between positive and negative adjectives, in a model in which gradable adjectives denote relations between individuals and "

,

"

"

intervals on a scale ("extents"}, rather than relations between individuals and

points on a scale ( degrees"), as traditionally assumed. The paper is organized as follows. First. I discuss the basics of traditional degree-based semantic analyses of gradable adjectives, and I show that although this type of analysis supports an explanation of monotonicity properties of gradable adjectives, it is empirically unsatisfactory, because it fails to account for the anomaly of comparatives constructed out of adjectives of opposite polarity. I then introduce an alternative analysis of gradable adjectives and adjectival polarity, based on an algebra of extents, that provides the basis for an account of the anomalous comparatives mentioned above. Finally. I demonstrate that this representation of adjectival polarity has the additional positive consequence of deriving the monotonicity properties of polar adjectives. "

2

.

2

.

Degrees 1

The algebra of degrees

A fundamental problem introduced by gradable adjectives like dificulty fall. and interesting is that they are inherently vague: the criteria for deciding whether an utterance of e.g. x is difficult or // is difficult to p is true may vary according to factors external to the adjective, such as the meaning of .v or p and the context of utterance. A basic requirement of any theory of the semantics of gradable adjectives is that it must provide a means of capturing this variability, while at the same time ensuring that for any particular context of utterance, sentences of this type have a definite interpretation.

2(»?

ON THE MONOTONIC1TY OF POLAR ADJECTIVES

One approach lo this problem maintains that gradable adjectives have a more complex meaning than might initially be assumed: they are not simple predicaies, but rather relations between individuals and some kind of abstract representation of measurement (see e.g.. Seurcn 1973: Cresswell 1976: see E

.

Klein 1991 for general discussion).1 On this view, ihe logical representa"

tion of (9) is (10). where m represents the "measure argument

of the

y

adjective talL (9)

Carmen is tall.

(10)

mH{Caymenjn ) s

The role of the "measure argument" is to provide a means of fixing the extension of the adjective by introducing a standard value against which the target of predication is compared. For example, die truth conditions of the expression in {10) can be slated as follows: Carmen is loll is true just in case Carmen is at least as tall as m : i.e.. just in case Carmen's measure of lallness is at least as great as the standard, where the standard value is "

"

f

determined contexlually.2 A question that immediately arises in this type of analysis concerns the formal representation of measures: just what kinds of objects are they, and does their structure determine (or alVect) aspects of the interpretation of gradable adjectives? One answer to this question, developed in Cresswell 1976. builds on the intuition that "(wjhen we make comparisons we have in mind points on a scale (Cresswell 1976:266). Cresswell formalizes the notion of measure in terms of an ontology of such points, starting from the general observation that every gradable adjective supports a partial ordering on its domain along some dimension, a general property that permits grading. Objects in the domain of the adjective tall (entities that can have some kind of vertical extent, such as dogs, stars, amoebae, etc.. but not charity, disgust. or syntax), for example, can be ordered along a dimension of height. Noting that a partial ordering on a set A with respect to a dimension d partitions 4 into equivalence classes of objects under Cresswell defines a scale S6 as the set of all equivalence classes under 5 , which is itself a totally ordered set. A degree of p+ness, where is a gradable adjective associated with Sd is a member of Sd. That is. a degree on SA corresponds to an equivalence class of objects under It is not necessary to use equivalence classes directly in the semantics: degrees may instead be construed as abstract "

:ii4

CIIRISTOPIIHR KliNNEDY

objects that are associated with the equivalence classes determined by by a one-to-one mapping. Given this general characterization of scales and degrees, gradable adjectives can be analyzed as expressions that define relations between individuals and degrees (see e.g. Cresswell 1976: Hcllan 1981: Hoeksema 1983. von Stechow 1984a: Heim 1985: Lemer and Pinkal 1992: Moltmann

1992: Rullmann 1995: Gawron 1995 and others: see Atlas 1984 for a related

analysis). The basic account of the semantics of positive adjectives in this system parallels the one sketched above. The logical representation of (11)

represents the degree argument of long and denotes a contextually determined standard of iongneSs 3

is (12). where

-/

-

a||

*'

"

.

.

(11)

The Brothers Karamazov is long.

(i2)

mmK4&*$

(I I) is true just in case The Brothers Karamazov is at least as long as tlAyltWJZ): ie

if and only if d K:s length. .

