Political Handbook of Asia 2007 (Regional Political Handbooks of the World)

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF ASIA 2007

REGIONAL POLITICAL HANDBOOKS OF THE WORLD

Political Handbook of the Middle East 2006 Political Handbook of Africa 2007 Political Handbook of Asia 2007 Political Handbook of Europe 2007

Political Handbook of Asia 2007 Editors: Arthur S. Banks, Thomas C. Muller, William R. Overstreet Assistant Editor: Tony Davies Production Assistants: Nathaniel Bouman, Thomas Scalese, Erin Stanley, Kathleen Stanley CQ Press Sponsoring Editor: Doug Goldenberg-Hart Chief, Editorial Acquisitions, Reference Publishing: Andrea Pedolsky Managing Editor, Reference: Joan A. Gossett Production Editor: Nancy Matuszak Copy Editors: Elaine Dunn, Mary Sebold, Anne Wendt Production and Research: Timothy Arnquist, Ilya Plotkin, Kate Stern Manager, Electronic Production: Paul P. Pressau Manager, Print and Art Production: Margot W. Ziperman Senior Vice President and Publisher: John A. Jenkins Director, Reference Publishing: Kathryn C. Su´arez Director, Editorial Operations: Ann Davies President and Publisher, Congressional Quarterly Inc: Robert W. Merry

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF ASIA 2007

A DIVISION OF CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC. WASHINGTON, D.C.

CQ Press 1255 22nd Street, NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20037 Phone: 202-729-1900; toll-free, 1-866-4CQ-PRESS (1-866-427-7737) Web: www.cqpress.com Copyright  C 2007 by CQ Press, a division of Congressional Quarterly Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Cover design: TGD Communications. Composition: Pooja Naithani and the production staff at TechBooks-Delhi. Maps courtesy of International Mapping Associates. ∞ The paper used in this publication exceeds the requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences– 

Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1992. Printed and bound in the United States of America 11

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Political handbook of Asia 2007. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN-13: 978-0-87289-497-6 ISBN-10: 0-87289-497-5 1. Asia–Politics and government–21st century–Handbooks, manuals, etc.

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JQ24.P65 2007 320.95–dc22 2006100065

CONTENTS

Intergovernmental Organization Abbreviations

I INTRODUCTION Introduction to Asia

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II GOVERNMENTS

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Afghanistan 29 Armenia 55 Australia 72 Azerbaijan 92 Bangladesh 108 Bhutan 129 Brunei 137 Cambodia 143 China 162 People’s Republic of China 166 Taiwan 188 Fiji 203 French Territories 219 Georgia 225 India 246 Indonesia 285 Japan 313 Kazakhstan 335 Kiribati 351 Korea 357 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 363 Republic of Korea 374 Kyrgyzstan 392 Laos 409 Malaysia 417 Maldives 438 Marshall Islands 445 Federated States of Micronesia 450 Mongolia 454 Myanmar (Burma) 469 Nauru 485 Nepal 491 New Zealand 512

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Pakistan 533 Palau 565 Papua New Guinea 570 Philippines 584 Samoa 610 Singapore 618 Solomon Islands 629 Sri Lanka 638 Tajikistan 666 Thailand 682 Timor-Leste (East Timor) 701 Tonga 715 Turkmenistan 722 Tuvalu 731 United States Territories 736 Uzbekistan 742 Vanuatu 755 Vietnam 767 III INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 779 ANZUS (Tripartite Security Treaty Between the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States) 781 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 783 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 788 Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific 794 Commonwealth 796 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 802 Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) 808 Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC) 811 Nonaligned Movement (NAM) 813 Pacific Community 818 Pacific Islands Forum 822 Permanent Court of Arbitration 827 Regional and Subregional Development Banks 830 Asian Development Bank (ADB) 830

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South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 834 United Nations (UN) 838 Security Council: Peacekeeping Forces 841 Economic and Social Council: Regional Commissions 841

IV APPENDIXES

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Appendix A: Chronology of Major Asian Events, 2005–2006 849 Appendix B: Serials List 863 Index

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I N T E R G OV E R N M E N TA L O R G A N I Z AT I O N A B B R E V I AT I O N S

Memberships in non-UN intergovernmental organizations are listed at the end of each country’s section under Intergovernmental Representation. An asterisk indicates a nonofficial abbreviation. In the individual country sections, associate memberships are indicated by italics.

ADB ANZUS APEC ASEAN CIS CP*

Asian Development Bank Australian, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Association of Southeast Asian Nations Commonwealth of Independent States Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Development in Asia and the Pacific

CWTH* ECO IOR-ARC NAM* PC PCA* PIF SAARC

Commonwealth Economic Cooperation Organization Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation Nonaligned Movement Pacific Community Permanent Court of Arbitration Pacific Islands Forum South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION TO ASIA AND OCEANIA

The geographic extent of Asia and Oceania (Australia, New Zealand, and the islands and island groups of the north and south Pacific) is enormous, spanning half of the globe. From the nations of Asia Minor and the Middle East, north through the Caucasus, east of the Ural Mountains to the island nations of Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, back west through the Himalayas and the Indian subcontinent, then southeast through Indochina and the Indonesian archipelago, Asia includes nearly 30 percent of the world’s land and more than 60 percent of the world’s population. Oceania, given its disparate and dispersed land areas ranging from the continental scale of Australia to the tiny island chains of Tonga and Kiribati, contains a much smaller land area and less than one percent of Asia’s total population. Taken together, Asia and Oceania occupy more than half of the world’s time zones and are home to over three-fifths of the world’s people. The definition of what constitutes the boundaries of Asia is one carved out by history and convention more than being tied to neat geologic features or geographic divisions. Many geographers treat Europe and Asia as one large landmass known as Eurasia, but political scientists and international policy makers tend to divide Europe and Asia into distinct areas for analysis, considering them as separate regions of the world because of their disparate historical and cultural trajectories, and further dividing them into subregions for closer analysis of patterns and trends. Asia is typically divided into at least five regions based on location: the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia, East Asia, and Southeast Asia. The Political Handbook of Asia 2007 concentrates on the last four of these subregions, plus the nations and governments of the north and south Pacific, also known as Oceania.1 Not surprisingly, there is tremendous diversity across this geographic expanse in terms of culture, ethnicity, language, religion, and political and economic development paths, as the sections on the subregions below discuss in greater detail. China and India, however, cast a long shadow over their neighbors, and promise to increase the magnitude of their cultural and political power in Asia in the decades to come. As the large size of the populations of China (approximately 1.3 billion) and India (approximately 1.1 billion) imply, these two 1 The governments and international organizations of the Middle East are profiled in the Political Handbook of the Middle East 2006 (CQ Press, 2006).

societies historically have had and will continue to have a huge impact on other cultures throughout Asia and the rest of the world. The large numbers of e´ migr´es from these two nations now living in Europe and North America, for instance, have reshaped Western culture in significant ways by transporting new ideas, languages, mores, religious practices, ideas, music, food, and other cultural forms into societies and political cultures already pluralistic in their orientation, whatever their level of openness to the influx of non-native peoples and customs. The rapid economic growth of India and China as well as the strong growth in much of Southeast Asia over the last decade, fueled in part by rising levels of education, has transformed global flows of capital, commodities (especially energy), and trade in consumer goods, and changed the global distribution of work for the manufacturing and service sectors. If current levels of economic growth and development continue, the twenty-first century likely will become the “Asian Century” some analysts have predicted. The linguistic diversity of Asia and Oceania is vast, with thousands of different languages spoken across the region and sometimes hundreds of languages and/or dialects within single nations (e.g., India, Indonesia, and the Philippines). The most spoken languages in Asia are Mandarin Chinese, Hindi, Bengali, and Japanese, but other significant languages native to the region include Russian, Uzbek, Azeri (in Central Asia); Urdu, Punjabi, and Pashto (in southwest Asia); Telugu, Tamil, Marathi, Kannada, Gujarati, Malayalam, and Oriya (in South Asia); Javanese, Vietnamese, Burmese, Thai, Sundanese, Tagalog, Lao, and Cebuano (in Southeast Asia); and Korean (in East Asia). Western languages, imported to the region by the colonial powers and still used in commerce and diplomacy, like English, French, Dutch, and Portuguese, are also widely spoken or studied in Asia. Many of the world’s most practiced religions can trace their origins to Asia. The most significant religious faiths in Asia today are Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Taoism, and Christianity. Islam is the dominant religion is Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Central Asian republics, Bangladesh, and Indonesia, while significant Muslim populations are also found in India, parts of Indochina, and the Philippines. The rise of political Islam and the spread of anti-Western jihadist movements has factored into political tensions in all of these regions, especially southwest Asia, India, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Political Islam also is emerging as a powerful force undermining the political

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INTRODUCTION

control of the authoritarian regimes that sprung up out of the dissolution of the Soviet system in Central Asia. Great diversity in national experiences, often born out of colonial and imperial legacies, has also shaped the region’s politics in profound ways. Both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Vietnam emerged from decades of imperial rule and subjugation by installing communist political regimes that outlawed other parties and monopolized political competition. India, on the other hand, emerged from British colonial rule with a multiparty democracy, even in the midst of tremendous internal ethnic and religious conflict. On the other hand, Pakistan, once part of the British empire and more religiously homogenous than India, has struggled to maintain its democratic regimes as they have fallen prey to a cycle of military dictators who have deposed the civilian governments, often to establish order in the midst of political instability and corruption. At the same time, the Central Asian nations established from the dissolution of the Soviet Union are still lurching toward stable political orders, with strongman presidents brokering power among local clan leaders and suppressing organized opposition. No single path from colonial domination to post-colonial political order captures the variation of outcomes for Asia and Oceania’s political regimes. The latest survey of the state of political democracy in the world from the nongovernmental organization Freedom House offers a mixed review of conditions in the Asia-Pacific region. Recent military coup d’´etats in Thailand and Fiji (pushing Thailand into the category “not free”) are the most visible, but by far not the only signs of a “pushback” against political forces advocating for the protection of human rights and expanded civil liberties and economic freedoms. Regimes are clamping down on political competition and silencing critics in Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar (Burma), the Philippines, and the People’s Republic of China, among others. Freedom House assigns “free” status to 16 nations in the region, 15 are designated as “partly free” (Nepal was upgraded for 2007), and 17 nations as “not free” in the region. “Worst of the worst” regimes in the ratings include North Korea, Myanmar (Burma), Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.2

Introduction to East Asia East Asia includes the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Japan, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), the Republic of China on Taiwan, and Mongolia. Although there is some legitimate debate over whether Mongolia and the non-Han dominated regions of China, including Xinjiang and Tibet, are best classified as part of East Asia, they will be discussed briefly 2 Arch Puddington, “Freedom in the World 2007: Freedom Stagnation amid Pushback against Democracy,” press release, Freedom House, 2007. http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/ press release/fiw07 overview final.pdf.

below. China, the region’s largest country, has traditionally exerted the strongest political, economic, and cultural influence over the people and countries in the region. There is great political diversity across the region. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia are vibrant multiparty democracies. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintains its one-party rule in China but rapid economic development and social change increasingly call into question the ability of the CCP to hold on to its monopoly on power. North Korea has a unique totalitarian political system based on the philosophy of Juche, or self-reliance, and the charismatic leadership of Kim Jong Il. The Freedom House political rights rankings demonstrate this diversity. On a scale of 1 to 7 with 1 being most free and 7 least free, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan all receive a score of 1, Mongolia a score of 2, and North Korea and China each receive a 7.3 Although the region is home to two security flashpoints, the Korean peninsula and the ChinaTaiwan tensions, the countries of East Asia have avoided a major conflict since the Korean War (1950–1953). Yet significant tensions between North and South Korea and between China and Taiwan, as well as China’s rapid economic rise and military expansion, present very real and immediate security concerns. To better understand the similarities and differences between current political regimes across the region and some of the more immediate regional security concerns, one must be familiar with the historical influence of China and Chinese Confucianism in the region; the debate over the existence of an East Asian political culture; and some of the events that influenced political development in the region.

Historical Background The majority of the people in the region are linked by what might be broadly defined as Confucian social, cultural, and political traditions. Confucian philosophy emerged in China during the Warring States Period (fifth to third centuries BCE), a period in which China was divided into multiple territories each fighting for supremacy. Confucius (551–479 BCE) and his disciples crafted a philosophy and strict social rules and rituals designed to bring stability and order back to government and society. The Confucian system places great emphasis on filial piety and ancestor worship and is strongly hierarchical, with each person’s role determined by his or her age and rank in the family and the society. The process starts with loyalty and respect within the family and extends to the greater society, culminating in loyalty to the ruler. Order and stability are achieved when people know their station and when they pay proper respect to those above them. Confucian practices became increasingly formalized and institutionalized, and eventually the Chinese implemented a form of state Confucianism. Many components of Confucianism spread into the other countries in the region and, although adapted to particular social and 3 “Freedom in the World 2007,” Freedom House, http://www. freedomhouse.org/uploads/press release/fiw07 charts.pdf.

INTRODUCTION

political conditions, they provided a relatively common set of practices and institutions across East Asia. Instead of relying on the extensive use of military force to dominate the region, imperial China relied on a tributary system that allowed foreigners the opportunity to establish trade and political relations with China as long as they were willing to accept China’s superiority. The process required foreign leaders to pay tribute to the imperial court in a highly ritualized form. In return, the tributary states were afforded trade rights and a certain measure of protection by the Chinese government, and China protected its status as the Middle Kingdom (Zhongguo). It also facilitated the spread of Chinese Confucian teachings and practices through the region.

Is There an East Asian Political Culture? While East Asian nations share some cultural and philosophical traditions, there also exist significant differences. In more contemporary terms, their shared Confucian heritage leads to the question of whether there is an East Asian political culture. Confucian social and political order has been used as an explanation or even justification for the existence of hierarchical authoritarian political regimes in the region. For example, Lee Kuan Yew, the former leader of Singapore, argues, “In the East the main object is to have a well-ordered society so that everybody can have maximum enjoyment of his freedoms. This freedom can only exist in an ordered state and not in a natural state of contention and anarchy.” Lee continues, “Eastern societies believe that the individual exists in the context of the family. He is not pristine and separate. The family is part of the extended family, and then friends and the wider society.”4 Thus, according to Lee and leaders in the two remaining authoritarian regimes in the PRC and North Korea, strong central authority is necessary for the maintenance of order and precludes the emergence of individual freedoms and liberties essential for democracy to function. The Chinese Communist Party recently argued that China’s unique history and culture have influenced and will continue to influence political development in the country. Therefore, the Chinese are quick to point out that a Chinese democracy, if it is to emerge, will look nothing like the liberal democracies of the West. The course of change in China will directly impact regional economic, political, and security relations. Kim Dae Jung of South Korea disagrees with Lee’s position. Kim points out that East Asian philosophies are not necessarily in conflict with democratic ideals and argues that socioeconomic changes in Asia weaken Lee’s argument. He states, “I do not think it [culture] alone determines a society’s fate, nor is it immutable.” Industrialization, Kim argues, is changing the face of East Asia and now, “the family-centered East

4 Fareed Zakaria, “A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew,” Foreign

Affairs 73, vol. 2 (March/April 1994), pp. 111–113.

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Asian societies are also rapidly moving toward self-centered individualism. Nothing in human history is permanent.”5 The East Asian case is not unique in the profound influence of traditional beliefs and values on current political structures and attitudes. At the same time, beliefs, values, and institutions change over time through indigenous discourse and debate and through the interpretation and adaptation of new ideologies and institutional forms to current conditions. Such changes contributed to the process of democratization in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia. Democratization in these countries makes Lee’s argument more difficult to defend in the 21st century. East Asia has changed and continues to change. Thus, while keeping historical similarities in mind, the differences between the current political systems in Asia can be better understood through an overview of the domestic and international forces that have influenced their development.

Colonialism, Imperialism, and Political Tradition and Change The countries of East Asia lived in relative isolation from other regions for millennia. Contact with the outside world increased dramatically during the 18th and 19th centuries, when Western powers desired greater access to East Asian natural resources, goods, and markets and Christian missionaries wished access to spread their message of faith. The arrival of the West sparked debates and conflicts within and between the countries of the region. Although the Western impact was different in each country, the varied responses influenced each country’s political development throughout the 20th century. In brief, the Western presence in the region had a number of effects, including but not limited to: 1. Exposing some of the existing weaknesses in the countries. 2. Forcing the often conservative ruling elite to acknowledge different political possibilities. 3. Exacerbating intellectual and policy divisions between different groups of elites. 4. Accelerating social, economic, and political change in the region. The Qing government’s response to the West was guided by its long-established belief in its centrality and superiority over all other nations, and China attempted to deal with the West much in the same way that it dealt with its tributary states. While there was significant intellectual debate between resistance and adaptation, the government generally responded with efforts to limit or control Western access to the country. The West responded with military force, taking control of important ports and cities in China. China did not have the technological or military capacity to resist, and China was carved 5 Kim Dae Jung, “Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia’s Anti-Democratic Values,” Foreign Affairs 73, vol. 6 (November/December 1994), p. 189.

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INTRODUCTION

up into multiple concessions controlled by different Western powers and the Qing government collapsed in 1911. China was then essentially powerless to stop foreign domination of its territory. Japan’s response to the West was quite different from China’s. With the arrival of U.S. Commodore Matthew Perry in 1854, the Japanese initiated a program of self-strengthening and adaptation. Japan borrowed Western ideas, institutions, and technology and attempted to adapt them to its culture. In 1868 a group of Japanese elite initiated the Meiji Restoration. In principle, the restoration was designed to return power to the emperor, but in practice political and military control evolved to a group of powerful oligarchs who guided Japan’s industrial and military development. The Meiji Restoration sparked a period of rapid industrialization and social and political change that led to Japan’s emergence as the strongest country in Asia by the end of the 19th century. Japan proved its strength with the military conquest of China in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) and the subsequent defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905). Through these victories, Japan gained control of Taiwan and the Korean peninsula and eventually gained a significant foothold on mainland China. Japanese power, combined with the Japanese leaders’ perception that its power was not respected by the West, contributed to the growth of Japanese nationalism and militarism. The Japanese military strengthened its hold on power through the early 20th century and by the 1930s set Japan on an effort to militarily dominate East Asia. Japan colonized Taiwan in 1895 and annexed Korea in 1910. In 1932 it conquered Manchuria, changed the name of the territory to Manchukuo, and established a puppet regime with the deposed Qing Emperor Puyi appointed as the chief executive. Japanese rule was harsh in these territories. One of the most infamous cases of Japanese brutality was the Rape of Nanjing in 1937. When Japanese troops took control of China’s southern capital, they went on a rampage, raping tens of thousands of women and killing hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians. This and other Japanese atrocities during the occupation of China comprise a strong component of the Chinese collective memory and continue to cause tensions in relations between China and Japan. Similarly, relations between both South and North Korea and Japan are influenced by the memory of Japanese atrocities on the Korean peninsula. Korea was often referred to as the Hermit Kingdom because of its desire to stay closed to the outside world. It maintained very strong tributary relations with China, but wanted little to do with other countries. Korean leaders counted on its tributary status with China for protection from other powers. Like China, however, Korea lacked the military capabilities to repel Western forces. Japan’s military rise put Korea in a precarious position as it called into question whether China could continue to protect Korea. This question was answered in the Sino-Japanese War when, as a part of the peace settlement, Korea was declared an independent state, free of Chinese control. Several years later, in 1910, Japan annexed and took control of the Korean peninsula.

Western and Japanese imperialism sparked the emergence of nationalist movements throughout the region. Some were guided by a belief in traditional values and philosophies and argued for a stronger return to native traditions to repel outside forces. Others were influenced by Western political philosophies ranging from liberal democracy to revolutionary Marxism. These ideological differences laid the foundation for civil war and political divisions that influenced the form of East Asia’s current political landscape following World War II.

Civil War, Authoritarianism, and Democratization Following World War II Japan’s surrender did not bring immediate peace and stability to East Asia, as authoritarian governments took hold across the region. Civil war erupted in China and on the Korean peninsula and Cold War divisions between socialist and capitalist regimes emerged. Communist regimes took control in China, North Korea, and Mongolia. In Taiwan and South Korea, pro-West anti-Communist regimes emerged and used the struggle against Communism as justification for strict authoritarian rule. After decades of such rule, democracy emerged in Taiwan, South Korea, and Mongolia in the 1980s and 1990s. Unfortunately, some of the Cold War ideological and political divisions remain, presenting the region with a precarious regional security situation.

Japan. Japan, Asia’s first fully-functioning democracy, is a unique case because democracy was implemented there under the rigorous guidance and control of the United States’ post–war occupation of the country. The occupying authorities imposed strict rule, created a new constitution for Japan, and while allowing the survival of the imperial system, stripped the emperor and court of any legitimate political authority. Japan today is classified as a constitutional monarchy with a democratic parliamentary government. Although Japan’s democracy is well-established, problems remain. The Liberal Democratic Party has long exercised excessive control over the electoral system and bureaucracy, factionalism, and corruption continue to plague the political process. Governmental decision making is often bogged down by factional politics, preventing essential reforms to the state bureaucracy and economic system. Additionally, Japan is struggling with its identity. Japanese imperialism during the war left a trail of bitterness and resentment across the region. In an effort to strip the Japanese of warmaking potential, the post–war constitution included Article 9, which limits Japan’s military potential. Japan’s emergence as a world economic power in the 1970s and 1980s led to tension between Japan’s leadership in the global economy and fear over its potential to expand its political and military influence. Thus, the extent to which Japan can assert its power is always in question. To this day, any Japanese signal of a desire to increase its power and influence around the region leads to sharp protest from other countries, particularly Korea and China.

INTRODUCTION

China and Taiwan. Following World War II, China collapsed into civil war as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) clashed with the Nationalist Guomindang (GMD) over control of the country. Poor leadership, corruption, and difficult economic conditions contributed to the GMD’s loss to the CCP, despite its superiority in troop strength and technology. The CCP took control of the country and established the People’s Republic of China in October 1949. The GMD government retreated to Taiwan, where it imposed harsh rule under martial law that lasted until 1987. The CCP under the control of Mao Zedong initiated a series of radical and disastrous revolutionary programs, including the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961) and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). These programs, based on radical restructuring of China’s economy into communes and the effort to deify Mao, contributed to the deaths of tens of millions of people through political violence and famine. By the end of Mao’s life in 1976, China was isolated from the rest of the world, its economy was in a shambles, and the CCP had lost almost any level of legitimacy in the eyes of the Chinese people. After Mao’s death, the CCP under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and other reformers initiated economic liberalization. Government control of the economy was loosened and entrepreneurial activity encouraged. These reforms sparked rapid economic growth further fueled by foreign investment. The reforms provided the Chinese people with more personal freedoms and helped improve the lives of millions. At the same time, they unleashed significant social change, including rural to urban migration and increasing income disparities. The rapidity of the changes fostered social unrest, which has sparked tens of thousands of protests each year over labor, property, and human rights, as well as environmental issues. The Communist regime is responding to the changing demands of the people with increased repression and information control. Other problems that confront the Chinese government include regionalism and the potential for political division. Specifically, independence movements exist in both Tibet and Xinjiang, where historical, religious, and cultural differences prompt the question over whether these people and territories fit with or are a part of China. China has used a combination of force and relocation of Han people into the territories to maintain control. The government also hopes that economic incentives or the promise of participating in China’s phenomenal economic growth will make the prospect of being a part of greater China more appealing. Following its loss to the CCP in the Chinese civil war, the GMD government under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek retreated to Taiwan. The GMD used harsh tactics to establish its control on the island. Carried out for years during what is called the White Terror, such tactics included political repression, random arrest and imprisonment of Taiwanese intellectuals and political leaders, and strict control of political discourse under martial law. The GMD justified its actions as necessary to prevent the spread of Communism to the island. The official policy of the GMD was to use Taiwan as a temporary base of operations until it could return to mainland China to reestablish

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its legitimate rule over China as a whole. As part of this policy the GMD government implemented an extensive socialization campaign to educate the people of Taiwan that they were Chinese and thus should desire unification with China. The regime faced political resistance. As Taiwan’s economy flourished, an increasing number of its people desired political rights and freedoms and a voice in their political system. In 1986 the first formal opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), formed. Finally, in 1987 the leader of the GMD government, Chiang Ching-kuo, announced the end of martial law and the process of democratization was initiated. In 1996 Taiwan had its first free and fair presidential election, and in 2000 the first non-GMD leader, Chen Shui-bian of the DPP, was elected president. Since the end of martial law and particularly since Chen’s election there has been a dramatic shift in Taiwanese attitudes toward Taiwan’s relations with China. An ever increasing number of people identify themselves as Taiwanese instead of Chinese and fewer Taiwanese desire unification with China. This shift is heightening tensions between China and Taiwan. China claims that Taiwan is part of China, a renegade province that must be brought back into the fold, and has not ruled out the use of force to gain control of Taiwan if the Taiwanese move closer to formal independence.

The Korean Peninsula. The Korean peninsula was divided along the 38th parallel following World War II as a result of political divisions within Korea and emerging tension and suspicions between the United States and Soviet Union. As the war in the Pacific drew to a close, Soviet troops swept into the Korean peninsula. The United States proposed a formal division of the peninsula into two separate occupation zones, with the Soviets in the north and the Americans in the south. The somewhat arbitrary division along the 38th parallel was intended to be temporary until a peaceful resolution and unification of the peninsula could be achieved. Unfortunately, disagreements between the United States and Soviet Union and among different factions within Korea made resolving the division more difficult than hoped. The United States turned the question over to the newly created United Nations, which established the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) to supervise elections. Not surprisingly, a legitimate election was never held. The northern leadership rejected UNTCOK’s authority and refused to allow UNTCOK into its territory. An election of questionable legitimacy was held south of the divide, and in May 1948 a new national assembly was created. The Republic of Korea (ROK) was officially established in August 1948 with Syngman Rhee as its first president. In response, North Korea held its own election of dubious legitimacy in which the Soviet-supported guerrilla fighter Kim Il Sung was elected president of the newly established Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Each government immediately claimed to be the only legitimate government for the entire peninsula; claims that continue today. In June 1950 Kim Il Sung launched an attack across the 38th parallel to attempt to unify the peninsula under his control. A coalition of United Nations forces

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INTRODUCTION

led by the United States responded to support South Korea, and troops from China and assistance from the Soviet Union supported North Korea. The conflict ended in a stalemate three years later and the division along the 38th parallel remained. Although each side claims to desire reunification, it appears that the divide may be even further entrenched as the political, social, economic, and cultural differences increase between the people of the ROK and DPRK. This division presents the region with its most precarious security threat. The ROK regime established authoritarian rule, which it justified as a necessary condition to prevent the spread of Communism across the 38th parallel. The socioeconomic changes tied to South Korea’s rapid industrialization and economic growth led to heightened popular pressure on the government to implement political reform. Frequent labor and student protests demanding workers’ rights and increased civil liberties were met with harsh repression. Finally, in the late 1980s the South Korean regime initiated the process of democratization. In 1993 Kim Young Sam became South Korea’s first democratically elected civilian president. Today, South Korea is a fully functioning multiparty democracy. Since its establishment in 1948 the North Korean regime has developed into a political system that defies simple classification. The foundation of the North Korean system is the Juche, or “self-reliance,” philosophy first enunciated by Kim Il Sung in the 1950s. Since that time Juche has expanded beyond its original emphasis on self-reliance in economics and defense to include political, social, and cultural components, transforming it into an all-encompassing belief system. In the 1980s, with the advent of what the North Koreans call Socio-Political Body Theory, the Juche philosophy took on an increasingly religious air, including discussion of the attainment of eternal life through participation in the Socio-Political Body. According to this theory, the leader of the country represents the brain of the body; the Workers Party of Korea, the only legal party in the one-party system, the nerve system; and the people the limbs that follow the directives of the brain and nerve center to complete the work of the country. The regime uses this belief system to justify its absolute and aggressive control of all aspects of society and politics, which has contributed to North Korea’s abysmal record on human rights. The DPRK government is struggling for relevance and survival. North Korea has long been isolated politically and economically. During the Cold War tensions between the PRC and the Soviet Union placed the DPRK in a difficult situation, forcing the regime to seek some distance from and balance in its relations with the two socialist giants. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the implementation of economic reforms in China, the DPRK is increasingly isolated. Poor economic planning and environmental disasters caused to a great extent by poor land use policies have contributed to the almost complete collapse of the North Korean economy. Floods, droughts, and famines have been all too common in recent years. The regime has little if any legitimacy internationally. All of these factors contribute to a better understanding of North Korea’s regional and international behavior.

Mongolia. Mongolia declared formal independence from China following the collapse of the Qing Dynasty in 1911. From that point forward, Mongolia was much more closely aligned with the Soviet Union than with China. It was not until the advent of perestroika and glasnost in the Soviet Union that Mongolia started to move toward political change. Following the Soviet Union’s collapse, Mongolia experienced a peaceful democratic revolution and has since worked to expand its political and economic ties to the West. In 1992 it ratified a new constitution that established a full democratic system, and the country currently enjoys a stable multiparty mixed presidential parliamentary system. Mongolia maintains close economic ties and friendly political ties with both China and Russia.

Regional Security Issues Although the countries of East Asia have avoided major conflict since the end of the Korean War in 1953, several flashpoints present the region and the world with significant security concerns. These include China’s regional hegemony, its claims regarding Taiwan, North Korea’s nuclear program, and the ambiguous status of Japan’s defense policy.

Rising China. The policies of the Maoist regime weakened China, leaving the country relatively isolated from the rest of the world. The implementation of economic reforms in the post-Mao era dramatically alters that situation. China is now the second largest economy in the world, and its political and economic influence is felt not only in Asia but across the globe. The Chinese government insists that the nation’s rise is peaceful and that China desires only to be a cooperative partner in global economics and politics. Some of its actions support that claim. China has adopted a stronger leadership role in international organizations, including the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, and it has demonstrated a more open and cooperative approach in its bilateral relations with the United States, countries of the European Union, and other nations. China’s economic growth has also generated a seemingly insatiable demand for natural resources, particularly oil. China has expanded and improved its diplomatic efforts in Southeast Asia to gain greater access to resources, but its efforts go far beyond Asia. It initiated a dialogue with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in December 2006 to negotiate a steady supply of oil. China’s efforts to establish stronger relations with nations in the Middle East are also intended to strengthen its international presence and have been met relatively warmly by these nations, who see China’s market potential and view China as a desirable counterweight to U.S. influence in the region. China’s improving relations with countries such as Syria and Iran, which the United States accuses of supporting terrorism, may generate antagonism between the United States and China. The Chinese leadership, however, has moved cautiously to avoid such risk. China’s actions are pragmatic. First, as important as the oil is for China, economic relations with

INTRODUCTION

the United States are still more important. Second, the Chinese have a vested economic interest in regional stability in the Middle East and will therefore avoid actions that could cause increasing tensions or conflict. Third, China generally supports actions against al-Qaeda, which is likely assisting Muslim Uighur separatists in China’s Xinjiang province. Still, China’s presence and its market size will continue to provide it with a significant political and economic presence in the region, and it will influence events, even if China’s leaders claim that they do not want to do so. One example of China’s influence can be seen in Africa, where it has close ties with Sudan. China purchases 80 percent of Sudan’s oil exports and has used its power on the UN Security Council to shield Sudan’s government from punishment for its actions in Darfur. In short, even if China’s leaders are sincere in their desire to have a peaceful rise, as with any other large power, China’s very size and demand for resources will ensure that its presence will alter the dynamics of international relations, and not always in concert with the goals of the West. Although the Chinese government consistently talks about its peaceful rise, it has come under questioning and criticism for its rapid increase in military spending, which has increased by double-digit percentages for almost twenty years. The size of China’s defense budget is disputed, with China reporting expenditures of approximately $30 billion per year while the Pentagon claims that the actual amount might be two to three times that. Even with its recent increases in spending, however, China still spends less on defense than do the United States, Britain, or France. There is no dispute, though, over the increased strength of China’s military. Advances in weapons technology and strategic capabilities have made China’s military a formidable force and have changed the military balance of power in the region. China raised great concern in January 2006 when it used a ground-based medium-range ballistic missile to shoot down one of its weather satellites. This event not only demonstrated China’s improved military capabilities but it also raised further questions about China’s intentions. Many countries in Asia, desiring positive economic relations with China, remain fairly quiet about its military rise, but maintain a watchful eye on the situation. Taiwan feels the greatest sense of threat. Since Taiwan is the most immediate political concern for China, it is possible that its military expansion is geared toward preparation for fighting a war in the Taiwan Strait.

China-Taiwan Relations. Relations between China and Taiwan are complex. On the one hand, China and Taiwan have a dynamic economic relationship; in 2006 trade between China and Taiwan totaled over $100 billion. On the other hand, the disagreement over Taiwan’s status presents the potential for conflict. Most countries, including the United States, maintain formal diplomatic relations with China but not with Taiwan. China pushes its formal diplomatic partners to acknowledge the “One China” policy, which states that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. While the United States recognizes China formally, its relations with Taiwan are guided by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). Under the TRA the United

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States maintains unofficial diplomatic relations with, offers the sale of defensive weapons to, and opposes the use of force against Taiwan. Despite the One China policy, Taiwan is a de facto independent state with its own democratically elected government, a strong economy, and a unique set of social and cultural traditions. The very presence of multiparty democracy in Taiwan may be perceived as a threat to the legitimacy of China’s one-party rule and its argument for a unique Chinese path for political development. China openly opposes any efforts by Taiwan to assert its sovereignty. For example, China consistently pressures other countries to avoid establishing formal relations with Taiwan, uses its power to prevent Taiwan’s admission into the United Nations or the World Health Organization, and even compels Taiwan to use the name Chinese-Taipei in international sporting events. China’s efforts have met with some success. At the present time only 24 countries have formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan and that number may shrink at any time. The security implications of this situation are significant. The number of people living in Taiwan who identify themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese consistently increases, and the number of Taiwanese who desire unification with China declines. It is likely that the only factor preventing Taiwan from holding a referendum on the issue of independence is China’s threat to use force. China has placed approximately 1,000 missiles and additional fighter jets along the coast within striking distance of Taiwan. In 2005 the Chinese People’s Congress passed the Anti-Secession Law, authorizing the government to respond with military force in the event that Taiwan moves toward independence. Japan, South Korea, and the United States do not want to oppose or abandon Taiwan, which is a democratic ally and an important trading partner, nor do they want to agitate China by showing too much support for Taiwan. To avoid conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the common policy has been to promote the maintenance of what is referred to as the “status quo.” Under this policy the United States, for example, attempts to persuade Taiwan to avoid actions that look like moves toward independence. The difficulty with this policy is that a status quo does not exist; changes in Chinese and Taiwanese behavior occur on a daily basis, making the situation unstable. Although it is unlikely that a military conflict will break out over this issue in the immediate future, no easy resolution to the disagreement is in sight.

North Korea. The Korean peninsula continues to present the region with a great security threat. As discussed above, the North Korean regime is struggling to survive and its international isolation and domestic problems compel the regime to take extreme measures to gain international attention and to keep the international community on its heels. The North Korean nuclear program has caused concern for more than a decade. North Korea long claimed that it was developing nuclear energy for strictly peaceful purposes, but recent events proved that the regime was also developing nuclear weapons capabilities. In 2003 North Korea admitted to developing a

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nuclear weapons program and then pulled out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In 2005 North Korea announced that it had built nuclear weapons for self-defense, and in October 2006 it conducted its first nuclear test. North Korea has also conducted missile tests, skirmished with the South Korean navy, and consistently backed out, or at least changed the terms of, international agreements. On occasion it has expressed a desire to cooperate, participated in multilateral talks, and even signaled a desire to improve relations with Japan and South Korea. While North Korea’s behavior is labeled by some as irrational, the regime continues to survive in the face of overwhelming odds. Its use of uncertainty to keep other countries engaged has been described by some observers as strategic. The international community continues its attempts to negotiate with North Korea. The first round of six-party talks including representatives from North Korea, South Korea, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia were initiated in 2003. As of early 2007, the talks are in their fifth round. Little substantive progress has been made, but the talks are considered crucial to keep North Korea engaged in negotiations. China, as North Korea’s closest ally and trading partner, is considered an essential participant, but it is displeased with the behavior of the North Korean regime and fears the implications of either a war on the Korean peninsula or the collapse of the North Korean government. The perceived importance of China’s participation in the talks grants it even more leverage in its diplomatic and trade relations. Yet given the nature of the North Korean regime and its intransigence in negotiations, even China’s influence is questionable. For that reason, immediate changes in the political and security situation on the Korean peninsula are not likely to result from the talks.

Japan. Japan occupies a unique position in the security situation in East Asia. Japan’s past aggression and its “Peace Constitution” place constraints on its military or security influence in the region. Still, Japan’s formidable military force and its economic strength as the world’s third largest economy provide it with leverage. In recent years many Japanese have expressed frustration with the restrictions placed on Japan’s military expenditures, its limited role in regional and international security affairs, and its reliance on the United States for defense. There has been an increase in Japanese nationalism and in a stated desire for Japan to exercise more autonomy in speech and action in the international community. Japan is also keeping a watchful eye on China’s rise. Although both countries are moving to improve relations, Japan and China have a long history of conflict and animosity, and they currently compete over regional power, resources, and trade. Japan will do all it can to prevent China from obtaining regional hegemony. Yet Japanese leaders are constrained by their past. No issue lends more insight into Japan’s unique position than Japanese political leaders’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, which commemorates and is believed to hold the spirits of the Japanese war dead. Countries that suffered under Japanese imperialism claim that the shrine is an inappropriate tribute to Japanese

aggression and oppose Japanese politicians’ visits, viewing them as an indication of Japan’s unwillingness to acknowledge its past deeds and of a rise in Japanese nationalism—and potentially its militarism. Thus, despite its economic power, Japan must tread carefully when dealing with military power or security concerns in Asia. At the same time, Japan and China will continue to compete, and this will likely lead to more assertive Japanese policy. Donald Rodgers is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Austin College in Sherman, Texas.

Overview of Southeast Asia and the Pacific The composite region of Southeast Asia and the Pacific stretches from the India-Bangladesh border eastwards through Burma (Myanmar), Thailand, and the former Indochina states of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, then across the South China Sea to the Philippines, and ultimately to the dozen micro-states of the Pacific lying between Asia and the Americas. The region also stretches southward from the China border to encompass the Malay peninsula with Singapore at its tip and the myriad islands of Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. Further south lie Australia, New Zealand, and ultimately the Antarctic. Spatially, this region extends over more than a quarter of the surface of the globe, making it the world’s largest region. It contains the world’s fourth most populous country, Indonesia—with 240 million inhabitants—and several of the world’s least populous states such as Nauru, Tuvalu, and Niue, each with fewer than ten thousand inhabitants. Except for domestic ethno-nationalist and ethno-religious clashes, the region has enjoyed peace and stability since the end of the China-Vietnam war of 1979, and faces no immediate threats from outside powers. Abundant natural and renewable resources, rising education, productivity, and consumption levels, high economic growth rates, and cultural and topographical variety make the region attractive to trade, capital, and tourism. Governmental and environmental mismanagement, political tensions, and occasional violence, however, raise costs and risks to outsiders. Differences of history, ethnicity, economic base, and ideological orientation render the region’s states sharply distinct in policies, and each must be considered in its own terms. A regional identity and institutions comparable to the European Union remain a very distant vision, and many doubt they can ever be achieved. Nevertheless, governments are taking steps to enhance regional, subregional, and bilateral cooperation, and practical linkages are being formed pragmatically. On balance, the outlook for the region is favorable.

Geographic Subregions It is conventional to divide the region into the following four geographic subregions. This division corresponds also to the

INTRODUCTION

traditional migration routes and settlement patterns, cultural and political centers, and economic bases of the societies that sprang up in each.

r Mainland Southeast Asia includes Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Irrigated wet-rice cultivation in alluvial plains is thought to have originated here, and great kingdoms arose on this rich economic base. r Maritime Southeast Asia includes Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Timor-Leste (East Timor). Coastal gathering, fishing, and trading, and later inland plantation agriculture, were the predominant economic activities of peoples who were influenced in part by traders from South Asia and the Middle East and later Spain and Portugal. Petty kingdoms, sultanates, and fiefdoms rose and fell here. r Oceania (sometimes called the South Pacific or the Pacific Islands) encompasses virtually all of the remaining countries in the Pacific, from Papua New Guinea in the west to Easter Island in the east, and from Guam and Hawaii in the north to New Caledonia and Fiji in the south. Their subsistence economies relied on artisanal fishing and root-crop cultivation. Their peoples originated in Southeast Asia and navigated and settled throughout the islands of the Pacific in pre-historic times. Those north of the Equator are called Micronesians; those in the southwest Pacific are called Melanesians; and those in the southeast are called Polynesians, a designation that also includes Hawaiians and Maori. r Australasia is a term that denotes Australia and New Zealand. Their economies were based on animal husbandry and temperate cultivation carried on by settlers mainly from the British Isles, who also brought European forms of government and warfare.

History, Ethnicity, and Religion While convenient for anthropologists, ethnographers, and geographers, and for those approaching the region for the first time, these subregional designations can be misleading because they obscure historical, ethnic, political, and economic distinctions that are important today. For example, pre-colonial rivalries between the great kingdoms of mainland Southeast Asia persist in political memory and underpin the sensitivities of the leaders of Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos towards each other despite their countries’ physical contiguity and similar economies rooted in wet-rice cultivation. Regardless of close maritime trading ties, petty kingdoms in the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagos, and in the island countries such as Fiji, Samoa, and Tonga often engaged in combat with one another. In all of these cases the epic victories and golden ages of dominance are recalled today, underpinning distinct political identities. The kingdoms of the dominant ethnic groups tended to preempt the fertile lowlands of the great river valleys and plains, pushing the minority groups into the less hospitable foothills and mountains. These ethnic groups, some indigenous, some migrants from southwest China, remain to the present, resisting

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the central governments and sometimes erupting in rebellion, to which government forces retaliate with force and occasional brutality. Upper Myanmar, for example, is home to the Wa, Mon, Chin, Karen, and other minorities ethnically distinct from the majority Burman people of the lowlands, and a state of virtual civil war exists in some frontier districts. The Hmong in Thailand and Laos, the Montagnards in Vietnam, the Dayaks of east Malaysia, the highlanders and Bougainvilleans in Papua New Guinea, and the Kanaks in New Caledonia are noteworthy examples of minorities that continue to be politically significant in recent times. Indonesia itself is an amalgam of numerous ethno-linguistic groups ranging from the Acenese, Batak, and Minangkabau in the west to the Moluccans and Papuans in the east. The Fijians are divided between the Melanesians in the west and the Polynesians in the east. The indigenous Australian Aboriginals and New Zealand Maori retain separate identities and are asserting their rights to compensation for their dispossession by European settlers in the twentieth century. All of the states in the region have become host to immigrant minorities, mainly from southern China and eastern India. These immigrants were invited in by the colonial governments to provide plantation labor and petty services. In Singapore the Chinese are a majority in a tri-racial (Chinese, Indian, Malay) state, and in Malaysia they make up more than one-third of the population. In Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines they comprise less than 10 percent but, as in Malaysia, they have become economically influential. In Fiji, the Indians at one time almost outnumbered the indigenous Fijians and became the dominant economic group. Some post-colonial governments have reacted by expelling immigrants, notably Myanmar and Vietnam. The Malaysian, Indonesian, and Brunei governments have imposed discriminatory policies on non-indigenous inhabitants, and Malaysia in 2006 expelled large numbers of migrant workers from Indonesia. Recent military governments in Suva, dominated by Fijians, have encouraged Indians to emigrate, and many have done so, mainly to New Zealand. Most governments, however, are attempting to manage the political tensions created by the immigrants while retaining the economic benefits they bring. This is particularly true of Australia and New Zealand, where immigrants from Asia and the Pacific islands (including Indians from Fiji) have developed significant social and economic communities, as well as become important political actors, in recent decades. The entry of religions new to the region also raised the potential for conflict. While Buddhism, brought by teachers from India and China, predominated in mainland Southeast Asia, differing sectarian interpretations between adherents of Theravada and Mahayana denominations, political adaptations by secular rulers, and breakaway factions such as Hoa Hao and Cao Dai in Vietnam produced schism rather than ecumenicalism. The arrival of Islam in Sumatra and Malaya and of Catholicism in the Philippines and eastern Indonesia set the stage for the ethnic violence that has disturbed the Indonesian provinces of Aceh, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Maluku, the Mindanao region of the Philippines, and the provinces of Thailand bordering Malaysia for the past century. More recently the resurgence of Islam as

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a political ideology has added to the social tension and antiwestern flavor of politics in Southeast Asia, and has fuelled acts of ethno-religious terrorism in Bali, Jakarta, Bangkok, southern Thailand, and southern Philippines. Catholics, converted by the French, initially predominated in Indochina, but were later suppressed by the Vietnamese Communist-nationalist government. Hinduism in Cambodia and Java was overwhelmed and survives only in Bali. Dutch, English, and American Protestantism were adopted by minority peoples in Myanmar and Java, attracting violent reaction by anti-Christian Muslims and local majority confessions even today. Chinese immigrants practicing Buddhism or Confucianism or adopting Christianity suffered severe discrimination. In contrast, in Australasia and Oceania, despite heated debate between Catholics and Protestants, Christianity has prevailed over native animism, and religious tolerance has been the norm.

Colonialism and Post-Colonialism Colonialism added a further overlay of ideological distinctiveness in addition to the other ethnic and economic changes it wrought to traditional societies. Rivalry between the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, French, and British, and later the Americans and Japanese produced unique local institutions and loyalties. Only Thailand avoided colonial occupation in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; all other Southeast and Pacific territories fell under European, American, or Japanese flags. Anti-colonial movements, accelerated by the Japanese conquest of much of the region between 1942 and 1945 contributed much to current political passions, particularly those leaning towards socialism and Communism and skeptical of European and American leadership. Nevertheless, while the winds of nationalism and decolonization swept away foreign direct rule in the post–World War II period, the flag of France continues to fly over New Caledonia, French Polynesia, and Wallis and Futuna, and the American flag flies over Guam, the Marianas, American Samoa, and Hawaii. In another historical anomaly, Australia and New Zealand, although self-governing from their founding in 1788 and 1840 respectively and fully independent for a century now, continue to acknowledge Elizabeth II, queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, as their formal head of state. Their alleged aloofness as Western outposts in an Asian and Polynesian region has often been remarked upon critically by regional leaders. Colonialism provided not only divisive influences but also some unifying elements. English has emerged as the language of commerce and regional politics, supplanting not only the “market Malay” of the pre-colonial period but also French, Dutch, Spanish, and Japanese languages used during the colonial period. Colonial infrastructure such as ports, roads, schools, and modern cities have been embraced and enhanced by the post-colonial governments and supplemented by Western communications and transportation technology, not least air travel and the Internet. The majority of states in the region have adopted some form of Western democracy as the basis

of their political system and the market as the basis of their economies. Legal systems based on the European models of common law and code law have been adopted. Nearly half of the states of the region are members of the Commonwealth, nominally led by Elizabeth II. All but a few states hampered by their small size are members of the United Nations General Assembly and are active in a variety of regional and international associations. Exceptions abound, however, notably the Communist states of Laos and Vietnam and the persistent military dictatorship of Myanmar. Local modifications of Western institutions and processes are also widespread, notably in the practices of what has been called “guided democracy,” wherein democratic institutions are managed in an authoritarian fashion such as in Singapore, Cambodia, and Tonga and, in the recent past, in Malaysia and Indonesia, or are set aside temporarily as in Thailand and Fiji, both of which came under military caretaker governments in 2006. Corruption, mismanagement, and civil turmoil have recently affected democratic institutions, market economics, and the integrity of law in Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Nauru, and French Polynesia.

Democratic Institutions and Practices The colonial powers severely modified, but in most cases did not sweep away, traditional institutions of governance in Southeast Asia and Oceania. Initially arriving for trade and too weak to impose their will, European entrepreneurs resorted to “indirect rule.” This entailed co-opting local rulers and influencing their behavior by means of resident “advisors” who induced (or sometimes coerced) rulers to draft new laws to secure trading privileges and property rights for Europeans. The kings of Burma and Vietnam remained nominally sovereign until the early twentieth century. Because of timely reforms and concessions to Britain and France, the king of Thailand remained on his throne and his successors rule today, as does the king of Tonga. The sultans of Malaysia and the Maori of New Zealand, with whom the British Crown signed treaties, were accorded roles in the colonial structure and in the postcolonial constitutions. The sultans of Java, the elders (matai) of Samoa, and the chiefs of Fiji continue to play influential roles in governance. Elsewhere, as a result of French colonialism, Communist victory, or adoption of modern institutions of political and economic governance centered in the capital cities, traditional leaders have given way to contemporary elites and remain influential only in the villages. In Australia, for instance, little remains of Aboriginal organization save tribal advisory councils liaising with European-style government entities. Today the political institutions of all but a handful of states resemble those in European and American democracies. They include executives responsible to legislatures, subject to courts, and answerable to electorates. Constitutions and laws are acknowledged as superior to personal rule. Upon closer inspection, however, the region’s states are found to differ in the quality of their democratic governance and may be placed in four

INTRODUCTION

categories, from the most to least democratic. In the first category, the political systems of Australia and New Zealand exemplify a high degree of achievement of democracy and good governance. Institutions are prescribed by constitutions and laws, elections are regular, transfer of power is orderly, civil liberties are widely enjoyed, and government is clean and effective. This is true also of the majority of the Pacific island states, if allowances are made for their small scale, inexperience of leadership, and the persistence of traditionalism in their political cultures. At the opposite end of the scale, however, military, Communist one-party, or monarchical dictatorship prevails, notably in Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam, and Brunei. In Myanmar a junta of generals calling themselves the State Law and Order Restoration Council nullified the election of 1990 and placed the leader of the winning party, Aung San Suu Kyi, under house arrest. Despite award of a Nobel Peace Prize to Suu Kyi and ostracism by Europe and the United States, Myanmar’s military rulers, now acting through the State Peace and Development Council, refuse to liberalize Myanmar’s political system and allow fresh elections. Laos is ruled by the Lao Peoples Revolutionary Party and Vietnam is ruled by the Communist Party of Vietnam acting through politburos legitimized by powerless legislatures. The Sultan of Brunei keeps a firm hand on the political life of his small but oil-rich realm. While in all four states a degree of peace and order prevail (with the exception of the ethnic insurgency in Myanmar’s northeast), opposition parties and public debate play no role in political life, and all four remain exceptions to the worldwide trend towards democracy. Between the extremes of Australia and New Zealand on the one hand and Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam, and Brunei on the other lie the majority of the region’s governments, in which two intermediate categories are identifiable. The political institutions of countries in the higher category are constitutionally democratic, their administrations are modern, their courts are nominally governed by law, and they are generally regarded as effective in the art of governance. In this category one finds Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. In each case, however, one also finds authoritarian practices that belie the progressive institutions. Such practices include the covert influence of a dominant political party with self-chosen leaders, such as the Peoples Action Party of Singapore or the United Malays National Organization in Malaysia. Alternately, the influence of the military in league with the economic elite is visible in Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The French overseas territories in the Pacific, generally effectively selfgoverned but dependent on largesse and subject to direction from Paris, also appear in this category. The term “guided democracy” is applicable to these governments, acknowledging their democratic forms and potential for improvement but also the fact that their current achievements fall short of true democratic standards. In the lower category one finds ostensibly modern institutions, but notes that their functioning is visibly and seriously flawed, not just by institutionalized authoritarianism but also by

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corruption, nepotism, traditionalism, near-bankruptcy, and the occasional breakdown of public order. Cambodia, Timor-Leste, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Fiji, and Tonga, particularly during their periodic crises, may be placed in this category. Some judge French Polynesia as having veered in that direction until the dispute over its presidency was resolved. Thailand may move down to this category if its military rulers further curtail civilian political leadership; some fear the Philippines will follow. On the other hand, Fiji could move up if the Royal Fiji Military Force steps aside in favor of a resumption of elected civilian government, as it has done in the past. Such examples illustrate that these four categories are rough and fluid and that governments may move from one to another as their democratic behavior develops or deteriorates. Nevertheless, the exercise of categorization is useful to clarify benchmarks by which one may assess governments, diagnose their shortfalls, and formulate recommendations for their reform.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties Related to democratic institutions but focused more on individuals’ ability to participate in political life, the condition of political rights and civil liberties is another yardstick by which to measure the quality of government in Southeast Asia, Oceania, and Australasia. Again, one finds Australia and New Zealand as exemplars, joined by the north Pacific states of Palau, Micronesia, and Marshall Islands and the south Pacific states of Nauru, Kiribati, Vanuatu, and Samoa. In Southeast Asia, Indonesians under the elected presidency of former general Susilo Bambang Yudhyono also enjoy increasing freedoms even though their government is beset by corruption and inefficiency and their society riven by ethno-religious tensions. Most of Indonesia’s neighbors—Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Timor-Leste, and Papua New Guinea—are regarded as only “partly free.”6 The same is true of the remainder of the Pacific island states. Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Brunei under the firm hand of the sultan are regarded as “not free.” Thailand’s freedom rating, previously high after more than a decade of elected civilian government, declined 6 This assessment was made by Freedom House, using the pub-

lic’s ability to engage in the following seven activities as their criteria for characterizing a country “free,” “partly free,” or “not free”: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Participate freely in the political process; Vote freely in legitimate elections; Have representatives that are accountable to them; Exercise freedoms of expression and belief; Be able to freely assemble and associate; Have access to an established and equitable system of rule of law; 7. Have social and economic freedoms, including equal access to economic opportunities and the right to hold private property. Source: http://www.freedomhouse.com.

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after the abortive election of 2005 and Thaksin Shinawatra’s caretaker prime ministership and dropped to “not free” after the military coup in September 2006; it is expected to return to “partly free” if junta leader General Sonthi Bunyaratkalin carries out his announced intention to call fresh elections.

Economic Liberalization Of increasing importance in a globalizing world is the degree of economic liberalization fostered by the region’s governments. In Southeast Asia, Singapore is the leading exemplar of liberalization, having instituted a near tariff-free import regime, a welcoming investment policy, and a series of free trade agreements with partners around the world. Thailand, too, attempted to liberalize under Prime Minister Thaksin and initiated a dozen free trade agreements with partners in Asia, the Americas, the Middle East, and Australasia. The 2006 military coup has cast this initiative in jeopardy and present policies are veering towards protectionism. Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia have professed free market principles but continue to practice protectionism of sensitive industries and have been slow to engage in free trade agreements. Vietnam and Cambodia have begun to explore free markets and trade and investment opening policies, but with caution borne of ideological suspicion. Their economies are rendered unattractive by political uncertainties, bureaucratic rigidities, and ambiguous legal guarantees for entrepreneurs. Myanmar and Laos remain as inhospitable to open markets as they are to political freedoms. Australia and New Zealand, along with Singapore, have led the world in deregulation and the opening of their economies to trade, investment, tourism, and (selectively) immigration. They have also encouraged their Pacific island partners to follow suit, and most have adopted nominal open-door policies to foreign traders and entrepreneurs. The small island economies are fragile, however, and the Pacific governments are prudently apprehensive about admitting overseas operators that could overwhelm local businesspeople or bring unscrupulous practices into the islands. Several island governments have fallen victim to fraud and criminal activity. Others are concerned that existing trading privileges with the United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the European Union could be undermined by the rigorous application of global nondiscriminatory trade rules. Given their shallow economic bases, narrow product lines, and high costs of transportation, the island economies are in a poor position to compete in world markets, and a case can be made for allowing them a degree of protection and subsidy. Further light is cast on economic liberalization and on economic performance in general by considering two related qualities: economic competitiveness and freedom from corruption. The World Economic Forum assessment of 125 economies in 2006 found Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand in the top quintile of economic competitiveness, in that order. Following in the next quintile were Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia. The Philippines and Vietnam fell into the fourth quintile and Cambodia and Timor-Leste were the least competitive, falling into

the bottom quintile.7 Pacific island countries were not included in the study. The international research agency Transparency International in 2006 assessed 163 countries on their degree of freedom from corruption. Again, New Zealand, Singapore, and Australia were found to be least corrupt, ranking first, fifth, and ninth respectively. Malaysia and Thailand fell into the second quintile. Timor-Leste, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia clustered in the next-to-bottom quintile and Cambodia and Myanmar ranked 151st and 160th respectively.8 Smaller Southeast Asian and Oceanic countries were not included in the survey. While these rankings of economic performance are not wholly consistent with each other, or with the political and freedoms rankings, they do reveal a general pattern. It is evident that Australia and New Zealand, and Singapore despite its latent authoritarianism, stand out as high performers in good governance and economic liberalism. Malaysia, Thailand (in the civilian period), Indonesia, and the Philippines, with Malaysia clearly in the lead, constitute a second tier. Myanmar, the former Indochina states, and Timor-Leste fall into the bottom tier. While data and assessments of the Oceanic states are sparse, this author believes they can be positioned comfortably in the second tier, exhibiting moderately good but flawed governance, at least during periods free from public crisis or military intervention, and keeping their markets moderately open.

Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia As globalization has accelerated, intergovernmental cooperation has not kept pace with the growth of technical and financial interdependence. To put it another way, the pace of globalization has outstripped the development of international institutions to manage it, and this imbalance has stimulated a reaction in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Recent peacekeeping failures of the United Nations, the stalling of the Doha round of the World Trade Organization, and the stagnation of negotiations in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum have induced leaders to reconsider the value of regional, subregional, and bilateral channels of political and economic cooperation. Furthermore, the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–98 stimulated the search for an Asian alternative to Western-dominated international agencies. The growth of China’s power and influence has induced Southeast Asian leaders to consider how to secure their regional identity and autonomy in harmony with their giant neighbor. And the success of the European Union has made regional intergovernmental cooperation a more attractive option. In response to these and other stimuli, Southeast Asia and Oceania have inaugurated regional organizations, albeit far less comprehensive or deep than the European model. The earliest 7 Michael E. Porter, Klaus Schwab, and Augusto Lopez-Claros, Global Competitiveness Report 2006–2007, World Economic Forum, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. 8 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, http://www.transparency.org/news room/in focus/2006/cpi 2006.

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that survives today was the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), founded in 1967 by Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Its motives were to strengthen its members in the face of challenges by Communist insurgency, allegedly backed by China, and to stimulate national and regional economic development so as to reduce dependency on the former colonial powers. In the ensuing years Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar have been admitted to membership. ASEAN has provided a forum for devising regional economic cooperation schemes, the most recent of which is the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, announced in 1992. As well, ASEAN leaders have invited friendly extraregional governments to engage in “dialogues” (diplomatic consultations). Current dialogue partners include Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, India, the United States, Canada, and the European Union. China, Russia, Papua New Guinea, and Timor-Leste have observer status. In order to discuss security issues, ASEAN set up the ASEAN Regional Forum in the 1990s, in which defense ministers and officials can meet and exchange views annually. ASEAN has also embarked on economic talks with China, Japan, and South Korea under the ASEAN Plus Three label and with Australia and New Zealand to harmonize their nascent free trade area with the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement of 1983. In 2005 an even more ambitious initiative emerged in the form of the East Asian Summit, to which ASEAN leaders invited the East Asian powers plus Australia, New Zealand, and India. Russia, the United States, and the European Union expressed interest in becoming observers or being otherwise associated. At the meeting in early 2007 in the Philippines the Summit announced its intention to study how to set up an East Asian Community, a sort of Asian version of the European Union, including a free trade zone. Other items on the agenda were energy security, bio-security, avian flu, disaster mitigation, educational exchange, and the future of regional and global trade liberalization negotiations. North Korea’s nuclear weapons were also discussed. Given the historical, political, and economic differences between Asian states, far deeper than those between European states, the notion of an Asian Community or Union was regarded by skeptics as more vision than reality. Even after thirty years of ASEAN collaboration, intergovernmental cooperation remains rudimentary and voluntary, only loosely facilitated by an advisory secretariat in Jakarta. Only one-fifth of the external economic activity of the ASEAN states is conducted within their region. Southeast Asian entrepreneurs are in fact global traders and hosts to short- and long-term capital from around the world. The region’s businessmen, scholars, students, tourists, and cultural exponents are cosmopolitan and their national airlines fly to the capitals of the world. English rather than any regional language is the sole tongue of intergovernmental dialogue. Thus no “natural” economic or cultural Southeast Asia region exists; whatever regionalism takes place must be negotiated, constructed, and sustained by governments. Never-

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theless, the unpredictability of international organizations and markets, the anxiety generated by the rise of China to their immediate north, the alleged unreliability of the United States that heretofore kept the balance of power in Asia, and the attractiveness of the European self-help model may yet draw the Southeast Asian governments into closer cooperation so as to meet an uncertain future together rather than in rivalry.

Regional Cooperation in Oceania In Oceania, too, regional cooperation has emerged. In 1971 the newly independent island states met in Auckland to found the South Pacific Forum. Subsequently, the states-party set up a secretariat in Suva, Fiji, invited the Freely Associated States of the northern Pacific to join and the French territories to observe, and renamed itself the Pacific Islands Forum. Under Forum auspices economic studies have been conducted, aid has been proposed and coordinated, and specific programs for tourism, education, fisheries, natural resources, and environmental management have been sponsored. Political stances have been affirmed against Japanese nuclear waste dumping, American chemical weapons disposal, and French nuclear testing and policies in New Caledonia. Additionally, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone treaty of 1987 was endorsed. More recently good governance, crime control, regional security, and counter-terrorism have been on its annual agenda. While disposing of few resources and no armed forces, the Forum has endorsed peacekeeping deployments led by Australia and New Zealand with contributions by other Pacific island members, most notably the Regional Assistance Mission in Solomon Islands in 2004 and again in 2006. A nascent free trade agreement—the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations—has been negotiated. While selected Asian governments have been invited to observe Forum meetings, and ASEAN has reciprocated, no formal links have been forged between Pacific island and Southeast Asian regional organizations or their free trade agreements, and none is anticipated. Australia and New Zealand, as members or associates of both, have by default become informal bridges between the two regions.

Regional Security The end of the Vietnam War in 1975, the subsequent Vietnam-Cambodia War and China-Vietnam War in 1978 and 1979, and the Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste in 1999 brought a period of relative peace to the region. No outside power is perceived as threatening at the present time, and no regional state is threatening its neighbors. Nevertheless, great power involvement continues in the form of security treaties and military assistance and maneuvers. The United States has ongoing security cooperation arrangements with Australia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. China has developed a close security relationship with Myanmar. Warships of the United States, China, Japan, India, Britain, France, and the regional states including Australia and New Zealand regularly

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INTRODUCTION

transit the waterways of the region, particularly the Strait of Malacca, without incident. Several regional states, notably Australia, Singapore, and Malaysia, are modernizing their defense forces by acquiring state-of-the-art aircraft, ships, and missiles. The defense forces of Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Myanmar are large in number but uneven in technical capability and are deployed primarily to maintain internal security, guard borders and territorial waters, or engage in international peacekeeping. Low-level boundary and fishing waters disputes trouble bilateral relations, for example between Myanmar and Thailand, but are not expected to precipitate armed conflict. The reefs and shoals of the South China Sea are claimed by Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, and also by China and Taiwan. China, Vietnam, and the Philippines have clashed militarily over specific islands as recently as 1989, but in 1995 they signed a code of naval conduct to avoid confrontation, and in 2000 ASEAN and China agreed to negotiate the various claims. In 1995 the ASEAN states signed a Southeast Asian NuclearWeapon-Free Zone treaty. No defense treaty comparable to the North Atlantic Treaty, however, binds the region’s states; intraregional military cooperation, for example between Singapore and Brunei, Australia, and New Zealand, is informal, sporadic, and conducted on a bilateral basis.

Looking Forward The trajectory of the composite region of Southeast Asia, Oceania, and Australasia is upwards. The integrity of the region and its constituent states is not threatened by any outside power or critical domestic conflict in the medium term, although the threats of ethnic strife, militant Islam, and the arming of China will require careful monitoring and management. Progress towards social order, civil liberties, and political democracy has been substantial in most states during the past two decades, and dramatic in cases such as Indonesia, despite some notable setbacks in Myanmar, Thailand, and Fiji. Economic growth continues despite the Asian Financial Crisis and rising oil prices. Liberalization, free trade agreements, and regional cooperation are deepening and institutions to sustain them are strengthening. The need to manage the environment, address poverty, curb crime and terrorism, and minimize corruption is being recognized and given higher priority. Although remedial measures and concrete results in all of these sectors may be slow in coming, the trend is in the right direction in most of the region’s states, not least because a new generation of more enlightened leaders, nudged by active nongovernmental organizations, is emerging. Progress is especially evident when one draws comparisons with the 1960s and 1970s and with persistent unfavorable political and economic conditions in other regions, such as the Middle East, Africa, and Russia. The task facing the leaders of Southeast Asia, Oceania, and Australasia is to sustain the successful policies of recent decades while devising fresh approaches to meet emerging challenges. Stephen Hoadley is Associate Professor of Political Studies at the University of Auckland in New Zealand.

Overview of South Asia South Asia’s two great river systems, the Ganges and the Indus, define the region, which includes the seven nation states of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. South Asia currently contains one-fifth of the world’s population. Historically, those rivers have sustained the high cultures of empires that were relatively protected from the rest of the world by the Himalayas, western deserts, eastern jungles, and the open sea. That semi-isolation gave a series of BronzeAge empires long periods of peace during centuries when Europe was almost perpetually at war. Evidence of those empires (Buddhist, Hindu, and Muslim) is ever-present in South Asia’s monuments, institutions, languages, and religions, and in the histories remembered by the region’s leaders even as they deal with contemporary problems. By definition, all of South Asia’s successful empires controlled the subcontinent’s fertile and productive heartland and, depending on the resources available, were able to extend their mandate out to the edges of that heartland and beyond through conquest and negotiation. The relationships established with local princes in those less productive areas were those of patronclient rather than of direct bureaucratic control. The princes who took on this relationship with the empire then became assets guarding the frontiers when things went well, but could also become a threat at times of imperial weakness. In practical terms, what this system of indirect rule did was permit local leaders outside the heartland to handle the day-to-day chores of government in ways that fit local custom and practice. The introduction that follows will review South Asia’s colonial inheritance, its regional politics during the Cold War, and its globalization in the post–Cold War, before analyzing India’s bilateral relations in the region.

The British Colonial Legacy The British empire, South Asia’s last colonial power, used a similar system by directly ruling the heartland, while establishing patron-client relationships with Indian princes who were contracted to govern the hinterland. When independence came in 1947 there were 562 Indian princes working for the British. At times the British went beyond those princely boundaries over the northern mountain passes to pursue what they called a “forward policy.” Imperial claims to Afghanistan and Tibet produced little benefit. The Afghan wars that ensued were colonial disasters, and British initiatives in Tibet had little effect; however, those claims would later become troublesome legacies for the new nations of India and Pakistan. Independence in 1947 came after long years of anticolonial agitation in a freedom struggle that produced two competing factions that held dramatically different plans for post-colonial India. The Indian National Congress led by Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru argued for unifying British and princely India in a secular democracy where all religious and ethnic groups would be treated fairly. That Congress position was fiercely opposed by the Muslim League led by Mohammed Ali

INTRODUCTION

Jinnah, who argued that the Muslim minority could not be safe in a unified India democratically ruled by a Hindu majority. Eventually Jinnah’s argument prevailed, and the British divided the imperial heartland according to the religious majority found in each region. The Muslim wings then became the new nation of Pakistan, while the center became a much reduced but independent India. When the new boundaries were announced in August 1947, widespread Hindu-Muslim rioting broke out, and in north India roughly 10 million minority members abandoned their homes to join the religious majority on the other side of the new borders. The great majority of Muslims who were living within India’s new borders, however, did not leave. Today India’s Muslim minority is only slightly smaller than the Muslim population of either Pakistan or Bangladesh. The following year the first Indo-Pakistan war broke out over the princely state of Kashmir, where a Hindu prince had ruled a heavily Muslim population. The fighting ended with a UN-negotiated truce that left Kashmir divided by a Line of Control that continues to be the de facto international boundary. That war set the stage for the ongoing conflict that is the major threat to regional peace. Three more wars would follow, with the most decisive being the Bangladesh war in 1971, which produced the new nation of Bangladesh and created the boundaries currently observed and contested within the region. The result divided the imperial heartland between the two Muslim countries and their much larger neighbor, with the two island republics (Sri Lanka, the Maldives) and the two mountain kingdoms (Bhutan, Nepal) in the margins.

South Asia and the Cold War With independence the newly sovereign nations of South Asia had to create foreign ministries from scratch and had little time to think through foreign policy issues before being asked to takes sides in the emerging Cold War between the Soviet Union and the West. Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech in 1948 set the Cold War agenda for the next forty years. During this period South Asia experienced four hot wars, sometimes described as proxy wars for the major Cold War confrontation; however, the alignments that occurred during and after these wars do not fit the simple East versus West conflict described by Churchill. For Nehru, and perhaps for most South Asians, the major international issue continued to be the European colonialism that continued to dominate much of Asia and Africa. In a variety of international forums Nehru became a major spokesman for anti-colonialism and would be a leading organizer of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) that came out of the Bandung conference of 1956. Over time the rest of South Asia would accept some version of the NAM position, with the exception of Pakistan. While Pakistan’s leaders had little sympathy for the colonial powers that were losing their empires, the Kashmir war had convinced those leaders that their major problem was defending themselves against India. For them the question had become: How

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could they best prepare themselves against future threats from the larger power? The Cold War came to South Asia in the 1950s, when U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles proposed an alliance of anti-Communist states that would block Communist incursions into the region. In the original plan put forward by Dulles, both India and Pakistan were to be key players in a phalanx of antiCommunist countries that would run from Turkey to East Pakistan (later Bangladesh), with generous military and economic resources on offer to partners who agreed to participate. A major gap in the grand alliance occurred when India refused to join. Nehru argued that security alliances would infringe on the national sovereignty so recently won. If Nehru made his argument for nonalignment idealistically, his position did have practical implications. By committing India to a position of nonalignment, Nehru could hold down India’s military expenditures while hoping to avoid Cold War conflict. On the other hand, Pakistan welcomed the plan as an opportunity to upgrade the Pakistani military, which was still smarting from the stalemate that ended the Kashmir war. Pakistan joined both the Baghdad Pact (CENTO) and the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the assistance received was quickly invested in military modernization. India protested that the military assistance given to Pakistan was an unwanted intrusion into South Asian affairs. That protest, however, became less important as India became engaged in a border dispute with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The PRC took full control of Tibet in 1950. When the Dalai Lama, Tibet’s leader, took refuge in India in 1959, the PRC objected and increased its military pressure on the IndoTibet border, where the PRC had rejected the British colonial border claimed by the Indians. The conflict escalated until 1962, when the PRC launched a major military offensive across the Indian border. By Cold War logic, this was a Communist threat, and the United States quickly responded with military assistance, which did not save the Indians from a humiliating defeat. That same Cold War logic was also challenged by the fact that the Soviets had begun to supply India with military equipment. When the Chinese declared a ceasefire, abandoned their forward positions, and withdrew to their border of choice, however, the U.S. Military Assistance Group (MAG) supporting India stayed on and continued to provide military assistance as India upgraded its neglected military. That assistance outraged Pakistan, for now its non-pact enemy was getting the same benefits Pakistan itself had received for openly taking sides in the Cold War. Pakistan’s response was to cultivate relations with the Chinese, who would then become its ally in subsequent Indo-Pakistani conflicts. The end results were a regional arms race and the second hot war, the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. This time the Soviet Union sided with India, the PRC with Pakistan, and an American MAG initially supplied both sides. The war ended with the United States placing an arms embargo on the entire region. The third hot war was the Bangladesh war of 1971. The thousand miles of hostile Indian territory that separated West

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INTRODUCTION

and East Pakistan was a major problem for Pakistan’s leadership as it struggled to create a unified Pakistan. In East Pakistan, Bengali separatists used a sympathetic India for safe haven in an insurgency that became increasingly violent. In 1971 a full-scale civil war broke out in the east, and some ten million refugees fled across the Indian border. The Indian army invaded East Pakistan and marched on Dhaka (Dacca), and once there, installed the new government of Bangladesh. During this conflict a new Indo-Soviet friendship treaty clearly put the Soviets on the side of the Indians, while the United States and the PRC supported Pakistan, to little practical effect. Like the previous regional conflicts, the Cold War lines between East and West were not clearly drawn, with alliances that clearly separated the PRC and the Soviet Union. South Asia’s fourth and final hot war of the period, the Afghan-Soviet war that began in 1979, came much closer to the Cold War struggle against Communist aggression that Churchill and Dulles envisioned. This time the Red Army did march, and the Soviet invasion overthrew an Afghan Communist government whose strong-willed Afghan leader had described himself as an Afghan Tito. The Afghan invasion ended what had been a period of d´etente between Cold War adversaries, and Pakistan was once again a frontline state in the struggle against Communism. In the negotiations that followed, General Zia ul Haq, Pakistan’s military dictator, acquired a substantial package of economic and military assistance in return for helping Afghan insurgents fight the Soviets. The assistance given to the insurgents was financed by the United States and Saudi Arabia, but managed by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI). Initially, the Afghan resistance was out-gunned by the Soviet military, but with training and the better equipment, the mujahidin’s guerrilla tactics paid off. Ten years of fighting elusive but deadly insurgents demoralized the Soviet soldiers, and in 1989 the Soviet Union withdrew its forces, leaving behind a devastated Afghanistan. Those Soviet soldiers went home to a Soviet Union that was falling apart, and the Cold War was over.

South Asia in the Post–Cold War The immediate effects of the collapse of the Soviet Union on both Pakistan and India were traumatic and set off changes with long-term consequences for the region. No longer a frontline state, Pakistan lost a major source of income and easy access to Western military equipment when the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan. At the same time several million Afghans were now in refugee camps on Pakistan’s always-troublesome borders, and once again the United States was asking probing questions about Pakistan’s not-so-secret nuclear weapons program. India’s loss of its Soviet ally was also an economic and military disaster for India had come to depend on the Soviets for most of its military equipment and much of its trade. Together India and the Soviet Union had developed an elaborate system of counter trade, with India trading consumer goods for Soviet military equipment in transactions outside the conventional foreign exchange market.

With the end of the Soviet Union, Russia and the other successor republics opened up their economies, the Russian ruble plunged in value, counter trade was abandoned, and a new Indo-Russian relationship had to be developed in a process that proved painful for both parties. The Soviet economic collapse set off a severe foreign exchange crisis for India, and India’s response was a program of economic liberalization that would radically change India’s position in the world economy over the next twenty-five years. India’s crucial reforms of 1991 were implemented by a weak Congress-led coalition that surprisingly lasted for a full fiveyear term. Finance Minister Manmohan Singh designed a program of fiscal austerity, deregulation, and privatization of state firms that reversed years of what has been described as Nehruvian socialism. Implementation was difficult and was resisted by trade unions, industries enjoying tariff protection, and bureaucrats comfortable with old routines. The results, however, not only solved the exchange problem, but also set off a series of economic initiatives that combined clever information technology, aggressive entrepreneurship, and increased foreign investment to move the Indian economy from its usual 3 percent growth rate to rates between 7 and 9 percent. This produced a thriving middle class of urban consumers with habits closely tied to the global marketplace. Politically, the reforms have been hard on incumbent governments, who are charged with favoring the rich over the poor. In the next general elections the Congress-led coalition lost, but the BJP-led coalitions that followed continued to move the process along until they were defeated by a Congress-led coalition in 2004. Significantly, Manmohan Singh became the prime minister of the new Congress government. Optimistic projections of India’s (and China’s) growth surpassing Europe and the United States are now common, but there are obvious problems that must be solved if those projections are to be realized. India’s young population is an obvious asset in a world where economically advanced countries have a labor shortage; however, providing Indian labor with the skills needed to match the evolving global economy is a daunting task. Similarly problematic is India’s access to the energy resources required to sustain present rates of growth, as the world’s supplies of petroleum and coal are threatened by political and environmental problems. India’s concern with energy is obvious in much of its foreign relations (the same is true of China), such as ongoing negotiations on a number of fronts for the construction of pipelines and nuclear power plants with a variety of potential partners. The most controversial of these negotiations has been the IndoU.S. agreement to share nuclear technology, signed in 2006 and currently moving toward implementation. The agreement has had major opposition in both countries and set off hostile reaction from Pakistan, which was refused a request for a similar agreement. This arrangement would give India access to American nuclear technology in exchange for India placing its civilian nuclear installations under international inspections, while India’s nuclear weapons program

INTRODUCTION

would continue to operate secretly. The opposition includes both those who oppose nuclear weapons in general and influential Indian scientists who argue that the agreement will limit India’s autonomy in pursuing nuclear research. The transformation of India by liberalization of the Indian economy has been the most important change in the region since the British left the subcontinent. Two other events, however, have attracted even more global attention and concern, and continue to affect South Asia’s relationship with the rest of the world. These are the nuclear weapons tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998 and the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001. The first led U.S. President Bill Clinton to declare that South Asia had become the most dangerous place in the world. The second set off another war in Afghanistan and a worldwide program to contain groups engaged in acts of terror, many of which had bases throughout South Asia.

South Asia’s Nuclear Confrontation From the time that Indira Gandhi’s Congress government set off what she called a “Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE)” in 1974, it was inevitable that South Asia would have a nuclear confrontation. Immediately after India’s test, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto said, “We will have nuclear weapons, if we have to eat grass!” At the time of India’s PNE, both India and Pakistan were engaged in producing nuclear power, with a cadre of scientists quite capable of developing nuclear weapons. Both countries refused to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) on the grounds that the treaty sustained the monopoly of the five countries with inventories of nuclear weapons. For India that monopoly also gave an unfair advantage to its enemy, the PRC, a member of the nuclear weapons cartel. For Pakistan the Indian PNE was an obvious direct threat, but in addition Pakistani nuclear weapons might reduce the superiority of India’s conventional forces that had just been demonstrated in the Bangladesh war. In the late 1970s rumors of a bomb being financed by Libya and developed by Pakistan soured U.S. relations with Pakistan, but the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan temporarily erased that concern. For the duration of the Afghan war the Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan was given carte blanche to develop nuclear weapons, with little supervision from Pakistan’s political or military leadership. On the Indian side of the border, nuclear power was already a vital part of India’s energy system, and the nuclear weapons program continued without further tests. Then in 1998 a weak coalition led by the Hindu militant party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), came to power with a campaign platform that promised further nuclear testing. The BJP, a longtime advocate of nuclear weapons, ordered tests that were conducted that summer. The success of the tests and the public enthusiasm they generated was used to produce a much stronger BJP coalition in new elections that were called immediately afterwards. Pakistan responded shortly thereafter with tests of its own.

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Since those tests, the threat of a nuclear exchange has hung over the region and generated global concern, particularly when India and Pakistan fought a minor war in Kargil in 2001, and later in the year a terrorist attack on the Indian parliament set off a full scale deployment of both armies on the Indo-Pakistan border that lasted several months.

South Asia and the Global Campaign Against Terror The terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 suddenly placed Pakistan and South Asia near center stage. When alQaeda took credit for the attacks and the Taliban government of Afghanistan refused to expel the group, the United States prepared to invade Afghanistan. Predictably, India was the first country to offer its assistance. Al-Qaeda had been involved on terrorist attacks against India, and Indians were already giving limited support to the Northern Alliance, the Afghan rebel group that continued to resist Taliban authority. Pakistan, on the other hand, had supported the Taliban in its campaign to restore order in the aftermath of the AfghanSoviet war, and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence had a long history of working with al-Qaeda during the war. In addition, U.S.-Pakistan relations were strained because of the sanctions imposed after the 1998 nuclear tests, and by U.S. pressure on General Pervez Musharraf to return Pakistan to democratic leadership. Consequently, it took three weeks for Musharraf to decide to break relations with the Taliban. When he finally decided in favor of cooperation with the American campaign, the sanctions against Pakistan were lifted, and U.S. economic and military assistance began to flow once again. Pakistan’s support was essential in the short campaign that expelled the Taliban from Afghanistan’s capital of Kabul and drove the Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders into hiding along the Pakistan border, where they have continued a limited insurgency against the new democratic government in Kabul. The counterinsurgency operation has been assigned to NATO, with U.S. military resources now more heavily invested in the Iraq campaign. For the region the major consequence is that both India and Pakistan are now uneasy partners in the George W. Bush administration’s global campaign against terrorist groups, with each having different nominations for the terrorist lists being compiled as part of the global campaign. In return, both now have access to weapons and technology that they had been denied after their respective nuclear tests. For other countries in the region, the global campaign against terror is both a threat and an opportunity. Failure to control exiles engaged in cross-border insurgencies can now be defined as harboring terrorists. On the other hand, the campaign provides an opportunity for governments to name their difficult ethnic minorities as terrorists. For example, the Sri Lankan government has managed to have the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) officially designated as a terrorist organization, a listing that has consequently made peace talks between the government and the group difficult to schedule.

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INTRODUCTION

Indian Hegemony Today India has a population almost four times larger than the rest of the region combined, giving Indians confidence that they are the region’s hegemonic power and fueling their ambition to be recognized as one of the world’s great powers. That ambition is best demonstrated by India’s strenuous efforts to obtain a permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) Security Council. This asymmetry means that bilateral relations with India are the relations that really matter for India’s six neighbors. The most important of these bilateral relations are described below for each country.

Pakistan. The most important bilateral relationship for the entire region is clearly that between India and Pakistan. Their relationship has continued to fluctuate between outright war and periods of badly maintained ceasefires since the Kashmir war in 1948. In summer 1998 their conflict escalated to the global level when both countries tested nuclear weapons, resulting in a major nuclear confrontation. Even between wars both countries have used their intelligence agencies to covertly support violent rebel factions in the other country. In recent years the training camps and logistical support Pakistan’s ISI has provided to Kashmiri rebels has been a conspicuous example of this kind of activity, and India’s Research Analysis Wing (RAW) has given similar support to insurgents in Pakistan. While these covert activities are important in their own right, the suspicion created in both countries by these actions makes normal diplomatic and economic relations difficult. Sensational allegations are incessantly repeated in the media and in government statements, and invariably opposition parties for their partisan advantage attack the confidence-building measures essential for reducing conflict between these adversaries. While Kashmir has been the most frequent source of violent confrontation between India and Pakistan, until 1971 the thousand miles of hostile Indian territory separating West and East Pakistan was the major problem for a Pakistani leadership struggling to create a unified country. Bengali separatists operating in Pakistan’s eastern province began to use a sympathetic India for safe haven in an increasingly violent insurgency. In 1971 a full-scale civil war broke out in the east, and some ten million refugees fled across the Indian border before the Indian army marched on Dhaka. Once there, the Indians installed a government of Bengali separatists to rule the new nation of Bangladesh. Bangladesh. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s (Mujib) new government in Bangladesh was appropriately grateful for India’s help in ending Pakistan’s oppressive rule, but inevitably grievances soon arose against their erstwhile ally, and critics now argue that Bangaldesh’s relations with the far-distant Pakistan are better than those with India. Price increases and food shortages in Bangladesh set off rumors of Indian exploitation, and Mujib was accused of being India’s puppet as his govern-

ment struggled with the aftermath of the civil war and a series of natural disasters. Mujib’s leftist government ended less than four years later. In 1975 Mujib was assassinated and his government overthrown in a military coup that installed a right wing government that broke openly with India on a range of bilateral issues. All subsequent Bangladeshi governments have had to address these problems. Bangladesh’s most significant problem with India has been the division of water resources in the Gangetic basin. India’s control of the headwaters of the rivers that irrigate Bangladesh’s enormous rice fields obviously threatens the Bangladesh economy. When India proposed a dam to divert water to flush out its heavily silted port in Kolkata (Calcutta), Bangladesh took the issue to the United Nations. Little relief was found there, and the issue continues to sour bilateral relations. Almost as important are bilateral quarrels over the controls of the 2,545 mile Indo-Bangladesh border. At issue are both security and migration problems. India’s troubled northeast experiences more than a dozen minor insurgent campaigns currently conducted by ethnic groups demanding some form of autonomy from Delhi. Even though the borders are patrolled by other countries, Indian insurgents in flight have been able to evade capture by crossing into Bangladesh. In addition, movement of Bangladeshi labor into India’s northeast by migrants seeking work has become a political problem for India. Assam and other eastern states complain about what they see as an invasion of foreigners who take jobs away from the states’ legitimate citizens. Those protests are often violent and, in addition, nativist groups frequently attack Muslim migrants from the lowlands, who may or may not be from Bangladesh. In the confusion that surrounds these borders, migrants have been lynched, and there have been minor skirmishes between Bangladesh and India’s border guards. At the diplomatic level, Bangladesh has been uncooperative, essentially denying that there is a problem, while India has tried to build a fence to block the migrants, a project that drew gunfire from Bangladesh’s border guards.

Sri Lanka. During the colonial period, leaders of Sri Lanka’s independence struggle had excellent relations with Jawaharlal Nehru’s Indian National Congress and, like their Indian counterparts, Sri Lanka’s politicians had to struggle with the question of minority rights. The largest minority in Sri Lanka were the Tamils, who had prospered under British rule and who felt threatened by the Sinhala language majority that later came to dominate the island’s democratic politics. Sri Lankan Tamils share their language and culture with a much larger group of Tamils in south India who follow the Tamil-Sinhala quarrel with great concern. Tamil protests over language policy in government employment and education moved from parliamentary debate to violence in the 1970s when young separatists began to attack government officials and installations. The rebel groups demanding an independent Tamil nation of Eelam in northern

INTRODUCTION

Sri Lanka were able to find financial support from Tamil supporters in Tamilnadu, the Indian state just nineteen miles away across the Palk Strait. In the civil war that ensued, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam emerged as the strongest rebel group, and they have successfully controlled much of northern Sri Lanka for twenty-five years. Initially, the Indian government simply gave safe haven to the Sri Lankan rebels, but over time that assistance escalated to include covertly arming and training rebels in Indian camps. As fighting in northern Sri Lanka increased, tens of thousands of Tamil refugees began to come ashore in Tamilnadu, and Indira and Rajiv Gandhi’s Congress-led coalitions protested strenuously while pushing for a settlement. Those negotiations eventually became more coercive, and in 1987 the Sri Lankan government agreed to allow an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to enter Sri Lanka to separate the warring parties. The IPKF received an enthusiastic welcome when it arrived in the northern city of Jaffna in 1987; however, the LTTE refused to disarm and in less than three months the IPKF was fighting the LTTE in the streets of Jaffna. The IPKF was recalled to India in April 1990. During almost three years of fighting, India lost more than one thousand soldiers while fighting the same LTTE soldiers it had previously armed and trained. The civil war persists and the IPKF episode remains a heavy weight for both Indian and Sri Lanka decisionmakers. Although India’s hegemonic stance continues to be seen as a threat by Sri Lankan leaders, subsequent governments on both sides of the Palk Strait have been reluctant to go beyond general statements of policy and humanitarian assistance to the war’s refugees, and while India’s Tamils continue to empathize with the plight of their fellows in Sri Lanka, Indian support of the LTTE cause evaporated in 1991 when a female member of the LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi.

Nepal. Unlike the 562 princes who were absorbed into India and Pakistan when the British left India, the mountain kingdom of Nepal was able to maintain its autonomy. That autonomy and the international protection provided by the British empire had been earned by the help provided by Nepal’s Gorkha soldiers during the Indian rebellion of 1857 and World War I (1914– 1918). When the British left the subcontinent, Nepal was left to deal directly with its powerful and competitive neighbors, India and China. The relationship with India has been more important and more difficult, both ideologically and in negotiating specific bilateral concerns. Ideologically, Nehru’s vision of a democratic and socialist South Asia left little room for Nepal’s feudal monarchy and his sympathy was with the democratic reformers who opposed the king. Before Indian independence Gandhi and Nehru had inspired and encouraged Nepali activists who were often in exile in Calcutta (later Kolkata). Those reformers were finally able to return to Nepal in 1951 to participate in the country’s first democratic reforms, reforms strongly supported by the new Indian government. Since then, India has continued to play

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a significant role in Nepal’s ongoing struggle among palace, political parties, and rebellious factions. Beyond democratic reform, three bilateral issues have been most troublesome: transit rights, Nepal’s relationship with China, and the Maoist insurgency that has seriously challenged the current regime in recent years. For landlocked Nepal, transit rights are crucial. As Nepal’s physical isolation has been reduced by better roads and modern technology, the country has become increasingly dependent on the imports that must move through Indian ports. Transit rights were routinely granted by the British, but a series of treaties has been required with India, often with prolonged negotiations that created costly delays of needed goods. Nepal’s relationship with the People’s Republic of China has not been difficult, except that any cooperation with that neighbor has been observed by India, particularly after the SinoIndian war in 1962. Minimal attempts at closer relations with the PRC have produced a negative reaction from India. Control of the Indo-Nepal border is also sensitive, for Indian separatists and Maoists have used Nepal as a safe haven. Not surprisingly, Nepal has tried to be one of the most nonaligned of nonaligned nations, conducting its own international campaign for making Nepal a “Zone of Peace,” an initiative not appreciated by India. Finally, Nepal’s recent troubles, which included the assassination of the king by his son and a Maoist insurgency, appear to have produced a revolution, with a Maoist group now sharing power with the traditional political parties, greatly reducing the new king’s role in governance. During an insurgency that killed some twelve thousand Nepalis, the Maoists finally isolated the king and his supporting army in Katmandu. India became deeply involved, first by cutting off the military assistance that had been routinely supplied to the government, then in pushing for a ceasefire that led to the current negotiation for power-sharing between the young Maoists and the older leaders of the political parties.

Bhutan and the Maldives. With much smaller populations and less military strength, neither Bhutan nor the Maldives carries much weight in South Asia’s regional politics. Both are major tourist attractions and depend heavily on India as their major transit point both for the tourists and for the goods required to serve those tourists. Placed between India and China, the Buddhist kingdom of Bhutan, like Nepal, has been appropriately neutral in the conflicts that have emerged between those enormous competitive powers. India’s ethnic troubles in its northeastern region have sometimes involved Bhutan, when separatist groups have used the Bhutanese border to elude Indian authorities. For Bhutan the border problem is: How to restrict economic immigration from the poorer regions of India for fear that their numbers would eventually overwhelm the Bhutanese population. The Maldives generally present few problems for the regional hegemon, as might be expected for a country with less than a half million people. India, however, has taken action

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INTRODUCTION

to protect those islands. When a small party of mercenaries, thought to be supported by Sri Lanka’s LTTE invaded the islands in 1987, India was quick to react in a military operation that defeated the intruders. Glynn Wood is Professor of International Policy Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

Introduction to Central Asia Central Asia as the region is commonly defined is comprised of the five states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Geographically, this area is bordered on the east by the Caspian Sea and on the west by China. There are advantages, however, to widening one’s purview to encompass the Greater Central Asian landmass, which extends the region across the Caspian Sea to the southwestern Asian (or Eurasian) states of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, and southward to include Afghanistan. As the transnational issues of energy security and terrorism rise on the world political agenda, this more broadly defined region can be seen as the twenty-first century version of antiquity’s Silk Road avenue for trade and the nineteenth century’s Great Game between England and Russia. In the twenty-first century it is no longer silk that captures the world’s imagination: now the region is prized for its importance as a source and transit point for oil and natural gas. Central Asian politics, economics, and cultures have been shaped by factors like topography, borders, empires, religion, and Great Power politics. The Caspian Sea is the world’s largest inland sea, and yet the wider view of Greater Central Asia reveals the world’s largest landlocked region. From end to end, across both the northern and southern routes, the vast deserts and porous borders have aided nomads and invaders for over two millenia, while the Tien Shan mountains establish the region’s border with China to the east (although the Uighurs of northeast China identify themselves ethnically more with the populations across the Tien Shan mountains than with the rest of China). The economy of the region has long been subject to the fluctuating importance of the area as a transit route for trade and, more recently, energy resources. Agriculture has also been a significant sector of the region’s economy, albeit not without significant government intervention, whether in the form of Soviet collectivization or market-driven irrigation of cotton fields. For most of Central Asia’s history, cities, linked together only by long desert trails, served as the primary political, economic, and cultural centers. The intermingling of so many peoples, whether by choice or by subjugation, over two millenia left a legacy of linguistic, ethnic, and religious diversity throughout Greater Central Asia. Until very recently, empires and caliphates ruling from distant imperial homes determined the borders of the region. The modern nation state, one with a sovereign central government and well-defined borders, developed in Central Asia briefly in the early twentieth century

after the fall of the Ottoman empire. The Soviet takeover shortly thereafter, however, provided little opportunity for independent states to develop. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 allowed new states to arise. These states were demarcated by borders established more by the previous Soviet regime than by local preferences. Modern political boundaries do little to impact the ethnographic and religious diversity of Greater Central Asia resulting from the region’s history of invasions, migrations, and empire. West of the Caspian Sea, most nations are dominated by their majority ethnic populations, with Armenians and Azeris comprising more than 97 and 90 percent of Armenia and Azerbaijan respectively. They are the most ethnically homogenous in the region, followed closely by Georgia. Across the Caspian to the east, however, the nations contain greater diversity. Kazakhstan’s population contains a large percentage of Russians, as well as a smaller number of Ukrainians, Uzbeks, Germans, and others. Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, but contribute less than half to the country’s overall population, with Tajiks comprising nearly a third, followed by Hazaras, Uzbeks, and other groups. Russians make up the largest minority groups in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Armenia and Georgia stand out among the nine countries covered here as predominantly Christian nations (although nearly 10 percent of Georgians are Muslim). Kazakhstan’s ethnic diversity is mirrored in its religious diversity, with Islam and Christianity (predominantly but not exclusively Russian Orthodox Christianity) each accounting for between 45 and 50 percent of the population. The populations of the remaining six countries largely identify with Sunni Islam, although Shii and Orthodox Christian minorities exist across the region, with Afghanistan having the largest Shii minority, comprising nearly 20 percent of the population. Armenia is considered the world’s earliest Christian state, dating to the turn of the fourth century CE. To the east, sedentary tribes inhabiting present-day Uzbekistan and Tajikistan adopted Islam, introduced by Arab invaders in the seventh century CE. The traditionally nomadic peoples in what is currently Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan were affected by Islam later and to a lesser extent. It is only recently that Islam has become a factor of political mobilization in the Central Asian region, mostly related to the spread of political Islam out of Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Central Asia has risen rapidly on the international political agenda in the post–9/11 era as the United States pays unprecedented attention to the region, particularly but not exclusively in the form of forward positioning of military forces needed for the conflict in Afghanistan. The Russian government did not initially object to these developments, but as time goes on Central Asia is once again the setting for a Great Game (a reference to the nineteenth century power politics maneuvering between Great Britain and Russia as the latter sought to protect its South Asian frontier from the southward-driving Russians). Now, the United States and Russia square off in their own Great Game as each power tries to secure access to former Soviet military bases. In addition, the area’s oil and natural gas reserves, as well

INTRODUCTION

as its value for transiting these resources to markets (given the landlocked nature of the region), have increased the attention of energy hungry nations such as China and Iran. Other players in the global petro-political arena are also taking note of the region, from China southward and westward to Eurasia and the Middle East. A combination of major world events shaped the contemporary domestic political arrangements in each of the Central Asian countries, namely the collapse of the Soviet Union and Communist political doctrine, the end of the Cold War, the rise of radical Islam and post–9/11 anti-terrorism efforts, and the increased global competition for energy resources. These major events, however, unfold within the local context of longstanding historical trends, especially in regard to the ethnic divisions in Central Asian civil society. Democratization has not occurred in the post–Soviet era as quickly or as comprehensively as many interested observers had hoped, but important changes took place in this direction in individual countries, particularly in Georgia. The most common form of governance in Central Asia is a strident presidentialism, in which elections are manipulated for the benefit of the incumbent strongman leader, many of whom were Communist leaders during the Soviet era and who have now recast themselves as nationalists. In many cases, however, these presidents retain power only through careful balancing of the interests of local power brokers whose names do not appear in headlines but who wield enormous influence on the local level.

History and Identities Many Central Asian peoples and cultures have been shaped by a history of nomadic living, the region’s position as a crossroads between East and West as illustrated by the Silk Road trade route, invasion, and empire. The earliest histories and exact identities of Central Asian peoples are largely undetermined. Nomadic life likely emerged from cattle-breeding people along the four-thousand-mile corridor between emerging eastern and western civilizations in the first millennium BCE. The steppes and deserts provided natural ground for land-faring people. By the fourth century BCE Eurasia became subject to the maneuverings of the imperial powers of the day, including the Hellenic, Roman, Parthian, and Sassanid empires. In the mid-seventh century CE Islam spread throughout the region, first through Arab conquest and then through both Arab and Turkic rule across Greater Central Asia. Arab conquests by the mid-eighth century included all of Central Asia. During this time a major schism developed within Islam that continues today—the split between Shiis, who believe the leadership (or caliphate) of the Islamic community (umma) must be direct descendants of Muhammad, and the Sunnis, who do not share the same religious leadership requirement. The Silk Road reached its height during China’s Tang dynasty (618–907). China’s power at this time brought stability to Greater Central Asia and lessened the threat from marauders, circumstances under which trade thrived. Changan, China, served as the starting point for all of the routes along the Silk

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Road, while the end point was near the Caspian Sea. When the Tang dynasty fell in the tenth century, the stability it brought to the region could not be maintained, and trade along the route decreased significantly while succeeding empires such as that of the Oghuz (Turkmen), Seljuks, and Mongols rose and fell. For the many clans and tribes inhabiting Central Asia, the desert and steppe lands provided the only constant throughout the centuries of empire. From the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries onward, Central Asian identities recognizable today began to develop. The Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and the Oghuz Turkmen established roughly consolidated khanates that, while still decidedly pre-modern, eventually shaped the ethnic composition of today’s sovereign states. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Mongol and Ottoman empires declined as other outsiders moved in. The value of the region attracted the attention of expanding imperial powers in the nineteenth century, with Russia and Great Britain the most important colonizing powers for Central Asia. Britain turned to Central Asia to bolster its imperial standing in India. Russia expanded into Siberia and the Kazakh steppes, and many Russians migrated to Central Asia. This resulted in the largest influx of non-Russians into the Russian empire and the largest grab of non-Russian land to that time. The lives of the large tribes in the region whose livelihoods were long defined by nomadic herding of cattle, horses, and other animals were irrevocably disrupted by the new, agriculturallybased settlers. The power politics defining Anglo-Russian relations in this period are commonly referred to as the Great Game, and this same phrase has resurfaced in application to the multilateral competition for influence and energy resources in the 21st century. The British established a presence in Central Asia that was motivated by the need for a buffer zone to protect the empire’s interest in South Asia, especially vis-`a-vis Russian southward colonization throughout the region, The two countries competed against one another from Iran during the demise of the Ottoman empire to Afghanistan. In fact, Afghanistan’s borders were largely decided by the British and the Russians through a series of agreements at the turn of the twentieth century. In the decade spanning the turn of the twentieth century, roughly 1895 to 1905, Anglo-Russian agreements established their imperial borders without regard to ethnic makeup or for local officials such as the amir of Afghanistan. At the same time the Jadidist movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries sought to foster unity among Turkic peoples, though at this time nationalism was rising rapidly to challenge attempts at establishing broad pannationalist political systems. The movement was one of panTurkism, in other words, the belief that the Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and (mistakenly) the Tajiks are all Turkic peoples and that divisions among them should be subsumed by an overarching and unifying identity. The challenge for such a pannationalist goal was that, in much of Central Asia, loyalties remained centered on localized clan leaders, not the broader abstraction of nationalism; furthermore, including the Tajiks meant incorporating Persians within a pan-Turkic identity. The

24

INTRODUCTION

Jadidist attempt to envelope the Tajiks into a pan-Turkic identity movement was in effect an attempt to overcome centuries of a history defined by separatism between Turks and Persians. Jadidism was both a pan-nationalist movement and an attempt to adapt Islam to the modern world. It emphasized the promotion of science and modern educational principles as being beneficial to Muslim society, detracting from the conservatism of many Muslim leaders. The Jadids eventually fell victim to Joseph Stalin’s purges and by 1938 were annihilated. Toward the end of the century, Jadidist ideals briefly resurfaced in post-Soviet Uzbekistan, but President Islam Karimov suppressed them. Civil war broke out in Russia after the 1917 Bolshevik revolution and directly affected Central Asia. Muslim guerillas in the briefly independent nations across Central Asia unsuccessfully opposed the Bolsheviks attempts to consolidate Soviet power. The Soviet Union needed to stamp out nationalism through Russification, which attempted to subsume traditional cultural and national identities to create a unified Soviet culture. An example of Russification is the forced change in writing (such as replacing Arabic with Cyrllic alphabet) and language (persistently introducing Russian throughout the region). By the end of the Soviet era, however, scholars were commenting on the limited success of Russianization in Central Asia, as the use of Turkic, Arabic, and Persian words and phrases resurfaced. The Soviets also instituted a forced movement of people, primarily intended to establish careful balances of populations within and across the Soviet republics. In addition to nationalism, the Soviet Union’s ideology of Communist atheism was at odds with the religious beliefs of Central Asian peoples. The Soviets attempted anti-Islamic policies such as closing mosques and clamping down on religious education, but achieved limited success. When the Soviet Union needed the support of its Muslim subjects during World War II, it lifted many of these measures, most temporarily. Islam in much of Central Asia at this time was for the large part apolitical, though change in that regard developed in some areas as the Soviet grasp weakened, in part because of the long and ultimately failed Soviet conflict against Muslim forces in Afghanistan during the 1980s, which contributed at least in part to the downfall of the Soviet empire.

Regional and Global Politics in the Post-Cold War and Post–9/11 era In the post–Cold War era, the governments of Central Asia, upon gaining independence from the Soviet Union, affirmed their sovereignty through membership in a host of intergovernmental organizations, including the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank. Multilateral organizations have been used by the nearby states of Russia and China to protect their interests in Central Asia. Russia established the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which includes the former Soviet states, to encourage economic cooperation and integration. Russia more often uses the CIS to justify its political intervention in the region. With the exception of the

energy market, such interventions meet with limited success. Russia serves as both supplier and transit route for oil and gas. In 2006 and 2007 Russia coerced higher fees and even stopped the flow of oil to neighboring, post–Soviet nations in Europe, the effects of which were felt beyond those national borders. Russian options in Central Asia, however, are constrained by several factors. For example, Russia is dependent on energy resources it buys cheaply from Central Asian nations such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and then sells for great profit to European customers. This limits its ability to exact political concessions from Central Asian supplier nations, as does China’s rapid rise as a potential competitor for these energy resources, which has given Central Asian nations a place to turn should relations with Russia become too difficult. Finally, Russia’s energy infrastructure is physically deteriorating and in need of great investment capital for its long-term ability to serve the country’s interests. Thus far Moscow has been using its energy-driven wealth to bolster itself back into great power politics and not to make these necessary investments. Over the long term, the decay of pipelines and roads will cost Russia both economically and politically. Russia has not succeeded in establishing and maintaining hegemony through the CIS because of limitations on Russian capabilities, Central Asian nations’ fierce protection of their independence, and the balancing effect of U.S. and Chinese interests in the region. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), grounded in the CIS-related Collective Security Treaty of the early 1990s, is another Russian effort to secure its interests in the region. Central Asian governments, however, react differently to pressure from Moscow. Uzbekistan, for example, values its independence; it joined and then withdrew from the CSTO, as well as from the GUAM (formerly GUUAM) organization—now constituted by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova—which was created to manage common economic, political, and security-related issues. Russian efforts at influence are challenged by the expansion of U.S. influence through both NATO partnerships and bilateral arrangements. U.S. support for the “colored revolutions” in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan in the early to mid-2000s, however, raised the stakes for wary Central Asian presidents whose retention of power depends on stability more than on political change. They must now weigh the costs and benefits of doing business with a nation that, under U.S. President George W. Bush, has announced its support for spreading democracy in the world. The situation became more complicated, and the stakes significantly raised, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. With the post–Soviet Taliban government harboring Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda infrastructure, Afghanistan came under a U.S.-led military coalition operation in October 2001 after it ousted the Taliban. Coalition forces continue to maintain a presence in the country. The conflict was soon felt throughout the Central Asian region and also affected the Russian-American relationship. In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Russian President Vladimir Putin supported U.S. efforts. Once it became clear

INTRODUCTION

that the United States had turned a more strategic eye to Central Asia, however, he moderated that support. The United States sought to gain access to military bases in Central Asian countries to provide its forces with bases from which to wage its war on terror and support burgeoning democracies. Russia turned its attention to acquiring the same bases in order to maintain its power in the region in the face of the growing U.S. presence. While some Central Asian nations welcomed the United States and the deals for trade and financial assistance it offered in exchange for military bases, the governing regimes soon felt the disadvantages of dealing with the superpower. U.S. support for the pro-democratic forces in Kyrgyzstan that overthrew the authoritarian government alarmed officials in Uzbekistan, where President Islam Karimov worried about similar political movements among his own people. As it turns out, there was cause for concern. In May 2005 government forces in Uzbekistan fired upon a protesting crowd, causing hundreds of casualties and prompting complaints from the United States and the European Union. Uzbekistan responded by ordering the evacuation of the United States from the Karshi-Khanabad airbase. The United States complied with the order but cut off aid to Uzbekistan as a punitive measure. Kyrgyzstan then granted the United States permission to utilize its Manas airport. The recently elected Kyrgyz national government in Bishkek has expended great effort to maintain pragmatically balanced relationships with the United States, Russia, and China. Just as the Silk Road served as a key crossroads between East and West in the past, Central Asia continues to play a significant role in geopolitics and geoeconomics. As the United States and Russia race to establish a strong military presence in the region, each Central Asian nation carefully considers which will support and maintain the governing regime before picking the better ally. At the same time, outside nations eye the region for the energy resources it offers. As rising (or reemerging) world powers like China, India, and Russia require greater access to energy supplies and the United States continues to consume a quarter of the world’s energy usage, the reserves of natural gas and oil in the Caspian Sea and throughout Central Asia are at a premium. The dilemmas surrounding the Caspian Sea energy reserves provide a case study in the high stakes game of petro-politics. The Caspian Sea is bordered by Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan. Although experts lack consensus on the amount of oil and gas to be found under the Caspian Sea, even the low-end estimates are significant enough to illicit high-level attention among all interested players, who argue over how to divide the reserves. Russia argues that the Caspian is actually a lake rather than a sea, whereas the Central Asians argue that it is a sea. The designation is of vital importance. If the Caspian is considered a lake, international law holds that access to its resources is open to negotiation among the interested parties. If the Caspian is a sea, however, the rules allow each coastal country to claim an exclusive zone along its shore. This is significant because the oil and gas reserves in the Russian and Iranian sectors are likely far less than those of the areas bordering Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan.

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Therefore, if the Caspian were declared a lake and its reserves evenly divided, Russia’s and Iran’s claimed shares would greatly increase and that of Azerbaijan would significantly decrease; conversely, Azerbaijan would claim a greater share if each nation was permitted to access only its own exclusive zone. For its part, China has also used energy security, concerns over terrorism, and international organization to influence events in Central Asia. China’s rapidly growing and modernizing economy increases the nation’s dependence on energy imports, thereby catapulting China into the 21st century Great Game. The Caspian reserves have also caught China’s interest. Another priority linking China to Central Asia is terrorism. Externally, China has used international organization to foster collaboration against terrorist threats to increase the political stability of the surrounding region. In 1996 China created the Shanghai Five—comprised of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—to settle long-standing disputes over territorial boundaries among these five bordering nations. Once the five nations reached agreement on this matter, they determined to meet regularly to address issues of common concern. Within a short period, extremist terrorism rose to the top of their agenda. The admission of Uzbekistan into the group in 2001 led to a new name for the organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and an intensified focus on the terrorist threat. One of the primary reasons for including Uzbekistan is the rise of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a radical group intent on the overthrow of Uzbek President Islam Karimov. The group formed in 1998 and has since represented a serious military threat not only to Uzbekistan but to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as well. IMU also operates out of Afghanistan and has allegedly received support from Saudi Arabia, making it a transnational entity. The SCO has become a prominent forum for its members to cooperate in their common counterterrorist cause. This cooperation has taken the form of financial aid from China, militaryto-military contacts, and, most prominently, the founding of an antiterrorism center in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. The harshness of the 2005 Uzbek crackdown on Islam, in which hundreds of Muslim protestors were killed, has not drawn criticism from China and the other SCO partners as it did from the United States and the European Union.

Change and Continuity The political landscape across Greater Central Asia is as it has always been—defined by the physical landscape and the interests of outsiders intervening within for self-interested purposes. Twenty-first century political modernization seemed to be arriving with the Rose Revolution in Georgia (2003), the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004), and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan (2005). The death of Turkmenistan’s President Saparmurad Niyazov, who had taken the nationalist name of Turkmenbashi, may have presented an opportunity to continue this promising if uncertain trend toward more open politics and

26

INTRODUCTION

civil society, but this failed to occur when participation in elections to replace Niyazov was denied to key opposition figures. The 2005 crackdown on protestors in Uzbekistan revealed its support for democracy to be superficial, despite its cooperation with the West. As soon as the West complained about the brutal crackdown, Uzbekistan ordered the United States to vacate the military base it was occupying as a staging area for the war in Afghanistan. The government of Kyrgyzstan then demand higher fees for its accommodation of U.S. forces, which may result in another severed relationship with the West. In the meantime, Kazakhstan continues to tread cautiously in its foreign affairs, attempting to maintain positive and lucrative relations with Russia, China, and the United States as these three great powers maneuver for advantage throughout the region. An important example of the delicacy of this balancing act is the recent creation of a Central Asian Nuclear-WeaponFree Zone (CANWFZ), as instituted in a treaty signed in September 2006, by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan at a former Soviet nuclear testing site in Kazakhstan. Nuclear-weapon-free zones have been created by treaties in other world regions, including Antarctica, Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. This was the first nuclear-weapon-free zone to be created in the northern hemisphere. On the surface, it would seem likely that the news of this treaty would be welcomed universally given the tensions surrounding North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France, however, refused to send delegations to the treaty signing ceremony out of concern for a provision in the treaty that may grant precedence to existing treaties, particularly the Collective Security Treaty, that conceivably could lead to the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons within Central Asia, thus negating the purpose of the CANWFZ treaty itself. The treaty will take effect when each of the signatory nations ratify it. Azerbaijan is engaged in difficult negotiations with Armenia over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the enclave within Azerbaijan populated mostly by Armenians. In Soviet times, Nagorno-Karabakh was an autonomous region, but upon sovereignty Azerbaijan claimed the province for itself. Thirty thousand people perished in war over the area in the immediate

post–Soviet era, and Armenia and Azerbaijan have remained in a vicious cycle of diplomacy and recriminations, with Armenian troops preventing Azeri refugees from returning to their homes, just as Azeris prevent Armenian refugees from returning to their homes in Baku, the national capital of Azerbaijan. The Minsk Group, formed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and comprised of France, Russia, and the United States, has been attempting to mediate the issue, with limited success. To complicate matters further, the people of Nagorno-Karabakh in late 2006 adopted a constitution of their own, declaring sovereignty for themselves. Not surprisingly, the government of Azerbaijan rejects the referendum’s outcome, though it is willing to continue negotiations that may result in a level of autonomy for the enclave. Additionally, petro-politics continues to raise tensions and opportunities across Central Asia. Long supported by the United States, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, constructed specifically to avoid both Russian and Iranian transit routes, has been completed and is expected to result in a financial windfall for Azerbaijan, once one of the poorest republics of the Soviet Union. While in many regards this would be considered good news for the Azeri nation, the government of Azerbaijan has already made public its plans to use these funds toward military modernization, which could further fuel the flames of conflict with Armenia. The conflict in Afghanistan between Taliban and U.S.led coalition forces continues to endanger the stability of the elected Afghani government. Afghanistan, like many Central Asian nations, has a diverse ethnic and linguistic community. Traditional political factions between Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and others persist and hinder the establishment of an overarching Afghan nationalism. Such factional differences continue to determine the course of events within the context of the war between the United States and its NATO allies against Taliban and al-Qaeda forces, with observers noting an increase in Taliban-controlled areas of the country. Gregory Granger is Associate Professor of Political Science, and Acting Director of the School of Social Sciences at Northwestern State University in Natchitoches, Louisiana.

PART TWO

G OV E R N M E N T S

A F G H A N I S TA N ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

OF

AFGHANISTAN

The Country Strategically located between the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Indian subcontinent, Afghanistan is a land marked by physical and social diversity. Physically, the landlocked country ranges from the high mountains of the Hindu Kush in the northeast to low-lying deserts along the western border. Pushtuns (alternatively Pashtuns or Pathans) constitute the largest of the population groups, followed by Tajiks, who speak Dari (an Afghan variant of Persian); others include Uzbeks, Hazaras, Baluchis, and Turkomans. The Kuchi tribespeople, primarily Pushtuns and Baluchis who maintain a centuries-old nomadic lifestyle, reportedly number 1.3–1.5 million. Tribal distinctions (except among the Tajiks) may cut across ethnic cleavages, while religion is a major unifying factor: 90 percent of the people profess Islam (80 percent Sunni and the remainder Shiite [mostly from the Hazara population]). Prior to the Taliban takeover in 1996, women constituted a growing percentage of the paid work force in urban areas, particularly in health services and education, although female participation in government was minuscule. In the countryside the role of women has for a long time been heavily circumscribed by traditional Islamic fundamentalist strictures, which the Taliban movement also imposed on the urban population. The interim administration of December 2001, transitional government of June 2002, and permanent government of December 2004 all included women, while a significant number of seats were reserved for women in the new National Assembly inaugurated in late 2005. However, Amnesty International concluded in early 2006 that the status of women had not improved nearly as much as

had been anticipated following the fall of the Taliban, with rape, abduction, and forced marriage still commonplace, particularly beyond Kabul. Economically, Afghanistan is one of the world’s poorest countries, with a per capita GNP of less than $200 a year in 2004. Nearly 80 percent of the labor force is engaged in agriculture (largely at a subsistence level). The country’s extensive mineral deposits are largely unexploited except for natural gas. Industry is virtually nonexistent. For many years the Soviet Union was Afghanistan’s leading trade partner, while development aid from the West and from such international agencies as the Asian Development Bank was suspended as a result of the Soviet military

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intervention in late 1979. Thereafter, more than 20 years of civil war and subsequent turmoil left an estimated 2 million dead and much of the country in ruins. The Taliban government, which spent most of its energy following its partial takeover in 1996 in an attempt to secure complete control of the country, was described as having “no apparent economic program.” The current major source of income reportedly is opium; as much as 90 percent of the world’s heroin reportedly originates in Afghanistan. The rate of childhood death (mostly from preventable diseases) is among the highest in the world, and the illiteracy rate is estimated at 80 percent. Nearly all girls and two-thirds of boys reportedly did not attend school under the Taliban regime, the former in large part because of Taliban policy against education for women. (It was reported in 2005 that some 54 percent of schoolaged children were now enrolled.) Life expectancy is only 45 years, an estimated 50 percent of the population lives in poverty, and 75 percent of the population lacks access to safe water. Economic development is hampered by the fact that much of the nation’s wealth is concentrated in the hands of powerful warlords backed by private militias. Western nations were eager in 1997 and early 1998 to see a resolution to the Afghan conflict so that progress could be made in laying oil and gas pipelines across the country from the huge and largely unexploited fields in Central Asia. However, alternate plans were subsequently adopted to run the pipelines through other countries as fighting continued in Afghanistan. Renewed Western interest in cross-Afghanistan pipelines returned following the overthrow of the Taliban in late 2001 and the subsequent installation of a transitional government of national unity. However, the most immediate concerns of the new administration were to start rebuilding the nation’s infrastructure, facilitate the return of millions of refugees from neighboring countries, and remove land mines (observers described Afghanistan as the most heavily mined country in the world). The United States, which led the military campaign that deposed the Taliban, was accused in some circles of losing its focus on Afghanistan in

2002–2003 as attention shifted to events involving Iraq. However, in 2004 the United States allocated $1.8 billion for reconstruction in Afghanistan and also increased the number of U.S. troops dedicated to fighting Taliban and al-Qaida remnants in Afghanistan. Overall, Western donors pledged $8.2 billion in new aid at a conference in April 2004 that also endorsed the Karzai administration’s economic plans. However, private foreign investors remained leery of ongoing security problems and perceived deep-seated corruption at all levels of authority. In general, the transitional government received praise for its “crisis management” during 2002–2004. Following its installation in late 2004, the new permanent administration pledged to pursue long-term stability and economic expansion through the promotion of free-market activity. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) in early 2006 estimated economic growth at 8 percent in 2004–2005 and nearly 14 percent in 2005–2006. However, journalists described the country as having “no viable economy” and noted that the government continued to rely on foreign aid for nearly all of its budget and foreign troops for its security. All observers agreed that opium production was on the rise after a failed eradication program in 2005.

Government and Politics Political Background The history of Afghanistan reflects the interplay of a number of political forces, the most important of which traditionally were the monarchy, the army, religious and tribal leaders, and foreign powers. The existence of the country as a political entity is normally dated from 1747, when the Persians were overthrown and the foundations of an Afghan Empire were established by Ahmad Shah DURANI. His successors, however, proved relatively ineffective in the face of dynastic and tribal conflicts coupled, in the 19th century, with increasingly frequent incursions by the Russians and British. The latter wielded decisive influence during the reign of ABDUR RAHMAN Khan and in 1898 imposed acceptance of the Durand line,

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Political Status: Republic established following military coup that overthrew traditional monarchy in July 1973; constitution of 1977 abolished following coup of April 27, 1978; successor regime, established following coup of December 27, 1979, effectively overthrown on April 16, 1992; successor regime effectively overthrown by the Taliban in late September 1996 but claimed to remain legitimate government; interim administration installed in December 2001 following overthrow of the Taliban; transitional government installed in June 2002; new constitution providing for multiparty democracy approved by a Loya Jirga (Grand National Council) on January 4, 2004; permanent government of the newly renamed Islamic Republic of Afghanistan established by inauguration of the president on December 7, 2004, and the cabinet on December 23. Area: 249,999 sq. mi. (647,497 sq. km.). Population: 13,051,358 (1979C), excluding an estimated 2.5 million nomads; 24,121,000 (2005E, including nomads). Nomads and refugees in western Pakistan and northern Iraq at one time totaled more than 5 million, many of whom have recently returned to Afghanistan. Major Urban Centers (2005E): KABUL (3,082,000), Kandahar (341,000), Herat (268,000), Mazar-i-Sharif (197,000). Official Languages: Pushtu, Dari (Persian); in addition, the 2004 constitution authorized six

which established the country’s southern and eastern borders but which, by ignoring the geographic distribution of the Pushtun tribes, also laid the foundation for subsequent conflict over establishment of a Pushtunistan state. Emir AMANULLAH succeeded in forcing the British to relinquish control over Afghan foreign affairs in 1919 and attempted to implement such reforms as modern education, women’s rights, and increased taxation before being forced to abdicate under pressure from traditional leaders. The outbreak of World War II severely damaged the economy: markets were lost and access to imports and credit was cut off. Subsequently,

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minority languages (Baluchi, Nuristani, Pamiri, Pashai, Turkmen, and Uzbek) to serve as official third languages in the areas where the majority speaks them. Monetary Unit: Afghani (market rate July 1, 2006: 43.00 afghanis = $1US). The afghani was “essentially worthless” during the Taliban regime (1996–2001). In late 2002 the transitional government introduced a “new afghani” to replace the old afghani at a rate of 1,000 old afghanis = 1 new afghani. President: Hamid KARZAI (nonparty); appointed chair of the new interim administration at the UN-sponsored Bonn Conference on December 5, 2001, and inaugurated on December 22 for a six-month term (for a detailed description of the complicated issue of the leadership of Afghanistan prior to Karzai’s inauguration, see the 2000–2002 Handbook); elected president of the new transitional government by an “emergency” Loya Jirga on June 13, 2002, and inaugurated on June 19 for a term that was scheduled not to exceed two years; elected by popular vote on October 9, 2004, and sworn in for a five-year term on December 7. Vice Presidents: Karim KHALILI and Ahmad Zia MASOUD; elected on October 9, 2004, and inaugurated on December 7 for a term concurrent with that of the president. (For a detailed description of the prior vice-presidential situation, see the 2000–2002 Handbook.)

dissent among intellectuals and failure to resolve the Pushtunistan issue led to a crisis of leadership. Prince Sardar Mohammad DAOUD, designated prime minister in 1953, succeeded in obtaining economic aid from both the United States and the Soviet Union, while modernization of the army helped to alleviate the threat posed by tribes hostile to the government. Politically, however, Daoud was quite conservative, ignoring the legislature, jailing his critics, and suppressing opposition publications. His dismissal in 1963 was followed by a series of moves toward a more modern political system, including the promulgation of a new constitution in 1964 and the holding of a

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parliamentary election in 1965. Nevertheless, problems were subsequently encountered, including recurrent famine; a worsening financial situation; increased restiveness on the part of the small, educated middle class; and a sense of impatience with civilian rule. The distress led in 1973 to a military coup, the overthrow of the monarch (Mohammad ZAHIR SHAH), and the return of Daoud as president of a newly proclaimed republic. On April 27, 1978, in the wake of unrest stemming from the assassination of a prominent opposition leader in Kabul, the Daoud regime was overthrown in a left-wing coup led by the deputy air force commander, Col. Abdul KHADIR. On April 30 a newly constituted Revolutionary Council designated Nur Mohammad TARAKI, secretary general of the formerly outlawed People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), as its president and announced the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, with Taraki as prime minister. On March 27, 1979, Taraki yielded the office of prime minister to party hard-liner Hafizullah AMIN while remaining titular head of state by virtue of his presidency of the Revolutionary Council. It was officially announced on September 16, 1979, that the PDPA Central Committee had unanimously elected Amin as its secretary general, and shortly thereafter the Revolutionary Council designated him to succeed Taraki as president. While Kabul radio reported on October 9 that Taraki had died after “a severe and prolonged illness,” foreign observers generally assumed that the former president had succumbed on September 17 to wounds received three days earlier during an armed confrontation at the presidential palace. Subsequent reports suggested that a Soviet-backed effort by Taraki to remove the widely disliked Amin as part of a conciliatory policy toward rebel Muslim tribesmen had, in effect, backfired. Such suspicions intensified when Moscow, from December 25 to 26, airlifted some 4,000–5,000 troops to Kabul, which resulted in Amin’s death and replacement on December 27 by his longtime PDPA rival, Babrak KARMAL, theretofore living under Soviet protection in Czechoslovakia. Karmal proved scarcely

more acceptable to the rebels than Amin, however, his regime being supported primarily by the continued presence of Soviet military personnel (estimated to number more than 110,000 by mid-1982). During the ensuing three years, the level of Soviet military involvement increased marginally because of continued resistance throughout the country by mujaheddin (“holy warrior”) guerrillas, operating largely from rural bases and supplied from Pakistan, where more than 3 million Afghans had sought refuge. However, in 1985 a semblance of constitutional government was restored. A partially elected Loya Jirga was convened on April 23, for the first time in eight years; it promptly endorsed the Soviet presence, while elections for local village councils were held from August through October, despite disruptions attributable to mujaheddin activity. On May 4, 1986, after a visit to the Soviet Union for what were described as medical reasons, Karmal stepped down as PDPA secretary general in favor of the former head of the state intelligence service, Mohammad NAJIBULLAH (Najib). On November 20 Karmal asked to be relieved of his remaining government and party posts, being succeeded as head of the Revolutionary Council by Haji Mohammad CHAMKANI, who was, however, designated only on an acting basis. In December 1986 the PDPA Central Committee endorsed Najibullah’s plan for “national reconciliation,” calling for a cease-fire, political liberalization, and the formation of a coalition government. Although the seven-party mujaheddin alliance refused to negotiate and intense fighting continued, the government promoted its democratization campaign in 1987 by legalizing additional political parties, drafting a new constitution providing for an elected national legislature, and conducting local elections. However, in practical terms there was little challenge to Najibullah’s consolidation of power: the Revolutionary Council on September 30, 1987, unanimously elected him as its president, and on November 30 the Loya Jirga, having approved the new constitution, named him as the first president of the republic (“Democratic” having been deleted from the country’s name).

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On April 14, 1988, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Soviet Union, and the United States concluded a series of agreements providing for a Soviet troop withdrawal within one year. Elections to the new National Assembly (Meli Shura) were held the same month, although the government was unable to convince the mujaheddin to participate. On May 26 the Revolutionary Council dissolved itself in deference to the assembly and, in a further effort by the government to reduce the appearance of PDPA dominance, Dr. Mohammad Hasan SHARQ, who was not a PDPA member, was appointed chair of the Council of Ministers to replace Soltan Ali KESHTMAND. The Soviet troop withdrawal was completed on February 15, 1989, precipitating significant political moves by both the government and mujaheddin. Najibullah quickly dropped all non-PDPA members from the Council of Ministers; concurrently, a state of emergency was declared and a new 20member Supreme Council for the Defense of the Homeland was created to serve, under Najibullah’s leadership, as the “supreme military and political organ” for the duration of the emergency. On February 21 Keshtmand effectively resumed the duties of prime minister through his appointment as chair of the Council of Ministers’ Executive Committee. For their part, the mujaheddin vowed to continue their resistance until an Islamic administration had been installed in Kabul. On February 24, 1989, the rebels proclaimed a “free Muslim state” under an Afghan Interim Government (AIG) headed by Imam Sibghatullah MOJADEDI as president and Abdul Rasul SAYAF as prime minister. However, the widespread belief that the rebels would quickly vanquish the Najibullah regime proved incorrect, despite two reported coup plots in December and a nearly successful uprising led (in apparent collusion with rebel fundamentalist Gulbuddin HEKMATYAR) by the hard-line defense minister, Lt. Gen. Shahnawaz TANAI, in March 1990. On May 7, 1990, President Najibullah named Fazil Haq KHALIQYAR, a former ministeradvisor in the Executive Council, to succeed Keshtmand as prime minister. Half of the members of the cabinet subsequently named by Khaliqyar were

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described as politically “neutral.” From May 28 to 29 the Loya Jirga convened in Kabul to reiterate its commitment to private sector development and to ratify a number of reform-minded constitutional amendments. On May 27, 1991, Najibullah announced that his government was prepared to observe a ceasefire with the mujaheddin to permit implementation of a peace plan advanced by UN Secretary General Javier P´erez de Cu´ellar that would entail an end to external involvement in Afghan affairs and nationwide balloting to choose a new government. However, the offer was rejected by the AIG leadership. Two months later, at the conclusion of talks in Islamabad, Pakistan, the AIG reversed itself, stating that it “had recognized positive points” in the UN proposal. On September 1 the United States and the Soviet Union declared that they were halting arms supplies to the combatants. Trilateral discussions among U.S., USSR, and mujaheddin representatives were subsequently held on transfer of power to an interim regime that would oversee elections within two years. The fundamentalists, however, continued to call for Najibullah’s immediate removal and the scheduling of an early poll. On March 19, 1992, mujaheddin hard-liners rejected an offer by Najibullah to yield effective authority to an interim administration, reiterating their earlier demand that he resign. By early April, on the other hand, a pronounced shift in the balance of power had emerged in the strategic northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif, where local militias were forming alliances with moderate mujaheddin units. The realignment cut across both government and insurgent groupings, inaugurating a new cleavage between southern Pushtun fundamentalists led by Hekmatyar and non-Pushtun northerners under the command of Ahmed Shah MASOUD. On April 16, 1992, Najibullah submitted his resignation and sought refuge in the Kabul UN office after four of his top generals had deserted to Masoud. Within a week, the eastern city of Jalalabad became the last provincial capital to fall to joint mujaheddin, militia, and former government forces, who thereupon initiated a successful assault on Kabul. On April 24 the leaders of six

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rebel groups met in Peshawar, Pakistan, to announce the formation of a 51-member Islamic Jihad Council (IJC), headed by Imam Mojadedi, to assume power in the capital. After two months the IJC was to be replaced by an interim administration under Burhanuddin RABBANI, with Hekmatyar as prime minister and Masoud as defense minister. However, Hekmatyar refused to participate, proceeding instead to launch an attack on his erstwhile allies. In three days of heavy fighting, Hekmatyar’s troops were unable to defeat the Masoud coalition, and on April 28 Mojadedi arrived to proclaim the formation of an Islamic republic. Meanwhile, Hekmatyar’s forces continued to ring Kabul’s southern and eastern outskirts, threatening to launch another offensive if Masoud did not break with the non-mujaheddin northerners (particularly with Gen. Abdul Rashid DOSTAM, an Uzbek, who had served under the former Communist regime). Subsequently, on May 25, Masoud and Hekmatyar agreed to halt hostilities and hold elections in six months. Even while they were talking, however, clashes were reported between units loyal to Hekmatyar and Dostam. In early June, fighting also broke out between Iranian-backed Hazara Shiites and Saudi Arabian–backed Sunni units loyal to Masoud. Reportedly the Shiites had demanded a minimum of eight ministerial posts in the Mojadedi government. Although initially indicating that he wished to continue as acting president beyond his two-month mandate, Mojadedi stepped down on June 28, 1992, in favor of Rabbani. Concurrently, Hekmatyar agreed to the appointment of his deputy, Ustad FARID, as prime minister of an interim cabinet. Formally invested on July 6, Farid was forced from office a month later, after heavy fighting had erupted in Kabul between pro- and anti-Rabbani groups, including a massive artillery bombardment by Hekmatyar’s forces that caused more than 1,800 deaths. On October 31, 1992, a Leadership Council, self-appointed five months earlier and chaired by Rabbani, extended the interim president’s mandate beyond its four-month limit, permitting Rabbani to convene a Council of Resolution and Settlement

in late December that elected him to a regular two-year term as head of state. Thereafter, Kabul was the scene of renewed fighting, culminating in a peace accord concluded by Rabbani and Hekmatyar in Islamabad, Pakistan, on March 7, 1993. The pact was endorsed by all but one of the major mujaheddin leaders. On March 8 Hekmatyar accepted appointment as prime minister, although differences immediately arose over the assignment of portfolios. On May 24, after further fighting in Kabul, a new cease-fire was announced, under which Masoud agreed to resign as defense minister and turn the ministry over to a tripartite commission. The principal obstacle having been overcome, a coalition cabinet was reportedly sworn in at an undisclosed location on June 17. However, the new administration was never effectively implemented in view of continued conflict between forces loyal to Rabbani and Hekmatyar, with General Dostam switching sides to join forces with Hekmatyar in fighting in Kabul and elsewhere in early 1994. In late June 1994 Rabbani’s troops succeeded in sweeping most Hekmatyar and Dostam units from the capital, and in mid-July the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) reported that all parties had agreed to a peace process. Concurrently, however, there were reports that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) was supplying large quantities of arms and ammunition to Hekmatyar, who commenced a systematic bombardment of Kabul after the Supreme Court had extended Rabbani’s presidential mandate for an additional six months without granting a similar extension of Hekmatyar’s prime ministerial mandate. On August 28, 1994, Maulawi Mohammad Nabi MOHAMMAD of the moderate Islamic Revolutionary Movement was named chair of a Loya Jirga convening commission in preparation for national elections. On November 6 Rabbani and his supporters accepted a modified version of a UN peace plan that called for a commission on which the principal mujaheddin units would have equal representation, with Rabbani subsequently announcing his willingness to step down as soon as “reliable mechanisms for a transfer of power” were in place.

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Meanwhile the balance of power within Afghanistan was disrupted by an incursion of several thousand young Taliban (Islamic students) supported by Pakistan’s fundamentalist Jamiat-ulUlema-e-Islam (Assembly of Islamic Clergy) and led by Maulana Fazlur RAHMAN. In November 1994 Taliban forces captured the city of Kandahar and initiated an anti-drug crusade throughout the opium-growing province of Helmand. The success of the new group appeared to reflect a major shift by Pakistan’s ISI away from Hekmatyar and gave rise to speculation that the new element in Afghanistan’s domestic turmoil might force a truce between Hekmatyar and Rabbani. After winning control of a third of the country’s provinces, the seemingly undefeatable Taliban by late February 1995 had driven Hekmatyar from his base at Charosyab, ten miles south of Kabul, and proceeded to advance on the capital. However, on March 11 the student militia suffered its first major defeat at the hands of Rabbani and Masoud and was subsequently forced to yield Charosyab to government forces. Routed in the east, the Taliban launched an offensive against the western city of Herat. That initiative also failed when Masoud dispatched a number of fighter bombers and some 2,000 troops to aid in the city’s defense. Further Taliban defeats followed, while the antiRabbani mujaheddin front collapsed with Hekmatyar’s withdrawal to the eastern city of Jalalabad and Dostam’s unwillingness to commit his forces to battle. On June 9, 1995, a truce was declared between government and Taliban forces. However, the latter mounted a major offensive in September that yielded the capture of Herat. On November 7 President Rabbani offered to resign if the Taliban agreed to a cease-fire and “foreign interference” (presumably by Pakistan in support of the Taliban) were to end. Thereafter, fighting intensified in the vicinity of Kabul, followed by peace talks in which the government succeeded in reaching an accommodation with Hekmatyar (although not with his erstwhile mujaheddin allies) providing for joint military action against the Taliban and for governmental power-sharing. Under a peace accord signed

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on May 24, 1996, the supporters of Rabbani and Hekmatyar undertook to cooperate on the organization of new elections and to establish “genuine Islamic government,” with Rabbani continuing as president and Hekmatyar being restored to the premiership. In accordance with the agreement, Hekmatyar was formally reappointed prime minister on June 26. Among the first actions of the restored prime minister were the closure of cinemas and the banning of music on radio and television on Sundays, on the grounds that such activities were contrary to Islamic precepts. However, the potential for a new round of conflict was apparent in the reaction of Hekmatyar’s former anti-Rabbani mujaheddin allies to the May agreement, which was to suspend Hekmatyar from membership of the coordination council established by the four main fundamentalist movements in 1994 under the leadership of former interim president Sibghatullah Mojadedi (leader of the National Liberation Front). More ominously for the new government, the predominantly Sunni Taliban guerrillas, still strongly backed by Pakistan, continued to make military advances in July and August 1996, so that by early September they controlled 18 of the country’s 30 provinces. The eastern city of Jalalabad, the country’s second largest, was captured on September 11, whereupon Taliban forces pursued retreating government troops to Kabul and mounted a new onslaught on the capital. After some heavy fighting on the eastern side of the city, resistance crumbled and the government fled. By September 25 Taliban units were in complete control of Kabul, where on September 27 a six-member Provisional Council was installed under the leadership of Mullah Mohammad RABBANI (not related to the ousted president). Meanwhile, Mullah Mohammad OMAR (the spiritual leader of the Taliban) assumed the status of de facto head of state. Among the first acts of the new rulers was to seize exPresident Najibullah from the UN compound in which he had lived since April 1992 and to execute him in summary fashion, together with his brother Shahpur AHMADZAY (who had served as his security chief) and two aides. The executions were justified by Mullah Rabbani on the grounds that

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the former president had been “against Islam, a criminal and a Communist.” After a period of disorganization, the ousted government of Burhanuddin Rabbani relocated to northern Afghanistan, where a military alliance of the regrouped government troops under Masoud’s command, the forces loyal to General Dostam, and Hazara fighters served to block the Taliban offensive. The military situation remained effectively stalemated until May 1997, when the Taliban troops were invited into the alliance’s stronghold at Mazari-Sharif by General Abdul Malik PAHLAWAN, who had apparently ousted General Dostam as leader of the National Front forces. However, just as the Taliban takeover of the entire country seemed imminent, General Pahlawan’s forces suddenly turned on the Taliban, killing, according to subsequent reports, some 2,000–3,000 Taliban fighters. Anti-Taliban groups, including, significantly, Hekmatyar’s Islamic Party, subsequently coalesced as the United National Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UNIFSA) and retained effective control of the north for the rest of the year. Collaterally, General Dostam, who had fled the country in June after Gen. Pahlawan’s “coup,” returned to Afghanistan in late October to wrest control of the Uzbek forces from Pahlawan, who apparently fled to Turkmenistan. Meanwhile, Mullah Omar was named emir of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan that was proclaimed by the Taliban on October 26, 1997. In early 1998 the Taliban and UNIFSA appeared willing to consider a negotiated settlement, agreeing in principle to establish a joint council of religious scholars to assist in the process. However, the Taliban olive branch did not extend to the Hazara Shiite community in central Afghanistan, where the regime was enforcing an economic blockade that was said to be threatening famine. Consequently, despite UN, U.S., and OIC mediation efforts, the peace talks quickly broke down, and heavy fighting was renewed. The Taliban launched what its supporters hoped would be a final offensive to secure total control of the country in midJuly, and Mazar-i-Sharif fell out of UNIFSA hands in mid-August. However, as Taliban forces ap-

proached the northern borders, neighboring countries sent troops to defend their own territory from possible fundamentalist incursions and also provided assistance to the beleaguered UNIFSA fighters. In addition, Iran, angered over the killing of eight of its diplomats during the recent fighting and concerned over the threat to the Afghan Shiite community, amassed some 250,000 soldiers along its border with Afghanistan, raising fears of a fullblown regional war. Further complicating matters, on August 20 U.S. cruise missiles struck camps in Afghanistan believed to be part of the alleged terrorist network run by Osama BIN LADEN. (The attack was ordered as retaliation for the bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania earlier in the month, in which Washington suspected bin Laden’s followers to have been involved.) Bin Laden’s presence in Afghanistan subsequently proved to be a barrier to Taliban attempts to gain additional international recognition. However, after the government rejected Western calls for bin Laden’s extradition, an Afghan court in November ruled that the United States had not produced evidence of his complicity in the embassy bombings and permitted him to remain in the country as long as he or his followers did not use it as a base for terrorist activity. In July 1999 U.S. President Bill Clinton imposed economic sanctions on Afghanistan as the result of the Taliban’s unwillingness to turn over bin Laden. Four months later, at Washington’s urging, the UN Security Council directed UN members to freeze overseas assets of the Taliban government and to halt all flights to Afghanistan to pressure Kabul regarding bin Laden as well as to protest the perceived mistreatment of women and other human rights abuses and ongoing opium production. (One correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor described the Taliban as having achieved the “rare feat of provoking the hostility of all five permanent members of the Security Council.” China, for example, reportedly expressed concern about Taliban influence on Islamic unrest within Chinese borders, while Russia went so far as to threaten to bomb Afghanistan if Kabul provided support to Chechen rebels or Islamist insurgents in neighboring Central Asian countries.) For their part, Taliban

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leaders appeared to remain preoccupied with attempting to secure control of the approximately 10 percent of the country in the northeast still in the hands of opposition forces. Major Taliban offenses were launched in the summers of 1999 and 2000, each being repulsed (after heavy fighting and largescale civilian dislocation) by fighters, now referenced as the Northern Alliance, led by Ahmed Shah Masoud. Consequently, in September 2000 discussion was reported on yet another peace plan, under which Masoud would have been given special administrative powers in an autonomous northeastern region. Negotiations between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban continued for the rest of 2000; however, they ultimately failed, and sporadic heavy fighting ensued in the first part of 2001. Meanwhile, tension intensified between the UN and the Taliban, the former rejecting a suggestion from the latter that bin Laden be tried in an Islamic country by Islamic religious leaders. Further complicating matters for the Taliban, Mullah Mohammad Rabbani, by then routinely referred to as chair of the Taliban’s “council of ministers,” died on April 15 of natural causes. Although he had been the architect of many of the harsh strictures imposed on the population by the Taliban, Rabbani had been viewed by the international community as more approachable than most of the rest of the Taliban leadership. He was also generally well-respected within Afghanistan for the prominent role he had played while a member of the Islamic Party (Hizb-i-Islami) in the mujaheddin war against the Soviets. Most of Rabbani’s duties were assumed by the vice chair of the ministerial council, Mohammed Hassan AKHUND, but no formal appointment to the chair was announced. The Taliban launched a major attack against the Northern Alliance in June 2001 and once again appeared dedicated to the pursuit of a final, complete military victory. However, such hopes were irrevocably compromised by the terrorist attacks on September 11 in the United States, which the Bush administration quickly determined to be the work of al-Qaida. Washington immediately demanded that bin Laden be turned over for prosecution or else military action would be initiated to remove

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him by force from Afghanistan. Intense debate was reported within the Taliban leadership on the issue, and efforts were made to forge a compromise under which, for example, bin Laden might be tried in a third country. However, President George W. Bush declared the U.S. terms to be “nonnegotiable,” and Mullah Omar finally decided that the Taliban would take a stand in defense of its “guest.” Consequently, after having secured broad “coalition” support for the action, the United States, declaring it was acting in self-defense, launched “Operation Enduring Freedom” on October 7 against al-Qaida and Taliban targets. By that time, it was clear that the assault was intended not only to destroy al-Qaida but also to produce a new regime in Afghanistan, Washington having concluded that al-Qaida and the Taliban were now “one and the same.” Heavy bombing by U.S. aircraft and cruise missiles quickly shattered the minimal infrastructure available to the Taliban military, while Omar’s call on October 10 to the rest of the Muslim world for assistance in countering the U.S. “invasion” elicited little response. The attention of the military campaign shifted later in the month to bombing alQaida and Taliban troops in the north to support a ground assault by the Northern Alliance. After a disorganized start, the anti-Taliban forces, substantially rearmed and resupplied by the United States and its allies, assumed an offensive posture at the end of October and drove toward the capital with few setbacks, as many warlords previously aligned with the Taliban defected to the Northern Alliance. The first big prize, Mazar-i-Sharif, fell on November 9, and Kabul was surrounded by November 11. The swiftness of the Taliban collapse apparently surprised coalition military planners, and confusion reigned over how control of the capital would be achieved, U.S. policy-makers being aware of the complicated political overtones involved in the establishment of a new Afghan government. Despite apparent U.S. wishes to the contrary, the Northern Alliance moved into Kabul November 12–13, and the administration of Burhanuddin Rabbani announced it was reassuming authority, at least over the territory now controlled by the Northern Alliance.

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Formal definition of the status of the Rabbani administration and governmental responsibility throughout the country overall remained illdefined following the fall of Kabul, pending the results of a UN-sponsored conference that convened in Bonn, Germany, on November 27, 2001, to negotiate a power-sharing post-Taliban government that would bridge the nation’s myriad cleavages. In addition to UNIFSA/Northern Alliance officials, attendees at the conference included representatives from the so-called Rome Group (supporters of Afghanistan’s former king, Mohammad Zahir Shah), the Peshawar Group (Afghan exiles who had been living in Pakistan), and a delegation of pro-Iranian refugees and exiles who had been centered in Cyprus. No Taliban officials were invited to participate. Initial negotiations at the Bonn Conference proved difficult regarding the issues of proposed international peacekeepers for Afghanistan (opposed by the Northern Alliance) and the selection of the head of the planned interim government. A collapse of the talks appeared possible over the latter when it became apparent that the choice would not be Rabbani or the 84-year-old ex-king. However, the conference on December 3 agreed upon Hamid KARZAI, an obscure former deputy minister with U.S. backing. Karzai was formally appointed on December 5 as chair of an interim administration that would eventually include a 29-member cabinet that had been carefully crafted to include as broad an ethnic base as possible. The Bonn Declaration that concluded the conference on December 5 authorized the interim government for only six months, by which time an emergency Loya Jirga was to have established a new transitional government to prepare for free elections of a permanent government. The conference participants also agreed that a UN peacekeeping force would be stationed in Kabul, although details on its mandate and size were left for further negotiation. Meanwhile, as plans for the installation of the interim administration proceeded, the military campaign against the remaining Taliban and alQaida forces continued unabated. After a sustained U.S. bombing campaign, the Taliban surrendered

its last remaining stronghold at Kandahar to the UNIFSA/Northern Alliance on December 7, although Mullah Omar and a number of Taliban ministers escaped capture, perhaps as part of controversial secret negotiations. The air assault subsequently focused on the cave complexes at Tora Bora southwest of Jalalabad, where it was estimated that as many as 1,700 al-Qaida and Taliban fighters may have died before the complex was overrun. (The fate of bin Laden subsequently remained unclear.) Karzai and his interim cabinet were inaugurated on December 22 in a ceremony in Kabul that featured a role for Rabbani as “outgoing president.” Notable attendees included General Dostam, who had threatened to boycott the proceedings because the Uzbek community was not sufficiently represented in the government. On December 26 Dostam accepted a post as vice chair of the interim administration and deputy defense minister. On January 10, 2002, final agreement was reached on the deployment of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), directed by the UN to assist in providing security in Kabul and surrounding areas but not to become involved outside that region. In May, the mandate of the ISAF (comprising some 4,500 troops from 19 countries at that point) was extended for another six months, some Western leaders reportedly pressing for its eventual extension to other areas of the country. Meanwhile, U.S. ground forces (upwards of 7,000 strong) remained in Afghanistan to conduct mopping-up activities against remnants of the Taliban and alQaida. No timetable was set for withdrawal of the American troops. Former King Zahir Shah, who had returned to Afghanistan in April, was given the honor of opening the emergency Loya Jirga in Kabul on June 12, 2002. On June 13 Karzai received about 80 percent of the votes against two minor candidates in the balloting for the president of the new transitional government, all potential major opponents (including Zahir Shah) having removed themselves from contention. On its final day (June 19) the council also endorsed, by a show of hands, the partial cabinet announced by Karzai. However, the council adjourned without having made a decision on the

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makeup of a proposed transitional legislature. The transitional government was authorized to hold power for up to two years, with a constitutional Loya Jirga to be convened in approximately 18 months to adopt a new constitution that would provide the framework for new elections by June 2004. In April 2003 President Karzai appointed a 33-member constitutional commission that drafted new basic law in November calling for a multiparty system headed by a president with broad powers and a mostly elected bicameral legislature. The constitution, with modifications, was approved by a Loya Jirga on January 4, 2004 (see Constitution and government, below, for details). Although both presidential and legislative elections were initially scheduled for June 2004, they were postponed due to difficulties in completing voter registration and other electoral arrangements. Presidential balloting was finally held on October 9, with Karzai winning in the first round of balloting with 55.4 percent of the vote. Authority was formally transferred from the transitional administration upon Karzai’s inauguration on December 7; Karzai appointed a new “reconstruction” cabinet on December 23.

Constitution and Government The Afghan Interim Government (AIG) announced by the mujaheddin on February 24, 1989, resulted from a 400-member consultative assembly (shura) that convened on February 10 in the Pakistani city of Rawalpindi. Nominal ministerial posts were distributed among the principal rebel factions on the basis of votes cast by the shura delegates, while a largely ceremonial president was named. However, many of Afghanistan’s northern and western provinces were unrepresented at the two-week conclave, and the shadow government contained no members of the country’s Shiite Muslim minority. A partial government announced on May 5, 1992, by Interim President Mojadedi stemmed not from the Rawalpindi conclave but from the Peshawar meeting of April 24. A substantial number of portfolios (including that of prime minister) remained unfilled (apparently because of the dis-

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pute with Hekmatyar), while many of the named appointees (Masoud, as defense minister, being a conspicuous exception) were relatively unknown. At the Islamabad meeting of March 1993 the appointment of Burhanuddin Rabbani as president was confirmed for an 18-month (later a two-year) period from December 1992, while the accord of May 24 on tripartite control of the defense ministry paved the way for the nominal installation of an allparty cabinet in mid-June. On January 28, 1995, the UN peace envoy, Mahmoud Mestiri, announced that plans were being finalized to transfer power to an interim council composed of two representatives from each of the country’s 30 provinces, plus 15–20 individuals nominated by the UN. However, prior to Hekmatyar’s defeat by the Taliban, Rabbani insisted that the latter also be permitted to name council members. The suggestion was opposed by Mestiri on the grounds that the students were “a different sort of force from the Afghan parties.” The issue became moot after the Taliban’s seizure of power in Kabul in September 1996. The Taliban quickly installed a six-member Provisional Council in Kabul that subsequently grew in stages into a full-fledged Council of Ministers. However, government decisionmaking authority appeared to remain in the hands of a small Taliban consultative council in Kandahar, the headquarters of the movement’s spiritual leader (and emir of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan proclaimed in October 1997), Mullah Mohammad Omar, who served, among other things, as de facto head of state and commander in chief of the armed forces. The constitution approved in January 2004 provided for a Western-style democracy with a strong central government headed by a popularly elected president (limited to two five-year terms) and a National Assembly (see Legislature, below, for details). The Loya Jirga (comprising the members of the assembly and the chairs of the proposed elected provincial and district councils) was institutionalized as the “highest manifestation of the people of Afghanistan” and given full responsibility to amend the constitution, prosecute the president if necessary, and “make decisions relating to

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independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and other supreme interests of the country.” The new basic law enshrined Islam as the state religion but guaranteed freedom for other religions to be practiced. Equal rights were guaranteed for men and women, as were freedom of expression and of association (see Political Parties and Groups, below, for details). Provision was made for an independent human rights commission and an independent judiciary headed by a Supreme Court comprising presidential appointees subject to confirmation by the lower house of the assembly. The new constitution authorized the establishment of the Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan pending what were expected to be simultaneous presidential and legislative elections. However, in view of the subsequent delay in holding assembly balloting, the transitional state was declared to have concluded with the inauguration in December 2004 of President Karzai to head the administration of the newly renamed Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The process of “institutioncreating” culminated in the election of provincial councils and the lower house of the new National Assembly on September 18, 2005 (see Legislature, below, for details).

Foreign Relations Afghan foreign policy historically reflected neutrality and nonalignment, but by the mid-1970s Soviet economic and military aid had become pronounced. After the April 1978 coup, the Taraki government, while formally committed to a posture of “positive nonalignment,” solidified relations with what was increasingly identified as “our great northern neighbor.” Following what was, for all practical purposes, Soviet occupation of the country in late 1979, the Karmal regime asserted that Soviet troops had been “invited” because of the “present aggressive actions of the enemies of Afghanistan” (apparently an allusion to the United States, China, Pakistan, and Iran, among others)— a statement that proved singularly unconvincing to most of the international community. On January 14, 1980, the UN General Assembly, meet-

ing in special session, called by a vote of 104–18 (with 18 abstentions) for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Soviet forces, while Afghanistan’s membership in the OIC was suspended two weeks later. Subsequently, the General Assembly and other international bodies reiterated their condemnation. Most nations refused to recognize the Kabul regime; exceptions included India, which participated in a joint Indo-Afghan communiqu´e in early 1985 expressing concern about “the militarization of Pakistan.” In early 1986, following the accession to power of economy-conscious Mikhail Gorbachev, Moscow indicated a willingness to consider a timetable for withdrawal of Soviet troops, conditioned on withdrawal of international support for the mujaheddin. The signature of an AfghanPakistani agreement (guaranteed by the Soviet Union and the United States) called for mutual noninterference and nonintervention. Accompanying accords provided for the voluntary return of refugees and took note of a time frame established by Afghanistan and the Soviet Union for a “phased withdrawal of foreign troops” over a nine-month period commencing May 15. However, the agreements did not provide for a cease-fire, with both the United States and Pakistan reserving the right to provide additional military supplies to the Afghan guerrillas if Moscow continued to provide arms to Kabul. In late 1990 the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on a policy of “negative symmetry,” whereby both would cease supplying aid to their respective Afghan allies in expectation that the aid suspension would necessitate a cease-fire between the government and the rebels. Upon implementation of the mutual suspension in September 1991, even fundamentalist rebel leaders reportedly declared that they welcomed “the end of [foreign] interference.” However, by early 1995 it was apparent that involvement by external powers had by no means ceased, although it was being conducted far less visibly than during the Najibullah era. The Taliban movement was launched by former students from Islamic seminaries in Pakistan, with one observer initially characterizing the

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seminarians as “cannon fodder” in a Pakistani effort to reopen vital highway shipping routes to Tajikistan and beyond. Countering Pakistan’s support of the Taliban was Indian aid to Rabbani and Masoud, particularly the provision of military aircraft that were crucial to the defense of Herat. For his part, General Dostam, the northern Uzbek warlord, had long been backed by Russia and Uzbekistan. Washington initially exhibited a somewhat surprisingly warm stance toward the Taliban takeover in late 1996, reportedly out of the hope that it offered Afghanistan a chance for “stability” after 17 years of civil war. However, the U.S. posture cooled significantly during 1997 because of the Taliban human rights record and harsh religious strictures, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright strongly criticizing the Taliban policies toward women. Meanwhile, Russia and members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, issued a stern warning to the Taliban in early 1997 not to attempt to spread militant fundamentalist influence beyond the Afghan borders. Collaterally, Iran displayed its support for the Shiite population in the Hazara region, which was aligned with the antiTaliban forces. International donors, at a conference in London in early 2006, pledged an additional $10.5 billion in assistance to Afghanistan over the next five years, predicated on the government pursuing reforms in a number of areas (see Current issues, below). U.S. officials led the aid campaign, and U.S. President Bush made a surprise five-hour stopover in Kabul as part of a regional tour in March. Among other things, Bush was believed to have consulted during his trip with President Karzai and President Musharraf of Pakistan on the delicate issue of the perceived use of Pakistani border areas by remnants of al-Qaida and the Taliban.

Current Issues Most of Afghanistan appeared in late 2001 to celebrate the collapse of the Taliban government, which had imposed a “joyless existence” on the

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population and fostered extreme international isolation. The festive mood was tempered, however, by the knowledge that many of the important components of the new interim government had been part of the disastrous mujaheddin regime in the first half of the 1990s that had created the opportunity for the Taliban to flourish in the first place. In addition, much of the country outside the capital remained under the control of warlords with very little inclination to acquiesce to a strong centralized government. The daunting task of maintaining stability under severe ongoing ethnic, regional, and religious strains fell to Hamid Karzai, whose emergence as the choice to head the interim administration had surprised most observers. Described as a “moderate” Muslim, Karzai had served as a deputy foreign minister in an early Burhanuddin Rabbani cabinet. Western capitals widely praised the performance of Karzai and his interim administration in the first half of 2002 and were considered influential in assuring that he faced little serious challenge in the balloting for president of the twoyear transitional government at the Loya Jirga in June. Western grants helped Afghanistan pay off its arrears to several international organizations in early 2003, but some officials reportedly worried in private that global attention had shifted away from Afghanistan and toward Iraq. In May U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld declared that only “pockets of resistance” remained within Afghanistan and that reconstruction was the transitional administration’s appropriate priority. However, a resurgence in the second half of the year of Taliban guerrilla attacks on U.S. and government forces killed hundreds. President Karzai also had to contend with outbreaks of fighting between various warlord militias, many of whom were resisting the new UN/Afghani demobilization and disarmament campaign. When Karzai dropped Vice President Mohammad Qasim FAHIM (a northern commander) as a running mate for the 2004 presidential campaign, many of the northern tribal leaders threw their support to Mohammad Yunos QANUNI, who finished second in the balloting with 16.3 percent of the vote. As a result, the election revealed a

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continued north/south divide that might still threaten national unity. On a more positive note, however, Taliban threats to disrupt the balloting proved mostly empty, and international observers accepted the results as accurately reflecting the popular will, despite a number of electoral irregularities. At his inauguration in December 2004, President Karzai pledged to combat the “mortal threat” of drug production and trafficking, to fight systemic poverty, and to promote “governmental accountability.” Toward those ends, his new cabinet appeared to rely more heavily on “technocrats” than his previous administration, although critics noted that most “power portfolios” remained in the hands of Pushtuns. The frequency of rebel attacks remained relatively low for a number of months after the presidential poll, but the Taliban-led insurgency reintensified in the spring of 2005. In an apparently related vein, a special Loya Jirga endorsed Karzai’s plan for a continued “strategic partnership” with the United States and NATO, although it was unclear if the final arrangements would include permanent U.S. military bases in Afghanistan. That issue was complicated by subsequent reports of alleged abuse of Afghan detainees by U.S. forces in Guant´anamo Bay and alleged torture of prisoners in a secret U.S. facility in Afghanistan. The elections for the lower house of the National Assembly (Wolesi Jirga) and provincial councils in September 2005 received widespread international attention as a pivotal moment in the nation’s democratization efforts. Balloting was conducted peacefully (a relief to those worried about potential disruption on the part of the Taliban), and observers described the poll as generally free and fair, despite a degree of alleged fraud. The successful candidates to the Wolesi Jirga represented a broad spectrum of the population, from mujaheddin (including deeply conservative tribal leaders) to communists to reformists to former members of the Taliban. Analysts found it difficult to predict the future nature of the lower house, suggesting the body was evenly split between members likely to support (for now, at least) the Karzai administration

and those likely to consider themselves as part of the opposition camp. Significantly, the Wolesi Jirga adopted an independent stance in April 2006 when, under the leadership of Qanuni (narrowly elected speaker the previous December), it announced it would vote separately on each of Karzai’s proposed cabinet appointments. (Five were subsequently rejected.) Despite these apparent beginnings of genuine political give-and-take, it was widely believed that the new legislature and the government would be hard-pressed to deal effectively with the myriad problems facing the nation. Among other things, as part of the “Afghanistan Compact” negotiated recently with international donors, the administration had agreed to improve human rights, combat corruption, eliminate illegal militias, counter the booming trade in narcotics, and “restore a functioning economy.” Pledges were also made to triple the size of the Afghan army (from 24,000 in 2006 to 70,000 in 2009) and to establish a judiciary appointed on merit rather than tribal or religious status. (Western capitals hoped that the new members of the Supreme Court appointed by Karzai in April would undercut the power of the Islamic hard-liners in that body.) The social fabric was also threatened by other events in early 2006 including widespread protest demonstrations prompted by the controversial publication in Denmark of cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammad, an outbreak of fighting between Sunnis and Shiites in Herat, and the controversial arrest of a man for converting from Islam to Christianity. Further complicating matters was the unabated guerrilla campaign on the part of the Taliban, particularly in the south. (More than 1,600 people, including 60 Americans, had died from “conflictrelated violence” in 2005.) NATO, which has commanded ISAF since August 2003, announced plans to increase that force from 8,500 personnel to 16,000 in 2006. About 6,000 of the troops were to be deployed in the “volatile” south, a departure from ISAF’s previous primary role as a peacekeeping and security mission around Kabul and “stable” northern regions. Collaterally, the U.S.-led Combined Forces Command Afghanistan (about

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17,000 U.S. troops complemented by about 1,600 personnel from some 20 other nations) announced plans for reduction of forces by 3,000–4,000. Neither Afghan officials nor U.S./NATO representatives were willing to predict when the government would be able to survive without the protection of the foreign troops.

Political Parties and Groups Based in Peshawar, Pakistan, the seven leading opponents of the Najibullah regime formed an Islamic Alliance of Afghan Holy Warriors (Ittehadi-Islami Afghan Mujaheddin) in May 1985 to coordinate resistance to the Moscow-backed regime in Kabul, as well as to the Soviet expeditionary force that protected it until 1989. The alliance spearheaded the overthrow of President Najibullah in April 1992, but its fragile unity was quickly shattered by subsequent conflict within and between fundamentalist and moderate groups, amid a complex pattern of surrogate involvement by interested neighboring states such as Pakistan and Iran. A new factor from late 1994 was the rapid military success of the Pakistan-backed Taliban guerrillas, who seized power in Kabul in September 1996. Resistance to the Taliban was coordinated at first by a Supreme Defense Council formed in October 1996 by the Islamic Afghan Society, the National Front, and the Islamic Unity Front. The umbrella organization’s name was changed to the United National Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UNIFSA) in mid-1997 to reflect the addition of new members (including the National Islamic Front) as well as expansion of the alliance’s mandate to cover political as well as military initiatives. UNIFSA, with heavy U.S. military and financial support, spearheaded the overthrow of the Taliban in late 2001. The new constitution approved in January 2004 provided for freedom of association, with political parties authorized if they had no military or paramilitary structures and their platforms were not “contrary to the principles of Islam.” Parties based on ethnicity, language, religious sects, or regions were also prohibited. Many small parties

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applied for legal status in 2004 and 2005, contributing to highly fluid and often confusing conditions in the run-up to the legislative balloting of September 2005. National Understanding Front—NUF (Jabha-i-Tafahon-i-Milli). Launched in early 2005 by some 11 political parties, the NUF was described by one reporter as the “first attempt to forge a serious opposition” to the Karzai administration. NUF Chair Mohammad Yunos Qanuni had finished second in the 2004 presidential poll after leaving his post as planning minister in the Karzai cabinet (see Current issues, above, for additional information). The leaders of the NUF announced that their first goal was to achieve parliamentary power in the National Assembly balloting scheduled for September 2005. They accused the Karzai administration of having failed to combat corruption in government, indicated opposition to the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan, and called for the adoption of a proportional voting system in the assembly. However, some observers described the Front as comprising “incongruous factions” that might lack sustained cohesion. It was estimated the candidates aligned with the NUF secured 60–80 seats in the balloting for the Wolesi Jirga in 2005, thereby securing the front’s position as the main opposition to the Karzai administration. Qanuni was subsequently elected as speaker of the Wolesi Jirga, after which he announced his resignation as chair of the NUF. Leaders: Ahmad Shah AHMADZAY, Mohammad MOHAQEQ, Najia ZHARA, Mohammad Ali JAWID (Spokesperson). New Afghanistan Party (Hizb-i-Afghanistan-i-Nawin). Formed by Mohammad Yunos Qanuni in advance of his 2004 presidential campaign, this party was among the core components at the formation of the NUF. Qanuni, an ethnic Tajik, is considered the most formidable political rival to President Karzai. Leader: Mohammad Yunos QANUNI (Speaker of the House of the People and 2004 presidential candidate).

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Islamic Unity Party of the People of Afghanistan (Hizb-i-Wahdat-i-Islami Mardom-i-Afghanistan). This party is an offshoot of the Islamic Unity Party; it is led by Mohammad Mohaqeq, a former member of the Karzai administration who left the government in 2004 in an unclear dispute with Karzai. Mohaqeq, an ethnic Hazara, finished third (as an independent) in the 2004 presidential election with 11.7 percent of the vote. He was elected to the Wolesi Jirga in 2005. Leader: Mohammad MOHAQEQ. National Islamic Empowerment Party (Iqtedar-i-Milli-Islami). The formation of this party was reported in early 2006 under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Ahmadzay, a deputy chair of the NUF previously referenced as leader of the Islamic Power Party. Ahmadzay, a religious conservative, ran as an independent in the 2004 presidential election on a platform of opposition to the presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Leader: Ahmad Shah AHMADZAY. Other components of the NUF reportedly included a faction of the Islamic Movement Party led by Mohammad Ali JAWID; a faction of the Islamic Revolutionary Movement Party (Hizb-i-Harakat-i-Inqilah-i-Islami) led by Ahmad NABI; the National Islamic Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-i-Milli-Islami-iAfghanistan), led by Ustad Mohammad AKBARI; the New Islamic Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-i-Islami Nawin-i-Afghanistan), led by journalist Sayed Jawad HUSSEINI; the Afghanistan Islamic Peace and Brotherhood Party (Hizb-i-Solh wa Ukhwat-i-Islami Afghanistan), led by Qadir Imami GHORI; the Afghanistan Ethnic Unity Party (Hizbi-Wahdat-i-Aqwam-i-Afghanistan), led by Nasrullah BARAKZAI; and the Afghanistan National Independence Party (Hizb-i-Istiqlali-Milli Afghanistan), led by Taj Mohammad WARDAK. Islamic Afghan Society (Jamaat-i-Islami Afghanistan). The Afghan Society draws most of its support from Tajiks in the northern part of the

country. It was long the most effective rebel force in the Panjsher Valley and engaged in heavy combat with Soviet forces in 1985, including sporadic invasions of Soviet Tajikistan. In July 1989 the Jamaat charged that a group of its leaders and fighters had been attacked and killed by guerrillas from the Islamic Party, subsequent retaliatory attacks leaving perhaps as many as 300 fighters dead. Internal disagreement over relations with the Islamic Party threatened to splinter Jamaat in 1990, when military commander Ahmed Shah Masoud temporarily parted company with political leader Burhanuddin Rabbani in rejecting an appeal to aid the Islamic Party’s offensive against Kabul. In October, Masoud, long a leading military figure, gained additional prominence when he chaired a shura of Afghan military chiefs and then flew to Islamabad for the first time in more than a decade to confer with Pakistani President Khan. Forces loyal to Rabbani fled from the Taliban offensive against Kabul in September 1996, subsequently coalescing under Masoud’s command in the north, where, in conjunction with other anti-Taliban militias, they fought the Taliban to a stalemate. Masoud’s forces, estimated to number 12,000–15,000, survived into the fall of 2001, having weathered heavy Taliban offensives during the summers of the past three years. Masoud was killed in an attack by suicide bombers disguised as journalists on September 10, 2001. The assassination was widely attributed to al-Qaida as a prelude to the terrorist attacks in the United States the following day. Masoud was succeeded as military commander of the Northern Alliance by Mohammad Qasim FAHIM, who became one of the top leaders in the subsequent expulsion of the Taliban. Rabbani, whose government had maintained the recognition of many countries throughout the Taliban regime, returned to Kabul in mid-November 2001 to resume the exercise of presidential authority. He reportedly hoped that the subsequent Bonn Conference would appoint him as president of the proposed new interim administration, and he only reluctantly accepted the appointment of Hamid Karzai after holding up the conference for several days in apparent protest to being sidelined. Any

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remaining short-term political aspirations on Rabbani’s part were also put on hold at the Loya Jirga in July 2002, where Rabbani endorsed Karzai’s election as president of the new transitional government. Fahim, however, was named vice president and minister of defense, establishing himself as one of the administration’s dominant figures. Rabbani supported Karzai in the 2004 presidential election even though Fahim was dropped from the Karzai ticket. Rabbani was elected to the Wolesi Jirga in 2005 and briefly campaigned for the speaker of that body before deferring to Yunos Qanuni. Leader: Burhanuddin RABBANI (Former President of the Islamic State), Abdul Hafez MANSUR, Munawar HASAN (Secretary General). National Front (Jumbish-i-Milli). The Jumbish-i-Milli is an Uzbek grouping formed by Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostam, who had been a military commander under Najibullah before aligning himself with Ahmed Masoud in 1992. In early 1994 Dostam broke with Masoud to join forces with Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami and Mazari’s Hizb-i-Wahdat in an anti-Rabbani alliance. He did not, however, support his new colleagues in the decisive encounters of March 1995, thereby contributing to their defeat. Thereafter, the Far Eastern Economic Review reported that Rabbani had attempted to “cut a deal” with Dostam, whose rejection of the terms contributed to the Rabbani government’s subsequent readiness for an accommodation with Hekmatyar. Following the Taliban takeover of Kabul in 1996, General Dostam initially played an important role in the anti-Taliban alliance (see Political background, above). However, it was reported that he and his remaining forces had retreated to Uzbekistan following the Taliban offensive of the second half of 1998, and his influence had declined significantly by mid-2000. Dostam returned to Afghanistan in March 2001 and rejoined the Northern Alliance. The general subsequently remained closely aligned with Rabbani during the overthrow of the Taliban and strongly objected to the selection at the Bonn Conference of Hamid Karzai over Rabbani as president of the new interim government in December.

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Initially, it appeared that Dostam’s disgruntlement would prove a threat to stability, but he accepted positions as vice chair of the interim administration and deputy minister of defense in late December, thereby calming the situation. General Dostam, burdened with a reputation for military ruthlessness and political shiftiness, was not included in the July 2002 cabinet. Running as an independent, Dostam finished fourth in the 2004 presidential poll with 10 percent of the vote. In early 2005 Dostam registered a party called the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (Jumbish-i-Milli-i-Islami Afghanistan), but in April he resigned from that grouping and became the chief of staff of the high command of the armed forces in Karzai’s administration. Leader: Gen. Abdul Rashid DOSTAM, Azizullah KARQAR, Sayyed NUROLLAH, Faysollah ZAKI, Abdul Majid ROZI. Islamic Unity Party (Hizb-i-Wahdat-iIslami). The Hizb-i-Wahdat was launched in mid1987 by the following Iran-based groups: the Afghan Nasr Organization (Sazmane Nasr); the Da’wa Party of Islamic Unity of Afghanistan (Da’wa-i-Ittehad-i-Islami Afghanistan); the Guardians of the Islamic Jihad of Afghanistan (Pasadaran-i-Jihhad-i-Afghanistan); the Islamic Force of Afghanistan (Nehzat-i-Afghanistan); the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (Harakati-Islami Afghanistan), led by Ayatollah Aseh MOHSENI; the Islamic Struggle for Afghanistan (Narave Islami Afghanistan), led by Zaidi MOHAZZIZI; the Party of God (Hezbollah), led by Qari AHMAD; and the United Islamic Front of Afghanistan (Jabhe Muttahid-i-Afghanistan). Also known as the “Tehran Eight,” the group claimed at its inception to represent an estimated two million Shiite Afghan refugees in Iran. During 1992 and early 1993 it joined with Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami in a number of clashes with Rabbani’s Jamaat-i-Islami and the Saudi-backed Ittihad-i-Islami. Its principal leader, Abdul Ali MAZARI, was killed on March 13, 1995, reportedly in a helicopter crash south of Kabul after having been captured by the Taliban student militia.

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Hizb-i-Wahdat was an important component of UNIFSA in that it represented the Hazara Shiite community in central Afghanistan. As of early 1998 the Hazaras were reportedly exercising autonomous government control in the Hazarajat region while contributing substantially to the antiTaliban military alliance in the north. However, Taliban forces pushed Hizb-i-Wahdat out of most of the populated areas in the region (including the important city of Bamiyan) in September 1998. In consonance with the ouster of the Taliban by the UNIFSA/Northern Alliance in late 2001, Hizb-i-Wahdat regained control of much of central Afghanistan, and party leader Karim Khalili was named as a vice president in the transitional government installed in June 2002. Leaders: Karim KHALILI (Vice President of the Republic), Ayatollah FAZL. National Islamic Front (Mahaz-i-Milli-iIslami). The most left-leaning of the moderate groups, the National Islamic Front had refused to join the Supreme Council in 1981 because not all of the participants had agreed to the election of people’s representatives to a provisional government. In November 1990 party leader Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani endorsed a reported U.S.-USSR peace plan that would have left Najibullah in power after the two countries withdrew their support for the combatants. Thereafter, at a meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, Gailani allegedly turned down an offer by Najibullah to assume control of the government, suggesting instead the return of Mohammad Zahir Shah, the former monarch. Gailani, the spiritual leader of the Sufi Muslims, served in the Rabbani cabinet from 1992 to 1996, he and his supporters relocating to Cyprus following the Taliban takeover. They subsequently served as the core component of the so-called “Cyprus Group” at the Bonn Conference in late 2001, where the Front continued to display a proroyalist orientation. Leader: Pir Sayed Ahmad GAILANI. Islamic Party (Hizb-i-Islami). Drawing most of its support from Pushtuns in the southeastern part of the country, the Islamic Party was one of the

largest and most radical of the mujaheddin groups and often engaged in internecine clashes with former allies including, most notably, the Jamaat-iIslami. Its principal leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, was known to have ties to both Iran and Libya in the 1970s and early 1980s, although they subsequently were believed to have been reduced. Hekmatyar was named prime minister following the all-party accord of March 1993 but was at that stage deeply opposed to the Rabbani presidency; his appointment lapsed in mid-1994. Thereafter, he maintained a partial siege of Kabul until forced to withdraw after a decisive defeat in March 1995. This experience eventually impelled him to break ranks with other mujaheddin leaders by reaching his own accommodation with the government in May 1996, enabling him to resume the premiership from June until the overthrow of the government in September. Hekmatyar’s decision to align his forces with those of Ahmed Masoud and General Dostam was considered an important factor in their subsequent ability to stall the Taliban offensive in the north in 1997. However, Hekmatyar and the Islamic Party were described in 1998 as only nominally associated with UNIFSA and apparently not playing a major role in the remaining military opposition to the Taliban. Interviewed in Iran in mid2000, Hekmatyar called on the Taliban to establish a provisional government including opposition representatives pending national elections, describing the civil war as benefiting only “foreign forces.” In the fall of 2001 Hekmatyar adopted a strongly anti–Northern Alliance stance and urged support for the Taliban against what he called a U.S. “invasion.” Hekmatyar returned to Afghanistan in early 2002 but remained noticeably outside the negotiations toward a government of national unity. Considered a threat to the stability of the interim administration, Hekmatyar was reportedly the target of an unsuccessful assassination attempt in May on the part of the United States through the use of an unmanned “drone” bomber. Hekmatyar subsequently reportedly fled to Iran, but he was eventually expelled from that country. Having returned to Afghanistan, he was labeled a terrorist because of attacks on U.S. and Afghani forces. In early

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2005 it appeared that some Islamic Party adherents had begun peace negotiations with the Karzai administration, although Hekmatyar (who rejected an apparent amnesty offer) and others remained committed to jihad until U.S. forces were removed from Afghanistan and an “Islamic System” was installed. Party members opposed to Hekmatyar’s hard line participated (reportedly with some success) in the 2005 legislative balloting. Meanwhile, an arrest warrant reportedly remained in effect for Hekmatyar. Leaders: Gulbuddin HEKMATYAR (Former Prime Minister), Mohammad Yunos KHALES. Islamic Unity (Ittihad-i-Islami). The Ittihadi-Islami was formed by ultra-orthodox Sunni Muslims backed by Saudi Arabia. Like the other fundamentalist formations, it long opposed Westernizing influences in pursuing what it viewed largely as an Islamic holy war (jihad) against Soviet-backed forces. One of its leaders, Abdul Rasul Sayaf, headed the Alliance at its inception in 1985. The party endorsed President Karzai in the 2004 presidential campaign. Subsequently, Sayaf, described as an “archconservative,” was elected to the House of the People in 2005 and was only narrowly defeated for the speaker’s position. (Reports have differed on Sayaf’s recent formal party affiliation.) Leader: Abdul Rasul SAYAF (Former Prime Minister of Government-in-Exile). National Liberation Front (Jabh-i-Nijat-iMilli). The National Liberation Front was formed to support Afghan self-determination and the establishment of a freely elected government. Its leader, Sibghatullah Mojadedi, was chair of the moderate opposition bloc in the late 1980s. In November 1990 Mojadedi, along with Sayed Ahmad Gailani (National Islamic Front, above), reportedly met with President Najibullah in Geneva, Switzerland, in an abortive attempt to form a coalition government. Subsequently, Mojadedi served as interim president from April to June 1992, before becoming a prominent opponent of the succeeding Rabbani government. In 1994 he became

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chair of a coordination council linking his own movement with the Islamic Party, the Islamic Unity Party, and the National Front. Immediately following the Taliban takeover of Kabul in September 1996, it was reported that Mojadedi had announced his support for the new government. However, he was subsequently described as having moved to Egypt, from where he was “abstaining” from the conflict between the Taliban and its opponents. Mojadedi supported Hamid Karzai in the 2004 presidential campaign and was later named chair of the fledgling national reconciliation commission. He was also elected as speaker of the House of Elders (Meshrano Jirga) in late 2005. Leaders: Imam Sibghatullah MOJADEDI (Former President of Government-in-Exile, Former Interim President of the Islamic State, and Speaker of the Meshrano Jirga), Dr. Hashimatullah MOJADEDI. Homeland Party (Hizb-i-Watan). Previously known as the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which dominated national political affairs during the late 1970s and most of the 1980s (see Political background, above), the Homeland Party adopted its new name at its second congress in June 1990. Although not formally dissolved following the fall of the pro-Soviet regime, the group’s subsequent activity was limited to occasional contact at meetings of international communist organizations. It was reported in 2003 that the interim government had refused a request from the Homeland Party for legal status, and party adherents subsequently appeared to have launched several new groupings. National Solidarity Movement of Afghanistan (Nahzat-´ı Hambastagi-i Milli Afghanistan). This party is led by Ishaq Gailani, who was a candidate for president in 2004 prior to withdrawing in support of Hamid Karzai. Leader: Ishaq GAILANI. Afghan Nation (Afghan Mellat). Established during the reign of King Zahir Shah in support of Pushtun nationalism, this grouping (also referenced as the Social Democratic Party of

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Afghanistan) has reportedly factionalized recently. One faction, which supported Hamid Karzai in the 2004 presidential campaign, is led by Anwar alHaq Ahadi, who was named minister of finance in the December 2004 cabinet. Leader: Anwar al-Haq AHADI. National Congress Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-i Kongra-i Milli-i Afghanistan). This party was launched in April 2004 in support of the presidential candidacy of moderate Abdul Latif Pedram, who finished fifth in the October poll with 1.37 percent of the vote. Pedram, a former journalist and professor, has proposed the establishment of a federal system in Afghanistan. Leaders: Abdul Latif PEDRAM, Nasir OJABER. National Movement of Afghanistan (Hizb-i Nahzat-i Milli-i Afghanistan). Primarily supported by Tajiks, Nahzat was launched by Ahmad Wali Masoud following the death of his brother, Ahmed Shah Masoud, the legendary mujaheddin military leader. The party was factionalized in 2004 when Nahzat member Yunos Qanuni ran against Hamid Karzai in the 2004 presidential campaign, while another Masoud brother, Ahmad Zia Masoud, was one of Karzai’s vice presidential running mates. Leaders: Ahmad Wali MASOUD (Party Leader), Ahmad Zia MASOUD (Vice President of the Republic). Other recently launched parties include the National Unity Movement (Tabrik-i-Wahdat-i Milli), led by Mahmud GHAZI and Homayun Shah ASEFI; the Afghanistan Independence Party (Hizb-i-Istiqlal-i Afghanistan), led by Ghulam Faruq NEJRABI, who won 0.3 percent of the vote in the 2004 presidential poll on a platform that rejected all “direct or indirect influence” on the part of “foreigners,” including aid organizations; the Freedom Party (Hizb-i Azadi), led by Gen. Abdul MALEK, a former leader of the National Front; the National Movement for Peace (Jumbish-i Milli-i Solk), led by Shahnawaz TANAY, a former defense minister in the Communist regime;

the People’s Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (Harakat-i Islami-i Mardon-i Afghanistan), led by Hosayn ANWARI, the minister of agriculture in the transitional government; the National Party (Hizb-i Milli), led by Abdul Rashid ARYAN, a former member of the PDPA and member of the cabinet during Communist rule; the Republican Party (Hizb-i Jamhuri Khwahan), led by Sebghatullah SANJAR, who supported Hamid Karzai in the 2004 presidential election; the Youth Solidarity Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-i-Hambastagi-i Millii Jawanan-i Afghanistan), which, under the leadership of Mohammed Jamil KARZAI, supported President Karzai in the 2004 election; the Islamic Justice Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-i Adalat-i Islami-i Afghanistan), which, under the leadership of Mohammad Kabir MARZBAN, also supported President Karzai in the 2004 campaign; and the National Freedom Seekers Party (Hizb-i Azadi Khwahan-i Maihan), led by Abdul Hadi DABIR, an independent presidential candidate in 2004.

Movement Formerly in Power Taliban. Translated as “seekers” or “students,” the Persian taliban was applied to a group of Islamic fundamentalist theology students from Pakistan who swept through southern Afghanistan during late 1994 in a campaign pledged to rid the country of its contending warlords and introduce “genuine” Islamic rule. The group captured the southeastern city of Kandahar on November 4 and pushed north, seizing one of the world’s major drug-producing regions. Its most dramatic success was the defeat of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-iIslami on the outskirts of Kabul in mid-February 1995. The Taliban suffered a major defeat by forces loyal to President Burhanuddin Rabbani a month later but recovered to capture Herat in September and subsequently mounted a major offensive against Kabul. In a statement issued in connection with U.S. congressional hearings on Afghanistan in June 1996, the Taliban movement listed its basic demands as including the resignation of President

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Rabbani, the demilitarization of Kabul, the formation of a national security force, and the convening of an elected assembly of the Afghan people charged with forming “a national Islamic government.” The group’s seizure of power in Kabul three months later gave it the opportunity to implement this program. Previous assessment of the Taliban as espousing a less ferocious brand of fundamentalism than the ousted regime was speedily revised in light of its imposition of strict Islamic law (sharia) and summary execution of opponents. The Taliban militia launched several offensives in late 1996 and 1997 designed to win complete control of the country but was unable to defeat opposition forces in the north or maintain command of the Hazara region west of Kabul. In part, resistance to the Taliban was based on ethnicity or religion: in the north the opposition militias comprised Uzbeks and Tajiks who had long been wary of domination by Pushtuns (the core Taliban ethnic group), while the Hazara-Taliban split pitted Shiite versus Sunni Muslims. Despite heavy international criticism, the Taliban leaders in 1997 exhibited little moderation in their harsh interpretation of sharia, described as “medieval” by some observers, particularly regarding strictures on women. Meanwhile, the Taliban’s 38-year-old spiritual guide, Mullah Mohammad Omar, was described as a reclusive leader who rarely left Kandahar (where the movement was launched) and who, following Taliban interpretation of religious law, never permitted himself to be photographed. Omar reportedly was advised by a small consultative council located in Kandahar. Although the Taliban nearly succeeded in the first half of 2001 in efforts to push opposition forces completely out of Afghanistan, the regime’s fortunes reversed dramatically as the result of the terrorist attacks in the United States in September. Washington quickly blamed the al-Qaida network of Osama bin Laden (see below) for the hijackings and demanded that the Taliban turn their “guest” over for prosecution or face U.S. military intervention. Although some Taliban leaders reportedly argued that the United States demand should be met,

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Omar and other hard-liners refused and thereby sealed the movement’s fate. Following the Taliban’s final military defeat at the hands of the Northern Alliance in late December, Omar and a number of Taliban ministers were reported to have fled to Pakistan. Although many observers predicted the total collapse of the Taliban in the wake of its fall from power, the movement subsequently regrouped and launched a series of deadly guerrilla attacks against U.S. troops and the new Afghani army. Mullah Omar, now believed to be operating as the head of a ten-man Taliban leadership council, called for a jihad (holy war) against all foreign forces and vowed to “punish” Afghans who supported the Karzai administration. The Taliban failed in its announced plan to disrupt the October 2004 presidential election, but it intensified its attacks in mid-2005, apparently in an effort to complicate the upcoming legislative balloting. Although some former Taliban leaders by that time reportedly had entered into negotiations with the government toward a possible peace settlement, Mullah Omar maintained his hard line, rejecting an apparent amnesty offer from administration representatives. Some reports attributed the 2005 attacks to a “NeoTaliban,” while it was also clear that several Taliban splinter groups were operating, raising questions about the cohesiveness and precise leadership of the movement. Meanwhile, the United States, convinced of Mullah Omar’s ties to al-Qaida, continued to offer a $10 million reward for his capture. Several former Taliban commanders were reportedly elected to the Wolesi Jirga in September 2005, while a number of other former members of the movement had reportedly been released from custody in return for their commitment to “peace.” Nevertheless, attacks attributed to the Taliban grew in number in late 2005 and early 2006, most of them emulating the roadside bombings and suicide attacks so prevalent recently in Iraq. By that time the Taliban was described as having significant ties to drug smuggling and was characterized as still representing a significant “menace” in parts of southern Afghanistan. In March 2006 Mullah

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Omar, believed to be in hiding in the border region of Pakistan, reportedly vowed that the Taliban “insurgency” would be accelerated soon. Leaders: Mullah Mohammad OMAR (Spiritual Leader and Former Emir of the selfproclaimed Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan), Mullah OBAIDULLAH, Laftullah HAKIMI (selfproclaimed spokesman for the “Neo-Taliban”), Qari Yousuf AHMADI.

Terrorist Group Al-Qaida (The Base). Al-Qaida is the network established in the 1990s by Osama bin Laden in pursuit of his goal of getting U.S. forces out of Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden, a member of one of the wealthiest Saudi families, had participated personally and financially in the mujaheddin (“holy warrior”) guerrilla campaign against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Having returned to his native land following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, bin Laden subsequently focused his fundamentalist fervor on the buildup of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia in connection with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces and the subsequent Desert Storm counterattack. Bin Laden reportedly urged the Saudi royal family to reject the U.S. forces, and adopted an antimonarchical stance when his recommendations were rebuffed. In 1991 bin Laden moved his operations to Sudan, his attacks on the Saudi government becoming more scathing after he was stripped of his citizenship in 1995 for “irresponsible behavior,” a reference to his having made large sums of money available to militant Islamic causes in a number of countries. Under heavy pressure from the United States, the Sudanese government expelled bin Laden in 1996, and he established a base in Afghanistan, where he reportedly helped to finance the Taliban takeover. Bin Laden also declared war on the “occupying American enemy,” which he blamed for the perceived repression and corruption on the part of the Saudi government. In February 1998 al-Qaida joined with several other regional militant organizations to form an

International Islamic Front, which urged Arabs to kill “Americans and their allies” until U.S. “hegemony” in the Gulf was dismantled. U.S. officials subsequently accused bin Laden’s “terrorist network” of masterminding the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7, and American cruise missiles attacked suspected bin Laden camps in Afghanistan two weeks later. Several alleged supporters of bin Laden were arrested in the United States on conspiracy and terrorism charges later in the year, while bin Laden was indicted in absentia. An Afghan court ruled in November that Washington had failed to present credible evidence of bin Laden’s guilt; he was therefore permitted to remain in Afghanistan, although the government officially cautioned him against using his base there to coordinate terrorist activity in other countries. In March 2000 Jordan announced the arrest of some 28 alleged bin Laden followers on charges of conspiring to conduct a terrorist campaign in the kingdom. Arrests were subsequently also made in the United Kingdom and Germany to combat what officials described as an international crackdown on groups affiliated with the alleged bin Laden network. The trial of four of his alleged associates charged in connection with the 1998 embassy bombings opened in New York in February 2001. Meanwhile, al-Qaida was being considered a prime suspect in the bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen in October 2000. Immediately following the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, Washington described bin Laden as the mastermind of the conspiracy that had left nearly 3,000 Americans dead. The U.S. government unsuccessfully pressed the Taliban government to turn bin Laden and his associates over for prosecution before launching Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and its “War on Terrorism” throughout the world. A reward of $25 million was offered for bin Laden, U.S. President Bush declaring the al-Qaida leader would be brought to justice “dead or alive.” Al-Qaida forces fought alongside the Taliban army against the Northern Alliance advances from

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October to December 2001, most analysts concluding that al-Qaida had become the main financial backer of the Taliban and its strongest military component. Mohammed ATEF, an al-Qaida military commander, was killed in a November 14 U.S. air strike, and many al-Qaida fighters died during heavy bombing of their cave complex in Tora Bora in the second half of December. Most analysts subsequently concluded that bin Laden had escaped to the “anarchic tribal areas” of western Pakistan along with a number of other al-Qaida leaders, one of whom—Abu ZUBAYDAH—was captured in Pakistan in March 2002 and turned over to the United States. Even though al-Qaida had obviously suffered major losses at the hands of U.S. forces, the international community remained extremely wary of the group’s ongoing potential to conduct new terrorist activity. Underscoring the breadth of al-Qaida’s appeal to a certain segment of the Muslim population, it was reported that the al-Qaida prisoners being held by the United States at the Guant´anamo Bay naval base had come from more than 40 countries. In early 2003 a purported audio tape from bin Laden called upon all Muslims to fight against any U.S.-led action against Iraq, although the tape also described Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and his administration as “apostates.” In March U.S. officials announced that more than half of al-Qaida’s “senior operatives” had been killed or captured, including Khalid Shaikh MOHAMMAD (considered one of the masterminds of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States), who was arrested in Pakistan. U.S. forces continued their assault on al-Qaida along the border with Pakistan in mid-2003, Pakistan having also sent soldiers to its side of the border to apply similar pressure. In response, in September Ayman al-Zawahiri (reportedly bin Laden’s top lieutenant) urged Pakistanis to overthrow President Pervez Musharraf. Two assassination attempts against Musharraf were reported late in the year. In April 2004 another bin Laden tape suggested that al-Qaida would no longer support terrorist attacks in Europe if European governments

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agreed to remove their military forces from Iraq and Afghanistan. (Many observers had suggested a possible link between al-Qaida and the train bombing in Madrid, Spain, the previous month.) The “offer” was immediately rejected by the European leaders, although political events in Spain were dramatically affected by the train attacks. Several leaders, including Abdelaziz Issa Abdul-Mohson al-MUQRIN, of a group calling itself “Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula” were killed by Saudi Arabian security forces in June 2004 in response to the killing of a kidnapped American. At the same time, many of the insurgent attacks against U.S. and Iraqi targets in Iraq were reportedly being conducted by followers of Abu Musab al-ZARQAWI, a Jordanian militant heading a group called Tawhid. Consequently, questions were raised concerning the extent to which bin Laden exercised control over al-Qaida adherents in particular and militant Islamists in general. However, in October al-Zarqawi declared his allegiance to bin Laden, who subsequently endorsed al-Zarqawi as the al-Qaida leader in Iraq. Bombings in Egypt and London in July 2005 were considered by some observers to have links to al-Qaida. Subsequently, al-Zarqawi claimed direct responsibility for a series of bombings in Jordan in November as part of an apparent campaign to broaden his campaign beyond Iraq. (Some reports currently refer to al-Zarqawi’s group as “alQaida in Mesopotamia.”) However, a degree of friction was reported between al-Zarqawi and alZawahiri over al-Zarqawi’s apparent endorsement of attacks on Shiites in Iraq and the beheading of hostages. For most of 2005, al-Zawahiri served as the primary al-Qaida spokesperson outside of Iraq, conducting what was described as a “political” campaign to gain greater support throughout the Muslim world. Among other things, al-Zawahiri was the target of a U.S. missile attack on a Pakistani village in January 2006. Meanwhile, Pakistani authorities insisted that Abu Hamza RABIA, described as “number three” in the al-Qaida hierarchy, had been killed in December by Pakistani security forces.

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Cabinet As of August 7, 2006 President Vice Presidents

Hamid Karzai (Pushtun) Karim Khalili (Hazara) Ahmad Zia Masoud (Tajik)

Ministers Adviser to the President on National Security Agriculture and Irrigation Border and Tribal Affairs Communications Commerce and Industries Counter-Narcotics Culture and Youth Affairs Defense Economics Education Finance Foreign Affairs Haj and Islamic Affairs Higher Education Interior Justice Martyrs, Disabled, and Social Affairs Mining Public Health Public Works Refugee Affairs Rural Development Transportation and Aviation Urban Development Water and Energy Women’s Affairs

Zalmay Rasool Obaidullah Rameen Mohammed Karim Barahoye Amir Zai Sangeen Mohammed Amin Farhang Habibullah Qaderi Abdul Karim Khorram Gen. Abdurrahim Wardak Mohammed Jalil Shams Hanif Atmar Anwar al-Haq Ahadi Rangin Dadfar Spanta Nematullah Shahrani Azam Dadfar Zarar Ahmed Moqbel Mohammad Sarwar Danish Noor Mohammed Qargeen Ebrahim Adel Mohammad Amin Fatemi Suhrab Ali Safari Ustad Akbar Akbar Ehsan Ziya Namatollah Ehsan Jawed Mohammad Yousuf Pushtun Mohammad Ismael Khan Hosna Banu Ghazanfar [f]

Ministers of State Parliamentary Affairs Presidential Advisor

Faruq Wardag Hedayat Amin Arsala

[f] = female

An audio tape released in December 2005 represented the first apparent public message from bin Laden in a year. The tape reportedly offered a vague truce to the United States if all U.S. troops were withdrawn from Afghanistan and Iraq. Washington

immediately dismissed the proposal, announcing it would never “negotiate” with al-Qaida. The United States continued to proclaim that al-Qaida was in complete disarray, despite bin Laden’s pledge that additional major attacks were being planned. Most

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analysts concluded that bin Laden and al-Zawahiri remained “deeply hidden” in the Pakistani border area as of the spring of 2006. However, al-Zarqawi was killed in a U.S. airstrike in June. Leaders: Osama BIN LADEN, Ayman alZAWAHIRI.

of seats. The first election was held on September 18, 2005. Candidates (approximately 2,775) ran as independents, although a number of them appeared easily identifiable as members of various political parties. The lower house convened for the first time on December 19. Speaker: Mohammad Yunos QANUNI.

Legislature

House of Elders (Meshrano Jirga). The upper house comprises 102 members: 34 indirectly elected for three-year terms by provincial councils; 34 appointed by the president for five-year terms; and (eventually) 34 indirectly elected by district councils for four-year terms. The first elections to the 34 provincial councils were held on September 18, 2005, and those councils subsequently each elected one permanent member of the Meshrano Jirga from among its ranks. In addition, the provincial councils each elected a temporary delegate to the Meshrano Jirga to serve on an interim basis in the place of the members slated to be elected by district councils. (Due to difficulties in establishing final boundaries for the proposed districts, balloting for the district councils was postponed until at least late 2006.) The upper house convened for the first time on December 19, following the announcement of President Karzai’s appointments. (Among other things, the president is required to ensure that there are at least 17 women in the Meshrano Jirga, as well as 2 Kuchi representatives and 2 representatives of the disabled population.) Speaker: Iman Sibghatullah MOJADEDI.

Following the overthrow of the Taliban in late 2001, an “emergency” Loya Jirga (Grand National Council) was held June 12–19, 2002, as authorized by the Bonn Conference of November–December 2001, to establish a transitional government. The Loya Jirga comprised more than 1,500 delegates, about two-thirds of whom were indirectly elected to represent various civic, business, academic, and religious organizations. The remaining delegates were selected by a special commission (appointed as part of the Bonn agreement) to represent minority groups and women. A new Loya Jirga convened in December 2003 to consider a new proposed constitution drafted by a constitutional commission appointed by President Karzai in April. The Loya Jirga comprised 500 delegates—450 elected by representatives of the previous Loya Jirga and 50 appointed by the president. The constitution approved on January 4, 2004, provided for a bicameral National Assembly (Shoray-i-Milli). House of the People (Wolesi Jirga). The lower house of the assembly comprises 249 members who are directly elected for a five-year term in singleround balloting. Each of the country’s 34 provinces has 2 or more Wolesi Jirga representatives, based on population. Voters cast a single vote for one candidate in their province. Seats for the most part are allocated to the top vote-getters in each province until that province’s seats are filled. However, the constitution requires that at least 68 members of the lower house be women; therefore, some women are named to seats despite having lower vote totals than candidates who would have otherwise qualified. In addition, 10 seats are reserved for Kuchi nomads, which can also alter the regular distribution

Communications Press Widespread civil war and other fighting in the 1980s and 1990s adversely affected the publication of many newspapers, some of which resumed publication following the overthrow of the Taliban government in 2001. Newspapers published in Kabul that have been cited in recent reports include Anis (Friendship), a long-standing governmentfunded daily published in Dari; the Kabul Times, another state-owned daily (in English); Erada, an

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independent daily; Arman-i Malli, a daily; Hewad (Homeland); Estah, a state-owned daily; Cheragh, an independent daily; Payam-i-Mujahid (Holy Warrior’s Message), an independent weekly; Kilit (Key, 13,000); and the Kabul Weekly.

News Agencies The official domestic facility is the Bakhtar News Agency.

Broadcasting Following the Taliban takeover, Radio Afghanistan was redesignated the Voice of Shari’a, and Kabul TV was shut down. Television service was resumed on a limited basis in the capital in 2001. TV Badakshan also broadcasts from Faizabad, although state-run Afghanistan Television resumed broadcasting following the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001. Several private stations have also been launched (including Aina and Tolu), as have a number of private radio stations. (A poll conducted by the Financial Times

in 2004 found that some 60 percent of the Afghani population used radio as its primary source of news.) In May 2005 the Karzai administration, facing criticism for using the national radio and television stations for public relations purposes, announced plans to privatize the stations. Meanwhile, it was reported that the Taliban had resumed sporadic broadcasts of Voice of Shari’a from an undisclosed location.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. Said Tayeb JAWAD U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald E. NEUMANN Permanent Representative to the UN Dr. Ravan A.G. FARHADI IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, CP, ECO, IDB, Interpol, IOM, NAM, OIC, WCO

ARMENIA REPUBLIC

OF

ARMENIA

Hayastani Hanrapetoutioun

The Country The eastern portion of what became (c. 301 AD) the world’s earliest Christian state, contemporary Armenia has Georgia, Azerbaijan, Iran, and Turkey as its northern, eastern, southern, and western neighbors, respectively. Its population is more than 93 percent ethnic Armenian, the principal minorities (less than 3 percent each) being Azerbaijanis, Kurds, and Russians. Although more than a third of Armenians reside in the capital, Yerevan, agriculture is the leading economic activity. Crops include grain, potatoes, sugar beets, grapes, and a variety of other fruits and vegetables. Output declined substantially as a result of a massive earthquake in 1988 and the onset of conflict with Azerbaijan the following year, combined with the effects of post-Communist economic restructuring. GDP underwent a 67 percent contraction between 1992 and 1993, and industry was reported to have virtually ceased by early 1993, with an estimated two-thirds of the country’s workforce unemployed. A partial recovery in 1994 yielded GDP growth of 5 percent (rare among the ex-Soviet republics, albeit from a very low base); the rate was maintained in 1995 with little tangible improvement in economic and social conditions. GDP growth surpassed 6 percent in 1996 and 1997, earning Armenia continued support from financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which had approved its first loan in 1996 to support Armenia’s economic reform program. However, it was clear that long-term economic strength depended on settling the long-standing dispute with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. (Armenia has

controlled that enclave in Azerbaijan since 1994. See Political background and Foreign relations, below, and the article on Azerbaijan for additional details.) In addition, widespread poverty, rising unemployment, and a huge trade deficit were reportedly fueling discontent over the effects of recent free-market emphasis, particularly the uneven distribution of wealth. Meanwhile, the IMF and World Bank continued to signal prospects for greater aid, particularly if the stalled privatization of the energy sector resumed and the government maintained its strict monetary policies, which had at least limited inflation to a negligible level. Significant interest

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was also focused on the U.S. plan for an oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea through Armenia to a Turkish port on the Mediterranean, which, if constructed, would mean a windfall in transit fees to Armenia. Impressive economic growth continued in the 2000s, fueled by an export boom, expanding foreign investment in the food-processing sector, and Armenia’s admission to the World Trade Organization in 2003. The IMF reported double-digit growth in Armenia in 2005 for the fourth consecutive year, while annual inflation had fallen to below 1 percent by 2005. The “remarkable” economic performance was attributed to “prudent” fiscal policy, and the IMF and World Bank eagerly supported the government’s economic management with new lending. However, at the same time, the IMF called on the government to broaden the tax base and strengthen its tax and customs administration. Concern also continued over the poverty level (33 percent of the population reportedly lived below the poverty line) and unemployment (officially 10 percent but possibly double that figure in the estimation of some independent observers). In addition, the IMF argued that Armenia would not reach its “full potential” until a resolution of the dispute over NagornoKarabakh, which, among other things, had led Azerbaijan and Turkey to close their borders with Armenia, thereby costing Armenia much-needed market access. A settlement was also considered crucial to Armenia’s achieving its long-term goal of membership in the European Union (EU), which as of mid-decade was additionally demanding immediate and substantial political reform in the face of what was widely judged to be Armenia’s poor record regarding genuine democratization, protection of human rights, and press freedom.

Government and Politics Political Background Ruled at various times by Macedonians, Romans, Persians, Byzantines, Mongols, Turks, and Russians, the territory of the present republic was obtained by Russia from Persia in 1828. Prior to their defeat in World War I, a western region was

controlled by the Ottoman Turks, who engaged in what Armenians have called a systematic campaign of genocide between 1894 and 1922. (Armenians estimate that 1.5 million people died during the period in question, and they continue to press for international acknowledgment that genocide had indeed taken place. For its part, Turkey has strongly resisted the genocide label, claiming that the loss of life was much less than estimated by Armenians. The issue has received renewed international attention in recent years; the French parliament in January 2001 officially accepted the genocide description, thereby prompting economic retaliation from Turkey.) Under the 1918 Treaty of BrestLitovsk, Russian Armenia became an independent republic under German auspices before emerging as the core of a revived Greater Armenia under the 1920 Treaty of S`evres. Shortly thereafter, the Russian component came under Communist control and was designated a Soviet Socialist Republic in December 1922, western Armenia having been returned to Turkey. In 1988 ethnic turmoil erupted in the form of protests by Armenians over the status of their compatriots in the Azerbaijani autonomous oblast (region) of Nagorno-Karabakh. In February 1988 the oblast council requested that the territory be transferred to Armenian administration. The ensuing year was punctuated by ethnic violence, and in November 1989 the Armenian Pan-National Movement (Hayots Hamazgain Sharzhum—HHSh) was organized in support of “genuine sovereignty” for the Armenian people and resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. In early 1990 the Armenian Supreme Soviet proclaimed its right to veto legislation approved by Moscow after the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet had ruled as unconstitutional a late 1989 declaration of a “unified Armenian republic” that included the Azeri-held region. The action prompted demonstrations by Azerbaijani nationalists at Baku, and communal violence ensued, leading Moscow to dispatch military units in an attempt to restore order. Fighting nonetheless intensified along the border of the two republics during ensuing months. In July 1990 a newly elected

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Political Status: Armenian Republic established on November 29, 1920; joined the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) as part of the Transcaucasian Soviet Socialist Republic on December 30, 1922; became constituent republic of the USSR on December 5, 1936; independence declared September 23, 1991, following national referendum of September 21. Area: 11,506 sq. mi. (29,800 sq. km.). Population: 3,210,606 (2001C); 3,214,000 (2005E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): YEREVAN (1,102,000), Gumayri (formerly Leninakan, 149,000). Official Language: Armenian. Monetary Unit: Dram (official rate July 1, 2006: 417.50 drams = $1US). President: Robert KOCHARIAN (nonparty); assumed office in an acting capacity following the resignation of Levon TER-PETROSIAN (Pan-Armenian National Movement) on February 3, 1998; elected on March 30, 1998, and inaugurated for a five-year term on April 9; reelected in second-round balloting on March 5, 2003, and inaugurated for a second five-year term on April 10. Prime Minister: Andranik MARKARIAN (Unity/Republican Party of Armenia); appointed by the president on May 12, 2000, to succeed Aram SARKISIAN, who had been dismissed by the president on May 2; formed new government on May 20, 2000; formed new government on June 11, 2003, following legislative elections of May 25.

Armenian Supreme Soviet refused to comply with a directive from USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev banning local “armed formations,” and on August 23 it issued a declaration of Armenian “independent statehood,” which did not, however, call for immediate secession from the Soviet Union. In mid-April 1991 the Armenian government moved to nationalize the property of the republican Communist Party, whose first secretary, Stepan POGOSIAN, resigned in favor of Aram SARK-

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ISIAN on May 14. At a congress on September 7, following the failure of the Moscow hard-line coup and coincident with a Supreme Soviet vote to establish a directly elected presidency, the party voted to disband. In a referendum two weeks later, 94.39 percent of those participating voted for full independence, which was declared by the Armenian Supreme Soviet on September 23. Subsequently, on October 16, the incumbent Supreme Soviet chair, Levon TER-PETROSIAN, was elected president of the republic, with Gagik HAROUTIUNIAN becoming vice president and, additionally, acting prime minister, following the resignation of Vazgen MANUKIAN on September 25. On July 30, 1992, the vice president yielded the prime ministerial post to Khosrov HAROUTIUNIAN (no relation). On February 2, 1993, President Ter-Petrosian dismissed Prime Minister Haroutiunian for having criticized government economic policies, and a successor administration under Hrand BAGRATIAN was inducted on February 16. The opposition parties thereupon pressed for new elections, mounting large antigovernment demonstrations in the capital on various occasions in 1993 and 1994; however, the Ter-Petrosian administration remained firmly in control, despite a deteriorating economic situation and no progress in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. In November 1994 the government introduced a major economic reform program in consultation with the IMF, and in March 1995 it launched a massive privatization drive aimed at selling off 64 percent of the ten largest state enterprises. In Armenia’s first postindependence election on July 5, 1995 (with reruns being held for some 40 seats on July 29), a six-party Republic bloc headed by Ter-Petrosian’s HHSh won a substantial legislative majority, while a constitutional referendum the same day gave 68 percent endorsement to a new post-Soviet text conferring enhanced powers on the president. The fairness of the electoral process was questioned by international observers, partly because the government had suspended the opposition Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Hai Heghapokhakan

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Dashnaktsutyun—HHD/Dashnak) in December 1994, thereby preventing it from contesting the election as a party. President Ter-Petrosian described the outcome of the 1995 election and referendum as “a victory for democracy” and noted that Armenia had not followed other former Soviet-bloc states in voting ex-Communist parties back into power. While acknowledging that there had been some technical difficulties in the conduct of the polls, he rejected the charge that they had been unfair, promising that deficiencies would be remedied. Attention subsequently focused on the fall 1996 presidential election, for which nine candidates were initially registered by the Central Electoral Commission, although five later withdrew. President Ter-Petrosian was reelected outright in the first-round balloting on September 22, 1996, with the official results giving him 51.75 percent of the vote. His nearest challenger was former prime minister Vazgen Manukian of the National Democratic Union of Armenia (Azgayin Zhoghovrdavarakan Miutiun—AZhM), who was credited with 41.29 percent. Claims by Manukian and other opposition leaders of widespread electoral fraud in the incumbent’s favor triggered several days of protests in Yerevan, during which demonstrators clashed violently with security forces. After the incidents, many opposition party members, including Manukian, were arrested. Although those prisoners were amnestied in mid-1997, various appeals filed by opposition leaders asking for annulment of the September 1996 elections were rejected. Meanwhile, observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) confirmed that “very serious breaches” of Armenian electoral law had occurred. (The European Parliament subsequently passed a resolution challenging the legitimacy of the elections and called for a new round of voting.) On November 4, 1996, the president appointed Armen SARKISIAN, the former ambassador to the United Kingdom, to succeed Bagratian as prime minister. The latter had resigned his post, ostensibly for personal reasons but perhaps under the influence of growing popular discontent over the effects of the government’s economic reforms, which, al-

though underpinning solid GDP growth, had also produced lower wages and higher unemployment. Sarkisian himself resigned on March 6, 1997; ill health was given as the cause of the resignation, although conflict between the popular prime minister and President Ter-Petrosian was widely believed to have been an underlying factor. Sarkisian was replaced on March 20 by Robert KOCHARIAN, the president of the self-proclaimed Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (see article on Azerbaijan). That attention-getting decision by President TerPetrosian was well received by the Armenian populace, but the president and the new prime minister were in open disagreement later in the year regarding negotiations with Azerbaijan. President Ter-Petrosian appeared to step in political quicksand in September 1997 when he suggested that he would consider an arrangement in which an autonomous Nagorno-Karabakh would remain a part of Azerbaijan. The president’s apparent willingness to compromise, based on his belief that Armenia’s economic potential was being held hostage to the conflict, put him at increasingly greater odds with Prime Minister Kocharian. Ter-Petrosian resigned on February 3, 1998, apparently under pressure from hard-line military leaders, who by that time were widely believed to wield the strongest authority in Armenia. Although the constitution provided for the president of the National Assembly to assume the presidency temporarily under such circumstances, speaker president Babken ARARKTSIAN also resigned his post, leaving Kocharian, as prime minister, to serve as acting president pending new elections. Twelve candidates contested the first round of presidential balloting on March 16, 1998, with Kocharian and Karen DEMIRCHIAN, who had led Armenia under Communist rule for 14 years (1974–1988), finishing in the top two spots. In the runoff poll on March 30, Kocharian was elected with 60 percent of the vote, although Demirchian challenged the accuracy of the count. On April 10 Kocharian named Economy and Finance Minister Armen DARBINIAN, a young (age 33) reformminded economist, as prime minister. About three-quarters of the former ministers were replaced in the new government installed on April 20.

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Having been embroiled in a series of conflicts with the assembly, President Kocharian called for early elections to be held on May 30, 1999. Some 21 parties and blocs registered for the balloting, many of them bearing little resemblance to previous formations. The most prominent coalition was the Unity bloc, comprising Demirchian’s People’s Party of Armenia (Hayastani Zhoghovrdakan Kusaktsutiun—HZhK) and Vazgen SARKISIAN’s Republican Party of Armenia (Hayastani Hanrapetakan Kusaktsutiun—HHK), which secured 42 percent of the nationwide proportional vote and a total of 55 seats in the new assembly. Demirchian was elected speaker of the assembly on June 10, and the following day Kocharian announced the appointment of Sarkisian, a former defense minister widely believed to have been involved in the “ouster” of President Ter-Petrosian, as prime minister. Many incumbents were retained in Sarkisian’s Unity-led government (formed June 15), which also included representatives from Dashnak and a number of independents. Hope subsequently grew that Armenia was set for a period of much-needed political stability, but such optimism was dashed on October 27, 1999, when gunmen seized the assembly and killed Prime Minister Sarkisian, Demirchian, and five other government officials. On November 3 President Kocharian named Aram SARKISIAN, Vazgen’s brother, as the new prime minister. A new cabinet (including members of Unity, Dashnak, the AZhM, and the Armenian Communist Party [Hayastani Komunistakan Kusaktsutiun—HKK], which had finished second in the May 1999 legislative balloting) was announced on February 28, 2000, significant friction in determining the structure and members of the government having been reported between Prime Minister Sarkisian and President Kocharian. Sarkisian also continued to criticize the president regarding the prosecution of the assassination case, and tension rose even higher in March when Kocharian issued several decrees asserting his right to appoint senior military officers. Impeachment proceedings against Kocharian were considered in the assembly in April but were not pursued, in part, apparently, because the president

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had appointed members of the Yerkrapah Union of Karabakh War Veterans, an important HHK power base, to top army posts. The infighting culminated in Kocharian’s dismissal of Sarkisian on May 2 and his appointment of the HHK’s Andranik MARKARIAN as prime minister on May 12. On May 20 Markarian announced a new cabinet, although many incumbents were retained. Amid continuing political and public discord (see Current issues, below), Kocharian was credited with 49.48 percent of the vote in the first round of presidential balloting on February 19, 2003. He defeated HZhK leader Stepan DEMIRCHIAN with 67.5 percent of the vote in the runoff poll on March 5. However, those results were strongly contested by opposition parties, as were the official results of the May 25 assembly elections that were again dominated by propresidential parties. Prime Minister Markarian formed a new cabinet (comprising members of the HHK and the Country of Law [Orinats Yerkir—OY] party) in June. (The Country of Law withdrew from the coalition in May 2006.)

Constitution and Government A new constitution approved by referendum on July 5, 1995, replaced the existing Soviet-era text by providing for a strong presidential system of government balanced by separation of powers, strengthened independence of the judiciary, and the creation of a Constitutional Court. Directly elected for a five-year term, the president has the right to appoint the prime minister and other government ministers, subject to approval by the National Assembly. The president can also dissolve the assembly and call new elections, although a veto on legislation can be overridden by simple majority in the assembly (instead of the two-thirds majority required previously). Administratively, Armenia is divided into 67 centrally controlled districts (raions), 8 of which are located in the capital, Yerevan. Following his election in 1998, President Kocharian appointed a commission to propose constitutional revision that would dilute presidential authority. However, the commission’s recommendations, published in 2001, would not have

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transferred nearly enough power to the assembly, according to opposition parties, who demanded the right to present their own plan for consideration by national referendum. Concurrent with legislative balloting in 2003, a national referendum was held on several constitutional issues, including the removal of a ban on dual citizenship; the specific conditions under which the president could dissolve the National Assembly; and whether to reduce the number of deputies in the assembly from 131 to 101. The referendum failed because the requisite turnout threshold was not met. A national referendum on November 27, 2005, approved a number of constitutional amendments designed to reduce the powers of the president and strengthen the legislature and the judiciary. The changes were not scheduled for implementation until after the 2007 assembly balloting.

Foreign Relations Armenia was a founding member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in December 1991. By early 1992 diplomatic relations had been established with a number of Western countries, including the United States, as well as with China and Japan, and Armenia had become a member of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, subsequently the OSCE). On March 2 Armenia was admitted to the United Nations, with membership in the IMF and World Bank following in ensuing months. Armenia’s major international issue since independence has been the status of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, a dispute that extends back to the early 20th century (see Political background in article on Azerbaijan) and that played an important role in the Armenian independence movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s (see Political background, above). In May 1992 Armenian forces captured Azerbaijan’s last major urban stronghold in the region and proceeded to open a corridor to Armenia proper. Concurrently, an attack was launched on the Azeri enclave of Nakhichevan near Armenia’s border with Turkey. Subsequently, Azerbaijan mounted a counterattack in Nagorno-

Karabakh and by early July had recaptured most of its northern sector, which, however, returned to Armenian control in ensuing months. Meanwhile, under a May 1992 agreement among Russia and five other CIS members (Azerbaijan not included), the signatories had pledged to provide assistance in the event of threats to each other’s security. Armenia appealed to the pact after an Azeri attack on one of its border villages in early August, receiving a manifestly cool response from Moscow, where there was little support for the proposed transfer of Armenian-populated Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan to Armenia. At the same time, Armenian forays into Nakhichevan raised the possibility of Turkish involvement, despite a pledge by Ankara to refrain from action that might lead to a wider conflict between the region’s Christians and Muslims. In May 1993 Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to a cease-fire brokered by the United States, Russia, and Turkey that called for Armenian withdrawal from recently conquered Azeri territory and the launching of peace talks in Geneva, Switzerland, under the auspices of the CSCE. However, the agreement was repudiated by the NagornoKarabakh leadership, and by mid-June Armenian forces had resumed military activity that left them in effective control of much of southwestern Azerbaijan. On May 5, 1994, talks sponsored by the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Union in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, yielded a cease-fire protocol, which Azerbaijan belatedly signed three days later. A followup agreement was concluded in Moscow on May 11, although the Azeri opposition criticized the pact as implying de facto recognition of the selfproclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Yet another accord on May 16 called for the deployment of some 1,800 CIS peacekeepers under a Russian commander, but the placement of the troops was deferred because of Azeri objection to the size of the Russian component. Subsequently, whereas the military advantage had appeared to lie with Azerbaijan in early 1994, a CIS-brokered cease-fire in July left the Armenians in control of much of the disputed territory.

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In late 1994 both sides accepted (in principle) a Budapest summit conference decision that 3,000 CSCE peacekeeping troops be deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh, subject to approval by the UN Security Council and formal cessation of hostilities by the contending parties. The Budapest decision represented the first peacekeeping venture by the CSCE/OSCE; it was further agreed that the force would be multinational, with no one country contributing more than 30 percent of the total. However, the Russian government, although endorsing the Budapest agreement, was reportedly reluctant to accept the deployment of a genuinely multinational force in one of the former Soviet republics, and no peacekeeping troops were subsequently dispatched. The Russian defense ministry estimated in late 1994 that some 18,000 people had died in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict since its inception. Efforts to establish a lasting cease-fire on the basis of the December 1994 accord were set back in May 1995 when Armenia withdrew from the negotiating process, charging Azerbaijani involvement in a bomb attack by Georgian Azeris that severed a pipeline carrying vital gas supplies to Armenia from Turkmenistan. Talks resumed in September but made little progress, complicated by NagornoKarabakh’s unilateral declaration of independence in March 1996. Despite calls by the Armenian opposition for the new entity to be recognized, the Ter-Petrosian government reacted cautiously, saying that recognition would not be extended by Yerevan until at least one other country had done so. The appointment of Robert Kocharian, the president of the self-declared Republic of NagornoKarabakh, as the new prime minister of Armenia on March 20, 1997, seriously increased the tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Although some observers expressed the hope that the maneuver might provide renewed energy to negotiations, Azerbaijan quickly accused Armenian president Ter-Petrosian of “provocation” in the matter, and in mid-April fighting between Armenian and Azerbaijani forces broke out in two locations along the frontier. In late May the OSCE submitted a draft peace plan that proposed giving Nagorno-

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Karabakh autonomous status within Azerbaijan. The plan also called for the withdrawal of the Armenian forces from five raions in Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Kocharian announced that his government did not rule out the possibility of annexing Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia’s relations with Russia subsequently remained strong, a 1997 treaty permitting Russia to maintain military bases in Armenia for up to 25 years. (As of 2003, some 3,500 Russian troops remained stationed in Armenia.) In addition, in 2001 the two countries signed a ten-year economic agreement, while in September 2003 Armenia transferred control of its sole remaining nuclear power plant to Russia. In January 2004 the United States agreed to provide some $75 million in aid to Armenia, including $5 million for humanitarian assistance in NagornoKarabakh and $2.5 million in military aid. Perhaps in response to the U.S. assistance, Armenia deployed 46 noncombat troops to Iraq in January 2005 to support the U.S.-led coalition. In August 2004 Armenia and China initiated a series of military cooperation discussions that included the expansion of Chinese training of Armenian military personnel. On another front, in December 2004 plans were announced for construction of a gas pipeline from Iran to Armenia. (In 2006 Armenia announced that Russia would be a joint owner of the proposed pipeline.) Meanwhile, relations between Armenia and Turkey remained strained. Turkey refused efforts to finalize the border between the two states because of the continuing presence of Russian troops along the border areas. In addition, Armenia continued to press for Turkish recognition that the Ottoman killing of Armenians in the late 19th and early 20th centuries had been genocide. Turkey also demanded that Armenia renounce any claims to territory in eastern Turkey.

Current Issues Following the 1999 legislative poll, international pressure continued to mount for a permanent resolution of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh,

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one U.S. plan calling for the region to attain the status of an autonomous republic (with its own army and currency) within Azerbaijan. Washington was reportedly offering financial incentives to both sides of the dispute since a resolution would facilitate construction of a pipeline to transport the anticipated flow of Caspian Sea oil from Azerbaijan through Armenia to a Turkish port on the Mediterranean Sea, thereby avoiding other routes preferred by Moscow. Such discussions also touched on the ongoing question of Armenia’s international orientation; a number of Armenians reportedly supported the HKK’s call for participation in the fledgling Union of Belarus and Russia, while others urged a more “multifaceted” approach that would provide additional ties with the West. Among other things, Russia maintains military bases in Armenia and has “guaranteed” Armenia’s security. As a result, Armenia has announced it does not intend to pursue full NATO membership, although it joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program in 1994. In early fall 1999 President Kocharian and his Azerbaijani counterpart, Heydar Aliyev, were reportedly involved in substantive dialogue regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, rumors (denied by both sides) persisting that a deal was under consideration in which Nagorno-Karabakh would be “traded” to Armenia in return for land linking Azerbaijan proper to Nakhichevan. Certain observers suggested there was a link between a perceived softening on Kocharian’s part in the matter and the shocking assassinations of Prime Minister Sarkisian and assembly speaker Demirchian in October, the gunmen being described in some quarters as hardline nationalists. Others theorized the killings were part of a “delusional” coup attempt, whereas statements from the attackers, who said Sarkisian was the primary target, condemned “corruption” and “poor leadership” within the government. In any event, although no precise explanation of motives was forthcoming, the incident had the immediate effect of halting discussions regarding NagornoKarabakh and throwing Armenian domestic political affairs into chaos. The most noticeable problem was the ensuing friction between Kocharian

and Prime Minister Aram Sarkisian, who was described by his critics as “politically immature” and whose appeal was based largely on the fact that he was the slain prime minister’s brother. In announcing the appointment of Andranik Markarian to the post in May 2000, Kocharian said he hoped the change would eliminate the “intrigues” that he described as barring government effectiveness. However, news reports throughout the summer and early fall focused on the perceived deterioration of relations between the two parties in the Unity coalition, which finally collapsed in mid-2001 (see Political Parties, below). In December 2000 the assembly adopted legislation that provided for an increase in the number of proportional seats from 56 to 94, a measure that was designed to mute criticism from opposition parties. However, tensions persisted, and mass demonstrations in the fall of 2001 called for President Kocharian’s resignation, while opposition parties attempted (unsuccessfully) to have the assembly consider an impeachment motion. Kocharian’s critics accused him of adopting a “Russian-style” authoritarian approach designed, among other things, to harass his opponents and muzzle the press. That notion was further supported by the assembly’s approval in July 2002 of an administration bill reducing proportional seating in the assembly to the original 56 for the elections scheduled for May 2003. Political violence and protests intensified following the first round of presidential balloting (contested by nine candidates) on February 19, 2003. Opposition groups charged the administration with heavy-handed intimidation of voters, while international observers reported broad electoral irregularities in both the second round of the presidential poll won by Kocharian and the May assembly elections. In protest, deputies from the Justice bloc and the National Unity Party boycotted the assembly from May until September and again starting in February 2004. Widespread demonstrations organized by the opposition in April 2004 were suppressed, sparking condemnation from the Council of Europe, the U.S. State Department, and international human rights organizations. The domestic campaign to force Kocharian’s resignation

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ultimately failed, in part due to new legislation passed in May that placed substantial restrictions on the right to demonstrate. The United States and the Council of Europe supported the constitutional amendments presented by the government for a national referendum on November 27, 2005, on the grounds that the revision represented a significant first step on the road to democratic reform, most importantly by diluting presidential authority. However, most opposition parties called for a boycott of the balloting as a means of indicating the populace’s desire for “regime change.” Street protests were organized during the prereferendum campaign, but they did not reach the organizers’ hopes regarding size or intensity. (Some leaders of the opposition concluded that Armenians were not yet ready for the kind of mass movements that had recently toppled strong-arm governments in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine.) The government announced a 65 percent turnout and a 93 percent yes vote in the referendum, claiming that voters had clearly indicated their support of the Kocharian administration’s policies. Unfortunately for the government, however, international observers quickly concluded that the balloting had been rigged, primarily through ballot-stuffing. Some 10,000 protesters demonstrated in Yerevan after the results were announced, but the government did not appear to feel serious pressure. In early 2006 EU representatives expressed “doubts” about the government’s “commitment to democracy” and called for broad political reform prior to the legislative poll scheduled for May 2007. For their part, domestic critics of the government suggested that the country was in fact “regressing” in regard to democratization and human rights, although public discontent was being tempered by the country’s undeniably excellent economic progress in recent years. Little progress was reported as of September 2006 regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, despite a face-to-face meeting of Presidents Kocharian and Ilham Aliyev in February and intense mediation efforts by the OSCE, which had reportedly concluded that it was imperative to resolve

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the issue in 2006 before the upcoming election seasons in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Kocharian pledged that Armenia would recognize NagornoKarabakh’s independence if Azerbaijan pulled out of peace talks, although some observers suggested that Azerbaijan’s growing military strength could prove to be a deterrent to genuinely provocative action.

Political Parties New legislation required all political parties to reapply for registration in November 2002. As of 2006 there were reportedly 74 legal parties. The Unity (Miasnutiun) coalition was launched in early April 1999 by the People’s Party of Armenia (HZhK) and the Republican Party of Armenia (HHK) in preparation for the upcoming legislative poll. Unity was described as a “marriage of convenience” that hoped to capitalize on the resurgent popularity of the HZhK’s Karen Demirchian and the “political machine” of the HHK’s Vazgen Sarkisian. The coalition of the left-leaning HZhK and the center-right HHK necessitated a “vague” campaign platform, although Unity broadly pledged to use government economic intervention to offset some of the problems associated with the freemarket transition of the 1990s. Unity won nearly 42 percent of the proportional vote in the May 1999 legislative balloting and, with support from independent legislators, subsequently controlled a comfortable parliamentary majority and formed a new government under Sarkisian’s leadership, while Demirchian was elected speaker of the assembly. However, following the assassination of both leaders in October 1999, tension between the two Unity partners bubbled to the surface. Meanwhile, Unity’s parliamentary strength had been eroded by the defection of a group of legislators opposed to the majority’s willingness to cooperate with President Kocharian. HZhK leaders described Unity as defunct in mid-2001, and the HHK announced it would run on its own in the 2003 elections. The HZhK subsequently was at the center of a new opposition coalition, the Justice bloc. As of early 2006 it appeared that significant

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realignments were likely to occur later in the year in anticipation of the 2007 legislative balloting, while a number of new parties were also forming.

Government Parties Republican Party of Armenia (Hayastani Hanrapetakan Kusaktsutiun—HHK). The HHK was launched in November 1998 as a merger of the small Republican Party (a founding member of the Republic bloc, below) and the Yerkrapah Union of Karabakh War Veterans, which had recently become influential in the National Assembly as well as in the national cabinet and a number of local administrations. Vazgen Sarkisian, the leader of Yerkrapah and defense minister in the Darbinian cabinet, was selected to lead the HHK, which he said would be dedicated to “free economic competition,” a stance that appeared somewhat at odds with the HZhK, its subsequent partner in the Unity coalition. Sarkisian also indicated he believed the HHK would serve as the future core of political support for President Kocharian, although ten Yerkrapah hard-liners subsequently dissociated themselves from the president in reaction to what they perceived as a softening of his position regarding Nagorno-Karabakh. A degree of appeasement appeared to develop in March 2000 when Kocharian appointed Yerkrapah leaders to a number of important military posts, although ten Yerkrapah legislators reportedly left the HHK parliamentary bloc because of the conflict. Meanwhile, Kocharian had accepted the HHK’s nomination of Andranik Markarian as prime minister in May 2000 after nearly six months of political instability precipitated by the October 1999 assembly shootings in which Sarkisian was among those killed. In the 2003 presidential balloting, the HHK supported incumbent President Kocharian. In the May 2003 legislative elections, the HHK gained 33 seats and became the largest party in the assembly. In June, Markarian was again appointed prime minister. Leaders: Andranik MARKARIAN (Prime Minister and Chair of the Party), Tigran TOROSIAN, Galust SAHAKIAN (Parliamentary Leader). Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Hai Heghapokhakan Dashnaktsutyun—HHD/

Dashnak). Originally founded in 1891 and the ruling party in pre-Soviet Armenia, the HHD retained a substantial following in the Armenian diaspora after it was outlawed by the Bolsheviks in 1920. Reestablished in 1991 as a nationalist and socialist opposition party, the HHD (popularly known as Dashnak) nominated the actor Sos SARGSIAN in the October 1991 presidential election, but he received only 4 percent of the vote. In 1992 the party struck a public chord with its criticism of the government’s conduct of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh. The government responded by alleging that the HHD leaders in exile had for many years cooperated with Soviet security authorities. In June 1994 the HHD parliamentary leader, Gagik OVANESSIAN, was expelled from the party for publicly criticizing its “Bolshevik” methods. In late December 1994 the HHD was suspended by presidential decree on the grounds that it had engaged in terrorism, political assassination, and drug trafficking. It was therefore unable to contest the July 1995 election as a party. Although more than 100 Dashnak candidates stood as individuals in the majoritarian component of the balloting, only 1 candidate was elected. In March 1996, 31 party members were put on trial in Yerevan, charged with involvement in an abortive coup attempt at the time of the July 1995 elections. In December 1997 one of the Dashnak leaders, Vahan Ovanesian, received a four-year prison sentence. However, he and other imprisoned HHD leaders were released in February 1998, and Dashnak was subsequently permitted to reregister as a legal party. Several Dashnak members were named to the April 1998 cabinet. Dashnak secured 7.83 percent of the vote in the proportional component of the May 1999 legislative poll. Dashnak accepted two cabinet posts in 2001. The HHD endorsed Kocharian in the 2003 presidential election. It secured 11 seats in the May 2003 legislative elections and joined the subsequent Unity government. Leaders: Ruben HAGOBIAN (Chair), Hrant MARKARIAN (Former Chair), Levon MKRTCHIAN (Parliamentary Leader), Gino MANOIAN, Vahan OVANESIAN.

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Other Parliamentary Parties Country of Law (Orinats Yerkir—OY). Formed in 1998, the Country of Law party was subsequently reported to enjoy the support of the influential Interior Minister Serzh Sarkisian, a native of Nagorno-Karabakh believed to have been instrumental in pressuring President Ter-Petrosian to resign. Describing itself as a centrist grouping, the Country of Law party won 5.28 percent of the votes in the proportional component of the May 1999 legislative poll. The party supported President Kocharian in the 2003 presidential balloting and secured 19 seats in the subsequent legislative elections. Artur Baghdasarian, the party’s leader, resigned as speaker of the assembly in May 2006 and announced that the Country of Law was withdrawing from the cabinet over an apparent foreign policy dispute with President Kocharian. (Baghdasarian was reportedly viewed as too “pro-NATO” by the president.) A number of Country of Law legislators reportedly later quit the party. Leader: Artur BAGHDASARIAN (Chair and Former Speaker of the Assembly). Justice (Artarutiun). Formed in 2003, the Justice bloc comprised opposition groups and parties that came together to oppose the propresidential parties in the legislative elections. The bloc gained 14 seats in the May 2003 legislative balloting. It subsequently represented one of the two main opposition parties to Kocharian and led a series of demonstrations and protests against the government. The bloc called for a boycott of the November 2005 constitutional referendum and accused the government of massive fraud regarding the official results of the vote. Leaders: Stepan DEMIRCHIAN (HZhK), Vazgen MANUKIAN (AZhM), Aram G. SARKISIAN (HDK), Aram SARKISIAN (Republic party). People’s Party of Armenia (Hayastani Zhoghovrdakan Kusaktsutiun—HZhK). The HZhK was formed in 1998 by former Communist leader Karen Demirchian following his defeat in the March presidential election, which he described as fraudulent. Demirchian had served

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as first secretary of the Communist Party in Armenia from 1974 until 1988, when he was dismissed by Mikhail Gorbachev for his perceived failure to combat the nationalist movement in Armenia. Although Demirchian was subsequently considered a “political has-been,” he made a remarkable comeback with his 1998 presidential campaign, which apparently struck a chord with those elements of the populace who yearned for the security of the Soviet era. Demirchian campaigned for the May 1999 legislative poll on a pledge to slow down liberalization in order to protect the populace from economic dislocation, his popularity being deemed the primary reason for Unity’s success. Following his assassination in October, Demirchian was succeeded as party leader by his son, Stepan, and as speaker of the assembly by Armen KHACHATRIAN, himself a subject of controversy within the fragile Unity coalition. Stepan Demirchian subsequently displayed increasingly anti-Kocharian sentiment, and the HZhK in 2001 announced the end of Unity, calling the HHK a “stooge” for President Kocharian. Demirchian was the HZhK’s candidate in the 2003 presidential election; he finished second with 32.5 percent of the vote in the second round. Leaders: Stepan DEMIRCHIAN (Chair), Hmayak HOVANISIAN. National Democratic Union of Armenia (Azgayin Zhoghovrdavarakan Miutiun— AZhM). The AZhM was formed by Vazgen Manukian following his resignation as prime minister and withdrawal from the Armenian National Movement (ANM) in September 1991. In mid-1994 the AZhM organized large-scale demonstrations against the Yerevan government. It took 7.5 percent of the vote in the 1995 assembly election, securing five seats. In April 1996 the party was taken to court by the authorities after its weekly newspaper Ayzhm (Now) published data contradicting the official results of the 1995 constitutional referendum. In 1996 Manukian challenged the official results of presidential balloting, in which he was runner-up

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to the incumbent with 41 percent of the vote. The AZhM leader won 12.2 percent of the vote in the first round of the 1998 presidential poll, while the party, described as displaying a center-right orientation, secured 5.17 percent of the vote in the proportional component of the May 1999 legislative balloting, just barely surpassing the threshold required to gain representation. The AZhM accepted a cabinet post in 2000, although significant opposition to that decision was reported within the party’s rank-and-file. In the 2003 presidential elections, Manukian received less than 1 percent of the vote. In 2006 he indicated that the AZhM might boycott the 2007 legislative balloting unless additional political reform was enacted. Leaders: Vazgen MANUKIAN (Chair). Democratic Party of Armenia (Hayastani Demokratakan Kusaktsutiun—HDK). The HDK was founded in late 1991 as selfproclaimed successor to the once-dominant HKK following the latter’s suspension in September 1991, after which many of the HKK’s senior members switched allegiance to the ruling HHSh. Weakened by the revival of the HKK for the 1995 legislative balloting, the HDK managed only a 1.8 percent vote share and no seats. In 1996 the HDK was prominent in opposition calls for the government to recognize the self-declared independence of NagornoKarabakh. It was a strong supporter of Robert Kocharian in the 1998 presidential election, its leader, Aram Sarkisian, subsequently becoming an influential foreign policy adviser to the new president. (Recent Handbooks have mistakenly referenced Aram G. Sarkisian of the HDK as having served as prime minister in 1999–2000. The man who served as prime minister was a different Aram Sarkisian [see Republic, below].) Meanwhile, the HDK had secured less than 1 percent of the proportional vote in the May 1999 legislative balloting. Leader: Aram G. SARKISIAN (Chair). Republic (Hanrapetutiun). This party was formed in 2001 by former members of the HHK,

including Albert Bazeyan (the former mayor of Yerevan) and Aram Sarkisian (prime minister for six months in 1999–2000 following the assassination of his brother, Prime Minister Vazgen Sarkisian). Republic has subsequently been referred to as one of the most strongly antiKocharian parties, calling, among other things, for a more pro-Western orientation for the government. The party vehemently opposed the 2005 constitutional referendum and in early 2006 continued to press for “regime change” prior to the legislative elections of 2007. Meanwhile, Bazeyan had left Republic in late 2005 (see National Revival, below) in opposition to what he reportedly perceived to be Aram Sarkisian’s “radical” antigovernment stance. Leader: Aram SARKISIAN (Chair and Former Prime Minister). National Democratic Party. Although it participated in the Justice bloc in the 2003 legislative elections, this party reportedly withdrew from the bloc in late 2005 after having been “censured” by the other members for failing to support the boycott of the November constitutional referendum. Shavarsh Kocharian, the “notably pro-Western” leader of the party, reportedly described other Justice leaders as “too radical.” Leader: Shavarsh KOCHARIAN. Other parties in the Justice bloc included the Social Democratic Hnchakian Party, led by Yeghia NAJARIAN; the Union of Constitutional Law, led by Grant KHACHATRIAN; and the National Democratic Alliance, led by Arshak SADOYAN. National Unity Party (Azgayin Miabanutiun). This nationalist party was formed in 1997 under the leadership of former Yerevan mayor Artashes Geghamian. The party supported continuing close ties to Russia as well as further integration into the institutions of Europe. In the 2003 presidential election, Geghamian placed third in the first round of balloting with 16.9 percent of the vote. In the subsequent legislative elections, the National Unity

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Party secured 8.8 percent of the vote and nine seats in the assembly. The party boycotted the assembly from February 2004 to September 2005. Leaders: Artashes GEGHAMIAN (Chair and 2003 presidential candidate), Alexan KARAPETIAN (Deputy Chair). Other parties that gained seats in the 2003 legislative elections included the United Labor Party (Miavorvats Ashkhatankayin Kusaksutiun— MAK), formed in 2002 and led by Gurgen ARSENIAN, and the All Armenian Labor Party.

Other Parties Contesting the 2003 Legislative Elections Armenian Communist Party (Hayastani Komunistakan Kusaktsutiun—HKK). Having secured the second-largest number of legislative seats in the 1990 election, the Soviet-era HKK was suspended in September 1991, some of its remaining adherents regrouping in the HDK (above). Permitted to resume activities in 1994, the HKK took a 12.1 percent vote share in the July 1995 legislative balloting, winning seven seats, while HKK leader Sergey BADALIAN secured 6.3 percent of the votes in the September 1996 presidential election and 11 percent in the first round of the 1998 balloting. Calling for Armenian reintegration with Russia and Belarus for security and economic reasons, the HKK secured 12.1 percent of the vote in the proportional component of the May 1999 legislative poll. Following Badalian’s death from a heart attack in November 1999, Vladimir Darbinian was elected as the HKK’s new first secretary, and the party reportedly accepted several portfolios in the February 2000 cabinet reshuffle. Several members were expelled from the HKK in 2001 for suggesting greater cooperation with the government; they reportedly later announced the launching of a “renewed” HKK. In the 2003 legislative elections, the HKK received 2 percent of the vote and, therefore, no seats in the assembly. Leaders: Vladimir DARBINIAN (First Secretary), Sanatruk SAHAKIAN (Second Secretary). Armenian Pan-National Movement (Hayots Hamazgain Sharzhum—HHSh). The HHSh was

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founded in November 1989 by proindependence leaders of the then-ruling Communist Party, including Levon Ter-Petrosian, who had been a key member of the unofficial Karabakh Committee seeking the transfer of the Armenian-populated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan to Armenia. Advocating Armenia’s withdrawal from the USSR as formally sanctioned by the Soviet constitution, the HHSh swept the May 1990 legislative elections and subsequently led Armenia to full independence. Following dissolution of the Communist Party, Ter-Petrosian in October 1991 secured a presidential mandate through direct election by an 83 percent majority. As the governing party, the HHSh insisted that the conflict with Azerbaijan be pursued to a successful conclusion, including the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh, with territorial adjustments to make it contiguous with Armenia proper. The HHSh was the driving force in 1995 in the formation of the Republic bloc (Hanrapetutiun), an electoral coalition that also included the DLPA (below); the Republican Party, led by A. NAVASARDIAN; the Social Democratic Hnchakian Party; and the Armenian Christian Democratic Union, led by Azat ARSHAKIAN. The Republic bloc took a 42.7 percent vote share in the 1995 proportional balloting, winning some two-thirds of the assembly seats by virtue of its dominance of the contests in the single-member districts. During 1996 and 1997 the HHSh witnessed serious internal problems and splits. One of the influential leaders of the reformist wing of the party, Eduard YEGORYAN, following his power struggle with the new leader of the party, Vano Siradeghyan, formed the Hairenik (Fatherland) faction together with 12 HHSh deputies, on September 10, 1997. Discord also permeated the party in regard to TerPetrosian’s resignation in February 1998, the ANM formally supporting new president Kocharian until late in the year, when it switched to opposition status after other members of the influential Presidential Council strongly criticized the HHSh’s performance during Ter-Petrosian’s presidency. Among those facing attack was Siradeghyan, accused of ordering politically motivated killings while he was interior minister from 1992 to 1996. Following an

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effort by reformist legislators to remove his parliamentary immunity, Siradeghyan left the country in January 1999. Nevertheless, he was reelected HHSh chair in absentia in March. The HHSh won only 1.17 percent of the vote in the proportional component of the May 1999 legislative balloting, although Siradeghyan was easily elected in his race for the seat in a singlemember district. Siradeghyan’s parliamentary immunity was subsequently lifted, and he was reported to have again gone into exile. In 2002 the HHSh absorbed the small National Democratic Party-21st Century, which was formed in 1998 by National Security Minister Davit SHAHNAZARIAN, who had campaigned for the presidency in 1998. Leaders: Levon TER-PETROSIAN (Former President of the Republic), Gagik HAROUTIUNIAN (Former Vice President of the Republic), Vano SIRADEGHYAN (Chair, in exile), Alexander ARZOUMANIAN (Chair). Dignified Future (Arzhanapativ Apaga). Led by prominent sociologist Lyudmila Harutiunian and described as having ties to (then) prime minister Armen Darpinian, Dignified Future was credited with 3.27 percent of the proportional vote in the May 1999 legislative election. In the 2003 legislative balloting, Dignified Future led a coalition called Dignity, Democracy, and Motherhood, which secured 2.8 percent of the vote. Leader: Lyudmila HARUTIUNIAN. Liberal Bloc. Formed prior to the 2003 legislative elections, the Liberal bloc is a coalition of three small parties. Its members include the Free Armenia Mission (Azat Hayk Arakelutin), led by Ruben MNATSAKANIAN; Intellectual Armenia (Mtavorakan Hayastan—MH), led by Hovhannes TOKMAJIAN; and the NSDU. National Self-Determination Union (NSDU). Formed in 1987 as a clandestine proindependence grouping by anti-Soviet dissident Paruyr Hairikian, the NSDU won 5.6 percent of the proportional vote and three seats overall in the 1995 legislative balloting, subsequently

providing support for Presidents Ter-Petrosian and Kocharian. The party’s Self-Determination Union and bloc, which also included the Motherland-Diaspora Union, secured only 2.29 percent of the proportional vote in the 1999 legislative balloting. In 2000 Hairikian was named a presidential adviser in the area of constitutional reform. However, he resigned that post in May 2002 and said that Kocharian should not be reelected in 2003 because of his failure to follow through with his 1998 campaign pledges. Hairikian, a survivor of 17 years in a Soviet labor camp, announced his intention to campaign for the presidency himself. Leader: Paruyr HAIRIKIAN. Other parties that contested the 2003 legislative elections but failed to secure representation included the Democratic Liberal Party (Ramakavar-Azatakan), founded in 1991 and led by Rouben MIRZAKHANIAN; the Liberal Democratic Union of Armenia, created in 2001 and led by Seyran AVAGIAN; the Labor, Law, and Unity Party (Iravunk ev Miabanutiun), led by Miran MOVSESIAN; the Mighty Fatherland Party, also known as the Powerful Homeland Party (Hzor Hayrenik—HH), formed in 1997 and led by Varden VARAPETIAN; and the Union of Producers and Women (AKM), which was formed in March 2003 by a coalition of trade unions, business leaders, the Advanced United Communist Parties of Armenia (Hayastani Arajadimakan Miatsial Komunistakan Kusaktsutiun—HAMKK), and the Women of the Armenian Land (Anayk Hayots Ashkhari). The AKM secured 2 percent of the vote in the 2003 balloting.

Other Parties and Groups Stability (Kazunitiun). Formed primarily by independents elected in single-member districts in the May 1999 legislative poll, the Stability parliamentary faction was reported to initially control 22 assembly seats and was generally supportive of the Unity government. In May 2000 Stability leaders indicated an interest in formalizing the faction as a political party that would evince a

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social-democratic orientation in support, among other things, of a stronger governmental role in managing the economy. Two Stability members were reportedly named to the May 2000 cabinet, one of whom was apparently dismissed in 2001. Leader: Vartan AYVAZIAN. Democratic Liberal Party of Armenia (DLPA). Derived from the Ramkavar movement that had long been influential among overseas Armenians, the DLPA was registered in Armenia in June 1991. Moderately right-of-center in orientation, it was favored by many professionals. In September 1994 the DLPA issued a declaration jointly with the HHSh and several smaller parties praising Armenia’s achievements since independence, listing its failings, and setting out requirements for the future. A split developed within the DLPA concerning the legislative balloting in 1995 when prominent party leader Vigen KHACHATRIAN, the former mayor of Yerevan, led his supporters into the Republic bloc led by the HHSh in support of President Ter-Petrosian while another faction contested the election independently. The factionalization has persevered ever since, generating confusion over party names and electoral positions and results. In 1998 Khachatrian contested the presidential election, but his opponents supported Robert Kocharian. Khachatrian also called for a boycott of the May 1999 legislative balloting, although the Liberal Democratic Party, apparently representing the anti-Khachatrian forces, was credited with 0.69 percent of the proportional vote. By that time the latter group had reportedly suffered further internal dissension, Rouben MIRZAKHANIAN having been elected as its chair in February 1999 following the resignation of Arutiun KARAPETYAN. (It appeared possible that two separate groupings with similar names were registered as of 1999, each claiming the original DLPA support.) In May 2000 Khachatrian announced that his grouping had aligned with several other antiKocharian parties to form the Union of Right-Wing Forces dedicated to pursuing the president’s resignation or impeachment as well as new legislative

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and presidential polls. Other members of the Union included the Freedom (Azatutium) party, which had secured 1.03 percent of the proportional vote in 1999 under the leadership of former prime minister Hrand BAGRATIAN; and Armat (Root), led by former assembly speaker Babken ARARKTSIAN and variously referenced as a party or “public organization.” Veterans of the Liberation Struggle. Formed in early 2000, this grouping was viewed as a proKocharian counterpart to Yerkrapah (see HHK, above), many of whose members were locked in conflict with the president. Initial reports indicated that the leader of the new group was Gen. Arkedii TER-TADEVOSSIAN, a prominent commander in the war in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, he reportedly resigned in August, a constituent congress in September electing four cochairmen and announcing its intention to seek formal party status. Leaders: Vartan OSKANIAN, Mihran MOVSISIAN. New Way (Nor Ughi). Formed in 1998, the small New Way party is led by Ashot Bleyan, who was sentenced in October 2000 to eight years in prison for the alleged embezzlement of state property while serving as acting minister of education. Bleyan claimed political factors were responsible for the charges against him. Leader: Ashot BLEYAN (Chair). Heritage (Zharangutian). This party is led by outspoken former foreign minister Raffi Hovanisian, an Armenian from the United States who was precluded from pursuing his goal of campaigning for the Armenian presidency in 2003 because of citizenship issues. In 2006 Heritage was reportedly preparing a major campaign for the 2007 legislative balloting. Leaders: Raffi HOVANNISIAN, Vartan KHACHATRIAN. Prosperous Armenia. Formed in 2006 by wealthy businessman Gagik Tsarukian, the reportedly pro-Kocharian Prosperous Armenia hoped to have a significant impact on the 2007 assembly poll. Leader: Gagik TSARUKIAN.

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Cabinet As of September 1, 2006 Prime Minister

Andranik Markarian (HHK)

Ministers Agriculture Cabinet Chief of Staff Culture and Youth Affairs Defense Economy and Finance Education and Science Energy Environmental Protection Foreign Affairs Health Justice Labor and Social Affairs Territorial Administration Trade and Economic Development Transport and Communication Urban Development

New Times (Nor Zhamanakner). The recently formed New Times party in early 2006 was described as a member of the “radical opposition” calling for regime change and early elections. Leader: Aram KARAPETIAN. National Revival. Formed in November 2005 by dissenters from the Republic party, National Revival announced it would oppose the Kocharian administration but without the “radical antigovernment discourse” and strongly pro-Western tilt of Republic. Leaders: Albert BAZEYAN (Former Mayor of Yerevan), Vagharshak HARUTIUNIAN (Former Defense Minister). Alliance (Dashink). Formed in November 2005 by former Nagorno-Karabakh strongman Gen. Samvel Babayan, Alliance described itself as a “neutral” party that favored decentralization and judicial reform. (Babayan, who had led the army in Nagorno-Karabakh in 1993–1999, was

David Lokian (HHD) Manuk Topuzian Hasmik Poghosyan (ind.) Serzh Sarkisian Vartan Khachatrian (HHK) Levon Mkrtchian (HHD) Armen Movsissian (HHK) Vardan Aivasian (HHK) Vardan Oskanian Norair Davidian (HHD) David Harutiunian (HHK) Aghvan Vardanian (HHD) Hovik Abrahamian (HHK) Karen Chshmaritian (HHK) Andranik Manukian (HHK) Aram Harutiunian

released from prison in September 2004 after having been given a 14-year sentence in 2000 for alleged participation in an assassination plot against Arkady Ghukasian, the prime minister of NagornoKarabakh.) Leader: Gen. Samvel BABAYAN. Other recently formed parties include the Liberal Progressive Party, led by pro-Western “oppositionist” Hovannes HOVANNISIAN; the Motherland Party, led by Karine TUMANIAN; Homeland and Honor, a participant in the fledgling opposition coalition of early 2006; and the Union for Armenia.

Legislature The 1995 constitution provided for a unicameral National Assembly (Azgayin Zhoghov) elected for a four-year term and comprising 190 members, 40 elected from national party lists on a proportional

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basis (subject to a threshold of 5 percent of the vote) and 150 elected from constituencies on a majoritarian basis. Electoral law revision in 1998 reduced the number of seats for the next election to 131, with 75 elected from single-member districts and 56 from national party lists on a proportional basis, the 5 percent threshold being retained. Further revision in 2000 initially called for 94 seats to be filled on a proportional basis before it was decided in 2002 that 75 seats would be filled on a proportional basis and 56 seats in single-member districts for the 2003 balloting. The most recent election, held on May 25, 2003, yielded the following distribution of seats following by-elections in several single-member districts for which the initial results had been invalidated: Republican Party of Armenia, 33 (23 seats in the proportional vote, 10 in single-member districts); the Country of Law party, 19 (12, 7); the Justice bloc, 14 (14, 0); Armenian Revolutionary Federation, 11 (11, 0); National Unity Party, 9 (9, 0); United Labor Party, 6 (6, 0); All Armenian Labor Party, 1 (0, 1); the Republic, 1 (0, 1); and independents, 37 (0, 37). Speaker: Tigran TOROSIAN.

Communications Press Although there were more than 90 newspapers published in Armenia prior to independence, most were controlled by the Communist Party and affiliated organizations. A number of new papers were launched in the 1990s, some as independents and others as party or government organs. One leading paper at the present is Hayastani Hanrapetoutioun (Republic of Armenia), founded in 1990 by the Supreme Council and published daily in Armenian at Yerevan. (A sister paper in Russian, Respublika Aremeniya, is also published, although it was reportedly beset by financial problems in the fall of 2000.) Other papers published daily at Yerevan in Armenian (unless otherwise indicated) include the following: Ankakhutiun (Independence), organ of the National Self-Determination Union;

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Aravot (Morning), independent; Azg (The Nation); Golos Armenii (The Voice of Armenia, 20,000), three times a week in Russian; Hayk (Armenia), weekly organ of the Armenian Pan-National Movement; Hayastan, in Russian; Hayastani Kommunist (Armenian Communist), HKK organ; Haykakam Zhamanak; Hayots Ashkhar; Iravunk; Molorak (Planet); Yerkir (Country), 168 Zham; and Charrord Ishkhanutian, an opposition paper. Papers have been subjected to increasing governmental pressure in recent years, prompting sharp criticism from domestic journalists and international watchdog organizations. In March 2006 the U.S. State Department described press freedoms as “limited,” in part in response to the government’s perceived tight control of the media during the run-up to the November 2005 constitutional referendum.

News Agency The domestic facility is the Armenian Press Agency (Armenpress), headquartered at Yerevan.

Broadcasting and Computing Radio Yerevan and Armenian TV broadcast from Yerevan in Armenian and a number of other languages. Several independent television stations have been shut down by the government in recent years. There were approximately 890,000 television receivers and 80,000 personal computers serving 150,000 Internet users in 2003.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. Tatoul MARKARIAN U.S. Ambassador to Armenia John Marshall EVANS Permanent Representative to the UN Armen MARTIROSIAN IGO Memberships (Non-UN) BSEC, CEUR, CIS, EBRD, Eurocontrol, Interpol, IOM, OSCE, WCO, WTO

AU S T R A L I A COMMONWEALTH

OF

AU S T RA L I A

The Country Lying in the Southern Hemisphere between the Pacific and Indian oceans, Australia derives its name from the Latin australis (southern). A nation of continental dimensions, with an area slightly less than that of the contiguous United States, Australia includes the separate island of Tasmania in the southeast. It is the driest of the inhabited continents, with the inner third of its territory a desert ringed by another third of marginal agricultural lands. The population is concentrated in the coastal areas, particularly in the southeastern states of New South Wales and Victoria. These states account for nearly three-fifths of the total population, with their capitals alone accounting for over one-third. Persons of British extraction now comprise only about half of the total population; the remainder includes a sizable group of immigrants of predominantly Western and Southern European origins and a substantial proportion of Asians (primarily refugees from Indochina), who since December 1988 have been held to strict financial and skill-based entry standards. There are also an estimated 300,000 Aboriginal people, whose campaign for native rights has recently progressed in both judicial and political arenas (see Political background, below). In 1998 women constituted 43 percent of the labor force, concentrated mainly in clerical, sales, and lowerlevel health care occupations. As of January 2006, women held no state premierships, but three were serving as state governors and a fourth was chief minister of the Northern Territory. Traditionally dependent on exports of wool and wheat, the Australian economy industrialized rapidly after World War II, with subsequent expansion based on extensive mineral discoveries. Al-

though agriculture continues to account for about one-fifth of exports, manufactured goods and such natural resources as iron ore, bauxite, coal, nickel, gold, silver, copper, uranium (the world’s largest deposits), oil, and natural gas have increased in relative importance. Agriculture now employs less than 5 percent of the labor force and contributes only 3 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), whereas the industrial sector as a whole employs about 21 percent of workers and accounts for about 25 percent of GDP. In addition to food and live animals, leading exports include mineral fuels, basic manufactures, machinery and transportation equipment, and metalliferous ores. Principal

AUSTRALIA

Political Status: Original member of the Commonwealth; established as a federal state under democratic parliamentary regime in 1901. Area: 2,966,136 sq. mi. (7,682,300 sq. km.). Population: 18,972,350 (2001C); 19,883,000 (2005E). Neither figure is adjusted for underenumeration, estimated at 1.9 percent in the 1991 census. Major Urban Centers (including suburbs, 2005E): CANBERRA (335,000), Sydney (4,484,000), Melbourne (3,783,000), Brisbane (1,876,000), Adelaide (1,151,000), Perth (959,000), Hobart (200,000), Darwin (134,000). Official Language: English. Monetary Unit: Australian Dollar (market rate July 1, 2006: 1.35 dollars = $1US). Sovereign: Queen ELIZABETH II. Governor General: Maj. Gen. Michael JEFFERY; appointed on June 22, 2003, and sworn into office August 11, following the resignation on May 25 of Peter HOLLINGWORTH and the acting incumbency of Sir Guy GREEN, governor of Tasmania. Prime Minister: John Winston HOWARD (Liberal Party of Australia); sworn in March 4, 1996, following election of March 2, succeeding Paul KEATING (Australian Labor Party); formed new governments following elections of October 1998, November 2001, and October 9, 2004.

trading partners are Japan, the United States, China, South Korea, and New Zealand. Between 1986 and 1991 Australia’s balanceof-payments deficit more than doubled, yielding a $100 billion foreign debt, one of the largest in the world. Part of the difficulty lay in a massive contraction in the world wool market, coupled with plummeting wheat prices because of U.S. and European Community (EC) farm subsidies. However, after its worst postwar recession, Australia began a recovery in late 1991, which led to a decade of continuous economic expansion that was consis-

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tently 3–5 percent annually before slowing to 2.5 percent in 2001. Despite a devastating drought that reduced agricultural output, 2002 saw overall expansion of 4.0 percent, which was followed by 3.3 percent GDP growth in 2003, 3.2 percent in 2004, and 2.2 percent in 2005. At the start of 2006 unemployment stood at 5.1 percent, the lowest rate in nearly three decades.

Government and Politics Political Background The Commonwealth of Australia was formed on January 1, 1901, by federation of the former British colonies of New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, and Western Australia, all of which became federal states. Two territorial units were added in 1911: the vast, underpopulated, and undeveloped area of the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory, an enclave created within New South Wales around the capital city of Canberra. The small Jervis Bay Territory was added to the latter in 1915 to afford the capital direct sea access. Political power since World War II has been exercised largely by three leading parties: the Australian Labor Party (ALP) on the one side and the Liberal Party of Australia (LPA), in alliance with the National Party (formerly the National Country Party), on the other. The Liberal–National Country coalition ruled from 1949 to 1972, when the Labor Party narrowly toppled the administration headed by Liberal prime minister William McMAHON. In the wake of the 1972 election, Prime Minister E. Gough WHITLAM moved quickly to eliminate military conscription, withdrew remaining Australian forces from Vietnam, and established closer links with other Asian governments—in particular, that of the People’s Republic of China. Following Senate rejection of the government’s annual budget in 1975, Governor General John R. KERR, in an unprecedented action, dismissed the prime minister, named minority leader Malcolm FRASER as his successor, and dissolved both houses of

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Parliament. At the ensuing election of December 13, the electorate turned decisively to Fraser, giving his Liberal–National Country coalition its most impressive victory ever. After winning elections in 1977 and 1980, the Liberal-National coalition experienced a decline in popular support. In February 1983 Fraser called a general election for March, and shortly thereafter William G. HAYDEN stepped down as Labor leader in favor of Robert (Bob) J. L. HAWKE, former head of the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU). Led by Hawke, Labor achieved a decisive victory in the House balloting, although it was unable to win effective control of the Senate. Additional victories followed in 1984, 1987, and 1990, when Hawke secured an unprecedented fourth term. Largely because of continued deep recession, by mid-1991 the prime minister’s popularity had plummeted. In what was viewed as a pyrrhic victory, Hawke turned back a bid by party treasurer Paul KEATING for the Labor leadership in June, but he was defeated by Keating at a second parliamentary caucus in December, thereby becoming the first Australian prime minister to be forced from office by his own party. Though trailing the opposition badly in the opinion polls, Prime Minister Keating called for a new election on March 13, 1993, at which Labor unexpectedly won a fifth consecutive election victory with a slightly increased House majority, although neither of the leading formations won control of the Senate. In 1993–1994 the Keating government made progress in addressing the contentious issue of Aboriginal land rights. Government legislative action followed a High Court ruling of June 1992 that effectively overturned the concept of Australia as a terra nullius (uninhabited land) at the time of 18th-century European settlement. In light of the “Mabo judgment,” the government in June 1993 introduced comprehensive legislative proposals on restitution, while announcing in October that all leases granted before the end of the year would be exempt from challenge. However, the attempt at “reconciliation” was denounced by the Aboriginal people, who demanded a right of veto over all leases; for their part, mining and timber rep-

resentatives objected to the revival of native titles upon lease expiration. Despite determined opposition and the longest Senate debate (nearly 50 hours) in Australian history, the government secured passage on December 22, 1993, of a Native Title bill that would permit Aboriginal people to press claims to as much as 10 percent of the country’s land. However, Aboriginal rejection of the A$1.46 billion financial provision for settlement of claims generated renewed controversy. In federal balloting on March 2, 1996, Keating failed to close Labor’s substantial opinion poll deficit, resulting in a heavy defeat by John HOWARD’s Liberals and their National Party allies. Commanding 94 of the 148 lower house seats, the first Liberal-National government since 1983 took office on March 4 under Howard’s premiership, while Keating immediately stepped down as ALP leader in favor of Kim BEAZLEY. The Howard administration soon faced difficulties involving immigration and Aboriginal affairs. On September 10, 1996, the Queensland representative Pauline HANSON addressed the House of Representatives in a highly charged speech that condemned Asian immigration and set off an escalating discussion not only of that issue but also of affirmative action and funding for Aboriginal social programs. Three months later the High Court ruled on an appeal brought in part by the Wik people of Queensland, deciding that Aboriginal peoples could claim leased pastoral lands provided that such claims did not substantially interfere with the rights of the leaseholders. Furthermore, in May 1997 a national human rights commission condemned the forced placement of Aboriginal children in white foster homes, an assimilationist practice that had involved some 100,000 children (the “stolen generation”) up through the 1960s. Although Prime Minister Howard unexpectedly offered a personal apology for the removal of the children from their parents, the government refused to make a formal apology and rejected proposals for compensation. Meanwhile, under pressure from the rural-based coalition partner, the Nationalists, the government had proposed legislation to limit the effect of the “Wik judgment” by

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increasing pastoralists’ control over leased land. With Howard apparently willing to stake his government’s continued viability on the result, on July 8, 1998, the Senate narrowly passed the Native Title Amendment Bill, which the House had already approved but which the upper house had previously rejected twice. On August 30, 1998, faced with the prospect that the ongoing financial crisis and recession in Asia would further damage the Australian economy in the coming months and thereby reduce his prospects for a second term, Prime Minister Howard called an early election for October 3. The Liberal-National coalition again prevailed at the polls, but with a reduced total of 83 seats in the 148-member House. Despite an impressive showing in Queensland’s June state elections, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party failed in its bid for greater federal representation, with Hanson losing her House seat and the party electing only one senator. Earlier in the year, a constitutional convention had convened to consider severing Australia’s remaining links to the British Crown. On February 13 the convention voted to adopt a republican form of government that would replace the British monarch and her representative, the governor general, with a president chosen by a two-thirds majority of Parliament. At a referendum held November 6, 1999, however, 55 percent of voters rejected the proposal. An even larger majority, 61 percent, defeated a proposed constitutional preamble that would have recognized the Aboriginal population as “the nation’s first people.” Three months earlier, Parliament had passed a Howard-sponsored motion expressing “deep and sincere regret” for injustices suffered by the Aboriginal people “under the practices of past generations,” but the deliberate avoidance of the word “apology” continued to anger Aboriginal leaders. In March 2000 the government introduced a widely praised literacy project aimed at Aboriginal children, but the resultant goodwill was almost immediately lost when the government’s Aboriginal affairs minister asserted that “lost generation” claims were exaggerated and that only 10 percent of Abo-

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riginal children had been “stolen” during the height of assimilationist policies. Critics blasted the government for falling back on a semantic argument in the face of what they termed cultural genocide. Riding a tide of popular support for its recently strengthened anti-immigration policy, coupled with a strong economy and public backing for the support extended to the United States following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, Prime Minister Howard’s Liberal-National coalition won a third term at the election of November 10, when it captured 81 of 150 lower house seats. The next day, Beazley stepped down as ALP leader. On May 25, 2003, Governor General Peter HOLLINGWORTH resigned, apparently in part in response to growing public sentiment that he had mishandled alleged misconduct by clergy while he was Anglican archbishop of Brisbane. His successor as governor general, Maj. Gen. Michael JEFFERY, a former governor of Western Australia, was sworn into office on August 11. Downplaying considerable public opposition to Australia’s participation in the March 2003 U.S.led invasion of Iraq, in June 2003 John Howard announced that he would seek a fourth term as prime minister in 2004. On February 5, 2003, for the first time in over a century, the Senate had passed, 34– 31, a symbolic no-confidence motion. The opposition move came in response to the government’s decision to dispatch troops to staging areas in the Middle East. A similar motion in the House was defeated by the Liberal-National majority. On October 9, 2004, Howard led his coalition to a bigger-than-expected electoral victory, increasing the Liberal-National total in the lower house and also, for the first time during his tenure, claiming a majority in the Senate.

Constitution and Government The Federal Constitution of July 9, 1900, coupled a bicameral legislative system patterned after that of the United States with the British system of executive responsibility to Parliament. The governor general, most of whose actions are

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circumscribed by unwritten constitutional convention, represents the crown and is advised by a Federal Executive Council that encompasses all federal ministers. Responsibility for defense, external affairs, foreign trade, and certain other matters is entrusted to the federal government, residual powers being reserved to the states. The prime minister, who is leader of the majority party (or coalition) in the Federal Parliament, is assisted by a cabinet selected from the membership of the House and Senate. The Senate is composed of no fewer than 6 (currently 12) senators from each of the six states, with 2 additional senators each from the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and the Northern Territory. Apart from the territorial incumbents, senators are elected for six years, the elections being staggered so that approximately half of the Senate is renewed every three years. The House of Representatives is to have, as nearly as possible, twice as many members as the Senate. Membership is proportional to population, although no state can be allotted fewer than five representatives. Save in cases of early dissolution, the House is elected for a period of three years and must initiate all measures dealing with revenue and taxation. The entire Senate may be elected in the event of a double dissolution, normally on the advice of the prime minister following upper house intransigence in regard to government measures, as occurred in both 1983 and 1987. The judicial system embraces the High Court of Australia, the Federal Court of Australia, state and territorial courts, and lower (magistrates’) courts. Under legislation enacted in 1976, the High Court remains responsible for interpreting the Constitution while also maintaining original and appellate jurisdiction in certain areas. The Federal Court, established in 1977, has assumed jurisdiction in a number of matters previously under the purview of the High Court and has replaced both the Australian Industrial Court and the Federal Court of Bankruptcy. For the most part, state governments are patterned after the federal government. Each state has an elected premier, an appointed governor, and (with the exception of Queensland) a bicameral

legislature. The more important activities of the state governments are in the areas of health, public safety, transportation, education, and public utilities. In 1974 the partially elected advisory councils of the Northern and Capital territories were replaced by fully elected legislative assemblies, and in 1978 a wide range of internal authority was transferred to the Northern Territory government. The ACT became self-governing in 1988, at which time the previously incorporated Jervis Bay Territory reverted to a separate status under ministerial administration. The governor general is empowered to make ordinances governing Jervis Bay; in 1995 the Wreck Bay Aboriginal Community Council was granted limited authority to enact by-laws. In an October 1998 referendum 53 percent of voters in the Northern Territory rejected a statehood proposal, even though opinion polls had indicated 80 percent support for becoming the seventh state. Analysts attributed the defeat, in part, to concern over taxation and a loss of federal funding. State and Capital

Area (sq. mi.)

Population (2001C)

New South Wales (Sydney) Queensland (Brisbane) South Australia (Adelaide) Tasmania (Hobart) Victoria (Melbourne) Western Australia (Perth)

309,498 666,872 379,922 26,177 87,876 975,096

6,371,745 3,655,139 1,467,261 456,652 4,644,950 1,851,252

899

311,947

519,768 28

210,664 611

Territory and Capital Australian Capital Territory (Canberra) Northern Territory (Darwin) Jervis Bay Territory

During a visit in March 1986, Queen Elizabeth gave royal assent to the Australia Act, which terminated most residual links to the monarchy. Court cases could not, thenceforth, be referred to Britain’s Privy Council on final appeal, and the queen would no longer tender ceremonial approval for gubernatorial appointments, although state governments wishing to do so might continue to bestow knighthoods.

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Foreign Relations Australia’s foreign policy, traditionally based on its position as an isolated outpost of Great Britain, adjusted to the realities of declining British power and geographic proximity to Asia, while a longstanding commitment to internationalism has been expressed by membership in the Commonwealth and the United Nations, in such regional security organizations as ANZUS (in partnership with New Zealand and the United States), and in such cooperative efforts as the Colombo Plan and the Asian Development Bank. During the 1970s Australia sought to delineate a foreign policy more independent of Britain and the United States. Almost immediately after assuming office, Prime Minister Whitlam, an outspoken critic of U.S. Vietnamese policy, established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, East Germany, and North Vietnam. Under Prime Minister Fraser, relations with Washington improved, while ratification of a major cooperation treaty with Japan was completed in 1977. Responding to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Canberra in 1980 supported a heightened ANZUS naval presence in the Indian Ocean and granted U.S. air and naval forces increased access to Australian bases. Following the 1985 refusal by New Zealand to allow docking privileges to a U.S. naval ship without a determination that no nuclear weapons were on board, U.S.-Australian security cooperation was reinforced in the form of annual AUSMIN (Australia-U.S. ministerial) talks, the legal framework of ANZUS being left intact pending resolution of the dispute between Washington and Wellington. Australia is also a partner with Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United Kingdom in the Five Power Defense Arrangements. Although refusing to deny port access to nuclear-armed U.S. vessels, the government in December 1986 responded to widespread antinuclear sentiment by ratifying the South Pacific Forum’s Treaty of Rarotonga, which calls for a “nuclearfree zone” in the region. In addition, while continuing to export uranium to nuclear powers, in-

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cluding France, the government’s vocal opposition to French nuclear testing in the South Pacific contributed to growing friction between the two countries, as did Australian support at the United Nations of measures requested by the independence movement on New Caledonia. In its later years the Hawke administration focused on superpower relations, signing a ten-year defense agreement with the United States in 1988 and separate trade agreements with the Japanese and Soviets in 1989. Meanwhile, tensions with Paris eased in the wake of French agreement to limit nuclear-arms testing in the Pacific and the proenvironmentalist convergence of the two countries’ Antarctica policies. In recent years Australia’s foreign policy has given increasing attention to nearby Asian and Pacific neighbors. In November 1989 Prime Minister Hawke’s efforts to establish an EC-style regional grouping led to the launching of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) initiative. Under his successor, Prime Minister Keating, Australia played an active role in securing agreement at the November 1995 APEC summit to liberalize regional trade over a 25-year period. At the same summit Australia joined other regional governments in strongly condemning France for resuming Pacific nuclear tests. In July 1997, however, the Howard government’s relations with Oceania suffered when, in a major government gaffe, the media obtained a confidential document highly critical of Pacific island leaders and administrations. Relations with Papua New Guinea, a former Australian-administered territory, improved significantly following the approval in 1985 of a treaty demarcating the maritime border in the Torres Strait, although difficulties subsequently emerged over access to traditional fishing grounds in the area. In early 1998 Australia greeted the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Papuan government and rebels on Bougainville by offering troops to monitor the agreement. In late 2003 Australia agreed to send a limited number of police and civil servants to help Papua New Guinea combat crime. Earlier in the year, the Solomon Islands had welcomed Australia’s lead in an international effort to

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restore order after a flare-up of ethnic hostility and lawlessness. The question of Asian immigration to Australia remains an international concern. Although Prime Minister Howard drew domestic as well as international criticism for what many considered his tardy repudiation of anti-immigration leader Pauline Hanson, the October 1998 election offered regional governments a measure of reassurance in that Hanson’s One Nation party won the support of less than 9 percent of the voters. The issue flared again, however, in 2001 as the Howard government, facing reelection, hardened its position on immigration. Beginning in August and continuing well beyond the election, Australia turned away attempts by refugee-laden ships to land on outer territories—most dramatically, Christmas Island, near where a Norwegian freighter, the MV Tampa, had rescued some 450 people from a sinking ferry. In September both the Liberals and Labor supported adoption of severe measures that included no right of appeal for rejected immigration applications and outright refusal to consider asylum claims made following landfall on remote islands. Many of the asylum applicants, most of whom had fled Afghanistan or Iraq, were held at remote detention centers or were transported to facilities in third countries, pending resolution of their cases. Australia’s principal partner in this “Pacific solution,” the tiny island of Nauru, accepted not only two-thirds of the Tampa’s refugees but also hundreds of others who had attempted to reach Australia by boat from Indonesia. In return, Canberra provided considerable foreign aid in addition to paying the full cost of internment. As of December 2002, approximately 700 asylum seekers remained on Nauru under conditions that had drawn considerable criticism from some human rights advocates. Meanwhile, in March–April 2002, violent riots had begun breaking out at several detention centers in Australia, including the notorious Woomera facility, a South Australian desert camp that was termed a “hell-hole” by former prime minister Malcolm Fraser and that also drew criticism in a July report by an envoy from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. To protest the lengthy

detentions and conditions at various centers, some detainees resorted to hunger strikes and breakouts. Government efforts to encourage repatriation included offers of A$10,000 to hundreds of Afghan detainees. In August 2003 the High Court ruled that the government could not detain the refugees indefinitely, but by then the crisis had abated. At the end of 2004 only some 50 detainees continued to be held on Nauru; higher numbers remained at several domestic detention centers. Although the Howard administration and immigration opponents had asserted that many of the asylum seekers were really “economic migrants,” in the end the vast majority who went through the application process were granted entry. By late 2005 only 2 refugees remained at the Nauru center; another facility at Manus Island, Papua New Guinea, had been “mothballed.” In June the Howard government had eased its strict detention policy, announcing that it would speed asylum hearings and release women and children from detention during the review process. In December 1995 Australia and Indonesia signed a security cooperation agreement providing for consultation in the event of “adverse challenges,” and in May 1998 the Howard government quickly extended its strong support to the newly installed Habibie government. Australia also continued to recognize Indonesia’s 1976 takeover of the Portuguese colony of East Timor (now TimorLeste). In January 1999, however, in a major policy shift, the Howard administration stated that it would back an “act of self-determination” for East Timor following a period of autonomy. Indonesia shortly thereafter suggested for the first time that it might accept the annexed territory’s independence. When an August 30 independence referendum passed, precipitating widespread civil disorder, Australia spearheaded the formation of an 8,000person peacekeeping force for East Timor, including 5,000 Australian troops, that began restoring order three weeks later. Although initially resentful of the Australian involvement in the Timor matter, by mid-2001 Jakarta appeared ready to ease relations, as indicated by the first visit by an Indonesian head of state, President Wahid, to Australia in a quarter

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century, which was followed by Prime Minister Howard’s reciprocal visit. Thereafter, however, relations were set back by Jakarta’s inability (or unwillingness) to stem the flow of asylum seekers embarking by boat from Indonesia to Australia’s outer territories. Relations were further complicated by terrorism, particularly the actions of Jemaah Islamiah, an Indonesian-based militant Muslim group responsible for the October 12, 2002, bombing of a Bali tourist resort that cost 88 Australian lives. The complex relations between Jakarta and Canberra took another, more positive turn in early 2005 when the Howard government responded quickly to the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster of December 2004 by offering Indonesia the largest aid package in Australian history, initially worth A$1 billion over five years. Australian military personnel were also dispatched to aid stricken areas. Relations with the independent Timor-Leste have generally been positive despite a dispute over their maritime border in the Timor Sea. Although Dili was to receive the vast majority of royalties from hydrocarbon extraction in a Joint Petroleum Development Area, it sought to revise an unratified 2003 agreement that would give it only 20 percent of the larger Greater Sunrise field, which mostly lies outside the joint area, within what Australia considers its territory. Border talks began in November 2003, but Timor-Leste soon accused Australia of delaying tactics. The Howard government has argued for retaining the border as delineated by a 1972 agreement with Indonesia. In January 2006 the disputants signed an agreement on sharing revenue from Greater Sunrise equally, although opponents in Timor-Leste’s National Parliament had stated that they would fight ratification, in part because the agreement did not resolve the border issue.

Current Issues The October 2004 Liberal-National election victory apparently reflected the public’s lack of confidence that Labor, under its new, youthful leader, Mark LATHAM, could match the economic performance of the incumbent government. Prime Min-

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ister Howard had presided over an era of steady growth, low interest rates, rising real wages, tax cuts, deregulation, and declining unemployment. Howard also benefited from a desire for continuity in national security policy, particularly with 88 Australians having been among the 184 killed by the 2002 bombing in Bali, Indonesia. Two months later Howard asserted that he would respond preemptively to imminent security threats, and his decisiveness in backing the U.S.-led “war on terrorism” was generally viewed as bolstering his case for a fourth term. Meanwhile, Latham was beset by divisions within his own party, some members having questioned his leadership style and judgment. In January 2005, citing serious health problems, Latham resigned his party and legislative posts, and shortly thereafter Kim Beazley resumed leadership of the opposition. Following that, two significant cabinet shuffles occurred. The first, in June–July 2005, saw the National Party’s Mark VAILE sworn in as deputy prime minister in succession to John ANDERSON, who had resigned for health reasons. The second, announced on January 24, 2006, included the naming of a new minister of defense, Brendan NELSON. His predecessor, Robert HILL, had decided to retire from politics. Neither shuffle altered the status of Treasurer Peter COSTELLO, a longtime colleague of the prime minister. Most observers considered it likely that Howard would not seek a fifth term as prime minister and would instead step aside in favor of Costello. The issue of Aboriginal rights, although far from settled, proved less volatile in the 2004 election campaign than it had in 2001. In May 2002 the High Court had ruled against a compensation claim from two “lost generation” Aborigines because too much time had lapsed. Three months later, in a complex, 400-page decision, the High Court further ruled that native title rights were largely a product of legislation and, at least in some circumstances, could be trumped by pastoral, mining, and petroleum leases. At the end of the year the High Court dealt another setback to the indigenous cause when it rejected a Yorta Yorta land claim because, as required by the 1993 Native Title Act, the tribe

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could not prove that its claim was “substantially uninterrupted.” More recently, in 2005 two key legal decisions supported tribal claims. In June a 23-year struggle by the Ngaanyatjarra people concluded when they were given title to the largest land claim in Australian history, nearly 188,000 sq. km. (72,500 sq. mi.) of Western Australia’s central desert. As part of the negotiated settlement, mining companies agreed to consult with the native owners regarding future development efforts. In December a federal judge, who rejected the reasoning of the 2002 Yorta Yorta decision, granted to the Wimmera peoples native title over 150 km. (95 miles) of crown land along Victoria’s Wimmera River. Tough new antiterrorism measures became law in early December 2005, a month after the arrest in Melbourne and Sydney of 18 suspected Islamic terrorists, many of them residents of Middle Eastern descent. Key provisions permit 14-day detention of suspects without charges, increased monitoring of communications and movement, and new police search and seizure powers. Most controversially, the law also made it a crime to incite sedition. The legislation had been outlined by Prime Minister Howard in early September and then endorsed later in the month by the government leaders of the six Australian states—all of them members of the Labor Party. Opponents, some of whom charged the government with attempting to establish a police state, included Muslim and indigenous groups, trade union members, and antiwar protesters. Only days after the law was enacted, heightened rhetoric regarding the potential for “homegrown” terrorism may have contributed to an outbreak of racial violence that some described as Australia’s worst in nearly 150 years. On December 11 a gang of some 5,000 whites attacked darker-skinned men and women at a beach in the Sydney area. The rampage injured 30 and led to reprisals by what some called “Arab” gangs. In an embarrassing development for the Howard government, in October 2005 charges surfaced that AWB Ltd. (the Australian Wheat Board, until priva-

tized in 1999), which holds a monopoly on the bulk export of Australian wheat, had indirectly provided $220 million in kickbacks to Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime during the UN-backed oil-for-food program of 1996–2003. Prime Minister Howard ordered an official inquiry into the scandal. The government had helped AWB obtain $2 billion in wheat contracts with Iraq, and it was unclear how much the Foreign Ministry or other government offices knew about AWB’s dealings.

Political Parties Government Parties Liberal Party of Australia (LPA). Founded in 1944 by Sir Robert MENZIES as a successor to the United Australia Party, the Liberal Party represents an amalgamation of traditional liberals and conservatives with strong ties to the business community. The Liberals have a record of conservative financial policies, economic stability, counterinflationary measures, and cooperation with the Commonwealth and the United States. While losing its legislative majority to Labor in 1983, the LPA recouped some of its losses in the 1984 election; but its popular leader, Andrew PEACOCK, resigned in September 1985 because of the rejection of his candidate for deputy leader and was succeeded by John Howard. Peacock failed to regain the leadership after the 1987 election but was able to do so following the unexpected ouster of Howard in May 1989. He again stepped down after the party’s 1990 defeat and was succeeded by John HEWSON. After the failure of the Liberal-National coalition’s March 1993 bid to unseat Labor, Hewson was replaced in May by Alexander DOWNER, a monarchist from the Liberal patrician wing who was nevertheless economically centrist and more progressive than many of his colleagues on such social issues as race relations, immigration, and homosexuality. However, Downer committed a series of public gaffes, precipitating such a sharp fall in poll support that he felt obliged to resign in

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January 1995, enabling the more conservative Howard to return unopposed to the leadership. A declared monarchist and “Thatcherite,” Howard moved to a more centrist stance for the March 1996 federal election, leading the Liberals to a landslide lower house victory and forming a government that again included the National Party. His decision to call an early election for October 1998 resulted in a loss of 11 House seats from the 1996 total of 75. At the 2001 election the Liberals moved up to 68 House seats. In October 2004 the party exceeded expectations not only by gaining six houses seats but also by picking up two Senate seats, thereby giving the LPA-NPA coalition an upper house majority. In June 2005 the Liberals elected their first woman party president, Chris McDiven. Leaders: John W. HOWARD (Prime Minister and Federal Party Leader), Chris McDIVEN (Federal President), Brian LOUGHNANE (Federal Director), Nick MINCHIN (Government Leader in the Senate), Peter COSTELLO (Deputy Parliamentary Leader), Helen COONAN (Deputy Leader in the Senate). National Party of Australia (NPA or The Nationals). Founded in 1920 as the Country Party and known as the National Country Party from 1975, the National Party assumed its present name in 1982 in an effort to widen its appeal. In 2003 the federal party and its state affiliates adopted the unofficial “The Nationals” designation in an effort to forge greater unity and a new public image. Conservative in outlook, the party’s policies traditionally reflected a concern with rural and farming issues, such as guaranteed farm prices, tax rebates for capital investment and conversion to electricity, and soil conservation. Precluded by its size from winning a majority in the House, it has a long history of alliance with the United Australia Party and its successor, the Liberal Party, although tensions have periodically surfaced on policy issues and the allocation of safe seats. The 1993 electoral outcome led to strains between the NPA and its coalition partner, in part

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because the Liberal leader John Hewson was far from staunchly antirepublican (a key concern to many NPA supporters). Further, the Nationalists sought a greater voice in coalition politics, including increased representation in the shadow cabinet. Hewson’s successor, Alexander Downer, found little NPA understanding for his progressive social views; John Howard’s recovery of the Liberal leadership in January 1995 was therefore seen as heralding improved relations between the coalition partners, who returned to government in March 1996. The NPA lost 3 House seats in October 1998, retaining a total of 16. On June 30, 1999, the party chief and deputy prime minister, Tim FISCHER, announced his decision to resign from both positions for family reasons. The following day the NPA elevated Deputy Leader John Anderson, who also succeeded Fischer as deputy prime minister. The Nationals lost three House seats at the November 2001 election and another in October 2004, but it added two Senate seats, thereby helping the Liberal-National bloc forge a slim majority in the upper house. In June 2005, citing health reasons, Anderson announced his intention to step down from his government and party posts. The party’s deputy leader, Mark Vaile, succeeded him. Leaders: Mark VAILE (Deputy Prime Minister and Party Leader), Warren TRUSS (Deputy Leader), David RUSSELL (Federal President), Ron BOSWELL (Leader in the Senate), Andrew HALL (Federal Director), Pam STALLMAN (Federal Secretary). Northern Territory Country Liberal Party (NTCLP or CLP). Established in 1974, the conservative CLP constituted an amalgamation of the Country Party of Sam CALDER and supporters of the Northern Territory’s Liberal Party branch. At the territory’s first Legislative Assembly election, in 1974, the CLP won 17 of 19 seats. In 1979 it established close official ties to both the LPA and the NPA. At various times CLP members of Parliament have chosen to sit with both those federal parties.

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Following the October 2004 election, the CLP continued to hold one seat in the federal House of Representatives and one seat in the Senate. At a territorial election in June 2005 the CLP lost six of the ten seats it had held in the territorial legislature. Leaders: Paul BUNKER (President), Jodeen CARNEY (Leader of the Opposition in the Northern Territory Legislature), David TOLLNER (Member of the House of Representatives), Nigel SCULLION (Senator).

Major Opposition Party Australian Labor Party (ALP). The oldest of the existing political parties, with a continuous history since the 1890s, the ALP began as the political arm of the trade-union movement, to which it still has close ties. Present policies include support for extensive social services, the pursuit of racial and sexual equality, a more independent foreign policy, and an end to the constitutional role of the British monarch. Recently, the party has retreated from earlier broad support for expanded immigration. It has long been divided between a moderate, pragmatic wing, which commands a majority in terms of parliamentary representation, and a dogmatically socialist, trade-union-oriented left wing, which tends to be more strongly entrenched in the party organization. First in office in 1904, the ALP formed the government from 1941 to 1949 and was then in opposition until E. Gough Whitlam led the party to victory in 1972. The dismissal of his administration in 1975 was followed by electoral defeat, but the ALP returned to power in 1983 under the leadership of Robert (Bob) Hawke, who also won the three succeeding elections in 1984, 1987, and 1990. On June 3, 1991, Hawke survived a parliamentary caucus challenge by his treasurer, Paul Keating, who claimed that Hawke had reneged on a promise to vacate the leadership after the 1990 election. Keating maintained his challenge, and in a further caucus vote on December 19 subjected Hawke to the unprecedented defeat of an incumbent prime minister.

Despite economic recession, record unemployment, and a series of financial scandals, the ALP won a fifth term on March 13, 1993, increasing its tally in the 147-member House of Representatives to 80 seats. The ALP failed to win a sixth successive term in the March 1996 election, following which Keating resigned as party leader and was succeeded by former deputy prime minister Kim Beazley. In the national election of October 1998 the party won 18 House seats more than its 1996 total of 49 and achieved a greater preferential vote share than the governing coalition (51.2 percent versus 48.8 percent, following the distribution of first-preference votes won by other parties). However, much of its increased support occurred in districts that it already held, leaving it short of a parliamentary majority. At the 2001 election the ALP’s House representation fell by 2, to 65 seats. Its Senate contingent ostensibly dropped from 29 to 28, but an additional seat was claimed by the closely affiliated, ruralbased Country Labor Party of New South Wales, which had registered in November 1999. A day after the national loss, Kim Beazley resigned as party leader and was replaced by Simon CREAN. Beazley challenged Crean for the leadership in June 2003, but 58 of the party’s 92 federal legislators backed Crean. He resigned in November, however, and was succeeded by Mark Latham, who defeated Beazley 47–45 for the post. At the 2004 general election the ALP lost ground in the lower house, winning 60 seats. Following a tight election in South Australia on February 9, 2002, in March the ALP formed a minority government to replace the incumbent Liberal regime, which had lost a confidence motion. Thus the ALP controlled all six state governments and both self-governing territories. In January 2005 Latham announced his retirement, for health reasons, as party leader and leader of the opposition. He was succeeded by former party leader Beazley, who was unopposed for the post following the withdrawals of Kevin RUDD and Julia GILLARD. Leaders: Barry JONES (National President), Kim BEAZLEY (Leader of the Opposition),

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Jenny MACKLIN (Deputy Leader of the Opposition), Chris EVANS (Leader in the Senate), Tim GARTRELL (National Secretary).

Other Parliamentary Parties Australian Democrats (AD). The social democratic AD was organized in 1977 by former Liberal cabinet minister Donald L. CHIPP and some members of the Australia Party, a small reformist group. By increasing its Senate representation from two seats to five at the October 1980 national election, it secured the balance of power in the upper house, a position that it maintained until the 2004 elections. In October 1996 the party lost its leader, Sen. Cheryl KERNOT, arguably the most prominent woman politician in Australia, through defection to the ALP. In June 1999 the Senate passed a controversial 10 percent goods and services tax (GST) after reaching an accommodation with the Democrats, including a food exemption and a shift in income tax cuts that favored those earning A$50,000 or less. The GST nevertheless remained a contentious issue within the party, and Dr. John COULTER, a former party leader, threatened to challenge then parliamentary leader Meg LEES over the issue. However, party members responding to a postal ballot in November–December gave Lees an 80 percent vote of confidence. In January 2000 President Michael MACKLIN, addressing a national party conference, appealed for unity but acknowledged “discontent among grassroots members” over a lack of consultation on the GST and other issues. At the same time he called for party restructuring, including adoption of a central party constitution as a replacement for divisional constitutions. Sharp divisions over the GST and other positions persisted into 2001, with Lees being replaced as parliamentary leader in April by GST opponent Natasha Stott Despoja. Lees resigned in July 2002 to protest the leadership of Stott Despoja, who in turn resigned her party post in August and was succeeded on an interim basis by Sen. Brian GREIG. In October Sen. Andrew Bartlett was named parliamentary leader, but

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he stepped down in December 2003 after a physical altercation with another senator. He was replaced by Sen. Lyn Allison. Meanwhile, in April 2003 Lees had formed the Australian Progressive Alliance (APA), but she failed to win reelection in 2004 and the APA was deregistered at the end of her senatorial term. At the October 2004 federal election the Democrats saw their senatorial delegation halved and their percentage of the first-preference vote drop to 2.1 percent. Although Stott Despoja won a Senate seat, the party’s deputy leader in the upper house, Aden RIDGEWAY—only the second Aboriginal candidate ever to win election to Parliament—was defeated in a reelection bid. Leaders: Nina BURRIDGE (President), Sen. Lyn ALLISON (Parliamentary Leader), Natasha STOTT DESPOJA, Sen. Andrew BARTLETT (Deputy Parliamentary Leader). Australian Greens. Preferring not to be called a “party,” the Australian Greens is a confederation of the following autonomous groups: ACT Greens (Australian Capital Territory), The Greens NSW (New South Wales), Queensland Greens, Greens SA (South Australia), Tasmanian Greens, NT Greens (Northern Territory), the Victorian Greens, and the Greens (WA) (Western Australia). The Greens have had considerable success in heightening public awareness of environmental problems and in persuading other parties, notably Labor, to embrace such issues. The movement attracted many adherents from the Nuclear Disarmament Party, formed by Labor dissidents in 1984. Although the Greens had not won election to the House of Representatives until a by-election victory by Michael ORGAN in 2002 (a seat they failed to retain in 2004), they have had a presence in the Senate since 1996, when party leader Bob Brown was elected from Tasmania. A second seat was added in 2001, and total representation was doubled at the 2004 election when they captured 7.5 percent of the first-preference vote, for third place behind the Liberal-National coalition and Labor. In October 2003 the Greens’ Bob Brown and Kerry

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Nettle drew one-day suspensions for interrupting U.S. President George W. Bush during his address to Parliament. From its founding in 1990 until October 2003, the Greens (WA) was organizationally separate from the federal Greens, although closely allied. It had held a federal Senate seat from 1993 until 1998. In a September 2003 ballot 80 percent of those voting endorsed formally joining the Australian Greens. Leaders: Bob BROWN and Christine MILNE (Senators from Tasmania), Kerry NETTLE (Senator from New South Wales), Rachel SIEWERT (Senator from Western Australia). Family First Party (FFP). Initially organized in South Australia, where Andrew Evans, an Assemblies of God pastor, was elected to the upper house of the legislature in early 2002, the FFP quickly drew support elsewhere because of its “family values” orientation. In August 2004, soon after organizing at the federal level, it named Andrea Mason the first indigenous woman to head an Australian party. Despite its deep Christian roots, the party has insisted that it is not a Christian party per se and seeks to cross religious as well as social and ethnic lines. Its positions include support for ecologically sustainable development, for the “war on terrorism” (although it initially opposed involvement in the war in Iraq), for mandatory filtering of the Internet by service providers, and for requiring women who seek publicly funded abortions to first receive “counseling.” In 2004 both the Liberals and Labor sought its support. The FFP won one Senate seat at the October federal election. Leaders: Peter HARRIS (Chair), Sen. Steve FIELDING (Parliamentary Leader), Andrea MASON (President), Chris BAKER (Treasurer/Secretary), Andrew EVANS.

Other Parties One Nation. Formed in April 1997 by Pauline Hanson, One Nation quickly became the focal point of the debate over the extent and character of im-

migration into Australia, Aboriginal welfare programs, and trade protectionism. After an initial burst of popular support, the party lost ground, although it still finds adherents among those who have not shared in the social and economic prosperity of a restructuring Australia. One Nation (for a time, formally called “Pauline Hanson’s One Nation”) suffered significant setbacks in the October 1998 national election, at which the party won only a single Senate seat despite having captured 11 of 89 seats, on a firstpreference vote share of 23 percent, in Queensland’s state legislature in June. Hanson herself lost her House seat in the October balloting, at which the party as a whole won 8.4 percent of first-preference votes. Although Hanson was reelected party leader in February 1999, by late in the month dissatisfaction with what some members called the party’s “autocratic and undemocratic structure” had led the majority of its recently elected Queensland state representatives to bolt or be dismissed from the party. In December 1999 five of the legislators formed the City Country Alliance (CCA). Six months earlier, Senator-elect Heather HILL had been ruled ineligible for her seat because she had not renounced her British citizenship. In November 1999 Hill was dismissed from the party after raising questions about its finances, and in 2000 she joined the CCA, which lost its Queensland registration in October 2001 because it had neither a sitting MP nor 500 statewide members. In early October 2000 Hanson forced the expulsion of a party cofounder, David OLDFIELD, over his participation in forming a new No GST Party with David ETTRIDGE, another One Nation cofounder. The party’s disintegration accelerated after that, and at the November 2001 federal election it took only 4.3 percent of the House vote. In January 2002 Hanson resigned as leader amid indications that differences within the remaining leadership threatened the party’s viability. In August 2003 both Hanson and Ettridge were convicted of electoral fraud in connection with the party’s registration in Queensland in 1997. They were sentenced

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to three years in prison, but the convictions were quashed by the Queensland Court of Appeals. By then, most One Nation members of various state legislatures had been defeated or had left the party. In 2004 its national secretary, Ed WALL, asked the Australian Electoral Commission to deregister One Nation, which he described as no longer viable. A month earlier the acting national president, John FISCHER, had resigned. Following the 2004 state election, One Nation held only one seat in the Queensland legislature, and at the 2004 federal election its sole senator, Len HARRIS, was defeated. Hanson herself, running as an independent, was also defeated in a Senate bid. David Oldfield, then head of the New South Wales One Nation, announced in 2005 that he would sit as an independent in the NSW upper house. In February 2005 One Nation lost its federal registration. Its membership had dropped by then to 200–300. Leaders: Rose LEE LONG (Member, Queensland Legislative Assembly), Jim CASSIDY (NSW Party President), Bill FLYNN (Queensland Party President), Tim FOSTER (Victoria Party President). Australia has many smaller parties, some operating at the state level and others focusing on single issues. Among those contesting at least five lower house seats at the 2004 federal elections were the following: the conservative, family-oriented Christian Democratic Party (Fred Nile Group), headed by the longtime New South Wales legislator Fred NILE and originally known as the Call to Australia; the Citizens Electoral Council, which was founded in 1988 and subsequently adopted the radical economic and social doctrines associated with the Lyndon LaRouche movement; the Ex-Service, Services, and Veterans Party; the environmental party Liberals for Forests; the New Country Party, which was launched in New South Wales in August 2002; the No Goods and Service Tax Party (No GST), which was established by former leaders of Pauline Hanson’s One Nation; and the Socialist Alliance (SA), which was organized in

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2001 by eight leftist parties and groups. SA founding organizations included the Democratic Socialist Party, which was established in 1972 as the Socialist Workers’ Party; the International Socialist Organization (ISO); and the Freedom Socialist Party. Other small parties active in 2004 included the Aged and Disability Pensioners Party; the Australians Against Further Immigration; the Curtin Labor Alliance; the conservative Democratic Labor Party, which was founded in 1955 in opposition to Communist influences in the ALP; the Fishing Party, which has called for fully opening the Great Barrier Reef to recreational fishing; the anti-income tax and antiglobalization Great Australians; the Help End Marijuana Prohibition (HEMP); the humanistic Hope Party, established at the federal level in 1999 and led by its founder Tim PETHERBRIDGE; the Lower Excise Fuel and Beer Party; the Nuclear Disarmament Party; the Outdoor Recreation Party; the “socialist and democratic” Progressive Labor Party, which was formed in 1996 as the New Labor Party; the Republican Party of Australia, also known as the Community Republicans; the Sydney-based Save the ADI Site, a local environmental group; and Tasmania First. The following small leftist formations did not contest the 2004 federal election: the Communist Party of Australia (CPA), which in 1996 changed its name from the Socialist Party of Australia (a 1971 splinter from the original, defunct CPA) and is currently led by Hannah MIDDLETON (President); the Socialist Party of Australia, a Trotskyite affiliate of the Committee for Workers International; and the Trotskyite Socialist Equality Party (SEP), formerly called the Socialist Labor League, which split from the original CPA in 1971.

Legislature The Australian Federal Parliament is a bicameral legislature with an upper chamber (Senate) and a lower chamber (House of Representatives), both elected by direct universal suffrage.

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Cabinet As of September 1, 2006 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister

John W. Howard Mark Vaile (NPA)

Cabinet Ministers Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry Communications, Information Technology, and the Arts Defense Education, Science, and Training Employment and Workplace Relations Environment and Heritage Families, Community Services, and Indigenous Affairs Finance and Administration Foreign Affairs Health and Aging Immigration and Multicultural Affairs Industry, Tourism, and Resources Trade Transport and Regional Services Attorney General Treasurer

Peter McGauren (NPA) Helen Coonan [f] Brendan Nelson Julie Bishop [f] Kevin Andrews Ian Campbell Mal Brough Nicholas (Nick) Minchin Alexander Downer Tony Abbott Amanda Vanstone [f] Ian Macfarlane Mark Vaile (NPA) Warren Truss (NPA) Philip Ruddock Peter Costello

Outer Ministers Aging Arts and Sport Community Services Fisheries, Forestry, and Conservation Human Services Justice and Customs Local Government, Territories, and Roads Revenue and Assistant Treasurer Small Business and Tourism Veterans’ Affairs Vocational and Technical Education Workforce Participation Special Minister for State [f] = female Note: Unless otherwise noted, ministers are members of the LPA.

Santo Santoro Rod Kemp John Cobb (NPA) Eric Abetz Joe Hockey Christopher Ellison Jim Lloyd Peter Dutton Fran Bailey [f] Bruce Billson Gary Hardgrave Sharman Stone [f] Gary Nairn

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Senate The Senate currently consists of 76 members (12 from each state plus 2 each from the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory), who are elected from state or territorial lists by proportional representation. Balloting is normally conducted every three years, with members of the state delegations serving staggered six-year terms. A casual Senate vacancy is filled by a member of the party holding the seat. Following the balloting of October 9, 2004 (with effect from July 1, 2005), the Liberal Party of Australia held 33 seats; the Australian Labor Party, 28 (including 1 won under the Country Labor Party label); the National Party of Australia/Country Liberal Party, 6 (NPA, 5; CLP, 1); the Australian Greens, 4; the Australian Democrats, 4; the Family First Party, 1. President: Paul CALVERT.

House of Representatives The present House consists of 150 representatives elected from single-member constituencies by preferential balloting (progressive elimination of lowest-ranked candidates with redistribution of preferences until one candidate secures a majority). Members are elected for three-year terms, subject to dissolution. Following the election of October 9, 2004, the Liberal Party of Australia held 74 seats; the Australian Labor Party, 60; the National Party of Australia, 12; the Northern Territory Country Liberal Party, 1; independents, 3. Speaker: David HAWKER.

Communications In recent years an increasing number of newspapers and broadcasting stations have been absorbed by media groups, the two principal ones being Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation, whose media interests extend to the United Kingdom and United States, and John Fairfax Holdings.

Press Newspapers are privately owned and almost all are published in the state capitals for intrastate

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readers; The Australian and the Australian Financial Review are the only genuinely national daily newspapers. The leading dailies are as follows: Herald-Sun (Melbourne, 540,000), sensationalist; Daily Telegraph-Mirror (Sydney, 410,000), tabloid; Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney, 220,000 daily, 400,000 Saturday), oldest morning newspaper (founded 1831), conservative; Courier Mail (Brisbane, 210,000 daily, 330,000 Saturday), conservative; Advertiser (Adelaide, 200,000 daily, 270,000 Saturday), conservative; The West Australian (Perth, 200,000 daily, 390,000 Saturday), conservative; The Age (Melbourne, 190,000 daily, 300,000 Saturday), independent; The Australian (Sydney, Adelaide, Perth, Melbourne, Townsville, Brisbane, 130,000 daily; 310,000 Saturday, published as The Weekend Australian), first national daily, independent; Australian Financial Review (Sydney, 90,000); Mercury (Hobart, 50,000 daily, 60,000 Saturday), conservative; The Canberra Times (Canberra, 40,000 daily, 70,000 Saturday), conservative; Northern Territory News (Darwin, 25,000 daily, 30,000 Saturday). The leading Sunday papers are Sunday Telegraph (Sydney, 700,000); Sunday Mail (Brisbane, 600,000); SunHerald (Sydney, 580,000); Sunday Times (Perth, 350,000); Sunday Mail (Adelaide, 340,000); Sunday Tasmanian (Hobart, 60,000); Sunday Territorian (Darwin, 25,000).

News Agencies The domestic agency is the Australian Associated Press (AAP), a Reuters-affiliated international news service owned by the country’s principal metropolitan dailies; in addition, most leading foreign agencies maintain bureaus in the Sydney area.

Broadcasting and Computing The federal Australian Broadcasting Authority determines and guarantees technical and programming standards for radio and television stations. Broadcasting services are provided both by private stations and by those of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, whose status is comparable to that

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of the British Broadcasting Corporation. Commercial Radio Australia is an association of privately owned radio stations; its television counterpart is Commercial Television Australia. There were approximately 19.6 million television receivers and 12.2 million personal computers serving 12.5 million Internet users in 2003.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. Dennis James RICHARDSON U.S. Ambassador to Australia Robert M. McCALLUM Permanent Representative to the UN Robert HILL IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, ANZUS, APEC, BIS, CP, CWTH, EBRD, IEA, Interpol, IOM, IOR-ARC, OECD, PC, PCA, PIF, WCO, WTO

Related Territories Ashmore and Cartier Islands Territory The Ashmore Islands (comprising Middle, East, and West islands) and Cartier Island, totaling about 0.36 square miles, are situated in the Indian Ocean about 200 miles off the northwestern coast of Australia. All are uninhabited save for a seasonal presence. Under the Ashmore and Cartier Islands Acceptance Act (effective May 10, 1934), it was intended that the territory be administered by Western Australia, but by a 1938 amendment to the act it was formally annexed to the Northern Territory. Since July 1978 Ashmore and Cartier have been under the direct administration of the Australian government, with oversight currently falling under the Department of Transport and Regional Services. Two oilfields, Challis and Jabiru, are located near the islands, and in April 2005 the Australian government included an area near Ashmore and Cartier among 29 new offshore exploration sites open for bidding by the petroleum industry.

In May 1996 officials from Australia and Indonesia visited the territory during discussions on the maritime boundary. International attention has since been drawn to Ashmore by “people smuggling” of refugees seeking Australian residency. To counter the flow, in 2001 Parliament passed legislation that deleted the territory from the country’s migration zone, thereby removing the right of refugees to apply for asylum.

Australian Antarctic Territory A British legacy, the Australian Antarctic Territory encompasses two sectors of Antarctica extending from 45 to 136 degrees east longitude and from 142 to 160 degrees east longitude. Together these sectors comprise almost 2.5 million square miles, or nearly 50 percent of the continent. The region is administered by the Australian Antarctic Division of the Department of the Environment and Heritage. The provisions of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 have placed the area in a state of suspended sovereignty, although nominally the laws of the Australian Capital Territory are in effect. In 1989 the Hawke administration expressed its unwillingness to sign the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resources adopted at a meeting of Antarctica Treaty countries in June 1988, calling instead for the territory’s designation as a “wilderness park.” However, in 1991 Australian legislation banning all mining in the Australian Antarctic Territory and the adjacent continental shelf came into effect. In December 1999 the Howard administration announced that it planned to survey the Antarctic continental shelf beyond Australia’s 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), international acceptance of the survey results would grant Australia exclusive rights to explore the seabed in the delineated area, which may extend as far as an additional 150 nautical miles. The Howard government noted, however, that the effort to exercise its sovereignty rights under UNCLOS did not signal any shift in policy toward the 50-year

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moratorium on mining the continental shelf. A more recent concern has been whaling by Japanese ships within the EEZ, particularly in the Australian Whale Sanctuary, which was established in 2000 under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act of 1999.

Christmas Island Named by a British captain on December 25, 1643, Christmas Island was annexed by the United Kingdom in 1888 but was not inhabited by a significant number of people until the late 1890s, when Chinese workers were brought in to mine phosphates. The Japanese occupied the island during World War II and imprisoned many of the residents. Australia took over administration of Christmas Island from Singapore in 1958. The former British crown colony, with an area of about 52 square miles, is located in the Indian Ocean about 230 miles south of Java. The chief government official, the administrator of the Indian Ocean Territories, is responsible to the federal government’s Department of Transport and Regional Services. The nine-member Christmas Island Shire Council, established in 1992 as successor to the Christmas Island Services Corporation, provides municipaltype services and economic management. On May 7, 1994, an unofficial referendum on secession was sponsored by the Union of Christmas Island Workers. While the result was negative, the poll served to point out widespread frustration over a number of issues, including a housing shortage. A subsequent referendum on November 6, 1999, returned a 62 percent vote favoring self-government. A 2001 census recorded 1,508 persons, 70 percent of whom were Chinese and 10 percent, Malays. The balance were predominantly of European descent. The only nonservice industry on the island, the extraction of nearly exhausted phosphate deposits, was previously under management of the British Phosphate Commission, the shareholders being Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. However, in June 1991, after a number of reorganizations, a new corporation, Phosphate Resources Ltd., was formed by mine workers to exploit ex-

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isting sites. In 2005 controversy arose over the company’s request to extend mining into a previously untouched rainforest to prolong the life of the operation. The Australian government has encouraged other private commercial activities to broaden the economic base, including a tourist hotel and casino complex, the Christmas Island Resort, which opened in 1993 but, in a major blow to the island’s economy, closed in April 1998, laying off some 320 workers. In July the resort directors canceled the license of the operators for failing to meet financial obligations, some A$108 million being owed to creditors. Four months earlier, the government selected the Asia Pacific Space Centre Pty. Ltd. consortium (APSC) to build a satellitelaunching facility on the island. In April 2000 the APSC bought the resort property, to use for housing, but by 2004 construction of the launch facility was behind schedule and some Australian lawmakers were raising questions about APSC’s solvency. In 2000 Canberra had pledged A$100 million for the space project and infrastructure, but by 2004 only some A$300,000 had been spent, for road design work. No significant progress occurred in 2005. Beginning in early 1999 Christmas Island witnessed a wave of illegal immigrants, many from as far away as the Middle East, who were transported by boat from nearby Indonesia in an effort to enter Australia. In November 1999 alone, nearly 1,000 people landed, while hundreds drowned attempting the passage. A decision by the central government not to allow some 430 mainly Afghan refugees to land in August 2001 led to a regional crisis and wide international criticism of the Howard government’s increasingly tough anti-immigration policies. Although some refugees were subsequently held at a detention center on Christmas Island and the government announced plans to construct a more permanent facility there, many others were transferred to other centers, pending resolution of their asylum claims. Furthermore, Parliament removed Christmas Island from Australia’s immigration zone. The new 800-bed “immigration reception and processing center” was scheduled for completion

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in late 2006. Local opponents, including the president of the Shire Council, feared the presence of the facility would adversely affect tourism. Some charged that the center was sited on Christmas Island to reduce national scrutiny and that it might also be used to hold suspected terrorists. Administrator: Neil LUCAS. President of the Shire Council: Gordon THOMPSON.

would, for voting purposes, thenceforth be treated as part of Australia’s Northern Territory. In 2001 the territory was removed from Australia’s migration zone to deter asylum seekers, a number of whom were being held at a former quarantine facility. The refugees were later moved to a camp on Christmas Island. Administrator: Neil LUCAS (resident on Christmas Island). President of the Shire Council: Ron GRANT.

Cocos (Keeling) Islands

Coral Sea Islands Territory

The Cocos Islands, discovered in 1609 by Capt. William Keeling of the British East India Company, consists of two copra-producing atolls of 27 islands that were detached from Singapore in 1955. They are located in the Indian Ocean about 580 miles southwest of Java and have an area of about 5.5 square miles. In 1978 John Clunies-Ross, the descendant of a Scottish sea captain who was granted authority over the islands by Queen Victoria in 1886, yielded his claim after agreeing to financial compensation of $7 million. While Australia’s administrator of the Indian Ocean Territories remains the chief executive officer of the islands, a seven-member Cocos (Keeling) Islands Shire Council with municipal-level powers was established in 1993 under the Territories Law Reform Act of 1992. The population of the islands at the 2001 census was 618: some 500 on Home Island, where virtually all the inhabitants are Muslims of Malay extraction, and the balance on West Island, where mainly federal government employees and their families reside. The islands have no significant industry apart from the production of coconuts and copra, and unemployment was estimated at 20 percent in 2001. In early 2000, plans to open a casino were scrapped, primarily because of the ongoing economic difficulties in Indonesia. In a referendum conducted on April 6, 1984, an overwhelming majority of the inhabitants voted for integration with Australia (as opposed to free association or independence), the Canberra government subsequently announcing that the islands

The Coral Sea Territory was created in 1969 as a means of administering a number of very small islands and reefs east of Queensland. Except at a weather station on Willis Island, there are no inhabitants. In 1997 the Coral Sea Islands Act of 1969 was amended to include Elizabeth and Middleton reefs, in the Tasman Sea. The widely scattered islands and reefs of the territory are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Transport and Regional Services.

Heard Island and McDonald Islands Heard and the McDonalds, totaling about 150 square miles and located about 2,500 miles southwest of Fremantle in Western Australia, serve primarily as scientific stations. There are no permanent inhabitants, and the islands are administered by the Australian Antarctic Division of the Department of the Environment and Heritage. In recent years poaching of Patagonian toothfish in the vicinity has led to increased patrolling of nearby waters. In August 2003 a Uruguayanregistered trawler was apprehended with an illegal toothfish cargo, and in November three crewmen were convicted, fined, and deported. A year earlier, Australia had established a fully protected marine reserve second in size only to the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park.

Norfolk Island Located about 1,000 miles east of Queensland, Norfolk Island has an area of 14 square miles and

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a population (2004E) of about 1,800. The island is the second-oldest British settlement in the South Pacific, having been discovered by Captain Cook in 1774 and occupied as a penal colony a few weeks after the founding of Sydney in 1788. Slightly less than half of its inhabitants are descendants of Bounty mutineers who moved from Pitcairn in 1856. Tourism is the principal industry, accommodating some 40,000 visitors a year. Until 1979 the island was supported by grants from Canberra. In that year the arrangements were altered by a Norfolk Island Act to provide Australian support for administrative staff, with the remainder of expenses to be met as much as possible from local sources, including tourism. Under the act, a nine-member Norfolk Island Legislative Assembly first convened in August 1979, its leadership constituting an Executive Council with cabinet-like functions. The Australian administrator is named by the governor general and is responsible to the federal government. The most recent islandwide, nonpartisan election occurred on October 20, 2004. There are no formal parties, the principal political division being between Islanders (of Pitcairn descent) and Mainlanders (Australians and New Zealanders). The main political issue has long been whether Norfolk is an integral part of Australia,

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as argued by Canberra, or whether the Pitcairners are an indigenous people and have a right of selfdetermination. In 1999 Canberra introduced legislation intended to further integrate the island, prompting a charge of “bloodless ethnic cleansing” from Norfolk leaders and an August vote by the local assembly for immediate and full internal selfgovernment. In March 2003, in the context of increasing criticism from Canberra over the need for governmental reform, the Legislative Assembly amended its electoral framework by requiring enrolled voters to be Australian, New Zealand, or British citizens. The assembly also reduced the residency requirement from 900 days to one year. Opponents viewed the changes as weakening the island’s autonomy. A subsequent report by the Parliament’s External Territories Committee alleged that some Norfolk officials had resorted to such tactics as intimidation, arson, and phone tapping to gain political or financial advantages. In a December 2005 report titled “Norfolk Island Financial Stability: The Challenge—Sink or Swim,” a parliamentary committee concluded that Norfolk’s taxation and welfare systems should be brought into the commonwealth’s. Administrator: Grant TAMBLING. Chief Minister: Geoffrey R. GARDNER.

A Z E R BA I JA N AZERBAIJAN REPUBLIC Azerbaycan Respublikasy

The Country Home to a largely Turkic-speaking, Shiite Muslim population, the Azerbaijan Republic is bordered by Georgia on the northwest, Russia on the north, the Caspian Sea on the east, Iran on the south, and Armenia on the west. Within its territory is the predominantly Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, which has been the focus of intense conflict since independence; it also controls the noncontiguous, but largely Azeri, autonomous region of Nakhichevan on the southwestern border of Armenia. The capital, Baku, is located on the Caspian’s Apsheron Peninsula, one of the world’s oldest oil-producing regions, the proceeds from which made Baku one of Europe’s richest cities in the years before World War I. Agriculture employs 30 percent of the labor force, with crops including wheat, barley, potatoes, cotton, tobacco, rice, and tea. Its mineral resources, which, in addition to petroleum, include natural gas, iron, zinc, copper, lead, and cobalt, support a number of manufacturing industries. The war with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh absorbed 25 percent of the state budget in the early 1990s, amid GDP contraction of some 60 percent between 1990 and 1994 and attendant widespread impoverishment. (Since 1994 Nagorno-Karabakh, which represents some 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s territory, has been under Armenian control; meanwhile, an estimated 1 million Azeri refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh reside in camps throughout the rest of the country awaiting a permanent settlement of the conflict and possible return to their former homes.)

Little immediate progress was made toward a market economy following the 1994 cease-fire in Nagorno-Karabakh, although in 1995 Azerbaijan obtained its first International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans to support economic transition amid hopes that Western exploitation of the country’s oil reserves would yield major financial benefits. Meanwhile, the non-oil sector essentially stagnated in the late 1990s, with widespread corruption reported at all levels of government. In April 1999 a 515-mile oil pipeline from Baku to the Black Sea port of Supsa, Georgia,

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Political Status: Azerbaijan Republic established under Turkish auspices in May 1918; joined the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) as part of the Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Republic on December 30, 1922; became separate Soviet Socialist Republic on December 5, 1936; independence declared August 30, 1991, and confirmed October 18, 1991; became sovereign member of the Commonwealth of Independent States on December 21, 1991; new constitution providing for a strong presidential system adopted by national referendum on November 12, 1995, and entered into force November 27. Area: 33,436 sq. mi. (86,600 sq. km.). Population: 7,953,000 (1999C); 8,329,000 (2005E). Major Urban Center (2005E): BAKU (1,820,000). Official Language: Azeri (Azerbaijani). Monetary Unit: Manat (official rate July 1, 2006: 4,485 manats = $1US). (A new manat, equivalent

was opened amid great fanfare. Attention subsequently focused on a Western-backed oil pipeline of even greater capacity from the Azerbaijan capital through Georgia to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, Turkey. The second phase of the country’s privatization program, launched in mid-2000, was directed toward major state enterprises in the energy, telecommunications, and transportation sectors. (The first phase [1995–1999], which had involved smalland medium-sized enterprises, had been criticized by the IMF for failing to meet disclosure standards.) Meanwhile, the population reportedly showed signs of restiveness regarding the delay in reaping the anticipated rewards from the projected oil windfall. Relations with the IMF have remained mixed in recent years, the fund suspending some of its support in 2002 and 2003 because of the government’s failure to implement several promised reforms. Meanwhile, Transparency International ranked Azerbaijan as one of the most corrupt countries in the world (95th out of 102 countries).

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to 5,000 old manats, was introduced in January 2006. Both were to remain as legal tender until the end of 2006, at which time all old manats were to be exchanged for new manats.) President: Ilham ALIYEV (New Azerbaijan Party); elected by popular vote on October 15, 2003, and sworn in for a five-year term on October 31 to succeed Heydar ALIYEV (New Azerbaijan Party). Prime Minister: Artur RASIZADE (New Azerbaijan Party); appointed acting prime minister by the president on July 20, 1996, to succeed Fuad KULIYEV (New Azerbaijan Party), who had resigned July 19; confirmed as prime minister by the president on November 26, 1996; reappointed by the president on October 23, 1998; resigned on August 4, 2003, but reappointed on an acting basis on August 6; reappointed in full capacity by the president on November 4, 2003.

Driven by energy exports and related construction projects, GDP grew by more than 10 percent annually in 2003–2004; inflation remained low (about 3 percent) in 2003 but surged to double digits in 2004. The IMF reported progress in the privatization of small- and medium-sized enterprises but in 2005 called for significant additional reform in the energy, financial, and business sectors. As did many other international institutions, the IMF also criticized the dearth of “good governance” on the part of Azerbaijan’s Aliyev regime (see Current issues, below). The $4 billion, 1,000-mile oil pipeline from the Caspian to Turkey was completed in May 2005 by a consortium that included British Petroleum as the largest shareholder. The pipeline, which began operating in June 2006, was ultimately expected to pump 1 million barrels per day, with some experts predicting it could eventually be extended under the Caspian to Kazakhstan, providing the West with even greater access to Caspian oil without dealing with Russia or Iran. Meanwhile, an important new pipeline was inaugurated in December 2005 for the shipment of natural gas from Iran to Nakhichevan.

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Government and Politics Political Background Historic Azerbaijan spanned the area of the present republic plus a somewhat larger region located in northern Iran. Persia and the Ottoman Empire competed for the territory in the 16th century, with the former gaining control in 1603. The northern sector, ceded to Russia in the early 19th century, joined Armenia and Georgia in a short-lived Transcaucasian Federation after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. It proclaimed its independence the following year but was subdued by Red Army forces in 1920. In 1922 it entered the USSR as part of the Transcaucasian Soviet Federal Republic, becoming a separate Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) in 1936. Whereas the largely Armenian-populated enclave of NagornoKarabakh had been ceded to the new Armenian SSR in 1920, three years later, at Stalin’s direction, it was returned to the Azerbaijan SSR; in 1924 the western enclave of Nakhichevan was also placed under Azerbaijan’s jurisdiction (this step was approved by Turkey in its capacity as a regional guarantor power under the 1921 Treaty of Kars). In 1989, as the Communist monolith began to crumble, a secessionist Azerbaijan Popular Front (Azerbaycan Xalq Cebhesi—AXC) emerged that was the object of intense repression by Soviet troops. Meanwhile, conflict had erupted with neighboring Armenia regarding the status of Nagorno-Karabakh (see article on Armenia for additional information), and the Azerbaijan Communist Party (Azerbaycan Kommunist Partiyasi— AKP) was able to deflect support from the nationalists by strongly opposing any compromise involving the enclave. As a result, the Communists were clear victors in elections to the republican Supreme Soviet on September 30 and October 14, 1990. In March 1991 it was reported that 93 percent of those voting in a national referendum in Azerbaijan had approved the draft “Union Treaty” proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev for the continuation of a Union of Soviet Republics with additional rights

being extended to the constituent republics. (Armenia declined to conduct a referendum on the matter for fear the new treaty would compromise its claim to Nagorno-Karabakh.) However, the chair of the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet, Ayaz Niyaz Ogly MUTALIBOV, subsequently appeared to side with hard-liners who in mid-August in Moscow attempted a coup aimed at stopping Gorbachev’s reforms. When the coup failed, Mutalibov denied having supported the initiative and resigned his post as first secretary of the AKP, apparently to show his solidarity with demonstrators clamoring for independence and separation from Communist rule. On August 30, 1991, the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet voted to “restore the independent status of Azerbaijan.” Opposition groups called for a delay in the presidential balloting scheduled for September 8, but Mutalibov insisted the balloting be held. As a result of an opposition boycott, Mutalibov, describing himself as a “new Communist,” was elected as the sole candidate. On October 10 the Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet passed legislation providing for the formation of a national defense force, and on October 18 it unanimously approved the Constitutional Act on the State Independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan, which reaffirmed the independence announcement of August 30. However, the administration flatly rejected the opposition’s demands for new legislative elections. President Mutalibov resigned on March 6, 1992, because of his government’s inability to protect the Azeri minority in Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenian guerrilla attacks; Yagub MAMEDOV was named his interim successor. However, following a major reversal in Nagorno-Karabakh, a quorumless legislature voted on May 14, 1992, to restore Mutalibov to the presidency. The action triggered a major clash between ex-Communists and AXC supporters that resulted in Mutalibov again being toppled on May 15. Four days later the Supreme Soviet voted to disband in favor of an AXC-dominated National Assembly, and on June 7 the AXC candidate, Abulfaz Ali ELCHIBEY, easily defeated four competitors in a new round of presidential balloting.

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In 1993 President Elchibey came under increasing pressure for his government’s failure to evict Armenian forces from Nagorno-Karabakh, and in early June a domestic insurrection was launched by the garrison in the country’s second city, Gyandzha. On June 16 the president left Baku for Nakhichevan as rebel units, commanded by Col. Surat GUSEINOV, approached the capital. On June 18 Heydar ALIYEV, formerly AKP first secretary, who as leader of the New Azerbaijan Party (Yeni Azerbaycan Partiyasi—YAP) had been installed as parliamentary chair on June 15, declared that, because of Elchibey’s “inexplicable and unwarranted absence,” he had assumed “the duties and responsibilities of the presidency of Azerbaijan.” On June 30 Aliyev named Col. Guseinov to head a new government. In popular balloting on October 3, YAP candidate Aliyev was confirmed as president, officially winning 98.8 percent of the vote. Following a further power struggle, President Aliyev on October 6, 1994, dismissed Guseinov as prime minister, in favor of Fuad KULIYEV (theretofore a deputy premier), while stressing that he (Aliyev) was head of the government. The president described the outgoing cabinet as “a den of criminals” and indicated that treason charges would be laid against Guseinov, who had fled to Russia. (Guseinov was extradited to Azerbaijan in 1996 and was sentenced to life imprisonment in early 1999 following his conviction on more than 40 charges.) A new crisis erupted in March 1995 when rebel interior ministry forces led by Deputy Interior Minister Ravshan JAVADOV staged an attempted coup, which was put down with numerous fatalities, including that of Javadov. Amid the turbulence, President Aliyev accused Russia of plotting to destabilize his government in concert with hard-line exiles, notably Mutalibov. According to Baku authorities, the effort reflected Moscow’s anger at a Caspian Sea oil-exploitation agreement that Azerbaijan had signed in September 1994 with a consortium of oil companies led by British Petroleum, a charge that the Russian foreign ministry rejected as “groundless.”

