Philosophical Perspectives on Depiction
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Philosophical Perspectives on Depiction
MIND ASSOCIATION OCCASIONAL SERIES This series consists of occasional volumes of original papers on predefined themes. The Mind Association nominates an editor or editors for each collection, and may cooperate with other bodies in promoting conferences or other scholarly activities in connection with the preparation of particular volumes. Publications Officer: M. A. Stewart Secretary: M. Fricker Recent volumes in the series include: Identity and Modality Edited by Fraser MacBride Values and Virtues Aristotelianism in Contemporary Ethics Edited by Timothy Chappell Truthmakers The Contemporary Debate Edited by Helen Beebee and Julian Dodd Dispositions and Causes Edited by Toby Handfield Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity, and Realism Essays on Wilfrid Sellars Edited by Willem A. deVries
Philosophical Perspectives on Depiction Edited by Catharine Abell and Katerina Bantinaki
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Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offices in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © the several contributors 2010 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2010 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available Typeset by Laserwords Private Limited, Chennai, India Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by MPG Books Group, Bodmin and King’s Lynn ISBN 978–0–19–958596–0 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Acknowledgements Most of the chapters in this collection were presented, in an earlier form, at a conference organized by the editors at the University of Manchester in May 2007 and funded by the Mind Association, the British Society of Aesthetics, and the Analysis Trust. We are grateful to these institutions for their support. The editors would particularly like to express their sincere gratitude to the Mind Association for their support and encouragement during the planning and preparation of the collection. We would also like to thank the philosophers and graduate students who attended the conference, whose wholehearted interest in depiction encouraged us to proceed with this volume. Finally, we would like to thank the chapters’ authors for contributing them to this collection, for their hard work and willingness to engage with one another’s arguments, and for their patience during the process of putting this volume together.
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Contents List of Figures and Table Notes on the Contributors Introduction Catharine Abell and Katerina Bantinaki
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1. Pictorial Diversity John Kulvicki
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2. Picture This: Image-based Demonstratives Dominic McIver Lopes
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3. The Epistemic Value of Photographs Catharine Abell
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4. Depictive Seeing and Double Content John Dilworth
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5. Picture Perception as Twofold Experience Katerina Bantinaki
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6. Inflected Pictorial Experience: Its Treatment and Significance Robert Hopkins
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7. Inflected and Uninflected Experience of Pictures Bence Nanay
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8. Seeing Things in Pictures John H. Brown
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Index
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List of Figures 2.1. Grey square and black circle 2.2. Grey circle and black square
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2.3. The phi phenomenon
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2.4. The phi phenomenon with change in colour
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2.5. Titchener–Ebbinghaus Illusion
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2.6. Two fish
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2.7. Poker chip on a table
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2.8. Pablo Picasso, Portrait of Fernande Olivier (1906). Drypoint, 16.2 × 11.8 cm. Worcester Art Museum, Worcester, Massachusetts, Sarah C. Garver Fund and anonymous gifts © Estate of Pablo Picasso (Paris)/SODRAC (Montr´eal) 2009
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2.9. Georges Seurat, Eiffel Tower (1889). Oil on panel, 24.1 × 15.2 cm
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2.10. Three shots of a rolling ball
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6.1. Rembrandt, Jan Cornelisz. Sylvius (c.1646), sketch for the posthumous etching. Pen and brown ink, with white heightening, 28.5 × 19.5 cm. © Trustees of the British Museum
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6.2. Rembrandt, Jan Cornelisz. Sylvius (1646), posthumous etching, 27.8 × 18.8 cm. © Trustees of the British Museum
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8.1. Alfred Stevens, Study of a Nude Figure, red chalk on buff paper, 16.5 × 16.4 cm. Reproduced by permission of The Barber Institute of Fine Arts, University of Birmingham
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List of Table 2.1. Three shots of a rolling ball
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Notes on the Contributors Catharine Abell is a philosopher at the University of Manchester. Her research interests lie predominantly in aesthetics, particularly in the philosophy of the representational arts. They include the nature and value of depictive representation; its role in communication and its relation to linguistic representation; expression and interpretation in the representational arts; and the phenomenon of style. Katerina Bantinaki worked at the University of Manchester before moving to the University of Crete, where she is currently a lecturer in aesthetics and the philosophy of art. Her research interests lie predominantly in the philosophy of art. She is particularly interested in philosophical issues relevant to the perception and interpretation of works of art, the value of works of art, and their expressive import. John H. Brown has been a member of the Philosophy Department at the University of Maryland at College Park since 1963, specializing in aesthetics and philosophy of art, including philosophy of art history. His recent publications include ‘Connoisseurship: Conceptual and Epistemological Fundamentals’, in Perspectives on Connoisseurship of Chinese Painting, edited by Jason C. Kuo (2008); and articles entitled ‘Beauty’ and ‘Abstract Art’ in the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1998), revisions of which will appear in the online edition (forthcoming). Other papers, a number of which apply digital technology to aesthetic problems in visual art, may be accessed on his website, . John Dilworth is a professor of philosophy at Western Michigan University. His book The Double Content of Art was published in 2005. He is also the author of numerous articles in aesthetics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language, copies of which are available via his website at . Robert Hopkins is a philosopher at the University of Sheffield. His research interests include the nature and value of pictorial representation, as well as many topics in the philosophy of art and philosophy of mind more generally. His chapter in this volume forms part of a series on the varieties of pictorial experience and their value, both aesthetic and epistemic. John Kulvicki received his Ph.D. in 2001 from the University of Chicago, and worked at Washington University in St Louis and Carleton University in Ottawa
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notes on the contributors
before moving to Dartmouth College in 2004, where he is currently Assistant Professor of Philosophy. He works on the philosophy of art and the philosophy of perception. Dominic McIver Lopes teaches philosophy at the University of British Columbia. He is the author of Understanding Pictures, Sight and Sensibility: Evaluating Pictures, and A Philosophy of Computer Art, as well as a number of articles on aesthetics, including pictorial representation. Bence Nanay is Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Adjunct Assistant Professor of Biology at Syracuse University, and Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of British Columbia in the Spring semesters. He has published articles on philosophy of mind, philosophy of biology, and aesthetics in various journals such as the Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophical Studies, Analysis, Synthese, Monist, and the Canadian Journal of Philosophy. His edited collection Perceiving the World is forthcoming at Oxford University Press in 2010.
Introduction CATHARINE ABELL AND KATERINA BANTINAKI
Depiction is a distinctive form of representation, characteristic of figurative paintings, drawings, and photographs. Pictures are representations that depict their objects. We do not have to look far for examples. They leer at us from advertising hoardings, televisions, and computer screens. They grace the walls of art galleries and the pages of fashion magazines. While the primary function of some pictures is aesthetic, this is not true of all, or indeed most, pictures. The pictures that accompany flat-packed furniture are not beautiful, but are essential if we are to assemble sheets of veneered chipboard into usable beds, desks, and drawers. Photographs of smiling politicians may help them to secure our trust and thereby our vote. The photographs that accompany newspaper reports of disasters in far-off places convey their scale and effects in a way the reports alone could not. Although depiction plays as important a role as language in contemporary culture and communication, its function is relatively poorly understood. While the philosophy of language has long been considered a philosophical discipline in its own right, the philosophy of depiction is usually thought of, when it is thought of at all, as a sub-discipline in aesthetics. This is like conflating the philosophy of language with the philosophy of literature. Although there are many interesting issues concerning the aesthetics of pictures, at least as many non-aesthetic issues fall within its domain. Its central concerns—what it is for something to depict an object, what sorts of things pictures can depict, how interpreters are able to work out what pictures depict, and how pictures affect their perceivers—are important for understanding how pictures function in both aesthetic and non-aesthetic contexts.
2 catharine abell and katerina bantinaki The philosophy of depiction draws on research in other areas of philosophy, most notably the philosophy of mind and language, as well as aesthetics. It also has the capacity to contribute to our understanding of other areas. An adequate understanding of the nature of depiction may improve our understanding of both mental representation and scientific theories. Adequate accounts of what pictures are and how they are interpreted may help us to grasp the role that pictures play in mathematical and scientific reasoning. An understanding of how they function communicatively may also assist the development of a general theory of human communication. This volume aims to further debate across a wide range of issues in the philosophy of depiction and to do so in a way that helps to make clear how those issues bear on our understanding of both the aesthetic and nonaesthetic roles that pictures play. We hope that this introductory chapter will serve two purposes. Firstly, we aim to provide an accessible overview of both the main issues in the philosophy of depiction and the main positions contemporary philosophers hold with regard to those positions. Secondly, we aim to situate the various chapters in this volume in relation to these issues and positions. Thus, we hope that this Introduction will provide both useful background knowledge for those unfamiliar with the topics addressed by the chapters that follow, and a tool to assist subsequent reflection on their wider implications.
1. The Project of Definition 1.1. A Taxonomy of Approaches Philosophical accounts of depiction aim, first and foremost, to answer the metaphysical question of what it is for one thing to depict another. That is, they aim to provide individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for being a picture of some object. There are four main contemporary philosophical approaches to this issue: (1) structural, (2) phenomenological, (3) recognitional, and (4) resemblance-based. 1. Structural accounts take the most important metaphysical problem in the philosophy of depiction to be that of distinguishing depiction from language and other non-depictive systems of representation. They therefore seek to identify features that jointly suffice to make a representation of some object
introduction
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depictive. Since they are interested only in explaining distinctions between different kinds of representation, and not in explaining distinctions between depictive representations and things that are not representations, they can appeal to features that pictures have in virtue of being representations. They attempt to identify structural features that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for a representation to be depictive. Structural features are features that representations have in virtue of their relationship to other members of the system of representation to which they belong. Nelson Goodman was the first to propose a structural account of depiction (Goodman 1976). He argued that depictive systems of representations are those that are both analog and relatively replete. A representational system is analog if it is both syntactically dense (any complete ordering of the system’s members is such that, between any two representations, there is a third) and semantically dense (any complete ordering of things denoted by the system’s syntactically distinct members is such that, between any two denotations, there is a third). It is replete if, in comparison with other systems, relatively many of its members’ features are relevant to determining what they represent. John Kulvicki has recently developed an alternative structural account (Kulvicki 2006). He improves on Goodman’s notion of analogicity, and adds a further structural feature, transparency, to those Goodman identified. He notes that a picture surface comprised of a circular mark could depict either a sphere, a circular disk seen from front on, or an oval dish seen from an oblique angle, and so on. A picture’s bare bones content, Kulvicki argues, incorporates all the properties that all its possible objects have in common. Pictures, he argues, instantiate their own bare bones contents. Bare bones content is opposed to fleshed out content, which is what a picture actually depicts. Although a picture of another picture in the same system will generally differ in fleshed out content from the latter picture (for example, a photograph of a photograph of a building will generally depict a photograph, not a building), Kulvicki argues that both will have the same bare bones content. Transparency consists in the fact that any picture of another picture in the same system will share the latter’s bare bones content. In Chapter 1 in this volume, Kulvicki continues the project of identifying structural features that distinguish depictive representational systems from linguistic and other non-depictive systems of representation. He identifies a further feature which concerns, not the relations between different pictures
4 catharine abell and katerina bantinaki in a single depictive system, but rather the relations that different depictive systems of representation bear to one another. He notes that there is a variety of different depictive systems, distinguished both by the features of their constituent members and by the interpretative significance of those features. There are various methods of depicting an object—for example, one can produce a picture of a lemon by photographing it with a normal lens or a fisheye lens, by drawing its outline, by means of chiaroscuro, or by painting it in a Cubist style—and the pictures that result from these different methods have very different features. How these features are interpreted also depends on the method by which they have been produced. For example, Kulvicki notes, we interpret pictures produced using chiaroscuro as depicting illuminated objects, although we do not interpret outline drawings as doing so, and we interpret colour photographs as depicting the colour of objects, whereas we do not interpret black and white photographs as doing so. Kulvicki argues that depictive systems are unique in competing neither syntactically nor semantically with one another. Two systems compete syntactically if they use the same features to represent features of different kinds. For example, a system which represents temperature over time by means of graphs plotting time on the x axis and temperature on the y axis competes syntactically with a system which represents monthly rainfall at a destination by plotting rainfall at that destination on the x axis and the months of the year on the y axis, because each represents something different by means of a given point on the graph. By contrast, black and white photographs do not compete syntactically with colour photographs because, although the latter is coloured and the former is not, the former does not represent colour. Because the hue of black and white photographs is syntactically irrelevant, there is no syntactic feature that the two systems share which they deploy to different representational ends. Two systems compete semantically if they use different syntactic features to represent a given property. French and English compete semantically, because French uses ‘vert’ to represent green, whereas English uses ‘green’. By contrast, where depictive systems represent the same properties, they do so in the same way. For example, both black and white and colour photographs, outline drawings, and chiaroscuro pictures represent shape in
introduction
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the same way. Likewise, black and white photographs, colour photographs, and chiaroscuro pictures all represent variations in light and dark in the same way. Kulvicki explains this lack of syntactic or semantic competition among pictorial systems by appeal to his claim, noted above, that pictures instantiate their bare bones contents. One consequence of this is that, to have different bare bones contents, different pictures would have to have different surface features. Pictorial systems therefore cannot compete syntactically with one another. The fact that pictures instantiate their bare bones contents also precludes semantic competition, he argues, because it means that, to the extent that pictures share bare bones contents, they will share surface features. Whereas structural approaches attempt to capture what is distinctive about depiction in terms of features that pictures have as representations, the remaining three approaches attempt to do so in terms of features that they have independently of their status as representations. In addition to distinguishing pictures from other representations, these approaches seek to distinguish pictures from things that are not representations. Rather than attempting to identify features that are necessary and sufficient to make a representation depictive, that is, these approaches attempt to identify features that are necessary and sufficient to make anything whatever a depictive representation. In this spirit, (2) phenomenological accounts of depiction claim that it is necessary for something to elicit a perceptual experience with a certain phenomenology if it is to depict an object. Ernst Gombrich claimed that it must produce the illusion of seeing that object (Gombrich 1977); Richard Wollheim claimed that it must elicit a twofold experience, seeing-in, one fold of which is analogous to that of seeing the object face to face (Wollheim 1987); Kendall Walton claims that it must support a rich and vivid visual game of make believe featuring that object (Walton 1990); Christopher Peacocke claims that our experience of it must resemble the experience we would have of the object were we to see it (Peacocke 1987); while Malcolm Budd and Robert Hopkins claim that it must be experienced as resembling that object (Budd 1993; Hopkins 1995). (3) Recognitional accounts deny that something need elicit any particular phenomenological response in order to depict an object, but claim instead
6 catharine abell and katerina bantinaki that it must engage particular sub-personal perceptual mechanisms if it is to do so. Flint Schier and Dominic Lopes, for instance, both claim that, in order to depict an object, it is necessary for something to engage those mechanisms that are responsible for our ability to recognize that object in the flesh (Lopes 1996; Schier 1986). Finally, (4) resemblance accounts claim that to depict an object, something must resemble that object. For example, John Hyman claims that it must resemble the object in respect of its occlusion shape or silhouette (Hyman 2006), and Catharine Abell claims that it must resemble the object in respect of perceptible features that jointly capture the object’s overall appearance (Abell 2009). While something’s resembling an object is not inconsistent with its bearing any of the phenomenological or perceptual relations just described to that object, such accounts remain neutral regarding both the psychological salience of the resemblances at issue, and whether the same sub-personal mechanisms are involved in recognition of something as depicting an object as are involved in recognizing that object in the flesh. Although the proponents of each approach claim that it is necessary for depiction, none of these relations plausibly suffices to make something a picture. This is because things that do not depict an object may nonetheless bear each of these relations to it. For example, the stains on a wall may be visually indistinguishable from a picture of a face, such that elicit experiences with the same phenomenology as those evoked by a picture of a face, engage the same sub-personal perceptual mechanisms as are involved in recognizing a face in the flesh, and bear the same resemblance relations to a face as does a picture of a face. 1.2. A Further Constraint: The Standard of Correctness It thus seems that phenomenological, recognitional, and resemblance accounts must all identify some further relation that something must bear to an object in order to depict it. What prevents the stains on the wall from depicting a face is that it is purely accidental that they bear the perceptible relations described above to a face. A further relation which constrains the manner in which something must have been produced if it is to depict an object therefore looks as if it can overcome this problem. This historical constraint comprises a standard of correctness which determines whether something that meets the necessary condition for depiction
introduction
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described above (whether that condition is to be specified in terms of phenomenology, recognitional resources, or resemblance) in fact depicts that object. There are two distinct schools of thought regarding the nature of the standard of correctness. Some philosophers hold that something must have been intended by its maker to bear the relevant phenomenological, recognitional, or resemblance relation to an object if it is to depict it (Hopkins 1998; Wollheim 1987). One objection sometimes made to this view is that, while this may be true of paintings and drawings, it does not apply to photographs, which bear causal rather than intentional relations to their objects. This has led some philosophers to claim that two distinct standards of correctness govern depiction, a causal standard for photographs, and an intentional standard for non-photographic pictures (Hopkins 1998; Wollheim 1987). Others object that even non-photographic pictures cannot be governed by an intentional standard, since picture makers can, due to technical incompetence or other factors, succeed in depicting things other than they intended to depict. Many who reason in this latter way claim that some form of causal standard governs all depiction. While non-photographic pictures are not directly causally related to their objects in the way that photographs are, philosophers such as Lopes claim that they are indirectly causally related to their objects via a series of preceding information states that have those objects as their sources (Lopes 1996). However, because the information chain linking picture and object may, but need not, incorporate agents’ mental states, it is not clear that such a standard captures the fact that pictures are artefacts. A pressing epistemological problem that faces any account of the standard of correctness is how we succeed in applying this standard and thus work out both what things are pictures and what content they have. However the standard is construed, we need to be able to determine that the constraints it imposes on pictures’ histories of production are met if we are to succeed in interpreting something as a picture. It seems unlikely that simply perceiving something would alone enable us to access either its causal history or its makers’ intentions and thus to determine that it has the history of production that is necessary for it to depict an object. Some philosophers who advocate an intentional standard of correctness argue that we are able
8 catharine abell and katerina bantinaki to identify the intentions with which pictures were produced because we possess background knowledge of particular kinds. Thus, Hopkins argues that our knowledge of the kinds of thing that exist, the kinds of thing that are generally depicted, and the various ways in which pictures are produced enable us, together with perception of a picture, to work out what it depicts (Hopkins 1998: 137–8). Others have suggested that we identify picture makers’ intentions in the same way as we identify speakers’ intentions and thus work out what their utterances mean (Abell 2009). Although relatively little has been said about how interpreters might identify a picture’s causal history, it is important to note that causal standards of correctness raise similar epistemological problems to intentional standards. 1.3. Epistemic Implications of the Standard of Correctness The nature of the standard of correctness may have important implications for the epistemic value of pictures. If photographs are governed by a causal standard of correctness, while the standard that governs non-photographic pictures is intentional, it may be possible to explain the differences in the epistemic roles that photographs and non-photographic pictures play by appeal to the differences in the standards of correctness that govern them. Thus, Hopkins argues that a photograph depicts an object or property only if that object or property was causally responsible for the way in which the photograph’s surface is marked. He argues that it does so because camera designers intend viewers to see in photographs the objects and properties that were causally responsible for the way those photographs are marked. It follows from this that photographs are necessarily accurate (Hopkins 1998: 72–3). If this is the case, it would explain why photographs provide better evidence than non-photographic pictures that their objects existed, and had the properties they are depicted as having, at the time the photographs were produced. In Chapter 3 in this volume, however, Catharine Abell denies that this is the correct explanation of the epistemic differences between photographic and non-photographic pictures. She characterizes the distinctive epistemic value of photographs as consisting in their being, in general, more reliable and richer than non-photographic pictures. Their greater reliability consists in the fact that they are more likely than non-photographic pictures to carry information about their objects in depictive form. Some feature of a picture carries the information that its object has a certain property if, had
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that object lacked the property in question, the picture would have lacked that feature. A picture carries the information that its object has a certain property in depictive form, she argues, if it both carries the information that its object has that property, and depicts the object as having that property. The relative richness of photographs in comparison to non-photographic pictures consists in the fact that they are reliable regarding more features of their objects. That is, she claims, they carry information in depictive form about more of their objects’ properties than non-photographic pictures. She explains the limited richness of non-photographic pictures as due to the serial processes by which they are produced. The makers of nonphotographic pictures can depictively encode information about objects only bit by bit. She argues that this places practical limitations on how much information picture makers can encode in depictive form. She explains the limited reliability of non-photographic pictures as resulting from the way their makers’ intentions affect the relations they bear to their objects, and from the limitations to their technical abilities. Their intentions limit the reliability of the pictures they produce because, even though picture makers often intend accurately to depict objects, they sometimes intend to depict them inaccurately, and it is always possible that any non-photographic picture was produced by a maker who intended it to depict its object inaccurately. Moreover, even when the makers of non-photographic pictures intend to depict objects accurately, a lack of technical competence may prevent them from doing so. Photographs, she argues, are not subject to these limitations on richness and reliability. They do not suffer the same limitations on richness because they are generally produced by parallel processes. They do not suffer the same limitations on reliability because they are produced by largely mechanized processes, over which their makers have limited influence. However, Abell claims that the epistemic differences between photographs and nonphotographic pictures are purely contingent. Richness in photographs, she claims, is a technological achievement: although photographic technology has developed towards richer and richer photographs, it might not have done. Likewise, she argues, relative reliability is a purely contingent feature of photographs. Their reliability results from the fact that photographic processes exhibit a high degree of standardization with respect to the outputs they produce given certain inputs. In particular, she claims, most photographic mechanisms have been largely standardized with respect to
10 catharine abell and katerina bantinaki the accuracy of the photographs they produce. In Abell’s view, this standardization is not a consequence of photographs being governed by a causal standard of correctness. Instead, she argues, camera designers might have designed mechanisms that produce photographs that misrepresent their objects, in which case photographs would have been no more reliable—and perhaps even less reliable—than non-photographic pictures. Camera designers’ intentions impose important constraints on how the photographs produced with those mechanisms depict their objects, and it is a contingent fact that they generally intend the photographs produced with the mechanisms they design to depict their objects accurately. 1.4. Aesthetic Implications of the Standard of Correctness The existence of a standard of correctness governing depiction may also have significant consequences for the aesthetic value of pictures. According to most phenomenological, recognitional, and resemblance accounts, the standard of correctness operates independently of the relevant phenomenological, recognitional, or resemblance relation. This opens up the possibility of the two relations yielding different verdicts regarding what a picture depicts. For example, assume that Hopkins is correct in holding both that a relation of experienced resemblance between picture and object governs depiction, and that an intentional standard of correctness governs non-photographic depiction. In some instances of depiction, there is a gap, or separation, between what a picture is experienced as resembling, and what its maker intends it to depict. For example, a stick figure drawing is experienced as resembling an emaciated human being, although its maker is likely to have intended it instead to be experienced as resembling a normally shaped human being. Hopkins attempts to solve the problem posed by mismatches between what a picture is experienced as resembling and what its maker intended it to depict by arguing that pictures have two distinct levels of content. He distinguishes between the content of seeing-in, which is determined by experienced resemblance alone, and pictorial content, which is determined by the content of seeing-in together with the picture-maker’s intentions (Hopkins 1998: 128). In Chapter 8 in this volume, John Brown explores the implications of the differences between these two levels of content for the phenomenology of our experiences of pictures. He claims that a phenomenologically distinct experience is associated with each level of content. Separation seeing-in
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involves seeing in the picture Hopkins’s content of seeing-in. As Hopkins notes, it involves seeing in the picture something other than it actually depicts, and reflects the limitations of the pictorial medium (in particular, the limitations to the verisimilitude achievable within a given medium). In addition to separation seeing-in, Brown claims, we also see in pictures what they actually depict (that is, their pictorial content). Although viewers must see in a picture what it actually depicts in order to interpret it accurately, Brown claims that such seeing-in is phenomenologically less immediate than separation seeing-in, since it requires the mediation of interpretative assumptions condoned by pictorial practices. Awareness of the eccentric properties that figure in separation seeing-in is perceptually more immediate than awareness of the properties that the picture ascribes to its subject, and quite persistent, Brown argues, as it is remarkably difficult to expel such properties from view. Hopkins’s account of the distinction between the content of seeing-in and pictorial content suggests that only the latter is governed by a standard of correctness. However, Brown argues that separation seeing-in is also governed by something akin to an intentional standard of correctness. It is not arbitrary or unfounded, he claims, but is instead guided and constrained by the surface properties of the picture, which are themselves intentionally produced by the picture’s maker. Rather than being an unintended consequence of the limitations of the available media, Brown argues, separation seeing-in is something that picture makers actually set out to elicit. Consequently, one can correctly or incorrectly see in a picture certain eccentric properties even if its maker did not intend to impute those properties to its subject. Brown claims that picture makers standardly intend viewers to see in their pictures objects with properties other than those depicted because awareness of such properties is of enormous aesthetic significance. It is by getting viewers to see such properties in a picture that picture makers achieve their aesthetic and artistic aims, as opposed to their merely depictive aims. Separation seeing-in is not only an intended but also an aesthetically merited response to a picture: ‘full and nuanced appreciation of the picture as a picture requires it . . . art criticism could hardly proceed without implicitly recognizing it, and . . . much of the charm of pictures derives from such seeings-in being intended and taken up’ (Chapter 8, Section 2). Through detailed discussion of specific examples, Brown argues
12 catharine abell and katerina bantinaki persuasively that viewers who see in a picture only what it depicts (where such an experience is even possible) will overlook features essential to an accurate and adequate assessment of its aesthetic value.