..

p dHK holds, where dBK is the degree of The Brothers

Negative adjectives are analyzed in roughly the same way. with one imponani modification: the relation between the standard and the degree of the subject s adjecliveness must be reversed (cf. Gawron 1995). (13) illustrates this point. '

(13)

The Dream of a Ridiculous Man is short.

(14)

short{DRMM,uhom)

Given the analysis of (II) outlined above, (13)should be true just in case the length of The Dream of a Ridiculous Man is at least as great a standard of shortness (for Russian novels: this may or may not be the same degree as rt/wijc) or a S*ven context: see E. Klein 1980 for discussion). The partial ordering relation involved in the truth conditions for this example must be the reverse of the corresponding relation in (II >. however. For example, if the standard of shortness for Russian novels in some context is 45 pages. then (13) is true just in case The Dream of a Ridiculous Man is 45 pages long or less. Taking (14) to be the logical representation of (13), then, we can saydi>RM. that (13) is true just in case A/iVir Sentences like (15M16) show thai the relational difference between positive and negative adjectives extents to the comparative forms as well.

ON Till-: MONOTONiriTY OF I'CJLAk ADJHCTIXT.S

(15)

2115

77/ Brothers Karamazov is longer than T/n' Dream of a Rulu u has Man.

(16)

Ftoe Dream of a Ridiculous Man is shorter than Tfc Brothers Karamazov.

For perspicuity. I will adopt two fairly common assumptions about the semantic analysis of comparatives (though I should point out that the arguments for the characterization of adjectival polarity that I will develop

in this paper are independent of the specific semantic analysis of compara tives that I will use in the discussion). First. I assume that the comparative clause (the complement of than or as) denotes a definite description of a (maximal) degree (see e.g.. Russell 1905: von Stechow 1984a; Rullmann 1995: Kennedy 1997c). Second. 1 will adopt an analysis of comparatives in

terms of restricted existential quantification over degrees, in which the semantic function of a comparative is to restrict the possible value of the degree argument of a gradablc adjective to only those degrees which stand in some relation - the relation introduced by the comparative morpheme to the degree denoted by the comparative clause (Heim 1985). The logical representation of (15), given these two assumptions, can be can be formulat-

ed as in (I7).J (17)

3 i(rJong{Dreamjdf)\[hnf;{BK.(l)\

According to (17). (15) is true just in case there is a degree d which exceeds the (maximal) degree of The Dream of a Ridiculous Man s length, and The Brothers K is d long. As was the case with the absolute, the ordering relation imposed by the comparative morpheme appears to be dependent on the ordering relation associated with the adjective it modifies. In order to get the correct truth conditions for (16), the ordering relation must be reversed: (16) should be '

laic just in case the length of Tlie Dream ofa Ridiculous Man is less than the length of The Brothers K. If the ordering associated with the comparative morpheme is reversed when it modifies a negative adjective, as in (18). then we get the right results.

(18)

&[d < idshort{BK.d')\\short(Dream.d)\

According to (18), (16) is true just in case there is a degree which is ordered below the degree of The Brothers fCs shortness, and The Dream ofa Ridieu hus Man is that short.

2i\b

22 .

ClIRISTOPIHiR KENNEDY

Degrees, polar opposition, and nuinoionu it)

The relational difference between positive and negative adjectives illustrated by the examples in the previous section suggests a way of formally representing the logical polarity of gradable adjectives within a degree algebra. Given the detinition of a scale as a linearly ordered set of degrees along

some dimension- and the analysis of gradable adjectives as relations between individuals and degrees, we can characlcri/c adjectival polarity in the following way: assume that antonymous pairs of adjectives define mappings between objects and the same scale (for example, rail and short both define relations between objects and degrees on a scale of height: cf. Rullmann I995K but they dilFer in that the ordering relations on the scale are reversed. That is, for any antonymous pair of adjectives and
a scale 5. jo

denotes a relation between objects and (SvCj), while
nef;

denotes a relation between objects and (5.>(>)

.