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Internal instability and stringent registration requirements resulted in only eight parties contesting the first round of legislative balloting on November 12, 1995; the exclusion of a dozen opposition parties and other factors led a monitoring mission from the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to conclude that the election had been less than fair. The official results (including runoff contests for 15 seats in February 1996) gave the ruling YAP and its allies a massive majority in the new 125member assembly. In a simultaneous referendum on November 12, a new constitution establishing a presidential republic was reported to have secured 91.9 percent approval. The legislative balloting of November 1995 and February 1996 served to entrench the Aliyev regime, which became noticeably more vigorous in its actions against those seeking to challenge its hold on power. It was assisted in this endeavor by traditionally compliant courts, which handed down a series of harsh sentences, including the death penalty, for opposition activists convicted of subversion. It also received unprecedented support from Russia, which Aliyev had previously castigated for harboring Azerbaijanis plotting to overthrow his government. In April 1996 ex-president Mutalibov and former defense minister Rakhim GAZIYEV were both arrested in Moscow, the latter being quickly extradited to Baku (where two months earlier a military court had sentenced him to death for high treason), while the former escaped extradition only on a legal ruling by the Russian procurator general. The shift in Russian policy reflected a partial resolution in October 1995 of the dispute with Azerbaijan about the exploitation of Caspian oil reserves, in particular, the route by which the oil would be piped to Western markets. As ratified by the Azerbaijani National Assembly in November 1994, the $7.5 billion agreement signed with a Western-led consortium in September 1994 had included Lukoil of Russia (with a 10 percent stake); nevertheless, Moscow had rejected its legitimacy, arguing that the Caspian Sea was the joint

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possession of its five littoral states (Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan) and that each should share in its exploitation. Further complications had ensued from Azerbaijan’s April 1995 granting an increased stake in the venture to Turkey, much to the chagrin of Iran. In the October 1995 announcement, however, Russian concerns were substantially met, the consortium agreeing that two pipelines from the Caspian Sea would be used, one an upgrade of the existing pipeline running through Russian territory to the Black Sea and the other a new pipeline through Georgia and thence potentially to Turkey. The U.S. government was reported to have played a significant role in the pipeline-route decision and in securing the exclusion of Iran from the consortium. In the latter regard, Azerbaijan was later able to make partial amends by allocating the Iranians a 10 percent stake in the next phase of Caspian oil development. Internal instability continued to complicate President Aliyev’s efforts to steer Azerbaijan to a negotiated settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict under the auspices of the OSCE, while accepting a Russian peacekeeping role. Several cease-fire agreements in 1993 and 1994 had proved abortive, not least because the opposition Popular Front had assailed associated provisions as amounting to de facto recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as a separate entity. Against this background, the Baku government had resisted a May 1994 plan from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) for the deployment of a predominantly Russian peacekeeping force and achieved a diplomatic victory in December, when it was agreed that a 3,000-strong multinational OSCE force would be sent, with no one country providing more than 30 percent of the total. However, subsequent efforts to establish a permanent cease-fire had made little progress by May 1995, when Armenia withdrew from the talks, charging Azerbaijani involvement in a Georgian Azeri bombing that severed a pipeline carrying vital gas supplies to Armenia from Turkmenistan. Talks resumed under OSCE auspices in September but were complicated by the issuance of a unilateral declaration of independence by the Karabakh Armenians in March 1996, an action that

drew predictably fierce condemnation from Azerbaijan. The Kuliyev government came under increasing criticism in 1996, not least from President Aliyev, for the slow pace of economic reform, particularly the privatization program. Matters came to a head with an announcement on July 19 that the president had accepted the prime minister’s resignation “on health grounds” and had also dismissed several senior economic ministers and state managers. The following day Artur RASIZADE was appointed to the premiership, while Nadir NASIBOV became chair of the State Privatization Committee. On January 24, 1997, Azerbaijani officials claimed that a coup attempt against President Aliyev, allegedly involving supporters of former president Mutalibov, former prime minister Guseinov, and a number of foreign intelligence officers, had been prevented in October 1996. Subsequently, after fighting had broken out in April and May in Nagorno-Karabakh, the OSCE submitted a draft peace plan for the region, proposing that the enclave be given autonomous status within Azerbaijan. However, the appointment of Robert Kocharian (the president of the selfdeclared Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh) as the prime minister of Armenia and the election of Arkady GHUKASIAN to replace him as the president of the disputed republic on September 1 were rejected by Azerbaijani officials as “intolerable provocations.” In addition, in late September the Armenian president Levon Ter-Petrosian issued a statement calling the demands for granting of autonomy to Nagorno-Karabakh “unrealistic.” On October 16 the Azerbaijani president Aliyev claimed that an agreement had been reached to settle the conflict on the basis of the proposals put forward by the OSCE, and on November 17 Ghukasian indicated that his government might agree to a stepby-step settlement of the conflict provided that the status of the region was determined in advance. However, no progress was achieved during the remainder of the year, and the ascendancy of hardliner Kocharian in the Armenian government in February 1998 (see article on Armenia) seemed to place further impediments in the way of a final

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negotiated settlement. In November 1998 the OSCE presented a new peace proposal that called for a “common state” between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia and the leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh welcomed the proposal, whereas Azerbaijani foreign minister Tofiq ZULFUGAROV said on November 20 that the idea was unacceptable because it represented a threat to Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty. Aliyev was reelected to another five-year term on October 11, 1998, although many prominent politicians and opposition parties boycotted the balloting to protest the government’s stranglehold on the national election commission. The opposition also alleged fraud in the counting of ballots, which officially showed Aliyev gaining 76 percent of the vote against four other candidates and thereby surpassing the two-thirds threshold required to eliminate the need for a second round of balloting. Although the cabinet resigned on October 20 (as constitutionally required following a presidential election), Aliyev reappointed Prime Minister Rasizade on October 23. Many incumbents were also subsequently returned to the cabinet, although the process dragged on for several months. Western leaders, hopeful that political liberalization in Azerbaijan would facilitate the exploitation of oil and gas, pressured the government to revamp its electoral code so that the municipal elections in December 1999 would be fully contested by opposition parties. However, many parties in fact boycotted the polling, while those opposition groups that participated cited “massive irregularities,” which exacerbated antigovernment discontent that culminated in April 2000 in mass demonstrations calling for Aliyev to resign. The government’s initial response was a crackdown that included a number of arrests. However, in June the president announced the release of some 87 political prisoners, a decision that was apparently designed to facilitate Azerbaijan’s accession to the Council of Europe. (The membership was formally approved in January 2001; similar concurrent action regarding Armenia led some analysts

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to suggest that a “military solution” in NagornoKarabakh had thereby become even less likely.) Controversy again surrounded the November 2000 assembly elections, as the government initially barred some parties and blocs from contesting the proportional component of the poll. International pressure influenced the administration to relent at the last minute, but the parties involved argued that their prospects had already been irrevocably compromised. (The YAP dominated the election by winning 75 seats.) Many observers also described the balloting as seriously flawed, and the election commission significantly revised the results of the proportional balloting. The Constitutional Court ruled in 2002 that President Aliyev was eligible to run for a third term in 2003 on the grounds that his first term should not count toward the two-term limit because he was elected prior to the constitutional revision of 1995. Campaign issues included the growing influence of Islamist groups in Azerbaijan (which had prompted the government to institute more extensive oversight of religious organizations) as well as continued accusations against the administration of human rights violations, including harassment of opposition parties and torture and other mistreatment of political prisoners. President Aliyev held several face-to-face talks with President Kocharian of Armenia in the first half of 2001, prompting reports of a possible settlement regarding NagornoKarabakh. No breakthrough occurred, however, and Kocharian subsequently declared it was “unthinkable” that Nagorno-Karabakh would return to any degree of control by Azerbaijan; meanwhile, the government of Azerbaijan and its internal critics found at least one issue upon which they agreed—that they would not accept a “defeatist” solution in Nagorno-Karabakh. In April 2003 President Aliyev collapsed twice during a televised speech, and he later announced he would not run for reelection in October. On August 4 Prime Minister Rasizade announced his resignation, purportedly for health reasons. President Aliyev’s son, Ilham ALIYEV, was appointed as the new prime minister, but on August 6 he announced he was taking an unpaid leave of absence to

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participate in the presidential campaign; Rasizade returned to the prime minister’s post in an acting capacity. Ilham Aliyev won the presidency in first-round balloting on October 15, 2003, securing 79.5 percent of the votes. Second place went to Isa GAMBAR, leader of the New Equality Party (Yeni Musavat Partiyasi—YMP), with 12 percent of the vote. (Opposition groups and a number of international observers decried the election as neither free nor fair.) Rasizade returned to the premiership in a permanent capacity as head of a reshuffled cabinet on November 4. Charges of massive irregularities also surrounded the November 2005 assembly elections, at which the YAP and its supporters again gained an overwhelming majority.

A national referendum on controversial constitutional revisions was approved by a reported 84 percent yes vote on August 24, 2002. Opposition groups strongly objected to a provision designating the presidentially appointed prime minister as the presidential successor in case of the incapacitation or death of the president. The constitutional successor previously had been the speaker of the assembly, and critics of President Aliyev argued that the change had been implemented to permit him to handpick his successor. They also strongly protested the elimination of partial proportional representation beginning with the 2005 assembly elections.

Constitution and Government

Although Azerbaijan participated in the formal launching of the CIS in December 1991, its legislature voted against ratification of the CIS foundation documents on October 7, 1992. In late 1991 Azerbaijan was admitted to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and by early 1992 it had established diplomatic relations with a number of foreign countries, including the United States. On March 2 it was admitted to the UN, with membership in the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development following on September 18. Its closest emerging links, however, were with Iran (because of a shared Shiite faith) and Turkey (because of a common Turkic ancestry). During a regional summit in Tehran on February 16 and 17, 1992, it joined with the four Central Asian republics of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan in gaining admission to the longdormant Economic Cooperation Organization that had been founded by Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey in 1963. Meanwhile, an additional threat to regional stability had been posed by the emergence of conflict in Nakhichevan. While troops of the former Soviet army remained stationed along the border with Turkey and Iran, an increasing number of clashes between Armenian and Azeri militias were erupting in the northern portion of the region. Following Heydar Aliyev’s assumption of the Azeri presidency in mid-1993, direct talks were initiated with

After nearly four years under a modified Sovietera constitution (an interim 50-member legislature replacing the former 360-seat Supreme Soviet in May 1992), Azerbaijan adopted a new basic law on November 12, 1995, that provided for a strong presidency. Executive power is vested in a head of state who is popularly elected for a maximum of two five-year terms and who appoints the prime minister and other cabinet members. Legislative authority resides in a 125-member National Assembly, also elected by universal adult suffrage for a five-year term. In other respects, preindependence administrative structures remained largely intact. The judicial structure includes a Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, and High Economic Court. The country includes two autonomous regions: Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian-populated enclave that has been the object of military contention with Armenia since 1990, and Nakhichevan, a largely Azeri-populated enclave within Armenia that has also been a source of military confrontation (see Armenia article). The Azerbaijani Assembly approved a new constitution for Nakhichevan in late 1998, formalizing its autonomous status despite objection from some legislators concerned that such action was setting a troublesome precedent.

Foreign Relations

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Karen BABURYAN, the president of the Karabakh parliament. Subsequently, after a meeting between Aliyev and the Russian president Boris Yeltsin in Moscow on September 6, the Azerbaijan Assembly endorsed CIS membership, although the government steadfastly distanced itself from Russian-led CIS security plans. Azerbaijan concluded a ten-year friendship and cooperation treaty with Turkey in February 1994 and became a signatory of NATO’s Partnership for Peace in May. In the latter month it also became an observer member of the Nonaligned Movement. In May 1997 Turkey and Azerbaijan issued a joint declaration condemning “Armenian aggression” in Nagorno-Karabakh and asking Armenia to withdraw its troops from the region. In January 2001 Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Azerbaijan, the two countries agreeing in principle on demarcation of the Caspian seabed border and signing numerous other cooperation protocols. (In February 2004 Azerbaijan and Russia signed the Moscow Declaration, which confirmed earlier agreements and pledged further bilateral cooperation regarding security, economic development, and other issues.) Azerbaijan’s relations with the West also subsequently improved, particularly after Baku agreed to support Washington’s war on terrorism following the attacks in the United States in September 2001. In January 2002 a grateful U.S. President George W. Bush lifted the partial economic sanctions that had been imposed on Azerbaijan as the result of Azerbaijan’s blockade of Armenia in connection with the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. The United States also provided humanitarian aid and granted Azerbaijan most-favored-nation trade status. Subsequently, Azerbaijan lent some 159 troops to the U.S.-led occupying forces in Iraq in 2003. In 2004 Washington, seen as interested in using improved ties with Azerbaijan as a counter to potential Russian dominance in the region, signed a security cooperation agreement with Baku. In May 2005 the defense ministers of Azerbaijan and Iran also signed a security cooperation agreement, the two countries having previously (in 2002) agreed to build a joint natural gas pipeline and to facilitate the transport of goods. Meanwhile, ne-

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gotiations on Azerbaijan’s proposed eventual entry into the European Union (EU) continued, although in early 2006 Cyprus was reportedly impeding progress in that regard because of its perception that Baku was willing to recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus if talks on the Cyprus impasse collapsed. Despite ongoing outreach from Russia (Putin visited again in March 2006), the Aliyev administration reportedly remained strongly interested in EU integration, in part because it considered the Armenian force in Nagorno-Karabakh to be essentially a Russian “proxy.”

Current Issues The brief elevation of Ilham Aliyev to the post of prime minister in August 2003 was widely perceived as a heavy-handed measure designed to ensure that he would succeed his father as president. Large-scale demonstrations broke out to protest the action, prompting what critics called “brutal” suppression by security forces. The presidential balloting in October was also widely criticized for failing to meet international standards. However, despite ongoing negative reaction in Western capitals, Ilham Aliyev’s administration maintained its hard line, quashing political protests and imposing restrictions on the media. Human rights groups estimated that more than 1,000 people were arrested, including a number of prominent officials from opposition parties. Numerous violations, including voter intimidation and ballot-box tampering, were alleged in the December 2004 local elections, which were boycotted by most opposition groups, including the YMP. Following a warning from the Council of Europe, President Aliyev pardoned more than 100 political prisoners in March 2005, and in May his administration accepted new electoral guidelines proposed by the OSCE. Meanwhile, the government condemned as illegal the June 2005 balloting in Nagorno-Karabakh in which the ruling proArmenian government secured a majority. A number of cabinet ministers were dismissed in October 2005, the government claiming that it had uncovered a coup plot. However, critics noted that reformists were the primary target of

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the crackdown, which also resulted in the arrest of a prominent youth movement leader and alleged suppression of the opposition parties’ campaign efforts prior to the November assembly balloting. Most international observers and numerous domestic analysts (including some associated with the government) strongly condemned the way the assembly poll was conducted. The opposition Freedom (Azadliq) coalition charged that ballotstuffing, vote-buying, intimidation of voters by the government, and fraudulent tallying had cost it many assembly seats. Azadliq organized mass demonstrations in Baku throughout November, its supporters wearing orange in an apparent attempt to duplicate the so-called Orange Revolution that had toppled the government of Ukraine a year earlier. However, support for “regime change” reportedly did not nearly reach critical mass, despite Azerbaijan’s ongoing reputation as what one Financial Times contributor described as a “highly corrupt post-Soviet state.” The OSCE bluntly reported that the assembly elections had failed to meet international standards, while other observers used stronger language such as “electoral crime” and “rigged elections.” The United States and the EU also criticized the government over its handling of the balloting, although, as one journalist put it, “not too loudly.” The opposition also suggested that criticism has been “toned down” in recognition of Western “military and energy interests” in Azerbaijan. For his part, President Aliyev was reportedly taking advantage of the Caspian oil boom to, among other things, strengthen the military, which by early 2006 was described as sufficiently upgraded to offer a genuine challenge to Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh. In March Aliyev announced that Azerbaijan’s “patience is running out” after 12 years of peace talks with Armenia. Meanwhile, Arkady Ghukasian, the “president” of Nagorno-Karabakh, announced that a proposed constitution for the disputed territory might be presented for a referendum before the end of the year. Mindful that renewed fighting was not out of the question, international mediators continued to press for a negotiated settlement that would

replace many of the Armenian troops in NagornoKarabakh with international peacekeepers pending an eventual self-determination referendum.

Political Parties Following the achievement of independence in 1991, Azerbaijan moved to a limited multiparty system, qualified by the exigencies of the ongoing war with Armenia, internal political conflict, and the continuing preponderance in the state bureaucracy of former functionaries of the long-dominant Azerbaijan Communist Party (Azerbaycan Kommunist Partiyasi—AKP). Suspended in late 1991, the AKP was relaunched in 1993 as the Azerbaijan United Communist Party (AVKP, below). More than 45 parties were registered as of early 1998, while a number of pro- and antigovernment umbrella organizations also formed, including the Movement for Democracy, launched by 23 opposition groups in November 1998. In April 1999 it was reported that 17 members of the assembly had launched the Democratic bloc under the leadership of Jabrail AHMADOV to confront the government on several issues, including the controversial national electoral law and the delay in conducting municipal elections. A Democratic Congress, comprising some 10 opposition parties and chaired by Mais SAFARLI, coordinated a demonstration in Baku in April 2000 demanding electoral law revision. However, in October 2000 it was reported that the component parties in the Congress had split into competing groups separated by disagreement as to which faction of the Azerbaijan Popular Front to support (see AXC, below). A number of opposition blocs were organized in advance of the November 2005 assembly poll, although their effectiveness was limited.

Government and Government-Supportive Parties New Azerbaijan Party (Yeni Azerbaycan Partiyasi—YAP). The YAP was founded by Heydar Aliyev in September 1992 as an alternative to the then ruling AXC following his exclusion from

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the June 1992 presidential election because he was over a newly decreed age limit of 65. At the time, Aliyev held the presidency of the Azerbaijani enclave of Nakhichevan, previously having been a politburo member of the Soviet Communist Party and first secretary of the party in Azerbaijan (from 1969); he had also served as a Soviet deputy premier until dismissed by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987 for alleged corruption. Aliyev used the YAP to rally opposition to the Popular Front government of Abulfaz Ali Elchibey, who was deposed in June 1993 with assistance from Nakhichevan military forces. Elected interim head of state, Aliyev won a presidential election in October 1993 (for which the 65-year age limit was rescinded), being credited with 98.8 percent of the vote. Amid a fragile internal security situation and with the major opposition parties barred from participation, the YAP and its allies secured an overwhelming parliamentary majority at legislative balloting in November 1995 and February 1996. Aliyev was reelected president on October 11, 1998, having been credited with 76.1 percent of the vote. Aliyev was also reelected YAP chair at the December 1999 party congress, while his son Ilham was chosen as a deputy chair in what was viewed as the possible first step in establishing himself as his father’s successor. Ilham Aliyev was elevated to first deputy chair at the YAP’s November 2001 congress, which also unanimously reelected Heydar Aliyev as party chair and 2003 presidential candidate. Following the health decline of his father in early 2003, Ilham Aliyev assumed control of the YAP. Heydar Aliyev died on December 12, 2003. Ilham Aliyev was elected president of the republic in the controversial 2003 presidential poll, while the YAP retained overwhelming control (with the support of many so-called independents) in the 2005 assembly balloting. As of 2006 the YAP claimed a membership of 400,000. Leaders: Ilham ALIYEV (President of the Republic and Party Chair), Artur RASIZADE (Prime Minister), Oqtay ASADOV (Speaker of the National Assembly), Mehriban ALIYEVA, Ali AHMADOV (Executive Secretary).

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Smaller parties allied with the YAP for National Assembly elections have included the Azerbaijan Independent Democratic Party (Azerbaycan M¨ustaqil Demokrat Partiyasi—AMDP), led by Leyla YUNUSOVA; the Independent Azerbaijan Party (M¨ustaqil Azerbaycan Partiyasi—MAP), led by Nizami SULEYMANOV, who contested the 1992 and 1998 presidential elections, coming in third in the latter with 8.6 percent of the votes; the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partiyasi—AP), modeled on the Turkish party of the same name and led by Fazail AGAMALY and Yusuf CUNAYDIN; and United Azerbaijan (Azerbaycan Vahid—AV), whose leader, Kerrar ABILOV, had received a 0.3 percent presidential vote share in 1993.

Other Parties Freedom (Azadliq). An opposition bloc formed by the following three parties prior to the 2005 assembly balloting, Azadliq called for “regime change” in the apparent hope of igniting antigovernment sentiment similar to the kind that had peacefully toppled strong-arm regimes in several other former Soviet states recently. However, Azadliq’s results in the elections were disappointing, leaders claiming that their campaign efforts had been repressed by the government and that massive fraud had occurred in counting the votes. The AXC and ADP consequently decided to boycott the May 2006 reballoting in ten districts, although the YMP agreed to participate, signaling the potential disintegration of Azadliq. Azerbaijan Popular Front Party (Azerbaycan Xalq Cebhesi—AXC). The AXC was launched in 1989 as an opposition movement urging reform by the (then) Communist regime. Spanning a range of political currents and led by philosophy teacher Abulfaz Ali Elchibey, the movement evinced a broadly pan-Turkic orientation, supporting irredentist calls for the acquisition of Azeri-populated areas of Iran. In January 1990 some 150 AXC activists and others were killed by the security forces in Baku and elsewhere in disturbances arising from AXCled anti-Armenian demonstrations. Allowed to

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contest the Supreme Soviet elections of September–October 1990, the AXC-led opposition won only 45 of the 360 seats. Together with other opposition parties, the AXC boycotted the direct presidential poll of September 1991, but it subsequently forced the resignation of President Mutalibov in March 1992. In a further presidential election in June 1992, Elchibey was elected with 59 percent of the vote against four other candidates. Replaced as head of state by Heydar Aliyev of the YAP in June 1993, Elchibey fled to Nakhichevan, and the AXC boycotted the September presidential election won by Aliyev. The authorities subsequently launched a crackdown against the AXC, raiding its headquarters in Baku in February 1994 and arresting a large number of its supporters. In May 1995 Elchibey repeated his call for a “greater Azerbaijan” to include Azeri-populated northern Iran. In the November 1995 assembly election the AXC was credited with winning three proportional seats on a national vote share of 10 percent, its tally increasing to four in the runoff balloting in February 1996. (The official name of the grouping was apparently changed prior to the 1995 balloting to the Azerbaijan Popular Front Party [AXCP]; subsequent reports have regularly referenced both the original and new names.) In January 1995, some 20 AXC members had received jail sentences for antistate offenses, and in February the former AXC defense minister, Rakhim GAZIYEV, was sentenced to death in absentia for alleged high treason. Two months later, he was extradited to Baku from Moscow, and he was subsequently jailed, his sentence having been changed to life imprisonment. Elchibey returned to Azerbaijan from exile in October 1997, but he and the AXC boycotted the 1998 presidential poll. Internal division between Elchibey’s conservative or “traditionalist” wing and a faction of young reformers continued despite Elchibey’s death in late August 2000. Deputy Chair Mirmahmud Fatteyev reportedly signed a

cooperation agreement on behalf of the conservative faction with the YMP for the November legislative balloting, an initiative that was criticized by the reformist wing, led by Deputy Chair Ali Kerimli and Asim MOLLAZADE, which preferred cooperation with the Civil Solidarity Party (below). The AXC presidential candidate in 2003, Qudrat Muzaffar HASANQULIYEV, won only 0.4 percent of the vote. Several AXC reformists, including Kerimli, were reportedly leading in districts for which the voting was annulled following the November 2005 legislative poll. Leaders: Ibrahim IBRAHIMLI (Chair), Ali KERIMLI (Head of “Reformist” Faction), Alimammud NURIEV, Mirmahmud FATTEYEV (Head of “Traditionalist” Faction), Fuad MUSTAFAYEV (Deputy Chair). New Equality Party (Yeni Musavat Partiyasi—YMP). Indirectly descended from the pre-Soviet Musavat nationalists, the panTurkic and Islamist YMP (often referenced as Musavat) was founded in June 1992 and was closely allied with the 1992–1993 AXC government. In sharp conflict with the succeeding Aliyev regime, the party was barred from the first round of legislative elections in November 1995, although YMP chair Isa Gambar, a former speaker of the assembly, won a constituency seat in the February 1996 runoff balloting. The YMP boycotted the 1998 presidential balloting. Although it participated in the 2000 legislative poll (winning two seats), the YMP subsequently called for a boycott of the assembly. (According to some reports, the successful YMP candidates refused to follow the decree and were expelled from the party.) Gambar placed second in the 2003 presidential balloting with 12.1 percent of the vote, with Musavat reportedly being perceived as significantly weakened by the government crackdown that followed that election. Following the November 2005 assembly poll, Gambar announced that the YMP would participate in the May 2006 reballoting, indicating that the YMP

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might withdraw from Azadliq over the issue. Gambar reportedly had concluded that Azerbaijan was “not ready” for the large-scale protests that had toppled governments in other former Soviet countries recently. Leaders: Isa GAMBAR (Chair), Rauf ARIFOGLU (Deputy Chair), Niyazi IBRAHIMOV (General Secretary). Democratic Party of Azerbaijan (Azerbaycan Demokrat Partiyasi—ADP). An opposition grouping launched in February 2000, the ADP includes among its leaders Rasul Guliev, who has been living in the United States since resigning as speaker of the assembly in 1996. The new party issued a joint statement in April 2000 with the AM˙IP (see below) strongly criticizing the Aliyev regime. Subsequently, the government accused ADP supporters of having planned a coup on behalf of Guliev and issued a warrant for his arrest. The ADP was initially declared ineligible for the November 2000 legislative balloting, but the ban was lifted shortly before the election. In 2004, the chair of the party’s Supreme Council (Nuraddin MAMMADLI) and several other ADP members defected to the AXC. Guliev attempted to return to Azerbaijan in 2005 to run as a candidate in the November assembly elections, but his plane was denied landing rights. Subsequently, ADP leader Sardar Jalaloglu reportedly appeared headed for victory in the assembly poll, but the results in his district were annulled. Leaders: Rasul GULIEV (in exile), Ilyas ISMAILOV, Sardar JALALOGLU. Liberal Party of Azerbaijan (LPA). Formed in 1995, the LPA was initially reported to have been involved in the formation of the New Policy bloc (see AM˙IP, below) for the 2005 assembly poll. However, subsequent reports indicated that the party had decided to cooperate (as the leader of a National Unity Movement) with Azadliq for the election. Lala Shovket Haciyeva, an LPA leader, was described in some reports as having won an

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assembly seat, which she reportedly refused to accept as an antigovernment protest. Leaders: Lala SHOVKET HACIYEVA, Avaz TEMIRKHAN. Civil Solidarity Party (Vatandas¸s Hamrayliyi Partiyasi—VHP). Founded in 1992 to support “progress toward a democratic society,” the VHP was credited with securing one seat in the 1995– 1996 legislative balloting. It subsequently was routinely referenced as a participant in various opposition groupings and activities and won three legislative seats in 2000. The VHP chair secured 1 percent of the vote in the 2003 presidential balloting. Leader: Sabir RUSTAMKHANLY (Chair). Azerbaijan National Independence Party ˙ (Azerbaycan Milli Istiqlal Partiyasi—AM˙IP). The AM˙IP was founded in July 1992 by Etibar Mamedov, who had been a prominent leader of the then ruling AXC but had defected in light of resistance to his hard-line nationalist approach to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia. Mamedov had been an initial candidate for the June 1992 presidential election but had withdrawn, claiming that the arrangements favored the AXC candidate. Mamedov backed Heydar Aliyev’s accession to power in June 1993 but declined to join the new cabinet. Thereafter, the AM˙IP vigorously opposed the government’s support for deployment of Russian troops in Azerbaijan to help guarantee a Nagorno-Karabakh settlement. The party was officially credited with winning three seats in the 1995–1996 assembly elections on the basis of a national vote share of 9 percent. Theretofore regarded as part of the “loyal opposition,” the party became strongly critical of the Aliyev regime in 1996. Mamedov came in second in the presidential election of October 1998 with 11.6 percent of the votes. A number of AM˙IP supporters were given prison sentences in early 1999 for their role in demonstrations in Baku in November 1998 protesting the government’s handling of the election. In 2000 the AM˙IP accused the government of being “authoritarian” and “antinational.”

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Mamedov finished fourth in the 2003 presidential balloting. In February 2005 an AM˙IP congress elected Ali Nader Aliev as the new party chair, Mamedov being named honorary chair. The AM˙IP served as a core component of the New Policy (Yeni Siyasat—YeS) electoral bloc, which also reportedly included several civic and professional groups; the Social-Democratic Party (Sosial-Demokratik Partiya—SDP), led by Araz ALIZADE; the Azerbaijan National Movement Party, led by Samir JAFAROV; and the Union of Free Democrats, launched in March 2004 by former deputy prime minister Ali MASIMOV. YeS declared itself to be a “third force” in politics, supporting evolutionary rather than revolutionary change. Ayaz Mutalibov, the former president of Azerbaijan who has been living in Russia, was permitted to run as a YeS candidate in the 2005 assembly poll, even though he reportedly faced possible arrest if he returned to Azerbaijan. Friction was reported within the AM˙IP in early 2006 as Mamedov and Aliev held rival congresses. Leaders: Ayaz RUSTAMOV (Chair), Ali Nader ALIEV (Former Chair), Etibar MAMEDOV (Honorary Chair). Civic Unity Party (Ventendash Birliyi Partiyasi—VBP). At the launching of the VBP in May 2000, its chair was announced as Iqbal Agazada. However, at a congress in December, the VBP elected ex-Azerbaijani president Ayaz Mutalibov, in exile in Russia, as its chair. As of May 2001, the party had reportedly split into two factions, one headed by Agazada, who accused the other, headed by Mutalibov, of pursuing “Russian interests” to the detriment of Azerbaijan. (Agazada had been elected to the assembly in November 2000, having been referenced variously as an independent, as a member of the “non-Mutalibov faction of the VBP,” or as a member of a VBP “splinter” called the National Unity Party.) In July 2002 the government accused Mutalibov and a group of supporters of plotting a coup attempt in late 2001. The VBP derided the charges and

demanded that the government permit the safe return of Mutalibov to Azerbaijan. In 2005 Mutalibov ran as an assembly candidate in the YeS electoral bloc (see AM˙IP, above). Leaders: Iqbal AGAZADA, Sabir HADJIEV (Secretary General). Azerbaijan United Communist Party (Azerbaycan Vahid Kommunist Partiyasi—AVKP). The AVKP was founded in November 1993 as the successor to the Azerbaijan Communist Party (AKP), which had governed the republic during the Soviet era, latterly under the hard-line rule of Ayaz Mutalibov. In elections to the 360-member Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet in 1990, the AKP won 280 of the 340 contested seats, and Mutalibov was reelected president in September 1991 in direct balloting that was boycotted by the opposition. As a result of military setbacks in Nagorno-Karabakh, Mutalibov was forced to resign in March 1992, and he fled to Russia after a brief return to power in May. The AKP was effectively suspended under the subsequent AXC government; nevertheless, party members remained preponderant in the state bureaucracy, and AKP deputies continued to regard the 1990 Supreme Soviet as the legitimate legislative body. The relaunching of the party in November 1993 under the AVKP rubric was aimed at rallying these elements in opposition to the YAP government. On September 1, 1995, the Supreme Court banned the AVKP for alleged antistate activities (such as advocating the restoration of the Soviet Union) but reversed its decision later in the month. As a result, the party was able to contest the November election, albeit unsuccessfully. The Communists have recently been described as severely factionalized. The Azerbaijan Communist Party-2 (AKP-2) is recognized as a legal party, and it put forward Firudin HASONOV as a presidential candidate in 1998, although he received less than 1 percent of the vote. Meanwhile, Sayad Sayadov leads a hard-line faction and Ramiz Ahmedov a pro-Russian group reportedly allied with the Communist Party of the Russian

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Federation; for his part, Mutalibov has lived in exile at Moscow since May 1992, although there has been a campaign recently for his political “rehabilitation” within Azerbaijan. Although the faction led by Sayadov reportedly announced in mid-2000 that it was changing its name to the Communist Workers Party, news reports surrounding the November legislative balloting regularly referenced the old AKP rubric. Sayadov’s faction is generally identified with the AVKP, while Ahmedov’s faction is routinely referenced under the old AKP rubric. Another group of AVKP members reportedly left the party in 2000 to form a small Stalinist party (led by Telman NURULLAYEV) called the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. Leaders: Ramiz AHMEDOV (Chair of AKP faction), Sayad SAYADOV (Leader of AVKP faction), Rauf GURBANOV. Justice (Adalat). Formed in November 2000 under the leadership of former ADP chair Ilyas Ismayilov, Adalat was reportedly supported mainly by judges and law enforcement officials. (Ismayilov had been a minister of justice in the early 1990s.) Leader: Ilyas ISMAYILOV. Parties receiving one seat in the November 2000 assembly balloting were the progovernment Alliance for Azerbaijan Party, led by Abutalyb SAMADOV; the Compatriot Party (Yurddash Partiyasi), an opposition grouping led by Mais SAFARLI; and the progovernment Social Welfare Party, led by Khanhuseyn KAZYMLY, who received 0.2 percent of the vote in the 1998 presidential election. (The latter also won one seat in the 2005 assembly poll.) Other parties that won a single seat in the 2005 assembly balloting included the Hope Party (Umid Partiyasi—UP), led by Abulfaz AHMEDOV; the Azerbaijan Democratic Reforms Party; the United Azerbaijan Popular Front Party, founded in 2002 under the leadership of Gudrat GASANKULIEV; and the Great Creation Party, founded in 2003 under the leadership of Fazil GAZANFAROGLU.

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Other parties participating in the 2005 assembly balloting included the Azerbaijan Evolution Party, founded in 1996 under the leadership of Teyub GANIEV; the Azerbaijan Progress Party, founded in 2001 under the leadership of Chingiz DAMUIROGLU; the Great Azerbaijan Party, founded in 2003 under the leadership of Elshad MUSAYEV; the People’s Party, led by Panah HUSEYNOV; the People’s Republican Party, whose inaugural congress in August 2005 elected Hurru ALIYEV as chair; the Democratic Azerbaijan World Party (Demokratik Azerbaycan D¨unyasi Partiyasi), led by Mammad ALIZADE; the Azerbaijan Democratic Enlightenment Party, led by Rufiz GONOGOV; the Unity Party (Birlik Partiyasi), led by Hussein ARTIKOGLU and Tahir KARIMLI; and the Azerbaijan National Statehood Party, led by Sabir TARVERDIYEV and Neimat PANAKHLY. In mid-2000 the Karabakh Liberation Organization, which claimed a membership of 10,000 under the leadership of Akif NAGIYEV, was denied party status in view of its military orientation. Meanwhile, several members of Allah’s Army (Jeyshullah), a Wahbabi opposition guerrilla movement that has operated in Azerbaijan since 1996 under the leadership of Mubariz ALIYEV, were convicted on terrorism charges in October 2000. Aliyev received a life sentence.

Legislature The unicameral National Assembly (Milli Majlis) created under the 1995 constitution is elected for a five-year term and has 125 members elected in single-member districts in single-round balloting. (Prior to 2005, 25 of the 125 members were elected from party lists by proportional representation [6 percent threshold] in a single nationwide constituency.) The most recent balloting was held on November 6, 2005. However, the results were annulled in 10 of the 125 districts. Although it was clear that the New Azerbaijan Party and its supporters had been credited with winning an overwhelming majority of the 115 seats that were

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Cabinet As of September 1, 2006 Prime Minister First Deputy Prime Minister Deputy Prime Ministers

Artur Rasizade Yagub Eyyubov Elchin Efendiyev Ali Hasanov Abid Sharifov

Ministers Agriculture Communications and Information Technology Culture and Tourism Defense Defense Industries Ecology and Natural Resources Economic Development Education Emergencies Finance Foreign Affairs Industry and Energy Internal Affairs Justice Labor and Social Security National Security Public Health Taxation Transportation Youth and Sports

certified, reports varied on exact figures as well as the role of some of the small parties. Following are the results as provided by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, referencing official results as provided by the electoral commission of Azerbaijan: New Azerbaijan Party (YAP), 56; Freedom, 6 (New Equality Party, 5; Azerbaijan Popular Front Party, 1); Motherland Party, 2; Civil Solidarity Party, 2; Hope Party, 1; Social Welfare Party, 1; Azerbaijan Democratic Reforms Party, 1; United Azerbaijan Popular Front Party, 1; Civic Unity Party, 1; Great Creation Party, 1; independents, 43. (Many of the candidates elected as in-

Ismat Abbasov Ali Mamad Abbasov Abulfaz Garayev Lt. Gen. Safar Abiyev Yavar Camalov Huseyn Bagirov Heydar Babayev Misir Mardanov Kyamaleddin Heydarov Samir Sharifov Elmar Mammadyarov Natiq Aliyev Lt. Gen. Ramil Usubov Fikrat Mammadov Fizuli Alekperov Eldar Makhmudov Oqtay Siraliyev Fazil Mamedov Ziya Arzuman Mammadov Azad Ragimov

dependents were reportedly allied with the YAP.) Preliminary results from the May 13, 2006, reballoting for 10 seats indicated that the YAP and independents allied with it had won an additional 8 seats. Speaker: Oqtay ASADOV.

Communications Press Prior to independence more than 150 newspapers were published in Azerbaijan, most of them

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in Azeri. A new media law entered into force in early 2000, its restrictions on the press drawing significant domestic and international criticism. Among other things, the legislation permitted the government to close newspapers under certain circumstances. International organizations guarding the rights of journalists subsequently expressed growing concern over the treatment of reporters in Azerbaijan. In addition, journalists demonstrated in early 2006 against what they charged was ongoing harassment and intimidation on the part of the government. The following are issued in Baku: Azadliq (Freedom), weekly; Azerbaijan, government daily in Azeri and Russian; Bakinskii Bulvard, opposition organ; Respublika (Republic), government daily; Halq Gazeti, government-owned; Uch Nogte; Yeni Musavat, YMP weekly; Zaman; Zerkalo, independent daily in Russian; 525-Gazeti, independent daily; Azerbaijan Gonjlari (Youth of Azerbaijan), weekly; Ses, YAP daily. Circulations in general are small, with readership mostly confined to urban areas.

News Agency The government facility is the Azerbaijan State News Agency (Azer TAJ), headquartered at Baku; private independent organizations include the Turan News Agency.

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Broadcasting and Computing Radio Baku and Azerbaijan National Television (AzTV) broadcast from Baku in Azeri and a number of other languages. According to recent OSCE reports, there are some 9 radio stations and 18 national or regional television stations. Privately owned stations include Lider TV, Space TV, ANS, and ATV. A public service station called Public TV was inaugurated in mid-2005. Analysts described broadcasting prior to the November 2005 elections as generally favoring the government, with television serving as the primary source of information for most of the population. There were approximately 2.0 million television receivers and 350,000 Internet users in 2003.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. Hafiz Mir Jalal PASHAYEV U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan Reno L. HARNISH III Permanent Representative to the UN Yashar ALIYEV IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, BSEC, CEUR, CIS, EBRD, ECO, IDB, Interpol, IOM, OIC, OSCE, WCO

BANGLADESH PE O P L E ’S R E P U B L I C

OF

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Ganaprojatantri Bangladesh

See the note at the end of this entry for information on current events.

The Country Located in the east of the Indian subcontinent, Bangladesh comprises a portion of the historic province of Bengal (including Chittagong) in addition to the Sylhet district of Assam. Except for a short boundary with Myanmar in the extreme southeast, the country’s land frontier borders on India. Endowed with a tropical monsoon climate, Bangladesh possesses rich alluvial plains dominated by the Ganges and Brahmaputra rivers. Although it is considered one of the world’s most densely populated independent countries, with over 1,000 people per square kilometer of land, since 1975 it has more than halved its growth rate to under 2 percent. The country is ethnically quite homogeneous, as 98 percent of the people are Bengali and speak a common language. Urduspeaking, non-Bengali Muslim immigrants from India, largely Bihari, comprise 1 percent; the remaining 1 percent includes assorted tribal groups, of which one of the most important is the Chakma of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Bangladesh contains more Muslim inhabitants than any other country except Indonesia and Pakistan, nearly 90 percent of its people professing Islam; Hindus constitute most of the remainder. Women constitute about 38 percent of the labor force, but they make up a much

smaller percentage of nonfarm labor, concentrated in domestic service. Although women remain underrepresented in politics, since 1991 two women have alternated as prime minister.

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Political Status: Independent state proclaimed March 26, 1971; de facto independence achieved December 16, 1971; republican constitution of December 16, 1972, most recently suspended following coup of March 24, 1982, restored on November 10, 1986; parliamentary system (abandoned in favor of presidential system in January 1975) restored by referendum of September 15, 1991. Area: 55,598 sq. mi. (143,999 sq. km.). Population: 129,247,233 (2001C); 137,135,000 (2005E). Both figures include adjustments for underenumeration. Major Urban Centers (2005E): DHAKA (Dacca, 6,788,000), Chittagong (2,640,000), Khulna (881,000). Official Language: Bangla (Bengali). Monetary Unit: Taka (official rate July 1, 2006: 69.76 takas = $1US). President: Iajuddin AHMED (nonparty); declared elected on September 5, 2002, by the Election Commission (which had rejected two other nominees on technical grounds) and sworn in for a five-year term on September 6, following the forced resignation of A. Q. M. Badruddoza CHOWDHURY (formerly Bangladesh Nationalist Party) on June 21, 2002, and the interim incumbency of National Parliament Speaker Jamiruddin SIRCAR. Prime Minister: Begum Khaleda ZIA (Bangladesh Nationalist Party); sworn in on October 10, 2001, following election of October 1, succeeding Sheikh Hasina WAJED (Awami League), who had stepped down on July 13, 2001, upon completion of the parliamentary term. (From July 16, 2001, Chief Adviser Latifur RAHMAN had headed a caretaker government mandated by the constitution.)

With a per capita income of only $400 in 2003, Bangladesh continues to rank as one of the world’s poorest countries. About three-fifths of the labor force is engaged in agriculture, which now accounts for about 15 percent of the GDP. Rice, sugarcane, wheat, and potatoes are among the leading food crops. Jute and jute goods, despite be-

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ing considerably less important to the economy than in earlier decades, remain major exports; however, the value of exported frozen fish and shrimp has recently surpassed that of the jute sector. Although industry contributes about one-fourth of GDP, Bangladesh is deficient in most natural resources except hydrocarbon reserves. Ready-made garments account for half of merchandise export earnings; other industrial output includes knitwear and hosiery, jute products, leather goods, metallic products, chemicals and fertilizers, and paper and wood. Processing of food, beverages, and tobacco also remains important. The country’s chief markets are Western Europe and the United States, while Western Europe, India, China, and Singapore are principal import sources. The country’s low-lying southern coast is extremely vulnerable to natural disasters, as evidenced by annual monsoon flooding and devastating cyclones, one of which, on May 1, 1991, is estimated to have killed upward of 150,000 persons and left more than 10 million homeless. Installation of a sophisticated storm-alert system in 1992 has reduced the death toll from subsequent cyclones, but Bangladesh remains vulnerable to weatherrelated homelessness and agricultural devastation. In July–September 1998 the most prolonged monsoons on record occurred, flooding two-thirds of the country, causing some 1,500 deaths, and leaving 23 million at least temporarily homeless. The dire situation was compounded by the discovery that naturally occurring arsenic was poisoning many of the country’s wells, endangering many millions. Average annual GDP growth of 5.1 percent in fiscal years 1995–1999 was followed by a 5.9 percent expansion in fiscal year 2000. In the next two years growth slowed somewhat, to 5.3 percent in 2001 and to 4.4 percent in 2002. It registered 5.3 percent again in 2003 and has fluctuated only slightly since then. The International Monetary Fund and other aid donors, which had consistently criticized the 1996–2001 government of Sheikh Hasina for not moving forward on economic and financial reform, noted that by 2003 the successor government was embarked on a program of structural changes, including the closure or priva-

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tization of state-owned manufacturing enterprises and nationalized commercial banks. Results have, however, been mixed.

Government and Politics Political Background When British India was partitioned into independent India and Pakistan in August 1947, Bengal was divided along communal lines. Predominantly Hindu West Bengal was incorporated into India, while predominantly Muslim East Bengal was joined with the Sylhet district of Assam as the Eastern Province of Pakistan. In the postindependence period a comparative lack of economic progress in East Pakistan accentuated political problems caused by cultural and linguistic differences with West Pakistan. In the early 1950s Bengalis successfully agitated for the equality of Bengali and Urdu as official languages. During the next decade, however, Bengali resentment over major disparities in development expenditure and representation in the public services intensified, and in 1966 Sheikh Mujibur RAHMAN (Mujib), president of the East Pakistan branch of the Awami League, called for a constitutional reallocation of powers between the central government and the provinces. The sheikh’s subsequent arrest helped coalesce Bengali opinion against Pakistani president Ayub Khan, who was forced from office in March 1969. Ayub’s successor, Gen. Yahya Khan, endorsed a return to democratic rule, and during the 1970 electoral campaign Sheikh Mujib and his party won 167 of 169 seats allotted to East Pakistan in a proposed National Assembly of 313 members. The issue of power distribution remained unresolved, however, and postponement of the National Assembly session on March 1, 1971, led to massive civil strife in East Pakistan. Three weeks later, Sheikh Mujib was again arrested and his party banned. Most of his colleagues fled to India, where they organized a provisional government. Martial law was imposed following disturbances in Dhaka, and civil war ensued. India, having protested to Pakistan about sup-

pression of the eastern rebellion and the influx of millions of refugees, declared war on Pakistan on December 3, 1971, and the allied forces of India and Bangladesh defeated Pakistani forces in the East on December 16. The new but war-ravaged nation of Bangladesh emerged on the same day. Upon his return from imprisonment in West Pakistan, Sheikh Mujib assumed command of the provisional government and began restructuring the new state along socialist but non-Marxist lines that featured a limitation on large landholdings and the nationalization of banks, insurance companies, and major industries. During July and August 1974 the already fragile economy was devastated by floods that led to famine and a cholera epidemic from which thousands died. Following a period of nearanarchy, a state of emergency was declared on December 28. Four weeks later, on January 25, 1975, a Constituent Assembly revised the constitution to provide for a presidential form of government and the adoption of a one-party system under the rubric of the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (Baksal), an all-encompassing socialist “political platform,” the full implementation of which was forestalled by Mujib’s assassination seven months later. On August 15, 1975, a group of pro-Pakistan, Islamic right-wing army officers mounted a coup, in the course of which the president’s house was attacked and Mujib, his wife, and five of their children were killed. Immediately thereafter the former minister of trade and commerce, Khandakar Moshtaque AHMED, was sworn in as president and on August 20 assumed the power to rule by martial law. On November 3 the new president was himself confronted with a rebellion led by Brig. Khalid MUSHARAF, the pro-Indian commander of the Dhaka garrison. Three days later President Ahmed vacated his office in favor of the chief justice of the Supreme Court, Abu Sadat Mohammad SAYEM, and on November 7 Musharaf was killed during a left-wing mutiny led by Col. Abu TAHER. As a result, President Sayem announced that he would assume the additional post of chief martial law administrator, with the army chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Ziaur RAHMAN (Zia), and the heads of the

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air force and navy as deputies. In April 1976 “Mujibist” and pro-Indian officers who had been implicated in the Musharaf coup were released from custody; however, vigorous action was taken against those implicated in the November 7 mutiny, and Colonel Taher was hanged on July 21. Although President Sayem announced in mid1976 that his government would honor former president Ahmed’s pledge to hold a general election by the end of February 1977, he reversed himself in November on the grounds that balloting would “endanger peace and tranquility” and “strengthen the hands of the enemy.” Eight days later, he transferred the office of chief martial law administrator to Ziaur Rahman and in April 1977 resigned the presidency, nominating the general as his successor. President Zia was confirmed in office by a nationwide referendum in May, designating the former special assistant to President Sayem, Abdus SATTAR, as vice president in June. Despite a coup attempt by senior air force officers in early October 1977, President Zia announced in April 1978 that a presidential election would be held in June, to be followed by a parliamentary election in December. Opposition allegations of polling irregularities notwithstanding, Zia was credited with a near three-to-one margin of victory over his closest rival in the presidential balloting and was sworn in for a five-year term. After two postponements, necessitated by discussions with opposition leaders who threatened a boycott if martial and other “repressive” laws were not revoked, a new Parliament dominated by Zia’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) was elected in February 1979, and in April a civilian cabinet with Shah Azizur RAHMAN as prime minister was announced. The Zia government encountered continuing unrest, including several coup attempts and a major uprising by tribal guerrillas in the southeastern Chittagong Hill Tracts in early 1980. On May 30, 1981, long-standing differences within the army precipitated the assassination of the president in the course of an attempted coup in Chittagong. The alleged leader of the revolt, Maj. Gen. Mohammad Abdul MANZUR, was killed while fleeing the city

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on June 1, most of the army having remained loyal to Acting President Sattar. The former vice president was elected to a five-year term as Zia’s successor in November, subsequently designating Mirza Nurul HUDA as his deputy while retaining Azizur Rahman as prime minister. Following a period in which the military, led by its chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Hossain Mohammad ERSHAD, pressed for a campaign to counter “political indiscipline, unprecedented corruption, a bankrupt economy, [and] administrative breakdown,” the armed forces again intervened on March 24, 1982, suspending the constitution, ousting the Sattar government, and installing Ershad as chief martial law administrator. Three days later, on Ershad’s nomination, Abul Fazal Mohammad Ahsanuddin CHOWDHURY, a retired Supreme Court judge, was sworn in as the nation’s eighth president. In September 1983, in an effort to bring an end to martial law, two broad opposition alliances— one headed by the Awami League under President Mujib’s daughter, Sheikh Hasina WAJED, and the other led by the BNP under President Zia’s widow, Begum Khaleda ZIA, and former president Sattar—formed a 22-party Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD). On November 11 General Ershad announced a timetable for local, parliamentary, and presidential elections under an amended version of the 1972 constitution that would afford an enhanced role for the military. Two weeks later, a regime-supportive People’s Party (Jana Dal) was formed under President Chowdhury, who resigned his office on December 11 in favor of Ershad. While the local (union council) balloting went forward on December 27, neither opposition nor government-supportive parties nominated candidates. Following a protracted struggle with opposition leaders, which included the repeated postponement or cancellation of presidential and parliamentary elections, General Ershad was reconfirmed as president by referendum in March 1985. Rural subdistrict elections in late May were boycotted by the leading opposition parties, while the promotion of a “transition to democracy” was announced by a Jana Dal– centered National Front in August.

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On January 1, 1986, coincident with revocation of a ban on political activity, it was announced that the National Front had been converted into a pro-regime National Party (Jatiya Dal), and on March 2 President Ershad scheduled parliamentary balloting for late April. Initially, the leading opposition groups refused to participate without a full lifting of martial law. Subsequently, both the Awami League alliance and the fundamentalist Bangladesh Islamic Assembly (Jamaat-i-Islami Bangladesh), but not the BNP, agreed to compete in an election rescheduled for May 7. Under conditions of unrest that a British observer group termed a “tragedy for democracy,” the Jatiya Dal won a narrow majority of legislative seats, and a new government was sworn in on July 9, 1986, that included Mizanur Rahman CHOWDHURY, then leader of a minority conservative faction of the Awami League, as prime minister. On September 1 General Ershad formally joined the government party to permit his nomination as its presidential candidate, and on October 15 he was credited with winning 83.6 percent of the vote. On November 10, having secured parliamentary ratification of actions taken by his administration since March 1982, Ershad announced the lifting of martial law and restoration of the amended 1972 constitution. In January 1987 the Awami League, which had returned briefly after a six-month boycott of parliamentary proceedings and which by now was under the undisputed leadership of Sheikh Hasina, again withdrew in response to President Ershad’s projection of an enhanced political role for the military. Subsequently, the League joined with the BNP, Jamaat-i-Islami, and a group of Marxist parties in supporting a series of strikes to protest economic conditions as well as the passage at midyear of a local government bill that authorized the armed forces to share administrative responsibilities with civilians in the country’s 64 district councils. While the controversial measure was effectively rescinded on August 1, the unrest continued, prompting the government to declare a nationwide state of emergency in late November. On December 6 the presi-

dent dissolved Parliament, but none of the leading opposition parties presented candidates for the legislative balloting of March 3, 1988, the official results of which yielded a government sweep of more than 80 percent of the seats. In August 1989 it was announced that Moudud AHMED, who had succeeded Chowdhury as prime minister in March 1988, had been appointed vice president in succession to A. K. M. Nurul ISLAM; concurrently, Deputy Prime Minister Kazi Zafar AHMED was named to succeed Moudud Ahmed as titular chief of government. On October 10, 1990, the student wings of both the BNP and the Awami League launched a series of antiregime demonstrations in Dhaka that soon mushroomed into nationwide strikes and riots. President Ershad’s declaration of a state of emergency on November 27 was generally ignored by increasingly violent mass protesters, and in early December 19, MPs from the president’s own party resigned their seats, with Ershad announcing his forthcoming resignation after army officers had indicated that they were unwilling to take control of the country. On December 5 the principal opposition formations nominated Shahabuddin AHMED, theretofore chief justice of the Supreme Court, as successor to the beleaguered head of state, who named Ahmed vice president (hence next in line to the presidency) prior to withdrawing from office. At legislative balloting on February 27, 1991, the BNP won a sizable plurality of seats, enabling it, with the support of the Jamaat-i-Islami, to claim a majority when the 30 additional seats reserved for women were allocated by the newly elected Parliament. On March 20 the BNP’s Begum Khaleda Zia was sworn in as prime minister, although her political mandate was constitutionally limited to offering “advice” to the president. Voters approved the return to a Westminster-style parliamentary system in a referendum on September 15, and Khaleda Zia became effective executive by reappointment as prime minister four days later. At legislative balloting for the substantially weakened presidency on October 8, the BNP’s Abdur Rahman BISWAS easily won.

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On May 5, 1994, eight opposition parties launched a legislative boycott to press for invalidation of a series of recent by-elections that they claimed had involved “massive vote-rigging” by the government. Subsequently, they insisted that Parliament be dissolved and a caretaker government be installed to oversee new elections. By the end of the year Prime Minister Khaleda Zia had agreed to all of the demands save one: that she not head the interim administration. In the wake of her refusal to stand down, 147 opposition MPs resigned on December 28. With the backing of the High Court, the parliamentary speaker on February 23, 1995, rejected 144 of the resignations while accepting those of ousted President Ershad and 2 others. The opposition responded by intensifying a series of violent strikes and demonstrations. Concurrently, the government’s position hardened, Prime Minister Zia insisting that she would not permit a general election to preclude completion of her five-year term in February 1996. From mid-September 1995 opposition leaders stepped up their demand for an immediate general election under a neutral administration. Another general strike on October 16–19 paralyzed major cities and triggered violent clashes between BNP supporters and opposition groups. In light of the opposition’s refusal to participate in scheduled by-elections, President Biswas on November 24, acting on the prime minister’s advice, dissolved Parliament and asked Zia to continue in an interim capacity pending an early general election, initially scheduled for January 18, 1996, and then postponed until February for religious reasons. However, the Awami League and other opposition parties maintained their stance of rejecting electoral participation until the appointment of a neutral caretaker government. Without the participation of the main opposition parties, a low turnout in the balloting on February 15, 1996, resulted in the BNP’s winning all but 2 of the 214 seats declared by the end of February, amid further violent clashes. Rejecting the prime minister’s renewed offer of dialogue, the opposition parties intensified their noncooperation campaign,

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launching an indefinite nationwide strike on February 24. Warning that the protests were plunging the country into civil war, the government ordered a crackdown in which six prominent opposition figures were arrested in late February (although all were released in March). By then, more than 100 people had been killed and at least 1,000 injured in nearly two years of continuous political unrest. In an important concession on March 3, 1996, the prime minister proposed interparty discussions on new balloting and amendment of the constitution to specify that all national elections should take place under a neutral administration. The Awami League’s Sheikh Hasina continued to demand the prime minister’s resignation, and tension mounted when, at the opening of the new Parliament on March 19, protesters attempted to storm the building as the BNP leader was sworn in for a second term. However, after the legislators on March 26 adopted the proposed amendment as their only business, near-paralysis of the civil service machine induced Zia to resign as prime minister on March 30, whereupon the president dissolved Parliament and named former chief justice Mohammad Habibur RAHMAN as “chief adviser” of a neutral caretaker government, pending a new election. An election campaign that again saw the Awami League and BNP leaders vying for supremacy was further enlivened on May 18, 1996, by a mutiny (at first reported as a coup attempt) by troops loyal to dismissed army commander Lt. Gen. Abu Saleh Mohammad NASIM, who, although later declared innocent, was one of several officers arrested and charged with sedition. Balloting nevertheless went ahead on June 12, when the 300 elective seats were contested by some 2,500 candidates from over 80 parties, including Ershad of the Jatiya Party campaigning from prison. In a record turnout of around 73 percent, the Awami League obtained a decisive plurality of 146 seats (against 116 for the BNP and 32 for the Jatiya Dal) and thus returned to power after 21 years in opposition. Vowing to restore democracy, Sheikh Hasina was sworn in as prime minister on June 23, 1996,

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at the head of a government that included representatives of the Jatiya Party and the small National Socialist Party–Rab. Their support gave the new administration an immediate parliamentary majority, which was consolidated in July when the Awami League took 27 of the 30 additional seats reserved for women and the Jatiya Party claimed the other 3. In a unanimous parliamentary vote on July 23, Shahabuddin Ahmed (nonparty) was elected president of Bangladesh in succession to Biswas, thus returning to the post he had previously held on a transitional basis following the demise of the Ershad regime in December 1990. In its first year in office, the Hasina government moved to resolve a major disagreement with India over water rights to the Ganges (see Foreign relations, below) and, as it had also pledged in the 1996 campaign, to settle the rebellion led by the Chakma tribal group in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Government negotiators met throughout 1997 with representatives of the political wing of the Shanti Bahini (Army of Peace), which had undertaken the Chittagong insurgency in the mid-1970s in response to an influx of Bengali settlers. However, the accord finally reached on December 2 drew immediate fire from the BNP-led opposition, which protested that the agreement’s surrender of powers to the region was unconstitutional and that it opened the way for greater Indian influence. On February 10, 1998, the Shanti Bahini formally declared its dissolution during ceremonies in Khagrachbari, bringing to a close a conflict that may have cost 20,000 lives. Although the government had released former president Ershad from prison in January 1997, thereby fulfilling a commitment that had won Sheikh Hasina the Jatiya Party’s support after the June 1996 election, on March 15, 1998, the Jatiya Party left the coalition, in part over objections to the Chittagong peace agreement. In May, despite opposition-led strikes and demands that legislative action on the accord be deferred, the Awami League majority passed four Chittagong implementation bills. On November 8, 1998, a Dhaka court pronounced death sentences (most of them in absentia) on 15 former army officers for plotting the assassi-

nation of President Mujib in August 1975. Shortly after taking office, Sheikh Hasina had Parliament repeal the immunity of those involved in the coup, thereby preparing the way for a series of politically contentious trials. (As of early 2006, 3 of the 15 had been exonerated by the High Court, 7 were fugitives abroad, 1 had died in Zimbabwe, and 4 remained in jail, awaiting final appeal.) On October 12, 2000, formal indictments were handed down against nearly two dozen individuals charged with involvement in the November 1975 slaying of 4 jailed Mujibist ministers. The defendants included many of the already condemned officers. Fifteen individuals were convicted in October 2004, with 3 receiving death sentences and 12 life in prison; 5 others, including prominent BNP figures, were acquitted. Beginning in December 1998, opposition efforts to force Sheikh Hasina’s government to step down escalated. The four-party alliance of the BNP, the Jamaat-i-Islami, the Jatiya Party, and the Islamic Unity Front (Islami Oikya Jote—IOJ) persistently boycotted parliamentary sessions and conducted a campaign of demonstrations and hartals (organized disruptions). The opposition also protested the nationwide municipal council elections of February 23–25, 1999, which went ahead as scheduled, but not without violent altercations that injured over 1,000 people. Meanwhile, Begum Khaleda, family members, and former ministers became targets in corruption investigations. In July–August 1998 the former prime minister was charged with using government funds to renovate her private residence, financially benefiting from state aircraft purchases, and abusing her power during 1991–1996 by canceling nearly 300 police appointments and giving the jobs to her supporters. On July 13, 2001, in accordance with the constitution, Parliament was dissolved, having completed its five-year term—the first to do so in 30 years. Collaterally, Sheikh Hasina and her cabinet stepped down, and a caretaker government headed by Chief Adviser Latifur RAHMAN, a retired chief justice, was named on July 16, pending elections. With many observers citing national concern over civil violence as a primary factor, at the balloting

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on October 1 Begum Khaleda Zia’s BNP won a massive victory, capturing 191 of 300 seats in the National Parliament. Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League took only 62 seats. On October 10 Zia was sworn in as the head of a BNP cabinet that also included two members of the Jamaat-i-Islami. On September 6, 2002, Iajuddin AHMED, a nonpartisan with close ties to the BNP, assumed office as Bangladesh’s largely ceremonial president, having been declared elected by the Election Commission the previous day upon the technical disqualification of the two other candidates (they had not been nominated by lawmakers). Ahmed’s predecessor, A. Q. M. Badruddoza CHOWDHURY, had served in office from November 14, 2001, until pressured to resign by the BNP on June 21, 2002, because he had not marked the May 30 anniversary of Ziaur Rahman’s death with an obligatory visit to the slain president’s grave.

Constitution and Government The constitution of December 1972, replacing a provisional document of the previous March, has been subjected to numerous revisions, the most important being the adoption of a presidential system in January 1975 and a return to the earlier parliamentary form in September 1991. At present, the essentially titular president is elected for a once-renewable five-year term by the Parliament (Jatiya Sangsad), from which the prime minister and all but one-tenth of the other ministers must be drawn. The president appoints as prime minister the individual who commands a legislative majority. Under the 13th Constitutional Amendment, adopted unanimously by the Parliament on March 26, 1996, the president has authority to create an 11-member nonparty caretaker government for a three-month interim period beginning with a dissolution of Parliament and concluding after a general election. The unicameral legislature, which has a fiveyear mandate, contains 300 seats filled by direct election from single constituencies. A constitutional provision reserving an additional 30 seats for women, all chosen by the directly elected mem-

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bers, expired in 2001, although in 2004 the Parliament passed an amendment to provide 45 such seats proportionally distributed among the parliamentary parties. Legislators lose their seats if they defect from their party. The Supreme Court is divided into a High Court, with both original and appellate jurisdiction, and an Appellate Division that hears appeals from the High Court. Other courts are established by law. Bangladesh comprises 6 administrative divisions (Barisal, Chittagong, Dhaka, Khulna, Rajshahi, and Sylhet), 64 districts (zillas), over 500 towns (thanas), over 4,400 unions, and some 87,000 villages. In addition, there are 4 metropolitan cities and over 100 other municipalities.

Foreign Relations The People’s Republic of China never recognized the Mujibur Rahman regime and because of its close ties with Pakistan frustrated Bangladesh’s efforts to enter the United Nations until 1974. However, relations improved considerably in the late 1970s, with an initial series of trade and cooperation accords being concluded in 1980. Bangladesh is now a member of all UN Specialized Agencies as well as the Commonwealth, various Islamic groups, and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The government of Mujibur Rahman committed itself to neutralism and nonalignment. At the same time, Bangladesh acknowledged natural ties of geography, culture, and commerce with India, and in March 1972 the two countries signed a 25-year treaty of friendship, cooperation, and peace. Relations with Pakistan, initially characterized by mutual hatred and suspicion, slowly improved, with Islamabad according Bangladesh diplomatic recognition in February 1974. A lingering source of tension between Bangladesh and Pakistan involves the status of what now totals 300,000 Biharis, many of whom supported Pakistan during the independence struggle in 1971 and whom former Pakistan president Zia Ul-Haq agreed to “repatriate.” However, it was not until a visit by Prime Minister

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Zia to Islamabad in August 1992 that the 21-year stalemate appeared broken. Although repatriation of about 300 took place in 1993, the program was suspended after Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto took office later in the year, effectively stranding the Biharis in 66 refugee camps. A May 2003 High Court ruling paved the way for Biharis to be counted as Bangladeshi citizens, but their plight remained unresolved as of early 2006. Dhaka also has been burdened, to a lesser extent, by Rohingya Muslims who fled Myanmar’s western Rakhine (Arakan) State in the 1990s. At its peak in 1992, the Rohingya flight numbered over 250,000. An agreement between Dhaka and Yangon led to repatriation by mid-1997 of all but about 21,000 Rohingyas, with Myanmar officials indicating in April 1998 that they were prepared to accept the voluntary return of additional numbers. Repatriation resumed the following November, but Myanmar again suspended the operation a month later. In January 2000 Yangon refused to accept 14,000 of the refugees, whom it claimed were not Myanmar. In April 2004 the neighboring countries once again agreed to the repatriation of the remaining 20,000 Rohingyas, but most have refused to leave or their return has not been authorized by Myanmar officials. In November 1998 Dhaka and New Delhi recommitted themselves to enforcing a 1991 agreement that called for the mutual return of illegal migrants, a principal concern being fleeing Indian insurgents from Assam, Manipur, and Tripura. Until the 1997 Chittagong accord, the presence in India of, at one point, up to 65,000 Chakma refugees had also caused tension. In the months following the peace agreement, the 30,000 remaining refugees returned to Bangladesh. In 1976 Bangladesh lodged a formal complaint at the United Nations, alleging excessive Indian diversion of water from the Ganges at the Farakka barrage, and in 1980 India’s unilateral seizure of two newly formed islands in the Bay of Bengal further complicated relations. Progress was reported on the river-waters dispute during a meeting between President Ershad and Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi in October 1985, the two leaders agreeing to an extension of an interim water-

sharing pact dating from 1982. Despite opposition objections, the Hasina government and India finally concluded a Ganges pact on December 12, 1996. Negotiations on use of other river resources continued thereafter, with an interim agreement on sharing the Teesta River flow having been reached in January 2000. The Indo-Bangla Joint Rivers Commission meets regularly, and on October 1, 2003, the two countries signed a water-sharing agreement for the Teesta and six other rivers. Nevertheless, a Joint Rivers Commission meeting in September 2005 failed to adopt a timetable for implementation with regard to the Teesta. In June 1992 India granted Bangladesh a 999year lease on a narrow corridor (Tin Bigha) to the enclave of Dahagram-Angarpota, located within the Indian state of West Bengal. Another transit agreement, concluded in August 1996, permits Nepal to use a 38-mile corridor across India to Bangladesh, fulfilling a long-standing Nepalese wish for improved ocean port access. Meeting in April 2003, representatives of India and Bangladesh agreed to move forward on delineating the final five kilometers of their mutual border and to discuss exchange of enclaves. (There are over 100 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh and 50 Bangladeshi enclaves in India.) Improving cross-border bus and train service also was discussed. Both countries recommitted to improving border security, which has been a persistent irritant. Members of the Indian Border Security Force and the Bangladesh Rifles have frequently exchanged fire over perceived territorial violations. The worst northern border clash in 25 years occurred in April 2001, resulting in nearly 20 fatalities. In 2005 illegal immigration and the cross-border activities of Indian separatists led India to begin construction at the border of a barbed-wire fence, to which Dhaka strongly objected. A related source of contention has been competing claims to a 50-hectare shoal at Parshuram. On January 15, 1998, the prime ministers of Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan met in Dhaka for the first of what promised to be an annual series of “business summits,” and in March 1999 Bangladesh hosted the second summit of the

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fledgling D-8 (Developing Eight) group of Islamic nations. The D-8 was organized in 1997 by Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey to advance cooperation in trade and other economic matters. The fourth summit convened in Tehran, Iran, in February 2004. A brief visit to Dhaka by U.S. President Bill Clinton on March 20, 2000—the first by a U.S. chief executive to Bangladesh—was protested by both leftists and Muslim clerics. During the visit Sheikh Hasina urged that Lawful Permanent Resident status be given to some 50,000 undocumented Bangladeshis living in the United States. On December 26, 2005, the cabinet approved Bangladesh’s participation in the seven-member South Asia Free Trade Area, which also includes Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Operations were slated to begin in July 2006.

Current Issues Although Khaleda Zia’s and Sheikh Hasina’s positions were dramatically reversed by the 2001 election, it quickly became apparent that the tenor of political discourse had not changed. While Hasina and the Awami League immediately protested the election results and began boycotting parliamentary sessions, the new government announced that it intended to pursue corruption charges against Hasina and members of her government, just as Hasina’s government had done to Zia and the BNP during its five-year stint in power. Thus it came as no surprise in January 2002 when charges were submitted against Hasina and six others for inappropriately costing the government $120 million in connection with the acquisition in 1999 of Russian fighter aircraft. Eight months later the High Court dismissed a 1998 corruption case against Khaleda Zia and others in connection with Airbus purchases. With both leaders still at the head of their parties, the 2006 election campaign was expected to repeat the themes from the 2001 contest: corruption and economic mismanagement, unemployment, and domestic security.

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In the first four years of Khaleda Zia’s latest term, little was achieved in correcting what a World Bank vice president had characterized in 2002 as a “crisis of law and order and governance.” Bangladesh is inevitably ranked high on international surveys assessing the extent of governmental and business corruption, while political assassinations and violent confrontations, often involving members of the BNP and the Awami League, have become commonplace. In August 2004 nearly two dozen people died in a grenade attack at an Awami League rally, with Sheikh Hasina being among the 200 or so injured. The attack provoked a series of reprisals by Awami League members. On January 27, 2005, another grenade attack took the lives of former Awami League finance minister Shah KIBRIA and several others, after which a February meeting of international donors, including the European Union, the United States, and the World Bank, issued a renewed expression of concern over the breakdown in law and order and the “climate of impunity.” Both the army and the police have been accused of abusing detainees and committing extrajudicial executions. The rancor between the BNP and the Awami League may have diverted attention from a threat posed by rising Islamic militancy. In a development that clearly caught the government and the rest of the political establishment unprepared, on August 17, 2005, some 460 widely dispersed lowgrade bombs were exploded in all but one of the country’s districts. A recently organized militant group, the Jamaat-ul-Mujaheddin Bangladesh (JMB), claimed responsibility for the explosions, which caused only two deaths and were clearly designed to deliver a message rather than inflict maximum casualties. Principal targets were government offices and courts. Authorities quickly began arresting suspects and laid blame on the JMB’s leader, Maulana Abdur RAHMAN, and the alleged operations chief of the closely linked Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), Siddiqul ISLAM (alias Bangla BHIA). It was nevertheless apparent that the government could not satisfactorily explain how planning for such a massive, well-coordinated attack had gone undetected.

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Political Parties Proscriptions on political party activity, imposed in the wake of the March 1982 coup, remained in effect on and off until November 1986, when General Ershad ended martial law. However, a ban on party activity was reimposed in November 1987 under a state of emergency, and opposition groups boycotted the March 1988 parliamentary election; the state of emergency was lifted the next month. In November 1990 Ershad, challenged by increasingly violent protests, declared another, ineffectual state of emergency that was rescinded a week later, upon his resignation. General elections have been held on a multiparty basis since then, although the losers declared the 1991 contest unfair, and the opposition boycotted the February 1996 balloting. Over 90 parties were registered at the time of the October 2001 election, and over 50 competed in at least one district.

Government and Allied Parties Bangladesh Nationalist Party —BNP (Bangladesh Jatiyabadi Dal). The BNP was formally launched in September 1978 by various groups that had supported President Zia in his election campaign. During 1978–1980 a number of defectors from other parties joined the government formation. According to official returns, the BNP candidate, Abdus Sattar, captured nearly 66 percent of the vote in a field of over 30 candidates at the November 1981 presidential balloting. In 1983 a BNP-led seven-party coalition helped form the anti-Ershad Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD). A breakaway BNP faction followed former prime minister Azizur Rahman into the National Front (below, under National Party [Ershad]) in July 1985. The main body of the party, led by Zia’s widow, refused to participate in the parliamentary poll of May 1986, the presidential balloting of October 1986, or the legislative election of March 1988. In 1989 the party was again divided into a majority group led by Begum Khaleda Zia and a dissident bloc led by former BNP secretary general A. K. M. Obaidur RAHMAN. Begum Khaleda

was installed as prime minister following the 1991 elections, after which parliamentary deputies were advised that factionalism would no longer be tolerated. The BNP won only 116 seats in the June 1996 election, Begum Khaleda becoming leader of an opposition “combine” that also included as principal participants the Jamaat-i-Islami and the Islamic Unity Front (IOJ), supported by a number of smaller, nonparliamentary parties. Following its March 1998 departure from the government, the Jatiya Party joined the BNP, Jamaat, and the IOJ in a four-party alliance. Although reportedly confronted in mid-July 1998 by the threatened resignations of 30 MPs unhappy with her policies, Begum Khaleda was reelected BNP chair for a two-year term in October. A month earlier, 2 prominent BNP members, former government ministers Obaidur Rahman and Nurul Islam MANJUR, were arrested for their alleged involvement in the 1975 murder of four Awami League ministers. They were indicted, along with 20 other individuals, in October 2000 but were ultimately acquitted in October 2004. The BNP’s October 2001 election victory saw Khaleda Zia’s return to the prime minister’s office on the strength of a 191-seat parliamentary majority, plus an additional 23 seats won by the other three alliance parties (below). In June 2002 Zia named a son, Tarique Rahman, as joint secretary general of the BNP. Leaders: Begum Khaleda ZIA (Prime Minister and Chair of the Party), Shahjahan SIRAJ, Abdul Mannan BHUIYAN, and Tarique RAHMAN (Secretaries General). Bangladesh Islamic Assembly (Jamaat-iIslami Bangladesh). Originally a pro-Pakistani grouping that was revived in 1979 after seven years of inactivity, the Jamaat-i-Islami remains the most prominent of the fundamentalist religious parties. It ran fourth in the 1991 balloting, winning 18 parliamentary seats. Its former head, Golam AZAM, returned from self-imposed exile in 1978 and was reappointed president in 1992. In April 1993 the Dhaka High Court reversed Azam’s loss of

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citizenship for allegedly collaborating with Pakistani military forces during the 1971 war of independence. After the 1996 election, at which it won only 3 seats, the party actively opposed the Awami League government, and in October 2001 it captured 17 seats and joined the new Khaleda Zia government. Leaders: Matiur Rahman NIZAMI (Party President and Minister of Industry), Abul Kalam Muhammad YOUSUF (Senior Vice President), Ali Ahsan MUJAHID (Party Secretary General and Minister of Social Welfare), Muhammad QUAMARUZZAMAN (Assistant Secretary General). Bangladesh Jatiya Party (BJP). Initially identified at its formation in April 2001 as the Jatiya Party (M-N) in honor of its initial president, M. A. Matin, and its prime mover, Naziur Rahman Manjur, the party was often referenced leading up to the October 2001 parliamentary election as the Jatiya Party (Naziur). Since the election, at which it won four seats, it has most often been identified as the BJP. (For a history of the parent Jatiya Party’s formation and complicated history, see the Jatiya Party [Ershad], below.) In March–April 2005 differences between Manjur and Matin threatened to split the party. The warring leaders tried to expel each other following what Matin characterized as an “anticoalition” speech by Manjur, who had attacked the BNP’s deference to Jamaat-i-Islami and the latter’s alleged contacts with Islamic extremists. Manjur, in turn, accused Matin of “antiorganizational activities.” In early March the BJP’s secretary general, Kazi Firoz Rashid, and other party leaders had defected to the Jatiya Party (Ershad). Leaders: Naziur Rahman MANJUR (Chair), M. A. MATIN (Chief Adviser). Islamic Unity Front (Islami Oikya Jote— IOJ). A fundamentalist organization that has urged the adoption of Islamic law, the IOJ was highly critical of Sheikh Hasina’s secularist policies. After the June 1996 election, it participated in the BNP-led opposition, although its sole member of Parliament, Golam Sarwar HIRU, was threatened with expulsion by the IOJ leadership for breaking

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party discipline. In October 2001 it won two seats but was offered no cabinet posts. The IOJ’s three main divisions are headed by the chair, the secretary general, and Mufti Izharul ISLAM, the last of whom emerged at the head of a new faction in April 2005. As in the BJP, elements of the IOJ have recently expressed dissatisfaction with the BNP’s alleged deference to Jamaat. Leaders: Shaikhul Hadith Muhammad Azizul HAQ (Chair), Fazlul Huq AMINI (Secretary General).

Other Parliamentary Parties Awami League. A predominantly middleclass party organized in East Pakistan during 1948 under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the Awami (People’s) League was, with Indian support, a major force in the drive for independence. Although formally disbanded by President Moshtaque AHMED in 1975, it remained the best-organized political group in the country and served as the nucleus of a Democratic United Front that supported the presidential candidacy of Gen. Mohammad Ataul Ghani OSMANI in June 1978. During 1980 a major cleavage developed between a majority faction led by Abdul Malek UKIL and a right-wing minority faction led by Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury. The former elected Mujibur Rahman’s daughter, Hasina Wajed, as its leader in February 1981, while Chowdhury accepted appointment as prime minister of the Ershad government in July 1986 and later joined Ershad’s Jatiya Dal. Committed to socialism, secularism, and a “Westminster-style” parliamentary system, Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League participated in the legislative balloting of May 1986 but boycotted most subsequent parliamentary proceedings (including the March 1988 poll) prior to the election of February 1991, at which it was runner-up to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). In 1991 the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (Baksal), a leftwing faction that had broken away in 1984 under the leadership of Abdur RAZZAQ, returned to the parent organization. (In 1997 Baksal was reestablished by new leaders.)

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Following the ultimately successful campaign to bring about the resignation of the BNP government, the League emerged victorious from the June 1996 election and thus took office for the first time since 1975, with a plurality of 146 seats of the 300 elected, to which it added 27 of the 30 seats reserved for women and thereby achieved a majority. Its principal partner, the Jatiya Party, left the government in March 1998. On June 16, 2001, a bomb exploded at an Awami League meeting, killing 22 and wounding some 100 others. Party leaders accused the BNP of involvement. At the October election the party suffered a devastating defeat, winning only 62 legislative seats. In December 2002 Sheikh Hasina was reelected party president. In addition, she heads a 14-party opposition “combine” that also includes the 11-party leftist alliance (see under the Left Democratic Alliance, below), the National Socialist Party (Inu), and the National Awami Party (NAP). Leaders: Sheikh Hasina WAJED (Former Prime Minister and Party President), Abdul JALIL (General Secretary). National Party (Ershad) (Jatiya Party [Ershad]). A Jatiya Dal was initially launched in August 1985 as the National Front, a somewhat eclectic grouping of right-wing Muslims and Beijing-oriented Marxists who rejected the confrontational politics of their former alliance partners in favor of cooperation with President Ershad. The Front embraced the People’s Party (Jana Dal), founded in 1983 by President Chowdhury; the United People’s Party (UPP), then led by Kazi Zafar Ahmed; the Democratic Party (Ganatantrik Dal), led by Sirajul Hossain KHAN and Nasrullah KHAN; the Bangladesh Muslim League (BML), led by Tofazzal ALI; and a dissident faction of the BNP, led by former prime minister Azizur Rahman. It was declared to have been converted into a unified party on January 1, 1986, in anticipation of the parliamentary balloting that was subsequently held on May 7, although the BML and the UPP subsequently functioned as independent parties. Following the 1986 election (which was boycotted by the BNP), the Jatiya Dal held 178 of

300 directly elective legislative seats, plus all 30 indirectly elected women’s seats. Amid numerous charges of electoral impropriety, it was awarded 250 of the 300 directly elective seats at the 1988 poll, which neither of the leading opposition groups contested. The party participated in the election of February 1991 “for the sake of democracy,” despite the issuance of corruption charges against most of its top leadership, including General Ershad, who was placed in detention in December 1990 and convicted of a variety of offenses during 1991– 1993. In September 1993 a number of party dissidents announced the formation of a Jatiya Party (Nationalist) under the nominal chairmanship of Ershad (from his prison cell), whose supporters subsequently established control of the party. Ershad’s wife, Raushan, became a member of its presidium. Having participated in the opposition boycott of the February 1996 election, the party won 32 elective seats in the June balloting and opted to join a coalition government headed by the Awami League, in part on the understanding that Ershad would be released on parole. This decision, taken by Ershad, provoked dissension in the party, as evidenced by the resignation of its former parliamentary leader, former vice president Moudud Ahmed, who later joined the BNP. In January 1997 Ershad was released from detention, but conflict continued within the party. A rebel congress on June 30 voted to remove Ershad and Vice Chair Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury from their leadership posts, with the dissidents, led by Kazi Zafar Ahmed and Shah Moazzem HOSSAIN, forming the National Party–Zafar-Moazzem. In March 1998 the Jatiya Party left the government, although its lone minister, Anwar Hossein Manju, decided to stay in the cabinet. Collaterally, Ershad removed him as the party’s secretary general. At a “unity conference” on December 28 Ershad and the Zafar-Moazzem splinter mended their rift, but in April 1999 a meeting of party dissidents led by Manju and Vice Chair Chowdhury “expelled” Ershad and formed their own Jatiya Party—see JP(M), below. In November 1999 former prime minister Kazi Zafar Ahmed was tried in absentia for corruption

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and received a 15-year sentence, while in August 2000 Ershad lost an appeal of a corruption conviction and was ordered back to prison by the High Court. In November Ershad began serving a 5-year sentence (reduced from 7) for a corruption conviction, but he was released on bail in April 2001. In August Ahmed returned from Australia (which later granted him asylum) to appeal his conviction, and he remains a key Ershad ally. With the end of the parliamentary term approaching and new elections to be held by October 2001, Ershad began distancing the party from his opposition partners, with the intention of campaigning independently even though he himself was barred from running. His decision led to yet another rift, with the party’s ousted secretary general, Naziur Rahman Manjur, forming another Jatiya offshoot in April (see BJP, above). Now identified as the Jatiya Party (Ershad), the parent group won 14 seats at the October election. In June 2002 the right-wing Jatiya Ganatantrik Party (Jagpa), led by Shafiul Alam PRODHAN, and the Progressive Nationalist Party (Progatishil Jatiyabadi Dal—PJD), led by Shawkut Hossain NILU, merged into the Jatiya Party (Ershad). Jagpa had originated in the 1990s as a faction within the National Democratic Party (NDP); the PJD was organized prior to the 1986 election by BNP dissidents. Both parties had participated in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) of nearly a dozen conservative Islamic groups, and both had supported the BNP-led opposition after the 1996 election. Both later joined Ershad’s Jatiya Party in the Islamic National Unity Front (Islami Jatiya Oikya Front), which Ershad and Pir Fazlul KARIM established to contest the 2001 elections. Also identified with the Front were the Islamic Constitution Movement (Islami Shasantantra Andolon), led by Maulana Syed Fazlul KARIM, and the Alhaj Zamir ALI faction of the Bangladesh Muslim League, both of which ran a few parliamentary candidates under their own banners. In anticipation of the 2006 general election, Ershad has tried to reunite the various Jatiya parties and forge a coalition substantial enough to challenge the BNP and the Awami League. Meanwhile, he has had to confront a well-publicized rupture

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with his second wife, Bidisha, a woman 40 years his junior whom he had promoted within the party. In June 2005 she was briefly detained by police after he accused her of theft. Bidisha and Shafiul Alam Prodhan were subsequently rumored to be considering establishing a new party. Meanwhile, Ershad’s first wife, Raushan, a member of Parliament to whom he has remained married, continues to play a significant role in the party. In May 2002 the High Court sentenced Ershad to six months in prison for attempting to influence a judge in an earlier proceeding. As of early 2006 he remained free pending the outcome of his various appeals. Leaders: Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Mohammad ERSHAD (Former President of the Republic), Kazi Firoz RASHID (Adviser), Begum Raushan ERSHAD, Ruhul Amin HAWLADER (Secretary General). National Party (Manju) (Jatiya Party [Manju]—JP[M]). The JP(M) began as the JP (Mizan-Manju), which was formed on April 24, 1999, when a “special council” held by rebellious members of General Ershad’s Jatiya Party broke from his leadership, charging him with corruption during his years as the country’s president and with undemocratic tendencies. Among those condemning Ershad was former prime minister (and party vice chair) Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury. Another factor in the break was Ershad’s removal from all party offices of Anwar Hossain Manju, who had stayed in the Hasina cabinet despite the JP’s departure from the government in March 1998. The new grouping included 11 members of Parliament, all of whom objected to Ershad’s recent alliance with the BNP. Shortly before the October 2001 election, Chowdhury, the party chair, left to join the Awami League, and the JP(M) won only 1 seat. In April 2004 Manju denied participating in reunification efforts by Ershad. Leaders: Anwar Hossain MANJU (Chair), Sheikh Shahidul ISLAM. Peasants and Workers People’s League (Krishak Sramik Janata League—KSJL). The KSJL was established by a former Awami League stalwart, Kader Siddiqui, in December 1999. In July

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2001 Siddiqui was the target of a warrant issued in connection with a corruption case dating back more than two decades. At the October parliamentary election he won the party’s sole seat. Leaders: Kader SIDDIQUI, Fazlur RAHMAN (Secretary).

Other Parties and Recent Alliances Alternative Stream Bangladesh (Bikalpa Dhara Bangladesh—BDB). The BDB was launched in May 2004 by former president and BNP leader A. Q. M. Badruddoza Chowdhury. In 2005, looking toward the 2006 parliamentary election, the new party reached a “strategic understanding” with the Awami League. Leaders: A. Q. M. Badruddoza CHOWDHURY, M. A. MANNAN (Secretary). Bangladesh Caliphate Movement (Bangladesh Khelafat Andolon—BKA). The Caliphate Movement was founded in 1981 to support the unsuccessful campaign for the presidency of its leader, Maulana Mohammed Ullah Hafezji HUZUR (a result that was repeated in 1986). In 1993 it participated in formation of the conservative Islamic NDA. In April 1999 the BKA joined a number of other Muslim organizations in urging Islamic states to assist the Kosovo people against the Yugoslavian government. A staunch opponent of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, in June 2004 the BKA branded U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld a “perpetrator of genocide,” a war criminal, and an “enemy of mankind and Allah.” Bangladesh Tariqat Federation (BTF). Formation of the BTF was announced in October 2005 by Najibul Bashar Maizbhandari. Formerly an official on the BNP, he resigned in September 2005 over the party’s alliance with Jamaat-i-Islami and the latter’s alleged involvement in recent bombings of shrines. Leader: Najibul Bashar MAIZBHANDARI (Chair). National People’s Party —NPP (Jatiya Janata Party). A social democratic party organized in

1978, the NPP supported the candidacy of its founder, Gen. Mohammad Ataul Ghani OSMANI, at the 1978 and 1981 presidential elections. Following Osmani’s death in 1985, the group split into a number of factions. At the October 2001 election three personalist factions ran a total of six candidates, none successfully. Leaders: Sheikh Mohammad ASADUZZAMAN (NPP–Sheikh Asad), Nurul Islam KHAN (NPP–Adv. Nurul Islam Khan), Hafizur Rahman KHAJA (NPP-Hafizur). National Awami Party (NAP). Founded by the late Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan BHASHANI, the original NAP was the principal opposition party prior to the 1975 coup. Thereafter it underwent numerous cleavages, the main splinters being the NAP-Bhashani (NAP-B) and the NAP-Muzaffar (NAP-M). The NAP-B began as a pro-Beijing grouping that participated in a five-party left-wing Democratic Front (Ganatantrik Jote), which was organized in 1979. The NAP-M began as a pro-Moscow splinter. Both NAP factions later joined the Awami League alliance within the anti-Ershad MRD. Leaders: Enamul HAQUE (NAP-B), Abul Kalam AZAD (Secretary General, NAP-B), Muzaffar AHMED (NAP-M). National Socialist Party (Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal—JSD). The JSD originated as a Scientific Socialists (Boigyanik Samajtantrabadi) faction within the Awami League in the early postindependence period. The largely student group, led by Abdur Rab and Shajahan Siraj, defected from the League in 1972. Many of its leaders were arrested following President Zia’s assumption of power. It was reinstated as a legal entity in November 1978, although several leaders were not released from detention until March 1980. Differences within the JSD over participation in a loosely formed 10-party opposition alliance contributed to a November 1980 split that resulted in formation of the Bangladesh Socialist Party (BSP, under LDF, below). Two months earlier, dissatisfaction with the alliance had led over 500 members of the JSD student wing to join the BNP.

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In 1983–1985 the party was a prominent member of the 15-party anti-Ershad coalition led by the Awami League. In May 1986 separate electoral lists were presented by supporters of Rab and Siraj. Subsequently, the JSD (Rab) remained an autonomous party, winning one seat in June 1996 (and joining the government), by which time the Siraj faction had become part of the People’s Forum (below). A third faction led by Hasanul Haq Inu joined the LDF. Siraj later joined the BNP, while the Rab and Inu factions reached an accommodation that reunited the rest of the party. On February 16, 1999, party leader Kazi Aref AHMED and five others were killed by masked assailants at a public rally in Kushtia. Both government and opposition leaders condemned the attack, which injured some two dozen others. The party failed to win any parliamentary seats in October 2001, after which the Inu and Rab factions reestablished separate identities as the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (Inu) and the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (Rab). JSD (Inu) Leaders: Hasanul Haq INU (Chair), Mainuddin Khan BADAL (Executive President), Sayed Zafar AHMED (General Secretary). JSD (Rab) Leaders: A. S. M. Abdur RAB, Nur Alam ZIKU (President), Abdul Malek RATAN (General Secretary).

ported the presidential candidacy of the NAP’s Muzaffar Ahmed in 1981 and joined the Awami League faction of the anti-Ershad MRD in 1983. In 1989 its general secretary, Saifuddin Ahmed Manik, was opposed within the central committee for advocating democratization; he subsequently joined the People’s Forum (below). The CPM was a leading component of the Patriotic Democratic Front from 1991 until formation of the LDF in 1994. It held its seventh congress in March 1999, at which time it called for leftist unity and criticized both the Awami League and the BNP. Leaders: Manjural Ahsan KHAN (President), Mujahidul Islam SELIM (General Secretary).

Left Democratic Front —LDF (Bam Ganatantrik Jote). The LDF was launched in April 1994 as an alliance of the five parties listed below, plus the Inu faction of the JSD and the Unifying Process (Oikya Prokria) of Nayeem JAHANGIR, who later joined the BNP. The LDF leadership rotates among its constituent party heads. Its constituent parties form the core of an 11-party leftist opposition alliance.

Bangladesh Workers’ Party (BWP). The BWP began as a pro-Soviet offshoot of the United People’s Party (UPP). Having opposed formation of a front with Ziaur Rahman, the BWP left the UPP in the late 1970s and in 1983 joined the anti-Ershad movement. It continues to be an active voice for leftist causes. Leaders: Rashed Khan MENON (Chair), Bimal BISWAS (Secretary General).

Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB). Although the pro-Moscow CPB was permitted to resume a legal existence in November 1978, over 50 of its members were arrested in March– April 1980. The party held its first congress since 1974 in February 1980 and participated in the opposition alliance of the same year. It sup-

Bangladesh Socialist Party (Bangladesher Samajtantrik Dal—BSD). The BSD was formed following a 1980 split in the JSD over joining a ten-party opposition alliance. The BSD itself subsequently split into factions, the BSD (Khaleq) and the BSD (Mahbub). In October

Communist Party of Bangladesh (Marxist-Leninist) (CPB-ML) (Bangladesher Samyabadi Dal [Marxbadi-Leninbadi]). Dating from 1971 and led by Dilip Barua, the Samyabadi Dal began as a Maoist formation but in 1983 adopted a pro-Soviet posture and supported the 15-party Awami League alliance in the MRD. It has been closely associated with the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (Ganatantrik Biplobi Jote—GBJ). Leaders: Dilip BARUA, Abu Hamed SAHABUDDAIN.

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2004 the leader of the latter, A. F. M. Mahbubul Haq, was seriously injured by unknown assailants. Leaders: KHALEQUZZAMAN Bhuiyan (Convenor of BSD [Khaleq]), A. F. M. Mahbubul HAQ (BSD [Mahbub]). Workers’ and Peasants’ Socialist Party (Sramik Krishak Samajbadi Dal—SKSD). Organized in 1969, the SKSD was allied with the Awami League after the 1982 Ershad coup. In 2001 the party’s longtime leader, Nirmal Sen, was its only parliamentary candidate. Leader: Nirmal SEN (Secretary). People’s Forum (Gano Forum). The Gano Forum was launched in August 1993 by a breakaway Awami League faction that declared as its objectives “violence-free politics, economic progress at the grassroots, and basic amenities for all.” It initially absorbed the faction of the National Socialist Party (JSD) led by Shajahan Siraj. In 1997 a JSDSiraj emerged from the Forum as a separate organization, but Siraj subsequently joined the BNP. The Gano Forum has been closely associated with the LDF. Leaders: Dr. Kamal HOSSAIN (President), Pankaj BHATTA-CHARYA, Mostafa Mohsin MONTU, Mofizul Islam Khan KAMAL, Saifuddin Ahmed MANIK (General Secretary). Zaker Party. The Zaker Party, established in 1989, supports introduction of an Islamic state but has rejected militant fundamentalism. It has never won a parliamentary seat. Discussions regarding an alliance with General Ershad’s Jatiya ended rancorously in 2005, with Zaker leader Mustafa Amir Faisal describing the former president as “insane due to his old age.” Leaders: Mustafa Amir FAISAL Mujaddedi (Chair), Elia BHUIYAN (Vice Chair). Other parties belonging to the 11-party leftist alliance are the Communist Center (Communist Kendra), led by Ajoy ROY; the Democrat Party (Ganatantri Party), led by Azizul Islam KHAN and Nural ISLAM; and the People’s Freedom League (Gano Azadi League), led by Abdus SAMAD.

Additional small parties of the left are the Bangladesh People’s League, led by Garib NEWAZ; the Democratic Proletarian Party (Ganotantrik Sarbahara Party), led by Ahsanul HUQ Bacchu; and the Peasants’ and Workers’ Liberation Movement (Krishak Sramik Mukti Andolon), led by Mohammed SADEQ. In October 2001 a revived Bangladesh Peasants’ and Workers’ Awami League (Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League—Baksal), currently led by Mahbub ALAM, a former CPB member, contested one parliamentary seat. In 2003 a new four-party radical alliance was established by the Democratic Workers’ Party (Ganotantrik Majdur Party), led by Abdus SALAM and Zakir HOSSAIN; the National People’s Front (Jatiya Gano Front), led by Tipu BISWAS; the People’s Solidarity Movement (Gano Sanghati Andolon), led by Jonaid SAKI; and the Revolutionary Unity Front (Biplobi Oikya Front), led by Mushrefa MISHU. The alliance expanded to five parties when a branch of the MarxistLeninist Samyabadi Dal joined in 2004. The Maoist Proletarian Party of East Bangla (Purba Banglar Sharbahara Party—PBSP) dates back to 1971 but has split into several factions, including the PBSP (Central Committee), led by Anwarul KABIR; the PBSP (Maoist Bolshevik Reorganization Movement); and the PBSP (Maoist Construction Center). A number of other outlawed communist groups also exist.

Chittagong Groups Chittagong Hill Tracts People’s Solidarity Association (Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity—PCJSS). Formed in 1972 under the leadership of Manabendra Narayan LARMA, a former member of Parliament, the PCJSS long opposed the influx of Bengali settlers into the Hill Tracts. Consisting mainly of Chakma tribesmen, the organization formed a military wing, the Shanti Bahini (Army of Peace), under Larma’s brother Jytrindriyo (also know as Shantu Larma) in 1973. In 1982 a PCJSS faction led by Priti Kumar CHAKMA left the parent grouping; many

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of its supporters, but not Chakma, surrendered to the government in 1985. M. N. Larma was killed in November 1983 by a rival group, with his brother leading subsequent negotiations with Dhaka and concluding a peace agreement in December 1997. The accord included amnesty for all members of the PCJSS, including the Shanti Bahini, and granted the Hill Tracts limited autonomy over regional affairs. Some of the more militant Chakma guerrillas objected, however, demanding full autonomy and stating that they would continue the insurgency. Subsequent clashes with the PCJSS occurred. In February 1999 it was announced that Larma would assume a status equal to that of a minister of state in the Hasina government, effective upon his formally taking office as chair of the interim Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council. The 21member Council was installed on May 2, 1999, and the PCJSS held its first party congress in November. Subsequently, Larma and the PCJSS have demanded that the current central government fully implement the 1997 accord, including ending discrimination, distributing development money, and permitting greater local control. As the opposition leader in Parliament, Khaleda Zia had opposed the settlement. Leaders: Jytrindriyo Bodhipriyo (Shantu) LARMA (Chair), Ushaton TALUKDER, Raktatpol TRIPURA. United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF). The UPDF was formally organized in late 1998 by opponents of the 1997 Chittagong settlement who demanded full regional autonomy. Some of those claiming allegiance to the UPDF have since been responsible for killings, kidnappings, and other criminal acts, and have repeatedly clashed with central government officials and the PCJSS. In February 2001 the UPDF was responsible for the kidnapping of four European engineers, all of whom had been released by mid-March. Conflict with the PCJSS and the Regional Council persists. Leaders: Prasit KHISHA, Rabi Shankar CHAKMA.

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Militant Islamic Groups The country’s first militant Islamic groups, which appeared more than a decade ago, were apparently organized as part of the anti-Soviet war effort in Afghanistan. Chief among these was the Bangladesh branch of the international Harkatul-Jihad Islami (HJI), the existence of which was long denied by Dhaka authorities. As a consequence, the HJI was not banned until October 2005 despite its links to al-Qaida. In the meantime, many of its members had branched out and helped found other militant organizations, including the Shahadat al-Hikma, which was banned in 2003. More recently, two closely linked organizations, the Jamaat-ul-Mujaheddin Bangladesh (JMB) and the Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), have attracted the most attention, especially following the coordinated explosion of some 460 crude bombs on August 17, 2005. Leaflets apparently left by the JMB at bomb sites demanded the adoption of strict Islamic law. Among those sought by authorities in the aftermath were JMB leader Maulana Abdur RAHMAN and JMJB operations chief Siddiqul ISLAM (alias Bangla BHIA). Both also were implicated by the government in two courthouse bombings in November 2005. The JMB and JMJB have reportedly established a joint military wing identified in October 2005 as the Shahid Nasrullah al-Arafat Brigade (SNAB).

Legislature The Parliament (Jatiya Sangsad, or House of the Nation) is a unicameral body of 345 seats: 300 filled by direct election for a five-year term, subject to dissolution, and 45 indirectly elected seats reserved for women. At the election of October 1, 2001, with additional balloting on October 8 in 15 districts where violence had forced a suspension of voting, the opposition four-party alliance won 214 seats (Bangladesh Nationalist Party [BNP], 191; Bangladesh Islamic Assembly [Jamaat-i-Islami], 17; Bangladesh Jatiya Party [BJP], 4; Islamic Unity Front, 2); the Awami League (AL), 62; the National Party (Ershad), 14; the National Party (Manju), 1;

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Cabinet As of March 15, 2006 Prime Minister

Begum Khaleda Zia [f]

Ministers Agriculture Armed Forces Division Cabinet Division Commerce Communications Chittagong Hill Tracts Affairs Defense Education Energy and Mineral Resources Environment and Forest Establishment Finance and Planning Fisheries and Livestock Food and Disaster Management Foreign Affairs Health and Family Welfare Housing and Public Works Information Industries Law, Justice, and Parliamentary Affairs Local Government, Rural Development, and Cooperatives Post and Telecommunications Primary and Mass Education Science, and Information and Communication Technology Shipping Social Welfare Textiles and Jute Water Resources Women’s and Children’s Affairs Without Portfolio Adviser, Parliamentary Affairs

M. K. Anwar Begum Khaleda Zia [f] Begum Khaleda Zia [f] Alhaj Altaf Hossain Chowdhury Nazmul Huda Begum Khaleda Zia [f] Begum Khaleda Zia [f] Osman Faruq Begum Khaleda Zia [f] Tariqul Islam Begum Khaleda Zia [f] M. Saifur Rahman Abdallah Al Noman Chowdhury Kamal Ibne Yusuf M. Morshed Khan Khandaker Mosharraf Hossain Mirza Abbas M. Shamsul Islam Matiur Rahman Nizami (Jamaat-i-Islami) Moudud Ahmed Abdul Mannan Bhuiyan M. Aminul Haque Begum Khaleda Zia [f] Abdul Moyeen Khan Akbar Hossain Ali Ahsan Mohammad Mujahid (Jamaat-i-Islami) Shahjahan Siraj Hafizuddin Ahmad Begum Khurshid Jahan Haque [f] Abdul Matin Chowdhury Salahuddin Kader Chowdhury

Ministers of State (Independent Charge) Civil Aviation and Tourism Cultural Affairs Expatriates’ Welfare and Overseas Employment Home Affairs Labor and Employment Land Liberation War Affairs

Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir Begum Selima Rahman [f] Mohammed Quamrul Islam Lutfuzzaman Babar Amanullah Aman Ukil Abdas Sattar Bhuiyan Rezaul Karim

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NGO Affairs Power Division Religious Affairs Youth and Sports

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Lutfar Rahman Khan Azad Iqbal Hasan Mahmud Tuku Mosharraf Hossain Shahjahan M. Fazlur Rahman Patal

[f] = female Note: Unless otherwise indicated, ministers belong to the BNP.

the Peasants and Workers People’s League, 1; independents, 6; vacancies, 2. The 2 vacant seats were filled in by-elections on November 12; on January 17, 2002, an additional 5 by-elections were held, 1 to fill the seat vacated by newly installed President Chowdhury and 4 to fill seats given up by AL candidates who had won election from more than one district. Following the January balloting the BNP and its three allies held 220 seats, while the AL held 59. In 2001 a constitutional provision expired that had provided for the elected membership to fill an additional 30 seats reserved for women. In May 2004 Parliament passed a new amendment calling for 45 reserved seats to be distributed proportionally among represented parties, and implementing legislation was approved on November 30. Following resolution of a court challenge, 36 of the 45 seats were filled on September 6, 2005, as follows: BNP, 30; Jamaat-i-Islami, 3; National Party (Ershad), 2; BJP, 1. The AL refused to participate in the election, as a result of which its 9 reserved seats were filled on October 4 as follows: BNP, 6; Jamaat-i-Islami, 1; National Party (Ershad), 1; Islamic Unity Front, 1. Speaker: Muhammad Jamiruddin SIRCAR.

Communications Press curbs were formally abandoned with the revocation of martial law in November 1986, although in early 1998 four journalists were charged with treason for printing an allegedly divisive report about the country’s defense forces. In late November 2002 UK and Italian journalists and two

Bangladeshi assistants were detained on suspicion of subversive activities in connection with the filming of a documentary on Islamic extremism. The Europeans were released and deported in December. Press intimidation remains common, particularly in rural areas, and at least seven journalists have been killed since 1997. In June 2002 the international organization Reporters Without Borders reported an escalation in threats and assaults against journalists since the latest Khaleda Zia government took office. The 2003 annual report by Reporters Without Borders described Bangladesh as “by far the world’s most violent country for journalists,” a conclusion that was echoed in March 2004 by the U.S.-based Committee to Protect Journalists.

Press The following are among the dozens of Dhaka dailies, all published in Bangla unless otherwise noted: Dainik Ittefaq (200,000), progovernment; Dainik Inqilab (180,000), Islamist; Dainik Janakantha (Dhaka, 100,000), independent, also published in four other cities; Bangladesh Observer (75,000), in English; Sangbad (70,000); Dainik Bangla (70,000); Dainik Bhorer Kagoj (50,000); Dainik Sangram (50,000); Dainik Purbanchal (Khulna, 40,000); Bangladesh Times (35,000), in English; Daily Star (30,000), in English.

News Agencies There are two domestic news agencies located in Dhaka: the government-owned Bangladesh News

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Agency (Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha—BSS) and the independent United News of Bangladesh; in addition, many of the leading foreign agencies maintain offices at the capital.

Ekushey Television, after the Supreme Court ruled its broadcast license invalid. In April 2005 the government issued a new license, but only for satellite service.

Broadcasting and Computing The government-controlled Bangladesh Betar operates domestic radio stations in Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna, and other leading cities while providing overseas service in six languages. Bangladesh Television, also operated by the government, broadcasts from Dhaka and Chittagong as well as from relay stations. There were approximately 1.0 million television receivers and 1.8 million personal computers serving 2.4 million Internet users in 2003. In August 2002 the government shut down the country’s sole independent terrestrial TV station,

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. Shamsher M. CHOWDHURY U.S. Ambassador to Bangladesh Patricia A. BUTENIS Permanent Representative to the UN Iftekhar Ahmed CHOWDHURY IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, CP, CWTH, IDB, Interpol, IOM, IOR-ARC, NAM, OIC, SAARC, WCO, WTO

Note: Prime Minister Khaleda Zia stepped down upon expiration of the five-year legislative term on October 27, 2006, with President Iajuddin Ahmed taking on the additional duties of chief adviser and minister in a constitutionally mandated caretaker government, pending a general election set for January 22, 2007. On December 11 four members of the caretaker government resigned in the context of ongoing demonstrations by the opposition Awami League, which has accused the caretaker administration of bias in favor of former prime Minister Zia’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party. Amid protests and international criticism over the handling of arrangements for the elections, President Ahmed declared a state of emergency on January 11, 2007, stepped down as chief advisor to the interim government, and indicated that elections were likely to be postponed.

B H U TA N KINGDOM

OF

BHUTAN

Druk-yul

See the note at the end of this entry for information on current events.

The Country The Kingdom of Bhutan is situated in the eastern Himalayas between Tibet and India. Mountainous in the north and heavily forested in the south, the country’s terrain has served to isolate it from the rest of the world and to inhibit any large population concentrations. Until quite recently the people were predominantly Bhutanese with about 20 percent of Nepalese extraction; the 1988 census, however, revealed that the latter component, known as Lhotshampas, had risen to about 40 percent, with the Sarchops community comprising 31 percent and the ruling Ngalung Drukpas of West Bhutan about 16 percent. Four main languages are spoken: Dzongkha (the official language) in the north and west, Bumthangkha in the central section, Sarachapkha in the east, and Nepali in the west and south. The Druk Kargue sect of Mahayana Buddhism is the official state religion, and Buddhist priests (lamas) exert considerable political influence. The lamas, numbering about 3,500, are distributed in 8 major monasteries (dzongs) and 200 smaller shrines (gompas). Most of the Nepalese are Hindu. Women constitute about 46 percent of the economically active population. Traditionally, women played a minimal role in governance, although the present National Assembly has 14 female members. The economy is largely agrarian, with an estimated 90 percent of the labor force in agriculture and animal husbandry, which account for about

33 percent of the GDP. The main crops are rice, maize, and other cereals; potatoes and other tubers and roots; and oranges and other fruits. Industry, contributing about 37 percent of GDP, is led by food and distillery operations and production of hydroelectric power. Electricity now accounts for one-third of nonservice export earnings, followed in importance by calcium carbide, wood and wood products (especially particle board), and cement.

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The export of raw timber was banned in 1999. India remains Bhutan’s principal trading partner, accounting for 95 percent of export earnings. With support from the World Bank group and other international donors, transportation, power, and communications have improved dramatically since the 1960s. GDP growth under a series of five-year plans averaged about 7 percent annually in 1976–1986 and nearly 9 percent in 1987–1997. Growth averaged 6.5 percent annually in 1998– 2001. During the same period consumer price inflation fell from 9 percent to under 3 percent. The Ninth Five-Year Plan (2002–2007) includes among its goals improved self-reliance, regional balance, environmental protection amid sustained growth, and continued expansion of the private sector, without, however, jeopardizing the country’s culture and traditions. (Bhutan’s development philosophy has as its overall goal improving “Gross National Happiness.”) Since 2002 GDP growth has been in the 6–7 percent range. The government nevertheless remains heavily dependent on foreign grants, which accounted for over 40 percent of government income in 2003–2005.

Government and Politics Political Background A consolidated kingdom since the mid-16th century, Bhutan is presently governed by a fourthgeneration hereditary monarch referred to as the Druk Gyalpo (Dragon King). Historically, the country was ruled by a dyarchy of temporal and spiritual rajas, but in 1907 Ugyan WANGCHUK was established on the throne with British assistance. British guidance of Bhutan’s external affairs, which began in 1865 in exchange for a financial subsidy, was confirmed by treaty in 1910. India succeeded to the British role by a treaty concluded August 8, 1949, in which India pledged not to interfere in Bhutanese internal affairs while Bhutan agreed to be “guided” by Indian advice in its external relations. The post–World War II era witnessed increased social and political change, primarily at the ini-

tiative of King Jigme Dorji WANGCHUK, who ascended the throne in 1952. Considerable unrest resulted from some of these policies, and in 1964 Prime Minister Jigme Polden DORJI was assassinated. Nonetheless, the king pursued his policy of modernization, establishing a Royal Advisory Council in 1965 and a Council of Ministers three years later, when a High Court was created, and the king gave the National Assembly authority to remove ministers as well as its chair (the monarch) by a vote of no confidence. The Assembly, however, subsequently abrogated the latter right. The present monarch, Western-educated Jigme Singye WANGCHUK, succeeded his father on July 24, 1972. From the late 1980s a resurgence of democracy in Nepal generated increased restiveness by Bhutan’s large Nepalese immigrant community, particularly after the monarch’s launching of a national integration (Driglam Namzha) drive that mandated the wearing of traditional Bhutanese dress and proscribed the teaching of Nepali in the schools. Based in the country’s southern regions, the Nepalese agitation spawned a number of political groups, including the Bhutan People’s Party (BPP) in 1990 and the Kathmandubased Bhutan National Democratic Party (BNDP) in 1992. Collaterally, violent outbreaks throughout the area accelerated what had initially been a small refugee problem, and by 1993 some 80,000 or more Bhutanese of Nepalese extraction had relocated to seven camps in eastern Nepal run by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In October 1993 representatives of Bhutan and Nepal held the first in a series of ministerial-level meetings to work toward resolution of the problem. Further rounds of talks in 1994 yielded agreement that a Joint Verification Team would categorize the refugees according to whether they were bona fide Bhutanese nationals, non-Bhutanese refugees from elsewhere, Bhutanese emigrants who had forfeited citizenship, or criminals. Meanwhile, a number of ethnic Nepalese leaders, most prominently Tek Nath RIZAL of the BPP, had been sentenced by Bhutan’s High Court to life imprisonment or

B H U TA N

Political Status: Independent monarchy; under Indian guidance in international affairs since 1949. Area: 18,147 sq. mi. (47,000 sq. km.). Population: 600,000 (1990C); 704,000 (2005E). The 1990 census figure is much smaller than the 1,165,000 reported in 1980, which was long considered approximate. Major Urban Center (2005E): THIMPHU (50,000). Official Language: Dzongkha. Monetary Unit: Ngultrum (official rate July 1, 2006: 46.04 ngultrum = $1US). The ngultrum is at par with the Indian rupee, which circulates freely within the country. Monarch: Jigme Singye WANGCHUK; proclaimed king (Druk Gyalpo) on July 24, 1972, following the death on July 22 of his father, Druk Gyalpo Jigme Dorji WANGCHUK. Heir to the Throne: Dasho Jigme Khesar Namgyel WANGCHUK; confirmed as crown prince on October 31, 1988; appointed heir to the throne (Chhoetse Penlop) on October 21, 2004, and invested on October 31. Chair of the Cabinet: Sangay NGEDUP; named minister of health and education by the king on July 1, 1998; named minister of agriculture by the king on July 10, 2003; rotated to chair of the cabinet for a one-year term on September 5, 2005, succeeding Yeshey ZIMBA.

other lengthy terms for terrorist activities. Intermittent violence by “antinationals” (ngolops), as they were branded by Bhutanese authorities, continued in the south as succeeding rounds of bilateral discussions made little progress. Rizal and 40 other political prisoners were released in December 1999, by which time the number of refugees had surpassed 100,000. On June 16, 1998, at the 181st session of the cabinet, the king announced his intention to dissolve the body for the first time since he ascended the throne, thereby preparing the way for the most significant governmental development in a genera-

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tion. In accordance with a royal edict (kasho) submitted to the speaker of the National Assembly in late June, the legislature on July 1 approved the formation of a partially elected cabinet to assume most of the king’s administrative duties and powers. Six days later the Assembly again bowed to the king’s wishes and accepted the authority to remove the monarch by a two-thirds vote of no confidence. On July 20 the king formally handed governmental authority over to the new cabinet, which included six ministers who had been nominated by the king and elected for five-year terms by secret ballot of the Assembly. At the king’s suggestion, Jigme Yoser THINLEY, the new foreign minister and theretofore the country’s ambassador to the UN in Geneva, assumed for a one-year term the chairmanship of the cabinet by virtue of having been elected by the largest majority (136–4). He was succeeded in July 1999 by Sangay NGEDUP, the minister of health and education, who was in turn succeeded a year later by Finance Minister Yeshey ZIMBA. Trade and Industry Minister Khandu WANGCHUK assumed the chairmanship on August 8, 2001; he was followed on August 14, 2002, by Agriculture Minister Kinzang DORJI. On June 28, 2003, the legislature voted its confidence in all six cabinet ministers, and two days later it endorsed additional ministerial nominees. On July 10 the king announced portfolio assignments for a new ten-member cabinet, which assumed office on August 30 under the chairmanship, once again, of Jigme Thinley. Yeshey Zimba, now minister of trade and industry, took over as chair on August 18, 2004, and he was succeeded by Minister of Health and Education Ngedup on September 5, 2005.

Constitution and Government Bhutan lacks a written constitution, but in the post–World War II period the infrastructure of a constitutional monarchy was established. Ultimate responsibility for the country’s sovereignty and security continues to be vested in the king as head of state, but under a 1998 royal edict he voluntarily surrendered his role as head of government.

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The cabinet (Lhengye Zhungtsho) is now partially elected for five-year terms, with the unicameral National Assembly approving or rejecting the king’s nominations by secret ballot. At present, the cabinet chair (the head of government) serves a oneyear term, with the position rotating among the elected ministers. As in the past, the cabinet also includes, ex officio, the 9 members of the Royal Advisory Council (Lodoi Tsokda, established in 1965): a chair named by the king, 2 members selected annually by religious authorities, and 6 members elected by the legislature from 20 candidates chosen at the district level. All 9 councilors also sit in the partially elected National Assembly (Tshongdu Chhenmo), which in the past did little but approve bills initiated by the monarch. In July 1998 the Assembly accepted the authority to remove the king by a two-thirds vote. The judicial system includes a High Court (Thrimkhang Gongma), with citizens conventionally accorded the right of ultimate appeal to the king through the royal chamberlain (gyalp¨on zimpon). The country is divided into 20 administrative districts (dzongkhags), each headed by a district officer (dzongda). Villages are grouped into counties (gewogs), each with its own elected Development Committee. In 2002 voters for the first time elected village headmen. In late 2001 the king announced that work had begun on drafting a formal constitution that would codify and extend the country’s fledgling democratic process. In December 2002 the committee charged with preparing the draft delivered it to the king, but it was not published until March 2005. The document, which is to be submitted to a referendum, calls for establishing a “democratic constitutional monarchy” in which political parties will be permitted to contest National Assembly elections (see Current issues, below).

Foreign Relations Bhutan’s external relations have long been conducted largely through the Indian government, although the 1949 treaty that requires Thimphu to seek “advice” from New Delhi in foreign affairs has come under periodic criticism, particularly in

the wake of India’s formal absorption of neighboring Sikkim in 1974. The question of the kingdom’s international status was revived in February 1980, following the establishment of diplomatic relations with Bangladesh. The action was Thimphu’s first effort to deal directly with a third country, although it had acted independently of India in several international forums, including the United Nations General Assembly. Since then, Bhutan has joined a number of multilateral bodies, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank, and has engaged in direct negotiations with China to settle a border controversy that is linked to the Chinese-Indian dispute over portions of Arunachal Pradesh. In 1983 it participated with Bangladesh, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka in the establishment of a committee that subsequently evolved into the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). In 2005 the seven reached agreement on establishing a South Asia Free Trade Area, which was to become operational in mid-2006. In late 2003 Bhutan moved to resolve a decadeold problem involving Indian separatists who were using bases in southeastern Bhutan to mount crossborder raids. Altercations with Bhutanese police also had occurred. The Indian government had long called for Bhutan to evict the Assamese and Bodo insurgents, and in 2000 the National Assembly concluded that Bhutan should be prepared to use military measures if a peaceful resolution could not be found. Bhutan subsequently repeated that it would not permit its territory to be used for activities deemed contrary to the best interests of its neighbor. Finally, in mid-December 2003, in its first large-scale mission since the 1865 AngloBhutanese war, the Royal Bhutanese Army attacked some 30 camps occupied by an estimated 3,000 separatists associated with three militant movements: the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), the National Liberation Front of Bodoland (NLFB), and the more recently organized Kamatapur Liberation Organization (KLO). In February 2004 India reported that over 400 insurgents had been killed in the successful offensive, which had extended into the new year.

B H U TA N

In recent years border discussions with China have been held on a near-annual basis. A government report on the Sino-Bhutanese talks presented to the National Assembly in 1995 said that Chinese territorial claims included some 270 square kilometers in the western sector and somewhat more in the northern sector, to which Bhutan had responded with counterclaims. The report stressed, however, that negotiations were proceeding “in a spirit of goodwill and cooperation.” Seventeen rounds of border talks had been held through April 2004, at which time the two sides agreed to form a technical expert group for purposes of demarcation. The second meeting of the expert group was held in Thimphu in July 2005, with the next session to be held in China in 2006.

Current Issues Toward the end of 2005 the king and Crown Prince Jigme Khesar Namgyel WANGCHUK began holding forums throughout the country, meeting with thousands of district representatives to explain the draft constitution and address concerns. If adopted, the 34-article, Western-style constitution would establish a constitutional monarchy featuring the separation of powers into executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The Druk Gyalpo would remain head of state, but he would be required to step down upon reaching the age of 65; in another break with tradition, females would not be excluded from the line of succession, although a male heir, even if younger, would take precedence. The draft defines Buddhism as “the spiritual heritage” of the country but guarantees freedom of religion as well as freedom of speech, press, and assembly. Political parties would be permitted as long as their membership was not based on “region, sex, language, religion, or social origin.” A bicameral Parliament would include a new National Council as well as the National Assembly. The latter would be streamlined to no more than 75 members, all elected through single-member constituencies in two stages: first, a primary round in which all registered political parties could compete, followed by a second round contested by the two parties that had received the most pri-

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mary votes. Serving as an upper house, the National Council would have 25 members: the country’s 20 districts would each elect 1 member on a nonpartisan basis, and the king would appoint 5 distinguished citizens. Both bodies would serve five-year terms, although the National Assembly would be subject to early dissolution in the event of a political impasse. As in nearby Bangladesh, interim governments would be responsible for holding elections following all parliamentary dissolutions. The king would appoint as prime minister the leader or nominee of the majority party in the National Assembly and also would name other ministers, on the recommendation of the prime minister. The National Assembly and National Council, sitting in joint session, could override a monarchical veto by a two-thirds vote. By a three-fourths vote and with popular concurrence in a national referendum, they could force the king to abdicate. Responding in January 2006 to concerns that the draft contains no provision for the king to assume control in a crisis (as occurred in Nepal in February 2005), the crown prince explained, “Our people must not be haunted by the fear of unscrupulous politicians and failing parties but must express their general will by selecting and electing responsible and capable parties and candidates.” The most controversial constitutional provisions involve citizenship. To be a citizen an individual must be the child of two Bhutanese parents or must have been officially registered as a resident on or before December 31, 1958. To be eligible for naturalization an individual must have resided in Bhutan for at least 15 years; have committed no criminal offenses; be able to speak and write Dzongkha; have a “good knowledge” of the country’s culture and history; and “have no record of having spoken or acted against the King, the Country, and the People of Bhutan.” Most of the ethnic Nepalese community would thereby be excluded from citizenship. Not surprisingly, Nepalese leaders rejected the draft. On October 22, 2003, Nepal and Bhutan had announced an agreement that would permit repatriation of approximately three-fourths of the ethnic Nepalese living at one of the refugee camps in

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Nepal. Only four months earlier, at the conclusion of the Joint Verification Team’s efforts at Khudunabari camp, Bhutan had insisted that only those who had been forcibly evicted from Bhutan—under 2.5 percent of the 12,000 at Khudunabari—would be allowed to return, with the status of the majority, “voluntary emigrants,” dependent on whether the government decided to reinstate their citizenship. In contrast, under the October agreement only some 3,000 non-Bhutanese would not be permitted entry. The repatriation was expected to begin in early 2004, but an incident at Khudunabari on December 22, 2003, during which refugees allegedly assaulted Bhutanese members of the verification team, led Thimphu to delay the process, which had not been resumed as of March 2006. In the larger international community, and especially among human rights activists, the postponement generated a combination of concern and impatience. Many Nepalese leaders, including Tek Nath Rizal, pressed for India to get involved, to no avail, while in January 2006 the UNHCR asked Nepal to grant refugees permission to leave the camps for third countries. As of February 2006 the constitutional referendum had not been scheduled, although the king had already announced that legislative elections would be held in 2008. In a move that stunned his most traditional supporters, he further announced in December 2005 that he intends to step down from the throne in 2008 in favor of the crown prince.

Political Parties At present, Bhutan has no legal parties, but they would be permitted by the draft constitution that remained under discussion in 2006. The groups below, which operate from abroad, mostly represent the ethnic Nepalese community, including refugees in Nepal. Many have overlapping leaderships. National Front for Democracy in Bhutan (NFDB). Formed in July 1996 (and also known as the United Front for Democracy), the NFDB is a coalition of prodemocracy groupings—the BPP, DNC, and BGNLF—which operates mainly from Nepal but also, under some limitations, from India.

In May 1998 the Front stated that, in the absence of major reform, it was prepared to launch a revolution in Bhutan, but its rhetoric has typically been less strident. More recently, it has organized regular protests at the Nepal-India border, in part to call attention to its demand that India intervene on behalf of the refugees. Members have repeatedly been arrested as a result of NFDB activities. In July 2005 the National Front announced that it was writing a “parallel constitution” to the draft being circulated by the Bhutanese government, which it accused of failing to support full democracy and of imposing its will on the people of Bhutan. Leaders: Thinley PENJORE, Balaram POUDEL. Bhutan People’s Party (BPP). With backing from the Nepalese Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist), the BPP evolved in 1990 from the still-extant People’s Forum for Human Rights. It was formally banned after disturbances in southern Bhutan in September 1990. It advocates the substitution of a constitutional monarchy for an absolute one, linguistic and religious freedom, equal rights for all ethnic groups, and a multiparty parliamentary system. The BPP subsequently became a leading component of the Appeal Movement Coordination Council (AMCC), which organized a number of refugee marches and protests. The party’s founder, Tek Nath Rizal, having been imprisoned since 1989 and sentenced to life in 1993 for “masterminding” antinational activities, was released by the king in December 1999 but barred from political activity. In January 2000 BPP president R. K. BUDHATHOKI described the release as part of a conspiracy to damage Rizal’s popularity. Budhathoki was assassinated in Nepal in September 2001. Leader: Balaram POUDEL (Chair). Druk National Congress (DNC). Founded on June 16, 1994, by Rongthong Kinley DORJI, leader of the Sarchop community in Bhutan, the DNC operated in Bhutan until 1995, when the regime began to limit its activities. The DNC’s primary policy goals are democratization and “social justice” under a constitutional monarchy.

B H U TA N

A split in the party was reported in 2001, with one faction remaining loyal to Dorji and another naming Chheku DUKPA as leader. Thimphu has repeatedly demanded Dorji’s extradition from India. Leaders: Thinley PENJORE (President), Naradmani ADHIKARI (General Secretary). Bhutan Gorkha National Liberation Front (BGNLF). Organized in December 1994, the BGNLF has called for constitutional protection of ethnic Nepalese, immediate repatriation of refugees, greater representation in the National Assembly, and establishment of an independent judiciary. The group has often organized demonstrations on the Indian border and has attempted to lead refugees into Bhutan. Leaders: Tara MUKARUNG (Chair), Dili Ram KATTEL (Vice Chair). Bhutan National Democratic Party (BNDP). Founded in February 1992 by former government officials of Nepalese ethnic origin, the party was banned shortly afterward and operates primarily from Nepal. It supports the institution of constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system. The BNDP was the driving force in the Bhutan Coalition for the Democratic Movement (BCDM), which received backing from the Communist Party of India-Marxist for a series of protest actions on the Bhutanese border in 1995–1996. Leaders: R. B. BASNET (President), Dev Narayan Singh DHAKAL (Founding General Secretary), Hari Prasad ADHIKARI (General Secretary). In early 2004 reports surfaced that a Communist Party of Bhutan (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist) had been formed in the Bhutanese refugee camps in Nepal under the leadership of VIKALPA (a probable alias). In addition, various expatriate human rights organizations—all of which the Bhutanese government classifies as political and therefore bans— have been operating abroad. In July 2003 seven of them banded together to organize the Human Rights Council of Bhutan (HRCB) under the chairmanship of Tek Nath RIZAL. Found-

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ing groups were the Bhutanese Refugees Representative Repatriation Committee (BRRRC), chaired by Suk Bahadur SUBBA; the Bhutanese Refugee Women Forum (BRWF), led by Garima ADHIKARI (Coordinator); the Center for Protection of Minorities and Against Racism and Discrimination (CEMARD Bhutan), led by Rakesh CHHETRI (Executive Director); the Association of Human Rights Activists of Bhutan (AHURA Bhutan), led by Ratan GAZMERE (Chief Coordinator); the Human Rights Organization of Bhutan (HUROB), led by Kishor RAIR (General Secretary); the People’s Forum for Human Rights in Bhutan (PFHRB), formed in 1989 by Rizal and now led by D. P. KAFLE (General Secretary); and the Students Union of Bhutan (SUB), represented by Mukti GURUNNG.

Legislature The National Assembly (Tshongdu Chhenmo) meets at least once annually, the session lasting, in recent years, for approximately four to six weeks. At recent sessions the total membership of 152 included some 100 elected district representatives, the 6 indirectly elected members of the Royal Advisory Council, 10 members chosen by religious bodies, and the remainder designated by the king to represent government and other secular interests. Members serve overlapping three-year terms. Speaker: Ugyen DORJI.

Communications The media were operated by the government until October 1992, when the king decreed that they should be granted greater independence. The government nevertheless exerts considerable influence over content and from 1989 until 1999 banned private television reception.

Press Published in Thimphu, the country’s only newspaper, Kuensel (Clarity, 17,000), was founded in 1967 as a bimonthly government bulletin but is now

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Cabinet As of July 15, 2006 Chair

Sangay Ngedup

Ministers Agriculture Education Finance Foreign Affairs Health Home and Cultural Affairs Information and Communications Labor and Human Resources Trade and Industries Works and Human Settlements

Sangay Ngedup Thinley Gyamtsho Wangdi Norbu Khandu Wangchuk Jigme Singay Jigme Yoser Thinley Leki Dorji Ugyen Tshering Yeshey Zimba Kinzang Dorji

Royal Advisory Council Chair Other Elected Members

Rinzin Gyeltshen Jangchub Dorji Sigay Dorji Yeshey Dorji Zeko Dorji D. B. Sinchuari Sangay Wangdi

Note: The Royal Advisory Council also includes two members chosen annually by religious leaders.

an autonomous, government-subsidized weekly published in English, Dzongkha, and Nepali.

Broadcasting The Bhutan Broadcasting Service Corporation (BBSC), an autonomous agency, transmits radio broadcasts in Dzongkha, Sarachapkha, Nepali, and English; it began limited television service in Thimphu, in English and Dzongkha, in 1999. In early 2006 the BBSC announced that its television broadcasts would shortly reach the entire country. The nation’s approximately 15,000 sets

also can receive transmissions from India and Bangladesh.

Intergovernmental Representation Diplomatic relations between Bhutan and the United States are conducted through the government of India. Permanent Representative to the UN Daw PENJO IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, CP, Interpol, NAM, SAARC, WCO

Note: On September 7, 2006 Foreign Minister Khandu Wangchuk became prime minister for a one-year term, succeeding Sangay Ngedup. On December 16, 2006, King Jigme Wangchuk stepped down, citing a need to give his son, Crown Prince Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuk, sufficient time to “gather experience” before the introduction of a constitution and the holding of legislative elections in 2008.

BRUNEI STATE

OF

BRUNEI DARUSSALAM

Negara Brunei Darussalam

The Country Brunei consists of two jungle enclaves on the north coast of Borneo. About two-thirds of its population is Malay; the remainder is largely other indigenous tribes and Chinese. Malay is the official language, but the use of English is widespread. A majority of the inhabitants follow Islam, the official religion; smaller groups are Buddhist, Confucian, Christian, and pagan. Brunei’s per capita income is one of the highest in eastern Asia. Its wealth is derived from royalties on oil produced by Brunei Shell Petroleum and Brunei Shell Marketing, in both of which the government now holds a 50 percent interest, and on liquefied natural gas (LNG) produced primarily by Brunei LNG, in which the government holds a 50 percent interest and Shell and Mitsubishi of Japan each holds 25 percent. Brunei ranks high among world LNG producers. Oil and gas account for 40 percent of GDP, 90 percent of government tax revenues, and 90 percent of exports. Leading markets are Japan and South Korea. A consistently positive balance of trade and current accounts have permitted extensive government investment in development projects. In recent years, concern over declining oil reserves has led the government to accelerate diversification in such areas as tourism, fishing, and trade. Efforts to privatize and commercialize such government services as electricity, water, and telecommunications were also initiated. Private sector growth has nevertheless been slowed not only by restrictions on foreign investment but also by an inability to equal the high

remuneration paid to public sector workers, who constitute a majority of the employed labor force. At present, agriculture and fishing contribute under 3 percent of GDP, while the largest nonpetroleum component of the industrial sector is construction. Manufactures include food and beverages, garments, wood products, and building materials. Consistent GDP growth in the mid-1990s was reversed in 1998 because of falling world oil prices, the impact of the regional financial crisis, and the collapse of Brunei’s largest nonpetroleum

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enterprise, the Amedeo Development Corporation, an investment and construction company. Growth averaged about 2.8 percent annually in 1999–2002 and advanced to 3.8 percent in 2003 before falling to 1.7 percent in 2004. With oil prices rising thereafter, a 3 percent rate of expansion was anticipated for 2005.

Government and Politics Political Background Brunei became a British protectorate in 1888 and was administered from 1906 to 1959 by a British resident. Sultan Sir Haji Omar ALI SAIFUDDIN, 28th in a line of hereditary rulers dating from the 15th century, promulgated Brunei’s first written constitution in 1959, creating a framework for internal self-government while retaining British responsibility for defense and external affairs. At balloting in August–September 1962, all 10 elective seats in a 21-member Legislative Council were won by the left-wing Brunei People’s Party (Parti Rakyat Brunei—PRB), led by A. M. N. AZAHARI, which sought a unitary state that would include the adjacent British territories of North Borneo (subsequently Sabah) and Sarawak. In December a rebellion was launched by the PRBbacked North Borneo Liberation Army, which, with Indonesian support, proclaimed a “revolutionary State of North Kalimantan.” However, the revolt was quickly suppressed, Azahari being granted political asylum by Malaya. A plan to join the Federation of Malaysia was accepted by the sultan during preliminary talks in 1963 but was subsequently rejected because of disagreements regarding Brunei’s position within the federation and the division of its oil royalties. Following talks with the British Commonwealth secretary in 1964, the sultan introduced constitutional reforms to allow a limited form of ministerial government, and a new general election was held in March 1965. Britain continued to press for a more representative government, however, and on October 4, 1967, the sultan, personally unwilling to accept further change, abdicated in favor of

his 22-year-old son, Crown Prince HASSANAL BOLKIAH, who was crowned on August 1, 1968. In early 1970 the constitution was suspended and the Legislative Council was reconstituted as an entirely appointive body, the sultan subsequently ruling primarily by decree. In 1971 renegotiated arrangements with Great Britain gave the sultan full responsibility for internal order but left the British with responsibility for external affairs. An agreement on formal independence, concluded in London on June 30, 1978, following 12 days of discussions between the UK government and Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah (assisted by his father), specified that Britain’s responsibilities for Brunei’s defense and foreign affairs would terminate at the end of 1983. Formal treaty signing on January 7, 1979, came only after Indonesia and Malaysia had given assurances that Brunei’s sovereignty would be respected, that the sultan’s opponents would not be allowed to maintain guerrilla bases in either country, and that both would support membership for Brunei in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). On January 1, 1984, after proclaiming independence, the sultan assumed the office of prime minister and announced a cabinet dominated by the royal family. In the early 1990s he attempted to shed his earlier “playboy” image in support of a new and demonstrably conservative ideology that blended elements of Bruneian Malay culture with the role of the monarch as defender of Islam (Melayu Islam Beraja). In 1998 Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah removed his younger brother, Prince Muda Haji JEFRI BOLKIAH, as chair of the Brunei Investment Agency (BIA) and as head of the Amedeo Development Corporation, which Jefri had started in 1994. Brunei’s largest nonpetroleum company, Amedeo had collapsed at an estimated cost of $16 billion, and the resultant scandal, compounded by Jefri’s notoriously lavish lifestyle, had caused a major rift in the royal family. On July 15, 2004, the sultan announced that the Legislative Council would reconvene shortly. On September 25 the 21 newly appointed members met to consider constitutional amendments, including provisions for a partially elected Council,

BRUNEI

Political Status: Former constitutional monarchy in treaty relationship with the United Kingdom; independent sultanate proclaimed January 1, 1984. Area: 2,226 sq. mi. (5,765 sq. km.). Population: 332,844 (2001C); 366,000 (2005E). Major Urban Center (2005E): BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN (30,000). Official Language: Malay (English is widely used). Monetary Unit: Brunei Dollar (market rate July 1, 2006: 1.58 dollars = $1US). The Brunei dollar is at par with the Singapore dollar. Head of State and Prime Minister: Sultan Sir Haji HASSANAL BOLKIAH Muizzaddin Waddaulah; ascended the throne October 5, 1967, upon the abdication of his father, Sultan Sir Haji Omar ALI SAIFUDDIN; crowned August 1, 1968; assumed office of prime minister at independence, succeeding former Chief Minister ABDUL AZIZ bin Umar. Heir Apparent: Crown Prince Haji al-Muhtadee BILLAH, eldest son of the sultan; installed as crown prince August 10, 1998.

which were approved by Hassanal Bolkiah on September 29. A major cabinet reshuffle on May 30, 2005—the first in 17 years—included the elevation of Crown Prince Haji al-Muhtadee BILLAH to the new post of senior minister in the Prime Minister’s Office.

Constitution and Government Many provisions of the 1959 constitution have been suspended since 1962; others were effectively superseded upon independence. Under its terms, the sultan, as head of state, presides over a Council of Cabinet Ministers and is advised by a Legislative Council, a Privy Council to deal in part with constitutional issues, and a Religious Council; the basic law also provides for a Council of Succession. The Legislative Council, to which a portion of the membership was elected in 1962 and 1965, is (as originally projected in 1959) wholly appointive,

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but the amendments approved in September 2004 authorize the future election of 15 members to a 45-member body. The judicial system includes a High Court, a Court of Appeal, and magistrates’ courts; there are also religious courts from which the Religious Council hears appeals. For administrative purposes Brunei is divided into four districts, each headed by a district officer responsible to the sultan. District councils with a minority of elected members advise the district officers on local affairs. Subdivisions include mukims, each headed by a penghulu (chieftain), and villages, each led by a ketua (headman). At independence, only ethnic Malays were accorded an unchallenged right to Bruneian citizenship; Chinese residents, theretofore protected by Bruneian-British passports, could acquire similar status only after 20 years’ residence and passage of a stringent Malay language test.

Foreign Relations Upon independence, Brunei became a member of the Commonwealth and in January 1984 joined ASEAN as its sixth member. Soon after, it was admitted to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). In September 1984 it became the 159th member of the United Nations and in October 1985 joined the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. In 1989 it became a founding member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group. Relations were established with China and the Soviet Union in 1991. The sultan moved quickly at independence to transfer the bulk of Brunei’s substantial investment portfolio from British management to the newly established BIA. In the defense sphere, however, an agreement of September 1983 provided for a battalion of British Army Gurkhas to be stationed in Brunei under British command and on the understanding that their sole function was to protect the country’s oil and gas installations (i.e., they could not be used by the sultan for internal security purposes). Originally concluded for a five-year term, the agreement was most recently extended (to 2008) during Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah’s visit to

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London in January 2003, at which time he met with Prime Minister Tony Blair. Brunei’s relations with Indonesia and Malaysia were long marred by territorial claims and support offered to the sultan’s political opponents. In addition, Malaysia regularly called upon Britain to “decolonize” Brunei and backed UN resolutions pressuring London to sponsor UN-supervised elections in the sultanate. Brunei, meanwhile, continued to claim sovereignty over Limbang, the area of Sarawak separating the nation’s two regions. In the second half of the 1970s, however, relations between the neighbors improved, and in July 1980 Hassanal Bolkiah paid the first official visit by a sultan to Malaysia in 17 years. In October 1984 he met in Jakarta with Indonesian President Suharto, who asserted that his government had no territorial ambitions in regard to the sultanate, and in March 1989 he made his first official visit to the neighboring Malaysian state of Sarawak. In April 1995 the foreign ministers of Brunei and Malaysia held an inaugural joint commission meeting, at which agreement was reached on adoption of a bilateral approach to resolution of the Limbang issue. In 1997, in the midst of the regional economic crisis, Brunei attempted to support its nearby neighbors by pledging over $1 billion in loans to Jakarta and by buying Malaysia’s ringgit and the Singapore dollar on foreign-exchange markets. More recently, the government participated in formation of the Brunei-Indonesia-MalaysiaPhilippines–East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMPEAGA), which, at its second summit in December 2005, approved a five-year plan for subregional economic development, with an emphasis on improved air and sea links. Early in the year, Hassanal Bolkiah was the first head of state to visit Indonesia’s devastated Aceh Province following the December 2004 tsunami disaster. A continuing foreign policy concern has been the status of the reputedly oil-rich Spratly Islands, portions of which Brunei, China, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam all claim.

Current Issues The steps toward democratic reform taken in 2004 and 2005 were at best tentative. All of the

constitutional changes of September 2004 were proposed by the sultan, and it came as no surprise when they were approved by the appointed Legislative Council. The amendments did include provision for 15 members of an expanded, 45-member Legislative Council to be elected, but as of early 2006 there were still no concrete plans to conduct an election. Moreover, other constitutional changes served to codify the sultan’s authority, including his absolute control of governmental administration. In another notable change, Brunei’s constitution now designates Islam as the country’s official religion. In 2003 Brunei’s Internal Security Department asserted that there was no evidence of terrorist activity in Brunei. However, the country’s Internal Security Act has sometimes been used against critics of the regime, some of whom have been charged with subversive activities. Offenses have included distributing illegal pamphlets and posting “propaganda” on a website. Although Brunei now has three recognized political parties, their membership and activities are strictly regulated by the government’s Registrar of Societies, and none has yet proposed policies that significantly differ from those of the sultan.

Political Parties Political parties were essentially moribund for most of the quarter-century after the failed 1962 rebellion. A Brunei People’s Independence Front (Barisan Kemerdekaan Rakyat—Baker), formed in 1966 by amalgamation of a number of earlier groups, was deregistered because of inactivity in early 1985. A Brunei People’s National United Party (Parti Perpaduan Kebangsaan Rakyat Brunei—Perkera), founded in 1968, had also stopped functioning. The moderate Islamist Brunei National Democratic Party (Parti Kebangsaan Demokratik Brunei—PKDB) and the PPKB (below) were accorded legal recognition in 1985 and 1986, respectively. However, in 1988 the government confirmed that it had dissolved the PKDB, while the PPKB disappeared from view until 1995. Since then, two additional parties, the PPK and Pakar, have been registered, but neither has challenged the government.

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Brunei National United Party (Parti Perpaduan Kebangsaan Brunei—PPKB). Formed in late 1985 under the leadership of Haji Hatta Zainal Abidin, the PPKB was an offshoot of the PKDB, led by Abdul LATIF Hamid and Abdul LATIF Chuchu. After the two Latifs had reportedly called upon the sultan to give up the premiership, to lift the state of emergency, and to hold a national election, the PKDB was banned early in 1988 and the Latifs detained, whereupon the PPKB also ceased to function. In February 1995 the PPKB received authorization to hold a general assembly in Bandar Seri Begawan, at which Latif Chuchu was elected party president (the other Latif died in 1990). However, conditions attached to his release from detention obliged Latif to resign, and the party remained largely inactive until a general meeting was again permitted in April 1998. Elected president by the attendees, Zainal Abidin thereby became, in effect, unofficial leader of the opposition. Also identified in English as the Brunei Solidarity National Party, the PPKB supports the concept of a Malay-dominated, Muslim monarchy but has also called for democratic reforms, including open legislative elections, discontinuation of the state of emergency, and permission for government employees (a large percentage of the adult population) to participate in politics. It has also called for higher wages for civil servants and an end to nepotism and cronyism. The most recent party congress was held in July 2004. In September 2005 the PPKB praised the sultan’s decision to name a new, expanded Legislative Council. Leaders: Mohamed HATTA ZAINAL Abidin (President), Ramli Haji ABDULLAH (Deputy President), HAMZAH bin Rahman (Secretary General).

and announced its intention to work as a government “partner.” Leaders: Muhammad Yassin AFFANDI (AFANDY) (President), Mahmud Morshidi Awang OTHMAN (Deputy President), Aminorashid GHAZALI (Secretary General).

National Development Party (Parti Pembangunan Kebangsaan—PPK). The PPK was registered on August 31, 2005, under the leadership of Muhammad Yassin Affandi, 83, former leader of the PRB who had been imprisoned from 1962 until 1973 and again in 1997–1999. The PPK quickly established branches in the country’s four districts

There is no legislature per se. At present, legislation is enacted by proclamation. A 21-member advisory Legislative Council (Majlis Meshuarat Negeri), a wholly nonelective body that incorporates all cabinet members, met in September 2004, two decades after last convening. It quickly approved constitutional amendments, including a

People’s Awareness Party (Parti Kesedaran Rakyat—Pakar). Also translated as the People’s Consciousness Party, Pakar was established in May 2000, although its existence was not widely reported until it was threatened with deregistration in 2004 for failure to meet technical requirements. Subsequently, a serious rift developed between factions loyal to the party’s president, Maidin Haji Ahmad, and its secretary general, Jumat bin Haji Idris, which led the factions to hold competing meetings in March 2005. For a time, Idris claimed the presidency, but in August 2005 the factions agreed to mend the rift. Leaders: Maidin Haji AHMAD, Jumat Haji IDRIS.

Exile Formation Brunei People’s Party (Parti Rakyat Brunei— PRB). Formerly a legal party that was deeply involved in the 1962 insurgency, the PRB has since been supported by a somewhat shadowy membership of about 100 individuals, most of them living as exiles in Indonesia or Malaysia. Over the years, the sultan has pardoned a number of participants in the 1962 rebellion, including former PRB leader Muhammad Yassin Affandi, who was released in August 1999 and formed the PPK in 2005. A party founder, A. M. N. Azahari, died in exile in May 2002.

Legislature

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Cabinet As of July 15, 2006 Prime Minister Senior Minister in the Prime Minister’s Office

Sultan Sir Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Prince Haji al-Muhtadee Billah

Ministers Communications Culture, Youth, and Sports Defense Defense II Development Education Energy Finance Finance II Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs II Health Home Affairs Industry and Primary Resources Religious Affairs

Abu Bakar bin Apong Mohamed bin Daud Sultan Sir Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Col. Mohamed Yasmin Singamanteri Abdullah bin Begawan Bakar Abdul Rahman bin Mohamed Taib Yahya bin Begawan Bakar Sultan Sir Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Abdul Rahman bin Ibrahim Prince Muda Haji Mohamed Bolkiah Lim Jock Seng Suyoi bin Osman Adanan bin Begawan Mohamed Yusof Ahmad bin Jumat Mohamed Zain bin Serudin

provision for the future election of 15 representatives to an expanded 45-member body. On September 1, 2005, the sultan dissolved the Legislative Council, and on September 2 he appointed a new, 29-member council. Speaker: Kamaludin ibni Mohamed YASSIN.

Broadcasting and Computing

Communications A 2001 press law makes publishing “false news” an offense punishable by up to three years in prison.

Press The following are published in Bandar Seri Begawan, unless otherwise noted: Pelita Brunei (25,000), official weekly in Romanized Malay; Borneo Bulletin (Kuala Belait, 20,000), progovernment daily, in English and Malay; Daily News Digest, government bulletin, in English; Brunei Darussalam Newsletter, fortnightly government newsletter, in English.

The government-controlled Radio Television Brunei, with broadcasts in Malay, English, Chinese, and local dialects, transmitted to approximately 3.4 million television receivers in 2003; private satellite service is also available. Some 27,000 personal computers serviced 45,000 Internet users in 2003.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. Pengiran Anak Dato PUTEH U.S. Ambassador to Brunei Darussalam Emil M. SKODON Permanent Representative to the UN Emran BAHAR IGO Memberships (Non-UN) APEC, ASEAN, CWTH, IDB, Interpol, NAM, OIC, WCO, WTO

CAMBODIA KINGDOM

OF

CAMBODIA

Preahreachanachak Kampuchea

See the note at the end of this entry for information on current events.

The Country The smallest of the French Indochinese states to which independence was restored in 1953, Cambodia is bounded by Thailand on the west and northwest, Laos on the north, and Vietnam on the east and southeast. The southwestern border of the country is an irregular coastline on the Gulf of Thailand. It is a basically homogeneous nation, with Khmers (Cambodians) constituting approximately 85 percent of the total population. Ethnic minorities were estimated in 1970 to include 450,000 Chinese, 400,000 Vietnamese, 80,000 Cham-Malays (Muslims descended from the people of the ancient kingdom of Champa), 50,000 Khmer Loeus (tribals), and 20,000 Thais and Laotians. Many of the Chinese and most ChamMalays and Vietnamese were reported to have been massacred during the period of Khmer Rouge rule; beginning in 1979, however, substantial (although not wholly voluntary) resettlement by Vietnamese occurred, largely in the Mekong region from Phnom Penh to the southeastern border. Social cohesion and stability traditionally derived from a common language (Khmer), a shared sense of national identity, and the pervading influence of Theravada Buddhism, the state religion. Only a handful of Muslims and Christians were said to have survived the 1975–1979 holocaust. Women have long played a major economic role as agricultural laborers and have also been prominent as local traders; as of 2000 they constituted about 52

percent of the labor force. Female participation in government is low, accounting for about 10 percent of the National Assembly elected in 2003. Cambodia’s economy was traditionally based on the agricultural sector (including forestry and fishing), which continues to employ about 70 percent of the labor force. In 2005 the sector accounted for roughly one-third of GDP, as did both industry and services. Timber and rubber long accounted

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for the bulk of export earnings, but since 1997 a rapidly expanding garment industry has been more important, contributing an estimated three-fourths of domestic exports in 2003. The chief food crops are rice (accounting for 80 percent of the cultivated area), corn, palm sugar, and sugarcane. Although the economy achieved an annual average growth rate of over 5 percent from 1987 to 1996, the rate dipped to 3.7 percent in 1997–1998 because of a financial crisis in Southeast Asia and because fighting between rival governmental factions led to the loss of international aid and the flight of foreign investment capital. At the same time, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) continued to insist upon substantial economic reforms, including deep civil service cuts, before it would resume lending. In 1999 GDP growth jumped to 10.8 percent, and that was followed by expansion rates of 7.0 percent and 5.7 percent in 2000 and 2001, respectively. Over the same three years, inflation was held in check. Growth remained steady at 5.5 percent in 2002 and 5.2 percent in 2003. Cambodia nevertheless remains one of East Asia’s poorest countries, with a per capita income of only $310 in 2003 as calculated by the World Bank. Although the IMF resumed lending to Cambodia in 1999, five years later it cautioned that “poor governance” has weakened competitiveness and that the slow pace of structural reform has continued to damage the economy. The IMF urged the government to “attach high priority” to agricultural and land reform as a key step in reducing poverty.

Government and Politics Political Background Increasing pressure from Siam (Thailand) and Vietnam had almost extinguished Khmer independence prior to the establishment of a French protectorate at the request of King ANG DUONG in 1863. In the early 1940s Japan, in furtherance of its “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere,” seized de facto control of Cambodia. A Thai claim to the western portion of the region had been resisted by the French, but Japan permitted Thailand to annex the provinces of Battambang and Siem Reap,

with the French retaining nominal control in the rest of the country. After the surrender of Japan in World War II, Cambodia was recognized as an autonomous kingdom within the French Union, and the two northwestern provinces were returned by Thailand. In 1949 Cambodia signed an accord with France that brought it into the French Union as an Associated State. Political feuds within the governing Democratic Party having hampered negotiations with the French, King NORODOM SIHANOUK dissolved the National Assembly in January 1953 and personally negotiated his country’s full independence, which was formally announced on November 9. Independence was reinforced by the Geneva Agreement of 1954, which called for the withdrawal from Cambodia of all foreign troops, including Vietminh elements that had entered from North Vietnam as a “liberation” force. To enhance his status as national leader, Sihanouk abdicated in 1955 in favor of his father, NORODOM SURAMARIT. Reverting to the title of prince, Sihanouk organized his own mass political movement, the People’s Socialist Community (Sangkum Reastr Niyum). In an election held in September 1955, Sangkum candidates chosen by Sihanouk won 82 percent of the popular vote and all seats in the National Assembly. Opposed only by the pro-Communist People’s Party (Pracheachon), the Sangkum again captured all 82 Assembly seats in an election held in September 1966. This time the candidates were not handpicked, and the conservative tendencies of the resultant government, headed by Lt. Gen. LON NOL, prompted Sihanouk to set up a “countergovernment” of moderates and leftists to act as an extraparliamentary opposition. Subsequent rivalry between the conservative and radical groups, coupled with an April 1967 revolt in Battambang Province in which Communists played a leading role, led Sihanouk to assume special powers as head of a provisional government in May. The new cabinet resigned in January 1968, and Sihanouk appointed another headed by PENN NOUTH. Penn Nouth resigned in July 1969, and Gen. Lon Nol returned to the premiership. In March 1970 Prince Sihanouk was deposed as head of state, and on October 9 the

CAMBODIA

Political Status: Became independent as the Kingdom of Cambodia on November 9, 1953; Khmer Republic proclaimed October 9, 1970; renamed Democratic Kampuchea by constitution of January 5, 1976, following Communist (Khmer Rouge) takeover on April 17, 1975; de jure authority contested by the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) and the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK, formed January 8, 1979) following the Vietnamese invasion of December 1978; PRK redesignated as State of Cambodia (SOC) on April 30, 1989; CGDK redesignated as National Government of Cambodia (NGC) on February 3, 1990, collateral with reversion of Democratic Kampuchea to Cambodia; transitional Supreme National Council (SNC) formally endorsed by all-party peace agreement signed in Paris, France, on October 23, 1991; interim coalition regime (without Khmer Rouge participation) authorized on June 16, 1993, following multiparty legislative election of May 23–28; current constitution ratified on September 21 and promulgated on September 24, 1993. Area: 69,898 sq. mi. (181,035 sq. km.). Population: 11,437,656 (1998C); 14,472,000 (2005E). Major Urban Center (2005E): PHNOM PENH (1,350,000). Following the 1975 Communist takeover, virtually the entire population of the

monarchy was abolished and Cambodia was proclaimed the Khmer Republic. An election initially scheduled for the same year was postponed because of military confrontation with the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese. Under a new constitution adopted on May 4, 1972, the Lon Nol government allowed political parties to organize and held a presidential election in June. The balloting, distributed among three candidates, was unexpectedly close, with the final tally giving Lon Nol 55 percent of the vote. In a legislative election held in September, however, opposition parties, claiming unfair electoral procedures, declined to participate, and all seats in the Senate and National Assembly fell to the progovernment Social-Republican Party.

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capital, some 1.8 million, was evacuated. In early 1979 substantial reverse migration commenced, with the population again in excess of 1 million by 2003. Official Language: Khmer; in addition, French is widely spoken. Monetary Unit: Riel (official rate July 1, 2006: 4,050 riels = $1US). Monarch: King NORODOM SIHAMONI; elected by the Royal Throne Council on October 14, 2004, and crowned on October 29, succeeding NORODOM SIHANOUK, who had announced his wish to abdicate, for reasons of health, on October 6. Prime Minister: HUN SEN (Cambodian People’s Party); former cochair of the Council of Ministers of the Provisional National Government; named Second Prime Minister of government formed on October 23, 1993; named Prime Minister on November 26, 1998, in succession to First Prime Minister UNG HUOT (formerly Funcinpec Party) under formal coalition agreement of November 23; continued in office as a caretaker following the legislative election of July 27, 2003; renominated as Prime Minister by the King on July 14, 2004, confirmed by the National Assembly on July 15, and sworn in on July 16 as the head of a renewed coalition government.

During 1974 a four-year war between government forces and the Khmers Rouges (“Red Khmers”) gained in intensity, and at midyear Lon Nol offered to engage in peace negotiations with the Communist-affiliated National United Front of Cambodia (Front Uni National du Cambodge—FUNC), nominally headed by Prince Sihanouk, who promptly rejected the offer in a statement issued from exile in Beijing. Following Khmer Rouge advances to the vicinity of the capital in early 1975, Prime Minister LONG BORET presented the president with a request, signed by a number of military and civilian leaders, that he leave the country, and on April 10 Lon Nol flew to Indonesia, with the president of the Senate, Maj. Gen. SAUKHAM

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KHOY, being named interim president of the republic. Two days later, U.S. embassy personnel evacuated Phnom Penh. Saukham Khoy having departed with the Americans, a temporary Supreme Committee of the Republic surrendered to the FUNC on April 17. The Communist-controlled government that followed included Prince Sihanouk, who was reinstated as head of state, and Penn Nouth, who returned as prime minister. In December 1975 the National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK, formerly the FUNC) approved a new constitution for what was to be known as Democratic Kampuchea, effective from January 5, 1976. An election of delegates to a new People’s Representative Assembly was held in March, and in April Prince Sihanouk resigned as head of state, receiving a life pension and the honorary title of “Great Patriot.” At its opening session on April 11 the Assembly designated KHIEU SAMPHAN as chair of the State Presidium and POL POT as prime minister. During its ensuing period of rule, the Pol Pot regime launched a massive effort at social change, in the course of which most urban dwellers were forced to relocate in rural areas under conditions of such brutality that upward of 2 million were estimated to have perished. The traditional hostility between the Khmer and Vietnamese peoples reached a climax in late 1978 with an expansion of many months of border conflict into a full-scale invasion by the Vietnamese, supported by a small force of dissident Khmers styling themselves the Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS). On January 7, 1979, Phnom Penh fell to the invaders, who proclaimed a People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) the following day and installed HENG SAMRIN, a former assistant chief of the Kampuchean General Staff, as president of a People’s Revolutionary Council. Remnants of the defending forces withdrew to the west, where guerrilla-type operations against the Vietnamese-supported regime were maintained by Khmer Rouge and right-wing Khmer Serei (“Free Cambodian”) forces, in alliance with a smaller unit claiming allegiance to Prince Sihanouk. In June 1982, after more than 18 months of negotiations, the three anti-Vietnamese groups con-

cluded an agreement in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on a Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). Under the agreement, Prince Sihanouk would serve as president; Khieu Samphan as vice president in charge of foreign affairs; and SON SANN, the leader of the Khmer Serei’s Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF), as prime minister. In December 1984 the chair of the PRK Council of Ministers, CHAN SI, died, and he was succeeded in January 1985 by Vice Chair and Foreign Minister HUN SEN, a former Khmer Rouge official who had defected to the Vietnamese in 1977. Citing continued abuse of refugees by Khmer Rouge forces, Prince Sihanouk announced in May 1987 that he was taking a year’s “leave of absence” from the CGDK presidency. In January 1988 he formally resigned as nominal leader of the threeparty coalition after having engaged in two rounds of talks in France with the PRK’s Hun Sen. He withdrew the resignation a month later but resigned again in early July, two weeks before a meeting in Bogor, Indonesia (the first so-called “Jakarta Informal Meeting”—JIM), that brought together, for the first time, representatives of all four Cambodian factions as well as of Vietnam, Laos, and the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Sihanouk met again with Hun Sen in France in November and resumed the CGDK presidency in February 1989, immediately prior to a second round of all-party discussions in Jakarta (JIM-II). An additional meeting between Sihanouk and Hun Sen in Jakarta in May 1989 followed an announcement by the PRK premier that his government was changing the country’s official name to State of Cambodia (SOC). Collaterally, the regime invited Sihanouk to return as SOC head of state, with new elections to follow. Further talks in Paris between Hun Sen, Prince Sihanouk, Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan, and the KPLNF’s Son Sann proved unproductive, however, as did a July 30– August 30 Paris International Conference on Cambodia (PICC), chaired by France and Indonesia. Vietnam nonetheless announced the withdrawal of its troops from Cambodia on September 20, honoring a pledge made the previous May.

CAMBODIA

In mid-January 1990 the UN Security Council’s five permanent members (P-5) reiterated an earlier appeal for an effective UN presence in the strifetorn country. A week later Prince Sihanouk again resigned as president of the CGDK to show the world that he was not “an accomplice of the Khmers Rouges.” On February 3, in an effort to dissociate the resistance movement from the earlier Democratic Kampuchean regime, he announced that the CGDK would henceforth be known as the National Government of Cambodia (NGC). On June 6, 1990, during a meeting in Tokyo, Sihanouk and Phnom Penh representatives signed an accord that called for the establishment of a Supreme National Council (SNC) of rebel and government members to pave the way for a cease-fire by the end of July. However, the Khmer Rouge guerrillas refused to participate unless they were granted representation equal to that of Phnom Penh. During an informal meeting in Jakarta on September 9 and 10, 1990, the four parties approved a P-5 “framework document” that provided for assignment of most SNC powers to the United Nations pending the election of a new Cambodian government. Despite an earlier Khmer Rouge objection to establishing an interim governing body, a 12-member SNC thereupon convened in Bangkok, Thailand, and on December 21 and 22, meeting in Paris, it accepted “most of the fundamental points” of a November P-5 document that provided for a UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) charged with overseeing a cease-fire, nationwide balloting, and the drafting of a new constitution. In January 1991, however, hard-line elements of the SOC effectively repudiated the agreement. Nevertheless, on May 1, 1991, the first cease-fire in the history of the 12-year struggle took effect. Subsequently, during an SNC meeting in Pattaya, Thailand, in June, Prince Sihanouk won agreement on a permanent truce and acceptance of the council as a “supergovernment” superior to both the SOC and NGC. In mid-July, during an “informal” meeting in Beijing, Sihanouk resigned as NGC president and was named SNC chair. Immediately thereafter a P-5 delegation met in the Chinese capital with representatives of the PICC cochairs to discuss implementation of UNTAC, and on August 23 a

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12-member UN truce monitoring team arrived in Cambodia. During another Pattaya meeting held August 26–29, 1991, SNC members agreed to a mutual troop and equipment reduction of 70 percent, with the balance to be relocated to specific areas under UNTAC supervision. In September, in a major concession by the SOC during an SNC meeting in New York, the parties agreed that the projected balloting in Cambodia’s 21 provinces would be on the basis of proportional representation rather than winner-take-all. The most contentious issues thus having been resolved, a formal peace agreement was signed in Paris on October 23. On November 19 Sihanouk announced a “treaty of cooperation” between the Hun Sen regime and his own political formation, known since 1989 as the United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Ind´ependant, Neutre, Pacifique et Coop´eratif—Funcinpec). The next day, the four SNC factions formally accepted Sihanouk as “legitimate head of state” and endorsed his candidacy for the presidency in 1993. However, the November 19 alliance, which had been widely construed as an attempt to limit Khmer Rouge influence, was abruptly terminated on December 5, reportedly at Chinese insistence. The Khmers Rouges boycotted the election of a constituent National Assembly held May 23– 28, 1993, at which the Funcinpec Party (FP), as Funcinpec had been renamed, won a plurality of 58 seats to 51 for the SOC’s Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). A somewhat confusing sequence of events then ensued. On June 3 Prince Sihanouk announced that he had formed a Funcinpec-CPP coalition government in which he would serve as head of state, prime minister, and supreme military commander. However, the CPP’s Hun Sen declared that his administration would not yield power until the United Nations had investigated alleged irregularities in the Assembly balloting, while Sihanouk’s younger son, Prince NORODOM CHAKRAPONG, theretofore SOC deputy prime minister, proclaimed the secession of the country’s seven easternmost provinces to form an “autonomous zone” outside the jurisdiction of the UN

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peacekeeping force. On June 14 the new Assembly convened and appointed Sihanouk head of state, with “full and special powers . . . to save [the] nation” from the secessionist threat and continued civil war. On June 15 the secessionist movement appeared to have collapsed, with Prince Chakrapong reportedly fleeing to Vietnam. On the following day the FP and the CPP agreed that Hun Sen and Prince NORODOM RANARIDDH, Sihanouk’s eldest son and FP chair, would share powers equally as cochairs of the Council of Ministers, with Sihanouk retaining his position as head of state. The two leading formations also agreed that each would hold 45 percent of cabinet posts, with 10 percent allocated to Son Sann’s Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP, successor to the KPNLF), which had run a distant third in the legislative balloting. The Provisional Cabinet received National Assembly approval on July 1. Meanwhile, Prince Chakrapong had returned to Cambodia, declaring the secession over. Cambodia’s new constitution was approved on September 21, 1993, and promulgated three days later, at which time Sihanouk was recrowned king. On October 23 a new royal government was formed, with Prince Ranariddh as first prime minister and Hun Sen as second prime minister. Shortly before the government formation, the Khmers Rouges rebuffed an offer of an “advisory” role in return for acceptance of a ceasefire, and sporadic fighting continued. Roundtable talks held in Pyongyang, North Korea, in May 1994 and in Phnom Penh in June ended in deadlock, with Khmer Rouge representatives rejecting a government proposal for a cease-fire pending a power-sharing agreement. The National Assembly thereupon voted unanimously to outlaw the Khmers Rouges, who on July 11 announced the formation of a Provisional Government of National Unity and National Salvation of Cambodia (PGNUNSC) under Khieu Samphan in the northern province of Preah Vihear. Meanwhile, in early July, the government reportedly thwarted a coup plot by several participants in the 1993 attempt, including Prince Chakrapong, who went into exile in Malaysia.

A major government offensive on remaining Khmer Rouge strongholds in the first half of 1996 yielded increasing numbers of defectors from the movement as well as a split in which a group led by IENG SARY opted to abandon the military struggle and to negotiate with the government. The fracturing of the Khmers Rouges eventually served to intensify the power struggle between Second Prime Minister Hun Sen and First Prime Minister Prince Ranariddh, both camps reportedly seeking alliances with Khmer Rouge factions. In February 1997 Ranariddh rankled Hun Sen further by announcing the formation of a National United Front (NUF) electoral alliance that included opposition leader Sam RAINSY, then of the Khmer Nation Party (KNP). In a further complication, Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan subsequently indicated that his supporters might back the alliance. These developments contributed to intermittent fighting between FP and CPP loyalists. In April Hun Sen announced the defection of several legislators from the FP, which had split into pro- and anti-Ranariddh factions. He also accused the prince of “collaboration” with the Khmers Rouges. By June the government was rent virtually in half, as were the Khmers Rouges: Pol Pot apparently ordered the execution of long-standing Khmer Rouge military leader SON SEN for negotiating with the government, while several days later Khmer Rouge radio announced that Pol Pot himself had been “arrested.” The Khmers Rouges subsequently conducted a “show trial” at which Pol Pot was convicted of “treason” and sentenced to house arrest. With the threat of Khmer Rouge and KNP support for Prince Ranariddh growing steadily, Hun Sen and his supporters went on the offensive, and civil war broke out near Phnom Penh in early July 1997. Prince Ranariddh left the country on July 4 in the face of Hun Sen’s superior forces, which reportedly executed numerous Ranariddh loyalists. The Assembly reconvened in late July and on August 6 confirmed Hun Sen’s choice of Foreign Minister UNG HUOT, a leader of the anti-Ranariddh FP camp, to replace Ranariddh as first prime minister. At the same time, the legislature stripped

CAMBODIA

Ranariddh of his immunity and charged him with treason for conspiring with the Khmers Rouges and with illegally importing weapons. Despite his successful “coup,” Hun Sen was rejected by the Assembly when he attempted to name a new cabinet devoid of all FP members in September. Consequently, attention turned to efforts to foster a settlement that would permit full participation in the national elections scheduled for July 1998. After initially resisting any compromise, Hun Sen in February 1998 accepted a Japanesebrokered “peace treaty” under which Ranariddh briefly returned to Cambodia from Thailand on March 30, nine days after receiving a prearranged pardon from King Sihanouk related to his convictions earlier in the month on the arms smuggling and treason charges. His four-day visit was marked by street fighting between his supporters and the CPP’s, despite a cease-fire that had previously been accepted by government troops and the remnants of Ranariddh’s forces. Meanwhile, government operations against the Khmers Rouges continued in the north, with reports surfacing in March 1998 that defecting troops and government forces had driven hard-line commander TA MOK (UNG CHOEUN) from his base in Anlong Veng. Accompanying Ta Mok were Khieu Samphan and former second-in-command NUON CHEA as well as Pol Pot, who died on April 15, reportedly of a heart attack, although subsequent accounts gave the cause of death as everything from suicide to execution. By the end of May, Ta Mok’s final stronghold, Ta Tum, had fallen, and on June 15 five more senior Khmer Rouge officials defected, amid frequent reports that the handful of remaining guerrilla leaders were negotiating terms of surrender with the government. In the run-up to the July 26, 1998, legislative balloting, the opposition repeatedly accused the CPP of campaign violations that ranged from scare tactics to murder, leading Sam Rainsy, now as the head of his own Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), to threaten an election boycott. In the end, however, 39 parties contested the election, at which the CPP received 41.4 percent of the 4.9 million votes cast, followed by the FP with 31.7 percent and the SRP with 14.3

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percent. While the formula for allocating the Assembly’s 122 seats awarded the CPP a majority of 64, compared to 43 for the FP and 15 for the SRP, the distribution left Hun Sen far short of the twothirds needed to form a new government. Neither Ranariddh nor Rainsy accepted the results, accusing the CPP of polling and votecounting irregularities as well as voter intimidation. On August 11, 1998, the National Election Commission dismissed all of the opposition’s 300-plus allegations, and on August 31 the Constitutional Council upheld the Commission’s findings. By that time, public demonstrations supporting Ranariddh and Rainsy had already begun, including a continuous, unauthorized sit-in outside the legislature. In mid-September CPP supporters forcibly broke up the opposition demonstrations, some of which had drawn up to 20,000 participants. With King Sihanouk presiding, Hen Sen, Prince Ranariddh, and Sam Rainsy met in Siem Reap on September 22, 1998. The three agreed that the new Assembly should meet as scheduled on September 24 and that they would hold talks on forming a new government. On November 14 Ranariddh concluded a coalition agreement with Hun Sen that had been brokered by King Sihanouk. The pact, formally signed on November 23, provided for Hun Sen to serve as sole prime minister, Ranariddh to assume the presidency of the National Assembly, and CPP chief CHEA SIM, theretofore presiding officer of the Assembly, to become chair of a newly created, largely advisory Senate. The CPP and the FP agreed to control 12 and 11 ministries, respectively, while continuing to share the defense and interior portfolios. Accordingly, King Sihanouk named Hun Sen prime minister on November 26, and on November 30 the National Assembly approved the new cabinet by a vote of 99–13, with 3 abstentions. Early December 1998 witnessed the defection of additional Khmer Rouge troops near the Thai border, the number being variously estimated at between 1,000 and 5,000. On December 24–25 Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea surrendered to the government. They soon relocated to Pailin, in the northwest, where their former colleague, Ieng

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Sary, supported by 25,000 or more former Khmers Rouges, had established a semiautonomous enclave. What was publicized as the final, formal Khmer Rouge surrender, involving some 4,300 cadres, took place in Anlong Veng on February 9. In succeeding months, despite international demands for Khmer Rouge leaders to be tried, Hun Sen wavered on the matter, noting that thousands of former Khmers Rouges, himself included, now held positions in the government and military and that a number of key figures had already been granted amnesty. By mid-2001 the only Khmer Rouge leaders awaiting trial for the 1975–1979 reign of terror were Ta Mok, who had been captured on March 6, bringing the insurgency to an end, and KANG KEK IEU (a.k.a. DUCH), once the chief of national security but now a Christian missionary, who freely admitted his part in torture and murder. At the National Assembly election of July 27, 2003, the CPP won 73 of 123 seats, 9 fewer than the two-thirds needed to form a government on its own. Initially, both Funcinpec and the SRP, the only other parties to win representation, refused to join any coalition headed by Hun Sen, who refused to step aside as prime minister. His refusal, combined with an August 4 decision by Funcinpec and the SRP to form an Alliance of Democrats, produced an 11-month impasse, during which the existing CPP-Funcinpec government continued on as a caretaker. On June 2, 2004, Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh announced that they had resolved remaining differences on a 73-point governmental platform and would again share power. The resultant accord, formally signed on June 30, gave the CPP 60 percent of the cabinet posts and did not include the SRP. On July 8, 2004, the new National Assembly convened for the first time and quickly passed constitutional amendments enabling the prime minister and Assembly president to be elected by a single show of hands rather than, as previously, by separate secret ballots. The Senate concurred, but King Sihanouk, who had been in North Korea since April, refused to sign the measure and instead asked that Chea Sim, the acting head of state, “please sign or not sign . . . in accordance with his

opinion.” On July 13, however, Chea Sim left the country for Thailand, fueling speculation of a split in the CPP, and the bill was ultimately signed into law by Senate Deputy Chair NHIEK BUN CHHAY of Funcinpec. The next day King Sihanouk nominated Hun Sen as prime minister and asked him to form a cabinet, which the National Assembly approved 96–0 on July 15. (The SRP boycotted the vote.) The new cabinet was sworn into office on July 16. Writing from Beijing on October 6, 2004, King Sihanouk, citing his age (81) and health concerns, expressed his desire to abdicate, and on October 14 the Royal Throne Council endorsed his preferred successor, Prince NORODOM SIHAMONI. The new king was crowned on October 29. On March 2, 2006, the National Assembly passed a constitutional amendment requiring that a new government be backed by a simple majority of lower house members, rather than by a two-thirds majority. Although Hun Sen stated after the vote that the CPP did not intend to force Funcinpec from Cambodia’s governing coalition, he quickly dismissed two Funcinpec cabinet members, the coministers of defense and interior. On March 3 Prince Ranariddh resigned as president of the National Assembly.

Constitution and Government Under the 1993 basic law Cambodia’s head of state is again a monarch who enjoys considerable latitude, including the power to dissolve the legislature during a national emergency. Selection of the monarch is the responsibility of a Royal Throne Council, which can choose from among any of several royal lines. The prime minister, chosen from the leading parliamentary party, is to be appointed by the monarch upon recommendation by the president of the National Assembly. For more than a decade, the government was required to win a twothirds majority vote of the National Assembly before taking office, but in early March 2006, with the backing of the opposition, the lower house passed a constitutional amendment to reduce the requirement to one-half plus one vote.

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The November 1998 CPP-FP pact included provision for establishing a Senate as the upper house of a bicameral Parliament, and in March 1999 the constitution was amended to that effect by the National Assembly. With a five-year term of office, the initial Senate comprised 61 appointees: 2 named by the king and the other 59 named by the party presidents of the CPP, FP, and SRP, in proportion to their representation in the lower house. Beginning in 2004, the Senate was to be directly elected, except for 2 appointees named by the monarch and 2 chosen by the National Assembly, but in January 2003 it was announced that, for budgetary reasons, the first election would be delayed. (It was ultimately held in January 2006.) The Senate’s role is largely advisory; principally, it may recommend changes to legislation passed by the lower chamber, which, however, is under no obligation to enact them. The president of the Senate serves as acting head of state when the king is abroad. A nine-member Constitutional Council is empowered to resolve election disputes as well as to interpret the constitution and legislation. The independent judiciary is headed by a Supreme Court. Local administration encompasses provinces and municipalities, the former subdivided into districts (srok) and communes (khum) and the latter into khan and sangkat. Local council elections were held for the first time in February 2002.

Foreign Relations The neighboring country most directly affected by the quarter-century of strife in Cambodia—and the one most deeply opposed to recognition of the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin government in 1979—was Thailand, whose eastern region provided sanctuary for some 250,000 Khmer refugees. In March 1980 an overture from Phnom Penh to engage in bilateral talks on the refugee issue was rebuffed by Bangkok as a maneuver to obtain de facto recognition. Subsequently, Thailand refused offers to negotiate a border security agreement prior to a Vietnamese withdrawal. It was not until September 1995 that the two countries agreed to establish a border coordination commission. In June 2000

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Thai and Cambodian officials signed a memorandum of understanding regarding demarcation of land boundaries. The two governments also agreed to work jointly toward elimination of smuggling, drug-trafficking, and illegal entry. Thai-Cambodian tensions flared up in January 2003 following comments allegedly made by a Thai TV personality regarding Thai ownership of the world historical site at Angkor Wat. Anti-Thai riots in Phnom Penh on January 29 led Thailand to close the border. Hun Sen apologized and offered restitution, but the border was not fully reopened until March. Full diplomatic relations were restored in late April. In February 2006 the two countries announced that they intended to complete their land border demarcation before the end of the year, with the maritime demarcation to follow in 2007. Indonesia was instrumental in bringing together Cambodia’s warring factions in mid-1988 and provided venues for a number of subsequent all-party meetings. In July 1989 it joined with France in cosponsoring the PICC, and both countries, in addition to Thailand and the five permanent Security Council members, were key players in the events leading to the peace accord of October 1991. The largest share in the cost of the UN’s peacekeeping operation was borne by Japan. Most UNTAC units withdrew in November 1993, at which time, in the first action of its kind, the UN General Assembly established a human rights center in Phnom Penh to serve as a local watchdog agency and to train government officials in drafting laws on human and civil rights. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the attendant loss to Phnom Penh and its Vietnamese backers of both financial and political aid contributed significantly to the domestic events of 1993. At the same time, the United States, recognizing that its “neutral” stance in the Cambodian matter had primarily benefited guerrilla forces, began supporting the new coalition government’s military efforts to eliminate the remaining Khmer Rouge strongholds. In August 1995, despite growing concerns over heavy drug-trafficking by Cambodia, Warren Christopher became the first U.S. secretary of state to visit Phnom Penh in 40 years.

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Cambodia’s relations with other countries were dramatically affected by the political turmoil in 1997 and 1998. Following Prince Ranariddh’s ouster, many countries refused to recognize new First Prime Minister Ung Huot. The United Nations refused to allow the Hun Sen/Ung Huot government to occupy the Cambodian seat in the General Assembly, while many Western countries suspended foreign aid. Japan, however, refused U.S. pressure to cut off aid and signaled its growing interest in Cambodian affairs by brokering the cease-fire of January 1998 between Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen. Relations with China improved in the wake of the July 1997 coup. When the West refused to recognize Ung Huot, Hun Sen began to court China as a potential ally. Beijing increased its economic aid in exchange for increased Cambodian policing of their border to combat smuggling of Chinese goods and citizens into Cambodia. In the wake of Pol Pot’s “capture,” China, his former ally, refused to intervene, calling the situation a “domestic matter.” Following formation of the November 1998 coalition government, Cambodia was permitted to reclaim its UN General Assembly seat. On April 30, 1999, the country was formally admitted to ASEAN. The formation of a coalition government also reopened the pockets of Western donors, who had agreed in January on a $470 million aid package. In May 2000 a meeting of aid agencies and donor countries concluded with pledges totaling $548 million, in return for which the government agreed to reduce the size of the military, improve fiscal control, attack illegal logging, continue its efforts to reduce poverty, and reform the judiciary. Four years later, however, donors were still voicing the same concerns. In October 2003 the World Trade Organization (WTO) approved Cambodia’s request for membership, but the 2003–2004 governmental impasse delayed legislative ratification until September 2004.

Current Issues The July 15, 2004, confirmation vote for the second CPP-Funcinpec government led observers to

question how effectively the unprecedented 186member cabinet—including 7 deputy prime ministers and 15 senior ministers as well as at least 6 secretaries of state for each of 26 ministries—could function. But with a government in place, the National Assembly could at long last proceed with an agenda that included authorizing formation of a war crimes tribunal and approving Cambodia’s accession to the WTO. The CPP-Funcinpec agreement nevertheless failed to end Cambodia’s political turmoil as Hun Sen pursued what his critics described as a crackdown against dissent, often by charging opponents with criminal defamation. In February 2005 Sam Rainsy and two other MPs from his party were stripped of their parliamentary immunity, leaving them open to prosecution. Rainsy had accused Hun Sen of ordering a grenade attack at a 1997 party rally that killed 16 people. He had also accused Prince Ranariddh of accepting bribes to cement Funcinpec’s alliance with the CPP. Having lost his immunity, Rainsy fled to France, and in December he was convicted in absentia and sentenced to 18 months in prison. Meanwhile, Hun Sen had come under increasing criticism by human rights activists and international donors alike. The latter cautioned that a return to authoritarian rule would jeopardize further economic assistance, on which Cambodia’s economy remains heavily dependent. That warning may have been a factor in Hun Sen’s decision, early in 2006, to support a pardon for Rainsy. Having offered apologies to Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh, Rainsy was pardoned by the king in early February 2006 and returned to Cambodia soon afterward. On February 28 the National Assembly unanimously reinstated not only Rainsy but also the two other SRP legislators who had lost their immunity a year earlier: CHEA POCH, who had also fled into exile to avoid defamation charges, and CHEAM CHANNY, who had been serving a prison sentence following his August 2005 conviction for organizing a “secret army”—in actuality, an opposition committee to assess the government’s defense-related activities. Also in February, Hun Sen dropped criminal defamation lawsuits against a handful of human rights activists,

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some of whom had objected to a recent border treaty with Vietnam. With Rainsy’s support, Hun Sen moved quickly on a constitutional amendment to reduce the requirement that a government be endorsed by at least two-thirds of the National Assembly members. The amendment, which trimmed the requirement to a simple majority, passed on March 2. The change meant that the CPP could now scrap its coalition pact with Funcinpec at any time and form a one-party administration. Hun Sen, displaying his newly consolidated power, immediately dismissed Funcinpec’s coministers of defense from the cabinet, although he indicated that he did not intend to make further changes. Prince Ranariddh’s resignation as National Assembly president soon followed. Even before Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea surrendered in December 1998, the questions of whom to try for the genocide and other abuses of 1975–1979, and of what the venue should be, had become a dominating concern. On the one hand, the United Nations, human rights organizations, and many countries—China being the major exception—advocated bringing 30–50 former Khmers Rouges before an international tribunal. Some Cambodians, on the other hand, argued for a purely domestic venue. Others preferred that the whole question be dropped, fearing the consequences of angering the many thousands of rankand-file Khmers Rouges who had laid down their arms. The capture of Ta Mok in March 1999 and the subsequent discovery of Kang Kek Ieu by a reporter for the Far Eastern Economic Review provided additional impetus to the search for a compromise. Although Ta Mok remained recalcitrant, the bornagain Kang Kek Ieu, a missionary and aid worker, not only admitted his guilt but also directly implicated most of the former Khmer Rouge leadership, particularly Nuon Chea and Ta Mok, in mass murder. Hun Sen, meanwhile, continued to reject all proposals for establishing an international tribunal, although he indicated a willingness to accept the participation of international judges in a Cambodian venue, as long as Cambodian jurists constituted a majority. Any other formula, he insisted,

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would be a violation of Cambodian sovereignty and a threat to domestic peace. Over the next several years the tribunal issue remained unresolved. In February 2002, after nearly five years of negotiations, the UN abruptly withdrew on the grounds that recently passed Cambodian legislation provided insufficient guarantees of the proposed tribunal’s “independence, objectivity, and impartiality.” In early July Hun Sen indicated a readiness to compromise with the UN, but it took until March 2003 for a draft agreement to be announced and until October 2004 for the National Assembly to approve the final version of “The Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic Kampuchea.” The Trial Chamber will have three Cambodian and two international judges; the Supreme Court Chamber will comprise four Cambodian and three international judges. The chambers have been given jurisdiction over “senior [Khmer Rouge] leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for crimes” committed between April 17, 1975, and January 6, 1979. Trial Chamber decisions will require concurrence by at least four judges; Supreme Court Chamber decisions, five. Many critics have questioned the prominent role of Cambodian judges, given institutional inadequacies, Cambodian jurists’ general lack of formal legal training, and concerns about judicial independence from political pressures. In early 2006 representatives of Cambodia and the UN indicated that the trials would begin in 2007. Proceedings may take three years and cost at least $56 million. Expectations are that ten or fewer former Khmer Rouge leaders will actually be indicted, and age and ill health may become factors. Ta Mok, 79, died on July 21, 2006. Khieu Samphan is 75. Nuon Chea, 80, has suffered at least one stroke. Ieng Sary, 83, already a cardiac patient, suffered a heart attack in February 2006.

Political Parties In the two years preceding the July 1998 National Assembly balloting, numerous disaffected

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factions of established political parties split off to contest the election separately. Many other small parties also emerged, but with little prospect of achieving any national impact. In all, 39 of the country’s 50-odd parties offered candidates at the election. For the July 2003 election, 22 parties competed. Each was required to contest at least onethird (41) of the National Assembly seats. No current party claims a Khmer Rouge heritage, although various leaders of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), including Prime Minister Hun Sen, were at one time Khmers Rouges. From a historical perspective, the Democratic National United Movement (DNUM), formed in 1996 by Khmer Rouge defector Ieng Sary, would appear to have been the last successor to a series of Khmer Rouge parties: the Pol Pot wing of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (PCK; see under CPP), which ruled the country from 1975 to 1979 but was declared dissolved in December 1981; the Party of Democratic Kampuchea—PDK (Pheakki Kampuchea Prachea Thipatai), which claimed in mid1985 to have adopted a “new ideology of democratic socialism”; and the Cambodian National Unity Party—CNUP (Kanakpak Samakki Cheat Kampuchea), which was launched in 1992. The CNUP was ostensibly formed to contest the 1993 National Assembly elections, although it ended up boycotting them. Subsequent abortive efforts to bring the CNUP into the political structure were followed in early 1996 by a renewed government offensive against Khmer Rouge strongholds. A major split in the CNUP/Khmer Rouge hierarchy occurred in August when Ieng Sary, a former Democratic Kampuchea deputy premier (and brother-in-law of Pol Pot), entered into talks with the government, reportedly with the backing of military commanders controlling about half the Khmer Rouge forces. Having received a pardon from King Sihanouk, Ieng Sary set up the DNUM in Pailin, his base. Technically not a political party, it did not compete in the 1998 national election. Meanwhile, former PDK president Khieu Samphan had reportedly formed a National Solidarity Party (NSP) to contest the July election, but at the time of Pol Pot’s

death in April he was traveling with the Khmer Rouge units still loyal to hard-liner Ta Mok. In late December Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea turned themselves over to authorities and pledged allegiance to the Hun Sen government, which permitted them to join Ieng Sary in the Pailin area. Ta Mok was finally captured in March 1999. In September 1999 the DNUM had announced its support for the government’s position on trying former Khmer Rouge leaders, but only if the trials took place in Cambodian courts and only if Cambodian judges and prosecutors outnumbered their foreign counterparts. The DNUM is no longer active.

Governing Coalition Cambodian People’s Party—CPP (Kanakpak Pracheachon Kampuchea). The CPP was launched as a non-Communist successor to the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP) during an extraordinary party congress in Phnom Penh held October 17–18, 1991. The KPRP had been founded in early 1951, when the Indo-Chinese Communist Party, led by Ho Chi Minh, was divided into separate entities for Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Following the 1954 Geneva Agreement, it encompassed three factions: the Khmer Vietminh, controlled largely by North Vietnamese; an underground force that served as the ideological core of the Khmers Rouges; and adherents of the legal People’s Party (Kanakpak Pracheachon). At its Second Congress, held secretly in Phnom Penh in 1960, the organization changed its name to the Communist Party of Kampuchea (Parti Communiste du Kampuchea— PCK/Kanakpak Kumunist Kampuchea) but continued to be divided, largely between supporters of the North Vietnamese and a Maoist contingent led by Pol Pot (then known as Saloth Sar). In 1962 the incumbent PCK general secretary was assassinated, allegedly on order of Pol Pot, who assumed the office the following year. The two factions were nominally reunited during 1970–1975, although most pro-Vietnamese went into exile in the wake of a purge that commenced

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in 1974. Following the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge government in 1979, the Hanoi-supported exiles staged a “reorganization Congress” at which Pen Sovan was elected general secretary and the KPRP label was readopted to distinguish the Phnom Penh group from the Khmer Rouge faction that continued to be led by Pol Pot until its formal dissolution on December 6, 1981 (see Democratic National United Movement, above). Two days earlier, on December 4, the KPRP Central Committee, following an apparent power struggle, had elected Heng Samrin as its secretary general. Later that month, a congress of the Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS), a mass organization established in 1978 by Khmer opponents of the Democratic Kampuchean regime, recognized the KPRP as its “leading nucleus.” At the same congress the front changed its name to the Kampuchean United Front for National Construction and Defense (KUFNCD). The most recent name change, to the United Front for the Construction and Defense of the Kampuchean Fatherland (UFCDKF), occurred in 1989. In addition to abandoning Marxism-Leninism, the CPP at its 1991 founding congress supported the adoption of a multiparty system, endorsed a free-market economy, called for the designation of Buddhism as the state religion, and announced a number of structural and leadership changes. The former KPRP Politburo and Secretariat were merged into a single CPP Standing Committee; Heng Samrin, theretofore KPRP general secretary, was named CPP honorary president; and Chea Sim and Hun Sen, the second- and third-ranked members of the KPRP Politburo, were designated chair and vice chair, respectively, of the CPP Central Committee. The party was runner-up at the balloting of May 1993, winning 51 Assembly seats on a vote share of 38.2 percent. Amid charges of campaign and voting irregularities, at the July 1998 election the CPP took 41 percent of the vote and 64 seats, making it the leading legislative party. It retained that standing at the July 2003 election, winning 47 percent of the vote and 73 seats—a majority, but shy of the two-thirds needed to govern on its own. A year later, follow-

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ing the conclusion of protracted coalition negotiations with the Funcinpec Party, the CPP’s two main factions—the hard-liners led by Chea Sim and the more moderate faction of Hun Sen—apparently collided over the issue of cabinet-level appointments, which may have been a factor in Chea Sim’s departure for Thailand, ostensibly for regular medical treatment. (Some reports said he was under armed guard.) On March 2, 2006, immediately after the National Assembly passed a constitutional amendment eliminating the two-thirds requirement for forming a government, Hun Sen announced the dismissal of two key Funcinpec ministers. A day later Prince Ranariddh resigned as president of the lower house and was replaced by the first vice president, Heng Samrin. Leaders: HENG SAMRIN (President of the National Assembly and Honorary Chair of the CPP), CHEA SIM (Chair of the CPP Central Committee, Chair of the UFCDKF National Council, and Chair of the Senate), HUN SEN (Prime Minister and Vice Chair, CPP Central Committee), SAY CHHUM (Secretary General). Funcinpec Party (FP). Funcinpec, the acronym for Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Ind´ependant, Neutre, Pacifique et Coop´eratif (United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia), was proclaimed in 1989 as the political counterpart of the National Army of Independent Cambodia, formerly the Sihanoukist National Army (Arm´ee Nationale Sihanoukiste—ANS). At a congress held February 27–28, 1992, the group was redesignated as the Funcinpec Party, with Prince Norodom Ranariddh, who had theretofore served as general secretary, being named chair. The FP secured an unexpected plurality of 58 National Assembly seats in May 1993 on a vote share of 45.5 percent. In June Prince Ranariddh was named cochair of the interim government’s Council of Ministers and then, in October, first prime minister under the new constitution. The FP was split in 1997 between those who supported Prince Ranariddh (and his courting of

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Khmer Rouge elements as potential electoral allies) and those more in consonance with the policies of Hun Sen’s CPP. A number of FP legislators defected to the CPP parliamentary camp in April, establishing a dissident faction under the leadership of Toan Chhay, who then formed the unsuccessful National Union Party (Kanakpak Ruop Ruom Cheat) to contest the 1998 election. Following the ouster of Prince Ranariddh from the government as the result of the civil war of midyear, anti-Ranariddh FP dissident Ung Huot was named first prime minister; he subsequently campaigned under the banner of the Populism Party (Reastr Niyum Party— RNP), while former Funcinpec secretary general LOY SIM CHHEANG formed the New Society Party (Sangkum Thmei Party—STP). Neither the RNP nor the STP won any seats at the election. (The STP became moribund after the death of its leader.) Prior to the July 1998 election, Funcinpec formed a National United Front (NUF) alliance with the Sam Rainsy Party; the Son Sann Party (SSP); and the small Khmer Neutral Party (Kanakpak Kampuchea Appyeakroet), which had largely disappeared after an unsuccessful 1993 election campaign but had reemerged in 1996. At the 1998 balloting the FP was runner-up to the CPP, claiming 31.7 percent of the vote and 43 seats in the National Assembly. The November 1998 coalition agreement with the CPP specified that the FP would control 11 of 25 ministries and would share the defense and interior portfolios. In mid-January 1999 the SSP merged with the FP. The SSP had originated in a faction of the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) that was loyal to the former BLDP president, Son Sann. (Both factions had claimed a legal right to the BLDP name, but before the 1998 election they agreed to adopt alternate designations: the SSP and the Buddhist Liberal Party.) Despite participation in the NUF alliance, the SSP won no seats at the July 1998 election. With Son Sann having retired from politics, SSP leadership passed to his son, SON SOUBERT, who was subsequently named to the Constitutional Court and therefore resigned from

his party post. The party’s de facto leader, KEM SOKHA, negotiated the merger with the FP. At the FP national congress held March 19–21, 2000, Prince Ranariddh urged the party to readmit former members who wished to rejoin, particularly the RNP contingent. In May and June 2002, however, Funcinpec saw two new eponymous parties formed by departing leaders Prince Norodom Chakrapong and Hang Dara. At the July 2003 general election the FP lost 17 seats, and its vote share fell to 21 percent. A month later it formed an Alliance of Democrats with the SRP (below) as part of their joint effort to deny the CPP’s Hun Sen another term as prime minister. Hun Sen refused to step aside, however, and as a consequence, after protracted negotiations, Ranariddh signed a new coalition agreement with the CPP in late June 2004. On March 3, 2006, a day after Hun Sen had dismissed the Funcinpec coministers of defense and interior, Ranariddh resigned as National Assembly president, “for the purpose of strengthening and moving forward the Funcinpec Party.” Leaders: Prince NORODOM RANARIDDH (Former President of the National Assembly and Party Chair), Prince NORODOM SIRIVUDH (Secretary General).

Parliamentary Opposition Sam Rainsy Party—SRP (Pak Sam Rainsy). In March 1998 the faction of the Khmer Nation Party (KNP, under Khmer Angkor Party, below) led by labor activist Sam Rainsy changed its name to the SRP, following the government’s earlier decision to officially recognize the KNP faction led by Kong Moni. At the July election the SRP won 14.3 percent of the vote and 15 seats in the National Assembly. Rainsy later accepted the CPP-FP coalition pact but challenged creation of the new Senate on constitutional and budgetary grounds. A party congress held February 12–13, 2000, reelected Rainsy as president. Among the resolutions passed at the session was a call for the government to reach agreement with the United Nations

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on “an independent—and therefore international— tribunal for the prosecution of former Khmer Rouge leaders suspected of crimes against humanity.” Rainsy, who has reportedly labeled members of the current government as “crooks, clowns, and criminals,” also drew criticism in early 2000 for proposing that the process for selecting a successor to the ailing King Sihanouk be reviewed and opened to public scrutiny. At the 2003 National Assembly election the SRP won 24 seats, only 2 less than the FP. Although the SRP strongly opposed Hun Sen’s continuation as prime minister, in 2004 it considered joining the CPP and the FP in a three-way coalition government. That possibility ended, however, when the CPP and the FP agreed to constitutional amendments that would permit the election of the prime minister and National Assembly president by a single show of hands. From Thailand, where he and all the other SRP legislators were ensconced during the July 15 confirmation vote, Rainsy declared the process unconstitutional and the resultant government illegal. In February 2005 Rainsy fled to France after the National Assembly revoked his parliamentary immunity, leaving him open to criminal lawsuits alleging defamation. He had accused Hun Sen of ordering a grenade attack at a 1997 party rally that killed 16 people. He had also accused Prince Ranariddh of accepting bribes to cement Funcinpec’s alliance with the CPP. Convicted in absentia in December and sentenced to 18 months in prison, Rainsy was pardoned by the king in early February 2006 after offering apologies. Another SRP legislator, CHEAM CHANNY, was also pardoned. In August 2005 a military court had sentenced him to seven years in prison for involvement in “an illegal rebel group.” On February 10 Rainsy returned to Cambodia, and on February 28 the National Assembly reinstated him, Cheam Channy, and a third SRP MP, Chea Poch, who had also fled into exile a year earlier. Leaders: Sam RAINSY (President), KONG KORM (Vice President), ENG CHHAY EANG (Secretary General).

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Other Parties Cambodian National Sustaining Party— CNSP (Kanakpak Tro Truong Cheat Kampuchea). Also identified as the Uphold the Cambodian Nation Party, the CNSP was formed in 1997 by Pen Sovan, former chair of the Council of Ministers (prime minister) of the PRK and general secretary of the Central Committee of the KPRP. It did not contest the 2003 National Assembly election. Leader: PEN SOVAN (President). Khmer Angkor Party—KAP (Kanakpak Khmer Angkor). The KAP was launched as the Khmer Nation Party (KNP) in November 1995 by former finance minister Sam Rainsy, who had been expelled from the FP in May and from the National Assembly in June for having complained of corruption in the awarding of government contracts. In February 1998 the government recognized a breakaway faction led by Kong Moni under the KNP banner, prompting Rainsy to establish the SRP. Shortly before the July 1998 election, at which it won no seats, the KNP adopted the KAP designation. At the 2003 national election the KAP, with less than 1 percent of the vote, again failed to win representation. Leaders: KONG MONI (President), POV PHOM, REACH CHAN SOVAN (Secretary General). Khmer Unity Party—KUP (Kanakpak Ekapheap Khmer). The liberal democratic KUP was formed in October 1997 by a former FP founder and Khmer Nation Party secretary general, Khieu Rada. It won no seats at the 1998 or 2003 balloting. Leaders: KHIEU RADA (President), BOU SARIN (Secretary General). National Liberation Movement of Kampuchea (Mouvement de la Lib´eration Nationale de Kampuchea—Moulinaka). Moulinaka was one of a number of pro-Sihanouk movements that participated in the formation of Funcinpec. In the wake of the 1991 peace agreement, it resumed a separate identity aligned with the BLDP. In the May 1993

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Assembly balloting, the party won one seat and was included in the subsequent coalition government, albeit in a junior capacity. It won no seats in 1998 or 2003, when it competed as Moulinaka and the Khmer Freedom Fighters’ Party. Leaders: KHLOK PRITHY (President), DY SETHY (Secretary General). The Khmer Democratic Party (Kanakpak Pracheathipatei Khmer), led by OUK PHURIK, won 1.8 percent of the vote at the July 2003 election. The Indra Buddra City Party, led by NARAK RATANAK VOATHANOR, took 1.2 percent. The Norodom Chakrapong Soul Khmer Party (Norodom Chakrapong Proleung Khmer Party), led by Prince Norodom CHAKRAPONG, a son of the king who broke from Funcinpec in 2002, won 1.1 percent. The following parties also contested the 2003 legislative election but won less than 0.75 percent of the vote: the Cambodia Development Party (Kanakpak Aphoviat Kampuchea), led by MAO BOURA; the Cambodia Free Independent Democratic Party (Kampuchea Serei Ekareach Pracheathipatei), led by SOK DY; the Cambodian Children’s Party (Kon Khmer Party), led by TY CHHIN; the Cambodian Women’s Party (Satrei Kampuchea Party), led by NUON BUNNA; the Farmers’ Party (Kaksekar Party), led by PONG PISETH; the Hang Dara Democratic Movement Party (Hang Dara Cholana Pracheathipatei), an FP splinter led by HANG DARA; the Khmer Citizens’ Party (Kanakpak Polroat Khmer), a 1996 splinter from Sam Rainsy’s KNP that was led by KHIEU SENG KIM; the Khmer Front Party (Ronakse Chuncheat Khmer), led by SUTH DINA; the Khmer Spiritual Aspiration Party (Proleung Khmer Party, also translated as the Khmer Soul Party), led by KHIEV PISETH; the Liberal Democratic Party (Pracheathipatei Serei), which traces its origins to the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and is led by CHHIM OM YON; the Nationalist Khmer Party (Khmer Cheat Niyum Party), led by KHIM PHUNVIHAN; the Rice Party, led by NHOUNG SEAP; and the Union of National Solidarity Party (Samakithoard Pracheacheat Party), led by

SIM SOKHOM. Virtually all of these parties supported multiparty democracy, continuation of a constitutional monarchy, international neutrality, territorial integrity, and an end to illegal (Vietnamese) immigration. In addition, the Khmer Help Khmer Party (Khmer Chuoy Khmer Party), an FP splinter initially called the Khmer New Life Party, was registered for the election but withdrew shortly before the balloting. The Progressive Cambodia Party (Khmer Chamroeun Niyum Party) and the National Construction Party (Karsang Cheat Party) failed to meet registration requirements.

Legislature Constitutional amendments passed by the National Assembly in March 1998 reestablished a bicameral Parliament (Sepiacheat) by creating an upper house, the Senate. Senate (Pritsepia). As constituted on March 25, 1999, the upper house comprised 61 appointed senators, including 2 named by the king, all serving five-year terms. In keeping with the coalition government agreement negotiated the preceding November, party representation was proportional to that of the lower house: Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), 31; Funcinpec Party (FP), 21; Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), 7. Subsequent Senates were to be elected, although in January 2003 the government announced that the election slated for 2004 would be shelved for budgetary reasons. On January 10, 2004, King Sihanouk announced his concurrence with a request from the Senate’s chair, Chea Sim, that the term of the upper house be extended for one year in order “to ensure legislative continuity and to avoid a constitutional crisis,” given the ongoing impasse in forming a government after the July 2003 lower house elections. The term was later extended for another year. The indirect election of January 22, 2006, for 57 seats produced the following seat distribution: CPP, 45; FP, 10; SRP, 2. Members were elected from eight constituencies (with varying numbers of seats) by 11,382 eligible electors: the 123 members

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Cabinet As of May 15, 2006 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Ministers

Senior Ministers (Ministers of State)

Hun Sen (CPP) Sar Kheng (CPP) Hor Nam Hong (CPP) Lu Lay Sreng (FP) Nhiek Bun Chhay (FP) Sok An (CPP) Gen. Tea Banh (CPP) Cham Prasidh (CPP) Chhay Than (CPP) Im Chhun Lim (CPP) Hong Sun Huot (FP) Keat Chhon (CPP) Khun Haing (FP) Khy Taing Lim (FP) Kol Pheng (FP) Men Sam On (CPP) [f] Mok Mareth (CPP) Nhim Vanda (CPP) Serei Kosal (FP) Tao Seng Huor (FP) Veng Sereyvuth (FP) You Hockry (FP)

Ministers Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing Commerce Cults and Religious Affairs Culture and Fine Arts Economy and Finance Education, Youth, and Sports Environment Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Health Industry, Mines, and Energy Information Interior Justice Labor and Professional Training Landscaping, Urbanism, and Construction National Defense Office of the Council of Ministers Parliamentary Affairs and Inspection Planning Posts and Telecommunications

Chan Sarun (CPP) Cham Prasidh (CPP) Khun Haing (FP) Prince Sisowath Panara Sirivudh (FP) Keat Chhon (CPP) Kol Pheng (FP) Mok Mareth (CPP) Hor Nam Hong (CPP) Nuth Sokhom (FP) Suy Sem (CPP) Khieu Kanharith (CPP) Sar Kheng (CPP) Ang Vong Vathana (CPP) Nhep Bun Chin (FP) Im Chhun Lim (CPP) Gen. Tea Banh (CPP) Sok An (CPP) Men Sam On (CPP) [f] Chhay Than (CPP) So Khun (CPP)

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Public Works and Transportation Rural Development Social Affairs, Veterans, and Youth Rehabilitation Tourism Water Resources and Meteorology Women’s Affairs

Sun Chan Thol (FP) Lu Lay Sreng (FP) Ith Sam Heng (CPP) Lay Prohos (FP) Lim Kean Hor (CPP) Ing Kantha Phavi (FP) [f]

Secretaries of State Attached to the Council of Ministers Civil Aviation Public Functions [f] = female

of the National Assembly plus the representatives who had been elected to 1,621 local councils in 2002. The king and the National Assembly each appointed 2 additional members. Chair: CHEA SIM. National Assembly (Radhsphea Ney Preah Recheanachakr). The current 123-member National Assembly was elected on July 27, 2003. The National Election Commission officially awarded seats on August 30 as follows: Cambodian People’s Party, 73; Funcinpec Party, 26; Sam Rainsy Party, 24. The president of the National Assembly, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, resigned the post on March 3, 2006. The first vice president and honorary chair of the Cambodia People’s Party, Heng Samrin, was named as his successor. President: HENG SAMRIN.

Communications Although the Cambodian constitution grants freedom of expression, press, and publication, “no one shall exercise this right to infringe upon the rights of others, to affect the good traditions of the society, or violate public law and order and national security.” In practice, the government has regularly acted to restrict publication of information it considers false or defamatory. In June 2002 the Ministry of Information announced that 29 newspapers, 18 magazines, and 7 news bulletins were being shut

Mao Hos Vannal (FP) Pech Bunthin (CPP)

down. During the 2003 election campaign, opposition parties had limited access to national media; the six national TV stations and all but two of more than a dozen national radio stations were owned by or affiliated with the CPP.

Press The following newspapers circulate primarily in Phnom Penh: Rasmei Kampuchea (Light of Cambodia), pro-CPP daily; Kaoh Santepheap, progovernment daily; Cambodia Daily, in Khmer and English; Cambodia Times, weekly in English; Phnom Penh Post, independent fortnightly, in English; Pracheachon (The People), semiweekly CPP organ.

News Agencies A Cambodian News Agency (Sapordamean Kampuchea/Agence Kampuchea Presse—AKP) was established in 1978. Several foreign services, including the Associated Press and Reuters, maintain Phnom Penh offices.

Broadcasting and Computing The government-controlled National Radio of Cambodia (Vithyu Cheat Kampuchea), formerly known as the Voice of the Cambodian People, provides domestic service in Khmer; there also are a number of private local stations as well as a Funcinpec station, Ta Prohm Radio, that was launched in 2003. Television service is offered by the government’s National Television of Cambodia and

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several private stations. There were approximately 102,000 television receivers and 32,000 personal computers serving 35,000 Internet users in 2003.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. SEREYWATH EK

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U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia Joseph A. MUSSOMELI Permanent Representative to the UN Chem WIDHYA IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, ASEAN, CP, Interpol, IOM, NAM, OIF, PCA, WCO, WTO

Note: An extraordinary congress of Cambodia’s royalist Funcinpec Party removes Prince Norodom Ranariddh from the presidency on October 18, 2006, and named as his successor Keo Puth Rasmey, ambassador to Germany. Subsequently, on October 24, Keo Puth Rasmey became deputy prime minister.

C H I NA Zhongguo (Chung-hua)

Note: As of January 1, 1979, the People’s Republic of China officially adopted a system known as Pinyin for rendering Chinese names into languages utilizing the Roman alphabet. The system was not concurrently adopted in Taiwan, where the Wade-Giles form of transliteration, introduced by the British in the 19th century, was, for the most part, retained. For Taiwan, the complexities of the issue surfaced in October 2000, when its education minister recommended the adoption of Pinyin (more specifically, the Hanyu version in use on the mainland); however, others preferred a recent variant known as Tongyong, which was designed to accommodate island dialects and was adopted for street names by the Taipei city government in 1997. In August 2002 Tongyong Pinyin was adopted as Taiwan’s official romanization system. In the material that follows, personal and place names—such as Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) and Beijing (Peking)—are rendered in Hanyu or Tongyong Pinyin, as appropriate, with occasional parenthetical reference to Wade-Giles or other English equivalents for purposes of clarification. For Taiwan, some anomalies will be evident, particularly for individuals adopting English given names.

The Country The most populous and one of the largest countries in the world, China dominates the entire East Asian landmass but since 1949 has been divided between two governments. The Communist-ruled People’s Republic of China (PRC) controls the Chinese mainland, including Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan), Tibet, Hong Kong (as of July 1, 1997), and Macao (as of December 20, 1999). The anti-Communist government of the Republic of China on Taiwan (Nationalist China) administers the island province of Taiwan and some smaller islands, including Kinmen (Quemoy), Matsu, and the Pescadores. Climatically and geographically, the vast and varied expanse of mainland China ranges from tropical to far-northern temperate, from desert to extremely wet-humid, from river plains to high mountains. Population density varies from fewer than 1 to more than 200 per square kilometer. Of the mainland population, 93 percent is ethnically Han Chinese, but there are 15 minority groups totaling over 1 million, including Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans, Uighurs, and many smaller groups. Agriculture is still the predominant occupation, with 80

percent of the population living in the countryside; on the other hand, the PRC has had considerable success developing both light and heavy industry, which by 2003 accounted for 53 percent of GDP, as contrasted with 38 percent of GNP in 1978. In 1998 45 percent of the labor force was female, with approximately 90 percent of adult women employed full-time outside the home; female representation in party and government averages about 20 percent. Taiwan, a semitropical island 100 miles off China’s southeastern coast, has small plains suitable for agriculture in the west and towering mountains along its east-central spine. About 98 percent of the population is ethnically Chinese, the remainder comprising 12 aboriginal tribes of MalayoPolynesian stock. The Chinese may be divided into three groups: numerically predominant Amoy Fukienese, whose ancestors arrived before the Japanese occupation of Taiwan in 1895; a minority of Hakkas, whose ancestors likewise arrived before 1895; and “mainlanders,” who arrived after 1945 from various parts of China. Population density, at more than 1,500 persons per square mile, is exceeded only by Singapore and Bangladesh among

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Political Status: Politically divided since 1949; mainland under (Communist) People’s Republic of China; Taiwan under (Nationalist) Republic of China. Area: 3,705,805 sq. mi. (9,598,045 sq. km.), including Taiwan. Population: 1,334,210,000 (2005E), mainland (including Hong Kong and Macao), plus Taiwan.

independent eastern Asian jurisdictions. The major occupations are farming, light and high-tech industry, commerce, fishing, and the processing of agricultural goods. Economic growth in 2003 was slowed by an outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) but still managed to remain above 3 percent. The government reported GDP growth of 5.7 percent in 2004, led by double-digit growth in trade. The standard of living is now one of the highest in East Asia, with per capita GNP of $13,100 in 2003, as compared with the mainland’s per capita income of $1,100. Approximately 75 percent of women over age 15 are salaried or wage workers, mainly in the textile and garment industry; female representation in government is minimal.

Political History China’s history as a political entity is less ancient than its cultural tradition but extends back to at least 221 BC, when northern China was unified under the Ch’in dynasty. In succeeding centuries of alternating unity and disunity, the domain of Chinese culture spread southward until it covered what is today considered China proper. After the fall of the Manchu dynasty in 1912, a republic was established under the leadership of Sun Yatsen, who abdicated the presidency in favor of the northerner Yuan Shih-kai but subsequently formed a rival regime in the south following Yuan’s attempt to establish a new dynasty. During the Northern Expedition of 1926–1928 (an attempt by the southern government, after Sun’s death, to reunify China), Chiang Kai-shek defeated his rivals, gained control of the Nationalist Party (Chung-kuo Kuo-

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min Tang or Kuomintang—KMT), and expelled the Communists from participation in its activities. With the capture of Beijing (Peking) in June 1928, the Kuomintang regime gained international recognition as the government of China. Many warlord regimes continued to exist, however, while the Communists set up local governments in Jiangxi Province (Kiangsi) and later, after the Long March of 1934–1935, at Yan’an, Shaanxi Province (Yenan, Shensi). In a remarkable display of Chinese unity, most such groups, including the Communists, accepted the leadership of the central government following the Japanese invasion of July 1937. Communist strength increased during World War II, and the failure of postwar negotiations on establishment of a coalition government was followed by full-scale civil war, in which the Communists rapidly won control of the entire mainland. In December 1949 the Nationalists moved their capital to Taipei on the island of Taiwan, whence they continued to claim legal authority over the whole of China. The Communists established their own government, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), in Beijing on October 1, 1949, and have since maintained a parallel claim to sovereignty over all of China, including Taiwan. While each of the two governments has sought diplomatic recognition from as many states as possible, a decisive breakthrough for the PRC occurred on October 25, 1971, when the UN General Assembly voted to recognize its delegation as comprising “the only legitimate representatives of China” to the world body. This action also encouraged increased acceptance of the PRC by individual governments, an overwhelming majority of which now recognize the PRC. At the conclusion of U.S. President Richard Nixon’s visit to the PRC February 21–28, 1972, a joint communiqu´e included a U.S. acknowledgment that “all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that Taiwan is a part of China,” together with an assertion that the United States “does not challenge that position.” It was not until December 15, 1978, however, that Washington agreed to severance of formal diplomatic relations with Taipei and recognition of the PRC, effective January 1, 1979.

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In 1980 the PRC succeeded Taiwan as Chinese member of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank group, and in 1984 it joined the International Atomic Energy Agency and the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol). In 1986 it acceded to membership in the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which had agreed to change Taiwan’s membership title from “Republic of China” to “Taipei, China.” In 1989 Taipei began inching toward direct, but limited, relations with the mainland. In May a delegation led by Taiwan’s finance minister attended an ADB meeting in Beijing on behalf of “Taipei, China”; subsequently, Taiwan participated in the PRC-hosted 1990 Asian Games, although Beijing succeeded in blocking its bid to act as host for the 1998 Games. In an unprecedented gesture that entailed implicit recognition of the PRC, Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui called at his 1990 inaugural for the establishment of “full academic, cultural, economic, trade, scientific and technological exchanges between the two countries.” The offer was contingent, however, on Beijing’s promoting democracy and a free economy, abandoning its goal of reconquering Taiwan, and not interfering with Taipei’s foreign affairs, all of which were characterized by Beijing as “impossible preconditions.” In February 1991 Taiwan’s recently established National Unification Council (NUC) drafted “Guidelines for National Unification,” which proposed incremental steps toward reuniting Taiwan and the mainland. Two months later an extraordinary session of the National Assembly approved constitutional measures permitting Lee to terminate the “Period of National Mobilization for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion.” From April 28 to May 5, 1991, members of the private, but officially recognized, Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) of Taiwan held a series of meetings with the Chinese State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office in the first such officially approved contact. The SEF acted on the basis of a mandate from Taipei’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) to seek resolution of “cross-strait” disputes in such areas as trade,

travel, piracy, and illegal immigration. In a somewhat reciprocal action in mid-August, two mainland journalists were permitted to attend the trial of a group of Chinese fishermen arrested a month earlier in Taiwanese waters, while the arrival one week later of two Chinese Red Cross representatives to meet with the fishermen constituted the first visit to Taiwan by officials of the PRC since the Communists had come to power. By 1992 the MAC was overseeing substantial fiscal penetration of the mainland, with cumulative Taiwanese investment in the PRC estimated at $5 billion by the end of the year. In part because of the degree of economic interaction, reformers within Taiwan’s governing KMT were increasingly urging abandonment of the “one China” policy in favor of a “divided nation” model, under which China would be redefined as a country with two political systems. In April 1993 a Taiwanese group led by the chair of the SEF met in Singapore with a group headed by the mainland’s nongovernmental Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). Although the meeting was still pointedly described as “unofficial,” the participants agreed to hold further sessions. In June 1997, through the offices of the two organizations, the PRC and Taiwan reached agreement on the repatriation of airplane hijackers and other illegal entrants. A month earlier Beijing had extradited a Taiwanese hijacker from the mainland, while Taiwan in mid-July reciprocated by repatriating two hijackers to the PRC. During 1998 relations with the PRC eased further. In July the ARATS deputy secretary general visited Taiwan as a guest of the SEF, and two months later the SEF vice chair reciprocated with an official visit to China. The SEF chair made a similar visit in October, during which a four-part agreement was concluded between SEF and ARATS representatives on both political and economic issues. In 2000 the PRC bitterly opposed Chen Shuibian’s quest for Taiwan’s presidency because his Democratic Progressive Party supported independence. In the wake of his March election, however,

CHINA

Chen indicated a willingness to accept his predecessor’s modified endorsement of “one China.” In what became known as his “four no’s plus one” policy, he gave assurances that Taiwan would not declare independence, alter its official name, amend the constitution in a way that could be interpreted as acknowledging the existence of two states, or hold a referendum on the independence question. He also stated that the NUC and its “Guidelines for National Unification” would remain in place. Furthermore, late in 2000 Chen’s administration announced its intention to complete work on a “three links” plan for direct trade, transport, and postal services between the two regimes. As a step toward that goal, in January 2001 three ships completed the first direct transit between the mainland and nearby Kinmen and Matsu since 1949, thereby opening what was dubbed the “mini-three-links.” The process of somewhat wary rapprochement continued thereafter. In September 2003 Taiwan’s Legislative Branch amended the island’s Statute Governing Relations Between People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area by giving the MAC and SEF authority to sanction links to the mainland by local government bodies and private groups. On January 29, 2005, shortly before the Chinese New Year holiday, a charter jet left Beijing airport for a nonstop flight to Taipei, restoring after 56 years direct, albeit strictly limited, civil aviation links. In March 2005 the PRC passed an antisecession law amid continued assertions by the PRC lead-

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ership that the use of force would “become unavoidable” if Taiwan openly engaged in proindependence activities in defiance of the “one China” principle. Although the law caused a furor in Taiwan, on April 26, 2005, the KMT chair, Lien Chan, began an eight-day visit to the PRC. The first KMT chair to travel to the mainland since 1949, he signed a joint communiqu´e with PRC President Hu Jintao calling for an end to the “hostile situation,” establishment of economic links, and discussion of the island’s international status. In May James Soong, leader of Taiwan’s People First Party, also traveled to the mainland. In early 2006 President Chen clearly hardened his public stance toward reunification, suggesting, for example, that UN membership might be sought for “Taiwan” instead of the “Republic of China” and that a new constitution should be drafted. In addition, on February 27 he announced that the NUC would “cease to function,” a decision widely criticized by Taiwan’s opposition parties, the United States, and the PRC. Nevertheless, in early March the chair of the PRC’s Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a mass organization representing a wide assortment of sanctioned political, social, cultural, and other interests, encouraged CPPCC members to seek out broad contacts with Taiwanese, including “pan-greens”—politicians and other individuals who support an independent, sovereign Taiwan.

PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF C H I NA Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo (Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-ho Kuo)

Government and Politics Political Background Following its establishment in 1949, the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) devoted major attention to the consolidation of its rule in China and outlying territories and to socialization of the Chinese economy. Within China proper, Communist rule was firmly established by the early 1950s. Xizang (Tibet), over which China historically claimed suzerainty, was brought under military and political control in 1950 and 1951 and then, after a nationalist revolt and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India in 1959, was incorporated as an autonomous region of the PRC in 1965. In contrast, occupation of Taiwan was prevented by the protective role assumed by the United States in 1950, although the offshore islands of Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu were sporadically shelled in subsequent years as an ostensible prelude to the “liberation” of Taiwan itself. The internal policy and economic planning of the PRC, originally modeled on Soviet experience and supported by Soviet technical aid and loans, began to deviate markedly from Soviet models with the proclamation in 1958 of the “Great Leap Forward,” a new system of economic development based on organization of the peasant population into rural communes and the use of labor-intensive, as opposed to capital-intensive, methods of production. The failure of the Great Leap Forward was followed by a period of pragmatic recovery from

1961 to 1965 that coincided with growing ideological differences between the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties. Apparently believing that the revolutionary ardor of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had succumbed to bureaucratization, Chairman MAO Zedong (MAO Tse-tung) launched the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” in 1965 and 1966 to reassert the primacy of Marxist-Leninist doctrine

PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

against “revisionist” tendencies imputed to leading elements within the CCP. A period of internal turmoil and civil strife from 1966 to 1968 found Mao, Defense Minister LIN Biao (LIN Piao), and others denouncing the influence of PRC Chair LIU Shaoqi (LIU Shao-ch’i), whose ouster was announced in October 1968, and other alleged revisionists, some of whom—including former CCP secretary general DENG Xiaoping (TENG Hsiao-p’ing)—were subsequently “rehabilitated.” After causing vast internal turbulence that reached a peak in 1967, the Cultural Revolution diminished in intensity during 1968 and early 1969 amid indications that one of its main results had been an increase in the power of the military. At the CCP’s Ninth Congress, held in April 1969, Lin Biao was hailed as the “close comrade in arms and successor” of Chairman Mao. Two years later, however, Lin disappeared from public view and was subsequently branded as an inveterate anti-Maoist who had been largely responsible for the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. He was later reported to have perished in a plane crash in Mongolia on the night of September 12, 1971, while en route to the Soviet Union after failing in an attempt to seize power. In early 1974 “counter-revolutionary revisionism” of the Lin variety was indirectly, but vigorously, attacked by means of a campaign directed against China’s ancient sage Confucius, with some arguing that the true target was Premier ZHOU Enlai (CHOU En-lai). By the end of the year, however, increasing numbers of senior officials had reappeared, including many military men who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution. A subsequent period of relative quiescence was shattered by the deaths of Premier Zhou on January 8, 1976, and of Chairman Mao on September 9. Shortly after Zhou’s death, Vice Premier HUA Guofeng (HUA Kuo-feng) was named acting premier. The appointment came as a surprise to foreign observers, who had anticipated the elevation of the rehabilitated Deng Xiaoping. As first vice premier, Deng had performed many of Zhou’s functions during the latter’s long illness, but on April 17, following demonstrations in Beijing and

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Political Status: Communist People’s Republic established October 1, 1949; present constitution adopted December 4, 1982; controls mainland China and represents China in the United Nations. Area: 3,692,213 sq. mi. (9,562,842 sq. km.), excluding Taiwan. Population: 1,242,612,226 (2000C, excluding Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao); 1,311,478,000 (2005E, excluding Taiwan). Major Urban Centers (urban areas, 2005E): BEIJING (Peking, 12,100,000), Shanghai (18,150,000), Guangzhou (Canton, 9,550,000), Wuhan (9,100,000), Tianjin (Tientsin, 6,350,000), Shenyang (4,550,000), Nanjing (Nanking, 3,500,000), Harbin (3,400,000), Dalian (Dairen, 2,900,000). Most of these figures are substantially less than previous estimates. Official Language: Northern (Mandarin) Chinese (putunghua is the officially promoted Beijing dialect). Monetary Unit: Yuan (official rate July 1, 2006: 7.99 yuan = $1US). The overall currency is known as renminbi (people’s currency). China shifted from a state-set, dual-rate exchange system to a single exchange system pegged to the U.S. dollar on January 1, 1994. On July 21, 2005, the government announced it would permit the yuan to fluctuate within a narrow band against a basket of foreign currencies. President of the People’s Republic and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party: HU Jintao; named to succeed JIANG Zemin as general secretary on November 15, 2002; elected president for a five-year term by the National People’s Congress on March 15, 2003, succeeding Jiang Zemin. Vice President: ZENG Qinghong; elected by the National People’s Congress on March 15, 2003, for a term concurrent with that of the president, succeeding HU Jintao. Premier of the State Council: WEN Jiabao; elected to a five-year term by the National People’s Congress on March 16, 2003, succeeding ZHU Rongji.

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elsewhere in support of Deng, it was announced that he had again been dismissed from all government and party posts and that Hua had been confirmed as premier. A widespread propaganda campaign was subsequently launched against Deng and other “unrepentant capitalist-roaders.” Mao’s death precipitated a renewed power struggle that resulted in a victory for the “moderate,” or “pragmatic,” faction within the Politburo over the “radical” faction composed of Vice Premier ZHANG Chunqiao (CHANG Ch’un-ch’iao), JIANG Qing (CHIANG Ch’ing, Mao’s widow), WANG Hongwen (WANG Hung-wen), and YAO Wenyuan (YAO Wen-y¨uan), who had called for a return to the principles of the Cultural Revolution. Stigmatized as the “gang of four,” the radicals were arrested on October 6, 1976, one day before Hua’s designation as chair of the CCP Central Committee. They were later indicted on charges that included plotting to overthrow the government. All four, plus six associates of Lin Biao, were convicted in January 1981, with Zhang and Jiang receiving deferred death sentences. (The ailing Jiang, who had been released to house arrest in 1984, committed suicide in May 1991; Zhang, who had been released for medical reasons in 1998, died in April 2005.) In July 1977 Deng Xiaoping, for the second time, was rehabilitated and restored to his former posts of CCP deputy chair, vice premier of the State Council, and chief of staff of the armed forces. Though the Fifth National People’s Congress (NPC), which met in Beijing February 25–March 5, 1978, reconfirmed Hua as premier and named CCP Deputy Chair YE Jianying (YEH Chien-ying) as NPC chair—a post vacant since the 1976 death of Marshal ZHU De (CHU Teh)—most observers considered Deng to be at least as powerful as Hua. The vice premier’s ascendancy was further manifested during what appeared to be another leadership struggle in the last quarter of the year, culminating in a late-December Central Committee meeting at which four of Deng’s close supporters were named to the party Politburo. At the same time, several “Maoists,” without losing their Politburo seats, were effectively stripped of key governmental and party responsibilities.

Of more far-reaching consequence than the personnel changes at the December meeting was a sweeping reform in agricultural policy that, as implemented in 1979 and 1980, progressively nullified the Maoist commune system by permitting a return in many areas to farming on a family basis. Subsequently, some land was converted to cashand industrial-crop production, while additional acreage was taken out of agriculture entirely for the construction of local workshops and plants. Collaterally, the state farms were transformed into integrated enterprises operating on the basis of longterm, low-interest loans rather than state subsidies. During a February 1980 plenum of the CCP Central Committee, a number of Deng’s opponents were removed from the Politburo, while two of his supporters were promoted to its Standing Committee. The party Secretariat, which had been abolished during the Cultural Revolution, was reinstated with HU Yaobang (HU Yao-pang), a Deng ally, named general secretary, while Liu Shaoqi was posthumously rehabilitated as “a great Marxist and proletarian revolutionary.” The trend continued at an August 30–September 10 session of the NPC, which at its conclusion accepted Hua’s resignation as premier of the State Council and named Vice Premier ZHAO Ziyang (CHAO Tzu-yang) as his successor. In an apparent effort to ease the transition, Deng also resigned as vice premier, while Hua retained titular status as party chair. Hua subsequently retired from public view after yielding the CCP chairmanship to Hu at a Central Committee plenum held in June 1981. The post of general secretary was left vacant. Although remaining a member of the Politburo’s Standing Committee, Hua was also removed as chair of the party’s Military Commission, with Deng being named his successor. The 12th CCP Congress, which met in September 1982, adopted a new party constitution that abolished the posts of chair and vice chair while reinstating that of general secretary, to which former chair Hu was again named. Although a number of leadership changes (generally strengthening the dominance of Deng’s “reformist” faction) were subsequently announced, the membership

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of the Standing Committee remained unchanged, save for the dropping of Hua, whose sole remaining position was membership on the Central Committee. The restructuring of the upper CCP echelon was accompanied by a program of widespread personnel “rectification” at the provincial and municipal levels in late 1982 and early 1983. The following October, a three-year “consolidation” campaign was announced to eliminate vestiges of “leftist factionalism” among party cadres. One year later, the party’s Central Committee unanimously approved an unprecedented program for “Reform of the Economic Structure” that urged reliance “on the world’s advanced methods of management, including those of developed capitalist countries.” The new urban policy sought to couple the requirements of a planned economy with those of a “commodity economy based on the law of value.” This was to be accomplished by reducing the degree of “mandatory planning” in favor of “guidance planning,” under which noncritical sectors would be increasingly subject to market forces. The reform called for rejecting an “irrational price system” that frequently reflected neither true commodity values nor “the relation of supply to demand.” On the personnel front, the “rectification” campaign continued into 1985, with General Secretary Hu Yaobang announcing in April that some 70 percent of the leaders in 107 party and State Council departments, as well as in 29 regional, provincial, and municipal governments, were to be replaced. The most dramatic implementation of the policy came in September, when an extraordinary National CCP Conference of Party Delegates (less amenable to local influence than a congress) was convened for the first time since 1955 and proceeded to abolish “de facto lifelong tenure” by retiring nearly one-fifth of the Central Committee; the latter body then met to accept the resignation of approximately 40 percent of the ruling Politburo. Although further consolidating the position of Deng Xiaoping, the shake-up at the senior level fell short of purging all those with misgivings about his policies. Conspicuous among this group was Hua Guofeng, who remained a member of the

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Central Committee despite a four-year period of political eclipse. Earlier, on December 4, 1982, the NPC had approved a new PRC constitution that reinstated the post of head of state (abolished under the 1975 constitution), with the incumbent to bear the title of president rather than that of chair. LI Xiannian (LI Hsien-nien) was named to fill the new position in June 1983, with the prominent Inner Mongolian leader, General ULANHU (ULANFU), being named vice president, following elections to the Sixth NPC in March and April. Subsequently, in the course of an extensive government reorganization at the opening session of the Seventh NPC in March and April 1988, the two leaders were replaced by YANG Shangkun and WANG Zhen, respectively. Political relaxation had reached its peak during 1986. Early in the year, General Secretary Hu endorsed open criticism of party pronouncements and subsequently revived a short-lived 1957 appeal by Chairman Mao to “Let a hundred flowers bloom,” promising that the policy, this time, would not be reversed. In December student demonstrations broke out in at least a dozen cities, including Beijing, calling for the election of more genuinely representative people’s congresses. The situation generated bitter resentment among conservatives, and in January 1987 Hu was forced to resign as party leader. Named as his successor, on an acting basis, was Premier Zhao, whose spokesmen insisted that while intellectuals should not be considered targets of a campaign against “bourgeois liberalization,” they should refrain from airing “new views” inappropriate to Chinese society. Zhao stepped down as premier coincident with confirmation of his status as CCP general secretary in November. LI Peng was designated to fill Zhao’s vacated post. The death of Hu Yaobang on April 15, 1989, in the course of an attempted political comeback, prompted student demonstrations in Beijing that precipitated a split within the government and party leadership. On April 26 a hard-line editorial in the official People’s Daily described the outbreak as “a planned conspiracy”; however, on his return from a week-long trip to North Korea, the visibly reformist Zhao Ziyang characterized the students as

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“well-intentioned and patriotic” and called for retraction of the April 26 editorial. By mid-May the protest had led to student occupation of Tiananmen Square, which proved an embarrassment to the government by severely disrupting a visit by Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev (the first such event in three decades). Immediately after the Soviet leader’s departure, martial law was declared in the capital, although it was not until the early morning of June 4, with hard-liners having assumed control of the party Politburo, that the military was ordered to disburse the demonstrators in an action that reportedly resulted in several thousand deaths. On June 24 General Secretary Zhao was formally purged and replaced by the Shanghai party chief, JIANG Zemin. On November 9 Deng Xiaoping turned over his last party post, the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission, to Jiang, albeit with no indication that his status as China’s most powerful political figure had thereby been jeopardized. The most important domestic event of 1992, the 14th CCP Congress, held October 12–18, saw an unusually large number of Politburo and Central Committee members replaced. Subsequently, at the first session of the Eighth NPC in March 1993, General Secretary Jiang was named to succeed Yang Shangkun as PRC president. Li Peng was reconfirmed as premier, although he received an unprecedented 330 negative ballots. Jiang’s elevation meant that he held the three key posts of PRC president, party general secretary, and chair of the CCP Central Military Commission—a consolidation unequaled since Hua Guofeng had held them in the immediate post-Mao era. Amid increasingly explicit reports of Deng’s declining health, the third session of the Eighth NPC in March 1995 saw significant minority opposition to two of President Jiang’s nominees for State Council posts. Additional evidence of dissent was provided by the passage of a major Central Bank law by a vote of 63 percent, the lowest ever recorded for an NPC legislative measure. In June the authorities instituted a major security clampdown to coincide with the sixth anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre, with the leading dissident, WEI

Jingsheng, receiving a 14-year prison sentence in December for alleged subversion. Deng Xiaoping, who had not appeared in public since early 1994, died on February 19, 1997. No major policy changes ensued, in large part because the succession issue had long been settled with the accession of Jiang Zemin at the head of a “third generation” of leaders. In the other major event of the year, Hong Kong returned to Chinese sovereignty on July 1 (see Special Administrative Regions, below). Jiang was reelected PRC president by the first session of the Ninth NPC on March 16, 1998, while ZHU Rongji was named on the following day to succeed the outgoing premier, Li Peng, who was elected NPC chair. Sweeping leadership changes marked the first session of the Tenth NPC, held March 5–18, 2003. HU Jintao, who had been named CCP secretary general in November 2002, was designated state president, although not immediately replacing Jiang Zemin as chair of the Central Military Commission. On March 17 a new State Council was announced, only a handful of whose members were carryovers from the previous body. By contrast, the second session of the Tenth NPC, held March 5–14, 2004, dealt largely with economic issues, including efforts to reduce internal disparities in the interest of more balanced economic growth. It also approved a number of constitutional amendments, including formal guarantees of private property and human rights. Six months later, on September 19, a CCP Central Committee plenum relieved former president Jiang as chair of the Central Military Commission, Hu Jintao thereby becoming, like his predecessor, holder of the three most powerful positions in state and party.

Constitution and Government The constitution adopted by the First NPC on September 20, 1954, defined the PRC, without reference to the Communist Party, as “a people’s democratic state led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants”; by contrast, both the 1975 and 1978 constitutions identified the PRC as “a socialist state of the dictatorship of the proletariat,” while specifically recognizing

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the CCP as “the core of leadership of the whole Chinese people.” Article One of the most recent (1982) constitution defines the PRC as “a socialist state under the people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants.” Like its immediate predecessor, it seemed designed in part to guard against abuses attributed to proponents of the Cultural Revolution. Thus, for example, its civil rights provisions are somewhat more circumscribed, and it did not revive a guarantee (dropped from the 1978 document in September 1980) that citizens may “speak out freely, air their views fully, hold great debates, and write bigcharacter posters”—“rights” that were viewed as being abused in political campaigns during the Cultural Revolution. Arrests must still be sanctioned by appropriate authorities and carried out by “public security” organs, and rights to a defense and to a public trial are retained, save in cases “involving special circumstances as prescribed by law.” The document defines minority rights, mandates equal pay for equal work, and specifies that deputies may be recalled at all legislative levels. Enumerated responsibilities include observing “labor discipline,” paying taxes, and exercising family planning. The National People’s Congress, “the highest organ of state power,” convenes once a year. Deputies are elected by lower-level legislative bodies and by units of the armed forces for five-year terms. Among the NPC’s functions are constitutional amendment and the election of most leading government officials, including the president and vice president of the PRC, whose terms are concurrent with that of the legislature; state councilors (including the premier and vice premiers); and ministers. Judicial authority is exercised by a hierarchy of people’s courts under the supervision of the Supreme People’s Court. A Supreme People’s Procuratorate supervises a parallel hierarchy of people’s procuratorates, with both the courts and the procuratorates accountable to legislative bodies at relevant levels. The principal regional and local organs are provincial and municipal people’s congresses (elected for five-year terms); prefecture, city, and county congresses (elected for three-year

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terms); and town congresses (elected for two-year terms). In mid-1985 it was reported that a five-year campaign to dismantle some 56,000 rural communes in favor of 92,000 local township governments had been completed. In March 1999 the NPC approved two constitutional amendments that represented evolutionary departures from the policies of Mao Zedong. One stated that the country “should implement the principle of rule by law.” The other declared private enterprise to be “an important component of the socialist economy”—a marked change from the 1954 specification that capitalists be “used, restricted and taught,” and even from the language of a 1978 amendment, which had required the private economy to be “guided, supervised and managed” as a “supplement” to the socialist economy. As one observer put it, the emphasis of both amendments was on “developing a market economy, rather than developing a free marketplace of ideas.” The impact of a surging economy and China’s heightened presence on the world stage was reflected in 2003 amendments concerning property rights and human rights, although a loophole was attached to the former by confining its scope to “legal private property” as defined, presumably, by the regime. Administratively, the PRC is divided into 22 provinces (excluding Taiwan): Anhui (Anhwei), Fujian (Fukien), Gansu (Kansu), Guangdong (Kwangtung), Guizhou (Kweichow), Hainan (Hainan), Hebei (Hopei), Heilongjiang (Heilungkiang), Henan (Honan), Hubei (Hupeh), Hunan (Hunan), Jiangsu (Kiangsu), Jiangxi (Kiangsi), Jilin (Kirin), Liaoning (Liaoning), Qinghai (Tsinghai), Shaanxi ([rendered with a non-Pinyin double vowel to distinguish it from Shanxi] Shensi), Shandong (Shantung), Shanxi (Shansi), Sichuan (Szechwan), Yunnan (Yunnan), Zhejiang (Chekiang); 5 autonomous regions: Guangxi Zhuang (Kwangsi Chuang), Nei Monggol (Inner Mongolia), Ningxia Hui (Ningsia Hui), Xinjiang Uygur (Sinkiang Uighur), Xizang (Tibet); 2 special administrative regions: Hong Kong and Macao; and 4 centrally governed municipalities: Beijing (Peking), Chongqing (Chungking), Shanghai (Shanghai), Tianjin (Tientsin).

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Foreign Relations Historically a regional hegemon periodically weakened by dynastic and other internal difficulties, China suffered its most extensive modern occupation following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and 1932, after nearly a century of coastal penetration by Britain and other Western powers. Technically a victor at the conclusion of World War II, it received substantial Soviet assistance after the Maoist takeover in 1949 but was progressively estranged from Moscow in the wake of Stalin’s death in 1953 and the alleged “revisionist” posture of his successors. For a lengthy period extending from the Soviet cancellation of its technical aid program in 1960 to the lapse of a 30-year friendship treaty in 1980, the ideological hostility persisted. It was aggravated by conflicting territorial claims, Moscow’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the presence of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, and what Beijing viewed as a threatening Soviet military presence in Mongolia. Subsequently, in the context of leadership changes in both countries, tensions subsided measurably; low-level normalization talks were initiated in October 1982 and continued at six-month intervals thereafter. In 1984 and 1985 a number of economic accords were concluded, while upon taking office in March 1985 Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev called for “a serious improvement in relations.” In 1987, after a 9-year lapse, two rounds of negotiations on the border issue were held, and in May 1989, three months after completion of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Gorbachev traveled to Beijing for a summit with Chinese leaders that was overshadowed by the student takeover of the capital’s Tiananmen Square. Li Peng reciprocated in April 1990, becoming the first Chinese premier since 1964 to travel to Moscow, where he and his Soviet counterpart, Nikolai Ryzhkov, signed a 10-year agreement for economic and scientific cooperation. Collaterally, the two countries’ foreign ministers concluded an agreement on troop reductions along their 4,300-mile common border. An ally of Hanoi during the Vietnam War, China denounced Vietnam as Moscow’s “Asian Cuba”

in mid-1978 and continued its support for Kampuchea (Cambodia) in the border dispute that culminated in the Vietnamese invasion of its western neighbor at the end of the year. A Chinese incursion into northern Vietnam in February 1979, triggered by the Vietnamese action in Cambodia but rooted in a series of border disputes going back to the mid-19th century, proved to be an embarrassment for the comparatively inexperienced Chinese military. Although Chinese forces registered local successes, serious personnel and equipment shortcomings were evident in engagements against battle-hardened Vietnamese militiamen. The Chinese withdrew in mid-March, claiming that they had succeeded in their objective of “teaching Hanoi a lesson.” Sporadic border clashes continued thereafter, some of the more serious occurring in April through June 1984 and in 1985. Subsequently, despite a naval clash in March 1988 stemming from conflicting claims to the Spratly Islands (see Vietnam map, p. 1371), Beijing appeared mollified by a Vietnamese announcement that it would withdraw all of its troops from Cambodia by 1990. In 1991, upon completion of a peace agreement that ended 13 years of conflict in Cambodia, China and Vietnam began normalizing relations. In 1994 long-smoldering tension over the Spratlys again erupted, with Beijing denouncing Vietnam for violating its “indisputable sovereignty” over the islands, which are also claimed by Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, and Taiwan. Three months later it expressed its “grave concern” over Hanoi’s oil-prospecting in the region, which drew a countercharge from Vietnam of “systematic and unacceptable” intrusion by Chinese fisherman into its exclusive economic zone in the Gulf of Tonkin. Concurrently, it was reported that China had moved to create an air and naval “rapid response” force to defend its claims in the South China Sea. Relations fluctuated for several years thereafter, but the two neighbors signed a land border agreement on December 30, 1999, and in 2000 pledged to resolve the sea disputes. In December 2000 the two settled the Tonkin issue, but the conflicting claims in the South China Sea remain open.

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For more than a quarter-century, relations with India were strained by a territorial dispute that resulted in full-scale fighting between the two countries in October 1962. China occupied some 14,500 square miles of territory adjacent to Kashmir in the west and also claimed some 36,000 square miles bordering Bhutan in the east (see map). In 1979 China declared that it would not seek Indian withdrawal in the east (south of the so-called McMahon Line drawn by the British in 1915) if India would recognize its claim in the west, which involves a portion of the strategically important SinkiangTibet highway; New Delhi responded by calling for Chinese withdrawal from both sectors as a precondition of settlement talks. The first direct negotiations on the issue were held in Beijing in 1981, but they proved abortive; a further round of discussions in New Delhi in 1985 also failed to end the impasse. Periodic discussions thereafter culminated in a visit to Beijing by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in December 1988— the first such meeting in 34 years—during which it was agreed that a joint working group of technical experts would be established to facilitate settlement “through peaceful and friendly consultation.” In September 1993, during a visit to Beijing by Indian Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao, the two governments agreed on a mutual reduction of troops deployed along the border and pledged to observe the de facto line of control, pending conclusive settlement of the dispute. Renewed border talks began in March 1999, but the long-standing issue remained unresolved after a much-heralded meeting in Beijing between Hu Jintao and India’s prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, in June 2003. India did, however, acknowledge Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, while China indicated de facto recognition of India’s sovereignty over Sikkim. In April 2005, following meetings between Premier Wen Jiabao and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the two countries announced plans for a “strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity.” They also set out an 11-point framework for settling the border issue. Beginning in the early 1970s, relations with the West improved dramatically, highlighted initially

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by U.S. President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972. The United States and the PRC established de facto diplomatic relations in 1973 by agreeing to set up “liaison offices” in each other’s capitals and subsequently completed the exchange, on a de jure basis, on January 1, 1979. Japan, long China’s leading trading partner, recognized the PRC as the “sole legal government of China” in 1972, and in 1978 the two signed a treaty of peace and friendship, culminating six years of intermittent talks. Relations with the United Kingdom long centered on the status of Hong Kong. In September 1984 the two governments issued a joint declaration on the future of the crown colony, as a consequence of which China, under the slogan “one country and two systems,” regained full sovereignty over Hong Kong on July 1, 1997, when the 99-year lease of the New Territories expired. China agreed to maintain the enclave as a capitalist “Special Administrative Region” for at least 50 years thereafter. The agreement on Hong Kong was followed in 1987 by a joint Sino-Portuguese declaration on the future of Macao, which reverted to Chinese sovereignty on December 20, 1999. At the outset of the Persian Gulf crisis in August 1990, Premier Li Peng declared that his government opposed any “big power” involvement in the region; subsequently, however, China abstained on the UN Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force to secure Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait, thus ensuring passage of the measure. The pace of interaction with foreign governments accelerated measurably in 1991. In May Jiang Zemin became the first Chinese party leader since 1957 to visit Moscow; during his stay the Chinese and Soviet foreign ministers signed an accord on demarcation of the eastern sector of the Sino-Soviet border. In late June Foreign Minister QIAN Qichen visited Tokyo, and in mid-August Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu became the first leader of a major industrialized nation to visit China since the Tiananmen Square massacre. During the visit Premier Li Peng announced his government’s willingness to end its long-standing boycott of the 1968 UN Treaty on the Non-Proliferation

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of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Subsequently, during a visit by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker in mid-November, China tentatively agreed to limit its foreign arms sales by endorsing the 18-nation Missile Technology Control Regime; it also signed a memorandum of understanding on the export of prisoner-made goods, although refusing to respond to more general U.S. complaints of human rights abuses. In March 1992 China and Russia, in their first official agreement since the collapse of the Soviet Union, concluded a major trade pact. During the preceding three months China had extended diplomatic recognition to Russia and the other 14 components of the former USSR. During a December visit to Beijing by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, two dozen joint statements were issued on matters ranging from economic cooperation and scientific exchanges to border security and armed forces reductions. A lengthy process of rapprochement between China and South Korea concluded in August 1992 with the normalization of diplomatic relations. While the reaction from North Korea was muted, Taiwan, which immediately severed relations with Seoul, branded the action as a “violation of international justice.” Despite its anger, Taipei did nothing to curtail its rising economic penetration of the PRC. In August 1993 the United States imposed a number of economic sanctions against China, claiming that it had breached the NPT by selling missile technology to Pakistan. The action came two months after Washington had agreed to a one-year renewal of China’s most-favorednation (MFN) trading status, despite continued criticism of Beijing’s human rights record. That record was believed to be at least partially responsible for a late September decision by the International Olympic Committee to reject China’s bid to host the 2000 Summer Games, although it was subsequently named host for the 2008 games. No concessions were made by President Jiang on either human rights or trade during a meeting with President Bill Clinton at a November AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in

Seattle, Washington. Beijing did, however, agree in May 1994 to cease jamming Voice of America broadcasts and end the export to the United States of prison-made products. In return, Clinton again renewed China’s MFN status, implicitly severing its linkage to the human rights issue. A new trade issue promptly surfaced over U.S. charges of intellectual copyright infringement. The dispute was momentarily resolved during “lastditch” talks in February 1995, with Beijing promising to take action against the distributors of pirated products. Shortly thereafter Beijing signed a number of energy contracts with U.S. firms and, as a quid pro quo for market access, Washington gave qualified endorsement to China’s bid to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). Relations worsened in June 1995, however, following U.S. complaints of Chinese arms shipments to Iran and Pakistan and Chinese anger over an unofficial visit by Taiwan’s President Lee Teng-hui to the United States. Other highly divisive Sino-U.S. issues provided the backdrop to a meeting between President Jiang and President Clinton in October 1995, during the 50th anniversary session of the UN General Assembly. The issues included Beijing’s recent incarceration of a number of human rights activists, the expulsion of two American military officers for allegedly taking photographs of war games on the coast adjacent to Taiwan, and restrictions placed on delegates to official and unofficial women’s conferences in Beijing and Huairou, respectively. In early 1996 trade issues again loomed large, although a partial defusing allowed President Clinton to announce another one-year renewal of China’s MFN status in May, while at the same time reiterating U.S. reservations about China’s eligibility for WTO membership. In November the U.S. and Chinese presidents agreed to exchange visits during the ensuing two years, and in October 1997 President Clinton welcomed his Chinese counterpart to a White House summit by calling for a “new era” in Sino-U.S. relations. Premier Li Peng and President Jiang visited Moscow in December 1996 and April 1997, respectively. On the later occasion China, Russia,

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Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan (the “Shanghai Five” group—see below) signed a comprehensive border agreement. In November 1997, following a visit by Russian Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin in June, President Yeltsin was welcomed in Beijing for talks that yielded a declaration formally ending decades of tension along the eastern sector of the Sino-Russian border. In April 1998 representatives of China and the European Union met in London for the first in a projected annual series of talks, with the participants pledging greater mutual cooperation in trade and other economic relations. Two months later, U.S. President Clinton declared his intention to renew China’s MFN status, and his visit from June 25 to July 3 became the first by a U.S. president to China since the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. In April 1999 Premier Zhu Rongji reciprocated with a nine-day visit to the United States, but he was unable to secure Washington’s backing on WTO entry, reportedly because of continued U.S. congressional opposition in the wake of charges—which ultimately proved to be unfounded—that Beijing had stolen highly classified military information from the Los Alamos nuclear weapons laboratory. It was not until September 19, 2000, that the way was paved for WTO accession by U.S. Senate approval of a landmark bill that granted China permanent trading status. (Formal WTO admission came in December 2001.) Earlier, in November 1998, President Jiang had become the first Chinese head of state to visit Japan. While the event was considered a breakthrough in Sino-Japanese relations, Jiang was unable to secure concessions from Tokyo in regard to Taiwan or to obtain a long-sought formal apology for the suffering inflicted by Japan’s occupation of China from 1937 to 1945. During a visit to Beijing in July 2000, Soviet President Vladimir Putin and his Chinese counterpart issued a joint declaration condemning the proposed U.S. national missile defense system as posing “grave adverse consequences” for their security interests. In July 2001 President Jiang and President Putin signed a 20-year friendship and cooperation treaty. A month earlier, China and

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Russia had joined their three “Shanghai Five” partners in establishing a new Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The original Shanghai forum had emerged from a 1994 meeting in Shanghai directed toward resolving border disputes and addressing security issues in Central Asia. It had subsequently developed a more encompassing posture toward regional stability, a principal focus being mutual opposition to Islamic militancy. Joining the Shanghai Five as a founding member of the SCO was Uzbekistan. In October 2004 President Putin again visited Beijing, the most important result of which was agreement on delineation of the full 2,700-mile Sino-Russian border. In the same year, President Hu expanded his overseas itinerary with summits in Brazil, Cuba, and France.

Current Issues On March 14, 2005, the NPC passed an antisecession law that threatened a military response should Taiwan move toward a formal declaration of independence. The timing appeared to indicate a waning willingness to deal with Taiwan’s President Chen, whose term expires in 2008 and whose public support has been dropping. At the same time, Beijing was completing arrangements for the first visit by the chair of Taiwan’s opposition Nationalist Party (KMT), former presidential candidate Lien Chan, who arrived in late April, met with President Hu, and was treated, according to news reports, much like a head of state. Less than a month later, Hu met with another opposition figure, James Soong, chair of Taiwan’s People First Party (PFP). Together, the KMT and PFP control Taiwan’s legislature, and one factor underlying Hu’s unprecedented cordiality was their continuing opposition to purchasing a $16–$18 billion armaments package offered by the United States and backed by President Chen. At the same time, China’s current leadership has shown no inclination to permit a freer flow of information across borders. In August 2005 the Ministry of Culture announced that it would not permit additional foreign-owned satellite television

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channels and would tighten controls on the 31 current operators to help protect what the government has termed “national cultural identity”—a stance seen internationally as part of a renewed effort to block access to political and social messages deemed undesirable. Beijing’s effort has also extended to the Internet. In July 2005 dissident ZHANG Lin was convicted of subversion and sentenced to five years in prison for posting antigovernment essays. In September the international group Reporters without Borders asserted that the Hong Kong–based branch of Internet giant Yahoo! had supplied damaging information about a journalist, SHI Tau, who had been sentenced to ten years in prison for revealing state secrets. Yahoo! was reportedly involved in at least one other instance in which a “cyberdissident” was convicted and imprisoned. In early 2006 another major Internet company, Google, admitted that it had censored its Chinese-language search engine to produce results deemed acceptable by the government. On November 13, 2005, an explosion at a northeastern petrochemical plant released some 100 tonnes of benzene and related chemicals into the Songhua River, subsequently forcing officials to cut off the water supply downriver at Harbin, a city of 3 million people, for nearly a week. The spill eventually made its way to Russia, for which the Chinese government offered an apology and material assistance. The accident was, however, only one in a growing number of reported incidents of environmental degradation, some of which have led to violent protests against the siting of chemical plants and similar facilities. In March 2006 the director of the State Environmental Protection Administration warned of potential disaster if steps were not taken to reduce pollution, improve access to clean drinking water, and recognize that “prosperity at the expense of the environment is very superficial and very weak.” Accordingly, the PRC’s 11th Five-Year Plan, adopted by the NPC on March 14, called not only for an annual economic growth rate of about 7.5 percent through 2010 but also for a reduction in both energy consumption and the discharge of pollutants.

China’s seemingly oxymoronic “socialist market economic system” has been growing at a phenomenal rate for more than a decade. Based on recent recalculations by the PRC’s National Bureau of Statistics, annual GDP growth averaged 8.9 percent from 1995 to 2002, the highest rate of expansion in the region. For both 2003 and 2004 estimated growth was about 10 percent, much of it linked to the export of chemicals, capital goods, and electronics. The electronics sector, in particular, has benefited from China’s success in supplanting other Asian countries as a final assembly point for goods. What has attracted the most attention in the West, however, has been quota battles over clothing and textiles. With the WTO’s quota system for textiles having expired on January 1, 2005, Chinese textile exports to the European Union (EU) and the United States jumped by more than 50 percent in the first five months of the year. As a consequence, both markets moved to protect their own textile industries by limiting further Chinese access—a move permissible until 2008 under WTO rules. In June 2005 the EU and China reached an initial agreement on limiting imports of certain types of clothing for three years, but it took until September to correct deficiencies in the agreement and for the EU to admit millions of Chinese-made items that had been impounded at European ports. In early November Washington and Beijing completed their own quota agreement covering nearly half of China’s clothing and textile imports to the United States. The arrangement, which eased the way for a scheduled visit by U.S. President George W. Bush to China later in the month, allowed for a 10 percent increase in the sale of affected imports in 2006, with the rate of growth rising to 15–16 percent in 2008. The recent surge in the U.S. trade deficit with China, which reached $202 billion in 2005 (including reexports from Hong Kong), has largely been offset by a decline in the U.S. trade deficit with the rest of eastern Asia. At the same time, U.S. exports to China have risen dramatically, up more than 80 percent since 2000, making the PRC a leading purchaser of such American commodities as soybeans, wheat, and cotton. China has nevertheless become

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an easy target for congressional and other critics of the Bush administration’s trade policies and its perceived indifference to the outsourcing of jobs. Critics have also lamented that China now holds more than $250 billion in U.S. government debt, second only to Japan. In 2005 the PRC’s overall trade surplus tripled, to $102 billion, lending credence to an international charge that the value of the yuan was still being artificially restrained despite China’s decision in July 2005 to permit its narrow fluctuation against a basket of foreign currencies. During President Bush’s November 20–21 visit, Chinese leaders stated their intention to continue currency reform and to improve the protection of intellectual property rights, which continues to be a sore point in bilateral relations. In addition, the growth of Chinese military spending was attacked by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld during a visit to the PRC in October. Subsequently, Beijing budgeted defense spending for 2006 at $35 billion, an increase of 14.7 percent. Despite frequently criticizing the PRC’s human rights record and many of its policies, Washington has clearly recognized Beijing’s growing international role, particularly in regional affairs. China’s influence with North Korea has attracted considerable attention since the opening in August 2003 of six-party talks (also involving Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States) on Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. With the U.S. Bush administration steadfastly refusing to accept North Korea’s demands for bilateral negotiations, Beijing has played a crucial role in repeatedly bringing the Kim Jong Il regime back to the bargaining table.

Political Parties and Groups Although established essentially as a one-party Communist state, the PRC has preserved some of the characteristics of a “United Front” regime by permitting the continued existence of eight small minority parties, some of whose leaders hold high government office along with Communists and nonparty personnel. In addition, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference

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(CPPCC), which originally included representatives of all bodies adopting the 1949 constitution, reemerged in 1978, its last previous meeting having been held in January 1965. Among the groups represented were political parties; minority nationalities; the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, the All-China Women’s Federation, and the Communist Youth League, all three of which had been denounced during the Cultural Revolution; religious groups; and an assortment of other social, scientific, artistic, and cultural interests. The current chair of the CPPCC is JIA Qinglin, a member of the Communist Party Politburo.

Leading Party Chinese Communist Party—CCP (Zhongguo Gongchan Dang). The previously unquestioned political dominance of the CCP was substantially weakened as a result of the Cultural Revolution and the disruptive activities of “Red Guard” forces in the mid-1960s. However, reconstruction of the party organization, begun in late 1969, was largely completed by late 1973, with the revolutionary committees created during the Cultural Revolution being made subordinate to party committees. The CCP’s resurgence was formalized in 1975, when, for the first time, it was constitutionally recognized as the “vanguard” of state and society; by contrast, in the 1982 constitution the party is mentioned only in the preamble, where, at several points, its “leadership” role is acknowledged. The party’s highest organ is the National Party Congress, whose Central Committee elects a Political Bureau (Politburo) as well as other top figures. In theory, party congresses are elected every five years and hold annual sessions; however, the 8th Congress held only two sessions (in 1956 and 1958), while the 9th Congress did not convene until 1969. The 12th Congress, which met in September 1982, adopted a new party constitution, under which the posts of CCP chair and vice chair were abolished. The ongoing process of internal reform was further advanced at the 13th Congress, held October 25–November 1, 1987. The 1,997 delegates elected

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a substantially reduced Central Committee of 175 full and 110 alternate members, a new Central Discipline Inspection Commission of 69 members, and a 200-member Central Advisory Commission. Most of the remaining “founding generation” CCP leaders retired, including Deng Xiaoping, who continued, however, as chair of the party’s Central Military Commission until November 1989. At its first plenary session on November 2 the new Central Committee confirmed Zhao Ziyang as general secretary and named a restructured Politburo of 17 full members and 1 alternate (including a 5-member Standing Committee) that included only half of the previous membership. The new Standing Committee thereupon appointed an even more drastically curtailed Secretariat of 4 full members and 1 alternate. On June 24, 1989, shortly after the dramatic events in Tiananmen Square, Jiang Zemin and two others were named to the Standing Committee, while Zhao Ziyang was one of two dismissed. In March 1991 Standing Committee member QIAO Shi was named head of a 31-member Central Committee for the Management of Public Security to provide liaison between the party Central Committee and the State Council in matters affecting public order and social stability. The 14th Congress was held in Beijing October 12–18, 1992, with 1,989 indirectly elected and 41 “specially invited” delegates representing a claimed 52 million party members. A new Central Committee of 189 full and 130 alternate members (new members constituting nearly half of the total) was elected on October 18. In addition, a new Politburo of 7 Standing Committee and 19 other members (including 2 alternates) was named; with the exception of General Secretary Jiang Zemin, Premier Li Peng, 1 promoted alternate member, and 7 others, all of the appointments were new. Most of the new members were economic reformers, while the military lost all of its representatives save one. However, the strength of the “Shanghai clique,” headed by President Jiang and Vice Premier Zhu Rongji, was enhanced in September 1994 by leadership changes that included the naming of Huang Ju, Zhu’s successor as mayor of Shanghai, to the Politburo.

The party’s 15th Congress, held September 12– 18, 1997, in Beijing, concluded by removing almost all members over the age of 70 from its Central Committee, while increasing the size of the body to 193 full and 151 alternate members. During its first plenary session on September 19, the Committee reelected Jiang Zemin as general secretary and made a number of changes in the Politburo, Secretariat, and Central Military Commission. At its plenary session October 9–11, 2000, the Central Committee approved the proposed Tenth Five-Year Plan for 2001–2005, pledged an expansion of democratic values, endorsed an “open-style economy,” and called for the construction of a “socialist rule of law.” The sixth plenary session, held September 24–26, 2001, focused on party-building, including improved leadership, governance, and anticorruption efforts in the context of “Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory.” The 16th Congress, initially scheduled for September 2002, was postponed until November 8–14, reportedly because of a power struggle over the composition of the “new generation of leaders.” At the congress, a new Central Committee of 198 full and 158 alternate members was named, which designated a 9-member Standing Committee, headed by Hu Jintao, and 15 other Politburo members. The fifth plenary session, held October 8–11, 2005, approved the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010), which was to be submitted to the National People’s Congress in March 2006. General Secretary: HU Jintao (PRC President and Chair, Central Military Commission). Other Members of Politburo Standing Committee: HUANG Ju (Vice Premier), JIA Qinglin (Chair, Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference), LI Changchun, LUO Gan, WEN Jiabao (Premier), WU Bangguo (Chair, NPC Standing Committee), WU Guanzheng, ZENG Qinghong (Member, Secretariat). Other Members of Politburo: Gen. CAO Gangchuan (Defense Minister and Member, State Council), CHEN Liangyu, GUO Boxiong, HE Guoqiang (Member, Secretariat), HUI Liangyu (Vice Premier), LIU Qi, LIU Yunshan, WANG Lequan, WANG Zhaoguo, WU Yi (Vice Premier), YU Zhengsheng, ZENG Peiyan (Vice

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Premier), ZHANG Dejiang, ZHANG Lichang, ZHOU Yongkang (Public Security Minister; Member, State Council; Member, Secretariat). Alternate: WANG Gang (Member, Secretariat). Secretariat: HE Guoqiang, HE Yong, LIU Yunshan, WANG Gang, Gen. XU Caihou, ZENG Qinghong, ZHOU Yongkang.

Regime-Supportive Minority Parties While expected “to work under the leadership of the Communist Party,” the following largely middle-class and/or intellectual groups were permitted, in October 1979, to recruit new members and to hold national congresses for the first time in two decades: the China Association for Promoting Democracy (Zhongguo Minzhu Cujin Hui), a Shanghai cultural and educational group founded in 1945; the China Democratic League (Zhongguo Minzhu Tongmeng), founded in 1941 by a group of intellectuals opposed to Chiang Kaishek’s Nationalist Party (Chung-kuo Kuo-min Tang or Kuomintang—KMT); the China Democratic National Construction Association (Zhongguo Minzhu Jianguo Hui), a business-oriented group founded in 1945; the China Party for Public Interests (Zhongguo Zhi Gong Dang), an outgrowth of a 19th-century secret society organized by overseas Chinese; the Chinese Peasants and Workers’ Democratic Party (Zhongguo Nong Gong Minzhu Dang), founded in 1947 as an outgrowth of a prewar movement that had joined forces with the CCP in 1935; the Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang (Zhongguo Guomin Dang Geming Weiyuanhui), founded in 1948 by a group of Hong Kong–based KMT dissidents opposed to Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership; the September 3, 1945 (VJ Day) Society (Jiu San Xuehui); and the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League (Taiwan Minzhu Zizhi Tongmen), founded in 1947 by a group of pro-PRC Taiwanese.

Dissident Groups During 1998 a number of dissidents sought to organize legal parties, notably WANG Youcai, QIN Yongmin, and XU Wenli on behalf of the China Democratic Party (CDP). In June the CDP

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activists appeared to have received encouragement from a number of local officials, but in September they were obliged to withdraw their request. In late November Wang, Qin, and Xu were arrested for “subversion of the state process” and sentenced to 11, 12, and 13 years imprisonment, respectively. The sentencing of 15 other CDP leaders during the ensuing year virtually destroyed the party. In early 1999 the regime also cracked down on the China Labor Party, although in March it released two leaders, LI Li and WANG Ce, of the China Democratic United Front–Liberal Democratic Party after four months’ incarceration. A clandestine Islamic Party of East Turkestan operates primarily in Xinjiang Province, where the Uighur minority has long sought separation. In early 2001 the party’s leader, Arkhan ABULLA, was reportedly sentenced to death.

Legislature National People’s Congress—NPC (Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui). A unicameral body indirectly elected for a five-year term, the NPC holds one session annually, although the Second Congress (1959–1963) did not meet in 1961 and the third met only once. No subsequent election was held until 1974, after which the Fourth Congress convened in complete secrecy in Beijing in January 1975. Meetings became regularized with the Fifth Congress, elected at a series of municipal and provincial congresses held between November 1977 and February 1978. The fourth session of the Tenth Congress was held in Beijing March 5–14, 2006, with 2,891 delegates in attendance. Chair of the Standing Committee: WU Bangguo.

Communications All media are under rigid government control. Some papers, mainly in the south, have been indirectly critical of the government, which has responded by temporarily suspending them from publication. In early 2004 the government announced that 677 state- and party-owned

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Cabinet As of August 15, 2006 Premier Vice Premiers

State Councilors

Wen Jiabao Hui Liangyu Huang Ju Wu Yi [f] Zeng Peiyan Gen. Cao Gangchuan Chen Zhili [f] Hua Jianmin Tang Jiaxuan Zhou Yongkang

Ministers Agriculture Civil Affairs Commerce Communications Construction Culture Education Finance Foreign Affairs Health Information Industry Justice Labor and Social Security Land and Natural Resources National Defense Personnel Public Security Railways Science and Technology State Commission for Development Reform State Commission for Ethnic Affairs State Commission for Family Planning State Commission for Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense State Security Supervision Water Resources Auditor General Chair, Central Military Commission Governor, People’s Bank of China Secretary General, State Council [f] = female

Du Qinglin Li Xueju Bo Xilai Zhang Chunxian Wang Guangtao Sun Jiazheng Zhou Ji Jin Renqing Li Zhaoxing Gao Qiang Wang Xudong Wu Aiying [f] Tian Chengping Sun Wensheng Gen. Cao Gangchuan Zhang Bolin Zhou Yongkang Liu Zhijun Xu Guanhua Ma Kai Li Dezhu Zhang Weiqing Zhang Yunchuan Xu Yongyue Li Zhilun Wang Shucheng Li Jinhua Hu Jintao Zhou Xiaochuan Hua Jianmin

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newspapers were being shut down because compulsory subscriptions had created undue financial burdens for grassroots units.

Press There are some 2,100 newspapers published in China. Most of the following (dailies published in Beijing, unless otherwise noted) have government-provided circulation estimates: Gongren Ribao (Workers’ Daily, 2,500,000); Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily, 2,150,000), official CCP Central Committee organ; Xin Min Wanbao (Xinmin Evening News, Shanghai, 1,800,000); Wenhui Bao (Wenhui Daily, Shanghai, 1,700,000); Yangcheng Wanbao (Yangcheng Evening News, Guangzhou, 1,300,000); Jingji Ribao (Economic Daily, 1,200,000); Jiefang Ribao (Liberation Daily, 1,000,000), organ of Shanghai CCP Municipal Committee; Nanfang Ribao (South China Daily, Guangdong Province, 1,000,000); Nongmin Ribao (Farmer’s Daily, 1,000,000 nationwide); Zhongguo Qingnian Bao (China Youth News, 1,000,000); Guangming Ribao (Brightness Daily, 920,000), organ of minority parties; Beijing Wanbao (Beijing Evening News, 800,000); Jiefang Junbao (Liberation Army Daily, 800,000), army organ; Beijing Ribao (Beijing Daily, 700,000), organ of Beijing CCP Municipal Committee; Guangzhou Ribao (Guangzhou Daily, 600,000); Liaowang/Outlook (450,000), influential bilingual weekly. China Daily (300,000) began publication in 1981 as an English-language daily; a New York edition was launched in 1983 and a London edition in 1986.

News Agencies The leading official facility is Xinhua She (New China News Agency—NCNA), which is attached to the State Council and has offices around the world; a number of other agencies service PRCsponsored papers abroad. Some two dozen foreign agencies maintain offices in Beijing.

Broadcasting and Computing China National Radio (CNR) provides service in putunghua and various local dialects via more than

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1,200 broadcast outlets, while China Central Television (CCTV) operates through some 200 television stations (excluding relays). In 2003 there were approximately 361 million television receivers and 45.7 million personal computers serving 79.5 million Internet users.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. ZHOU Wenzhong U.S. Ambassador to China Clark T. RANDT Jr. Permanent Representative to the UN WANG Guangya IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, AfDB, APEC, BIS, CDB, Interpol, PCA (de jure), WCO, WTO

Special Administrative Regions Hong Kong The former Crown Colony of Hong Kong, situated on China’s southeastern coast, consists of (1) Hong Kong Island and Kowloon Peninsula, both ceded by China to Great Britain “in perpetuity” in the mid-19th century, and (2) the mainland area of the New Territories, leased for 99 years in 1898. Its total area is 423 square miles (1,095 sq. km.), the New Territories alone occupying 365 square miles. The population, concentrated on Hong Kong Island and Kowloon, is 6,835,000 (2005E), of which 98 percent is Chinese, nearly one-quarter from the PRC. The capital is Victoria, on Hong Kong Island. The economy was formerly based on exported industrial products, especially cotton textiles, but the services sector now accounts for 85 percent of GDP, in the wake of Hong Kong’s emergence as one of the world’s premier banking and financial centers. During 2003 hundreds of Hong Kong residents were afflicted with a previously unknown viral illness, termed severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) by the World Health Organization.

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The disease caused a drastic decline in tourism, weakening a struggling economy and contributing to a record unemployment rate of 8.6 percent at midyear. Thereafter, extraordinary growth on the mainland, an upswing in business, and improving trade spurred a recovery that continued into 2004, when GDP grew by 8.2 percent. Growth for 2005 was expected to be about 7.0 percent. Responding to mounting indications of uneasiness on the part of the business community, in October 1982 British and Chinese diplomats began discussing a transition to full Chinese sovereignty. The talks culminated in the signature on December 19, 1984, in Beijing of a “Sino-British Joint Declaration of the Question of Hong Kong,” which took effect on May 27, 1985. Under the slogan “one country and two systems,” China would regain title to the entire area on July 1, 1997, when the lease of the New Territories expired, but agreed to maintain the enclave as a capitalist “Special Administrative Region” for 50 years thereafter. In the wake of the June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre in Beijing, concern mounted in Hong Kong regarding the 1997 reversion, with London coming under criticism for its unwillingness to permit the emigration to Britain of the 3.5 million Chinese—approximately 60 percent of Hong Kong’s residents—who were entitled to restricted “British National Overseas” passports. On April 4, 1990, the PRC’s National People’s Congress approved a postreversion “miniconstitution” that had been drawn up by a 59member joint Basic Law Drafting Committee. The document included a complicated formula for Legislative Council (Legco) representation; one-third of its members were to be elected at the first postreversion balloting, with the proportion rising to twofifths in 1999 and to one-half in 2003. The law was not widely applauded in Hong Kong, particularly since it made no reference to the future status of a Bill of Rights that had been approved by the colony’s Executive Council a month earlier. In late April 1990 the UK House of Commons approved a bill permitting the issuance of British passports to some 300,000 Hong Kong Chinese. The documents would be awarded on the

basis of a point system that limited admission to select categories, such as leading businessmen, civil servants, and educators. The plan was immediately denounced by right-wing British Conservatives as an abandonment of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s campaign pledge that her administration would not tolerate further mass immigration, as well as by many Laborites, who denounced it as “elitist and discriminatory.” To the surprise of British authorities, fewer than 60,000 applied for passports prior to the expiration date for “first tranche” requests on February 28, 1991. On September 15, 1991, the United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK), led by Martin LEE Chuming, joined other prodemocracy groups in winning 16 of 18 contested Legco seats at the colony’s first direct election in 150 years of British rule. The following March, the Chinese government responded by naming a 44-member panel of advisers to assist in the forthcoming transition, all of whose local members were representatives of pro-Beijing groups. In April 1992 UK Prime Minister John Major announced that Chris Patten, the Conservative Party chair, would replace Sir David Wilson as governor of Hong Kong at midyear. Local sentiment seemed to favor the appointment of Patten, who rejected the traditional tender of a peerage, but doubts developed when the new governor quickly became embroiled in an acrimonious dispute with Beijing. In his first policy statement to the Legco in October, Patten outlined plans for reform of Hong Kong’s system in the period before its reversion to China, claiming that his proposals enshrined the highest degree of democratization permissible under the Basic Law. Although Legco’s “general approval” of the proposals was given in November, China reacted angrily, vilifying Patten and claiming that his plan breached signed Sino-UK agreements. The Chinese line received broad support from the traditional Chinese business community in Hong Kong, whose representatives pointed out that Patten’s proposals were worthless without China’s approval. Nevertheless, Patten, backed by liberal members of Legco, published his proposals on March

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12, 1993. Further Chinese condemnation ensued, although concessions by both sides soon enabled the resumption of diplomatic contacts. Negotiations again appeared deadlocked by November, the Chinese describing the British insistence on prereversion democratization as “tricks played by oldstyle colonialists.” Meanwhile, the Beijing regime continued to create alternative bodies to handle the transfer, including a Preparatory Committee (PC) for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR). Amid growing strains in UK-Chinese relations, the director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office of the Chinese State Council, LU Ping, visited the colony May 1–8 but refused to meet with Patten and publicly rejected the so-called “through train” by which Hong Kong’s elected legislators would continue in office after the reversion to China in 1997. Having approved the first part of the Patten package on February 24, 1994, Legco endorsed the second part on June 30, 32 votes to 24. In addition to lowering the voting age from 21 to 18, it provided for the number of directly elected members in the 60-seat Legco to rise from 18 to 20, while 30 members would be indirectly elected to represent professional and other “functional” associations, and 10 would be indirectly elected by a committee of local government representatives. The governor would continue to preside over Legco, which would have enhanced powers of scrutiny over the Executive Council appointed and chaired by the governor. It was subsequently confirmed by Lu Ping that Legco and other elected councils under the new arrangements would be disbanded upon reversion to China in 1997. Nevertheless, Hong Kong prepared for its first fully democratic elections. In April 1994 the UDHK had announced a merger with the prounification Meeting Point group to form the Democratic Party (DP), which advocated autonomy for Hong Kong following the reversion to Chinese sovereignty. The UDHK thereby incurred the ire of the mainland government, which also objected to UDHK members’ support for the prodemocracy movement in China. Also launched

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in April, the business-oriented Hong Kong Progressive Alliance (HKPA), with Ambrose LAU as its spokesman, favored close relations with China. The Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood (ADPL), led by Frederick FUNG Kinkee, also attracted considerable support in the runup to the balloting, which took place on September 18 for a total of 346 seats on 18 district boards. Independents won 167 seats; the DP, 75; the ADPL, 29; four pro-Chinese parties, a total of 68; and other parties, 7. The prodemocracy DP and ADPL also polled strongly in elections to urban and regional councils held on March 5, 1995. Meanwhile, in November 1994 Hong Kong and Chinese government representatives had reached an agreement in principle on the financing of a new Hong Kong airport, while in December a joint UKChinese coordinating committee on cross-border infrastructure projects had been created. New strains developed in January 1995 over China’s demand for access to the personal files of Hong Kong civil servants, and in May Lu Ping again visited the colony without meeting Patten. Tensions eased somewhat with the signature on June 9 of an accord on maintaining elements of an independent legal system after reversion. Prodemocracy parties fiercely criticized concessions made to the PRC, but Legco passed the agreement by a two-toone margin on July 26. Also, the airport financing agreement was signed on June 30, while the Hong Kong chief secretary, Anson CHAN (CHAN Fang On-sang), subsequently paid an unprecedented visit to Beijing for talks with Chinese leaders. Elections to the Legco on September 17, 1995, gave the DP 12 of the 20 directly elected seats plus 7 indirectly elected seats, although China had indicated that no DP members would be permitted to serve in the future legislature of the HKSAR. The Liberal Party (LP), a business group favoring accommodation with Beijing, won 10; the strongly pro-Chinese Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB), 6; and the ADPL, 4, with independents claiming most of the balance. Prodemocracy activists were displeased that the UK government was unable to persuade China to

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modify its opposition to Legco when Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen visited London October 2–3, nor when his opposite number, Malcolm Rifkind, visited Beijing January 9–11, 1996. On December 28, 1995, China published the names of the 150 members of the PC, including 94 Hong Kong residents but no DP supporters. At its first meeting, held January 26–27, 1996, in Beijing, the PC formally replaced the Preliminary Working Committee that had hitherto represented China’s interests. Tasks assumed by the PC included establishing a 400-member selection committee to appoint a chief executive for the HKSAR, and on March 24 it voted 149 to 1 to constitute a Provisional Legislative Council (PLC) that would replace the existing Legco until formation of a new Legco after reversion; the sole dissenting member, Fung of the ADPL, was banned from serving on the PC, as were all DP members. In the course of a visit to Hong Kong March 2–4, 1996, Prime Minister Major protested against Beijing’s decision to abolish Legco, its refusal to deal with Governor Patten, and its disregard for the Bill of Rights. The UK prime minister also announced that some 2.4 million Hong Kong Chinese would be given limited rights to enter Britain, but not the guaranteed residence rights demanded by the DP. Shipping magnate TUNG Chee-hwa (generally known as “C. H.”) resigned from the Executive Council on June 3, 1996, while remaining vice chair of the PC. He was regarded as China’s favored candidate for the position of HKSAR chief executive. The first round of balloting by the selection committee on November 15 (when Foreign Minister Qian made his first visit to Hong Kong) was contested by 8 candidates, after China had rejected 23 other nominees. Anson Chan had announced her decision not to stand, in light of Tung’s declared wish to retain her as chief secretary. Tung won 206 votes in the first round and was formally designated chief executive after securing 320 votes in a runoff ballot on December 11 against former chief justice Sir TI-LIANG Yang and Peter WOO. On December 21 the PC went on to nominate the 60 members of the PLC, thereby generating a series of DP-

led demonstrations as well as strong protests from Patten and Rifkind. Governor Patten nevertheless pledged to cooperate with Tung in the transition period. At midnight on June 30, 1997, in a colorful ceremony attended by Britain’s Prince Charles, Chinese President Jiang Zemin, and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, Hong Kong was returned to Chinese sovereignty. Immediately thereafter Chief Executive Tung formally named an administrative team that included Anson Chan as chief secretary and, somewhat surprisingly, Sir Donald TSANG (TSANG Yam-kuen), the incumbent financial secretary, who had earlier expressed opposition to Tung’s economic policies. Most of the remaining members of the Executive Council were newcomers. On April 3, 1998, approximately 5 percent of Hong Kong’s 2.6 million voters, representing professional, labor, and religious groups, were permitted to vote for 588 members of an 800-seat Election Committee that was, in turn, to name 10 members of the first postreversion Legco. Another 30 Legco members were to be selected by professional and business groups. At the Legco balloting on May 24, prodemocracy candidates won 14 of the 20 directly elective seats but constituted a minority because the remaining 40 seats were dominated by pro-China groups. The DP once again led the prodemocracy forces, taking 9 directly elective seats, while a new party, The Frontier, led by Emily LAU Wai-hing, took 3; Christine LOH Kung-wai’s Citizens’ Party, 1; and an independent, 1. The DAB, led by TSANG Yok-sing, won 5 seats in the direct balloting. The LP won only 1; its leader, Allen LEE Peng-fei, was among the defeated. By May 2000 Tung’s popularity had fallen to 18 percent and the DP was also losing support, apparently because of widespread frustration with the convoluted electoral system. Among other difficulties, controversy had erupted over whether the Election Committee, for which balloting was held on July 9, was authorized to choose the chief executive in addition to its functions regarding Legco.

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The turnout was only 43.6 percent at the election of September 10, 2000, after which the prodemocracy DP held only 12 of 60 seats on a declining vote share, while the pro-Beijing DAB total rose to 11. The overall balance of power on the Legco remained with the pro-Beijing forces following the election, which also saw the LP, the HKPA, the Frontier, and the New Century Forum winning seats. Although denying that she was reacting to pressure from Beijing, the enclave’s popular civil rights advocate, Anson Chan, resigned as chief secretary on January 12, 2001. Financial Secretary Tsang was named as her successor on February 15, amid speculation that Anson Chan might challenge Tung’s reelection bid in early 2002. Passage of the Chief Executive Election Bill by the Legco on July 11, 2001, generated considerable controversy and precipitated a walkout by opponents, principally because of a provision permitting Beijing to remove a chief executive considered “incapable of serving.” Opposition deputies, including Martin Lee, branded the provision as a fundamental betrayal of Hong Kong’s autonomy. The voting for chief executive on February 28, 2002, was conducted by a committee containing a minority of pro-Beijing appointees, with threefourths of the 800 delegates representing various functional and other constituency groups. The result was a fait accompli, however, since Tung, who retained solid support from President Jiang, had collected more than 700 nominating signatures, thereby preventing any prospective opponent from obtaining the minimum 100 signatures needed for consideration. On June 24 Tung announced the formation of a new Executive Council, which was approved by a 36–21 Legco vote despite strenuous opposition from prodemocracy forces. On the political front, massive public protests led Beijing to withdraw a highly unpopular security bill in September 2003. Two months later, prodemocracy parties won 144 of 206 relatively meaningless district council seats, but they failed to gain an expected majority of Legco seats at the September 12, 2004, election, at which 30 seats

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were directly elected from geographic constituencies and the other 30 chosen by functional groups. Prodemocracy advocates came away with 25 seats but the DP, led by Martin Lee and YEUNG Sum, saw its total drop to 9, while a new centrist organization of barristers, the Article 45 Concern Group, led by Alan LEONG Kah-kit, won 4 seats on a platform that called for direct election of the chief executive in 2007 and Legco in 2008. The Frontier and the ADPL each won 1 seat, with most of the remaining prodemocracy seats being claimed by unaffiliated candidates. The DAB and the resurgent LP, the latter now led by James TIEN Peichun, won 12 and 10 seats, respectively, to lead the pro-Beijing contingent. In February 2005 the DAB absorbed the HKPA. After surviving numerous additional demonstrations, triggered in part by Beijing’s assertion in April 2004 that it would not tolerate a direct election in 2007, Chief Executive Tung resigned on March 10, 2005, citing health reasons, and was succeeded on an interim basis by his deputy, Donald Tsang. Having declared himself a candidate to fill the two-year balance of Tung’s term, Tsang resigned on May 25 and was replaced by the financial secretary, Henry TANG Ying-yan. The DP’s LEE Wing-tat also declared his candidacy, but Tsang was confirmed on June 16 after obtaining over 700 signatures of support from members of the Election Committee. He was sworn in on June 24 in Beijing. In October 2005 the Tsang administration revealed plans to double the Election Committee to 1,600 members and to add ten seats to Legco, five of them directly elected. A month later, in an apparent effort to mollify prodemocracy advocates, who had rejected the electoral reform as inadequate, Tsang revived and expanded a Commission on Strategic Development, one of whose committees would develop “a road map for universal suffrage.” Nevertheless, on December 21 the Legco failed to approve the proposed electoral reforms, which received 34 votes, 6 short of the two-thirds needed for referral to the PRC’s National People’s Congress. Earlier in December, crowds numbering

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as many as 250,000 (63,000, according to the police) demonstrated in favor of a timetable for full democracy. Chief Executive: Sir Donald TSANG (TSANG Yam-kuen). Secretary for Finance: Henry TANG Ying-yan. Secretary for Security: Ambrose LEE Siukwong.

Macao Established in 1557 as the first European enclave on the China coast, Macao comprises a peninsula and two small islets in the mouth of the Canton River, about 40 miles from Hong Kong. Its area of 6 square miles (15.5 sq. km.) accommodates a population of 675,000 (2005E) that is predominantly Chinese, with a Portuguese minority of only 2,000– 3,000. Its economy shrank by 4.6 percent in 1998 and by 2.9 percent in 1999, but increased substantially thereafter as the former Portuguese colony became an Asian center of casino gambling (see below). In 1974 Western diplomats in Beijing reported that the governor of Macao, Col. Jos´e Eduardo Martinho Garc´ıa Leandro, had been directed to communicate to Chinese representatives the Lisbon government’s willingness to withdraw from the enclave. China had no desire, however, to alter the status of the territory, which was flourishing, partly because of legalized casino gambling—the source of nearly half of its revenue—and partly because of its status as an entrepˆot for trade with China. The trade relationship had been enhanced by creation of a Special Economic Zone in the nearby province of Zhuhai. (It had long been alleged that the port also exported opium into the international market.) The establishment of diplomatic relations between Portugal and the PRC on February 9, 1979, did not alter the status of Macao, Portuguese Prime Minister Carlos Mota Pinto declaring that it would remain “Chinese territory under Portuguese administration.” Following conclusion of the agreement on Hong Kong’s future in December 1984, China changed course, however, and initiated discussions on Macao’s future.

In May 1985, following the designation of Joaquim Pinto Machado as Macao’s latest governor, Portuguese President Ant´onio Eanes announced that Sino-Portuguese talks on reversion would begin in 1986. On May 26, 1987, the two countries initialed an agreement for the return of the territory to Chinese sovereignty on December 20, 1999, under a plan similar to the “one country and two systems” approach approved for Hong Kong. China agreed to grant Macao 50 years of noninterference with its capitalist economy, and residents holding or entitled to hold Portuguese passports were given the right to continue doing so after reversion. In January 1993 the ninth and final session of the Macao Special Administrative Region (MSAR) Basic Law Drafting Committee, meeting in Beijing, approved the text of the document that would serve as the MSAR constitution following reversion. In late March the text was approved by the Chinese legislature. Harmony between China and Portugal continued during visits by President M´ario Soares to Macao in October and by Prime Minister An´ıbal Cavaco Silva to China and Macao in April 1994. In the last assembly balloting before the reversion to Chinese rule, a record 64.4 percent turnout on September 22, 1996, delivered a majority for pro-Chinese groupings. A Chinese-appointed MSAR Preparatory Committee was launched in Beijing on May 5, 1998. Charged with defining the procedure for the election of Macao’s first postreversion government, the committee consisted of 100 members, 40 of whom were from China. At its fourth plenary session held November 6–7, the group authorized its chair, Chinese Vice Premier Qian Qichen, and his vice chairs to designate candidates for a 200-member Nominating Committee, which, following election by the Preparatory Committee, would be responsible for electing members of the new government. On December 23 Beijing announced a new nationality law for the enclave: upon reversion, all residents of Chinese descent would become Chinese citizens, while those of mixed Chinese and Portuguese descent would be allowed to choose either Chinese or Portuguese allegiance.

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Two related issues emerged in 1998 and early 1999 to mar the transition process: a seemingly uncontrollable crime rate and the introduction of Chinese troops to curb the violence. In March 1999 Portugal’s President Jorge Sampaio charged that the 1987 agreement did not sanction the stationing of troops prior to December 20 and that he was prepared to boycott the handover ceremonies if Beijing’s garrison plan was not rescinded. Immediately following its formation in April 1999, the Chinese Nominating Committee winnowed the list of potential chief executives from nine to two, with HO Hau Wah (Edmund HO), a banker, appearing to hold a decided preelection advantage over AU Chong Kit (Stanley AU), another banker. On May 15 the committee elected Ho by a landslide of 163 votes to 34. The territory’s inhabitants looked to the widely popular Ho to reverse a languishing economy and take decisive action against long-standing violence by underworld groups, known as triads. Because of the turmoil, which had severely damaged the economy by inhibiting tourism, Chinese troops were widely applauded by Macanese at reversion in December 1999. In its first postreversion parliamentary election, held September 23, 2001, Macao saw the 10 popularly elected seats filled by 4 pro-Beijing, 4 probusiness, and 2 prodemocracy representatives, including NG Nuok Cheong, leader of the New Democratic Macao Association (Associa¸ca˜ o de Novo Macau Democr´atico—ANMD). An additional 10 Legislative Assembly members were in-

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directly elected by four interest groups: labor; employers; professionals; and welfare, cultural, educational, and sports constituencies. The final 7 assembly members were subsequently appointed by Chief Executive Ho. The only Beijing-controlled territory with legalized gambling, Macao by 2004 had been transformed by income from more than a dozen casinos whose combined revenue was expected to exceed that of Las Vegas by 2005. With street signs in both Chinese and Portuguese, it was also seen as a Chinese bridge to Portuguese-speaking countries, particularly Brazil, which almost overnight counted China as its second-ranked trading partner. The election of September 25, 2005, saw 58 percent of Macao’s voters turn out to fill 12 seats on the 29-seat Legislative Assembly. A dozen associations offered candidates, with eight of them winning at least 1 seat, including 2 each by the ANMD, the Union for Development (Uni˜ao para o Desenvolvimento—UD), the United Citizens’ Association of Macao (Associa¸ca˜ dos Cidad˜ao Unidos de Macau—ACUM), and the Union for Promoting Progress (Uni˜ao Promotora para o Progresso—UPP). As in the past, interest groups indirectly elected 10 members and Chief Executive Ho appointed the balance Chief Executive: HO Hau Wah (Edmund HO). Secretary for Administration and Justice: Florinda da Rosa Silva CHAN. Secretary for Economy and Finance: TAM Pak Yuen (Francis TAM).

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CHINA

Chung-hua Min-kuo

Note: In view of the Republic of China’s decision to abandon its claim that it constituted the sole legitimate representative of all of China, the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in New York has indicated that the designation Republic of China on Taiwan (Tsai Taiwan te Chung-hua Min-kuo) is acceptable for informal usage.

Government and Politics Political Background Following its move to Taiwan in 1949, the Chinese Nationalist regime continued to insist that it represented all of China and vowed to return eventually to the mainland, while devoting its main attention to ensuring its own survival and the province’s economic development. The danger of Communist conquest, which appeared very real in 1949 and 1950, was averted primarily by the decision of U.S. President Truman to interpose the protection of the American Seventh Fleet upon the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. Thereafter, the Nationalist government continued under the domination of the Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (Chung-kuo Kuo-min Tang—KMT), led by CHIANG Kai-shek until his death on April 5, 1975. Many of the individuals who were in control in 1949 continued to hold important positions, although the government subsequently began infusing “new blood” into the bureaucracy. As part of a major reorganization in 1969, the post of vice pre-

mier was awarded to the president’s son, CHIANG Ching-kuo, who was subsequently named premier

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Political Status: Chinese province; controlled by the government of the Republic of China (established 1912), whose authority since 1949 has been limited to the island of Taiwan (Formosa), Penghu (the Pescadores), and certain offshore islands, including Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu; present constitution adopted December 25, 1946, effective from December 25, 1947. Area: 13,592 sq. mi. (35,203 sq. km.). Population: 22,300,929 (2000C); 22,732,000 (2005E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): TAIPEI (2,619,000), Kaohsiung (1,522,000), Taichung (1,039,000), Tainan (761,000), Keelung (394,000). Official Language: Mandarin Chinese. Monetary Unit: New Taiwan Dollar (market rate July 1, 2006: 32.38 dollars = $1US). President: CHEN Shui-bian (Democratic Progressive Party); elected March 18, 2000, and sworn in May 20 for a four-year term, succeeding LEE Teng-hui (Nationalist Party); sworn in May 20, 2004, for a second four-year term following the election of March 20. Vice President: LU Hsiu-lien (Annette LU, Democratic Progressive Party); elected March 18, 2000, and sworn in May 20 for a term concurrent with that of the president, succeeding LIEN Chan (Nationalist Party); sworn in for a second term concurrent with that of the president on May 20, 2004, following the election of March 20. President of Executive Branch (Premier): SU Tseng-chang (Democratic Progressive Party); appointed by the president on January 19, 2006, and sworn in on January 25, succeeding Frank Chang-ting HSIEH (Democratic Progressive Party), who had resigned on January 17.

in May 1972. The younger Chiang was selected by the National Assembly in 1978 to succeed C. K. YEN as president. Following his May inaugural, he designated SUN Yun-hsuan as premier.

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President Chiang was reelected in 1984. A new vice president, LEE Teng-hui, an islander who had served since 1981 as governor of Taiwan, was elected in succession to HSIEH Tung-min, who had decided to retire from office. Lee succeeded to the presidency following Chiang’s death in January 1988 and was then elected to the post in March 1990, with LI Yuan-zu being chosen as his vice president. In June, LEE Huan, who had succeeded YU Kuo-hua as premier a year earlier, was replaced by his defense minister, Gen. (Ret.) HAU Pei-tsun. In 1991, a year after Lee’s implicit recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland (see the China article for details), the National Assembly rescinded the “Temporary Provisions” that, since 1948, had conferred emergency powers on the president and frozen the tenure of mainland-elected deliberative officials. In addition, a number of constitutional amendments were promulgated, including reapportionment of the three popularly elected branches of government and a stipulation that all mainland parliamentarians would be obliged to retire prior to the election of a new National Assembly. On May 17, 1991, the Legislative Branch repealed the Statute of Punishment for Sedition that for more than four decades had served as the principal weapon against the KMT’s opponents. The KMT secured a resounding victory at the December 1991 National Assembly election, winning 254 of 325 seats, with 71.2 percent of the vote (16.9 percent higher than in 1989), while its principal competitor, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), won 66 seats on a vote share 16.4 percent lower than in 1989. At a meeting of the KMT Central Committee held March 14–16, 1992, agreement was reached on a number of constitutional reforms: shortening the presidential term from six to four years, increasing the authority of the National Assembly, and providing for elective rather than appointive designation of the governor of Taiwan and the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung. It could not, however, agree on direct election of the head of state, which had long been urged by the DPP and, more recently, by President Lee. Nor could the

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recently elected National Assembly reach a conclusion in the matter. The KMT suffered a serious reversal at balloting for a new 161-member Legislative Branch on December 19, 1992. While it retained control with nearly 60 percent of the seats, KMT candidates garnered only 53 percent of the vote, down 18 percent from its showing at the National Assembly poll a year earlier. On January 30, 1993, after losing a tumultuous intraparty struggle with liberal opponents, the conservative Hau Pei-tsun signaled his wish to resign as premier, and on February 10 the ethnic Taiwanese provincial governor, LIEN Chan, was approved by the KMT’s Central Standing Committee as his successor. At an election of mayors and county magistrates on November 27, 1993, the KMT proved more resilient than opinion polls had predicted, winning 15 of 23 positions in a three-way contest with the DPP and the recently organized New Party (NP). Local and provincial elections in January and December 1994 produced mixed results, but at the Legislative Branch balloting of December 2, 1995, the KMT retained a narrow majority (85 of 164 seats), although its vote share was a worst-ever 46.1 percent. Earlier, in July 1994, the National Assembly, over the objections of the DPP, had passed constitutional reforms that included direct presidential elections. In the first such presidential balloting, held March 23, 1996, Lee secured a second term with a vote share of 54 percent. A fierce campaign against him by mainland China, backed by attempted military intimidation, appeared to assist his reelection cause rather than harm it. In simultaneous election of a third National Assembly, the KMT won 183 of the 334 seats with 54.8 percent of the votes, while the DPP advanced to 99 seats and 29.6 percent. Lien Chan had resigned as premier on January 28, 1996, to pursue the vice presidency as Lee’s running mate, but he had then been sworn in as head of a caretaker government on February 28. Despite some resistance in the new National Assembly, Vice President Lien was reappointed premier on June 8, heading a greatly changed cabi-

net in which opposition spokespersons nevertheless saw little evidence that President Lee intended to honor a number of anticorruption and proreform campaign pledges. In the months that followed, President Lee encountered rising popular discontent over the corruption issue, efforts to downsize provincial government, and a marked deterioration in law and order. Lee’s inability to resolve the crisis, which included opposition demands for Premier Lien’s resignation, forced him to postpone a state-of-thenation address to the National Assembly on May 13, 1997. Undaunted, Lee moved ahead with a series of reform proposals that had been broached at a tripartite National Development Conference in December 1996. In the end, a consensus was reached on a number of key elements in the Lee agenda, but only after the prounification NP had withdrawn from the deliberations to protest a “tacit coalition” between the KMT and the nominally opposition DPP. Under the package as approved by the National Assembly on July 16, 1997, the president would have sole discretion in the selection of a premier, while the legislature, with the support of one-third of its members, would be able to propose a noconfidence motion. It was also agreed that the number of Legislative Branch members would be increased from 164 to 225 and that elections for Taiwan’s provincial governor and assemblymen would be suspended upon expiration of the incumbents’ terms in late 1998, pending the adoption of legislation to reduce the scale of the provincial administration. On July 29 Vice President Lien announced that he intended to resign as premier, and on September 1 Vincent SIEW, former head of the Mainland Affairs Council, was installed as his successor. At large-city mayor and county magistrate balloting on November 29, 1997, the KMT was, for the first time, outpolled by the DPP, 43.3 to 42.1 percent, raising the “once-unthinkable” prospect that the DPP might become Taiwan’s next ruling party. At elections on January 24, 1998, however, the KMT rebounded to win 59 percent of the contests

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for county and city councilors, small-city mayors, and township chiefs, and on December 5 it again won a majority at Legislative Branch balloting. In a stunning development, at the presidential poll of March 18, 2000, the KMT’s nominee, Lien Chan, finished third, with 23.1 percent of the vote, behind the DPP’s CHEN Shui-bian (39.3 percent) and James C. Y. SOONG (36.8 percent), a KMT dissident who ran as an independent. Shortly after the election, the DPP and KMT agreed to abolish the National Assembly; however, the move was superseded on April 24 by the assembly’s own decision to transfer significant powers to the Legislative Branch (see Constitution and government, below). At his inauguration on May 20, 2000, President Chen distanced himself somewhat from the position of his own party by declaring, in what became known as his “four no’s plus one” policy, that, in the absence of aggressive action by the PRC, Taiwan would not declare independence, alter its official name, amend the constitution to suggest the existence of two Chinas, or hold an independence referendum. He added that his predecessor’s National Unification Council (NUC) and its phased “Guidelines for National Unification,” drafted in 1991, would remain in place. Earlier, on May 1, he had announced a cabinet headed by his KMT predecessor’s defense minister, Gen. TANG Fei, but Tang resigned five months later, ostensibly for health reasons, although most analysts considered the precipitating factor to be his opposition to a presidential decision terminating work on the country’s fourth nuclear power plant. On October 4 Chen’s former campaign manager, Vice Premier CHANG Chunhsiung, stepped in as Tang’s successor. At the general election of December 1, 2001, the KMT lost its legislative majority for the first time, capturing only 68 seats in the 225-member Legislative Branch. It nevertheless retained control of the legislature by virtue of the 46 seats won by James Soong’s new People First Party (PFP), the KMT’s principal partner in an informal “panblue” alliance that also included the NP. The DPP achieved a plurality of 87 seats, while its “pangreen” allies, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU)

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and the small Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP), won 13 and none, respectively. Although President Chen had proposed during the election campaign that the leading parties establish a “National Stabilization Alliance,” both the KMT and the PFP dismissed the idea after the polling. As mandated by the constitution, Premier Chang and the entire cabinet resigned on January 21, 2002, prior to the opening of the new legislative session on February 1. President Chen immediately named YU Shyi-kun, a former vice premier, as Chang’s replacement, and a substantially new cabinet, which included four KMT members despite the objections of their party, assumed office on February 1. In the meantime, the township, county, and provincial elections of January 26, 2002, had confirmed the KMT’s relative strength at the local level. The presidential election of March 20, 2004, concluded with President Chen and his “pangreen” running mate, Vice President LU Hsiu-lien (Annette LU), also of the DPP, winning 50.1 percent of the vote, but the “pan-blue” ticket (49.9 percent) of the KMT’s Lien and the PFP’s Soong immediately challenged the results. In the end, the Supreme Court dismissed KMT allegations of electoral fraud and other irregularities, including that Chen and Lu had staged a March 19 assassination attempt in which they were both slightly wounded by gunfire. Chen’s razor-thin success at the polls did not, however, carry over to the Legislative Branch election of December 11, after which the KMT and its allies continued to hold a slim majority, 114 seats, compared to 101 for the DPP and the TSU. On January 25, 2005, President Chen named the mayor of Kaohsiung, Frank Chang-ting HSIEH, to succeed Premier Yu, who, along with the rest of the cabinet, had resigned the previous day. Most of the departing ministers were, however, reappointed on January 31. With the backing of both the DPP and the KMT, on August 23, 2004, the Legislative Branch had approved a constitutional reform package that included halving its own membership, to 113 seats, and abolishing the National Assembly. Following an ad hoc election on May 14, 2005, to fill its 300

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seats, a final National Assembly convened and on June 7 voted 249–48 in favor of the constitutional amendments, which the president promulgated on June 10. Premier Hsieh resigned on January 17, 2006, following DPP losses in the local elections of December 2005, and was replaced by SU Tseng-chang (DPP). Sworn in on January 25, Premier Su conducted an immediate cabinet shuffle.

Constitution and Government The government of the Republic of China (ROC), launched in 1912 under the leadership of SUN Yat-sen, drew on both Western and traditional Chinese elements in a constitution promulgated January 1, 1947, effective from December 25, 1947. A popularly elected National Assembly, designed to represent the will of the people and initially comprising over 3,000 members, was placed at the apex of the complex system. Empowered to name the president and vice president, it contained both mainland and island delegates until 1992. Although downsized to under 350 members, it continued thereafter to hold powers of recall and impeachment, of constitutional amendment, and of nomination to three of the government’s five specialized branches, or yuans (Judicial, Examination, and Control). On April 25, 2000, the National Assembly, faced with its likely abrogation, approved constitutional amendments that transferred the initiation of constitutional changes and the appointment of senior officials to the Legislative Branch, although it retained the power to ratify constitutional amendments, approve boundary changes, and impeach the president and vice president. In addition, its size was further reduced to 300 proportionally elected delegates convening for sessions of no longer than one month. In June 2005 the final National Assembly, which had been elected a month earlier, passed a package of constitutional reforms that included its abolition as an institution. Upon promulgation of the reforms by the president on June 10, the National Assembly’s impeachment powers were transferred to the

Judicial Branch. Constitutional amendments and boundary changes now require not only approval by at least three-fourths of a Legislative Branch quorum but also concurrence by at least half of those eligible to vote in a referendum. The president, elected for a once-renewable four-year term as of 1996, can declare war and peace and issue emergency decrees that must, however, secure legislative confirmation within ten days. He also has wide powers of appointment and acts as mediator in disputes between two or more yuans, each of which has its own president. Following a vote of nonconfidence in the government, he may dissolve the Legislative Branch. The president’s authority with regard to cross-strait relations is also extensive. The National Unification Council, which reports to the president, was established in 1990 to advise on cross-strait issues, while a cabinet-level Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) oversees policy implementation. With the imprimatur of the MAC, a private Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) has served as a semiofficial vehicle for contact with the mainland government (see the China article for details). The president of the Executive Branch (premier), previously requiring legislative approval after state presidential nomination, is now appointed by the state president but is subject to a legislative nonconfidence vote. The premier and his entire cabinet, which includes eight ministries and more than two dozen ministerial commissions, councils, and other offices, must step down following a Legislative Branch election. The Legislative Branch, currently a 225member body popularly elected for a three-year term, enacts laws but cannot increase the budget. Its powers include initiating impeachment of the president or vice president, which requires a twothirds vote of the full membership for the charges to be forwarded to the Judicial Branch. At the next general election the Legislative Branch will be downsized to 113 members serving four-year terms. The 15-member Court of Grand Justices sits at the apex of the Judicial Branch. Nominated by the president and confirmed by the legislature, the

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grand justices serve terms of four or eight years. Their duties include constitutional interpretation and administrative oversight of the entire court system. When considering impeachment questions, they sit as the Constitutional Court. Also within the Judicial Branch are district courts, high courts, and the Supreme Court. The Examination Branch deals with personnel, legal, and other matters affecting civil servants. Its 21 members are presidentially appointed, subject to Legislative Branch confirmation. The Control Branch, comprising 29 members serving six-year terms, is responsible for auditing and general administrative surveillance and can impeach or censure public officials. Formerly elected by local councils, the Control Branch is now filled by presidential nomination, subject to legislative confirmation. It has not functioned since January 31, 2005, because of opposition objections to President Chen’s nominees for the term that was scheduled to begin February 1, 2005. As of March 2006 the opposition-dominated Legislative Branch had yet to vote on the nominees. The territorial jurisdiction of the ROC currently extends to one Chinese province (Taiwan) and part of a second (Fujian’s offshore islands). The province of Taiwan is currently subdivided into 16 counties and 5 cities. Taipei and Kaohsiung are defined as special municipalities. On December 31, 1998, the Legislative Branch formally declared the uninhabited Tiaoyutai Islands northeast of Taiwan and the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea to be within its territorial jurisdiction. The former are also claimed by both China and Japan, while the latter have long been subject to rival claims by Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.

Foreign Relations The most important factor in the foreign policy of the Taiwan government has been the existence on the mainland of the Communist regime, which was awarded the Chinese seat at the United Nations on October 25, 1971. Reflecting its diminished political status, the ROC is today recognized by none of

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the major powers, though its trade relations are extensive. Diplomatic relations with Japan were severed in 1972, following Japanese recognition of the PRC. Relations with the United States, once extremely close, cooled after President Richard Nixon’s visit to the mainland in February 1972. The communiqu´e issued at the conclusion of the Nixon visit contained the following expression of Washington’s posture on the Taiwan question: “The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.” Concurrent with the announcement on December 15, 1978, that the United States and the PRC would establish diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979, Washington issued a statement saying that both diplomatic relations and, upon expiration of a required one-year’s notice, the Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC would be terminated. In addition, all U.S. military personnel would be withdrawn from Taiwan within four months. Washington subsequently stated, however, that remaining agreements with Taipei would continue in effect. In particular, arms shipments would be permitted to continue “on a selective basis,” a policy that was subsequently modified in the interest of maintaining a balance of power with the mainland. In recent years Taiwanese policy with regard to the mainland government and countries recognizing the PRC has undergone substantial modification. As contrasted with its earlier practice of shunning relations with states or intergovernmental organizations linked to Beijing, Taipei has adopted what it has termed “pragmatic diplomacy” aimed particularly at ministates capable of being wooed by development assistance. On such a basis it broadened its international contacts, including diplomatic relations with 31 countries as of early 1996. The diplomatic network shrank marginally thereafter, most significantly by the severance of relations with South Africa. At the end of 2005, the Holy See plus 24 countries in Africa, the

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Pacific, Latin America, and the Caribbean maintained full diplomatic relations with Taiwan. For some years the Taiwan government has sought to secure ROC readmission to the United Nations. In July 1994 12 countries submitted a joint proposal that the UN set up an ad hoc committee to study ROC participation in the world body. Citing earlier membership of the two Germanys, Foreign Minister Fredrick CHIEN declared that his government was not attempting to challenge Beijing’s status or to seek Taiwanese independence, but merely to give the ROC and its people representation in international activities. The UN General Committee, as it had in 1993, refused to act, citing a “lack of consensus” in the matter, a position reaffirmed in 1995 and yearly thereafter. Meanwhile, the United States, which was silent on the UN bid but had endorsed Taiwanese membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—GATT (precursor of the World Trade Organization—WTO), moved to enhance the ROC’s official presence by allowing what had been known as the Coordinating Council for North American Affairs to restyle itself in a number of locations as the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office. In addition, President Bill Clinton permitted U.S. Transportation Secretary Federico Pena to become, on December 5, 1994, the first American cabinet official to visit Taiwan in more than 15 years. The action, which caused Beijing “strong displeasure,” heightened pressure from Taipei for a long-sought visit by President Lee to the United States, and in early May 1995 the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, by votes of 97–1 and 360–0, respectively, approved resolutions calling upon President Clinton to permit Lee to enter the country in a “private capacity.” After some hesitation, the White House responded affirmatively, and on June 7, in what Beijing termed a “wanton wound inflicted upon China,” the Taiwanese leader arrived to attend an alumni reunion at Cornell University. The mainland regime responded by suspending all contacts with Taiwan; further protests were issued by Beijing following issuance of a visa to Vice President Li Yuan-zu for a 1996 stopover in Los Angeles while en route to Guatemala. A similar courtesy was extended to Vice President Lien

Chan in 1998 and President Chen in 2001, although denied to the outspoken Vice President Annette Lu in September 2000. On November 11, 2001, the WTO endorsed membership for “Chinese Taipei,” which became the organization’s 144th member on January 1, 2002, under the listing of “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu.”

Current Issues The continuation of a “pan-blue” legislative majority following the December 2004 general election left President Chen with few opportunities to advance his agenda or to address opposition charges that his administration was guilty of corruption, economic mismanagement, and a failure to strengthen cross-strait relations. The KMT-PFP majority continued to bottle up proposed legislation, most notably a $16–$18 billion U.S.-backed arms deal that included submarines, antimissile defenses, and antisubmarine aircraft. Chen, supported by the U.S. George W. Bush administration, argued that the purchases were needed to counter a military buildup by the PRC, but the opposition insisted that the package was too big, too expensive, and too likely to complicate relations with Beijing. In February 2005 Chen met with the PFP’s Soong in an effort to find common ground and end the legislative stalemate. The meeting was also widely seen as an indication of Soong’s disgruntlement at the outcome of the Legislative Branch election, at which the PFP had lost nearly a dozen seats to the KMT as a consequence of their decision to avoid directly competing against each other. Chen and Soong concluded their February meeting by issuing a ten-point program in which, among other things, they agreed to seek consensus on any constitutional changes, improve transport connections to the mainland, and promote expanded investment in the PRC. Whatever headway the two leaders made was undercut, however, by Soong’s May visit to the mainland, a month after Lien Chan had become the first KMT chair to visit the PRC and only two months after an estimated 900,000 demonstrators had taken to the streets of Taipei to protest an

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antisecession law that had just been passed by the PRC’s legislature. Despite their policy differences, June 2005 saw President Chen’s DPP and Lien’s KMT both backing constitutional reforms under consideration by the National Assembly, while the smaller “panblue” PFP and “pan-green” TSU stood together in opposition. Delegates to this final National Assembly were required to vote on the amendments as a package, and neither the PFP nor the TSU could support halving the size of the Legislative Branch and employing a method of election that appeared to advantage the two larger parties (see the Legislature section for details). At the December 3, 2005, balloting for city and county councils as well as county and township mayors, the DPP suffered significant losses, winning only 42 percent of the vote to the KMT’s 51 percent. The results appeared to stiffen Chen’s resolve, and in January 2006 he repeated his call for passage of the arms package, argued for the necessity of further constitutional reform, and raised the possibility of seeking UN membership as Taiwan instead of as the ROC. He also announced that he intended to abolish the NUC and abandon the “Guidelines for National Unification,” a proposal attacked by the opposition and viewed by Washington as potentially destabilizing. On February 27 Chen confirmed that the NUC would “cease to function”—a considered change in language that Washington had reportedly encouraged. Meanwhile, the KMT was steadily gaining seats in the Legislative Branch, mostly as a result of defections from the PFP. Following a March byelection victory, the KMT held 88 seats, tying the DPP and raising its prospects for capturing a majority at the election scheduled for 2007. Moreover, the KMT’s new, 55-year-old leader, Taipei Mayor MA Ying-jeou, was widely considered to be the leading 2008 presidential contender.

Political Parties Prior to 1986, two non-Kuomintang (tang-wai) political groups were occasionally successful in Taiwanese elections, although their representatives were obliged to run as independents since opposi-

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tion parties were not allowed to compete for public office. In a major concession to opposition sentiment, the government in May 1986 permitted an umbrella Tangwai Public Policy Association to open offices in Taipei and elsewhere; four months later, two new dissident groups were formed, one of which, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was permitted to participate in the December 1986 balloting even though it did not achieve legal status until 1989. By August 1993 some 74 parties were reported to have been formed, but only the Nationalist Party (KMT), the DPP, and the New Party (NP) had significant standing. In the run-up to the December 2001 legislative election, two informal alliances began to be commonly referenced as the “pan-blue” camp (the KMT, the People First Party [PFP], and the NP) and the “pan-green” camp (the DPP, the Taiwan Solidarity Union, and the Taiwan Independence Party). Neither alliance subsequently evolved formal structures, although the KMT and PFP offered a combined ticket for the 2004 presidential/vice presidential election, and they, along with the NP, coordinated their candidate lists for the December 2004 Legislative Branch election. The camps split, however, over the constitutional amendments passed by the National Assembly in June 2005. The two largest parties, the KMT and DPP, supported the package, whereas the other four parties voted in opposition. As of December 2005 the number of registered parties stood at 114.

Parties Winning Legislative Branch Seats in 2004 Democratic Progressive Party—DPP (Minchu Chin-pu Tang). Despite the ban on organization of new parties, a group of dissidents, advocating trade, tourism, and communications links with the mainland, met in Taipei in September 1986 to form the DPP (sometimes rendered as Democratic Progress Party). Although unrecognized, the group won 11 National Assembly and 12 Legislative Branch seats in December 1986. Delegates to the party’s second annual congress in November 1987 approved a resolution stating

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that “the people have the freedom to advocate Taiwan independence”; however, its leaders agreed to abandon the position during a meeting with KMT representatives in February 1988, and the party was legalized in April 1989. As a former political prisoner, DPP Chair HUANG Hsin-chieh continued to be barred from election to public office in the December 1989 balloting, at which the party nearly doubled its representation to 21 legislative seats. In December 1990 HUANG Hwa, the leader of a New County Alliance faction, was given a tenyear prison term for “preparing to commit sedition” by an attempted revival of the campaign for Taiwanese independence. Earlier, a group of radical DPP members had broken away to join the Labor Party (Kung Tang). In June 1991 another prominent DPP member, LIN Cheng-chieh, resigned from the party over advocacy of island “separatism” by the New Tide, a faction with views similar to those of the New County Alliance. However, separatism prevailed at the DPP’s fifth national congress, in October 1991, which issued a draft manifesto pledging to “build a Taiwanese republic with independent sovereignty.” Adoption of the clause was subsequently viewed as the principal reason for the party’s unexpectedly poor showing at the December National Assembly election. At the fifth congress the DPP elected as its new chair HSU Hsin-liang, founder of the banned opposition magazine Formosa. Although sentenced to a ten-year prison term upon his clandestine return from exile in 1989, he had received a presidential amnesty in 1990. Hsu resigned in favor of SHIH Ming-teh following the mayoral and county executive balloting of November 1993, at which the number of DPP officeholders dropped from seven to six. At gubernatorial and municipal elections in December 1994, the DPP’s most notable accomplishment was winning the Taipei mayoralty. It then won 25 percent of the Legislative Branch seats in 1995 and 31 percent in 1998. Having captured the presidency in March 2000 on a 39.3 vote share, the DPP went on to claim a plurality of 87 Legislative Branch seats at the December 2001 election. Nev-

ertheless, the DPP and its allies in the “pan-green” camp (so named for the DPP’s party colors) fell short of a majority. President Chen and his running mate, Annette Lu, won reelection by a minuscule 0.2 percent margin in March 2004. Although the DPP hoped to win an outright majority at the December Legislative Branch election, its total declined by two seats. In view of the outcome, Chen resigned as chair of the party, which in January 2005 elected Su Tsengchang as his replacement. In December 2005 the party suffered a major defeat at local elections, winning only 42 percent of the vote to the KMT’s 51 percent, prompting Su to step down as party chair. In mid-January 2006 a Chen ally, former premier Yu Shyi-kun, won election as Su’s successor despite dissatisfaction within the party over Chen’s leadership. One of the leading critics, former chair Lin Yi-hsiung, resigned his membership on January 24, a day before Su was sworn in as premier in succession to Frank Hsieh. Former chairs Hsu Hsin-liang and Shih Ming-teh had already departed. Leaders: CHEN Shui-bian (President of the Republic), YU Shyi-kun (Chair), SU Tseng-chang (Premier), LU Hsiu-lien (Annette LU, Vice President of the Republic), LIN Chia-lung (Secretary General). Nationalist Party (Chung-kuo Kuo-min Tang or Kuomintang—KMT). Dominant until March 2000 at all levels of government, the KMT traditionally operated on principles similar to those of a communist party, with a National Congress, a Central Committee, party cells, and so on. In November 1976, at its first congress since 1969, the party elected Premier Chiang Ching-kuo to succeed his father, Chiang Kai-shek, as chair. In 1984, as the result of a party “rejuvenation” campaign, it was reported that 70 percent of an estimated 2 million party members were native Taiwanese. Contrary to expectations that newly legalized groups might severely cripple the party’s longtime political dominance, the KMT secured a landslide victory at the National Assembly balloting of December 1991, winning 254 of 325 available seats, which, with 64 carryover deputies, gave it

TA I WA N

78.9 percent of the overall total of 403 seats— substantially more than the three-quarters majority needed for unilateral constitutional revision. It fared much more poorly at the Legislative Branch poll of December 1992, winning 96 of 161 seats (59.6 percent). Subsequently, many younger and reform-minded members formed a “nonmainstream” New KMT Alliance within the party. Most withdrew to launch the New Party (below) in 1993. At its 14th congress, held in August 1993, the KMT changed its self-characterization as a “revolutionary democratic party” to that of a “democratic party,” provided for election of its chair by secret ballot, approved the appointment of four vice chairs, increased the size of the Central Committee from 180 to 210 members, and authorized the chair to designate 10 to 15 of the Central Standing Committee’s 31 members. Approximately half of the latter were replaced at a party plenum in August 1994 in an effort to “rejuvenate” the body, largely by the addition of trade specialists. On December 13, 1995, Judicial Branch President LIN Yang-kang and former premier HAU Peitsun were ousted from the KMT for campaigning on behalf of New Party candidates in the December 2 Legislative Branch poll, which left the KMT with a bare three-seat majority. Subsequently, the two ran for president and vice president, respectively, on an independent ticket. The KMT won only 45 percent of the seats in local council balloting in June 1998; however, it recovered to win 57 percent (123 of 225 seats) at the Legislative Branch poll of December 5. It ran third in the presidential poll of March 18, 2000, winning only 23.1 percent of the vote and surrendering the Taiwanese presidency for the first time. President Lee Teng-hui, assuming responsibility for the defeat of the KMT’s candidate, Lien Chan, transferred the party chair to Lien on a temporary basis. In late 2000 the KMT announced that it would hold its first direct election for party chair in early 2001. The March 24 election of Lien Chan ended up being uncontested, however, as his only announced opponent, TUAN Hong-Chun, failed to collect the necessary 100,000 nominating signatures. On September 21, 2001, the KMT formally

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expelled former president Lee, who had emerged as a supporter of the new Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU, below). Leading up to the December 2001 Legislative Branch election, the similar stances of the KMT, NP, and PFP in favor of eventual reunification with the mainland produced the informal “pan-blue” alliance (a reference to the KMT’s party colors). At the election the KMT lost considerable support to the PFP and the TSU, contributing to the first loss of its majority in the Legislative Branch. Four members of the KMT, including Minister of National Defense TANG Yian-min, were named to the new DPP-led cabinet in January 2002, which led to the suspension of their party rights. In December 2004 the party gained 11 Legislative Branch seats over its 2001 tally, for a total of 79—sufficient, in coalition with its “pan-blue” allies, the PFP and NP, to control the body. Largely as a result of subsequent defections from the PFP and a recent by-election victory, in March 2006 its legislative delegation rose to 88, equal to that of the DPP. In late April 2005 Lien Chan had become the first KMT chair to visit the PRC. With Lien having decided to step down as chair, the KMT conducted its first direct leadership election in July 2005. Deputy Chair Wang Chin-ping garnered only 28 percent of the vote in losing to Taipei’s mayor, Ma Ying-jeou, who was widely expected to seek the presidency in 2008. Leaders: MA Ying-jeou (Mayor of Taipei and Chair of the Party), LIEN Chan (Honorary Chair), WANG Chin-ping (President, Legislative Branch), CHAN Chuen-po (Secretary General). People First Party (PFP). The PFP is a prounification formation launched by KMT dissident James Soong, following the 2000 presidential election, at which he placed second with a 36.8 percent vote share. The PFP performed well at the December 2001 Legislative Branch election, winning 46 seats, primarily at the expense of the KMT and NP. Prior to the December 2004 legislative election the PFP and its “pan-blue” partners, the KMT and the NP, agreed to coordinate their campaigns in

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order to avoid vote-splitting. Largely as a consequence, the PFP lost 12 seats and the KMT gained 11 more than in 2001, which created considerable resentment within the PFP. Although the KMT and PFP both supported the successful constitutional reform package that was approved by the National Assembly in June 2005, subsequent defections to the KMT further soured PFP hard-liners. Talks in December 2005 with the KMT leadership were widely expected to lead to a longanticipated merger, but differences could not be resolved. In February 2006 Soong announced that the PFP would “walk its own path” in future relations with the KMT. Leaders: James C. Y. SOONG (Chair and 2004 vice presidential candidate), CHANG Chao-hsiung (Deputy Chair), TSAI Chung-hsiung (Secretary General). Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). Formation of the TSU was announced in July 2001 by former KMT leader and interior minister HUANG Chuwen. Declaring Taiwan to be a sovereign state, the TSU attracted defectors from both the KMT and the DPP, its most senior supporter being former president Lee Teng-hui. (Lee, having accused the KMT of aligning with Beijing, was subsequently expelled by the KMT, but he never officially joined the TSU.) The TSU finished fourth, with 13 seats, at the December 2001 election, a ranking that was retained with 12 seats in 2004. Huang resigned after the party’s disappointing performance at the 2004 election. At the National Assembly election of May 2005 the TSU won 7.1 percent of the vote, good for 21 seats. Leader: SU Chin-chiang (Chair). Non-Partisan Solidarity Union (NPSU). The centrist NPSU was established in June 2004 by ten independent members of the Legislative Branch, led by former interior minister Chang Po-ya. Advocating a “middle way” between the “pan-blue” and “pan-green” camps, the party won six seats at the December 2004 Legislative Branch election and two seats (based on a 0.7 percent vote share) at the May 2005 National Assembly balloting. Like the other smaller parties in the Legislative Branch

(the PFP, TSU, and NP), the NPSU opposed the constitutional reform package passed by the National Assembly in June 2005, largely because the method of electing representatives to the downsized Legislative Branch was seen as benefiting only the larger DPP and KMT. Leader: CHANG Po-ya (Chair). New Party—NP (Hsin Tang). The prounification NP was formally launched in August 1993 by a group of KMT dissidents theretofore associated with the New KMT Alliance. Seeking support from second-generation mainlanders, the new formation advocated more energetic reform than the KMT leadership but opposed the DPP’s policy of Taiwanese independence. The NP placed a distant third in the urban and provincial balloting of November 1993, winning only 3.1 percent of the vote. A week prior to the election it reportedly absorbed the Chinese Social Democratic Party (CSDP), formed in 1991 by a group of DPP dissidents, although the CSDP chair, JU Gau-jeng, did not pledge to withdraw the party’s registration until 1994, when he was campaigning for the Taiwan governorship under the NP banner. Proportionally, the NP was the most impressive contestant in December 1995, tripling its Legislative Branch representation from 7 to 21. It did not, however, present a 1996 presidential candidate; its leader, WANG Chien-shien, withdrew from the race after the legislative poll in an effort to consolidate the “third force” in Taiwanese politics. Its Legislative Branch representation fell to 11 in 1998, accompanying a decline in vote share from 12.8 percent to 4.8 percent. With much of the NP leadership supporting independent presidential contender James Soong, the party’s official nominee, LI Ao, won only 0.1 percent of the 2000 presidential vote. Further injured by defections to Soong’s PFP, the party secured only one Legislative Branch seat in 2001. For the 2004 election most of the party’s legislative candidates ran under the banner of its principal “pan-blue” ally, the KMT, although the NP again won one seat under its own name. At the May 2005 National Assembly election the NP won 0.9 percent of the vote, good

TA I WA N

for three seats. It parted ways with the KMT, however, on the issue of constitutional reform, which it opposed in the National Assembly. Leader: YOK Mu-ming (Chair).

Other Parties Formosa Party (FP). The proindependence FP was launched on July 4, 2004, by a group of former Taiwan Independence Party members. Characterizing the DPP and its TSU ally as corrupt and complacent, the new formation sought “to narrow the gap between rich and poor, to establish a fair taxation system, and to protect the rights of minority groups.” Leaders: William HUANG (Chair), CHEN Ta-cheng (Secretary General). Green Party Taiwan (GPT). The GPT dates from January 1996, when it was organized by members of the Taiwan Environmental Protection Union to contest the March National Assembly election, at which the GPT’s KAO Ming-ting unexpectedly won a seat. The party’s platform is based on such traditional “green” concerns as ecological balance, opposition to nuclear power, antimilitarism, and social equality. It won one seat in the Legislative Branch poll in December 2001 but lost it in 2004. Leader: PENG Yen-wen (Convener). Taiwan Independence Party (TAIP). The TAIP was launched in September 1996 by a previously overseas-based group known as the Taiwan Nation-Building Party (TNBP). Another former overseas group, the World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI), which had organized locally as a DPP faction, vowed to work with the TAIP in pushing for independence. In September 1997 the TAIP was reported to have joined with the New Taiwan Alliance (NTA) and some 30 other proindependence groups in a United Front for Taiwan’s Independence (UFTI). The TAIP secured one Legislative Branch seat in 1998, none thereafter. In April 2000 nearly two dozen long-time members of the TAIP, including former chair LEE Chenyuan, left the party, saying that its mission had been achieved with the election of President Chen; others rejected the proposal and vowed to continue the

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campaign for independence. At the May 2005 National Assembly election the TAIP won 0.3 percent of the vote and was awarded one seat. Four months later, it joined several other minor proindependence parties and activists in purchasing an advertisement in the Washington Post that called for the United States to assume military control of Taiwan as a step toward formation of an independent country. Leader: Roger LIN (Spokesperson). Three additional small, proindependence parties won seats at the May 2005 National Assembly election: the Chinese People’s Party (1.1 percent of the vote; three seats); the Civil Party (0.2 percent; one seat), and the Peasant Party (0.4 percent; one seat). All supported the package of constitutional reforms passed by the National Assembly in June. Two other minor organizations, the Taiwan Wisdom-Action Aspirant Party and the Labor and Education Workers’ Alliance, had offered one candidate each at the December 2004 Legislative Branch election.

Legislature Under the unusual constitutional system of the ROC, parliamentary functions were traditionally performed by the National Assembly (Kuo-min Tahui), the Legislative Branch, and even the Control Branch before its 1992 transformation into a more supervisory agency. Originally elected on an all-China basis in November 1947 for a term of six years, the National Assembly, prior to governmental reforms introduced in 1991, had a nominal membership of 3,045. Its surviving members periodically reconvened on Taiwan either as an electoral college to select a president and vice president (as in March 1990) or as a constituent body (as in April 1991). Balloting for 325 members of a second National Assembly took place on December 21, 1991, after which more than 500 surviving members of the first assembly retired. Balloting for a third, 334-member National Assembly took place on March 23, 1996. An election scheduled for March 20, 2000, was canceled, after which the assembly was reduced to a nonstanding body of 300 members empowered to

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Cabinet The cabinet is known as the Executive Branch Council (Hsing-cheng Yuan Hu-yi). The premier is currently chosen by the president (subject to a legislative nonconfidence vote), whereas the vice premier and other cabinet members are appointed by the president upon recommendation of the premier. Cabinet officials are chosen individually; the cabinet is not responsible collectively. As of June 15, 2006 President, Executive Branch (Premier) Vice President, Executive Branch (Vice Premier)

Su Tseng-chang Tsai Ing-wen [f]

Ministers Economic Affairs Education Finance Foreign Affairs Interior Justice National Defense Transportation and Communications Ministers Without Portfolio

Morgan Hwang Ing-san Tu Cheng-sheng Joseph J. C. Lyu James Huang Chih-fang Lee Yi-yang Shih Mao-lin Lee Jye Kuo Yao-chi [f] Frank Feng-shan Fu Li-yeh Ho Mei-yueh Hu Sheng-cheng Lin Ferng-ching Lin Si-yao Wu Tse-cheng

Commission Ministers Consumer Protection Fair Trade Financial Supervisory Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs National Youth Overseas Chinese Affairs Public Construction Research, Development, and Evaluation Veterans’ Affairs

Tsai Ing-wen [f] Hwang Tzong-leh Kong Jaw-sheng Hsu Chih-hsiung [f] Cheng Li-chiun [f] Chang Fu-mei [f] Wu Tse-cheng Yeh Jiunn-rong Kao Hua-chu

Council Ministers Agriculture Atomic Energy Cultural Affairs Economic Planning and Development Hakka Affairs Indigenous Peoples Labor Affairs

Su Jia-chyun Ouyang Min-shen Chiu Kun-liang Hu Shing-cheng Lee Yung-teh Walis Pelin Lee Ying-yuan

TA I WA N

Mainland Affairs National Science Physical Fitness and Sports

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Jaushieh Joseph Wu Chen Chien-jen Chen Chuan-show

Other Ministers Central Personnel Administration Coast Guard Administration Department of Health Directorate General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics Environmental Protection Administration Government Information Office Director, National Palace Museum Chair, Central Election Commission Chair, North American Affairs Coordination Council Governor, Central Bank of China Secretary General, Executive Branch

Chou Hung-hsien Wang Ginn-wang Hou Sheng-mao Hsu Jan-yau Chang Kow-lung Cheng Wen-tsang Lin Mun-lee [f] Chang Masa Lin Fang-mei [f] Perng Fai-nan Liu Yuh-san

[f] = female

consider a limited range of matters—constitutional amendments, presidential or vice presidential impeachment, national boundaries—referred by the Legislative Branch. Following passage of a constitutional reform bill by the Legislative Branch on August 23, 2004, an ad hoc National Assembly election was called for May 14, 2005. Voter turnout to fill the 300 seats (through proportional representation from party lists) was only 23.4 percent. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won 127 seats; Nationalist Party (KMT), 117; Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), 21; People First Party (PFP), 18; Chinese People’s Party, 3; New Party, 3; Non-Partisan Solidarity Union, 2; Civil Party, Peasant Party, and Taiwan Independence Party, 1 each; ad hoc electoral coalitions, 6. On June 7, 2005, the National Assembly approved the reform package by a vote of 249–48, with support from both the DPP and the KMT; the TSU and PFP led the opposition. Under the reforms, which were promulgated by the president on June 10, the National Assembly as an institution was abolished.

Legislative Branch (Li-fa Yuan). The unicameral Legislative Branch, the formal lawmaking organ of the ROC, first convened in 1948. Its 760 members were popularly elected on a regional and occupational basis for three-year terms. On December 19, 1992, at the first balloting for a full house since 1948 (all mainland members had retired by late 1991), a total of 125 directly elected and 36 proportionally allocated seats were filled. At the most recent election, held December 11, 2004, a total of 168 members were directly elected from multimember constituencies, 41 by proportional representation, 8 from aboriginal constituencies, and 8 by party appointment from overseas Chinese. The opposition “pan-blue” coalition won a bare majority of 114 seats (Nationalist Party, 79; People First Party, 34; New Party, 1); the propresidential “pan-green” coalition, 101 (Democratic Progressive Party, 89; Taiwan Solidarity Union, 12); the Non-Partisan Solidarity Union, 6; independents, 4. The constitutional reforms ratified by the National Assembly in May 2005 halved the Legislative Branch to 113 members, effective from the

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next election. Under a new “single seat, two votes” electoral system, 73 members are to be directly elected from single-member constituencies, 6 will be filled by aboriginal communities, and 34 at-large and overseas expatriate seats will be proportionally allocated to political parties that win at least 5 percent of the votes on a separate ballot. In addition, the legislative term is to be lengthened to four years. President: WANG Jin-pyng.

Communications Press Prior to the easing of long-standing restrictions on December 31, 1987, the total number of newspapers was limited to 31, nearly half of which were owned either by the government or by the KMT. Individuals with close ties to the KMT controlled several of the others. As of January 1, 1988, the government indicated that it would accept applications for new papers for the first time since 1951, although it would continue to be illegal for journalists to “advocate communism” or to support independence for the island. In May 1990 the government reported that the number of papers had risen to 192; by 2003 the number had grown to 602 despite rising costs and competition from both cable television and personal computers. Apple Daily, a tabloid launched in April 2003, is now considered Taiwan’s most widely read newspaper. The following are published in Taipei, unless otherwise indicated: Chung-kuo Shih-pao (China Times, 800,000), relatively independent; Lieh-ho Pao (United Daily News, 700,000), relatively independent; Tzu-yu Shih-pao (Liberty Times, 700,000); Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News, 600,000), KMT organ; Taiwan Hsinsheng Pao (Taiwan New Life Daily, 460,000), Taiwan provincial government paper; Chung-hua Jihpao (China Daily News, southern edition, Tainan, 270,000), KMT organ; Taiwan Jih-pao (Taiwan Daily News, 250,000); Chung-hua Jih-pao (China Daily News, northern edition, 210,000), KMT organ; China Post (140,000), in English; China News (100,000), in English; Taiwan Hsin-wen Pao (Daily

News, Kaohsiung, 100,000); Chung-kuo Wan-pao (China Evening News, Kaohsiung, 60,000).