2. Pictorial Experience 2.1. The Nature of Seeing-In Brown’s argument highlights the central importance of the nature of pictorial experience to the philosophy of depiction. An adequate understanding of the experience interpreters have when they see a picture as a picture is important both because of the central importance phenomenological accounts give it in determining what it is for something to depict an object, and because of its implications for the aesthetic value of pictures. One way to think of pictorial experience is as continuous with ordinary perception. On this view, in seeing a picture of a tree, one has an experience that exactly matches in phenomenology the experience of seeing the depicted tree face to face. Accordingly, Ernst Gombrich describes pictorial experience as a case of illusion (Gombrich 1977). However, this experience is not ordinarily continuous with seeing that object face to face since the perceiver is generally aware of the medium as well as the subject of the picture. This has led most philosophers to endorse the view that pictorial experience is generally twofold: it has both a configurational and a recognitional dimension to its content, related to the picture’s medium and its subject, respectively. Following Wollheim, the contributors to this volume use the term ‘seeing-in’ for this twofold phenomenological state. An adequate account of seeing-in must answer the questions of how each dimension of seeing-in should be characterized, and of how the two are related. As Robert Hopkins indicates in Chapter 6 in this volume, answers to the first of these questions may be either divisive or unitary. Divisive accounts take each dimension of seeing-in to correspond to a distinct experience or component of experience, each with a single content. By contrast, unitary accounts treat the two dimensions of content of seeing-in as simply ‘abstractions from the complex, structured content of pictorial experience as a whole’ (Chapter 6, Section 1). According to Wollheim, seeing-in is a single perceptual act that incorporates two distinguishable but inseparable aspects of awareness: an aspect
introduction
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which relates to the marked surface, and an aspect which relates to the object depicted (Wollheim 1987). This formulation is divisive because it takes seeing-in to combine two aspects of awareness, each representing a single object. However, Wollheim is notoriously elusive when it comes to the question of exactly how each aspect relates to its content. Lopes provides a more comprehensive divisive account of seeing-in, claiming that pictures typically elicit two spontaneous experiences, one representing their marked surfaces, and the other representing the scenes they depict (Lopes 2005). The first experience relates to the marked surface in virtue of visually representing it, he claims, while the second relates to the depicted scene because it bears a significant resemblance to face-to-face visual experience of that scene. Neither of these divisive accounts explains how the two distinct and, in certain respects, incompatible objects of awareness (one of which, furthermore, is actually absent from the viewer’s visual field) merge, in the viewer’s experience, into an integrated whole. Without an answer to this question, however, the notion of seeing-in remains incomprehensible. Hopkins attempts to meet this challenge, arguing that seeing-in involves an experience whereby the marks on the pictorial surface are seen as resembling the object depicted (Hopkins 1998). This is a unitary construal of seeing-in, since it holds that there are not two objects of visual awareness but only one: the marked picture surface. Although he denies that the viewer is perceptually aware of the depicted object, Hopkins nonetheless claims that the object enters into the content of our experience because the thought of the object transforms the look of the marks in a way that we could characterize, in part, by reference to the object and its properties. In Chapter 5 in this volume, Katerina Bantinaki suggests an alternative unitary construal of seeing-in. She focuses particularly on the fact that, in seeing-in, the medium and the subject of the picture are somehow united in perception to form a single, complex object of awareness, the picture-of-X. An understanding of this unified object of awareness, is, Bantinaki claims, the key to an adequate understanding of seeing-in and, in particular, of twofoldness. She begins by noting that such unity is not unique to pictorial experience but is rather an aspect of all acts of generic perception. As perceptual psychologists have long indicated, an object of perception is ordinarily a gestalt, i.e. a unity or an organized whole. In this gestalt, distinct material elements are grouped together under an identifiable
14 catharine abell and katerina bantinaki generic structure: a shape or form that enables us to discriminate the object from its surroundings and (if the form is familiar) to identify it. According to Bantinaki, the unity of the object of pictorial experience is analogous to the unified character of the (gestalt) object of perception. Drawing on Aristotle’s analysis of compound substances in order to illuminate this unity, she explains that, on the one hand, the matter of the object—the materials out of which it is made and its distinct components—is unified in perception under its identified shape or form (unless, that is, the viewer focuses her attention on those materials and parts). Moreover, the form is tied to the matter in perception—it is the form of the particular piece of matter, rather than a form thought of in the abstract, that we perceive. Bantinaki suggests that a picture, as it figures in our awareness, exhibits just this kind of unity. Although it has both a medium, and a form (a shape or outline) characteristic of a real or imaginary object, these are distinct components of the object of experience only in the sense that they can be abstracted from the homogeneous whole. The two components are (ordinarily) perceptually inseparable: as one cannot (without effort) see a table without seeing, for instance, the wood that constitutes the table; so one cannot (without effort) see, for instance, the subject of a portrait without seeing the particular manner in which that subject has been construed. Consequently, she argues, any analysis of pictorial experience as involving two aspects of awareness, one of which relates to the medium and the other to the object of representation, is only an abstraction from the complex but homogeneous content of the experience, the aspects or dimensions of which are inextricably enmeshed. This account, Bantinaki argues, explains Wollheim’s claim that awareness of the medium and the subject of representation, as they figure in seeing-in, differ phenomenologically from, respectively, the experience of seeing a non-representational surface and that of seeing the represented object in the flesh. In pictorial seeing, medium and subject are enmeshed. Awareness of the medium when seeing the picture-of-X is not to be compared with seeing inchoate material elements because, in the former case but not in the latter, the material elements form a meaningful whole. They are accordingly seen through (and so inseparably from) what together they make seen. Conversely, the experience of seeing an object in a picture is
introduction
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not to be compared with seeing the object face to face (or simply imagining it) because the picture presents a medium-specific construal of that object, such that the object is (normally) seen as construed. 2.2. The Scope of Seeing-In Because they do not take awareness of the picture’s subject to be a distinct component of seeing-in, unitary theorists deny that in seeing-in the subject is represented in the same way as it is represented when seen in the flesh. That is, they deny that the subject is perceptually experienced, if by ‘perceptual experience’ we mean a mode of representation typical of ordinary perception. As we have noted, many philosophers who offer accounts of seeing-in do so with the further aim of answering the metaphysical question of what it is for something to depict an object. Whether or not any of the accounts of seeing-in described above can be deployed to this further end depends on whether or not all pictorial experience is twofold. If it is not, and some pictures do not elicit seeing-in, such accounts will, at best, characterize the experiences that some pictures elicit, but will be of little help in answering questions about depiction in general. Wollheim has argued that pictures not only permit, but also require, seeing-in, so that seeing an object in a picture always differs phenomenologically from seeing that object face to face. Lopes, on the other hand, acknowledges that pictures often trigger a twofold perceptual experience, but denies that pictorial experience is, by default, twofold (Lopes 2005; see also Levinson 1998). Twofold experience, Lopes argues, is relevant to art-pictures, especially art-pictures of a certain ‘painterly’ style, but he denies that we must be aware of the marked picture surface in order to interpret or use documentary or illustrative pictures. Moreover, he notes, trompe l’œil paintings are designed with the express purpose of producing the illusion of seeing their objects by prohibiting awareness of their medium properties. He argues that the claim that all pictorial experience is twofold therefore excludes such paintings from the domain of depiction by fiat. Wollheim is happy with this upshot and, indeed, sees in trompe l’œil the boundaries of depiction (Wollheim 1987). But trompe l’œil paintings, Lopes notes, are pictures and a comprehensive account of depiction ought to recognize them as such.
16 catharine abell and katerina bantinaki 2.3. Inflection and the Puzzle of Mimesis Even if pictorial experience admits of variety and the project of defining depiction phenomenologically is abandoned, the nature of pictorial experience is still of significant aesthetic importance. Whether the aesthetic appreciation of pictures as pictures involves simultaneous or sequential awareness of design and object, it presents a puzzle, which Lopes has labelled ‘the puzzle of mimesis’ (Lopes 2005). We evaluate pictures in part for eliciting experiences as of the scenes they depict and, moreover, Lopes claims, these experiences bear significant resemblances to face-to-face experiences of those scenes. However, he notes, we often value pictures when we would not value seeing their objects face to face. For example, we value seeing Van Gogh’s painting of a pair of old boots when we would not value seeing a pair of old boots in the flesh. How can this be if the former experience resembles the latter in important respects? Lopes argues that the solution lies in the phenomenon of inflection. With Michael Podro (1998), he holds that the experience of many art-pictures is inflected: that is, features of the design are recruited into the depicted scene, so that the scene no longer looks the way it would look in any experience purported to be of that scene. Although pictures elicit experiences that resemble face-to-face experiences of their objects, the two experiences can also differ in certain respects. In particular, only the former can be inflected, because only the former enables us to see objects as having properties they could not be seen to have face to face. Because it explains the different value that we assign to each experience, Lopes argues, this difference solves the puzzle of mimesis. In doing so, it construes inflected pictorial experience as having a central significance to pictorial aesthetics. Such significance, however, is by no means secure. As Hopkins argues in his chapter, the significance of inflection for pictorial aesthetics is contingent on the puzzle of mimesis, but the puzzle of mimesis arises only if pictorial experience is construed as divisive, such that the depicted object is represented by a separate experience, or fold of experience, from that representing the picture’s design. However, on a unitary construal of pictorial experience, it exhibits a complex, structured content from which the element representing the design and that representing the depicted object cannot be separated, except as abstractions over that content as a whole. Consequently, this experience is always different
introduction
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phenomenologically from the experience of seeing the depicted scene in the flesh, and the puzzle of mimesis never arises. Therefore, inflection loses the aesthetic significance it appeared to gain by solving that puzzle. The phenomenon of inflection, however, may also have repercussions for the nature of seeing-in. In his chapter, Hopkins aims to show that inflection undermines divisive accounts of seeing-in. Inflection, he argues, occurs when ‘what is seen in a surface includes properties a full characterization of which needs to make reference to that surface’s design (conceived as such)’ (Chapter 6, Section 2). He argues that this phenomenon raises two challenges for the divisive theorist. Firstly, if seeing-in is understood on the divisive model, the design of the surface should figure twice over in inflected seeing-in (in the component of the experience that captures the design, and in the component that captures what is seen in the design). However, he notes, such doubling is not present in the phenomenology of inflected seeing-in. Secondly, Hopkins argues, the phenomenon of inflection is incompatible with the divisive theorist’s account of the scene-oriented component of seeing-in. From the perspective of a divisive account such as Lopes’s, pictorial experience includes a component that represents a picture’s design, and a component that represents the scene it depicts. If we are to understand the character and content of seeing-in as a whole, the form of representation each dimension of content involves must be specified. With regard to the design-oriented dimension, at least, it can be assumed without controversy that the representation is the same as that involved in ordinary face-to-face experience; call this Standard Visual Representation (SVR). Inflection aside, the divisive theorist can further assume that the scene-oriented component of the experience also involves SVR: that this component represents the depicted scene in the way that ordinary face-to-face visual experience represents its objects. However, Hopkins argues, acknowledging inflection puts pressure on this account of the scene-oriented component of pictorial experience. When inflection occurs, the depicted scene is seen as having properties that no face-to-face experience of that scene could represent (i.e. properties that need characterizing in part by reference to features of the design). This, Hopkins claims, makes it implausible that the depicted scene is represented by SVR. So either inflected and uninflected seeing-in represent the depicted scene differently (only the latter being a case of SVR), or the scene-oriented
18 catharine abell and katerina bantinaki component of seeing-in is never a case of SVR. In either case, Hopkins concludes, there is pressure on the divisive theorist to explain what type of representation the scene-oriented component of pictorial experience involves, when, or if, it does not involve SVR.
3. Pictorial Perception: Philosophical Implications 3.1. The Mechanism of Pictorial Perception The question of how the two components of pictorial experience are visually represented unveils a further concern for pictorial theory, particularly relevant, perhaps, to recognitional accounts of depiction. This is the need to understand the process of pictorial perception in a way that illuminates how the character and content of pictorial experience relates to that of ordinary perception. Since we do not generally mistake pictures for their objects, but usually recognize them as pictures, it seems unlikely that pictures engage exactly the same perceptual mechanisms as their objects. An adequate account of picture perception must therefore explain how the mechanisms it engages are like, and how they are unlike, those engaged in face-to-face object perception. In Chapter 7 in this volume, Bence Nanay proposes such an explanation, and explores its implications for pictorial experience and, in particular, for inflection. Nanay draws on empirical research which suggests that there are two anatomically and functionally distinct visual subsystems, the dorsal and the ventral, the former of which provides visual control for motor actions, and the latter of which is responsible for object recognition. He argues that the processes involved in interpreting a picture of an object are like those involved in face-to-face recognition of that object in that both ventrally represent the object. However, he argues, the two processes differ in that the latter dorsally represents the object while the former does not, and the former dorsally represents the picture surface while the latter does not. Moreover, he claims, features of the picture surface may be ventrally represented in perception of a picture of an object, although this is never true of face-to-face perception of that object. The nature of picture perception processes has implications for the character and content of pictorial experience and thus for how seeingin is to be understood. Nanay points towards a possible ambiguity in
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Wollheim’s characterization of seeing-in that, if removed, could resolve the dispute concerning the scope of seeing-in. He argues that the notion of awareness that figures in Wollheim’s claim that pictorial experience involves simultaneous awareness of the medium and the object of representation is ambiguous. This claim has two possible interpretations: (a) we consciously attend both to the depicted object and to some properties of the surface, and (b) we perceptually represent both the depicted object and the surface of the picture (irrespective of whether we attend to them). These interpretations differ, crucially, on the issue of whether seeing-in requires consciousness of those features of the picture surface that are responsible for the picture’s depictive content. Nanay denies that (a) is a necessary condition for pictorial experience, but argues that (b) is plausibly construed as one, and suggests that we construe pictorial experience as twofold only in the sense that it involves the perceptual representation of both medium and object. However, this construal of seeing-in is not intended to bolster the project of defining depiction phenomenologically. It suggests that there need only be one dimension to the phenomenology of pictorial experience—one relating to the object depicted—so it does not clearly distinguish pictorial experience from the face-to-face experience of objects. Instead, Nanay argues, its significance lies in its ability to meet the challenges that, according to Hopkins, inflection raises for divisive accounts of seeing-in. Nanay offers a competing characterization of inflection as involving attention to ‘designscene properties’: relational properties of the way the depicted object emerges from a picture’s design. Both Nanay and Hopkins agree that inflected pictorial experience involves the perception of properties that cannot be fully characterized without reference to both the picture’s design and the depicted object. However, in response to Hopkins, Nanay contends that the design does not figure twice over in our awareness in inflected seeing-in, because seeing-in does not generally require consciousness of the design (the design is represented dorsally but not ventrally, so it is visually processed without entering conscious experience), while inflected seeing-in requires consciousness of the design only in so far as it is involved in our consciousness of the design-scene properties we attribute to the depicted scene (in this case, that is, some properties of the design are represented not only dorsally but also ventrally). Further, Nanay argues, to the extent that the depicted scene figures in inflected or uninflected
20 catharine abell and katerina bantinaki seeing-in (being represented by our ventral vision), that scene is perceptually experienced—no matter how else the overall experience may differ from ordinary perception. 3.2. The Content of Pictorial Perception Like Nanay, John Dilworth, in Chapter 4, focuses on the nature of pictorial perception. Dilworth’s primary aim is to illuminate the content of the perceptual states that give rise to pictorial experience, and thereby to solve a problem that faces any attempt to explain how these states can produce an experience with two distinct contents. As Wollheim’s seeing-in account makes clear, when we see a picture as a picture, our experience represents both the picture surface and the object it depicts. However, Dilworth notes, both contents are derived from a single distal stimulus: namely, the picture surface. An adequate account of the contents of the perceptual processes responsible for pictorial experience must explain how these two forms of content are extracted from a single stimulus. Moreover, he notes, it must do so in a manner consistent with the general nature of human perceptual abilities and representational processing structures. The explanation Dilworth offers for our ability perceptually to extract two forms of content from a single pictorial stimulus begins with the observation that ordinary perceptual processes extract two levels of content from the environment. Firstly, their low-level, aspectual content represents properties that pertain to an object under a certain aspect: that is, to the object as it appears from the viewpoint from which and under the environmental conditions in which it is seen. At this level, perceptual content is inherently ambiguous because it fails to distinguish between intrinsic properties of the object, properties that it has only relative to the viewpoint from which it is seen, and properties of the environment in which it is seen. For example, the retinal image formed when one sees a white object illuminated by blue light may be identical to that formed when one sees a blue object illuminated by white light. The retinal image represents blueness, without specifying whether that blueness is a property of the object seen or the environmental conditions under which it is seen. However, our visual experience will normally determinately represent either a white object illuminated by blue light, or a blue object illuminated by white light. Perception extracts an unambiguous, upperlevel, object-related content from lower-level, aspectual representations,
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Dilworth claims, by means of further perceptual investigation and appeal to probabilities of certain aspect–object correlations derived from previous perceptual experience. It is by this process that perception represents the surface of a picture. Like ordinary perceptual processes, Dilworth argues, perceptual representations of depictive content exhibit a double content structure. Object-related representations of a picture surface, like retinal images, fail to distinguish between different interpretations of its depictive content. For example, an elliptical mark on a picture surface could depict either a circular object seen from side on, or an elliptical object seen from front on. Dilworth claims that perceptual representations of depictive content have a low-level, aspectual content which represents the elliptical shape but does not specify whether it is an intrinsic or viewpoint-relative property of the depicted object. From this ambiguous, aspectual content, we perceptually extract the unambiguous, object-related content of a picture, which unambiguously construes ellipticity as either an intrinsic or a viewpoint-relative property of the depicted object. Object-related depictive content differs from ordinary object-related perceptual content, however, in that it is extracted from aspectual depictive content by appeal to artistically relevant factors such as artists’ intentions and depictive conventions, rather than features of the perceptual environment. Dilworth proposes an orientational double content theory in terms of which he analyses the range of possible interpretations in depictive double content ambiguity cases. Finally, he explores the aesthetic implications of this theory, arguing that perceptual disambiguation of an aspectual content depends on features of the medium employed—whether it be painting, etching, or charcoal—and that while we may ascribe the same object-related content to pictures in different media, different aspectual content ascriptions have different expressive significance. 3.3. The Function of Pictorial Perception The nature of the processes involved in pictorial perception may have important implications for the functions that it can serve. For example, in Chapter 2 Lopes argues that these processes are such as to enable pictures to ground demonstrative reference perceptually. Ordinary perceptual experience can ground demonstrative reference. That is, if I look at an apple and say ‘That’s an apple’, what I say is true. By contrast, if I look at a picture of an apple and say ‘That’s an apple’, it is generally thought, my statement
22 catharine abell and katerina bantinaki is false, since ‘that’ is a picture of an apple, not an apple. However, by investigating the features of ordinary perceptual experience that enable it to ground demonstrative reference and arguing that pictorial perception shares these features, Lopes seeks to show that the latter statement is in fact true. Lopes begins by outlining an argument of Mohan Matthen’s (Matthen 2005). Matthen argues that ordinary visual perception grounds demonstrative reference because it exhibits two features. Firstly, he claims, the phi phenomenon shows that it represents objects, as well as features and locations. Secondly, he argues, it represents objects deictically. That is, it represents objects in an egocentric framework, providing information about their location relative to the viewer, and it represents them nondescriptively. To see that vision represents objects non-descriptively, it is important to distinguish between the different ways in which the two visual subsystems represent objects. Descriptive vision (or ventral vision, as Nanay terms it) represents features of objects, whereas motion-guiding vision (dorsal vision) represents objects egocentrically and non-descriptively. Thus, Matthen claims, it is in virtue of the way that motion-guiding vision represents objects that perception grounds demonstrative reference. He claims that motion-guiding vision is not implicated in seeing objects in pictures. It thus appears to follow that pictures cannot perceptually ground demonstrative reference. Although he agrees with Matthen (and Nanay) that seeing-in does not involve motion-guiding vision, Lopes argues that pictures can nonetheless perceptually ground demonstrative reference to their objects. He claims that the deictic representation of an object is best construed as comprising the egocentric representation of that object, where that egocentric representation is not accomplished by attributing features to the object. Although descriptive vision represents features of objects, Lopes argues, this does not preclude it from representing them deictically. Indeed, he claims that descriptive vision must be capable of representing objects deictically, since it is able to communicate with motion-guiding vision, and the latter cannot represent objects descriptively. Thus, he claims, descriptive vision represents objects both descriptively and deictically. Lopes claims that it follows from most theories of depiction that seeing-in implicates descriptive vision. However, he acknowledges, it does not follow
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automatically that seeing-in represents objects deictically, since descriptive vision need only represent objects deictically when it communicates with motion-guiding vision, and seeing-in does not implicate motion-guiding vision. Nevertheless, he claims, there is reason to think that seeing-in does represent objects deictically. Firstly, pictures represent their objects centrally (that is, from a viewpoint). Secondly, he notes, there is a significant overlap between the direction they represent their objects as occupying relative to that viewpoint, and the direction ordinary visual experience of those objects represents them as occupying relative to the viewer. The upshot, Lopes claims, is that pictures support a process called ‘deep decentering’, whereby we transform central representations of objects as being to the right of the picture’s viewpoint to deictic representations of those objects as being simply to the right. Thus, Lopes concludes, depiction perceptually grounds demonstrative representation.
Conclusion The chapters in this volume span the range of issues (metaphysical, epistemological, evaluative, and phenomenological) with which the philosophy of depiction is concerned. While some of their authors share their underlying views about the nature of depiction, the phenomenology of pictorial experience, or the processes involved in picture perception, these chapters nonetheless reveal a significant disparity of opinion on these issues. Indeed, there is nothing even approximating philosophical consensus on any of the major issues in the philosophy of depiction. Recent research has succeeded in identifying a range of constraints that adequate solutions to these issues must meet, and has thereby narrowed the range of plausible solutions to these issues, showing certain purported solutions to be inadequate. It has also given rise to a variety of new theories designed to meet these constraints. In doing so, it has drawn on research in science, art history, and other areas of philosophy. Considerable progress has also been made in exploring the implications of various prominent theories in the philosophy of depiction, both for philosophy and for other disciplines. Nevertheless, perhaps the most striking outcome of this research is the realization that the number and scope of the philosophical issues raised by depiction is far
24 catharine abell and katerina bantinaki greater than had previously been recognized. In virtue of their collective scope and individual achievement, the chapters collected here advance debate in an area that is only beginning to elicit the philosophical attention it deserves.
References Abell, Catharine (2009), ‘Canny Resemblance’, Philosophical Review, 118/2: 183–223. Budd, Malcolm (1993), ‘How Pictures Look’, in Dudley Knowles and John Skorupski (eds), Virtue and Taste (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Gombrich, Ernst (1977), Art and Illusion, 5th edn (London: Phaidon). Goodman, Nelson (1976), Languages of Art, 2nd edn (Indianapolis: Hackett). Hopkins, Robert (1995), ‘Explaining Depiction’, Philosophical Review, 104/3: 425–55. (1998), Picture, Image and Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Hyman, John (2006), The Objective Eye: Color, Form and Reality in the Theory of Art (Chicago: Chicago University Press). Kulvicki, John (2006), On Images (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Levinson, Jerrold (1998), ‘Wollheim on Pictorial Representation’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 56/3: 227–33. Lopes, Dominic McIver (1996), Understanding Pictures (Oxford: Clarendon Press). (2005), Sight and Sensibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Matthen, Mohan (2005), Seeing, Doing and Knowing (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Peacocke, Christopher (1987), ‘Depiction’, Philosophical Review, 97/3: 383–410. Podro, Michael (1998), Depiction (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). Schier, Flint (1986), Deeper into Pictures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Walton, Kendall (1990), Mimesis as Make-Believe (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). Wollheim, Richard (1987), Painting as an Art (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
1 Pictorial Diversity JOHN KULVICKI
Once I did a drawing of what seemed to be a cube and someone looking at it said your perspective is off your perspective is wrong and I said no the perspective is true that’s a perfectly accurate drawing of an odd shaped object. (Paul Ziff, Antiaesthetics)
There are undeniably many ways of depicting things, but it is unclear what this pictorial diversity is. What is a way of depicting something, and how many ways of depicting things are there? There are many individual pictures, of course, and many of them differ from one another. They have different surface features and they represent different things, but all of this is unsurprising. No one thinks that all the world’s pictures depict one and the same thing and no one denies that pictures depicting different things can differ quite a bit in their surface features. Pictorial diversity starts to seem interesting and confusing when one tries to fix a picture’s content while varying its surface features, or vice versa. Could this picture, ostensibly one of Van Gogh’s bedroom portraits, depict instead Gauguin’s aunt? Could Fra Angelico’s Annunciation and Bosch’s Ship of Fools depict exactly the same thing? Sensible individuals, as well as most philosophers, would answer each of the above questions with a resounding ‘No!’ But it is obscure whether such denials are directed at the particular examples or at the more general claims that these questions interrogate. Most would agree An early version of this chapter was presented at the Depiction conference, organized by the editors of this volume, at the University of Manchester, May 2007. I thank the participants for helpful feedback. I am also grateful to audiences at the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, in 2007 and the American Society for Aesthetics, Pacific Division, in 2008. In the latter case, Ed Winters provided very useful comments. Finally, Catharine Abell and Katerina Bantinaki provided truly constructive criticism that much improved the chapter.
26 john kulvicki that some pictures admit of multiple interpretations. And it will become clear that many agree there are pictures with rather distinct surface features that nevertheless have exactly the same contents. This chapter seeks to explain what is at issue in discussing pictorial diversity and to introduce two tools for understanding it. The value of these tools will become clear as they are used. After Section 1 clears up some preliminary issues, Section 2 argues that, while there are various means of making pictures, viewers do not use a complementary variety of schemes for interpreting them. So, interpretative diversity is outmatched by the myriad means for making pictures. Section 3 shows that the distinct interpretative schemes employed by observers meet an interesting constraint: they compete neither syntactically nor semantically with one another. Interpretations of non-pictorial representations, like diagrams and linguistic representations, do not obey this constraint. Section 4 considers an objection to the previous section’s claims based on Ernst Gombrich’s discussion of landscape painting, and Section 5 considers a related objection based on Heinrich W¨olfflin’s distinction between linear and painterly styles. Section 6 discusses related worries about the depiction of space. The overall conclusion is that people have a very powerful tendency to avoid competing interpretative schemes for pictures. Sections 7 and 8 consider how one might explain this surprising pattern and suggest that, while no accounts of pictorial representation predict or preclude such a pattern, some make room for it more naturally than others. The following does not take any particular account of depiction as its starting point. There are indefinitely many ways in which one could pair representations with contents. Some systematic ways of doing so are pictorial and some are not; some are diagrammatic, some linguistic, and so on. In order to avoid committing to a particular account of depiction from the outset, it will be important to focus on the practice of interpreting representations that, intuitively at least, are pictorial, and sometimes comparing these to representations that are not. Just as an account of depiction overall must begin in part with intuitions concerning which representations are pictures, so this discussion begins by focusing on the respects in which, at least intuitively, systems of representation can differ from one another and nevertheless all be pictorial. The upshot of this investigation will be an understanding of pictorial diversity that any account of depiction must respect and, if possible, explain.
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1. Objects, Interpretations, and Means of Production It is useful for present purposes to think in terms of systems of representation. At a minimum, systems of representation couple a sense of which objects in the world count as representations with a scheme for interpreting them (Goodman 1976, Ch. 1; Kulvicki 2006, Ch. 2). For example, coloured two-dimensional surfaces are good candidates for being pictures, while chairs, trees, and skyscrapers are not. That’s not to say that it is sufficient for being a pictorial representation that something is a two-dimensional surface. It’s just that being so is plausibly a necessary condition for being a picture, or even more minimally, that pictures are quite typically two-dimensional surfaces. In addition to knowing which things count as pictures, one also needs to know how to interpret them as representations. Interpretation is a rather broad category, encompassing one’s sense of a work’s expressive features, its representational content, associations and other connections between the work and others, etc. The following ignores most of this complexity to focus on representational content. This coloured surface is a good candidate for being a picture, but if it is a picture, what does it depict? Put slightly differently, if it is a picture, what does it represent qua picture? There might be many pictorial ways of interpreting coloured surfaces, or there might be very few. Observers’ practice with pictures can shed light on this issue, even absent an account of what depiction is. And while there might be an impressive diversity to the expressive features of pictures, that topic is beyond the scope of this chapter. For present purposes then, a system of representation is just the combination of some conditions on what objects count as representations with a scheme for interpreting them as representations. It will become clear that there are, intuitively at least, a number of representational interpretative schemes that are distinct from one another but nevertheless all pictorial. Alongside these systems of representation, there are systems for producing representations: ways of making objects that count as members of one system or another (Willats 2003: 129). For example, the Renaissance saw the proliferation of techniques for rendering objects in linear perspective (Elkins 1994, Ch. 4). These techniques shared a goal: the creation of marked planar surfaces that, when interpreted as pictures in linear perspective, have
28 john kulvicki certain contents. So, if you want a surface to depict a floor tiled regularly with squares and octagons from a certain point of view within a linear perspective system, these techniques will allow you to do so. There are also techniques for producing pictures in reverse perspective and in axonometric perspective (Willats 1997: 55–9, 65–9). In a similar vein, different lenses placed on a camera can produce, at least intuitively, different kinds of pictures. The right lenses can yield pictures that obey the rules of linear perspective, while fisheye lenses produce something else. Like the painting techniques, these cameras serve as tools for producing certain kinds of marked surfaces. In particular, a system of production is a way of making marked surfaces that bear certain chromatic and spatial relations to their chosen objects, or at least to objects that would bear such relations to the marked surfaces were the objects to exist. It would prejudice matters to say that a system of production for, say, linear perspective pictures also determines that the result of such a process should, or would, be interpreted as a picture in linear perspective. Perhaps this is what typically happens, perhaps not. One would need to consult our practice with pictures to determine whether this is so. As the next section will show, it is far from clear that the products of many methods of production are interpreted in such a straightforward manner. At this point it should be clear that there are three dimensions along which pictorial diversity can manifest itself. There could be diversity in the kinds of objects that count as pictures, in the interpretative schemes that assign contents to those objects, and in the means one has for producing such objects. The latter two dimensions are the most interesting. Perhaps some systems of depiction only deal with coloured spheres, to the exclusion of coloured planes, but this kind of diversity is not philosophically compelling. The next section shows that, while there are many schemes for producing pictures, observers use a comparatively thin set of schemes for interpreting them.