On this view, the set of

positive degrees D/I(n and the set of negative degrees D g on a scale S stand in the dual relation. Moreover, since there is a one-to-one mapping between the two sets (the identity function), D and are isomorphic. This characterization of adjectival polarity has three important results. First, it explains why the ordering is reversed when computing the meaning of positive and negative absolute and comparative adjectives. Second, it correctly predicts that statements like (19) are valid. ,,

(19)

The Dream of a Ridiculous Man is shorter than The Brothers

Karamazov if and only if The Brothers Koramozov is longer than The Dream of a Ridiculous Man. Degrees of longness and shortness are the same objects, therefore, given the diflercnce in the ordering relations associated with positive and negative adjectives, the two conjuncls in (19) are true in exactly the same situations. Third, and most importantly for the current discussion, the formali/ation of adjectival polarity outlined here has the additional positive consequence that negative adjectives are monotone decreasing. To see why, consider an arbitrary case of ordering along a dimension. for example, safety. If b is safer than a, then the following relation holds:

(20)

a<sa

b

Assume that every gradable adjective is associated with a function which

ON THE MONOTONICITY OF POLAR ADJECTIVES

maps individuals to degrees.5

2(17

If the ordering relation associated with a

negative adjectives is the dual of the relation associated with its positive counterpart, then whenever (20) holds, (21) (22) also hold (where Safe and DANGEROUS denote functions from individuals to degrees). (21)

sai i u;) < SAFE(/>)

(22)

DANGEROUS(/>) < DANGliROUS(a)

Given the standard dclinitions in (23), it follows that positive adjectives arc monotone increasing and negative adjectives are monotone decreasing.

(23)

'

a.

A function/ is monotmf imreasing ill : a < h -* f\a) < f{b)

b

A function/is monotone decreasing iff: a < h -*fih) < j\a)

.

Although this is a positive result, it must be acknowledged that the mono-

tonicky of negative adjectives does not follow from an independent aspect of the algebra of degrees. Rather, it is a definitional property of negative adjectives. The facts discussed so far indicate that within a degree algebra, the assumption that negative adjectives are scale reversing is necessary in order to construct a semantics that has the correct truth conditions for both

positive and negative adjectives in the absolute and comparative forms. Nothing about the system itself requires negative adjectives to be monotone decreasing: rather, it is the data which force this assumption. An alternative situation would be one in which independently motivated aspects of the formalism have the additional consequence that negative adjectives are scale reversing. In Section 4, I will introduce an algebra of measures which does have this property: before 1 do this, however. I will turn to a set of empirical data which calls into question the descriptive adequacy of the degree-based characterization of adjectival polarity presented here.

3

.

Cross-polar anomaly

(24 27) show that comparative constructions formed out of positive and negative pairs of adjectives are anomalous: in the discussion that follows. 1 will refer to this phenomenon as cross poku anomaly (see Kennedy 1997b for more detailed discussion of this phenomenon and the problems it poses for a degree algebra).

:iis

CIIRISTOPHHR KIINNliDY

(24)

Brothers Karamazov \s longer lhan The Idiot is short.

(25) *Mike is shorter than Carmen is tall. (26) *The surf at Maverick's is twice as high as the surf at Seabright is low.

(27)

Maureen is even less exciting lhan Maurice is dull.

These examples should be compared to acceptable sentences like (28 29). in which the polarity of the adjectives is the same. (28)

The desk is longer lhan the table is wide.

(29)

Luckily, the licus was shorter than the doorway was low.

The puzzle of sentences like these is that the very same assumption which leads to the right semantics for positive and negative adjectives, an explanation of the validity of (19). and an account of the monotonicity of negative adjectives the assumption that positive and negative degrees on a scale are the same objects makes the wrong prediction in cases of comparison between adjectives of opposite polarity. If positive and negative degrees are

the same objects, then, given the analysis of typical comparatives like (15). (24) should be true when the point on a scale of length corresponding to the longness of The Brothers Karamazov exceeds the point on a scale of length corresponding to the shortness of The Wat, Consider the logical representation of (24). shown in (30).

(30)

Md > idshortadiot.d)\\hm}>{BK.d)\

Given the analysis of comparatives sketched in Section 2.1. (24) should not only be interprctable. it should be logically equivalent to (15). The same argument can be made for examples in which the adjectives are reversed. This result points out a fundamental flaw in the degree approach: because positive and negative degrees denote the same objects, there is no way to rule out comparisons like (24> (27). It should be noted that within a degree algebra the anomaly of (24i (27) cannot be reduced to the better-known anomaly of (3IM32), which are examples of i/u ttmmensarabUity. or incompatibility of scales (see E. Klein 1980. 1991 for discussion).