News Agencies There were some 1,200 registered news agencies as of December 2004, most of them small and specialized. The oldest and largest domestic facility remains the privately owned Central News Agency—CNA (Chung-yang Tung-hsun She). Agence France-Presse, AP, East Asia News, Naigai News, Pan-Asia Newspapers Alliance, Reuters, and UPI maintain bureaus or stringers in Taipei.

Broadcasting and Computing Most broadcasting facilities are commercial, although all are government-supervised. There are about 170 radio stations transmitting in Mandarin, Taiwanese, or both; additional stations broadcast to the mainland and overseas in a large number of languages and dialects. The newest of Taiwan’s five terrestrial television channels, the Public Television Service, began operations in 1998. Some 150 cable and satellite systems also provide television. As of 2003, there were approximately 9.7 million TV sets and 10.7 million personal computers serving 12.3 million Internet users.

Intergovernmental Representation A founding member of the United Nations, the Republic of China lost its right of representation in that body’s major organs on October 25, 1971. The United States terminated formal diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979. Informal relations continue to be maintained through the American Institute in Taiwan and its Nationalist Chinese counterpart in Washington (and other U.S. cities), the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office. IGO Membership (Non-UN) ADB (listed as “Taipei, China”), APEC, BCIE, WTO (listed as “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu”)

FIJI REPUBLIC

OF THE

FIJI ISLANDS

Matanitu Tu-Vaka-i-koya ko Viti (Fijian) Fiji Ripablik (Hindustani)

See the note at the end of this entry for information on current events.

The Country Situated in the South Pacific between New Caledonia and Western Samoa, Fiji consists of a group of some 330 principal islands, many of them mountainous and only about one-third inhabited, together with 500 islets spread over an area of 250,000 square miles of ocean. Viti Levu, the largest island, accommodates close to 80 percent of the population and is the site of Suva, the capital, and of the airport at Nadi, an important hub of South Pacific air communications. Native Fijians (mainly Melanesians, save for Polynesians in the far northern island of Rotuma) became a minority of Fiji’s mixed population in consequence of the introduction of numerous Indian indentured laborers following the establishment of British rule in 1874. At the 1976 census Fijians constituted about 44 percent of the population; Indo-Fijians, 50 percent; other Pacific Islanders, 2 percent; Europeans and part-Europeans, 3 percent; and Chinese, 1 percent. By contrast, the percentages of the two leading groups at the 1996 census were 51 and 44, respectively, largely as the result of postcoup Indian outmigration. Virtually all native Fijians are Christian, approximately 85 percent being Methodist and

12 percent Roman Catholic. The Indo-Fijian population is predominantly Hindu, with a Muslim

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minority. In 1997 women were reported to constitute 29 percent of the official labor force, with about one-third of all females assumed to be engaged in subsistence activities. Traditionally, Fiji’s economy was based on agriculture. Although that sector now accounts for only 16 percent of GDP, sugar remains the country’s most important export, despite production difficulties related, in large part, to differences between indigenous landowners and Indo-Fijian leaseholders over tenure and rentals. Fish, coconuts, and ginger also are significant sectoral exports. Industry, led by food processing and garment production, contributes about one-fourth of GDP and employs one-third of the labor force. Gold mining is the most important extractive industry. Within the services sector, tourism is a major source of income, accounting for one-fourth of GDP. After a coup-induced decline of 7 percent in 1987, real GDP rose by an average of 6.2 percent during 1987–1990, with per capita income over the period increasing by nearly 40 percent (from F$1,800 to F$2,500). However, the economy stagnated thereafter, in part because of a decline in virtually all export sectors, accompanied by disappointing returns from a recently introduced valueadded tax (VAT). After a contraction of 0.9 percent in 1997, modest growth of 1.5 percent was achieved in 1998. The following year saw a remarkable expansion of 9.2 percent, due largely to a revival in sugar production. In 2000, however, political turmoil led to a 28 percent drop in tourist arrivals and contributed to a 2.8 percent downturn for the year. Tourism has since recovered, but sugar production remains erratic. GDP growth of 2.7 percent in 2001 was followed by 4.3 percent in 2002, dipping marginally thereafter.

Government and Politics Political Background Discovered by the Dutchman Tasman in 1643 and visited by Captain Cook in 1774, Fiji became a British possession in 1874, when it was unconditionally ceded to the United Kingdom by the

paramount chief in order to ensure internal peace. The beginnings of modern Fijian administration came with implementation of the Fijian Affairs Ordinance in 1945, which laid the foundations for local government. A ministerial system was introduced in 1966 under a British constitutional order providing for a Legislative Council elected in such a way as to ensure adequate Fijian representation. Indian insistence on the introduction of the “one man, one vote” principle delayed further constitutional progress until early 1970, when Indian leaders agreed to postpone their demands until after independence. Following an April–May constitutional conference in London, Fiji became independent on October 10, 1970. The Alliance Party, led since before independence by Ratu Sir Kamisese K. T. MARA, lost its parliamentary majority in a stunning upset at an election that concluded in April 1977. However, the opposition National Federation Party (NFP) was unable to form a government, and Prime Minister Mara continued to serve in a caretaker capacity until his party recovered its majority at a September election. Following a bitterly fought campaign, the Alliance retained power, with a substantially reduced majority, at the election of July 1982. Prior to the 1987 balloting, the NFP formed a coalition with the Fiji Labour Party (FLP), which had been launched in mid-1985 with trade-union backing. In an apparent effort to dampen momentum generated by the coalition, Prime Minister Mara called for an early election on April 4–11, at which the Alliance obtained only 24 of 52 legislative seats. On April 14 the coalition (a majority of whose representatives were Indo-Fijians) formed a government headed by the FLP’s ethnic Fijian leader, Dr. Timoci BAVADRA. Demonstrations were thereupon mounted by Fijians demanding constitutional changes that would preclude Indo-Fijian political domination, and on May 14 an army unit led by (then) Lt. Col. Sitiveni RABUKA stormed the Parliament building and arrested Bavadra and his fellow ministers. Declaring that he had assumed control pending elections under a new constitution, Rabuka announced the appointment of a 17-member interim ruling council

FIJI

Political Status: Voluntarily assumed the status of a British dependency in 1874; became independent member of the Commonwealth on October 10, 1970; Republic declared on October 15, 1987; current constitution promulgated on July 25, 1997, with effect from July 27, 1998. Area: 7,055 sq. mi. (18,272 sq. km.). Population: 775,077 (1996C); 848,000 (2005E). Major Urban Center (2005E): SUVA (86,000). Official Languages: English, Fijian (Na Vosa Vakaviti), and Hindustani (Fijian Hindi). Monetary Unit: Fiji Dollar (official rate July 1, 2006: 1.77 dollars = $1US). President: Ratu Josefa ILOILO; named Vice President by the Great Council of Chiefs on January 12, 1999, and sworn in on January 18, having served in an acting capacity following the death on November 17, 1997, of Ratu Sir Josaia TAVAIQIA; appointed Interim President by the Great Council on July 13, 2000, and sworn in July 18, following the interim presidency of Cmdr. Frank BAINIMARAMA, who had declared martial law and assumed executive authority on May 29, 2000, after the reported resignation of Ratu Sir Kamisese K. T. MARA; designated as President for a five-year term by the Great Council on March 13, 2001, and sworn in on March 15; redesignated for a second five-year term on March 8, 2006.

composed largely of former Alliance officials, including Ratu Mara as foreign minister. A confusing sequence of events followed. Initially the governor general, Sir Penaia GANILAU, refused to recognize the new regime, insisting that “in the temporary absence of Ministers of the Crown” it was his duty to exercise executive authority on behalf of the queen. He reversed himself on May 17, swearing in Rabuka as chief minister, but reversed himself again on May 19 by refusing to officiate at the installation of Rabuka’s ministerial colleagues. Two days later, after extensive consultation with the native Great Council of Chiefs, it was reported that Rabuka would be assigned responsibility for home affairs and the armed forces in a 19-member council charged with advising the governor general as head of an interim government.

205

Vice President: Ratu Joni MADRAIWIWI; named by the Great Council of Chiefs on December 14, 2004, succeeding Ratu Jope SENILOLI, who had been convicted of treason and sentenced to a four-year prison term on August 6, 2004, and who had resigned on November 29, three days after being released from prison for health reasons; redesignated on March 8, 2006, for a term concurrent with that of the president. Prime Minister: Laisenia QARASE (United Fiji Party); appointed Interim Prime Minister by Interim President Iloilo on July 18, 2000, to succeed Mahendra Pal CHAUDHRY (Fiji Labour Party), who had been taken hostage in a coup on May 19 and whose duties had been assumed by Cmdr. Frank BAINIMARAMA upon declaration of martial law on May 29; formed interim government on July 28, 2000, that was declared illegitimate by the Court of Appeal on March 1, 2001; appointed in a caretaker capacity on March 15, 2001, following the de jure reassumption of the office by Chaudhry on March 7, the latter’s dismissal by the Interim President on March 14, and the one-day caretaker tenure of Tevita MOMOEDONU (Fiji Labour Party); formed new government on September 12, 2001, following election of August 25–September 1; reappointed on May 18, 2006, following election of May 6–13.

The new body was, however, reduced to 16 members at its inaugural meeting on May 25 because of the withdrawal of Dr. Bavadra and two Indo-Fijian associates. Four days later Rabuka was reported to have been confirmed as commander in chief of Fiji’s armed forces, with the rank of colonel. On September 25, 1987, in the wake of inconclusive constitutional discussions and mounting racial violence, Rabuka mounted a second coup that yielded formal abrogation of the 1970 constitution and replacement of the existing civilian administration by a military council. On October 7 Rabuka (now a general) proclaimed the establishment of a republic and announced the appointment of a largely nonmilitary government of 23 members. On October 15 the queen accepted Ganilau’s resignation as governor general. On December 5

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Ganilau was designated president of Fiji, stating that his principal objective was to effect “a return to parliamentary democracy and the reestablishment of links with Her Majesty the Queen.” Subsequently, he swore in a new cabinet that included Ratu Mara as prime minister and General Rabuka as home minister. On September 23, 1988, the interim government presented the draft of an ethnically discriminatory new constitution, on the basis of which a national election was promised by late 1989. Although the deadline was not met, the country returned to full civilian rule on January 5, 1990, when Rabuka stepped down as home affairs minister, with two other serving army officers also resigning their portfolios. Earlier, in his New Year’s address, President Ganilau had indicated that the new basic law would be adopted during the latter half of the year, with legislative balloting to be held within 24 months; subsequently, however, the election was further postponed to mid-1992. In July 1991 General Rabuka resigned his commission and regained the home affairs portfolio in addition to appointment as codeputy prime minister. In October, after being elected president of the recently organized Fijian Political Party (Soqosoqot ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei—SVT), he again left the government, although indicating that he would be a candidate in the forthcoming parliamentary balloting. At the election of May 23 and 30, 1992, 30 of the 37 Melanesian seats in the new House of Representatives were won by the SVT. On June 3, one day after his appointment as prime minister, Rabuka announced a cabinet that included 15 SVT members, 2 members of the General Voters’ Party (GVP), 1 Fijian independent, and the MP from Rotuma. During the run-up to the 1992 balloting pronounced differences had surfaced between Rabuka and his principal SVT rival, Deputy Prime Minister Josevata KAMIKAMICA, who Prime Minister Mara favored as his successor. Initially, it appeared likely that Kamikamica, with the aid of the Indianbased NFP and the non-ethnic GVP, would triumph. However, Rabuka supporters launched an intense courtship of FLP leader Mahendra CHAUDHRY

who, as Bavadra’s finance minister, had been jailed by the general in the wake of the May 1987 coup. For his part, Chaudhry had long been at legislative loggerheads with Kamikamica and was persuaded to provide the support needed to ensure Rabuka’s confirmation. As a result, Rabuka, the symbol of Fijian nationalism, formed a government with the backing of a party that had long been his implacable opponent, thereby alienating right-wing elements within both the SVT and the broader Fijian community. In December 1992 Rabuka proposed the formation of a “government of national unity,” although indicating that it would have to take place within the framework of the 1990 basic law. While the parliamentary leaders of the major Indian-dominated opposition parties (FLP and NFP) endorsed the proposal, NFP President Balwant Singh RAKKA declared that no meaningful consideration of the ethnic problem was possible prior to amendment of the “racist” constitution. Political unrest mounted in the wake of a cabinet shake-up in October 1993, and on November 29 the House of Representatives rejected the government’s 1994 budget bill. Rabuka thereupon called for a legislative dissolution, which was set for January 19, 1994, by Acting President Mara (serving due to the incapacity of President Ganilau, who ultimately succumbed on December 15). At the ensuing election of February 18–24 the SVT gained an additional seat, while six Indian seats shifted from the FLP to the NFP, permitting Rabuka to form a new government on February 28. In mid-1994, responding to international condemnation of the 1990 basic law, Prime Minister Rabuka announced the appointment of a constitutional review commission. The composition of the commission itself drew criticism, however, and following the establishment of a “working relationship” between Rabuka and opposition leader Jai Ram REDDY, it was replaced by a three-member group headed by former New Zealand governor general Sir Paul REEVES. While not all of the commission’s recommendations were accepted, a Constitutional Amendment Bill approved by President Mara on July 25, 1997, mollified most critics

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by substantially increasing Indo-Fijian representation in parliament and permitting a non-Melanesian to become prime minister. As a consequence, many ethnic Fijians who had endorsed the 1990 constitution felt betrayed by its successor, which guaranteed them only 23 of 71 lower house seats. At House of Representatives balloting on May 5–15, 1999, a People’s Coalition, encompassing the FLP, the Fijian Association Party (FAP), and the Party of National Unity (PANU), won 51 seats, while a government coalition of the SVT and the United General Party (UGP) secured only 10. On May 19 the FLP’s Mahendra Chaudhry was sworn in as the nation’s first ethnic Indian prime minister, announcing on May 21 a multiracial cabinet in which ethnic Fijians held 11 of 17 full ministerial posts. A year later, on May 19, 2000, feeding on ethnic Fijian resentment at growing Indo-Fijian influence, a group of gunmen led by George SPEIGHT, a failed Suva businessman, stormed the Parliament building, taking hostage Prime Minister Chaudhry, many cabinet members, and a number of MPs. On May 20 Speight released 20 of the hostages and declared himself prime minister. On May 27 President Mara appointed Minister of Labor Tevita MOMOEDONU (FLP), his nephew, as acting prime minister to meet constitutional requirements for dismissing the cabinet, proroguing the House of Representatives, and assuming full administrative authority, but on May 29 Commodore Frank BAINIMARAMA, commander in chief of the armed forces, declared martial law and announced that Mara had resigned. On May 30 he named Ratu Epeli NAILATIKAU as prime minister of an interim military government, but he withdrew the nomination on May 31 because of objections by Speight. On July 10 the military signed the socalled Maunikou Accord with Speight for the election of a new president by tribal leaders in return for release of the remaining hostages. On July 13 the last hostages, including Chaudhry, were released, and Vice President Josefa ILOILO was named interim president. On July 26, arguing that he had voided an amnesty by failing to surrender his weapons, authorities arrested Speight. The next day

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over 350 of his followers were taken into custody following a violent confrontation with the military that left dozens injured, and on August 11 Speight was charged with treason. An interim government was sworn in on July 28, 2000, under Prime Minister Laisenia QARASE, a banker who had initially been proposed in a caretaker capacity by Bainimarama on July 3 and was then appointed by Interim President Iloilo on July 18. Apart from restoring domestic order and stabilizing the economy, the new administration’s principal task was to oversee the drafting of yet another constitution, but the political dynamics were altered on November 15 when a High Court justice ruled that the 1997 constitution remained in effect, that Mara remained president, that the current interim government was illegitimate, and that the legislature should be called into session. The decision was unanimously supported by the Court of Appeal on March 1, 2001 (although it determined that President Mara had not resigned until December 15, 2000), and on March 7 Prime Minister Chaudhry asked the interim president, Iloilo, to recall Parliament for the purpose of formally dissolving it and calling new elections. On the same day Qarase offered his government’s resignation, but Iloilo decided first to consult with the Great Council of Chiefs, which on March 8 rejected the Court’s decision and supported retention of Qarase until new elections could be held. Having been selected to serve as president for a five-year term by the Great Council on March 13, Iloilo dismissed the reinstated Chaudhry on the following day, arguing that the prime minister’s request for dissolution meant, ipso facto, that he no longer had the legislature’s confidence. The outraged Chaudhry declared the action unconstitutional. Also on March 14, Iloilo accepted Qarase’s resignation and then named Tevita Momoedonu as caretaker prime minister, with the mutual understanding that Momoedonu’s tasks would be simply to approve the swearing in of Iloilo and Vice President Jope SENILOLI and to advise the president to dissolve Parliament. That done, Momoedonu resigned on March 15, making way for President Iloilo to redesignate Qarase as prime minister of a caretaker

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administration pending fresh elections. Although his complex maneuvering raised constitutional questions, Iloilo, in a national address, described his approach as a “middle way of moderation, reasonableness, and common sense,” particularly given a constitution that did not “provide complete and realistic answers to the misfortunes caused by an armed insurrection and revolution in a racially split nation.” At the balloting of August 25–September 1, 2001, Prime Minister Qarase’s recently established United Fiji Party (Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua—SDL) captured a plurality of 32 seats, while Chaudhry’s FLP took 27. To form a governing coalition, Qarase turned to George Speight’s Conservative Alliance (Matanitu Vanua—MV), which had won 6 seats in the 71-member lower house. (Although elected to the House, Speight himself remained incarcerated, pending conclusion of his treason trial, and thereby forfeited his seat by nonattendance.) Despite a constitutional requirement that all parties receiving at least 8 seats be offered cabinet positions, Qarase refused to include the FLP, asserting that the SDL and the FLP were incompatible. Sworn in on September 10, two days later Qarase presented a new cabinet that included only one Indo-Fijian. As expected, Chaudhry took his case to court. In February 2002 Speight pleaded guilty to treason for the 2000 coup and was sentenced to life in prison. Ten of his 12 codefendants also pleaded guilty to lesser charges. In the same month the Court of Appeal ruled in favor of the FLP’s inclusion in the cabinet and declared the existing government unconstitutional. The decision was appealed by Prime Minister Qarase to the Supreme Court, which on July 18, 2003, concurred with the lower court. Qarase thereupon offered the FLP 14 newly established cabinet posts, none of which were accepted by Chaudhry or other FLP leaders. In addition to arguing that many of the proposed posts were minor, Chaudhry demanded 3 additional posts. This dispute also was submitted to the Supreme Court, which ruled on July 9, 2004, in Qarase’s favor regarding the number of posts of-

fered to the FLP. The decision did not, however, resolve the underlying differences between Qarase and Chaudhry over ministerial assignments. On November 24 Chaudhry brought an end to the impasse by announcing that the FLP would no longer pursue a role in the cabinet and would instead lead the official parliamentary opposition. On December 17, 2004, Prime Minister Qarase carried out a cabinet shuffle, in part to ease public concern over friction between the government and the military, which had strongly objected to the November 26 release from prison of Vice President Seniloli for reasons of health. Seniloli had served less than four months of a four-year prison term following his August 5 conviction by the High Court in Suva for having taken an illegal oath during the events of May 2000. He resigned the vice presidency on November 29, and on December 14 the Great Council of Chiefs endorsed the president’s choice of a replacement, former High Court judge Joni MADRAIWIWI. In March 2006, despite calls for a more overtly Fiji nationalist successor, President Iloilo was reappointed by the Great Council of Chiefs. Two months later, after his party had secured a legislative majority, Qarase was reinstalled as prime minister.

Constitution and Government Fiji’s 1970 constitution established Fiji as a fully sovereign and independent state with a titular head, the British monarch, represented locally by a governor general. Executive authority was vested in a prime minister and cabinet appointed by the governor general and responsible to a bicameral Parliament consisting of an appointed Senate and an elected House of Representatives. A complex electoral system was advanced to ensure adequate representation for the Fijian community, encompassing both communal and national electoral rolls. The judicial system included a Fiji Court of Appeal, a Supreme Court (the superior court of record), magistrates’ courts, and provincial and district courts. Judicial appointments were assigned to the

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governor general, with provision for an ombudsman to investigate complaints against government officials. Following independence, Fiji was partitioned into four administrative divisions, each headed by a divisional commissioner assisted by district officers, with main urban areas governed by local authorities. In addition, a separate Fijian administration, headed by a Fijian Affairs Board, was established to oversee 14 communal provinces, each with a partially elected council. At the apex of the provincial councils, a Great Council of Chiefs (Bose Levu Vakaturaga) was empowered to advise the government on Fijian affairs. A National Land Trust Board was given administrative responsibility for over four-fifths of the nation’s land, which could not be alienated, on behalf of village groups. Indians were restricted to leasing holdings for up to 10 years (later expanded to 30 years), a situation that, along with the system of representation, remained the object of persistent Indian dissatisfaction. The 1970 basic law was abrogated after the second coup of September 1987. Its successor, promulgated on July 25, 1990, also was complex. A president, named for a five-year term by the Great Council of Chiefs, was endowed with executive authority, as well as with capacity to initiate legislation under emergency conditions. A Presidential Council was to provide advice on matters of national importance. The administration was headed by a prime minister who selected cabinet associates from members of Parliament. The legislature remained bicameral, with a nonelective, Fijiandominated Senate authorized to amend, alter, or repeal any measure affecting the customs, land, and tradition of the indigenous population. Sitting for a five-year term, the House of Representatives contained 70 members, 37 of whom were required to be Fijian; of the remaining 33 members, 27 were elected from Indo-Fijian constituencies, 5 from those of other ethnic groups, and 1 from Rotuma. A High Court was added to the judicial hierarchy and assigned constitutional review functions to be shared with the Supreme Court.

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Provision also was made for the establishment of indigenous courts, while a Native Land Commission was assigned ultimate jurisdiction in any dispute relating to customary land rights and usage. Finally, the 1990 constitution called for Judicial, Police, and Public Sector commissions mandated to ensure that no less than 50 percent of all appointments were reserved for Fijians and Rotumans. The manifestly discriminatory document of 1990 was superseded in 1997 by a constitution that provided for continued Melanesian domination of the Senate but opened the door to possible Indo-Fijian control of the House by providing for the election of 25 members on a nonracial basis (see Legislature, below). The ensuing designation of Mahendra Chaudhry as prime minister in 1999 served as a catalyst for abrogation of the 1997 document in May 2000, although on November 15 the High Court ruled that it remained in force. That decision was confirmed by the Court of Appeal on March 1, 2001. Local administration is based on four divisions (Northern, Southern, Eastern, and Western), each of which comprises 2 or more of the country’s 14 traditional provinces. Divisions and lower-level districts are headed by appointed commissioners and officers, respectively. Urban areas include cities and towns, each of which elects a governing council. There also are local rural authorities responsible primarily for matters of public health. Native Fijian affairs are governed through an overlapping system based on the village (koro) and extending up to the provincial level. Each province has a provincial council and an executive head (roko tui). Executives are named by the Fijian Affairs Board, which oversees administration of ethnic Fijian matters.

Foreign Relations Fiji is a member of the United Nations and of many of its associated agencies as well as of several regional organizations, including the Pacific Community and the Pacific Islands Forum. Since June 1978 it has been a major contributor to UN

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peacekeeping forces, the expenses of which have been assumed by the UN. In December 1994 opposition MPs criticized the government for supplying international peacekeeping personnel while failing to curb increases in domestic crime. In response, the home minister pointed out the contribution to national income resulting from the policy. More recently, in December 2004 Fiji dispatched a company of 134 troops to Iraq to assist the UN in peacekeeping and in protecting key personnel. In March 2005 Fiji confirmed that it had been asked by the UN to ready an additional 268 soldiers for the Iraq mission, and in early April the cabinet approved deployment of 90. (At that time some 230 additional Fijians were employed in Iraq by Global Reach Strategies, a private security contractor.) The republican proclamation of October 1987 occurred during a Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Vancouver, Canada, prompting a declaration that Fiji’s membership in the grouping had “lapsed.” The joint statement went on to say that Fiji’s status might be reconsidered should “the circumstances warrant,” with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher pointedly noting that the Commonwealth encompassed 26 other republics and at least 4 military governments; however, readmission required the unanimous endorsement of the members, with India reluctant to give its assent under constitutional arrangements perpetuating native Fijian control. Fiji was readmitted to the Commonwealth in August 1997 (effective October 1), following adoption of the new constitution. Its status was again jeopardized by the May 2000 coup, which resulted in suspension from participation in meetings of the organization. The action came after the United States had resumed its aid program, India had reopened its Suva embassy, and Fiji was preparing to host the representatives of more than 70 ACP–EU (African, Caribbean, Pacific–European Union) countries for the signing of a successor to the Lom´e Convention that was to have been known as the Suva Convention. As a consequence, the meeting was moved to Cotonou, Benin, where the Cotonou Agreement was concluded on June 23, 2000. Full participation

in the Commonwealth was restored following the August–September 2001 democratic election.

Current Issues On May 14, 2004, marking the 125th anniversary of the arrival of the first Indian indentured workers to Fiji, Epeli GANILAU, chair of the Great Council of Chiefs, strongly promoted multiculturalism and apologized to the Indo-Fijian community for the council’s errors during the 1987 and 2000 coups. In July, however, in the context of a dispute with the government over precisely when his term as council leader expired, Ganilau was replaced by an interim chair (to serve until May 2005), Ovini BOKINI. The move was instigated by the Qarase government, which made little effort to disguise its intentions. The strained relationship between the government and the military was not improved in November 2004 when Attorney General Qoriniasi BALE ordered the release of Vice President Seniloli from prison even though Seniloli had served only a small fraction of his coup-related sentence. Within the military the decision was widely viewed as tantamount to an endorsement of the May 2000 coup. Also in November, the army sentenced 29 soldiers to between two and seven years in prison for backing the coup. Many of them were already servings terms for participating in a November 2000 mutiny in the army’s Counter-Revolutionary Warfare unit that had led to a day of heavy fighting in Suva before the rebels were subdued. In late November the Naitasiri paramount chief, Inoke TAKIVEIKATA, was convicted and sentenced to life in prison for inciting the army mutiny. Meanwhile, other court proceedings related to the May 2000 events continued. Recently, despite Qarase’s efforts, tension between his administration and the military has continued, with Commodore Bainimarama announcing in late January 2006 that he no longer recognized the authority of Home Affairs Minister Josefa VOSANIBOLA and that the military was answerable to no one. Two weeks earlier Bainimarama had dismissed the acting land forces

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commander, Lt. Col. Jone BALEDADROKA, on the ground that he had been planning a governmentinspired mutiny. Subsequently, in mid-February, Bainimarama instituted a legal action against Finance Minister Jone KUBUABOLA because of what were alleged to be improper deductions from Bainimarama’s salary. Race relations, and therefore politics, in Fiji are directly related to questions of land tenure and the rights of landlords. Under the Native Land Trust Act (NLTA), a 12-member Native Land Trust Board (NLTB) administers indigenous land holdings, which now amount to about 88 percent of the country’s territory. Another 3 percent is classified as state land, which is held in trust for the people, while only 9 percent (freehold land) can be bought and sold without restriction. Although ethnic Fijians “own” the land administered by the NLTB, they cannot alienate it, nor can they easily appeal to the courts if they object to NLTB decisions. In 1966 Fiji passed the Agricultural Landlords and Tenants Act (ALTA), which set forth basic guidelines for leasing and tenancy and established 30-year leases as the standard. Those leases began expiring in 1997, however, and many landlords, primarily objecting to what they considered the ALTA’s inadequate rental rates, refused to renew the leases and began evicting Indo-Fijians, who grow virtually all of the country’s sugar cane. Much to the consternation of the tenant farmers, in 2001 the NLTB, with its close ties to the traditional chiefs and the ethnic Fijian political parties, took over administration of ALTA. Although the NLTB has argued the advantages of setting rents at closer to market values, many indigenous landlords also have had their differences with the NLTB, which siphons off 15 percent of rent payments for operating expenses, holds another 10 percent in trust, and distributes 22.5 percent to the traditional hierarchy. Meanwhile, tenants still have no way to obtain their own land, are not guaranteed compensation for any improvements they make to leased land (not even for erecting housing), and have no right to automatic lease renewal. Because of the problem, the sugar industry has suffered, with con-

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siderable acreage lying fallow. Moreover, an agreement for the sale of Fijian sugar to the EU—at triple the world price—will expire in 2007.

Political Parties Political party activity was formally suspended in October 1987, although most groups remained active in preparation for parliamentary elections, which were ultimately held under the 1990 constitution in May 1992. The most conspicuous casualty was the Alliance Party (AP), a multiracial grouping formed in 1968 by the Fijian Association, the Indian Alliance, and the General Electors’ Association. Under Ratu Sir Kamisese K. T. Mara, the AP led the country to independence but by 1990 had become effectively dormant. Formal party activity was again temporarily suspended in the wake of the May 2000 coup, with considerable realignment then occurring in preparation for the August–September 2001 general election. In early 2005, looking toward the general election scheduled for 2006, Prime Minister Qarase stepped up efforts to unite the major ethnic Fijian parties. In late February Qarase’s United Fiji Party (SDL) and its junior coalition partner, the Conservative Alliance (MV), announced that they would cooperate in nominating candidates and subsequently served as the basis of the GCIG, below. Grand Coalition Initiative Group (GCIG). The GCIG was launched in mid-2005 by the four Fijian nationalist parties below, all of whom were committed to the maintenance of an indigenous Melanesian government. Although the NVTLP and the SVT were formally listed on the 2006 ballot, the only participant credited with winning seats was the SDL. Initially, the nonracist PNP (see under PNU, below) also was identified (possibly in a reporting error) as a member of the GCIG. Leader: Laisenia QARASE (Prime Minister). United Fiji Party (Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua—SDL). The SDL was established in May 2001 by Laisenia Qarase, at that time the caretaker prime minister, in preparation for the

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upcoming national election. The new party attracted members from the principal indigenous formations, including the Fijian Political Party (SVT, below), the Fijian Association Party (FAP, below), and the Christian Democratic Alliance (Veitokani ni Lewenivanua Vakarisito—VLV). A predominantly Methodist party that had been formed in 1998, the VLV won three parliamentary seats in 1999 and ran under the SDL banner in 2001, but it became dormant after that and was deregistered in February 2004. The SDL emerged from the August– September 2001 balloting with a plurality of 32 seats in the House of Representatives. Having negotiated a coalition arrangement with George Speight’s Conservative Alliance Party (MV, below), Qarase formed a new government that also included a representative of the New Labour Unity Party (NLUP, below). The party won a majority of 36 seats in May 2006. Leaders: Laisenia QARASE (Prime Minister), Jale BABA, Jonetani KAUKIMOCE (House Majority Leader). Conservative Alliance Party (Matanitu Vanua—MV or CAMV). Formation of the CAMV was announced in April 2001, and the party was formally launched in mid-June by supporters of coup leader George Speight. It won six seats at the August–September 2001 election (including one by the incarcerated Speight) and then entered into a coalition government with the plurality SDL. A former party president and deputy speaker of the House of Representatives, Rakuita Vakalalabure, was convicted in August 2004 of taking an illegal oath and was sentenced to a six-year prison term. Naiqama LALABALAVU, a northern paramount chief as well as minister of lands and mineral resources, was sentenced to eight months in jail, also for a 2000 offense, in April 2005. His cabinet replacement, Samisoni Tikoinasau (Sam Speight), was George Speight’s brother. In February 2005 it was reported that the SDL and CAMV had decided to merge, and in Febru-

ary 2006 it was reported that the merger had taken place, although the CAMV interim secretary declared in March that the party had not been dissolved. Leaders: George SPEIGHT (Ilikini NAITINI), Ratu Rakuita VAKALALABURE, Samisoni TIKOINASAU (Former Minister of Lands and Mineral Resources), Lasarusa SOVEA (Interim Secretary). Nationalist Vanua Tako Lavo Party (NVTLP). A strongly anti-Indian communal organization, the NVTLP descends from what was originally launched in 1974 as the Fijian Nationalist Party (FNP). The FNP’s strenuous campaigning drew many votes from the Alliance and contributed to the latter’s reversal in the election of March–April 1977. The party won no seats in 1982 or 1987, many of its candidates losing their deposits. In early 1988 it sent a telegram to Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi asking him to repatriate the Indo-Fijian population. Reorganized as the Fijian Nationalist United Front (FNUF) prior to the 1992 balloting, the party had expected to be called upon as an SVT coalition partner, a role that the SVT caucus rejected in favor of a platform that would ensure the electoral participation of the FLP. Subsequently, FNUF leader Sakeasi BUTADROKA moved the party into opposition, branding General Rabuka as the “betrayer of the century.” In August 1992 Butadroka echoed his 1988 appeal by urging parliamentary action to deport all Indo-Fijians to their ethnic homeland. The FNUF won five lower house seats in 1992, all of which were lost in 1994 under the banner of the Fijian-Rotuman Nationalist United Front Party. The NVTLP entered the 1999 election campaign opposing the existing constitution and demanding that the primacy of customary law be restored. It won two seats at the balloting of May 8–15. Sakeasi Butadroka died in December 1999. A number of Nationalists were directly involved or implicated in the May 2000 coup, including the party’s President, Iliesa DUVULOCO, who was sentenced to 18 months in

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prison in February 2002, and a vice president, Viliame SAVU, who was convicted twice: in December 2002 for misprision of treason and in August 2004 for taking an illegal oath. Savu won early release on the second charge in January 2005. Following Duvuloco’s conviction, the party elected Manasa MOCE as president; he died in February 2005 while on trial for taking an illegal oath. At the 2001 national election the party failed to win any House seats. In March 2002 Josaia WAQABACA, the party’s general secretary, was acquitted of conspiring to kidnap Prime Minister Qarase, army commander Frank Bainimarama, and the attorney general in late 2001. Leaders: Saula TELAWA, Samisoni BOLATAGICI. Fijian Political Party (Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei—SVT). The SVT was launched by the Great Council of Chiefs in mid1991 to fill the vacuum created by the demise of the Fijian Association, although its appeal was expected to be limited largely to ethnic Fijians. At an organizational meeting in October Deputy Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka won the party presidency, despite not being a chief. The party secured pluralities at the election of May 1992 and February 1994, with Rabuka forming governments that included representatives of the General Voters’ Party (GVP) on both occasions. In early 1999 the SVT announced it would contest the May general elections in a multiracial coalition with the UGP (then its government partner) and the NFP, theretofore the leading opposition party. It placed third in the election of May 1999, winning eight lower house seats. In January 2001 the SVT, the former Christian Democratic Alliance (Veitokani ni Lewenivanua Vakarisito—VLV), and the Tu’uakitau Cokanauto faction of the FAP announced an alliance, the Combined Fijian Political Parties (CFPP), to represent indigenous Fijians. Subsequently called the Fijian Political Parties Forum (FPPF), the participants indicated that they would cooperate at the next election, but little came of the initiative. The SVT failed to

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win any seats at the August–September 2001 House election, having lost the endorsement of the Great Council of Chiefs. In April 2004 Rabuka again floated the concept of a party alliance, but this time the proposal was for a “Fijian Multiracial Alliance.” Six months later the SVT called for the release of all those convicted in connection with the May 2000 incidents. Leaders: Ratu Sitiveni RABUKA (Former Prime Minister), Ema DRUAVESI (Secretary General). Fiji Labour Party (FLP). Launched in July 1985 by leaders of the Fiji Trades Union Congress (FUTC), the FLP presented itself as a “multi-racial political vehicle . . . for all working people,” although drawing most of its support from the IndoFijian community. It outpolled the NFP (below) in winning eight Suva city council seats in November 1985 and subsequently gaining three parliamentary seats held by NFP defectors. For the 1987 campaign the two groups decided to present a joint list. Partly to neutralize potential Alliance claims that an Indo-Fijian might become prime minister as a result of the 1987 balloting, the FLP’s ethnic Fijian leader, Dr. Timoci BAVADRA, was named to head the coalition slate, with the NFP’s Harish SHARMA as his deputy. Both were forced from office by the Rabuka coup. Bavadra died on November 3, 1989, the FLP leadership being assumed by his widow, Adi Kuini Bavadra. In early 1991 Kuini Bavadra announced that she would marry an Australian business leader, Clive SPEED, who had once been a campaign adviser to Prime Minister Mara. In part because of Speed’s former link to the AP, Kuini Bavadra stepped down in April as leader of the NFP/FLP coalition, in favor of her deputy, the NFP’s Sharma; at a party convention in August she was supplanted as FLP president and eventually left the party to join the All National Congress (ANC, under FAP, below). In September 1991 the NFP formally rejected a proposal to merge with the FLP, which subsequently broke with its partner by a decision (ultimately reversed) to boycott the 1992 election. The FLP backed Rabuka for prime minister in June

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1992 after the SVT leader had promised to launch a review of the ethnically biased 1990 constitution; it did not, however, join the de facto ruling coalition and withdrew its support of the Rabuka administration in June 1993. In August 1998 the FLP formed an electoral alliance called the People’s Coalition with the FAP and the PANU (see under PNU, below) that was viewed as presenting a major challenge to the SVT for the 1999 poll. In addition to favoring a multiracial approach to government, the coalition pledged to halt a privatization program that had led to the dismissal of many public sector employees. At the balloting of May 8–15 the FLP obtained a majority of 37 lower house seats, with its leader, Mahendra Pal Chaudhry, serving as prime minister until his ouster after the coup of May 19, 2000. Reinstated on a de jure basis by the Court of Appeal on March 1, 2001, Chaudhry was dismissed by President Iloilo a week after reclaiming the office on March 7. The FLP went on to finish second in the August– September 2001 election but was not invited to join the SDL-controlled government. As a consequence, Chaudhry challenged the government’s legitimacy in court and refused to assume the parliamentary post of opposition leader. Although the courts consistently upheld the FLP’s challenge, a mutually acceptable arrangement with the SDL was never achieved, and on November 24, 2004, Chaudhry announced that the FLP would henceforth lead the parliamentary opposition. In the 2006 legislative poll, the FLP (supported in a People’s Coalition by the UPP, FAP, and PNU, below) finished second to the SDL, with 31 House seats. Leaders: Mahendra Pal CHAUDHRY (Former Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition), Jokapeci KOROI (President), Poseci BUNE (Former Ambassador to the UN). United People’s Party (UPP). In an effort to broaden its appeal, the former United General Party (UGP) changed its name in 2003 to the UPP. The UGP, representing “General Electors” (those not belonging to either the ethnic Fijian or Indo-Fijian

communities), was formed in September 1998 by merger of the General Voters’ Party (GVP) and the smaller General Electors’ Party (GEP). At the May 1999 election the UGP won two parliamentary seats. In May 2001 President David PICKERING was succeeded by Mick Beddoes, and in June Pickering joined the NFP. Beddoes won the party’s only seat at the 2001 general election. In 2002– 2004, while the FLP’s right to join the government remained in the courts, Beddoes served as leader of the opposition in the House. Running in tandem with the FLP in 2006, the UPP won two legislative seats in its own right. Leader: Millis (Mick) BEDDOES (Party Leader). Fijian Association Party (FAP). The FAP was launched in 1995 by merger of the former Fijian Association (FA) and the multiracial All National Congress (ANC). The FA had been formed prior to the 1994 election by a group of SVT dissidents led by former finance minister Josevata KAMIKAMICA, whose objection to the 1994 budget had caused the government’s defeat in November 1993. The new formation was held to only five parliamentary seats in February 1994 and thus was denied a balance-ofpower role in the new house. Kamikamica died in August 1998. The ANC had been organized in mid-1991 by elements of both the former AP and its longtime political rival, the NFP. The FAP joined in the coalition government announced in August 1997 but withdrew from it in November. It contested the May 1999 poll in alliance with the FLP and the PANU (see under PNP, below), FAP leader Adi Kuini SPEED (the widow of former prime minister Timoci Bavadra, who had been ousted in the coup of May 1987) having argued that conditions for ethnic Fijians had deteriorated under the Rabuka regime. The FAP placed second in the legislative poll of May 1999, winning 10 seats. In September 1999, while serving as a deputy prime minister in the Chaudhry government, Speed was removed as party leader by Tu’uakitau Cokanauto’s faction.

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The action was thrown out by the High Court, however, and Speed narrowly prevailed in a party election in October. Differences between the two factions persisted, with the Cokanauto faction announcing in April 2000 that it would no longer cooperate with the government and then in March 2001 reiterating its objection to restoration of the 1997 constitution. The FAP failed to win any seats in 2001. Speed resigned as party leader in November in view of that poor legislative performance. She died in December 2004. Leader: Tu’uakitau COKANAUTO. Party of National Unity (PNU). The PNU was launched in March 2006 as a merger of three groups in Viti Levu’s northern province of Ba, including the People’s National Party (PNP) and its constituent members (one also known, under a slightly different abbreviation, as the Party of National Unity). Establishment of the PNP had been announced in September 2004 by Josaia DUACIA, deputy chair of the Ba Provincial Council. The PNP resulted from the merger of two Ba parties that had competed against each other in 2001, namely the Party of National Unity (PANU), led by Meli BOGILEKA, and the Protector of Fiji (Bai Rei Viti—BKV), led by Ratu Tevita MOMOEDONU. The PANU had been launched in April 1998 to provide greater legislative representation for Ba. For the May 1999 balloting the PANU joined the FLP and FAP to present coalition candidates, winning four House seats. In April 2001 PANU leader Ponipate LEVAVUA joined the SVT’s Rabuka, the FAP’s Speed, FLP leader Tupeni Baba, and Mick Beddoes of the UGP in calling for adherence to the rule of law and a commitment to political multiethnicity. Regarded as one of Fiji’s “moderate” parties, the PANU failed to retain any House seats at the subsequent national election. The PNP’s secretary general previously served the PANU in the same capacity. The BKV was launched in late June 2001 under the leadership of Ratu Tevita Momoedonu, minister of labor under Chaudhry and Qarase (and very briefly acting prime minister in May 2000 and

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March 2001). Among those drawn to the new formation were key members of the Taukei Movement (below), including Minister of Agriculture Apisai TORA, formerly of the PANU. At the 2001 general election the BKV failed to win any parliamentary seats. The PNU contested the 2006 legislative poll as an ally of the FLP. Leader: Tui Ba Ratu Sairusi NAGAGAVORA. National Federation Party (NFP). The NFP was formed in 1963 by A. D. PATEL, Siddiq KOYA, and Jai Ram REDDY as a union of two parties: the Federation, a predominantly ethnic Indian party, and the National Democratic Party, a Fijian party. Most of its support came from the Indo-Fijian community because of its advocacy of the “one man, one vote” principle. At the election of March–April 1977, the NFP increased its parliamentary strength from 19 to 26 seats, but because of internal leadership problems it was unable to form a government. Divisions between so-called “dove” (NFP–D) and “flower” (NFP–F) factions proved disastrous in the September 1977 balloting, with overall representation dropping to 15. In 1982 the party won a total of 22 seats, but factional disputes and leadership issues persisted through mid-decade. The NFP successfully contested the 1987 election in partnership with the FLP but was ousted from ministerial participation by the coup of May 14. In May 1989 it was announced that the NFP and the FLP had agreed to merge, although their subsequent relationship remained that of a coalition (occasionally referenced as the Coalition Party) under the overall leadership of the FLP’s Kuini Bavadra. The coalition itself became moribund in late 1991 after the NFP had voted not to join the FLP’s proposed boycott of the 1992 election. Surprising many observers, the NFP unsuccessfully contested the May 1999 elections in coalition with the then ruling SVT (above). The party’s only successful candidate in the 2001 general election was Prem SINGH, who was named leader of the opposition in the House of Representatives by President Iloilo after the FLP’s Mahendra Chaudhry

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declined that designation. The situation was further complicated in August 2002 when the Supreme Court voided Singh’s legislative victory because of electoral irregularities. At its annual convention in August 2004 the NFP elected a new leadership as part of a restructuring effort. In February 2005 the party’s new general secretary noted that in view of the country’s shrinking Indo-Fijian population the NFP should seek to participate in the government rather than remain outside it. Leaders: Dorsami NAIDU (Leader), Chandhu LODHIA (Treasurer), Pramod RAE (General Secretary). New Labour Unity Party (NLUP). The NLUP was organized in May 2001 by Tupeni BABA, a former deputy prime minister and FLP leader who had become an opponent of Mahendra Chaudhry’s continued leadership. The new formation won two seats at the 2001 general election. Kenneth ZINCK was subsequently named minister of labor by Prime Minister Qarase, but the party leadership moved to expel him because of its opposition to participation in a government that also included George Speight’s CAMV. In March 2006 Baba left the NLUP to join the SDL, after which the NLUP was described as virtually defunct. Taukei Movement (Soqosoqo I Taukei). A “movement” rather than a party, the right-extremist Soqosoqo I Taukei is one of a number of taukei (indigenous) groups formed in the wake of the 1987 military takeover that, in the words of former President Ganilau, had “distorted the essence of the Fijian identity.” In June 1990 some 250 of its adherents demonstrated in Suva to demand the deportation of a number of political opponents and the closure of the Fiji Times for having resorted to “abusive language.” After a period of decline, the Movement was revived in April 2000 under the leadership of Tevita BOLOBOLO and of Apisai TORA, former leader of the PANU, and many of its members supported the May 2000 coup. Despite previous ties to the SVT, a number of the Move-

ment’s leaders backed formation of the BKV (see under PNP) in 2001. Other parties include the Dodonu ni Taukei (DNT), an FAP breakaway led by Dr. Fereti Seru DEWA; the Girmit Heritage Party (GHP), led by Beni SAMI; the Justice and Freedom Party (AIM), led by Dildar SHAH; the Party of the Truth (POTT), led by Nimilote FIFITA; and the Voice of the Rotuman (Lio ‘On Famor Rotuma— LFR), led by Sakumanu PENE. The Fiji Democratic Party (FDP) was formed in September–October 2002 with former foreign minister and SVT leader Felipe BOLE as secretary general. In March 2004 formation of the Social Liberal Multi-Cultural Party was announced by Joketani DELAI. In January 2005 former chair of the Great Council Epeli GANILAU announced the formation of a National Alliance Party of Fiji (NAPF), based on the multiracial model of the defunct Alliance Party, portions of which subsequently merged with the FDP.

Legislature Under the 1970 Constitution, Parliament consisted of an appointed Senate of 22 members serving staggered six-year terms and an elected House of Representatives of 22 Fijian, 22 Indian, and 8 “general” members serving five-year terms, subject to dissolution. Both bodies were suspended in the wake of the May 1987 coup. The 1990 constitution provided for a bicameral legislature that was overtly discriminatory, while its 1997 successor, without restoring ethnic parity, made substantial concessions to Indo-Fijian demands. Senate (Seniti). The 1990 basic law called for a nonelective upper house of 34 seats, 24 for Melanesians nominated by the Great Council of Chiefs, 9 for Indo-Fijians and others, and 1 for inhabitants of Rotuma. Under the 1997 document the chamber’s size was reduced to 32, with the president appointing 14 members nominated on a provincial basis and approved by the Great Council of Chiefs, 9 named by the prime minister, 8 designated by

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Cabinet As of July 1, 2006 Prime Minister

Laisenia Qarase (SDL)

Ministers Agriculture Commerce and Industry Curative Health Service Education, Youth, and Sport Employment Opportunities and Productivity Energy and Mineral Resources Environment Fijian Affairs, Culture, and Heritage Finance and National Planning Fisheries and Forests Foreign Affairs and External Trade Home Affairs and Immigration Information, Communications, and Media Relations Justice Labor and Industrial Relations Lands and Provincial Development Local Government and Urban Development Multi-Ethnic Affairs National Reconciliation and Unity Primary and Preventive Health Services Public Sector Reform Public Utilities and Infrastructure Tourism and Transport Without Portfolio Women, Social Welfare, and Poverty Alleviation Attorney General

Gyani Nand (FLP) Adi Sivia Tora (FLP) Gunasagaran Gounder (FLP) Ro Teimumu Kepa (SDL) [f] Ragho Nand (FLP) Lekh Ram Vayeshnoi (FLP) Poseci Bune (FLP) Laisenia Qarase (SDL) Ratu Jone Kubuabola (SDL) Ilaitia Tuiese (SDL) Kaliopate Tavola (SDL) Josefa Vosanibola (SDL) Isireli Lewenigila (SDL) Qoroniasi Bale (SDL) Krishna Datt (FLP) Naigama Lalabalavu (SDL) Chaitanya Lakshman (FLP) Ratu Meli Saukuru (SDL) Laisenia Qarase (SDL) Udit Narayan (FLP) Savenaca Draunidalo (ind.) Robin Urwin (ind.) Tomasi Vuetilovoni (SDL) Adi Samanunu Talakuli Cakobau (SDL) [f] George Shiu Raj (SDL) Qoriniasi Bale (SDL)

[f] = female

the leader of the opposition, and 1 chosen by the Rotuma Council. The Senate term is concurrent with that of the lower house. Following the August–September 2001 general election, naming of the opposition leader’s nominees was delayed by confusion over who should hold the post. In the end, the National Federation Party’s Prem Singh named nominees proposed by the Fiji Labour Party’s Mahendra Chaudhry, who had declined the position of op-

position leader while seeking his party’s inclusion in the cabinet. Seven of the eight nominees were named in April 2003, with the last being appointed in August 2002. President: Taito WAQAVAKATOGA. House of Representatives (Vale). The 1990 Constitution called for an elective lower house of 70 seats (37 reserved for Melanesians, 27 for Indians, 5 for others, and 1 for the island of Rotuma).

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In 1997 the size of the House was increased to 71, of which 25 were to be open to all races, with 23 reserved for Melanesians, 19 for Indo-Fijians, 3 for general voters, and 1 for Rotuman Islanders. The House term is five years, subject to early dissolution. At the election of May 6–13, 2006, the Fiji United Party won 36 seats; the Fiji Labour Party, 31; the United People’s Party, 2; and independents, 2. Speaker: Ratu Epeli NAILATIKAU.

Communications Freedom of speech and of the press is guaranteed under the 1997 constitution, but such freedoms may be limited by law for reasons that include preserving national security, public safety, public order, and public morality and “preventing attacks on the dignity of individuals, groups, or communities or respected offices or institutions in a manner likely to promote ill will between the races or communities or the oppression of, or discrimination against, any person or persons.”

Press The first three of the following papers are owned by the international media tycoon Rupert Murdoch; all are published in Suva: The Fiji Times (30,000), founded in 1869, in English; Nai Lalakai (20,000), Fijian weekly; Shanti Dut (10,000), Hindi

weekly; Fiji Daily Post, public-private joint ownership, daily, in English; Fiji Sun, daily.

Broadcasting and Computing The Fiji Broadcasting Commission operates several FM and AM radio stations broadcasting in English, Fijian, and Hindustani to approximately 520,000 receivers; in addition, the privately held Communications (Fiji) Ltd. currently broadcasts in English, Fijian, and Hindi from separate FM outlets. In 1994 domestic TV transmissions were launched by Fiji Television Limited; two companies currently provide subscription services. In 2003 there were approximately 98,000 TV receivers and 50,000 personal computers serving 60,000 Internet users.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. Jesoni VITUSAGAVULU U.S. Ambassador to Fiji Larry Miles DINGER Permanent Representative to the UN Isikia Rabici SAVUA IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, CP, CWTH, Interpol, PC, PCA, PIF, WCO, WTO

Note: After a tense period of discussions with the government and threats to topple the government, Cmdr. Frank Bainimarama led a coup that deposed Prime Minister Qarase on December 5, 2006.

FRANCE FRENCH REPUBLIC R´e publique Fran¸c aise

Related Territories Overseas Countries The classification “overseas country” (pays d’outre-mer) was established to recognize New Caledonia’s unique constitutional status under 1998’s Noum´ea Accord between Paris and what was then the overseas territory of New Caledonia. French Polynesia was recategorized as an overseas country in 2004. French Polynesia (Polyn´esie Fran¸caise). Scattered over a wide expanse of the South Pacific, the 35 islands and 83 atolls of French Polynesia (comprising the Austral [Tubuai] Islands, the Gambier Islands, the Marquesas Archipelago, the Society Archipelago, and the Tuamotu Archipelago) have a combined area of 1,622 square miles (4,200 sq. km.) and a population of 260,000 (2005E), of whom approximately 27,000 are settled at the territorial capital, Papeete (Tahiti). The economy relies heavily on tourism, with additional earnings coming from the harvesting of black pearls, the sale of commercial fishing licenses, and the export of coconut products. Under legislation approved in 2004, local executive responsibilities are vested in a Council of Ministers headed by a president responsible to the Assembly of French Polynesia, which is directly elected for a five-year term. The territory is represented in the French Parliament by one senator (two as of 2007) and two National Assembly deputies. At present, the strongest party is the People’s Front (Tahoera’a Huira’atira—TH), which operated as a local section of the metropolitan RPR.

It long favored internal self-government under French sovereignty. Led by Gaston FLOSSE, the TH was in opposition in 1986–1991 to a coalition ´ headed by Alexandre LEONTIEFF, leader of Te Tiaraama (formed by TH dissidents). At the Territorial Assembly poll of March 17, 1991, the TH secured a plurality, enabling it to form a coalition government with the support of the small ´ New Land (Ai’a Api) party led by Emile VERNAUDON. By the end of the year, however, Ai’a Api had been replaced as the junior coalition partner by the Autonomous Patriotic Party (Pupu Here Ai’a Te Nuneao Ia Ora), led by Jean JUVENTIN. On April 1, 1992, Territorial President Flosse was given a suspended six-month prison sentence by a Paris court after being convicted of sanctioning an illegal land deal during a previous term of office. Upheld on appeal in November 1992, the verdict against Flosse provoked calls for his resignation and new territorial elections, as well as a confrontation between Flosse and Territorial Assembly President Vernaudon. As a result of the dispute, the latter was forced from office and succeeded by Juventin. In the March 1993 general election, Flosse and Juventin obtained French Polynesia’s two National Assembly seats, both standing under the banner of the metropolitan RPR. Flosse was returned outright in the first round, whereas Juventin was taken to a runoff ballot by Oscar Temaru, leader of the proindependence People’s Servant/Liberation Front of Polynesia (Tavini Huira’atira/Front de Lib´eration de la Polyn´esie—FLP). Flosse’s conviction was eventually overturned in September 1994.

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Under a ten-year agreement approved in November 1993, French Polynesia was to receive some $620 million in aid from the metropolitan government in the period 1994–1998. The intention was to facilitate diversification of the territory’s economy and compensate for the financial losses arising from the suspension of French nuclear testing, which had first been announced by Premier B´er´egovoy in April 1992. The resumption of French nuclear tests in September 1995 sparked protest demonstrations and serious violence in Papeete, eliciting a firm response from French security forces. In November 1995 the Territorial Assembly adopted a bill providing for greater autonomy for French Polynesia, in such areas as transportation, communications, the offshore economic zone, and fishing rights. France retained responsibility for defense and security as well as judicial oversight in the accord, which was approved by the French National Assembly in December and entered into effect in April 1996. The TH secured a majority of 22 seats (out of 41) in the May 1996 balloting for the Territorial Assembly, with Tavini Huira’atira finishing second with 10 seats on the strength of its appeal to opponents of the recent nuclear testing. Oscar Temaru won 42 percent of the vote in the French National Assembly race in 1997, although the two right-wing incumbents were reelected. Temaru subsequently petitioned the South Pacific Forum to support efforts to have French Polynesia reinstated on the UN’s decolonization agenda. France began dismantling the Mururoa nuclear test site in 1997, and the project was completed in mid-1998. Serious questions remained, however, over the environmental impact of the testing, the possible exposure of the population to radiation, and the apparent widespread use of underage workers at the site. In the context of continuing discussions on greater autonomy, local balloting on May 6, 2001, to an expanded, 49-seat Territorial Assembly again produced a majority for the TH list, which won 28 seats. The separatist Tavini Huira’atira won 11 seats; the New Star (Fe’tia Api) list of Boris ´ LEONTIEFF, 7; and others, 3. As a result, the TH’s

Flosse was elected to a fifth term as president of the government, despite a conviction in 1999 for accepting bribes (on behalf of his party, he asserted) from an illegal gambling operation. Upon appeal, in mid-2001 a Paris court ruled in his favor. At the French National Assembly election of June 2002 two TH candidates, both running under the banner of President Chirac’s new Union for a Presidential Majority (UMP, subsequently the Union for a Popular Movement), were elected: Papeete Mayor Michel BUILLARD won reelection and was joined by B´eatrice VERNAUDON, who ´ easily defeated the incumbent, Emile Vernaudon. Temaru’s Tavini Huira’atira boycotted the balloting. In March 2003, as specified by French constitutional revisions, French Polynesia was reclassified from overseas territory to overseas collectivity, with the provision that additional autonomy could be granted by legislative action. A statute to that effect was passed by the Senate in December 2003 and the National Assembly in January 2004, with the Constitutional Council approving the Autonomy Act for French Polynesia in February. Accordingly, French Polynesia became an overseas country, like New Caledonia, on March 3, 2004. A month later the Polynesian legislature was dissolved, which averted a vote of no confidence that had been filed against President Flosse by the FLP. Balloting for the new, 57-member Assembly of French Polynesia was held on May 23, 2004, but a near-stalemate resulted. Flosse’s UMP-allied TH won 28 seats and Temaru’s newly organized coalition, the Union for Democracy (Union pour la D´emocratie—UPLD), won 27, including 24 seats in the Windward Islands of Tahiti and Moorea. The balance of power was thus held by Nicole BOUTEAU of the This Country Is Yours (No Oe E Te Nunaa—NOETN) party and New Star’s Philippe SCHYLE, who had become party president as a consequence of Boris L´eontieff’s death in a 2002 plane crash. Elected president by the legislature on June 15, Temaru indicated his intention to move French Polynesia toward a goal of independence within 20 years. Temaru’s hold on the office proved tenuous, however, as differences within the governing

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coalition over cabinet portfolios contributed to the departure of Hiro TEFAARERE and other dissidents in September. As a consequence, Temaru lost a no-confidence motion 29–0 on October 10, and on October 23 the assembly named Flosse to assume the presidency once again. The issue of whether to conduct a new legislative election, as advocated by Temaru, was complicated on November 15 by a Council of State ruling that electioneering violations justified nullifying the May election results for the 37 Windward Islands seats. By-elections in the 37 constituencies were held on February 13, 2005, with the UPLD, now encompassing seven parties, winning 25 seats, which thereby gave the UPLD and Flosse’s TH a 27–27 split in the assembly. In the meantime, Bouteau and Schyle had joined forces in the Alliance for a New Democracy (Alliance pour la D´emocratie Nouvelle—ADN), which held 3 seats. Shortly thereafter Flosse lost a no-confidence motion and then stepped aside as his party’s presidential candidate. Temaru, by a vote of 29–26, was reelected president on March 3, defeating the TH’s new candidate, Gaston Tong SANG. By the end of 2005 Flosse’s TH had seen its legislative caucus drop to 21 members. Former party leader Jean-Christopher BOISSOU, following a dispute with Flosse, had announced formation of the Rautahi party, while several other TH members had become independents. During the same period, Oscar Temaru was repeatedly criticized by the opposition for proindependence statements. In late March 2006 Temaru presented the visiting French minister of overseas territories, Fran¸cois Baroin, with a plan for devolution, the “Tahiti Nui Accords,” modeled on New Caledonia’s Noum´ea Accord. In January 2006 President Temaru disbanded the Polynesia Intervention Group (Groupement d’Intervention de la Polynesie—GIP), a 1,300person quasi-security force that had been established in the mid-1990s by Flosse to assist in national and regional disaster relief but had since taken on additional land and maritime responsibilities. Several times during 2005 some 300 GIP militants had blockaded the port of Papeete and its industrial zone over a disputed employment contract.

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High Commissioner: Anne BOQUET. President of the Government: Oscar TEMARU (UPLD). ´ Speaker of the Assembly: Antony GEROS (UPLD). New Caledonia (Nouvelle-Cal´edonie). A group of islands covering 7,375 square miles (19,000 sq. km.) in the Pacific Ocean east of Queensland, Australia, New Caledonia has a population (2005E) of 237,000, of whom about 93,000 reside in Noum´ea, the jurisdiction’s capital. The largest ethnic group is Melanesian, followed by those of European origin. New Caledonia is presently represented in the French Parliament by two deputies and one senator, although a second senator is to be added in 2010. An important mining center, the territory possesses some of the world’s largest nickel reserves; the metal accounts for 90 percent of export earnings. A long-term economic development plan, which included a proviso that the territory could not become independent for at least 19 years, was approved by the Territorial Assembly in February 1979. In an assembly election the following July that was widely interpreted as a referendum on the issue, the Independence Front (Front Ind´ependantiste—FI), encompassing a group of parties demanding the severance of all links to France, obtained a little over one-third of the vote. Subsequently, the FI succeeded in concluding a legislative coalition with the autonomist Federation for a New Caledonian Society (F´ed´eration pour une Nouvelle Soci´et´e Cal´edonienne—FNSC), which had theretofore been allied with the antiindependence Rally for Caledonia in the Republic (Rassemblement pour la Cal´edonie dans la R´epublique—RPCR). In June 1982 the new de facto majority ousted the RPCR-led government and installed an FI-led “government of reform and development” headed by Jean-Marie TJIBAOU. The change in government without an intervening election precipitated widespread demonstrations by right-wing elements, who invaded the Territorial Assembly chamber in July, injuring three FI deputies. Following a restoration of order, the high commissioner announced that a new

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constitution for New Caledonia, to be promulgated by mid-1983, would give the territory increased internal autonomy. Under the proposed statute of autonomy, as presented by the French government in March 1983, substantial powers would be transferred from the French high commissioner to a new territorial government headed by a president, who would be elected by the Territorial Assembly and empowered to name his own ministers. At the conclusion of an all-party conference near Paris in mid-July, the FI and the FNSC accepted the French offer on the basis of an anticipated vote on self-determination that would be confined to Melanesians and other New Caledonians with at least one parent born in the territory. The RPCR, dominated by planters, declared its opposition to any reform that excluded persons other than French military and civil service personnel from the franchise. In July 1984 the French National Assembly approved the autonomy statute, without, however, calling for electoral reform. As a result, the FI position hardened into a demand that the vote be confined exclusively to Melanesians (approximately 45 percent of the total population). Subsequently, the FI joined with a number of other proindependence groups in forming a Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front (Front de Lib´eration Nationale Kanak Socialiste—FLNKS). The FLNKS boycotted the November legislative balloting, at which the RPCR won 71 percent of the vote and 34 of 42 seats. One week later, amid mounting acts of terrorism and the deaths of a number of separatists, the FLNKS announced the formation of a provisional Kanaki government under Tjibaou’s presidency. During 1985 a number of new proposals for resolving the controversy were advanced, including a plan advocated by French Premier Fabius whereby four regional councils would be established. The members would sit collectively as a Territorial Congress, replacing the existing Territorial Assembly. The Fabius plan was immediately condemned as “iniquitous” by the RPCR, but it was tentatively accepted by the FLNKS as strengthening the movement toward independence. The plan was subsequently approved by the French National

Assembly, and balloting for the regional bodies was conducted in September. The RPCR, which reluctantly agreed to participate, secured 25 of 46 seats in the congress despite winning a majority only in the heavily populated but largely non-Melanesian Noum´ea region. Following the Socialist defeat in the French National Assembly balloting of March 1986, the situation changed dramatically. Criticizing the regional council arrangement as “badly conceived, badly organized, and badly prepared,” Bernard Pons, the new minister for overseas departments and territories, advanced a plan under which the councils would be limited to responsibility for local public works and cultural matters. After extensive debate, the proposal to return effective political and economic authority to the high commissioner received parliamentary approval. As a consequence, in August the South Pacific Forum, supported by the FLNKS, recommended that New Caledonia be restored to the UN’s list of non-self-governing territories. Despite intense pressure by France, which indicated that it would ignore such action, the UN General Assembly voted overwhelming to do so in December. In the face of an FLNKS boycott, an independence referendum conducted in September 1987 yielded a 98 percent vote in favor of remaining within the republic. A month later, Pons introduced a new “autonomy statute” that by means of boundary redefinition left the FLNKS dominant in two, rather than three, of the four regions. Subsequently, in balloting for a new Territorial Congress (conducted in conjunction with the first-round French presidential poll in April 1988), the RPCR won 35 of 48 seats. Following the Socialists’ return to power in June 1988, the Rocard government concluded an agreement with pro- and anti-independence forces on a plan whereby the French government, through its high commissioner, would administer the territory for a year, in the course of which New Caledonia would be divided into three new autonomous regions, one (in the south) dominated by settlers and two (in the north and in the Loyalty Islands) by Kanaks. The arrangement, to commence on July 14, 1989, would remain in effect for a ten-year

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period, prior to the conclusion of which a territorywide referendum on independence would be held. The “Matignon Accord” ultimately received the FLNKS’s backing and was approved by both territorial and mainland voters in November, although turnout by the latter was an unimpressive 37 percent. Hard-line separatists subsequently branded the 1988 pact as a sellout to the colonists, and in May 1989 FLNKS leader Tjibaou and his deputy, Yeiwene YEIWENE, were assassinated during a tribal ceremony on the island of Ouv´ea. Despite the bloodshed, elections to provincial assemblies for the three regions were conducted, as scheduled, on June 11, 1989, with the RPCR winning in the south and the FLNKS ahead elsewhere. Nine days later, balloting was held for the presidency of a restructured Territorial Congress with limited powers and an RPCR majority. Although he headed one of the FLNKS’s relatively hard-line components, Tjibaou’s succes´ sor, Paul NEAOUTYINE, called in early 1990 for the coalition to redirect its immediate energies to economic development. He also indicated that as part of its effort to bring all proindependence groups into a single organization, the FLNKS would not rule out talks with the extremist United Kanak Liberation Front (Front Uni de Lib´eration Kanak—FULK), which had rejected the 1988 accord and whose leader, Yann C´el´en´e UREGEI, had left New Caledonia in the wake of the Tjibaou assassination. Earlier, however, Nido¨ısh NAISSELINE, leader of the equally radical Kanak Socialist Liberation (Lib´eration Kanak Socialiste— LKS), had announced that the LKS would join the FULK in a front with a structure paralleling that of the FLNKS. In the July 1995 provincial balloting the RPCR retained a majority in the Territorial Congress and the FLNKS again took second place. Under the new leadership of Rock WAMYTAN of the Caledonian Union (Union Cal´edonienne—UC), the FLNKS in February 1996 agreed that a consensus proposal on the territory’s future, rather than the stark options of independence or continued French territorial status, would be put to a referendum in 1998. The FLNKS withdrew from discussions with

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the French government several months later, however, partly because Paris had removed full independence from the list of possible outcomes. Negotiations resumed sporadically later in the year and in 1997, but no progress was achieved as attention focused on a major dispute over the proposed opening of a new nickel smelter in the north. French insistence that the facility could be opened only after the autonomy issue was resolved was viewed as “blackmail” by some FLNKS elements and engendered suspicion that France would ultimately be unwilling to turn valuable mineral rights over to local control. As a result of the conflict, the FLNKS boycotted the French National Assembly balloting in May–June 1997, at which the two RPCR incumbents were reelected, and blockaded nickel operations in the south for much of 1997. Some FLNKS elements questioned its tactics, however, which resulted in formation of the Federation of Independence Coordination Committees (F´ed´eration des Comit´es de Coordination des Ind´ependantistes— FCCI). On April 21, 1998, representatives of the FLNKS and RPCR concluded an agreement with French officials providing for a period of “shared sovereignty” during which power would gradually devolve to the island. A final referendum on the question of independence would be held in 15–20 years. The “Noum´ea Accord” was formally signed on May 5 during a ceremony in the capital attended by French Prime Minister Jospin, and the French Parliament endorsed the pact on July 6. A referendum in New Caledonia on November 8 produced a resounding 72 percent “yes” vote, despite opposition from the local branch of the National Front (FN) and other right-wing parties. The French National Assembly approved the required implementing legislation in December, followed by the Senate in February 1999. Elections were subsequently scheduled for early May for three new provincial assemblies, which were authorized to select a proportion of their members as a new Congress of New Caledonia. In turn, the Congress was scheduled to elect a new island government, headed by a president, to assume some of the powers previously exercised by the administration of the French high commissioner.

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In balloting for provincial assemblies on May 9, 1999, the RPCR secured a majority in South Province, while proindependence alliances won majorities in North Province and the Loyalty Islands. The provincial assemblies subsequently chose the new 54-member Congress, with the RPCR holding 24 seats; the FLNKS, 12; two FLNKS constituent groups, the National Union for Independence (Union Nationale pour l’Ind´ependance—UNI) and the Kanak Liberation Party (Parti de Lib´eration Kanak—Palika), 6; the FCCI, 4; the local branch of the FN, headed by Guy GEORGE, 4; Didier LEROUX’s Alliance for Caledonia (Alliance pour la Cal´edonie—APLC), 3; and the LKS, 1. With the RPCR and the FCCI having established a congressional alliance, the ` RPCR’s Jean LEQUES emerged as president of the proportionally balanced government. Although the FLNKS took control of four ministries, to seven for the RPCR/FCCI, the FLNKS’s Wamytan was bypassed for vice president in favor of the FCCI’s ´ E. ´ L´eopold JOREDI Disagreements over the power-sharing arrangement persisted, however, which contributed to President L`eques’s decision to step down following the March 2001 provincial elections. On April 3 the Congress elected the RPCR’s Pierre FROGIER to head a new government in which the FLNKS’s D´ew´e GORODEY assumed the vice presidency. With the UC and Palika in conflict over leadership of the FLNKS, Wamytan subsequently lost the Front’s presidency. At balloting for the French National Assembly in June 2002 the two incumbents were returned under the banner of President Chirac’s new Union for the Presidential Majority (UMP). In runoff balloting Pierre Frogier defeated the FLNKS’s Paul N´eaoutyine, and Jacques LAFLEUR defeated the APLC’s Didier Leroux. Meanwhile, the government was increasingly beset by internal policy disputes, which ultimately led to its dissolution and reorganization in November 2002, again under the leadership of Frogier. In the new Council of Ministers the RPCR-FCCI coalition remained dominant, holding seven of the ten ministerial posts, to two for the FLNKS and one for the UC.

A July 2003 visit by French President Chirac was met by a series of public protests by trade unionists and independence supporters. The May 9, 2004, assembly elections saw a new proautonomy party, the Future Together (Avenir Ensemble—AE), unseat the RPCR in the south, winning 19 seats to 16 for the RPCR and then forming a provincial government with the support of the FN, which had won the remaining 4 seats. (None of the proindependence parties had met the 5 percent threshold needed for representation under the proportional distribution system.) In Northern Province the proindependence parties continued to dominate, led by the UNI and the UC, while in the Loyalty Islands the assembly’s 14 seats were split among six parties. In the resultant Congress the AE and RPCR each held 16 seats, followed by the UNI-FLNKS, 8; the UC, 7; the FN, 4; the UCCI, 1; the LKS, 1; and the Renewed Caledonian Union (Union Cal´edonienne Renouvea—UCR), 1. Under the Noum´ea Accord, parties with at least six congressional seats are entitled to participate in the power-sharing government, which resulted in a virtual three-way tie among the RPCR (four ministries), the proautonomy AE (four), and the proindependence parties (three). On June 10, 2004, the new government elected the AE’s Marie-No¨elle Th´emereau to serve as its president, but within hours three RPCR ministers had resigned, forcing dissolution of the government. On June 29 Th´emereau won sufficient votes to resume the presidency, with the FLNKS’s Gorodey again being named vice president. The first half of 2006 was marked by differences over construction of a $2 billion nickel and cobalt processing plant that has been called the biggest industrial project in the South Pacific. Kanak indigenous groups have sought to stop the project, which, they asserted, did not adequately address environmental concerns and had been improperly licensed. Some 3,000 Filipino workers were to be employed during construction. High Commissioner: Michel MATHIEU. President of the Government: Marie-No¨elle ´ THEMEREAU (AE). President of the Congress: Harold MARTIN (AE).

GEORGIA Sakartvelo

The Country Located in western Caucasia, Georgia is bordered on the north and northeast by Russia, on the southeast by Azerbaijan, on the south by Armenia and Turkey, and on the west by the Black Sea. It includes three Muslim-dominated areas: the autonomous republic of Abkhazia on the northwestern border with Russia, the autonomous republic of Ajaria on the southwestern border with Turkey, and the autonomous region of South Ossetia on the north-central border with Russia. (Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been the source of conflict with the central government throughout most of the 1990s and into the 2000s; see Political background and Current issues, below.) Approximately 70 percent of the population is Georgian, 8 percent Armenian, 6 percent ethnic Russian, 6 percent Azerbaijani, 3 percent Ossetian, and 2 percent Abkhazian. Orthodox Christianity is the predominant religion; it has also played an increasingly important political role in recent years as a voice of nationalist sentiment and, in the opinion of some critics, as a source of intolerance toward religious minorities. The country’s terrain is largely mountainous, with a subtropical region adjacent to the Black Sea that supports the production of tea, tobacco, grapes (Georgian wines are highly prized in Russia and elsewhere), and citrus fruits. Mineral resources include manganese, coal, oil, and peat. There also is abundant hydroelectric capacity. Industrial output includes iron and steel, chemicals, machine tools, plastics, and paper. Overall, Georgia’s combination of fertile land, scenic coastline, and deep cultural background provide what one journalist recently described as “all the ingredients for a rich and prosperous nation.”

However, domestic turmoil and political transition yielded an economic decline of more than 60 percent in 1990–1994 (including large drops in industrial production and agricultural output), accompanied by hyperinflation of around 10,000 percent in 1993 and 7,400 percent in 1994. Remedial action recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) began to produce results in 1995, notably a fall in the inflation rate to 65 percent and output contraction of only 5 percent. Robust GDP growth (11 percent) was recorded in both 1996 and 1997. Double-digit growth also was anticipated for 1998, but conditions were severely compromised by the Russian financial crisis of that year. Consequently, GDP growth of only 2.9 percent, 3.0 percent, and

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1.9 percent was achieved in 1998, 1999, and 2000, respectively, with inflation registering 10.7 percent, 10.9 percent, and 4.6 percent for the same years. In 1998 the IMF complimented the Georgian government for its reform of the banking sector and privatization campaign, particularly in regard to the sale of land and agricultural enterprises. However, the IMF said “daunting challenges” remained to be addressed and encouraged the administration to reduce spending and increase tax revenues. As was the case for many former Soviet republics, however, such directives conflicted, at least in the short term, with the administration’s efforts to combat pervasive (and persistent) poverty. The economy was described in 2001 as having “hit rock bottom,” with more than half of the population living below the poverty line in a country that had been one of the most prosperous republics in the USSR. Problems included widespread corruption, an “old-style” (i.e., Soviet) mentality among government leaders, faltering legal reform, and the plight of an estimated 260,000 refugees of Georgian ethnicity who had fled the civil war in Abkhazia in 1992–1993. However, significant assistance continued to arrive from Western capitals, particularly Washington, which had provided more than $1 billion since independence in an effort to shift Georgia away from Russian influence. On the other hand, private foreign investors remained generally wary, although great attention was given to the proposed construction of an oil pipeline from Azerbaijan through Georgia to a port in Turkey (see article on Azerbaijan for details). Transit fees from the pipeline were expected to have an immediate positive impact on the stalled Georgian economy. (The pipeline was opened in mid-2006.) Georgia remained one of the poorest of the former Soviet republics in the early 2000s, and the economy continued to suffer from the civil strife that preceded the ouster of President Eduard SHEVARDNADZE in 2003. Problems included the failure of the tax collection system and widespread corruption of public officials. In 2004 the IMF approved a three-year loan to Georgia under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility. Georgia also won pledges of aid of $1 bil-

lion for 2004–2006 at an international donors’ conference in Brussels. The biggest contributor was the United States with $360 million. Russia did not make any pledges but promised to reschedule Georgia’s debt burden. The new government installed in 2004 implemented broad structural reforms designed to revive the economy through, among other things, the extensive privatization of state-run enterprises and the introduction of a simplified tax system. The administration also launched an anticorruption drive with the goal of reducing the role of the “gray” economy (estimated at that point to be responsible for 80 percent of economic activity). GDP grew by 9.3 percent in 2004 and 7.7 percent (estimated) in 2005, and by 2006 the government was broadly praised for having fostered the return of basic services to the population and having increased tax collections fourfold. However, despite such progress, foreign investors reportedly remained wary of the “frozen conflicts” in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which also were seen as hindering Georgia’s goals for accession to the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The IMF also continued to call for judicial reform, particularly in regard to the protection of property rights.

Government and Politics Political Background Absorbed by Russia in the early 19th century, Georgia proclaimed its independence in May 1918, with Soviet recognition being extended two years later. However, in February 1921, after having been overrun by the Red Army, Georgia was proclaimed a Soviet republic. In 1922 it entered the USSR as a component of the Transcaucasian Federated Soviet Republic, and in 1936 it became a separate union republic. At balloting in October–November 1990 for the Georgian Supreme Soviet, a proindependence Round Table–Free Georgia coalition secured a parliamentary majority, and on December 8 the Georgian Communist Party withdrew from the

GEORGIA

Political Status: Formerly the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, a constituent republic of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR); renamed Republic of Georgia on November 14, 1990; declared independence on April 9, 1991; became sovereign member of the Commonwealth of Independent States on March 1, 1994; renamed Georgia under new constitution promulgated on October 17, 1995. (The autonomous republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia have unilaterally declared their independence and have defied Georgia’s political and military efforts to integrate them into the national structure. However, their independent status has not been recognized by any other country.) Area: 26,900 sq. mi. (69,700 sq. km.). Population: 4,371,535 (2002C); 4,491,000 (2005E). While the 2002 figure excludes the population of South Ossetia (included in the 2005 estimate), an overall decline of more than 1 million since the 1989 census of 5,443,350 is attributed largely to the emigration of working-age people and has been termed a “demographic catastrophe” by local immigration authorities.

Communist Party of the Soviet Union, announcing that it would seek Georgia’s secession from the USSR. In January 1991 the Supreme Soviet voted to establish a 20,000-member National Guard, and on April 9 it declared the country’s independence. Five days later it named its chair, Zviad GAMSAKHURDIA, to the new post of executive president of the republic. On May 26 Gamsakhurdia retained the post by winning 87 percent of the vote in Georgia’s first direct presidential poll. However, opponents had already criticized his “dictatorial” tendencies, and on August 18, immediately prior to the attempted Moscow coup, Prime Minister Tengiz SIGUA resigned, with Gamsakhurdia assuming personal control of the foreign, interior, and justice ministries, as well as of the republican security force. On September 16 the leader of the opposition National Democratic Party (NDP), Georgi CHANTURIA, was arrested as he tried to leave the country. Other arrests followed, and on September 24 Gamsakhurdia declared a state of emergency. Vi-

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Major Urban Center (2005E): TBILISI (1,037,000). Official Language: Georgian (Abkhazian is recognized in Abkhazia). Monetary Unit: Lari (official rate July 1, 2006: 1.77 lari = $1US). President: Mikhail SAAKASHVILI (National Movement–Democrats); popularly elected on January 4, 2004, and sworn in for a five-year term on January 25 succeeding Nino BURDJANADZE, who had been declared interim president on November 23, 2003, by opposition leaders participating in the ouster of Eduard Amvrosiyevich (Georgi) SHEVARDNADZE (Citizens’ Union of Georgia). Prime Minister: Zurab NOGHAIDELI; nominated by the president on February 9, 2005, and approved by the parliament on February 17 to succeed Zurab ZHVANIA, who had died on February 3. (President Saakashvili had assumed the prime minister’s responsibilities on an interim basis following Zhvania’s death.)

olence nonetheless intensified, culminating in fullscale armed conflict in late December. On January 2, 1992, after meeting with opposition party leaders, rebel commanders Dzhaba IOSELIANI and Tengiz KITOVANI announced the deposition of the president (who subsequently fled to Armenia) and the establishment of a ruling Military Council. On March 6 Eduard Shevardnadze, who had served for 13 years as first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party before being named Soviet foreign minister, returned to Georgia. On March 10 he was named chair of a State Council, whose 50 members included virtually all of the anti-Gamsakhurdia leadership, including Tengiz Sigua, who was reappointed to his former position as nominal head of government. In national elections on October 11, Shevardnadze received a 95 percent popular mandate as head of state, while simultaneous legislative balloting yielded seats for over 30 parties and alliances, none gaining a decisive advantage.

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In addition to the struggle for control of Georgia’s central administration, the republic was racked by ethnic strife in the early 1990s. In September 1990 the Supreme Soviet of the autonomous oblast (region) of South Ossetia, in a move branded as invalid by its Georgian counterpart, proclaimed itself a full Union republic independent of Tbilisi. In January 1991 USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev issued a decree annulling the region’s act of secession, and in March President Gamsakhurdia and Russian President Boris Yeltsin agreed to establish a joint GeorgianRussian militia to disarm Georgian and Ossetian paramilitary groups, which had become engaged in what was termed a “mini-civil war.” The conflict nonetheless continued, with Yeltsin rejecting appeals for South Ossetia’s inclusion within the Russian Federation on the basis of union with North Ossetia. A referendum on January 19, 1992, in which an overwhelming majority of South Ossetians voted for integration with its Russian counterpart, was rejected by Georgia’s new Military Council as “a blatant attempt to violate the territorial integrity of a sovereign state.” During the first half of 1992, intermittent fighting continued between government and proGamsakhurdia forces, particularly in western Georgia, where the former president’s supporters were entrenched. Tbilisi’s problems were compounded on July 23, when Abkhazia’s Supreme Soviet proclaimed the republic’s “state sovereignty,” an action that the Georgian State Council immediately branded as null and void. Although the area’s inhabitants were only 18 percent Abkhaz (as contrasted with 46 percent Georgian), the conflict continued. A cease-fire in early September failed to halt an intensification of the struggle during early 1993, with rebel forces being repulsed during a three-day effort to capture the governmentoccupied capital, Sukhumi, in mid-March. During the offensive, Shevardnadze denounced the participation of “thousands of Russian troops” on the Abkhazian side. The charge drew an admission from Moscow that some Russians might be involved; however, Moscow argued that the Russians were being used by President Yeltsin’s hard-line opponents to destabilize the Caucasian region.

On August 5, 1993, Prime Minister Sigua resigned, and on August 10 he was replaced by Otar PATSATSIA. Three days later Shevardnadze met with Yeltsin to arrange for “final settlement” of the Abkhazian conflict, while the UN Security Council agreed on August 25 to dispatch a team of military observers to monitor a cease-fire that had been concluded on July 27. However, the Abkhazis responded with renewed hostilities that on September 27 yielded the capture of Sukhumi. Subsequently, forces loyal to former president Gamsakhurdia overran a number of strategic towns in western Georgia, including the Black Sea port of Poti. Russian units were then deployed to secure road and rail links cut off by the “Zviadists,” and most of the area was recaptured. On December 31 Gamsakhurdia was reported to have committed suicide after a rebel band he was leading was surrounded by government troops. On December 1, 1993, the government and its Abkhazian opponents signed an agreement in Geneva that seemed to pave the way for peace in the war-torn former Soviet republic. It provided for a cease-fire, the deployment of a team of international observers, the drafting of proposals on the future of Abkhazia by a team of representatives of the UN and the Conference on (later Organization for) Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE), the return of refugees, and an exchange of prisoners. During second-round talks in Geneva on January 11–13, 1994, it was decided that Russian troops, acting for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), would be deployed as a buffer between Georgian and Abkhazian forces. Two weeks later, during a Russian-Georgian summit in Tbilisi (hailed by Shevardnadze as “one of the major events in 200 years of history between our two peoples”), a memorandum was signed authorizing the establishment of three Russian military bases within Georgia. Georgian and Abkhazian officials concluded a further agreement in Moscow on April 4, 1994, that reaffirmed the December 1993 accord, while asserting, in principle, that Abkhazia should be granted the status of an autonomous republic within Georgia. However, the basic conflict of aspirations was again evident in November when the

GEORGIA

Abkhazian legislature adopted a new constitution enshrining the republic’s self-declared sovereignty and elected its chair, Vladislav ARDZINBA, as president, drawing protests from the United States, the UN, and Russia, all of which continued to recognize Georgian sovereignty over the region. Earlier, in November 1993, President Shevardnadze had sought to broaden his political base by launching the Citizens’ Union of Georgia (CUG), while in May 1994 a “declaration of national unity and accord” was signed by 34 parties and groups, including the opposition NDP. Nevertheless, the president continued to face fierce nationalist opposition to his policy of rapprochement with Moscow and acceptance of Abkhazian autonomy. One casualty of the deadly hostilities was NDP leader Chanturia, who was assassinated in Tbilisi on December 3. In January 1995 government forces successfully resisted an advance by members of the National Liberation Front (NLF) intended to “liberate” Abkhazia, with Tengiz Kitovani being arrested for leading the attempt. In May the government made another effort to confront the NLFassociated Mkhedrioni paramilitaries, now led by Dzhaba Ioseliani. The unremitting violence of Georgian politics was highlighted by a bomb attack on Shevardnadze on August 29, 1995, while he was en route to sign a new presidential constitution approved by the legislature five days earlier. He escaped with minor injuries, and the constitution was duly promulgated on October 17 amid a security crackdown and the dismissal of the security minister, Igor GIORGADZE, who was named as one of three instigators of the bombing (all of whom were believed to have fled to Russia). The complete disbandment of the Mkhedrioni was announced on October 1, with Ioseliani being arrested on November 15 and charged with complicity in the assassination attempt. (Ioseliani was sentenced in November 1998 to 11 years in prison following his conviction on charges related to the attack, as well as a count of armed robbery.) The breakaway Abkhazian parliament categorically rejected the definition of Abkhazia as part of Georgia in the new Georgian constitution of Au-

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gust 1995, and the separatists boycotted the Georgian parliamentary balloting of November. However, despite the continuing instability, presidential and parliamentary elections went ahead peacefully, and to all appearances fairly, on November 5, 1995, followed by a second legislative round on November 19 and further balloting for unfilled seats on December 3. Standing as candidate of both his own CUG and the Socialist Party of Georgia (SPG), Shevardnadze easily won the presidential contest against five other candidates, obtaining 76.8 percent of the popular vote. The legislative elections yielded a substantial plurality for the CUG, with the seats won by allied parties ensuring a commanding pro-Shevardnadze majority. A new government appointed on December 11 included Nikoloz LEKISHVILI (former mayor of Tbilisi) as minister of state, the next highest political post after the president. Meanwhile, having denounced the inclusion in the new Georgian Parliament of the 12 Abkhazian deputies elected in 1992, Abkhazia conducted elections to its own 35-member People’s Assembly in November 1996, the Georgian government and legislature condemning the balloting as illegal. (The Georgian administration announced that it had polled the ethnic Georgian refugees from Abkhazia and that over 99 percent of them were opposed to the separatist initiative.) Brokered by Moscow and the OSCE, a security and confidence-building accord was initialed by Georgian and South Ossetian representatives on April 17, 1996, yielding direct talks in September between Shevardnadze and the chair of the South Ossetian legislature, Ludvig CHIBIROV. However, tension rose again when the South Ossetians held a direct presidential election on November 10 (returning Chibirov on a separatist platform), despite the Georgian government’s dismissal of the exercise as illegal. Negotiations with Abkhazia stalled in 1997, despite mediation efforts by Russia, the UN, and Western powers. Shevardnadze and Abkhaz President Ardzinba signed a nonaggression pact on August 15 but could agree on little else. Tbilisi favored replacing the CIS force with an international one organized by the UN, but Abkhazia would not consent.

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On the other hand, Georgia appeared to reach an agreement with South Ossetia in March 1997, preserving Georgia’s territorial integrity while giving “special powers of self-determination” to the separatist region. A joint commission for economic reconstruction of South Ossetia also was established. However, in December, South Ossetia canceled further negotiations, and a final settlement remained in doubt. President Shevardnadze was the target of a second assassination attempt on February 9, 1998, when a band of attackers opened fire on his motorcade. They were subsequently reportedly identified as former members of the private army of the late President Gamsakhurdia and were allegedly financed outside of Georgia. Shevardnadze renewed his demand that Moscow extradite former security minister Igor Giorgadze, who was suspected of being a ringleader in the 1995 assassination attempt. The president also speculated that “powerful interests” opposed to the transit of Caspian Basin oil across Georgia may have been involved in the attack. Tension intensified in Abkhazia in mid-May 1998, as heavy fighting broke out when Abkhazian forces entered the “security zone” along the border with Georgia proper and met resistance from Georgian troops. (Some observers suggested the Abkhazian initiative had been fueled by the region’s negative response to a recent CIS proposal that autonomy within a confederal Georgia was Abkhazia’s appropriate ultimate political status, not independence.) Some 35,000 ethnic Georgians reportedly fled from Abkhazia and the security zone to escape the fighting. Although a ceasefire was announced at the end of May, sporadic clashes were reported throughout the rest of the year. Meanwhile, many cabinet members had resigned in July and August, ostensibly to permit a restructuring of ministries. The reshuffling of the cabinet was completed by September, the most noteworthy change being the appointment of Vazha LORTKIPANIDZE as minister of state. Municipal balloting held in November was described by the OSCE as generally free and fair, the CUG suffering some slippage but for the most part retaining dominance.

The Georgian government faced another serious threat in October 1998 when several hundred soldiers (reportedly Gamsakhurdia loyalists) revolted at an army base in the town of Senaki. The soldiers seized tanks and advanced on Kutaisi, the country’s second largest city, before being crushed by government troops. Shevardnadze again attributed the unrest to opponents of the trans-Georgia oil pipeline from Azerbaijan. Discussions toward economic cooperation were reportedly launched with officials from South Ossetia in January 1999, although relations were strained by that region’s plan to conduct new legislative balloting in May. Meanwhile, little progress was apparent regarding the Abkhazia stalemate, although a plan was announced in March for repatriating the refugees from the 1998 unrest. Collaterally, the mandates of the CIS and UN missions were extended to at least the middle of the year. On the domestic front, the Shevardnadze administration, perhaps with an eye on the legislative elections scheduled for the fall, announced several anticorruption measures during the first half of 1999, including plans to forcibly dismiss judges (many of whom had been appointed during Communist rule) and replace them with jurists selected through competitive examination. Legislative balloting was conducted in South Ossetia in May 1999, although the Georgian government denounced the balloting as contrary to the national constitution; the OSCE also refused to recognize the poll’s legitimacy. Subsequently, on October 3, Abkhazian President Ardzinba was reelected without opposition in Abkhazia’s first-ever popular vote, securing a reported 99 percent of the votes. On the same day, a reported 97 percent of those participating in a referendum in Abkhazia endorsed the 1994 Abkhazian constitution and its declaration of the region’s status as an independent republic. The Georgian government also challenged the legality of the voting in Abkhazia, noting that, among other things, ethnic Georgians who had fled Abkhazia during the civil war had been excluded from the balloting. Underlining the apparent stalemate in negotiations toward a compromise settlement, the Abkhazian legislature subsequently approved another declaration of sovereignty.

GEORGIA

In balloting for the Georgian Parliament in October–November 1999, the CUG retained a solid majority, although a strong challenge was posed by the Revival for Georgia bloc, led by Aslan ABASHIDZE, the chair of the Ajarian Supreme Council and longtime “strongman” of Ajaria. (Opposition parties claimed there had been significant irregularities in the poll, and international observers, while not as harsh, did not fully endorse the balloting.) Abashidze also was expected to be the main challenger to Shevardnadze in the Georgian presidential balloting of April 9, 2000, but the Ajarian leader withdrew shortly before polling day. Abashidze’s sudden withdrawal led some analysts to suggest a deal had been struck. In fact, shortly after Shevardnadze was reelected with 79 percent of the vote, the Parliament revised the constitution to recognize the “Republic of Ajaria” as an official autonomous region. Moreover, in June, when the Supreme Council of Ajaria adopted a new constitution, flag, and anthem, Shevardnadze announced that those initiatives did not violate the Georgian constitution, in contrast to the administration’s consistent rejection of constitutional moves on the part of separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Meanwhile, Shevardnadze appointed a new cabinet that included Gia ARSENISHVILI in the post of minister of state, whose responsibilities had been expanded in late 1999 to approach those of a prime minister. Following a series of protest demonstrations, Shevardnadze reshuffled the cabinet in late 2001, naming Avtandil JORBENADZE as the new minister of state. On November 4, 2001, Abashidze was elected unopposed as president (“Head of the Republic”) in Ajaria, voters there also electing a new bicameral legislature (comprising a 35-member Council of the Republic and a 10-member Senate). Subsequently, in first-round presidential balloting in South Ossetia on November 18, President Chibirov finished third among six candidates in controversial balloting. The runoff, held on December 6, was won by businessman Eduard KOKOITY over Stanislav KOCHIYEV, speaker of the South Ossetian legislature and leader of the local Communist Party. (Kokoity’s name also is often referenced in a Russian version—Eduard KOKOYEV.) The Geor-

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gian government and most international organizations deemed that balloting illegal, adopting a similar stance toward the legislative elections held in Abkhazia on March 2, 2002. National legislative balloting was held on November 2, 2003, in the wake of severe political turbulence and opposition to Shevardnadze’s rule (see Current issues, below). Preliminary results indicated a victory for progovernment candidates, but international observers cited widespread irregularities, including apparent falsification of results. Thousands of protesters demonstrated in Tbilisi and other cities, while several Western capitals argued that the Georgian opposition had been denied its rightful victory. Subsequently, some 30,000 demonstrators under the leadership of Mikhail SAAKASHVILI, a former cabinet minister who had quit the CUG in 2001 to protest perceived rampant corruption in government, marched on the parliament building on November 22 to prevent the legislature from convening. When troops declined to intervene, Shevardnadze was evacuated from the building, and he declared a nationwide state of emergency. However, reportedly heeding Russian advice, Shevardnadze resigned the next day (apparently in return for immunity from prosecution), and Nino BURDJANADZE, the chair of the parliament, assumed presidential authority pending new national elections. In presidential balloting on January 4, 2004, Saakashvili won 97 percent of the vote, and he was inaugurated on January 25. Upon Saakashvili’s recommendation, the parliament on February 17 approved a new cabinet headed by Zurab ZHVANIA in the reintroduced post of prime minister. Subsequently, new elections were held on March 28, 2004, to fill the 150 proportional seats in the Parliament, with Saakashvili’s National Movement– Democrats (NMD) reportedly winning 68 percent of the vote and more than 130 seats. In March 2004 Ajarian leader Abashidze agreed to hold new legislative elections, but he was forced to step down in April and leave for Moscow after Tbilisi emboldened the local population and police to rise against him. (Saakashvili immediately announced the imposition of his presidential authority in the region.) Saakashvili’s Victorious

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Ajaria Party won an overwhelming majority in June balloting for the Ajarian legislature, and Levan VARSHALOMIDZE, an ally of the president, was named to head the council of ministers in Ajaria. Meanwhile, the Georgian parliament adopted several constitutional amendments reducing the level of autonomy for Ajaria. New presidential balloting was held on October 3, 2004, in Abkhazia, with Abkhazian Prime Minister Raul KHAJIMBA (supported by Russia) and former prime minister Seregey BAGAPSH as the main contenders to succeed the ailing President Ardzinba. Bagapsh was initially announced as the winner, but disorder broke out over the results, prompting a series of takeovers of government buildings by supporters of the two camps. Following the threat of a Russian intervention, Bagapsh and Khajimba agreed to run in new elections on a joint ticket, with Bagapsh as the presidential candidate and Khajimba as the vice presidential candidate. The “unity” ticket secured more than 90 percent of the vote in reballoting on January 20, 2005, and the two were inaugurated on February 12. Georgian Prime Minister Zhvania died on February 3, 2005, in what was ultimately ruled an accident involving a faulty gas heater. He was succeeded on February 17 by Zurab NOGHAIDELI.

Constitution and Government The constitution given legislative approval on August 24, 1995, and promulgated on October 17 defines Georgia as a democratic state with freedom of speech, thought, conscience, and faith being guaranteed. The president, who serves as head of state, commander in chief, and chief executive, is elected for a once-renewable five-year term by universal adult suffrage. He also appoints and presides over the Council of Ministers. The position of prime minister was reintroduced on February 11, 2004. Legislative authority is vested in a parliament, which is to have two chambers when conditions permit but is currently unicameral (see Legislature, below). In 1997 parliament approved a law giving the president the right to appoint the mayors

of the six largest cities. A National Security Council (inaugurated in January 1996) has a consultative role in defense and security matters. The country’s territory is defined as being established by the Act on the Restoration of the State Independence of Georgia of April 9, 1991. Thus the Soviet-era autonomous republics of Abkhazia and Ajaria and the autonomous region of South Ossetia (each containing a substantial Muslim population) are regarded as being under Georgian sovereignty. However, the final status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia remained in dispute as of mid-2006, both areas being controlled by separatist governments. Meanwhile, Ajaria’s autonomous status was codified in June 2002 (see Political background, above). Judicial power is exercised by independent courts, normally sitting in public. Final authority resides in the Supreme Court, whose members are elected by parliament on the president’s recommendation. A Constitutional Court of nine members serving ten-year terms has oversight over the constitutionality of legislative and executive acts.

Foreign Relations In part because of the civil strife that was then raging, Georgia did not become a member of the CIS at the latter’s launching on December 21, 1991. In April 1992 State Council Chair Shevardnadze asserted that Georgian public opinion strongly opposed entry into the CIS, adding that “I don’t believe the Commonwealth can survive.” However, Georgia sent observers to CIS meetings and, reversing itself, agreed in October 1993 to join the group, with ratification by the Georgian legislature on March 1, 1994. Georgia joined the IMF on May 5, 1992. It did not, however, become a member of the UN until July 31, when it became the last former Soviet republic to gain admission to the world body. The United States recognized Georgia’s independence on December 25, 1991, but, because of the conditions in Georgia, did not establish full diplomatic relations until March 24, 1992, one day after recognition by the European Community (EC, later the European Union—EU). Coincident with

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the U.S. action, Georgia was admitted to the CSCE. On April 15 it became a member of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), linking the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to its former adversaries in Eastern Europe. In March 1994 Georgia became a signatory of NATO’s Partnership for Peace initiative, having the previous month signed a friendship and cooperation treaty with Russia. With Georgia’s concurrence, the UN Security Council gave its approval in July 1994 to the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia (having in May ruled out sending more than a handful of UN observers to the region). In March 1995 President Shevardnadze initialed a further agreement with Moscow providing for Russia’s retention of four military bases in Georgia in exchange for economic assistance. The accord was confirmed when the Russian prime minister visited Tbilisi in September, and in January 1996 the Georgian parliament ratified the 1994 friendship treaty with Russia. The government’s strategy of alignment with Russia to secure Moscow’s backing for the resolution of Georgia’s internal conflicts remained controversial in Tbilisi. Shevardnadze justified the granting of military base rights to Russia by pointing out that Moscow had reciprocated by upholding the territorial integrity of Georgia within its Soviet-era borders, meaning that Russia had formally agreed that Abkhazia and South Ossetia were sovereign Georgian territory. Nevertheless, the nationalist parties opposed ratification of the 1994 friendship treaty with Russia and repeatedly called for the withdrawal of all Russian forces from Abkhazia, claiming that the Russian troops were protecting the separatist regime in Sukhumi and preventing the return of ethnic Georgian refugees. In April 1996 Georgia joined with Armenia and Azerbaijan in signing partnership and cooperation accords with the EU. Collaterally, Georgia sought to improve its relations with neighboring states, although strains with Turkey remained. In April 1997 Georgia hosted a regional conference regarding the possible revival of the historic “Silk Road,” which once connected China to Europe via Central

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Asia, the Transcaucus region, and Turkey. The proposed transportation and telecommunications corridor presented significant political concerns because, among other things, it bypassed Russia. U.S. and EU financing was subsequently pledged for the project, which included eight other countries in addition to Georgia. Georgia joined the Council of Europe in February 1999, the Shevardnadze administration describing the accession as indicative of the country’s movement toward European “political and economic standards.” At the same time, the government continued to question its ties with the CIS, which it called ineffective as far as both economic and security issues were concerned. The presence of Russian troops on four military bases leased from Georgia continued to be an irritant for nationalists, who lobbied for a complete withdrawal. Meanwhile, the parliament threatened to annul the leasing agreement unless Russia supported Georgia’s efforts to reassert control over Abkhazia. Georgia also sought backing among CIS states to tighten economic sanctions on the separatist region, Shevardnadze declaring in January 1997 that Georgia would not remain in Russia’s “sphere of influence” unless Russia helped Georgia restore its sovereignty over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The president also indicated that Georgia saw more advantage in joining the EU rather than NATO but did not rule out the possible “political” involvement of NATO in resolving the Abkhazian conflict. He called on the CIS either to broaden the mandate of its Russian peacekeeping force to more effectively protect Georgians displaced by the conflict in Abkhaz or to comply with the parliament’s resolution calling for withdrawal of the force. At its summit in March 1997, the CIS agreed to a broader mandate that would extend the peacekeepers across a wider area to facilitate the return of 200,000 refugees displaced by fighting in 1993, but the CIS failed to implement the redeployment, apparently due to Russian opposition. Despite the discomfort of Russia, an informal but growing Azerbaijan–Georgia–Ukraine alliance, the “Union of Three,” continued to take form in 1997. The alignment, created in late 1996 as

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an alternative to reliance on the CIS, was Westernoriented and interested in military cooperation independent of Russia. One of its goals was to export Azerbaijan’s Caspian oil to Europe via Georgia and the Black Sea, completely bypassing Russia. Moldova declared that it shared strategic interests with the Union of Three in a quadrilateral communiqu´e issued in November 1997, necessitating the coining of a new abbreviation, GUAM (for Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova). (The abbreviation was updated to GUUAM in April 1999 with the addition of Uzbekistan to the grouping; however, Uzbekistan announced in mid-2002 that it was suspending its participation because of the grouping’s lack of effectiveness.) In the early years of the 21st century, Georgia drew closer to the West and away from the Russian orbit. The U.S. influence was felt directly in the ouster of President Shevardnadze in 2003 and the installation of the U.S.-trained Mikhail Saakashvili as president after the “Rose Revolution.” The U.S. has troops on Georgian soil and controls the flow of aid money ($1.3 billion over the past ten years). For Russia, influence in this former colony that borders on Chechnya is a vital national security interest, in part because Georgia has two ports that offer access to the Black Sea. At the same time, Russia is the patron of the two secessionist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which broke away from Georgia in the 1990s with Moscow’s blessings and have resisted Georgia’s attempts to reunify the country. Russia also has granted the residents of the secessionist republics Russian passports, in effect granting them Russian citizenship. Another point of contention between Russia and Georgia concerns the Russian military bases maintained in Georgia by treaty rights. Russia also controls Georgia’s supplies of oil and gas and periodically cuts off supplies to signify its displeasure with Georgia’s policies. There has been friction between the two countries over the presence of Chechen rebel fighters in Pankisi Gorge in Georgia. (Russia has long accused Georgia of sheltering Chechen rebels.) In 2005 the Georgia Parliament issued a national security report that listed foreign policy priorities as strategic cooperation with the United States,

Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Turkey and partnership with Russia. European integration was not mentioned as a foreign policy imperative. During a visit to Tbilisi in May 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush called upon “all nations” to respect Georgia’s “sovereignty,” a remark widely construed as critical of Russian support for the breakaway republics. Bush also told the cheering crowd of 100,000 that Georgia was a “beacon of liberty for the region and the world.” In a possibly related matter, Russia later in the month announced that it would close its two remaining military bases in Georgia by the end of 2008.

Current Issues Despite the appearance of support supplied by Shevardnadze’s presidential victory in 2000, his administration was already besieged on many fronts, and conditions subsequently deteriorated even further as a number of government officials became ensnarled in budget and other financial scandals. Although the president pledged anew to make fighting corruption his top priority, many reformers, including former Shevardnadze supporters, accused him of exhibiting an unacceptably high tolerance of illicit conduct within the government. Critics also charged that the administration was displaying an inability or unwillingness to protect basic human rights or to extend democratic reforms. Unrest, exacerbated by economic stagnation, culminated in massive protest demonstrations in Tbilisi in late 2001 following efforts by security forces to close down an independent radio station that had been vocal in its criticism of the government. Although Shevardnadze survived the crisis by revamping his cabinet, many CUG legislators subsequently left the party to form new opposition groupings which, along with independents, dominated the June 2002 local elections. Meanwhile, little progress had been made by mid-2002 in resolving the situations in South Ossetia or Abkhazia, hostilities of unclear origin having broken out in the latter in October 2001 despite an agreement by Georgian and Abkhazian officials the previous March to avoid violence.

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Georgia continued to accuse Russia of fueling separatist sentiment in the disputed regions, while Russia alleged that Georgia was preventing effective action against Chechen rebels operating out of the Pankisi Gorge in the mountainous border region between Georgia and the secessionist-minded Russian region of Chechnya. After Russian planes had violated Georgian airspace several times in alleged “hot pursuit” of rebels, Russian President Vladimir Putin in September 2002 threatened direct military intervention unless Georgia adopted a more aggressive anti-Chechen stance. Adding another layer of nuance to the matter was the presence of U.S. special forces who had arrived earlier in the year to help train Georgian forces in antiterrorism tactics. (Washington believed that members of al-Qaida or other terrorist networks may have also found a safe haven among Muslim refugees from Chechnya in the border area.) Although Russia might have been expected to welcome the U.S. assistance as a means of undercutting the strength of the Chechen rebels, Moscow in fact was reportedly concerned, in private at least, that Washington was attempting to gain inroads into the Russian “sphere of influence” in the Caucasus. Opposition to Shevardnadze’s rule intensified in early 2003 as student-based protest organizations as well as the principal opposition parties conducted large-scale antigovernment demonstrations. The peaceful overthrow of Shevardnadze in November became known as the “Rose Revolution” and prompted speculation that other former Soviet states might soon face similar circumstances. In his inaugural address in January 2004, President Saakashvili pledged to root out corruption and restore the central government’s control over Ajaria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. As an indicator of the popular support for the new administration, the legislature adopted the NMD standard as the new national flag. Meanwhile, the members of the cabinet appointed in February averaged 35 years of age and were mostly Western educated. Despite his hopes regarding the three breakaway republics, Saakashvili achieved progress in 2004 only with Ajaria (see Political background, above, for details). Georgia mounted a massive

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show of military forces along the border with South Ossetia in September, but the deployment backfired when the assault was repulsed by South Ossetian fighters. In December 2005 the president appeared to signal a shift to a less confrontational approach by proposing a settlement plan calling for “demilitarization” of the conflict in early 2006 and the eventual granting of broad autonomy to South Ossetia, albeit still under Georgian sovereignty. Saakashvili also reportedly reached out to the separatist leaders in Abkhazia, suggesting that peace negotiations could lead to a mutually acceptable refinement of a 2000 UN plan that would accord significant autonomy to Abkhazia. Russia initially appeared to support the broad plans for both separatist regions but backed away from that stance in early 2006, apparently in part in response to a row with Georgia in January over gas supplies. (The unexplained bombing of a Russian gas pipeline in North Ossetia had severely compromised deliveries to Georgia, causing widespread heating shortages.) Tensions in the “cold war” between Georgia and Russia subsequently continued to escalate, the Saakashvili administration accusing Russia of engaging in a “creeping annexation” of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Exacerbating the hostility was Saakashvili’s reassertion of Georgia’s goal of joining NATO (anathema to Russia) by 2008. A meeting between Saakashvili and Russian President Putin in June apparently did little to resolve their differences, and the leaders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia subsequently met to discuss their possible mutual interest in independence, a la Montenegro. Meanwhile, on the domestic front, Saakashvili continued to receive praise for his handling of the economy (see The Country, above), although opposition parties charged him with having violated the spirit of the Rose Revolution by overconsolidating his authority and “packing” governmental bodies with his supporters.

Political Parties The formerly dominant Georgian Communist Party (GCP) was dissolved following the abortive Moscow coup of August 1991, with its deputies

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being expelled from the Georgia Supreme Soviet in mid-September. The secessionist Round Table– Free Georgia coalition that had supported President Gamsakhurdia became largely moribund following his ouster in January 1992. Legislative elections in October 1992 gave representation to more than 30 parties or alliances, none with a meaningful plurality. Most were as much military as political groupings, being commonly based on clan or regional loyalties. In November 1993 President Shevardnadze launched a new progovernment grouping called the Citizens’ Union of Georgia (CUG, below); however, the revival in June 1994 of the GCP (as the United Communist Party of Georgia) showed that old allegiances remained powerful. A total of 32 parties and alliances presented candidates in the 1999 parliamentary poll. Nearly 50 parties reportedly participated in the 2003 and 2004 legislative elections, many of them in newly organized (and often unstable) blocs or coalitions that sometimes lacked clearly formulated ideologies or agendas. Following the ouster of the Shevardnadze regime in 2003, many of the old parties lost their relevance. Meanwhile, most new groupings were perceived as still attempting to define themselves and establish viable political goals. The following list contains some of the new parties as well as some outdated (and often defunct) groupings that are included to provide historical context. However, considering the fluidity of current Georgian politics and the fact that parties usually do not operate in the conventional Western sense, this list should not be considered definitive. In addition, some of the party leaderships are likely to be outdated. Several blocs were credited with securing legislative seats in the 2003–2004 elections. One of the most important was the Right Opposition, Industrialists, and News bloc, an alliance that included the New Rights Party, the Georgian Liberal Party, Industry Will Save Georgia, and other groupings. The well-financed bloc supported private enterprise and included some of the country’s most successful business leaders. However, it also suffered at the polls because of its image as a party

of “oligarchs.” Industry Will Save Georgia reportedly subsequently left the bloc, whose parliamentary faction later was referenced as the Political Union–New Rights, News. In April 2003 supporters of President Shevardnadze launched the For a New Georgia bloc, which included, among others, the Citizens’ Union of Georgia, the Socialist Party of Georgia, the Christian Democratic Union, the National Democratic Party, and the Party for the Liberation of Abkhazia. The bloc was reportedly the top performer in the November 2003 legislative balloting. However, following the ouster of Shevardnadze, the bloc factionalized, and it did not present candidates in the 2004 presidential or legislative polls. National Movement–Democrats (NMD). The NMD was formed prior to the March 2004 legislative poll by the Unified National Movement (UNM), the United Democrats (below), and others. The center-right, nationalist UNM was founded in 2001 in support of governmental and economic reform, closer ties with the EU and the United States, and restoration of Georgian control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The UNM platform also called for raising pensions, enhancing social services for the poor, fighting corruption, and increasing state revenues by curtailing the power of the oligarchs. The UNM was led by Mikhail Saakashvili, a former cabinet minister who quit the CUG in late 2001 to protest what he considered to be acceptance on the part of the government of widespread corruption. Campaigning with the motto of “Georgia Without Shevardnadze,” Saakashvili led a National Movement–Democratic Front to notable success in the June 2002 local elections. In 2003 the UNM joined with the United Democrats, the Union of National Security, and the youth movement Kmara (“Enough”) to form the United People’s Alliance, which played a central role in the forced resignation of President Shevardnadze. (Candidates for the November 2003 legislative balloting were presented through a Saakashvili–National Movement bloc that reportedly also included the Republican Party of Georgia and others.) The alliance subsequently

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presented Saakashvili as the dominant presidential candidate in the January 2004 balloting. Prior to the March 2004 legislative poll, the UNM was reported to have “merged” with the United Democrats to form the NMD. However, a degree of tension was subsequently reported between the UNM and the United Democrats, particularly following the death in 2005 of Zurab Zhvania, the leader of the United Democrats and an ally of Saakashvili in the Rose Revolution of late 2003. Consequently, as of mid2006 references to the NMD had ceased, with the UNM being regularly described as the nation’s ruling party. Leaders: Mikhail SAAKASHVILI (President of the Republic), David BAKRADZE, Giga BOKERIA. Revival of Georgia. The Revival bloc, also known as the “Batumi Alliance” (a reference to Batumi, the capital of Ajaria), was formed as an electoral coalition for the 1999 legislative balloting by the following three parties and a number of small groupings, including the Konstantine Gamsakhurdia Society, a rightist, anti-Shevardnadze grouping led by Vakhtang BOCHORISHVILI; the Georgian Freedom and Integrity Movement, led by Jemal GAMAKHARIA; and the Movement of the Survival of Georgia “Voice of the Nation.” The major connecting theme among the bloc’s components was opposition to the current government. Led by Aslan Abashidze, the dominant figure in Ajarian affairs, the bloc secured 26 percent of the proportional vote in the parliamentary poll, although its strength was centered largely in Ajaria. The bloc’s components spanned the leftright spectrum, but it was generally perceived as “pro-Russian” and committed to the restoration of public services, the implementation of genuine anticorruption initiatives, and the maintenance of public security. Abashidze, considered the major opponent to Shevardnadze in the 2000 presidential race, withdrew his candidacy under murky circumstances shortly before the balloting (see Political background, above). He was subsequently named as Shevardnadze’s special envoy for conflict resolution in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

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Abashidze led a Union for Georgia’s Democratic Revival in the November 2003 legislative poll. It was not clear how closely the Union’s membership matched that of the Revival of Georgia bloc. (See Current issues, above, for details on Abashidze’s departure from Georgia in 2004.) All-Georgian Union of Revival (Sruliad Sakartvelos Aghordzinebis Kavshiri—SSAK). Based in the predominantly Muslim autonomous republic of Ajaria, the SSAK was founded in 1992 as the All-Georgian Union for the Revival of Ajaria, which became the leading party in the autonomous republic and participated in the 1992 legislative poll as part of the Mshvidoba (Peace) bloc. In 1995 it came in third place in the national legislative balloting with 6.8 percent of the proportional vote, winning 32 seats in all. In the September 1996 parliamentary elections in Ajaria, the SSAK won an overwhelming majority in a coalition with the CUG. In local elections in November 1998, the SSAK won almost all seats in local councils in Ajaria, its leader, Aslan Abashidze, becoming known as the “strongman” of the Ajarian government. Thirteen of the 57 successful candidates from the Revival of Georgia bloc in the 1999 legislative balloting subsequently joined the SSAK faction in Parliament. Socialist Party of Georgia (Sakartvelos Sotsialisturi Partia—SSP). The SSP was founded in 1995 on a democratic, left-wing program, aligning itself with the CUG and endorsing Shevardnadze’s presidential candidacy in November. It failed to cross the 5 percent threshold in the 1995 parliamentary elections (taking 3.8 percent) but won four constituency seats thanks to its alliance with the CUG. Twelve of the successful candidates from the Revival of Georgia bloc in the 1999 legislative balloting subsequently joined the SSP faction in parliament, the SSP having previously moved firmly into an anti-CUG stance. The SSP was one of the leading parties in the June 2002 local elections. It participated in the pro-Shevardnadze For a New Georgia bloc in

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the November 2003 legislative elections. Following Shevardnadze’s ouster, Vakhtang RCHEULISHVILI resigned as the SSP chair. Leader: Irakli MINDELI (Chair). Union of Georgian Traditionalists (Kartvel Traditsionalista Kavshiri—KTK). Also known as the Traditionalist Party, the conservative KTK won seven seats in the Supreme Council in 1992. Its 4.2 percent share of the vote in 1995 was insufficient for proportional seats in the Georgian parliament, but it elected two deputies in the constituency contests. The KTK and several other opposition parties unsuccessfully demanded in September 1997 that the Central Election Commission schedule a referendum on how mayors are elected. They also opposed a 1997 law giving the president the right to appoint the mayors of the six largest cities, saying it was passed to ensure a victory by the CUG in the parliamentary elections. Eleven of the successful candidates from the Revival of Georgia bloc in the 1999 legislative balloting subsequently joined the KTK parliamentary faction. The KTK participated in the June 2002 local elections in an electoral alliance with the People’s Party (see below). Following the Rose Revolution, it was reported that the KTK had merged with the National Democratic Party (NDP, below) to form the NDP-KDK. Leader: Akaki ASATIANI (Chair and Former Chair of the Parliament). Industry Will Save Georgia. The Industry bloc was formed as an electoral alliance for the 1999 legislative by the following two groups and a number of smaller parties, including the centerright Political Union “Sporting Georgia,” formed in 1998 under the leadership of economist Roman RURUA; the Movement for the Georgian State, a center-right grouping formed in 1998 under the leadership of Irakli BATIASHVILI; and the National Movement “Georgia First of All,” a rightwing grouping led by Guram SHARADZE. The bloc won 7.8 percent of the proportional vote in the 1999 legislative balloting.

Industry Will Survive Georgia. Launched in 1999, this nationalist, protectionist grouping was described as comprising “well-heeled business leaders” (including Gogi Topadze, a “beer magnate”) opposed to the sale of government assets to foreign investors. It also objected to many of the economic strictures recommended by the IMF. Leader: Gogi TOPADZE (Chair). Union of Reformers and Agrarians (URA). The URA is a successor to the Reformers’ Union of Georgia (RUG), a “liberalcentrist” grouping founded in 1993 in support of closer relations with Russia as well as market reforms designed to facilitate the emergence of a middle class. The RUG had competed in the 1995 legislative balloting as a member of the bloc Reformers’ Union of Georgia–National Concord (Sakartvelos Reformaforta Kavshiri– Erovnuli Tankhmoba), which won two parliamentary seats. Other members of that 1995 bloc were the Georgian Citizens’ Political Association (GCPA), launched in August 1995 as a centrist-traditionalist grouping in favor of “unification of national mentality,” and the SUG (below). Leader: Bakur GULUA (Chair). Georgian Labor Party (GLP). The GLP is a successor to the Union for a Law-Governed State (ULGS), founded in August 1995 and also rendered in English as the State Justice Union. The ULGS, an ideologically centrist grouping, won one legislative seat in 1995, while the GLP (founded in 1997) secured two seats in 1999 in single-member constituencies while just barely missing the 7 percent threshold for proportional representation with 6.85 percent of the vote. The GLP also performed well in the June 2002 local elections. One of the few Georgian parties with a clear ideology, the GLP enjoys strong support in Tbilisi. At its founding, the GLP was considered “proRussian,” but its stance has shifted in recent years to one that favors eventual membership for Georgia

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in NATO. The GLP was among the parties calling for the resignation of Prime Minister Saskashvili in the first half of 2006. Leader: Shalva NATELASHVILI (Chair). United Democrats. A centrist grouping formed in June 2002 by former CUG leader and former speaker of the parliament Zurab Zhvania, the United Democrats claimed the allegiance of some 25 legislators. Subsequently, Zhvania formed an electoral alliance with Nino Burdjanadze (chair of the Parliament) called the Burdjanadze–Democrats Bloc, which won a number of seats in the November 2003 legislative poll. (Several other groups reportedly participated in the bloc, including the Union of Georgian Traditionalists and the Christian-Conservative Party of Georgia.) Zhvania was named prime minister in February 2004 but died a year later. The United Democrats participated in the 2004 legislative poll in cooperation with the UNM (see NMD, above). However, as of early 2006 the United Democrats appeared to be still functioning as an independent party. New Rights Party. Formed in October 2000 as the “New Faction” by dissident CUG legislators, this grouping adopted its current name in June 2001. It scored significant victories in the June 2002 local elections. For the 2003 legislative balloting, the New Rights Party formed the New Right bloc with the Georgian Liberal Party, the Conservative Party of Georgia, and others. It participated in the 2004 legislative poll as part of the Right Opposition, Industrialists, and News bloc. Although the New Right bloc gained legislative representation in part based on cooperation with the NMD, a number of legislators from the bloc supported the drive in early 2006 by opposition parties to force the resignation of President Saakashvili. Leaders: David GAMKRELIDZE (Chair), Levan GACHECHILADZE. National Democratic Alliance–The Third Way. This electoral alliance was launched for the 1999 legislative balloting by the following two groups and the Party of National Industry and

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Economic Revival, formed in 1999 under the leadership of Besik JUGELI, a former NDP legislator. National Democratic Party (NDP). Claiming to be the heir of a pre-Soviet party of the same name, the NDP was organized in 1988 as a secessionist grouping with a “Christian outlook.” It favored restoration of the monarchy as a means of national unification. Allied with the smaller and more secularist Democratic Party (DP), it won 32.6 percent of the vote in the 1990 republican election, while in the October 1992 legislative balloting the NDP took 12 seats and the DP, 10. Having initially supported Shevardnadze’s assumption of power, the NDP became critical of his policy of rapprochement with Moscow and opposed Georgia’s CIS membership. In December 1994, NDP leader Georgi CHANTURIA was assassinated at Tbilisi in an attack that also seriously injured his wife, Irina SARISHVILI, who took over the party leadership despite having one of three bullets that struck her lodged close to her heart. The former DP chair, Kartlos GHARIBASHVILI, took only 0.5 percent of the vote in the November 1995 presidential election; however, in the legislative balloting the NDP came in second place, with 8 percent of the proportional vote and 34 seats in total. In January 1996, NDP deputies unsuccessfully opposed ratification of the 1994 friendship treaty with Russia, claiming that it contained unacceptable “military union” provisions. Following the NDP’s participation in the For a New Georgia bloc in the November 2003 legislative poll, Irina Sarishvili resigned as NDP leader in order to form a new party. Leader: Bachuki KARDAVA (Leader). Republican Party of Georgia (RPG). Launched in 1990, the RPG participated in the October 1992 legislative elections as a member of the “October 11 Bloc” and later was a founding member of the URP (see PFG, below), which it subsequently left. The RPG was allied with the Saakashvili–National Movement bloc for the 2003 legislative elections and joined the

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“parliamentary majority” in support of President Saakashvili in 2004. However, a number of RPG legislators subsequently split with the government following conflict between the RPG and the UNM over elections in Ajaria. As of mid-2006 the RPG was among the opposition parties calling for Saakashvili’s resignation. Leaders: Ivliane KHAINDRAVA, Davit BERDZENISHVILI, David USUPASHVILI. Conservative Party of Georgia. This grouping was formed in 1995 as a successor to the Liberal-Conservative Party, which had been founded by former members of the Georgian Conservative Monarchists’ Party (GCMP). (The GCMP had been launched in late 1989 in support of the Georgian monarchy, for which there was not an obvious claimant.) The Conservative Party secured representation in the 2004 legislative poll as part of the New Right bloc. In early 2006 the party was among the opposition groups that organized public demonstrations calling for the resignation of President Saakashvili. At that point, several of the party’s legislators were participating in an opposition parliamentary faction called the Democratic Front that also included the Republican Party of Georgia and Industry Will Save Georgia. In April 2006 the front, led by Davit ZURABISHVILI, announced a boycott of parliament pending action on the front’s demands for representation on the national election commission, the direct election of the mayor of Tbilisi (currently appointed by the president), and other reforms. Leaders: Koba DAVITASHVILI, Zviad DZIDIGURI, Kakha KUKAVA. Christian-Conservative Party of Georgia. Launched in 1997, this right-wing grouping was an outgrowth of the Movement of National Survival–Resistance Front, which had been prominent in public protests in 1992–1993. The party participated in the 1999 legislative balloting as a member of the Round Table–Free Georgian Bloc that also included the Helsinki Union of Georgia–National Revival, led by Tengiz KIKACHEISHVILI; the rightist, monarchist Royal League of Georgia, led by David

PHAVLENISHVILI; and several other small rightwing parties. Citizens’ Union of Georgia—CUG (Sakartvelos Mokalaketa Kavshiri—SMK). The CUG was launched by President Shevardnadze in November 1993 in an effort to gain a clear parliamentary majority rather than having to rule by consensus. Shevardnadze told a founding congress that the group would be an alliance of parties and groups that would retain their individual manifestos but would act together on legislative issues. The post of CUG general secretary was taken by Zurab ZHVANIA, a close associate of Shevardnadze’s and leader of the Green Party of Georgia. Other founding groups included the Unity and Prosperity Movement, a group of intellectuals, and parts of the Republican Party. Shevardnadze’s candidacy in the November 1995 presidential election was officially endorsed by the Socialist Party of Georgia as well as by the CUG. In the parliamentary balloting held simultaneously with the presidential poll, the CUG won 107 of the 231 seats filled, Zhvania being elected speaker of the new body. In the municipal elections of November 1998, the CUG declined in vote percentage in comparison to the 1995 parliamentary elections but still prevailed in many local councils. The CUG secured 42 percent of the proportional vote in the 1999 legislative poll, and Zhvania was returned to the speaker’s post. However, the CUG subsequently split into several factions, including a “young reformers” group (led by Zhvania and former justice minister Mikhail Saakashvili) and a pro-Shevardnadze group (led by Levan MAMALADZE). As demanded by some CUG members as well as opposition parties, Shevardnadze resigned as CUG chair in September 2001, although he indicated he would remain active in party affairs. Subsequently, the CUG parliamentary faction splintered, with dissidents joining several new parties. For his part, Zhvania remained in the CUG with the intention of presenting his own CUG list in the June 2002 local elections. However, the Supreme Court ruled in May 2002 that only the propresidential faction was entitled to use the CUG rubric, and

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Zhvania subsequently formed a new party (see United Democrats, above). Meanwhile, in June 2002 the CUG elected Minister of State Avtandil JORBENADZE as the new chair and, by extension, a leading potential successor to Shevardnadze. References to the CUG ceased following the ouster of President Shevardnadze in 2003. People’s Party. Formed by former members of the NDP, the People’s Party contested the 1999 legislative elections in a coalition with two other small groupings—the Popular Union and the Party of Independence and Unity of Georgia. The People’s Party formed an alliance with the KTK for the June 2002 local elections. Leader: Mamuka GIORGADZE. United Communist Party of Georgia — UCPG (Sakartvelos Komunisturi Partia). The UCPG was launched in June 1994 in an attempt to unite the various factions that claimed descent from the Soviet-era Georgian Communist Party (GCP). The old GCP had been somewhat less tainted by corruption and abuse of power than its counterparts elsewhere; it was nevertheless dissolved in August 1991 as Georgia moved to independence and its leaders shifted their support to other parties. Prior to the launching of the UCPG, communist support was channeled into the Communist Workers’ Party (CWP) and the Alliance of Communists of Georgia (ACG). Despite formation of the UCPG, communist unity was not an important feature of the 1995 elections. In the presidential contest, the UCPG leader, Maj. Gen. Panteleimon Giorgadze, ran fourth with only 0.5 percent, being heavily outpolled by former GCP first secretary Dzhumber PATIASHVILI, who finished second with 19.5 percent of the vote. The UCPG, which had taken a conservative/nationalist line on Abkhazian separatism and favored close alignment with Moscow, contested the 1995 parliamentary election as part of a United Communist Party–Social Democrats bloc that failed to cross the 5 percent proportional barrier and obtained no seats in the single-mandate constituencies. In 1997 the UCPG played a leading role in the formation of the National-Patriotic Movement for

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Georgia’s Salvation, a bloc of 12 parties favoring close integration with Russia and open to all “patriotic” forces that shared a commitment to socialism. For the 1999 legislative elections, the UCPG participated in the United Communist Party (Stalin) and Workers’ Union that also included the Citizens’ Political “Union of Georgian Workers” (a recently formed leftist grouping) and the Workers’ Union of Georgia, led by Vakhtung GABUNIA. Patiashvili was elected to the legislature in 1999 as a candidate of the Revival of Georgia bloc; he and a number of the bloc’s other successful candidates subsequently formed a “Unified Georgia” faction in the parliament. Patiashvili finished second in the 2000 presidential balloting with 17 percent of the vote. In September 2001 he announced the formation of a new grouping called Unity (Ertoba) in conjunction with Aleksandre CHACHIA. The UCPG leader is the father of Igor Giorgadze, former chief of the Georgian Security Service, who officials have claimed was a key figure in the attempt to assassinate Shevardnadze in 1995. The government demanded in July 1997 that Moscow extradite the alleged conspirator, but his father said his son was not in Moscow. Igor Giorgadze, who claimed the charges against him were “utterly groundless,” helped to launch the Party of Justice (registered in 2004 in Georgia) from exile. After having reportedly spent time in some eight countries over the past 11 years, he announced from Moscow in 2006 that he was not seeking Russian citizenship or permanent asylum in Russia but rather intended to attempt to regain political influence in Georgia through the Party of Justice. Leader: Maj. Gen. Panteleimon GIORGADZE. Political Union Tanadgoma (Solidarity). Tanadgoma was founded in July 1995 by parliamentary speaker Vakhtang GOGUADZE and Prime Minister Otar Patsatsia as leaders of a 20member parliamentary faction, which was reduced to 3 deputies at the November–December poll. The group described its outlook as democratic-centrist and supported marketization, land privatization, and the cultivation of good relations with both

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Russia and the neighboring Transcaucus states. Goguadze left the party in November 1997 to join the new National-Patriotic Movement for Georgia’s Salvation. Leader: Tamaz KALANDADZE (Chair). Christian Democratic Union (CDU). The CDU strongly favored private ownership while endorsing political pluralism as an antidote to the “syndrome of totalitarianism,” which it viewed as by no means banished. It participated in the “October 11 Bloc” in the 1992 legislative elections (see PFG, below); it supported Eduard Shevardnadze in the 1995 presidential race but subsequently became an opponent of the CUG government. Leader: Vazha LORTKIPANIDZE. Popular Front of Georgia (PFG). The PFG is a center-right successor to the United Republican Party (URP), which had been launched in 1995 as a merger of the Georgian Public Front (GPF), led by Nodar Natadze; the Charter 1991 Party; and the Republican Party of Georgia (RPG). (Those three parties had formed the core of the “October 11 Bloc” that had won 27 seats in the October 1992 legislative elections.) The URP failed to achieve the 5 percent proportional minimum in the 1995 legislative poll but won 1 constituency seat. Shortly thereafter, the RPG and Charter 1991 left the URP. Subsequently, the URP supported opposition calls for the removal of Russian troops from Georgian territory, and in November 1997 Natadze called for Georgia’s withdrawal from the CIS and denounced the confederation model for settling the disputes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The URP adopted the PFG rubric in 1999, and it competed in the 1999 legislative balloting in coalition with the Ilia Chavchavadze Society, which had won 7 seats in the 1992 legislative balloting and is currently led by Tamas CKHEIDZE. Leader: Nodar NATADZE. Political Union of Citizens–Unitary National Movement. Launched in 1999 under the leadership of Mirian Mirianashvili, a former legislator from Round Table–Free Georgia, this grouping

participated in the 1999 legislative elections in a coalition with the SUG. Leader: Mirian MIRIANASHVILI (Chair). Sportsmen’s Union of Georgia (SUG). Founded in June 1994, the SUG considered itself a centrist grouping oriented toward consolidation of the nation. It supported the establishment of a close economic and political bloc with CIS countries. Leader: Edisher MACHAIDZE (Chair). Farmers’ Union of Georgia. Among the founders of the Farmers’ Union in 1989 was Roin LIPARTELIANI, who contested the 1991 presidential balloting as well as the 1995 poll, at which he secured 0.4 percent of the vote as the candidate of the recently formed Agrarian Party of Georgia. Liparteliani was not permitted to contest the 2000 presidential election because of a lack of sufficient signatures for his nomination by the David the Builder (a reference to a Georgian king) Political Union, a coalition of some 15 small centrist parties. Leaders: Ivza CHANKVETADZE, Temur LIPARTELIANI, Jemal MIKELADZE (Cochairs). Democratic Union of Georgia (DUG). Led by Tengiz ABULADZE, an internationally respected cinematographer, the DUG was formed in 1991. It subsequently supported President Shevardnadze’s economic policies, while urging heightened democratic reforms. In the October 1992 election it was a component of the conservative “Peace Bloc,” which emerged as the largest single grouping, with 29 seats. In 1995 the DUG was a member of the Progress Bloc, which won four legislative seats. It participated in the 1999 legislative balloting as a member of the Revived Communists and Peoples’ Patriots, which also included the Revived Communist Party of Georgia, launched in 1997 as a successor to the CPG and currently led by Shalva BERIANIDZE. Leader: Avtandil MARGIANI (Chair). Green Party of Georgia (Sakartvelor Mtsvaneta Partia—SMP). Launched in 1988 as a

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section of the nationalist All-Georgian Rustaveli Society, the SMP won 11 legislative seats in 1992. Zurab Zhvania, one of the founders of the SMP, joined the CUG in 1993, and the SMP subsequently remained closely aligned to the CUG, several members securing legislative seats on the CUG list in 1995. Leader: George GACHECHILADZE (Chair). Other parties and blocs that competed in 1999 and/or 2003–2004 included the Citizens’ Political Union of Lecturers, a centrist grouping led by author Nugzar TSERETELI; the Communist Party of Georgia (CPG), led by Ivane TSIKLAURI; the centrist Democratic Center of Georgia, led by Zurab MURVANIDZE; Freedom (Tavisupleba), led by Konstantine GAMASAKHURDIA; the center-left Georgian League of Intellectuals, led by Irakli LOMTADZE; the Georgian National State Political Union, led by Lasha LAMIDZE; the Georgian Social Democratic Party, led by Jemal KAKHNIASHVILI; the Georgian Social Realistic Party, led by Guram BEROZASHVILI; the Merab Kostava Society, a rightist grouping led by Vaja ADAMIA; the National Ideology Party of Georgia, a right-wing grouping led by Zurab GAGNIDZE; the National Independence Party, led by Irakli TSERETELI; the Nationalist Party, led by Zaza VASHKAMADZE; the Party of Economic and Social Victims of Georgia, formed in 1999 under the leadership of Malkhaz CISKARISHVILI; the nationalistic Political Movement “Fate of Georgia,” led by Temur MDINARADZE; the Popular Democratic Party, led by Guram USITASHVILI; Strong Regions–Strong Georgia; the conservative Union of Nationalists of Georgia, led by Gaioz MAMALADZE; the Union of Social Justice of Georgia, a leftist grouping led by Archil IOSELIANI; and the Unity Alliance (Ertoba), led by Aleksandre CHACHIA and Dzhumber PATIASHVILI. Other recently formed parties include For the Future of Georgia, an Ajaria-based grouping led by Nino KVIRIKADZE; the Forward Georgia Party, launched in the wake of the Rose Revolu-

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tion to provide opposition to the Saakashvili administration; the Freedom Party, an opposition grouping led by Konstantine (Koko) GAMSAKHURDIA, son of former president Zviad Gamsakhurdia; Georgia’s Way, led by former minister of foreign affairs Salome ZOURABICHVILI; and the New Force Party, a center-left grouping led by Irina SARISHVILI-CHANTURIA, formerly of the NDP.

Legislature The 1995 constitution specifies that when territorial and political conditions permit the Georgian Parliament (Sakartvelos Parlamenti) will consist of two chambers, namely a Council of the Republic elected by proportional representation and a Senate composed of deputies elected in the country’s territorial units. In the interim, the legislature consists of a single chamber of 235 members serving fouryear terms, of whom 150 are elected from party lists by proportional representation subject to a 7 percent threshold (raised from 5 percent prior to the 1999 election) and 85 in single-member constituencies. (First-round candidates in the single-member constituencies must receive 33 percent of the vote to be elected; if no candidate reaches that level, a runoff is held between the top two vote-getters.) The balloting held on October 31 and November 14, 1999, produced the following distribution of seats: Citizens’ Union of Georgia, 131; Revival of Georgia, 57; Industry Will Save Georgia, 16; Georgian Labor Party, 2; Abkhazian deputies, 12; and independents, 17. Elections were next held on November 2, 2003. Preliminary, incomplete, and often confusing results for the single-member districts indicated that the For a New Georgia bloc had won approximately 20 seats; the Saakashvili–National Movement, 11; the Burdjanadze–Democrats Bloc, 6; the Union for Georgia’s Democratic Revival, 6; the New Right, 3; the Georgian Labor Party, 3; Industry Will Save Georgia, 2; Abkhazian deputies, 10; and independents, 16. (Runoff balloting was due in a number of districts.) The central election commission also

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Cabinet As of September 1, 2006 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Ministers

Zurab Noghaideli Giorgi Baramidze Ivane Merabishvili

State Ministers Civil Integration European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Regulation of Conflicts Structural Reform

Zinaida Bestaeva [f] Giorgi Baramidze Merab Antadze Kakha Bendukidze

Ministers Agriculture Culture, Protection of Monuments, and Sport Defense Economic Development Education and Science Environmental and Protection of Natural Resources Finance Foreign Affairs Home Affairs Infrastructure and Development Justice Labor, Health, and Social Affairs Power Engineering Refugee and Resettlement Issues

Mikheil Svimonishvili Giorgi Gabashvili Irakli Okruashvili Irakli Chogovadze Alexander Lomaia David Tkeshelashvili Aleksi Aleksishvili Gela Bezhvashvili Ivane Merabishvili Tamar Sulukhia [f] Gia Kavtaradze Vladimir Chipashvili Nika Gilauri Giorgi Kheviashvili

[f] = female

reported the following distribution of the proportional seats: For a New Georgia, 38; Union for Georgia’s Democratic Revival, 33; Saakashvili– National Movement, 32; Georgian Labor Party, 20; the Burdjanadze–Democrats Bloc, 15; and the New Right, 12. However, in late November, following the ouster of President Shevardnadze, the Supreme Court annulled the results of the proportional balloting due to perceived fraud on the part of electoral authorities. New balloting for the proportional seats was held on March 28, 2004, with the National Movement–Democrats reportedly securing approximately 133 seats and the Right Opposition, Industrialists, and News, 17.

In the wake of a number of by-elections and continually shifting party allegiances and coalitions, the Georgian government as of mid-2006 described the distribution of seats in the parliament as follows: the Unified National Movement, 97; the Political Union–New Rights, News, 12; Industry Will Save Georgia, 7; Republican Party of Georgia, 6; the Union for Georgia’s Democratic Revival, 3; the Conservative Party of Georgia, 3; the Georgian Labor Party, 2; the Christian-Conservative Party of Georgia, 1; the Georgian Liberal Party, 1; the Union of Georgian Traditionalists, 1; Unity, 1; Strong Regions–Strong Georgia, 1; independents, 82; others or vacant, 18.

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For the next elections, Parliament has reduced its size from 235 to 150 (100 proportional seats and 50 from single-member constituencies). Chair: Nino BURDJANADZE.

Communications A proposed press freedom law was introduced in the parliament in 1999, but no action had been taken on it as of 2003. Meanwhile, the Shevardnadze government was reportedly seeking the reinstatement of legislation providing for heavy penalties against journalists deemed guilty of libeling officials, an initiative that watchdog groups described as an effort to thwart investigations into corruption. However, the media under Shevardnadze’s administration were considered “relatively free” in comparison to some other post-Soviet countries, and the Georgian independent television station Rustavi 2 was perceived as playing a significant role in support of the Rose Revolution that ousted Shevardnadze. Although the Saakashvili administration was elected on a reformist platform, it was described by critics in 2006 as having exerted “subtle pressure” on media owners in an alleged effort to curtail press freedom. In addition, a number of newspapers have been closed since 2004.

Press There are approximately 200 independent newspapers in circulation, many of them subject to the influence of their financial patrons in politics and business. The independent daily with the highest circulation reportedly is Alia. The following are published in Tbilisi in Georgian, unless noted otherwise: Rezonansi (10,000); Akhali Taoba (New Generation); Dilis Gazeti (Morning Newspaper), independent; Georgian Times (2,000), in English; Shvidi Dghe (Seven Days, 3,000); and

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Georgian Messenger, in English. Other publications (also published in Tbilisi in Georgian unless noted otherwise) include Akhalgazrda Iverieli (Young Iberian); Eri (Nation), weekly; Mamuli (Native Land), Rustaveli Society fortnightly; Respublika (Republic, 40,000), independent weekly; Sakartvelo (Georgia), government daily; Tavisupali Sakartvelo (Free Georgia), former Round Table–Free Georgia organ; and Vestnik Gruzii (Georgian Herald), government daily, in Russian.

News Agency The domestic facility is the Georgian Information Agency (Sakinform), headquartered in Tbilisi.

Broadcasting and Computing Georgian Radio broadcasts in Georgian, Russian, and a number of regional languages; Georgian Television broadcasts in Georgian and Russian. There are several independent television stations, including Rustavi 2, which the government attempted to shut down in October 2001, thereby precipitating significant protest demonstrations. There were approximately 26,300 television receivers and 151,000 Internet users in 2003.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. Vasil SIKHARULIDZE U.S. Ambassador to Georgia John F. TEFFT Permanent Representative to the UN Revaz ADAMIA IGO Memberships (Non-UN) BSEC, CEUR, CIS, EBRD, Interpol, IOM, OSCE, WCO, WTO

INDIA REPUBLIC

OF

INDIA

Bharat

The Country Forming a natural subcontinent between the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal and stretching from the Himalayas in the north to the Indian Ocean in the south, the Republic of India encompasses a m´elange of ethnic, linguistic, and socioreligious groups that together constitute a national population second in size only to that of mainland China. Although India has the largest Hindu population in the world, with about 83 percent of the people professing Hinduism, the Muslim component (over 11 percent) makes India the country with the world’s fourth-largest Muslim population, after Indonesia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Smaller religious groups include Christians, Sikhs, Buddhists, and Jains. Despite Hindu predominance, independent India has rigorously adhered to the concept of a secular state in which all religions enjoy equal status under the constitution. Caste discrimination, although still practiced in rural areas, is legally outlawed. Although the participation rate for women in the paid labor force has been rising rapidly, it stands at only about one-third, the vast majority in agricultural and related processing industries. Female representation in the most recently elected lower house of Parliament is 8 percent. Legislation has been proposed that would reserve one-third of the seats in Parliament for women, as has been the case for local councils and village leaders since a 1993 constitutional amendment, but the proposal remains controversial. India embraces over 1,600 different languages and dialects. Most are of Indo-European derivation, followed in importance by Dravidian, Austro-

Asiatic, and Sino-Tibiti. The states, the federal units of India, are delimited by major linguistic groups, the official language of a given state being that spoken by the majority of its inhabitants. Agriculture employs about 70 percent of Indian workers and contributes 23 percent of GDP; the principal crops are rice, cotton, and jute (fall harvest); wheat (summer harvest); and oilseeds, sugarcane, coffee, tea, spices, and nuts. Industrial activity traditionally centered on the production of cotton textiles, jute, tea, and food products,

INDIA

Political Status: Independent member of the Commonwealth since August 15, 1947; republican system instituted January 26, 1950. Area: 1,222,559 sq. mi. (3,166,414 sq. km.), excluding approximately 30,160 sq. mi. (78,114 sq. km.) of Jammu and Kashmir presently held by Pakistan and 16,480 sq. mi. (42,685 sq. km.) held by China. Population: 1,028,610,328 (2001C); 1,124,000,000 (2005E). The 2001 figure excludes three subdistricts of Manipur where administrative and technical difficulties resulted in cancellation of the results. Major Urban Centers (urban areas, 2005E): NEW DELHI (15,966,000); Mumbai, formerly Bombay (17,893,000); Kolkata, formerly Calcutta (14,213,000); Chennai, formerly Madras (6,877,000); Bangalore (6,463,000); Hyderabad (6,096,000); Ahmadabad (5,118,000).

but today industry is considerably diversified, with additional manufactures ranging from transport equipment (principally two-wheeled vehicles) and diesel engines to aluminum, petroleum products, and televisions. Industry as a whole accounts for 26 percent of GDP, compared with 52 percent for services. Leading merchandise exports include textiles and garments; gems and jewelry; electronics and computer software; chemicals and related products; leather and leather goods; marine products; and such traditional agricultural commodities as oil cakes, rice, coffee, tea, spices, and cashews. India’s principal markets are the United States, China (including Hong Kong), the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom. For more than four decades after independence, economic policy has been aimed at a “socialist pattern of society,” embracing both public and private sectors. Railroads, aviation, armaments, and atomic energy were assigned exclusively to government control, with the state dominating a range of other activities, including iron and steel, shipbuilding, oil, chemicals, certain types of mining, banking, and foreign trade. Because of the emphasis placed on import substitutions, government

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Official Languages: Hindi, English (in addition to other languages which are official at state levels). Monetary Unit: Rupee (market rate July 1, 2006: 46.04 rupees = $1US). President: A. P. J. Abdul KALAM; elected July 15, 2002, by an electoral college and inaugurated July 25 for a five-year term, succeeding Kicheril Raman NARAYANAN. Vice President: Bhairon Singh SHEKHAWAT; elected by Parliament on August 12, 2002, and inaugurated August 19 for a five-year term, succeeding Krishan KANT, who had died on July 27. Prime Minister: Manmohan SINGH (Indian National Congress); appointed by the President on May 19, 2004, and sworn in on May 22, in succession to Atal Bihari VAJPAYEE (Bharatiya Janata Party), who had submitted his resignation on May 13 following the election of April–May.

intervention, and protectionism, India’s share of world trade declined between the 1950s and the late 1980s, creating trade imbalances and fueling inflation. With the appearance of stagnation and a decline in foreign investment, the government of P. V. Narasimha RAO (1991–1996) attempted a radical overhaul of the Indian economy that included devaluating the rupee, permitting foreign majority control of domestic companies, and reducing constraints on market activity. The overall results of the controversial reforms were mixed. GDP growth averaged 6.1 percent in 1990–1998, and by 1998 India’s economy was the 11th largest in the world; however, per capita income remains low, at $530 in 2003, according to World Bank calculations. About 29 percent of the population—more than 300 million people—remains below the national poverty line. GDP growth for the fiscal year that ended in March 2002 was 5.8 percent, but growth fell to 3.8 percent in the 2002–2003 fiscal year, largely as a consequence of a severe drought and high oil prices. Export growth remained strong, however, in part because the rupee appreciated against the U.S. dollar, and the economy soared to an 8.5 percent

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growth rate in the year that ended in March 2004. Annual growth averaged about 7.5 percent in the next two years. According to a February 2005 report, the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26, 2004, cost some 17,000 Indian lives (including those missing and presumed dead) and displaced another 650,000 in the southern states of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu, plus the union territories of Pondicherry and the severely affected Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The most damaging economic effects were the loss of housing and fisheries. Less than four years earlier, on January 26, 2001, a major earthquake centered in the state of Gujarat had caused massive casualties and destruction. Described as India’s worst natural disaster in the modern era, the quake claimed at least 30,000 lives and left 600,000 or more homeless.

Government and Politics Political Background After a prolonged struggle against British colonial rule, India attained independence within the Commonwealth on August 15, 1947, when Britain put into effect the Indian Independence Act, thereby partitioning the subcontinent into the sovereign states of predominantly Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan. However, the act applied only to former British India, thus setting the stage for confrontation between the two new nations over accession of various princely states and feudatories that had retained nominal independence under the Raj, including the still-disputed Jammu and Kashmir, where a militarized Line of Control (LoC) still separates Indian and Pakistani sectors. Mohandas Karamchand GANDHI, an advocate of nonviolence and internal reform of Indian society who had led the country’s quest for independence, was assassinated on January 30, 1948, provoking widespread rioting that claimed the lives of countless members of the Mahasabha, the Hindu politico-religious group to which his assassin belonged. Jawahar Lal NEHRU, leader of the politically dominant Indian National Congress (INC),

served as India’s first prime minister, enunciating its basic principles of democracy, secularism, socialism, and nonalignment. Nehru died in May 1964 and was succeeded by Lal Bahadur SHASTRI, who died in January 1966 and was succeeded by Indira GANDHI, Nehru’s daughter. In 1969 the Congress split into Gandhi and conservative factions, the latter subsequently being styled the INC-Organization, or Congress (O), by the Election Commission. Mrs. Gandhi’s late-1970 political gamble of obtaining a dissolution of the lower house of Parliament was vindicated when her “New Congress” group, which had held 228 of 520 seats, swept the election of March 1971 with a record-setting 352 seats, sufficient to amend the constitution. The combined strength of Mrs. Gandhi’s principal adversaries, a coalition of the conservative Congress (O), the right-wing Jana Sangh and Swatantra parties, and a group of extreme leftists, was reduced to 49. Internal developments during 1971–1974 included the enactment of legislation authorizing the use of preventive detention as an antiterrorism measure and the adoption of constitutional amendments permitting parliamentary restriction of fundamental rights. In March 1975 a growing anticorruption campaign led by Jaya Prakash NARAYANAN, who had founded the Indian Socialist Party in 1948 but had subsequently withdrawn from politics to become a leader of the Sarvodaya movement, culminated in a massive demonstration in Delhi and the presentation of a “charter of demands” for reform to the presiding officers of Parliament. At a crucial state election in Gujarat on June 8 and 11, the Congress lost its overwhelming majority to the Janata (People’s) Front, a multiparty coalition that supported Narayanan’s program. The following day, the High Court of Allahabad ruled in favor of a petition filed by Raj NARAIN, Mrs. Gandhi’s Samyukta Socialist opponent in 1971, that charged election irregularities. The ruling disqualified Mrs. Gandhi from membership in the lower house of Parliament, the Lok Sabha, but she was granted a 20-day stay to appeal to the Supreme Court. Opposition party leaders immediately launched a civil disobedience campaign to force the prime

INDIA

minister’s resignation, and on June 26, 1975, President Fakhruddin Ali AHMED declared a state of emergency at Mrs. Gandhi’s request. Nearly 700 opposition leaders were promptly arrested, and press censorship was introduced for the first time since independence. The state of emergency was approved by both houses of Parliament on July 22. A majority of the opposition members subsequently withdrew from the lower house in protest. On November 7 the Indian Supreme Court unanimously upheld the prime minister’s appeal, and on December 29 the Congress Party approved postponement of the 1976 parliamentary election. The decision to continue the existing Lok Sabha was formally affirmed by Parliament in February 1976. In January 1977 Mrs. Gandhi called an election for March. In spite of the short, six-week campaign, Janata forces were able to organize behind Narayanan and Congress (O) leader Moraji R. DESAI. Pledging to end the state of emergency and restore democracy, Janata swept the election, Mrs. Gandhi being among the defeated candidates. On March 24 Desai was designated prime minister, and the state of emergency was revoked on March 27. In late December 1977 Mrs. Gandhi, followed shortly by seven supporters, resigned from the INC Working Committee and, in January 1978, organized the Indian National Congress–Indira (universally rendered as Congress [I]), which by midyear had become the nation’s major opposition party. Mrs. Gandhi returned to the Lok Sabha after winning a November by-election, but in late December she was stripped of her seat and imprisoned for the duration of the parliamentary term by action of the Janata majority. The fragility of the Janata coalition was highlighted in mid-1978 by a major leadership dispute between Prime Minister Desai and his home affairs minister, Charan SINGH. Moreover, a series of communal riots in a number of states effectively split the party into Hindu and secular factions and provoked demands by Raj Narain and others that Janata adopt the posture of a secular “third force” opposed to both Hindu extremism and the “authoritarianism” of Mrs. Gandhi. In mid-July Singh and a number of others resigned to join Narain’s recently

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formed Janata Party–Secular (JP-S), thus depriving the government of its majority in the Lok Sabha and forcing Desai’s resignation as prime minister. Invited by President Neelam Sanjiva REDDY to form a new government, Singh was sworn in on July 28, but he submitted his own resignation three weeks later following the defection of a number of Congress (O) members and an announcement that Congress (I) would not support him in a confidence vote. President Reddy dissolved the Lok Sabha on August 22 and asked Singh to remain in office in a caretaker capacity pending a new election. In a dramatic reversal of her defeat in 1977, Mrs. Gandhi swept back into power at the Lok Sabha election of January 1980, her party’s majority (enhanced by a by-election win in February) equaling that of her 1971 triumph: 352 seats. The personal popularity of Mrs. Gandhi was further evidenced when a longtime supporter, Giani Zail SINGH, a Sikh, easily won parliamentary election as India’s seventh president in July 1982. However, her administration proved unable to curb mounting domestic violence. A continuing influx of illegal Bengali immigrants generated reprisals in Assam, while riots broke out in Karnataka over a recommendation that Kannada be adopted as the language of instruction. Muslims and Hindus battled sporadically in Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat, and Harijans (“Untouchables”) were targets for numerous atrocities. Maoists, Naxalites (named after a peasant revolt in the 1960s at Naxalbari in West Bengal), and other extremists continued their frequently violent activities in Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, and West Bengal, while demands for autonomy by Sikhs in Punjab led to the storming of Parliament in October 1982 by several thousand individuals as part of a continuing morcha (“mass agitation”). The Sikh agitation of the early 1980s was directed by the relatively moderate leader of the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD), Harchand Singh LONGOWAL. In March 1984, as Hindu-Sikh violence intensified, the government charged Longowal with sedition, thus driving many of his supporters closer to the extremists led by Sikh fundamentalist Jarnail Singh BHINDRANWALE, who operated from

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sanctuary within the Golden Temple in Amritsar. A series of subsequent assassinations, reportedly ordered by Bhindranwale, led to an assault on the Golden Temple by Indian security forces during the night of June 5–6, in the course of which over 1,000 persons, including Bhindranwale, were killed. The action provoked an even deeper Sikh resentment, which reached a climax on October 31 with Mrs. Gandhi’s assassination by two Sikh members of her personal bodyguard. Mrs. Gandhi’s son, Rajiv GANDHI, was immediately sworn in as prime minister, and an election was called. In a record turnout of 63.6 percent, Congress (I) won a victory of unprecedented magnitude, capturing 401 of 508 contested seats. In July 1985 the government concluded a peace accord with Akali Dal. Sikh extremists responded by assassinating Longowal on August 20, and violence in Punjab and elsewhere persisted through 1986. At indirect balloting in July 1987, Vice President Ramaswamy VENKATARAMAN of the Congress (I) easily defeated the opposition candidate for president and was sworn in as President Singh’s successor on July 25. On September 3 Dr. Shankar Dayal SHARMA, theretofore governor of Maharashtra, was inaugurated as vice president, after having been elected unopposed. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had been buffeted by a wide variety of ethnic, religious, and political challenges to his leadership. Perhaps the most intractable problem, however, was that of Punjab. In August 1986 Gen. Arun VAIDYA, who had led the 1984 raid on the Golden Temple, was assassinated. In January 1987 some 400 troops mounted a fresh assault (the tenth since 1984) on the Golden Temple complex, and in May central government rule was reimposed on Punjab. In mid-1988 the Gandhi administration lost a critical series of state elections as evidence emerged of extensive corruption, particularly in the placing of arms contracts with Western companies. The government also came under serious challenge from Vishwanath Pratap SINGH, whose anticorruption campaign as defense minister had led to his expulsion from Congress (I) in mid-1987. Elected to the Lok Sabha as an independent in June,

Singh played a key role in organizing a National Front coalition of seven opposition parties in August, within which a tripartite Janata Dal (People’s Party) grouping of Janata, the Lok Dal, and Singh’s own Jan Morcha was formed in October. Prime Minister Gandhi called an early lower house election for November 1989, at which the National Front and its allies gained a clear-cut majority of seats. On December 2 Singh, although not favored by supporters of former Janata Dal president Chandra SHEKHAR, was sworn in as head of a new administration endorsed both by the rightwing Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and by the two leading leftist formations, the Communist Party of India (CPI) and the Communist Party of India–Marxist (CPI-M), none of which sought or was offered a cabinet position. In September 1990 BJP leader Lal Krishna ADVANI began a religious pilgrimage (rath yatra) to the site of an abandoned Muslim mosque in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, where Hindu efforts to construct a temple had led to serious ethnic unrest. On October 23 Prime Minister Singh ordered Advani’s arrest, whereupon the BJP withdrew its support from the government. With the National Front government thus weakened, Janata Dal split on November 5, 1990, Chandra Shekhar and Deputy Prime Minister Devi LAL forming Janata Dal (Socialist). Two days later Singh became the first Indian prime minister to be defeated on the floor of the Lok Sabha, losing a confidence vote 346–142, and on November 10 Shekhar, with Congress (I) backing, was named as his successor. Prime Minister Shekhar, whose Janata (S) parliamentary group counted only 54 members, felt obliged to resign on March 6, 1991, in the wake of a rift with Gandhi. On March 13 President Ventkataraman, acceding to a request by the Congress (I) leader, dissolved Parliament. At first-stage legislative balloting on May 20, Congress (I) was the victor in a substantial proportion of completed contests but did not appear likely to gain a majority in two remaining rounds. On May 21 the election was thrown into chaos by Gandhi’s assassination, almost certainly at the hands of Sri Lankan Tamil separatists angered over India’s 1987–1990

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intervention in support of the Sri Lankan government (see Foreign relations, below). Second- and third-stage polling were immediately postponed, with longtime party stalwart P. V. Narasimha Rao being named Congress (I) president on May 29. Completion of the election on June 15 yielded, as anticipated, less than a legislative majority for the Congress (I) and its allies; Rao nonetheless succeeded in forming a coalition administration, becoming India’s ninth prime minister when it was sworn in on June 21. Through a series of by-election victories and opposition defections, Rao was able to convert his plurality to a majority over the ensuing two years. On July 13, 1992, Dr. Sharma was accorded nearly two-thirds of the electoral college vote in being designated India’s ninth president, with Kicheril Raman NARAYANAN being chosen as his vice presidential successor on August 19. During 1994 Prime Minister Rao became increasingly beleaguered by critics of his marketoriented economic policies, and in December he was further weakened by the resignation of his heir apparent, Human Resources Minister Arjun SINGH, who insisted that the administration had turned a deaf ear to the plight of the country’s poor. Rao promptly expelled Singh from the Congress (I). In March 1995 Congress (I) suffered electoral defeats in the western states of Maharashtra and Gujarat, bringing the number of state legislative reversals to 11 in 16 contests since late 1993. The losses generated an open revolt within the ruling party, and a dissident rally on May 19 named a longtime rival of the prime minister, Narain Dutt TIWARI, to succeed Rao as party leader. Although Tiwari and his ally Arjun Singh subsequently formed the All India Indira Congress (AIIC), they and Rao alike called for intervention by Sonia GANDHI, Rajiv’s widow, who had been in seclusion since her husband’s assassination. On August 24 she broke her lengthy silence with a speech in which she criticized the Rao government’s handling of the stillincomplete inquiry into the killing. The near-collapse of the rupee in October 1995 was followed in January 1996 by India’s biggest

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corruption scandal to date, involving payments totaling $18 million to over 100 senior politicians and officials by a businessman in quest of government contracts. The disclosures led to ten ministerial resignations by early April and threw Congress (I) into deep crisis, although the other major parties were also sullied. Despite persistent reports that he himself had received illicit payments, Rao survived an opposition motion for his expulsion from Parliament on March 11. Balloting for the 11th Lok Sabha, held in several rounds beginning on April 27, delivered a heavy defeat for Congress (I), which retained only 140 seats and was overtaken by the Hindu fundamentalist BJP, with 161 seats. A 14-party center-left alliance, which was subsequently redesignated the United Front (UF), secured an aggregate of 177 seats, its largest single component being Janata Dal, with 45. Following precedent, President Sharma invited the BJP parliamentary leader, Atal Bihari VAJPAYEE, to form a government. A BJP administration was announced on May 15, 1996, but resigned on May 28 rather than face a confidence vote. The president then turned to the UF, which had selected the Karnataka chief minister, H. D. DEVE GOWDA (Janata Dal), as its overall leader. Crucially, Deve Gowda obtained a prompt pledge of support from the Congress (I) leadership. A UF minority government, containing representatives of nine component parties, was sworn in on June 1. Facing corruption and bribery charges, former prime minister Rao resigned as party president on September 21, 1996. (Although he was convicted in October 2000, the verdict was overturned in March 2002.) He was succeeded two days later, initially in an acting capacity, by the party treasurer, Sitaram KESRI, the first member of a lower caste to head the party. By then, having outlasted or reabsorbed most rival Congress formations, the party favored dropping the appended “I.” Although the UF and the Congress appeared to have few policy differences, on March 30, 1997, the latter announced that it was withdrawing its external support from the government. The UF administration consequently lost a confidence motion

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on April 11, prompting Deve Gowda to announce his resignation. With neither the Congress nor the UF strong enough to form a government on its own, Deve Gowda, who had stayed on as caretaker, announced on April 14 that he would step down as head of the UF, thereby permitting a “face-saving” change of leadership that would facilitate further UF-Congress cooperation. As a result, the highly respected foreign minister, Inder Kumar GUJRAL of the Janata Dal, was sworn in as prime minister on April 22. He reappointed most of the incumbent ministers to his new cabinet. In electoral college voting on July 14, 1997, Vice President Narayanan, who had the support of all major parties, was elected president, thereby becoming the first head of state with a Dalit (formerly “Untouchable” or Harijan) heritage. On August 16 Krishan KANT was chosen as vice president. Corruption issues remained a focus of attention in mid-1997 and a source of difficulty for the Gujral administration. Also complicating affairs was the revelation in late August that the appointed Jain Commission, in the course of its investigation into the 1991 assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, had considered evidence of a possible indirect connection between the Sri Lankan rebels who had allegedly killed Gandhi and the Dravidian Progressive Federation (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam—DMK), a member of the UF government. An additional factor in UF internal tension was the ongoing competition for control of Tamil Nadu between the DMK and the Tamil Maanila Congress (TMC), the latter of which had strong ties to the Gandhi family. Consequently, the TMC and Congress demanded the ouster of the DMK. When Gujral refused, Congress withdrew its support from the government, triggering its collapse on November 28. Congress and the BJP each subsequently tried to form a new government, but neither could attract UF support, prompting President Narayanan on December 4 to announce that midterm elections would be held in February–March 1998, with Prime Minister Gujral staying on in a caretaker capacity until then. Although the 1998 balloting failed to produce a majority for any of the major national parties, the BJP and its allies emerged with a parliamen-

tary plurality of some 252 seats, while the UF lost nearly half of its former representation. Having secured the support of a patchwork coalition of some 20 other national and regional parties, the BJP’s Vajpayee was sworn in as prime minister on March 19, and the government passed its first confidence test in the Lok Sabha by a vote of 274–261 on March 28. Meanwhile, the Congress Party, facing renewed internal dissension, had turned increasingly toward Sonia Gandhi, who, although not a candidate herself, had campaigned heavily in the final weeks before the election. On March 9, 1998, Sitaram Kesri announced his decision to retire as party leader, clearing the way for Gandhi’s assumption of the presidency. On March 16 Gandhi was additionally named the party’s parliamentary chairperson and thus the de facto leader of the opposition even though she had never held elective office. Earlier, on January 28, a New Delhi court had sentenced 10 Indians and 16 Sri Lankans to death for conspiring in her late husband’s 1991 assassination. (Although India has not abolished the death penalty, no executions have occurred since 1991.) On May 11 and 13, 1998, India conducted nuclear weapons tests for the first time since 1974, exploding five devices underground in the Rajasthan desert near Pokaran. (Pakistan responded on May 28 and 30 with six explosions of its own.) Domestically, the news prompted widespread expressions of national pride, although international condemnation quickly followed. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Vajpayee found himself facing ultimatums from his own coalition partners, particularly Jayalalitha JAYARAM, the flamboyant leader of the All India Dravidian Progressive Federation (All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam—AIADMK) and a former chief minister of Tamil Nadu. Vajpayee’s rejection of her demands for policy and personnel changes led Jayalalitha (as she is universally known) to withdraw her support, and on April 17, 1999, the government lost a confidence motion 270–269 in the Lok Sabha. The prime minister resigned the following day, and after Sonia Gandhi proved unable to forge a Congress-led coalition, President Narayanan dissolved the lower house on April 26.

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The ensuing election campaign was marked by considerable political reshuffling, with the BJP announcing in May 1999 the formation of a National Democratic Alliance (NDA) that, by late August, included 24 parties. Significantly, the NDA election manifesto emphasized economic reforms and infrastructural development while omitting Hindu nationalist goals. The most important development of the preelection period, however, was renewed hostilities in Kashmir. In early May India had discovered an incursion across the long-established LoC by Islamic militants and Pakistani troops. India responded by rushing additional forces and military supplies to the mountainous Kargil area, and heavy shellings and clashes continued through June. By July India appeared to have the upper hand. A negotiated withdrawal was completed late in the month, although sporadic artillery exchanges persisted, as did bombings, assassinations, and terrorist attacks by Islamic separatists. At multistage balloting in September–October 1999 the NDA won a clear victory in the Lok Sabha. On October 13, with the support of some 18 parties and just over 300 MPs, Prime Minister Vajpayee was sworn in at the head of a massive 70-member cabinet (including ministers of state). Numerous cabinet reshuffles occurred in the following three years, most significantly in September 2001 and on July 1, 2002. Two days earlier Vajpayee had elevated the hard-line minister of home affairs, Lal Krishna Advani, to the post of deputy prime minister. On February 27, 2002, Muslims burned train cars carrying Hindu activists from the disputed sacred site in Ayodhya. Nearly 60 died in the attack, which generated reprisals by Hindi vigilantes that cost an additional 1,000 Muslim and Hindu lives and forced over 100,000 Muslims to flee their homes. In September 2003 the Supreme Court pointedly criticized the Gujarat government, headed by the BJP’s Narendra MODI, for its failure to successfully prosecute anyone in connection with the Muslim deaths, and in April 2004 the Court went so far as to order the “Best Bakery” case, involving the deaths of 14 Muslims at a bakery, to be retried in another state. (In Febru-

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ary 2006 nine “Best Bakery” defendants were convicted and sentenced to life in prison; eight others were freed for lack of evidence.) Meanwhile, reports prepared by the United Kingdom and the European Union had alleged that the anti-Muslim riots that followed the train burning were not spontaneous, as some officials had claimed, but were instead an organized campaign conducted with the acquiescence—in some cases, the assistance—of government personnel. On July 15, 2002, A. P. J. Abdul KALAM, a scientist and the architect of India’s ballistic missile program, was elected president of India. Although a political novice, the widely popular Kalam, a Muslim, drew support from most of the opposition as well as the NDA. On August 12 Bhairon Singh SHEKHAWAT, a former chief minister of Rajasthan, was elected vice president, his predecessor, Krishan KANT, having died in office on July 27. Hoping to take advantage of a booming economy, a recent rapprochement with Pakistan (see Foreign relations, below), and favorable results from the previous month’s state elections, in late January 2004 Prime Minister Vajpayee advised President Kalam to dissolve the Lok Sabha and call an early election. Although public opinion polls indicated that Vajpayee would easily lead the NDA to victory, the government’s efforts to reduce the deficit, institute major tax reforms, privatize staterun enterprises, and permit foreign investment in a wider variety of industries had apparently contributed to voter perception that the plight of the rural poor was being slighted. In addition, the inadequate government response to the communal violence that followed the 2002 train-burning incident had raised questions about the government’s commitment to a secular union. As a result, voters confounded expectations, and in staged balloting in April–May Sonia Gandhi’s Congress and its allies registered an upset victory, winning 219 seats, versus 185 for the NDA. On May 13 Vajpayee submitted his resignation, and on May 19 the president named the INC’s Manmohan SINGH, a Sikh senator and economist, as India’s new prime minister. A day earlier, Gandhi had withdrawn her name from

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consideration, in part to defuse the divisive issue of her Italian birth. Having obtained the external support of the CPI-M, its Left Front partners, and an assortment of other parties, Singh and a multiparty United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government were sworn in on May 22.

Constitution and Government India’s frequently amended constitution of January 26, 1950, provides for a republican form of parliamentary government in a union that currently embraces 28 states and 7 centrally administered territories. The national government is headed by a president who serves a five-year term; the head of state is chosen, under a weighted voting system, by an electoral college comprising the elected members of both the bicameral Parliament and the state legislatures. The vice president is elected by the members of the full Parliament and serves as ex officio chair of the upper house of the legislature, the Council of States (Rajya Sabha), and presides over its meetings. The lower House of the People (Lok Sabha) is presided over by a speaker elected by its members. The speaker must be a member of Parliament but by convention abandons party affiliation while serving as presiding officer. The prime minister is elected by the parliamentary members of the majority party or coalition of parties and heads a government that is collectively responsible to the legislature. Each of the states has a governor, who is appointed by the president for a term of five years, and a popularly elected legislature. The legislatures may be bicameral or unicameral, but all are subject to maximum terms of five years. Administration is carried out by a chief minister heading a cabinet subject to parliamentary responsibility. In the event that constitutional processes in a state are rendered inoperative, the union constitution provides for the institution of direct presidential rule, with the concurrence of both houses of Parliament. The president can also appoint an agent to act as presidential surrogate, while the prime minister can call for new state elections. The union territories, some of which are former foreign territories or are located in outlying regions,

are administered by appointed officials (called lieutenant governors or administrators) responsible to the president. Pondicherry and the National Capital Territory of Delhi, like the states, also have elected assemblies and chief ministers. Three new states were added in November 2000: on November 1, Chhattisgarh, which was carved from Madhya Pradesh; on November 9, Uttaranchal, carved from Uttar Pradesh; and on November 15, Jharkhand, carved from Bihar. Possible state status for Delhi and Pondicherry has also been broached.

State and Capital Andhra Pradesh (Hyderabad) Arunachal Pradesh (Itanagar) Assam (Dispur) Bihar (Patna) Chhattisgarh (Raipur) Goa (Panaji) Gujarat (Gandhinagar) Haryana (Chandigarh) Himachal Pradesh (Shimla) Jammu and Kashmir (Srinagar)∗ Jharkhand (Ranchi) Karnataka (Bangalore) Kerala (Thiruvananthapuram) Madhya Pradesh (Bhopal) Maharashtra (Mumbai) Manipur (Imphal) Meghalaya (Shillong) Mizoram (Aizawl) Nagaland (Kohima) Orissa (Bhubaneswar) Punjab (Chandigarh) Rajasthan (Jaipur) Sikkim (Gangtok) Tamil Nadu (Chennai) Tripura (Agartala) Uttaranchal (Dehradun)

Area (sq. mi.)

Population (2005E)

106,204

79,765,000

32,333 30,285 36,356 52,197 1,429 75,684 17,070

1,198,000 28,542,000 91,604,000 22,224,000 1,420,000 54,873,000 22,276,000

21,495

6,484,000

39,146 30,778 74,051

11,150,000 29,249,000 56,179,000

15,005

33,006,000

119,013 118,808 8,620 8,660 8,139 6,401 60,118 19,445 132,138 2,740 50,215 4,045

65,903,000 104,958,000 2,552,000 2,560,000 987,000 2,427,000 38,945,000 26,105,000 32,398,000 604,000 64,804,000 3,383,000

20,650

9,098,000

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Uttar Pradesh (Lucknow) West Bengal (Kolkata)

93,022 34,267

182,019,000 85,665,000

3,185

391,000

44

970,000

190

300,000

43 12

159,000 61,000

185

975,000

573

13,851,000

Union Territory and Capital Andaman and Nicobar Is. (Port Blair) Chandigarh (Chandigarh) Dadra and Nagar Haveli (Silvassa) Daman and Diu (Daman) Lakshadweep (Kavaratti) (Pondicherry) (Pondicherry) National Capital Territory Delhi (Delhi) ∗

Indian-held portion

Foreign Relations India’s policies as a member of the Commonwealth, the United Nations, and other multilateral organizations have been governed by a persistent belief in nonalignment, peaceful settlement of international disputes, self-determination for colonial peoples, and comprehensive efforts to ameliorate conditions in the developing nations. Following independence, it avoided participation in regional defense pacts and exclusive alignment with either Western or Communist powers, although it accepted economic and, from 1962, military aid from members of both groups. India’s foreign policy has often focused on Pakistan. The centuries-old rivalry between Hindus and Muslims in the subcontinent was directly responsible for the partition in 1947 and continued to embitter Indo-Pakistani relations thereafter, particularly in regard to the long-standing dispute over Jammu and Kashmir. Fighting over that territory in 1947–1948 resulted in a de facto division into Pakistani- and Indian-held sectors. The Indian portion was subsequently absorbed as a separate state of the Indian Union. The action was strongly protested by Pakistan, and renewed armed conflict

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between the two countries erupted in 1965. In December 1971, following a political crisis in East Pakistan and the flight of some 10 million Bengali refugees to India, the two nations again went to war. The brief conflict ended with Pakistani acceptance of a cease-fire on the western front and the emergence in the east of the independent state of Bangladesh. In March 1972 India and Bangladesh concluded a 25-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, and relations remain close despite recent disagreements over boundaries; conflicting claims to newly formed islands in the Bay of Bengal; and the continued presence in Bangladesh of Indian insurgents from Assam, Tripura, and Manipur. (See the Bangladesh article for details.) In December 1996 the two countries concluded a pact on sharing the Ganges River, while an agreement signed on October 1, 2003, covers seven other rivers. India and Pakistan agreed to resume normal relations in mid-1972, but ambassadors were not exchanged until July 1976. Despite differences in 1981–1982, generated in large part by U.S. decisions to sell fighter aircraft and grant some $3.2 billion in aid and military credits to Islamabad, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq met in November 1982 and agreed to the establishment of a permanent joint commission to discuss economic, educational, cultural, and technical—but not military—cooperation. In December 1985 Zia and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi announced an agreement not to attack each other’s nuclear facilities. Subsequent bilateral talks focused on controlling illegal crossings, drugtrafficking, smuggling, and terrorism along their border. The Jammu and Kashmir issue continued to poison relations, however, particularly after separatists and Islamic fundamentalists began increasing their attacks in 1989. In May 1990 tension flared with the assassination, by persons unknown, of Kashmir’s most senior Islamic leader, Moulvi Mohammed FAROOQ. The conflict intensified again in 1993 when evidence surfaced that Afghan guerrillas had joined local Muslim separatists, and Indian and Pakistani units engaged in a series of clashes in September and October. Further escalation occurred in May 1995

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with an Indian army siege of Muslim militants, which resulted in the destruction of one of Kashmir’s most revered shrines, in Charar-i-Sharief. Although a number of bilateral meetings were held in 1997 regarding Jammu and Kashmir, domestic politics in both India and Pakistan constrained progress. In March 1998 the assumption of power by the Hindu nationalist BJP in New Delhi was viewed with consternation in Islamabad. India’s May 1998 nuclear weapons tests provoked widespread international criticism, including the mandatory imposition of economic sanctions by the United States, which cut off all but humanitarian aid, halted defense-related exports, and barred loans to India from U.S. banks. Other countries introducing punitive economic measures included Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, and Sweden. At least in part to diffuse external criticism, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif conferred briefly during the July 29–31, 1998, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) session in Colombo, Sri Lanka. They met again on September 23 in New York and agreed to renew bilateral talks on Kashmir in October, with discussions on such other matters as economic cooperation, terrorism and drug-trafficking, and cultural affairs to follow. Collaterally, speaking at the UN General Assembly, Vajpayee for the first time indicated that India was prepared to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) within a year, provided that remaining international sanctions were lifted. Within weeks many had in fact been canceled, as various governments responded to the decrease in regional tensions. Of even greater import, on February 20–21, 1999, Vajpayee and Sharif met in Lahore, Pakistan, the first such visit across the border by an Indian leader in a decade and only the third bilateral summit since the 1947 partition. Among the provisos in the resulting “Lahore Declaration” was a commitment by both governments to reduce the possibility of accidental nuclear war. The heightened hostilities in Kashmir in May– July 1999 effectively reversed the previous year’s

progress, while the coup by the Pakistani military in October further undermined regional relations and prompted India to postpone the SAARC meeting scheduled for November in Nepal. On July 14– 16, 2001, Prime Minister Vajpayee conferred with Pakistan’s chief executive, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, in Agra, but the meeting concluded without significant progress. On October 1 militants carried out an assault on the state assembly building in Srinagar, the summer capital of Jammu and Kashmir, causing nearly 40 deaths. India, asserting that Pakistan was not taking adequate measures to stop infiltration by terrorists, dispatched additional armed forces to Kashmir, with Pakistan responding in kind. On December 13 terrorists attacked India’s Parliament, leaving 14 dead, including the terrorists, and by May 2002, when three gunmen stormed a Kashmiri army base and left nearly three dozen dead, India and Pakistan had a combined million troops or more stationed along the LoC. Diplomatic intervention, led by the United States, ultimately helped to defuse the situation, but in Kashmir the familiar pattern of hostilities continued: clashes between Indian forces and separatist guerrillas, shelling by Indian and Pakistani forces across the LoC, bombings, and assassinations. Speaking in Srinagar on April 18, 2003, Prime Minister Vajpayee called for “open dialogue” with Pakistan, and the gesture quickly led to a mutual upgrading of diplomatic relations. On November 26 the two governments instituted a cease-fire, the first in 14 years, between Pakistani and Indian forces in the disputed border region, although India made it clear that it would continue operations within Jammu and Kashmir against militant separatists. The cease-fire was followed up with an announcement at the January 4–6, 2004, SAARC session that the two governments would soon begin a “composite dialogue” and seek a peaceful solution to outstanding bilateral issues. Meeting in New Delhi on April 17, 2005, Prime Minister Singh and Pakistan’s President Musharraf jointly declared that the peace process was “irreversible.” In its relations with the People’s Republic of China, India initially attempted to maintain a friendly posture; however, border tensions between

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the world’s two most populous nations escalated into military conflict in October 1962. At issue were 14,500 square miles of territory in the Aksai Chin area of eastern Kashmir and some 36,000 square miles of Arunachal Pradesh in the northeast (below the so-called McMahon line, dating from 1913–1914), from which China withdrew after the 1962 war (see map). Following a thaw in relations during 1976, ambassadors were exchanged for the first time in nearly 14 years. During a state visit by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China in December 1988 (the first by an Indian head of government since 1954), “in-depth discussions” on the boundary question were reported. An agreement to reduce troop levels and respect the existing Line of Actual Control (LAC) without prejudice to the rival claims was signed by Chinese Premier Li Peng and Prime Minister Rao in Beijing on September 7, 1993. In May 1998 relations took an unexpected turn when Indian Defense Minister George FERNANDES asserted that China, not Pakistan, posed the single greatest security threat to India, a stance repeated by Prime Minister Vajpayee in a letter to U.S. President Bill Clinton explaining the decision to conduct the May nuclear tests. Nevertheless, at year’s end New Delhi indicated its continuing desire to seek improved Sino-Indian relations, and talks on the border issue resumed in March 1999. In April 2005 the two countries agreed to a framework for settling the border issue (see the article on the People’s Republic of China for additional information about the border dispute). Relations between India and the Soviet Union were founded on a general coincidence of views on international political problems, mutual proximity to China, Soviet support for the Indian position on Kashmir, and Soviet economic and military aid. The breakup of the Soviet Union was viewed as having major consequences for India’s posture in international affairs, although good relations have continued with the succeeding Russian Federation. The United States was a strong supporter of Indian independence, and U.S. aid to India for some years thereafter far exceeded that received by any other nation. Politically, relations have fluctuated,

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the most severe strain occurring in the course of the 1971 conflict between India and Pakistan. Differences also arose over India’s explosion of an underground nuclear device in May 1974 and its subsequent refusal to permit international inspection of nuclear facilities. A variety of nuclear and arms supply issues (particularly as they involved Pakistan) were reportedly discussed with President Ronald Reagan during a U.S. visit by Rajiv Gandhi in June 1985. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Washington increased its pressure on New Delhi to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and join with Pakistan and China in limiting nuclear development in East and South Asia. India refused to do so on the ground that “the treaty in its present form is discriminatory” in that it legitimizes possession of nuclear weapons by a handful of countries. Without referencing the nuclear issue, a U.S.-Indian military accord was concluded in mid-January 1995 that called for joint military exercises, training, defense research, and weapons production. In February 2000 Prime Minister Vajpayee stated that India would not sign the CTBT until a national consensus was achieved. Subsequent discussions with Washington proved beneficial, however, and by mid-2001 the U.S. George W. Bush administration appeared willing to lift remaining sanctions and forge a closer strategic link. The last sanctions were lifted on September 23, 2001, as the Bush administration marshaled support for an impending assault on the al-Qaida terrorist network based in Afghanistan. In 2003 India opposed the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. With a U.S. presidential election looming in 2004, the outsourcing of many U.S. service jobs to India, made possible by the Internet and other advances in information technology, became a significant issue with the American electorate. During 1987 India became directly involved in the ethnic strife engulfing its southern neighbor, Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka’s Tamil dissidents had long enjoyed support in the south Indian state of Tamil Nadu, which is predominantly ethnic Tamil. It was not until 1985 that Rajiv Gandhi retreated from the overtly pro-Tamil posture of his recently

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assassinated mother by declaring that he opposed any attempt by the Tamil minority to establish an autonomous state in Sri Lanka. In late 1986 he proposed the merger of Sri Lanka’s largely Tamil Northern and Eastern Provinces as a basis of settling the dispute, and in July 1987, during his first official visit to Sri Lanka, he offered military assistance to the Jayawardene government in support of the regionalization plan. Within days, 3,000 Indian troops had been dispatched to the island’s Jaffna peninsula to assist in the disarming of the guerrillas. Although some 70,000 Indian troops were deployed by early 1988, the mission proved to be a political liability for both governments, and by March 1990 the Indian troops had been withdrawn. New Delhi made no effort to send them back when the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka resumed with even greater ferocity, after which Gandhi himself became a victim. In other regional activity, in 1989 a somewhat improbable “war of nerves” with Nepal over the renewal of trade and transit treaties led to a cutoff in bilateral commerce that lasted until June 1990. Among the more significant recent bilateral developments were the signing in 1996 of the Mahakali Integrated Development Treaty and a subsequent agreement providing Nepal with transit rights across Indian territory to Bangladeshi ports. A continuing dispute involves the Kalapani border area, which Indian troops have occupied since the 1962 Sino-Indian war. From 1994 India lobbied extensively for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, insisting that such action would permit the council to reflect more accurately the distribution of the world’s population. The United States, which was actively supporting bids by Germany and Japan, characterized the Indian request as “premature,” while Pakistan declared its strong opposition, pending resolution of the Kashmir dispute.

Current Issues Upon taking office Manmohan Singh’s UPA government quickly announced a broad “Common Minimum Program” that included promoting so-

cial harmony; maintaining economic growth of 7– 8 percent annually; improving the lives of farmers and other laborers; empowering women; advancing full equality for scheduled castes and tribes; and encouraging entrepreneurs, professionals, and productive enterprises. The program, which significantly departed from that of the preceding government, was partly designed to retain crucial support from the Left Front. In addition, the new government vowed to repeal the controversial Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), which had been passed by a joint session of Parliament in March 2002 (following promulgation as an ordinance the previous October). Introduced in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the United States, the POTA had broadened the definition of terrorism, had granted the government powers to monitor communications and compel journalists to disclose information, had provided for 90-day detention without court order, and had loosened evidentiary rules. The act was eventually repealed in December 2004 and replaced by an Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Bill. The Singh government’s first major cabinet reshuffle, on January 29, 2006, brought in ten new ministers and a dozen ministers of state. Several of the changes involved energy-related portfolios, including power, petroleum, and heavy industry and utilities. Among those departing was Minister of Petroleum Mani Shankar AIYAR, who had been a strong advocate for constructing a new gas pipeline that would originate in Iran and pass through Pakistan. In addition, the prime minister retained the external affairs portfolio he had assumed following the December 6, 2005, resignation of Foreign Minister Natwar SINGH. Although he denied any involvement, Natwar Singh had been implicated in the UN-ordered investigation into the Iraqi oil-forfood bribery scandal. The 2006–2007 union budget, introduced in late February 2006, proposed increased spending for health care, education, and rural infrastructure while simultaneously cutting the deficit. The pace of economic reform remains sluggish, however, largely because of the continuing need to

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maintain support from the left. As a consequence, labor reforms; privatization of state enterprises; cuts in consumer subsidies; and liberalized rules for foreign direct investment in retail, banking, and insurance have all been delayed. A third round of peace talks with Pakistan was held January 17–18, 2006, in New Delhi. The most tangible results to date have been improved overland transportation links and marginal troops withdrawals along the LoC. In response to the devastating earthquake that struck Kashmir and northern Pakistan on October 8, 2005, both sides agreed to temporarily open five crossing points along the LoC to aid divided families and provide quake relief, but the transit points saw little traffic, in part because of severe winter weather. At the same time, however, official and nongovernmental contacts have significantly expanded with moderate separatist leaders, chiefly those represented in the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (for details, see the discussion under Kashmiri Separatist Groups, below). Meanwhile, relations with the United States have continued to strengthen, at least in part because the George W. Bush administration views India as a counterweight to China. During a visit by Prime Minister Singh to Washington in July 2005, plans were announced for a new nuclear partnership, although completion of the agreement awaited a return visit by President Bush to India in March 2006. The plan calls for sharing civilian nuclear technology and fuel, provided that India separate its civil and military nuclear programs, permits international monitoring of its civil operations, refrains from further nuclear tests, and agrees not to transfer nuclear technology to third countries. The agreement was not expected to see easy passage through the U.S. Congress, however, particularly given India’s refusal to sign the NPT.

Political Parties and Groups Although a count during the first general election in 1952 revealed over 100 parties and political groups contesting seats throughout the country, the undivided Indian National Congress

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dominated the political scene until 1969, when it split into ruling (Gandhi) and opposition factions. The latter, although repudiating the designation, was subsequently styled the Indian National Congress–Organization, or Congress (O), by the Election Commission. The Gandhi Congress swept the election of 1972 but became increasingly divided after its defeat in March 1977, and in January 1978 those remaining loyal to Mrs. Gandhi organized separately as the Indian National Congress– Indira (INC-I), or the Congress (I). Following the declaration of emergency in June 1975, a national Janata (People’s) Front, comprising Congress (O), the Indian People’s Party (Bharatiya Lok Dal), the Socialist Party, the Indian People’s Union (Bharatiya Jana Sangh), and the Congress for Democracy, formed to oppose the Gandhi Congress. In May 1976 the widely respected Jaya Prakash Narayanan announced that the front would be converted into a unified political party in order to present a “democratic national alternative” to Congress rule. In March 1977 the resultant Janata Party swept to victory. The expulsion of Charan Singh from the government in mid-1978, plus communal riots and intraparty conflict in a number of states, split Janata in July 1979. A breakaway faction organized as the Janata Party–Secular (JP-S) thereafter formed the core of the Lok Dal (People’s Party) in preparation for the January 1980 lower house election, at which the Congress (I) secured a near two-thirds majority. In the wake of Mrs. Gandhi’s assassination, Congress (I) swept nearly 80 percent of contested seats at the Lok Sabha balloting of December 1984. In 1985 Parliament passed an antidefection constitutional amendment that, under most circumstances, would disqualify members of Parliament or of state legislatures upon changing party allegiance. Largely for this reason, the Jan Morcha (People’s Front), organized by V. P. Singh in October 1987 after his break with Rajiv Gandhi and Congress (I), was characterized as a “nonparty political forum.” A year later Singh became leader of the broader Janata Dal (People’s Party), which itself formed part of the seven-party centrist

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National Front—NF (Rashtriya Morcha) alliance. Although failing to outpoll Congress (I) in November 1989, the NF was able to form a government with the external support of the two main Communist parties—the Communist Party of India (CPI) and the CPI-Marxist (CPI-M)—and the fundamentalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The BJP’s withdrawal of support a year later and a split in Janata Dal precipitated the government’s fall. Although the NF was broadened to include the Communist and other left-wing parties for the June 1991 election, becoming the NF/Leftist Front (NF/LF), Congress (I) and its allies returned to power. The April–May 1996 election yielded a major advance for the BJP, but its inability to attract other support enabled an even larger, 14-party NF/LF, subsequently renamed the United Front (UF), to form a minority government under H. D. Deve Gowda of the Janata Dal. The ministerial lineup included representatives of nine parties: Janata Dal; Dravidian Progressive Federation (DMK); Samajwadi Party (SP); CPI; Assam People’s Council (AGP); the Telugu Desam Party (TDP); and the now-defunct Congress-Tiwari (a splinter from the Congress [I]), Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party (MGP), and Tamil Maanila Congress (TMC). While the members of the United Front acted in concert in support of its prime ministers, the front was not a permanent political organization with established structures. Dependent on the support of the nonmember Congress, the UF was also caught in its own internal contradictions, and when the Jain Commission split the Tamil parties from both Congress and others within the front, the UF’s position became untenable. In the election of March 1998 the coalition fell from 177 seats to 97. The government formed after the 1998 elections was based around the BJP but also included a dozen other parties, among them several mutually antagonistic groups from the southern state of Tamil Nadu. Although not as unwieldy as the preceding UF coalition, the Vajpayee government proved equally susceptible to fracturing and in April 1999

lost a confidence motion by a single vote following the withdrawal of the All India Dravidian Progressive Federation (AIADMK). On May 16 the BJP and a dozen of its allies announced formation of a National Democratic Alliance (NDA) that by the time of the September–October Lok Sabha election victory numbered some 24 mostly regional organizations. For the 2004 election the country’s six “national” parties (the Bahujan Samaj Party, BJP, CPI, CPIM, INC, and NCP), three dozen “state” parties with national standing, and a number of India’s 700-plus additional state and local parties offered candidates. Although many of the smaller NDA component parties had left the fold since the 1999 balloting, the NDA entered the 2004 election campaign as the odds-on favorite. Most of the BJP’s major allies in 1999, including Shiv Sena (SS), the Biju Janata Dal (BJD), the SAD, and the Janata Dal (United), remained in place, and two state governing parties, the TDP of Andhra Pradesh and the AIADMK of Tamil Nadu, had joined. Despite dire predictions of record losses, the Congress had cemented alliances with the main Tamil Nadu opposition parties, including former NDA member DMK; had repaired relations with the leaders of the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP); and had gained the support of a new Andhra Pradesh formation, the Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS). Congress and its allies prevailed, and with external support from the four-party Left Front alliance and others, they succeeded in forming a minority government. In addition to India’s myriad political parties, many unrecognized or proscribed separatist or militant groups exist. The principal ones are based in Kashmir or the northeast states. The October 2001 Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance banned two dozen of them, including, of those discussed below, the Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin, the Lashkar-i-Taiba, the Sikh Babbar Khalsa International, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), the Achik National Volunteers Council (ANVC) of Meghalaya, the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, the National Liberation Front of Tripura

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(NLFT), the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), and the Manipur People’s Liberation Front (MPLF) and its component organizations.

United Progressive Alliance Indian National Congress (INC). Founded in 1885 and led from 1966 to 1977 by Indira Gandhi, the original INC experienced the withdrawal in 1969 of an anti-Gandhi conservative faction that became India’s first recognized opposition party, the Indian National Congress–Organization (Congress-O), prior to joining Janata. The INC was further weakened by the defection or expulsion of numerous leaders both before and after the March 1977 election, at which the party suffered its first defeat, and Mrs. Gandhi lost her own parliamentary seat. In January 1978 her supporters designated the former prime minister as the president of a new national opposition party, the Indian National Congress–Indira (INC-I), or Congress (I). Building from a political base in the traditionally pro-Gandhi south, Congress (I) had displaced the rump INC as the principal opposition force in both houses of Parliament by May. In July 1981 the Election Commission ruled that the Congress (I) was the “real” Congress in that the majority of INC leaders and legislative officeholders at the time of the 1978 division had since become members of Mrs. Gandhi’s party. By late 1982 the anti-Gandhi Congress had, for all practical purposes, disintegrated. Under the leadership of Mrs. Gandhi’s son Rajiv, Congress (I) won 401 of 508 contested lower house seats in December 1984, but at the general election of November 1989 its representation plummeted to 193 seats. Even though the latter constituted a plurality, the National Front and its allies claimed 283 seats, forcing the Congress into opposition. At the 1991 poll, however, Congress (I) obtained 223 seats, sufficient for it and its allies to form a minority government under the premiership of P. V. Narasimha Rao, successor to the assassinated Rajiv. The Rao government’s pursuit of rapid economic liberalization and deregulation met with lit-

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tle resistance from Congress (I) elements still attached to the party’s earlier socialist aspirations. More threatening to Rao was a rising tide of corruption disclosures and other scandals. At the 1996 election, by which time the party considered the “Indira” (“I”) designation unnecessary, its representation in the Lok Sabha fell to an all-time low of 140 seats, behind the BJP and the United Front (UF). After helping to bring about the speedy collapse of a BJP government, the Congress opted to give external support to a minority UF administration. Accusations of corruption and other wrongdoing while he was prime minister led Rao to resign as party chief on September 21, 1996, and he was replaced by the Congress treasurer, Sitaram KESRI, who became the party’s first non-Brahmin leader. The apparent ability of the late Rajiv Gandhi’s Italian-born widow, Sonia Gandhi, to bring support back to the ailing party led to her involvement in the legislative campaign in January 1998. Despite winning only 141 seats, the party emerged as the largest opposition formation. Party President Kesri announced his resignation on March 9, after which Sonia Gandhi was chosen as his replacement and as the party’s parliamentary leader, despite holding no elective office. The party’s governing body, the All-India Congress Committee, ratified her selection on April 6. Meanwhile, Congress had begun welcoming the return of many former dissidents who had formed splinter parties because of opposition to the policies of Mrs. Gandhi or Rao. Among these leaders were Sharad Pawar of the Indian National Congress (Socialist), Madhavrao SCINDIA of the Madhya Pradesh Vikas Party (MPVP), Arjun SINGH of the All India Indira Congress (AIIC), and Sis Ram OLA of the All India Indira Congress (Secular). Following Prime Minister Vajpayee’s resignation on April 17, 1999, Sonia Gandhi attempted to organize a Congress-led coalition, but on April 25 she admitted failure, paving the way for President Narayanan to dissolve the lower house and call a fresh election. On May 17 Gandhi resigned as INC president when several prominent party leaders,

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principally Sharad Pawar, proposed a constitutional amendment that would restrict the national presidency, vice presidency, and prime ministership to native-born Indians. Three days later Pawar and two others were expelled by the party, and on May 24 Gandhi withdrew her resignation. Pawar went on to cofound the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP, below), describing the INC leadership as a “virtual cult phenomenon” and claiming the current INC could no longer fulfill its nationalist heritage. At the September–October 1999 Lok Sabha election the Congress turned in its worst performance in nearly half a century, winning only 114 seats despite a slight increase in its vote share. On October 17 Gandhi, who had been elected to the lower house in her first contest, was chosen leader of the opposition. Prior to the 2004 election the Congress picked up additional support through mergers with a number of parties, most prominently the Tamil Maanila Congress (TMC) of the late G. K. MOOPANAR, who had left the Congress in April 1996 in opposition to reactivation of an alliance with the Tamil AIADMK (below). Another 1996 splinter, the Haryana Vikas Party (HVP), led by former Haryana chief minister Bansi LAL and a son, Surender SINGH, also reunited with the Congress shortly before the election. (Singh died in a 2005 helicopter crash; Lal died in March 2006.) The Himachal Vikas Congress (HVC) of Sukh RAM did likewise; in 1999 it had won one seat as part of the NDA. In August 2003 the main body of the Sikkim Sangram Parishad (SSP, below), led by former Sikkim chief minister Nar Bahadur BHANDARI, had also merged with Congress. Following its Lok Sabha victory, Congress on May 14, 2004, elected Sonia Gandhi as its parliamentary leader, paving the way for her designation as prime minister. The BJP and other Hindu parties had already announced, however, that they strongly opposed her assumption of the prime ministership because of her foreign birth. Although Congress’s allies, the parties of the Left Front, and most of the other non-NDA parliamentary parties continued to express support for her, on May 18 she withdrew from consideration, assert-

ing that she had never sought to be prime minister. It was also widely believed that her children, having seen their grandmother and father assassinated while in office, had urged her to step aside. In her stead Gandhi put forward Manmohan Singh, an economist and former finance minister who was widely credited with introducing, a decade earlier, reforms that had saved India’s faltering economy. Singh, a Sikh, thus became the first member of a minority to serve as prime minister of India. In the 2004 election Palaniappan CHIDAMBARAM, who had been expelled from the TMC in 2001 and had then formed the Congress Jananayaga Peravai (originally the TMC Democratic Forum), ran on the Congress list and was later named minister of finance, after which his party decided to merge with Congress. On March 23, 2006, Sonia Gandhi resigned her seat in the Lok Sabha to deflect criticism that she had violated a technical provision of a law prohibiting elected politicians from holding salaried positions. She then announced she would run in a by-election scheduled for May but would first resign from her positions in several foundations and other organizations, including as unsalaried chair of the extraconstitutional National Advisory Council, which she had established in May 2004 to direct government policy. As of April 2006 the Congress was the majority or plurality party in just under half of the states. Leaders: Sonia GANDHI (President of the Party), Dr. Manmohan SINGH (Prime Minister), A. K. ANTONY, Pranab Kumar MUKHERJEE (Leader of the Lok Sabah), Arjun SINGH, Ahmen PATEL (Political Secretary). Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD). Formed in 1997 in the state of Bihar, the RJD (National People’s Party) emerged from the conflict between the charismatic leader of Bihar state, L. P. Yadav, and his successor as president of the Janata Dal, Sharad Yadav. After his indictment on charges stemming from alleged misallocation of $250 million in agricultural support funds, L. P. Yadav was ousted from the Janata Dal and formed the RJD. In the March 1998 national balloting the party held its 17 seats

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in Bihar but failed to move significantly into other states. In June 1998 L. P. Yadav and Samajwadi Party leader M. S. Yadav announced that they were forming a National Democratic Front (Rashtriya Loktantrik Morcha) as an anti-BJP, secular formation that they hoped would attract other parties. By the end of the year, however, there were no indications that it had emerged as a viable center of opposition activity. In mid-February 1999 L. P. Yadav and his wife, Rabri Devi, the controversial chief minister of Bihar State, were arrested while protesting New Delhi’s decision to assume governance of the state in the wake of two massacres of peasants, allegedly at the instigation of private landlords. The central takeover was rescinded in March when the Vajpayee administration could not muster support for the move from a majority of the Rajya Sabha. At the September–October 1999 election the RJD lost all but 7 Lok Sabha seats, including L. P. Yadav’s, despite an alliance with Congress. At the Bihar State election in February 2000, however, it showed unexpected strength, capturing a plurality of legislative seats. In 2004 the RJD took 21 Lok Sabha seats as a Congress ally, but at the February 2005 state election it won only 75 assembly seats and was forced to surrender power. With the BJP and its allies apparently unable to form a government, in March the union administration recommended the imposition of president’s rule, which ultimately led to another state election in October– November 2005, at which the RJD lost another 21 seats and finished third. In the meantime, Yadav had been charged with embezzling agricultural subsidies in 1996, when he was chief minister. As of May 2006 dozens of former government officials and businessmen had been convicted of involvement in “fodder scam”; Yadav had yet to go to trial. Leaders: Lalu Prasad YADAV (President of the Party and Minister of Railways), R. P. YADAV (Working President), Rabri DEVI (Former Chief Minister of Bihar). Dravidian Progressive Federation (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam—DMK). The DMK, which

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dates back to the early years of Indian independence, is an anti-Brahmin regional party dedicated to the promotion of Tamil interests and more autonomy for the states. A major split in 1972 led to formation of the AIADMK (below), which proved ascendant in most subsequent Tamil Nadu balloting. However, in an unprecedented swing occasioned in part by the alleged corruption of the AIADMK state administration, the DMK in 1996 not only won 17 Lok Sabha seats but also returned to power with a landslide majority in the concurrent state election. Allegations related to the DMK’s possible indirect involvement in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi split the informal coalition holding the United Front in power and brought about the elections of 1998, at which the party won only 6 seats. In preparation for the 1999 Lok Sabha election, in mid-May the DMK joined several other Tamil Nadu parties, including the PMK and MDMK (see below), as participants in the NDA. Party leaders cited the BJP’s decision to distance itself from Hindi communalism as a principal reason for their decision. Having carried 12 seats at the September– October balloting, the DMK agreed to join the Vajpayee cabinet. At the May 2001 state election the DMK was handily defeated by its nemesis, the AIADMK, and at the end of June party leader M. Karunanidhi was arrested on corruption charges. Mass demonstrations and a governmental crisis followed, and intervention by federal authorities soon led to his release. The DMK pulled out of the NDA government in December 2003 and allied itself with Congress in January 2004. It won 16 Lok Sabha seats at the subsequent election and was awarded several portfolios in the resultant Singh cabinet. As in past elections, for the May 2006 Tamil Nadu assembly balloting the DMK led a multiparty Democratic Progressive Alliance (DPA) that included Congress as well as the PMK, IUML, CPI-M, and CPI (see below). Leaders: Dr. Muthuvel KARUNANIDHI (Former Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu and President of the Party), M. K. STALIN, Dayanidhi MARAN.

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Nationalist Congress Party (NCP). Formation of the NCP was announced in May 1999 by three Congress members who had been expelled from the parent party for proposing, in a direct affront to Sonia Gandhi, a constitutional amendment requiring that only “natural-born” Indian citizens be permitted to serve as national president, vice president, or prime minister. At its formal launch in June the NCP absorbed what remained of the Indian National Congress (Socialist)—the INC-S or Congress (S)—which traced its origin to the antiGandhi Congress of 1977–1978. (The NCP president had served as leader of the INC-S from 1981 until his return to the Congress in 1986.) The new party won eight seats in the September–October Lok Sabha election. Despite its differences with the parent party, in Maharashtra State the NCP joined the INC and a number of independents in forming a state government under a Democratic Front. In May 2002 the Kerala branch of the NCP reestablished the Congress (S)—see below. The NCP entered the 2004 election campaign allied with Congress, but in March a faction led by Purno Sangma broke away (largely because of opposition to the foreign-born Sonia Gandhi as a prospective prime minister) and joined the AllIndia Trinamul Congress (AITC, below), although Sangma returned to the NCP in December 2005. At the 2004 election the NCP won nine seats. Earlier in the year another faction, based in Chhattisgarh and led by V. C. SHUKLA, had broken away and formed the short-lived Rashtriya Janatantrik Dal, which merged with the BJP in March. Leaders: Sharad PAWAR (President), Purno SANGMA, Tariq ANWAR (General Secretary). Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK). A Tamil Nadu party based in the disadvantaged Vanniyar community of the northern part of the state, the PMK (“Pattali People’s Party”) emerged in 1997 as a bitter opponent of the AIADMK, although in the interests of political power it subsequently joined a coalition with its enemy. It won all four seats it contested in the 1998 national election, and five of eight in 1999. On February 5, 2001, it left the NDA,

but after a lack of success at the subsequent state elections, it rejoined the alliance in late July. It departed again in January 2004 and joined the DMK and MDMK (below) as allies of Congress for the April–May general election, at which it won six seats. Anbumani Ramdoss, son of the party founder and president, entered the Singh cabinet. For the 2006 Tamil Nadu assembly election, the PMK participated in the DMK-led Democratic Progressive Alliance, although it insisted that it would not participate in a coalition government should the alliance win. Leaders: Dr. S. RAMDOSS (President), Anbumani RAMDOSS (Minister for Health and Family Welfare). Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM). The JMM (Jharkhand Liberation Front) was organized in 1980 to represent the tribal people of Bihar and Orissa. It was allied with the National Front/Leftist Front in the 1991 national election, winning six Lok Sabha seats, but its main faction remained outside the alliance for the 1996 poll, at which its representation was reduced to two members. As an ally of Congress in 1998, the party lost its remaining lower house seats. In 1999 a factional dispute between Shibu Soren and Suraj MANDAL threatened to split the party, which failed again in its bid for lower house seats. The Soren wing of the party supported Prime Minister Vajpayee’s government but broke with the NDA when the alliance backed a BJP candidate for chief minister of the new state of Jharkhand in November 2000. (Mandal, having been expelled from the JMM, went on to form the Jharkhand Vikas Dal, which merged with the JD[U] after the 2004 general election.) In March 2004 the JMM concluded a pact with the Congress, and it then won five Lok Sabha seats, after which Soren joined the Singh cabinet. He was forced to resign as minister of coal and mines in late July, however, following issuance of an arrest warrant related to his alleged involvement in a 1975 riot that cost ten lives. He returned to the cabinet in November but then resigned in March 2005 in

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an unsuccessful effort to become chief minister of Jharkhand. He then rejoined the Singh cabinet in January 2006. Leaders: Shibu SOREN (President of the Party and Minister of Coal), Sudhir MAHATO. Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS). The TRS was founded in April 2001 by former members of the governing Telugu Desam Party (TDP, below) who advocated restoration of a separate Telangana State, which had been absorbed by Andhra Pradesh in 1956. At the 2004 general election the party won five seats in the Lok Sabha. It joined the Singh government but withdrew in August 2006 over the statehood issue. Leader: K. Chandrasekhar RAO (President of the Party). Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK). The MDMK is a strongly Tamil nationalist grouping, occasionally accused of being too close to Sri Lanka’s separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) for easy cooperation with national parties. The Jain Commission report on the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi caused the party some difficulties, although its long-standing antipathy to the DMK contributed to its participation in the AIADMK alliance in 1998 and in the subsequent BJP-led government coalition. The party had run five candidates in Tamil Nadu, winning three seats. In April 1999 the MDMK broke ranks with the AIADMK over the latter’s withdrawal of support for the Vajpayee government, which led to a rapprochement with the DMK and the MDMK’s participation in the NDA. In July 2002 the MDMK’s general secretary, Vaiko, was detained by the AIADMK-led Tamil Nadu government for delivering a speech in which he urged support for the LTTE. He was held under the controversial Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) until released on bail in February 2004. Responding to an imminent NDA-AIADMK pact, the MDMK had left the Vajpayee government in December 2003. It contested the 2004 election with

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Congress (and the DMK), winning four Lok Sabha seats, as it had in 1999. In March 2006 the MDMK aligned with the AIADMK for the May Tamil Nadu assembly election, prompting the DMK to demand the MDMK’s removal from the UPA. Leaders: L. GANESAN (Presidium Chair), VAIKO (V. GOPALASWAMI, Secretary General). Lok Janshakti Party (LSP). The LSP was formed as the Janshakti Party in late November 2000 by government minister Ram Vilas Paswan and three other members of the lower house, all formerly of the derecognized Lok Shakti (LS; see JD[U], below). The new party was recognized by the Elections Commission under its present name in December 2000. In April 2002 Paswan resigned as minister of coal and mines and pulled his party out of the governing NDA, citing the government’s inability to resolve the ongoing sectarian violence in Gujarat. Allied with Congress in 2004, the LSP won four seats, all from Bihar, and Paswan was again appointed to the cabinet. In 2005 the LJP did not support the RJDCongress coalition at the Bihar State elections, prompting the RJD leadership to demand Paswan’s ouster from the UPA government. Leaders: Ram Vilas PASWAN (President), Phool Singh BARAIYYA (Senior Vice President). Indian Union Muslim League (IUML). The IUML (regularly also referenced simply as the Muslim League—ML) is a remnant of the prepartition Muslim League led by Mohammad Ali JINNAH. It opposes both secularism and Hindu nationalism. It won two lower house seats in 1996, 1998, and 1999, when its successful candidates entered the Lok Sabha under the banner of the Muslim League Kerala State Committee (MLKSC). In 2004 its general secretary, E. Ahmed, the only winning candidate on the MLKSC list, was named a minister of state in the Ministry of External Affairs. The IUML participates in Kerala’s United Democratic Front government, led by Congress. In November 2005 K. T. JALEEL and other

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dissidents within the IUML organized the CH Secular Forum, which has called for closer ties to Left Front parties. Leaders: Gulam Mehmood BANATWALLA (President), Panakkad Mohammed Ali Shihab THANGAL (Kerala State President), E. AHMED (General Secretary). People’s Democratic Party (PDP). At the September–October 2002 Jammu and Kashmir State election the PDP finished third and went on to join the second-ranked Congress in unseating the National Conference (NC, below) government. At the 2004 national election the PDP won one Lok Sabha seat. In November 2005 the PDP’s Mohammed Sayeed, who had served as chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir for three years, was replaced by senior Congress leader Ghulam Nabi Azad, in accordance with the 2002 coalition pact. Leaders: Mehbooba MUFTI (President), Mufti Mohammed SAYEED (Former Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir), Muzaffar Hussain BAIG (Deputy Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir). Republican Party of India (RPI). Founded in 1956 by Bhimrao Ramji AMBEDKAR and based in Maharashtra, the RPI is dedicated to carrying out the equality clauses of the Indian constitution for its largest constituency, the Dalits (from the Hindu for “Oppressed”), formerly called “Untouchables” or Harijans. The party’s intense factionalism has not helped its cause, although at the 1998 elections three factional leaders were among the four RPI candidates to win Lok Sabha seats. With part of the party linked to the Congress and another part favoring the new Nationalist Congress Party, all four seats were lost in 1999. In 2004, running as an ally of Congress, the Ramdas Athawale faction, RPI(A), won one seat in the lower house but was not offered a ministerial portfolio in the Singh cabinet, an “injustice” that led Athawale to question his faction’s future loyalty to Congress at the state level. Leaders: Ramdas ATHAWALE, Jogentra KAWADE, and Ramkrishna S. GAVAI (Faction Leaders).

Sikkim Democratic Front (SDF). Formed in opposition to the then-ruling Sikkim Sangram Parishad (SSP, below), the SDF obtained a commanding majority in the Sikkim State election of December 1994 and went on to win the state’s single Lok Sabha seat in 1996. It retained the seat in 1998, swept the simultaneous state and national elections in 1999, and held both the Lok Sabha seat and the state in 2004. In February 2006 it joined the UPA. Leader: Pawan Kumar CHAMLING (Chief Minister of Sikkim and President of the Party).

National Democratic Alliance Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The Bharatiya Janata (Indian People’s) Party was formed in April 1980 by the bulk of Janata’s Jana Sangh group, which opposed efforts by the Janata leadership to ban party officeholders from participation in the activities of the National Volunteer Corps (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh—RSS), a secretive paramilitary Hindu communal group that is generally regarded as the BJP’s parent organization. By 1982 the BJP was widely viewed as the best-organized non-Communist opposition party and in fact held more Lok Sabha seats than Janata. In August 1983 the party entered into a National Democratic Alliance with the Lok Dal that was abandoned prior to the Lok Sabha balloting in December 1984, at which the BJP’s representation fell to two seats. The BJP experienced a dramatic revival of fortune in 1989, winning 88 Lok Sabha seats, and supported the National Front government of V. P. Singh until October 1990, when BJP leader L. K. Advani was detained in connection with the Ayodhya temple dispute. The party’s legislative representation rose to 119 in 1991 as the leading component of an electoral alliance that included Shiv Sena (below). Its anti-Muslim populism helped it emerge from the April–May 1996 Lok Sabha election as the plurality party, with 161 seats, after which it formed a minority government that was led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee and included Shiv Sena representatives. The administration resigned after 13 days, however, rather than be defeated in a confidence vote.

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In 1997 the party tried to expand its support through moderating its Hindu nationalist (Hindutva) image and forging ties to state and regional parties. At the 1998 election it again emerged as the plurality party, winning 181 seats, with Vajpayee then cobbling together a governing coalition. In 1999 it won 182 seats, and Vajpayee succeeded in forming his third government. In May 2001 the BJP absorbed the Progressive Manipur State Congress Party (PMSCP), a breakaway faction of the Manipur State Congress Party (MSCP). The MSCP itself, which had won one Lok Sabha seat in 1999 as a component of the NDA, merged with the BJP in August 2003. In February 2002 the BJP had also absorbed the M. G. R. Dravidian Progressive Federation (M. G. R. Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam—MGR ADMK, named after AIADMK founder M. G. Ramachandran), a 1997 offshoot of the AIADMK that in 1999 had won one lower house seat from Tamil Nadu as part of the NDA. In March 2004, with the next Lok Sabha election approaching, the Chhattisgarhbased Rashtriya Janatantrik Dal of former NCP leader V. C. SHUKLA also joined the BJP. Confounding expectations, the BJP-led NDA fell to Congress and its allies at the 2004 Lok Sabha elections, with the BJP winning only 22 percent of the vote and 137 seats. Shortly after the election, L. K. Advani was named head of the BJP’s parliamentary party, and thus leader of the opposition, while former prime minister Vajpayee was awarded the new position of parliamentary party chair. The following October, Advani also took over as BJP president, after the resignation of Venkaiah NAIDU. The party continued to experience internal rumblings in the wake of the election failure, however, and in November the secretary general, Uma BHARATI, a former chief minister of Madhya Pradesh and a leader of hard-line fundamentalists within the party, was removed as secretary general because of her apparent unwillingness to compromise with other factions. Internal tensions were heightened once again in June 2005, following a trip by Advani to Pakistan, where his conciliatory remarks raised the ire of the party’s militant elements. He was fur-

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ther weakened in July when charges of incitement were reinstated against him and seven others in connection with the 1990 Ayodhya mosque incident. In mid-September, apparently pressured by the RSS and the fundamentalist World Council of Hindus (Vishwa Hindu Parishad—VHP), Advani announced that he would step down as party president at the end of the year but would remain leader of the opposition. In December 2005 several significant developments occurred, beginning with Bharati’s expulsion from the BJP for “indiscipline and anti-party activities”; shortly thereafter, she indicated her intention to form a new party. Near the end of the month RSS figure Sanjay JOSHI resigned as party secretary general for organization after allegations of sexual misconduct surfaced, Vajpayee announced his retirement from active politics, and the BJP named Rajnath SINGH as president. In April 2006 Joshi returned to his post after being exonerated by investigators. As of April 2006 the BJP headed the state governments in Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan. Leaders: Rajnath SINGH (President), Lal Krishna ADVANI (Leader of the Opposition), Atal Bihari VAJPAYEE (Chair of Parliamentary Party), Jaswant SINGH (Leader in the Rajya Sabha), Shivraj Singh CHAUHAN (Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh), Narendra MODI (Chief Minister of Gujarat), Sanjay JOSHI (Secretary General for Organization). Shiv Sena (SS). Meaning “Army of Shivaji” (referencing a 17th-century Hindu warrior king who repulsed the armies of the Muslim Moghul empire), the Maharashtra-based Shiv Sena articulates Hindu nationalism even more forcefully than the BJP. Led by a former newspaper cartoonist turned populist orator, the movement was prominent in the anti-Muslim violence that led to the destruction of the Ayodhya mosque in December 1992. It won 15 Lok Sabha seats in the April–May 1996 election and was represented in the resultant very shortlived government led by the BJP. Closely linked to the BJP, the SS brought its remaining 6 seats

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into the BJP-led government following the 1998 election. In the 1999 Lok Sabha balloting the party returned to its earlier strength, winning 15 seats even though its president had been disenfranchised for six years in July 1999 because of a conviction for inciting communal hatred in a 1987 speech. At the 2004 general election it retained 12 seats. In early 2003 a dispute between Bal Thackeray’s youngest son, Uddhav, and a nephew, Raj THACKERAY, over who would accede to the party leadership concluded with Uddhav’s elevation. In December 2005 Raj resigned from the party, and in March 2006 he formed the Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (MNS), to which he hope to attract SS dissidents. Leaders: Balashaheb (Bal) THACKERAY, Uddhav THACKERAY (Executive President). Biju Janata Dal (BJD). An Orissa party, the BJD is led by Naveen Patnaik, the son of a former important state leader, Biju PATNAIK. Naveen, who had taken over his late father’s national legislative seat in 1996 while a member of the Janata Dal, subsequently left the parent grouping in protest over that party’s failure to ally with the BJP. He formed the BJD in December 1997 in the middle of a tumultuous state assembly session. The new party won nine seats in the March 1998 national balloting, and Patnaik was named minister of mines. At the 1999 election the BJD won ten seats. Patnaik stepped down as minister of mines to become chief minister of Orissa following a BJDBJP victory at state balloting in February 2000. Patnaik won a second term as chief minister at the April 2004 state election, while the BJD took 11 Lok Sabha seats in simultaneous union balloting. Leader: Naveen PATNAIK (Chief Minister of Orissa and President of the Party). Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD). Although the Sikh Akali Dal (Akali Religious Party) contests elections nationally, its influence is confined primarily to Punjab, where it campaigns against excessive federal influence in Sikh affairs. Prior to the June 1984 storming of Amritsar’s Golden Temple, leadership of the Sikh agitation had effectively passed from the Akali Dal to the more extrem-

ist followers of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale. In July 1985, a year after Bhindranwale’s death, the moderate Akali Dal leader, Harchand Singh LONGOWAL, concluded a peace agreement with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, but he was assassinated in August. In May 1986 a number of Akali Dal leaders, including Parkash Singh Badal, a former chief minister, withdrew to form a separate party that was recognized as a distinct formation within the state assembly. In February 1987 the two breakaway factions agreed to reunification under the leadership of Simranjit Singh Mann, a former police official. Factionalism nevertheless persisted. In 1994–1995 the Sikh religious leadership, under Manjit SINGH, attempted to unify the party, with half a dozen of the more distinctly nonsecular factions—the most notable exception being the Badal group—adopting an “Amritsar declaration” and briefly appending “Amritsar” to their collective identity. However, Mann, asserting that other party leaders were not abiding by the declaration, subsequently formed a separate party (see SAD [Mann], below). In 1998–1999 a serious internal feud saw a faction led by Gurcharan Singh TOHRA criticizing the BJP-led central government and demanding that President Badal and his Punjab administration step down. In mid-1999 Tohra launched the All India Shiromani Akali Dal (AISAD). The dispute may have contributed to the SAD’s lack of success at the September–October 1999 election, when it won only two Lok Sabha seats, down from eight in 1996 and 1998. Tohra and Badal reconciled and reunited their followers in 2003, but Tohra died in March 2004. Less than a month later Jaswant Singh MANN organized a new anti-Badal AISAD. At the 2004 general election the SAD won eight seats as a component of the NDA. Shortly afterward a dissident SAD leader, Prem Singh CHANDUMAJRA, announced formation of another anti-Badal offshoot, the Shiromani Akali Dal (Longowal). Leaders: Parkash Singh BADAL (Former Chief Minister of Punjab and President of the Party), Sukhdev Singh DHINDSA (Parliamentary Leader and Secretary General).

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Janata Dal United —JD(U). Janata Dal was created by the merger in 1988 of the Janata (People’s) grouping, led by Subramanian Swamy; Lok Dal (confusingly also meaning “People’s Party”); and Jan Morcha (People’s Front), led by Vishwanath Pratap Singh. Janata had been established as a formal merger of several diverse parties following the grouping’s victory in the 1977 elections; Lok Dal had been founded in 1979 by a number of dissident Janata factions; and Jan Morcha had been launched in 1987 by Congress (I) dissidents. Janata Dal obtained 141 of the 144 seats won by NF candidates in November 1989 but only 55 of the 128 NF/LF seats obtained in 1991. The latter election was precipitated by a split in Janata Dal that led to the creation of what became the Samajwadi Party (below). A further split in 1994 eventually led to formation of the BJP-allied Samata Party. The rump Janata Dal led the United Front (UF) to a plurality in the 1996 general elections, although its seat tally fell to 45. The party was further reduced by corruption charges against its president, Lalu Prasad Yadav, chief minister of Bihar, whose rebel Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) substantially eroded the Janata Dal’s role in Parliament and in the UF government. In the election of 1998 the party captured only 6 seats. The party further splintered because of differences between Sharad Yadav and former prime minister H. D. Deve Gowda. With both factions claiming to be the “real Janata,” on August 8, 1999, the Election Commission recognized the competing factions as separate entities, with the Deve Gowda branch being called the Janata Dal (Secular) and the Yadav branch, Janata Dal (United). At the same time, it approved joint use of the arrow symbol by the JD(U), the Samata Party, and the Lok Shakti (LS), which had been in negotiations since May over presenting a common list for the balloting. A week later the JD(U), as expected, joined the NDA, and at the subsequent election the JD(U) list won 21 seats in the Lok Sabha. Launched in February 1997 by the former chief minister of Karnataka State, Ramakrishna HEGDE, the LS stressed decentralization of power from Delhi to the states. Formed from the merger

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of four other parties—the Socialist Party, the Bharatiya Socialist Party, the Rashtriya Vikalp Nirman Manch (a Rajasthan party), and the Bharatiya Lok Dal—the LS party committed itself to internal democracy. Hegde had been a member of the Janata Dal but was expelled before returning to politics through the vehicle of the LS, which took three seats in the 1998 national legislative balloting. Hegde died in January 2004. The Samata (Equality) Party had resulted from the Janata Dal split in early 1994 that yielded a Janata Dal (G); led by George Fernandes, the new party adopted the Samata designation late in the year. Remaining outside the center-left alliance that became the United Front, it won 6 Lok Sabha seats in the 1996 balloting, all in the state of Bihar. Although the Samata Party appeared to have sharp differences with the BJP, its 12 seats in the new Lok Sabha were important to the formation of the BJP-led coalition government in March 1998. An anticipated formal merger of the JD(U), the LS, and the Samata Party failed to materialize in January 2000 when the Samata Party, which had wanted Yadav to step down in favor of its leader, George Fernandes, rejected unification. The status of the LS and the Samata Party was compromised, however, by a decision of the Election Commission that derecognized officeholders of both who had been elected on the JD(U) list. In September 2000 the LS itself was derecognized, and in November former LS leader Ram Vilas Paswan formed the Lok Janshakti Party (LSP, above). In March 2001 Samata President Jaya JAITLEY, who had replaced Fernandes following the earlier Election Commission ruling, resigned after being videotaped accepting a bribe in a sting operation. Fernandes, although not implicated, resigned as defense minister, but he returned to the post in October. In December 2003 the long-anticipated merger of the Samata Party and the JD(U) was achieved, with Fernandes then becoming JD(U) president. The merger met with objections from a minority of both parties, including former JD(U) parliamentary leader Devendra Prasad YADAV, who instigated formation of a JD(U-Democratic) faction in the Lok Sabha. He as well as a number of other

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dissenters ultimately joined the RJD before the 2004 lower house election, at which the JD(U) won only eight seats. At the Bihar State elections in October– November 2005 the JD(U) finished first and formed an NDA government with the second-place BJP. In April 2006 Sharad Yadav was elected president of the party over the ailing George Fernandes, who had refused to step aside. Leaders: Sharad YADAV (President), George FERNANDES (Former President of the Party and Convener of the NDA), Nitish KUMAR (Chief Minister of Bihar). Telugu Desam Party (TDP). An Andhra Pradesh–based party, Telugu Desam (Telugu Nation) was reported to have disbanded in March 1992, with six of its Lok Sabha members indicating that it would support the Congress (I) government on certain issues. However, a revitalized party, led by former film star Nandmuri Tarak (N. T.) Rama RAO, swept into power in Andhra Pradesh at the state election of December 1994. Subsequent intraparty divisions ultimately saw the reform-minded Chandrababu Naidu replace Rao as chief minister in September 1995. The leadership of the Rao faction passed, after Rao’s death in January 1996, to his widow, Lakshmi PARVATHI. In the 1996 national election the TDP-Naidu (or TDP-Babu) won 16 lower house seats as a member of the United Front. In 1998 the Parvathi faction, having organized separately as the NTR Telugu Desam Party, won no seats, while the Naidu faction slipped from 16 to 12. In March 1999 the TDP leadership voted to leave the United Front, in part because the alliance’s central committee had decided to support a Congress Party candidate for speaker of the Lok Sabha. Under Naidu the TDP achieved major gains in 1999, winning 29 Lok Sabha seats and extending its support to the NDA government without, however, joining the Council of Ministers. In 2004, as part of the NDA, the TDP saw its Lok Sabha representation plummet to 5 seats as the Congress Party successfully exploited a widening gap between the rising fortunes of the state’s urban elite and the plight of

its rural farmers. In the simultaneous state election the TDP lost all but 45 of its 180 assembly seats. As in 1999, Parvathi’s group won no Lok Sabha seats. In April 2006 the TDP and Mulayam Singh Yadav’s Samajwadi Party (below) indicated their intention to form a “Third Force” in opposition to both the Congress and the BJP following the conclusion of state assembly elections in April–May. The “national alternative” was also expected to include the AIADMK of Tamil Nadu, the AGP of Assam, and the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (all below). Leader: N. Chandrababu NAIDU (Former Chief Minister of Andhra Pradesh and President of the Party). All India Trinamul Congress (AITC). The AITC, which is often referenced simply as the Trinamul Congress, emerged in September 1997 out of the bitter struggle to wrest control of West Bengal from the CPI-M and its state leader, Jyoti Basu. Formed by Mamata Banerjee from her rural base in the state, the party won seven seats in the 1998 national election and eight in 1999 as part of the NDA. In March 2001 Banerjee resigned as minister of railways (for the second time in six months) and pulled her party from the NDA. The timing reflected her desire to ally with Congress and seek the chief ministership of West Bengal. However, the Left Front, led by the CPI-M, easily won the June election, after which Banerjee briefly resigned as AITC leader. In August the party, having severed its ties to Congress, again joined the NDA. In March 2004 a faction of the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP, above) under Purno Sangma merged with the AITC to form the Nationalist Trinamul Congress (NTC), although the AITC designation was to be retained until after the April– May general election. The party suffered a major setback, however, winning only two seats—two short of the four required for registration, under its new name, as a national party. Prior to a February 2006 by-election, Sangma returned to the NCP. Meanwhile, in August 2005 Banerjee distanced her party from the NDA in anticipation of running

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independently in the April–May West Bengal assembly election. Leaders: Kumari Mamata BANERJEE (Party Leader), Pankaj BANERJEE (Chair), Mukul ROY (Secretary). Mizo National Front (MNF). A leading force in Mizoram State, the MNF won one seat at the Lok Sabha election of April–May 2004. It also holds one seat in the upper house. Leaders: ZORAMTHANGA (Chief Minister of Mizoram), VANLALZAWMA. Nagaland People’s Front (NPF). In addition to belonging to the governing Democratic Alliance of Nagaland, the NPF claimed the state’s only Lok Sabha seat at the 2004 election. Leader: Neiphiu RIO (Chief Minister of Nagaland). All India Dravidian Progressive Federation (All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam— AIADMK). The AIADMK is a Tamil party that split from the DMK (above) in 1972. Its founder, former matinee idol Maruthur Gopala RAMACHANDRAN, died in 1987, provoking a succession struggle. In 1991, as an ally of Congress (I), the AIADMK retained the 11 Lok Sabha seats won in 1989 and also ended two years of DMK rule in Tamil Nadu, winning an overall majority in the state assembly and forming a government under Jayalalitha Jayaram, a former actress. Accused by the opposition of massive financial corruption, Jayalalitha resumed the AIADMK’s alliance with the Congress for the 1996 Lok Sabha and state elections, but her party was wiped out by the DMK in the former (although it continued to be represented in the upper house) and retained only 4 seats in the latter. Although court proceedings continued within Tamil Nadu State against Jayalalitha, the party took 18 seats in March 1998 and joined the BJP coalition government, from which Jayalalitha repeatedly threatened to withdraw because of her objections to ministerial and military appointments and dismissals. Making good on her threat, she precipitated the confidence vote of April 17, 1999,

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that brought down the government and led to the September–October election, at which the party, once again allied with Congress, won 10 seats. In February and October 2000 Jayalalitha was sentenced to prison following corruption convictions, but she ultimately prevailed on appeal. Numerous other cases against her have been similarly unsuccessful. Although herself barred from competing, at the May 2001 state election Jayalalitha once again led her party and its Secular Front alliance to a lopsided victory over the DMK. She then won a by-election in February 2002, permitting her to reclaim the chief ministership. Prior to the April–May 2004 general election the AIADMK joined the NDA, but it was rejected by the electorate, losing all 33 seats it contested. In early 2006, in preparation for the upcoming Tamil Nadu assembly election, the AIADMK forged a Democratic People’s Alliance (DPA) that included the MDMK (above); the Dalit Panthers of India (DPI), led by T. THIRUMAVALAVAN; the Indian National League (INL), founded by the late Ibrahim Sulaiman SAIT; the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC); the Movendar Munnetra Kazhagam (MMK); the JD(S) (below); and splinter groups of the IUML (above) and AIFB (below). Leader: Jayalalitha JAYARAM (Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu and General Secretary of the Party).

Left Front Communist Party of India–Marxist (CPIM). Organized in 1964 by “leftist” deserters from the CPI favoring a more radical line, the CPIM called for small-scale, rural-oriented, laborintensive development as well as political decentralization. In 1969 some of its more extreme and overtly pro-Chinese members withdrew to form the CPI-ML (below). At its annual conference in January 1992, the CPI-M responded to events in the former Soviet Union by proclaiming itself “the strongest Communist party in the world.” CPI-M representation in the lower house fell back to 32 seats (from 35 in 1991) at the 1996

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election, after which it supported, but declined to participate in, the resultant UF minority government. At the party’s 16th congress in October 1998, it attacked the “multiple threat of communalism and retrograde economic policies” offered by the BJP-led government. In 1998 it retained its 32 seats in the Lok Sabha and then added 1 more in 1999. Prior to the latter election it and the CPI jointly identified the defeat of the BJP as their primary goal. However, the RSP and the Forward Block (both below) contended that the left should also disavow any association with the Congress. As a result, the left entered the contest without a unified “Left Front” platform. At the 2004 general election the CPI-M led a unified Left Front once again, winning 43 Lok Sabha seats and subsequently extending external support to the Congress-led government. At the state level the CPI-M continues to hold an overall majority in Tripura and West Bengal. Party leader Jyoti Basu served as chief minister of West Bengal from 1977 until ill health forced him to step down in November 2000. Leaders: Jyoti BASU, Somnath CHATTERJEE (Speaker of the Lok Sabha), Buddhadev BHATTACHARJEE (Chief Minister of West Bengal), Manik SARKAR (Chief Minister of Tripura), Prakash KARAT (General Secretary). Communist Party of India (CPI). Established in 1925, the CPI was India’s largest opposition party following the new country’s first general election in 1952. Although the CPI-M took with it the majority of CPI members when it broke away in 1964, most of the party bureaucracy, legislative representatives, and trade unionists remained in the CPI. The party’s Lok Sabha representation doubled from 6 to 12 in November 1989, with another seat being added in 1991. It fell back to 12 seats in 1996 and 9 in 1998 before plummeting to 4 in 1999. At the 2004 general election it won 10 seats, primarily from Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal. Leaders: Ardhendu Bhushan BARDHAN (General Secretary), Doraiswamy RAJA.

All India Forward Bloc (AIFB). Frequently referenced simply as the Forward Bloc, the AIFB is a leftist party confined primarily to West Bengal. Its program calls for land reform and nationalization of key sectors of the economy. It won two Lok Sabha seats in 1991, three in 1996, and two in 1998 and 1999. The party suffered the loss of one of its most important modern leaders with the death of General Secretary Chita BASU in October 1997. In 2004 it won three Lok Sabha seats. Leaders: G. DEVARAJAN, Debabrata BISWAS (General Secretary). Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP). The RSP is a Marxist-Leninist grouping based in West Bengal and Kerala. Its 1989 representation of four seats dropped to three in 1991 but increased to five in 1996, when it was a UF party. It chose not to join the new UF government. In May 1999 a rebel faction under the leadership of party veteran Baby JOHN held its own convention, where it argued for leftist unity in the effort to prevent the BJP’s return to power. The “official” RSP, however, joined the Forward Bloc in advocating a policy of equidistance from both the BJP and the Congress in the forthcoming national election, at which it won three seats, down from five in 1998. It again won three in 2004. Leaders: Abani ROY, T. J. CHANDRACHOODAN (Kerala State Secretary), K. PANKAJAKSHAN (General Secretary).

Other Parliamentary Parties Samajwadi Party (SP). The Samajwadi (Socialist) Party held its inaugural convention in October 1992. The new formation was an outgrowth of the Janata Dal–Socialist (JD-S), which had been organized by former Janata Dal leaders Chandra Shekhar and Devi Lal following their withdrawal from the National Front in November 1990. Shekhar, with Congress (I) support, subsequently served as prime minister until March 1991. Following the 1993 balloting in Uttar Pradesh, the party formed a state government coalition with the Bahujan Samaj Party (below), but this alliance collapsed

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in June 1995, and president’s rule was imposed. The party won 17 Lok Sabha seats in the 1996 election. Party leader Mulayam Singh Yadav attempted to play a conciliatory role within the UF following the Jain Commission report, although his conflict with the Janata Dal leadership appeared to reduce his effectiveness. The party won 20 seats in 1998, second to the CPI-M among UF members, and 26 in 1999, although an attempt by the party president and the NCP’s Sharad Pawar to forge a “third force” front in opposition to the NDA and the Congress failed to materialize. Of the 36 seats won by the SP at the 2004 Lok Sabha election, 35 were in Uttar Pradesh. The party backed formation of the Congress-led government in May but remained independent of the Congress in Uttar Pradesh, where it leads the state government. In April 2006 it joined with the TDP (above) in announcing an intention to form a “national alternative” to both Congress and the BJP. Leaders: Mulayam Singh YADAV (President of the Party and Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh), Ram Gopal YADAV (General Secretary). Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP). Representing India’s disadvantaged and Dalits, the BSP (Party of the Majority) advances no ideological program, save nonsecularism and “power to the majority.” Having joined the Uttar Pradesh government after the 1993 state election, it became the lead coalition party from June 1995 until the BSP chief minister resigned in October, whereupon president’s rule was imposed. The party’s tally of 11 Lok Sabha seats in the April–May 1996 national election came mainly from Uttar Pradesh and Punjab. In 1998 the BSP’s 5 Lok Sabha members in 1998 stayed outside any coalition. In 1999 the party remained nonaligned and won 14 seats. In partnership with the BJP, it regained leadership of the Uttar Pradesh government in May 2002, but the coalition dissolved in August 2003, and Chief Minister Kumari Mayawati stepped down. Five months earlier a scandal had erupted over a videotape that recorded Mayawati asking BSP loyalists to donate to the party money that they had obtained from public projects.

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In March 2004 Mayawati ruled out an alliance with Congress for the upcoming national election, at which the BSP won 18 seats. It remains a significant force in Uttar Pradesh. In December 2005 its parliamentary leader, Raja Ram PAL, was one of 11 legislators expelled by the lower house after being caught accepting bribes in a sting operation. Leader: Kumari MAYAWATI (General Secretary). Janata Dal (Secular) —JD(S). The JD(S) name was applied by the Election Commission to the Deve Gowda faction of Janata Dal (see JD[U], above) in August 1999. Although the party contested nearly 100 seats at the subsequent national election, it captured only 1, with Deve Gowda himself going down to defeat. In April 2004 the JD(S) won 3 Lok Sabha seats, including 1 contested by Deve Gowda, and placed third in the Karnataka State assembly balloting. In May Deve Gowda announced that the JD(S) would form a coalition government with the second-ranked Congress, rather than the plurality BJP, in Karnataka. In January 2006, however, H. D. Kumaraswamy, son of Deve Gowda, led 39 JD(S) members of the Legislative Assembly in a revolt that brought down the Congress-JD(S) government. Realigned with the BJP, Kumaraswamy formed a new administration. In February Deve Gowda suspended the defectors. Leaders: H. D. DEVE GOWDA (Former Prime Minister and Chair of the Party), H. D. KUMARASWAMY (Chief Minister of Karnataka). Rashtriya Lok Dal (RLD). The current RLD was established by the September 1998 merger of the preexisting RLD and the Bharatiya Kisan Kamgar Party (BKKP). The BKKP had been launched in opposition to the BJP in September 1996 by Lok Sabha member Ajit Singh, a former Congress (I) agriculture minister and son of Charan Singh, with the support of Mahendra Singh TIKAIT, a peasant leader in Uttar Pradesh. At the 1999 national election the RLD was allied with the Congress and won two seats. In July 2001 it joined the NDA, although

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Ajit Singh resigned from the cabinet in May 2003. At the 2004 general election the RLD won three seats. Allied with the Samajwadi Party, it added a Rajya Sabha seat in 2006. Leader: Ajit SINGH (President). Assam People’s Council (Asom Gana Parishad—AGP). The AGP was launched in October 1985 as a coalition (but not a merger) of the All-Assam Students’ Union (AASU) and the All-Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP), which were united by their call for the deportation of (largely Bangladeshi) “aliens” from Assam. The coalition won a slim majority of state assembly seats and seven Lok Sabha seats in December 1985. It made no contribution to the National Front’s parliamentary representation in November 1989 due to the postponement of balloting in Assam. It won two seats in 1991 and five in 1996 (and regained a substantial plurality in concurrent state balloting in Assam) but claimed none in 1998 or 1999. In May 2001 it lost the state election to the Congress. The AGP returned to the Lok Sabha at the 2004 election, winning two seats. It remained the leading opposition party in Assam, pending the outcome of state elections in April 2006, despite a September 2005 split that saw the party’s founder, Prafulla Kumar MAHANTA, a former chief minister of Assam, expelled. Mahanta then formed a new Assam People’s Council (Progressive) party. Leader: Brindaban GOSWAMI (President). National Conference (NC). The dominant party in Jammu and Kashmir following independence, the NC continued to be led by Sheikh Mohammed ABDULLAH, who was primarily responsible for the 1947 decision to join India, until his death in 1982. He was succeeded as party leader and chief minister by his son, Farooq Abdullah, who was, however, dismissed from the latter post in July 1984 by Mrs. Gandhi, following a series of violent clashes with Congress (I) supporters and the loss of his majority in the state assembly. He returned as chief minister in March 1987, following balloting at which the NC, in coalition with Congress (I), won 62 of 76 assembly seats.

The NC held three of Jammu and Kashmir’s six Lok Sabha seats prior to the 1991 election (when polling was canceled in the state) and opted in the 1996 national balloting to support Congress candidates. In return, Congress backed the NC in a state election in September 1996 (the first since 1987), assisting the party to a decisive overall majority and enabling Abdullah to resume the post of chief minister. The conference won three seats in the 1998 balloting as a United Front party but abstained on the March 28 confidence vote for the BJP-led government. At the September–October 1999 election the party picked up an additional seat, after which it joined the NDA government. In June 2002 Farooq Abdullah turned over the presidency of the party to his son, Omar. At the following September–October state election the NC finished with a plurality of seats but lost control of the government to a coalition of the Congress and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP, above). In July 2003 the NC left the NDA, and at the Lok Sabha election of 2004 it won two seats. Leaders: Omar ABDULLAH (President), Farooq ABDULLAH (Former Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir). All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (AIMIM). Aiming to represent India’s Muslims, the AIMIM (All India Muslim Federal Assembly) won a Lok Sabha seat in a 1994 by-election and expanded to two seats in the 1996 general election. The party declared its qualified support for the new UF government. It retained one seat in 1998, 1999, and 2004. Leaders: Sultan Salahuddin OWAISI (President), Asaduddin OWAISI (Member of the Lok Sabha). Kerala Congress (KC). The KC won two Lok Sabha seats in 1980, although they were split between two factions, led by P. J. JOSEPH and K. M. MANI, that had emerged in July 1979. The Joseph faction controlled the two seats won in 1984, both of which were lost in 1989, whereas the Mani faction won a single seat as a Congress (I) ally in 1991, retaining it in 1996 and, campaigning as the Kerala Congress (M), in both 1998 and 1999. At

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the 1999 election the Kerala Congress (Joseph) also won one seat, as it did in 2004. It later picked up a second seat by absorbing the Indian Federal Democratic Party (IFDP), led by P. C. THOMAS, which had originated in 2001 as a loose alliance of Lok Sabha independents. Leaders: R. Balakrishna PILLAI (Kerala Congress [B]), C. F. THOMAS (Mani Faction), K. Francis GEORGE (Joseph Faction). Three other parties won single seats at the 2004 Lok Sabha elections: the Bharatiya Navshakti Party (BNP), based in Dadra and Nagar Haveli and led by Mohanbhai DELKAR; the National Loktantrik Party (NLP), led by Masood AHMAD; and the Samajwadi Janata Party (Rashtriya), led by former prime minister Chandra SHEKHAR. In addition, the Swatantra Bharat Paksh, led by Sharad JOSHI, was awarded one Raja Sabha seat at the June 2004 election. In mid-2005 the NLP split into two factions, one led by Ahmad and the other led by Arshad KHAN.

Other Parties Akhil Bharatiya Loktantrik Congress (ABLC). The ABLC (All India Democratic Congress), a splinter from the INC, is usually referred to simply as the Loktantrik Congress. Under Naresh AGARWAL it won two seats from Uttar Pradesh at the 1999 Lok Sabha election and supported Prime Minister Vajpayee’s new government. Agarwal later joined the Samajwadi Party. The ABLC did not contest the 2004 Lok Sabha election. Its sole Rajya Sabha member subsequently joined the Congress. Leader: Mohammed MASOOD. Arunachal Congress (AC). The AC was formed in 1996 when the chief minister of Arunachal Pradesh State, Gegong APANG, left the Congress because of its “authoritarian” leadership. At the March 1998 national election Apang’s son, Omak APANG, won one of the party’s two Lok Sabha seats and joined the Vajpayee government as a minister of state. In January 1999 internal turmoil split the party, with Mukut MITHI leading a group of dissenters in formation of a com-

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peting Arunachal Congress (M). A no-confidence vote against the Apang state administration followed, with Mithi, backed by the Indian National Congress, forming a new government. In April the AC(M) merged with Congress, which in September–October won an overwhelming victory in balloting for the state assembly and also captured from the AC both its Lok Sabha seats. Gegong Apang, having attracted a number of Congress defectors to his cause, returned as chief minister at the head of a BJP-aligned United Democratic Front coalition in August 2003. At the 2004 general election the AC ran only one candidate, who lost. Prior to the October 2004 state assembly election, however, Apang switched allegiance to Congress; he continues to head the state government. Leader: Kamen RINGU (President). Autonomous State Demand Committee (ASDC). The ASDC emerged in the mid-1980s seeking greater autonomy for the predominantly tribal Karbi Anglong district of Assam. It won a Lok Sabha seat in a 1994 by-election in Assam and retained it in the 1996 and 1998 general elections. In 1999 the party’s then-president, Jayanta Rongpi, ran successfully under the banner of the Communist Party of India–Marxist-Leninist (Liberation) (see under CPI-ML, below). Subsequently, the party split into competing “United” and “Progressive” factions. It was unsuccessful at the 2004 general election. Leaders: Holiram TERANG, Elwin TERON, Chomang KRO, Rabi Kumar PHANGCHO. Communist Party of India–Marxist-Leninist (CPI-ML). As the result of disagreement over operational strategy for the spread of communism in rural India, an extreme faction within the CPI-M organized the CPI-ML in 1969. Committed to Maoist principles of people’s liberation warfare, the party was actively involved in the “Naxalite” terrorist movement in West Bengal and was banned during the state of emergency. Some members subsequently rejected revolutionary Marxism in favor of parliamentary democracy, but none of the party’s many splinters ever secured Lok Sabha

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representation until 1999, when the ASDC’s Jayanta Rongpi agreed to run under the banner of the legal Communist Party of India– Marxist-Leninist (Liberation) (CPI-ML-L). The party failed to retain the seat in 2004. Leaders: Dispenser BHATTACHARYA (General Secretary), Jayanta RONGPI. Congress (Socialist)—Congress (S). In May 2002 the Kerala branch of the NCP reestablished the Congress (S) under the leadership of Ramachandran Kadannappally, in part over objections to NCP support for the controversial Prevention of Terrorism Act. Most Congress (S) members rejoined the NCP in December 2005, however, a month after some of the leadership had revolted against Kadannappally’s “politics of opportunism” and attempted to install Vice President Karakulam Krishna PILLAI as the acting president. Leader: Ramachandran KADANNAPPALLY. Democratic Indira Congress (Karunakaran)—DIC(K). Based primarily in Kerala State, the DIC(K) was established in May 2005 by former Congress leader K. Karunakaran, initially as the National Congress (Indira). The party’s present name was adopted because of legal objections to the initial name, and the party was recognized by the Election Commission at the beginning of September under the leadership of Karunakaran’s son, K. Muraleedharan. The DIC(K) subsequently absorbed the Jacob faction of the Kerala Congress, led by T. M. JACOB and Johnny NELLORE, and sought an alliance with the Left Front. Objections by the CPI-M, in particular, prevented an alliance prior to Kerala State elections in April–May 2006, resulting in a decision to cooperate with Congress. Leaders: K. KARUNAKARAN, K. MURALEEDHARAN (President). Desiya Murpokku Dravida Kazhagam (DMDK). The DMDK (National Progressive Dravidian Party) was launched in September 2005 in Tamil Nadu by film star Vijayakant and former AIADMK minister Panruti S. Ramachandran. Advocating “progressive programs and policies,” Vijaykant has directly linked himself to the founder

of the AIADMK, M. G. Ramachandran, and is widely called “Karuppu MGR” (dark-skinned MGR). Leaders: VIJAYKANT (President), Panrutti S. RAMACHANDRAN (Presidium Chair), S. Ramu VASANTHAN (General Secretary). Indian National Lok Dal (INLD). Announced by Devi LAL in October 1996 under the name Haryana Lok Dal (HLD), the INLD marked the latest in a series of political transformations by the octogenarian Haryana State politician and his supporters. Lal was a leader of the early Samajwadi Party but switched to the Samata Party before breaking from it to form the HLD, which campaigned as the HLD (Rashtriya), or HLD-R, after another political group appropriated the HLD designation. The HLD-R contested the 1998 elections in alliance with the BSP (above) and won four seats, but it subsequently backed the Vajpayee government. In mid-February 1999, however, it withdrew its support to protest subsidy cuts for food grains and fertilizer. By the time the NDA was formed in May 1999, the party was almost uniformly referred to as the INLD, which went on to win five Lok Sabha seats in the September–October election. In July 1999 Lal’s son, Om Prakash CHAUTALA, had returned as chief minister of Haryana following the resignation of Bansi Lal of the nowdefunct Haryana Vikas Party (HVP; see under Congress, above). At a premature state election in February 2000, the INLD won a clear mandate, with the BJP joining the Chautala administration as a junior partner. At the national level, Chautala broke with the BJP shortly before the 2004 general election, at which the INLD won no seats. The INLD lost control of Haryana at the March 2005 state elections. Leader: Om Prakash CHAUTALA (Former Chief Minister of Haryana and President of the Party). Janata Party (JP). The present Janata Party descends from the Janata grouping that Subramanian Swamy led into the Janata Dal at its formation in October 1988. Although the JP, a BJP ally,

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presented 16 candidates in six different states at the 1998 Lok Sabha election, Swamy was its only victor, running in Tamil Nadu. In 1999, however, he lost, leaving Janata with no MPs. Since the 2004 election Swamy has been an outspoken critic of the UPA government. Leaders: Dr. Subramanian SWAMY (President), Vijay MALLYA. Party for Democratic Socialism (PDS). The PDS was established in February 2001 by dissidents from the CPI, who rejected doctrinaire Marxism-Leninism and were more willing to engage in multiparty alliances. Not a significant party nationally, the PDS has focused its activities on West Bengal and other left-leaning states. Leader: Saifuddin CHOUDHURY. Shiromani Akali Dal (Mann)—SAD(M). The SAD(M) was formed by radical Akali Dal faction leader S. S. Mann in the mid-1990s because, he claimed, other leaders had failed to adhere to the 1994 Amritsar declaration (see SAD, above). At the time, the party was also known as the SAD (Amritsar). Mann successfully competed for a Lok Sabha seat in 1999. In 2004 the party ran six candidates, all unsuccessful. In June 2005 Mann was arrested for sedition for advocating establishment of Khalistan, a Sikh homeland. Leaders: Simranjit Singh MANN, Jagmohan SINGH (General Secretary). Sikkim Sangram Parishad (SSP). In the December 1994 state election the SSP (“Sikkim Campaign Council”) lost its majority to the Sikkim Democratic Front (SDF, above), which also captured the SSP’s single Lok Sabha seat in the 1996 national election. Allied with the Congress for the 1999 election, the SSP failed to reclaim its lost seat. In August 2003 the main body of the party under former chief minister Nar Bahadur Bhandari merged with the Congress. The Election Commission later awarded the SSP designation to a remnant headed by Rajendra Uprety, who ran unsuccessfully for the Lok Sabha in 2004. Leader: Rajendra Prasad UPRETY.

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United Communist Party of India (UCPI). The UCPI was launched as the All India Communist Party (AICP) in 1980 by supporters of S. A. DANGE, who had resigned the CPI chairmanship in 1979 following rejection of his proposal that the party should support Congress (I). The UCPI, which adopted its present name in 1989, secured one Lok Sabha seat as a member of the Congress alliance in 1991 but disappeared from the parliamentary scene in 1996. In 1998 and 1999 it was again allied with the Congress. In April 2000, however, most of the Tamil Nadu branch of the party reunited with the CPI. Longtime Communist leader Mohit SEN died in 2003. Leader: Sukhinder Singh DHALIWAL. The following state parties, all unrepresented at the national level, were recognized in all states and union territories at the time of the 2004 general election: the Federal Party of Manipur (FPM), led by Gangmumei KAMEI; the Hill State People’s Democratic Party (HPDP), based in Meghalaya and led by H. S. LYNGDOH; the Indigenous Nationalist Party of Twipra (INPT) of Tripura, led by Bijoy Kumar HRANGKHWAL (who has also headed the separatist Tripura National Volunteers); the Jammu and Kashmir National Panthers Party (JKNPP), led by Bhim SINGH; the Janadhipathya Samrakshana Samithi (JPSS; “Association for the Defense of Democracy”) of Kerala, led by K. R. Gowri AMMA; the Maharashtrawadi Gomantak (MAG), Goa’s ruling party during most of the 1960s and 1970s, led by Shashikala KADODKAR; the Manipur People’s Party (MPP), led by O. Joy SINGH; the Meghalaya Democratic Party (MDP), led by M. D. MUKHIM; the Mizoram People’s Conference (MZPC), led by former Mizoram chief minister Brig. Thenphunga SAILO and Pu LALHMINGTHANGA; the Nationalist Democratic Movement (NDM) of Nagaland, led by K. L. CHISHI; the United Democratic Party (UDP) of Meghalaya, led by Donkupar ROY; the United Goans Democratic Party (UGDP) of Goa and Jharkhand, led by Bandhu TIRKEY and Joba MANJHI; the Uttarakhand Kranti Dal (UKD;

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Uttarakhand Revolution Party) of Uttaranchal, led by B. D. RATURI and Pushpesh TRIPATHI; and the Zoram Nationalist Party (ZNP) of Mizoram, led by LALDUHOMA. Of the many small communist parties operating in India, the Maoist Communist Center (MCC) gained notoriety in connection with the March 1999 killing of Bhumihar caste members in Bihar in revenge for two massacres of peasants, allegedly at the instigation of private landlords. In December 2002 the MCC also claimed responsibility for an attack in Jharkhand that killed 20. Bihar remains a center of activity for Maoist Naxalites, who in June 2000 were once again involved in a chain of revenge massacres. Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Orissa, in particular, have also been the scene of numerous terrorist attacks by Maoists, principally the People’s War Group (PWG). In 2004 reports surfaced that the MCC and PWG had merged as the Communist Party of India–Maoist (CPI-Maoist).

Kashmiri Separatist Groups All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC). Founded in March 1993 as a coalition of 26 political parties and other groups, the APHC seeks to end the division of the “occupied territories” through peaceful means, including civil disobedience and protests. This has led to the arrest of various leaders on numerous occasions, in Pakistan as well as India. The APHC maintains offices both in Jammu and Kashmir and in Pakistan. It has consistently maintained that it constitutes the sole political representative of the Kashmiri people and, as in the past, refused to participate in the most recent Jammu and Kashmir state election, held in September–October 2002, and in the Indian general election of April–May 2004. Participants currently include Mirwaiz Umar Farooq’s Awami Action Committee; the Azad Kashmir People’s Party, a Pakistan People’s Party splinter founded and led by Sardar Khalid IBRAHIM; the Democratic Freedom Party, founded in 1998 by Shabir Ahmed SHAH; the Ittihad-ul-Muslimeen, led by Maulana Muham-

mad Abbas ANSARI; the Muhammad Yasin MALIK faction of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF); Abdul Ghani BHAT’s Muslim Conference, which has historically been central to the government of Azad Kashmir (see Pakistan: Related Territories); the People’s Conference, headed by Abdul Ghani LONE until his assassination on May 21, 2002; the People’s League, led by Shiekh Abdul AZIZ; and the People’s Political Front, led by Fazal-ul-Haq QURESHI. The JKLF, established in 1977 by Amanullah KHAN, has been split since 1995 into two organizations, Khan’s militant JKLF-A and Malik’s moderate JKLF-Y. In June 2005 the two leaders met and resolved to reunite their factions, but both remain active, Malik’s based in Indian Kashmir and Khan’s in Azad Kashmir. The People’s Conference has also divided into factions, one led by Sajjad LONE, a moderate and an APHC leader, and the other headed by his brother, Bilan Ghani LONE, who remains more militant. In September 1999 New Delhi arrested 15 APHC leaders under the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act and then prevented 2 other APHC leaders from leaving for a New York meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Although the Indian government announced in December that it planned to hold the detained APHC members without trial until September 2001, in April– May 2000 it released a number of them, including the APHC chair, Syed Ali GILANI (GEELANI). Speaking in New Delhi, Gilani repeated shortly after his release that the Kashmir question could be resolved only through tripartite talks involving India, Pakistan, and the Kashmiri people. In July Abdul Ghani Bhat succeeded Gilani as chair. In July 2003 the election of Muhammad Abbas Ansari as chair of the Executive Council precipitated a split in the organization, and two months later the more hard-line members, led by Gilani, attempted to replace him with Masrat ALAM. Since then, the organization has remained divided, with the more radical Gilani branch, encompassing about 16 groups and often identified as the Tehrike-Hurriyat Jammu and Kashmir, steadfastly rejecting overtures from the Indian government.

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On January 22, 2004, responding to overtures from New Delhi, moderate APHC leaders, chaired at the time by Ansari, met with representatives of the Indian government and agreed to seek an “honorable and durable solution” through dialogue and step-by-step measures. Participants included former chairs Bhat and Farooq. The delegation met Prime Minister Vajpayee the next day. The following July, Ansari resigned as APHC chair in order to facilitate reconciliation, a task undertaken by APHC founder Farooq, who became “caretaker” chair in August. On June 2, 2005, a dozen moderate APHC representatives crossed the LoC into Pakistan’s Azad Kashmir for the first time since 1947. Led by Mirwaiz Farooq, who addressed the Azad Kashmir Legislative Assembly, the delegation then traveled to Islamabad for meetings with Pakistani officials, including President Musharraf. In February 2006 Farooq became the first separatist leader to hold a public rally in Hindudominated Jammu in over a decade and urged those in attendance to “build bridges” between their various communities. A round table proposed by Indian Prime Minister Singh for later in the month in New Delhi drew a rejection from the APHC moderates, who argued that the talks would not advance the negotiations. Hard-liner Gilani termed the proposed talks a “futile exercise.” In contrast, a March 10–12 conference in Islamabad, organized by the Washington-based Pugwash Conferences, was attended not only by various APHC leaders—among them, Yasin Malik, Sajjad Lone, and Abdul Ghani Bhat—but also by officials from both Azad Kashmir and Indian Kashmir, civil society leaders, and “back-channel” diplomats. Leader: Mirwaiz Umar FAROOQ (Chair). Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin (HuM). Founded in 1990, the Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin is the largest of the Islamic militant organizations seeking separation of Jammu and Kashmir from India and establishment of a fundamentalist regime. Unlike many other separatist groups, which have bases in the Pakistani territory of Azad Kashmir, it has asserted that it is an exclusively Kashmiri organization, al-

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though it has close links to the Pakistan’s Jamaate-Islami party. The HuM has claimed responsibility for or been implicated in many of the most widely reported violent incidents in Kashmir in recent years. On July 24, 2000, the organization’s operational chief, Abdul Majid DAR, announced a three-month cease-fire that was rescinded in early August when talks with Indian officials broke down. In May 2002 Dar was expelled for “violating discipline.” He was murdered in March 2003, after which his followers announced their separation from the organization’s leadership, headed by Syed Salahuddin, whom some opponents accused of ordering the elimination of influential opponents. Dar’s successor as operational chief, Saiful ISLAM, died in a gun battle in April 2003, and Islam’s successor, Ghulam Rasool DAR, met a similar fate in January 2004. Since then, in an apparent effort to confound authorities, the HuM has tended to identify key field commanders only by aliases. HuM leader Salahuddin has also served as chair of the United Jihad Council, a grouping of some 15 organizations committed to the separation of Jammu and Kashmir. Leaders: Syed SALAHUDDIN (a.k.a. Mohammad Yusuf SHAH). Lashkar-i-Taiba (LiT). The LiT (Army of the Pure) was established between 1990 and 1993 as the military wing of an above-ground religious group, the Markaz ud-Dawa Wal Irshad, which was formed in 1986 to organize Pakistani Sunni militants participating in the Afghan revolution. The Markaz was officially dissolved in December 2001 and all its assets transferred to the “new” Jamaat-ud-Dawa (Party of the Calling) in an effort to avoid proscription. The LiT, which the United States has labeled a terrorist group, was banned by India in October 2001 and by Pakistan in January 2002. Since then it has often been referenced as the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, which was placed on a “watch list” but not banned by the Pakistani government in November 2003, and which, without much credibility, has denied any connection to the LiT. Hafiz Mohammed Sayeed continues to be identified in

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many sources as head of both. Further complicating matters, the LiT is suspected of using other front names, including al-Mansurian and the Islami Inqilabi Mahaz (Islamic Revolutionary Group). In its various guises the LiT has claimed responsibility for and been implicated in innumerable bombings, suicide missions, and other attacks within Kashmir and elsewhere. Many of its members have been jailed in India and Pakistan. An LiT commander, Bashir Ahmad KHAN, was killed by Indian forces in April 2004, by which time it was already extending its activities beyond Kashmir to other areas of India. For example, Indian authorities have linked it to the August 2003 Mumbai bombings, which killed over 50 people, and to the New Delhi bombings of October 2005, which caused some 60 fatalities. The LiT has denied responsibility for the New Delhi blasts. Leaders: Hafiz Mohammed SAYEED, Maulana Abdul Wahid KASHMIRI. For information on other Kashmiri separatist groups, many of which are based in Pakistan’s Azad Kashmir, see the article on Pakistan.

Principal Northeast Militant Organizations In February 2003 the Bodo Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF) agreed to end an insurgency in Assam that dated from 1968. The agreement followed a March 2000 cease-fire. On December 6, 2003, a Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) was established and an amnesty extended to some 2,600 BLTF members who laid down their arms. BLTF commander-in-chief Hagrama BASUMATARY was inaugurated as chief executive of the BTC. A National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) denounced the accord and remained in militant opposition until announcing a cease-fire in October 2004 that was then extended for a year in May 2005. The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), established in 1979, is led by military commander Paresh BARUA and political chair Arabinda RAJKHOWA. The largest and bestorganized of the northeastern separatist organizations, it continues to be responsible for a significant

number of terrorist acts against Indian authorities. In the 1990s the ULFA and several other militant organizations began operating from camps set up in nearby Bhutan, but in December 2003, after several years of efforts by the Bhutanese government to negotiate their departure, the Royal Bhutanese Army took to the field against some 30 insurgent bases. The campaign, which extended into early 2004, resulted in the capture of several ULFA leaders and the destruction of its bases, after which the organization reportedly dispersed to the neighboring Indian states of Nagaland, Meghalaya, and Arunachal Pradesh. Additional bases have been reported in Bangladesh, although the Bangladeshi government has denied any support for the organization. Connections have also been reported with outlawed groups in Myanmar. In September 2005 the ULFA’s Barua indicated a willingness to begin peace talks. Other groups forced from Bhutan were the NDFB and the Kamatapur Liberation Organization (KLO), which has sought creation of a Kamatapur state from districts in Assam and West Bengal; the KLO is led by Tamir DAS. The Dima Halam Daogah (DHD), led by Pranab NUNISA, has sought to create, primarily from part of Assam, a separate state for the Dimasa people. A cease-fire entered into effect at the start of 2003, but it has not been observed by a faction led by a former DHD president, Jewel GARLOSSA. The Karbi-Anglong district of Assam has also been the focus of a tribal dispute between the Kuki Revolutionary Army and the Karbi United People’s Democratic Solidarity. Many Kukis had fled to Assam from Manipur, where they had been under attack by elements of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN). The separatist conflict in Nagaland, dating from 1954, has cost an estimated 200,000 lives, according to separatist sources. The creation of Nagaland State in 1963 failed to halt the insurgency, which sought to establish a “greater Nagaland” that would also include areas of those neighboring states populated in part by Nagas. The principal separatist group, the NSCN, subsequently split into Khaplang (NSCN-K) and Isaac Muivah (NSCN-IM) factions.

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On January 12, 2003, the leaders of the latter, Isaac SWU and Thuingalend MUIVAH, having met with Prime Minister Vajpayee and other leading government officials, stated that they considered the insurgency at an end, and in a joint statement on January 23 both sides agreed to seek peaceful resolution of their differences. Discussions between the government and the NSCN-K were also ongoing, and in April 2004 the government extended a cease-fire for another year. The following October, peace talks opened at Bangkok, Thailand, with the NSCN-IM. In Mizoram, reconciliation talks, begun in September 2001 between the state government and the Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF), led by Surjomoni REANG, achieved an agreement in April 2005. The BNLF claims to represent the 70,000 Bru (Reang) people, up to half of whom (the government claims 17,000) fled to Tripura in 1997 to escape attacks by Mizo tribesmen. The BNLF initially demanded autonomy but ultimately agreed to surrender its weapons in return for repatriation. On April 15, 2004, two faction leaders of the insurgent National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT), Nayanbasi JAMATIA and Montu KOLOI, joined Deputy Prime Minister L. K. Advani and the chief minister of Tripura in endorsing a sixmonth cease-fire. Peace talks followed. At issue has not only been independence or autonomy but also the expulsion of Bengali settlers from Tripura. Another separatist group, the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), led by Ranjit DEBBARMA, joined the ULFA and the NDFB in rejecting Prime Minister Vajpayee’s April 2004 offer of unconditional peace talks. The ATTF, which is based in Bangladesh, reportedly has a political wing, the Tripura People’s Democratic Front (TPDF). In Manipur, the umbrella organization for the separatist insurgency is the Manipur People’s Liberation Front (MPLF), which was formed by the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (Prepak), and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The UNLF, which was established in 1964 by Areambam Samrendra SINGH, formed a Manipur People’s Army (MPA) in 1990 in an ef-

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fort to achieve independence for Manipur. Singh was killed in 2001, and the organization is now led by Rajkumar MEGHEN (a.k.a. Sana YAIMA). Manipur groups also include the Zomi Revolutionary Organization (ZRO), led by Thanzlianpau GUITE, and its Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA). In August 2005 the ZRO agreed to a ceasefire. Other separatist groups include the Babbar Khalsa International (BKI), which is led by Wadhwa SINGH and which has demanded creation of a Sikh state of Khalistan, and the Achik National Volunteers Council (ANVC), led by Dilash MARAK, which has sought to carve an Achik Land from parts of Assam and Meghalaya.

Legislature The union-level Parliament (Sansad) is a bicameral body consisting of an indirectly elected upper chamber (Rajya Sabha) and a directly elected lower chamber (Lok Sabha). Under the Indian constitution, all legislative subjects are divided into three jurisdictions: the union list, comprising subjects on which the union Parliament has exclusive authority; the state list, comprising subjects on which the state assemblies have authority; and the concurrent list, comprising subjects on which both may legislate, with a union ruling predominating in the event of conflict and where state questions assume national importance. Council of States (Rajya Sabha). The upper chamber is a permanent body of not more than 250 members, up to 12 of whom may be appointed for six-year terms by the president on the basis of intellectual preeminence; the remainder are chosen for staggered six-year terms (approximately one-third retiring every two years) by the elected members of the state and territorial assemblies, according to quotas allotted to each. As of late April 2006, following the March 28 replenishment for 60 seats, the 241 occupied seats were distributed as follows: Indian National Congress, 72; Bharatiya Janata Party, 50; Communist Party of India (Marxist), 13; Samajwadi Party, 13; All India Dravidian

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Cabinet As of September 1, 2006 Prime Minister

Manmohan Singh (INC)

Ministers Agriculture Chemicals and Fertilizers Coal Commerce and Industry Communications and Information Technology Company Affairs Consumer Affairs, Food, and Public Distribution Defense Department of Atomic Energy Department of Space Development of North Eastern Region Environment and Forests External Affairs Finance Health and Family Welfare Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises Home Affairs Human Resource Development Information and Broadcasting Labor and Employment Law and Justice Mines Minority Affairs Ocean Development Overseas Indian Affairs Panchayati Raj Parliamentary Affairs Personnel, Public Grievances, and Pensions Petroleum and Natural Gas Planning Power Railways Road Transport, Highways, and Shipping Rural Development Science and Technology Small-Scale, Agro-, and Rural Industries Social Justice and Empowerment Steel Textiles Tourism and Culture Tribal Affairs

Sharad Pawar (NCP) Ram Vilas Paswan (LJP) Shibu Soren (JMM) Kamal Nath (INC) Dayanidhi Maran (DMK) Prem Chand Gupta (RJD) Sharad Pawar (NCP) Pranab Mukherjee (INC) Manmohan Singh (INC) Manmohan Singh (INC) P. R. Kyndiah (INC) A. Raja (DMK) Manmohan Singh (INC) Palaniappan Chidambaram (INC) Anbumani Ramdoss (PMK) Sontosh Mohan Dev (INC) Shivraj Patil (INC) Arjun Singh (INC) Priyaranjan Dasmunsi (INC) (Vacant) Hans Raj Bhardwaj (INC) Sis Ram Ola (INC) A. R. Antulay (INC) Kapil Sibal (INC) Vayalar Ravi (INC) Mani Shankar Aiyar (INC) Priyaranjan Dasmunsi (INC) Manmohan Singh (INC) Murli Deora (INC) Manmohan Singh (INC) Sushil Kumar Shinde (INC) Lalu Prasad Yadav (RJD) T. R. Baalu (DMK) Raghuvansh Prasad Singh (RJD) Kapil Sibal (INC) Mahavir Prasad (INC) Meira Kumar (INC) [f] Ram Vilas Paswan (LJP) Shankarsinh Vaghela (INC) Ambika Soni (INC) [f] P. R. Kyndiah (INC)

INDIA

Urban Development Water Resources Youth Affairs and Sports

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S. Jaipal Reddy (INC) Saif-u-Din Soz (INC) Mani Shankar Aiyar (INC)

Ministers of State (Independent Charge) Civil Aviation Food Processing Nonconventional Energy Sources Statistics and Program Implementation Urban Employment and Poverty Alleviation Women and Child Development Without Portfolio

Praful Patel (NCP) Subodh Kant Sahay (INC) Vilas Muttemwar (INC) G. K. Vasan (INC) Kumari Selja (INC) [f] Renuka Chowdhury (INC) [f] Oscar Fernandes (INC)

[f] = female

Progressive Federation, 12; Bahujan Samaj Party, 7; Rashtriya Janata Dal, 7; Telugu Desam Party, 6; Janata Dal (United), 5; Nationalist Congress Party, 5; Biju Janata Dal, 4; Shiv Sena, 4; Indian National Lok Dal, 3; All Indian Trinamul Congress, 3; All India Forward Bloc, 2; Janata Dal (Secular), 2; Shiromani Akali Dal, 2; Dravidian Progressive Federation, 2; Indian Union Muslim League, 2; Revolutionary Socialist Party, 2; Communist Party of India, Mizo National Front, Nagaland People’s Front, National Conference, Pattali Makkal Katchi, People’s Democratic Party, Rashtriya Lok Dal, Samata Party, Sikkim Democratic Front, Swatantra Bharat Paksh, 1 each; independents, 8; and nonparty nominees, 7. Chair: Bhairon Singh SHEKHAWAT. House of the People (Lok Sabha). Serving a five-year term (subject to earlier dissolution), the lower chamber currently has 545 seats, of which 543 are allocated to directly elected members from the states and union territories, with 2 filled by presidential nomination to represent the Anglo-Indian community. Seventy-nine seats are reserved for members of scheduled castes, and 41 are reserved for members of specified tribes. General elections held in stages on April 20, 22 (for Tripura’s two seats), and 26 and May 5 and 10, 2004, resulted in the following distribution: Indian National Congress and allies, 219 (Indian Na-

tional Congress, 145; Rashtriya Janata Dal, 22; Dravidian Progressive Federation, 16; Nationalist Congress Party, 9; Pattali Makkal Katchi, 6; Jharkhand Mukti Morcha, 5; Telangana Rashtra Samithi, 5; Lok Janshakti Party, 4; Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, 4; Indian Union Muslim League, 1; People’s Democratic Party, 1; Republican Party of India [A], 1); National Democratic Alliance, 185 (Bharatiya Janata Party, 137; Shiv Sena, 12; Biju Janata Dal, 11; Shiromani Akali Dal, 8; Janata Dal [United], 8; Telugu Desam Party, 5; All India Trinamul Congress, 2; Mizo National Front, 1; Nagaland People’s Front, 1); Left Front, 59 (Communist Party of India [Marxist], 43; Communist Party of India, 10; All India Forward Bloc, 3; Revolutionary Socialist Party, 3); Samajwadi Party, 35; Bahujan Samaj Party, 18; Janata Dal (Secular), 3; Rashtriya Lok Dal, 3; Assam People’s Council, 2; National Conference, 2; All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen, Bharatiya Navshakti Party, Indian Federal Democratic Party, Kerala Congress (Joseph), National Loktantrik Party, Samajwadi Janata Party (Rashtriya), Sikkim Democratic Front, 1 each; independents, 5; nominated members, 2. Four seats remained open as a result of electoral irregularities. In the following two years the most significant change in representation saw the Bharatiya Janata Party total drop by 6 seats. Speaker: Somnath CHATTERJEE.

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INDIA

Communications

man (Kolkata and New Delhi, 150,000), founded 1875, in English; Samaj (Cuttack, 150,000), in Oriya.

Traditionally among the freest in Asia, Indian news media were subjected to rigid government control following the declaration of emergency in June 1975. Most of the emergency legislation was rescinded in April 1977, and a constitutional amendment passed in August 1978 guaranteed the right to report parliamentary proceedings. Although the public sector remains the only source of radio news broadcasts, a state monopoly on television services ended in 1992.

India’s principal news agencies are the Press Trust of India (PTI) and United News of India (UNI), both of which offer services in English and Hindi; UNI also has an Urdu service. Numerous foreign agencies maintain offices in New Delhi and other principal cities.

Press

Broadcasting and Computing

As of 2001 there were 52,000 newspapers and magazines published in 100 languages and dialects. Of 5,600 dailies, the Hindi press claimed by far the greatest number, 2,500, followed by Urdu with over 500. The English-language press, however, is dominant at the national level in both political influence and readership. Nearly all of the following dailies publish not only from the listed locations but from various other cities: Times of India (Delhi, 2,600,000), founded 1838, in English; Dainik Bhaskar (Bhopal, 1,570,000), in Hindi; Malayala Manorama (Kottayam, 1,210,000), in Malayalam; Eenadu (Hyderabad, 1,100,000), in Telugu; Gujarat Samachar (Ahmedabad, 1,040,000), in Gujarati; Hindustan Times (New Delhi, 1,030,000), in English; The Hindu (Chennai, 930,000), founded 1878, in English; Ananda Bazar Patrika (Kolkata, 870,000), in Bengali; Punjab Kesari (Jalandhar, 840,000), in Hindi; Mathrubhumi (Kozhikode, 830,000), in Malayalam; Indian Express (New Delhi, 690,000), in English; Daily Thanti (Chennai, 610,000), in Tamil; Navbharat Times (New Delhi, 470,000), in Hindi; Economic Times (New Delhi, 440,000); Lokasatta (Mumbai, 370,000), in Marathi; Prajavani (Bangalore, 300,000), in Kannada; Ajit (Jalandhar, 230,000), in Punjabi; States-

The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting oversees two separately operated facilities, All India Radio (AIR), which remains the country’s only radio news source, and Doordarshan India (Television India—TVI). Permitted only since 2000, privately owned FM radio is expanding rapidly. Cable and satellite television services are now widely available. State-run broadcasting is supervised by the autonomous Broadcasting Corporation of India (Prasar Bharati). There were approximately 92.3 million television receivers and 9.0 million computers serving 22 million Internet users in 2003.

News Agencies

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. Ranendra SEN U.S. Ambassador to India David C. MULFORD Permanent Representative to the UN Nirupam SEN IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, AfDB, BIS, CP, CWTH, Interpol, IOR-ARC, NAM, PCA, SAARC, WCO, WTO

INDONESIA REPUBLIC

OF

INDONESIA

Republik Indonesia

Note: On May 27, 2006, a major earthquake, measuring 5.8 on the Richter scale, struck central Java. Centered near the city of Yogyakarta, the quake killed 5,800 people, injured 20,000, and left some 200,000 at least temporarily homeless.

The Country The most populous country of Southeast Asia and fourth in the world, Indonesia is an archipelago of over 13,500 islands that fringes the equator for a distance of 3,000 miles from the Asian mainland to Australia. Java, Sumatra, and Borneo (whose territory Indonesia shares with Malaysia and Brunei) are the principal islands and contain most of the population, which is predominantly of Malay descent but includes some 3.5–4.0 million ethnic Chinese. The country embraces the world’s largest single Muslim group in addition to small minorities of Christians (10 percent) and of Hindus and Buddhists (1 percent). Overall, a total of more than 500 languages and dialects are in use. As of 1998 women made up 40 percent of the labor force, with the majority engaged in agriculture or cottage industries. Islamic strictures and, until 1999, the predominance of the military in government have restrained female participation in politics; women held about 12 percent of the 550 seats in the People’s Representation Council elected in 2004. Agriculture continues to employ about twofifths of the workforce but now contributes less than one-fifth of GDP. Indonesia nevertheless remains one of the world’s principal exporters of rubber and palm oil, with coffee, tea, and spices ranking among other significant sectoral exports. As the leading oil producer in the Far East, the country has benefited from high oil prices since the 1980s but has

also promoted diversification into agribusiness and manufacturing. Such manufactured goods as garments and other textiles, wood products, electrical appliances, and food products have become major sources of export earnings, as has liquefied natural gas. Indonesia is also a leading producer of tin. In 2004 industry as a whole accounted for about 46 percent of GDP, compared with 38 percent for

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the service sector. Major trading partners include Japan and the United States. After a decade of rapid economic expansion that averaged 7.1 percent annually in 1985–1995, GDP growth slowed to 4.4 percent in 1996–1997. Moreover, the second half of 1997 saw a precipitous decline in the value of the rupiah, mirroring the descent of the Thai baht and other regional currencies and triggering an economic tailspin in 1998: The GDP contracted by 13 percent, while inflation, which had averaged 8.5 percent annually in 1990– 1997, soared to nearly 75 percent. At the same time, the country was beset by its worst drought in half a century. Efforts to stabilize the economy in 1998–1999 included proposals to reform the banking and energy industries, speed up privatization and foreign participation, restructure corporate debt, and offer greater fiscal autonomy to the provinces. Estimated growth through the fiscal year ending March 2000 was 2 percent, roughly the rate of inflation, although rising world oil prices had produced a significant jump in export earnings. For 2000 as a whole, GDP growth was 4.9 percent, although it fell to an average of 3.8 percent in 2001–2003. Inflation dropped from 12 percent in 2002 to 6.6 percent in 2003. GDP growth in 2004 turned upward, to 5.1 percent. The Indian Ocean tsunami disaster of December 26, 2004, which cost an estimated 220,000 lives in Indonesia alone, did not have a major impact on the overall economy in 2005—even though the Asian Development Bank put the total cost at $4.7 billion—because the worsthit area, Aceh, contributes only a small fraction of GDP. Growth for 2005 stood at about 5.3 percent, but inflation averaged about 10 percent, in part because of higher domestic energy prices resulting from reduced fuel subsidies for consumers.

Government and Politics Political Background Colonized by the Portuguese in the 16th century and conquered by the Dutch in the 17th century, the territory formerly known as the Netherlands East Indies was occupied by the Japanese in

World War II. Upon Japanese withdrawal, Indonesian nationalists took control, proclaiming the independent Republic of Indonesia in August 1945. After four additional years of war and negotiation, the Netherlands government recognized the new state on December 27, 1949, and relinquished claim to all its former East Indian possessions except West New Guinea (Irian Jaya). A Netherlands– Indonesian Union under the Dutch Crown was established by the 1949 agreements but was dissolved in 1956, and in 1963 Irian Jaya (subsequently renamed Papua) came under Indonesian control. In December 1975 Indonesian troops occupied the Portuguese Overseas Territory of East Timor, and on July 17, 1976, the government formally incorporated the region into Indonesia, an action that neither Portugal nor the United Nations recognized. (Following a quarter-century of strife, including allegations of genocide and other human rights abuses by Indonesia, the annexed territory became independent as the Democratic Republic of TimorLeste on May 20, 2002.) SUKARNO, one of the leaders of the nationalist struggle, served as constitutional president from 1949 until the late 1950s, when he responded to a series of antigovernment rebellions by proclaiming martial law and, in 1959, imposing a so-called “guided democracy” under which he exercised quasi-dictatorial powers. The Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia—PKI) assumed an increasingly prominent role and by 1965 had embarked, with Sukarno’s acquiescence, on the establishment of a “Fifth Armed Force.” The campaign to arm its supporters was actively resisted by the army, and on October 1, 1965, the PKI attempted to purge the army leadership. In retaliation, the military and the Indonesian masses assaulted their perceived opponents by the thousands in rural areas, killing numerous Chinese and virtually eradicating what had been the world’s third largest Communist party. In succeeding months President Sukarno attempted to restore order, but public confidence in his leadership had seriously eroded. In March 1966 he was forced to transfer key political and military powers to Gen. SUHARTO, who had achieved prominence by turning back the attempted Communist takeover.

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Political Status: Independent republic established August 17, 1945; original constitution reinstated by presidential decree in 1959; under modified military regime from March 12, 1966, until democratic multiparty system reinvigorated following change of government on May 21, 1998. Area: 735,354 sq. mi. (1,904,569 sq. km.). Population: 206,264,595 (2000C); 221,184,000 (2005E). Both figures exclude East Timor, which became the independent country of Timor-Leste in 2002. Major Urban Centers (2005E): JAKARTA (8,455,000), Surabaya (2,675,000), Bandung (2,179,000), Medan (2,009,000), Palembang (1,648,000), Tangerang (1,590,000), Semarang (1,524,000), Ujung Pandang (formerly Makassar, 1,190,000), Malang (789,000), Padang (762,000), Yogyakarta (390,000). Official Language: Bahasa Indonesia (a form of Malay). Monetary Unit: Rupiah (market rate July 1, 2006: 9,263 rupiahs = $1US). President: Susilo Bambang YUDHOYONO (Democratic Party); elected in runoff balloting on September 20, 2004, and inaugurated on October 20 for a five-year term, succeeding Megawati SUKARNOPUTRI (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle). Vice President: Muhammad Jusuf KALLA (Golkar Party); elected in runoff balloting on September 20, 2004, and inaugurated on October 20 for a term concurrent with that of the president, succeeding Hamzah HAZ (United Development Party).

In March 1967 the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat—MPR) removed Sukarno from office, and he retired to private life until his death in June 1970. Suharto, who had proclaimed a “New Order” as acting president, was elected by the MPR in 1968 for a five-year term as chief executive. Although curbing many of the excesses of his predecessor, Suharto faced widespread discontent over steadily rising prices, domination of important sectors of the economy by foreign (particularly Japanese) capital, and per-

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vasive military influence in government. Thus his election to a third term in 1978 was preceded by six months of student demonstrations directed in part against alleged government corruption and a structure of political representation that permitted an overwhelming majority of the MPR to be drawn from the military and from Golkar, the governmentsupportive coalition of functional groups. However, widespread support greeted the decision to free some 30,000 political detainees, including most of those held since the abortive 1965 coup, under a government program that concluded in December 1979. In 1984 government legislation was introduced requiring all political, social, and religious organizations to adopt the five-point Pancasila state philosophy of belief in a supreme being, humanitarianism, national unity, consensus democracy, and social justice. The initiative encountered strong opposition, notably from Muslim groups, and in September security forces were needed to suppress antigovernment rioting in Jakarta. By mid1985, however, all political groupings had accepted Pancasila, and there followed a decade of relative stability, underpinned by increasing economic prosperity, albeit very unevenly distributed. At the nationwide balloting of June 9, 1992, Golkar retained overwhelming control of the largely elective People’s Representation Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat—DPR). On March 10, 1993, the MPR unanimously elected President Suharto to a sixth five-year term. Having made significant gains in the 1992 election, the Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia—PDI) became the focus of an increasingly vigorous political opposition, which was led from December 1993 by Sukarno’s eldest daughter, Megawati SUKARNOPUTRI (familiarly identified as Megawati). The authorities responded by promoting a takeover of the PDI by progovernment elements, which led to the ouster of Megawati at a PDI congress in June 1996. Condemning the congress as illegally convened and conducted, she and her supporters refused to vacate the party’s Jakarta headquarters, the storming of which by the security forces in late July triggered Indonesia’s worst civil disorder since 1984.

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The crackdown continued in subsequent months, with numerous human rights and other prodemocracy activists being detained, although Megawati herself was released on August 9. The May 1997 election of the DPR produced an even more dominant position for Golkar, which gained 73 percent of the vote and 325 of the 425 elective seats. The only significant opposition came from the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan—PPP), with 23 percent of the vote and 89 seats; the PDI managed only 3 percent of the vote and 11 seats after Megawati encouraged her supporters to vote for the PPP in the wake of the split within the PDI. The campaign was accompanied by widespread rioting and violence, particularly when the government forced the cancellation of opposition rallies in March and April. An estimated 300 people died during the unrest. On March 10, 1998, the MPR elected President Suharto for a seventh term. The MPR also confirmed Suharto’s choice of Bacharuddin Jusuf HABIBIE, minister of research and technology and a longtime Suharto associate, as successor to Vice President Try SUTRISNO. By then, however, the financial crisis that had spread in the second half of 1997 from Thailand throughout East Asia had given new impetus to antigovernment forces. In February, with both unemployment and inflation soaring, protests and sporadic rioting over rising food and fuel prices had accelerated into calls for Suharto to step down. Peaceful demonstrations on university campuses began demanding far-reaching reformasi—the Indonesia term for political reform that was to become a rallying cry in the turmoil ahead. On March 9 the MPR gave Suharto unspecified special powers to maintain social order, and three days later Gen. WIRANTO, the armed forces commander who had taken office in February, warned of a military crackdown if the protests began to threaten national security. Throughout April 1998 student protests occurred almost daily, while accusations of human rights abuses by security forces against political activists began to surface. On May 1 Suharto ruled out any political reforms before the expiration of

his term in 2003, and on May 4 the government announced a deep cut in subsidies for fuel, electricity, and transportation that had been agreed to the previous year as part of a $43 billion economic assistance package put together by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Widespread outrage at the price increases began degenerating into looting and rioting as civic, religious, ex-military, and political leaders began taking up the call for reform and urging the president to resign. Among the most outspoken critics was Amien RAIS of Muhammadiyah, the country’s second largest Muslim organization, with some 28 million members. On May 12, 1998, six students died in Jakarta in street protests, triggering a wave of looting, burning, raping, and other violence directed largely by the urban poor against ethnic Chinese, who had long been prominent in Indonesian business and whom many Indonesians blamed for the country’s economic plight. Nearly 1,200 deaths occurred May 12–15, with thousands of businesses and buildings in Jakarta destroyed. Responding to the mounting chaos, on May 15 Suharto cut short a visit to Egypt and returned to Jakarta, where the regime, to no avail, rescinded the May 4 price increases. Support for Suharto within Golkar also began to waver, and on May 18 HARMOKO, speaker of the DPR as well as Golkar chair, called for Suharto to resign. On May 20, with thousands of students occupying the legislature, Rais, who had emerged as a leader of the reform movement, heeded warnings from the military and canceled a million-strong “people’s power” march in Jakarta to avoid “more bloodshed, more unnecessary victims.” By then, however, Suharto had lost the key support of the military leadership, including Gen. Wiranto, and on May 21 he resigned, Vice President Habibie immediately taking the oath of office as president. The following day, pledging a “total reformation of the political, economic, and legal systems,” President Habibie presented a new Kabinet Reformasi that nevertheless included many holdover ministers. On May 25 he began a series of political prisoner releases and announced that new national elections would be held following an overhaul of

INDONESIA

the election laws, a process expected to take about a year. In late May a ban on labor unions and restrictions on political party formation were lifted, and dozens of new parties began emerging. Most restrictions on the media were also ended. Although protests against worsening economic conditions continued and student demonstrators now began calling for Habibie’s resignation, the violence had abated. In late June 1998, having pledged to investigate the Suharto family’s estimated $40 billion fortune, Habibie replaced 41 appointed MPR members accused of “KKN”— an Indonesian acronym for collusion, corruption, and nepotism—and announced a National Action Plan on Human Rights. These and other measures gained the new government cautious support from a number of opposition leaders, including Abdurrahman WAHID of the 30-million-member Council of Scholars (Nahdlatul Ulama—NU), the country’s largest Muslim organization. Protests and sporadic rioting directed against high food prices occurred in September and early October 1998, but students did not take to the streets again en masse until October 28, when some 8,000 demonstrators challenged the legitimacy of an upcoming special session of the MPR that was to begin work on electoral reform legislation. The activists also demanded Habibie’s resignation, formation of a transitional government, prosecution of Suharto for political and economic offenses, and an end to military representation in the legislature. When the MPR session convened on November 10, the student reform movement anticipated receiving support for their cause from a meeting of opposition leaders Megawati, Rais, Wahid, and Sri Sultan HAMENGKU BUWONO X, head of the former royal family of Yogyakarta and recently named governor of the region. However, the four political leaders rejected the idea of a transitional government and instead indicated that they would back measures leading to orderly elections in 1999 and a six-year withdrawal of the military from the political process. On November 13, 1998, with crowds outside the adjourned legislature having swelled to an estimated 20,000, troops opened fire when unarmed

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protesters tried to break through barricades, precipitating another wave of civil disorder that left 16 dead. Insisting that the demonstrators were being manipulated by groups that wanted to overthrow the government, authorities briefly detained for questioning a number of opposition figures. Although the protesters immediately dubbed November 13 “Black Friday,” the disturbances did not reach the proportion of the May rioting, which, according to a government fact-finding report released earlier in the month, had been partly instigated by armed forces units. On December 3, 1998, the government announced that elections for the DPR would be held on June 7, 1999, with a reconstituted MPR then to convene later in the year to elect a new president. In April 1999 the police force was formally separated from the military; the MPR repealed the 1963 Subversion Law, which under Sukarno and Suharto had been invoked to imprison dissidents; and the DPR passed a law on regional autonomy designed to permit the provinces greater control over their economic and political affairs. Forty-eight parties contested the June 1999 DPR election, the principal contenders being Megawati’s newly registered PDI-Struggle (PDI-Perjuangan, or PDI-P); President Habibie’s Golkar; Wahid’s NU offshoot, the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa—PKB); and Rais’s National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional—PAN). The sheer logistics of conducting the poll, compounded by the refusal of more than two dozen smaller parties to accept the outcome, delayed release of the final results until August 3, when President Habibie officially validated the returns. Even then, the intricacies of the complex proportional electoral system delayed final determination of seat assignments into September, when the PDI-P was credited with 153 seats and second-ranked Golkar with 120. Despite initial expectations that Megawati would claim the presidency when the MPR convened, many of the country’s new Islamic parties objected to the prospect of a woman chief executive. Furthermore, Megawati remained aloof from coalition-building, and the eventual decision of the

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PKB’s Wahid, an erstwhile Megawati supporter, to accept the nomination offered by the PAN and a group of other “Central Axis” Muslim parties led to his election on October 20, 1999, by a 373– 313 margin over the PDI-P chair. Earlier, Yusril Ihza MAHENDRA of the Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang—PBB) had withdrawn from the contest, as had the incumbent, President Habibie, whose October 14 “accountability” speech, in which he sought to justify his administration’s policies but also apologized for its shortcomings, had been rejected 355–322 by the MPR. On October 21, with the backing of President Wahid, Megawati was elected vice president over Hamzah HAZ of the PPP, 396–284, thereby quelling a spate of rioting by her disappointed supporters. The “Cabinet of National Unity” announced by President Wahid on October 26, 1999, constituted an ethnic, religious, and regional cross-section, with all of the leading parties represented. One of the more notable appointments was that of a civilian as minister of defense, with Gen. Wiranto being moved to the position of coordinating minister for politics and security. Although widely respected, the nearly blind Abdurrahman Wahid—familiarly, Gus Dur (“Older Brother Dur”)—had assumed the presidency in fragile health, having suffered two major strokes in recent years. Within months of taking office he found his patched-together coalition government being disparaged for inexperience and inefficiency, both of which had slowed down the pace of economic reform. Moreover, Wahid himself began drawing criticism for seemingly off-the-cuff comments and erratic decision making as well as for the absence of effective initiatives for resolving separatist and sectarian conflicts. In northwest Sumatra secessionist sentiment had resurged in Aceh, where the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka—GAM) repeatedly clashed with security forces. In August 1998 the military had begun withdrawing nonlocal troops from Aceh, with Gen. Wiranto apologizing for human rights abuses inflicted by the military during nearly a decade of suppressive efforts. President Habibie made a similar apology during a

visit to the province in March 1999. A month later the Acehnese secessionists, led from exile in Sweden by Hasan di TIRO, demanded that a referendum on the province’s future be put to the voters. In early November Aceh’s provincial assembly refused to authorize an independence referendum. In response, demonstrators torched the assembly building, and a recently formed Campaign for a Referendum in Aceh, led by Mohammad NAZZAR, organized a protest in Banda Aceh, the provincial capital, that attracted between 500,000 and 1.5 million Acehnese. On May 12, 2000, meeting in Geneva, representatives of the two sides agreed to a three-month cease-fire, termed a “humanitarian pause,” but security sweeps, ambushes, and other incidents continued. Meanwhile, Amnesty International had charged that the number of human rights violations by the military was escalating. The purported cease-fire was ultimately extended into 2001, but on April 12 the central government announced that law and order would be reestablished, ending the cease-fire. Elsewhere, communal strife between Christians and Muslims in Maluku (the Moluccan Islands), in the east, had cost several thousand lives by mid2000 and threatened to spread elsewhere (see map). In Kalimantan, a dispute between native Dayaks and immigrant Madurese repeatedly flared up. In predominantly Melanesian West Papua (now officially Papua; see Annexed Territory, below), separatists threatened to declare independence. Most dramatically, an August 30, 1999, proindependence vote in East Timor had precipitated a wave of unprecedented violence by pro-Jakarta militias that was not contained until a UN peacekeeping force began arriving on September 20. On October 19 the MPR endorsed the referendum results, thereby rescinding East Timor’s 1976 annexation and paving the way for the former territory’s full independence after a period of UN administration (for details, see the Timor-Leste article). The sectarian strife in Maluku began on the small island of Ambon in January 1999, triggered by a traffic incident. In the next 18 months an estimated 3,000 people died, and many thousands more fled violence perpetrated by both Christians

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and Muslims. Once known for religious harmony, with its population equally divided between the two communities, since the 1980s Maluku had seen a shift in the balance of political and social power away from the comparatively affluent Christians, mainly because a government program relocated some 100,000 Muslims there. A large segment of the Muslim population had long perceived itself as economically victimized by the Christians, many of them ethnic Chinese. In the context of continuing strife in Maluku, an anti-Christian rally on January 7, 2000, in Jakarta attracted over 100,000 Muslims, while on January 15 the Indonesian Council of Ulemas, the country’s highest Islamic authority, called for a holy war (jihad) against Christians. In succeeding months several thousand well-trained Muslim fighters from other provinces, the “Holy Warriors” (Laskar Jihad), landed in Maluku despite President Wahid’s directive that authorities stop them. By then, Christian and Muslim neighborhoods had become armed camps whose perimeters could be crossed only at the risk of death. In late June Wahid declared a state of civil emergency in the region, but critics asserted that more forceful action, even martial law, was needed. Moreover, similar sectarian outbreaks had occurred elsewhere, including on nearby Sulawesi. President Wahid suspended Gen. Wiranto from the cabinet on February 14, 2000, in response to a January 31 report by the Indonesian Commission to Investigate Human Rights Violations in East Timor. The report called for the government to explore the possible prosecution of 33 individuals, including Wiranto and several other generals, in connection with human rights violations in East Timor following the August 1999 referendum. On May 16, following questioning by the office of the attorney general, Wiranto tendered his resignation from the cabinet. Having apologized to the MPR for the failings of his administration in a speech on August 7, 2000, Wahid announced two days later that he would assign day-to-day “technical” presidential tasks to Vice President Megawati and would reorganize the cabinet. The changes, announced on August 23, included the naming of two new coordinating minis-

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ters, one assigned to oversee economic and financial matters and the other to supervise political, social, and security affairs. On February 1, 2001, the DPR formally censured Wahid 393–4 for his handling of a $2 million donation from the sultan of Brunei and for an effort by an associate to scam millions from the State Logistics Agency (Bulog). Dissatisfied with his response, which included an assertion that the move against him was unconstitutional, the DPR approved a second censure motion on April 30 and then on May 30 voted 365–4 to convene the MPR to consider impeachment. Cabinet changes in June failed to reduce the momentum against Wahid, even though the attorney general had cleared him of any involvement in “Brunei-gate” and “Bulog-gate.” In July the beleaguered president issued a decree dissolving the DPR, but the Supreme Court ruled the move illegal, and the MPR responded by convening earlier than planned. On July 23 it voted 591–0 to remove Wahid and then quickly elected Megawati as his successor. Two days later Wahid agreed to leave the presidential palace, although he continued to insist that he was the rightful president. On July 26, 2001, the MPR elected PPP leader Hamzah Haz as vice president. The Megawati cabinet, which took the oath of office on August 10, was equally divided between representatives of supportive political parties and nonaffiliated technical experts. Meanwhile, former president Suharto had not been forgotten. Immediately after taking office in October 1999, the attorney general reopened a corruption investigation that had been closed by the Habibie administration. On April 26, 2000, a court granted permission for the government to seize suspect assets, which have been estimated at $25–45 billion, and on May 29 Suharto was placed under house arrest. On September 28, however, a Jakarta court dismissed charges involving some $590 million allegedly skimmed from state funds into seven Suharto-controlled charitable foundations. The court stated that Suharto, who had suffered three strokes in the preceding year, was medically unfit to stand trial, and on February 5, 2001, the Supreme Court upheld the decision.

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Shortly after assuming office President Megawati had backed special autonomy provisions for Aceh, but the GAM continued to reject any such arrangements. Nevertheless, talks held in Switzerland between the government and the exiled GAM leadership produced a December 9, 2002, cease-fire and a tentative peace accord under which the GAM would disarm and the Indonesian military would return to barracks. In an arrangement similar to what had been worked out in West Papua in 2001, the troubled province was to retain the majority of earnings from exploitation of its petroleum reserves. International monitors were assigned to Aceh, where an estimated 12,000 people had died in the conflict in the past decade, but the peace gradually disintegrated, and at a May 17–18, 2003, negotiating session in Tokyo, the GAM once again refused anything short of independence. In response, President Megawati quickly instituted martial law, ordered a resumption of military action, and in June decreed that all journalists obtain presidential permission before reporting from Aceh. Martial law was downgraded a year later to a state of civil emergency, but much of the province remained restive. In Maluku, in February 2002 the leaders of the Christian and Muslim communities signed an agreement to end the sectarian fighting that by that time had claimed 5,000 lives and had displaced hundreds of thousands. Although numerous incidents of violence were subsequently reported, the peace agreement held relatively intact beyond midyear, and in October it was reported that Laskar Jihad had decided to disband. (Laskar Jihad had also been active in the sectarian conflict in Sulawesi, where about 1,000 people had died before a peace agreement was signed in December 2001.) In the same month more than a dozen members of the Christian Maluku Sovereignty Front (Front Kedaulatan Maluku—FKM) were convicted of charges related to raising the banned flag of the South Maluku Republic, which had been proclaimed in 1950. Subsequent flag-raising episodes likewise resulted in clashes with security forces, arrests, and additional prosecutions of FKM members for subversion.

At balloting on April 5, 2004, Indonesian voters elected the 550 members of a restructured DPR; the new Regional Representatives Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah—DPD), which had been established as an upper house of the MPR by a 2002 constitutional amendment; and local legislators— a total of more than 15,200 offices contested by nearly 450,000 candidates. As had been predicted by opinion polls, Golkar won a plurality, 127 seats, in the DPR, followed by Megawati’s PDI-P with 109. Somewhat unexpectedly, 58 seats were won by the recently organized Democratic Party (DP), headed by Megawati’s former coordinating minister for political and security affairs, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Susilo Bambang YUDHOYONO. Encumbered by a perceived lack of progress in eliminating corruption and resolving regional conflicts, President Megawati was defeated in Indonesia’s first direct presidential election. At firstround voting on July 5, 2004, she finished second to Yudhoyono, who at the September 24 runoff took 60.9 percent of the vote against the incumbent’s 39.1 percent. The other first-round contenders were Golkar’s Wiranto (despite his indictment in TimorLeste in connection with the abuses that followed East Timor’s independence referendum), the PAN’s Amien Rais, and the PPP’s Hamzah Haz. Inaugurated on October 20, President Yudhoyono formed a new “United Indonesia Cabinet” (Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu) that included representatives of his own DP, Golkar, the PKB, the PPP, the recently organized Justice and Prosperity Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera—PKS), the PAN, and the PBB. On December 26, 2004, the largest earthquake in 40 years (9.3 on the Richter scale) occurred off the coast of Sumatra and generated a tsunami that devastated Aceh Province. A June 2005 report put the toll at 220,000 dead or missing (170,000 in Aceh) and 475,000 displaced in Indonesia alone. An additional consequence of the tsunami disaster was the increased international attention brought to bear on the secessionist conflict in Aceh, where, some feared, the infusion of aid and its distribution would become enveloped in the political battle between the GAM and Jakarta. In fact, disputes did arise, but the calamity also spurred

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both sides to return to the negotiating table. Talks held in January, February, April, and May in Helsinki, mediated by former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari’s Crisis Management Initiative team, made significant strides toward an agreement on “special autonomy” for Aceh. In May President Yudhoyono lifted the state of civil emergency in the province, and on July 16, at the end of a fifth round of talks, the participants announced a peace agreement that was signed on August 15 by Minister of Justice and Human Rights Hamid AWALUDDIN and GAM leader Malik MAHMUD. By late December the GAM had disarmed and Jakarta had removed a significant proportion of nonlocal troops and security personnel from Aceh. In late January 2006 the government presented to the DPR draft legislation on autonomy for the province.

Constitution and Government In the wake of unsuccessful efforts to draft a permanent constitution in 1950 and 1956, the government in 1959 readopted by decree the provisional constitution of 1945, which allocated most powers to the president under a strong executive system. The five guiding principles (Pancasila) identified in the preamble are monotheism, humanitarianism, national unity, democracy by consensus, and social justice. During Suharto’s 32 years in power, the presidency and the military were the dominant political forces. The president, who is now limited to two fiveyear terms, remains the commander-in-chief; “may declare war, make peace and conclude treaties,” with legislative concurrence; and may declare a state of emergency under conditions set by the legislature. Beginning in 2004, the president and vice president were directly elected on a single ticket; if no ticket receives a majority of the votes cast, the two leading tickets compete in runoff balloting. Prior to constitutional reforms passed in 2001 and 2002, the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) was considered the highest state organ, with sole competence to interpret the constitution and to elect the president and vice president. It included all members of the ordinary legislature, the Peo-

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ple’s Representation Council (DPR), in addition to regional delegates and representatives of the military and assorted functional groups. With effect from the 2004 general election, the MPR became a bicameral legislature, the new upper house being the indirectly elected Regional Representatives Council (DPD). The DPD, whose membership may total no more than one-third that of the DPR, has limited authority but can propose legislation on regional autonomy, regional boundaries, the allocation of resources between the central government and the regions, and management of natural resources. The DPD may choose to oversee implementation of related laws and may also advise the lower house, the DPR, on such matters as taxation, the budget, religion, and education. The DPR continues to carry out regular legislative functions and may impeach the president by a two-thirds vote of the entire membership. Dismissal of the president would then require investigation, trial, and concurrence by the Constitutional Court, after which two-thirds of those voting in the MPR would also have to give their assent. The MPR oversees the inauguration of the president and vice president and is empowered to consider constitutional amendments. At the apex of the judicial system is the Supreme Court, whose members are proposed by the Judicial Commission of the DPR and appointed by the president. There are also lower public courts, religious courts, military tribunals, and state administrative courts. In addition, a 2002 constitutional change authorized creation of a nine-member Constitutional Court (the president, the DPR, and the Supreme Court each nominate three judges), which, in addition to its role in the presidential dismissal process, has authority to review the constitutionality of legislative acts, to resolve disputes between state organs, to review contested election results, and to consider the dissolution of political parties. Indonesia is presently divided into 32 provinces (propinsipropinsi), including 2 special regions (Aceh and Yogyakarta) and 1 special capital district (Jakarta). In late 2004 a court ruling on the 2003 three-way division of Papua Province let stand the

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completed separation of the westernmost area of the province as West Irian Jaya but prevented further division because of a conflict with a 2001 law on special autonomy for Papua. In April 2005 the Constitutional Court affirmed the decision, leaving Indonesia with 32 instead of 33 de facto provinces. Each province has an elected legislature (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah) and, under the post-Suharto reforms, an elected governor; government at the regency (kabupaten) and municipal (kotamadya) levels includes elected legislatures and elected executives (bupati and walikota, respectively).

Foreign Relations Following independence, Indonesia initially sought to play a prominent role in Asian affairs while avoiding involvement in conflicts between major powers. In the early 1960s, however, President Sukarno, asserting that a basic world conflict existed between the “old established forces” and the “new emerging forces,” attempted to project Indonesia as the spearhead of the latter. While officially nonaligned in foreign policy, his regime formed close ties with the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China; obtained the surrender of West New Guinea (Irian Jaya/West Papua) by the Netherlands; and instituted a policy of “confrontation,” supported by guerrilla incursions, against the new state of Malaysia. Most of these policies were reversed under Suharto, with Indonesia, although still formally nonaligned, moving markedly closer to the West. The three-year “confrontation” with Malaysia was terminated in 1966, after which diplomatic relations were established with Malaysia and Singapore. In addition, Indonesia took the lead in forming the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as an instrument of regional cooperation. Membership in the United Nations and many of its related agencies resumed in 1966, Indonesia having withdrawn in 1965 because of opposition to its annexation of West New Guinea. Formal diplomatic relations with China, having been suspended in October 1967, were restored in August 1990. Re-

lations suffered as a consequence of attacks against Chinese in the upheaval leading to Suharto’s resignation, but in May 1999 President Habibie issued a decree outlawing ethnic discrimination and ended a ban against using or teaching Mandarin Chinese. Developments in East Timor attracted international criticism for more than two decades. Relations with neighboring Australia worsened in 1983–1984 because of protests by Canberra’s newly elected Labor Party government against large-scale antiguerrilla offensives in East Timor, although in 1985 Prime Minister Bob Hawke emulated his Liberal predecessor by recognizing Indonesian sovereignty in the territory. In December 1995 Indonesia and Australia signed a security cooperation agreement providing for mutual notification in case of emergency, and in 1997 the two neighbor states completed a treaty establishing mutual maritime boundaries, ending some three decades of debate and tension over the issue. In January 1999 the Australian government, in a significant policy change, stated that it would support an “act of self-determination” for East Timor following a period of autonomy. The about-face left Jakarta with no major ally supporting its hard-line stance against self-determination. Shortly thereafter, the Habibie government indicated for the first time that it might accept East Timor’s independence. Australia’s prominence in condemning Jakarta’s inaction against the postreferendum paramilitary violence of September 1999, followed by its leading role in the resultant UN peacekeeping force, led to a dramatic chilling of relations. Under President Wahid relations initially improved, but Jakarta’s failure to discourage a flow of boats carrying asylum-seekers (most of them from Afghanistan and the Middle East) to Australia’s outer territories in 2001–2002 drew sharp criticism from the government of Prime Minister John Howard. Relations were further complicated by the threat of terrorism and Jakarta’s unwillingness to acknowledge the presence of the Jemaah Islamiah (JI) terrorist organization until an October 12, 2002, bombing of a Bali tourist resort that claimed 202 lives, 88 of them Australian.

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In January 2005 President Yudhoyono warmly acknowledged Australia’s unprecedented pledge of A$1 billion in aid following the December 2004 earthquake and tsunami disaster, and in April the two countries signed a framework partnership agreement that included among its provisions closer military cooperation. Only 11 months later, however, Indonesia protested Australia’s decision to grant temporary admission to more than 40 Papuans who were seeking asylum after having entered Australian waters in January. Relations with the United States strengthened during the 1980s, primarily because the Ronald Reagan administration regarded Indonesia as an important anticommunist presence in the region. However, a December 1991 massacre in Dili in East Timor led the U.S. Congress to cut off direct military funding. In October 1996, during the U.S. presidential election campaign, allegations surfaced in Washington that an Indonesian business conglomerate had illegally donated some $250,000 to the Democratic Party. Subsequent U.S. congressional criticism of alleged human rights violations in Indonesia further disturbed relations, while in late 1997 economic differences came to the fore. During the first weeks of 1998 Secretary of Defense William Cohen and former vice president Walter Mondale were separately dispatched to Jakarta by President Bill Clinton in unsuccessful efforts to convince Suharto to act upon IMF mandates attached to an economic aid package. Following Suharto’s resignation, the Clinton administration voiced its support for the Habibie government and, later, the Wahid presidency, although the East Timor turbulence had prompted Washington to temporarily suspend military assistance. U.S. President George W. Bush has described Indonesia as a key ally in the “war on terrorism” despite massive demonstrations in October– November 2001 to protest the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan. (Widespread opposition also greeted the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.) During a visit by President Yudhoyono to Washington in May 2005, the Bush administration announced that it was relaxing restrictions on the sale of nonlethal military equipment to Indonesia. Restoration of full

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military links, including weapons sales and training, was announced by Washington on November 22, 2005, subject to congressional approval. In August 2004 appeals court decisions overturned the convictions of four high-ranking officers for abuses in East Timor in 1999. In November the conviction of the former civilian governor of East Timor, Ab´ılio SOARES, was also overturned, and he was released. This meant that of the 18 individuals who had been tried for related crimes, only 1 civilian, militia leader Eurico GUTTERES, might actually serve a full sentence. Not surprisingly, human rights advocates questioned under what circumstances military figures would ever be held accountable for crimes committed in East Timor. In January 2005 Timor-Leste and Indonesia agreed to establish a “Commission of Truth and Friendship” that would examine remaining human rights cases but without prosecutorial authority.

Current Issues President Yudhoyono brought into office a broad-based cabinet that included a number of ministers who had served in the Wahid and Megawati administrations. In his inaugural address he announced his commitment to “a democratic country, open, modern, pluralistic and tolerant.” His plans focused on promoting economic growth, curbing corruption, resolving separatist conflicts, and combating terrorism—an agenda that, at least in its broad strokes, did not significantly differ from that of his predecessor. Megawati, however, had been perceived by many voters as too aloof from their concerns. She may also have been damaged by her administration’s reluctance to admit the presence in Indonesia of terrorist groups. Denial was no longer an option after the October 2002 Bali bombing. The prosecutions that resulted from that deadly attack and an August 5, 2003, bombing at the Jakarta Marriott, which killed 12, connected the principal perpetrators to the al-Qaida-linked Jemaah Islamiah (JI), which has emerged as the leading regional terrorist organization. Subsequent bombings have also been linked to the JI, including suicide attacks on Bali that claimed 44 lives in October 2005.

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The most dramatic accomplishment of the Yudhoyono administration (with the crucial assistance of Finnish mediators) has been the Aceh peace agreement. In return for accepting provincial autonomy instead of independence and agreeing to surrender its weapons and disband its army, the GAM was guaranteed that some 500 exiled members would receive amnesty, that 1,400 held in jails and prisons would be freed, and that the majority of nonlocal military and police would be withdrawn from the province by the end of 2005. The agreement also provided for Aceh to receive 70 percent of the income collected by the government from exploitation of its natural resources. On schedule, the army was disbanded; some 840 listed weapons were turned over to the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), which was coordinated by the European Union; and nearly 24,000 government troops and police left the province. It was by no means certain, however, that legislators would approve the 206-article draft law on autonomy for Aceh that the government presented to the DPR on January 26, 2006. A number of leading politicians expressed concern that the peace agreement had jeopardized the continued existence of Indonesia as a unitary state. They also objected to a provision permitting, for the first time, locally based political parties, presumably including a reconstructed GAM. At present, all Indonesian parties are required to have their headquarters in Jakarta and to maintain offices in at least half the country’s provinces. Although the government had hoped to win passage of the Aceh bill in time to hold provincial elections in April 2006, debate continued well beyond the March 31 target. On December 7, 2005, President Yudhoyono announced his first cabinet reshuffle. Most prominently affected were economic, financial, and industrial ministries. Although overall economic growth showed no signs of a slowdown, inflation had become a concern following Yudhoyono’s decision to slash subsidies for fuel, most dramatically on October 1, when prices rose by an average of 126 percent. Even after a 29 percent increase on March 1, 2005, gasoline had been available for less than $1.00 a gallon. Opponents of the policy change

included former presidents Wahid and Megawati, both of whom had also criticized the Aceh settlement. At the same time, the government has been battling endemic corruption, installing a Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi—KPK) whose most prominent target to date, Aceh Governor Abdullah PUTEH, was convicted in April 2005 and sentenced to ten years in prison for personally profiting from government purchase of a helicopter at an inflated price. The KPK has also successfully prosecuted a member of the national election commission for accepting kickbacks. Ongoing investigations involve a range of public concerns, including several banks, public utilities, and transport services. A December 2005 New York Times article brought renewed attention to military corruption as well. It has long been known that much of the financing for Indonesia’s armed forces comes not through government outlays but through bribes and protection schemes. The Times documented how U.S.-based Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold had made $20 million in payments to the military to protect its mine in Papua.

Political Parties Prior to May 1998 the government was supported by a coalition of social groups familiarly called Golkar, with only two other parties—the United Development Party (PPP) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), both dating from 1973—being allowed to contest elections. Efforts to promote democracy and reform in the early 1990s included formation of three groups in 1991: a 45-member Democracy Forum, one of whose leaders was Abdurrahman Wahid of the Council of Scholars (Nahdlatul Ulama—NU); the more radical League for the Restoration of Democracy, led by H. Johannes PRINCEN of the unrecognized Setiakawan (Solidarity) trade union; and a Forum for the Purification of People’s Sovereignty, led by Gen. Hartono Resko DHARSONO, Indonesia’s most prominent dissident at the time. None had a significant impact on national elections or on the

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Suharto regime’s political agenda. The Indonesian United Democratic Party (PUDI) and the Democratic People’s Party (PRD) were launched in May and July 1996, respectively, but the Suharto government granted neither official status. The following September President Suharto rejected calls for more parties to be recognized, contending that the existing three-party system had evolved by consensus over 20 years and that a multiparty system would require the repeal of the 1984 legislation making acceptance of the Pancasila state philosophy obligatory for all political and social organizations. Given the scarcity of political alternatives under Suharto, various Muslim associations increasingly assumed a quasi-political character. These included the country’s two largest Muslim organizations, the long-established NU and Muhammadiyah, the latter chaired by Amien Rais. In addition, an Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals (Ikatan Cendikiawan Muslim Indonesia—ICMI) was formed in December 1990, with President Suharto and a large number of Muslim leaders in attendance. The ICMI was widely regarded as the outgrowth of the president’s desire to create a broad-based Muslim constituency that would be at least partially independent of the military. Its first chair was B. J. Habibie, a Germantrained aeronautical engineer and staunch Suharto ally. In 1998 this political landscape underwent a volcanic transformation. Suharto’s departure from office in May and the Habibie government’s decision to ease restrictions on political parties resulted in formal registration of nearly 140 new parties by late February 1999. A total of 48 subsequently met the requirements for offering candidates at the June 1999 DPR election, with the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) of Megawati Sukarnoputri, the National Awakening Party (PKB) of Abdurrahman Wahid, and the National Mandate Party (PAN) of Amien Rais emerging as the principal anti-Golkar contenders. An anticipated alliance of the three was never formalized. Although 21 parties won at least 1 seat in the DPR, only 6 met the threshold of 10 seats (2 percent of

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the 500-seat body) required for contesting the next legislative election. After the June balloting a loose coalition of ten or so predominantly Islamic parties emerged. Controlling over 160 DPR seats, the “Central Axis” (Poros Tengah) coalesced around Wahid as a presidential alternative to either the incumbent B. J. Habibie or Megawati. In addition to the PKB and the PAN, parties associated with the axis included the PPP, the Crescent Star Party (PBB), the Justice Party (PK; now the Justice and Prosperity Party— PKS), the Nahdlatul Ummat Party (PNU; see PPNUI), and the United Believers Awakening Party (PKU; see under PPP). Under current electoral laws, 24 of the country’s roughly 300 parties qualified for the April 2004 DPR elections: the 6 that had won at least 2 percent of the 1999 vote, plus 18 that had met membership and other requirements in at least two-thirds of the provinces. Only parties achieving 5 percent of the popular vote or 3 percent of the DPR seats at the April balloting were then eligible to nominate presidential candidates. In August 2004, in an unsuccessful effort to defeat front-runner Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of the Democratic Party (PD) at the September presidential runoff, Golkar, the PDI-P, the PPP, and the new Prosperous Peace Party (PDS) established a loose Coalition of the Nation in support of President Megawati. Collectively, the 4 parties controlled over 300 seats in the 550-seat DPR, but Golkar, now led by Yudhoyono’s vice presidential running mate, Jusuf Kalla, soon withdrew.

Presidential Party Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat—PD). The centrist PD (often translated as the Democrats Party or Democracy Party) was formally established in 2002, largely to advance the cause of its principal founder, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a former Golkar member who was serving at the time as coordinating minister for political and security affairs in the Megawati cabinet. Using Yudhoyono’s popularity to build its base, the PD won an unexpected 7.5 percent of the

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vote and 56 seats at the DPR election in April 2004. A month earlier its founder, having declared in December 2003 that he would seek the presidency, had resigned from the cabinet. After finishing first in the July presidential balloting, with just under 34 percent of the vote, Yudhoyono handily won the July runoff against Megawati, taking 60.9 percent. His closest advisers included Rachmat WITOELAR, a former Golkar secretary general, and two former PDI-P leaders, Heru LELONO and Suko SUDARSO. Leaders: Susilo Bambang YUDHOYONO (President of the Republic), Subur BUDHISANTOSO (Chair), Muhammad MUBAROK (Deputy Chair), Umar SAID (Secretary General).

Other Parliamentary Parties Functional Group Party (Partai Golongan Karya—Golkar). A government-sponsored formation organized in 1964, the Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups (Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya—Sekber Golkar) captured 64 percent of the popular vote in the 1982 election and 73 percent in 1987. Initially a loose alliance of some 200 groups representing such functional interests as those of farmers, laborers, veterans, women, and youth, the largely military-led organization was technically not a party. Although Golkar was labeled “toothless” by some observers, in October 1989 the Suharto regime called on the organization to play a more active role as a representative body. In the June 1992 legislative election Golkar won 68 percent of the vote and 282 of 400 elective seats in the DPR, while in May 1997 it captured 73 percent of the vote and 325 out of 425 legislative seats. At a July 9–11, 1998, congress in Jakarta, in the first such open election in the organization’s history, State Minister Akbar TANJUNG won election as the group’s new chair. The congress also abolished its board of patrons, which effectively removed Suharto from the party, and stripped two members of his immediate family of their official posts. Later in July, Golkar’s Central Executive

Council removed seven Suharto family members from their MPR seats. Formally converted into a political party prior to the 1999 election campaign, Golkar finished second, with 21 percent of the vote and 120 seats in the DPR. Having been nominated on May 14 as Golkar’s presidential candidate, President Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie withdrew shortly before the MPR balloting on October 20, the assembly having delivered what amounted to a no-confidence vote following his “accountability” speech of October 14. His candidacy had already been damaged by a major scandal that erupted in July 1999 over $70 million in public funds that had been diverted through the Bank Bali for Golkar’s use, allegedly to buy votes. Following Habibie’s withdrawal, most Golkar representatives supported the PKB’s Abdurrahman Wahid, ensuring his election. Party Chair Tanjung was elected speaker of the DPR in early October 1999 and then stood as the party’s vice presidential candidate before a last-minute withdrawal. Subsequently, a number of Habibie supporters and others formed an “eastern caucus” dubbed Iramasuka or Iramasuka Nusantara—an acronym constructed from Irian Jaya, Maluku, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan, plus Nusa Tenggara. Following President Wahid’s 2001 removal and the election of Megawati Sukarnoputri as his successor, Tanjung finished second in the election to fill the republic’s vice presidency. In September 2002 Tanjung was convicted of corruption for diverting over $4 million in state funds to Golkar. He declined to resign as speaker of the DPR or as Golkar chair, however, pending appeal of his conviction, which was overturned by the Supreme Court in February 2004. The taint of corruption nevertheless may have contributed to Tanjung’s failure to win the party’s 2004 presidential nomination. In a second-round intraparty vote in April, he was defeated by Gen. Wiranto, 315–227, despite the latter’s indictment in Timor-Leste for “command responsibility” during the 1999 turmoil in East Timor. Wiranto named Salahuddin WAHID, brother of former president

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Abdurrahman Wahid, as his running mate and obtained the support of Wahid’s PKB, the Suhartobacked Concern for the Nation Functional Party (PKPB, below), and the National Democratic Unity Party (PPDK, below), but he finished third in the July presidential balloting, with 22 percent of the vote. At the April DPR election the party had had more success, winning a plurality of 127 seats on a 21.6 percent vote share. Equally important for the party, the winning vice presidential candidate in 2004 was Golkar’s Jusuf Kalla, who was then elected party chair in late December. His ascent had the additional consequence of separating Golkar from the other participants in the opposition Coalition of the Nation. Leaders: Jusuf KALLA (Vice President of the Republic and Chair of the Party), WIRANTO (2004 presidential candidate). Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia–Perjuangan—PDIStruggle, or PDI-P). The Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) was formed in January 1973 as a result of the government’s exhortation to “simplify” Indonesia’s party system. The party was organized through merger of the following five minority parties: the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia—PNI), the Upholders of Indonesian Independence (Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia—IPKI), the Catholic Christian Party of Indonesia (Partai Kristen Katolik Indonesia), the (Protestant) Christian Party (Partai Kristen Indonesia—Parkindo), and the People’s Party (Partai Murba—PM). The PDI won 11 percent of the popular vote in 1987, as contrasted with 8 percent in 1982; much of the gain was attributed to an energetic campaign conducted by former president Sukarno’s eldest daughter, Megawati Sukarnoputri, who was seen as appealing to “Youth Power” within opposition ranks. The PDI was the most conspicuous gainer at the 1992 balloting, increasing its legislative representation from 40 to 56. Despite government objections, Megawati was elected party chair in December 1993.