2. Interpretative Diversity versus Productive Diversity Consider two photographs of a lemon, the only difference between them being that one was made with an ordinary lens and the other with a
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fisheye lens. One lens is a means for producing pictures within a system akin to linear perspective while the other produces fisheye photos. Fisheye photos bear different, albeit systematic, spatial relations to their objects than ordinary photos do. One could imagine an interpretative scheme for the fisheye photos that merely, as it were, inverts the mapping from world to plane. In that case, the regular photo interpreted within the regular scheme has the same content as the fisheye photo interpreted within the fisheye system: an ordinary lemon. Perhaps each of these interpretative schemes is pictorial, though reasons will be offered later for why the fisheye scheme is not. While less outrageous than the Fra Angelico–Bosch example mentioned earlier, the fisheye–normal case suggests, at least prima facie, that pictures with different surface features can have the same contents. (It is trivial that representations with different surface features can have the same contents.) In one sense, these pictures manifest different ways of representing, and perhaps even depicting, the lemon. They represent it as having the same qualities, but each photo has its own set of what Dominic Lopes has called ‘design–content correlations’ (1996: 153). While one could imagine interpretative schemes that give each of these photos the same contents, however, this does not fit well with how viewers actually interpret the pictures. In practice, these pictures have quite different contents. The fisheye photo depicts a lemon that bulges much more than the lemon depicted by the normal photo. True, both pictures were produced by pointing a camera at the very same lemon. But that does not mean the resulting photos represent the lemon as having the same qualities, given the interpretative schemes viewers deploy. The fisheye photo and its normal counterpart are similar in depicting lemons, and perhaps in depicting yellow lemons, and they may very well depict the same particular lemon, but their contents are not identical overall. Each depicts the lemon as having a shape different from what the other depicts it as having. This makes sense if the regular picture and its fisheye counterpart are interpreted as though they are both members of the regular system of depiction. While each photo is made by a different system of production, they are both interpreted as members of the same representational system. A rather bulgy lemon would result in a linear perspective picture just like the fisheye photo in its surface details, which suggests that something akin to linear perspective is a kind of default or standard system for interpreting pictures.
30 john kulvicki Similar considerations apply to pictures in many ‘systems’. Cubist portraits seem to depict rather shattered subjects. It is also true that the picture surface of a Cubist portrait is broken up and shattered, but this has an important effect on how that picture is interpreted in so far as it seems to depict shattered things. This makes sense if Cubist portraits are interpreted with the scheme appropriate to a linear perspective system, and it makes little sense otherwise. Similarly, Picasso’s blue period paintings depict exaggeratedly emaciated people (Kulvicki 2006: 213). That’s not to say there is nothing more to the interpretation of such pictures: cf. Hopkins (1998, Ch. 6; 2003: 663). Interpretation is a rather multifaceted activity, after all. But interpretations such as these are clearly significant for understanding these pictures. All of this suggests that a diversity of systems for making pictures—normal lenses, fisheye lenses, Cubist stylizations, or what have you—does not entail a similar diversity of systems for interpreting them. There are many interpretative schemes, and a good number of them might even seem to be pictorial. But when one considers the way in which pictures are actually interpreted, it seems as though this group suffers a high rate of unemployment. The default interpretative scheme(s) might change over time, or differ from place to place. None of the foregoing suggests that linear perspective must be special in some deep sense, though it happens to be one of the interpretative schemes that viewers use. The claim is merely that interpreters use fewer schemes than one might think, given the many means for making pictures. But is it really true that the fisheye photo is interpreted as depicting a bulgy lemon? It’s generally easy to identify fisheye photos as such, which suggests they are interpreted differently than ordinary photos. Perhaps the fisheye photo depicts an ordinary lemon after all, not a bulgy one. The properties responsible for depicting an ordinary lemon shape are just bulgier in the fisheye system than the corresponding properties in ordinary photos. Similar considerations also apply to the other examples mentioned above. Richard Wollheim (2003: 144) suggested that ‘The long neck of Parmigianino’s Madonna can be seen in his picture, but it cannot be correctly seen in it, so it should be allowed only to bring about how the Madonna is perceived.’ By extension, it is possible to see a fisheye photo’s subjects as bulgy, but incorrect to do so. The fisheye aspect of the photo should just inform, in some sense, how the subjects are perceived, but not the shapes they are perceived as having. Perhaps
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people use a vaster variety of interpretative schemes than the foregoing suggests. In response, it suffices to ask how one identifies fisheye photos as such and notice that it cannot be solely because of their surface features. What makes a patterned surface seem like a fisheye photo is the fact that it depicts an oddly bulging scene. This interpretation plays an essential role in determining that the photo is a fisheye, but this is not the interpretation that merely inverts the fisheye mapping. It is the interpretation characteristic of ordinary photos. Also, the realization that the photo was made with a fisheye lens does not entirely undermine the bulgy interpretation. Try it. The bulgy interpretation endures even though one acquires beliefs about the picture’s method of production: ‘this picture of a bulgy lemon was made with a fisheye lens camera pointed at an ordinary lemon’. Similarly, we know that Parmigianino is up to something interesting because he depicts a long-necked Madonna. This does not mean that what makes the painting interesting is that the Madonna is depicted as having a long neck, and it might even be that this interpretation is somehow trumped by other considerations. But it is impressively implausible to suggest that the long-necked interpretation does not play a central role in understanding the picture. Brown (Chapter 8 in this volume, Section 2 and n. 30) is sympathetic to this line of reasoning. The discussion so far has uncovered a hazardous ambiguity in the claim that a pair of pictures manifests different ways of depicting things. On the one hand, a way of depicting something can be identified with a correlation between design and content. So, an extraordinary way of depicting something is a system of picture production and interpretation that differs from the norm. This emphasizes the vehicle of representation as special, not its content: something like this depicts something ordinary like a lemon. On the other hand, a way of depicting something is just the set of properties something is depicted as having. This requires no departure from ordinary design–content rules, only a use of those rules to represent something as being somewhat extraordinary, like an extra-bulgy lemon. This emphasizes an ordinary system of interpretation coupled, perhaps, with an extraordinary method of picture production. The vehicle is treated as being rather ordinary—in that it’s part of an ordinary interpretative scheme—while its content stands out as special: this ordinary photo depicts an extraordinary thing. Pictures can be distinctive as vehicles or as bearers
32 john kulvicki of a rather distinctive content (or both, of course). Practice suggests that, by and large, it is the content and not the vehicle that is regarded as distinctive.¹ There are many interpretative schemes out there, but precious few of them are employed by interpreters. The fisheye example does not exemplify all kinds of pictorial diversity, and it’s important to keep the limited claims of this section in sight. None of the foregoing suggests that interpreters use only one interpretative scheme. Indeed, interpreters use many, and this must figure in any account of pictorial diversity. For example, outline drawings typically are not interpreted as representing objects as illuminated in any particular way, while systems that employ some form of chiaroscuro are. It is wrong to interpret black and white photos as representing a black and white world; they are just silent concerning things’ colours. These systems differ with respect to the properties they characteristically represent objects as having, and are interpreted as such. So, even though there are not as many interpretative schemes employed as there are methods for making pictures, there is significant range to the way in which viewers are prepared to interpret them. In order to appreciate, rather than just enumerate, these various interpretative schemes, one needs to understand how they relate to one another. The next section suggests that amidst this variety there is an impressive regularity: these interpretative schemes do not compete with one another. This distinguishes the diversity of pictorial interpretative schemes from the range of schemes for interpreting diagrams and linguistic representations.
3. Competition What is competition? Interpretative schemes compete syntactically when they use a given syntactic feature to serve distinct semantic ends, and they compete semantically when they use distinct syntactic features to serve a given semantic end. ¹ Robert Hopkins’s (1998: 94–7) discussion of misrepresentation in caricature lines up well with this section’s claims about pictorial interpretation. We do not interpret caricatures as odd depictions of ordinary things, so much as ordinary depictions of odd things. Indeed, Hopkins’s sense of the phenomenon of pictorial diversity overall (1998, Ch. 6, esp. 147–58; 2003) fits quite well with that developed herein, as will become clear. One important difference is that Hopkins distinguishes what one sees in a picture from what that picture depicts. At least sometimes, for Hopkins, these two things come apart. I have not drawn such a distinction herein because I am skeptical of its usefulness.
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Consider some property of pictures, p, in virtue of possessing which, ceteris paribus, a picture represents P within a given interpretative scheme. Another interpretative scheme in which possession of p is ceteris paribus responsible for representing Q, which is not identical to P, competes syntactically with the first scheme. Each competing scheme makes use of p in the service of different representational ends. This is ‘syntactic’ competition only in the sense that p is a feature of picture surfaces, not (necessarily) a feature of what these pictures depict. It might often be difficult to determine just what a picture represents, ceteris paribus, in virtue of possessing some property, but some examples make this idea clear enough to be useful. The scheme envisioned by Wollheim (1980) and Nelson Goodman (1976), in which colours stand for their complements, competes syntactically with an ordinary interpretative scheme. In such an inverted system, red areas of a picture surface generally depict green things, while in the ordinary system red regions represent red things. That is to say, ordinary pictures represent red things as such by being coloured red in some region of their surfaces. In the inverted scheme, such pictures represent green. Similarly, it’s generally true that pictures representing four-sided surfaces or regions of space as such tend to do so by having four-sided regions of their surfaces marked off by lines, regions of colour, or what have you. The fisheye system competes syntactically with the ordinary system, because fisheye photos with rectilinear regions of their surfaces depict regions of space with concave sides. By contrast, black and white photography does not compete syntactically with its colour counterpart because in the former interpretative scheme hue is irrelevant to the interpretation of photos, and otherwise these schemes are the same. There is no syntactic feature common to both systems that serves different representational ends. So, these interpretative schemes differ, even though they do not compete. One might object that black and white photos do compete syntactically with colour photos: both of these schemes use the colours black and white differently. In one system, white represents white, while in the other it just represents a degree of lightness. But it’s not the colour white per se that plays such a role in the black and white picture scheme. In black and white photos, what matters are not colours like black and white but degrees of lightness. Many black and white photos have hues, whether they are shades of sepia, yellow, or brown, but these hues play no role in determining what such photos represent. This is important because it
34 john kulvicki reveals a sense in which indistinguishable pictures can nevertheless have rather different contents. A black and white photo of a black and white checkerboard could be indistinguishable from a colour photo of the same. But the former represents a board with alternating light and dark squares, while the latter represents a board with alternating black and white squares. These interpretative schemes do not compete syntactically, even though some members of the black and white system are indistinguishable from members of the colour system. This example is not quite as surprising as a picture of Van Gogh’s bedroom depicting Gauguin’s aunt within an alternate interpretative scheme, but it’s nevertheless an instance of intrinsically identical pictures having distinct contents depending on the interpretative scheme one employs. While syntactic competition involves distinct semantic uses of a given syntactic feature, interpretative schemes compete semantically when they represent a given property by using distinct syntactic features. Consider some property of pictures, p, in virtue of possessing which, ceteris paribus, a picture represents P within a given interpretative scheme. Another interpretative scheme in which possession of q, which is not identical to p, is ceteris paribus responsible for representing P competes semantically with the first scheme. Each competing scheme makes use of different syntactic features in the service of a given representational end: they compete over how they represent P. The colour-inverted system competes syntactically with its ordinary counterpart because green in one system represents green, while in the other it represents red. These systems compete semantically because green is represented by one system with green while it is represented with red by the other system. Systems that compete semantically need not share any syntactic features—they just need to share contents—while systems that compete syntactically need not represent any of the same qualities. The different schemes we actually use to interpret pictures compete neither syntactically nor semantically with one another. As mentioned above, black and white photos do not depict hues, and they depict spatial features, as well as variations in light and dark, in the same manner as colour photographs do. That is to say, where black and white photos overlap semantically with colour photos—the cases in which we are prepared to say they represent the same properties, like shapes—they do so in the same way, rather than in competing ways. Similar remarks apply to the contrast
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between chiaroscuro and line drawing. The former represents variations in light and dark while the latter does not, but they represent shapes and the like in much the same manner.² The next section will say a lot more about the representation of light and dark, because there is at least some art-historical evidence that there is semantic competition in the way light and shadow are represented. Odd interpretative schemes that are not used with any regularity compete both syntactically and semantically with the ones that are. As mentioned, in the colour complement system green represents red, while in the ordinary system green represents green (syntactic competition). And in the complement system green is represented by red, while in the ordinary system green is represented by green (semantic competition). Similar remarks apply to the possible fisheye system of interpretation vis-à-vis ordinary linear perspective as well, but with respect to shapes, not colours or degrees of lightness. For example, a region with four straight sides in a linear perspective picture tends to represent a quadrilateral region of space. In the fisheye system, by contrast, four sides with a given degree of curvature would represent quadrilateral regions of space. And a region of a fisheye picture that has four straight sides would represent a region of space with four concave sides. It is easy to find interpretative schemes that compete both syntactically and semantically with the ones that people do use, but it’s a very interesting fact that such competing schemes are not employed. The next two sections deepen and defend this proposal. Before moving on, it is worth noting that this pattern of non-competition does not appear in other representational kinds. Many diagrammatic interpretative schemes compete syntactically but not semantically, and conversely. There are numerous ways to diagram a given data set, for example, so semantic competition is common. Similarly, one and the same abstract diagram can be applied to many different representational ends, which amounts to syntactic competition. This seems true of the more logical or linguistic representations as well. There are many names for red, and ‘red’ could have named indefinitely many things. This makes the pattern one finds with pictures all the more puzzling. Pictures are often taken to be close cousins to diagrams and related representations, but in this ² Cf. Willats (1997), who would agree about the representation of shape in each system but claim that such pictures make use of different picture primitives (lines vs regions of light and dark) constituting different ‘denotational systems’.
36 john kulvicki respect at least it seems as though diagrams are more like languages than like pictures.
4. Objection: Light and Shadow The portrait of pictorial diversity that emerges here is one in which viewers latch onto a somewhat diverse but non-competing set of interpretative schemes amidst an abundance of methods for making pictures. The distinctions between interpretative and productive systems and between competing and non-competing interpretative systems reveal an impressive regularity in practice that otherwise would have been missed. This section considers a significant potential counter-example due to Ernst Gombrich, while the next section considers a related worry due to Heinrich W¨olfflin. Gombrich begins Art and Illusion (1961, pt 1) with a discussion of the ways in which light, shadow, and colour have been represented in landscape painting, especially between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. The features of paintings that represent such properties changed over that period, Gombrich claims. Observers with the right exposure and training readily understand pictures that differ substantially in their surface features as representations of one and the same thing, or so the story goes. The history of picture-making thus suggests that some pictures at least compete semantically, over how they represent light, colour, and shadow; and they might compete syntactically as well. Gombrich’s discussion of this issue is curiously inconclusive, however. On the one hand, he suggests that there is genuine semantic competition between, say, seventeenth-century Dutch landscapes, like Hobbema’s Watermill (1670), and their nineteenth-century English counterparts, such as Constable’s White Horse (1819) (Gombrich 1961: 58–9). Both depict scenes unevenly illuminated by the sun, and both face the challenge of representing significant contrasts in illumination using a colour palette that lacks such differences in brightness. Each accomplishes this goal by employing different aspects of that common colour palette, which is a clear case of semantic competition. The earlier work, for example, eschewed great variation in hue as a technique for suggesting changes in the illumination of a depicted scene. Constable, by contrast, made liberal use of greens and blues in the service of similar representational ends.
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On the other hand, Gombrich (1961: 46–9) suggests that nineteenthcentury developments in technique from Constable through Corot and Monet allowed the depiction of brighter scenes than those depicted by Hobbema, Lorrain, or Gainsborough. Picking up on a remark by Ernst Brücke, Gombrich claims that Monet let the midday sun into paintings (1961: 49). Though it is undeniable that landscape painting over the centuries has maintained a relatively consistent subject matter—landscapes—and that the surface features of such paintings have changed quite a bit, it is also true that the aspects of landscapes upon which artists focus have changed. Does one depict a landscape in the evening or at midday? In full sun, dappled, or shrouded by clouds? Since there is a sense in which the contents of landscapes seem to have changed over the centuries, the changes in landscapes’ surface features do not establish any semantic competition in interpretative practice. In addition, it is certainly possible that interpretative practices change over time, but that would not undermine this chapter’s main claim. The interesting fact about interpretative practice is that viewers at a given time (and in a given cultural milieu) make use of a diverse set of interpretative schemes that do not compete syntactically or semantically. Hobbema’s contemporaries might have found his Watermill just as bright as Constable’s contemporaries found his White Horse. In that sense, the interpretative scheme deployed in seventeenth-century Europe might compete semantically with the one used a century and a half thereafter. But that doesn’t mean anyone actually makes use of competing interpretative schemes. Constable’s work might very well have rendered Hobbema’s scenes dark to nineteenth-century eyes. Landscape painting from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has a tendency to seem dark, or at least quite misty, and perhaps the cost of letting the midday sun into painting was letting it set a bit on one’s forebears. Gombrich’s slippage between discussing changes in subject matter and changes in the non-semantic features that accomplish certain representational ends might result from the fact that he too used non-competing interpretative schemes, even though his historian’s eyes could see the diachronic development of interpretative practice. Overall, then, while it’s not implausible that interpretative practice has changed over time, Gombrich’s landscape examples are far from establishing that viewers deploy competing interpretative schemes, and it is an interesting question how one might go about settling this issue decisively.
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5. Objection: Linear and Painterly One finds a related discussion of painting in Heinrich W¨olfflin’s Principles of Art History (1932), which introduces five opposed pairs that qualify sixteenth- and seventeenth-century European pictures, respectively. Most famous is the development from linear to painterly style. Linear style emphasizes things’ edges while the painterly stresses masses. Everything depends on how far a preponderating significance is assigned to or withdrawn from the edges, whether they must be read as lines or not . . . Therefore, what makes the difference between Dürer and Rembrandt is not less or more in the exploitation of light and shade, but the fact that in the one case the masses appear with stressed, in the other with unstressed edges. (W¨olfflin 1932: 19)
It was important to W¨olfflin that this distinction does not depend essentially on the contents of the pictures in question. It is not a matter of the representation of light and shadow, since chiaroscuro came into its own in the Cinquecento, well before the painterly style bloomed a century thereafter. Linear and painterly are thus candidates for semantically competing, and perhaps syntactically competing, systems of pictorial representation. That is, if there is no bar to which subjects each style can represent, there can be pictures in each style that differ from one another in their surface details even though they do not differ in content. W¨olfflin was not blind to the fact that there was a shift in subject matter over the two centuries on which he focused, however. Some subjects’ outlines lend themselves to being stressed. Others do not. He even went so far as to explicate the ‘picturesque’ (1932: 23–7) in terms that would help to explain this. Picturesque scenes lend themselves to painterly depiction. For example, ‘there is a picturesque beauty of the ruin. The rigour of the tectonic form is broken up, and while the wall crumbles and holes and fissures arise, a life quickens which quivers and shimmers over the surface’ (1932: 24). The idea is that ruins, having outlines that are rather indeterminate and thus de-emphasized from the perspective of an ordinary observer, lend themselves to depiction that does not emphasize edges so much as it stresses masses. The picturesque effect on perceivers is ‘impossible for non-ruinous architecture’ (1932: 24), though, as will become clear, it is
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possible for pictures of non-ruinous architecture. Light and shadow also play a role in the picturesque. Unevenly illuminated scenes (1932: 25), presumably even those that involve ‘non-ruinous architecture’, de-emphasize the outlines of objects because luminance boundaries compete for viewers’ attention with object boundaries. And in dimly illuminated scenes, ‘instead of a number of separate objects, we see indeterminate lighter or darker masses which flow together in a common tonal movement’ (1932: 26). The dim light at dusk is picturesque; the bright light at noon is not. The picturesque is a problem if one thinks that linear and painterly can be explained independently of content. Indeed, the challenge is similar to the one faced by Gombrich. Might it be that the painterly is merely the depiction of relatively picturesque scenes? Or, to put it more carefully, might it be that the painterly is merely the depiction of scenes as being picturesque? In that case, linear and painterly depiction might be explained solely in terms of pictorial content, rather than independently of it. W¨olfflin seems to have been aware of this worry. His response was that there are painterly pictures of non-picturesque scenes. ‘A delicate architectural painter does not require picturesque buildings to make a painterly picture’ (1932: 26). That is to say, even non-ruinous architectural scenes can be portrayed in a painterly manner by a skilled artist. He suggests that all of this should be obvious by a mere ‘glance at art history’ (1932: 26). But there is nothing obvious about it, and even if it is true, it is unclear how this would support W¨olfflin’s thesis. The idea is supposed to be that a scene might not be picturesque when seen face to face, but that some pictures of it can nevertheless be painterly. This suggests to W¨olfflin that we cannot understand the painterly exclusively in terms of pictorial content. But different pictures of any given scene can depict it as having different features. So it might be that the painterly style amounts to a particular set of features that objects are represented as having, and that these features are distinct from those typically represented by linear pictures. This alternative explanation is not considered by W¨olfflin, even though much of what he says strongly suggests that it is true. W¨olfflin believed that painterly pictures of picturesque scenes are merely the ‘preliminary stage to the higher forms of the painterly taste’ (1932: 27), and that just about any scene can be the basis of a painterly picture once painterly technique has been fully developed. Why is the picturesque an
40 john kulvicki important first step, however? Why are such contents what matter, at least originally, to the development of painterly style? The most obvious explanation is that what W¨olfflin calls ‘painterly’ consists of a certain set of features that objects are depicted as having. Techniques developed in the sixteenth century, applied to picturesque scenes, yield something close to the painterly depiction of the seventeenth century. This is because picturesque scenes have the features that painterly pictures strive to depict objects as having: indeterminate or, at least, unstressed outlines, etc. One can depict scenes not otherwise picturesque as having features characteristic of picturesque scenes, once the techniques for producing such pictures have been learned by depicting picturesque scenes. Indeed, this might be easier than one would think, because the painterly is understood in terms of lacking what linear pictures possess. The painterly does not emphasize edges or outlines, so a picture of a non-ruinous classical fac¸ade can be painterly if it says little about the edges that, if depicted in detail, would result in a more linear effect. The next section shows how a tendency to give up on depicted detail reinforces the view that pictorial interpretative schemes do not compete with one another. For now, the point is that W¨olfflin does little to establish the linear–painterly distinction in a way that demonstrates interpretative competition.³ Gombrich was influenced by W¨olfflin in particular, and by Burkhardtian art history in general, but in his famous essay ‘Norm and Form’, he criticizes W¨olfflin’s distinctions precisely because they seem more tied to the contents of paintings than W¨olfflin wanted to admit (Gombrich 1971: 93–4). The details of Gombrich’s criticism and his own counter-proposal are beside the point, but the gist of his response is important. W¨olfflin underestimated the complexities of pictorial representation, or understood them as uninteresting compared to non-representational, formal aspects of pictures (Gombrich 1971: 94–5). Of course pictures represent, but they are artistically interesting because of the formal aspects that distinguish them from one another. Gombrich notes that this is something of a reversal from the Renaissance, when formal and compositional aspects of pictures received almost no attention from critics and other commentators, compared to their representational aspects. The problem is that by ³ Similar remarks apply to the other four distinctions Wo¨ lfflin draws between sixteenth- and seventeenth-century pictures. Indeed, they are even less plausibly divorced from content than linear and painterly.
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de-emphasizing representational aspects of pictures, W¨olfflin simply ignored what might be essential to understanding the distinction between linear and painterly. Meyer Shapiro voiced a similar worry: ‘It is not always clear which formal traits are independent of representation’ (1994: 81), and ‘it may be asked whether the formal schemas, like W¨olfflin’s, are not veiled categories of representation’ (1994: 76).
6. Space: Less Is Sometimes More Pictorial While the representation of light and shadow is a decent candidate for interpretative competition, the representation of space is not. Robert Hopkins points out that the representation of spatial features is central to depiction in a way that the representation of light, colour, and shadow is not: ‘Colour and tone are features of a picture which only sometimes play a role in dictating what it depicts . . . Shape, on the other hand, is always relevant—if anything is’ (1998: 52). Gombrich famously exempted linear perspective from the class of pictorial conventions, claiming that its special place is due merely to the fact that we cannot see around corners (1961: 250). Goodman (1976, Ch. 1) took Gombrich to task for this, but for present purposes it’s not the conventionality debates that matter. Gombrich was acutely aware of the fact that pictures are much less forgiving of spatial variation than they are of variations in other dimensions, and this seems true regardless of whether one explains the phenomenon by appeal to non-conventional features of pictures, or by appeal to habits. The fisheye system’s pictures, for example, bear a different kind of spatial relation to the objects they depict than ordinary pictures do. Similar claims hold for pictures in reverse perspective and for anamorphic distortions of all sorts. It is contrary to our practice to suggest that we interpret such pictures as competing syntactically or semantically with one another. Fisheye photos seem to depict bulgy things, and anamorphic distortions seem to depict objects distorted. It’s even tempting to think that there is no spatial diversity manifest in our practice with pictures, but this would go too far. Viewers use many distinct, but non-competing, interpretative schemes, even when it comes to the representation of space, and these spatial examples are rather striking illustrations of how interpreters avoid competition.
42 john kulvicki Recall that there is a sense in which the fisheye photo is interpreted as depicting a bulgy lemon. Realizing that the lemon is depicted as having an odd shape does not lead one to reinterpret the photo as though it depicts an ordinary lemon in a fisheye interpretative scheme. What does plausibly happen, however, is that one discounts the bulgy interpretation in favor of something much less specific. The photo is understood to depict a lemon without depicting it as having any particular shape aside from a generally lemony one. Faced with a fisheye photo, or even an odder anamorphic monstrosity, there is a temptation to discount shape as something that is represented at any level of detail. Reverse perspective constructions are similar. On the one hand they seem to depict rather oddly shaped objects, while on the other they can seem to say little about spatial detail.⁴ Yes, that Byzantine icon depicts an altar, but no, it doesn’t depict the altar as having any particular shape. At best, it depicts the altar as having a certain number of sides, sharp or rounded corners, etc. So we do not give up altogether on such pictures as representing spatial qualities; we just give up on the details when the details seem particularly odd. Our willingness to give up on depicted detail is as striking as our unwillingness to adopt odd interpretative schemes for pictures, and it is not limited to spatial aspects of pictures, even though it is most prominent there. When the colour scheme of a picture is particularly extravagant, colour is discounted as contributing systematically to representational content. There is a sense in which many Matisses seem to depict things as oddly coloured and oddly shaped, but there is an equally strong tendency to regard these paintings as saying quite little about the details of shape and colour. The shapes and colours of the painted surfaces are quite interesting, aesthetically and otherwise, but they are not interesting just because of what they manage to depict. In such cases, it’s easier to focus on surface features of a picture in their own right. It’s more difficult to ignore spatial and chromatic features of C´ezanne’s paintings when interpreting them than it is for Matisse’s, ⁴ Hopkins agrees that these seem like the live options for handling such odd pictures. Using different examples, he finds ‘two possible sources of legitimate diversity. One is if the two pictures depict oblong tables while differing over the details . . . The other possibility is that, while the two pictures do not disagree on the table’s properties, one is simply indeterminate with respect to features which the other represents’ (1998: 153). He develops the latter point in Hopkins (2003). Most of Hopkins’s discussion takes place in the context of defending his account of depiction against possible counter-examples. The present focus is understanding pictorial diversity, but the next section will show that Hopkins’s account is well suited to explaining the kind of diversity articulated herein.
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for example, so the former are more apt to be interpreted as representing things as bearing odd but interesting spatial relations to one another. This back-and-forth between content and surface has been mentioned by almost every philosopher writing about pictorial representation, but it has not been noticed that this process manifests a commitment to avoid competing interpretative schemes.⁵ To the extent that shape is discounted, competition with an ordinary system of depiction is avoided, at the price of informativeness. Such pictures have a more limited vocabulary, as it were, but they don’t speak a different language. Informativeness is a price we are willing to pay in order to avoid competition. At this point, pictorial diversity seems to have a rather interesting shape, one unique to pictures. No explanation has yet been offered for this pattern of pictorial diversity. Given that it does not show up with other kinds of representation, however, one might expect accounts of what distinguishes pictures from other representational kinds to explain the pattern. As it turns out, no existing account of pictorial representation predicts such a pattern of interpretative schemes, even though no account excludes it, either. The next two sections sketch what an explanation of this phenomenon should look like, and indicate how some accounts of pictures and the perception thereof can accommodate such an explanation. There are, in a sense, two things to explain: why competition is absent and why the non-competing diversity manifests itself as it does. As will become clear, understanding both facts requires keeping one’s eyes firmly fixed on both the syntactic and semantic features of pictures.