(31) #Mike is taller lhan Carmen is clever.

nikisTomHR K :N

l:l)

(24) #Tke Brothers Karamazov is longer lhan The Idiot is short. (25) *Mike is shorter than Carmen is tall. (26) The surf at Maverick's is twice as high as the surf at Seabright is low.

(27)

Maureen is even less exciting than Maurice is dull.

These examples should be compared to acceptable sentences like (28 29>. in which the polarity of the adjectives is the same. (28)

The desk is longer lhan the table is wide.

(29)

Luckily, the licus was shorter than the doorway was low.

The puzzle of sentences like these is that the very same assumption which

leads to the right semantics for positive and negative adjectives, an explanation of the validity of (19), and an account of the monotonicity of negative adjectives the assumption that positive and negative degrees on a scale are the same objects makes the wrong prediction in cases of comparison between adjectives of opposite polarity. If positive and negative degrees are the same objects, then, given the analysis of typical comparatives like (15). (24) should be true when the point on a scale of length corresponding to the longness of The Brothers Karamazov exceeds the point on a scale of length corresponding to the Shortness of The Idiot. Consider the logical representation of (24), shown in (30).

(30)

d[d > id short{ldiotxf)\\hmg{BKxl)\

Given the analysis of comparatives sketched in Section 2.1. (24) should not only be interpretable. it should be logically equivalent to (15). The same argument can be made for examples in which the adjectives arc reversed. This result points out a fundamental flaw in the degree approach: because positive and negative degrees denote the same objects, there is no way to rule out comparisons like (24)-(27). Il should be noted that within a degree algebra the anomaly of (24) (27) cannot be reduced to the belter-known anomaly of (31) (32), which are examples of incommensurability, or incompatibility of scales (see E. Klein 1980. 1991 for discussion).

(31) *Mike is taller than Carmen is clever.

UN Tin: MONOTONKTTY OF POLAR ADJIKTIVES

2W

(32) «7yu, j(ij0f js morc lragic than my copy of The Brothers Kara mazflv is heavy. The oddness of these examples follows from general properties of ordering relations and the fairly natural assumption that the adjectives fall and clever are associated with distinct scales (i.e.. scales along diil erent dimensions). The comparative in (31) restricts the possible values of the degree variable be a degree which exceeds the maximum degree of Carmen's cleverness. Since ordering relations are dertned only for objects in the same ordered set. only degrees of cleverness satisfy this restriction. The result is that the comparative restricts the degree argument of loll to be a degree of cleverness. Degrees of cleverness are not of the appropriate sort for the adjective /
applied to (32). as well),6 An incommensurability explanation of cross-polar anomaly would start

from the same claim: antonymous pairs of adjectives like long and shaft are associated with distinct scales, and so their degrees cannot be compared. Such an account is unavailable in the degree approach, however, because it presupposes that there is no mapping of the degrees on the scales associated with the incomparable adjectives onto some common scale appropriate to both adjectives. When such a mapping can be defined, comparison is possible, as shown by typical examples of comparative subdelelion like (33).

(33)

Mike's hands are wider than Carmen's arc long.

(33) is interpretable despite the fact that the compared adjectives wide and tong use diil'erent scales because degrees of width and length can be mapped onto a common scale

call il I im.ar mi.asi rimi ni

- which can be used

to calculate the denotation of the comparative. In order for an incommensurability explanation of (24) (27) to go through, then, it must be demonstrated that for any for positive-negative pair of adjectives, there is no possible mapping between D/3fif and D - If such a mapping can be defined, then these constructions should be amenable to the same sort of analysis as (33). The problem is that given the assumption that and are related by the dual relation an assumption that is necessary to explain the validity of (19) there is a mapping from positive to negative degrees: the identity function (see Rullmann 1995 for additional discussion of this point). The incommensurability explanation fails because

210

niRisTomiiR Ki-.\M;m

any algebra ot degrees which explains ihc validity of (19). a minimal requirement of descriptive adequacy, also permits a mapping between positive and negative degrees, with the consequence that (24) should be fully interpretablc. Although it fails to explain the anomaly of (24) (27i. the proposal that positive and negative adjectives are incomparable contains an interesting

hypothesis; that degrees of tallness and degrees of shortness are basically

diflereiM KXta of objects, and cross polar anomaly can be explained in terms of this dillcrence. Without an ad hoc stipulation to this elfect. however. there is no way to build such a sortal dilference into an algebra of degrees. What is required to make this type of explanation work is an elaboration of

the algebra of "measures in such a way that the measures associated with

positive ami negative adjectives arc stmcluralK distinct. In the following section. 1 will describe such an elaboration, and I will show that this distinc-

non not only provides an explanation of cross polar anomaly, it also entails that positive adjectives are monotone increasing and negative adjectives are monotone decreasing.