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In January 1995 a split in the PDI was reported, with a dissident group (charged by the party mainstream as being a product of infiltration by government agents) insisting that many members were linked to the banned Communist Party (PKI, below). These tensions came to a head in June 1996 when the progovernment PDI wing convened a party congress and elected Megawati’s predecessor, Dr. SURYADI, as chair. When Megawati loyalists later attempted to retain the main PDI building in Jakarta, party activists clashed with security forces sent to evict them, resulting in a disputed number of fatalities, other casualties, and arrests. In September the Megawati faction was refused permission to register a list of candidates for the 1997 legislative election. With Megawati having advised supporters to vote for PPP candidates, the PDI won only 11 seats with 3 percent of the vote in the May 1997 elections. On August 19, 1998, the Supreme Court dismissed Megawati’s lawsuit challenging her removal as PDI leader, and six days later clashes with the police occurred when 1,000 of her supporters tried to disrupt a congress of the progovernment faction in Palu. On October 8–10 in Denpasar, Bali, the pro-Megawati PDI faction held its fifth congress, its leader, without naming names, asserting that Indonesia had been “destroyed by parasites.” In addition to being authorized to name her own 17member governing board, she was officially designated as the faction’s candidate for president in 1999. Megawati subsequently registered her majority faction as a separate party, the PDI-Struggle. At the June 1999 election the PDI-P captured a plurality of 153 seats in the DPR on a 37 percent vote share, while the rump PDP won only 2 seats. Although Megawati was considered the leading contender for the presidency, her decision to remain aloof from political alliances prior to the October meeting of the MPR, combined with the reluctance of many Islamic parties to support a woman candidate, ultimately cost her the victory. Rioting by some of her supporters immediately broke out but was calmed by her election as vice president on October 21. On July 23, 2001, upon President

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Wahid’s removal from office, the MPR elevated Megawati to the presidency. At the April 2004 DPR election the PDI-P fared poorly, winning 109 seats on 18.5 percent of the vote. Seeking a full term as president three months later, Megawati finished second in the first round, winning 26 percent support—higher than had been expected shortly before the balloting but well behind the front-runner. At the September runoff she managed only 39 percent despite having as her running mate Hasyim MUZADI, head of the NU. In early 2005 a number of party reformers were reportedly seeking a candidate to replace her as party chair, but she won reelection “unanimously” in March. The dissidents were expelled in May and went on to form the PDP (below) late in the year. Leaders: Megawati SUKARNOPUTRI (Former President of the Republic and Chair of the Party), Jacob NUWA WEA (Deputy Chair), Gunawan WIROSAROYO, SUTJIPTO, Pramono Anung WIBOWO (Secretary General). United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan—PPP). In the face of sustained pressure from the government to simplify Indonesia’s party system through fusion, four Islamic groups—the Muslim Scholar’s Party of the NU, the Indonesian Islamic Party (Partai Muslimin Indonesia—PMI), the United Islamic Party of Indonesia (Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia—PSII), and the Muslim Teachers’ Party (Persatuan Tarbijah Islamijah—Perti)—merged into the PPP in 1973. Although the party remained highly factionridden, its leadership generally supported government policies while seeking to suppress both radical elements and the more conservative NU faction. During its first national congress, held in Jakarta in August 1984, the PPP formally adopted Pancasila as its sole ideology. However, elements within the NU, led by Abdurrahman Wahid, demanded that the group withdraw from “practical politics” and expressed dissatisfaction with the leadership of the PPP chair, Jailani NARO, who had formerly led the PMI and who was viewed as favoring the latter within the coalition. As a result, not only the NU but also the less influential Syarikat

Islam severed their links with the PPP the following December, insisting that henceforth they would concentrate exclusively on social and religious activities. The party’s influence declined dramatically after the departure of the NU; it secured only 16 percent of the vote and 61 seats in the DPR in 1987, down from 28 percent and 94 seats in 1982. In 1992 the party gained 2 additional legislative seats on a meager gain of 1 percent in vote share, but it won 89 legislative seats in the 1997 elections, garnering 23 percent of the vote. It benefited greatly from a split in the PDI (see PDI-P, above), which had led Megawati Sukarnoputri to encourage her followers to vote for the PPP. Following the departure of Suharto in May 1998, the PPP campaigned actively to reduce military representation in the DPR. At the June 1999 election it won 11 percent of the vote but a comparatively disproportionate share of 58 seats because of a vote-sharing agreement (stembus akoord) it had concluded with a number of smaller Islamic parties. As a result, the PPP gained 19 more seats than it otherwise would have won. PPP leader Hamzah Haz was defeated in the October 21, 1999, vice presidential contest in the MPR, losing to Megawati. Subsequently named coordinating minister for people’s welfare and eradication of poverty, he announced on November 20, after only a month in office, that he would leave the cabinet and concentrate on party affairs. Following Megawati’s election to the presidency, on July 26, 2001, Haz was elected vice president by the MPR. In the run-up to the 2004 elections the PPP’s ranks were reportedly increased by merger or cooperation agreements with several smaller parties, including the United Believers Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Umat—PKU), which is often rendered in English as the Islamic Awakening Party. It had been launched in October 1998 by NU members and clerics committed to the adoption of Islamic law and opposed to the selection of a secularist as the next president. In announcing the “merger,” PKU leader Asnawi LATIEF indicated that his party, which did not meet the requirements for competing in the 2004 DPR

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elections, did not plan to dissolve but to work in tandem with the PPP. Other parties adopting similar strategies were Ridwan SAIDI’s New Masyumi Party (Partai Masyumi Baru—PMB), which derived its name from a Sukarno-era Consultative Council of Muslim Indonesians (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia), and the New Indonesia Party (Partai Indonesia Baru—PIB). At the April 2004 legislative election the PPP finished third, with 58 DPR seats based on 8.2 percent of the vote. In the July presidential contest Hamzah Haz finished fifth, with 3 percent of the vote. His running mate, Agum GUMELAR, a retired general, had been a member of the Wahid cabinet. In April 2005 demonstrators occupied party headquarters in a failed effort to convince the party’s executive board to move up the date of the next party congress from 2007. The protest resulted from dissatisfaction with the continuing leadership of Haz. Leaders: Hamzah HAZ (Chair), Suryadarma ALI (State Minister for Cooperatives and Small and Medium-Sized Businesses), Ali Marwan HANAN (Deputy Chair), Endien SOFIHARA (DPR Faction Leader), Yunus YOSFIAH (Secretary General). National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional—PAN). Founded on August 23, 1998, by reformist Amien Rais of the Muhammadiyah, the PAN has advanced a program based on democracy; pluralism; nonsectarianism; nondiscrimination; women’s equality; market economics; disengagement of the military from politics; and separation of executive, legislative, and judicial powers. The PAN won only 7 percent of the June 1999 vote, for 34 seats in the DPR. Thereafter, Rais was a driving force behind formation of the “Central Axis” coalition. When the MPR convened in October, Rais was elected its chair, the third highest office (after president and vice president) in the state hierarchy. At the April 2004 DPR election the PAN won only 6.4 percent of the vote but captured 53 seats. In July presidential balloting Rais finished fourth, managing only 15 percent of the vote despite the

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backing of many moderate Muslim parties and having selected as his running mate Siswono Yudohusodo, a former Golkar member and Suharto minister who had himself been the initial presidential choice of the PSI (below) and a number of smaller parties. In April 2005 Amien Rais’s candidate to succeed him as party chair, Sutrisno Bachir, defeated party cofounder and former finance minister Fuad BAWAZIER. In August Bawazier resigned from the PAN, which, he asserted, had “abandoned its characteristic democracy.” Leaders: Sutrisno BACHIR (Chair), Amien RAIS (Former Chair of the MPR), A. M. FATWA, Abdillah TOHA, Zulkifli HASAN (Secretary General). National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa—PKB). Launched in July 1998 by the NU, the PKB nevertheless supports secular government, a stance that led more conservative Muslims within the NU to organize other parties, including the PKU (see PPP, above). The NU chair, Abdurrahman Wahid, himself considered a potential 1999 presidential candidate, subsequently repeated his willingness to support Megawati Sukarnoputri’s bid for the presidency. By mid1999, however, growing opposition to Megawati within various other Islamic and reform parties found them proposing Wahid as their favored candidate even though the PKB had won only 51 DPR seats (on a 17 percent vote share) at the June election. Formally nominated on October 7 by Amien Rais, leader of the PAN and newly elected chair of the MPR, Wahid continued to voice support for Megawati but nevertheless accepted the nomination. With firm backing from Golkar and the “Central Axis” parties, he was elected by the MPR, 373–313 over Megawati, on October 20. Wahid’s relations with the other leading parties and the Indonesian legislature grew increasingly fractious, however, culminating in his July 2001 removal from office. The nearly blind Wahid had suffered two major strokes even before being elected president, and in 2004 his frail health disqualified him as a

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repeat candidate. As a consequence, the PKB ended up backing Golkar’s Wiranto, who had selected the former president’s brother and NU leader, Salahuddin Wahid, as his running mate. At the April 2004 legislative election the PKB won about 10.6 percent of the vote (third place) but only 52 seats (sixth place). Within a year, a leadership dispute had split the party into two principal factions. Following decisions by party Chair Alwi Shihab and Secretary General Syaifullah Yusuf to join the Yudhoyono cabinet as, respectively, coordinating minister of people’s welfare and minister of state for acceleration of development in disadvantaged areas, both were forced to vacate their party offices. A congress in April 2005 elected Muhaimin Iskandar to chair the party, but in October 2005 Shihab supporters held a competing convention that named Choirul Anam as chair and Shihab as chair of the party’s Executive Council. The December 2005 cabinet reshuffle saw the departure of Shihab, the retention of Yusuf, and the addition of Iskandar loyalist Erman SUPARNO as minister of manpower and transmigration. Some analysts viewed the changes as a step toward reconciliation, but in early 2006 both factions continued to claim a right to register their executive boards even though the Supreme Court had ruled that Shihab’s faction had title to the party name. Leaders: Muhaimin ISKANDAR (Chair, PKBMuhaimin) Choirul ANAM (Chair, PKB-Alwi), Abdurrahman WAHID (Former President of the Republic and Chair of Advisory Council, PKBMuhaimin), Alwi SHIHAB (Chair of Executive Council, PKB-Alwi), Syaifullah YUSUF (PKBAlwi). Justice and Prosperity Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera—PKS). Also identified in English as the Prosperous Justice Party, the PKS began as the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan—PK), which was formed in July 1998 and campaigned for the June 1999 election on a platform that included a call for racial and ethnic harmony and nondiscrimination. A moderate Islamic party, the PK won under 2 percent of the vote and seven seats in the DPR, after which it joined the PAN in organizing a parliamen-

tary Reform Faction. The party’s founding chair, Nur Mahmudi ISMAIL, resigned the leadership in May 2000 to concentrate on ministerial duties in the Wahid government. Because the PK had not won sufficient DPR seats in 1999 to qualify for the 2004 DPR election, in 2002 the PK leadership organized an alternative party, the PKS, which succeeded in meeting the registration requirements. At the April 2004 election the PKS won an unexpected 7.3 percent of the vote and 45 seats. In the September 2004 presidential runoff it threw its support to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and in October it joined the new cabinet. Leaders: Hidayat NUR WAHID (Chair of the MPR and Chair of the Party), Tifatul SEMBIRING, Anis MATTA (Secretary General). Reform Star Party (Partai Bintang Reformasi—PBR). The moderate Islamic PBR began as the PPP-Reformasi, a faction within the United Development Party that viewed the PPP leadership as too conservative. The more youthful reform group also opposed a leadership decision (subsequently reversed) to delay a party congress that had been planned for 2003. Formally established in September 2002 as a separate party led by popular Islamic preacher Zainuddin MZ, who was a former PPP vice chair, the PPP-Reform changed its name to the PBR in April 2003 to avoid a legal altercation over use of the PPP label. Although Zainuddin was initially named the party’s presidential candidate for 2004, the party won only 2.4 percent of the vote and 14 seats at the April 2004 DPR election and therefore did not meet the threshold for contesting the race. The PBR ultimately chose to support the PAN’s Amien Rais in first-round balloting and then backed President Megawati in the second round. In May 2005 Zainuddin was unanimously reelected party chair despite differences with Zainal MAARIF, a deputy speaker of the DPR. Leaders: ZAINUDDIN MZ (Chair), Mahendra DATTA, Djafar BADJEBER (Secretary General). Prosperous Peace Party (Partai Damai Sejahtera—PDS). The PDS, which is sometimes

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rendered into English as the Peace and Prosperity Party, was established in October 2001. Although committed to Pancasila, the party membership is largely from the Christian minority and is led by a Christian preacher, Ruyandi Hutasoit. Although Hutasoit intended to seek the presidency in 2004, the PDS failed to meet the threshold for nominating him when it won only 2 percent of the vote and 13 seats at the April DPR election. Instead, the party chose to support President Megawati’s reelection. Leaders: Ruyandi Mustika HUTASOIT (Chair), Denny TEWU (Secretary General). Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang— PBB). Defining itself as a democratic and modernist Islamic party with roots in the Masyumi party that was dissolved during the Sukarno era, the PBB won 13 seats and a 2 percent vote share at the June 1999 legislative election. In April 2004 the PBB won about 2.6 percent of the vote and 11 seats at the DPR election. It supported Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono for president even though the party chair, Yusril Mahendra, was justice and human rights minister in the Megawati cabinet. Mahendra was named to the powerful post of state secretary in the Yudhoyono cabinet. In the DPR the PBB joined four smaller parties—the PPDK, the PP, the PPDI, and the PNIM (all below)—in forming the Democratic Star Pioneer faction. In May 2005, with Mahendra having stepped down as chair, M. S. Kaban was elected to replace him. The party continues to press for adoption of Islamic law (sharia). Leaders: Malam S. KABAN (Chair of the Party and Minister of Forestry), Yusril Ihza MAHENDRA (Chair of Advisory Board), Abdul Rahman SALEH (Attorney General), M. S. KABAN (Secretary General). National Democratic Unity Party (Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan—PPDK). Established in July 2002, the PPDK (also known in English as the United Democratic Nationhood Party) drew support from reform-minded, nationalist members of the middle class. Its chair was minister of state for administrative reforms in the Wahid cabinet but resigned in January 2001 be-

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cause he considered the government’s regional devolution efforts to be insufficient. At the 2004 DPR election the PPDK won 1.2 percent of the vote and four seats. It supported Golkar’s Wiranto for president in July. Leaders: Ryaas RASYID (Chair), Rivai PULUNGAN (Secretary General). Pioneer Party (Partai Pelopor—PP). The PP was established in August 2002 by Rachmawati Sukarnoputri, a younger sister of President Megawati, to advance her father’s Marhaenist philosophy of support for “ordinary people” and selfreliance. Having attacked Megawati’s leadership, Rachmawati intended to seek the presidency herself but ended up supporting Amien Rais of the PAN when the PP managed to win only three DPR seats and less than 1 percent of the vote at the April 2004 DPR election. In January 2006 Rachmawati was named an adviser to President Yudhoyono. Leader: Rachmawati SUKARNOPUTRI (Chair). Concern for the Nation Functional Party (Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa—PKPB). The PKPB was founded in September 2002 with the support of former President Suharto and his eldest daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana. When the PKPB won only 2 percent of the vote and two DPR seats at the April 2004 legislative election, thereby precluding Rukmana’s nomination for the presidency, the party decided to support Golkar’s Wiranto. The PKPB’s representatives sit with the Golkar faction in the DPR. Leaders: R. HARTONO (Chair), Siti Hardiyanti RUKMANA. Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia—PKPI). The PKPI began as the PKP, which was formed in midDecember 1998 by former Golkar members. One of its leaders, former general and defense minister Edi Sudrajat, had resigned from Golkar in November after having lost an election for Golkar chair the previous July. Another founder, Gen. Try Sutrisno, had served as Suharto’s vice president from 1993 to 1998. The PKP won 1 percent of the vote and four

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seats in the DPR at the June 1999 election. Having reconstituted itself as the PKPI, in April 2004 it won only one seat. In the 2004 presidential contest the PKPI backed Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Leader: Edi SUDRAJAT (Chair). Indonesian Democratic Vanguard Party (Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia—PPDI). Also identified in English as the Upholders of Indonesian Democracy Party, the PPDI was established in 2003. It won under 0.8 percent of the vote and one DPR seat at the April 2004 election and subsequently supported the PAN’s Amien Rais for president. Leader: H. Dimmy HARYANTO (Chair). Indonesian National Party (Marhaenism) (Partai Nasional Indonesia [Marhaenisme]— PNIM). Formed in May 2002 by another of Sukarno’s daughters, Sukmawati, the PNIM is a leading Marhaenist party, claiming descent from Sukarno’s PNI, which he had established in 1927 and which was consolidated into the PDI in 1973. Sukmawati planned to compete for the presidency in 2004 against her sisters, the incumbent Megawati and the PP’s Rachmawati, but her PNIM won only one DPR seat and 0.8 percent of the vote at the April DPR election. In the end, the PNIM backed the PAN’s Amien Rais. Leaders: Sukmawati SUKARNOPUTRI (Chair), Achmad Marhaen SUWARNOPUTRO (Secretary General).

Other Parties Contesting the 2004 DPR Election Freedom Bull National Party (Partai Nasional Banteng Kemerdekaan—PNBK). Established in July 2002 by former PDI-P members who no longer supported President Megawati, the PNBK began as the Partai Nasional Bung Karno, which incorporated in its title a nickname for former President Sukarno. Marhaenist in orientation, the PNBK was renamed because of a new law prohibiting the naming of parties after individuals. The party won 1.1 percent of the vote but no seats at the

2004 DPR election. It supported Amien Rais of the PAN for president. Leader: Eros DJAROT (Chair). Indonesian United Party (Partai Sarikat Indonesia—PSI). The PSI was formed in December 2002 by eight parties, each of which had won only one seat at the 1999 DPR election and which therefore did not meet the threshold for contesting the 2004 election. From the time of its formation the PSI was viewed as a coalition of convenience, with the ideologically diverse constituent organizations retaining their status as separate parties. The Democratic Catholic Party (Partai Demokrat Katolik—PDK) had won its 1999 seat from East Timor. The Indonesian Independence Vanguard Party (Partai Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia—IPKI), also translated more literally as the Indonesian Independence Supporters Association Party, traced its name to the IPKI that was consolidated into the PDI in 1973. The Indonesian National Party–Populist Front (Partai Nasional Indonesia–Front Marhaenis—PNI-FM) was one of several Marhaenist parties (see, for example, the PP and the PNIM, above). The Indonesian National Party–Marhaenist Masses (Partai Nasional Indonesia–Massa Marhaen—PNI-MM) was established in December 1998 by merger of two identically named PNI formations. The Indonesian United Islam Party (Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia—PSII) was a revival of the PSII that was subsumed by the PPP in 1973. The Indonesian Unity in Diversity Party (Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia—PBI), which campaigned on a platform of economic equality and ethnic, racial, and religious harmony, is led by Nurdin PURNOMO (Chair). The People’s Sovereignty Party (Partai Daulat Rakyat—PDR) was formed in early 1999 by backers of Golkar member and government minister Adi Sasono. The United Party (Partai Persatuan—PP) was organized by former PPP leader and 1988 vice presidential candidate H. J. NARO. Although the amalgamated PSI won a place on the April 2004 ballot, it failed to win any seats and attracted only 0.6 percent of the voters. Its 2004

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presidential candidate, Siswono YUDOHUSODO, eventually became the running mate of the PAN’s Amien Rais. Leaders: Rahardjo TJAKRANINGRAT (Chair), Jumhur HIDAYAT (Secretary General). Six additional parties, each with less than 1 percent of the vote, unsuccessfully competed in the 2004 DPR elections: the Freedom Party (Partai Merdeka—PM), formed in 2002 and led by former government minister Adi SASONO, who had previously been associated with the PDR; the Indonesian Nahdlatul Community Party (Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia—PPNUI), which emerged from the NU as the Nahdlatul Ummat Party and won five seats in 1999 under the leadership of Syukron MAKMUN; the New Indonesia Alliance Party (Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru—PIB), established in September 2002 and chaired by SYAHRIR; the Pancasila Patriot Party (Partai Patriot Pancasila—PPPC), formed in mid-2001 and led by Yapto Sulistio SOERJOSOEMARNO; the Regional Unity Party (Partai Persatuan Daerah—PPD), founded in 2002 and chaired by Oesman SAPTA; and the Socialist Democratic Labor Party (Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat—PBSD), formed in 2002 by labor union leader Mochtar PAKPAHAN, who had organized the National Labor Party (Partai Buruh Nasional—PBN) after being released from prison in 1998.

Other Legal Parties Democratic People’s Party (Partai Rakyat Demokrasi—PRD). Launched in mid-July 1996, the prodemocracy PRD derived from student groups active in Java. Linked by government spokesmen with the banned Communist Party (PKI) and allied with the main opposition PDI, the new grouping was accused by the authorities of fomenting the serious violence in Jakarta at the end of the month. PRD Chair Budiman SUDJATMIKO, Secretary General Petrus HARYANTO, and others were subsequently found guilty of subversion, with the leaders being sentenced to 13 years in prison. In September 1997 the government declared the PRD

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illegal, but in August 1998 the ban was overturned by the courts. Sudjatmiko and Haryanto later rejected presidential pardons, stating that acceptance would imply guilt. Both were among those released under a December 1999 presidential amnesty. Sudjatmiko, who had resigned from the PRD in 2002, announced in December 2004 that he was joining the PDI-P. Leader: Dita Inda SARI (Chair). Indonesian Democratic Union Party (Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia—PUDI). Also referred to in English as the Indonesian United Democratic Party, the PUDI was launched in May 1996 by Sri Bintang Pamungkas, a former Golkar legislator, shortly after he had been sentenced to 34 months in prison for calling President Suharto a “dictator.” Released on bail pending appeal, Sri Bintang said that the PUDI would seek to promote democracy, the rule of law, and observance of human rights. In March 1997 Pamungkas and 20 others were arrested and charged with “subversion” in connection with rioting in Jakarta. Following B. J. Habibie’s accession to the presidency, Pamungkas was one of the first political prisoners to be released. The PUDI failed to win any seats at the June 1999 election and was not eligible to contest the 2004 DPR elections. Since then, Pamungkas has frequently criticized the Yudhoyono government. Leader: Sri Bintang PAMUNGKAS (Chair). Love the Nation Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa—PDKB). Also translated as the Patriots Democratic Party, the Christian-oriented PDKB was formed in August 1998. It advocates development of small-scale business and cooperatives in order to reduce economic inequalities. Strongest in North Sumatra, the PDKB won five DPR seats but under 0.5 percent of the vote in 1999. As a consequence, it did not meet the requirements for competing in the 2004 DPR election. Leader: G. Seto HARYANTO (Chair). Reformed Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Pembaruan—PDP). The PDP began as a reform group within the PDI-P, but its leaders

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were expelled in May 2005 after challenging Megawati’s reelection as party chair. Charging that Megawati had turned away from Sukarno’s teachings, the dissidents announced formation of the PDP the following December under the leadership of Roy B. B. Janis, who had previously served as an associate chair of the PDI-P. Leaders: Roy B. B. JANIS (Executive Chair), Abdul MADJID (Chair of Advisory Council), Laksamani SUKARDI, Didi SUPREYANTI (Secretary).

Illegal and Insurgent Groups Communist Party of Indonesia (Partai Komunis Indonesia—PKI). Founded in the 1920s, the PKI was banned in 1966 in the wake of the failed 1965 coup attempt. It subsequently split into proPeking and pro-Moscow factions. A number of imprisoned party leaders were executed in 1985 and 1986 (some 15 years after being sentenced for their involvement in the 1965 revolt) and at present only a handful of underground PKI activists appear to be operating within the country. In April 1996 the government restored the suffrage rights of over 1 million people listed as having been involved in the 1965 PKI insurgency, although over 20,000 others continued to be barred from voting. Voicing support for the reformasi movement, in 1998 the party called for formation of a Patriotic and Democratic Alliance. Three PKI members, all of whom had been in prison for over 30 years, were among 28 political prisoners freed by the Habibie government in August 1998. In May 2000 President Wahid called for revoking the country’s ban on communist ideology, but the proposal was attacked by most political leaders. In February 2004 the Constitutional Court restored the political rights of former PKI members, but discrimination against members and their families remains common. Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka—GAM). The GAM, which fought for Aceh’s independence from 1976 until 2005, is virtually indistinguishable from the Aceh Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF), which was es-

tablished in 1989. The GAM leader, Hasan di Tiro, has lived in Sweden since 1979. Following a resurgence of separatist activity dating from early 1999, the government and the GAM negotiated a temporary cease-fire effective from June 2, 2000. Both sides subsequently violated the agreement, which was nevertheless extended until the central government announced a renewed effort to exert its authority in April 2001. Three months later, newly inaugurated President Megawati unsuccessfully attempted to defuse the situation by granting greater autonomy to the province. In January 2002 Abdullah SYAFII, the GAM military commander, was killed by Indonesian forces. A month later, the GAM joined in peace talks in Geneva, Switzerland, that led to a December 9 cease-fire and peace agreement, under which the GAM was to begin disarming. Ultimately, however, the GAM continued to reject greater autonomy in place of independence, and in May 2003, following the breakdown of peace talks in Tokyo, Japan, Megawati declared martial law in Aceh. In May 2004 martial law was downgraded to a state of civil emergency but not before a number of GAM activists had been convicted of treason and terrorism and sentenced to lengthy prison terms. Indonesia long sought the arrest in Sweden of GAM leaders, and in June 2004 several members of the GAM government-in-exile were detained on suspicion of having committed “crimes violating international law.” All, however, were quickly released. In the aftermath of the December 26, 2004, tsunami disaster, the GAM declared a cease-fire and dropped its demand for independence, which opened the way for a resumption of peace negotiations with the government. The peace agreement signed on August 15, 2005, effectively ended the secessionist conflict (despite the continuing presence of small proindependence militant groups), and by the end of the year the GAM had decommissioned its weapons and disbanded its armed wing, the Tentara Nasional Aceh (TNA). To aid in its political transformation the GAM established an Aceh Transition Committee (Komite Peralihan

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Aceh—KPA), the goal being its participation (probably under a new name) in provincial elections that would be held following passage by the DPR of autonomy legislation. On April 19, 2006, a dozen GAM leaders, including Malik Mahmud (but not the 83-year-old Hasan di Toro), returned to Aceh. Most had become Swedish citizens. Leaders: Hasan di TIRO, Malik MAHMUD (Prime Minister of the Government-in-Exile), Zaini ABDULLAH (Foreign Minister of the Government-in-Exile). Jemaah Islamiah (JI). In the days after the September 11, 2001, al-Qaida terrorist attacks on the United States, the shadowy JI emerged as the principal Southeast Asian terrorist organization. Operating from various cells located throughout the region, the JI was believed to have direct ties to al-Qaida. JI-attributed bombings and other plots have taken place or been uncovered in a number of countries, including the Philippines, Singapore, and Malaysia as well as Indonesia, which is generally regarded as the organization’s home base. The militant cleric Abu Bakar BASHIR (BAASYIR) has been labeled as the organization’s spiritual leader—an accusation that he has denied. After serving four years in jail for subversion during the Suharto era, Bashir moved to Malaysia but subsequently returned to Indonesia, purportedly to promote the establishment of a regional Islamic state through his participation in an umbrella organization known as the Indonesian Mujaheddin Council (Majelis Mujaheddin Indonesia— MMI). Until the October 2002 bombing of a Bali tourist resort, which killed 202 people, the Megawati government refused to acknowledge an Islamic terrorist presence in Indonesia. Although Bashir was detained after the bombing, which had led the United States and the UN to declare the JI a terrorist organization, the government was unable to directly connect him to the attack. In September 2003 Bashir was convicted of crimes that included subversion for authorizing a series of bombings in December 2000 and for plotting to assassinate Megawati, who was vice president at the time, but

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in December the subversion conviction was overturned. He remained incarcerated for forgery and immigration violations, and upon being released on April 30, 2004, he was immediately rearrested for his alleged leadership of the JI and for his alleged involvement not only in the Bali case but also in the August 2003 bombing of a Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, which killed 12. In August 2003 another allegedly key figure in JI operations, Riduan ISAMUDDIN (also known as HAMBALI), was apprehended by Thai officials, with assistance from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Hambali, flown to the United States for interrogation, has since been held incommunicado at an undisclosed location. Among the three dozen suspects arrested for the Bali bombing, the JI-linked Amrozi bin NURHASYIM, Imam SAMUDRA, and Ali GUFRON were convicted and sentenced to death in 2003, although the sentences had not been carried out as of May 2006. Bashir’s trial, which began in late October 2004, concluded on March 3, 2005, when he was found guilty of conspiracy in the Bali bombing and sentenced to a prison term of 30 months (later reduced to 25). In September 2004 a suicide bombing outside the Australian embassy in Jakarta had killed 11. Azahari HUSIN and Noordin Mohammed TOP, both suspected JI members, were believed to have planned the attack and quickly climbed to the top of the regional “most wanted” list. In October 2005 suicide bombers again struck Bali, killing 44. A month later, Husin was killed by security personnel in East Java. By then, some analysts were reporting a split in the JI between hard-line militants and those who rejected the tactic of inflicting civilian casualties. Top and other extremists had reportedly formed an alQaida organization identified as Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad (“Organization for the Basis of Jihad”). In March 2006 Indonesian officials indicated that they had arrested some 270 alleged JI members since 2000, including Bashir’s apparent successor, Abu RUSDAN. Leaders: Ainal BAHRI (Abu DUJANA), ZULKARNAEN (Arif SUNARSO).

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Malukan Sovereignty Front (Front Kedaulatan Maluku—FKM). Established in mid-2000, the largely Christian FKM has advocated independence for the so-called South Maluku Republic (Republik Maluku Sarani—RMS), which had been proclaimed on April 25, 1950. The FKM’s most visible activity, raising the RMS flag each year on the anniversary of the independence declaration, has led authorities to arrest dozens of Malukans for subversion. This, in turn, has repeatedly contributed to violent clashes with security forces. Those convicted of subversion have included FKM leaders Alex Manuputty, Moses Tuanakotta, and Samuel Waileruny. Manuputty fled to the United States in December 2003, following rejection of his appeal. In November 2004 Tuanakotta was sentenced to nine years in prison, after which Simon SAIYA was named by exiled leaders in the Netherlands to head an RMS transitional government. As of April 2006 Waileruny was free pending the outcome of his appeal. Leaders: Alex MANUPUTTY, Samuel WAILERUNY, Moses TUANAKOTTA. For a discussion of the Free Papua Organization, see the Annexed Territory section, below.

Legislature Under constitutional changes passed in August 2002, Indonesia’s People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat—MPR) now comprises two bodies: the Regional Representatives Council (DPD), which functions as an upper house with limited powers related primarily to regional concerns, and the People’s Representation Council (DPR), which performs ordinary legislative functions. Initially, the MPR was an outgrowth of the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara—MPRS) appointed by President Sukarno in 1960. As of January 1999 its membership included the 500 members of the DPR, plus another 500 comprising additional Golkar and military representatives, unaffiliated regional delegates, and, in proportion to

their respective shares of DPR seats, appointed members of the United Development Party and the Indonesian Democratic Party. Governmentsupportive members, including those elected by regional parliaments, held about 80 percent of the seats. Reforms passed by the DPR on January 28, 1999, reduced the membership to 700, including 135 regional representatives and 65 civic and social delegates in addition to the 500 DPR members. The changes enacted in 2002 and implemented in 2004 restructured the MPR as, in effect, a joint session of the DPR and the DPD. Before the 2002 reforms, which instituted direct presidential elections, the MPR elected the president and vice president. As in the past, it must meet at least once every five years. MPR Chair: Hidayat NUR WAHID. Regional Representatives Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah—DPD). The DPD was created by constitutional amendment in August 2002. Members (familiarly styled “senators”) are directly elected for five-year terms on a nonpartisan basis and must convene at least once a year. The first election for 128 members (4 from each of Indonesia’s 32 provinces) was held April 5, 2004. Chair: Ginandjar KARTASASMITA. People’s Representation Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat—DPR). An outgrowth of the Mutual Cooperation House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat–Gotong Rojong— DPRGR) named by President Sukarno in 1960, the DPR encompassed 425 elected members and 75 military appointees until the June 1999 election. Electoral reforms passed on the preceding January 28 cut military representation to 38 seats. Additional reforms passed in August 2002 eliminated all reserved seats while increasing the number of members to 550, effective from the 2004 election. Representatives are directly elected through a province-based proportional system that permits voters to cast ballots for individual candidates as well as parties. On May 5, 2004, the General Elections Commission announced “final” results of the April 5 balloting, but challenges subsequently resolved by

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Cabinet As of August 1, 2006 President Vice President

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (DP) Muhammad Jusuf Kalla (Golkar)

Coordinating Ministers Economy People’s Welfare Political, Legal, and Security Affairs

Boediono Aburizal Bakrie (Golkar) Adm. (Ret.) Widodo Adi Sucipto

Ministers Agriculture Defense Energy and Mineral Resources Finance Foreign Affairs Forestry Health Home Affairs Industry Justice and Human Rights Manpower and Transmigration Maritime and Fisheries Affairs National Education Public Works Religious Affairs Social Affairs Trade Transportation

Anton Apriyantono Juwono Sudarsono Purnomo Yusgiantoro Mulyani Indrawati [f] Nur Hasan Wirayuda Malam Sambat Kaban (PBB) Siti Fadilah Supari [f] Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Muhammad Maruf (DP) Fahmi Idris (Golkar) Hamid Awaluddin Erman Suparno (PKB) Freddy Numberi Bambang Sudibyo Joko Kirmanto Mohammad Maftuh Basyuni Bachtiar Chamsyah (PPP) Mari E. Pangestu [f] Hatta Radjasa (PAN)

Ministers of State Acceleration of Development in Disadvantaged Regions Administrative Reform Communication and Information Cooperatives and Small and Medium-Sized Businesses Culture and Tourism Environment National Development Planning Public Housing Research and Technology State Enterprises Women’s Empowerment Youth Affairs and Sports Cabinet Secretary State Secretary Attorney General [f] = female

Saifullah Yusuf (PKB) Taufiq Effendi (DP) Sofyan A. Djalil Suryadarma Ali (PPP) Jero Wacik (DP) Rachmat Witoelar Paskah Suzetta (Golkar) M. Yusuf Anshari (PKS) Kusmayanto Kadiman Sugiharto (PPP) Meutia Hatta Swasono [f] Adhyaksa Dault Sudi Silalahi Yusril Ihza Mahendra (PBB) Abdul Rahman Saleh (PBB)

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the Constitutional Court resulted in 4 seats changing hands. The following party totals reflect the new house as sworn in on October 1, 2004: Golkar Party, 127 seats; Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, 109; United Development Party, 58; Democratic Party, 56; National Mandate Party, 53; National Awakening Party, 52; Justice and Prosperity Party, 45; Reform Star Party, 14; Prosperous Peace Party, 13; Crescent Star Party, 11; National Democratic Unity Party, 4; Pioneer Party, 3; Concern for the Nation Functional Party, 2; and Indonesian Democratic Vanguard Party, Indonesian Justice and Unity Party, Indonesian National Party (Marhaenist), 1 each. Speaker: Agung LAKSONO.

Communications The Indonesian press, rigidly controlled under the Sukarno regime, was accorded relative freedom under President Suharto until early 1974, when riots in Jakarta triggered a government crackdown. Over the next quarter-century more than 200 newspapers and periodicals were shut down, and others were ordered not to report on various matters, including regional independence movements. In March 1995 the government arrested several members of the recently formed Alliance of Independent Journalists for “insulting the government” and subsequently announced that it would enforce a requirement that all editors and reporters be members of the regime-backed Indonesian Journalists Association. The political reforms that followed President Suharto’s resignation in 1998 led to increased press freedom. Numerous party newspapers began publishing, and soon after taking office in October 1999 President Wahid abolished the notorious Ministry of Information, which was soon replaced by a more tolerant State Information Dissemination Bureau. In November 2002, however, the legislature passed a restrictive media law that established a new regulatory body, the Indonesian Broadcasting Committee, with authority over ownership, licensing, advertising, and the content of news as well as entertainment programming. Under the new law

broadcasters may be fined or imprisoned for inflaming racial, religious, or tribal relations or for promoting violence, pornography, or other forms of unethical behavior. Severe restrictions were also placed on cross-ownership of print and broadcast media.

Press The following are dailies published in Jakarta in Indonesian, unless otherwise noted: Kompas (520,000), liberal Catholic; Pos Kota (500,000), sensationalist; Merdeka (130,000); Jawa Pos (Surabaya, 120,000); Suara Merdeka (Semarang, 200,000); Berita Buana (150,000), sensationalist; Pikiran Rakyat (Bandung, 150,000), independent; Surabaya Post (Surabaya, 110,000); Harian Umum AB (80,000), official army paper; Pelita (80,000), Muslim; Harian Analisa (Medan, 80,000); Waspada (Medan, 60,000); Jakarta Post (50,000), in English; Harian Indonesia/Indonesia Rze Pao (40,000), in Chinese.

News Agencies The principal domestic service, with branches throughout the country, is the Indonesian National News Agency (Antara); the KNI News Service operates from Jakarta, as do the major foreign bureaus.

Broadcasting and Computing The number of broadcast outlets expanded rapidly after the change of government in 1998, and there are now over 1,000 radio stations. The former government network, Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI), was converted to a public broadcasting service in 2000 and remains the largest radio source, supplying half a dozen networks and more than 50 stations. Televisi Republik Indonesia (TVRI), which also became a public broadcasting service in 2000, offers two networks and employs an extensive relay system to reach the entire country. Since 1998 the number of commercial TV stations has doubled, to 10, and there are also 15 regional stations. As of 2003 there were 37.4 million

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television receivers, while 2.5 million personal computers served 8.0 million Internet users.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. Sudjadnan PARNOHADININGRAT U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia B. Lynn PASCOE Permanent Representative to the UN Rezlan Ishar JENIE IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, APEC, ASEAN, BIS, CP, IDB, Interpol, IOR-ARC, NAM, OIC, OPEC, WCO, WTO

Annexed Territory Papua (West Irian Jaya and Papua Provinces). The western half of the island of New Guinea, Papua has an area of 159,375 square miles (412,781 sq. km.) and a population of 2.6 million (2005E). As a consequence of recent transmigration, mainly from Java, native Papuans now number only slightly more than half of the total. Jayapura is the principal city and the capital of Papua Province. The territory’s extensive resources include natural gas, gold, copper, nickel, and tropical woods. Long known as Netherlands New Guinea and more recently as Irian Jaya and West Papua (the name favored by independence supporters), Papua is a former Dutch colony that was administered by Indonesia after May 1, 1963, under a UNsponsored agreement. The territory had been retained by the Netherlands upon recognition of Indonesian independence in 1949 but was subsequently turned over to the United Nations on the understanding that administrative authority would be transferred to Indonesia pending selfdetermination before the end of 1969. Although Papuan representatives complained of oppression by Indonesia and expressed a desire to form an independent state, Indonesia staged an “act of free choice” during July and August 1969 by conven-

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ing eight regional consultative assemblies, all of which voted for annexation to Indonesia. In 1971 a “Provisional Revolutionary Government of West Papua New Guinea” was established by insurgents who in 1976 claimed to control about 15 percent of the territory in the eastern sector, adjacent to Papua New Guinea. Although the latter banned all anti-Jakarta movements, it sought the help of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in an effort to find third countries willing to grant Irian insurgents asylum. An offensive by the Indonesian Army against the Free Papua Organization (Organisasai Papua Merdeka—OPM) in February 1984 provoked the flight of hundreds of Irian villagers into Papua New Guinea, damaging relations with Port Moresby, while the shooting of Irian intellectual Arnold AP in a Jayapura prison brought international criticism. Relations with Papua New Guinea stabilized in 1985, and a border cooperation agreement was signed in October; however, Indonesian forces mounted a series of cross-border raids in 1988, including an incursion in late October that drew an angry response from Port Moresby after a number of individuals, for the first time, were captured within its territory. In early 1989 yet another Indonesian offensive, codenamed “Operation Eagle,” was launched, but it was halted in August following reports that the OPM no longer posed a threat and that a major OPM leader, Elias AWOM, had surrendered. In January 1992 a new Status of Forces Agreement was concluded with Papua New Guinea that dealt with a number of security issues but stopped short of sanctioning joint military operations against guerrilla units. In February 1994 Radio Australia reported that the OPM was willing to enter into peace talks with Jakarta, although intermittent hostilities continued. In July 1998 Indonesian troops clashed with independence demonstrators at several locations, but two months later the newly installed Habibie government and the OPM, led by Moses WERROR, announced a cease-fire. In October the Indonesian military declared that Irian Jaya was no longer considered to be a “military operation zone.” No authoritative casualty figures for the prolonged conflict exist, although civilian

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deaths may exceed 40,000; some less-thanobjective sources have placed the number as high as 150,000–300,000. In October 1999 the Habibie administration announced that the province of Irian Jaya was being divided into three—West, Central, and East Irian Jaya—to improve administration, delivery of services, and distribution of economic development assistance. Most independence advocates protested the change, condemning it as an effort to divide the population. Two months later members of the Indonesian legislature announced that they would support restoring the territory’s traditional name, Papua. On June 4, 2000, some 3,000 representatives to a Papua People’s Congress, chaired by Theys ELUAY, declared their desire to separate the territory from Indonesia. The Wahid administration, which had provided financial support for the Congress with the understanding that the body would not declare independence, immediately rejected Papuan sovereignty claims. Jakarta nevertheless ordered security forces to avoid violence in dealing with proindependence demonstrators, organized a fact-finding team to investigate alleged human rights abuses, and granted permission, at least temporarily, for Papuans to fly their own flag beneath that of Indonesia. In early July members of the Congress’s Presidium met with Wahid, who continued to rule out secession. Eluay and other leaders of a Papuan Presidium Council (Presidium Dewam Papua—PDP) were subsequently charged with subversion for advocating independence, and their trial was ongoing at the time of President Wahid’s removal from office. Although his successor, President Megawati, apologized for decades of repression in Papua and elsewhere, she too ruled out independence.

On October 23, 2001, the Indonesian legislature approved an autonomy structure for Papua (as the region was to be officially named as of January 1, 2002) under which some 70–80 percent of revenues from the exploitation of natural resources would be retained for local use. Although the OPM, under the leadership of Mathias WENDA, denounced the autonomy status and continued to press for an independence referendum, the cease-fire held despite sporadic clashes. On April 21, 2003, a military court convicted seven officers and soldiers of kidnapping and murdering Theys Eluay in November 2001, but the brevity of the sentences—between two and three and a half years—drew considerable criticism. The proposed trifurcation of Papua, ostensibly to improve administration, has also been attacked as an effort to split the independence movement, and independence advocates have refused to recognize the creation of West Irian Jaya Province. (Indonesia’s Constitutional Court has ruled against any further division of Papua—see the Constitution and government section, above.) In October 2005 the central government created a Papua People’s Assembly to which local officials appointed 42 members. PDP leader Willy MANDOWEN denounced the assembly as undemocratic and asserted that the people of West Papua would create their own assembly, one that “truly represents the cultural, tribal groups in West Papua.” President Yudhoyono, for his part, expressed his hope that the 2005 Aceh peace process and resultant autonomy agreement would serve as a model for resolving the Papua dispute. Meanwhile, in May 2005 a court sentenced two individuals to 10 and 15 years in prison for having raised a West Papuan independence flag in December 2004.

J A PA N Nippon

Note: On September 20, 2006, Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe was elected president of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), winning 464 votes to 136 for Foreign Minister Taro Aso and 102 for Finance Minister Sadakazu Tanigaki. The victory ensured Abe’s designation as prime minister by the Diet on September 26. Outgoing Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi had voluntarily stepped down after serving five years in office.

The Country Situated off the coast of Northeast Asia and stretching some 2,000 miles, the Japanese archipelago consists of over 3,000 islands, although the 4 main islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, and Shikoku account for 98 percent of the land area. While mountainous terrain has limited the acreage available for cultivation, the country’s location has provided a stimulus to fishing and other maritime pursuits (despite a paucity of good harbors) as well as trading. The thickly settled, basically Mongoloid population is remarkably homogeneous; the only significant ethnic minority consists of 700,000 Koreans, most of whom are descended from some 2.5 million laborers brought to Japan in the period 1910–1945. The Ainu, an indigenous people concentrated on the northern island of Hokkaido, today number only about 50,000. Buddhism and Shintoism are the two major religions. Women constitute about 41 percent of the labor force but remain underrepresented in elective office. For example, women won only 9.0 percent of the seats (43 of 480) in the September 2005 lower house election, the lowest proportion for major industrialized countries. Japan’s most remarkable achievement over the past century has been its unique industrial development, which gave it undisputed economic primacy in Asia even before World War II. (The role of agriculture in the Japanese economy has shrunk as

those of industry and services have grown; fulltime agricultural labor has declined since 1960 from 33 percent to under 5 percent of the national workforce and now produces only 1 percent of GDP.) Growth between 1954, when prewar economic levels were first regained, and 1970 proceeded at an average rate, in real terms, of at least 10 percent annually, vaulting Japan past West

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Germany and into second place, behind the United States, among the world’s largest economies. In the 1980s average yearly expansion, at 4 percent, remained higher than that of the other major industrialized countries. In 1990–1999, however, it slumped to 1 percent as business investment declined and productivity growth proved inadequate. Beginning in 1997 Japan experienced its worst recession in over half a century, to which the government responded with broad tax cuts and supplementary public works spending. Fueled by consumer spending and renewed vigor in the export sector, growth of 2.8 percent was achieved in 2000, but the following two years saw minimal growth of 0.4 percent in 2001 and a decline of 0.3 percent in 2002. In 2003 growth returned to about 1.4 percent and the unemployment rate, after peaking at a record 5.5 percent early in the year, showed a modest drop. Alone among the major industrialized nations, Japan has also been experiencing deflation (averaging 1.3 percent a year in 2001–2004), leading the Bank of Japan to drop short-term interest rates to zero percent. Although a mild recession in April–September 2004 temporarily set back expectations that the Japanese economy was emerging from the doldrums, growth in 2005 was about 2.5 percent. Japan continues to rank third, behind the United States and Germany, in total trade of goods and services. Its leading trading partner in 2005 was China (including Hong Kong), which surpassed the United States for the first time in 2004.

Government and Politics Political Background The armistice signed by Japan on September 2, 1945, concluded World War II and ended the era of modernization and imperial expansion that had begun with the Meiji Restoration in 1867. Stripped of its overseas territorial acquisitions, including Manchuria, Korea, Formosa (Taiwan), southern Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands (in addition to the de facto loss of its “Northern Territories” to the Soviet Union—see Foreign relations, below), Japan

was occupied by Allied military forces under Gen. Douglas MacArthur and entered a period of farreaching social, political, and economic reforms under the guidance of U.S. occupation authorities. A constitution promulgated November 3, 1946, effective May 3, 1947, deprived Emperor HIROHITO of his claim to divine right and transformed Japan into a constitutional monarchy that expressly renounced war and the maintenance of military forces. The Allied occupation was formally ended by a peace treaty signed in San Francisco on September 8, 1951, effective April 28, 1952; by its terms (still unrecognized by Moscow when the Soviet Union dissolved), the United States retained control of the Bonin and Ryukyu Islands while informally recognizing Japan’s “residual sovereignty” in those territories. Concurrently, a security treaty between Japan and the United States (modified in 1960 by a Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security) gave the latter the right to continue maintaining armed forces in and around Japan. The Bonin Islands were returned to Japanese administration in 1968, while reversion of the Ryukyus (including Okinawa) occurred in 1972. For nearly six decades Japan’s political fortunes have rested mainly with a small group of conservative politicians, civil servants, and businessmen identified with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), established in 1955 by merger of the preexisting Liberal and Democratic Parties. Dedicated both to free enterprise and to continued close association with the United States, the LDP was periodically challenged until the 1980s by leftist forces associated primarily with the Social Democratic Party of Japan—SDPJ (formerly the Japanese Socialist Party—JSP), the small Japanese Communist Party (JCP), and a wide but volatile extraparliamentary opposition, including trade union, student, and intellectual groups. LDP prime ministers during this period included Eisaku SATO (1964–1972); Kakuei TANAKA (1972– 1974), whose tenure was cut short by charges of personal and financial irregularities; Takeo MIKI (1974–1976); Takeo FUKUDA (1976– 1978); Masayoshi OHIRA (1978–1980); Zenko SUZUKI (1980–1982); Yasuhiro NAKASONE

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Political Status: Constitutional monarchy established May 3, 1947; under multiparty parliamentary system. Area: 145,850 sq. mi. (377,750 sq. km.). Population: 126,925,843 (2000C); 127,988,000 (2005E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): TOKYO (8,483,000), Yokohama (3,579,000), Osaka (2,629,000), Nagoya (2,215,000), Sapporo (1,881,000), Kobe (1,525,000), Kyoto (1,475,000), Fukuoka (1,401,000), Kawasaki (1,327,000), Saitama (1,176,000), Hiroshima (1,155,000), Sendai (1,025,000), Kitakyushu (993,000). Official Language: Japanese. Monetary Unit: Yen (market rate July 1, 2006: 114.32 yen = $1US). Sovereign: Emperor TSUGUNOMIYA AKIHITO; ascended the throne on January 7, 1989, on the death of his father, Showa Emperor MICHINOMIYA HIROHITO. Heir Apparent: Crown Prince NARUHITO. Prime Minister: (See headnote.) Junichiro KOIZUMI (Liberal Democratic Party); elected by the Diet on April 26, 2001, succeeding Yoshiro MORI (Liberal Democratic Party), who had resigned on April 7; continued in office following elections of November 9, 2003, and September 11, 2005.

(1982–1987); Noburu TAKESHITA (1987–1989); and Sosuke UNO (1989). On January 7, 1989, Emperor Hirohito, at 87 the country’s longest reigning monarch, succumbed to a lengthy illness and was succeeded by his son, Crown Prince AKIHITO. In midyear, the LDP suffered major electoral defeats, including the unprecedented loss of its majority in the House of Councilors on July 23. On July 24 Prime Minister Uno submitted his resignation and was succeeded on August 8 by Toshiki KAIFU of the party’s small Komoto faction. At a crucial lower house election on February 15, 1990, the LDP succeeded in retaining its control with a reduced majority. In 1991 the party suffered a major embarrassment in the race for the Tokyo governorship when it withdrew its support from the incumbent and en-

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dorsed a Komeito nominee, who lost by a 2–1 margin. As a result, Ichiro OZAWA, widely viewed as a future prime minister, resigned as LDP secretary general. This was followed by the revelation in late June that a number of securities dealers had attempted to conceal reimbursements to favored clients who had suffered investment losses. While the practice as such was not illegal, it appeared that the cover-up had included tax evasion. Finance Minister Ryutaro HASHIMOTO felt obliged to tender his resignation on October 3, and on November 5 Kiichi MIYAZAWA, himself a former finance minister who had left office in the wake of an insider trading scandal, was elected by the Diet to succeed Kaifu as prime minister. In January 1992 the Miyazawa government was shaken by the most serious financial scandal in Japanese history, involving payments to upward of 200 politicians by the Tokyo affiliate of Sagawa Kyubin, Japan’s second-largest parcel delivery firm. While the LDP won 69 of 127 available seats at House of Councilors balloting on July 26, the Sagawa Kyubin affair forced the resignation, three months later, of Shin KANEMARU, the country’s most powerful politician, from the LDP vice presidency and from the Diet. On December 11 Miyazawa reshuffled his cabinet, drastically reducing the influence of the theretofore dominant Takeshita faction, which promptly disintegrated into a rump group led by Keizo OBUCHI when former LDP secretary general Ozawa and former finance minister Tsutomu HATA formed a new faction. During early 1993 the LDP continued to be plagued by scandals. On March 6 Kanemaru and his former secretary were arrested on charges of tax evasion, and in the wake of a mass exodus of party leaders Prime Minister Miyazawa lost a noconfidence motion on June 18. At the ensuing lower house election of July 18 the LDP lost its parliamentary majority, although retaining a sizable plurality. Following the poll, an improbable seven-party coalition emerged that included the SDPJ and three new groups recently organized by LDP dissidents: the Japan Renewal Party (JRP), led by Ozawa and Hata; the Japan New Party (JNP); and the New

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Party Harbinger (Shinto Sakigake). On July 29 the coalition named as its choice for prime minister a conservative populist from the JNP, Morihiro HOSOKAWA, who secured parliamentary confirmation on August 6 over the LDP nominee, Yohei KONO. The new prime minister indicated that electoral reform would be his top priority, and on January 29, 1994, the Diet approved, in preliminary form, a group of compromise measures that provided for a cap on political donations and for a 500seat lower house with 300 constituency members and 200 elected by proportional representation. In February 1994 Hosokawa was forced, mainly by SDPJ objections to higher indirect taxes, into a humiliating modification of an economic stimulus package, thus provoking major coalition dissent on the 1994–1995 budget. In early April disclosures of alleged financial misconduct forced the prime minister to submit his resignation, thereby sparking a contentious succession battle. Tsutomu Hata of the JRP, who was nominated as the coalition parties’ joint candidate on April 22, was elected on April 25. The new administration’s viability was immediately thrown into doubt when the SDPJ on April 26 withdrew from the coalition, thereby compelling Hata to form a minority cabinet dominated by his own party. The SDPJ’s action followed the formation, principally at the instigation of Ichiro Ozawa, of a new center-left parliamentary alliance called Kaishin (“Innovation”), which linked the JRP, the JNP, and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) with two new ex-LDP splinter groups. In late June, faced with almost certain defeat on an LDP-sponsored nonconfidence motion, Hata resigned, giving rise to interparty negotiations that yielded a coalition agreement between the LDP, the SDPJ, and Shinto Sakigake. On June 29 the Diet elected the SDPJ chair, Tomiichi MURAYAMA, prime minister over the candidate of the outgoing coalition, former LDP prime minister Toshiki Kaifu. Five months later, the principal elements of the Kaishin alliance agreed to merge as the New Frontier Party (Shinshinto). Japanese political realignment was temporarily halted by a massive earthquake that caused some

5,000 deaths in Kobe and surrounding areas on January 17, 1995, followed by the release of deadly nerve gas in a Tokyo subway system on March 20. The latter incident, which resulted in ten deaths and injury to thousands of commuters, was the work of a millennial religious cult, Aum Shinrikyo, whose leader, Shoko ASAHARA, was arrested in May after an intensive manhunt. At a House of Councilors election on July 23, 1995, the LDP and Shinshinto registered impressive gains while the SDPJ fell from second to third place, regaining only 16 of the party’s 41 vacated seats. The LDP-SDPJ-Sakigake coalition nonetheless continued in office until January 5, 1996, when Prime Minister Murayama resigned, having been battered by a variety of economic and political problems. Murayama was succeeded on January 11 by the country’s outspoken LDP trade minister, Ryutaro Hashimoto, at the head of a new administration of the same three parties. Encouraged by the failure of Shinshinto to sustain its early promise as a “government in waiting,” the prime minister called an early lower house election on October 20 and was rewarded by a significant increase in LDP representation to 239 seats in the new 500-seat House of Representatives. The two smaller government parties both suffered heavy losses, in part because the new Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took 52 seats in its first election. Both the Social Democratic Party (SDP, formerly the SDPJ) and Shinto Sakigake declined to join a new LDP-dominated government, as did the DPJ, with the result that Hashimoto had to settle for a pledge of qualified external support from the SDP and Shinto Sakigake in return for formal policy consultation. On that basis, Hashimoto was reelected prime minister on November 7 and thereupon announced an exclusively LDP cabinet. At the end of 1997 Shinshinto collapsed, with the DPJ quickly emerging as the largest opposition party. In late May 1998 both the SDP and Shinto Sakigake decided to withdraw their support from the LDP at the end of the legislative session in June, but the announcement posed no threat to the LDP, which, owing to defections from other parties since

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the last election, once again controlled a majority of lower house seats. Despite easily surviving a no-confidence motion in the lower house on June 12, 1998, the Hashimoto administration approached the July 12 election for half the House of Councilors with dim prospects amid economic turmoil. Buffeted by its worst postwar recession (and the first since the oil shock of 1974), Japan faced record postwar unemployment, a falling stock market, the highest budget deficit as a percentage of GDP among the major industrialized states, and a rising number of failures among leading banks, brokerages, insurance companies, and other financial institutions. Furthermore, charges of bribery and other corruption had generated a series of resignations and dismissals within the Ministry of Finance and the central bank. On July 13, with the LDP having captured only 44 of the 60 contested seats it had previously claimed in the upper house, Prime Minister Hashimoto resigned. Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi succeeded him as party leader on July 24 and as prime minister, at the head of an “economic reconstruction Cabinet,” on July 30, pledging to carry through on bank reform, to cut income and corporate taxes, and to pump additional funds into public works. Following protracted negotiations, in midJanuary 1999 Prime Minister Obuchi announced formation of a coalition with Ichiro Ozawa’s Liberal Party (LP), a successor to Shinshinto, although a cabinet reshuffle on January 14 incorporated only one LP minister. The move was designed primarily to bring the government closer to a majority in the House of Councilors, where the combined opposition forces continued to hold an advantage of some 11 seats. Nevertheless, with additional support from the recently organized New Komeito (the second largest opposition party), by May the government had succeeded in passing several key economic and defense bills through the Diet. On October 5, 1999, the New Komeito formally joined the government, guaranteeing a majority in both houses to Obuchi, who announced a major collateral cabinet reshuffle. In December 1999, with a general election due in less than a year, the LP’s Ozawa threatened to

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pull his party from the tripartite coalition unless Obuchi put forward legislation reducing the size of the lower house. Obuchi relented and in January– February 2000 forced through the Diet a bill that cut 20 proportional seats from the 500-member House of Representatives, precipitating a two-week boycott of the chamber by major opposition parties. The LDP-LP relationship remained tenuous, however, in part because the LDP would not support as many LP candidates for the upcoming lower house election as Ozawa demanded. Thus, on April 1 Obuchi announced that the two parties were severing connections. Later that day the prime minister suffered what would prove to be a mortal stroke, although Chief Cabinet Secretary Mikio AOKI withheld the seriousness of Obuchi’s condition from the public until April 3. With Obuchi in a coma, the cabinet resigned on April 4, paving the way for the election of the LDP’s Yoshiro MORI as prime minister on April 5. The Obuchi cabinet was reappointed en masse. Two days earlier over two dozen Diet members had left Ozawa’s LP and formed the New Conservative Party (NCP), which replaced the LP in the three-party government. Keizo Obuchi died on May 14, 2000, and on June 2 Mori announced a general election for June 25, the late prime minister’s birthday. In the context of continuing economic doldrums, and with Mori having committed several verbal gaffes since taking office, the LDP lost its lower house majority at the balloting, winning only 233 seats. Despite having suffered significant losses themselves, New Komeito and the NCP provided enough additional seats to ensure Prime Minister Mori’s reelection by the Diet on July 4. With the economy verging on recession and with his administration plagued by corruption allegations as well as his personal unpopularity, Mori resigned on April 7, 2001. Although former prime minister Hashimoto was widely expected to win the LDP leadership, he was defeated on April 24 by former health minister Junichiro KOIZUMI, whose reformist agenda included limiting the influence of the LDP’s factions, enabling faster deregulation, reducing the government deficit, and instituting additional banking and other structural reforms. On

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the following day the New Komeito and the NCP agreed to renew their coalition with the LDP, and on April 26 the Diet confirmed Koizumi as prime minister. At the House of Councilors election of July 29, both the LDP and the opposition DPJ gained seats at the expense of the smaller parties. In October 2001, responding to the previous month’s al-Qaida attacks on the United States and U.S. President George W. Bush’s announcement of a “war on terrorism,” the Diet passed legislation that permitted the government to deploy warships to the Indian Ocean in support of U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan. Such noncombat deployment of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) remained controversial, however, and the issue became even more inflammatory in 2003 when Koizumi won approval to commit additional SDF personnel in support of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. By late 2002 Koizumi’s administration had failed to resolve the country’s economic plight, in part because he proved unable to tame various LDP factions that differed with him over how to proceed with reform while simultaneously reinvigorating the economy. As a consequence, Koizumi’s popularity dropped. During the same period the government drew criticism for its handling of a minor outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), the “mad cow disease.” Having handily defeated three challengers for the presidency of the LDP in September 2003, Koizumi reshuffled his cabinet later in the month and then announced a general election for November 9. Aided by the LDP’s absorption of the NCP shortly before the balloting, the LDP and New Komeito maintained a slightly reduced majority, but the DPJ, bolstered by a September merger with the LP, gained 40 seats, apparently confirming speculation that Japan was moving toward a two-party system. That possibility was further supported by the results of the July 11, 2004, election for half the House of Councilors: the DPJ won 50 seats and the LDP won 49, although the latter and New Komeito retained an overall majority. On September 27 Prime Minister Koizumi announced a completely revamped cabinet notable for 11 new appointments, including 9 first-timers.

On August 8, 2005, following the defeat in the House of Councilors of postal banking reform legislation on which he had staked his continuing leadership, the prime minister called an early election for September 11. At the balloting the LDP registered the largest victory in Japan’s post–World War II history, winning 296 seats and permitting Koizumi to pass his postal reform plan, which included privatizing the government agency and dividing it into separate mail delivery, savings bank, and insurance components.

Constitution and Government The constitution of May 3, 1947, converted Japan from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy by transferring sovereign power from the emperor to the people and limiting the former to a “symbolic” and ceremonial role. In addition, the peerage was abolished and a range of civil rights enumerated, including freedom of thought and conscience, free and equal education, an absence of censorship, and impartial and public judicial procedures. Legislative and fiscal authority are vested in a bicameral parliament (Diet) consisting of a dominant House of Representatives and an upper chamber, the House of Councilors, that has limited power to delay legislation. Constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority of both houses and subsequent ratification by a majority vote in a popular referendum. The cabinet, headed by a prime minister, is collectively responsible to the Diet and must resign on passage of a no-confidence vote in the House of Representatives unless the house is dissolved and a new election held. Judicial power is vested in an appointive Supreme Court and in lower courts as established by law. Article Nine of the constitution, which renounces war and the maintenance of armed forces and “other war potential,” has impeded the assumption of mutual defense responsibilities but has been interpreted by the government as permitting the maintenance of “SelfDefense Forces” (SDF), currently totaling about 240,000 personnel. In July 1999 the Diet passed a bill authorizing the formation in each house of a

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constitutional review committee to consider “widely and comprehensively” the provisions of the basic law, including Article Nine. The two committees convened for the first time on January 20, 2000, and continued their work into 2006 (see Current issues, below). Administratively, Japan is divided into 47 prefectures, each with an elected mayor or governor and a local assembly. Smaller municipal units have their own elected assemblies.

Foreign Relations Japan’s failure to offer a clear apology for its 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor has caused some lingering ill-feeling in the United States, as has, in Japan, Washington’s refusal to apologize for the decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. Neither resentment has significantly affected Japan’s continuing postwar reliance on the United States for its defense, and the 1960 mutual security treaty remains in effect. Although the resultant presence of American forces in Japan has long been criticized by political and extraparliamentary opponents, in September 1997 the two countries negotiated revised guidelines for military cooperation. For the first time Japan agreed to commit military personnel to overseas support during Far East crises. Without specifying a precise geographical purview, enabling legislation passed in 1999 permits Japan, in an emergency, to provide U.S. forces with fuel, food, and other logistic support plus access to Japanese civilian airports and ports. In addition, Japanese ships may assist in such activities as minesweeping in international waters, while members of the Japan SDF deployed abroad may carry weapons to defend themselves and Japanese civilians. Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of the U.S.Japan defensive alignment has been the American military presence in Okinawa. In December 1996 agreement was reached on a 20 percent reduction in the land utilized by the U.S. military on Okinawa, without, however, a reduction in the 28,000 U.S. forces stationed on the island (60 percent of the 47,000 U.S. troops deployed in Japan). In May

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2006, following years of discussions, the two countries completed a plan for relocation of a U.S. Marine heliport to Nago, in the north, and the transfer by 2015 of 8,000 Marines to Guam, at a cost of $10.3 billion (60 percent to be paid by Japan). Also as part of force reorganization, all or part of five military facilities will revert to Japanese control. Nevertheless, many Okinawans object to the continued U.S. presence while recognizing its positive economic impact. Local resentment has been particularly fierce in response to criminal acts committed by U.S. servicemen against civilians. In 1995 Washington agreed to turn troops involved in such cases over to Japanese authorities. Legislation passed in 1992 permitted, for the first time since World War II, the use of Japanese military personnel for international peacekeeping missions. Accordingly, a Japanese contingent was deployed with the UN mission in Cambodia and another was sent to Mozambique, but only to provide logistical support. Such action remains highly controversial in Japan given the ongoing debate as to whether the antiwar clauses of the constitution should be revised. Since 1996 Japanese troops have been assigned to the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights, but Tokyo has declined to participate in other UN Security Council peacekeeping missions. Japan was admitted to the United Nations in 1956 and belongs to all of its specialized and related agencies. To date, however, the UN has not given Japan a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. A member of such “Western” bodies as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Group of Ten, Japan also participates in the annual economic summit meetings of the industrialized Group of Seven/Group of Eight. Japan’s policies in Asia and the Pacific are closely linked to aid, trade, and reparations issues, and to its membership in the Asian Development Bank and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. In 1989 Japanese overseas development assistance (ODA) exceeded, for the first time, that of the United States, but Japanese aid declined after 2000. Although Japan’s ODA was again second to

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the United States in 2003, on a per capita basis Japan ranked 19th among the major industrialized donor states. For many years Tokyo pursued a policy of “separating politics from economics” by trading extensively with both Taiwan and mainland China while according diplomatic recognition only to the former. Thus the Japanese were ill prepared for U.S. President Richard Nixon’s opening to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in February 1972. Later that year Prime Minister Tanaka mounted a pathbreaking visit of his own to Beijing, during which he agreed to recognize the PRC as the sole legal government of China and to sever diplomatic (but not economic) relations with Taiwan. The rapprochement was formalized by the signing of a treaty of peace and friendship in Beijing in August 1978. In October 1992, during the first visit to the PRC by a Japanese monarch, Emperor Akihito acknowledged that Japan’s wartime occupation had “inflicted great suffering on the people of China,” but he yielded to domestic right-wing groups by stopping short of a formal apology. A November 1998 visit to Japan by Chinese President Jiang Zemin, the first by a Chinese head of state since World War II, failed to produce the expected formal, written Japanese apology for its 1937–1945 occupation because of a disagreement over the content. Instead, Prime Minister Obuchi repeated an expression of “deep remorse” that Prime Minister Murayama had voiced in 1995. A persistent insular dispute has centered on the uninhabited Senkaku Islands (called the Diaoyutai Islands by China) located between Taiwan and Okinawa. Under Japanese control after the SinoJapanese War of 1895, they were held by the United States from 1945 to 1972, when they were returned to Japan. In March 2004 Japan detained seven Chinese activists who had evaded Japanese patrols and landed on one of the disputed islands. In April 2006 the PRC strongly objected to a high-school textbook revision that identified the islands as definitively Japanese territory. Although the PRC and Japan have cooperated internationally when their policies have been in

accord—for example, in efforts to convince North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons ambitions— bilateral relations have remained cool. Beijing continues to express concern over U.S.-Japanese security guidelines and their potential implications regarding the defense of Taiwan, while Japan has criticized recent increases in PRC military spending. The PRC, like North and South Korea, has also criticized Prime Minister Koizumi’s repeated visits to the Yasukuni shrine honoring Japanese war dead, including a small number of convicted war criminals, and the adoption by Japanese schools of history texts that have minimized or ignored Japanese crimes during its occupation of the Korean peninsula, parts of China, and Southeast Asia before and during World War II. The postwar normalization of relations with the Soviet Union proceeded slowly. Bilateral talks on a Japanese-Soviet peace treaty were instituted in January 1972, but Soviet refusal to return the northern islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and Habomai, which were annexed after World War II, prevented any significant progress toward a treaty until the post-Soviet era. In April 1996 Moscow and Tokyo agreed to resume negotiations on a peace treaty that would include resolution of the “northern territories” issue. Prime Minister Hashimoto stated at the conclusion of an informal summit with Russian President Boris Yeltsin on November 1– 2, 1997, that the two had agreed to “make maximum efforts to conclude a peace treaty by the year 2000,” and in January 1998 a joint commission was formed to draft the text of a definitive accord. In February the countries signed a fishing agreement covering quotas for Japan around the disputed islands, and in November, during the first state visit to Moscow by a Japanese head of government in 25 years, Prime Minister Obuchi and President Yeltsin reaffirmed the 2000 target date for completing the peace accord and ending the insular impasse. Although the two countries agreed in November 2000 to try a “new approach” to the issue and in 2003 established a “Council of Wise Men” to consider confidence-building measures and improve relations, as of May 2006 no significant progress had been made.

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Normal relations with South Korea, but not with North Korea, were established in 1965–1966 after many years of hostility, which, in muted form, lingered because of resentment over the Japanese occupation of 1910–1945 and over alleged discrimination against Koreans born and living in Japan. It was not until a visit by South Korean President Roh Tae Woo in May 1990 that the residual bitterness was substantially eased by Emperor Hirohito’s tender of “deepest regret” for “the suffering . . . which was brought about by my country.” During a state visit by South Korean President Kim Dae Jung to Japan on October 7–8, 1998, Emperor Akihito publicly communicated his “deep sorrow” for Japan’s 35 years of colonial rule, while a concluding statement from the two governments included the first written “heartfelt apology” from Tokyo to Seoul. In January 1992 Tokyo admitted that the Japanese army had forced tens of thousands of Korean women to serve as “comfort women” (unpaid prostitutes) during World War II. In all, up to 200,000 women had been so enslaved in the territories occupied by Japan. In August 1994 the Murayama government announced an “atonement” commitment of $1 billion over a ten-year period that, in part, would fund vocational training centers for women in neighboring countries. The first disbursements from a resultant Asian Women’s Fund (of $18,500 each to 4 Filipino women) were made in August 1996, but other “comfort women” and their organizations refused to accept payments that did not come directly from the Japanese government. When the program concluded in 2002, only 285 South Korean, Taiwanese, and Filipino women had received compensation. Additional outlays were provided from an unofficial government-backed fund for medical and welfare support. In November 1996 the Japanese foreign ministry lodged a formal protest with South Korea because of a port facility being constructed in a group of small islands (called Takeshima by Japan and Tokto by South Korea) located midway between the two countries. Partly because of the territorial dispute, in January 1998 Tokyo scrapped a 1965 fishing treaty with its neighbor, but in September

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the two compromised on a treaty revision governing fishing zones and quotas. The Tokto issue has repeatedly flared up since then, most recently following Japan’s announcement in April 2006 that it intended to conduct a hydrographic survey of the area—an announcement that was denounced by both South Korea and North Korea. Relations with North Korea have been dominated by security concerns, especially after Pyongyang fired a three-stage missile over the Pacific in August 1998. The launch produced a strong rebuke from Tokyo, which temporarily froze food aid and development assistance to Pyongyang. North Korea’s growing launch capability also contributed to Japan’s September announcement that it would participate with the United States in research on a theater missile defense system (MDS). Furthermore, in November 1998 Tokyo stated that it intended to deploy four reconnaissance satellites. Relations with Pyongyang were strained again in March 1999, when, in the first action of its kind since 1953, Japanese destroyers and other naval vessels chased and fired on two suspected North Korean spy ships in territorial waters. In December 2001 the Japanese coast guard intercepted a suspected North Korean spy ship within Japan’s exclusive economic zone. An exchange of fire ended with the sinking of the North Korean vessel, which led Pyongyang to accuse Tokyo of “brutal piracy.” In October 2002, following a visit by Prime Minister Koizumi to North Korea and the latter’s belated admission that it had kidnapped 13 Japanese citizens in the late 1970s and early 1980s to provide language instruction for government agents, Japan and North Korea restarted normalization talks in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The two days of discussions made no progress, however, and further efforts were hindered by other developments, including Pyongyang’s renewal of its nuclear weapons development program. In March 2003 North Korea objected to Japan’s launch of two reconnaissance satellites and then, in December, to Tokyo’s confirmation that it would move ahead with deployment of the MDS. A one-day visit to Pyongyang by Koizumi in May 2004 concluded without

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noticeable progress on any bilateral issues, nor have ongoing normalization talks led to any breakthroughs. In recent years, the Japanese economy has been buffeted by heightened resistance to Japanese export penetration, particularly of automobiles and electronics, in both the United States and Western Europe. The Bill Clinton administration claimed to have extracted some concessions from Japan in 1993, but the U.S. trade deficit with Japan continued to rise, led by automobile imports. A full-scale trade war was averted by an accord that broadened U.S. access to a number of Japanese markets, and in June 1995 the United States and Japan reached a somewhat ambiguously worded agreement only hours before $5.9 billion in tariffs against Japanese luxury cars were to go into effect. A pattern of imprecise accords being signed at the last minute to avert U.S. punitive action continued in 1996. In 1997–1998 a strong U.S. economy mitigated concerns about the continuing trade imbalance, but during a November 1998 visit to Japan President Clinton once again cautioned Japan that maintaining trade barriers and using unfair trade practices to undercut international competitors could well generate anti-Japanese protectionism abroad. Beginning in 1999, accusations regarding Japanese steel exports and retaliatory American actions led both to seek redress before the World Trade Organization (WTO). In 2003 the WTO ruled against a U.S. law that permitted distribution of antidumping tariffs to U.S. steel firms. The WTO further ruled in 2004 that Japan and other affected countries could impose retaliatory tariffs, which Tokyo did in September 2005 against U.S. ball bearing and steel products. On February 9, 2001, a U.S. submarine, the USS Greeneville, had accidentally surfaced beneath a Japanese trawler, the Ehime Maru, sinking the vessel and causing 9 deaths. Despite U.S. apologies and a naval inquiry, the incident off the coast of Hawaii provoked outcries throughout Japan, particularly when it was revealed that civilian visitors aboard the submarine had participated in the rapid ascent drill. In November 2002 the United States

agreed to pay $13 million in compensation. The incident did not, however, damage the U.S.-Japan defense relationship. Japan remained a key participant in the six-party talks on North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, and in December 2005 approved the joint development of sea-based missiles as part of the MDS. In late November 1998 a Tokyo court rejected compensation claims made on behalf of some 20,000 former prisoners of war (POWs) and World War II internees by 7 plaintiffs from the United States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia. The court ruled that the pertinent article of the 1907 Hague Convention on Prisoners of War did not apply when the state acted illegally. Another suit brought by Dutch POWs was also dismissed days later, although the court acknowledged violations of international law. Although several claims by Chinese and South Koreans have been successful, most have not. Other suits are pending, a principal issue being whether time limits apply to claims for compensation.

Current Issues Prior to the August 2005 defeat of the postal reform legislation in the House of Councilors by a 108–125 vote (which followed a narrow 233–228 victory in the House of Representatives), Prime Minister Koizumi had stated that he would call an election if he did not prevail. Thirty-seven rebel LDP members had voted against him in the lower house and as a consequence were targeted for defeat in the September balloting by Koizumi-backed “assassins,” most of whom won. As a result of the sweeping LDP victory, Koizumi easily secured passage of the postal reforms in October. The reorganization and eventual privatization of Japan Post was so controversial because it stood at the center of Koizumi’s efforts to reform Japan’s banking and financial sector while reducing the government’s role and opening the industry to greater commercial—including foreign— participation. Japan Post was, in effect, the largest savings bank in the world, with savings assets of $1.7 trillion, total assets of $2.9 trillion, and

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260,000 employees. The reforms called for establishing a government holding company and separate units responsible for mail delivery, banking, insurance, and management services. Beginning in October 2007, individuals’ savings, which in the past have been invested primarily in low-yielding, government-guaranteed bonds, will begin to be diversified into equity investments, an expanded range of mutual funds, and other forms of financial vehicles subject to market forces, with potentially profound effects for Japan’s financial sector as well as account holders. Business models for the banking and insurance units have yet to be completed, but by 2017 both are to be privatized, although the government will retain a one-third interest. Investments will be guaranteed by a deposit insurance company, not the government. Having won passage of the postal reforms and announced a cabinet shuffle on October 31, 2005, Koizumi set his sights on other aggressive goals, such as additional government downsizing and changes to the tax structure, primarily through an increase in the 5 percent consumption tax. His proposals included consolidating eight state banks into one, reducing the number of civil service employees, cutting budget subsidies to local governments, and mandating higher health care payments by the elderly. At the same time, however, opinion polls began showing a dramatic decline in support for Koizumi’s agenda, which was increasingly being perceived as too focused on deregulation and market capitalism as well as insufficiently concerned with widening income disparities. His standing was not improved by the arrest of Internet entrepreneur Takafumi HORIE, who had received Koizumi’s backing in an unsuccessful effort to unseat one of the leading LDP defectors, former LDP faction leader Shizuka KAMEI, in the September 2005 election. In early 2006 the government filed charges of market manipulation and accounting fraud against Horie, whose Internet services company, Livedoor, had been widely regarded, only a year earlier, as epitomizing the new economy. Now it was being called “Japan’s Enron,” a reference to the U.S. energy company that had collapsed in late 2001.

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In addition, public opinion was sharply divided over another Koizumi-backed initiative, revision of the Imperial Household Law to permit females and their children to ascend the throne. In February 2006 Koizumi shelved the proposal, apparently in response to news that the wife of Emperor Akihito’s second son, Prince AKISHINO, was expecting a third child. (No males have been born to the imperial family since 1965.) In early 2004, in support of U.S. policy toward Iraq, the first of up to 1,000 SDF personnel had been sent to provide humanitarian assistance and logistical support in Iraqi “safe areas.” The deployment was vociferously condemned by the opposition and much of the public. In April several Japanese civilians were kidnapped by Iraqi militants and threatened with death if the forces were not withdrawn, but Prime Minister Koizumi refused to consider the “despicable threats” and the hostages were soon released unharmed. In May 2006 Koizumi indicated that the Iraq deployment (at that time, 600 troops) would conclude when Australia and the United Kingdom withdrew their troops. The larger issue of whether the government should be granted a freer hand in deploying SDF forces overseas, including participation in collective self-defense efforts, is linked to the ongoing consideration of whether the 1947 constitution should be amended or even replaced. Committees in both houses of the Diet have been discussing constitutional revision since 2000, and in November 2005 the LDP published its proposed amendments. They included lowering the barrier between some church and state interactions, reducing the threshold for legislative approval of constitutional amendments to a simple majority (instead of twothirds) in each house, and incorporating rights to privacy, freedom of information, intellectual property, and environmental safety. The most contentious area involves Article Nine of the constitution, which prohibits “the threat or use of force” internationally and the creation of armed forces for such purposes. Presently, dispatch of SDF contingents abroad is limited to peacekeeping operations under the United Nations or, as in the case of the recent deployments to the Indian

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Ocean and Iraq, to the terms of specific legislation passed by the Diet. The LDP draft proposed retaining Article Nine’s renunciation of war but, in language much broader than the current constitution’s, would permit the maintenance of “military forces for self-defense.” (The LDP has also advocated converting the existing Japan Defense Agency into a cabinet-level Ministry of Defense, although Prime Minister Koizumi put that proposal on hold in February 2006 following disclosure of a defense-related bid-rigging scandal.) Although opinion polls have indicated that a large majority of Japanese favor updating some aspects of the constitution, the public would appear to be less sure about revising Article Nine. Meanwhile, the LDP became increasingly preoccupied over who to select as Koizumi’s successor. In June 2005 Koizumi had announced that he would retire as party president when his current term expires in September 2006—an announcement that, despite the mandate won in the September 2005 snap election, threatened to make him a lame duck. As 2006 progressed it appeared that Koizumi’s policies were being undercut by “old guard” elements of his own party, including some faction leaders who had opposed his efforts at internal party reform. The leading contenders to succeed Koizumi were generally acknowledged to be Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo ABE, Foreign Minister Taro ASO, and Finance Minister Sadakazu TANIGAKI.

Political Parties Throughout most of the postwar era, Japan’s multiparty political structure featured the predominance of a single government party, the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), over a diversified opposition on the center and left of the political spectrum. On November 24, 1994, nine opposition groups united as the New Frontier Party (Shinshinto). In addition to five LDP dissident formations, Shinshinto brought together the Japan New Party (JNP) of former coalition prime minister Morihiro Hosokawa (discussed below under the Demo-

cratic Party of Japan—DPJ); the Japan Renewal Party (JRP) of former LDP secretary general Ichiro Ozawa (also discussed under the DPJ); much of the Clean Government Party (Komeito), under Koshiro Ishida (discussed below under New Komeito); and the Democratic Socialist Party—DSP (Minshu Shakaito-Minshato) of Takashi YONEZAWA, the last being a 1961 right-wing offshoot of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP, subsequently the Social Democratic Party—SDP). The JNP, JRP, Komeito, and DSP had joined with the Social Democrats and the New Party Harbinger (Shinto Sakigake) as part of the Hosokawa coalition government in August 1993. The Hata government of April 1994 was supported by Komeito and the Kaishin parliamentary alliance, which included the JNP, JRP, DSP, and two LDP splinters. But Shinshinto, initially headed by former LDP prime minister Toshiki Kaifu and then by Ichiro Ozawa, never coalesced into a viable alternative to the LDP and by 1996 had lost impetus, being upstaged in the fall election campaign by the newly organized DPJ despite remaining the largest opposition group, with 156 seats, in the House of Representatives. In December former prime minister Hata and a dozen lower house members abandoned Shinshinto to form the Sun Party, and in late 1997 Shinshinto dissolved, with many of its elements reforming as new parties in early 1998. A number of these, plus the Sun Party, soon afterward joined the DPJ, which had emerged as the largest opposition grouping. Another Shinshinto successor, Ichiro Ozawa’s Liberal Party (LP; see the DPJ), left the opposition and formed a governing coalition with the LDP in January 1999. At the start of April 2000 the LP resigned from the government, but the majority of the party’s Diet members quickly established the New Conservative Party (NCP) and remained in alliance with the LDP. Six months earlier, the New Komeito had also joined the government. The subsequent four years produced increasing evidence that Japan may be moving toward a twoparty system. In 2004 the LDP gained strength through consolidation with the NCP, while the opposition DPJ increased its base by merging with

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the LP. Although New Komeito held its own as the third-ranked party, the once-powerful Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and SDP steadily lost ground: following the July 2004 election for half the House of Councilors, neither the JCP nor the SDP could claim more than nine seats in either house of the Diet.

Government Coalition Liberal Democratic Party—LDP (JiyuMinshuto). Born of a 1955 merger between the former Liberal and Democratic parties, the LDP attaches more importance to organization and financial power than to ideology. It has favored private enterprise, alliance with the United States, and expansion of Japanese interests in Asia. The party leadership, generally drawn from the bureaucratic and business elites, was traditionally distributed among some dozen “faction leaders,” each of whom controlled from 10 to 50 votes in the Diet. In 1978, however, the party implemented a primary system for selecting candidates for its presidency, and in November, in the first runoff between two members of the same party in the Diet’s history, Masayoshi Ohira defeated Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda for the leadership. Ohira’s successor, Zenko Suzuki, announced in October 1982 that he would not seek reelection because of rising dissent within the party. Four candidates thereupon presented themselves, and in a primary conducted in November Yasuhiro Nakasone secured 58 percent of the vote, thus ensuring his designation as prime minister. In October 1984 Nakasone became the first LDP president in 20 years to secure reelection. Ineligible, under party rules, for a further term, he was granted a oneyear extension in September 1986, following the LDP’s overwhelming parliamentary victory in July. He stood down from the party position in October 1987 and retired as prime minister in November, being succeeded in both positions by the party’s secretary general, Noboru Takeshita. Subsequently, numerous party officials were implicated in an insider trading scandal, Takeshita himself being forced to resign in favor of Sosuke

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Uno, who assumed office in June 1989. Buffeted by involvement in a sex scandal, coupled with unprecedented LDP defeats in Tokyo municipal elections and House of Councilors balloting, Uno announced his resignation after only 53 days in office and was succeeded in August by Toshiki Kaifu. Kaifu’s own position was substantially weakened by an embarrassing LDP loss in the April 1991 Tokyo gubernatorial election, which led the party’s powerful secretary general, Ichiro Ozawa, to resign. Six months later, Kiichi Miyazawa was chosen to succeed Kaifu as party leader. In December 1992 the influence of the party’s long-dominant Takeshita faction was reduced as the result of a major cabinet reshuffle and by the creation from its ranks of a new faction effectively headed by former secretary general Ozawa. Ozawa was one of a number of leaders to withdraw from the party prior to the July 1993 balloting, at which the LDP for the first time lost control of the lower house. On July 30 the battered party elected Yohei Kono as its new president. Although further weakened by postelection defections, the LDP rump seized the opportunity of a split in the new ruling coalition in April 1994 to establish an alliance with the Social Democrats and Shinto Sakigake. This resulted in the party’s return to government as the dominant member of a three-party coalition in June. On January 11, 1996, in the wake of SDP leader Tomiichi Murayama’s withdrawal as prime minister, the LDP’s Ryutaro Hashimoto was elected to the post. The party’s lower house representation advanced to 239 out of 500 in October balloting, permitting formation of a minority government with the external support of the SDP and Shinto Sakigake. By fall 1997 it had reestablished its majority through defections from other parties. Hashimoto, although unopposed in reelection as party president on September 8, 1997, resigned as prime minister and party leader on July 13, 1998, accepting full blame for the poor showing by the LDP at the previous day’s upper house election. Following an intraparty campaign unprecedented in its openness, on July 24 Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi defeated two other candidates to claim the

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LDP leadership, preparing the way for his election as prime minister on July 30. Obuchi was reelected party leader on September 21, 1999, receiving 68 percent of the vote—the other 32 percent went to the leaders of the Koichi KATO and Yamasaki factions—and freeing him to pursue an alliance with New Komeito (below). Obuchi’s disabling stroke on April 1, 2000, immediately generated heated behind-the-scenes activity that culminated on April 5 in the elevation of the party’s secretary general, Yoshiro Mori, to the LDP presidency and thus to the prime ministership. At the June 25, 2000, lower house election the party lost its majority, winning only 233 seats in the 480-member chamber (it had held 271 of 500 seats before the balloting), but Mori continued in office with the support of coalition partners New Komeito and the New Conservative Party—NCP (Hoshuto). The latter had been formed in April 2000 by Transport Minister Toshihiro Nikai and 25 other members of Parliament who had abandoned the Liberal Party (LP; see DPJ, below) upon the LP’s departure from the governing coalition. Despite having survived parliamentary noconfidence votes in November 2000 and March 2001, Mori resigned on April 7, 2001. In the fourperson contest to succeed him as LDP leader, Hashimoto, who was now head of the largest party faction, unexpectedly lost to Junichiro Koizumi, a reformer and former health minister who vowed to end the faction system. In voting on April 21–22 Koizumi won 123 of 141 party chapters, and his victory was confirmed on April 24 when he captured 51 percent of the 346 votes of Diet members. He was reelected, unopposed, to a two-year term on August 10, 2001, but over the next year his policies met frequent resistance from the heads of other powerful LDP factions. In March 2002 he lost a key ally, Koichi Kato, who fell victim to a tax-evasion scandal involving a key aide. At the September 20, 2003, election for the LDP presidency, Prime Minister Koizumi received over 60 percent support, defeating three other candidates: faction leader Shizuka Kamei, former transport minister Takao FUJII, and former foreign minister Masahiko Komura. At the subsequent

November election for the House of Representatives the LDP won 237 seats. It then renewed its coalition with New Komeito and absorbed the NCP, which, having never won widespread support, had captured only 4 seats on November 9 (down from 7 in 2000). At the July 2004 House of Councilors election the LDP won 49 of 121 seats, slightly less than its target and 1 less than the DPJ. Its 114 total upper house seats (8 short of a majority) were supplemented by New Komeito’s 24. Following the replenishment, Chikage OGI, former NCP leader and transport minister, was elected the upper house’s first female president. On July 30, 2004, former prime minister Hashimoto announced that he would surrender the leadership of his faction, still the LDP’s largest, as a consequence of a political contributions scandal. The move was seen as strengthening Prime Minister Koizumi’s position within the party. In late September, shortly before announcing a cabinet reshuffle, Koizumi reorganized the party leadership, naming, for example, a new head of the Policy Research Council and a new secretary general. The defeat of postal reform legislation in August 2005 had been proceeded by a major split within LDP ranks, with the result that 37 LDP legislators voted against the package in the lower house. Reform opponents Mitsuo HORIUCHI and Shizuka Kamei resigned as faction leaders, and Kamei then helped form the People’s New Party (PNP, below). In the run-up to the September 2005 snap election, Prime Minister Koizumi refused to extend party backing to any of the rebels and instead ran other candidates, dubbed “assassins,” against them. Most of the rebels were defeated. A number of those who had not formally resigned from the party prior to the election were expelled in October. In June 2005 Koizumi had announced that he would step down as president of the party when his term ended in September 2006. By late 2005 potential successors were already jockeying for position, a development that undercut Koizumi’s efforts to end factionalism within the party. By early 2006 three leading presidential candidates had emerged: Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe,

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Foreign Minister Taro Aso, and Finance Minister Sadakazu Tanigaki. In September 2005 Tanigaki had been elected leader of the former Ozata faction, Sadatashi OZATA having retired. Two months later, Yuji Tsushima was elected to head the former Hashimoto faction. Former health and welfare minister Yuya Niwa and Makoto Koga have taken control of the former Horiuchi faction. Former labor minister Bunmei Ibuki has assumed leadership of the much-diminished Kamei faction. Leaders: Junichiro KOIZUMI (Prime Minister and President of the Party), Yohei KONO (Speaker of the House of Representatives), Mikio AOKI (Leader in the House of Councilors), Shinzo ABE (Chief Cabinet Secretary), Taro ASO (Foreign Minister, Kono Faction), Koki CHUMA (Kono Faction), Bunmei IBUKI (Former Minister of Labor, Ibuki Faction), Makoto KOGA (Niwa-Koga Faction), Masahiko KOMURA (Former Foreign Minister, Komura Faction), Yoshiro MORI (Former Prime Minister, Mori Faction), Toshihiro NIKAI (Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry, Nikai Faction), Yuya NIWA (Former Minister of Health and Welfare, Niwa-Koga Faction), Sadakazu TANIGAKI (Minister of Finance, Tanigaki Faction), Yuji TSUSHIMA (Tsushima Faction), Taku YAMASAKI (Yamasaki Faction), Tsutomu TAKEBE (Secretary General). New Komeito (New Clean Government Party). The New Komeito was formed by merger on November 7, 1998, of Komei with members of Shinto Heiwa (“New Peace Party”), which had disbanded earlier in the day. The New Komeito is the latest incarnation of Komeito (Clean Government Party), which started as the Komei Political League, a political society, in 1961 and became a party in 1964. Komeito was a formal affiliate of the Soka Gakkai Buddhist organization until 1970, when the linkage became an informal one to broaden the party’s appeal. Komeito long opposed the LDP on foreign policy, particularly with regard to retention of the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty, although it shifted its position in 1978 with respect to the country’s Self-Defense Forces, which it had come to view as necessary

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for “protection of the territory.” Having slipped to 45 seats in 1990, Komeito’s tally in the lower house rose to 51 in the July 1993 balloting, whereupon the party participated in both the Hosokawa and Hata non-LDP coalition governments before going into opposition in June 1994. Sometimes also referred to as the New Clean Government Party, Komei was the smaller of two groups to emerge from Komeito, which disbanded in December 1994. The larger group, the Komei New Party, followed the Komeito chair, Koshiro ISHIDA, into Shinshinto five days later, while the smaller Komei held the loyalty of some 3,200 local assembly members and much of the Komeito delegation in the House of Councilors. Organized under the slogan “Reform Initiated Locally,” it saw itself as the inheritor of Komeito’s “clean government” program, emphasizing grassroots democracy, humanism, protection of the global environment, disarmament, and resolution of North-South issues. Following the breakup of Shinshinto in December 1997, some 18 members of the House of Councilors initially organized as the Dawn Club (Reimei Kurabu), which in January 1998 merged with Komei, while many Shinshinto lower house members formed Shinto Heiwa on January 4, 1998. Shinto Heiwa and another post-Shinshinto formation, the Reformers’ Network Party—RNP (Kaikaku Kurabu, also known as the Reform Club), joined in a lower house alliance called the Peace and Reform Network, which soon constituted the second-largest opposition group in the House of Representatives. Formation of the New Komeito in November 1998 served to broaden the alliance with the RNP in the lower house, where the two parties’ 52 members formed a parliamentary group under the name Komeito Kaikaku (roughly, “Clean Government Reform”). At a convention on July 24, 1999, the party voted to join the LDP-LP alliance, but expansion of the governing coalition was delayed until October 5. (The RNP accompanied the New Komeito into the Obuchi government as a junior partner, but by then it had already been weakened by defections to other parties, and it lost all of its remaining 5 lower house seats at the next

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election.) At the June 2000 lower house election New Komeito fared poorly, winning 31 seats, 11 fewer than it had held upon dissolution but enough to help ensure continuation of the governing alliance. By early 2001, however, the party was publicly dissatisfied with Prime Minister Mori’s leadership, and on February 18 the New Komeito secretary general stated that it would leave the coalition if Mori did not resign soon, which he did less than two months later. At the November 2003 election the party won 34 lower house seats. Following the July 2004 House of Councilors election, New Komeito held 24 seats in the upper house, where it ranked third. In September 2005 it lost 3 of its lower house seats. In early 2006, with party offices up for election in October, speculation surfaced that Takenori Kanzaki, who was in his fourth term as president, would not seek a fifth. Leaders: Takenori KANZAKI (Chief Representative), Toshiko HAMAYOTSU (Acting Chief Representative), Kazuo KITIGAWA (Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport), Tetsuzo FUYUSHIBA (Secretary General), Akihiro OTA (Acting Secretary General).

Principal Opposition Parties Democratic Party of Japan—DPJ (Nihon Minshuto). The “liberal” DPJ was launched in September 1996 by a faction of the New Party Harbinger (Shinto Sakigake) led by Yukio Hatoyama and including the popular health and welfare minister, Naoto Kan. Grandson of a leader of the pre1955 Democratic Party component of the LDP, Hatoyama had fallen out with the Shinto Sakigake leadership over electoral strategy. The new party quickly attracted parliamentary and popular support, winning 52 lower house seats in the October balloting, mostly at the expense of the SDPJ and what remained of Shinto Sakigake. On March 12, 1998, the New Party Fraternity— NPF (Shinto Yuai, or Amity Party), the Democratic Reform League—DRL (Minshu Kaikaku Regno), and the Good Governance Party—GGP (Minseito) voted to dissolve and join the DPJ. All had previ-

ously agreed to work with the DPJ in a parliamentary bloc called Minyuren. The GGP had been established on January 23, 1998, by the merger of three other parties: the Sun Party—SP (Taiyo), which had formed as a Shinshinto splinter in December 1996; the Voice of the People—VP (Kokumin no Koe); and the From Five Party (FFP) of former prime minister Morihiro Hosokawa. Like the NPF, the VP and FFP had emerged on January 4, 1998, from the ruins of Shinshinto. Prior to formation of Shinshinto, Hosokawa had been associated with the Japan New Party—JNP (Nihon Shinto), which he had launched in 1992 upon leaving the LDP. Although the JNP ranked only fifth after the July 1993 election, Hosokawa had been selected to head a seven-party coalition government, but in June 1994, two months after he was forced to resign, the JNP went into opposition. In May the JNP had been strengthened by the adherence of leading members of the United Social Democratic Party—USDP (Shaminren), itself a 1977 offshoot of the Japan Socialist Party (later the SDP). The USDP had decided to disband because its “historic mission” of removing the LDP from power had been achieved (temporarily, as it turned out). In April 1998 Hosokawa resigned from his seat in the House of Representatives, ending his political career. Following the July 1998 election the DPJ, supported in the House of Councilors by the affiliated Shin-Ryokufukai group, remained the largest opposition force in the Diet. In balloting for prime minister on July 30, Democratic leader Kan outpolled the LDP’s Obuchi 104–103 in the upper house, but the LDP’s majority in the lower house guaranteed Obuchi’s election. At a DPJ convention in January 1999, Kan easily won reelection as party chief, despite earlier allegations of sexual misconduct. In September 1999, however, Kan lost his leadership to Secretary General Yukio Hatoyama by a runoff vote of 182–130. At the June 2000 election the DPJ made major gains, advancing to 127 seats, 32 more than it had held before the balloting. Within days 2 independents, who had run with the support of the small

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Independents (Mushozoku no Kai) group, had agreed to form a parliamentary group called the Democratic Party of Japan and Club of Independents. In March 2001 the DPJ absorbed much of Sakigake, as the reconfigured rump of Shinto Sakigake had been named in 1998. (In 2002 the remaining elements of Sakigake formed the Environmental Political Party Green Assembly [Kankyosenta Midori no Kaigi], which dissolved in 2004.) In September 2002 President Hatoyama won a narrow reelection victory over Naoto Kan, but a significant faction remained dissatisfied with his leadership. In December he resigned as president after other party leaders reacted strongly against his having unilaterally approached Ichiro Ozawa, then of the Liberal Party (Jiyuto), about a merger aimed at uniting the opposition prior to the next general election. The DPJ’s Diet delegation quickly replaced Hatoyama with Kan. Ozawa had formed the Liberal Party (LP) in January 1998 following the breakup of Shinshinto. Prior to establishing the Kaishin legislative alliance in 1994, Ozawa, along with former finance minister Tsutomu Hata, had led a group of 44 LDP dissidents in June 1993 to form the Japan Renewal Party (Shinseito), also referred to in English as the New Birth, New Life, or Renaissance Party. A month later Shinseito won 55 seats in the lower house election, and it participated in both the Hosokawa and Hata coalitions of 1993–1994 before going into opposition in June 1994 and joining Shinshinto later that year. While the LP was reported at its founding to have attracted the greatest number of Shinshinto members (including 54 lower house representatives), it was viewed by many analysts as being unable to mount an effective campaign against the LDP because of its leader’s autocratic style. The LP won 6 upper house seats in the July 1998 election, for a total of 12, but its membership in the lower house later fell to under 40, leaving it third among the opposition parties. In January 1999 the LP joined the LDP in a coalition government, reuniting conservative forces that had separated upon Ozawa’s departure from the LDP in 1993. The accompanying LDP-LP agree-

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ment called for a reduction of 50 proportionally elected seats in the House of Representatives, cabinet restructuring, and greater participation—not simply logistic support—by Self-Defense Forces in UN peacekeeping missions. In early 2000, with Ozawa having threatened to withdraw from the government, Prime Minister Obuchi forced through the Diet a bill reducing by 20 the number of proportional lower house seats, but Ozawa’s insistence on LDP support for additional LP candidates at the upcoming general election contributed to a parting of ways on April 1, only hours before Obuchi’s ultimately fatal stroke. Rejecting Ozawa’s leadership, more than half the LP Diet members abandoned the party and quickly formed the New Conservative Party (NCP), which reestablished the LDP linkage. At the June 2000 election the LP fared considerably better than the NCP, winning 22 seats, 4 more than it had held in the House of Representatives prior to dissolution. The forced resignation of DPJ President Hatoyama in December 2002 over his unauthorized contact with the LP’s Ozawa probably delayed, but did not prevent, the parties’ unification. The merger ultimately occurred on September 26, 2003, six weeks before the next lower house election, at which the DPJ made significant gains, to 177 seats. On May 10, 2004, Kan resigned as DPJ president, beset not only by an admission that he, like many other politicians, had not paid all his required payments into the state pension plan but also by opposition from within the DPJ to his support for the LDP’s pension reform bill. He was replaced on May 18 by the party’s former secretary general, Katsuya Okada, after the likely successor, Ichiro Ozawa, admitted six years of nonpayments into the pension scheme. At the House of Councilors election of July 2004 the DPJ won 50 seats, 1 more than the LDP, for a total of 83 seats, a gain of 24 over its total after the 2001 election. In late August Okada was elected to a two-year term as DPJ president, but the party’s loss of more than one-third of its seats at the September 2005 general election led Okada to resign. His successor, the youthful Seiji MAEHARA, defeated Naoto Kan for the post, but on March 31,

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2006, Maehara also resigned, accepting responsibility for the party’s involvement in false accusations of financial impropriety directed against an LDP official. On April 7 the party’s Diet members chose Ichiro Ozawa over Kan to fill the five-month balance of Maehara’s term. Leaders: Ichiro OZAWA (President), Naoto KAN (Acting President), Tsutomu HATA (Supreme Adviser), Takeaki MATSUMOTO (Chair, Policy Research Committee), Yukio HATOYAMA (Secretary General). Japanese Communist Party—JCP (Nihon Kyosanto). Founded in the 1920s, the JCP traditionally relied on tight discipline to maximize its role in united front operations. Although “Eurocommunist” in outlook prior to the demise of the Soviet Union, the party focused primarily on domestic affairs, with an emphasis on the antinuclear issue. JCP strength in the House of Representatives crested at 39 in 1979 and fell to 15 after the 1993 poll. No longer calling for abolition of the monarchy and immediate nationalization of core industries, the JCP attempted to recast itself as a democratic socialist party without abandoning its name. It had some success in the October 1996 lower house balloting, rising to 26 seats by attracting disaffected left-oriented former supporters of the SDP. It won 15 seats, for a total of 23 (a gain of 9), at the July 1998 upper house election, but won only 20 lower house seats in June 2000 and then fell to 9 in 2003. Its representation in the upper house also dropped to 9 after the July 2004 partial election. The party made no gains at the September 2005 lower house election, at which it claimed 9 block seats. At the party’s 24th Congress, held in January 2006, longtime leader Tetsuzo Fuwa, citing age and health concerns as well as the need to “strengthen young energy” within party ranks, stepped down as chair of the Central Committee, a post that was temporarily left vacant. Leaders: Kazuo SHII (Chair, Executive Committee), Tetsuzo FUWA, Tadayoshi ICHIDA (Head, Secretariat). Social Democratic Party—SDP (Shakai Minshuto). Dating from 1945, the SDP was known until

1991 as the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and then, until 1996, as the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ). The party long appeared to be more radical than its principal rival, the Japanese Communist Party, but a platform adopted in 1966 favored nonalignment, a nonaggression pact among the great powers, and a democratic transition from capitalism to socialism. Since 1983 extreme leftist representation among Diet members has been minimal, and in 1986 the party formally abandoned Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Subsequently, the party’s membership base was eroded by the decision of the pro-JSP Sohyo trade union federation to merge with the recently organized Private Sector Trade Union Confederation (Rengo). A platform revision in 1993 called for abandoning historic socialism, in favor of what its then secretary general termed “a Japanese version of Western democratic socialism”; ending the party’s opposition to Japan’s Self-Defense Forces; dropping objections to the U.S.-Japan Security and South Korean normalization treaties; and accepting nuclear power generation until safer sources of energy are found. The SDPJ’s lower house representation plummeted to 70 members at the balloting of June 1993 (down from 136 in 1990), but the party remained second ranked and the LDP’s overall defeat enabled the SDPJ to participate in the first non-LDP government in four decades. After leaving the new ruling coalition in April 1994, the SDPJ entered a coalition government with the LDP and Shinto Sakigake in June, providing Japan’s first socialist prime minister, Tomiichi Murayama, since 1948. In late 1994, 60 dissident members of the party’s right wing, led by former chair Sadao YAMAHANA, formed a policy group within the SDPJ called the New Democratic Union—NDU (Shin Minshu Rengo). Early in 1995 Yamahana met with key members of three non-Socialist groups—Banri KAIEDA of the Democratic New Party Club (Minshu Shinto Kurabu), Takashi KURIHASHI of the Democratic Reform League, and Tatsuo Kawabata of Shinshinto—to create a new third party, and 24 SDPJ and other MPs subsequently agreed to form the Democratic League–Democratic New Party Club (Minshu Rengo–Minshu Shinto Kurabu).

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However, in the wake of the January 17 Kobe earthquake and, two months later, the Tokyo subway attack, the participants suspended their efforts, with most of them ultimately finding their way to the new DPJ. Of 41 SDPJ seats up for election at the upper house poll of July 23, 1995, only 16 were retained. Weakened in 1996 by the formation of the New Socialist Party (below) as well as the DPJ, the SDP suffered further electoral disaster in October, slumping to only 15 lower house seats. Fearing total domination by the LDP in a further coalition, the SDP opted instead to give qualified external support to a minority LDP government. On May 30, 1998, the SDP announced it would end its loose alliance with the LDP at the end of the June legislative session. At the July upper house election, it recaptured only 5 of 12 contested seats it had previously held, but in June 2000 it increased its lower house membership to 19. Two months earlier, former prime minister Murayama had announced his retirement. At the November 2003 lower house election the SDP won only six seats, which led longtime leader Takako Doi to resign as chair. Her deputy, Mizuho Fukushima, was named to succeed her. At the July 2004 House of Councilors balloting, the SDP won two seats, leaving it with a total of only five. Several months earlier, in February, former party officials Kiyomi TSUJIMOTO and Masako GOTO had received suspended sentences following their conviction on charges relating to diversion of state funds earmarked for staff secretaries. The SDP gained one seat at the September 2005 general election. At its most recent convention, held in February 2006, the party vowed to continue its opposition to Prime Minister Koizumi’s policies and any constitutional change that would weaken the renunciation of war. Leaders: Mizuho FUKUSHIMA (Chair), Tomiichi MURAYAMA and Takako DOI (Honorary Leaders), Seiji MATAICHI (Secretary General). New Party Daichi—NPD (Shinto Daichi). Technically not a political party, the NPD was established on August 18, 2005, by former LDP member Muneo Suzuki, who had been convicted

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of bribery in 2003 but was free on bail. At the September 2005 lower house election Suzuki won a proportional seat and chose to sit as an independent. Leader: Muneo SUZUKI. New Party Nippon—NPN (Shinto Nippon). Formed on August 21, 2005, by Nagano’s governor, Yasuo Tanaka, the NPN attracted four LDP lower house members who opposed postal privatization. The party won one proportional seat in the lower house election of September 2005. It also holds one seat in the House of Councilors. Leaders: Yasuo TANAKA, Koki KOBAYASHI, Makoto TAKI, Hiroyuki ARAI. People’s New Party—PNP (Kokumin Shinto). The PNP was formed on August 17, 2005, under the leadership of former LDP legislator and Hashimoto faction leader Tamisuke Watanuki and others who objected to Prime Minister Koizumi’s plan for postal privatization. Many of the members of the new party had previously belonged to the LDP’s Kamei faction, whose leader, Shizuka Kamei, had argued that the cost of postal reform came at the expense of rural and needy constituents. At the September lower house election the PNP retained four seats (two of them proportional), including Kamei’s. In the House of Representatives its members formed a political group with the NPN member and an independent. In the upper house the PNP’s three members sit with the sole NPN member. Leaders: Tamisuke WATANUKI, Shizuka KAMEI.

Other Parties Liberal League (Jiyu Rengo). The Liberal League was established by physician and antitax campaigner Torao Tokuda in 1995 and subsequently participated with the Second Chamber Club (Ni-In Kurabu) in an upper house parliamentary group that claimed four seats following the July 1998 election. The last Ni-In Kurabu Diet member eventually joined the DPJ, and the Liberal League failed to win any seats at the July 2001 upper house election despite a candidate slate loaded with sports figures and other celebrities. Tokuda,

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who won the party’s sole lower house seat at the June 2000 and November 2003 elections, sat as an independent. The party did not contest either the 2004 upper house or the 2005 lower house election. Leaders: Torao TOKUDA, Ichiji ISHII (Secretary General). New Socialist Party —NSP (Shin Shakaito). The NSP was founded in March 1996 by left-wing elements of the SDP opposed to the latter’s recent espousal of more moderate policies. It called in particular for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Okinawa and for a return to the old electoral system of multimember constituencies. Under the new system, the NSP failed to win a seat in the October lower house election, and it lost its three seats in the upper house in July 1998. In July 1999 the party chair, Tatsukuni KOMORI, led an unofficial delegation of socialists to North Korea in an effort to promote diplomatic ties. Since then, the party has continued to promote dialogue with Pyongyang and to oppose U.S. foreign policy. It strongly objected to the use of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces in Afghanistan and, later, in Iraq. In the most recent lower house elections it has cooperated with the SDP. Leader: Kazumi HARA (2005 lower house candidate). Other recently active minor parties include the Okinawa Masses Socialist Party (Okinawa Shakai Taishuto—Shadaito), which was founded in 1950 and recently held one seat in the House of Councilors (until July 2004). A variety of small right-extremist (uyoku) groups continue to function. Most are intensely nationalist “new wave” formations that espouse a revisionist view of Japan’s imperialist history. Recently active groups on the extreme left include the Trotskyite Japan Revolutionary Communist League (JRCL), which was founded in 1957 but soon split into several factions; the Japan Revolutionary Communist League (Revolutionary Marxist Faction), a JRCL offshoot frequently referred to simply as the Revolutionary Marxists (Kakumaru-ha); and the Workers’ Socialist

League, which was formed in February 1998 by the merger of the Workers’ Party of Japan and the Party Building League. On February 7, 1998, a Revolutionary Workers’ Association claimed responsibility for launching three homemade rockets at Narita Airport, outside Tokyo, to protest plans for building a second runway at the facility.

Legislature The bicameral Diet (Kokkai) is composed of an upper chamber (House of Councilors) and a lower chamber (House of Representatives). Real power resides in the lower chamber, although amendments to the constitution require two-thirds majorities in both houses. Both houses vote for prime minister, but the lower house results prevail in the absence of a consensus. House of Councilors (Sangiin). The upper chamber, which replaced the prewar House of Peers, is renewed by halves every three years, each member serving a six-year term. The chamber cannot be dissolved. An October 2000 electoral law reduced the membership from 252 to 247 effective from the July 2001 election, and another 5 seats were eliminated in 2004. At the July 11, 2004, balloting, 48 members were elected from the nation at large and 73 from 47 prefectural districts returning from 1 to 4 members (per replenishment). Following the election, the Liberal Democratic Party held 114 seats (49 newly won); Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and Shin-Ryokufukai, 83 (50); New Komeito, 24 (11); Japanese Communist Party, 9 (4); Social Democratic Party, 5 (2); independents, 7 (5). Later in July one independent joined the DPJ and Shin-Ryokufukai chamber group. In the aftermath of the August 2005 upper house defeat of postal reform legislation, a small number of councilors changed their affiliations. Two new parties, the New Party Nippon and the People’s New Party, attracted 1 and 3 members, respectively. President: Chikage OGI. House of Representatives (Shugiin). An electoral reform bill adopted in 2000 specified that at the next election the existing 500-seat lower

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Cabinet As of August 1, 2006 (see headnote) Prime Minister

Junichiro Koizumi

Ministers Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Economy, Trade, and Industry Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology Environment, and Minister in Charge of Global Environmental Problems Finance Foreign Affairs Health, Labor, and Welfare Internal Affairs and Communications Justice Land, Infrastructure, and Transport

Shoichi Nakagawa Toshihiro Nikai Kenji Kosaka Yuriko Koike [f] Sadakazu Tanigaki Taro Aso Jiro Kawasaki Heizo Takenaka Seiken Sugiura Kazuo Kitagawa (New Komeito)

State Ministers Administrative Reform, Regulatory Reform, Special Zones for Structural Reform, Regional Revitalization Defense Disaster Management, National Emergency Legislation Economic and Fiscal Policy, and Financial Services Gender Equality and Social Affairs Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs Privatization of the Postal Service Science and Technology Policy, Food Safety, Information Technology Chief Cabinet Secretary Chair, National Public Safety Commission

Kouki Chuma Fukushiro Nukaga Tetsuo Kutsukake Kaoru Yosano Kuniko Inoguchi [f] Yuriko Koike [f] Heizo Takenaka Iwao Matsuda Shinzo Abe Tetsuo Kutsukake

[f] = female Note: Except as noted, all cabinet members belong to the Liberal Democratic Party.

chamber would be reduced to 480 seats, of which 300 would be filled from single-member electoral districts by simple majority voting and 180 by proportional representation applied in 11 electoral blocks returning from 6 to 30 members. The term of office is four years. The election of September 11, 2005, produced the following results (block seats in parentheses): Liberal Democratic Party, 296 (77); Democratic Party of Japan, 113 (61); New Komeito, 31 (23); Japanese Communist Party, 9 (9); Social

Democratic Party, 7 (6); People’s New Party, 4 (2); New Party Daichi, 1 (1); New Party Nippon, 1 (1); independents, 18. Speaker: Yohei KONO.

Communications News media are privately owned and are free from government control.

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Press The Japanese press exerts a strong influence on public policy. The large newspapers publish numerous main editions a day as well as subeditions, and per capita circulation figures are among the highest in the world. The following three dailies, all of which publish in Tokyo, Osaka, and several other locations, constitute the “big three” national newspapers: Yomiuri Shimbun (10,200,000 morning, 4,300,000 evening), independent; Asahi Shimbun (8,320,000 morning, 4,070,000 evening), independent; Mainichi Shimbun (3,980,000 morning, 1,710,000 evening), independent. Other prominent dailies include Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Tokyo and elsewhere, 3,000,000 morning, 1,700,000 evening), leading economic journal; Chunichi Shimbun (Nagoya, 2,700,000 morning, 750,000 evening), independent; Sankei Shimbun (Tokyo and Osaka, 2,000,000 morning, 900,000 evening), independent; Nishi Nippon Shimbun (Fukuoka, 830,000 morning, 190,000 evening), independent; Shizuoka Shimbun (Shizuoka, 730,000 morning, 730,000 evening); Tokyo Shimbun (Tokyo, 660,000 morning, 350,000 evening).

News Agencies The leading domestic agencies are the Jiji Press, the Kyodo News Service, and Radiopress. In addition, many foreign agencies maintain offices in Tokyo and other leading cities.

Broadcasting and Computing There are two separate radio and television broadcasting systems. The Japan Broadcasting

Corporation (Nippon Hoso Kyokai—NHK), a public entity operating three nationwide radio networks (one each for general, educational, and FM stereophonic programs) and two nationwide television networks (one general, the other educational) as well as digital services, is financed by subscription fees provided for under the Japanese Broadcasting Law. This system supplies over 6,000 stations, which reach approximately 99 percent of the population. In addition, there are nearly 200 independent members of the National Association of Commercial Broadcasters in Japan, who operate over 650 radio and 8,300 television stations financed solely through advertising revenues. Multiple ownership of the 100 radio and 125 TV broadcasting companies by a single concern is prohibited. There were approximately 95.1 million television receivers and 48.7 million personal computers serving 60.0 million Internet users in 2003.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. Ryozo KATO U.S. Ambassador to Japan John T. SCHIEFFER Permanent Representative to the UN Kenzo OSHIMA IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, AfDB, APEC, BIS, CP, EBRD, G-10, G-7/G8, IADB, IEA, Interpol, IOM, OECD, PCA, WCO, WTO

K A Z A K H S TA N REPUBLIC

OF

KAZAKHSTAN

Qazaqstan Respublikasy

See the note at the end of this entry for information on current events.

The Country The second largest of the former Soviet republics in area and the fourth largest (after Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan) in population, Kazakhstan consists largely of a vast flatland, much of it desert, extending nearly 2,000 miles from the Altai Mountains in the east to the Caspian Sea in the west. It is bordered by Russian Siberia on the north, China on the east, and the republics of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan on the south. Its people are about 52 percent Turkic-speaking Kazakhs and 31 percent Russians, down from over 42 percent in 1960. Relations between the dominant Kazakhs and the country’s large ethnic Russian population deteriorated after independence, new citizenship and language laws being viewed by the latter as discriminatory. As a result, over 1.5 million ethnic Russians emigrated. Three-fifths of Kazakhstan’s preindependence German population of 946,000 likewise left the country, as did a large number of ethnic Ukrainians. Slightly less than half the current population is Sunni Muslim, with most of the rest being Russian Orthodox. Women constitute about 47 percent of the labor force. Prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan’s northern tier of “virgin lands” produced most of the USSR’s cattle and wool and a substantial amount of its wheat. Wheat, wool, and meat continue to be exported, with the agricultural sec-

tor currently contributing about 8 percent of GDP and employing about one-third of the labor force. Industry, which accounts for about 39 percent of GDP, is concentrated in hydrocarbon and mineral extraction, the most important sectoral exports being oil and gas, copper and other metals, and chemicals. The country’s deposits of aluminum, barite, chromium, copper, iron, lead, magnesium,

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manganese, silver, tungsten, uranium, and zinc rank among the world’s largest; other extractable resources include coal, iron ore, gold, and titanium. Development of the vast Kazakh petroleum deposits, including those under the Caspian Sea, has attracted significant foreign investment. Russia, China, and Italy are leading trading partners. As with the other former Soviet republics in Central Asia, Kazakhstan experienced a sharp economic reversal following independence: for 1990 to 1995 the World Bank calculated an average annual GDP contraction of more than 10 percent. In 1993 inflation peaked at over 2,100 percent. With assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other multilateral agencies, Kazakhstan undertook a major restructuring program that has seen, for example, majority shares in most state enterprises sold and virtually all state and collective farms placed in the hands of cooperatives, associations, or individual farmers. In 1996 the economy registered its first, marginal expansion since independence, and in 1997 GDP growth rose to 1.7 percent. In 1998, however, the economy was beset by a series of adverse factors, including plummeting world prices for oil and metals, a Russian financial crisis, and a severe drought, resulting in a recession that persisted far into 1999. GDP fell by 1.9 percent in 1998 and continued to drop in the first nine months of 1999 before experiencing a sharp turnaround that resulted in growth of 2.7 percent for the year as a whole. Since then, growth has been explosive, thanks primarily to the petroleum sector. GDP expansion exceeded 13 percent in 2001 and more than 9 percent annually in 2002–2005, overcoming an annual inflation rate of nearly 7 percent. Additional oil and gas discoveries in 2001 and 2002 supported predictions that Kazakhstan could become one of the world’s leading energy suppliers within ten years. In late 2001 a new oil pipeline linking Kazakhstan’s largest onshore field, Tengiz, to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk opened, while construction began in 2004 on a $700 million pipeline to China. The government expected to complete negotiations in 2006 on use of another route, through Azerbaijan and Georgia to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean Sea.

Meanwhile, a multinational consortium has begun development of the massive Kashagan field in the Caspian—the world’s largest petroleum discovery in the last 30 years—and other offshore areas. Participants in the Kashagan project, Agip KCO, include Royal Dutch/Shell, ExxonMobil, Conoco Phillips, France’s Total, Italy’s ENI, Japan’s Inpex, and Kazakhstan’s KazMunaiGaz.

Government and Politics Political Background The Kazakh lands were controlled by Russia from 1730 to 1840 and, after a brief attempt at independence in 1917, became an autonomous Russian republic in 1920 and a full union republic within the USSR in 1936. Its leaders long acted in close concert with Moscow, and its current president had been viewed as a possible contender for the presidency of the Soviet Union. Thus, the Kazakh Republic approached secession from the USSR cautiously, issuing a declaration of state sovereignty only in October 1991 and withholding a declaration of independence until December 16. In June 1989 Nursultan Abishevich NAZARBAYEV, chair of the Kazakhstan Council of Ministers, had been named first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party. On February 22, 1990, Nazarbayev was elected to succeed K. U. MEDEUBEKOV as chair of the Supreme Soviet (head of state), a post to which he was reelected on April 24 following a legislative replenishment. In late 1991 the Communist Party was renamed the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, with Nazarbayev stepping down as its leader prior to being popularly elected president of the republic on December 1 and appointing a government headed by Sergei TERESHCHENKO. In early 1993 Nazarbayev became the acknowledged but unofficial leader of the new People’s Union of Kazakhstan Unity (Soyuz Narodnoye Edinstvo Kazakhstana— SNEK), which on March 7, 1994, won a plurality of 33 directly elective seats in the 177-seat Supreme Council (Kenges). Some 220 prospective candidates, many assumed to be opponents

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Political Status: Entered the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic as autonomous republic on August 26, 1920; became constituent republic of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) on December 5, 1936; declared independence on December 16, 1991; current constitution approved by referendum of August 30, 1995, effective from September 6. Area: 1,049,155 sq. mi. (2,717,300 sq. km.). Population: 14,953,100 (1999C); 15,136,000 (2005E). Emigration of ethnic Russians, Germans, and Ukrainians after independence, coupled with a declining birth rate (the lowest in Central Asia), has resulted in a net decrease from the 1989 total of 16,536,511. Major Urban Centers (2005E): ASTANA (formerly Tselinograd and then Akmola, 333,000), Almaty (formerly Alma-Ata, 1,159,000). Formal transfer of the government from the former capital, Almaty, to Astana occurred on June 10, 1998. Official Language: Kazakh (replaced Russian in 1989); confirmed as official language in 1995 constitution, which also accords Russian special

of the president, had been denied participation in the election, the conduct of which drew much international criticism. The alignment of the Kenges thereafter depended on the “state list” and independent deputies (together, about 100), who were broadly pro-Nazarbayev, although in several instances in 1994 the legislature asserted its independence. Following a major cabinet reshuffle in June, Tereshchenko was replaced as prime minister by Akezhan KAZHEGELDIN in October, amid presidential reproaches about the slow pace of economic reform. A major political crisis erupted on March 6, 1995, when the Constitutional Court invalidated the 1994 poll because of numerous irregularities. The Kenges responded on March 11 by adopting a constitutional amendment enabling the legislature to overrule the court, but the latter refused to accept the action as lawful. The president appeared to back down by accepting the resignation of the Kazhegeldin government, dissolving the Kenges,

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status as “the social language between peoples” while specifying that government officials are required to be proficient in Kazakh by the year 2010. Monetary Unit: Tenge (official rate July 1, 2006: 118.45 tenge = $1US). President: Nursultan Abishevich NAZARBAYEV; elected by the Supreme Soviet as its chair on February 22, 1990, succeeding K. U. MEDEUBEKOV (Communist Party of Kazakhstan); reelected on April 24; sworn in to newly created post of president on December 10, 1991, following popular election on December 1; confirmed in office until 2000 by referendum on April 29, 1995; elected for a seven-year term on January 10, 1999; reelected on December 4, 2005, and sworn in on January 11, 2006. Prime Minister: Daniyal AKHMETOV; nominated by the president and confirmed by Parliament on June 13, 2003, to succeed Imangali TASMAGAMBETOV, who had resigned on June 11; renominated following presidential election of December 4, 2005, and reconfirmed by Parliament on January 18, 2006.

and announcing a new election, which a substantial majority of deputies opposed. He then recaptured the initiative by calling an April 29 referendum at which he obtained a 95 percent mandate for the extension of his presidential term to December 2000. In a further referendum on August 30, the president was credited with securing 89 percent support for a new constitution strengthening the powers of the presidency. The turnout was officially given as 90 percent despite a boycott by the main opposition parties, which estimated turnout at under 50 percent. Ruling by decree, President Nazarbayev dismissed the Constitutional Court in October 1995 and introduced a new government structure that enlarged his personal staff and pared down the number of ministries and state committees. Elections to the two legislative chambers created under the new constitution were held in early December, followed by runoff balloting. The January 1996 opening of the legislature, in which SNEK and its allies

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remained dominant, marked the end of rule by presidential decree. On October 10, 1997, President Nazarbayev announced the resignation of Prime Minister Kazhegeldin and appointed Nurlan BALGIMBAYEV, head of the state oil company, as the new prime minister. The cabinet announced several days later retained a number of incumbents in key posts, although several senior members were replaced in a reshuffle announced on February 20, 1998. Adoption of constitutional amendments by a joint session of Parliament on October 7, 1998 (see Constitution and government, below), was followed on January 10, 1999, by a premature presidential election at which the incumbent received 79.8 percent of the votes cast. His closest competitor, Serikbolsyn ABDILDIN of the Communist Party, won 11.7 percent. Several potential candidates, including former prime minister Kazhegeldin, had been ruled ineligible for violating a law against participation in meetings of unregistered organizations. As required by the constitution, the Balgimbayev cabinet resigned following the election, with Balgimbayev then being reconfirmed as prime minister on January 21 and introducing a revamped cabinet the following day. On July 7, 1999, President Nazarbayev announced that elections for the Senate and the Assembly would be conducted in September and October, respectively. The recently formed presidential party, Fatherland (Otan), which in March had absorbed the Party of People’s Unity (successor to the SNEK), emerged from the Assembly elections of October 10 and 24 holding a plurality of 23 seats, with the progovernment Civic Party of Kazakhstan claiming 13 and independents (many of them progovernment), 22. The opposition was led by the current Communist Party (Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Kazakhstana—KPK), which won only 3 seats in the expanded 77-seat body. As with the January presidential election, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) refused to validate the results, citing campaign irregularities. On October 12, 1999, Kasymzhomart TOKAYEV, the foreign minister in the Balgimbayev cab-

inet, was formally nominated as prime minister by the president and confirmed by Parliament, replacing Balgimbayev, who had resigned on October 1 to return to his previous post as head of the state oil monopoly. A revamped cabinet, including new ministers of defense, industry, and economy as well as foreign affairs, was appointed by President Nazarbayev October 12–14. The cabinet and a number of government agencies were again reorganized in several steps during December 2000. In September 2001 former prime minister Kazhegeldin was sentenced, in absentia, to ten years in prison for abuse of power and bribery. Prime Minister Tokayev resigned on January 28, 2002, citing the need for “new ideas” in government. He was succeeded by Imangali TASMAGAMBETOV, previously a deputy prime minister, who announced a reshuffled cabinet on January 29. Expressing concerns about a lack of democratic progress, a number of government officials participated in the launching of the moderate Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (Demokraticheskii Vybor Kazakhstana—DVK) movement in November 2001, provoking their dismissal. In the following year two prominent DVK founders— Galymzhan ZHAKIYANOV, who had been fired as governor of the northern Pavlodar region, and Mukhtar ABLYAZOV, a former minister of economy and trade—were sentenced to jail terms for having abused their former offices. (Ablyazov received a presidential pardon in April 2003 and retired from politics; Zhakiyanov, was not paroled until January 2006.) Prime Minister Tasmagambetov resigned on June 11, 2003, accusing the lower house of “crude violations of voting procedure” during a May 19 confidence vote that his government had won. The prime minister had requested the vote after legislators introduced major amendments to the government’s proposed land privatization code. Tasmagambetov, who refused “to continue to cover the whole thing up,” was succeeded on June 13, 2003, by Daniyal AKHMETOV, former governor of Pavlodar region. Akhmetov’s initial cabinet lineup included only four ministerial changes from his predecessor’s. A revised land code was

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passed by both houses of Parliament at the end of the month. Meanwhile, under the terms of a restrictive political party law that had come into force in July 2002, several opposition parties had been officially “liquidated.” Others had decided not to seek reregistration, while the Ministry of Justice had used the law’s technical provisions to block the registration of new opposition groups. Thus, only 12 parties were eligible to contest the September 19–October 3, 2004, Assembly election, at which the propresidential Otan won a commanding 42 of 77 seats. The only opposition seat was won by the Democratic Party of Kazakhstan “White Road” (Ak Zhol), a DVK splinter. Otan also dominated the Senate replenishment of August 19, 2005. Of some two dozen prospective presidential candidates, five made it onto the ballot of December 4, 2005. President Nazarbayev won 91.1 percent of the vote, while the principal opposition candidate, former Assembly speaker Zharmakhan TUYAKBAI, collected only 6.6 percent. Having been sworn in for another term on January 11, 2006, Nazarbayev reappointed Prime Minister Akhmetov to head a revamped cabinet, which was confirmed by a joint session of Parliament on January 18.

Constitution and Government The constitution approved by referendum on August 30, 1995, was independent Kazakhstan’s third in less than four years, a Soviet-era text having been replaced in January 1993 by a post-Soviet version that was eventually found wanting by President Nazarbayev. As originally adopted, the 1995 constitution provided for a strong executive president, popularly elected for a five-year term, with powers to appoint the prime minister (subject to parliamentary confirmation) and to dissolve the bicameral legislature. Parliament is empowered to remove the president, for treason or medical incapacity, by a three-fourths vote of a joint session. Amendments passed by Parliament on October 7, 1998, increased the presidential term to seven years and removed both a two-term limit and a maximum age restriction (65) for election to the office. In addition, the term of the Senate was increased

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from four years to six, with partial replenishment every three years, while the term of the Assembly was increased from four years to five. Effective with the 1999 election, Assembly membership expanded from 67 to 77, the 10 additional members being selected on a party list basis from among those organizations receiving at least 7 percent of the vote. The constitution guarantees private property and permits private ownership of land (although a 2003 land reform bill generated considerable controversy) while retaining state control of water and other natural resources. It also provides for a Constitutional Council as the highest legal body, its members being appointed jointly by the chairs of the legislative houses and the president. The latter may veto council decisions. A Supreme Court is the highest judicial body for criminal, civil, and other cases originating in the courts of general jurisdiction. Kazakhstan encompasses a total of 16 “administrative-territorial units”: 14 regions (oblystar), the capital, and Almaty, each governed by an elected council (maslikhat) and an executive body, the latter headed by a governor (akim) appointed by the president on the recommendation of the prime minister. Councils and executive bodies also function at lower administrative levels. The city of Baykonur (formerly Leninsk), which borders the Russian-run Baykonur space center, is under Russian administration.

Foreign Relations Kazakhstan became a sovereign member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) on December 21, 1991. By early 1992 it had established diplomatic relations with a number of foreign countries, including the United States. On March 2 it was admitted to the United Nations, and it joined the IMF and World Bank in July. It also joined the Conference on (later Organization for) Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE) and in May 1994 became a signatory of the NATO Partnership for Peace program. In January 1995 Kazakhstan signed a partnership and cooperation accord with the European Union, and

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the following December it joined the Organization of the Islamic Conference. In the early 1990s disarmament became a leading foreign policy issue. While the government pledged itself to nonnuclear defense at independence, it subsequently stated that it would wait for equivalent action by Russia and the other two nuclear-endowed CIS republics, Belarus and Ukraine. During a 1992 Washington visit, however, President Nazarbayev indicated that Kazakhstan was prepared to accede to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and agreed to sign a revised version of the strategic nuclear arms reduction treaty (START) initially concluded by U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in July 1991. Both actions were formalized during a visit by U.S. Vice President Al Gore in December 1993. Thereafter, the United States provided technical and financial aid, including funds for dismantling nuclear weapons. On May 24, 1995, the Kazakh foreign ministry announced that all the country’s nuclear weapons had been transferred to Russia or destroyed. Regionally, Kazakhstan and Russia have remained close allies. In January 1995 they concluded an agreement providing for “unification” of their armed forces, while ongoing talks about greater economic integration led in March 1996 to the establishment of a CIS Customs Union with Belarus and Kyrgyzstan. (In 1998 Tajikistan agreed to become the fifth member.) Meeting in Moscow on July 6, 1998, Nazarbayev and Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a number of accords, including the first of several bilateral agreements concerning Caspian sea boundaries and development, thereby clearing the way for exploitation of underlying oil reserves. In 2001 Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan concluded a related agreement, which, like the Kazakh-Russian accords, was harshly attacked by another littoral state, Iran. In April 2002 the leaders of the five littoral countries, including Turkmenistan, held an inconclusive meeting in an effort to resolve their differences over Caspian rights. No significant progress was made in the following four years, even though representatives of the five had held 20 working sessions as of March 2006.

On January 10, 1994, an economic union with Uzbekistan was announced; six days later Kyrgyzstan joined the grouping, effective from February 1. In July the scope of the new Central Asian Economic Union was extended to include cooperation in defense, foreign policy, and social affairs. In March 1998 Tajikistan agreed to join the union, which four months later adopted the name Central Asian Economic Community. Subsequently renamed the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO), it welcomed Russia as the fifth member in October 2004. A year later, the CACO agreed to merge with the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), which also includes Belarus, in furtherance of creating a single regional economic zone. In April 1996 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan undertook jointly with China to oppose separatist, terrorist, and Islamic fundamentalist activities in Central Asia. Beijing’s main interest was to ensure the isolation of the Muslim Uighur minority in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, bordering Kazakhstan, but the rise of militant Islamic groups throughout Central Asia had become a major concern among the “Shanghai Five” states (so called from the site of their 1994 initial gathering). Meeting in Moscow in April 1997, President Nazarbayev and his four counterparts signed a treaty on improved border security. In a related development, in July 1998 visiting Chinese President Jiang Zemin and the Kazakh president signed an accord that “finally and irreversibly” settled disagreements over the 1,200mile-long Sino-Kazakh border. In May 2000 working groups from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan began demarcating their mutual border, a process that continued into 2006. In August 1999 Kazakhstan joined Russia and Uzbekistan in offering Kyrgyzstan military assistance to resolve a hostage crisis caused by ethnic Uzbek Islamists in southern Kyrgyzstan. With the continuing conflict in Afghanistan as a backdrop, the defense ministers of the Shanghai Five group, meeting in Astana in March 2000, pledged their cooperation against terrorism. Similarly, a regional summit in April 2000 saw Nazarbayev join the presidents of Kyrgyzstan,

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Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in signing a mutual security agreement to combat terrorism, extremism, and other threats. In May 2001 Kazakhstan and the other members of the CIS Collective Security Treaty (Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan) authorized formation of a joint rapid reaction force, and in April 2003 the six formed the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Two years earlier, Uzbekistan had joined the Shanghai Five in establishing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The country’s global profile was heightened by its support for the U.S.-led “war on terrorism” and the October 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, which elevated several Central Asian republics to the status of Washington’s “newest strategic partners.” Among other things, Kazakhstan granted overflight permission to U.S. planes, which were also permitted to use Kazakh airfields for refueling and emergency landings. Sixteen members of a new Conference on Cooperation and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia met in September 1999 in Almaty and signed a declaration of principles regarding mutual relations. Modeled on the OSCE, the organization was first proposed by President Nazarbayev at a UN General Assembly session in 1992. Now numbering 17 members, the conference met in Almaty in October 2004, at which time the foreign ministers adopted procedural rules that called for the group’s heads of state and government to convene every four years. Kazakhstan has also participated in the regional Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and in recent conferences of Turkic-speaking states.

Current Issues In March 2003 a U.S. oil consultant and Nazarbayev associate, James Giffen, was indicted in the United States for offering some $84 million in bribes to Kazakh officials, including President Nazarbayev and former prime minister Balgimbayev. Dubbed “Kazakhgate,” the scandal took on an added dimension when government correspondence with U.S. officials suggested that U.S. access to Kazakhstan’s natural resources would

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be advanced if the Giffen prosecution were to be dropped. It wasn’t, and Giffen’s trial for violating the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was expected to begin in 2006. Kazakhgate was one of the issues that Zharmakhan Tuyakbai tried to use to gain ground against President Nazarbayev in the December 2005 presidential election, but the outcome was predetermined. Although Tuyakbai had the support of the For Fair Kazakhstan movement, which had been formed in March to unite the opposition, he and the other three candidates— Alikhan BAIMENOV of Ak Zhol, Communist Yerasyl ABYLKASYMOV, and environmental advocate Mels YELEUSIZOV—were handicapped by Nazarbayev’s domination of the media, restrictions on campaigning and freedom of expression, physical intimidation, and interference at polling stations. Not unexpectedly, a report by OSCE monitors termed the election “flawed.” President Nazarbayev has continued to speak of the need to democratize government, although he has cautioned that instituting such changes must be gradual, given that Kazakhstan has no history or tradition of democratic procedures. In March 2006 he assigned a new state commission to develop a program of democratic reforms and to promote a national dialogue on changes to the political system. An earlier commission on democratization and civil society, established in November 2004, had considered such changes as decentralizing local government, electing district-level executives, granting additional supervisory powers to an expanded Assembly, and passing a new media law. The government’s most vocal opponents have expressed little confidence in Nazarbayev’s version of democratization. Some cite the increasingly central political role being played by Nazarbayev’s eldest daughter, Dariga NAZARBAYEVA, whom some observers view as his heir-apparent. More dramatically, on February 13, 2006, former ambassador Altynbek SARSENBAYEV, an outspoken critic of the government and of Nazarbayeva, was found shot dead. A week later, members of the antiterrorism unit of the national intelligence agency (the KNB, successor to the Soviet-era

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KGB) were arrested in connection with the murder, and on February 22 the heads of the KNB and the antiterrorism unit resigned. Sarsenbayev’s apparent execution had been preceded in mid-November 2005 by the death of Zamanbek NURKADILOV, a former minister of emergency situations who had joined the opposition. Officials initially ruled Nurkadilov’s death a suicide, despite evidence of multiple gunshot wounds. President Nazarbayev has set his sights on Kazakhstan’s becoming, in 2009, the first Central Asian state to chair the OSCE. Acceptance of Kazakhstan’s application depends, however, on Nazarbayev’s convincing the European Union and others that Kazakhstan has made sufficient progress toward meeting democratic and human rights standards. In its favor, Kazakhstan has achieved a growing international presence as, in the words of U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, “a good friend and a key strategic partner in many areas.” Cheney’s comment came during a May 6–7, 2006, visit to Astana, during which he offered thanks for Kazakh assistance in the “the global fight against terrorism” and in Afghanistan and Iraq. (Kazakhstan has stationed about 30 military personnel in Iraq, engaged in mine-clearing and improving delivery of drinking water to the civilian population.) Cheney also met with several opposition leaders, including Tuyakbai. No one failed to notice, however, that the timing of the vice president’s visit coincided with escalating oil prices, heightened concern over the stability of Middle Eastern suppliers, Russian efforts to continue dominating the flow of oil from Central Asia, and China’s increasing thirst for oil. The Christian Science Monitor remarked, “Cheney’s trip was mainly a defensive move, like a queen on a chessboard, in a 21st-century version of the old ‘great game’ of big powers vying to control the heart of Eurasia.”

Political Parties In September 1991 the ruling Communist Party of Kazakhstan (KPK) renamed itself the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan (Sotsialisticheskaya Partiya Kazakhstana—SPK) and adopted a platform of po-

litical pluralism and cautious economic reform. President Nazarbayev, the former KPK leader, withdrew from the SPK before his reelection in December 1991, and the party subsequently declined in importance. Nazarbayev was later associated with the Party of People’s Unity of Kazakhstan (PPU), which was generally regarded as a “presidential” party prior to its 1999 merger with the newly established Otan. The Kazakhstan Democratic Party “Citizen” (“Azamat”) was launched in April 1996 as an opposition movement aspiring to a government “of honest and competent people.” Azamat, which did not register as a party until June 1999, was the first opposition grouping to feature eminent public figures in its leadership, including former government official and SPK chair Petr SVOIK. In February 1998 the current KPK, the SPK, Azamat, the nationalist Azat movement, and a number of other opposition groups formed a People’s Front of Kazakhstan that suspended its activities ten months later, in the midst of the presidential campaign. By then, another movement, For Fair Elections, had been formed by Azamat, the KPK, and the Green Party (see Tabiyghat, below), among others. In mid-October a number of For Fair Elections leaders were arrested for participating in meetings of the unregistered movement, which ultimately led to their disqualification from presidential candidacy. In July 1999 the KPK, the recently formed Republican People’s Party of Kazakhstan (RNPK; see under Alga!, below) of former prime minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, and three public movements formed an opposition bloc, Respublika, to contest the October 1999 Assembly election on a platform that included abolition of the strong presidency and its replacement with a parliamentary system. Following the election, the KPK, RNPK, Azamat, Green Party, and various public associations formed an oppositionist Forum of Democratic Forces of Kazakhstan (Forum Demokraticheskikh Sil Kazakhstana—FDSK), which demanded that authorities invalidate the results for both parliamentary houses. Launched in November 2001 as a movement, the Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan (DVK; see

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Alga!) brought together members of the opposition from a number of parties and movements— among them, the KPK, RNPK, and FDSK—and a number of government officials concerned over the slow pace of democratization. As a consequence of their involvement, the government officials were quickly dismissed. In another attempt to consolidate opposition forces, in December 2001 leaders of the RNPK, Azamat, and the Kazakhstan People’s Congress (Narodnyi Kongress Kazakhstana—NKK; see under Alga!) announced that they were forming a United Democratic Party (UDP), but the UDP failed to cohere and was never registered. Generating further criticism for its autocratic approach in dealing with political opponents, the government adopted a new Law of Political Parties in June 2002 that required a party to have 50,000 members, representing all regions, in order to obtain legal standing (the previous threshold had been 3,000 members). The new legislation also prohibited parties based on religion, ethnicity, or gender, and authorized the government to abolish any that did not register within two months of formation, failed to contest two consecutive elections, or failed to obtain 3 percent of the vote at an election. Opposition leaders argued that the new regulations would eliminate many parties and leave progovernment groups with even greater power. In response to the legislation, a number of opposition formations, including Azamat, the NKK, and the RNPK, refused to reregister and were therefore “compulsorily liquidated.” Several others were denied registration, ostensibly for failing to meet technical provisions of the new law. A total of 12 parties were registered in time to contest the September–October 2004 legislative election, but only 4 met the 7 percent threshold needed to qualify for any of 10 proportional seats. Following the election, the KPK, DVK, and the Democratic Party of Kazakhstan “White Road” (“Ak Zhol”) announced formation of an opposition Coordinating Council of Democratic Forces. Subsequently, in March 2005, most of the opposition parties established a Bloc of Democratic Forces “For Fair Kazakhstan” under former Assembly

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speaker and Otan member Zharmakhan Tuyakbai, who was designated as the bloc’s 2006 presidential contender. In September 2005 Otan, Asar, the Agrarian Party (APK), the Civic Party (GPK), the Democratic Party (see Adilet), and Rukhaniyat (all below) formed the propresidential People’s Coalition of Kazakhstan in support of President Nazarbayev’s reelection. Headed by Dariga Nazarbayeva of Asar, the coalition announced formation of a Democratic Union on December 6, 2005, two days after Nazarbayev’s reelection.

Democratic Union Parties Republican Political Party “Fatherland” (“Otan”). On January 10, 1999, former prime minister Sergei Tereshchenko, head of the reelection campaign for President Nazarbayev, announced that he planned to form Otan, which would adhere to “democratic and parliamentarian principles” while advancing the candidacy of Nazarbayev for reelection in 2006. Otan was officially launched at a founding congress on March 1, with Tereshchenko being named acting chair when Nazarbayev declined the leadership on constitutional grounds. Merging into Otan were the Party of People’s Unity of Kazakhstan (PPU), the Kazakhstan Liberal Movement, the Democratic Party of Kazakhstan, and the For Kazakhstan–2030 Movement. Beginning in February 1993 as a sociopolitical movement called the Union of People’s Unity or the People’s Union of Kazakhstan Unity (Soyuz Narodnoye Edinstvo Kazakhstana—SNEK), the PPU later emerged as a progovernment political party. With its leadership composed primarily of officials who had been associated with the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, it inherited much of the organization of the former ruling party. It advocated gradual economic reform and political pluralism. It also sought to serve as a bridge between the country’s ethnic groups while opposing dual citizenship and language rights for ethnic Russians. Registered for the March 1994 legislative balloting, the PPU won a small plurality, amid claims of fraud. It remained

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the dominant party as the result of legislative balloting in 1995 and 1996 and supported Nazarbayev’s reelection in 1999. Otan emerged from the 1999 lower house election as the plurality party, with 23 seats. In September 2002 the People’s Cooperative Party of Kazakhstan, which had been formed in 1994 as a pro-Nazarbayev formation with a predominantly rural base, merged with Otan; it had won 1 Assembly seat in 1999. The Republican Political Labor Party, which had been established in 1995, also merged with Otan in 2002. At the 2004 Assembly election Otan won a majority, achieving 61 percent of the party list vote and taking 42 of the 77 seats. Shortly thereafter, however, the speaker of the Assembly, Zharmakhan Tuyakbai, described the election as a “disgraceful farce” in which voters’ rights were violated. He then resigned from Otan. Leaders: Bakhytzhar ZHUMAGULOV (Acting Chair), Amangeldy YERMEGIYAYEV (Deputy Chair). Republican Party “All Together” (“Asar”). Originating as an outgrowth of the Asar social movement, the Asar party was established in September 2003 by Dariga Nazarbayeva, the president’s eldest daughter and a prominent figure in the country’s mass media industry. Officially registered in December, Asar had reportedly grown to be Kazakhstan’s second-largest party (after Otan) by the time of the September–October 2004 Assembly election, at which it won 11 percent of the party list vote and four seats. Among those joining the party was Raushan Sarsembayeva, president of the Association of Businesswomen of Kazakhstan and former leader of the National Democratic Party “People’s Wisdom” (“Yel Dana”). Yel Dana has begun in 1999 as the Democratic Party of Women of Kyrgyzstan, which was not allowed to seek registration under the 2002 party law without changing its name and opening its membership to men. Yel Dana was denied registration because of what Sarsembayeva characterized as “minor” technical irregularities.

Many observers have viewed the founding of Asar as Nazarbayeva’s first step in an effort to position herself as her father’s successor. Leaders: Dariga NAZARBAYEVA (Chair), Mukhtar ALIYEV, Raushan SARSEMBAYEVA. Agrarian Party of Kazakhstan (APK). The progovernment APK held its founding congress on January 6, 1999, at the capital, pledging support for farmers and private land ownership. It won one district seat in the October 1999 Assembly election and captured two more on the basis of a 12.6 percent party list vote share. In June 2004 the APK and the Civic Party (below) announced formation of the Bloc of the Agrarian and Civic Parties “Agrarian Industrial Workers Union” (AIWU) to contest the upcoming Assembly election. At the balloting the AIWU won 11 seats, second to Otan, but only 7 percent of the party list vote. Leaders: Romin MADINOV (Chair), Vladimir CHALYSHEV (Deputy Chair). Civic Party of Kazakhstan (Grazhdanskaya Partiya Kazakhstana—GPK). The progovernment GPK was formed in November 1998 at the initiative of entrepreneurs in mining and heavy industry. It emerged from the October 1999 election with 11.2 percent of the party list vote and a total of 13 seats, second only to Otan among the competing parties. In September it had denied an accusation by Azamat that it had received foreign funding. For the 2004 Assembly election the GPK participated with the Agrarian Party in the progovernment AIWU bloc. Leaders: Azat PERUASHEV (First Secretary), Aleksandr MASHKEVICH, Rakhmet MUKASHEV. Justice Party (Adilet Party). Adilet began as the Democratic Party of Kazakhstan (DPK), which was registered in June 2004. Led by Maksut Narikbayev, long a champion of legal reform and head of the “For Legal Kazakhstan” movement, the centrist party won one constituency seat at the 2004 Assembly election but less than 1 percent of the party list vote. An April 2006 party conference

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decided to adopt its current name to better reflect the party’s focus on political, legal, and legislative concerns. Leaders: Bakhytbek AKHMETZHAN, Zeynulla ALSHIMBAYEV, Maksut NARIKBAYEV, Yerkin ONGARBAYEV, Tolegen SYDYKOV (Cochairs). Spirituality (Rukhaniyat). Rukhaniyat was registered in October 2003 under the leadership of writer Altynshash Dzhaganova, head of Kazakhstan’s Migration and Demographics Agency. In 1995 she had founded the Revival of Kazakhstan Party, which the Ministry of Justice refused to register in April 2003. As a result, Dzhaganova organized Rukhaniyat to advance a socially oriented program based on spiritual revival. The party won less than 1 percent of the party list vote in 2004. Leader: Altynshash DZHAGANOVA (JAGANOVA).

Registered Opposition Parties Democratic Party of Kazakhstan “White Road” (“Ak Zhol”). Ak Zhol, whose Englishlanguage variants include “Bright Path” and “Light Way,” was formed in March 2002 by several defectors from the recently organized opposition movement Democratic Choice (see Alga!, below). Although Ak Zhol also took a position in moderate opposition to the government, its critics initially asserted that it was the product of a government effort to co-opt opponents and establish an officially approved opposition party. One of the founders, Oraz Zhandosov, had previously served as deputy prime minister, and in January 2003 he was appointed as a presidential aide. Another founder, former Security Council secretary and ambassador to Russia Altynbek Sarsenbayev, was named minister of communications in July 2004; he stepped aside as the September election approached and then resigned on September 20, in the course of a ministerial reorganization that, in effect, eliminated his position. A third founder, Assembly member Bulat Abilov, was convicted of slandering a fellow MP in July 2004 and given a suspended sentence, which precluded his running for reelection.

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At the September–October 2004 balloting Ak Zhol finished second to Otan in terms of the party list vote, but its 12 percent share was only good enough for a single Assembly seat—the only seat won by the opposition. Alikhan Baimenov, who had headed the Ak Zhol party list, immediately stated that he would not take up the seat as a protest against the conduct of the “illegitimate” election. In early 2005 Ak Zhol split over policy differences and direction. As a consequence, three cochairs—Abilov, Sarsenbayev, and Zhandosov— established the “True Ak Zhol” (below) in late April. At the December 2005 presidential election Baimenov finished third, with only 1.6 percent of the vote. Leaders: Alikhan BAIMENOV (Chair), Ludmila ZHYLANOVA (Deputy Chair). Democratic Party of Kazakhstan “True White Road” (“Naghyz Ak Zhol”). The founding congress of the True Ak Zhol was held in late April 2005 following a split in the leadership of the Ak Zhol. Unlike the Ak Zhol, the True Ak Zhol gave its support to For Fair Kazakhstan’s Tuyakbai in the 2005 presidential race. On February 13, 2006, former ambassador and party cofounder Altynbek Sarsenbayev, his driver, and a bodyguard were found murdered, apparently at the hands of national security agents. As of May 2006 the investigation of the deaths was still under way. Somewhat unexpectedly, the Ministry of Justice accepted Naghyz Ak Zhol’s registration in March 2006. Leaders: Bulat ABILOV, Oraz ZHANDOSOV, Tulegen ZHUKEYEV (Cochairs). Communist Party of Kazakhstan (Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Kazakhstana—KPK). A faction of the old ruling Communist Party opposed its conversion into the SPK in September 1991 and eventually achieved legal registration as the KPK in February 1994. The party favors close economic ties with other ex-Soviet republics, restoration of state ownership, welfare, and equality of ethnic groups. In April 1996 the procurator general requested the justice ministry to ban the KPK on

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the grounds that it had “a procommunist ideology” and had organized antigovernment demonstrations. In response, the KPK in October eliminated references in its manifesto to “the struggle for proletarian dictatorship and the reinstatement of the USSR.” Party leader Serikbolsyn Abdildin finished second, with 11.7 percent of the vote, at the presidential election of January 1999. The KPK won three Assembly seats the following October, including two from the party list on a 17.8 percent vote share. It nevertheless objected to the results, accusing the progovernment Civic Party and the Agrarian Party, in particular, of vote manipulation. In early 2004 differences over funding sources led supporters of Vladislav Kosarev to leave the KPK and establish the Communist People’s Party (KNPK, below). In July the KPK and the newly registered DVK party (see Alga!) agreed to form an electoral bloc, the Opposition People’s Union of Communists and People’s Party “Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan,” which won only 3.4 percent of the party list vote at the September election and failed to win any seats in the Assembly. Leader: Serikbolsyn ABDILDIN (First Secretary). Communist People’s Party of Kazakhstan (Kommunisticheskaya Narodnaya Partiya Kazakhstana/Qazaqstan Kommunistyk Khalyk Partiyasy—KNPK/QKKP). The KNPK was established in 2004 by dissident KPK members who accused Serikbolsyn Abdildin of accepting suspect funds. Registered in June 2004, the KNPK, with 2 percent of the party list vote, failed to win any seats at the 2004 Assembly election. Its 2005 presidential candidate, maverick parliamentary deputy Yerasyl ABYLKASYMOV, won only 0.3 percent of the vote. Leader: Vladislav KOSAREV.

Other Registered Parties Farmers Social Democratic Party “Village” (“Aul”). Aul was first registered in March 2000 by parliamentary deputy Gani Kaliyev in support of rural dwellers and agro-industry. The party was

reregistered in 2003 but won under 2 percent of the party list vote and no Assembly seats at the 2004 election. It did, however, win a Senate seat in 2005. Leader: Gani KALIYEV (Chair). Party of Kazakhstan’s Patriots (PKP). Established in mid-2000 by Gani Kasymov, an Assembly deputy and 1999 independent candidate for president, the Patriots Party reregistered in 2003. In April 2004 the Officers’ Union of Kazakhstan, an association of war veterans, joined the party, which was unsuccessful at the 2004 Assembly election. Although the PKP supported President Nazarbayev’s reelection in December 2005, it has differed with the government on some issues. Following the murder of former ambassador Sarsenbayev in February 2006, the party chair expressed concern over the state of civil society in Kazakhstan and an absence of checks and balances in the government. Leader: Gani KASYMOV (Chair).

Unregistered Opposition Parties Forward! (Alga!). Alga! is the successor to the People’s Party “Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan” (Demokraticheskii Vybor Kazakhstana— DVK), which was deregistered in January 2005. Although supportive of devolving power from the presidency to the legislature, the DVK was considered more moderate than the Forum of Democratic Forces (FDSK) when it was launched as a movement in November 2001 by a number of government officials, including Minister of Labor Alikhan Baimenov, who were promptly dismissed. In March 2002 Baimenov and other DVK founders, including former deputy prime minister Oraz Zhandosov, departed to form the Ak Zhol. Two prominent DVK founders—Galymzhan Zhakiyanov, who had been dismissed as governor of the northern Pavlodar region, and Mukhtar Ablyazov, another former minister—were convicted in 2002 on charges of abuse of power. Critics of the government charged that the trials were politically motivated. Ablyazov was granted a presidential pardon in April 2003 and retired from politics, but Zhakiyanov, who had been sentenced

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to serve a seven-year prison term, remained incarcerated until January 2006. After repeated unsuccessful attempts to register as a nonprofit organization, the DVK was ultimately registered as a political party in May 2004. It had attracted members from a number of other parties, including the NKK and the RNPK, both of which had refused to register under the 2002 political party law. (Founded in October 1991, the NKK had emerged from a well-supported antinuclear movement and smaller intellectual groups; it also included ecological and internationalist aims in its platform. The party initially appeared to have the backing of President Nazarbayev but ultimately gravitated to opposition. It won nine seats in the 1994 election but none thereafter. Former prime minister Kazhegeldin’s RNPK was organized in December 1998 but was never successful at the polls.) In July 2004 Democratic Choice joined the KPK in forming the KPK-DVK electoral bloc, the Opposition People’s Union, which was unsuccessful at the subsequent Assembly election. In January 2005 an Almaty court ordered the DVK dissolved for promoting civil disobedience. Party leaders planned to appeal to a higher court but in late March, despairing of the process, announced that they would attempt to form a successor party, Forward, DVK! (Alga, DVK!), although “DVK” was dropped from the name by the July 2005 founding congress. Since then, Alga! has repeatedly had its registration application denied by the Ministry of Justice, which in February 2006 questioned the “authenticity” of the party’s member list. Leaders: Asylbek KOZHAKHMETOV (Chair), Galymzhan ZHAKIYANOV, Gulzhan ERGALIEVA (Formerly of the NKK). Tabiyghat Party. The “green” Tabiyghat Party held its constituent congress in March 2006 under the leadership of environmental advocate Mels Yeleusizov. Tabiyghat (“Nature”) had been established as a nongovernmental organization in the early 1990s but has frequently been associated with opposition causes, particularly through the Party of

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Social Justice and Ecological Revival “Tabiyghat” and then the Green Party. Yeleusizov, who was disqualified as a 1999 presidential candidate because he had been convicted of participating in an unauthorized For Fair Elections meeting, ran in 2005 as an independent but won only 0.3 percent of the vote. Leader: Mels YELEUSIZOV.

Other Organizations Freedom Civil Movement of Kazakhstan (Grazhdanskoye Dvizhenie Kazakhstana–Azat— GDK-Azat). The Kazakh nationalist Azat was founded in 1990 to promote Kazakhstan’s independence, after which it lost ground to other formations. In October 1992 it joined with the December National Democratic Party (Natsionalnaya Demokraticheskaya Partiya Jeltogsan), which drew its name from the month of antigovernment riots in Almaty in 1986, and the Republican Party of Kazakhstan (Respublikanskaya Partiya Kazakhstana—RPK) to form the Republican Party–Azat. However, the merger quickly broke down over policy and personal differences. Azat leader Khasen Kozhakhmet was later associated with the Democratic Movement of Kazakhstan, which opposed the constitutional referendum of 1995, as well as the Jeltogsan (Zheltoqsan) movement. Leader: Khasen KOZHAKHMET (Hasan QOZHAKHMET). Other politically active Kazakh movements include Attan Kazakhstan, led by antinuclear activist and protester Amantay-Haji ASYLBEK. In October 2004 the Supreme Court labeled the following as terrorist organizations and banned them: al-Qaida; the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan; the Islamic Party of East Turkestan, based in China’s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region; and the Kurdistan Worker’s Party. All have been the focus of regional attention. Another group, the Hizb ut-Tahrir, which has sought to establish an Islamic state in the region but has not been directly linked to terrorist activities, was banned in March

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Cabinet As of May 15, 2006 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister

Daniyal Akhmetov Karim Masimov

Ministers Agriculture Culture and Information Defense Economy and Budget Planning Education and Science Emergency Situations Energy and Mineral Resources Environmental Protection Finance and State Revenues Foreign Affairs Industry and Trade Internal Affairs Justice Labor and Social Welfare Public Health Tourism and Sports Transport and Communications

Akhmetzhan Yessimov Yermukhamet Yertysbayev Mukhtar Altynbayev Karim Masimov Byrganym Aytimova [f] Shalbay Kulmakhanov Baktykozha Izmukhambetov Nurlan Iskakov Natalya Korzhova [f] Kasymzhomart Tokayev Vladimir Shkolnik Baurzhan Mukhamedzhanov Zagipa Baliyeva [f] Gulzhana Karagusova [f] Erbolat Dosayev Temirkhan Dosmukhanbetov Askar Mamin

[f] = female

2005; a number of its alleged members have been prosecuted by Kazakhstan in recent years.

The 1995 constitution provides for a bicameral Parliament, which replaced the unicameral Supreme Council (Kenges).

“Fatherland” (“Otan”) constitute the largest party bloc. The most recent election, for 16 senators, took place on August 19, 2005, with the following results: Otan, 10 seats; Civic Party of Kazakhstan, 1; Farmers Social Democratic Party “Village,” 1; Republican Party “All Together,” 1; independents, 3. Chair: Nurtay ABYKAYEV.

Senate (Senat). The Senate has 39 members, of whom 7 are appointed by the president and 32 indirectly elected by representative assemblies of the country’s regions, Astana, and Almaty. Constitutional amendments passed in 1998 increased senatorial terms from four years to six, with half the seats renewable every three years. Members of the progovernment Republican Political Party

Assembly (Majilis). Constitutional changes approved in 1998, effective from the 1999 election, increased Assembly membership from 67 to 77 by adding 10 seats filled from party lists. At the same time, the term of office was raised from four to five years. Successful candidates must win a majority of the votes cast in their districts, which often necessitates runoffs. The election of September 19,

Legislature

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2004, with runoff balloting on October 3 in 22 districts, produced the following results: Republican Political Party “Fatherland,” 42 seats (35 district, 7 party list); Agrarian and Industrial Workers Union, 11 (10, 1); Republican Party “All Together,” 4 (3, 1); Democratic Party of Kazakhstan 1 (1, 0); Democratic Party of Kazakhstan “White Road,” 1 (0, 1); independents, 18. Chair: Oral MUKHAMEDZHANOV.

Communications Although the constitution prohibits censorship, most media outlets are directly or indirectly controlled by presidential family members or loyalists, while opposition journalists can be targeted under libel and other criminal statutes for such offenses as insulting the honor of the president, undermining national security, encouraging violence, or inciting ethnic or religious hatred. A media law introduced in January 2002 limited foreign ownership of broadcast facilities to 20 percent and permitted the government to terminate the licenses of stations that relied on rebroadcasts of foreign programming for more than half of their material. As a consequence, a number of regional and local TV stations were shut down. The foreign content limit fell to 20 percent in 2003. In April 2004 the Constitutional Council struck down as unconstitutional another proposed media law that would have significantly broadened the list of offenses with which journalists and media outlets could have been charged. President Nazarbayev’s family controls the powerful Khabar Agency, the country’s leading media company.

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(250,000), independent weekly; Vremya (Time, 125,000), weekly; Novoye Pokoleniye (New Generation, 50,000), weekly; Kazakhstanskaya Pravda (Kazakhstan Truth, 35,000), government organ; Yegemen Kazakhstan (Sovereign Kazakhstan, 30,000), government organ, in Kazakh; Express K (20,000); Delovaya Nedelya (Business Week, 16,000), weekly; Uighur Avazi (Voice of Uighur, 10,000), twice weekly, government organ, in Uighur. Karavan may be the most widely circulated newspaper in Central Asia. An opposition weekly, Respublika, was founded in 2000 and by 2002 reportedly had a circulation of 18,000, despite having been subjected to a number of formal actions and unofficial intimidation. In an effort to avoid closure, for a time the paper’s parent company began publishing under the title Assandi Times. In May 2005 Respublika was again closed down by the government, although its staff continued its publication as part of another opposition newspaper, Soz. In November Respublika began reappearing on the newsstands under the name Pravo.Ekonomika.Politika.Kultura. Other opposition papers include Azat, Epokha, Svoboda Slova, and Zhuman-Times.

News Agencies The former domestic facility, the Kazakh Telegraph Agency, was abolished in September 1997. The Kazakh Information Agency (Kazinform) currently offers government information. The Russian agency Interfax is among the foreign services offering news from Kazakhstan.

Broadcasting and Computing Press In August 1999 the government announced that it would stop funding of most official newspapers, exceptions being Kazakhstanskaya Pravda and Yegemen Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, many newspapers continue to receive government stipends. The following are dailies published in Almaty in Russian, unless otherwise noted: Karavan

The official Kazakh Radio and Kazakh Television broadcast primarily in Kazakh and Russian. Over 100 independent television and 35 radio stations also broadcast, but of the half-dozen television broadcasting companies, only 1 is fully independent. There were approximately 4.7 million television receivers and 250,000 Internet users in 2003.

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Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. Kanat B. SAUDABAYEV U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan John M. ORDWAY

Permanent Representative to the UN Yerzhan KAZYKHANOV IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, CIS, EBRD, ECO, IDB, Interpol, IOM, OIC, OSCE, WCO

Note: Prime Minister Daniyal Akhmetov resigned on January 8, 2007.

K I R I B AT I REPUBLIC

OF

KIRIBATI

I Kiribati

The Country Apart from Ocean Island (Banaba) in the west, Kiribati consists of three widely dispersed island groups scattered over 2 million square miles of the central Pacific Ocean: the Gilbert Islands and Ocean (Banaba) Island on the equator; the Phoenix Islands to the southeast; and the Line Islands still farther east and both north and south of the equator. The Gilbert group comprises Abaiang, Abemama, Aranuka, Arorae, Beru, Butaritari, Kuria, Maiana, Makin, Marakei, Nicunau, Nonouti, Onotoa, Tabiteuca, Tamana, and Tarawa. The Phoenix group encompasses Birnie, Enderbury, Gardner, Hull, Kanton (formerly Canton), McKean, Phoenix, and Sydney. The Line group embraces Kiritimati (Christmas), Fanning, Malden, Starbuck, Vostock, and Washington, as well as Millennium (formerly Caroline) and Flint, which in 1951 were leased to commercial interests on Tahiti. (The renaming of Caroline in August 1997 was intended to draw attention to the contention that Kiribati, having arbitrarily moved the international date line several hundred miles to the east, was to be the first nation over which the sun would rise on January 1, 2000.) Not all of the islands are inhabited and several attempts at settlement have been abandoned because of drought conditions, with potable water throughout the area often described as being “as precious as gasoline.” Most of the country’s national income was traditionally derived from phosphate mining on the most western island, Banaba. By the time of independence, however, the phosphate supply was largely exhausted, although some $70 million in

mining royalties had been invested in Europe. Mining ceased at the end of 1979, causing the loss of some 500 jobs. Fishing grounds in the area are said to be among the richest in the world, although the first commercial fishing vessel, built in Japan, was not put into service until 1979. A number of five-year development plans have sought to expand and diversify agriculture, fishing, mining, external trade, financial services, and tourism. Real GDP has fluctuated markedly in recent years, rising by 12.6 percent in 1998 but by only 1.5 percent in 2005; part of the difficulty has

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stemmed from an adverse trade balance that increased steadily from $26.8 million in 1998 to $58.7 million in 2003.

Government and Politics Political Background The Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony was under the jurisdiction of the British High Commissioner for the Western Pacific until 1972, when a governor was appointed from London. In 1975 the Ellice Islands became the separate territory of Tuvalu, prior to the achievement of independence in 1978. At a constitutional conference in London in early 1979, the British government refused a request by the Banabans, most of whom had been resettled on Rabi (Rambi) Island in the Fiji group during World War II and had since become Fijian citizens, that Ocean Island be separated from the Gilberts, and the latter became independent as a republican member of the Commonwealth on July 12. Upon independence the former chief minister, Ieremia T. TABAI, assumed office as president of the Republic and on July 20 appointed Teatao TEANNAKI as vice president. Following the first postindependence legislative election of March 26, 1982, Tabai was returned to office in presidential balloting conducted May 4. The government fell, however, on December 10 when the House of Assembly rejected, for the second time in two days, a bill that would have retroactively legitimized 5 percent salary raises for six public officials who, through an oversight, had erroneously benefited from a pay hike granted civil servants earlier in the year. In accordance with Kiribati’s somewhat unusual constitutional practice, interim administration was assumed by a three-member Council of State chaired by the chair of the Public Service Commission, Rota ONARIO. Tabai was reelected on February 17, 1983, following legislative balloting on January 12 and 19, and on February 18 reappointed most members of his previous administration. On May 12, 1987, following the election of a new House of Assembly on March 12 and 19, Tabai was again reelected, defeating his vice pres-

ident, Teatao Teannaki, and opposition candidate Teburoro TITO with a 59 percent share of the vote. With the support of Tabai (who was ineligible for a further term), Teannaki secured the presidency on July 3, 1991, defeating his principal competitor, Roniti TEIWAKI, by a vote margin of less than 5 percent. He was, however, obliged to resign on May 24, 1994, when the parliamentary opposition, which had accused his administration of financial irregularities, successfully introduced a no-confidence motion. Government authority thereupon passed again to a Council of State, pending a new legislative election and the designation of a successor president. However, a constitutional crisis erupted when one of the Council’s members refused to step down at the expiration of his term on May 28 and was forcibly removed from office by his colleagues (see Current issues, below). At balloting held July 21–29, 1994, the incumbent Gilbertese National Progressive Party won only 7 assembly seats as contrasted with 13 for the opposition Christian Democratic (subsequently Christian Democratic Unity) Party, which in the wake of the election attracted enough support from independents to capture all four presidential nominations. Thereafter, Teburoro Tito won a decisive 51 percent vote share (half again as much as the runner-up) at a popular election on September 30 and was sworn in as chief executive on October 1. He was elected to a second term on November 27, 1998, easily defeating Harry TONG and Amberoti NIKORA. In November 2002 Tito’s legislative grouping, the Maurin te Maneaba Party—MMP (Blessings of the Meeting House Party) lost control to the opposition Boutokaan te Koaua—BTK (Supporters of the Truth). However, by early 2003 the BTK was reported to have “fractured,” and on February 24 Tito won reelection by narrowly defeating the BTK’s Taberannang TIMEON. Little more than a month later, on March 28, Tito was obliged to resign after failing, in a close vote, to secure approval of a $700,000 supplemental budget. In the legislative balloting of May 9 and 12, 2003, Tito’s faction secured an 18-member plurality. Nonetheless, at the ensuing presidential election of July 5, with Timeon ineligible after

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Political Status: Formerly the Gilbert Islands; became a British protectorate in 1892; annexed as the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony in 1915, the Ellice Islands becoming independent as the state of Tuvalu in 1978; present name adopted upon becoming an independent member of the Commonwealth on July 12, 1979. Area: 313 sq. mi. (811 sq. km.). Population: 84,494 (2000C); 93,000 (2005E); neither figure includes upward of 2,500 Kiribati nationals living abroad. Major Urban Center (2005E): BAIRIKI (South Tarawa, 48,000). Official Language: I-Kiribati (Gilbertese); English is also widely spoken. Monetary Unit: Australian Dollar (market rate July 1, 2006: 1.35 dollars = $1US). The British Pound is also in circulation. President (Beretitenti): Anote TONG (Boutokaan te Koaua); popularly elected on July 5, 2003, succeeding Teburoro TITO (Maurin te Maneaba), whose government had been defeated in a confidence vote on March 28. Vice President (Kauoman-ni-Beretitenti): Teima ONORIO (Boutokaan te Koaua); appointed by the President on July 10, 2003, succeeding Beniamina TINGA (Maurin te Maneaba).

losing his House seat, the BTK’s Anote TONG defeated his brother and new MMP standard-bearer, Dr. Harry TONG, by some 1,000 votes.

Constitution and Government For a small country, Kiribati has a relatively complex constitution (part of the UK Kiribati Independence Order 1979) that includes a number of entrenched provisions designed to safeguard individual and land rights for the Banabans. It provides for an executive president (beretitenti) who must command the support of a legislative majority. Upon passage of a no-confidence motion, the president must immediately resign, transitional executive authority being exercised by a Council of State composed of the chair of the autonomous Public Service Commission, the chief justice, and

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the speaker of the House of Assembly, pending a legislative dissolution and the holding of a general election. Subsequent to each such election, the House must propose no fewer than three and no more than four candidates for the presidency from its own membership, the final selection being made by nationwide balloting. If the presidency is vacated for reasons other than a loss of confidence, the vice president (kauoman-ni-beretitenti), originally appointed by the president from among his cabinet associates, becomes chief executive, subject to legislative confirmation. The cabinet includes the president, the vice president, and no more than ten other ministers (all drawn from the assembly), plus the attorney general, and is collectively responsible to the legislature. The unicameral House consists of 40 elected members, an additional member named by the Banaban Rabi Council of Leaders, and the attorney general, ex officio if he is not an elected member. The speaker has no voting rights and must be elected by the House from outside its membership. The normal legislative term is four years. The judicial system encompasses a Court of Appeal, a High Court, and local magistrates’ courts, the last representing consolidation of former island, lands, and magistrates’ courts. There is a right of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the UK Privy Council in regard to the High Court’s interpretation of the rights of any Banaban or member of the Rabi Council. The nominated Banaban member of the House need not be a Kiribati citizen, while all expatriates with ancestors born in Banaba before 1900 may register as electors or stand for election as if resident on the island.

Foreign Relations Kiribati became a member of the Commonwealth upon independence, but its international contacts are otherwise quite limited. In March 1984 diplomatic relations (backdated to 1979) were established with Tuvalu, augmenting links established earlier with Australia and the United Kingdom, while New Zealand appointed a high commissioner in early 1989. The country joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in June 1986 but did not request UN membership until April 1999,

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being admitted to the world body in September. Kiribati opened its first overseas diplomatic mission by posting a high commissioner in Suva, Fiji, in September 2001. Under a 1979 treaty, the United States agreed to relinquish all claims to territory in the Phoenix and Line island groups, except for Palmyra. Included were Canton and Enderbury, previously under joint US-UK administration, but from which the British had already withdrawn. The parties also agreed that no military use of the islands by third parties would be permitted without joint consultation and that facilities constructed by the United States on Canton, Enderbury, and Hull islands would not be so used without U.S. approval. In mid-1996 President Tito urged neighboring states to reject a developer’s offer to provide a $100 million development trust fund in return for their acquiescence in a plan to buy privately owned Palmyra for the storage of highlevel nuclear waste. Modest developmental assistance has been provided by Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Asian Development Bank. A 1985 agreement allowing Russian fishing boats within the archipelago’s continental shelf lapsed in October 1986 and Kiribati subsequently enacted legislation to detain crews as well as vessels in cases of poaching within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which Royal New Zealand Air Force planes aid in policing. In May 1995 relations between Kiribati and the United States were strained because of a failure of the former to participate in Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) negotiations in New York. (Washington refused to accept Kiribati’s assertion that it lacked resources to send a delegate to the meeting on the ground that external resources were available to assist small nations in such activities.) In early 1998 it appeared that the future of a Chinese satellite tracking facility in Bonriki in eastern Tarawa might be jeopardized by the transfer of the controlling authority from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Science Commission to the People’s Liberation Army. By mid-1999 the issue had become sensitive because of indications that the prin-

cipal purpose of the facility might be to monitor a theater missile defense system under construction by the United States on Kwajalein in the Marshall Islands. On November 7, 2003, the Tong administration established diplomatic relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan), saying that it wished to retain existing relations with the People’s Republic of China; however, the PRC promptly severed relations. The action was preceded by dismantlement of the satellite tracking station, the withdrawal of Chinese medical personnel, and the termination of PRC funding for the construction of a sports stadium. Subsequently, in August 2004, President Tong accused Beijing of attempting to destabilize his government, although his brother, as opposition leader, stated that he viewed Taiwan as a greater threat to Kiribati than the PRC. In March 2006 Kiribati received an unrestricted grant of $1 million from Japan. The action came several months after Kiribati had refused an Australian government request to join a campaign to banish “scientific” whaling.

Current Issues The constitutional crisis of mid-1994 pointed up a deficiency in Kiribati’s basic law, since it was by no means clear that the Council of State possessed the power of self-replenishment. The issue was further complicated by the fact that the country’s chief justice was himself a Council member, which meant that a legal challenge in the matter would have to be submitted to a temporary judge brought in from Australia or New Zealand. In recent years Kiribati has become increasingly concerned about the impact of long-term elevation of the sea level because of global greenhouse emissions. In September 1997 the president of a Smaller Island States (SIS) summit in Rarotonga, Cook Islands, declared that both Tuvalu and Kiribati would “sink beneath the waves” if estimates of sea-level rise were to be realized. During 2005, a number of legislators voiced concern about personnel remaining at the PRC embassy that had been formally closed two years

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Cabinet As of July 1, 2006 President Vice President

Anote Tong Teima Onorio [f]

Ministers Commerce, Industry, and Tourism Communications, Transport, and Tourist Development Education, Youth, and Sports Environment, Lands, and Agricultural Development Finance and Economic Development Fisheries and Natural Resources Development Foreign Affairs and Immigration Health and Medical Services Internal Affairs and Social Development Labor and Human Resources Development Line and Phoenix Islands Development Public Works and Utilities Attorney General

Iotebwa Redfern Naatan Teewe Teima Onorio [f] Martin Tofinga Nabuti Mwemwenikarawa Tetabo Nakara Anote Tong Natanera Kirata Amberoti Nikora Bauro Tongaai Tawita Temoku James Taom Titabu Tabane

[f] = female

earlier, accusing them of spying. The government responded in May 2006 by insisting that all such individuals leave the country.

Political Parties Traditionally, there were no formally organized parties in Kiribati; instead, ad hoc groups tended to form in response to specific issues or in support of particular individuals. Thus, a grouping known as the Mouth of the Kiribati People (Wiia I-Kiribati) was significantly involved in the 1982 defeat of the Tabai government, but subsequently became moribund. Prior to the 1991 assembly balloting, the only recognizable party was a Christian People’s Party (Mwaneaba), organized in August 1985 by a number of Catholic opposition legislators following the failure of a no-confidence motion against President Tabai on the Soviet fishing treaty. Prior to the 1991 presidential poll two additional groups emerged: a Gilbertese National Progressive Party (GNPP),

launched to support the (ultimately successful) candidacy of Vice President Teatao Tennaki, and a Kiribati United Party (KUP), to further the candidacy of Tewareka TENTOA, whose name was not on the four-man list approved by the assembly. For the 1994 campaign a Protestant-oriented Christian Democratic Party (CDP) was launched in support of Teburoro Tito’s successful candidacy, thereafter becoming the nucleus of a Christian Democratic Unity Party (CDUP), which also included the GNPP. The two groups below were the principal contenders at the 1998 and subsequent elections. Boutokaan te Koaua —BTK (Supporters of the Truth). Theretofore in opposition, the BTK won the presidency in July 2003, despite failing to obtain a majority in its own right at a legislative poll two months earlier (see below). Leader: Anote TONG (President of the Republic). Maurin te Maneaba Party —MMP (Blessings of the Meeting House Party). Composed of Tito

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supporters, the MMP was the governing party under President Tito but is currently in opposition. Leaders: Teburoro TITO (Former President of the Republic), Dr. Harry TONG (2003 presidential candidate).

Legislature The unicameral House of Assembly (Maneaba ni Maungatabu) currently consists of 40 elected members plus a nominated representative of Banabans resident on Rabi and the attorney general, ex officio. The normal legislative term is four years. At the most recent election, held on May 9 and 14, 2003, the Maurin te Maneaba was reported to have won 18 seats and the Boutokaan te Koaua, 13, although the latter secured sufficient support among the 9 independents to command a majority for presidential election. Speaker: Etera TEANGANA.

Communications Press The following are published on Tarawa: Te Uekera (5,000), published weekly in English and I-Kiribati by the government’s Broadcasting and Publications Authority; Te Itoi ni Kiribati

(2,300), Catholic monthly newsletter in I-Kiribati; Te Kaotan te Ota (1,700), Protestant quarterly newsletter in I-Kiribati; Kiribati Newstar, weekly, in English and I-Kiribati, established in 2000.

Broadcasting and Computing The government-operated Radio Kiribati transmits in Gilbertese, Tuvaluan, and English. In late 1993 the House of Assembly legalized the private ownership of radio stations, although the country’s first FM station, launched in 1998 by former president Ieremia Tabai, was closed down on the ground that it was being operated without a license. There were approximately 1,500 television receivers and 2,100 personal computers serving an equal number of Internet users in 2001.

Intergovernmental Representation Kiribati was admitted to the United Nations in September 1999. To date it has not opened an embassy in Washington, D.C. U.S. Ambassador to Kiribati Larry Miles DINGER (resident in Fiji) Permanent Representative to the UN (Vacant) IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, CWTH, PC, PIF

KO R E A Chos o˘ n Alternate Name: Hankuk

The Country Korea is a mountainous peninsula projecting southeastward from Manchuria between China and Japan. Whether viewed in terms of race, culture, or language, the population is extremely homogeneous. The literacy rate is more than 90 percent. For further details see the separate discussions of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, which follow.

Political History A semi-independent state associated with China from the seventh century A.D., Korea was annexed by Japan in 1910 and tightly controlled by Tokyo until Japan’s defeat in World War II. The northern half of Korea was integrated with the Japanese industrial complex in Manchuria, while the southern half remained largely agricultural. Although the restoration of an independent Korea “in due course” was pledged by U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt, Britain’s Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Nationalist Chinese President Chiang Kai-shek at the Cairo Conference in 1943, the need for prompt arrangements to receive the surrender of Japanese military forces in 1945 led to a temporary division of the country into Soviet (northern) and U.S. (southern) occupation zones along the line of the 38th parallel. Efforts by the two occupying powers to establish a unified Korean provisional government shortly became deadlocked, and the issue of Korea’s future was referred to the UN General Assembly on U.S. initiative in 1947. A UN Temporary Commission was

set up to facilitate elections and the establishment of a national government but was denied access to the Soviet-controlled zone. UN-observed elections were accordingly held in the southern half of Korea alone in May 1948, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) was formally established on August 15; a separate, Communist-controlled government, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), was established in the North on September 9. The UN General Assembly refused to recognize the latter action and declared the ROK as the lawful government of the nation. Soviet troops withdrew from the DPRK in December 1948, and U.S. forces left the ROK in June 1949. On June 25, 1950, five months after U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson had delineated a Pacific “defense perimeter” that did not include Korea, DPRK troops invaded the ROK in an attempt to unify the peninsula by force. U.S. forces promptly came to the assistance of the southern regime, and the UN Security Council, meeting without the USSR, called on all member states to aid the ROK. A total of 16 UN members subsequently furnished troops to a UN Unified Command established by the Security Council in July 1950 and headed initially by U.S. Gen. Douglas MacArthur (later by generals Matthew B. Ridgway and Mark Clark). The intervention of some 300,000 Chinese Communist “volunteers” on the side of the DPRK in late 1950 produced a military stalemate, and an armistice agreement was eventually signed in Panmunjom on July 27, 1953, establishing a cease-fire line and a four-kilometer-wide demilitarized zone (DMZ) bisecting Korea near the 38th parallel.

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Negotiations in Geneva in 1954 failed to produce a settlement, and relations between the two countries were governed thereafter by the 1953 agreement, under which a Military Armistice Commission representing the former belligerents (including China) continued to meet in Panmunjom. Chinese military forces withdrew from the DPRK in 1958, but UN forces (now exclusively American) remain in the South. The United States initiated troop cutbacks from 1970 through 1972 and proposed to the UN Security Council in June 1975 that the UN Command in Korea be dissolved, but no action was taken on the proposal. In February 1977 the U.S. Jimmy Carter administration announced a “phased withdrawal” of U.S. combat personnel, but the plan was reversed in mid-1979 because of reports that the DPRK army held a numerical superiority in men and tanks far in excess of earlier estimates. A more recent such withdrawal that would have halved the U.S. troop strength of 39,000 by 1995 was postponed in November 1991, pending evidence that Pyongyang had abandoned its quest for nuclear weapons capability. Political relations between North and South have alternated between overt hostility and mutual tolerance. Contacts regarding the problem of families separated by the political division of the country began in September 1971 under the auspices of the Red Cross societies of the respective countries. Talks directed toward peaceful reunification were initiated by political representatives of the two regimes in July 1972 and resulted in the establishment of a North-South Coordinating Committee, which convened in October and continued to meet on a regular basis until August 1973, when negotiations were unilaterally broken off by the DPRK. Following the North’s acceptance of an appeal by ROK President Park Chung Hee to reopen discussions, representatives of the two Koreas met in Panmunjom in February 1979 in preparation for broader negotiations. After three brief sessions, however, the talks ended over differences regarding representation and the level at which future negotiations should be conducted. The DPRK delegates, all representing the Democratic Front for

the Reunification of the Fatherland, insisted that a “whole-nation congress” of representatives from all Korean social and political organizations should be convened, while the ROK delegates refused to recognize the legitimacy of the technically nongovernmental Democratic Front and called for a reconvening of the 1972 North-South Coordinating Committee. In July ROK President Park and his U.S. counterpart, Jimmy Carter, jointly called for tripartite talks with the North, but the DPRK flatly rejected the overture. In January 1980 Pyongyang and Seoul agreed to a series of working-level talks designed to prepare for a first-ever meeting of their prime ministers. Ten working-level sessions were held during the ensuing eight months without agreement on an agenda for a high-level meeting, and North Korea terminated the discussions in September. In 1981 and 1982 overtures by the ROK were rejected by the DPRK, which called instead for a conference of private citizens, excluding political party representatives. A number of social and economic issues were addressed following a resumption of working-level discussions in 1983, with little substantive result, save for a limited number of family reunions conducted in Seoul and Pyongyang under Red Cross auspices in September 1985. Sporadic politicalmilitary talks were ritualistically suspended by the North during annual U.S.–South Korean “Team Spirit” military exercises. Inconclusive economic cooperation talks were also held in 1984–1985, in addition to a series of preliminary interparliamentary discussions in July–September 1985. The interparliamentary meetings were resumed in August 1988 but quickly bogged down in the face of a DPRK call for a joint meeting of the nearly 1,000 members of their respective legislatures. In November a compromise was reached; however, agreement on an agenda proved elusive. On January 1, 1989, North Korea’s Kim Il Sung called, for the first time (albeit indirectly), for a summit meeting with his South Korean counterpart. The overture was accepted three weeks later by ROK President Roh Tae Woo, but in early February Pyongyang suspended further discussions

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Political Status: Politically divided; Democratic People’s Republic of Korea under Communist regime established September 9, 1948; Republic of Korea under anti-Communist republican regime established August 15, 1948.

because of Seoul’s refusal to cancel the round of “Team Spirit” exercises scheduled for March. A year later, Kim extended the initiative, calling for “total openness of both North and South,” including the sanctioning of “free and mutual visits.” Roh again responded affirmatively and offered to invite North Korean, Chinese, and Soviet observers to scaled-down “Team Spirit” maneuvers. Pyongyang, however, continued to insist on cancellation of the exercises. The prospect of a prime ministerial meeting surfaced in mid-1990, following a stunned North Korean reaction to a summit between Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and ROK President Roh in San Francisco, but the first-ever chiefs of government meeting in Seoul on September 4–7 yielded mutually exclusive scenarios. North Korean Premier Yon Hyong Muk called for an arms control/ nonaggression pact that would limit each side to a standing army of 10,000 men and require the withdrawal of U.S. forces; in addition, he demanded the release of South Korean students who had been jailed for traveling illegally to the North, an end to “Team Spirit” exercises, and a common application for admission to the UN. South Korean Prime Minister Kang Young Hoon aimed at a more gradual cultivation of bilateral relations through a mutual exchange of military information, establishment of a hot line between defense ministers, the conclusion of an economic cooperation agreement, freer travel across the common border, and simultaneous entry into the UN of the two Korean states. Additional sessions were held in October and December 1990, without significant movement. In May 1991 North Korea abandoned its insistence on common representation at the UN, and on September 17 both Koreas were admitted to the world body. In late October the fourth round of

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prime ministerial talks were held in Pyongyang, again without notable progress. In contrast, the fifth round in Seoul concluded on December 13–14 with a historic nonaggression pact and an agreement to meet again in mid-February to work toward a nuclear-free Korea. In signing the December accord, which called for formal termination of the 1950–1953 war, the North Korean government for the first time officially recognized its southern counterpart. Ratifications of the December accords were exchanged during the sixth round of premierial talks in Pyongyang in February 1992, clearly indicating that Pyongyang had abandoned its long-standing demand for “one Korea” achieved through “liberation of the South.” A month later, at the seventh premierial session, the participants agreed to establish a Joint Nuclear Control Committee, while during the eighth round in mid-September the participants announced agreements on nonaggression, crossborder exchanges, and establishment of a NorthSouth Joint Reconciliation Commission. Despite these positive developments, relations soon foundered once again, in part over North Korea’s refusal to permit inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at a number of nuclear sites—a dispute that, during succeeding years, became enmeshed in matters of foreign aid and U.S.-DPRK diplomatic relations (for details, see the Foreign relations section of the DPRK article). The death of Kim Il Sung in July 1994, shortly before a planned first DPRKROK presidential meeting, brought progress to a halt. In April 1996, after North Korea had threatened to withdraw from the 1953 armistice, U.S. President Bill Clinton and ROK President Kim Young Sam proposed that quadripartite talks, with China as the fourth participant, be initiated in an effort to conclude a definitive peace treaty. The following September Seoul broke off all North-South contacts following the discovery in South Korean waters of an abandoned North Korean submarine, and in July 1997 a military clash in the DMZ further threatened the renewed peace effort. Nevertheless, following a preliminary four-power meeting in

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August, on December 9–10 representatives of the four met in Geneva, Switzerland, to begin peace negotiations, while in February 1998 North Korea indicated its willingness to begin a dialogue with political parties and civic organizations in the South. In March a second four-party session in Geneva descended into procedural wrangling and disagreements over the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the South, but on April 11, at the DPRK’s suggestion, Pyongyang and Seoul held their first ministerial meeting in four years, in Beijing, the purpose being to discuss agricultural aid to the North. Although the talks broke down over South Korea’s insistence that aid was contingent on North Korea’s willingness to discuss family reunification, in a public letter dated April 18 DPRK leader Kim Jong Il called for improved relations “to achieve the great unity of our nation” and added that all Koreans “must visit one another, hold contacts, promote dialogue and strengthen solidarity.” On June 23, 1998, for the first time in seven years, officers of the UN Command and the DPRK army held talks in Panmunjom, despite South Korea’s capture, the previous day, of a North Korean midget submarine that had become entangled in fishing nets. (Nine bodies were discovered on board when the submarine was opened.) A second, empty five-man sub was found in July. Four-power talks resumed on October 21–24, with subcommittees being created to consider ways to establish a “peace regime” and to reduce peninsular tension. Despite the sinking of yet another suspected DPRK spy vessel in December, the fourth formal four-power session was held January 19–22, 1999. The focus of a fifth session, held April 24–28, was humanitarian aid to the North, which had been suffering a devastating famine since 1995. A sixth round held on August 5–9 made little headway, the diplomatic emphasis having shifted toward bilateral negotiations between, on the one hand, the two Koreas and, on the other, North Korea and Washington. Progress toward improved North-South relations was threatened by a June 15, 1999, naval battle in the Yellow Sea—the first such encounter since the 1953 armistice—that resulted in the sinking of

a North Korea gunboat, the death of an estimated 30 North Korean sailors, and additional damage to ships on both sides. Tensions had risen earlier in the month when North Korean vessels began accompanying crab-fishing boats into a buffer zone around the Northern Limit Line (NLL), established at the time of the 1953 armistice. Prompted by a South Korean offer of additional fertilizer deliveries to aid its famine recovery program, North Korea agreed to attend family reunification talks in Beijing on June 22, 1999, but after two brief sessions the talks broke down on July 3, as Pyongyang demanded an apology for the Yellow Sea incident. On September 2 North Korea unilaterally declared an extension of its territorial waters to 40 miles (65 km) south of the NLL, prompting Seoul to announce the following day that it fully intended to defend the disputed area. Although the North rejected a January 3, 2000, proposal from South Korea’s President Kim Dae Jung to foster economic cooperation, a speech delivered by Kim on March 9 in Berlin, Germany, offered massive aid for building the North Korean economy if intergovernmental dialogue resumed. Only a week later secret talks between Seoul and Pyongyang reportedly opened in Beijing, leading to a surprise announcement on April 10 that South Korea’s President Kim would meet North Korea’s Kim at a first-ever summit in June. Following five rounds of preparatory negotiations, the historic meeting took place June 13– 15, 2000, in Pyongyang. On June 14, noting “the lofty wishes of the Korean people,” the two leaders signed an accord that declared their intention to work toward peaceful national unification, authorized family reunions by August 15 and eventual repatriation of long-term political prisoners, and promoted a “balanced development” of their economies as well as accelerated social, cultural, health, environmental, and sports exchanges. The accord also called for a continuing dialogue, including a reciprocal visit to Seoul by Kim Jong Il “at an appropriate time.” The foreign ministers of the two Koreas conferred for the first time during the July 2000 forum

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of the Association of Southeast Asians Nations, held in Bangkok, Thailand. Ministerial-level discussions continued July 29–31 in Seoul and August 29–September 1 in Pyongyang. The latter session concluded with an agreement permitting the ROK and DPRK military establishments to open a dialogue. Both delegations also approved additional family reunion meetings in Mt. Keumgang, a resort just north of the DMZ. Renewals of rail and highway links were also approved. The North-South defense ministers met in late September, with the first working-level military sessions following in November and December. The inaugural meeting of an Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Committee convened on December 28. Apparently because of the less-thanconciliatory stance of the new U.S. George W. Bush administration, North Korea postponed a fifth round of North-South talks that had been scheduled for March 2001. The session was ultimately held in Seoul on September 15–18 and was followed by a mostly unproductive November 9–14 round in Mt. Keumgang. Objecting to the heightened security instituted in Seoul following the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Pyongyang delayed the seventh session until August 12–14, 2002. In the interim, another altercation near the NLL had resulted in the sinking of a South Korean patrol boat and casualties on both sides. Several additional rounds of ministerial-level talks were convened between October 2002 and October 2003, a period that also saw the continuation of family reunions in Mt. Keumgang, the opening of the first road link between North and South in February 2003, and completion of the first rail connection across the DMZ in June 2003. In the same month, groundbreaking occurred for an industrial complex in Kaesong, in the North, to house South Korean manufacturing firms. (The first tenant in the industrial park began operations in December 2004.) The 14th round of cabinet-level talks held May 5–7, 2004, were followed by a meeting of senior military leaders on May 26 and by a June 4 agree-

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ment to reduce tensions at the DMZ and near the NLL. Such positive developments were more than offset, however, by continuing hostility between Washington and Pyongyang. Following the latter’s assertion in October 2002 that it had not abandoned its nuclear weapons program, as it had agreed to do in 1994, fuel oil shipments to the North were halted. Pyongyang then reopened its nuclear facility in Yongbyon, ordered the last IAEA inspectors to leave the country, and announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The consequent diplomatic crisis was marked by heightened rhetoric from Pyongyang, which further stated that it would abrogate the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The North nevertheless gave way on its demand for bilateral discussions with the Bush administration and agreed to participate in the opening of six-party nuclear talks in Beijing on August 27–29, 2003, involving both Koreas, China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. Second and third rounds of six-party talks took place in February and June 2004, but North Korea continued to insist that it would not abandon its weapons program, despite inducements from other participants. (For details of subsequent six-party developments, see the DPRK article.) In August 2004 the North canceled an additional round of North-South cabinet-level talks because 469 North Korean refugees had been flown to South Korea from Vietnam. (The number of defectors rose to 1,385 in 2003 and 1,890 in 2004 before dropping back to 1,386 in 2005, while an estimated 100,000 to 300,000 illegal migrants may be living in China and elsewhere.) After a ten-month lapse, working-level discussions, held in Kaesong, resumed on May 16–19, 2005, and on June 22–23 a 15th round of cabinet-level meetings was conducted in Seoul. In addition to further bilateral military talks and a tenth meeting of the Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Committee, July saw the restoration of private North-South telephone links, 60 years after they had been severed. On November 17 ROK President Roh Moo Hyun and U.S.

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President Bush jointly called for establishment of a forum to draft a formal peace treaty as a step toward “full reconciliation and peaceful reunification” of the Koreas. Despite an impasse in the six-party talks, NorthSouth discussions at working and ministerial levels continued into 2006. The 18th cabinet-level session, held April 21–24 in Pyongyang, concluded

with issuance of an eight-point statement that, among other things, supported joint development of the Han River estuary and of zinc and magnesite mines in the North. The two Koreas also appeared to be moving closer toward resolving a complaint from Seoul that the North continues to hold some 450 prisoners of war, dating back to the 1950–1953 conflict, as well as nearly 500 abductees.

D E M O C R AT I C P E O P L E ’ S R E P U B L I C O F KO R E A Chos o˘ n Minchu-chui Inmin Konghwa-guk

See the note at the end of this entry for information on current events.

The Country A land of mountains and valleys, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is located in East Asia, bordering in the north on the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation and in the south on the Republic of Korea (ROK). Its people, like those in the ROK, are characterized by ethnic and linguistic homogeneity, tracing their origins to the Mongols and the Chinese. Traditionally, Koreans have followed Buddhism and Shamanism, but after the establishment of the Communist regime, religion declined as a factor in North Korean life. Information on women’s economic participation is not currently available, although the DPRK claims full employment for all its citizens. The DPRK has more plentiful natural resources than the ROK and inherited a substantial industrial base from the Japanese occupation, but the Korean conflict of 1950–1953 destroyed much of its economic infrastructure. The Soviet-type economy was reconstructed at a high rate of growth with substantial Soviet and Chinese aid. At present, more than 90 percent of the economy is socialized, agricultural land and production remain collectivized, and state-owned enterprises continue to produce the vast majority of manufactured goods. Recently,

however, the government has permitted farmers and others to retain income from legal “sideline activities,” such as kitchen gardens, while a “special economic zone” was established in Rajin-Sonbong in 1991 to facilitate joint ventures with foreigners.

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In 1998 the government agreed to form a partnership with South Korea’s Hyundai to develop scenic Mt. Keumgang, on the southeast coast, as a tourist resort; to proceed with a number of other joint ventures; and to build during the next ten years an industrial park for branches of various South Korean firms. As of May 2006, the industrial complex in Kaesong housed a dozen South Korean companies and employed some 6,500 North Koreans; completion is expected in 2012. The agricultural sector is dominated by production of rice, maize, and other grains for domestic consumption. Heavy industry includes the manufacture of steel, other metallurgical products, and cement. Ore deposits include coal, iron, gold, silver, magnesite, copper, and lead. Light manufacturing has been of increasing importance since the breakup of the Soviet Union forced economic reorganization, and textiles now constitute a principal source of export earnings. China ranks as North Korea’s main trading partner. Economic data on the DPRK remain difficult to obtain, and those released by the government often are not comparable with those for other countries. According to Pyongyang, the economy suffered drastic declines in the 1990s, with the GDP dropping by over 27 percent in 1994 and by more than 18 percent in 1995 and again in 1996. Despite some $1 billion in international food and other aid from South Korea and elsewhere, as many as 1.5 million people may have died from starvation or related disease from 1995 to 1998. Agriculture employed just under 30 percent of the labor force and accounted for 30 percent of GDP in 2002, with industry contributing 38 percent. In 1999 the economy reportedly grew for the first time in a decade, expanding by 6 percent. Growth in the following three years averaged about 2 percent.

Government and Politics Political Background A provisional “people’s republic” was established in the northern half of Korea under Soviet

auspices in February 1946, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was formally organized on September 9, 1948, following proclamation of the Republic of Korea in the South. Both the government and the ruling Korean Workers’ Party (KWP), which superseded the Communist Party in 1949, were headed by KIM Il Sung, a Soviettrained Communist. Suggesting that North Korean political authority might be passing from Kim Il Sung to his son, KIM Jong Il, the younger Kim was appointed to what was one of the country’s most powerful posts, chair of the National Defense Commission (NDC), on April 9, 1993. Kim Il Sung died on July 8, 1994, but no action on succession was forthcoming until October 8, 1997, when Kim Jong Il was named KWP general secretary. The state presidency remained vacant. Uncontested elections to the 687-member Tenth Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) were held on July 26, 1998, with the Central Election Committee reporting a voter turnout of 99.85 percent. At its first session on September 5 the new legislature, which included 60 generals among its membership, approved a number of constitutional changes (see Constitution and government, below) and reelected Kim Jong Il as NDC chair. Kim was thereby confirmed as de facto head of state, the state presidency having been abolished in deference to the memory of Kim Il Sung, whom the new preamble to the constitution described as the country’s “eternal President.” On the same day KIM Yong Nam, theretofore foreign minister, was named to the newly created post of president of the Assembly’s Presidium, and Vice Premier HONG Song Nam was elevated to the premiership, succeeding KANG Song San, who had served as premier since 1984. In a surprise statement on April 10, 2000, the two Koreas announced that Kim Jong Il and President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea would hold a summit in Pyongyang in mid-June. The announcement came in the midst of an unprecedented DPRK foreign relations initiative that included conclusion of a new friendship treaty with Russia in February, reestablishment of relations with Australia in May,

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Constitution and Government Political Status: Communist people’s republic established September 9, 1948. Area: 46,540 sq. mi. (120,538 sq. km.). Population: 21,213,378 (1993C); 22,942,000 (2005E). Major Urban Centers (1993C): PYONGYANG (2,741,000), Nampo (731,000), Namhung (710,000), Chongjin (582,000), Kaesong (334,000). Official Language: Korean. Monetary Unit: Won. The won is not readily convertible. As of July 1, 2006, the government’s official exchange rate was approximately 142 won = $1US. However, the unofficial market rate at that time was more than 2000 won = $1US. Chair of the National Defense Commission: KIM Jong Il (KIM Ch˘ong-il); served as de facto head of state from the death of President KIM Il Sung (KIM Il-s˘ong) on July 8, 1994, until election to a five-year term by the Supreme People’s Assembly on September 5, 1998; reelected on September 3, 2003. President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly: KIM Yong Nam; elected to the newly created office by the Supreme People’s Assembly on September 5, 1998; reelected on September 3, 2004. Premier: PAK Pong Ju; elected by the Supreme People’s Assembly on September 3, 2003, succeeding HONG Song Nam.

and an unexpected visit by Kim Jong Il to China in late May—his first trip abroad in 17 years. During the historic June 13–15 summit in Pyongyang, the two Korean leaders called for, among other things, eventual national reunification and economic cooperation (see the preceding Korea article for details). Pro forma balloting for the SPA on August 3, 2003, saw all 687 members elected unopposed. In its first session on September 3 the new legislature reelected Kim Jong Il as NDC chair and approved the selection of PAK Pong Ju, formerly the chemical industry minister, as premier.

From 1948 to 1972 the DPRK’s nominal head of state was the chair of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly; the office was, however, of substantially less consequence than that of premier. Under the constitution of December 1972 executive authority was vested in the president of the republic. In addition, a “super cabinet,” the Central People’s Committee, oversaw operation of the Administration Council, a cabinet-like body headed by the premier. Constitutional changes adopted on September 5, 1998, by the SPA included abolition of the state presidency. Although the SPA remains the highest state organ, its authority to determine questions of war and peace passed to the ten-member National Defense Committee, whose chair now serves as head of state. The Central People’s Committee and the Standing Committee were abolished, with most of their duties and powers being assigned to a newly created SPA Presidium that ranks as the “highest organ of state power” between full SPA sessions. The Presidium also assumed responsibility for diplomatic functions, including ratifying and abrogating treaties, that had previously been under the purview of the state presidency; the Presidium’s president, the second highest DPRK official, “represents the state” and receives credentials of foreign representatives. The Administration Council was replaced by a smaller Cabinet that not only functions as the SPA’s “administrative and executive” body but also has additional authority for governmental management. The premier, who “represents the government of the DPRK,” is assisted by two (previously ten) vice premiers. The judicial system is headed by the Central Court and includes a People’s Court and local courts. Judges are elected by the SPA. Administratively, the DPRK is divided into nine provinces and four special municipalities (Pyongyang, Nampo, Najin Sonbong, and Kaesong). Smaller units of local government include cities, urban districts, and counties. Each unit has its own people’s assembly with a people’s committee that, in addition to serving as the “local sovereign power

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organ” between assembly sessions, functions as the local administrative and executive body.

Foreign Relations For more than four decades the foreign posture of the DPRK was largely determined by its relations with the ROK and with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union. The most important foreign policy issue has long been reunification of the peninsula, but the promising initiatives of the early 1970s failed to bear fruit. By 1979 the ROK had charged the DPRK with 43,000 violations of the 1953 armistice, while the DPRK had in turn charged the ROK with over 217,000 violations. The most striking rupture in North-South relations came in October 1983 after a bomb attack in Yangon, Myanmar, that killed four South Korean cabinet ministers. After two captured DPRK army members confessed to having been ordered to attack the South Korean delegation, including President Chun Doo Hwan, Yangon withdrew recognition of the DPRK and both Seoul and Washington demanded a public apology. Pyongyang, however, persisted in denying any responsibility for the incident. (For subsequent North-South developments, see the preceding article.) The country has gone through a number of phases in relations with its northern and western neighbors. Close links with the Soviet Union were cultivated until 1964, while a generally proChinese period came to an end during the PRC’s “Cultural Revolution” in the second half of the 1960s. Subsequently, the Kim Il Sung regime maintained a somewhat ambivalent position, steadfastly proclaiming a policy of Juche, or self-reliance, while depending on both the Soviet Union and the PRC for aid. In September 1995 Moscow formally terminated a defense treaty dating from 1961. Pyongyang responded that the treaty had been “as good as nullified” by the collapse of the Soviet Union and welcomed a proposal for a new nonmilitary cooperation agreement with the Russian Federation. In February 2000, during a visit to the North

Korean capital by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov—the first such visit by a leading Russian official since Moscow had granted diplomatic recognition to South Korea a decade earlier—the two states concluded a friendship treaty that the SPA ratified in April. Newly inaugurated Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Pyongyang in mid-July, while Kim Jong Il paid reciprocal visits to Russia in August 2001 and in August 2002. On November 3, 1998, the DPRK, Russia, and the PRC signed an agreement demarcating their mutual sea borders. On June 3–7, 1999, Kim Yong Nam led the first high-level visit to China since Beijing had extended diplomatic recognition to South Korea in 1991. During Kim Jong Il’s May 2000 trip to Beijing, he conferred with both President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji, who reportedly offered some $1 billion in additional aid but also encouraged cooperation with South Korea, restraint in weapons and missile development, and economic reform. On December 11, 1991, Seoul announced that all U.S. atomic weapons had been removed from South Korea, and in March 1992 the two Koreas agreed to form a Joint Nuclear Control Committee. In April North Korea reversed a six-year refusal to permit inspection of its nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and in early May submitted a detailed report on its nuclear program. Although thereafter permitting inspectors to visit some nuclear sites, the Communist regime refused to open others and in March 1993 threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which it had acceded in 1985. On April 1 the IAEA notified the UN Security Council of North Korea’s “noncompliance” with the NPT and requested a food and fuel embargo. While remaining defiant, Pyongyang soon called for discussions with Washington to secure an end to the impasse. In July 1993 U.S.-DPRK negotiations in Geneva yielded an agreement whereby Pyongyang would resume talks with the IAEA, and Washington would consider aid for the construction of nonmilitary light-water reactors. In August North Korea granted access to five “declared” sites, but not to

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two others in Yongbyon. No further progress was registered until February 1994, when the DPRK agreed to unimpeded inspection of all seven sites, although not of two suspected nuclear waste dumps that could potentially yield a supply of bomb-grade material. Talks on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula were thereupon resumed until continued North Korean intransigence brought them to a halt in March. In June former U.S. President Jimmy Carter began two days of talks with the DPRK leadership, which led to a resumption of negotiations in Geneva in August. Shortly thereafter North Korea agreed to permit IAEA inspectors to visit the previously closed Yongbyon installations. The undeclared waste sites remained off limits. Further talks produced a formal pact on October 21, 1994, in which Washington agreed to extend diplomatic recognition, arrange for financial assistance (estimated at some $4.6 billion) for the construction of two modern nuclear reactors, and supply 500,000 tons of fuel oil a year during the switch-over. (Subsequently, it was agreed that South Korea would meet 70 percent of the cost and Japan another 20 percent, with the balance to be provided by the United States and others.) For its part, Pyongyang agreed to freeze all of its nuclear activities, provide safe storage for some 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods, and accept full IAEA inspection after significant progress had been made toward construction of the new facilities. On December 16, at the conclusion of a two-day meeting in San Francisco, representatives of the United States, South Korea, and Japan agreed to set up a multilateral consortium, named the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), to oversee financing of the U.S.-DPRK nuclear accord. One day after the San Francisco meeting, U.S.DPRK relations again worsened with the downing of a U.S. military helicopter that had apparently strayed into North Korean air space. Although Pyongyang promptly returned the body of a pilot killed in the incident, release of a surviving pilot came only after Washington had warned that the nuclear plant financing could be in jeopardy.

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A deadline of April 21, 1995, for finalizing the October 1994 nuclear accord was not met, primarily because of Pyongyang’s insistence that the replacement light-water reactors be of U.S. rather than of South Korean manufacture. In June, however, the DPRK reversed its long-held position, accepting a face-saving proviso that the reactors be of “the advanced version of U.S.-origin design and technology currently under production.” By late September 1996 intensive DPRK-KEDO negotiations had led to an agreement on the details of the nuclear plant project, and a groundbreaking ceremony was held in the east coast town of Sinpo on August 9, 1997. By then, the European Union had joined KEDO. Meanwhile, the DPRK continued to deny IAEA inspectors access to some laboratory sites, although U.S. help in sealing spent fuel rods continued. In August 1998 reports surfaced that U.S. intelligence had discovered yet another underground weapons site. Despite Pyongyang’s initial demands for monetary compensation in return for opening the Kumchangri complex, a series of bilateral talks resulted on March 16, 1999, in a joint statement in which the North Korean regime agreed to provide access to the site beginning in May. For its part, U.S. President Bill Clinton’s administration pledged additional food and agricultural aid. An initial inspection of the Kumchangri facilities on May 20–24, 1999, and a repeat inspection a year later revealed that they were incomplete and posed no security threat. In mid-1999 rumors began emerging that North Korea was preparing to test a longer-range version of a missile it had fired on August 31, 1998, over Japan and into the Pacific. U.S.-DPRK talks on North Korea’s missile program had begun in 1996, with the most recent round having ended inconclusively on March 30, 1999. In a renewed diplomatic effort, on May 25–29, 1999, former U.S. secretary of defense William Perry visited Pyongyang, reportedly offering additional economic assistance and diplomatic ties if the DPRK showed sufficient restraint in its nuclear weapons and missile programs. In the preceding month Washington had already pledged some 500,000 tons of direct food

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assistance, all previous food aid having been channeled through UN agencies. Meeting with North Korean representatives in Geneva on August 3, U.S. officials threatened an end to the food aid if the anticipated missile test occurred. Despite initial recalcitrance, later in the month Pyongyang agreed to postpone indefinitely further missile flight tests and to participate in additional bilateral sessions on the matter. Talks conducted in Berlin, Germany, on September 7–11, 1999, by Vice Foreign Minister KIM Kye Kwan and U.S. special envoy Charles Kartman were followed on September 17 by an announcement that the United States would soon ease the embargo that had been in place since 1953, the principal exception being for military-related goods and technology. A week later Pyongyang formally announced a suspension of ballistic missile testing. Additional talks in Berlin in November and in January 2000 focused on ways of improving relations and on prospects for higher-level negotiations. The talks moved to New York in March and then to Rome, Italy, in late May before returning to Berlin in July, where the DPRK reportedly demanded that it be removed from the U.S. list of countries that support international terrorism. On June 19, 2000, President Clinton, following through on his announcement of the previous September, lifted economic sanctions against the DPRK, Pyongyang having reaffirmed its moratorium on missile flight testing. Talks on the missile program resumed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, July 10–12 and November 1–3 but ended with the United States refusing to meet the DPRK’s request for $1 billion a year in compensation for ending missile sales. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and DPRK Foreign Minister PAEK Nam Sun met for the first time on July 28 during a session of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Bangkok, Thailand, with Albright on October 23 then becoming the most senior U.S. official ever to visit the North. The change of U.S. administration in January 2001 clearly chilled relations between Washington and Pyongyang, and they worsened throughout 2002, which began with U.S. President George W.

Bush identifying the DPRK, along with Iraq and Iran, as part of an “axis of evil.” The North also continued to be angered over U.S. insistence on IAEA inspection of all nuclear facilities. On August 7 U.S. officials attended the first pouring of concrete for a nuclear power plant under the 1994 KEDO agreement, but relations took on a darker cast during an October 3–5 visit by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly to Pyongyang: the DPRK proclaimed that it had continued its nuclear weapons program in violation of the agreement. On November 15 KEDO announced that it would suspend future deliveries of heavy fuel oil to the North, pending progress on the nuclear weapons issue. With the rhetoric on both sides escalating, Pyongyang ordered all IAEA inspectors to leave the country, restarted the Yongbyon nuclear reactor, and in April 2003 formally withdrew from the NPT. At the same time, the North demanded that the United States renew bilateral discussions, a demand rejected by the Bush administration, which, since coming into office in January 2001, had been disinclined to pursue the dialogue begun by the preceding Clinton administration. As a direct consequence of Pyongyang’s decisions, work on the two KEDO reactors was ultimately suspended. On August 27–29, 2003, in an effort to diffuse the crisis, six-party talks involving the two Koreas, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia opened in Beijing, with additional rounds taking place on February 25–27 and June 23–26, 2004. By then, the general consensus was that Pyongyang had sufficient plutonium for up to eight nuclear warheads. In February 2004 the former head of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, revealed that he had transmitted nuclear secrets to several countries, including North Korea, giving credence to speculation that North Korea had in turn assisted Pakistan with missile development. For years the cash-strapped North has been considered the world’s leading exporter of rockets and related technology—in August 2000 Kim Jong Il himself had confirmed sales to Iran and Syria. (Accusations have surfaced in recent years that the North may also be obtaining much-needed income from the sale of illegal drugs.)

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Following more than a year of political gamesmanship, a fourth six-party session opened in Beijing on July 26, 2005, and continued until a recess on August 7. When the talks resumed on September 13–19, the DPRK indicated its intention to renew participation in both the NPT and the IAEA’s safeguards regime, but no additional progress was reported in the fifth round, held November 9–11. Less than a month later, the DPRK announced a boycott of further six-party sessions until the United States ended financial sanctions that it had imposed in response to the DPRK’s alleged counterfeiting of U.S. currency, money-laundering, and smuggling. Until the nuclear weapons impasse brought the program to a halt, Pyongyang and Washington had regularly discussed the fate of the 8,000 U.S. servicemen still listed as missing in action from the Korean conflict. Some 40 joint exhumations took place 1996–1999, but further efforts stopped in late 1999 because Washington refused to accept any linkage, as demanded by the North, to additional economic assistance. In June 2000 the two sides reached agreement on a plan for further excavations, the first of which took place on June 25, the 50th anniversary of the start of the Korean War. Between 1996 and North Korea’s termination of the program in June 2005, the remains of over 200 individuals were recovered. In an abrupt reversal of policy, the DPRK sought during 1990 to establish relations with Japan, although it demanded that Tokyo apologize for its 35 years of colonial rule and match the $500 million in economic compensation given to South Korea when Tokyo and Seoul normalized relations in 1965. The apology was forthcoming at the January 30, 1991, launching of normalization talks, although Japan rejected the demand for compensation. Little was accomplished before the DPRK terminated discussions in November 1992. The following May, to Tokyo’s consternation, North Korea test-fired a medium-range missile over the Sea of Japan. In June 1998 the DPRK suspended a 1997 program under which Japanese-born spouses of Korean men had been allowed to visit their homeland, Japan having earlier dismissed the results of

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an unsuccessful North Korean investigation into the whereabouts of ten or more Japanese who had allegedly been kidnapped in the 1970s and 1980s to teach North Korean agents. Tokyo insisted that normalization would not proceed until the search for the missing Japanese showed progress. Relations with Japan took yet another downturn with the DPRK’s August 1998 missile launching, which prompted Tokyo to temporarily freeze food aid and development assistance, including its share of KEDO funding. North Korea insisted that the vehicle was a satellite launcher, which U.S. intelligence later admitted may have been the case. Tokyo announced in May 1999 that it would release its KEDO funding. In mid-December 1999, meeting in Beijing, representatives of the DPRK and Japan agreed, after a seven-year hiatus, to resume the suspended normalization talks. The normalization process, which nevertheless failed to advance over the next two years, was set back on December 22, 2001, when the Japanese coast guard sank a suspected North Korean spy ship in Japan’s exclusive economic zone, an act that the North characterized as “brutal piracy.” On September 17, 2002, in an effort to reenergize the diplomatic process, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi traveled to Pyongyang, where, for the first time, the DPRK admitted having abducted Japanese between 1977 and 1983. Kim Jong Il also expressed a willingness to permit full IAEA inspections and to maintain a moratorium on the DPRK’s missile testing beyond 2003. In return, Koizumi apologized for the colonial occupation and offered to provide economic assistance following normalization of relations. Although ministerial-level talks resumed October 29–30, 2002, in Kuala Lumpur, the event was overshadowed by the revelation, earlier in the month, of North Korea’s continuing nuclear weapons program and by a visit to Japan of five of the nationals who had been abducted more than two decades earlier. The unsuccessful October talks were to have been followed by additional negotiations in November, but the decision of the five kidnapped Japanese to remain in Japan led to a further rupture. A visit by Japan’s Prime Minister

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Koizumi in May 2004 accomplished little. Bilateral talks resumed February 4–8, 2006, but no progress occurred with regard to normalization, the abduction issue, or the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs.

Current Issues In mid-2004 Washington appeared ready to propose incentives if North Korea would adhere to a strict timetable for ending nuclear weapons development, allowing inspectors to return, and permitting weapons facilities to be dismantled and equipment to be shipped abroad for disposal, as Libya had recently done. Upon North Korean acceptance of the proposal and suspension of its weapons program, the other four participants in the six-party talks would quickly resume fuel aid and Washington would prepare security assurances. Talks could follow on lifting economic sanctions, providing additional energy aid, and retraining weapons scientists. According to this scenario, the DPRK might then be in a position to reduce by up to one-third the ranks of its million-plus armed forces, slash military spending, and commit more funds to economic development. Eventual diplomatic recognition from Washington could also lead to the DPRK’s membership in the Asian Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other sources of concessionary loans. For the most part, however, the DPRK has never chosen to accept such scenarios, all of which apparently entail an unacceptable loss of face. In September 2005, before the six-party talks collapsed once again, the South Korean United News Agency reported that Kim Jong Il had been induced back to the talks in July not only by assurances that Washington regarded the DPRK as a sovereign state and that it had no intention of initiating military action, but by what was perceived as President Bush’s respectful reference to the DPRK leader as “Mr. Kim Jong Il” during discussions with the South Korea’s President Roh in June. Efforts to restart the sixparty talks in 2006 were set back once again by the DPRK, which decided to break its moratorium on missile flight tests. On July 4, despite warnings from the other six-party participants, North Korea

launched seven missiles over the Sea of Japan, one of them a longer-range rocket that failed less than a minute into its flight. In March 2004 Premier Pak stated that his government’s principal task for the year was “to make leaping progress in the national economy.” In 2002 the government had increased wages and prices of rice, diesel, and other commodities to reflect market values, and in 2003 it had expanded the range of products individuals could offer in “farmers’ markets,” where consumers can purchase some privately produced manufactures as well as agricultural goods. Nevertheless, such small-scale commerce still constitutes under 5 percent of the economy. During a January 10–18, 2006, trip to the PRC, Kim Jong Il visited a number of central and southern economic centers and was reportedly “deeply impressed” by the results of China’s free-market reforms. His apparent interest in instituting such reforms, even in a limited number of special economic zones, has been hampered, however, by the tight financial and banking controls imposed by the United States because of the counterfeiting and money-laundering accusations. Furthermore, economic growth will require industrial modernization, which in turn depends on foreign capital, and North Korea continues to be perceived as an investment risk. In August 2004 an assessment prepared by the UN Environment Program, the UN Development Program, and Pyongyang noted significant environmental degradation in the North, including deforestation, polluted rivers, and diminished air quality. The report stated that crop yields had dropped by two-thirds in the 1990s because of such factors as poor land management, overuse of chemicals, and both drought and floods. In November 2004 the World Food Program (WFP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization jointly reported that, despite its best harvest in a decade, North Korea would still require food support for one-fourth of its population in the coming year, in part because the poorest segment could not afford the recently raised food prices. In the second half of 2005 North Korea demanded that the WFP discontinue emergency food

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aid and replace it with development assistance. As a result of the attendant disagreement, by the end of the year the WFP was feeding only 600,000 North Koreans, down from 6.5 million at midyear. Effective January 1, 2006, Pyongyang ordered an end to the program. Months of negotiations followed, and in May 2006 the WFP introduced its first “transitional program,” under which it is to provide grain and enriched foods for two years to 1.9 million North Koreans while moving, in the words of the WFP’s Asia director, “in the direction of development assistance.” The WFP also agreed to reduce the number of field monitors, who remain responsible for seeing that the food reaches the “intended beneficiaries.” Speculation about Kim Jong Il’s possible successor persists. Kim, now 64, is rumored to have heart problems, and it has generally been assumed that he would soon begin grooming one of his three sons to carry on the minidynasty. KIM Jong Nam, at 35 the eldest of the three, apparently fell out of favor following his 2001 arrest in Japan while carrying a fraudulent Dominican passport. Kim’s second son, KIM Jong Chol, 25, has been identified as a likely heir.

Political Parties Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland (DFRF). The DFRF is an umbrella grouping of the dominant KWP, two smaller parties (below), and a number of mass organizations, including the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea, the Korean Democratic Women’s Union, the Kim Il Sung Socialist Youth League, and the Union of Agricultural Working People of Korea. Chief of the Secretariat: KIM Wan Su. Korean Workers’ Party—KWP (Chos˘on No-dong Dang). Founded in 1949 through merger of the existing Communist Party and the recently established National Party, the KWP controls all political activity in the DPRK through an overlapping of party, executive, and legislative posts. Although party congresses are to meet every five years, the last one to convene, the sixth, met October 10–14, 1980, nearly

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a decade after the fifth. Between congresses, a Central Committee (encompassing 171 members and 141 alternates as of April 1998) acts on its behalf. In turn, the Central Committee names a Politburo. Kim Jong Il is the only remaining member of the five-man Politburo Presidium designated at the 1980 congress, one member having been dismissed and three having died. On October 8, 1997, Kim was named to the additional post of general secretary, an office that had been vacant since Kim Il Sung’s death. Other party organs include a Central Military Commission and a Secretariat. An October 1999 report by the South Korean intelligence service suggested that Politburo member Kye Ung Thae may have been dismissed from his public security duties, while the elderly Kim Yong Ju and Pak Song Chol, each of whom had been named honorary vice chair of the SPA Presidium in 1998, may have left the leadership. In April 2001 the South Korean newspaper Chosun Ilbo reported that Kim Jong Il’s younger sister, KIM Kyong Hui, had been made secretary to the KWP Central Committee. General Secretary: Mar. KIM Jong Il. Other Members of Politburo: HAN Song Ryong, JON Pyong Ho, KIM Yong Ju, KIM Yong Nam, KYE Ung Thae, PAK Song Chol. Korean Social Democratic Party—KSDP (Chos˘on Sahoeminjudang). The KSDP was launched in November 1945 as the Democratic Party, acquiring substantial support in both urban and rural areas prior to the flight of most of its leaders to the south in 1946. The party assumed its current name in 1981. Its current chair succeeded the late KIM Pyong Sik, who had served as a DPRK vice president from 1993 to 1998. Leader: KIM Yong Dae (Chair). Chongdoist Chungu Party —CCP (Chondogyo Ch’ong-u-dang). Sometimes translated as the Young Friends Party, the CCP descended from a prewar anti-Japanese group of religious (Chondo, or “Heaven’s Way”) nationalists. The Young Friends enjoyed a degree of autonomy

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Cabinet As of June 1, 2006 Premier Vice Premiers

Pak Pong Ju Jon Sung Hun Kwak Pom Gi Ro Tu Chol

Ministers Agriculture Chemical Industry City Management Commerce Construction and Building-Materials Industries Crude Oil Industry Culture Education Electronics Industry Extractive Industries Finance Fisheries Foreign Affairs Foreign Trade Forestry Labor Land and Environmental Protection Land and Marine Transport Light Industry Machine-Building Industry Metal Industry People’s Armed Forces Post and Telecommunications Power and Coal Industries Procurement and Food Administration Public Health People’s Security Railways State Construction Control State Inspection Chair, State Planning Commission Chair, Physical Culture and Sports Guidance Committee Director, Central Statistics Bureau President, National Academy of Sciences President, Central Bank Chief Secretary

Ri Kyong Sik Ri Mu Yong Choe Jong Gon Ri Yong Son Tong Chong Ho Ko Jong Sik Kim Jin Song Kim Yong Jin O Su Yong Kang Min Chol Mun Il Bong Ri Song Ung Paek Nam Sun Kim Kyong Man Sok Kun Su Jong Yong Su Pak Song Nam Kim Yong Il Ri Ju O Jo Pyong Ju Kim Sung Hyon Kim Il Chol Ryu Yong Sop Ju Tong Il Choe Nam Gyun Kim Su Hak Ju Sang Son Kim Yong Sam Pae Tal Jun Kim Ui Sun Kim Kwang Rin Mun Jae Dok Kim Chang Su Pyon Yong Rip Kim Wan Su Kim Yong Ho

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until the Korean conflict, when it was brought under effective KWP control. Leader: RYU Mi Yong (Chair).

Legislature The unicameral Supreme People’s Assembly (Choe Ko In Min Hoe Ui) is elected from a single slate of KWP members and party-approved nominees. Although the five-year term of the Ninth Assembly technically expired in 1995, an extended period of mourning for Kim Il Sung was given as the reason for having postponed the election of the 687-member Tenth Assembly until July 26, 1998. The new assembly convened on September 5 to approve constitutional amendments and to elect the state and legislative leaderships. One of the changes to the basic law abolished the assembly’s Standing Committee, which had previously conducted the body’s business between sessions, and replaced it with a 17-member Presidium. The 11th SPA was elected August 3, 2003. President of the Presidium: KIM Yong Nam.

Communications All news media are censored by the KWP and staffed by KWP-approved personnel.

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unless otherwise noted: Rodong Shinmun (Labor Daily), organ of the KWP Central Committee; Rodongja Shinmun (Workers’ Daily), organ of the General Federation of Trade Unions; Minju Chosun (Democratic Korea), organ of the SPA; Chosun Inmingun (Korean People’s Army); Saenal (New Day), biweekly Youth League organ; Korea Today, monthly in Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish.

News Agencies The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) is the official government news service. Russia’s ITAR-TASS has a bureau in Pyongyang.

Broadcasting The DPRK Radio and Television Broadcasting Committee controls all stations. Television programming was available to approximately 2.1 million receivers in 2003.

Intergovernmental Representation At present, there are no diplomatic relations between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

Press

Permanent Representative to the UN PAK Gil Yon

Reliable circulation figures remain unavailable. The following are dailies published in Pyongyang,

IGO Memberships (Non-UN) NAM

Note: North Korea conducts its first nuclear test on October 9, 2006, provoking widespread international condemnation. In a unanimous vote on October 14, the UN Security Council imposes trade and travel sanctions on North Korea in response.

R E P U B L I C O F KO R E A Taehan-min’guk

The Country Characterized by mountainous terrain in the north and east and broad plains in the south, the Republic of Korea (ROK) is densely settled. A majority of its population is concentrated in the southern section, although approximately one-quarter are residents of the capital, Seoul, which is located within 30 miles of the demilitarized zone (DMZ) that separates it from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The people are ethnically homogeneous, tracing their heritage to Mongol and Chinese origins. Buddhism, Shamanism, and Christianity are the important religions; the ROK has one of the largest Christian populations in Asia, numbering in excess of 17 million. Women constitute over 40 percent of the labor force, although many work unpaid on family farms. The remainder are concentrated in services, health care, and textile and electronics manufacture. Unlike the DPRK, the ROK did not begin the post–World War II period with a substantial industrial base, and postwar growth was cut short by the Korean conflict of 1950–1953. Subsequently, however, industrial expansion was rapid, and by the mid-1970s the agricultural sector (agriculture, fishing, and forestry) had been surpassed by manufacturing as a contributor to GDP. Agriculture now employs under 10 percent of the labor force and accounts for only 4 percent of GDP. Farming is devoted primarily to grain production, chiefly rice; ocean fishing, both for domestic markets and export, is also important. Industry (manufacturing, construction, and utilities), which employs about 25 percent of workers and constitutes 40 percent of GDP, is concentrated in electronics, transport equipment (including ships), machinery, ferrous

metals, chemicals, processed foods, and textiles. South Korea’s relatively scarce mineral resources include deposits of coal and iron. Leading trading partners are the United States, Japan, and China. During the 1980s South Korea experienced an average annual economic growth rate of 9.5 percent, making it one of the world’s fastest-growing economies. The 1990–1997 rate of 7.2 percent was only slightly less impressive. In 1995 the value of its exports exceeded $100 million for the first time, and by 1996, when it joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as a “developed” state, South Korea had achieved the world’s 11th-largest GNP. In the second half

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Political Status: Independent republic established August 15, 1948; present constitution approved in national referendum of October 27, 1987, effective February 25, 1988. Area: 38,309 sq. mi. (99,221 sq. km.). Population: 46,136,101 (2000C); 49,774,000 (2005E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): SEOUL (9,572,000), Pusan (3,566,000), Taegu (2,625,000), Inchon (2,567,000), Taejon (1,467,000), Kwangju (1,451,000), Ulsan (928,000). Official Language: Korean. Monetary Unit: Won (market rate July 1, 2006: 948.70 won = $1US). President: ROH Moo Hyun (Uri Party; initially Millennium Democratic Party); elected December 19, 2002, and sworn in for a five-year term on February 25, 2003, succeeding KIM Dae Jung (Millennium Democratic Party); presidential duties assumed by Prime Minister GOH Hun upon impeachment of Roh by the National Assembly on March 12, 2004; reinstated on May 14 by ruling of the Constitutional Court. Prime Minister: HAN Myeong Sook (Uri Party); nominated by the president on March 24, 2006, and confirmed by the National Assembly on April 19, following the resignation of LEE Hae Chan (Uri Party) on March 14 and the acting incumbency of Deputy Prime Minister HAN Duck Soo (Uri Party).

of 1997, however, the bankruptcies of a number of important conglomerates (chaebols) devastated the financial sector, and the value of the won, which had already been damaged by the spreading financial crises elsewhere in eastern Asia, plummeted against the U.S. dollar, dropping by half for the year. Collaterally, South Korea’s foreignexchange reserves fell drastically, prompting the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to offer in December a record $58 billion stabilization package in return for a commitment to economic reform, including corporate restructuring. During 1998 the

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economy contracted by 6.7 percent and unemployment more than doubled, but by the end of the year a trade surplus had helped Seoul rebuild its foreign reserves from $9 billion to $50 billion, the won had rebounded, interest rates had dropped, and the government had repaid the first $3 billion installment on the IMF loan. Far exceeding expectations, South Korea’s economy recorded growth of 10.9 percent in 1999 and 9.3 percent in 2000, while unemployment rapidly declined. The GDP expanded by a more modest 3.8 percent in 2001, largely because of economic slowdowns in major export markets, but rebounded to a 7.0 growth rate in 2002. Subsequent growth was somewhat erratic, averaging 3.1 percent for 2003 as a whole and 4.6 percent in 2004.

Government and Politics Political Background Syngman RHEE, a conservative president, dominated ROK politics from the establishment of the republic in 1948 until student-led demonstrations against ballot tampering forced his resignation on May 3, 1960. Plagued by administrative chaos, the liberal successor government of President YUN Po Sun and Prime Minister CHANG Myon was overthrown in a bloodless military coup staged by Maj. Gen. PARK Chung Hee and four other officers on May 16, 1961. The National Assembly was dissolved, the constitution suspended, and all political parties disbanded, with General Park assuming executive powers under a military junta called the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction. Although authoritarian, the junta proved relatively incorruptible and sympathetic to the needs of a largely agrarian but modernizing society. As a step toward the reestablishment of civilian rule under a revised constitution, General Park and other leading officers retired from the army preparatory to seeking elective office. Park and his newly formed Democratic Republican Party (DRP) won the presidential and legislative elections held in 1963, and constitutional rule was formally restored with Park’s inauguration as president on December 17.

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President Park was reelected in 1967, but a legislative election the same year was marked by charges of irregularities that led to renewed demonstrations. Following a presidentially inspired constitutional change permitting him to run for a third term, Park was reelected in 1971, winning a narrow victory over opposition candidate KIM Dae Jung. Shortly thereafter, Park declared a state of national emergency and extracted from the National Assembly, over strong opposition, emergency powers that gave him virtually unlimited authority to regulate the economy and limit constitutional freedoms in the interest of national security. Responding to increased political tension, Park abruptly proclaimed martial law on October 17, 1972, and called for the preparation of a new constitution. The resulting document, approved in a referendum held under martial-law restrictions, provided for a powerful president, to be designated by a directly elected National Conference for Unification (NCU), and a weak legislature with one-third of its membership appointed by the NCU. Park was reconfirmed by the NCU on December 22, and a legislative election held February 27, 1973, completed the nominal return to constitutional government. Opposition to the so-called Yushin (“Revitalizing”) Constitution of 1972 grew slowly, with the government responding to recurring protests, both peaceful and violent, by increasingly repressive measures; thus, in May 1975 the regime issued a decree making it a crime to criticize the president and his policies, banning reports of any such criticism, and prohibiting rallies called to urge constitutional revision. Park was returned for a further sixyear term on July 6, 1978, and the DRP, although failing to capture a plurality of votes in balloting on December 12, retained control of the National Assembly. In August 1979 some 200 women employees of a recently bankrupt textile company occupied the headquarters of the opposition New Democratic Party (NDP), demanding that they be allowed to take over management of the firm. On August 11 police and members of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) stormed the building, injur-

ing and arresting several hundred demonstrators as well as a number of NDP assemblymen and journalists. Two days later, intraparty opponents of NDP President KIM Young Sam went to court in an effort to have his mid-May election as NDP leader thrown out, and on September 7 the court ruled in their favor. Following Kim’s expulsion from the National Assembly on October 4 for having criticized the regime in a New York Times interview, the entire legislative opposition resigned in protest. At that point student demonstrations, begun in the aftermath of the August labor protest, expanded into riots, and within a week the cities of Pusan and Masan were under martial law. On October 26, 1979, Park and five companions were assassinated at the direction of the KCIA chief, KIM Jae Kyu, who was subsequently reported to have been severely criticized by Park for incompetence and to have been disturbed by violent tactics ordered against demonstrators. Although anticipating military backing for a government takeover, the KCIA’s Kim was instead arrested by army authorities within hours of the assassination. Park was immediately succeeded by the prime minister, CHOI Kyu Hah, who was elected by the NCU on December 6 to complete Park’s term. Having revoked his predecessor’s emergency decrees and declared an amnesty that freed 1,646 prisoners, the new president stated, at his inauguration on December 21, that he anticipated the enactment of a new constitution “in about a year’s time, unless unexpected contingencies arise.” Earlier in the month, however, Lt. Gen. CHUN Doo Hwan, head of the Defense Security Command, had taken control of the armed forces in what amounted to a coup. Although President Choi remained in office, control of the country was, in effect, in Chun’s hands. A widespread series of labor strikes in April 1980 in support of wage increases to compensate for inflation gradually assumed a political character, with mass student demonstrations on May 17 calling for the resignations of Prime Minister SHIN Hyon Hwak and General Chun. The government responded by arresting Kim Dae Jung and a number of other opposition leaders on May 18, provoking

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a popular uprising in the southern city of Kwangju the following day. On May 20 the Shin government resigned, and PARK Choong Hoon was designated as acting prime minister. On May 27, after heavy fighting and at least 200 deaths, the Kwangju insurrection was suppressed by government forces. President Choi resigned on August 16, 1980, and was succeeded, as acting head of state, by Prime Minister Park. On August 27 Chun Doo Hwan, who had resigned his commission six days before, was elected president by the NCU, and on September 2 he designated NAM Duck Woo as prime minister. A new constitution, approved by a reported majority of 91.6 percent in a referendum held October 22, came into effect five days later, at which time the existing National Assembly was dissolved and its functions assumed, on an interim basis, by an appointive Legislative Council for National Security. Meanwhile, on September 17, Kim Dae Jung had been condemned to death for sedition, but in January 1981, after worldwide appeals for clemency, his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. (In March 1982 the sentence was further reduced to 20 years, and Kim was permitted to seek medical treatment in the United States the following December.) On January 21, 1981, President Chun rescinded martial law, which had been in effect since the Park assassination, and announced that a presidential election would be held on February 25, following balloting for an electoral college on February 11. In the electoral college, Chun’s newly formed Democratic Justice Party (DJP) secured 70 percent of the seats, and he was reinstalled as president on March 3 after being credited with more than ten times as many electoral votes as his closest competitor. Shortly thereafter, on March 25, a new National Assembly was elected, with the DJP obtaining 151 of 276 seats. In a move interpreted as reflecting dissatisfaction with management of the nation’s economy as well as a desire to recruit senior officials not closely associated with the Park regime, President Chun accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Nam on January 3, 1982, and appointed YOO Chang

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Soon as his successor. Four months later the country was rocked by a major financial scandal involving the manipulation of a sizable portion of the country’s money supply by a leading money market operator who, in collusion with a number of government officials, had forced several large firms into bankruptcy. On June 24 the Yoo government, accepting “moral and political responsibility” for the affair, submitted its resignation. The widely respected former president of Korea University, KIM Sang Hyup, was asked to form a new administration that lasted until October 1983, when the DJP chair, CHIN Iee Chong, was named prime minister. Earlier in the month North Korean agents had killed four South Korean cabinet ministers in a bomb attack in Yangon, Myanmar. In December 1984 a number of opposition politicians formed the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP), which won nearly 25 percent of the seats at National Assembly balloting on February 12, 1985. Four days earlier, Kim Dae Jung had returned from the United States and been placed under house arrest (as was Kim Young Sam), even though his 20-year sedition sentence had been suspended. On February 18 Chun again reshuffled the Council of State, replacing the ailing Prime Minister Chin with former intelligence chief LHO Shin Yong, who was in turn replaced in May 1987 by LEE Han Key. Amid intensifying public disorder associated with demands for constitutional reform, in June 1987 ROH Tae Woo, who had been formally endorsed by the DJP as its choice to succeed President Chun, reversed policy and unexpectedly announced that virtually all of the opposition’s reform demands would be met, including the call for direct presidential balloting. On July 10 Chun resigned as DJP leader so that he could carry out his remaining official duties from a “supra-partisan position.” In a cabinet reshuffle three days later he removed all of the party incumbents. KIM Chong Yol, a former air force general and ambassador to the United States, replaced Lee as prime minister. On August 31, 1987, an eight-member committee of government and opposition representatives reached agreement on the essentials of a new

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constitution, which was overwhelmingly approved by the National Assembly on October 12 and by South Korean voters in a referendum on October 27. Although a unified opposition might have won the December 16 presidential poll, neither Kim Young Sam nor Kim Dae Jung was willing to defer to the other. As a result, Roh obtained 35.9 percent of the vote, with Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung winning 27.5 percent and 26.5 percent, respectively; KIM Jong Pil, a former prime minister under President Park, ran fourth with 7.9 percent. Following his victory, Roh named LEE Hyun Jae, a respected educator, as prime minister. The assembly poll of April 26, 1988, yielded only a plurality (125 of 299 seats) for the DJP. It was the first time that a South Korean presidential party had failed to win outright legislative control. A preelection agreement by Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam to merge their forces had again failed, with Kim Jong Pil’s recently organized New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP) securing the balance of power with 35 seats. Faced with former president Chun’s reluctance to testify about alleged misdeeds of his administration, President Roh on December 5, 1988, dismissed most of the ministers prominently associated with the previous regime. KANG Young Hoon, a retired general, replaced Lee as prime minister. In a startling political realignment, in February 1990 the DJP merged with Kim Jong Pil’s NDRP and Kim Young Sam’s Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) to form the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), which immediately controlled nearly threefourths of the assembly. In 1990 support for the Roh administration’s domestic policies plummeted to an all-time low, and in late December a trusted presidential aide, RO Jai Bong, succeeded Prime Minister Kang as head of a substantially reshuffled cabinet. A lengthy series of street protests nonetheless continued, and on May 24, 1991, Roh announced the 11th cabinet shake-up since December 1987, with hard-line former education minister CHUNG Won Shik taking over as prime minister. Two months earlier the DLP had secured a major political victory by winning more than half the contests in South Korea’s first

local legislative elections in three decades. It performed even better at balloting for provincial and metropolitan assemblies in June, winning nearly two-thirds of the races. Buffeted by charges of corruption and economic mismanagement, the DLP saw its representation plunge to 49 percent at the National Assembly election of March 24, 1992, although it subsequently attracted enough defectors from other parties to claim a majority. Kim Dae Jung’s opposition Democratic Party (DP) increased its strength by nearly onethird, to 97 seats, but the most dramatic showing was the 31 seats won by the Unification National Party (UNP), which had been formed only weeks before by industrial magnate CHUNG Ju Yung. In watershed balloting on December 18, 1992, Kim Young Sam, with a vote share of 42 percent, became the first nonmilitary candidate in three decades to win election as South Korean president. His former opposition colleague, Kim Dae Jung, received 34 percent, while Chung Ju Yung, the candidate of the United People’s Party (the reorganized UNP), drew 16 percent. The day after his inauguration on February 25, 1993, Kim named HWANG In Sung, a business leader and former general, to head a regionally dispersed cabinet that excluded former government officials. Earlier in the month Hyundai tycoon Chung had been indicted for using some $63 million in corporate funds for campaign purposes. (Subsequently convicted, he would be granted amnesty in August 1995.) On December 21, 1993, after introducing an unprecedented but poorly received series of anticorruption measures and reversing a promise not to open the rice market to foreign imports, President Kim named LEE Hoi Chang to succeed Hwang in a major cabinet shake-up that tilted the balance in favor of conservative DLP loyalists. Following a dispute over the division of executive authority between the president and the prime minister, Lee Hoi Chang was replaced on April 22, 1994, by his deputy, LEE Yung Duk, who was in turn succeeded on December 17 by Deputy Prime Minister LEE Hong Ku. On June 27, 1995, at the country’s first local executive balloting in 35 years, the ruling DLP

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captured fewer than one-third of the contests, behind the DP. Three months earlier Kim Jong Pil, having left the DLP, had formed the conservative United Liberal Democrats (ULD). The South Korean party kaleidoscope continued to revolve in September with the launching of the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP) under the leadership of Kim Dae Jung. The NCNP immediately became the strongest opposition party by virtue of DP defections. On December 6, moreover, the DLP, in apparent pursuit of a new image, changed its name to the New Korea Party (NKP). Nine days later the president named LEE Soo Sung, president of Seoul National University, to succeed Lee Hong Ku as prime minister. The National Assembly election of April 11, 1996, saw the NKP’s plurality slip to 139 seats, with the NCNP winning 79 and the ULD, 50. The disintegrating DP was reduced to 15 seats, much of its previous support having gone to the NCNP. The NKP quickly attracted sufficient independents and defectors from other parties (notably from the rump DP contingent) for the Lee Soo Sung government to command an overall majority in the new assembly. In March 1997 Prime Minister Lee resigned in the wake of a scandal surrounding the bankruptcy of the Hanbo conglomerate. He was succeeded by GOH Kun, a university president. Meanwhile, on August 6, 1996, at the conclusion of South Korea’s “trial of the century,” former presidents Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo were found guilty of mutiny, treason, and corruption during the excesses and illegalities that began with the 1979 coup and extended beyond the 1980 Kwangju suppression. For the more profound crimes Chun was sentenced to death and Roh to 22 and a half years in prison. In December an appellate court commuted Chun’s sentence to life imprisonment and reduced Roh’s prison term to 17 years. The South Korean party system displayed continued volatility in the run-up to the presidential election of December 18, 1997, at which former dissident Kim Dae Jung, heading an NCNP/ULD coalition, secured a 40.3 percent plurality; his closest competitor, with 38.8 percent, was Lee Hoi Chang of the recently formed Grand National Party

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(GNP), an amalgamation of the NKP and the DP. Four days later President Kim Young Sam pardoned Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, an action endorsed by his successor but criticized by others as an affront to the prodemocracy movement. In February 1998 President Kim Dae Jung, as he had agreed to do before the election, nominated the ULD’s Kim Jong Pil to be the next prime minister, but the GNP-led assembly rejected the nominee on March 2 because of his participation in past authoritarian regimes, including that of Park Chung Hee. Undaunted, Kim Dae Jung named Kim Jong Pil as acting prime minister on March 3 to head a new government that included a number of representatives of the “old guard.” Nevertheless, the dispute persisted, tying up legislative proceedings and effectively blocking most of the administration’s program. With the country in the midst of a major economic crisis and with the public growing increasingly hostile to the opposition’s recalcitrance, the GNP finally relented and on August 17 approved Kim Jong Pil’s appointment. By early September defections from the GNP had given the governing coalition a working majority in the National Assembly. President Kim undertook his first major cabinet reshuffle on May 24, 1999, replacing the majority of his ministers in an effort to reinvigorate his economic reform program despite delaying tactics by the GNP. At the same time Kim continued to espouse his “sunshine” policy of peaceful political engagement and economic and cultural cooperation with North Korea, although improving relations were threatened by a June 15 naval battle in the Yellow Sea and North Korea’s subsequent unilateral extension of its territorial waters (see the DPRK article for details). Kim again reshuffled his cabinet on January 13, 2000, naming 11 new ministers concurrent with National Assembly approval of the ULD’s PARK Tae Joon as successor to Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil, who had announced his resignation on January 1 to prepare his party for the upcoming legislative election. On February 24, 2000, LEE Han Dong, a former GNP faction leader and the newly elected ULD leader, announced that his party would move into

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opposition because Kim Dae Jung’s new Millennium Democratic Party (MDP, successor to the NCNP) had failed to honor its commitments, particularly consideration of constitutional changes that would replace the existing strong presidency with a parliamentary system. Also contributing to the rupture was President Kim’s verbal support for a citizens’ movement of some 470 civic organizations that had named Kim Jong Pil as one of more than 100 assembly members considered unfit for reelection on grounds of corruption or participation in earlier military regimes. The break was less than complete, however, with Prime Minister Park remaining at the head of the cabinet. On April 10, 2000, three days before the national election, President Kim stunned the opposition by announcing a June summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang. Although the MDP recorded significant gains on April 13, the GNP retained its plurality, a mere 4 seats short of a majority in the downsized, 273-seat legislature. The ULD suffered major losses, winning only 17 seats, 33 fewer than it had won in 1996. Prime Minister Park resigned on May 19, 2000, in response to a court ruling that he had accepted bribes while chair of the giant Pohang Iron and Steel and had then evaded taxes. Three days later, having received Kim Jong Pil’s approval, President Kim nominated the ULD’s Lee Han Dong as Park’s successor, unofficially sealing a renewal of the MDP-ULD partnership. Lee was confirmed by the National Assembly on a largely party-line vote of 139–130 on June 29. Two weeks earlier, during the historic June 13–15 summit in Pyongyang, the leaders of the two Koreas had called for, among other things, greater economic cooperation and eventual national reunification. On October 13, in recognition of his efforts to promote democracy and human rights and to achieve “peace and reconciliation” with the DPRK, Kim Dae Jung was awarded the 2000 Nobel Peace Prize. On March 26, 2001, President Kim undertook a major cabinet reshuffle that included the designation of HAN Seung Soo of the small Democratic People’s Party (DPP) as minister of foreign affairs and trade. The ULD also received three portfo-

lios in an effort to cement the MDP-ULD relationship. Shortly thereafter, the DPP announced that it would join the coalition, thereby giving the government a slim majority in the National Assembly, and the three parties concluded a formal pact on April 16. On September 4, 2001, the entire cabinet resigned following passage in the National Assembly of a nonconfidence motion against Minister of Unification LIM Dong Won, whom the GNP had criticized following attendance by some 300 South Korean nongovernmental representatives at a ceremony in the North marking the end of the Japanese occupation in 1945. Joining the GNP in voting for the motion was the ULD, effectively announcing its departure from the government. The revamped cabinet presented on September 7 retained Lee Han Dong as prime minister, precipitating his expulsion from the ULD. At National Assembly by-elections in October 2001 the MDP lost its slim legislative majority, which contributed to President Kim’s November 8 decision to resign as MDP president. He undertook another cabinet reshuffle on January 29, 2002, introducing a number of bureaucrats and professionals in an effort to shore up his faltering government for the final year of his term. Those departing included the DPP’s Han. With two of his sons under investigation for bribery and tax evasion (they were ultimately convicted, fined, and sentenced to prison), Kim Dae Jung resigned from the MDP on May 6, 2002, as did half a dozen ministers on the following day. Kim announced another series of ministerial changes on July 11, but his nominee for prime minister, CHANG Sang, was rejected by the National Assembly on July 31. A second nominee, CHANG Dae Whan, met a similar fate on August 28. Earlier in the month the GNP had cemented a legislative majority with by-election victories in 11 of 13 contests. On October 5 the National Assembly approved the president’s third nominee for prime minister, former Supreme Court justice KIM Suk Soo, by a vote of 210–31. A general lack of progress on domestic reforms and in President Kim’s “sunshine” policy toward

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the North further undermined his standing in the polls and contributed to the GNP’s accretion of a legislative majority. Meanwhile, with Kim barred from seeking a second term in office, both the MDP and the GNP were busy choosing their 2002 presidential nominees, ROH Moo Hyun and Lee Hoi Chang, respectively, through a series of Americanstyle political primaries. Although polls initially gave Lee a clear advantage going into the December balloting, the race was made considerably closer in late November when the leading thirdparty candidate, CHUNG Mong Joon, the head of South Korea’s Football Association and a son of the Hyundai founder, left the race in favor of Roh. Although Chung withdrew his support the day before the election, apparently because of policy differences with regard to North Korea, Roh won with 48.9 percent of the vote in a come-frombehind victory over Lee, who took 46.6 percent and, shortly thereafter, retired from politics. On January 22, 2003, President-elect Roh nominated as prime minister a former officeholder, Goh Kun, who was approved by the National Assembly on February 26, a day after Roh’s inauguration. The president then named a substantially reconfigured cabinet dominated by academics and managers. The initial months of Roh’s presidency were marred by two ongoing scandals, one involving the illegal channeling through a Hyundai subsidiary and the Korean Development Bank of some $100– 200 million to the North Korean government to entice its participation in the June 2000 summit, and the other involving alleged insider trading and accounting fraud by the country’s leading chaebols, including Hyundai, Samsung, and the SK Group. An investigation into the summit scandal led to the June indictment of two former government ministers, LIM Dong Won and PARK Jie Won, both of whom were ultimately found guilty, and the chair of Hyundai, CHUNG Mong Hun, who committed suicide in August. By then, public support for Roh was dropping sharply, not only because of the scandals but also because of an economic downturn, an April decision to commit South Korean troops to a noncombat role in support of the U.S. intervention in Iraq, and a lack of progress on negotiations with

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the DPRK. Roh proposed holding a public referendum on his presidency, but the National Assembly, dominated by his opponents, dismissed the proposal as unconstitutional. In September 2003 several dozen reformminded legislators abandoned the MDP (as did Roh himself), and in late October they named their new formation the Uri Dang (“Our Party”). In the same month an investigation was launched into charges that prominent members of the MDP and GNP had accepted illegal donations prior to and soon after the 2002 presidential election. On December 4 the National Assembly, in the first such action since 1954, overrode Roh’s veto of a bill establishing an independent investigation into the donations. Later in the month Lee Hoi Chang admitted that the GNP had received over $40 million in illegal funds. Among those ultimately charged with receiving illegal contributions were leaders in both the GNP and MDP, including a chief aide to President Roh. On March 12, 2004, following several days of acrimonious debate, the National Assembly, led by the GNP and Roh’s former party, the MDP, voted 173–2 to impeach the president for corruption, economic mismanagement, and violation of political neutrality. The last charge involved his having urged voters to support the Uri Party at the upcoming general election. Prime Minister Goh assumed the president’s duties, pending a decision by the Constitutional Court on Roh’s removal from office. Amid rising public support for Roh, at the April 15, 2004, National Assembly election the Uri Party claimed a majority of 152 seats in the 299-seat legislature, with the GNP finishing second and the MDP seeing its representation shrink from more than 60 seats to 9. A month later, on May 14, the Constitutional Court dismissed the corruption and economic mismanagement cases against President Roh. Further, the Court ruled that Roh’s minor electioneering violation was insufficient to warrant impeachment. Roh thereupon resumed his office, and six days later he joined the Uri Party. On May 24, 2004, Prime Minister Goh tendered his resignation, which was accepted on the following day. On June 8 the president nominated as Goh’s

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successor the Uri Party’s LEE Hae Chan, who was confirmed on June 29. During the next year a majority of ministerial posts changed hands, while in January and March 2005 deputy prime ministers resigned when their ethics were questioned. A January 2, 2006, cabinet reshuffle was followed on March 14 by the resignation of Prime Minister Lee, whose propriety had been called into question by his playing a round of golf on the very day, March 1, when a nationwide railway workers’ strike began. Deputy Prime Minister HAN Duck Soo headed the government until the confirmation of HAN Myeong Sook (Uri Party) on April 19. A former minister of the environment, Han thereby became the ROK’s first woman prime minister.

Constitution and Government The 1987 constitution (technically the ninth amendment of the country’s 1948 basic law) sets forth a variety of guarantees, including freedom of press and assembly, the right of habeas corpus, labor’s right to organize and strike against employers, and the prohibition of detention without a court order. In addition, the armed forces are enjoined to observe “political neutrality.” The president is directly elected for a single five-year term; there is no requirement that he obtain a popular majority and no provision for a vice president. The president appoints a prime minister (subject to legislative confirmation) and, on the prime minister’s recommendation, a State Council of 15–30 members from which heads of executive ministries are drawn. Members of the National Assembly serve four-year terms, are specifically authorized to investigate government affairs, and enjoy complete immunity for activity inside the house. By a twothirds vote of the membership the assembly may impeach the chief executive, although his removal from office requires the concurrence of the Constitutional Court. The three-tiered judiciary includes at its apex a Supreme Court, with regional appellate high courts and district courts operating at the lower levels. Within the district level are city and county courts and a family court. The chief justice of the Supreme

Court is appointed for a six-year term by the president, with the concurrence of the assembly; associate justices are similarly appointed, on recommendation of the chief justice. A separate Patent Court was added to the system in 1998, along with the first district-based Administrative Court to handle tax, labor, and similar cases. In addition, a Constitutional Court rules on the constitutionality of legislation, hears petitions on constitutional questions, and also has in its purview impeachments, disputes involving state agencies and local governments, and cases related to the dissolution of political parties. Administratively, the country is divided into 16 “local authorities”: the capital of Seoul and 6 additional metropolitan areas (Inchon, Kwangju, Pusan, Taegu, Taejon, and Ulsan), 8 mainland provinces, and the island province of Cheju. The provinces are divided into counties, cities, towns, and townships. Under legislation approved in March 1994 and first implemented in June 1995, provincial governors and local executives are now directly elected.

Foreign Relations Before its admission to the United Nations in September 1991 the ROK maintained a permanent observer at the world organization’s New York headquarters and participated in the activities of many of its specialized agencies. The designation of Seoul as the site for both the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympics reflected South Korea’s growing acceptance as a member of the international community, while a thriving export program strengthened economic ties with a variety of trading partners. Relations with the DPRK and the United States have long been the most sensitive areas of external concern for the ROK. Communication between Seoul and Pyongyang has fluctuated widely in recent years, sporadic talks alternating with hostile exchanges on a variety of issues. Both sides are formally committed to reunification but have adopted differing (and occasionally shifting) positions on the means of achieving it. After failing to agree

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on a face-saving formula that would permit the North to share in Olympic sponsorship, links between the two regimes reached a nadir in November 1987 with the destruction by North Korean agents of a South Korean airliner en route from Bahrain to Seoul. Subsequently, in the wake of global reverses suffered by Communist regimes, tensions eased, and in September 1990 a series of talks were launched at the prime ministerial level that culminated in the nonaggression pact of December 1991 (see Korea article). In the most serious incursion in nearly three decades, a 26-strong party of North Korean military personnel and espionage agents came ashore on September 18, 1996, from a submarine that had run aground. Eleven were found dead, 1 was captured alive (and gave some details of the mission under interrogation), and 11 were hunted down and killed by early November, with the loss of 8 South Korean soldiers (several shot by friendly fire) and 4 civilians. Pyongyang initially rejected South Korean protests at the incursion, which cost the South Korean defense minister his job, but after lengthy discussions with U.S. officials the North Korean government issued a surprisingly contrite apology at the end of December. The subsequent reduction in tension helped open the door for substantive talks among DPRK, ROK, Chinese, and U.S. representatives on a proposed permanent peace settlement for the peninsula. Toward that end, the sixth session of four-power talks convened in Geneva, Switzerland, August 5–9, 1999. The successful June 2000 DPRK-ROK summit in Pyongyang— the first meeting of the top leaders of the two Koreas—portended a new era of direct NorthSouth bilateral contacts. Since 2003 the ROK has also joined the DPRK, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Japan, Russia, and the United States in intermittent six-party talks aimed at resolving the crisis over the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program. Relations with Japan, formally restored in 1965 after 14 years of negotiation, have been constrained by Korean bitterness over the pre-1945 occupation and Tokyo’s treatment of resident Koreans. For its part, Japan was long critical of Seoul’s record

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on human rights and then curtailed economic assistance after the abduction of Korean opposition leader Kim Dae Jung from Japan in 1973. A state visit to Japan by Chun Doo Hwan in September 1984, the first by a South Korean president, elicited a ritual apology from Emperor Hirohito for “the unfortunate past between us.” President Roh visited Tokyo in May 1990 and again in November 1992, but President Kim canceled a meeting at UN headquarters with Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama in October 1995 after the latter referred to his country’s occupation of the Korean peninsula as “legally valid.” Further complicating relations with Tokyo has been the issue of Korean and other “comfort women” forced into unpaid prostitution during World War II by the Japanese military (see Japan article). Then in February 1996 a long-standing dispute over sovereignty of an uninhabited small island group in the Sea of Japan (called Tokto by the Koreans, Takeshima by the Japanese, and the Liancourt Rocks by Western navigators) reignited, leading both countries to declare 200-mile exclusive economic zones encompassing the disputed islands. In January 1998 Japan unilaterally terminated a bilateral fishing treaty because of the insular dispute, but eight months later the two governments reached agreement on a new treaty that included a compromise on the issue of fishing zones in the contested area. An October state visit by President Kim Dae Jung to Tokyo reinforced the fisheries pact and also produced a joint statement that included a Japanese expression of “deep remorse and a heartfelt apology” for its 1910–1945 occupation. Historical differences continue to flare up, however, over such matters as the treatment of Korea in Japanese history textbooks, while in April 2006 South Korea denounced Japan’s announcement that it intended to conduct a hydrographic survey of the Tokto area. Normalization of relations with the Soviet Union, long of lesser priority, was severely impaired by the destruction of a civilian Korean airliner in September 1983, after the plane had strayed off course and passed over Soviet missile installations on the Kamchatka peninsula. A meeting between Presidents Roh Tae Woo and Mikhail

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Gorbachev in San Francisco on June 4, 1990, preceded mutual diplomatic recognition on September 30 and a historic first visit to Moscow by President Roh in December. In August 1992 relations were also normalized with the PRC, and in late September President Roh traveled to Beijing for the first official visit by a South Korean head of state. Relations with the United States were temporarily strained in the late 1970s not only by the repressive policies of the Park regime but by revelations of widespread Korean influence peddling in U.S. congressional circles. Subsequently, U.S. President Ronald Reagan pledged continued military and economic aid during a visit to Seoul in 1984 and while hosting his Korean counterpart in Washington in 1985. Anti-American sentiment in the ROK, most dramatically symbolized by arson attacks on U.S. cultural centers in Kwangju and Pusan in the early 1980s and occupation of the U.S. Information Service library in Seoul in 1985, came mainly from opposition politicians, students, and religious leaders, who argued that support for President Chun inhibited the emergence of a truly democratic system. In mid-1987, however, Chun’s acceptance of constitutional reform was reported to have stemmed in part from strong U.S. diplomatic pressure. During a brief visit to Washington in July 1999 Kim Dae Jung requested revision of a 1979 agreement with Washington that prevented Seoul from developing surface-to-surface missiles with a maximum range greater than 180 kilometers. Reacting to North Korea’s missile program, Kim requested that the limit be extended to 300 kilometers. In January 2001 Seoul announced that it was moving forward on its missile development program, and in January 2002 the Ministry of Defense signed a contract with U.S. manufacturer Lockheed Martin to purchase its Army Tactical Missile System. At the same time, however, Seoul opposed deployment in South Korea of a theater missile defense system, as proposed by the United States. The withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, initiated in 1990 because of a lessened threat from the Soviet Union, was suspended in October 1992 upon emergence of the North Korean nuclear inspection

issue. Although small reductions later resumed, some 37,500 U.S. troops remained until 2005, when the force was cut to 30,000. Troop levels are scheduled to decline to 25,000 by 2008. At the beginning of November 2004 South Korean troops assumed full responsibility for policing the DMZ. In April 2003 the National Assembly voted to send South Korean troops to provide noncombat assistance in Iraq, a move that the president supported despite differences with Washington over its hard-line policy toward North Korea. In May some 650 military engineers and medics were dispatched to Iraq. In February 2004 authorization was given to deploy an additional 3,000 troops, thereby making South Korea’s the third-largest military contingent, after those of the United States and the United Kingdom. Because of a worsening security environment, the additional deployment did not begin until August 2004. In December 2005 the National Assembly voted to extend the mission through 2006 but to reduce South Korea’s commitment to about 2200 personnel. The partial withdrawal began in May 2006.

Current Issues Roh Moo Hyun won the presidency on a platform that called for greater independence from U.S. foreign policy and a continuation of Kim Dae Jung’s “sunshine” policy toward the North, albeit with a less conciliatory posture. Roh’s popularity quickly declined after the election, however, as he faced a brief economic recession in the first half of 2003, corporate as well as government and party funding scandals, and opposition to sending Korean troops in support of the widely unpopular war in Iraq. Nevertheless, most Koreans viewed the 2004 effort by the GNP and the MDP to impeach Roh as unjustified, and the backlash carried the Roh-supportive Uri Party to a narrow victory at the April legislative election. With only a slim majority, Roh was expected to have considerable difficulty in carrying through on a domestic agenda that included repealing the controversial National Security Law, which prohibits pro-DPRK activities and unauthorized

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contacts with the North; introducing additional anticorruption measures; and advancing liberal social programs. The task became even more difficult in April 2005 when the Uri Party failed to win any of six seats being filled in by-elections. As a consequence, it fell four seats short of a legislative majority. In July and August 2005 Roh called for formation of a “grand coalition,” but the GNP quickly dismissed the overture and appeared increasingly likely to wait out the two years until the next presidential election. Roh’s ability to govern was further undercut by the resignation of Prime Minister Lee in March 2006. Lee, not for the first time, had chosen a particularly inopportune time for a round of golf, not only because of the national railway strike but because March 1 marked the anniversary of a 1919 uprising against the Japanese occupation. In yet another major blow to the president, the Uri Party was trounced at local elections on May 31, losing all seven major mayoral races and eight of nine gubernatorial contests. Confronted by the growing presence of Chinese manufactured goods on the international market, South Korean has begun the transition to a more open market for goods and services. Globalization has not, however, been uniformly welcomed. On November, 18, 2005, some 15,000 demonstrators protested the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit held at Pusan. Their numbers included farmers who opposed a government bill granting rice-exporting countries greater access to the South Korean market. (Under the terms of the bill, which the National Assembly passed less than week later, import quotas would gradually double, to 8 percent, by 2014.) Of potentially far greater impact, in February 2006 Seoul and Washington announced that they would shortly begin negotiating a free trade agreement, conclusion of which President Roh has set as a principal goal for what remains of his term in office. Dealing with the Kim Jong Il regime in the North remains the biggest foreign policy challenge for President Roh—a task not made easier by embarrassing revelations in September 2004 that South Korean scientists had extracted a small quantity

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of plutonium from spent fuel rods in 1982 and had produced 0.2 grams of enriched uranium in 2000. Nevertheless, Seoul apparently played a crucial role in convincing the North to return to the sixparty talks in July 2005. With the United States and Japan unlikely to renew their support for construction of light-water nuclear reactors in the DPRK, South Korea proposed supplying the North with much-needed electricity by building transmission lines across the North-South border—but only if Pyongyang accepted the six-party goal of ending the North’s nuclear weapons program.

Political Parties In the five years before 1972 South Korea had what was essentially a two-party system of the Democratic Republican Party (DRP), formed in 1963 as an electoral mechanism for the ruling military junta, and the New Democratic Party (NDP), organized in 1967 as a coalition of opposition elements. The imposition of emergency decrees and alteration of the electoral system under the 1972 constitution strongly favored progovernment groups, with the DRP becoming a personal vehicle for President Park Chung Hee. In the wake of Park’s assassination in 1979, the NDP, having won a plurality in the 1978 balloting, took the lead in calling for a new constitution. The existing parties were dissolved following the constitutional referendum of October 1980, President Chun having announced that he favored the establishment of a multiparty system prior to the presidential election of February 1981. At the March 1981 National Assembly balloting, eight parties obtained legislative representation, the Democratic Korea Party (DKP) emerging as the largest opposition group, second to Chun’s Democratic Justice Party (DJP). In February 1985 the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) displaced the DKP as the principal opposition formation, the two subsequently merging under the NKDP label in early April. In April 1987 the two leading dissidents, Kim Dae Jung (then under house arrest) and Kim Young Sam, joined a majority of the NKDP legislators

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in announcing the formation of a new opposition group, the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP); however, Kim Dae Jung withdrew from the RDP in October to launch the Peace and Democracy Party (PDP) in support of his bid for the presidency. In early 1990 President Roh Tae Woo’s DJP, Kim Young Sam’s RDP, and Kim Jong Pil’s New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP) joined to form the regime-supportive Democratic Liberal Party (DLP). Essentially bipartisan politics returned in September 1991 when the opposition Democratic Party (DP), founded by RDP members who had refused to join the DLP, expanded to accommodate Kim Dae Jung’s New Democratic Party (NDP). The latter had been formed in April 1991 by merger of Kim’s PDP and the Party for a New Democratic Alliance (PNDA), an RDP rump led by LEE Ki Taek. In March 1995 Kim Jong Pil, having left the DLP, formed the United Liberal Democrats (ULD), and six months later Kim Dae Jung returned to active politics after a three-year absence and launched the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP), which by attracting a substantial number of DP defectors became the largest opposition formation. Prior to the April 1996 National Assembly election the DLP restyled itself as the New Korea Party (NKP), and in November 1997, with another presidential election approaching, the NKP and the DP joined forces as the Grand National Party (GNP) in support of candidate Lee Hoi Chang. A month earlier the NCNP and the ULD had formed an alliance behind Kim Dae Jung. In January 2000 the NCNP merged into the newly organized Millennium Democratic Party (MDP). Kim Dae Jung failed to convince the ULD to join the new organization, and in February the ULD withdrew from the government, although the ULD prime minister, Park Tae Joon, remained in office. In the aftermath of the April 2000 legislative election MDP-ULD ties were reestablished by President Kim’s selection of the ULD’s new president, Lee Han Dong, to succeed Park as prime minister. In September 2001, however, the ULD

again broke with the government, although Lee remained prime minister as an independent until he was dismissed in July 2002. In September and October 2003 deep divisions within the MDP led a reform-minded group to depart and form the Uri Party, which went on to claim a slim majority at the National Assembly balloting of April 2004. The National Election Commission reported that 25 parties were registered before the contest, but only 6—the Uri Party, the GNP, the Democratic Labor Party (DLP), the MDP, the ULD, and the National Alliance 21 (NA21)—won representation, and all of the rest, mainly regional formations, failed to meet the alternative requirement, 2 percent of the vote, needed to guarantee their continued registration. In May 2004 the NA21 was disbanded by its leader and sole National Assembly member, Hyundai heir Chung Mong Joon, who had organized the party in November 2002 as his personal presidential vehicle. In February 2006 the ULD, which had seen many of its members defect to the new People First Party (PFP), announced its intention to merge into the GNP. As of mid-2006, only the Uri Party and the GNP could claim a significant national following.

Governing Party Uri Party (Uri Dang). The Uri Party, initially called the New Party for Participatory Citizens, was established in September 2003 by dissident members of the MDP who supported President Roh Moo Hyun and objected to the “old guard” policies represented by regionalism and close connections to the country’s major corporations. Initially, 37 members of the National Assembly bolted the MDP, with their new formation adopting its present name (“Our Party”) in late October. A month later the party absorbed the small People’s Party for Reform, led by YOO Si Min, an ally of President Roh who had won a seat in the National Assembly at an April by-election. At the April 2004 National Assembly election the party won a slim majority, 152 seats. A month later, following the Constitutional Court decision

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that reinstated him to the presidency, Roh Moo Hyun joined the party. The first Uri Party leader, Chung Dong Young, had previously headed the MDP. In June 2004, having stepped down from his party post, he was named to the cabinet. Chung’s successor as party chair, SHIN Ki Nam, resigned in August following revelations that his father had served in the military police during the period of Japanese rule. Shin’s successor, LEE Bu Young, and the party’s National Assembly floor leader, CHUN Jung Bae, both resigned their posts in early January 2005 after failing to push their party’s reform agenda through the legislature. A temporary party chair, LIM Chae Jung, was succeeded in April by a newly elected permanent chair, Moon Hee Sang. In March 2005 the party lost its majority in the National Assembly when two legislators surrendered their seats because of electoral violations. At by-elections in April the party failed to win any of the six contested seats, five of which it had previously held. It was equally unsuccessful in October, when it failed to win any of four open seats, which led Moon to resign as chair. His replacement, CHUNG Sye Kyun, then stepped down in January 2006 after being nominated for a cabinet post. At a party convention on February 19, 2006, delegates elected as chair former leader Chung Dong Young, who defeated former health and welfare minister KIM Geun Tae and five others for the post. Chung’s victory was seen as aiding his prospects for the party’s 2007 presidential endorsement until the party suffered unprecedented losses at the May 31, 2006, local elections, when it won no provincial governorships and only one of seven major mayoral races. The next day, Chung resigned as party chair. Leaders: ROH Moo Hyun (President of the Republic), HAN Myeong Sook (Prime Minister), KIM Han Gill (National Assembly Floor Leader).

Other Parliamentary Parties Grand National Party—GNP (Hannara Dang). The “progressive conservative” GNP was

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formed in November 1997 by merger of the New Korea Party—NKP (Shin Hankuk Dang) and the Democratic Party—DP (Minju Dang). The NKP had been called the Democratic Liberal Party—DLP (Minju Dayu Dang) until December 1995, when the conservative DLP leadership endorsed a decision by President Kim Young Sam to redesignate the party in an effort to shake off the taint of past corruption, including a slush fund scandal involving Roh Tae Woo. At the April 1996 National Assembly election the NKP lost its overall majority, taking a plurality of 139 seats on a 34.5 percent vote share, but the subsequent adhesion of defectors, mainly from the DP, and independents restored its majority. In February 1995 the DP had absorbed an earlier NKP, a minor party that was formed by DLP dissidents in October 1992 and had itself absorbed the New Political Reform Party—NPRP (Shin Jungchi Gaihyok Dang) before joining the DP. In addition, in April 1995 the DP had attempted an abortive merger two months later with Chung Ju Yung’s United People’s Party—UPP (Tongil Minju Dang). At the April 1996 balloting the DP suffered near annihilation: it won only 15 seats, down from 97 in 1992 and 5 less than the minimum required for official group status. Several of its assemblymen promptly defected to President Kim’s NKP. The GNP was runner-up to the NCNP/ULD at the presidential poll of December 18, 1997, with candidate Lee Hoi Chang winning 38.7 percent of the vote. On August 3, 1998, most of the party leadership, including President CHO Sun, resigned following the GNP’s failure to elect its candidate for speaker of the National Assembly, and by early September 1998 defections had cost the party its legislative majority. In preparation for the April 2000 assembly election, party leader Lee withheld nominations from a number of GNP legislators who had been associated with former president Kim Young Sam or with the earlier military dictatorship. In February 2000 many of this “old guard” were central to formation of the Democratic People’s Party—DPP (Minkook Dang), which won 2 seats at the April balloting.

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The GNP won 133 seats, 4 short of a majority, on a 39.0 percent vote share, but subsequent defections from other parties, coupled with by-election victories in October 2001 and August 2002, gave it more than half the seats. Before the December 2002 presidential election the GNP attempted to win back the support of its most prominent defectors, including members of the DPP, which had participated in the ruling MDPULD coalition from April 2001 until the dismissal of DPP legislator Han Seung Soo as foreign minister in January 2002. Han rejoined the GNP in October 2002. A month later Park Geun Hye, daughter of the late Park Chung Hee and a former GNP vice president, also rejoined the party. She had left in early 2002 and in May had formed the short-lived Korean Coalition for the Future (KCF). In the 2002 presidential election Lee Hoi Chang again finished second, with 47 percent of the vote, and announced his retirement shortly thereafter. On March 23, 2004, Park Geun Hye replaced the party chair, CHOE Byung Yol, whose leadership had been undermined by the 2002 illegal fund-raising scandal. At the April 2004 National Assembly election the GNP lost its majority, winning 121 seats and under 36 percent of the party list vote. It had considerable success in subsequent by-elections, however, and by the end of 2005 it had picked up an additional 6 seats. Meanwhile, Park had won election to a full two-year term at the party convention in July 2004 and was widely expected to seek the party’s nomination for the national presidency in 2007, as was Seoul Mayor Lee Myung Bak. On February 20, 2006, KIM Hak Wan, the only remaining National Assembly member from the United Liberal Democrats (Jayu Minju Yonmaeng), announced that his party would merge into the GNP before the local elections at the end of May. The conservative ULD had been formed by Kim Jong Pil in March 1995, following his withdrawal from the DLP. After having won 50 seats in the National Assembly in 1996 and having participated in several subsequent governments, its fortunes declined. In April 2004 it had won only 4 seats, and in 2005

many members joined the new People First Party (below). In April 2006 the GNP asked prosecutors to investigate two party lawmakers, including National Assembly floor leader KIM Deog Ryong, for allegedly accepting bribes from individuals who were seeking the party’s endorsement prior to the upcoming local elections. On May 20, while campaigning for local candidates, party leader Park was slashed by a knife-wielding assailant, and the GNP may have benefited from a sympathy vote at the polls: on May 31 it captured six of seven major mayoral contests and six of nine governorships. Leaders: PARK Geun Hye (Chair), LEE Myung Bak (Former Mayor of Seoul), SOHN Hak Kyu (Former Governor of Gyeonggi Province), LEE Jae OH (National Assembly Floor Leader). Democratic Labor Party —DLP (Minjunodong Dang). Organized by labor activists in late January 2000, the DLP campaigned on a platform that included political reform and advocacy of workers’ interests. One of the founders, KWON Young Kil, captured 1.2 percent of the vote in the 1997 presidential race as the candidate of the People’s Victory. At the April 2000 election the party drew only 1.2 percent of the vote and won no seats. As a result, on April 17 the National Election Commission canceled its registration. At a special convention on May 20, however, the party announced that it was being “reborn” as a progressive party and would lead a civic effort to eliminate government corruption. Many of its leaders have also served in the leadership of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions. In a second run for the presidency, Kwon finished third in 2002, with 3.9 percent of the vote. At the April 2004 election the DLP attracted considerable support from voters who were disaffected with “old guard” politics, winning 13 percent of the party list vote for a total of eight proportional seats. It also won two district seats. Because the party’s constitution prohibits individuals from leading both the party and its parliamentary delegation,

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Kwon stepped down as DLP president at a party convention in June. His successor, KIM Hye Kyung, resigned after the October 2005 byelections, at which the DLP had failed to retain a seat won in April 2004. In February 2006 Moon Sung Hyun, the interim president, retained the post by defeating CHO Seung Soo in a party runoff. Leaders: MOON Sung Hyun (President), KIM Sun Dong (Secretary General). Democratic Party —DP (Minju Dang). The current DP was launched by Kim Dae Jung in January 2000 as the “reformist populist” Millennium Democratic Party—MDP (Saecheonnyeonminju Dang), which dropped “Millennium” from its name in August 2005. The MDP was successor to the centrist National Congress for New Politics—NCNP (Sae Jungchi Kukmin Hoiee), which had been formed in September 1995. The NCNP quickly displaced the existing Democratic Party as the leading opposition grouping by drawing to its ranks 54 assemblymen who had sided with Kim in a power struggle with former DP president Lee Ki Taek. Standing on an anticorruption platform in the April 1996 assembly election, the NCNP confirmed its status as the strongest opposition party, winning 79 seats on a 25.3 percent vote share concentrated in Kwangju and the surrounding province of Chonnam (South Cholla). Kim Dae Jung was elected president in December 1997 with a plurality of 40.3 percent. On August 29, 1998, the New Party by the People (NPP) merged with the NCNP. The NPP had been launched in November 1997 by the former governor of Kyonggi Province, Rhee In Je, following his loss of the NKP presidential nomination to Lee Hoi Chang. Rhee ran third in the 1997 presidential balloting, with 19.2 percent of the vote. In January 2000 the NCNP simultaneously dissolved and merged into the MDP. At the April National Assembly election the new party captured 115 seats and 35.9 percent of the vote, second to the GNP. President Kim subsequently convinced four independent assemblymen to join the party’s ranks.

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Beset by factional infighting, scandals involving members of his government and his family, and byelection losses in October 2001 that cost the party its slim legislative majority, President Kim resigned the party presidency on November 8, 2001. Six months later he left the party, as did six cabinet ministers. In April Roh Moo Hyun, victor in a series of regional party primaries, had emerged as the party’s 2002 presidential candidate, but his prospects were dimmed by further by-election losses in August. On November 25, however, one of the three leading presidential nominees, Chung Mong Joon of the newly formed NA21, withdrew in favor of Roh, who won the December election with 49 percent of the vote. Soon afterward, sharp divisions emerged between reform-minded Roh supporters and the party’s “old guard.” As a consequence, three dozen members of the National Assembly and Roh resigned from the MDP in September 2003. Those departing included the MDP chair, CHYUNG Dai Chul, and another prominent leader, Chung Dong Young, who became chair of the new Uri Party. Chyung was among the most prominent politicians subsequently convicted of receiving illegal contributions during 2002–2003. Following Roh’s departure, the MDP joined the opposition and supported Roh’s impeachment in March 2004. At the same time, some members of the party strongly objected to readmitting a number of former members who had defected to other parties prior to the 2002 presidential election. Those seeking readmission included SHIN Nak Kyun, who had recently headed the NA21. The MDP entered the April 2004 National Assembly election holding some 60 seats, but it emerged from the balloting having won only 7 percent of the proportional vote and 9 seats. As a consequence, the party’s chair, CHOUGH Soon Hyung, resigned. In April 2006 the party’s secretary general, JO Jae Hwan, was charged with accepting a $400,000 bribe from a would-be mayoral candidate who wanted the party’s endorsement. Leader: HAHN Hwa Gap (Chair).

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Cabinet As of June 1, 2006 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Ministers

Han Myeong Sook [f] Han Duck Soo Kim Jin Pyo Kim Woo Shik

Ministers Agriculture and Forestry Commerce, Industry, and Energy Construction and Transportation Culture and Tourism Defense Education and Human Resources Development Environment Finance and Economy Foreign Affairs and Trade Gender Equality and Family Government Administration and Home Affairs Government Legislation Health and Welfare Information and Communications Justice Labor Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Patriots and Veterans Affairs Planning and Budget Science and Technology Unification

Park Hong Soo Chung Sye Kyun Choo Byung Jik Kim Myung Gon Yoon Kwang Ung Kim Jin Pyo Lee Chi Beom Han Duck Soo Ban Ki Moon Jang Ha Jin [f] Lee Yong Sup Kim Sun Uk [f] Rhyu Si Min Rho Jun Hyong Chun Jung Bae Lee Sang Soo Kim Sung Jin Park Yu Chul Byeon Yang Kyoon Kim Woo Shik Lee Jong Seok

[f] = female

People First Party —PFP (Gukmin Jungsim Dang). Formation of the PFP was announced in October 2005 by the governor of South Chungchong Province, Sim Dae Pyung, and several National Assembly members. At its formal inauguration in January 2006, Sim and assembly independent Shin Kook Hwan were elected cochairs, while Rhee In Je, who had run for president in 1997 as the candidate of the New Party by the People and had later joined the ULD, was given the responsibility of leading the PFP into the May 2006 local elections. Two other former ULD legislators had also joined the new party, but a merger with the

ULD fell through. As of May 2006 the party held five seats in the National Assembly. Leaders: SIM Dae Pyung and SHIN Kook Hwan (Cochairs), RHEE In Je, RYU Keun Chan, KIM Nak-sung, CHUNG Jin Seok.

Other Parties In the 2002 presidential contest former prime minister and ULD president LEE Han Dong ran as the candidate of the personalist Hanaro National Union, receiving 0.3 percent of the vote. He returned to the ULD in February 2004 but was later

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convicted of having received illegal campaign contributions. KIM Gil Su, a Buddhist monk, running as the candidate of the small Defense of the Nation Party, won 0.2 percent of the presidential vote. KIM Young Kyu, a former academic, was nominated by the Socialist Party (formerly the Youth Progressive Party) and won 0.1 percent.

Legislature The present National Assembly (Kuk Hoe) is a unicameral body of 299 members elected for fouryear terms. At the most recent election of April 15, 2004, 243 seats were filled by direct election from single-member constituencies, while 56 were distributed proportionally among those parties winning at least 5 district seats or 3 percent of the party vote. The results (direct/proportional breakdowns in parentheses) were as follows: Uri Party, 152 (129, 23); Grand National Party (GNP), 121 (100, 21); Democratic Labor Party (DLP), 10 (2, 8); Millennium Democratic Party, 9 (4, 5); United Liberal Democrats (ULD), 4 (4, 0); National Alliance 21 (NA21), 1 (1, 0); independents, 2. The NA21 disbanded in May 2004, with its representative becoming an independent. Following by-elections held on April 28, 2005, to fill 6 seats vacated because of electoral law violations, the Uri Party total was 146 (4 short of a majority), while the GNP held 125. On October 26, 2005, the GNP picked up 2 additional seats, at the expense of the Uri Party and the DLP, in similar by-elections. In January 2006 the new People First Party was formally inaugurated; it had attracted 5 National Assembly members, including 3 who had previously represented the ULD. The ULD then announced it would merge with the GNP. Speaker: KIM Won KI.

Communications

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in Seoul, unless otherwise noted: Chosun Ilbo (Korea Daily, 2,470,000); Joong-ang Ilbo (Central Daily, 2,300,000); Dong-A Ilbo (East Asia Daily, 2,150,000); Hankuk Ilbo (Korea Daily, 2,000,000); Kyung-hyang Shinmun (Kyung-hyang News, 730,000); Hankyoreh Shinmun (Korean People’s News, 500,000); Seoul Shinmun (Seoul News, 500,000); Korea Herald (150,000), in English; Korea Times (100,000), in English.

News Agencies The principal domestic facility is the United News Agency (Yonhap Tong Shin). A number of foreign agencies maintain offices in Seoul.

Broadcasting and Computing The publicly owned Korean Broadcasting System (Hankuk Pangsong Kongsa) is a nationwide, noncommercial radio and television network. The public Munwha Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), the private Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS), and the American Forces Korea Network also transmit both radio and TV programming. Religious radio programming is provided by the Buddhist Broadcasting System (BBS), the Christian Broadcasting System (CBS), and the Far East Broadcasting Company (FEBC). Cable TV became available in most metropolitan areas in early 1995. Satellite service is now also available. There were approximately 18.7 million television receivers and 26.7 million personal computers serving 29.2 million Internet users in 2003.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. LEE Tae Sik U.S. Ambassador to Republic of Korea Alexander R. VERSHBOW

Press

Permanent Representative to the UN CHOI Young Jin

South Korea has about 80 general dailies, about 20 of which are national in scope. The following are Korean-language dailies published

IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, AfDB, APEC, BIS, CP, EBRD, IADB, IEA, Interpol, IOM, OECD, PCA, WCO, WTO

K Y R G Y Z S TA N KY R G Y Z R E P U B L I C Respublika Kirgizstan (Russian) Kyrgyz Respublikasy (Kyrgyz)

See the note at the end of this entry for information on current events.

The Country A mountainous country in eastern Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan is bounded on the northwest by Kazakhstan, on the east by China, on the south by Tajikistan, and on the southwest by Uzbekistan. Approximately 65 percent of the population is Turkic-speaking Kyrgyz, 14 percent Russian, and 13 percent Uzbek, with substantially smaller minorities of other ethnic groups; the dominant religion is Sunni Islam. Women make up about 45 percent of the labor force. The agricultural sector, which accounts for about 39 percent of GDP and employs half the workforce, is now dominated by wheat production, the government having set self-sufficiency in the grain as a leading sectoral goal. Production of sugar beets, potatoes, and vegetables has also expanded since independence, while livestock and wool output have dropped significantly. Industry contributes about 25 percent of GDP and employs 12 percent of workers. In 1997 production began at the Kumtor gold mine, which ranks among the ten largest in the world. Other extractable resources include natural gas, petroleum, coal, lead, tungsten, mercury, and uranium. Manufacturing focuses on food process-

ing, metallurgy, clothing and other textiles, and machine building. In addition to gold, leading exports

K Y R G Y Z S TA N

Political Status: Designated autonomous republic of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic on February 1, 1926; became constituent republic of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) on December 5, 1936; Republic of Kyrgyzstan proclaimed December 13, 1990; independence from the USSR declared by the Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet August 31, 1991; current constitution introduced on May 5, 1993. Area: 76,640 sq. mi. (198,500 sq. km.). Population: 4,822,938 (1999C); 5,118,000 (2005E). Major Urban Center (2005E): BISHKEK (formerly Frunze, 851,000). Official Languages: Kyrgyz, Russian. Russian has had official status since May 2000. It had previously enjoyed official status in areas where ethnic Russians are a majority. Kyrgyz is the “state language.” Monetary Unit: Som (official rate July 1, 2006: 40.15 soms = $1US). President: Kurmanbek BAKIYEV; named acting president and acting prime minister by the bicameral Supreme Council on March 24, 2005, his predecessor, Askar A. AKAYEV, having fled the country earlier the same day; elected president on July 10 and sworn in on August 14 for a five-year term. (The new unicameral Supreme Council formally accepted the resignation of President Akayev on April 11.) Prime Minister: Feliks KULOV; appointed first deputy prime minister by Acting President Bakiyev on May 16, 2005; appointed acting prime minister by, and in succession to, the president on August 15; confirmed as prime minister by the Supreme Council on September 1.

include hydroelectricity, food products, and machinery. Electricity is sold primarily to neighboring Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan experienced major economic disruption upon the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, as it sought to shift from central control to

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a free-market system. In the process of introducing one of the more aggressive restructuring and liberalization programs among the former Soviet republics, Kyrgyzstan suffered a 51 percent contraction in GDP from 1991 to 1995, with inflation soaring to more than 1,300 percent in 1993. Agroindustry was particularly hard hit, experiencing a 90 percent decline in the production of most commodities. Beginning in 1995, however, overall economic growth resumed, with the GDP registering an average annual gain of 6.8 percent in 1996– 1997. By 1998 the government had privatized the majority of state enterprises, restructured the financial industry, and introduced a liberal trade and capital exchange regime. Nevertheless, responding to the Russian financial crisis, GDP growth slowed to about 1.8 percent, the som depreciated by 35 percent, exports to regional markets dropped, and consumer price inflation rose to over 18 percent. For 1999 GDP registered a 3.5 percent gain, but inflation approached 40 percent and the som continued to drop in value. Conditions improved in 2000–2001, when growth averaged over 5 percent. In part because of a temporary reduction in gold extraction, 2002 saw no growth, but in 2003 and again in 2004 GDP expanded by 6.7 percent. A long-term problem continues to be widespread poverty: Kyrgyzstan’s per capita gross national income was only $330 in 2003, with 40 percent of the population living below the national poverty line.

Government and Politics Political Background Conquered by Russia between 1855 and 1876, the territory then called Kyrgyzia mounted an unsuccessful revolt against Bolshevik rule before being incorporated into the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic as an autonomous oblast (region) in 1924. It was designated an autonomous republic in 1926 and a constituent republic of the Soviet Union in 1936. As Soviet discipline began to weaken in the late 1980s, Kyrgyzstan became

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the scene of Central Asia’s worst preindependence ethnic violence, with at least 300 people killed in Kyrgyz-Uzbek clashes in mid-1990. The “Soviet Socialist” component of the republic’s name was formally abandoned in December 1990. Independence from the Soviet Union was declared on August 31, 1991, by the Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet, following the failed coup against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow and a collateral attempt by Soviet authorities to remove the Kyrgyz executive president, Askar AKAYEV. On October 28, 1990, the Supreme Soviet had elected Akayev from a field of six candidates to the newly created post of president. On January 22, 1991, Nasirdin ISANOV, theretofore vice president, was named head of the cabinet (de facto prime minister). Following Isanov’s death in an automobile accident on November 29, Tursunbek CHYNGYSHEV was designated his successor. Meanwhile, on October 12, Akayev, with Feliks KULOV as his running mate, was popularly reelected to a five-year presidential term. On December 10, 1993, Vice President Kulov resigned after being accused of complicity in a scheme to embezzle the country’s gold reserves. The Chyngyshev government lost a legislative confidence vote over the same issue three days later, with Apas JUMAGULOV being confirmed as head of a new administration on December 17. On January 30, 1994, voters overwhelmingly backed an economic reform program advanced by President Akayev, but undiminished opposition by former Communists led the president’s supporters to threaten a legislative boycott. In September the Jumagulov government resigned but continued in a caretaker capacity. In another referendum on October 22, 1994, a large majority of voters approved the abolition of the existing legislature and the creation of a much smaller bicameral body. Elections on February 5 and 19, 1995, were contested by over 1,000 candidates, many of them independents but some representing 12 political parties. The voting was largely along clan/ethnic lines, with most of the new deputies being conservative-minded survivors of the Communist-era bureaucracy.

The reappointment of Jumagulov as prime minister on April 5, 1995, signaled President Akayev’s intention to pursue his reform program. When conservative elements in the legislature succeeded in September in blocking the president’s request for an extension of his mandate to 2001, he called an early presidential election for December 24 and registered a commanding 71.6 percent victory over two other candidates. Moreover, in a referendum on February 10, 1996, Akayev secured 94 percent endorsement for constitutional amendments that substantially increased presidential powers and abolished the post of vice president (which had remained vacant since December 1993). Having submitted his resignation following the referendum, Jumagulov was again reappointed prime minister on March 4, at the head of a reorganized government. On March 24, 1998, Prime Minister Jumagulov resigned, ostensibly for health reasons, and he was succeeded the following day by Kubanychbek JUMALIEV, previously head of presidential administration. On September 3, faced with what he labeled foot-dragging by the conservative Supreme Council on key legislation, such as legalization of private land ownership, President Akayev announced a referendum to restructure the bicameral legislature and reduce its authority in several areas, including budget deliberations. His political opponents argued against passage, in part because the proposed amendments were presented in an allor-nothing package, but on October 17 some 90 percent of those voting gave it their approval. On December 23, 1998, with the som having depreciated significantly because of the recent Russian economic crisis and Moscow’s devaluation of the ruble, the Jumaliev government resigned at the president’s request. Two days later Jumabek IBRAIMOV, chair of the State Property Fund, succeeded Jumaliev, with a refurbished cabinet being announced five days later. Ibraimov died on April 4, 1999, and was succeeded on an acting basis on April 12 by former deputy prime minister Amangeldy MURALIYEV, who had been serving as governor of the Osh oblast. Muraliyev was confirmed as prime minister on April 21 by vote of

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the upper house of the legislature, although more than a third of the representatives in attendance abstained and a number of them used the occasion to criticize the shortcomings of President Akayev’s policies. On November 12, 1999, President Akayev announced first-round parliamentary elections for February 20, 2000. Although the only party-byparty election results released by the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) were for 15 party list seats in the expanded 60-seat lower house, progovernment parties and blocs appeared to make significant gains. The conduct of the balloting drew wide criticism from international observers and the opposition, however, not least because the CEC had disqualified several opposition party lists on technicalities (see Political Parties, below). One of the principal antigovernment leaders, former vice president Feliks Kulov of the recently organized Dignity (Ar-Namys) party, lost under highly questionable circumstances at runoff balloting on March 12, and ten days later authorities arrested him for offenses allegedly committed during his 1997–1998 tenure as minister of national security. A military court acquitted Kulov on August 7, 2000, but the verdict was annulled by a higher court on September 11. Although widely considered a leading opposition candidate in the presidential election scheduled for October 29, Kulov later refused to take a mandatory Kyrgyz language proficiency test and was therefore disqualified, leaving Socialist (Ata-Meken) candidate Omurbek TEKEBAYEV as President Akayev’s principal challenger. At the election Akayev won 75 percent of the vote against five challengers; Tekebayev finished second, with 14 percent. Following President Akayev’s inauguration on December 9, 2000, the Muraliyev cabinet resigned, as required by the constitution, and on December 21 Kurmanbek BAKIYEV, theretofore a southern regional governor, was named as prime minister. A substantially restructured cabinet was completed by Akayev on January 2, 2001, and sworn in on February 19. On January 22 the retrial of Feliks Kulov had concluded with another guilty verdict, the mili-

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tary court imposing a seven-year prison sentence. On March 26 Kulov appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, which upheld his conviction and sentence on July 19. In January 2002 the government arrested Azimbek BEKNAZAROV, an outspoken legislator from the south and a critic of a 1999 Sino-Kyrgyz treaty that had ceded territory to China (see Foreign relations, below). During his trial on charges of having abused his authority while chairing an investigative committee, many of Beknazarov’s southern supporters took to the streets, and at a demonstration held March 17–18 in Jalal-Abad’s district of Aksy, security forces killed five demonstrators. Although convicted in May and given a short sentence, Beknazarov received amnesty under a bill passed in June. (In December a military court convicted two prosecutors and two interior department officials of offenses related to the Aksy incident, but the convictions were subsequently overturned.) On May 22, 2002, in the midst of antigovernment protests that condemned not only the prosecution of Beknazarov but also ratification of the border treaty and the government’s mishandling of the March demonstrations, Prime Minister Bakiyev and his cabinet resigned. President Akayev immediately appointed Nikolay TANAYEV, first deputy prime minister under Bakiyev, as acting prime minister. Tanayev was confirmed in the post in a permanent capacity on May 30, securing a reported 36 votes out of 42 cast in the Assembly of People’s Representatives. On February 2, 2003, three-fourths of those voting approved a constitutional referendum that had been called by the president less than a month before. The changes returned the national legislature to a unicameral Supreme Council, effective as of the election scheduled for February–March 2005, and also called for eliminating all party list (proportional) seats. In a separate question that asked whether Akayev should remain in office until the expiration of his term in late 2005, 79 percent gave him a vote of confidence, despite the previous year’s turmoil. The opposition had sought to postpone the referendum, complaining of undue haste, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in

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Europe (OSCE), among other observers, had concurred, to no avail. Of the 31 seats filled at the first round of elections to the new Supreme Council on February 27, 2005, only 2 went to members of the opposition. The CEC, often on technical grounds, had excluded many critics of the government from contesting seats, while those who found their way onto the ballot had to contend with limited media access, official as well as unofficial intimidation, and polling irregularities. Runoff voting on March 13 concluded with opposition candidates having won only 6 of the Supreme Council’s 75 total seats. Except for monitors from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), most international observers concluded that the elections had failed to meet democratic standards. The release of preliminary results quickly led to peaceful protests, beginning in Osh and Jalal-Abad and spreading elsewhere in the south. On March 21, however, the southern demonstrations turned violent, and protesters began assembling in Bishkek. Although President Akayev described the unrest as “temporary,” on March 24 a crowd estimated at 5,000 marched on government offices, looters took to the streets, and Akayev and his immediate family fled to Russia. On the same day, protesters freed Feliks Kulov from prison and the outgoing bicameral legislature named former prime minister Kurmanbek Bakiyev, leader of the multiparty opposition People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan (PMK), as acting president and acting prime minister. On March 25 Bakiyev appointed a new cabinet that included Kulov as minister of security, although Kulov resigned only five days later. Meanwhile, the issue of legislative legitimacy had been resolved in favor of the newly elected Supreme Council, both houses of the bicameral legislature having dissolved themselves on March 28–29. On April 4, 2005, Askar Akayev, from Moscow, tendered his resignation, which the Supreme Council accepted on April 11. At a presidential election on July 10 Bakiyev won 89.5 percent of the vote against five other candidates. Kulov, having been appointed first deputy prime minister on May 16, had withdrawn as a presidential candidate after receiving assurances that he would be named to head

the next cabinet. Appointed acting prime minister on August 15, Kulov won parliamentary confirmation as prime minister on September 1, although in late September the legislature rejected several ministerial nominees put forward by the BakiyevKulov “tandem.” The completed cabinet was finally sworn in on December 20. Relations between the Bakiyev-Kulov government and the Supreme Council were often antagonistic in the following months, and in early May 2006 the cabinet members submitted their resignations en masse (except for Kulov, who had been urged not to by his colleagues) in response to legislative criticism of most ministers’ individual performances. President Bakiyev rejected the resignations but on May 10, bowing to the demands of a growing opposition, announced a number of key changes, including new deputy prime ministers (one of whom was ultimately rejected by the legislature), a new head of presidential administration, and a new chief of the National Security Service.

Constitution and Government The post of executive president was created by the Supreme Soviet in 1991, although the constitution of the former Communist system was not superseded until May 5, 1993. In approving the 1993 document, the legislature agreed to President Akayev’s demand that a provision calling for adherence to the moral values of Islam be dropped; equality of rights and treatment is guaranteed for all ethnic groups. As amended in 1994, the constitution provided for a bicameral legislature and a popularly elected president, both serving for five-year terms. Under constitutional amendments approved by referendum in February 1996, the president appoints and dismisses the prime minister (subject to legislative approval), appoints other ministers and officials, and signs bills into law or returns them to the legislature. The president may also call referendums on issues of state, and may dissolve the legislature and call new elections. The 1996 constitutional amendments also sought to resolve confusion regarding the responsibilities of the two legislative houses, the Assembly

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of People’s Representatives and the Legislative Assembly. The former’s “nonprofessional members” were to hold at least two sessions annually. Their powers included approving the appointment of the prime minister and various other high-ranking government officials. The Legislative Assembly’s fulltime deputies convened in standing sessions to conduct “day-to-day” legislative activity. A referendum held on October 17, 1998, at President Akayev’s instigation approved a package of further constitutional changes. They included reducing the size of the Assembly of People’s Representatives and expanding the Legislative Assembly from 35 seats to 60, with 15 filled on the basis of party lists. Additional amendments limited the extent of legislative immunity from prosecution, prohibited the legislature from restricting freedom of the press, reduced legislative control over the budget, and authorized private land ownership. (Regarding the last of these provisions, the legislature subsequently enacted a five-year moratorium that was lifted in December 2000.) Yet another referendum, held February 2, 2003, approved restoration of a unicameral Supreme Council as of 2005 and eliminated party list seats from the new legislature. The judicial structure is headed by a Constitutional Court charged with ensuring the constitutionality of executive and legislative acts, and by a Supreme Court as the highest organ of civil, criminal, and administrative justice. The members of both bodies are appointed by the legislature on the recommendation of the president. Administratively, Kyrgyzstan comprises seven regions (dubans or oblasts)—Batken, Chuy, IssykKul, Jalal-Abad, Naryn, Osh, and Talas—plus the city of Bishkek. Local and regional assemblies are directly elected.

Foreign Relations Kyrgyzstan became a sovereign member of the CIS on December 21, 1991. It joined the United Nations on March 2, 1992, with admission to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank following in May and September, respectively. Kyrgyzstan subsequently became a member of the Conference on (later Organization for) Security and Coopera-

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tion in Europe (CSCE/OSCE) and, as a predominantly Muslim country, of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. In June 1994 Kyrgyzstan acceded to NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, under which Kyrgyz troops have regularly participated in joint military exercises. Regionally, during a summit in Tehran, Iran, held February 16–17, 1992, Kyrgyzstan, along with its sister republics of Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, gained admission to a long-dormant Economic Cooperation Organization that had been founded by Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan in 1963. In addition, Kyrgyzstan has regularly participated in summits of Turkic-speaking states. In January 1994 Kyrgyzstan became the third member of the Central Asian Economic Union (CAEU), which had been launched by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In February 1995 the CAEU was given a formal ministerial framework, and its role was extended to cover defense, foreign affairs, and social policy. It also began addressing such regional issues as drug smuggling, the allocation of scarce water resources, and infrastructural development. In July 1998, with Tajikistan having agreed to join, the CAEU adopted the name Central Asian Economic Community, which then became the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) in March 2002. In January 2006 the CACO merged into another regional grouping, the six-member Eurasian Economic Community of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan also participated in the six-member CIS Collective Security Treaty (with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Tajikistan), which in 2001 agreed to base a Collective Rapid Reaction Force in Bishkek; in April 2003 the six treaty members reconfigured their association as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The formation of the CSTO was largely a response to concerns about Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism, and drug-trafficking in the region. Earlier, in the mid-1990s, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan had begun meeting as the so-called “Shanghai Five,” which had as its focus border issues, regional stability, and

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security concerns involving Islamic militancy. In 2001 Uzbekistan joined the grouping, which redesignated itself as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), with a formal SCO charter then being signed in 2002. Central Asian summits have repeatedly seen the participants pledge cooperation against terrorism and Islamic extremism. In Kyrgyzstan, the most serious related incidents occurred in 1999 and 2000. In August 1999 a force numbering in the hundreds took 20 or so hostages in Batken. With assistance from Russia and Kazakhstan, the government launched a counteroffensive that ultimately included bombing runs in Tajikistan, to where the insurgents, who were linked to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (see the Uzbekistan article), had retreated. A negotiated release of the final hostages occurred in October. In August and September 2000 bands of militants, variously numbered from a handful to over 200 according to Kyrgyz officials, reportedly crossed the border from Tajikistan and were met by defense units. Tajik officials denied that the militants had been based in Tajikistan. In 1999–2000 Uzbekistan began laying land mines along its border with Kyrgyzstan to stop incursions and drug-trafficking. The issue appeared resolved in mid-2004, when Uzbekistan began clearing the mines, which had caused civilian injuries on both sides. Meanwhile, protracted negotiations on delimiting the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border were continuing. Relations were further damaged in 2005 when Kyrgyzstan refused to extradite 29 refugees (out of more than 400) who had fled across the border in May to escape what was widely labeled a massacre of protesters in Uzbekistan’s Andizhan region. Economic difficulties and the allocation of natural resources have also repeatedly contributed to tensions among regional states. During 1999, for example, shipment of natural gas from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan was temporarily discontinued for nonpayment; when deliveries resumed, Tashkent unilaterally raised the price. In June 1999 Kyrgyzstan cut off water supplies to Kazakhstan because the latter had failed to deliver coal shipments as payment. In April 2006 representatives

of the regional governments met in Berlin, Germany, in a cooperative effort to conclude an agreement on sharing water and hydroelectricity—two of Kyrgyzstan’s principal resources. In exchange, Kyrgyzstan reportedly sought more secure supplies of coal, oil, and natural gas from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In August 1999 President Akayev signed a SinoKyrgyz treaty that ceded to China some 360 square miles of territory. Ratification of the treaty by both houses of the Kyrgyz legislature in May 2002 was met with widespread protests. Final demarcation of the border with China was accomplished in 2004. President Akayev responded to the September 2001 al-Qaida attacks against the United States and the resultant U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan by declaring Kyrgyzstan to be a “frontline state” in the war against terrorism, drug-trafficking, and Islamic extremism. Having approved U.S. and NATO use of the Manas airport, in September 2003 Kyrgyzstan reached agreement with Moscow on establishing a Russian air base in nearby Kant. Speaking at the latter facility in August 2004, Foreign Minister Askar AITMATOV characterized Russia as Kyrgyzstan’s “main strategic partner.” In early June 2006 negotiations on continued U.S. use of the Manas facility, at a much higher price than the previous $2.6 million per year, were nearing their conclusion.

Current Issues Fifteen months after the March 2005 “Tulip Revolution,” it was not at all clear where Kyrgyzstan would find itself, politically speaking, in March 2007. A process of political realignment was ongoing. New parties had been registered, while the antiAkayev opposition had fractured along crisscrossing fault lines. Some parties strongly supported the Bakiyev-Kulov tandem, while others were highly critical of the government’s lack of progress on institutional reforms, official corruption, and organized crime. Some in the new opposition viewed the existing Supreme Council as a relic of the Akayev era and advocated new elections immediately, whereas Bakiyev and Kulov both favored a

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more orderly reform process that might see both the legislature and the president complete their terms. Some parties favored adoption of a parliamentary system, reversing the constitutional changes put in place under Akayev; some wanted to retain a strong presidency; and others preferred a mixed presidential-parliamentary system. Perhaps the most vocal opponent of the BakiyevKulov government was Ata-Meken’s Omurbek Tekebayev, who had served as speaker of the new Supreme Council until resigning in February 2006 after criticizing the government’s performance. In April–May Tekebayev and the recently resigned minister of industry, trade, and tourism, Almaz ATAMBAYEV of the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (Partiya Sotsialdemokraticheskaya Kyrgyzstana—PSDK), led formation of a For Reforms (Za Reformy) movement. Bakiyev supporters were organizing their own alliances, including the National Forum for the Support of Democratic Reforms and Legality. One of the most vexing problems for the Bakiyev-Kulov government has been combating criminal activity, particularly weapons-smuggling and drug-trafficking. Some legislators have accused officials in the National Security Service of obstructing anticrime efforts, while some critics have questioned whether President Bakiyev or his family have ties to criminal kingpins. Ryspek AKMATABAYEV, a reputed crime boss, was killed on May 10, 2006, not long after winning a Supreme Council by-election to fill a seat that had been held by his brother, who had died during a prison protest the previous October. Also in May, a skirmish along the Kyrgyz-Tajik border left at least four dead, allegedly members of the banned Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Smuggling of weapons may have been involved.

Political Parties The previously dominant Kyrgyz Communist Party withdrew from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on August 28, 1991, at which time its property within Kyrgyzstan was nationalized and its funds frozen; three days later it was disbanded.

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From then until the departure of President Akayev in March 2005, party affiliation did not have a significant impact on government leadership, despite the presence of a vocal opposition. According to the Ministry of Justice, 19 parties were registered as of March 1999. An electoral code adopted at that time restricted eligibility for the 2000 legislative elections to parties active for at least 12 months before the balloting. A number of newer parties circumvented the restriction by forming electoral blocs with older parties. A total of 9 parties and 2 blocs offered approved party lists for the February–March 2000 balloting. The principal bloc was the progovernment Union of Democratic Forces (Soyuz Demokraticheskikh Sil—SDS), encompassing the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (PSDK), the Unity Party of Kyrgyzstan (Birimdik; see Forward, Kyrgyzstan!, below), the Republican Party of Kyrgyzstan “Justice” (Adilet), and the Party of Economic Revival of the Kyrgyz Republic. The SDS participants presented a single party list and finished second to the Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan (PKK) in the proportional vote, attracting a 19 percent share and claiming 4 of the 15 party list seats in the lower house. In April 2001, 9 opposition parties formed a coalition dedicated to democracy and human rights. Parties participating in the People’s Patriotic Movement were the Agrarian Labor Party of Kyrgyzstan (later renamed the New Kyrgyzstan party), the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan (CPK), ArNamys, Erkindik, the PKK, the “Poor and Unprotected” People’s Party (Bei Becharalar; see PSDK, below), the Poor Nation Party (Kairan-El), the Republican Party of Kyrgyzstan (RPK), and the Socialist Party “Fatherland” (Ata-Meken). In November Feliks Kulov, imprisoned leader of Ar-Namys, was named chair of a People’s Congress, which included Ata-Meken, Bei Becharalar, and Erkindik as well as Ar-Namys. In August 2002 over 20 opposition parties and nongovernmental organizations announced the formation of a Movement for the Resignation of President Askar Akayev and Reforms for the People. In January 2004 six leading opposition parties— the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan (DDK),

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Erkindik, Kairan-El, the Party of National Restoration “Banner” (Asaba), the Progressive Democratic Party “Free Kyrgyzstan” (ErK), and the RPK— established an ideologically diverse electoral bloc, For the People’s Power (Za Vlast Narodna). The alliance subsequently announced that it would support former prime minister Kurmanbek Bakiyev for president in 2005. In September 2004, looking toward the legislative election expected in February 2005, the six were joined by both Communist parties (the CPK and PKK) and New Kyrgyzstan in forming a People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan (PMK), which pledged to work for free and fair elections. The PMK held a constituent conference in early November, at which time Bakiyev was elected chair. Earlier, in May 2004, a Civic Union “For Fair Elections” was announced by Ar-Namys, AtaMeken, Bei Becharalar, and the PSDK. Described as a centrist “third force” positioned between strongly progovernment parties and the regime’s most vocal opponents, the grouping designated as its leader Misir ASHURKULOV, an associate of President Akayev who was dismissed as Security Council secretary shortly thereafter. In October 2004, by which time there were at least 40 registered parties, Bakiyev’s PMK and For Fair Elections declared that they would join forces. Although the opposition leadership had no expectations that it would win a victory at the February–March 2006 legislative election, the systematic disqualification of opposition candidates, who ended up winning only half a dozen of the 75 seats, led directly to the “Tulip Revolution” of March 24. By early 2006 the number of registered parties had surpassed 70. The PMK had registered in May 2005 as an 8-party bloc (CPK, Erkindik, ErK, New Kyrgyzstan, Party of Economic Revival of the Kyrgyz Republic, Party of Farmers and Local Communities, PKK, and RPK) that later redefined itself as the Sociopolitical Movement of Kyrgyzstan. Most members, in April 2006, participated in forming the propresidential National Forum for Support of Democratic Reforms and Legality, chaired by Tabyldy Orozaliyev of the re-

cently formed Party of Labor and Unity. The National Forum was initially described as including 13 parties and 20 public movements. Meanwhile, in January 2006 a new People’s Coalition of Democratic Forces, encompassing 7 parties, 2 blocs, and 9 nongovernmental organizations, was established to promote constitutional and social reforms, including the adoption of a parliamentary system of government; among the participants were Ar-Namys, Ata-Meken, KairanEl, My Country (Moya Strana), the PKK, and the PSDK. In succeeding months the People’s Coalition was increasingly viewed as disenchanted with the Bakiyev-Kulov government, and in April it gave birth to the opposition For Reforms (Za Reformy) movement. The party system remained far from settled, however, and it seemed likely that party mergers and the formation of other alliances lay ahead. [Note: In accordance with a directive from President Bakiyev in April 2006, all government ministers and other senior officials were required to suspend their party activities, if they had not yet done so. Some, including Prime Minister Kulov, had already resigned from their parties. Nevertheless, many members of the administration remain influential in particular parties, and therefore they continue to be listed, below, as party leaders.] Agrarian Party of the Kyrgyz Republic (Agrarnaya Partiya Kyrgyzskoj Respublik— APKR). Registered as a party in November 1993, the small Agrarian Party promotes agricultural reform and protection of the rights and interests of farm workers. Although it supported privatization of land, it characterized the Akayev government’s reform program as “unviable.” In January 2000 the newly organized Socio-Political Peasants (Farmers) Party of Kyrgyzstan (see PKPLC, below) announced that it and the APKR would contest the 2000 parliamentary election together. Leader: Medetbek SHAMSHIBEKOV (Chair). Ar-Namys (“Dignity” or “Honor”). Ar-Namys was organized in July 1999 by one of Kyrgyzstan’s leading oppositionists, former vice president Feliks Kulov, who had resigned as Bishkek mayor

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in April to protest corruption and antidemocratic tendencies in the Akayev administration. The party quickly emerged as one of Kyrgyzstan’s largest. Because Ar-Namys had not existed long enough to offer its own party list for the February 2000 election, it attempted to qualify by joining with the DDK, which put Kulov at the head of its list. With the DDK list disqualified, Kulov ran in a single-mandate district, reportedly winning some 40 percent of the vote on February 20 but then, in balloting fraught with accusations of official misconduct, losing in the runoff on March 12. Ten days later, in the context of continuing demonstrations demanding that the election be nullified, he was arrested and charged with abuse of power and other offenses during his tenure as minister of national security in 1997–1998. Considered a leading opposition candidate for president, Kulov was disqualified in September 2000 when he refused to take the mandatory Kyrgyz language test. Having already announced a preelection alliance with Ata-Meken, Kulov later agreed to head Omurbek Tekebayev’s campaign. In January 2001 and May 2002 he was convicted of various crimes and sentenced to prison. Despite repeated calls from the opposition for his release, he remained incarcerated and ineligible for parole until November 2005. He was nevertheless regarded as a potential contender for the presidency in 2005. Freed on March 24, 2005, his convictions were later thrown out by the courts. Having been named prime minister, he resigned his party membership in April 2006. Leader: Emil ALIYEV (Chair). Ata-Jurt (“Fatherland”). The Ata-Jurt movement was founded in December 2004 in preparation for the legislative elections scheduled for early 2005. Headed by former foreign minister Roza Otunbayeva, the movement was quickly recognized as one of the leading opposition formations and signed a partnership agreement with Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s PMK. The Central Electoral Commission denied Otunbayeva a place on the February 2006 ballot because she had not been a continu-

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ous resident of Kyrgyzstan for the preceding five years, having served as an ambassador abroad before breaking with the Akayev administration. Generally regarded as the foremost woman diplomat in the country, Otunbayeva was reappointed foreign minister by Acting President Bakiyev, but in September the Supreme Council rejected her nomination for the permanent post. In January 2006, disenchanted with the BakiyevKulov government, she joined Asaba (below). Another prominent Ata-Jurt member, Adakhan MADUMAROV, became a deputy prime minister in the Bakiyev-Kulov government and then state secretary. Leader: Anvar ARTYKOV. Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan (CPK). Formation of the CPK was announced in August 1999 by dissidents who had accused Absamat Masaliyev of cooperating with ideological enemies and defending corrupt officials. In 2004 party founder Klara Adzhibekova proposed reunification, an offer rejected by the PKK in the absence of an apology. Leader: Klara ADZHIBEKOVA. Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan (Demokraticheskoye Dvizhenie Kyrgystana— DDK). Founded in May 1990, the DDK served as an umbrella for various prodemocracy and proindependence groups, including the Osh Region Movement (Osh Aymaghi), Truth (Aqigat), and Ashar. After independence several components broke away to launch independent formations, leaving the rump DDK with a more nationalist identity. The DDK backed the election of Askar Akayev to the presidency in October 1991 but later withdrew its support. It was registered as a political party in July 1993. In early January 2000 the DDK and Ar-Namys, subsequently joined by Bei Becharalar and the new RPK, announced that they would form an electoral coalition for the February national election. Subsequently, however, the Central Electoral Commission disqualified the coalition’s party list because of a disputed party congress. As a result, the DDK

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expelled several members, including former leader Kazat AKMATOV, in February. After the election the DDK and its three allies, plus the Kairan-El, formed the For Kyrgyzstan’s Future bloc to campaign for opposition causes. In May 2005 the party withdrew from the PMK. In July the party’s presidential candidate, Dzhypar Dzheksheyev, finished fourth, with 0.9 percent of the vote. Leader: Dzhypar DZHEKSHEYEV (Jypar JEKSHEEV), Viktor CHERNOMORETS. Erkindik Party. Announced in February 2000 by former members of the Progressive Democratic Party “Free Kyrgyzstan” (ErK) who rejected the leadership of Tursunbay Bakir-uulu, Erkindik (“Freedom”) was officially registered in late April and held a founding congress a month later, at which time Topchubek Turgunaliyev succeeded Adylbek KASYMOV as leader. The party immediately joined the For Kyrgyzstan’s Future bloc. On September 1, 2000, Turgunaliyev and seven others were convicted of a 1999 plot to assassinate President Akayev, with Turgunaliyev, labeled the “mastermind” by the government, receiving a sentence of 16 years’ imprisonment. Leading opposition politicians quickly protested the conviction and sentence as politically motivated. President Akayev subsequently granted a pardon to Turgunaliyev, due to Turgunaliyev’s deteriorating health. In late 2003 Turgunaliyev praised Georgia’s “Rose Revolution” and suggested that it might serve as a model for Kyrgyzstan. A key member of the PMK and a strong supporter of President Bakiyev, Turgunaliyev has spearheaded a campaign to dissolve the Supreme Council and hold new legislative elections. In May 2006 he announced formation of a new proreform Kuttuu Kyrgyzstan (“Kyrgyzstan, Land of Plenty”) coalition, which was described as including over ten parties. Leader: Topchubek TURGUNALIYEV (Chair). Forward, Kyrgyzstan! (Alga, Kyrgyzstan!— AG). The AG was established in September 2003 by merger of four small progovernment parties:

the New Movement (Jany Kyimyl), the New Times (Jany Zaman), the Party of Cooperators, and the Party of Spiritual Revival “Manas El” (People of Manas). Advocating “a strong and democratic Kyrgyzstan,” the party placed an emphasis on decentralization and development. In January 2004 the congress of a fifth party, the Unity Party of Kyrgyzstan (Birimdik), led by former prime minister Amangeldy Muraliyev, agreed to join the AG. Bermet Akayeva, daughter of former president Akayev, was a founding member of the AG. She has consistently attacked the “Tulip Revolution” as financed by criminal money and a portent of “legal nihilism.” Leader: Bolot BEGALIYEV (Chair), Bermet AKAYEVA. Justice (Akyykat). Akyykat was established in March 2006 by Keneshbek Duyshebayev, President Akayev’s final interior minister, who initially termed the events of March 24, 2005, a “coup d’´etat” and who finished last among the six presidential candidates in July, winning only 0.5 percent of the vote. Leaders: Keneshbek DUYSHEBAYEV (Cochair and 2005 presidential candidate), Temirbek AKMATALIYEV (Cochair). My Country (Menim Ata-Jurtum/Moya Strana). Often referenced in English as the Party of Action “My Country,” the center-right Moya Strana party was established in October 1998. A progovernment formation, it was awarded one party list seat in the lower house, based on a 6 percent vote share, following the 2000 election. Leader: Djoormart OTORBAYEV (Chair of the Party and Former Deputy Prime Minister). New Force (Novaya Sila—NS). Registered in October 1994 as the Women’s Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (Demokraticheskaya Partiya Zhenshchin Kyrgyzstana—DPZK), New Force adopted its present name in November 2003, at which time it opened its membership to men as well as women. Broadly supportive of the Akayev government, it received two party list seats based on a 13 percent share (including President Akayev’s vote) at

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the February 2000 election. In 2003 the NS chairperson, Tokon Shailiyeva, was named governor of Issyk-Kul, but she was replaced by the new government in March 2005. Leader: Tokon SHAILIYEVA (Chair). New Kyrgyzstan (Zany Kyrgyzstan—ZK). Based in southern Osh, the leftist, rural-based ZK was registered in October 1994 as the Agrarian Labor Party of Kyrgyzstan (Agrarno-Trudovnaya Partiya Kyrgyzstana—ATPK). Its initial goal was preventing a breakdown in agricultural infrastructure and overcoming what its founders perceived as a crisis in agro-industry. The party’s Usen Sydykov, a populist, was disqualified as a parliamentary candidate before the 2000 elections and again in 2002 after having received a near-majority in the first round of a by-election. Sydykov subsequently served as President Bakiyev’s head of presidential administration until being transferred in May 2006. Another prominent leader, Minister of Education DOSBOL Nuruulu, resigned his party membership later the same month. The party has advocated retention of a strong national presidency. Leaders: Usen SYDYKOV, Sarygul SADYGALIYEV. Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan (Partiya Kommunistov Kyrgyzstana—PKK). The PKK was launched in June 1992 as the successor to the former ruling Kyrgyz Communist Party, which had been disbanded in August 1991. Registered in September 1992, the party enjoyed significant support in the state bureaucracy. A majority of successful candidates in the February 1995 legislative elections reportedly belonged to or had close ties to the party. PKK leader Absamat MASALIYEV was runner-up in the December 1995 presidential poll, winning 24.4 percent of the vote. Despite having suffered defections in 1999 (see CPK, above), the PKK won a plurality of party list seats (5 of 15) at the 2000 Legislative Assembly election, taking 28 percent of the vote on a platform that included a call for reconstitution of the Soviet Union. Its contender for president in 2000, Iskhak

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Masaliyev, failed the mandatory Kyrgyz language test. In July 2004 longtime party leader Absamat Masaliyev died, and two months later his deputy, Bakytbek BEKBOYEV, was elected to be his successor, defeating fellow MP Nikolay Baylo. Bekboyev lost the post, however, the following December, partly as a consequence of an internal dispute over energy policy, and was replaced by Baylo. Leaders: Nikolay BAYLO (Chair of Central Executive Committee), Ishak MASALIYEV (First Deputy Chair). Party of Economic Revival of the Kyrgyz Republic (Ekonomicheskogo Vozrozhdeniya Kirigizskoi Republiki—EVKR). The Economic Revival Party was formed in 1997 for the purpose of protecting the rights and interests of entrepreneurs. Its leaders initially criticized the government for permitting official corruption and for not having a viable plan to end the country’s economic difficulties, although it joined the SDS prior to the 2000 elections. Leader: Valery KHON. Party of Kyrgyzstan’s Peasants and Local Communities (PKPLC). Registered in September 1999 as the Socio-Political Peasants’ (Farmers’) Party of Kyrgyzstan (PfPK), the party adopted its current name in February 2004. In 2000 the PfPK contested the parliamentary elections in alliance with the government-supportive APKR. In 2004, however, the party chair described the party as centrist rather than progovernment. It supports the rights of farmers and rural development. Leader: Esengul ISAKOV. Party of Labor and Unity (Emgek Dzhana Birimdik). Labor and Unity was established in August 2005 by key Bakiyev supporters, including the well-known writer Yuruslan Toychubekov, who had served as the president’s campaign manager. The party’s initial platform focused on relieving poverty, developing the economy, and reducing unemployment. In April 2006 Toychubekov and the party’s chair, Kurmanbek Temirbayev, suspended

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their membership while they continued to hold senior positions in the executive branch. Leaders: Kurmanbek TEMIRBAYEV, Yuruslan TOYCHUBEKOV, Tabyldy OROZALIYEV. Party of National Restoration “Banner” (Partiya Natsionalnovo Vozrozhdeniya “Asaba”). Named with reference to a Kyrgyz military banner, Asaba was launched in November 1991 by a nationalist faction of the DDK that supported creation of a sovereign, democratic state and protection of the Kyrgyz economy and political interests. The party’s current leader, Azimbek Beknazarov, whose 2002 trial was a precipitating factor in the March riots in the south, was regarded as a possible 2005 presidential contender before Asaba and other opposition parties endorsed former prime minister Bakiyev in 2004. A former prosecutor general, Beknazarov stated in May 2006 that his principal goal was constitutional reform and that Asaba was considering a merger with the like-minded, centrist ErK. In January Roza Otunbayeva, a former foreign minister, had joined the party leadership. Leaders: Azimbek BEKNAZAROV and Roza OTUNBAYEVA (Cochairs). Party of Protection. Established in October 1996 and more formally known as the Party for the Protection of Industrial and Agricultural Employees and of Poor Families of the Kyrgyz Republic, the Protection Party supports economic reforms based on development, protection of the interests of workers and low-income families, and creation of a “socially oriented market economy.” For the 2000 legislative election it joined the Republican People’s Party of Jenishbek TENTIYEV in forming the Manas Bloc (Blok Manas), which took its name from an ancient, venerated national epic. In the July 2005 presidential election the party’s candidate, Akbaraly Aitikeyev, finished third, with 3.7 percent of the vote. Leader: Akbaraly AITIKEYEV (Chair). Party of War Veterans in Afghanistan and Participants in Other Local Military Conflicts (Politicheskaya Partiya Veteranov Vojny b

Afghanistane i Uchastnikov Drugikh Lokalnykh Boyelykh Konflicktov—PPVVAA). The Party of War Veterans has as its principal goals military reform, other progressive reforms, assistance to veterans, and an end to corruption. It traces its origins to the Democratic Party of Economic Reform, which its chair also headed. The latter group, registered in October 1994, had advocated movement toward a more democratic, free society founded on social justice and social values. Based on an 8 percent vote share at the 2000 parliamentary election, the PPVVAA received two party list seats in the lower house. Leaders: Akbokon TASHTANBEKOV (Chair of Political Council), Asel MAMBETALIYEVA. Poor Nation Party (Kairan-El Partiyasi). Registered in September 1999, Kairan-El is a moderately leftist, nationalist party. It participated in the PMK and, more recently, the People’s Coalition of Democratic Forces. Leaders: Dooronbek SADYRBAYEV, Kurmanbek TURUMBEKOV. Progressive Democratic Party “Free Kyrgyzstan” (Progressivno-Demokraticheskaya Partiya “Erkin Kyrgyzstan”—ErK). The ErK (an acronym meaning “will”) was founded in 1991 as a splinter group of the DDK on a platform of moderate nationalism and support for a liberal market economy. It was weakened in 1992 by secession of the more nationalist Ata-Meken (below), its subsequent attempts to build a prodemocracy bloc making little progress. ErK’s founder, Topchubek Turgunaliyev, was campaign manager for Medetkan SHERIMKULOV in the December 1995 presidential election but was arrested (for insulting the incumbent) shortly before the polling, in which Sherimkulov placed last of three candidates. In January 1997, in what his supporters charged was a politically motivated case, Turgunaliyev was convicted of embezzlement during his tenure as rector of Bishkek Humanitarian University. Released from prison in November 1998, Turgunaliyev was subsequently charged with participating in a 1999

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plot to assassinate President Akayev, although he eventually received a presidential pardon. In February 2000 formation of the breakaway Erkindik was announced. Two months later, ErK Chair Tursunbay Bakir-uulu accepted responsibility for the party’s failure to win any party list seats at the 2000 national election. He subsequently announced his intention to run for president in October, but he received under 1 percent of the vote. After being elected by the Legislative Assembly in November 2002 to serve as Kyrgyzstan’s first ombudsman, Bakir-uulu resigned as ErK’s formal leader, although he remains its dominant figure. In July 2005 he finished second in the presidential election, winning 4.0 percent of the vote. Leaders: Bektur ASANOV (Chair), Tursunbay BAKIR-UULU. Republican Party of Kyrgyzstan (RPK). Registered in October 1999, the RPK was established through the auspices of Zamira SYDYKOVA, editor of the leading opposition newspaper, Res Publica. The party advocates equality for all, freedom of speech, environmental preservation, and other left-centrist principles. Leader: Giyaz TOKOMBAYEV (Chair). Republican Party of Kyrgyzstan “Justice” (“Adilet”). Considering itself a party of the intelligentsia, Adilet was established in September 1999 by renowned writer Chingiz AYTMATOV, who had previously been associated with the Party of Spiritual Restoration “Manas El.” The new party sought to promote national unity, ethnic accord and cooperation, and educational and cultural development. Among those joining Adilet were former prime minister Apas Jumagulov and former finance minister Marat SULTANOV (who became speaker of the Supreme Council in 2006). Leaders: Toychubek KASYMOV (Former Governor of Chuy Region), Altay BORUBAYEV (Former Speaker of the Assembly of People’s Representatives), Kubanychbek DJUMALIEV (Former Deputy Prime Minister). Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (Partiya Sotsial-demokraticheskaya Kyrgyzstana—

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PSDK). The PSDK was launched in July 1993 with the political endorsement of President Akayev. Supporting the government’s reformist, promarket line, it won representation in the February 1995 legislative elections and was a leading component of the SDS in 2000. Its chair, Almaz Atambayev, was a 2000 presidential nominee, winning about 6 percent of the vote, for third place. In 2003 he indicated that he would be a candidate again in 2005, although his prospects appeared to be dimmed by his bodyguard’s alleged involvement in the 2004 murder of Chynybek ALIYEV, the head of the government’s anticorruption agency. In October 2004 the PSDK absorbed the “Poor and Unprotected” People’s Party (El Partiyasi “Bei Becharalar,” or simply the El Party). Appealing to intellectuals, the disadvantaged, and students, the leftist, reform-minded Bei Becharalar had been registered in December 1995. Its leaders had included Daniyar USENOV, who was named acting first deputy prime minister in May 2006, and Melis Eshimkanov, who had won about 1 percent of the vote in the 2000 presidential election. In April 2006 Atambayev resigned as minister of industry, trade, and tourism and moved into opposition, becoming cochair of the For Reforms movement. Leaders: Almaz ATAMBAYEV (Chair), Melis ESHIMKANOV. Socialist Party “Fatherland” (Socialisticheskaya Partiya “Ata-Meken”). The leftist AtaMeken was founded in 1992 by a nationalist faction of the ErK. It failed to meet the 5 percent threshold for claiming party list seats at the 2000 Legislative Assembly balloting, although its chair won election in a single-mandate district and was subsequently elected deputy speaker of the body. Following the disqualification of Feliks Kulov, he was widely considered to be the leading opposition presidential contender for the October 2000 election, at which he finished second, with 14 percent of the vote. In late 2003 Tekebayev threw his support to Kulov for the 2005 presidential election. Briefly speaker of the Supreme Council, Tekebayev resigned in February 2006 after criticizing

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Cabinet As of June 26, 2006 Prime Minister First Deputy Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister

Feliks Kulov Daniyar Usenov (Vacant)

Ministers Agriculture, Water, and Processing Industry Culture Economy and Finance Emergencies Defense Education, Science, and Youth Policy Foreign Affairs Health Industry, Trade, and Tourism Interior Justice Labor and Social Welfare Transportation and Communication

Azim Isabekov Sultam Rayev Akylbek Zhaparov Dzhanysh Rustenbekov Maj. Gen. Ismail Isakov Dosbol Nur-uulu Alikbek Jekshenkulov Shailoobek Niyazov Medetbek Kerimkulov Murat Sutalinov Marat Kaipov Evgeny Semenenko Nurlan Sulaimanov

Head, Prime Minister’s Administration Chair, State Committee for Migration and Employment Chair, State Committee for State Property

Turusbek Koenaliev Aigul Ryskulova [f] Tursun Turdumambetov

[f] = female

the government’s commitment to rapid reform. He was considered a principal architect of the For Reforms opposition movement that took shape two months later. Leader: Omurbek TEKEBAYEV (Chair). Other recently active parties include the Party of Popular Unity and Concord, first registered in April 1999 and led by Azamjam AKBAROV; the Party of Fairness and Progress (Partiya Spravedlivosti i Progressa—PSP), headed by former foreign minister Muratbek IMANALIYEV, who also leads the New Direction (Jany Bagyt) movement; People’s Heritage (El Muras), led by Toktokan BOROMBAYEVA, who also heads the National Council for Women, Family, and Gen-

der Development but who was rejected for the post of minister of culture by the Supreme Council in September 2005; the Political Party of Kyrgyzstan “Nation” (“Elet”), which has also been popularly referred to as the Party of Regions, led by Naken KASIYEV, the governor of Osh; and the Youth Party, registered in June 2001 and led by Aidar BAKIYEV of the Kel Kel movement. Many new parties have been announced since the ouster of the Akayev regime. Registered in August 2005 and led by Emilbek KAPTAGAYEV, the National Democratic Party “Great Unity” (“Uluu Birimdik”) was described as appealing to owners of small and medium-size businesses as well as the “rural intelligentsia.” The Kyrgyz Conservative Republican Party, led by Bakyt

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KODZHOKEYEV, and the Alliance of Democratic Forces, headed by Kubatbek BAYBOLOV, were both formed in November 2005. The National Patriotic Party “Peace” (“Tynchtyk”) was registered in February 2006 under the leadership of Ismail KOCHKOROV. The Commonwealth Party (Sodrudzhestvo), dating from April 2006 and advocating closer relations within the Commonwealth of Independent States, is led by Vladimir NIFADYEV. Formation of the Patriots of Kyrgyzstan, led by Almay OROZBEKOV, was also announced in April 2006; it called for dissolution of the Supreme Council and establishment of a presidential-parliamentary form of government.