7. Explaining Diversity’s Presence To begin, why would one expect the diversity that exists? The previous section suggests that details of a picture surface are often excused from carrying semantic weight, when their doing so would result in a picture with a rather odd content. Other interpretative schemes that viewers use are, in a sense, abstractions from linear perspective: they leave out what linear perspective leaves in. Rather than take the fisheye photo to depict ⁵ Two interesting examples are in this volume (Hopkins and Brown, Chs 6 and 8). For a related discussion of these phenomena as they relate to pictorial realism, see Kulvicki (2006, Chs 11–12).
44 john kulvicki something oddly bulgy for a lemon, it is taken to say something less specific about the lemon’s shape. So what happens when the fisheye photo is reinterpreted as representing something rather indeterminate? The most plausible account is that the features of the picture surface that are responsible for depicting the specific, bulgy shape are themselves ignored. One merely regards less determinate features of the picture as those that carry semantic weight, while the properties responsible for depicting the bulgy shape are relieved of their semantic burdens. So, it’s not the specific shape of the region of the lemon picture that determines what it represents so much as an abstraction from that specific shape. Such a watered-down interpretative scheme is the same as the richer one where they overlap syntactically and semantically, so these two schemes do not compete with one another. It is a striking feature of pictures that one can ignore some of their surface details and still regard the artefact as having content. Indeed, this is not true of most other kinds of representation, and this fact about pictures goes some way towards explaining the pattern of pictorial diversity that we find here. Consider, by contrast to the picture case, that friend of yours who always exaggerates. His most recent missive describes two feet of snow with winds over fifty and temperatures below zero. That’s a rather extraordinary spring storm. The charitable reader in you understands him to describe merely a large amount of snow, somewhat high winds, and fairly chilly temperatures. In effect, you abstract from the details of the content because you know those details are unlikely to be accurate. The details constitute more an aspect of your friend’s expressive style than an accurate reflection of the way things are. In such cases, notice, you abstract over features of the contents alone: features of the inscriptions play no role in the reinterpretation. There is no interesting abstraction over the properties of the representation, such as the letters or words inscribed, that corresponds to an abstraction over the properties of what is represented. If you abstract over those properties, the likely result is uninterpretable nonsense. This situation with the exaggerating friend contrasts sharply with pictures. It is easy to abstract over features of pictures and still have interpretable representations. For example, one can ignore the garishly coloured landscape and treat the picture as though it merely represents a landscape while remaining silent concerning the landscape’s colours. Working with the representation itself, and discounting some of its features, leads readily to
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abstractions over its content. With your friend’s letter, the abstraction relies completely on your conception of what your friend describes. You know what storms are like in the spring and you know what your friend is like, so certain charitable reinterpretations suggest themselves. With a picture, such abstractions are always possible based on an acquaintance with the features of the picture surface. Ignoring some of them leads quite readily to an abstraction over the picture’s content. This feature of pictures deserves further discussion (see e.g. Kulvicki forthcoming; 2006, Ch. 12). For now, the point is that this aspect of pictures makes the pattern of diversity that we find rather plausible. Pictures lend themselves straightforwardly to such reinterpretations.
8. Explaining Diversity’s Absence But why isn’t there more diversity to pictures? Why isn’t there any competition among pictorial schemes? After all, many diagrams and graphs lend themselves to abstractions over their contents in the way that pictures do (Kulvicki forthcoming), but they are also readily interpretable in ways that compete. A graph could just as well chart changes in temperature over time as changes in pressure over time, for example, while pictures do not readily admit of such reinterpretations. Why? There are two claims that seem particularly relevant to explaining this lack of pictorial diversity. The first is uncontroversial, in part because it is fairly weak, while the second is rather more controversial. The second claim entails the first. Even if one accepts both claims, they do not complete the story. The full story concerning pictorial diversity is not one that a philosopher is in a position to tell. First, many agree that there is a fairly significant constraint on what can be depicted. In particular, to use Hopkins’s phrase, ‘what can be depicted can be seen’ (1998: 28).⁶ Hopkins’s remark does not just concern the semantics ⁶ Elsewhere, I suggest that it’s more accurate to characterize this constraint by claiming that visible pictures depict visible things, audible pictures depict audible things, and so on (2006: 117). It’s best to ignore the possibility of audible and other kinds of pictures in this context. Wollheim (1987: 64) cites Lessing’s Laocoon (1910) as a source for an extreme version of the view that the realm of depiction is limited by the realm of the visible. Wollheim himself disagrees (1987: 65–9) for reasons inspired by Goodman (1976, Ch. 1) and Evans (1982), but these worries do not cut against the point being made here.
46 john kulvicki of pictures, as his formulation might suggest. Pictures, as Hopkins conceives of them, are themselves visible, in the sense that the features of pictures responsible for them depicting what they do are all visible features. That’s not to say that being a picture is merely being something with the right set of visible features, since on any reasonable view of what an artefact is, the intentions of makers play some role in determining its identity. It’s just that which picture something is depends on such an artefact’s perceptible features, and these relevant features are all visible. This is a claim about pictorial syntax. The non-semantically identifiable features of a picture that are responsible for it depicting what it does are all visible features and, adding a semantic point to this syntactic one, ‘what can be depicted can be seen’. So there is an important relationship, on most views of depiction, between the syntactic features of pictures and the features they depict objects as having: they are all visible. This fact prevents much competition, because something whose visible features are responsible for it representing invisible features of objects, like a graph of temperature over time, is not a picture. One is thus not going to find syntactic competition in which some visible feature is used to represent some visible quality on the one hand and some invisible quality on the other. This fact about pictures does not preclude all competition, of course. The colour-complement scheme, reverse perspective, anamorphosis, and other techniques fit the visibility desideratum while at the same time competing syntactically and semantically with our ordinary interpretations of pictures. The second kind of claim upon which an explanation of diversity can build is rather controversial, but not without its supporters. Not only is it the case that visible pictures depict visible things, but pictures depict what they do partly by instantiating properties of what they depict (Kulvicki 2006) or, at least, by being experienced as resembling what they depict (Hopkins 1998). Each of these views takes to heart the idea that pictures resemble what they depict, while parrying famous objections to such a proposal (e.g. Goodman 1976, Ch. 1). To be a little more specific, such proposals suggest that in order to represent X pictorially, a representation must either share some properties with X or be experienced as resembling X in some respects. Such proposals are controversial for many reasons, and it would take the present study off topic to discuss them in great detail. The question on the table is whether and to what extent they help explain the lack of pictorial diversity in question.
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For each of these accounts, the properties of a picture’s surface place significant constraints on what such a picture can depict. My view is that pictures have, following up on an idea of John Haugeland’s (1991), bare bones contents.⁷ These contents are rather abstract, typically including things like indeterminate shape and colour properties. A linear perspective picture of a rectangular table seen obliquely, for example, includes a quadrilateral region of space as part of its bare bones content. Bare bones contents constrain fleshed out contents in the sense that the latter include and are consistent with the former, but bare bones content does not fully determine fleshed out content. Being a rectangular table at an oblique angle to the line of sight is consistent with occupying a quadrilateral region of space, but so is being a trapezoidal object at an angle perpendicular to the line of sight. Alternative fleshed out interpretations of pictures are always available, while alternative bare bones interpretations are not. Pictures are interesting partly because they instantiate their bare bones contents. Pictures whose bare bones contents include a quadrilateral region of space are themselves quadrilateral in some region of their surface. This helps to explain why alternative interpretations with respect to bare bones content are unavailable and why fleshed out alternatives are. In order to have different bare bones content, the picture would need to change its surface features. Also, this helps further to explain the presence of certain kinds of diversity. If one systematically ignores, by abstracting over, certain features of pictures ordinarily included in their bare bones content, the result is a less determinate constraint on fleshed out content. By ignoring hue, for example, interpreters are less committed to the colours a picture represents things as having. But more to the immediate point, this fact about pictures, if it is a fact about them, also helps to explain the lack of competition among interpretative schemes. Syntactic competition involves treating a given feature of pictures, like being quadrilateral in a certain region, as being responsible for representing distinct properties in distinct interpretative schemes. If pictures instantiate their bare bones contents, however, it’s going to be difficult to find pictorial schemes of interpretation that compete syntactically. At least one of those purported competing schemes will fail to be pictorial because it will fail to ⁷ What follows is not a defense of my view, but merely a statement of it sufficient to show how such an account might explain the facts about pictorial diversity. For more detail and defense, see Kulvicki (2006, esp. Chs 3–4).
48 john kulvicki meet the constraint that the picture instantiate its bare bones content. For example, the interpretative scheme that inverts the fisheye mapping is not a pictorial scheme of interpretation on the current view. Fisheye photos with quadrilateral regions of their surfaces do not represent quadrilateral regions of space according to the fisheye interpretative scheme. Semantic competition is similarly constrained. Two pictures alike in some respect of their bare bones contents are also alike in some respect of their surface features. Perhaps this last proposal sounds like trying to solve a substantive issue with a merely legislative decision. The fisheye photos and countless anamorphic distortions have been excluded from discussion because they are not, strictly speaking, pictorial interpretative schemes. It is of interest why we do not merely invert the fisheye projection, however, and the present approach avoids that issue by declaring these systems non-pictorial. But the point is that if this is the correct account of depiction, then the range of pictorial interpretative options is quite limited, and thus it is easy to explain some of the lack of pictorial diversity. This would be a merely legislative move if the account of pictorial representation upon which it depends were either unmotivated or motivated solely by a desire to explain the absence of certain kinds of diversity. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to motivate the view of pictorial representation in question, it helps to notice that it was fashioned without the end of handling this specific problem. So, what motivation it has does not come from here. The foregoing does not fully explain the lack of pictorial competition, since there are distinct pictorial interpretative schemes, even given the constraint that pictures instantiate their bare bones contents. Reverse perspective, for example, is a pictorial system of representation, even though it works quite differently than ordinary linear perspective. Similar remarks apply to axonometric perspective and variants thereupon (Kulvicki 2006, Ch. 5). Failure to use such interpretative schemes cannot be explained in the above manner, and there is nothing else in the account that will explain it. This is the point at which facts about the ways in which we can engage perceptually and otherwise with artefacts must play a role in limiting our range, and psychologists are in a better position to identify and explain those limitations than philosophers are. Hopkins’s view is that pictures depict what they are experienced as resembling in outline shape. Outline shape is a relational, three-dimensional
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spatial property that coloured planes can share with the three-dimensional objects they typically depict. Pictures need not share outline shape with objects to depict them, but they need to be experienced as doing so. The details about outline shape are irrelevant to present purposes, but it is easy to see how such a constraint on depiction restricts pictorial diversity. Syntactically competing schemes would require one and the same pattern on a surface to be experienced as resembling distinct outline shapes, depending on the interpretative scheme being used. There is no reason to think this is impossible, but it is highly implausible. What one experiences an object as resembling in outline shape might depend on one’s prior experience with pictures, one’s care in observing things, etc., but it hardly seems to be the kind of thing one can shift at will depending on the kinds of pictures one interacts with. Indeed, Hopkins even has an easy time explaining why reverse perspective pictures are not readily interpretable within a reverse perspective system: they systematically distort outline shape (Hopkins 1998: 156–8; 2003). Semantic competition is more plausibly permitted by the experienced resemblance view. It requires that distinct surface patterns are experienced as resembling one and the same thing. There is no reason to think this is impossible or even terribly uncommon. If there were something systematic to such experiences, it’s plausible that one could make use of semantically competing pictorial systems. It is encouraging to note from this perspective that the most plausible, though not decisive, instances of competition are semantic and not syntactic, as noted in the discussion of Gombrich and W¨olfflin above. The reason there is not much semantic competition, if there is any at all, is presumably that there is no such systematic bivalence to our experiences. This latter fact is in no way internal to the experienced resemblance theory of depiction, so this is another point at which an account must look beyond itself for a full explanation of pictorial diversity. Other views of depiction are less readily equipped to explain pictorial diversity as unpacked above because they place less stress on the specific relationships between syntactic features of pictures and their semantic features. Recognitional accounts of depiction, like those of Flint Schier (1986) and Lopes (1996), for example, explain pictorial content merely by appeal to the recognitional capacities pictures trigger and engender. Goodman’s symbolic account is designed to make the range of depictive
50 john kulvicki possibilities quite open-ended. Even so, the pattern of pictorial diversity explicated herein is not inconsistent with these other accounts of depiction. It’s just that whatever limits the range of pictorial diversity, or explains its presence, is more completely external to such views than it is to mine or to Hopkins’s. Proponents of such views tend to suggest that pictorial diversity is a bit vaster in scope than this chapter suggests it is. Goodman was exceedingly cavalier in discussing the scope of depiction—‘almost any picture may represent almost anything’ (1976: 38)—and Lopes suggests that the range of interpretative schemes in use is quite broad (1996: 32–5).
9. Conclusion The goal of this chapter has been to sketch the shape of pictorial diversity and suggest how the phenomenon might be explained. Most discussions of pictorial diversity start with an account of depiction and ask how that account can handle the diversity we find. But too little time has been spent trying to articulate the phenomenon in detail, and this is likely because the focus of most discussions is the vindication of one or another account of depiction. The hope is that this chapter remedies such past offenses by introducing two conceptual tools that help to sort out the respects in which pictures do and do not vary. Focusing on the distinctions between systems for producing and interpreting pictures and between competing and non-competing interpretative schemes reveals an impressive pattern in what might otherwise seem like a rather anarchic jumble. Independently of how one wants to explain the pattern, the pattern itself distinguishes pictorial representations from other kinds of representation. And it is an interesting challenge for any view of depiction, though one not fully in the philosophers’ court, to explain the pattern that makes pictures so distinctive.
References Elkins, James (1994), The Poetics of Perspective (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press). Evans, Gareth (1982), The Varieties of Reference (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Gombrich, Ernst (1961), Art and Illusion, 2nd edn (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
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(1971), Norm and Form (London: Phaidon). Goodman, Nelson (1976), Languages of Art, 2nd edn (Indianapolis: Hackett). Haugeland, John (1991), ‘Representational Genera’, in W. Ramsey, S. Stich, and D. Rumelhart (eds), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum). Hopkins, Robert (1998), Picture, Image, and Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). (2003), ‘Perspective, Convention, and Compromise’, in H. Hecht, R. Schwartz, and M. Atherton (eds), Looking into Pictures (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press). Kulvicki, John (2006), On Images (Oxford: Clarendon Press). (forthcoming), ‘Knowing with Images: Medium and Message’, Philosophy of Science. Lessing, Gotthold (1910), Laocoon: An Essay upon the Limits of Painting and Poetry (1766), trans. E. Frothingham (Boston: Little, Brown). Lopes, Dominic McIver (1996), Understanding Pictures (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Schier, Flint (1986), Deeper into Pictures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Shapiro, Meyer (1994), Theory and Philosophy of Art (New York: George Braziller). Willats, John (1997), Art and Representation (Princeton: Princeton University Press). (2003), ‘Optical Laws or Symbolic Rules? The Dual Nature of Pictorial Systems’, in H. Hecht, R. Schwartz, and M. Atherton (eds), Looking into Pictures (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press). W¨olfflin, Heinrich (1932), The Principles of Art History, trans. M. D. Hottinger (New York: Holt). Wollheim, Richard (1980), Art and its Objects, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). (1987), Painting as an Art (Princeton: Princeton University Press). (2003), ‘What Makes Representational Painting Truly Visual?’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol., 77/1: 131–47. Ziff, Paul (1984), Antiaesthetics (Dordrecht: D. Reidel).
2 Picture This: Image-based Demonstratives DOMINIC MCIVER LOPES
Settling down after the big meal at the family reunion brings on a little nostalgia. Out come the photo albums. As the pages turn, you see familiar faces as they looked long ago. One photo shows a surprisingly sexy young woman, and you exclaim, ‘That’s Aunt Jane!’ What you say is true. The explanation is this: what you say is true in part because the picture puts you in the same kind of position with respect to Aunt Jane as the position you are in when you see her face to face. In general, (DR) Pictures perceptually ground demonstrative reference to depicted objects. This chapter makes a case for DR.
1. Pictures, Perception, and Demonstrative Reference Philosophers mostly hold that your exclamation is not on a par with ‘That’s Scarlett Johansson’, said in plain sight of her. A contrast with such views sharpens DR and indicates how to defend it. One line of thinking is pushed by Jos´e Luis Berm´udez (2000). Berm´udez assumes that a perceiver can demonstratively refer only to an object to which he stands in a certain perceptual relation. The details of the relation I am grateful to Catharine Abell, Katerina Bantinaki, Vincent Bergeron, Mohan Matthen, Bence Nanay, Dustin Stokes, Alberto Voltolini, and the Press’s anonymous referees for many helpful suggestions.
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do not matter now: what matters is that the relation grounds demonstrative reference—the perceiver is able to refer demonstratively to an object in part because he stands in the given perceptual relation to it. However, according to Berm´udez, looking at Aunt Jane’s photograph does not place you in the given perceptual relation with her. So that is not your aunt, that is a photograph, and ‘That’s Aunt Jane’ is false if it refers demonstratively. Since this is obvious, we seek a non-demonstrative reference, and what Berm´udez calls the ‘pictorial nature’ of the photograph swiftly brings us to see that the intended referent is the woman in the photograph. Berm´udez suggests that your exclamation contains an elliptical definite description and should be parsed as ‘The woman represented by that photograph is Aunt Jane’. This reasoning highlights two facts that need to be explained. First, we often succeed in referring when we point to images and say things like ‘That’s Aunt Jane’ or ‘That’s a mongoose’. You open yourself to correction if you point to the photograph of Aunt Jane and say ‘That’s Aunt Rose’ or if you point to a photograph of a mongoose and say ‘That’s a mink’. The correction will be ‘No, that’s Aunt Jane’ or ‘No, that’s a mongoose’. How is reference made in these cases, if not demonstratively? Descriptively, according to Berm´udez—though other answers are available (e.g. Voltolini 2009). Second, we need to explain why, in your exclamation, the appearance of demonstrative reference exerts so little strain. It is as natural as can be to point to an image and use a ‘this’ or a ‘that’ to refer to its depictum. To see this, consider three cases: you say ‘That’s Aunt Jane’ when you point to her, when you look at a picture of her, and when you pick out her number from the phone book. The second case is not just like the third case, where you ostend a phone number and say ‘That’s Aunt Jane’ (Quine 1968: 194). Even if the second and third cases both involve a reference shift, the mechanisms are different, and this difference can be expressed in any of a number of ways. Perhaps the second case is grounded in a ‘quasi-perceptual experience’ as of Aunt Jane; or perhaps, as Berm´udez proposes, the second case exploits the ‘pictorial nature’ of the photograph. Whatever we say to express this difference should explain the relative ease and automaticity of the second case, by contrast with the third case. Gareth Evans makes similar points about moving images. He writes that in watching TV, ‘ ‘‘this’’ and ‘‘that’’ pop out without the slightest
54 dominic mciver lopes sense of strain’ (Evans 1982: 147–8). The reason is that the TV image provides an information link to its depictum—albeit via an information channel with ‘circuits and time lags’ (Evans 1982: 147). But although the information link to the depictum explains why ‘this’ and ‘that’ so easily pop out, it is not enough to ground demonstrative reference. Evans proposes that statements like ‘That’s Luongo in net’ (said as you watch the hockey game on TV) exploit a concept of the information link via an image from object to perceiver, so they do not involve pure demonstrative reference. Like Berm´udez, Evans accepts that refusals to read your exclamation at face value, as referring demonstratively to Aunt Jane, are compelling so long as we are told how your exclamation does refer to Aunt Jane and why the apparent demonstrative reference to Aunt Jane exerts practically no strain. DR explains without a bit of fuss why ‘That’s Aunt Jane’ refers without strain to Aunt Jane. First, your exclamation involves a genuine demonstrative reference to Aunt Jane. Second, this demonstrative reference is grounded in the photograph’s putting you in the same kind of perceptual state as you are in when you see her face to face. So now the challenge is not to explain how the ‘pictorial nature’ of the image is sufficiently like ordinary perception to ease the strain caused by the apparent demonstrative. The challenge is rather to show how the ‘pictorial nature’ of the image is so like ordinary perception as to ground genuine demonstrative reference. Berm´udez and Evans take all demonstrative reference to be grounded in a perceptual relation, but DR does not require this assumption. Colin McGinn (1981: 161–3) and Marga Reimer (1991: 191–4) discuss cases where demonstrative reference seems not to rely on any perceptual link to the referent, and they go on to infer that perception is incidental to demonstrative reference. As Susanna Siegel points out, this inference implies that demonstrative reference is a uniform phenomenon, and she gives some reasons to reject this assumption (Siegel 2002: 13–14). So DR is consistent with the view that demonstrative reference must be grounded in a perceptual relation, but it is also consistent with the view that demonstrative reference is not uniform and only some forms of demonstrative reference are grounded in perception. Thus, the case for DR hinges on an account of a perceptual relation that grounds some cases of demonstrative reference. P. F. Strawson (1959: 18) wrote that demonstrative reference requires that a perceiver ‘can pick out
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by sight or hearing or touch, or can otherwise sensibly discriminate, the particular being referred to’. Evans complained that the ordinary concept of perceptual picking out is too vague to make Strawson’s comment much more than a starting point: it is quite undetermined by the ordinary concept what kinds of spatial circuitousness and time-lags in the information channel are consistent with the subject’s being said to perceive the object. We speak of seeing someone on the television, or hearing him on the radio. We speak of seeing someone in a mirror as well as of seeing his reflection—but only of seeing someone’s shadow, not of seeing him in a shadow. (Evans 1982: 144)
If this is right, then we should expect accounts of the ordinary concept of perception more to reflect than to settle contending views about your exclamation. If analysis of the ordinary concept of perception is no help, then we should see what science has to offer. Mohan Matthen’s Seeing, Doing, and Knowing uses findings in vision science to construct an account of perception as, in part, anchoring demonstrative reference (Matthen 2005: 271–324). Elements of this account contribute to the case for DR. Moreover, since Matthen mounts an argument that gives legs to some philosophers’ worries about DR, the best hope for DR is to find resources for its defence within Matthen’s argument.
2. Seeing Objects Perception can ground demonstrative reference only if it represents objects. However, some philosophers hold that perception cannot represent objects (e.g. Lowe 1993; Davies 1997; Clark 2000). Matthen’s first step is to show that perception does represent objects. Or rather, since he holds that not all perceptual modalities represent objects, he shows more specifically that vision represents objects (Matthen 2005: 271–82). The argument for this will provide materials essential when we come back to consider demonstrative reference through pictures. Vision represents features. It represents grey and black, square and round, and rough and smooth, for instance. Obviously enough, seeing grey or
56 dominic mciver lopes
Figure 2.1. Grey square and black circle
Figure 2.2. Grey circle and black square
round is not normally an experience of grey or round throughout a visual scene. Normally, part of the scene is grey and part of the scene is round. Added to that, features are normally represented together, or bound. Some grey is bound to the round; it has a determinate size and shape. These facts generate the binding problem. Vision can discriminate the scene in Figure 2.1, containing a grey square and a black disk, from the scene in Figure 2.2, containing a grey disk and a black square. The difference between the scenes cannot be represented if vision merely represents the features grey, black, round, and circular. Vision must represent more in order to bind grey to square and black to circular in Figure 2.1 and grey to circular and black to square in Figure 2.2. What more is needed? One answer is location (Clark 2000). In Figure 2.1, vision represents grey and square as at the same place and black and round as at the same place; in Figure 2.2, vision represents round and grey as at one place and black and square as at another place. So vision represents features at places. Now consider the phi phenomenon. You are looking at a screen. A light flashes on and off, then a light slightly displaced from the first light
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Figure 2.3. The phi phenomenon
Figure 2.4. The phi phenomenon with change in colour
flashes on and off. If conditions are right, you will seem to see one light moving rather than one light flashing followed by a second light flashing. (The phenomenon is a function of the distance between the lights, the size of the lights, the duration of each flash, and the interval between flashes.) The phi phenomenon is the basis of motion perception, since it generalizes beyond the regularities of the two-light case. For example, suppose four lights are arranged in the pattern shown in Figure 2.3, with the distance between lights 2 and 3 set at twice the distance between 1 and 2 and 3 and 4. You will seem to see one light moving across the screen only if the interval between the flashes of lights 2 and 3 is about twice that of the interval between 1 and 2 and 3 and 4. Finally, Nelson Goodman asked what happens if the lights are different colours, as in Figure 2.4. The answer is that one light is seen as moving and changing colour. Matthen argues that the phi phenomenon and hence the visual representation of motion require more than the representation of features at places. Let n be the interval between flashes of two white lights of a given size at a given distance when the flashes occur for a given duration. The duration of the flashes, the size of the lights, and the distance between lights are fixed, but we vary n, the length of time after light 1 switches off and before light 2 switches on. The phi phenomenon occurs when n falls below a threshold value, otherwise it looks as if light 1 switches off and light 2 switches on. Suppose that the threshold value is 200 ms. So here are two candidate operating assumptions of vision: Assumption 1. If white-here at t and white-there at t + 100 ms, then white-here belongs to the same object as white-there.
58 dominic mciver lopes Assumption 2. If white-here at t and white-there at t + 300 ms, then white-here does not belong to the same object as white-there. Accordingly, when the antecedent of Assumption 1 is satisfied, vision represents one object, and when the antecedent of Assumption 2 is satisfied, vision represents two objects. However, there is no difference in the features and locations that are represented in each antecedent. Thus, it is not possible to explain the identity of white-here and white-there in Assumption 1 in terms of features at locations. Vision must represent something more than features and locations if it represents the difference between the 100 ms interval, which triggers the phi phenomenon, and the 300 ms interval, which does not trigger the phi phenomenon. Matthen proposes that vision represents objects. The operating assumptions of vision are in fact these: Assumption 1∗ . If object 1 appears to be here at t and object 2 appears to be there at t + 100 ms, then object 1 is the same as object 2. Assumption 2∗ . If object 1 appears to be here at t and object 2 appears to be there at t + 300 ms, then object 1 is not the same as object 2. Vision therefore attributes features to moving, changing objects. As Matthen sums up the point, ‘perceptions of change and motion demand an identity that underlies change. Locations do not provide such an identity. Hence the proper representation of visual states demands reference to objects, which can continue through time’ (Matthen 2005: 282). Notice that this is a minimal conception of object representation. Of course, vision captures the difference between the case which triggers the phi phenomenon and the case which does not by representing times in addition to features and locations. That is made clear in the antecedents of Assumptions 1 and 2. However, the point is that representing features as bound at places and times suffices to represent objects. Representing change and motion represents objects. This is what is captured in the antecedents of Assumptions 1∗ and 2∗ . We cannot solve the binding problem just by saying that vision represents features at locations. Adding time to location is not an alternative to Matthen’s proposal, it is Matthen’s proposal, given a minimal conception of object representation.