4

Extents

.

4

1 Extentx and polar opposition

.

Semr (1 78. 19X4) proposes that a gradahle adjective does not denote a relation between an individual and a degree (a point on a scale), but rather a relation between an individual and an extent* where an extent is an interval on a scale (see also von Stechow 1984b and l.ohner I 90: see Bierwisch

1989 for a similar proposal). As in the degree approach, every gradable adjective is associated with a scale, and scales are dillerentiated from one

another through association with a dimension (e.g.. ht't ht. neadbtg Ivnitth. contplfxity. ahstracOma, etc). The dilference is that the scalar values that provide the measure argument of a gradable adjective are not points, but "

"

rather intervals. More formally, let a scale {S.< be a dense, linearly ordered set of points along a dimension 6, An extent E on <S.<£> is a nonempty. convex subset of 5. i.c.. a subset of S with the following property: / E/:! (cf. Landman 1991: 110; this is simply V/)r/»,G£V/>< 5l/>/<< ,

_

ON THE MONOTONICITY OF POLAR ADJECTIVES

211

the delinition of interval for a linearly ordered set of points). Finally, let a proper extent on <S.<.v> be a nonempty, convex proper subset of S. In general terms, an extent, like a degree, is an abstract representation of the measure of an object s adjectiveness The advantage of formalizing these measures as intervals, rather than as points, is that a basic structural '

"

"

.

distinction can be made between dilferent sorts of extents, and this distinc-

tion can be used as the basis for a theory of adjectival polarity. Following Seuren (197X. 1984) and von Stechow (1984b). I will distinguish two sorts of extents; positive extents and negative extents, delined in (34) (35):

(34)

A positive extent on {St
(35)

A negative extent on (S.<>) is a proper extent on

that

ranges from some positive point to the upper end of the scale. The primary distinction between positive and negative extents is perspec tive. The delinitions in (34) (35) entail that the complement of any positive extent on a scale is a negative extent, and vice versa. The intuition which this is meant to capture is that although positive and negative pairs of adjectives are fundamentally similar in meaning (they map objects onto the same scale). they are used in a very dilferent way. Specifically, they are used to express complementary perspectives on a scale. For example, the sentences Carmen is beautiful and Mike is ugly both provide information about the attractiveness of the individuals denoted by the subjects, but the information is qualitatively dilferent in each case. The positive adjective beautiful conveys information about the attractiveness an object has, while the negative

adjective ugly conveys information about the attractiveness an object does not have (cf. von Stechow 1984b: 196>. 7

To make this idea more precise, assume that for any object a which can be ordered along some dimension d. there is a function d from a to a unique

point on the scale {S.
a with respect to {Sxd) neg a) be the interval {p £ {S9<$ I (Ha) /;}. Thus for any a.pos6(a) and neg a) represent (join) complementary perspectives

on a with respect (5.
212

niRISTOI'lIHR KENNEDY

scale, there is no way to differentiate positive and negative degrees: for any (d) denote the same object. In contrast, because extents have additional structure (the intervals ranging to one or the other end of the scale), positive and negative extents are distinct objects: for any a ordered along a dimension d. posd{a) * neg a)* More generally, for any scale

object a. deg

a) and deg

(S.
.

This result provides the basis for a theory of polar opposition. Assume thai the set of relations between individuals and extents can be sorted

according to their range, with the following result: positive adjectives denote

gradable properties whose range is EL negative adjectives denote gradable

properties whose range is Ene In other words, logical polarity is represented as a sortal distinction between positive and negative adjectives: positive adjectives denote relations between individuals and positive extents: negative adjectives denote relations between individuals and negative extents.

Ail immediate advantage of this approach is that propositions construct ed out of positive and negative adjectives can be analyzed in exactly the same way it is not necessary to stipulate that the ordering relation used when computing the interpretations of absolute and comparative adjectives must be reversed in the negative form. The interpretation of the absolute is straightforward: a sentence of the form a is (p.