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A first round of balloting on February 27, 2005, concluded with 31 of the legislature’s 75 seats being filled; runoff balloting was then held on March 13. With most candidates having run as independents, no breakdown by party affiliation was provided, although the opposition reportedly won only 6 seats. Following the ouster of President Akayev, many members of the former opposition called for throwing out the election results and reseating the bicameral legislature. On March 28–29, however, the Assembly of People’s Representatives and the Legislative Assembly both dissolved in favor of the new Supreme Council. Speaker: Marat SULTANOV.

Banned Organizations In November 2003 the Supreme Court banned four Islamic fundamentalist organizations: the Hizb-ut-Tahrir; the East Turkestan Islamic Party (Sharq Turkestan Islam Partiyasy); the East Turkestan Liberation Organization (Sharq Azzat Turkestan); and the Islamic Party of Turkestan, also known as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).

Legislature The Soviet-era unicameral legislature of 350 members was replaced in 1995 by a bicameral Supreme Council comprising a 70-member (later reduced to 45 members) Assembly of People’s Representatives (El Okuldor Palatasy) and a 35-member (later increased to 60 members) Legislative Assembly (Myizan Chygaru Palatasy). Members of both houses were directly elected for five-year terms. Whereas the Assembly of People’s Representatives consisted of nonprofessional deputies who represented the nation’s regional/ ethnic communities, the Legislative Assembly met in standing session to handle the day-to-day workload of the parliament. The constitutional referendum of February 2003 endorsed restoration of a unicameral legislature, the Supreme Council (Jorgorku Kenesh), effective from the next election.

Communications In July 1992 the Supreme Soviet adopted a mass media law that made no reference to freedom of the press and was criticized by Russia’s Interfax agency as being more restrictive than its Communist-era predecessor. Government censorship was explicitly rejected, however, in a presidential decree of October 1994, while in October 1998 constitutional amendments approved by referendum included a provision forbidding the legislature from imposing restrictions on press freedoms. Nevertheless, opposition newspapers, particularly Res Publica, encountered frequent problems with the authorities under President Akayev, including fines and suspension of publication for such alleged offenses as libel and insulting officials.

Press The following are published at least five times a week in Bishkek in Kyrgyz, unless otherwise noted: Slovo Kyrgyzstana (Kyrgyz Word, 110,000), government organ, in Russian; Delo No (Case Number, 50,000), weekly, in Russian; Vechernyi Bishkek (Bishkek Evening News, 20,000 daily, 50,000 weekend), in Russian; Zaman Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyz Herald, 15,000), weekly; Bishkek Shamy (10,000), Bishkek City Council organ; Yuzhnyi

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Kurier (Southern Courier, 10,000), weekly, in Russian; Res Publica (Republic, 10,000), independent, in Russian and English; Kyrgyzstan Chronicle (5,000), weekly, in English; Times of Central Asia, weekly, in English; Asaba (Banner), twice weekly; MSN, private daily.

News Agencies The government facility is the Kyrgyz National News Agency (Kabar), headquartered in Bishkek. AkiPress and KyrgyzInfo are independent agencies. Russia’s Interfax and ITAR-TASS also maintain bureaus in the capital.

mainly from the capital. Kyrgyz Television offers limited service to more than 240,000 TV sets; some areas also receive broadcasts from Russian Public Television. There were approximately 70,000 personal computers serving 160,000 Internet users in 2003.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. Zamira Beksultanovna SYDYKOVA U.S. Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan Marie L. YOVANOVITCH

Broadcasting and Computing

Permanent Representative to the UN Nurbek JEENBAEV

Kyrgyz Radio broadcasts in Kyrgyz, Russian, and other languages, while a number of independent stations have recently started transmitting,

IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, CIS, EBRD, ECO, IDB, Interpol, IOM, OIC, OSCE, PCA, WCO, WTO

Note: Kyrgyzstan’s opposition coalition initiated large-scale demonstrations demanding that the government undertake constitutional reform on November 2, 2006. After reaching agreement with the opposition on reform of key institutions. President Bakiyev signed the amended constitution, which gave greater authority to the Supreme Council, on November 9. Prime Minister Felix Kulov and his entire cabinet resigned on December 19, but continued to perform in an acting capacity, pending approval of a new Council of Ministers. With the opposition boycotting the vote, Kyrgyzstan’s legislature voted to restore a number of presidential powers, including appointment of the prime minister and government, on December 30, 2006.

LAOS L A O PE O P L E ’S D E M O C R A T I C R E P U B L I C Sathalanalat Paxathipatai Paxax oˆ n Lao

The Country The wholly landlocked nation of Laos sits between Vietnam and Thailand but also shares borders with Cambodia, China, and Myanmar (Burma). Apart from the Mekong River plains adjacent to Thailand, the country is largely mountainous, with scattered dense forests. Tropical monsoons provide a May–October wet season that alternates with a November–April dry season. The population is divided among three major groups: about 56 percent Lao-Loum (valley Lao), 34 percent Lao-Theung (mountainside Lao), and 9 percent Lao-Soung (mountaintop Lao); the LaoTheung and Lao-Soung have long protested the disproportionate economic and political influence of the lowland population. Tribal minorities include non-Khmer-speaking groups in the southern uplands and Hmong and Yao in the northern mountains. Although most ethnic Lao, especially the valley Lao, follow Hinayana (Theravada) Buddhism, most of the tribal minorities practice animism. Lao is the official language, while English has supplanted French within government circles. Pali, locally known as Nang Xu Tham, a Sanskrit language of Hindu origin, is generally used by priests. About one-third of the population is illiterate, according to the government. Laos remains one of the world’s poorest countries, with an estimated per capita income of $320 in 2003, according to World Bank calculations. About 60 percent of the population is engaged in subsistence agriculture, which continues to account for about 50 percent of GDP. Rice, the principal food staple, grows on the large majority of the farmed

land; other crops include maize, tobacco, cotton, citrus fruits, and coffee; opium, nominally subject to state control, is an important source of income in Hmong hill areas. Manufacturing employs only about 2 percent of the workforce, although industry as a whole (including construction and mining) accounts for about one-fourth of GDP, as does the service sector. Mining is presently confined almost entirely to tin, but there are deposits of copper, gold, silver, zinc, and gemstones as well as large quantities of high-quality iron ore in Xieng Khouang Province.

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Wood products, principally timber and logs, traditionally accounted for the largest share of exports, but in recent years manufactured garments have moved to the lead. Electricity has also become a leading source of foreign earnings, with Laos pinning much of its hopes for economic development on additional efforts to tap the hydroelectric potential of the Mekong basin. Vietnam, Thailand, and China are major trading partners. Remittances from expatriate Laotians remain a significant income source, and tourism has also become increasingly important. Although the Communist regime that gained power in 1975 instituted strict socialist policies, including the creation of large agricultural cooperatives, in the 1990s it promoted a return to family farming, encouraged private enterprise and foreign investment, privatized nonstrategic stateowned enterprises, and began reorganizing “strategic” companies, including banks and utilities, to compete commercially. Economic growth averaged more than 6 percent from 1987 to 1997 but declined in 1998 and 1999, when weak fiscal and monetary policies, coupled with the regional economic downturn, led to triple-digit inflation and a drastic drop in the value of the kip. By mid-2000, however, the kip had stabilized and inflation had been checked to around 10 percent, according to the government. For 2000–2002 GDP growth averaged 5.8 percent annually. The rate of growth, which rose to 6.1 percent in 2003 and 6.4 percent in 2004, was projected to reach 7.0 percent for 2005. After spiking at over 15 percent in 2003, inflation declined again, with a drop to about 7 percent in 2005.

Government and Politics Political Background Laos became a French protectorate in 1893 and gained limited self-government as an Associated State within the French Union on June 19, 1949. Although the French recognized full Lao sovereignty on October 23, 1953, the Communistled Vietminh—supported within Laos by the socalled Pathet Lao (“Land of Lao”), the military

arm of the Lao Communist movement—mounted a war of “national liberation” in 1954 in conjunction with its operations in Vietnam. Hostilities were ended by the Geneva Accords of 1954, and the last French ties to Laos lapsed in December of that year. Pro-Western or conservative governments held power from 1954 to 1960, except for a brief interval in 1957–1958 when neutralist Prime Minister SOUVANNA PHOUMA formed a coalition with Prince SOUPHANOUVONG, his half-brother and leader of the pro-Communist Lao Patriotic Front (Neo Lao Hak Xat—NLHX). In April 1960 the Lao army, headed by Gen. PHOUMI NOSAVAN, gained control of the government through a fraudulent National Assembly election. A coup in August by a group of neutralist officers under Capt. KONG LE led to the reinstatement of Souvanna Phouma as prime minister, but a countercoup led by General Phoumi brought about the installation four months later of a rightist administration headed by Prince BOUN OUM NA Champassak. In an effort to defuse the fighting and avoid deeper involvement by the great powers, a 14-nation conference was convened in Geneva in May 1961, and the rightists, neutralists, and NLHX eventually agreed to join a coalition government under Souvanna Phouma that took office in June 1962. Renewed factional feuding nevertheless led to the withdrawal of the NLHX ministers over the next two years and the continuation, with North Vietnamese support, of the Communist insurgency based in the north. The NLHX refused to participate in an election held in July 1965, the results of which left Souvanna Phouma in control of the National Assembly. Military encounters between the government and the Pathet Lao (formally renamed the Lao People’s Liberation Army in 1965) continued thereafter, with the Pathet Lao retaining control of the northeast and working closely with North Vietnamese forces concentrated in the area. Peace talks between the Pathet Lao and the Souvanna Phouma government resumed in 1972, and in February 1973 cease-fire proposals put forward by the latter were accepted. A political protocol signed the following September provided for a provisional

LAOS

Political Status: Fully independent constitutional monarchy proclaimed October 23, 1953; Communist-led people’s democratic republic established December 2, 1975; present constitution adopted August 14, 1991. Area: 91,428 sq. mi. (236,800 sq. km.). Population: 4,581,258 (1995C); 6,059,000 (2005E). Major Urban Center (2005E): VIENTIANE (Viangchan, 730,000). Official Language: Lao (English is considered the business language in government circles). Monetary Unit: New Kip (market rate July 1, 2006: 10,116 new kips = $1US). The Thai baht also circulates. President: CHOUMMALY SAYASONE; elected by the National Assembly on June 8, 2006, to succeed KHAMTAY SIPHANDONE. Vice President: BOUNNHANG VORACHIT; elected by the National Assembly on June 8, 2006, succeeding CHOUMMALY SAYASONE. Prime Minister: Bouasone BOUPHAVANH; approved by the National Assembly on June 8, 2006, to succeed BOUNNHANG VORACHIT.

coalition government and a joint National Political Consultative Council (NPCC) empowered to advise the cabinet. On April 5, 1974, King SAVANG VATTHANA signed a decree appointing the coalition government, thus formalizing the end of a decade of bitter warfare. Prince Souvanna Phouma was redesignated prime minister, while Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphanouvong (the “Red Prince”) was named president of the NPCC. In May 1975, following the fall of Cambodia and South Vietnam to Communist insurgents, Pathet Lao forces moved into the Laotian capital of Vientiane and began installing their own personnel in government posts while subjecting both military and civilian supporters of the neutralist regime to political “reeducation” sessions. Three months later, on August 23, the formal “liberation” of Vientiane was announced. On December 2, at a People’s Congress called by the Lao Patriotic Front,

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the monarchy was abolished, the 19-month-old coalition government of Prince Souvanna Phouma was terminated, and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LPDR) was established. Concurrently, Souphanouvong was designated head of state and chair of a newly established Supreme People’s Assembly, while KAYSONE PHOMVIHAN, secretary general of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP), was named prime minister. Souphanouvong resigned his state posts after reportedly having suffered a stroke in September 1986; he was succeeded as head of state (on an acting basis) by PHOUMI VONGVICHIT, theretofore a deputy chair of the Council of Ministers. The presidency of the republic was thus separated from the chairmanship of the assembly. The government, in emulation of both Moscow and Hanoi, subsequently retreated from its hardline socialist posture, decentralizing economic planning in favor of greater free-market activity. Some degree of political liberalization also ensued, culminating in a Supreme People’s Assembly election in March 1989. Although non-LPRP candidates were permitted, all candidates required the advance approval of the Lao Front for National Construction (LFNC). On August 14, 1991, the assembly unanimously approved the LPDR’s first constitution. The basic law provided for a strong presidency, to which ministerial chair Kaysone Phomvihan was elected on August 15, with Gen. KHAMTAY SIPHANDONE being named prime minister. Promulgation of the constitution was preceded by a number of legislative measures that provided for a New Economic Mechanism, which sought to reconcile a continued belief in central economic planning with the requirements of a market economy, taking China’s recent change of economic course as its model. President Kaysone died on November 21, 1992. Four days later the renamed National Assembly elected the number three man in the party hierarchy, NOUHAK PHOUMSAVAN, to the presidency, while Prime Minister Khamtay, the secondranked leader, was named on November 24 to succeed Kaysone as party president. The sixth LPRP congress in March 1996 took a more cautious approach to economic reform

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while tightening the grip of the military on the country’s political structures. Notably, the party removed Deputy Prime Minister KHAMPHOUI KEOBOUALAPHA, a leading proponent of privatization and other market reforms, from both the Politburo and Central Committee. A government reorganization in April included the elevation of Gen. SISAVATH KEOBOUNPHANH, previously minister of agriculture and forestry, to the new post of state vice president. On February 24, 1998, the newly elected National Assembly designated Prime Minister Khamtay as President Nouhak’s successor, moved Vice President Sisavath to the prime ministership, and brought in the LFNC chair, OUDOM KHATTIGNA, as vice president. Oudom died on December 9, 1999, with no successor being named in subsequent months. The seventh LPRP congress, held March 12– 14, 2001, introduced few changes in the aging hierarchy and was followed on March 27 by the National Assembly’s election of the outgoing minister of defense and a deputy prime minister, CHOUMMALY SAYASONE, to the vacant vice presidency. The legislature also confirmed the nomination of BOUNNHANG VORACHIT, theretofore the finance minister and a deputy prime minister, to head a new cabinet. The National Assembly election of February 24, 2002, concluded once again with LPRP candidates winning all but one seat, which went to an independent, the minister of justice. The president, vice president, and prime minister were all retained in office by vote of the new parliament on April 9. On January 15, 2003, however, the government’s economic team was shuffled. In an apparent response to internal security concerns, on the following October 1 the National Assembly approved Politburo member BOUASONE BOUPHAVANH to be Laos’s fourth deputy prime minister. The eighth LPRP congress, held March 18–21, 2006, marked the departure of Khamtay Siphandone, 82, from the party leadership and presaged his retirement as president two months later, following the National Assembly election scheduled for April 30. His successor in both roles was Choummaly Sayasone, 70, who was elected presi-

dent at the first session of the new National Assembly on June 8. On the same day, Bounnhang Vorachit was elevated to the vice presidency and Bouasone Bouphavanh was confirmed as prime minister.

Constitution and Government The August 1991 constitution redefined the country’s political and economic systems as well as the rights and duties of citizens. Although codifying the partial liberalization introduced since the late 1980s, the basic law in effect preserved a oneparty state under the umbrella of the LFNC. The present 109-member National Assembly, which is elected for a five-year term, names the president for a term of equal duration and approves a cabinet headed by a prime minister whose authority is substantially less than that of the former Council of Ministers chair. In the wake of the 1975 takeover, judicial functions were assumed by numerous local “people’s courts,” with a People’s Supreme Court subsequently being added. The president of the Supreme Court is chosen by the National Assembly; all other judges are named by the legislature’s Standing Committee. The country is divided into 16 provinces (khoueng), the municipality of Vientiane, and the remote Saysomboun Special Zone, which was created in 1994. The state president names provincial governors, the municipal mayor, and the governor of Saysomboun. Provinces are subdivided into districts, each of which has an appointed chief administrator.

Foreign Relations Laos’s neutrality in major power issues ended with the 1975 declaration of the LPDR. In late 1978 Laos strongly supported Soviet-backed Vietnam’s ouster of the Pol Pot government in Cambodia, subsequent reports indicating that Laotian troops had joined Vietnamese forces in fighting the regrouped Khmers Rouges. Although Laos condemned China’s incursion into Vietnam in February 1979 and broke off relations with Beijing over the issue, it backed the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan ten months later. Relations with China were restored in 1989, Laos’s previous concern over

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reports of China-based “reactionaries” in northern Laotian provinces having diminished. After a lengthy series of skirmishes, Lao-Thai relations hit a nadir in late 1987 when fighting broke out over disputed border territory. However, Bangkok adopted a conciliatory response to Vientiane’s subsequent removal of trade barriers, and a series of high-level talks in late 1990 led to a mutual troop withdrawal from border areas in March 1991. Five months later the two governments concluded a border security and cooperation settlement and agreed to complete the repatriation of some 60,000 Lao refugees from Thailand. April 1994 saw the inauguration of the first bridge across the lower Mekong River, providing a major road link between Vientiane and northern Thailand and thus giving landlocked Laos easier access to southern Thai ports. A year later Cambodia and Vietnam joined Laos and Thailand in establishing the Mekong River Commission to develop the river basin, and in September 1996 Vientiane and Bangkok set up a joint boundary commission to delineate a definitive border. In April 2000 Laos joined China, Myanmar, and Thailand in completing a treaty governing navigation on the upper Mekong. More recently, in March 2004 the Thai and Laotian cabinets held their first joint meeting, at which Thailand pledged assistance for a series of transportation and infrastructural projects. During the Vietnam War, American forces tried to cut off the flow of North Vietnamese troops and supplies passing through Laos and Cambodia into South Vietnam. As part of that effort the U.S. military flew some 580,000 bombing missions over Laos, dropping more tonnage than fell on Europe during World War II. The United States broke off diplomatic relations with Laos in 1975, and contacts at the ambassadorial level did not resume until November 1992. Recent U.S.-Lao diplomatic activity has addressed two ongoing U.S. concerns: efforts to curtail the narcotics trade and the ongoing search for several hundred U.S. servicemen listed as missing in action in Laos during the Vietnam War. Vientiane’s cooperation on these issues contributed to Washington’s May 18, 1995, announcement that it was lifting its 20-year aid embargo, thus making Laos

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eligible for assistance from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and paving the way for further normalization of bilateral relations. Although the George W. Bush administration concluded a minor trade agreement with Laos in September 2003 and pledged to pursue reestablishing “Normal Trading Relations” (NTR), in 2004 congressmen in the U.S. president’s own party voiced strong opposition because of Laos’s human rights record, including alleged abuse of prisoners and the Hmong minority (see Current issues, below). NTR status was ultimately approved by both houses of the U.S. Congress in October and November 2004, but only because it was incorporated into an essential piece of trade legislation. In July 1992 Laos signaled its desire for greater regional economic and political integration by signing the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). That move paved the way for ASEAN membership, which was approved in June 1997. Vientiane hosted its first ASEAN summit on November 27–30, 2004.

Current Issues While the 2006 elevation of Choummaly Sayasone to the top posts of party and government was expected, the announcement that Bouasone Bouphavanh, a prot´eg´e of President Khamtay, would take over as prime minister marked, for Laos, a surprisingly rapid ascent through the ranks. He was first named to the LPRP’s Politburo at the party’s 2001 congress, reportedly having risen from 40th place on the previous LPRP Central Committee. Presently in his 50s and one of the youngest Politburo members, Bouasone had earned a doctorate in the Soviet Union during the Mikhail Gorbachev era. His status took another leap in 2003 when he was named deputy prime minister for internal security even though he had not previously held a ministerial position. Opposition to the government persists in the north among remote Hmong tribals, whose insurgency began with U.S. support nearly four decades ago. Only small, ragtag Hmong bands remain active, although they continue to receive financial

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support from a U.S.-based expatriate community. (The United States had resettled more than 100,000 Hmong, including leader Gen. VANG PAO, after the conclusion of the Vietnam War.) In early 2003 two assaults by “robbers”—a term frequently applied to Hmong—on buses traveling the main road between Vientiane and the former royal capital of Luang Prabang killed two dozen people. American and other international opponents of the Communist government have often accused Laos of human rights abuses related to suppression of the Hmong. In December 2003 the United States agreed to accept an additional 15,000 Hmong from Thai refugee camps. Reports periodically surface of other antigovernment activities, including the formation in 2003 of a Lao Citizens Movement for Democracy, which issued the dubious claim that it had initiated an uprising in 11 provinces, and a Free Democratic People’s Government of Laos, which claimed that it had committed 14 antigovernment bombings since 2000. In February 2004 another group, the Committee for Independence and Democracy in Laos, claimed responsibility for 2 recent blasts. Opposition within the Lao expatriate community has often centered on SOULIVONG SAVANG, the eldest grandson of Laos’s last king, who, from his home in Paris, France, has called for U.S. and European Union help in negotiating a peaceful transition to a constitutional monarchy.

Political Parties In 1979 the Lao Front for National Construction (LFNC) succeeded the Lao Patriotic Front (Neo Lao Hak Xat—NLHX) as the umbrella organization for various social as well as political groups committed to national solidarity. The most recent LFNC congress was held May 15–16, 2006. President: SISAVATH KEOBOUNPHANH.

Leading Party Lao People’s Revolutionary Party —LPRP (Phak Pasason Pativat Lao—PPPL). Known prior to the Communist seizure of power as the People’s Party of Laos (Phak Pasason Lao), the LPRP is

the Communist core of the LFNC. The sixth LPRP congress, held March 18–20, 1996, featured the unanimous reelection of General Khamtay as party president and the installation of four new Politburo members, with three being dropped. The latter included (then) President Nouhak, who was appointed to the Central Committee’s “advisory board,” created at the fifth congress in 1991 to provide a role for “old guard” revolutionaries. Also elected was a new Central Committee reduced from 55 to 49 full members. The seventh party congress, held March 12–14, 2001, was attended by 452 delegates, who unanimously reelected Khamtay to another term as LPRP president, expanded the Central Committee to 53, and added 3 new Politburo members, for a total of 11. With Khamtay having announced his retirement, the eighth congress, held March 18–21, 2006, renamed the office of president as secretary general—its original title until a 1991 change—and elected Choummaly Sayasone to the post. The 498 delegates replaced one-third of the Central Committee, now comprising 55 members, but made only 2 changes in the Politburo, including the addition of its first female, Pany Yathothu, a Hmong. Secretary General: CHOUMMALY SAYASONE. Other Members of Politburo: Gen. ASANG LAOLY (Deputy Prime Minister), BOUASONE BOUPHAVANH (Prime Minister), BOUNNHANG VORACHIT (Vice President of the LPDR), Maj. Gen. DOUANGCHAY PHICHIT (Minister of National Defense), PANY YATHOTHU, Gen. SAMANE VIYAKHET (Former Chair, National Assembly), Gen. SISAVATH KEOBOUNPHANH (Former Prime Minister), SOMSAVAT LENGSAVAD (Deputy Prime Minister), THONGLOUN SISOULITH (Minister of Foreign Affairs), THONGSING THAMMAVONG (Chair, National Assembly).

Legislature A 264-member National Congress of People’s Representatives was convened by the Lao Patriotic Front on December 1–2, 1975, to approve

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Cabinet As of June 15, 2006 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Ministers

Bouasone Bouphavanh Asang Laoly Maj. Gen. Douangchai Phichit Somsavat Lengsavad Thongloun Sisoulith

Ministers Agriculture and Forestry Communication, Transport, Post, and Construction Education Energy and Mining Finance Foreign Affairs Industry and Commerce Information and Culture Justice Labor and Social Welfare National Defense National Security Public Health Prime Minister’s Office

Prime Minister’s Office, Head of Government Secretariat Committee Prime Minister’s Office, Head of National Tourism Authority Prime Minister’s Office, Head of Public Administration and Civil Service Authority Prime Minister’s Office, Head of Science, Technology, and Environment Organization Prime Minister’s Office, President of National Mekong River Committee Presidential Palace’s Office President, Committee for Planning and Investment President, State Control and Inspection Governor, Central Bank [f] = female

Sitaheng Lathsaphone Sommath Pholsena Somkoth Mangnormek Borsaikham Vongdara Chansy Phosikham Thongloun Sisoulith Nam Viyaket Mounkeo Oraboun Chaleum Yapaoheu Onchanh Thammavong [f] Maj. Gen. Douangchai Phichit Thongbane Sengaphone Ponemek Daraloy Bouasi Lorvansay Khamouan Boupha Onneua Phommachanh Saysengly Tengbriaju Cheuang Sombounkhanh Somphong Mongkhonvilay Bounpheng Mounphosay [f] Bounteim Phitsamai Khamluad Sitlakon Soubanh Sritthirath Soulivong Daravong Asang Laoly Phouphet Khamphounvong

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the transition to a people’s republic. A 45-member Supreme People’s Assembly, established by the Congress, served as an interim legislature until replenished in the regime’s first nationwide election on March 26, 1989. The body was renamed the National Assembly (Sapha Heng Xat) under the 1991 constitution. The most recent election for 115 members (from candidates approved by the Lao Front for National Construction) was held on April 30, 2006. Two independent candidates won seats, while the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party won the other 113. Representatives serve four-year terms. Chair: THONGSING THAMMAVONG.

Communications

letins in Lao, English, and French. Russian and Vietnamese agencies as well as Reuters have representatives in the capital.

Broadcasting and Computing National and international radio service is provided by National Radio of Laos, which broadcasts in Lao, Khmer, English, French, Thai, Vietnamese, and numerous dialects. Lao National Television broadcasts through two stations. Some of the approximately 54,000 TV sets also receive Lao Television 3, a joint venture of the government and a Thai company. There were about 20,000 personal computers serving an equal number of Internet users in 2003.

Press Laotian newspapers, tightly controlled by the government or the LPRP, are of limited circulation and scope. Current publications include Lao Dong (Labor, 50,000); Paxaxˆon (The People, 30,000), LPRP organ; Vientiane Mai (New Vientiane, 3,000), organ of the local LPRP; and Vientiane Times (3,000), in English.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. PHANTHONG PHOMMAHAXAY U.S. Ambassador to Laos Patricia M. HASLACH

News Agencies

Permanent Representative to the UN Alounk`eo KITTIKHOUN

Khaosan Pathet Lao (KPL), the domestic agency, is a government organ issuing daily bul-

IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, ASEAN, CP, Interpol, NAM, OIF, PCA

M A L AY S I A

See the note at the end of this entry for information on current events. The capitalized portions of non-Chinese names in this article are frequently the more familiar components, rather than “family” names in the Western sense.

The Country Situated partly on the Malay Peninsula and partly on the island of Borneo, Malaysia consists of 11 states of the former Federation of Malaya (Peninsular or West Malaysia) plus the states of Sarawak and Sabah (East Malaysia). Thailand and Singapore are the mainland’s northern and southern neighbors, respectively, while Sarawak and Sabah share a common border with the Indonesian province of Kalimantan. The multiracial population is comprised predominantly of Malays (54 percent), followed by Chinese (26 percent), non-Malay tribals (10 percent), and Indians and Pakistanis (8 percent). Although the Malay-based Bahasa Malaysia is the official language, English, Tamil, and several Chinese dialects are widely spoken. Islam is the state religion, but the freedom to profess other faiths is constitutionally guaranteed. Minority religious groups include Buddhists (20 percent), Christians (9 percent), and Hindus (6 percent). Female status is largely determined by ethnic group and location, urban Malay women being better educated than their rural counterparts. Overall, women comprise approximately 38 percent of the workforce, concentrated primarily in the agricultural and clerical sectors. Traditionally a leader in the production of rubber, palm oil, and tin, Malaysia continues to be the world’s principal supplier of palm oil and a major source of tin. In the past decade, however, these and other commodity exports, including petroleum, liquefied natural gas, and saw logs and sawn timber, have been superseded in importance

by manufactures—chiefly electrical goods and electronic components, which account for about one-third of all export earnings. Other exports include textiles, clothing, and footwear; chemicals and chemical products; and wood products. Agriculture now contributes only about 9 percent of GDP and employs 15 percent of the labor force, while industry accounts for 49 percent of GDP and 37 percent of jobs. In mid-1991 the government introduced a New Development Policy (NDP) as successor to the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1970s and

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1980s. The NDP, which set as a national goal the achievement of fully developed status by the year 2020, placed substantially less emphasis than its predecessor on transferring corporate assets to the bumiputras (“sons of the soil”; comprising Malays and other indigenous peoples) while providing added incentives for both foreign and domestic investors. In 1990–1997 Malaysia ranked as one of the world’s most rapidly expanding economies, with an average annual GDP growth rate of 8.7 percent. During the same period unemployment and inflation were held in check, and both poverty and income inequality were reduced. By late 1997, however, Malaysia had succumbed to the East Asian economic crisis, with the value of the ringgit dropping, the stock and property markets declining in value, and the overall economy heading toward recession. Although the economy contracted by 7.4 percent in 1998—its worst downturn since independence—it rebounded rapidly, registering a 6.1 percent gain in GDP for 1999. Growth in 2000 reached 8.9 percent, led by exports, although an economic slowdown in the United States, the country’s principal market, contributed to a downturn in 2001, when growth was only 0.3 percent. Growth recovered to 4.4 percent for 2002, and it then climbed to 5.4 percent in 2003 and 7.1 percent in 2004. Malaysia was spared the brunt of the December 26, 2004, Indian Ocean tsunami: the death toll was 68 and damage was estimated at $25 million, concentrated in western fishing villages. Growth for 2005 was 5.5 percent, although inflation, which had averaged well under 2 percent a year in 2000–2004, rose to 3 percent.

Government and Politics Political Background Malaysia came into existence as a member of the Commonwealth on September 16, 1963, through merger of the already independent Federation of Malaya with the self-governing state of Singapore and the British Crown Colonies of Sarawak and Sabah. The Malay states, organized by the British

in the 19th century, had achieved sovereign status in 1957, following the suppression of a longstanding Communist insurgency. Tunku ABDUL RAHMAN, head of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and subsequently of the Alliance Party, became Malaya’s first prime minister and continued in that capacity after the formation of Malaysia. Singapore, with its predominantly Chinese population, had been ruled as a separate British colony and became internally selfgoverning in 1959 under the leadership of LEE Kuan Yew of the People’s Action Party (PAP). Its inclusion in Malaysia proved to be temporary and was terminated in August 1965, primarily because the attempt of the PAP to extend its influence beyond the confines of Singapore was viewed as a threat to Malay dominance of the federation. The separate colonies of Sarawak and Sabah were included in Malaysia despite strong objection from the Philippines and Indonesia, the latter maintaining an armed “confrontation” against Malaysia until after Indonesian President Sukarno’s removal from power in 1965–1966. On May 13, 1969, racial riots in Kuala Lumpur led to a declaration of national emergency. A ninemember National Operations Council was given full powers to quell the disturbances, but parliamentary government was not fully restored until February 1971. Meanwhile, communist guerrillas, relatively quiescent since 1960, had begun returning from sanctuaries across the Malaysian-Thai border, and by early 1974 they were once again posing a serious threat to domestic security. In the context of a vigorous campaign against the insurgents, an August election resulted in an impressive victory for Prime Minister ABDUL RAZAK bin Hussein’s newly styled National Front (Barisan Nasional) coalition, whose predominance left only two of the eight opposition parties with seats in the lower house of Parliament. In January 1976 Abdul Razak died and was succeeded by the deputy prime minister, HUSSEIN bin Onn, who was also designated chair of the National Front. Under Hussein’s leadership the front retained overwhelming control of the federal House of Representatives at an early election in July 1978. In May 1981, however, Hussein announced that for

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Political Status: Independent Federation of Malaya within the Commonwealth established August 31, 1957; Malaysia established September 16, 1963, with the addition of Sarawak, Sabah, and Singapore (which withdrew in August 1965). Area: 127,316 sq. mi. (329,749 sq. km.), encompassing Peninsular Malaysia, 50,806 sq. mi. (131,588 sq. km.); Sarawak, 48,050 sq. mi. (124,450 sq. km.); Sabah, 28,460 sq. mi. (73,711 sq. km.). Population: 23,274,690 (2000C, incorporating adjustment for underenumeration, including Peninsular Malaysia, 18,599,699; Sabah, 2,603,485; Sarawak, 2,071,506); 26,121,000 (2005E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): KUALA LUMPUR (1,390,000), Kelang (Klang, 735,000), Ipoh (630,000). In August 1995 ground was broken for a new administrative capital, Putrajaya, 25 miles south of Kuala Lumpur, where the paramount ruler now has his offices. Official Language: Bahasa Malaysia. Monetary Unit: Ringgit (official rate July 1, 2006: 3.67 ringgit = $1US).

health reasons he would not stand for reelection as UMNO president, and he was succeeded in June by the party’s deputy president, MAHATHIR bin Mohamad, who formed a new government following his designation as prime minister in July. Mahathir emulated his predecessor by calling for an early election in April 1982, which yielded an even more impressive National Front victory. Opposition parties and independents together captured only 22 of 154 seats in the lower house. In another early election in August 1986, the front overcame predictions of a setback by winning 148 seats in an enlarged house of 177. The poll was interpreted as a clear-cut victory for Malay nationalism in that UMNO’s leading partner in the National Front, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and the opposition Parti Islam (Pas), a fundamentalist group, both experienced substantial losses. Many of the issues that had been expected to cause electoral difficulties for the Mahathir coalition resurfaced in early 1987, provoking a major crisis within UMNO as it prepared for a trien-

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Paramount Ruler: Tuanku SYED Sirajuddin ibni al-Marhum Syed Putra Jamalullail (Sovereign of Perlis); elected for a five-year term on December 12, 2001, by the Conference of Rulers; sworn in on December 13 and formally installed on April 25, 2002, succeeding Sultan SALAHUDDIN Abdul Aziz Shah al-Haj ibni al-Marhum Sultan Hisamuddin Alam Shah al-Haj (Sovereign of Selangor), who had died on November 21, 2001. Deputy Paramount Ruler: Sultan MIZAN Zainal Abidin ibni al-Mahum Sultan Mahmud al-Muftaki Billah Shah (Sovereign of Terengganu); elected February 26, 1999, for a five-year term, succeeding Sultan SALAHUDDIN Abdul Aziz Shah al-Haj ibni al-Marhum Sultan Hisamuddin Alam Shah al-Haj (Sovereign of Selangor); reelected on December 12, 2001, for a term concurrent with that of the new paramount ruler. Prime Minister: ABDULLAH bin Ahmad Badawi (United Malays National Organization); sworn in October 31, 2003, upon the resignation of MAHATHIR bin Mohamad (United Malays National Organization); continued in office following the election of March 21, 2004.

nial leadership poll in April. Accusing Mahathir of tolerating corruption, mismanagement, and extravagant spending, Deputy Prime Minister MUSA bin Hital joined with a number of other prominent UMNO figures in supporting the candidacy of Trade and Industry Minister Tengku RAZALEIGH Hamzah for the party presidency. After an intensely fought campaign, Mahathir defeated Razaleigh by a mere 43 of 1479 votes, with Abdul GHAFFAR bin Baba outpacing Musa by an even closer margin for the deputy presidency. The party thereupon divided into two factions, a “Team A” headed by the prime minister and a dissident “Team B.” In February 1988 Peninsular Malaysia’s High Court, responding to a writ filed eight months earlier by “Team B” leaders, ruled that UMNO was an illegal entity under the country’s Societies Act because members of 30 unregistered branches had participated in the April 1987 balloting. Former prime ministers Abdul Rahman and Hussein bin Onn, on behalf of the dissidents, thereupon filed for recognition of a new party (UMNO-Malaysia)

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but were rebuffed by the Registrar of Societies on the ground that the High Court order had not yet become effective. Mahathir, applying on February 13 (the date of deregistration), was granted permission to begin the process of legalizing a governmentsupportive “new” UMNO (UMNO-Baru). Subsequently, the government secured legislation authorizing the transfer of UMNO assets to UMNO-Baru and also saw enacted a series of constitutional amendments rescinding the right of the High Court to interpret acts of Parliament. In May 1988 Mahathir announced that his new formation would recommend to the National Front’s Supreme Council that parliamentary members of the old UMNO who refused to join UMNO-Baru be expelled from National Front ranks. In early June, one day before a scheduled Supreme Court hearing on the February decision, the prime minister advised the paramount ruler to suspend the Supreme Court’s lord president, Mohamad SALLEH bin Abas. Amid considerable judicial maneuvering, a special tribunal appointed to review the controversy unanimously supported Mahathir, and Salleh was formally removed from office. The prime minister, in a dramatic reversal, subsequently invited Razaleigh and Musa to join UMNO-Baru—an offer that was repeated, “in the interests of Malay unity,” at the party’s inaugural assembly in October. While both dissidents initially rejected the offer, their somewhat uneasy alliance collapsed in January 1989, when Musa accepted reentry into the government formation. Razaleigh subsequently announced that the successor to “Team B,” Semangat ’46 (“Spirit of ’46,” after the year of UMNO’s founding), had formed a coalition with Pas that, with the addition of two smaller formations, was registered in May as the Muslim Unity Movement (Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah—APU). Although the National Front was for the first time faced with a seemingly viable opposition, the latter secured only 53 of 180 seats in the federal parliamentary balloting of October 20–21, 1990. At the state level, however, the opposition won control in Kelantan and ousted UMNO’s chief minister in Penang.

In November 1993 Finance Minister ANWAR Ibrahim emerged as Prime Minister Mahathir’s most likely successor by replacing Ghaffar bin Baba as UMNO deputy president, Ghaffar having resigned before party balloting when faced with certain defeat. In December Mahathir followed tradition by naming Anwar deputy prime minister. In parliamentary elections on April 24–25, 1995, the National Front scored a landslide victory, capturing 162 of 192 seats on an unprecedented vote share of 64 percent (compared with 53 percent in 1990). In addition, front parties won overwhelming majorities in 10 of the 11 contested state assemblies. A year later the governing alliance in Kelantan between Pas and Semangat ’46 collapsed, the latter’s leader, Razaleigh Hamzah, having announced in May his intention to return to UMNO. Shortly thereafter the fundamentalist Pas, which still held a legislative majority in Kelantan, was forced by the federal government to suspend a plan to introduce a harsh Islamic criminal code similar to the one imposed by the Taliban in Afghanistan. In the second half of 1997, differences between Mahathir and his deputy began to surface in their approaches to the regional financial crisis that was drawing Malaysia into its grasp. Mahathir, an economic nationalist, attributed the crisis to foreigncurrency traders and speculators, who were abetting international institutions and foreign powers that wanted to “recolonize” the country. In contrast, Anwar, a proponent of the global marketplace, responded to the crisis by introducing, beginning in December and continuing into 1998, a series of austerity and financial reform measures, including a relaxation of racial quota laws to allow the country’s Chinese and Indian minorities greater participation in Malay-dominated companies. As mid1998 approached, Mahathir appeared to conclude that Anwar’s program was strangling the economy, and on June 24 the prime minister named his chief economic adviser, DAIM bin Zainuddin, to the cabinet as special functions minister in charge of economic development. The move came less than a week after a key Anwar supporter, UMNO youth wing leader Ahmad ZAHID Hamidi, had launched a veiled attack on Mahathir’s leadership by calling

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for an end to nepotism, cronyism, and corruption in the party. On September 2, 1998, Mahathir dismissed his former prot´eg´e from the cabinet, and later he removed him as deputy president of UMNO. Anwar quickly opened a campaign against Mahathir under the banner of reformasi, the call for political reform that had accompanied President Suharto’s resignation in Indonesia earlier in the year. On September 8 Mahathir stated that he had removed Anwar because of “moral misconduct,” alluding to widely circulated rumors that Anwar had engaged in both homosexual and heterosexual liaisons. On September 20, 1998, addressing a crowd variously estimated at between 30,000 and 50,000— the country’s largest opposition rally in three decades—Anwar called for Mahathir to resign. Later that day he was arrested under the Internal Security Act (ISA), which was also invoked in the following days to detain a number of Anwar supporters, most of whom, including Zahid Hamidi, were subsequently released. On September 29 Anwar appeared in court with a black eye and other bruises, alleging that police had beaten him unconscious and inflicted serious injuries. By then, various nongovernmental organizations had formed a Coalition for People’s Democracy (Gagasan), one of a number of groups campaigning for reforms that included abolition of detention without trial. On October 24 rock-throwing protesters and police engaged in the most violent street confrontation of the crisis. By late October 1998 Anwar faced five counts of sodomy as well as five of corruption for using his office to interfere with official investigations into his activities. A trial on four corruption charges began on November 2, and on April 14, 1999, Anwar was convicted on all counts and sentenced to six years (later reduced to four years) in prison. The verdict sparked renewed rioting by Anwar’s supporters. Meanwhile, on January 8, 1999, Mahathir had reshuffled his cabinet, naming former foreign minister ABDULLAH bin Ahmad Badawi to the post of deputy prime minister. Anticipating that Mahathir might call a snap election before the expi-

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ration of the legislature’s term in 2000, the principal opposition parties announced in June 1999 that they would join forces. The resultant Alternative Front (Barisan Alternatif—BA) included Pas, the Democratic Action Party (DAP), the small Malaysian People’s Party (Parti Rakyat Malaysia— PRM), and the new National Justice Party (Keadilan), which had been formed in early April by Anwar’s wife, Wan AZIZAH Wan Ismail, an eye surgeon and political novice. On November 10 the prime minister announced that the House of Representatives would be dissolved, and two days later the national election commission scheduled balloting for November 29. Led by Pas, which won 27 seats (20 more than in 1995) and also took control of the Terengganu State legislature, the opposition registered significant gains, but the National Front nevertheless won more than enough seats to maintain its two-thirds majority in the house. Accordingly, Mahathir took the oath of office for his fifth term on December 14, and nine days later he named Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah as his preferred successor to head UMNO upon his eventual retirement. On August 8, 2000, the High Court in Kuala Lumpur convicted Anwar of sodomy and pronounced an additional nine-year prison sentence. Anwar’s defense lawyers had been barred by the court from presenting evidence of a political conspiracy against him. Remaining charges were ultimately dropped in May 2001. In an emotional speech that opponents quickly labeled a political ploy, Mahathir announced on June 22, 2002, that he was immediately retiring as UMNO leader and prime minister in favor of Abdullah Badawi. Within hours, however, ostensibly responding to the entreaties of colleagues, he agreed to remain in office for the time being. Three days later the date of his retirement was announced as October 2003. On July 3 Mahathir identified Minister of Defense Mohamed NAJIB bin Abdul Razak as the future deputy prime minister. On October 31, 2003, Prime Minister Mahathir handed the prime ministership over to Abdullah Badawi, who took a cautious approach to ministerial changes until confirming his support at the

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polls in an early election held March 21, 2004. The National Front captured 198 of 219 seats in an expanded House of Representatives, while Pas saw its numbers diminish to 7. A new cabinet was sworn in on March 30. In September 2004, with his sodomy conviction having been overturned on final appeal, Anwar Ibrahim was released from prison. Under the terms of his 1999 corruption sentence, he remained barred from holding public office until 2008.

Constitution and Government The constitution of Malaysia is based on that of the former Federation of Malaya, as amended to accommodate the special interests of Sarawak and Sabah, which joined in 1963. It established a federal system of government under an elective constitutional monarchy. The administration of the 13 states (11 in the west, 2 in the east) is carried out by rulers or governors acting on the advice of State Executive Councils. Each state has its own constitution and a unicameral State Assembly that shares legislative powers with the federal Parliament. The supreme head of the federation is the paramount ruler (Yang di-Pertuan Agong), who exercises the powers of a constitutional monarch in a parliamentary democracy. He and the deputy paramount ruler (Timbalan Yang di-Pertuan Agong) are chosen for five-year terms by and from the nine hereditary rulers of the Malay states, who, along with the heads of state of Malacca, Penang, Sabah, and Sarawak, constitute the Conference of Rulers (Majlis Raja Raja). In March 1993, with the reluctant agreement of the rulers, constitutional amendments were enacted that curbed royal legal immunities; a further restriction in May 1994 ended the paramount ruler’s authority to block legislation. Executive power is vested in a prime minister and cabinet responsible to a bicameral legislature consisting of a partially appointed Senate with few real powers and an elected House of Representatives. Ultimate judicial authority is vested in a Federal Court (formerly called the Supreme Court); Peninsular and East Malaysia have separate high courts. An intermediary Court of Appeal was estab-

lished by constitutional amendment in 1994. The pattern of local government varies to some extent from state to state. The federal government has authority over such matters as external affairs, defense, internal security, justice (except Islamic and native law), federal citizenship, finance, commerce, industry, communications, and transportation. Sarawak and Sabah, however, enjoy guarantees of autonomy with regard to immigration, civil service, and customs matters. Under a constitutional amendment adopted in 1974, the federal capital, Kuala Lumpur, became a federal territory. Ten years later the island of Labuan became the second federal territory. The new administrative capital, Putrajaya, previously part of Selangor, was established as the third federal territory on February 1, 2001.

State and Capital Johore (Johore Bahru) Kedah (Alor Star) Kelantan (Kota Bahru) Melaka (Malacca) Negeri Sembilan (Seremban) Pahang (Kuantan) Perak (Ipoh) Perlis (Kangar) Pulau Pinang (George Town) Sabah (Kota Kinabalu) Sarawak (Kuching) Selangor (Shah Alam) Terengganu (Kuala Terengganu)

Area (sq. mi.)

Population (2005E)

7,330 3,639 5,765 637 2,565 13,886 8,110 307 399 28,460 48,050 3,148 5,002

3,129,000 1,830,000 1,374,000 703,000 949,000 1,419,000 2,095,000 216,000 1,437,000 2,664,000 1,989,000 3,126,000 1,011,000

94 35 18

1,390,000 91,000 7,250

Federal Territories Kuala Lumpur Labuan (Victoria) Putrajaya∗ ∗

Population as of February 2001

Foreign Relations From the early 1960s, Malaysia was a staunch advocate of regional cooperation among the nonCommunist states of Southeast Asia, and it has been an active member of the Association of

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Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since the organization’s inception in 1967. Although threatened by leftist insurgency in the first two decades of independence, Malaysia committed itself to a nonaligned posture by expanding relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, establishing ties with North Korea and Vietnam, and attempting to normalize relations with the People’s Republic of China, which it recognized in May 1974. At the same time, it maintained linkage with Western powers, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand all pledging to defend the nation’s sovereignty and assisting Malaysia against Indonesia’s “confrontation” policy of 1963–1966. Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore are further linked through the Five Power Defense Arrangement. Tensions with Indonesia again arose in 1979 over Malaysia’s decision to force Indochinese refugees back to sea, a development that Jakarta condemned as causing the inundation of its own shores by “boat people.” A year later Malaysia proclaimed an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) extending up to 200 miles from its territorial sea boundaries as defined in newly drawn maps. Protests were immediately registered by China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, the last having recently dispatched troops to occupy jointly claimed Amboyna Island, northeast of Sabah. In February 1982 Malaysia became the first neighboring state to recognize Indonesia’s “archipelagic” method of defining territorial seas by means of lines drawn between the outermost extensions of outlying islands. In return, Indonesia agreed to respect Malaysian maritime rights between its peninsular and Borneo territories, and in 1984 the two countries concluded a joint security agreement that strengthened a 1972 accord. In January 1994 talks between Malaysia and Indonesia ended without resolution of conflicting claims to two islands, Sipadan and Ligitan, off the east coast of Borneo, although the two sides agreed to settle the dispute in accordance with principles of international law. In December 2002 the International Court of Justice awarded both islands to Malaysia,

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but in early 2005 access to surrounding waters became an issue. In April two warships brushed sides while patrolling the disputed area of the Sulawesi Sea. In January 1998 Jakarta received assurances that Indonesians holding valid temporary work permits would be exempt from a recently announced “Operation Go Away,” the expulsion of tens of thousands of mainly illegal foreign workers who had been welcomed during the country’s economic boom. A large percentage of illegal workers were also Indonesian, however, and the Mahathir government moved quickly to begin deporting them. The most violent incident occurred on March 26 at the Seminyeh repatriation camp, where rioting claimed nine lives. Subsequently, several dozen members of Indonesia’s Acehnese minority, fearing reprisals related to a decades-old separatist conflict in Aceh district, sought asylum by breaking into a handful of foreign missions in Kuala Lumpur. Although Brunei, French, and Swiss officials quickly permitted Malaysian authorities to remove the Acehnese, in August some 20 who had sought refuge at the U.S. embassy and the offices of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees were granted asylum by Denmark and Norway. In 2004–2005 Malaysia’s threatened expulsion of up to 1.5 million illegal immigrant workers, most of them Indonesian, again drew protests from Jakarta. In late May 2005 Malaysia, faced with an unexpected labor shortage, reversed the policy. Relations with Singapore, which were cool following the latter’s withdrawal from the Federation of Malaya in August 1965, improved in subsequent years, although it was not until July 1988 that Tunku MAHMOOD Iskandar became the first Malaysian monarch to make an official visit to the Chinese-dominated neighboring state. In 1991 Singapore strongly supported Malaysia’s call for an East Asian Economic Group (EAEG), while in early 1995 the two agreed on the joint manufacture and marketing of military equipment, in addition to the formation of a common force for UN peacekeeping purposes. Recent relations have not been without controversy, however. In March 1997 Malaysia

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announced that it was indefinitely withholding new business opportunities for Singapore following the publication of remarks by the latter’s former prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, that were critical of the Malaysian city of Johore Bahru. Lee’s subsequent apology mitigated the damage. In April 1998 the two states agreed to submit to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) competing claims to the islet of Pulau Batu Putih (Pedra Branca) off the coast of Johore. As of May 2006 the ICJ had not yet ruled on the dispute. In September 2001 Malaysia and Singapore agreed to settle differences over such matters as water supplies to Singapore and the use of Malaysian airspace by Singapore’s aircraft. Little additional progress was achieved through 2003, however, because Singapore sought to resolve open issues as a package. In early 2004 Prime Minister Abdullah visited Singapore, at which time Singapore’s prime minister, Goh Chok Tong, agreed to consider a less comprehensive approach. In December the two countries launched new talks, which also focused on releasing Malaysian workers’ pension funds held by Singapore and on building a bridge to replace the outdated causeway that connects Singapore to the mainland. In April 2006, however, Malaysia scrapped plans for the bridge, construction of which Singapore continued to link to restoration of full airspace rights as well as to a 20-year commitment from Malaysia for 1 billion cubic meters of sand for reclamation. Relations with China have been particularly strong in recent years. Prime Minister Mahathir traveled to Beijing in August 1999, with Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji paying a reciprocal visit to Malaysia in November. Topics discussed at the latter meeting included competing claims to the Spratly Islands. Both sides endorsed a code of conduct for all claimants. In May 2004 Prime Minister Abdullah, fresh from his March election victory, traveled to China with one-third of his cabinet and over 500 businessmen to mark 30 years of diplomatic relations and to promote closer business and trade ties. Regionally, the proposed EAEG (now more frequently referred to as the East Asian Economic

Community—EAEC) as a grouping of the ten ASEAN members plus China, India, and Japan has been viewed as an eventual challenge both to the European Union and to the North American Free Trade Area. A first East Asian summit of prospective members was held in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005. During Prime Minister Abdullah’s tenure, relations with the United States have been considerably less volatile than they were under his predecessor. Prime Minister Mahathir was the only major head of government to decline U.S. President Bill Clinton’s invitation to attend a summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping in Seattle in November 1993 on the grounds that Washington sought to dominate the Asian countries. Subsequently, relations with Washington eased, Mahathir holding talks on “bilateral and regional issues” with President Clinton in May 1994. An otherwise cooperative tone at the November 1998 APEC meeting in Kuala Lumpur was undercut by the ongoing Anwar controversy, with several visiting dignitaries questioning the treatment of the former deputy prime minister, and with U.S. Vice President Al Gore voicing support for the reformasi movement in remarks that the Mahathir government labeled as rude and irresponsible. Although Prime Minister Mahathir initially condemned the September 2001 al-Qaida attacks on New York and Washington, in October he criticized the U.S. military campaign against al-Qaida’s bases and Afghanistan’s Taliban regime, and before leaving office in 2003 he was a vocal opponent of U.S. actions in Iraq. In a speech delivered to the Malaysian Human Rights Commission in September 2005, the former prime minister attacked the United States and the United Kingdom for applying double standards to human rights and for “stateinitiated terrorism” in Iraq.

Current Issues Soon after taking office at the end of October 2003, Prime Minister Abdullah introduced an anticorruption campaign that may have contributed to

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the National Front’s massive victory at the polls in March 2004 but also raised hackles within UMNO. Abdullah has also vowed to end “crony capitalism” by insisting on open bidding for government contracts and thereby ending special treatment for favored businessmen and political supporters. To date, two ministers have left the cabinet under suspicion. A former minister of land and cooperative development, KASITAH Gaddam, was charged in February 2004 with corruption involving some $10 million in transactions during his previous tenure as head of a state land development board; his trial was scheduled to begin in November 2006. In October 2005 Federal Territories Minister MOHAMED Isa Abdul Samad resigned when UMNO’s Supreme Council refused to overturn his June suspension from the party for having purchased votes during his successful effort to be elected to a party vice presidency. The release of Anwar Ibrahim from prison in September 2004 drew little comment from the government, although Anwar and Prime Minister Abdullah exchanged pleasantries at an open house held by Abdullah two months later. In August 2005 the Kuala Lumpur High Court awarded Anwar over $1 million in a libel case he had brought against an author who had accused him of corruption and homosexuality, and he even received an apology from the police official responsible for his wellpublicized beating while in detention in 1998. In January 2006 Anwar filed another defamation lawsuit, this time against former prime minister Mahathir, who in September 2005 had again “falsely and maliciously” accused him of homosexuality. Anwar has gradually reentered the political arena, serving as an adviser to Keadilan, campaigning on behalf of a Pas candidate in a Kelantan byelection in December 2005, and agreeing to work toward unifying the opposition prior to the national election due by early 2009, when he would again be eligible to run for office. (The National Front could, however, call an early election if Anwar, who remains widely popular, is perceived as a significant threat.) The major obstacle to a comprehensive opposition alliance may be Pas’s support for Islamic causes, including adoption of Islamic law. Both

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Anwar and the DAP, in particular, have rejected any electoral pact with Pas until it modifies its fundamentalism and accepts a continuation of secular government. Pas, for its part, would appear to be adopting a more temperate stance, as indicated by the recent election of younger, more moderate party officers, notably Deputy President NASARUDDIN Mat Isa. Even before the al-Qaida attacks on the United States, Malaysia’s Internal Security Act (ISA), which permits detention without trial, was being used to arrest alleged Islamic radicals, particularly those linked to the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM) and the Jemaah Islamiah (JI), an extremist group based in Indonesia. In many cases the KMM detainees have been Pas members, including NIK ADLI Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, son of the chief minister of Kelantan. In September 2003 the government announced that nine individuals held since August 2001, including Nik Adli, would be detained under the ISA for another two years. Three were released in November 2005, but the others remained in detention as of May 2006.

Political Parties Malaysia’s political system has long been dominated by the National Front coalition. Thus far, opposition coalitions have not presented a viable alternative to the UMNO-led alliance. A right-of-center Muslim Unity Movement (Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah—APU) was formed in May 1989 as a loose alliance of the PanMalaysian Islamic Party (Pas), the Muslim Front of Malaysia (Hamim), the Malaysian Islamic Council Front (Berjasa), and Razaleigh Hamzah’s Semangat ’46. Except for a notable success in Kelantan, where it won all state and national seats, it failed to make significant inroads against the National Front in the October 1990 election. Another alliance, the People’s Might (Gagasan Rakyat), which included the Democratic Action Party (DAP), the Malaysian People’s Party (PRM), the Indian Progressive Front (IPF), and the Sabah United Party (PBS), was organized only shortly before the 1990 balloting and was not officially registered until 1992, by which

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time Hamim and the Malaysian Indian Muslim Congress (Kimma) had also joined. Before the 1995 general election the Gagasan Rakyat was weakened by the departure of several parties, including the DAP and the IPF, with the latter ultimately declaring its support for the National Front. Although the remaining APU parties contested the 1995 national elections together, Razaleigh’s return to UMNO in May 1996 led to the subsequent demise of Semangat ’46 and, ultimately, to the end of the APU. In late September 1998, responding to the call for reform that accompanied the ouster and arrest of Anwar Ibrahim, two loose opposition coalitions emerged: the Coalition for a People’s Democracy (Gagasan Demokrasi Rakyat), chaired by Tian Chua, and the People’s Justice Movement (Gerakan Keadilan Rakyat—Gerak), chaired by Fadzil Nor of Pas. The two shared overlapping memberships that encompassed various social and reform organizations as well as several political parties, including the DAP, Pas, and the PRM. In February 1999 Pas and the DAP indicated that they were prepared to support an effort by Gagasan to contest the next national election as a party. Instead, Pas, the DAP, the PRM, and the newly established National Justice Party (Keadilan) announced in April 1999 that they would form a loose opposition coalition to contest the forthcoming election. In June the constituent parties agreed to present only one candidate in each district. Subsequently called the Alternative Front (Barisan Alternatif—BA), the ideologically incongruous grouping won 42 seats in the November 1999 election. With the DAP having withdrawn from the BA in 2001, the coalition won only 7 seats in the March 2004 general election. In all, 27 parties were registered for the balloting.

Government Coalition National Front (Barisan Nasional—BN). Malaysia’s leading formation since its launching in 1973, the BN is a coalition of parties representing the country’s leading ethnic groups. The nucleus

of an earlier coalition, organized in 1952 as the Alliance Party, was Tunku ABDUL RAHMAN’s United Malays National Organization (UMNO). With the establishment of Malaysia, the Alliance was augmented by similar coalitions in Sarawak and Sabah, the number of participating organizations totaling 11 in 1990, prior to the withdrawal of the Sabah United Party (PBS). The front’s membership rose to 12 with the addition of the People’s Justice Movement (Akar) and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1991 but was effectively reduced to 11 when UMNO absorbed a remnant of the United Sabah National Organization (USNO) in April 1993. By mid-1994, with the recent addition of 3 PBS splinters—the PDS (renamed the UPKO in 1999), the PBRS, and the SAPP (see discussions of all three, below)—the BN encompassed 14 parties. In 2001 Akar voted to merge with UMNO, and in 2002 the PBS rejoined the BN. In April 1995, in addition to the National Front’s overwhelming victory at the federal level, member parties captured 10 of the 11 state legislatures up for election, the sole exception being Kelantan’s. A year earlier, defections from the PBS had permitted the National Front to form a new government in Sabah, while in September 1996 it easily won the legislative election in Sarawak. Thus, Barisan Nasional controlled 12 of the country’s 13 state assemblies. In the November 1999 national election the BN retained its two-thirds majority in the lower house, but its 148 seats were 15 short of its 1994 total. At the state level it won 9 of 11 contests, losing Terengganu as well as Kelantan to Pas. The March 2004 elections concluded with the BN having won 199 seats in an expanded House of Representatives. It also recaptured Terengganu to once again control 12 states. Leaders: ABDULLAH bin Ahmad Badawi (Prime Minister), RADZI Sheikh Ahmad (Secretary General). United Malays National Organization —UMNO (Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Bersatu). The leading component of the ruling National Front, UMNO has long supported the

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interests of the numerically predominant Malays while acknowledging the right of all Malaysians, irrespective of racial origins, to participate in the political, social, and economic life of the nation. Party officials are selected by indirect election every three years. In April 1987 Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad retained the presidency by a paperthin margin after an unprecedented internal contest. The intraparty struggle culminated in deregistration of the original party in February 1988, in the wake of which the pro-Mahathir faction organized the “new” UMNO (UMNOBaru). The dissidents, led by Razaleigh Hamzah and supported by former prime ministers Abdul Rahman and Hussein bin Onn, were denied an opportunity to regroup as UMNO-Malaysia. In 1989 Mahathir launched a partially successful campaign to woo back the dissidents. In the federal parliamentary poll of October 1990, UMNO-Baru captured 71 seats, while the National Front as a whole won 127, 21 fewer than in 1986 but more than the two-thirds majority needed for constitutional revision. In April 1995 the front’s representation surged to 162 seats, 88 of which were won by UMNO-Baru. At an extraordinary general assembly in September 1997, the party unanimously endorsed dropping “Baru” and restoring its original name. In the November 1999 federal election UMNO won 71 seats, 17 fewer than in 1995, which analysts attributed to a loss of support among Malay backers of Anwar Ibrahim, who had been ousted as deputy president in September 1998. On December 23, having already announced that he was serving his final term as prime minister, Mahathir named Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi as his preferred successor, and on January 3, 2000, the party Supreme Council recommended that Mahathir and Abdullah be unopposed for the top two party posts in the May UMNO election. Subsequently, Razaleigh, who had rejoined UMNO in 1996, indicated that he would accept the will of the “grassroots” if they chose to nominate him for a leadership position, but by

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late March Mahathir and Abdullah had garnered enough support to preclude any challenge. In May 2001 the People’s Justice Movement (Angkatan Keadilan Rakyat—Akar) overwhelmingly voted to disband and join UMNO. Akar had been formed in September 1989 by former members of the Sabah United Party (PBS). A participant in the National Front since July 1991, Akar had its greatest success following the February 1994 Sabah State election when several of its leaders assumed key roles in a National Front government. It failed to win any lower house seats in November 1999. With Mahathir having stepped down from party and government posts in October 2003, Abdullah Badawi led UMNO to victory at the polls in March 2004, when the party won 110 lower house seats. Leaders: ABDULLAH bin Ahmad Badawi (Prime Minister and President of the Party); Mohamed NAJIB bin Abdul Razak (Deputy Prime Minister and Deputy President of the Party); MUHYIDDIN bin Mohamad Yassin and MOHAMED ALI Rustam (Vice Presidents); RADZI Sheikh Ahmad (Secretary General). Malaysian Chinese Association —MCA (Persatuan China Malaysia). The MCA supports the interests of the Chinese community but is committed to “moderation” and the maintenance of interracial goodwill and harmony. More conservative than the Chinese opposition DAP, it withdrew from the government after the 1969 election but has participated in the governing alliance continuously since 1982 despite internal turmoil in 1985–1986. In late 1988 the party issued a statement criticizing the government’s failure to provide promised funds for Chinese institutions and in 1989 walked out of the legislature after one of its traditional appointments was given to Gerakan (below). However, the party mobilized against the new Muslim opposition coalition, APU, carrying the National Front to victories in three state by-election contests and continuing to provide the swing vote in semirural Malay

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elections. The party won 30 parliamentary seats in 1995, up from 18 in 1990, and then 29 in November 1999. More recently, a leadership dispute erupted between factions loyal to the party president, LING Liong Sik, and the deputy president, LIM Ah Lek, both of whom resigned in May 2003 as the party’s Central Committee struggled to mend the rift. In the March 2004 election the MCA gained 2 seats, to 31. Leaders: ONG Ka Ting (President), CHAN Kong Choy (Deputy President), CHUA Soi Lek, ONG Ka Chuan (Secretary General). United Traditional Bumiputra Party (Parti Pesaka Bumiputra Bersatu—PBB). Founded in 1983, the PBB traces its origins to the Sarawak Alliance of Bumiputra (“sons of the soil”), a mixed ethnic party; Pesaka, a Dayak and Malay party; and the Sarawak Chinese Association. The PBB won a plurality of 19 seats in the Sarawak state assembly election of December 1983, subsequently forming a coalition government with the Sarawak Native People’s Party (PBDS; see the PRS, below) and the SUPP (below). In the state assembly balloting of September 1991, the PBB ran as the dominant member of a self-styled Front of Three (Barisan Tiga) that won 49 of 56 seats. In September 1996 it led a four-party National Front coalition that captured 57 of 62 state legislative seats, and it added 3 more in 2001. In 1999 it won 10 seats in the House of Representatives, and in 2004 it added 1 more. In February 2000 Prime Minister Mahathir had announced that UMNO would not establish a branch in Sarawak, despite efforts by a former PBB deputy president, Abang ABU Bakar Mustapha, to do so. In May 2006 the party won all 35 seats it contested in the state assembly elections. Leaders: Patinggi Amar Abdul TAIB bin Mahmud (Chief Minister of Sarawak and President of the Party); ADENAN bin Satem and Celestine UJANG (Senior Vice Presidents).

Malaysian People’s Movement Party (Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia). Based in Pulau Pinang (Penang), Gerakan is a social democratic party that has attracted many intellectual supporters, especially in the Chinese community. It was organized in 1968 by TAN Chee Khoon, who left the party after the 1969 election to form the now-defunct Social Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Masyaraka—Pekemas). The party was weakened by a leadership dispute in 1988 that saw numerous members defect to the MCA and two of its vice presidents resign. It retained five seats in the House of Representatives in 1990, added two more in 1995, dropped to six in 1999, but captured ten in March 2004. Subsequently, some of the leaders voiced support for exploring a merger with the MCA. In August 2005 Lim Keng Yaik, turning back a challenge from then Deputy President KERK Choo Ting, won another term as party president. Leaders: LIM Keng Yaik (President), KOH Tsu Koon (Deputy President of the Party and Chief Minister of Pulau Pinang), CHIA Kwang Chye (Secretary General). Malaysian Indian Congress —MIC (Kongresi India Malaysia). The leading representative of the Indian community in Malaysia, the MIC was founded in 1946 and joined the alliance in 1955. In 1989 S. Samy Vellu recaptured the party presidency with 59 percent of the vote, defeating his deputy, S. Subramaniam, in a highly acrimonious campaign. The MIC won seven House seats in the 1995, 1999, and March 2004 elections, after which Vellu continued to hold the Works portfolio in the cabinet. He won election to his tenth term as MIC president in March 2006. A month before, a number of disgruntled branch leaders had announced that they intended to form a new party. Leaders: S. Samy VELLU (President), S. SUBRAMANIAM (Deputy President), S. SOTHINATHAN (Secretary General). Sarawak People’s Party (Party Rakyat Sarawak—PRS). Registered in October 2005,

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the PRS traces its origin to a leadership dispute that split the now-defunct Sarawak Native People’s Party (Parti Bansa Dayak Sarawak— PBDS). The PBDS had been organized in 1983 by a number of legislators from the Sarawak National Party (SNAP, below) who wished to affiliate with a purely ethnic Dayak party. The new formation was accepted as a National Front partner in January 1984 and formed a coalition state government with the PBB, SNAP, and the SUPP (below) the following March. It was dismissed from the state (but not the federal) National Front grouping prior to the 1987 balloting for a new Sarawak assembly, in which (without dislodging the coalition) it obtained a plurality of 15 seats. It was decisively defeated in state balloting in 1991, but in 1996 and September 2001 it again ran successfully with the PBB, SUPP, and SNAP as coalition partners. In the November 1999 national election it won 6 seats. The 2003 decision of longtime party leader and cabinet member Leo MOGGIE anak Irok to retire led to a protracted leadership dispute between Daniel TAJEM and James Masing. As a consequence, the PBDS was deregistered in December 2003, although it regained its official status shortly before the March 2004 elections, in which it won six House seats. Subsequently, the party was directed by the National Front to resolve the dispute by holding a new intraparty election, which was scheduled for October 2004 but never held. As a consequence, the PBDS was deregistered again on October 22, 2004, by which time the new PRS was already being organized under SIDI Munan. As expected, Masing’s PBDS faction joined the new party, with Masing being named president shortly thereafter. In June 2005 the PRS was accepted into the federal National Front. In January 2006 the PRS and another National Front party, the SPDP (below), announced their intention to merge, but discussions were ultimately postponed until after the May 2006

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state election, in which the PRS won eight of the nine seats it contested. Leaders: James Jemut MASING (President), SNG Chee Hua (Deputy President). Sarawak United People’s Party —SUPP (Parti Bersatu Rakyat Sarawak). The SUPP was organized in 1959 as a left-wing Sarawak party. It won 16 seats in the Sarawak assembly election of 1991 and in 1996, as part of a coalition with the other Sarawak-based National Front parties, won 57. In November 1999 it won 8 seats in the House of Representatives. In September 2001 the front’s parties took 60 of the Sarawak Assembly’s 62 seats. In the 2004 national election the SUPP won 6 lower house seats. In May 2006 it won only 11 state legislative seats, unexpectedly losing 8 of those it contested as part of the National Front. Leaders: George CHAN Hong Nam (President of the Party and Deputy Chief Minister of Sarawak), LAW Hieng Ding (Deputy President), SIM Kheung Hui (Secretary General). Sarawak Progressive Democratic Party— SPDP (Parti Demokratik Maju Sarawak). The SPDP was established in November 2002 following a leadership crisis in the Sarawak National Party (SNAP, below) that led to SNAP’s deregistration. Several months before, William Mawan had been elected president of SNAP, but a competing SNAP faction had refused to accept the decision. Within days of SNAP’s deregistration, Mawan announced formation of the multiracial SPDP, which was soon accepted into the National Front as SNAP’s replacement. In the 2004 general election the SPDP won four seats, and in May 2006 it won eight at the state level. Leaders: William MAWAN Ikom (President), Peter NYAROK (Deputy President), Sylvester ENTRI Muran (Secretary General). Sabah United Party (Parti Bersatu Sabah—PBS). A predominantly Kadazan party with a Roman Catholic leader, the PBS was founded by defectors from the now-moribund Sabah People’s Union (Bersatu Rakyat Jelata

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Sabah—Berjaya) in March 1985. Appealing to urban, middle-class voters disaffected with the Berjaya-led government, it won a majority of state assembly seats in April. Having been admitted to the National Front in 1986, in 1988 the PBS announced a “loose alliance” with fellow National Front member Gerakan. Titled the Pan-Malaysian Congress of Unity (Pehimpunan Bersatu SeMalaysia—PBS), the alliance retained the initials of the Sabah formation in an apparent effort to avoid the implication that it was to be “colonized” by the peninsular group. In 1989 the party president, Joseph Pairin Kitingan, dismissed his deputy, Mark KODING, for helping organize the splinter party Akar (see UMNO, above). The PBS retained control of the Sabah assembly in a state general election in July 1990, but less than a week before the federal legislative poll of October 1990 it withdrew from the National Front and went into opposition. In what some viewed as an act of political retaliation, Pairin was arrested by federal authorities in early 1991 and charged with three counts of corruption. His conviction in January 1994 led to a fine of approximately $4,600. In April 1993 the PBS attracted almost half of the state assembly contingent of the United Sabah National Organization (USNO), immediately prior to that party’s long-envisaged merger with UMNO. In an early state election in February 1994 the PBS obtained a plurality of seats but because of subsequent defections was obliged to yield to a National Front administration on March 18. It won only 17 of 48 seats in the March 1999 state election and then lost 2 to defections. The party won only 3 seats in the subsequent national election. The PBS was readmitted to the National Front in January 2002, and in the March 2004 election won 4 seats in the federal legislature. Leaders: Joseph PAIRIN Kitingan (Former Chief Minister of Sabah and President of the Party); Maximus ONGKILI, YEE Moh Chai, and ALIUDDIN Mohamad Tahir (Deputy Presidents); Radin MALLEH (Secretary General).

United Pasok Momogun Kadazandusun Murut Organisation (UPKO). Reviving the name of a Sabah party from the 1960s, a congress of the Sabah Democratic Party (Parti Demokratik Sabah—PDS) voted on August 8, 1999, to adopt the UPKO designation. The PDS had been organized in 1994 by withdrawal from the PBS of a group of dissidents led by Deputy President Bernard Dompok. The original UPKO had been established by the 1964 merger of the Pasok Momogun party and the United National Kadazan Organization (UNKO), but the party dissolved in 1967. Intended to unite the majority Kadazandusun community and the Murut population of Sabah, the current UPKO subsequently indicated its willingness to discuss mergers not only with other Sabah-based National Front parties but also with the PBS. UPKO won three lower house seats at the 1999 general election and four in 2004. In 2005 UPKO and the PBRS (below) held several rounds of merger talks, but at the UPKO congress in August Dompok told the delegates that the merger “would not happen for now.” Leaders: Bernard DOMPOK (President), Wilfred BUMBURING (Deputy President). Sabah Progressive Party—SAPP (Parti Maju Sabah). Formally registered in 1994, the SAPP is a Chinese formation that was admitted to the National Front after splitting from the PBS. It won two seats in the 1999 balloting. In September 2002 one of the seats was vacated when the Election Commission found the party’s president guilty of corrupt electoral practices. A party vice president, LIEW Teck Chan, retained the seat by winning a November by-election. In March 2004 the SAPP won two seats in the House of Representatives. Leaders: YONG Teck Lee (President), Richard YONG We Kong (Secretary General). United Sabah People’s Party (Parti Bersatu Rakyat Sabah—PBRS). The PBRS was launched in 1994 by Joseph Kurup, theretofore secretary general of the PBS. In the 1999

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national election Kurup came within a few hundred votes of unseating PBS President Joseph Pairin Kitingan. In 2002 a leadership dispute ended with a decision by the Registrar of Societies that Kurup was the legitimate president. His challenger, Jeffrey Kitingan, was then expelled by the party. In the March 2004 election the PBRS won one lower house seat. Subsequently, the PBRS and UPKO appeared ready to merge, but negotiations were discontinued in 2005. At the party’s tenth congress, held in September 2005, Kurup expressed his concern that the comparatively small PBRS was being “marginalized” within the National Front’s power-sharing system. Leader: Joseph KURUP (President). People’s Progressive Party of Malaysia — PPP (Parti Kemajuan Rakyat Malaysia). Centered in Ipoh, where there is a heavy concentration of Chinese, the left-wing PPP was organized in 1955. In 1996 the Registrar of Societies approved a new constitution for the party, which thereupon adopted the name Parti Progressif Penduduk Malaysia (Baru), or PPP (New). However, a four-year-old dispute over the party leadership continued. In September 1999 the High Court annulled the presidency of M. Kayveas, who had been elected in 1993, and threw out the 1996 constitutional changes, at which time the party reverted to its original name. Kayveas quickly obtained a stay from the Court of Appeal, which confirmed him as president in November. Other claimants to the presidency included P. V. DAS, a former PPP secretary general, who continued to pursue his legal battle into 2003. For the 1999 general election the National Front did not allocate any seats to the PPP, although it won one in 2004. Kayveas was reelected president in September 2005. Leaders: M. KAYVEAS (President), MOHAN Kandasamy (Secretary General). Liberal Democratic Party —LDP (Parti Liberal Demokratik). A Chinese-dominated party based in Sabah, the LDP joined the Na-

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tional Front in 1991. In 1999 it captured one seat in the House of Representatives, but it lost the seat in 2004. At the party’s October 2004 congress President Chong Kah Kiat attributed the loss to “treachery” by some front members. Leader: CHONG Kah Kiat (President).

Parliamentary Opposition Democratic Action Party—DAP (Parti Tindakan Demokratik). A predominantly Chinese, democratic socialist party, the DAP is a 1965 offshoot of the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) of Singapore. In October 1987 a number of DAP politicians, including parliamentary opposition leader Lim Kit Siang, were arrested and held without trial for “provoking racial tensions.” In April 1989 Lim was released from jail and the party agreed to cooperate with the APU in upcoming elections, although refusing to join the coalition because of its Muslim orientation. The DAP went on to win 20 seats in the House of Representatives in 1990 but saw its representation plummet to 9 in 1995. In August 1998 Lim Guan Eng, deputy secretary general of the party and son of Lim Kit Siang, began serving concurrent 18-month prison sentences for sedition and for publishing falsehoods in a pamphlet that attacked the government’s failure to bring charges of statutory rape against a former state chief minister. Earlier, an effort by the elder Kim to mount support for his son may have contributed to an intraparty squabble in which critics charged the secretary general with nepotism and dictatorial actions. Kim responded in June by suspending the party’s vice chair, treasurer, and publicity secretary—all of whom subsequently helped found the MDP (below)—for “creating confusion, disharmony, and disunity.” Two months later the 12th national party congress declared a “New DAP” dedicated to creating a national movement for “Justice, Freedom, Democracy, and Good Governance.” Lim Guan Eng was released from prison in August 1999. Three months later, as part of the Alternative Front, the DAP won only ten seats in the

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national election, although it remained the leading legislative opponent of various National Front parties in a majority of states. Taking responsibility for the poor national showing, the elder Lim, who had lost his own parliamentary seat, resigned as party secretary general—a post he had held for three decades—but he was immediately named party chair. In September 2001, objecting to Pas’s call for establishing an Islamic state, the DAP withdrew from the BA. Although it and Keadilan discussed cooperating at the March 2004 election, the DAP kept its distance from Pas and went on to win 12 seats, thereby becoming the leading opposition party once again. At a party congress in September Lim Kit Siang stepped down as chair. Lim Guan Eng was elected secretary general. Leaders: LIM Kit Siang (Leader of the Opposition), KARPAL Singh (Chair), LIM Guan Eng (Secretary General). Alternative Front (Barisan Alternatif—BA). Organized in April–June 1999 in preparation for the forthcoming national election (for which a date had not yet been set), the BA encompassed Pas, Keadilan, the DAP, and the Malaysian People’s Party (PRM; see under Keadilan). In September 1999 it announced that the incarcerated Anwar Ibrahim would be its candidate for prime minister. Although the former Mahathir deputy subsequently withdrew as a lower house candidate because of his uncertain status after his April 1999 corruption conviction, he remained at the head of the coalition for the November balloting, in which the BA won 42 seats. The DAP withdrew in September 2001 because of opposition to Pas’s Islamic agenda, and in the 2004 national election the BA won only 7 seats. Leaders: Wan AZIZAH Wan Ismail, TIAN Chua, Abdul Hadi AWANG.

it won control of Kelantan State, where it continues to be the governing party. It retained its 7 federal seats in 1995 but rose to lead the opposition by winning 27 in November 1999, when it also captured Terengganu State and made major gains in Kedah. As part of its effort to draw greater national support, Pas has stated that should it win control of the federal government and introduce Islamic law, non-Muslims could be tried in accordance with the country’s current secular legal system. In June 2000, however, the party indicated that, in addition to restricting membership to Muslims, it would continue to prohibit women candidates at the state and federal levels. In June 2002 the party’s president, the moderate Fadzil Mohamad NOR, died. His immediate successor as party leader, Abdul Hadi Awang, a more radical Islamist and longtime supporter of Afghanistan’s ousted Taliban regime, announced in July that Islamic law would be strictly enforced in Terengganu State, where he served as chief minister until Pas was ousted in the March 2004 state election. Nationally, it saw its lower house representation plummet to six seats. A loss in a state by-election in December 2005 reduced the party’s majority in the Kelantan assembly to a single seat. Party elections held in June 2005 were notable for the success of more moderate politicians. Although Hadi Awang had no challengers, the new deputy president and all three vice presidents were regarded as reformers. Leaders: Abdul Hadi AWANG (President of the Party and Former Chief Minister of Terengganu), NIK ABDUL AZIZ Nik Mat (Spiritual Leader of Pas and Chief Minister of Kelantan), Ustaz NASARUDDIN Mat Isa (Deputy President), KAMARUDDIN Jaafar (Secretary General).

Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (Parti Islam SeMalaysia—Pas). An essentially fundamentalist Islamic right-wing party with a strong rural base, Pas participated in the governing coalition in 1973–1977 but since then has been in opposition. Pas increased its federal legislative representation to 7 in 1990; more importantly,

People’s Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Rakyat—PKR). The PKR resulted from the August 2003 merger of the National Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Nasional—PKN) and the Malaysian People’s Party (Parti Rakyat Malaysia—PRM).

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Announced on April 4, 1999, by Wan Azizah Wan Ismail as a centrist, multiracial formation, the PKN was organized by supporters of Anwar Ibrahim in an effort to unite anti-Mahathir forces. The party was largely an outgrowth of the nonparty Movement for Social Justice (Pergerakan Keadilan Sosial—Adil), which had been announced by Azizah the previous December 10 as a vehicle for reform. Anwar indicated from prison that he would not officially join the party, which selected a blue and white eye as its symbol—a reference to the injuries he suffered while in police custody after his September 1998 arrest. As part of the BA, Keadilan won five lower house seats in November 1999. It unexpectedly picked up a sixth, at the National Front’s expense, in a November 2000 byelection. On January 12–13, 2000, one of the party’s vice presidents, Marina YUSUF, and the head of its youth wing, Mohamed EZAM Noor, were arrested under the Official Secrets Act. (Yusuf subsequently left the party in a leadership dispute with the deputy president; Ezam’s 2002 conviction for illegally distributing government documents was overturned in April 2004.) In late March 2000 an anticipated merger with the PRM was announced, although some party members reportedly objected to the PRM’s socialist history. Formerly the Malaysian People’s Socialist Party (Parti Socialis Rakyat Malaysia—PSRM), the PRM was a left-leaning party that never held legislative seats. Its former leader, KASSIM Ahmad, was arrested in 1976 on suspicion of having engaged in Communist activities and was not released until 1981. Another leader, Syed Husin Ali, was similarly detained without trial under the country’s Internal Security Act in 1974–1980. In 1989 the party changed its name back to its pre-1970 title as part of an effort to assume a more moderate position. In July 2002 the PRM and Keadilan signed a memorandum of understanding on their eventual merger as the PKR, which was accomplished in August 2003. However, the Registrar of Societies did not formally approve the move

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until after the March 2004 election, at which the PKN retained only one seat. The party held its second congress in December 2005. Leaders: Wan AZIZAH Wan Ismail (President), ANWAR Ibrahim (Adviser), SYED HUSIN Ali (Deputy President), TIAN Chua (Chief Spokesperson).

Other Parties Indian Progressive Front —IPF (Barisan Kemajuan India SeMalaysia). The IPF was launched in 1990 by M. G. Pandithan, who had been an MIC vice president until ousted by Samy Vellu. The IPF supported the National Front for the 1999 and 2004 elections and has applied for National Front membership. Following the March 2004 balloting, Pandithan stated that his party was prepared to merge with the MIC “on an equal footing” if it would strengthen the National Front. The MIC has opposed the party’s inclusion in the front. Leader: M. G. PANDITHAN (President). Malaysian Dayak Congress —MDC (Kongres Dayak Malaysia). Established in May 2005, primarily by former members of the deregistered PBDS, the MDC was formed to advance the Dayak community. It sought to contest the May 2006 Sarawak state elections but had not yet been officially registered. Its candidates therefore ran under the SNAP banner. Leaders: Nicholas BAWIN (President Pro Tempore), Johnical RAYONG NYIPA (Deputy President), Louis JARAU PATRICK (Secretary General). Malaysian Democratic Party —MDP (Parti Demokratik Malaysia). The MDP was formed in April–May 1999 by a number of DAP members who objected to what they considered Lim Kit Siang’s autocratic policies. Officially registered in October, it contested, without success, 11 lower house seats in the November election on a multiracial, multicultural, and prodemocracy platform. In 2004 it ran in only one constituency. Leader: WEE Choo Keong (Secretary General). Malaysian Indian Muslim Congress (Parti Kongres Indian Muslim Malaysia—Kimma).

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Kimma was founded in 1977 as a means of uniting Malaysia’s Indian Muslims. In August 1999 it applied to join the National Front, which in June 2000 deferred a decision. A leadership dispute subsequently emerged, with incumbent SIKANDER Batcha continuing to claim the presidency despite the election of MOHAMED Haniffah and a new governing council at an August biennial meeting. In the 2004 election the party supported the National Front candidates, and in March 2006 it announced that it would once again seek National Front membership. Leaders: AMSAA Alla Pilchay (President), KAMAL Batcha (Deputy President). Malaysian Islamic Council Front (Barisan Jemaah Islamiah SeMalaysia—Berjasa). Berjasa is a Kelantan-based party organized in opposition to Pas following the latter’s withdrawal from the government in 1977. Despite its past differences with Pas, the party left the National Front and joined the APU in mid-1989 to counter the influence of its rival, the Muslim Front of Malaysia (Hizbul Muslimin Malaysia—Hamim), another Pas splinter that is now moribund. Berjasa later applied to rejoin the National Front. Although still registered prior to the 2004 general election, Berjasa had few remaining supporters. Leader: Mohamed Din bin NIZAM Din. Malaysian Justice Movement (Parti Angkatan Keadilan Insan Malaysia—AKIM). AKIM was launched in 1995 by a number of Semangat ’46 and Pas dissidents. In October 1999, it announced an electoral alliance, the People’s Realization Movement (Angkatan Insaf Rakyat—AIR), formed with a recent Pas splinter, the Pas (Baru), led by ZAINAL Abidin Yusuf, and some Berjasa members. AKIM nevertheless contested only one district in the November 1999 federal election. It was still registered at the time of the 2004 general election. Leader: Hambali YAZID (President). Sarawak National Party —SNAP (Parti Kebangsaan Sarawak). Long a leading Sarawak party,

SNAP ran in the 1974 federal election as an opposition party, capturing nine seats in the lower house. Supported largely by the Iban population of Sarawak, it joined the National Front at both the state and federal levels in 1976. In 1996 and 2001 it joined the PBB, SUPP, and PBDS in dominating the Sarawak state balloting. In November 1999 it won four seats in the national election. On November 5, 2002, SNAP was formally deregistered as a consequence of a leadership dispute, dating from the preceding April, in which the party’s deputy president, Peter TINGGOM Karmarau, had challenged its longtime president, James WONG Kim Ming. In August an extraordinary party meeting had elected William Mawan Ikom as successor to Wong, who refused to accept what he termed a “coup d’´etat.” Within days of the deregistration, which Wong planned to challenge, Mawan announced formation of the Sarawak Progressive Democratic Party (SPDP). The deregistration was suspended by the Court of Appeal in April 2003, permitting SNAP to compete in the March 2004 national election, in which it failed to win any of the seven seats it contested. With the deregistration appeal not yet resolved, SNAP won one state seat in May 2006. Leader: Edwin DUNDANG (President). State Reform Party—Star (Parti Reformasi Negeri). Led by a former Sarawak state cabinet member and senior vice president of SNAP, Star was registered as a party in October 1996. It ran a small number of unsuccessful candidates in the lower house balloting of 1999 and 2004. Star chose not to contest the May 2006 state election after failing to arrange an acceptable seat allocation with other opposition parties. Leader: Patau RUBIS (President). In early March 2004 Jeffrey KITINGAN, who had been expelled from the PBRS in 2002, announced an effort to unite Sabah opposition parties and independents in a Sabah Front (Barisan Sabah) that would include the Sabah People’s Unity Front (Parti Barisan Rakyat Sabah Bersekutu), led by BERMAN Angkap; the Sabah People’s

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Cabinet As of June 1, 2006 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister

Abdullah bin Ahmad Badawi (UMNO) Mohamed Najib bin Abdul Razak (UMNO)

Ministers Agriculture and Agro-Based Industry Culture, Arts, and Tourism Defense Domestic Trade and Consumer Affairs Education Energy, Water, and Communications Entrepreneurial and Cooperative Development Federal Territories Finance Foreign Affairs Health Higher Education Home Affairs Housing and Local Government Human Resources Information Internal Security International Trade and Industry Natural Resources and Environment Plantation Industries and Commodities Prime Minister’s Office

Rural and Regional Development Science, Technology, and Innovations Tourism Transport Women, Family, and Community Development Works Youth and Sports

Muhyiddin bin Mohamed Yassin (UMNO) Rais Yatim (UMNO) Mohamed Najib bin Tun Abdul Razak (UMNO) Mohamed Shafie bin Haji Apdal (UMNO) Hishammuddin bin Hussein (UMNO) Lim Keng Yaik (Gerakan) Mohamed Khaled bin Nordin (UMNO) Zulhasnan bin Rafique (UMNO) Abdallah bin Ahmad Badawi (UMNO) Nor Mohamed bin Yakcop (UMNO) Syed Hamid bin Syed Jaafar Albar (UMNO) Chua Soi Lek (MCA) Mustapha bin Mohamed (UMNO) Mohamed Radzi bin Sheikh Ahmad (UMNO) Ong Ka Ting (MCA) Fong Chan Onn (MCA) Zainuddin bin Maidin (UMNO) Abdullah bin Ahmad Badawi (UMNO) Rafidah binti Abdul Aziz (UMNO) [f] Azmi bin Khalid (UMNO) Peter Chin Fah Kui (SUPP) Bernard Giluk Dompok (UPKO) Mohamad Nazri bin Abdul Aziz (UMNO) Mohamed Effendi Norwawi (PBB) Abdullah bin Mohamed Zin (UMNO) Maximus Ongkili (PBS) Abdul Aziz bin Shamsudin (UMNO) Jamaluddin bin Mohamed Jarjis (UMNO) Adnan bin Tengku Mansor (UMNO) Chan Kong Choy (MCA) Shahrizat binti Abdul Jalil (UMNO) [f] S. Samy Vellu (MIC) Azalina binti Othman (UMNO) [f]

[f] = female

United Democratic Party (Parti Demokratik Setiasehati Kuasa Rakyat Bersatu Sabah—Setia), and the United Pasok Nunkragang National Organization (Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Pasok

Nunkragang Bersatu—Pasok), led by KANUK Gindol. Pasok, for one, quickly disavowed any interest in Kitingan’s effort, and as of April 2006 Kitingan remained unaffiliated.

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Other small parties registered for the March 2004 election were the Community Coalition Congress Party (Parti Kongres Penyatuan Masyarakat), led by LIEW Chin Kong; the Malaysian Punjabi Party (Parti Punjabi Malaysia), which was established by J’swant SINGH in 1986 and has applied for National Front membership; and the Malaysian Workers’ Party (Partai Pekerja-Pekerja Malaysia), led by MURUGESU Kannan.

Legislature The federal Parliament is a bicameral body consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives. Senate (Dewan Negara). The upper chamber consists of 70 members: 44 appointed by the paramount ruler (including 2 senators from the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur and 1 each from Labuan and Putrajaya) and 2 selected by each of the 13 state legislatures. Members serve oncerenewable three-year terms. The Senate is never dissolved, new elections being held by the appropriate state legislative assembly as often as there are vacancies among the elected members. As of May 2006, 66 seats were occupied as follows: National Front, 61 (United Malays National Organization, 34; Malaysian Chinese Association, 11; Malaysian Indian Congress, 6; United Traditional Bumiputra Party, 3; Malaysian People’s Movement Party, 3; Liberal Democratic Party, People’s Progressive Party, Sarawak United People’s Party, United Pasok Momogun Kadazandusun Murut Organization, 1 each); Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, 2; minority representatives, 3. President: Abdul Hamid PAWANTEH. House of Representatives (Dewan Rakyat). The lower house currently has 219 elected members (up from 193 in the previous election cycle). The term of the House is five years, subject to dissolution. Elections are by universal adult suffrage, but the voting is weighted in favor of the predominantly Malay rural areas, with some urban (mainly

Chinese) constituencies having three to four times as many voters as their rural counterparts. In the most recent election of March 21, 2004, the National Front won 199 seats (United Malays National Organization, 110; Malaysian Chinese Association, 31; United Traditional Bumiputra Party, 11; Malaysian People’s Movement Party, 10; Malaysian Indian Congress, 9; Sarawak Native People’s Party, 6; Sarawak United People’s Party, 6; Sarawak Progressive Democratic Party, 4; Sabah United Party, 4; United Pasok Momogun Kadazandusun Murut Organization, 4; Sabah Progressive Party, 2; United Sabah People’s Party, 1; People’s Progressive Party of Malaysia, 1). The other 20 seats were distributed as follows: Democratic Action Party, 12; Alternative Front, 7 (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, 6; National Justice Party, 1); independent, 1. Speaker: Diraja RAMLI bin Ngah Talib.

Communications Journalists are subject to arrest under the Internal Security Act and the Official Secrets Act, and the home minister is empowered “at any time by notification in writing” to alter a newspaper license. Thus in 1991 two opposition papers, Pas’s Harakah and the DAP’s Rocket, were officially defined as “in-house” organs that could be distributed only to party members. In February 1999 the government prohibited federal agencies from subscribing to the International Herald Tribune, Asiaweek, and the Far Eastern Economic Review, all three of which were deemed too critical of Malaysia. The following September, the Court of Appeal sentenced the Canadian bureau chief of the Far Eastern Economic Review to a brief term in prison for “scandalizing the court” in a 1997 article. In January 2000 the editor and printer of Harakah were arrested for publishing an allegedly seditious article the previous August, and two months later the government, asserting that Harakah had been violating its status as an in-house organ, ordered that its publication schedule be reduced to twice a month. More recently, in February

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2006 the government suspended publication of the Sarawak Tribune after it reprinted satirical Danish editorial cartoons that caricatured the prophet Muhammad.

Press The following, unless otherwise noted, are dailies published in Kuala Lumpur: Berita Harian (350,000 daily; 420,000 Sunday, published as Berita Minggu), in Malay; Utusan Malaysia (240,000), UMNO-controlled organ in Malay; Sin Chew Jit Poh (Selangor, 230,000 daily; 230,000 Sunday), in Chinese; The Star (Selangor, 220,000 daily; 250,000 Sunday, published as Sunday Star), MCA organ in English; Chung Kuo Pao (210,000), in Chinese; New Straits Times (190,000 daily; 190,000 Sunday, published as New Sunday Times), in English; Nanyang Siang Pao (180,000 daily, 220,000 Sunday), in Chinese; Shin Min Daily News (80,000 daily, 80,000 Sunday), in Chinese; Malay Mail (75,000 daily; 75,000 weekend, published as Weekend Mail), tabloid in English, founded 1896; and Tamil Nesan (35,000 daily, 60,000 Sunday), in Tamil.

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Broadcasting and Computing The Ministry of Information is empowered to revoke the license of any broadcaster who transmits materials “conflicting with Malaysian values.” Government services are provided by Radio Television Malaysia (RTM), which operates about 30 radio stations and 2 television networks. In addition, the RTM’s Voice of Malaysia (Suara Malaysia) provides overseas service in a number of languages. A limited number of private companies also provide broadcast services. There were more than 4.2 million television receivers in 2003, over 90 percent being concentrated in Peninsular Malaysia. Concurrently, some 4.2 million personal computers served 8.7 million Internet users.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. RAJMAH Hussain U.S. Ambassador to Malaysia Christopher J. LaFLEUR

News Agencies

Permanent Representative to the UN HAMIDON Ali

The domestic facility is the Malaysian National News Agency (Bernama); a number of foreign agencies maintain offices in Kuala Lumpur.

IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, APEC, ASEAN, BIS, CP, CWTH, IDB, Interpol, IOR-ARC, NAM, OIC, PCA, WCO, WTO

Note: Paramount Ruler Sultan Mizan Zainal Abidin ibni al-Mahun Sultan Mahmud took office on December 13, 2006, for a five-year term. He was elected from among and by the nine hereditary rulers of Peninsular Malaysia on November 3 after having served as deputy paramount ruler since February 1999.

MALDIVES REPUBLIC

OF

MALDIVES

Dhivehi Jumhuriyah

The Country The Republic of Maldives is a 500-mile-long chain of small, low-lying coral islands extending southward in the Indian Ocean from a point about 300 miles southwest of India and 400 miles west of Sri Lanka. Grouped into 20 atoll clusters, the more than 1,200 islands (only about 200 of which are inhabited) have vegetation ranging from scrub to dense tropical forest. The population displays mixed Sinhalese, Dravidian, and Arab traits. The official language, Dhivehi, is related to Sinhalese. Islam is the state religion, most of the population belonging to the Sunni sect. The degree of female emancipation is highly unusual for a Muslim country; a large number of women are employed by the government, and women have many of the same rights of divorce as men. The economy has traditionally been dependent on fishing; at present, it accounts for over half of exports and about 10 percent of GDP. However, it has been passed in the latter regard by a booming tourism sector, which accounts for over 30 percent of GDP and 70 percent of foreign exchange. (Tourist arrivals surpassed 560,000 in 2003, led by visitors from Italy, Germany, and Japan.) Manufacturing, which contributes about 12 percent of GDP, is limited, the most important products being canned fish and garments. Cottage industries and handicraft production are also significant sources of employment and income. The government dominates most economic activity, but private sector participation has been increasingly encouraged. Gross national income grew steadily in 1995– 2004, a decade during which annual GDP expansion averaged about 6.6 percent and reached 8.8 percent in 2004. The economy was severely

damaged, however, by the December 26, 2004, Indian Ocean tsunami. Only about 100 people died, but with 80 percent of habitable land one meter or less above sea level, damage to infrastructure and housing was estimated at $375 million—about half the country’s GDP for 2004. Fourteen islands suffered what the International Monetary Fund labeled “virtually complete destruction”; 3 of the 14 were abandoned. Despite an inflow of international aid from the World Bank and other institutions as well as individual countries, Maldives saw its economy contract by 3.8 percent in 2005. In July 2000 the UN Economic and Social Council deferred a decision by the Committee for Development Policy to remove Maldives from its list

MALDIVES

Political Status: Former British protectorate; independent since July 26, 1965; sultanate replaced by republican regime November 11, 1968; present constitution promulgated January 1, 1998. Area: 115 sq. mi. (298 sq. km.). Population: 270,101 (2000C); 295,000 (2005E). Major Urban Center (2005E): MALE´ (88,000). Official Language: Dhivehi. Monetary Unit: Maldivian Rufiyaa (market rate July 1, 2006: 12.80 rufiyaa = $1US). President: Maumoon Abdul GAYOOM; nominated by the Majlis on July 28, 1978, to succeed Ibrahim NASIR, who had declined to seek reelection; assumed office for a five-year term on November 11 after being confirmed by popular referendum; most recently reelected by the People’s Majlis on September 25, 2003, and confirmed in office by referendum on October 17; sworn in for a sixth term on November 11.

of the world’s 48 least developed countries (LDCs). The deferral followed an appeal by the island state, which argued that the resultant loss of tariff concessions and concessionary loans would cause the collapse of the country’s fishing industry and a loss of direct foreign investment. Maldives also argued that the criteria for determining LDC status did not adequately consider the vulnerability of the country’s two principal industries, tourism and fishing, and the threat of rising sea levels.

Government and Politics Political Background Subjected to a brief period of Portuguese domination in the 16th century, the Maldives came under British influence in 1796 and were declared a British protectorate in 1887. Internal selfgovernment was instituted in 1960, and full independence was achieved on July 26, 1965, following negotiations with the United Kingdom covering economic assistance and the retention of a British air facility on southern Gan Island. The centuries-

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old Maldivian sultanate, which had been temporarily replaced by a republican form of government in 1953–1954, was then reinstated until 1968, when the Maldives again became a republic in accordance with the outcome of a national referendum. Having been initially appointed prime minister in 1972, Ahmed ZAKI was redesignated in February 1975. Although he reportedly had the support of a newly elected Majlis (Citizen’s Assembly), he was removed from office and placed under arrest in March. President Ibrahim NASIR assumed executive responsibilities, and Zaki was banished. The change of government was confirmed by a constitutional revision that also empowered the president to appoint an unlimited number of vice presidents. Four such positions were subsequently established, only to be discontinued in a further government reorganization in February 1977. After 21 years of rule, President Nasir announced in mid-1978 that he would not seek reelection, despite a parliamentary request that he continue in office. The Majlis thereupon nominated as his successor Transport Minister Maumoon Abdul GAYOOM, who had once been banished and once imprisoned for criticizing Nasir’s administration but had since become the country’s first permanent representative to the United Nations. Prior to Gayoom’s installation on November 11, outgoing President Nasir pardoned a number of those under house arrest or banished, including former prime minister Zaki, who subsequently served as UN representative. The Majlis renominated President Gayoom for additional terms in 1983 and 1988, with confirmation by referendum. In 1988 the islands withstood an attempted coup by more than 400 foreign gunmen who landed in Mal´e on November 3, attacking government troops and causing at least 12 deaths. On November 4 India dispatched some 1,600 paratroopers, who quickly restored order. The invaders, reportedly mercenary members of the Sri Lankan People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam, fled with 20 hostages by boat, which was overtaken and captured two days later by an Indian frigate. A trial of 73 individuals involved in the affair concluded in August 1989 with 17 sentenced to death and the rest to lengthy prison terms. In mid-September,

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however, President Gayoom commuted the death sentences, including that imposed on the coup leader, Maldivian businessman Abdulla LUTHUFEE, to life imprisonment. During Majlis deliberations in 1993 regarding its next presidential nomination, Gayoom was unexpectedly challenged by his brother-in-law, Ilyas IBRAHIM, who as minister of atolls administration had developed a degree of political support away from the capital. It was subsequently reported that the president had defeated Ibrahim by an informal vote of 28–18 in the Majlis, which then proceeded on August 23 to nominate Gayoom as its official unanimous candidate. Meanwhile, Ibrahim was charged with illegally attempting to influence members of the Majlis and fled the country prior to being sentenced in absentia to 15 years’ imprisonment. Gayoom was inaugurated for a fourth term on November 11, 1993, after receiving a 92.8 percent endorsement as the sole candidate in a referendum on October 4. Amid growing calls for political reform, especially for the legalization of party activity, legislative balloting for the 40 elective seats in the Majlis on December 3, 1994, was contested by 229 candidates, all standing as independents. Public speeches and meetings were not permitted during the campaign, and 5 candidates were detained. Those elected included several leaders of the “proreform” movement, notably former ministers Abdulla KAMALUDDEEN and Ahmed MUJUTABA. Ilyas Ibrahim returned to house arrest in Maldives in 1996 but was released in 1997, his case apparently having influenced the way presidential balloting in the legislature (now termed the People’s Majlis) was to be conducted under the constitution that was promulgated on January 1, 1998. Although four others sought the presidential nomination during secret balloting in the legislature on September 24, 1998, President Gayoom received unanimous endorsement for a fifth term. Following confirmation by 90.9 percent of those voting in a referendum on October 16, he took the oath of office on November 11. In a surprising but, for Maldives, not unprecedented development, the new cabinet introduced by President Gayoom included

his erstwhile adversary Ilyas Ibrahim as minister of transport and civil aviation. Abdulla Kamaluddeen also rejoined the cabinet as minister for human resources, employment, and labor. The People’s Majlis election of November 19, 1999, saw a nearly 50 percent turnover in the elected membership, with two government ministers, including Kamaluddeen, being among the defeated. A total of 129 independent candidates contested the election. In 2003, President Gayoom was again unanimously endorsed for an unprecedented sixth consecutive term, and his confirmation by 90.3 percent of the voters on October 17, 2003, made him one of the longest-serving political leaders in the world. Legislative elections to the 50-seat People’s Majlis, originally scheduled for December 31, 2004, but postponed because of the Indian Ocean tsunami, were held on January 22, 2005. Although all candidates were required to run as independents, reform advocates performed strongly. Those endorsed by the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP), an opposition party then based in Sri Lanka, captured 18 of the 42 elective seats. In furtherance of a political reform process initiated by President Gayoom, on May 28, 2004, voters cast ballots for a partially elected People’s Special Majlis that was assigned the task of drafting another new constitution. Meanwhile, on June 2, 2005, the People’s Majlis unanimously passed legislation legalizing the formation of political parties. The MDP quickly registered and immediately became the principal opposition to President Gayoom’s Maldivian People’s Party (Dhivehi Rayyithunge Party—DRP).

Constitution and Government Since adoption of a republican constitution in 1968, Maldivian government has combined constitutional rule with de facto control by members of a small hereditary elite. The current basic law, having been drafted over a 17-year period by a Citizens’ Special Majlis, was approved by the president on November 20, 1997, effective January 1, 1998. Like its predecessor, the new constitution provides for a unicameral legislature, now called

MALDIVES

the People’s Majlis (People’s Assembly), controlled by an elected majority. The legislature nominates the president for a five-year term, with confirmation required by popular referendum. The president appoints other leading officials, including those entrusted with overseeing the legal system, which is based on Islamic law (Sharia). Changes introduced by the 1998 basic law include multicandidate competition in the People’s Majlis for its presidential nomination, parliamentary immunity from prosecution, expansion of ministerial powers, and greater citizens’ rights. It also increased the number of atoll-based administrative districts from 19 to 20 and, accordingly, added 2 more elected members to the 50-member legislature, which includes 8 presidential appointees. In addition to the ordinary legislature, the constitution provides for a People’s Special Majlis (previously the Citizens’ Special Majlis) to draft or amend a constitution. Either the president or the People’s Majlis may convene a People’s Special Majlis, whose membership includes the 50 members of the People’s Majlis, an additional 42 elected members (2 per administrative district), 8 presidential appointees, and the members of the cabinet. Each atoll is governed by a presidentially appointed atoll chief (verin), who is advised by an elected committee. Each inhabited island is administered by a headman (kateeb), a number of assistant headmen (one for every 500 people), and a mosque functionary (mudim). The capital constitutes a separate, centrally administered district.

Foreign Relations An active participant in the Nonaligned Movement, the Republic of Maldives has long sought to have the Indian Ocean declared a “Zone of Peace,” with foreign (particularly nuclear) military forces permanently banned from the area. Thus, despite the adverse impact on what was an already depressed economy, the government welcomed the withdrawal of the British Royal Air Force from Gan Island in 1976 and rejected a subsequent Soviet bid to establish a base there. Since assuming office, President Gayoom has actively sought to increase the republic’s interna-

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tional visibility, particularly in regard to regional affairs, economic development, and such environmental issues as global warming. The republic became a “special member” of the Commonwealth in July 1982 and a full member in June 1985. It was a founding member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) the following December. Gayoom has been in the forefront of those pressing for the regional grouping to address political issues that have constrained economic integration. In mid-1998, responding to recent nuclear weapons tests conducted by India and Pakistan, Gayoom asked “all parties concerned to exercise maximum restraint.” India remains the Maldives’s closest international partner and the only country with which Mal´e has a defense cooperation agreement. Most ambassadors to Maldives reside in Sri Lanka, although Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka have high commissioners at Mal´e. For economic reasons Maldives maintains diplomatic missions only at UN headquarters in New York, in London, and in Colombo.

Current Issues In June 2004 President Gayoom unveiled a sweeping reform agenda that was widely praised in some quarters but greeted with skepticism elsewhere, given his regime’s questionable human rights record. His proposals included limiting presidents to two five-year terms, creating the post of prime minister, establishing a Supreme Court, institutionalizing the separation of powers, and allowing the formation of political parties. In late September he presented to his cabinet a draft of a new constitution, in preparation for submitting it to the People’s Special Majlis. The most notable development in the following 12 months was the legalization of political parties in June 2005. Progress on the new constitution has been slow, however, with the work of the People’s Special Majlis initially delayed by a lengthy dispute over the election of a speaker and recently by opposition demands that President Gayoom’s 29 appointees to the body be stripped of their seats. On March 27, 2006, the president presented a “road

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MALDIVES

map for the reform agenda” that included a June 2007 target for completing the constitution, with a multiparty election to be held in October 2008. Much of the opposition dismissed the road map as part of an effort by Gayoom to delay true reforms. Although espousing the virtues of democracy and the reform process, the government has neither loosened media laws nor ended its prosecution of opposition figures. Journalists and publishers of opposition newspapers and electronic newsletters continue to be fined or to receive lengthy prison sentences for violating content restrictions, while large antigovernment demonstrations, unheard of before 2003, have resulted in hundreds of arrests and the prosecution of dissidents. On August 13, 2004, the president declared a state of emergency following demonstrations demanding the release of political prisoners, some of whom had been detained since protesting the deaths of several prisoners at the hands of security personnel in September 2003. When the state of emergency was lifted on October 10, 2004, nearly 80 of the 185 who had been arrested in August were still being held. Repeat demonstrations in August 2005 led to the arrest of more than 130, including the MDP chair, Mohamed NASHEED, who had returned from exile on April 30. Nasheed faced charges of terrorism and sedition. In October 2005 Jennifer LATHEEF, daughter of exiled MDP founder Mohamed LATHEEF, was convicted of inciting a riot in September 2003 and sentenced to ten years in prison. Four codefendants had already received comparable prison terms. In accordance with his reform agenda, in midMay 2006 President Gayoom issued a decree, the Regulation on Strengthening the Right to Freedom of Assembly, pending action by the People’s Majlis. Gatherings or marches by three or more people for purposes of political expression are to be permitted in government-designated areas so long as all laws are obeyed and police are notified in writing 14 days in advance. The decree did little to assuage international critics, however, with the European Union (EU) and the United Nations both issuing statements, later in May, that urged the government to adhere more closely to its own road map. The EU cited an “atmosphere of fear and in-

timidation” occasioned by the actions of security personnel and the continuing arrests of peaceful demonstrators. UN agencies based in Maldives expressed their collective concern over an increasing number of arrests and the summary trials held for some of 200 recently detained protesters.

Political Parties On June 2, 2005, at President Gayoom’s request, the People’s Majlis unanimously passed a reform allowing the registration of political parties, which had long been banned in Maldives. Parties seeking registration must submit the signatures of at least 3,000 members. As of May 2006 five parties had been registered.

Presidential Party Maldive People’s Party (Dhivehi Rayyithunge Party—DRP). Registered shortly after the legalization of parties, the DRP was established by President Gayoom. Its members include the cabinet and the government-supportive members of the People’s Majlis and the People’s Special Majlis. The party held its first congress April 19–21, 2006, at which time Gayoom was formally elected party chair by a vote of 887–33 over reform activist Ali SHAFEEQ. A number of more youthful party leaders, including Ahmed Shaheed and Hassan Saeed, head a proreform “New Maldives” caucus that claimed the support of President Gayoom. Leaders of a more conservative faction include Ilyas Ibrahim, Ismail Shafeeu, and Thasmeen Ali. Leaders: Maumoon Abdul GAYOOM (Chair of the Party and President of the Maldives), Thasmeen ALI (Home Minister), Ilyas IBRAHIM (Minister of Health), Ismail SHAFEEU (Minister of Defense), Hassan SAEED (Attorney General), Ahmed SHAHEED (Foreign Minister).

Leading Opposition Party Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP). Efforts to establish a legal MDP date back to at least 2001, when the government refused to register it. As a result, the MDP was based in Colombo, Sri Lanka,

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Cabinet As of June 1, 2006 President

Maumoon Abdul Gayoom

Ministers Atolls Development Communication, Science, and Technology Construction and Public Works Defense and National Security Economic Development and Trade Education Environment, Energy, and Water Finance and Treasury Fisheries, Agriculture, and Marine Resources Foreign Affairs Gender and Family Health Higher Education, Employment, and Social Security Home Affairs Housing and Urban Development Human Resources, Employment, and Labor Information and Arts Justice Planning and National Development Presidential Affairs President’s Office Tourism and Civil Aviation Trade and Industries Transport and Communication Women’s Affairs, Families, and Social Welfare Youth and Sports Attorney General Minister of State

Mohamed Waheed Deen Midhath Hilmy Mohamed Mauroof Jameel Ismail Shafeeu Mohamed Jaleel Zaahiya Zareer [f] Ahmed Abdulla Qasim Ibrahim Abdulla Kamaluddeen Ahmed Shaheed Aishath Mohamed Didi [f] Ilyas Ibrahim Abdulla Yameen Ahmed Thasmeen Ali Ibrahim Rafeeq Abdul Rasheed Hussain Mohamed Nasheed Mohamed Jameel Ahmed Hamdoon Hameed Mohamed Hussain Aneesa Ahmed [f] Mahmood Shaugee Abdulla Yameen Mohamed Saeed Zaahiya Zareer [f] Hussain Hilmy Hassan Saeed Ibrahim Rashad

[f] = female

from 2003 until officially registered in the Maldives in June 2005. The Majlis elected in 1999 reportedly included 7 MDP supporters; 18 representatives elected in January 2005 had run with MDP endorsements. Following legalization of political parties, the MDP assumed leadership of the parliamentary opposition. On August 22, 2005, the party’s chair, Mohamed Nasheed, was charged with terrorism and sedition for his participation, a week ear-

lier, in demonstrations demanding the release of political prisoners. Jennifer Latheef, daughter of party founder Mohamed Latheef, received a 10year prison sentence in October 2005 for inciting a riot in September 2003. In May 2006 the party president, Ibrahim ISMAIL, resigned over tactical issues. Unlike most of the other party leaders, he favored opening negotiations with President Gayoom even though all political prisoners had not yet been released.

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Leaders: Mohamed NASHEED (Chair), Ibrahim Hussain ZAKI (Acting President), Mohamed LATHEEF (Cofounder and Spokesperson), Hassan AFEEF, Hamid Abdul GHAFOOR (Secretary General).

Other Parties Justice Party (Adhaalath Party—AP). The opposition Justice Party was registered in August 2005. Islamic in orientation, the party has backed demands for the release of political prisoners and governmental reform. Leaders: Abdul Majed Abdul BARI, Hussein RASHID, Mohamed SHAHEEM. The Islamic Democratic Party (IDP) was officially registered in December 2005 under the leadership of Umar NASEER. The Maldivian Social Democratic Party (MSDP), led by H. Reeko Ibrahim MANIKU, became the Maldives’s fifth registered political party in February 2006.

Legislature The Maldivian People’s Majlis is a unicameral body of 50 members: 8 appointed by the president and 42 popularly elected (2 from Mal´e and 2 from each of the 20 administrative districts) for five-year terms. The last election was held on January 22, 2005, all candidates running as independents. The opposition Maldivian Democratic Party had endorsed 18 of the successful candidates, and 1 other was regarded as having pro-MDP leanings. Of the balance, 20 winners were progovernment and 3 were independents. Most, if not all, of the progovernment representatives as well as the 8 presidential appointees subsequently joined the Maldivian People’s Party, which was registered in July 2005. Speaker: Ahmed ZAHIR.

Communications After a brief flirtation with freedom of the press in 1990, the government reversed itself, outlawing all but officially sanctioned publications and jailing a number of journalists. More recently, lim-

ited freedom has been permitted, although selfcensorship is common and the government retains the authority to prosecute journalists and shut down publications and media outlets “if any undesirable outcome arises due to the publication of an article or statement.” In 2006 several journalists from the country’s only opposition daily, Minivan Daily, were charged with “disobedience to order” for publishing unlawful articles.

Press The following are published in Mal´e: Haveeru Daily (4,500), in Dhivehi and English; Aafathis (3,000), daily in Dhivehi and English; Jamaathuge Habaru (Community News, 1,500), monthly in Dhivehi; Maldives News Bulletin (400), official weekly in English; Miadhu News, daily in Dhivehi and English; and Minivan Daily (Independence Daily), proreform opposition daily in Dhivehi.

News Agencies The Haveeru News Service (HNS) and the Hiyama News Agency operate in Mal´e. The Ministry of Information and Arts also maintains a Maldives News Bureau.

Radio and Television The government-owned Voice of Maldives offers programming in Dhivehi and English to approximately 36,000 receivers in 1999. Television Maldives provides two channels for some 8,000 receivers.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. and Permanent Representative to the UN Mohamed LATHEEF U.S. Ambassador to the Maldives Jeffrey LUNSTEAD (resident in Sri Lanka) IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, CWTH, CP, IDB, Interpol, NAM, OIC, SAARC, WCO, WTO

MARSHALL ISLANDS REPUBLIC

OF THE

MARSHALL ISLANDS

The Country The Marshalls consist of a double chain of coral atolls, encompassing 33 islands and more than 850 reefs, within the Pacific region known as Micronesia, some 2,000 miles southwest of Hawaii. The two chains are about 80 miles apart, the eastern (which includes the capital, Majuro) being known as the Rataks (“Sunrise”) Chain and the western (which includes Bikini, Eniwetak, and Kwajalein) being known as the Ralik (“Sunset”) Chain. More than 90 percent of the inhabitants are indigenous Marshallese. Christianity is the principal religion, with adherents of Roman Catholicism the most numerous. Copra products long dominated exports, although a decline in copra oil prices in the early 1980s led to a severe trade imbalance. The sale of fishing licenses and income from fishing-related services now make up a significant portion of external earnings. Financial assistance from the United States (currently at about $50 million a year) is a crucial component of government revenue for a country whose GDP declined by nearly 25 percent in 1995–2001, with debt servicing equaling about 40 percent of budget outlays and far exceeding export earnings. For several years the unemployment rate has been relatively unchanged at around 30 percent, while the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has labeled the Marshalls as having inadequate tax policies. Nonetheless, the economy grew by about 4.0 percent in 2002 before receding by 1.8 percent in 2003, then rising again by 3.5 percent in 2005.

Government and Politics Political Background Purchased by Germany from Spain in 1899, the Marshalls were seized in 1914 by Japan and retained as part of the mandate awarded by the League of Nations in 1920. The islands were occupied by U.S. forces near the end of World War II and (along with the Caroline and Northern Mariana islands) became part of the U.S. Trust

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MARSHALL ISLANDS

Territory of the Pacific in 1947. In 1965 a Congress of Micronesia was established, with the Marshalls electing 4 of the 21 members of its House of Representatives. Subsequently the Marshall Islands district drafted its own constitution, which came into effect on May 1, 1979. Three years later the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) concluded a Compact of Free Association with the United States, which was declared to be in effect on October 21, 1986, following ratification by the U.S. Congress and final approval by the islands’ government. Under the Compact, the RMI is a fully sovereign state, save with regard to defense, which was to remain a U.S. responsibility for at least a 15year period; it is also obligated to “consult” with Washington with regard to major foreign policy matters. The islands’ first president was Amata KABUA, who first assumed office on May 1, 1979, and was subsequently reelected to four successive four-year terms. He died on December 20, 1996, while undergoing medical treatment in Honolulu, Minister of Transportation Kunio D. LEMARI being named acting president pending legislative designation of a successor. In balloting within the Nitijela on January 14, 1997, Imata KABUA (a cousin of Amata and a minister without portfolio in the previous government) was elected to fulfill the remainder of Amata Kabua’s term. In the legislative poll of November 15, 1999, the United Democratic Party (UDP) won a first-ever majority for an opposition group and on January 3, 2000, named Kessai H. NOTE, theretofore Nitijela speaker, to succeed Kabua as president. On January 15, 2001, President Note survived a no-confidence motion, 19–14, brought by Imata Kabua and six other senators dissatisfied, in part, by the government’s preparations for negotiating a successor agreement to the 1986 Compact. President Note, addressing the legislature after the vote, described it as a “wake-up call” to the cabinet. On November 1, 2002, after several rounds of negotiations, the U.S. George W. Bush administration and the Note government initialed on Majuro a new 20-year Compact, although the Marshalls

entered reservations with regard to specific monetary figures, pending completion of ongoing negotiations on the Military Use and Operating Rights Agreement (MUORA) governing future use by the United States of defense facilities on Kwajalein Island. In early 2003 RMI and U.S. negotiators reached agreement on lease renewal for the Kwajelein Missile Range (renamed the Ronald Reagan Missile Defense Test Site in 2001), and on May 1 they signed a new Compact that would provide the Marshalls with economic aid for the ensuing two decades and preserved the right of RMI citizens to enter, reside, and work in the United States without visas. On November 17, 2003, the UDP secured a 20seat majority in the Nitijela, and on January 4, 2004, President Note won reelection by a 20–9 House vote over Justin DEBRUM.

Constitution and Government The 1979 constitution provides for a bicameral parliament whose popularly elected lower house (Nitijela) performs most legislative functions. The 33-member body selects from its own ranks an executive president, who serves for the duration of the four-year parliamentary term. There is no specific provision for succession should the presidential office become vacant, as happened following the death of Amata Kabua in December 1996. The upper house is a council of 12 traditional chiefs who make recommendations with regard to customary law and practice. Municipalities are governed by elected magistrates and councils, while villages follow traditional forms of rule.

Foreign Relations The effective degree of Marshalls’ autonomy in foreign affairs is not entirely clear. In early 1987 the Nitijela debated whether to endorse the Treaty of Rarotonga that called for the establishment of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ), but, unlike the Federated States of Micronesia (see

MARSHALL ISLANDS

Political Status: Sovereign state in free association with the United States (which retains authority with regard to defense) since October 21, 1986. Area: 70 sq. mi. (181 sq. km.). Population: 50,848 (1999C); 63,000 (2005E). Major Urban Center (2005E): DALAP-ULIGA-DARRIT (Majuro Atoll; 26,000). Official Languages: English, Marshallese. Monetary Unit: U.S. Dollar. President: Kessai H. NOTE (United Democratic Party); elected by the House of Representatives on January 3, 2000, to succeed Imata KABUA (Presidential Caucus); reelected on January 4, 2004, and inaugurated for a second four-year term on January 12.

FSM article), failed to take action in the matter after a Washington official had termed adherence “inappropriate” given the U.S. obligation under the Compact to defend the Marshalls, coupled with its own decision not to sign the document. In December 1990 the UN Security Council formally abrogated the U.S. Trusteeship in respect to the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, and in September 1991 both the FSM and the Marshalls were admitted to the United Nations. In May 1992 the Marshalls became the 161st member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 157th member of the World Bank. Regionally, the Republic belongs to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Pacific Community, and the Pacific Islands Forum. Following independence, the Marshalls joined a number of Pacific neighbors in attempting to attract investors by the sale of passports to Asians. By mid-1996 the practice was officially suspended in the wake of complaints by allegedly disadvantaged Marshallese businessmen and objections by the U.S. State Department on the impact of such sales on the Compact provision granting islanders the right of entry into the United States. Because of

447

the problem, Washington initiated a policy late in the year of denying entry to passport holders whose places of birth were other than the Marshalls. In November 1998 the Marshalls established diplomatic relations with Taiwan, hoping thereby to attract both trade and investment. Already linked to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the government hoped that a “two-Chinas” policy might be possible; however, the PRC, saying that the Marshalls “must correct their mistake,” severed relations three weeks later.

Current Issues The revised Compact of Free Association covering 2003–2023 provides for some $960 million in grants, an annual contribution of $7 million toward a trust fund, and services to be provided by various U.S. agencies, including the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Office of Disaster Assistance. In 2005 concern was expressed over the adequacy of the trust fund upon the expiration of grant assistance in 2023. The response from Washington was that income from the trust fund was never intended to match the level of grant support. An indication of the country’s economic difficulty surfaced in February 2006, when the minister of finance announced a suspension of disbursement from the government’s general fund because of a shortfall between spending and revenue from tax collection. In April 2006, the government supported a lawsuit by residents of Bikini against the United States for nonpayment of a 2001 award of $560 million by the Marshall Islands Nuclear Claims Tribunal.

Political Parties Traditionally there were no formal parties in the Marshalls. In the 1991 balloting, however, an Our Islands “presidential caucus” chaired by Amata Kabua defeated a Ralik-Ratak Democratic Party organized by Tony Debrum, a former Kabua prot´eg´e.

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MARSHALL ISLANDS

Cabinet As of July 1, 2006 President

Kessai H. Note

Ministers Assistance to the President Education Finance Foreign Affairs and Trade Health and Environment Internal Affairs Justice Public Works Resources and Development Transportation and Communications

Witten Philippo Wilfred I. Kendall Brenson S. Wase Gerald M. Zackios Alvin Jacklick Nidel L. Lora Donald Capelle Rien R. Morris John M. Silk Michael Konelios

United Democratic Party (UDP). The main opposition grouping prior to the legislative poll of November 1999, the UDP supported the presidential candidacy of Kessai Note. Leaders: Kessai H. NOTE (President of the Republic), Litokwa TOMEING (Chair).

electoral districts. In the most recent election of November 17, 2003, the United Democratic Party won 20 seats and the Ailen Kein Ad, 13. Speaker: Litokwa TOMEING.

Our Islands (Ailin Kein Ad—AKA). An outgrowth of the earlier Our Islands caucus, the AKA was formally launched in 2002. Leader: Justin DEBRUM (2004 presidential candidate).

Communications

Legislature Technically, a bicameral system prevails, although only the lower house engages in normal legislative activity. Council of Chiefs (Council of Iroij). The council encompasses 12 traditional leaders who tender advice on matters affecting customary law and practice. Chair: Iroij Kotak LOEAK. House of Representatives (Nitijela). The Nitijela is comprised of 33 members (called senators) directly elected for four-year terms from 24

Press There is a weekly Marshall Islands Journal (3,700), which has been self-deprecatingly dubbed “the world’s worst newspaper,” as well as an official Marshall Islands Gazette, both issued on Majuro; the Kwajalein Hourglass (2,000) is published twice weekly on Kwajalein.

Broadcasting and Computing Radio Marshalls (WSZO) broadcasts from Majuro. Subscription-only TV service is provided by the Marshall Islands Broadcasting Corporation. In addition, the U.S. Department of Defense offers radio and television programming for its personnel on Kwajalein Island. There were some 5,000 personal computers serving 1,400 Internet users in 2003.

MARSHALL ISLANDS

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. Banny DeBRUM U.S. Ambassador to the Marshall Islands Greta N. MORRIS

Permanent Representative to the UN Alfred CAPELLE IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, Interpol, PC, PIF

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F E D E R AT E D S TAT E S O F MICRONESIA

The Country The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), with, at their western extremity, the Republic of Palau, occupy the archipelago of the Caroline Islands, some 300 miles to the east of the Philippines. The constituent states are the island groups (from west to east) of Yap, Chuuk (formerly Truk), Pohnpei (formerly Ponape), and Kosrae, each of which has its own indigenous language, with English as the official language of the Federation. Most inhabitants of the more than 600 islands are of either Micronesian or Polynesian extraction. Roman Catholicism predominates among the largely Christian population. Subsistence farming and fishing are the principal economic activities, with tourism of increasing importance. GNP per capita was reported to have declined by 1.4 percent in real terms during 1990–1999. It rose by 8.4 percent in 2000 but declined steadily thereafter to −3.8 percent in 2004 because of reductions in Compact assistance and a disastrous typhoon in April 2004. More than half of the tax-paying wage earners are government employees, with most of the remainder dependent on spending by either government or government workers.

Government and Politics Political Background Purchased by Germany from Spain in 1899, the Carolines were seized in 1914 by Japan and retained as part of the mandate awarded by the League of Nations in 1920. The islands were occupied by U.S. forces in World War II and (along with the Marshall and Northern Mariana Islands) became part of the U.S. Trust Territory of the

Pacific in 1947. In 1965 a Congress of Micronesia was established, with the Carolines electing 14 of the 21 members of its House of Representatives. Following acceptance of a 1975 covenant authorizing creation of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the remaining components of the Trust Territory were regrouped into six districts, four of which in July 1978 approved a constitution of the FSM that became effective on May 10, 1979. In October 1982 the FSM concluded a Compact of Free Association with the United States, which was declared to be in effect on November 3, 1986, following ratification by the U.S. Congress and final approval by the FSM government. Under the Compact, the FSM is a fully sovereign entity, save

F E D E R AT E D S TAT E S O F M I C R O N E S I A

Political Status: Sovereign state in free association with the United States (which retains authority with regard to defense) since October 21, 1986. Land Area: 271 sq. mi. (701 sq. km.). Population: 107,008 (2000C); 109,000 (2005E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): PALIKIR (Pohnpei, 6,600), Weno (Chuuk, 12,300), Kitti (Pohnpei, 6,800), Nett (Pohnpei, 6,300), Kolonia (Pohnpei, 5,000). Official Language: English. The principal native languages are Kosrean, Pohnpeian, Trukese, and Yapese. Monetary Unit: U.S. Dollar. President: Joseph J. URUSEMAL; elected by the Congress on May 10, 2003, and sworn in on July 14 for a four-year term succeeding Leo A. FALCAM. Vice President: Redley KILLION; elected on May 12, 1999, for a term concurrent with that of the former President; elected to a second term on May 10, 2003, and sworn in on July 14.

with regard to defense, which was to remain a U.S. responsibility for a minimum of 15 years; it is also obligated to “consult” with Washington on major foreign policy matters. On May 15, 1987, John R. HAGLELGAM was sworn in as the FSM’s second president, succeeding Tosiwo NAKAYAMA. Haglelgam was unable to stand for a second term because of his failure to secure reelection to the Congress on March 5, 1991, and on May 11 Bailey OLTER, formerly vice president under Nakayama, was elected his successor. Olter was elected to a second term on May 11, 1995. In November 1996 the Congress ruled that President Olter, who had recently suffered a stroke, was unable to fulfill his responsibilities and directed Vice President Jacob NENA to serve as acting president. Subsequently, it was determined that Olter would be unable to return to office, and on May 8, 1997, Nena was formally installed for the balance of his four-year mandate. Olter died in February 1999. At the election of May 12, 1999, Vice President Leo A. FALCAM was elected to the presidency by

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the Congress, all 14 members of whom had been returned to office at nationwide balloting on March 2. However, both President Falcam and former president Nena lost their seats at the full legislative replenishment of March 4, 2003, and on May 10 the Congress elected Joseph J. URUSEMAL as chief executive. Following a two-year extension of the 1986 Compact, a successor was signed on May 1, 2003, and approved by the U.S. Congress in November. The new Compact calls for annual grants of $76.2 million, in addition to $16 million annually for a Micronesian trust fund.

Constitution and Government The 1979 constitution provides for a unicameral Congress of 14 members, referred to as senators. One senator is elected from each state for a fouryear term, while the others are elected for two-year terms from single-member districts delineated on a population basis. The president and vice president, who serve four-year terms, are selected by the Congress from among the four-year senators, the vacated seats being refilled by special election. The individual states have elected governors and legislatures, the latter encompassing a bicameral body of 38 members for Chuuk (a 10-member Senate and a 28-member House of Representatives) and unicameral bodies of 27, 14, and 10 members, respectively, for Pohnpei, Kosrae, and Yap. The state officials serve for four years, save that legislative terms on Chuuk and Pohnpei are staggered. Municipalities are governed by elected magistrates and councils, while villages follow traditional forms of rule. State

Area (sq. mi.)

Population (2005E)

Chuuk Kosrae Pohnpei Yap

45.6 42.3 132.4 46.7

53,800 8,000 35,200 11,300

In late 2000 local voters overwhelmingly endorsed creation of a fifth state, Faichuk, encompassing eight islands, with a population of about

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F E D E R AT E D S TAT E S O F M I C R O N E S I A

Cabinet As of July 1, 2006 President Vice President

Joseph J. Urusemal Redley Killion

Secretaries Economic Affairs Finance and Administration Foreign Affairs Health, Education, and Social Services Justice Transportation, Communications, and Infrastructure Postmaster-General Public Defender

Akillino Susaia Nick L. Andon Sebastian L. Anefal Nena S. Nena Marstella E. Jack [f] Andrew Yatilman General Bethwel Henry Beautean Carl Worswick [f]

[f] = female

20,000, that currently constitute part of Chuuk. However, no further action had been taken in the matter by early 2006.

Foreign Relations As in the case of the Marshall Islands, FSM’s political autonomy is seemingly constricted by the U.S. retention of authority in defense matters and its right of “consultation” in foreign affairs. Nevertheless, the FSM parted company with both Majuro and Washington in endorsing the Treaty of Rarotonga that called for the establishment of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ). Like its neighbor, it is a member of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Pacific Community, and the Pacific Islands Forum. In December 1990 the UN Security Council formally abrogated the U.S. Trusteeship with respect to the Federated States, the Northern Marianas, and the Marshall Islands, and in September 1991 both the Marshalls and the FSM were admitted to the United Nations. In June 1993 the FSM was admitted to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

Current Issues A leading issue in recent years has been the alleged political “dominance” of Chuuk (Truk), which holds nearly half of the FSM congressional seats. The controversy was reportedly a precipitant of impeachment proceedings against Chuuk Governor Gideon DOONE in 1989 that involved a variety of charges, including misuse of government funds. The governor was eventually acquitted of the charges in January 1990, but more than a decade later, the state’s status remained at issue, as evidenced by support from Chuuk’s Faichuk region for separation as a fifth state. In early 2004 President Urusemal petitioned the Supreme Court to intervene in a dispute with Congress over the attempted disqualification of a judge who was to hear a case involving 14 individuals from Chuuk. Those indicted (including three legislators) had been accused of money laundering and other financial irregularities. The immediate result was the introduction of a bill that would grant amnesty to anyone accused of the misuse of public funds during the preceding 17 years. Nonetheless, in late August one of the accused, former House Speaker Jack S. FRITZ, was obliged to resign his

F E D E R AT E D S TAT E S O F M I C R O N E S I A

seat after being convicted of fraud and the theft of government funds. In another intragovernmental dispute, the FSM Supreme Court in June 2006 upheld the president’s request to dismiss a congressional lawsuit that questioned certain aspects of his veto power.

Political Parties There are, at present, no formal parties in the FSM, political activity tending to center on regional (state) alignments.

Legislature The FSM Congress is a 14-member body, 4 of whose members are elected on a statewide basis for four-year terms, while 10 are selected on a population/district basis for two-year terms. The last full election was on March 4, 2003; elections for the 10 two-year seats were most recently held on March 8, 2005, at which 8 incumbents were reelected, with 2 members from Chuuk newly elected. Speaker: Peter M. CHRISTIAN.

Communications

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monthly; there is also a Chuuk News Chronicle and a Micronesia Focus, both published in Pohnpei, and a bimonthly Island Tribune that began publication in late 1997. In March 1997, the FSM Congress called for deportation of Canadian-born Sherry O’SULLIVAN, the editor since 1994 of the independent monthly, FSM News, on the ground that she had disregarded “local customs, traditions, and culture” by publishing accounts of “widespread bribery” and other malpractices at election time.

Broadcasting and Computing There is a radio station on each of the four principal islands that broadcasts in English and the local language; there are also television stations on Chuuk, Pohnpei, and Yap. There were approximately 31,000 television receivers and 7,000 Internet users in 2003.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. Jesse B. MAREHALAU U.S. Ambassador to the Federated States of Micronesia Suzanne HALE

Press

Permanent Representative to the UN Masao NAKAYAMA

The National Union (5,000) is a governmentsponsored information bulletin that appears twice-

IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, PC, PIF

MONGOLIA Monggol Ulus

The Country Traditionally known as Outer Mongolia (i.e., that portion of historic Mongolia lying north of the Gobi Desert), the present country of Mongolia occupies a vast area of steppe, mountain, and desert between the Russian Federation on the north and the People’s Republic of China on the south. Khalkha Mongols make up 82 percent of the population. The remainder are other Mongol groups (often speaking their own dialects); Turkic-speaking peoples; and Chinese, Russian, and Tungusic minorities. Until 1989 the state restricted religious functions, although guaranteeing freedom of religion. Lamaist Buddhism is the prevalent faith, practiced by an estimated 40 percent of the population, even though its leadership was largely wiped out by antireligious activity in 1937–1939 and over 700 monasteries were destroyed. Islam is practiced by the small Kazakh minority (4 percent), and there are also small numbers of Christians and shamanists. Some 47 percent of the labor force is female, but women constitute only 5 percent of the legislators elected in 2004. The Mongolian economy has traditionally been pastoral, and agriculture, especially animal husbandry, continues to account for one-fifth of GDP while employing about two-fifths of the domestic labor force. Moreover, manufacturing is largely devoted to processing agricultural products into such goods as cashmere, leather, clothing, and carpets. Equally important are ore extraction and processing, chiefly of copper and gold, which together typically account for at least half of the country’s export earnings. One of the world’s largest copper-

molybdenum facilities, built largely with Soviet assistance in the 1970s, is located in Erdenet, while production at the massive Oyu Tolgoi copper-gold mine is expected to begin in 2007 (see Current issues, below). Other mineral resources include fluorspar, coal, tungsten, and recently discovered petroleum deposits; extraction of crude from the Tamsig basin began in 1997. The services sector accounts for slightly more than half of GDP and employs about half of the labor force. For decades Mongolia relied heavily on Soviet aid, and the breakup of the Soviet Union precipitated a severe economic crisis in the first

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Political Status: Independent since 1921; Communist People’s Republic established November 26, 1924; multiparty system introduced by constitutional amendment of May 11, 1990; current constitution adopted January 13, 1992, with effect from February 12. Area: 604,247 sq. mi. (1,565,000 sq. km.). Population: 2,373,493 (2000C); 2,616,000 (2005E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): ULAANBAATAR (Ulan Bator, 936,000), Erdenet (82,000), Darhan (64,000), Choybalsan (40,000). Monetary Unit: Tugrik (market rate July 1, 2006: 1,172 tugriks = $1US). Official Language: Khalkha Mongol. President: Nambaryn ENKHBAYAR (Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party); popularly elected for a four-year term on May 22, 2005, and sworn in on June 24, succeeding Natsagiyn BAGABANDI (Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party). Prime Minister: Miyeegombo ENKHBOLD (Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party); endorsed by the president and elected by the State Great Hural on January 25, 2006, succeeding Tsakhiagiyn ELBEGDORJ (Democratic Party), whose government had been dissolved by the legislature on January 13.

half of the 1990s. Industrial production and GDP dropped, inflation soared into the triple digits, and trade with Russia declined drastically. At the same time, Mongolia began privatizing state-owned enterprises while seeking new trading partners. Financial assistance from the West and international institutions helped support a subsequent economic recovery, with annual GDP growth averaging over 3 percent in 1996–1998. Despite adverse world prices for key export commodities, growth for 1999 stood at 3.2 percent before falling to 1.1 percent in 2000–2001, largely as a consequence of adverse weather. For 2002 the government reported 4.0 percent growth; for 2003, 5.6 percent. An official estimate of 10.6 percent growth in 2004 reflected high world prices for copper and gold and renewed vigor

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in livestock production, which had been devastated by the harsh winter of 2000–2001. Private companies and joint enterprises now account for most industrial output. However, the benefits of recent economic reforms have markedly increased social inequality despite declining unemployment (down to 3.6 percent in 2004, compared with 7.5 percent in 1997). According to World Bank calculations, per capita income in 2003 was only $480, and more than one-third of the population lives below the national poverty line.

Government and Politics Political Background The home of such legendary figures as Genghis Khan and Tamerlane, Mongolia fell under Chinese control in the 17th century and continued under Chinese suzerainty for over 200 years. The fall of the Manchu dynasty resulted in a brief period of independence from 1911 until 1919, when Chinese hegemony was reestablished. Two years later Mongolian revolutionary leaders Sukhe BATOR and Horloogiyn CHOYBALSAN (Khorloin CHOIBALSAN) defeated the Chinese with Soviet assistance and established permanent independence. Initially, a constitutional monarchy was created under Jebtsun Damba KHUTUKHTU, but following his death in 1924 the Mongolian People’s Party (founded in 1921) was renamed the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP), and the Mongolian People’s Republic (MPR) was proclaimed as the first Communist state outside the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Rightist influences, including a major revolt in 1932, were suppressed, and Choybalsan gained the ascendancy in 1934–1939, continuing to dominate both party and government until his death in 1952. Yumjaagiyn TSEDENBAL was named chair of the Council of Ministers in 1952 and, after a twoyear period of apparent political eclipse, succeeded Dashiyn DAMBA as MPRP first secretary in 1958. In addition, in 1974 he was named chair of the Presidium of the People’s Great Hural. In August

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1984 Tsedenbal was relieved of his government and party posts, reportedly because of failing ¨ health, with Jambyn BATMONH being named MPRP secretary general. Upon designation as Presidium chair in December, Batm¨onh relinquished the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers to Dumajiyn SODNOM. Both were reconfirmed following the 19th MPRP Congress in May 1986. In obvious response to the unprecedented pace of political change in Eastern Europe, the regime in December 1989 permitted the organization of an opposition Mongolian Democratic Union (MDU), which mounted a series of demonstrations calling for political and economic reforms as well as the return from Moscow of Tsedenbal to stand trial for “Stalinist crimes.” The government responded with an announcement that a new constitution was being drafted that would deny the MPRP monopoly status. In mid-February 1990 some 300 MDU adherents organized the Mongolian Democratic Party (MDP), which was tacitly recognized by the transmittal of a greeting from MPRP General Secretary Batm¨onh to its initial congress. A number of other opposition groups also emerged. At an MPRP Central Committee plenum on March 12–14, 1990, the entire Politburo was replaced, with Gombojavyn OCHIRBAT succeeding Batm¨onh as party leader. Subsequently, at a March 21–23 session of the People’s Great Hural, the minister of foreign economic relations, Punsalmaagiyn OCHIRBAT (no relation to the party leader), was named to succeed Batm¨onh as head of state, with deputy premier Sharavyn GUNGAADORJ replacing Sodnom as chair of the Council of Ministers. Significantly, neither was a member of the MPRP top leadership. On May 10–11, 1990, the Great Hural approved constitutional amendments that formally abandoned the one-party system and provided for a proportionally elected standing body (Little Hural) to complement the existing legislature. At the ensuing election in July–August the MPRP won approximately four-fifths of the seats in the Great Hural (and nearly two-thirds of those in the Little Hural), but, in a first for Mongolia, a three-party

opposition “Coalition of Democratic Forces” also won representation. On September 3 the Great Hural named Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat to the new post of state president and elected Radnaas¨umbereliyn GONCHIGDORJ of the recently organized Mongolian Social Democratic Party (MSDP) as state vice president and chair of the Little Hural. Seven ¨ days later Dashiyn BYAMBASUREN succeeded Gungaadorj as chief of government (now termed prime minister) and on the following day named a “coalition” government that did not, however, include representatives of the MDP. Under a new constitution, balloting for a reinstituted unicameral legislature took place on June 28, 1992, with the MPRP capturing 71 of 76 seats even though opposition parties won 40 percent of the vote. On July 21 the Great Hural elected a freemarket economist, Puntsagiyn JASRAY, as prime minister, and on August 21 an all-MPRP administration was announced. On April 10, 1993, a special congress of the ruling MPRP refused to nominate President Ochirbat for popular reelection, selecting instead Lodongiyn ¨ TUDEV, editor of the party newspaper Unen. As a result, Ochirbat agreed to stand as joint candidate of the MSDP and the Mongolian National Democratic Party (MNDP), and on June 6 he retained the presidency, winning 57.8 percent of the vote. The legislative poll of June 30, 1996, marked the end of more than seven decades of communist rule as a recently organized Democratic Union (DU), led by the MNDP and the MSDP, defeated the MPRP by an unexpected two-to-one margin. Thirty days later the coalition’s leader, Mendsaikhan ENKHSAIKHAN, formed a new government. However, the MPRP quickly regained a dominant position in the provincial and municipal elections of October 1996. Moreover, the MPRP’s Natsagiyn BAGABANDI overwhelmed incumbent president Ochirbat, the DU nominee, by 60.8 percent to 29.8 percent in the presidential balloting of May 18, 1997. On January 15, 1998, the Great Hural approved a measure that would permit its members to serve concurrently as government ministers. On April 16 the governing organs of the MNDP and MSDP,

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preferring a government more closely tied to the national legislature, both recommended that the DU chair, Tsakhiagiyn ELBEGDORJ of the MNDP, assume the prime ministership, leading Prime Minister Enkhsaikhan to tender his resignation the next day. Following formal acceptance of the resignation by President Bagabandi and the Great Hural, on April 23 Elbegdorj won the endorsement of the legislature by a vote of 61–5. For more than a month, however, parliamentary infighting led to rejection of several ministerial nominees, with the cabinet that was ultimately assembled consisting entirely of legislators. In late May 1998 the MPRP precipitated a parliamentary crisis when its delegation began a boycott of the Great Hural following approval (subsequently rescinded) of a merger involving the bankrupt public Renovation Bank with a private bank. With the legislative process paralyzed by the boycott, on July 24 the Great Hural passed a noconfidence motion 42–33, the prime minister thereupon resigning a scant three months after taking office. With the Elbegdorj cabinet staying on as caretakers, the DU leadership and the MPRP’s Bagabandi were soon at loggerheads. The president repeatedly rejected the coalition’s nominee for prime minister, Davaadorgjiyn GANBOLD of the MNDP, on the grounds that his role as chair of the legislature’s economic policy committee made him largely responsible for the abortive banking merger. On August 31, 1998, the president accepted DU nominee Rinchinnyamiin AMARJARGAL, the outgoing minister of foreign affairs, but on September 2 the Great Hural defeated the nomination 36–35. Before the end of the month the president had rejected two additional nominees, while on October 2 the country was deeply shaken when an apparent MNDP compromise candidate, Sanjaas¨urengiyn ZORIG, who had been a principal leader of the prodemocracy movement in 1989– 1990, was killed in his home. The political stalemate continued, with Ganbold again being rejected by the president for a sixth and a seventh time, and the DU refusing to nominate any of six potential candidates deemed acceptable by Bagabandi.

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On November 24, 1998, the Constitutional Court ruled for the second time in less than a month that the constitution prohibited members of the Great Hural from serving as prime minister or in the cabinet. The decision apparently helped break the impasse, and on December 9, having received the imprimatur of both the DU and the president, Janlaviin NARANTSATSRALT, the mayor of Ulaanbaatar, was confirmed as prime minister by a 36–21 vote of the Great Hural. The prime minister faced immediate difficulty in forming a cabinet, with the Great Hural rejecting the majority of his initial nominees and withholding approval of the final four until mid-January 1999. Barely six months later, Narantsatsralt lost the support of the entire MNDP-dominated cabinet, which threatened to resign and accused him of jeopardizing national interests in a letter he had sent, without prior ministerial consultation, to a Russian official regarding terms for the sale of Russia’s share in the Erdenet copper-molybdenum joint venture. Having lost a legislative no-confidence vote 41–22 on July 23, Narantsatsralt tendered his resignation the following day and was succeeded in an acting capacity by Foreign Minister Nyamosor TUYA. (Narantsatsralt subsequently attributed his loss of support to political undercurrents, including his efforts to expose corruption and to push forward the investigation of the unsolved Zorig murder.) On July 30 the State Great Hural gave swift approval, this time, to President Bagabandi’s prime ministerial nominee, Rinchinnyamiin Amarjargal, who resigned from the legislature and immediately won confirmation by a vote of 50–2. The cabinet approved on September 2 was substantially unchanged from its predecessor. On January 2, 2000, President Bagabandi vetoed a series of proposed constitutional changes that he described as unnecessary and hasty, including a renewed effort that would have permitted legislators to serve as government ministers. On March 15 a panel of the Constitutional Court ruled that the proposed amendments violated the constitution, although a number of parliamentarians argued that the court did not have authority to review the content of such amendments.

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With the electorate searching for a measure of stability and firmer leadership, at the general election of July 2, 2000, the MPRP swept back into power, capturing 72 of the 76 seats in the State Great Hural. The sole MNDP seat was won by former prime minister Narantsatsralt, while the MSDP, running on its own, won none. Nambaryn ENKHBAYAR, chair of the MPRP and a member of the State Great Hural, was confirmed as prime minister on July 26, and an MPRP cabinet won legislative approval on August 9. The legitimacy of Enkhbayar’s appointment was ultimately resolved in May 2001, when President Bagabandi finally accepted constitutional amendments permitting legislators to serve as cabinet members. President Bagabandi won a second term in office at the election of May 20, 2001, taking 58.0 percent of the vote. His chief opponent, Radnaas¨umbereliyn Gonchigdorj (36.6 percent), stood as the candidate of the Democratic Party (DP), which had been formed the preceding December by merger of the MNDP, the MSDP, and three smaller parties. Looking toward the next State Great Hural election, in 2003 the principal opposition parties discussed working in concert to defeat the MPRP. As a result, in June 2003 the DP and the Motherland– Mongolian Democratic New Socialist Party (M-MDNSP), led by gold magnate Badarchiin ERDENEBAT, formed the Motherland Democratic Coalition (MDC), which was joined by the Civil Will Republican Party (CWRP) in March 2004. At the June 27 balloting the attempt to avoid dividing the opposition vote succeeded, and the MDC won 34 seats, only 2 less than the MPRP. With neither group able to claim a majority in the 76-seat legislature, protracted negotiations on formation of a new government ensued. On August 13 the legislators unanimously elected the outgoing prime minister, Nambaryn Enkhbayar, as chair of the State Great Hural, and on August 20 former prime minister Tsakhiagiyn Elbegdorj of the DP/MDC won legislative endorsement to reassume the office he had occupied in April–December 1998. It took another month for the MPRP and MDC to reach agreement on an equal division of

cabinet posts, with a “Grand Coalition Government” then being sworn in on September 28. Late in December, however, the M-MDNSP withdrew from the MDC, which soon led to the dissolution of the MDC and to the February 2005 dismissal from the government of the two M-MDNSP ministers. With President Bagabandi prohibited from seeking a third term, the MPRP nominated former prime minister Nambaryn Enkhbayar as its candidate for the May 22, 2005, presidential election. In a field of four candidates, Enkhbayar won 53.4 percent of the vote; his closest competitor, former prime minister Mendsaikhan Enkhsaikhan of the DP, won 19.7 percent. On January 11, 2006, Prime Minister Elbegdorj’s coalition cabinet was crippled by the decision of all ten MPRP ministers to resign, and two days later the State Great Hural voted to dissolve the government. Four key votes in favor of dissolution were cast by members of the DP, including Enkhsaikhan, former prime minister Janlaviin Narantsatsralt, and Mishigiyn SONOMPIL. An effort by the MPRP to forge a “national unity” government was rebuffed by the DP, although Enkhsaikhan, Narantsatsralt, and Sonompil all accepted posts in the new cabinet of MPRP Chair Miyeegombo ENKHBOLD, who was confirmed as prime minister by the legislature on January 25.

Constitution and Government The constitution adopted in 1960 left intact the guiding role of the MPRP, whose highly centralized leadership also dominated the state administration. The national legislature (People’s Great Hural) was identified as the supreme organ of government but typically met only for a brief annual session to approve measures submitted by the Council of Ministers. The Presidium of the Hural represented the legislature between sessions, and its chair served as head of state. In March–May 1990 a number of constitutional changes were debated and approved, including renunciation of the “guiding role” of the MPRP in favor of a multiparty system, conversion of the Presidium chairmanship into a state presidency, and

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the creation of a vice presidency. Selected by the Great Hural, the vice president was to serve as ex officio chair of a new standing assembly (Little Hural). The current constitution, adopted on January 13, 1992, returned legislative power to a single chamber, the State Great Hural, whose 76 members are elected by universal suffrage for four-year terms. Its powers include appointing and dismissing the prime minister and other administrative officials. A popularly elected president serves as head of state for a four-year term; should no presidential candidate receive a majority of the votes cast, a two-way runoff is held. The president can veto legislative decisions (subject to override by a twothirds majority), nominates the prime minister in consultation with the largest legislative party, and serves as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. A Supreme Court sits at the apex of the judicial system, while a Constitutional Court is charged with ensuring the “strict observance” of the basic law and with resolving constitutional disputes. Mongolia is divided into 21 provinces (aymguud or aimags), each subdivided into counties and baghs, plus the capital city of Ulaanbaatar, subdivided into districts and horoos. At the provincial and capital level the prime minister appoints governors (dzasag darga) nominated by elected hurals. Each county (soum) and district (khoron) also elects a hural, while “General Meetings of Citizens” function at the lowest administrative tier. A local governor is nominated by each subdivision’s legislative body and appointed by the governor of the next highest level. The possibility of regrouping the existing aimags into 4 provinces has been under discussion.

Foreign Relations Although Mongolia attempted to take a neutral stance in the early period of the Sino-Soviet dispute, it subsequently aligned itself with the Soviet Union, in part because of an inherited fear of Chinese hegemony and in part because of a dependence on Soviet military, economic, and cultural assistance. A member of the UN since 1961,

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it became a full member of the Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in 1962 and signed a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance with the USSR in 1966. Relations with China began to thaw in 1985; a consular treaty signed the following year was the first since 1949. In March 1989 Moscow announced that it would begin withdrawing its reported 50,000 troops from Mongolia, a process completed in September 1992. President Ochirbat visited Russia in January 1993 for talks with President Boris Yeltsin that yielded a treaty of friendship and cooperation, under which the two countries agreed to refrain from entering into military-political alliances aimed against each other. A similar treaty (replacing a 1960 predecessor) was concluded with China during an official visit by Chinese Premier Li Peng in April 1994. Earlier in the year Mongolia, China, and Russia signed a tripartite pact defining their border junctures. In December 1998, during a visit by President Bagabandi to China, Beijing reiterated its support for Mongolia’s independence, sovereignty, and nuclear-free status and its right to choose its own path toward development. At the same time, Mongolia has become increasingly wary of China’s growing economic power, which already dominates Mongolia’s cashmere industry. Diplomatic relations with the United States were not established until 1987. In January 1991 President Ochirbat became the first Mongolian head of state to travel to the United States, where he met with President George H. W. Bush and signed a bilateral trade agreement. In February Mongolia’s international contacts were further broadened by the country’s admission to the Asian Development Bank and to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. In July U.S. Secretary of State James Baker visited Ulaanbaatar and in the first address by a Western politician to the Mongolian parliament promised international aid in support of economic liberalization. More recently, Mongolia has actively pursued a “third neighbor” policy intended to develop strong international relationships with countries other than Russia and China, including the United

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States. Mongolia has frequently been in accord with Washington on foreign policy matters, including the “war on terrorism,” the October 2001 intervention in Afghanistan, and the 2003 ouster of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. Visits by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in October 2005 and U.S. President George W. Bush (the first sitting U.S. chief executive to do so) a month later included praise for Mongolia’s continuing commitment. As of June 2006 Mongolia had some 160 troops serving in Iraq.

Current Issues The success of the MDC at the polls in June 2004 can largely be attributed to a mathematical lesson learned by the opposition parties at the 2000 election: When they split the anti-MPRP vote by competing against each other in district after district, only the MPRP benefited. Accordingly, the MDC’s constituent parties collectively offered a single candidate in each district in 2004 and thereby became a viable alternative. The MDC also took advantage of lax residency rules by busing voters into swing districts, a legal but controversial tactic that apparently caught the MPRP by surprise and may have helped the opposition overcome being outspent tento-one on media advertising. The MPRP also accused the MDC of buying votes with gifts but, according to many observers, had itself committed egregious electoral violations, including using state employees and resources to advance its cause. The outcome of the 2005 presidential election was more definitive and less controversial. The three opposition candidates criticized the General Election Committee’s performance, but the electorate clearly favored the MPRP’s Enkhbayar. Moreover, the demise of the MDC and factionalism within the DP had once again led much of the public to conclude that the MPRP offered the best prospect for improved governance. Although the five-party Enkhbold cabinet sworn in on January 28, 2006, had the trappings of a “national unity” government, the MPRP did not have support from the DP leadership, which resented the calculated departure of the MPRP ministers from,

and the consequent collapse of, the Elbegdorj government. The ostensible reason for the ministers’ withdrawal was the government’s lackluster economic performance, but the MPRP, having gained a clear advantage in the legislature following the breakup of the MDC, saw no reason to continue sharing power on an equal footing with the DP. In addition to the three maverick DP ministers, who were subsequently expelled from their party, the unity government included the leaders of three small parties: Badarchiin Erdenebat’s Motherland Party (the renamed M-MDNSP); the Republican Party of Bazarsadiin JARGALSAIKHAN; and the new People’s Party, headed by former DP deputy ¨ chair Lamjaviin GUNDALAI. As one of its first acts the Enkhbold government won parliamentary concurrence in a 30 percent raise for civil servants. Priority was also given to increasing financial support for war veterans and families with children. In May 2003 a controversial land privatization law entered into effect, ending the state monopoly on land ownership. Some 30 million acres were designated for private industrial, agricultural, and residential use. The privatization plan not only ran counter to decades of communist policy but also marked a break from Mongolia’s nomadic tradition. Pastureland was excluded from the scheme, which involves only a small fraction of the country’s area, but some critics expressed fear that powerful economic interests could find ways to abuse the program. In June 2005, with only about 40 percent of those eligible for free residential plots having taken advantage of the offer, the deadline for applying was extended to 2008. Meanwhile, Mongolia continues to seek foreign investment for developing its industrial capacity. A debate continues over how best to exploit the country’s mineral wealth, particularly the Oyu Tolgoi (“Turquoise Hill”) copper-gold deposit, which may be the world’s richest. Discovered in 2001 by the Canadian corporation Ivanhoe Mines, which currently owns 100 percent of the concession, the Oyu Tolgoi project may have the potential to boost Mongolia’s GDP by one-third and create tens of thousands of jobs. Some have advocated revising the country’s 1997 mining law, which permits

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full foreign ownership and full repatriation of profits, and renegotiating “stability agreements,” which limit tax liabilities for existing foreign-run operations. The government would also like to increase value-added investment, building smelters and other downstream ventures that would reduce the export of raw or minimally processed ore.

Political Parties Until 1990 the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) was the country’s only authorized political formation. On March 23, 1990, the People’s Great Hural ended the party’s monopoly, and in June 1996 the MPRP lost to the Democratic Union—DU (Ardchilsan Kholboo, also translated as the Democratic Alliance), a loose four-party coalition of the Mongolian National Democratic Party (MNDP), the Mongolian Social Democratic Party (MSDP), the Mongolian Religious Democratic Party (MRDP), and the Mongolian Green Party (MGP), each of which backed its own candidates. The DU failed to capture the presidency in 1997 despite nominating the incumbent, Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat, formerly of the MPRP. As of March 2000, Mongolia had 24 registered parties. Thirteen individual parties, 2 two-party coalitions, and 1 three-party coalition contested the July 2000 general election, which overwhelmingly returned the MPRP to power. Prior to provincial and local elections held three months later, a significant coalescence of forces occurred. The MPRP’s principal opponents were a six-party Coalition of Democratic Forces (the “Big Six”), led by the MNDP and the MSDP, and another eightparty grouping led by the Civil Will Party (CWP) and the Mongolian Republican Party (MRP). In December 2000 the MNDP and MSDP led the formation of a new Democratic Party (DP), while the CWP and the MRP merged in February 2002 as the Civil Will Republican Party (CWRP). In December 2003, however, the merger fell apart, primarily because most former Republicans wanted the CWRP to adopt the role of a “third force” in the upcoming national election and therefore objected to contesting the 2004 national election

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in alliance with the DP. In June the DP and the Motherland–Mongolian Democratic New Socialist Party (M-MDNSP) had announced formation of the Motherland Democratic Coalition—MDC (Ekh Oron Ardchilsan Evsel), which the CWRP ultimately decided to join. Thus, at the June 2004 election the MPRP, unlike in 2000, faced a unified front of the major opposition parties, which won 44.7 percent of the national vote and emerged with sufficient seats to demand a role in the new government. Five other parties ran candidates in the June parliamentary election: the rejuvenated Republican Party (RP) led a loose “third force” grouping that also included the MGP, the Mongolian Liberal Party (MLP), the Mongolian National Unity Party (MNUP), and the Mongolian United Heritage Party (MUHP). In December 2004 the M-MDNSP (renamed Motherland in 2005) withdrew from the MDC, which was disbanded on December 26. Only parliamentary parties may nominate candidates for the state presidency. Those offering candidates in 2005 were the DP, Motherland, the MPRP, and the RP. With the addition of the recently formed People’s Party (PP) in December 2005, Mongolia had 22 registered parties.

Presidential Party Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party— MPRP (Mongol Ardyn Khuv’sgalt Nam). For nearly seven decades the MPRP (known until 1924 as the Mongolian People’s Party—MPP) was organized along typical Communist lines, its tightly centralized structure nominally subject to party congresses meeting at five-year intervals. An elected Central Committee met twice yearly, and a Politburo and Secretariat served as principal policymaking bodies. At a Central Committee plenum in March 1990, the entire party leadership resigned in favor of a new Politburo and a Secretariat headed by Gombojavyn Ochirbat. An extraordinary party congress in April abolished the Politburo in favor of a Central Committee Presidium, with the incumbent general secretary redesignated as Presidium chair.

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Promising the “creative use of Marxist-Leninist methodology with the aim of building humane democratic socialism in Mongolia,” the MPRP secured more than 80 percent of Great Hural seats on the basis of a 60 percent vote share at the 1990 balloting. At the MPRP’s 20th congress in February 1991, Budragchaagiyn DASH-YONDON succeeded Ochirbat as the party’s Presidium chair, with all but one of the other Presidium members also being replaced. Further structural changes were introduced at a party plenum in October 1992: a 169-member Little Hural replaced the Central Committee and the Presidium’s functions were transferred to an 11-member Leadership Council headed by a general secretary. As a result of the constitutional amendments of 1992, President Punsalmaagiyn Ochirbat of the MPRP was obliged to face popular election, but the party declined to renominate him for the 1993 race, choosing instead Lodongiyn Tudev, editor of the party newspaper. President Ochirbat, while maintaining nominal MPRP membership, ran as a joint candidate of the MNDP and MSDP and won a new four-year term. At the 1996 election the MPRP’s legislative representation plummeted to 25 seats, a loss of 46 from its 1992 total. It elected Natsagiyn Bagabandi, former chair of the Great Hural, as the MPRP chair in February 1997 and subsequently nominated him as its presidential candidate. Bagabandi won a landslide victory on May 18, 1997, defeating President Ochirbat, who had formally resigned from the party to run as the Democratic Union candidate. On March 1, 1999, a contemporary Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) merged with the MPRP, although a number of party dissidents continued to claim the MPP name. The MPP had been launched in 1991, which later prevented the restructured MPRP from resuming its original name. At the July 2000 general election the MPRP reasserted its dominance, winning 72 seats in the State Great Hural. On July 17 the party’s ninth congress unanimously endorsed the party chair, Nambaryn Enkhbayar, for prime minister, and he won easy legislative confirmation on July 26. Following the local elections of October 2000, the MPRP controlled all 21 provincial legislatures.

In June 2004 the party won 46.5 percent of the national vote but lost half its seats in the State Great Hural. Shy of a legislative majority, the MPRP courted the three parliamentary independents but was unsuccessful and therefore entered into negotiations with the opposition MDC on formation of a coalition government. Ultimately, Prime Minister Enkhbayar agreed to step down and was elected chair of the legislature. At the October 2004 local elections the MPRP easily outdistanced the MDC, winning a reported 444 of 690 legislative seats in the provincial and Ulaanbaatar legislatures. In May 2005 Enkhbayar was elected president, succeeding Bagabandi, who had completed two terms in office. A month later, following Enkhbayar’s mandatory resignation as party chair, the MPRP elected Miyeegombo Enkhbold, mayor of Ulaanbaatar, as his successor. The collapse of the Elbegdorj government in January 2006 led to Enkhbold’s designation as prime minister. Leaders: Nambaryn ENKHBAYAR (President of Mongolia), Miyeegombo ENKHBOLD (Prime Minister), Tsendiin NYAMDORJ (Chair of the State Great Hural), Doloonjin IDEVKHTEN (Parliamentary Leader), Sanjaa BAYAR (General Secretary).

Other Parliamentary Parties Democratic Party—DP (Ardchilsan Nam). The DP was formed on December 6, 2000, by formal merger of the four parties indented below plus the Mongolian Social Democratic Party (MSDP, below), which was reregistered as a separate party in January 2005, and a faction of the Mongolian United Heritage Party (MUHP, below). In September 2000 the MNDP and the MSDP had agreed to the merger, and they were subsequently joined in their decision by other members of the “Big Six” coalition. Mongolian National Democratic Party— MNDP (Mongoliin Undeshii Ardchilsan Nam). The MNDP was formed on October 27, 1992, by merger of four opposition groups: the Mongolian Democratic Party (MDP) of Sanjaas¨urengiyn Zorig, the Mongolian Party of National Progress (MPNP), the Mongolian United

MONGOLIA

Party (MUP), and the Mongolian Renewal Party (MRP). The MDP was organized as the political arm of the Mongolian Democratic Union, an antiMPRP grouping formed in December 1989. Its stated aims were to work for democratization of the Mongolian political system and to promote diverse forms of property control, including private ownership. The MDP won 20 Great Hural and 13 Little Hural seats in 1990 but failed to obtain legislative representation in 1992. Originally launched as the political wing of the New Progressive Union, the MPNP called for a “speedy transition to a market economy” at its inaugural congress in May 1990. It won six Great Hural and three Little Hural seats at the July–August election. Like the MDP, it was unwilling to continue in an MPRP-led coalition administration after being shut out in the June 1992 legislative poll. The MUP was formed in early 1992 by merger of the Republican Party, the Free Labor Party, and a faction of the MDP. It won four Great Hural seats in 1992. The MRP was organized in 1991 by a reformist faction of the MPRP. The MNDP joined with the MSDP in supporting the reelection of President Ochirbat in June 1993. It won the majority of the DU’s 50 State Great Hural seats in 1996, but in 1998 disputes among the founding factions contributed to the lengthy governmental impasse that followed Prime Minister Elbegdorj’s resignation. A party conference on April 24–25, 1999, elected Prime Minister Narantsatsralt as president, but continuing factionalism contributed to his departure as prime minister three months later. Intraparty disputes erupted again in January 2000, when a number of members bolted to the new MDP (below). Narantsatsralt won the party’s only seat at the July 2000 election, which it contested as the DU in coalition with the Mongolian Religious Democratic Party (MRDP, below). Mongolian Religious Democratic Party (MRDP). The MRDP was a Buddhist party es-

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tablished in 1990. It participated in the DU in both the 1996 and 2000 elections and then, un¨ der the chairmanship of Ts. BAYARSUREN, decided to dissolve in favor of the DP. Mongolian Democratic Party (MDP). Tracing its routes to the MDP that participated in formation of the MNDP, this MDP was formed in January 2000 by 9 disaffected members of the MNDP, with an estimated 200 additional members of the parent party joining shortly thereafter. At that time the MDP’s ranks reportedly included several members of the Great Hural, none of whom retained a seat at the July election. A number of MDP dissidents objected to the 2000 merger into the DP and vowed to maintain the separate registration of the party. Mongolian Democratic Renewal Party (MDRP). Founded in 1994, the MDRP participated in formation of the unsuccessful Grand Coalition with the MUHP and the Party for Mongolia (PM; see CWP, below) for the July 2000 legislative election. It then joined the “Big Six” coalition for the October provincial and local elections before announcing its intention to join the DP. The DP was officially registered on December 26, 2000, under the chairmanship of the MNDP’s Dambyn DORLIGJAV, a former minister of defense. Its 2001 presidential candidate, former chair of the MSDP Radnaas¨umbereliyn Gonchigdorj, finished second, with 36.6 percent of the vote. In April 2002 differences emerged within the DP over the effectiveness of its leadership. Former prime minister Amarjargal, addressing the party’s National Consultative Council (NCC), called for the leadership to resign, but the NCC voted to retain Dorligjav as chair. He ultimately stepped down in January 2003. Meanwhile, State Great Hural member Lamjaviin G¨undalai had repeatedly disrupted legislative sessions to call attention to the MPRP’s alleged squelching of opposition opinion. He subsequently accused the minister of justice of secret links with a foreign power, presumably China, and was briefly detained in July 2003 after having been

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prevented from attending a conference in Singapore. At the June 2004 State Great Hural election the DP provided the majority of candidates running under the MDC banner and won 26 of the MDC’s 35 seats. The MDC and the MPRP then formed a coalition government led by the DP’s Tsakhiagiyn Elbegdorj. In late December, however, the MDC dissolved, shortly after the DP’s National Consultative Committee voted to overhaul the party’s leadership, which had been dominated by former prime minister Mendsaikhan Enkhsaikhan. He was replaced as chair by the party’s 2001 presidential candidate and former State Great Hural speaker, Radnaas¨umbereliyn Gonchigdorj. Enkhsaikhan nevertheless remained the party’s 2005 candidate for president; he finished second, winning 19.7 percent of the vote. Prime Minister Elbegdorj’s government was dismissed by the State Great Hural in January 2006. Four DP members, including Enkhsaikhan and former prime minister Janlaviin Narantsatsralt, cast the deciding votes against the government, and three of them subsequently defied party orders and accepted cabinet positions in the new MPRP-led government. As a result, Enkhsaikhan, Narantsatsralt, and Mishigiyn Sonompil were dismissed from the party. A party congress, which met March 30–April 1, 2006, elected former prime minister Elbegdorj over Erdeniin Bat-Uul as permanent chair. Leaders: Tsakhiagiyn ELBEGDORJ (Chair of the Party and Former Prime Minister), Radnaas¨umbereliyn GONCHIGDORJ (Former Chair), Erdeniin BAT-UUL, Sh. TUVDENDORJ (General Secretary). Motherland Party (Ekh Oron Nam). Motherland began as the Mongolian Democratic New Socialist Party—MDNSP (Mongoliin Ardchilsan Shinz Sotsialist Nam). The MDNSP was organized in 1998 under the auspices of B. Erdenebat, wealthy director general of the Erel Company, which has profited from the duty-free export of gold. The new formation quickly attracted defectors from other parties, including the MPRP, whose chair charac-

terized the MDNSP as Erel’s political tool. Erdenebat later asserted that he intended to spend 5–7 billion tugriks in the 2000 election campaign (in contrast to the combined 160 million tugriks spent by the MNDP and the MPRP in preparation for the 1996 balloting). In mid-1999 the MDNSP and the Mongolian Workers’ Party—MWP (Mongolyn Ajilchny Nam) announced formation of a leftist Motherland coalition in support of a return to state regulation and coordination of industry, coupled with sustainable social development. Although the MWP offered its own candidates at the July 2000 election, Erdenebat ran under the banner of the MotherlandMDNSP (M-MDNSP), winning the organization’s sole seat. The M-MDNSP supported President Bagabandi’s 2001 reelection but in June 2004 ran as part of the MDC, from which it withdrew at the end of December, in part because of Erdenebat’s presidential aspirations. He served as minister of defense in the Elbegdorj cabinet until February 2005 and finished fourth, with 11.4 percent of the vote, at the May presidential election as candidate of Motherland, as the party had been renamed in January. In January 2006 Erdenebat joined the Enkhbold cabinet. Leaders: Badarchiin ERDENEBAT (Chair of the Party and Minister of Fuel and Energy), N. CHULUUNBAATAR (Secretary General). Civil Will Party—CWP (Irgeni Zorig Nam). The centrist CWP was registered in March 2000 under the leadership of Sanjaas¨urengiyn Oyun, sister of the slain MNDP activist and cabinet member Sanjaas¨urengiyn Zorig. The CWP campaigned in coalition with the Mongolian Green Party (MGP, below) for the July 2000 election, with Oyun winning its only seat. In September 2000 Oyun was elected chair of an eight-party opposition coalition to contest the October 2000 provincial and local elections. Participants included the Mongolian Republican Party (MRP), the Mongolian Liberal Democratic Party (MLDP), the Mongolian Civil Democratic New Liberal Party (see MLP, below), and the Party for

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Mongolia (PM), which was established by Luvsandambyn Dashnyam in 1998 and which agreed to join the CWP in December 2000. For the 2001 presidential election the CWP nominated Dashnyam, who captured only 3.5 percent of the vote. In February 2002 the CWP and the MRP merged to form the Civil Will Republican Party—CWRP (Irgeni Zorig Najramdakh Bugd Nam), but they separated in December 2003 (see the RP, below), although, at least temporarily, the CWRP retained “Republican” in its name when it reregistered in April 2004. It then entered the national election campaign as part of the MDC, winning two State Great Hural seats. The CWRP chose not to offer a presidential candidate in 2005. In January 2006 it reestablished itself as the CWP. Leaders: Sanjaas¨urengiyn OYUN (Chair), M. ZORIGT, Luvsandambyn DASHNYAM. People’s Party—PP. Organized in November 2005 by former DP deputy chair L. G¨undalai, the PP was registered a month later, at which time G¨undalai held its only seat in the State Great Hural. In January 2006 G¨undalai joined the MPRP-led Enkhbold government. ¨ Leader: Lamjaviin GUNDALAI (Chair of the Party and Minister of Health). Republican Party—RP (Bugd Najrmdahk Nam). The RP traces its origins to the 1992 launching of the Mongolian Capitalists’ Party, which changed its name to the Mongolian Republican Party (MRP) in 1997. In May 1999 the MRP was reported to have merged with the Party for Mongolia (PM; see CWP, above), but the two were separately registered for the July 2000 State Great Hural balloting. In January 2000 the MRP was one of nine nonparliamentary parties that discussed organizing a “third force” coalition to contest the national election, at which it failed to win any seats. In early 2002 the MRP merged with the CWP to form the Civil Will Republican Party (CWRP), but the MRP reemerged as the RP in December 2003 because of its leaders’ opposition to forming a broad alliance for the June 2004 election. The RP ran 35 candidates in another loose “third force”

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effort, but its only victory was won by longtime leader B. Jargalsaikhan. In May 2005 Jargalsaikhan won 13.9 percent of the vote at the presidential election. He joined the Enkhbold coalition cabinet in January 2006. Leader: Bazarsadiin JARGALSAIKHAN (Chair of the Party and Minister of Industry and Commerce).

Other Parties Mongolian Green Party—MGP (Mongolyn Nogoon Nam). The MGP was organized in 1990 as the political arm of the Mongolian Alliance of Greens. It competed as part of the DU in 1996 but failed to win any seats. For the July 2000 election it was allied with the CWP, but for the October provincial and local elections it participated in the six-party Coalition of Democratic Forces. Unlike its fellow coalition members, however, it later announced that, while it would act in concert with other parties to achieve common goals, its specific agenda prevented it from joining in the merger of the MNDP and MSDP. In 2001 the MGP supported the presidential candidacy of the DP’s Gonchigdorj. It ran six unsuccessful candidates for the State Great Hural in 2004. In April 2006 the party participated in protests, including a sit-in near government offices, against official corruption and infringement of demonstrators’ rights by police. The protests also demanded that the government distribute to citizens dividends earned from exploitation of natural resources. Leaders: Davaagiin BASANDORJ, Olzod BHUM-YALAGCH. Mongolian Liberal Party—MLP (Mongolyn Liberal Nam). The MLP was formed in February 2000 as the Mongolian Civil Democratic New Liberal Party—MCDNLP (Mongolyn Irgenii Ardchilsan Shinz Liberal Nam). Both names are now recognized. It ran four unsuccessful candidates for the State Great Hural in 2004. Leader: D. BANZRAGCH. Mongolian National Unity Party—MNUP (Mongolyn Undesnii ev Nogdliin Nam). Also referenced in English as the Mongolian National

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Solidarity Party, the MNUP was formed in 1994 and was for a time allied with the MPRP. In 2001 it supported President Bagabandi’s reelection, and in June 2002 the chairs of the two parties concluded a cooperation agreement. In 2004 it participated in the informal “third force” movement but won none of the 23 State Great Hural seats it contested. Leader: Namsrain NYAM-OSOR (Chair). Mongolian New Social Democratic Party —MNSDP (Mongolyn Shine Sotsial Ardchilsan Nam). Combining socialism and Buddhism, the MNSDP was formed in early 2000 by dissidents from the MSDP. It supported President Bagabandi’s reelection in 2001 and has had a cooperative arrangement with the MPRP. It reregistered in April 2004 but ran no candidates under its own banner in the June national election. ¨ Leader: Lantuugiin DAMDINSUREN. Mongolian Social Democratic Party—MSDP (Mongolyn Sotsial Ardchilsan Nam). The MSDP called at its inaugural congress in March 1990 for a just and humane society patterned on the values espoused by social democratic parties in the West. The party’s legislative representation fell from 7 (overall) in 1990 to 1 in 1992, but it won 12 Great Hural seats in 1996 as part of the DU. One of its leaders, Radnaas¨umbereliyn Gonchigdorj (later a DP candidate for president), served as state vice president and speaker of the State Great Hural. Differences with its senior DU partner resurfaced in April 1999 when the MSDP chair of the State Property Committee was replaced by an MNDP member, leading some MSDP leaders to declare that the party would henceforth act independently. In May, however, the two parties announced that they would continue to present a joint front when their positions permitted. The party lost all its Great Hural seats at the July 2000 election and in September agreed to merge with the MNDP. The DP resulted in December. In December 2004, objecting to DP policies, the MSDP separated from the DP. It was reregistered as a separate party on January 20, 2005, although the DP protested the restoration of the party’s name. Leaders: Adyagiin GANBAATAR (Chair), Ts. SAIKHANBILEG (Secretary General).

Mongolian United Heritage Party—MUHP (Mongolyn Ulamjlaliin Negdsen Nam). Also identified in English as the Mongolian Traditional United Party, the MUHP was formed in 1993 by merger of the following four parties: the Mongolian Bourgeois Party (MBP), launched prior to the 1992 election to defend the interests of small businessmen; the Mongolian Independence Party (MIP), formed in 1992 by the Union of 281 in Defense of the Nation’s Independence; the Mongolian United Private Owners’ Party (MUPOP), organized in early 1992 by a group opposed to continued state monopolies; and the United Herdsmen and Farmers’ Party (UHFP), formed in 1990. Jambyn GOMBOJAV, having defected from the MPRP, ran as the MUHP candidate for president in May 1997 but won only 6.6 percent of the vote. In early 1999 the MUHP’s chair and its sole Great Hural member, Ochirbatyn DASHBALBAR, announced that he was joining the Mongolian National People’s Socialist Party (MNPSP). For the July 2000 election the MUHP participated in a “Grand Coalition” with the Party for Mongolia (PM; see CWP, above) and the Mongolian Democratic Renewal Party (MDRP; see DP, above). The coalition had been announced at a meeting attended by nine nonparliamentary parties the preceding January, although most of the “third force” participants subsequently decided to offer their own candidate lists. Having failed to win any seats in July, the MUHP joined the Coalition of Democratic Forces before the October 2000 local elections. In December a wing of the party led by B. JAMTSAI joined in forming the DP. In 2001 the MUHP supported President Bagabandi’s reelection. In 2004 it contested nine Great Hural seats, winning none. In 2005 it criticized immigrant workers as a source of crime and a threat to “solidarity and national security.” ¨ Leaders: S. KHURELBAATAR, L. JARGALSAIKHAN. Other parties include the Mongolian Communist Party (Mongolyn Kommunist Nam); the Mongolian Democratic Socialist Party (Mongolyn Ardchilsan Sotsialist Nam); the Mongolian Ethnic United Socialist Party (Mongolyn Ugsaatny

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Cabinet As of June 15, 2006 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister

Miyeegombo Enkhbold (MPRP) Mendsaikhan Enkhsaikhan∗

Ministers Construction and Urban Development Defense Disaster Relief Education, Culture, and Sciences Finance Food and Agriculture Foreign Affairs Fuel and Energy Health Industry and Commerce Justice and Internal Affairs Nature and Environment Professional Inspection Matters Road, Transportation, and Tourism Social Welfare and Labor Chief of Government Secretariat

Janlaviin Narantsatsralt∗ Mishigiyn Sonompil∗ Sainbuyan Otgonbayar (MP) Ulziisaikhanii Enkhtuvshin (MPRP) Nadmidiin Bayartsaikhan (MPRP) Dendeviin Terbishdagva (MPRP) Nyamaagiin Enkhbold (MPRP) Badarchiin Erdenebat (MP) Lamjaviin G¨undalai (PP) Bazarsadiin Jargalsaikhan (RP) Dorjiin Odbayar (MPRP) Ichinkhorloogiin Erdenebaatar (MPRP) Ukhnaagiin Hurelsukh (MPRP) Tsegmidiin Tsengel (MPRP) Luvsangiin Odonchimed (MPRP) Sunduin Batbold (MPRP)

Note: The three ministers whose names are followed by an asterisk were members of the DP when appointed but were expelled from their party for joining the cabinet.

Negdsen Sotsialist Nam); the Mongolian Party for Tradition and Justice (Mongolyn Ulamjlal, Shudarga Yosny Toloo Nam), which was founded in 1994 as the Mongolian National People’s Socialist Party (MNPSP) and then adopted its present name in 1999; the Mongolian People’s Party (Mongol Ardyn Nam); the Mongolian Rural Party (Mongolyn Hodogiin Nam); the Solidarity Party (Ev Negdliin Nam); and the Mongolian Youth Party (Mongolyn Zaluuchuudyn Nam). Although all had been registered by the April 2004 deadline for contesting the June 2004 election, none competed. In March 2006 Jalbas¨uren BATZANDAN, leader of the Just Society Civil Movement, announced his intention to form a Just Society Party, which he described as a “Western-style new liberal party.” Since January 2005 his movement had been leading demonstrations against corruption and in favor of new parliamentary elections. Batzandan

indicated that should former DP members Enkhsaikhan and Narantsatsralt form their own new party, he would consider joining them.

Legislature State Great Hural (Ulsyn Ikh Khural). The 76 members of the current Great Hural are popularly elected in single-member constituencies for fouryear terms. At the election of June 27, 2004, the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) won 36 seats; the Motherland Democratic Coalition, 34 (Democratic Party [DP], 25; Motherland– Mongolian Democratic New Socialist Party, 7; Civil Will Republican Party, 2); the Mongolian Republican Party, 1; and independents, 3. Two seats remained in dispute over alleged irregularities. One was won by the MPRP in reballoting on February 27, 2005; the Supreme Court, ruling on September

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26, 2005, confirmed the election of a DP member in the other disputed constituency. Chair: Tsendiin NYAMDORJ.

Communications The 1992 constitution guarantees freedom of the press and the right “to seek and receive information.” The central government’s leading newspapers, Ardyn Erh and Zasgiyn Gazryn Medee, were privatized in early 1999. A 2005 law ordered the conversion of state-run broadcast outlets into public service companies.

Press Mongolia presently has five weekday dailies and more than two dozen weeklies. The following are published at least five days a week in Ulaanbaatar, unless otherwise noted: Ser¨uu¨ leg (Alarm Clock, 29,000), weekly tabloid; Udriyn Sonin (Daily News, 14,000), formerly the governmentrun Ardyn Erh (People’s Power); Zuunii Medee (Century’s News, 8,000), formerly Zasgiyn Gazryn ¨ Medee (Government News); Unen (Truth, 8,000), MPRP organ; Unuudur (Today, 5,000); Mongolyn Medee (Mongolian News, 3,000); Mongol Messenger, English-language weekly, owned by staterun Montsame agency; UB Post, English-language weekly.

News Agencies The state-run Mongolian News Agency (Mongol Tsahilgaan Medeeniy Agentlag—Montsame) is

the principal domestic facility in Ulaanbaatar. The Russian agencies ITAR-TASS and RIA-Novosti and China’s Xinhua also have offices in the capital.

Broadcasting and Computing Mongolian Radio (Mongol Yaridz) broadcasts domestically in Mongolian and Kazakh. Its Voice of Mongolia offers an overseas service in Chinese, English, Japanese, and Russian. Since the 1990s private radio stations have also been established. Although cable television is available in larger towns, and local stations have been established in the largest cities, the central Mongolian Television (Mongol Televiz) remains dominant. There were approximately 172,000 television receivers and 190,000 personal computers serving 143,000 Internet users in 2003.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. Bold RAVDAN U.S. Ambassador to Mongolia Pamela J. H. SLUTZ Permanent Representative to the UN Baatar CHOISUREN IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, CP, EBRD, Interpol, NAM, WCO, WTO

M YA N M A R ( B U R M A ) UNION

OF

MYANMAR

Myanmar Naingngandaw

The Country Myanmar is the largest country on the Southeast Asian mainland. Its extensive coastline runs along the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea, while it shares a common border with Bangladesh and India in the west, China in the north, and Laos and Thailand in the east. Dominating the topography are tropical rain forests, plains, and mountains that rim the frontiers of the east, west, and north. Major rivers include the Ayeyawady (Irrawaddy), the Chindwin, and the Sittaung (Sittang); nearly threequarters of the population is concentrated in the Ayeyawady basin in the south. The dominant ethnic group is the Burman, which encompasses more than 70 percent of the inhabitants. The Kayins (Karens, about 7 percent) are dispersed over southern and eastern Myanmar, while the Shans (6 percent), Thai in origin, are localized on the eastern plateau; Chins, Kachins, Mons, and Rakhines (Arakanese), totaling about 1 million, are found in the north and northeast. In addition, about 400,000 Chinese and 120,000 Indians and Bangladeshi are concentrated primarily in the urban areas. The various ethnic groups speak many languages and dialects, but the official Myanmar (Burmese), which is related to Tibeto-Chinese, is spoken by the vast majority. The use of English, long the second language of the educated elite, declined substantially after the 1962 coup. About 80 percent of the population professes classical Buddhism (Theravada Buddhism), the state religion; minority religions include Islam (5–10 percent), Christianity (5 percent), Hinduism (3 percent), and primitive animism. About 43 percent of women are

in the official labor force; female representation in the present military-dominated government is virtually nonexistent. Although the country is rich in largely unexploited mineral resources (including hydrocarbons, silver, zinc, copper, lead, nickel, antimony, tin, and tungsten), its economy is heavily dependent on agriculture, which accounts for nearly three-fifths of GDP and employs two-thirds of the labor force. Rice, teak and other hardwoods, rubber, pulses and beans, and cotton are among the major exports, and agriprocessing is the leading industry. Production of textiles and garments has recently become

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M YA N M A R ( B U R M A )

more important as a source of export earnings; base metals, ores, and gemstones also contribute to foreign exchange income. Officially, most economic activity other than food production is conducted by state-owned enterprises, but routine shortfalls, stemming in part from bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption among public officials, have made black-market trade the main source of consumer goods (largely smuggled in through border areas by ethnic minorities). There is also a thriving trade in opium, grown primarily in the “Golden Triangle” at the border juncture with Laos and Thailand. Despite its wealth of resources, Myanmar remains a poor country, with an estimated per capita income of about $400 per year and severe problems in health care, education, housing, and employment. Calculations of GDP growth vary widely, with most international agencies regarding the government’s figure of 8.4 percent annually during the 1996–2001 Five-Year Plan as inflated. For the 2004–2005 fiscal year the government reported growth of 12.6 percent. In contrast, the International Monetary Fund has projected growth of 3.5 percent for 2006, with inflation exceeding 27 percent. Falling commodity prices since the early 1980s, especially for rice; a failure to attract foreign investment; and recent Western sanctions imposed against the authoritarian military regime have yielded chronic economic distress marked by high inflation, a nearly unmanageable external debt, the depletion of foreign exchange, and import constraints that have exacerbated the shortages of goods and spare parts for manufacturing. Furthermore, in November 2003 the international Financial Action Task Force (FATF) called for additional sanctions against Myanmar for its failure to enforce money-laundering legislation.

Government and Politics Political Background Modern Burma was incorporated into British India as a result of the Anglo-Burmese wars of 1824–1886 but in 1937 was separated from India

and granted limited self-government. During World War II Japan occupied the country and gave it nominal independence under a puppet regime led by anti-British nationalists, who subsequently transferred their loyalties to the Allied war effort. The Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL), a coalition of nationalist forces, emerged as the principal political organization in 1945. Under the AFPFL, various groups and regions joined to form the Union of Burma, which gained full independence from the British in January 1948 and for a decade maintained a parliamentary democracy headed by Prime Minister U NU. In May 1958 the AFPFL dissolved into factional groups, precipitating a political crisis that, four months later, forced U Nu to resign in favor of a caretaker government headed by Gen. NE WIN, commander-inchief of the armed forces. Ne Win scheduled elections in February and March of 1960, and the U Nu faction of the AFPFL returned to power in April under the name of the Union Party. However, growing differences within the new formation and problems of internal security, national unity, and economic development contributed to government ineffectiveness. As a result, Ne Win mounted a coup d’´etat in March 1962, organized a Revolutionary Council of senior army officers to run the government, and abolished the national legislature. A Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) was launched by the council the following July. In January 1974, after 12 years of army rule, the Ne Win government adopted a new constitution and revived the legislature as a single-chambered People’s Assembly. At a special BSPP congress in October 1976 the party’s general secretary, SAN YU, severely castigated his colleagues for the economic malaise that the country had long endured, and 16 leading party members, including Prime Minister SEIN WIN and Deputy Prime Minister U LWIN, were denied reelection to the Central Committee in February 1977. In March a new cabinet was organized with MAUNG MAUNG KHA as prime minister, and a new People’s Assembly was elected in January 1978. At its inaugural session in March the assembly designated an enlarged State Council chaired

M YA N M A R ( B U R M A )

Political Status: Independent republic established January 4, 1948; military-backed regime instituted March 2, 1962; one-party constitution of January 4, 1974, abrogated upon direct assumption of power by the military on September 18, 1988, at which time the words “Socialist Republic” (Socialist Thamada) were dropped from the country’s official name; official title in English changed from Union of Burma to Union of Myanmar on May 27, 1989. Area: 261,789 sq. mi. (678,033 sq. km.). Population: 35,306,189 (1983C); 50,776,000 (2005E). The 1983 figure includes nonresident nationals but excludes adjustment for underenumeration. Major Urban Center (2005E): YANGON (Rangoon, 4,082,000). Official Language: Myanmar (Burmese). Monetary Unit: Kyat (official rate July 1, 2006: 6.42 kyats = $1US). (A UN operational rate of exchange of 1,286 kyats = $1US was reported as of July 1, 2006.) Chair, State Peace and Development Council: Sr. Gen. THAN SHWE; former vice chair of the State

by Ne Win, who was thereby reconfirmed as president, and approved a new cabinet headed by the incumbent prime minister. At the BSPP’s fourth congress in August 1981, Ne Win announced his intention to resign as president while retaining his post as party chair. In November, following a legislative election in October, the assembly approved San Yu as his successor. In a move evidently intended to demonstrate government continuity, Maung Maung Kha was reappointed prime minister. San Yu’s status as Ne Win’s heir apparent was enhanced at the party’s fifth congress in August 1985 by his appointment to the newly created post of BSPP vice chair. In November, following a pro forma legislative election a month earlier, the regime’s third most powerful figure, party General Secretary AYE KO (already second in line to the presidency as secretary of the State Council), was formally designated vice president. In September 1987, following a series of demonetization measures that invalidated more than

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Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC); assumed roles of SLORC chair and prime minister in succession to Gen. SAW MAUNG following the latter’s resignation on April 23, 1992; became chair of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) on November 15, 1997, when it replaced the SLORC; stepped down as prime minister on August 25, 2003. Vice Chair, SPDC: Sr. Gen. MAUNG AYE; appointed to revived position of vice chair of the SLORC on April 27, 1994; became vice chair of the SPDC on November 15, 1997. First Secretary, SPDC: Lt. Gen. THEIN SEIN; appointed second secretary on August 25, 2003, succeeding Lt. Gen. SOE WIN; appointed first secretary on October 19, 2004, succeeding Lt. Gen. SOE WIN. Second Secretary, SPDC: (Vacant). Prime Minister: Lt. Gen. SOE WIN; formerly first secretary of the SPDC; named prime minister on October 19, 2004, succeeding Lt. Gen. KHIN NYUNT, who had been dismissed the same day.

half of the currency in circulation, student rioting in Yangon prompted the closure of all schools for a five-day period. More serious student-led disturbances erupted in the capital in March and June 1988, leading to an extraordinary BSPP congress in July. At its conclusion both Ne Win and San Yu resigned from the party leadership, the former being replaced as chair by SEIN LWIN. The position of vice chair remained vacant. In July Sein Lwin was named by the People’s Assembly to succeed San Yu as state president and chair of the State Council, while Maung Maung Kha stepped down as prime minister in favor of Thura TUN TIN. Student leaders thereupon mounted a campaign to press for President Sein Lwin’s resignation, which culminated in a popular outpouring of more than 100,000 demonstrators in Yangon on August 8. Eleven days later Sein Lwin was replaced as both president and party chair by the attorney general, Dr. MAUNG MAUNG (one of only two civilian cabinet members). Like his predecessors, however, Maung Maung was a longtime associate of

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Ne Win, who remained a behind-the-scenes power broker. At an emergency BSPP congress in September 1988, delegates approved a resolution calling for a multiparty general election. The proposal secured assembly endorsement the following day. Eight days later President Maung was relieved of office, with the army commander, Gen. SAW MAUNG, assuming the chair of a new State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). Collaterally, all of the country’s leading institutions, including the presidency, the State Council, the Council of Ministers, and the People’s Assembly, were abolished. The Defense Service Intelligence director, Brig. Gen. KHIN NYUNT, assumed the post of SLORC first secretary. On September 20 the SLORC presented a new cabinet composed, with one exception, of military figures; on the following day Saw Maung, who had already assumed the defense and foreign affairs portfolios, took on the additional post of prime minister. Subsequently, although few restrictions were placed on the formation of opposition parties, many of their supporters were severely repressed, and all public gatherings of more than four individuals were banned. By February 28, 1989 (the closing date specified by a Political Parties Registration Law), over 200 parties had been legalized, although the electoral campaign for a new People’s Assembly was largely a contest between the government’s National Unity Party (NUP, successor to the BSPP) and the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by Daw AUNG SAN SUU KYI, the daughter of the “founder of modern Burma,” AUNG SAN, who had been assassinated in 1947 on the eve of independence. The results of the poll of May 27, 1990, which observers characterized as remarkably fair and accurate, yielded a massive victory for the NLD, despite the detention since July 19, 1989, of its leader. The NLD secured more than 80 percent of the seats, with the military’s NUP being limited to a humiliating 2.1 percent. The SLORC leadership refused to let the assembly convene, and neither repeated pressures from Western countries

nor a rebuke from the UN General Assembly in November 1991 forced the junta to relent. The naming in October 1991 of Aung San Suu Kyi as recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize focused world attention on the repressive policies of the SLORC and triggered a wave of domestic demonstrations on behalf of the imprisoned opposition leader. The government responded by shutting down universities in the capital, arresting numerous protestors, and mounting a dry-season campaign against dissident minorities, especially Kayin insurgents on the Thai border. On March 20, 1992, Saw Maung, who was reported to be in poor mental health, turned the defense portfolio over to Gen. THAN SHWE and on April 23 stepped down as SLORC chair and prime minister, also in favor of Than Shwe. (There were strong indications that Ne Win had approved the changes.) Following his installation, the new SLORC leader stated that he intended to release all those who had been imprisoned “for political reasons,” although only about half of an estimated 2,000 such persons had been freed by December 1992. Aung San Suu Kyi remained under house arrest as the SLORC continued its systematic delegalization of opposition parties. On May 28, 1992, the SLORC announced that a “coordination meeting” would be convened to pave the way for a National Convention to draft a new constitution. Most opposition groups were excluded, however, from the preparatory process for the Convention, which opened on January 9, 1993, but was subject to a series of adjournments. On July 10, 1995, nearly six years after her confinement, Aung San Suu Kyi was freed. Following her release, she called for conciliation between the democracy movement and the SLORC leadership, but on November 29 the NLD delegation (only 86 members out of 703) pulled out of the National Convention, insisting that the body had displayed scant interest in democratic reform. In March 1996 the convention began what would turn out to be an eight-year hiatus. In advance of a planned NLD congress on May 26–28, 1996, the government arrested some 260

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party members, limiting the number of attendees to 18. In mid-August the regime announced that there could be no political role for the NLD until it returned to the National Convention, and in late September it barred the NLD leader from continuing with weekly addresses to supporters outside her home. Some 500–800 NLD supporters were arrested when they attempted to hold another congress at Aung San Suu Kyi’s house on September 27–29. Intensifying conflict between students and the government culminated in weeklong demonstrations in Yangon and Mandalay in early December, which prompted the government to close the universities once again. The regime charged Aung San Suu Kyi with orchestrating the disturbances and reimposed her house arrest. NLD activists continued to be targeted by the regime’s security forces throughout the first half of 1997; however, in late September the NLD held its first authorized congress, with Aung San Suu Kyi in attendance, since 1995. Shortly thereafter the cycle of arrests and imprisonments began anew and continued through early 1998. During the mid-1990s, the SLORC had mounted a series of successful attacks on longtime military insurgents. With the capture in late January 1995 of Manerplaw, the headquarters of the rebel Karen National Union (KNU), and the fall of the KNU’s last stronghold in Kawmoora on the Thai border a month later, most ethnic opposition to the junta came to an end. On March 19 Gen. BO MYA resigned as commander of the Karen National Army (KNA), although continuing as chair of the KNU. On March 21 the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) also abandoned armed struggle, leading SLORC officials to claim that 14 of 16 rebel groups had now laid down their arms. Most of the remaining military opposition came from the Mong Tai Army (MTA) of Shan drug warlord KHUN SA, against which the government had launched a major offensive on March 14. Eight months later, on November 22, Khun Sa announced his “retirement” as MTA chief, and on January 1, 1996, government troops occupied his headquarters in Ho Mong. On January 9 Khun Sa’s troops

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began their formal surrender, with the government announcing on April 26 that their leader would neither be tried for his crimes nor extradited to the United States to face charges of drug-trafficking. Negotiations between the regime and the KNU collapsed in early 1997, and government forces immediately launched an offensive against the remaining rebel bases. Sporadic fighting was reported throughout the remainder of the year and into early 1998, with thousands of refugees fleeing into Thailand. Meanwhile, on November 15, 1997, the SLORC was dissolved and immediately replaced by the “permanent” State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), which thereupon announced a cabinet reshuffling and the creation of an advisory board to which a number of the officials displaced by the SLORC-SPDC transformation were appointed. According to observers, the composition of the SPDC and reshuffled government reflected the primacy of Khin Nyunt in a power struggle with hardline Vice Chair Lt. Gen. MAUNG AYE. Subsequently, Khin Nyunt ordered the detention of a number of former cabinet officials and their supporters on corruption charges. A further cabinet reshuffling occurred on December 20. Although the SPDC approved an NLD party congress held May 27–28, 1998, at Aung San Suu Kyi’s residence, twice in July the NLD leader attempted to visit supporters outside the capital only to find the military blocking her way. On the second occasion the regime ordered her to be forcibly driven home after a six-day standoff. Another, longer standoff in August ended when ill health forced Aung San Suu Kyi to abandon her protest. In September 1998 Aung San Suu Kyi and nine other activists carried out a threat to initiate a “People’s Parliament.” Calling themselves the Committee Representing Elected Lawmakers, they declared all junta laws and proclamations invalid, demanded the release of all political prisoners, and stated their intention to act as a parliament until the Constituent Assembly was allowed to meet. Meanwhile, the SPDC continued what had become its biggest crackdown against the opposition since

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early in the decade. By October nearly 900 NLD members had been detained. Shortly before the March 1999 death of Suu Kyi’s terminally ill husband in England, she rejected the SPDC’s offer to let her visit him, fearing that she would not be allowed reentry. The 11th anniversary of the August 8, 1988 (8– 8–88), mass demonstrations passed without significant disruptions, as did an exile-led “Global Day of Action” called for September 9 (9–9–99). Fully prepared for the latter, the government deployed riot police in the capital, closed the Thai border, suspended e-mail service, and imposed curfews in some towns. In August–September 2000 Aung San Suu Kyi twice tried to venture outside Yangon but was prevented from doing so. In January 2001, however, reports surfaced that in recent months the NLD leader had met at least twice with SPDC members, including Khin Nyunt, despite her house arrest. In November 2001 the government hierarchy underwent its most significant changes since the formation of the SPDC four years earlier. SPDC Secretary WIN MYINT, reportedly the fourthranked member of the council following the February death of Lt. Gen. TIN OO in a helicopter crash, was dismissed, as were the three deputy prime ministers. Several additional cabinet changes were announced, and 10 of 12 regional military commanders were reassigned. Although the SPDC did not explain its actions, observers concluded that the changes had served to strengthen the hands of Than Shwe and Maung Aye. Meanwhile, a UN special envoy to Myanmar, Malaysian diplomat Razali Ismail, was attempting to facilitate prisoner releases and discussions between the opposition and the SPDC. The military regime had begun releasing detained NLD members, including, in August, the party’s chair and vice chair, AUNG SHWE and TIN OO, but in December Aung San Suu Kyi described the negotiations as still engaged in confidence-building. At the end of the year an estimated 1500 political prisoners continued in custody. On May 6, 2002, Aung San Suu Kyi was unconditionally released from house arrest, although the SPDC gave no indications that

it was any more willing to consider democratic reforms. Two months earlier, in March 2002, the SPDC had reported the discovery of a planned coup led by Ne Win’s son-in-law AYE ZAW WIN. Ne Win and his daughter SANDAR WIN, wife of the alleged ringleader, were placed under house arrest. On September 26 Aye Zaw Win and his three sons were sentenced to hang for treason. (Although the Supreme Court confirmed the sentences in August 2003, executions, in deference to the country’s Buddhist heritage, are rarely carried out.) Ne Win, age 91, died on December 5, 2002. On May 30, 2003, a convoy carrying Suu Kyi and supporters was attacked by a mob near Mandalay. The attack, reportedly by a mob of up to 2,000, was orchestrated by the governmentsupportive Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA). Shortly after, the NLD leader was placed in “protective custody” until transferred to her home on September 26. Internationally, the regime’s actions provoked widespread outrage. The consequences included renewed sanctions imposed by a number of countries. Within months import restrictions by the United States cost the textile industry tens of thousands of jobs. On August 25, 2003, the SPDC announced a major cabinet reshuffle that saw Than Shwe turn over the prime ministership to Khin Nyunt, who collaterally lost his post as SPDC first secretary to the promoted second secretary, Lt. Gen. SOE WIN. Five days later the new prime minister announced that the long-adjourned National Convention would reconvene as the first element of a sevenstep “road map” to democracy that would also include a referendum on a new constitution, legislative elections, and the selection of state leaders by the resultant People’s Assembly. On January 16, 2004, Prime Minister Khin Nyunt and Gen. Bo Mya of the KNU opened peace talks in the capital. When the negotiations adjourned a week later, both sides appeared to endorse the idea of a cease-fire, although no official agreement was concluded, and sporadic clashes continued to occur. Although smaller ethnic groups continued in open opposition to the government, the

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KNU was generally viewed as the only militarily significant autonomy movement that had not come to terms with the Yangon regime. Meeting in Nyaunghnapin Camp in Hmawby Township, outside Yangon, the National Convention reconvened on May 17, 2004, with SPDC Second Secretary Lt. Gen. THEIN SEIN as chair. The 1,088 delegates included representatives of political parties, ethnic groups (“national races”), workers, farmers, intellectuals and the intelligentsia, and state service personnel, plus “invited delegates” from state “Special Regions” and former insurgent groups that had “exchanged arms for peace.” Conspicuously absent were NLD representatives, who refused to participate until the regime released Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD Vice Chair Tin Oo from house arrest. A cabinet reshuffle on September 18, 2004, drew international attention primarily because of civilian Foreign Minister WIN AUNG’s replacement by a senior military officer. A more dramatic announcement came a month later. On October 19 Prime Minister Khin Nyunt was “permitted to retire” and reportedly placed under house arrest, with Soe Win assuming the cabinet leadership. At the same time Thein Sein was elevated to SPDC first secretary. During the same period the SPDC began another major reorganization of the military command structure as well as a purge of the military intelligence apparatus, previously headed by Khin Nyunt. Ministerial-level changes also occurred on August 11, 2005, and May 15, 2006, and in midJune 2006 eight deputy ministers retired or were relieved of their responsibilities.

Constitution and Government The 1974 constitution was adopted with the stated objective of making Burma a “Socialist Republic” under one-party rule. It provided for a unicameral People’s Assembly as the supreme organ of state authority and for a State Council comprising 14 representatives from the country’s major political subdivisions plus 15 additional members (including the prime minister) elected from the assembly. The State Council and its chair, who was also

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state president, served four-year terms, concurrent with that of the assembly. The prime minister was designated by the Council of Ministers, which was elected by the assembly from its own membership, following nomination by the State Council. All of these institutions were abolished upon direct assumption of power by the military in September 1988. Pending conclusion of the National Convention that began drafting a new basic law in 1993, government authority resides in the SPDC, whose chair serves as head of state and chief executive officer. Under the projected new basic law both houses of a bicameral legislature are to include military members appointed by the commander-in-chief, while the army is to be given “the right to independently administer all affairs concerning the armed forces.” The country’s principal political components are seven states (Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Rakhine, Shan) and seven divisions (Ayeyawady, Bago, Magway, Mandalay, Sagaing, Tanintharyi, Yangon). The states and divisions are divided into townships, which are subdivided into urban wards and village tracts.

Foreign Relations Nonalignment was the cornerstone of Burmese foreign policy from 1948 through the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, and until quite recently, the country’s participation in most intergovernmental organization activity, including that of the UN and its specialized agencies, was marginal. Following the Sixth Summit Conference of the Nonaligned Movement in Havana in September 1979, Burma announced its withdrawal from the group, indicating that it would consider participation in an alternative organization committed to “genuine nonalignment.” In 1992, however, it rejoined the existing group. In 1997 Myanmar was admitted to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), partly in an effort by neighboring states to foster “constructive engagement” with the SPDC. In 1949 Burma became the first non-Communist country to recognize the People’s Republic of

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China, with which it shares a 1,200-mile border. The two signed a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Nonaggression in 1960, following settlement of a long-standing border dispute. By 1967, however, leftist terrorism, aimed at instituting a Chinesestyle “Cultural Revolution,” was increasingly resented by the Burmese and led to a severe deterioration in Sino-Burmese relations that lasted into the next decade. Relations with Bangladesh plummeted in mid1978 because of an exodus from Burma of some 200,000 Rohingya Muslims who, according to Dhaka, had been subjected to an “extermination campaign.” Later, it appeared that Muslim leaders had encouraged the flight in part to publicize their desire to establish the Rakhine (Arakan) region as an Islamic state; meanwhile, the number of refugees living in makeshift camps on the Bangladeshi side of the border had reportedly risen to more than 260,000 by March 1992. Repatriations began in September 1992; however, many Rohingyas were reluctant to return, while some of those who did were reported to be members of a terrorist Rohingya Solidarity Organization (Kalarzo) that was responsible for the killing of 16 Myanmar troops in May 1994. By September 1995 most refugees had been repatriated, although over 20,000 remained in Bangladesh as of early 1998. Myanmar subsequently announced it would guarantee the safety of any additional voluntary returnees. In January 2000 Yangon rejected reentry for some 14,000 refugees, whom it claimed were not Myanmar, but in April 2004 the two governments agreed that the remaining Rohingyas would be repatriated. Nevertheless, most have refused to leave or have not received authorization from Myanmar. In October 1994 Myanmar concluded a friendship pact with Thailand, but relations have remained cool. Insurgent refugee camps are still located on Thai soil, and Myanmar military forces have repeatedly crossed the border in pursuit of guerrillas. In October 1999 Thai authorities freed the five Myanmar perpetrators of a hostage incident at the Myanmar embassy in Bangkok, leading an angered SPDC to close the Thai-Myanmar

border until late November. In contrast, in January 2000 Thailand earned the SPDC’s praise for a swift, deadly response when a small Kayinni group called God’s Army took some 700 hostages at a hospital near the border. In April 2000 both countries joined Laos and China in an agreement on commercial navigation of the upper Mekong River. In June 2001, four months after another cross-border clash had led to a series of bilateral meetings, Myanmar and Thai leaders agreed to resolve border issues and to jointly fight drug production and smuggling. Difficulties continued into 2002, however, and the border was closed from May to October. In April 1997 the United States announced the imposition of economic sanctions against Myanmar, largely because of its repression of prodemocracy advocates. In 1998 the United States and Japan approved a grant of $3.8 million to the UN Drug Control Program to help eliminate opium poppy cultivation in Myanmar, but Washington continued its ten-year-old policy of refusing to make direct grants to the Yangon regime. Later that month, in response to the Bill Clinton administration’s October 1996 ban on travel to the United States by junta leaders, Yangon denied permission for the U.S. ambassador to the UN, Bill Richardson, to enter Myanmar. In April 2000 the European Union (EU) announced that it was freezing assets of Myanmar officials in addition to increasing sanctions. In mid-2000 the SPDC was condemned, not for the first time, by the International Labour Organization (ILO) for using forced labor, and was also accused, at an international conference in Nepal, of having more child soldiers—at least 50,000, according to a Save the Children spokesperson—than any other country in the world. On November 16 the ILO, for the first time in its 81-year history, urged its members to impose sanctions against a country. In March 2002, in an effort to diffuse continuing criticism, the government signed an agreement permitting the ILO to monitor compliance through a new liaison office in Yangon. An action plan drawn up in May 2003 by ILO representatives and the government remained largely unimplemented, and in June 2005 the ILO once again called for sanctions.

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In May 2001 Pakistan’s Chief Executive Pervez Musharraf visited Myanmar. The trip was noteworthy in that he was the first head of government, apart from ASEAN and Chinese leaders, to visit the country in 12 years. Visits by other foreign leaders remain infrequent, although in March 2006 A. P. J. Abdul Kalam became the first president of India to visit Myanmar.

Current Issues When the National Convention reconvened in May 2004, the SPDC made it clear that the deliberations were to pick up where they had left off eight years earlier and that decisions by the delegates should be made in view of the “six objectives” and “104 principles” that had already been determined. The six objectives encompassed continuation of the union; national solidarity; national sovereignty; multiparty democracy; furtherance of justice, liberty, and equality; and continuing participation by the military (the Tatmadaw) “in the national political leadership role of the State.” The most recent convention session convened on December 5, 2005, and adjourned on January 31, 2006. There were no indications, however, that the new constitution, when completed, would do much more than ensure continued military domination. On May 27, 2006, the SPDC renewed Aung San Suu Kyi’s detention order despite international pressure for her release. Some observers speculated that the government had been prepared to release her but that she had found the proposed terms unacceptable. There was, however, no way to verify this account, given that she is held virtually incommunicado, except for visits by her doctor. Meanwhile, the government figure who had appeared most willing to negotiate with the prodemocracy movement, former prime minister Khin Nyunt, was convicted in July 2005 on eight counts of corruption and bribery and received a sentence of 44 years, although his sentence was apparently suspended, and he was placed under house arrest. Several dozen of his relatives and associates were also reportedly given long sentences. A key ally, former

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foreign minister Win Aung, who had been “retired” in September 2004, was, as of February 2006, being tried by a special court for associated crimes. In October 2005 the UN’s special human rights rapporteur for Myanmar, Paulo Sergio Pinheiro of Brazil, who had not been permitted to visit Myanmar since November 2003, reported that human rights abuses continued, particularly against ethnic minorities, and that there were some 1,100 political prisoners being held. In January 2006 UN envoy Razali Ismail, who had been denied entry since March 2004, resigned in frustration. Recent appeals for reform from a host of international leaders, including UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, Nobel Peace Prize winner Desmond Tutu of South Africa, and former Czech president V´aclav Havel, have generally been ignored by the SPDC. In May 2006 UN Under-Secretary General for Political Affairs Ibrahim Gambari became the first high UN official to visit Myanmar in two years. In addition to meeting with government officials and the government-backed NUP, he met with NLD leaders and was even permitted a rare, brief visit with Suu Kyi. Gambari’s visit was preceded by a request from the KNU that the military end an offensive in the east that had brought an end to the two-yearold cease-fire and had reportedly displaced 10,000 Kayins. (In March 2006 the Norwegian Refugee Council estimated that Myanmar had 540,000 internally displaced people, the largest number of any country in Asia.) The government has justified its offensive against the KNU and other ethnic groups as a response to an increasing number of small bomb blasts, which have also been blamed on exile groups. The most serious incident occurred on May 7, 2005, in the capital; according to official sources, three bombs killed 19 and injured 150. The most unexpected recent decision of the SPDC was to make Naypyidaw the country’s administrative capital. The 2005 decision was, according to the Financial Times, typical of how the “long-isolated generals govern—making crucial decisions abruptly, in secret, without public debate, with little advance warning and often without

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any logic clear to those beyond the regime’s highest echelons.” Given the aging SPDC leadership and the need to prepare the way for the next generation, the rationale for recent personnel changes in both the government and the military would appear to be somewhat less opaque. Some analysts have speculated that Than Shwe, 73, may soon step down as SPDC chair.

Political Parties and Groups Immediately prior to the 1962 coup, the most important Burmese parties were U Nu’s Union Party (Pyidaungsu Party); the opposition Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League; and the pro-Communist National United Front, with its major affiliate, the Burmese Workers’ Party. Although a number of their leaders were imprisoned, the parties continued to exist until March 1964, when the Revolutionary Council banned all but its own Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP). Following the September 1988 coup, the party ban was rescinded, and the BSPP reorganized as the National Unity Party (below). Over 200 political organizations were registered prior to the 1990 general election, although many were little more than discussion groups. The outcome of the May 1990 Constituent Assembly poll was an overwhelming victory for the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD), tacitly allied with some 21 ethnic-based regional parties. In response, the military regime not only refused to convene the new assembly but also withdrew recognition from nearly all opposition formations. Fewer than a dozen parties, most of them government supportive, participated in the intermittent 1993–1996 sessions of the National Convention, which was to draw up a new constitution. When the convention reconvened in May 2004, it was attended by a number of additional political organizations that had negotiated ceasefire agreements with the SPDC, but the principal opposition parties, the NLD and the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, refused to participate until NLD leaders Aung San Suu Kyi and Tin Oo were released from house arrest.

National Convention Participants National Unity Party—NUP (Taingyintha Silonenyinyutye Party). An outgrowth of the former BSPP, the NUP was launched on September 24, 1988. Unlike the practice under BSPP rule, members of the armed forces have been specifically excluded from membership. The party won only 10 of 485 available seats at the Constituent Assembly balloting of May 1990. A closely associated Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), founded in 1993, was described by the Far Eastern Economic Review in 1998 as a more inclusive “quasipolitical party established under the guise of a community-assistance organization”; the USDA was seen as eventually emerging as the military’s “civilian mask.” In May 2003 the USDA was accused of organizing the attack against Aung San Suu Kyi’s motorcade. According to the government, the USDA has a membership of some 22 million, although it continues to be known in the vernacular by a derogatory abbreviation, Kyant Phut. It is widely believed that when the National Convention concludes its work, the USDA will be registered as a party in time to contest the anticipated legislative election. Leaders: THA KYAW (Chair), KHIN MAUNG GYI (Secretary General). The following parties have also supported the military regime and uniformly condemned the NLD’s announcement of the “People’s Parliament” in 1998: the Khami National Solidarity Organization (also known as the Mro National Solidarity Organization); the Lahu National Development Party, based in the Lahu tribe of eastern Shan State; the Kokang Democracy and Unity Party; the Union Kayin League (Union Karen League); the Union Pa-O National Organization, based in west-central Shan State; and the Wa National Development Party. Also participating in the reconvened National Convention in 2004, at the invitation of the SPDC, were a number of additional groups, some of which had split off from still-active insurgent formations

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and had “exchanged arms for peace.” The invited groups included the Arakanese Army; the Burmese Communist Party (Rakhine Group), led by SAW TUN OO (see BCP, below); the Democratic Karen Buddhist Association (see KNU, below); the Haungthayaw Special Region Group from Kayin State; the Homein Region Welfare and Development Group; the Kachin Defense Army (formerly a battalion in the Kachin Independence Army) of Shan State Special Region 5; the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) of Kachin State Special Region 2; the Kayinni National Progressive Party Dragon Group (see KNPP, below); the Kayinni National Progressive Party (Hoya Splinter); the Kayinni National Unity and Solidarity Organization (Ka Ma Sa Nya); the Manpan Regional Militia Group; the Mon Armed Peace Group (Chaungchi Region); the Mon (Splinter) Nai Saik Chan Group; the New Mon State Party; the Phayagon Special Region Group, also from Kayin; the Shan State National Army (SSNA), which broke from the Mong Tai Army (MTA) of Shan drug warlord KHUN SA in 1995 and is now led by SAI YI; the Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization (Ya La La Pha); and the Shwepyiaye (MTA) Group. All of these organizations claimed predominantly ethnic or regional support. In many cases their ideological orientations remained problematic. Some expressed support for Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD, and all opposed at least some aspects of the government’s constitutional proposals. Some have denied allegations of continuing involvement in drug trafficking. The government-supportive United Wa State Army (UWSA), led by BAO YU XIANG, is probably the country’s leading producer of opium, heroin, and methamphetamines. Reportedly numbering 20,000, the UWSA has been described as operating with considerable autonomy within the Golden Triangle. During 2005, in the context of continuing hostilities in Shan State, the SSNA announced that it had ended its cooperation with the government and was joining the insurgent Shan State Army–South (see

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below). Clashes between government forces and a number of other groups, including the KIO and Mon tions, were also reported during 2005–2006.

Opposition Parties National League for Democracy (NLD). Registered as a political party in September 1988, the NLD was an outgrowth of the Democracy and Peace (Interim) League (DPIL), which had been formed by a number of leading dissidents a month earlier. Its founding president, AUNG GYI, withdrew to form the Union National Democratic Party (UNDP) after having called, unsuccessfully, for the expulsion from the DPIL of a number of alleged communists. (The UNDP was deregistered in 1992.) Following her return to Burma in April 1988, the party’s first general secretary, Aung San Suu Kyi, became the regime’s most vocal and effective critic. Both she and fellow NLD leader Tin Oo were arrested in July 1989 and declared ineligible to compete in the May 1990 balloting. The NLD’s two other principal leaders, KYI MAUNG and CHIT KHAING, were arrested in September 1990. In April 1991 the SLORC announced that the NLD’s Central Committee had been “invalidated,” thus technically removing the four leaders from their party positions. Kyi Maung and Tin Oo were released from prison in March 1995, while Aung San Suu Kyi was freed from house arrest in July. Kyi Maung left the NLD in 1997, reportedly because of a dispute with Suu Kyi. In July 1997 SLORC leader Khin Nyunt met with NLD chair Aung Shwe, and on September 27–28 NLD delegates were permitted to attend the group’s first congress with Aung San Suu Kyi in attendance in two years. An authorized NLD Congress on May 27–28, 1998, at Aung San Suu Kyi’s residence was attended by 400 party members. In the following months, however, in response to the NLD’s threat to call a “People’s Parliament” unless the elected legislature was convened, the regime began a series of crackdowns against the party that included hundreds of detentions, closure

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of many local offices, and forced resignations. In all, tens of thousands of party members may have been forced to resign in 1998–1999. The party leadership in Yangon was cut off from its rural constituencies by SPDC actions in 1999– 2000, including the de facto house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi following her September 2000 efforts to leave the capital. Beginning in October, however, secret negotiations reportedly began with the SPDC. Again released from house arrest on May 6, 2002, Suu Kyi gave no details of her negotiations with the government. On May 30, 2003, following a violent attack on an NLD motorcade by government supporters, Suu Kyi was taken into “protective custody.” An unclear number of NLD members—initial reports indicated 4, but some subsequent accounts said 60 or more—were killed by the mob, and many others were soon taken into custody by authorities. Aung San Suu Kyi’s house arrest resumed on September 26. On April 13, 2004, Aung Shwe and U Lwin were released, leaving Suu Kyi and Tin Oo as the only senior NLD members in detention. A month later the NLD refused to participate in the reconvened National Convention until both were freed. As of mid-2006, all NLD offices outside of Yangon had been closed. Suu Kyi, whose house arrest had again been extended on May 27, was permitted no visitors except her doctor and housekeepers. Leaders: AUNG SAN SUU KYI (De Facto Leader), AUNG SHWE (Chair), TIN OO (Vice Chair), U LWIN (General Secretary). Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD). Established in 1988, the SNLD won 23 seats at the 1990 Constituent Assembly balloting, second only to the NLD. Its leader, Khun Tun Oo, has been a key opposition figure both in Shan State and on the national scene, where he has participated in the “People’s Parliament” and has conferred repeatedly with UN and EU representatives. The SNLD refused to participate when the National Convention reconvened in May 2004. In February 2005 the group’s chair and secretary were among nearly a dozen individuals charged with treason, insurrection, and other offenses. In

November Tun Oo was convicted and sentenced to spend the rest of his life in prison. Eight others also received lengthy sentences. Leaders: KHUN TUN OO (Chair), SAI NYUNT LWIN (Secretary). Like the SNLD, the other seven parties of the United Nationalities Alliance also boycotted the reconvened National Convention in 2004–2006: the Arakan League for Democracy, which won 11 seats in the 1990 Constituent Assembly election and whose chair, SAW MRA AUNG, was elected leader of the “People’s Assembly” in 1998 by the Committee Representing Elected Lawmakers; the Chin National League for Democracy, which won 2 seats in 1990; the Kachin State National Congress for Democracy, which won 3 seats in 1990; the Karen National Congress for Democracy; the Kayah State All Nationalities League for Democracy, which won 2 seats in 1990; the Mon National Democratic Front (also identified in some sources as the Mon National League for Democracy), which won 5 seats in 1990; and the Zomi National Congress, which won 2 seats in 1990 and is currently led by PU CIN SIAN THANG.

Insurgent Groups During the first half of the 1990s the military regime eliminated or arranged cease-fires with most of the country’s longtime military insurgents, although negotiations with several groups subsequently broke down. After 2004, only a few remained militarily active. (For a more complete accounting of insurgent groups active prior to 1995, see the 1993 and 1994–1995 editions of the Handbook.) Karen National Union (KNU). With Kayin origins dating back to 1947, the KNU and its military wing, the Karen National Liberation Army, operated as one of the more effective minority-based insurgent groups into the 1990s. The KNU declared a unilateral cease-fire in March 1995, following the loss of its Manerplaw headquarters in January and its base in Kawmoora a month later. In early 1997, however, talks between the KNU and the

M YA N M A R ( B U R M A )

government broke down, with the army quickly renewing its campaign against remaining KNU bases. In March 1999 KNU guerrillas reportedly executed ten or more immigration officials who had been captured the previous month near the Thai border. Earlier, a splinter group calling itself the Democratic Karen Buddhist Organization (DKBO) had broken away from the largely Christian KNU. With the support of government forces, the DKBO’s military wing, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), spearheaded several assaults in 1997–1998 on KNU refugee camps in Thailand. The KNU responded in March 1998 by attacking DKBA bases in Myanmar. As the Democratic Karen (or Kayin) Buddhist Association, the group was invited by the government to participate in the reconvened National Convention in 2004. At a ten-day party congress held in late January 2000, Bo Mya stepped down as KNU chair in favor of the party’s former secretary general, who indicated that the party intended to adopt “political means” rather than use force of arms to achieve its goals. A fringe KNU group, God’s Army, took 700 hostages at a hospital in Ratchaburi, Thailand, in January 2000, demanding an end to an anti-Kayin offensive in the Thai-Myanmar border region. All 10 hostage-takers died in an assault by Thai forces a day later. Dating from 1997 and probably numbering no more than 150 men, the cult-like God’s Army was ostensibly led by 12-year-old twins, Johnny and Luther HTOO. It apparently disbanded in October 2000, with the Htoo brothers being granted asylum in Thailand in January 2001. On January 16–22, 2004, Bo Mya led a delegation that held peace talks in Yangon with Prime Minister Kin Nyunt. Although a loose agreement on establishing a cease-fire was reportedly reached, no official pact had been signed by midyear, and skirmishes continued to occur. At a congress held November 18–December 8 Bo Mya, reportedly in poor health, was replaced as vice chair but remained in charge of defense. In May 2006 a renewed government offensive against KNU supporters drew widespread interna-

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tional criticism as well as calls for a new cease-fire and renewed negotiations. Leaders: SAW BA THEIN SIEN (Chair), Gen. BO MYA, Gen. TAMLA BAW (Vice Chair), PHADO MAHN SHA (Secretary General). Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP). With a predominantly Kayinni membership, the KNPP was established in 1957. It concluded an agreement with the SLORC in March 1995 but in mid-1996 took up arms again and remained in active opposition in 2004, although two splinter groups had concluded cease-fire agreements with the SPDC and, on that basis, were invited to send delegates to the reconvened National Convention. Leaders: KHU RIMOND HTOO (Secretary General), KHON OO REH. Shan State Army–South (SSA-S). Dating from 1964, the Shan State Army established the Shan State Progressive Party (subsequently the Shan State Peacekeeping Council) in 1972, although the two later separated. In April 1998 Amnesty International, in a report quickly ridiculed by the SPDC, accused the Myanmar army of torturing or killing hundreds of Shans and forcing at least 300,000 to flee their homes in 1996–1997 as part of its effort to cut off support for the SSA. Although the SSA-North concluded a peace agreement with the SPDC, as of mid-2006 the SSA-South remained in militant opposition to the government. It was joined by the Shan State National Army in 2005. Leader: Col. YAWD SERK (Commander). Burmese Communist Party (BCP). Long a doctrinaire Beijing-oriented group, the BCP was outlawed in 1953. It attempted numerous alliances with minority insurgent groups during the 1980s but by 1989 had largely dissolved along ethnic lines. However, remnants remain active in exile and underground, many of them in the drug trade. In December 1996 a reputed underground leader, NYRIN MINT, was arrested, while in March 1997 several hundred supporters of the Rakhine BCP turned over their arms to the government. In 2004

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the government invited the Rakhine Group to send delegates to the reconvened National Convention. Other insurgent groups include the Chin National Front, which rejected a government ceasefire offer in July 1998, and the Arakan Liberation Party. Among the groups reputedly engaged in drug manufacture and trafficking is the Shan United Revolutionary Party, an offshoot of the Mong Tai Army that rejected the latter’s surrender to government forces.

Exile Groups A number of exile opposition groups currently function. Most support a National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), a shadow government that was established in 1991 and is currently headed by Dr. SEIN WIN from exile. In April 2006 the government declared the NCGUB, the All Burma Student Democratic Front (ABSDF), the Federation of Trade Unions Burma (FTUB), and the National League for Democracy– Liberated Areas (NLD-LA) to be terrorist organizations. All Burma Student Democratic Front (ABSDF). The ABSDF was founded in 1988 by disaffected students. On March 1, 1998, the Yangon regime accused the ABSDF of organizing a plot to assassinate government leaders and bomb government buildings and foreign embassies. The ABSDF denied the charge, responding that it had decided in 1997 to abandon armed conflict in favor of “nonviolent, political defiance.” On April 30 the SPDC announced that 6 of the 40 individuals detained in the plot had been given death sentences for carrying explosives. Earlier, ABSDF leader KO AUNG TUN was imprisoned for 15 years for writing a history of the Burmese student movement. The ABSDF held its Seventh Congress in June 2003 near the Myanmar-Thai border, elected a new leadership, and resolved to combine a “people’s struggle” and “armed struggle” as its new strategy. Leaders: KO THAN KE (Chair), KO MYO WIN (Vice Chair), KO TIN KO KO (Secretary General).

Other exile groups include the Democratic Party for a New Society, the People’s Defense Front, the Burma Women’s Union, and the Network for Democracy and Development. In February 2004 they joined with the ABSDF and a number of other groups to organize an umbrella Democratic Alliance of Burma. Additional formations include the National Council of the Union of Burma (NCUB) and the Federation of Trade Unions Burma (FTUB), which was established in 1991; both are led by PYITHIT NYUENT WAI (a.k.a. MAUNG MAUNG). The National League for Democracy–Liberated Areas (NLD-LA) is led by WIN KHET and TIN AUNG. The U.S. Campaign for Burma is headed by KO AUNG DIN. Overlapping memberships are common. In April 2005 an exile group based in Australia and led by SAI SOE NYUNT declared the independence of the Federated Shan States.

Legislature The former People’s Assembly (Pyithu Hluttaw), elected in November 1985, was abolished by the military government on September 18, 1988. On March 1, 1989, the government issued an election law for a new Constituent Assembly, which excluded from either voting or presentation as candidates all members of the armed forces, members of religious orders, those who “abuse religion for political purposes,” persons associated with insurgent groups, and citizens enjoying “the rights and privileges of a subject or citizen of a foreign power.” At the balloting of May 27, 1990, 93 parties competed for 485 of 492 Assembly seats (polling being banned in 7 constituencies for security reasons). The National League for Democracy won an overwhelming majority of 392 seats, compared to 10 for the government-backed National Unity Party. (For a complete listing of the 25 other parties that won at least 1 seat, see the 1999 or earlier editions of the Handbook.) The Assembly was not permitted to convene.

M YA N M A R ( B U R M A )

Cabinet As of July 1, 2006 Prime Minister

Lt. Gen. Soe Win

Ministers Agriculture and Irrigation Commerce Construction Cooperatives Culture Defense Development Affairs Education Electric Power No. 1 Electric Power No. 2 Energy Finance and Revenue Foreign Affairs Forestry Health Home Affairs Hotels and Tourism Immigration and Population Industry No. 1 Industry No. 2 Information Labor Livestock and Fisheries Mines National Planning and Economic Development Progress of Border Areas and National Races Rail Transport Religious Affairs Science and Technology Social Welfare, Relief, and Resettlement Sports Telecommunications, Posts, and Telegraphs Transport Air Force Commander-in-Chief Navy Commander-in-Chief Commander, Coastal Military Command Commander, Eastern Military Command Commander, Northeast Military Command

Maj. Gen. Htay Oo Brig. Gen. Tin Naing Thein Maj. Gen. Saw Tun Col. Zaw Min Maj. Gen. Khin Aung Myint Sr. Gen. Than Shwe Col. Thein Nyunt Chan Nyein Maj. Gen. Tin Htut Khin Maung Myint Brig. Gen. Lun Thi Maj. Gen. Hla Tun Maj. Gen. Nyan Win Brig. Gen. Thein Aung Kyaw Myint Maj. Gen. Maung Oo Maj. Gen. Soe Naing Maj. Gen. Manung Maung Swe Aung Thaung Maj. Gen. Saw Lwin Brig. Gen. Kyaw Hsan U Thaung Brig. Gen. Maung Maung Thein Brig. Gen. Ohn Myint Soe Tha Col. Thein Nyunt Maj. Gen. Aung Min Brig. Gen. Thura Myint Maung U Thaung Maj. Gen. Maung Maung Swe Brig. Gen. Thura Aye Myint Brig. Gen. Thein Zaw Maj. Gen. Thein Swe Lt. Gen. Myat Hein Vice Adm. Soe Thein Brig. Gen. Khin Zaw Oo Brig. Gen. Thaung Aye Brig. Gen. Aung Than Htut

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Communications The Revolutionary Council banned all publication of privately owned foreign newspapers in early 1966. Under the 1974 constitution, all newspapers remained heavily censored. At present, all media are directly controlled by the government or strictly supervised.

Press Since September 1988 the principal daily published in Yangon has been the official government organ, Myanama Alin/New Light of Myanmar (called Loketha Pyithu Neizin/Working People’s Daily until April 1993), in Myanmar (400,000) and English (15,000). Other government-controlled dailies published in the capital are Botahtaung (The Vanguard), in Myanmar; Guardian, in English; and Kyehmon (The Mirror), in Myanmar. Irregular clandestine papers include the Dawn News Bulletin, published by the All Burma Student Democratic Front. There also is an opposition electronic newspaper, BurmaNet News.

News Agencies The domestic facility is the official Myanmar News Agency—MNA (Myanmar The Din Zin). Several foreign agencies maintain offices in Yangon.

Broadcasting and Computing Programming is controlled by the state-owned Myanmar TV and Radio Department (MTRD), formerly the Burma Broadcasting Service, which transmits in Myanmar, English, and a variety of local languages. TV Myanmar broadcasts, with the aid of relays and satellite, can be received throughout the country; a second station has limited coverage. An opposition Democratic Voice of Burma radio station also broadcasts from overseas. There were approximately 456,000 television receivers and 300,000 personal computers serving 310,000 Internet users in 2003.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. (Vacant) U.S. Ambassador to Myanmar (Vacant) Permanent Representative to the UN KYAW TINT SWE IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, ASEAN, CP, Interpol, NAM, WCO, WTO

NAU RU REPUBLIC

OF

NAURU

Naoero

The Country An isolated coral island in the west-central Pacific, Nauru is located just south of the equator between the Marshall and Solomon Islands. The present population consists of some 60 percent indigenous Nauruans (a mixture of Micronesian, Melanesian, and Polynesian stocks), 25 percent other Pacific islanders, 8 percent Chinese, and 7 percent Australians and other Caucasians. Habitation is mainly confined to a fertile strip of land ringing a central plateau composed of very highgrade phosphate deposits. For several decades this mineral wealth yielded one of the world’s highest per capita incomes, which, however, declined from a peak of over $17,000 in 1975 to scarcely more than $8,000 a decade later. For 1998, annual GDP per capita was estimated by the UN at under $3,000, and the overall GDP continued its decline. According to the government, 1999 saw a recovery, with estimated growth of 3 percent, but the rate of expansion in 2000 dropped to under 1 percent, and in April 2004 Nauru sought Australian help to avoid bankruptcy. Income from the government-owned Nauru Phosphate Company was intended to provide an investment fund against the time, originally thought to be around 2010, when the phosphate deposits would be exhausted. However, a variety of difficulties, including widespread fiscal mismanagement, led to drastic depletion of the fund; to compensate, Nauru turned to offshore banking accounts, which, however, led to international accusations by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and others that it had become a

center for tax evasion and money laundering, and on March 27, 2003, Parliament passed legislation abolishing the practice (see Current issues, below).

Government and Politics Political Background A former German colony, Nauru became a British League of Nations mandate in 1919, with Australia as the administering power. The Japanese occupied the island during World War II and transported most of the inhabitants to Truk, where

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fewer than two-thirds survived the hardships of forced labor. In 1947 Nauru was made a UN Trust Territory under joint administration of the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, with Australia again serving as de facto administering authority. Local self-government was gradually accelerated, and in 1966 elections were held for members of a Legislative Council with jurisdiction over all matters except defense, external affairs, and the phosphate industry. Pursuant to the council’s request for full independence, Australia adopted a Nauru Independence Act in November 1967, and the trusteeship agreement was formally terminated by the United Nations, effective January 31, 1968. The arrangements for independence were negotiated by a delegation led by Hammer DeROBURT, who had been head chief of Nauru since 1956 and who became the new Republic’s first president by legislative designation on May 18, 1968. Relations with the Commonwealth were defined by an agreement announced on November 29, 1968, whereby Nauru became a “special member” entitled to full participation in the organization’s activities, except meetings of Commonwealth heads of government. President DeRoburt, reelected in 1971 and 1973, was replaced by Bernard DOWIYOGO following a legislative election in December 1976. Although reconfirmed following a parliamentary election in November 1977, Dowiyogo resigned in January 1978 because of a deadlock over budgetary legislation. Immediately reelected, he resigned again in mid-April after the opposition had blocked passage of a bill dealing with phosphate royalties. He was succeeded by Lagumot HARRIS, who in turn resigned on May 11 because of an impasse on an appropriations bill. Harris was succeeded, on the same day, by former president DeRoburt, apparently as the result of a temporary defection by an opposition representative. The remarkable spectacle of three presidents in one month was accompanied by intense debate on the economic future of Nauru upon exhaustion of its phosphate deposits. Exports of the commodity

had been declining for several years, and both public and private groups had engaged in substantial overseas investment, including a retail and office complex on Saipan in the Marianas and a 53-story office building in Melbourne, Australia. DeRoburt was reelected in 1980 and 1983 but was forced to yield office to Kennan Ranibok ADEANG during a ten-day loss of his parliamentary majority in October 1986 and for a four-day period in the wake of an election on December 6. He was sworn in for a ninth term on January 27, 1987, following redesignation by a new parliament elected three days earlier. DeRoburt again fell victim to a nonconfidence vote on August 17, 1989, Kenas AROI being designated his successor. However, Aroi was obliged to resign on December 12 to seek medical treatment in Australia, Dowiyogo returning for a third time as chief executive. Legislative balloting on November 15, 1992, yielded a standoff between supporters of President Dowiyogo and Beraro DETUDAMO, a prot´eg´e of former president DeRoburt, who had died on July 15. After intense negotiations, Dowiyogo succeeded in forging a ten-member coalition of the nominally independent members. On November 22, 1995, following a legislative poll the day before, Parliament reelected former president Lagumont Harris over Dowiyogo by a 9–8 vote. However, Dowiyogo was reappointed by Parliament on November 7, 1996, only to be ousted himself on November 26 in favor of Adeang, who in turn lost a confidence motion soon thereafter, prompting the appointment of Reuben KUN as acting president. Following new legislative elections on February 8, 1997, Kinza CLODUMAR, a former finance minister, was appointed president on February 12. He was ousted by a noconfidence vote on June 17, 1998, and was succeeded by Dowiyogo, who assumed office for a fifth term. Dowiyogo himself lost a no-confidence motion on April 27, 1999, and was succeeded by Ren´e HARRIS, a member of Parliament since 1977 and former head of Nauru’s national phosphate corporation.

NAURU

Political Status: Independent republic since January 31, 1968; special membership in the Commonwealth changed to full membership on May 1, 1999. Area: 8.2 sq. mi. (21.3 sq. km.). Population: 9,919 (1992C); 13,200 (2005E). At the time of the 1983 census, only 4,964 of 8,042 inhabitants were declared to be native Nauruans. Major Urban Centers: None; the Domaneab (“meeting place of the people”), which is the site of the Nauru Local Government Council, is located in Uaboe District, while government offices are located in Yaren District. Official Languages: English, Nauruan. Monetary Unit: Australian Dollar (market rate July 1, 2006: 1.35 dollars = $1US). President: Ludwig SCOTTY; served as President from May 29 to August 8, 2003; returned to office by Parliament on June 22, 2004, succeeding Ren´e HARRIS; reconfirmed on October 26, 2004, following legislative election of October 23.

President Harris was reelected following legislative balloting on April 8, 2000, but was obliged to resign on April 19 because of factional differences, with Dowiyogo being returned to office on April 20. His sixth term in office ended with passage of a no-confidence motion on March 30, 2001, at which time Ren´e Harris resumed the presidency. Harris was defeated in a no-confidence vote on January 8, 2003, with Dowiyogo sworn in as his successor the following day. However, the Nauru Supreme Court (sitting in Australia) ruled that the vote for Dowiyogo was invalid because it had been called without the presence of Harris and his ministers. With the Harris group in attendance, the vote was split 9–9. Following a period of confusion that included Harris’s return to the presidency for one day, Dowiyogo defeated Clodumar on a 9–8 vote and was reinvested on January 20. However, he died after undergoing heart surgery in Washing-

487

ton, D.C., on March 20 and was succeeded on an acting basis by Derog GIOURA. Another general election was held on May 3, 2003, and on May 29 Ludwig SCOTTY was installed as president. On August 8 Scotty was ousted and replaced by Harris; however, on June 22, 2004, Harris was in turn replaced by Scotty. On October 1, Scotty dissolved Parliament and in the ensuing general election on October 23 was accorded a new majority that permitted his reinvestiture.

Constitution and Government Nauru’s constitution, adopted by an elected Constitutional Convention on January 29, 1968, and amended on May 17 of the same year, provides for a republic whose president combines the functions of head of state and chief of government. The unicameral Parliament, consisting of 18 members popularly elected for three-year terms (assuming no dissolution), selects the president from among its membership; the president in turn appoints a number of legislators to serve as a cabinet that is responsible to Parliament and is obligated to resign as a body in the event of a nonconfidence vote. The judiciary consists of a Supreme Court and a District Court. The island is administratively divided into 14 districts, which are regrouped into 8 districts for electoral purposes. An elected Local Government Council of nine members (one of whom is designated Head Chief) shares administrative responsibilities with Parliament.

Foreign Relations Nauru maintains formal diplomatic relations with about a dozen foreign governments, primarily through representatives accredited to Australia and Fiji. In January 1998, on the 30th anniversary of Nauru’s independence, President Clodumar announced that the country would apply for membership in the United Nations. (A formal request was issued in April 1999 with admittance to the world body in September.) Long a member of the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia

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and the Pacific and of the South Pacific Forum (SPF, now the Pacific Islands Forum), it acceded in August 1982 to the South Pacific Regional Trade Agreement (Sparteca), under which Australia and New Zealand had agreed to permit the duty-free entry of a wide variety of goods from SPF member countries. Its principal international tie, however, has been with the Commonwealth. Under special membership status negotiated following independence, Nauru was permitted to participate in a wide range of Commonwealth activities and was eligible for technical assistance. Full membership was accorded on May 1, 1999. In January 1992 Nauru joined with sister island nations Kiribati and Tuvalu, and the New Zealand dependencies of the Cook Islands and Niue, to form a Small Island States (SIS) grouping to address a number of common concerns, including global warming, the negotiation of fishing rights in their 200-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs), and the possibility of renting airspace to planes overflying their countries. During 1995 Nauru adopted the hardest line of all regional countries in opposing France’s decision to resume nuclear testing at Mururoa Atoll in September. It was one of four countries and territories to boycott the Tahiti Games in August because of the issue, with President Dowiyogo, who had previously supported New Zealand’s World Court bid to stop the tests, traveling to Paris with other regional leaders in an unsuccessful effort to secure cancellation. In July 2002 Nauru and the Republic of China (Taiwan) ended two decades of diplomatic relations as the Harris government and the People’s Republic of China agreed to establish formal ties. The Harris administration, attempting to justify its about-face, cited the alleged interference of a Taiwanese envoy in a recent parliamentary byelection, although most observers attributed the shift to an expectation that Beijing would provide substantially more economic aid than Taipei. However, little aid was forthcoming, and in May 2005 the Scotty administration resumed relations with Taiwan.

Since 2001, two issues have dominated Nauru’s foreign relations: its role as an offshore banking center, which drew charges of money laundering from the United States and the OECD, and its cooperation with Australia in the temporary housing of refugee “boat people” (see Current issues, below).

Current Issues Beginning in 1998, with virtual exhaustion of Nauru’s phosphate deposits and the squandering of its phosphate trust assets in a series of failed investments, the country’s economy has been in crisis. The decline was briefly arrested with an influx of offshore banking transactions, Russian deposits alone amounting to $70 billion, according to the U.S. Treasury Department. Responding to what became an OECD-led chorus of complaints, Parliament passed an anti–money laundering bill in August 2001. Nonetheless, Nauru remained on the OECD’s uncooperative list because of little concrete action against an estimated 400 shell banks, and in March 2003 offshore banking was outlawed. However, the action failed to dispel recurrent charges of corruption that yielded an average of two executive turnovers a year in the period 1999–2004. Meanwhile, Nauru had entered into a series of agreements with Australia for the detention of large numbers of “boat people,” whom Canberra did not wish to admit as refugees. In 2001 Nauru agreed to accept 240 Iraqis who had been rescued at sea by a Norwegian freighter; subsequently, it accepted A$10 million to house 400 Afghans who had also sought to settle in Australia. Later, as the number of asylum seekers rose to 1,200, the payment increased to a total of A$31 million, a sum approximately that of the island’s GDP. The arrangements, part of Australia’s “Pacific Solution” for migrants, were not intended to be permanent, and in late 2003 a group of detainees staged a hunger strike to press consideration of their claim by Canberra. The strike was called off in early 2004, after Australia agreed to review their cases and New Zealand

NAURU

489

Cabinet As of July 1, 2006 President

Ludwig Scotty

Ministers Culture and Tourism Education Environment Finance and Economic Planning Fisheries and Marine Resources Foreign Affairs and Trade Health Home Affairs Island Development and Industry Justice Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust Nauru Rehabilitation Corporation Public Service Public Works and Infrastructure Sports Transport Women’s Affairs Youth Affairs

Frederick Pitcher Baron Waqa Frederick Pitcher David Adeang Godfrey Thoma David Adeang Dr. Kieren Keke [f] Ludwig Scotty Frederick Pitcher Godfrey Thoma Frederick Pitcher Kieren Keke [f] Ludwig Scotty Baron Waqa Dr. Kieren Keke [f] Dr. Kieren Keke [f] Dr. Kieren Keke [f] Baron Waqa

[f] = female

said it would accept some of them on humanitarian grounds. Others were expected to accept Australian financial incentives to return home. Despite the Australian funds, Nauru has continued to experience budgetary crises. In February 2003 the island was virtually cut off from the outside world by the collapse of its telephone system, and in April 2004 Nauru sought Australian help in staving off bankruptcy after the appointment of a receiver for its debt-ridden Phosphates Royalties Trust. The following September, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), in a rare move, announced that it would assist Nauru in paying government wage arrears and help to develop measures of fiscal reform. In addition, Australia said it would provide funds to address food shortages and diet-related health problems.

In October 2005 President Scotty appealed, without visible success, for financial aid from the United Nations. Of more tangible value, an Australian company was reported in November to have signed a contract valued at $5–6 million to restart mining for what remained of the island’s phosphate deposits.

Political Parties Until 1976 there were no political parties in Nauru. Following the election of December 1976 at least half of the new Parliament claimed membership in the Nauru Party, a loosely structured group led by Bernard Dowiyogo and consisting primarily of younger Nauruans opposed to some of President DeRoburt’s policies. The party won 9 of 18

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seats in the election of November 1977 but became moribund there after. Following the election of January 1987, it was reported that eight members of Parliament had joined an opposition Nauru Democratic Party under the leadership of former president Kennan Adeang. A subsequent report indicated that Dowiyogo’s supporters had formed a Democratic Party, with supporters of former president Lagumot Harris having launched another Nauru Party. None, however, developed into effective organizations. In 2001 a Nauru First (Naoero Amo) party was organized by a group of activists, including David ADEANG, Dr. Kieren KEKE, and Marlene MOSES, in opposition to both the Dowiyogo and Ren´e Harris camps. A second new formation, the Center Party, also emerged under the leadership of former president Kinza Clodumar.

Legislature The unicameral Parliament of 18 members is popularly elected for a three-year term, subject to dissolution. Voting is compulsory for those over 20 years of age. The most recent election was on October 23, 2004. Speaker: Valdon DOWIYOGO.

Communications Press The Bulletin (750), weekly in English and Nauruan; Central Star News, fortnightly; The Visionary, periodical published by Nauru First.

Broadcasting Government-owned Radio Nauru currently broadcasts in English and Nauruan. Television service was launched in May 1991 by means of a contract with Television New Zealand that now services some 1,100 receivers.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. Marlene MOSES U.S. Ambassador to Nauru Larry Miles DINGER (resident in Fiji) Permanent Representative to the UN Marlene MOSES IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, CWTH, Interpol, PC, PIF

N E PA L KINGDOM

OF

NEPAL

Nep a´ l Alhirajya

See the note at the end of this entry for information on current events.

The Country Landlocked between India and Tibet in the central Himalayas, Nepal is renowned for a mountainous landscape dominated by such peaks as Everest and Annapurna and for the prowess of its Gurkha regiments, who have served in the British and Indian armies. It encompasses three distinct geographic zones: a southern plain known as the Terai, a central hill region with many rivers and valleys, and a northern section dominated by high mountains. The country is inhabited by numerous tribes who fall into two main ethnic groupings, Mongolian and Indo-Aryan. The majority of the population, particularly in the south, is Hindu in religion and linked in culture to India. The northern region, adjoining Tibet, is mainly Buddhist, but throughout the country Hindu and Buddhist practices have intermingled with each other and with Shamanism. In 1998 women constituted 40 percent of the labor force, almost entirely in agriculture; however, female participation in government is minimal. With GNP per capita of approximately $240 in 2003 and with 56 percent illiteracy (74 percent for females), Nepal is considered one of the world’s least-developed nations. About 80 percent of the population has access to safe drinking water but only about 27 percent to sanitary facilities, while half of all children under the age of five are considered malnourished. Moreover, Nepal suffers from a severely unequal distribution of wealth: according to some estimates, average income in the “hill

country” is less than 10 percent that of the capital region. Agriculture continues to employ 75 percent of the labor force and to account for about 40 percent of GDP. Industry, which contributes about 20 percent of GDP, is oriented toward processed foods and other nondurable consumer goods, industrial development being hindered by rudimentary communication and transportation facilities.

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Natural resources include timber (despite extensive deforestation in some areas), mica, and coal, while there is increasing emphasis on the export potential of hydropower. At present, leading exports include woolen carpets, ready-made clothing, and such agricultural products as pulses, jute, and spices. India continues to account for half of Nepal’s export earnings and two-fifths of its imports, although an effort has been made to expand markets elsewhere, particularly in easternAsia. GDP growth averaged about 5 percent annually in the 1990s, during which extensive foreign aid from individual countries and such organizations as the World Bank supported a wide variety of projects, including construction of roads, railways, and hydroelectric facilities. For fiscal year 2000– 2001 growth continued at a 5.6 percent rate, but an escalating Maoist insurgency contributed to a 0.6 percent drop in output in the following fiscal period. GDP growth recovered to 3.4 percent for each of the next two fiscal years but then dipped to an estimated 2.5 percent in 2004–2005. In May 2004, in the context of the worsening insurgency, 30 international donors announced that they would withhold further economic aid commitments, on which Nepal heavily depends, until the government made progress toward restoring domestic stability, improving human rights, and meeting democratic standards.

Government and Politics Political Background Founded in 1769 by the Gurkha ruler Prithvi NARAYAN Shah as a kingdom comprising 46 previously sovereign principalities, Nepal was ruled by Narayan’s descendants until the 1840s, when the Rana family established an autocratic system that, under hereditary prime ministers, lasted until 1951. A revolution in 1950, inspired in part by India’s independence, restored the power of King TRIBHUVAN Bir Bikram Shah Dev and initiated a period of quasi-constitutional rule that continued after 1955 under the auspices of Tribhuvan’s son, King MAHENDRA Bir Bikram Shah Dev.

A democratic constitution promulgated in 1959 paved the way for an election that brought to power the socialist-inclined Nepali Congress (NC) under Biseswar Prasad KOIRALA. In December 1960, however, the king charged the new government with misuse of power, dismissed and jailed its leaders, suspended the constitution, banned political parties, and assumed personal authority. A new constitution promulgated in 1962 and amended in 1967 established a tiered panchayat (assembly) system of representative bodies that was held to be more in keeping with Nepal’s traditions. The “nonparty” system encountered persistent opposition, despite reconciliation efforts that included Koirala’s release from detention. King BIRENDRA Bir Bikram Shah Dev, who succeeded to the throne in January 1972, accorded high priority to economic development but encountered difficulty in combining monarchial rule with pressures for political liberalization. Confronted with mounting unrest, Prime Minister Kirti Nidhi BISTA was forced to resign in July 1973, while his successor, Nagendra Prasad RIJAL, was replaced by Tulsi GIRI in December 1975. Bista returned to office when Giri resigned in September 1977 in the wake of corruption charges and a failure to regularize relations with India. In May 1979, after prolonged demonstrations that began as a student protest but expanded to include workers, peasants, and the middle class in a call for political reforms, King Birendra announced that a referendum would be held to determine whether the nation favored revision of the panchayat structure or its replacement by a multiparty system. Immediately thereafter, Bista was succeeded by Surya Bahadur THAPA, who had previously served as prime minister in 1965–1969. A year later, in May 1980, Nepalese voters rejected reintroduction of a party system, and in December the king proclaimed a number of constitutional changes, including direct, nonparty election to the National Assembly. Less than a third of the assembly members elected in May 1981 were considered strongly progovernment, and nearly two-thirds signed a nonbinding motion in mid-1982 urging Thapa to resign because of food shortages and high prices. Al-

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Political Status: Independent monarchy established 1769; limited constitutional system promulgated December 16, 1962; constitutional monarchy proclaimed under constitution of November 9, 1990. Area: 54,362 sq. mi. (140,797 sq. km.). Population: 23,151,423 (2001C); 24,166,000 (2005E). Major Urban Center (2005E): KATHMANDU (804,000). Official Language: Nepali. Monetary Unit: Nepalese Rupee (market rate July 1, 2006: 73.66 rupees = $1US). Sovereign: King GYANENDRA Bir Bikram Shah Dev; succeeded to the throne June 4, 2001, on the death of his comatose nephew, DIPENDRA Bir Bikram Shah Dev, who on June 1 had murdered his father, King BIRENDRA Bir Bikram Shah Dev, and most of the rest of the royal family before shooting himself. Heir to the Throne: Crown Prince PARAS Bir Bikram Shah Dev; designated by his father, King Gyanendra, on October 26, 2001. Prime Minister: Girija Prasad KOIRALA (Nepali Congress); proposed by a seven-party alliance on April 26, 2006, and appointed by the king on April 27, in succession to King GYANENDRA Bir Bikram Shah Dev, who on April 21 had announced his intention to step down as chair of the Council of Ministers; sworn in April 30.

though the prime minister retained the king’s confidence, severe economic problems plus renewed charges of official corruption and mismanagement resulted in parliamentary defeat of the Thapa government in July 1983 and the appointment of Lokendra Bahadur CHAND as prime minister. In March 1986 Prime Minister Chand submitted his resignation to concentrate on the forthcoming national election, former prime minister Rijal being named as his interim successor. In balloting that began on May 12, little more than two-thirds of the Assembly incumbents secured reelection, with a majority of the new members reportedly favoring abolition of the panchayat sys-

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tem. On June 13 the parliament elected Marich Man Singh SHRESTHA to the post of prime minister. In the wake of economic distress caused by the March 1989 lapse of crucial trade and transit treaties with India (see Foreign relations, below), the banned NC called for dissolution of the Shrestha administration. Inspired by events in Eastern Europe, the NC and seven Communist groups joined in February 1990 to form a Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) that sought multiparty elections and an end to the panchayat system. On April 6, amid a mounting “People’s Movement” (Jana Andolan), the monarch replaced the basically hard-line Shrestha with his more moderate predecessor. Ten days later Chand again resigned, and on April 19 King Birendra reluctantly agreed to the appointment of the NC president, Krishna Prasad BHATTARAI, to head an interim cabinet that included three of Bhattarai’s colleagues, three Communists, two independent human rights activists, and two royal nominees. On May 17 the king declared an amnesty for all political prisoners (most of whom had campaigned for party legalization) and on May 21 delegated legislative power to the Bhattarai cabinet, the assembly having been dissolved in mid-April. On May 30 he approved the government’s nominees to a Constitutional Recommendation Commission and on September 10 accepted the commission’s draft of a new basic law, which was formally promulgated on November 9. On May 12, 1991, at the country’s first multiparty general election since 1959, the NC won control of the new House of Representatives, although Bhattarai lost his seat; as a result, the party’s strongly anti-Communist general secretary, Girija Prasad KOIRALA (brother of the former prime minister), was named to head a new administration on May 26. On June 26 the NC consolidated its parliamentary control by filling a majority of seats in the upper house, the National Council. Subsequently, the NC was seriously weakened by differences between Prime Minister Koirala and his predecessor, coupled with rumors of foul play in a May 1993 road accident that had killed two opposition Communist leaders. In mid-February 1994, following allegations that Koirala had

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engineered a by-election defeat for Bhattarai, a group of NC dissidents joined with a coalition of left-wing legislators to introduce a no-confidence motion against the government. The motion failed, and it was not until July 10, when he could not secure endorsement of an overview of government policies and programs, that Koirala felt obliged to submit his resignation. At the balloting of November 15, 1994, the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified MarxistLeninist)—CPN(UML) won a plurality of 88 seats in the 205-member lower house, and its leader, Man Mohan ADHIKARI, was sworn in as prime minister on November 30. On June 11, 1995, however, the NC tabled a nonconfidence motion that the National Democratic Party (Rashtriya Prajatantra Party—RPP), theretofore a crucial CPN(UML) ally, announced it would support. Two days later, at Adhikari’s request, the king dissolved the National Assembly. The action was protested by the NC, the rightist RPP, and the royalist Nepali Goodwill Party (Nepal Sadbhavana Party—NSP), which collectively held 106 of 205 legislative seats. In August the Supreme Court upheld the opposition contention that the action was unconstitutional, and the prime minister was obliged to submit his resignation following rejection of a confidence motion on September 10. Two days later, the NC’s Sher Bahadur DEUBA formed the country’s first coalition administration, encompassing the NC, RPP, and NSP. The Deuba coalition government remained vulnerable to potential shifting alliances, especially among the RPP ministers, and the prime minister was forced to resign on March 6, 1997, after losing a confidence motion by two votes. On March 10 the king invited former prime minister Chand of the RPP to form a new government, which, as announced on March 12, included the CPN(UML), RPP, and NSP. Following local balloting in May, elements within the RPP as well as opposition parties charged the victorious CPN(UML) with having committed election fraud and other irregularities. By late September the RPP had split into factions led by Chand and former prime minister Thapa. When Chand lost a confidence motion on October 4, he resigned, with Thapa taking over

as prime minister and naming a new government that included the RPP and NSP. The NC subsequently joined the cabinet in another reshuffle, but the coalition remained unstable, and in early January 1998 Thapa asked the king to dissolve the Parliament and call new elections. The CPN(UML) and the Chand faction of the RPP objected and instead called for a special legislative session to consider a no-confidence motion. As a result, the RPP expelled the Chand group, which immediately formed a “New RPP.” Meanwhile, the king had referred the issue to the Supreme Court, which on February 4 recommended convening the House of Representatives. On February 20 the government survived a no-confidence motion by only three votes. On April 10, 1998, Prime Minister Thapa resigned in accordance with a power-sharing arrangement with the NC. Although former NC prime minister G. P. Koirala failed to fashion another coalition, he was sworn in on April 15 as the head of a three-person minority government, the NC being the plurality party in the House following a March 5 split in the CPN(UML). The latter party had lost more than half its MPs to a new Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist)—CPN(ML) in a dispute over what the new group considered the inadequacies of the water-sharing Mahakali Integrated Development Treaty concluded with India in 1996. On April 18 Koirala secured a confidence vote and three days later introduced an expanded cabinet. A cabinet reshuffle on August 26, 1998, marked formation of an NC-led coalition with the new CPN(ML), which had demanded in return for its support review of the 1950 Indo-Nepal Peace and Friendship Treaty; withdrawal of Indian troops from the disputed Kalapani border area, where they had been posted since the 1962 Sino-Indian war; and repatriation to Bhutan of the nearly 100,000 Bhutanese refugees of Nepali descent who had been sheltered in camps in southeast Nepal since 1990 (see Foreign relations, below). On December 10, charging that the NC had failed to honor its commitment, the CPN(ML) withdrew from the government, prompting Prime Minister Koirala to recommend that the lower house be dissolved. On December 20 the NC and the CPN(UML) agreed to

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form an interim, preelection government—Nepal’s sixth in four years—that, with the additional participation of the NSP, was sworn in on December 28. The interim administration won a confidence vote on January 14, 1999, and a day later the king dissolved the House of Representatives and announced that a general election would be held in May. With the left split by the CPN(UML)-CPN(ML) rupture, and with Prime Minister Koirala having announced that he would step aside in favor of his longtime intraparty rival, former prime minister K. P. Bhattarai, the NC swept to victory at the May 3 and 17, 1999, balloting. Despite the objections of all the major parties except the NC, the election had been conducted in two phases to ensure adequate security in the western and central regions, site of a three-year-old Maoist “People’s War” insurgency. With the NC having won a majority of 111 seats in the 205-seat lower house, Bhattarai was sworn in as prime minister on May 31, at the head of a 16minister cabinet that was reshuffled and expanded to 19 on June 30. The difficulty in forming a cabinet reflected continuing internecine warfare between NC President Koirala and Prime Minister Bhattarai, a situation that worsened in the following months even though the two septuagenarians had committed themselves to preparing a “younger generation” of leaders. By December 1999 moves were already afoot to force the prime minister’s departure, and on March 16, 2000, one day before a scheduled vote by the NC parliamentarians would have ousted him from office, Bhattarai announced to the lower house that he would submit his resignation to the king. On March 18 Koirala easily defeated former prime minister Deuba in the NC’s first-ever open leadership election, and on March 20 the king appointed him prime minister for the fourth time. Koirala, who was sworn in on March 22 as the head of a wholly revamped cabinet, committed his new administration to preserving law and order, ending corruption, and providing “good governance,” but he offered no specific initiatives. Koirala survived another challenge from Deuba at a January 2001 NC convention, despite corruption allegations involving an airline leasing deal

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that had been awarded without competitive bidding. In February Koirala included members of Deuba’s NC faction in a reshuffled cabinet, but after two months of parliamentary boycotts and disruptions led by the opposition CPN(UML), King Birendra prorogued both houses of the legislature on April 5. On June 1, 2001, Nepal experienced an unprecedented trauma when Crown Prince DIPENDRA Bikram Shah Dev killed most of the royal family, including King Birendra and Queen AISHWARYA, with an automatic weapon during a family get-together at the palace. Eight died immediately and two others, including Dipendra, who had shot himself, succumbed on June 4. Upon the death of Dipendra, who had been proclaimed king on June 2 despite his comatose state, Prince Regent GYANENDRA Bir Bikram Shah Dev, brother of King Birendra, ascended to the throne. The massacre had apparently originated in the late king and queen’s persistent rejection of Dipendra’s choice of a bride, whose ancestry they found wanting. With the kingdom barely recovered from the June tragedy, Prime Minister Koirala resigned on July 19, 2001, having proved unable to quell the Maoist insurgency and to overcome corruption allegations. On July 22 King Gyanendra named the new NC leader, former prime minister Deuba, to head a new government that was sworn in four days later. Upon nomination, Prime Minister Deuba had identified resolving the insurgency as his highest priority, and on July 23 he declared a cease-fire with the rebels. By mid-August Deuba had announced an ambitious series of reforms, including a land redistribution plan to aid the poor (and undercut rural support for the Maoists), a proposal to make discrimination against dalits (“untouchables”) a crime, establishment of a National Women’s Commission to pursue gender equality, and forward movement on the previous administration’s anticorruption bill. He was already encountering opposition from elements of his own party, however, particularly over the land distribution scheme. The opening of talks between the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the government on August 30, 2001, was preceded by mutual prisoner releases, but the two sides failed to make progress

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before a third round of talks collapsed on November 13. Shortly thereafter the Maoists broke the ceasefire, and on November 26 the king declared a state of emergency; promulgated a Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Ordinance, which defined terrorism and suspended many civil liberties; and for the first time authorized full mobilization of the army against the rebels. In succeeding months casualties rapidly mounted, and on February 21, 2002, Deuba easily marshaled the two-thirds lower house majority needed to extend the state of emergency for another three months. Responding to criticism from the opposition as well as from international human rights advocates, on April 4 the government somewhat relaxed the state of emergency to permit greater press freedom and to allow public political meetings. Meanwhile, the Maoists had continued to widen their campaign, and with increasing frequency were attacking the country’s infrastructure, including communications facilities, water supplies, dams, bridges, schools, and health clinics. By late May the death toll from the six-year insurgency had risen to 4,000–5,000, up from about 1,800 the preceding October. In May 2002 Koirala supporters within the NC, charging that Deuba had failed to consult them before requesting a second extension of the state of emergency, prepared to join the parliamentary opposition in rejecting the proposal. Facing defeat, Prime Minister Deuba convinced King Gyanendra to dissolve the House of Representatives on May 22, a decision that was attacked by most parties and led several NC ministers to resign from Deuba’s caretaker cabinet. In late May the NC disciplinary committee expelled Deuba from the party for three years. In turn, Deuba supporters called a convention for June 16–19 and proceeded to expel Koirala. On September 17 the Election Commission determined that the Koirala faction had the right to the NC title, and on September 23 Deuba registered a new Nepali Congress (Democratic)—NC(D). With a backdrop of the increasingly intense Maoist insurgency, on October 4, 2002, King Gyanendra dismissed the Deuba government for “incompetence,” postponed the early legislative elec-

tion that had been scheduled for November 13, and temporarily assumed executive powers. On October 11 he named a former prime minister, Lokendra Bahadur Chand of the promonarchy RPP, to head a nonparty government, which was then expanded in mid-November. The dismissal of the Deuba government was challenged on constitutional grounds by the NC, the CPN(UML), and other mainstream parties, which demanded that an all-party administration be formed. On January 29, 2003, following extensive negotiations conducted by Minister of Physical Planning and Construction Narayan Singh PUN, the Chand government and the CPN (Maoist) agreed to a new cease-fire and peace talks, which opened in the capital on April 27. A second round was held on May 9, but by then the cease-fire was beginning to break down. Facing student-led antigovernment demonstrations and the continuing refusal of the major political parties to join in his peace efforts, on May 30 Prime Minister Chand resigned. On June 4, 2003, the king named the RPP’s Surya Bahadur Thapa as prime minister after rejecting the candidate of a five-party opposition Joint People’s Movement (JPM), Madhav Kumar NEPAL, the CPN(UML)’s general secretary. Like its predecessor, the all-RPP cabinet introduced on June 1 was denounced as illegitimate by the NC, the CPN(UML), and the other JPM parties, who accused the king of undermining multiparty democracy through “regression.” Many in the opposition advocated recalling the dismissed House of Representatives—although there was no constitutional provision for doing so—as well as forming an all-party government. A third round of peace talks on August 17–19, 2003, made no significant progress as the Maoists continued to insist that a constituent assembly be elected to draft a new constitution. On August 27 the CPN (Maoist) leader, Pushpa Kamal DAHAL (Comrade PRACHANDA), issued a statement announcing an end to both the talks and the ceasefire, and in succeeding months the violence escalated once again as the insurgents demonstrated their ability to attack throughout the country. The CPN (Maoist) also continued its efforts to organize

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administrative machinery in the districts it claimed to control. On May 7, 2004, Prime Minister Thapa resigned “to pave the way for national consensus,” and on June 2 the king reappointed former prime minister Deuba—the country’s 14th prime minister in 14 years. Shortly thereafter, the CPN(UML), contending that opposition-supported antigovernment street demonstrations were no longer “meaningful,” withdrew from the JPM. On July 5 the Deuba cabinet was expanded to include the CPN(UML), the RPP, and the NSP, in addition to Deuba’s NC(D). At the beginning of 2005 the government remained in disarray over how to confront the persistent Maoists and whether, as the prime minister insisted, a legislative election should be scheduled even if the insurgents refused to return to the negotiating table. The NC, frustrated by the king’s unwillingness to compromise with the opposition, had already joined the CPN(UML) in calling for creation of a republic, while other parties had decided to support the Maoists’ demand for election of a constituent assembly and their inclusion in an interim government. On February 1 King Gyanendra dismissed the Deuba government, reintroduced a state of emergency, placed many political leaders under house arrest, ordered the army into the streets of the capital, and suspended press and other freedoms. Having vowed to “restore peace and effective democracy in this country within the next three years,” on February 2 he named a cabinet of loyalists under his leadership. Although the state of emergency was lifted on April 29, 2005, by which time most political leaders had been released, a number of civil restrictions remained in effect. The cabinet was expanded on July 15 by the addition of several other loyalists, all the major political parties having rejected the king’s proposal that they put forward nominees. On May 8, 2005, the country’s leading opposition parties had announced formation of a “sevenparty alliance” (SPA). They adopted a common agenda and a roadmap to restoration of democracy that included reinstating the dissolved House of Representatives and forming a unity govern-

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ment. Participating in the SPA were the NC; the NC(D); the CPN(UML); the NSP (Anandi Devi), an NSP splinter formed in 2003; People’s Front Nepal (Janamorcha Nepal—JMN), the electoral front of the Communist Party of Nepal (Unity Center Mashal); the Nepal Workers’ and Peasants’ Party (NWPP); and the United Left Front (ULF), at that time a five-party grouping of small Communist parties. Together, the SPA parties had held all but about a dozen of the 205 seats in the dissolved House of Representatives. Among other actions, the SPA’s coordinating committee began organizing prodemocracy demonstrations in Kathmandu and elsewhere. Responding to overtures from the SPA, including indications that the participating parties were ready to consider formation of a constituent assembly that would draft a new constitution, on September 3, 2005, the Maoists’ Prachanda announced a three-month unilateral cease-fire. Subsequent talks between the SPA and the Maoists led to a November 22 announcement of a 12-point agreement designed to end the king’s “autocracy” and move toward election of a constituent assembly. The cease-fire, which saw relatively few violations by the Maoists, was extended on December 2 but terminated on January 2, 2006, because of the government’s nonresponse. Meanwhile, on December 7 Gyanendra had conducted a major cabinet shuffle, dropping eight ministers and bringing a number of royalist parties, principally the RPP, into the cabinet. Antigovernment agitation expanded early in 2006 as the public became increasingly disenchanted with the king’s harsh civil restrictions and his inability to end the insurgency. On January 12, 2006, in Janakpur a reported 150,000 protesters took to the streets, prompting the government to install a curfew in Kathmandu to forestall a similar rally there on January 20. Municipal elections held on February 8 were boycotted by the SPA, while Maoist threats against candidates and voters contributed to a low turnout. With the Maoists in control of an estimated three-fourths of the countryside and with the roads into Kathmandu again blockaded, the SPA began a general strike

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on April 6. Demonstrations in support of the Loktantra Andolan (“Democracy Movement,” or “People’s Movement II” to echo the 1990 Jana Andolan) grew increasingly fervent, and on several occasions the police and army fired into crowds. The death toll had reached 18 by April 24. That night, in a televised proclamation, King Gyanendra succumbed to public pressure, announcing that he would reinstate the House of Representatives and asking the SPA to assume responsibility “for taking the nation on the path to national unity and prosperity, while ensuring permanent peace and safeguarding multiparty democracy.” The next day, the SPA called off the general strike and further protests. On April 26 the SPA selected veteran NC leader G. P. Koirala as its choice for prime minister. On the same day, the Maoists ended the blockade of Kathmandu and announced another cease-fire despite their initial objections to reinstating the legislature. The House of Representatives convened on April 28, but the octogenarian Koirala, who had been officially appointed prime minister by the king on April 27, was too ill to attend and so did not take the oath of office until April 30. Later that day, the House unanimously approved a resolution endorsing formation of a constituent assembly. On May 18, 2006, the House of Representatives assumed all legislative powers; stripped most governmental rights and responsibilities from the king, including his role as commander-in-chief; and delegated executive authority to a Council of Ministers responsible to the House. In their first face-toface meeting, held June 16, 2006, Prime Minister Koirala and Comrade Prachanda, joined by other Maoist negotiators and representatives of the SPA, concluded an 8-point agreement that called for implementing the November 2005 12-point agreement and a 25-point cease-fire code of conduct that had been signed on May 26. The pact also prepared the way for a constituent assembly election (see Current issues, below).

Constitution and Government The panchayat system in operation prior to the May 1980 referendum provided for a hierarchically

arranged parallel series of assemblies and councils encompassing four different levels: village (gaun) and town (nagar), district (jilla), zone (anchal), and national (Rashtriya Panchayat); the members of the village and town assemblies were directly elected, members of the other bodies being indirectly elected by bodies directly below them in the hierarchy. The constitutional changes introduced in December 1980 provided for direct, rather than indirect, election to a nonpartisan 140-member National Assembly; designation of the prime minister by the assembly, rather than by the king; and parliamentary responsibility of cabinet members. Under the 1990 constitution the remaining vestiges of the panchayat system were abandoned in favor of multiparty parliamentary government, with the king’s role substantially curtailed. Executive powers are exercised jointly by the king and a Council of Ministers, the latter headed by a prime minister who, although named by the king, must command a majority in the popularly elected lower house of Parliament, the House of Representatives. A 60-member upper chamber, the National Assembly, contains both indirectly elected and nominated members. The constitution can be amended by a two-thirds majority of the lower house, save for entrenched provisions dealing with such matters as human rights, the basic structure of the governmental system, and the rights of parties. Treaties and other major state agreements must be approved by a two-thirds majority of both houses in joint session. The judicial hierarchy encompasses district courts, appellate courts, and a Supreme Court with powers of constitutional review. The May 18, 2006, proclamation by the House of Representatives, which stripped King Gyanendra of his rights and powers, specified that the House is “sovereign . . . until another constitutional arrangement is made.” Executive authority was delegated to the Council of Ministers, which is responsible to the House. The House also assumed full authority over the Nepalese Army (renamed from Royal Nepal Army), made the king’s property and income subject to taxation, and declared Nepal to be a secular state. Further, the proclamation declared that the 1990 constitution and prevailing laws “shall

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be nullified to the extent of inconsistency” with the proclamation. An additional measure passed on June 10 specifically stripped the king of the veto and of his power to sign legislation into law. Administratively, the country is divided into 5 development regions, 14 zones, 75 districts, nearly 4,000 villages, and 36 municipalities.

Foreign Relations Although historically influenced by Britain and subsequently by India, Nepal has endeavored to strengthen its independence, particularly after India’s annexation of the adjacent state of Sikkim in 1975. Thus, Kathmandu adopted a policy of nonalignment and has sought a balance in regional relations. Nepalese leaders have moved to involve not only India and China but also Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Pakistan in cooperative endeavors, with primary emphasis on water resource development. In November 1979, after 18 months of negotiation, a major issue in relations with China was apparently resolved by the signing in Beijing of an agreement defining Nepal’s northern frontier. The agreement, based on modern watershed and midstream principles as well as more conventional methods, was hailed as a model for the potential settlement of outstanding border disputes between China and the neighboring states of India and Bhutan. Relations with India plummeted in March 1989 as a result of an impasse over trade and transit agreements upon which the Nepalese economy was highly dependent. Factors influencing India’s reluctance to renew the treaties included recent Nepalese arms purchases from China, the levying of a 55 percent tariff on Indian goods, and the enactment of legislation requiring non-Nepalese to obtain work permits. The agreements were revived following an announcement by Prime Minister Bhattarai in June 1990 that his government had postponed receipt of the latest Chinese arms shipment in order “to accommodate Indian sensitivities on [the] issue.” An additional series of agreements covering trade, transit, border control, agriculture, and cultural exchanges were signed in December 1991. A

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subsequent tour of both India and China by Prime Minister Adhikari in April 1995 included discussion of changes in the 1950 Indo-Nepal Peace and Friendship Treaty insofar as they bore on the Chinese arms issue. In January 1996 the Nepalese and Indian foreign ministers signed an agreement in Kathmandu calling for a joint hydroelectric project in the Mahakali River basin. The $5 billion undertaking was bitterly opposed by a faction of the CPN(UML), which joined other left-wing groups in mounting widespread public protests that nevertheless failed to prevent ratification of the accord on September 20. Passage was somewhat eased by the conclusion in mid-August of an agreement allowing Nepal transit rights across northeastern Indian territory to ports in Bangladesh. On April 27, 1998, however, some 8,000 leftist demonstrators attacked the Indo-Nepal Mahakali Integrated Development Treaty as unbalanced in favor of India, called for reconsideration of the 1950 friendship treaty, and protested the continuing presence of Indian troops in the disputed Kalapani territory. Since the early 1990s successive governments have expressed concern about an influx of ethnic Nepalese from nearby Bhutan. Although some claimed to be descendants of 19th-century settlers, Bhutanese authorities insisted that most had relocated to Bhutan in the 1980s and were illegal immigrants. Preliminary talks on resolving the problem were held in Kathmandu in October 1993, and in April 1994 an agreement was reached on how to categorize the more than 90,000 Bhutanese of Nepalese origin stranded in eastern Nepal. However, subsequent bilateral talks failed to resolve the dispute, despite international pressure mounted to address the plight of the refugees living in UNrun camps, and it wasn’t until October 2003 that an agreement was reached that was to permit repatriation of about three-fourths of the ethnic Nepalese in one of the seven refugee camps in Nepal. In the end, however, Bhutan demurred, prompting Nepal to consider the possibility of granting the Bhutanese a status equivalent to that of Tibetan refugees, which would facilitate their departure to third countries.

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As of mid-2006 no significant repatriation had occurred. (For additional details, see the Bhutan article.) In September 2004 insurgents in Iraq announced that they had executed 12 Nepalese hostages for assisting the U.S.-led occupation. In response to the deaths of the 12, who had been working as cleaners and cooks, rioters in Nepal attacked Muslimowned businesses, mosques, and Arab airlines. Some 800,000 Nepalese work abroad, about onefourth of them in the Middle East. In April 2004 Nepal became the first leastdeveloped country to join the World Trade Organization.

Current Issues Considerable relief greeted the king’s decision to relinquish his “autocratic” powers in late April 2006, and the public was further encouraged by the rapidity with which the Koirala cabinet and the reinstituted House of Representatives moved to take control of the government and negotiate with the Maoists. Some 13,100 people had died during the decade-long conflict, nearly half of them civilians, which had led some observers to warn that the country’s social fabric was disintegrating. Both domestic and international human rights organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, had charged the Maoists with a panoply of abuses, such as hostage-taking, use of children as combatants, torture, and the murder of captives. Similarly, the Nepalese Army and the police had been accused of arbitrary detentions, torture, summary executions, and the “disappearance” of Maoist sympathizers. The insurgency had largely relied on support from the illiterate, impoverished peasantry in the hinterlands, who have reaped few economic or other gains from the political changes introduced in 1990. From attacking isolated police stations and infrastructure, the Maoists had gradually expanded their scope and reach until they were able to initiate countrywide general strikes and to blockade Kathmandu by cutting off access to the two principal highways serving the capital.

The June 16, 2006, eight-point agreement between the SPA and the Maoists expressed a commitment to “democratic norms and values,” including the rule of law, a competitive multiparty system, human rights, civil rights, and press freedom, and called for all parties to seek consensus on issues related to the country’s long-term interests. More specific provisions included the immediate drafting of an interim constitution, to be followed by formation of an interim government in which the CPN (Maoist) would participate. Following dissolution of the House of Representatives and the “people’s governments” that the Maoists had established in territory under their control, a constituent assembly election would be held. In the run-up to the balloting, the UN would be asked to supervise both the Maoist People’s Liberation Army and the Nepalese Army. International observers would then monitor the polling. Despite the June 16 agreement and the immediate formation of an interim constitution drafting committee, headed by former Supreme Court justice Laxman Prasad ARYAL, many Nepalese remained wary. By the end of the month, citing continuing abductions, extortion, and decisions handed down by “people’s courts,” human rights organizations had already complained that the Maoists were not fulfilling their commitments under the May cease-fire code of conduct. Others questioned how effectively the existing political party system, headed by aging leaders and regarded by many as corrupt, would be able to function in the longer term. By early July some members of the House of Representatives were voicing objections to dissolution of the legislature before completion of the constituent assembly, and difficulties had been encountered in forming the interim constitution drafting committee. It was also unclear what effect the introduction of the CPN (Maoist) into electoral politics would have. Moreover, not all Nepalese desire the abolition of a constitutional monarchy and its replacement by a republic. The Maoists have stated that should the constituent assembly include a ceremonial role for a monarch in a new constitution, they would abide by the decision.

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Political Parties Political formations were banned by royal decree in 1960, although de facto party members subsequently served as cabinet ministers and Rashtriya Panchayat delegates. For many years the principal opposition group was the essentially moderate Nepali Congress (NC). The 1990 constitution prohibits restrictions on political parties. To be officially recognized, a party must register with the Election Commission, and at least 5 percent of its candidates must be women. To qualify as a “national party,” a group must secure at least a 3 percent vote share in a general election. At the time of the 1999 election, there were 101 recognized parties, of which 30 offered candidates. Only 6 parties captured 3 percent or more of the vote. In October 2002 the king dismissed Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba of the Nepali Congress (Democratic)—NC(D), an NC splinter, and dissolved the House of Representatives. In May 2003, with no new election in sight, the NC, the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), the Nepali Goodwill Party (Anandi Devi), the Nepal Workers’ and Peasants’ Party (NWPP), and the People’s Front Nepal (JMN) formed an opposition “joint people’s movement” (JPM) that won the support of half a dozen other parties. In June 2004, with Deuba having been reappointed as prime minister, the CPN(UML) left the JPM, and in July it joined a multiparty cabinet that excluded the remaining JPM members. The king’s assumption of power in February 2005 led directly to the May 8 formation of the “seven-party alliance” (SPA) of the original five JPM parties, the NC(D), and the United Left Front of smaller Communist parties. All of the major opposition parties boycotted the local council elections of February 8, 2006. Some six dozen parties, most of them minuscule, were registered by the Election Commission for the balloting, which had a very low turnout.

Seven-Party Alliance Nepali Congress (NC). Founded in 1947, the NC long sought abolition of the panchayat system

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and defied the regime by holding a national convention in Kathmandu in March 1985, after which it launched a civil disobedience movement (satyagraha) to press for the release of political prisoners and for party legalization. Following widespread popular agitation that began in mid-February 1990, NC President K. P. Bhattarai was asked to head a coalition government pending nationwide balloting in May 1991. Although the NC won 110 of 205 House seats in 1991, Bhattarai failed to secure reelection and hence was obliged to yield the office of prime minister to G. P. Koirala. In February 1992, during the party’s first national convention in more than three decades, a series of bitter exchanges broke out, pitting party leader Ganesh Man SINGH against the prime minister. Singh, winner of the UN Human Rights Award in December 1993, resigned from the party in September 1994. Koirala returned as prime minister in April 1998, although his selection of a cabinet provoked considerable intraparty controversy over the inclusion of what some members considered “corrupt” ministers who had served in previous administrations. In late December he remained in office at the head of a coalition formed pending parliamentary elections subsequently scheduled for May 1999. During the campaign Koirala announced that, to foster party unity, he would step aside in favor of Bhattarai, who thereby returned as prime minister when the NC, on a 38 percent vote share, won a clear majority of 111 seats in the House of Representatives. Conflict between Bhattarai and supporters of Koirala, who had retained the party presidency, nevertheless continued, forcing Bhattarai to resign on March 16, 2000, a day before a scheduled vote of the NC parliamentary delegation would have turned him out of office. Meeting two days later to hold the party’s first open leadership election, the parliamentarians, as expected, selected Koirala as their leader by a 69–43 vote over Sher Bahadur Deuba, who had served as prime minister in the coalition government of 1995–1997. Accordingly, King Birendra redesignated Koirala as prime minister on March 20. In early June the NC absorbed the small National People’s Council

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(Rashtriya Janata Parishad—RJP), which had been formed in 1992 and had most recently been led by a former NC general secretary, Shri Bhadra SHARMA. Leadership disputes within the NC continued to simmer. On August 8, 2000, Koirala dismissed the minister of Water Resources, Khum Bahadur KHADKA, for demanding that Koirala step aside as party president in favor of Sailaja ACHARYA, a former deputy prime minister. Khadka drew support for the principle of “one man, one office” from former prime ministers Deuba and Bhattarai, but Koirala remained firm in his dual roles. Although Koirala beat back another challenge by Deuba’s supporters at a party convention in January 2001, he resigned as prime minister on July 19. Deuba then defeated Secretary General Sushil Koirala, 72–40, for the party leadership and was designated by the king to be prime minister. The stark division between the Koirala and Deuba factions persisted, culminating in the NC disciplinary committee’s May 2002 decision to expel Deuba for failing to consult the party before seeking parliamentary extension of the country’s state of emergency. Deuba supporters then expelled Koirala at a June 16–19 “general convention.” The fissure ultimately led Deuba to register his faction as the Nepali Congress (Democratic) following a decision by the Election Commission that the Koirala faction held title to the Nepali Congress name. In the months following the king’s October 2002 decisions to dissolve the House of Representatives and replace Prime Minister Deuba with the National Democratic Party’s L. B. Chand, the NC joined the CPN(UML) and other, smaller parties in challenging the constitutionality of the moves. The NC was a prime mover in formation of the joint people’s movement in April–May 2003 and of the SPA two years later. Leaders: Girija Prasad KOIRALA (Prime Minister and President of the Party), Sushil KOIRALA (Vice President), Ram Chandra POUDYAL (General Secretary).

Communist Party of Nepal (Unified MarxistLeninist)—CPN (UML) (Nepala Kamyunishta Parti [Ekikrit Marksbadi ra Leninbadi]). Sometimes referenced as the United (or Unified) Communist Party of Nepal (UCPN), the CPN(UML) was formed in January 1991 by merger of the Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist)—CPN (Marxist) and the Communist Party of Nepal (MarxistLeninist)—CPN(ML). The CPN (Marxist) had long attempted to maintain a posture of neutrality between Moscow and Beijing, although it was not until 1987 that two distinct factions, one led by Man Mohan Adhikari and the other by Pushpa Lal SHRESTHA (subsequently by his widow, Sahana Pradhan), agreed to merge. Originating as a pro-Chinese offspring of the Indian Naxalite movement, the CPN(ML) in the mid-1980s adopted the policy of using panchayat organs to further its objectives; late in the decade it began favoring Moscow over Beijing. In April 1990 the CPN (Marxist) and the CPN(ML) joined with five other leftist formations, including three pro-Soviet CPN factions, a pro-Chinese group, and the NWPP (below), in a United Leftist Front in support of the Bhattarai government. Because of the diversity of its member parties and differences between their leaders, the United Leftist Front became moribund prior to the 1991 poll. In May 1991 Adhikari was elected leader of the CPN(UML) parliamentary group and therefore leader of the opposition. In September 1994 he resigned his parliamentary seat and left the party, giving no reason for his actions. Regaining his seat at the November election, he was reelected parliamentary leader on November 23 and was then sworn in as prime minister on November 30. He was obliged to resign after losing a nonconfidence vote on September 10, 1995. The CPN(UML) subsequently participated in the coalition government formed by Prime Minister Chand in March 1997 before joining that of Prime Minister Koirala in December 1998. In March 1998 more than one-half of the CPN(UML) legislators left the parent grouping and reorganized under the former CPN(ML) title

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to protest the 1996 water-sharing agreement with India. Former prime minister Adhikari, the party’s candidate for prime minister in the May 1999 election, died on April 26. In the election the CPN(UML) won 71 seats, down from the 88 it had claimed in 1994. On November 16, 1999, the party led a general strike to protest government price increases for fuel, electricity, and public transport. On January 11, 2000, it announced that it would continue to pressure the government through a civil disobedience and protest campaign. In early 2001 the CPN(UML) was largely responsible for legislative boycotts and disruptions that led the king to prorogue both houses of Parliament in April. In June 2001 the small CPN (Burma), led by Krishna Raj BURMA, and the Varma faction of the CPN (United) merged with the CPN(UML). In February 2002 the bulk of the CPN(ML) rejoined the parent party, although a faction headed by C. P. Mainali remained independent as the “reconstituted” or “reorganized” CPN(ML); see below. The CPN(ML)’s secretary general, Bam Dev Gautam, immediately resumed a leadership role in the CPN(UML). The party’s current general secretary, Madhav Kumar Nepal, who has demonstrated prime ministerial ambitions, was a principal organizer of the Joint People’s Movement in 2003. Having left the JPM following Prime Minister Deuba’s reappointment, in July 2004 the CPN(UML) joined an expanded four-party cabinet, in which Bharat Mohan Adhikari served as deputy prime minister until the entire government was dismissed on February 1, 2005. Leaders: Madhav Kumar NEPAL (General Secretary), Amrit Kumar BOHARA, Bharat Mohan ADHIKARI, Bam Dev GAUTAM, K. P. Sharma OLI (Deputy Prime Minister), Sahana PRADHAN. Nepali Congress (Democratic)—NC(D). The NC(D) was organized by supporters of Prime Minister Deuba following an intraparty dispute with factions backing former prime minister G. P. Koirala. On September 17, 2002, the Election

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Commission determined that the Koirala faction held the right to the NC title, and on September 23 Deuba registered the new NC(D), whose membership included 40 of the NC representatives who had been elected to the lower house in 1999. Dismissed as prime minister by the king in October 2002, Deuba was reappointed for a third time in June 2004, only to be dismissed once again on February 1, 2005, and placed under house arrest. Convicted in July 2005 by the Royal Commission for Corruption Control (RCCC) in connection with the awarding of a contract, Deuba was given a twoyear prison term, but he was released in February 2006 when the Supreme Court declared the RCCC unconstitutional. In May 2006 Deuba, by a vote of 24–13, defeated a challenge from B. K. Gachhadar for leadership of the NC(D) parliamentary delegation. Leaders: Sher Bahadur DEUBA (Former Prime Minister and President of the Party), Gopal Man SHRESTHA (Minister of Physical Planning and Works), Bijaya Kumar GACHHADAR (General Secretary). Nepal Goodwill Party (Anandi Devi) (Nepali Sadbhavana Party [Anandi Devi]—NSP [Anandi Devi]). Formation of the NSP (Anandi Devi) in 2003 followed a divisive NSP convention in March at which Anandi Devi, the widow of the longtime NSP president, Gajendra Narayan Singh, sought to succeed her husband. Her supporters included the NSP secretary general, Hridayesh Tripathi, but the heated contest ended up rupturing the party (see NSP, below). The NSP (Anandi Devi) participated in formation of the opposition joint people’s movement in 2003. It was among the first of Nepal’s mainstream parties to call for election of a constituent assembly as a means of resolving the Maoist insurgency. Leaders: Anandi DEVI (President), Hridayesh TRIPATHI (Minister of Industry, Commerce, and Supplies), Bharat Bimal YADAV, Rajendra Kumar MAHATO (General Secretary). Nepal Workers’ and Peasants’ Party—NWPP (Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party). An advocate for

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the poor and working people, the NWPP began as a Maoist formation but currently advocates nonalignment and a mixed economy. It doubled its lower house strength from two to four seats in 1994 but won only one in May 1999. Leaders: Narayan Man BIJUKCHHE (“Rohit”), Prem SUWAL. People’s Front Nepal (Janamorcha Nepal— JMN). The JMN is the electoral front for the Communist Party of Nepal (Unity Center Mashal)— CPN(UCM) (Nepala Kamyunishta Parti [Ekata Kendra Mashal]), formation of which was announced in April 2002 by the leaders of the CPN (Unity Center) and the CPN (Mashal). Both the Unity Center and Mashal (“Torch”) formations traced their origins to the pro-Chinese CPN (Fourth Congress), which had been founded in September 1974 in India. In 1983 the latter split into the CPN (Mashal), headed by Mohan Bikram SINGH, and a rump group headed by Nirmal LAMA. The Mashal group suffered its own division in 1986, when a Bahumat Mashal (Majority Torch) faction departed. In 1990 the Lama group, the Bahumat Mashal, another CPN (Mashal) faction, and the Nepal Proletarian Labor Organization formed the CPN (Unity Center). During the 1990s both the CPN (Unity Center) and the CPN (Mashal) established electoral fronts. In 1991 the Unity Center’s United People’s Front/Nepal (Samyukta Janmorcha Nepal—SJN) won nine seats in the House election. In 1994 the party split, one faction forming the radical CPN (Maoist), below, which took with it an allied SJN faction. The rump SJN won no seats at the 1994 election but took one in May 1999, on a 1 percent vote share. The CPN (Mashal) had boycotted the 1991 election. It subsequently formed the National People’s Front (Rashtriya Jana Morcha—RJM) for electoral purposes, although its two successful candidates in 1994 technically ran as independents. Thereafter, the majority of the CPN (Mashal) leadership chose to remain in conventional politics and opposed the Maoist rebellion, which led to the departure of a senior member, Dinanath Sharma, to the CPN

(Maoist). At the May 1999 election the RJM won five seats despite capturing only 1 percent of the vote. Prior to the 1999 lower house election the SJN’s Amik Sherchan spearheaded formation of a “Coordination Committee” of eight leftist organizations that, nevertheless, failed to present a comprehensive joint list of candidates. The committee’s other participants included the CPN (Mashal) and its affiliated RJM; the NWPP; the National People’s Movement Coordination Committee (NPMCC); and four parties that later formed the United Left Front (below): the CPN(ML), the CPN (United), the CPN (Marxist), and the CPN(MLM). In July 1999 leaders from the Unity Center and all the above parties except the NWPP and the CPN(ML) met with newly installed Prime Minister Bhattarai to urge immediate steps to promote human rights, maintain order, control inflation, and protect national borders. The following February all nine leftist parties jointly announced a protest program to begin in March 2000 with the aim of pressuring the government to control essential commodity prices, fight corruption, and protect national interests. The April 2002 decision to form the CPN(UCM) was followed in July by an announcement that the SJN and the RJM would also merge as the JMN. Leaders: Chitra BAHADUR (Chair of the CPN[UCM]), Mohan Bikram SINGH (General Secretary of the CPN[UCM]), Amik SHERCHAN (JMN Chair and Deputy Prime Minister), Lilamani POKHAREL (JMN Vice Chair), Nav Raj SUBEDI (JMN General Secretary). United Left Front (ULF). The ULF was formed in October 2002 by five small Communist parties: the CPN (Marxist-Leninist), the CPN (United), the CPN (Marxist), the CPN (MarxistLeninist-Maoist), and the Nepal Samyabadi Party (Marxbadi-Leninbadi-Maobadi). Through mergers, the ULF currently encompasses the three parties discussed below. The ULF chair rotates among the leaders of the participating parties. Communist Party of Nepal (MarxistLeninist)—CPN(ML). On March 5, 1998, 46 of the CPN(UML)’s 89 House members left

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the parent grouping and formed the CPN(ML). The split occurred primarily because of the dissidents’ opposition to the water-sharing arrangements in the 1996 Indo-Nepal Mahakali Integrated Development Treaty, although the CPN(UML) subsequently accused CPN(ML) leader Bam Dev Gautam of mishandling millions in funds while a deputy prime minister. Describing the new formation as a party of the progressive left, its leaders voiced support for nationalism and democracy while labeling the United States imperialist and India a “regional hegemonist.” The CPN(ML) joined the NC in the government of August–December 1998; its departure over policy differences guaranteed the administration’s collapse. It subsequently accused its former governing partner of killing some 2,000 innocent civilians in its effort to suppress the ongoing Maoist revolt. Despite winning 7 percent of the vote in May 1999, the party failed to capture any lower house seats. In August 2001 the CPN(ML) and the CPN(UML) agreed to discuss reunification, although the February 2002 decision to proceed was rejected by some CPN(ML) leaders. They then restructured the party, which is sometimes still referred to as, for example, the CPN(ML)Reorganized or CPN(ML)-Reconstituted. Leader: Chandra Prakash MAINALI (General Secretary). Communist Party of Nepal (United Marxist)—CPN (United Marxist). The CPN (United Marxist) resulted from the September 2005 merger of the CPN (United) and the CPN (Marxist). The CPN (United) descended from the proMoscow branch of the original CPN, which was launched in 1949 but split in the early 1960s as a result of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Long led by Dr. Keshar Jung RAYAMAJHI, the pro-Moscow CPN split in 1982 with the formation of a faction led by B. B. Manandhar. In 1983 the Manandhar faction was weakened by the defection of a group led by K. R. Varma. By 1985 the Raya-

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majhi faction had become virtually moribund, and in 1990 Rayamajhi was named a king’s representative to the Bhattarai government after having left the party. (His faction, renamed the Socialist Democratic Party, dissolved shortly after failing to win any seats at the May 1991 election.) Meanwhile, an additional faction had surfaced under Tulsi Lal AMATYA. The Manandhar faction contested the 1991 election as the CPN (Democratic), winning two seats. In July 1991 the CPN (Democratic), the CPN (Varma), and the CPN (Amatya) formed a unified party, the CPN (United). In December 1993 Amatya broke from the CPN (United) and led his faction into the CPN(UML), of which he continued to be a leading member until his death in August 1997. The CPN (United) won less than 0.5 percent of the vote and no House seats in 1994. In 1998 the party formed a United Marxist Front (UMF) with another small group led by P. N. Chaudhari, namely the CPN (Marxist), which should not to be confused with the party of the same name that had participated in formation of the CPN(UML) in 1991. The UMF hoped to attract additional leftist factions for a joint campaign leading up to the May 1999 election, at which it attracted fewer than 5,000 votes. In 2001 the Varma faction joined the CPM(UML). Leaders: Prabhu Narayan CHAUDHARI (President of the Party and Minister of Land Reform and Management), Lok Narayan SUBEDI, Madhav GYAWALI, Bishnu Bahadur MANANDHAR (Secretary General), Ganesh SHAH (Deputy Secretary General). Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist-Maoist) —CPN (Unified MLM). The CPN (Unified MLM) was formed in November 2005 by merger of the CPN (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist)—CPN(MLM) or CPN (Malema)—and the Nepal Samyabadi Party (Marxbadi-Leninbadi-Maobadi), the latter of which was more commonly referenced as the Communist Party (Samyabadi) or the NSP (Malema). One of the smaller Communist

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offshoots, the CPN(MLM) had been formed in 1991. The Communist Party (Samyabadi) began as a CPN(MLM) splinter led by N. K. Prasai. Leaders: Krishna Das SHRESTHA (Chair of the Party and of the ULF), Nanda Kumar PRASAI (General Secretary).

Leading Royalist Parties National Democratic Party (Rashtriya Prajatantra Party—RPP). A monarchist party comprised largely of former panchayat members and supporters, the RPP was formed in 1992 by merger of two groups (both calling themselves the National Democratic Party), one led by S. B. Thapa and the other led by L. B. Chand. The unified RPP fared much better than expected in the November 1994 balloting, upping its legislative representation from 4 to 20. It entered the government as a member of the NC-led coalition in September 1995, but factionalism within the RPP contributed to the government’s instability. The demise of the coalition in March 1997 led to Chand’s designation as prime minister in a CPN(UML)-RPP-NSP cabinet that survived less than seven months before being replaced by an RPP-NSP (and subsequently NC) government under Thapa. In January 1998 the RPP expelled former prime minister Chand and nine supporters for threatening to back a no-confidence vote against Prime Minister Thapa, who had asked the king to dissolve the House of Representatives. The rebel group quickly formed a “New RPP,” commonly called the RPP (Chand), which was formally recognized as a party on January 16. The RPP won 11 percent of the vote and 11 seats in the May 1999 balloting, while the RPP (Chand) claimed a meager 3 percent and no seats. Although talks on reunification between the Thapa and Chand groups had taken place even before the election, a merger was not announced until January 2000. A minority of RPP (Chand) members strongly objected and went on to form the RPP (Rastrabadi) following the deregistration of the RPP (Chand). After the dismissal of the Deuba government in October 2002, the king reappointed former prime

minister Chand to that office, but Chand resigned in late May 2003 and was in turn replaced by former prime minister Thapa. The change further widened the rift between the Chand and Thapa factions in the party, and in December 2003 the RPP called for Thapa’s resignation for undermining multiparty democracy. Thapa ultimately resigned in May, although the four-party cabinet announced by the reinstated Deuba in July included several RPP members. By late 2004 the rupture within the RPP appeared complete. Although Chand and the party’s president, P. S. Rana, were continuing their efforts to hold the party together, Thapa had stated his intention to form a new party, which was launched in March 2005 as the Rashtriya Janshakti Party (RJP, below). The departure of Thapa supporters did not, however, end factionalism within the RPP. In September the RPP announced that it would support the prodemocracy “agitation” led by the SPA, but in December half a dozen RPP members were in the reshuffled cabinet announced by the king. Furthermore, the party split over whether or not to support the local elections called for early February 2006. In January 2006 the party president, P. S. Rana, ousted ten members of the party’s Central Committee, including six cabinet ministers. A day later, the dissident faction led by Rabindra Nath SHARMA and Minister of Home Affairs Kamal THAPA convened a special party convention, at which the participants voted to replace Rana with Thapa. The split persisted thereafter, and by March Rana was supporting the prodemocracy demands for an allparty government. Meanwhile, the RPP reportedly won the largest number of local council seats at the February 8 elections. Leaders: Pashupati Shumsher RANA (President), Lokendra Bahadur CHAND (Party Leader), Padma Sundar LAWATI (Vice President), Khem Raj PANDIT (Co-General Secretary). National Democratic Party (Nationalist) (Rashtriya Prajatantra Party [Rastrabadi]—RPP [Rastrabadi]). The January 2000 merger announcement by the RPP and the RPP (Chand) was met

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with strong objections by a minority of the latter party, including its president Rajeshwor Devkota. The minority insisted on retaining the RPP (Chand) designation, but when the Supreme Court upheld the deregistration of the RPP (Chand), Devkota announced that he would form a new party. The RPP (Rastrabadi) resulted. It supported King Gyanendra’s assumption of power in February 2005. Leader: Rajeshwor DEVKOTA (Chair). Nepali Goodwill Party (Nepal Sadbhavana Party—NSP). Formed in 1990, the NSP promotes the interests of the Madhesiya Indian inhabitants of the Terai. It has sought redelineation of the southern constituencies on the basis of population and the granting of citizenship to all persons settled in Nepal before adoption of the present constitution; it has also sought recognition of Hindi as a Nepali national language. The party won three House seats in 1994 after winning none in 1991 and was awarded one portfolio in the Deuba government of September 1995. In 1997 the former secretary general of the NSP, Hridayesh Tripathi, left the party to form a new grouping called the Nepal Samaj-wadi Janata Dal, but he subsequently rejoined the party and assumed his former office. In December 1998 the NSP entered the NCCPN(UML) coalition administration as a junior partner, despite having opposed the installation of the Koirala minority government the preceding April. At the May 1999 election the NSP won five seats on a 3 percent vote share. In January 2002 the party’s longtime president, Gajendra Narayan SINGH, died. Differences subsequently emerged over who should fill party posts. At a divisive national convention in March 2003 one faction supported Singh’s widow, Anandi Devi, for the presidency, while another backed the acting president, Deputy Prime Minister Badri Prasad Mandal. As a consequence, the party split. In April 2004 the Supreme Court upheld an August 2003 Election Commission decision that awarded the NSP title to the Mandal faction, with the other faction becoming the NSP (Anandi Devi). In July 2004 Mandal brought the NSP into the latest Deuba cabinet, albeit as a junior partner, and

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accepted the post of minister for forest and soil conservation. He subsequently served in the royalist cabinet installed by King Gyanendra, most recently as minister of general administration. He resigned the party presidency in March 2006. Leader: Badri Prasad MANDAL. Nepal Samata Party (NPS). The NPS was formed in 2002 by then government minister Narayan Singh Pun, who had been elected to the House of Representatives as an NC member. In 2003, while serving under Prime Minister Chand, Pun was widely credited with bringing the CPN (Maoist) to the negotiating table. In December 2005 he was named minister of land reform in King Gyanendra’s cabinet. The party also participated in the February 2006 local elections. As a consequence, in April 2006 Pun was formally expelled from the NC delegation to the reinstituted House. Leaders: Narayan Singh PUN (President), Hasta Bahadur BISWO-KARMA (Vice President), Laxmikant PANDEY (General Secretary). Rastriya Janshakti Party (RJP). The RJP was launched in March 2005 by former prime minister S. B. Thapa, whose long and complicated history of rivalry with former prime minister L. B. Chand over control of the RPP culminated in his decision to form a new party. Although a royalist, in May 2006 Thapa, arguing in favor of “political stability,” backed the legislative proclamation that stripped King Gyanendra of his powers and bestowed temporary authority on the House of Representatives and the Council of Ministers. Leaders: Surya Bahadur THAPA and Prakash Chandra LOHANI (Cochairs).

Other Parties Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)—CPN (Maoist). Established in 1994 by a breakaway faction of the CPN (Unity Center), in 1996 the CPN (Maoist) launched the “People’s War” insurgency, centered in the western districts of Rolpa and Rukum. In 1996 the party was proscribed, and for several years thereafter its assaults most frequently targeted the police. On January 6, 2000, party leader Dev GURUNG was released on bail

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after more than three years in detention. Gurung failed to keep a court appearance a week later. Despite having rejected previous government overtures, in early 2000 the Maoists indicated that they would be willing to open discussions related to a 32-point list of demands. Further movement was delayed, however, by the fall of the Bhattarai government and the return to power of hard-line Prime Minister Koirala. In August the CPN (Maoist) announced that it had formed a People’s Liberation Army. It also set up a “United People’s Revolutionary Council” as a quasi-central government for the areas under its control. At the first round of peace talks with the Deuba government on August 30, 2001, Maoist representative Krishna Bahadur Mahara pressed for an end to the monarchy, formation of an interim government, establishment of a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution, and the release of all Maoist prisoners. Although the Maoists ultimately withdrew their demand that the monarchy be abolished, no significant progress was made before they abruptly ended a four-month-old cease-fire in November. The January–August 2003 cease-fire and resultant peace talks yielded no significant progress as the Maoists continued their insistence on election of a constituent assembly. In the following 18 months the insurgency continued to expand both its reach and its tactics, initiating a number of general strikes (with varying success) and, on more than one occasion, blockading Kathmandu. In early 2005 a significant rift over strategy emerged between party General Secretary Prachanda and party ideologue Baburam Bhattarai, the latter of whom was suspended from the party’s Standing Committee, reportedly because he advocated opening lines of communication with the parties that were agitating against King Gyanendra’s assumption of power in February. In July, however, Bhattarai and two close associates, his wife, Hisila YAMI (a.k.a. RAHUL), and Dinanath SHARMA (a.k.a. ASHOK), were reinstated to their posts, the “organizational issues” having been resolved, according to a statement released by

Prachanda, “through a process of self-criticism and in accordance with the desires of the people and classes.” With opposition to King Gyanendra’s “autocratic monarchy” mounting, secret talks between the CPN (Maoist) and the SPA began even before the September 2005 unilateral Maoist ceasefire (which lasted into the new year). Further discussions then led to the November 2005 12-point plan for restoring democracy and bringing the CPN (Maoist) into the political mainstream. In early May 2006 one of the first measures of the new Koirala government was to end the party’s proscription. The June 16, 2006, 8-point agreement with the new government, accomplished following the first face-to-face meeting between Prime Minister Koirala and Prachanda, granted the Maoists much of what they had been seeking, including the election of a constituent assembly in the near future and a role in an interim government, while committing them to dissolving the rural governments they had formed and to permitting international supervision of their army and weapons prior to the election. Leaders: Pushpa Kamal DAHAL (Comrade PRACHANDA, General Secretary), Baburam BHATTARAI, Krishna Bahadur MAHARA. Green Nepal Party (Hariyali Nepal Party— HNP). Formed in 1996, the HNP is committed to “clean environment and clean government” and to a free-market economy. It also favors maintaining a multiparty democracy within the context of a constitutional monarchy. It ran 45 candidates for the lower house in 1999, but none was successful. Leader: Pushpa Prasad LUITEL. Nepal Praja Parishad (NPP). Nepal’s oldest political party, the NPP dates back to 1936. In November 2004 the party’s longtime leader, octogenarian Ram Hari Sharma, indicated that he intended to step down soon in favor of a younger leadership. Following the 2005 announcement that local council elections would be held in February 2006, Sharma urged all parties to participate. Leader: Ram Hari SHARMA (Chair).

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Cabinet As of July 15, 2006 Prime Minister Vice Prime Ministers

Girija Prasad Koirala (NC) Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli (CPN[UML]) Amik Sherchan (JMN)

Ministers Agriculture and Cooperatives Culture, Tourism, and Civil Aviation Commerce, Industry, and Supplies Defense Education and Sports Finance Foreign Affairs Health Home Affairs Land Reform and Management Law, Justice, and Parliamentary Affairs Local Development Physical Planning and Works Water Resources

Mahanta Thakur (NC) Pradip Gyawali (CPN[UML]) Hridayesh Tripathi (NSP[Anandi Devi]) Girija Prasad Koirala (NC) Mangal Siddhi Manandhar (CPN[UML]) Ram Sharan Mahat (NC) Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli (CPN[UML]) Amik Sherchan (JMN) Krishna Prasad Sitaula (NC) Prabhu Narayan Chaudhari (ULF) Narendra Bikram Nemwang (NC[D]) Rajendra Pandey (CPN[UML]) Gopal Man Shrestha (NC[D]) Gyanendra Karki (NC[D])

Ministers of State Forest and Soil Conservation General Administration Information and Communication Labor and Transport Management Science and Technology Women, Children, and Social Services

Gopal Rai (NC) Dharma Prasad Shah (CPN[UML]) Dipendra Prasad Badu (NC) Ramesh Lekhah (NC[D]) Man Bahadur Biswokarma (NC) Urmila Aryal (CPN[UML]) [f]

[f] = female

Legislature The 1990 constitution provides for a bicameral Parliament (Sansad) consisting of a 60-member National Assembly, one-third of whose members are replenished every two years, and a 205-member House of Representatives with a five-year mandate. National Assembly (Rashtriya Sabha). The upper chamber, which the constitution defines as a permanent house, consists of 35 members (including at least 3 women) designated by the House

of Representatives, 15 members chosen by an electoral college that includes local committees of the country’s development regions, and 10 members named by the king. A total of 20 members are selected every two years. All serve six-year terms. In balloting on June 27, 2001, for 16 elective seats (11 chosen by the House and 5 by local bodies), the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) won 8 seats; the Nepali Congress, 7; and the National Democratic Party, 1. The results produced the following distribution (excluding appointed members): Communist Party

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of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), 23; Nepali Congress, 21; National Democratic Party, 3; Communist Party of Nepal (Marxist-Leninist), 1; Nepali Goodwill Party, 1; other, 1. Twenty members’ terms expired in June 2003, but with the House of Representatives having been dissolved and local mandates having expired, no elections to fill the open seats were held. Another 20 expired in June 2005. The proclamation of sovereignty by the House of Representatives on May 18, 2006, effectively suspended the National Assembly’s governmental role. House of Representatives (Pratinidhi Sabha). Under antidefection legislation adopted in 1997, the House speaker may decertify legislators who do not adhere to party discipline. However, a group of legislators could still form a new party if they number at least 40 percent of their original party’s central working committee. The lower house election of May 3 and 17, 1999 (plus June balloting in 4 constituencies), yielded the following results: Nepali Congress, 111 seats; Communist Party of Nepal (Unified MarxistLeninist), 71; National Democratic Party, 11; Nepali Goodwill Party, 5; National People’s Front, 5; Nepal Workers’ and Peasants’ Party, 1; United People’s Front, 1. Three by-elections held on December 9, 1999, raised the Nepali Congress total to 113 seats and dropped the CPN(UML) total to 69. The House was dissolved by the king on May 22, 2002. Although a general election was later scheduled for November 13, 2002, it was postponed on October 4. On April 24, 2006, the king announced that he was reinstating the House, which then reconvened on April 28 and assumed “sovereign” authority on May 18. Speaker: Subash NEMWANG.

Communications The current constitution has endorsed freedom of the press, most importantly by outlawing prior censorship, although on occasion the government has attempted to restrict independent media from disseminating news it considered sensationalist or

unverified. More severe restrictions accompanied recent states of emergency, and journalists have been detained under antiterrorism ordinances and acts. A significant number were tortured or killed, either by the police or the military for supporting the Maoist cause or by Maoists for spying or other alleged offenses. Along with other constitutionally guaranteed rights, freedom of the press was suspended, by order of the king, when a state of emergency was reinstituted on February 1, 2005. According to Reporters Without Borders, over 400 journalists were arrested during the following year. Restrictions were eased, however, with the restoration of multiparty government in April–May 2006.

Press For its size, Nepal has an unusually large number of newspapers, including some 140 dailies and several hundred weeklies. The following are published daily in Kathmandu in Nepali, unless otherwise noted: Gorkha Patra (75,000), government organ; Nepali Hindi Daily (60,000), pro-Indian, in Hindi; Kathmandu Post (30,000), in English; Rising Nepal (20,000), government organ, in English; Samaya (18,000); Daily News (20,000); Janadoot (7,000); The Commoner (7,000), independent, in English; The Motherland (5,000), independent, in English; Samaj (5,000); Janadesh, pro-Maoist weekly.

News Agencies The domestic facility is the government’s Rastriya Samachar Samiti (RSS); AP, UPI, Agence France-Presse, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Reuters, Xinhua, and Kyodo News Service are among the organizations that maintain bureaus in Kathmandu.

Broadcasting and Computing A government broadcasting mono-poly ended in the mid-1990s, and limited private FM radio and television service is now available. Radio Nepal, owned and operated by the government, broadcasts in Nepali and English, while the governmentoperated Nepalese Television Corporation also transmits in Hindi/Urdu. There were approximately

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247,000 television receivers and 90,000 personal computers serving 3,900 Internet users in 2003.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. Kedar Bhakta SHRESTHA

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U.S. Ambassador to Nepal James Francis MORIARTY Permanent Representative to the UN Madhu Raman ACHARYA IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, CP, Interpol, NAM, SAARC, WCO, WTO

Note: A peace agreement calling for inclusion of the Maoists in an interim government and interim legislature was signed on November 7, 2006. The government parties and the Maoists agreed on December 16 on a draft interim constitution that would assign the prime minister full executive powers.

NEW ZEALAND Aotearoa

The Country Extending north and south for 1,000 miles some 1,200 miles southeast of Australia, New Zealand is the most physically isolated of the world’s economically advanced nations. The two main islands (North Island and South Island, separated by the Cook Strait) exhibit considerable topographical diversity, ranging from fertile plains to high mountains, but are endowed for the most part with a relatively temperate climate. The majority of the population is of British extraction, but Maori descendants of the original Polynesian inhabitants constitute more than 15 percent of the total. Smaller ethnic groups include Pacific Islanders (6 percent) and Asians (5 percent). The Anglican, Roman Catholic, and Presbyterian churches predominate. Women constitute about 45 percent of the labor force, primarily in the clerical and service sectors; female representation in elected bodies includes 39 of the 121 members of the House of Representatives elected in September 2005. Although the agricultural sector employs under 10 percent of the labor force and accounts for a comparable share of the GDP, dairy products, meat, forest products, fish, fruits and vegetables, and wool provide about half of New Zealand’s export earnings. Machinery, transport equipment, chemical products, and metals are also significant sources of foreign exchange. The industrial sector as a whole employs about one-fifth of the workforce and contributes one-quarter of the GDP, with processed foods, wood and paper products, and chemicals ranking among the leading industries. Following a major recession in the mid-1970s, development efforts focused on the exploitation

of significant natural gas, coal, and lignite deposits, as well as hydroelectric capacity. Leading trading partners continue to be Australia, the United States, and Japan, but China, South Korea, Malaysia, and other Asian states are steadily increasing in importance. The Labour government elected in 1984 undertook radical reforms to promote free enterprise, including deregulation, privatization of stateowned enterprises, and lower taxation. Continued by the post-1990 National administration, the reforms yielded economic growth of 5–6 percent a year in 1993–1995, accompanied by low inflation and falling unemployment. The average growth

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Political Status: Original member of the Commonwealth; independence under parliamentary system formally proclaimed in 1947. Area: 104,454 sq. mi. (270,534 sq. km.). Population: 3,737,277 (2001C); 4,301,000 (2005E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): WELLINGTON (341,000), Auckland (370,000), Christchurch (342,000). Official Languages: English, Maori. Monetary Unit: New Zealand Dollar (market rate July 1, 2006: 1.64 dollars = $1US). Sovereign: Queen ELIZABETH II. Governor General: Anand SATYANAND; named by the queen on April 3, 2006, to succeed Dame Silvia CARTWRIGHT, effective August 4. Prime Minister: Helen CLARK (Labour Party); named by the governor general to form a new government following the parliamentary election of November 27, 1999, and sworn in on December 10, succeeding Jennifer (Jenny) M. SHIPLEY (National Party); continued in office following the general election of July 27, 2002; returned for a third term in the election of September 17, 2005; coalition government sworn in on October 19.

rate slowed to about 2.0 percent in 1996–1997 and then contracted in the first half of 1998, primarily because of severe drought and the ongoing economic crisis affecting Asian economies. A 0.2 percent decline in GDP for 1998 as a whole was followed by an annual gain of about 4.0 percent in the next two years. For 2001 the growth rate dropped to 3.0 percent, but in 2002 it rose to 4.8 percent as an improving international outlook led to greater export demand. In 2003 the GDP grew by 3.4 percent, followed by 4.4 percent in 2004 but only 2.2 percent in 2005.

Government and Politics Political Background New Zealand’s link to Europe began with a landing by the Dutch mariner Abel Tasman in 1642, but

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settlement by the English did not begin until the 18th century. In 1840 British sovereignty was formally accepted by Maori chieftains in the Treaty of Waitangi. Recurrent disputes between the settlers and the Maoris were not resolved, however, until the defeat of the latter in the Maori wars of the 1860s. Granted dominion status in 1907, New Zealand achieved full self-government prior to World War II, although independence was not formally proclaimed until 1947. Through the mid-20th century both of the main parties endorsed a controlled economy and extensive programs of social welfare, and differences between them subsequently turned primarily on how such a system could best be administered. The more conservative National Party, which was in power from 1960 to 1972 under the leadership of Keith J. HOLYOAKE and John R. MARSHALL, was defeated by Norman E. KIRK’s Labour Party in 1972. Following Kirk’s death in August 1974, Wallace E. ROWLING was elected Labour Party leader and designated prime minister; collaterally, Robert D. MULDOON was named to succeed Marshall as National leader. In a landmark decision in 1975, the outgoing Labour government agreed to the creation of the Waitangi Tribunal, charged with investigating alleged violations of Maori land and fishing rights under the 1840 treaty. Within a decade about 70 percent of New Zealand’s land area had become subject to claims filed by Maori groups. In the midst of growing concern over increased state control of the economy and after an aggressive “presidential-style” campaign waged by Muldoon, National won an unexpected landslide victory in November 1975 and then retained control, with a substantially reduced majority, three years later. It continued in office after balloting in November 1981, but with the precarious advantage of a single legislative seat. Faced with intraparty defections in the wake of mounting fiscal problems, Muldoon was forced to call an early election for July 1984 that yielded a victory for Labour under David R. LANGE. Lange continued in office following the election of August 1987, but a year later an intraparty dispute precipitated his resignation, Geoffrey PALMER

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being designated as his successor. Prime Minister Palmer, whose lackluster image was credited with hastening Labour’s decline in the public opinion polls, resigned on September 4, 1990, in favor of Foreign Minister Michael (Mike) MOORE. However, the party was unable to benefit from the 11th-hour shift and lost to the National Party under James (Jim) BOLGER by a record 40 legislative seats (68–28) on October 27. Despite being weakened by the formation of the breakaway New Zealand First Party (NZ First) in July 1993, the National Party emerged from the general election of November 6 with a one-seat margin of victory. At the same time, the voters gave final approval to the introduction of a form of proportional representation for the next election. Two weeks later, Prime Minister Bolger dismissed his highly unpopular finance minister, Ruth RICHARDSON, replacing her with Bill BIRCH, a longtime conservative. Richardson responded by resigning her parliamentary seat, forcing a byelection in August 1994 that National won narrowly. However, when National right-winger Ross MEURANT broke away in September to form the Right of Centre (subsequently Conservative) Party, the result was the country’s first coalition government since the 1930s, since Meurant retained his junior ministerial post. In December 1994 the government announced a NZ$1 billion ten-year allocation for the settlement of some 400 Maori land claims under the Waitangi Tribunal, but most Maori leaders rejected the allocation as insufficient to meet claims valued at upward of NZ$90 billion. Protests included violent disruption of National (Waitangi) Day ceremonies in February 1995. Three months later Prime Minister Bolger and the Queen of the Tainui (the largest Maori federation) signed a NZ$170 million agreement in final settlement of land grievances dating back to the 1860s. In Wellington in November Queen Elizabeth gave the royal assent to the Tainui compensation legislation, which included an expression of the Crown’s “profound regret and apologies.” In another major settlement, in November 1997 the government agreed to turn over land and other assets valued at NZ$170 million to the

Ngai Tahu ethnic group on South Island. A number of smaller claims have since been settled. The change to proportional representation had stimulated the launching of several new parties prior to the 1996 legislative election, notably United New Zealand (United NZ), which in February 1996 became a member of the ruling coalition. As widely predicted, the general election on the following October 13 produced a fragmented House of Representatives: the National Party won 44 seats in a legislature enlarged to 120 members, followed by Labour with 37, NZ First with 17, and the center-left five-party Alliance with 13. Also gaining representation were the conservative ACT New Zealand and the United NZ. Protracted interparty negotiations over the following two months eventually yielded the formation on December 16 of a National–NZ First coalition government, with Bolger continuing as prime minister and NZ First leader Winston PETERS becoming deputy prime minister and treasurer. Commanding 61 seats, the new coalition also obtained a pledge of external support from the single United NZ member. The following year proved difficult for the coalition, and in early November 1997 Jennifer (Jenny) SHIPLEY, who held several government portfolios, presented Bolger with written commitments from a majority of the National legislators supporting her for party leader. Consequently, on November 3 Bolger announced his decision to retire, and Shipley was sworn in as the new prime minister on December 8. A cabinet reshuffle later in the month underscored a rightward shift in government. The NZ First left the government on August 18, 1998, four days after Prime Minister Shipley had sacked Deputy Prime Minister Peters over budgetary and other policy differences. Shipley retained the support of half of the NZ First parliamentary delegation, however, effectively splitting the party and permitting her to remain in office at the head of a reshaped minority government that on September 8 won a 62–58 confidence vote in the House of Representatives. Following the resignation in early December of a former NZ First MP, the government’s support dropped to 61 seats. On

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February 23, 1999, it won another confidence call by 2 votes. Despite recent favorable economic news, Shipley failed to carry the day at national balloting on November 27, 1999, and it appeared on election night that Labour, in coalition with the Alliance, would hold 63 seats in the 120-member House of Representatives. However, on December 7 a Green Party candidate was declared the winner in a single district, guaranteeing the Greens, under New Zealand’s complex, partly proportional electoral system, at least 6 seats. A seventh was added three days later. The resultant adjustment in the proportional seats awarded to the other parties left the Labour-Alliance coalition 2 seats shy of a majority, but with the Greens having agreed to extend their support on crucial votes Helen CLARK was sworn in as New Zealand’s first elected woman prime minister on December 10. The Alliance’s leader, James (Jim) ANDERTON, assumed office as deputy prime minister, having negotiated with Clark a novel coalition agreement permitting “public differentiation between the parties in speech and vote” when they disagreed. In April 2002 the Alliance split over the issue of government support for the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan. Deputy Prime Minister Anderton and six other Alliance MPs backed the use of New Zealand equipment and a small number of military personnel in U.S.-led operations against the al-Qaida terrorists and the Taliban regime, but they were opposed by other Alliance officials, who insisted on greater UN involvement as a precondition. In June, largely as a consequence of the dispute, Prime Minister Clark called for new elections to be held in July, several months earlier than scheduled. In the July 27, 2002, balloting Labour won 52 House seats, nearly doubling the total won by the National Party, which suffered its worst-ever defeat. With Anderton’s new party, the Progressives, bringing only 2 MPs into a new coalition, Prime Minister Clark again turned for support to the Greens, but they instead joined the opposition when Clark refused to accept their demand that the government continue a moratorium on the use

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of genetically modified organisms in agriculture. Clark then sought external support from the more conservative United Future New Zealand (United Future) party—the product of a 2000 merger of the United NZ and Future New Zealand (Future NZ) parties—whose 8 House members agreed to vote with the government on confidence motions and key legislation. With a 2-seat working majority, a new Clark government assumed office on August 14. The first major challenge to Prime Minister Clark’s minority government occurred in May 2004 over a Foreshore and Seabed Bill that would ensure public ownership of New Zealand’s shore and seabed. The legislation was adamantly opposed by most Maori leaders, who viewed it as truncating tribal rights, but polls showed a clear hardening of public opinion against accepting further indigenous claims. Although the new National Party leader, Don BRASH, had called for an end to “special privileges” for Maoris, National opposed the bill as a “mess” that would damage relations with the Maori minority while giving Maoris power to delay development. Furthermore, given discord within the ranks of Labour’s seven Maori-seat MPs, National clearly saw an opportunity to inflict a major defeat on the government. Shortly before the opening of floor debate on the bill, the associate minister for Maori affairs, Tariana TURIA, announced that she would vote against the measure. As a result, Turia was dismissed from the government. She then announced that she would quit Labour, resign from Parliament to force a byelection in her district (which she easily won in July), and establish a new Maori Party. On May 4, 2004, Clark won a non-confidence motion, 62–58, and two days later the Foreshore and Seabed Bill passed first reading by a vote of 65–55 on the strength of support from Winston Peters’s NZ First, which had won 13 seats at the July 2002 election. (United Future voted in opposition.) The brief debate had been preceded by a week-long hikoi (“walk”) by Maoris from the top of North Island to Wellington, concluding outside the parliamentary building in a demonstration attended by a crowd of over 10,000. Following six months of

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public hearings, the coastal bill was enacted into law in November. The national election of September 17, 2005, was marked by dramatic gains for the National Party, but Labour nevertheless managed a 2-vote plurality, 50–48, sufficient for Prime Minister Clark to remain in office at the head of a multiparty government that was sworn in on October 19. In addition to renewing a coalition with the renamed Jim Anderton’s Progressive (1 seat), Clark negotiated “supply and confidence” agreements with Winston Peters’s NZ First (7 seats) and Peter DUNNE’s United Future (3 seats) that produced a bare majority of 61 in the 121-member House of Representatives.