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3. Seeing and Doing and the Feeling of Presence Representing objects is not enough for vision to ground demonstrative reference. What more is needed? Matthen proposes that a representation grounds demonstrative reference if it represents objects deictically. For future reference, (DX) Vision grounds demonstrative reference by representing objects deictically. A deictic representation is one that ‘makes reference to an object relative to a perceiver’s own body without intermediary descriptive information’ (Matthen 2005: 302). Thus, there are two conditions on deixis. First, a deictic representation represents an object in an egocentric framework. Second, it represents the object non-descriptively. Matthen uses this notion of deictic representation in part to explain a phenomenological contrast between seeing an item in a picture and seeing it face to face, and the explanation of this contrast adds to DX. Seeing Aunt Jane in a picture differs phenomenologically from seeing her face to face. For one thing, the latter comes with a feeling of presence that is obviously absent in looking at her portrait. In general, seeing things in pictures lacks this feeling of presence (though there are exceptions, like trompe l’œil images). Beyond this, little can be said about the phenomenological character of the feeling—about what the feeling is like. Matthen (2005: 304) calls it ‘inarticulate’, though he does say something about what the feeling is a feeling of. It is a feeling of things being ready to hand, of being perceptually coupled with them (Matthen 2005: 315–16). You do not feel as if you can reach out and touch your aunt when you see her in the photograph, as you would were you to see her in the flesh. Perhaps this is not saying much, but not much more needs to be said. Matthen’s project is not descriptive phenomenology. His project is to explain why face-to-face seeing comes with this feeling of presence that seeing-in lacks. The explanation makes ingenious use of the two-pathway model of vision. Vision integrates two systems, which
60 dominic mciver lopes can be called ‘descriptive vision’ and ‘motion-guiding vision’. The systems recruit anatomically distinct structures, one running along ventral pathways from the occipital lobe to the inferior temporal lobe, and the other along dorsal pathways from the occipital lobe to the parietal lobe. For this reason, the two systems are often called ‘ventral’ and ‘dorsal’ vision (and this is the terminology Bence Nanay uses in Chapter 7 in this volume). However, it will be important to characterize them functionally rather than anatomically. Descriptive vision represents features of objects, such as shape. As a result, it feeds long-term memory and has epistemic significance. Motion-guiding vision subserves short-term motor control: it orients the body to objects of attention and guides the limbs in acting on objects. To do this, it represents objects in an egocentric spatial framework. Since it is not descriptive, it does not feed long-term memory and it has no epistemic significance. Descriptive and motion-guiding vision are doubly dissociable. An impairment of one system may spare the other (Milner and Goodale 1995; Weiskrantz 1997). A person with impaired descriptive vision may be able to reach for and pick up an object with the correct grip although she cannot describe its shape. A person with optic ataxia cannot properly manipulate an object that he can describe quite well. For example, he might be able to describe the distance and orientation of a slot and yet prove unable to put a letter through the slot without trial and error. The dissociation is also seen in unimpaired subjects. For instance, motionguiding vision is immune to size-contrast illusions that affect descriptive vision. In the Titchener (or Ebbinghaus) illusion, the size of the centre disk seems to vary as a function of the size of the disks surrounding it (Figure 2.5). Melvyn Goodale and his collaborators constructed a threedimensional version of the illusion using disks like poker chips (Aglioti et al. 1995; see also Ellis et al. 1999). As expected, the centre disk appeared smaller when surrounded by large disks than when surrounded by small disks. Nevertheless, subjects who were asked to pick up the centre disk scaled their grip to its actual size. Matthen proposes that motion-guiding vision is immune to the sizecontrast illusions because it only represents features of objects that are needed to guide action: it only represents target points. Consider a seabird diving for a fish (Matthen 2005: 301–3). The fish is moving fast but the bird must grip it with its beak. To succeed in catching the fish, the bird
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Figure 2.5. Titchener–Ebbinghaus illusion
must first target two grip points, such that connecting the top beak with one point and the bottom beak with the other point allows it to carry off the fish (Figure 2.6). There is initially an interaction with descriptive vision, which uses shape information to determine the target points. It might use the information that striped fish are tasty and round fish are bony to choose a particular fish and it might then use the shape of that fish to decide what precise points (at the tick marks on Figure 2.6) on the fish to target. But once the target points have been set, the bird need only home its upper beak on one target point and its lower beak on the other, making rapid adjustments as its prey moves. Motion-guiding vision performs this task. Further updates from descriptive vision about the fish’s shape are not required: all the bird needs to secure its dinner is timely information that allows it to reorient itself continuously to the target points as they move and as the bird gets closer. If this distinction between motion-guiding vision and descriptive vision is correct, then only motion-guiding vision is deictic. It represents target points for action in an egocentric spatial framework without the intermediary descriptive information that is vulnerable to size-contrast illusions. With this distinction and the notion of deixis in hand, Matthen proposes that deixis is responsible for the feeling of presence. We are aware of the outputs of descriptive vision through conscious experience of shapes, sizes,
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Figure 2.6. Two fish
colours, and the like; and we are aware of the outputs of motion-guiding vision through the ‘inarticulate’ feeling that things are ready to hand, that we are perceptually coupled with them for action. Moreover, motion-guiding vision is not implicated in seeing objects in pictures, though it does represent the surfaces of pictures. Suppose that you are about to reach for a poker chip on a table, gripping its near and far sides (as indicated by the tick marks on Figure 2.7). Your grip at these edges will be the same diameter as a grip targeting its left and right sides. Now consider a chip that is depicted as lying on a table. If motion-guiding vision set you up to reach for the depicted chip, it would use the same grip diameter for the near and far sides as for the left and right sides. In fact, motion-guiding vision sets a much smaller grip on the near and far sides of the depicted chip than on its left and right sides. The grip it sets for the near and far sides of the depicted chip is the same as the grip it sets for the top and bottom edges of the ellipse on the picture surface which depicts the chip. Motion-guiding vision does not guide your reach into the depicted space. It stops, as it were, at the picture surface. (In most cases anyway. One exception is being taken in by a trompe l’œil picture. To be taken in by such a picture, you must fail to see it as
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Figure 2.7. Poker chip on a table
a marked, two-dimensional picture surface: seeing the surface as a surface blocks any illusionistic experience of the depicted scene and hence any chance of being ‘taken in’ (Lopes 2005: 29–34). Thus, when taken in, one would expect motion-guiding vision not to set a grip diameter for the near and far sides of a trompe l’œil chip that matches the diameter of the grip it would set for the top and bottom edges of the corresponding ellipse on the picture surface. Instead, it should set the same grip on the near and far sides of the depicted chip as on its left and right sides.) To sum up, only motion-guiding vision is deictic, deictic representation comes with the feeling of presence, and seeing in pictures does not engage motion-guiding vision. These claims explain why seeing in pictures lacks the feeling of presence: (M1) (M2) (M3) (M4) (M5)
Only motion-guiding vision is deictic. Seeing O in P does not implicate motion-guiding vision. So seeing O in P is not deictic. Deixis is responsible for the feeling of presence. So seeing O in P lacks the feeling of presence.
64 dominic mciver lopes Remember, though, that the goal was to say what is needed, in addition to representing objects, in order for perception to ground demonstrative reference. According to Matthen, perception grounds demonstrative reference to objects by representing them deictically: (DX) Vision grounds demonstrative reference by representing objects deictically. We are now in a position to build on DX. Deictic representation is representation in an egocentric framework without intervening descriptive information. Motion-guiding vision is deictic, but not descriptive vision. Visually based demonstrative reference is grounded in motion-guiding vision.
4. Deixis in Motion-Guiding Vision Although Matthen never draws the inference explicitly, DX conjoined with M1 and M2 implies that (M6) Seeing O in P does not ground demonstrative reference to O. The empirical evidence suggests that motion-guiding vision is not involved in seeing in pictures. So if only motion-guiding vision is deictic, then seeing-in is not deictic. This explains why we do not feel as if we are in the presence of depicted objects—why we do not feel ready to reach out and act upon them. It also means that we cannot refer to them demonstratively. The explanation of why seeing O in P does not come with a feeling of presence also implies, given DX, that it does not ground demonstrative reference to O. But since M6 follows directly from M1, M2, and DX, making a case for DR means rejecting one or more of these premises. M2 is on solid ground and DX is plausible. That leaves M1.
5. Deixis in Descriptive Vision Matthen explains that seeing in pictures lacks the feeling of presence because deixis is responsible for the feeling of presence. Seeing face to face is deictic; seeing-in is not. However, there is another explanation of why seeing-in
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lacks the feeling of presence: it does not implicate motion-guiding vision. If this explanation is correct, M4 is not needed, and if M4 is not needed, then there is room to doubt M1. Seeing things in pictures normally lacks the feeling of presence that is part of seeing things face to face (or in trompe l’œil). According to Matthen, we have a feeling of O’s presence because O is represented deictically, and O is represented deictically because motion-guiding vision represents O. An equally good explanation is this. We have a feeling of O’s presence because motion-guiding vision represents O. Our experiences of depicted objects normally lack this feeling of presence because motion-guiding vision does not normally represent depicta—it stops at the picture surface. This explanation fits our intuitions about the character of presence. Matthen describes presence as a feeling of things being ready to hand, of being perceptually coupled with them. Of course, you do not feel as if you can reach out and touch your aunt when you see her in the photograph, as you would were you to see her in the flesh. The reason is that seeing her in the picture does not implicate motion-guiding vision. If M4 is not needed to explain why seeing in pictures lacks a feeling of presence, then there is room to contemplate rejecting M1, breaking the monopoly of motion-guiding vision over deixis. A word about ‘deixis’. As we saw, Matthen uses the term quite specifically: a deictic representation is one that represents objects in an egocentric framework ‘without intermediary descriptive information’ (Matthen 2005: 302). In the context of M1, the final clause of this definition is a little puzzling. The claim that only motion-guiding vision is deictic is tautological if deictic representation excludes descriptive vision by definition. Since M1 is not intended as a tautology, the definition must be read another way. Here is one reading: R is a deictic representation of O just in case (1) R represents O egocentrically and (2) R does not accomplish (1) in virtue of attributing features to O. This reading is consistent with Matthen’s account of the seabird. As a matter of fact, the story of the seabird shows what is wrong with M1. An explanation of how motion-guiding vision works non-descriptively requires that descriptive vision represent objects deictically. The story tells of a seabird who is diving for fish. Its motion-guiding vision system targets two good grip points on the chosen fish, enabling the bird to catch its prey with its beak (see Figure 2.6). In order to do this, descriptive vision must
66 dominic mciver lopes indicate for motion-guiding vision which points to target. Only once these points are indicated can motion-guiding vision take over and complete the task at hand. But how does descriptive vision indicate the points for motion-guiding vision? There are two options. One is that motion-guiding vision processes descriptive information and descriptive vision indicates the points by describing features of the fish. It ‘says’ something like this: ‘See the striped fish? Go for the spot just forward of the dorsal fin and the spot just below the gills’. (The point is the same if the vocabulary is restricted to shapes and colours.) The problem is that this kind of descriptive information is not available to motion-guiding vision. If it were, motion-guiding vision would yield size-contrast effects, and it does not yield these effects. The alternative is that descriptive vision speaks the language of motionguiding vision and represents the target points in that language. That is, it hands over to motion-guiding vision a set of coordinates in an egocentric spatial framework. It targets those spots: there and there, without using descriptive information about shapes and colours and other features whose representation yields size-contrast effects. So target assignment requires that descriptive vision represent objects deictically. (This is why it is crucial for present purposes to describe the two systems functionally rather than anatomically, as ‘dorsal’ and ‘ventral’ streams. It may be that the ventral stream does not process egocentric target information but descriptive vision integrates data from both streams so that it is deictic.) The claim that both systems represent objects deictically is consistent with the evidence that they are dissociable. What distinguishes the systems is not that one is deictic and the other is not. Rather, only one represents features in a way that makes it susceptible to size-contrast effects; and only one is responsible for precision grip. An optic atactic can describe one poker chip as ‘to my right’ and the other as ‘to my left’ but nevertheless have difficulty when told to pick up either one. In the Titchener illusion, descriptive vision underestimates the size of the solid angle subtended by the centre circle when surrounded by larger circles and overestimates the size of the solid angle subtended by the centre circle when surrounded by smaller circles. Motion-guiding vision does not make this error: it equips us with accurate, precision grip. Descriptive vision does not guide precision grip, but reduced accuracy does not imply a difference in spatial framework.
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Breaking the monopoly of motion-guiding vision over deixis also makes sense of seeing things in the distance. Motion-guiding vision does not stretch to distant objects. I have no precision grip for Crown Mountain, which I see across Burrard Inlet from my study window. Still, I can point to it (and very poorly gauge its distance) and I see it as lying to the left of Grouse Mountain. Nevertheless, descriptive vision places Crown Mountain in my action space—it primes me to set out in a certain direction to reach it or to point my binoculars in a certain direction to see it ‘up close’. So descriptive vision non-descriptively represents objects in an egocentric spatial framework: it is deictic. Replacing M1 with the claim that descriptive and motion-guiding vision are deictic breaks the argument for M6.
6. Deixis in Seeing-In If the argument for M6 fails, then a case can be made for DR, the thesis that seeing an object in a picture grounds demonstrative reference to the object. The case goes like this: (D1) Seeing O in P implicates descriptive vision. (D2) Descriptive vision represents objects deictically. (D3) So seeing O in P represents O deictically. Given DX, which takes perception to ground demonstrative reference by representing objects deictically, it follows that (D4) Seeing O in P grounds demonstrative reference to O. This reasoning vindicates DR, if it is sound. As long as it is given a weak reading, D1 follows from most theories of depiction. On a strong reading, seeing O in P involves some of the very same processes of descriptive vision as are engaged in seeing O face to face. According to recognition theories of depiction, if P depicts O then P engages the same visual processes as are involved in seeing O (Schier 1986; Lopes 1996). As a result, recognition theories endorse the strong reading of D1. Most other theories of depiction imply, at the least, a weaker reading of D1. For example, according to some theories, seeing O in P is explained as seeing a resemblance between O and P (Budd 1993; Hopkins 1998). Seeing a resemblance between O and P involves descriptive vision, for descriptive
68 dominic mciver lopes vision represents shapes, sizes, colours, and other such features of the visual scene, and it is also responsible for representing resemblances among these. So most leading contemporary theories of depiction imply D1, though perhaps not all do. An unclear case is Kendall Walton’s (1990) proposal that seeing O in P is explained by one’s imagining of one’s seeing P that it is a case of seeing O. This theory implies D1 only if imagining seeing involves descriptive vision. Only Goodman’s (1976) theory of depiction clearly fails to imply the weak reading of D1, though some have argued that it is consistent with it (Lopes 2000). In the circumstances, D1 looks like a safe bet. The more likely target is D2, the claim that descriptive vision represents objects deictically. The objection is not that D2 is out-and-out false, but rather that it must be qualified in a way that breaks the step to D3. After all, the account of the seabird shows only that descriptive vision sometimes represents objects deictically. In particular, it represents objects deictically when it must pass on information to motion-guiding vision. But seeing-in does not pass on information about depicta to motion-guiding vision, since seeing-in does not implicate motion-guiding vision. So maybe descriptive vision does not represent objects deictically when it is implicated in seeing them in pictures. If that is right, the step to D3 is invalid. This objection fits Matthen’s discussion of pictures. Perceivers normally ‘cross-index descriptive information with information in egocentric coordinates’ (Matthen 2005: 315), but this does not happen when they see scenes in pictures (trompe l’œil aside). He writes, Suppose you are looking at a picture of two men shaking hands. Where are they? As far as you can tell by seeing in the picture, the question has no answer. The space within the picture is connected, as any good three-dimensional space should be: since the two men are shaking hands, they are spatially connected to one another in quite determinate ways. But their spatial relations are visually represented in object-centred, not viewer-centred coordinates. (Matthen 2005: 315)
As this passage suggests, the space within the picture is not part of the picture viewer’s space. In Matthen’s slogan, the picture lacks a ‘here’ (Matthen 2005: 316). The account given in Section 2 of how vision represents objects explains what it is for depicted objects to be represented in a space within the
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picture—not as part of the space of the picture surface. Vision represents features as bound together. According to the location theory of binding, features are bound at locations; but this does not explain the phi phenomenon, in which vision binds features to (potentially) moving and changing objects. Matthen proposes that vision represents objects just in case it represents features at different places at different times as belonging to the same object. On either theory, vision represents depicted objects in a space which is not the space of the picture surface, because not all features are bound with features located at the picture surface. In particular, vision does not bind every surface shape, colour, and texture with a depicted shape, colour, or texture. A striking example is Picasso’s 1906 portrait of Fernande Olivier (Figure 2.8), where the vertical lines to the viewer’s upper left are not bound to the sitter’s facial features (they are not part of her ‘do’). Indeed, they have no depictive function. What about surface features that do have a depictive function? The famous landmark in Seurat’s painting of 1889 (Figure 2.9) is depicted by dots of paint, but as long as the viewer is close enough to discriminate the dots, vision does not bind them to the tower’s structure. Just as the Picasso evokes an experience like seeing a woman through a scratched glass, the Seurat evokes an experience like seeing an object through a pattern glass window. So depicted features need not be bound to the surface features in virtue of which they are represented. In these examples, features of the picture surface are bound together and features of the depicted object are bound together; and some features of one are bound to features of the other—but not all. Assuming that vision represents distinct objects just in case it binds features at different places at a given time, it follows that vision represents depicted objects in a space distinct from that of the picture surface. It does not follow just from this that vision represents depicted space in a non-egocentric—allocentric or object-oriented—framework. Independent evidence is needed, and the picture of the two men shaking hands does seem to indicate that depicta are not represented egocentrically. Might another example indicate the contrary? The following example takes advantage of the full account of object perception as the representation of features bound as objects moving through space and time. After all, the phi phenomenon gives us the motion in motion pictures.
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Figure 2.8. Pablo Picasso, Portrait of Fernande Olivier (1906)
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Figure 2.9. Georges Seurat, Eiffel Tower (1889)
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72 dominic mciver lopes Table 2.1. Three Shots of a Rolling Ball
Static Shot Pan with the Ball Dolly with the Ball
Distance
Direction
Constant Changes Constant
Changes Constant Constant
Figure 2.10. Three shots of a rolling ball. Left: Static Shot; middle: Pan with the Ball; right: Dolly with the Ball
Suppose that you are directing Rolling Ball, a movie whose script reads simply: ‘A ball rolls across the grass’. Here are three shots for you to choose from. A very low-budget version is Static Shot. You mount the camera on a tripod, run the film, and kick the ball across a playing field. With a bigger budget you can choose Pan with the Ball. You hire an assistant to kick the ball and you pan the camera to keep the ball in the centre of its viewfinder. The high-budget version is Dolly with the Ball. You mount the camera on a dolly and track down the playing field alongside the ball. All three movies depict the ball as moving relative to the playing field, but they show it in ways that look quite different (see Table 2.1). In Static Shot, the ball travels across the screen, from one side to the other. In Pan with the Ball, the ball stays at centre screen but starts out far, comes in close, and rolls out far again. In Dolly with the Ball, the ball stays at a constant distance and direction in the field of view. The difference between these three shots can be represented either egocentrically or allocentrically. Egocentric and allocentric representations of the same scene may carry the very same information, though they carry it in different ways, or as Matthen (2005: 313) puts it, in different ‘forms’. The three drawings in Figure 2.10 represent the trajectory of the ball relative to the camera in the three versions of Rolling Ball allocentrically, yet each carries the same information as its movie counterpart about the apparent distance and direction of the ball from the camera. Indeed, the same is true
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of Table 2.1! The question is whether the three movie versions represent the distance and direction of the ball from the camera in allocentric or egocentric form. The objection that D2 should not apply to seeing in pictures hinges on an answer to this question.
7. Varieties of Central Representation The question calls for a closer look at deixis, and especially egocentric representation, but also at the idea that vision sometimes represents objects egocentrically without relying on intermediary descriptive information. A compelling account of the three versions of Rolling Ball is that they differ in how they represent the ball as seen from a point of view. Static Shot looks as the scene would look if you saw it without moving. Pan with the Ball looks as the scene would look if you saw it by turning your head. Dolly with the Ball looks as the scene would look if you saw it while running alongside it. None of them look like the three drawings in Figure 2.10—not because the drawings are so sketchy, but rather because they do not represent the ball as seen from the same point of view as their cinematic counterparts. What point of view is that? The point of view of the camera is not the same as the point of view of the movie’s spectator. By extension, the representation of the ball as seen from the camera’s point of view is not the same as the representation of the ball as seen from the point of view of a spectator watching the movie in the cinema. To make this distinction a little more precise, it helps to see that both kinds of representation are species of the same genus. Call this genus ‘central representation’. Central representation is perspectival representation. It represents objects in a scene from a viewpoint, an origin, or a ‘here’, as Matthen puts it; and it represents them as lying in various directions and at various distances from that viewpoint. Normal vision is central in this way. It represents objects in your environment from a viewpoint (your location), as lying in various directions and at various distances from that viewpoint. Likewise, Rolling Ball represents the ball from a viewpoint (the camera’s location), as lying in various directions and at various distances from that viewpoint. The difference
74 dominic mciver lopes between these varieties of central representation has to do with their viewpoints. In ordinary vision, the viewpoint is the perceiver’s location. In Rolling Ball, it is the camera’s location—that viewpoint is the ‘here’ of the movie. Matthen (2005: 302) restricts egocentric representation to the former, which is ‘relative to a perceiver’s own body’. Call the latter species of central representation ‘cameracentric representation’. Egocentric and cameracentric representation are distinct varieties of central representation. The complement of central representation is allocentric representation, which represents objects in relation to each other, but not from a viewpoint. Neither egocentric nor cameracentric representations are allocentric. These distinctions might seem to show why the intuitive account of Rolling Ball lends no support to applying D2 to seeing in pictures. The intuitive account only shows that Rolling Ball represents the ball’s movement cameracentrically. So the movie does not represent the ball’s movement egocentrically—that is, it does not represent the ball’s movement in relation to the movie’s spectator. Since deictic representation is egocentric, seeing the ball in the movie is not deictic. One strategy in reply to this argument denies the assumption that deictic representation is egocentric and asserts instead that it is central. However, it is better to grant the assumption and focus instead on a reply that picks up on features of depiction. The claim that deixis requires only central representation does not vindicate the application of D2 to seeing-in unless seeing-in represents objects centrally without the benefit of intermediary descriptive information. Since the viewpoint of the camera is not the same as the viewpoint of the spectator in the cinema, the worry is that we see objects in pictures centrally only with the aid of intermediary information about the location of depicta in relation to the camera. An idea borrowed from John Campbell (2002) helps to express the worry. Here is Rob’s Story: ‘Rob stood facing the summit, a path winding up the ridge to his right. He took a deep breath and then turned up the path.’ This story represents Rob’s environment centrally. If asked where the summit is at the end of the story, you can easily figure out that it is to Rob’s left. Maybe you use a bit of reasoning: the summit is ahead of Rob, if x is ahead of y and y turns right, then x is to the left of y, and Rob turns right, so the summit is to the left of Rob. Whether or
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not you actually reason like this, you do use concepts like ‘to the left’ that are the same as the concepts used in this reasoning. Campbell calls them relational. The concept ‘to the left’ is a concept of a relation with (at least) two places, one of them occupied by Rob (the relation could be represented by ‘Lsr’). Such concepts contrast with what Campbell calls monadic concepts, which we deploy in experience. Rob sees the summit is ahead, then he sees the summit is to the left. This concept ‘to the left’ does not represent a relation with a place occupied by Rob (it is represented by ‘Ls’). The worry is that the viewer’s experience of seeing the ball in Rolling Ball represents the ball’s location centrally and also relationally. It represents the ball from the viewpoint of the camera (hence centrally), in such terms as ‘to the left of the camera’. In deictic representation, the locations of objects relative to the viewpoint are represented monadically. Deixis is immediate in the sense that it is monadic. It does not allow a place for intermediary descriptive information about the locations of viewpoints to come in to represent the locations of objects relative to those viewpoints. We now know what to look for in a case for stretching D2 to seeing in pictures. Grant that deictic representation is egocentric. Also grant that the intuitive account is correct and Rolling Ball represents its protagonist’s movement cameracentrically. An additional assumption is needed for the inference that seeing the ball in the movie is not deictic—namely, that the movie does not represent the ball egocentrically if it represents the ball cameracentrically. Why not allow that there are hybrid species of central representation, that the movies represents the ball cameracentrically and egocentrically? Put another way, why not monadically as well as relationally? Viewpoints individuate central representations. Two central representations may represent the very same objects and yet they are distinct if they represent those objects from different viewpoints—that is, if they represent the objects as lying in different directions from their viewpoints. Thus, the viewpoint is implicit in the directions the object is represented as lying in. Call the spatial content of a central representation that determines its viewpoint its viewpoint-determining content. Central representations of the same objects from different viewpoints must differ in their viewpoint-determining content.
76 dominic mciver lopes What Rolling Ball represents cameracentrically differs from what your egocentric experience of the depicted scene represents in so far as the viewpoint-determining content of the movie does not match that of your visual experience. However, there is a rich and systematic overlap in the two viewpoint-determining contents—that is, between the represented directions from the camera to depicted objects and directions the objects appear to lie in from the picture viewer in normal viewing conditions. The ball is represented as to the cameracentric right of the tree just in case the ball looks to you to be to the right of the tree, and the ball is represented as moving to the upper left relative to the camera just in case it looks to you to be moving to the upper left. Relative distance also determines viewpoint, and there is an overlap in the representation of relative distances. The ball is represented as closer than the goal-post to the camera just in case it looks to you to be closer than the goal-post. The overlap is not complete. If you view the movie from the far right side of the theatre, then a cameracentric direction to the ball—say, two o’clock—will not match the egocentric direction to the ball—say, eleven o’clock. When you view Rolling Ball from straight ahead, there will often be some discrepancy in visual angles subtended by objects, so that, for example, an object that is represented as subtending a visual angle of twenty degrees cameracentrically may seem to subtend a visual angle of fifteen degrees egocentrically. So the viewpoint-determining contents of the movie and the experience of seeing in the movie do not match precisely (except when the viewer occupies exactly the right spot). The claim is merely that the viewpoint-determining contents do overlap. Pictures exploit this systematic overlap in viewpoints to facilitate what Campbell calls ‘deep decentering’ (in a discussion of memory demonstratives). In deep decentring, a central relational representation is transformed into a central monadic representation. Suppose that Pan with the Ball represents the ball as moving to the right of the camera. Your experience of seeing the ball in the shot also represents it as moving to the right. This content could be relational (Rbc) or it could be monadic (Rb). We need not use relational concepts to represent the ball’s motion: we need not represent the ball as moving to the right from the viewpoint of the camera. We simply see it as moving to the right. Contrast this case with an avant-garde version of Rolling Ball —call it Sideways—where the camera is rolled ninety degrees, so that viewers see
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the ball moving from the top to the bottom of the screen. Sideways subverts the systematic overlap between cameracentric and egocentric viewpoints. Either an effort of imagination is needed to decentre into the cameracentric viewpoint or else we think of the ball as moving right relative to the camera, and not, as it appears, moving downwards relative to us. Putting the point another way, there’s a difference between our experiences of seeing the ball in Static Shot, Pan with the Ball, and Dolly with the Ball, on one hand, and Sideways, on the other hand. All four are cameracentric. The difference is that in only the first three is there a rich and systematic overlap between egocentric and cameracentric directions, which facilitates decentring and hence a monadic representation of the location of objects in space. The experience of seeing in a picture represents objects egocentrically and monadically, so it represents them deictically.
8. Seeing and Seeing-In The claim that seeing objects in pictures is deictic does not imply that seeing-in is just the same as seeing O face to face. Some differences are worth noting. First, the fact that seeing-in exploits overlaps in central spatial content between cameracentric and egocentric representations does not imply that vision represents the picture and the depicted scene in the very same space. Vision does not represent Aunt Jane as in your living room when the photograph of her is in your living room. In part this is because the overlap between egocentric experience and cameracentric representation is not normally complete. Even when the overlap is complete (when you occupy the right spot in front of the picture), the spaces are not identical if the depicted space is not represented by motionguiding vision. Only in trompe l’œil does motion-guiding vision represent depicted space, but trompe l’œil spaces are experienced as part of ecological space. In addition, seeing O in P involves seeing P, and one sees O in P by seeing P. Seeing O in P is seeing indirectly. However, indirect seeing is not obviously incompatible with deixis. According to Paul Snowdon (1992: 56), for example, S directly perceives O just in case S stands, in
78 dominic mciver lopes virtue of S’s perceptual experience, in such a relation to O that S can make the true, non-dependent demonstrative judgement ‘That is O’. Yet Snowdon describes your contact with Aunt Jane as ‘fairly indirect’. It follows that your exclamation ‘That’s Aunt Jane’ involves a dependent rather than a non-dependent demonstrative reference (Snowdon 1992: 59). This does not mean that as you look at the picture you must think ‘That is a photo of Aunt Jane’. On the contrary, you might lose all awareness of the photograph. But unless you would acknowledge under questioning the truth of ‘That is a photo of Aunt Jane’, then you are mistaking the photo for your aunt. Vision grounds a dependent demonstrative reference to O just in case you can count as demonstratively referring to O only if you are prepared to acknowledge under questioning that O bears a certain relation to P. By this definition, seeing-in grounds dependent demonstrative reference (except in trompe l’œil). Whereas direct perception grounds non-dependent demonstrative reference, seeing-in is indirect and grounds dependent demonstrative reference. Defending Snowdon’s analysis of direct perception is a task for another occasion, but it does illustrate one way to capture an obvious difference between seeing-in and seeing face to face. And it makes no concession to views like those of Evans and Berm´udez. They hold that your exclamation does not involve a pure demonstrative reference to Aunt Jane—descriptive elements are mixed in. Snowdon’s dependent demonstrative judgements are pure: your being prepared to acknowledge under questioning that you are looking at a photo of Aunt Jane is not part of the meaning of your exclamation. Before wrapping up, it should be noted that nothing has been said against the arguments of Evans and Berm´udez. They must be assessed against what we know about how vision works. Matthen’s Seeing, Doing, and Knowing begins with vision science. If we begin with Evans and Berm´udez, we will end up reading Matthen; and if we begin with Matthen, then a good next step might be to look at the arguments of Evans and Berm´udez. Assuming that deictic visual representation grounds at least some cases of demonstrative reference, a case can be made that seeing O in P grounds demonstrative reference to O. Given that you see Aunt Jane in the photograph, your so seeing her grounds the demonstrative reference in your exclamation. Therefore, what you say is true.