Constitution and Government New Zealand’s political system, historically patterned on the British model, has no written constitution. As in other Commonwealth states that have retained allegiance to the queen, the monarch is represented by a governor general, now a New Zealand citizen, who performs the largely ceremonial functions of chief of state. The only legally recognized executive body is the Executive Council, which includes the governor general and all government ministers; de facto executive authority is vested in the cabinet, headed by the prime minister, under a system of parliamentary responsibility. The judicial system is headed by a Court of Appeal and a High Court; district courts and justices of the peace function at lower levels. Local administration is based on 16 regions; 4 (Nelson City, Gisborne, Tasman, and Marlborough) are defined as unitary authorities, whereas the other 12 are subdivided into 57 districts and 16 cities. In addition, the remote, sparsely populated Chatham Islands, some 500 miles east of Christchurch, have unitary status. Each local unit is governed by an elected council headed by a chair or mayor. In September 1992, against the advice of most major political leaders, the electorate voted to abandon the prevailing “first-past-the-post” electoral

system, favoring from among four alternatives a variant of the German multiple member system (called in New Zealand the MMP option), under which an expanded parliament would be filled by a combination of members elected in single-seat constituencies and others chosen by proportional representation from national party lists. Formally approved in a second referendum on November 6, 1993, the MMP arrangements provided that the constituency seats should include some designated for Maori representation, to be filled from a separate electoral roll on which Maoris could opt to be registered. Another possible constitutional change involves the country’s link to the British Crown. While prorepublican sentiment currently appears to be less strong than in Australia, Prime Minister Clark was quoted in February 2002 as saying that New Zealand will inevitably become a republic. One step in that direction was taken in October 2003 when the House of Representatives, by a relatively narrow margin, passed a bill ending the right of final legal appeal to the Privy Council in London and creating a Supreme Court, which began hearing cases in July 2004. In April 2000 the government had withdrawn from the imperial honors system, although individuals currently bearing titles were permitted to retain them.

Foreign Relations As a small and isolated nation, New Zealand has traditionally maintained preferential trading and military relations with Australia and has supported collective security through the United Nations; the Commonwealth (former foreign minister Don McKINNON became its secretary general in 2000); ANZUS, in partnership with Australia and the United States; and the Five Power Defense Arrangements (with Australia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the United Kingdom). In February 1985 the Lange administration refused docking privileges to a U.S. naval ship because of Washington’s unwillingness to certify that the vessel was not carrying nuclear arms. Fearing

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similar action by other allies, the Ronald Reagan administration reacted by canceling ANZUS military exercises planned for March, and in August 1986 it suspended its security commitments to New Zealand. In June 1987 the Wellington parliament approved a Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act that formally prohibited the entry of nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered ships into New Zealand waters. In September 1999 U.S. President Bill Clinton announced that the ban on joint military exercises would be lifted to prepare for the UN-backed peacekeeping mission in East Timor, to which New Zealand committed some 800 troops. Nevertheless, the fundamental disagreement remains unresolved. The Clark administration strongly endorsed the U.S.-led “war on terrorism” in late 2001, and in March 2002 Prime Minister Clark met with U.S. President George W. Bush, the first such visit by a Labour leader since the mid-1980s. In contrast, Clark vehemently opposed the 2002 invasion of Iraq as unjustified. New Zealand has played an active part in the development of South Pacific and Asia-Pacific economic and political cooperation. The resumption of French nuclear tests at Mururoa Atoll in 1995 provoked particularly vigorous condemnation in New Zealand. Recent initiatives included a role in mediating the Bougainville separatist conflict in Papua New Guinea and, under Prime Minister Shipley, efforts to forge a free-trade pact, dubbed Project 5 (P5), that would span the Pacific and include Australia, Singapore, Chile, and the United States. By 2004, however, the proposed pact had been reduced to the “Pacific Three”: New Zealand, Chile, and Singapore. Brunei subsequently joined the negotiations, which culminated in the July 18, 2005, signing in Wellington of a Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (SEP) agreement. In March 2006 the House of Representatives ratified the SEP, which, while reducing tariffs with Chile and Brunei (New Zealand and Singapore already had free trade in goods), was expected to have its greatest impact on the export of services. New Zealand has also been engaged in free-trade negotiations with

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China. A wider agreement has been under discussion with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus Australia. In addition, Japan has proposed a 16-nation trade pact that would include New Zealand.

Current Issues In mid-2005, with a national election less than three months away, the National Party held a small lead over Labour in some opinion polls. The main issue appeared to be tax and budget policies—specifically, the government’s “Working for Families” program of tax credits and income assistance versus National’s call for tax cuts and increased spending on defense and law enforcement. Minority rights also remained contentious. A controversial civil unions law had entered into effect in late April, but indigenous rights remained central to both campaigns. Don Brash called for an end to “racial separation,” including elimination of the seven Maori roll seats in the legislature. Clark countered by announcing in August that a deadline of September 1, 2008, would be set for filing of Treaty of Waitangi claims. In the end, Labour recovered enough support to squeeze out a third term for Clark, although she had to negotiate unusual “supply and confidence” agreements with the NZ First and United Future parties. NZ First’s Peters was named foreign minister and United Future’s Dunne minister of revenue, but they remained outside the cabinet. In return, both parties agreed to support the government on confidence votes and on legislation related to their leaders’ respective portfolios, although they may vote as they see fit on other matters. Meanwhile, with the National Party having picked up 21 seats, the future status of a number of smaller parties remained uncertain. Except for the new Maori Party, which won 4 constituency seats, all the other small parties lost ground. In the first half of 2006 attention turned to the economy, which had experienced a marked slowdown during 2005 as a whole and a 0.1 percent drop in GDP during the fourth quarter. At the same time,

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the central bank, in an effort to bring inflation back under a 3 percent ceiling, had raised interest rates to the highest in the developed world, 7.25 percent, in December 2005. Growth in the first quarter of 2006 rebounded to 0.7 percent, but expectations for the full year remained modest.

Political Parties The equivalent of a two-party system long characterized New Zealand politics, traditional conservative and liberal roles being played by the National and Labour parties, respectively. Differences between the two narrowed considerably after World War II, and even more so with the election in 1984 of the Labour Party, which brought the strictures of Britain’s Thatcherite policies to bear on New Zealand’s long-standing, strong welfare state. The potential for smaller groups to play a significant role in politics was enhanced by the electorate’s 1993 endorsement of limited proportional representation. For the September 2005 election 19 parties offered party lists (up from 14 in 2002), while a number of others competed in at least one electoral district. As of June 2006 there were 22 officially registered parties, each of which must have at least 500 members, as well as a number of unregistered parties. The latter may offer parliamentary candidates for election in individual electorates but may not compete for proportional (party list) seats.

Governing Coalition New Zealand Labour Party (Labour Party). Founded in 1916 and in power 1935–1949, 1957– 1960, 1972–1975, and 1984–1990, the Labour Party originated much of the legislation that gave rise to what is essentially a welfare state. However, in an about-face that generated internal dissension, the post-1984 Labour administration of David Lange introduced sweeping changes to promote free-market conditions, including economic deregulation and reduction of government subsidies. The party nonetheless maintained its traditional antimilitarist posture, voting in 1984 to with-

draw from all alliances with nuclear powers. In August 1987 Labour retained its substantial legislative majority, but in August 1989 the increasingly unpopular Lange resigned in favor of Geoffrey Palmer, who was in turn succeeded by Michael (Mike) Moore on September 4, 1990. The party’s legislative representation fell to an all-time low of 28 seats at the October 1990 election, but it staged a recovery to 45 seats out of 99 in November 1993. In December 1993 a Labour caucus ousted Moore as opposition leader in favor of Helen Clark, a member of the party’s left wing although a conservative, David CAYGILL was elected Clark’s deputy. In 1994 the party suffered a minor split leading to the creation of the Future New Zealand Party (see under United Future, below), while increasing criticism of Clark’s leadership was highlighted by the resignation of Caygill as deputy leader in June 1996. In the October general election Labour fell back to 37 seats. In August 1998 Labour and the Alliance (below) began discussing the possibility of forming a coalition government following the 1999 election, at which Labour led all parties, taking 38.7 percent of the list vote and 49 seats. With external support from the Green Party (below), Clark thus became New Zealand’s first elected woman prime minister at the head of a center-left Labour-Alliance cabinet. The collapse of the Alliance led to the early election of July 2002, at which Labour retained its plurality, winning 52 seats (including all 7 Maori roll seats) on the basis of 45 percent of electorate votes and 41 percent of the party list vote. In coalition with the Progressives of Jim Anderton (the former Alliance leader), Prime Minister Clark negotiated a cooperation agreement with United Future that assured her new government a working majority on crucial votes. In September 2005, although its electorate vote dropped to 40 percent, Labour won a narrow plurality of 50 seats and formed another coalition with Jim Anderton’s Progressive that required additional support from United Future and the New Zealand First Party (below). Leaders: Helen CLARK (Prime Minister), Michael CULLEN (Deputy Leader), Mike

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WILLIAMS (President), Mike SMITH (General Secretary). Jim Anderton’s Progressive (Progressive). When deep divisions over defense policy split the Alliance coalition party in April–May 2002, its former leader and the sitting deputy prime minister organized his own “Jim Anderton’s Progressive Coalition,” which was registered by the Electoral Commission in June 2002. Included in the leftist coalition were the Democrats (see Democrats for Social Credit, below), also formerly a component of the Alliance, which then went their separate way later in the year. In the July 2002 election the Progressive Coalition attracted only 1.7 percent of the party list vote but claimed one proportional seat on the strength of Anderton’s constituency seat victory. Anderton retained his ministerial portfolios, but not his position as deputy prime minister, in the new Clark minority government. In April 2004 the Progressive Coalition was formally reregistered as the Progressive Party, which then adopted its current name in July 2005. In the 2005 national election Anderton retained his seat, but the party’s 1.2 percent party list vote did not entitle it to another seat. Leaders: Jim ANDERTON (Leader), Matt ROBSON (Deputy Leader), Phil CLEARWATER (General Secretary). New Zealand First Party (NZ First). The right-wing populist NZ First was launched in July 1993 by the charismatic former Maori affairs minister, Winston Peters, who had been ejected from the National Party caucus earlier in the year. Forcing a by-election by resigning from the House, he retained his seat with a massive 11,000-vote majority and subsequently attracted much public approval for his campaign against corruption in the Cook Islands (see Related Territories, below). The NZ First won only 2 seats in the November 1993 election on a vote share of 8 percent. It improved to 13 percent of the party list in the October 1996 balloting, its 17 seats (including all 5 Maori roll seats) enabling it to negotiate a coalition agreement with the National Party whereby Peters was

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named deputy prime minister. However, the coalition agreement generated some unrest within the NZ First, which had fought the election on a platform that condemned the record of the National government and whose supporters were shown by opinion polls to strongly favor a coalition with Labour. On August 14, 1998, a day after calling Prime Minister Shipley “devious” and “untrustworthy” on the floor of the legislature, Peters was dismissed as deputy prime minister and treasurer. Peters took the NZ First out of the government four days later. Nevertheless, half the party’s delegation, including its four other cabinet members, continued their support for the Shipley administration. Several of the dissidents subsequently chose to sit as independents. Others, including two government ministers, formed the short-lived Mauri Pacific (“Spirit of the Pacific”), which failed to win any House seats in 1999 and dissolved in 2001. Although some preelection polls had indicated that the NZ First might win sufficient seats to hold the balance of power, the party fared poorly at the November 1999 national balloting, taking only 4.3 percent of the proportional vote. The party would have been eliminated from parliament had Peters not retained his seat (by 63 votes); his victory enabled it to claim four additional party list seats. Peters later indicated that the NZ First would not sit with the opposition but would support or oppose the government issue by issue. In July 2002 the NZ First, in a dramatic turnabout, took 10.4 percent of the party list vote and ended up with 13 House seats (12 of them awarded on a proportional basis). In the September 2005 election the party won only 7 list seats (on a 5.7 percent vote share) but then negotiated a “supply and confidence agreement” with Labour that brought it into the government and made Peters minister of foreign affairs, although he remained outside the cabinet. Leaders: Winston PETERS (Minister of Foreign Affairs and Party Leader), Peter BROWN (Deputy Leader), Douglas WOOLERTON, Brian DONNELLY, Edwin PERRY (Secretary).

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United Future New Zealand (United Future). The United Future was formed in late 2000 by the merger of United New Zealand (United NZ) and Future New Zealand (Future NZ). United NZ had been launched in June 1995 by a group of National and Labour legislators, including Peter Dunne, a former Labour MP who in 1994 had founded the moderate Future New Zealand Party. In February 1996 the United NZ concluded a formal coalition agreement with the National Party, one provision being that Dunne would be given a cabinet post. The “centre-liberal” United NZ won only one seat in the October 1996 election, its single member promising to give external support to the new National–NZ First coalition. In September 1997 the United NZ had absorbed two parties closely allied with the immigrant population—the Ethnic Minority Party and Advance New Zealand, the latter led by England SO’ONALOLE. In April 1998 the Conservative Party (CP), led by Colin JACKSON, had also merged into the United NZ, which hoped to benefit by adding the CP’s rural and provincial base to its own largely urban constituency. The CP had been launched in September 1994 as the Right of Centre Party by Ross MEURANT, theretofore a National Party member and junior minister. As the CP, the party had failed to win representation in the October 1996 election. Known as the Christian Democratic Party (CDP) and led by Graeme LEE until relaunched as the Future NZ in November 1998, Future NZ did not describe itself as a Christian party per se. It was considered more liberal than the Christian Heritage Party (CHP; see under Christian Heritage NZ, below), with which the CDP campaigned in 1996. The Future NZ was unsuccessful in the 1999 House election, whereas the United NZ retained its single seat. The new United Future faced its first national election in July 2002. It won eight House seats, seven of them on the strength of a 6.7 percent party list vote, and two weeks later it agreed to extend external support for three years to Clark’s LabourProgressive coalition. In September 2005 the party won only 2.7 percent of the party list vote and a to-

tal of three seats. Those three seats proved crucial in Labour’s effort to remain in power, as a consequence of which Dunne negotiated a “supply and confidence” agreement that put him at the head of the revenue ministry. Leaders: Peter DUNNE (Minister of Revenue and Party Leader), Graeme REEVES (President), Denise KRUM (Vice President), Phil JOHNSON (Secretary/Treasurer).

Other Parliamentary Parties New Zealand National Party. Founded in 1936 as a union of the earlier Reform and Liberal Parties, the National Party controlled the government from 1960 to 1972, 1975 to 1984, and 1990 to 1999. A predominantly conservative grouping drawing its strength from rural and suburban areas, the party traditionally has been committed to the support of personal initiative, private enterprise, and the removal of controls over industry. However, the orientation became clouded as Labour shifted to free-market policies, and the 1975–1984 National government of Sir Robert Muldoon endorsed selective state intervention in the economy. A dispute in late 1985 and early 1986 between Muldoon and his successor as party leader, James McLAY (whose free-market philosophy mirrored that of the Labour government), led to McLay’s resignation. The new leader, James (Jim) Bolger, endorsed the Muldoon position, although reports of intraparty dissent continued. In 1983 real estate millionaire Bob Jones announced the formation of a libertarian New Zealand Party (NZP) as an overt challenge to the National Party. In 1984 it drew 12 percent of the vote, mainly from National supporters, but failed to obtain parliamentary representation. In 1986 the NZP formally merged with the National Party. During the 1990 campaign, Bolger was consistently eclipsed in the polls by his half-Maori populist colleague, Winston Peters, but National nonetheless won a landslide victory over Labour in the October balloting. Dismissed as Maori affairs minister in late 1991 for “disloyalty,” Peters was excluded from the party’s parliamentary caucus in

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early 1993. He responded by resigning his seat and humiliated the government by regaining it in a byelection under the banner of his newly established NZ First (above). The National Party won a bare majority of 50 of the 99 legislative seats in the 1993 balloting on a lackluster vote share of 35 percent, but the defection of Ross Meurant in September 1994 to form the Right of Centre Party (see under United Future, above) eliminated this margin, obliging Bolger to form a coalition with the new party. In the October 1996 legislative balloting the party slipped to 34 percent of the list vote but won a plurality of 44 out of 120 seats, sufficient for it to form a coalition government with the NZ First. In November 1997 Bolger was supplanted as party leader by Jenny Shipley, the leader of the party’s right wing, who was named prime minister in December. The NZ First left the coalition in August 1998, but the support of half its parliamentary delegation helped the Shipley administration remain in office as a minority government. At the November 1999 election the National vote share fell to 30.5 percent, and it won only 39 seats. Shipley resigned her party post in October 2001 and was succeeded by Bill ENGLISH, a former minister of health, who was then ousted in November 2003 by Don Brash, a former governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand who had joined the party only three years before. At the July 2002 election the party had seen its party list vote share plummet to 20.9 percent, and it won only 27 seats, a record low. The National Party made a dramatic recovery in September 2005, winning 48 seats and 39 percent of the party list vote, but the totals were not enough to forestall another Labour government. Leaders: Don BRASH (Party Leader), Judy KIRK (President), Gerry BROWNLEE (Deputy Leader), Greg SHEEHAN (General Manager).

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reductions, eventual disarmament, and reorganization of the government to meet the needs of people. In 1991 it was instrumental in forming the Alliance with New Labour and other small groups, and it gained three legislative seats in the 1996 balloting. In October 1997 the party voted to separate from the Alliance electorally, although it pledged continued parliamentary support for the Alliance’s policy agenda. Initial returns from the November 1999 election indicated that the Greens had failed to win any parliamentary seats. A December 7 recount produced, however, a constituency victory for party leader Jeannette Fitzsimons, entitling the party, under New Zealand’s complex electoral system, to five additional party list seats. A sixth party list seat was added three days later when the party was officially credited with a 5.2 percent vote share. As a result, the Labour-Alliance coalition lost its majority standing, leaving the incoming Clark minority government dependent on Green support, although a formal cooperation agreement was never concluded. At the July 2002 election the Greens improved to 7.0 percent of the party list vote, giving them nine House seats. Following the election, the Greens joined the opposition when Prime Minister Clark rejected their demand that the government continue a moratorium on introducing genetically modified organisms. In September 2005 the Greens won 5.3 percent of the party list vote for six seats. The party remained outside the new coalition government (reportedly at the insistence of NZ First’s Winston Peters) but agreed not to oppose Prime Minister Clark on confidence votes. A longtime party leader, Rod DONALD, died in November 2005. Leaders: Jeannette FITZSIMONS and Russel NORMAN (Co leaders), Sue BRADFORD, Nandor TANCZOS.

Green Party of Aotearoa Founded in 1972 as the New Zealand Values Party, the country’s left-oriented ecologist grouping adopted its present name in 1988. In addition to environmental concerns, it advocates military

Maori Party Tariana Turia, a former Labour MP and associate minister for Maori affairs, established the Maori Party in June 2004. She had left Labour in May

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to protest the government’s Foreshore and Seabed Bill, which she saw as a betrayal of Maori rights. Under the banner of her new party Turia won a parliamentary by-election for her old seat on July 10, taking some 90 percent of the vote and generating considerable speculation over whether the new party would be able to consolidate Maori support. Prior to the September 2005 national election, in which the Maori Party won four Maori roll seats, what had been the leading Maori party for a generation, Mana Maori Motuhake (“Maori Self-Determination”), requested deregistration. It had been established as the Mana Motuhake in 1979 by Maori leader Matiu RATA and participated in the Alliance (below) from 1991 until after the 2002 election (from 1999 on, as the Mana Motuhake O Aotearoa). A party conference had adopted the name Mana Maori Motuhake in October 2002. Also deregistered in 2005 was the Mana Maori Movement, which had run unsuccessfully in 2002. Leaders: Tariana TURIA, Pita SHARPLES.

vote. In February 2003, however, its parliamentary caucus expelled one of its members, Donna AWATERE HUATA, who had been accused of misusing public funds provided to a children’s reading foundation that she had sponsored. In November 2004 the Supreme Court backed her expulsion, and she was forced to vacate her seat. With public support for ACT New Zealand falling below 3 percent, Richard PREBBLE stepped down as party leader in April 2004. A fourway battle to replace him followed, with Rodney Hide prevailing in June over Deputy Leader Ken SHIRLEY, Stephen FRANKS, and Muriel NEWMAN. In July 2005 the House of Representatives defeated, 109–9, a motion introduced by Shirley that would have lifted the 20-year-old ban prohibiting nuclear ships or those carrying nuclear weapons from entering New Zealand’s territorial waters. In September 2005 the party won 1.5 percent of the party list vote and a total of two seats. Leaders: Rodney HIDE (Leader), Heather ROY, Barbara ASTILL (Secretary).

ACT New Zealand

Other Parties

Founded in 1994 as the political arm of the Association of Consumers and Taxpayers, ACT New Zealand advocates tax reform, welfare reform, school choice, health care reform, and discontinuation of Waitangi Treaty claims. One of the party’s founders, Sir Roger DOUGLAS, was a former Labour finance minister who had been the architect of the deregulatory and free-market reforms introduced in the 1980s. The party won eight seats on a 6 percent party list vote share in the October 1996 election. In August 1998 and February 1999 its support was crucial to the confidence votes won by Prime Minister Shipley’s minority government. At the November 1999 election it won 7 percent of the list vote, for nine party list seats. The lackluster results led Douglas to warn, at the party’s March 2000 annual conference, that it should avoid “flash in the pan” populist positions and adhere to core principles. In 2002 ACT New Zealand retained its nine seats on the basis of a 7.1 percent share of the party list

The Alliance. The Alliance was launched in 1991 as a coalition of five parties—the NewLabour Party, the Mana Motuhake, the New Zealand Democratic Party, the Green Party of Aotearoa, and the Liberal Party—on a platform calling for preservation of the welfare state and an end to the free-market policies of the two major parties. It won 2 seats on an 18.2 percent vote share in November 1993, thereafter overtaking Labour in the opinion polls and narrowly failing to take a National Party seat in a by-election in August 1994. Although Labour rebuffed an offer to form an electoral alliance for the 1996 campaign, the Alliance achieved a creditable 10.1 percent of the party list vote in October and won 13 seats. However, in late 1997 the Greens left the Alliance. The Liberal Party, which had been formed in 1991 by a number of National dissidents, dissolved in January 1998. At the November 1999 election the Alliance captured ten seats (including one won by a former Green) on a 7.7 percent party list vote share and

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in early December worked out a power-sharing arrangement with Labour that left open the possibility of taking separate stances on issues affecting the “distinctive political identity” of each party. The cabinet sworn in on December 10 included four Alliance ministers. A fifth, Phillida BUNKLE, was named to outer ministries for consumer affairs and customs, but she was forced to step down in February 2001 because of alleged misuse of a parliamentary housing allowance—a charge that she persistently denied. The democratic-socialist NewLabour had been formed in April 1989 by Jim Anderton, who had been expelled by Labour’s parliamentary caucus after refusing to support a government measure to privatize the Bank of New Zealand and who thereupon resigned from the parent party. The party’s 6 percent vote share gave it one House seat in 1990, which it retained in 1993. Under proportional representation, the NLP secured five seats in 1996 and held them at the 1999 election, after which it gave up its individual identity and merged into the Alliance. In April 2002 a sharp division between the majority of the Alliance MPs and the formal party leadership, headed by Matt McCARTEN, led to the “expulsion” of Anderton and six other MPs who had supported the government’s decision to participate in U.S.-led military operations in Afghanistan. All ten Alliance MPs indicated that they would continue to back the government until the upcoming election, but the split contributed to Prime Minister Clark’s decision to move up the balloting by several months. Anderton and his supporters, including the Democrats, went on to campaign as the Progressive Coalition. (In July 2005 Anderton’s party was renamed Jim Anderton’s Progressive, and the Democrats became the Democrats for Social Credit.) At the July 2002 election the Alliance was ousted from the House, having won only 1.3 percent of the party list vote. In December 2002 Mana Motuhake formally left the Alliance. (It dissolved in 2005—see the Maori Party, above.) Former government minister Laila HARRE´ retired as Alliance leader in November 2003 and was succeeded by

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McCarten. Both, however, later became associated with the Maori Party. The Alliance announced in November 2004 that it would prepare a party list for the 2005 election, reversing an earlier decision to recommend support for the Greens or the Maori Party. At the September election the Alliance won only 0.1 percent of the vote and no seats, leaving its future in jeopardy. Leaders: Jill OVENS (President), Len RICHARDS (Co-leader), Paul PIESSE (Co-leader and General Secretary). Christian Heritage New Zealand (Christian Heritage NZ). Founded in 1989 as the Christian Heritage Party, the Christian Heritage NZ has opposed all legislative decisions and referendums that “contravene Biblical principles.” It supports “family values” and strongly opposes abortion. It joined with the Christian Democrats (see United Future, above) to contest the 1996 election as the shortlived Christian Coalition, which won 4.3 percent of the party list vote but no parliamentary seats. In 1999, running alone, Christian Heritage won 2.4 percent of the vote. In July 2002 Christian Heritage saw its party list vote drop to 1.3 percent. In August 2003 party founder Graham CAPILL retired, and in November the party officially assumed its present name. At the 2005 election it won only 0.1 percent of the vote. Leaders: Ewen McQUEEN (Party Leader), Derek BLIGHT (Deputy Leader), Bruce McCARTNEY (Executive Director), David SIMPKIN (Secretary). Destiny New Zealand (Destiny NZ). Established in June 2003, Destiny NZ is a fundamentalist Christian party dedicated to traditional values, family empowerment, lower taxes for individuals and businesses, and a less intrusive government. It won 0.6 percent of the party list vote in the September 2005 national election. Leaders: Richard LEWIS (Leader), Steven BROWN (President), Anne WILLIAMSON (Secretary). New Zealand Democratic Party for Social Credit (Democrats for Social Credit). Established

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in May 1953 as the Social Credit Political League, the Democrats campaigned largely on a platform that promoted economic sovereignty, small business, worker shareholding and participation in management, tax and bank reform, public ownership of utilities, and introduction of a “Universal Basic Income.” Social Credit subsequently proposed a defense posture of “armed neutrality” in the context of a nuclear-free zone, a position reaffirmed during the May 1985 congress at which the league adopted the name New Zealand Democratic Party. A minor presence in the House from 1978 until 1987, the party secured no representation thereafter until winning two seats as part of the Alliance in 1996. It retained both in 1999. When the Alliance split in 2002, the Democrats joined Jim Anderton’s Progressive Coalition but won no seats at the July 2002 House election. At a party conference three months later most of the Democrats, but not party leader Grant GILLON, opted to separate from the Progressives and “return to core principles.” The party adopted its present name in July 2005, two months before the most recent national election, at which it won only 0.1 percent of the party list vote and no seats. Leaders: Neville AITCHISON (President), Stephnie de RUYTER (Leader), John PEMBERTON (Deputy Leader), Mark ATKIN (Secretary). All of the parties discussed above participated in the proportional balloting in the September 2005 election. Other minor parties offering party list slates—none of which won more than 0.05 percent of the vote—were the Aotearoa Legalize Cannabis Party, led by Michael APPLEBY, Michael BRITNELL, and Irinka BRITNELL; the Direct Democracy Party, registered in June 2005 under the leadership of Kelvyn ALP; the Libertarianz, a libertarian party founded in 1995 and led by Bernard DARNTON; the New Zealand Family Rights Protection Party (New Zealand F.R.P.P.), which was registered in March 2005 and campaigned on behalf of Pacific islanders; the 99 MP Party, which was registered in April 2005 and campaigned for a reduction in the size of the

House of Representatives to 99 members; the One New Zealand Party (OneNZ Party), which won only 0.02 percent of the vote and was expected to dissolve in 2006; and the Republic of New Zealand Party (RONZP), which, led by Kerry BEVIN, was registered in July 2005 and called for establishment of a republic, adoption of a written constitution, and an end to ethnic-based set-asides and government institutions. Outdoor Recreation NZ (ORNZ), which was registered in March 2002, decided to run in 2005 under the banner of the United Future, as did the one-issue WIN Party, which was registered in May 2005 and advocates free choice for adult smokers. Some WIN members later objected to the decision of United Future’s leader, Peter Dunne, to join the Labour-led government. United Future and the ORNZ, led by Phil HOARE and former United Future MP Marc ALEXANDER, announced an amicable separation in March 2006, although Alexander had criticized what he saw as an evangelical Christian influence within his former party. The Maori Te Tawharau, led by Rangitukehu PAORA (Secretary), was associated with the Mani Maori Movement from 1999 until 2002. Although a registered party, it did not offer a party list in 2005. New Zealand has a long history of leftist parties, but most extant groups have minuscule memberships. The Anti-Capitalist Alliance (ACA), which had been established as an umbrella formation prior to the 2002 national election, ran eight candidates (who collectively received nearly 600 votes) in 2005, the most of any unregistered group. In 2006 the ACA adopted a new name, the Workers Party of New Zealand (WPNZ), which is led by longtime activist Daphna WHITMORE. A key WPNZ component is Whitmore’s Revolutionary Workers’ League (RWL), formed in 2004 by an earlier Workers’ Party, Revolution, and others. The Communist League (CL), which was established in 1969 as the Trotskyist Socialist Action League, ran two candidates in 2005. The Socialist Worker (previously called the Socialist Workers’ Organization—SWO) was founded in 1995 under Grant MORGAN as a merger of the Communist Party of New Zealand (CPNZ, established in 1921) and the International

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Cabinet As of July 15, 2006 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister

Helen Clark [f] Michael Cullen

Ministers Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) Agriculture Arts, Culture, and Heritage Biosecurity Broadcasting Building Issues Civil Defense Commerce Communications Conservation Corrections Courts Crown Research Institutes Customs Defense Disarmament and Arms Control Economic Development Education Energy and Climate Change Environment Finance Fisheries Food Safety Forestry Health Housing Immigration Industry and Regional Development Information Technology Internal Affairs Justice Labor Land Information Local Government Maori Affairs Pacific Island Affairs Police Research, Science, and Technology Rural Affairs Senior Citizens Small Business

Ruth Dyson [f] James (Jim) Anderton (Progressive) Helen Clark [f] Jim Anderton (Progressive) Steven (Steve) Maharey Clayton Cosgrove Richard (Rick) Barker Lianne Dalziel [f] David Cunliffe Christopher (Chris) Carter Damien O’Connor Rick Barker Steve Maharey Nanaia Mahuta Phil Goff Phil Goff Trevor Mallard Steve Maharey David Parker David Benson-Pope Michael Cullen Jim Anderton (Progressive) Annette King [f] Jim Anderton (Progressive) Peter (Pete) Hodgson Chris Carter David Cunliffe Trevor Mallard David Cunliffe Rick Barker Richard Mark Burton Ruth Dyson [f] Pete Hodgson Mark Burton Parekura Horomia Phil Goff Annette King [f] Steve Maharey Damien O’Connor Ruth Dyson [f] Lianne Dalziel [f]

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Social Development and Employment Sport and Recreation State-Owned Enterprises State Services Statistics Tertiary Education Tourism Trade and Trade Negotiations Transport Veterans’ Affairs Waitangi Treaty Negotiations Women’s Affairs Youth Affairs Attorney General

David Benson-Pope Trevor Mallard Trevor Mallard Annette King [f] Clayton Cosgrove Michael Cullen Damien O’Connor Phil Goff Pete Hodgson Rick Barker Mark Burton Lianne Dalziel [f] Nanaia Mahuta Michael Cullen

Outer Ministries Community and Voluntary Sector Consumer Affairs Foreign Affairs Racing Revenue Transport Safety Ministers of State

Luamanuvao Winnie Leban Judith Tizard [f] Winston Peters (NZ First) Winston Peters (NZ First) Peter Dunne (United Future) Harry Duynhoven Mahara Okeroa Mita Ririnui Dover Samuels

[f] = female Note: Unless otherwise noted, all ministers belong to Labour.

Socialist Organization (ISO), although the latter subsequently split from the SWO and reestablished a separate identity. Among the other leftist groups are the World Socialist Party (New Zealand), the Marxist-Leninist Socialist Party of Aotearoa, and the Maoist Communist Party of Aotearoa.

Legislature The former General Assembly of New Zealand became a unicameral body in 1950 with the abolition of its upper chamber, the Legislative Council. Now called the House of Representatives (although delegates are referred to as “members of Parliament”), the body currently consists of 120 members elected by universal suffrage for a three-

year term, subject to dissolution. Under a partially proportional system introduced in 1996, 69 members are elected from constituencies by majoritarian voting (including 7 elected by voters on a Maori Electoral Roll) and at least 51 from party lists to ensure proportional representation for those parties winning at least one constituency or obtaining at least 5 percent of the national vote. In the most recent election, held September 17, 2005, the new Maori Party won 1 more electorate seat than would otherwise have been awarded on the basis of the party list vote. Under New Zealand’s complicated electoral system, this “overhang” seat meant that for the length of its present term the House has 121 seats (69 electorate, 52 party list), distributed as follows: Labour Party, 50

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(constituency seats, 31; party list seats, 19); National Party, 48 (31, 17); New Zealand First, 7 (0, 7); Green Party of Aotearoa, 6 (0, 6); Maori Party, 4 (4, 0); United Future New Zealand, 3 (1, 2); ACT New Zealand, 2 (1, 1); and Jim Anderton’s Progressive, 1 (1, 0). Speaker: Margaret WILSON.

Communications Press Complete freedom of the press prevails, except for legal stipulations regarding libel. Except as indicated, the following are dailies: New Zealand Herald (Auckland, 215,000), only national paper; Sunday Star-Times (Auckland, 200,000), weekly; Christchurch Star (Christchurch, 120,000), twice weekly; Sunday News (Auckland, 110,000), weekly; Dominion-Post (Wellington, 100,000), established in 2002 by merger of The Dominion and The Evening Post; The Press (Christchurch, 90,000); The Otago Daily Times (Dunedin, 45,000); Waikato Times (Hamilton, 40,000); Southland Times (Invercargill, 30,000); Daily News (New Plymouth, 30,000); Hawke’s Bay Today (Hastings, 30,000), established 1999.

News Agencies The New Zealand Press Association (NZPA) is a cooperative, nonprofit organization established in 1879 to provide both local and international news to all New Zealand papers. Other agencies in Wellington include a number of foreign bureaus.

Broadcasting and Computing The state-owned Radio New Zealand operates public, noncommercial radio broadcasting, while the Radio Network of New Zealand includes some 90 commercial stations. A large number of independent stations also transmit. The state-owned Television New Zealand operates two networks. A handful of independent companies also hold TV licenses, several of them for pay-TV broadcasts. There were approximately 2.0 million television receivers and 1.8 million personal computers serving 2.1 million Internet users in 2003.

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Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. Roy FERGUSON U.S. Ambassador to New Zealand: William P. McCORMICK Permanent Representative to the UN: Rosemary BANKS IGO Memberships (Non-UN): ADB, ANZUS, APEC, BIS, CP, CWTH, EBRD, IEA, Interpol, IOM, OECD, PC, PCA, PIF, WCO, WTO

Related Territories New Zealand has two self-governing territories, the Cook Islands and Niue, and two dependent territories, Ross Dependency and Tokelau.

Cook Islands Located some 1,700 miles northeast of New Zealand and administered by that country since 1901, the Cook Islands have a land area of 90 square miles (234 sq. km.) and are divided between a smaller, poorer, northern group and a larger, more fertile, southern group. The island of Rarotonga, with a population of 12,900 (2005E), is the site of the capital, Avarua. The islands’ total resident population of 17,000 (2005E) is almost entirely Polynesians, who are New Zealand citizens. Some 52,000 Cook Islanders reside in New Zealand, with another 15,000 in Australia, and remittances are a significant source of income for the territory. Leading exports include pearls, fish, tropical fruits, and handicrafts, while tourism is the main source of foreign earnings. Offshore banking and the sale of fishing licenses to foreign ships also contribute income. Future prospects include mining of undersea mineral nodules. Internationally, the Cook Islands is a member of the Pacific Community, the Smaller Island States subgroup (with Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, and Tuvalu) within the Pacific Islands Forum, various UN agencies, and the Asian Development Bank. In June 2000 Cook Islands was named by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and

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Development (OECD) as 1 of 35 uncooperative tax havens and by the international Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) as 1 of 15 noncooperative countries and territories. In 2002 the islands resolved the tax haven issue with the OECD, and in 2005 were finally removed from the FATF list, having satisfied demands for tighter controls. Internal self-government with an elected Legislative Assembly (commonly called the Parliament) and a premier (prime minister, since 1981) was instituted in 1965, with New Zealand continuing to oversee external and defense affairs. A hereditary House of Ariki, with up to 15 members, serves as an upper house, advising on customary matters and land use. Over the past 25 years political power has most often swung between the Cook Islands Party (CIP), which dates from 1965, and the Democratic Alliance Party (DAP), which was established as the Democratic Party in 1971. It returned to that name in 2003, 14 years after adopting the DAP designation. The CIP, under Sir Geoffrey HENRY, retained power with an overwhelming majority of 20 of 25 seats at the election of March 24, 1994. The CIP achieved its victory despite the prior establishment in Wellington of a judicial inquiry into allegations of tax fraud by New Zealand–registered firms operating in and out of the Cook Islands, in collusion with the Avarua government. Pursued in the New Zealand House of Representatives by Winston Peters of the New Zealand First Party, the allegations and the inquiry served to strain relations between the territorial and Wellington governments. In August 1997, however, a special commission reported that there was no basis for the claims—a decision that was largely upheld by the New Zealand High Court in August 1999. Alleged local corruption, economic mismanagement, and a bloated government payroll (accounting for one in three of the adult population) contributed to a full-scale financial crisis in mid-1996, when the islands’ public debt had reached the equivalent of $120 million. An emergency debt-repayment plan forced upon the ter-

ritorial government by external creditors in June stipulated a 50 percent pruning of the civil service, the privatization of state enterprises, and cutbacks in the islands’ generous welfare provisions. In May 1997 a National Development Council, with members drawn from the business community, nongovernmental organizations, and traditional and church leaders, was formed to offer advice in such areas as tax reform, repaying the debt, and privatization. More contentious was an eagerly awaited November 1998 report on political restructuring presented by a Commission of Political Review, which recommended reducing the Legislative Assembly to 17 members, choosing the prime minister from among the nationally elected representatives, and adopting a preferential voting system similar to that used in Australia. On April 27, 1999, the islands’ chief justice ruled unconstitutional a recently passed electoral law that restricted political campaigning, including the formation of new parties, to five weeks before the election scheduled for June. The measure had been attacked by the opposition as an effort by the CIP to stifle competition. The CIP nevertheless came away from the June 16 balloting with a 1-seat plurality, despite obtaining only 39.8 percent of the vote, compared to the DAP’s 44.5 percent. With the CIP holding 11 seats and the DAP holding 10, the balance of power lay with former Democrat Norman GEORGE, then of the New Alliance Party (NAP), who controlled the remaining 4 seats (won on a disappointing 13.4 percent vote share) and who threw his support to the incumbent, Sir Geoffrey. On July 26, however, 3 CIP legislators defected to the opposition, and it appeared that the DAP’s Terepai MAOATE would claim the premiership. Three days later, in an effort to save his CIPled government, Sir Geoffrey resigned after having reached an accommodation with one of the defectors, Dr. Joe WILLIAMS. Recommitted to the CIP, Williams was confirmed as prime minister by a 13– 12 vote of the Legislative Assembly, and he was sworn in on July 30. The Williams administration proved short-lived. On September 29, 1999, the DAP won a by-election

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victory, the Court of Appeal having voided a June win by a CIP candidate. The DAP quickly negotiated a coalition agreement with the NAP’s George, resulting on October 13 in the latter’s dismissal as deputy prime minister. When Parliament reconvened on November 17, Williams lost a vote of no confidence 14–11, and on November 18 Terepai Maoate was sworn in as the head of a new cabinet that again included the NAP leader as deputy prime minister. Although Prime Minister Maoate continued in office through 2000, by mid-2001 dissatisfaction with his leadership from within the cabinet had surfaced. In late July he dismissed Deputy Prime Minister George, although George’s replacement, Robert WOONTON of the DAP, also voiced criticism of Maoate. Further differences led to a December no-confidence motion, which Maoate beat back, but he lost a subsequent motion by a 15–9 vote on February 12, 2002, and was replaced as prime minister by Woonton, who had the support of the CIP as well as the NAP. Both Sir Geoffrey, as deputy prime minister, and Norman George returned to the cabinet. In May George’s NAP merged with Woonton’s DAP faction, leaving former prime minister Maoate as head of a competing Democratic faction as well as leader of the opposition. The fifth coalition since the 1999 election, encompassing the DAP and the CIP, was formed in November 2002. Having once again been dropped from the cabinet, Norman George was described as the sole opposition member of Parliament. However, the DAP-CIP partnership lasted only until January 31, 2003, at which time Terepai Maoate replaced Sir Geoffrey as deputy prime minister under Woonton. Reunited, Woonton’s DAP and Maoate’s Democrats agreed to restore their organization’s original name, Democratic Party (DP or Demo). The rift between Maoate and Woonton reappeared in early November 2003, when Maoate mounted an unsuccessful attempt to force a noconfidence motion and once again left the cabinet. The new deputy prime minister, Ngamau MUNOKOA (“Aunty Mau”), became the first woman to hold a high cabinet post. Meanwhile,

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Norman George had taken on the role of senior adviser to the prime minister. With the next legislative election scheduled for 2004, and with the public increasingly jaundiced by the machinations of leading politicians, momentum for political reform began building in 2002. Among those leading the efforts was Elizabeth PONGA, heading a Group for Political Change, which advocated reducing the size of the legislature, eliminating the overseas seat, and shortening the parliamentary term. In March 2003 businessman Teariki HEATHER established a new Cook Islands National (CIN) party, but it merged with the CIP in February 2004. In September 2003 Parliament voted to drop the overseas seat and to reduce the legislative term to four years, with the latter measure requiring voter confirmation before implementation. At the September 7, 2004, election for what was now a 24-member Parliament, initial tallies gave the DP 14 seats to 9 for the CIP, although the results in many districts were contested. On November 14 Prime Minister Woonton announced a DP-CIP “unity” government, but the move confirmed a major rift in the DP. Led by former prime minister Maoate and former deputy prime minister Munokoa, Woonton’s opponents held control of the DP, and as a consequence the prime minister and his supporters formed a new Demo Tumu party. In midDecember, however, Woonton resigned as prime minister when a hearing determined that the race for his parliamentary seat had ended in a tie and that a by-election would be held. On December 14 Parliament elected as Woonton’s replacement Jim Marurai of the Demo Tumu, which subsequently adopted the name Cook Islands First (CIF). After serving two years Marurai was to exchange positions with Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Henry, who continued to lead the CIP, but in August–September 2005 Marurai dismissed Henry and then two other CIP ministers. Terepai Maoate, the new deputy prime minister, brought the DP back into the government, which also continued to include the CIP’s Wilkie RASMUSSEN. With the opposition CIP having won a July 2006 by-election, Prime Minister Marurai advised

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Queen’s Representative Frederick Goodwin to dissolve Parliament, and a snap election was called for September. The announcement had been preceded by the June decision of Legislative Assembly Speaker Norman George to side with the opposition. Queen’s Representative: Sir Frederick GOODWIN. New Zealand High Commissioner: John BRYAN. Prime Minister: Jim MARURAI. President of the House of Ariki: Travel Tou ARIKI.

Niue An island of 100 square miles (259 sq. km.), Niue is the largest and westernmost of the Cook Islands but has been governed separately since 1903. The territory obtained internal self-government in 1974, with a premier heading a 4-member cabinet and a Legislative Assembly of 14 (subsequently 20) members elected for threeyear terms. The capital is Alofi. The resident population has declined almost continuously from 5,194 in 1966 to about 1,590 in early 2005. Some 20,000 Niueans reside in New Zealand, and overseas remittances constitute a major source of income. Other economic resources include recurrent aid from New Zealand; export sales of noni juice, fish, taro, honey, and vanilla; and a small tourism industry that attracted some 1,400 tourists in 2003 but little more than half that in 2004 because of cyclone damage. Recent efforts to increase the island’s income have included leasing its telephone area code for sex-related and other services, selling its postal code (“NU”) for Internet domain addresses, and investigating prospects for commercial fishing. Internationally, Niue participates in the Pacific Community, the Smaller Island States subgroup (with the Cook Islands, Kiribati, Nauru, and Tuvalu) within the Pacific Islands Forum, and several UN agencies, but its efforts to join the Cook Islands in the Asian Development Bank have not yet succeeded.

In 1984 Sir Robert R. REX, who had served continuously as the island’s premier since 1974, expressed a desire to retire, but he accepted redesignation in 1987 and again following the contentious election of April 1990. He died in December 1992, being replaced initially by Young Vivian and then, following legislative elections in February 1993, by Frank LUI. During 1994 the opposition moved three nonconfidence motions, all of which were inconclusive because of a 10–10 deadlock in the Niue Assembly (Fono). In view of the paralysis an unsuccessful appeal was made to New Zealand Governor General Catherine Tizard to persuade premier Lui to dissolve the legislature and hold a new election. The general election of February 16, 1996, saw the incumbent government face strong opposition from the Niue People’s Party (NPP), the island’s only political party, but a week later the Fono reelected Lui as premier by 2 votes over the NPP nominee, Robert REX Jr., son of the former premier. In the March 19, 1999, election Premier Lui lost his seat, and a week later the Fono elected NPP leader Sani LAKATANI premier by a 14–6 vote over former government minister O’Love JACOBSEN. In late December 1999, by a 10–10 vote, Lakatani survived a no-confidence motion over allegedly questionable procedures in his attempt to bring international airline flights to the island. Less than six months later the Assembly split evenly again, voting 9–9 on a nonbinding call for him to step down; this followed disclosure that he had negotiated with the Niue Development Bank for a loan to help him pay a personal debt and forestall bankruptcy, which would have disqualified him from office. At the election of April 20, 2002, all 20 Assembly incumbents were returned to office. However, a majority within the NPP backed Young Vivian to replace Lakatani, and on May 1 Vivian was elected premier over Hunukitama HUNUKI of the Alliance of Independents, an opposition “team” that had been formed in late 2001 by Frank Lui and O’Love Jacobsen, among others. Although Lakatani was

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named deputy premier, in August he was dismissed after crossing the aisle and voting against an unsuccessful budget proposal. The office of deputy was subsequently filled by independent Toke TALAGI. In July 2003 the NPP dissolved. In June 2002 the legislature repealed a controversial 1994 act that had permitted the licensing of offshore banks. Never as lucrative as envisaged, the banking legislation had contributed to Niue’s designation in 2000 by the international Financial Action Task Force (FATF) as noncompliant in fighting money laundering. Collaterally, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) had labeled Niue as 1 of 35 jurisdictions considered to be an “uncooperative” tax haven. As a consequence, in 2001 the United States placed sanctions on Niue. Despite initially protesting its inclusion on the FATF and OECD lists, by the end of 2002 Niue had taken sufficient corrective actions to warrant removal from both. In early January 2004 Niue was devastated by Cyclone Heta, which killed 2, left some 200 homeless, destroyed the island’s hospital as well as a fish processing plant that was under construction, and damaged or destroyed an estimated 95 percent of tourist accommodations. Although some observers immediately questioned Niue’s viability, the extensive damage drew wide international attention to the island and generated an influx of aid that permitted the government not only to begin a recovery effort but also to contemplate a comprehensive review of economic, social, and environmental policies. Fish processing and noni juice plants opened in October 2004. Following the election of April 30, 2005, Young Vivian retained the premiership. Three new MPs were elected, one of whom defeated Robert Rex Jr. In May 2006 controversy erupted over a plan to have Malaysian loggers harvest trees from the island’s hardwood forest. Some legislators objected that the cabinet had approved a contract without even notifying the legislature. New Zealand High Commissioner: Anton OJALA. Premier: Young VIVIAN.

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Ross Dependency A large, wedge-shaped portion of the Antarctic Continent, the Ross Dependency extends from 160 degrees east to 150 degrees west longitude and has an estimated area of 160,000 square miles (414,400 sq. km.). It includes the Ross Ice Shelf, the Balleny Islands, and Scott Island. Although administered by New Zealand on behalf of the United Kingdom since 1923, its legal position is currently suspended, in conformity with the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. Executive and legislative authority is vested in the New Zealand governor general. With New Zealand having ratified the Environmental Protocol of the treaty in 1994, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomed its entering into effect on January 14, 1998, stating that New Zealand would continue to “demonstrate the highest standard of environmental stewardship in this most important region of Antarctica.” Late in the year, in an effort to stop illegal fishing in the Ross Sea, Wellington announced that it would begin military surveillance of the area.

Tokelau A group of three atolls (Atafu, Fakaofo, and Nukunonu) north of Samoa with an area of 4 square miles (10.4 sq. km.), Tokelau has a resident population of 1,560 (2005E), but many more Tokelauans reside in New Zealand, Samoa, and Hawaii. International affiliations include membership in the Pacific Community and associate membership in the World Health Organization. Tokelau is claimed by the United States but has been administered by New Zealand since 1923 and was included within its territorial boundaries by legislation enacted in 1948. The islands have limited economic viability, the principal income sources being recurrent aid from New Zealand; remittances from overseas citizens; the export of coconut, copra, and tuna; the sale of stamps, handicrafts, and souvenir coins; and the purchase of fishing licenses by foreign fleets. Each of the atolls elects for a three-year term a faipule, whose duties include executive and judicial responsibilities. As each atoll’s highest elected

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official, the faipule advises the territory’s appointed administrator, who represents the crown and is responsible to New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Collectively, the faipule constitute the Council of Faipule, which functions as a cabinet. Each atoll also has a Council of Elders (Taupulega) and an elected mayor (pulenuku). In 1992 the island leaders and the New Zealand government agreed to begin the process of decolonization, and on August 1, 1996, the Tokelau Amendment Act came into effect, conferring general legislative powers on a body called the General Fono. In June 2004 the General Fono assigned to the three atoll councils a range of public service responsibilities. The 18-member General Fono is chaired for a one-year term by the Ulu-O-Tokelau, the titular head of the territory, who is chosen by and from among the three faipule. All members of the Fono, which includes the faipule and the pulenuku, are elected for three-year terms, most recently in January 2005. In July 1998, speaking to the UN decolonization committee, Ulu-O-Tokelau Kuresa Nasau stated that “real self-determination for Tokelau is about economic independence, cultural affirmation, iden-

tity, and the protection of the pristine environment,” with the goal being to move toward sustainable development and full internal self-government. In April 2000 the Clark government reaffirmed that Tokelau would not be forced into independence despite its continued presence on the UN committee’s decolonization list. In April 2004 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, speaking to the committee, described Tokelau’s ongoing movement toward self-determination as “satisfying.” In June 2003 Tokelau assumed responsibility for managing its budget, and later that year the General Fono unanimously voted to explore the possibility of self-government in free association with New Zealand. On February 11–15, 2006, however, voters rejected a draft treaty of free association. Although the referendum attracted majority support from those voting, 349–232, passage required two-thirds approval. Despite assurances from the Clark government, many opponents had questioned New Zealand’s continuing financial commitment to Tokelau under the proposed treaty. Administrator: Neil WALTER. Faipule: Kuresa NASAU (Atafu), Kolouei O’BRIEN (Fakaofo), Pio TUIA (Nukunonu).

PA K I S T A N ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

OF

PAKISTAN

Islami Jamhuria-e-Pakistan

The Country Located in the northwest of the Indian subcontinent, Pakistan extends from the Arabian Sea a thousand miles northward across eastern plains to the Hindu Kush and the foothills of the Himalayas. The racial stock is primarily Aryan, with traces of Dravidian. The dominant language is Punjabi (50 percent), followed by Pushtu, Sindhi, Saraiki, Urdu, Gujarati, and Baluchi. In addition, English is widely spoken in business and government. Islam, the state religion, is professed by over 95 percent of the people; Christians and Hindus constitute most of the balance. Women make up only 29 percent of the labor force, but many others participate in unpaid agricultural work. In addition, women are often engaged in home-based or cottage industry. Female participation in government has been constrained by Islamic precepts, although Benazir BHUTTO was the Muslim world’s first woman prime minister (1988–1990, 1993–1996). Much of the country consists of mountains and deserts, but some of the most fertile and bestirrigated land in the subcontinent is provided by the Indus River system. Agriculture continues to employ just under half of the population, the principal crops being cotton, wheat, rice, sugarcane, and maize. In addition, the western province of Baluchistan supplies a rich crop of fruits and dates. The agricultural sector contributes about onequarter of GDP, as does industry, which employs less than one-fifth of the labor force. Though not heavily endowed in mineral resources, the country extracts petroleum, natural gas, iron, limestone, rock salt, gypsum, and coal. Manufacturing in-

cludes production of cotton and other textile yarns and fabrics, which account for half of merchandise export earnings; other leading manufactures are clothing and accessories, cement, petroleum products, sugar and other foodstuffs, and fertilizer. Pakistan’s exports also include fruits, seafood, carpets, and handicrafts. Leading export partners are the European Union and the United States. Overall, the economy registered an average growth rate of 6–7 percent during the 1980s, with remittances from Pakistanis employed in the Arabian Gulf largely offsetting a substantial trade

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imbalance. GDP growth averaged over 4 percent in 1990–1996, but inflation exceeded 11 percent annually during the same period. Although growth slowed to 1.3 percent in the 1996–1997 fiscal year, it rebounded to 5.4 percent in the following year, in part due to ongoing economic reforms, which included liberalizing trade and promoting privatization in banking, utilities, and industry. However, the government’s decision to conduct nuclear weapons tests in late May 1998 had immediate economic repercussions, including the imposition of sanctions by other countries, capital flight, and a drop in remittances and foreign-exchange reserves. Thus in the 1998–1999 fiscal year GDP growth missed the target of 6 percent by 1.8 percent. In the first quarter of 2000 the newly installed government moved forward on privatizing nonstrategic state-owned enterprises, improving tax collection, and cutting nonessential spending as components of an economic program partly designed to secure additional assistance from the International Monetary Fund. Growth for fiscal year 1999–2000 declined to 3.9 percent, which was nevertheless considerably better than the 1.8 percent rate measured in 2000–2001. By 2003–2004 the growth rate had risen to 6.4 percent, with projections for the following fiscal year exceeding 8 percent—the highest growth rate in two decades. In the long term, the most serious impediment to sustained progress is one of Asia’s highest population growth rates, currently about 2.4 percent annually, and a fertility rate of 4.5 children per woman. About one-third of Pakistanis live below the national poverty line, two-fifths do not have access to safe drinking water, and two-thirds of adult women remain illiterate.

Government and Politics Political Background Subjected to strong Islamic influences from the 7th century onward, the area that comprises the present state of Pakistan, together with former East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), became part of British India during the 18th and 19th centuries

and contained the bulk of India’s Muslim population in prepartition days. First articulated in the early 1930s, the idea of a separate Muslim state was endorsed in 1940 by the All-India Muslim League, the major Muslim political party. After the league swept the 1946–1947 election, the British accepted partition and Parliament passed the Indian Independence Act, which incorporated the principle of a separate Pakistan. Transfer of power occurred on August 14, 1947, with the new state formally coming into existence at the stroke of midnight, August 15. India’s Muslim-majority provinces and princely states were given the option of remaining in India or joining Pakistan. Sindh, the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), Baluchistan, and three-fifths of the Punjab accordingly combined to form what became West Pakistan, while a part of Assam and two-thirds of Bengal became East Pakistan. The Hindu maharaja of the predominantly Muslim state of Jammu and Kashmir subsequently acceded to India, but Pakistan challenged the action by sending troops into the territory; resultant fighting between Indian and Pakistani forces was halted by a UN cease-fire on January 1, 1949, leaving Pakistan in control of territory west and north of the cease-fire line. Communal rioting and population movements stemming from partition caused further embitterment between the two countries. Mohammad Ali JINNAH, head of the All-India Muslim League and independent Pakistan’s first governor general, died in 1948. The assassination in 1951 of LIAQUAT Ali Khan, the country’s first prime minister, was a second serious blow to Pakistan’s political development. By 1954 the influence of the Muslim League had dwindled, particularly in East Pakistan, and Governor General Ghulam MOHAMMAD declared a state of emergency. The installation of President Iskander MIRZA in August 1955 and the belated implementation of a republican constitution in March 1956 contributed little to political stability, and in October 1958 Mirza abrogated the constitution, declared martial law, dismissed the national and provincial governments, and dissolved all political parties. Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub KHAN,

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Political Status: Formally became independent on August 15, 1947; republic established on March 23, 1956; national territory confined to former West Pakistan with de facto independence of Bangladesh (former East Pakistan) on December 16, 1971; independence of Bangladesh formally recognized on February 22, 1974; martial law regime instituted following military coup of July 5, 1977; modified version of 1973 constitution introduced on March 2, 1985; martial law officially lifted December 30, 1985; constitution suspended and state of emergency imposed on October 14, 1999, following military coup of October 12; constitution restored on November 16, 2002, as amended by Legal Framework Order (LFO) promulgated by the president on August 21; 17th constitutional amendment, containing many of the LFO provisions, approved by Parliament on December 29–30, 2003, and signed by the president on December 31. Area: 310,402 sq. mi. (803,943 sq. km.), excluding Jammu and Kashmir, of which approximately 32,200 sq. mi. (83,400 sq. km.) are presently administered by Pakistan. Population: 130,579,571 (1998C), excluding population of Pakistani-controlled portion of Jammu and Kashmir (see Related Territories); 152,974,000 (2005E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): ISLAMABAD (974,000), Karachi (11,767,000), Lahore (6,317,000), Faisalabad (2,514,000), Rawalpindi (1,778,000), Gujranwala (1,460,000), Multan (1,436,000), Hyderabad (1,374,000), Peshawar

appointed supreme commander of the armed forces and chief martial law administrator, took over the presidency from Mirza later in October and was confirmed in office by a national referendum of “basic democrats” in February 1960. Constitutional government, under a presidential system based on indirect election, was restored in June 1962, and Ayub Khan was designated president for a five-year term in January 1965. Despite a second war with India in late 1965, Pakistan experienced considerable economic progress during most of Ayub Khan’s tenure, but growing political and economic discontent, particularly in East Pak-

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(1,241,000). Opponents of the 1998 census, claiming widespread urban underenumeration, estimated the population of Karachi at close to 15 million. National Language: Urdu. Monetary Unit: Rupee (market rate July 1, 2006: 60.21 rupees = $1US). President and Chair of the National Security Council: Gen. Pervez MUSHARRAF; deposed Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz SHARIF (Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz) on October 12, 1999, and assumed title of chief executive two days later; assumed, ex officio, chair of National Security Council, the civilian members of which were sworn in on November 6; assumed the presidency on June 20, 2001, upon his dismissal of President Rafiq TARAR (Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz); confirmed in office for an additional five years by disputed referendum of April 30, 2002; took the oath of office as president again on November 16, 2002, upon restoration of the amended constitution; transferred chief executive authority to the newly installed prime minister on November 23, 2002. Prime Minister: Shaukat AZIZ (Pakistan Muslim League); named by the President on June 26, 2004, upon the resignation of Zafarullah Khan JAMALI (Pakistan Muslim League); confirmed by the National Assembly on August 27 and sworn in on August 28, succeeding interim Prime Minister Chaudhry Shujaat HUSSAIN (Pakistan Muslim League).

istan, led the president to announce in early 1969 that he would not seek reelection but would permit a return to decentralized parliamentary government. The announcement failed to quell the disorders, and Ayub Khan resigned in March. Gen. Agha Mohammad Yahya KHAN, army commander in chief, thereupon assumed authority as chief martial law administrator, suspended the constitution, dismissed the national and provincial assemblies, and took office as president. January 1970 marked a return to normal political activity, the major unresolved issue being East Pakistani complaints of underrepresentation in the

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central government and an inadequate share of central revenues. In preparing for the nation’s first direct election on the basis of universal suffrage (ultimately held in December 1970 and January 1971), efforts were made to assuage the long-standing political discontent in the more populous East Pakistan by allotting it majority representation in the new assembly, rather than, as in the previous legislature, mere parity with West Pakistan. Of the 300 seats up for direct election (162 from East Pakistan, 138 from West Pakistan), Sheikh Mujibur RAHMAN’s East Pakistani Awami League won 160 and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), 82. After repeated postponements of the assembly opening, originally scheduled to take place in Dacca (East Pakistan) in March 1971, the government banned the Awami League and announced in August the disqualification of 79 of its representatives. By-elections to the vacated seats, scheduled for December, were prevented by the outbreak of war between Pakistan and India in late November and the occupation of East Pakistan by Bengali guerrilla and Indian military forces. Following the surrender of some 90,000 of its troops, Pakistan on December 17 agreed to a cease-fire on the western front. Yahya Khan stepped down as president three days later and was replaced by Zulfikar Ali BHUTTO as president and chief martial law administrator. In July 1972 President Bhutto and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi met in Simla, India, and agreed to negotiate outstanding differences. As a result, all occupied areas along the western border were exchanged, except in Kashmir, where a new “Line of Control” (LoC) was drawn. In July 1973 the National Assembly granted Bhutto the authority to recognize Bangladesh, and in August a new constitution was adopted. The speaker of the assembly, Fazal Elahi CHAUDHRY, was elected president of Pakistan, and Bhutto was designated prime minister. A general election held in March 1977 resulted in an overwhelming victory for the ruling PPP; however, the opposition Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) denounced the returns as fraudulent and initiated a series of strikes and demonstrations that led to outbreaks of violence throughout the country.

Faced with impending civil war, the army mounted a coup on July 5 that resulted in the arrest of many leading politicians, including Prime Minister Bhutto, and the imposition of martial law under Gen. Mohammad ZIA ul-Haq. Later in the year, General Zia announced a search for a “new political system” that would reflect purely Islamic values. Shortly after President Chaudhry’s term expired in August 1978, General Zia assumed the presidency, announcing that he would yield to a regularly elected successor following legislative balloting in 1979. On April 4, 1979, despite worldwide appeals for clemency, former prime minister Bhutto was hanged. Riots immediately erupted in most of the country’s urban areas, and on April 15 PNA representatives withdrew from the government. Later in the year, Zia postponed elections, banned all forms of party activity, and imposed strict censorship on the communications media. An interim constitution promulgated in March 1981 provided for the eventual restoration of representative institutions “in conformity with Islam,” while the formation the same year of the PPPled Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) created a force against both the regime and right-wing Islamic parties. In late 1984 the president announced a December referendum on an “Islamization” program, endorsement of which would also grant him an additional five-year presidential term. In the wake of an MRD call for a referendum boycott, the size of the turnout was hotly disputed, estimates ranging from as low as 15 percent to as high as 65 percent. Nevertheless, citing an overwhelming margin of approval, Zia scheduled parliamentary elections on a nonparty basis for February 1985. Despite another opposition call for a boycott, five incumbent ministers and a number of others associated with the martial law regime lost their bids for parliamentary seats. As a result, the president dissolved the cabinet and designated Mohammad Khan JUNEJO, of the center-right Pakistan Muslim League (PML), as the country’s first prime minister in eight years. In the absence of legal parties, the assembly divided into two camps—a government-supportive Official

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Parliamentary Group (OPG) and an opposition Independent Parliamentary Group (IPG). The first serious disruption in the “peaceful transition” came in July 1985, following the death in Paris under mysterious circumstances of the former prime minister’s son, Shahnawaz BHUTTO. After his funeral his sister, PPP leader Benazir BHUTTO, who had arrived from London, was placed under house arrest for “inciting public unrest,” and she returned shortly thereafter to Britain. In August Prime Minister Junejo announced the impending end of martial law. In October 1985 the assembly approved a political parties law, despite objection by President Zia, who continued to view a multiparty system as “unIslamic.” Dissent immediately ensued within the MRD; some components—including the PML and the moderate Jamaat-e-Islami, which controlled the OPG and IPG, respectively—announced their intention to register, while others termed the entire exercise “fraudulent” and continued to press for fresh elections under a fully restored 1973 constitution. Without responding to the pressure, Zia proceeded with the scheduled termination of martial law on December 30. In what was dubbed a “constitutional coup” on May 29, 1988, President Zia abruptly dismissed the Junejo government because of alleged corruption. He also dissolved the National Assembly, the provincial assemblies, and local governments. On June 9 he appointed a PML-dominated caretaker administration headed by himself and on July 20 announced that “free, fair and independent” elections to the national and provincial assemblies would be held on November 16 and 19, respectively. On August 17, 1988, General Zia, the U.S. ambassador, and a number of senior military officers were killed in a plane crash in southeastern Punjab. Immediately afterward the Senate chair, Ghulam Ishaq KHAN, was sworn in as acting president and announced the formation of a caretaker Emergency National Council to rule the country pending the November balloting, which was to proceed on schedule. Intense political maneuvering followed, with the PPP securing a substantial plu-

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rality in the National Assembly poll but achieving only second place in three of the four provincial elections. Nonetheless, in what some viewed as a political “deal,” on December 1 Ishaq Khan formally appointed as prime minister Benazir Bhutto, who had returned to Pakistan in 1986, and was himself elected to a five-year term as president on December 12. By 1990 relations between the president and the prime minister were becoming increasingly strained. Accusing her government of corruption, abuse of power, and various other unconstitutional and illegal acts, President Khan dismissed Bhutto on August 6, 1990, appointing as her interim successor Ghulam Mustafa JATOI, leader of the Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA), a somewhat disparate coalition of conservative anti-Bhutto groups that had been organized two years earlier. Two months later the PPP was decisively defeated in balloting for national and provincial assemblies, including a loss in its traditional stronghold of Sindh. On November 6 the IDA’s Mian Mohammad Nawaz SHARIF was sworn in as Pakistan’s first Punjabi prime minister. On April 18, 1993, in the wake of a failed effort by Nawaz Sharif to curtail the president’s constitutional power, Ishaq Khan dismissed the Sharif government, naming Balkh Sher MAZARI, a dissident member of Sharif’s PML, as acting prime minister. On May 26, however, the Supreme Court reinstated Sharif, thereby canceling a general election that had been scheduled for July 14. The action failed to resolve the widening split within the PML, and on July 18, following intervention by the recently appointed army chief of staff, Gen. Abdul WAHEED, both the president and prime minister stepped down. Ishaq Khan was succeeded, on an acting basis, by Senate chair Wasim SAJJAD, and Nawaz Sharif by a relatively unknown former World Bank vice president, Moeenuddin Ahmad QURESHI. Nawaz Sharif attempted to regain power as leader of the PML’s largest faction. Although the PML-Nawaz outpolled the PPP 41–38 percent at the National Assembly election of October 9, 1993, the latter gained a plurality of seats (86, as opposed

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to 72 for Sharif supporters), and Bhutto was returned to office on October 19. In electoral college balloting for president on November 13, the PPP’s Sardar Farooq Ahmad Khan LEGHARI defeated the acting incumbent, and he was inaugurated the following day. On July 24, 1996, in the wake of increased tension with India over Kashmir and heightened domestic unrest on the part of Islamic fundamentalists and activists of the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), 13 opposition parties announced an alliance to topple Bhutto. On July 31 the prime minister greatly enlarged her cabinet. Among 14 new appointees was her controversial husband, Asif Ali ZARDARI, who, in his first ministerial assignment, was named to head an investment portfolio. Shortly thereafter, on September 20, the prime minister’s estranged brother, Murtaza BHUTTO, was one of seven breakaway PPP faction members killed in a gunfight outside his Karachi home. Citing evidence of corruption, intimidation of the judiciary, misdirection of the economy, and failure to maintain law and order, President Leghari on November 5, 1996, dismissed Prime Minister Bhutto, naming Malek Meraj KHALID, a former legislative speaker and long-estranged Bhutto confidant, as her successor in a caretaker capacity pending balloting for a new National Assembly in February 1997. In the interim, President Leghari announced in January 1997 the formation of a Council for Defense and National Security (CDNS) comprising himself, the prime minister, several cabinet ministers, and the heads of the branches of the armed forces. Voter turnout was low for the February 3, 1997, legislative balloting, in which the PML-Nawaz swept to power by securing 134 of the 207 seats, compared to 19 seats for Bhutto’s PPP. The PML subsequently invited a number of smaller parties to join the governing coalition, giving it more than the two-thirds majority required for constitutional amendment. Following the installation of a new cabinet on February 26, Prime Minister Sharif quickly oversaw the abolition of the CDNS and directed constitutional revision that, among other things, removed the president’s authority to dismiss

the prime minister and assembly at will and to appoint military leaders. In the wake of renewed violence in Karachi (much of it perpetrated by rival MQM factions) as well as conflict between minority Shiite and majority Sunni Muslim militants in Punjab, a new antiterrorism bill was adopted in August 1997, granting sweeping new powers to security forces and establishing special courts to try terrorism cases. The collateral usurpation of power from traditional courts served to exacerbate tension between the government and the judiciary, already at loggerheads over the proposed expansion of the Supreme Court and challenges from certain judges to the earlier constitutional amendments. Chief Justice Sajjad Ali SHAH in November established several special courts to hear a number of constitutional and political challenges, including contempt citations against Sharif for alleged antijudiciary public statements. On December 2, calling Sharif an “elected dictator,” President Leghari resigned rather than comply with the prime minister’s order to swear in a new acting chief justice, Shah having been suspended from office when a majority of the deeply divided Supreme Court asserted that he had been improperly promoted to the post in 1995. On December 31 a Sharif ally, Mohammad Rafiq TARAR, was elected president by an overwhelming majority of electors. Throughout 1998 the upsurge in religious, ethnic, and political violence resisted resolution. In August the Sharif administration’s failure to contain the violence led the principal MQM faction to withdraw its support for the government, which in February had already lost a leading ally when the Awami National Party (AWP) left the cabinet because of the prime minister’s reluctance to endorse renaming the NWFP as Pakhtoonkhwa (“Land of the Pakhtoon”). Demands for greater provincial autonomy also continued to gather momentum in 1998, and in early October the AWP was a leading force behind the announcement of a new opposition alliance, the Pakistan Oppressed Nations’ Movement (PONM), its principal focus being a greater assertion of provincial and minority rights. By then

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the PML-Nawaz was, in effect, governing on its own. A deeply divided society came together briefly in late May 1998 when Pakistan exploded six nuclear weapons beneath the Chagai Hills of the Baluchistan desert. The tests on May 28 and 30 came in response to similar explosions conducted earlier in the month by India. Pakistan’s Muslim fundamentalists were particularly jubilant, welcoming the tests as confirmation that Islamabad had developed the first “Islamic bomb.” To the surprise of many observers, on October 7, 1998, Gen. Jehangir KARAMAT, chair of the joint chiefs of staff, resigned, two days after calling for greater military participation in the government and criticizing the prime minister for his administration’s economic shortcomings and its inability to stem domestic disorder. On April 9, 1999, Prime Minister Sharif named Karamat’s replacement as army chief of staff, Gen. Pervez MUSHARRAF, to the chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. Although relations with India had improved following the May 1998 nuclear weapons tests, culminating in a meeting between Prime Ministers Sharif and Atal Vajpayee in Lahore on February 20–21, 1999 (see Foreign relations, below), renewed conflict in Kashmir once again disrupted diplomatic progress. In early May 1999 India discovered that militant Islamic separatists, backed by Pakistani forces, had crossed the LoC into the mountainous Kargil area. For two months heavy shellings and clashes ensued, with India gradually gaining the upper hand. Military commanders from both sides met on July 11 and agreed to a timetable for withdrawal, which was completed late in the month, but sporadic fighting continued as the government’s perceived retreat was widely denounced within Pakistan, particularly by Islamic groups. On October 12, 1999, while attending a conference in Sri Lanka, General Musharraf was alerted by supporters within the army that Prime Minister Sharif was replacing him. Musharraf immediately flew back to Pakistan on a commercial flight, but, on the prime minister’s order, his plane was denied permission to land in Karachi, whereupon the army moved in and secured the airport. At the

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same time, the military arrested Prime Minister Sharif and his cabinet. On October 14 Musharraf proclaimed a state of emergency (but not martial law), suspended the constitution, and named himself “chief executive” of Pakistan. President Tarar continued in office. Addressing the nation on October 17, Musharraf identified his priorities as preventing economic collapse, pursuing corruption, and paving the way for “true democracy.” He also announced that he had ordered troop reductions along the Indian border, but not the LoC. On October 25 the chief executive named the initial civilian members of a governing National Security Council (NSC), which also included, ex officio, the naval and air force chiefs. The civilian members of the NSC and a nonparty cabinet were sworn in by President Tarar on November 6. On April 6, 2000, an antiterrorism court sentenced Nawaz Sharif to life imprisonment following his conviction for hijacking and terrorism in connection with his refusal to let General Musharraf ’s plane land. The terrorism conviction was ultimately overturned on appeal, and on December 10, 2000, Musharraf granted a pardon to Nawaz Sharif, who flew to exile in Saudi Arabia with members of his family. In a national address, General Musharraf justified the pardon as a step toward ending the country’s “feudal political culture” and the rivalry with Benazir Bhutto, which had corrupted Pakistan’s governmental institutions. Ruling unanimously on May 12, 2000, the Supreme Court legitimized the October 1999 coup as justified and necessary to end political corruption and lawlessness, despite being “extraconstitutional.” It also ruled that democratic national and provincial assembly elections should be held no later than October 2002, a timetable that General Musharraf publicly accepted on May 25. On August 15 the NSC was reconstituted to include four civilian ministers, and the cabinet was expanded. On June 20, 2001, General Musharraf dismissed President Tarar, assumed the presidency himself, dissolved both houses of Parliament, and also disbanded all provincial legislatures. In an apparent effort to legitimize his standing, General Musharraf

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called an April 30, 2002, referendum in which voters were asked to extend his presidency for another five years, to support a crackdown against Islamic extremists, and to support economic reforms. Although 97.7 percent of those casting ballots reportedly voted “yes,” the referendum was replete with irregularities, and the outcome was rejected by the boycotting Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD), an umbrella grouping of more than a dozen opposition parties, including the PPP and the PML-N. In August–December 2001, searching for domestic stability as well as increased international legitimacy following the September 11 al-Qaida attacks on the United States, Musharraf had begun freezing assets and detaining the leaders of some militant Islamic groups. On January 12, 2002, in what was widely regarded as a landmark speech, Musharraf rejected the “intolerance and hatred” of extreme sectarianism; banned a number of militant Islamic political parties and groups (see “Banned Organizations,” below); stated that all fundamentalist Islamic schools (madrasses) would be brought under government supervision to ensure that they adopted adequate educational goals; and called for creation of a modern, progressive Islamic society based on the “true teachings of Islam.” On August 21, 2002, President Musharraf promulgated a controversial Legal Framework Order (LFO) that incorporated 29 constitutional amendments, including the creation of a permanent NSC to institutionalize a governmental role for the military leadership. The LFO also enlarged both houses of Parliament and gave the president sweeping powers, including the right to dismiss the cabinet, dissolve the National Assembly, appoint provincial governors if he saw fit, name Supreme Court judges, and unilaterally increase his term of office. Balloting for the 272 directly elective seats in Pakistan’s reconfigured, 342-seat National Assembly took place on October 10, 2002, with the Musharraf-supportive Qaid-i-Azam faction of the PML (PML-Q) finishing ahead of the newly registered PPP Parliamentarians (PPPP) and the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal Pakistan (MMAP), an Is-

lamic coalition. Most international observers regarded the electoral process as seriously deficient in meeting democratic standards. When the 60 seats reserved for women and 10 seats reserved for religious minorities were distributed at the end of the month, the PML-Q held a plurality of 118 seats, followed by the PPPP with 81 and the MMAP with 60. In simultaneous provincial assembly elections, the PML-Q won in Punjab and the MMAP assumed control in the NWFP, with the two parties forming coalition administrations in Baluchistan and, in conjunction with smaller parties, in Sindh. Immediately upon assuming power in the NWFP, the MMAP government announced that it would impose Islamic law in the province. The MMAP’s success in the NWFP was also viewed as a setback for efforts by Musharraf and the United States to track down members of the al-Qaida terrorist network and the deposed Taliban regime in neighboring Afghanistan, given the MMAP’s opposition to Islamabad’s participation in the U.S.-led “war on terrorism” and the consequent presence of U.S. forces on Pakistani soil. At the central level, over the next several weeks the PML-Q and PPPP jockeyed for MMAP support in an effort to establish a governing coalition, but neither succeeded. The process culminated on November 21, 2002, when the National Assembly confirmed Zafarullah Khan JAMALI of the PML-Q as prime minister after he had secured the backing of several small parties and of ten dissenters within the PPPP, who organized as the PPPPatriots. Runner-up in the voting was the MMAP’s Fazlur RAHMAN, followed by the PPPP’s Shah Mahmood QURESHI. During the following year the National Assembly was unable to overcome the obstructive tactics of LFO opponents, including the PPPP and MMAP, who also demanded that President Musharraf should resign as chief of the army staff. Indirect elections to the Senate were held on February 25 and 27, 2003, with the PML-Q again attaining a plurality, but the opposition parties extended their LFO protest into a Senate boycott. The stalemate

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over the LFO was not resolved until late December, when Musharraf announced an agreement with the MMAP under which he agreed to step down as army chief by December 2004, to submit to a vote of confidence by Parliament, and to permit review by the Supreme Court of any presidential decision to dissolve the National Assembly. In addition, it was agreed that the NSC would be established by legislative act, not by constitutional amendment. With the deadlock broken, on December 29 the National Assembly voted, 248–0, to incorporate most LFO provisions as the 17th amendment to the constitution, although the PPPP and the PMLN walked out of the session. The Senate, 72–0, approved the amendment the following day. On January 1, 2004, Musharraf received a vote of confidence from both houses, 191–0 in the assembly (the MMAP abstaining and the ARD boycotting), and 56–1 in the Senate, as well as from the provincial assemblies. A bill establishing a 13-member NSC, to include the chiefs of the army, navy, and air force, was signed into law by the president on April 19. On June 26, 2004, Prime Minister Jamali resigned under pressure from President Musharraf. Chaudhry Shujaat HUSSAIN, leader of the largely reunited PML (minus the PML-N), was confirmed as an interim successor on June 29 and sworn in on June 30. He was expected to serve until Finance Minister Shaukat AZIZ won a National Assembly seat, thereby making him eligible for designation as prime minister. Following a by-election victory on August 18, Aziz won assembly approval as prime minister on August 28 and assumed office on August 29. Most members of a substantially reconfigured cabinet were sworn in three days later. On November 30, 2004, Mohammad Mian SOOMRO, chair of the Senate and acting president during a trip abroad by General Musharraf, signed into law a bill permitting Musharraf to continue as both army chief of staff and president. The new law, which proponents justified as necessary to maintain stability in the face of terrorism and subversion, was attacked by the MMAP as a betrayal of its December 2003 agreement with Musharraf.

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Constitution and Government Between 1947 and 1973 Pakistan adopted three permanent and four interim constitutions. In August 1973 a presidential system introduced by Ayub Khan was replaced by a parliamentary form of government. Following General Zia’s assumption of power in 1977, a series of martial law decrees and an interim constitution promulgated in March 1981 progressively increased the powers of the president, as did various “revisions” accompanying official restoration of the 1973 document in March 1985. Constitutional changes introduced in April 1997 revoked major provisions of the 1985 changes, reducing the president to little more than a figurehead. On October 14, 1999, General Musharraf proclaimed a state of emergency under which he suspended the constitution; assumed the title of chief executive; suspended both houses of the Parliament and the provincial assemblies; dismissed the federal cabinet, provincial governors, and provincial governments; and placed the country under the control of the armed forces. The next day he issued “Provisional Constitution Order No. 1 of 1999,” which specified that Pakistan would continue to be governed, “as nearly as may be,” in accordance with the constitution. The order also mandated the continued functioning of the existing court system, with the proviso that no court could act against the chief executive, his orders, or his appointees; restricted the president to acting on the “advice” of the chief executive; and left intact all fundamental constitutional rights, including freedom of the press, not in conflict with the state of emergency. The LFO instituted by General Musharraf in August 2002, effective from October 12, incorporated 29 constitutional changes, enhancing presidential power, enlarging both houses of Parliament, and creating as a permanent body a civilian-military National Security Council (NSC) that would include the president, the prime minister, the speaker of the National Assembly, the chair of the Senate, the leader of the parliamentary opposition, the four

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provincial governors, the chair of the joint chiefs of staff, and the chiefs of staff of the army, navy, and air force. The LFO also disqualified convicted criminals from running for the legislature, thereby ensuring that neither Benazir Bhutto nor Nawaz Sharif could stand in the October 2002 election. Opposition to promulgation of the LFO remained strong even after the October balloting, which ultimately led to a December 2003 compromise under which most of the LFO provisions were enacted as the 17th amendment to the constitution. The NSC provision was removed, however, and enacted by law in April 2004. The president, who serves a five-year term, is chosen by vote of the Parliament and the four provincial assemblies sitting jointly as an electoral college. The bicameral Parliament includes an indirectly elected Senate and a popularly elected National Assembly; the latter includes reserved seats for women and religious minorities, and it has sole jurisdiction over money bills. Sitting in joint session, the Parliament may by a simple majority enact bills that have been returned to it by the president. The prime minister, who must be a member of the National Assembly, may be removed by a majority vote of the house’s total membership; the president may be removed by a two-thirds vote of the full Parliament. The judicial system includes a Supreme Court, a Federal Shariat Court to examine the conformity of laws with Islam, high courts in each of the four provinces (Baluchistan, North-West Frontier, Punjab, and Sindh), and a number of antiterrorism courts authorized by legislation in 1997. The assembly approved a measure in May 1991 that called for formal appeal to the Koran as the country’s supreme law. In August 1991 it mandated the death penalty for blasphemy. Provincial administration is headed by centrally appointed governors. Each province also has an elected Provincial Assembly and a Council of Ministers led by a prime minister, the latter named by the governor. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), located between the NWFP and Afghanistan, and the Federal Capital Territory are governed by central appointees.

A Federal Legislative List defines the exclusive authority of the center; there also is a Concurrent Legislative List, with residual authority assigned to the provinces. To safeguard provincial rights, a Council of Common Interests is mandated, comprising the chief ministers of the four provinces plus four federal ministers.

Foreign Relations Relations between India and Pakistan reflect a centuries-old rivalry based on mutual suspicion between Hindus and Muslims. The British withdrawal in 1947 was accompanied by widespread communal rioting and competing claims to Jammu and Kashmir. A start toward improved relations was made in 1960 with an agreement on joint use of the waters of the Indus River basin, but continuing conflict over Kashmir and the Rann of Kutch on the Indian Ocean involved the two countries in armed hostilities in 1965, followed by a withdrawal to previous positions, in conformity with the Tashkent Agreement negotiated with Soviet assistance in January 1966. After another period of somewhat improved relations, the internal crisis in East Pakistan, accompanied by India’s open support of the Bengali cause, led to further hostilities in 1971. Following recognition by Pakistan of the independent nation of Bangladesh, bilateral negotiations were renewed, and a number of major issues were resolved by the return of prisoners of war, a mutual withdrawal from occupied territory, and the demarcation of a new LoC in Kashmir. Further steps toward normalization were partially offset by Pakistani concern over India’s explosion of a nuclear device in May 1974, and formal diplomatic ties were not resumed until July 1976. Following General Zia’s death in August 1988, Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto held a number of private discussions during a meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Islamabad in late December. The two signed a treaty not to attack each other’s nuclear facilities and concluded a number of economic and cultural agreements, without, however, addressing the Kashmir issue. The rapprochement abruptly

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ceased in early 1990 as Kashmir became the scene of escalating violence on the part of Muslim separatists. By April thousands of residents had fled to Pakistan from the Indian-controlled Kashmir valley. Despite a resumption of talks in 1997—the first since 1994—bilateral tensions remained high because of continuing skirmishes, both military and diplomatic, over Kashmir. On April 6, 1998, Pakistan test fired its first domestically produced medium-range surface-to-surface missile, which provoked immediate criticism from India’s recently installed Vajpayee administration. Then on May 11 and 13 India exploded five nuclear weapons in underground testing, prompting Pakistan to respond on May 28 and 30 with six nuclear tests of its own. The international community quickly condemned the tests, with a number of countries imposing economic sanctions against both governments. Shortly after, however, Prime Ministers Sharif and Vajpayee adopted less belligerent stances, meeting during the July 29–31 SAARC session in Colombo, Sri Lanka, and again on September 23 in New York, where they announced that renewed talks on Kashmir and other matters would begin in October. Addressing the UN General Assembly separately, both heads of government also stated their intentions to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty within a year if the recently imposed economic sanctions were lifted, but neither country had done so as of July 2006. Although the Kashmir talks produced no tangible results, the prime ministers met again on February 20–21, 1999, in Lahore. The resulting Lahore Declaration included pledges by both administrations to reduce the possibility of accidental nuclear war. Pakistan, however, continued to reject India’s proposed “no first use” policy, citing India’s superiority in conventional weapons. Diplomatic moves, both public and behind the scenes, stalled in May 1999 because of the renewed fighting in Kashmir. In October India reacted cautiously to Prime Minister Sharif’s overthrow but found little substance in Chief Executive Musharraf ’s announcement that he was immediately pulling some troops back from the Pakistan-

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India border. The Vajpayee government dismissed Musharraf ’s subsequent announcement that he was prepared to continue the Lahore dialogue as long as India recognized the “centrality” of the Kashmir issue. Responding to a May 2001 invitation, General Musharraf met for the first time with Prime Minister Vajpayee in Agra, India, on July 15–16. Although the two sides agreed to further meetings, they remained far apart, with Pakistan insisting on the primacy of Kashmir and with India unsuccessfully attempting to broaden the discussion to such other concerns as trade and cultural relations. On October 1 militants carried out an assault on the state assembly building in Srinagar, the summer capital of Jammu and Kashmir, resulting in nearly 40 deaths. Charging that Pakistan had failed to stop terrorist infiltrators, India ordered additional troops to Kashmir, with Pakistan responding in kind. On December 13 terrorists attacked India’s Parliament, leaving 14 dead, including the terrorists, and by May 2002, when three gunmen stormed a Kashmiri army base and left nearly three dozen dead, India and Pakistan had a combined million troops or more stationed along the LoC. Diplomatic intervention, led by the United States, ultimately helped to diffuse the immediate situation. When Prime Minister Vajpayee called on April 18, 2003, for “open dialogue” with Pakistan, Islamabad announced its willingness to cooperate, which led to a mutual upgrading of diplomatic relations. On November 26 the two governments instituted a cease-fire, the first in 14 years, between Pakistani and Indian forces in the disputed border region. The cease-fire was followed by an announcement at the January 4–6, 2004, SAARC session that the two governments would undertake “composite talks” on bilateral issues, and in late June 2005 Prime Minister Aziz described the peace process as “irreversible.” Nevertheless, scant progress was made in the following year. Relations with Bangladesh have improved considerably in recent years, although no formula has yet been found for relocating some 300,000 Biharis, most of whom have been stranded in the former East Pakistan since the 1972 breakup. An

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agreement in August 1992 led to the airlifting of an initial contingent to Lahore in early 1993, but the Bhutto government suspended the program later in the year. Although Pakistan recommitted itself in early 1998 to resettling the Biharis, no substantive move toward that goal had been achieved by mid-2006. In May 2003 the Bangladeshi High Court opened the way for Baharis to be counted as Bangladeshi citizens. Although Pakistan and Afghanistan had long been at odds over the latter’s commitment to the creation of an independent “Pushtunistan” out of a major part of Pakistan’s NWFP, Islamabad reacted strongly to the Soviet invasion of its neighbor in late 1979, providing Muslim rebel groups (mujaheddin) with weapons and supplies for continued operations against the Soviet-backed regime. Support for the rebels occasionally provoked bombing raids in the area of Peshawar, the NWFP capital, and the presence of over 3.5 million Afghan refugees proved economically burdensome. Following the Soviet departure, which was completed in early 1989, Pakistan supported the installation of an interim coalition government in Kabul, and by late 1992 some 1.5 million of the displaced Afghans were reported to have returned home. Kabul later accused Islamabad of supporting the fundamentalist Taliban militia, which Pakistan in fact recognized as Afghanistan’s government shortly after it took power in September 1996. Subsequent relations have been complicated by the fact that Islamic fundamentalists, having been permitted to establish education and training camps in the Peshawar area during the Afghan revolution, became increasingly active within Pakistan itself, particularly in the FATA and the NWFP as well as within the divided Kashmir. Relations with Afghanistan took a downturn in early 2006 when President Hamid Karzai accused Pakistan of failing to secure Pakistan’s side of the border and of not curbing Pakistani-based al-Qaida and Taliban militants. In March President Musharraf, in turn, described Karzai as “totally oblivious” to what was happening in Afghanistan. From the mid-1990s U.S.-Pakistani relations were dominated by concerns over terrorism. In

February 1995 the government permitted American agents to join in the apprehension of Ramzi Ahmed YOUSEF, the suspected mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York, and then approved his prompt extradition. In the wake of the March killing by Pakistani gunmen of two U.S. consular officials, Prime Minister Bhutto appealed for foreign assistance in closing down Muslim schools and other facilities used as fronts for international terrorism. In 1997 agents of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation apprehended in Pakistan Mir Aimal KASI, who in January 1993 had shot five people, killing two of them, outside the Virginia headquarters of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Kasi, who described his assault as a protest against American involvement in Islamic countries, was sentenced to death in January 1998 by a Virginia court. (The sentence was carried out in November 2002.) In addition, in August 1997 Pakistan arrested three suspects in the bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Although a planned visit to Pakistan by U.S. President Bill Clinton had been canceled soon after the October 1999 coup, a brief stopover was rescheduled for March 25, 2000, during a trip to the Indian subcontinent. The United States used the occasion to urge that Pakistan set a timetable for a return to democratic rule, exert greater control over separatist infiltration into Indian-held Kashmir, and help combat regional terrorism. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist assaults on the United States, relations with the new U.S. George W. Bush administration were significantly strengthened by Pakistan’s assistance against the al-Qaida terrorist network and, ultimately, the Taliban. In early 2002 the Musharraf regime reacted swiftly to the murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl, who had been abducted by members of a group calling itself the National Movement for Restoration of Pakistan’s Sovereignty. The principal suspect, Ahmad Omar SHAIKH, a UK national, was captured in February and, on July 15, sentenced to death. Three codefendants received life in prison. As of July 2006 the appeals process was ongoing. Another leading suspect, Amjad

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Hussain FAROOQI, allegedly a member of the outlawed militant group Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, was killed in a shootout with police in September 2004. Washington received less support for its 2003 invasion of Iraq, with Pakistan consistently declining to supply troops in the aftermath. The United States continues to praise and support Musharraf. Not even a February 4, 2004, public admission by Abdul Qadeer KHAN, the former head of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, that he had passed nuclear secrets to Iran, Libya, and North Korea damaged the U.S.-Pakistani relationship. Musharraf pardoned Khan, a national hero, on February 6, without protest from Washington. (The International Atomic Energy Agency subsequently speculated that Khan’s revelations were merely the “tip of the iceberg” in an operation that also involved the sale of nuclear components in a number of countries.) On March 17–18, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, making his fourth visit to Pakistan, announced that Pakistan was regarded as a “major non-NATO ally,” and a week later U.S. President Bush lifted the few remaining sanctions imposed after the 1998 nuclear tests and the 1999 coup. Musharraf’s recent steps toward democracy were also rewarded in May when the Commonwealth lifted Pakistan’s four-and-a-half year suspension.

Current Issues As of mid-2005 Pakistan had reportedly handed over to the United States some 700 al-Qaida suspects since September 2001, including key operatives. Pakistan’s armed forces have also launched several major offensives against tribal Islamists, alQaida, and Taliban remnants in the NWFP and especially in the FATA, where Islamabad has never had firm control. At the same time, U.S. forces in Afghanistan have sent missiles across the border into the tribal areas, particularly North Waziristan, seeking to kill al-Qaida leaders. Reports of casualties and other consequences remain sketchy and of questionable accuracy, however, not only because of security issues but also because of competing political agendas.

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The MMAP, in particular, has increasingly attacked Musharraf as a U.S. lackey who will not oppose anti-Islamic Western policies. In February 2006 republished Danish satirical cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad generated a widespread outcry throughout the Islamic world. They also provided the MMAP and other fundamentalist organizations with an additional opportunity to inflame anti-Western and, by association, anti-Musharraf, sentiments. Large demonstrations in Karachi, Peshawar, Islamabad, and elsewhere turned violent, targeting Western-oriented businesses. Other MMAP-led demonstrations greeted a visit by U.S. President Bush on March 3–4, 2006, immediately after he had concluded a civil nuclear energy agreement with India that most Pakistanis resented. The MMAP has also continued to pressure the central government to enforce fundamentalist doctrines, including many that discriminate against women. In August the Supreme Court threw out 20 subsections of a recently passed NWFP law authorizing clerics to oversee media content and social behavior, including interactions between the sexes. The central government had successfully argued that the law overstepped constitutional bounds. Objections to central authority have also flared up in Baluchistan Province. In January 2005 the alleged rape of a woman doctor by one or more military personnel triggered a spate of unrest by Bugti tribesmen, who centered their attacks on the vital Sui natural gas facility, temporarily shutting it down. By the end of March several dozen individuals had died in the fighting, amid continuing demands from tribal leaders that the military withdraw from the province. Underlying disputes involve demands for greater provincial autonomy and an increased share of revenue from exploitation of Baluchistan’s natural resources. Baluchistan has also witnessed its share of sectarian violence between Shiite and Sunni communities—a persistent problem throughout much of Pakistan. On October 8, 2005, a massive earthquake measuring 7.2 on the Richter scale struck Azad Kashmir (see Related Territories, below) and the NWFP, affecting some 2,800 villages. In late November

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the official death toll reached 73,300, with another 69,300 seriously injured and 3.3 million left homeless. The region’s remoteness, the harsh terrain, political difficulties, and then adverse winter weather contributed to the difficulty of marshaling a coherent relief effort, in which a number of banned organizations assisted. Several reports from the stricken region particularly credited the work performed by Lashkar-i-Taiba and Jamaatud-Dawa, both of which have been classified as terrorist organizations. Internationally, India was one of the first countries to offer assistance, although initial relief efforts were hindered by border restrictions. Looking ahead, President Musharraf has hinted that he will seek another term as president following legislative elections scheduled for 2007. Meanwhile, the opposition has continued to insist that he step down as army commander. Speaking to a joint session of Parliament in January 2004 (amid heckling from some members of the ARD), Musharraf had called for a “sustainable democratic system,” which was generally regarded as an indirect reference to instituting a permanent governmental role for the military. In that light, some analysts have viewed the controversial NSC as potentially forestalling future coups by providing the military leadership with a means of influencing the government on questions of security and sovereignty. The NSC has, however, provided a convenient focus for those seeking repeal of the LFO and the 17th constitutional amendment. On May 14, 2006, meeting in London, former prime ministers Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif signed a “Charter of Democracy” that was welcomed by the opposition but dismissed by Musharraf supporters. Although both are prohibited, under current law, from serving as prime minister again, the charter was a clear attempt to provide a focus for the opposition in advance of the 2007 legislative elections. Provisions of the charter, which decried “the erosion of the federation’s unity” and “the military’s subordination of all state institutions,” included the aforementioned repeal, establishment of a Federal Constitutional Court to resolve constitutional issues, inclusion of minority representatives in the

Senate, the release of all political prisoners and the return of political exiles, the installation of neutral caretaker governments prior to national elections, and creation of a Defense Cabinet Committee (in place of the NSC) that would exert control over the military, including its nuclear capability.

Political Parties and Groups Political parties have functioned only intermittently since Pakistan became independent. Banned in 1958, they were permitted to resume activity in 1962. The Pakistan Muslim League (PML), successor to Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s All-India Muslim League, continued its dominance during Ayub Khan’s tenure. Opposition parties, though numerous, were essentially regional in character and largely ineffectual. The military government of Yahya Khan did not ban political formations as such, but the lack of opportunity for overt activity restricted their growth. The election of December 1970 provided a major impetus to the reemergence of parties. The PML’s supremacy ended with the rise of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) in West Pakistan and the Awami League in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). At the election of March 1977, the PPP faced a coalition of opposition parties organized as the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). Although formal party activity was suspended following the coup of July 5, the ban was subsequently relaxed, and the PNA, with but minor defection from its ranks, became a de facto government party until withdrawing in 1979. In October all formal party activity was again proscribed. In February 1981 nine parties agreed to form a joint Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), of which the most important component was the PPP under the leadership of Begum Nusrat Bhutto and her daughter, Benazir Bhutto. The composition of the alliance changed several times thereafter, although it remained the largest opposition grouping for the balance of the Zia era. Despite the president’s denunciation of parties as “non-Islamic” and the fact that the 1985 assembly balloting was on a nonparty basis, some political

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leaders subsequently organized informal legislative coalitions and immediately prior to the lifting of martial law supported legislation permitting legalization of parties under highly controlled circumstances. While most MRD participants declined to register under the new law, the PML, led by Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo, did so in February 1986, thus becoming the de facto ruling party. Following the legislative dissolution of May 1988, all of the leading parties agreed to participate in the upcoming national and provincial elections. As the result of disagreement with the PPP over electoral strategy, the other MRD parties decided in October to campaign separately in a loose coalition of their own, the MRD becoming, for all practical purposes, moribund. Concurrently, two factions within the PML, which had split after Zia’s death in August, reunited and joined a number of other groups, including the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), the National People’s Party (NPP), and the Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan (JIP), to form the Islamic Democratic Alliance—IDA (Islam-e-Jamhoori Ittehad). The IDA routed the PPP at the balloting of October 1990 but fell into disarray thereafter. The PPP recovered to defeat the PML’s Nawaz Group (PML-N) in a basically two-party contest on October 6, 1993. On February 3, 1997, the PML-N scored a smashing victory over Benazir Bhutto’s PPP. Although initially governing with the support of several smaller parties, including the principal faction of the MQM and the Awami National Party (ANP), by late 1998 the PML-N was essentially governing on its own. Meanwhile, as in the past, various groups were attempting to coordinate their policies through loose multiparty alliances, the principal ones being the Islamic Milli Yakjehti Council— MYC (National Unity Council), spearheaded by the Jamaat-e-Islami; the largely secular Pakistan National Conference (PNC), formed in June 1997 by 12 opposition parties; and the Pakistan Awami Ittehad (PAI), an amalgam of 15 secular, religious, and regional opposition groups, including the PPP and two anti-Nawaz PML factions. In early 1999 some 16 mostly regional parties, sev-

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eral of them with concurrent connections to the PAI, were still in the process of formally establishing another alliance, the Pakistan Oppressed Nations’ Movement (PONM), which had been announced in October 1998 at a conference called to advance the cause of autonomy for Sindhis, Pushtoons, Baluchs, and Seraikis within a federal system. Some party leaders had already raised the possibility that the PAI-PONM interconnections might lead to formation of a “grand alliance,” but the PONM remained aloof from the anti-Nawaz Grand Democratic Alliance (GDA) formed on September 14, 1999, by the PAI, the MQM, the ANP, and the Tehrik-e-Insaaf. Of these alliances, all are defunct except the PONM, which reportedly encompasses some 30 parties that support, among other things, election of a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution. In mid-April 2000 the GDA and the PML-N began discussions on forming a “political front” devoted to restoring democracy. Despite the objections of some party leaders, the PML-N allied with the PPP and over a dozen other parties in November 2000. Subsequently named the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD), the grouping selected veteran politician Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan of the Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP) as its president. (Khan died in September 2003 and was succeeded in October by Makhdoom Javed Hashmi of the PML-N.) A total of 73 parties and alliances contested the October 2002 election. In addition to the ARD, whose constituent parties ran independently, the principal alliances were the newly formed Islamic Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal Pakistan (MMAP; see below) and the government-supportive National Alliance (NA), which included the Millat Party (MP), National Awami Party (NAP), NPP, Sindh Democratic Alliance (SDA), and Sindh National Front (SNF). A looser Grand National Alliance encompassed the PML’s dominant Qaid-i-Azam faction and the NA plus the ANP, the MQM, the PPP (Sherpao), and a number of other progovernment, predominantly regional groups, all running independently. In 2004 some of the NA parties merged with the substantially reunited PML.

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Leading Party Pakistan Muslim League (PML). The PML was launched in 1962 as successor to the preindependence All-India Muslim League. Long ridden by essentially personalist factions, it split over participation in the February 1985 election. A “Chatta Group,” led by Kawaja KHAIRUDDIN, joined the MRD’s boycott call, while the mainstream, led by Pir Sahib Pagaro, announced that it would participate “under protest.” Pagaro was subsequently reported to have invited President Zia to join the league, 27 of whose members were elected to the assembly, and to have urged the selection of Mohammad Khan Junejo, a longtime party member, as prime minister. In the absence of a party-based legislature, the PML served as the core of the government-backed Official Parliamentary Group (OPG) and was the first to register as a legal party following the lifting of martial law in early 1986. Later in the year a cleavage emerged between grassroots party loyalists, led by Pagaro, and office holders (many with no previous party affiliation), led by Junejo. The PML split again in August 1988, an army-supported faction of Zia loyalists (the PML-Fida) emerging under Fida Mohammad KHAN. The party reunited as a component of the IDA prior to the November balloting, at which the IDA routed the PPP, Mohammad Nawaz Sharif of the PML thereupon being named prime minister. Pagaro formed his own party, the PML-Functional (PML-F, below), in mid-1992. In May 1993, two months after Junejo’s death, the Junejo group split into a majority (Nawaz, or PML-N) faction headed by Nawaz Sharif and a rump (Junejo, or PML-J) faction led by Hamid Nasir Chatta. The latter joined the Bhutto government following the October 1993 election, while the PML-N became the core of the parliamentary opposition. Following the elections of February 3, 1997, at which it won a majority of the assembly seats, the PML-N took power. The party remained prone to factionalism, however, with the PML-J and a Qasim Group (PML-Qasim) joining the opposi-

tion PAI alliance upon its formation in 1998. Following the October 1999 coup another faction, the PML–Qaid-i-Azam (“Father of the Nation,” a reference to Mohammad Ali Jinnah), or the PML-Q, was formed with the tacit support of the military. Entering the 2002 election, the PML-Q was allied with the National Alliance in the Grand National Alliance. The separate PML-N (see below) ran independently as part of the ARD. The PMLJ, although running independently, appeared to be drawing closer to the PML-Q. Also running independently were the PML-F; the PML–Zia ul-Haq (PML-Z), which had been formed by the son of the late president in August 2002; and the PMLJinnah, which had been established in 1998 following a factional dispute within the PML-J. Electoral results gave the PML-Q 118 seats; the PML-F, 5; the PML-J, 3; and the PML-Z, 1. With the PML-Q in the ascendancy, holding a plurality of seats in both houses of Parliament and dominating the government, efforts to unite the PML factions gathered strength in 2003, leading to the announcement in May 2004 of a “united PML,” excluding only the PML-N. In August, however, objecting in particular to the leadership of Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain, Pir Sahib Pagaro declared that he intended to restore the PML-F’s separate standing. Days after the formation of the “united PML,” the National Alliance (NA) parties, which had won 16 seats at the October 2002 election, announced that they were merging with the PML. (One of the founding NA parties, the Sindh National Front, had already withdrawn from the alliance.) The Sindh Democratic Alliance (SDA), led by Arbab Ghulam RAHIM (chief minister of Sindh since June 2004), had been launched in September–October 2001 and had already established a working relationship at the provincial level with the PML-Q. The Millat Party (MP) had been launched in August 1998 by former president Sardar Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari. There was, however, opposition to the merger within the other NA parties. In the end, the National People’s Party (NPP, below) and the National Awami Party (NAP, below) retained separate identities.

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In mid-June 2004 the Election Commission approved the merger of the PML-F, PML-J, PMLJinnah, PML-Z, and SDA into the PML-Q and the redesignation of the latter as, simply, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML). Formal incorporation of the MP followed. In 2005 vocal opposition surfaced to the continued leadership of the party president, Shujaat Hussain, and to the prominent role of the Punjab chief minister, Chaudhry Pervez ELAHI, who allegedly ignored the recommendations of National Assembly representatives in choosing candidates for local council elections. The “forward bloc” dissident group, numbering about 30 members of the National Assembly, were led by Mian Riaz Hussain PIRZADA, Farooq Amjad MIR, and Mazhan QURESHI. In May 2006 President Musharraf, looking toward the next general election, asked Shujaat Hussain to form a dispute resolution board to resolve the differences. Leaders: Chaudhry Shujaat HUSSAIN (President), Shaukat AZIZ (Prime Minister), Manzoor Ahmad WATTOO (Senior Vice President of the Party and Former Leader of the PML-Jinnah), Sardar Farooq Ahmad Khan LEGHARI (Former President of Pakistan), Zafarullah Khan JAMALI (Former Prime Minister), Chaudhry Hamid Nasir CHATTA (Former Leader of the PML-J), Muhammad Ijaz ul-HAQ (Minister of Religion and Former Leader of the PML-Z), Mushahid HUSSAIN (Secretary General).

Other Parties in Governing Coalition Muttahida Qaumi Movement —MQM (Nationalist People’s Movement). Organized in 1981 as the Muhajir National Movement, the MQM was primarily concerned with the rights of postpartition migrants to Pakistan, whom it wanted to see recognized as constituting a “fifth nationality.” Originally backed by Zia ul-Haq as a counter to Zulfikar Bhutto’s Sindh-based PPP, the party became the third-largest National Assembly grouping, with 13 seats, after the 1988 election. It was subsequently allied, at different times, with both the PPP and the PML.

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The assassination of party chair Azim Ahmad TARIQ on May 1, 1993, exacerbated a violent cleavage that had emerged within the group the year before, the principal leaders being Altaf Hussain (MQM-Altaf), currently resident in London, and Afaq Ahmed of the MQM-Haqiqi (below). Although the party boycotted the National Assembly balloting in 1993, it was runner-up to the PPP in the Sindh provincial elections. In June 1994 Altaf Hussain and two of his senior associates were each sentenced in absentia to 27-year prison terms for terrorism, but in January 1997 the convictions were quashed. In February 1997 balloting the MQM-Altaf, under the banner of the Haq Parast Group, won 12 National Assembly seats, all from Sindh, and thereafter entered a governing alliance with the PMLN at both provincial and national levels. Also in 1997, the party changed its named from “Muhajir” to “Muttahida” to indicate that its interests had broadened to encompass Pakistanis in general rather than only the Muslim migrants from India. In August 1998 the MQM announced its intention to withdraw from the governing coalitions, in part because the Nawaz Sharif administration had not done enough to stem increasingly violent clashes in Karachi between the MQM-Altaf and the MQM-Haqiqi, the latter of which was functioning primarily as a collection of urban street fighters. However, when Islamabad responded to the violence by dismissing the Sindh provincial government and imposing federal rule, Altaf Hussain loyalists accused the Nawaz Sharif government of trying to take away the party’s power base. In 1999 a number of party leaders broke with Hussain and threatened to form a separate party unless he adopted a stronger stance toward autonomy for Sindh. At the 2002 National Assembly election the MQM won 17 seats, after which it joined the Jamali government. At local elections in August 2005 Haq Parast candidates were successful in a number of key Sindh cities, including Karachi. Leaders: Altaf HUSSAIN (President), Farooq SATTAR (Parliamentary Leader).

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Pakistan Muslim League (Functional) (PML-F). The PML-F was established by longtime PML leader Pir Sahib Pagaro, who broke with his party in mid-1992. In 2002 the PML-F won five National Assembly seats and one in the Senate. Although Pagaro initially appeared willing to participate in the reunification of the various PML parties with the dominant PML-Q in 2004, he soon retreated from that position. In 2005 the largely reunited PML indicated that it regarded the PMLF as a separate, allied party. Leaders: Pir Sahib PAGARO, Abdul Razzaq THAHIM. Pakistan People’s Party (PPP [Regd.]). The PPP (Regd.) is often referenced as the PPP (Patriots) and the PPP (Sherpao), the two organizations that merged in June 2004 and were officially registered by the Election Commission simply as the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) later that month. Benazir Bhutto’s PPP had been deregistered after affirming her status as chair for life despite a proscription against convicted criminals being party officeholders. Bhutto’s PPP immediately appealed the Election Commission’s decision on the grounds that use of the PPP name by another party would deceive and defraud the electorate, but as of July 2006 the Sindh High Court had yet to resolve the issue. The Pakistan People’s Party (Sherpao), or PPP(S), had been established by Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao following Benazir Bhutto’s 1999 decision to dismiss him as PPP senior vice president for breaking party discipline over political developments involving the NWFP government. At the 2002 general election the PPP (Sherpao) won two seats in the Senate and two in the National Assembly. The Pakistan People’s Party (Patriots), or PPP (Patriots)—sometimes referenced as the Pakistan People’s Party Parliamentarians (Patriots)— resulted from a split in the Bhutto-supportive Pakistan People’s Party Parliamentarians (PPPP, below) following the October 2002 national election. Ten PPPP representatives supported the in-

stallation of the Jamali government, with six of the defectors being offered cabinet posts. The group then organized under Rao Sikander Iqbal as the PPP (Patriots). Leaders: Aftab Ahmad Khan SHERPAO (President of the Party and Minister of the Interior), Rao Sikander IQBAL (Chair of the Party and Minister of Defense), Sayed Faisal Saleh HAYAT (General Secretary of the Party and Minister of the Environment).

Other Parliamentary Parties Pakistan People’s Party Parliamentarians (PPPP). To get around a proscription against the electoral participation of any party having a convicted criminal as an officeholder, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) organized the legally separate PPPP in August 2002. An avowedly Islamic socialist party founded in 1967 by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the PPP held a majority of seats in the National Assembly truncated by the independence of Bangladesh in 1971. Officially credited with winning 155 of 200 assembly seats in the election of March 1977, it was the primary target of a postcoup decree of October 16 that banned all groups whose ideology could be construed as prejudicial to national security. Bhutto was executed in April 1979, the party leadership being assumed by his widow and daughter, both of whom, after being under house arrest for several years, went into exile in London. After having briefly returned to Pakistan in July 1985 to preside over the burial of her brother, Shahnawaz, Benazir Bhutto again returned in April 1986. The PPP won a sizable plurality (92 of 205 contested seats) at the National Assembly balloting of November 1988, and Bhutto became prime minister. The party lost ministerial control with Bhutto’s dismissal on August 6, 1990; its legislative strength was subsequently cut by more than half at the election of October 24 and 27 (for which it joined with a number of smaller groups to campaign as the People’s Democratic Alliance—PDA). It regained its plurality at the 1993 legislative poll, with Ms. Bhutto being reinstalled as prime minister.

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In December 1993 the PPP’s Executive Council ousted Prime Minister Bhutto’s mother, Begum Nusrat BHUTTO, as party cochair. The action was the product of estrangement between the two over the political role of Benazir’s brother, Murtaza Bhutto, who had returned from exile in November to take up a seat in the Sindh provincial legislature and who in March 1995 announced the formation of a breakaway faction of the PPP. Murtaza died in a firefight with gunmen on September 20, 1996. Following the ouster of Prime Minister Bhutto in November, her husband, Asif Ali ZARDARI, was charged with complicity in the killing. The new PML-led government formed an “accountability” department to investigate the allegations and corruption in general, a principal target being the PPP leadership. Meanwhile, Benazir Bhutto was meeting with leaders of smaller opposition parties, which ultimately led to the formation of the PAI alliance in late February 1998. Earlier, at the end of 1996, allegations about the death of Murtaza Bhutto had led his widow, Ghinwa BHUTTO, to form the Pakistan People’s Party (Shaheed Bhutto), or PPP-SB, to challenge Benazir Bhutto’s hold on the party. The subsequent national legislative campaign in early 1997 contained an added element of personal hostility between the two women, although both suffered disastrous defeats in the election. During 1998–1999 new corruption allegations or charges were repeatedly brought against Benazir Bhutto and her husband: kickbacks involving gold transactions, commissions from foreign defense manufacturers, abuse of power in making political appointments, and use of Swiss bank accounts to launder money. Bhutto’s political viability suffered a major blow on April 15, 1999, when a two-person Lahore court sentenced her and her husband to five years in prison, disqualified them from public office for five years, and fined them $8.6 million for corruption and abuse of power. Bhutto asserted from England that she would appeal the conviction to the Supreme Court, which on April 6, 2001, threw out the decision and ordered a retrial because of apparent government involvement in the verdict.

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In early 1999 Benazir Bhutto dismissed the party’s senior vice president, Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao, for breaking party discipline over political developments involving the NWFP government. He went on to form the Pakistan People’s Party (Sherpao)—see under PPP (Regd.), above. In March the party leadership elected the former prime minister chair for life, a decision reiterated by a party convention on September 11, 2000, in defiance of the government’s August announcement that convicted criminals could not hold party offices. Bhutto remained in self-imposed exile, the Musharraf regime having refused to lift outstanding arrest warrants. In July 2002 Bhutto was again convicted, in absentia, of corruption, as was her husband in September. He had been imprisoned since 1986. Other cases against the two were pending in Switzerland, the United States, and the United Kingdom as well as Pakistan. In September 2004 Zardari’s corruption conviction was overturned, and on November 22 he was released on bail. He later left the country for medical treatment in the United States. Two months after its formation in 2002 the PPPP won 81 National Assembly seats, but in November it suffered the defection of 10 representatives who supported the installation of the Jamali government. (The move was possible because the antidefection clause of the constitution remained suspended.) The defectors then organized under Rao Sikander Iqbal as the Pakistan People’s Party (Patriots)—see the PPP (Regd.), above. Leaders: Benazir BHUTTO (Former Prime Minister and PPP Chair for Life), Makhdoom Amin FAHIM and Syed Yousaf Raza GILANI (Vice Chairs), Begum Nusrat BHUTTO, Chaudhry Aitzaz AHSAN (PPPP National Assembly Leader), Mian Raza RABBANI (PPPP Senate Leader), Khalid Ahmad Khan KHARAL (Secretary General of the Federal Council), Jehangir BADER (Secretary General). Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal Pakistan—MMAP (United Council for Action in Pakistan). The MMAP was organized in June 2001 by the Islamic parties discussed below. The MMAP campaigned

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on a platform that included restoration of the constitution, creation of an Islamic state, and resolution of the Kashmir issue through negotiation. Only the two JUI factions supported the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, but all of the constituent parties opposed Musharraf’s subsequent decision to join the U.S.-led “war on terrorism” and to permit U.S. forces to operate from Pakistani soil. Having won 60 seats in the National Assembly, the MMAP was courted by both the PML-Q and the PPPP (with which it had little in common ideologically) to form a coalition government, but it rejected both. Its firm opposition to the 2002 Legal Framework Order was largely responsible for the year-long stalemate in the National Assembly, until an agreement was reached with President Musharraf in December 2003. Although the MMAP was chaired from its inception by the moderate Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani SIDDIQUI of the JUP until his death in December 2003, the JUI-F’s Fazlur Rahman and the JIP’s Qazi Hussain Ahmad have exerted more influence. More recently, differences between the two largest parties, the JUI-F and the JIP, have threatened the MMAP’s effectiveness. One contentious issue has been the JIP’s objections to participation in President Musharraf’s National Security Council. As leader of the opposition, Fazlur Rahman holds a seat on the council, as does the chief minister of the NWFP, JUI-F member Akram Khan Durrani. Leaders: Qazi Hussain AHMAD (President), Fazlur RAHMAN (Secretary General). Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur Rahman Group (JUI-F). The Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (Assembly of Islamic Clergy) was founded in 1950 as a progressive formation committed to constitutional government guided by Sunni Islamic principles. In December 1988 the JUI’s Darkhwasty Group withdrew from the IDA to reunite with the parent formation, although a faction headed by Maulana Sami ul-Haq remained within the government coalition until November 1991. Factionalization subsequently remained a problem, with Sami ul-Haq head-

ing one group, the JUI-S (below), and Fazlur Rahman heading another, the JUI-F. The latter, which won two National Assembly seats from Baluchistan in 1997, emerged as the dominant faction. Fazlur Rahman supported Afghanistan’s Taliban and, following the 1999 coup, condemned ousted prime minister Sharif’s “lust for unlimited powers.” He was placed under house arrest in October 2001, at the opening of the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan. At the 2002 National Assembly election the JUI-F claimed the most MMAP seats. Leaders: Maulana Fazlur RAHMAN (Leader of the Opposition in National Assembly), Akram Khan DURRANI (Chief Minister of NWFP), Hafiz Hussein AHMAD. Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam Sami ul-Haq Group (JUI-S). The JUI-S began as a faction of the parent JUI. Under the leadership of Sami ul-Haq, the JUI-S has generally adopted a more conservative course than the “modernist” JUI-F, promoting fundamentalist Islam causes but also outwardly opposing terrorism despite vocal objections to U.S. intervention in the region. Sami ul-Haq was prominent in the MYC alliance and participated in formation of the MMAP. At the 2002 National Assembly election the JUI-S finished third among the MMAP parties, and Sami ul-Haq currently sits in the Senate. Relations with the MMAP have, however, become increasingly tenuous, leading to repeated reports that the JUI-S was separating from the alliance or that Sami ul-Haq had been expelled from the leadership, in part because of his alleged ties to the ruling coalition. In December 2005 the MMAP recognized Pir Abdul Rahim Naqshbandi as leader of the officially accepted JUI-S faction. Leaders: Maulana Sami ul-HAQ, Pir Abdul Rahim NAQSHBANDI, Qari Gul REHMAN. Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan—JIP (Pakistan Islamic Assembly). Organized in 1941, the Jamaat-e-Islami is a right-wing fundamentalist group that has called for an Islamic state based on a national rather than a purely communalistic

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consensus. Members of the party ran as individuals in the 1985 assembly election, and ten were elected; subsequently, although party leaders agreed to legislative coordination with the PML, the Jamaat-e-Islami dominated the anti– martial law Independent Parliamentary Group (IPG) and, despite its unregistered status, functioned as the largest legislative opposition party. The group participated in formation of the IDA in 1988 but withdrew in May 1992, in part because the coalition had failed to implement a promised Islamization program. In 1993 it was instrumental in launching a Pakistan Islamic Front (PIF), which won only three seats at the October legislative poll. Although the JIP held no national legislative seats following the 1997 election, it remained politically influential. It welcomed the October 1999 coup but called for setting up a caretaker civilian government. Officially a branch of the Jamiat-e-Islami in Pakistan but so independent that it might well be considered a separate movement, the Jammu and Kashmir Jamiat-e-Islami was active in electoral politics by 1970 and even participated to a limited degree in Indian Lok Sabha and provincial elections. In 1997 the party denied that it was the political wing of the militant Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin, and in October 40 of its members challenged the militant campaign as not contributing to the goal of an independent Kashmir. Leaders: Amir Qazi Hussain AHMAD (Chair), Liaqat BALOCH, Syed Munawwar HASAN (Secretary General). Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan—JUP (Assembly of Pakistani Clergy). Founded in 1968, the JUP is a popular Islamic group that withdrew from the PNA in 1978. It joined the MRD in February 1981, severed its membership the following March, then rejoined in August 1983 at the commencement of the civil disobedience campaign. Its president, Maulana Shah Ahmed NOORANI, was among those failing to secure an assembly slot in 1988; its secretary general, Maulana Abdul Sattar Khan NIAZI, quit the

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Nawaz Sharif cabinet in March 1991 after being criticized by the prime minister for not supporting government policies on the Gulf War against Iraq. The party subsequently split into Noorani and Niazi factions, the latter emphasizing religious issues. Niazi died in May 2001 and Noorani, in December 2003. At the 2002 election the JUP won no National Assembly seats. In May 2006 the JUP (Niazi), which has supported the ARD, indicated that it would sign the Charter of Democracy that had been drafted by former prime ministers Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Leaders: Maulana Shah Muhammad Anas NOORANI (President, Noorani Group), Pir Syed Anis HAIDER (President, Niazi Group), Muhammad Hashim SIDDIQUI (Joint Secretary). Markazi Jamiat-e-Ahle Hadith (MJAH). A militant Sunni group, the MJAH had close ties to former prime minister Nawaz Sharif. Originally a component of the MMAP, it withdrew when the latter decided to function as an electoral alliance for the 2002 National Assembly election, although it later returned. Its leader, Sajid Mir, was elected to the Senate in 2006 with the joint endorsement of the PML-N. In addition to the MJAH, a separate Jamiat-e-Ahle Hadith (Lakhwi Group) and a Jamiat-e-Ahle Hadith were both registered for the 2002 elections. Leader: Sajid MIR. Islami Tehrik-i-Pakistan (TiP). The TiP is the successor to the banned Tehrik-e-Jafariyae-Pakistan—TJP (Pakistan Jafari Movement). The TJP was an outgrowth of the Movement for the Implementation of Shia Jurisprudence (Tehrik-e-Nifaz Fiqh Jafariya—TNFJ), an activist group representing Pakistan’s Shia minority. The TNFJ launched a campaign in 1980 against the government’s Islamization campaign, insisting that it was entirely Sunni-based. In July 1987 it decided to reorganize as a political party committed to the principles of Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini. An electoral ally of the

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PPP in 1990, it was frequently a target of Sunni violence. The TJP was closely associated with the extremist Shiite Sipah-i-Muhammad, which has been a major participant in Pakistan’s ongoing sectarian warfare. The latter group was banned in August 2001, as was the TJP in January 2002. In an effort to get around the ban, the organization assumed the TiP designation, but the TiP was itself banned in November 2003. Its leader, Sajid Naqvi, was arrested in the same month in connection with the assassination of Maulana Azam Tariq of the Sunni Sipah-i-Sahaba (below), but he was acquitted in November 2004. Leaders: Allama Sajid Ali NAQVI, Abdul Jalil NAQVI. Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N). Under the leadership of former Punjab chief minister and then Prime Minister Mohammad Nawaz SHARIF, the PML-N emerged from the PMLJunejo Group in 1993 and quickly established itself as the dominant PML grouping. In 1997 the PMLN won a parliamentary majority under Nawaz Sharif. Following the October 1999 coup the PMLN established a 15-member Coordination Committee to consider party reorganization. It did not, however, call for the immediate restoration of the Sharif government, having concluded that directly confronting the military would be inadvisable. As of October 2000, efforts by Sharif’s wife, Kulsoom SHARIF, to exert greater control over the party had succeeded primarily in preventing her husband’s removal as party president. As a condition of his release from prison two months later, Sharif agreed to abandon politics for at least two decades, although he continues to exert considerable influence from exile. In May 2004 his brother, Shabaz, having received a favorable ruling from the Supreme Court on his right to return, attempted to end his four-year exile but was immediately ushered back out of the country by officials. At the October 2002 National Assembly election the PML-N ran as part of the ARD, winning 19 seats. A year later the party’s acting president,

Javed Hashmi, was arrested for distributing a letter, allegedly written by army officers, that was critical of President Musharraf. Despite widespread expressions of outrage from the ARD and other elements of the opposition, Hashmi was convicted in April 2004 of treason, mutiny, and forgery. In August he was put forward as the opposition candidate for prime minister. As of July 2006 his appeal remained open. Leaders: Mian Shabaz SHARIF (President of the Party and Former Chief Minister of Punjab), Makhdoom Javed HASHMI (Acting President), Raja Muhammad ZAFAR-UL-HAQ (Chair), Khawaja Saad RAFIQ (National Assembly Leader), Ishaq DAR (Senate Leader), Iqbal Zafar JHAGRA (Secretary General). Awami National Party (ANP). The Awami (“People’s”) National Party was formed in July 1986 by four left-of-center groups: the National Democratic Party (NDP), a group of Pakistan National Party (PNP) dissidents led by Latif Afridi, and elements of the Awami Tehrik (PAT, below) and the Mazdoor Kissan Party (MKP). As originally constituted under the direction of Pushtun leader Khan Abdul WALI KHAN, the ANP was unusual in that each of its constituent groups drew its primary support from a different province. The NDP had been organized in 1975 upon proscription of the National Awami Party, a remnant of the National Awami Party of Bangladesh that, under the leadership of Wali Khan, was allegedly involved in terrorist activity aimed at secession of Baluchistan and the NWFP. A founding component of the PNA, the NDP withdrew in 1978, and in 1979 a group of dissidents left to form the PNP (below). The ANP won three assembly seats in October 1993 and ten seats—all from the NWFP—in February 1997. A year later the ANP terminated its alliance with the governing PML-N because of the latter’s refusal to support the redesignation of the NWFP as Pakhtoonkhwa, the area’s precolonial name. Later in 1998 the ANP was a prime mover in formation of the PONM opposition alliance, but it parted ways in 1999 with what it considered the

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PONM’s unrealistic goals for national reconfiguration. The ANP failed to win representation at the National Assembly election of 2002 but won two Senate seats in February 2003. The party’s founder, Khan Abdul Wali Khan, died in January 2006. Despite some reservations, in June 2006 the central party leadership endorsed the Charter of Democracy proposed by former prime ministers Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. In the same month, an agreement in principle was reached on reunification with the National Awami Party (NAP, below), a 2000 offshoot. Leaders: Asfandyar WALI KHAN (President), Begum Nasim WALI Khan, Latif AFRIDI. Baluchistan National Party (BNP). One of several rival political formations in Baluchistan, the BNP evolved from the Baluchistan National Movement (Mengal Group) to win three National Assembly seats in February 1997. It initially backed the Nawaz Sharif government but later withdrew its support. In October 1998 it participated in the founding conference of the PONM opposition alliance. At the 2002 National Assembly election the BNP-Mengal won one seat; at the 2003 Senate election the BNP-Mengal and the BNP-Awami each won one. The BNP-Awami was closely associated with the National Alliance but rejected merger with the PML in 2004. In June 2006 party chief Sardar Ataullah Mengal resigned as head of the PONM. Leaders: Sardar Ataullah MENGAL (BNPMengal), Mir Mohim Khan BALOCH (BNPAwami). Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP). A successor to the Baluchistan National Alliance (BNA), the JWP is active at both provincial and national levels. The JWP won two seats from Baluchistan at the February 1997 National Assembly election and as of early 1999 held five Senate seats. Although initially extending support to the Nawaz Sharif government, the JWP later moved into opposition, but without joining either the PNC or the PAI alliance. As a participant in the ARD, the JWP won one lower house seat in 2002 and one Senate seat in

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2003. The death of its prominent leader, Nawab Akbar BUGTI, in an August 2006 military operation precipitated widespread rioting. Leader: Mir Ghulam Haider BUGTI (National Assembly Member). National Party (NP). The NP was formed in 2003 by merger of the Baluchistan National Movement (BNM) and the Baluchistan National Democratic Party (BNDP). Competing primarily against supporters of the BNP’s Sardar Ataullah Mengal, the BNM had failed to win any National Assembly seats in February 1997 but remained a significant force in Baluchistan. The BNM participated in the formation of the PNC opposition alliance in 1997 and currently holds one Senate seat. Leader: Abdul HAYEE Baluch (Chair). Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaaf—PTI (Pakistan Justice Movement). The Tehrik-e-Insaaf was launched in 1996 by former national cricket captain Imran Khan, who announced that the new group’s objective was to work for change in a country “on the brink of disaster” by “demanding justice, honesty, decency and self-respect.” Despite high expectations, Khan failed to attract voter support in the February 1997 national election, and the party won no assembly seats. In 1998 Khan confirmed that he and Asghar Khan of the Tehrik-e-Istiqlal (below) had broached the subject of a merger, but none appeared imminent. In August 2000 Imran Khan was expelled from the GDA for “undemocratic” comments. The party won one assembly seat in October 2002. More recently, Khan has voiced opposition to President Musharraf and his close ties to the United States. Leader: Imran KHAN (Chair). Pakhtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP). Drawing its support mainly from the Pakhtoon ethnic group in the NWFP, the PkMAP has campaigned for greater regional autonomy. It elected three National Assembly members in 1993 but none in 1997. In 1998 it participated in formation of the PONM opposition alliance.

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At the 2002 National Assembly election the PkMAP won one seat; in 2003 it won two Senate seats, picking up a third in 2006. On July 4, 2006, the party’s chair and National Assembly member, Mahmood Khan ACHAKZAI, and a bodyguard were shot to death by unknown assailants. Achakzai had been elected president of the PONM in June. Leader: Abdul Rahim Khan MANDOKHEL (Senator and Senior Deputy Chair).

Other Parties Awami Qiadat Party—AQP (People’s Leadership Party). Formed in 1995, the AQP serves primarily as a personal vehicle for Aslam Beg, a retired general. Linked to Pakhtoon issues, the party also supports the military. Although committed to democratic procedures, General Beg has argued for a stronger response to civil disorder and sectarian violence. Prior to the 2002 National Assembly election he chastised the secular opposition parties for failing to unite. In May 2006 he called on Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif to join forces and mobilize the opposition to President Musharraf. Leader: Gen. (Ret.) Mirza Aslam BEG (Chair). Khaksar Tehrik (Service Movement). A right-wing Islamic organization advocating universal military training, the Khaksar Tehrik is also known as Bailcha Bardar (Shovel Carriers) because the group’s founder, Inayatullah Khan MASHRIQI, adopted the spade as a symbol of self-reliance. Following the 1999 coup, which the party leader termed a “blessing,” the party called for an anticorruption drive. It subsequently opposed the Musharraf government, however, supporting restoration of the constitution and democracy and endorsing the Bhutto–Nawaz Sharif Charter of Democracy signed in May 2006. Leader: Hameeduddin al-MASHRIQI. Muhajir Qaumi Movement–Haqiqi (MQMHaqiqi). The MQM-Haqiqi (“Real”) resulted from a 1992 rupture within the MQM. Violent clashes between the current MQM and the MQM-Haqiqi have periodically flared into open warfare in Karachi. Although unrepresented at the national

level since the April 2003 death of its sole National Assembly representative, MQM-Haqiqi members continue to hold elective office in Sindh. In December 2004 the party’s secretary general, Amir KHAN, was sentenced to ten years in prison in connection with the murder of two rival MQM members. Three other MQM-Haqiqi members were given life sentences. Leader: Afaq AHMED (Chair, in detention). National Awami Party (NAP). The NAP was formed in 2000 by defectors from the Awami National Party (ANP, above) led by Ajmal Khan KHATTAK, although he later rejoined the ANP. They were joined by a faction of the Pakistan National Party (PNP) under Raziq BUGTI. The NAP participated in the 2002–2004 National Alliance but chose not to participate in the alliance parties’ proposed merger with the PML. In June 2006 the NAP and the ANP announced their pending merger. Leaders: Arbab Ayub JAN (President), Sharif KHATTAK. National People’s Party (NPP). The NPP was formed in 1986 by a group of PPP moderates led by former Sindh chief minister Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, who accused Benazir Bhutto of “authoritarian tendencies” prior to being removed as provincial PPP president. Jatoi served as interim prime minister following the dismissal of Bhutto in 1990. The NPP entered the first Sharif government coalition but was expelled in 1992 because of alleged collusion with the PPP. The NPP turned to the PPP (Shaheed Bhutto) for an electoral alliance in 1997, winning one seat under the leadership of former communications minister Ghulam Murtaza Jatoi. The NPP became a founding member of the National Alliance in May 2002. Two years later, following the announcement that some alliance parties were merging with the PML, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi stated that, while the party’s parliamentary group may have decided to join the PML, he had not. The NPP has since maintained its independence. Leader: Ghulam Mustafa JATOI.

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Pakistan Awami Tehrik—PAT (Pakistan People’s Movement). The Awami Tehrik originally served as a Sindh-based Maoist youth group. Its leader, Rasul Bakhsk PALEJO, was released from prison in 1986, having been held without trial since 1979, and later served as secretary general of the ANP. Party leader Tahir ul-Qadri left the leadership of the PAI alliance in February 1999, apparently because of policy differences with the PPP and the ANP, but the PAT subsequently joined the GDA. In August 2000, however, the GDA expelled Qadri. In May 2002 the PAT was a founding member of the National Alliance (see PML, above), but it withdrew a month later and contested the October 2002 National Assembly election independently, winning one seat. In December 2004 Qadri resigned the seat after passage of a bill permitting President Musharraf to remain in uniform. Leader: Tahir ul-QADRI. Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP). A former component of the PNA and the MRD, the PDP is a strongly Islamic party organized in 1969. Its president, Nawabzada Nasrullah KHAN, joined with the PPP and a number of smaller parties to launch the PAI opposition alliance in early 1998 and the GDA in September 1999. Khan later assumed the leadership of the postcoup ARD. He died in September 2003 and was succeeded as PDP leader by his son. Leader: Nawabzada Mansoor Ali KHAN (President). Qaumi Jamhoori Party (QJP). The QJP is an offshoot of the Tehrik-e-Istiqlal (below). It was formed in January 2002 under the leadership of Omar Asghar KHAN, son of by Air Mar. (Ret.) Mohammad Asghar Khan. When Omar died five months later under disputed circumstances that the authorities labeled a suicide, his father took over the party reins. Leader: Mohammad Asghar KHAN. Sindh National Front (SNF). Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, an uncle of the former prime minister, launched the SNF following the dissolution in 1989 of the Sindh-Baluch-Pushtoon Front (SBPF), of

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which Bhutto had been a leader. Like the SBPF, the SNF called for a confederation of Pakistan’s four provinces, with each free to establish its own domestic and foreign policies. Although a founder of the National Alliance in preparation for the 2002 general election, the SNF later withdrew. Leader: Mumtaz Ali BHUTTO (Chair). Tehrik-e-Istiqlal (Solidarity Movement). The Tehrik-e-Istiqlal is a democratic Islamic group that was a founding member of the PNA, from which it withdrew in November 1977. One of its leaders, Air Mar. (Ret.) Mohammad Asghar Khan, was a leading proponent of election boycotts, stating “there can be no compromise” under martial law; however, following the lifting of martial law, the party broke ranks with its coalition partners by announcing its intention to register as a legal party. It was a leading component of the MRD until September 1986, when most of its leadership withdrew in opposition to Benazir Bhutto’s domination of the alliance. In October 1988 Tehrik-e-Istiqlal formed an electoral alliance with the JUP (above) for the November legislative balloting, although agreeing not to contest seats for which the IDA was presenting candidates. Asghar Khan resigned from the presidency of Tehrik-e-Istiqlal in December in the wake of poor results in the November poll. The party was subsequently a member of the PPP-led PDA in 1990. Following the 1997 national elections, which the Tehrik-e-Istiqlal boycotted, Asghar Khan returned to the head of the party and became a major figure in the development of the PNC opposition alliance. In January 2002, however, the party split, with Asghar Khan joining the QJP (above). In June 2006 the party president, Rehmat Khan Wardag, despite opposition to recent increases in defense spending, suggested that Pervez Musharraf should remain president until 2017. Leaders: Qaiser Ahmed SHAIKH (Chair), Rehmat Khan WARDAG (President). Pakistan has many other relatively small legal parties, most with a provincial or religious focus. Parties on the left include the Pakistan

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Mazdoor Kissan Party—PMKP (Pakistan Workers’ and Peasants’ Party), which was known from 1994, when it merged with the Communist Party of Pakistan, until 2003 as the Communist Mazdoor Kissan Party (CMKP). A revived Communist Party of Pakistan (CPP), currently split into at least two factions, separated from the CMKP in 1999, as did a new Communist Mazdoor Kissan Party from the PMKP in 2003. Other leftist groups include the National Workers’ Party (NWP); the Labor Party Pakistan (LPP); the Labor Party (Marxist), a 2003 LPP offshoot; and the Social Democratic Party of Pakistan. In March 2006 the LPP, the PMKP, the NWP, the Pakistan Mazdoor Mehaz (PMM), the Awami Tehrik (AT), and the Meraj Muhammad Khan Group announced formation of a People’s Democratic Movement (Awami Jamhoori Tehrik—AJT) led by the NWP’s Abid Hasan MANTO.

Banned Organizations Jaish-e-Muhammad Mujaheddin-e-Tanzeem —JMMT or JeM (Movement of the Army of the Holy Warriors of Muhammad). Formation of the Jaish-e-Muhammad was announced on February 4, 2000, by Masood Azhar. A founding member of the Harkat-ul-Ansar (subsequently renamed the Harkat-ul-Mujaheddin [Islamic Freedom Fighters]), he had been detained by India from 1994 until late December 1999, when the hijackers of an Indian Airlines jet demanded his release before freeing their hostages. Azhar has called for a holy war against India as part of the effort to establish an independent, Islamic Kashmir. He was detained in December 2001 but released three months later. The JeM has been linked to many recent terrorist incidents in India, including a December 2001 attack on the Parliament. Having been banned in January 2002, the JeM restyled itself as the Khudam-ul-Islam (Servants of Islam), which was then banned in November 2003 along with the Jamaat-al-Ansar (Party of Helpers), the new designation of the Harkatul-Mujaheddin, led by Maulana Fazlur Rehman

KHALIL. In 2002 a JeM splinter, the Jamaat-ulFurqan (JuF), had been established by Abdul JABBAR; the JuF was also banned in November 2003. The JeM and the Harkat-ul-Mujaheddin are both regarded by the United States as terrorist organizations. In August 2003 the Indian Border Security Force killed the JeM field commander, Shahnawaz KHAN (also known as Ghazi BABA), alleged mastermind of the 2001 attack on Parliament. In April 2004 Qari Mohammed ASIF, a JeM military operations chief, was also killed. Since then, Azhar has repeatedly been listed by India among suspected terrorists that it wants Pakistan to extradite. Leader: Maulana Masood AZHAR. Lashkar-i-Taiba—LiT (Army of the Pure). The LiT was established in 1993 as the military wing of an above-ground religious group, the Markaz adDawa Wal Irshad (Center for Religious Learning and Propagation), which was formed in 1986 to organize Pakistani Sunni militants participating in the Afghan revolution. The Markaz was officially dissolved in December 2001 and all its assets transferred to the “new” Jamaat-ud-Dawa (Party for Religious Propagation) in an effort to avoid proscription. The LiT, which the United States has labeled a terrorist group, was banned by Pakistan in January 2002. Since then it has often been referenced as the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, which was placed on a “watch list,” but not banned, by the Pakistani government in November 2003. The LiT, which may be the largest Pakistan-based militant group seeking separation of Jammu and Kashmir from India, with bases in Azad Kashmir and near the LoC, has claimed responsibility for and been implicated in innumerable attacks within Kashmir and elsewhere. Many of its members have been jailed in India and Pakistan. An LiT commander, Bashir Ahmad KHAN, was killed by Indian forces in April 2004. Following a series of transport blasts that killed several hundred people in Mumbai, India, in July 2006, the Indian government placed suspicion on the LiT, which denied involvement. Leader: Hafiz Mohammed SAYEED.

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Sipah-i-Sahaba—SiS (Guardians of the Friends of the Prophet). The SiS is a militant Sunni group founded in 1982 as a JUI breakaway by Maulana Haq Nawaz JHANGVI, who was later murdered. It has close connections to the extremist Lashkar-iJhangvi (LiJ) and the equally militant TNSM (below), both of which have been involved in sectarian bloodshed. In February 2000 the SiS announced that it was prepared to give nearly 100,000 workers to Maulana Masood Azhar’s newly organized JMMT (above) to aid in holy war (jihad). Both were banned in January 2002, as the LiJ had been in August 2001. The LiJ’s leader, Riaz BASRA, was killed by Indian police on May 14, 2002. Another leader, Asif RAMZI, who had been linked to the kidnapping and murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl, was killed in a bomb explosion in December 2002. ATTAULLAH, an alleged LiJ leader, was sentenced to death in September 2003. Another alleged LiJ member was also sentenced to death in June 2005 for his involvement in the bombing of Shia mosques that killed 45 in May 2004. In October 2003 SiS leader Muhammad Azam TARIQ, who had won election to the National Assembly a year earlier as an independent while still in prison, was assassinated, allegedly by members of the Shiite TJP (see TiP, above). Earlier, the SiS had been renamed the Millat-i-Islamia Pakistan (MIP) to circumvent a government ban, but the MIP was then proscribed in November 2003. The United States has placed both the SiS and the LiJ on its list of terrorist organizations. In April 2006 reports surfaced that the Pakistani government was considering allowing the MIP to operate legally, but with restrictions. Leader: Maulana Muhammad Ahmad LUDHIANVI (under house arrest). Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi— TNSM (Mohammadan Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law). The TNSM is a fundamentalist group that was blamed by the government for the deaths of 11 persons in May 1994 and of 10 more the following November as the result of tribal demands in the northern areas of Malakand

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and Swat for the introduction of Islamic law. The TNSM responded to the August 1998 U.S. missile attack against terrorist camps in Afghanistan by organizing a rally in Peshawar at which it threatened to lay siege to U.S. property and kidnap Americans. It was banned in January 2002. Leaders: Maulana Sufi MUHAMMAD, Maulana Muhammad ALAM. Harkat-ul-Mujaheddin al-Alami (HMA). A splinter from the Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin (HuM; see the article on India), the HMA was implicated in an April 2002 assassination attempt against President Musharraf and a June 2002 bombing at the U.S. consulate in Karachi. Some of its members were previously associated with the banned Harkat-ulJihad-i-Islami. The two groups and the LiJ are believed to be linked in the 313 alliance. Hizb-ut-Tahrir. Based in London, England, but present in many areas of Central Asia, the Islamist Hizb-ut-Tahrir was banned by the Pakistani government in November 2003. It has ostensibly disavowed terrorism but is believed to have links to many jihadist groups around the world. In April 2006 the government banned the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) as a terrorist organization. In the preceding year the BLA had been blamed for a number of separatist attacks within Baluchistan, although its very existence as an organization remained in question. A Baluchistan government minister asserted that the BLA was in fact just a name that provided “an excuse for antistate activities.”

Legislature The Parliament (Majlis-e-Shoora), also known as the Federal Legislature, is a bicameral body consisting of the president, an indirectly elected Senate, and a directly elected National Assembly. The 87-member Senate and the 217-member National Assembly were “suspended” by proclamation of Chief Executive Musharraf on October 15, 1999, and dissolved by him on June 20, 2001. Elections

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Cabinet As of July 15, 2006 Prime Minister Senior Minister of Defense

Shaukat Aziz (PML) Rao Sikander Iqbal (PPP [Regd.])

Ministers Commerce Communication Culture Defense Production Education Food, Agriculture, Cooperatives, and Livestock Environment Finance Foreign Affairs Health Housing and Works Industries and Production Information and Broadcasting Information Technology Interior Inter-Provincial Coordination Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas Labor, Manpower, and Overseas Pakistanis Law, Justice, and Human Rights Local Government and Rural Development Narcotics Control Parliamentary Affairs Petroleum and Natural Resources Political Affairs Population and Welfare Ports and Shipping Privatization and Investment Railways Religious Affairs, Zakat, and Ushr Science and Technology Social Welfare and Special Education Sports States and Frontier Regions Textile Industry Tourism Water and Power Women and Youth Affairs [f] = female

Hamayoon Akhtar Khan (PML) Muhammad Shamim Siddiqi (MQM) Syiad Ghazi Gulab Jamal (ind.) Habibullah Khan Warraich (PML) Javed Ashraf Qazi (PML) Sikandar Hayat Bosan (PML) Makhdoom Syed Faisal Saleh Hayat (PPP [Regd.]) Shaukat Aziz (PML) Mian Khursheed Mehmood Kasuri (PML) Muhammad Nasir Khan (PML) Syed Safwanullah (MQM) Jehangir Khan Tareen (PML) Muhammad Ali Durrani (PML) Awais Ahmed Khan Leghari (PML) Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao (PPP [Regd.]) Saleem Saifullah Khan (PML) Tahir Iqbal (PML) Ghulam Sarwar Khan (PML) Muhammad Wasi Zafar (PML) Abdul Razzaq Thahim (PML-N) Ghaus Bakhsh Khan Mahar (PML) Sher Afghan Khan Niazi (PPP [Regd.]) Amanullah Khan Jadoon (PML) Amir Muqam (PML) Chaudhry Shahbaz Hussain (PML) Babar Khan Ghauri (MQM) Zahid Hamid (PML) Shiekh Rasheed Ahmen (PML) Muhammad Ijaz ul-Haq (PML) Nouraiz Shakoor Khan (PPP [Regd.]) Zubaida Jalal (PML) [f] Mian Shamim Haidar (PML) Sardar Yar Muhammad Rind (PML) Mushtaq Ali Cheema (PML) Nilofar Bakhtiar (PML) [f] Liaqat Ali Jatoi (PML) Sumaira Malik (PML) [f]

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to expanded lower and upper houses were held in October 2002 and February 2003, respectively.

Senate The current upper house comprises 100 members: 22 elected by each of the four provincial legislatures (14 general seats, 4 reserved for women, and 4 reserved for technocrats/ulema), plus 8 from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and 4 from the Federal Capital (2 general, 1 woman, 1 technocrat/aalim). In 2003 the FATA and Islamabad senators were chosen by the National Assembly members of their respective jurisdictions. Senatorial terms are six years, with one-half of the body retiring every three years, although the election of February 24 and 27, 2003, was for the full, reconfigured house. The most recent election was held March 6 and 10, 2006. Immediately following the balloting the Pakistan Muslim League held 39 seats; Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMAP), 17; Pakistan People’s Party Parliamentarians, 9; Muttahida Qaumi Movement, 6; Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz, 4 (including 1 held by the leader of the Markazi Jamiat-e-Ahle Hadith); Pakistan People’s Party–Sherpao, 3; Pakhtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party, 3; Awami National Party, 2; Baluchistan National Party–Awami, Baluchistan National Party– Mengal, Jamhoori Watan Party, Jamiat-Ulema-eIslam Sami ul-Haq Group, National Party, and Pakistan Muslim League–Functional, 1 each; independents, 11. The 8 FATA senators are all considered to be independents, but the majority were reported to support the MMAP. Chair: Mohammad Mian SOOMRO.

National Assembly Serving a five-year term, subject to premature dissolution, the current National Assembly has 342 seats: 272 directly elected in single-member constituencies, 60 seats reserved for women and distributed on a proportional basis, and 10 proportional seats designated for members of religious minorities (4 Christian; 4 Hindu; 1 Sikh, Buddhist, or Parsi; 1 Qadiani). The most recent balloting for the directly elected seats took place on October

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10, 2002, after which the Election Commission ordered reballoting in two constituencies that was held on November 2 and 18. Seats reserved for women were allocated on October 31; religious minority representatives were announced on November 1. Some 29 independent candidates were elected on October 10, but by early November 2002 most had declared party allegiances. The following totals represent the standing of the parties when the final seat was filled on November 18, 2002: Pakistan Muslim League–Qaid-i-Azam, 118 seats; the Pakistan People’s Party Parliamentarians, 81; the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMAP), 60; the Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz, 19; the Muttahida Qaumi Movement, 17; the National Alliance, 16; the Pakistan Muslim League–Functional, 5; the Pakistan Muslim League–Junejo, 3; the Pakistan People’s Party–Sherpao, 2; the Baluchistan National Party–Mengal, Jamhoori Watan Party, Muhajir Qaumi Movement–Haqiqi, Pakistan Awami Tehrik, Pakistan Muslim League–Zia, Pakistan Tehrik-eInsaaf, Pakhtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party, 1 each; independents, 14. Although all 12 representatives elected from the FATA are regarded as independents, the majority support the MMAP. Speaker: Chaudhry Amir HUSSAIN.

Communications The constitution guarantees press freedom, but formal censorship has been imposed during periods of martial law. In the late 1990s journalists asserted that the Nawaz Sharif government was engaged in a “systematic pattern of harassment and victimization.” Under President Musharraf greater freedom has returned, although in July 2003 a court in the NWFP, where Islamic law was imposed in 2002, sentenced an editor of the Frontier Post to life in prison for blasphemy.

Press The following are among the more than 400 daily Pakistani newspapers: Daily Jang (Karachi, Lahore, Quetta, and Rawalpindi, 750,000), in Urdu,

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independent; Nawa-i-Waqt (Voice of the Time, Karachi, Lahore, Multan, and Islamabad, 560,000), in Urdu and English, conservative; Dawn (Karachi, Islamabad, and Lahore, 110,000 daily; 125,000 Sunday), in English and Gujarati; Jasarat (Karachi, 50,000), in Urdu, conservative; The Nation (Lahore, 50,000), in English; Frontier Post (Peshawar and Lahore), in English, leftist.

News Agencies There are three principal domestic news agencies: the government-owned Associated Press of Pakistan (APP) and the privately owned Pakistan Press International (PPI) and News Network International (NNI); a number of foreign agencies also maintain offices in leading cities.

IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, CP, CWTH, ECO, IDB, Interpol, IOM, NAM, OIC, PCA, SAARC, WCO, WTO

Related Territories The precise status of predominantly Muslim Jammu and Kashmir has remained unresolved since the 1949 cease-fire, which divided the territory into Indian- and Pakistani-administered sectors. While India has claimed the entire area as a state of the Indian Union, Pakistan has never regarded the portion under its control as an integral part of Pakistan. Rather, it has administered “Azad Kashmir” and the “Northern Areas” (see map) as de facto dependencies for whose defense and foreign affairs it is responsible.

Broadcasting and Computing

Azad Kashmir

The government-owned Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation (PBC) offers regional, national, and international programming in a variety of languages. Private radio stations, of which over 100 are now registered, are prohibited from broadcasting news. Additional service is provided by Azad Kashmir Radio. The public Pakistan Television Corporation (PTC) and the public-private Shalimar Television Network are based in Islamabad. Private satellite, but not terrestrial, service is also available, although the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority banned 35 foreign television channels in December 2005. There were approximately 28.6 million television receivers and 800,000 personal computers serving 1.5 million Internet users in 2003.

Formally styled Azad (“Free”) Jammu and Kashmir, the smaller (4,200 sq. mi.) but more populous (2,973,000 in 1998C) of the Jammu and Kashmir regions administered by Pakistan is a narrow strip of territory lying along the northeastern border adjacent to Rawalpindi and Islamabad. It is divided into two divisions (Muzaffarabad and Mirpur) and seven districts (Bagh, Bhimber, Kotli, Mirpur, Muzaffarabad, Poonch, and Sudhnuti). Muzaffarabad City serves as the territory’s capital. An Interim Constitution Act of 1974 provided for a Legislative Assembly, now comprising 49 members—41 directly elected plus 5 women and single representatives for technocrats, overseas Kashmiris, and mashaikh (Muslim spiritual leaders), all named by those directly elected. In addition, an Azad Kashmir Council consists of the president of Pakistan (chair), the president of Azad Kashmir (vice chair), the prime minister of Azad Kashmir, members designated by the Legislative Assembly of Azad Kashmir, and others. In April 1985, 13 parties, most of them affiliated with pro-Pakistani groups in Indian Kashmir, began campaigning for the first assembly election in ten years; however, the military government in March had established a cutoff of 12 percent of the

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. Jehangir KARAMAT U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Ryan C. CROCKER Permanent Representative to the UN Munir AKRAM

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overall vote and 5 percent of the vote in each district for a party to remain legal, thus ensuring that the Islamabad-supported All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference (also known simply as the Muslim Conference—MC), led by former president Sardar Abdul QAYYUM Khan, would remain politically dominant. Qayyum was reelected president in August 1990. In April 1991 the prime minister, Mumtaz Hussain RATHORE of the Azad Kashmir affiliate of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), annulled the results of a state election, claiming they had been rigged by the central government, only to be subsequently dismissed for the action by Qayyum. On July 5 Islamabad announced Rathore’s arrest to “prevent him from committing further illegal and unconstitutional acts”; six days later Qayyum was named prime minister after resigning as president and being elected to an assembly seat reserved for Muslim scholars. In late June 1996 the governing MC suffered an unprecedented drubbing by PPP candidates in the Legislative Assembly election, and on July 30 Sultan Mahmood CHAUDHRY, president of the Azad Kashmir PPP, was sworn in as prime minister, replacing the MC’s Qayyum. Except for a brief period in 1990, the MC had been in power for 13 years. On August 12 President Sikander Hayat Khan, also of the MC, lost a no-confidence motion in the assembly, in which the PPP now controlled more than three-fourths of the 48 seats. On August 25 Mohammad IBRAHIM Khan was sworn in as his successor. The transition marked the fourth time the octogenarian Ibrahim had assumed the presidency. The existing Azad Kashmir government remained in place following the October 1999 coup in Islamabad. The MC turned the tables on the PPP at the July 5, 2001, election, winning 25 out of 40 directly elected seats to the PPP’s 8 and then picking up 5 more when the Legislative Council filled the reserved seats. The PPP ended up with a total of 9 seats and the PML, 8. When the new council convened Sikander Hayat defeated the incumbent by a vote of 30–17 and thereby returned as prime minister.

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Seventeen parties contested the legislative election of July 11, 2006, at which the MC won 21 of 40 elective seats (revoting was necessary in a 41st district) and quickly gained the support of 3 independents. Preliminary results gave the PPP Azad Kashmir, led by Sahibzada Ishaq ZAFAR, 7 seats; the PML, led by Sultan Mehmood Chaudhry, 4; the MQM, 1; and Sardar Khalid IBRAHIM’s Jammu and Kashmir People’s Party, 1. Immediately after the election the MMAP, which had fielded a large slate of unsuccessful candidates, led a chorus of opposition parties in accusing the central government of vote-rigging, particularly in refugee camps set up in the wake of the devastating October 8, 2005, earthquake, which had caused 11,000 deaths in the capital alone (see Current issues, above). On July 22 the MC added 7 of the 8 reserved seats to its total. With Sikander Hayat having chosen not to seek reelection to the Legislative Assembly, the MC proposed Sardar ATTIQUE AHMED Khan, son of Sardar Abdul Qayyum, as prime minister, and he was sworn in on July 24, 2006. Three days later, the new legislature elected the MC’s Raja ZULQARNAIN Khan as president by a vote of 40–8 over the PPP Azad Kashmir candidate, Sardar QAMAR-UZAMAN. President: Raja ZULQARNAIN Khan. Prime Minister: Sardar ATTIQUE AHMED Khan.

Northern Areas The Northern Areas encompass approximately 28,000 square miles, with a population (2001E) of 870,000. The Northern Areas have served as the principal conduit for supplying troops and mat´eriel to the Line of Control, facing Indian Kashmir. Pakistan’s overland route to China, the Karakoram Highway, also traverses the Northern Areas, which currently comprises three regions, each with two districts: Baltistan (Ghanche and Skardu), Diamir (Astore and Diamir), and Gilgit (Ghizar and Gilgit). Approximately half the population is Shiite, with the other half divided between Sunnis and Ismailis.

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A Northern Areas Council, now of 36 members—24 directly elected seats plus 6 reserved for women and 6 for technocrats, with the women and technocrats chosen by the elected members— originally served in an advisory capacity. On October 4, 1993, Pakistan’s caretaker government announced that some provincial powers would be delegated to the region, with the minister for Kashmir and the Northern Areas serving as chief executive and chair of the Northern Areas Legislative Council. In practice, however, authority has continued to reside in Islamabad, in the person of the minister, a deputy chief executive chosen from the Legislative Council, and an advisory panel drawn from the council. In May 1999 Pakistan’s Supreme Court ruled that residents of the Northern Areas were entitled to full constitutional rights, including an elected legislature and an independent judiciary, and gave the government six months to institute the changes. In early October the Sharif administration announced that party-based elections would be held on November 3 for a 33-member Northern Areas Legislative Council having the same powers as provincial assemblies. The announcement marked a significant departure in that the government had previously argued that no permanent institutions could be established until the fate of the entire Jammu and Kashmir was determined through a UN-sponsored plebiscite.

Although the October military coup in Islamabad intervened, the November 1999 balloting took place as scheduled, but only for the existing 24 elective Northern Areas Council seats. Of the leading parties, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) won 6 seats (5 more than it had previously held); the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), 6; and the Tehrike-Jafariya-e-Pakistan (TJP), 6. Voter turnout was very low, which analysts attributed in part to the council’s severely limited role. After the reserved seats (at that time, 5 for women and none for technocrats) were finally filled nearly nine months later, a PML-TJP alliance controlled 19 of the 29 seats. As a result, the PML’s Sahib KHAN was elected speaker of the Legislative Council and the TJP’s Fida Muhammad NASHAD won election as deputy chief executive. At the Northern Area Legislative Council election of October 12, 2004, the PML and PPP Parliamentarians (PPPP) each won six seats and the PML-N won two, the balance being claimed by independents, eight of whom then aligned with the PML. When the reserved seats were finally filled on March 22, 2006, the PML picked up ten of them, with independents claiming the remaining two. The PPPP immediately protested that the election had been rigged and argued that seats should have been assigned on a proportional basis. Chief Executive of the Northern Areas: Tahir IQBAL.

PA L A U REPUBLIC

OF

PALAU

Belu’u era Belau

The Country Palau encompasses a chain of more than 200 Pacific islands and islets at the western extremity of the Carolines, some 720 miles southwest of Guam and 500 miles east of the Philippines. Both Palauan and English are spoken, and Roman Catholicism is the principal religion. The climate is tropical with quite heavy rainfall. Fishing and tourism are the leading economic sectors, with the United States pledging approximately $500 million in aid over a 15-year period as part of a trusteeship settlement that became effective on October 1, 1994. Because of the aid, Palau’s nominal GDP grew by 24.3 percent in fiscal year 1994–1995 but declined sharply thereafter. After averaging just over 2 percent in 1996–1998, it dropped by 5.4 percent in the next fiscal year. For 2000–2005 GDP growth, despite some vacillation, recovered to about 2.2 percent annually.

Government and Politics Political Background Purchased by Germany from Spain in 1889, the Palau group was among the insular territories seized by Japan in 1914 and retained as part of the mandate awarded by the League of Nations in 1920. The islands were occupied by U.S. forces near the end of World War II and became part of the U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific in 1947. A republican constitution was adopted by referendum in October 1979, and on January 1, 1981, Haruo I. REMELIK was inaugurated as the country’s first president. On

November 30, 1984, Remelik was elected to a second four-year term on a platform that called for early implementation of a 1980 Compact of Free Association with the United States. In an act that did not appear to have been politically motivated, Remelik was assassinated on June 30, 1985, and at a special election on August 28 Lazarus SALII defeated Acting President Alfonso OITERONG in balloting for Remelik’s successor. The Palauan Compact, including provision for substantial U.S. aid, required that the Republic provide facilities for U.S. conventional and nuclear forces. It was approved by 60 percent of the voters

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in a 1983 plebiscite, but with only 50 percent agreeing to a crucial accompanying proposal to override a constitutional ban on the entry, storage, or disposal of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and waste. A second plebiscite on September 4, 1984, also failed to secure the 75 percent majority needed for the override. A third plebiscite, held on February 21, 1986, in the wake of an enhanced U.S. aid commitment, yielded a favorable vote of 72 percent. President Salii, who had received assurances that Washington would not “use, test, store, or dispose of nuclear, toxic, chemical, gas, or biological weapons on the islands,” then suggested that only a simple majority was needed for Compact approval. His position was challenged by the islands’ ranking chief, who obtained a favorable appellate ruling by the Palauan Supreme Court on September 17. Congressional endorsement of the Compact immediately prior to the decision notwithstanding, the U.S. government responded by declaring that it would “respect the judicial process of Belau,” and the agreement was not implemented. Subsequent plebiscites on December 2 and June 30, 1987, yielded approval by 66 percent and 68 percent, respectively. A referendum on amending the constitution to suspend the applicability of its antinuclear clause to the Compact was then held on August 4, which resulted in 71 percent approval, with majorities in 14 of the 16 states. The vote was hailed by the government, which contended that amending (as distinguished from overriding a constitutional proscription) required only a simple majority overall, coupled with majorities in at least 12 states. The constitutional issue seemingly having been resolved, a sixth plebiscite (yielding 73 percent approval) was held on August 21, with the Palauan legislature voting on August 27 to approve the Compact. Meanwhile, a suit had been filed contending that constitutional revision could occur only in conjunction with a presidential election but was withdrawn (apparently as the result of duress) on the day of the plebiscite. On March 28, 1988, the U.S. Senate endorsed the Compact, although strong opposition continued to block action in the House of Representatives. On April 22, acting on a refiled opposition suit, the is-

lands’ Supreme Court trial division ruled that the August 4 referendum was invalid. U.S. President Ronald Reagan responded by urging the House to proceed with its vote on the ground that the legislation contained safeguards that would preclude implementation of the pact until the court’s decision had been appealed. However, intense debate continued in the House subcommittee on the issue, with Democratic leaders insisting that a public auditor’s office and a special prosecutor’s position be established in Palau to investigate allegations of drug smuggling, fiscal mismanagement, and government corruption. On August 20, 1988, President Salii was found dead in his office from an apparently selfinflicted gunshot wound, Vice President Thomas REMENGESAU subsequently being sworn in to serve for the rest of the year, pending the results of November’s regularly scheduled presidential election. Shortly thereafter, the appellate division of the Supreme Court upheld the April decision invalidating the 1987 Compact voting. While ruling that a special referendum on constitutional revision could be called at any time, the Court declared that the proposed amendment must first be approved by 75 percent majorities in both houses of Parliament or be requested by a petition signed by at least 25 percent of the electorate. In balloting on November 2 Ngiratkel ETPISON, who appeared to enjoy the backing of many former Salii supporters, was elected president from among seven candidates. Etpison received 26.5 percent of the votes, surpassing his closest rival, Roman TMETUCHL, by less than 40 votes, with Remengesau finishing third. A seventh Compact vote on February 6, 1990, yielded an even lower approval rate (68.7 percent) than in 1987, with an Associated Press correspondent reporting that the islanders appeared to be “comfortable under the trusteeship arrangement and uncertain as to whether they are ready to take control of their destiny.” In September 1991 the Palau Senate refused to endorse a House measure that would have subjected the constitution’s antinuclear clause to another referendum, and in October the government

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Political Status: Former U.S. Trust Territory; became sovereign state in free association with the United States on October 1, 1994. Land Area: 178 sq. mi. (461 sq. km.). Population: 19,907 (2005C). Approximately 6,000 residents are nonnationals. Major Urban Center (2005C): KOROR (10,743). The constitution calls for a new capital on the largely undeveloped northern island of Babeldaob (Babelthuap). Official Languages: English, Palauan. Monetary Unit: U.S. Dollar. President: Thomas (Tommy) REMENGESAU, Jr. (nonparty); served as Vice President 1993–2000; elected President on November 7, 2000, and inaugurated for a four-year term on January 19, 2001, succeeding Kuniwo NAKAMURA (nonparty); reelected for a four-year term on November 2, 2004. Vice President: Elias Camsek CHIN (nonparty); elected on November 2, 2004, for a term concurrent with that of the President, succeeding Sandra PIERANTOZZI (nonparty).

indicated that it would seek reduction of the constitutional amendment threshold from three-quarters to a simple majority if Washington would reduce the duration of the Compact from 50 to 15 years and maintain a $70 million trust fund over the shorter period. The overture drew an immediate rejection from the George H. W. Bush administration. President Etpison thereupon called for a threshold vote on July 13 but was again rebuffed by the court, which ruled that prior congressional approval was required. In August the legislators responded by placing the matter on the ballot for the general election of November 4. For the 1992 presidential balloting Etpison was defeated in a primary that resulted from abandonment of the earlier first-past-the-post system, and on November 3 the incumbent vice president, Kuniwo NAKAMURA, moved up in edging out Johnson TORIBIONG by a slim 50.7 percent majority. More importantly, the amendment to reduce

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the threshold required to alter the antinuclear provision of the constitution was approved by the voters. This cleared the way for approval of the Compact by 64 percent of the participants on November 9, 1993. In September 1994 the Palauan Supreme Court dismissed an appeal challenging the validity of the 1993 vote, and on October 1, 1994, independence was formally proclaimed. Benefiting from an economic upswing based on the infusion of U.S. Compact funds, in addition to a “look north” policy that had attracted significant Japanese, Filipino, and Taiwanese investment, President Nakamura won reelection on November 6, 1996, easily defeating the mayor of Koror, Paramount Chief Ibedul Yutaka GIBBONS, by a 2–1 margin. Earlier, Toribiong, second-ranked in preelection polling, had withdrawn from the race because of the incumbent’s seemingly insurmountable lead. Nakamura’s reelection was preceded on September 26, 1996, by the collapse of a recently renovated bridge (the world’s largest of its type) between Koror and Babeldaob. The collapse was a major economic disaster, as it cut off the smaller, more densely populated capital region from the country’s only airport and electrical supplier. Although Nakamura secured legislative funding for construction of a temporary span, a sharp decline in tourist arrivals and curtailment of development prospects for the northern island were among the immediate consequences. At the national election of November 7, 2000, Vice President Tommy REMENGESAU, Jr., captured the presidency, winning 52 percent of the vote against Sen. Peter SUGIYAMA. Running separately, Sen. Sandra PIERANTOZZI defeated her nephew, Alan REID, for the vice presidency even though Reid had been endorsed by outgoing President Nakamura. President Remengesau was accorded a second term at the election of November 2, 2004, although Vice President Pierantozzi was defeated by Elias Camsek CHIN. The vice-presidential outcome led to a constitutional amendment (approved in 2004) that the president and vice president thereafter be elected as a team.

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Constitution and Government Under the Compact of Free Association, Palau is a fully sovereign state, save in regard to defense, which was to remain a U.S. responsibility for at least a 15-year period; it was also obligated to “consult” with Washington in regard to major foreign policy matters. Heretofore, its constitution has provided for a president and vice president elected on separate tickets for four-year terms after having been selected (since 1992) by primaries replacing a first-past-the-post system. The somewhat unusual procedure was replaced in 2004 by a requirement that the two offices be filled on a single ticket. The bicameral National Congress consists of a Senate, currently composed of 14 members elected on a population basis (9 from Koror, 4 from the northern islands, 1 from the southern islands), and a House of Delegates, encompassing one representative from each of the Republic’s 16 states (a proposal to abandon bicameralism in favor of a unicameral legislature was rejected by voters in 2004). There is also a 16-member Council of Chiefs to advise the government on matters of tribal laws and customs. The judicial system consists of a Supreme Court (including both Trial and Appellate Divisions), a National Court, and a Court of Common Pleas. Each of the states (Aimeliik, Airai, Angaur, Kayangel, Koror, Melekeok, Ngaraard, Ngardmau, Ngaremlengui, Ngatpang, Ngchesar, Ngerchelong, Ngiwal, Peleliu, Sonsorol, and Tobi) elects its own governor and legislature. With the addition of municipal and traditional structures, Palauans, on a per capita basis, have been termed “the most governed people on earth.” In addition to the measures referenced above, three constitutional amendments were approved in 2004: the holding of dual U.S.-Palau citizenship, a limitation of three four-year terms for legislators, and a cap on congressional salaries.

Foreign Relations Palau was admitted to the United Nations on December 15, 1994. It participates in the Pacific Islands Forum and a number of other intergovern-

mental organizations. Following independence the government established embassies in Tokyo and Washington. In 1999 diplomatic relations were formalized with Taiwan. Palau also maintains ties with many of its Pacific neighbors. In November 2004 President Remengesau announced that Palau was withdrawing from the G-77 group of developing countries (which it had joined two years before) on the ground that it had been ineffective in lobbying on environmental issues, such as global warming.

Current Issues With Compact approval by less than two-thirds of the voters in the 1993 referendum, substantial opposition to the pact continued. A leading opponent was Paramount Chief Gibbons, who boycotted the independence ceremonies to protest the Compact as “a blank check on land matters.” In addition, considerable uncertainty existed as to likelihood of continued U.S. funding at the end of the Compact period, particularly in view of comments such as those appearing in the National Inquirer about “Uncle Sam’s giving $500 million to a tiny island that does nothing for us.” President Remengesau’s relations with the National Congress have been less than uniformly cordial. In 2004 his call for adoption of a unicameral legislature was rebuffed, while approval of the 2006 budget was delayed by two months because of difficulties between the two houses, some of which concerned the extent of presidential authority. Meanwhile, in June 2005, the governor of Ngiwal was indicted on charges of embezzling state funds, while in April 2006 the state legislature of Peleliu dismissed its governor for the alleged misappropriation of funds and for calling for Remengesau’s resignation over a conflict-of-interest issue.

Political Parties Traditionally there were no formal parties in Palau. However, an antinuclear Coalition for Open, Honest, and Just Government emerged

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Cabinet As of July 1, 2006 President Vice President

Thomas (Tommy) Remengesau Jr. Elias Camsek Chin

Ministers Commerce and Trade Community and Cultural Affairs Education Finance Health Justice Resources and Development State

to oppose the Compact of Free Association, which was defended by a Ta Belau Party, led by Kuniwo NAKAMURA. Subsequently, a Palau National Party was launched by opposition leader Johnson TORIBIONG.

Legislature The Palau National Congress (Olbiil era Kelulau) is a bicameral body, both of whose chambers have four-year mandates. The most recent election was on November 2, 2004.

Senate

Otoichi Besebes Alexander R. Merep Mario Katosang Elbuchel Sadang Dr. Victor Yano Elias Camsek Chin Fritz Koshiba Temmy Shmull

Communications Press The Palau Gazette is issued in Koror on a twiceweekly basis; there is also a Belau News.

Broadcasting The Palau National Communications Corporation operates one radio station and one television station in Koror. There is also a privately operated cable television system in the capital. There were approximately 14,800 television receivers in 2003.

Intergovernmental Representation

The upper house currently consists of 14 members representing geographic districts that may be reapportioned every eight years. President: Johnny REKLAI.

Ambassador to the U.S. Hersey KYOTA

House of Delegates

Permanent Representative to the UN Stuart J. BECK

The lower house contains 16 members, one from each of Palau’s states. Speaker: Augustine MESEBELUUA.

U.S. Ambassador to Palau (Vacant)

IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, PC, PIF

PA P U A N E W G U I N E A INDEPENDENT STATE

OF

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Gau Hedinarai ai Papua-Matamata Guinea

Note: The literal translation of Gau Hedinarai is “entity of the people,” hence the official title in Hari-Motu could be “Republic of Papua New Guinea.”

The Country Situated in the tropics between Asia and Australia, Papua New Guinea consists of the eastern half of the island of New Guinea—where the nation’s only border is shared with the Indonesian territory of Irian Jaya—and numerous adjacent islands, including those of the Bismarck Archipelago as well as part of the Solomon group. The indigenous inhabitants, mainly of Melanesian stock, comprise over 1,000 tribes that speak more than 700 languages, of which English and two pidgins, Tok Pisin and Hari-Motu, have become lingua francas and accorded official status. Pantheism is the religion of the majority of the people, although there are numerous Christian missionary societies throughout the country. While females are reported to constitute 42 percent of the labor force, most are engaged in subsistence agriculture; female representation in elected bodies is minimal, although “women’s councils,” active at both the national and provincial levels, receive significant government funding. Much of the country’s terrain consists of dense tropical forests and inland mountain ranges separated by grassland valleys. The climate is monsoonal. Roughly 70 percent of the population, living by quite primitive standards, relies on subsistence farming and hunting for domestic needs, although some economic modernization has been achieved with government support. There are nu-

merous mineral deposits, including silver and copper (which, until closure of the vast Bougainville mine because of secessionist activity, provided about 17 percent of government revenue and 40 percent of export earnings); in addition, exploitation of natural gas and hydroelectric resources has begun. Falling mineral prices, lack of private investment, and the Bougainville insurrection yielded economic deterioration in recent years,

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Political Status: Former Australianadministered territory; achieved internal self-government on December 1, 1973, and full independence within the Commonwealth on September 16, 1975, under constitution of August 15. Area: 178,259 sq. mi. (461,691 sq. km.). Population: 5,130,365 (2000C); 5,969,000 (2005E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): PORT MORESBY (metropolitan area, 290,000), Lae (73,000), Arawa (35,000). Official Languages: English, Tok Pisin, Hari-Motu. Monetary Unit: Kina (market rate July 1, 2006: 2.99 kina = $1US). Sovereign: Queen ELIZABETH II. Governor General: Sir Paulias MATANE; elected by the National Parliament on May 28, 2004, and installed for a six-year term after formal appointment by the Queen, on June 29, succeeding Sir Silas ATOPARE and the interim incumbency of William (Bill) SKATE. Prime Minister: Sir Michael SOMARE (National Alliance Party); served as Prime Minister from September 1975 to March 1980 and from August 1982 to November 1985; returned to office by the National Parliament on August 6, 2004, succeeding Sir Mekere MORAUTA (People’s Democratic Movement). President of Bougainville Autonomous Government: Joseph KABUI (Bougainville People’s Congress Party); served as president, 1999–2004; reelected on May 20–27, 2005.

although major oil and gold discoveries offer promise of long-term relief: Recoverable oil reserves in the southern highlands have been estimated at 500 million barrels, while gold extraction, from what were once described as the world’s foremost undeveloped deposits, averaged more than 30 metric tons a year from 1987 through 1992. Real economic growth, according to the World Bank, rose at an average rate of 5.0 percent during 1990– 1996. However, by early 1998 the country was described as facing its “worse financial crisis since independence” because of prolonged drought and

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the Asian economic decline, while three massive tidal waves (tsunamis) in mid-July devastated the island’s northwest coast, killing an estimated 3,000 people. The economy contracted nearly 4 percent in 1997 and again in 1998, although growth in the gas and minerals sector helped spur a recovery to 4.2 percent growth in 1999; the subsequent record has been uneven, the International Monetary Fund reporting declines of 0.1 and 0.2 in 2000 and 2001, then gains of 2.9 percent in 2003 and 2004 and of 3.0 percent in 2005.

Government and Politics Political Background Sighted in 1526 by a Portuguese navigator who gave it the name Papua (“woolly haired”), eastern New Guinea was colonized over the centuries by Australia and a variety of European and Asian nations, including the Netherlands, Germany, and Japan. In 1906 the British New Guinea sector, renamed the Territory of Papua, officially came under Australian administration, with Northeast New Guinea, a former German colony, being added as a League of Nations mandate in 1920. Parts of both sectors were occupied by Japanese forces from 1942 to 1945, when Australia reassumed control. A joint administration was introduced in 1949 and continued until the granting of independence on September 16, 1975. Representative government was initiated in 1964 when the House of Assembly replaced the former Legislative Council after the first commonroll election. In 1968 the territorial constitution was amended to provide for an Administrator’s Executive Council, a majority of whose members were drawn from the elected members of the House of Assembly. Beginning in 1970 Papua New Guinea increasingly assumed control over its own internal affairs through the chief minister of the council, a process that was enhanced in December 1973 by redesignation of the Australian administrator as high commissioner. In March 1975 the territory acquired responsibility for its own defense, becoming independent six months later, with

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former chief minister Michael T. SOMARE assuming the office of prime minister. Somare was immediately confronted with a threat to national unity by secessionists on the island of Bougainville, who declared unilateral independence for the “Republic of the North Solomons,” claiming that the central government had been extracting too much revenue from the copper industry. However, following an agreement in August 1976 that provided for substantial regional autonomy, secession leaders formally accepted provincial status for the island. After the nation’s first postindependence election for a National Parliament, held June 18–July 9, 1977, Somare’s Pangu Pati, the People’s Progress Party (PPP), and a number of independents formed a coalition government, Somare being redesignated as prime minister on August 9. In November 1978 the PPP went into opposition and was replaced in the ruling coalition by the United Party (UP). The Somare government collapsed in the face of a nonconfidence vote on March 11, 1980, a new majority coalition being constituted two days later by Sir Julius CHAN of the PPP. Somare returned as prime minister on August 2, 1982, after intense political maneuvering that followed balloting for a new Parliament on June 5–26. Somare survived a nonconfidence vote on March 25, 1984, after Deputy Prime Minister Paias WINGTI and a number of his followers had withdrawn from the government; he was, however, obliged to form a new coalition on April 1 that included Pangu Pati, the Melanesian Alliance (MA), and the National Party (NP), although the last soon returned to opposition in a dispute over the distribution of ministries. The increasingly beleaguered Somare survived two more confidence motions before succumbing to a 1986 budget vote on November 21, 1985. Opposition leader Wingti was thereupon invested as head of a coalition that included his recently organized People’s Democratic Movement (PDM), the Nationalist Papua Besena, the NP, the PPP, and elements of the UP. Contrary to expectations, Wingti retained office as the leader of a modified six-party coalition in the wake of parliamentary balloting on June 13–July 4, 1987,

securing the support of a bare majority of 54 assemblymen (3 seats of 109 being vacant) at commencement of the legislative term on August 5. On April 11, 1988, a vote on a nonconfidence motion against the Wingti administration was averted by suspending legislative proceedings until June 27. Following an abortive effort to mount a “grand coalition” involving the PDM and Pangu Pati, the Wingti administration was defeated on July 4. Four days later, Rabbie NAMALIU, who had succeeded Somare as Pangu Pati leader, announced the formation of a six-party government that included Somare as foreign minister. In May 1989 the Bougainville copper facility suspended operations because of mounting sabotage by local landowners who had long sought compensation for losses attributed to mining operations. By midyear the violence had escalated to a revival of full-scale secessionist activity by the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) under the leadership of a former land surveyor, Francis ONA. At the end of the year, the government yielded to rebel demands that the mine be closed, and in March 1990 it concluded a cease-fire agreement with the rebels that included the withdrawal of police and army units. Formal peace talks, which were to have been initiated on April 12, stalled over rebel demands that they be held on Bougainville, and in early May Port Moresby instituted an air and naval blockade of the island. On May 17 Ona declared Bougainville’s independence, proclaiming himself president of what was styled Me’ekamui. Port Moresby responded by rejecting the declaration and tightening its blockade. The deadlock over a venue for peace talks was eventually broken by New Zealand’s offer of the use of two naval vessels, and negotiations were launched in late July 1990 between Somare and the former provincial premier of Bougainville, Joseph KABUI. On August 7 the parties signed the “Endeavor Accord” (after the vessel on which the parties met), which provided for lifting the blockade and restoring communications and other essential services; in addition the government agreed that security forces would not return, pending a resumption of talks on September 24. However, another

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impasse ensued because of the occupation by the Papua New Guinea Defense Forces (PNGDF) of the small island of Buka off Bougainville’s northern coast. On January 24, 1991, a second accord, the Declaration on Peace, Reconciliation and Rehabilitation in Bougainville, was signed by Somare and Kabui in Honiara, Solomon Islands. The new agreement provided that PNG security forces would not return to the island and that the BRA would surrender its arms to a multinational peace observation team. However, the pact stimulated at least as many questions as it resolved. One such issue was whether the surrender of weapons meant their “destruction.” It was also unclear as to whether Ona and BRA commander Sam KAUONA had endorsed the settlement, while Kabui insisted that in approving the declaration the central government had accepted the temporary authority of the government established by the secessionists, known as the Bougainville Interim Government (BIG). In late March 1991, after his government had called unsuccessfully for a third round of talks, Foreign Minister Somare presented the PNG cabinet with a proposal to purchase a 53.6 percent interest in the Bougainville mine from its Australian owners, the shares to be held by a new entity in which a Chicago investor would hold a 51 percent interest; the Bougainville landowners, 30 percent; and the PNG government, 19 percent. Shortly thereafter, in manifest violation of the January declaration, a PNGDF contingent landed in northern Bougainville and succeeded in bringing the region under its control. Ona and Kauona reacted by indicating their support for a multinational supervisory force, which Port Moresby now appeared to oppose. A third round of negotiations was eventually scheduled to begin on October 8 but was postponed because of disagreement as to a venue, and sporadic clashes between government and BRA units subsequently ensued. In November Prime Minster Namaliu announced that a multinational force would arrive sometime in 1992, following the establishment of six new government authorities on the island, while secessionist leader Kabui declared in

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December that the BRA would surrender its arms if Australia and New Zealand, in addition to providing peacekeeping troops, would abide by the results of an impartially conducted referendum on the island’s future. Meanwhile, on September 27, 1991, the recently appointed governor general, Sir Vincent Serei ERI, rejected the results of a four-year inquiry that had found Deputy Prime Minister Ted DIRO guilty on 81 counts of corruption and misconduct. The unprecedented action prompted an appeal to London for Eri’s ouster, as a result of which both Diro and the governor general tendered their resignations on October 1. At legislative balloting that concluded on June 27, 1992, a record 59 (of 109) sitting parliamentarians lost their seats, including more than half of Namaliu’s 28-member cabinet. At the vote for selection of a prime minister on July 17 the Parliament for the first time tied 54–54, with Paias Wingti being returned to office by the tie-breaking vote of the speaker, who had himself been named by a 55–54 vote. In what appeared to be a remarkable “political coup” made possible by a 1991 constitutional prohibition of a nonconfidence vote during a government’s first 18 months in office, Prime Minister Wingti tendered a surprise resignation on September 23, 1993, and accepted reappointment the following day. It seemed likely that Wingti would thereby remain in office until the general election due in mid-1997, since the constitution also prohibited a nonconfidence vote during the 12 months preceding an election. However, the Supreme Court ruled in August 1994 that Wingti had failed to give a required 24-hour advance notice before calling for a new election by Parliament. His status thus being construed as that of a caretaker, the Court ordered a new election, which the government lost 69–32 on August 30 because of the defection of its PPP coalition partner. The latter thereupon forged a new coalition with Pangu Pati, permitting Sir Julius Chan to return as head of a new administration installed on August 31. On September 8, 1994, Prime Minister Chan and BRA commander Kauona concluded a new

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cease-fire in the Solomon Islands capital of Honiara. The agreement provided for deployment of a peacekeeping force of troops from Fiji, Tonga, and Vanuatu coincident with the launching of formal peace talks on October 10. However, the BRA representatives failed to appear for the talks on the ground that insufficient guarantees had been given for their safety, and on October 16 the government formally abandoned the effort. In early 1995 the Parliament approved the formation of a Bougainville Transitional Government (BTG) with Theodore MIRIUNG, a former legal adviser to the secessionists, as premier. Under the terms of a subsequent peace agreement (the Waigani Communiqu´e), signed by Chan and Miriung on May 18, leaders of both the BTG and BRA were granted unconditional amnesties for any crimes committed against the state; however, the top three BRA figures repudiated the accord and refused to take up seats reserved for them in the 32-member provincial legislature. As a result, sporadic violence continued on the island, and on November 10 Prime Minister Chan halted government participation in talks aimed at ending the seven-year conflict. On the other hand, discussions that one observer termed “pre-peace-negotiation talks” involving BRA and BTG representatives were launched in the Australian coastal city of Cairns in mid-December. At the conclusion of the talks agreement was reached on a plan to end the lengthy rebellion, with formal peace negotiations to begin in March 1996. However, skirmishes resumed in February following the burning of the Honiara home of rebel spokesman Martin MIRIORI, and in late March the 18-month cease-fire formally ended with a resumption of government military activity. In late June Prime Minister Chan ordered a second “Operation High Speed” designed to destroy the BRA stronghold in the vicinity of the mining complex, but the offensive was abandoned in mid-July. The situation deteriorated even further when a group of PNGDF soldiers were “massacred” under confusing circumstances in September and Miriung was assassinated on October 12. Bougainville’s provincial legislature selected Gerard SINATO to succeed Miriung, the new premier

pledging to continue his predecessor’s efforts to facilitate a negotiated settlement to the conflict. In late February 1997 Prime Minister Chan acknowledged that his government had contracted with Sandline International, a private British military group, to supply mercenaries against the Bougainville rebels. Brig. Gen. Jerry SINGEROK, commander of the PNGDF, reacted on March 17 by calling upon Chan to resign. Although the prime minister survived a nonconfidence vote on March 25, he felt obliged to step down two days later in favor of a caretaker government headed by John GIHENO, theretofore mining and petroleum minister. On April 1 a commission of inquiry was convened to look into the Sandline matter, and on June 2, upon issuance of a commission report that found “no credible evidence” of wrongdoing, Chan announced that he was resuming his post as prime minister. However, a major electoral reversal on June 14–28 included the loss of his own parliamentary seat, and on July 22 Port Moresby Mayor William (Bill) SKATE was chosen as his successor. In late November 1997 Skate himself came under intense pressure to resign because of the broadcast on Australian television of tapes allegedly showing him engaging in bribery and boasting of being the “godfather” of a Port Moresby criminal gang. On December 2, 1997, Skate dismissed his deputy minister, Chris HAIVETA of Pangu Pati, and Agricultural Minister Andrew BAING of the PPP, accusing them of promoting a smear campaign against him. A group of Pangu Pati cabinet ministers immediately resigned in protest; however, the threat to the government receded when a PPP caucus voted to replace Baing as party leader with Trade and Tourist Minister Michael NALI and stay in the cabinet. Consequently, on December 15 Skate significantly reshuffled his cabinet, naming Nali as deputy prime minister, enlisting members of the newly organized United Resources Party (URP), and leaving Pangu Pati out of the government altogether. Meanwhile, ongoing peace negotiations with the Bougainville rebels (which had yielded a truce on October 10, 1997) achieved a peace treaty on January 23, 1998. The accord provided for the truce

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to become a permanent cease-fire as of April 30, 1998, as well as for phased withdrawal of the PNGDF and establishment of a regional monitoring group to oversee the settlement. The 1998 accord envisaged the election of a Bougainville Reconciliation Government (BRG) by the end of the year, when the BTG’s mandate was set to expire. However, talks proceeded slowly, and in October agreement was reached between Bougainville leaders and the national government for an interim BRG to be appointed on January 1, 1999, with elections to follow by midyear. Although the PNG opposition parties initially appeared to support the plan, most of their legislators abstained from parliamentary balloting in early December on the enabling legislation, which consequently failed to gain approval. Nevertheless, the Bougainville leaders proceeded on their own. In mid-January a newly constituted Bougainville Constituent Assembly (comprising the BTG members, national Bougainville legislators, and representatives of all rebel forces, save Ona’s) elected Kabui and former BTG premier Sinato as its cochairs. It also adopted a constitution and appointed an interim BRG. Although the PNG government formally objected to the extraconstitutionality of those proceedings, it signaled its de facto acceptance by suspending the Bougainville provincial government and agreeing to negotiate with the BRG on a permanent political structure for the island. Despite ongoing legal confusion, an election for a Bougainville People’s Congress (BPC) was held in early May, with Kabui elected as its president on May 27. On June 3, 1999, Prime Minister Skate announced a cabinet reshuffle, and three weeks later the PDM and URP withdrew from the governing coalition. Confronted by an impending no-confidence motion, Skate resigned on July 7 and was succeeded by the PDM’s Sir Mekere MORAUTA, who had been among those dismissed on June 3. Initial participants in Morauta’s administration included Michael Somare’s National Alliance Party (NAP), Julius Chan’s PPP, the Advance PNG Party (APNGP), and Pangu Pati. In the succeeding two years, however, the line-up changed

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considerably, with a number of parties moving in and out of the coalition and with Morauta initiating frequent cabinet changes. In early May 2001 most of the APNGP legislators defected to the PDM, as a consequence of which the PDM achieved a clear parliamentary majority—a postindependence first for a single party. Bolstered by deserters from other parties, Morauta dismissed the remaining NAP members from the government, with a resultant ministerial shuffle on May 17 leaving only the PDM and, in a decidedly secondary role, Pangu Pati represented in the cabinet. The election of June 15, 2002, yielded a plurality of 20 parliamentary seats for the NAP, with Somare, designated prime minister for the third time on August 6, naming a coalition administration which, after a reshuffle on August 2, 2003, encompassed the NAP, MAP, Pangu, PAP, PLP, PNC, PNGNP, PPP, UP, and URP (see Political Parties, below). On May 18, 2004, the PNC members were dismissed and replaced by members of former prime minister Morauta’s recently formed PNG Party (PNGP). Further changes were made in June, July, and December 2004 and in January 2005. Meanwhile, negotiations with the BPC’s Kabui continued, leading on January 26, 2001, to acceptance of a proposal offering Bougainville greater autonomy and, for the first time, the option of independence at a referendum to be held in 10–15 years. In May 2001 the BRA and the Bougainville Resistance Force agreed to begin surrendering their arms, while autonomy talks opened later in the month. A “final” agreement on June 22 included provisions for creating an autonomous Bougainville police force and restricting the PNGDF to a limited role in the province. The pact was signed on August 30 in Arawa, Bougainville, and accepted by the UN Security Council on December 20. At Bougainville balloting on May 20–27, 2005, Kabui was elected president of the autonomous province, while his Bougainville People’s Congress Party (BPCP) won a majority of legislative seats. Veteran rebel leader Francis Ona died on July 24, 2005, and on October 5 the regional government,

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in a move strongly criticized by the Port Moresby administration, voted to reopen the Panguna copper mine.

Constitution and Government Under the 1975 constitution, which can be amended by a two-thirds legislative majority, executive functions are performed by a National Executive Council that includes a governor general, nominated by the council itself to represent the Crown for a six-year term; a prime minister, appointed by the governor general on advice of the legislature; and other ministers who are designated on advice of the prime minister and must total no fewer than six and no more than one-quarter the number of legislators. The unicameral National Parliament normally sits for a five-year term, dissolution not being mandated in the wake of a nonconfidence vote (which can be called by 10 percent of the members) if an alternative prime minister (previously designated by the leader of the opposition) succeeds in securing a majority. The judicial system encompasses a Supreme Court that acts as the final court of appeal, a National Court, and lesser courts (currently including district, local, warden, and children’s courts) as established by the legislature. In 1977 provision was made for replacement of the country’s 20 “Australian-style” districts by 19 provinces, each with the right to an elected assembly and an executive headed by a premier, plus a National Capital District, for which a structure of partially elective government was approved in 1990. Decentralization was abandoned under a 1995 constitutional amendment that also provided for the regional assembly member from each province to become governor. At the subprovincial level there are approximately 145 local government councils and community governments.

Foreign Relations Two issues influenced Papuan foreign affairs following independence: somewhat sensitive relations with Indonesia stemming from the status of Irian Jaya (West New Guinea) and a dispute with Australia regarding demarcation of a maritime

boundary through the Torres Strait. Though the Papuan government officially supported Jakarta in the matter of Irian Jaya, advocates of a “free Papua” called on the United Nations to review the 1969 plebiscite that served as the basis of Indonesia’s annexation of the mineral-rich territory. More than 10,000 refugees have entered Papua New Guinea from Irian Jaya since 1983, alleging persecution by Indonesian authorities; attempts at even smallscale repatriation have proved unsuccessful, while Jakarta has denounced the maintenance of two large border refugee camps by Port Moresby, citing the settlements as sources of aid for rebels of the Free Papua Organization. On the other hand, a Status of Forces Agreement between the two countries was concluded in January 1992 that was intended to yield greater cooperation on security matters short of joint military operations against the insurgents. Indicative of the improved relations was a five-day official visit to Indonesia by Prime Minister Wingti in February 1993, during which a wide range of issues, including the secessionist struggle in Irian Jaya, were discussed. Although the talks appeared to bear no immediate fruit, the PNG government in late 2002 ordered the refugee camps emptied and in January 2003 instructed police and the PNGDF to arrest any separatists remaining therein. With regard to the Torres Strait, the Papuan government attempted to negotiate a boundary equidistant between its shore and that of Australia shortly after independence. Such an arrangement was unacceptable to Canberra because the boundary would prejudice the citizenship of Strait islanders whose interests had been vigorously championed by the government of Queensland. Thus, in June 1978 the two nations agreed on a complex formula involving (1) a seabed line running south of a number of islands and reefs that would remain Australian enclaves, and (2) a protected zone embracing much of the waters between the two countries and to which each would have access; a treaty to such effect was ultimately ratified in February 1985. However, pressure mounted in the 1990s to renegotiate the accord on the ground that it served to deny some islanders access to traditional fishing grounds.

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A joint “communiqu´e of mutual recognition” was signed on May 22, 1995, between Papua New Guinea’s deputy prime minister and Taiwan’s foreign minister. Following a strong protest by Beijing, the Papuan signatory, Chris Haiveta, insisted that the agreement represented government-togovernment, rather than state-to-state, recognition. Four years later, on July 5, 1999, Prime Minister Skate formally recognized Taiwan. Beijing again reacted with a threat of “serious consequences” and on July 21, Skate’s successor, Sir Mekere Morauta, nullified the agreement, which was reportedly to have been followed by a $2 billion loan package from the People’s Republic of China. Relations with the neighboring Solomon Islands became tense upon the outbreak of the uprising on Bougainville, since the rebellious province is closer to the Solomons than to the PNG mainland and its people are ethnically akin to the islanders. In late 1991 Honiara’s provincial affairs minister called for Bougainville’s independence or its merger with the Solomons, while a number of PNG search-and-destroy missions were launched in 1992 against rebels allegedly using the adjacent country as a safe haven. By contrast, the National Parliament in July 2003 approved the participation of PNG personnel in a Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) intervention force to restore law and order in the Solomons. Papua New Guinea is an active participant in a number of regional organizations. As a member of the PIF, it has actively championed selfdetermination for French Overseas Territories, particularly New Caledonia, and in 1985 joined with Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands in a so-called “Spearhead” group within the forum to coordinate policy on regional issues with a view to possible formation of a united Melanesian state. At a summit meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in December 1987, the six-member group agreed to amend its 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation to permit Papua New Guinea to become an acceding state (an option, formally exercised in July 1989, that did not alter Papua’s observer status with ASEAN itself).

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Current Issues The principal issue for Papua New Guinea continues to be the status of the island province of Bougainville. While the 2001 agreement conferred regional autonomy and the promise of eventual independence, it was not accepted by secessionist leader Francis Ona, who disregarded an ultimatum by former BRA commander Ishmael TOROAMA in March 2003 to disarm his Me’ekamui Defence Force within two months. It was not until March 2005 that Ona appeared in public for the first time in 16 years, calling at a rally in Arawa for the withdrawal of PNG government and Australian Assisting Police forces, and terming the transitional island leaders as “devil men.” However, effective opposition to the Bougainville settlement appeared to have ceased at Ona’s death in mid-2005. Meanwhile, the Bougainville Interim Provincial Government established a Bougainville Constituent Assembly, which approved a draft constitution for the province that was formally handed over to Governor John MOMIS on January 14, 2005. Subsequently, Momis resigned from the National Parliament to campaign for election to the island presidency as head of a New Bougainville Party (NBP) but placed second to Kabui at the May balloting.

Political Parties Since independence, party loyalties have been extremely fluid, largely because the major groupings differ more over tactics than ideology. The pattern continued into 2004 with Prime Minister Somare appointing three ministers from the theretofore opposition PNG Party, led by former Prime Minister Morauta. There were 43 registered parties eligible for the June 2002 balloting.

Parties Registered for 2002 Election National Alliance Party (NAP). The NAP was launched as an anticorruption group prior to the 1997 election by Prime Minster Somare. In December 1999 Somare formed a People’s National Alliance (PNA) that also included the Bougainvillebased Melanesian Alliance Party (MAP) of Fr.

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John Momis; the Movement for Greater Autonomy (MGA), which had been launched in May 1995 by Stephen Pokawin and other northern premiers who opposed abolishing the provincial government system; and the People’s Action Party (PAP, below), led by Ted Diro. The MAP had been formed in 1978 after Momis, a former secessionist leader, was removed as minister for decentralization by Somare. In the ensuing two decades Momis moved in and out of government positions, as did another former MAP leader, Sir John KAPUTIN. Somare entered the July 1999 Morauta cabinet as foreign minister, subsequently serving as minister for mines and Bougainville affairs before being dismissed in December 2000. The remaining NAP ministers were ousted in May 2001, Morauta having accused Somare of untoward political maneuvering. Somare returned as prime minister following the election of August 2004. Leader: Sir Michael Thomas SOMARE (Prime Minister). People’s Democratic Movement (PDM). The PDM was organized by former Deputy Prime Minister Paias Wingti, who broke with Pangu Pati in March 1985. The Wingti grouping gained ground during the ensuing months by focusing on alleged government corruption and budgetary issues, with conflict over the latter leading to the formation of a PDM-led government in November. Wingti remained in office following the 1987 election but was defeated in a nonconfidence vote on July 4, 1988. In a close assembly vote, Wingti returned on July 17, 1992, as head of a coalition government that included the PPP. However, the PPP withdrew in August 1994 after the Supreme Court’s invalidation of Wingti’s July 1993 reappointment, forcing the defeat of the latter’s chosen successor, outgoing parliamentary speaker and PNCP leader Bill Skate, on August 30. Following Skate’s second ouster in July 1999, Sir Mekere Morauta was elected by the Parliament to head a multiparty coalition government whose composition changed frequently over the next two years. In May 2000 most of the Advance PNG Party (APNGP) was absorbed by the

PDM, which thereupon claimed a majority in the national legislature. Morauta was ousted as PDM leader after losing the 2002 election; reinstated by court order in early 2003, he subsequently withdrew to form the PNG Party (PNGP), three of whose members (though not Morauta himself) joined the Somare government in May 2004. Leaders: Paias WINGTI (Former Prime Minister), Iairo LASARO, John PUNDARI (Former APNGP Leader). People’s Progress Party (PPP). The PPP participated in the postindependence government until 1978, when it went into opposition. It became the core component of the government that succeeded the Somare administration in March 1980. It returned to opposition upon the reconfirmation of Somare as prime minister in August 1982, Sir Julius Chan being prominently involved in a number of nonconfidence motions against Somare before the latter’s ouster in late 1985. The party was again in opposition from July 1988 to June 1992, becoming part of the Wingti government of July 17. In the wake of the Supreme Court’s August 1994 invalidation of Wingti’s 1993 reappointment, the PPP withdrew from a governing coalition with the PDM and revived its earlier alliance with Pangu Pati; Sir Julius, after 12 years, returned as prime minister on August 30. He was obliged to step down following the election of June 1997, at which he lost his own parliamentary seat, although the PPP continued to be represented in the cabinet. The PPP withdrew from the Skate administration in October 1998, joined the Morauta government in July 1999, but then saw party leader Michael Nali dismissed as trade and industry minister in November 2000. In 2001 Sir Julius rejoined the party leadership in preparation for the 2002 general election, at which it won 9 seats. Thereafter, it joined the Somare administration. Leaders: Paul TIENSTEN (Trade and Industry Minister), Andrew BAING (Former Deputy Prime Minister), Sir Julius CHAN. Papua and Niugini Union Pati (Pangu Pati— PP). The urban-based Pangu Pati was organized in

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1967 and long advocated the early achievement of independence. It was the senior component of the former National Coalition and secured the largest number of legislative seats at the 1977 election. It moved into opposition following parliamentary defeat of the Somare government in March 1980 but returned to power after the election of June 1982 and the redesignation of Somare as prime minister on August 2. Pangu was greatly weakened by the defection of Deputy Prime Minister Paias Wingti in April 1985, and Somare was ousted from power in a nonconfidence vote the following November. However, the party retained a significant parliamentary bloc and secured a reduced plurality of 26 assembly seats at the election of November 1987. Pangu Pati suffered the worst defeat of the 1992 balloting, losing half of its 30 sitting members while picking up only 4 new seats. Following the election party leader Sir Rabbie NAMALIU announced his retirement from politics and on August 3 was succeeded as leader of the opposition by Somare, who stated that he would also step down in March 1993. Implementing the decision seven months later, Somare resigned from the party to sit as a backbench independent. His successor as leader of the opposition, Jack GENIA, died in July 1993 and was in turn succeeded by Chris Haiveta. Following the Supreme Court’s action of August 1994, Namaliu emerged from retirement to accept appointment as Parliament speaker, while Pangu and the PPP revived their old partnership to form an administration led by the PPP’s Sir Julius Chan, Somare indicating that he wished to continue as a backbencher. The party continued its governmental representation as part of the Skate administration until the turmoil of late 1997. It joined the Morauta government in September 1999 and continued as part of the Somare administration after the 2002 election. Leaders: Chris HAIVETA, Moses TAIAN (Secretary General). People’s Action Party (PAP). The PAP was formed on December 4, 1986, by (then) forestry minister Ted Diro, a staunch Wingti supporter, who was named foreign minister eight days later but de-

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nied reappointment in August 1987 following allegations of corruption in his previous post. Diro’s return to the cabinet as minister without portfolio in April 1988 contributed to Wingti’s defeat on July 4, while the previously independent Akoka DOI was widely viewed as a stand-in for Diro in the Namaliu administration during the PAP founder’s lengthy legal struggle. The PAP’s founding president, Vincent ERI, was named governor general in early 1990 but resigned following Diro’s conviction in September 1991. Party leader Akoka Doi was among those failing reelection in 1992. Diro served in subsequent administrations, however, including Mekere Morauta’s until being dismissed as agriculture minister in December 1999. The party was accorded five cabinet posts in the 2002 Somare government. Leader: Ted DIRO (Former Deputy Prime Minister). People’s Labour Party (PLP). Launched in 2001 by Peter Yama, the PLP won five parliamentary seats in 2002 and held the housing portfolio in the subsequent Somare administration until January 2004. Leader: Peter YAMA. People’s National Congress Party (PNCP). Launched in early 1993 by a group of largely independent MPs, the original PNC merged in April 1998 with the Christian Century Party (CCP) and a number of smaller formations to form the PNG First Party (PNGFP) led by Prime Minister Skate. In June 1999 the PNGFP was divided in the interest of national stability, according to Skate. Twentytwo PNG First MPs remained with the restored PNC, and 11 moved to the revived National Party (PNGNP, below), while the rump PNGFP secured one parliamentary seat in 2002. Subsequently, the PNC’s ranks thinned considerably, and by mid2001 the party held only about half a dozen seats in Parliament. It won three seats in 2002 and placed three ministers in the new Somare government, all of whom were ousted in May 2004. For reasons that were not immediately clear, Skate was expelled from the party in early 2005; he died on January 3, 2006. Meanwhile, party (and

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opposition) leader Peter O’Neill was arrested in August 2005 on charges of misappropriating funds from an investment account. Leader: Peter O’NEILL. PNG National Party (PNGNP). The original National Party participated in the pre-1977 National Coalition. After the 1977 election two of its leaders, Thomas KAVALI and Pato KAKARYA, joined the Somare government as pro-Pangu independents, the remainder of the party going into opposition. Kavali was dismissed from the government in January 1979, joining the opposition People’s United Front (PUF) organized in November 1978 by (then) UP dissident Iambakey Okuk. The PUF adopted the NP label in early 1980 and, under the leadership of Stephen TAGO, joined the Somare government on April 1, 1985. Having been allocated fewer ministries in the April government than had been demanded, the NP returned to opposition in May when Okuk, upon his return to parliament in a by-election, was not offered a cabinet post. The party was instrumental in Wingti’s parliamentary victory in November and obtained significant cabinet representation in the post-Somare government, Okuk serving as primary industry minister until shortly before his death in November 1986. The party split prior to the parliamentary adjournment of April 1988, Paul Pora leading a group that crossed the aisle in support of Pangu Pati, while other NP members remained loyal to Wingti. Pora was among those dismissed from the cabinet in July 1995 for refusing to support abolition of provincial self-government. The June 1999 division of the PNG First into the PNC and the NP served to revive the latter formation, now commonly referenced as the PNGNP. Leaders: Paul PORA, Michael MEL. United Party (UP). The UP is a highlandsbased party organized in 1969. It favored a cautious approach to self-government and was opposed to early independence. Formerly the main opposition grouping in the House of Assembly, it entered the government in coalition with Pangu Pati in November 1978. Technically in opposition after formation of the Chan government in March 1980, many of

its members subsequently crossed the aisle to join the Chan majority. The party suffered major losses at the balloting of June 1982, after which it rejoined forces with Pangu Pati. It returned to opposition in April 1985. Some members supported the Wingti coalition the following November, yielding another split between government and opposition. The UP won only two legislative seats at the 1997 election but subsequently saw its delegation swell to more than a dozen. Prime Minister Morauta brought the UP into his coalition, but by May 2001 its ministers had been dismissed and defections had claimed most of its MPs. It won three seats in 2002. Leader: Gabia GAGARIMABU. United Resources Party (URP). Organized in early December 1997 by defectors from an assortment of government and opposition parties, the URP set as its principal goal obtaining a greater voice for resource owners and resource-rich provinces. After its launching it participated in the Skate administration, its withdrawal from which in June 1999 helped to precipitate the government’s collapse. In December 1999 the party leaders extended their support to the Morauta government. Peter IPATAS, governor of Enga Province, defected to the PDM in April 2001. Leaders: Pita IPATAS (Chair), Masket IANGALIO, Roy YAKI. Other registered groups in 2002 included the Christian Democratic Party (CDP), launched in January 1992; the Economic Endeavor Party (EEP), organized in January 2002; the Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP), formed in October 2001; the Liberal Party (LP), formed in November 1991; the Melanesian Labour Party (MLP), established in March 1997 by Dr. Paul MONDIA; the Melanesian People’s Party (MPP), founded in December 2001 by John TEKWIE; the National Front Party (NFP), launched in January 2001; the National Transformation Party (NTP), dating from July 2001; the National Vision for Humanity Party (NVHP), established in August 2001; the One People Party (OPP), formed in January 2002; the Pan Melanesian Congress Party (PMCP), incorporated in November 2001;

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Cabinet As of August 1, 2006 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister

Sir Michael Somare (NAP) Sir Moi Ayei (MA)

Ministers Agriculture and Livestock Bougainville Affairs Community Development Correctional Services Culture and Tourism Defence Education Environment and Conservation Finance Fisheries Foreign Affairs and Immigration Forestry Health Higher Education, Research, Science, and Technology Housing Intergovernmental Relations Internal Security Justice Labor and Industrial Relations Lands and Physical Planning Mining Petroleum and Energy Planning Public Service State Enterprises and Information Trade and Industry Transport and Civil Aviation Treasury Works Minister of State Assisting the Prime Minister Minister of State Without Portfolio

Sasa Zibe (NAP) Sir Peter Barter (ind.) Dame Carol Kidu (MA) [f] Posi Menai (PAP) David Basua (PNGP) Matthew Gubag (PNGP) Michael Laimo (NAP) William Duma (URP) John Hickey (NAP) Ben Semri (PAP) Sir Rabbie Namaliu (Pangu) Patrick Pruaitch (ind.) Sir Peter Barter (ind.) Brian Pulayasi (PAP) Mark Maipalei (PPP) Melchior Pep (PNGNP) Alphonse Willie Bire Kimisopa (UP) Matthew Siune (PNGP) Puka Temu (NAP) Sam Akoitai (URP) Sir Moi Avei (MA) John Hickey (NAP) Sinai Brown (NAP) Sir Michael Somare (NAP) Paul Tiensten (PPP) Don Polye (NAP) Bart Philemon (NAP) Gabriel Kapris (PAP) Puka Temu (NAP) Roy Biyama (PAP)

[f] = female

the Party for Justice and Dignity (PJD), launched by Peter LAFANAWA in October 2001; the People’s Destiny and Development Party (PDDP), formed by Rore RIKIS in January 2002; the Peo-

ple’s Development Party, dating from November 1991; the People’s First Conservative Party (PFCP), formed in July 2002; the People’s Freedom Party (PFRP), organized in July 2001; the

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People’s Heritage Party (PHP), formed in October 2001; the People’s Resource Awareness Party (PRAP), launched in May 1997; the People’s Solidarity Party (PSP), dating from March 1992; the People’s Welfare Party (PWP), established in August 2001; the Pipol First Pati (PFP), formed in July 2001; the PNG Country Party (PNGCP), the revival by Sinake GIREGIRE in 2001 of an earlier Country Party that had been absorbed by PNG First in 1998; the PNG Greens Party (PNGGP), launched in November 2001; the PNG Integrity Party (PNGIP), formed in January 2002; the PNG Labour Party (PNGLP), organized in January 2001 by John PASKA of the Trade Unions Congress; the PNG Revival Party (PNGRP), launched in January 2002; the Rural Pipols’ Pati (RPP), formed by Peter Namus in January 2002; the Simple People’s Party (SPP), organized in November 2001; the True People’s Party (TPP), launched in February 2002; and the Yumi Reform Party (YRP), formed in January 2002. Bougainville parties include the Bougainville People’s Congress Party (BPCP), led by provincial president Joseph KABUI; the New Bougainville Party (NBP), led by former island governor John MOMIS; the Bougainville Independence Movement (BIM), led by James TANIS; and the Leitana Council of Elders, led by Joel BANAM.

Legislature The unicameral National Parliament was called the House of Assembly (Bese Taubadadia Hegogo) before independence and is sometimes still referenced as such. It currently consists of 109 members (89 from open and 20 from provincial electorates) elected to five-year terms by universal adult suffrage. Candidates have not been obligated to declare party affiliation, and postelectoral realignments have been common, although controversial legislation passed in December 2000 requires future candidates to declare their affiliations and then, if elected, to maintain them or face expulsion. The following was the distribution after the balloting of June 15–29, 2002, and

a series of reruns extending to May 2003: National Alliance Party, 20 seats; People’s Democratic Movement, 14; People’s Progress Party, 9; Papua and Niugini Union Pati, 6; People’s Action Party and People’s Labour Party, 5 each; Christian Democratic Party, Melanesian Alliance Party, People’s National Congress Party, PNG National Party, and United Party, 3 each; National Transformation Party, Pan-Melanesian Congress Party, People’s Solidarity Party, Pipol First Pati, and Rural Pipols’ Pati, 2 each; Advance PNG Party, National Vision for Humanity Party, One People Party, PNG Country Party, PNG First Party, PNG Labour Party, PNG Revival Party, and United Resources Party, 1 each; independents, 17. Speaker: Jeffrey NAPE.

Communications Press Papua New Guinea’s press is considered one of the freest in the Asian-Pacific area, although the Ministry of Communications called in early 1990 for curbs on excessively negative reporting. The following are published in English unless otherwise noted: Papua New Guinea Post-Courier (Port Moresby, 34,000), daily; Niugini Nius (New Guinea News, Boroko, 31,000), daily in Tok Pisin; The National (Boroko, 20,000), daily; Wantok (One Talk, Boroko, 10,000), rural weekly in Tok Pisin; The Independent (Boroko), launched in 1995 as weekly replacement for The Times of Papua New Guinea; and Arawa Bulletin (Arawa, 4,600), North Solomons weekly.

News Agency There is no domestic facility; the Associated Press and Australian Associated Press are used for international news.

Broadcasting and Computing Radio broadcasting is provided by the National Broadcasting Corporation of Papua New Guinea, a public agency that the government announced in early 1997 would soon be commercialized, and

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from the Papua New Guinea Service of Radio Australia. Television service was initiated in February 1987 by the Niugini Television Network (NTN), following a successful legal challenge to a government decision to postpone local broadcasting as potentially detrimental to the nation’s culture; in July a second channel, EM TV, went on air in Port Moresby, and in March 1988 NTN was shut down, reportedly for financial reasons. There were approximately 130,000 television receivers and 340,000 personal computers serving 100,000 Internet users in 2003.

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Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. Evan Jeremy PAKI U.S. Ambassador to Papua New Guinea Robert W. FITTS Permanent Representative to the UN Robert Guba AISI IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, APEC, CP, CWTH, Interpol, NAM, PC, PIF, WCO, WTO

PHILIPPINES REPUBLIC

OF THE

PHILIPPINES

Republika ng Pilipinas

The Country Strategically located along the southeast rim of Asia, the Philippine archipelago embraces over 7,000 islands stretching in a north-south direction for over 1,000 miles. The largest and most important of the islands are Luzon in the north and sparsely populated Mindanao in the south. The inhabitants, predominantly of Malay stock, are 83 percent Roman Catholic, although a politically significant Muslim minority (5 percent) is concentrated in the south. The country is not linguistically unified; English and Spanish are used concurrently with local languages and dialects, although Pilipino, based on the Tagalog spoken in the Manila area, has been promoted as a national language. Due partly to a strong matriarchal tradition (an indigenous holdover from 300 years of Spanish Catholic influence), Filipinos accord high status to women: More than 70 percent possess at least secondary education. About 50 percent of women are in the labor force. They have been prominent in journalism and politics, though most often through their association with powerful men, as in the cases of Imelda MARCOS and Corazon AQUINO. Women make up 16 percent of the representatives elected to the lower house of Congress in May 2004. Rice for domestic consumption and wood, sugar, and coconut products for export were traditionally mainstays of the economy. Although agriculture continues to employ 35 percent of the labor force, it now accounts for only 14 percent of GDP, compared to about 32 percent for industry and 54 percent for services. Well over half of the country’s exports by value are now electronics; garments,

other manufactures, coconut products, sugar cane, and bananas also rank among the leading exports, with the United States and Japan constituting the principal markets. During the 1970s balance-of-payments deficits and questionable management of government funds contributed to fiscal crises, successive devaluations of the peso, chronic difficulty in meeting external debt repayments, high unemployment, and rapid inflation. The economic climate improved following the departure of President Ferdinand MARCOS in February 1986; however, political instability, a series of natural disasters, and energy shortages led to another downturn in 1990.

PHILIPPINES

Political Status: Independent republic since July 4, 1946; currently under constitution adopted by referendum of February 2, 1987, effective from February 11. Area: 115,830 sq. mi. (300,000 sq. km.). Population: 76,504,077 (2000C); 86,207,000 (2005E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): MANILA (de facto capital, 1,510,000), QUEZON CITY (designated capital, 2,375,000), Caloocan City (1,357,000), Davao (816,000), Cebu (783,000). Official Languages: Pilipino and English. Monetary Unit: Peso (market rate July 1, 2006: 53.13 pesos = $1US). President: Gloria MACAPAGAL-ARROYO (Lakas–Christian Muslim Democrats); popularly elected as vice president on May 11, 1998, and inaugurated on June 30 for a six-year term; sworn in as president on January 20, 2001, succeeding Joseph E. ESTRADA (Party of the Filipino Masses), the Supreme Court having ruled on January 19 that the presidency was vacant; elected to a full term on May 20, 2004, and sworn in on June 30. Vice President: Noli DE CASTRO (Lakas–Christian Muslim Democrats); elected for a six-year term on May 20, 2004, and sworn in on June 30, succeeding Teofisto GUINGONA (most recently an independent).

After 1994, growth increased significantly, averaging 5.8 percent in 1996–1997, fueled in part by foreign direct and portfolio investments and the influx of earnings from millions of overseas workers, who constitute the country’s leading source of foreign exchange. By the end of 1997, however, a regional financial crisis had caused a sharp drop in the value of the peso, and in 1998 the Philippines experienced an economic downturn of 0.6 percent. GDP growth resumed in 1999, reaching an unexpected 3.4 percent. Growth for 2000 was 4.4 percent, but it dropped back to 1.8 percent in 2001 before returning to 4.4 percent in 2002. The GDP expanded by 4.5 percent in 2003 and then reached a 6.0 percent growth rate in 2004 before dropping to about 5.1 percent in 2005.

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Government and Politics Political Background Claimed for Spain by Ferdinand Magellan in 1521 and ruled by that country until occupied by the United States during the Spanish-American War of 1898, the Philippines became a self-governing commonwealth under U.S. tutelage in 1935 and was accorded full independence on July 4, 1946. Manuel ROXAS, first president of the new republic (1946–1948), took office during the onset of an armed uprising by Communist-led Hukbalahap guerrillas in central Luzon that continued under his successor, the Liberal Elpidio QUIRINO (1948–1953). Quirino’s secretary of national defense, Ramon MAGSAYSAY, initiated an effective program of military action and rural rehabilitation designed to pacify the Huks, and he was able to complete this process after his election to the presidency on the Nacionalista Party ticket in 1953. Magsaysay also dealt strongly with bureaucratic corruption and did much to restore popular faith in government, but his accidental death in March 1957 led to a loss of reformist momentum and a revival of corruption under his Nacionalista successor, Carlos P. GARCIA (1957–1961). Efforts toward economic and social reform were renewed by Liberal President Diosdado MACAPAGAL (1961– 1965). The election, under Nacionalista auspices, of former Liberal leader Ferdinand E. MARCOS in November 1965 was accompanied by pledges of support for the reform movement, but the Marcos program was hindered by congressional obstruction and a temporary renewal of the Huk insurgency. Discontent with prevailing conditions of poverty, unemployment, inflation, and corruption fostered a climate of violence that included the activities of the Maoist New People’s Army (NPA), which was founded in 1969, and a persistent struggle between Muslim elements and government forces on Mindanao and in Sulu Province. In some areas the latter conflict originated in religious differences, with Muslims seeking to drive out Christian settlers from the north, but as antigovernment activities expanded under the direction of

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the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), Muslim leaders increasingly called for regional autonomy or outright independence. In the midst of a rapidly deteriorating political situation, a Constitutional Convention began work on a new constitution in July 1971, but its deliberations were curtailed by a declaration of martial law in September 1972. Strict censorship immediately followed, as did widespread arrests of suspected subversives and political opponents of the regime, most notably Liberal Party (LP) leader Benigno S. AQUINO Jr. The new constitution, which provided for a parliamentary form of government, was declared ratified in January 1973; concurrently, Marcos assumed the additional post of prime minister and announced that the selection of an interim National Assembly called for by the constitution would be deferred. Following talks in early 1975 between representatives of the Philippine government and the MNLF, the Muslims dropped their demand for partition of the republic, while the government agreed to an integration of rebel units into the Philippine armed forces. A split within the MNLF ensued, a majority of its leaders calling for continued insurgency. President Marcos nevertheless ordered a suspension of military operations in the south in late 1976, following a cease-fire agreement with representatives of the moderate MNLF faction in Tripoli, Libya. In accordance with the agreement, a referendum was held in April 1977 on the establishment of an autonomous Muslim region. Most Muslims boycotted the polls, however, and the proposal was defeated by an overwhelming majority of those participating. Meanwhile, the Communist Party of the Philippines–Marxist-Leninist (CPP) and its military wing, the NPA, had joined with other leftist Marcos opponents to organize a National Democratic Front (NDF) in 1973. Amid charges of widespread voting irregularity, particularly in the Manila area, balloting for the interim National Assembly was conducted in April 1978. The president’s recently organized New Society Movement (Kilusan Bagong Lipunan—KBL) was officially credited with winning 151 of 165 elective seats.

Martial law was lifted in January 1981, prior to the April adoption by plebiscite of a series of constitutional changes that included direct presidential election. At nationwide balloting in June Marcos was overwhelmingly reelected to a six-year term, and in July Cesar E. A. VIRATA secured legislative confirmation as head of a new 18-member cabinet. At the first full election to a unicameral National Assembly in May 1984, opposition candidates claimed approximately one-third of the seats. Despite the lifting of martial law, the Marcos regime continued to rule by decree. Opposition feeling had already been inflamed by the assassination of Benigno Aquino upon his return from the United States in August 1983, which precipitated 18 months of often violent antiregime demonstrations. In October 1984 a government commission of inquiry concluded that ultimate responsibility for Aquino’s death lay with the armed forces chief of staff, General Fabian VER, who was thereupon temporarily suspended from his duties. (In December 2005, having been acquitted of conspiracy in the assassination, he was reinstated.) A year later, in the face of mounting support for Corazon AQUINO as political surrogate for her slain husband, Marcos announced that a premature presidential election would be held in early 1986 to “restore confidence” in his administration. Mrs. Aquino filed as the sole opposition candidate for the presidency, with Salvador H. LAUREL as her running mate. The balloting in February was conducted amid allegations of manifest government fraud by both opposition leaders and foreign observers; Aquino was named the victor by an independent citizens’ watchdog group, while official figures attesting to the president’s reelection were accepted by the National Assembly. With both candidates thus claiming victory, Aquino called for an expanded program of strikes, boycotts, and civil disobedience to “bring down the usurper.” The turning point came on February 22, 1986, when Defense Secretary Juan Ponce ENRILE and Lt. Gen. Fidel V. RAMOS, the leader of an anticorruption campaign within the military, declared their allegiance to Aquino. Ramos, who had served as chief of staff during Ver’s suspension, quickly

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joined troops loyal to him at Camp Crame, the national police headquarters. In response to an appeal from Cardinal Jaime SIN to protect the rebels, the base was surrounded by thousands of Philippine citizens in what became known as the first “People Power” rally. Subsequently, much of the media passed to opposition control, while the military, including the palace guard, experienced mass defections. On February 26, a day after the swearing in of both presidential claimants, Marcos and his immediate entourage departed for exile in Hawaii. The cabinet named by President Aquino retained Enrile in his previous post, the remaining ministries being assigned to a broad spectrum of human rights activists, politicians, and technocrats. In March 1986 the new chief executive dissolved the National Assembly by suspending the 1973 constitution, presenting in its place an interim document “under which our battered nation can shelter.” On February 2, 1987, more that 80 percent of those voting approved a new U.S.-style constitution, under which President Aquino and Vice President Laurel would remain in office until 1992. At subsequent congressional balloting on May 11, Aquino supporters won more than 80 percent of 200 directly elective seats in the House of Representatives and defeated opposition candidates in 22 of 24 Senate races. On August 28, 1987, the Aquino government barely survived a coup attempt led by Col. Gregorio HONASAN, who had been prominently involved in the military revolt that toppled President Marcos. Immediately thereafter a number of leading government officials either resigned or were removed from office, including the president’s closest adviser, cabinet executive secretary and former human rights lawyer Joker ARROYO, who had been openly critical of the military leadership. Concurrently, Salvador Laurel resigned as foreign minister (though retaining the vice presidency) and for all practical purposes moved into opposition by forming a de facto alliance with neo-Nacionalista conservatives. The most serious of six efforts to topple the Aquino government erupted on December 1, 1989,

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with the seizure by rebel troops of Manila’s Fort Bonifacio army camp and the adjacent Villamar Air Force headquarters, followed by an air attack on the presidential palace. Despite U.S. air support of the government, the insurgency (which presumably included Colonel Honasan, who had escaped from prison in April 1988) was not completely crushed for ten days, in the course of which 119 persons died and more than 600 were wounded. A substantially less serious uprising in northern Mindanao was overcome without bloodshed on October 4, 1990. Seven candidates vied for the presidency in May 1992, with Aquino-endorsed Fidel Ramos turning back strong challenges by political newcomer Miriam DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO and conservative businessman Eduardo COJUANGCO. While former House speaker Ramon MITRA, heading the pro-Aquino Democratic Filipino Struggle (Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino—LDP), had been considered by many to be the leading contender, he could salvage no better than fourth place, despite a convincing legislative victory by his party. Nominally allied with the LDP, Ramos’s People Power–National Union of Christian Democrats (Lakas-NUCD) emerged as the principal victor in the May 1995 legislative poll, winning approximately two-thirds of the lower house seats. It also gained 5 Senate seats to its partner’s 4; however, the LDP retained an upper house majority because of 10 holdovers in the 24-member body. Thereafter, the LDP split, Edgardo ANGARA, the LDP chair, going into opposition with 5 supporters after being ousted as Senate president in favor of Neptali GONZALES, also of the LDP. As a result, elements of the LDP were left on both sides of the political aisle. In May 1996, however, the LDP severed its remaining coalition links. Five months later Gonzales, a strong supporter of President Ramos, was himself removed as Senate leader in favor of Ernesto MACEDA, president of Cojuangco’s National People’s Coalition (NPC). In September 1992 the MNLF had rejected an offer of amnesty until the government implemented its 1976 pledge to sanction the creation of semiautonomous political structures for the Mindanao

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region. In November 1993, however, the two sides concluded a three-month truce agreement, which was followed by the signing of a cease-fire in January 1994. In June 1996 government negotiators announced a breakthrough that called for the establishment of a three-member Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), headed by the MNLF’s Nur MISUARI, to “supervise and coordinate the implementation of peace.” The understanding led to a formal peace agreement on September 2, and Misuari stood unopposed on September 9 for election as governor of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), encompassing the four provinces—Sulu, the Tawi Tawi island group, and the mainland provinces of Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur—then controlled by the MNLF. The treaty specified that after three years a referendum would be held to determine if additional provinces referenced in the 1976 Tripoli Accord should be added to the ARMM. Meanwhile, 7,500 of the MNLF’s 16,000-member military would be incorporated into the national army and police. The peace agreement was immediately rejected by the more militant Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and by hard-line MNLF splinters. Political developments in 1997 were dominated by preparations for the 1998 presidential election. In June a Supreme Court decision scuttled a campaign by a group of President Ramos’s supporters, the so-called People’s Initiative for Reform, Modernization, and Action, to amend the constitution so that he could run for a second term. But the president appeared to be undeterred until a September rally drew an estimated 600,000 opponents. Ramos finally renounced a second-term bid that day. Meanwhile, in June Vice President Joseph E. ESTRADA, a former film actor and the leading contender for the presidency, had formed a threeparty electoral coalition called the Struggle for the Nationalist Filipino Masses (Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino—LAMMP), which included his own Party of the Filipino Masses (Partido ng Masang Pilipino—PMP), the NPC, and the LDP. In December Estrada selected Angara as his running mate. Although the ouster of NPC presi-

dent Maceda as Senate president in December apparently forestalled LAMMP’s merger into a unified party, Estrada won the May 11, 1998, presidential election with 39.9 percent of the vote in a field of ten candidates, with Gloria MACAPAGALARROYO, backed by Ramos’s Lakas-NUCD, easily winning the vice presidency over Angara. The LAMMP electoral coalition also swept to victory in the House of Representatives and won a majority of the open seats in the Senate. By inauguration day defections from the Lakas-NUCD, coupled with the informal merger of the LAMMP parties into the new Struggle of the Filipino Masses (Laban ng Masang Pilipino—LAMP), provided Estrada with a firm base of support in the Congress despite opposition from most of the business community and the Catholic hierarchy, which called him morally unfit for office. Shortly thereafter the LAMP was renamed the Party of the Philippine Masses (Lapian ng Masang Pilipino—LAMP). A year into his term Estrada’s popularity dropped dramatically in response to his ultimately unsuccessful effort to introduce constitutional changes that would have opened the economy to increased foreign investment. His standing was further damaged by allegations that his administration was replete with corruption, cronyism, and mismanagement, and, in March 2000, that he himself had tried to halt an investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission into insider trading and other improper practices by BW Resources, a real estate and gambling company whose principal stockholder was a close Estrada supporter. In mid2000, in contrast, Estrada benefited from the success of a renewed military effort against the MILF secessionist movement on Mindanao. On October 9, 2000, Luis SINGSON, governor of Ilocos Sur, charged at a press conference that he had transmitted to President Estrada some $8.6 million in illegal gambling payoffs and another $2.8 million in provincial tobacco taxes. Singson repeated the accusations before a congressional hearing two days later, and on October 12 Vice President Macapagal-Arroyo resigned from the cabinet amid opposition calls for Estrada to resign. By the end of the month the vice president was at the

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front of a “united opposition” that included most of the opposition political parties, led by LakasNUCD. Other prominent figures resigned from the LAMP. On November 4, 2000, a rally organized by Cardinal Sin drew tens of thousands of anti-Estrada demonstrators into the streets of Manila. Proclaiming his innocence, Estrada asked the House to move quickly on an impeachment complaint that had been introduced in October. On November 13, arguing that more than one-third of the House membership had signed the impeachment complaint, Speaker of the House Manuel VILLAR ordered, without a formal committee vote or a floor debate, that articles of impeachment be forwarded to the Senate for trial. Although the impeachment charges focused on Singson’s allegations, they also referenced the BW Resources controversy and other matters. The Senate trial opened on December 7, 2000, but adjourned on January 17, 2001, a day after the Senate voted 11–10 not to admit evidence proving, according to the prosecution, that Estrada held secret bank accounts under aliases. In response, the Senate president and the House prosecutors resigned, an estimated 500,000 people took to Manila’s streets in “People Power II” demonstrations, most of the cabinet joined the opposition, and the police and military withdrew their support from Estrada. On January 19 the Supreme Court, acting extraconstitutionally, ruled the presidency vacant, and Estrada abandoned the presidential palace, although he refused to resign. Macapagal-Arroyo took the oath of office as president on January 20. Her hand-picked successor as vice president, Teofisto GUINGONA of Lakas-NUCD, was confirmed by Congress on February 6. On April 25, 2001, Estrada was arrested and charged with economic plunder, his immunity from prosecution having been lifted on March 2 by the Supreme Court. At that time a unanimous court had also confirmed the legitimacy of the MacapagalArroyo presidency, asserting that Estrada “by his acts and statements” had resigned. At legislative elections held on May 14, Macapagal-Arroyo’s Lakas-NUCD and its immediate allies won a plu-

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rality in the House of Representatives. The government also claimed a majority in the Senate until a previously supportive independent joined the opposition in June 2002, resulting in a 12–12 split. Upon taking office Macapagal-Arroyo had moved quickly to open discussions with Communist and Muslim insurgents, with mixed results. Since 1992 the Communist-led NDF had engaged in a series of on-again, off-again talks with successive administrations, but without resolving the conflict, which was estimated to have cost 40,000– 50,000 lives since the late 1960s. Negotiations were renewed on April 27–29, 2001, in Oslo, Norway, but in June the government suspended the process indefinitely in response to the NPA’s alleged involvement in the assassination of a congressman. At the same time, the Macapagal-Arroyo administration, having halted the military campaign against the MILF that had begun under President Estrada, opened peace talks with that organization on June 20, 2001, in Tripoli. A preliminary peace agreement was announced two days later. On August 7, despite the condemnation of Muslim rejectionists, the MILF signed a more formal cease-fire in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. In April 2001 the MNLF Central Committee had removed Governor Misuari as MNLF chair because of the ARMM government’s manifest failures to improve living conditions and institute reforms. On August 14, in a long-delayed plebiscite on expansion of the ARMM, unenthusiastic voters in 10 of 11 Mindanao provinces and all but one of a dozen cities rejected inclusion. On November 19, a week before a scheduled ARMM gubernatorial election, Misuari loyalists staged an uprising on Jolo Island that led to more than 100 deaths. Misuari, having been suspended as governor, was arrested on November 24 while trying to enter Malaysia. Extradited to the Philippines on January 7, 2002, the former governor was ultimately charged with inciting a rebellion. Meanwhile, at the November 26 ARMM election the MNLF’s Farouk HUSSEIN (Parouk HUSSIN), with Manila’s backing, had won election as Misuari’s successor. Vice President Guingona resigned his cabinet post as minister of foreign affairs effective July

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15, 2002. He had been an outspoken critic of a January decision by President Macapagal-Arroyo to permit extensive U.S.-Philippine military exercises and counterinsurgency training in Mindanao’s Zamboanga area and on nearby Basilan Island, stronghold of a comparatively small fundamentalist Muslim organization, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Since March 2000 the ASG had drawn considerable international attention through a series of frequently audacious kidnappings and ruthless hostage executions. As the six-month-long Balikatan (“shoulder-to-shoulder”) Mindanao exercises proceeded, it became increasingly clear that, despite initial denials, the U.S. contingent, peaking at about 1,000, was directly involved in largely unsuccessful efforts to root out the terrorist group. In April 2002 another 2,700 U.S. troops had begun “Balikatan 2” exercises in Central Luzon, a stronghold of the NPA, although President Macapagal-Arroyo insisted that they would be prohibited from engaging the Communist insurgents. A breakthrough with regard to the Muslim insurgency followed a statement by MILF Chair Hashim SALAMAT in June 2003 (shortly before his unexpected death) that renounced terrorism. On July 19 the government and the MILF initiated a new cease-fire that paved the way for a series of informal meetings. More formal peace talks, held in Kuala Lumpur, resumed in April 2005. Meanwhile, under the sponsorship of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), members of an International Monitoring Team from Malaysia, Brunei, and Libya had taken up their posts in Mindanao. (Japan joined the group in July 2006, in a nonmilitary advisory role.) In December 2002 Macapagal-Arroyo had stated that she would not seek election to a full term as president because a “vindictive, vicious, and divisive” political climate was interfering with her efforts to perform her duties, but she reversed herself in October 2003, asserting that she needed a full term to implement the necessary political and economic reforms. Vice President Guingona, who had already distanced himself from the president on a number of issues, responded that she had been an ineffective leader, failing to root out corruption and

to end the Muslim rebellion in the south. Guingona resigned from the Lakas-CMD, as did Sen. Loren LEGARDA, who joined the opposition. With general elections approaching, in December 2003 the LDP, the Filipino Democratic Party–Laban (Partido Demokratikong Pilipinos– Laban—PDP-Laban), and Estrada’s Force of the Filipino Masses (Puwersa ng Masang Pilipino— PMP, as the Party of the Filipino Masses was now known) established an opposition alliance, the Coalition of the United Filipinos (Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino—KNP). A month later the Lakas–Christian Muslim Democrats (Lakas-CMD, the reconfigured Lakas-NUCD) led the formation of a second major electoral alliance, the Coalition for Truth and Experience for the Future (Koalisyon ng Katapatan at Karanasan sa Kinabukasan— K4), which also included the NPC, the LP, and several smaller parties. At the presidential election on May 20, 2004, Macapagal-Arroyo won 40 percent of the vote against the KNP’s Fernando POE Jr. and three other candidates. Poe, a film actor and friend of former president Estrada, took 35.5 percent of the vote. The vice presidency was won by former news anchor Sen. Noli DE CASTRO of the Lakas-CMD, who defeated another former news anchor, the KNP’s Sen. Loren Legarda. In congressional contests the K4 parties won 7 of the 12 contested Senate seats and a clear majority in the House of Representatives. Although Poe and his supporters, claiming fraud, refused to accept the presidential results, a joint session of Congress officially named Macapagal-Arroyo the winner on June 24, and she was sworn in on June 30. On February 11–14, 2004, Manila and the NDF reopened peace talks in Oslo, and additional rounds were held in March–April and June. An August session was canceled by the NDF, however, in part because the government had not attempted to convince the United States, Canada, Australia, and the European Union (EU) to remove the NDF, CPP, and NPA from their lists of foreign terrorist organizations. On July 8–11, 2005, a dozen cabinet members and senior aides resigned and called for President

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Macapagal-Arroyo to do likewise over allegations of vote-rigging during the 2004 presidential election and illegal gambling payoffs to members of her immediate family. The president refused to step down and told her opponents to “take your grievances to Congress,” where they could pursue impeachment. On July 20 a formal impeachment motion was introduced in the House of Representatives, but the removal effort failed to gain sufficient support. On August 31 the House’s Justice Committee rejected the complaint 48–4, and a week later, with 79 votes needed to pursue impeachment, only 51 House members voted against accepting the committee report. Opposition to the president nevertheless persisted, and on February 24, 2006, she declared a state of emergency in response to the discovery of an alleged coup plot by elements of the armed forces. The state of emergency was lifted on March 3, four days after charges were filed against 16 individuals, including 6 leftist members of the House of Representatives. Among more than 100 others ultimately implicated in the plot was Gregorio Honasan.

Constitution and Government The basic law approved on February 2, 1987, supplanting the “Freedom Constitution” of March 1986, provides for a directly elected president serving a single six-year term in conjunction with a separately elected vice president; a bicameral Congress consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives (with senators and representatives who may serve no more than two and three terms, respectively); and an independent judiciary headed by a Supreme Court. The president is specifically enjoined from imposing martial law for more than a 60-day period without legislative approval. The document contains broad civil rights guarantees, denies the military any form of political activity save voting, prohibits abortion, authorizes local autonomy for Muslim-dominated areas, calls for a “nuclear-free” policy (save where the national interest dictates otherwise), and requires legislative concurrence for the leasing of Filipino territory to

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foreign powers. The death penalty, abolished under the 1987 document, was restored in December 1993 for 13 crimes, including treason and plundering the treasury. The House of Representatives may impeach the chief executive if one-third of its membership concurs, with a two-thirds vote of the Senate then needed for conviction. Administratively, the country encompasses 17 regions, 79 provinces, 117 cities, 1,500 municipalities, and nearly 42,000 local authorities (barangays). In November 1975 an enlarged Metropolitan Manila was created by merging the city with 16 surrounding communities, including the official capital (Quezon City), the cities of Rizal and Caloocan, and 13 towns. The new metropolis, with a total population of more than 5 million, is governed by a Metropolitan Manila Commission. The Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) currently includes the provinces of Basilan, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi Tawi, plus Marawi City.

Foreign Relations After independence Philippine foreign policy was based on strong opposition to communism, close alliance with the United States, and active participation in the United Nations and its related agencies. The Philippines also joined various regional organizations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). After the Vietnam War, however, uncertainty about the U.S. role in Southeast Asia spurred greater independence in foreign policy, and diplomatic and trade relations were established with several Communist states, including the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam. A major issue for the Aquino government concerned U.S. financial assistance during the remaining years of the 1947 treaty that provided for American use of six military installations, including Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Station, the two largest U.S. overseas installations. Following the eruption of Mount Pinatubo on June 9, 1991, however, the U.S. Defense Department announced

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that, because of the magnitude of cleanup costs, no attempt would be made to reopen Clark, which had been engulfed in volcanic ash. Negotiations to extend the Subic Bay lease ultimately broke down, with formal “disestablishment” being proclaimed on September 30, 1992. On January 14, 1998, despite nationalist and leftist opposition, Manila and Washington signed a controversial Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) that would permit large-scale joint military exercises, allow U.S. warships in Philippine waters, and accord legal standing to visiting U.S. forces. The Philippine Senate approved the pact in May 1999, one of the repercussions being the formal withdrawal of the Communist NDF from peace negotiations with the government. The first joint military exercises under the VFA were held in February 2000. In November 2002, in the context of the U.S.led “war on terrorism,” the two governments signed a Mutual Logistics Support Agreement, which permits the United States to position communications and other nonlethal equipment in the Philippines. In March 2003, during a visit by President Macapagal-Arroyo to Washington, U.S. President George W. Bush declared the Philippines to be a “major non-NATO ally.” In February 1994, at the conclusion of the first U.S. court case involving alleged human rights violations in another country, a federal jury in Honolulu, Hawaii, ordered the estate of the late President Marcos to pay damages of some $2.5 billion to thousands of individuals said to have suffered under his rule. To settle the claim, in February 1999 the Marcos family agreed to pay $150 million to some 10,000 victims. In July 2004 the Hawaii district court ordered $40 million in hidden assets to be paid out, but Manila appealed the decision on the grounds that “all decisions on illgotten wealth lie within the sovereign prerogative of the Philippines.” In May 2006 a U.S. appeals court backed the Hawaii court’s decision. In June 1998 the Swiss Supreme Court had rejected a final appeal by Marcos family representatives that would have prevented the return to the Philippine government of $590 million from the former president’s Swiss bank accounts.

Relations between Manila and its ASEAN partners have typically been stable. On February 5, 1995, the Philippines and Vietnam signed an agreement for the orderly repatriation of Vietnamese who had fled the country but did not qualify as political refugees. The agreement led to a melee at a Philippine detention camp in mid-March, with a number of inmates wounding themselves and threatening suicide as they were being prepared for return to their homeland. A month later outraged Filipinos staged widespread protests at Singapore’s execution of a Filipino maid who had been convicted of murder. The latter incident ultimately led to the approval of new procedures for overseas employment of Philippine domestics. A vexing regional issue concerns competing claims to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, which sit astride vital shipping lanes, support a major fishing industry, and may contain significant oil and natural gas deposits. In addition to the Philippines, the claimants include China, Taiwan, and three other members of ASEAN (Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam). Since 1995 China and the Philippines have had numerous clashes over fishing rights and construction on various reefs and shoals, and in January 1999 the Philippine National Security Council convened for the first time in more than three years to consider its response to renewed tensions. In March the Chinese and Philippine foreign ministers, conferring in Manila, agreed to “exercise joint restraint” in the Spratlys, although China continued to oppose a Philippine proposal for international mediation. Altercations also occurred with Malaysia and Vietnam in 1999. A visit by President Estrada to China in May 2000 concluded with both countries repeating their intentions to settle the dispute peacefully. In September 2004 the Philippine and Chinese state oil companies announced that they would jointly conduct a seismic study to determine if oil and natural gas are present in the Spratlys. In March 2005 they and Vietnam’s counterpart agreed to a tripartite Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking. In the aftermath of the U.S. overthrow of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in 2003, President MacapagalArroyo endorsed dispatch to Iraq of a small

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Philippine military unit. The decision met with considerable domestic opposition, even though the mission was defined as humanitarian. In July 2004 a Filipino truck driver, who was employed by a Saudi company, was kidnapped in Iraq by Islamic insurgents, who threatened to execute him if the military personnel were not withdrawn. In response, Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the 51 troops home, despite criticism from the interim government in Baghdad and from the U.S. Bush administration. The hostage was then released.

Current Issues President Macapagal-Arroyo’s narrow 2004 victory against actor Fernando Poe, a high school dropout with no significant political experience, served as another indication of the deep political divide that has hampered reforms and that contributed to a brief mutiny led by junior military officers in July 2003. Within weeks of her inauguration, differences had emerged within the Lakas-CMD congressional delegation over leadership posts, committee chairmanships, and party representation on key committees, precipitating a rebellion that saw more than 30 Lakas-CMD representatives switch their loyalties to President Macapagal-Arroyo’s original party, the revitalized Alliance of Free Filipinos (Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino—Kampi), and threaten to sit with the House minority. A cabinet reshuffle in mid-August was accompanied by declaration of a “new coalesced majority” based on the LakasCMD, NPC, LP, and several smaller parties, but excluding Kampi, whose leader, Ronaldo PUNO, was not given a ministerial post until another shuffle, in February 2006, brought Kampi back into the cabinet. The July 2005 calls for Macapagal-Arroyo to resign were triggered primarily by the revelation that she had spoken with an election official during the May 2004 vote count, which her opponents saw as a blatant attempt to steal the election. While admitting a “lapse in judgment,” the president defended her victory and rebuffed public protests and the urging of erstwhile supporters, including former pres-

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ident Corazon Aquino, that she step down. Accusations that Macapagal-Arroyo’s husband and a son had taken gambling bribes also contributed to her difficulties, and both voluntarily left for the United States so the issue would not further undermine her presidency. Although opinion polls consistently indicated a dramatic loss of public support, the outcry never rose to the level of the “People Power II” demonstrations that had forced Joseph Estrada from office. In the midst of the turmoil, in late July 2005 the president included in her annual State of the Nation address to Congress a constitutional reform proposal that called for replacing the existing “dysfunctional” presidential system with a parliamentary form of government headed by a prime minister. Such a “charter change” (“cha-cha”) could be undertaken by an elected constitutional convention; by Congress, sitting as a constituent assembly; or through a “people’s initiative” petition that would require support from at least 12 percent of the voters, including a minimum of 3 percent in each congressional district. Though the legality of a people’s initiative would certainly face a challenge in the courts, the Senate’s opposition to forming a constituent assembly led the government to begin a signature campaign in March 2006. The constitutional reform proposal has become entangled in the opposition effort to unseat President Macapagal-Arroyo. Although her term of office is not set to expire until 2010, some legislators have proposed that she resign in 2007, following a plebiscite on a revised constitution. Meanwhile, resistance to charter change has been particularly strong in the Senate, which would be abolished under the proposed unicameral system. The February 2006 state of emergency, although brief, focused additional attention on what some critics have seen as the government’s increasing authoritarianism. On April 20 the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional sections of an executive order that required senior executive, military, police, and national security officials to receive the president’s prior consent before appearing before congressional inquiries. Five days later, a unanimous court also threw out a “calibrated preemptive

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response” (CPR) policy introduced “in lieu of maximum tolerance” toward rallies and public demonstrations. The September 2005 press release announcing the CPR policy had stated, “The authorities will not stand aside while those with ill intent are herding a witting or unwitting mass of people and inciting them into actions that are inimical to public order, and the peace of mind of the national community.” In its ruling the court stated that the CPR “has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses.” In the same decision the court also rejected a “no permit, no rally” policy but added that local governments could restrict permitless demonstrations to designated “freedom parks.” The courts further stated that officials could deny permits “only on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.” Meanwhile, resolution of the Communist and Muslim insurgencies remained a government priority. The most recent ARMM election, held August 8, 2005, saw a Lakas-CMD candidate with backing from the MNLF—once again chaired by Nur Misuari, despite his continuing detention—win the governorship. Although peace talks with the MILF continued, as of July 2006 negotiations with the NDF had not resumed. Indeed, Macapagal-Arroyo had announced that she would pursue a military victory against the Communists.

Political Parties and Groups From 1946 until the imposition of martial law in 1972, political control oscillated between the Nacionalista Party (NP), founded in 1907, and the Liberal Party (LP), organized by slightly left-ofcenter elements that split from the Nacionalistas in 1946. Both parties concerned themselves primarily with local alliances and patronage, and their adherents readily shifted from one to the other. Powerful sugar interests, which tended to resist foreign investment in Philippine enterprises, dominated

among the Nacionalistas, while most Liberals favored a more flexible approach to foreign capital. In early 1978, coincident with a pro forma return to party politics, the New Society Movement (KBL) was organized as the personal vehicle of President Marcos. In February 1980 representatives of 8 opposition groups formed a loose coalition, the United Democratic Opposition (Unido), which reorganized in April 1982 as the United Nationalist Democratic Organization, a 12-party alignment that retained the Unido acronym. Participants included the Nacionalistas and Liberals; the Filipino Democratic Party (PDP), an ideological descendent of the pre-1972 Christian Socialist Movement founded by the exiled Raul Manglapus; and the People’s Power Movement (Laban), which was under the nominal presidency of former LP leader Benigno Aquino Jr. until his assassination in August 1983. Laban was subsequently led by Lorenzo TANADA. The Aquino assassination spawned a number of cross-party alliances among the opposition, which was divided on whether to boycott the May 1984 election. In late 1983 the PDP formed an alliance with Laban (PDP-Laban) under the leadership of Teofisto Guingona, while Tanada organized a separate National Alliance for Justice, Freedom, and Democracy. By early 1984 three distinct opposition formations had emerged: (1) a proboycott “compact” group encompassing PDPLaban; Tanada’s National Alliance; former president Diosdado Macapagal’s National Union for Liberation, another Unido participant; and a number of groups, including the Movement for Philippine Sovereignty and Democracy, associated with former senator Jose DIOKNO; (2) the rump of Unido, led by Salvador H. Laurel, who described the forthcoming balloting as the “last chance for Philippines democracy”; and (3) the Alliance of Metropolitan Associations (AMA), composed of a variety of formerly apolitical groups that had adopted a militantly antigovernment posture under the leadership of Agapito “Butz” Aquino. At the May poll, only the AMA stood firm against participating. In all, the opposition won about one-third of the elective National Assembly seats.

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In November 1984 Corazon Aquino joined with a number of other opposition leaders in organizing a nonparty Convener’s Group to devise a “fast track” method of selecting an anti-Marcos candidate in the event of an early presidential election. In June delegates to a Unido convention unanimously selected Salvador Laurel as their candidate, thus abrogating an April pledge to consult with the Convener’s Group on the choice of a nominee. Most of Unido’s Laban component formally drafted Mrs. Aquino in November. Only on December 11, the closing date for the filing of nomination papers, did Aquino and Laurel agree to stand as Unido candidates for the presidency and vice presidency, respectively, at the election called for February 1986. A landslide in support of the Aquino government at the legislative balloting of May 1987 was achieved without an articulated party structure. Most pro-Aquino candidates ran under a variety of rubrics loosely joined in a Laban-centered coalition that eventually coalesced into the regimesupportive Democratic Filipino Struggle (LDP) in June 1988. The principal contenders at the presidential and legislative balloting of May 1992 were the LDP, led by presidential candidate Ramon Mitra; the People Power–National Union of Christian Democrats (Lakas-NUCD), led by Fidel Ramos; the National People’s Coalition (NPC) of Marcos associate Eduardo Cojuangco; and the LP, under Jovito Salonga. Although the LDP won a plurality of House seats, by mid-1993 nearly three-fourths of its delegation had aligned with President Ramos’s Lakas-NUCD. For the 1995 legislative poll, the Lakas-NUCD entered into an electoral coalition with the LDP that subsequently fell into disarray. Several electoral coalitions were formed prior to the 1998 balloting, the most significant being that among Vice President Joseph Estrada’s Party of the Filipino Masses (PMP), the LDP, and the NPC. Under the banner of the Struggle of the Nationalist Filipino Masses (Laban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino—LAMMP), the constituent parties supported Estrada for president and Angara for vice president. The LAMMP also offered a sin-

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gle list of senatorial candidates, but the LDP and NPC ran separate lists for the House. In support of its presidential candidate, Jose de Venecia, LakasNUCD joined forces with the small, Mindanaobased United Muslim Democratic Party (UMDP) and the Kabalikat ng Mayayang Pilipino (Kampi), whose leader, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, ran successfully for the vice presidency. A total of 10 candidates, 9 of them with party backing, competed for the presidency, the Commission on Elections having disqualified 72 other potential candidates in March on the grounds that they had no national following. In the 1998 balloting for the House of Representatives the LAMMP won 110 seats; the NPC, 15; and the LDP, 7. The LAMMP senatorial list won 7 upper house seats. Following the coalition’s victories, Estrada initially attempted to attract new members to his PMP, both from his coalition partners and from the opposition. Some members of the LDP in particular objected, and instead Estrada formed the Struggle of the Filipino Masses (Laban ng Masang Pilipino—LAMP), which the LDP agreed to join. Also joining the LAMP were a number of defectors from other parties, most prominently a group of some 40 Lakas-NUCD members led by Rep. Manuel Villar Jr. Nevertheless, the initial LAMP remained unregistered as a unified party, and on August 28, 1999, President Estrada attempted to strengthen the alliance and give added impetus to his campaign for constitutional change by reconfiguring the “Struggle” as the Party of the Filipino Masses (Lapian ng Masang Pilipino— LAMP). Prominent new members of the organization included Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and Sen. Gregorio Honasan. However, a wave of party resignations, including those of Speaker of the House Villar and Senate President Franklin Drilon, preceded President Estrada’s November 13, 2000, impeachment, and his forced departure from office in January 2001 reduced the LAMP to little more than a political artifact. With the next legislative election scheduled for May 2001, two new coalitions quickly formed. At the beginning of February the Lakas-NUCDUMDP-Kampi group, the Liberal Party (LP), the

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Progressive Movement for Development of Initiatives (PROMDI), the Party for Democratic Reform (Reporma), the Democratic Action Party (AD), and a dissenting faction of the LDP agreed to present a common senatorial candidate list as the People Power Coalition (PPC), while later in the month the former LAMP participants—the PMP, LDP, and NPC—similarly formed a Democratic Filipino Struggle–Force of the Masses (Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino–Puwersa ng Masa— LDP-PnM) coalition. Generally, the individual parties presented separate candidates for the House of Representatives election. As the January 2004 deadline approached for filing certificates of candidacy for the May 2004 national election, the Lakas–Christian Muslim Democrats (Lakas-CMD, the unified and renamed Lakas-NUCD-UMDP) announced formation of a successor to the PPC, the Coalition for Truth and Experience for the Future (Koalisyon ng Katapatan at Karanasan sa Kinabukasan—K4), which also included part of the divided NPC, the LP, Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s People’s Reform Party (PRP), PROMDI, and Reporma. Early in December 2003 the LDP, PDP-Laban, and the PMP (now called the Force of the Filipino Masses) had agreed to form an opposition alliance, the Coalition of the United Filipinos (Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino—KNP), which proved unable to mount a successful challenge to the K4 at the ballot box. Shortly after the election, differences within the Lakas-CMD led a significant number of representatives to identify themselves as members of Kampi. As of mid-2006, although the NPC and the LP remained part of Macapagal-Arroyo’s government, each had competing pro- and antipresidential wings.

Government Parties Lakas–Christian Muslim Democrats— Lakas-CMD (Lakas ng Kristiyano at Muslim Demokrata). Lakas-CMD traces its origin to the People Power Party—PPP (Partido Lakas ng Tao) that was founded by presidential hopeful Fidel

Ramos in January 1992, two months after he had left the dominant LDP because of its decision to designate Ramon Mitra as its nominee. In early February the formation was redesignated as EDSA-LDP (EDSA being an acronym for Epifanio de los Santo Avenue, the location of the first “People Power” rally in 1986). Subsequently, Lakas ng EDSA (“Edsa Power”) joined in a coalition with the National Union of Christian Democrats (NUCD), led by Raul MANGLAPUS. While Lakas-NUCD won only 51 of 201 lower house seats at the 1992 election, its ranks were subsequently swelled by defections from other parliamentary groups, including, most notably, the LDP. In mid-1994, by contrast, it lost a number of House supporters, most prominently its majority leader, Ronaldo Zamora (formerly of the LDP and most recently of the PMP). It captured an overwhelming majority of House seats in 1995. In June 1997 the Supreme Court ruled that Ramos could not run for reelection, and in December he backed Jose de Venecia, speaker of the House of Representatives. To enhance his party’s chances at the polls, Ramos engineered an electoral alliance with the moderate United Muslim Democratic Party (UMDP) of Mindanao and the Alliance of Free Filipinos (Kampi) of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, daughter of former president Diosdado Macapagal. Although opinion polls indicated that MacapagalArroyo was running second only to Joseph Estrada among presidential contenders, she agreed to unite Kampi with Lakas-NUCD and to serve as de Venecia’s running mate. In May 1998 de Venecia finished second, with 15.9 percent of the presidential vote, while Macapagal-Arroyo won the vice presidency with a 47 percent share and subsequently agreed to join the cabinet as secretary of social welfare and development. Although the Lakas-NUCD won 5 Senate seats and 50 House seats, its effectiveness as the leading opposition party was soon weakened by defections to President Estrada’s LAMP. The situation was reversed leading up to and following Estrada’s departure from office in January 2001, and the Lakas-NUCD emerged from the May 2001 election with a plurality of some 85 seats (including

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those won by Lakas candidates with other endorsements). President Macapagal-Arroyo was named chair of the party in June 2002, at which time she proposed adopting a new, consolidated name. Accordingly, in October the party leadership approved the change to Lakas-CMD, which replaced the tripartite Lakas-NUCD-UMDP coalition designation. Meanwhile, Macapagal-Arroyo’s Kampi continued its separate existence, although most members held simultaneous membership in Lakas-CMD. In October 2003 Macapagal-Arroyo reversed a 2002 decision not to seek election to a full term in 2004, which resulted in the departure from the party of Vice President Teofisto Guingona, who had been Lakas-CMD’s president. At the May 2004 balloting Macapagal-Arroyo won a full term, with 40 percent of the vote, against four other contenders. At the same time, the party and its K4 allies captured sufficient seats to maintain a government majority in the Senate and swept to an easy victory in the House of Representatives. The K4’s apparent unity subsequently suffered a significant setback in the House, however, when several dozen members, dissatisfied with the House leadership and the divvying up of key committee assignments, declared allegiance to a revitalized Kampi. Leaders: Gloria MACAPAGAL-ARROYO (President of the Republic and Chair of the Party), Jose de VENECIA (President of the Party and Speaker of the House of Representatives), Fidel V. RAMOS (Chair Emeritus), Prospero NOGRALES (House Majority Leader), Kiko PANGILINAN (Senate Majority Leader). Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC). The NPC was formed prior to the 1992 balloting by right-wing elements of both the Liberal and Nacionalista parties under the leadership of President Aquino’s estranged cousin and former Marcos business confidant, Eduardo Cojuangco. Although Cojuangco finished third in the 1992 presidential poll, NPC candidate Joseph Estrada won the vice presidency on a 33 percent vote share. The NPC remained in opposition during the Ramos presidency, joining LAMMP upon its for-

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mation in June 1997. In December, however, NPC President Ernesto Maceda was ousted as Senate president and, blaming Estrada and LDP leader Edgardo Angara, apparently sidetracked a planned formal merger of the three LAMMP parties. The NPC remained allied with President Estrada until his departure from office in January 2001, after which it agreed to cooperate with President Macapagal-Arroyo’s administration. At the May 2001 lower house balloting the NPC captured 54 seats (10 of those won by candidates with endorsements from additional political organizations), second to Lakas-NUCD. As the 2004 elections approached, the NPC was divided over support for Macapagal-Arroyo’s reelection bid. As a result, some members supported her principal opponent, Fernando Poe, and ran for Congress as participants in the opposition KNP alliance, while the majority participated in the K4 alliance. At the balloting the NPC won over 50 seats. Leaders: Frisco SAN JUAN (President), Faustino DY Jr. (Chair), Ernesto MACEDA (President Emeritus), Eduardo COJUANGCO (Chair Emeritus), Francis ESCUDERO (House Minority Leader). Liberal Party (LP). The LP was organized in 1946 by a group of centrist Nacionalista dissidents. Formerly a member of Unido, its congressional delegation after the 1987 election encompassed 8 senators and 42 representatives. Subsequently, it divided into a pro-Aquino mainstream faction headed by Jovito SALONGA and a more rightist group headed by Eva KALAW. The party suffered numerous defections before and after the May 1992 elections, being reduced to little more than an echo of its former prominence. Manila Mayor Alfredo LIM was the party’s 1998 “law-and-order candidate” for president and ran with the endorsement of former president Corazon Aquino. Lim won only 8.7 percent of the vote, and the LP captured 14 House seats. The party subsequently entered a “strategic” coalition with the LAMP, although the leadership was later reported to be divided over the issue of constitutional

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reform. In January 2000 Lim joined the Estrada cabinet. Although the LP was divided over the Estrada impeachment question, most of the party leadership ended up calling for the president’s resignation. Secretary of Trade and Industry Manuel Roxas resigned from the cabinet on November 2, 2000, while the LP’s president, Florencio ABAD, signed the impeachment complaint. The LP won 21 lower house seats in May 2001. It supported President Macapagal-Arroyo’s reelection in 2004 and participated in the K4, winning more than two dozen seats in the House of Representatives plus 2 in the Senate. The 2005 presidential impeachment battle effectively split the LP. In March 2006 a faction led by Manila Mayor Jose Atienza ousted Senate President Franklin Drilon as party president, but the Drilon faction met shortly thereafter and expelled Atienza and cabinet member Michael Defensor. Drilon subsequently asked the Commission on Elections to decide the issue, although Atienza appeared to represent the majority. In July Drilon stepped down as Senate president. Leaders: Atienza Faction: Jose ATIENZA Jr. (President of the Party and Mayor of Manila), Michael DEFENSOR (Chair), Sally ZALDIVARPEREZ (Governor of Antigue). Drilon Faction: Franklin DRILON (President of the Party), Francis PANGILINAN (Senate Majority Leader), Manuel ROXAS III (Executive Vice President), Florencio ABAD, Benigno C. AQUINO III (Secretary General).

a Lakas-led coalition. Following the 2004 election, however, disputes arose within the K4 alliance over congressional committee assignments and a reform agenda, which split the Lakas-CMD/Kampi partnership. In July a number of Kampi leaders derailed President Macapagal-Arroyo’s recommendation that Kampi and Lakas-CMD merge. By August several dozen congressmen had announced their affiliation with Kampi, which in the following months nevertheless continued to support the president’s legislative agenda. Leaders: Ronaldo PUNO (President of the Party and Secretary of the Interior), Luis VILLAFUERTE (Acting President), Rodolfo ANTONINO (Vice President).

Alliance of Free Filipinos (Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino—Kampi). Organized in 1997 by Jose COJUANGCO and other supporters of Sen. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Kampi served as the vehicle for her 1998 presidential exploration, although she ultimately opted to unite with LakasNUCD and seek the vice presidency. Following her victory, Kampi remained in existence, although most of its members were also affiliated with Lakas-NUCD. In May 2004, as it had in 2001, Kampi won seats in the House of Representatives as part of

KNP Opposition Parties

Philippine Democratic Socialist Party (Partido Demokratiko Sosyalista ng Pilipinas—PDSP). The PDSP dates from 1981, when it was founded by left-leaning legislators from the Nacionalista and other parties. Although associated with the People Power Coalition in 2001, in January 2004 the PDSP announced that it would not participate in the K4 alliance but would still support President Macapagal-Arroyo’s reelection. Party leader Norberto Gonzales, an adviser to the president, had left her cabinet, partly over objections to the inclusion of former opposition members in the government’s Senate list, but he returned a month later. At the May balloting the PDSP won two seats in the lower house, although one of the victors subsequently left the party. Leader: Norberto GONZALES (National Security Adviser).

Democratic Filipino Struggle (Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino—LDP). Formally established in September 1988, the LDP constituted a merger of the Filipino Democratic Party– Laban (Partido Demokratikong Pilipinas–Lakas ng Bayan—PDP-Laban) and the People’s Struggle (Lakas ng Bansa). The PDP, launched in 1982 by former members of the Mindanao Alliance, had joined with the People’s Power (Lakas ng Bayan— Laban), nominally led by Benigno Aquino Jr. until

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his death in August 1983, to form the PDP-Laban. (Part of the PDP-Laban formation, led by Aquilino Pimentel, refused to enter the LDP and maintains a separate identity—see below.) The People’s Struggle had been formed in 1987 by a nephew of Corazon Aquino. The LDP won 22 House seats (1 in coalition with the NPC) at the May 2001 election. Earlier in the year a faction known as the “Conscience Bloc” abandoned the party because of its support for pro-Estrada candidates. Most of the dissenters ultimately joined the Lakas-NUCD. In 2004 the party was divided over the presidential contest, with supporters of party leader Edgardo Angara constituting the backbone of the KNP and backing its nominee, actor Fernando Poe Jr., who finished second, with 36.5 percent of the vote. A smaller LDP faction headed by Agapito “Butz” AQUINO supported the candidacy of Sen. Panfilo LACSON, who finished third, with 10.9 percent of the vote. Poe died on December 14, 2004, three days after suffering a stroke and falling into a coma. He was 65. Angara reaffirmed his control of the party at a March 2005 national congress. In 2006, without rejecting President Macapagal-Arroyo’s call for constitutional reform, Angara advised a go-slow approach. Leaders: Sen. Edgardo ANGARA (Chair), Miguel ROMERO (Secretary General). Filipino Democratic Party–Laban (Partido Demokratikong Pilipinas–Lakas ng Bayan—PDPLaban). The current PDP-Laban constitutes the branch of the original PDP-Laban that refused to join in formation of the LDP in 1988. In 2004 it won two lower house seats as a component of the KNP alliance. In 2005–2006 party leader Aquilino Pimentel was one of the more outspoken voices demanding President Macapagal-Arroyo’s resignation. Leaders: Aquilino PIMENTEL Jr. (Senate Minority Leader), Jejomar BINAY (Mayor of Makati), Teodoro LOCSIN Jr. Force of the Filipino Masses (Puwersa ng Masang Pilipino—PMP). The PMP was founded

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as the Party of the Filipino Masses (Partido ng Masang Pilipino—PMP) in the early 1990s by Joseph Estrada, a former Liberal, to support his presidential aspirations. He ultimately ran as the vice presidential candidate of the NPC in 1992, but by 1998 the rejuvenated PMP claimed 5 million members. The PMP was virtually eliminated as an electoral force at the May 2001 election, although Estrada’s wife, Luisa EJERCITO-ESTRADA, won election to the Senate as a PnM candidate. With his trial ongoing, former president Estrada continued to hold sway over the PMP (now known as the Force of the Filipino Masses) as the 2004 elections approached. In December 2003 the PMP joined in formation of the KNP and supported presidential aspirant Fernando Poe. After the May 2004 balloting the PMP claimed several House seats, while Estrada’s son Jose joined his mother in the Senate. According to reports, in September 2004 the former president rejected a proposal by LDP opposition leader Edgardo Angara to merge the PMP into the LDP. In August 2005 Juan Ponce Enrile, the chair of the party, took the unorthodox step of joining the majority in the Senate. Enrile stated at the time that former president Estrada had approved the move. Leaders: Horacio “Boy” MORALES (President), Joseph ESTRADA (Chair Emeritus of the Party and Former President of the Republic, under house arrest), Sen. Juan Ponce ENRILE (Chair), Sen. Jose “Jinggoy” ESTRADA, Ronaldo ZAMORA.

Other Mainstream Parties Nacionalista Party (NP). Essentially the right wing of the Philippines’ oldest party (formed in 1907), the Nacionalistas had been reduced by 1988 to a relatively minor formation within the Grand Alliance for Democracy (GAD), which had been organized by former defense minister Juan Ponce Enrile prior to the 1987 congressional balloting as an anti-Aquino and anticommunist formation. The GAD also included the now-defunct Mindanao Alliance and the Philippine Democratic Socialist Party (PDSP, above). In February 1990 Enrile

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was arrested on charges of involvement in the December 1989 coup attempt, but the Supreme Court subsequently ordered the more serious charges reduced, and Enrile quickly returned to politics. As the party’s 1992 presidential candidate, Vice President Salvador Laurel ran eighth with a vote share of only 3.4 percent. In 1998 Enrile, who had been expelled from the party by Laurel in 1991, ran for president as an independent, capturing 1.4 percent of the vote. For the 1998 elections the NP was allied with the Lakas-NUCD and subsequently supported the removal of President Estrada. As of December 2004, seven months after the most recent elections, the NP held five lower house seats. Its president headed the Senate Finance Committee. Leaders: Sen. Manuel VILLAR Jr. (President), Cynthia VILLAR, Sen. Ralph RECTO. New Society Movement (Kilusan Bagong Lipunan—KBL). Organized in 1978 as a proMarcos formation, the KBL was utilized by the former president’s widow for her own bid in 1992. Initially considered a major threat to the other contenders, Mrs. Marcos captured only 10.3 percent of the vote for a fifth-place finish. In April 1998, trailing in the polls with only a 2 percent share, Mrs. Marcos withdrew from the upcoming presidential election “to save the Filipino people from the ultimate injustice of a bloody election.” In 2001 and 2004 the party won one seat in the House of Representatives. Leaders: Imelda MARCOS, Imee MARCOS. People’s Reform Party (PRP). The PRP was the nominal party vehicle for the 1992 presidential bid of political independent Miriam DefensorSantiago, who campaigned with sufficient vigor on an anticorruption platform to gain a 19.7 vote share as runner-up to Fidel Ramos. Subsequent to her loss, she complained bitterly of “wholesale electoral fraud” by Ramos supporters. Senator Defensor-Santiago proved less successful in 1998, winning only 3.0 percent of the presidential vote as the coalition candidate of the PRP and the small Nation’s Guide (Gabay ng Bayan) party. She was one of President Estrada’s strongest Senate supporters

before and after his November 2000 impeachment. In May 2001 she lost her reelection bid. Defensor-Santiago was expected to seek another Senate term in 2004 as an opposition candidate, but she ultimately gained the endorsement of the government-supportive K4. After winning, she had a falling out with the Lakas-CMD and declared herself an independent. Later, however, she repaired relations with the administration and spoke in favor of constitutional reform. Leader: Sen. Miriam DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO. The following parties were organized prior to the 1998 elections primarily as personal vehicles of particular presidential contenders: the Democratic Action Party (Aksyon Demokratiko—AD), led by Raul S. ROCO, who took third place with 13.8 percent of the presidential vote; the Progressive Movement for Development of Initiatives (PROMDI), led by former Cebu governor Emilio “Lito” R. OSMENA (12.4 percent); and the Party for Democratic Reform (Partido para sa Demokratikong Reporma), led by former secretary of defense Renato DE VILLA (4.9 percent), who had left the Lakas-NUCD in December 1997 after failing to receive its backing. In April 2000 Roco announced that the AD, Osmena’s PROMDI, and de Villa’s Reporma planned to launch a “Third Way” alliance, and in October all three parties joined opposition calls for President Estrada’s resignation or impeachment. In 2003 the three parties formed the Alliance for Hope (Alyansa ng Pagasa—AP) in support of Roco’s 2004 candidacy, but he won only 6.4 percent. Another 2004 presidential candidate, evangelist Eduardo VILLANUEVA, leads the Rise Philippines (Bangon Pilipinos); he won 6.2 percent of the vote. Several primarily provincial or local parties won seats at the May 2004 lower house elections. They included the Estrada-supportive Alayon, based in Cebu City and led by John “Sonny” OSMENA and Eduardo GULLAS, and the Magdalo Party (Partido Magdalo), the dominant party in the province of Cavite. The United Negros Alliance (UNA), based in the province of Negros Occidental and

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chaired by Alfredo MARANON, is the provincial partner of the NPC, which included UNA candidates on its list. In addition, the Independent Nacionalista and Allies (INA), based in Masbate, and the New People Power Party of Nueva Ecija (Lapiang Bagong Lakas ng Nueva Ecija— BALANE) each had successful candidates who also ran under the banner of the NPC. For a complete list of the 16 groups that won party-list seats in the House of Representatives at the 2004 election, see the Legislature section, below.

Leftist and Communist Parties Akbayan! Citizens’ Action Party (Akbayan). Akbayan was formed in January 1998 as an electoral coalition of various leftist groups, including splinters from the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP, below) and the KRMR (see under PMPMerger, below). At the May 1998 election it won one party-list seat. In May 2001 it again won sufficient support for a single party-list seat, while in 2004 it captured 6.7 percent of the vote and was awarded three seats. In 2003 it had participated in formation of a broad left front, the People’s Alternative (Alternatiba ng Mamamayan). Leaders: Etta ROSALES, Mario AGUJA, Ana Theresia HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL. Bayan Muna Party. The leftist Bayan Muna (People First), which descends from the Communist-affiliated New Nationalist Alliance (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan—Bayan), has been the most successful of the party-list groups, winning three seats in the House of Representatives in 2001 and again in 2004 (with 9.5 percent of the vote) despite government charges that it and two associated party-list organizations—the Gabriela Women’s Party (GWP) and the Anakpawis (Toiling Masses)—had channeled money to Communists. Party leader Satur Ocampo has also been associated with the NDF (below). Among those arrested in connection with the alleged coup plot against Macapagal-Arroyo in February 2006 were six party-list members of the

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House of Representatives: the three Bayan Muna members, Crispin BELTRAN and Rafael MARIANO from Anakpawis, and Liza MAZA from the GWP. The six, minus Beltran, who had already been arrested, initially sought sanctuary in the House complex, Batasan, and were therefore dubbed the “Batasan 5.” Other Bayan Muna members were also charged. Leaders: Satur OCAMPO, Joel VIRADOR, Teodoro CASINO Jr. (Members of the House of Representatives). National Democratic Front (NDF). The NDF was launched by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in April 1973 in an effort to unite Communist, labor, and Christian opponents of the Marcos regime, which declared it illegal. It encompasses more than a dozen “revolutionary allied organizations,” most prominently the CPP and the CPP’s military wing, the New People’s Army (NPA). Both the NDF and the CPP were technically legalized (by repeal of the antisubversive edict under which they had been proscribed) on September 1, 1992, immediately prior to the launching of peace negotiations in the Netherlands with government representatives. The talks lasted until June 1995, when they collapsed because of the government’s refusal to free imprisoned NPA leader Sotero LLAMAS, whose release had been ordered by a Manila court; the negotiations resumed a year later and continued into 1998. On March 16 in The Hague, representatives from the government and the NDF signed a Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL). They also exchanged drafts of a second agreement on social and economic reforms. Two additional agreements, one on political and economic reform and another on ending hostilities, were to follow. Shortly before leaving office in June 1998, President Ramos freed 18 Communist guerrillas as a goodwill gesture, while on August 7 President Estrada formally implemented the March human rights pact. In late February 1999, however, responding to the NPA’s abduction of an army general and another officer on Mindanao, Estrada

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suspended negotiations. Two months later, after the release of the general and four other captives, the president expressed his willingness to reopen talks, but the NDF refused. In late May the NDF announced that it was formally ending the talks, in part because of the recently ratified Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) with the United States, which it characterized as “treason and betrayal of national sovereignty.” Talks resumed in Oslo, Norway, in April 2001 but were suspended two months later by the Macapagal-Arroyo government because of the alleged NPA assassination of a congressman. For most of the next three years the government and the NDF took turns in proposing and rejecting cease-fires as well as the resumption of peace talks. The process was complicated by continuing clashes between NPA and government forces; by the NDF’s vehement opposition to the renewed presence in the Philippines of U.S. troops to combat terrorism; and, in 2002, by the decision of both Washington (in August) and then Manila (in October) to list the NDF as a terrorist organization. On February 11–14, 2004, a new round of peace talks took place in Oslo, and a second round on March 30–April 3 concluded with an agreement to establish a Joint Monitoring Committee to oversee implementation of the CARHRIHL. Work also proceeded on a Declaration of Principles of the Comprehensive Agreement on Social and Economic Reforms. A June 22–25 session proved less productive, however, and an additional round scheduled for August was canceled by the NDF, partly because Manila had not sought removal of the Communist groups from the foreign terrorist organization lists of the United States, Canada, Australia, and the EU. In July 2006, responding to President Macapagal-Arroyo’s directive that the police join with the armed forces to pursue all-out war against the NPA, NDF leader Luis Jalandoni called for renewed peace talks. The government further stated that it planned to open peace talks with local NPA contingents, bypassing the central leadership, while the NDF indicated that it would pursue back-channel talks with Manila and also open contacts with the opposition.

Leaders: Luis JALANDONI (Chair of the NDF Negotiating Panel), Fidel AGCAOILI (Chair of Monitoring Committee), Jose Maria SISON (Political Consultant). Communist Party of the Philippines– Marxist-Leninist (CPP-ML or CPP). The CPP was launched as a Maoist formation in 1968, the New People’s Army (NPA) being added as its military wing in early 1969. Between 1986 and 1991, many of its leaders were captured by government forces, including NPA commander Romulo KINTANAR, who was released in 1992, abandoned the guerrilla movement, and was assassinated in January 2003. Jose Maria Sison (who reportedly uses the pseudonym Armando Liwanag) was reelected party chair at a Central Committee meeting in September 1992, although he had been an exile in the Netherlands since his release by the Aquino government in 1986. A number of splinter groups subsequently left the CPP (see below). The NPA numbers some 9,000 rural-based guerrillas, down from a peak of 25,000 in 1987; it is strongest in northeast and central Luzon, in the Samar provinces of the Visayas, and in southern Mindanao, although at various times it has undertaken insurgent activity in well over threequarters of the country’s provinces. In March 1999 the NPA announced that it had established an alliance with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). In October 2002 the government declared the CPP to be a terrorist organization. In 2004 hard-liners attacked Sison for supporting electoral candidates through a number of party-list organizations, including the Bayan Muna Party. Meanwhile, the NPA and government forces continued to clash. Leaders: Jose Maria SISON (Chair, in exile), Benito E. TIAMZON (Vice Chair), Wilma TIAMZON (Secretary General), Gregorio ROSAL (Spokesperson). Filipino Workers’ Party–Merger (Partido ng Manggagawang Pilipino–Merger—PMPMerger). The PMP-Merger was formed in August

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2002 through unification of the PMP; the Party of Proletarian Democracy (Partido Proletaryo Demokratiko—PPD), which had been organized in 1995 by a former CPP splinter called the Third Force; and the Socialist Party of Labor (Sosyalistang Partido ng Paggawa—SPP). The PMP was established in 1999 by the ManilaRizal Revolutionary Committee (Komiteng Rebolusyonaryo ng Manila-Rizal—KRMR), which had separated from the CPP in July 1993 under the leadership of Filemon “Popoy” LAGMAN. Although subsequently experiencing its own defections, the KRMR reportedly held the loyalty of most CPP forces in the capital region. The PMP acted legally through connections to a trade union group, a socialist propaganda organization, and a federation of mass organizations known as People’s Solidarity for Democracy and Freedom (Sandigan ng Lakas et Democrasya ng Sambayanan—Sanlakas). Under the leadership of Renato CONSTANTINO Jr., Sanlakas captured one party-list seat at the May 1998 House election. “Popoy” Lagman was killed by unknown gunmen on February 6, 2001. He was in the process of organizing a new Workers’ Party (Partido ng Manggagawa—PnM) that competed on the partylist ballot in the May 2001 lower house election and won one seat in May 2004. The SPP was launched in November 1998 by merger of the Socialist League (Liga Sosyalista— LS), led by Sonny MELENCIO, and the Revolutionary Proletarian Party (Rebolusyonario ng Partido ng Proletaryo—RPP). The LS had split from the KRMR earlier in the year, in part because of the latter’s “right-wing trajectory” under Filemon Lagman. The RPP had left the now-defunct, Moscoworiented Communist Party of the Philippines (Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas—PKP) in 1993. Revolutionary Workers’ Party–Philippines (Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa– Pilipinas—RPMP). The founding conference of the RPMP was held in April 1998. Many of its members were previously affiliated with the CPP but rejected its Maoist ideology in favor of a Trotskyite platform. Its military wing is the Rev-

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olutionary Proletarian Army–Alex Boncayao Brigade (RPA-ABB). The ABB, based in Manila, had declared its “autonomy” from the mainstream CPP in 1993. In late December 1999 President Estrada met with four leaders of the RPMP and RPA-ABB in furtherance of his peace efforts. The four, including Arturo TABARA and Nilo de la Cruz, were immediately vilified by Jose Maria Sison of the CPP and Filemon Lagman of the KRMR. The RPMP–RPAABB has since been rejected by most of the left, and in September 2004 Tabara was assassinated by the NPA. Peace negotiations with the MacapagalArroyo government are ongoing. Leaders: Nilo de la CRUZ, Ike de los REYES (RPA-ABB). Other recently active Communist splinter parties include the Marxist-Leninist Party of the Philippines (MLPP), which separated from the CPP in 1998 and whose members have reportedly been targeted for assassination by the CPP/NPA; the Metro Manila Rizal Regional Party Committee, a 1998 offshoot of the KRMR; and the Revolutionary Worker’s Party–Mindanao (Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa–Mindanao— RPM-M), formed in 2001 as an RPMP splinter. In October 2005 the RPM-M signed a cease-fire agreement with the government.

Southern-Based Muslim Groups Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). In separatist rebellion since 1974 on behalf of Mindanao’s Muslim communities, the MNLF split in 1975 into Libyan- and Egyptian-backed factions, the latter subsequently calling itself the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF, below). Originally the stronger of the two guerrilla armies, MNLF forces had dwindled by 1986 to one-third their original size, and in early 1987 the MNLF leader, Nur Misuari, tentatively agreed to drop his demands for an independent southern state in favor of autonomy for “Muslim Mindanao” as spelled out in the new constitution. A January 1994 cease-fire and a subsequent peace agreement directly led to Misuari’s election as governor of the Autonomous

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Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) on September 9, 1996, although hard-line MNLF splinters and the MILF rejected the arrangement. In March 2000 an MNLF splinter, the MNLF–Islamic Command Council, currently chaired by Habib Mujahab HASHIM, announced that it intended to renew guerrilla warfare to achieve a “separate Islamic state in Mindanao.” In April 2001 the MNLF Central Committee voted to remove Misuari as chair, citing a lack of progress during his tenure as governor of the ARMM. He was replaced by a “Committee of 15” but refused to acknowledge the decision. In August the government named the MNLF general secretary, Muslimin Sema, to replace him as head of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), and in October he was derecognized by the OIC. On November 19 Misuari loyalists broke the MNLF’s five-year-old cease-fire in a series of attacks on Jolo Island. Arrested on November 24 while attempting to enter Malaysia, Misuari was later extradited to the Philippines to face charges of rebellion. On November 26 the MNLF’s Farouk Hussein was elected to succeed Misuari as ARMM governor. Meanwhile, a number of Misuari’s followers, identified as the Misuari Breakaway Group or the Misuari Renegade Group, had reportedly allied with Abu Sayyaf. With Hussein having withdrawn from a reelection bid to become the Philippines ambassador to the Middle East, the August 8, 2005, gubernatorial contest was won by a Lakas-CMD candidate, Zaldy AMPATUAN. Elements of the MNLF and the MILF boycotted the balloting. In February 2006 the MNLF again elected as its chair Nur Misuari, whom House Majority Leader Prospero Nograles described as a “key player” in the peace process despite his continuing detention. Two months later reports indicated that reunification talks between the MNLF and the MILF were under way. Leaders: Nur MISUARI (Chair, in detention), Farouk HUSSEIN (Parouk HUSSIN; Former Governor of the ARMM), Alvarez ISNAJI (Faction Leader), Hatimil HASSAN (Chair, Council of 15), Muslimin SEMA (General Secretary and Mayor of Cotabato City).

Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The MILF was launched as a fundamentalist faction within the MNLF, with Hashim Salamat, a Cairotrained ulema (Islamic religious leader), as deputy to Nur Misuari. It split from the parent group in 1978 but did not adopt the MILF name until 1980. Estimates of the size of its military wing, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces, vary widely, from a Philippine government assessment of 10,000 to an MILF claim of 120,000. In opposing the September 1996 peace agreement, the MILF indicated that it would settle for nothing less than full independence for Muslimdominated areas. Nevertheless, the MILF, which had begun preliminary peace talks with the government a month earlier, subsequently agreed to temporarily halt hostilities. Clashes continued to occur, however, despite a series of cease-fires. In December 1997 MILF leader Salamat returned from 20 years of exile in Libya, and in March 1998 the two sides reached agreement on setting up a quick-response team to prevent future altercations from escalating. In March 1999 Hashim Salamat and the MNLF’s Nur Misuari reportedly conferred for the first time in 21 years. Intermittent formal peace talks, interrupted by suspensions and punctuated by continuing hostilities, continued into 2000. In August the MILF indefinitely suspended talks following a series of military defeats, including the loss of its headquarters at Camp Abubaker on July 9. Salamat responded by calling for a “jihad” (holy war) against the government and insisted that any further peace talks should take place abroad, in a Muslim country. President Macapagal-Arroyo proved to be more willing than her predecessor to meet this demand, and negotiations in Tripoli in June 2001 quickly led to a peace pact that was formalized in Kuala Lumpur in August. At the same time, the MILF and the MNLF concluded a “framework of unity” agreement. Although the MILF condemned the subsequent participation of U.S. troops in the Balikatan military exercises, in a meeting with government representatives in Putrajaya, Malaysia, on May 6–7, 2002, it agreed to assist in eliminating such criminal activities as kidnapping for ransom. The MILF

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also accepted responsibility for distributing funds to be provided by Manila as reparations for damages attributable to the 2000 military campaign in Mindanao. In March 2003 the MILF and the Communist NPA announced a “tactical” alliance that stopped short of actual military cooperation. Later in the same month, the MILF agreed to resume peace negotiations with the government, but continuing military activity by the MILF led the MacapagalArroyo administration to cancel talks that had been scheduled for May and to reject a cease-fire offer. On June 23 MILF Chair Salamat stated that the MILF renounced terrorism and denied any terrorist links, despite numerous reports that members of the regional Jemaah Islamiah (JI) network had infiltrated the MILF. Salamat’s statement undoubtedly contributed to the government’s decision to reverse itself and accept a cease-fire from July 19. Although it was not made public until August 5, 2003, Hashim Salamat died suddenly on July 13, 2003, and was soon succeeded by the vice chair for military affairs, Murad Ibrahim. A series of informal meetings concluded in February 2004 with an announcement that formal peace talks would open in Kuala Lumpur in April. A small number of international personnel began monitoring the cease-fire in March, but the planned negotiations were ultimately postponed in response to events that included the May national elections. As the end of the year approached, a start date of early 2005 was set for the peace talks, Manila having complied with two MILF preconditions: the dropping of charges against MILF members for a series of bombings near Davao Airport in March– April and government withdrawal from a captured MILF complex in Buliok. October witnessed the deployment of some 50 Malaysian troops, the core of an International Monitoring Team offered by members of the OIC. Exploratory peace talks resumed in April–June 2005. A 12th round was held May 2–4, 2006. Meanwhile, reports indicated that Hashim SAMIR, brother of Hashim Salamat, was seeking to become the MILF’s next chair. Recent reports have suggested that a newer militant organization, the so-called Pentagon Group, may have connections to the MILF and may even

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be the equivalent of an MILF special operations unit. The MILF has denied any connection to the group, whose principal activity has been kidnapping for ransom. Pentagon leader Tahir ALONTO was reportedly killed by the Philippine military in August 2004. Leaders: Al-Haj MURAD Ibrahim (Chair), Ghazali JAAFAR (Vice Chair for Political Affairs), Mohaqher IQBAL (Chief Negotiator), Jun MANTAWIL (Head, Peace Panel Secretariat). Abu Sayyaf. The most radical of the fundamentalist Muslim insurgent groups, Abu Sayyaf (Bearers of the Sword) has continued its activities despite an August 1994 announcement by Manila that the rebels, including their leader, Brahama SALI, had been “annihilated.” Although the MILF had earlier condemned the group as a terrorist organization at odds with the precepts of Islam, Abu Sayyaf reportedly agreed in September 1996 to operate under MILF command in opposition to the government’s accord with the MNLF. In December 1998 the authorities announced that Abu Sayyaf’s leader, Abdurajak Abubakar JANJALANI, had been killed by government forces. In contrast to the MILF, Abu Sayyaf is believed to number no more than a few hundred guerrillas. After more than a year of relative quiescence, Abu Sayyaf dramatically resurfaced in March 2000 with the kidnapping of more than 50 Philippine hostages on the southern island of Basilan. Their demands included the release of three Muslim militants jailed in the United States. On April 23 Abu Sayyaf staged an even more dramatic kidnapping, taking more than 20 hostages from the Malaysian resort island of Sipadan, off the Borneo coast, and transporting them to Jolo Island. Half a dozen of the Basilan hostages were reportedly executed, but by late July the rest had been rescued or released. Most of the Sipadan hostages were ultimately ransomed for some $17.5 million, in part through the intercession of Libya, and as of early December Abu Sayyaf reportedly held only 2 individuals, including an American kidnapped in August. A government offensive against the group, begun on September 16, continued. The American hostage was finally rescued in April 2001, but in

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May–August Abu Sayyaf renewed its kidnapping activities, abducting dozens of people and beheading a number of them. In May 2002 the United States offered a $5 million reward leading to the apprehension of five Abu Sayyaf leaders; the Philippine government already had in place its own bounty program, which had contributed in July 2001 to the capture of a principal leader, Najmi SABDULA (“Commander Global”). Also in May 2002, U.S. counterterrorism advisers participating in the Balikatan military exercises on Basilan admitted that efforts to unearth the group had proved unsuccessful. A month later an American missionary, Martin Burnham, and a Filipina nurse who had been held captive for over a year died during a rescue attempt by Philippine forces; Burnham’s wife, Gracia, was wounded but freed. In December 2003 a leading Abu Sayyaf commander, Ghalib ANDANG (“Commander Robot”), was captured by government forces. Through 2004 Abu Sayyaf continued its tactics, including deadly bombings, which most often centered on Zamboanga, a Mindanao port on the Basilan Strait, but which also included the February 2004 bombing of a Manila ferry that cost over 100 lives. In August 2004 a Basilan court sentenced 17 members to death for the 2002 kidnappings. In December the Philippine military charged that the Abu Sayyaf leader, Khaddafy Janjalani, was taking advantage of the government’s ceasefire with the MILF by hiding in an area of Mindanao where the military did not have free access. Meanwhile, the United States, noting the organization’s apparent links to the Indonesian-based JI as well as al-Qaida, had added Abu Sayyaf to its list of foreign terrorist organizations. A failed prison break on March 14–15, 2005, resulted in over two dozen deaths. Those killed included Najmi Sabdula and Ghalib Andang. Since then, Abu Sayyaf has continued its bombings and kidnappings, although none on the scale evidenced earlier. Leader: Khaddafy JANJALANI. The Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM) is believed to be a small radical organization with links

to Abu Sayyaf and the JI. Led by Hilarion del Rosario SANTOS (a.k.a. Ahmad SANTOS), it may have been involved in the February 2004 Manila ferry bombing. Recent reports have identified an additional Islamist group, the Tan Zim Qaidat alJihad, which may have links to the RSM and JI.

Legislature The 1987 constitution provides for a bicameral Congress of the Philippines, encompassing a Senate and a House of Representatives.

Senate The upper house consists of 24 at-large members who may serve no more than two six-year terms. Half of the body is elected every three years; voters may cast as many votes as there are seats to be filled. Because of the upper house’s small size, senators are often elected less by party affiliation than by personal following. (At the most recent election, for example, the victors included three film actors with no significant political experience.) At the balloting of May 10, 2004, the Coalition for Truth and Experience for the Future won 7 seats (Lakas-CMD, 4; Liberal Party, 2; People’s Reform Party [PRP], 1), and the Coalition of United Filipinos won 5. As a consequence, the Lakas-supportive majority reportedly held 14 seats and the opposition held 8, although the PRP senator subsequently declared herself to be the house’s second independent. The inauguration of Sen. Noli de Castro as vice president left 1 seat vacant. President: Manuel VILLAR Jr.

House of Representatives The lower house encompasses 212 members directly elected from legislative districts, plus a maximum of 52 members elected via “a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.” Each voter may cast a ballot for both a district representative and a partylist group. For each party-list seat, an organization must receive at least 2 percent of the total party-list votes cast, but no group may exceed 3 seats. (For 2004 the Commission on Elections accredited 66

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Cabinet As of July 15, 2006 President Vice President

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Lakas-CMD) Noli de Castro (Lakas-CMD)

Secretaries Agriculture Budget and Management Education Energy Environment and Natural Resources Finance Foreign Affairs Health Interior and Local Government Justice Labor and Employment Land Reform National Defense Public Works and Highways Science and Technology Social Welfare and Development Tourism Trade and Industry Transportation and Communications

Domingo Panganiban Rolando Andaya Jr. (LP) Fe Hidalgo [f] Raphael Lotilla Angelo Reyes Margarito Teves (Lakas-CMD) Alberto Romulo (Lakas-CMD) Francisco Duque III Ronaldo Puno (Kampi) Raul Gonzalez (Lakas-CMD) Patricia Santo Tomas [f] Nasser Pangandaman Avelino Cruz Hermogenes Ebdane Jr. Estrella Alabastro [f] Esperanza Cabral [f] Joseph Durano (NPC) Peter Favila Leandro Mendoza

Executive Secretary Chair, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council National Security Adviser Director General, National Economic and Development Authority Presidential Chief of Staff Presidential Spokesman

Eduardo Ermita (Lakas-CMD) Noli de Castro (Lakas-CMD) Norberto Gonzales (PDSP) Romulo Neri Michael Defensor (LP) Ignacio Bunye (Lakas-CMD)

[f] = female

party-list organizations.) All representatives serve for three years, with no member to be reelected more than twice. At the May 10, 2004, election some members of the three-party Coalition of the United Filipinos (KNP) ran under the KNP label, while others ran under their individual party banners (the Democratic Filipino Struggle, the Party of the Filipino Masses, and the Filipino Democratic Party–

Laban). A number of other winning candidates ran with more than one party endorsement. To further complicate matters, some representatives clarified or changed their party status shortly after the election. As a consequence, various sources have reported slight variations in results, even when relying on information from the Commission on Elections and the House itself. Accordingly, the following totals for the 212 district seats should

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be regarded as qualified: Lakas–Christian Muslim Democrats (Lakas-CMD), 93 seats; Nationalist People’s Coalition (NPC), 54; Liberal Party, 29; Coalition of the United Filipinos, 10; Democratic Filipino Struggle, 7; Party of the Filipino Masses, 4; Philippine Democratic Socialist Party, 2; Filipino Democratic Party–Laban, 2; Alayon, Alliance of Free Filipinos (Kampi), Democratic Action Party, Magdalo Party, Nacionalista Party, New Society Movement, 1 each; independents, 5. In addition, the following 16 parties and other organizations were awarded a total of 24 party-list seats (thus giving the House a total membership of 236): Bayan Muna Party, 3 seats; Association of Philippine Electrical Cooperatives (APEC), 3; Akbayan! Citizens’ Action Party, 3; Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (Buhay), 2; Anakpawis, 2; Alagad, Alliance of Volunteer Educators (AVE), Anak Mindanao (Amin), An Laban ng Indiginong Filipino (ALIF), An Waray, Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (Cibac), Cooperative NATCCO Network Party (Coop-NATCCO), Gabriela Women’s Party, Luzon Farmers Party (Butil), Veterans’ Freedom Party (VFP), Workers’ Party, 1 each. Early in the new House’s session friction arose between Lakas-CMD factions over House leadership posts and committee appointments. In August Kampi, previously a Lakas-CMD ally with a largely overlapping membership, claimed to have the allegiance of 36 congressmen. By then, most of the KNP winners were sitting with their component parties, although several had defected to other parties. Among other changes, 4 of the independents had chosen to sit with the Lakas-CMD group. Speaker: Jose de VENECIA Jr.

Communications Before the martial law period, the Philippine press, including 19 Manila dailies, flourished, but most of the leading papers were shut down in 1972. With easing of the press ban in 1973–1974, some reemerged under the supervision of the Philippine Council for Print Media, but it was not until the 1983 assassination of Benigno Aquino that a true revival occurred.

Freedom of the press is guaranteed by the constitution, but in the wake of the February 2006 state of emergency the government, in an effort to reduce the incidence of negative news reports about its activities, has employed pressure tactics that include, according to the International Herald Tribune, “warnings, watch lists, surveillance, court cases, harassment lawsuits and threats of arrest on charges of sedition.” Moreover, the Communist and Islamic insurgencies have contributed to a climate of violence that has made the Philippines the second deadliest country for journalists, after Iraq.

Press The following are English-language dailies published in Manila, unless otherwise noted: People’s Bagong Taliba (500,000), in Pilipino; Abante (420,000), tabloid, in Pilipino and English; Philippine Star (275,000); Manila Bulletin (270,000); Philippine Daily Enquirer (250,000); Tempo (230,000), in English and Pilipino; Manila Times (200,000); Malaya (180,000); Balita (150,000), in Pilipino; Bisaya (90,000), weekly, in CebuVisayan; Bannawag (40,000), weekly, in Ilocano.

News Agencies The domestic facility is the Philippines News Agency (PNA); a number of foreign bureaus also maintain offices in Manila.

Broadcasting and Computing The principal broadcasting group, encompassing some 600 radio and 130 television stations (including television relays), is the Association of Broadcasters in the Philippines (Kapisanan ng Mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas). The government’s Philippines Broadcasting Service, with some 30 radio stations, is a leading source of news. The government has announced its intention to privatize two state-run television networks, IBC-13 and RPN-9. In 1999 radio stations reached approximately 12.5 million receivers. In 2003 more than a dozen television networks were received by over 12 million television sets, while 2.5 million personal computers served 4.5 million Internet users.

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Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. Albert Ferreros Del ROSARIO U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Kristie KENNEY

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Permanent Representative to the UN Lauro L. BAJA Jr. IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, APEC, ASEAN, BIS, CP, Interpol, IOM, NAM, WCO, WTO

S A M OA INDEPENDENT STATE

OF

SAMOA

Sa‘oloto Tuto‘atasi o Samoa

The Country What was formerly called Western Samoa consists of two volcanic islands (Savai’i and Upolu) and several minor islets located east of Fiji and west of American Samoa in the south central Pacific. The country enjoys a tropical climate and good volcanic soils, but rugged topography limits the cultivated and populated areas to the lowlands and coastal fringes. The Christian, highly literate Samoans are representatives of the second-largest ethnic group of Polynesia. They have had lengthy contact with the West but retain their traditional social structure. This structure is based on an extended family grouping known as the aiga, whose chief, or matai, serves also as the group’s political representative. The economy is largely based on subsistence agriculture and fishing, supplemented by the production of copra, coffee, and bananas for export. (Cocoa was an increasingly important cash crop in the 1980s but is currently limited primarily to domestic consumption.) Basic raw materials are lacking and the country suffers from a chronic trade deficit, part of which is offset by tourism and remittances from Samoans living in New Zealand and the United States. Listed by the United Nations as a Least Developed Country (LDC), Samoa was ravaged by cyclones in February 1990 and December 1991 that decimated crucial banana, cocoa, and coconut plantations, leaving the economy in tatters. In 1993 leaf blight of the taro, a plant cultivated widely throughout tropical regions of Asia for its edible tuber, threatened devastation of another major crop. Nonetheless, real economic growth, led

by a surge in exports, averaged over 6 percent per year in 1995 and 1996 before declining to 1.6 percent in 1997. Growth of about 3.5 percent was achieved in 1998 (primarily due to a boom in commercial tuna fishing) with inflation declining to 2.2 percent (from nearly 7 percent in 1997). Growth rose to 5.6 percent in 1999 and to an estimated 6.8 percent in 2000, with inflation averaging less than 1 percent for the two-year period. The economic improvement was attributed, in part, to government initiatives to support the private sector, which have included tax breaks for foreign investors, modernization of customs procedures, and

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Political Status: Independent state since January 1, 1962; member of the Commonwealth since 1970; under mixed political system approximating a constitutional monarchy. Area: 1,097 sq. mi. (2,842 sq. km.). Population: 176,710 (2001C); 179,000 (2005E). Major Urban Center (2005E): APIA (40,700). Official Languages: English, Samoan. Monetary Unit: Tala (official rate July 1, 2006: 2.80 tala = $1US). Head of State: Susuga Malietoa TANUMAFILI II; assumed office as Joint Head of State for Life on January 1, 1962, becoming sole Head of State on the death of his associate, Tupua Tamasese MEAOLE, on April 5, 1963. Prime Minister: Tuila’epa Sailele MALIELEGAOI (Human Rights Protection Party); confirmed by the Legislative Assembly on November 23, 1998, following the resignation of Tofilau Eti ALESANA (Human Rights Protection Party); continued in office following the elections of March 2, 2001, and March 31, 2006.

reduction of import tariffs. The government has also privatized some state-run enterprises while promoting the fledgling offshore banking sector. Efforts to improve oversight of offshore facilities followed criticism in June 2001 by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which included Samoa on a list of jurisdictions with questionable tax policies. Triggered by a widening trade deficit, the economy wavered in 2001 through 2004, GDP growth averaging less than 3.0 percent annually through the period, but reviving to 6.0 percent in 2005.

Government and Politics Political Background An object of missionary interest since the 1830s, the Samoan Islands came under joint British, German, and American supervision in 1889 but were politically divided as a consequence of an 1899 treaty whereby the United States annexed East-

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ern (American) Samoa, while Western Samoa became a German protectorate. New Zealand occupied Western Samoa during World War I and acquired subsequent control of the territory under a League of Nations mandate. Opposition to the New Zealand administration resulted in the formation of a nationalist organization known as the “Mau,” which was active between 1927 and 1936. Following World War II a Samoan request for independence was rejected, and Western Samoa continued under New Zealand administration as a United Nations Trust Territory. Political evolution, however, gained momentum. Cabinet government was introduced in 1959; a new constitution, adopted in 1960, was approved by plebiscite in 1961; and the country became fully independent by agreement with New Zealand and the United Nations on January 1, 1962. The largely ceremonial position of head of state was at first held jointly by the representatives of two of the four royal lines (the Tuiaana/Tuiatua and the Malietoa), but one of the incumbents died in 1963. The other, Malietoa TANUMAFILI II, now over 90, continues in office. Political life since independence has seen a number of changes as well as a series of recent challenges to certain aspects of the country’s constitutional structure. The first government after independence lasted through 1970 under Prime Minister Fiame MATA’AFA, when it was replaced by an administration headed by Tupua Tamasese LEALOFI IV. The Tamasese regime was in turn succeeded in 1973 by another Mata’afa government, although Tupua Tamasese returned as acting prime minister to serve the remainder of Mata’afa’s term upon the latter’s death in May 1975. In March 1976, following a legislative election in which over half of the incumbents lost their seats, Tupuola Taisi EFI became the first prime minister not a Tama Aiga (“Royal Son”) from one of the four leading families. After balloting on February 24, 1979, that again saw over half the assembly members defeated, Tupuola Efi was redesignated prime minister after legislative endorsement by a narrow vote of 24–23. At the election of February 27, 1982, the islands’ first formally constituted political group, the

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Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP), won a plurality of 22 parliamentary seats and after a lengthy period of consultation with independent members succeeded, on April 13, in organizing a government under Va’ai KOLONE. However, the party lost its 1-seat majority in late June upon the ouster of a member found guilty of electoral malpractice, and on September 18 Kolone’s own seat was vacated by the Supreme Court on similar grounds. Former prime minister Tupuola Efi was thereupon returned to office, although his attempt to form a coalition government was rebuffed by the HRPP, which argued that the court had exceeded its authority in its expulsion orders. Upon rejection of a budget bill, Tupuola Efi was again forced to resign, and the new HRPP leader, Tofilau Eti ALESANA, succeeded him on December 30, the party having regained its majority in special elections to refill the vacated seats. In mid-1984 opposition leader Tupuola Efi was designated a Tama Aiga in succession to his cousin, former prime minister Tamasese Lealofi IV, thenceforth being addressed as Tuiatua Tupua Tamasese EFI. The HRPP captured 31 of 47 assembly seats at the election of February 22, 1985, Tofilau Eti being redesignated prime minister after former prime minister Va’ai Kolone had withdrawn a bid to recover the party leadership. Despite his party’s technical majority, Tofilau Eti was forced to resign on December 27, 1985, after members of the HRPP had joined with the opposition (now including Va’ai Kolone) to defeat the 1986 budget bill on a 27–19 vote. During the following week a new coalition government headed by Kolone was formed, the head of state having rejected a request to dissolve the assembly. The results of the extremely close election of February 26, 1988, were not announced until the new assembly convened on April 7, at which time the HRPP was declared to have obtained a bare majority of 24 seats, with Tofilau Eti returning as prime minister. By late summer, following a number of Supreme Court rulings on electoral challenges and a series of special elections, HRPP’s representation had increased to 27. In a popular referendum on October 29, 1990, voters, by a narrow margin, indicated that they fa-

vored the adoption of universal suffrage for all persons 21 or over (albeit with only chiefs eligible as candidates), while rejecting by a 3–2 margin the establishment of an upper chamber reserved for matai. Under the new procedure the HRPP won an increased majority of 30 seats (1 of which was subsequently vacated) at the election of April 5, 1991, with Tofilau Eti forming a new government on May 14. In early 1994 the introduction of a value-added tax on goods and services generated a series of demonstrations and protest marches, one of the latter being led by the head of the Catholic Church in Apia, Cardinal Pio TAOFINUU, who called for the exemption of such items as food and school supplies. The HRPP responded by expelling 3 antitax members, thereby reducing its position (in the wake of several 1993 defections) to a legislative plurality of 23 seats. However, by March 1995, after special elections and other realignments, it had regained a majority of 33. At the election of April 26, 1996, government representation declined further to 22, with a loss of 3 cabinet members and the assembly speaker. However, Tofilau Eti retained office by a 34–14 vote on May 17, with a number of independents entering the HRPP to establish its majority once more. In early 1997 Tofilau Eti introduced a constitutional amendment, which was subsequently approved, to change the country’s name from Western Samoa to Samoa. The change was bitterly opposed by American Samoans, who were, however, unable to secure a reversal. On November 23, 1998, Tofilau Eti, who had long been in ill health, resigned as prime minister in favor of his deputy, Tuila’epa Sailele MALIELEGAOI. The former prime minister died four months later. Questionable practices by high-level officials were apparently involved in the bizarre murder of Public Works Minister Luagalau Levaula KAMU on July 16, 1999. Eletise Leafa VITALE, the son of former Women’s Affairs minister Leafa VITALE, was arrested and on August 7 sentenced to death for the crime. The elder Vitale and former Post Office and Telecommunications Minister Toi AUKUSO

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were subsequently charged with complicity in Luagalau’s death and on April 14, 2000, were also given death sentences, which were, however, commuted by the head of state on May 12. Prime Minister Tuila’epa was returned to office following the legislative election of March 2, 2001, although the HRPP required the adherence of independents to secure his confirmation and establish a working majority in the Legislative Assembly. He was returned with a far more commanding majority of 33 after the election of March 31, 2006.

Constitution and Government As defined by the constitution of October 28, 1960, Samoa’s political institutions combine the forms of British-style parliamentary democracy with elements of the traditional Samoan social structure. The head of state (O le Ao o le Malo), who performs the duties of a constitutional sovereign, has been and presumably will continue to be recruited from among the four paramount island chiefs. Although the present incumbent has been designated for life, future heads of state will be elected by the Legislative Assembly (Fono Aoao Faitulafono) for five-year terms. The head of state appoints the prime minister and, on the latter’s advice, members of the cabinet, who are drawn from the assembly and are responsible to that body. Traditionally, most members of the assembly were indirectly elected by matai, or family heads, whose number was increased by one-third to 16,000 in a series of controversial appointments before the 1985 balloting; direct election was limited to two special representatives chosen by universal adult suffrage of persons outside the matai system. Although universal suffrage (without universal right of candidacy) was endorsed in the October 1990 referendum, the Washington Pacific Report noted that “only 62.4 percent [of the eligible voters] were registered, only 46.3 percent voted and only 22.9 percent actually backed . . . the measure.” A similar franchise extension had been rejected by the assembly in 1981; however, with chiefly titles being created at a rate exceeding that of population growth and with some individuals holding multiple titles (each carrying an electoral vote), the matai

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system had come under mounting criticism. Given the increasingly prevalent practice of bestowing titles for political purposes, universal suffrage, ironically, came to be viewed as a means of maintaining historic Samoan values. The judicial system is headed by a Supreme Court and includes a Court of Appeal, magistrates’ courts, and a special Land and Titles Court for dealing with disputes over customary land and Samoan titles. For the most part, local government is carried out through the matai system and includes the institution of the village fono, or council. There are some part-time government officials who operate in rural areas.

Foreign Relations Samoa has established diplomatic relations with over two dozen other countries (including the People’s Republic of China), most of which conduct relations with Apia through diplomats accredited to New Zealand. Although not choosing to apply for United Nations membership until 1976, Samoa had previously joined a number of UN subsidiary agencies and other international organizations, including the World Health Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank group, in addition to such regional organizations as the South Pacific Commission (now the Pacific Community). Relations with the country’s principal trading partner, New Zealand, which had been cordial since independence, cooled in 1978 and 1979 as a result of Wellington’s attempt to expel some 200 Samoan “overstayers” who had expected to be granted New Zealand citizenship. Subsequently, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London ruled that all Western Samoans born between 1928 and 1949 (when New Zealand passed legislation separating its own citizenship from that of Britain), as well as their children, were entitled to such rights. However, the decision was effectively invalidated by an agreement concluded in mid-1982 by prime ministers Va’ai Kolone and Robert Muldoon whereby only the estimated 50,000 Samoans resident in New Zealand could claim citizenship. The

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accord was widely criticized within Samoa, then opposition leader Tupuola Efi chastising the government for abrogating “a basic tenet of the AngloSaxon legal heritage that the right to legal citizenship can only be surrendered by personal choice.” A related issue arose in early 1989, when Wellington announced that it might terminate a special immigration quota for Samoans on the ground that the immigrants were contributing to New Zealand’s high rate of unemployment. The dispute was partially resolved at midyear with a statement from Prime Minister Lange that the quota would remain, with a stricter application of its rules. Subsequently, in September 1991, the Samoan government indicated that it would not seek amnesty from Wellington for 7,500 overstayers, following assurances by New Zealand authorities that their appeal rights would be protected. There have also been many visa overstayers in American Samoa, where it is estimated that some 37,000 of the territory’s 57,000 inhabitants are nonnative; however, the problem is not viewed as seriously as elsewhere because of the shared cultural identity of the two island peoples. That shared identity was, however, central to American Samoa’s objection to adoption of the unqualified name “Samoa” by its western neighbor. In early 1998 the lower house of the territorial legislature approved a bill that would have refused entry to anyone whose passport bore the new name; however, the measure subsequently died in the Senate. As with a number of other financially strapped countries, accusations have been made of the illegal sale of passports to Chinese nationals. Prime Minister Tofilau Eti denied any knowledge of such a practice, although a number of individuals were formally indicted in the matter, including the former ambassador to the United States, Dr. Tuaopepe Felix WENDT.

remittances are the highest in the region, tourism is now the leading foreign exchange earner. Both have helped to provide Samoa with one of the fastest growing Pacific island economies.

Political Parties Traditionally there were no political parties in Western Samoa. Following the 1979 election, the Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP) was organized by Va’ai Kolone to oppose the reconfirmation of Tupuola Taisi Efi as prime minister. Following his expulsion from the Legislative Assembly in 1982, Va’ai turned the party leadership over to Tofilau Eti Alesana and, upon his return, sat as an opposition independent before joining the Samoan National Development Party (SNDP). (Va’ai Kolone died in April 2001.) A number of short-lived parties were formed during the 1990s. The Samoa Democratic Party was launched in 1993 by previously independent Fono deputy Le Tagaloa Pita, who objected to the two-year extension of the parliamentary mandate (see under Legislature, below) without submission of the issue to a popular referendum. The Samoa Liberal Party (SLP) was formed in 1994 by four deputies, including three expelled from the HRPP, who had opposed the goods and services tax. The Samoa Labour Party (SLP) was launched in 1994 by Toleapaialii Siueva, an outspoken resort operator, who succeeded in defeating the incumbent Fono speaker in the 1996 election before resigning in the face of bribery charges. The Samoa AllPeople’s Party (SAPP) was organized before the 1996 election by a previously independent deputy, Matatumua MAIMOAGA, who failed to retain her seat.

Governing Party Current Issues Samoa has long experienced widespread poverty and joblessness among young people; in addition, despite the cultivation of direct foreign investment, there has been a persistent imbalance between imports and exports. Although overseas

Human Rights Protection Party (HRPP). One seat short of a legislative majority after its formation in 1979, the HRPP won 22 of 47 seats at the February 1982 balloting and, after protracted negotiation with independent members, secured a 1-seat majority that permitted the installation of a Va’ai

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Kolone government on April 13. As a result of legal actions in late June and mid-September, 2 seats, including the prime minister’s, were lost, Va’ai turning the party leadership over to Tofilau Eti Alesana, who was able to form a new HRPP government at the end of the year. Tofilau Eti subsequently led the HRPP to a landslide 31–16 victory at the election of February 22, 1985, but lost control of the government in December by defection of HRPP members to the opposition. Gaining a new term as prime minister by the barest possible legislative majority in April 1988, he described the party’s program as emphasizing “electrification, sealed roads, and water supplies for the whole country.” Declaring that it would be his last, the HRPP leader formed a drastically restructured government following the election of April 5, 1991. Despite a serious heart condition, he reversed himself in 1996 and won easy reelection. His party was less successful, declining to a plurality of 22 seats before regaining a majority with the conversion of independents. Tofilau Eti’s successor as prime minister, Tuila’epa Malielegaoi, carried the party to a plurality at the March 2001 election, after which the HRPP attracted enough independents to claim a majority of 28 seats when the new Legislative Assembly convened and gained 2 additional seats as a result of subsequent special elections. The HRPP led the balloting of March 31, 2006, and with the addition of 5 members who had campaigned as independents, held a commanding majority of 33 legislative seats. Leaders: Tuila’epa Sailele MALIELEGAOI (Prime Minister), Misa Telefoni RETZLAFF (Deputy Prime Minister), Laulu Dan STANLEY (General Secretary).

Parliamentary Opposition Samoa Democratic United Party (SDUP). The SDUP was formed in 2003 by the merger of the Samoan National Development Party (SNDP) and the Samoan United Independent Party (SUIP) following disqualification of the SNDP for providing the Interparliamentary Union (IPU) with allegedly false information about the government.

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The SNDP had been formed by opposition leader Tupua Tamasese Efi after the 1988 election. The new group was reportedly backed by members of the former Christian Democratic Party (organized by Efi before the 1985 balloting, at which it won 16 seats), in addition to defectors from the HRPP. It slipped to 14 seats in 1991 and to 13 in 1996. By mid-1997 SNDP representation had dropped to 8 MPs, 1 fewer than permitted by Samoan law to retain official recognition. At the March 2001 general election the SNDP finished with 13 seats and then fashioned a coalition with the SUIP. Before the opening of the new legislative session the coalition claimed to have sufficient support to form a new government, but it ended up 4 seats short of a majority, with 21. It therefore remained in opposition under Lemamea Ropati Mualia, who replaced Tupua Tamasese Efi as leader of the party and of the opposition. The SUIP was registered as a party before the March 2001 election, at which it initially claimed 13 seats after the balloting; however, the number fell to 7 following recounts and defections to the HRPP. After formation of an opposition coalition with the SNDP, Asiata Saleimoa Va’ai, son of former Prime Minister Va’ai Kolone, was selected as leader of the opposition in the Fono, but he voluntarily surrendered the post to the larger SNDP. Leaders: Lemamea Ropati MUALIA (Leader of the Opposition), Tuimalealiifano Va’aletoa SUALAUVI, ASIATA Saleimoa Va’ai.

Other Parties Samoan Party (SP). The SP was formed in September 2005 by Su’a Rimoni Ah Chong, who had been dismissed as auditor general in 1995 for issuing a report that criticized government corruption. The party won no seats in 2006. Leader: Su’a RIMONI Ah Chong. Samoan Christian Party (SCP). Also referenced simply as the Christian Party (CP), the SCP is primarily a women’s party. Leader: Tuala Tiresa MALIETOA. There is also a recently launched Samoan Progressive Political Party (SPPP) that is without

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Cabinet As of August 1, 2006 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister

Tuila’epa Sailele Malielegaoi Misa Telefoni Retzlaff

Ministers Agriculture, Forests, and Fisheries Commerce and Industry Communications and Information Technology Community and Social Development Education, Sports, and Culture Finance and National Provident Fund Foreign Affairs Foreign Trade Health Immigration Justice Labor Natural Resources and Environment Police, Prisons, and Fire Service Revenue Tourism Women’s Affairs Works, Transport and Infrastructure Attorney General’s Office

Taua Tavagokitiona Seuala Misa Telefoni Retzlaff Mulitalo Siafausa Vui Fiame Naomi Mata’afa [f] Toomata Alapati Poesi Toomata Niko Lee Hang Tuila’epa Sailele Malielegaoi Misa Telefoni Retzlaff Gatoloaifaana Amataga Alesana Gidlow [f] Tuila’epa Sailele Malielegaoi Unasa Mesi Galo Misa Telefoni Retzlaff Faumuina Tiatia Liuga Toleafoa Apulu Faafisi Tuu’u Anasi’i Leota Misa Telefoni Retzlaff Fiame Naomi Mata’afa [f] Tuisugaletaua Sufara Aveau Tuila’epa Sailele Malielegaoi

[f] = female

legislative representation, while a number of parties that presented candidates in 2001, including the Faamatai Party (FP), the Pati Samoa Aoao (PSA), the Samoa National Party (SNP), and the Samoa United People’s Party (SUPP), are now considered defunct.

stituencies by universal suffrage of persons over 21, with an additional 2 members elected by and from those outside the matai system. After the balloting the Human Rights Protection Party held 33 seats; the Samoa Democratic United Party, 10; and independents, 6. Speaker: Tolofuaivalelei Falemoe LEIATAVA.

Legislature In November 1991 the term of the unicameral Legislative Assembly (Fono Aoao Faitulafono) was changed from three to five years (subject to dissolution), with 2 seats being added to the existing 47. At the most recent election of March 31, 2006, 47 matai were elected from territorial con-

Communications Press Freedom of the press is constitutionally guaranteed, although instances of implicit censorship or of contempt citations against journalists are not

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unknown. The following are issued in Apia in English and Samoan: Samoa News (5,000), daily, merged with the weekly Samoa Times in 1994; The Samoa Observer (4,600), independent daily; Samoa Weekly (4,000); Savali (2,000), government fortnightly. During 1997 concern arose over threats by the government to impede publication of the Samoa Observer, the country’s only daily. The paper faced $1.6 million in libel and defamation suits as representative of influences that “stir up trouble” but went on to become the first Pacific paper to win the 1998 Astor Award for press freedom in the Commonwealth.

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dio service in English and Samoan. Domestic television broadcasting was initiated in mid-1993. The country’s 40,000 TV sets can also receive programming from American Samoa. There were approximately 1,100 personal computers serving 4,000 Internet users in 2003.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. and Permanent Representative to the UN Ali’ioaiga Feturi ELISAIA

Broadcasting and Computing

U.S. Ambassador to Samoa William Paul McCORMICK (resident in New Zealand)

The Samoa Broadcasting Service is a government-controlled body that provides commercial ra-

IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, CWTH, PC, PIF, WCO

SINGAPORE REPUBLIC

OF

SINGAPORE

Xinjiapo Gongheguo (Chinese) Republik Singapura (Malay) Singapur Kutiyarasu (Tamil)

The Country Joined to the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula by a three-quarter-mile-long causeway, Singapore consists of a single large island, on which the city of Singapore is located, and some 50 adjacent islets. Situated at the crossroads of Southeast Asian trade routes, the country is one of the world’s most densely populated, with some twothirds of the population—about 77 percent ethnic Chinese, 14 percent Malay, and 7 percent Indian and Pakistani—residing in Singapore City. Religious divisions follow ethnic divisions: the Malays and Pakistanis are Muslim, the Indians are Hindu, and the Chinese include Buddhists, Christians, Taoists, and Confucianists. Adult literacy is over 90 percent. Women, who constitute 44 percent of the labor force, are prominent in the professions and academia, although constituting only 20 percent of the 84 members of Parliament elected in May 2006. The economy has traditionally been geared to the entrepˆot trade, with a heavy emphasis on the processing and transshipment of rubber, timber, petroleum, and other regional products, and on related banking, shipping, insurance, and storage services. Services still account for 65 percent of GDP and employ 75 percent of the labor force. In the 1980s, however, the government promoted the growth of sophisticated, capital-intensive manufacturing: computers and electronic instruments, machinery, automobile parts, and precision tools. At the same time, mandated wage increases effec-

tively forced the relocation of labor-intensive, lowvalued-added enterprises to other countries and decreased the city-state’s dependence on foreign workers. Thus, in addition to ranking as a leading oil refining hub and as a “global operations center” for over 3,500 multinational firms, Singapore is now a major producer of disk drives, personal computers, and related electronics as well as pharmaceuticals. Principal markets are Malaysia, the United States, China/Hong Kong, and Japan. Tourism is also a significant source of earnings.

SINGAPORE

Political Status: Independent republic within the Commonwealth since August 9, 1965. Area: 246 sq. mi. (636 sq. km.), including adjacent islets that encompass some 15 sq. mi. (39 sq. km.). Population: 4,017,733 (2000C); 4,296,000 (2005E). Both figures include nonresidents, who totaled 754,524 in 2000. Major Urban Center (2005E): SINGAPORE (urban area, 4,296,000). Official Languages: Chinese (Mandarin is the preferred form), English, Malay, Tamil. Monetary Unit: Singapore Dollar (market rate July 1, 2006: 1.58 dollars = $1US). President: Sellapan Ramanathan NATHAN; declared president-elect on August 18, 1999, by Presidential Elections Commission, which had ruled other potential nominees ineligible; inaugurated on September 1 for a six-year term, succeeding ONG Teng Cheong; declared president for a second term on August 17, 2005, by the Presidential Elections Commission, which had again ruled other potential nominees ineligible. Prime Minister: LEE Hsien Loong (People’s Action Party); sworn in on August 12, 2004, upon the resignation of GOH Chok Tong (People’s Action Party); continued in office following the election of May 6, 2006.

The rapid economic expansion that characterized the 1970s and 1980s continued into the 1990s. With inflation averaging only 2.5 percent, GDP growth in 1990–1998 reached 8.0 percent, despite a gain of only 1.5 percent in 1998 as a regional financial crisis continued and the world market for electronics softened. A faster-than-expected recovery in 1999 saw growth of about 5.4 percent and was followed by a 10 percent gain in 2000. In 2001, however, a slump in export demand led to the country’s worst recession since the mid-1960s, with GDP down 2.3 percent. A recovery in 2002 produced 4.0 percent growth, while the regional Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in the first half of 2003 contributed to a major setback in the second quarter and annual growth

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of only 2.9 percent. The economy soared in the following year, however, growing at a rate of 8.7 percent. For 2005 growth remained strong, at 6.4 percent.

Government and Politics Political Background Established as a trading station by Sir Stamford RAFFLES in 1819, purchased by Great Britain in 1824, and subsequently organized as part of the Straits Settlements (with Penang and Malacca), Singapore became a crown colony in 1867. It was occupied by the Japanese in World War II and governed after its liberation as a separate entity, achieving internal self-rule within the Commonwealth on June 3, 1959. Led by LEE Kuan Yew of the People’s Action Party (PAP), it joined in 1963 with the Federation of Malaya, Sarawak, and Sabah to form Malaysia, an arrangement designed in part to provide a political counterweight to Singapore’s largely Chinese and left-oriented electorate. Malay opinion subsequently became alarmed by the efforts of Lee and his party to extend their influence into other parts of Malaysia, and Singapore was consequently excluded on August 9, 1965. As a fully independent state, Singapore adopted a republican form of government in 1965. The PAP, which had been seriously challenged in the early 1960s by the more radical Socialist Front (Barisan Sosialis), subsequently consolidated its position, obtaining a monopoly of all legislative seats in the elections of 1968, 1972, 1976, and 1980, but losing one at a by-election in October 1981, two at the general election of 1984, and one in 1988. By then, Prime Minister Lee had made a strong effort to bring “second-liners” (second-generation leaders) into government and the PAP hierarchy. In October 1989, Lee, having become the world’s longest-serving prime minister, confirmed reports that he planned to step down as prime minister. On November 28, 1990, GOH Chok Tong formally succeeded Lee, who nevertheless retained backstage power as “senior minister” and, until 1992, as PAP secretary general.

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Although retaining its political dominance, the PAP was jolted by the outcome of an early election called by Goh for August 31, 1991: the opposition captured four seats while the ruling party’s popular support fell to a 23-year low of 61 percent. In response, the prime minister undertook a September cabinet shakeup that dispensed with most of his “second generation” colleagues in favor of a “third generation” cohort, including his predecessor’s son, LEE Hsien Loong. Conscious that the anti-PAP vote had secured inadequate representation, and in an apparent effort to undermine byelection campaigns by the opposition, the government approved a parliamentary recommendation of September 14, 1992, that six nonelected persons should become MPs, as allowed under a 1990 constitutional amendment. At the legislative election of January 2, 1997, the PAP won 81 of 83 seats with about 65 percent of the popular vote. The following May J. B. JEYARETNAM, secretary general of the Workers’ Party (WP) and a longtime opponent of Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP, was awarded a nonconstituency seat to bring the opposition total up to the constitutionally mandated minimum of three. In mid-July 1999, ONG Teng Cheong, who had been installed in 1993 as Singapore’s first popularly elected president, announced that he would not seek reelection. Ong detailed “a long list of problems” he had faced during his tenure—principally, difficulty in obtaining information from his own government about the extent of Singapore’s financial reserves, for which the president is responsible. Furthermore, despite Ong’s popularity, Prime Minister Goh had withheld his support for a second term, citing concerns over the incumbent’s recent treatment for lymphoma. As a result, S. R. NATHAN, a former military intelligence official and ambassador to the United States, was designated president-elect on August 18 by the Presidential Elections Commission, which had declared that the two other potential nominees did not meet the standards for office. The Commission canceled the presidential election scheduled for August 28, and on September 1 Nathan took the oath of office. (Former president Ong died in February 2002.)

Hoping to forestall negative political consequences of an economic downturn, in October 2001 Prime Minister Goh announced an early legislative election for November 3. Earlier, four opposition parties had organized a Singapore Democratic Alliance (SDA), but the PAP nevertheless retained its stranglehold on Parliament, winning 82 elective seats, compared to 1 for the SDA and 1 for the WP. On August 17, 2003, Prime Minister Goh confirmed what had long been anticipated when he announced that he planned to step aside in favor of Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong before the expiration of the current parliamentary term. The transfer of power took place a year later, on August 12, 2004. A collateral cabinet reshuffle retained all of Goh’s key ministers. On April 20, 2006, Parliament was dissolved and an early election called for May 6. Although the PAP experienced a drop in overall support (67 percent of the vote, down from 75 percent in 2001), it again won 82 seats. Prime Minister Lee then reshuffled his cabinet on May 22.