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References Aglioti, Salvatore, Joseph F. X. DeSousa, and Melvyn A. Goodale (1995), ‘SizeContrast Illusions Deceive the Eye But Not the Hand’, Current Biology, 5/5: 679–85. Bermu´ dez, Jos´e Luis (2000), ‘Naturalized Sense Data’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61/2: 353–74. Blaser, Erik, Zenon Pylyshyn, and Alex Holcombe (2000), ‘Tracking an Object Through Feature Space’, Nature, 408/6809: 196–9. Budd, Malcolm (1993), ‘How Pictures Look’, in Dudley Knowles and John Skorupski (eds), Virtue and Taste (Oxford: Blackwell). Campbell, John (2002), Reference and Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Clark, Austen (2000), A Theory of Sentience (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Davies, Martin (1997), ‘Externalism and Experience’, in Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and Güven Güzeldere (eds), The Nature of Consciousness (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press). Ellis, Robert R., J. Randall Flanagan, and Susan J. Lederman (1999), ‘The Influence of Visual Illusions on Grasp Position’, Experimental Brain Research, 125/22: 109–14. Evans, Gareth (1982), The Varieties of Reference (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Gombrich, E. H. (1961), Art and Illusion (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Goodman, Nelson (1976), Languages of Art, 2nd edn (Indianapolis: Hackett). Hopkins, Robert (1998), Picture, Image, and Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Lopes, Dominic McIver (1996), Understanding Pictures (Oxford: Oxford University Press). (2000), ‘From Languages of Art to Art in Mind’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 58/3: 227–31. (2005), Sight and Sensibility: Evaluating Pictures (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Lowe, E. J. (1993), ‘Self, Reference, and Self-Reference’, Philosophy, 68/263: 15–33. McGinn, Colin (1981), ‘The Mechanism of Reference’, Synthese, 49/2: 156–86. Matthen, Mohan (2005), Seeing, Doing, and Knowing (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Milner, David A., and Melvyn A. Goodale (1995), The Visual Brain in Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
80 dominic mciver lopes Quine, W. V. O. (1968), ‘Ontological Relativity’, Journal of Philosophy, 65/7: 185–212. Reimer, Marga (1991), ‘Demonstratives, Demonstrations, Demonstrata’, Philosophical Studies, 63/2: 187–202. Schier, Flint (1986), Deeper into Pictures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Siegel, Susanna (2002), ‘The Role of Perception in Demonstrative Reference’, Philosophers’ Imprint, 2/1: 1–21. Snowdon, Paul (1992), ‘How to Interpret ‘‘Direct Perception’’ ’, in Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Strawson, P. F. (1959), Individuals (London: Methuen). Voltolini, Alberto (2009), ‘How Demonstrative Pictorial Reference Grounds Contextualism’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 90/4: 402–18. Walton, Kendall (1990), Mimesis as Make-Believe (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). Weiskrantz, Lawrence (1997), Consciousness Lost and Found: A Neuropsychological Exploration (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
3 The Epistemic Value of Photographs CATHARINE ABELL
Photographs play epistemic roles that most other pictures cannot. Firstly, they can provide compelling evidence that the things they depict existed at the time they were taken. We might doubt that the unfamiliar animals drawn by zoologists of the past ever existed, but be convinced by photographs of Tasmanian tigers that this now extinct marsupial once populated its namesake state. Likewise, a photograph of a politician lunching with a known criminal may convince us of her corruption, when a drawing of the same scene would not. Secondly, photographs play a unique investigative role, enabling us to identify features of their objects that are easily overlooked. Police detectives consult photographs, rather than paintings, of crime scenes, looking for clues that will help them solve cases. Similarly, consumers pore over photographs of potential purchases on eBay, looking for flaws that a hand-drawn picture would not reveal, whether unintentionally or through deliberate omission. This does not mean that all photographs are alike in respect of epistemic value. While many photographs are suited to the epistemic roles described above, others—for example, those that are badly focused—are not. Token photographs may lack the epistemic significance that photographs generally possess, and token non-photographic pictures might have such epistemic
Thanks to Katerina Bantinaki and to the audience at Mimesis, Metaphysics, and Make-Believe, a conference in honour of Kendall Walton, University of Leeds, 2007, particularly my commentator, Aaron Meskin, for helpful feedback on earlier versions of this chapter.
82 catharine abell significance, although non-photographic pictures generally do not. For example, a painting by Vermeer may better enable us to identify readily overlooked features of the scene it depicts than would a photograph of that scene. Photographs have a distinctive epistemic value because the epistemic properties they generally possess differ from those that non-photographic pictures generally possess. The contrast between the epistemic properties of photographic and non-photographic pictures obtains between photographs, considered in general, and non-photographic pictures, considered in general. Nor does it follow that photographs generally have greater epistemic value than non-photographic pictures generally do. Their epistemic significance simply differs. Non-photographic pictures can play epistemic roles that photographs generally cannot. For example, botanical drawings may make salient features of plants that would not be prominent in photographs of them, but information about which is of particular epistemic value to us. The scope of non-photographic pictures also lends them an epistemic significance that photographs do not have. Whereas photographs can depict only particulars, non-photographic pictures can depict, in addition, objects of a certain type that are not existent particulars of the type at issue. Unlike photographs, they can thus be used to depict the prototypical features of a type in isolation from the accidental features of particular instances of that type. What nonphotographic pictures can teach us may be just as valuable as what photographs can teach us, but each teaches in virtue of different epistemic capacities. My aim, in this chapter, is to explain why photographs are generally able to play the epistemic roles described above, and why non-photographic pictures generally are not. This requires accounts, first, of the difference between the two sorts of picture and, second, of the form of epistemic value (let us call it EV) that a picture must have in order to play those roles. These I offer, respectively, in Sections 1 and 2. In Section 3, I examine three proposed explanations of why photographs generally have EV and non-photographic pictures generally lack it, and argue that none is adequate. In Section 4, I explain why nonphotographic pictures typically have little EV. In Section 5, I explain why the EV of photographs typically exceeds that of non-photographic pictures.
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1. Photographic versus Non-Photographic Pictures For the purposes of this chapter, we can understand a picture as something that depicts. Depiction is a distinctive form of representation, characteristic of figurative paintings, drawings, and photographs. Some philosophers claim that pictures depict their objects in virtue of looking like, or visibly resembling, them (Hopkins 1998). Others deny that depiction can be explained in terms of resemblance (Kulvicki 2006; Lopes 1996). Nevertheless, none denies that pictures generally seem, to those viewers who successfully interpret them, to resemble the things they depict (Kulvicki 2006: 81; Lopes 1996: 4). Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide an account of depiction,¹ we can therefore understand a picture’s depictive content as that content a grasp of which is generally accompanied by the visual perception of apparent resemblances. In specifying a picture’s depictive content, we must be careful to distinguish between its internal and its external object. Its internal object is what it depicts, whereas its external object, if it has one, is the independently existing object whose properties are causally responsible for the picture’s surface being marked in the way it is. A black and white photograph of you has a person of indeterminate colour as its internal object, but a person of perfectly determinate colour as its external object. What distinguishes photographic and non-photographic pictures is not the form of representation each employs, but the way in which each is produced. Photographs are produced by largely mechanical means, whereas non-photographic pictures are not. Moreover, photographic mechanisms operate such that all photographs have external objects, and the design features of any photograph (those features in virtue of which it depicts its object) depend causally on the features of its external object, such that the former depend counterfactually on the latter. When I photograph a mountain, for example, the mountain causes my photograph to have the design features it does, such that, had the mountain been different, my photograph would likewise have differed. By contrast, not all nonphotographic pictures have external objects (there need be no existent particular which they depict) and, while the features of some of those that ¹ I provide such an account in Abell (2009).
84 catharine abell do are counterfactually dependent on features of their external objects, not all are. I might seek to draw a mountain accurately such that the features of the drawing I produce depend counterfactually on those of the mountain. However, faced with the same mountain, I might instead employ a schema or formula for the depiction of a mountain, in which case the features of my drawing need not depend counterfactually on those of the mountain. One might likewise sever the counterfactual dependence of a photograph’s features on features of its external object—by over-painting it, for example. However, this would render the photographic mechanism redundant. Consequently, the resultant picture would not be genuinely photographic. Photographers’ intentions play a significant role in determining what their photographs depict. Their intentions determine where they point their cameras, what kind of cameras they choose, and how they set their variable parameters. They can also affect depictive content after the photographic mechanism has been employed. By using the darkroom technique of dodging and burning, for example, photographers can realize their intention to represent certain aspects of the photographed scene as darker, and others as lighter, than they would otherwise have been depicted. Likewise, by cropping, they can select which aspects of the photographed scene are depicted.² However, photographers’ intentions can sever the counterfactual dependence of features of the photograph on features of its external object only by overriding the effect of the photographic mechanism, and producing a picture that is not purely photographic.
2. An Account of EV What features enable a picture both to provide compelling evidence that an object existed and had certain properties at the time the picture was produced, and to reveal features of an object that are easily overlooked? We need a clear grasp of EV, the form of epistemic value that enables a picture to play these roles, before attempting to explain why photographs and non-photographic pictures play different epistemic roles. ² This understanding of what it is to be a photograph is thus broader than Scruton’s notion of the ideal photograph (Scruton 1983).
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A picture provides compelling evidence of an object’s existence, and of its possessing certain features, only if it is produced by a reliable process. That is, the process linking picture and object must be such that we are likely to form true beliefs about objects on the basis of pictures produced by that process. This requires two things. Firstly, the pictures produced by this process must be likely to carry information about their external objects. Secondly, they must be likely to do so in depictive form. For the purposes of this chapter, we can understand information carrying, with Jonathan Cohen and Aaron Meskin, as a counterfactual relationship between independent variables, such that x’s being F carries information about y’s being G if and only if the counterfactual conditional (if y were not G, then x would not have been F) is true (Cohen and Meskin 2006: 3). A picture’s having a certain feature carries the information that an object has a certain property if and only if, had the object not had that property, the picture would have lacked that feature. Things may carry information in virtue of a variety of different features. A tree trunk may carry information about the tree’s age in virtue of the number of rings in its bark. A history book may carry information about a war in virtue of the words written on its pages. A picture-production process is reliable only if the pictures it produces are likely to carry information about their external objects in depictive form. A picture carries the information that an object has a certain property in depictive form if it both carries that information and depicts the object as possessing that property. Pictures may carry information about objects without doing so in depictive form. For example, a photographic negative may carry the information that an object had a certain colour because, had the object’s colour differed, the colours of the negative would also have differed. Nevertheless, the negative does not depict the object as having the colour it had: adequate knowledge of the photographic process involved may enable one to work out, from the negative’s colour, what colour its external object was, but doing so does not make the negative appear to resemble that object in respect of colour. It is difficult to work out, from a colour negative, the colour of the object about which it carries information. By contrast, it is easy to discern such information from a picture which carries it in depictive form. The information pictures carry in depictive form is easier to grasp than that which they carry in other forms. Consequently, we are more likely to form
86 catharine abell true beliefs about objects on the basis of the former information than the latter. It is an interesting question why this is so. One possible explanation is that the interpretation of depictive content engages our visual recognitional abilities (Lopes 1996; Schier 1986), and thus inherits the reliability of our perceptual processes. Nevertheless, detailed discussion of this issue must await another occasion. The upshot of these two conditions is that a process will be more reliable the more likely it is to produce pictures whose depictive content is accurate: whose internal objects have only features possessed by their external objects. Consequently, it is tempting to analyse the reliability of a picture-production process as the probability, given any picture produced by that process, that its object was as it is depicted as being at the time it was produced. However, doubts that there is any non-epistemic account of probability able to accommodate probabilities of inverse conditional properties make this approach seem unpromising (Cohen and Meskin 2006: 4). Fortunately, an alternative, modal analysis is possible. If a picture depictively encodes information about its object, then, according to David Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals (Lewis 1973), its depictive content will differ in the closest possible world in which its object differs. The likelihood that a process will produce pictures that depictively encode information about their external objects can be construed in terms of the distance between worlds in which the depictive content of pictures produced by that process is accurate, and worlds in which it is not.³ Accordingly: A given picture-production process⁴ is more reliable the greater the distance, for any non-actual picture produced by that process, between the nearest possible world to the actual world in which the picture exists and its external object was as it is depicted as being at the time the picture was produced and the closest possible world to that world in which the picture exists and its external object was not as it is depicted as being at the time the picture was produced. This construal of reliability assumes that the actual world is closer to the former than to the latter world.⁵ ³ In what follows, I construe the likelihood of this outcome in the way specified, not as synonymous for its probability. ⁴ The level of generality at which any picture-production process is to be individuated depends on how it is conceived by those who designed it (where it is mechanized), or those who use it (where it is not). ⁵ As Cohen and Meskin point out, Lewis construes distance relations between worlds as interestdependent, which would make counterfactuals depend tacitly on the doxastic (Cohen and Meskin
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We cannot understand EV solely in terms of the reliability of pictureproduction processes. Even if it is the result of a reliable process, a picture will not reveal features of an object that are easily overlooked unless it carries a reasonable amount of information about that object. To play such a role, a picture must also be rich, where richness is a measure of the amount of depictively encoded information a picture carries. The more such information it carries, the richer it is. How much information a picture carries is a measure of the number of features of its external object about which it carries information in depictive form. How finely the features of its object can be individuated is determined by the relations of counterfactual dependence that obtain between picture and object. If a difference in the shape of a single hair on a woman’s head would result in a corresponding difference in the shape a portrait of that woman depicts the hair as having, the shape of the hair counts as a feature of the woman about which the picture depictively encodes information. However, if she would have to have lacked hair altogether in order for the portrait to depict her hair differently, her having hair counts as a feature about which the picture depictively encodes information, but neither the shape nor the existence of the individual hair counts as such. A picture may be richer—and the process by which it is made more reliable—regarding some types of features than others. For example, black and white photographic processes may be very likely to produce pictures that depictively encode information about the shape properties of their external objects, and may produce pictures that carry a lot of information about such properties, but are generally both unlikely to produce pictures that depictively encode information about the colour properties of their external objects, and incapable of producing pictures that carry much information about colour properties. We can understand a process’s reliability relative to features of a certain type as follows: A given picture-production process is more reliable, relative to features of type F, the greater the distance, for any non-actual picture produced by that process which depicts F features, between the nearest possible 2006: 10). However, like Cohen and Meskin, I take the distance relations between worlds to be mind-independent.
88 catharine abell world to the actual world in which the picture exists and its external object had the F features it is depicted as having at the time the picture was produced, and the closest possible world to that world in which the picture exists and its external object did not have the F features it is depicted as having at the time the picture was produced. Again, it is assumed that the actual world is closer to the former than to the latter world. A picture is richer, relative to features of type F, the more information about F features it carries. We thus need to distinguish between a picture’s EV simpliciter, and its EV relative to features of a certain type. A picture’s EV simpliciter is a measure of its richness and of the reliability of the process by which it was produced, while its EV relative to features of a certain type is a measure of its richness relative to features of that type and the reliability of its production process relative to features of that type. This account construes EV as independent of individual viewers’ particular interests and attributions. A picture could have a high EV simpliciter despite the information it conveys being less important to some viewers than the information conveyed by a picture with a lower EV simpliciter, and thus of less overall epistemic value to them. As I noted earlier, EV is not the only form of epistemic value a picture may have. Nevertheless, given that information about features of a certain type is important to viewers, one picture may have greater EV than another relative to features of the type at issue. I have not specified how richness and reliability combine to determine EV. Rather, I construe them as independent dimensions, each of which may contribute to EV in isolation from the other. This reflects the fact that different purposes impose differing demands for reliability and for richness. Someone consulting a picture to determine whether a galloping horse ever has all its hooves in the air simultaneously seeks reliability above richness. The detective who consults pictures of a crime scene looking for information that will enable her to solve the crime seeks both richness and reliability. A fashion stylist who consults pictures of the Paris catwalks looking for inspiration seeks richness over reliability. Individual viewers may make erroneous attributions of EV. A viewer who mistakenly takes a photorealist painting to have been produced by a photographic process will attribute to it greater EV than it possesses.
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Moreover, even when their attributions of EV are accurate, viewers will derive inappropriate beliefs from pictures if they misidentify their external objects on the basis of their internal objects. Suppose the photographs apparently showing the first moon landing were in fact taken in a Hollywood studio. While our beliefs about photographic processes may justify an attribution of high EV to such photographs, it would be wrong to construe them as providing good evidence that a moon landing occurred, since their external object is not a moon landing. Let us now consider three different explanations of the epistemic differences between photographic and non-photographic pictures. Their adequacy will depend on whether they explain it as a difference in EV.
3. Existing Explanations 3.1. Photographs as Transparent According to Kendall Walton, photographs are aids to vision, not mere representations (Walton 1984: 263). Just as we see a scene when we examine it through a telescope or regard its reflection in a mirror, so too, he claims, we literally see a scene when we look at a photograph of it. Photographs are transparent: we see through them to their objects. Like mirrors, they are transparent although their surfaces are visible when we see through them, and although they afford only indirect visual access to things. Unlike mirrors, photographs enable us to see spatially and temporally distant scenes. Seeing through photographs is a unique form of perception that enables us to see things that could not otherwise be seen. Contrarily, Walton argues, most non-photographic pictures are opaque: when we look at them, we see depictive representations, not the scenes they depict. He identifies three conditions that, he claims, are individually necessary for transparency. Firstly, to see one object through another, the object through which it is seen must be counterfactually dependent on the object seen through it. Secondly, this relation of counterfactual dependence must be belief-independent. Walton asks us to suppose that an explorer goes into the jungle and comes back with either photographs or sketches of a dinosaur. Both the photographs and the sketches may convince us that there is a dinosaur in the jungle. However, he argues, ‘The important difference is that, in the case of the sketches, we rely on the picture maker’s
90 catharine abell belief that there is a dinosaur in a way in which we don’t in the case of the photographs’ (Walton 1984: 263). If the explorer did not believe there were a dinosaur in the jungle, Walton thinks, his sketches wouldn’t depict a dinosaur, whereas his photographs would depict a dinosaur no matter what he believed. Finally, Walton claims, transparency requires the preservation of the real relations of similarity and dissimilarity between objects. Pears are similar to apples and dissimilar to bears. Visual experiences of pears reflect this fact: perceivers may mistake pears for apples, but not for bears. Both photographic and non-photographic pictures, and our visual experiences of them, likewise preserve the similarity relations among objects: we may mistake a picture of a pear for a picture of an apple, but would not mistake it for a picture of a bear. However, neither written descriptions nor our experiences of them preserve real similarity relations between the objects they represent. ‘Pear’ is more like ‘bear’ than ‘apple’, and this is reflected in the mistakes we are likely to make about a description’s content. Even though a mechanically generated description might exhibit belief-independent counterfactual dependence on its object, therefore, it is not transparent. Walton’s account suggests an explanation of photographs as having EV because photographic processes have the reliability of perceptual processes and the richness of perceptual experiences. However, while many visual experiences may be the rich products of reliable processes, not all are. The visual experiences of the myopic and the colour-blind are not. The transparency of photographs therefore does not ensure that they have EV, since photographic processes may be among those visual processes that are unreliable. To explain the EV of photographs, we need an explanation of why photographic processes typically count among reliable visual processes, and why photographs are akin to rich visual experiences.⁶ Walton suggests that photographic processes are reliable in virtue of ‘the fact that our photographic equipment and procedures happen to be standardised in certain respects’ (Walton 1984: 273). However, there are many respects in which photographic equipment and procedures are not standardized, but differ considerably. For example, while most ⁶ A general evaluation of Walton’s claim that photographs are transparent is beyond the scope of the present chapter, which is concerned solely with its epistemic implications. For criticisms of this claim, see Cohen and Meskin (2004), Currie (1991), and Dretske (1984).
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cameras utilize visible light, infra-red cameras do not, and both camera types may have either analog or digital mechanisms. Moreover, the mere standardization of such equipment and procedures would achieve only uniformity, not reliability. More needs to be said about the respects of standardization at issue and how they ensure reliability if this explanation is to succeed. One could relinquish the claim that photographs are transparent and simply insist that their epistemic value is explained by their meeting Walton’s three conditions. On his account, photographs differ from those non-photographic pictures that depend counterfactually on their objects only in their belief-independence. However, many non-photographic pictures are also belief-independent, but lack the EV of photographs. Picture makers may, and often do, depict objects by employing schemata, or formulae, for the depiction of objects of particular types. In such cases, which schema they employ depends on what they believe about the object they seek to depict. However, many picture makers instead depict objects by attending carefully to their visible features and allowing those features to guide the way in which they mark the picture surface. As Dominic Lopes notes, ‘In drawing, the eye and the hand work together, perhaps bypassing the mind, or rather that portion of the mind that deals in concepts and beliefs’ (Lopes 1996: 186). There is empirical evidence to support this claim, which suggests that the visual information that guides our motor actions may differ from that carried by conscious visual experience. For example, subjects presented with disks arranged to produce the Tichener or Ebbinghaus illusion have conscious visual experiences that misrepresent the relative sizes of the disks. They experience disks of the same size as differing in size, and disks of different sizes as being of the same size. Nevertheless, when subjects reach for those disks, the aperture produced between finger and thumb is perfectly suited to the actual sizes of the disks, rather than the sizes they are represented as having in subjects’ conscious visual experiences (Milner and Goodale 1995: 168).⁷ Since it is the information carried by conscious visual experience, rather than that used for visually based motor control, that is made available for conceptual mobilization, this evidence suggests that the ⁷ For philosophical discussion of these results, see Clark (2001) and Jacob and Jeannerod (2003). In their chapters in this volume, Lopes and Nanay discuss further the implications this experiment has for the philosophical understanding of depiction (see Lopes, Ch. 2, Sect. 3; Nanay, Ch. 7, Sect. 7).
92 catharine abell information that guides picture makers’ actions could indeed bypass their cognitive centres. Walton acknowledges that some non-photographic pictures, such as tracings and ‘doodles done automatically, while the doodler’s mind is on other things’, may be belief-independent (Walton 1984: 267). They too, he claims, are probably transparent. While some such pictures may have EV, however, not all do. An automatic doodle of a crime scene would lack the EV of a photograph of that scene. The belief-independence of photographs does not suffice to explain EV.⁸ 3.2. Photographs as Necessarily Accurate Robert Hopkins has argued that photographs are necessarily accurate (Hopkins 1998).⁹ For something to depict an object, he argues, it must not only have the right appearance, but also the appropriate history of production. This history comprises a standard of correctness, which determines whether something that appears to depict an object actually does so. Hopkins argues that the standard of correctness for non-photographic pictures is intentional. Something is a non-photographic picture of an object only if its maker intended it to represent that object. Even if it is visually indistinguishable from a picture of a lion, the blotch made by accidentally spilling a bottle of ink is not a picture, since it was not produced with the requisite intention. However, he claims, the standard of correctness that governs photographs cannot depend on photographers’ intentions, since photographs that are taken accidentally depict scenes that photographers did not intend them to depict. Instead, he argues, this standard depends on the intentions of those who design the mechanisms with which photographs are taken. Since camera designers cannot always control how these mechanisms are used, their intentions are, of necessity, quite general. Hopkins argues that ‘the relevant intention is better put thus. The camera’s designer intended that we see in the photographs whatever is causally responsible for those surfaces being marked as they are’ (Hopkins 1998: 72). In his view, therefore, the ⁸ One might think the real difference between photographic and non-photographic pictures lies in the latter’s dependence on, and the former’s independence from, their maker’s intentional states in general, not their beliefs in particular. However, as I will argue in Sect. 5, some photographs depend on developers’ visual states. ⁹ See also Scruton (1983) and Currie (1999: 288).
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standard of correctness for photographs comprises both an intentional and a causal element. The ink blotch is not a photograph, since it is not the product of a mechanism designed with the relevant intentions, and no lion is causally responsible for its appearance. Since it follows from his characterization of camera designers’ intentions that they intend the photographs produced with the mechanisms they design to depict their external objects accurately, Hopkins concludes that photographs necessarily depict their objects accurately (Hopkins 1998: 72–3). However, the nature of camera designers’ intentions is an empirical matter, not one that can be determined a priori. Like makers of nonphotographic pictures, camera designers may intend that the photographs produced with the mechanisms they design misrepresent their external objects. For example, the designer of a camera whose lens systematically distorts the shape of the things seen through it is best understood as intending that the photographs produced with his camera depict their external objects as having shapes that differ in various systematic ways from the shapes they actually possess. Moreover, even if camera designers’ intentions were as Hopkins claims, this would not ensure the accuracy of the photographs produced using their cameras, since development processes are beyond camera designers’ control. To the extent that techniques such as dodging and burning are available, which enable the depictive content of photographs to be altered during the development process, photographers can produce photographs that misrepresent their objects, irrespective of camera designers’ intentions. Photographs are no less able to misrepresent their objects than other pictures. There is a sense in which photographs are necessarily accurate, but the form of representation at issue is causal (indexical, in Peirce’s terminology), rather than depictive. Just as the number of rings in the trunk of a tree may accurately represent the tree’s age, in virtue of the causal relation between its age and the rings, so too photographs accurately represent the objects that caused them. When photographs depict their objects accurately, their depictive and causal contents coincide. However, the two kinds of content can come apart. Even if photographs were necessarily accurate qua pictures, Hopkins’s claims do not yield an adequate explanation of their epistemic significance. His claims would explain their reliability: there would be no possible world in which a photograph exists but its object was not as the photograph
94 catharine abell depicts it at the time the photograph was taken. However, they would not explain their richness. Badly focused photographs have relatively little EV, not because they are produced by unreliable processes, but because they are not rich. Despite their accuracy, a detective would clearly prefer to consult a properly focused photograph of a crime scene. 3.3. Photographs as Spatially Agnostic Informants Cohen and Meskin argue that photographs are epistemically valuable because they are spatially agnostic informants: they carry information about their objects’ visually accessible properties other than their egocentric spatial locations, without carrying information about their egocentric spatial locations (that is, about their objects’ spatial locations relative to oneself) (Cohen and Meskin 2004: 204). Contrarily, visual experiences can carry information about the former properties of their objects only if they also carry information about the latter. On Cohen and Meskin’s view, photographs are epistemically valuable because they can provide information about their objects’ visually accessible properties, in conditions in which information about those objects’ egocentric spatial location is unavailable (Cohen and Meskin 2004: 205). Many non-photographic pictures are also spatially agnostic informants. Cohen and Meskin construe the epistemic differences between photographs and such pictures as merely apparent, not real. Viewers take photographs, but not most other pictures, to be spatially agnostic informants, they argue, because the type photograph is salient to viewers and because they believe tokens of that type typically to be spatially agnostic informants, whereas this is not true of most non-photographic picture types. A picture type is salient if viewers typically categorize tokens of the type in question as belonging to that type (Cohen and Meskin 2004: 205). The type photograph is salient because viewers typically categorize token photographs as belonging to that type. Contrarily, the type accurate landscape drawing is not salient, as viewers will typically categorize tokens of that type as belonging, not to it, but to the more general type landscape drawing. Whereas viewers believe that tokens of the type photograph typically carry information about visually accessible properties, they do not believe the same of tokens of the type landscape drawing (Cohen and Meskin 2004: 205). Viewers do not take tokens of most non-photographic picture types to be spatially agnostic informants because the types at issue are either not salient to them, or
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they don’t believe that tokens of those types are typically spatially agnostic informants. There are two reasons why Cohen and Meskin’s account does not suffice to explain our attributions of epistemic value. Firstly, like the type photograph, the type photographic negative is salient. Moreover, while some viewers may not believe that photographic negatives typically carry information about visually accessible properties, others—those with insight into the nature of information—believe that they do. Nevertheless, such viewers will take the photographs produced from such negatives to differ from the negatives in respect of EV. A lawyer would not use negatives, in lieu of the photographs produced from them, to provide a jury with evidence about an object’s colour, even if she knew the members of the jury believed the negatives to carry information about the object’s colour, since it would be much more difficult for them to derive such information from the negatives than from the photographs. Cohen and Meskin’s account fails to accommodate the relevance of the form in which information is carried. Secondly, we may attribute different EV to pictures of two different, salient types, both of which we know to be spatially agnostic informants. For example, we attribute different epistemic value to court drawings than to photographs. If it were permissible to take photographs in the courtroom, most newspapers and television news programmes would show photographs instead of court drawings, precisely because of their distinctive epistemic properties. Like the type photograph, the type court drawing is salient to viewers. The distinctive content of such drawings, and the contexts in which they are usually presented—on television news programmes and in newspaper reports—mean that viewers typically categorize such pictures as belonging to the type court drawing rather than to some more general type. Moreover, viewers also usually believe that court drawings typically carry information about their objects’ visually accessible properties. We attribute different epistemic capacities to court drawings and photographs because we take the latter to be both richer and more reliable sources of information about their objects. Because Cohen and Meskin’s account does not mention the amount of information pictures carry about their objects’ visually accessible properties, it does not capture the epistemic significance of richness. Neither does it capture the epistemic significance of reliability: it appeals to our beliefs about the information different
96 catharine abell types of picture typically carry, but not our beliefs about the likelihood that pictures of the relevant types will carry information. It therefore fails to capture the epistemic differences between photographs and court drawings. None of the accounts considered here succeeds in explaining why photographic and non-photographic pictures differ—or appear to differ—with respect to EV. In the remaining sections, I propose an alternative explanation of this difference, which I construe as an actual difference in the EV pictures of the two types actually possess.