Constitution and Government Singapore’s current basic law has evolved since 1959, with amendments necessitated by its temporary Malaysian affiliation and the subsequent adoption of republican status. The executive branch is headed by a president with limited powers and a presidentially designated prime minister, who must command a parliamentary majority and who selects a cabinet that is collectively responsible to the Parliament. The unicameral legislature is elected by universal suffrage and compulsory voting for a maximum term of five years. A Presidential Council for Minority Rights reviews legislation (except money bills or security-related legislation) to ensure racial and religious nondiscrimination. Originally, the president was selected by Parliament and served a largely ceremonial role, but a 1991 constitutional amendment provided for a directly elected head of state with enhanced fiscal, national security, and appointive powers. By contrast, a 1996 amendment limited presidential authority, particularly with regard to the veto, as a result of

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which the head of state’s principal role is now to safeguard the country’s financial reserves. A Presidential Elections Commission is responsible for vetting presidential nominees, who must have sufficient governmental or corporate experience and be able to demonstrate “good integrity, character and reputation.” In a 1988 constitutional amendment the electoral system was altered by converting 39 of 81 single-member constituencies (SMCs) into 13 Group Representation Constituencies (GRCs), each of whose 3 members were to include 1 nonChinese. In late 1996 the government announced an expansion of the multimember system, which was again revised before the November 2001 balloting, when candidates were elected from 14 GRCs (9 with 5 members, 5 with 6 members) and 9 SMCs, for a total of 84 elected parliamentarians. Under a 1984 constitutional amendment, up to six additional “nonconstituency” seats may be awarded to ensure opposition representation, with the precise minimum number of opposition seats (currently three) determined by electoral law. Should fewer than three members of the opposition win election, the requisite number of nonconstituency seats are awarded to the opposition candidate(s) who came closest to winning. Such nonelected members are not permitted, however, to vote on key measures, such as money bills, nonconfidence motions, and constitutional amendments. In addition, a 1990 constitutional amendment authorized the president, based on recommendations from a Special Select Committee of Parliament, to name up to six similarly constrained “nonpolitical Singaporeans” to two-year terms. A 1997 amendment raised the number of nonpolitical MPs to nine. Singapore’s Supreme Court encompasses a High Court and a Court of Appeal. Since 1994 the Court of Appeal has served as the highest appellate court, replacing in that capacity the Judicial Committee of the UK Privy Council. Subordinate courts include district and magistrate’s courts. Even before independence, Singapore was administered as a unified city-state, local government bodies having been absorbed by departments of the central government in 1959. In 1960 Parlia-

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ment created a People’s Association (PA), a statutory board chaired by the prime minister and led by a chief executive director. Its goals have included achieving multiracial harmony, advancing social cohesion, and organizing community work. As such, it has sponsored residential committees, a Social Development Service, volunteer and grassroots organizations, community clubs, and youth programs, among other bodies and activities. The PA is also responsible for appointing members of Community Development Councils (CDCs). In 2000 Prime Minister Goh stated that the government planned to give the CDCs greater authority, responsibilities, and funding, in order to decentralize delivery of various services and other government functions. At present, the country’s 23 electoral constituencies are grouped into five CDCs, each of which has an appointed mayor (a member of Parliament) assisted by roughly 12–80 councilors drawn from among community leaders, administrators, and professionals.

Foreign Relations Singapore joined the United Nations in 1965 and in 1967 helped found the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Upon the departure of most British defense forces in 1971, Singapore became a member of the Five Power Defense Arrangement (along with Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia), a regional security system that calls for the maintenance of Commonwealth forces in Singapore. Following independence, Singapore’s relations with its immediate neighbors were frequently tense, although they have improved dramatically in recent years. In February 1989 Malaysia and Singapore held their first joint military exercises since 1965, and in March the Lee government signed defense agreements with both Malaysia and Indonesia. In early 1992, however, SingaporeMalaysia relations were again strained when a visit to Singapore by U.S. President George H. W. Bush produced an agreement on relocating a U.S. naval logistical command headquarters from Subic Bay, Philippines, to Singapore.

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With regard to other regional countries, Singapore’s staunch anticommunist posture precluded close ties with China and Vietnam until the early 1990s. In October 1990 China announced that longsevered diplomatic links to Singapore had been resumed. Subsequently, in the wake of the October 1991 pact to end hostilities in Cambodia, Singapore and Vietnam agreed to upgrade their relations to the ambassadorial level. In early 1997 Singapore’s relations with Malaysia took a downturn once again after Lee Kuan Yew described the Malaysian state of Johor as “notorious for shootings, muggings and carjackings.” Lee ultimately apologized for the remark, and in 1998 the two countries moved in concert to combat the regional economic crisis, with Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad and President Goh both urging improved coordination among fellow ASEAN members. In April the two states agreed to submit to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) competing claims to the islet of Pulau Batu Putih (Pedra Branca), although a formal agreement to that effect was not signed until February 2003. (As of June 2006, the ICJ had not yet ruled.) Eight months later the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ruled against Malaysia and in favor of Singapore’s right to conduct land reclamation on Pulau Tekong island. In January 2005 the neighbors reached a “mutually acceptable and beneficial solution” to the dispute. On September 4, 2001, Singapore and Malaysia signed an agreement on settling their differences over water supplies, transport links, the right of Singapore’s aircraft to enter Malaysian airspace, and other matters. The accord took some 15 years to negotiate but failed to achieve quick results because of Singapore’s insistence on resolving all issues as a package. In December 2004 the two countries began new talks, which also focused on releasing Malaysian workers’ pension funds held by Singapore and on building a bridge to replace the outdated causeway that connects Singapore to the mainland. In April 2006, however, Malaysia scrapped plans for the bridge, construction of which Singapore continued to link to restoration

of full airspace rights as well as to a 20-year commitment from Malaysia for 1 billion cubic meters of sand for reclamation. In 1997–1998 Singapore responded to the economic crisis in Indonesia by offering humanitarian aid, loan guarantees, and credits, but an influx of Indonesian refugees in May 1998, preceding the resignation of President Suharto, caused considerable concern. Tenuous relations with the successor Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie government were not helped when the new Indonesian president later characterized Singapore as a “dot” on the map. In November, however, newly elected Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid made Singapore the first stop on his first overseas trip and garnered a pledge of support from the Goh administration. In 2006 Singapore and Indonesia signed an agreement on establishing special economic zones on three nearby Indonesian islands, the principal purpose being to attract investment capital from Singapore. Other matters under consideration at midyear included an antiterror pact and a defense cooperation agreement that Prime Minister Lee had proposed during an October 2005 official visit to Indonesia. In early 2003 the government published a report on the regional Jemaah Islamiah (JI—see the Indonesia article for additional information) network detailing a terrorist bombing campaign that had been thwarted by the arrest in December 2001 of 15 Muslims. A number of those arrested had apparently been trained in Afghanistan at al-Qaida camps. The government announced the arrests of another 21 militants in September 2002. The government’s support for the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 met with considerable disapproval, not exclusively from Muslims. Singapore committed one ship, but no troops, to the effort.

Current Issues The outcome of the May 2006 national election held no surprises except, perhaps, that overall support for the PAP had dropped since 2001. To

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counter concerns of a widening income disparity, the budget introduced in February had called for distributing some $1.7 billion in a “Progress Package” that included a “growth dividend” for all adults, a Workfare Bonus for some 260,000 low-paid workers, a national service bonus for adult males who had completed or were currently fulfilling their national service requirement, and “top-ups” to Central Provident Fund retirement and medical accounts. The first Progress Package payments were distributed shortly before the election. The abbreviated election campaign also focused on WP candidate James GOMEZ, who had charged the elections department with losing his required paperwork. In the end, however, he was forced to admit that he had failed to submit all the forms, which permitted the government to attack opponents who questioned its integrity. Criticism of the government remains circumscribed by legal impediments, including the country’s severe slander laws and the Internal Security Act. Moreover, the PAP continues to use lawsuits and the threat of consequent bankruptcy against opponents. A recent target has been CHEE Soon Juan, leader of the small Singapore Democratic Party (SDP). Chee’s many offenses have included speaking publicly without a license, selling his book To Be Free without a permit, defaming Goh and Lee Kuan Yew during the 2001 election campaign, and questioning the judiciary’s independence. Internationally, Singapore continues to actively pursue trade pacts. Since 2000 important bilateral agreements have been concluded with Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States. In July 2005 Singapore, Brunei, Chile, and New Zealand signed a Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership agreement. In addition, a proposed East Asian Economic Community (EAEC), grouping the ten ASEAN members plus China, India, and Japan, could eventually challenge both the European Union and the North American Free Trade Area. A first East Asian summit of prospective members was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in December 2005.

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Political Parties Since Singapore achieved self-rule in 1959, the People’s Action Party (PAP) has never been out of power. Although roughly two dozen legal parties have been registered in recent years, most have had minuscule memberships. In November 2001 the opposition offered candidates in only 29 of 84 districts, protesting that high candidates’ deposits, fund-raising restrictions, gerrymandering, and use of defamation suits against opposition politicians guaranteed the PAP’s predominance. In May 2006 the three leading opposition formations—the Workers’ Party (WP), the Singapore Democratic Alliance (SDA), and the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP)—contested 47 seats but won only 2.

Governing Party People’s Action Party (PAP). Organized as a radical socialist party in 1954, the PAP has been Singapore’s ruling party since 1959. Some of its more militant leaders were arrested by the British in 1957, and other radicals split off in 1961 to form the Socialist Front (see under WP, below). What remained was the more moderate, anti-Communist wing of the original party, which has supported a pragmatic program emphasizing social welfare and economic development. Despite its legislative dominance, the party’s share of the total vote declined steadily from 78 percent in 1980 to 61 percent in 1991. However, it rebounded to a 65 percent share in January 1997, when the PAP won 81 of 83 parliamentary seats, and to nearly 75 percent in 2001, when it won 82 of 84 seats. Prime Minister Goh soon announced that a “People’s Action Forum” of 20 MPs would be set up as an internal opposition to encourage debate within the PAP. Under the leadership of Goh’s successor, Lee Hsien Loong, the PAP won 67 percent of the vote and 82 elective seats at the May 2006 election. Leaders: LEE Hsien Loong (Prime Minister and Secretary General of the Party), LEE Kuan Yew (Minister Mentor), GOH Chok Tong (Senior

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Minister), LIM Boon Heng (Chair), YAACOB Ibrahim (Vice Chair).

Parliamentary Opposition Workers’ Party—WP (Parti Pekerja). Founded in 1957 and reorganized in 1971, the WP long advocated a more democratic constitution and closer relations with Malaysia. In its early years a number of WP leaders were arrested for alleged proCommunist activities, and in 1978 its secretary general, Joshua Benjamin Jeyaretnam, was convicted of having committed “a very grave slander” against Prime Minister Lee. At a by-election in October 1981, the Sri Lankan–born Jeyaretnam became the first opposition member of Parliament since 1968. Despite having previously been acquitted of making a false declaration about party finances, Jeyaretnam and the party chair, Wong Hong Toy, were retried in September 1985. Jeyaretnam was fined and imprisoned for one month in late 1986, which cost him his legislative seat. Prior to the 1988 balloting, the Socialist Front (Barisan Sosialis) and the Singapore United Front—SUF (Barisan Bersatu Singapura) merged with the WP. Formed in 1961 by a group of proBeijing PAP militants under the leadership of trade unionist LIM Chin Siong, the Barisan Sosialis was the leading opposition party until 1966, when 11 members resigned their seats and 2 went underground. The SUF, organized in 1973, ran third in 1984 but won no legislative seats. In May 1989 Singapore’s most celebrated political prisoner, former Barisan Socialis leader CHIA Thye Poh, was released after 23 years’ detention, a record second only to that of South Africa’s Nelson Mandela. Remaining restrictions imposed on Chia’s political activity were finally lifted in November 1998. The WP elected one MP in 1991 and again in January 1997. In May 1997 Secretary General Jeyaretnam was awarded a nonconstituency seat, even though he and fellow WP candidate TANG Liang Hong had been sued by Prime Minister Goh and other PAP members for defaming them during the election campaign. Claiming his life had been threatened, Tang fled abroad, and in March he was

found guilty in absentia and ordered to pay heavy damages. To make matters worse, in late 1997 the government issued a warrant for his arrest on tax evasion charges. Jeyaretnam also lost his case, and in July 1998 a court not only dismissed his appeal but also raised the damage award. A subsequent report indicated that Jeyaretnam had agreed to pay some $61,500 in installments to avoid bankruptcy and forfeiture of his seat in Parliament. In May 1999 the Court of Appeal dismissed a request by the WP to throw out a defamation award of over $150,000 won by a group called the Tamil Language Committee, which had sued over an article in the party newsletter. The septuagenarian Jeyaretnam himself lost an appeal of a bankruptcy order in July 2001 and was thereby forced to vacate his parliamentary seat. Citing lack of support for his case, he resigned from the WP before the November 2001 election, at which the party again won one seat. In April 2002 Jeyaretnam publicly apologized for his 1997 remarks, in return for which the government dropped seven other lawsuits against him. In 2003 Sylvia Lim was elected to chair the party, thereby becoming the first woman to assume that role. At the 2006 election the WP won one seat. Lim claimed a second, nonconstituency seat. Leaders: Sylvia LIM Swee Lian (Chair), LOW Thia Khiang (Secretary General and Member of Parliament). Singapore Democratic Alliance (SDA). Formation of the four-party SDA was announced on July 28, 2001. At the November 2001 election it won only one seat but was later awarded an additional nonconstituency seat. In May 2006 it retained only its electoral seat. Afterward, the SDA’s lack of success led to calls from some quarters for a change of leadership and the merger of the participating parties. Leaders: CHIAM See Tong (Chair), MUHAMMAD Ali Aman (Vice Chair), YIP Yew Meng (Secretary General). Singapore People’s Party (SPP). A moderate breakaway faction of the SDP (below), the

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SPP was registered in November 1994. In December 1996 it joined most of the other active opposition parties, including the SDP, NSP, SJP, DPP, and SNF (all discussed below), in efforts to avoid competing against each other in the upcoming national election. At the January 1997 balloting the party won one seat, tying the WP for opposition representation in the Parliament. The SPP’s sole MP is Chiam See Tong, a longtime legislator who joined the party in late 1996 after losing a power struggle in the SDP. Leaders: SIN Kek Tong (Chair), YONG Seng Fatt (Vice Chair), CHIAM See Tong (Secretary General and Member of Parliament). Singapore Malay National Organization (Pertubuhan Kebangsaan Melayu Singapura— PKMS). Originally an affiliate of the United Malays National Organization in Malaysia, the PKMS supports Malay interests, racial harmony, national unity, and “the advancement of Islam without interfering in the affairs of other religions.” In February 1999 it called for government creation of a “supervisory council” charged with eliminating racial discrimination. An intraparty dispute erupted in November 2003 when two members accused the party’s secretary general, Muhammad Ali Aman, of an affair with a married staffer. They also demanded the dismissal of Vice President KHAMARUDDIN Ahman Sufi for being bankrupt and the party’s treasurer for alleged illiteracy. At the same time, two previously prominent PKMS members were under investigation for allegedly misappropriating funds from a party-owned company. Dismissed from the PKMS in May 2003 but reinstated on technical grounds by the courts in November, Mohammed RAHIZAN Yaacob, a former secretary general, subsequently joined the WP. Leaders: BORHAN Ariffin (President), MUHAMMAD Ali Aman (Deputy President). National Solidarity Party (NSP). According to the Far Eastern Economic Review, the NSP was conceived in April 1986 by a group

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of former SDP and SUF leaders to appeal to “young professionals [seeking] to preserve the one-man-one-vote system [while paying] more attention to the feelings of the people.” It had never gained legislative representation until Steve Chia was named a “nonconstituency member” after the 2001 election. In December 2003 Chia resigned as NSP secretary general because of admitted sexual peccadilloes, but he was reelected to the vacant post in July 2005. Leaders: YIP Yew Meng (President), Sebastain TEO (Vice President), Steve CHIA Kiah Hong (Secretary General). Singapore Justice Party (SJP). The SJP is a small group organized in 1972. It has contested only a handful of parliamentary seats, winning none. Leader: AMINUDDIN bin Ami (Secretary General).

Other Opposition Parties Singapore Democratic Party (SDP). Organized in 1980 by Chiam See Tong, the SDP attracted liberal-minded Singaporeans seeking a degree of formal opposition to the PAP. Chiam won one of the two seats lost by the PAP in 1984; the seat was retained in 1988. The party won three parliamentary seats in 1991, but in June 1993 Chiam resigned as the SDP secretary general, apparently as a result of an internal power struggle, and later joined the SPP. Having been targeted by the PAP during the campaign, the SDP lost all its seats at the January 1997 parliamentary elections. In February 1999 party leaders Chee Soon Juan and Wong Hong Toy received brief jail terms, and considerable international publicity, in connection with unlicensed public policy speeches. Two months later, Chee was fined for illegal sales of a book he had written. Despite attracting about 8 percent of the vote, the SDP failed to win any parliamentary seats in November 2001. It had campaigned on a “Singaporeans First” platform that blamed foreign workers for rising unemployment. Chee also drew attention to the party by questioning a $9 billion

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Cabinet As of July 15, 2006 Prime Minister Senior Minister Minister Mentor Deputy Prime Minister and Coordinating Minister for National Security Deputy Prime Minister

Lee Hsien Loong Goh Chok Tong Lee Kuan Yew Shanmugam Jayakumar Wong Kan Seng

Ministers Community Development, Youth and Sports, and Second Minister for Information, Communications, and the Arts Defense Education and Second Minister for Finance Environment and Water Resources Finance Foreign Affairs Health Home Affairs Information, Communications, and the Arts Law Manpower and Second Minister for Defense Muslim Affairs National Development Prime Minister’s Office Trade and Industry Transport and Second Minister for Foreign Affairs

government loan that had been extended to Indonesia’s Suharto before his resignation from the presidency. Sued by Prime Minister Goh and Senior Minister Lee over the loan allegation, Chee lost a summary judgment in August 2002 and an appeal in April 2003. Forced into bankruptcy in 2006, Chee was thereby disqualified to run for Parliament in May. In March he was sentenced to eight days in jail when he proved unable to pay a fine for contempt of court. Chee and the party were again accused of defamation, this time by Prime Minister Lee and his father, for an article published in the party newsletter prior to the May 2006 election.

Vivian Balakrishnan Rear Adm. (Res.) Teo Chee Hean Tharman Shanmugaratnam Yaacob Ibrahim Lee Hsien Loong George Yong-Boon Yeo Khaw Boon Wan Wong Kan Seng Lee Boon Yang Shanmugam Jayakumar Ng Eng Hen Yaacob Ibrahim Mah Bow Tan Lim Boon Heng Lim Swee Say Lim Hng Kiang Raymond Lim-Siang Keat

Leaders: LING How Doong (Chair), CHEO Chai Chen (Vice Chair), CHEE Soon Juan (Secretary General), WONG Hong Toy (Assistant Secretary General). Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The DPP failed to win representation in 1997 or 2001. One of its leaders, TAN Soo Phuan, submitted nomination papers to run for the national presidency in 1999 but was ruled ineligible by the Presidential Elections Commission on the grounds of insufficient government or corporate experience. In 2002 the DPP was vocal in its opposition to the government’s ban on the wearing of the Muslim headscarf

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(tudung) in schools. It was equally vocal in opposing the government’s decision in 2003 to support the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Leaders: MANSOR Abdul Rahman (Chair), TAN Lead Shake. Singapore National Front (SNF). The SNF is a Malay party established in 1991 by former members of the PKMS. In June 1997 it joined the WP and the PKMS in forming a Singapore Malay Rights Assembly as a forum for discussing and protecting the Malay community’s interests. It has not been active in national elections. Its founder, Ibrahim ARIFF, retired as president in 2004. Leader: M. SANI Jan (President).

Legislature The unicameral Parliament currently includes 84 members directly elected by direct universal suffrage for five-year terms, subject to dissolution. At the early general election of May 6, 2006, the People’s Action Party won 82 seats and the Singapore Democratic Alliance and the Workers’ Party (WP), 1 each. In accordance with a constitutional provision that the Parliament must provide for a minimum number of opposition seats, a second WP representative was later named to the body. Prior to the opening of the new Parliament, President Nathan was to appoint 9 additional unaffiliated members, with limited powers, for terms of two and a half years, thereby bringing the total membership to 94. Speaker: Abdullah TARMUGI.

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in 1984 with the merger of Singapore’s three largest publishers into the government-controlled Singapore Press Holdings (SPH). In addition, the government has taken strong exception to stories in a number of foreign publications distributed in Singapore, including the Economist, FinanceAsia, and the International Herald Tribune. At various times and for various offenses, all have been forced to apologize for articles and to make civil payments to government officials over charges of nepotism or inappropriate financial dealings. In June 2000 the government announced it was ending the newspaper and broadcasting monopolies of SPH and state-owned MediaCorp, respectively, by licensing both to compete against each other in print and over the airwaves. In 2004, however, the two merged some of their operations.

Press Many daily newspapers also publish Sunday editions: The Straits Times (390,000 daily, 390,000 Sunday), in English, Chinese, Malay, and Tamil; Lianhe Zaobao (200,000), in Chinese; Lianhe Wanbao (130,000), in Chinese; The New Paper (120,000), in English; Shin Min Daily News (120,000), in Chinese; Berita Harian/Minggu (70,000 daily, 70,000 Sunday), in Malay; Business Times (35,000), in English, Chinese, and Malay; Tamil Murasu (15,000 daily, 20,000 Sunday), in Tamil. There are a number of opposition newsletters.

News Agencies

Communications The press has long been free in principle although restrained in practice by continuous government monitoring and periodic crackdowns for exceeding official perceptions of acceptable criticism. In the 1970s a number of extremist papers were banned and minority journalists were imprisoned for alleged involvement in efforts to create a “pro-Communist Malay base in Singapore.” Effective competition between major newspapers ended

There is no domestic facility; the numerous foreign agencies include AP, UPI, Reuters, and Agence France-Presse.

Broadcasting and Computing The Media Development Authority (MDA, formerly the Singapore Broadcasting Authority) regulates all radio and television services. In February 1998 the government banned political parties from making videos and buying TV time so that,

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according to the minister for information and the arts, political debates would not “become like the selling of soap.” Internet sites that include political or religious content must also register with the MDA. Television programs are broadcast over several channels and radio programs over several networks in Chinese, Malay, Tamil, and English. All major broadcast outlets are government-controlled. There were approximately 1.4 million television receivers and 1.8 million personal computers serving 2.8 million Internet users in 2003.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. Heng-Chee CHAN U.S. Ambassador to Singapore Patricia L. HERBOLD Permanent Representative to the UN Vanu Gopala MENON IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, APEC, ASEAN, BIS, CP, CWTH, Interpol, IOR-ARC, NAM, PCA, WCO, WTO

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The Country The Solomons comprise a twin chain of 922 Pacific islands stretching nearly 900 miles in a southeasterly direction from the Papua New Guinean territory of Bougainville to the northern New Hebrides. The 6 largest islands are Guadalcanal (on which the capital, Honiara, is located), Choiseul, Malaita, New Georgia, San Cristobal, and Santa Isabel. Approximately 93 percent of the inhabitants are Melanesian, with smaller groups of Polynesians (4 percent), Micronesians (1.5 percent), Europeans (0.7 percent), and Chinese (0.3 percent). Anglicans are the most numerous among the largely Christian population, followed by Roman Catholics and adherents of a variety of evangelical sects. An estimated 85 percent of the population is rural, with women bearing much of the responsibility for subsistence agriculture. No women serve in the current legislature or cabinet. Over 90 percent of the land is governed by customary land-ownership practices, creating, in combination with the strong influence of tribal nationalism, some barriers to recent development efforts. The principal traditional export commodities are copra, timber, fish, and palm oil; to encourage development of a processing industry, the government in 1999 moved toward ending copra exports. Since the late 1990s gold has also been exported. Untapped resources include lead, zinc, and bauxite. The economy has encountered severe difficulty in past years, with timber resources (the second most important source of foreign earnings) rapidly dwindling and real GNP per capita gaining an average of only 1.0 percent annually during 1990– 1998. Civil unrest in 1999–2000, coupled with major shortfalls in export earnings from copra, palm oil, and fish, brought the economy to the verge of collapse. GDP fell by 3.5 percent in 1999 and by

14 percent in 2000, with soaring unemployment and investment capital in flight. Recovery thereafter yielded a rise in GDP of 5.6 percent in 2003, 5.5 percent in 2004, and an estimated 4.4 percent in 2005.

Government and Politics Political Background Originally named on the basis of rumors that the 16th-century Spanish explorer Alvaro de Mendana had discovered the source of the riches of King Solomon, the islands became the object of European labor “blackbirding” in the 1870s. The excesses of the indenture trade prompted Britain

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to declare a protectorate over the southern islands in 1893, the remaining territory being added between 1898 and 1900. Occupied by the Japanese in 1941, some of the most bitter fighting of the Pacific war occurred near Guadalcanal and in the adjacent Coral Sea during 1942–1943. After the war, a number of changes in British administration were introduced in response to a series of indigenous political and evangelical movements. In 1960 the resident commissioner’s Advisory Council was replaced by separate legislative and executive councils which, under a constitution adopted in 1970, were combined into a high commissioner’s Governing Council of both elected and nominated members. Four years later, the high commissioner assumed the title of governor and the Governing Council was supplanted by an elected Legislative Council led by a chief minister, who was empowered to designate his own cabinet. The territory became internally self-governing in January 1976, following the official abandonment in 1975 of its status as a protectorate. After lengthy constitutional discussions in London in 1977, full independence was achieved on July 7, 1978, former chief minister Peter KENILOREA being designated as prime minister. Kenilorea was redesignated following a legislative election on August 6, 1980, but was defeated 20–17 in intraparliamentary balloting on August 31, 1981, and obliged to yield office to Solomon MAMALONI, who had served briefly as chief minister during the transition period immediately preceding independence. Neither of the leading parties gained an absolute majority at the election of October 24, 1984, Kenilorea eventually being empowered by a 21–17 legislative vote on November 19 to form a coalition government that included members of his United Party and the recently organized Solomone Agu Sogufenua, in addition to a number of independents. Although the opposition charged the ruling coalition with inefficiency and “inexplicable delays” in presenting a national development plan, Kenilorea survived a nonconfidence vote on September 6, 1985. However, he was obliged to resign on November 14, 1986, because of contro-

versy surrounding the allocation of aid in the wake of a severe cyclone, Deputy Prime Minister Ezekiel ALEBUA being approved by the National Parliament as his successor on December 1. While the opposition People’s Alliance Party (PAP) obtained a plurality of only 11 legislative seats at the election of February 22, 1989, its leader, former Prime Minister Mamaloni, benefiting from crossover and independent support, was returned to office with 21 of 38 MP votes on March 28. In May the High Court ruled the 1988 appointment of Sir George LEPPING as governor general unconstitutional on the ground that he had not taken a leave of absence from a civil service position. At the same time, the Court rejected an opposition challenge to the legality of the Mamaloni government, which technically had been appointed by Lepping. The government’s reappointment of Lepping in June also drew criticism because a new parliamentary vote had not been taken. In a startling move on October 9, 1990, shortly before he was to face a leadership challenge at the ruling party’s annual convention, Mamaloni resigned from the PAP to form a government of “national unity” that included a number of theretofore opposition parliamentarians and was designed to be broadly representative of the country’s principal islands in terms of both geography and population. The action was later formalized by the launching of a Group for National Unity and Reconciliation (GNUR), which won 21 of 47 parliamentary seats at legislative balloting on May 26, 1993. However, the GNUR was unable to attract sufficient additional support to ensure the incumbent’s retention of office on June 18. By a 1-vote margin, the National Coalition Partners (NCP), an alliance of six anti-Mamaloni groups, elected Francis Billy HILLY, an independent who had not participated in national politics for eight years, as the new prime minister. Mamaloni immediately charged that Hilly’s 24–23 victory did not meet the constitution’s definition of an absolute majority as “at least one half of all the members plus one.” Eventually both the governor general and the Court of Appeal ruled against the contention, although the issue was rendered moot in November, when 3 government ministers joined the

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Political Status: Former British-administered territory; achieved internal self-government on January 2, 1976, and full independence within the Commonwealth on July 7, 1978. Area: 10,639 sq. mi. (27,556 sq. km.). Population: 409,042 (1999C); 521,000 (2005E). Major Urban Center (2005E): HONIARA (61,000). Official Language: English (Solomons Pidgin is the effective lingua franca). Monetary Unit: Solomon Dollar (official rate July 1, 2006: 7.27 dollars = $1US). Sovereign: Queen ELIZABETH II. Governor General: Nathaniel WAENA; elected by the National Parliament on June 15, 2004, and sworn in on July 7 for a five-year term, succeeding Sir John Ini LAPLI. Prime Minister: Manasseh Damukana SOGAVARE (Solomon Islands Social Credit Party); Prime Minister, June 30–December 17, 2001; returned to office May 4, 2006, succeeding Snyder RINI (Association of Independent Members of Parliament), who had served only eight days as successor of Sir Allan KEMAKEZA (People’s Alliance Party), following the general election of April 5.

opposition and 1 opposition MP joined the government, presumably giving Mamaloni the capacity to defeat Hilly on a 25–22 vote. However, a further shift in the fragile balance yielded approval of the government’s budget on a 25–21 vote late in the year. The defection of two ministers during a legislative adjournment in early October 1994 again reduced the Hilly coalition to a minority, and on October 13 Governor General Moses PITAKAKA dismissed the prime minister. A government crisis ensued, with Hilly refusing to stand down and the Court of Appeal upholding the action of the governor general, who proceeded to swear in Mamaloni on a caretaker basis on October 24. Two days later the judiciary reversed itself by agreeing with Hilly that dismissal required a legislative vote of nonconfidence, but added that the governor general was not obligated to take advice from a minority administration. As a result, Hilly resigned on October

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31 and Mamaloni, buttressed by additional NCP defections, was formally confirmed as his successor by a 29–18 vote on November 7. In the face of a growing financial crisis, Mamaloni called for an election on August 6, 1997. While it appeared that his National Unity group had won a plurality, Mamaloni was unable to command a legislative majority, and on August 27 Bartholomew ULAFA’ALU of the Solomon Islands Liberal Party (SILP) was elected as his successor. Soon after assuming office, Ulufa’alu became embroiled in a long-standing ethnic dispute between the indigenous (Isatambu) inhabitants of Guadalcanal and those of the adjacent island of Malaita, many of whom had migrated to Honiara, an urban area that had emerged from the World War II American base at Henderson Field as the nation’s capital. In early 1999 leaders of the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army (GRA) demanded $4 million annual rent for accommodating the capital, eventually accepting $103,000 as a “temporary goodwill gesture.” Hostilities continued, however, between the GRA, restyled as the Isatambu Freedom Movement (IFM), and the so-called Malaita Eagles Force (MEF), despite the formal signing of a peace accord on June 28. A second accord was concluded on August 12, while a third, cosigned by Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and Vanuatu on October 23, paved the way for a multinational peace-monitoring group that began arriving two days later. On April 10, 2000, following a series of riots in Honiara, further peace talks were postponed, and on June 5 the MEF mounted a coup that included the kidnapping of Prime Minister Ulufa’alu, who, although himself a Malaitan, was charged with failure to resolve the conflict. Ulufa’alu was released on June 9 and resigned under pressure four days later, former Finance Minister Manasseh SOGAVARE being elected his successor on June 30. Another cease-fire agreement between the IFM and MEF was concluded under Australian auspices on August 3, 2000, while additional peace talks were conducted on September 7–13 on a New Zealand frigate before the conclusion on October 15 in Townsville, Queensland, of a peace agreement that included provision for Australia and

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New Zealand to provide peace monitors. Forces on both sides nevertheless remained reluctant to turn in their weapons, as called for in the Townsville Peace Agreement, and by the initial deadline of December 15 only about half of the anticipated weapons—and virtually none of the more modern ones—had been surrendered. Four days later Parliament passed a bill granting amnesty to the militias for crimes committed during the civil uprising. On February 7, 2001, the IFM and another group, the Marau Eagles Force from east Guadalcanal, completed a peace agreement. In August 2001 Parliament dissolved in preparation for a general election. At the balloting of December 5 the PAP captured a plurality of 20 seats, and on December 17 the PAP’s Sir Allan KEMAKEZA was named prime minister by the National Parliament. In May 2005, a new rebel group, the Malaita Separatist Movement (MSM), was reported to have been launched by former members of the MEF to oppose what were perceived as injustices perpetrated by the Kemakeza government and the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI). The turmoil intensified after the April 2006 election, with rioting erupting in Honiara upon the appointment as prime minister of Snyder RINI, who was accused of being influenced by local Chinese on behalf of Taiwan, which the Solomon Islands recognized rather than the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the wake of widespread looting of Chinese businesses, Rini resigned and was replaced on May 4 by former prime minister Sogavare.

Constitution and Government The independence agreement negotiated in September 1977 provided for a constitutional monarchy with the queen represented by a governor general of local nationality, who is appointed for a five-year term on the advice of Parliament. Upon independence, the unicameral Legislative Assembly, which had been increased to 38 members in April 1976, became the National Parliament, with

the authority to elect a prime minister from among its membership (subsequently increased to 47 and then 50 legislators). The cabinet, which is appointed by the governor general on advice of the prime minister, is responsible to the Parliament. In addition, the independence agreement called for devolution of authority to local government units, within which the traditional chiefs retain formal status. The most seriously contested issue yielded a provision that nonindigenous Solomon Islanders (mainly Gilbertese, Chinese, and European expatriates) would be granted automatic citizenship upon application within two years of independence. The judicial system includes a Court of Appeal, a High Court, magistrates’ courts, and local courts whose jurisdiction encompasses cases dealing with customary land titles. Ultimate appeal, as in certain other nonrepublican Commonwealth nations, is to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London. For administrative purposes the islands are currently divided into nine provinces, each headed by a premier. In August 1991 Parliament began debate on proposed constitutional amendments, including conversion to republican status. No progress was subsequently reported, although Prime Minister Hilly informed the provincial premiers in mid-1994 that he was committed to a responsible partnership between the national and provincial administrations. By contrast, three provincial premiers threatened secession in mid-1996 after the Mamaloni administration had secured legislation transferring powers of the provincial assemblies to 75 local assemblies and councils. In 2001 adoption of a statebased federal system was again being considered, with a Constitutional Report on the proposed system being delivered to the central government in late May and with individual provinces preparing draft state constitutions.

Foreign Relations The Solomon Islands retains close links with Britain, which agreed in 1977 to provide some $43 million in nonrepayable financial assistance during

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1978–1982. Additional aid has been obtained from Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and such multilateral sources as the Asian Development Bank. Regionally, Honiara has been a strong supporter of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone movement and an opponent of what former prime minister Kenilorea called French “imperialism,” although he stopped short of offering material aid to independence activists on New Caledonia. Despite its antinuclear posture, the Solomons was one of the few Pacific island states to express concern about the future of ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty), given its own lack of defense forces. In mid-1986 Prime Minister Mamaloni indicated that he would ask members of the South Pacific Forum’s Melanesian Spearhead Group to join forces in providing aid to the region’s poorest territories. He also stated that he had long favored the establishment of a Federated States of Melanesia, encompassing the Solomons, Papua New Guinea (PNG), and Vanuatu. By the end of the year, however, the principal concern had become the insurrection in Papua New Guinea’s province of Bougainville. In late 1990 (then) Foreign Minister Kenilorea flew to Port Moresby to discuss the provision of humanitarian aid for the rebellious province, which is geographically closer to the Solomons than to the PNG mainland and whose people are ethnically akin to the islanders. In March 1991 the government reiterated an earlier position that Bougainville was an integral part of Papua New Guinea and that the rebellion was an internal PNG matter. However, relations between Honiara and Port Moresby worsened thereafter, with the Namaliu government charging in August that the Bougainville rebels were using the Solomons as both a safe haven and a conduit for arms. The strain between the two Melanesian governments was exacerbated in April 1992, when PNG military units on two occasions crossed into Solomons territory on search-and-destroy missions. A third incursion in mid-September, during which two Solomon Islanders were killed and a third abducted, further strained relations, despite PNG acceptance of full responsibility for what its

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prime minister termed an “atrocious act.” For its part, the Solomons government used the occasion to reiterate an earlier complaint that Papua’s continuance of the antirebel struggle was sustained by military aid from Australia, which, it alleged, was acting in defense of Australian mining interests. Subsequently, Prime Minister Mamaloni was accused of meddling in PNG internal affairs upon publication of a confidential letter to a Papuan provincial premier that seemed to support secession if PNG Prime Minister Wingti abolished the regional government system. Subsequently, tension between the two governments eased somewhat, with a series of ministerial-level meetings in early 1993 yielding tentative agreement on rules for “hot pursuit” in border areas affected by the insurrection, although it was not until early 1996 that talks were launched on a comprehensive border treaty. Signed in July 1997, the resultant Basic Border Agreement recognized Bougainville as part of Papua New Guinea, endorsed cooperation in security matters, and acknowledged the rights of indigenous peoples in the border area. Long-standing controversy over relations with Taiwan intensified in March 2006, when Joses TUHANUKU, president of the Labour Party, charged Prime Minister Kemakeza with favoring government supporters in allocating Taiwanese special projects funds. Concurrently, the PRC evacuated some 250 of its nationals whose property had been destroyed in the preelection rioting, while Australia’s foreign minister warned both Taiwan and the PRC to refrain from interfering in local politics through “checkbook diplomacy.”

Current Issues The violence that erupted on Guadalcanal in early 1999 was due to a perception by indigenous inhabitants of the dominance of Malaitan “immigrants,” who controlled the national government and police force and appeared to be the principal beneficiaries of development in the capital. In large part because of the conflict, the Sogavare government was confronted by an ever-deepening economic collapse, leaving the country highly

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dependent on external aid. In April 2001 the prime minister introduced legislation intended to extend the term of Parliament for an additional year, to 2002, arguing that the additional time was needed to stabilize the country politically and economically. In August 2001, recognizing that it did not have sufficient votes to pass the proposed extension, the government withdrew the measure. Prior to the 2001 balloting a principal challenger to Sogavare was expected to be former prime minister Ulufa’alu, who in June had asked the High Court to rule unconstitutional his forced resignation and his replacement by Sogavare. However, in November the court dismissed the case, and the December 5 election concluded with a PAP plurality and Sogavare’s People’s Progressive Party (PPP) reduced to a mere four seats. The balloting in Parliament for a prime minister proved to be a contest primarily between former deputy prime minister Allan Kemakeza and Patteson OTI, Oti having supplanted Ulufa’alu as the candidate of the Solomon Islands Alliance for Change Coalition (SIACC). Newly elected prime minister Kemakeza himself described the Solomon Islands as resembling “a company in liquidation.” By far the most controversial cabinet appointment was that of Alex BARTLETT, an MEF leader, as foreign minister. In July 2003 the Australian Parliament approved the contribution of 2,000 troops and 300 police officers to the 14-nation RAMSI. In August the force captured the rebel warlord Harold KEKE, who had been accused of murdering 21 people, including 5 of his own followers whom he believed to have been disloyal. In early October Keke was committed for trial, while Moses SU’U, an MEF leader, was also apprehended and charged with murder. Two more MEF leaders were arrested in Honiara in December. These and related actions yielded a measure of stability to the afflicted region, despite the killing of an Australian police officer on December 22. On March 18, 2005, Keke and two of his aides were found guilty of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The return of Manasseh Sogavare as prime minister in May 2006 defused the latest outbreak in the Solomons but offered little hope for long-term relief. The Malaita dissidents appeared to be regroup-

ing, Chinese businessmen were caught in a crossfire between supporters of Taiwan and the PRC, and the government remained dependent on foreign peacekeepers to maintain a degree of public order.

Political Parties As in neighboring Papua New Guinea, party affiliations tend to be transient and based more on personality than ideology. The People’s Alliance Party (PAP) government formed by Prime Minister Mamaloni in 1989 was the first single-party administration since independence; in 1990, by contrast, Mamaloni withdrew from the PAP to form a “national unity” government that included a number of theretofore opposition figures and became the basis of the Group for National Unity and Reconciliation (GNUR). In June 1993 the five anti-Mamaloni parliamentary parties, led by Francis Billy Hilly, joined with Christian Fellowship and independent members to form a government alliance called the National Coalition Partners (NCP), which lost its slim legislative majority and became effectively moribund in October 1994. The GNUR, having regrouped after the 1997 election, had faded from the political scene by the 2001 balloting. Solomon Islands Alliance for Change Coalition (SIACC). The SIACC evolved in 2001 from the Solomon Islands Alliance for Change (SIAC), which had contested the 1997 election and saw its leader, Bartholomew Ulufa’alu, form a government on August 30. (As a consequence of its origins and name, the current coalition is frequently referenced simply as the SIAC.) Ulufa’alu was forced to resign in June 2000 but a year later filed a constitutional challenge to the action and the election of Prime Minister Sogavare of the PPP. In November 2001 the High Court dismissed Ulufa’alu’s case. Like the SIACC, the SIAC had been formed as a grouping of smaller parties and independents, a principal component being Ulufa’alu’s Solomon Islands Liberal Party (SILP), which had begun in 1976 as the National Democratic Party (Nadepa). The only formal party to contest the 1976 election, Nadepa won five legislative seats. It joined the first Mamaloni government in 1981 but lost

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three of its four seats in 1984. Having returned to four seats in 1989 (three years after redefining itself as the SILP), the party joined a number of smaller groups and independents in a parliamentary formation called the Coalition for National Unity. In the course of the 1990 realignment, Mamaloni persuaded SILP leader Ulufa’alu to resign from Parliament and accept appointment as a government consultant. Joining Ulufa’alu in formation of the SIACC in 2001 was former prime minister Francis Billy Hilly, Fred Fono, and Patteson Oti. At the December parliamentary election it won 12 seats. Shortly thereafter Ulufa’alu decided to seek the prime ministership despite the party’s endorsement of Oti. Oti ultimately finished second to the PAP’s Kemakeza, with 13 votes, while Ulufa’alu won only 3. Although a member of the SIACC, Fono served in the Kemakeza cabinet. Also participating in the alliance are the National Party (NP), led by Ezekiel ALEBUA, former prime minister and former head of the Solomon Islands United Party (Siupa); the Solomon Islands Party for Rural Advancement (SIPRA); and the Solomon Islands Social Credit Party (Socred), launched in July 2005 by the current prime minister, Manasseh Damukana Sogavare. (Sogavare had previously headed the now defunct People’s Progressive Party [PPP] that had been founded and led, through a number of changes, by former prime minister Mamaloni before his death in January 2000.) Leaders: Manasseh Damukana SOGAVARE (Prime Minister), Francis Billy HILLY (Former Prime Minister), Patteson OTI (Former Leader of the Opposition), Fred FONO (Former Minister of National Planning). People’s Alliance Party (PAP). Also called the Solomon Islands People Alliance (SIPA), the PAP was formed in late 1979 by merger of the People’s Progressive Party (PPP), led by former chief minister Solomon Mamaloni, and the Rural Alliance Party (RAP), led by David KAUSIMAE. Mamaloni had urged a more cautious approach to independence than had Peter Kenilorea of Siupa (see under SIUDP, below). Chosen to succeed Kenilorea

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as prime minister in August 1981, Mamaloni was forced into opposition after the election of October 1984, but returned to the office on March 28, 1989. He resigned from the PAP in October 1990 to head a coalition administration that included a revived PPP, thus effectively splitting the alliance. In January 1992 PAP leader Kausimae announced the expulsion from the party of ten MPs who were serving in the second Mamaloni government. Despite participating in the first Sogavare government, the PAP strongly opposed extension of the 1997–2001 legislative term by a year. Party leader Allan Kemakeza served as deputy prime minister under Sogavare until his dismissal in August 2001 for alleged mishandling of compensation funds related to the recent civil disruptions. With the PAP having achieved a plurality of 20 seats at the December parliamentary election, Kemakeza, with independent support, was elected prime minister, continuing in office until after the April 2006 election. The PAP has called for adoption of a federal republic headed by a president. Leaders: Sir Allan KEMAKEZA (Former Prime Minister), Edward KINGMELE (General Secretary). Solomon Islands Democratic Party (SIDP). The SIDP was formed in October 2005 to offer the country an “alternative leadership.” It won three legislative seats in April 2006. Leaders: Gabriel SURI (President), Sir John Ini LAPLI (Former Governor General and Former Vice President of the Party), Matthew WALE (Parliamentary Leader). Solomon Islands Labour Party (SILP). The SILP, organized by the Solomon Islands Council of Trade Unions in 1988, won two legislative seats in 1989. A firm advocate of a federal system, party head Joses Tuhanuku retained his parliamentary seat in 2001 but lost it in 2006. Leaders: Joses TUHANUKU (President), Tony KAGOVAI (General Secretary). Solomon Islands United Democratic Party (SIUDP). The SIUDP adopted its current name before the 2001 election. It traced its origins to the Solomon Islands United Party (Siupa), an

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Cabinet As of August 1, 2006 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister

Manasseh Sogavare Job Dudley Tausinga

Ministers Agriculture and Livestock Commerce, Industries, and Employment Communications, Aviation, and Meteorology Culture and Tourism Education and Human Resource Development Finance and Treasury Fisheries and Marine Resources Foreign Affairs and Trade Relations Forestry, Environment, and Conservation Health and Medical Services Home Affairs Infrastructure and Development Justice and Legal Affairs Lands and Surveys Mines and Energy National Planning and Aid Coordination National Reconciliation and Peace Police and National Security Provincial Government and Constituency Development Public Service

outgrowth of the Civil Servants’ Association that placed ten members in the legislature in 1973 but saw its president, former chief minister Peter Kenilorea, defeated in his bid to sit for Honiara. Kenilorea entered the assembly in 1976 and served as prime minister from independence until supplanted by Solomon Mamaloni in 1981. He returned to office in 1984–1986 and continued thereafter to play a central role in Solomon politics, serving as chair of the Peace Monitoring Council and, after the December 2001 election, as speaker of Parliament, a post to which he was reelected in 2006. Leaders: Sir Peter KENILOREA (Former Prime Minister and Current Speaker of Parliament), John MAETIA Kaluae. Association of Independent Members of Parliament (AIMP). Not a party in the strict sense

Trevor Olavae Francis Billy Hilly Patrick Vahoe Bently Samuel Rogosamani Derrick Sikua Bartholomew Ulufa’alu Nollen Leni Patterson Oti Job Dudley Tausinga Clay Forau Soalaoi Bernard Giro Stanley Festus Sofu Samuel Manetoali Leslie Boseto Toswell Kauwa Gordon Darcy Lilo Sam Iduri Isaac Inoke Japhet Waipora Joses Wawari Sanga

of the word, since it is composed of independents (some of whom are party aligned), the AIMP secured 13 seats in 2001 and 30 in 2006. Leader: Snyder RINI (Former Prime Minister). Lafari Party (LP). The LP stresses the function of the tribal chiefs. Leader: John Martin GARO (Former Minister of State).

Legislature The unicameral National Parliament currently consists of 50 members elected for four-year terms. Results of the most recent balloting on April 5, 2006, gave the Solomon Islands Alliance for Change Coalition 12 seats (the National Party, 4; the Solomon Islands Party for Rural

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Advancement, 4; the Solomon Islands Liberal Party, 2; the Solomon Islands Social Credit Party, 2); the People’s Alliance Party, 3; the Solomon Islands Democratic Party, 3; the Lafari Party, 2; and independents (grouped as the Association of Independent Members of Parliament), 30. Speaker: Sir Peter KENILOREA.

Communications Press The following weeklies are published in Honiara: Solomons Voice (10,000); Solomon Star (4,000), in English and Pidgin; and Solomon Times.

News Agency There is no national facility. The regional Pacnews moved to Honiara in 1990 after its staff was expelled from Fiji.

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Broadcasting and Computing The Solomon Islands Broadcasting Corporation (SIBC) provides daily radio service in Pidgin and English. Until establishment of a Christianoriented private station in 2002, there was no broadcast television service, although some TV sets were available for videotaped programs. In 2003, there were approximately 2,100 television sets and 2,300 personal computers serving 2,500 Internet users.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. and Permanent Representative to the UN Collin David BECK U.S. Ambassador to the Solomon Islands Robert W. FITTS (resident in Papua New Guinea) IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, CWTH, PC, PIF, WTO

SRI LANKA DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

OF

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Sri Lanka Prajatantrika Samajawadi Janarajaya (Sinhala) Llankais Sananayaka Socialisak Kutiyarasa (Tamil)

The Country The insular location of Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) off the coast of southeast India has not prevented the development of an ethnic and religious diversity comparable to that of other parts of southern Asia. Approximately 74 percent of the people are of Sinhalese extraction, descended from Aryan stock of northern India, while 18 percent are Tamil, akin to the Dravidian population of southern India, and 7 percent are Moors; small minority groups include Europeans, Burghers (Eurasians), and Veddah aborigines. Roughly 70 percent of the inhabitants are Buddhist, while about 15 percent are Hindu, 8 percent Christian, and 8 percent Muslim. The country’s major ethnic problem has long centered on the Tamil population, which is divided into two groups: “Ceylon Tamils,” whose ancestors have lived in Sri Lanka for many generations, and “Indian Tamils,” whose forebears were brought to the island late in the 19th century as plantation laborers. The former, numbering nearly 2 million, predominate in the north and constitute about 40 percent of the population in the east. The latter, numbering about 900,000, are concentrated on the central tea plantations and, thus far, have not been prominently involved in the Tamil eelam (homeland) movement. Women constitute some 33 percent of the labor force. Even though they have occupied both the presidency and the prime ministership, they make up only 5 percent of the Parliament.

About 34 percent of the labor force is engaged in agriculture, which contributes about 18 percent of GDP and a comparable share of export earnings. Sri Lanka ranks with Kenya as the world’s leading exporters of tea; other traditional exports include rubber, coconuts, and coconut products, with cinnamon being a leader among the specialized export crops promoted by a government-sponsored diversification program. Although a deficiency of natural resources limits the potential for heavy industry, small-scale manufacturing has advanced

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Political Status: Independent since February 4, 1948; present constitution adopted on August 6, 1978, effective September 7. Area: 25,332 sq. mi. (65,610 sq. km.). Population: 16,864,544 (2001C); 19,755,000 (2005E). The census figure is provisional and lacks results from several districts where security concerns prohibited enumeration. Major Urban Centers (2005E): SRI JAYEWARDENEPURA (Kotte, administrative capital, 119,000), Colombo (Kolamba, commercial capital, 650,000), Dehiwala–Mount Lavinia (219,000), Jaffna (154,000), Kandy (Maha Nuwara, 111,000). Official Languages: Sinhala, Tamil. English is recognized as a “link language.” Monetary Unit: Rupee (market rate July 1, 2006: 103.97 rupees = $1US). President: Mahinda RAJAPAKSE (United People’s Freedom Alliance); served as prime minister from April 6, 2004; elected president on November 17, 2005, and sworn in November 19 for a six-year term, succeeding Chandrika Bandaranaike KUMARATUNGA (United People’s Freedom Alliance). Prime Minister: Ratnasiri WICKREMANAYAKE (United People’s Freedom Alliance); previously served as prime minister August 2000–December 2001; most recently designated by the president and sworn in on November 21, 2005; succeeding Mahinda RAJAPAKSE (United People’s Freedom Alliance).

significantly in the past decade, with garments and other textiles now accounting for half of export earnings and industry as a whole contributing 25 percent of GDP. The United States and the European Union (EU) are Sri Lanka’s principal export markets, while India, the EU, and China/Hong Kong rank as the leading sources for imports. In the early 1980s Sri Lanka possessed one of Asia’s most promising economies because of its advanced educational system, high literacy rate, workforce potential, and expectations of a tourist boom. However, falling commodity prices,

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drought, extreme Sinhalese militancy in the south (1987–1989), and widespread Tamil unrest in the north and east (since 1983) have held back growth. The complex, at times fratricidal, maelstrom of violence has left more than 100,000 dead, with some 1 million individuals being displaced during the Tamil conflict. It also has contributed to infrastructure decay (particularly in the Tamil areas), economic dislocation, lagging tourist arrivals, and long-term university closings. Nevertheless, GDP growth averaged 5 percent annually in 1987–1998. Growth was 4.3 percent in 1999 and 6.0 percent in 2000, but in 2001 the economy suffered a 1.5 percent decline—the first since independence— because of a fall in the export markets for clothing and textiles, a drought, and the economic repercussions of political uncertainties. Growth resumed in 2002, reaching 4.0 percent in that year and 6.0 percent in 2003. For 2004 the GDP expanded by 5.4 percent. In late December 2004 the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster, in addition to killing more than 30,000 Sri Lankans and displacing hundreds of thousands, caused an estimated $1 billion in physical damage. Fishing and tourism were particularly hard hit.

Government and Politics Political Background After nearly four and a half centuries of foreign domination, beginning with the arrival of the Portuguese in 1505, followed by the Dutch (1658– 1815) and the British (1815–1948), Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) became an independent state within the Commonwealth on February 4, 1948. Since the country’s first parliamentary election in 1947, political power has oscillated between the moderate and generally pro-Western United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), which has emphasized Buddhism, nationalism, “democratic socialism,” and nonalignment in international affairs. Until 1956 the country was governed by the UNP, led successively by D. S. SENANAYAKE, his son Dudley SENANAYAKE, and Sir John KOTELAWALA. The SLFP, led by

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S. W. R. D. BANDARANAIKE, came to power in the 1956 election with an aggressively Sinhalese program reflecting the emergence of a nationalist, Sinhala-educated professional class, but a series of disorders culminated in the prime minister’s assassination in 1959. The UNP formed a shaky minority government following the March 1960 general election but was unable to withstand a noconfidence vote shortly thereafter. In July 1960 the SLFP, under the leadership of Sirimavo R. D. BANDARANAIKE, wife of the former prime minister, won a near-majority in the legislature and organized an all-SLFP government. Ceylonese policy under her leadership acquired an increasingly anti-Western character, accompanied by allegations of rightist plots and attempted coups. The UNP, however, regained a leading position in the election of March 1965 and organized a coalition government under the premiership of Dudley Senanayake. Subsequently, political power shifted back to the SLFP under Mrs. Bandaranaike, the UNP winning a bare 17 seats in a house of 157 members at balloting in May 1970. Sri Lanka’s democratic tradition received a serious setback in 1971 when a radical Sinhalese group, the People’s Liberation Front (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna—JVP), attempted to overthrow the government. The rank and file of the essentially Maoist formation were drawn largely from rural Buddhist youth. Most Ceylonese, however, declined to support the insurgents, and order was restored (at the cost of an estimated 20,000 deaths) within a few weeks even though the underlying cause of the uprising, a deteriorating economy accompanied by a high unemployment rate, persisted. An extremely bitter election campaign culminated in July 1977 in an unprecedented victory for the UNP, which, led by J. R. JAYEWARDENE, obtained 142 of the 168 legislative seats. SLFP representation plummeted from 91 to 8. Following adoption by the UNP-dominated National State Assembly of a constitutional amendment providing for a French-style executive system, Jayewardene assumed the presidency in February 1978 and named Ranasinghe PREMADASA prime minister.

Having secured passage of a constitutional revision permitting the president to call an election after a minimum of four years in office, Jayewardene was reelected for a second six-year term in October 1982 (effective from February 1983). In November, by a near-unanimous vote, the Parliament endorsed a government proposal that its own term be extended by six years to August 1989, subject to approval in a popular referendum. At the balloting in December, which occurred under a state of emergency, the measure was reported to have been approved by 54.7 percent of the participating voters. In July 1983 the killing of 13 soldiers near the northern city of Jaffna set off a wave of antiTamil rioting that did not cease until early August. Over 400 people, mainly Tamils, died in the disturbances. In addition to proscribing three leftist parties, President Jayewardene secured passage of a constitutional amendment banning all separatist activity and requiring MPs to take loyalty oaths. The 16 MPs of the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) responded by withdrawing from Parliament and were subsequently declared to have forfeited their seats. As the violence momentarily subsided, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi sent an envoy to mediate between the Jayewardene government and the Tamil militants; however, most opposition leaders boycotted projected multiparty talks in October 1983. It was not until late December that the president agreed to invite the TULF to attend, without preconditions, a roundtable conference to be convened in January 1984. A series of “amity talks” ensued, with Tamil representatives advancing, as a minimal demand, the creation of an autonomous regional council encompassing the northern and eastern regions of the country. At midyear Jayewardene countered with a proposal for a second legislative chamber consisting of district representatives plus spokesmen for special interests. The overture was quickly rejected by the TULF. During 1985 the level of violence intensified, with four of five Madras-based exile groups announcing in mid-April that they had formed a coalition to facilitate “armed revolutionary struggle for

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national independence.” Meanwhile, the new Indian prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, retreated somewhat from the overtly pro-Tamil posture of his recently assassinated mother. He declared his opposition to any attempt by the Tamils to establish an autonomous regime in Sri Lanka but sponsored a series of ultimately inconclusive talks between the rebels and Sri Lankan officials in Thimphu, Bhutan. In December 1986 the government cut off essential northern services. Two months later, it mounted a major offensive against the rebels that recaptured most of the Jaffna peninsula by late May. The Indian government, under strong domestic pressure to take action on the insurgents’ behalf, responded by airlifting humanitarian supplies to the north in early June, which drew a sharp diplomatic protest from Colombo. Subsequently, high-level discussions between the two governments produced a remarkable announcement: Prime Minister Gandhi would fly to Colombo in late July to conclude a so-called India– Sri Lanka Accord (ISLA) that would bring Indian troops to Sri Lanka in support of a cease-fire and the establishment by an elected provincial council of an integrated northeastern government. On July 30, the day after conclusion of the ISLA, a 3,000man Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) arrived in Jaffna to assist in disarming the Tamils. However, the IPKF found itself in a major confrontation with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the largest of the guerrilla groups. While the IPKF, augmented to a force of some 30,000, eventually gained control of much of the contested area, heavy fighting resumed in October. The LTTE failed to respond to an Indian call to surrender during a unilateral cease-fire in late November, and by early 1988 it was reported that IPKF troop strength had risen to 70,000. In the south, the extremist JVP experienced a considerable resurgence because of its insistence that the ISLA conceded too much ultimate power to the Tamil minority. From mid-1987 the JVP engaged in a widespread assassination campaign against political figures and on August 18 almost succeeded in killing President Jayawardene in a grenade attack in the Parliament building. The gov-

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ernment nonetheless proceeded to enact legislation that provided for elected provincial councils patterned after the Indian state legislatures and, despite SLFP charges of “gross betrayal to the nation,” endorsed the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The UNP swept a series of provincial council elections in non-Tamil areas during April and June 1988. With the SLFP refusing to participate because of alleged UNP concessions to the northern rebels, most of the remaining seats were won by the recently organized United Socialist Alliance (USA) which, although a leftist formation, had supported the mid-1987 pact with India. On September 8 Jayawardene signed a proclamation merging the Northern and Eastern Provinces. However, both the LTTE and the TULF declared a boycott of the subsequent provincial council election. Consequently, the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) and the Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF) filled the council seats from the north without an election, while in the east the EPRLF and the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) each won 17 seats and the UNP 1 seat in November. On December 19, 1988, Prime Minister Premadasa was elected to succeed the aging President Jayawardene, barely avoiding the necessity of a runoff by capturing 50.4 percent of the vote; Mrs. Bandaranaike obtained 44.9 percent, while USA candidate Ossie ABEYGUNASE-KERA ran a distant third, with 4.6 percent. On December 20 the president dissolved Parliament and at legislative balloting on February 15, 1989, the UNP won 125 of 225 seats. The SLFP, benefiting from the introduction of proportional representation, won 67 seats. The completion of the provincial, presidential, and parliamentary elections was considered quite remarkable in view of the instability that prevailed, especially in the south, where JVP terror tactics had intensified. More than 1,000 people had died during the election campaigns. On March 3, 1989, Premadasa selected former finance minister Dingiri Banda WIJETUNGE as prime minister, bypassing several better-known UNP leaders and thereby appearing to undercut

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potential competition for reelection in 1994. A month later he offered amnesty to Tamil guerrillas in the north and JVP militants in the south if they would renounce violence and join the political process. As an inducement he offered them 29 of the UNP’s legislative seats. Although the LTTE agreed to negotiations, the JVP responded with a fresh wave of bombings and killings, the subsequent average daily death toll of 35–40 necessitating the June reimposition of a nationwide state of emergency. In an apparent effort to neutralize one of the JVP’s most popular positions, Premadasa, never a supporter of the 1987 accord with New Delhi, requested in mid-1989 that the Indian troops in Sri Lanka (then estimated at 50,000) leave immediately. An international crisis loomed over the issue until an agreement was reached in September for complete withdrawal by the end of the year. Fighting among Tamil groups broke out again, however, and the new Indian government announced in December that the deadline would be extended to March 31, 1990. Meanwhile, bombings and assassinations continued in the south despite the killing of all known JVP leaders during an intensified anti-insurgency campaign. The government had initiated the measures, which apparently included the use of shadowy “death squads,” after the JVP refused to join an “all-party conference” on the country’s political future. India completed its withdrawal from Sri Lanka on March 24, 1990, leaving the LTTE in virtual control of the northern region. Three weeks earlier, the North-East Provincial Council had approved a resolution proclaiming the area to be an independent state of Eelam. The action was repudiated by New Delhi and seen as a “last gesture” by the council’s chief minister, Annamalai Varatharaja PERUMAL, who, with numerous EPRLF associates, subsequently sought refuge in South India from the advancing LTTE. In June 1990, after the observance of a yearlong cease-fire in the north, President Premadasa agreed to dissolve the North-East Provincial Council and hold fresh elections. The LTTE responded

by launching a new wave of insurgent activity, and the elections were indefinitely postponed. In mid1992 the government mounted a new offensive in the north that produced widely divergent casualty estimates. The LTTE responded in August– November with a series of assassinations and terrorist attacks on both military and civilian targets. On April 23, 1993, opposition leader Lalith ATHULATHMUDALI of the Democratic United National Front (DUNF, subsequently the United Lalith Front) was killed by an LTTE suicide attack, as was President Premadasa on May 1. Prime Minister Wijetunge, who immediately succeeded Premadasa on an acting basis, was elected by Parliament on May 7 to serve the balance of his predecessor’s term, with Ranil WICKREMESINGHE filling the prime ministerial vacancy. At parliamentary balloting on August 16, 1994, an SLFP-led People’s Alliance (PA), in coalition with the SLMC, won 112 of 225 seats and obtained sufficient support from minor groups to provide a solid majority for PA leader Chandrika Bandaranaike KUMARATUNGA. She was sworn in as Wickremesinghe’s successor on August 19, the third member of her family to serve as prime minister. Concurrently, most mainstream Tamil parliamentarians extended their support to the new administration. On October 23, 1994, the UNP presidential candidate, Gamini DISSANAYAKE, and a number of his associates were assassinated in a suicide bomb attack at an election rally in Colombo. The UNP named as Gamini’s replacement his widow, Srima DISSANAYAKE, who failed to prevent Kumaratunga from winning with a record-setting 62.2 percent of the vote. Following her inauguration on November 12, the new president not only reappointed her mother, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, to her former post as prime minister but also pledged to abolish the executive presidency by July 1995— a pledge she proved unable to keep. On December 12, 1994, President Kumaratunga announced that a government proposal for a ceasefire in the lengthy civil war had been accepted by the LTTE, and talks aimed at ending the conflict opened in Jaffna on January 3, 1995. However, no

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progress was subsequently reported, and the talks collapsed on April 19 with a resumption of attacks by the rebels on government forces. Tiring of the search for a negotiated solution, the government on October 17, 1995, launched a major military offensive, code-named Rivirasa (“Sunshine”), aimed at capturing the rebel stronghold of Jaffna. Government forces encountered fierce LTTE resistance and terrorist counteractions. Nevertheless, on December 6 the city of Jaffna finally came under government control. President Kumaratunga took advantage of the military success to urge the LTTE to accept a cease-fire and enter into negotiations, but her offer was rejected. On January 31, 1996, the financial center of Colombo was devastated by a huge LTTE lorry bomb, killing over 90 people and injuring more than 1,400. With heavy fighting continuing, the government declared an extended nationwide emergency that secured parliamentary approval on April 10 despite opposition objections, and nine days later the military launched operation Rivirasa II to capture the areas around the city of Jaffna. On May 17 it was claimed that government forces were in control of the whole of the Jaffna peninsula, but government assertions that the LTTE had been effectively destroyed as a fighting force were speedily disproved in mid-July when Tamil guerrillas overran the army garrison in Mullaittivu, southeast of Jaffna, inflicting the heaviest defeat on government forces since 1993. The military responded by launching another offensive in the north, during which an estimated 200,000 refugees fled. In early April 1997 the two leading parties agreed to a pact, brokered by the United Kingdom, by which they would cooperate in an effort to end the civil war. On May 13 the military launched operation Jaya Sikuru (“Victory Assured”) in an effort to establish a stable overland supply route to Jaffna. Efforts by the government to restore normalcy to the Jaffna region included the holding of local elections on January 29, 1998. Most of the leading Tamil parties participated despite threats from the LTTE, which the government had formally outlawed on January 26 in response to the

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bombing of the country’s most sacred Buddhist site, the Temple of Tooth in Kandy. Thereafter the LTTE undertook a bombing and assassination campaign to eliminate key leaders of the TULF and other government-supportive parties. On August 4, 1998, the government again declared a nationwide state of emergency, thereby permitting it, under the constitution, to cancel elections scheduled for August 28 in five provinces. The UNP, which had staged a month-long boycott of Parliament in March to protest what it considered the government’s antidemocratic policies, assailed the declaration. The government argued that in the midst of the Victory Assured campaign it could not spare the tens of thousands of soldiers needed to provide security for the polling. Throughout most of 1998 fighting centered on the rebel-held northern town of Mankulam, at one end of the strategic supply route to the Jaffna peninsula. Government forces finally captured the town in late September but at virtually the same time lost control to the LTTE of the now-deserted town of Kilinochchi, which it had held since 1996. An army spokesman called the defeat the “biggest blow” since the July 1996 loss of the Mullaittivu garrison. On December 4 the government announced the conclusion of the Victory Assured campaign without explanation, even though the original goal of opening the road to Jaffna had not been accomplished. On January 25, 1999, the PA won a majority in the North-Western Provincial Council election, wresting control from the UNP. The latter refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the results, however, pointing to preelection violence, voter intimidation, and other illegalities by PA activists. Two days later the Supreme Court censured President Kumaratunga for having illegally postponed the August 1998 elections, and balloting was finally conducted in the five provinces on April 6 after a campaign marked by comparatively fewer infractions. In all five provinces the PA finished ahead of the UNP, which had previously controlled four of the five councils. On June 10 the voters in Southern Province also went to the polls, with the PA again besting the UNP. The 1999 local elections

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had, however, collectively confirmed the JVP as the country’s third most influential party. On October 20, 1999, President Kumaratunga called an early presidential election with a year left in her term. Although a fresh LTTE offensive in the north threatened her lead over the UNP’s Ranil Wickremesinghe and nearly a dozen other candidates, an attempted assassination at a December 18 political rally, three days before the election, may have helped her cause. The suicide bombing killed 26 individuals and wounded many others, including the president, who won reelection with 51.1 percent of the vote and was sworn in for a second term on December 22. She again named her mother as prime minister. In early November 1999 the LTTE had initiated its latest military campaign, “Unceasing Waves III,” which within five days had cost the government ten towns, including, once again, Mankulam. The offensive constituted the most sustained operation ever by the insurgents. On April 22, 2000, the LTTE forced some 17,000 government troops to retreat northward from the strategic causeway at Elephant Pass, severing the army’s land connection to the south. On May 3 President Kumaratunga invoked, for the first time in the country’s history, the Public Security Ordinance, which placed the country on a war footing. She also banned strikes and political demonstrations and imposed strict media censorship. Although the LTTE moved to within several kilometers of Jaffna city and also launched an assault in the east, around Batticaloa, the offensive stalled in June. In February 2000 the government had confirmed that Norway was prepared to act as a mediator in direct talks with the LTTE. The Tamil Tigers insisted, however, on several preconditions, principally that government forces be withdrawn from the north and east and restricted to barracks during the discussions. The government refused. Meanwhile, the resurgent JVP questioned Norway’s neutrality and demonstrated against its involvement in the peace process. Staunch Sinhalese Buddhists, including hundreds of monks, also were taking to the streets, demanding that the government achieve a military

victory over the separatists and accusing Norway of giving LTTE leaders a safe haven. On August 3, 2000, with the legislative term nearing its end, the government introduced a longdelayed, controversial constitutional reform bill in Parliament, even though the proposal had already been rejected by the UNP and all the main Tamil parties. The bill’s provisions included devolving powers to seven elected provincial councils and establishing an interim appointed council for a NorthEast region, with the final status of the latter jurisdiction dependent on whether the multiethnic population in the east approved a future referendum on union with the north. On August 8 the government acknowledged that it could not marshal the needed two-thirds parliamentary majority to pass the 31-chapter bill and therefore withdrew it. Ten days later President Kumaratunga dissolved Parliament in preparation for a general election. Octogenarian Prime Minister Bandaranaike resigned for health reasons on August 10, 2000, and was replaced by the minister for public administration and home affairs, Ratnasiri WICKREMANAYAKE. The retired prime minister died shortly after casting her ballot in the general election of October 10, which saw the PA capture 107 seats in the 225-member Parliament. Six seats short of a majority, the PA quickly negotiated a coalition with the National Unity Alliance (an affiliate of the PA-supportive SLMC), the Tamil-based Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP), and an independent deputy. On October 13 Prime Minister Wickremanayake again took the oath of office as prime minister, and a substantially reconfigured cabinet was sworn in on October 19. On November 27, 2000, the LTTE leader, Velupillai PRABHAKARAN, reversed his stance and called for unconditional peace talks. The LTTE subsequently initiated a month-long unilateral cease-fire effective from December 24, but the government rejected the overture. Despite ceasefire extensions through April 24, 2001, as well as the efforts of Norwegian negotiator Erik Solheim, at midyear the two sides appeared no closer to peace negotiations.

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On June 20, 2001, President Kumaratunga dismissed SLMC leader Rauff HAKEEM from the cabinet, leading Hakeem and 6 other MPs from the SLMC to defect to the opposition. The loss cost the PA-led coalition its parliamentary majority and left the president’s administration subject to a vote of no confidence. On July 10 the president suspended Parliament until September to avoid that consequence, and then on September 5 the PA announced a formal agreement with the JVP that restored the government majority’s to 119 parliamentary seats. Although the JVP remained outside the reshuffled cabinet, it won a number of policy concessions, including an end to further moves toward Tamil autonomy, a halt to privatizations, a major reduction in the size of the cabinet, and loan relief for farmers. The pact was severely criticized by the TULF and other Tamil parties and ultimately served only to postpone the government’s collapse. On October 10, 2001, 13 PA legislators, including S. B. DISSANAYAKE, secretary general of the president’s own SLFP, defected to the opposition. With a no-confidence motion looming, Kumaratunga dissolved Parliament and called a general election for December 5, only 14 months after the previous election. This latest setback also brought to an end the president’s effort to hold a referendum on a new constitution, which had been scheduled for mid-October. Meanwhile, in a daring raid on July 24 an LTTE assault team had attacked the country’s principal international airport and an adjoining military air base, causing an estimated $400 million in damages. Although all 13 LTTE assailants were killed, the attack constituted a major blow to the administration and also harmed an ailing economy. With much of the public having turned against President Kumaratunga’s increasingly hard-line stance toward negotiating with the LTTE, the UNP surged ahead during a violence-plagued election campaign, and at the December 2001 parliamentary balloting it captured a plurality of 109 seats, compared to the PA’s 77. As a consequence, Prime Minister Wickremanayake handed in his resigna-

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tion, and Kumaratunga was forced to turn to her longtime foe, the UNP’s Wickremesinghe, to form a new cabinet. The UNP leader quickly established a majority coalition, dubbed the United National Front (UNF), with the SLMC, which had won 5 seats, and also secured the external support of the TULF-led Tamil National Alliance (TNA), an electoral ally. The bulk of the new cabinet was sworn in on December 12, with most remaining appointments then being made in February 2002. The president was forced to surrender the defense and finance portfolios she had held in the preceding cabinet. Although the LTTE had launched a series of attacks to coincide with induction of the Wickremesinghe cabinet, it declared a unilateral ceasefire from December 24. The government reciprocated, reiterating, over the president’s objections, its intention to open negotiations with the LTTE. Wide public relief, if not unanimous acclaim, greeted the announcement on February 22, 2002, of an indefinite cease-fire. The first direct government-LTTE talks in seven years were launched on September 16–18 in Thailand under Norwegian sponsorship, with the principals quickly reaching agreement on formation of a joint committee on security and a joint task force on reconstruction. An estimated 65,000 people had been killed since the beginning of the Tamil conflict. Through early February 2003 four additional negotiating sessions were held at various locations, but on April 21 the LTTE announced its withdrawal from further talks, citing the government’s unwillingness to put establishment of an interim administration for Tamil areas at the top of the agenda. It also complained of too little progress on reconstruction and rehabilitation. Meanwhile, President Kumaratunga continued to assert that Prime Minister Wickremesinghe was conceding too much to the LTTE; she insisted that a political settlement should be concluded only after the LTTE disarmed—a proposition that the LTTE labeled as “suicidal.” She further insisted that the LTTE disband the “Black Tigers” squad of suicide bombers and fulfill its pledge to end the induction of child soldiers.

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On November 4, 2003, during a visit by Prime Minister Wickremesinghe to Washington, President Kumaratunga suspended Parliament for two weeks and dismissed three key ministers, taking over the defense, interior, and mass communications portfolios herself. In response to the resultant governmental crisis, on November 14 Norway withdrew from its role as mediator of the peace process, although it left its Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission in place to continue supervising the ceasefire. In January 2004 the SLFP and the JVP concluded an alliance, and on February 7 Kumaratunga dissolved Parliament and called an election for April 2. The multiparty United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA, successor to the PA) won 105 seats to 82 for the UNP, and on April 6 the popular SLFP parliamentary leader, Mahinda RAJAPAKSE, was sworn in as prime minister. Although the UPFA remained 8 seats short of a parliamentary majority, Rajapakse had won the external support of the newly organized Buddhist National Heritage Party (Jathika Hela Urumaya—JHU), which had won an unexpected 9 seats. It took the UPFA government until September 10, 2004, to cement a legislative majority, which Kumaratunga achieved by bringing an erstwhile UNP ally, the Ceylon Workers’ Congress (CWC), into the administration. Earlier, an MP from the SLMC had defected to the government, and in late October three additional members of the SLMC joined the government as noncabinet ministers. In a reversal of fortunes, the coalition government lost its legislative majority on June 15, 2005, when the JVP withdrew in opposition to the inclusion of Tamil separatist organizations in the distribution of international aid provided in the wake of the December 26, 2004, Indian Ocean tsunami. In a further blow to the UPFA, Foreign Minister Lakshman KADIRGAMAR was assassinated by an unidentified gunman on August 12, 2005. The Supreme Court ruled on August 26, 2005, that President Kumaratunga’s second term would expire in December 2005—not, as she contended, a year later to compensate for the year that had

been shaved off her first term by the early election of December 1999. With the incumbent prohibited from seeking a third term, the presidential election of November 17, 2005, was contested by Prime Minister Rajapakse, the UNP’s Ranil Wickremesinghe, and 11 other minor candidates, several of whom withdrew at the last minute. Rajapakse won 50.3 percent of the vote versus 48.4 percent for Wickremesinghe and was sworn in as president on November 19. Two days later, he named Ratnasiri Wickremanayake to resume his former role as prime minister.

Constitution and Government In May 1972, under the country’s second constitution since independence, Ceylon was redesignated the Republic of Sri Lanka. Under the present constitution (adopted August 16, 1978, as a codification and enlargement of a series of constitutional amendments approved October 20, 1977), the name was further changed to Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, and a British-style parliamentary structure was abandoned in favor of a “Gaullist” presidential-parliamentary system. The most visible feature of the present system is the concentration of powers in a “strong” president who may serve no more than two six-year terms. The president appoints a prime minister and, in consultation with the latter, other senior administrative officials, the only restriction being that all ministers and deputy ministers must hold legislative seats. Should Parliament reject an appropriations bill or approve a no-confidence motion, the president may appoint a new government. The legislative term is six years, subject to presidential dissolution, although the life of the body elected in 1977 was extended by an additional six years in 1982. A constitutional amendment passed in August 1983 requires all members of Parliament to take an oath of loyalty to the unified state of Sri Lanka and bans all activity advocating “the division of the state.” Judges of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal are appointed by the president. Courts of

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first instance include a High Court, which tries criminal cases, and district courts. A presidentially appointed parliamentary commissioner for administration (ombudsman) investigates complaints of wrongdoing by public officials. In September 2001 Parliament passed legislation authorizing creation of a Constitutional Council that has as part of its mandate naming independent commissions with responsibilities over police, the judiciary, public servants, and elections. Prior to 1988 the country was divided into nine provinces, each with an appointed governor and elected Development Council. In November 1987 a constitutional amendment provided for the election of substantially more autonomous provincial councils, each headed by a chief minister. The amendment also authorized the president to merge the Northern and Eastern Provinces, a long-sought objective of their Tamil inhabitants. President Jayawardene implemented the change in September 1988. A North-East provincial government was temporarily installed, but the continuing civil strife rendered the merger moot by the early 1990s. Further devolutionary measures, approved in January 1988, called for a network of district councils (pradeshiya sabhas) throughout the country. Municipalities have urban or town councils, while rural areas are administered by elected village councils.

Foreign Relations Sri Lanka has long maintained a nonaligned position in world politics despite its membership in the Commonwealth and a mutual defense agreement that grants the United Kingdom the right to maintain naval and air bases, as well as land forces, on its territory. While the Jayawardene government stressed Sri Lanka’s economic similarity and cultural affinity with Southeast Asia, the country’s application for admission to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was rejected in 1982 on geographical grounds. The action helped to precipitate the 1985 launching of the South Asian As-

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sociation for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), of which Sri Lanka was a founding member. The island state’s major foreign policy problems since independence have involved relations with India. Conflicting claims to Kachchativu Island in the Palk Strait, which separates the two countries, were resolved in 1974; India yielded its claim, and Sri Lanka agreed to permit Indian fishermen and pilgrims easy access to the island. The Palk Strait accord was supplemented in March 1976 by a general agreement on maritime economic zones. More recently, on December 31, 1998, New Delhi and Colombo signed a trade agreement designed to phase out most tariffs and to facilitate trade, investment, and development. Much more explosive has been the situation involving Sri Lanka’s Tamil dissidents, who have strong ties to some 50 million Tamils in southern India. As ethnic violence on the island escalated, relations between Colombo and New Delhi became strained, largely because of the use of Indian territory as a refuge and staging area by Tamil guerrilla groups. By 1986 local authorities in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu were becoming increasingly disenchanted with the LTTE presence, and the rebels transferred most of their operations to Sri Lanka’s Jaffna area. In addition, New Delhi and Colombo concluded a treaty in mid-1987 under which Indian troops attempted a peacekeeping role in Sri Lanka, although the accord ultimately became a political liability for both governments, and the troops were withdrawn in March 1990. In June 1995 the Indian government again attempted to come to its neighbor’s aid by setting up the equivalent of a naval quarantine around Sri Lanka’s northern coast, thereby depriving the rebels of easy access to supply bases in Tamil Nadu. Despite massive further flight of refugees as the result of the government’s Rivirasa offensive against Tamil separatists in October 1995, Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar the following month prohibited access to international relief organizations for fear of a “lack of impartiality.” However, in a change of tack following the alleged success of Rivirasa II, the government appealed,

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with some success, to the international community for assistance in rebuilding former LTTEcontrolled areas and in providing food aid for returning refugees. On October 9, 1997, the U.S. Bill Clinton administration announced that it had added the LTTE to its list of terrorist organizations.

Current Issues Recent elections have continued to evidence deep divisions over such vital issues as devolving power from the center to the provinces and reconciling Tamil calls for sovereignty with Sinhalese and Buddhist nationalism. The UNP’s Ranil Wickremesinghe almost certainly lost the presidency in November 2005 because of a low voter turnout among Tamils following an expression of “disinterest” in the outcome by the LTTE and its political partner, the TNA. For his part, Prime Minister Rajapakse had managed to win the endorsement of the JVP and JHU by agreeing to support a unitary state rather than broad provincial or regional autonomy, to end privatization of state-run companies, and to renegotiate the terms of the cease-fire with the LTTE. Having won the election, Rajapakse attempted to bring the JVP back into the cabinet, but the effort failed, reportedly because the JVP was dissatisfied with the offered ministerial posts. Nevertheless, the external support of the JVP on most issues gave the Rajapakse-Wikremanayake government a working majority in Parliament. At the same time, to lessen his dependence on the JVP President Rajapakse set about offering UNP defectors cabinet and subcabinet posts and actively courting the CWC. Meanwhile, the incidence of cease-fire violations was on the rise. In May 2004 the LTTE had stated that it was prepared to resume peace negotiations, but only if its proposal for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) in the northeast headed the agenda. That proved unacceptable to the government. Complicating matters was a schism within the LTTE itself. In March 2004 Col. KARUNA (the nom de guerre of Vinayagamurthi MURALITHARAN), the LTTE eastern comman-

der, had led a force of some 6,000 in a revolt against domination of the organization by northern leaders. An April 9–13 LTTE offensive appeared to quash the rebellion and drove Karuna underground, but his command subsequently regained strength. The LTTE later charged that the Sri Lanka Army was aiding Karuna’s forces in a “secret war.” The Indian Ocean tsunami that struck the eastern coast of Sri Lanka on December 26, 2004, caused widespread devastation from Jaffna in the north to the resort city of Galle in the south. As of late March 2005, the death toll was officially 32,000, with over 4,000 still missing, although some estimates put the loss of life at closer to 39,000. While the government of (then) Prime Minister Rajapakse indicated that it would work in concert with the LTTE to aid affected Tamil areas, it added that no relief funds would flow directly to the Tamil Tigers, whose Tamil Relief Organization, according to most reports, was working effectively in LTTE-controlled areas. The LTTE, for its part, wanted the UN and other international organizations, not the government, to distribute relief supplies. In the south, there were reports that the JVP was hijacking relief convoys and delivering aid under its own name. As a consequence of political wrangling, it took six months to fashion an arrangement whereby the LTTE would share in some $3 billion in international humanitarian and reconstruction aid. That prompted the JVP to withdraw its support from the government a week before the agreement was signed on June 24, 2005. The JVP departure cost Prime Minister Rajapakse his parliamentary majority, but most of the opposition, including the UNP, supported the aid plan, which called for establishing a Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure headed by a three-member panel of government, LTTE, and Muslim representatives. The structure permitted the government to avoid giving aid directly to the LTTE. Ironically, by then an estimated 90 percent of aid to tsunami victims was already being distributed through nongovernmental organizations, according to a report in the Financial Times. In the following year the cease-fire repeatedly appeared on the verge of collapse. LTTE and

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government representatives met in Geneva, Switzerland, on February 22–23, 2006, to discuss the escalation in cease-fire violations, but a second round of talks scheduled for April 24–25 was canceled because the Sri Lankan navy had denied sea access to eastern LTTE leaders. On April 25 a suicide bomber attacked army headquarters in Colombo, killing 11, injuring 25, and prompting government forces to launch air strikes and shell suspected LTTE camps in Trincomalee District, in the east. (Trincomalee was already the site of communal strife involving Muslims as well as Sinhalese and Tamils.) On May 11 a navy patrol boat was sunk after being rammed in an LTTE suicide mission that killed at least 17 sailors and led to additional retaliation. Although both the LTTE and the government repeatedly stated their continuing commitment to the cease-fire, there was little evidence of it on the ground, and in late July a protracted battle began in Trincomalee over an irrigation canal that the LTTE had barricaded. In early August both sides accused the other of responsibility for the latest atrocity in the conflict: the execution in Muttur of 17 Tamils who were working for the French aid agency Action Against Hunger (Action Contre le Faim). A month later, however, the government and the LTTE agreed to resume talks unconditionally.

Political Parties and Groups At the April 2004 election 24 parties and alliances contested at least one district, and 7 won at least one seat. As of February 2006 there were 53 registered parties.

Governing Alliance United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA). Organized in preparation for the April 2004 parliamentary election, the UPFA was an expansion of the People’s Alliance—PA (Bahejana Nidasa Pakshaya). The PA had been formed prior to the 1993 provincial elections as an SLFP-dominated coalition that included a number of groups that had theretofore operated under the banner of the United Socialist Alliance (USA), formed by Chan-

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drika Kumaratunga in 1988 (see earlier editions of the Political Handbook for details regarding the USA). In the 1993 balloting it defeated the UNP in Western Province (including Colombo) while limiting the ruling party’s majorities elsewhere. In August 1994 a broader coalition formed with the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) produced, with the support of minor parties, a parliamentary majority of one seat. In January, April, and June 1999 the PA claimed victories in all seven provincial council elections, winning clear majorities in two, exactly half the seats in two others, and pluralities in three. At the October 10, 2000, parliamentary election the PA won 45 percent of the vote and 107 seats, 6 short of a majority. Within days President Kumaratunga forged a governing coalition with the National Unity Alliance (NUA, below), the Tamil Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP), and an independent, for a total of 116 seats. At the December 2001 election the PA won only 37 percent of the national vote and 77 parliamentary seats. Formation of the UPFA was announced in January 2004 by the SLFP and the People’s Liberation Front (JVP). On February 3 the National Liberation People’s Party (DJVP), the NUA, the People’s United Front (MEP), and the Sri Lanka People’s Party (SLMP) announced their participation, as did the Lanka Equal Society Party (LSSP) and the Sri Lanka Communist Party (SLCP) two weeks later. What propelled the UPFA to 45.6 percent of the vote and a near-majority at the April 2004 parliamentary election was the participation of the JVP, which won 39 of the alliance’s 105 seats. In July the UPFA also won victories in all six provinces that held elections. Sharp differences between the staunchly leftist JVP and other alliance parties persisted, however, especially over the terms of peace negotiations with the LTTE. In August President Kumaratunga resigned as alliance leader, reportedly because of differences with the JVP. In June 2005 the JVP withdrew in a dispute over government relations with the LTTE, thereby reducing the UPFA government to a minority. In late July the alliance selected Prime Minister Rajapakse as its candidate for the next presidential

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election. Following Rajapakse’s narrow victory, external support permitted a new UPFA cabinet under Prime Minister Wickremanayake to take office. Leaders: Mahinda RAJAPAKSE (President of the Republic), D. A. JAYARATNE, Susil PREMAJAYANTHA (General Secretary). Sri Lanka Freedom Party—SLFP (Sri Lanka Nidahas Pakshaya). Founded in 1951 and a leading advocate of republican status prior to adoption of the 1972 constitution, the SLFP initially advocated a neutralist foreign policy and the progressive nationalization of industry. Although winning a clear majority of seats in the House of Representatives at the election of 1970, it governed in coalition with the Lanka Sama Samaja and Communist parties until September 1975. Its legislative representation plummeted from 90 seats to 8 at the election of July 1977. In October 1980 former prime minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike was deprived of her civil rights for a seven-year period for alleged corruption while in office. She nevertheless remained active in party affairs, causing a split between her supporters and those of the nominal president, Maithripala SENANAYAKE. Mrs. Bandaranaike’s rights were restored by means of a presidential “free pardon” issued on January 1, 1986, and she immediately launched a campaign for early general elections. In August the SLFP joined with some 20 groups, as well as prominent Buddhist leaders, in establishing the Movement for the Defense of the Nation (MDN) to oppose government policy that “conceded too much” on the Tamil question. Although its parliamentary representation had dropped to 6 by late 1982, the SLFP gained 3 additional seats in May 1983 by-elections and became the formal opposition when MPs belonging to the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF, below) refused to accept the extension of the parliamentary term. The party boycotted the 1988 provincial council elections but provided the main challenge to the United National Party (UNP) in subsequent presidential and legisla-

tive balloting: Mrs. Bandaranaike won nearly 45 percent of the December presidential vote, while the SLFP secured 67 parliamentary seats in February 1989. From 1993 it has constituted the core of the PA and then the UPFA. In October 1993, Anura Bandaranaike, the former prime minister’s son and theretofore leader of the opposition, withdrew from the party, amid reports of a family power struggle, and subsequently joined the first Wickremesinghe administration. He rejoined the SLFP prior to the December 2001 election and quickly assumed a leading role. In October 2001 the SLFP general secretary, S. B. Dissanayake, was among the 13 PA defectors to the opposition, which precipitated the dissolution of Parliament. Following the election loss in December, former prime minister Ratnasiri Wickremanayake, under pressure, resigned as leader of the opposition. In December 2004 Dissanayake was sentenced to two years in prison for defaming Supreme Court judges while he was SLFP general secretary. Leaders: Chandrika Bandaranaike KUMARATUNGA (President of the Party and Former President of the Republic), Mahinda RAJAPAKSE (President of the Republic), Ratnasiri WICKREMANAYAKE (Prime Minister), Anura BANDARANAIKE, Mangala SAMARAWEERA, Maithiripala SIRISENA (General Secretary). Sri Lanka Communist Party (SLCP). Founded in 1943, Sri Lanka’s official Communist party consistently urged the nationalization of all banks, estates, and factories and the use of national languages rather than English. Initially, differences within the party membership prevented it from taking a clear position on SinoSoviet relations, but subsequent trends yielded a strongly pro-Soviet posture. During 1976 the SLCP proposed a United Socialist Front with what it called the “centralized Left” in the SLFP. The initiative resulted in the formation in April 1977 of the United Left Front (ULF), comprising the SLCP, the LSSP, and the now-defunct

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People’s Democratic Party (PDP); however, the ULF obtained no National State Assembly seats at the July election. Briefly banned in 1983, the SLCP joined the SLFP in forming the USA in 1988 and then the PA in 1993. Longtime party leader Pieter KEUNEMAN died in January 1997. In November 1998 the party called on the administration to renew talks with the Liberation Tigers “to find a negotiated settlement within the united framework of Sri Lanka.” It continues to advocate devolution of powers as a step toward resolving the Tamil conflict. In May 2004, following the UPFA’s victory at the polls, the SLCP secretary general, D. E. W. Gunasekera, was named minister for constitutional reforms. In April, despite President Kumaratunga’s backing, he had lost the race for speaker of Parliament by one vote. In April 2006 the SLCP joined several other leftist parties in announcing formation of a Socialist People’s Alliance (SPA). Other initial participants were identified as the LSSP, SLMP, the Democratic Left Front (DLF), and the National Liberation People’s Party (DVJP). Leaders: D. E. W. GUNASEKERA (Secretary General), Raja COLLURE. Lanka Equal Society Party (Lanka Sama Samaja Pakshaya—LSSP). Established in 1935 as a Trotskyite formation named the Ceylon Equal Society Party, the LSSP first entered into a coalition with Mrs. Bandaranaike’s SLFP in 1964. The party, which went into opposition in September 1975, lost all 19 of its legislative seats as a component of the ULF at the election of July 1977. Subsequently, it joined the SLMP and the SLCP in supporting measures to negotiate a settlement with Tamil activists. In 1994 Vasudeva Nanayakkara rejoined the party. A presidential candidate in 1982, the outspoken Nanayakkara had led the NSSP (below) during his hiatus from the LSSP. In 1999 he was expelled from party membership for crossing to the parliamentary opposition, thereby technically depriving the PA of its one-vote majority.

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Nanayakkara ran as the candidate of the Left and Democratic Alliance in the presidential balloting of December 1999. The party’s Wimalasiri de Mel was minister of science and technology under Prime Minister Wickremanayake, having joined the cabinet in January 1998 as a replacement for recently deceased party leader Bernard SOYSA. A year later the party leadership openly criticized the government for its failure to contain the violence that preceded the January 25, 1999, North-Western Provincial Council election. It subsequently threatened to leave the PA unless the government moved forward with abolition of the executive presidency and a return to the Westminster model. In February 2004, despite some initial objections to the SLFP-JVP alliance, the LSSP decided to join the UPFA for the April parliamentary election. Shortly after the election, longtime LSSP General Secretary Batty WEERAKOON resigned. Leaders: Wimalasiri de MEL (General Secretary), Tissa VITHARANA (Minister of Science and Technology). National Congress (NC). The NC, initially called the National Muslim Congress, was formed in 2004 by A. L. M. Athuallah, who had previously been a leader in the SLMC and a noncabinet minister under Prime Minister Wickremesinghe. In 2003, having criticized the government for favoring the LTTE and not addressing the needs of the eastern Muslim community, Athuallah and S. SUBAIRDEEN broke away from the SLMC and established the Ashraff Congress. In February 2004 Athuallah left the Ashraff Congress and allied himself with the UPFA, joining the cabinet under Prime Minister Rajapakse. The party adopted its present name in September 2005. Shortly thereafter, some of its original members, dissatisfied with the UPFA government, returned to the SLMC. Leader: Ahamed Lebbe Marikkan ATHUALLAH (Minister of Infrastructure Development and Fisheries Housing).

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National Liberation People’s Party (Desha Vimukthi Janatha Pakshaya—DVJP). Active nationally since 1988, the DVJP is a leftist group often linked to the SLCP, SLMP, and LSSP. Leader: K. A. PODIAPPUHAMI (General Secretary). National Unity Alliance (NUA). The NUA was formed prior to the October 2000 election by the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress (SLMC, below) as a vehicle for expanding its influence beyond its Muslim base. Although the NUA took four seats at the balloting, the death of the SLMC’s Mohamed H. M. Ashraff in September 2000 ultimately led to a power struggle between Rauff Hakeem and Ashraff’s widow, Ferial, with the former assuming control of the SLMC and Mrs. Ashraff being relegated to the NUA. A further rupture between the two leaders occurred following Hakeem’s removal from the cabinet in June 2001. Mrs. Ashraff ultimately remained loyal to the PA and in early July was affirmed by the courts as NUA leader, despite Hakeem’s objections. She was named to the Rajapakse cabinet in April 2004 but threatened to leave the government because she was not consulted about tsunami aid negotiations. The potential rift was repaired in June 2005, and she continued to serve under Prime Minister Wickremanayake. Leaders: Ferial ASHRAFF (President of the Party and Minister of Housing and Construction), M. I. M. RAFEER (Secretary General). People’s United Front (Mahajana Eksath Peramuna—MEP). The MEP, a left-wing party formed in 1956, was formerly allied with the JVP. Strongly Sinhalese and Buddhist, it long advocated the nationalization of foreign estates. In April 1999 it captured three legislative seats in Western Province and subsequently backed President Kumaratunga’s reelection. Although it later protested against the government’s proposed constitutional changes, in August 2000, the MEP joined the PA for the October general

election. Its president was named transport minister in the reshuffled Wickremanayake cabinet. In 2004 Dinesh Gunawardena was appointed minister of urban development and water supply in the Rajapakse cabinet, a position he retained in the Wickremanayake cabinet. Leaders: Dinesh GUNAWARDENA (President), Piyasena DISSANAYAKE (General Secretary). Sri Lanka People’s Party (Sri Lanka Mahajana Pakshaya—SLMP). Formed in January 1984 by the younger daughter of Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Chandrika Kumaratunga, and her husband, Vijaya, the SLMP is a socialist grouping that accused the SLFP, under Anura Bandaranaike, of “dancing to his excellency’s [the president’s] tune.” By 1987, however, the party, which had previously cooperated informally with the SLCP and the LSSP, had become supportive of the government’s approach to a negotiated settlement of the Tamil question. Vijaya KUMARATUNGA, a popular film star, was assassinated in Colombo on February 16, 1988, apparently as part of a campaign by the JVP (below) to suppress support of the 1987 India– Sri Lanka Accord. Chandrika Kumaratunga ultimately assumed leadership of the SLFP. The party’s general secretary and USA presidential candidate in 1988, Ossie Abeygunasekera, was among those killed in the October 1994 bomb attack that also took the life of UNP presidential nominee Gamini Dissanayake. Leader: Ranjith NAWARATHNE (General Secretary). Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP). The EPDP was formed in the late 1980s by Douglas Devananda, a founding member of the EROS (see EDF, below) in the 1970s and of the EPRLF (below) in the 1980s. Having abandoned armed conflict, Devananda joined the political mainstream following the India–Sri Lanka Accord. In the 1994 legislative election EPDP members won nine “independent” seats from Jaffna, while

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in January 1998, defying LTTE threats and the deaths of at least two of its candidates, the party claimed victories in a majority of the 17 local council elections in the region. Late in the year a major clash with LTTE forces occurred. Nadarajah ATAPUTHARAJAH, an influential EPDP MP and editor of a widely read Tamil weekly, was assassinated in November 1999. The party backed President Kumaratunga’s reelection in December 1999. Following the October 2000 general election, at which the party won four seats, it agreed to support the PA government. Its leader was awarded with a cabinet post. In December 2001 the EPDP won two parliamentary seats on a vote share of 0.8 percent. In April 2004 it won only 0.3 percent and one seat. Devananda was then named to the Rajapakse cabinet. Leader: Douglas DEVANANDA (General Secretary of the Party and Minister of Social Services and Social Welfare).

Other Parliamentary Parties United National Party—UNP (Ekshat Jathika Pakshaya). A democratic-socialist party founded in 1946, the UNP advocates a moderate line and the avoidance of a narrowly “communal” posture. Having survived virtual annihilation as a legislative force in 1970, the party swept 142 of 168 assembly seats in July 1977 and remained in power by subsequent extension of the parliamentary term to 1989. While losing the two-thirds majority required for constitutional revision, it won 125 of 225 seats at the balloting of February 1989. From 1978 until 1989 the UNP’s Junius R. Jayewardene served as executive president of Sri Lanka. The UNP finished second in 1994 with 94 of 225 seats, including 7 won by members of the CWC, who ran on the UNP ticket but subsequently announced that they would sit as progovernment independents. The party’s initial choice as 1994 presidential candidate, Gamini Dissanayake, was assassinated less than three weeks prior to the November 9 poll, his widow, Srima, securing only 35.9 percent of the vote as his successor. In balloting

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for seven provincial councils in January, April, and June 1999 the UNP uniformly finished second to the PA, despite having won majorities in five of them at the previous provincial elections. In November 1999 five members of Parliament and two dozen or so other elected officials announced their break from the UNP leadership over the party’s lack of support for constitutional reform. The MPs indicated that they would remain within the party but function independently. They also threatened a judicial challenge if the leadership formally expelled them, which it did. On November 9 two of the five were named to President Kumaratunga’s cabinet as “special assignment” ministers. UNP presidential candidate Ranil Wickremesinghe finished second in the December 1999 balloting, with 42.6 percent of the vote. At the October 2000 parliamentary election the UNP won 89 seats on a 40 percent vote share. Three UNP dissidents received cabinet portfolios in the subsequent Wickremanayake government. In the run-up to the December 2001 election Wickremesinghe negotiated electoral alliances with the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), the recently formed four-party Tamil National Alliance (TNA), and the CWC. Following the balloting, at which the UNP won 109 seats and 46 percent of the vote, Wickremesinghe formed a governing coalition with the SLMC, also brought the CWC leader into the cabinet, and obtained external support from the TNA. In April 2004 the UNP and the CWC, running together as the United National Front (UNF), won 37.8 percent of the vote and 82 seats (74 claimed by the UNP). In November 2005 former prime minister Wickremesinghe once again lost the presidency, this time by only 2 percent of the vote. The first half of 2006 saw several MPs defect to the UPFA, in return for which they were given government posts. At the same time, some party members voiced dissatisfaction with Wickremesinghe’s continuing leadership. Leaders: Ranil WICKREMESINGHE (Former Prime Minister), Deshabandu Karu JAYASURIYA

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(Deputy Leader), Malik SAMARAWICKRAMA (Chair), Sirisena COORAY (Mayor of Colombo), N. V. K. K. WERAGODA (General Secretary), Tissa ATTANAYAKE (Deputy General Secretary). People’s Liberation Front (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna—JVP). The Sinhalese JVP (not to be confused with the Tamil National Liberation Front—JVP, under TULF, below) was formed as a legal Maoist party in the mid-1960s. It led an attempt to overthrow the government in 1971, and a variety of ensuing clandestine groups were presumed to be made up of JVP members disguising their connection with the earlier uprising. The front regained legal status in 1977 and emerged as the third-ranked party in Colombo as the result of local balloting in May 1979. It was again proscribed after the July 1983 riots, reemerging in 1987 as a major threat to the government through a campaign of killing and terror in the south directed at government targets and Sinhalese supporters of the India–Sri Lanka Accord. In an attempt to win the JVP over to conventional politics, the government again legalized the party in May 1988, but JVP leaders renounced the offer and remained underground. Exploiting growing anti-Indian nationalistic sentiment among some Sinhalese, the JVP subsequently expanded its guerrilla campaign in the south, apparently operating through a military wing called the Patriotic People’s Movement (Deshapriya Janatha Viyaparaya—DJV). Having disrupted provincial, presidential, and legislative elections in 1988 and early 1989, the front again rejected government overtures in September 1989. Subsequently, JVP founder and leader Rohana WIJEWEERA, General Secretary Upatissa GAANAYAKE, and other senior JVP members were killed by security forces under questionable circumstances. Although observers predicted the deaths would drastically curtail the group’s effectiveness, the JVP was nonetheless deemed responsible for renewed violence in late 1989. In all, the armed struggle in the south may have cost 50,000 lives or more.

Having disavowed violence in the mid-1990s, the JVP gathered strength late in the decade as a “third force” in opposition to the PA and the UNP, sometimes releasing joint statements with other leftist formations, including the NSSP (below) and various smaller parties. In 1999 it presented candidates for all seven provincial council elections, capturing at least one seat at each. In Western and Southern Provinces, where neither the PA nor the UNP secured a majority, the JVP held the balance of power, although JVP leaders stated that they had no intention of entering either provincial government. Its December 1999 presidential candidate, Nandana Gunathilake, finished third, with 4.1 percent of the vote, having campaigned on a platform that included abolition of the executive presidency and rejection of World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) prescriptions for economic reform. In October 2000 the party won 6 percent of the vote and ten seats in Parliament. In September 2001 the JVP’s Gunathilake and President Kumaratunga signed a 28-point agreement that guaranteed the JVP’s support to the PA government, in return for which the JVP obtained key policy concessions. Parliament was nevertheless dissolved in October, and at the December election the JVP picked up an additional 6 seats on a 9 percent vote share. In 2004 the JVP was credited with 39 of the UPFA’s seats. Despite participating in the Rajapakse cabinet, the JVP continued to press its own agenda, including an end to privatization, noncooperation with World Bank and IMF economic prescriptions, and opposition to broad autonomy for Tamil areas. Despite having left the Rajapakse government in June 2005, the JVP lent its support to Rajapakse’s presidential candidacy later in the year in return for his commitment to key elements of the JVP’s agenda, including renegotiation of the cease-fire agreement with the LTTE. The JVP nevertheless remained outside the subsequent Wickremanayake government and reconfirmed its decision in July 2006, when it rebuffed overtures form the UPFA and demanded the expulsion of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission.

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Leaders: Somawansa AMARASINGHE (Chair), Wimal WEERAWANSA (Parliamentary Leader), Nandana GUNATHILAKE, M. Tilvin SILVA (General Secretary). Tamil National Alliance (TNA). The TNA was established on October 18, 2001, by the four parties indented below, in preparation for the December general election, at which it ran under the symbol of the TULF, the “rising sun.” The TNA, strongly supportive of a negotiated settlement with the Tamil Tigers (LTTE, below), soon concluded an electoral pact with the opposition UNP and went on to win 15 parliamentary seats on a vote share of 3.9 percent. Following the election it extended its external support to the United National Front government. At the April 2004 election the TNA appeared on the ballot under the “house” symbol of the Sri Lanka Tamil Government Party (Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi—ITAK), an original component of the TULF that had been revived because of a split in the TULF. (Organized in the 1940s, the ITAK had not directly competed in a national election since 1970.) For the first time the TNA explicitly served as the proxy of the LTTE, winning 22 seats in the north and east. In November 2005 the LTTE and TNA indicated their “disinterest” in the outcome of the presidential election, which probably contributed to a low voter turnout in Tamil areas and a resultant loss for UNP candidate Wickremesinghe. Leaders: Rajavarothiyam SAMPANTHAN (Parliamentary Leader), K. VIGNESHWARAN (ITAK). Tamil United Liberation Front—TULF (Tamil Vimuktasi Peramuna). The TULF was initially organized as the Tamil Liberation Front (Tamil Vimukthi Peramuna—TVP) in May 1976 by a number of Tamil groups, including the CWC, the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), the so-called Federal Party (the ITAK, also known as the Tamil State Party), the National Liberation Front (Jatika Vimukthi Peramuna— JVP), and the Muslim United Front. The ITAK,

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which was led by S. J. V. CHELVANAYAKAM, and the ACTC had previously been partners in a coalition organized prior to the 1970 election as the Tamil United Front (TUF). The TULF stated in its 1977 election manifesto that its successful candidates would serve as the constituent assembly of a proposed Tamil state (Tamil Eelam). At the July election the front obtained 16 seats in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, becoming the largest opposition group in the National Assembly. Having previously declared their intention to resign from Parliament to protest the extension of the existing body beyond its normal term, the TULF MPs failed to appear for an oath renouncing separatism in August 1983, and their seats were thereupon declared constitutionally vacant. Despite pressure from militants, the TULF maintained an essentially moderate posture, engaging in talks with the government and supporting the 1987 India–Sri Lanka Accord. Under pressure from the LTTE, the TULF boycotted the North-East Provincial Council balloting of November 1988; however, it won ten seats in the February 1989 parliamentary poll, its candidates reportedly having been supported by other proaccord Tamil groups. The TULF secretary general, Appapillai AMIRTHALINGAM, was killed and the party president seriously wounded in a July 1989 attack attributed by some reports to a “rogue cell” of the LTTE. The TULF won five seats in Parliament at the 1994 election, after which it agreed to support the PA. In January 1998 the TULF won a majority of seats on the Jaffna Municipal Council, but in March the party president was quoted as saying that his organization would step aside in favor of the LTTE if the PA and the UNP would reopen talks with the group and accept it as the legitimate representative of the Tamils. In May the newly elected TULF mayor of Jaffna, Sarojini YOGESWARAN, was assassinated by a group claiming allegiance to the LTTE. Four months later her successor, Ponnuthurai SIVAPALAN, was also killed, by a bomb, and in

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December a party secretary, Ponnathurai MATHIMUGARAJAH, was assassinated at a public rally. The well-respected party vice president, Neelan TIRUCHELVAM, was killed by an LTTE suicide bomber on in July 1999. Because of intraparty differences, the TULF did not officially endorse a presidential candidate in December 1999. In October 2000 it won five seats in Parliament. In 2001 it was a prime mover in forming the TNA in opposition to President Kumaratunga. Technically, the TULF per se did not contest the April 2004 parliamentary election because of a leadership dispute that remained in the courts. The TNA-supportive wing of the party, led by R. Sampanthan, backed the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil people, while the other wing refused to accept the LTTE’s contention. The latter wing, led by V. Anandasangari, offered a slate of independent candidates but won no seats. In December 2005 party leader and TNA legislator Joseph PARARAJASINGHAM was assassinated. The government blamed the LTTE; the LTTE blamed government-backed paramilitaries. In January 2006 the Anandasangari wing, the anti-LTTE faction of the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF, below), and the People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE, below) were reportedly discussing formation of a new Tamil party. Leaders: Veerasingham ANANDASANGARI, Rajavarothiyam SAMPANTHAN. All Ceylon Tamil Congress —ACTC (Akila Ilankai Tamil Congress). Organized in 1944 and generally regarded as the founder of the movement for Tamil statehood, the ACTC participated in formation of the TULF in 1976 but subsequently reregistered as a separate party. The ACTC did not contest the January 1998 Jaffna local elections. On January 5, 2000, its leader, Kumar PONNAMBALAM, was assassinated. An anti-LTTE group calling itself the National Front Against Tigers later claimed responsibility. The party

won one seat at the 2000 and 2004 Parliament elections. Leader: Gajendrakumar PONNAMBALAM (General Secretary). Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). The EPRLF conducted guerrilla activity in Tamil areas in the first half of the 1980s before being decimated by a full-scale LTTE offensive in late 1986. In the wake of the 1987 accord that brought Indian troops to the region, the EPRLF was rebuilt, with New Delhi’s support, to serve as a vehicle for the assumption by moderate Tamils of local political autonomy. In November 1988 the EPRLF gained 40 of 71 seats in the newly created North-East Provincial Council: It won 17 of 35 seats in the east and, under an agreement with the Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF, below), filled 23 seats in the uncontested north. In addition, an EPRLF leader was appointed chief minister of the province, and an EPRLF-dominated militia, the Tamil National Army, was formed. However, upon completion of the Indian withdrawal in March 1990 the Tamil army proved to be no match for the LTTE, and many of its members joined most of the EPRLF leadership in fleeing to India. Party leader K. PADMANABHA was assassinated in June 1990. The party failed to win control of any of the local bodies at the January 1998 Jaffna balloting. A year later former party chief and North-East chief minister Annamalai Varatharaja Perumal returned from exile, reportedly to rebuild the EPRLF, but in January 2000 he was expelled by the party’s central committee for “antiparty” activities. Two months earlier he had stated that he no longer considered Tamil independence realistic. Perumal and his dissident supporters contested the October 2000 elections on independent district lists while voicing support for the PA at the national level. In June 2003 the leader of Perumal’s faction, Thambirajah SUBATHIRAN, was assassinated, apparently by the LTTE. The party remained divided through 2004, with the faction loyal to

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Suresh Premachandran continuing its participation with the TNA. The Perumal faction, led by T. Sritharan, backed the presidential candidacy of Prime Minister Rajapakse in 2005. Faction Leaders: Suresh K. PREMACHANDRAN, Annamalai Varatharaja PERUMAL (in exile), Thirunavakkarasu SRITHARAN. Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO). The TELO resulted from the merger, in Madras, India, in April 1984, of a preexisting group of the same name with the Eelam Revolutionary Organization (ERO) and the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Front (EPRF). The organization was reported to have been “virtually eliminated” in battles with the LTTE in 1986, with its principal leader, Mohan Sri SABARATNAM, among the estimated 300 casualties. The TELO had little success in the Jaffna area elections of January 1998, winning control of only one village council. Reports in 1999 stated that the TELO and the PLOTE (below) had clashed over control of Vavuniya, the major northern railhead. At the 2000 and 2004 national elections the party won three seats in Parliament. Leaders: Selvan ADAIKALANATHAN (President), M. K. SIVAJILINGAM, N. INDRAKUMAR (General Secretary). National Heritage Party (Jathika Hela Urumaya—JHU). Launched in March 2004 with a platform that called for protecting Buddhism as the state religion, rooting out government corruption, and rejecting concessions to the Tamil Tigers, the JHU grew out of the strongly nationalist Sinhalese Heritage (Sihala Urumaya—SU). The SU was established in April 2000 on a similar platform that opposed concessions to Tamil militants, including any movement toward a federal state. At the October 2000 election the party won only one national list seat. An intraparty dispute over who should occupy the parliamentary seat led the SU president, S. L. GUNESEKARA, to resign and form the Sinhala National Front (Sinhala Jathika Sangamaya—SJS). In December 2001 the SU won under 0.6 percent of the vote and no seats in Parliament.

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At the April 2004 election the Buddhist JHU won an unexpected nine seats with 6.0 percent of the vote, after which it gave its external support to Prime Minister Rajapakse. Differences subsequently surfaced over whether the organization should abandon any future electoral role. The JHU supported Rajapakse in the 2005 presidential election, following his commitment to maintaining a unitary state and renegotiating the LTTE cease-fire. Like the JVP, the JHU has called for annulling the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Leaders: Katapola AMARAKITHTHI Thera (Chair), Ellawala MEDHANANDA Thera, Omalpe SOBITHA Thera (General Secretary). Ceylon Workers’ Congress (CWC). Arising as part of the labor union movement in 1939, the CWC is a Tamil group that participated in formation of the TULF in 1976. It regards itself as the main spokesman for the Indian Tamils who work primarily as laborers on centrally located tea plantations. In recent years it has attempted to prevent their forging links with the Tamil insurgents in the north and east. In 1994 the CWC elected seven members of Parliament on the UNP list, but they subsequently withdrew to sit as a group of progovernment independents. At the April 1999 provincial elections, the party campaigned under the banner of the National Union of Workers (NUW) because of a legal dispute over use of the party symbol. The NUW proceeded to win single seats in Uva and Sabaragamuwa Provinces and captured six in Central Province. In all three the NUW’s support was sufficient to give the PA a working legislative majority. The CWC’s longtime president, Sauvmiamoothy THONDAMAN, died in October 1999. He was succeeded as minister of livestock development and estate infrastructure by his grandson Arumugam. In late August 2000, five MPs broke from the CWC over a leadership dispute and announced their support for the UNP. In September 2001 the party severed its ties to the PA and then negotiated an electoral pact with the UNP, but not before the

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original dissidents rejoined the PA as the Ceylon Workers’ Alliance. Following the December 2001 election, Thondaman joined the new UNP-led cabinet. In 2004 the CWC ran as the UNP’s partner in the United National Front (UNF), winning eight parliamentary seats. Following the election, the CWC was courted by the UPFA, which needed eight seats to claim a majority. In early June the CWC leadership rejected joining the minority government, but in early September it offered its “unconditional full support,” thereby giving the UPFA a parliamentary majority and earning a cabinet post. Less than a year later, however, in February 2005, the CWC threatened to resign from the government, which it accused of neglecting the needs of its Tamil constituency. Differences were patched up late in the month and the CWC remained in the government, but in October the party announced that it would support the UNP’s Wickremesinghe for the presidency. In mid-2006 reports indicated that the Wickremanayake government had reached an agreement that would bring the CWC back into the government at the next cabinet shuffle. Earlier, the CWC had supported the government in the March 2006 local elections. Leaders: Arumugam THONDAMAN, Muttu SIVALINGAM. Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC). Formed in 1980, the SLMC declared itself a political party at a conference convened in December 1986 to represent Muslim interests in the negotiations for a political settlement of the Tamil question. The party won 17 seats in the North-East Provincial Council balloting in November 1988 and supported Mrs. Bandaranaike’s bid for the presidency in December 1988. It obtained 3 legislative seats in February 1989, adding 4 more as a coalition partner of the PA in August 1994. Following the January 25, 1999, North-Western Provincial Council election, the SLMC, objecting to the violence and intimidation allegedly committed by PA activists during the campaign, raised the possibility that it would sever its links to the al-

liance. In August 2000 comments by SLFP minister A. H. M. Fowzie belittling the SLMC’s importance to the PA led President Mohamed H. M. ASHRAFF to submit his resignation as ports minister, but the rift was patched at the end of the month. At the same time, the SLMC agreed to remain partnered with the PA for the October general election, although it decided to contest four districts separately. To broaden its appeal beyond its Muslim constituency, the party also decided to campaign as the National Unity Alliance (NUA, above). At the balloting the NUA won four seats in addition to those won under the PA banner. Party founder Ashraff died in September 2000 in a helicopter crash. His widow, Ferial, was named to the cabinet announced after the October election, as was her party coleader, Rauff Hakeem. Hakeem soon supplanted Mrs. Ashraff within the SLMC, although she became the ostensible NUA leader. On June 20, 2001, President Kumaratunga removed Hakeem from the cabinet, at which time he and six other SLMC members of Parliament abandoned the government, thereby costing it its legislative majority. Ashraff initially resigned her cabinet post but continued her support for the government. She resumed her ministerial position in early July, leaving the SLMC/NUA asunder. Following the December 2001 election, at which the SLMC won five seats, Hakeem negotiated a coalition agreement with the UNP and joined the new cabinet. Mrs. Ashraff’s NUA had remained with the PA. Subsequent efforts to resolve their differences did not succeed. In 2002–2003 the party splintered further, largely over the perception of a faction led by A. L. M. Athuallah that the UNP government was favoring the LTTE at the expense of eastern Muslims (see NC, above). For the April 2004 general election the SLMC ran independently, capturing five parliamentary seats. In May one SLMC MP defected to the UPFA, and three others did likewise in October, for which the three were named noncabinet ministers responsible for rehabilitation and district development in three Tamil districts. The SLMC leadership attempted to expel the three but was overruled by the Supreme Court.

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The SLMC supported the UNP Ranil Wickremesinghe in the 2005 presidential contest. In 2006, however, it announced that it would extend issue-based support to the government. Leaders: Rauff HAKEEM, M. T. Hasen ALI (Secretary General). Up-Country People’s Front (UCPF). Representing Indian Tamil plantation workers, the UCPF was organized as an alternative to the CWC by former CWC member P. Chandrasekaran, who was elected to Parliament as an independent in 1994 but aligned with the PA. The party won two seats on the Central Provincial Council in April 1999, but on December 7 Chandrasekaran resigned as President Kumaratunga’s deputy minister for estate housing and threw his support to the opposition UNP, which he described as “offering more benefits to the estate Tamils.” In December 2001 he was named to the incoming UNP-led cabinet. In 2004 the UCPF won one parliamentary seat and 0.5 percent of the national vote. It backed the UNP’s Wickremesinghe for president in 2005 but shifted its support to the Rajapakse government in 2006. The party’s president has proposed the direct participation of India in settling the Tamil question. Leaders: Periyasamy CHANDRASEKARAN (President), V. RADHAKRISHNAN, S. VIJAYAKUMARAN (Secretary).

Other National or Sinhalese Parties Liberal Party (LP). The LP began as the Council for Liberal Democracy, founded in 1981 by UNP member Chanaka AMARATUNGA, who ultimately formed the LP in 1987. It won two Western Province council seats in 1988 and ran on the SLFP ticket in 1989. In August 1996 Amaratunga, who had helped draft the devolutionary constitutional amendments favored by the Kumaratunga administration, died in an automobile accident. The LP won no provincial council seats in 1999 despite offering candidates in six provinces. Its current leader ran for president in December 1999 but attracted little support, and in December 2001 and April 2004 the LP won only a handful of votes.

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Leaders: Rajiva WIJESINHA (President), Kamal NISSANKA (Secretary). Muslim National Alliance (MNA). The MNA was established in May 2005 by three parties: the Democratic Unity Alliance (DUA); the Sri Lanka Muslim Kachchi (SLMK), led by Abdul RASOOL; and the United Muslim People’s Alliance (UMPA), led by Nizar MOULANA. Although the DUA’s Nazeer Ahamed initially intended to enter the 2005 presidential contest, the alliance decided to back the UNP’s Wickremesinghe. In October 2005, however, it switched its allegiance to Prime Minister Rajapakse of the UPFA. Other organizations joining the MNA included the Ashraff Congress (see NC, above) and the Muslim United Liberation Front (MULF). Leader: Z. A. Nazeer AHAMED. New Equal Society Party (Nawa Sama Samaja Pakshaya—NSSP). A 1977 splinter of the LSSP, the NSSP was one of the leftist parties briefly banned for alleged seditious activity in 1983. Despite its general support for the Kumaratunga administration, in June 1996 its offices were raided by the police following government allegations that it was involved in a strike against the state-owned Ceylon Electricity Board. For the December 1999 presidential race it was allied with the JVP. Leading up to President Kumaratunga’s February 2004 decision to call a snap national election, the NSSP had drawn closer to Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, who was viewed as the lesser of two evils because of his peace efforts. Immediately after the dissolution of Parliament the NSSP joined with Vasudeva Nanayakkara’s Democratic Left Front (DLF) and a small LSSP splinter, Chandra KUMARAGE’s LSSP (Alternative Group), to announce a New Left Front (NLF) to contest the April election. Nanayakkara, a former LSSP parliamentary deputy, had run for president in 1999 as the candidate of a Left and Democratic Alliance. His DLF had won less than 0.1 percent of the vote in December 2001. A previous incarnation of the NLF had been organized in 1998 by the NSSP, eight other minor leftist parties, and the MULF, which was particularly

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concerned with retaining a Muslim identity in the Tamil-dominated north. The NLF presented candidates in all seven provincial legislative elections in 1999 but won only one seat, in Western Province. It later called for full devolution of powers to an autonomous North-East Province. At the 2001 election the NLF won 0.5 percent of the vote and no parliamentary seats. At the April 2004 election the new NLF won only 0.1 percent of the vote. Leaders: Wickramabahu Bandara KARUNARATNE, Chamil JAYANETHTHI (2005 presidential candidate), Vasudeva NANAYAKKARA (NLF). Sons of the Soil Party (Sinhalaye Mahasammatha Bhoomiputra Pakshaya—SMBP). Strongly nationalist, Sinhalese, and Buddhist, the SMBP was founded by Wijetamuni Rohana De SILVA, who attempted to assassinate Rajiv Gandhi in July 1987. In August 1997 the SMBP, blaming India for the country’s civil strife, asserted that New Delhi should pay compensation because of its alleged support for the Tamil insurgents. It contested council seats in two provinces in April 1999 but won no seats. Party leader Harischandra Wijetunge ran for president in 1999, as he had in 1994, but secured under 1 percent of the vote. In December 2001 and April 2004 the SMBP won few votes. Leaders: Harischandra WIJETUNGE (President), W. M. KARUNARATNE (Secretary). Sri Lanka Progressive Front (SLPF). The SLPF, which was formed in the late 1980s by former SLFP leader Ariya BULEGODA, won one seat in the 1994 balloting for Parliament. Its 1994 presidential candidate, Nihal Galappathy, won only 0.3 percent of the vote; Galappathy later joined the JVP. The SLPF failed to secure provincial council representation at balloting in 1999. At the 2000, 2001, and 2004 general elections it won little support. Bulegoda died in April 2004. The party’s 2005 presidential candidate, Nelson PERERA, withdrew at the last minute in favor of Prime Minister Rajapakse. Leader: Rohan JAYATUNGA (Secretary).

United Lalith Front (ULF). The ULF was launched in January 1992 as the Democratic United National Front (DUNF) by a group of eight politicians who had been expelled from the UNP for supporting the impeachment of President Premadasa. The DUNF’s principal leader, Lalith ATHULATHMUDALI, was assassinated while addressing a rally in Colombo in April 1993. Subsequently, the group secured about 15 percent of the overall vote at the May provincial council balloting as an ally of the People’s Alliance. The DUNF leadership passed to Athulathmudali’s widow Srimani Lalith ATHULATHMUDALI, who became a minister in the government appointed in August 1994. In March 1997 the DUNF did not cooperate with the PA at local elections, and in June Srimani Athulathmudali lost her cabinet posting. The party subsequently adopted the ULF designation. It maintained a tenuous relationship with the PA until withdrawing from it entirely in late August 2000, apparently because the PA did not offer Athulathmudali a place on its national list for the October election. The ULF won no seats then, in December 2001, or in April 2004, when it took only 0.04 percent of the vote. Srimani Athulathmudali died in December 2004. Leaders: Anura de SILVA (2005 presidential candidate), T. M. S. NANAYAKKARA (General Secretary). Additional parties contesting the 2004 election (none obtaining more than 0.2 percent of the vote) included the Ceylon Democratic Unity Alliance (CDUA), led by S. SATHASIVAM; the rump of the Democratic United National Front (DUNF; see the ULF, above), led by Ariyawansha DISSANAYAKE; the Jathika Sangwardhena Peramuna (JSP), led by 2005 presidential candidate Achala Ashoka SURAWEERA; the National People’s Party (NPP), led by Mudhitha KARUNAMANI; the Ruhuna Janatha Party (RJP), led by Aruna SOYZA; the Socialist Equality Party (SEP), led by 2005 presidential candidate Wije DIAS; the Sri Lanka National Front (SLNF), led by Wimal GEEGANAGE, who withdrew from the 2005 presidential race to back Prime Minister

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Rajapakse; the Swarajya (SR), led by Naweendra Lal GUNARATNE; and the United Socialist Party (USP), a splinter from the NSSP that participated in formation of the New Left Front in 1998 but ran on its own in 2001 and 2004. The USP’s leader, Siritunga JAYASURIYA, finished third, with 0.4 percent of the vote, in the 2005 presidential election.

Other Tamil Parties and Groups Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Founded in 1972 as the Tamil New Tigers, the LTTE is the largest and most hard-line of the militant Tamil groups. It has proposed a socialist Tamil homeland, although ideology has recently been overshadowed by military considerations. In 1985 the Tigers joined the EPRLF, EROS (see under EDF, below), and TELO in an antigovernment coalition, the Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF), to fight for a separate Tamil state. However, the LTTE was soon engaged in a bloody campaign against some of its former allies, assuming effective control of much of northern Sri Lanka, especially the Jaffna peninsula. The Tigers also conducted extensive guerrilla activity against the Indian troops brought into the region as peacekeepers under the 1987 accord between Colombo and New Delhi. The LTTE boycotted and partially sabotaged the provincial elections in November 1988 and the presidential elections in December. In 1989 the LTTE agreed to peace negotiations with the government, announced a temporary cease-fire, and vowed to renounce violence if the other militant Tamil groups did likewise. It also launched the People’s Front of Liberation Tigers (PFLT) as a “democratic socialist” political party. However, fighting was reported at year’s end between the LTTE and the EPRLF, the Tigers’ primary opposition in the struggle for Tamil dominance. Completion of the Indian withdrawal in March 1990 left the LTTE in virtual control in the north. Amid periodic hostilities and an ongoing LTTE terrorist campaign against civilian targets, various peace initiatives in the 1990s failed to yield a durable settlement. The government consistently

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rejected LTTE demands for third-party mediation of the conflict. On January 26, 1998, in response to the bombing of the country’s holiest Buddhist shrine, in Kandy, the government officially banned the LTTE. Three days later, the group boycotted the Jaffna local elections after having warned voters and other parties not to participate. The threat undoubtedly contributed to a voter turnout of well under 50 percent. On November 10 the High Court ruled that party members could be tried in absentia on charges related to the January 1996 Colombo financial center bombing that killed nearly 100 and injured another 1,400. Near the end of the year, for the second time since 1995, the LTTE reportedly responded to a revolt in its ranks with a crackdown against dissident troops. A major LTTE offensive begun in November 1999 continued into 2000, reversing many of the losses suffered in the preceding 18 months and threatening government control of Jaffna. Meanwhile, a series of LTTE-sponsored assassinations and suicide bombings continued unabated. The targets included leaders of the government-supportive Tamil parties as well as, on December 18, 1999, President Kumaratunga, who narrowly escaped assassination. In the two years following the January 1998 local elections in the north, the LTTE killed at least 25 councilors. In March–April 2000 the LTTE appeared to be inching closer to talks with the government, with Norway to serve as mediator, although the Kumaratunga administration steadfastly rejected an LTTE demand that government forces be confined to barracks during any such negotiations. A breakthrough finally occurred in the wake of the December 2001 parliamentary election, and in February 2002 the LTTE and the new UNP-led government concluded an indefinite cease-fire agreement, with formal negotiations then opening in September. On April 21, 2003, after four additional rounds of negotiations, the LTTE called a halt to the peace process, citing lack of progress with regard to autonomy, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. On October 31, 2003, the LTTE published its proposal for an Interim Self-Governing Authority

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(ISGA) for the northeast. The plan called for Tamils to exert complete control over the region for five years, after which an election would be held. The most significant challenge to the LTTE leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran was launched in March 2004 by the commander of forces in the east, Col. Karuna, who led an estimated 6,000 troops (out of the LTTE’s total of 15,000) in a revolt against northern domination. The rebellion was largely suppressed in April, however, and Karuna went underground. In October he announced formation of the Tamil People’s Liberation Party (TMVP, below). By early 2005 his forces were again challenging the LTTE, which accused the Sri Lanka Army and Karuna of cooperating in a “secret war” against the LTTE. The LTTE and the Rajapakse government met in February 2006 in Switzerland to discuss increasingly frequent cease-fire violations, but the severity of the clashes continued to escalate through midyear. On May 29, 2006, the EU labeled the LTTE a terrorist organization (as had Canada in April), threatening its main fund-raising activities. Leaders: Velupillai PRABHAKARAN (PIRABAKARAN), S. P. THAMILSELVAN (Political Leader), Anton S. BALASINGHAM (Chief Negotiator), Yogarathnam YOGI (PFLT). Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF). Initially a strong ally of the EPRLF and a supporter of the India–Sri Lanka Accord of 1987, the ENDLF filled 13 uncontested seats from the North in the creation of the North-East Provincial Council in November 1988. Since the withdrawal of Indian troops from Sri Lanka, the ENDLF has operated primarily in India. In October 2004, however, it announced formation of Tamil Eelam United Liberation Front (Tamileela Iykkiya Viduthalai Munnani—TIVM) with the TMVP, the new party of ex-LTTE commander Karuna. Leaders: G. GNANASEKARAN, Parathan RAJAN (TIVM Coleader), R. RAJARATTINAM (General Secretary). Eelavar Democratic Front (EDF). The EDF emerged in 1988 from reorganization of the Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS),

which dated from the mid-1970s. Although not legally registered, the EDF presented a slate of independent candidates (with the reported tacit approval of the LTTE) in the February 1989 parliamentary balloting, securing 13 seats and becoming the third largest legislative block. EDF representatives boycotted subsequent parliamentary sessions, calling for repudiation of the 1987 India–Sri Lanka Accord, immediate withdrawal of Indian troops, and the release of all Tamil prisoners. Two of its parliamentary members resigned their seats in early 1990, while the remaining 11 followed suit in July, saying they did “not want to be dormant spectators who witness the torment of our people.” The EDF has contested a number of subsequent elections without notable success. It did not present a slate of candidates for the 2004 general election. Leader: V. BALAKUMAR. People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE). The PLOTE was the most important of the separatist groups not involved in the May 1985 coalition (see LTTE, above). Attempts were made on the lives of a number of its leaders in Madras in March 1985, apparently by the LTTE, which severely curtailed PLOTE rebel activity in 1986. PLOTE General Secretary Uma WAHESWARAN, who along with other PLOTE members had been implicated in an attempted coup in the Maldives in late 1988, was reportedly assassinated in Colombo in July 1989. Since 1988 the PLOTE’s political wing has been the Democratic People’s Liberation Front (DPLF), which won three parliamentary seats in 1994 and extended its support to the PA (even though the leader of a progovernment faction, N. S. K. Uma PRAKASH, had been assassinated early in the year). The DPLF’s vice president, Karavai KANDASAMY, was assassinated in December 1994. Like the TULF, the EPDP, and the TELO, the DPLF chose to contest the January 1998 local elections in Jaffna but won control only of two urban and two village councils. The PLOTE, running under its own banner, had even less success, achieving no majorities. On September 2, 1999, the PLOTE

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Cabinet As of August 1, 2006 Prime Minister

Ratnasiri Wickremanayake

Ministers Agriculture, Irrigation, and Mahaweli Development Child Development and Women’s Empowerment Constitutional Affairs and National Integration Defense, Public Security, and Law and Order Disaster Management and Human Rights Education Enterprise Development and Investment Promotion Environment Finance and Planning Foreign Affairs Healthcare and Nutrition Highways Housing and Construction Industry Infrastructure Development and Fisheries Housing Internal Administration Justice and Law Reforms Labor Relations and Foreign Employment Local Government and Provincial Councils Mass Media and Information Nation Building and Development Petroleum and Petroleum Resource Development Ports and Aviation Posts and Telecommunication Power and Energy Public Administration and Home Affairs Railways and Transport Religious Affairs Rural Economy Development Science and Technology Rural Industries and Self-Employment Promotion Social Services and Social Welfare Tourism Trade, Commerce, Consumer Affairs, and Marketing Development Urban Development and Water Supply Vocational and Technical Training [f] = female Note: Except as noted, ministers are affiliated with the SLFP.

Maithripala Sirisena Sumedha Jayasena [f] D. E. W. Gunasekera (SLCP) Mahinda Rajapakse Mahinda Samarasinghe (UNP) Susil Premajayantha Rohotha Bogollagama (UNP) Maithripala Sirisena Mahinda Rajapakse Mangala Samaraweera Nimal Siripala de Silva Jeyaraj Fernandopulle Ferial Ashraff (NUA) [f] A. L. M. Athuallah (NC) Ratnasiri Wickremanayake Amarasiri Dodangoda Athauda Senaviratne Janaka Bandara Tennakoon Anura Priyadarshana Yapa Mahinda Rajapakse A. H. M. Fowzie Mangala Samaraweera D. M. Jayaratne John Seneviratne Sarath Amunugama A. H. M. Fowzie Mahinda Rajapakse D. M. Jayaratne Tissa Vitharana (LSSP) S. B. Nawinne Douglas Devananda (EPDP) Anura Bandaranaike Jeyaraj Fernandopulle Dinesh Gunawardena (MEP) Piyasena Gamage

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military commander, Thasan MANIKKADASAN, and a deputy were killed by a suspected LTTE suicide bomber. The party backed President Kumaratunga’s reelection two months later. At the December 2001 general election the DPLF won under 0.2 percent of the vote but one seat in Parliament. It failed to hold the seat in 2004, attracting less than 0.1 percent of the vote. Leaders: Dharmalingam SIDDHARTHAN (President), S. SATHANANTHAN (DPLF).

the basis of nationwide vote totals. Following the balloting, the United People’s Freedom Alliance held 105 seats (92 district, 13 national); the United National Front, 82 (71, 11); the Tamil National Alliance, 22 (20, 2); the National Heritage Party, 9 (7, 2); the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress, 5 (4, 1); the Up-Country People’s Front, 1 (1, 0); the Eelam People’s Democratic Party, 1 (1, 0). Speaker: W. J. M. LOKKUBANDARA.

Tamil People’s Liberation Party (Tamileela Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal—TMVP). Formation of the TMVP was announced in October 2004 by Col. Karuna, the former LTTE eastern commander who broke with the LTTE in March 2004 and quickly saw his forces, numbering some 6,000, bear the brunt of an LTTE offensive. Later in October, Karuna and the leaders of the long-dormant ENDLF announced formation of the TIVM front “to achieve the cherished rights and the reasonable aspirations” of Sri Lanka’s Tamils. Since then, the Karuna breakaway group has continued to engage in open hostilities with the LTTE. Leader: Col. KARUNA (Vinayagamurthi MURALITHARAN).

Communications

Legislature Sri Lanka’s former House of Representatives, originally elected for a five-year term in 1970, was reconstituted as a unicameral National State Assembly on promulgation of the 1972 republican constitution, which also provided for extension of the existing legislative term to 1977, with six-year terms mandated thereafter. Under the 1978 basic law, the assembly was redesignated as the Parliament. In December 1982 the life of the existing Parliament was extended by referendum for an additional six years to August 1989 (although dissolution was decreed on December 20, 1988). Elections for a 225-member body were first held in February 1989. At the early election of April 2, 2004, 196 members were chosen by proportional representation at the district level, while 29 members were elected on

The 1978 constitution guarantees free speech and publication, but these and other rights are “subject to such restrictions as may be presented by law.” Justifications have included maintaining racial and religious harmony, national security, and public order and welfare. As a consequence, varying degrees of censorship and other forms of media control often prevail. In particular, the government has periodically banned news coverage of military operations against the Tamil Tigers.

Press The leading publishing groups are the government-owned Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd., which was nationalized in 1973; the privately held Upali Newspapers Ltd.; and the private Wijeya Newspapers Ltd. The last two have close connections to the two leading political parties. Sri Lankan newspapers do not typically reveal their circulation figures, and those given below are estimates. The following are Sinhalese dailies published in Colombo, unless otherwise noted: Silumina (260,000), weekly; Lankadeepa (140,000 daily, 325,000 Sunday, published as Irida Lankadeepa), in Sinhala and English; Divaina (130,000 daily, 310,000 Sunday, published as Divaina Irida Sangrahaya); Sunday Times (100,000), weekly, in English and Sinhala; Daily News (75,000), government owned, in English; Dinamina (60,000), government owned; The Island (50,000 daily, 40,000 Sunday), in English; Virakesari (50,000 daily, 70,000 Sunday, published as Virakesari Vara

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Veliyeedu), in Tamil; Janasathiya (50,000), weekly; Mithran Varamvalar (44,000), weekly, in Tamil; Thinakaren (30,000 daily, 35,000 Sunday, published as Thinakaran Vaaramanjari), in Tamil; Observer (19,000 daily, 90,000 Sunday), in English.

News Agencies

a dozen private channels and the state-run Independent Television Network. There were approximately 2.4 million television receivers and 325,000 personal computers serving 250,000 Internet users in 2003.

Intergovernmental Representation

The principal domestic facilities are the National News Agency of Sri Lanka (Lankapuvath) and the Press Trust of Ceylon; a number of foreign bureaus maintain offices in Colombo.

Ambassador to the U.S. Bernard Anton Bandara GOONETILLEKE

Broadcasting and Computing

Permanent Representative to the UN Prasad KARIYAWASAM

The public Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation (SLBC) controls both national and commercial radio services. The Sri Lanka Rupavahini Corporation (SLRC) provides daily telecasts, as do half

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U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka Jeffrey LUNSTEAD

IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, CP, CWTH, Interpol, IOM, IOR-ARC, NAM, PCA, SAARC, WCO, WTO

TA J I K I S TA N REPUBLIC

OF

TA J I K I S T A N

Jumhurii Tojikiston

See the note at the end of this entry for information on current events.

The Country A mountainous country in southeast Central Asia, Tajikistan is bordered by Kyrgyzstan on the north, China on the east, Afghanistan on the south, and Uzbekistan on the west. Approximately 80 percent of the population is Tajik, 15 percent Uzbek, and only 1 percent Russian, as a consequence of a significant exodus of minorities in the 1990s. The dominant religion is Sunni Islam. Women make up about 44 percent of the labor force. Although less than 10 percent of Tajikistan is arable, ample water supplies have helped make its farmland very productive, the leading crops being cotton, grains, vegetables, and fruits. The agricultural sector as a whole employs nearly two-thirds of the workforce, although its contribution to the GDP, reflecting changes in relative prices, has varied widely in recent years, from 15 percent in 1995 to double that in 2002. Industry, fueled by the country’s extensive hydroelectric capacity, remains concentrated in such energy-intensive ventures as ore extraction and refining. Aluminum, by far the most important industrial product, is the leading national export, followed by hydroelectricity and cotton. Other mineral resources include gold, silver, and uranium. Leading manufactures include clothing and textiles, processed foods, and carpets. The Tajik economy, the weakest among the former Soviet republics at independence, was further disrupted by civil war: the GDP contracted by half during 1991–1996, while inflation reached over 2,000 percent in 1995. Moreover, the conflict cost

between 50,000 and 100,000 lives and displaced a million or more people. Although consumer price inflation remained at an estimated 160 percent in 1997, the GDP recorded a 1.7 percent gain, the first since independence. Greater progress was recorded in 1998, with GDP growth reaching 5.3 percent and inflation falling dramatically, to under 3 percent. With support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and other multilateral institutions, the government undertook a reform program that included privatization of state

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Political Status: Designated autonomous republic within the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic on October 27, 1924; became constituent republic of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) on October 16, 1929; declared independence as Republic of Tajikistan on September 9, 1991; current constitution adopted by referendum on November 6, 1994. Area: 55,250 sq. mi. (143,100 sq. km.). Population: 6,127,493 (2000C); 6,346,000 (2005E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): DUSHANBE (598,000), Khujand (144,000). Official Language: Tajik, although the 1994 constitution accords Russian the status of a language of communication between nationalities. Monetary Unit: Somoni (official rate July 1, 2006: 3.28 somoni = $1US). President: Imomali RAKHMONOV (Emomali RAHMONOV; originally identified with the Communist Party of Tajikistan, currently a member of the People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan); designated by the Supreme Soviet on November 19, 1992, upon the resignation of Akbarsho ISKANDAROV (Islamic Renaissance Party); reelected by popular vote on November 6, 1994, and inaugurated for a five-year term on November 16; reelected on November 6, 1999, and inaugurated for a seven-year term on November 16. Prime Minister: Oqil OQILOV (Akil AKILOV; originally identified with Communist Party of Tajikistan); appointed by presidential decree on December 20, 1999, succeeding Yakhyo AZIMOV (identified with Communist Party of Tajikistan), who, as required by the Constitution after a presidential election, had resigned on November 23 but remained in office during the interim.

enterprises (including the country’s largest industrial facility, the Tursunzade aluminum plant), restructuring of the financial industry, and alleviation of poverty. GDP grew by 3.7 percent in 1999, but consumer price inflation jumped to over 30 percent. Both rates doubled in 2000, while in 2001 growth

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accelerated to 10.2 percent and inflation declined to about 12.5 percent. Growth subsequently remained strong—9.1 percent in 2002, 10.2 percent in 2003, and 10.6 percent in 2004—but inflation remained in the double digits until 2004, when it fell to under 6 percent.

Government and Politics Political Background Most of the Tajik lands were conquered by Russia in the 1880s and 1890s. Popular uprisings in the wake of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution were not completely suppressed until 1921. In 1924 the region was made an autonomous republic within the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic and in 1929 a constituent republic of the USSR. On February 11, 1990, rioting erupted in Dushanbe when demonstrators, initially responding to reports that Armenian refugees were to be settled there, began calling for democratic reforms. A resultant state of emergency led to the suppression of the demonstrations, in part by Soviet soldiers. On August 25, 1990, with nationalism on the rise, a “sovereignty” declaration was issued asserting the precedence of the republic’s constitution and laws over those of the USSR, and on November 30 the Supreme Soviet voted to replace its chair with a president as head of state. On August 25, 1991, in the wake of the failed Moscow coup against USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev, the Supreme Soviet ordered the nationalization of the assets of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) within the republic. On August 29 the Communist Party of Tajikistan (CPT) voted to withdraw from the CPSU, while the words “Soviet Socialist” were dropped from the republic’s name. Meanwhile, anticommunist opposition groups, principally the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), the secular and pro-Western Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT), and the nationalist Rastokhez (Rebirth) movement, had continued to organize demonstrations against the government. On September 1, 1991, after losing a nonconfidence vote, the CPT’s Khakhor MAKHKAMOV

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resigned the presidency in favor of the Supreme Soviet chair, Kadreddin ASLONOV. On September 9 the legislature declared the independence of the Republic of Tajikistan, and on September 22 Acting President Aslonov issued a decree banning all CPT activities, despite the fact that the party had redesignated itself as the Tajik Socialist Party (TSP) the day before. On September 23 the Communist ban was reversed and Aslonov resigned, being succeeded by former CPT first secretary Rakhman NABIYEV. Nabiyev immediately imposed a state of emergency that was to have continued for the remainder of the year but was lifted on October 2, 1991. Opposition demonstrations nonetheless continued, and on October 6 Nabiyev submitted his resignation, ostensibly to permit all candidates an opportunity to campaign on an equal footing for the popular presidential balloting that was thereupon rescheduled from October 27 to November 24. At the presidential poll, despite his reputation as a hard-line conservative, Nabiyev drew a 58 percent vote share in a field of seven candidates. His closest competitor, Davlat KHUDONAZAROV of the DPT, won more than a quarter of the vote. Significantly, the DPT candidate received backing from the IRP, thus sealing an Islamic-prodemocracy opposition alliance that was to become a crucial factor in the unfolding civil conflict, which was based more on ethnic and regional differences than on ideology. In January 1992 Nabiyev named Akbar MIRZOYEV prime minister. In March 1992 Maksud IKRAMOV, a prominent DPT member and chair of the Executive Committee (mayor) of Dushanbe, was arrested and charged with bribery. Coupled with an earlier dismissal of a minister from the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region, the action triggered widespread antiregime protests. Led by the IRP, the DPT, Rastokhez, and Lali Badakhshan (a nationalist formation organized by the Pamiri ethnic group of Gorno-Badakhshan), the demonstrators called for dissolution of the Supreme Soviet and the adoption of a new constitution. In late April, with the unrest continuing and the local army commander having indicated that his troops would not intervene, President Nabiyev organized a series of progovernment

rallies in the capital, many of the demonstrators being Communists from the southern Kulyab and northern Leninabad regions. In addition, Nabiyev secured legislative approval for a six-month period of direct presidential rule, including a suspension of civil liberties, and backed the formation of a Tajik “national guard.” DPT leader Shodmon YUSUF responded by charging Nabiyev with an attempt “to prolong totalitarian rule” and called for an interim state council similar to one that had assumed control in Georgia. On April 22, 1992, the hard-line Safarali KENJAYEV resigned as chair of the Supreme Soviet. His reinstatement on May 3 triggered a fresh wave of protests, including a demonstration by upward of 100,000 persons on May 5. On May 10 security forces killed some 20 individuals gathered in front of the National Security Committee headquarters, where negotiations were taking place between government and opposition representatives. The next day, following intervention by the Muslim spiritual leader, Kazi Ali Akbar TURAJONZODA of the IRP, Vice President Narzullo DUSTOV and a number of other hard-line officials resigned, and agreement was reached on a powersharing arrangement whereby the opposition DPT and IRP would be awarded 8 of 24 cabinet posts. It was also agreed that an interim representative Assembly (Majlis) would be established, pending multiparty election of a permanent successor. However, the local soviets in Leninabad and Kulyab refused to accept the accord. Fighting between supporters and opponents of the agreement broke out in Kulyab and soon spread to the adjacent region of Kurgan-Tyube, where in August clashes between progovernment Kulyabi militiamen and Islamicprodemocracy oppositionists reportedly cost hundreds of lives. On August 30, 1992, Prime Minister Mirzoyev resigned and was succeeded on an interim basis by his deputy, Jamshed KARIMOV, while on September 7 President Nabiyev was forced to resign by opposition elements that had seized him during a melee in Dushanbe airport. On September 24 Nabiyev’s acting successor, Supreme Soviet Chair Akbarsho ISKANDAROV, named Abdumalik ABDULLOJONOV to replace Karimov as the

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acting head of a coalition administration. Nevertheless, the conflict continued to intensify, with the new government losing effective control of Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube to Nabiyev supporters led by Sangak SAFAROV. In early October former Supreme Soviet chair Kenjayev, who had organized a pro-Nabiyev Popular Front, tried to seize control of the capital from Islamic-prodemocracy forces. On November 19 Supreme Soviet Chair Iskandarov stepped down in favor of Imomali RAKHMONOV, leader of the pro-Nabiyev forces in Kulyab. Concurrent with Iskandarov’s departure, the presidential system was abolished in favor of a parliamentary system, with the chair of the legislature again serving as head of state. Prime Minister Abdullojonov remained in office, but the cabinet was stripped of opposition appointees. On December 10, after a two-month blockade of the capital led by Kenjayev’s militias, troops loyal to the successor government regained control of Dushanbe from Islamic-prodemocracy forces, most of which were eventually driven into the Afghan border region. On April 3, 1993, the DPT’s Maksud Ikramov was for the second time dismissed as mayor of Dushanbe, after having been reinstated to the position in late 1992. On April 11 former president Nabiyev died of an apparent heart attack, and on April 27 the Russian Supreme Soviet voted to send a peacekeeping force to Tajikistan to join contingents from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan that had been dispatched by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Two months later, on June 21, the Supreme Court banned the four leading opposition groups—the IRP, DPT, Rastokhez, and Lali Badakhshan—for engaging in assassination, kidnapping, and rebellion. By that time, the government had regained control over most of the country, and many opposition leaders, including the IRP’s Turajonzoda, had gone into exile. The conflict nonetheless continued in the border region, with the Islamic forces reportedly receiving support from Afghan guerrillas. Prime Minister Abdullojonov resigned on December 19, 1993, at least in part because of the country’s economic decline, and was succeeded on December 22 by his deputy, Abdujalil Ahadovich SAMADOV. Subsequently, peace talks with oppo-

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sition leaders were initiated in Moscow, despite the assassination on March 11, 1994, of Deputy Prime Minister Mayonsho NAZARSHOYEV, who had been named to head the government delegation. The talks yielded an agreement to cooperate on aid to refugees and to seek national reconciliation through “political measures alone,” but clashes continued to occur in areas along the Afghan frontier. Further UN-sponsored talks in Tehran, Iran, resulted in the signature of a cease-fire accord on September 18, seemingly without the government making any major concessions to the opposition. The cease-fire did little to reduce hostilities, with another deputy prime minister, Munavvarsho NASIRYEV, being killed by a land mine on the day of its notional implementation, October 20. Meanwhile, a draft “presidential” constitution that had been circulated in late April was, on July 20, approved by the Supreme Soviet, which called for its submission to a popular referendum in conjunction with balloting for a state president in the fall. Held on November 6, 1994, the constitutional referendum and presidential balloting were boycotted by the Islamic opposition and the DPT, although some secular opposition parties backed the presidential candidature of former prime minister Abdullojonov. According to the official results, over 90 percent of the voters endorsed the constitution, and the incumbent, Rakhmonov, received 58 percent of the votes cast, against some 35 percent for Abdullojonov, who complained of vote-rigging. On December 2 Jamshed Karimov returned as prime minister to preside over a government that continued to be dominated by actual or former Communists. Elections to the new 181-member Supreme Assembly, held on February 26 and March 12, 1995, were boycotted by most of the opposition parties, Islamic and secular. A majority of the winners had no overt party allegiance, although about a third were declared Communists. Before and after the legislative balloting, fighting continued unabated between government and opposition forces, despite the presence since December 1994 of a small UN observer mission charged with monitoring the supposed cease-fire. In a major flare-up in Gorno-Badakhshan in April,

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hundreds died as government and Russian/CIS forces advanced on units of the Afghanistanbased IRP armed wing operating in alliance with Badakhshan separatists. By mid-1995 some 25,000 CIS peacekeeping troops were deployed in Tajikistan, the majority of them Russian. Further peace talks took place in Kabul, Afghanistan, in May 1995 between President Rakhmonov and the IRP leader, Sayed Abdullo NURI, but no substantive progress was made on the opposition’s demand for the legalization of all political parties, press freedom, release of political prisoners, amnesty for rebel leaders, and full autonomy for Gorno-Badakhshan. In June–July 1995 the government succeeded in bringing about a split in the DPT, with one faction accepting official registration and the other remaining in full opposition. During the latter part of 1995, notwithstanding an extension of the notional cease-fire, the civil war continued in the south and along the Afghan border. An escalation of the conflict at the beginning of 1996 impelled President Rakhmonov to carry out a government reorganization in early February, with Karimov being replaced as prime minister by Yakhyo AZIMOV and with Makhmadsaid UBAYDULLAYEV being dismissed as first deputy prime minister. The changes were reportedly made in response to demands by two rebel military leaders who had occupied the southern and western towns of Kurgan-Tyube and Tursunzade; troops loyal to one of the rebels, Col. Makhmud KHUDOBERDIYEV, an ethnic Uzbek from Leninabad, had briefly threatened the capital. Thereafter, fighting intensified in the central Garm and Tavil Dara areas. The fall of Kabul to Taliban forces in September 1996 provided a spur to further peace efforts, and new negotiations between the government and the opposition were launched in October. At a meeting in Afghanistan on December 10–11, President Rakhmonov and the IRP’s Nuri agreed to another cease-fire and to open formal peace talks in Moscow later in the month. Despite violations, the cease-fire appeared to contain the fighting, and on December 23 Rakhmonov and Nuri signed ac-

cords in the Russian capital providing for the establishment of a transitional National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), to be headed by a representative of the IRP-led United Tajik Opposition (UTO). The NRC would assume responsibility for overseeing the reintegration of the opposition into normal life and the reform of electoral laws. Under the accords, opposition representatives were to be introduced into the structures of executive power, including central and local government and law enforcement agencies, in proportion to the representation of the parties on the NRC, taking regional balance into account. The commission would cease its work after the convocation of a new parliament and the formation of its ruling bodies. Early in 1997 the secular National Revival movement, which had been organized in July 1996 by former prime ministers Abdullojonov, Karimov, and Samadov, staged protests against its exclusion from the peace process. At the same time, further negotiations between the government and the UTO were being overshadowed by kidnappings and battles among warlords and rogue military officers, most prominently Colonel Khudoberdiyev, who for a time controlled much of southern Tajikistan and again threatened the capital before being repulsed by government troops. Nevertheless, the cease-fire between the UTO and the government, which controlled little more than the capital region, continued to hold, and when an assassination attempt on the life of President Rakhmonov failed in April, the UTO joined world capitals in condemning the attack. On June 27, 1997, Rakhmonov and UTO leader Nuri signed a peace agreement in Moscow, officially ending the five-year civil war. The agreement provided for the eventual legalization of the UTO parties, the return of refugees and Afghanbased opposition forces, the integration of the latter within the regular army, and the granting to the UTO of 30 percent of government posts. The signatories also agreed that the NRC would have 26 members, 13 from the government and 13 from the UTO. Implementation of the peace was by no means assured, however, and in mid-January 1998 the UTO briefly quit the NRC, citing government

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delays in meeting the terms of the agreement. Under pressure from the UTO, President Rakhmonov named five UTO members to his cabinet on February 12. On March 10 he added as deputy prime minister the UTO’s recently repatriated Ali Akbar Turajonzoda, who, however, failed to win formal parliamentary approval until November 13 even though the position, which had previously carried supervisory responsibilities involving the economy, defense, and the interior, had been redefined to cover only economic and trade relations with CIS countries. Sporadic fighting continued to break out throughout 1998, with the combatants including troops loyal to the government, renegade field commands, UTO contingents (sometimes against each other), and unaffiliated militias. The most serious incident occurred in the northern city of Khujand (formerly Leninabad) on November 4–7, when forces under Colonel Khudoberdiyev staged a rebellion that claimed an estimated 300 lives and injured another 650 before being put down. Among those implicated in the rebellion were former prime minister Abdullojonov; a brother, Abdughani ABDULLOJONOV, who had previously served as mayor of Khujand; and a former vice president, Narzullo Dustov. In the second half of 1999 progress accelerated toward fulfilling the terms of the 1997 peace accords. Meeting on June 17, Chair Nuri and President Rakhmonov had agreed to emphasize constitutional reform while continuing to decommission UTO forces, to integrate UTO troops into national military and security units, and to pursue the 30 percent target for UTO staffing of government positions. In early August Nuri announced that the military goals had been accomplished, which, under the terms of the June agreement, led the Supreme Court on August 12 to reinstate the four political groups that had been banned in 1993. Six weeks later, on September 26, 71.8 percent of those voting in a national referendum approved major changes to the constitution that the NRC, the president, and the Supreme Assembly had finalized in late June. The amendments, affecting more than two dozen articles, included provisions permitting sec-

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tarian political parties, creating a bicameral parliament, and lengthening the presidential term to seven years. With the notable exception of President Rakhmonov’s People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT) and the IRP, however, most political parties had campaigned against the revisions, arguing that they would increase the current president’s authority over legislation, regional administration, and the courts and that the new upper house would slow down legislation and exacerbate regional tensions. On October 18, 1999, the UTO suspended its participation in the NRC and announced that it would boycott the November 6 presidential election, primarily because the Central Commission for Elections and Referendums had disqualified opposition candidates (technically, for having failed to obtain sufficient signatures to get their names on the ballot). Hours before the balloting began, the UTO canceled the boycott, Nuri having received assurances from Rakhmonov regarding the conduct of upcoming parliamentary elections. With Rakhmonov’s only opponent on the ballot, Davlat USMON of the IRP, having denounced the presidential contest as a sham, Rakhmonov secured 97 percent of the vote, and on November 16 he took the oath of office for another term. On November 23 Yakhyo Azimov and his cabinet resigned, as constitutionally mandated. The president named Oqil OQILOV (Akil AKILOV) as the new prime minister on December 20 and continued to make cabinet changes well into the new year. With several of the smaller opposition parties having been declared ineligible, balloting for the new lower house, the Assembly of Representatives, took place on February 27 and March 12, 2000. Amid accusations of campaign and voting irregularities, the PDPT and supporting parties captured more than two-thirds of the 63 seats. The Communists won only 13, and the IRP, 2. On March 23 indirect elections were held for the majority of the seats in the new upper house, the National Assembly, which was also expected to support President Rakhmonov’s agenda. Completion of the parliamentary elections meant that the basic tasks set forth in the 1997

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peace accord had all been accomplished. Consequently, on March 26, 2000, the NRC held its final session and dissolved. In the next four years, amid numerous ministerial changes, President Rakhmonov consolidated his power, in part through passage in June 2003 of a referendum that removed a constitutional proscription against his seeking reelection in 2006. Similarly, the dominance of the PDPT was confirmed by the legislative elections of February–March 2005, which the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) described as seriously flawed.

Constitution and Government The last of the ex-Soviet Central Asian republics to do so, Tajikistan adopted a post-Soviet constitution by referendum on November 6, 1994, with the new text coming into force immediately. It defines Tajikistan as a democratic, secular, and unitary state, and the people as the sole source of state power. Amendments approved by referendum in September 1999 included a provision permitting formation of sectarian political parties. In all, the referendum authorized changes to 27 articles of the basic law. Another referendum, passed on June 22, 2003, made 56 mostly minor changes (which voters had to accept or reject as a single package), with the most controversial provision being removal of a one-term limit for the presidency. The 1999 revisions also replaced the unicameral legislature with a bicameral Supreme Assembly encompassing a National Assembly of indirectly elected and appointed members (plus former presidents of the republic) and an Assembly of Representatives, the latter directly elected from a combination of single-seat districts and national party lists. All parliamentarians serve five-year terms. The powers of the National Assembly, which must meet at least twice a year, include redefining territorial divisions and considering laws proposed by the lower house. The Supreme Assembly can override presidential vetoes with a two-thirds vote. The Assembly of Representatives, meeting in continuous session, is authorized to independently adopt

the state budget and can override an upper house rejection of legislation with a two-thirds vote. Passage of constitutional amendments requires a twothirds vote of both bodies and a three-fourths vote in the event of a presidential veto. The president, described as the head of the executive branch and commander in chief, is now directly elected for up to two seven-year terms. His powers include appointing the prime minister and other ministers, as well as judges and other senior state and regional administrators, subject to legislative endorsement. He can also initiate referendums. The system of judicial authority is headed by a Constitutional Court and includes a Supreme Court, a Supreme Economic Court, and a Military Court. Administratively, Tajikistan currently comprises the capital city of Dushanbe, the centrallyadministered Karotegin “region of republican subordination,” and three regions (viloyatho): Sughd (formerly Leninabad); Khatlon, established in 1992 by the merger of the Kulyab (K˘ulob) and Kurgan-Tyube (Q˘urghonteppa) regions; and the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (Badakhshoni K˘uh´ı Viloyati Avtonomii), which the 1994 constitution specifically defines as “an integral and indivisible part of Tajikistan.” Regions, towns, and districts elect local assemblies that are chaired by presidential appointees, subject to the approval of the respective assemblies.

Foreign Relations On December 21, 1991, Tajikistan became a charter member of the post-Soviet CIS. By early 1992 it had established diplomatic relations with a number of foreign countries, including the United States, and had been admitted to the Conference on (later Organization for) Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE). It joined the United Nations in March 1992, the IMF in April 1993, and the World Bank in June 1993. As a predominantly Muslim country, Tajikistan also became a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. More recently, in February 2002 it formally joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace program.

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Relations with Moscow have remained close since independence, with Russia repeatedly renewing its commitment, through a CIS collective security treaty, to protect the Tajik-Afghan border. In addition, from 1993 until the mission’s end on September 16, 2000, Russia provided the bulk of troops for the CIS peacekeeping operation, which also included contingents from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. In December 1994 the UN Security Council authorized formation of a small United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) to help monitor the September 1994 cease-fire. The mission was renewed at six-month intervals thereafter, despite the failure of the original cease-fire and the killing of four UN workers on July 20, 1998, in central Tajikistan. In reaction to the killings, UN activities were briefly suspended. On March 21, 2000, the UN Security Council announced the end of the UNMOT mandate, effective May 15. Regionally, during a summit in Tehran, Iran, on February 16–17, 1992, Tajikistan, along with its sister republics of Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, gained admission to the long-dormant Economic Cooperation Organization, which had been founded by Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan in 1963. On March 26, 1998, Tajikistan was admitted as a candidate member to the Central Asian Economic Union—renamed the Central Asian Economic Community in July 1998 and then the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) in February 2002—which had been established four years earlier by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. A month later, on April 28, a Tajik application to join Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan in the CIS Customs Union was approved, and formal entry occurred in February 1999. In 2005 the CACO merged into the Eurasian Economic Community (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan). Postindependence relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have been complicated by persecution of ethnic Tajiks in Uzbekistan and by nationalist resentment in Tajikistan over the prominence of ethnic Uzbeks in the state hierarchy;

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although not espoused by the government, territorial claims by Tajik nationalists on Uzbek cities, including Samarkand and Bukhara, have also caused strains. At the same time, Tajikistan has continued to depend on Uzbekistan for almost all overland traffic, and both countries have kept a watchful eye on Islamic fundamentalism, especially in Afghanistan, where Tajik and Uzbek ethnic groups were prominent in the anti-Taliban alliance. In May 1998 the Tajik and Uzbek governments joined Russia in pledging to coordinate efforts to contain fundamentalism. Later in the year, however, President Rakhmonov accused the Uzbek government of complicity in the failed November revolt in Khujand. Although captured rebels later claimed that members of the Uzbek special forces had helped train them, Uzbek President Karimov denied any involvement and subsequently accused Tajik officials of drug-trafficking. Despite such tempestuous exchanges, in January 1999 Tajik Prime Minister Azimov met with President Karimov in Tashkent to discuss trade and economic cooperation. Three months later the presidents of both countries joined their counterparts from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in signing a mutual security agreement intended to combat terrorism, extremism, and related threats. In August Uzbek aircraft inadvertently bombed Tajik villages while attacking ethnic Uzbek militant camps. Dushanbe lodged a protest, but the incident was not serious enough to threaten the neighbors’ common stance regarding Afghanistan and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. In June 2000 Tajikistan and Uzbekistan reached agreement on a protocol for delimiting their common border and signed a treaty of friendship. In December 2003 they joined China, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkmenistan in pledging to respect post-Taliban Afghanistan’s sovereignty and to remain aloof from its internal affairs. Since 1994 Tajikistan has met regularly with the other members of the so-called “Shanghai Five”— China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia— which have largely focused their attention on matters of regional stability and security. In 2001 Uzbekistan joined the grouping, which renamed itself the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

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(SCO); a formal SCO charter was signed in 2002 and a Secretariat was inaugurated in January 2004. Tajikistan’s principal external security issue nevertheless continues to involve its borders with Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan. Even before the October 2001 launch of U.S.-led strikes against alQaida and Afghanistan’s Taliban regime, Tajikistan was believed to be aiding the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, which was dominated by ethnic Tajiks. Special forces from the Ministry of the Interior were subsequently reported to be directly assisting the Northern Alliance in its march toward Kabul, and it was later confirmed that Tajikistan had permitted several of its air bases to be used by the United States and its allies in the campaign. In January 2002, apparently rewarding the Rakhmonov government for its cooperation, the United States lifted a 1993 restriction on the transfer of military equipment to Tajikistan. Primarily to deter infiltration across the Afghan and Kyrgyz borders by such extremist groups as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), some 5,000 Russian troops remain in Tajikistan. In June 2004, after lengthy negotiations, the Rakhmonov government granted Russia permission to establish a permanent military base for its troops and also agreed to permit unlimited Russian use of the Soviet-built space surveillance center in Nurek, one of the world’s most sophisticated facilities for tracking satellites. In return, Russia reportedly agreed to forgo some $300 million in debt payments, to be offset by partial ownership of a hydroelectric power facility.

Current Issues With the government dominating the media and strictly controlling the registration of political parties, the opposition emerged from the February– March 2005 national elections holding only two seats in the upper house and six in the lower. Although two new parties, the Agrarian Party of Tajikistan (APT) and the Party of Economic Reforms of Tajikistan (PERT), were registered in November 2005, neither was seen as posing a challenge to the government. Indeed, Shokirjon HAKI-

MOV, deputy chair of the Social Democratic Party of Tajikistan (SDPT), described both as part of an effort by the government to “create a semblance of a multiparty system.” Meanwhile, with no consensus candidate in sight, most analysts gave the opposition no chance of unseating President Rakhmonov at the election expected in November 2006. Outspoken critics of the Rakhmonov regime have often found themselves in court or threatened with prosecution. In April 2005 Mahmadruzi ISKANDAROV, chair of the DPT, was abducted in Moscow, spirited back to Tajikistan, placed on trial, and in October sentenced to 23 years in prison for a variety of offenses that included terrorism, embezzlement, and attempted murder. In March 2006 SDPT leader Rahmatullo ZOIROV accused the government of holding some 1,000 political prisoners, including Iskandarov, which prompted the prosecutor-general to warn Zoirov that he could face charges unless he produced proof. Zoirov further asserted that evidence of involvement in terrorism had been fabricated against many incarcerated members of the Hizb-ut-Tahrir, a regional Islamic group that has been banned by most Central Asian states. Clashes continue to occur in the Tajik-Kyrgyz-Ukbek border area, with either the Hizb-ut-Tahrir or the more militant IMU typically blamed.

Political Parties After June 1997 Tajik politics was dominated by efforts to reintegrate the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) into government and the military. During this period political parties did not play a significant role in President Rakhmonov’s administration, although the Communist Party of Tajikistan (CPT) continued to be influential in the Supreme Assembly and, as the decade drew to a close, the president’s People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT) became increasingly important. The UTO included most opposition paramilitary organizations and four groups banned in 1993: the Islamic Rebirth Party (IRP), the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (the so-called “Almaty” wing of the DPT, following a party rupture in 1995), and

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two social organizations, the Lali Badakhshan and the Rastokhez movements. The Lali Badakhshan (Badakhshan Ruby Movement), led by Atobek AMIRBEK, had been formed in the late 1980s as a nationalist movement of the Pamiri people, who belong to the Ismaili Muslim sect and who demanded full autonomy for Gorno-Badakhshan. Rastokhez (Rebirth Movement) had been founded in 1990 as a nationalist/religious organization advocating the revival of Tajik culture and traditions. Established in Afghanistan in 1993 as the Islamic Revival Movement, the UTO name was adopted in 1996, while its chair, Sayed Abdullo Nuri of the IRP, was serving as principal negotiator in peace talks with the government. As a result of the 1996–1997 accords, the UTO and the government were equally represented on the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC). The IRP, DPT (Almaty), Lali Badakhshan, and Rastokhez had their legal standing restored in 1999. In June 1999 a loose Consultative Council of Political Parties was formed in opposition to the constitutional amendments then being considered by the NRC. Parties associated with the council during the subsequent referendum campaign included the CPT, the DPT (Tehran), the Congress of People’s Unity, Hakim MUHABBATOV’s National Movement Party, the Agrarian Party, the Party of Justice, and the Party of Justice and Development (predecessor of the current Social Democratic Party of Tajikistan—SDPT). In mid-September the Consultative Council and the IRP announced a joint effort to draft an electoral law that would lead to democratic elections for the presidency and the national legislature. The ideological diversity of its members precluded the council’s functioning as an electoral coalition at the 2000 legislative elections. Meanwhile, the government had begun closing political parties on technical grounds. The People’s Unity Party (PUP—also identified in the Englishlanguage press by a variety of other names, including the Party of Popular Unity and Accord, the Popular Unity of Tajikistan, and the National Unity Party), founded in 1994, was in part a successor to the Party of Economic Freedom (PEF) that Abdumalik Abdullojonov had formed upon resigning

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as prime minister in December 1993. Drawing its main support from northern Tajikistan, it won two seats in the 1995 legislative election. At that time, it was the only legal opposition party. Despite efforts by PUP leaders to condemn the November 1998 rebellion in Khujand and to disavow any recent association with Abdullojonov, in December 1998 the Tajik Supreme Court banned the PUP and ordered its property and assets nationalized. In March 1999 the Supreme Court suspended the Tajikistan Party of Political and Economic Renewal, which had won one seat in the 1995 election under party leader Mukhtor BOBOYEV, who was murdered in March 1996. The Agrarian Party, established in 1998 by Hikmatullo NASRIDDINOV, was closed in September 1999 on the grounds that its participation in the Consultative Council of Political Parties constituted a violation of its earlier suspension by the Supreme Court. Initially registered in 1996, the Party of Justice (Hizb-i-Adolatkhoh) nominated Saifuddin TURAYEV, chair of the affiliated Congress of People’s Unity, for the Tajik presidency in 1999, but his candidacy was disallowed for an insufficient number of supporting signatures. At the 2000 legislative election it won only 1.3 percent of the vote and no seats. In August 2001 the Supreme Court ruled that Adolatkhoh had failed to correct technical deficiencies and therefore made an earlier suspension final. In April 2004, looking toward the 2005 elections, the IRP, the SDPT, and the Socialist Party of Tajikistan (SDP) agreed to cooperate in a loose “For Fair and Transparent Elections” alliance, which the DPT then joined in August. Given that a party must be formally registered for at least a year in order to contest an election, the only other parties eligible for the February 2005 balloting were the president’s PDPT and the CPT. Two additional parties were registered in November 2005, bringing the total to eight.

Presidential Party People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan —PDPT (Hizb-i-Khalq-i-Demokrati Tojikiston).

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Formed in 1993 as the People’s Party of Tajikistan (PPT) by a group of northern business interests centered in Khujand, the PDPT includes in its membership many former Soviet-era Communists, including President Rakhmonov. Formally registered in December 1994, the PPT emerged from the 1995 Supreme Assembly election with only a handful of seats, but its representation subsequently swelled to about 90 with the addition of members who had run without declaring affiliations. The party adopted its present name in 1997. President Rakhmonov officially joined the PDPT in March 1998 and was elected chair at a party congress in April. Described by a spokesman at the time as a party of “pragmatists and technocrats,” the PDPT significantly expanded its base of support throughout the country as a result of the president’s membership. At the election for the new lower house of the Supreme Assembly in February– March 2000, the PDPT won 15 of 22 party list seats on a 65 percent first-round vote share. In 2005 it won 52 of the lower house’s 63 seats and also claimed 29 of 34 seats in the upper house. President Rakhmonov also chairs the Central Council of a closely associated social movement, the Movement for National Unity and Revival of Tajikistan (frequently shortened to the National Unity Movement), which was established in 1997. It supported his presidential candidacy in 1999 and claims about 1.5 million members (nearly onequarter of the population). Leaders: Imomali RAKHMONOV (President of the Republic and Chair of the Party), Davlatali DAVLATOV (Deputy Chair).

Parliamentary Opposition Communist Party of Tajikistan—CPT (Hizbi-Kommunisti Tojikiston). Primarily based in the northern industrial region of Leninabad (now Sughd) and in other areas of high ethnic Uzbek or Russian population, the CPT was the only registered party prior to the Tajik declaration of independence on September 9, 1991. On September 22 it was banned by the Aslonov government one day after it had decided to reorganize as the Tajik Socialist

Party (TSP). The ban was overturned on September 23 but was reimposed on October 2. By early 1993 the party was again functioning under its original name, having regained its status as the dominant political group with the outlawing of its principal opponents in June 1993. In the February–March 1995 legislative balloting, at least a third of the elected candidates were acknowledged CPT members. It continued to advocate collective ownership and revival of a soviet-based union of republics. Claiming that a presidential victory by a Communist candidate would anger Russia, the CPT unexpectedly supported President Rakhmonov for reelection in 1999. It nevertheless remained within the opposition Consultative Council of Political Parties. The CPT won five party list seats, on a 20.6 percent vote share, in the Assembly of Representatives at the 2000 legislative election. In 2005 it won a total of four seats in the lower house and two in the upper. Leaders: Shodi SHABDOLOV (First Secretary), Tuyghun KARIMOV (Central Committee Secretary). Islamic Rebirth Party—IRP (Hizb-i-Nahzati Islom). A rural-based grouping founded in June 1990, the IRP has indicated that its long-term objective is the conversion of Tajikistan into an Islamic republic, although it has rejected the label “fundamentalist.” It supported the DPT’s Davlat Khudonazarov for the presidency in 1991 but was banned in June 1993. “Rebirth” has also been translated as “Renaissance” and “Revival.” During 1992–1996 the armed Defense of the Fatherland wing of the IRP engaged in hostilities against government and CIS forces, drawing support from Tajiks who had fled to Afghanistan, from pro-Tajik Afghan mujaheddin, and possibly from the Afghan government. Following the June 1997 peace agreement, the IRP remained at the center of the UTO. Relegalized on August 12, 1999, the IRP elected UTO leader Nuri as chair in mid-September and, in the interest of national unity, gave grudging support to the constitutional referendum of September 26 despite objections to particular provisions.

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Late in September the IRP designated as its presidential candidate Davlat Usmon, minister of economics and foreign economic relations. In October, reversing a decision by the election commission that would have kept him off the ballot, the Supreme Court ruled that a sufficient number of supporting signatures had been gathered on his behalf. However, Usmon and much of the opposition criticized the decision as an illegitimate effort to create the impression that the election offered a choice to voters. Usmon subsequently decided to boycott the November 6 contest, but his name remained on the ballot and he won 2 percent of the vote. Party and UTO Deputy Chair Ali Akbar Turajonzoda reportedly resigned both positions on October 17, 1999, a day before being expelled from the IRP because he had broken party regulations and had described President Rakhmonov as worthy of reelection. In the first-round legislative election of February 2000, the IRP won two party list seats on a 7.3 percent vote share. In September 2003 the party’s fourth conference reelected Chair Nuri, who has consistently denied the existence of any IRP connections to militant Islamic groups, particularly the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Nuri has also charged the government with persecuting the IRP in the guise of cracking down on another regional Islamic group, the Hizb-ut-Tahrir. In May 2003 IRP Deputy Chair Shamsiddin SHAMSIDDINOV was arrested and subsequently charged with murder, forming an armed group, and other crimes dating back to the civil war. In January 2004 he was sentenced to a lengthy prison term. At the 2005 legislative elections the IRT again won two seats. Leaders: Sayed Abdullo NURI (Chair), Muhiddin KABIRI (First Deputy Chair), Muhhadsharif HIMMATZODA (Deputy Chair).

Other Registered Parties Agrarian Party of Tajikistan (APT). The APT was formed in September 2005 and officially registered two months later. (An earlier Agrarian

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Party was permanently suspended in 1999.) In January 2006 the APT chair denied that his party intended to form a coalition with the PDPT before the November 2006 presidential election. Leader: Amir QORAQULOV (Chair). Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT). Drawing its support largely from GornoBadakhshan, the strongly anti-Communist DPT was launched in 1990 on a platform that called for Tajik sovereignty within a framework of confederal states. It was formally outlawed in June 1993. Divisions between moderate and hard-line DPT factions led to an open split in June 1995, when Shodmon YUSUF was ousted from the leadership but refused to recognize the election of Jumaboy Niyazov as his successor. Claiming to be the authentic DPT leader, Yusuf approved terms with the government under which his faction was relegalized in July as the DPT, although it was thereafter often referenced as the DPT (Tehran Platform) to distinguish it from Niyazov’s DPT (Almaty Platform). The latter entered into an opposition alliance with the IRP and functioned as part of the UTO. The peace agreement of June 1997 provided for the eventual legalization of the outlawed faction, and Niyazov was later named to the NRC’s political committee. Closely associated with the DPT during the civil war was the Coordinating Center for the Democratic Forces of Tajikistan, led by Otakhon LATIFI until his return from exile in 1997. The head of the NRC legal committee, Latifi was assassinated on September 22, 1998, in Dushanbe. At its third congress in July 1999 the DPT (Tehran) replaced Yusuf with Azam Afzali and in September nominated a former presidential defense adviser, Zafar IKROMOV, as its candidate for president in November. When Ikromov withdrew, citing the election commission’s failure to issue the papers needed to obtain the 145,000 signatures required for a place on the ballot, the party nominated in his stead Sulton Kuvvatov. Along with two other opposition candidates, Kuvvatov announced in early October that he would boycott the balloting

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because his campaign workers were being harassed and the news media were not providing impartial campaign coverage. The boycott became moot on October 12 when the election commission disqualified Kuvvatov because he had not met the deadline for obtaining the requisite signatures. Meanwhile, in accordance with the June 1997 peace accords, the DPT (Almaty) had been legalized by the Supreme Court on August 12, 1999, although the Ministry of Justice refused to register it because of a prohibition against two parties having similar names. At its fifth congress in late September the Almaty group replaced Jumaboy Niyazov with Mahmadruzi Iskandarov. Subsequently, the Supreme Court recognized the DPT (Almaty) as the official DPT, permitting its registration in time to contest the 2000 parliamentary election. With the DPT (Tehran) officially disbanded, Afzali and Kuvvatov formed the Taraqqiyot (below). Iskandarov was detained by Russian authorities in December 2004 at the request of the Tajik government, which accused him of terrorism and corruption. Shortly after his April 2005 release, he was abducted and delivered to Tajikistan, where in October he was convicted of terrorism, attempted murder, embezzlement, and weapons possession, and sentenced to 23 years in prison. More recently, some DPT members have been organizing a Watan (“Motherland”) faction within the party. Leaders: Mahmadruzi ISKANDAROV (Chair, in prison), Rakhmatullo VALIYEV (Deputy Chair), Hojimuhammad UMAROV, Jumaboy NIYAZOV. Party of Economic Reforms of Tajikistan (PERT). Formation of the PERT was announced in September 2005. It was officially registered on November 10. Leader: Olimjon BOBOYEV (Chair). Social Democratic Party of Tajikistan (SDPT). The SDPT traces its origins to the Party of Justice and Development (Adolat va Taraqqiyot), formation of which was announced in April 1998 by Rahmatullo Zoirov. Initially registered in Febru-

ary 1999, the party subsequently added “Social Democratic Party” to its name, but shortly thereafter the Ministry of Justice indicated that it intended to seek the party’s closure for violating a proscription against membership by servicemen, law enforcement personnel, and judiciary staff. As a result, its registration was annulled. Zoirov subsequently served President Rakhmonov as senior adviser on legal policy from 2001 until resigning in 2003. Meanwhile, in December 2002 Zoirov had succeeded in registering the current SDPT. In 2005 he was a leading critic of how the legislative elections were conducted. In November 2005 a deputy chair of the party, Hurinisso GHAFFORZODA, resigned from the SDPT to establish a social movement aimed at reviving cultural values. In the same month, Zoirov called for the opposition to name a joint candidate for the 2006 presidential election. Leaders: Rahmatullo ZOIROV (Chair), Shokirjon HAKIMOV (Deputy Chair). Socialist Party of Tajikistan —SPT (Hizb-iSotsialisti Tojikiston). Organized in 1996 by former Supreme Soviet chair and Popular Front leader Safarali Kenjayev, the SPT announced in March 1999 that it was prepared to participate in new national elections “if all principles of democracy are observed,” including equal access to the media. In November 1998 the party reportedly expelled former vice president Narzullo Dustov for his alleged participation, earlier in the month, in the abortive revolt in the north. (Dustov went into exile.) Kenjayev, who had been serving as the head of the Supreme Assembly’s Committee on Legislation and Human Rights, was murdered by unknown gunmen in March 1999. The SPT advocates economic and social pluralism, decentralization of power, and secularism. It supported President Rakhmonov for reelection in November 1999 and won only 1.2 percent of the party list vote at the subsequent lower house election. In August 2004 Mirhusayn NARZIEV was reelected chair, although he was opposed by members

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of a splinter group led by Abduhalim Ghafforov. In December, with both factions claiming to control the party, the Supreme Court ruled in Ghaffaorov’s favor. As of mid-2006, Narziev was continuing his effort to register a new party. Leaders: Abduhalim GHAFFOROV (Chair), Qurbon VOSIYEV.

Unregistered Parties Party of Progressive Youth of Tajikistan (PPYT). Formation of the PPYT was announced in August 2005 by a former PDPT member, Saidjafar Ismonov. Its platform calls for the development of democratic institutions and the protection of rights and freedoms. Leader: Saidjafar ISMONOV (Chair). Progress Party (Taraqqiyot). Also translated into English as the Development Party, Taraqqiyot held its founding congress in the capital in May 2001. Virtually all of its initial membership had previously belonged to the disbanded DPT (Tehran). One of its founders, Sulton Kuvvatov, was a former chair of the state tax committee and a prospective candidate for president in 1999 (see the DPT, above). Another founder, Azam AFZALI, stated that the party would offer “constructive opposition” to the government. Committed to protecting the political rights of all citizens without regard to ethnicity, religion, language, or gender, the party has repeatedly tried to register, without success. In March 2004 several members went on a brief hunger strike to call attention to the party’s plight, and Kuvvatov later stated that he would take his case to the International Court of Justice. The party ran into additional difficulty in August 2004 when the government filed a criminal lawsuit against Kuvvatov for “insulting the honor and dignity of the president” and inciting extremism and ethnic hostility. In July 2004 the SDPT offered to reserve places for Taraqqiyot members, including Kuvvatov, on its party list for the 2005 legislative elections. In June 2005 party leader Rustam Fayziyev was given a

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six-year prison sentence for insulting the president and stirring up ethnic hatred. Leaders: Sulton KUVVATOV (QUVVATOV, Chair), Rustam FAYZIYEV, Shodikhon KENJAYEV. Unity Party (Hizb-i-Vahdat). Unity was formed in late 2001 to unite ethnic minorities and the country’s regions. It had not been registered as of July 2006. Leader: Hikmatullo SAIDOV.

Banned Organizations Two banned Islamic organizations, the Hizbut-Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), have been active in Tajikistan. The IMU, now also known as the Islamic Party of Turkestan, has claimed responsibility for or been linked to numerous terrorist incidents in the Central Asian region and beyond, and both Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have asserted that the group has operated from bases in Tajikistan, a charge that the government has denied. Members of the transnational Hizb-ut-Tahrir have been tried and sentenced to prison in Tajikistan, although the organization has not been as militant as the IMU.

Legislature The 1994 constitution established a 181member unicameral Supreme Assembly (Majlisi Oli). Constitutional amendments passed by referendum in September 1999 reconstituted the body as a bicameral legislature, all of whose members serve five-year terms. National Assembly (Majlisi Milli). The upper chamber encompasses 25 indirectly elected members, 8 presidential appointees, and former presidents of the republic (currently one, Khakhor Makhkamov). The elected members are chosen by secret ballot of regional legislators in each of five equally weighted electoral districts: the country’s three regions, Dushanbe, and “cities and districts of republican subordination.” The most recent election was held March 24, 2005, with President

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Cabinet As of July 15, 2006 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Ministers

Oqil Oqilov Asadullo Ghulomov Khairinisso Mavlonova [f]

Ministers Agriculture Communications Culture Defense Economics and Trade Education Emergency Situations and Civil Defense Energy Finance Foreign Affairs Grain Products Health Industry Internal Affairs Justice Labor, Employment, and Social Welfare Land Reclamation and Water Resources Security State Revenue and Tax Collection Transport and Road Management

Voris Madaminov Said Zubaydov Rajabmad Amirov Col. Gen. Sherali Khayrulloyev Hakim Soliyev Abdujabbor Rahmonov Maj. Gen. Mirzo Zieyev Abdullo Yorov Safarali Najmiddinov Talbak Nazarov Bekmurod Uroqov Nasratullo Faizulloyev Zayd Saidov Col. Gen. Khomiddin Sharipov Halifabobo Hamidov Zokir Vazirov Abduqohir Nazirov Maj. Gen. Khayruddin Abdurahimov Ghulomjon Boboyev Abdurahim Ashurov

State Committee Chairmen Administration of Affairs of State Border Protection Construction and Architecture Environmental Protection and Forestry Land Resources and Reclamation Oil and Gas Religious Affairs State Property Statistics Television and Radio [f] = female

Matlubkhan Davlatov Col. Gen. Saidamir Zuhurov Ismat Eshmirzoyev Abduvohid Karimov Davlatsho Gulmakhmadov Salomsho Muhabbatov Murodullo Davlatov Sherali Gulov Migand Shahbozov Asadullo Rahmonov

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Rakhmonov announcing his nominees on March 25, after which the party breakdown was as follows: People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan, 29 seats; Communist Party of Tajikistan, 2; independents, 3. Speaker: Makhmadsaid UBAYDULLAYEV. Assembly of Representatives (Majlisi Namoyandagon). The lower chamber encompasses 63 members: 41 deputies directly elected on a majority basis from single-seat districts, and 22 divided proportionally among eligible parties receiving at least 5 percent of the national vote. Following the most recent election of February 27, 2005, with runoff balloting in three constituencies on March 13, the People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan held 52 seats; Communist Party of Tajikistan, 4; Islamic Rebirth Party, 2; independents, 5. Speaker: Saydullo KHAYRULLOYEV.

Communications Although the Tajik press experienced unprecedented freedoms immediately before and shortly after independence, domestically published opposition newspapers disappeared with the onset of the civil war in 1992. By 1997, 40 or more journalists had been killed. The press remains largely government controlled, although the 1996–1997 peace accords called for the lifting of restrictions on opposition media.

Press Narodnaya Gazeta (People’s Gazette, in Russian), Jumhuriyat (Republic, in Tajik), and Khalk Ovozi (People’s Voice, in Uzbek) are government organs managed by a presidentially supervised publishing house, with distribution by the Ministry of Communications. The following papers are also published in Dushanbe: Bizness i Politika (Business and Politics), independent weekly in Russian; Kurer Tajikistana (Tajikistan Courier), independent weekly in Russian; Minbar-i Khalk

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(People’s Tribune), PDPT monthly in Tajik; Nido-i Ranjbar/Golos Tajikistana/Tojikiston Ovozi (Voice of the Toiler/Voice of Tajikistan), CPT weekly in Tajik, Russian, and Uzbek. In August 2004 the government shut down a private printing firm that had been producing the IRP’s weekly Najot (Salvation) and two independent weeklies that were also frequently critical of the government, Ruzi Nav (New Day) and Nerui Sukhan (Strength of Word). Najot later resumed publication.

News Agencies The principal domestic facility, Khover, was established in Dushanbe in 1991 as successor to the Tajik Telegraph Agency. There are also several independent agencies, including Asia-Plus, which also distributes daily news summaries. RIA-Novosti has an office in the capital.

Broadcasting and Computing An electronic broadcast law passed in 1996 requires state licensure for all facilities. To date, licenses have typically been granted to individuals and organizations with close political connections to local or national officials, although Asia-Plus and a few other private companies have recently been permitted to offer independent radio broadcasting from the capital. The state-owned Tajik Radio and Tajik Television broadcast from Dushanbe in Tajik, Russian, and Uzbek. There were approximately 4,100 Internet users in 2003.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. Khamrokhon ZARIPOV U.S. Ambassador to Tajikistan Richard E. HOAGLAND Permanent Representative to the UN Sirodjidin M. ASLOV IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, CIS, EBRD, ECO, IDB, Interpol, IOM, OIC, OSCE, WCO

Note: With the opposition divided, President Imomali Rakhmonov secured 79% of the vote against four other candidates on November 6, 2006, and won a third term. A new cabinet, headed by returning Prime Minister Oqil Oqilov, received parliamentary approval on December 16.

THAILAND KINGDOM

OF

THAILAND

Prathet Thai

Note: On September 19, 2006, with Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in New York for the opening of the UN General Assembly, the Thai military, led by the army commander-in-chief, Gen. Sondhi Boonyaratglin, seized power in a bloodless coup, imposed martial law, suspended the constitution, dissolved the National Assembly, and banned political gatherings. On September 20 King Bhumibol Adulyadej appointed General Sondhi head of a Council for Democratic Reform “in order to create peace in the country,” which had experienced a political impasse following the Constitutional Court’s nullification of an April legislative election. Furthermore, Thaksin’s opponents had accused him of corruption and abuse of power, and General Sondhi, a Muslim, had reportedly objected to the Thaksin government’s handling of the Muslim insurgency in the south. Immediately after the coup General Sondhi stated that a civilian government would be installed within two weeks and that legislative elections under a new constitution would be held by October 2007. Coup leaders subsequently indicated that the Council of Democratic Reform would be reconstituted as a Council of National Security to advise the interim government. Surayud Chulanot, a retired general, was named interim prime minister of Thailand by royal decree on October 1. Note: There is considerable variation in the English transliteration of Thai names. Where possible, we have relied directly on Thai sources. Even then, however, variants are more common than not.

The Country Surrounded by Myanmar (Burma) in the west, Laos in the north and northeast, Cambodia in the southeast, and Malaysia in the deep south, the Kingdom of Thailand (known historically as Siam) is located in the heart of mainland Southeast Asia. It is a tropical country of varied mountainous and lowland terrain. About 75 percent of its population is of Thai stock; another 14 percent are overseas Chinese, an urban group important in banking, mining, and commerce. Other minorities are of Malaysian, Indian, Khmer, and Vietnamese descent. Theravada Buddhism is professed by about 95 percent of the population, but religious freedom prevails and a number of other religions claim adherents. Women constitute approximately 46 percent of the labor force, primarily in agriculture; female participation in government, while increasing somewhat in recent years, remains low.

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Political Status: Independent monarchy presently functioning under constitution approved by the National Assembly on September 27, 1997, and promulgated October 11. Area: 198,455 sq. mi. (514,000 sq. km.). Population: 60,606,947 (2000C), excluding adjustment for underenumeration; 64,133,000 (2005E). Major Urban Center (2005E): BANGKOK (urban area, 6,599,000). Official Language: Thai. Monetary Unit: Baht (official rate July 1, 2006: 38.16 baht = $1US). Sovereign: King BHUMIBOL Adulyadej (King RAMA IX); ascended the throne June 9, 1946; crowned May 5, 1950. Heir Apparent: Crown Prince Maha VAJIRALONGKORN. Prime Minister: (See headnote.) THAKSIN Shinawatra (Thai Rak Thai); elected by the House of Representatives and endorsed by the King on February 9, 2001, following the general election of January 6, in succession to CHUAN Leekpai (Democrat Party); continued in office following the election of February 6, 2005; announced on April 4, 2006, two days after a disputed snap election for the House of Representatives, that he would not seek reappointment as prime minister; succeeded on an acting basis by Deputy Prime Minister CHITCHAI Wannasathit (Thai Rak Thai); resumed prime ministership, in a caretaker capacity, on May 23, following a May 8 decision of the Constitutional Court nullifying the April election and ordering new polling.

Like most countries in Southeast Asia, Thailand is predominantly rural, with more than 40 percent of its people still engaged in agriculture. Food, especially rice, and other agricultural products traditionally accounted for the bulk of export earnings, but the growth of industrial output since the mid-1980s has vaulted computerrelated items and other manufactured goods—from

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garments to electrical appliances—into the lead. Agriculture now accounts for under 10 percent of GDP, compared to 40 percent for industry and 50 percent for services. The country’s mineral resources include cassiterite (tin ore), tungsten, antimony, coal, iron, lead, manganese, molybdenum, and gemstones. Despite extreme inequality of wealth, in 1986– 1995 Thailand was one of the world’s most rapidly expanding economies, with average GDP growth approaching 10 percent, but in 1996 the rate of expansion dropped to 6.4 percent and export growth (goods and services) plummeted to 2.4 percent, down from 14.8 percent the previous year. At the same time, a real estate bubble burst. The boom in property values and construction had been financed in large part by short-term foreign debt, and when currency speculation began driving the value of the baht down in 1997, more than half of the country’s financial institutions faced insolvency. In addition, the central bank’s initial decision to defend the baht soon cost the country the majority of its foreignexchange reserves. The crisis not only left the country dependent on a $17.2 billion rescue plan offered by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) but also precipitated an economic downturn that cascaded throughout Southeast Asia. During 1998 the government implemented an IMF-supported recovery program that included increased taxes, budget cuts, and efforts to hold down inflation and the trade deficit. It also drafted legislation to deal with the dozens of insolvent financial institutions, to transform state enterprises into limited liability companies with private shareholders, and to permit greater foreign ownership of Thai companies. Although the economy registered a 10.5 percent downturn for the year, by early 1999 the situation had stabilized. In March, with IMF backing, the government reversed course on its economic priorities, passing a stimulus package that included a temporary tax cut and an increase in the projected budget deficit. For the year as a whole, growth reached 4.4 percent—considerably higher than expected. Collaterally, foreign reserves recovered, the baht steadied, and inflation declined, although the government was left with a high

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interest burden. GDP growth for 2000 was 4.8 percent, but the World Bank termed the Thai recovery “fragile” in a September report. Growth for 2001 dropped to 2.2 percent, although it subsequently surged to 5.3 percent in 2002, 6.9 percent in 2003, and 6.1 percent in 2004. The Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26, 2004, left some 8,000 people dead or missing in Thailand—at least one-third of them foreigners (from 38 countries), most of whom were vacationing at seaside resorts. The disaster, which caused an estimated $800 million in damage to Thai property, combined with drought, a weaker electronics market, and political unrest in the southern provinces to produce a slowdown in 2005, when growth was estimated at 4.0 percent.

Government and Politics Political Background Early historical records indicate that the Thai people migrated to present-day Thailand from China’s Yunnan Province about a thousand years ago. By the 14th century the seat of authority was established in Ayutthaya, a few miles from Bangkok. Toward the end of the 18th century, Burmese armies conquered the kingdom but were eventually driven out by Rama I, who founded the present ruling dynasty and moved the capital to Bangkok in 1782. Upon the conquest of Burma by the British in 1826, Rama III began the process of accommodating European colonial powers by negotiating a treaty of amity and commerce with Britain. Subsequent monarchs, Rama IV and V, demonstrated great skill, by a combination of diplomacy and governmental modernization, in making it possible for their country to survive as the only Southeast Asian power free of European domination into the early 20th century. Thailand was ruled as an absolute monarchy until 1932, when a group of military and civilian officials led by Col. (later Field Mar.) Luang PIBULSONGGRAM (PIBUL Songgram) and PRIDI Phanomyong seized power in the first of what was to be a long series of military coups.

The Pibulsonggram dictatorship sided with the Japanese in World War II, but the anti-Japanese Seri Thai (Free Thai) movement, led by Pridi and SENI Pramoj, paved the way for reconciliation with the Allied powers at the war’s end. Pridi dominated the first postwar government but was discredited and fled to China in 1947, after Pibulsonggram had again seized power. Pibulsonggram was overthrown a decade later by Field Marshal SARIT Thanarat, who appointed a constituent assembly in 1959 but continued to rule by martial law until his death in December 1963. Sarit’s successor, Field Marshal THANOM Kittikachorn, likewise began his regime in authoritarian style, stressing economic over political development and working closely with Gen. PRAPAS Charusathira, the army commander and reputed national strongman. Following promptings from the throne, the military regime agreed to the promulgation in June 1968 of a new constitution restoring limited parliamentary government. An officially sponsored political party, the United Thai People’s Party (UTPP), was organized to contest a lower house election in February 1969. The opposition Democrat Party (DP), led by Seni Pramoj, won all seats in the major urban centers of Bangkok and Chon Buri, but the government, through the UTPP, mustered sufficient strength elsewhere to retain control. The Thanom government decided in November 1971 that parliamentary inefficiency had placed the country in a position where outward forms of democracy could no longer be tolerated. The legislature was thereupon dissolved, the constitution suspended, and all political parties banned, except for a new government-sponsored Revolutionary Party. In October 1973, as a result of widespread student demonstrations, the Thanom government fell, and the rector of Thammasat University, SANYA Dharmasakti (Thammasak), was appointed prime minister. Following the adoption of a new constitution in October 1974 and a legislative election in January 1975, DP leader Seni Pramoj formed a new government that lasted only into March, when it was defeated on a confidence vote. Shortly thereafter, the retiring prime minister’s younger brother,

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KUKRIT Pramoj, succeeded in organizing a coalition government based primarily on the Thai Nation (Chart Thai) and Social Action (SAP) parties. Kukrit lost his legislative seat at an election in April 1976 that returned a greatly increased plurality for the Democrat Party. Seni was reinstated as prime minister but resigned in September after being criticized for not opposing the return from exile of former prime minister Thanom. Reappointed two days later, Seni was ousted in October by a military coup nominally headed by Admiral SANGAD Chaloryu, who was designated chair of a newly established Administrative Reform Council (ARC). Later in October King BHUMIBOL approved the formation of a military-dominated government headed by a former Supreme Court justice, THANIN Kraivichien. After surviving an attempted right-wing coup in March 1977, the Thanin government was ousted in October by the military, which established a 23member Revolutionary Council (subsequently the National Policy Council) virtually identical in composition to the former ARC. In November the council designated Gen. KRIANGSAK Chamanan, the commander of the armed forces, as prime minister. A legislative election held under another new constitution in April 1979 saw Kukrit’s SAP secure an overwhelming plurality of the votes cast. However, Kriangsak’s control of the appointive upper house permitted him to remain in office. His new government was formed in May, whereupon the National Policy Council was dissolved. Responding to an economic crisis, Kriangsak formed another government in February 1980, but in order to avoid a near-certain legislative vote of no confidence he resigned at the end of the month. Gen. PREM Tinsulanond was soon designated as his successor. A year later, in April 1981, a coup by a group of middle-ranked army officers dubbed the “Young Turks” was narrowly averted by the loyalty of senior officers and the timely intervention of the monarch. No clear parliamentary majority emerged at the election of April 1983, and General Prem, who had announced his intention to retire from politics, was induced to return as nonpartisan head of a four-

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party coalition government. In September 1985, while the prime minister and the armed forces commander, Gen. ARTHIT Kamlang-Ek, were abroad, a number of army and air force officers under the alleged leadership of Col. MANOON Roopkachorn, a former Young Turk, launched another attempted coup. Eight days later, former prime minister Kriangsak was arrested for complicity in the revolt, as were a number of senior officers. Cleavages within the coalition’s SAP weakened the government in the spring of 1986 and forced General Prem to call a premature election in July at which the Democrats replaced the SAP as the dominant legislative grouping. In August a new four-party government was installed under Prem’s leadership. In April 1988, facing a nonconfidence vote that most observers expected him to win, Prime Minister Prem called for dissolution of the assembly and scheduled a new election for July at which no group secured an overall majority. Somewhat unexpectedly, General Prem refused reappointment, and in August Maj. Gen. CHATCHAI Choonhavan, leader of the plurality Chart Thai, was named to head a six-party coalition administration that also included the DP, the SAP, the Citizens’ Party (Rassadorn), the United Democratic Party, and the Mass Party (Muan Chon). Although initially benefiting from quite favorable economic conditions, the coalition eventually became engulfed by charges of widespread corruption. In response to mounting intragovernmental dissent, Prime Minister Chatchai announced a major cabinet shake-up in August 1990, thereby staving off the collapse of his administration until early December, when the DP, SAP, and Muan Chon parties withdrew and were replaced by two groups formerly in opposition, the Solidarity (Ekkaparb) and Thai Citizens (Prachakorn Thai) parties. The realignment failed to prevent a generally accepted, if not universally applauded, coup on February 23, 1991, that installed a National Peacekeeping Council (NPC). On March 3 the NPC called upon former diplomat ANAND Panyarachun to form an interim government and 12 days later replaced the bicameral National

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Assembly with a wholly nominated unicameral body charged with drafting yet another constitution. At the election of March 22, 1992, for a new 360-member House of Representatives, the leading promilitary parties (see Political Parties, below) captured a majority of seats and thereupon offered the prime ministership to the Army commander, Gen. SUCHINDA Kraprayoon, who accepted the appointment on April 7 after resigning his military posts. The designation of a nonelected individual as prime minister, while permissible under the 1991 constitution, triggered massive opposition demonstrations in Bangkok. Nonetheless, a new cabinet was sworn in on April 21, at which time the NPC was dissolved. On May 9, amid continuing popular unrest, the house speaker announced government and opposition agreement on a number of constitutional changes, including the banning of a nonelected individual as prime minister, effective upon the completion of Suchinda’s term. Extensive rioting then erupted, with security forces killing 50–100 persons on May 17–19. Five days later Suchinda resigned, and on May 25 the House of Representatives approved the first two readings of a constitutional amendment bill containing the reforms sought by the opposition. On June 10 former prime minister Anand was asked to form another interim administration, and on June 29 the house was dissolved. At the election of September 13, 1992, four nonmilitary parties emerged with a slim 51.4 percent of legislative seats and formed a coalition that also included the conservative SAP. Ten days later DP leader CHUAN Leekpai became the first nonmilitary leader since the mid-1970s to be designated prime minister. The departure of the SAP in September 1993 weakened the Chuan coalition, which was particularly embarrassed by parliamentary rejection on April 1, 1994, of a bill to reduce the size of the Senate to one-third that of the House. The measure had topped a list of proposed democratic reforms, the nonelected upper house being dominated by military officers appointed after the 1991 coup. Although momentarily strengthened by a cabinet reshuffle on October 26, the government

lost its majority by the defection of Gen. CHAOVALIT Yongchaiyut’s New Aspiration Party (NAP) on December 8, only to recover with the addition of General Chatchai’s National Development Party (Chart Pattana) on December 12. On May 19, 1995, the Righteous Force (Palang Dharma) party withdrew from the ruling coalition in the wake of a land reform scandal, and the government of Chuan Leekpai, the country’s longestserving elected prime minister, collapsed. At the ensuing early election of July 2 the conservative Chart Thai won a plurality of lower house seats, and on July 13 its leader, BANHARN Silpa-Archa, was installed as head of a seven-party, right-wing coalition dubbed the “Thai Development Front.” In May 1996 Palang Dharma again withdrew from the government in an unsuccessful effort to force the ouster of a controversial Chart Thai member. In response to Palang Dharma‘s return in an ensuing cabinet reshuffle, Prachakorn Thai leader SAMAK Sundaravej took his party out of the coalition for a two-week period in mid-June. On August 14, in the course of a mounting bank-license scandal, Palang Dharma departed for the third time, amid indications that two smaller coalition members might do likewise. Faced with a nonconfidence vote that he appeared certain to lose, Prime Minister Banharn on September 21, 1996, agreed to resign. Six days later the House of Representatives was dissolved, and at balloting on November 17 Chaovalit’s NAP won a plurality of 125 seats, displacing Banharn’s Chart Thai, which plunged from 92 seats to 39. On November 29 Chaovalit was installed at the head of a new six-party coalition government. When the Thai currency crisis erupted in July 1997 (for details, see the economic discussion in section above), the fractious Chaovalit coalition was unable to implement an effective defense. In addition, thousands of Thais took to the streets in support of a proposed new constitution that, among other things, was designed to curb political corruption. Although the government reluctantly guided the new basic law through the legislature on September 27, protests continued. Withering criticism persisted as the economic crisis deepened

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into a major recession, finally obliging Chaovalit to announce his resignation effective November 7. Subsequent attempts to hold the ruling coalition in power failed when the two leading prospects to head the government, former prime ministers Chatchai Choonhavan and Prem Tinsulanond, reportedly declined. Consequently, on November 9 the king appointed the DP’s Chuan Leekpai as the new prime minister, and a DP-led multiparty coalition government took office on November 4. On October 5, 1998, Prime Minister Chuan’s position was strengthened by the addition of the Chart Pattana to the governing coalition, giving it an overwhelming majority in the House of Representatives. At the same time, the opposition Prachakorn Thai carried through on its threat to expel from its ranks 12 representatives, including 2 cabinet ministers, who had defied party discipline by supporting the government. By law, the expulsion threatened their house seats. The renegades, labeled the “Cobras” by Prachakorn Thai leader Samak, appealed the party’s decision to the Constitutional Court, which on February 12, 1999, ruled the expulsion unconstitutional and gave them 30 days to find new party affiliations. Nine of the 12 soon joined the revived Rassadorn, which became the seventh party in the Chuan coalition. On July 2, however, the SAP withdrew from the government because of an internal party dispute over cabinet posts, which led to a cabinet reshuffle that was completed on July 12. On March 4, 2000, voters participated in the first direct election for the new 200-seat Senate, but a new, independent Election Commission disqualified 78 of the winners because of campaign and voting irregularities, and it was late July, after four additional rounds of balloting, before the final seat was filled. On November 9 the House of Representatives was dissolved in preparation for a January election. At balloting on January 6, 2001, the Thai Rak Thai party, competing in its first national election, won an unprecedented 248 seats in an expanded, 500-seat house. Over the next several weeks party founder THAKSIN Shinawatra, who had amassed a fortune in the telecommunications industry and

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was reputedly the country’s wealthiest individual, negotiated a coalition with the NAP and Chart Thai, and on February 9 the house elected him prime minister by a vote of 339–127. His cabinet, dominated by ministers from his own party, was sworn in on February 18. On August 3, 2001, the Constitutional Court, by an 8–7 vote, acquitted Thaksin of charges that while serving in a previous administration he had deliberately concealed some 2.3 billion baht in assets by transferring corporate shares to household servants. Had he been convicted, the prime minister would have been required to resign and to remove himself from politics for five years. Thaksin had already solidified his hold on the House of Representatives through Thai Rak Thai’s absorption in July 2001 of the Seri Tham party’s 14 deputies. A March 2002 cabinet shuffle, which marked the addition of Chart Pattana to the government, was followed later in the month by completion of a much-discussed merger between Thai Rak Thai and the NAP. As a consequence, Thai Rak Thai held an unassailable legislative majority. On November 8, 2003, Thaksin shuffled his cabinet for the seventh time, dropping Chart Pattana but nevertheless retaining a two-thirds majority in the house. Yet another shuffle took place on March 10, 2004, amid security concerns related to Islamic militancy in Muslim-majority southern provinces (see Current issues), and on July 1 Chart Pattana returned to the government as Thaksin consolidated his position in advance of a national election. At the election of February 6, 2005, Thai Rak Thai won a commanding 377 seats, permitting Prime Minister Thaksin to form a one-party government. The opposition DP won only 96 seats, prompting the resignation two days later of its leader, BANYAT Bantadtan. Thaksin announced a reconfigured cabinet on March 11. During the next year, opposition to the prime minister’s policies and alleged authoritarianism continued to grow, especially among middle- and upper-class political elites in Bangkok, where on February 4, 2006, an anti-Thaksin rally drew an estimated 100,000 to Royal Plaza. A direct precipitant had been the tax-free sale by Thaksin’s family

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of its 49 percent stake in the Shin Corporation, a telecommunications company, for $1.9 billion. Immediately after the anti-Thaksin rally, leaders from some 40 nongovernmental organizations and other groups announced formation of a People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), which demanded Thaksin’s resignation and a return to political reform. Responding to the growing crisis of confidence in his administration, on February 26 Thaksin dissolved the House of Representatives and called an election for April 2. The next day, opposition leaders ABHISIT Vejjajiva of the DP, former prime minister Banharn Silpa-Archa of Chart Thai, and SANAN Kachornprasart of Mahachon announced that they would boycott the election. As a consequence, Thaksin attempteed to turn the vote into a referendum on his administration, vowing to step down as prime minister unless Thai Rak Thai won majority support from the electorate, who had the option of casting “no vote” ballots. With 360 of 400 directly elected seats decided, including 278 where Thai Rak Thai candidates stood without opposition, Thaksin’s party won about 61 percent of the valid votes (about 12 percent of all ballots were deliberately spoiled by voters), while 38 percent were abstentions. Reversing course, on April 4 Thaksin announced that he would not accept reappointment as prime minister, and the next day, stating that he was “taking some time off,” he named Deputy Prime Minister CHITCHAI Wannasathit to act in his stead. On April 25, in a nationwide address, King Bhumibol asked the nation’s highest courts to solve the country’s “political mess.” By that time, lawsuits had been filed to nullify the April 2 results, and on May 8 the Constitutional Court did so by an 8–6 vote, primarily on grounds that voters’ right to a secret ballot had been compromised by the positioning of voting booths and that the Electoral Commission had not allowed sufficient time between the late February dissolution of the sitting House of Representatives and the election date. The court further ordered, 9–5, that new elections be held. On May 23 Thaksin reassumed his post as caretaker prime minister, and near the end of the month the

Election Commission and the cabinet set October 15 as the new election date.

Constitution and Government Thailand is a highly centralized constitutional monarchy traditionally functioning through a strong prime minister. In the modern era the king has exercised little direct power but remains a popular symbol of national unity and identity and has played a pivotal indirect role at times of national crisis. He is advised by a Privy Council of his own appointees. An interim constitution approved by the monarch after the 1991 coup assigned a virtually unlimited “supervisory” role to the National Peacekeeping Council (NPC). A new draft constitution was endorsed unanimously by the NPC-appointed National Legislative Assembly in mid-1991 and after being scrutinized by an assembly-appointed review committee was declared in effect on December 9. Bicameralism was restored, with the House of Representatives, but not the Senate, being elected. On September 14, 1996, a joint session of the two legislative houses called for the election of an assembly to draft a new constitution. The assembly’s new “open government” charter elicited intense debate and drew considerable opposition, for the most part from entrenched political sectors. However, in view of large public demonstrations in support of the proposal, the new basic law was approved by the parliament on September 27, 1997. Changes included the expansion of the House of Representatives to 500 members, 400 to be elected on a single-member constituency basis and 100 by proportional representation from party lists. Other provisions called for the direct election of senators; guarantees regarding human rights, freedom of the press, and the right to assembly; and establishment of increased accountability on the part of officials, with greater governmental “transparency” overall. Senatorial powers include removal of ministers, members of the House, and justices. The Thai judicial system is patterned after European models. The Supreme Court, whose justices

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are appointed by the king, is the final court of appeal in both civil and criminal cases; an intermediate Court of Appeals hears appeals from courts of first instance located throughout the country. Administratively, the country is divided into 76 provinces, including Bangkok. Provincial governors are appointed by the minister of the interior, except for Bangkok, where the governor (often referred to as the mayor) is elected. Provincial subdivisions include districts (amphoe), communes (tambons), and villages (mubans). The larger towns are governed by elected municipal councils. Legislation passed in March 2000 authorizes direct election of municipal mayors and most local administrators.

Foreign Relations One of the few Asian countries to reject a neutralist posture, Thailand was firmly aligned with the United States and other Western powers after World War II and was a signatory of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, which established the now-defunct Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954. During the period 1952–1972 Thailand received almost $1.2 billion in U.S. military aid, more than twice the economic assistance granted from 1946 to 1972. The Thanom government sanctioned the use of Thai air bases for U.S. military operations in Laos and South Vietnam, and at its peak in 1969 the American buildup totaled 48,000 personnel. By the end of 1974 the number had been reduced to 27,000, and in compliance with a policy established by Prime Minister Kukrit when he assumed office in March 1975, all remaining U.S. military installations were closed down in mid-1976. Various UN bodies functioning in East and Southeast Asia maintain headquarters in Bangkok, and Thailand has played a leading role in the establishment of several regional organizations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Most recently, in a marked departure from previous policy, in 1999 Thailand dispatched some 1,500 troops as part of the international peacekeeping force sent to East Timor (now Timor-

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Leste) following the territory’s independence vote in August. Relations with Cambodia have traditionally been antagonistic, although Thailand joined with other ASEAN nations in recognizing the Pol Pot regime in mid-1975 and in calling for “the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops” following the Vietnamese invasion of December 1978. While tacitly aiding Khmer Rouge forces in their opposition to the Vietnamese-backed regime of Heng Samrin, Thailand encouraged the noncommunist Khmer resistance to form a united front, an effort that contributed toward the organization of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea in June 1982. By late 1988, following a publicly stated desire of Prime Minister Chatchai to turn Indochina “from a battleground into a market place,” policy toward Hanoi measurably softened. Thailand was also a participant in the “Jakarta Informal Meetings” that paved the way for establishment of a quadripartite Supreme National Council for Cambodia in 1990. As many as 250,000 Cambodians crowded refugee camps in eastern Thailand during the Pol Pot era and the ensuing occupation by Vietnamese forces, and as late as 1998 the region continued to be a refuge for those fleeing fighting between the Cambodian military and remaining Khmer Rouge guerrillas. Periodically, however, charges that Thailand provided sanctuary to fleeing Khmer Rouge strained relations with a number of countries, including the United States. Concern that arms might end up in guerrilla hands led Washington to terminate military aid and training under its 1995 Foreign Operations Act. Angered by the American action, Thailand joined Indonesia and Malaysia in opposing a request for the stationing of a “rapid response” flotilla of U.S. military supply ships in the Gulf of Thailand. Relations later improved, with Thailand receiving strong U.S. support in 1998 for its economic reforms. A history of uneven relations with neighboring Laos reached a low point in late 1987, when fighting broke out over disputed border territory. Despite the conflict, Bangkok subsequently adopted a conciliatory economic policy, and a “new atmosphere”

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of cooperation was reported to have resulted from a series of high-level governmental and military talks in late 1990, with a mutual troop withdrawal from border areas occurring in March 1991. Five months later a border security and cooperation agreement provided for the repatriation of some 60,000 Laotian refugees from Thailand over a three-year period. In February 1993 Thai officials met in Hanoi with representatives of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam to chart a new framework of cooperation for developing the resources of the lower Mekong River. Subsequently, talks were also initiated with Laos, Myanmar (Burma), and China on development of the upper Mekong, which led to completion in April 2000 of a treaty governing navigation on the waterway. In March 1996 Banharn Silpa-Archa became the first Thai prime minister in 16 years to visit Myanmar, with whose leadership a border trade agreement was signed, while in 1998 the UN agreed to help protect some 100,000 Mon, Kayin (Karen), and other ethnic refugees from Myanmar living on the Thai side of the border. In March 1999 Myanmar’s head of state, Than Shwe, joined Prime Minister Chuan for discussions on narcotics control and border tensions, but the cordiality ended on October 2 when Thai authorities freed five Myanmar dissidents who had taken 89 hostages at the Myanmar embassy in Bangkok the preceding day. Myanmar’s military leadership immediately closed the Thai-Myanmar border. Bangkok, in turn, threatened to expel hundreds of thousands of illegal Myanmar migrant workers. The border remained closed until late November. A second hostage incident occurred on January 24, 2000, when members of a Myanmar ethnic minority group called God’s Army occupied a hospital in Ratchaburi, near the border, taking some 700 hostages. In contrast to the October incident, the Thai forces stormed the hospital on January 25, freed all the hostages, and killed all ten rebels, some, according to eyewitnesses, by summary execution. This time Yangon praised Thailand’s forceful response. On February 9–11, 2001, Thai troops engaged Myanmar forces that had reportedly chased mem-

bers of the Shan State Army across the border. The encounter led to a series of bilateral meetings, culminating in a June visit by Prime Minister Thaksin to Yangon. The two governments agreed not only to work toward resolution of remaining border issues but also to jointly fight drug production and smuggling. Nevertheless, difficulties continued into 2002, with the border being closed from May until early October. In February 2003 Thaksin again traveled to Myanmar in furtherance of improved relations, and in July he announced that all Myanmar dissidents would be moved to refugee camps near the border. In January 1998 Malaysia shifted policy toward the Muslim separatists of southern Thailand when it quietly arrested several alleged Muslim insurgents from a faction of the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and returned them for trial in Bangkok. Malaysia, which is predominantly Muslim, had previously been a sanctuary for the separatists, who want independence for the 2.5 million Muslims residing in Thailand’s southern provinces. The change in policy was seen as evidence of a new cooperativeness at a time when both countries faced the regional economic crisis. In recent years Thailand has had warm relations with China. During a visit to China in June 2005 Prime Minister Thaksin and the Chinese leadership announced that they were proceeding with an action plan to develop a “strategic partnership” in a host of areas, including trade, security, and science and technology. Even after the September 2001 al-Qaida attacks on the United States, and despite growing Islamic militancy in Thailand’s southern provinces, Thai authorities routinely denied the possible involvement of the Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiah (JI) and al-Qaida in sporadic bombings and attacks against police stations. In June 2003, however, alleged JI members were among those arrested in connection with a plot to blow up two tourist resorts and the Bangkok embassies of Australia, Germany, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Citing the urgency of the situation, in August 2003 the government bypassed the National Assembly and issued two antiterrorism laws by

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decree. In the same month, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency assisted Thai authorities in capturing Riduan Isamuddin (a.k.a. Hambali), an alleged JI leader with ties to al-Qaida, who was then taken to the United States. Relations with the U.S. George W. Bush administration have remained close. Thailand also assisted in the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq, although its 440 medical and engineering personnel were withdrawn in August 2004.

Current Issues Prime Minister Thaksin’s continuing popularity in rural Thailand, coupled with widespread public support for the government’s comparatively wellmanaged response to the December 2004 tsunami disaster, carried him to the unprecedented election victory of February 2005. In the succeeding year, however, he was increasingly beset by accusations that he was arrogant, favored cronies in his numerous cabinet shuffles, surrounded himself with “yes men,” tried to manage the government as if it were a private business and he were the CEO, and used his political power to curtail media critics. His use of the police and the military also contributed to charges of authoritarianism. In February 2003 the government initiated a crackdown against drug dealers that, by the end of April, had reportedly led to nearly 2,300 deaths (a government report, released the following December, put the number at some 1,300). Police tactics in the crackdown generated accusations from Amnesty International and others that high-level officials had condoned or, worse, encouraged extrajudicial killings. Furthermore, critics asserted that most drug kingpins, allegedly including senior civilian and military figures, had managed to avoid the sweep. In May an unapologetic Thaksin announced a new campaign, a “war on dark influences,” aimed at prostitution, extortion rackets, gambling, and smuggling. During the same period Islamic militancy became a major issue in the Muslim-majority southern provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala. In January 2004 the government declared martial

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law in the three provinces in response to escalating attacks that targeted not only authorities but also school teachers, civil servants, and Buddhist monks. On April 30 a coordinated series of attacks against 11 police bases was met with a lethal response from the police and military, leaving over 100 Muslims dead, 30 of them killed during the storming of a mosque. An official inquiry concluded that excessive force had been used. In October another deadly encounter ended with nearly 80 of some 1,300 detainees suffocating or dying of heat stroke while being transported in overcrowded trucks. Although Thaksin established a National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) in March 2005 to formulate “peace-building” proposals for the south, in mid-July the cabinet approved an Emergency Powers Act that was promulgated by executive decree. The act, which was passed by both houses of the National Assembly in August, granted Thaksin authority to conduct wiretaps, ban media, conduct searches and detain suspects without warrants, censor news, and ban publications. In January 2006, with the death toll in the south having surpassed 1,000, Amnesty International accused the government and military of using arbitrary detentions, excessive force, and torture in the south. In June 2006 the NRC issued its final report. The commission, headed by former prime minister Anand Panyarachun, concluded that the underlying issues could not be resolved militarily. Instead, it recommended that indigenous Malay be adopted as a “working language” in the south, that the application of Islamic law be permitted in some situations, that a dialog be opened with militants, that a Fund for Healing and Reconciliation be created, and that mechanisms be established to allow greater local input in cultural and governmental matters. Anand subsequently complained that the caretaker administration would be unlikely to follow the report’s recommendations. Indeed, Thaksin quickly rejected extending any heightened status to the Malay language. The Thaksin government’s apparent inability to resolve the southern rebellion was a major factor

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in the anti-Thaksin movement. The PAD campaign, in addition to demanding Thaksin’s resignation, hoped to rekindle the political reform movement that had brought down the Suchinda government in 1992. It brought together a broad cross-section of predominantly urban interest groups—nongovernmental organizations, academics, students, organized labor, businesses, and advocates for the poor. PAD leaders included antipoverty activist SUWIT Watnoo, former Thaksin mentor CHAMLONG Srimuang of the Santi Asoke Buddhist sect, academic SOMKIAT Pongpaibun, labor leader SOMSAK Kosaisuk, and PHIBHOP Dhongchai and SURIYASI Kitasila of the Campaign for Popular Democracy. Wealthy media personality SONDHI Limthongkul, once a Thaksin supporter and now one of his severest critics, had been the principal force behind the February 4, 2006, Bangkok rally. Following the April 2006 election, the Election Commission recommended to the attorney general that five parties—Thai Rak Thai, the DP, and three minor formations—be dissolved for violating the constitution and the Political Party Act. Allegations included that Thai Rak Thai had bankrolled two of the small parties to offer token competition, thereby illegally circumventing a requirement that a candidate in an uncontested race had to receive at least 20 percent of the vote to claim the seat. The DP was charged with paying bribes to elicit accusations that Thai Rak Thai had committed electoral fraud. The cases were to be decided by the Constitutional Court, which had not ruled by early August. Although the major opposition parties all agreed to contest the election scheduled for October 2006, analysts uniformly expected Thai Rak Thai to win a large plurality, if not a majority, of lower-house seats. As of August, it appeared virtually certain that that the DP, Chart Pattana, and Mahachon would run independently rather than in an alliance, and none of the numerous newly registered parties seemed capable of challenging the more established parties. Should Thai Rak Thai require a partner to fashion a coalition government, its previous partner, Chart Thai, was considered the most likely option.

Meanwhile, it remained possible that the Constitutional Court would dissolve Thai Rak Thai and/or the DP, which would almost certainly necessitate postponement of the election in order to permit party members to regroup. Conducting the election as scheduled already faced difficulties, including fashioning a completely new Election Commission. Of the previous commission’s five members, one had died, one had voluntarily resigned, and in June the remaining three, already reviled by the opposition, had been convicted of malfeasance in the conduct of the April balloting. The new commissioners were finally named in September.

Political Parties For the quarter-century preceding the 2001 election, Thailand’s civilian governments typically featured shifting multiparty coalitions, with no single party being able to emerge from national elections holding a legislative majority. Although political party activity was temporarily suspended after the February 1991 coup, 15 registered parties contested the legislative election of March 1992, with 11 winning seats; the short-lived Suchinda government included the plurality legislative party, Unification Virtue (Sammakkhi Tham), plus the promilitary Chart Thai, Prachakorn Thai, Social Action Party (SAP), and Rassadorn. For the run-up to the September 1992 balloting, the Chart Thai, Prachakorn Thai, Chart Pattana (National Development Party), Unification Virtue (now defunct), and Rassadorn parties formed a promilitary coalition that the media dubbed “the devils”; an opposing coalition, the “angels,” encompassed four prodemocracy groups: the Democrat Party (DP), New Aspiration Party (NAP), Palang Dharma (Righteous Force), and Ekkaparb (Solidarity). After the election the conservative SAP joined the four prodemocracy groups in a governing coalition led by Chuan Leekpai, but it was obliged to withdraw a year later upon the announcement of its participation in a projected “super-party” with Prachakorn Thai, Chart Pattana, Mass Party (Muan Chon), and Rassadorn; the SAP was replaced in the coalition by the smaller

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Seri Tham (Virtuous Freedom) party. In December 1994 the NAP also withdrew from the government but was quickly succeeded by the rightist Chart Pattana. The withdrawal of Palang Dharma five months later precipitated the collapse of the government, and following the July 1995 election a new seven-party grouping of Chart Thai, NAP, Palang Dharma, SAP, Prachakorn Thai, Muan Chon, and the minor Nam Thai (now defunct) took office under Prime Minister Banharn Silpa-Archa. In May 1996 Palang Dharma withdrew from the Banharn government, then returned, which caused Prachakorn Thai to briefly depart in June. In August Palang Dharma once again withdrew, contributing to the demise of the Banharn administration. The six-party government formed by Gen. Chaovalit Yongchaiyut immediately after the November 1996 election included his NAP, Chart Pattana, the SAP, Prachakorn Thai, Seri Tham, and Muan Chon, while its successor, formed in November 1997 by returning Prime Minister Chuan, initially comprised the DP, Chart Thai, SAP, Ekkaparb (now defunct), and Seri Tham, plus 12 representatives from the opposition Prachakorn Thai. In addition, it received the backing of the Palang Dharma and the small Thai Party. In October 1998 the coalition was bolstered by the addition of the Chart Pattana, and in February 1999 most of the renegade Prachakorn Thai members joined the revived Rassadorn, the seventh member of the coalition. The SAP, however, withdrew in July 1999. Thirty-seven parties (out of some 60 registered parties) presented lists for the proportional seats at the January 2001 election for the House of Representatives. The government announced in February by Prime Minister Thaksin was dominated by his Thai Rak Thai but also included Chart Thai and the NAP. Palang Dharma dissolved after failing to win any seats. In July Seri Tham merged with Thai Rak Thai, as did the NAP in March 2002. Chart Pattana joined the government in March 2002, was forced out in November 2003, and then returned in July 2004, after which it was absorbed by Thai Rak Thai. Also in July 2004, Rassadorn was reor-

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ganized as the Public Party (Mahachon). Following the February 2005 election Thai Rak Thai formed Thailand’s first elected single-party government. The failed election of April 2006 was boycotted by all the parties in the parliamentary opposition: the DP, Chart Thai, and Mahachon. Of the country’s 30 registered parties, 28 were eligible for the contest, although many had minuscule memberships or existed primarily on paper; 18 ran in at least one district and 8 presented party lists for proportional seats. Two weeks after the April 2006 election Muan Chon was reregistered as the New Alternative. As of early June, with a repeat election having been scheduled for October, the number of registered parties had grown to 38.

Government Party Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thais). Thaksin Shinawatra, a leading figure in the telecommunications industry and a former leader of Palang Dharma, announced formation of Thai Rak Thai in July 1998. He subsequently set about positioning the party for the next general election, advocating debt relief for farmers and various measures to promote business expansion. In addition, he began recruiting senior members from virtually all of the country’s other parties, including the DP, in a process that DP leaders characterized as assembling a “used car” fleet. By April 2000, however, with the standing of the NAP and other parties endangered by factionalism, he had attracted sufficient support to make Thai Rak Thai a leading electoral contender. At the January 2001 election the party won 248 seats, permitting Thaksin to claim the prime minister’s office. In July 2001 Thai Rak Thai absorbed Seri Tham (also known as the Liberal Democratic Party), which had been launched in 1992 by Arthit Urairat and which went on to win 8 seats at the 1992 election. It then entered the first Chuan government in September 1993 upon the departure of the SAP. Arthit defected to the DP before the November 1996 election, after which Seri Tham joined the NAP-led coalition government despite having

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won only 4 seats in the house (down from 11 in 1995). In the formation of the DP-led government in November 1997 the party secured one deputy ministerial position. A planned merger in 2000 with Rassadorn failed to materialize, and at the January 2001 election, under the leadership of former Chart Pattana member PRACHUAB Chaiyasarn, Seri Tham won 14 seats. It then supported the election of Prime Minister Thaksin, who pursued the Seri Tham merger in the interest of securing a Thai Rak Thai majority in the house. In March 2002 Chaovalit Yongchaiyut’s NAP disbanded and also merged into Thai Rak Thai. (For a history of the NAP, which was soon reregistered by opponents of the merger, see below.) In August 2004 Chart Pattana (National Development Party) merged into Thai Rak Thai. Chart Pattana had been launched in mid-1992 by former Chart Thai prime minister Chatchai Choonhavan, whose assets of some $24.5 million had been seized in mid-January as representing “unusual wealth,” and who had chosen not to contest the March election. Despite its leader’s liabilities, the new group captured third place with 60 lower house seats in September 1992. Chart Pattana joined the first Chuan Leekpai government in December 1994, although General Chatchai declined a cabinet post and formally resigned as party leader to assuage DP members who disapproved of support he had given to the military junta from February 1991 to June 1992. The party came in fourth, with 53 seats, in 1995 and then took 52, for third place, in the 1996 election. Chatchai died in May 1998, and in October his successor as party leader, KORN Dabbaransi, brought the party into the governing Chuan coalition. In August 2000 the chief party adviser, Prachuab Chaiyasarn, resigned from the party to head Seri Tham. Representation plummeted to 29 seats at the January 2001 election, after which the party was reportedly considering various merger options. None came to fruition, however, and in March 2002 Chart Pattana joined the government. In November 2003 it returned to the opposition upon its dismissal from the cabinet. Shortly thereafter, Korn joined Thai Rak Thai, leading to rumors that the two parties

might eventually merge. Chart Pattana rejoined the government a month before the merger. Internally, Thai Rak Thai is dominated by various factions loyal to Thaksin, Sudarat Keyuraphan, Suriya Jungrungreangkit, and others. By far the largest is the Wang Nam Yom faction. Among the leaders who resigned from the party in 2006 were Korn Dabbaransi and Sanoh Thienthong, the latter taking with him most of his Wang Nam Yen faction. Leaders: THAKSIN Shinawatra (Prime Minister), PONGTHEP Thepkanchana (Deputy Leader), CHAMLONG Khrutkhunthod (formerly of Chart Pattana), CHAOVALIT Yongchaiyut (formerly of NAP), CHATURON Chaisaeng (Deputy Leader, formerly of NAP), NEWIN Chidchob (formerly of Ekkaparb), PINIJ Jarusombat (Minister of Health, formerly of Seri Tham), PONGPOL Adireksarn (formerly of Chart Thai), PRACHA Maleenont (Wang Kang Kao faction), SOMSAK Thepsutin (Minister of Labor, Wang Nam Yom faction, formerly of SAP), SONTAYA Kunplome (Ram Nam faction), SUDARAT Keyuraphan (Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Bangkok faction, formerly of Palang Dharma), SUWAT Liptapanlop (Deputy Prime Minister, Lam Ta Kong faction, formerly of Chart Pattana), SUWIT Khunkitti (Deputy Leader, formerly of SAP), WAN Muhammad Noor Matha (Wadah faction, formerly of NAP), YOAWAPA Wongsawat (Wang Bua Ban faction), SURIYA Jungrungreangkit (Deputy Prime Minister, Wang Nam Yom faction, Secretary General of the Party).

Leading Opposition Parties Democrat Party—DP (Pak Prachatipat). Organized in 1946, Prachatipat now constitutes Thailand’s oldest party. Traditionally a strong defender of the monarchy, it has derived much of its support from urban professional and official groups. The fourth-ranked party in March 1992, with 44 seats, it secured a plurality of 79 seats the following September; it was second-ranked with 86 seats in 1995 and similarly ranked with 123 seats in 1996.

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In August 2000 the Constitutional Court convicted DP Secretary General Sanan Kachornprasart of having falsified an assets declaration and banned him from politics for five years. At the January 2001 election the party actually gained a handful of seats over 1996, for a total of 128, but was far outdistanced by Thai Rak Thai. With former prime minister Chuan Leekpai having stepped aside as party leader, the April 2003 DP Congress saw longtime party stalwart Banyat Bantadtan defeat three other candidates, principally the youthful Abhisit Vejjajiva, for the post. In mid-2004 supporters of former secretary general Sanan left the Democrats and joined Mahachon (below). With his party having won only 96 seats at the February 2006 election, Banyat stepped down in favor of Abhisit, who was unanimously confirmed as party leader in March. Leaders: ABHISIT Vejjajiva, KORN Chatikavanij (Deputy Leader), CHUAN Leekpai (Chief Adviser), SUTHEP Thaugsuban (Secretary General). Chart Thai (Thai Nation). Chart Thai is regarded as the principal heir of the Thanom regime’s United Thai People’s Party. In 1983 it merged with the Siam Democratic Party (Prachatipat Siam), a rightist group dating from 1981. Following the 1988 election the Chart Thai served as the core of a governing coalition led by Gen. Chatchai Choonhavan that included the SAP, Rassadorn, Muan Chon, and the DP in addition to the now-dissolved United Democratic Party (Sabha Pracha Tripathi), with the Thai Mass (Phangcho Chao Thai, likewise defunct) being added in August 1990. The coalition collapsed in early December (the DP, SAP, and Muan Chon going into opposition) and, with General Chatchai remaining as prime minister, was succeeded by a new five-party grouping that included Ekkaparb and Prachakorn Thai. Chatchai resigned from the Chart Thai leadership following his ouster as prime minister in the coup of February 1991. In June the party voted to retain Chatchai, who had gone into exile, as party leader until the next general elec-

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tion; upon being informed that he had withdrawn from politics, the party named retired Air Chief Marshal Somboon Rahong as his successor. The nomination of Somboon as prime minister in May 1992 heightened the popular unrest that led to the legislative dissolution of June 29. (Somboon later left the party and joined Rassadorn.) In July 1995 Chart Thai became the largest legislative party, its representation rising from 77 to 92, before plunging to 39 in 1996. In April 2000 a dispute between former prime minister Banharn and Secretary General Pongpol Adireksarn resulted in the latter’s departure from the Chuan cabinet, where he had served as minister of agriculture and cooperatives. The ostensible precipitant was the ministry’s management of a farm reform loan from the Asian Development Bank, but the two party leaders had been at odds for some time. Pongpol subsequently resigned as secretary general and was invited to join Thai Rak Thai. In October a former Chart Pattana minister, SOMPONG Amornvivat, was named acting secretary general, but he also soon departed in favor of Thai Rak Thai. The party won 41 seats at the January 2001 election and then agreed to join in coalition with Thai Rak Thai. Chart Thai, which won 25 seats at the 2005 election for the House of Representatives, was not invited to join Prime Minister Thaksin’s new government. Prior to the April 2006 snap election it joined the DP and Mahachon in boycotting the balloting and demanding the prime minister’s resignation. Leaders: BANHARN Silpa-Archa (Former Prime Minister), WIRASAK Khowsurat (Deputy Leader), PRAPHAT Bhothasuthon (Secretary General), KASEM Sorajakkasem (Deputy Secretary General). Mahachon (Public Party). Previously called Rassadorn (Citizens’ Party or Party of the People), Mahachon adopted its present name in July 2004, having been joined by followers of former DP leader Sanan Kachornprasart. Sanan and his supporters had initially intended to establish a new party but ultimately chose to transform Rassadorn.

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Rassadorn had been registered in May 1986 by a largely military group whose leader, Gen. TIENCHAI Sirisamphan, had played a prominent role in the countercoup operation of September 1985. It disbanded after failing to win any house seats in the November 1996 election, but on February 10, 1999, it was reregistered by VATANA Asavahame, one of the Prachakorn Thai rebels who had defied the party leadership by supporting the Chuan administration. Two days later the Constitutional Court ruled that the Prachakorn Thai “Cobras” had 30 days to find a new party or lose their house seats, and later in the month 9 of the 12 joined Rassadorn. On March 8 the resurrected party held a general assembly, but Vatana turned down the party chair, which went to former Chart Thai leader SOMBOON Rahong. In April 2000 a planned merger with Seri Tham fell through. Rassadorn won only two House seats in January 2001, as a consequence of which Somboon indicated that he would step aside as party leader. Leaders: SANAN Kachornprasart, AKHAPOL Sorasuchart.

Other Parties Maharaj Party. Maharaj was established following the May 2006 decision of the Constitutional Court to void the April 2006 House of Representatives election. Initial leaders included Anek Laothammathat, formerly of Mahachon. The NAP (below) was reportedly considering merging with Maharaj. Leaders: ANEK Laothammathat, UAYCHAI Watha, KRAISAK Choonhavan, KARUN Saingam. New Alternative (Thang Luak Mai). New Alternative, formerly Muan Chon, was registered under its present name on April 18, 2006. The original Muan Chon had been formally registered in June 1985 by a group of dissidents from both government and opposition ranks. A participant in several coalition governments between then and 1997, it won only two house seats in November 1996 un-

der the leadership of Chalerm Yoobamrung. In May 1998 the NAP absorbed the Muan Chon, but in late April 2002, objecting to the dissolution of the NAP and its merger into the Thai Rak Thai, Chalerm reregistered the revived Muan Chon. He then ran unsuccessfully for governor of Bangkok in 2004. In 2006 Chalerm supported the opposition boycott of the April lower house election. Leader: CHALERM Yoobamrung. New Aspiration Party—NAP (Pak Kwam Hwang Mai). Organized by controversial former army commander Chaovalit Yongchaiyut, who had also served as General Chatchai’s defense minister, the NAP was formally registered in September 1990. Characterized by its founder as an anticorruption grouping, the party claimed 300,000 adherents by early 1991. Despite his military background, Chaovalit strongly opposed the 1991 coup and subsequently emerged as the NPC junta’s most outspoken critic. The NAP was third-ranked in March 1992, winning 72 house seats, and fourth-ranked in September, with 51. The party withdrew from the ruling coalition in December 1994, after helping to defeat a government-sponsored constitutional amendment providing for direct election of local administrative bodies. It emerged from the 1995 legislative poll as the second-ranked party with 86 seats, which it increased to a narrow plurality of 125 in November 1996. Following his resignation as prime minister in November 1997, Chaovalit became leader of the opposition in the house. In mid-April 1999 General Chaovalit and the party’s entire executive board quit in a move designed to force the resignation of the party’s secretary general, Sanoh Thienthong. At a party session on April 27 Chaovalit was reinstated and a new secretary general, Chaturon Chaisaeng, chosen. On March 19, 2000, Chaovalit again resigned as party leader, this time to force out the reformminded Chaturon, who promptly resigned as secretary general. In April Chaturon and several NAP house members joined Thai Rak Thai, which had admitted Sanoh earlier in the month. After having won 36 seats at the January 2001 election, the

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NAP joined the governing coalition led by Thai Rak Thai. In January 2002 the NAP leadership agreed to merge into Thai Rak Thai, and on March 28 the Constitutional Court approved the party’s dissolution. On May 10, however, Chingchai Mongkoltham, a member of the NAP’s lower house delegation who had objected to the merger, reregistered the party. Leader: CHINGCHAI Mongkoltham. Prachakorn Thai (Thai Citizens). Prachakorn Thai was launched prior to the 1979 election by the promilitary and charismatic populist Samak Sundarajev, who succeeded in routing the Democrats in their traditional stronghold of Bangkok. From 1983 to 1986 it participated in a quadripartite governing coalition with the DP, the SAP, and the now-defunct National Democracy Party (Chart Prachathipatai) of former prime minister Kriangsak Chamanan, and in December 1990 it entered the reshuffled Chatchai coalition. Although the party won only 3 house seats in September 1992, it took 18 in 1995 and again in 1996. Twelve of its MPs joined the governing coalition formed by Prime Minister Chuan in late 1997, for which they were expelled from the party in October 1998, threatening their house seats. Dubbed the “Cobras” by the party leader, the 12 appealed the decision to the Constitutional Court, which in February 1999 ruled the dismissal unconstitutional and gave the renegades 30 days to find new parties or lose their standing in the House. Nine joined the revived Rassadorn; 2, Chart Pattana; and 1, Seri Tham. Samak won the Bangkok gubernatorial election in July 2000, defeating 21 other candidates, but the party failed to win any House seats in 2001 or 2005. At the April 2006 disputed election it won only 0.9 percent of the vote. Leaders: SUMIT Sundaravej, SAMAK Sundaravej (Former Governor of Bangkok), SONTHIYA Sawassde (Spokesperson). Pracharaj (Royal People Party). Pracharaj was registered in April 2006 under the leadership of Sanoh Thienthong, formerly of the NAP and

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Thai Rak Thai. An early supporter of Prime Minister Thaksin, he had left Thai Rak Thai earlier in the year, intending to retire from politics. He returned, however, to help organize the Pracharaj, although he stated that he would serve only as interim leader. Leaders: SANOH Thienthong; THANBUNSONG Promsutra; BOONTHUENG Pholphanit, PRAMUAL Rujanaseri, and CHUCHEEP Harnsawat (Deputy Leaders); PRACHAI Leophairatana (Secretary General). Social Action Party—SAP (Pak Kit Sangkhom). A 1974 offshoot of the DP, the SAP is somewhat more conservative than the parent group. It was the leading party in the 1983 balloting and served as the core of the Prem government coalition prior to the emergence of internal fissures that prompted the resignation of longtime party leader Kukrit Pramoj in late 1985 and necessitated the legislative dissolution of May 1986. It was runnerup to the Chart Thai in 1988, with Kukrit returning to the party leadership in August 1990. It won 31 legislative seats in March 1992 and entered the Suchinda government in April; however, it left the promilitary alignment in June. It secured 22 seats in the September 1992 poll. Although a participant in the ensuing Chuan coalition, its leader, MONTRI Pongpanit, was not offered a cabinet portfolio because of allegations that he had become “unusually rich.” The party went into opposition in September 1993, subsequently joining the Chaovalit coalition after the 1996 election, at which it won 20 seats, down from 22 in 1995. Kukrit Pramoj died in October 1996, and two years later Montri announced that he was stepping down as formal party leader, in part as a gesture of responsibility for a scandal that had cost the party its health portfolio. In July 1999 the SAP withdrew from the governing coalition as a result of a dispute between Deputy Prime Minister Suwit Khunkitti and RAKKIAT Sukthana over the party’s cabinet seats. In March 2000 Suwit resigned his party leadership post, and in August he led a mass defection to Thai Rak Thai. With Rakkiat having joined Seri Tham and Montri having died in June, the SAP’s life as an effective

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national force appeared to be approaching its end. It won one seat at the January 2001 lower house election, but its MP, NARONGLERT Surapol, resigned his seat in August 2004 and was expected to join the new Mahachon party. In June 2006 Suwit stated that his former party would be formally dissolved in the near future. Leader: SAYOMPHU Kiatsayomphu (Acting Secretary General). Small parties that competed in the April 2006 election included Thai Farmers, which finished second, with 2.1 percent of the vote; Better Life (Cheewit Thideekwa); Dhammocratic Party; Kasikornthai; Khonkhoplodnee, which claimed to have won four seats under the leadership of CHUCHAT Pathantham; Kitsangkom; Krit Thai Man Kong; a new incarnation of Palang Dharma, led by BHAMORN Mavaratanakorn; Pattana Chart Thai, led by BOONTHAWEESAK Amornsin; People Power Party (Palang Prachachon), led by KAN Thienkaew; Progressive Democratic Party (Prachatippatai Kao Na), led by ISARA Yuangprasit; Siam; Thai Chuay Thai, led by POMAT Jaroenphuvadol; and Thai Ground (Pan Din Thai), led by BOONITHIPHON Chinarat. As of August 1 the Constitutional Court had not ruled on the attorney general’s recommendation that Pattana Chart Thai, the Progressive Democratic Party, and Thai Ground, as well as Thai Rak Thai and the DP, be dissolved for electoral violations. Other parties organized in the first half of 2006 included the following: Dam Rong Thai, led by NATTHAWAT Nuchanart; Labor Party, led by TECHIN Tap-Plee; Santiparb Thai, led by WEERASAK Uppatham; Strength of the Land (Palang Phaendin Thai), led by LIKHIT Dhiravegin and SARIT Santimethanedol; Thai Agriculture Labor Party, led by WARAPONG Klansuta; Thai Citizen Freedom Party, led by PISAL Younfpeasit; Thai Women, led by RABIEBRAT Pongpanit. Several figures in the People’s Alliance for Democracy were described in May as preparing to launch a new Mass Party, but they did not intend to contest the upcoming election; leaders

were SOMKIAT Pongpaibun, CHAIWAT Sinsuwong, and PHIBHOP Dhongchai.

Insurgent Groups For several decades the small Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) has fought for formation of an independent Islamic state carved from several southern provinces having Muslim majorities. More recently, a “New PULO” splinter was reported, as was the formation of a militant group, Bersatu (United), that may include members of both the PULO and the National Revolutionary Front (Barisan Revolusi Nasional). In October 2001 three purported PULO leaders were sentenced to life in prison in connection with a bombing campaign. Another militant organization, the Pattani Islamic Mujaheddin Movement (Gerakan Mujaheddin Islam Pattani), was among the groups allegedly involved in carrying out escalating attacks in the south in 2004. Connections to the international al-Qaida terrorist network and to Jemaah Islamiah have been alleged.

Legislature The 1991 basic law restored bicameralism in the form of a National Assembly (Ratha Sapha) encompassing an appointed Senate and an elected House of Representatives. The 1997 constitution provides for a directly elected Senate of 200 members serving six-year terms. The house expanded to 500 seats at the January 2001 election, four-fifths directly elected from single-member constituencies and, for the first time, one-fifth chosen on a proportional basis from parties obtaining at least 5 percent of the national vote. (See headnote.) Senate (Woothi Sapha). The first election to the new Senate was held March 4, 2000, with the successful candidates being a mix of unaffiliated political neophytes, reformers, and established figures. The Election Commission quickly disqualified 78 victors for vote-buying, fraud, and campaign offenses. All but 2 were, however, allowed to compete in a second round of balloting on April 29 for

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Cabinet As of August 1, 2006 (see headnote) Caretaker Prime Minister Deputy Prime Ministers

Thaksin Shinawatra Chidchai Wannasathit Somkid Jatusripitak Suchai Charoenratanakul Surakiart Sathirathai Suriya Jungrungreangkit Suwat Liptapanlop

Ministers Agriculture and Cooperatives Commerce Culture (Acting) Defense Education Energy Finance Foreign Affairs Information and Communications Technology (Acting) Industry Interior Justice Labor Natural Resources and Environment Public Health Science and Technology Social Development and Human Services Tourism and Sports Transport

Sudarat Keyuraphan [f] Somkid Jatusripitak Surakiart Sathirathai Gen. Thammarak Isarangura Na Ayutthaya Chaturon Chaisaeng Viset Choopiban Thanong Bidaya Kantathi Suphamongkhon Suchai Charoenratanakul Suriya Jungrungreangkit Kangsak Wanthana Chidchai Wannasathit Somsak Thepsutin Yongyut Tiyapairat Pinij Jarusombat Pravich Rattanapien Watana Muangsook Pracha Maleenont Pongsak Raktapongpaisal

[f] = female

the vacated seats. Meanwhile, the term of the predecessor Senate had expired on March 21, and the Constitutional Court had ruled that the new body could not convene without the full complement of 200 senators. Sixty-six were elected on April 29, 8 in a third round on June 4, 3 in a fourth round on July 9, and the final senator in a fifth round on July 22. The new Senate convened on August 1. The most recent election, held April 19, 2006, was once again conducted amid numerous charges that some candidates were attempting to circum-

vent proscriptions against campaigning or were too closely connected to political parties despite their technically unaffiliated status. As of late July, 180 of the 200 potential senators had been endorsed by the Election Commission, but the commission ceased to function when its three remaining members were convicted of malfeasance and forced to resign. Reballoting had already been ordered in two provinces. Meanwhile, the previous Senate continued to serve in an interim capacity. President: SUCHON Chaleekrua.

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House of Representatives (Sapha Poothan Rassadorn). Following the general election of February 6, 2005, Thai Rak Thai held 377 seats (including 67 party-list seats); the Democrat Party, 96 (26); Chart Thai, 25 (7); Mahachon, 2 (0). On May 8, 2006, the Constitutional Court nullified the results of a snap election held April 2, 2006. (Reballoting had been held on April 23 in 40 districts where unopposed candidates had not won the minimum 20 percent vote on April 2; a similarly-necessitated third round in 14 of the 40 constituencies had been postponed.) The Constitutional Court ruled that the voters’ right to a secret ballot had been compromised and that the Electoral Commission had not allowed sufficient time between the late February dissolution of the sitting House and the election date. Had the results not been nullified, Thai Rak Thai would have been credited with all but a handful of the filled seats, given an election boycott by the leading opposition parties. A new election was subsequently scheduled for October 15. Speaker: BHOKIN Bhalakula (March 2005– February 2006).

Communications Immediately after the 1976 coup all newspapers were banned. Subsequently, most were permitted to resume publication under strict censorship, which was formally lifted after the coup of October 1977. The government seized all broadcast facilities in the wake of the February 1991 coup but did not impose formal censorship on the print media. The current constitution protects freedom of the press, but under Prime Minister Thaksin, who made his fortune in the telecommunications industry, the government has frequently been accused of interfering with opposition media.

(800,000); Naew Na (Frontline, 200,000); Baan Muang (200,000); Matichon (180,000); Dao Siam (120,000); Siam Rath (Siam Nation, 120,000); Tong Hua Daily News (85,000), in Chinese; Kia Hua Tong Huan (80,000), in Chinese; Krungthep Turakij (75,000); Sig Sian Yit Pao (70,000), in Chinese; Bangkok Post (50,000), in English; The Nation (50,000), in English.

News Agencies There is no domestic facility; however, numerous foreign bureaus maintain offices in Bangkok.

Broadcasting and Computing The regulatory agency is the recently established, independent National Broadcasting Commission. There are a variety of radio and television services, most of them, including Radio Thailand’s 100-plus stations, provided under government auspices; some stations are educational and some accept commercial advertising. All radio stations are required to transmit news twice a day from the government’s National Broadcasting Services of Thailand. Broadcasts are in Thai, English, French, and a number of other languages. All six national television stations are government owned, although two are operated by private interests. There were approximately 18.8 million television receivers and 2.9 million personal computers serving 6.0 million Internet users in 2003.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. FUTRAKUL Virasakdi U.S. Ambassador to Thailand Ralph Leo BOYCE Jr.

Press

Permanent Representative to the UN Laxanachantorn LAOHAPHAN

The following are dailies issued in Thai in Bangkok, unless otherwise noted: Thai Rath (Thai Nation, 800,000), sensationalist; Daily News

IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, APEC, ASEAN, BIS, CP, Interpol, IOM, IOR-ARC, NAM, PCA, WCO, WTO

TIMOR-LESTE (EAST TIMOR) DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

OF

T I M O R- L E S T E

Rep u´ blica Democr a´ tica de Timor-Leste

The Country Timor-Leste occupies the eastern half of the tropical island of Timor, near the eastern end of the Malay Archipelago, plus the small islands of Ata´uro (Pulo Cambing) and Jaco (Pulo Jako) as well as Oecussi (Ocussi Ambeno), an enclave on the northern coast of West Timor. The landing site of the first Portuguese settlers, Oecussi was retained as part of East Timor when in 1859 Portugal and the Netherlands defined the border between East and West Timor. That dividing line constitutes Timor-Leste’s only land border, with Indonesia. The nearest overseas neighbor is Australia, to the south across the Timor Sea. The Timorese population is primarily of Malay and Papuan descent. About three-quarters speak Bahasa Indonesia; less than one-quarter are fluent in Portuguese. Also commonly spoken is Tetum, an Austronesian language that incorporated elements of Portuguese over the centuries. The vast majority of the population is Roman Catholic, with small Protestant, Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist minorities. Equality of the sexes is guaranteed under the 2002 constitution. Of the 88 members elected to the Constituent Assembly in 2001, 24 were women. Leading occupations continue to be subsistence agriculture and fishing, which account for nearly three-fourths of employment and one-third of nonoil GDP (data on the oil and gas industry is imprecise). Principal crops include grains, coffee (by far the leading export), cassava, spices, coconut, vanilla, and tropical fruits. Small-scale

manufacturing, accounting for under 5 percent of nonoil GDP, involves production of handicrafts, cloth, processed coffee, and a limited range of other consumables. The industrial sector as a whole, led by construction, contributes about 15 percent of GDP. Services account for some 54 percent of nonoil GDP, led by public administration. Future development depends primarily on tapping extensive offshore hydrocarbon reserves. Other resources include gold, manganese, and marble.

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In 1999 violence perpetrated mainly by antiindependence militias destroyed much of the country’s infrastructure and precipitated refugee flows that were a major factor in a 35 percent economic contraction for the year. In 2000 and 2001, however, under UN administration, East Timor registered growth of 15 percent and 17 percent in its nonoil economy, respectively. In 2002, however, as the international presence, particularly personnel associated with UN missions, wound down, output fell by 6.7 percent, and that was followed in 2003 by another 6.2 percent drop. At the same time, delays in concluding bilateral arrangements, coupled with lack of a functioning regulatory and legal structure, slowed inflows of drastically needed investment capital and donor assistance. A marginal recovery of 1.8 percent occurred in 2004 and growth of 2.5 percent was projected for 2005, but the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has estimated that annual growth of 7 percent will be needed to significantly reduce the poverty rate. Per capita income was estimated at $370 in 2005 (noticeably lower than in 2001), adult illiteracy is 50 percent, only half the population has access to safe drinking water, and only one-fourth has electricity.

Government and Politics Political Background Even though the bulk of the Indonesian archipelago came under Dutch control in the 17th century, the eastern end of the island of Timor and the enclave of Ocussi Ambeno were claimed by Portugal, whose traders first arrived there in the early 1500s. In 1859 the Netherlands and Portugal delineated the border between West and East Timor (although the resultant treaty was not ratified until 1904), with East Timor continuing to be governed from Macao until reorganized as a separate colony in 1896. A local rebellion in 1910–1912 was repressed. Following harsh Japanese occupation during World War II, East Timor returned to European control. Although Indonesia won independence from the Netherlands in 1949, a collateral

struggle in East Timor failed, and in 1951 Lisbon amended the Portuguese constitution to redefine the colony as an overseas territory. After a 1974 coup in Lisbon, the new Portuguese government offered to conduct a referendum on East Timor’s future status. Although some organizations favored a continued relationship with Portugal or a gradual process of separation, by 1975 the leading parties were advocating independence. Violence escalated, however, over what form of independent government should be established. On November 28 the left-wing Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Frente Revolucion´ario do Timor-Leste Independente—Fretilin) declared a “Democratic Republic,” but it was opposed by a number of anticommunist parties, including the Timorese Democratic Union (Uni˜ao Democr´atica Timorense—UDT) and the Timorese Democratic People’s Association (Associa¸ca˜ o Popular Democr´atica de Timor—Apodeti). On December 7 Indonesian forces invaded, ultimately driving Fretilin from the capital. Jakarta annexed East Timor on July 17, 1976, although Portugal and the United Nations refused to recognize the action. The initial years of rule from Jakarta were marked by a severe humanitarian crisis that saw an estimated 100,000 East Timorese succumb to starvation or what some observers characterized as genocidal violence by Indonesian forces intent on suppressing the Fretilin-led opposition. During this period, access by the outside world was severely limited, and public expressions of dissent were routinely—often violently—suppressed. In December 1988 Jakarta accorded East Timor “open territory” status after it was determined that Fretilin was “no longer a security threat.” Nevertheless, repression continued. On November 12, 1991, Indonesian troops fired on an estimated 3,500 demonstrators who had assembled peacefully in a Dili cemetery to pay homage to a student killed in a clash with police two weeks earlier. Between 60 and 180 persons were slaughtered before the troops moved in to beat up the survivors, with some 300–400 subsequently reported to have been tortured and/or executed. In response to worldwide

TIMOR-LESTE (EAST TIMOR)

Political Status: Independent republic established May 20, 2002; constitution approved by Constituent Assembly on March 22, 2002. Area: 5,641 sq. mi. (14,609 sq. km.) Population: 924,642 (2004C); 939,000 (2005E). Major Urban Center (2005E): DILI (49,000). Official Languages: Portuguese, Tetum. A majority of Timorese are fluent in Bahasa Indonesia (a form of Malay); both it and English are “working languages.” Monetary Unit: U.S. Dollar. President: Kay Rala Xanana (Jos´e Alexandre) ˜ (nonparty); elected by popular vote GUSMAO on April 16, 2002; sworn in for a five-year term on May 20. Prime Minister: Jos´e RAMOS-HORTA (nonparty); appointed by the president on July 8, 2006, and sworn in on July 10, succeeding Mar´ı ALKATIRI (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor), who had resigned under pressure on June 26.

condemnation, Indonesia dismissed East Timor’s two principal commanders and meted out penalties to a number of other officers. The follow˜ ing November Fretilin’s leader, Xanana GUSMAO, was captured in a western suburb of Dili and in May 1993 was sentenced to life imprisonment (later reduced to 20 years). In November Konis SANTANA was reported to have taken over as commander of Fretilin’s military wing, the For¸cas Armadas de Liberta¸ca˜ o Nacional de Timor-Leste (Falintil). In April 1994, in the first reported public expression of dissent since the 1991 massacre, a small group of protestors calling for Gusm˜ao’s release and freedom for East Timor mounted a demonstration in Dili that was quickly dispersed by security forces. Substantially more violent confrontations occurred in Dili in July during a visit by a UN special rapporteur on human rights and in November, immediately before the opening of an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit near Jakarta. On November 25 a 12-day sit-in at the U.S. embassy in Jakarta ended with 29 of the

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participants being permitted to leave the country for Portugal. A further protest by East Timorese youths outside the university in Dili was broken up by police and military units in January 1995. UN-sponsored talks between Portugal and Indonesia made no substantive progress toward resolving the East Timor issue in 1995–1996. Jakarta’s policy of waiting for the East Timor question to fade from the international agenda received a major setback in October 1996 when two prominent Timorese proindependence campaigners were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. In its citation for Bishop Carlos Felipe XIMENES BELO (Roman Catholic prelate of East Timor) and Jos´e RAMOSHORTA (a former guerrilla campaigning in exile against Indonesian rule), the Norwegian Nobel committee accused Indonesia’s Suharto government of “systematically oppressing the people” of East Timor and also referred to estimates that under Indonesian occupation “one third of the population of East Timor have lost their lives due to starvation, epidemics, war, and terror.” The Indonesian government expressed its “regret” at the award, while Bishop Ximenes Belo took the opportunity to repeat his call for a referendum to decide the status of East Timor. Sporadic unrest continued in 1997, incidents being sparked by, among other things, the installation of a new Roman Catholic bishop and by special visits by a U.S. human rights expert and a UN envoy. In June Indonesian troops reported the death of rebel leader David ALEX, his colleagues claiming he died under torture. On March 11, 1998, Falintil commander Santana died in a fall and was shortly thereafter succeeded by Taur Matan RUAK. On April 23–27, 1998, over 200 delegates of the All-Inclusive Intra-East Timorese Dialogue (AIETD) convened in Peniche, Portugal. Most significantly, the session approved formation of a National Council of Timorese Resistance (Conselho Nacional de Resistˆencia Timorense—CNRT) to better coordinate the efforts of proindependence groups, including the UDT and Fretilin. Xanana Gusm˜ao and Ramos-Horta were named president and vice president, respectively, of the CNRT political committee.

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Even more significant events were taking place in Jakarta, however, and on May 21, 1998, Indonesia’s longtime president, Suharto, was forced to resign. The new government quickly began showing greater flexibility toward the territory. On June 9, less than three weeks after assuming office, President B. J. Habibie indicated that he was willing to make East Timor the country’s fourth “special” region in return for UN recognition of Indonesian sovereignty. The following day the government confirmed the release of 15 Timorese political prisoners. On June 24 Ximenes Belo reported that Habibie was prepared to reduce troop levels in the territory, free additional prisoners, and permit greater freedom of movement for residents. Although East Timorese demonstrators and the CNRT leadership initially rejected the concept of special status, in July the CNRT stated that it might accept transitional autonomy for five years, to be followed by an independence referendum. On July 28 Jakarta countered with an offer of autonomy in all areas but defense, foreign relations, and economic policy. Meeting under UN sponsorship in New York on August 4–5, Indonesian and Portuguese representatives agreed to pursue the option of “wide-ranging autonomy.” Several setbacks occurred during the remainder of the year, including a statement by East Timor’s governor, Jos´e Abilio SOARES, that civil servants would be dismissed if they failed to pledge support for Jakarta’s policies. More importantly, violent clashes between proindependence and pro-Jakarta (prointegrationist) Timorese raised the specter of civil war, and in January 1999 thousands were reported fleeing their homes to escape the hostilities. Late in the month, for the first time, the Habibie administration opened the possibility of eventual freedom for the territory. Indonesian Minister of Defense Gen. Wiranto stated that the military would abide by the “will of the people” on the issue, and Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, although continuing to reject the concept of a referendum, told reporters that Jakarta would consider independence if the East Timorese rejected autonomy. On January 28 talks between Indonesia and Portugal resumed at the United Nations. The next day, Xanana Gusm˜ao

accepted the government’s offer to move him from prison to house arrest, which was carried out on February 10. Meeting in New York on May 5, 1999, the Portuguese and Indonesian foreign ministers agreed to an August 8 poll in East Timor. Two days later the agreement was supported by a UN Security Council resolution. Proindependence advocates immediately expressed concern that Indonesian forces would remain largely responsible for security despite increasing evidence that prointegrationist militias, most prominently the Red and White Iron (Besi Merah Putih—BMP) and the Thorn (Aitarak), were receiving clandestine support from elements in the army. On June 18 Gusm˜ao and Leandro ISAAC of the CNRT, BMP head Jo˜ao da Silva TAVARES, and Domingos SOARES of the pro-Jakarta Forum for Democracy, Unity and Justice (Forum Demokrasi, Persatuan dan Keadilan— FDPK) signed a cease-fire pact and agreed to disarm before the balloting, but the agreement proved no more durable than earlier efforts. Later in the month the 4 were joined by 56 other East Timorese leaders for reconciliation talks organized by Ximenes Belo and Mgr. Basilio dos NASCIMENTO. The dialogue accomplished little, however, and by mid-July some 60,000 Timorese had sought refuge from the continuing violence. In June 1999 and again in July the date for the referendum was pushed back because of the unstable security situation, difficulties in registering voters, and insufficient cooperation by local officials and police with the UN Assessment Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). The balloting was finally held on August 30, UNAMET reporting a 98.6 percent voter turnout. Even before the release of official results, however, prointegrationist militia leaders stated that they would reject the outcome and refused to attend an inaugural meeting of a UN-sponsored Reconciliation Council. As soon as the results were announced on September 4— 78.5 percent in favor of independence and 21.5 percent for autonomy—the militias took to the streets in violent assaults on UN workers and journalists as well as East Timorese. The Indonesian military failed to intervene, and in subsequent days

TIMOR-LESTE (EAST TIMOR)

massacres and attacks were reported throughout the territory. Despite a declaration of martial law by President Habibie, in Dili thousands of fleeing people were driven from the compound of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the official residence of Bishop Ximenes Belo. Gusm˜ao, released from house detention on September 7, appealed for international intervention. With Dili in ruins, the refugee total rose to 450,000, nearly half of whom fled to West Timor. On September 9, 1999, responding to lobbying from international representatives, President Habibie agreed to allow a peacekeeping presence, and on September 15 the UN Security Council unanimously approved formation of the International Force East Timor (INTERFET). Led by some 4,500 Australians and commanded by Maj. Gen. Peter Cosgrove, the 8,000 peacekeepers began deploying on September 20. Seven days later, with most of the Indonesian armed forces having withdrawn, INTERFET formally assumed control and began moving into the hinterlands. Few encounters with militias were reported. On October 19, 1999, Indonesia’s supreme legislature, the People’s Consultative Assembly, ratified the referendum results without dissent, revoking a 1978 integration decree, and three days later Gusm˜ao flew into Dili, receiving a hero’s welcome. Shortly after, UN troops reached Oecussi, where all but a small percentage of the 57,000 population had fled into the countryside to escape prointegrationist violence, most of which was attributed to the Scorpion militia under Florentino SOARES. On October 25 the UN Security Council decided to replace INTERFET with an enlarged body of troops and police in support of a United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). Led by Special Representative Sergio Vieira de Mello, the UNTAET was assigned the task of administering East Timor during the two- or three-year transition to independence. Through November 1999 some 150,000 refugees remained in West Timor, primarily in 140 camps around Atambua, but they continued to suffer the depredations of the militias, which had relocated across the border. On December 1

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Jos´e Ramos-Horta ended his 24-year exile, and on December 11 Vieira de Mello convened a 15member advisory National Consultative Council (NCC), which included integrationists as well as CNRT representatives and UNTAET members. On December 12 Gusm˜ao met at the border with the BMP’s da Silva Tavares, who the following day called on his forces to lay down their arms. On January 31, 2000, the Indonesian Commission to Investigate Human Rights Violations in East Timor asserted that members of the armed forces, the police, and the civil administration as well as the militias had conducted a postreferendum campaign of violence and destruction that it termed systematic and planned. The commission’s report called for Jakarta to investigate further the actions of 33 individuals, including Wiranto and several other generals. On the same day a UN report on human rights abuses recommended creation of a war crimes tribunal, and in April the Indonesian attorney general named a 79-member investigative team to pursue the alleged “crimes against humanity.” Jorge Sampaio, the first Portuguese head of state to visit East Timor, arrived on February 12, 2000, six weeks after Jakarta and Lisbon had restored diplomatic relations. Even more significantly, on February 29, during a trip to Dili, Indonesia’s new president, Abdurrahman Wahid, apologized for his country’s legacy of repression, prompting Gusm˜ao to describe him as a symbol of “peace, justice and democracy.” A week earlier INTERFET, having suffered no combat deaths, completed its mission by handing over security responsibilities to UNTAET forces. In May 2000 the newly organized, pro-Jakarta People’s Party of Timor (Partido do Povo de Timor—PPT), led by Herminio da Silva da COSTA, sought recognition from the UNTAET in order to contest future elections. Da Costa had previously been affiliated with an anti-independence political umbrella, the Timor Warriors’ Association (Uni Timor Aswain—Unitas), that continued to reject the referendum results. Meeting with Gusm˜ao in mid-June, da Costa apologized for the previous year’s mayhem, offered his support should

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Gusm˜ao seek the presidency, and sought assurances that the thousands of prointegration refugees in West Timor would not be mistreated if they returned. The status of proindependence refugees continued to be of greater international concern, however, as the military remained unable or unwilling to completely disarm the militias. On September 6 an attack on the compound of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Atambua cost the lives of three aid workers and prompted the temporary withdrawal of UN personnel from West Timor. On July 12, 2000, the NCC approved formation of a transitional government comprising Jo˜ao ˜ CARRASCALAO, president of the UDT; Mar´ı ALKATIRI of Fretilin; Fr. Filomeno JACOB; Mariano LOPES, head of the Public Service Commission; and four UNTAET members. Ramos-Horta joined as foreign minister on October 19. A CNRT congress in Dili on August 21–30 refused to accept the resignations of Gusm˜ao and Ramos-Horta, who were instead reelected as president and vice president, respectively. Carrascal˜ao was also elected to a vice presidency. On October 23, 2000, Gusm˜ao was elected president of the 36-member UN-appointed interim legislature, the East Timor National Council (ETNC), but he resigned on March 28, 2001, because of dissatisfaction with the ETNC. His replacement, Ramos-Horta, was succeeded by Carrascal˜ao on April 9. At the end of January the UN Security Council had extended the UNTAET mandate through January 31, 2002, and by midyear it was generally acknowledged that the transition to full independence could not be achieved by the end of 2001. More than 110,000 refugees remained in West Timor, although it was unclear how many wished to return to East Timor. On August 30, 2001, East Timor democratically elected the 88 members of a Constituent Assembly, which was to supersede the ETNC and begin drafting a constitution. As expected, Fretilin dominated the election, winning 55 seats; the Democratic Party (Partido Democr´atico—PD) followed with 7 seats; the Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata—PSD), 6; and the Timorese Social Democratic Association (Associa¸ca˜ o Social-

Democrata Timorense—ASDT), 6. As a result, Fretilin’s secretary general, Mar´ı Alkatiri, who had spent many years in African exile, was named chief minister of an interim East Timor Council of Ministers that included Fretilin, the PD, and a number of independents. Meanwhile, a UNTAET-sponsored court in Dili continued investigating militia-related crimes. In October 2001 the Constituent Assembly called upon the UN to set May 20, 2002, as the date of independence. In January 2002 the assembly voted to convert itself into a National Parliament upon adoption of the constitution, which was achieved by vote of the Constituent Assembly on March 22. On April 14 Gusm˜ao, who had severed his ties to Fretilin after the 1999 referendum, was easily elected to the presidency as an independent, capturing 82 percent of the vote against the token opposition of the ASDT’s Francisco Xavier do AMARAL. Gusm˜ao was inaugurated for a fiveyear term on May 20 in conjunction with the formal establishment of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. On the same day Fretilin’s Alkatiri was sworn in as Timor-Leste’s first prime minister. Independence day also marked the end of the UNTAET mission, which was succeeded by a United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). The UN Security Council, in authorizing its formation on May 17, directed UNMISET to enhance political stability, to provide interim law enforcement while assisting the development of a domestic police service, and to help maintain external security. Although securing the border with West Timor was assumed by Timor-Leste in October 2003, continuing instability, at least some of it perpetrated by integrationists seeking to destabilize the government, resulted in decisions that extended the UNMISET mission into 2005. UNMISET was replaced in May 2005 by a scaled-down UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) with a one-year mandate. On April 28, 2006, demonstrations in the capital supporting soldiers who had been dismissed from the army turned violent, precipitating two months of sporadic gang violence as well as clashes between elements of the police and armed forces

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that left nearly 40 people dead. On May 24 the government requested assistance from Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Portugal, and peacekeeping contingents began arriving in Dili the following day, although it took two weeks for them to restore a semblance of order to the city and its environs. On June 26, 2006, Prime Minister Alkatiri resigned under pressure brought to bear by supporters of the dismissed soldiers, the parliamentary opposition, and President Gusm˜ao, who on June 22 had threatened his own resignation if Alkatiri did not step down. On July 8 Gusm˜ao named Jos´e RamosHorta prime minister, and a reshuffled cabinet was sworn in on July 14.

Constitution and Government The constitution drafted by the Constituent Assembly and approved in its final form on March 22, 2002, after a period of popular consultation, provides for freedom of speech and of the press, freedom of religion, the right of habeas corpus, and freedom of association (except that “armed, military or paramilitary associations, including organizations of a racist or xenophobic nature or that promote terrorism, shall be prohibited”). The chief executive, a popularly elected president serving a once-renewable five-year term, plays a largely ceremonial role. In the event no presidential candidate receives a majority on a first ballot, the constitution mandates a runoff between the top two contenders. Most executive power resides with the prime minister, who is appointed by the president but must command a parliamentary majority. The prime minister selects the members of the cabinet, who are then appointed by the president. The unicameral National Parliament currently has 88 members: 13 chosen to represent singlemember districts and the balance elected nationally under a party-based proportional system. Beginning with the next election, however, the number of representatives will be reduced to between 52 and 65 members, with the precise number and electoral procedures to be determined by law. The National Parliament, which has a five-year term, may be dis-

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solved prematurely and new elections held, but not within six months of the next scheduled election or within six months of the end of a presidential term. Among its powers, the legislature may amend the constitution on a two-thirds vote. The 2002 constitution also provides for a Council of State, an advisory body chaired by the president and encompassing all past presidents, the prime minister, the speaker of the National Parliament, five citizens selected by the legislature, and five designated by the president. The independent judiciary is headed by a Supreme Court of Justice with authority to rule on the constitutionality of statutes and referenda and to certify “the regularity and validity of the acts of the electoral process.” There is also a High Administrative, Tax, and Audit Court and provision for Military Courts. Administratively, Timor-Leste is presently divided into 13 districts. The constitution recognizes Oecussi as meriting a “special administrative policy and economic regime.”

Foreign Relations Timor-Leste became the 191st member of the United Nations on September 27, 2002. By the end of the year it was also a member of several UN Specialized Agencies, including the World Bank, the IMF, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, and the World Health Organization. In addition, Timor-Leste has stated its intention to seek admission to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), but probably not until near the end of the decade. It joined the regional security grouping, the ASEAN Regional Forum, in 2005. Even before independence, Timor-Leste attempted to facilitate close relations with its immediate neighbors, Indonesia and Australia. In a gesture of reconciliation, Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri attended the independence ceremonies in Dili in May 2002, prompting President Gusm˜ao to relegate decades of repression and violence under Indonesian rule to “history and the past.” In early July, during a visit to Jakarta by Gusm˜ao, Timor-Leste and Indonesia signed a joint communiqu´e establishing diplomatic relations. In

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April 2005, during a visit by Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the two countries signed a border demarcation agreement. The Australian delegation to the independence festivities was led by Prime Minister John Howard, who on May 20 joined Gusm˜ao in signing a Timor Sea Treaty that granted Timor-Leste 90 percent of revenue from the Bayu-Undan hydrocarbon field in a Joint Petroleum Development Area. The National Parliament ratified the treaty in December 2002, as did the Australian legislature in March 2003, but the neighbors remained at odds over delimitation of their maritime boundary and further development rights. Dili sought to revise an unratified 2003 agreement that would give it only 20 percent of the larger Greater Sunrise field that mostly lies outside the joint area, within what Australia considers its territory. Dili also wanted to redraw the maritime border with Australia at the halfway point, but the Howard government argued for retaining the border as delineated by a 1972 agreement with Indonesia. Border talks began in November 2003, broke down in October 2004 amid charges from Dili that Australia was employing delaying tactics, and resumed in March 2005. Two months later a tentative agreement was announced that would postpone determination of the boundary for 50 years but would give Timor-Leste 50 percent of Greater Sunrise revenues. In January 2006 the disputants signed an agreement to that effect, although opponents in Timor-Leste’s National Parliament had stated that they would fight ratification, in part because the agreement did not resolve the border issue. In late July 2006 Prime Minister Ramos-Horta stated that he intended to seek parliamentary approval of the agreement shortly and to make a “robust and convincing argument” in its defense.

Current Issues The origin of the breakdown in civil order that occurred in late April 2006 can be traced to early February, when some 400 soldiers of the Timorese army (For¸cas de Defesa de Timor Leste—FDTL), led by Lt. Gast˜ao SINHALA, left their barracks

to protest alleged discrimination. The disgruntled troops, westerners (Loromonu) whose numbers grew to about 600 later in the month, complained of favoritism toward the majority easterners (Lorosae), who had been more prominent and numerous in Falintil. Having refused to return to their barracks, they were relieved of duty on March 17 by Brig. Gen. Taur Matan Ruak, a former Falintil chief of staff. On April 24 the dismissed soldiers began a largely peaceful protest in Dili that was joined, over the next several days, by youthful civilians, many of whom were unemployed. Violence erupted on April 28, and at least five people were killed over the next several days. Rioting and panic quickly engulfed much of the city, where 100 buildings were reportedly burned, and spread to outlying communities, where gang and ethnic rivalries fueled the disorder. The FDTL rebels, who had been joined early in May by Maj. Alfredo REINADO and a contingent of military police, set up camps in the hills outside the capital. On May 24 Foreign Minister Ramos-Horta requested international aid, and the first of some 2,500 Australian, Malaysian, New Zealander, and Portuguese forces began arriving the next day as “Operation Astute.” On May 29, 2006, President Gusm˜ao convened the Council of State, which was also attended by UNOTIL representative Sukehiro Hasegawa and special UN envoy Ian Martin. The next day, Gusm˜ao declared a 30-day state of emergency and, as commander in chief, assumed control of the FDTL and the Timorese police (Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste—PNTL), superseding the authority of Minister of the Interior Rog´erio LOBATO (Fretilin) and Secretary of State for National Defense Roque F´elix RODRIGUES. Both cabinet members resigned on June 1, after which RamosHorta was assigned the defense portfolio in addition to his duties as foreign minister. On June 8 accusations surfaced that Alkatiri and Lobato had armed a score of civilian supporters and had directed them to eliminate Alkatiri’s opponents— accusations that both denied but that served to increase pressure for Alkatiri’s resignation. By then, the incidence and severity of the civil disturbances had declined.

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On June 22, 2006, President Gusm˜ao threatened that if Alkatiri did not step down, he himself would resign. The president and prime minister had long been at odds over government policy. Four days later, despite a show of support from Fretilin, the prime minister accepted “my own share of responsibility for the crisis” and resigned “so as to avoid the resignation of His Excellency the President.” As of early August, the death toll was 37. Some 155,000 Timorese had fled their homes during the disturbances. Meanwhile, there was growing recognition that UNMISET’s departure from the fledgling country in 2005 had been too hasty, leaving behind an incomplete institutional infrastructure and an inadequately prepared PNTL, which had collapsed during the disturbances. Many of the police, siding with the rebels, had battled the FDTL. On June 20, 2006, the UN Security Council extended the UNOTIL mission until August 20 “with a view to planning for the strengthening of the United Nations post-UNOTIL role,” which, Ian Martin stated, required a sustained, long-term commitment. With presidential and legislative elections scheduled for 2007, a key element of the mission would be an international police force. In late July Prime Minister Ramos-Horta requested an 800-man force for five years, although it seemed more likely that the UN Security Council would propose an initial mandate of two years. On August 4 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan recommended creation of a new assistance program that would include a “solidarity fund” of voluntary contributions, a community restoration program to help the victims of the 1999 violence, and a justice program to help investigate the 1999 crimes. Civilian and military figures who had been convicted of crimes against humanity by an Indonesian Ad Hoc Human Rights Court included former governor of East Timor Jos´e Abilio Soares, former Dili military commander Lt. Col. Soedjarwo, and former army commander Brig. Gen. Noer Moeis, but all three had won their appeals. As of August 2006 former militia leader Eurico Gutteres was the only individual incarcerated in Indonesia for human rights crimes committed in East Timor.

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In Dili, a UN-funded Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) had indicted nearly 400 individuals since 2000, but Indonesia refused to recognize the indictments, including one against former defense minister and presidential candidate Gen. Wiranto. Based on the SCU indictments, two Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC), also funded by the UN, had conducted 55 trials and handed down 84 convictions, but the process came to an end with the termination of UNMISET in May 2005. In November 2005 President Gusm˜ao delivered to the National Parliament the 2,500-page final report of the appointed Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation in East Timor (Comiss˜ao de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconcilia¸ca˜ o de Timor Leste—CAVR), which had begun work in 2002, but he recommended that its contents not be made public immediately. The report, covering April 1974– October 1999, put the death toll under Indonesian rule at 102,000 and attributed 85 percent of the human rights violations committed during the period to Indonesian security personnel, although the UDT and Fretilin were not held blameless. Among its recommendations, the CAVR called for a renewed mandate for the SPSC to prosecute those responsible, which led President Gusm˜ao to disparage the commissioners’ “grandiose optimism.” In August 2005 Indonesia and Timor-Leste had established a joint Commission on Truth and Friendship to resolve their historical differences, and at a February 2006 meeting both he and Indonesian President Yudhoyono, meeting with the cochairs of the bilateral commission, treaded lightly on the earlier human rights issues. “Problems end with justice, truth and reconciliation,” Gusm˜ao said, “‘but we will not sacrifice the two countries’ hopes and interests to build better relations in the future.”

Political Parties Timor-Leste’s oldest parties date from 1974, when the question of the Portuguese territory’s future status was becoming increasingly divisive. After the December 1975 Indonesian invasion, opposition to Indonesian annexation was led by the leftist Revolutionary Front for an Independent

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East Timor (Fretilin) and its military wing, Falintil. In April 1998 Fretilin agreed to join other parties in forming an umbrella National Council of Timorese Resistance (Conselho Nacional de Resistˆencia Timorense—CNRT). The end of the Suharto regime in 1998 was soon followed by the emergence of a number of new parties, many of which initially sought autonomy for East Timor within Indonesia. Sixteen parties registered candidate lists for the August 2001 election, at which 12 won at least one seat.

Leading Party Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Frente Revolucion´ario do Timor-Leste Independente—Fretilin). Founded in 1974 with a commitment to East Timorese independence from Portugal, the leftist Fretilin had emerged from the Timorese Social Democratic Association (ASDT, below). It mounted an insurrection in 1975 and then declared formation of a Democratic Republic of East Timor on November 28. In December, however, it was forced from the capital by Indonesian forces. Fretilin and its military wing, the Armed Forces of National Liberation of East Timor (For¸cas Armadas de Liberta¸ca˜ o Nacional de Timor-Leste— Falintil), led by Xanana Gusm˜ao, continued to resist Indonesian annexation for more than two decades. In November 1992 Gusm˜ao was captured by Indonesian forces, and in May 1993 he was sentenced to life in prison (subsequently reduced to 20 years and then, in 1999, house arrest). In the context of the UN intervention that followed the August 1999 independence referendum, Fretilin accepted a role in a UN-sponsored National Consultative Council (NCC). In July 2000 Fretilin’s secretary general, Mar´ı Alkatiri, joined a transitional government. Meanwhile, Gusm˜ao had resigned from Fretilin after the 1999 referendum. At the Constituent Assembly election of August 2001, Fretilin emerged with 57.3 percent of the popular vote and 55 of 88 seats, leading to Alkatiri’s selection as chief minister in the second interim

government and, ultimately, his assumption of the prime ministership at independence. The April–July 2006 crisis strengthened a dissident group that sought Alkatiri’s removal as party leader. In May his position was challenged at a party congress by Jos´e Lu´ıs Guterres, TimorLeste’s ambassador to the UN and the United States, who withdrew when Alkatiri engineered a change from secret ballot to a show of hands. On June 25 the Fretilin leadership backed his continuing as prime minister, but he stepped down the following day. Leaders: Mar´ı ALKATIRI (Former Prime Minister and General Secretary of the Party), Francisco (“Lu’Olo”) GUTERRES (Speaker of the National Parliament and President of the Party), Jos´e Lu´ıs GUTERRES (Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation).

Other Parliamentary Parties Democratic Party (Partido Democr´atico/ Partai Demokrat—PD). Organized in June 2001 in preparation for the August Constituent Assembly election, the centrist PD advocates participatory democracy, an independent judiciary, and a market economy with “selective intervention” by the government. Based on an 8.7 percent vote share at the balloting, it was awarded seven assembly seats. ´ Leaders: Fernando de ARAUJO (Leader of the Opposition), Ernesto Dudo FERNANDES (Vice President), Jo˜ao Soares MARTINS, Mariano SABINO (Secretary General). Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata—PSD). Founded in September 2000 as a centrist alternative to Fretilin and the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT, below), the PSD advocated consensus and formation of a national unity government. Its president had helped form the UDT in the 1970s. At the 2001 election it won 8.1 percent of the vote and six seats. ˜ Leaders: M´ario Viegas CARRASCALAO (President), Leandro ISAAC and Agio PEREIRA (Vice Presidents), Zacarias de COSTA (Secretary General).

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Timorese Social Democratic Association (Associa¸ca˜ o Social-Democrata Timorense— ASDT). The current ASDT was formed in 2001 by one of the earliest Fretilin leaders, Francisco Xavier do Amaral, as a “third way” Fretilin offshoot positioned between the parent party and more conservative elements. In 1974 Nicolau dos Reis LOBATO, Xavier do Amaral, Jos´e RamosHorta, and others had established the original ASDT, which was soon superseded by Fretilin. During Indonesian rule, Xavier do Amaral had resided in Jakarta, and he initially returned to East Timor as a proautonomy integrationist. He has also been associated with a more radical Fretilin offshoot, the CPD-RDTL (below). At the 2001 Constituent Assembly election the ASDT won 7.8 percent of the vote and six seats. Despite recognizing the inevitability of the outcome, Xavier do Amaral entered the April 2002 presidential contest as an alternative to Xanana Gusm˜ao. He took 17.3 percent of the vote. Leader: Francisco Xavier do AMARAL (President). Association of Timorese Heroes (Klibur Oan Timor Asuwain—KOTA). Also known as the Sons of the Mountain Warriors, the KOTA was established in 1974 by Le˜ao Pedro dos Reis AMARAL and the late Jos´e MARTINS. The KOTA descended from the Popular Association of Monarchists of Timor (Associa¸ca˜ o Popular Monarquia de Timor—APMT), which represented traditional royalty. In 1975 the KOTA joined the UDT and Apodeti (below) in actively opposing Fretilin’s efforts to establish a leftist government. Reemerging in the late 1990s, the KOTA backed independence, joined the CNRT, and participated in the 2001 Constituent Assembly election, at which it won 2.1 percent of the vote and two seats. Leader: Manuel TILMAN (President). Christian Democratic Party (Partido Democrata Crist˜ao/Partai Demokrasi Kristen—PDC/ PDK). Established in August 2000, the PDC was briefly allied with the UDC (below). Considered somewhat more left-leaning than the UDC, it attracted both Protestants and Catholics. At the 2001

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election it won 1.9 percent of the vote and two Constituent Assembly seats. Leaders: Ant´onio XIMENES (President), Arlindo MARC¸AL (Secretary General). Timorese Nationalist Party (Partido Nacionalista Timorense/Partai Nasionalis Timor— PNT). The PNT was established in 1999 as a proautonomy party. At one time a member of Fretilin, its leader had been expelled because of business links to Indonesia’s Suharto family. He had also lived in exile in Portugal. At the 2001 Constituent Assembly election the PNT won two seats on a 2.2 percent vote share. Leader: Ab´ılio ARAUJO. People’s Party of Timor (Partido do Povo de Timor—PPT). Founded in 2000 as a prointegration formation, the PPT descended from the People’s Movement of East Timor (Movimento do Povo de Timor Leste—MPTL). One of its founders, Herminio da Silva da Costa, was a former Apodeti leader who was subsequently closely tied to the pro-Jakarta militias; the prereferendum Forum for Democracy, Unity and Justice (Forum Demokrasi, Persatuan dan Keadilan—FDPK); and its successor, the umbrella Timor Warriors’ Association (Uni Timor Aswain—Unitas). Da Costa subsequently sought UNTAET recognition for the PPT in order to enter the electoral process, and in mid-June he met with Gusm˜ao and offered his support should Gusm˜ao seek the presidency. At the August 2001 election the PPT won 2 percent of the vote and two Constituent Assembly seats. Leaders: Jacob XAVIER (President), Herminio da Silva da COSTA, Francisco PINTO (Secretary General). Timorese Democratic Union (Uni˜ao Democr´atica Timorense—UDT). The conservative UDT was established in 1974 as a predominantly Catholic, anticommunist formation that was initially open to federation with Portugal. Having opted for independence, the UDT was briefly allied with Fretilin, but the two were on opposite sides of the civil war that saw Fretilin’s declaration

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of a republic in November 1975 and the subsequent invasion by erstwhile UDT ally Indonesia. The UDT operated primarily from exile in Portugal and Australia during the period of Indonesian rule, although it again allied itself with Fretilin in 1986. It was revived in 1997 and participated in the CNRT, the NCC, and the transitional government of October 2000 before competing in the August 2001 Constituent Assembly balloting. At the election it won 2.3 percent of the vote, for two seats. ˜ (PresLeaders: Jo˜ao Viegas CARRASCALAO ident), Francisco Ly Assis NICOLAU (Vice President), Domingos de OLIVEIRA (Secretary General). Christian Democratic Party of Timor (Partido Democrata-Crist˜ao de Timor—UDC/PDC). Initially identified as the Christian Democratic Union of Timor (Uni˜ao Democrata-Crist˜ao de Timor—UDC) and commonly referenced by a conjoint acronym, the UDC/PDC was founded in 1998 in Portugal as a largely Catholic party supportive of limited presidential powers and a market economy. It participated in the CNRT and went on to win one seat, on a 0.6 percent vote share, at the 2001 Constituent Assembly election. Leader: Vicente da Silva GUTERRES (President). Liberal Party (Partai Liberal—PL). A party on the right, the PL won one seat at the 2001 Constituent Assembly election, at which it took 1.1 percent of the vote. Leaders: Armando Jos´e Dourado da SILVA, Carlos de Almeida SARMENTO. Socialist Party of Timor (Partido Socialista de Timor—PST). With Marxist-Leninist leanings, the PST, a Fretilin splinter, has a small base of support among students and labor. In August 2001 it won one legislative seat on a 1.7 percent vote share. Leaders: Avelino da SILVA, Pedro M´atires da COSTA.

Other Parties Maubere Democratic Party (Partido Democr´atico Maubere/Partai Demokratik Maubere— PDM). Formed in October 2000, the PDM failed

to win any seats at the 2001 Constituent Assembly election. (Its name incorporates a Tetum word, Maubere, that refers to rural East Timorese.) Leader: Paulo Sarmento PINTO. National Republic Party of East Timor (Partido Republika Nacional Timor Leste—Parentil). Organized in early 2001, the conservative Parentil supported Francisco Xavier do Amaral in the 2002 presidential contest. It had failed to win representation at the 2001 Constituent Assembly election. Leader: Flaviano Pereira LOPEZ. Popular Council for Defense of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (Conselho Popular pela Defesa da Rep´ublica Democr´atica de Timor-Leste—CPD-RDTL). Established in 1999 but currently banned, the Popular Council considers itself an umbrella grouping rather than a political party as such. It rejected the legitimacy of the CNRT, the UNTAET, and the Constituent Assembly. Instead, it argued that an independent East Timor should be based on the republic that Fretilin had declared in November 1975. It has attracted some of the more militant elements of Falintil and has more recently been accused of efforts to destabilize the government. Leader: Ant´onio Aitahan MATAK. Pro Referendum Popular Democratic Association of Timor (Associa¸ca˜ o Popular Democr´atica Pro Referendo—Apodeti Pro Referendo). Established in 1974, the anticommunist Apodeti opposed Fretilin during 1975. It later adopted a proautonomy posture toward Indonesia but ultimately supported independence. In 2000 it added “Pro Referendum” to its name. Having participated in the CNRT, it ran unsuccessfully at the 2001 assembly election. Leaders: Frederico Almeida Santos da COSTA (President), Laurentino Domingos Lu´ıs de ˜ (Vice President), Jo˜ao Baptista Dos GUSMAO SANTOS (Secretary General). Timorese Labor Party (Partido Trabalhista Timorense—PTT). Dating from 1974, the PTT initially advocated gradual independence from Portugal. In the late 1990s it rejected autonomy in favor

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Cabinet As of August 1, 2006 Prime Minister First Deputy Prime Minister Second Deputy Prime Minister

Jos´e Ramos-Horta (ind.) Estanislau Alexio da Silva (Fretilin) Rui Maria de Ara´ujo (ind.)

Ministers Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry Defense Development Education and Culture Health Interior Justice Natural Resources, Minerals, and Energy Planning and Finance Presidency of the Council of Ministers Public Works State and Internal Administration Transport and Communications Work and Solidarity

Estanislau Alexio da Silva (Fretilin) Jos´e Ramos-Horta (ind.) Arcanjo da Silva (ind.) Ros´alio Corte-Real (ind.) Rui Maria de Ara´ujo (ind.) Alcino Baris (ind.) Domingos Maria Sarmento (ind.) Jos´e Texeira (ind.) Maria Madalena Brites Boavida (Fretilin) [f] Antoninho Bianco (Fretilin) Odete Victor (ind.) [f] Ana Maria Pessˆoa Pereira da Silva Pinto (Fretilin) [f] In´acio Freitas Moreira (ind.) Ars´enio Paix˜ao Bano (ind.)

[f] = female

of independence from Indonesia. It failed to win any seats at the 2001 election. Leader: Paulo Freitas da SILVA GUTERRES.

Legislature An 88-member Constituent Assembly (Assembleia Constituinte) was elected on August 30, 2001, superseding a 36-member interim body, the East Timor National Council, which had been appointed by UN administrators in October 2000. Under a transitional provision of the 2002 constitution, the assembly was reconstituted as a National Parliament (Parlamento Nacional). For the next election, due by May 2007, the National Parliament will be reduced to between 52 and 65 members (elected for five-year terms), with constituencies, eligibility, and electoral procedures to be defined by law. At the 2001 election (for 13 district seats and 75 proportional seats) the Revolutionary Front for

an Independent East Timor won 55 seats (12 district, 43 proportional); the Democratic Party of East Timor, 7; the Social Democratic Party, 6; the Timorese Social Democratic Association, 6; the Timorese Democratic Union, 2; the Timorese Nationalist Party, 2; the Christian Democratic Party, 2; the Association of Timorese Heroes, 2; the People’s Party of Timor, 2; the Christian Democratic Party of Timor, the Liberal Party, and the Socialist Party of Timor, 1 each; independent, 1 district seat. Speaker: Francisco GUTERRES.

Communications Freedom of the press and of other media is guaranteed by the Timorese constitution, which requires the state to ensure the independence of the public mass media from “political and economic powers.” Public broadcasting services are to be impartial and guarantee “opportunities for the expression of different lines of opinion.”

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Press The facilities of East Timor’s principal newspaper, Suara Timor Timur (Voice of East Timor), were destroyed in 1999. The daily Timor Post, published in Portuguese, Tetum, Bahasa Indonesia, and English, was established in 2000. Tais Timor, originally published under UN auspices, served as a free national news bulletin prior to independence. It now appears as a fortnightly.

facilities then being transferred to the government at independence. In addition to Radio Nacional de Timor-Leste and Televis˜ao de Timor-Leste, there are several private radio stations.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. and Permanent Representative to the UN Jos´e Lu´ıs GUTERRES

Broadcasting

U.S. Ambassador to Timor-Leste Grover Joseph REES III

Beginning in 2000 the UNTAET provided radio and television services in the capital, with the

IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, CPLP, Interpol, NAM, WCO

TONGA KINGDOM

OF

TO N G A

Fakatu’i ’o Tonga

Note: King Taufa’ahau Tupou IV of Tonga died at age 88 on September 10, 2006, in a hospital in Auckland, New Zealand, where he had been under treatment for an unspecified illness since April 2006. His son, Crown Prince Tupouto’a, was immediately sworn in to succeed him. The new king was unlikely to be crowned, however, until after at least a year of national mourning.

The Country Located south of Samoa in the Pacific Ocean, Tonga (also known as the Friendly Islands) embraces some 200 islands that run north and south in two almost parallel chains. Only 45 of the islands are inhabited, the largest being Tongatapu, which is the seat of the capital and the residence of almost two-thirds of the country’s population. Tongans (mainly Polynesian with a Melanesian mixture) constitute 98 percent of the whole, while Europeans and other Pacific islanders make up the remainder. The majority of the population is Christian, approximately 60 percent belonging to the Free Wesleyan Church of Tonga. The official female labor force participation rate is less than 14 percent, due in part to child-rearing demands in a society with an average of five children per family; female representation in government is virtually nonexistent, although a woman won a commoner seat in the National Assembly at a by-election in May 2006.

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Primarily an agricultural country, Tonga produces coconuts and copra, bananas, vanilla, yams, taro, sweet potatoes, and tropical fruits. Pigs and poultry are raised, while beef cattle (traditionally bred by Europeans) are beginning to assume importance, thus reducing dependence on beef imports. In the early 1990s several thousand metric tons of squash pumpkins (Tonga’s leading export) were shipped annually to Japan, although declining production because of drought, disease, and lower market prices led to a market collapse late in the decade. Government-sponsored diversification efforts have focused on fishing and cultivation of specialty crops, including kava and mozuku (a type of edible seaweed). With the exception of some coconut-processing plants, no significant industries exist, although exploration for oil has recently been under way. GDP growth averaged only 1–2 percent between 1994 and the first half of 1998 but was estimated at 3.5 percent in fiscal year 1998– 1999 and 5.5 percent in 1999–2000. In the latter period Tonga benefited from increased foreign remittances and a surge in trade and services related to millennial celebrations. Thereafter, growth (termed “lackluster” by the International Monetary Fund [IMF]) receded to an average of 1.6 percent for 2002–2004, although rising to 2.5 percent in 2004–2005. Through the same period, inflation remained relatively constant, averaging slightly more than 11 percent. In 2000 Tonga was identified by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as among a number of Pacific jurisdictions with “harmful” tax policies permitting noncitizens to evade overseas taxes. Following passage of corrective legislation, Tonga was removed from the OECD blacklist in August 2001.

Government and Politics Political Background Christianized by European missionaries in the early 19th century, Tonga became a unified kingdom in 1845. British protection began in 1900 with the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and alliance whereby a British consul assumed control

of the islands’ financial and foreign affairs. New treaties with the United Kingdom in 1958 and 1968 gave Tonga full internal self-government in addition to limited control over its external relations, with full independence within the Commonwealth occurring on June 4, 1970. The present monarch, TAUFA’AHAU TUPOU IV, has governed since late 1965, when he succeeded his mother, Queen SALOTE TUPOU, whose reign had begun in 1918. In June 1989 the commoner (popularly elected) legislators for the first time forced rejection of a proposed government budget. Eight months later the country mounted its most intensely contested legislative election, with 55 candidates vying for the nine commoners’ seats and 23 for the nine nobles’ seats. While not organized as formal parties, two major groupings emerged: a prodemocracy movement headed by ’Akilisi POHIVA that criticized the islands’ maldistribution of wealth and called for more responsible and efficient government, and a conservative group primarily concerned with economic development and the creation of new employment opportunities. Pohiva had been discharged from an education ministry post in 1985 after asserting in a radio broadcast that assemblymen had voted themselves 400 percent pay increases. Prior to the 1987 election (at which he successfully contested an assembly seat), Pohiva launched a hard-hitting opposition newsletter, Ko’e Kele’a, and instituted a suit for reinstatement to his former position. While the basic issue had become academic because of his assembly status, the Tongan Supreme Court handed down an unprecedented decision in mid-1988 awarding damages plus costs for unfair dismissal and a denial of free speech. At the February 1990 poll, Pohiva’s formation captured a majority of the commoner seats but remained a minority overall as the conservatives strengthened their control of the seats reserved for election by the nobles. Subsequently, the political ferment intensified, with the king of the predominantly Protestant country accusing both Pohiva and Tonga’s Roman Catholic bishop of communist sympathies. On August 21, 1991, the king’s younger brother, Prince Fatafehi TU’IPELEHAKE, stepped down

TONGA

Political Status: Constitutional monarchy; independent within the Commonwealth since June 4, 1970. Area: 289 sq. mi. (748 sq. km.). Population: 97,784 (1996C); 102,500 (2005E). Major Urban Center (2005E): NUKU’ALOFA (39,300). Official Languages: Tongan, English. Monetary Unit: Pa’anga (official rate July 1, 2006: 2.06 pa’anga = $1US). Head of State: (See headnote.) King TAUFA’AHAU TUPOU IV; succeeded to the throne December 16, 1965, on the death of his mother, Queen SALOTE TUPOU; crowned July 4, 1967. Heir to the Throne: Crown Prince TUPOUTO’A. Prime Minister: Feleti (Fred) SEVELE; appointed by the king on March 31, 2006, following acting appointment to succeed Prince ‘ULUKALALA Lavaka Ata, who had resigned on February 11.

after 26 years as prime minister, Deputy Prime Minister Baron VAEA being named his successor. In November 1992 the prodemocracy movement organized a four-day public conference to indicate how the constitution could be amended to provide for greater popular participation in the political process. The government declined to participate in the conference, prevented foreign invitees from entering the country to attend its sessions, and refused to broadcast news of the event on the ground that it was not officially sponsored. Nonetheless, the movement appeared to be growing, as evidenced by its capture of six of nine popularly elected seats at the legislative balloting of February 4, 1993, and the formation of the Tonga Democratic Party (TDP, under Human Rights and Democracy Movement [HRDM], below) in August 1994. Prodemocracy candidates retained a majority of commoner seats at the subsequent poll of January 25, 1996. In September 1996 ’Akilisi Pohiva and two Times of Tonga editors were jailed for contempt by the assembly following publication of a story that Pohiva intended to introduce a motion of impeachment against Justice Minister Tevita TUPOU

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for unauthorized attendance at the Atlanta Olympic games. The 30-day sentences yielded widespread protests by international media, and after 26 days the men were freed by the Supreme Court on procedural grounds. Although Pohiva and the HRDM expected to increase the representation of prodemocracy advocates in the March 11, 1999, commoner balloting, only five were elected. Crown Prince TUPOUTO’A was thought to have been the leading candidate to succeed Prime Minister Vaea upon the latter’s retirement in early 2000, but he was passed over in favor of the king’s youngest son, Prince ‘ULUKALALA Lavaka Ata. The January 3, 2000, appointment was followed by a cabinet expansion and reorganization on January 25, 2001. In late September 2001 Justice Minister Tupou and Education Minister T¨utoatasi FAKAFANUA were forced to resign after being linked to the loss of millions in investments from the Tonga Trust Fund, into which income from the questionable sale of Tongan passports in 1983– 1991 had been deposited. At the legislative election of March 7, 2002, the HRDM won seven of the nine popularly elected seats despite a controversy involving its recent publication in the Times of Tonga of a letter, possibly forged, that accused the king of holding $350 million in secret offshore accounts. On February 25 police had raided the HRDM offices and briefly detained ’Akilisi Pohiva, who was among several politicians and journalists later charged with sedition and dealing in a forged document. Pohiva and two others were acquitted of the charges on May 19, 2003. At the election of March 16–17, 2005, eight of the nine commoners were HRDM members; in an unprecedented move following the poll, King Taufa’ahau named two commoners to an expanded 16-member cabinet, one of whom, Feleti (Fred) SEVELE, became the first commoner to serve as prime minister.

Constitution and Government Tonga is a hereditary constitutional monarchy whose constitution dates back to 1875. The executive branch is headed by the Privy Council,

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which includes the king and a cabinet that encompasses a prime minister, a deputy prime minister, other ministers, and the governors of Ha’apai and Vava’u. Meeting at least once a year, the unicameral Legislative Assembly includes an equal number of elected hereditary nobles’ and people’s representatives, plus the cabinet members sitting ex officio; when the body is not in session, the Privy Council is empowered to enact legislation, which must, however, be approved by the assembly at its next meeting. The judicial system is composed of a Supreme Court, magistrates’ courts, and a Land Court. Ultimate judicial appeal is to the king, who appoints all judges. Tonga is administratively divided into several groups of islands, the most important of which are the Tongatapu group, the Ha’apai group, and the Vava’u group.

Foreign Relations In 1900 Tonga and the United Kingdom signed a Treaty of Friendship and Protection, which provided for British control over financial and external affairs. Tonga became a member of the Commonwealth upon independence and is affiliated with the European Union under the Cotonou Agreement. It became the 188th member of the United Nations in September 1999; earlier it had joined a number of UN-related organizations, including the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Health Organization (WHO), and United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). It was admitted to the IMF in September 1985. Regionally, it belongs to the Pacific Islands Forum and the Pacific Community. Relations with the United States were initially formalized in an 1888 treaty, which was largely revoked by Tongan authorities in 1920. A successor Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation was concluded during ceremonies marking the king’s 70th birthday in July 1988. The most important component of the new accord was a provision guaranteeing transit of U.S. military vessels—including nuclear-armed craft—in the Tongan archipelago. The action was seen as underscoring a “tilt toward Washington” by a government that had failed to

join a majority of its neighbors in ratifying the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga). Earlier, in October 1986, Tonga had served as the venue for the completion of negotiations that, after 25 months, yielded agreement on a tuna treaty between the United States and members of the South Pacific Forum (subsequently Pacific Islands Forum) Fisheries Agency. The local economy was reported to have benefited substantially from the nine-day discussions, which, for approximately $60 million, permitted access by the U.S. tuna fleet to nearly 8 million square miles of prime fishing grounds over a five-year period. Tonga became the final signatory to the pact in June 1989. In late 1998 Taiwan said it was breaking relations with Tonga after the kingdom had switched allegiance to the People’s Republic of China, which had promised to extend both trade and aid. The action came less than five months after Tonga and Taiwan had agreed to strengthen their cooperation in a number of areas. In February 2002 relations with New Zealand suffered a setback after Foreign Minister Phil Goff was quoted as saying that he saw scant evidence that Tonga was actively attempting to end endemic corruption.

Current Issues In recent years differences within the royal family have led to speculation over the ultimate successor to King Taufa’ahau, who celebrated his 88th birthday in July 2006. (See headnote.) Although the eldest of the king’s three sons, Tupouto’a, remains the crown prince, he apparently refused to accept appointment as prime minister in early 2000 because the king opposed changing the constitution to permit the prime minister to replace cabinet ministers, all of whom are currently appointed by the king for life or until they retire. According to some reports, the crown prince also wanted to remain actively involved in his business affairs while heading the cabinet. As a result, the king turned to his youngest son, Prince ’Ulukalala, who had replaced Tupouto’a as foreign and defense minister in 1998.

TONGA

A major issue for the last decade has been a media struggle between the government and the opposition Times of Tonga (Taimi ‘o Tonga). Following the deportation of its publisher, who had accused the government of corruption, the paper was issued from New Zealand. In April 2003 the Supreme Court overturned a ban on the publication, and it resumed sale in Tonga. A month later the Legislative Assembly approved a Media Operator’s Act, which outlawed foreign media ownership; subsequently, government control was tightened by constitutional amendment. However, on October 8, 2004, the Supreme Court declared both the 2003 Act and the constitutional limitation invalid; as a result, the paper again resumed circulation within the country. In April 2004 the debt-ridden Royal Tonga Airlines (RTA) suspended international service when its Boeing 747 was repossessed by Royal Brunei Airlines. In May the RTA’s domestic service also ended, provoking a controversy involving former police minister Clive EDWARDS, who was dismissed in August because of his objections to monopolistic control of the facility. Edwards, who had long championed the royal family against the ProDemocracy Movement and had supported the 2003 Media Act, abruptly joined the opposition, but he failed to secure a legislative seat in the commoner poll of March 17, 2005. In July 2005 a strike by public service workers generated widespread social difficulties. The work stoppage (the first in Tongan history) was provoked by salary differences between government officials and lower paid workers, with the Public Service Association (PSA) demanding increases of up to 80 percent. Resolution of the issue on September 5, when the government agreed to most of the PSA’s demands, was followed on the next day by a protest march calling for democratic reform of the constitution, and on October 18 the king announced that he would appoint a parliamentary commission to look into the matter. While no recommendation had been forthcoming as of mid-2006, it was perhaps significant that the new prime minister, appointed on March 31, was, for the first time, a commoner.

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Political Parties Traditionally there were no political parties in Tonga, the initial equivalent of such a formation, the HDRM (below), being an outgrowth of the Pro-Democracy Movement that sponsored the conference on democracy in November 1992. At the March 2002 legislative election a royalist Kotoa Movement, launched in 2001, also offered a number of candidates. Human Rights and Democracy Movement (HRDM). The HRDM was formerly known as the People’s Party (PP), which had initially been launched in August 1994 as the Tonga Democratic Party (TDP) by opposition MP ’Akilisi Pohiva. Five of the Legislative Assembly’s nine commoner members were reported to have joined the group, which, while predicting a democratic Tonga by the end of the century, had pledged to retain the king as a figurehead. In January 1995 the PP claimed royal backing for the introduction of a Westminster-style system of government. Supporters of the HRDM captured five of the nine commoner seats in the March 1999 balloting, disappointing prodemocracy activists, who had hoped to capture at least seven (and possibly all nine) and thereby generate momentum for its petition to the king to make all assembly seats subject to election by universal suffrage. Following the election, Pohiva argued that some voters had been swayed by progovernment television broadcasts and by misinformation concerning plans for land distribution in a “fully democratic” Tonga. In August 2001 the government turned down the HRDM’s application for registration as an incorporated society. At the March 2002 legislative election the HRDM won seven seats. Subsequently, Pohiva was one of several persons charged with publication of a letter that accused the king of secreting some $350 million in offshore bank accounts; however, verdicts of acquittal were issued in May 2003. Leader: ’Akilisi POHIVA (General Secretary). People’s Democratic Party (PDP). The PDP was launched on April 15, 2005, by a group of

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Cabinet As of August 1, 2006 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister

Feleti (Fred) Sevele Dr. Viliami Tau Tangi

Ministers Agriculture, Food, Fisheries, and Forestry Civil Aviation, Marine Affairs, and Ports Communications Defense (Acting) Disaster Relief Activities Education and Culture Environment Finance and Statistics Foreign Affairs (Acting) Health Justice and Attorney General Labor, Commerce, and Industries Lands, Survey, and Natural Resources Police, Prisons, and Fire Services Public Works Tourism Training and Employment Women’s Affairs Youth and Sports Governor of Ha’apai Governor of Vava’u (Acting)

Sione Peauafi Haukinima Paul Karalus Feleti (Fred) Sevele Sonatane Tu’a Taumoepeau Tupou Feleti (Fred) Sevele Dr. Tevita Hala Palefau Tuita Siosiua Tu’italukua Tupou ’Utoikamanu Sonatane Tu’a Taumoepeau Tupou Dr. Viliami Tau Tangi Malia Viviena ’Alisi Numia Afeaki Taumoepeau [f] Feleti (Fred) Sevele Tuita Siaosi Taimani ’Aho Nuku Fineasi Funaki Tu’ivakano Dr. Tevita Hala Palefau Tu’ivakano Malupo Sonotane Tu’a Taumdepeau Tupou

[f] = female

HRDM defectors with the announced goal of pursuing reform more aggressively than the parent group. On July 13 it became Tonga’s first officially registered party. Leaders: Teisina FUKO, Clive EDWARDS (Former Minister of Police), Semisi TAPUELUELU (Secretary).

sal suffrage, and the Privy Council, encompassing the king and his ministers. At the most recent commoner election of March 17, 2005, 8 of the available seats were won by members of the prodemocracy Human Rights and Democracy Movement. Election of the legislature’s 9 nobles had taken place a day earlier. Speaker: TU’IHA’ANGANA.

Legislature

Communications

The unicameral Legislative Assembly (Fale Alea) currently consists, apart from the speaker, of 9 nobles selected by the 33 hereditary nobles of Tonga, 9 people’s representatives elected by univer-

Press Tongan authorities have recently evidenced scant regard for freedom of the press. In March

TONGA

1995 the editor of the independent Times of Tonga was deported for publishing material deemed to have offended the minister of police, while two of his colleagues were incarcerated for legislative contempt in 1996. In 2002 Times journalists were also charged with sedition and publishing a forged document that accused the king of holding millions of dollars in secret bank accounts. Thereafter, a lengthy contest ensued between the government and the paper that extended to 2004 (see Current issues, above). The following are published in Nuku’alofa: Koe Taimi ‘o Tonga/The Times of Tonga, weekly, in Tongan and English (8,000); Kalonikali Tonga/Tonga Chronicle, government weekly in Tongan (6,000) and English (1,200); Ko’e Kele’a/Conch Shell (3,500), dissident news sheet, issued weekly in Tongan and English; Matangi Tonga, bimonthly (2,000); and Tonga Today, monthly. In 1990 Tonga Nquae, a right-wing counterpart to Kele’a, was launched in opposition to “any move to change the present structure of our government,” while religious papers are issued monthly by the Catholic and Protestant communities. A daily, Talanga/Speak

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Out, is published in Auckland, New Zealand; aimed in part at some 25,000 expatriates, it also circulates in Tonga.

Broadcasting and Computing Radio broadcasting is the responsibility of the Tonga Broadcasting Commission (Komisioni Fakamafolalea Tonga—KFT), which transmits commercial programming in Tongan, English, Fijian, and Samoan. There is a private television outlet that for about nine hours a day services some 2,100 sets. There were some 2,000 personal computers serving 3,000 Internet users in 2003.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. and Permanent Representative to the UN Fekitamoeloa ’UTOIKAMANU U.S. Ambassador to Tonga Larry Miles DINGER (resident in Fiji) IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, CWTH, Interpol, PC, PIF, WTO

T U R K M E N I S TA N REPUBLIC

OF

TU R K M E N I S T A N

Tiurkmenostan Respublikasy

See the note at the end of this entry for information on current events.

The Country The southernmost republic of the former Soviet Union, Turkmenistan is bordered on the northwest by Kazakhstan, on the north and northeast by Uzbekistan, on the southeast by Afghanistan, on the south by Iran, and on the west by the Caspian Sea. The Kara Kum (Garagum) Desert occupies about 80 percent of the land area. Ethnic Turkmens, who are predominantly Sunni Muslims, account for approximately 77 percent of the population, followed by Uzbeks (9 percent), Russians (7 percent), and Kazakhs (2 percent). Women constitute about 46 percent of the labor force. Agriculture employs some 45–50 percent of workers and has recently contributed about 25 percent of GDP, even though only about 4 percent of the country is currently arable. A principal component of the country’s irrigation network is a 500-mile canal that carries water from the AmuDarya (Oxus) River, a major tributary of the Aral Sea. (The diversion has contributed to an ecological catastrophe that some have compared to the Chernobyl nuclear disaster.) Turkmenistan normally ranks second only to Uzbekistan in regional cotton production, and although output of the crop has fallen to less than half of its tonnage in the Soviet era, processed cotton fiber typically accounted for 15–20 percent of export earnings until the late 1990s, when its relative importance diminished because of surging hydrocarbon sales. The chief crop for domestic consumption is wheat; high-quality Persian lambs are among the country’s important livestock.

Industry, which contributed about 45 percent of GDP in 2001 and employs about one-fifth of the labor force, is dominated by hydrocarbons. Some estimates rank Turkmenistan’s proven and potential natural gas reserves as the world’s fourth largest. Natural gas normally accounts for 60–70 percent of export earnings, with oil products adding another 7–10 percent. However, gas exports declined severely in 1994–1997 because of regional disputes, chiefly with Russia (see Foreign relations section). The impact on Turkmenistan’s economy

T U R K M E N I S TA N

Political Status: Turkmenian districts of former Bukhara and Khorezm republics added to autonomous Turkistan Soviet Socialist Republic within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic on October 27, 1924; became constituent republic of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) on May 12, 1925; declared independence as Republic of Turkmenistan on October 27, 1991; present constitution adopted May 18, 1992. Area: 188,456 sq. mi. (488,100 sq. km.). Population: 4,483,251 (1995C); 5,016,000 (2005E). Major Urban Center (2005E): AS¸GABAT (ASHKHABAD, 559,000). Official Language: Turkmen. Monetary Unit: Manat (official rate July 1, 2006: 5,200 manats = $1US). President and Prime Minister: Gen. Saparmurad Atayevich NIYAZOV (Saparmyrat NYYAZOW; Democratic Party of Turkmenistan); elected to redefined post of chair of the Supreme Soviet on January 19, 1990; unopposed in popular election to the new post of president on October 27, 1990; reelected as sole candidate for a five-year term on June 21, 1992; tenure extended for an additional five years by referendum of January 15, 1994, that exempted the incumbent from running again in 1997; granted “an exclusive right to be a lifetime president” by a constitutional amendment passed by the Assembly on December 28, 1999.

was dramatic. According to the World Bank, real GDP declined 30 percent in 1993–1995, 3 percent in 1996, and another 26 percent in 1997, when overall export earnings dropped by 55 percent. During the same period, Turkmenistan experienced rampant inflation, which peaked at 1,800 percent in 1994 before declining to roughly 25 percent in 1997. The government has reported GDP growth in excess of 10 percent each year since 1999, including 17 percent in both 2003 and 2004. Most analysts regard the figures as inflated. The World Bank es-

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timated gross national income per capita at $1,120 in 2003. Nearly half the population lives in poverty, although this is mitigated by access to free housing and utilities plus high subsidies for key foods. Despite international pressure, Turkmenistan has approached market reforms reluctantly.

Government and Politics Political Background Historic Turkestan occupied a vast area extending from the Caspian Sea in the west to the border of China in the east, and from the Aral Sea watershed in the north to Persia (Iran) and Afghanistan in the south. In 1924 what had been an autonomous republic of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic was split into (western) Turkmen and (eastern) Uzbek components, both of which became constituent republics of the USSR in 1925. Following republican elections on January 7, 1990, Saparmurad NIYAZOV, the first secretary of the Turkmen Communist Party (TCP), was named chair of the Supreme Soviet (head of state). On August 23 the Supreme Soviet issued a declaration of Turkmenistan’s “independent statehood,” on the basis of which the adjectives “Soviet” and “Socialist” were dropped from the republic’s official name and the Turkmen constitution and laws were assigned precedence over those of the Soviet Union. In a somewhat unusual move, the declaration identified Turkmenistan as a nuclear and chemical weapons-free zone. On October 27 Niyazov was unopposed in direct election to the new post of executive president. In April 1991 Turkmenistan overwhelmingly endorsed USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev’s abortive union treaty. Four months later, with democratic activists reportedly being arrested for charging that Niyazov had supported the failed hard-liners’ coup in Moscow, the president broke with the leaders of most fellow republics by not dismantling the Communist Party. Nevertheless, a referendum on independence was conducted on October 26 that yielded a 93.5 percent affirmative vote, and an implementing declaration was issued

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by the Supreme Soviet the following day. On December 16 the TCP was formally dissolved and immediately succeeded by the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (DPT), which abandoned the Marxist-Leninist precepts of its predecessor while maintaining an absolute grip on power. On December 21 Turkmenistan joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The Supreme Soviet approved a new constitution on May 18, 1992, and on June 26 Niyazov was reinvested as president after an election five days earlier in which he was again the sole candidate. On January 15, 1994, a reported 99.5 percent of voters favored exempting the president from having to stand for an additional term, while at elections to the lower house of the new legislature, held on December 11, only 1 of 50 seats was contested, with most of the returned candidates being DPT nominees. The first evidence of popular unrest came in July 1995 when demonstrators in Ashgabat called for new presidential elections and an end to economic hardship and shortages. Authorities swiftly removed the demonstrators, and a number of political opponents subsequently were detained in prisons or psychiatric facilities. In 1996 Turkmenistan drew criticism from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other international groups for being the least politically “reconstructed” of the former Soviet republics, with no opposition parties being officially registered and dissenting political expression being effectively outlawed. In mid-April 1998, at the urging of a visiting OSCE delegation, President Niyazov released several detainees incarcerated in connection with the July 1995 antigovernment demonstration. They included Durdymurat KHOJAMUKHAMMED, a leader of the opposition Democratic Progress Party (DPP), who had been held in a psychiatric hospital since 1996. Within days, however, exiled opposition leader and former foreign minister Avde KULIEV, having returned from Moscow, was placed under house arrest on charges that included extortion and trying to organize a coup in 1995. Kuliev was released on April 20, and he returned to Moscow on April 22. On the very same day,

President Niyazov, fielding questions at the start of an official visit to the United States, denied that Turkmenistan held any political prisoners. In December 1999 the OSCE refused to monitor the Assembly election, noting that “the legislative framework is inadequate for even a minimally democratic election.” Virtually all of the 100-plus candidates were DPT nominees who had been approved by Niyazov. On December 28, as proposed by the People’s Council, the newly convened Assembly amended the constitution to permit Niyazov the option of a lifetime tenure as president. In early November 2001 it was reported that the government had issued an arrest warrant for Boris SHIKHMURADOV, a former Western-oriented foreign minister who had most recently served as ambassador to China and was then in Russia. In addition to denying allegations that he had appropriated $25 million in state property, chiefly aircraft and armaments, and then sold them, Shikhmuradov responded by announcing that he was forming an opposition group, subsequently identified as the People’s Democratic Movement of Turkmenistan (PDMT), to help depose Niyazov. Subsequent rumors of a pending coup were given credence by a major shake-up of the defense and security establishment that began in March 2002 and continued into May. Those dismissed from the government included the ministers of defense and interior and the head of the National Security Committee. On November 25, 2002, gunmen fired on a presidential motorcade. Niyazov, who was uninjured, immediately attributed the attack to a number of former government officials who had aligned with Shikhmuradov, including former deputy prime minister Khudayberdy ORAZOV and the recently resigned ambassador to Turkey, Nurmuhammet HANAMOW (Nurmukhammed KHANAMOV), who subsequently emerged as a leader of the exiled opposition. A month later Shikhmuradov, who had secretly returned to Turkmenistan, announced on an opposition website that he intended to surrender to authorities in an effort to prevent further persecution of government opponents. By then, over 100 individuals had reportedly been taken into custody. Within days, Shikhmuradov was arrested, tried, convicted, and sentenced to life in prison. (In a

T U R K M E N I S TA N

taped confession Shikhmuradov admitted stealing state property, hiring mercenaries to assassinate the president, orchestrating a coup, using illegal drugs, and various other offenses. Professing rediscovered admiration for Niyazov, Shikhmuradov praised the president as a “gift from on high to the people of Turkmenistan.”). By February 2003 more than 50 individuals had been convicted of involvement in the November plot. The Assembly election of December 19, 2004, with runoff balloting on January 9, 2005, was once again conducted without international monitoring. All candidates were members of the DPT.

Constitution and Government Under the 1992 constitution Turkmenistan is led by a popularly elected strong president (head of both state and government) who has the power to issue laws, save those amending the constitution or revising the criminal code. He is also empowered to appoint judges and local government administrators, who have less authority than under the former system of soviets. Up until 2003, the country’s “highest” representative body, the People’s Council (Khalk Maslakhaty), typically met once a year with a mandate that included consideration of basic economic, social, and political policy; constitutional changes; ratification of intergovernmental treaties; and declarations of war and peace. The smaller Assembly (Mejlis) was chiefly responsible for enacting ordinary legislation. At the initiative of the president, in August 2003 the People’s Council was restructured as a “fourth branch” of government, a “permanently functioning supreme representative body of popular government having the powers of supreme state authority and government.” The body’s membership was expanded to 2,507, encompassing executive, judicial, and legislative members as well as representatives of regional, local, civic, labor, party, and other groups. The 1992 basic law barred the hiring of nonTurkmenians in state enterprises and dropped Russian as an official language. It also guaranteed the right of private property, despite a presidential de-

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cree of May 1992 to the contrary, and fundamental human rights, including freedom of religion. The country is divided into five administrative regions, or velayaty (Akhal, Balkan, Dashkhovuz, Lebap, and Mary), which are subdivided into districts (etraps), towns, and urban settlements.

Foreign Relations By early 1992 Turkmenistan had established diplomatic relations with a number of foreign countries, including the United States. On March 2 it joined the United Nations and on September 22 was admitted to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. As a predominantly Muslim country, it also joined the Organization of the Islamic Conference. During a summit in Tehran, Iran, on February 16–17, 1992, Turkmenistan, along with its sister republics of Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, gained admission to the long-dormant Economic Cooperation Organization that had been founded by Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan in 1963. It has also attended summits of the Turkic-speaking states and in 1995 joined the Nonaligned Movement. In 1994 Turkmenistan became the first Central Asian republic to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. With “permanent neutrality” mandated by the 1992 constitution, the government’s geopolitical priorities have focused on economic matters, particularly market access for its massive hydrocarbon reserves. In 1994 a dispute with Russia over pricing and barter arrangements led Moscow to cut off Turkmenistan’s access to the sole natural gas pipeline that reached its European customers. Thereafter, Turkmenistan interrupted deliveries to Armenia, Georgia, and Ukraine because of payments arrears, while in March 1997 Russia completely stopped the flow into the regional pipeline in retaliation for Turkmenistan’s decision to dissolve the financially troubled joint venture the two countries had set up to export Turkmen gas. In February 1998 Moscow and Ashgabat resolved their major disputes, and late in the year Turkmenistan and Ukraine agreed to resume sales that were, however, stopped again in May 1999 because of nonpayment. An October 2000 visit by Ukraine President

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Leonid Kuchma resolved the differences over payments arrears and future gas deliveries. Meanwhile, in December 1997 President Niyazov and new Iranian President Mohammad Khatami had inaugurated a 125-mile-long pipeline carrying comparatively small quantities of natural gas to Iran. In late 1996 the government took a more conciliatory line than neighboring republics toward the overthrow of the Afghan government by the Taliban militia, in part because the Islamic group had reportedly approved plans for a gas pipeline to Pakistan. However, the U.S. corporate sponsor of the venture withdrew following U.S. attacks in August 1998 on Afghan guerrilla bases. Following the September 2001 al-Qaida attacks on the United States and the consequent U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, Turkmenistan opened land and air corridors for the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Afghan people, and Niyazov indicated his support for a UN-led effort against international terrorism. He denied U.S. forces access to military facilities, however, citing his country’s commitment to neutrality, but he has not been averse to accepting U.S. military aid for training and equipment. In 2005 and early 2006 Ashgabat and Washington repeatedly denied reports that they were negotiating U.S. access to the Mary air base. The overthrow of the Taliban led to a May 2002 agreement with Pakistan and the interim Afghan government to conduct a new feasibility study for the pipeline project, which was approved in December 2002 at an initial projected cost of $2–3 billion. Other proposed pipeline destinations include China and Turkey (see Current issues, below). Another regional issue involves national claims to the Caspian. Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan have negotiated bilateral agreements dividing the seabed into territorial sectors, but Iran and Turkmenistan have argued for a more comprehensive approach. The presidents of the five countries conferred in Ashgabat in April 2002 but without making significant progress. As of mid-2006 a joint task force continued to meet, but the basic issue remained unresolved. In late March 2000 the presidents of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan reportedly agreed to draft

a pact that would demarcate their shared border and also provide a plan for joint use of the Amu-Darya River. Following the apparent attempt to assassinate President Niyazov in November 2002, relations with Uzbekistan worsened because of alleged Uzbek involvement, which Tashkent denied. In November 2004 President Niyazov met with Uzbek President Islam Karimov in Bukhara, Uzbekistan, where they signed a declaration of friendship and pledged closer cooperation in trade and variety of other areas.

Current Issues Turkmenistan remains under the absolute control of President Niyazov, who has adopted the title Turkmenbashi (“leader of the Turkmen people”) and who has the epithet “the Great” routinely appended to his name in government press releases. The legislature has repeatedly bestowed upon him the “Hero of Turkmenistan” award, innumerable streets and structures bear his name, statues in his honor abound, and he has ordered the months of the year and days of the week renamed in honor of famous Turkmen, including his mother and himself. In addition to being the country’s supreme political leader, he has taken on the mantle of cultural protector, banning, for example, car radios, ballet, opera, and the playing of recorded music at various functions, including weddings. In February 2000, days before his 60th birthday, Niyazov stated that he planned to step down as president in five or six years, once he was sure Turkmenistan was “irrevocably” on the path to being a democratic, economically progressive state, but his tight control over the machinery of government and the media has squelched domestic opposition and discouraged the emergence of possible successors. In 2005 he pushed his possible departure date back to 2009. Meanwhile, Niyazov has continued his practice of regularly dismissing ministers and other officials, often during live television broadcasts in which he details their personal as well as their professional shortcomings. (In April 2006 the minister of culture was sacked for “moral depravity,”

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namely, living with a man who was not her husband.) Often, prominent cabinet figures have soon ended up in exile or incarcerated for bribery, theft, embezzlement, or other offenses. In May 2006 the Times of Central Asia reported the dismissal of the 4th deputy prime minister since the beginning of the year and the 60th since Niyazov took office. In April 2006, during a visit to China, President Niyazov and Chinese officials approved a framework agreement on construction of a 4,000kilometer natural gas pipeline to China via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Meanwhile, preliminary work on the anticipated line to Pakistan via Afghanistan has been proceeding. Turkmenistan has also expressed interest in a possible TransCaspian pipeline route that would transit Azerbaijan and Georgia and then terminate in Turkey, thereby bypassing Russia and providing a new route to European customers. At present, Turkmenistan has no gas distribution system of its own, forcing it to rely on Russia’s natural gas giant, Gazprom. The Niyazov regime clearly views the proposed projects as a way to reduce its economic dependence on Russia, even while Gazprom, facing the prospect of declining domestic production, views Turkmenistan’s natural gas as increasingly vital. As of mid-2006 Russia and Ukraine were paying Turkmenistan $65 per 1,000 cubic meters of gas, but Ashgabat was threatening to cut off future supplies unless they agreed to pay $100 per unit.