4. The EV of Non-Photographic Pictures Non-photographic picture-making processes typically lack the reliability required for their pictures to play the epistemic roles to which photographs are suited, because their makers’ intentions affect the relations they bear to their objects. Picture makers’ intentions are variable. Sometimes they intend to depict objects accurately, while, at others, they intend to misrepresent them. The fact that someone who uses any non-photographic process might have done so with the intention of misrepresenting an object severely limits the reliability of that process. Generally speaking, those nonphotographic pictures that are the product of intentions to misrepresent objects will misrepresent their external objects. However, it is not true that non-photographic pictures that are products of intentions accurately to represent objects will generally depict them accurately. Picture makers’ ability to realize their intentions is constrained both by the limitations to their technical abilities and by the reliability of their visual processes. Even in cases in which they intend to depict something accurately, the former constraint in particular significantly diminishes the likelihood that they will succeed in doing so. Picture makers’ intentions affect the reliability of some non-photographic processes more than others. The processes involved in court drawing are more reliable than many other non-photographic processes, for example. A variety of factors—professional norms, the threat of unemployment—make the likelihood that such processes are exploited for the purpose of misrepresenting objects much lower than the likelihood that many other non-photographic processes were used for such a purpose. However, the
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fact that their makers might have intended that they misrepresent their objects affects their reliability nonetheless. The possible world in which a picture produced by a non-photographic process depicts its external object accurately is therefore never very much closer to the actual world than one in which it misrepresents that object. Furthermore, even when non-photographic pictures do carry information about their external objects, the serial process by which they are made limits their richness. Picture makers cannot mark a picture surface so as to achieve simultaneous depictive encoding of information about the various different features of an object. Instead, they must encode information little by little. Consequently, the more information a picture maker seeks to encode depictively, the longer the picture-making process takes. This places practical limits on how much information picture makers can encode in depictive form. Moreover, many of the scenes picture makers seek to depict change during the time taken to produce rich non-photographic pictures of them. This further limits how much depictively encoded information most non-photographic pictures can carry. Some picture makers (Vermeer, for example) possess the tenacity required to pursue richness despite the time required to achieve it. Nevertheless, it is no accident that many of those non-photographic pictures that rival photographs in richness are still lifes or are copied from photographs.
5. The EV of Photographs Most photographic processes are parallel, rather than serial: they enable the simultaneous depictive encoding of information about the various different features of objects. Most cameras simultaneously record light reflected from the various different parts of the scene photographed. While some photographic processes are serial—such as those involved in astronomical photography—this does not affect the richness of the resultant photographs, in so far as the things they are used to photograph remain unchanged during the time taken to photograph them. Moreover, the automation of such serial photographic processes means that there are fewer practical limitations on their employment than on that of serial non-photographic picture-production processes, which require their makers’ participation throughout.
98 catharine abell Photographs are therefore generally immune to the factors that limit the richness of non-photographic pictures. However, this alone does not explain why they are typically richer than the latter. Poorly focused photographs may be the result of parallel processes, but are less rich than many non-photographic pictures. Photographic richness is a technological achievement. The richness of the photographs that could be produced using early cameras was no greater than that of many paintings. Later cameras could be used to produce much richer photographs, and the advent of colour film further enhanced their capacity for richness, by enabling photographs to encode information depictively about more kinds of features of their objects. Contemporary colour film has enhanced the capacity for photographic richness further still, by enabling photographs to encode more information depictively about the colours of their objects. The fact that a photograph was produced using photographic technology that enables a high degree of richness is no guarantee that it is rich. There are certain conditions that need to be met in order for such technology to yield rich photographs. For example, many cameras will produce them only if there is a certain level of ambient light in the photographed scene, or if the film is exposed for a suitable length of time. Nevertheless, photographs are typically considerably richer than non-photographic pictures because most photographs are produced using photographic technology that ensures a high degree of richness under the conditions in which they are taken. The reason why both photographic technology has developed in the direction of increasing richness and the conditions required for richness are usually met is precisely that, in general, we value richness. We may not value it enough to pursue it at the expense of the other activities we could pursue in the time required to produce a rich non-photographic picture, but we value it enough to want it when the time required to achieve it does not prohibit us from pursuing other activities we value. The reliability of photographic processes results from the standardization, not of the processes themselves, but of the functions they perform. This standardization is enabled by the fact that photographic processes are largely mechanical. Although there is a variety of different photographic mechanisms, both analog and digital, the mechanisms involved in the production of most photographs are alike in respect of the outputs they produce, given certain inputs. In particular, given a certain scene, most such
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mechanisms will yield an accurate depictive representation of that scene. This is a purely contingent fact about photographic mechanisms. Contra Hopkins, camera designers might have intended that the photographs produced with the mechanisms they designed misrepresent their external objects, and thus have designed mechanisms that function to produce inaccurate pictures. The reason why they did not—in the most part, at least—may be that they designed them for consumers who, they assumed, generally value depictive accuracy over inaccuracy. There are two respects in which this standardization is incomplete. Firstly, it is incomplete to the extent that photographic mechanisms do not function to produce accurate photographs. As we have seen, some photographic mechanisms, such as those that incorporate distorting lenses, do not produce accurate photographs. Moreover, many mechanized processes are reliable relative to most, but not all, feature types. For example, many produce photographs that, while otherwise accurate, misrepresent the determinate colours of the scenes they depict. Even those mechanisms that generally produce photographs that are accurate in all respects may have the potential to produce photographs that misrepresent the scenes they depict. This may be because, while the mechanisms at issue produce accurate photographs given most inputs, there are some inputs—for example, scenes of very low absolute illumination—given which they produce inaccurate photographs. Secondly, it is incomplete to the extent that photographic processes are not mechanized. Whereas photographs taken with instamatic cameras and developed in commercial labs are produced by wholly mechanized processes, others are not. To the extent that photographic processes are not mechanized, their outcome is subject to the influence of the same factors as affect the reliability of non-photographic processes. For example, non-mechanized development procedures may depend, not just on photographers’ intentions, but also on their visual states. Photographers sometimes include colour charts in the scenes they photograph so that, when they come to develop their photographs, they can check the colours the photographs depict the charts as having against the colours of such a chart (Snyder and Allen 1975: 162). This process will only ensure colour accuracy if photographers both intend to depict objects’ colours accurately, and they are not colour-blind. Photographic processes are reliable only to the extent that they function to produce accurate pictures. The easier it is to produce an inaccurate
100 catharine abell photograph using a given photographic process, the smaller the distance will be between the nearest possible world in which a picture produced by that process depicts its object accurately and the nearest possible world in which it depicts it inaccurately (assuming the latter world to be further from the actual world), and the less reliable that process will be. Nevertheless, the extent to which photographic processes standardly function to produce accurate pictures makes them considerably more reliable than non-photographic processes. The great majority of photographic mechanisms either function to produce such pictures, or do so under most conditions, or function to produce photographs that are accurate in most respects. Moreover, although the processes by which many photographs are produced are not wholly mechanized, and although photographers’ intentions need be no less variable than those of other picture makers, two factors make it considerably harder for photographers to realize their intentions to misrepresent objects than for the makers of non-photographic pictures to do so. Firstly, unlike the latter, they can affect depictive content only if they preserve the counterfactual dependence of features of photographs on features of their external objects. This makes them dependent on the existence of techniques such as dodging and burning, or the use of colour filters, that enable them to influence the causal relation between picture and object without breaking it. Secondly, the extent to which photographic processes are governed by standardly functioning mechanisms significantly restricts the range of available techniques, and thus the capacity for photographic misrepresentation. For example, the use of distorting lenses is one of few techniques that enable the photographic misrepresentation of shape. However, the fact that the process of recording light reflected from scenes photographed is largely governed by standardly functioning mechanisms means that this technique is not readily available to photographers. What of photographic manipulation? There has been a dramatic rise, in recent years, in the frequency with which photographs are intentionally manipulated to misrepresent the scenes they depict. This is a direct result of the increasing prominence of digital photographic equipment; the greater accessibility of the computer technology required to manipulate digital photographs; and the spread of the skills required to use this technology. Digital photographic processes, it seems, can readily be exploited to produce photographs that misrepresent their objects.
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However, it is important to distinguish two forms of digital manipulation. The development of techniques which enable the systematic alteration of the shape or colour a digital photograph depicts its object as having, while preserving the counterfactual dependence of features of the photograph on features of its external object, has made photographic misrepresentation much easier than it previously was, and thus reduced the reliability of digital photographic processes and the EV of the photographs produced by them. By contrast, while techniques which enable the pixel-by-pixel retouching of photographs produce pictures which misrepresent objects’ shapes and colours, they override the effect of the photographic mechanism by severing the counterfactual dependence that features of those pictures would otherwise bear to features of the objects photographed, and thus produce pictures that are not purely photographic. Such techniques do not affect the reliability of photographic processes, because they make them redundant. Consequently, although they can be used to undermine the EV of particular photographs by transforming them into non-photographic pictures, they do not diminish the EV that photographic pictures generally possess. Nevertheless, such techniques affect the EV we are likely to attribute to the pictures they are used to produce. The seamlessness of the manipulation enabled by such techniques makes us likely to mistake such pictures for photographs, and thus to attribute to them the EV that photographs generally possess. While digital manipulation of the first kind is still sufficiently rare for the EV typical of photographs to exceed that typical of non-photographic pictures by a comfortable margin, the epistemic future of photographs is by no means assured. As Barbara Savedoff notes, advances in digital photographic processes may one day eradicate the epistemic differences between photographic and non-photographic pictures (Savedoff 1997: 212).
Conclusion On two of the explanations I have considered, the epistemic differences between photographic and non-photographic pictures result from essential differences between the two types of picture. Walton sees the difference between the two as consisting in the fact that photographs are aids to vision,
102 catharine abell while non-photographic pictures are mere representations. Hopkins sees it as consisting in the fact that they are governed by different standards of correctness. By contrast, while they take photographs to differ epistemically from those non-photographic pictures that do not carry information about objects, Cohen and Meskin take certain of the epistemic differences attributed to pictures of the two types to be merely apparent. I have steered a somewhat different course, arguing that, while photographs in general do differ epistemically from non-photographic pictures in general, this difference is due to wholly contingent factors, namely advances in photographic technology and the standardization of the function of photographic processes.
References Abell, Catharine (2009), ‘Canny Resemblance’, Philosophical Review, 118/2: 183–223. Clark, Andy (2001), ‘Visual Experience and Motor Action: Are the Bonds Too Tight?’, Philosophical Review, 110/4: 495–519. Cohen, Jonathan and Aaron Meskin (2004), ‘On the Epistemic Value of Photographs’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 62/2: 197–210. (2006), ‘An Objective Counterfactual Theory of Information’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 84/3: 333–52. Currie, Gregory (1991), ‘Photography, Painting and Perception’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 49/1: 23–9. (1999), ‘Visible Traces: Documentary and the Contents of Photographs’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 57/3: 285–97. Dretske, Fred (1984), ‘Abstract of Comments: Seeing Through Pictures’, Nous, 18: 73–4. Hopkins, Robert (1998), Picture, Image and Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Jacob, Pierre and Marc Jeannerod (2003), Ways of Seeing: The Scope and Limits of Visual Cognition (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Kulvicki, John (2006), On Images (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Lewis, David (1973), Counterfactuals (Oxford: Blackwell). Lopes, Dominic McIver (1996), Understanding Pictures (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Milner, A. D. and M. A. Goodale (1995), The Visual Brain in Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Savedoff, Barbara (1997), ‘Escaping Reality: Digital Imagery and the Resources of Photography’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 55/2: 201–14.
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Schier, Flint (1986), Deeper into Pictures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Scruton, Roger (1983), ‘Photography and Representation’, in Scruton, The Aesthetic Understanding (London: Methuen). Snyder, Joel and Neil Walsh Allen (1975), ‘Photography, Vision and Representation’, Critical Inquiry, 2/1: 143–69. Walton, Kendall (1984), ‘Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic Realism’, Critical Inquiry, 11/2: 246–77.
4 Depictive Seeing and Double Content JOHN DILWORTH
This chapter provides an overview of a comprehensive double content (DC) approach to the depictive issues of seeing-in, as discussed by other contributors to this volume such as Robert Hopkins, Dominic Lopes, Bence Nanay, and John Brown. A potential advantage of the DC approach to pictorial depiction is that it has previously been systematically worked out in two much broader contexts. First, my 2005 book The Double Content of Art argues that all of the arts—and not just depictive arts such as painting or photography—involve similar double content structures. And second, the DC account has also been extended to perceptual content generally in several recent articles (Dilworth 2005b,c). These latter articles securely embed the DC account in a cognitive science framework, which—among other things—enables the account to avoid the potential dangers of an over-reliance on everyday assumptions concerning experiences of pictures. A useful point of entry for subsequent discussion is provided by Richard Wollheim’s influential concept of ‘seeing-in’ (Wollheim 1968, 1987). In particular, Wollheim’s distinction between the configurational, or design, features of a picture and its recognitional features is taken as a point of departure for such accounts. Any adequate account of depiction must explain how two distinct elements—namely, the purely physical design features of the surface of a picture, and the subject matter that is seen in the picture—are related to each other in our experience of pictures as pictures. Consequently, Lopes, Hopkins, and Nanay follow Wollheim in assuming that, in so far as pictorial experience has two kinds of content, they are best My thanks to the editors, Catharine Abell and Katerina Bantinaki, for their very helpful comments on earlier versions of this chapter.
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distinguished as design-related, configurational content on the one hand, and subject-related, recognitional content on the other hand. However, from a cognitive science point of view this is a confused—or at least superficial or inadequately analysed—content-based contrast. This is because the purely physical design or configurational features of the surface of a picture must provide the physical basis for any kinds of content whatsoever that are associated with the picture. If, for example, the relevant two kinds of content are kinds of perceptual content associated with viewings of the picture, then both kinds must be derivable from viewings of the same single physical design on the surface of the picture. Thus, there is a sense in which all pictorial content must be configurational content, since all of it must be derived from the same visible design. This is not to deny that there are two saliently different kinds of content that are thus derivable, but it is to insist that their differences cannot be explained purely in terms of their common derivation from a single design. An informal exposition of some legitimate content differences will now be provided, after which a more systematic account will be presented in subsequent sections. A typical picture, such as Rembrandt’s pen drawing of pastor Jan Cornelisz Sylvius, as discussed by Hopkins (Fig. 6.1), in some respects resembles an actual person seen face to face, while in other respects—such as in the directions of its inked lines—it instead resembles the design configuration on the surface of the drawing. Presumably some such contrast underlies Wollheim’s intuitive configurational versus recognitional content distinction, as further developed by Hopkins et al. However, the comparison is superficial or preliminary only, because it is those very inked lines themselves that also must provide the respects in which the picture resembles a person seen face to face, since strictly all that is visible in the picture is those inked lines. But, it could reasonably be asked, how could two different kinds of perceptual content be derived from the very same visible areas of a picture? Would they not visually compete with each other, so that, for instance, once all of the configurational, inked-lines content of the pen drawing has been accounted for, there would be no areas of the picture left over to represent the person who is portrayed by the drawing? In reply to such concerns, clearly the visible ink lines have to do double duty—both providing content or information about the features of these specific drawn lines that show
106 john dilworth Rembrandt’s pen-drawing style, and providing information about the person depicted in the picture as well. I have argued elsewhere (Dilworth 2005a,e) that in cognitive science terms there is really only one possible solution to this potential problem of informational conflict—namely, that the two kinds of content or information must be hierarchically arranged, in two distinct levels, with one level encoding or representing the other. Also, arguably the most plausible hierarchical arrangement is one in which lower-level, design-related content—providing information about the configuration of lines etc. on the picture surface—is used to encode or represent a higher level of subject-related content. This is the structure adopted by the current DC account of depiction. So, on this DC account, viewers of a picture see the depicted subject in the picture by seeing the manner in which the lower-level configurational content of the picture represents that higher-level subject. The next section will give a preliminary, intuitive account of how these two levels of content could explain seeing-in, and will preview further details of the DC theory.
1. Double Content and Perceptual Ambiguity Issues It is important to situate the DC account in a broader context of human perceptual abilities and representational processing structures. It will be shown that closely related double content structures must be involved in normal perception of objects that are not pictures, so that the postulated DC structure of depictive perception is plausible, in that it is no more than a natural extension of more generic perceptual abilities. But in addition, it will be important to be able to theoretically account for a significant ambiguity problem that is unavoidably associated with the suggested DC approach—both with respect to pictures, and for perception generally. The problem is that any object having a two-level DC structure is inevitably potentially ambiguous between various distinct DC interpretations, because by hypothesis at most one of the levels is directly or basically perceived—the upper-tier represented level must be inferred or interpreted from the data provided by the lower level. But in fact the situation is even worse than this preliminary description suggests, because there are potential conflicts between the two levels of content as well, so that, strictly speaking, neither level of content is fully determined by the
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initial data as derived from the surface of a picture or from worldly objects generally. A legitimate interpretation would assign appropriate determinate content to each level, but the basic problem is that there would always be more than one possible way of doing this for each level. Hence, representational ambiguity ensues: potentially there is a range of distinct, at least minimally legitimate compatible double content interpretations of the retinal configuration, so that there is no one unique double content structure associated with a concrete perceptual state S. For example, retinal information indicating that blue light was visually received might show that object X was blue and illuminated by ambient neutral white light, or it might instead show that object X was white but illuminated by ambient blue light. (There is also an indefinite range of equally compatible, though less extreme, aspect and object data combinations for colour factors.) A similar point holds for some concrete shape pattern on the retina, such as an elliptical shape. That shape might have been caused by light emanating from an actually elliptically shaped object X directly facing the perceiver, or from a circular object X that was viewed from an oblique angle, and so on. Hence, any concrete retinal shape properties are just as ambiguous with respect to double content interpretations of them as are concrete colour properties of the retinal image. But, since arguably all low-level information provided by retinal images is either shape or colour information, it follows that all of the basic information derivable from concrete retinal states is potentially multiply ambiguous with respect to compatible double content interpretations of those states (Dilworth 2005c).
2. Basic Similarities in the Perceptual Content of Pictures and Non-Pictures It might initially be assumed that perception of an external representation, such as a picture, is fundamentally unlike perception of an ordinary real object, such as a cow, which does not represent anything. However, we must be careful not to confuse the legitimate differences in representational status of the relevant objects themselves—pictures versus non-pictures—with differences in the perceptual content of a person who is viewing each kind of item. There are at least three fundamental kinds of
108 john dilworth similarities in perceptual content that apply to both classes of object, which will now be briefly summarized. As a preliminary, note that some sort of distinction of two kinds of perceptual content is inevitable in the case of pictures, because of the differences between their surface designs and their depicted subject. One way to express this point is that, for any given subject S, such as a scene or a person, there could be many different pictures of it, each having the same subject S but with a different design content D1, D2, . . . , Dn. However, there is an analogous distinction between perception of an object O, and perception of various aspects A1, A2, . . . , An of that object O, as seen from various distinct perceptual viewpoints. To invoke a G. E. Moore-style argument, just as I can know that I see a hand when I look at one of my hands, so also can I know that in so doing, I also see some particular aspect of that hand—such as the palm of my hand, or the back of the hand. But since my perceptual content always includes both the hand and some aspect of the hand, and since the two must be distinct—since there is only one hand, but many aspects of it—there must be two distinct kinds of perceptual content involved in one’s perception of the hand, just as there must be in one’s perception of a picture and its subject. The relevant concept of an aspect of an object may be generalized to include any broadly aspectual or contextual conditions under which objects are perceived, including lighting, distance, atmospheric conditions such as rain or mist, and partial occlusion by other objects. This generalization is legitimate because any such factors can affect our retinal images of objects, which provide the proximal source of all our visual information about them. So we may distinguish the aspect or aspectual content of retinal visual images from their specifically object-related intrinsic content. Arguably, aspect and intrinsic content together provide a generic two-level DC structure of perceptual content, which is closely analogous to the two-level DC structure of design and subject content in the case of pictures. The second fundamental similarity in perceptual content for pictures and non-pictures is provided by the mediating role of retinal images themselves. Indeed, it is arguable that such retinal images are themselves closely analogous to external pictures, such as projected screen images, in that, physically speaking, a retinal image literally is a projected image focused on the retina by the eyeball. In addition, the double perceptual content of external pictures must always be perceptually mediated via the
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retinal images of viewers of the pictures, so that inevitably there must be an intimate relation between the contents of perception of external pictures and of non-pictures. Or, in more detail, when a picture is perceived, the image of the picture that is formed on the retina of the perceiver will approximately duplicate the main qualitative features of the surface design of the picture itself. Consequently, a perceptual interpretation of the design of the picture would involve—as applied to the closely similar retinal image—the same standard double content extraction procedures as would be used to extract content from any retinal image of worldly objects. In other words, since all visual perceptual interpretation is mediated by retinal images, it should not be surprising that those retinal images that represent external pictures are internally processed in similar structural ways to other more miscellaneous retinal images. As for the third fundamental similarity in perceptual content for pictures and non-pictures, it is that generic perceptual content is just as fundamentally ambiguous as is pictorial content—as will be further demonstrated in the next section.
3. More on Double Content and Representational Ambiguity in Perception and Depiction This section provides a more detailed theoretical overview of issues concerning generic perceptual double content and its inevitable ambiguities. These generic perceptual issues will also be closely related to pictorial double content issues (Dilworth 2005a,b,c). Normal perception of an actual object X involves a particular viewpoint of the perceiver with respect to X, so that different aspects Y of object X will be seen from differing viewpoints. Perception of such an aspect Y provides information both about object X itself and about various concrete aspectual factors Y1 , Y2 , . . . , such as intervening objects, lighting and atmospheric conditions, and so on, that together make up the totality of what can be perceived from a given perceptual viewpoint during observation of object X. A primary task of normal perception is to extract from such viewpoint-dependent aspects correct information about object X itself, free of the potentially distracting aspectual factors. An early stage of this perceptual extraction involves the processing of sensory information derived
110 john dilworth from a concrete sensory input state S, such as a concrete pattern of retinal excitation caused by light rays emanating from a given viewpoint-dependent aspect of X. Hence, in symbolic form, the initial or low-level informational content Z derivable from such a concrete sensory state S thoroughly intermixes data Y —about specifically aspectual worldly factors Y—with data X about X itself. Hence, in order to extract useful information about object X itself, the perceptual system must somehow transform or decode the low-level data Z = Y (X ) into upper-level data X that is specifically about object X itself. (In typical perceptual cases, the extracted aspect content factors Y , which provide information about worldly aspectual factors Y, would be discarded as being irrelevant to the main perceptual task.) Consequently, perceptual data has a two-level or double content structure in which low-level, intermixed information Y (X ) of a raw, broadly aspectual kind, has to be decoded to extract the upper-level objectual information about object X. However, there is a fundamental epistemic problem associated with this task, namely that a concrete sensory input state S, such as a concrete pattern of retinal excitation as discussed above, provides no guaranteed or automatic procedure for separating out the genuinely X-related information X from more miscellaneous information Y that is about the aspect Y and its aspectual factors Y1 , Y2, . . . , rather than specifically about X. The perceptual state S potentially contains information both about object X and about the ambient, aspectual conditions under which X is being perceived. But since two distinct content factors Y and X have to be extracted from the single retinal state, arguably there is a range of distinct possible twofactor interpretations, each of which is compatible with the same concrete retinal state. The general point that perceptual data is fundamentally ambiguous or indeterminate in various respects is widely accepted in vision science (see, for instance, Purves and Lotto 2003 for further examples). However, the specific double content structures summarized here, and defended in more detail elsewhere as noted, provide a novel, DC-based theoretical approach for articulating what are, arguably, the two most salient kinds of content involved in such perceptual cases of informational ambiguity.
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Turning now to external representation cases such as pictures, arguably a closely analogous structure, along with similar possibilities of representational ambiguity, holds in their case as well. Just as a concrete perceptual state S has a low-level, broadly aspectual content of form Z = Y (X ), so also does a concrete external representation R have a low-level, broadly design or configurational content of the same form Z = Y (X )—which content Z is the raw or unprocessed design information derivable from the visible surface of the relevant picture. In addition, in both perceptual and external representation cases, an upper-level content X must be extracted by some means—where X is content that is about an object X in generic perceptual cases, and about a subject matter X of the picture in a specific pictorial case. As to the status of the decoded lower-level aspectual or design content factors Y in both generic object and picture perception cases, this information may simply be discarded in utilitarian cases, such as everyday perception of objects or vacation snapshots, in which all that is desired is accurate information about the actual properties of the objects that were seen or photographed. But, arguably, artistic pictures gain much of their significance—including their typical inflective differences from face-to-face seeing of an actual object X—from perception of such lower-level design factors Y . As for the issue of how potential double content ambiguities could be resolved in generic perceptual cases, various views are possible. Purves and Lotto (2003) argue that broadly historical statistical factors, such as probabilities of previous correlations between a given kind of low-level retinal data pattern and actual facts about the objects being perceived, are sufficient to resolve the ambiguities. I would add that in many cases of normal perception of non-representational objects, the potential ambiguities could be resolved by more comprehensive current perceptual observation. Potential ambiguities in allocation of colour information to either aspectual or object factors could be reduced by examining the ambient illumination directly. Or potential shape ambiguities could be reduced or eliminated by viewing an object from a range of viewpoints. By contrast, in typical pictorial cases, artistic intentions help to resolve ambiguities. Here is an example that involves artistic intentions and the nature of artistic media (Dilworth 2005a). Presumably, Rembrandt intended
112 john dilworth viewers of his pen drawing (as discussed previously) to see it as depicting a person. On such a legitimate interpretation, arguably only some of the pen lines could be concurrently noticed as such by a viewer, because noticing all of them as pen lines—i.e. as lower-level content only—would be perceptually inconsistent with concurrently noticing Rembrandt’s intended depicted subject at all. Or, to put the matter another way, though all of the pen-line-derived data must be initially processed as lower-level configurational content, in a legitimate interpretation some of it should ultimately be interpreted as transparently representing the subject—i.e. as upper-level content only—while other elements may be semi-transparent—i.e. providing content elements at both levels—while still others might provide low-level content only that provides no subject information (such as the frame or signature). Semi-transparent cases, involving both levels of content, could be illustrated as follows. For these cases too there could be both appropriate and inappropriate interpretations. For example, Rembrandt’s drawing could be incorrectly interpreted as indeed depicting a person, but nevertheless one who has strange pen-like markings all over his face. This possible interpretation is semi-transparent (involving both levels of content) because the pen markings are seen as being on the depicted person’s face—rather than just as being meaningless lower-level pen strokes—but it is nevertheless wrong because it would betray a fundamental misunderstanding of the artistic medium of pen drawing. Or, as Ernst Gombrich remarks in a similar case, a drawing of Tivoli should not be interpreted as depicting Tivoli as being bounded by wiry lines (Gombrich 1962: 78). A DC-based theory capable of explaining the basic cognitive factors involved in such ambiguity cases will be provided in the following sections. To sum up the points raised in this section, the two-level perceptual content associated with viewing a picture is potentially ambiguous between various distinct two-factor content interpretations of its design. The potential ambiguities would need to be resolved via constraints provided by artistically relevant factors, such as the artist’s intentions, or relevant media conventions, such as those applying to drawings rather than paintings. In addition, more generic kinds of perception of worldly objects involve structurally similar kinds of perceptual double content—except that, in their case, the standards for appropriateness of double content interpretation are provided by normal standards for veridical perception of objects and their properties.
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4. An Orientational Double Content Theory: Basic Concepts Because of the importance of double content ambiguities for the understanding of both perception in general and depiction in particular, it is appropriate to develop a theoretical structure that is specifically geared to the analysis and articulation of the full range of relevant factors in such double content ambiguity cases. The following theoretical structure was initially developed (Dilworth 2005a, Chs 8–10, 12) to explain pictorial ambiguities that become salient in cases of changes in spatial orientation of a picture, and hence it is appropriately described as an orientational theory of double content ambiguities. As a preliminary, since a given picture—such as Rembrandt’s pen drawing—could be interpreted in more than one distinct double content way, we shall describe each of those ways as characterizing a distinct pictorial content (PC) PC1, PC2, . . . of the concrete design provided by the picture. The orientational theory to be provided shows how these various possible distinct double content interpretations PC1, PC2, . . . of the picture relate both to each other and to the basic raw or uninterpreted information that can be perceptually extracted from the picture surface via the concrete retinal configurations of a perceiver of the picture. To begin, here is a basic example that shows a need to introduce orientational concepts. A picture is capable of being interpreted in at least two different pictorial ways, involving distinct pictorial contents PC1 and PC2, as follows. If a picture of an upright house is spatially inverted, an ambiguity becomes apparent: the inverted picture can either be interpreted as an inverted picture of an upright house (PC1), or as an upright picture of an inverted house (PC2 ). The relevant pictorial contents PC1 and PC2 must be distinct, because each involves a distinct subject matter—namely, an upright house in the first case and an inverted house in the second case. But the two distinct pictorial contents PC1 and PC2 are associated with only a single concrete picture. Hence, it becomes necessary to distinguish at least three different kinds of items and three corresponding relevant orientational factors—respectively, those applying to the concrete picture, to each distinct pictorial content
114 john dilworth PC1 and PC2, and to the distinct subjects S1 and S2 of each pictorial content. An adequate orientational theory must articulate all of the relevant orientational factors involved in such cases. It is immediately clear from the example that at least two distinctive orientational factors are involved: namely, the spatial orientation of the concrete picture P on the one hand, and the differing spatial orientations of the subject matters S1 and S2 of each pictorial content PC1 and PC2 on the other hand. But arguably a third kind of orientational factor, which concerns the spatial orientation of the distinct contents PC1 and PC2 themselves, must also be involved. This is so for the following reason. The orientation of the subject matter of a pictorial content (PC) cannot be determined independently of knowing the orientation of the PC itself. For example, if a picture P depicts an inverted house, then it must be possible to see that the depicted house is inverted when the relevant PC is viewed in its normal upright orientation. But this is only possible if the PC itself has an orientation that is independent of the orientation of its subject matter S. And finally, arguably a fourth, broadly environmental orientational factor E is required as well, so that the orientation of other items relative to environment E can be described. The most basic orientational concept in the current DC theory is that of a field. A field (to be discussed further in the following section) is an abstract structure of different specific qualities of some generic, homogeneous kind, such as some interrelated spatial positions, or some interrelated colours, or shapes. In the case of a spatial field, a field is a three-dimensional structure of abstract spatial points, the coordinates of which could be used to describe or index corresponding positions in some region of threedimensional space. Each of the four orientational factors described above would involve, among other things, its own distinct spatial field, so that four implementations or tokens of the same abstract spatial field type would be required to fully explain the orientational structure of the relevant example. Second, a concept of field orientation needs to be defined. This concept concerns the way in which two distinct copies of the same field type relate to each other. For example, if a concrete pictorial token T has had a spatial field F(T) assigned to it, then the field orientation of token T with respect to the environmental field E is defined in terms of the correspondence or alignment between the differing coordinates of field E and field F(T).
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Third, a concept of intrinsic orientation is also required. Whereas the concept of field orientation (or alignment) is a relational concept specifying the relations of two distinct though type-identical fields, the concept of intrinsic orientation instead presupposes that there is some functionally defined standard that specifies a unique internal positional structure for elements of the field (in some particular application of the field structure). In particular, a top distinguished element or layer must be specifiable, which thereby counts as an intrinsic top of the relevant intrinsically oriented field. In contrast, a field top of an item X is whichever side or region of X is aligned with the intrinsic top of the relevant environmental field E, whether or not X has an intrinsic top—and, if it does, whether or not its current field orientation with respect to E results in its intrinsic top being aligned with its field top. For example, a spatial environmental field E is normally regarded as having an intrinsic orientation in which elements of the field that are more distant from the earth’s surface are taken to be higher than elements that are closer to the earth, so that the intrinsic top of the field would be the layer of elements that are at the highest altitude (most distant from the earth). Or, as another example, a car has an intrinsic orientation, with its intrinsic top being the top of the roof, because that is the functionally based orientation in which cars are normally driven. However, by contrast, miscellaneous items of hardware, such as small hand tools do not have an intrinsic orientation because they lack any unique, functionally specified orientation in which they are normally used. The concept of intrinsic orientation is particularly important in analysing pictures. Both PCs PC1 , PC2, . . . and their corresponding subject matters S1 , S2 , . . . possess an intrinsic spatial orientation, and in the analysis to be given, concrete pictures P do so as well, as part of the analysis, even though such pictures need not independently have an intrinsic orientation in their own right, simply as physical objects. Also, it will turn out that when the orientational theoretical framework is generalized—to include colour, shape, etc. fields, as well as spatial fields—pictorial contents, subject matters, and pictures will continue to possess an intrinsic orientation and an intrinsic top element with respect to their relevant fields. Fourth in this list of basic orientational concepts is a concept of uprightness, along with a correlative concept of inversion. An item X is upright just in case it has an intrinsic top that is currently aligned with the top of an
116 john dilworth intrinsically oriented environmental field E—i.e., in the spatial case, if X’s intrinsic top is currently spatially above any other parts of X, relative to the environmental field. Correspondingly, an item X is inverted in spatial cases if its intrinsic top is currently spatially below any other parts of X. It will also be convenient to use a more inclusive concept of inversion for any case in which item X is not upright. Finally, a fifth basic orientational concept comes in the form of a principle: the oriented subject matter invariance principle, or OSMI principle (Dilworth 2005a, Chs 9, 12). As a simple example, we normally assume that if a concrete picture P of an upright house is spatially inverted, so that the field orientation of picture P relative to environmental field E changes by 180 degrees, nevertheless the field orientation of the subject matter S—which is defined relative to the intrinsic top of the relevant pictorial content PC1 —does not change during the rotation, in that the picture remains one that is interpreted as being a picture of an upright house, rather than its changing into a picture of an inverted house.
5. Applications of Orientational Concepts The orientational concepts just defined will now be applied both to concrete retinal tokens Tr, and to aspect Y (X ) and object X contents. A parallel application to concrete pictures P, double pictorial contents PC = Y (X ), and subject matters S will also be described. The orientational concepts provide ways in which to keep track of changing relationships between these three kinds of items, plus of their relations to a fourth item—an environmental, intrinsically oriented field E. However, these structured orientational relations are not just a perspicuous way of describing the relevant relations. In addition, they are intended to be a useful tool in articulating a broadly truth-functional or correctness-based view of depiction—which closely associates depictive content with a correctnessbased view of perceptual content as well. Thus, on the present view, pictures can correctly or incorrectly represent their subjects, just as perception can correctly or incorrectly represent worldly objects. Consequently, the current orientational DC framework must fully support a clear distinction between correctly and incorrectly depicted subjects. It does so by identifying orientational uprightness of subject in some
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respect—such as colour, shape, or spatial orientation—with correctness of subject in that respect, and generic inversion in the relevant respect with incorrectness of subject. Similarly, in the case of object-related perceptual content X , uprightness of its relevant field is identified with correctness of object-related content. Next, here are some further details on the structure of a field. Because of the emphasis on correctness of subject matter, the elements of the relevant field are defined in the following way. First, there is an intrinsic top element, consisting of the relevant kind of correct subject matter—such as a particular correct spatial orientation, or a correct colour, or a correct shape, and so on. As a result, all four copies of the relevant field have the same intrinsic top and intrinsic orientation. Environmental field E provides a fixed reference standard, relative to which the other three intrinsically oriented fields may have differing field orientations. Second, the rest of the elements in the field are defined in a structured relational way that corresponds to (what could be called) relevant psychophysical alternatives for the kind of property being considered. For example, with spatial orientation, the relevant alternatives are other spatial orientations to which a picture could be rotated. In the case of colours, because of our psychophysical makeup, the other colour elements in the field would roughly correspond to some standard ‘colour wheel’ structure for the colours. In the case of perceptual shapes, the actual shape of the subject matter would be the intrinsic top of the field, with other retinal shapes produced by actual viewing of such an object from various angles making up the rest of the field elements. In depictive cases, stylistic and medium-related considerations also serve to structure other characteristic kinds of field, in ways to be discussed further in Section 6 below. For example, a medium such as pencil drawing would use fields in which top elements were fully realistic renderings of a subject, with increasingly graphic elements such as linear shading and cross-hatching becoming more prominent in the less realistic, more inverse elements of a field. As an initial application of the orientational framework, consider a colour change case. During stormy weather, daylight that is normally a neutral white colour tends to take on a bluish tinge—as evidenced by any number of undesirably bluish photographs taken under such conditions. As perceivers with sophisticated perceptual constancy mechanisms, we are
118 john dilworth usually able to compensate for such cases of abnormal ambient lighting. Hence, normally, a white sheet of paper continues to look white to perceivers of it, whatever the weather conditions, or time of day, may be. But colour information extracted directly from a perceiver’s concrete retinal image of the paper in such cases would still contain an unusually high amount of bluish light. How are we able to correctly perceive the inherent colour of the paper as being white under such conditions? The orientational framework in this case would involve a colour field with a white intrinsic top, since white is the correct colour of the paper. As a preliminary, recall that low-level aspectual double perceptual content is of form Y (X ), involving aspectual factors Y and objectual factors X , and that this double content information has to be extracted from a concrete retinal image token Tr. Also, since the paper X is indeed white, and it is correctly perceived as white by normal perceivers, the paper-related perceptual content X of such a perceiver must be upright relative to the relevant environmental field E. Now in the orientational model, the colour that the paper is perceived to have is the colour that is the current field top (relative to field E) in the object-related content X . Since this is a case of correct perception of colour, the field top of X is also identical with the white intrinsic top of the colour field, so that the paper is perceived to be white. But nevertheless, the colour-related properties of the concrete retinal image token Tr include a predominance of bluish-light-related properties, so that consequently token Tr’s copy of the relevant colour field is not upright, but instead it is generically inverted with respect to reference field E. Hence, there is a potential compatibility problem: how can the actual white colour of the paper be made consistent with the physical bluish properties of retinal token Tr, which consequently makes token Tr’s own copy of the colour field non-upright relative to field E? Clearly the answer is that perceivers can correctly compensate for the bluish ambient light conditions by adopting a full double content perceptual interpretation Y (X ) of the retinal image token Tr, in which the aspectual content Y (X ), and its included aspectual colour factors Y , are non-upright, or inverted, in the orientational model, to the same degree as token Tr itself . Such a double content interpretation is fully compatible with the nonupright orientation of token Tr, in that the predominance of bluish light properties in token Tr is fully explained as being entirely due to aspectual
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ambient light factors, rather than its being due to the inherent colour of the paper. An alternative interpretation of the retinal image token Tr will now be considered. To make the alternative interpretation plausible, and to link it to a case of depiction, suppose that a colour photograph Tp was taken of the original piece of white paper X from the same position, and at roughly the same time, as the original perceptual observation of X that produced the bluish retinal image Tr. Then a subsequent viewing of that photographic token Tp could produce a retinal image Tr2 that was qualitatively very similar to the initial retinal image Tr of the actual sheet of paper. However, suppose that the lighting conditions have now changed to neutral white light, so that, in viewing the photograph Tp, there is no automatic perceptual compensation by the viewer for the bluish tinge of retinal image Tr2. Instead, the photograph is perceived by its viewer as depicting a bluish sheet of paper, rather than a white sheet of paper. How is this difference from the original perception of the paper as being white to be explained? To begin, since the sheet of paper X depicted by the photograph—i.e. the subject matter of the photograph—is in fact white as before, the appropriate colour field is also the same as before, with the same white intrinsic top. However, the depictive token depicts the subject matter—the paper—as being bluish in colour rather than white. Consequently, in the orientational model the colour field for the subject matter is no longer upright relative to the environmental reference field E. Instead, its field top is the bluish colour that the photograph is perceived as depicting with respect to its subject matter, rather than the actual white colour of the intrinsic top of the subject matter field. Hence, the subject matter field must be non-upright, or broadly inverted, relative to the environmental field E, which indicates in the model that the colour of the subject matter is incorrectly depicted by the photograph. It still remains to be explained how this broadly inverted subject matter interpretation can be rendered compatible with the full current double content interpretation Y (X ) of each of the two tokens—namely, the bluish retinal token Tr2, and the bluish concrete depictive token Tp itself. But perhaps it is clear enough that the broadly inverted subject matter, with its incorrect bluish field top, fully explains by itself how the bluish properties of retinal token Tr2 and depictive token Tp have been processed. Clearly, it has been perceptually assumed that the full informational content
120 john dilworth of the bluish qualities of concrete tokens Tr2 and Tp is exhausted by the bluish qualities of the relevant subject matter, namely the paper. Consequently, in the orientational model the pictorial content PC itself—i.e. the full, low-level aspectual content Y (X )—would normally be being interpreted as being upright in its field, i.e. with a white field top. Hence, the full aspectual content Y (X ) that constitutes the pictorial content PC is assumed to be a neutral white colour, and, consequently, assumed to have no impact on the relation between the bluish qualities of tokens Tr2 and Tp and the perceived bluish subject matter of picture P. Or, in terms of the specifically perceptual content of token Tr2 itself, the aspectual content Y is assumed to involve nothing more than neutral ambient white light that could have no effect on the colour content of the perceived object—which ambient light conditions, as it happens, were in force during viewing of the photograph itself. Consequently, these viewing conditions help to explain why the photographic picture is misperceived as depicting a bluish sheet of paper. As for notation, the following simplified version is appropriate for pictures: upright picture content (UPC), inverted picture content (IPC); and upright subject matter (US), inverted subject matter (IS). Or, for perceptual content in general, including the special case of perception of a picture, we may distinguish an upright aspect (UA), inverted aspect (IA); and upright object (UO), inverted object (IO). Then the case of double content ambiguity given above for retinal tokens Tr is one in which a given kind of bluish retinal image can be given an orientational double content interpretation either as an inverted aspect–upright object (IA–UO) case, or as an upright aspect–inverted object (UA–IO) case. As for a more detailed analysis involving the relevant concrete tokens as well, upright token (UT) and inverted token (IT) factors are also required. In the example given, the correct colour of the paper was white, but both the retinal token Tr and the picture P were bluish. Consequently, these were both inverted token (IT) cases, or, more fully, IT–IA–UO and IT–UA–IO cases.
6. The Artistic Functions of Design Content In this section the context will be broadened to briefly consider characteristic ways in which artists can exploit orientational factors in their pictures
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to produce results that normally could not be seen in face-to-face seeing. These factors will serve to sharply distinguish artistic cases of depiction from more generic perceptual cases. Such phenomena, as previously discussed by Podro (1998) and Lopes (2005) for instance, can readily be explained in terms of Wollheim’s two-factor concept of ‘seeing-in’, so it is important that the current rival DC view should also be able to explain the phenomena, in order to effectively compete with Wollheim’s influential account. To begin, I have argued elsewhere that perceptually based double content phenomena in the arts are not confined to depictive cases of visual artworks, but instead they are endemic in all forms of art (Dilworth 2005a). But such a synoptic approach to the arts in general thereby takes on the burden of explaining all facets of artistic meaning, not just those that are particularly salient in a given art form. In particular, it is not enough for a double-content-based approach to the arts to explain just standard, purely representational kinds of content or subject matter. Instead, the approach must also explain factors in artistic meaning specifically associated with each particular art form and with artists themselves, including factors such as the idiosyncratic expressive means used by a particular artist within a given medium, more general stylistic considerations, artistic intentions and attitudes, and so on. My own attempt to explain both kinds of meaning—of both artistic and representational kinds—closely associates each kind with a particular kind of content in the two-level structure. Standard representational content is explained in terms of upper-level subject-matter content, while broadly artistic kinds of content, involving expressive artistic styles, attitudes, and intentions, are explained in terms of lower-level aspectual content. This section will concentrate on showing how characteristic aspectual factors are recruited by visual artists for their own expressive purposes. Fortunately, the orientational framework established in the previous sections is particularly useful in articulating specifically artistic factors in the content of depictive and other artworks. A leading idea is that an art medium, such as the medium of painting or etching, is closely associated with its own, medium-specific orientational fields. These fields have fully realistic intrinsic tops, such as particular shapes, textures, or colours, but what makes them artistically appropriate is that their non-top elements are mediumspecific. For example, an etching uses groups of purely linear elements to depict subject matter. So the subtle shading on a woman’s face would
122 john dilworth be depicted using combinations of dense cross-hatched lines for darker shadings, along with looser patterns of lines to depict lighter shadings. Nevertheless, as previously discussed, the etched linear design on the surface of a print is not intended to be a realistic picture of a woman’s face as one that is covered with a network of fine lines. The lines are part of the medium, or the depictive means of etching, not part of the subject matter that it depicts. In orientational terms, correct perception of what an etching depicts is of form IP–IPC–US. A correct interpretation of the wiry linear elements in the concrete design understands them as expressing aspectual depictive content of form Y (X ), with this aspectual content being inverted because its field top is etching-specific linear elements rather than the realistic facial contours that are the intrinsic top of the relevant field or fields. Hence, just as we can perceptually compensate for an oblique view of a shape by interpreting it as an IA–UO case, so also can we perceptually compensate for etching-specific aspectual content in a picture by a structurally similar IPC–US interpretation; whereas, by contrast, a naive incorrect interpretation of an etching as depicting a woman with wiry lines on her face would be using a dual, UPC–IS orientational interpretation instead. Artists may also use their own inimitable stylistic fields for specifically expressive purposes. For example, many of the Swiss sculptor Giacometti’s wiry, vertically elongated sculptures may initially look, to the uninitiated, like three-dimensional pictures, having the outline shapes of very thin or spindly people. Arguably, however, they are instead expressive sculptural pictures of ordinary-shaped people. Their apparent distortions in shape require an IP–IPC–US interpretation in which the prominent aspectual divergences in shape from realistic US shapes express the drained and marginalized lives of ordinary individuals in modern societies. By contrast, an incorrect IP–IPC–IS interpretation would instead interpret such works as inexpressive, pointless realistic sculptures of spindly people (Dilworth 2008). Colour can also be used for aspectual expressive purposes, such as in the case of Andy Warhol’s various serigraphs of Marilyn Monroe. One of these has a strong red colour in the area depicting her face (Dilworth 2005a: 258). The uninitiated might think that this incorrectly depicts Marilyn as having a red face rather than her actual pink face—a strange kind of deliberate error by Warhol, of orientational form UPC–IS or IPC–IS. However, much
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more artistically appropriate is a dual IPC–US interpretation in which the red colour has the aspectually expressive function of allowing us to see Marilyn, with her ordinary pink face, through the garish, red-light-district glow of hyperactive media publicity. Indeed, the whole series of Marilyn serigraphs, with their various colours, only makes any artistic sense if thus interpreted in IPC–US expressive colour terms. To briefly summarize these points, the current account has a ready explanation of such cases in terms of inverted aspectual expressive content (IPC). Since this aspectual content is inverted, it is not realistic and hence does not resemble the object seen face to face. But, at the same time, it is not seen as being visually inconsistent with the correct subject matter content either, since it is perceived as expressive pictorial (IPC–US) rather than as incorrect subject matter content (UPC–IS). This seeing of the red-faced Marilyn picture is not like seeing Marilyn face to face, but nor is it like incorrectly seeing Marilyn as having a red face. Instead, the potent alchemy of aspectual inversion enables us to see Marilyn as viewed via Warhol’s idiosyncratic expressive vision.
7. Other Conceptions of Pictorial Content The current double content (DC) theory of depiction distinguishes aspect representation and content from object representation and content. It postulates that this specific representational or content-based distinction is applicable both to perceptual content generally, and to depictive content in particular. However, there are various other extant distinctions of kinds of representation or content in the literature. This section surveys some of these, with an emphasis on distinctions that are particularly relevant to depiction and to the current collection. In order to avoid any invidious comparisons, after a brief discussion of Wollheim’s seeing-in view, the other views are presented alphabetically by the names of their proponents. The comments are brief because their main purpose is to distinguish other content distinctions from those of the current DC view. 7.1. Wollheim Recall that Wollheim (1968, 1987) introduced the two-factor seeing-in view, which is taken as basic by the other participants, according to which
124 john dilworth seeing of both the physical design of a picture and its content typically occurs during seeing-in. Though the DC view denies Wollheim’s claim that the physical design as such of a depictive token is seen during depictive seeing, it is possible to sympathetically reinterpret his view so as to render it consistent with the DC view, using as a basis other views of his concerning artistic media that license such a reinterpretation (Dilworth 2005a, Ch. 6). Nevertheless, for present purposes it is simpler to regard Wollheim’s views of content as directly entailing a theory of depiction that is incompatible with the DC view. 7.2. Brown Brown’s pioneering investigations in Chapter 8 in this volume, in addition to being of significant value in their own right, could be regarded as providing further evidence for the current DC theory. Brown is able to successfully show, via further development of Hopkins’s concept of separation, that standard conceptions of seeing-in are overly narrow and simplistic, in that they neglect various kinds of possibilities of separation between what can be seen in a picture and its official subject. From the perspective of the DC theory, arguably such additional cognitive possibilities are only to be expected, for reasons such as the following. If the DC orientational theory is correct, specific artistic media involve socially constructed, artistically relevant fields, which are arrived at in the following way. Groups of artists experiment with specific media, such as the medium of pen and ink drawing, and, in collaboration with informed audiences, discover how pen and ink marks may be used, both to depict people and places, and to express an artist’s own attitudes and ideas about those subjects. However, what this means is that the relevant cognitive fields are social constructions—the products of whole cultures over many years—whose depictive functioning inevitably outruns the specific intentions of any one artist as applied to any one specific drawing. Consequently, precisely because the social functioning of a field thus outruns individual intentions, that artist is unable to fully communicate to the viewer exactly how each penned mark is intended by him to characterize his official intended subject in the current particular picture. Nevertheless, according to the DC theory, the lower-level pen marks are inevitably capable of representing some higher-level subject matter in some way. But since not all of this higher-level content can be attributed to
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the official subject (because of the intentional gap between social meanings of fields and individual artistic intentions), the DC theory predicts that there would, in general, be surplus higher-level represented content that would piggyback on content associated with the officially intended subject. But this widespread, separated surplus higher-level content or meaning is exactly what Brown’s insightful investigations have uncovered. Also, presumably artists have learned to control (via prior observations of their own earlier pictures) these additional kinds of higher-level content for further artistic purposes of their own. 7.3. Hopkins Robert Hopkins (1998, Ch. 6) suggests that in some cases what can be seen in a picture is separate from what the picture depicts. An example he gives (1998: 128) is of a photograph of a dog. If the photograph is overexposed, what is seen in it might be a greenish dog, because the overexposure has resulted in an overall greenish tint to the picture—even though what the photograph depicts is a dog of no particular colour. Hopkins also argues that in part the separation occurs because there are standards of correctness for what a picture depicts, but not for what can be seen in the picture. Arguably this general distinction—of what can be seen in a picture from what it depicts—is a legitimate one for the following reason (though it is not one that is explictly discussed by Hopkins). Wollheim (1987: 67–71) has argued that any general account of representation, including of iconic kinds such as depictive representation, must acknowledge that it is possible to represent objects that are not particular actual objects—such as a painting of a lake that depicts no particular actual lake. In such a case, one could see the lake in the painting, even though there is no actual lake depicted by the painting, and hence no standards of correctness for what it depicts. I have suggested elsewhere that in order to explain such cases, a general distinction is needed between cases of external representation—in which some actual object is represented—versus cases of internal representation, in which some object is represented, whether or not the representation also externally represents an actual object (Dilworth 2005a, Ch. 11). As applied to Hopkins’s greenish dog, a greenish dog can be seen in the picture because the concrete depictive token does indeed internally represent a greenish dog, even though the depictive token does not externally represent a greenish dog. Perhaps there are other ways to defend Hopkins’s distinction,
126 john dilworth including his own explanatory framework, but the main point is that his distinction is indeed a legitimate one that is distinct from, and hence does not conflict with, the DC distinction. As for Hopkins’s current contribution in this volume (Chapter 6), he makes a good case that unitary, rather than divisive, accounts of seeing-in have much to recommend them. To that extent, his analyses support both his own unitary theory, and the current unitary DC theory as well. 7.4. Kulvicki John Kulvicki (2006) distinguishes, roughly following Haugeland (1991), the bare bones from the fleshed out content of an image, and a similar distinction plays a more minor role in his current contribution (Chapter 1 in this volume). However, there are two significant problems in attempting to compare his two kinds of content with my aspectual and subject matter kinds of content. First, on my account it will typically be possible to find more than one depictive double content interpretation of a given depictive token. But those alternative interpretations would not typically differ in level of specificity or richness as do Kulvicki’s two kinds of content. Second, Kulvicki’s interesting claim in the current volume—that there is limited diversity and competition in viewers’ interpretive schemes, which fails to match the diversity in picture production schemes—can be directly questioned in various ways such as the following. First, since depictive tokens always permit dual or ambiguous interpretations, those interpretations do semantically compete with each other. And second, unusual production schemes, such as those of fisheye photography, do produce legitimate pictures and depictive interpretations (pace Kulvicki) in that they involve specialized shape fields that define the relevant art medium. Arguably a bulgy fisheye picture of a lemon is just as much a picture as is a wiry etching of the same lemon, once their double content structure is properly understood.
References Dilworth, John (2005a), The Double Content of Art (New York: Prometheus Books). (2005b), ‘The Double Content of Perception’, Synthese, 146: 224–43. (2005c), ‘The Twofold Orientational Structure of Perception’, Philosophical Psychology, 18: 187–203.
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5 Picture Perception as Twofold Experience KATERINA BANTINAKI
The notion of twofoldness has been one of Richard Wollheim’s important contributions to the study of depiction. By means of this notion Wollheim aimed to highlight the fact that in seeing a picture the viewer can be visually aware of both the object that is being depicted and the medium in a single perceptual act. In seeing Lucian Freud’s portrait of Queen Elizabeth II, for instance,