Political Parties The Turkmen political system is dominated by the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (DPT), which has been tightly controlled since its inception by President Niyazov. A National Movement “Revival” (Galkynysh), chaired by the president, is a government-sponsored association of various associations and the DPT. Although allowed by the 1992 constitution, opposition parties have never achieved legal standing, and most political opponents currently operate from exile in Russia, Scandinavia, and Eastern Europe.

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Government Party Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (DPT). The DPT is the successor to the Turkmen Communist Party, which was dissolved on December 16, 1991, after its 25th congress had admitted to “mistakes” during seven decades of Soviet rule. The DPT describes itself as the country’s “mother party” and has been virtually unchallenged as the leading political force in the country. Leader: Saparmurad NIYAZOV (President of the Republic and Chair of the Party).

Unregistered Parties Peasants’ Party. Created in 1993 by DPT rural cadres, the Peasants’ Party was often cited by the government as a first step toward a multiparty system. Nevertheless, it was never officially registered. Unity (Agzybirlik). Originally formed in 1989 as a cultural and environmental forum, Agzybirlik was banned in 1990 and one of its founders, Shiraly NURMYRADOV, imprisoned, ostensibly for fraud. Released in 1992, Nurmyradov then relocated to Moscow. The party advocates adoption of a multiparty democracy. In February 2000 another leader, Nurherdi NURMAMEDOV, was sentenced to five years in prison, reportedly for hooliganism and intent to murder. He had been arrested in January 2000 after criticizing the legislature’s decision to permit the president more than two consecutive terms. He was released in January 2001. Democratic Progress Party (DPP). Organized as a party in 1991 by Agzybirlik members, the DPP is sometimes identified in English as the Party of Democratic Development. One of its leaders, Durdymurat KHOJAMUKHAMMED, having been incarcerated in a psychiatric institution following the July 1995 demonstration in the capital, was one of several dissidents released in April 1998. In September, however, Khojamukhammed was abducted and severely beaten by unidentified assailants. Human Rights Watch assigned responsibility for the assault to the government.

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Cabinet As of July 15, 2006 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Ministers

Saparmurad Niyazov Aganiyaz Akiyev Gurbanmyrat Atayew Gurbanguly Berdimuhhamedow Yusup Dawudow Orazberdi Hudayberdiyew Yklymberdi Paramow

Ministers Agriculture Communications Construction and Building Materials Industry Culture and TV and Radio Broadcasting Defense Economy and Finance Education Foreign Affairs Health and Medical Industry Internal Affairs Justice Motor Transport and Roads National Security Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Oil, Gas, and Mineral Resources Power Engineering and Industry Social Security Textile Industry Trade and Foreign Economic Relations Water Resources

Esenmyrat Orazgeldiyew Resulberdi Hojagurbanow Orazmyrat Esenow Enebay Atayeva [f] Col. Gen. Agageldi Mammetgeldiyew (Vacant) Shemsat Annagylyjova [f] Rasit Meredow Gurbanguly Berdimuhhamedow Akmammet Rahmanow Asyrgeldi Gulgarayew Baymuhammet Kelow Geldimuhammet Asyrmuhammedow Magtymguly Akmyradow Gurbanmyrat Atayew Yusup Dawudow Bibitac Wakilowa [f] Yklymberdi Paramow Gurbangeldi Melekeyew Tekebay Altyyew

[f] = female

Exile opposition groups include the Republican Party of Turkmenistan (RPT), led by Nurmuhammet Hanamow, a former ambassador to Turkey; the United Democratic Opposition of Turkmenistan (UDOT), led by former foreign minister Avde Kuliev; and the People’s Democratic Movement of Turkmenistan (PDMT, also identified as the National Democratic Movement of Turkmenistan), founded by former foreign

minister Boris Shikhmuradov. Shikhmuradov and Hanamow were both accused of involvement in an alleged November 2002 assassination attempt against President Niyazov, and Shikhmuradov is serving a life sentence. In October 2003 four opposition groups, all in exile, announced formation of a Union of Democratic Forces of Turkmenistan (UDFT). Founding members were the RPT; the UDOT; the

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Socio-Political Movement “Watan” (“Motherland”), led by Aleksandr DODONOV from Moscow; and the Socio-Political Movement “Revival,” led by Nazar SUYUNOV. Earlier, in June 2002, various opposition formations had convened in Vienna, Austria, and had organized a “Roundtable of the Turkmen Democratic Opposition”; participants included Agzybirlik, the Communist Party of Turkmenistan, the National Patriotic Movement of Turkmenistan, the PDMT, Shirali NURMURADOV’s Popular Social Movement “Mertebe” (“Dignity”), the Social Democratic Party, Turkmen communities from Russia and elsewhere, and a veterans’ group. In April 2006, responding to an announcement that Turkmenistan would hold elections to local councils in July, the RPT and Watan called on Western leaders to pressure Niyazov into holding free elections. They expressed their willingness to field candidates if Niyazov concurred.

Legislature Under the 1992 constitution, as amended, Turkmenistan has two national representative bodies: a quasi-parliamentary People’s Council, which has among its powers establishing broad policy guidelines and amending the constitution, and a smaller Assembly performing ordinary legislative functions. People’s Council (Khalk Maslakhaty). The People’s Council, as reconfigured by constitutional changes approved on August 15–16, 2003, is Turkmenistan’s “supreme representative body” and now encompasses 2,507 members, including, among others, the president, the Assembly, cabinet ministers, the chair of the Supreme Court, the prosecutor general, the chief administrators of the country’s five regions and Ashgabat, elected representatives from each district, heads of local councils, and the chairpersons of officially recognized political parties and of trade union, youth, and women’s groups. Balloting for the 65 directly elected members was most recently held on April 6, 2003.

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At its August 2003 session the People’s Council elected President Niyazov as council president for life. President: Gen. Saparmurad NIYAZOV (President of the Republic). Assembly (Mejlis). The Mejlis consists of 50 members elected for five-year terms. The Supreme Soviet elected on January 7, 1990, became the Mejlis as of May 19, 1992. About 130 candidates, all members of the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, contested the most recent election, held December 19, 2004, with runoff balloting in 7 constituencies on January 9, 2005. Chair: Ovezgeldi ATAYEV.

Communications All media are strictly controlled by the government. Individuals may subscribe to Russian newspapers, but not to those of other foreign countries. In January 1999 the government broke up a meeting called to establish an Independent Journalists’ Association, while in April President Niyazov stated that press censorship was needed to prevent fomenting interethnic hostility. In 2002 the OSCE stated that, in its experience, the lack of press freedom in Turkmenistan was “unprecedented.” In October 2005 Reporters Without Borders, in its fourth annual World Press Freedom Index, ranked Turkmenistan 165th out of 167 countries.

Press The following are among the newspapers published in Ashgabat in Turkmen, unless otherwise noted: Adalat (Justice, 40,000), weekly; Galkynys (25,000), weekly DPT organ; Watan (Motherland, 20,000), three times a week; Turkmenistan (20,000), daily government organ; Neitralnyi Turkmenistan (Neutral Turkmenistan, 20,000), daily government organ, in Russian; Novosti Turkmenistana (Turkmenistan News), weekly newsletter published by the Turkmen State News Service, in Russian, English, and Turkmen.

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News Agency The domestic facility is the Turkmen State News Service (TSNS), headquartered in Ashgabat.

Broadcasting Turkmen Radio’s two outlets and Turkmen Television’s four stations broadcast in Turkmen and Russian. Rebroadcasts of programs from Russia are often censored, in part because of what President Niyazov has described as their “indecency.” There were approximately 890,000 television receivers in 2003. Internet access is controlled by the government.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. Meret Bairamovich ORAZOV U.S. Ambassador to Turkmenistan Tracey Ann JACOBSON Permanent Representative to the UN Aksoltan T. ATAEVA IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, CIS, EBRD, ECO, IDB, Interpol, NAM, OIC, OSCE, WCO

Note: Turkmenistan’s autocratic leader, President Saparmurad Niyazov, 66, succumbed to a heart attack on December 21, 2006, leaving a leadership vacuum. Deputy Prime Minister Gurbanguly Berdimuhhamedow (Kurbanduly Berdymuhhamedov) assumed the role of acting head of state. On December 26, the country’s highest legislative body amended the constitution to permit Acting President Berdimuhhamedow to run in a February 2007 presidential election. The legislature also approved five other, relatively obscure candidates—none of them opposition figures—for the ballot.

T U VA L U CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY

OF

TU V A L U

Fakavae Aliki-Malo i Tuvalu

The Country Formerly known as the Ellice Islands in the Gilbert group, Tuvalu consists of nine atolls stretching over an area of 500,000 square miles north of Fiji in the western Pacific. Only eight of the islands are considered inhabited for electoral purposes; activity on the ninth is confined to a copra plantation. With a total land area of ten square miles, Tuvalu is one of the world’s smallest countries, although its population density is the highest among South Pacific island nations. Its inhabitants are predominantly Polynesian and Protestant Christian. The soil is poor, and agricultural activity is confined largely to the coco palm and its derivatives, yielding a dependency on imported food. Women constitute 30 percent of the paid labor force, concentrated almost entirely in the service sector; female participation in politics and government has traditionally been minimal, although a woman entered the Paeniu cabinet in 1989. Much of the islands’ revenue is derived from the sale of stamps and coins and from remittances by Tuvaluans working abroad, primarily as merchant seamen or as phosphate miners on Nauru and Kiribati’s Banaba Island. In 1987 these resources were augmented by an agreement with Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom for the establishment of a Trust Fund, worth approximately $40 million in 1999, that at that time covered approximately one-quarter of the country’s annual budget. Economic development plans include the promotion of handicraft industries and the exploitation of marine resources, but neither is likely to equal the dramatic financial windfall realized through sale of

the country’s fortuitous Internet designation “.tv” (see Current issues, below).

Government and Politics Political Background Proclaimed a protectorate with the Gilbert Islands (now independent Kiribati) in 1892 and formally annexed by Britain in 1915–1916, when the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony was established, the Ellice Islands were separated on October 1, 1975, and renamed Tuvalu. Independence on October 1, 1978, occurred only five months after the

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acquisition of full internal self-government, former chief minister Toalipi LAUTI becoming prime minister and Sir Fiatau Penitala TEO being designated Crown representative. On September 17, 1981, nine days after the country’s first general election since independence, Lauti, on a 5–7 parliamentary vote, was obliged to yield office to Dr. Tomasi PUAPUA. Lauti’s defeat was blamed largely on his controversial decision in 1979 to invest most of the government’s capital with a California business that promised assistance in obtaining a $5 million development loan; the money, plus interest, was reported to have been returned by mid1984. Dr. Puapua remained in office as head of a largely unchanged administration after the election of September 12, 1985, but was forced to step down in favor of Bikenibeu PAENIU because of the loss of parliamentary seats by two cabinet members at the election of September 27, 1989. Following legislative balloting on September 2, 1993, Parliament found itself in a 6–6 tie between those who wished to retain Prime Minister Paeniu and supporters of his predecessor. The deadlock remaining after a second ballot, a new election was held on November 25. Thereafter, Puapua chose not to present himself as a candidate; Kamuta LATASI, a parliamentary backbencher and former private secretary to Governor General Toalipi LAUTI, was chosen over Paeniu on a 7–5 vote. Latasi himself was on the losing end of a 7–5 nonconfidence vote on December 17, 1996, and was succeeded by Paeniu on December 23. Following a campaign of exceptional bitterness (primarily between Paeniu and Latasi), new balloting for Parliament on March 26, 1998, returned Paeniu to his seat but not Latasi. Paeniu was reappointed for a new term as prime minister on April 8. However, he lost a vote of confidence by 7–4 on April 14, 1999, the Parliament on April 27 selecting Ionatana IONATANA, the minister of education and culture as well as of women’s and community affairs, as his successor. Prime Minister Ionatana died unexpectedly on December 8, 2000, and was succeeded by Deputy Prime Minister Lagitupu TUILIMU, in an acting

capacity. On February 23, 2001, Parliament elected Faimalaga LUKA as his successor, and he was sworn in at the head of a reshuffled cabinet the following day. On December 13, 2001, the Parliament elected Koloa TALAKE, a former minister of finance, as head of government. The previous week, Prime Minister Luka had lost a no-confidence motion when four legislators, including Talake, crossed the aisle to support the motion. (Named governor general on September 9, 2003, Luka retired in April 2005 and died on August 19.) At balloting for an expanded 15-seat Parliament on July 25, 2002, Talake, three other government ministers, and the speaker of Parliament all lost their seats. On August 2 Saufatu SOPOANGA defeated the other candidate for prime minister, Amasone KILEI, by a vote of 8–7 and named a completely new cabinet. Accused of misusing government property and money (charges he heatedly denied), Sopoanga lost a no-confidence vote (8–6) on August 25, 2004, and delayed the naming of a successor by resigning his legislative seat, thus forcing a by-election. Reelected on October 7, Sopoanga was named deputy prime minister by Maatia TOAFA following his election as the new prime minister on October 11. Toafa continued in office in mid-2005 after a crucial legislative by-election at which a progovernment candidate was chosen to replace a member who had resigned.

Constitution and Government The 1978 constitution (a substantially revised version of a preindependence document adopted three years earlier) provides for a governor general of Tuvaluan citizenship who serves a four-year term (or until age 65) and a prime minister who is elected by a unicameral Parliament of 15 members. Should the office of prime minister become vacant with Parliament unable to agree on a successor, the governor general may, at his discretion, name a chief executive or call for legislative dissolution. The government is collectively responsible to Parliament, whose normal term is four years.

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Foreign Relations Political Status: Former British dependency; independent with “special membership” in the Commonwealth since October 1, 1978. Land Area: 10 sq. mi. (26 sq. km.). Resident Population: 9,561 (2002C); 9,700 (2005E). Both figures are exclusive of more than 3,000 Tuvaluans living overseas. Major Urban Center (2005E): VAIAKU (Funafuti, 6,200). Official Language: English (Tuvaluan is widely spoken). Monetary Unit: Australian Dollar (market rate July 1, 2006: 1.35 dollars = $1US). A Tuvaluan coinage (at par with the Australian) was introduced in 1977 but is circulated largely for numismatic purposes. Sovereign: Queen ELIZABETH II. Governor General: Rev. Filoimea TELITO; sworn in on April 15, 2005, to succeed Faimalaga LUKA. Prime Minister: Apisai IELEMIA; elected by parliament on August 14, 2006, to succeed Maatia TOAFA, following the election of August 3, 2006.

The judiciary consists of a High Court, which is empowered to hear appeals from courts of criminal and civil jurisdiction on each of the eight inhabited islands as well as from local magistrates’ courts. Appeals from the High Court may be taken to the Court of Appeal in Fiji and, as last resort, to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London. Island councils (most of whose members are reportedly wary of centralized government) continue to be dominant in local administration. In accordance with the results of a 1986 public poll that rejected republican status, the government announced that the link with the Crown would be retained, although constitutional changes would be introduced that would limit the governor general to a largely ceremonial role. However, the High Court in August 2003 ruled that he retained the power to convene Parliament in the face of a government effort to delay recall as a means of continuing in office.

Upon independence Tuvalu elected to join Nauru as a “special member” of the Commonwealth, having the right to participate in all Commonwealth affairs except heads of government meetings. It was admitted to the United Nations as the world body’s 189th member on September 5, 2000. At the regional level it participates in the Pacific Islands Forum and the Pacific Community. Most of its contacts with other states are through representatives accredited to Fiji or New Zealand, although in 1984 formal relations, backdated to 1979, were established with former colonial partner Kiribati. In early 1979 Tuvalu and the United States signed a treaty of friendship (ratified in June 1983) that included provision for consultation in the areas of defense and marine resources, with Washington acknowledging Tuvalu’s sovereignty over four islands (Funafuti, Nukufetau, Nukulaelae, and Niulakita) originally claimed by the U.S. Congress in the so-called Guano Act of 1856. In February 1986 Tuvalu refused to sanction a “goodwill visit” by a French warship as a means of protesting continued nuclear testing in French Polynesia. Earlier, in August 1985, it had become one of the signatories of the Treaty of Rarotonga, which declared the South Pacific a nuclear-free zone. In December 1998 Prime Minister Paeniu visited Taiwan, whose battle with China for diplomatic support in the South Pacific had recently intensified. Taiwanese officials pledged development aid for Tuvalu’s fishing industry in return for the islands’ continued “friendship.” In 2001 Tuvalu joined the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, and the Solomon Islands in supporting UN membership for Taiwan. In March 2005 Tuvalu joined with Kiribati in seeking assistance from the Pacific Islands Forum for wage arrears and repatriation of some 1,000 of their nationals who had been working for a decade as laborers in Nauru’s phosphate mines. For its part, Nauru has estimated that more than $2.3 million would be required for the repatriation effort.

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Cabinet As of September 1, 2006 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister

Apisai Ielemia Tavau Teii

Ministers Communications and Transport Education, Sports, and Culture Energy Finance and Economic Planning Foreign Affairs Health Home Affairs and Rural Development Industry Labor Natural Resources and Environment Tourism Works

Current Issues In November 1999, Idealab, a California-based firm, agreed to pay Tuvalu $50 million over the ensuing decade for use of the country’s Internet suffix “.tv,” which would be licensed to electronic mail and Web address customers as an alternative to the ubiquitous “.com.” The government has thus far used the money (which far exceeds all other forms of revenue) for infrastructural projects in health, education, and transportation. In addition, the largess enabled the previously cash-strapped country to open a permanent mission at UN headquarters in 2001 and to purchase a controlling interest in Air Fiji, thereby ensuring improved air transport. The dominant current concern involves the consequences for low-lying Tuvalu of a continuing rise in sea level because of global warming. Recent overtures to New Zealand and Australia about possible resettlement have produced mixed responses for the endangered island nation, which has already experienced shore erosion and increased salinity. According to recent estimates, the land areas (most

Taukelina Finikaso Iakoba Italeli Taukelina Finikaso Lotoala Metia Apisai Ielemia Iakoba Italeli Willy Telavi Lotoala Metia Apisai Ielemia Tavau Teii Lotoala Metia Taukelina Finikaso

of which are little more than a meter above sea level) will be severely flooded within the next 15– 20 years and will be completely submerged by the end of the century. In early 2005 Prime Minister Toafu reopened the republican issue, declaring, over the apparent objection of his deputy, former prime minister Sopoanga, that he hoped to hold a referendum by midyear on replacing the Queen with a president as head of state. However, no such action had been taken by mid-2006. In mid-2005 arrangements were made to repatriate 300 Tuvaluans who had been engaged in phosphate mining on Nauru. An earlier repatriation attempt had been rejected by the workers because of unpaid wages.

Political Parties Political affairs in Tuvalu are grounded in family ties and personalities, not ideology. In late 1992 it was reported that a group called the Tuvalu United Party (Tama i Fulu a Tuvalu) had been organized by

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Prime Minister Paeniu and his deputy, Dr. Alesana Kleis SELUKA, but the party has played no part in recent elections.

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a monthly religious newsletter, Te Lama, which includes some items of general interest.

Broadcasting

Legislature Known prior to independence as the House of Assembly, the unicameral Parliament (Palamente o Tuvalu) consists of 15 members: 2 each from seven islands and 1 from the least populous inhabited island. The legislative term, subject to dissolution, is four years. In legislative balloting held on August 3, 2006, 8 new members, primarily senior civil servants, were among the 15 legislators elected. Speaker: Kamuta LATASI.

Communications Press The only sources of printed news are Tuvalu Echoes/Sikuleo o Tuvalu (250), published fortnightly in English and Tuvaluan by the government’s Broadcasting and Information Division, and

Radio Tuvalu broadcasts for about six hours daily from Funafuti to approximately 5,000 receivers. There is no television service, although an Australian engineering firm was reported in early 1995 to have been retained to install a satellitebased telecommunications network to link Funafuti with the outer islands.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. (Vacant) U.S. Ambassador to Tuvalu Larry Miles DINGER (resident in Fiji) Permanent Representative to the UN Enele Sosene SOPOAGA IGO Memeberships (Non-UN) ADB, CWTH, PC, PIF

U N I T E D S TAT E S United States of America

See the note at the end of this entry for information on current events.

Related Territories The United States never acquired a colonial empire of significant proportions. Among its principal former overseas dependencies, the Philippines became independent in 1946, Puerto Rico acquired the status of a commonwealth in free association with the United States in 1952, and Hawaii became the 50th state of the Union in 1959. In addition to Puerto Rico, the United States now exercises sovereignty in the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and an assortment of smaller Caribbean and Pacific islands. Until October 1, 1979, the United States held administrative responsibility for the Panama Canal Zone, while U.S. administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands was effectively terminated with the independence of Palau on October 1, 1994. (For a discussion of the Trust Territory see the 1993 edition of the Handbook, pp. 946–948.)

Major Pacific Jurisdictions American Samoa. Located in the South Pacific just east of the independent state of Samoa, American Samoa includes the six Samoan islands (Annuu, Ofu, Olosega, Rose, Tau, Tutuila) annexed by the United States pursuant to a treaty with Great Britain and Germany in 1899 and also the privately owned Swain’s Island (currently with 30 inhabitants), 200 miles to the north and west, which was annexed in 1925. The land area of 77 square miles (199 sq. km.) is inhabited by a population almost entirely of Polynesian ancestry that numbered 57,291 at the 2000 census and approxi-

mately 58,000 in 2005, but is projected to decline marginally by 2010. Pago Pago, the capital, is situated on the island of Tutuila. The social structure is based on the same matai (family chief) system that prevails in neighboring Samoa. Although educational levels are comparatively high, subsistence farming and fishing remain the predominant way of life. U.S. government spending, fish canning, and tourism are the main sources of income, and the government is the territory’s single largest employer. About one-third of all high school graduates leave Samoa for the U.S. mainland. Constitutionally, American Samoa is an unorganized, unincorporated territory whose indigenous inhabitants are nationals but not citizens of the United States. Administered since 1951 by the Department of the Interior, the territory voted for its first elected governor in November 1977. Its bicameral legislature (Fono) consists of an 18-member Senate chosen by clan chiefs and subchiefs and a popularly elected, 20-member House of Representatives, exclusive of a nonvoting member from Swain’s Island. The judiciary consists of a High Court and five district courts. Appointed district governors head the territory’s three political districts. At four-way gubernatorial balloting on November 3, 1992, former governor A. P. LUTALI, a Democrat, bested the Republican incumbent, Peter Tali COLEMAN, 53–36 percent, for his first victory in four contests involving the two. Coleman had been the only person in American history to serve as governor in five different decades. In 1996 Coleman, nearing 77 and in poor health, chose not to run again, while Lutali placed third in

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the first round of nonpartisan voting on November 5; as a result, Lutali’s lieutenant governor, Tauese P. F. SUNIA, entered a November 19 runoff against Coleman’s nephew and longtime campaign manager, Sen. Leala P. REID, emerging victorious by a 51.2 to 48.8 percent margin. He was elected to a second term in November 2000, once again defeating Reid in a close contest that saw Reid unsuccessfully challenge the results in court. The current governor, Togiola T.A. Tulafono, was elected on November 16, 2004, and sworn in January 3, 2005. American Samoa has been alone among the U.S. insular possessions in failing to conduct a referendum on change in its territorial status. Indeed, the Samoan delegate to Congress, E. F. H. FALEOMAVAEGA, was asked by the local legislature in September 1993 to withdraw a request for establishment of a joint federal-territorial political status commission. The principal reason for resistance to a change in Samoa’s status is a fear that elements of the U.S. constitution might thereby be invoked to invalidate the territory’s traditional land tenure system. Subsequently, Faleomavaega was paraphrased by the Washington Pacific Report as suggesting that “only the chiefs tend to speak at village meetings, demonstrating once again the classic difficulty inherent in any attempt to overlay western institutions on nonwestern societies.” These considerations notwithstanding, a new constitutional review process was launched in early 1995 that, in due course, is to lead to a constitutional convention. In response to then Western Samoa’s decision to change its name to simply Samoa in July 1997, the American Samoa’s House of Representatives approved a motion in August to ignore the name change and forbid anyone carrying a Samoan passport from entering its territory. Subsequently, despite Tauese Sunia’s pledge to veto any legislation attempting to pressure Samoa into reverting back to its previous name, the House approved a bill on March 10, 1998, that stated that American Samoa would continue to refer to the Samoans as Western Samoans; however, the measure subsequently died in the Senate. Governor: Togiola T. A. TULAFONO.

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Guam. The unincorporated U.S. territory of Guam is geographically the southernmost and largest of the Mariana Islands in the west-central Pacific. Its area of 209 square miles (541 sq. km.) supports a population that numbered 154,805 at the 2000 census, inclusive of U.S. service members and their dependents, and an estimated 168,000 in 2005. The capital, Hag˚at˜na (formerly Aga˜na), has a civilian population of about 1,100. The islanders, predominantly of Chamorro (Micronesian) stock and Roman Catholic faith, have a high level of education, with a literacy rate of more than 90 percent. The economy depends largely on military spending (despite closure of the Naval Air Station in early 1995) and tourism (about 350,000 arrivals a year, almost entirely from Japan). Originally acquired from Spain by the 1898 Treaty of Paris, the island is the responsibility of the U.S. Department of the Interior. Guamanians were made U.S. citizens by an Organic Act of 1950; although they do not vote in national elections, they have sent a delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives since 1973. Under the Guam Elective Governor Act of 1968, both the governor and lieutenant governor have, since 1970, been popularly elected. An elective legislature was reduced from 21 to 15 members in 1998. A Federal District Court heads the judicial system. Local government in 19 municipalities is headed by elected district commissioners. In the election of November 2, 1982, the Democratic nominee, Ricardo J. BORDALLO, narrowly defeated the Republican gubernatorial incumbent, while the Republicans won control of the Legislature. On September 6, 1986, Bordallo won the Democratic primary in a bid for reelection, despite having been indicted three days earlier for influence peddling, but he lost in the November balloting to the Republican candidate, Joseph F. ADA; concurrently, completing a reversal of the 1982 outcome, the Democrats, although deeply divided between pro- and anti-Bordallo factions, captured the Legislature. Bordallo was ultimately convicted in February 1987, secured partial suspension of the sentence against him in October 1988, and committed suicide at Aga˜na immediately before he was to

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serve out the remainder of the sentence in prison in February 1990. The Republicans retained the governorship and representation in the U.S. House but fell one seat short of capturing legislative control on November 6,1990; on November 3, 1992, the Democrats secured a substantially increased legislative majority of 14–7. On November 8, 1994, Democrat Carl GUTIERREZ overcame charges of sexual impropriety to defeat Tommy TANAKA, the Republican nominee, by a comfortable 54.6 percent majority; concurrently the Democrats also bucked a national trend by retaining legislative control with a slightly reduced majority of 13–8. In 1996, on the other hand, Republicans regained legislative control for the first time since 1980 by a razor-thin margin of 11–10. In a comeback effort, former governor Ada failed to turn back Gutierrez’s reelection on November 3, 1998, while the Republicans surged to a 12–3 majority in the downsized legislature. A recall effort against the governor floundered in October 2000 when he attracted enough Republican support to keep the issue off the November ballot. In 1982 voters, by a three-to-one margin, had expressed a preference for a commonwealth rather than statehood, and in an August 8, 1987, referendum, approved 10 of 12 articles of a Commonwealth Act; on November 7 the remaining articles, providing for the recognition of indigenous Chamorro rights and local control of immigration (both bitterly opposed by non-Chamorros) were also approved. In 1992 the end of protracted talks between Guam’s Commission on SelfDetermination, chaired by Governor Ada, and a Bush administration task force on Guam, brought a “qualified agreement” on a commonwealth bill. Although endorsed by Democratic presidential candidate Bill Clinton at the party’s 1992 convention, the measure was not introduced in the U.S. Senate until November 1997; by then, President Clinton, under pressure because of congressional unwillingness to sanction a Chamorro-only franchise or line-item veto power over federal legislation, had reversed himself, and the measure did not pass. Accordingly, the Guam administration announced plans in mid-1998 to hold a new status

vote, restricted to Chamorros, in November 1999 that would delete the status quo and commonwealth options and limit the choices to independence, free association, and statehood. The action came shortly after a public opinion poll of all residents had yielded a 56-percent majority in favor of the status quo, with a small minority endorsing free association and only a smattering of support for independence. At the November 5, 2002, election Republican Felix Camacho won the governorship over Democrat Robert UNDERWOOD, taking 55.2 percent of the vote. In legislative balloting, Democrats won nine seats, while Republicans took the other six. There was no shift in the legislative balance at the next election, held November 2, 2004. Governor: Felix CAMACHO. Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. Located north of the Caroline Islands and west of the Marshalls in the western Pacific, the Marianas (excluding Guam) constitute an archipelago of 16 islands with a land area of 184 square miles (477 sq. km.). The population of 69,221 at the 2000 census and an estimated 80,000 in 2005, resides on six islands, including Saipan (the administrative center), Tinian, and Rota. Classed as Micronesian, the people are largely Roman Catholic. In 1972 a Marianas Political Status Commission initiated negotiations with Washington that resulted in the 1975 signing of a covenant to establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in political union with the United States. The covenant was approved by the U.S. Senate on February 24, 1976, and signed by President Gerald Ford on March 24. In December 1977 a government consisting of the commonwealth’s first governor and a Northern Marianas Commonwealth Legislature was established. The bicameral legislature encompassed a 9-member Senate elected for a four-year term and a 14-member (currently 18-member) House of Representatives elected biennially. The initial legislators assumed office on January 9, 1978. Under U.S. and local law, the commonwealth ceased to be a component of the

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Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands on November 3, 1986, with its residents becoming U.S. citizens on the same day. The change in status under international law came with formal removal from trusteeship by vote of the UN Security Council on December 22, 1990. In early 1991 a question arose as to whether the commonwealth’s representative in Washington, D.C., should seek a seat in Congress on a basis similar to that of delegates from Guam and the Caribbean territories. Whereas the former representative (a Democrat) felt that commonwealth interests were best served by a person with “quasidiplomatic” status, his successor (a Republican) appeared to favor a congressional presence, in part because of the direct entr´ee to lawmakers, but also because the costs would be assumed by the federal government. In August 1992 six in ten respondents to a Pacific Daily News poll were reported to favor congressional representation, which was not expected to occur soon because of tension between Congress and the Commonwealth administration. Much of the difficulty stems from a flow of ill-paid foreign workers into the Marianas, which sets its immigration and minimum wage policies and is able to ship tariff-free goods to the United States, thus underpricing mainland clothing manufacturers. In addition, Congress has been unwilling to increase financial aid to the commonwealth because of a highly regressive tax structure that includes substantial rebates to the rich. Partly for these reasons, the incumbent Republican governor, Lorenzo (Larry) I. De Leon GUERRERO, lost a reelection bid in November 1993 to his Democratic opponent, Froilan C. (“Lang”) TENORIO, although the Republicans retained majorities in both legislative houses. However, the split-party government weakened the executive, because commonwealth executive orders (unlike those issued by the U.S. president) are subject to legislative veto within 60 days of promulgation. Thus a major government reorganization plan was defeated in early 1994. At the election of November 1, 1997, Tenorio and Lt. Gov. Jesus C. BORJA ran on separate tickets (the latter technically as an independent), thus

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splitting the Democratic vote and enabling twotime former Republican governor Pedro Pangelinan (“Teno”) TENORIO to win with 45.6 percent of the vote. A subsequent judicial challenge to Teno’s victory on the basis of a two-term limit adopted in 1986 was rejected on the grounds that the change could not be applied retroactively. By late 1998 it was unclear when covenantmandated consultations between Saipan and Washington, in abeyance for more than two years because of the immigration and wage issues, would resume. One U.S. member of Congress termed the commonwealth a “legalized sweatshop,” and federal legislation on both wages and foreign workers was widely anticipated. The commonwealth administration restricted the hiring of additional foreigners while complaining of competition from Mexican garment factories operating under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). As a source of new jobs, commonwealth officials hailed the advent of casino gambling on Tinian. Designed primarily as a boon to the tourist trade, the new industry was expected to have a multiplier effect on the overall economy. In May 2000 it was reported that the commonwealth representative in Washington, D.C., Juan BABAUTA, was promoting legislation for a nonvoting delegate in the House, insisting that widespread support had emerged for such a position. At the election of November 3, 2001, Babauta, a Republican, captured the governor’s office with 42.8 percent of the vote, defeating Benigno Fitial of the Covenant Party (CP), the Democrat Borja, and Froilan Tenorio, now of the Reform Party. Republicans also retained control of both legislative chambers. The four-way gubernatorial race of November 5, 2005, pitted Governor Babauta against Speaker of the House Fitial, Froilan Tenorio, and independent Heinz HOFSCHNEIDER. The contest was so close, however, that the outcome remained unclear until more than 1,200 absentee ballots were counted two weeks later. In the end, Fitial won by 99 votes over Hofschneider. In simultaneous legislative balloting, no party won a majority in either house. In the Senate, the CP and the Republicans

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each won three seats, compared to two for the Democratic Party and one for an independent; in the House, the CP and the Republicans each won seven seats, followed by the Democrats and independents with two each. Governor: Benigno FITIAL.

Other Insular Possessions Palmyra Island. A currently uninhabited group of about 50 islets situated on a horseshoeshaped reef about 1,000 miles south of Honolulu, Palmyra became a U.S. territory upon the annexation of Hawaii in 1898. It was placed under civil administration of the Interior Department by the Hawaii Statehood Act of 1959. Privately owned by the Fullard-Leo family of Hawaii since 1922, the atoll, covering 4 square miles (10.44 sq. km.), was occupied during World War II by the U.S. Navy, which built an airstrip subsequently used by the U.S. Air Force until 1961. In early 2000 the U.S.based Nature Conservancy announced that it had launched a $37-million fund-raising campaign to buy the atoll, which has five times as many coral species as the Florida Keys, as a wildlife reserve. The sale was concluded in November 2000. Wake Island. Consisting of three islets with a combined area of 3 square miles (7.8 sq. km.) and a population in 2000 of approximately 2,500, Wake Island lies roughly midway between Hawaii and Guam. It was formally claimed by the United States in 1900. The site of an important air base, it is administered by the Department of the Air Force. In May 1990 congressional representatives of Guam and Hawaii introduced a bill that would give Guam jurisdiction over Wake Island and Hawaii jurisdiction over Howland, Baker, and Jarvis Islands, Kingman Reef, Midway, and Palmyra. At stake was a potential gain of 120,000 square miles to Guam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and of 300,000 square miles to Hawaii’s. The move was condemned by Marshall Island leaders, who had long viewed Wake as Marshallese territory, although no claim to such effect had been included in its compact of free association with the United

States. The bill died and was not reintroduced in the next Congress. Johnston Island. Part of an atoll that also includes the Sand, Hikina, and Akau Islands, Johnston Island lies about 700 miles southwest of Hawaii. The islands have a combined area of about 0.5 square miles (1.3 sq. km.). The population of Johnston Island was 1,387 (primarily government personnel) in 1994; the other islands are uninhabited. Annexed in 1858, the atoll has been under the joint administration of the U.S. Defense and Interior Departments since World War II. During the first half of 1990 a number of island governments, including those of American Samoa, the Marshall Islands, and the Northern Marianas, complained to the federal government of the incineration of dangerous chemicals on Johnston Island, arguing that there was a danger of the jet stream carrying pollutants not only to their shores but “around the world.” Subsequently, during an October summit meeting with Pacific leaders in Hawaii, President George H. W. Bush indicated that the Defense Department would proceed with disposal of the materials already on the island but had no plans to continue the practice thereafter. In early 1999 the U.S. Army announced that its Johnston Island Atoll Chemical Disposal System (JACADS) would be closed by 2000. Although the closure took place on schedule, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, which in 1926 had been assigned responsibility for the area as a wildlife refuge, was reluctant to resume its role because of the contamination. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, a unit of the Defense Department, has argued that the level of radioactivity is too low to present a threat to humans or wildlife, but the agency is nonetheless working with the Fish and Wildlife Service on means that should be taken if problems develop. Howland, Baker, and Jarvis Islands. Uninhabited, with a combined area of about 3 square miles (7.77 sq. km.), Howland, Baker, and Jarvis are widely scattered islands situated more than 1,300 miles south of Honolulu. Claimed by the United States in 1936, they are under the administration of the Department of the Interior.

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In May 1999 President Teburoro Tito of Kiribati claimed that the three islands were geographically part of Kiribati and should come under its jurisdiction; there was no indication, however, that Washington was prepared to consider the claim. Kingman Reef. The uninhabited Kingman Reef, surrounding a lagoon 1,100 miles south of Honolulu, was annexed in 1922 and is administered by the Department of the Navy. Midway Islands. Consisting of Eastern and Sand Islands (not to be confused with Sand Island, above), the Midway Islands have a combined area of two square miles (5.2 sq. km.) and had a largely

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military population in 1994 of about 2,500, most of which was subsequently withdrawn. Located at the northwestern end of the Hawaiian chain, the Midway Islands were annexed in 1867, administered as an unincorporated territory by the Department of the Navy until 1996, and then taken over by the Department of the Interior. On June 15, 2006, President George W. Bush turned a 200,000 square mile tract of ocean including the Midway Islands into the world’s largest marine sanctuary. The Northwestern Hawaiian Islands National Monument, to be renamed by Hawaii’s voters, is home to approximately 7,000 species, several of which are threatened or endangered.

Note: The November 7, 2006 election for governor between the incumbent Republican, Felix Camacho, and Democratic challenger Robert Underwood concluded with Camacho holding a narrow lead. Republicans achieved an 8–7 majority in the Senate. On December 20, the Guam Supreme Court, ruling that some 500 disputed ballots should be regarded as spoiled, confirmed Governor Camacho’s reelection.

U Z B E K I S TA N REPUBLIC

OF

UZBEKISTAN

Uzbekistan Zhumhurijati

The Country The Central Asian state of Uzbekistan—the region’s most populous—is bordered on the north and west by Kazakhstan, on the northeast by Kyrgyzstan, on the southeast by Tajikistan, and on the south, save for a short frontier with Afghanistan, by Turkmenistan. The national territory also includes several small exclaves in Kyrgyzstan, the largest being the town of Sokh. The principal ethnic groups are Turkic-speaking Uzbeks (approximately 69 percent); Russians (11 percent); and Tatars, Kazakhs, and Tajiks (4 percent each). The vast majority of citizens are Sunni Muslims, but there is also a small Shiite population; Eastern Orthodoxy predominates among the Russians. Women make up about 47 percent of the workforce and constitute one-sixth of the current lower house of the Supreme Assembly. Endowed with a basically dry climate but traversed by two of the region’s major rivers—the northern Syr Darya and the southern Amu Darya, both of which flow into the Aral Sea—Uzbekistan developed the most extensively irrigated agricultural sector of any of the former Soviet republics. Its crops include cotton and rice (once contributing two-thirds and one-half, respectively, to total USSR output), wheat, tobacco, sugarcane, and a wide variety of vegetables and fruits. The agricultural sector contributes about one-third of GDP and employs a similar proportion of workers. Although legislation passed in 1998 prohibits private ownership of land, the breakup of collective farms and crop diversification have helped to overcome Uzbekistan’s Soviet-era reputation as little more than a cotton plantation writ large—a situation that

caused irreparable damage to the land and a reduction of almost a foot a year in the water level of the increasingly polluted Aral Sea. At present, cotton fiber still accounts for 25–30 percent of export earnings. Industry, which contributes 20–25 percent of GDP, is led by textiles, machinery, fuels, and metallurgy. Uzbekistan ranks as one of the world’s leading producers of both natural gas and gold; other extractable resources include oil, coal, uranium, copper, molybdenum, tungsten, and zinc. Principal trading partners are the European Union (EU), Russia, South Korea, Ukraine, and Tajikistan.

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Political Status: Eastern portion of Turkistan Soviet Socialist Republic detached on October 27, 1924, to form Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic; became constituent republic of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) on May 12, 1925; declared independence as Republic of Uzbekistan on August 31, 1991; present constitution adopted on December 8, 1992. Area: 172,740 sq. mi. (447,400 sq. km.). Population: 19,810,077 (1989C); 26,887,000 (2005E). Major Urban Centers (2005E): TASHKENT (2,167,000), Namangan (375,000), Samarkand (360,000), Andizhan (323,000). Official Language: Uzbek. Russian remains the principal everyday language. Monetary Unit: Sum (official rate July 1, 2006: 1,225 sums = $1US). President: Islam A. KARIMOV; elected to the new office of president by the Supreme Soviet on March 24, 1990; reconfirmed for a five-year term by popular election on December 29, 1991; granted three-year term extension (to December 31, 1999) by referendum of March 26, 1995; reelected on January 9, 2000; current term extended by the Supreme Assembly to January 2007, in accordance with a referendum passed on January 27, 2002. Prime Minister: Shavkat MIRZIYOEV (MIRZIYAYEV); appointed by the President and confirmed by the Supreme Assembly on December 11, 2003, succeeding Otkir SULTONOV.

The end of the Soviet system led to a 15 percent contraction in Uzbekistan’s GDP during 1992– 1994, combined with inflation averaging over 700 percent a year. Since then, market reform has proceeded slowly despite the urging of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), other institutions, and donor countries. In December 1996 the IMF suspended assistance after the government, reacting to poor harvests and dropping world prices for both cotton and gold, imposed strict trade and foreign-

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exchange controls. Nevertheless, by 1997 the GDP was at more than 90 percent of its preindependence level, a substantially better performance than nearly all other former Soviet republics. Inflation, having peaked at over 1,100 percent in 1994, declined to 71 percent in 1997 and then to 35 percent in 1998. Government figures put GDP growth at slightly more than 4 percent annually in 1999–2002 and 4.4 percent in 2003, when inflation was reported to be 4 percent—considerably below the 20 percent figure estimated by the IMF. Growth in 2004 accelerated to 7.7 percent, although inflation, at about 15 percent according to the IMF, remained a problem.

Government and Politics Political Background Astride the ancient caravan routes to the Orient, Uzbekistan is one of the world’s oldest civilized regions. In the 14th century what is now its second city, Samarkand, served as the hub of Tamerlane’s vast empire. In the 19th century, after a lengthy period of decay, much of its territory was conquered by Russia. In 1920 it became part of the Turkistan Soviet Socialist Republic within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. Separated from Turkmenia in 1924, it entered the USSR as a constituent republic in 1925. In 1929 its eastern Tajik region was detached and also accorded the status of a Soviet republic. On March 24, 1990, at the opening of a recently elected Uzbek Supreme Soviet, Islam A. KARIMOV was elected by secret ballot to the new post of Supreme Soviet president. Concurrently, Shakhrulla MIRSAIDOV was reelected chair of the Council of Ministers. The following November, however, a government reorganization resulted in creation of a cabinet to replace the Council of Ministers, and Mirsaidov was named vice president. In April 1991 Uzbekistan endorsed USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev’s abortive union treaty proposal. On August 23, in the wake of a failed Moscow coup against Gorbachev, President Karimov opposed dissolution of the Communist Party

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of the Soviet Union but nonetheless resigned from its Politburo. The property of the Uzbek Communist Party (UCP) was nationalized the following day. On August 28 Uzbekistan assumed control of all union enterprises within its territory and declared its intention to conduct its own foreign policy. Three days later the Supreme Soviet issued a declaration of independence and announced a change of name to Republic of Uzbekistan, while in November the UCP was replaced by the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (PDP). On December 29 independence was endorsed, by a 98.2 percent vote, in a popular referendum. In a parallel poll, Karimov, as the PDP candidate, won popular confirmation as president with an 86 percent share of the vote, as contrasted with the 12 percent garnered by Muhammad SALIH of the opposition Freedom (Erk) grouping. Following the poll, Abdulhashim MUTALOV of the PDP was named independent Uzbekistan’s first prime minister. A month later, the vice presidency was abolished. Although the 1992 constitution enshrined a commitment to multiparty democracy, Uzbekistan remained effectively a one-party state under the PDP. Genuine opposition parties, such as the nationalist Unity (Birlik) movement and the more moderate Erk, experienced systematic harassment leading to outright proscription, while the authorities encouraged the formation of new parties broadly supportive of the government. Elections to a new 250-member legislature, held in three rounds on December 25, 1994, and January 8 and 22, 1995, were contested by two parties, the PDP and the government-aligned Progress of the Fatherland, with the PDP winning a large majority of the seats claimed by party nominees. In a referendum held on March 26, President Karimov further consolidated his power by securing 99.6 percent endorsement for a three-year extension of his existing five-year term, due to expire at the end of 1996. The referendum results, dismissed by opposition leaders as fantasy reminiscent of the Soviet era, made Uzbekistan part of a regional trend, in that Turkmenistan had recently taken a similar step and Kazakhstan followed suit in April. On Decem-

ber 21, with the economy facing continuing difficulties, the Supreme Assembly confirmed the appointment of Otkir SULTONOV as prime minister in succession to the demoted Mutalov, who three months later was dismissed from the cabinet altogether. In June 1996, on the eve of a visit by Karimov to the United States, the government granted amnesty to a few political prisoners, but critics, including former vice president Mirsaidov, continued to accuse the government of authoritarianism and oneparty rule. Later in the year the legislature approved a new law that banned ethnic- and religious-based political parties. In November–December 1997 an outbreak of violence in Namangan precipitated a government crackdown against alleged Islamic activists, and between May 1998 and January 1999 several dozen were convicted of terrorism and anticonstitutional acts. A series of at least six bomb blasts shook Tashkent on February 16, 1999, killing 15 and injuring more than 120. Hundreds of Islamic activists and government critics were arrested in succeeding weeks. Uzbekistan drew support from Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and other regional states in its efforts to track down Uzbek dissidents. Between June and August more than two dozen individuals were sentenced to death or lengthy prison terms on related charges that included attempted assassination of the president. Most of those arrested in the wake of the bombings were subsequently released, after months in detention. Elections for the Supreme Assembly took place on December 5, 1999, with runoff contests held on December 19. Nominations were permitted by local authorities, citizens’ initiative groups, and five progovernment parties; Birlik and Erk were denied registration. Although the PDP again won more seats than any of its competitor parties, its predominance was challenged by the National Democratic Party “Self-Sacrificers” (Fidokorlar), formation of which had been announced, with President Karimov’s imprimatur, in December 1998. On January 9, 2000, Karimov, officially nominated by Fidokorlar but also backed by the rest of the political

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establishment, easily won reelection as president, capturing 92 percent of the vote against the PDP’s token candidate, Abdulkhafiz JALOLOV, who stated on election day that he, too, had cast his ballot for the incumbent. In a January 27, 2002, referendum a reported 92 percent of those voting approved extending the presidential term to seven years, while 94 percent endorsed introducing a bicameral legislature, as had been proposed by President Karimov in May 2000. The Supreme Assembly subsequently passed implementing legislation, effective from the legislative election scheduled for December 2004. On December 11, 2003, the Supreme Assembly confirmed President Karimov’s selection of Shavkat MIRZIYOEV, governor of Samarkand and an agricultural specialist, as successor to Prime Minister Sultonov, who had served in the post longer than any predecessor. Sultonov was retained as a deputy prime minister, with responsibilities that included the energy sector, oil and gas, and several other heavy industries. On March 28–April 1, 2004, a series of explosions in Bukhara and Tashkent claimed nearly 50 lives, the majority of them suspected terrorists. President Karimov assigned blame for the attacks to members of the Hizb ut-Tahrir, an Islamic organization that has sought Islamic sovereignty in the region but had not been directly linked to terrorist incidents. On July 30 three coordinated suicide bombings occurred outside the U.S. and Israeli embassies and at the prosecutor general’s office, with President Karimov again accusing the Hizb ut-Tahrir. Dozens of individuals were ultimately tried, convicted, and sentenced to between 3 and 18 years in prison for the spring incidents. At the first election for the new 120-seat Legislative Chamber, held on December 26, 2004, with runoff balloting on January 9, 2005, the recently organized Liberal Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (LDP) won a plurality of seats, ahead of the PDP and Fidokorlar. Elected members of the new Senate were chosen indirectly by regional bodies on January 17–20. On May 13–14, 2005, the eastern city of Andizhan erupted in a mass protest against the gov-

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ernment that ended with troops reportedly firing indiscriminately into crowds of mostly unarmed civilians. The government, which put the death toll at 187, attributed the unrest to terrorists and Islamic extremists. Government opponents reported up to 500 dead, and hundreds of others fled across the Kyrgyz border, but there was no independent confirmation of total casualties. UN and other international calls for an independent inquiry were rebuffed by the Karimov regime.

Constitution and Government The 1992 constitution describes Uzbekistan as a democratic presidential republic in which “there may be no official state ideology or religion.” Freedom of thought and conscience and respect for human rights are guaranteed, although a 1998 law set stringent requirements governing the reregistration and activities of religious groups, which are prohibited from engaging in sectarian social movements, missionary work, proselytizing, most forms of religious education, and publication of religious materials deemed extreme, chauvinistic, or separatist. The popularly elected head of state, who may serve no more than two consecutive terms, wields broad authority that includes naming the prime minister and cabinet (subject to parliamentary confirmation), initiating legislation, and serving as commander in chief. The bicameral Supreme Assembly comprises a directly elected 120-member Legislative Chamber and a 100-member Senate. The Senate is largely chosen by and from among regional and local councils but also includes presidential appointees. It has authority to approve certain government officials (ambassadors and Supreme Court justices, for example) as well as limited powers to delay or block bills passed by the Legislative Chamber. At its highest level the independent judiciary includes a Constitutional Court, a Supreme Court, and a High Economic Court. Administratively, Uzbekistan encompasses 12 regions (wiloyatlar), the autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan (Qoraqalpoghiston), and the capital city (Tashkent).

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Subdivisions include some 162 districts and 118 cities and towns. The president appoints regional governors (khokims) as well as lower court judges.

Foreign Relations On December 21, 1991, Uzbekistan became a sovereign member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). By early 1992 it had established diplomatic relations with a number of Western countries, including the United States. On March 2 it was admitted to the United Nations and in September became a member of the IMF and World Bank. It joined the Conference on (later Organization for) Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE/OSCE) in 1992 and subscribed to the NATO-sponsored Partnership for Peace program in July 1994. In June 1996 Tashkent signed a “partnership and cooperation” agreement with the EU. The Uzbek government has continued close relations with Russia. A March 1994 economic integration agreement led in July 1995 to the signing of 15 detailed accords covering economic and military cooperation. During a visit by President Karimov to Russia in May 1998, he and President Boris Yeltsin agreed to coordinate their efforts to control the spread of fundamentalism, with President Imomali Rakhmonov of Tajikistan concurring. In October Yeltsin paid a return visit to Uzbekistan, at which time the two chiefs of state promised mutual aid should either be attacked, presumably by Afghanistan’s Taliban or its allies. In February 1999 Uzbekistan announced that it would not renew its participation in the CIS Collective Security Treaty, although the government denied reports that the decision reflected its objections to military assistance provided by Russia to other regional states, particularly Armenia and Tajikistan. In May 2000 President Karimov, speaking to the Supreme Assembly, stated that Uzbek troops would not be deployed in external conflicts and that, while Russian militarytechnical assistance remained desirable, Russian forces would not be stationed in Uzbekistan. Regionally, during a summit in Tehran, Iran, on February 16–17, 1992, Uzbekistan, along with its sister republics of Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajik-

istan, and Turkmenistan, gained admission to a long-dormant Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), which had been founded by Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan in 1963. Two years later, in January 1994, Uzbekistan joined with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan to form the Central Asian Economic Union (CAEU), which was later extended in scope to cover defense, foreign policy, and social affairs. In July 1998, with Tajikistan having joined as a candidate member in March, the CAEU adopted the name Central Asian Economic Community, which was then reconfigured in March 2002 as the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO). Russia became the fifth member in October 2004. In January 2006 Uzbekistan was admitted to the Eurasian Economic Community of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan, which at the same time decided to absorb the redundant CACO. Uzbekistan has also participated in various summits of Turkic-speaking states. In April 1999 Uzbekistan joined Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova in a regional grouping previously identified by the acronym GUAM but accordingly updated to GUUAM. In June 2002 the Karimov government announced that it was suspending its participation in GUUAM because the organization had not made adequate progress toward regional integration. It then withdrew in May 2005, at which time the organization’s name reverted to GUAM. In June 2001 Uzbekistan joined China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan in establishing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which had begun as the so-called “Shanghai Five” in the mid-1990s. The principal mandate of the SCO is to ensure regional stability, with a particular focus on containing Islamic militancy. Uzbekistan’s overriding concern with Islamic militancy can be traced to the Afghan civil war of the 1990s, when the Uzbek government, despite its denials, was widely reported to be providing weapons and financial assistance to the antiTaliban militia led in the north by Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostam, an ethnic Uzbek. In July 1999, as a member of the “Six-Plus-Two” contact group

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on Afghanistan, Uzbekistan hosted UN-sponsored peace talks between the Taliban and its principal opponents. The Tashkent meeting produced no significant progress in resolving the Afghan civil war, although the Six-Plus-Two partners (China, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and the United States as well as Uzbekistan) reaffirmed their ban on military assistance to all belligerents in the conflict. A month earlier, in an effort to reduce tensions with the Taliban regime, Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz KAMILOV conferred in Kandahar, Afghanistan, with the Taliban’s leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar. Relations remained strained, however, and in late 2001 the Karimov government agreed to support the United States and its allies in the “war on terrorism” and the collateral effort to oust the Taliban. In April 2000 the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan signed a mutual security agreement providing for joint action against terrorism, political and religious extremism, organized crime, and other threats. The situation has been complicated, however, by strongly nationalistic, but antigovernment, sentiments among Kyrgyzstan’s and Tajikistan’s ethnic Uzbek minorities, most of whom are also Muslim. Disputes between Uzbekistan and the other three countries have often involved Islamic militancy and mutual borders. In the mid-1990s Uzbek authorities displayed increasing apprehension that the Tajik civil war might spill across the border. In January 1998 Uzbekistan’s relations with Tajikistan shifted significantly when Presidents Karimov and Rakhmonov signed several bilateral agreements covering, among other things, the resolution of debt issues and joint antidrug activities. The meeting also apparently indicated Karimov’s grudging acceptance of proposed Islamist participation in the Tajik government. Later in the year, however, relations again grew more heated, with President Rakhmonov asserting on November 12 that Uzbekistan had allowed entry to leaders of a failed revolt in northern Tajikistan and that Tashkent had as its goal “to take the whole of Tajikistan under its control.” Shortly thereafter, captured rebels report-

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edly admitted that members of the Uzbek special forces had helped train them. In addition to denying the allegations, Karimov later accused Tajik officials of involvement in drug-trafficking. In August 1999, in an effort to root out ethnic Uzbek militants, government aircraft bombed camps across the Tajik border. Some of the bombs hit Tajik villages, provoking an outcry from Dushanbe. In June 2000, however, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan signed a friendship treaty and agreed to demarcate their border, although the alleged persecution of ethnic Tajiks in Uzbekistan and claims by Tajik nationalists to Uzbek territory continue to cause strains. In August 1999 fundamentalists associated with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) seized hostages in southern Kyrgyzstan and reaffirmed their intention to create an Islamic state in Central Asia. Uzbekistan joined Russia and Kazakhstan in providing military assistance to the Kyrgyz government, which negotiated the release of the final hostages in October. In 2000 Uzbekistan unilaterally began mining its borders with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan as part of its efforts to stop incursions by militants and to halt the flow of illegal drugs. The mining of the border remained a sore point into 2004, when Tashkent announced that it would remove the explosives by the end of the year. In 2005 Kyrgyzstan refused to extradite 29 of the more than 400 refugees who had fled across the border in May to escape the unrest in Andizhan. Relations with Kazakhstan tend to be less volatile. During a visit to Uzbekistan by President Nazarbayev in October 1998, he and President Karimov signed friendship and economic cooperation treaties in addition to agreements relating to industry, crime prevention, education, science, and culture. In April 1999 the two countries agreed to resolve competing boundary claims, which nevertheless remained a matter of contention until the countries’ presidents signed another border agreement in September 2002, with final demarcation later being assigned to a working group that was continuing its activities in 2006. Regional disputes have also often involved water rights. Tensions over water supplies erupted in a demonstration in July 1997 on the Kazakh-Uzbek border

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when Tashkent decided to reduce the amount of water flowing through its territory to southern Kazakhstan. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan debated how much to begin charging Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan for water from Kyrgyz reservoirs. In September the three nations agreed with Turkmenistan and Tajikistan to set up a fund to try to save the Aral Sea by alleviating the damage caused by overuse of the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya rivers for irrigation. More recently, in April 2006 representatives of the regional governments met in Berlin, Germany, in a cooperative effort to conclude an agreement on sharing water and hydroelectricity. The U.S.-led “war on terrorism” provided the Karimov regime with an opportunity to exploit its now-strategic location. Having been visited by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in October 2001 Karimov granted U.S. forces access to the former Soviet air base in Khanabad—the largest such facility in Central Asia—as part of a “qualitatively new relationship” with the United States. Although the initial announcement indicated that the base would be used for launching search and rescue missions and for funneling humanitarian aid to the Afghans, Khanabad was soon being used for offensive staging by U.S. and, later, NATO forces. In March 2002 Karimov met with President George W. Bush at the White House, and he and U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell signed five cooperation agreements, one of which stated that the United States would “regard with grave concern any external threat” to Uzbekistan. For its part, Uzbekistan promised to move forward with its political and economic transformation. In July 2005, however, hard U.S. criticism of the events in Andizhan may have contributed to Tashkent’s demand that U.S. forces vacate the Khanabad base in 180 days. The U.S. withdrawal was completed on November 21.

Current Issues In addition to decrying Karimov’s authoritarianism, the opposition has tried to call attention to the government’s lack of progress in relieving widespread poverty and its persistent human rights violations. The opposition has been widely

supported by sources that include Human Rights Watch, the UN Commission on Human Rights, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the U.S. State Department. Accusations have included arbitrary arrests, secret trials, torture, misuse of mental institutions to house political dissidents, and incarceration of religious practitioners—especially Muslims but also Protestant Christians—for not restricting their activities to officially sanctioned institutions. A year after the May 2005 violent unrest in Andizhan, Uzbekistan’s political climate continued to be dominated by the incident. Although the government had quickly assigned responsibility to the IMU and Hizb-ut-Tahrir, its version of events has never squared with eye-witness accounts. According to some reports, protesters occupied a government building after freeing from prison a number of alleged extremists. A crowd numbering in the low thousands congregated outside the administrative building to protest widespread poverty and civil injustices. President Karimov, mindful of the recent successful revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and, just a month before, Kyrgyzstan, ordered the demonstration suppressed. Under the command of the minister of the interior, Shokirjon ALMATOV, troops opened fire. Human rights groups put the death toll at 500–750, several times higher than the government’s count, and charged that many had been massacred in the streets. The Karimov government rejected demands from the international community for an independent investigation of the incident. As a result, in October 2005 the EU imposed sanctions, including an embargo on the sale of arms and related equipment to Kyrgyzstan. In late December, Almatov, who had been undergoing treatment for cancer in Germany, resigned, ostensibly for health reasons. By then, the government had arrested 150 or more for involvement in the incident, and some had already received lengthy prison terms. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which had been attempting to assist the hundreds who fled from Andizhan to Kyrgyzstan, warned that “unfounded convictions” risked leaving the “real perpetrators of atrocities” unpunished. In March 2006

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the government ordered the UNHCR to leave the country.

Political Parties Throughout most of the 1990s the political system was dominated by the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (PDP), successor to the Sovietera Uzbek Communist Party. Although a small number of other parties were permitted to form, true opposition parties were routinely banned. All five of the progovernment parties discussed below were established with President Karimov’s participation or approval. In October 1995 a number of opposition parties, including Birlik and Erk, formed a Democratic Opposition Coordination Council (DOCC) chaired by former prime minister and vice president Shakhrulla Mirsaidov. In March 1998 Mirsaidov announced his intention to retire from politics and criticized the DOCC members for quarreling among themselves and failing to address the hardships and economic difficulties faced by most Uzbeks. In a surprising reversal, he also claimed that the government had “laid down the foundations” for establishing both a democratic state and a free-market economy. Although Mirsaidov indicated that the DOCC had in effect dissolved, a number of member organizations met a month later and called for greater harmony within the opposition, but also for improved cooperation with the government. A new law on political parties, effective January 7, 1997, proscribed groups based on religious or ethnic lines as well as those considered subversive. Prospective parties were also required to submit evidence that they had no less than 5,000 members, spread over eight provinces. Although 1,010 candidates contested the December 1999 legislative election, the Ministry of Justice refused to register any opposition parties, and no declared opponents of the government were permitted to run. In May 2004 the government reported that registration had been approved for 73 of the 76 nongovernmental organizations and political parties that had applied. Of the 73, however, only 5 were

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officially recognized as parties, all government supportive. The 3 organizations that had been denied registration were Erk, Birlik, and the new Free Peasants’ Party (OD), making them ineligible to contest the December 2004 elections. The government alleged that all 3 had forged signatures on their membership lists. As of 2004, electoral regulations required 50,000 membership signatures for a party to be registered, with no more than 8 percent of the total coming from any single administrative region.

Progovernment Parties Liberal Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (LDP). Aiming to attract businessmen, entrepreneurs, and industrial workers, the LDP held its founding congress in November 2003, a month after receiving the imprimatur of President Karimov. The only new party to have been registered since the 1999 Supreme Assembly election, the LDP contested the December 2004–January 2005 balloting for the new lower house of the Supreme Assembly, finishing first, with 41 seats. The party’s original chair, Qobiljon TOSHMATOV, resigned in May 2004, ostensibly for health reasons, although some reports indicated that he had earned President Karimov’s displeasure at a recent session of the Supreme Assembly. In February 2005 the LDP, Fidokorlar, and Adolat announced formation of a Democratic Bloc in the legislature. Leaders: Muhammadyusuf TESHABOYEV (Chair), Shuhrat ORIPOV. People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan— PDP (Khalk Demokratik Partiiasi). The PDP was organized in November 1991 as successor to the former Uzbek Communist Party, whose activities had been suspended in August. Officially committed to promarket reform and multiparty democracy, the PDP has nevertheless backed the Karimov government’s cautious line on both fronts. In June 1996 President Karimov resigned as party chair and PDP member. His successor, Abdulkhafiz Jalolov, contested the January 2000 presidential race, with Karimov’s approval, but won only 4.2 percent of the vote and subsequently retired from politics. A month earlier the PDP had won 48 Supreme

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Assembly seats, down from the 69 it had claimed at the balloting of December 1994–January 1995. At the December 2004–January 2005 election for the new lower house the PDP won 28 seats, with another 8 being captured by party members who had been nominated by independent citizens’ groups. Leaders: Latifjon GULOMOV (Central Committee Chair), Asliddin RUSTAMOV (First Secretary).

in 1992. Adopting a left-of-center economic and social program, the new party claimed the support of some 50 deputies in the new Supreme Assembly and subsequently obtained official registration. It won 11 Supreme Assembly seats in 1999 and 8 at the 2004–2005 election, not counting 2 seats claimed by party members nominated by independent citizens’ groups. Leader: Turgunpolat DAMINOV (First Secretary).

National Democratic Party “Self-Sacrificers” (Fidokorlar). Established at a congress on December 28, 1998, Fidokorlar (sometimes translated as “Patriots”) was created in response to President Karimov’s call a month earlier for a new party of uncorrupted, more youthful, future leaders. Prior to the congress the party’s formation received Karimov’s approval during a meeting he held with the new group’s leadership, which stated its readiness “to assume responsibility for democracy, justice and the happiness of the people.” Fidokorlar won 34 seats at the December 1999 national election, and in January 2000 President Karimov was reelected under the party’s banner. On April 14, 2000, Fidokorlar and Progress of the Fatherland (Vatan Tarrakiyeti—VT) announced a merger, with the new group to retain Fidokorlar as its name. The VT, founded in 1992, was a promarket party broadly supportive of the Karimov government. Usman ASIMOV, its original chair, had been a member of the opposition Unity movement before accepting appointment to the Presidential Council. It was credited with 14 seats in the December 1994–January 1995 legislative balloting and added 6 more in 1999. The united Fidokorlar held its first congress in June 2000. At the 2004–2005 national election the party won 18 seats, not counting 1 won by a party member nominated by an independent group of citizens. Leader: Ahtam TURSUNOV (First Secretary).

National Revival Party (Milli Tiklanish Partiiasi—MTP). Based in the Uzbek artistic and intellectual community, the MTP held its founding congress in June 1995, declaring its intention to work for national progress and self-awareness. It won 10 Supreme Assembly seats in 1999 and 11 in 2004–2005. Leaders: Xurshid DOSTMUHAMMAD (Chair), Olim USAROV (Deputy Chair).

Justice Social Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (Adolat). Adolat was relaunched in February 1995 as a progovernment grouping, having in a previous incarnation been a grouping of Muslim dissidents that was banned shortly after its formation

Unregistered Groups Birlik Popular Movement Party. The Birlik Party, which held its founding congress in August 2003, traces its origin to the Popular Movement of Uzbekistan “Unity” (Ozbekiston “Birlik” Xalq Harakati—Birlik), a nationalist and secular formation launched in 1988 on a platform that urged secession from the Soviet Union. Presumed to be the strongest of the opposition groups (although weakened by the formation of Erk, below), it was not permitted to contest the presidential balloting of December 1991 and, a year later, was banned by the Supreme Assembly for “antigovernment activities.” Most of its principal leaders were subjected to beatings, imprisonment, and other forms of harassment by the Karimov regime. Having failed to obtain reregistration as a party, Birlik did not contest the 1994–1995 election and held a congress in exile in Moscow in July 1995. Since again being denied party status in 1999, Birlik has continued as a nongovernmental social movement. Hoping to finally achieve recognition as a party, in 2003 Birlik members organized the Birlik Party, which was nevertheless equally unsuccessful in its effort to register. The organization

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has close ties to the Ezgulik human rights society headed by Vasila Inoyatova. Leaders: Abdurahim PULAT (Chair, in exile), Vasila INOYATOVA (Secretary General). Freedom Democratic Party (Erk Demokratik Partiiasi). Erk was organized in April 1990 by a group of Birlik dissidents who called for economic and political autonomy for Uzbekistan within a Soviet federation (i.e., in positive response to President Gorbachev’s union proposal) and rejected the use of violence. Its chair, Muhammad Salih, a prominent poet, was a distant runner-up to the PDP’s Karimov in the 1991 presidential poll and in July 1992 resigned from the legislature (and left the country) after being denied an opportunity to speak. At a joint meeting the same month, Erk and Birlik representatives committed themselves to common action against the Karimov regime. In October 1993 Erk failed to meet a deadline for reregistration as a party because it had no address, its offices having been declared a fire risk. A brother of the Erk chair was reported in August 1995 to have been jailed for five years for activism in the Association of Young Democrats of Turkistan, an Erk affiliate. It was reported in late 1997 that Erk had asked President Karimov to endorse the party’s proposed reregistration and to permit the group’s chair, Muhammad Salih, to return from exile. Karimov subsequently accused Salih of being behind the February 1999 bombings in Tashkent, despite an absence of convincing evidence. Salih was convicted of terrorism in November 2000 and sentenced, in absentia, to 15 years in prison. Erk was permitted to hold its first party congress in ten years in October 2003, but it remained unregistered. An internal dispute saw a number of party members, led by Samad MUROV, argue for replacement of the party leadership—an effort that Secretary General Otanazar Oripov characterized, in February 2004, as a government effort to undermine the party. In May 2006 a National Salvation Committee, newly established among exiles in Kyrgyzstan, proposed Salih as a presidential candidate for 2007.

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Leaders: Muhammad SALIH (SOLIH, SOLIKH; a.k.a. Salay MADAMINOV), Otanazar ORIPOV (Secretary General). Free Peasants’ Party (Ozod Dehqonlar— OD). At its founding congress in December 2003, the OD called for agricultural reform and limitations on presidential powers. In opposition to the government, the party failed to achieve legal status in 2004. In April 2005 the OD announced formation of an opposition coalition called My Sunny Uzbekistan (Serquyosh Ozbekistonim). The Sunny Coalition, as it is also known, is headed by Sanjar UMAROV, who in March 2006 was given a tenyear prison sentence for theft. Leaders: Muhammadbobir MALIKOV (Chair), Olim KARIMOV (Honorary Chair), Nigora HIDOYATOVA (Secretary General). Party of Peasants and Entrepreneurs (PPE). Established in 2003, the PPE joined several opposition forums in 2004, including an April round table discussion organized by various parties and human rights organizations. The party leader, Marat Zohidov, also chairs the unregistered Human Rights Protection Committee. Leader: Marat ZOHIDOV.

Banned Groups Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The militant IMU, which has also been known since 2001 as the Islamic Party of Turkestan, advocates creation of an Islamic republic under Islamic religious law. It has probably never numbered more than 1,000 members. Some may have participated in the Justice (Adolat) Movement that was banned in 1992, but the IMU itself did not emerge until 1999. In May 2000 a U.S. State Department report labeled it as one of the world’s most dangerous terrorist organizations and alleged that it had been behind the February 1999 Tashkent bombings and an August–October hostage situation in Kyrgyzstan. Later reports indicated that at least some members were moving from bases in Tajikistan to Afghanistan, where many of its members were apparently trained at al-Qaida camps.

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Cabinet As of August 1, 2006 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Ministers

Shavkat Mirziyoev Abdulla Aripov Rustam Azimov Svetlana Inamova [f] Rustam Kasymov Nodirkhon Khanov Ergesh Shaismatov

Ministers Agriculture and Water Resources Culture and Sports Defense Economy Education Emergency Situations Finance Foreign Economic Relations, Investments, and Trade Foreign Affairs Higher and Secondary Specialized Education Interior Justice Labor and Social Security Public Education Public Health Social Security and Labor

Sayfiddin Ismoilov Rustam Kurbonov Ruslan Mirzaev Botir Khodjaev Turobjon Jorayev Kobol Berdiev Rustam Azimov Elyor Ganiev Vladimir Norov Rustam Kasymov Bahodir Matlubov Buritosh Mustafayev Akiljan Abidov Turbojon Juraev Feruz Nazirov Oqiljon Obidov

Chairs of State Committees Architecture and Construction Customs Demonopolization, Competition, and Business Support Geology and Mineral Resources Land Resources, Geodesy, Cartography, and Real Estate Nature Protection State Property Management Statistics Taxes

Azamat Tokhtaev Sodirkhon Nosirov Boymurot Ulashev Nurmukhammad Akhmedov Ergashali Kurbanov Bari Alikhanov Dilshod Musayev Gafurjon Kudratov Botir Parpiyev

[f] = female

In June 2000 a municipal court sentenced ten people to 7–17 years in prison for undermining the constitution and other offenses. All were alleged to be IMU supporters, including a brother

of the IMU commander, Juma NAMANGONIY (the nom de guerre of Jumaboy KHOJIYEV). Two IMU incursions from across the Tajik border occurred in August 2000. Operations against

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the 100 or so militants continued into September. Two months later, on November 17, the Supreme Court found IMU leaders Tohir Yoldoshev and Namangoniy guilty, in absentia, of terrorism and imposed death sentences. In November 2001 Namangoniy was killed in Afghanistan, where IMU forces suffered heavy losses as allies of the Taliban. In May 2005 the Uzbek government assigned blame for the Andizhan unrest to the IMU and Hizb-utTahrir (below). In 2004 an offshoot, the Jihad Islamic Group, also known as Jamoat (“societies” or “groups”), claimed responsibility for suicide bombings in Tashkent. Leader: Tohir YOLDOSHEV (Tahir YOLDASH). Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP). Founded in 1990 and based in the Ferghana Valley, the IRP is a fundamentalist Muslim group similar to those of Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. It was banned in 1991 under legislation proscribing religious parties, with its leader, Abdullah UTAYEV, reported in early 1993 to have “disappeared” after being imprisoned the previous year. Hizb ut-Tahrir. Originating in the 1950s in Syria, the Hizb ut-Tahrir (Liberation Party) is a pan-Islamic movement that has been banned in a number of countries throughout Northern Africa and the Middle East. Its Central Asian activists support establishment of an Islamic state in portions of Uzbekistan, southern Kyrgyzstan, and western Tajikistan. Some of those convicted for the February 1999 bombings in Tashkent claimed allegiance to the group, as did others rounded up by authorities following the incident. In 2004 President Karimov repeatedly asserted that Hizb ut-Tahrir was responsible for bombings in March–April and again in late July. He also alleged that the organization was involved in the May 2005 Andizhan incident.

Legislature The Supreme Assembly (Oliy Majlis) was initially established as a unicameral legislature of 250 directly elected members. Amendments to the elec-

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tion law passed after the 1994 balloting opened the nomination process to citizens’ initiative groups in addition to political parties and local authorities. Constitutional revisions passed by referendum in February 2002 called for establishment of a bicameral Supreme Assembly encompassing a Senate and a Legislative Chamber, with the members of both serving five-year terms.

Senate The Senate comprises 100 members: 16 presidential appointees in addition to 84 representatives (6 from each of the country’s 12 regions, 6 from the capital, and 6 from the Karakalpakstan autonomous republic), chosen by and from among regional “representative bodies of state power.” Elected members were most recently chosen on a nonpartisan basis on January 17–20, 2005. Named on January 24, the initial presidential appointees included several cabinet members, judges, academics, heads of civil organizations, and industrialists. Speaker: Ilgizor SOBIROV.

Legislative Chamber The lower chamber, directly elected from among nominees put forward by parties and citizens’ groups, comprises 120 members. The first election to the Legislative Chamber, held December 26, 2004, with runoff balloting in 58 constituencies taking place on January 9, 2005, produced the following results: Liberal Democratic Party of Uzbekistan, 41 seats; People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (PDP), 28; National Democratic Party “Self-Sacrificers” (Fidokorlar), 18; National Revival Party, 11; Justice Social Democratic Party of Uzbekistan (Adolat), 8; nominees of citizens’ initiative groups, 14. Of the last 14, 8 nominees were PDP members, 2 were members of Adolat, and 1 belonged to Fidokorlar. Speaker: Erkin KHALILOV.

Communications It was reported in January 1995 that a registration process completed the previous month had

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effectively denied authorization to all independent publications and that only the organs of the state “power structures” were able to continue publishing. In May 2002 Uzbekistan ostensibly ended formal press censorship, but the government continues to dominate the media and exert overwhelming pressure on nongovernmental outlets. The international monitoring group Reporters Without Borders has repeatedly reported that journalists’ rights have been seriously threatened in Uzbekistan. Both print and broadcast journalists were prohibited from reporting on the Andizhan unrest in 2005.

Press The following are published at least five times a week in Tashkent in Uzbek, unless otherwise noted: Khalk Suzi (People’s World, 55,000), government organ, in Uzbek and Russian; Narodnoye Slovo (People’s Word, 50,000), weekly, government organ in Russian and Uzbek; Fidokor (30,000), three times a week, Fidokorlar party organ; Marifat (Enlightenment, 20,000), twice weekly; Pravda Vostoka (Eastern Truth, 10,000), government organ in Russian.

News Agencies The domestic facility is the Uzbek National News Agency (UzA), headquartered in Tashkent. Leading American, British, French, and Russian bureaus also have offices in the capital.

Broadcasting and Computing The State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company runs Radio Tashkent International, which broadcasts in Uzbek and a dozen other languages. Uzbek Television offers local programming and relayed broadcasts from Russia and several other countries, while a joint venture with a U.S. firm provides satellite TV service and relays from the United States, the United Kingdom, India, and Russia. There are a number of other private broadcasting companies. In January 1999 the British Broadcasting Corporation was, in effect, forced off the air when the government directed that its broadcasts return to Soviet-era frequencies, thereby rendering them inaccessible to most Uzbeks. There were 7.4 million television receivers and 492,000 Internet users in 2003.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. Abdulaziz KAMILOV U.S. Ambassador to Uzbekistan Jon R. PURNELL Permanent Representative to the UN Alisher VOHIDOV IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, CIS, EBRD, ECO, IDB, Interpol, NAM, OIC, OSCE, WCO

VA N U A T U REPUBLIC

OF

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R´e publique de Vanuatu (French) Ripablik blong Vanuatu (Bislama)

The Country An 800-mile-long archipelago of some 80 islands, Vanuatu is situated in the western Pacific southeast of the Solomon Islands and northeast of New Caledonia. The larger islands of the group are Espiritu Santo, Malekula, Tanna, Ambrym, Pentecost, Erromanga, Aoba, Epi, and Efat´e, on which the capital, Vila, is located. Over 90 percent of the inhabitants are indigenous Melanesians; the remainder encompasses small groups of French, English, Vietnamese, Chinese, and other Pacific islanders. Approximately 85 percent are Christian, Presbyterians constituting the largest single denomination, followed by Roman Catholics and Anglicans. Approximately three-quarters of adult women have been described as “economically active,” most of them in agricultural pursuits; female participation in government, on either the village or national level, is minimal. The bulk of the population is engaged in some form of agriculture: Coconuts, taro, and yams are grown for subsistence purposes, with copra, kava, timber, cocoa, and beef constituting the principal exports. In 1981 a national airline was established, while maritime legislation was enacted to promote Vanuatu as “a flag of convenience.” The country has also emerged as an offshore financial center, with well over 1,000 companies (including more than 60 banks as of 2000) incorporated in Port Vila yielding close to $1.5 million annually in revenue. Although Vanuatu had been formally characterized by the United Nations as a “least developed country,” tourism, forestry projects, and the dis-

covery of promising mineral deposits, including gold and manganese, offer potential for long-term economic growth. From 1990 to 1997, however, the annual real change in GNP averaged −3.5 percent. Growth of 6 percent in 1998 was followed by another downturn, of 2.5 percent, in 1999, in part because of adverse weather. Renewed expansion of 2.8 percent occurred in 2000, with further improvement thereafter to an estimated 3.7 percent in 2005. The recent promising economic results led the UN to announce in July 2006 that Vanuatu is likely to qualify for “developing country” status by 2013. Its

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current status, however, has made Vanuatu eligible for the U.S. Millennium Challenge Account Fund: Vanuatu will receive $66 million under a five-year fund program. In June 2000 Vanuatu was threatened with economic sanctions by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for “harmful” policies related to its offshore financial services. Although the government subsequently pledged its cooperation in fighting money laundering and other financial crimes, in 2001 it insisted that it had the right to set its own tax policies and would not share information about nonnational accounts with foreign tax authorities. However, it later relented and in May 2003 was taken off the OECD’s list of uncooperative tax havens.

Government and Politics Political Background Settled during the first half of the 19th century by a variety of British and French nationals, including a sizable contingent of missionaries, the New Hebrides subsequently became the scene of extensive labor recruitment by plantation owners in Fiji and Queensland. Following a series of unsuccessful efforts to stem the frequently inhumane practice of “blackbirding,” Britain and France established a Joint Naval Commission in 1886 to safeguard order in the archipelago. Two decades later, faced with competition by German interests, the two governments agreed to form a cumbersome but reasonably serviceable condominium structure that entailed dual instruments of administration at all levels, including two police forces, two resident commissioners, and two local commissioners in each of the territory’s four districts. A 42-member Representative Assembly (replacing an Advisory Council established in 1957) convened for the first time in November 1976 but immediately became embroiled in controversy as to whether 13 members not elected by universal suffrage (4 representing tribal chiefs and 9 representing economic interests) should be required to declare party allegiance. Condemning what they

termed the “present unworkable system of government,” the 21 representatives of the Party of Our Land (Vanua’aku Pati—VP) boycotted the second assembly session in February 1977, prompting the colonial administrators to call a new election, the results of which were voided because of another VP boycott. At the assembly election of November 14, 1979, the VP won 26 of 39 seats, and on November 29 party leader Fr. Walter Hadye LINI was designated as chief minister. Earlier, the colonial powers had agreed to independence in 1980, a constitution having been drafted in September and approved in a series of notes between London and Paris in October. The attainment of independence on July 30, 1980, was clouded by secessionist movements on a number of islands, most importantly Espiritu Santo, whose principal town had been seized, with indirect support from the local French community, by the cultist Na-Griamel movement under the leadership of Jimmy Tupou Patuntun STEVENS. The Vanuatu flag was, however, raised on Santo on July 30 by an emissary of the Lini government in the presence of a contingent of British and French troops that was withdrawn on August 18 upon the arrival of a Papua New Guinean force backed by central government police. Most of the insurgents subsequently surrendered, and Stevens was sentenced on November 21 to a prison term of 14.5 years (ultimately serving 11, before being released because of poor health). The aftermath of the revolt continued well into 1981, with over 700 eventually convicted of crimes related to it. Stevens’s trial had revealed that the insurgency was supported by both the former French resident commissioner (subsequently declared persona non grata by the Lini government) and the Phoenix Foundation, a right-wing group based in Carson City, Nevada. By late 1981 the security situation had improved substantially, and all of the imprisoned rebels except Stevens and his principal lieutenant, Timothy WELLES, were released. The Lini government was returned to office in the islands’ first postindependence election on November 2, 1983. Three months later, following

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Political Status: Formerly the New Hebrides; became the Anglo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides in 1906; present name adopted upon becoming an independent member of the Commonwealth on July 30, 1980. Area: 4,647 sq. mi. (12,035 sq. km.). Population: 186,678 (1999C); 226,000 (2005E). Major Urban Center (2005E): VILA (Port Vila, 36,600). Official Languages: English, French, Bislama. The last, a pidgin dialect, is recognized constitutionally as the “national language,” and efforts are currently under way to accord it equal status with English and French as a medium of instruction. Monetary Unit: Vatu (official rate July 1, 2006: 114.02 vatu = $1US). President: Kalkot MATASKELEKELE; selected for a five-year term by the electoral college on August 16, 2004, succeeding Alfred Maseng NALO, who had been elected on April 12 but had been removed from office by the Supreme Court on May 10 because of past criminal convictions and replaced, on an acting basis, by parliamentary speaker Roger ABIUT. Prime Minister: Ham LINI (National United Party); elected by the Parliament on December 11, 2004, to succeed Serge VOHOR, who had lost a no-confidence vote on the same day.

his conviction on a charge of nonpayment of a road tax, President George Ati SOKOMANU resigned. Despite voicing his frustration with Father Lini and offering to lead a new “national unity” government as prime minister, Sokomanu was reappointed to his former post by the electoral college on March 8. Lini was returned to office at the balloting of November 30, 1987, with the VP’s vote share falling for the first time below 50 percent, while the opposition Union of Moderate Parties (Union blong Moderet Pati—UMP) increased its showing to 42 percent, compared with 33 percent in 1983. Following the 1987 election a leadership dispute erupted between Lini and party ideologue Barak SOPE Ma’au Tamate, who mounted an unsuccess-

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ful bid for the prime ministership and was subsequently charged with instigating a major riot in Vila on May 16, 1988. In the wake of the disturbance, Sope was dismissed from the cabinet, stripped of his longtime post as party secretary general, and, along with four associates, expelled from the party after endorsing a no-confidence motion against the administration. On July 25 the “Gang of Five” was also ousted from Parliament under a 1983 Vacation of Seats Act that precluded alteration of party affiliation by members. In response to the action, 18 members of the opposition UMP initiated a legislative boycott and on July 27 were also expelled for violating a parliamentary ban on three consecutive absences. Ironically, the Vanuatu Court of Appeal on October 21 ruled the 1983 act unconstitutional and reinstated the Sope parliamentarians (who had regrouped as the Melanesian Progressive Party— MPP) while upholding the ouster of the UMP members. Five days after by-elections on December 13, 1988, for the vacated UMP seats, which neither the UMP nor the MPP contested, President Sokomanu attempted to dissolve Parliament and name an “interim” government headed by Sope. Lini reacted by arresting Sope and his “ministers,” with the Supreme Court ruling on December 19 that the president’s action had been unconstitutional because it had not been undertaken with the support of two-thirds of the legislators and the advice of the prime minister. On January 12, 1989, Sokomanu was dismissed from office for “gross misconduct,” and on January 30 Health Minister Fred TIMAKATA was designated by the electoral college as his successor. Subsequently, Sokomanu was convicted of incitement to mutiny and sentenced to a six-year prison term, while Sope and UMP leader Maxime CARLOT received five-year sentences for seditious conspiracy and treason. The sentences were dismissed in April by an appeals tribunal of jurists from Tonga, Papua New Guinea, and Vanuatu, although the convictions were allowed to stand. At a party congress in April 1991 Lini was severely castigated by four ministerial associates, including the VP’s secretary general, Donald

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KALPOKAS, for what was viewed as an increasingly autocratic and arbitrary leadership style. An ultimatum in May that the dissidents pledge their loyalty or face dismissal yielded a joint letter suggesting that the prime minister himself step down. Lini thereupon sacked the ministers, although an attempt to oust Kalpokas from his party post was rebuffed by the VP’s Executive Council. In the wake of numerous other purges of government personnel (the prime minister at one point reported to be holding more than 50 portfolios), Lini was replaced as VP president at a special party congress on August 7, 1991, by Kalpokas. On September 6, after President Timakata had denied a request that Parliament be dissolved, Lini was also ousted as prime minister, with Kalpokas designated his successor. Lini and a number of supporters thereupon organized the National Unity Party (NUP), which, by splitting the traditional VP vote at the election of December 2, gave a plurality to the francophone UMP. On December 16, in an action he characterized as stemming from a “pact with the devil,” the UMP’s Carlot (the honorific “Korman” subsequently being added to his name) formed a governing coalition with the NUP and a small regional formation, Fren Melanesia. Initially withdrawing to the status of a parliamentary backbencher, Lini precipitated a government crisis in mid-1993 by reportedly demanding appointment as deputy prime minister and minister of justice. Rebuffed in the matter, Lini and five legislative colleagues withdrew their support for the government, thereby causing a rupture with a progovernment NUP faction led by Sethy John REGENVANU, which subsequently reorganized as the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). The ensuing reduction in Carlot Korman’s parliamentary majority to 24 of 46 seats made it impossible to reach the two-thirds majority in the electoral college needed to elect a new president at the expiration of the incumbent Timakata’s term on January 31, 1994. It was not until March 2 that a compromise government nominee, Jean-Marie LEYE Lenelgau, was able to secure election through a decision by the VP, which held 9 legislative seats, to support his candidacy. As a result of its action the VP was ex-

pelled from the opposition coalition, with Barak Sope succeeding the VP’s Kalpokas as leader of the opposition. In September 1994, as the result of a Decentralisation Act approved four months earlier, the country’s 11 local government councils were abolished to pave the way for elected bodies in six newly defined provinces. For the ensuing provincial council balloting of November 15, the opposition consisted, on the one hand, of Lini’s NUP and, on the other, of a Unity Front (UF) coalition encompassing the VP, the MPP, the Tan Union, and a relegalized NaGriamel under the leadership of its founder’s son, Frankie STEVENS (although the younger Stevens was also serving as the leader of government business in Parliament). The result was a three-way split, with the UMP, NUP, and UF winning two provinces each, although the UF secured an overall plurality of 41 seats, as contrasted with 34 and 20 for the UMP and NUP, respectively. At the general election of November 30, 1995, Kalpokas’s UF secured a plurality of 20 legislative seats, while Carlot’s UMP won 17 and Lini’s NUP, 9. Meanwhile, a deep intra-UMP split had developed between Carlot and the party president, Serge VOHOR, with the UF seeking an alliance both with the Vohor faction and with the NUP. Intense negotiation then ensued, with Vohor eventually concluding a pact with the NUP that yielded his installation as Carlot’s successor on December 24. In early February 1996 a number of Carlot’s supporters joined the UF in a motion of no confidence in Vohor, whose resignation averted the need for a vote and permitted Carlot to form a new government in coalition with the UF. The dispute between Carlot and Vohor intensified in March, with Vohor convening a UMP congress (on his home island of Santo) at which Carlot and his supporters were expelled from the party. Two months later, anti-Vohor faction leader Amos ANDENG called for a retaliatory congress (in Carlot’s home village of Erakor) that declared the action of the Santo meeting invalid and named Carlot to succeed Vohor as UMP president. In mid-1996 the Carlot administration was rocked by the issuance of an ombudsman’s report

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charging that the country faced bankruptcy because of an alleged scam involving issuance of letters of guarantee signed by Carlot and his finance minister, Barak Sope. While denying any wrongdoing, the prime minister shuffled his cabinet on August 5, reassigning Sope to the Ministry of Commerce and Trade. Having refused to accept the demotion, Sope was dismissed from the government on August 12. Concurrently, Carlot cited the MPP leader for “disloyalty” in withdrawing his party from the UF in favor of a new alliance with the Tan Union and Fren Melanesia, styled the MTF. The government coalition thus being effectively reduced to his UMP faction and the VP rump of the UF, Carlot succumbed to a nonconfidence vote on September 30 and was immediately succeeded by party rival Vohor, who named Sope as his deputy. On October 12, 1996, while Vohor was visiting French Polynesia, striking members of the paramilitary Vanuatu Mobile Force (VMF) abducted President Leye and flew him to the northern island of Malekula for talks at gunpoint with Acting Prime Minister Sope, who promised that payment would be forthcoming to the VMF for long overdue arrears of $980,000. Thirteen days later Sope and three MTF ministerial colleagues were sacked in a cabinet shakeup that brought the VP into the government as a coalition partner of Vohor’s UMP faction and the NUP. In late May 1997 Vohor and Carlot were apparently reconciled, with Carlot and his UMP-Natora faction joining Vohor’s UMP group, Sope’s MPP, and the NUP in a new government coalition, the VP’s Kalpokas again becoming leader of a oneparty opposition. However, the friction between Carlot and Vohor soon resurfaced, with the former filing a nonconfidence motion in November against the prime minister, whose government had been the target of numerous corruption allegations. President Leye immediately dissolved the legislature and ordered new elections, which, following a January 1998 Court of Appeal ruling upholding his decision, were held on March 6. The balloting produced no significant alteration in the party makeup of the Parliament, and intense negotiations were reportedly required before the VP and the NUP,

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longtime rivals, agreed to form the next government. On March 30 the VP’s Kalpokas returned to the prime ministerial post he had held in the early 1990s, while the NUP’s Lini was named deputy prime minister. On October 19, 1998, Kalpokas dismissed Lini and expelled his NUP from the ruling coalition because of the party’s participation in drafting a nonconfidence motion against the government. Kalpokas then formed a new alliance with a faction of the UMP headed by Willie JIMMY and the John Frum Movement (JFM). Nearly two dozen candidates competed in the 1999 presidential race. Not surprisingly, no one received the required support at the first round of balloting of the electoral college in mid-March. Following apparently intense negotiations, Fr. John Bernard BANI, an Anglican minister and Kalpokas ally, was elected on March 25 with the reported support of all parties except the NUP, even though he had received only two votes on the first ballot. The government lost its parliamentary majority at by-elections in August 1999 and, facing the loss of a no-confidence vote, Kalpokas resigned on November 25. MPP leader Barak Sope was immediately elected his successor, appointing a coalition administration that included members of the JFM, the NUP, the UMP, the Vanuatu Republican Party (VRP), and Fren Melanesia Pati (FMP). Divisions within the UMP, including the departure in early 2001 of Willie Jimmy’s faction, were followed in late March by Serge Vohor’s decision to withdraw what was left of the UMP from the government and side with the VP, now headed by Edward NATAPEI, leader of the opposition. Without UMP support, Prime Minister Sope could no longer command a parliamentary majority, but he failed to convince President Bani to dissolve Parliament and schedule a new general election. In early April Parliament Speaker Paul Ren TARI of the NUP refused to permit legislative debate on a noconfidence motion filed by the opposition, which turned to the courts for redress. With the country’s chief justice having threatened to cite Tari for contempt if he failed to let debate proceed, on April 13 the no-confidence motion passed 27–18,

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immediately after which Natapei was elected prime minister at the head of a VP-UMP coalition. At the parliamentary election of May 2, 2002, Natapei’s VP secured 14 seats and its coalition partner, the UMP, won 15, thereby ensuring the reelection of Natapei as prime minister when the new Parliament convened on June 3. His tenure ended with the inconclusive election of July 6, 2004, that yielded the third designation of the UMP’s Serge Vohor on July 29. Vohor subsequently became embroiled in a dispute over his decision in early November to establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan (see Foreign relations, below), and his government fell on December 11, with the election of Ham LINI as the head of a nine-party coalition administration.

sition; of the other three justices, one is nominated by the speaker of Parliament, one by the president of the National Council of Chiefs, and one by the council presidents. A Court of Appeal is constituted by two or more Supreme Court justices sitting together. Parliament is authorized to establish village and island courts, as deemed appropriate. The six provinces created in 1994 bear names that are acronyms of those of their principal islands. Stretching roughly from north to south they are Torba (Torres, Banks), Sama (Espirito Santo, Malo), Penama (Pentacost, Ambae, Ma´ewo), Malampa (Malakula, Ambrym, Paama), Shefa (Shepherds, Epi, Efat´e), and Tafea (Tanna, Anatom, Futuna, Erromango, Aniwa).

Foreign Relations Constitution and Government Under the independence constitution, Vanuatu’s head of state is a largely titular president designated for a five-year term by an electoral college consisting of the Parliament and local (now provincial) council presidents. Executive power is vested in a prime minister elected by secret legislative ballot; both the prime minister and other ministers (whom the prime minister appoints) must hold legislative seats. Members of the unicameral Parliament are elected from multimember constituencies through a partially proportional system intended “to ensure fair representation of different political groups and opinions.” The legislative term is four years, subject to dissolution. There is also a National Council of Chiefs, whose members are designated by peers sitting in District Councils of Chiefs. The National Council is empowered to make recommendations to the government and Parliament on matters relating to indigenous custom and language. A national ombudsman is appointed by the president after consultation with the prime minister, party leaders, the president of the National Council of Chiefs, and others. The judicial system is headed by a four-member Supreme Court, the chief justice being named by the president after consultation with the prime minister and the leader of the oppo-

Although Vanuatu was not admitted to the United Nations until the fall of 1981, it became, at independence, a member both of the Commonwealth and the Agence de Coop´eration Culturelle et Technique, an organization established in 1969 to promote cultural and technical cooperation within the French-speaking world. Regionally, it is a member of the Pacific Community and the Pacific Islands Forum, while in 1984 both the Asian Development Bank and the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific established regional headquarters in Port Vila. Diplomatic relations were established with the Soviet Union in July 1986 and with the United States the following October, although Vanuatu maintains no embassies abroad. Under the francophone UMP, Vanuatu’s prior policy of supporting liberation struggles and actively attacking remaining pockets of colonialism in the Pacific subsided, particularly with regard to the French territory of New Caledonia. On the other hand, President Jacques Chirac’s 1995 announcement that France would launch a new series of nuclear tests at Mururoa Atoll in September posed a dilemma for Prime Minister Carlot Korman. While indicating that his government would end its intransigence and approve the Treaty of Rarotonga

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establishing a South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone, he refused to join his regional colleagues in condemning the testing, insisting that it was a purely internal matter of France. In a highly unusual move, Prime Minister Vohor announced on November 3, 2004, that Vanuatu had established relations with Taiwan, asserting that the country could continue to maintain existing relations with the People’s Republic of China (a position to which the PRC took immediate exception). His own cabinet responded by voting twice against the action, and on November 16 Vohor dismissed Foreign Minister Barak Sope, who had led the opposition to it. The outcome was Vohor’s ouster on December 11 and repudiation of “all agreements made by Vohor with Taiwan” by the new government’s foreign minister, Sato KILMAN. Subsequently, during a visit to China in March 2005, Prime Minister Lini applauded Beijing’s reunification efforts under a one-China policy. Vanuatu is also a member of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), a South Pacific island regional bloc that includes Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands. The MSG was formed in 1986 to promote economic development and sustainable growth, good government, preservation of Melanesian cultures, and regional cooperation and security among members, and in the 1990s was a force supporting decolonization movements in New Caledonia. In 2006 Vanuatu sponsored the MSG draft constitution presented at the MSG Senior Officials Meeting in Buala, Solomon Islands, scheduled for adoption by a MSG Leaders’ Summit later in 2006. The government was less enthusiastic about MSG proposals to establish a joint security force: Prime Minister Lini supported the concept but maintained that the proposition was expensive and therefore behind other financial priorities. Membership in the Pacific Islands Forum has increased Vanuatu’s support for greater regional and international labor mobility as a means for improving the local economy, especially in regard to greater access to Australia and New Zealand labor markets for its citizens. In 2006 Vanuatu sought

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to formally restart talks for accession to the World Trade Organization. Talks were suspended in 2001 in part over Vanuatu’s unwillingness to expose its retail, telecommunications, and services sectors to rapid liberalization.

Current Issues Few countries have displayed party alliances as tenuous as those of Vanuatu. In the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s the VP and the UMP were repeatedly split by factional disputes that ultimately saw breakaway groups form the MPP, the NUP, the VRP, and other less significant parties. Invariably, these ruptures arose as much from personality and leadership clashes as from policy differences. Thus the nearly all-encompassing coalition formed by Ham Lini in late 2004 was more a result of the row over Volor’s seemingly impetuous Taiwan move than a sudden coalescence on government policy. By the same token, the coalition could fracture as easily as it had been formed. President Mataskelekele wrote a formal letter to Prime Minister Lini in June 2006 repeating his recommendation that Vanuatu adopt a republican system of government with a popularly elected president who would be the head of state and the head of government with the power to appoint a cabinet whose members may not necessarily be members of Parliament. The president first made this suggestion at the opening session of Parliament earlier in the year. His letter stated that his would require review by the Constitutional Review Committee before approval by the Parliament, and then adoption via a national referendum. Mataskelekele’s concern was to avoid further episodes of political instability in government. Prime Minister Lini acknowledged in August that the country did need to engage in a review of the national constitution but stopped short of endorsing a presidential system. In July 2006 Prime Minister Lini reorganized portfolios in the cabinet to redesignate the former Ministry of Comprehensive Reform Program as the Ministry of Justice and Social Welfare (under the same minister) and shifted the reform

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program portfolio under the prime minister’s office. The public justification was to place strategic planning and reform under the head of government.

Political Parties Parliamentary Parties National Unity Party (NUP). The NUP was organized by Fr. Walter Lini following his ouster as VP president on August 7, 1991, and his defeat on a parliamentary nonconfidence motion on September 6. A majority (21) of the VP MPs supported Lini in the September vote, leaving his successor, Donald Kalpokas, with a bare overall majority. After winning ten seats in the December balloting, the NUP joined the coalition supporting Maxime Carlot as prime minister. However, a majority faction led by Lini withdrew its support of Carlot in August 1993. In May 1994 Deputy Prime Minister Sethy REGENVANU and two other NUP MPs who had remained in the Kalpokas cabinet in the wake of Lini’s withdrawal were expelled from the party; in June they formed the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Third-ranked with nine seats, after the 1995 election, the NUP reentered the government as the UMP’s junior partner. Excluded from the Carlot government of February 1996, it returned as a participant in the second Vohor administration in late October 1996, although Lini did not enter the cabinet until succeeding his estranged sister, Hilda LINI, as justice minister in November. Prior to his dismissal in October 1998, Walter Lini served as Prime Minister Kalpokas’s deputy in a VP-NUP coalition. He died on February 21, 1999. Ten months later the NUP was a leading participant in formation of Barak Sope’s five-party government. At the 2002 parliamentary election the NUP declined from 11 to 8 seats, but it rebounded to a plurality of 10 seats in July 2004, with Lini’s brother, Ham, forming a coalition government on December 11. Leaders: Ham LINI (Prime Minister), Willie TITONGOA (Secretary General). Party of Our Land (Vanua’aku Pati—VP). Long at the forefront of the drive for indepen-

dence and the return of indigenous lands, the VP was formed in 1972 as the New Hebrides National Party. Its boycott of a Representative Assembly election in 1977 led to cancellation of the results. It won 26 of 46 legislative seats in November 1987, a reduction, proportionally, from 24 of 39 in 1983. In an unexpected contest in December 1987, (then) Secretary General Barak Sope challenged Fr. Walter Lini for the party leadership but was defeated by a near 2–1 vote. Sope was expelled from Parliament on July 25, 1988, after having been dismissed from the cabinet and the party for reportedly instigating a riot in Vila in mid-May. He and four other former VP members responded by announcing the formation of a rival Melanesian Progressive Party (MPP, below), whose members refused to accept courtsanctioned legislative reinstatement on October 21. Subsequently, in early 1989, Sope was convicted of sedition after having been named head of the antiLini “interim government” by President Sokomanu in mid-December. The VP won all of the 5 vacant seats filled by special elections in 1989 because of boycotts by the MPP and UMP. The VP split as a result of the 1991 ouster of its longtime leader, Father Lini, who subsequently formed the NUP. Prior to the November 1994 provincial elections the party joined the MPP and the Tan Union in a coalition called the Unity Front (UF), which won a plurality of 20 seats in the general election of November 1995 but became effectively moribund upon withdrawal of the MPP and Tan Union in August 1996. The VP returned to government in October 1996, moved into opposition in May 1997, and in March 1998 joined with the NUP in forming an administration under Donald Kalpokas that lasted until November 1999. Shortly thereafter, Kalpokas was replaced as party leader by Edward Natapei, who became prime minister in April 2001 and retained the post after the May 2002 election, at which the party won 14 seats. He was forced to resign after the election of June 2004, at which the VP was reduced to 8 seats. A member of the Vanua K Group (VKG), a VP splinter on Tanna, was named education minister in the Ham Lini government.

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Leaders: Edward NATAPEI (Former Prime Minister), Donald KALPOKAS (Former Prime Minister and Honorary President of the Party), Sela MOLISA (Secretary General). Vanuatu Republican Party—VRP (Ripablikan Pati blong Vanuatu). The formation of the VRP was announced in January 1998 by Maxime Carlot, who had previously led a UMP faction opposed to Prime Minister Vohor. The VRP won three seats at the May 2002 legislative election, four in 2004. Leader: Maxime CARLOT Korman (Former Prime Minister). Melanesian Progressive Party (MPP). The MPP was organized by Barak Sope and four other VP members after the former VP secretary general had been expelled from the party in mid-1988. In April 1989 ousted president George Sokomanu formally joined the new group after he, Sope, and two others had been released from prison by reversal of their sedition convictions. During 1989 both the Vanuatu Independent Alliance Party (VIAP) and the National Democratic Party (NDP) merged with the MPP. The VIAP was a Santo-based group formed in June 1982 by two dismissed VP ministers, Thomas Reuben SERU and George WOREK; for the 1983 campaign it adopted a platform based on “free enterprise capitalism and anticommunism,” losing all three of its existing parliamentary seats. The NDP was formed in late 1986 by John NAUPA, transport minister in the Lini government from 1980 to 1983; it was critical of the administration’s handling of the economy and insisted that foreign policy should concentrate on the maintenance of good relations with Britain and France. Following Prime Minister Sope’s ouster in April 2001, it appeared likely that the MPP and the other leading opposition party, the NUP, would establish a coalition or merge. Instead, an MPP faction led by Sato Kilman split off (see PPP, below) in August, and the MPP won only three seats at the 2002 election and an equal number in 2004. Leaders: Barak SOPE Ma’au Tamate (Former Prime Minister and Party Chair), George Ati

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SOKOMANU (Former President of the Republic), Georges CALO (Secretary General). Vanuatu Green Party (VGP). Vincent Boulekone and Paul TELUKLUK organized the Vanuatu Greens after leaving the UMP in early 2001. Boulekone had previously helped found the Tan Union, also a splinter from the UMP, before the December 1988 election, but he had subsequently rejoined the parent party. His 2001 departure coincided with that of Willie Jimmy and was generally regarded as reflecting leadership, rather than ideological differences with the UMP’s Serge Vohor faction. The Greens won three parliamentary seats in May 2002; the seats were retained in 2004 by a Green Confederation (GC) that included the VGP and the Vanuatu Green Alliance (VGA). Telukluk won a seat in the 2004 poll as leader of the Namangi Aute (NA), a rural group from North Malekula. Leaders: Vincent BOULEKONE, Fr. Gerard LEYMANG. Union of Moderate Parties (Union des Partis Moder´es—UPM/Union blong Moderet Pati— UMP). The UMP is the successor to the New Hebrides Federal Party, which was organized in early 1979 as an alliance of predominantly pro-French groups, including Jimmy Stevens’s Na-Griamel. Following the deportation of two Federal Party MPs to New Caledonia in 1982 for involvement in the Santo rebellion, the nonsecessionist elements of the party regrouped under the present label, winning 12 seats at the 1983 election and 19 seats in 1987. Party leader Vincent Boulekone was ousted from Parliament in 1986 for missing meetings but was ordered reinstated by the Supreme Court, which ruled that ill health excused the absences. Following the 1987 balloting, he was replaced by Maxime Carlot. On July 27, 1988, 18 UMP members were dismissed from Parliament after having walked out in protest at Barak Sope’s expulsion, the party refusing to recontest the seats at by-elections on December 13. Carlot was among those convicted of sedition after having been named deputy prime minister in the abortive Sope government of December 18.

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The Tan Union, a now-defunct breakaway UMP faction headed by Boulekone, contested the December balloting, becoming the official opposition upon winning six legislative seats. Following the December 1991 election, at which it won a plurality of 19 seats, the UMP joined with Lini’s NUP to form a coalition government under Carlot. Most of the Lini group went into opposition in mid-1993, save for a faction that later reorganized briefly as the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) to continue as the UMP’s junior partner. A new UMP-NUP coalition was concluded after the November 1995 balloting, although the UMP was by then divided into factions led by Carlot and Serge Vohor. Carlot left the UMP in early 1998 to launch the VRP, and the party was further split by the decision of a faction led by Willie Jimmy to support the VP-led Kalpokas government in October. Vohor and Jimmy, rivals for the party leadership, reached a short-lived accommodation at a November 2000 party congress, but in early 2001 Jimmy announced his resignation from the UMP and eventually joined the NUP. Meanwhile, Vohor’s decision to leave the Barak Sope government led to the nonconfidence motion that ended Sope’s tenure in April 2001, with Vohor then being appointed deputy prime minister in the Natapei VPUMP administration. The UMP won a plurality of 15 seats at the May 2002 parliamentary election, 7 of which were lost in July 2004. Vohor’s unpopular decision as prime minister to establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 2004 cost him some clout both inside and outside the party. Rumors circulated in mid-2006 that he might face a challenge for the party leadership at a scheduled September 2006 party conference. Leaders: Serge VOHOR (Former Prime Minister and President of the Party), Henri TAGA (Former Speaker of Parliament). People’s Progressive Party (PPP). Formation of the PPP was announced in August 2001 by Sato Kilman, previously a faction leader of the MPP. Kilman indicated that the party’s focus would be on development of agriculture, commerce, com-

munications, and tourism. The party won four parliamentary seats in 2004. Leader: Sato KILMAN. People’s Action Party (Parti de l’Action Populaire—PAP). The PAP was launched prior to the 2004 election, at which it secured one seat. Leader: Peter VUTA. There is also a National Community Association—NCA (Association de la Communaut´e Nationale—ACN), which won two legislative seats in 2004 and was awarded portfolios in both the Serge Vohor and initial Ham Lini administrations.

Other Parties and Groups Na-Griamel Movement. Na-Griamel was founded by Jimmy Stevens, whose secessionist rebellion on Espiritu Santo was crushed in 1980. Stevens was released from 11 years’ imprisonment in August 1991 and died on February 28, 1994, leadership of Na-Griamel passing to his son, Frankie. Elected to Parliament in 1991, the younger Stevens served briefly as deputy opposition leader before defecting to the government in early 1994. Na-Griamel was permitted to reopen its headquarters for the first time in 14 years the following August. Despite the ambiguous role of its leader, NaGriamel participated in the UF for the 1994 provincial poll before formally rejoining the government in February 1995. It secured one legislative seat in 1995, none thereafter. Leader: Frankie STEVENS. Tu Vanuatu Movement (Tu Vanuatu Kominiti). The Tu Vanuatu Movement was launched by Fr. Walter Lini’s sister, Hilda Lini, after she resigned from the NUP in November 1996. Not a political party per se, the group is dedicated to support for women’s and rural issues in a context of traditional Melanesian and Christian values. The legislature lost its only female member when Lini failed to secure reelection in March 1998. Leader: Hilda LINI.

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Cabinet As of August 1, 2006 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Minister

Ham Lini (NUP) Sato Kilman (MPP)

Ministers Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Comprehensive Reform Program Education Finance and Economic Management Foreign Affairs Health Justice and Social Welfare Internal Affairs Lands Ni-Vanuatu Business Development Public Service Public Utilities and Infrastructure Sports and Youth Telecommunications Trade, Commerce, and Industry

Marcellino Pipite (VP) Ham Lini (NUP) Joe Natuman (VKG) Willie Jimmy Tapangararua (NUP) Sato Kilman (MPP) Morking Iatika Stevens (NUP) Isabelle Donald (VP) [f] Georges Andre Wells (VP) Maxime Carlot Korman (VRP) Lui Etap Ham Lini (NUP) Edward Natapei (VP) Dunstan Hilton (MPP) (Vacant) James Bule (NUP)

[f] = female

Regional parties include the Efat´e Laketu Party (ELP), based on the island of Efat´e; the Fren Melanesia Pati (FMP), which won a parliamentary seat in 1995 under the leadership of former agriculture minister Albert RAVUTIA; and the John Frum Movement (JFM), led by Song KEASPAI, which represents interests on the island of Tanna and won two legislative seats in 1998.

Legislature The Vanuatu Parliament is a unicameral body currently consisting of 52 members elected for four-year terms, subject to dissolution. The most recent election was held on July 6, 2004, with results as follows: National Unity Party, 10 seats; Party of Our Land, 8; Union of Moderate Parties, 8; People’s Progressive Party, 4; Vanuatu Republi-

can Party, 4; Greens Confederation, 3; Melanesian Progressive Party, 3; National Community Association, 2; Namangi Aute, 1; People’s Action Party, 1; independents, 8. Speaker: Sam Dan AVOCK.

Communications Press The following are published in Port Vila: Vanuatu Daily Post (2,000), independent, in English; Port Vila Presse (2,000), English/ French daily launched in 2000; Vanuatu Weekly (1,700), government organ, in English, French, and Bislama; Viewpoints, VP weekly. In early 1995 a presidential aide threatened the editor of the Vanuatu Daily Post (then known as The Trading Post) with deportation

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if he did not publish some material in French; however, the action was repudiated by President Korman on the ground that only the government was held to multilingual publication. Vanuatu Post publisher Marc Neil-Jones, an Australian, ran into additional difficulties in 2000 and 2001, when Prime Minister Sope objected to “unbalanced” reporting in the publication and pursued deportation.

receivers and 3,200 personal computers serving 7,500 Internet users.

Broadcasting and Computing

U.S. Ambassador to Vanuatu Robert W. FITTS (resident in Papua New Guinea)

The government-operated Radio Vanuatu broadcasts from Vila. Television blong Vanuatu began transmitting in 1993, with its first production facilities being inaugurated in mid-1995. As of 2003, there were approximately 2,040 television

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. Vanuatu does not maintain an embassy in Washington.

Permanent Representative to the UN (Vacant) IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, CWTH, NAM, OIF, PC, PIF

V I E T NA M SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

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C oˆ ng-H o` a X a¯ -H oˆ i Chu-Ngh i¯a Viˆe t Nam

The Country A tropical land of varied climate and topography, Vietnam extends for roughly 1,000 miles along the eastern face of the Indochina Peninsula between the deltas of its two great rivers, the Red River in the north and the Mekong in the south. To the east, the country borders on the Gulf of Tonkin and the South China Sea; in the west, the mountains of the Annamite Chain separate it from Cambodia and Laos. A second mountainous region in the north serves as a partial barrier between Vietnam and China, which historically has exercised great influence in Vietnam and provided its name, “Land of the South.” The Vietnamese population is of mixed ethnic stock and includes numerous highland tribes as well as Chinese, Khmer, and other non-Vietnamese peoples. The Viet (Kinh) constitute some 88 percent of the population. Although religion is not encouraged by the state and a March 1999 UN report criticized Hanoi for denying freedom of worship, most Vietnamese are nominally Buddhist or Taoist, with a significant Roman Catholic minority, particularly in the south. Vietnamese is the national language, while French was long the preferred second language. Women constitute close to one-half the paid labor force, but their participation in party and governmental affairs is considerably less. Northern Vietnam was traditionally a fooddeficient area, dependent on supplementary rice and other provisions from the south. It developed a considerable industrial economy, however, based on substantial resources of anthracite coal, chromite, iron, phosphate, tin, and other minerals. Nearly 60 percent of the country’s labor force con-

tinues to be employed in the agricultural sector, which contributes about 23 percent of GDP, compared to 39 percent for industry and 38 percent for services. Industry employs about 17 percent of the workforce and services, 25 percent. Crude oil now constitutes Vietnam’s leading export (about onefifth of the total), followed by garments, footwear, marine products (mainly frozen seafood), and electronic goods and components. Leading markets include the United States, the European Union (EU), Japan, and China. A key component of the reunified socialist republic’s 1976–1980 Five-Year Plan was large-scale

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redistribution of the population, including resettlement of many residents of southern cities into “new economic zones” in rural areas, and a shift of surplus labor northward. Midway through the plan the government announced that it intended to nationalize all land beyond what was needed by individual families to meet basic requirements, but the adverse impact on production led to new decrees in 1979 permitting greater freedom to cultivate reclaimed and virgin land. Since that time, food self-sufficiency has largely been achieved, in part because the government introduced a contract system whereby farmers could market their products freely after meeting state quotas. Incentives for industrial export production, foreign investment, and expansion of such nonsocialist components as handicraft industries were also initiated. Decentralization of economic planning yielded only marginal overall growth, however, and in 1986 Vietnam enacted a political and economic “renovation” program, doi moi, reportedly modeled after the Soviet Union’s perestroika. Radical reforms included fiscal and monetary austerity, a shift away from public sector control of the economy, and an opening of markets to international trade. The resultant turnaround was marked by a strengthened dˆong; a drop in overall inflation to single digits, down from the triple-digit levels that had prevailed in the 1980s; and an average annual GDP growth rate of about 9 percent for 1992–1997. Growth fell to an average of about 4 percent in 1998 and 1999, however, as Vietnam began to suffer the effects of a regional economic crisis. Other problems besetting the economy included the slow pace of reform within state-owned enterprises, widespread smuggling, and corruption, compounded, in November 1999, by the worst flooding in a century, which left an estimated 1 million or more peasants temporarily homeless. For 2000 and 2001 the government reported growth of about 6.8 percent. After that, the growth rate incrementally moved upward, to 7.1 percent in 2002, 7.3 percent in 2003, and 7.7 percent in 2004 before jumping to 8.4 percent in 2005. World Bank calculations put Vietnam’s per capita income at $480 in 2003.

Government and Politics Political Background Vietnam’s three historic regions—Tonkin in the north, Annam in the center, and Cochin-China in the south—came under French control in 1862– 1884 and were later joined with Cambodia and Laos to form the French-ruled Indochinese Union, more commonly called French Indochina. The Japanese, who occupied Indochina in World War II, permitted the establishment on September 2, 1945, of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) under HO CHI MINH, the Communist leader of the nationalist resistance movement then known as the Vietminh (Viˆet Nam Duc-Lap Don Minh Hˆoi, or Vietnamese Independence League). Although the French on their return to Indochina accorded provisional recognition to the DRV, subsequent negotiations broke down, and in December 1946 the Vietminh initiated military action against French forces. While fighting with the Vietminh continued, the French in 1949 recognized BAO DAI, former emperor of Annam, as head of state of an independent Vietnam within the French Union. Treaties conceding full Vietnamese independence in association with France were initialed in Paris on June 4, 1954; in practice, however, the jurisdiction of the Bao Dai government was limited to South Vietnam as a consequence of the military successes of the Vietminh, the major defeat suffered by French forces at Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, and the armistice and related agreements concluded in Geneva, Switzerland, July 20–21, 1954. The Geneva accord provided for a temporary division of Vietnam near the 17th parallel into two separately administered zones—Communist in the north and non-Communist in the south—pending an internationally supervised election to be held in 1956. These arrangements were rejected, however, by the Bao Dai government and by the republican regime that succeeded it in South Vietnam in 1955. Vietnam thus remained divided between a northern zone administered by the Communistruled DRV and a southern zone administered by

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Political Status: Communist republic originally proclaimed September 2, 1945; Democratic Republic of Vietnam established in the North on July 21, 1954; Republic of Vietnam established in the South on October 26, 1955; Socialist Republic of Vietnam proclaimed on July 2, 1976, following surrender of the southern government on April 30, 1975; present constitution adopted on April 15, 1992. Area: 128,402 sq. mi. (332,561 sq. km.). Population: 76,323,173 (1999C); 83,304,000 (2005E). Major Urban Centers (metropolitan areas, 2005E): HANOI (5,046,000), Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon, 5,289,000), Haiphong (2,032,000), Can Tho (1,120,000), Da Nang (720,000). Official Language: Vietnamese. Monetary Unit: Dˆong (market rate July 1, 2006: 15,996 dˆong = $1US). President:; NGUYEN MINH TRIET; elected by the National Assembly on June 27, 2006, for a five-year term, succeeding TRAN DUC LUONG. Vice President: TRUONG MY HOA; elected by the National Assembly on July 25, 2002, succeeding NGUYEN THI BINH. Prime Minister: NGUYEN TAN DUNG; elected by the National Assembly on June 27, 2006, succeeding PHAN VAN KHAI. General Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party: NONG DUC MANH; appointed by the Central Committee on April 22, 2001, succeeding LE KHA PHIEU; reappointed on April 25, 2006.

the anti-Communist government of the Republic of Vietnam. Within North Vietnam, a new constitution promulgated in 1960 consolidated the powers of the central government, and elections in 1960 and 1964 reaffirmed the preeminence of Ho Chi Minh, who continued as president of the DRV and chair of the Vietnam Workers’ Party (VWP), successor in 1954 to the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). Ho Chi Minh died in 1969, his party position

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remaining unfilled in deference to his memory. The political leadership passed to LE DUAN, who had been named first secretary nine years earlier. Communist-led subversive and terrorist activity against the government of South Vietnam resumed in the late 1950s by Vietcong (Vietnamese Communist) resistance elements in a continuation of the earlier anti-French offensive, now supported and directed from the north. Within the south, these operations were sponsored from 1960 onward by a Communist-controlled political organization called the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF). Despite the initiation of U.S. advisory assistance to South Vietnamese military forces in 1954, guerrilla operations by Vietcong and regular North Vietnamese units proved increasingly disruptive, and by early 1965 the Republic of Vietnam appeared threatened with military defeat. The United States therefore intensified its efforts by initiating air operations against selected military targets in the north and by ordering large contingents of its ground forces into action in the south. Earlier, in 1961, the growth of the Communistsupported insurgency forced NGO DINH DIEM (who had assumed the South Vietnamese presidency following the ouster of Bao Dai in 1955) to assume emergency powers. Popular resentment of his increasingly repressive regime led, however, to his death in a coup d’´etat that was secretly supported by the United States and directed by Gen. DUONG VAN MINH (“Big Minh”) on November 1, 1963. A period of unstable military rule followed. Leadership was held successively by General Minh (to January 1964), Gen. NGUYEN KHANH (to February 1965), and Gen. NGUYEN VAN THIEU, who assumed the functions of head of state in June 1965. The powerful post of prime minister went to Air Marshal NGUYEN CAO KY. In response to U.S. pressure, a new constitution was promulgated on April 1, 1967, and Thieu and Ky were elected president and vice president, respectively, on September 3. Following the southern “Tet offensive” by Communist forces conducted January–February 1968, the United States on March 31 announced a

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cessation of bombing in all but the southern area of North Vietnam, adjacent to the demilitarized zone straddling the 17th parallel. The action proved more successful than a number of earlier bombing halts in paving the way for peace talks. Preliminary discussions between U.S. and North Vietnamese representatives were initiated in Paris on May 13, while expanded talks began in Paris on January 18, 1969. It was not until September 1972, however, following major U.S. troop withdrawals and the failure of another major Communist offensive, that Hanoi agreed to drop its insistence on imposing a Communist regime in the south and accepted a 1971 U.S. proposal for a temporary cease-fire. A peace agreement was subsequently concluded on January 27, 1973, on the basis of extensive private discussions between U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and DRV negotiator LE DUC THO. The agreement provided for a withdrawal of all remaining U.S. forces and for political talks between the South Vietnamese and the Vietcong aimed at the establishment of a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord (NCNRC). The Saigon government and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam failed, however, to reach agreement on the council’s composition. Moreover, despite the U.S. withdrawal and North Vietnam’s formal support of the peace accord, it was estimated that as of May 1974 some 210,000 North Vietnamese troops were fighting in the south, as compared to 160,000 at the time of the 1972 cease-fire. A new Communist offensive, launched in late 1974, resulted in the loss of Phuoc Long Province, 70 miles north of Saigon, in early January 1975. By late March, in the wake of a near total collapse of discipline within the South Vietnamese army, the cities of Hu´e and Da Nang had fallen. On March 25 President Thieu ordered Prime Minister TRAN THIEN KHIEM to organize a broadly representative government to deal with the emergency, but by early April demands were being advanced for Thieu’s resignation. On April 4 the Khiem government resigned and NGUYEN BA CAN, the speaker of the House of Representatives, was named to head a new cabinet that was installed on April 14. Seven

days later, as the Communist forces neared Saigon, President Thieu announced his resignation, and Vice President TRAN VAN HUONG was sworn in as his successor. Huong himself resigned on April 28 in favor of Gen. Duong Van Minh, who called for a cease-fire and immediate negotiations with North Vietnamese and People’s Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) representatives. The appeal was rejected, and on April 30 Communist forces entered Saigon to receive the surrender of the South Vietnamese government. Upon the fall of Saigon, a Military Management Committee under PLAF Lt. Gen. TRAN VAN TRA was established to govern the city. On June 6 the Provisional Revolutionary Government under the nominal presidency of HUYNH TAN PHAT was invested as the government of South Vietnam, although real power appeared to be exercised by PHAM HUNG, fourth-ranked member of the Politburo of the North Vietnamese Workers’ Party and secretary of its South Vietnamese Committee. At a conference in Saigon held November 5–6, a delegation headed by Pham Hung was named to negotiate with northern representatives on an election to a common National Assembly for a reunified Vietnam. Elected on April 25, 1976, the enlarged legislature convened for the first time in Hanoi on June 24. On July 2 it proclaimed the reunification of the country as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. On the same day it named TON DUC THANG, the incumbent president of North Vietnam, as head of state. It also appointed two vice presidents: NGUYEN LUONG BANG, theretofore vice president of the DRV, and NGUYEN HUU THO, leader of the southern NLF. DRV Premier PHAM VAN DONG was designated to head a cabinet composed largely of former North Vietnamese ministers, with the addition of six South Vietnamese. On December 20 the VWP concluded a congress in Hanoi by changing its name to the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) and adopting a series of guidelines designed to realize the nation’s “socialist goals.” Vice President Nguyen Luong Bang died in July 1979, at which time no successor was named. President Ton Duc Thang’s death in March 1980 led to

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Nguyen Huu Tho’s appointment as acting president on April 1. Under a revised constitution adopted in December, a new National Assembly was elected on April 26, 1981, and a five-member collective presidency (Council of State) designated on July 4. The second-ranked member of the VCP Politburo, TRUONG CHINH, was named council chair (thus becoming nominal head of state). The thirdranked Pham Van Dong continued as chair of the Council of Ministers. Longtime party leader Le Duan died in July 1986, with the VCP Central Committee naming Truong Chinh as his successor. The designation proved temporary: In a remarkable change of leadership at the Sixth VCP Congress in December, NGUYEN VAN LINH was named general secretary, with Chinh, Dong, and Tho being among those retired from the Politburo. A major governmental reorganization ensued in February 1987, while in mid-June, following a National Assembly election in April, Gen. VO CHI CONG succeeded Chinh as chair of the Council of State, and Hung replaced Dong as chair of the Council of Ministers. Sr. Gen. VO VAN KIET, theretofore a deputy chair of the Council of Ministers, was named acting chair following Hung’s death in March 1988. In an unprecedented contest in June, the nominee of the party’s Central Committee, DO MUOI, was forced to stand against Vo Van Kiet for election as permanent chair, winning the office by only 64 percent of the National Assembly vote. Another major restructuring of the party leadership occurred at the Seventh VCP Congress in June 1991, when 7 of 12 Politburo members were dropped, with Do Muoi succeeding Nguyen Van Linh as general secretary. The party shake-up was paralleled by sweeping government changes when the Eighth National Assembly met for an unusually lengthy 9th session in July and August. A new Council of State was named (albeit with Vo Chi Cong continuing as chair), as well as a new Council of Ministers under Vo Van Kiet. The legislature also initiated debate on a new constitution, the draft of which was completed at the body’s 10th session in December and approved at the 11th session in April 1992.

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Following its replenishment by the election of prescreened candidates on July 19, 1992, the National Assembly on September 23 named Sr. Gen. LE DUC ANH and NGUYEN THI BINH to the newly created posts of president and vice president, respectively, while reappointing Vo Van Kiet as head of government, now titled prime minister. No changes in the top government leadership were announced in the immediate wake of the Eighth Party Congress of June 28–July 1, 1996, which, in addition to replacing half the Politburo’s 16 members and expanding its membership to 19, created a 5-member Standing Board to replace the larger party Secretariat. Four months later an ailing President Le Duc Anh was temporarily replaced by Vice President Nguyen Thi Binh, whose party credentials were insufficient to ensure her eligibility for permanent succession. Significant personnel changes were recorded in the government and party leadership ranks in the second half of 1997. In September the new National Assembly, elected on July 20, chose TRAN DUC LUONG and PHAN VAN KHAI to succeed Le Duc Anh and Vo Van Kiet as president and prime minister, respectively. On December 29 the VCP Central Committee elected the decidedly more conservative Lt. Gen. LE KHA PHIEU as general secretary in place of Do Muoi. In January 1998 Prime Minister Khai acknowledged a division within the leadership over the country’s economic direction, noting that some party officials had expressed “second thoughts” about the doi moi reform program. By that time the ongoing Asian economic crisis had clearly penetrated Vietnam’s borders, adding weight to the debate over the pace of reform and contributing to delays in conclusion of a major trade pact with the United States that was ultimately signed, after four years of negotiations, in July 2000 and ratified in late 2001. Meeting in its Ninth Party Congress, the VCP on April 22, 2001, replaced Le Kha Phieu with economic reformer NONG DUC MANH, a member of the northern Tay ethnic minority and theretofore chair of the National Assembly. The congress also reinstituted the party Secretariat. No major changes

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in the government occurred until a new cabinet was installed on August 8, 2002, during the opening session of the expanded, 498-seat National Assembly, which had been elected on May 19. President Luong and Prime Minister Khai were reelected on July 24 and 25, respectively, by the legislature, which chose TRUONG MY HOA as vice president. The Tenth Congress of the VCP, held April 18– 25, 2006, marked the departure from the party leadership of President Tran Duc Luong and Prime Minister Phan Van Khai. On June 27, as expected, the National Assembly elected NGUYEN MINH TRIET as president and confirmed NGUYEN TAN DUNG as prime minister.

Constitution and Government Upon reunification in 1976, the DRV constitution of January 1, 1960, was put into effect throughout the country pending adoption of a new basic law that on December 18, 1980, received unanimous legislative approval. The 1980 document defined the Socialist Republic as a “state of proletarian dictatorship” advancing toward socialism and identified the Communist Party as “the only force leading the state and society.” It provided for a unicameral National Assembly, elected for a five-year term by universal adult suffrage, as the highest organ of state authority. The assembly was mandated to elect, for a term corresponding to its own, a Council of State as the state’s collective presidency; administrative functions were to be directed by a chair and other members of a Council of Ministers, all appointed by and responsible to the assembly. Under the 1992 constitution the Council of State was abolished in favor of a president who is elected by and from within the assembly. The chief executive nominates a vice president, a prime minister, a chief justice of the Supreme Court, and a head of the Supreme People’s Inspectorate, all of whom must be approved by the assembly. According to the current basic law, the party continues to define overall state policy but no longer conducts its day-to-day implementation. The judicial system is headed by the Supreme People’s Court and the procurator general of

the Supreme People’s Organ of Control. People’s Courts, Military Tribunals, and People’s Organs of Control operate at the local level. Economic courts to adjudicate business disputes were authorized in 1993, while the country’s first comprehensive civil code was approved in 1994, effective from July 1996. For administrative purposes the country is divided into 59 provinces and 5 centrally administered municipalities (Can Tho, Da Nang, Haiphong, Hanoi, and Ho Chi Minh City); subdivisions include districts, towns, and provincial capitals. Each administrative unit elects a People’s Council, which then selects a People’s Committee to serve as an executive. In its November–December 2001 session the National Assembly approved 24 constitutional amendments, including recognition of private enterprise as a legitimate economic sector. Another change permits the National Assembly to consider no-confidence motions against government leaders.

Foreign Relations For many years prior to reunification, North Vietnamese external policy combined traditional Vietnamese nationalism with Communist ideology and tactics. Relations with most other Communist nations were close, and aid from the People’s Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe was essential to both the DRV’s industrial development and its military campaigns in the south. Largely because of this dependence, the DRV avoided commitments to either side in the Sino-Soviet dispute, although it disregarded Beijing’s objections by participating in the Paris peace talks in 1968. Prior to the end of the Vietnam War, Hanoi had evidenced no interest in joining the United Nations. An application submitted in July 1975 was blocked by U.S. action in the Security Council, as was a second application submitted on behalf of the newly unified state in August 1976. In May 1977 the United States withdrew its objection after Hanoi agreed to provide additional information on

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the fate of missing U.S. servicemen, and the socialist republic was admitted to the world body on September 20. The DRV had long been involved in the internal affairs of both Laos and Cambodia (Kampuchea), where it supported insurgent movements, partly as a means of keeping open its supply routes to South Vietnam. Following reunification, Hanoi concluded a number of mutual cooperation agreements with Laos that some observers viewed as leaving that country little more than a province of Vietnam. Collaterally, relations with the Khmer Rouge–led government of Democratic Kampuchea deteriorated sharply, yielding numerous military encounters along the two countries’ common frontier and a severance of diplomatic relations in December 1977. The clashes continued throughout 1978, escalating into full-scale border warfare and a Vietnamese invasion of its neighbor at the end of the year. On January 7, 1979, Phnom Penh fell to the Vietnamese, supported by a small force of dissident Khmers styling themselves the Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS), and on January 8 a pro-Vietnamese “People’s Republic of Kampuchea” was proclaimed under Heng Samrin, a former member of the Kampuchean General Staff. Some 200,000 Vietnamese troops remained in the country. In reaction to the drive into Cambodia, Chinese forces invaded northern Vietnam on February 17, 1979, and occupied a number of border towns, suffering heavy casualties before withdrawing in midMarch. The incursion was described by Beijing as a “limited operation” designed to teach Hanoi “a lesson” after failure to resolve a number of longstanding disputes—primarily, the validity of late19th-century border agreements between France and the Chinese empire, jurisdiction over territorial waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, and sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The last group (also claimed in whole or in part by Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, and Taiwan) was considered particularly important because of its strategic location astride shipping lanes and the possibility (subsequently confirmed) of oil

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and gas reserves in its vicinity. Peace talks undertaken by Hanoi and Beijing in April 1979 were broken off by the Chinese in March 1980. Intermittent border conflicts continued thereafter. In January 1987, in the bloodiest encounter since 1979, China mounted a three-day incursion into Vietnam’s Ha Tuyen Province, while a brief but pitched encounter between Chinese and Vietnamese naval units erupted in March 1988. In January 1989 Hanoi dispatched a delegation to Beijing for the first, albeit highly secret, highlevel discussions between the two governments in eight years. Seven months earlier Vietnam had formally turned over control of the anti-insurgent campaign in Cambodia to Phnom Penh. Of even greater significance was the fact that Hanoi had participated in an unprecedented meeting of all parties to the Cambodian conflict in Bogor, Indonesia, in July 1988. On September 26, 1989, Vietnam announced that it had withdrawn all its troops from Cambodia, a claim disputed by China. In November 1991 high-level talks resulted in normalization of Vietnam-China relations after a 20-year estrangement, although it was not until October 1993 that the two countries agreed to negotiations aimed at resolving their various territorial disputes. Meanwhile, following the Communist collapse in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union (on which Vietnam had heavily depended for economic assistance), regional relations with Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Brunei, and Malaysia had improved, as had relations with various European states, including France, Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom. In April 1992 Australia formally renewed aid to Vietnam, ending a 12-year suspension, and the United States eased its long-standing trade embargo with a statement that agricultural and medical supplies to meet basic human needs would no longer be withheld. In early November Japan ended a 14-year freeze on official developmental assistance, and in mid-December U.S. President George H. W. Bush authorized U.S. companies to initiate commercial relations with Vietnam. The U.S. decision followed progress on the issue of missing U.S. servicemen.

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In July 1993 Washington indicated that it was dropping its opposition to international assistance in the repayment of $140 million in International Monetary Fund (IMF) debt obligations, and in late September, France, Japan, and 13 other countries joined as “Friends of Vietnam” to clear the arrears, after which the IMF, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank resumed lending. Subsequently, U.S. President Bill Clinton announced on February 4, 1994, an end to the 19-year U.S. economic embargo in view of “significant and tangible results” in the search for American servicemen missing in action. The leading foreign affairs problem during the first half of 1995 turned on the status of more than 46,000 Vietnamese expatriates in numerous detention camps ringing their homeland, from Thailand to Hong Kong. In mid-March representatives of 30 countries met in Geneva and agreed that 40,000 “boat people” in Hong Kong and Southeast Asia would be returned by early 1996, triggering riots by detainees in Hong Kong, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Many of the detainees declared that they preferred death to repatriation. In the end, however, an aid program sponsored by the EU assisted some 50,000 returnees before concluding in mid-1999. Declaring that it was time to “bind up our own wounds,” U.S. President Clinton extended full diplomatic recognition to Vietnam on July 11, 1995, 22 years after the American disengagement. (In November 2000 Clinton would become the first U.S. president to visit the unified Vietnam.) The action appeared to have been triggered by Vietnam’s admission to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which was formalized a month later. In 1996 Vietnam officially applied to join the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, to which it was formally admitted in 1998. In October 1998 a visit by Prime Minister Khai to China prompted an announcement that both governments intended to resolve land and Gulf of Tonkin boundary disputes by the year 2000. The two signed a land border agreement on December 30, 1999. The National Assembly ratified the land treaty on June 19, 2000, and a maritime agreement was concluded in December 2000, although the lat-

ter did not resolve the Spratly and Paracel Islands dispute. On November 4, 2002, China and the ten ASEAN members signed a voluntary Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea that, while not a formal code of conduct, pledged to seek nonviolent solutions to the territorial disputes. The agreement did not, however, prevent flaps over such subsequent events as Taiwan’s 2004 construction of what it termed a “bird-watching stand” in the Spratlys and Vietnam’s announced plans to lead a “sight-seeing tour” there. In December 1998 South Korea’s President Kim Dae Jung apologized for his country’s having sent some 300,000 troops to supplement U.S. forces during the Vietnam War. Prime Minister Khai, noting that Vietnam required neither an apology nor reparations, called instead for a “progressive and future-oriented bilateral relationship.” In September 2000 Vietnam and Russia reached agreement on settling Soviet-era debts, with Hanoi indicating that it would repay $1.7 billion over 23 years, mostly through business concessions. In February 2001 Russian President Vladimir Putin became the first Russian head of state to visit Vietnam. During a visit by Chinese President Hu Jintao on October 31–November 2, 2005, China and Vietnam marked an improving relationship by signing an agreement for $1 billion in Chinese loans to finance the construction of power plants, rail upgrades, and a police academy. Earlier, the neighbors agreed to conduct joint naval patrols.

Current Issues In June 2005, during the highest-level visit by a representative of the Vietnamese government to the United States since reunification, Prime Minister Phan Van Kai conferred with President George W. Bush at the White House and then continued on to New York City, where his activities included ringing the opening bell at the New York Stock Exchange. Although the VCP continues to exert tight control over the country’s political machinery, the gesture was further indication not only that Hanoi would welcome additional foreign investment

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capital but also that its fundamental economic model continues to shift toward liberalization and a more open, market-oriented economy. A principal policy goal set for 2006 was admission to the World Trade Organization. Vietnam’s eventual entry was all but sealed in May when it overcame a last major hurdle: completion of a new bilateral trade and investment agreement with the United States. In addition to opening up Vietnam’s banking, securities, and insurance markets to foreign companies, the pact also ended U.S. quotas on the importation of Vietnamese garments, cut Vietnamese tariffs, and cleared the way for foreigners to participate in wholesale and retail trade. At the beginning of August the U.S. Senate Finance Committee overwhelmingly voted to extend permanent normal trading relations (PNTR) status to Vietnam, although it was uncertain how quickly the PNTR bill would proceed to floor votes, given the upcoming congressional elections. Opposition was expected from U.S. garment and textile manufacturers, organized labor, and some members of Congress who have long attacked Hanoi’s restrictions on religion; alleged human rights abuses against the country’s (largely Christian) Montagnard minority; and prosecution of dissidents for offenses that have included “violating state security,” “abusing democratic rights,” “sabotaging religious solidarity,” providing false information to “reactionary forces overseas,” and “sabotaging national unity and causing social disorder.” At the opening of the Tenth Congress of the VCP in April 2006, General Secretary Nong Duc Manh reiterated an oft-expressed theme: the need to fight corruption. Vietnam has pursued a moreor-less constant anticorruption campaign in recent years in an effort to combat endemic graft and patronage. Investigators have uncovered a panoply of offenses—smuggling within the customs service, the fraudulent acquisition of state loans by bogus companies, embezzlement, bribery by criminal gangs, kickbacks, the awarding of contracts to family-run companies—all made easier by a lack of transparency in the government bureaucracy. In the most notorious recent case, the minister of transport, DAO DINH BINH, resigned in April 2006 fol-

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lowing revelations that officials in a division under his management had siphoned off million of dollars from infrastructure projects for gambling and other illegal pursuits. Vietnam emerged largely unscathed from the 2003 Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic in Southeast Asia. The first domestic case was reported in late February, but quick action by medical personnel and representatives from the World Health Organization contained the outbreak to just over 60 cases, 5 fatal. In late April Vietnam was certified as the first affected country to be SARS-free. A more recent concern has been the avian influenza strain H5N1, which cost more than 40 lives in Vietnam from 2004 through late 2005. Spread of the disease was suppressed through culling 5 million birds, vaccinating some 200 million others, and conducting a public information campaign.

Political Parties The Communist party apparatus of North Vietnam operated for many years as the Vietnam Workers’ Party—VWP (Dang Lao Dong Viˆet Nam). The VWP was formed in 1954 as successor to the Indochinese Communist Party (founded in 1930 and ostensibly dissolved in 1954) and was the controlling party of North Vietnam’s National Fatherland Front (NFF). In South Vietnam, the core of the Provisional Revolutionary Government formed in 1969 was the National Liberation Front (NLF), which had been organized in 1960 by some 20 groups opposed to the policies of President Diem. In July 1976, representatives of the NFF, the NLF, and other organizations met in Hanoi to organize an all-inclusive Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF), which was formally launched during a congress held in Ho Chi Minh City January 31– February 4, 1977. In addition to the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), the front includes various trade-union, peasants’, women’s, youth, and other mass organizations. Under an electoral law approved by the National Assembly in 1980, the VFF is responsible for nominating candidates in all constituencies, in consultation with local groups.

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PHAM THE DUYET was elected chair of the front’s Central Committee Presidium at the organization’s Fifth National Congress, held August 27– 28, 1999. His predecessor, LE QUANG DAO, had died a month earlier. The 879 delegates to the Sixth National Congress met September 22–23, 2004, in Hanoi. Although expatriate Vietnamese in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere have established numerous political groups, many of which claim insurgent or other support within Vietnam, none has seriously challenged the VCP’s monopoly.

Leading Party Vietnamese Communist Party —VCP (Dang Cong san Viˆet Nam). The ruling party’s present name was adopted by the VWP at its Fourth Congress in 1976. The Sixth Congress, held in Hanoi December 15–18, 1986, saw a drastic restructuring of the Politburo that included retirement of 5 of its 6 most senior leaders. At the Seventh Congress, June 24–27, 1991, another major purge, involving a majority of both Politburo and Secretariat members, also occurred (see Political background, above), while the Eighth Congress, June 28–July 1, 1996, approved a new 19-member Politburo, a 5-member Politburo Standing Board (replacing the Secretariat), and a new 170-member Central Committee. At a party plenum June 9–18, 1997, the Central Committee chose Phan Van Khai to replace Vo Van Kiet as prime minister (pending assembly approval) and voted to limit local officials to two five-year terms (the appointments were previously for life). The committee members were unable, however, to decide on a replacement for President Le Duc Anh, who, along with Vo Van Kiet, had been left off the candidate list for the National Assembly elections due in July. Subsequently, despite reports that competition for the presidency had been narrowed to Foreign Minister NGUYEN MANH CAM and Defense Minister DOAN KHUE, the Committee gave the nod to Tran Duc Luong, and on September 24 its choices were approved by the National Assembly.

On December 29, 1997, the Central Committee elected Lt. Gen. Le Kha Phieu as the party’s new general secretary, replacing Do Muoi, who joined Le Duc Ahn and Vo Van Kiet in resigning from the Politburo. All three were subsequently named advisers to the VCP Central Committee. On January 6, 1998, following the election of four new Politburo members, the Standing Board was revamped, with Phieu being the only holdover. In January 1999 the party expelled TRAN DO, a retired general and a Central Committee member, for having advocated open elections and freedom of expression. His subsequent request to publish a newspaper was denied. He died in August 2002. The Ninth Party Congress, held April 19–22, 2001, was attended by 1,168 delegates, who elected a 150-member Central Committee, a 15-member Politburo, and a 9-member Secretariat. Reportedly, the outgoing Politburo had recommended a second term for General Secretary Le Kha Phieu but was resisted by the Central Committee, which settled on the chair of the National Assembly, Nong Duc Manh. A tenth member was added to the Secretariat at the party’s seventh plenum in January 2003. Meeting April 18–25, 2006, the 1,176 delegates to the Tenth Party Congress elected a 160-member Central Committee (plus 21 alternate members), a Politburo of 14, and an 8-member Secretariat. Although Nong Duc Manh stayed on as general secretary, 8 members of the Central Committee were newly elected. Most notably, President Tran Duc Luong, Prime Minister Phan Van Khai, and National Assembly Chair NGUYEN VAN AN all retired from the leadership, signaling their imminent departure from government. General Secretary: NONG DUC MANH. Other Members of Politburo: HO DUC VIET (Chair, National Assembly Science, Technology, and Environment Committee), LE HONG ANH (Director, Central Committee Inspection Board), LE THANH HAI (Chair, Ho Chi Minh City People’s Committee), NGUYEN MINH TRIET (State President), NGUYEN PHU TRONG (Hanoi Party Leader), NGUYEN SINH HUNG (Deputy Prime Minister), NGUYEN TAN DUNG (Prime Minister), NGUYEN VAN CHI (Director, Central

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Cabinet As of August 1, 2006 Prime Minister Deputy Prime Ministers

Nguyen Tan Dung Nguyen Sinh Hung Pham Gia Khiem Truong Vinh Trong

Ministers Agriculture and Rural Development Construction Culture and Information Education and Training Finance Fisheries Foreign Affairs Industry Interior Justice Labor, War Invalids, and Social Welfare National Defense Natural Resources and Environment Planning and Investment Post and Telecommunications Public Health Public Security Science and Technology Trade Transport

Cao Duc Phat Nguyen Hong Quan Le Doan Hop Nguyen Thien Nhan Vu Van Ninh Ta Quang Ngoc Pham Gia Khiem Hoang Trung Hai Do Quang Trung Uong Chu Luu Nguyen Thi Hang [f] Phung Quang Thanh Mai Ai Truc Vo Hong Phuc Do Trung Ta Tran Thi Trung Chien [f] Le Hong Anh Hoang Van Phong Truong Dinh Tuyen Ho Nghia Dung

Minister-Chairpersons Committee of Nationalities Physical Training and Sport Committee Population, Family, and Children Committee Minister-Director, Government Office Governor, State Bank Inspector General

Ksor Phuoc Nguyen Danh Thai Le Thi Thu [f] Doan Manh Giao Le Duc Thuy Tran Van Truyen

[f] = female

Committee Inspection Commission), PHAM GIA KHIEM (Deputy Prime Minister), PHAM QUANG NGHI (Minister of Culture and Information), PHUNG QUANG THANH (Minister of

National Defense), TRUONG TAN SANG (Director, Central Committee Economic Commission), TRUONG VINH TRONG (Deputy Prime Minister).

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Secretariat: LE VAN DUNG, NGUYEN VAN CHI, NONG DUC MANH, PHAM TRUONG NGHI, TO HUY RUA, TONG THI PHONG, TRUONG TAN SANG, TRUONG VINH TRONG.

Legislature The present National Assembly (Quoc Hoi) is a unicameral body of 498 members serving fiveyear terms. For the most recent election of May 19, 2002, some 760 candidates were approved by the Fatherland Front, 80 percent of them members of the Vietnamese Communist Party and a total of 13 described as “self-nominated.” Two of the latter won seats, as did 51 nonparty candidates. Chair: NGUYEN PHU TRONG.

Communications All communications media are controlled and operated by the government, the Vietnamese Communist Party, or subordinate organizations. A June 2006 Decree on Cultural and Information Activities requires prepublication review of articles and sets fines for using anonymous sources, defaming unspecified “national heroes,” distributing “reactionary ideology,” and revealing “party secrets, state secrets, military secrets, and economic secrets.”

Press Approximately 75 daily and 250 weekly newspapers are published in Vietnam. The following appear daily in Hanoi, unless otherwise noted: Nhˆan Dˆan (The People, 200,000), official VCP organ; Sai Gon Giai Ph´ong (Liberated Saigon, Ho

Chi Minh City), local VCP organ, in Vietnamese (100,000) and Chinese (14,000); Lao Dong (Labor, 80,000), trade-union publication; Hanoi Moi (New Hanoi, 35,000), local VCP organ; Viˆet Nam News (25,000), English-language organ launched by the Vietnam News Agency in 1991.

News Agencies The domestic facility is the Vietnam News Agency (Viˆet Nam Thong Tin Xa). A number of foreign bureaus maintain offices in Hanoi.

Broadcasting and Computing The Ministry of Culture and Information manages the state-owned Voice of Vietnam (Tieng Noi Viˆet Nam) and Vietnam Television (Dien Thi Viˆet Nam). Both provide some foreign-language service, principally in English and French. Thousands of small radio stations and satellite TV transmissions from Hanoi provide access across the country. Internet service providers are closely monitored. There were approximately 15.8 million television receivers and 900,000 personal computers serving 3.5 million Internet users in 2003.

Intergovernmental Representation Ambassador to the U.S. CHIEN TAM NGUYEN U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Michael W. MARINE Permanent Representative to the UN LE LUONG MINH IGO Memberships (Non-UN) ADB, APEC, ASEAN, CP, Interpol, NAM, OIF, WCO

PART THREE

I N T E R G OV E R N M E N TA L O R G A N I Z AT I O N S

ANZUS

Official Name: Tripartite Security Treaty Between the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS Pact). Established: By treaty signed September 1, 1951, in San Francisco, California, effective April 29, 1952. Purpose: “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.” Principal Organ: ANZUS Council. Membership (3): Australia, New Zealand, United States. Official Language: English. Origin and development. The ANZUS Pact was concluded at the time of the 1951 peace settlement with Japan as part of a complex of U.S.supported mutual security arrangements in the Pacific. Subsequent realignments in international and regional politics reduced the effectiveness of the treaty, while its trilateral character is now in de facto suspense because of disagreement between the United States and New Zealand over the latter’s ban on nuclear vessels (see below). Structure. ANZUS lacks both a headquarters and a permanent staff, with the ANZUS Council as its only political organ, consisting of the members’ foreign ministers or their deputies. The council is empowered to consider any matter that a treaty partner views as relevant to the security of individual members or of the alliance. In the past, it met annually in Canberra, Australia; Wellington, New Zealand; or Washington, D.C.; with most

costs borne by the host government. Council meetings were attended by military advisers, who also met separately. At its first meeting in 1952, the council decided that responsibility for coordination between meetings would be given to the member states’ representatives in Washington. Activities. In the absence of a comprehensive Pacific security system, the ANZUS treaty has served primarily as a vehicle for political/strategic consultation. The council has monitored and discussed significant political and economic developments considered by the partners to be relevant to their security interests, including the former Soviet presence in the South Pacific and South Asian areas. This concern was overshadowed in 1985 by New Zealand’s refusal to permit U.S. warships to dock at its ports without formal notification that they were neither nuclear powered nor nuclear armed. The action prompted the United States, which had a firm policy of not announcing which of its ships carry nuclear weapons, to postpone all ANZUS meetings and military exercises until further notice. David Lange, New Zealand’s then-prime minister, affirmed his commitment to the security pact, but his stand on the nuclear issue left the future of ANZUS in doubt. The controversy between New Zealand and the United States continued in 1986, following the introduction by the Lange government of legislation banning nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered ships and aircraft from its territory and declaring New Zealand a nuclear-free zone. In a communiqu´e issued at the conclusion of a U.S.-Australian ministerial meeting on June 22, 1987, in Sydney, the two governments declared “that the Treaty would remain in place and would provide the underlying framework for a resumption of full trilateral cooperation when that became feasible.”

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In 1987, New Zealand’s defense minister said there was “no pressure which will force us to accept nuclear weapons”—a posture that appeared to enjoy widespread domestic support. Meanwhile, Australia and the United States continued to hold bilateral defense talks in lieu of ANZUS Council meetings. In May 1989, Lange described ANZUS as a “dead letter” between Wellington and Washington and suggested that New Zealand might formally withdraw from the alliance; however, his comments proved unpopular both at home and abroad and no subsequent action was taken. In response to a U.S. query, Lange’s successor, Geoffrey Palmer, indicated in August that no policy change was being considered, while in March 1990, New Zealand’s National Party, a conservative grouping theretofore committed to repeal of the antinuclear legislation, reversed its position, leaving the country with no organized opposition in the matter. In March 1991, however, the Washington Pacific Report indicated that the ANZUS “squabble” was “back in the news spotlight” as the result of a continuing thaw in U.S.– New Zealand relations and Wellington’s pledge to try to “rejoin the West” without compromising “nonukes” sentiment. In early 1992, U.S. President George H. W. Bush said the “concept” of ANZUS was still “very important,” and at midyear Wellington again expressed an interest in reviving ANZUS cooperation, particularly after Bush announced that all nuclear weapons had been removed from U.S. surface vessels in the wake of lessened superpower contention. In February 1994 following a protracted review of U.S.–New Zealand relations, the new Clinton administration endorsed the resumption of highlevel military contacts between the two nations. However, the U.S. president subsequently indicated that no joint military exercises would be conducted without a shift in New Zealand’s stance on Washington’s “neither confirm nor deny” policy regarding nuclear-armed vessels. In November 1997, New Zealand Prime Minister-Elect Jenny Shipley

said “there is no intention or likelihood” that the nuclear ban would be lifted. During a September 10, 2001, visit by Australian Prime Minister John Howard to Washington, he and U.S. President George W. Bush marked the 50th anniversary of the ANZUS alliance. The next day New Zealand expressed its solidarity with the United States following the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, and in December, New Zealand committed a small troop contingent to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Minor naval and air support was subsequently added. On September 15, Australia invoked the mutual defense clause in the ANZUS treaty, instructing its forces to deploy alongside U.S. forces inside and outside the United States to meet the terrorist threat. Although a visit by New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark to the White House in March 2002 led to speculation about future free trade negotiations, no reconciliation on the nuclear issue appeared imminent. In 2003, Clark’s opposition to the U.S.-led (and Australian-supported) invasion of Iraq served to accentuate the rift in ANZUS. In early 2006, Prime Minister Clark was quoted as saying New Zealand had moved beyond its suspension from ANZUS and remained a very good friend of the United States. On January 20, the highest-ranking naval officer of the U.S. Pacific Command, Adm. William J. Fallon, visited New Zealand, and met with Clark and Minister of Defense Phil Goff. The visit was characterized as friendly, but no substantive announcements were issued. Less positively, the private papers of former prime minister Lange, who died in August 2005, were published, revealing implicit U.S. threats to begin spying operations against New Zealand if it did not renounce its antinuclear position. Also in 2006, New Zealand and NATO announced the start of a formalized procedure to share intelligence. Although outside the ANZUS structure, the arrangement was important in view of New Zealand’s work alongside NATO in Afghanistan.

A S I A - PA C I F I C E C O N O M I C C O O P E R AT I O N ( A P E C )

Established: At a meeting of foreign and economic ministers of 12 nations November 6–7, 1989. in Canberra, Australia; objectives and principles set forth in Seoul Declaration approved during ministerial meeting November 12–14, 1991, in Seoul, South Korea; Declaration of Institutional Arrangements adopted September 10–11, 1992, in Bangkok, Thailand. Purpose: To provide a forum for discussion on a variety of economic issues and to promote multilateral cooperation among the region’s marketoriented economies. Headquarters: Singapore. Principal Organs: Economic Leaders’ Meeting, Ministerial Meeting, Senior Officials’ Meeting, Budget and Management Committee, Committee on Trade and Investment, Economic Committee, Secretariat. Executive Director: Tran Trong Toan (Vietnam, 2006), succeeding Choi Seek Young (Republic of Korea, 2005). The position changes annually. Membership (21): Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan (“Chinese Taipei”), Thailand, United States, Vietnam. Observers: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, Pacific Islands Forum. Official Language: English.

Origin and development. In early 1989, Australian Prime Minister Robert Hawke proposed that a permanent body be established to coordinate economic relations among market-oriented nations on the Pacific Rim, with particular emphasis to be given to dialog between Western Pacific countries and the United States. The proposal was endorsed by the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC—a group of business, academic, and government representatives who had held informal discussions since 1980), and the first APEC meeting was held November 6–7 in Canberra, Australia. Ministers from 12 nations—Australia, Brunei, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and United States—attended the inaugural session, with debate centering on how to proceed in adopting formal APEC arrangements. Primarily because of concern among some members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN—see separate article) that they might be “overwhelmed” by such “economic giants” as Canada, Japan, and the United States if the organization moved too quickly, the Canberra session decided to keep APEC as a loosely defined, informal grouping officially committed only to an annual “dialog” meeting. As regional economic cooperation gained momentum in other areas of the world, however, pressure grew within APEC for a more structured format. Consequently, the Ministerial Meeting in November 1991 in Seoul, South Korea, adopted a declaration outlining APEC’s objectives, established additional organizational structure, and approved the membership of China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.

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The “institutionalization” of APEC was completed during a Ministerial Meeting September 10– 11, 1992, in Bangkok, Thailand, with the decision to establish a permanent Secretariat in Singapore as of January 1, 1993. Mexico and Papua New Guinea were admitted in November 1993, while Chile’s membership application was approved effective November 1994. The latter was the subject of debate within APEC, with some officials suggesting that admission of South American countries could cost the organization its “focus.” Consequently, a moratorium on any additional APEC members was declared until at least 1996. In 1998 another South American country, Peru, joined, along with Russia and Vietnam, but leaders also decided that no new membership requests would be considered for at least ten years. Structure. APEC’s governing body is the annual Ministerial Meeting, whose chair rotates each year among the members. Decisions are reached by consensus. Since 1993 overall guidance has been provided by an informal gathering of APEC “Economic Leaders,” that is, a summit of the heads of state and/or government of APEC members, who meet annually immediately following the Ministerial Meeting. In addition, sectoral ministerial meetings have been held (some annually) in education, energy, environment and sustainable development, finance, human resources development, science and technology cooperation, small and medium enterprises, telecommunications and information, tourism, trade, transportation, and women’s affairs. In 2002 a Maine Resources Conservation/Fisheries Working Group was added at this level. Responsibility for policy implementation rests primarily with a Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM), which convenes as necessary. There are four standing committees: Budget and Management; Trade and Investment, which is assisted by more than a dozen subcommittees and expert groups; Economic, assisted by an Economic Outlook Task Force; and the SOM Committee on Economic and Technical Cooperation. Other organs include several topical special task groups that address concerns related to anticorruption and transparency, counterterrorism, electronic commerce, gender,

health, social safety nets, and emergency preparedness. There are also 11 working groups: Agricultural Technical Cooperation, Energy, Fisheries, Human Resources Development, Industrial Science and Technology, Marine Resources Conservation, Small and Medium Enterprises, Telecommunications and Information, Tourism, Trade Promotion, and Transportation. Since 1996 an APEC Business Advisory Council, comprising up to three senior business executives from each member country, has met to discuss APEC action plans and other business issues. A small Secretariat is led by an executive director appointed for a one-year term by the nation chairing the upcoming Ministerial Meeting. Activities. The November 1992 Ministerial Meeting directed APEC’s new permanent Secretariat to establish an electronic tariff database for the region, survey members regarding investment regulations, and study ways to harmonize customs procedures and reduce impediments to “market access” among members. Additional emphasis in the telecommunications, tourism, and environmental sectors was also approved at the November 14–18, 1994, Ministerial Meeting in Seattle, Washington. However, the APEC ministers postponed action on what were seen as “modest” recommendations from an Eminent Persons Group, established in 1992, regarding development of a Pacific free trade area. Ongoing apprehension in some Asian nations (most pointedly Malaysia) was also a background issue at the much-publicized summit of the APEC heads of state convened at the request of U.S. President Bill Clinton immediately after the Ministerial Meeting. Nevertheless, the summit endorsed a broadly worded “economic vision” for its members and agreed to establish “nonbinding” codes for investment and the transfer of technology. Hoping to impel integrationist sentiment in the region (which controls more than one-half of the world’s economy and accounts for nearly one-half of all global trade), the APEC finance ministers met for the first time March 18–19, 1994, in Honolulu, Hawaii. Among other things, plans were endorsed to double the capital of the Asian Development Bank, to promote cross-border investment, and to

A S I A - PA C I F I C E C O N O M I C C O O P E R AT I O N

study ways of facilitating finance for large infrastructure projects. The mood of the meeting was described as “upbeat” although caution was still expressed about tension between the United States and Japan over the Japanese trade surplus and disagreement between Washington and several Asian capitals, particularly Beijing, over U.S. efforts to couple trade and human rights issues. A potentially historic step was taken at the second APEC summit, held November 15, 1994, in Bogor, Indonesia, with the adoption of a “declaration of common resolve” to pursue “free and open trade and investment” over the next quarter century. The loosely worded accord called on the region’s developed nations to dismantle their trade barriers by 2010, followed by similar action by developing nations by 2020. However, many observers cautioned that it would be extremely difficult to translate APEC “resolve” into action. Differences of opinion regarding the appropriate pace and intensity for implementing the 1994 “action agenda” were readily apparent at the next summit, held in November 1995 in Osaka, Japan. The United States called for a concrete liberalization schedule that would strictly limit the number of exemptions made for specific sectors. Other nations resisted that approach, however, led by China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, who sought substantial protection for their farmers. In addition, some of the poorer Asian countries argued against cooperation between APEC and the World Trade Organization (WTO) to protect their industrial sectors. Consequently, it was agreed that many APEC stipulations, at least for the time being, would be implemented on a voluntary basis. A degree of momentum was maintained at the November 1996 summit, held in Subic Bay, Philippines. Among other things, the members agreed to draft individual plans specifying the various impediments they faced in reducing and/or eliminating trade barriers, along with specific proposals for addressing those areas. In other activity at the summit, President Clinton presented the Information and Technology Agreement (ITA), which was fully endorsed by APEC. The ITA committed APEC to cut and eventually eliminate tariffs on the

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trade of computer-related goods between members. Furthermore, APEC’s endorsement of the ITA was considered essential to its approval by the WTO and eventual global implementation. The central issue of the November 1997 summit, held in Vancouver, Canada, was the Asian economic crisis, which prompted several APEC members to seek assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Japan proposed creating a separate Asian fund to help resolve the crisis, but that idea was rejected at an ASEAN meeting held earlier in November in Manila, where it was agreed that the IMF would play the central role in promoting economic stabilization. However, APEC also endorsed additional backup funding from other sources and asked for greater regional cooperation to help mitigate the crisis. Meanwhile, APEC members agreed to lift, on a voluntary basis, intraAPEC tariffs on environmental goods and services, fish and fish products, forest products, medical equipment and instruments, energy, toys, gems and jewelry, chemicals, and telecommunications. However, exactly when and how this “early voluntary sectoral liberalization” (EVSL) scheme was to be accomplished was left to the individual members to decide. Japan’s insistence that it could not reduce tariffs on fish and forest products led to an acrimonious dispute with the United States at the November 1998 APEC summit, held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The United States insisted that tariffs be lifted on all goods included in the agreement reached at the previous summit and accused Japan of attempting to bribe other members with a $30 billion assistance package in return for their support on this issue. In response, a Japanese spokeswoman said the United States was jeopardizing the region’s economy by insisting on greater trade liberalization at a time when several of the members’ economies were already in trouble. The two sides could not reconcile their differences, and the summit decided to send the matter to the WTO for further consideration. Despite their disagreement, the United States and Japan disclosed a $10 billion plan at the summit to provide debt relief to the region’s ailing economies.

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U.S. Vice President Al Gore, who attended the 1998 summit in President Clinton’s place, stirred controversy by criticizing the host country’s human rights record, particularly the handling of the arrest and trial of Anwar Ibrahim (see Malaysia article for more information). Many of the other participants felt APEC was the wrong forum for addressing such issues. Political events in East Timor, Indonesia, provided a backdrop to the September 12–13, 1999, Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Auckland, New Zealand, where the APEC foreign affairs ministers supported formation of a UN multinational military presence to restore order to the troubled jurisdiction. The leaders’ summit noted progress toward economic recovery in Asia, approved APEC Principles to Enhance Competition and Regulatory Reform, and called for an improved “international framework” for the flow of trade and investment capital. With a WTO ministerial conference set to convene in late November in Seattle, Washington, the summit also voiced support for launching a new round of comprehensive trade negotiations, with abolition of agricultural export subsidies as a principal APEC concern. The timing of a new round of trade negotiations proved to be a contentious topic at the November 15–16, 2000, summit, which was held in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei. Partly in an effort to restore momentum in the wake of the disrupted WTO talks in Seattle, the largest APEC economies— the United States, Japan, and Canada—pressed for a rapid start, whereas Malaysia and many of the smaller economies preferred a more deliberate pace. In its final declaration the summit opted for a carefully worded compromise in which the leaders agreed “that a balanced and sufficiently broadbased agenda that responds to the interests and concerns of all WTO members should be formulated and finalised as soon as possible in 2001 and that a round be launched in 2001.” Also coming out of the summit were, among other things, an agreement to fight e-piracy, a call for increased oil supplies and petroleum price stability, a further commitment to narrow the “digital divide,” and a decision to invite

North Korean participation in APEC committees and working groups. The October 19–21, 2001, Economic Leaders’ Meeting, held in Shanghai, China, offered general support for U.S.-led efforts to combat terrorism, including cutting off funding for terrorist groups. The summit declaration did not, however, specifically address U.S. military response to the September terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. The attendees also expressed concern over the ongoing worldwide economic downturn and the consequences for emerging economies, reaffirmed the goal of sustainable growth, highlighted the necessity of sharing the benefits of globalization and the “New Economy,” and repeated their commitment to a new round of multilateral trade negotiations by the WTO. During 2002, rather than proposing new initiatives, APEC concentrated its efforts on previously established goals, including improved business management and evaluation, peer review, structural reforms, and transparency. All were in keeping with the three emphases outlined in the 1994 Bogor Declaration, namely trade and investment liberalization, business facilitation, and economic and technical cooperation. At the October 26–27 Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Cabo San Lucas, Mexico, attendees endorsed a Trade Facilitation Action Plan aimed at reducing transaction costs by 5 percent over five years; a Statement to Implement APEC Transparency Standards; several counterterrorism measures, including an APEC Energy Security Initiative and a proposal for Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR); and a Statement to Implement APEC Policies on Trade and the Digital Economy. The summit also urged the WTO to complete its current round of trade negotiations by January 2005, condemned the October 12 terrorist bombing in Bali, Indonesia, and called on North Korea to end its nuclear weapons program. In the first half of 2003, planned APEC activities were overshadowed by the onset of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak. Precautions against the spread of the newly identified viral illness led to the cancellation of some 30

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APEC-sponsored meetings in March–July. Meeting on June 2–3, in Khon Kaen, Thailand, the APEC Ministers Responsible for Trade, recognizing the severe economic repercussions of SARS for the region, pledged to restore business confidence in trade, investment, travel, and mobility and endorsed a plan of action that focused on the need to establish principles for health screenings, the timely exchange of information on the outbreak, and cooperation in prevention and treatment. The 2003 Economic Leaders’ Meeting, held October 19–21 in Bangkok, endorsed the SARS Action Plan and a Health Security Initiative, but with the outbreak contained, greater attention was directed toward economic matters and, at U.S. urging, international security. A principal focus was on “free and open trade and investment,” including the need for bilateral, regional, and multilateral accords to be “complementary and mutually reinforcing.” Along the same lines, the participants called for a renewed commitment to WTO liberalization negotiations as well as efforts to extend the perceived benefits of globalization to a broader spectrum of people and societies. With regard to security matters, APEC attempted to address the challenges posed by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. North Korea’s continuing effort to develop nuclear weapons was of particular concern. A Ministerial Meeting in early June 2004 in Puc´on, Chile, called for steps that would “provide a clear way forward” for renewed WTO negotiations. The ministers noted the need for “special attention” to dismantling trade barriers in agriculture, especially the elimination of export subsidies by developed countries, and for improving market access. In a similar vein, the APEC annual summit, held November 19–21 in Santiago, Chile, adopted the Santiago Initiative for Expanded Trade in APEC and also received a study from the APEC Busi-

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ness Advisory Council outlining the dimensions of a possible Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific. In addition to highlighting trade and investment liberalization as a path toward advancing development, the leaders’ closing declaration stressed the importance of promoting energy security; strengthening public health systems; advancing the fight against AIDS, SARS, avian flu, and other health threats; and combating corruption and ensuring transparency. As in 2003, U.S. President George W. Bush devoted much of his time to discussing with other heads of government North Korea’s nuclear program. The summit participants also noted the need to improve security through adoption of antiterrorist conventions and implementation of measures intended, for example, to cut off terrorist financing. Some critics have asserted, however, that expanding the scope of APEC discussions to include such matters as security and good governance was a mistake in that it has diminished APEC’s importance as an economic forum. At the Ministerial Meeting on November 15– 16, 2005, in Busan, Korea, APEC adopted a document called the “Busan Roadmap,” which outlines a strategy for reaching the organization’s original goals in the light of a decade of globalization and change in world economic relationships, while maintaining sustainable development practices. The national leaders issued a separate statement in support of a successful conclusion to the WTO’s sixth Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong, China, and agreed to confront pandemic health threats and continue to fight against terrorism. Though the European Union (EU) was not specifically mentioned in any APEC communiqu´e, the comments of conference participants made it clear that APEC felt the EU’s trade policies were a major obstacle to the liberalization of world trade.

A S S O C I AT I O N O F SOUTHEAST ASIAN N AT I O N S ( A S E A N )

Established: By foreign ministers of member states August 9, 1967, in Bangkok, Thailand. Purpose: “To accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region . . . to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific, and administrative fields . . . to collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of [the member states’] agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of problems of international commodity trade, the improvement of their transport and communication facilities and raising the living standards of their people.” Headquarters: Jakarta, Indonesia. Principal Organs: ASEAN Heads of State and Government, ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Standing Committee. Secretary General: Ong Keng Yong (Singapore) for a five-year term beginning in 2003. Membership (10): Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam. Official Language: English. Origin and development. ASEAN was part of a continuing effort during the 1960s to create a framework for regional cooperation among the non-Communist states of Southeast Asia. Earlier efforts included the Association of South-

east Asia (ASA), established in 1961 by Malaya, the Philippines, and Thailand; and the short-lived “Maphilindo” association, created in 1963 by Indonesia, Malaya, and the Philippines. The change of government in Indonesia in 1966 opened the way to a somewhat broader association, with plans for ASEAN broached at an August conference in Bangkok, Thailand, and implemented a year later with Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand as founding members. A further widening of ASEAN’s sphere of concerns occurred with the first ASEAN-sponsored regional summit conference held February 1976 in Pattaya, Thailand. Sri Lanka was denied admission on geographic grounds in 1982, while Brunei was admitted following independence in 1984. Vietnam joined in July 1995, Laos and Myanmar in July 1997, and Cambodia in April 1999. As the association has grown, it has pursued a more global posture, in part by establishing agreements for formal consultation with a list of “dialog partners” that currently includes Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Russia, the United States, and the UN Development Program. Structure. While the ASEAN Heads of State and Government is the organization’s highest authority, the annual Ministerial Meeting, comprised of the foreign ministers of the member states, ordinarily sets general policy. Continuing supervision of ASEAN activities is the responsibility of the Standing Committee, which, located in the country hosting the Ministerial Meeting, includes the director generals of the ASEAN departments

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within each member country’s foreign ministry. The foreign minister of the host country acts as chair; the ASEAN secretary general also participates. Sectoral ministerial meetings convene in more than a dozen fields, including agriculture and forestry, economics, energy, environment, finance, information, investment, labor, law, rural development and poverty alleviation, science and technology, transportation, and tourism. Nearly 30 committees and more than 120 working groups offer support. In addition, the heads of the ASEAN countries’ diplomatic missions in various countries— Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, France, India, Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Pakistan, Russia, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States—meet to confer on matters of external relations. The secretariat is headed by the secretary general, who serves a five-year term. ASEAN has also established a number of specialized centers: Agricultural Development Planning, Biodiversity Conservation, Earthquake Information, Energy, Management, Specialized Meteorology, Poultry Research and Training, Rural Youth Development, Timber Technology, Tourism Information, and University Network. Activities. Although economic cooperation has long been a principal ASEAN concern, progress has been slowed by such factors as differing levels of development and similarity of exports. By contrast, the association generally demonstrated political solidarity in its early years, primarily through an anticommunist posture that yielded strong condemnation of Vietnam’s 1978–1989 military involvement in Cambodia. ASEAN convened its first summit in a decade on December 14–15, 1987. Meeting in Manila, Philippines, the heads of state called for a reduction in tariff barriers between members and a rejuvenation of regional economic projects. Observers noted that concerted action seemed more likely than in the past because of an increasingly hostile global trading environment and concern over growing Western protectionism. Another major development of the summit was an announcement by Japan that it was offering ASEAN countries $2 billion in low-

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interest loans and investments over the next three years to finance private sector projects. Among the issues receiving attention by ASEAN in 1988 were additional Japanese economic and political initiatives in the region, efforts to advance the status of women in member countries, and proposals to alleviate the Indochinese refugee problem. However, the dominant concern remained the situation in Cambodia. The specter of a return to the brutality of the 1970s appeared to weaken the theretofore steadfast anti-Hanoi sentiment within ASEAN, whose members met with representatives of the Vietnamese and warring Cambodian factions in July 1988 and February 1989 in Jakarta, Indonesia, in an effort to negotiate a settlement. When Vietnam withdrew its last troops in September 1989, ASEAN continued to play an important role in talks aimed at producing a permanent political resolution to the Cambodian conflict. The association also became increasingly vocal in attempts to resolve the status of the estimated 125,000 Vietnamese “boat people” who fled to ASEAN countries. Another major issue for ASEAN was the formation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which now includes seven ASEAN members plus 14 other countries (see article on APEC). Apparently concerned that their interests could be slighted in a grouping involving global economic powers, the ASEAN countries were initially seen as resisting efforts to formalize the APEC, inaugurated in November 1989, beyond regular meetings of foreign and trade ministers. In fact, in early 1991 Malaysia proposed that an alternative economic bloc—the East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG)—be established to include the ASEAN members, Hong Kong, Myanmar, South Korea, and possibly Japan and Vietnam, but not nations in which the non-Asian population dominates. Concerned that economic integration in North America and Europe might negatively affect the Far East, the January 27–28, 1992, ASEAN Summit in Singapore created the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) while offering foreign investors and manufacturers simplified access to the region’s

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increasingly affluent 330 million people. The decision to phase the agreement in over 15 years came at the urging of Indonesia and the Philippines, who reportedly feared being overwhelmed by their more rapidly expanding neighbors. The summit participants also considered but did not approve a plan for an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), a forum recommended as an alternative to the EAEG. A partial compromise was apparently reached on how the region should pursue global economic cooperation when ASEAN agreed later in the year to APEC’s institutionalization. It was subsequently decided that the EAEC would operate under the “umbrella” of the APEC but would be directly coordinated by the ASEAN economic ministers. An informal ministerial session was held in July 1994 to discuss preliminary EAEC plans, but a proposed full-scale summit to formalize the caucus failed to materialize. In July 1993 the ASEAN foreign ministers decided the association would “host” a regional security forum designed, among other things, to facilitate the peaceful resolution of disputes and promote regional stability. The forum—now comprising the ASEAN members, Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, and United States—was perceived by some as an Asian equivalent of the Conference on (later Organization for) Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, OSCE), although its eventual structure and purview remained vague. It was also unclear if the new body would address human rights issues, a delicate subject for some ASEAN members. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) met for the first time July 25, 1994, during the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Bangkok, Thailand. Substantive talks were reported on a variety of concerns, including North Korea’s nuclear posture, the region’s escalating arms race, claims by a number of countries to the potentially oil-rich Spratly Islands in the South China Sea (see article on Vietnam), and the need for the other ARF members to engage China in a “genuine security dialog.” However, no formal

agreements were reached regarding conflict resolution mechanisms, and most attendees cautioned that they expected the ARF to proceed slowly. Much of the attention at the August 1, 1995, session of the ARF focused on what was perceived in some quarters as Beijing’s “aggressiveness,” with China having recently conducted missile tests off the coast of Taiwan and having constructed a military outpost on one of the Spratly Islands. Some reduction in tension was reported following the meeting in the wake of China’s decision to negotiate a resolution with the other Spratly claimants based on the UN’s International Law of the Sea Convention. Meanwhile, at their annual meeting just prior to the ARF session, the ASEAN foreign ministers endorsed a proposal to move up the final implementation date for AFTA from 2003 to 2000. (The original target date of 2008 had already been changed to 2003 the previous year.) Vietnam, admitted as a full ASEAN member at the meeting, would be given until 2006 to comply with the AFTA tariff reductions. Although the 2003 target date was retained at the December 1995 ASEAN summit held in Bangkok, it was agreed that attempts would be made to achieve the 2000 goal for most products. In other activity, the summit attendees signed a somewhat controversial South-East Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) treaty by which they pledged that their nations would not manufacture, possess, or use nuclear weapons. The ASEAN foreign ministers meeting on July 20–21, 1996, appeared to be at odds with the United States and other Western nations regarding the extent to which international bodies should “interfere” in the domestic affairs of members, the ASEAN leaders suggesting, among other things, that issues such as human rights and government corruption should not be addressed by the upcoming first ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The question came into even sharper focus for ASEAN two days later at the third session of the ARF, attended for the first time by India and Myanmar. The presence of the latter was the source of much discussion considering the heavy pressure Western capitals had exerted on

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Yangon regarding human rights and political repression. That controversy was also described as the “burning issue” at the ASEAN summit held at the end of November in Jakarta, Indonesia. Laos and Myanmar were admitted to ASEAN on July 23, 1997, the day before the 30th annual meeting of foreign ministers held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. However, Cambodia’s admission, which was to have occurred on the same day, was postponed because of renewed political turmoil there. The west, as expected, objected to Myanmar’s accession, and at the July 27 meeting of the ARF, Western nations and Japan criticized Myanmar’s human rights record. The biggest problem addressed by ASEAN in 1997 was the financial crisis experienced by many of its members and other Asian countries in the latter half of the year. After some debate, in early December 1997 the ASEAN finance ministers announced they would support a leading role for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in providing relief to regional governments in need of assistance. Later that month, the Chinese, Japanese, South Korean, and ASEAN heads of state and government, meeting in Kuala Lumpur, called for “global efforts” to help combat the fall in value of the region’s currencies. The general feeling at the meeting was reportedly one of “growing dissatisfaction” with the aid offered by the IMF. The admission of Myanmar continued to be a source of tension between ASEAN and the west in 1998, and Myanmar was excluded from the AsiaEurope Meeting (ASEM) held in London, England, in April. The primary topic of discussion at the session was the continuing Asian financial crisis; United Kingdom Prime Minister Tony Blair, responding to earlier criticism that the EU had not done enough to assist the ASEAN members during the recent trouble, pledged that Europe would “stick by Asia thick and thin.” At a July 1998 meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers, a proposal from the Philippines and Thailand to include discussions on the internal affairs of members within the ASEAN framework was rejected by the other members. However, expanded dialog was endorsed for such

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regional issues as forestry and piracy. Subsequently, the ASEAN Summit on December 15–16 in Hanoi, Vietnam, was marked by disagreement over Cambodia’s prospective membership; Hanoi, backed by Indonesia and Malaysia, pushed hard for Cambodia’s immediate accession, but the other members insisted on further delay to assess the new Cambodian government’s stability. (Cambodia was ultimately admitted to ASEAN at a special ceremony April 30, 1999, in Hanoi.) Meanwhile, prior to the summit, the ASEAN foreign and finance ministers agreed to bring AFTA’s launch date forward to 2002 for the original ASEAN partners. The 1999 annual foreign ministers’ session convened July 23–24 in Singapore and was immediately followed by an ARF session. The political crisis in Indonesia and East Timor generated great concern throughout the region, but ASEAN’s commitment to noninterference in members’ internal affairs prevented consensus on an appropriate response. Because of the climate of violence that followed the August East Timorese independence referendum, in September the wider international community organized a peacekeeping mission led by Australia. Some ASEAN states, objecting to Australia’s prominence, argued that ASEAN should assume a commanding role, but most acknowledged that the association had neither the experience nor the organizational structure for such an assignment. Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore ultimately agreed to provide troops to the UN International Force East Timor (Interfet). An informal summit held November 27–28, 1999, in Manila, overlapping meetings of the ASEAN foreign and finance ministers, again discussed developments in East Timor and also proposed a code of conduct regarding the disputed Spratly Islands, but the session was dominated by economic developments. With China, South Korea, and Japan participating, in a format dubbed “ASEAN plus three” (ASEAN +3), the session reached agreement on a nonspecific framework for East Asian economic cooperation, which was hailed as a major advance toward wider regional integration. The ASEAN leaders also advanced the

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target date for elimination of all import duties from 2015 to 2010 for all but Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, which saw their target moved from 2018 to 2015. Efforts to revitalize ASEAN continued into 2000 amid concerns over recent economic gains in northeast Asia and over the organization’s difficulties in achieving consensus, especially since the accession of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam. At a May 6–8 meeting of the Asian Development Bank in Chiang Mai, Thailand, the ASEAN +3 agreed to establish a currency swap system as part of a concerted effort to prevent a repetition of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The Chiang Mai Initiative stopped short of calling for an Asian Monetary Fund, as had long been advocated by Japan, but it constituted another significant step toward economic cooperation. The 33rd annual Ministerial Meeting was held July 24–25, 2000, in Bangkok, with the most notable development being a decision to establish an informal ministerial “troika” that would serve as a rapid response team in the event of a regional emergency. Consisting of the current ministerial chair, his predecessor, and his successor, the troika would, however, have limited ability to act, given the noninterference principle and the need to consult all ASEAN members beforehand. The foreign ministers’ meeting was once again followed by a session of the ARF, which for the first time included North Korean participation. At the broader meeting the European Union agreed to reopen its dialog with ASEAN three years after suspending the talks to protest Myanmar’s accession. An informal summit November 24–25, 2000, in Singapore agreed to examine the feasibility of a free trade area that would include China, South Korea, and Japan. The summit also agreed to $1 billion in central bank support for the Chiang Mai Initiative. Final plans for implementing the swap arrangement were concluded the following May. At the July 23–25, 2001, Ministerial Meeting, held in Hanoi, ASEAN Secretary General Rodolfo Severino of the Philippines delivered a harsh message that summarized recent concerns over the organization’s international status and its difficulties

in moving forward since expansion. Describing the region as in “disarray and rudderless,” Severino called for the ASEAN members to institute social and political reforms and to support more rapid economic integration. The annual summit held November 5–6, 2001, in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, was also attended by leaders of China, Japan, and South Korea. Two major developments were a commitment to oppose terrorism, despite some differences over the U.S.-led military intervention in Afghanistan, and an agreement to support a Chinese proposal for an eventual ASEAN-China free trade area (FTA). With regard to the latter, Malaysia, in particular, expressed concerns about the ability of ASEAN products to compete directly against Chinese manufactures. On May 20–21, 2002, the ASEAN home and security affairs ministers met in Kuala Lumpur in search of a cooperative approach toward combating terrorism and furthering regional security. At the same time, the attendees cautioned against linking terrorism to any “religion, race, culture or nationality.” The annual meeting of foreign ministers, held July 29–30 in Bandar Seri Begawan, was immediately followed by an ARF session. With U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell in attendance, the ARF meeting concluded on August 1 with a declaration on fighting terrorism that specifically endorsed U.S. involvement in regional antiterrorism efforts. Although the declaration focused in part on the need for financial and technical assistance and information exchange, observers noted that the Philippine government had already permitted the deployment of U.S. troops as part of an antiterrorism campaign and questioned whether that action might serve as a precedent for other ASEAN states. The November 3–5, 2002, summit in Phnom Penh was also attended by Chinese President Zhu Rongji and the Indian prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee. At the meeting the ten ASEAN members signed a framework agreement on establishing an FTA by 2010, although the poorer ASEAN states—Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam— were given an additional five years to eliminate specified tariff barriers. The ASEAN leaders also created a task force for drafting an FTA framework agreement with India. Significant progress was also

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made regarding competing territorial claims in the South China Sea, although the summit’s joint declaration on the issue did not contain the formal code of conduct that ASEAN states had sought. In other business, the summit formally approved the appointment of Ong Keng Yong of Singapore as the organization’s next secretary general, effective January 2003. The second quarter of 2003 was dominated by the Asian outbreak of the new viral disease Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), which centered on Hong Kong and China. (Of the ASEAN states, Singapore recorded the most cases.) An emergency meeting of the ASEAN +3 health ministers on April 26 in Kuala Lumpur was quickly followed by a Special ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting on SARS (and a parallel ASEAN-China session) April 29 in Bangkok. The meeting noted the outbreak’s “serious adverse impact” and emphasized the importance of “strong leadership, political commitment, multisectoral collaboration and partnership” in overcoming the economic and societal consequences. By the June 11–13 meeting of the ASEAN +3 health ministers in Siem Reap, Cambodia, the crisis had passed; the last regional case was identified May 11. Meeting October 7–8, 2003, in Bali, Indonesia, the ASEAN leaders endorsed creation of a free trade area by 2020. The “Bali Concord II” plan also called for greater security and social cooperation, but significant barriers remain to be overcome, including the economic disparities among members. The summit also saw various agreements signed with China, India, and Japan. On July 2, 2004, in Jakarta, the ARF admitted Pakistan to its membership, following the withdrawal of Indian objections. The ARF session, which was immediately preceded by ASEAN foreign ministers and ASEAN +3 meetings, covered in its discussions North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, international terrorism, improved maritime security, the need to increase export controls on technology and materials that could be used in producing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the political situation in Burma. The November 27–30 summit in Vientiane, Laos, appeared to indicate a return to the principle of noninterfer-

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ence in members’ internal matters, however, as further initiatives on Burma were shelved, as was the topic of Thailand’s handling of an insurrection in its Muslim-dominated south. Major developments in the economic sphere included a decision to accelerate by three years the schedule for introducing the ASEAN FTA: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand committed to ending internal tariffs by 2007, with Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam following suit by 2012. Also at the summit, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and the ASEAN leaders signed a trade agreement eliminating tariffs on many agricultural and manufactured goods by 2010. At an April 9–12, 2005, foreign ministers’ meeting in Cebu, Philippines, Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore reportedly led in exerting pressure on Myanmar to bypass its turn to chair ASEAN. Although the Myanmar government previously resisted any such suggestion, the foreign ministers announced July 25 that Myanmar would in fact “relinquish” the chairmanship for 2006 in favor of the Philippines, ostensibly because it wanted to maintain its focus on reconciliation and democratization at home. Meeting on July 27 the ASEAN +3 welcomed North Korea’s decision to resume six-party talks (with China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States) on its nuclear program and also to resume an inter-Korean dialogue with Seoul. It was also announced that Australia, India, and New Zealand decided to participate with the ASEAN +3 in the first East Asia Summit, scheduled for December 14, 2005, in Kuala Lumpur. Russia was also invited to participate, but it was noted that the United States was not. The East Asia Summit was held jointly with the 11th ASEAN Summit on December 12–14, 2005, in Kuala Lumpur. The early months of 2006 were marked by efforts to arrange an ASEAN fact-finding mission to Myanmar to investigate the human rights situation there. After several delays, the Myanmar government agreed to a visit by the Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid Albar at the end of March. He made the visit, but returned one day early on March 24 apparently because he was not allowed to meet with the prodemocracy leader under house arrest, Aung San Suu Kyi.

COLOMBO PLAN FOR C O O P E R AT I V E E C O N O M I C AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA A N D T H E PA C I F I C

Established: July 1, 1951, pursuant to an initiative by Commonwealth foreign ministers in Colombo, Sri Lanka, January 9–14, 1950. Purpose: To facilitate economic and social development, to coordinate technical assistance and capital aid to the countries of Asia and the Pacific, to promote South–South cooperation in development, and to assist the region’s least developed countries (LDCs) in obtaining technical and industrial knowhow. Headquarters: Colombo, Sri Lanka. Principal Organs: Consultative Committee, Colombo Plan Council, Colombo Plan Secretariat. Secretary General: Kittipan Kanjanapipatkul (Thailand). Membership (25): Major Donors (4): Australia, Japan, New Zealand, United States. Regional Members (21): Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Iran, Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Vietnam. Origin and development. What was initially styled the “Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia”

was conceived at a meeting of the Commonwealth foreign ministers in January 1950 in Colombo, Sri Lanka. The decision to form a Consultative Committee resulted in meetings in Sydney, Australia, and London, England, the same year, while technical cooperation began in March 1951 after the commencement of capital aid operations in support of national development plans. Soon after its inception the plan began to lose its exclusively Anglophone character, and Commonwealth countries now constitute a minority of the membership. The present name was adopted following the December 1977 implementation of a new constitution intended to reflect more accurately the plan’s extended geographic composition and scope of activity. Structure. The Colombo Plan is multilateral in approach but bilateral in operation: multilateral in that the plan takes cognizance of the problems of Asia and the Pacific as a whole and endeavors to deal with them in a coordinated way; bilateral because negotiations for assistance are made directly between a donor and a recipient country. The Consultative Committee, the highest deliberative body, consists of ministers and/or other senior officials representing the member governments. It meets biennially to survey the development of the region, assess needs, and examine how international cooperation can help fill gaps in national resources and accelerate development. The

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Colombo Plan Council, which generally consists of the heads of members’ diplomatic missions in Colombo, meets several times per year to direct activity of the Colombo Plan Secretariat and the Drug Advisory Program (DAP) and to prepare recommendations on current issues for consideration by the Consultative Committee. The secretariat advises the Consultative Committee during its meetings, helps the council carry out its functions, conducts research, records aid flow to the region, and disseminates information on the plan as a whole. The DAP, launched in 1973 to help ameliorate the causes and consequences of drug abuse in member states, has become one of the plan’s most active components. It is funded by voluntary contributions from several members. A Colombo Plan Staff College for Technician Education, established in 1974, was relocated from Singapore to Manila in 1987. Activities. At the July 1991 session of the Colombo Plan Council, the organization agreed to discuss a proposal to increase the program budget by increasing members’ annual contributions. However, the plan was severely compromised the following October when Canada and the United Kingdom, voicing a series of programmatic and other concerns, announced their withdrawal from the organization. In the wake of the Canada-UK decision, the 1992 Consultative Committee meeting called for a “reactivation” of the plan, based in part on greatly expanded “South-South” technical assistance programs. Evaluation of the plan’s future role continued into 1994, an Eminent Persons Group convening in September to consider the question. Based on the group’s recommendations, the 35th Consultative Committee meeting, held October 26–28 in Seoul, South Korea, called for a “two-pronged approach” for subsequent plan activity under which relatively few permanent programs would be sup-

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plemented by numerous short-term training programs approved on a “project-by-project” basis. In addition to relying on continued support from the remaining four major donor members, the committee said it would seek financing from “nontraditional donors” throughout the world. In addition, regional developing nations would be asked to contribute to plan projects from which they were benefiting. One of the first steps in the plan’s reorganization was the establishment of a Japanese-financed Program for Public Administration, through which government personnel receive training in how best to respond to the “changing needs of marketoriented economies.” Another major component is the Private Sector Development Program. Areas of long-standing interest include promotion of entrepreneurship, technical cooperation and vocational training, integration of women into the development process, human resource development, and poverty alleviation. In 2001, Australia and the World Bank launched a distance-learning initiative, pointedly titled the Virtual Colombo Plan, that emphasizes computer and Internet use to provide affordable educational opportunities not only in Asia but also across the Pacific and into Africa. As such, it updated one of the Colombo plan’s initial emphases, namely, offering overseas educational opportunities for citizens of developing country members. Meeting in April 2002 in its 238th session, the Colombo Plan Council voted to renew assistance to Afghanistan, which had not been a recipient of Colombo Plan aid since 1979. Accordingly, in March 2003 the United States provided $500,000 for a DAP-sponsored drug demand reduction program in Afghanistan. The Colombo plan organization continues to sponsor a variety of training courses, meetings, and scholarships in pursuit of its aims.

C O M M O N W E A LT H

Established: By evolutionary process and formalized December 31, 1931, in the Statute of Westminster. Purpose: To give expression to a continuing sense of affinity and to foster cooperation among states presently or formerly owing allegiance to the British Crown. Commonwealth Center: The Secretariat is located in Marlborough House, London, which also serves as the site of Commonwealth meetings in the United Kingdom. Principal Organs: Meeting of Heads of Government, Secretariat. Head of the Commonwealth: Queen Elizabeth II. Secretary General: Donald McKinnon (New Zealand). Membership (53, with years of entry): Antigua and Barbuda (1981), Australia (1931), Bahamas (1973), Bangladesh (1972), Barbados (1966), Belize (1981), Botswana (1966), Brunei (1984), Cameroon (1995), Canada (1931), Cyprus (1961), Dominica (1978), Fiji (reentered 1997), Gambia (1965), Ghana (1957), Grenada (1974), Guyana (1966), India (1947), Jamaica (1962), Kenya (1963), Kiribati (1979), Lesotho (1966), Malawi (1964), Malaysia (1957), Maldives (1982), Malta (1964), Mauritius (1968), Mozambique (1995), Namibia (1990), Nauru (1999), New Zealand (1931), Nigeria (1960), Pakistan (reentered 1989, but suspended following military coup of October 1999; readmitted on May 22, 2004), Papua New Guinea (1975), St. Kitts-Nevis (1983), St. Lucia (1979), St. Vincent and the Grenadines

(1979), Samoa (1970), Seychelles (1976), Sierra Leone (1961), Singapore (1965), Solomon Islands (1978), South Africa (reentered 1994), Sri Lanka (1948), Swaziland (1968), Tanzania (1961), Tonga (1970), Trinidad and Tobago (1962), Tuvalu (2000), Uganda (1962), United Kingdom (1931), Vanuatu (1980), Zambia (1964). (Zimbabwe, a member since 1980, withdrew in 2003.) Working Language: English. Origin and development. A voluntary association that gradually superseded the British Empire, the Commonwealth traces its origins to the mid1800s, when internal self-government was first introduced in the colonies of Australia, British North America (Canada), New Zealand, and part of what was to become the Union of South Africa. The increasing maturity and independence of these overseas communities, particularly after World War I, eventually created a need to redefine the mutual relationships between the United Kingdom and the self-governing “dominions” that were collectively coming to be known as the “British Commonwealth of Nations.” The Statute of Westminster, enacted by the British Parliament in 1931, established the principle that all members of the association were equal in status, in no way subordinate to each other, and united by allegiance to the Crown. The original members of the Commonwealth, in addition to the United Kingdom, were Australia, Canada, the Irish Free State, Newfoundland, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa. In 1949 Newfoundland became a province of Canada, and the Irish Republic became an independent state outside the Commonwealth. South Africa ceased to be a member upon becoming a republic in 1961 because of the opposition of the other Commonwealth

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countries to Pretoria’s apartheid policies; however, it was readmitted June 1, 1994, following the installation of a multiracial government. Pakistan withdrew in 1972 but rejoined in 1989, although its membership was suspended in response to the coup of October 1999. The ethnic, geographic, and economic composition of the Commonwealth has been modified fundamentally by the accession of former colonial territories in Asia, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. This infusion of racially non-white and economically less developed states had significant political implications, including modification of the Commonwealth’s unwritten constitution to accommodate the desire of many new members to renounce allegiance to the British Crown and adopt a republican form of government. In 1949 the pattern was set when Commonwealth prime ministers accepted India’s formal declaration that, on becoming a republic, it would accept the Crown as a symbol of the Commonwealth association and recognize the British sovereign as head of the Commonwealth. The movement toward a multicultural identity was solidified by the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles adopted by the heads of government at their 1971 Singapore summit. In addition to acknowledging the organization’s diversity, the Singapore Declaration enumerated a set of common principles, including the primacy of international peace and order; individual liberty regardless of racial, ethnic, or religious background; people’s “inalienable right to participate by means of free and democratic processes in framing the society in which they live”; opposition to “colonial domination and racial oppression”; and the “progressive removal” of wide disparities in wealth and living standards. The new thrust was further evidenced by a North-South summit in October 1981, which reflected that most Commonwealth members were developing countries. Subsequently, a 1982 report, The North-South Dialogue: Making It Work, proposed many institutional and procedural reforms to facilitate global negotiations on development and related issues, and a 1983 document, Towards

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a New Bretton Woods, proposed short-, medium-, and long-range changes to enhance the efficiency and equity of the international trading and financial system. A declaration in October 1987 that Fiji’s Commonwealth status had lapsed followed two successive coups, abrogation of the country’s constitution, and proclamation of a republic. Readmission required the unanimous consent of the Commonwealth members, and Fiji’s application remained blocked until mid-1997 by India on the grounds that appropriate constitutional recognition had yet to be given to the island’s Indian population. Fiji was finally readmitted effective October 1, 1997, following the adoption of a new constitution in July, but its membership was suspended in May 2000 following displacement of the elected government. Full participation was restored in late 2001, following democratic elections in August through September. The October 1991 summit in Harare, Zimbabwe, was noteworthy for the adoption of a declaration redefining the Commonwealth’s agenda. The Harare Declaration, drafted under the guidance of a ten-member High Level Appraisal Group, committed all Commonwealth countries, regardless of their political or economic conditions, to promote democracy, human rights, judicial independence, equality for women, educational opportunities, and the principles of “sound economic management.” In a departure from precedent, membership was granted on November 13, 1995, to Mozambique, even though it had never been a British colony and was not at least partly English speaking. A “unique and special” case regarding Mozambique had been presented by its Anglophone neighbors because of regional trade concerns. In 1999 Nauru became the 53rd full member of the Commonwealth after 31 years as a special member, and Tuvalu, also a special member (from 1978), became the 54th full member in 2000. In 2005 Nauru resumed its status as a special member, a category of membership available to very small countries. In March 2002 Zimbabwe’s participation in Commonwealth meetings was suspended as a

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consequence of a widely condemned presidential election earlier in the month. In response to its continued suspension, Zimbabwe withdrew effective December 7, 2003. Structure. One of the least institutionalized intergovernmental organizations, the Commonwealth was virtually without permanent machinery until the establishment of its Secretariat in 1965. The symbolic head of the organization is the reigning British monarch, who serves concurrently as constitutional sovereign in those member states that still maintain their traditional allegiance. Since World War II, the heads of government have held biennial meetings, and specialized consultations occur periodically among national ministers responsible for such fields as foreign affairs, defense, finance, education, agriculture, health, trade, legal affairs, science and the environment, and women’s and youth affairs. National finance ministers normally convene in the nearest convenient Commonwealth site on the eve of the annual fall meetings of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank to discuss monetary and economic issues. The Secretariat organizes meetings and conferences, collects and disseminates information on behalf of the membership, and is responsible for implementing collective decisions. The secretary general, who currently serves a four-year term, is assisted by three deputies with responsibilities for political affairs, economic and social development, and development cooperation. Since its reorganization in 2002, the Secretariat has encompassed nine divisions: Communications and Public Affairs, Corporate Services, Economic Affairs, Gender and Human Resources Development, Governance and Institutional Development, Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Political Affairs, Science and Technology, and Special Advisory Services. The organization’s technical assistance program is financed primarily through the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC). The fund is supported by all Commonwealth countries on a voluntary basis, and its governing body includes representatives of all contributors. In addition, a Commonwealth Equity Fund, designed to encourage private sector investment in the

emerging stock markets of developing countries, was launched in 1990 and was followed in 1995 by formation of a Commonwealth Private Investment Initiative (CPII). The latter was established to help geographic regions attract capital for small- and medium-sized ventures and for former state enterprises that were being privatized. The first CPII investment fund, for Sub-Saharan Africa, was established in 1996, and others followed. On the political front, a Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) was created in November 1995 to provide guidance toward “good governance” in countries undergoing transition to democracy. The autonomous Commonwealth Foundation, the formation of which was authorized by the Commonwealth heads of government in 1965, supports nongovernmental organizations, professional associations, and other such bodies. Known informally as the “unofficial Commonwealth,” the foundation directs its attention to “inter-country networking, training, capacity-building, and information exchange.” The Commonwealth of Learning, likewise authorized by the heads of government and located in Vancouver, Canada, was established in 1987 to promote distance learning and thereby improve access to education and training. Some three dozen additional Commonwealth associations, institutes, councils, and other groups were also established over the years, largely to promote development or disseminate information in such fields as forestry, health, telecommunications, education, journalism, law, and sports. Most are based in London. Activities. The Secretariat’s divisions oversee Commonwealth activities. Among the most prominent, the Political Affairs Division participates in organizing Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings (CHOGMs), conducts research, aids various committees in their tasks, and monitors political issues and developments of importance to Commonwealth members. Since 1990 its observer missions have also monitored election campaigns, preparations for balloting, and elections in some two dozen Commonwealth countries around the globe, and in 1999 it drafted a “Framework for Principles for Promoting Good Governance and

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Combating Corruption.” The Economic Affairs Division conducts research and analysis and supports expert groups in such areas as North–South economic relations, protectionist tariffs, reform of the international financial system, debt management, and youth unemployment. Its purview also includes environmental concerns and sustainable development. In the area of technical assistance and development, CFTC provides training, expertise, and advice in the promotion of economic growth, public sector reform, poverty alleviation, infrastructural and institutional development, and capacity building. A Commonwealth Youth Program likewise funded through voluntary contributions, is an effort to encourage youth participation in economic and social development. Among more recent innovations, in 1995 the heads of government endorsed a Commonwealth Plan of Action on Gender and Development. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the Commonwealth was most prominently identified with its efforts to end apartheid in South Africa, although debate frequently raged within the organization over tactics, especially the imposition of sanctions. Accordingly, the formal readmission of South Africa at midyear was the highlight of 1994, newly elected South African President Nelson Mandela hailing the “sterling contribution” of the grouping to the installation of a nonracial government in Pretoria. The heads of government meeting held November 8–13, 1995, in Auckland, New Zealand, was dominated by discussion of recent events in Nigeria, which resulted in the suspension of Nigeria’s membership and the launching of efforts (ultimately largely unsuccessful) by the Commonwealth to influence the actions of the military regime in Abuja. The governments of Gambia and Sierra Leone were also criticized for their perceived failure to support genuine democratization; the summit established CMAG in part to “guide” developing Commonwealth countries toward abiding by the principles enunciated in the 1991 Harare Declaration. Nigeria, Gambia, and Sierra Leone were also major topics at the 1997 Commonwealth heads

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of government meeting held in Edinburgh, Scotland. While praising the role Nigeria played in the Liberia conflict, the summit decided to continue the former’s suspension because of ongoing human rights abuses and the suppression of democracy by the government. The summit also indicated it might impose sanctions if they would help move Nigeria toward democracy. Sierra Leone was also suspended (until the restoration of President Tejan Kabbah’s government in March 1998), and the summit called on Commonwealth members to support the UN and ECOWAS sanctions imposed on that country. In contrast, the government in Gambia was praised for having made progress toward genuine democratization. Another focus of attention at the summit was the promotion of economic prosperity. The heads of government adopted the Edinburgh Commonwealth Economic Declaration, which called for continued global economic integration with greater attention to the smaller, less developed countries that believed they were being “left behind.” To assist the smaller countries, the Commonwealth leaders agreed to support efforts to develop a successor to the Lom´e Convention, to offer duty-free access to certain markets, and to establish a Trade and Investment Access Facility (TIAF) with initial funding from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The Commonwealth leaders also endorsed establishing a Commonwealth Business Council, which would meet every two years to ensure that the voice of the “business community” was heard. In October 1998 CMAG concluded that the Nigerian government had taken enough steps toward democracy to warrant a lifting of sanctions and a resumption of Nigerian participation in some Commonwealth activities. Full participation was restored May 29, 1999, following presidential elections the previous February. In other activities during the year, a Commonwealth ministerial mission lobbied leading providers of aid and loans to developing countries on behalf of small island states, arguing they deserved special consideration because of their extreme exposure to outside political, economic, and environmental forces.

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At the November 12–15, 1999, Commonwealth summit in Durban, South Africa, the organization established a ten-member High-Level Review Group (HLRG) comprising the heads of government of Australia, India, Malta, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, South Africa, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe. The HLRG was assigned the task of recommending how the Commonwealth could best meet 21st century challenges. Issues facing the organization included what measures to take in response to corrupt governments and how to reconcile promotion of good governance with the principle of national sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs. In this context, a number of Commonwealth countries called for expanding CMAG’s mandate to allow firmer action where democratic practices were perceived as under threat—for example, in cases of arbitrarily postponed elections, restrictions on freedom of speech and the press, and evidence of persistent human rights violations. To date, such proposals have been met with less than unanimity, however, given that many Commonwealth countries have questionable records with regard to political pluralism and press independence. Also at the Durban heads of government session, Donald McKinnon, former deputy prime minister and foreign minister of New Zealand, was elected to succeed Chief Eleazar Chukwuemea (Emeka) Anyaoku of Nigeria as secretary general, effective April 2000. McKinnon, who received wise praise for his role in resolving the Bougainville crisis in Papua New Guinea, subsequently indicated that his priorities would include obtaining debt relief for developing countries, promoting democracy, and facilitating technology transfers. The heads of government also confirmed Pakistan’s suspension from Commonwealth activities in the wake of the previous month’s coup in Islamabad. Pakistan (like Fiji, Gambia, Sierra Leone, and the Solomon Islands) continued to be one of the countries on the CMAG agenda for 2001. Recent threatening events in Zimbabwe were also discussed at CMAG’s March 19–20 session. Collaterally, HLRG established three working groups to consider the Commonwealth’s political role, in-

cluding conflict prevention and the mandate of CMAG; its developmental role, including how to reduce the “digital divide”; and Commonwealth governance and structures. The CHOGM scheduled for October 2001 was postponed in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States and then rescheduled for March 2–5, 2002, in Coolum, Australia. The meeting’s concluding declaration called for a rationalized and streamlined organizational structure, as HLRG’s report recommended. Emphasis was also given to “people-centered economic development,” good governance and human rights, efforts to bridge the widening gap between rich and poor, and the elimination of terrorism. (Some African participants, however, although condemning the September 11 al-Qaida attacks, expressed concern that the definition of terrorism was too closely tied to U.S. and Western concerns and ignored, for example, that a number of present-day African leaders had themselves been branded as terrorists during the colonial and apartheid eras.) In addition, the assembled heads of government voiced support for the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad), which was launched in 2001 under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and endorsed a new assistance effort for small states. Countries continuing under CMAG scrutiny included Fiji, Pakistan, the Solomon Islands, and Zimbabwe. In keeping with a summit recommendation that they pursue more active consultations, the Commonwealth foreign ministers convened for the first time in September 2002, during the opening days of the annual UN General Assembly session in New York. At that time the ministers agreed to hold annual meetings. The next CHOGM, which was held December 5–8, 2003, in Abuja, Nigeria, was dominated by the Zimbabwe issue. Although many African states argued that the Mugabe government could best be engaged by lifting the suspension, opponents prevailed. The Commonwealth proceeded to form a balanced committee of leaders from Australia, Canada, India, Jamaica, Mozambique, and South Africa to pursue “national reconciliation”

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in Zimbabwe and a rapid return of that country to full participation, but Zimbabwe’s governing party quickly voted to terminate membership in the Commonwealth. In acknowledging the withdrawal, Secretary General McKinnon, who was elected to a second term at the CHOGM, expressed his hope that Zimbabwe would rejoin “in due course, as have other members in the past.” Also at the CHOGM, membership applications from the Palestinian Authority, Rwanda, and Yemen were rejected. Four and a half years after the military coup that brought Gen. Pervez Musharraf to power, Commonwealth ministers decided to restore full membership to Pakistan at a May 2004 meeting in London. Ministers insisted that General Musharraf uphold his pledge to step down as chief of the army by the end of the year and expected the country to move forward with democratic reforms. Some African nations, including Nigeria and Tanzania, objected to the readmission of Pakistan because they feared that military rulers, who thought that international sanctions could be reversed, might take power in other countries. The marriage of Prince Charles, Queen Elizabeth’s son and heir to the throne, to Camilla Parker Bowles in April 2005 had implications for the Commonwealth. The British Department of Constitutional Affairs stated on March 21 that Parker Bowles would automatically become queen when Charles became king, despite Charles’s declara-

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tions to the contrary, unless parliaments of the UK and the Commonwealth countries of which the UK monarch was head of state all agreed to a change in the law. On March 23 the Commonwealth Secretariat announced that Charles would not automatically succeed Queen Elizabeth as head of the Commonwealth when he became king. Instead, the various Commonwealth heads of government would elect the next head of the Commonwealth. Appointing anyone other than the British monarch to this symbolic position would mark a substantial shift away from the organization’s British and imperial roots. The next CHOGM, which was held November 25–27, 2005, in Valletta, Malta, declared that Pakistan could remain a member in full standing as long as General Musharraf resigned from the military within two years. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni was much criticized for the arrest on treason charges of Uganda’s main opposition leader, Col. Kiza Besigye. The European Union received criticism for maintaining agricultural subsidies and for a 36 percent cut in the guaranteed price of sugar—a matter of great concern to Commonwealth Caribbean countries. The summit issued a Statement on Multilateral Trade, calling for agreement on trade subsidies at forthcoming World Trade Organization talks. The 2007 CHOGM meeting will take place in Uganda, unless Commonwealth members continue to question Museveni’s policies.

C O M M O N W E A LT H O F I N D E P E N D E N T S TAT E S (CIS) Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv

Established: During a meeting of 11 of the former constituent states of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Alma-Ata (now Almaty), Kazakhstan, on December 21, 1991. Purpose: To assist in the orderly transfer of governmental functions and treaty obligations of the former Soviet Union to its independent successor states; to promote coordinated policies in disarmament and national security; and to work toward economic unity among members. Administrative Center: Minsk, Belarus. Principal Organs: Council of Heads of State, Council of Heads of Government, Ministerial Councils, Interparliamentary Assembly, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Executive Committee. Executive Secretary: Vladimir Rushailo (Russia). Membership (11): Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. Associate Member (1): Turkmenistan. Origin and development. Following acceptance on September 6, 1991, of the Baltic states’ withdrawal from the Soviet Union, a proposal was advanced for the creation of an economic commonwealth of the remaining Soviet republics. The plan was endorsed by all 12 republics during a meeting on October 1–2 in Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan, although

four (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) abstained from signing a formal treaty in Moscow on October 18. Less than a month later, on November 14, agreement was reached on the formation of a Union of Sovereign States, which its principal advocate, USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev, characterized as a union of “confederal democratic states.” However, the seven republican delegations that attended a subsequent meeting November 25 decided not to initial a draft treaty, returning it to their Supreme Soviets for more consideration. Ukraine’s absence from the discussions cast further doubt as to the treaty’s viability. In a referendum December 1, Ukrainians voted overwhelmingly for independence, and one week later, in a highly symbolic meeting in Brest, Belarus, the Russian Federation and Belarus joined Ukraine in proclaiming the demise of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). On December 13 the five Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan agreed to join the CIS, which, with the additional endorsement of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, was formally launched in Alma-Ata on December 21. The Azerbaijan legislature voted against ratification of the accord in October 1992. However, following the June 1993 change of government in Baku, the legislature reversed its position, and Azerbaijan’s membership was formalized at the CIS summit in September. Georgia’s membership,

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provisionally endorsed by national leaders in October 1993, was ratified by the Georgian Supreme Council in March 1994. Moldova’s parliament ratified CIS membership in April 1994, reversing a negative vote on the question taken the previous August. After the first six months of its existence, the viability of the CIS appeared in question because little effective action had been taken in economic, political, or military affairs. On the economic front, in seeming contradiction to their stated goal of cooperation, CIS members were preparing to introduce their own national currencies and had instituted numerous cross-border trade restrictions. The Commonwealth had also proved ineffective in resolving the fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, ethnic conflict in Moldova, and secularist–Islamic fundamentalist disputes in Central Asian republics. Meanwhile, tension remained high between Russia and Ukraine, particularly over the status of Crimea and control of the Black Sea fleet. Ukraine was one of five countries (the others being Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova) that declined to sign a CIS collective security treaty at a May 1992 summit in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. However, a certain CIS momentum appeared to develop following the June agreement between Russia and Ukraine on the Black Sea Fleet dispute. In March 1992, CIS members (except Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Ukraine) endorsed the creation of a joint CIS military command, which subsequently moved into the former Warsaw Treaty Organization headquarters in Moscow. CIS leaders also backed establishing CIS peacekeeping forces to assist in conflict prevention and resolution within and between member states, and in May most signed a Treaty on Collective Security. However, de facto control of both nuclear and regular forces remained in national hands. In 1993 the participating CIS defense ministers ended the joint military command, preferring less structured and, at least from the Russian perspective, less expensive efforts at military cooperation. In 1999 six members of the CIS Collective Security Council— Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Rus-

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sia, and Tajikistan, but neither Azerbaijan nor Uzbekistan—renewed their commitment to collective defense for an additional five years. Meeting on April 28, 2003, the six completed arrangements for formation of a separate Collective Security Treaty Organization—CSTO (Organizacii Dogoora o Kollektivnoi Bezopasnosti—ODKB). Turkmenistan downgraded its participation to associate status in 2005. Structure. The Council of Heads of State (the supreme CIS body) and the Council of Heads of Government are required to meet at least every six and three months, respectively, although more frequent meetings were held during the CIS startup period. In addition, CIS discussions regarding foreign affairs, defense, transportation, energy, the environment, and other areas have been regularly conducted at the ministerial level. Preparation for the various CIS meetings is the responsibility of a permanent administrative staff located in Minsk, Belarus. An Interparliamentary Assembly was approved by seven CIS states (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) in April 1992. Subsequently, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine joined. Although the assembly’s first meeting was held in September in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, St. Petersburg was subsequently designated its permanent home. The assembly is assisted by its own Secretariat. In April 1999 the CIS Executive Secretariat was reorganized as the Executive Committee; the executive secretary was given the collateral title of chair of the Executive Committee. Many other organs were subsumed by the new committee, including the Interstate Economic Committee. Activities. In July 1993 Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine agreed in principle to establish their own “single economic space,” reflecting an apparent acknowledgment among the three regional “powerhouses” that effective CIS activity remained a distant prospect. Central Asian states also subsequently voiced concern over the Commonwealth’s future, and in 1994 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan formed a Central Asian Economic Union (CAEU).

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Nevertheless, negotiations continued within the CIS, and later in 1994 enthusiasm for economic integration increased substantially. On September 9 the Council of Heads of Government endorsed the creation of an Interstate Economic Committee (IEC), described as the first CIS supranational executive body. Supporters of the proposal anticipated that the IEC would assume control of “transnational systems” (in the energy and communications sectors, for example), with the possible addition of certain industrial and financial corporations jointly owned by member states. They also projected that the new committee would coordinate an integration process that could proceed from a proposed monetary union to a CIS free trade zone and, ultimately, to a full-fledged common market. However, thorny issues remained unresolved, particularly the extent to which members would be willing to turn sovereign powers over to the IEC. (Ultimately, the CIS Executive Committee absorbed the IEC.) Supporters of genuine economic cooperation were buoyed by the signing of a customs union between Belarus and Russia during the May 1995 CIS summit in Minsk. Meeting in Moscow in November, CIS heads of government signed integration agreements covering gas supplies, external relations, and scientific research, although Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin warned that a solution needed to be found to the problem of nonpayment of CIS members’ energy supply debts to Russia. On the eve of the premiers’ session, CIS defense ministers formalized their February agreement to create a unified air defense system, which was to be under Russian control and mainly financed by Russia. Delegates to a CIS summit in Moscow agreed in January 1996 that sanctions should be imposed on the breakaway republic of Abkhazia to compel it to accept Georgian sovereignty; it also extended the mandates of the CIS peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia and Tajikistan. On March 29 the presidents of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, meeting in Moscow under CIS auspices, signed a treaty to create “a community of integrated states,” i.e., a CIS customs union intended to provide an

inner core of CIS members committed to integration. The CIS enterprise appeared to lose momentum later in 1996 amid mounting criticism that CIS accords were not being implemented. A heads of state summit scheduled for December 1996 to mark the fifth CIS anniversary was postponed into 1997, apparently because of Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s health problems, and a session of prime ministers in mid-January 1997 in Moscow was far from united on yet another CIS economic integration plan, which Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan declined to support as drafted. Divisions were also apparent at a meeting of CIS defense ministers later in the month. A majority called for the reinstatement of Gen. Viktor Samsonov as head of the CIS military cooperation staff, thus rejecting the nominee of President Yeltsin, who had removed General Samsonov from the CIS post the previous October upon appointing him chief of the Russian general staff. Seeking to deflect charges that the CIS was dedicated to “paper creativity,” Executive Secretary Ivan Korotchenya claimed in December 1996 that 365 of some 800 treaties and agreements signed within the CIS framework since December 1991 had been implemented, the others having encountered opposition from one or more member states. The next CIS summit was finally held on March 28, 1997. Once again plans were endorsed by CIS members (with the exception of Georgia) for accelerated integration. The prime ministers of six CIS states also signed an agreement in early October called the “Concept for the Integrated Economic Development of the CIS,” but little hope for implementation was provided by the subsequent CIS summit, held October 23 in Chi¸sinˇau, Moldova. A number of CIS leaders reportedly criticized Russia for failing to provide strong leadership, while Russian leaders warned that excessive concerns with issues of national sovereignty were preventing other members from acting effectively within the CIS. CIS supporters also wondered whether the proliferation of smaller economic groupings among CIS members was proving counterproductive to the goals of the parent grouping. Blocs included

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the Belarus-Russia union; the CIS Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia; the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC, successor to the CAEU) of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan; and the so-called GUAM grouping of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. (Tajikistan joined the CIS Customs Union in February 1999, and the GUAM became the GUUAM after Uzbekistan’s admission in April 1999. In February 2002 the participants of the CAEC agreed to reshape it as the Central Asian Cooperation Organization [CACO].) At the April 1998 summit, entrepreneur Boris Berezovsky, a close political ally of Yeltsin’s, was appointed as the Commonwealth’s executive secretary. Berezovsky’s tenure was short-lived, however, because he soon became a target of an anticorruption investigation in Russia. Yeltsin dismissed him in March 1999 and appointed Yury Yarov his successor a month later. At the January 20, 2000, Moscow summit, Vladimir Putin, then the acting president of Russia, was elected to chair the Council of Heads of State. The June 20–21 summit in Moscow voiced support for the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which CIS saw as threatened by efforts in the United States to implement a national missile defense, and at a meeting on November 30–December 1 in Minsk CIS leaders agreed to move forward with establishment of an antiterrorism center in Moscow. An earlier decision ended the peacekeeping mandate in Tajikistan as of September 16, although the mission in the Georgian region of Abkhazia remained active. On October 10, 2000, the five constituent states of the CIS Customs Union signed a treaty in Astana, Kazakhstan, authorizing conversion of the organization into the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC), effective April 2001. EAEC decisions require a two-thirds vote of approval for passage but are then binding on the members. Using a weighted system, Russia was assigned 40 percent of the voting power; Belarus and Kazakhstan, 20 percent each; and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 10 percent each. Initial goals of the EAEC, which is modeled on the European Economic Community, were to

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harmonize tariff and taxation policies, employment regulations, and visa regimes. Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine have observer status in the EAEC. Meeting in Yerevan, Armenia, May 25, 2001, the presidents of the six states of the CIS Collective Security Council agreed to move ahead on formation of a 3,000-troop rapid reaction force to be headquartered in the Kyrgyz capital. In recent years the CIS has frequently expressed concern over activities by Islamic extremists in Central Asia. At the Yerevan meeting the heads of state also condemned terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking. The session was followed by a full CIS summit on May 31–June 1 in Minsk, where the focus of attention was progress toward establishment of a much-delayed free trade zone. At an informal summit held on August 1, 2001, in Sochi, Russia, Russian President Putin identified mutual economic concerns as “the sole basis for developing cooperation in all spheres” and described the EAEC, the GUUAM, the CAEC, and similar CIS-related offspring as complementary to the CIS and “a sort of laboratory” where various initiatives could be tested before wider introduction. Putin cautioned, however, that policies adopted by these less-encompassing groups should not interfere with the collective interests of the Commonwealth. The organization’s focus turned once again to terrorism in the wake of the September 11, 2001, al-Qaida attacks against the United States. Particular emphasis was given to closer coordination on counterterrorism and on border security. The most significant shift in policy, however, may have been Russian acquiescence in the positioning of U.S. forces in Central Asia during the U.S.-led “war on terrorism.” In connection with the effort to root out terrorist bases in Afghanistan and oust the Taliban regime, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, in particular, permitted the entry of U.S. contingents. The U.S. military presence was not met with universal acceptance by CIS member states, however, nor was U.S. military assistance in Georgian counterterrorism training. In August 2005 the United States was ordered to vacate its bases in Uzbekistan, and the last U.S. forces were gone by the end of the year.

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The tenth anniversary CIS summit in Moscow on November 29–30, 2001, identified stable development and “dignified integration” into the world community as principal Commonwealth goals. President Putin once again lent support to creation of a single economic zone, encouraged respect for minority rights (with an eye toward the millions of Russians living in the former Soviet republics), and defined the regional role of the CIS as that of “unifying, coordinating, and stabilizing.” In April 2002 the six parties to the Collective Security Treaty met in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in furtherance of joint efforts against terrorism, drug smuggling, and illegal immigration. The session concluded with agreement on establishing a more formal security structure and was immediately followed by military exercises involving the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces. Plans for the new security organization were further advanced at the October 6–7, 2002, CIS summit in Chi¸sinˇau, where the treaty participants signed a charter for the organization. In other business, the summit continued to emphasize efforts against terrorism and the drug trade, discussed measures to boost flagging interstate CIS trade, and reappointed Executive Secretary Yarov for another three-year term. Meeting on April 28, 2003, in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, the presidents of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan formally established the Collective Security Treaty Organization and named Nikolai Bordyuzha of Russia as its first secretary general. The CSTO’s headquarters in Moscow began functioning at the beginning of 2004. One of the organization’s principal assignments was identified as management of the rapid reaction forces. A CIS summit on September 18–19, 2003, in Yalta, Ukraine, saw the presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine reach agreement on formation of a “Single Economic Space” (SES) that would ultimately harmonize customs, tariff, transport, and related regimes. Although all other CIS members were eligible for membership, some viewed the development with chagrin. Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin, for one, noted that the agreement once again highlighted a lack of unity

within the CIS, and he indicated that as a consequence Moldova “should make the move to more decisive action in the direction of the European Union.” As the SES initiative moved forward in 2004, various disputes arose over the adoption of a single economic agreement for the CIS. Ultimately, the CIS decided to adopt 61 separate agreements to be reviewed at a summit in Yalta in September, when several were signed. Other fractious issues arose over SES members’ move to try to join the World Trade Organization as a single entity. Because of differences that could not be resolved, the members instead decided to approach the WTO separately. The CIS heads of government met in April 2004 and supported creation of a CIS Reserve Fund, which would help member states in the event of natural disasters. The following month CIS defense ministers met in Armenia and agreed to form a CIS peacekeeping force, and in June they drafted a document that encouraged the CIS and NATO to cooperate in managing a peacekeeping force under UN mandate. Because of increasing concerns about terrorism and border control (and to bolster military cooperation among members), the Secretariat of Defense Ministers was increased from 10 members to 21 in August 2005. The 38th CIS summit on September 16, 2004, in Astana, Kazakhstan, focused primarily on security and economic issues; the group issued a statement on the fight against international terrorism and vowed to step up the work of the CIS antiterrorist center. A summit on August 16, 2005, in Kazan, Tatarstan, also included adoption of antiterrorism documents but marked the departure of Turkmenistan from full membership. Turkmenistan, which expressed its preference for establishing its international neutrality, remained an associate member. Holding the summit in Kazan was seen as a sign of Tatarstan’s increasing independence within the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, internal problems arising from dramatic changes of government in the region—the “rose revolution” in Georgia in 2003, the “orange revolution” in Ukraine in 2004, and the “tulip revolution”

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in Kyrgyzstan in 2005—did not bode well for the organization’s future. President Putin increasingly seemed to see the West as a rival rather than a partner and began to exploit politically Russia’s position as a supplier of oil and natural gas. During the winter of 2005–2006 huge increases in the price of natural gas caused outrage and recrimination in such Western-leaning CIS members as Ukraine and in the EU. There were reports in May

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2006 that Georgia and Ukraine were planning to leave CIS, which prompted Russian energy officials to threaten adverse consequences. The EAEC admitted Uzbekistan as a member at a January 2006 summit in St. Petersburg and decided to absorb the CACO to eliminate institutional duplication and more efficiently pursue common objectives and activities related to currency, customs, and a potential free trade area.

E C O N O M I C C O O P E R AT I O N O R G A N I Z AT I O N ( E C O )

Established: As Regional Cooperation for Development in 1964 by Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey; reactivated under present name in 1985; formally launched in 1990, following amendment of the (1977) Treaty of ˙Izmir; membership expansion approved by heads of state summit on February 16–17, 1992; Treaty of ˙Izmir further amended on September 14, 1996. Purpose: To promote regional cooperation in trade, transportation, communications, tourism, cultural affairs, and economic development. Headquarters: Tehran, Iran. Principal Organs: Summit, Council of Ministers, Regional Planning Council, Council of Permanent Representatives, Secretariat. Secretary General: Askhat Orazbay (Kazakhstan). Membership (10): Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan. Guest: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Origin and development. The Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD), established in 1965 by Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, achieved little progress and was moribund after 1979 until revived and renamed the Economic Cooperation Organization in 1985. For the rest of the decade the ECO remained of minor influence, although it established the South and West Asia Postal Union in 1988 and a joint Chamber of Commerce and Industry in 1990.

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the ECO assumed greater significance as a potential vehicle for regional economic cooperation that would include the new Central Asian republics. The ECO heads of state Summit on February 16–17, 1992, in Tehran, Iran, approved membership requests from Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Afghanistan and Kazakhstan joined those nations (minus Tajikistan, whose foreign minister was unable to attend because of that nation’s domestic turmoil) in formally signing the ECO charter on November 27. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus participates in certain economic and technical activities of the ECO but is not a full voting member. The expanded ECO faced significant political problems, particularly internal crises in various member states and a perceived contest between Iran and Turkey for leadership. Stressing the Islamic identity of the members, Tehran appeared to view the ECO as a means for establishing a future Islamic common market that would promote Muslim solidarity and values; Ankara, while supportive of trade negotiations, was just as insistent that the ECO remain a secular body devoted entirely to reducing trade barriers, establishing a free market system, and developing the region’s infrastructure. Structure. Policy decisions at the highest level are made by summits of the members’ heads of state or government, who convene, at a minimum, biennially. The Council of Ministers, comprising the foreign ministers of the member countries, is the ECO’s principal decision-making body. Council meetings, which are held at least once a year, rotate annually from country to country. The Regional

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Planning Council (RPC), which also convenes annually, formulates plans and policies in line with ECO objectives and direct instructions from the council. It also reviews the work of the Secretariat and progress on the various ECO programs, and it may propose the formation of ad hoc committees. Assisting the RPC is an ambassadoriallevel Council of Permanent Representatives. Under the Secretariat are seven sectoral or service directorates: Agriculture, Industry, and Health; Energy, Minerals, and Environment; Trade and Investment; Transport and Communications; Economic Research and Statistics; Project Research; and Coordination and International Relations. The oldest of the ECO’s three specialized agencies is the Tehran-based Cultural Institute, which began as an RCD organ and was revived by the March 1995 Third ECO Summit. A Science Foundation, authorized at the same summit, is to be based in Islamabad, Pakistan. At the Fifth Summit, in 1998, the ECO leaders signed a charter for an ECO Educational Institute, to be located in Ankara, Turkey, but the charter has not been ratified. Functioning Regional Institutions are a Chamber of Commerce and Industry, a Shipping Company, a Consultancy and Engineering Company, and a College of Insurance. In various stages of development are a Trade and Development Bank, a Reinsurance Company, an ECO News Agency, and an ECO Supreme Audit Institution. Plans to establish a regional airline, ECO Air, were scrapped in 2001. Activities. Discord was reported at the Fourth ECO Summit, held on May 14–16, 1996, in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, as a number of members objected to efforts by Iran to “politicize” the grouping by criticizing Israel and the United States. Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan were described as the most irritated by Tehran’s actions; Uzbek President Islam Karimov reportedly accused Iran of trying to transform the ECO into a “military-political unit.” However, the summit leaders did manage to endorse a 22-point declaration pledging expanded cooperation in a number of fields, including energy, trade, transportation, and communications. A year earlier summit participants had signed transit

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trade and visa agreements as well as an agreement with the United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) designed to coordinate regional efforts to combat the production of opium and other narcotic substances. The need for oil and gas pipelines dominated the 1997 extraordinary summit, held on May 13–14 in Ashgabat. One area of particular interest was how to get oil from Azerbaijan to international markets, a principal stumbling block being the resistance of the United States to the idea of shipping Azeri oil through Iran, a route many experts consider the best. In contrast, the heads of state of Turkmenistan and Pakistan reached an agreement with U.S. and Saudi oil companies to construct a pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan. Turkmenistan also came to an agreement to ship gas to Europe through Iran and Turkey. In other business, the Taliban government in Afghanistan objected to its exclusion from the summit, arguing that there was no “true and lawful” Afghan representative present. (The Afghanistan delegation seated at the summit was from the government that had fled Kabul in 1996.) At the Fifth Summit, held on May 10, 1998, in Almaty, Kazakhstan, ECO leaders called for the establishment of several ECO institutions (see Structure, above) and urged greater cooperation in agriculture and industry. Meeting just before the summit, Iran and Kazakhstan agreed to continue negotiations over the legal status of the Caspian Sea, the two having adopted different positions on access to the sea’s resources. A leading topic at the Sixth Summit, held June 10–11, 2000, in Tehran, was prospects for accelerating sustained regional socio-economic development. The summit also called for greater cooperation in agriculture, industry, and human development; welcomed a proposal for cooperation in tourism; called attention to the growing importance of environmental issues; and praised the continuing effort to stop illegal drug production and trafficking. The ECO-UNDCP Project on Drug Control Coordination Unit in the ECO Secretariat had opened in July 1999. Held in the Turkish capital on October 14, 2002, the Seventh Summit reviewed the ECO’s

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accomplishments during its first decade of expanded membership and envisioned increased cooperation, integration, and development. Since 2000 the ECO has inaugurated ministerial-level meetings in such sectors as agriculture, commerce and foreign trade, energy, the environment, industry, information technology, and transport and communications. The 2002 summit participants called for early conclusion of an ECO Trade Agreement (ECOTA), which would remove nontariff barriers to trade and reduce intraregional tariffs. They also agreed to pursue a unified front on international trade issues “to ensure a rule-based nondiscriminatory and equitable international economic system responsive to the legitimate interests of the developing world.” The closing summit declaration also called attention to a growing network with regional and international organizations, including many of UN agencies and the World Trade Organization. Meeting in July 2003, ECO ministers signed the ECOTA, one provision of which is the stepped reduction of internal tariffs to 15 percent within eight years. A month earlier the ECO had established a fund for economic aid to Afghanistan as part of its efforts to help the social and economic rebuild-

ing of that member state. Also at the June meeting, the Council of Ministers approved the appointment of Kazakh diplomat Bekzhasar Narbayev as secretary general. However, Narbayev resigned for health reasons in December; he was succeeded by Askhat Orazbay, also of Kazakhstan. The Eighth Summit was held in September 2004 in Tajikistan. Activity in 2004–2005 included agreement to establish an ECO Trade and Development Bank and otherwise expand cooperation in financial affairs. Several prominent ECO members also called for the “revitalization” of the organization to, among other things, combat terrorism and drug smuggling. If “revitalization” was in fact needed, it seemed under way in 2006. The first meeting of the Board of Governors of the new bank was scheduled to take place on July 6, 2006, in Ankara. Initial capitalization and the hiring of staff were on the agenda. The Ninth Summit, held on May 5, 2006, in Baku, Azerbaijan, concluded that to continue the organization needed to reform and modernize its structure. Later in May 2006, ECO announced that Iran would become the hub of an electricity grid for member states. Iran dispatched a team to Austria to undergo training on Europe’s international power grids.

INDIAN OCEAN RIM A S S O C I AT I O N F O R R E G I O N A L C O O P E R AT I O N (IOR-ARC)

Established: By charter signed at a meeting of 14 insular and littoral Indian Ocean countries March 6–7, 1997, in Port Louis, Mauritius. Purpose: To “increase cooperation in trade, investment, infrastructure, tourism, science, technology, and human resource development.” Headquarters: Vacoas, Mauritius. Principal Organs: Council of Ministers, Committee of Senior Officials, Indian Ocean Rim Business Forum, Indian Ocean Rim Academic Group, Coordinating Secretariat. Director of the Coordinating Secretariat: Devdasslall Dusoruth (Mauritius). Membership (18): Australia, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, Yemen. Observer (1): Indian Ocean Tourism Organization. Official Language: English. Origin and development. Responding to a proposal by the government of Mauritius, on March 29–31, 1995, representatives of Australia, India, Kenya, Oman, Singapore, and South Africa met in

Mauritius to discuss economic cooperation, trade liberalization, and potential investment opportunities based on “principles of open regionalism and inclusivity.” To follow up, a working group of government officials, businessmen, and academics developed a charter for a tripartite regional organization. At a ministerial-level meeting March 6–7, 1997, in Port Louis, Mauritius, representatives of the 14 founding states—Indonesia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mozambique, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Yemen in addition to the seven that met in 1995— signed the charter for the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC). At the second biennial meeting of the Council of Ministers, held in March 1999 in Maputo, Mozambique, the countries of Bangladesh, Iran, Seychelles, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates were invited to join the IOR-ARC. They were welcomed into the organization at an extraordinary Council of Ministers session in Muscat, Oman, in January 2000, although Seychelles decided to withdraw in July 2003. “Dialog Partners” are China, Egypt, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Turkey also has requested dialog status. Structure. The Council of Ministers, comprising the foreign ministers of the member states, is the highest authority of the IOR-ARC, setting policy, reviewing progress toward the organization’s goals, and creating new organizational bodies. It meets biennially in regular session, but ad hoc meetings also may be called. Convening as needed, a Committee of Senior Officials supervises implementation of

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council decisions, drafts work programs, and helps seek financing for projects. Working in cooperation with the senior officials are the Indian Ocean Rim Business Forum and the Indian Ocean Rim Academic Group. All organs reach decisions by consensus. The Coordinating Secretariat, headed by a director, is located in Vacoas, Mauritius. Activities. Apart from providing a regional forum and conducting research in such areas as sectoral tariff levels, the IOR-ARC accomplished little in its first six years. During the March 1999 Council of Ministers session participants agreed to promote trade facilitation and liberalization as well as economic and technical cooperation. Accordingly, they set up a Working Group on Trade and Investment (WGTI), which met for the first time in conjunction with the extraordinary Council of Ministers session in Muscat in January 2000. Meeting April 7–8, 2001, in Muscat, the Council of Ministers authorized formation of a High Level Task Force (HLTF) with a mandate that included proposing a future direction for the organization, devising a medium-term strategic plan, defining criteria for dialog partners, raising the IOR-ARC’s international profile, and examining the functioning and funding of the secretariat. On October 7– 13, 2003, the various IOR-ARC organs held meet-

ings in Colombo, Sri Lanka. At the culminating session, the Council of Ministers adopted the HLTF report, which offered recommendations on work programs and provided guidelines for organizing the secretariat. Long-range organizational goals include eventual elimination of internal tariffs, but some observers have noted that such broad measures will be difficult to achieve. Wide economic disparities persist among the member states, which also participate in other intergovernmental organizations that frequently have competing goals. In addition, there have been reports of major differences between the IOR-ARC members with the largest economies, namely India and Australia. Recent commentary suggests that the organization has not lived up to its promise. Before July 2005, however, it agreed to allow projects to go ahead with the support of at least six members, rather than by full consensus, and this change in rules might help drive more action. The IOC-ARC has no website, and information about its activities must come from member governments, all of which voice support, and from general news reports. Ministerial meetings were held August 26–27, 2004, in Colombo and February 21–22, 2006, in Tehran, Iran.

N O NA L I G N E D M OV E M E N T ( NA M )

Established: In the course of an increasingly structured series of 11 nonaligned conferences, the first of which met September 1–6, 1961, in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, and the most recent, February 24–25, 2003, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Purpose: To promote a “transition from the old world order based on domination to a new order based on freedom, equality, and social justice and the well-being of all”; to pursue “peace, achievement of disarmament, and settlement of disputes by peaceful means”; to search for “effective and acceptable solutions” to world economic problems, particularly the “disparities in the level of global development”; to support self-determination and independence “for all peoples living under colonial or alien domination and foreign occupation”; to seek “sustainable and environmentally sound development”; to promote “fundamental rights and freedom”; to contribute to strengthening “the role and effectiveness of the United Nations” (Final Declaration, Belgrade, 1989). Headquarters: None. Principal Organs: Conference of Heads of State, Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Coordinating Bureau (25 members). Chair: Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (Malaysia). Malaysia is Chair of the group from 2003–2006. Membership (116): Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde Is-

lands, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoro Islands, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Cˆote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Djibouti, Dominica Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine (represented by the Palestinian Authority), Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, TimorLeste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. The 1979 conference refused to seat either delegation (representing the Khieu Samphan and Heng Samrin regimes) from Cambodia, that country being represented by an “empty seat” at subsequent NAM summits until the 1992 meeting. One of the NAM’s founding members, Burma (now Myanmar), withdrew in 1979 but was readmitted in 1992. Venezuela shifted from full member to observer because of a boundary dispute with Guyana and then back to full membership (effective 1989). In September 1991 Argentina’s President Carlos Menem announced his nation’s

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withdrawal on the ground that the NAM “no longer had any reason to exist.” A June 1994 NAM meeting of foreign ministers refused to seat a delegation from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the Serbian and Montenegrin constituent republics of the dissolved Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), which was attempting to claim the predecessor state’s founding membership in the NAM. Yugoslavia’s membership remained suspended thereafter, and in July 2001 the Federal Republic applied for observer status, which was granted and retained upon the country’s transformation to the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. Cyprus and Malta became observer states in 2004 when they joined the EU. In May 2006 Antigua and Barbuda and Dominica, previously observers, became full members. Observer States (16): Armenia, Azerbaijan, Brazil, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, El Salvador, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malta, Mexico, Paraguay, Serbia as the successor state after the June 2006 split of Serbia and Montenegro, Ukraine, Uruguay. In addition, the following organizations attended the 2003 summit as observers: the African Union, the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization, the Arab League, the Kanaka Socialist National Liberation Front (New Caledonia), the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the New Independentist Movement of Puerto Rico, and the United Nations. Guests (32): Australia, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Macedonia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, Vatican. (In addition, many intergovernmental organizations had guest status at the most recent NAM Summit in 2003.) Origin and development. The first Conference of Nonaligned Heads of State, at which 25 countries were represented, was convened in September 1961 in Belgrade, largely through the initiative of Yugoslavian President Josip Tito, who

had expressed concern that an accelerating arms race might result in war between the Soviet Union and the United States. Subsequent conferences, which attracted more and more Third World countries, were convened in Cairo, Egypt, in 1964; Lusaka, Zambia, in 1970; Algiers, Algeria, in 1973; Colombo, Sri Lanka, in 1976; Havana, Cuba, in 1979; New Delhi, India, in 1983; Harare, Zimbabwe, in 1986; Belgrade in 1989; Jakarta, Indonesia, in 1992; Cartagena, Columbia, in 1995; and Durban, South Africa, in 1998. The most recent summit was held February 24–25, 2003, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The 1964 conference in Cairo, with 47 countries represented, featured widespread condemnation of Western colonialism and the retention of foreign military installations. Thereafter, the focus shifted away from essentially political issues, such as independence for dependent territories, to the advocacy of occasionally radical solutions to global economic and other problems. Thus, in 1973 in Algiers there was an appeal for concerted action by the “poor nations against the industrialized world”; this became a basis of debate within the United Nations for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and led to the convening of an inconclusive Conference on International Economic Cooperation in late 1975 in Paris, France. At the 1979 Havana meeting, political concerns resurfaced in the context of an intense debate between Cuban President Castro, who was charged with attempting to “bend” the movement in the direction of the “socialist camp,” and Yugoslavian President Tito, who urged that it remain true to its genuinely nonaligned origins. In search of a compromise, the Final Declaration of the Havana Conference referred to the movement’s “nonbloc nature” and its opposition to both “hegemony” (a euphemism used in reference to presumed Soviet ambitions) and all forms of “imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism.” In addition, the conference reiterated an earlier identification of “Zionism as a form of racism.” At the 1983 New Delhi conference, delegates focused on the precarious financial condition of Third World countries. The conference’s

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declaration stated, in part, that developed countries should meet with developing countries to discuss debt relief, reduced trade barriers, increased aid for development, and increased cash flow. Its economic proposals, already widely accepted by the world banking community, called for the rescheduling of Third World debt and an increase in Special Drawing Rights by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The eighth NAM summit was held in Harare, Zimbabwe, in 1986, the 25th anniversary of the movement. The site was chosen to underscore the group’s main concern: the South African government’s policy of forced racial segregation. A final declaration called on nonaligned nations to adopt selective, voluntary sanctions against South Africa pending the adoption of comprehensive, mandatory measures by the UN Security Council. The members demanded international pressure to eliminate apartheid, Pretoria’s withdrawal from Namibia (South-West Africa), and an end to its aggression against neighboring states. With Liberia, Singapore, and a number of other members dissenting, the United States was severely criticized for its lack of sanctions against Pretoria, as well as for its policies toward Angola, Libya, and Nicaragua. In implicit criticism of the Soviet Union, the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan also was urged. The group denounced Israel for its occupation of Arab territory and its activities in Lebanon, while reiterating support for the Palestinians’ “just struggle.” An appeal was made for the end of interference by unspecified “outsiders” in the Cambodian conflict, and both sides were encouraged to negotiate for peace in the Iran-Iraq war. In addition, an Independent Commission of the South on Development Issues was established to study the causes of underdevelopment and produce common strategies to combat it. Some of the NAM’s most radical members (including Cuba, Iran, and Iraq) stayed away from the 1989 Belgrade summit after preparatory talks revealed that most members favored fewer polemics and a return to the group’s original posture of neutrality. Consequently, the meeting’s final declara-

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tion was markedly less anti-American and antiWestern than previous declarations. Instead, the summit emphasized the need for the movement to “modernize” and develop “a realistic, far-sighted, and creative” approach to international issues in which concordance would be favored over confrontation. The declaration also praised Washington and Moscow for their recent rapprochement, which, by reducing tensions in many areas of the world, had created a “window of opportunity for the international community.” At the same time, the Belgrade declaration described the economic situation in the “vast majority of the developing countries” as having “deteriorated dramatically,” with many of those nations “suffocating” from the outflow of capital. NAM leaders reaffirmed the NIEO as a “difficult but valid goal,” appealing for the developed world to do a better job of addressing the needs of the developing countries. Structure. By convention, the chief executive of the country hosting the most recent Conference of Heads of State serves as the NAM’s chair. Foreign ministers’ meetings are generally held annually between conferences, which are usually convened every three years. A Coordinating Bureau, established at the 1973 conference, currently numbers 25 (including the chair, a rapporteur-general and, on an ex officio basis, the immediate past chair) with the following regional distribution: Africa, 10; Asia, 9; Latin America and the Caribbean, 4; Europe, 2. In addition to a Political Committee, an Economic and Social Committee, and a Committee on Palestine, the NAM has created various Working Groups over the years. Those functioning as of 2003 addressed matters of Disarmament, Peacekeeping Operations, Human Rights, Sixth Committee Matters (terrorism), and the Restructuring of the Security Council. Activities. The NAM emerged somewhat revitalized from its tenth summit, held in 1992 in Jakarta, Indonesia. At the conclusion of the meeting the NAM declared its intention to project itself as a “vibrant, constructive, and genuinely independent component of the mainstream of international relations.” With anti-Western rhetoric having been kept to a minimum, the NAM asked

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developed nations to give “urgent priority” to establishing “a more equitable global economy” and to assist developing nations in resolving the problems of low commodity prices and “crushing debt burdens.” The summit agreed to establish a broadbased committee of experts to devise a debt reduction approach. For their part, reflecting the organization’s increasingly pragmatic approach, NAM members committed themselves to a measure of “self-reliance” in such areas as population control and food self-sufficiency. The Jakarta Message also called for extended South/South trade and investment cooperation. In addition, the NAM said it would press for a restructuring of the United Nations that would include the diminution or elimination of the veto power of the five permanent members of the Security Council and an expansion of council membership. The most contentious issue at the summit appeared to be the question of Yugoslavian membership, many Arab countries having called for expulsion of the Federal Republic because of events in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ultimately, the summit postponed a decision in the matter, opting instead to condemn “ethnic cleansing by Serbs” of Muslim communities, without reference to Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia remained unrepresented at the NAM Meeting of Foreign Ministers held in May–June 1994 in Cairo, Egypt, while action on politically sensitive membership applications from Macedonia and Russia was deferred indefinitely. However, in what was considered one of the high points of the movement’s history (in view of its long-standing anti-apartheid stance), South Africa was welcomed to the NAM ranks following the installation of a multiracial government in Pretoria. The NAM continued to press for UN restructuring at the 11th summit, held October 18–20, 1995, in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia. It also argued that UN peacekeeping efforts should be cut, so more resources could be used for combating poverty. The summit’s communiqu´e strongly criticized the United States for continuing its heavy economic pressure against Cuba and urged the industrialized nations to adopt a more “just” system of world trade. However, the movement remained

plagued by questions of its relevancy in the post– Cold War era, with NAM supporters arguing that the organization’s attention should focus on the long-term global division between the North and the South. The 12th NAM summit, held September 2–3, 1998, in Durban, South Africa, was expected to concentrate on economic issues, but the ongoing fighting in the Democratic Republic of the Congo diverted attention. With regard to the May 1998 testing of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan, the NAM called on both members to settle their disputes peacefully and articulated its concern over the development of all weapons of mass destruction. The summit also condemned terrorism, insisting that it be countered in accordance with UN principles, not by unilateral initiatives, and expressed regret that the Middle East peace process remained at a standstill—a situation it attributed to Israeli intransigence. On the economic front, the summit called for the IMF and the World Bank to expand funding to the developing world and for changes in international financial institutions to prevent the kind of economic crisis that was currently plaguing much of Asia. In more general terms, the NAM criticized the direction of globalization, arguing that economic integration was leading many of the poorest countries toward greater poverty. The NAM was divided over the Kosovo crisis of 1999, with Muslim member states supporting intervention on behalf of the Kosovars and predominantly backing the US-led NATO air war against Yugoslavia in March–June. The division came in the context of a more fundamental concern that the movement was being eclipsed by the (then) 133member Group of 77, which had gained increasing recognition as an effective voice for the economic interests of developing countries. The organization’s 13th Ministerial Conference met on April 8–9, 2000, in Cartagena, where the topics under discussion included barring participation by military regimes that had overthrown democratically elected governments. Championed by India, the proposal was generally viewed as an effort to establish democracy as the norm for all

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members, but observers also noted that New Delhi was clearly targeting Pakistan for exclusion. The 13th summit was planned for October 2001 in Bangladesh, but the meeting was postponed because of preparations for that country’s October 1 national election. In November the newly installed Bangladeshi government announced that it was unable to host the meeting, which had been rescheduled for April 2002, for reasons that included the country’s recent economic downturn, inadequate hotel accommodations and other infrastructure and, in the context of the September terrorist attacks on the United States, an inability to guarantee security for the 5,000 or more expected attendees. The venue was subsequently changed to Amman, Jordan, but instability in the Middle East ultimately led the Coordinating Bureau, meeting in April 2002 in Durban, to designate Malaysia as the host. Thus the 13th summit convened on February 24–25, 2003, in Kuala Lumpur. Attended by some 60 heads of state or government, the first day of the summit included an address by the outspoken, soon-to-retire Malaysian Prime Minister, Mahathir bin Mohamad, who lambasted the West for using undemocratic means to force democracy on other countries, permitting international financial agencies to ignore the debt burden of developing countries, and leaving poorer countries “oppressed and terrorized.” Among the specific issues debated at the summit were the threat of war against Iraq and the nuclear crisis in North Korea. In a “Statement Concerning Iraq,” the movement warned against the dangers of preemptive action by the United States and its allies, but it also advised the Saddam Hussein regime to comply with UN Security Council resolutions. With regard to North Korea’s nuclear program, the summit ultimately supported Pyongyang’s contention that a solution would best be found if the U.S. George W.

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Bush administration would agree to negotiate directly instead of insisting on multilateral involvement. In addition, as at previous summits, the participants voiced support for the Palestinian people and condemned Israeli actions and alleged human rights abuses in the West Bank and Gaza. In keeping with its overall theme of “Continuing the Revitalization of the Non-Aligned Movement,” the 2003 summit approved the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, which broadly called for multilateral efforts to prevent the marginalization of poorer states but also focused on steps to be taken by the movement’s members. Among other things, the declaration urged the wider international community to ensure that globalization leads to the “prospering and empowering of the developing countries, not their continued impoverishment and dependence.” In addition, the declaration called upon member states to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the movement; to enhance unity and cohesion “by focusing on issues that unite rather than divide us”; to meet more frequently with the Group of 77 to improve South-South coordination and cooperation; to bring together states, civil society, and the private sector in a partnership that might bridge the “digital divide”; and to improve North-South understanding through “constructive dialog and interaction” with the Group of Eight and other development partners. Because the NAM has no central headquarters, it has perhaps suffered in recent years from lack of an official, external face. Malaysia has attempted to address this problem with a very comprehensive website, or “E-Secretariat,” which not only documents Malaysia’s leadership of the organization, but also thoroughly records all aspects of the movement’s work. The fourteenth Conference of Heads of State was scheduled to take place from September 11–16, 2006, in Havana, Cuba.

PA C I F I C C O M M U N I T Y Communaut´e du Pacifique

Established: As the South Pacific Commission by Agreement signed February 6, 1947, in Canberra, Australia, effective July 29, 1948; structure modified by Amending Agreements signed on October 6, 1964, in London, United Kingdom, and at Noum´ea, New Caledonia, on October 12, 1978; current name adopted effective February 8, 1998. Purpose: “ . . . to provide a common forum within which the Island peoples and their governments can express themselves on issues, problems, needs and ideas common to the region; . . . to assist in meeting the basic needs of the peoples of the region; . . . to serve as a catalyst for the development of regional resources . . . ; to act as a center for collection and dissemination of information on the needs of the region. . . .” Headquarters: Noum´ea, New Caledonia. Principal Organs: Conference of the Pacific Community, Committee of Representatives of Governments and Administrations, Secretariat of the Pacific Community. Director General: Jimmie Rodgers (Solomon Islands). Members (26): American Samoa, Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, France, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Pitcairn Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, United States, Vanuatu, Wallis and Futuna Islands. (The United Kingdom withdrew effective January 1, 1996, although it

retained a minor affiliation with the SPC via the membership of the Pitcairn Islands. It rejoined in 1998, and withdrew again in 2005.) Official Languages: English, French. Origin and development. The South Pacific Commission (SPC) was organized in 1947–1948 to coordinate the economic and social development policies of states administering dependent South Pacific territories. The original members were Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In 1951 the founding Canberra Agreement was amended to include within the organization’s geographic scope U.S. dependency Guam and the U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, north of the equator. The Netherlands withdrew in 1962 when it ceased to administer the former colony of Dutch New Guinea, which was incorporated into Indonesia as Irian Jaya (West New Guinea). In 1962 Western Samoa (now simply Samoa), a New Zealand dependency, became the first Pacific territory to achieve independence, and two years later the SPC approved an amending agreement that allowed the admission of newly independent states as full members. Accordingly, Western Samoa joined in 1965, followed by Nauru (1969), Fiji (1971), Papua New Guinea (1975), and Solomon Islands and Tuvalu (1978). Collateral with this period of initial expansion, participants in the original South Pacific Conference, which was composed exclusively of dependent territories, called into question the SPC’s retention of elements of its earlier tutelary character. Thus the conference members proposed in 1973 that joint sessions of the commission and

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conference be held. The representatives of the dependent Pacific territories thereby hoped to influence the aid and development policies of the administering states. Under a 1974 memorandum of understanding, the commission and conference began meeting once per year in a joint session known as the South Pacific Conference. Two years later another memorandum of understanding revised SPC voting procedures. From 1964 each participating government was entitled to one vote for itself and one for each territory it administered. The 1976 change put all full members on an equal footing, with one vote each in decision-making bodies. In 1978 the SPC approved an additional amending agreement, which entered into force in 1980 and opened full membership to regional territories “in free association with a fully independent Government.” Thus, the New Zealand dependencies Cook Islands and Niue joined in 1980. The 14 other current members (several of which were already independent) joined en masse in 1983. Vanuatu, the Marshall Islands, and Papua New Guinea were absent from the 1987 commission session, with Papuan officials reportedly urging that the SPC be “scrapped” because of its “colonial” nature. Although the dissidents participated in the 1988 conference, they continued to press the SPC to accept merger overtures from the South Pacific Forum (SPF, now the Pacific Islands Forum), which was formed in 1971 to discuss areas outside the SPC mandate, especially political affairs. Collaterally, a decision on whether the SPC would join the South Pacific Organizations Co-ordinating Committee (SPOCC, now the Council of Regional Organizations in the Pacific—CROP), recently created by the SPF, was postponed. By the time of the October 1989 Conference, however, it was apparent that agitation for abolition of the SPC in favor of an SPF-led single regional organization had largely disappeared. Following the inclusion of Micronesian territories (all located north of the equator) to commission membership in the 1980s, it was suggested that the designations “South Pacific Commission” and “South Pacific Conference” were outdated, but the organization did not resolve to change its name

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until 1996. The October 1997 SPC session agreed to the designation Pacific Community, after extended debate over several alternatives. The name change was formally adopted February 6, 1998. Norfolk Island, a member of the original South Pacific Conference, has not been admitted to the Pacific Community because of Canberra’s insistence that the territory is an integral part of Australia and therefore ineligible. Structure. The Conference of the Pacific Community (successor to the South Pacific Conference) is the organization’s governing body, with authority to appoint the director general, make broad policy decisions, and review the work of the Committee of Representatives of Governments and Administrations (CRGA). At its annual sessions the CRGA evaluates current programs, examines and approves the draft work program and budget for the coming year, selects topics for conference discussion, nominates the organization’s principal officers, and reports to the conference on its work. The Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC, which deliberately retained the acronym of the South Pacific Commission) is based in Noum´ea, New Caledonia, but also has a regional office in Suva, Fiji. Reporting to the secretariat’s director general are the planning unit, corporate services, and three divisions: land resources (agriculture and forestry), marine resources, and social resources (community education and training, cultural affairs, demography, energy, health, information and communication, statistics, women’s resources, and youth resources). Activities. At the 16th conference in 1976, members adopted a review committee recommendation that the SPC engage in the following specific activities: (a) rural development, (b) youth and community development, (c) ad hoc expert consultancies, (d) cultural exchanges (in arts, sports, and education), (e) training facilitation, and (f) assessment and development of marine resources and research. In addition, special consideration was to be given to projects intended to meet pressing regional or subregional needs or the expressed needs of the smaller Pacific countries. Much of this agenda remained current a decade later, although

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environmental issues were gaining importance, particularly global warming and the potentially devastating effect of higher water levels on lowlying Pacific islands. The environment dominated the 1990 conference, which endorsed expansion of the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) and agreed that it should evolve into an autonomous, financially independent organization. (Formed in 1982 by the SPC, the SPF, and several UN agencies, the SPREP became autonomous in 1995.) The 1990 conference also called for further strengthening of the SPOCC in the hope of eliminating the duplication of services in the region. At the 34th conference, held October 24–25, 1994, in Port Vila, Vanuatu, it was reported that Canada, Chile (because of its Easter Island Territory), and South Korea were being considered as prospective new SPC members. In addition, broader cooperation links were proposed with other regional organizations, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, progress on those fronts was impeded by subsequent SPC internal problems, most notably the United Kingdom’s withdrawal as of January, 1, 1996, and announced retrenchment on the part of other major donors, which were frustrated by what they perceived as general inefficiency, waste, and lack of accountability within the SPC. At the 35th SPC conference, held in October 1995, in Noum´ea, New Caledonia, Bob Dun of Australia was elected as the new SPC secretary general. Under Dun’s leadership the SPC undertook what one regional observer called “massive administrative and financial renovations.” At the fall 1996 conference, held in Saipan, Northern Marianas, the membership endorsed administrative staff cuts, procedural reforms, and consolidation of programs. It also gave the CRGA expanded authority for administrative and program budgets and for evaluating the performance of the director general (as the secretary general’s post was to be renamed). In addition, the conference was to become a biennial rather than an annual event, beginning in 1999, with the CRGA to convene annually instead of every six months.

At the May 1997 CRGA meeting a new structure for contributors was adopted and a Small Islands Fund was created to assist the 12 smallest Pacific states and territories. At the October 20–21, 1997, South Pacific Conference, held in Canberra, Australia, the SPC agreed to change its name to the Pacific Community effective February 6, 1998. Significantly, the United Kingdom announced its decision to rejoin the organization. Convening December 6–7, 1999, in Papeete, in its first biennial meeting, the Conference of the Pacific Community elected Lourdes Pangelinan of Guam as the organization’s new director general. As the first woman to head a Pacific regional organization, Pangelinan indicated that among her priorities would be continued decentralization, including efforts to base new projects in locations other than Noum´ea and Suva, gender equality throughout the organization, aquaculture research and development, and further steps toward rationalization of regional organizations. The session concluded by issuing the Declaration of Tahiti Nui, which updated the organization’s guiding policies and procedures. The second biennial Conference of the Pacific Community, held November 19–20, 2001, convened at the organization’s Noum´ea headquarters instead of in Nauru, as was planned. At the time, most of Nauru’s hotel rooms were occupied by Australian and international representatives engaged in resolving the status of seaborne refugees who, after being denied entry by Australia, were temporarily at a holding center made available by the Nauru government. The thematic focus of the conference was “Adapting to Global Changes,” including globalization, trade issues, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The spread of HIV and the potential dangers of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) were among the topics addressed at the November 10– 11, 2003, third conference, held in Lami, Fiji, under the theme “The Pacific Response to Infectious Diseases.” France and New Zealand announced they would sponsor a new program of regional disease surveillance and networking, while France and Australia committed additional funds to

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combat HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases. The SPC also joined the World Health Organization (WHO) in fighting such diseases as AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. In other business, Director General Pangelinan, who was reappointed for a third two-year term at the session, committed the secretariat to improving technical services. The fourth biennial conference was held November 18, 2005, in Koror, Palau. It discussed or adopted reports on several topics, including

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HIV/AIDS, response to a possible influenza pandemic, tuna fisheries and deep-sea trawling, and prospects for introducing young people in the community. The meeting also took note of the Pacific Plan, developed under the auspices of the Pacific Islands Forum (see separate article). This comprehensive plan for integration of many aspects of Pacific nations’ lives, while created outside the Pacific Community, seemed to be something in which the community might well want to be involved.

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Established: As the South Pacific Forum by a subgroup of the South Pacific Commission meeting August 5, 1971, in Wellington, New Zealand; current name adopted October 3–5, 1999, effective October 2000. Purpose: To facilitate cooperation among member states, to coordinate their views on political issues of concern to the subregion, and to accelerate member states’ rates of economic development. Headquarters: Suva, Fiji. Principal Organs: Forum, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. Secretary General of Forum Secretariat: Greg Urwin (Australia). Membership (16): Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu. Observers (2): New Caledonia, Timor-Leste. Official Language: English. Origin and development. Since the South Pacific Commission (SPC, now the Pacific Community) was barred from concerning itself with political affairs, representatives of several South Pacific governments and territories decided in 1971 to set up a separate organization, the South Pacific Forum (SPF), where they might speak with a common voice on a wider range of issues. At the meeting of the Forum in April 1973, representatives of Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, New Zealand, Tonga, and Western Samoa signed the Apia Agreement, which established the South Pa-

cific Bureau for Economic Cooperation as a technical subcommittee of the committee of the whole. The Gilbert Islands (now Kiribati), Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu subsequently acceded to the agreement. In 1975 the bureau was asked to serve as secretariat, although it was not reorganized and renamed the Forum Secretariat until 1988. The Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia, formerly observers, were granted membership in 1987 after Washington, in late 1986, declared their compacts of free association with the United States to be in effect. Palau, formerly an SPF observer, became a full member in 1995 following resolution of its compact status. An SPF-sponsored South Pacific Regional Trade and Cooperation Agreement (Sparteca), providing for progressively less restricted access to the markets of Australia and New Zealand, came into effect in 1981. The process culminated in 1985 with approval by Canberra and Wellington of the elimination of all duties for most products from other SPF members. Following a decision at the 15th annual SPF meeting, the delegates to the 16th annual meeting in 1985 concluded the Treaty of Rarotonga (Cook Islands), which established the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone (SPNFZ). The treaty forbids manufacturing, testing, storing, dumping, and using nuclear weapons and materials in the region. It does, however, allow each country to make its own defense arrangements, including deciding whether or not to host nuclear warships. The treaty became operative in December 1986 when Australia became the eighth SPF member to tender its ratification. Those countries known to possess nuclear weapons were asked to sign the treaty’s three protocols, the SPF having added an “opt-out” provision

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that would permit adherents to withdraw if they believed their national interests were at stake. The Soviet Union and China both ratified the protocols in 1988. France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, after years of declining to support the treaty, signed the protocols March 25, 1996. France, the object of intense SPF criticism for its nuclear tests in the region in late 1995 and early 1996, ratified the SPNFZ on September 20, 1996, as did the United Kingdom on September 19, 1997. Washington has yet to ratify the treaty. To break a long-standing impasse on the proposed merger of the economic and technical functions of the SPF with the SPC, in 1988 the SPF created the South Pacific Organizations Co-ordinating Committee (SPOCC; renamed in 1999 as the Council of Regional Organizations in the Pacific— CROP). The SPF envisioned the SPOCC as a looseknit regional “umbrella” that would be able to reduce program duplication without the complications stemming from a single regional organization. In January 1992 five of the smallest SPF members (Cook Islands, Kiribati, Nauru, Niue, and Tuvalu) formed the Small Island States (SIS) to address mutual concerns, such as fishing rights, global warming, and airspace issues. The SIS members also began to explore the possible creation of their own development bank. (The SIS should not be confused with the New York–based Alliance of Small Island States [AOSIS], an informal grouping of more than 40 countries and observers attempting to maximize their lobbying effectiveness in the United Nations regarding environmental and other issues.) The Marshall Islands became the sixth SIS member in 1997. Meeting October 3–5, 1999, in Koror, Palau, the SPF decided to restyle itself as the Pacific Islands Forum, following a one-year transition period. At the 31st Forum session, held October 27–30, 2000, in Tarawa, Kiribati, the renamed organization approved (with immediate effect) and opened for ratification a new Agreement Establishing the Pacific Island Forum Secretariat. Structure. The Pacific Islands Forum has no constitution or codified rules of procedure. Decisions are reached at all levels by consensus.

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The Forum meets annually at the heads of government (summit) level but also convenes at other times on a ministerial basis to discuss particular concerns and prepare proposals for summit action. In recent years meetings have been held, for example, by the member states’ ministers of foreign affairs, economy, education, trade, aviation, and communication. In addition, since 1989 Forum summits have been followed by Post-Forum dialogue Meetings, which constitute the organization’s “highest level forum for multilateral consultations.” The August 2002 acceptance of India brought the number of “dialogue partners” to 12, the other 11 being Canada, China, the European Union, France, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, United Kingdom, and United States. (Taiwan applied for dialogue status in the early 1990s, but the Forum sidestepped the issue by permitting individual members to establish the requested dialogue relationship without formal SPF involvement.) The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, headed by a secretary general, reports to the Forum Officials Committee, which includes representatives from all 16 member countries. The secretariat encompasses four divisions—corporate services; development and economic policy; political, international, and legal affairs; and trade and investment. Affiliated organizations include the Association of South Pacific Airlines (ASPA); the Pacific Forum Line, a shipping agency formed by ten SPF members in 1977; the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA); the South Pacific Trade Commission, with offices in Auckland, New Zealand, and Sydney, Australia; the South Pacific Tourism Council; and the South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC). In addition, the Forum’s secretary general chairs the eight-member Council of Regional Organizations in the Pacific (CROP), which includes the Secretariat of the Pacific Community and the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) among its participants. Activities. During the first half of the 1990s environmental concerns became an increasingly important focus for the Forum. Among other things, it called for the abolition of drift-net fishing;

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argued that global warming could cause sea levels to rise and inundate such low-lying countries as Kiribati and Tuvalu; objected to the planned incineration of chemical weapons on Johnston Atoll, an unincorporated territory about 700 miles southwest of Hawaii that was controlled by the U.S. military since 1934; and announced, in 1994, an attempt to negotiate regionwide logging and fishing agreements that would sharply curtail access and protect fragile ecosystems while providing for sustainable development. The major concern for the SPF in 1995 was France’s resumption of nuclear testing at Mururoa Atoll in French Polynesia. Soon after new French President Jacques Chirac announced in June that up to eight tests would be conducted, a special Forum delegation was dispatched to Paris to protest the decision. Following the first detonation September 5, the SPF, meeting September 10–11 in regular session in Madang, Papua New Guinea, expressed its “extreme outrage” at the situation, and on October 3 the SPF suspended France from its list of dialogue partners. In other activity at the 1995 summit, the SPF endorsed a draft logging code, although to the consternation of the measure’s proponents, individual members were permitted to decide if they would implement the new regulations. Partly in response to the intense international criticism France was receiving regarding the issue, French President Jacques Chirac in January 1996 announced the “permanent end” of French nuclear testing, some three months and two explosions prior to completion of the schedule originally planned for the South Pacific series. Two months later France joined the United Kingdom and United States in signing the SPNFZ, and at the Forum held September 3–5, in Majuro, Marshall Islands, France was “readmitted” as an active SPF dialogue partner. The environment continued as the dominant topic at the September 17–19, 1997, summit in Rarotonga. Australia sparked intense debate when it insisted it would not support legally binding targets for the reduction of greenhouse emissions and proposed instead that reduction goals be pegged to the costs involved. Many of the other SPF mem-

bers strongly criticized Australia’s position, given the threat to small island states posed by global warming. The argument over emissions overshadowed discussion of other topics, such as a proposal by the SPF economy ministers to study establishment of a free trade area among Forum members, in conjunction with reforms in national economic policies that would better promote foreign investment. The tone was less confrontational at the August 24–25, 1998, summit, which was held in the Federated States of Micronesia. The SPF endorsed establishing a South Pacific Whale Sanctuary (a proposal that is repeatedly rejected by the International Whaling Commission), criticized India and Pakistan for testing nuclear devices, granted New Caledonia observer status for the next summit, and called on its members to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. The 30th SPF met October 3–5, 1999, in Koror, Palau, and endorsed the concept of a Pacific free trade area (FTA) that, it was hoped, might eventually include Australia and New Zealand. (In 1993 the Melanesian Spearhead Group of Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu introduced their own FTA, which Fiji later joined.) As envisaged, free trade would be introduced in stages over the next decade, with the six SIS countries and other least-developed countries (LDCs) joining a bit later. In a related matter, the Forum agreed to authorize a Forum Island Trade Officials group to work in conjunction with the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Forum also called for continued work on a comprehensive “vulnerability index” for determining concessionary aid and trade status. In particular, the Forum pushed for inclusion not only of basic economic data in the index but also of environmental and “capacity” factors. Reiterating previous concerns, participants again called for action on global warming, condemned the shipment of radioactive waste and mixed oxide (MOX) fuels through the region, and noted that regional security had become “more fluid and uncertain” because of such factors as financial and cyber crime, people smuggling, civil unrest, and drug trafficking. The Forum also decided to adopt the name Pacific

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Islands Forum, following a one-year transition period. Meeting under its new name, the Forum convened October 27–30, 2000, in Tarawa, Kiribati, and welcomed the Solomon Islands peace agreement of October 15 and efforts by Fiji’s interim government to reestablish constitutional democracy. In a significant departure from previous decisions to maintain distance from the internal conflicts of member states—for example, the 1987 military coup in Fiji, French policies in New Caledonia in the late 1980s, and the more recent secessionist movement on Bougainville in Papua New Guinea—the leaders adopted the “Biketawa Declaration,” which outlined a series of steps to take in response to political instability related to ethnic tensions, socioeconomic disparities, land disputes, loss of cultural values, or lack of good governance. Despite its continuing commitment to noninterference in its members’ internal affairs, the Forum provided for the secretary general, after consultation with the Forum chair and the members’ foreign ministers, to undertake any of a number of actions, including conducting a fact-finding mission, creating a ministerial action group, seeking third-party mediation, and convening a special session of the Forum Regional Security Committee. Failing resolution of the crisis, a special meeting of Forum leaders could consider additional steps, including “targeted measures.” Beginning in 1990 the Forum expressed concern over possible sanctions against members that were classified as having harmful tax policies or regulations that allow international money laundering. A “tax haven” list, first published in June 2000 by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), singled out Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu among the 35 “noncompliant” international jurisdictions. At the same time, the independent Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) released a list of 15 “Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories” that included Cook Islands, Nauru, Marshall Islands, and Niue. Although the Forum responded that all sovereign states were entitled to establish their own

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tax policies and regimes, by the end of 2003 the Marshalls remained the only Forum member on the shortened OECD list. The Cook Islands and Nauru remained on the FATF list. Hosted by Nauru, the August 16–18, 2001, Forum session marked the organization’s 30th anniversary with one of its most notable accomplishments: the opening for signature of the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) and the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER). The PICTA was signed by all of the 12 Forum Island Countries (FICs) except the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau, which were given additional time to sign because of complexities related to their compact status with the United States. The PICTA anticipates creation of an FTA by 2010, although the SIS members and LDCs do not have to eliminate their intracommunity tariffs until 2012. In addition, “excepted imports” are protected until 2016. The PACER outlines a framework for future trade relations between the PICTA states and the much larger economies of Australia and New Zealand. The PACER contains provisions for “trade facilitation” and increased financial and technical assistance to the FICs, but it also offers assurances to Australia and New Zealand that they will not be disadvantaged by any external trade agreements negotiated by the PICTA group. Following ratification by six signatories, the PICTA entered into force in April 2003, at which time all nontariff barriers to trade were eliminated. The PICTA signatories have as a long-range goal creation of a single market that would cover trade in services as well as goods and would permit free movement of capital and labor. The PACER, which entered into effect in October 2002, following ratification by seven signatories, provides for future trade negotiations but does not mandate a Forumwide FTA. The 33rd Forum meeting, held August 15– 17, 2002, in Suva passed a Pacific Islands Regional Ocean Policy and the Nasonini Declaration on Regional Security, which addressed terrorism and transnational organized crime. Other topics discussed at the session included the regional impact of HIV/AIDS; climate change and other

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environmental concerns; and continuing negotiations related to disarmament, nonproliferation, and the transport of radioactive materials through the region. Later in the year, in line with the Biketawa Declaration, the first Forum Elections Observer Mission was sent to the Solomon Islands. Meeting on August 14–16, 2003, in Auckland, the Forum elected Australia’s Greg Urwin as secretary general, a post that was traditionally awarded to an FIC national. The election came in the context of increasing regional involvement by Australia, whose prime minister, John Howard, emerged as a leading advocate for greater economic and political integration. The 2003 Forum session also saw the adoption of the Forum Principles of Good Leadership, the first being respect for the rule of law and the system of government, including disclosure of fraud, corruption, and maladministration. Also identified as central to good governance were transparency, diligence, and protection of public resources from waste, abuse, and improper or extravagant use. Other principles on the list were respect for cultural values, for freedom of religion, and for “people on whose behalf leaders exercise power.” In another first, the year 2003 saw the Forum countries fulfill a request from the government in

Honiara, Solomon Islands, for deploying a policing mission. The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was asked to help restore law and order, strengthen the judicial system, and aid in the restoration of basic services. This mission was successful, and the Solomon Islands were able to hold peaceful general elections in April 2006. The 2004 meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum was held August 3–10, 2004, in Apia, Samoa. The chief subject of the meeting was discussion and endorsement of the Forum’s emerging multi-year Pacific Plan, an instrument for encouraging the Forum’s vision of sustainable growth and integration in the Pacific region. It endorsed the plan as thus far developed, and looked for more specifics in the future. The 36th Pacific Islands Forum was held October 25–27, 2005, in Papua New Guinea. It endorsed the Pacific Plan, noting the need to expand access to markets for trade in goods under the SPARTECA, PICTA, PACER, and with non-Forum trading partners; to expand vocational education throughout the region; and to ensure the mutual recognition of technical qualifications and the free movement of labor. The plan paid particular attention to the interests of the SIS, which endorsed it in a separate communiqu´e.

P E R M A N E N T C O U RT O F A R B I T R AT I O N Cour Permanente d’Arbitrage

Established: By the First International Peace Conference held in 1899, in The Hague, Netherlands. The Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes was signed July 29, 1899, and entered into force September 4, 1900. The convention was revised October 18, 1907, by the Second International Peace Conference in The Hague and entered into force January 26, 1910. Purpose: To facilitate international dispute resolution through arbitration, conciliation, and factfinding and through assistance to other arbitration procedures. Headquarters: The Hague, Netherlands. Principal Organs: Administrative Council, International Bureau. Secretary General: Tjaco T. van den Hout (Netherlands). Membership (106): Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Libya,

Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe. The People’s Republic of China, which was first asked June 2, 1972, to clarify its position toward the Hague conventions, finally designated its four members of the court July 15, 1993. In 1991, following dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia assumed the USSR’s membership. The Court subsequently announced that the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) and the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States not yet affiliated with the court (Belarus and Ukraine having long held separate representation) would, as “successors” to the former Soviet Union, be considered contracting parties to the conventions by filing a request for such status. However, only Kyrgyzstan and Latvia had done so by early 2002. (The possible accession of the other Baltic States is complicated by their unwillingness to be designated as USSR “successors.”) The new republics that emerged following the breakup of the former Yugoslavia were also invited to declare their adherence to the conventions as successor states, and by 2002 all but Bosnia and Herzegovina had done so. The Czech Republic and Slovakia joined in 1993 as successors to the former Czechoslovakia.

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Official Working Languages: English and French, although proceedings may be in any language on which the disputants agree. Origin and development. A product of the Hague Peace Conference of 1899, the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes contained—in addition to provisions on good offices, mediation, and inquiry—several articles on international arbitration, the object of which was “the settlement of differences between States by judges of their own choice, and on the basis of respect of law.” The convention did not impose any obligation to arbitrate but instead attempted to set up a structure that could be utilized when two or more states desired to submit a dispute. Detailed procedural rules were therefore set out in the convention, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration was established. The 1907 revised convention included a method for selecting arbitrators. Structure. The so-called Permanent Court of Arbitration is in no sense a “permanent court”; instead, a court is selected from among a permanent panel of arbitrators. Each party to the convention is eligible to nominate a maximum of four people “of known competency in questions of international law, of the highest moral reputation, and disposed to accept the duties of Arbitrator.” Arbitrators, currently totaling over 300, are appointed for renewable six-year terms. Under modernized procedures adopted in 1992, parties seeking arbitration may ask for a tribunal of one, three, or five persons. The International Bureau is the administrative arm of the court and serves as its registry. It channels communications concerning court meetings, maintains archives, conducts administrative business, and receives from contracting parties reports on the results of arbitration proceedings. The Administrative Council of the bureau is composed of diplomatic representatives of contracting parties accredited to The Hague; the Netherlands’s minister of foreign affairs acts as president of the council. Activities. Historically, arbitration has been a relatively infrequent means of resolving international disputes. In 1976, however, the introduction under the United Nations Commission for Interna-

tional Trade Laws (UNCITRAL) of standard rules for commercial arbitration led to a renewal of interest in the court’s services. Under the UNCITRAL regime, the PCA’s secretary general may be requested to designate an appointing authority for an arbitration proceeding or to rule on challenges to appointment of particular arbitrators. In addition, under UNCITRAL rules as well as many private contracts and international bilateral or multilateral agreements, the secretary general is mentioned as an authority competent to designate arbitrators, a function he has performed frequently in recent years. Since 1968 the court has had a working arrangement with the World Bank’s International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, and it is also authorized to arbitrate cases issuing from the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), a World Bank affiliate inaugurated in 1988. The members of the International Court of Justice are elected by the UN General Assembly and the Security Council from a list of nominees chosen by the PCA members, who may also nominate candidates for the Nobel Peace Prize. More recently, the International Bureau has served as registry for a revived dispute resolution tribunal established by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). In the early 1990s it was suggested that the court could soon be involved in more cases in light of a perceived softening in the attitude of many national administrations toward international arbitration as a means of dispute settlement. In 1991 the Administrative Council expressed its “cautious” optimism on the matter and inaugurated a campaign to heighten international awareness of the court’s mechanisms and to promote its potential value to the emerging “new world order.” To provide greater flexibility and thereby promote greater use of its resources, the court adopted a new set of optional rules for arbitrating disputes between two states in 1992. Based on proven successful UNCITRAL guidelines, the new procedures provided, among other things, for smaller (and presumably faster) tribunals. A model clause for inclusion in future bilateral and multilateral treaties was also devised whereby the court would

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be the designated arbitrator of disputes between their signatories. A similar set of new operating rules was adopted in 1993 for arbitrating disputes between a state and a nonstate party, and this was followed by adoption of optional rules for settling disputes between intergovernmental organizations and states or private parties. The PCA has also sought to identify other gaps in existing dispute resolution frameworks, including ground rules for procedures and statements of proof in mass claims cases. Hopeful that the climate for the peaceful settlement of international disputes was continuing to improve, the PCA held its first Conference of Members in September 1993 in The Hague to discuss the court’s future. Among other things, the conference called for intensified cooperation between the PCA and the United Nations, and the UN General Assembly subsequently accorded observer status to the court. In 1994 the court’s Administrative Council agreed to establish a Financial Assistance Fund to help developing nations meet the costs involved in bringing cases before the court. A group of experts also asked the International Bureau to appoint a working group to advise on whether special institutional arrangements should be made for settling environmental disputes. As a result, in June 2001 the Administrative Council adopted by consensus “Optional Rules for Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Natural Resources and/or the Environment.” In April 2002 the council adopted conciliation rules in the same area. Also in the environmental area, the court has participated in conferences related to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change as well as the UN Convention on Biodiversity and the Intergovernmental Committee for the Biosafety Protocol. In its most significant recent arbitration decision, in 1998–1999 the court announced a two-part settlement of land and marine boundary claims between Eritrea and Yemen. In a similar vein, the

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International Bureau has served as the registry for the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, which announced its decision on border delimitation in June 2002, and for the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission. The PCA was also involved in a dispute in which Ireland, citing the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (the OSPAR [Oslo/Paris] Convention), expressed concerns about operation of a mixed plutonium and uranium oxide processing plant in the United Kingdom (settled July 2, 2003). Other recent arbitration involves an UNCITRAL case between a Netherlands company and the Czech Republic, a dispute between the Netherlands and France over the 1976 Convention on the Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution by Chlorides (settled in March 2004), and a dispute between Belgium and the Netherlands over the “Iron Rhine” railway line (settled in two separate decisions in May and September 2005). On September 19, 2003, a Tribunal Concerning the BIS rendered a decision that determined compensation for privately held BIS shares, all of which were recalled by the bank in 2001. In February 2004 the court began hearing a dispute between Guyana and Suriname about their maritime boundary. In 1999 the court initiated a series of International Law Seminars that have addressed such diverse areas as mass claims procedures; dispute resolution with regard to international investments and environmental protection; air, space, and telecommunications law; relations with Arabic and Islamic countries in the context of e-commerce, foreign investment, and the World Trade Organization; labor law; and international water disputes. The court is also publishing the seminar proceedings. In September 2003 the court signed an agreement to establish its second regional facility in South Africa. The first, dating from December 2001, is based at the UN University for Peace in San Jos´e, Costa Rica.

R E G I O NA L A N D S U B R E G I O NA L DEVELOPMENT BANKS

Regional development banks are intended to accelerate economic and social development of member states by promoting public and private investment. The banks are not meant, however, to be mere financial institutions in the narrow sense of the term. Required by their charters to take an active interest in improving their members’ capacities to make profitable use of local and external capital, they engage in such technical assistance activities as feasibility studies, evaluation and design of projects, and preparation of development programs. The banks also seek to coordinate their activities with the work of other national and international agencies engaged in financing international economic development. Subregional banks have historically concentrated more on integration projects than have regional development banks.

Asian Development Bank (ADB) Launched under the auspices of the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ESCAFE), subsequently the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), the ADB began operations December 19, 1966, in its Manila, Philippines, headquarters as a means of aiding economic growth and cooperation among regional developing countries. Its original membership of 31 has since expanded to 63, including 45 regional members: Afghanistan, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, China, Cook Islands, Fiji, “Hong Kong, China,” India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, the Republic of Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Laos,

Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, “Taipei, China,” Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, and Vietnam; and 18 nonregional members: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The People’s Republic of China acceded to membership March 10, 1986, after the ADB agreed to change Taiwan’s membership title from “Republic of China” to “Taipei, China.” Taiwan thereupon withdrew from participation in bank meetings for a year, although continuing its financial contributions, before returning “under protest.” North Korea applied for membership in 1997, but the United States and Japan, in particular, remain opposed. Each member state is represented on the Board of Governors, which selects a 12-member Board of Directors (eight from regional states) and a bank president who chairs the latter. Four vice presidents and a managing director general assist the president in managing the bank. ADB resources are generated through subscriptions, borrowings on capital markets, and income from several sources, including interest on undisbursed assets. Most funds are in the form of country subscriptions, which totaled $43.6 billion at the end of 2001. Leading shareholders as of 2005 were Japan (15.8 percent), the United States

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(15.8 percent), China (6.5 percent), India (6.4 percent), Australia (5.8 percent), Indonesia (5.5 percent), Canada (5.3 percent), the Republic of Korea (5.1 percent), and Germany (4.4 percent). In all, about 64 percent of subscribed capital is provided by regional members. In June 1974 an Asian Development Fund (ADF) was established to consolidate the activities of two earlier facilities, the Multi-Purpose Special Fund (MPSF) and the Agricultural Special Fund (ASF), whose policies were criticized because of program linkages to procurement in donor countries. The ADF, which provides soft loans, receives most of its funding from voluntary contributions by the industrialized ADB members, who also support a Technical Assistance Special Fund (TASF). A Japan Special Fund for technical assistance grants was set up in 1988 to aid in economic restructuring and facilitating new investment; a Currency Crisis Support Facility was added in 1999. The ADB Institute Special Fund supports the ADB Institute, which was established in 1997 to examine development issues and to offer related training and assistance. In the mid-1980s there was intense debate within the ADB regarding proposed changes in lending policies. Western contributors called on the bank, which in the past provided loans almost exclusively for specific development projects, to provide more “policy-based” funding, under which the recipient country would have spending discretion as long as certain economic reforms were implemented. A compromise agreement was reached in 1987 to allocate up to 15 percent of annual outlay to such loans. Also in partial response to Western demands, the ADB in 1986 established a private sector division to provide private enterprise loans that would not require government guarantees. During the same year, after potential loan recipients complained that ADB requirements were too stringent, the ADB adopted an adjustable lending rate system. Extensive debate on the bank’s direction and strategies for the next decade was generated by a report from an expert external panel submitted in early 1989. The report echoed many of the rec-

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ommendations of an earlier internal task force that urged greater support for social programs. The report also called for expanded private sector activity, attention to the role of women in development, and additional environmental study in connection with all bank projects. In May the Board of Governors endorsed many of the proposed initiatives, especially those concerned with poverty alleviation and the environment. As negotiations began in 1993 on a proposed doubling of the bank’s authorized capital, an independent task force was established to review ADB operations in light of questions from several major subscribers over lending policies, internal operations, and loan failure rates. The task force recommended the bank shift from an “approval culture,” in which quantity of lending was the major criteria, to a focus on “project quality.” The bank also agreed to stricter guidelines regarding arrears. Those proposed refinements notwithstanding, it was apparently widely agreed that the bank’s past performance was satisfactory, and the Board of Governors in May 1994 approved an increase in ADB subscribed capital to $48 billion, with the replenishment expected to support lending for the next eight to ten years. Although members with combined 94 percent of the board’s voting power supported the increase, some regional members, particularly China, reportedly voiced strong protest over the insistence of Western nations that future lending be tied to “good governance” and that additional emphasis be given to social and environmental development. Some members of the Board of Governors reportedly expressed concern at the May 1995 annual meeting about the drop in lending volume in 1994 (down to $3.7 billion from $5.3 billion in 1993). Bank officials attributed the decline, in part, to the fact that staff members had been concentrating, as requested, on improving the quality of current loans rather than developing new proposals. However, bank President Mitsuo Sato of Japan said he expected lending in 1995 to rebound to the 1993 level. Some of the increase was expected to occur in the ADB’s new Private Sector Group, which was inaugurated in January. In addition, the bank hoped

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to attract greater private investment participation in joint projects with the ADB, which had liberalized its cofinancing and guarantee policies. At the ADB’s annual meeting held April 30– May 1, 1996, President Sato announced that the ADB’s primary goal would be poverty reduction through a “broadening of opportunities.” Toward this end, the ADB planned to push for more economic liberalization in Asia and to concentrate new lending toward ventures in the social sector. Agreement was finally reached January 17, 1997, between the ADB and donor countries on the next ADF replenishment of $6.3 billion for 1997– 2000. Subsequently, at the annual meeting held May 11–13 in Fukuoka, Japan, the ADB reaffirmed its commitment to fighting poverty in the region while helping to sustain the impressive growth rates many members had experienced recently. The issue of growth sustainability quickly came into surprisingly sharper focus as several Asian countries suffered severe currency crises and related collapses of their financial markets. In October the ADB significantly reduced its GDP growth rate projections for 1998 (from 7.5 percent to 4 percent) for the region. Subsequently, in December, the bank approved a $4 billion loan—the largest single loan in ADB history—to South Korea as part of that country’s bailout package negotiated with the International Monetary Fund. The Bank also contributed a $300 million loan to Thailand’s rescue package earlier in the year. As a consequence of the massive South Korean loan, total lending for 1997 jumped to $9.3 billion, compared to $5.6 billion in 1996. For the three years 1998 through 2000 total lending dropped back to $6.0 billion, $5.0 billion, and $5.9 billion, respectively. The eighth replenishment of the ADF, amounting to $5.7 billion, was approved in September 2000. Twenty-five donor countries pledged $2.9 billion for 2000–2004, with the balance to be provided through repayments of existing loans. On the whole, consultations leading up to the ADF replenishment went smoothly, although the Malaysian government, apparently disgruntled by the policies of Western-dominated multilateral lending institutions, did not participate. Greater behind-the-

scenes controversy attended a subsequent effort by the ADB to prepare a 2001–2015 Long-Term Strategic Framework, with recipient countries resisting pressure by donor countries for greater say in development plans and for making loan approvals partially dependent on such considerations as good governance. Meanwhile, at the 2000 annual meeting, which was held May 6–8 in Chiang Mai, Thailand, the United States urged South Korea and other members to undertake early repayment of the loans borrowed during the 1997 economic crisis. A year later, at the 2001 annual ADB meeting, which opened May 10 in Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S. Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill urged more rapid financial and corporate reform, while several countries, including Japan and South Korea, meeting on the sidelines of the session, announced swap arrangements designed to prevent the kind of currency speculation that led to the 1997 crisis. In 2000 the Japanese government committed $90 million to establish a new Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction, and a year later it announced it would underwrite a Japan Fund for Information and Communication Technology that would have as a principal purpose narrowing the “digital divide” between rich and poor countries. Other special program funds authorized in 2001 included those by Canada, for managing climate change; the Netherlands, for promoting renewable energy and energy efficiency; and the United Kingdom, for poverty reduction in India. In addition, a multidonor Cooperative Fund for water management was established. Under the leadership of bank President Tadao Chino, who was reelected to a second term in September 2001, the ADB undertook a partial administrative reorganization. As part of the 15-year strategic plan, and with effect from January 2002, the reform was designed to permit better management of multiple goals, to establish a balance between country and sectoral factors in approving loans, to improve project quality and compliance, and to permit the bank to better serve as a regional resource and knowledge center. Greater emphasis was to be given to sustainable development, private

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sector participation (a Private Sector Operations Department was created), and environmental considerations as well as poverty reduction. Projects involving “social infrastructure,” such as health facilities and programs, education, and water supplies, were to receive greater support. The ADB was criticized in the early 2000s for a perceived failure to allocate sufficient resources for poverty reduction. Perhaps as a consequence, the bank announced it would begin offering grants (as opposed to loans) to its poorer members. That decision was made after donors agreed to a $7 billion replenishment of the ADF for the four-year period through 2008. Bank officials estimated that about one-fifth of ADF assistance in the future would consist of grants.

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Haruhiko Kuroda of Japan was installed as the ADB’s new president in February 2005. A former special advisor to the Japanese prime minister, Kuroda was described as a proponent of greater financial integration among Asian countries. In early 2005 the ADB established a $600 million fund to assist victims of the recent devastating tsunami. ADB loan approvals in 2005 totaled $7.4 billion, compared to $5.3 billion in 2004, $6.1 billion in 2003, and $5.6 billion in 2002. The leading recipients were China (26 percent), Indonesia (19 percent), and Pakistan (13 percent). Nearly 30 percent of new loans were directed toward transportation and communication, followed by energy with 18.5 percent.

SOUTH ASIAN A S S O C I AT I O N F O R R E G I O N A L C O O P E R AT I O N (SAARC)

Established: By charter signed December 8, 1985, in Dhaka, Bangladesh. Purpose: “. . . to promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life; . . . to promote and strengthen collective selfreliance among the countries of South Asia; . . . to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields; . . . and to co-operate with international and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes.” Headquarters: Kathmandu, Nepal. Principal Organs: Meeting of Heads of State or Government (all members), Council of Ministers (all members), Standing Committee (all members), Programming Committee (all members), Secretariat. Secretary General: Chenkyab Dorji (Bhutan). Membership (7): Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka. Origin and development. Prior to formation of the SAARC, South Asia was the only major world region without a formal venue for multigovernmental cooperation. The association was launched December 8, 1985, in Dhaka, Bangladesh, during the first high-level meeting of the political leaders of the participating gov-

ernments. The summit was convened on recommendation of the ministerial South Asian Regional Cooperation Committee (SARC), formed August 1983 in New Delhi, India, with subsequent meetings in July 1984 in Mal´e, Maldives, and in May 1985 in Thimbu, Bhutan. At the conclusion of the SAARC’s founding session, the participants issued a charter setting forth the objectives of the new grouping and directed that decisions would be made by unanimous vote at annual summits at which “bilateral and contentious” issues would be avoided. Structure. General policies are formulated at the annual meeting of heads of state and, to a lesser extent, at the semiannual meetings of the Council of Ministers. Sectoral ministerial meetings may also convene. A Secretariat was established in January 1987 in Kathmandu. Seven technical committees address agriculture and rural development; communications and transport; energy; environment and meteorology; human resources development, science and technology, and social development. The committees report to the Standing Committee of foreign secretaries, which prepares recommendations for the Council of Ministers. A Programming Committee was established to assist the Standing Committee, which also oversees SAARC’s regional centers: SAARC Agricultural Information Center, established in Dhaka in 1988; SAARC Documentation Center (New Delhi, 1994); SAARC Human Resources Development Center (Islamabad, Pakistan, 1999); SAARC

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Meteorological Research Center (Dhaka, 1995); and SAARC Tuberculosis Center (Kathmandu, 1992). Activities. In light of the SAARC’s formal repudiation of involvement in purely bilateral concerns, the 1986 summit in Bangalore, India, did not officially address the major conflicts within the subcontinent, such as the Himalayan river waters dispute between India and Bangladesh, the confrontation between ethnically South Indian Tamil guerrillas and the Sri Lankan government, and the variety of problems affecting relations between India and Pakistan. Instead, the summit was devoted to discussion of proposed SAARC institutions that would serve to reduce regional tensions through cooperation in such areas as communication, transport, and rural development. Subsequently, a group of experts that convened in February 1987 in New Delhi attempted to facilitate “people-to-people contacts” through the establishment of a SAARC documentation center, the institution of academic programs that would inculcate a sense of South Asian community, the promotion of tourism, the creation of a South Asian broadcasting network, and the formation of organized volunteer programs in reforestation, wasteland development, and agricultural extension. Little SAARC progress was achieved in 1989 and 1990, as national and international conflicts continued to hold center stage in the region. The 1989 summit, scheduled for November in Sri Lanka, was postponed as the result of widespread ethnic violence there, coupled with increased tension between Colombo and New Delhi over the presence of Indian troops. SAARC subsequently attempted to convene the meeting in March 1990, but intensified Indian-Pakistani friction over Kashmir necessitated another postponement. The summit was finally held in November in Mal´e although substantive action was limited because India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka had recently installed new governments, while internal turmoil broke out in the other three. The sixth summit was originally scheduled for early November 1991 in Colombo but was postponed when Bhutan’s King Jigme Singye

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Wangchuk announced that ethnic strife in his country precluded his attendance. The summit eventually convened December 21, the heads of state agreeing to “suppress terrorism” while also committing themselves to support “civil and political rights” and to combat poverty in the region. In addition, an intergovernmental group was created to consider ways to dismantle long-standing barriers to trade between SAARC members. Meanwhile a SAARC development fund was discussed, proponents arguing that “trade and business unity” would help reduce political cleavage in the region. Subsequently, unsettled conditions in the region continued to plague SAARC, and the summit scheduled for January 1993 was postponed at the request of Prime Minister Rao in the aftermath of severe communal disturbances in India. When the summit was finally held April 10–11 in Dhaka, Bangladesh, it was marred by mass demonstrations against Rao and his government’s handling of the Hindu-Muslim conflict. The most significant development at the summit was the initialing of a plan to establish a South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) for reducing or eliminating intraregional trade barriers. No SAARC summit was held in 1994, primarily because of ongoing turmoil in India (where the meeting was scheduled to be held) and continued friction between SAARC members. By that time, many observers saw SAARC as having fallen significantly behind most counterparts elsewhere in terms of regional integration. When SAARC leaders finally met May 2–4, 1995, in New Delhi, they agreed to proceed with the SAPTA launching, with more than 200 products identified for lower tariff rates. Following ratification by all SAARC states, SAPTA formally went into effect December 8, concurrent with the commemoration of the grouping’s tenth anniversary. However, it was widely agreed that SAPTA represented only a modest beginning, and SAARC established an “expert working group” to begin work immediately on plans to expand SAPTA into a South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA). Despite that apparent progress, at least “on paper,” several SAARC members argued that genuine

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regional integration could not be achieved unless contentious political issues, such as the IndianPakistani dispute over Kashmir, were resolved. For its part, Pakistan formally called for a change in the section of the SAARC charter that precludes bilateral talks. India strongly resisted that concept, however, and at a symposium on SAARC in mid-1996 in Washington, D.C., U.S. officials also advised the grouping to avoid “the political realm.” Although Pakistan was not swayed by that argument and several other members still appeared willing to expand the SAARC mandate, activity within the grouping for the rest of the year focused on economic matters. The political question reemerged at the ninth SAARC summit, held May 12–14, 1997, in Mal´e, Maldives. The seven heads of state or government agreed that a process of informal political consultations would help their efforts to foster better relations and faster economic integration. Although still officially opposed to a political component within SAARC, India nonetheless reached a bilateral agreement with Pakistan on May 12 within the “SAARC setting.” The SAARC leaders also agreed to move the formation of SAFTA forward to 2001 from 2005. At that time, approximately 20 percent of the world’s population lived within SAARC’s borders, but intraregional trade accounted for only 1 percent of the global total. Following India’s and Pakistan’s tests of nuclear devices in May 1998, Pakistan again attempted to introduce a political element into SAARC at the tenth summit, held in late July 1998 in Colombo, Sri Lanka. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif offered changes to the SAARC charter that would allow for bilateral negotiations and establish a regional peace council, but the other members rejected the proposed changes. Although the prime ministers of India and Pakistan met during the summit for the first time since the nuclear tests, the talks were not considered successful as the dispute over Kashmir remained a stumbling block. Another focus of the summit was economic integration. SAARC reaffirmed its intention to complete and implement SAFTA in 2001 and decided to improve ties with other regional economic or-

ganizations, such as the Association of Southeastern Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, a group of eminent persons appointed by SAARC reported that 2008 was a more realistic date for launching SAFTA. The 11th SAARC summit, scheduled for November 1999 in Kathmandu, was postponed at India’s request following the October coup in Pakistan, and little progress on the organization’s major concerns was accomplished in the following two years. A third special session of the Standing Committee met August 9–10, 2001, in Colombo at which time the participating foreign secretaries agreed that the summit process should be resumed as quickly as possible. They also adopted a schedule for negotiating additional SAPTA concessions, drafting the SAFTA treaty, and holding meetings (some at the ministerial level) concerned with culture, the environment, health, information, media, telecommunications, and poverty alleviation. As a further indication of the political differences impeding progress toward SAARC’s regional goals, in October 2001 the organization abandoned its efforts to draft a unified statement condemning terrorism and the September 11 attacks against the United States. Once again, India and Pakistan strongly disagreed: India insisted the proposed statement condemn terrorism in Kashmir, whereas Pakistan rejected any such explicit reference to the disputed region. The 11th SAARC summit was finally held January 5–6, 2002, in Kathmandu, Nepal, the attendees reaffirming their commitment to SAFTA and adopting a convention on preventing trafficking in women and children. However, renewed tension between India and Pakistan prompted postponement of the summit scheduled for January 2003 until January 2004, at which time a new protocol was approved in regard to combating terrorism. The SAARC leaders also endorsed tentative draft guidelines for SAFTA, which, fully established, would encompass approximately 20 percent of the world’s population. SAFTA came into force January 1, 2006. Although the 2004 summit (which also adopted a new “social charter”) was deemed successful, political considerations again

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interrupted regional progress in early 2005 when the 13th summit was postponed because of turmoil in Nepal and Bangladesh. The 13th summit was held November 8–13, 2005, in Dhaka. It was postponed twice, once because of the December 26, 2004, tsunami, and once because of the Nepalese king’s coup. The meeting declared the decade 2006–2015 the “SAARC

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Decade of Poverty Alleviation,” and decided to establish a SAARC Poverty Alleviation Fund (SPAF) with contributions both voluntary and/or assessed, as was to be agreed in future discussions. Some commentators felt that dealing with trade and economic concerns was SAARC’s best way forward, given the intractable political differences between some of its members.

U N I T E D N AT I O N S ( U N )

Established: By charter signed June 26, 1945, in San Francisco, United States, effective October 24, 1945. Purpose: To maintain international peace and security; to develop friendly relations among states based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples; to achieve international cooperation in solving problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character; and to harmonize the actions of states in the attainment of these common ends. Headquarters: New York, United States. Principal Organs: General Assembly (all members), Security Council (15 members), Economic and Social Council (54 members), Trusteeship Council (5 members), International Court of Justice (15 judges), Secretariat. Secretary General: Kofi Annan (Ghana). Membership (192). Official Languages: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, Spanish. All are also working languages. Origin and development. The idea of creating a new intergovernmental organization to replace the League of Nations was born early in World War II and first found public expression in an InterAllied Declaration signed on June 12, 1941, in London, England, by representatives of five Commonwealth states and eight European governments-in-exile. Formal use of the term United Nations first occurred in the Declaration by United Nations, signed on January 1, 1942, in Washington, D.C., on behalf of 26 states that subscribed to

the principles of the Atlantic Charter (August 14, 1941) and pledged their full cooperation for the defeat of the Axis powers. At the Moscow Conference on October 30, 1943, representatives of China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States proclaimed that they “recognized the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.” In meetings in Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, D.C., between August 21 and October 7, 1944, the four powers reached agreement on preliminary proposals and determined to prepare more complete suggestions for discussion at a subsequent conference of all the United Nations. Meeting from April 25 to June 25, 1945, in San Francisco, California, representatives of 50 states participated in drafting the United Nations Charter, which was formally signed June 26. Poland was not represented at the San Francisco Conference but later signed the charter and is counted among the 51 “original” UN members. Following ratification by the five permanent members of the Security Council and most other signatories, the charter entered into force October 24, 1945. The General Assembly, convened in its first regular session January 10, 1946, accepted an invitation to establish the permanent home of the organization in the United States; privileges and immunities of the UN headquarters were defined in a Headquarters Agreement with the U.S. government signed June 26, 1947. The membership of the UN, which increased from 51 to 60 during the period 1945–1950, remained frozen at that level for the next five years as

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a result of U.S.-Soviet disagreements over admission. The deadlock was broken in 1955 when the superpowers agreed on a “package” of 16 new members: four Soviet-bloc states, four Western states, and eight “uncommitted” states. Since then, states have normally been admitted with little delay. The exceptions are worth noting. The admission of the two Germanies in 1973 led to proposals for admission of the two Koreas and of the two Vietnams. Neither occurred prior to the formal unification of Vietnam in 1976, while action in regard to the two Koreas was delayed for another 15 years. On November 16, 1976, the United States used its 18th veto in the Security Council to prevent the admission of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, having earlier in the same session, on June 23, 1976, employed its 15th veto to prevent Angola from joining. Later in the session, however, the United States relented, and Angola gained admission. In July 1977 Washington dropped its objection to Vietnamese membership as well. With the admission of Brunei, the total membership during the 39th session of the General Assembly in 1984 stood at 159. The figure rose to 160 with the admission of Namibia in April 1990, fell back to 159 after the merger of North and South Yemen in May, advanced again to 160 via the September admission of Liechtenstein, and returned to 159 when East and West Germany merged in October. Seven new members (Estonia, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Marshall Islands, and Federated States of Micronesia) were admitted September 17, 1991, at the opening of the 46th General Assembly. Eight of the new states resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) were admitted March 2, 1992, along with San Marino. Russia announced the previous December that it was assuming the former USSR seat. Three of the breakaway Yugoslavian republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia) were admitted May 22. Capping an unprecedented period of expansion, Georgia became the 179th member on July 31.

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The total dropped back to 178 with the dissolution of Czechoslovakia on January 1, 1993, then moved up to 180 when the Czech Republic and Slovakia joined separately on January 19. On April 8 the General Assembly approved the admission of “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” the name being carefully fashioned because of the terminological dispute between the new nation and Greece. Monaco and newly independent Eritrea were admitted May 28, followed by Andorra on July 28. Palau, which had finally achieved independence following protracted difficulty in concluding its U.S. trusteeship status, became the 185th member December 15, 1994. Kiribati, Nauru, and Tonga were admitted September 14, 1999, and Tuvalu joined September 5, 2000. A change of government in October 2000 led to the November 1, 2000, admission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). On September 22, 1992, the General Assembly, acting on the recommendation of the Security Council, decided the FRY could not automatically assume the UN membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The assembly informed the FRY that it would have to apply on its own for UN membership, and such an application was submitted the following day. However, no action on the request was taken by the assembly because of concern over the Federal Republic’s role in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, later, its actions regarding the ethnic Albanian population in the Yugoslavian province of Kosovo. As a consequence, the FRY was excluded from participation in the work of the General Assembly and its subsidiary bodies. Throughout this period, however, the UN membership of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia technically remained in effect. A certain ambiguity, apparently deliberate, surrounded the issue, permitting the FRY and others to claim that it was still a member, albeit excluded from active participation, while some nations argued that the membership referred only to the antecedent Yugoslavian state. In any event, the flag of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was also the flag of the FRY, continued to fly outside UN headquarters with the flags of all other UN

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members, and the old nameplate remained positioned in front of an empty chair during assembly proceedings. In October 2000 the Security Council, in a resolution recommending admission of the FRY, acknowledged “that the State formerly known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist.” A representative of the FRY took up the empty seat, and a new FRY flag replaced that of the former Yugoslavia. On September 10, 2002, the UN admitted Switzerland, which had long maintained a permanent observer mission at UN headquarters and had actively participated as a full member of the various UN specialized and related agencies. The Swiss government, having concluded that UN membership in the post–Cold War era would not jeopardize its long-standing international neutrality, sought admission after winning majority support from Swiss voters at a March 2002 referendum. Timor-Leste became the 191st member on September 27. In 2003 the FRY became the “state union” of Serbia and Montenegro, which dissolved in June 2006, following a successful independence referendum in Montenegro. Accordingly, on June 28 the world’s newest independent state, Montenegro, was admitted as the UN’s 192nd member. Serbia, as the successor state to the state union, retained the UN seat held to that point by the FRY. The Holy See (Vatican City State) has formal observer status in the General Assembly and maintains a permanent observer mission at UN headquarters. In July 2004 the UN granted the Holy See the full range of membership privileges, with the exception of voting. Structure. The UN system can be viewed as comprising (1) the principal organs, (2) subsidiary organs established to deal with particular aspects of the organization’s responsibilities, (3) a number of specialized and related agencies, and (4) a series of ad hoc global conferences to examine particularly pressing issues. The institutional structure of the principal organs resulted from complex negotiations that attempted to balance both the conflicting claims of national sovereignty and international respon-

sibility, and the rights of large and small states. The principle of sovereign equality of all member states is exemplified in the General Assembly; that of the special responsibility of the major powers, in the composition and procedure of the Security Council. The other principal organs included in the charter are the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the Trusteeship Council (whose activity was suspended in 1994), the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the Secretariat. UN-related intergovernmental bodies constitute a network of Specialized Agencies established by intergovernmental agreement as legal and autonomous international entities with their own memberships and organs and which, for the purpose of “coordination,” are brought “into relationship” with the UN. While sharing many of their characteristics, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) remains legally distinct from the Specialized Agencies; the World Trade Organization, which emerged from the UN-sponsored General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT), has no formal association with the UN. The proliferation of subsidiary organs can be attributed to many complex factors, including new demands and needs as more states attained independence; the effects of the Cold War; a subsequent diminution of East-West bipolarity; a greater concern with promoting economic and social development through technical assistance programs (almost entirely financed by voluntary contributions); and a resistance to any radical change in international trade patterns. For many years, the largest and most politically significant of the subordinate organs were the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), which were initial venues for debates, for conducting studies and presenting reports, for convening conferences and specialized meetings, and for mobilizing the opinions of nongovernmental organizations. They also provided a way for less developed states to formulate positions vis-`a-vis the industrialized states. During the 1970s both became intimately involved in activities related to program implementation, and on January 1,

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1986, UNIDO became the UN’s 16th Specialized Agency. One of the most important developments in the UN system has been the use of ad hoc conferences to deal with major international problems.

Security Council Permanent Membership (5): China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States. (The other permanent members in late December 1991 accepted Russia’s assumption of the seat previously filled by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.) Nonpermanent Membership (10): Terms ending December 31, 2006: Argentina, Denmark, Greece, Japan, Tanzania; terms ending December 31, 2007: Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Qatar, Peru, and Slovakia.

Security Council: Peacekeeping Forces and Missions In addition to the forces and missions listed below, the United Nations Command in Korea (established on June 25, 1950) remains technically in existence. The only UN member now contributing to the command is the United States, which proposed in June 1975 that it be dissolved. As of mid-2006 no formal action had been taken on the proposal.

United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) Established: By resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on August 13, 1948, and January 5, 1949; augmented and brought under the jurisdiction of the Security Council by resolution of September 6, 1965, in view of a worsening situation in Kashmir. Purpose: To assist in implementing the cease-fire agreement of January 1, 1949.

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Headquarters: Rawalpindi, Pakistan (November– April), Srinagar, India (May–October). Chief Military Observer: Maj. Gen. Dragutin Repinc (Croatia). Composition: As of July 1, 2006, 43 military observers from Chile, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Republic of Korea, Sweden, and Uruguay.

United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) Established: By Security Council resolution of August 24, 1993. Purpose: To monitor the cease-fire approved on July 27, 1993, by the Republic of Georgia and Abkhazian secessionists. The UNOMIG mandate was subsequently expanded to monitor and verify (in conjunction with peacekeeping forces from the Commonwealth of Independent States) a second cease-fire signed on May 14, 1994. Headquarters: Sukhumi, Georgia. Chief Military Observer: Niaz Muhammad Khan Khattak (Pakistan). Composition: As of July 1, 2006, 120 military observers and 11 civilian police from Albania, Austria, Bangladesh, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay.

Economic and Social Council: Regional Commissions The primary aim of the five Regional Commissions, which report annually to ECOSOC, is to assist in raising the level of economic activity in their respective regions and to maintain and strengthen the economic relations of the states in each region,

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both among themselves and with others. The commissions adopt their own procedural rules, including how they select officers. Each commission is headed by an executive secretary, who holds the rank of under secretary of the UN, while their Secretariats are integral parts of the overall United Nations Secretariat. The commissions are empowered to make recommendations directly to member governments and to Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, but no action can be taken in respect to any state without the agreement of that state.

Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) Established: March 28, 1947, as the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; current name adopted in 1974. Purpose: To facilitate cooperation in economic and social development within the region, to provide technical assistance and serve as an executing agency for operational projects, to conduct research and related activities, to offer advisory services as requested by governments, to serve as the principal forum for the region within the UN system. Headquarters: Bangkok, Thailand. A Pacific Operations Center opened in Port Vila, Vanuatu, in 1984. Principal Subsidiary Organs: Advisory Committee of Permanent Representatives and Other Representatives Designated by ESCAP Members; Asian and Pacific Center for Transfer of Technology (New Delhi, India); Committee on Emerging Social Issues; Committee on Managing Globalization; Committee on Poverty Reduction; Regional Coordination Center for Research and Development of Coarse Grains, Pulses, Roots, and Tuber Crops in the Humid Tropics of Asia and the Pacific (Bogor, Indonesia); Special Body on Least Developed and Landlocked Developing Countries; Special Body on Pacific Island Developing Countries;

Statistical Institute for Asia and the Pacific (Chiba, Japan); Secretariat. The Secretariat includes an Office of the Executive Secretary, an Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary, the United Nations Information Services, the Pacific Operations Center, and nine divisions, two of them largely administrative (Program Management and Administration) and the other seven substantive: Emerging Social Issues; Environment and Sustainable Development; Information, Communication, and Space Technology; Poverty and Development; Statistics; Trade and Investment; and Transport and Tourism. Executive Secretary: Kim Hak-Su (Republic of Korea). Membership (53): Afghanistan, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Fiji, France, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Republic of Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russia, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, United Kingdom, United States, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vietnam. Associate Members (9): American Samoa, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Cook Islands, French Polynesia, Guam, Hong Kong, Macao, New Caledonia, Niue. Switzerland participates in a consultative capacity. Recent activities. ESCAP is the largest of the five ECOSOC Regional Commissions, with its member countries encompassing about 60 percent of the world’s population. It operates with a general staff of nearly 400 as well as 200 professionals, advisers, and project personnel. The various divisions of the Secretariat carry out the projects and programs formulated by the organization’s policymaking committees. To strengthen its role in helping South Pacific island nations and territories, ESCAP inaugurated a Pacific Operations

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Center in Vanuatu in 1984. In 1993 ESCAP signed an agreement with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) that delineates 11 areas of common interest in which closer cooperation will be pursued. The two organizations agreed to prepare joint studies, develop and carry out projects together, and conduct ESCAP/ADB workshops and conferences. In addition, ESCAP remains a source of highly respected economic analyses, including its annual Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific. A continuing area of concern for ESCAP in 1994 was the “wide gap” between economic progress in the region and social development. Although many members were to be congratulated for fostering dynamic economic growth, ESCAP officials said, governments needed to give greater emphasis to the integration of “social concerns” in development policies. In addition, staff members in 1995 reported that many South Pacific countries were experiencing a reduction in growth rates. The ESCAP officials criticized governments in that region for not using their resources wisely and for making poor investments with aid from donor countries and international organizations. ESCAP activity in 1996 included administration of a new program, financed by Australia, to encourage cooperation between the region’s island nations and the expanding Asian economies. The commission also cautioned the island states that they would face declining living standards unless population growth was reduced. In October 1996 various international agencies, including ESCAP, inaugurated more than 45 initiatives aimed at building cooperation between the private and public sectors. Two of the most prominent initiatives concerned developing Asian infrastructure—the New Delhi Action Plan on Infrastructure (1997–2006) and the Asian Infrastructure Development Alliance. ESCAP celebrated its 50th anniversary on March 28, 1997, by holding a three-day symposium at which participants praised the achievements of the region but also noted that some 700–800 million inhabitants continued to live in poverty. At the 53rd commission session, held at the end of April, the delegates agreed to organization reforms, particu-

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larly with regard to the committee and divisional structure. The central topic of the 1998 commission session was the financial crisis impacting several of its members. ESCAP called for greater regional economic integration to prevent future crises and to help foster economic development. The continuing economic turbulence was also discussed at the commission’s 1999 session, participants calling for greater social spending on the part of national governments. ESCAP held its 2001 session under the leadership of Executive Secretary Kim Hak-Su of South Korea, who had succeeded Adrianus Mooy of Indonesia in July 2000. The main topic of the meeting concerned balanced development for urban and rural areas and regions. Subsequent sessions focused on the role of health (particularly the impact of HIV/AIDS) in development; the need to foster “secondary crops” for poor farmers in the region; and the pervasive negative effect of corruption and poor governance on the economies of Pacific island nations. In 2005 ESCAP proposed the establishment of an Asian Investment Bank to, among other things, improve regional financial services. The commission also called for the provision of “soft” loans for infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia. In addition, in December 2005 ESCAP announced the creation of a $12.5 million regional trust fund to develop early warning systems for tsunamis. ESCAP also sponsored the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Asian Highway Network, which called for the creation of a highway system to link more than 140,000 km of existing roadways in 32 countries.

Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) Established: August 9, 1973, as the Economic Commission for Western Asia; current name adopted in 1985. Purpose: To “initiate and participate in measures for facilitating concerted action for the economic

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reconstruction and development of Western Asia, for raising the level of economic activity in Western Asia, and for maintaining and strengthening the economic relations of the countries of that area, both among themselves and with other countries of the world.” Temporary Headquarters: Beirut, Lebanon. Principal Subsidiary Organs: Preparatory Committee; Advisory Committee; six specialized committees: Energy, Liberalization of Foreign Trade and Economic Globalization, Social Development, Statistics, Transport, Water Resources; Secretariat. The Secretariat includes seven divisions: Administrative Services; Program Planning and Technical Cooperation; Economic Analysis, Information and Communication Technology; Globalization and Regional Integration; Social Development; and Sustainable Development and Productivity. There are also a Statistics Coordination Unit and an ESCWA Center for Women. Executive Secretary: Mervat M. Tallawy (Egypt). Membership (13): Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen. Recent activities. The most important procedural event in the commission’s history was the 1977 decision to grant full membership to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)—the first nonstate organization to achieve such standing in a UN agency—despite a fear on the part of some UN members that the PLO would use its membership to gain full membership in the General Assembly. Israeli-Palestinian agreements, beginning with the 1993 Declaration of Principles, led to the redesignation of the PLO membership as, simply, Palestine, even though no de jure Palestinian state existed. In view of growing regional economic cooperation throughout the world, the commission at the 1992 Ministerial Session urged members to adopt policies designed to promote inter-Arab trade and the eventual creation of an Arab common market. A

decision was postponed on the designation of a new permanent headquarters for the commission, which had moved to Amman, Jordan, from Baghdad, Iraq, during the Gulf crisis. It was subsequently decided to move the headquarters to Beirut, Lebanon; the relocation was completed in early 1998. During the mid-1990s the ESCWA reorganized its work agenda, reducing the number of operational programs from 15 to 5: Natural Resources and Environmental Management, Improvement of the Quality of Life, Economic Development and Global Changes, Coordination of Policies and Harmonization of Norms and Regulations for Sectoral Development, Coordination and Harmonization of Statistics and Information Development. In 1997 ECOSOC established a Technical Committee on Liberalization of Foreign Trade and Globalization in Countries of the ESCWA Region in order to observe movement toward free trade in other parts of the world and advise members on its benefits. At its 19th session, held in Beirut on May 5– 8, 1997, ESCWA discussed a proposed 1998–2001 medium-term plan that stressed sustainable development and cooperation within the region, reported on the development of data bases on population and gender issues, and followed up on actions taken at the previous session regarding new committees on energy and water resources. The 1999 biennial session coincided with the commission’s 25th anniversary. The May 8–11, 2000, ministerial meeting focused on the topic of “Regional Integration and Globalization.” In November 2000 Mervat M. Tallawy of Egypt succeeded Hazem El Beblawi, also of Egypt, as executive secretary. In 2003 Tallawy lamented the fact that UN negotiations had failed to prevent the U.S./UK-led invasion of Iraq and called for the UN to take a greater role than initially envisioned in the reconstruction of Iraq following the war. For its part, ESCWA pledged to concentrate on reviving civil society in Iraq, noting that “turmoil and anxiety” in the region had diverted resources away from development. The 2005 ESCWA session further addressed the question of “peace and security” and determined that too much money had been spent

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on armaments at the expense of employment and other social programs. ESCWA also announced plans for its own restructuring to emphasize local community development and cooperation with the private sector. The commission continued to

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express deep concern over the repercussions of Israeli “occupation” on the living conditions of Palestinians. In July 2006 ESCWA protested the Israeli incursion into Lebanon, including attacks on UN facilities.

PART FOUR

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A: CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR ASIA EVENTS, 2006

AFGHANISTAN March 1. U.S. President Visits. U.S. President George W. Bush visits Afghanistan for the first time. During his five-hour stopover, on the way to India, he meets President Hamid Karzai and attends the opening of the U.S. embassy in Kabul. April 20. Legislators Confirm Most Ministerial Nominees. The Wolesi Jirga, the lower house of the National Assembly, confirms 20 of 25 ministerial candidates proposed by President Karzai in a March cabinet reshuffle. May 17–19. Taliban Stages Assault. Taliban fighters attack the town of Musa Qala but are driven back by Afghan and U.S.-led forces. The assault is reportedly the Taliban’s most extensive offensive operation since its 2001 ouster. July 31. NATO Takes Control. NATO takes over command of international forces from the United States in the southern province of Helmand, which has borne the brunt of recent fierce fighting. August 7. Legislators Approve Final Cabinet Ministers. The Wolesi Jirga approves five ministerial nominees, completing the cabinet. September 28. Bush Hosts Karzai and Musharraf. President Bush meets President Karzai and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in Washington. The two Asian leaders, who have exchanged harsh words in recent months over the ongoing insurgency, neither speak nor shake hands publicly. December 12. Meeting Focuses on Civilian Casualties. President Karzai convenes a meeting of military and government leaders to discuss the ris-

ing number of civilian casualties, especially in the volatile southern provinces. December 23. U.S. Military Claims to Have Killed Key Taliban Figure. U.S. forces report killing Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Osmani, as associate of Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar and al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden, in an air strike on December 19. Osmani would be the highestranking Taliban leader killed since the U.S.-led invasion in 2001.

ARMENIA February 10–11. Talks with Azerbaijan Make No Headway. Discussions in Rambouillet, France, between Armenian President Robert Kocharian and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh fail to yield any progress. May 12. Junior Coalition Partner Leaves Government. The Country of Law Party, led by National Assembly Speaker Artur Baghdasarian, withdraws from the governing coalition because of differences with President Robert Kocharian. Baghdasarian, who simultaneously resigned as speaker, had voiced support for Armenia’s joining the European Union and NATO. June 4–5. Presidents Confer Again on NagornoKarabakh. The Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents meet in Bucharest, Romania, but again fail to make progress. November 28. Presidents Meet for a Third Time in 2006. With international pressure for resolution

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of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue rising, Presidents Kocharian and Aliyev meet on the sidelines of the Commonwealth of Independent States summit in Minsk, Belarus. December 10. Nagorno-Karabakh Backs Independence from Azerbaijan. Nearly 99 percent of those voting in Nagorno-Karabakh give their support to a constitution that affirms the region’s independence from Azerbaijan.

ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION (APEC) November 18–19. Vietnam Hosts Its First APEC Summit. APEC’s 14th Economic Leaders’ Meeting convenes in Hanoi, Vietnam.

ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS (ASEAN) July 23–28. ASEAN Meetings Are Under Way. Various meetings of ASEAN organs are held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. At the ASEAN Regional Forum session, Timor-Leste applies for membership.

AUSTRALIA January 12. Howard Government Settles Dispute with Timor-Leste over Natural Gas Field. Australia signs the Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea (CMATS), whereby it agrees to share equally with Timor-Leste revenue from the Greater Sunrise hydrocarbon field. The agreement also postpones resolution of an underlying border dispute for 50 years. July 31. Prime Minister Howard Announces Plans to Seek Fifth Term. John Howard of the governing Liberal Party tells his party’s parliamentary members that he intends to lead them into the next general election, to take place in 2007. August 14. Howard Withdraws Asylum Bill. Prime Minister Howard, facing defeat in the Sen-

ate, drops a controversial bill that would require offshore processing of asylum seekers—in Nauru, for example—entering Australian waters by boat. October 20. Australian Police Conduct Solomon Islands Raid. Australian police stationed in the Solomon Islands raid the office of Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare in connection with efforts by Australian citizen and international fugitive Julian Moti, who is wanted on child sex charges, to escape extradition to Australia. A political row develops over Australian involvement in the affairs of its Pacific neighbors.

AUSTRALIA RELATED TERRITORY: NORFOLK ISLAND December 21. Australia Decides against Restructuring. Reversing course, the Australian government indicates that despite parliamentary reports warning of Norfolk’s looming insolvency, it would not pursue significant financial restructuring in the territory. Most islanders had objected to the prospect of greater federal control.

AZERBAIJAN January 1. Government Redenominates Currency. At the start of the year Azerbaijan introduces a new manat, equivalent to 5,000 old manats. February 10–11. Talks with Armenia Register No Progress. Discussions in Rambouillet, France, between Armenian President Robert Kocharian and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh fail to yield any progress. Other talks are held in June and November (see Armenia chronology). May 13. Ruling Party Registers Electoral Gains. The ruling New Azerbaijan Party and allies win eight of ten legislative seats in repeat balloting. Results of the November 2005 election had been annulled in the ten constituencies. December 10. Azerbaijan Rejects NagornoKarabakh Vote. The Azerbaijani government rejects the results of a referendum on a constitution

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR ASIA EVENTS, 2006

in Nagorno-Karabakh. Nearly 99 percent of those voting support the constitution, which affirms the region’s independence from Azerbaijan.

BANGLADESH October 15. Yunus Wins Nobel Prize. The Nobel Prize Committee awards Muhammad Yunus the Nobel Peace Prize for pioneering microcredit lending to the poor and promoting “economic and social development from below.” October 27. Term of Prime Minister Expires; Caretaker Government Appointed. Prime Minister Khaleda Zia steps down upon expiration of the five-year legislative term, with President Iajuddin Ahmed taking on the additional duties of chief adviser and minister in a constitutionally mandated caretaker government, pending a general election set for January 23, 2007. December 11. Four Ministers Resign. Four members of the caretaker government resign in the context of ongoing demonstrations by the opposition Awami League, which has accused the caretaker administration of bias in favor of former Prime Minster Zia’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party.

BHUTAN September 7. New Prime Minister Assumes Office. Foreign Minister Khandu Wangchuk becomes prime minister for a one-year term, succeeding Sangay Ngedup. December 16. King Abdicates. Citing a need to give his son, Crown Prince Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuk, sufficient time to “gather experience” before introduction of a constitution and the holding of legislative elections in 2008, King Jigme Wangchuk steps down.

BRUNEI May 17. Government Relaxes Citizenship Requirements. The home affairs minister announces

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that ruler Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah has liberalized citizenship rules governing foreign permanent residents as well as foreign nationals with Bruneian spouses.

CAMBODIA February 10. Opposition Leader Returns from Exile. Sam Rainsy, leader of the Sam Rainsy Party, returns to Cambodia after receiving a royal pardon for having defamed Prime Minister Hun Sen and Prince Norodom Ranariddh. Rainsy, sentenced to 18 months in prison in December 2005, had spent the previous year in France. March 2. Constitutional Amendment Passes. The National Assembly amends the constitution, reducing from two-thirds to a simple majority the level of lower house support required for formation of new governments. Prime Minister Hun Sen, of the majority Cambodian People’s Party, proceeds to dismiss two key ministers from the Funcinpec Party of Prince Norodom Ranariddh, prompting Ranariddh’s resignation as assembly speaker on March 3. July 3. Tribunal Judges Sworn In. Seventeen Cambodian and 10 UN-named foreign judges are sworn in to begin preparations for trying former Khmer Rouge leaders. July 21. Ta Mok Dies. A principal Khmer Rouge commander, Ta Mok (Chhit Choeun) dies in custody while awaiting trial for crimes committed in 1975–1979. October 18. Funcinpec Ousts Prince. An extraordinary congress of Cambodia’s royalist Funcinpec Party removes Prince Norodom Ranariddh from the presidency and names as his successor Keo Puth Rasmey, ambassador to Germany. October 24. National Assembly Approves New Deputy Prime Minister. Keo Puth Rasmey, new leader of the Funcinpec Party, becomes a deputy prime minister. October 26. Government Approves Conscription. Despite international pressure to reduce its armed forces, the Cambodian government

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approves mandatory military conscription for men between 18 and 30.

CHINA: PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA September 12. IMF States Monetary Concerns. The International Monetary Fund warns of potentially adverse global consequences if China does not revalue the undervalued yuan and speed up currency liberalization.

May 6–13. Fiji Holds Parliamentary Elections. The United Fiji Party, led by Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase, wins 36 of 70 seats in the House of Representatives, leading to Qarase’s redesignation as prime minister on May 18. December 5. Army Stages Coup. Following a tense period of discussions with the government, Cmdr. Frank Bainimarama leads a coup that deposes Prime Minister Qarase. December 7. Interim Prime Minister Takes Office. Jona Senilagakali, named by self-proclaimed Interim President Bainimarama to head an interim government, takes office.

CHINA: TAIWAN January 17. Premier Resigns. Premier Frank Hsieh announces his resignation following losses by his Democratic Progressive Party in the December 2005 local elections. January 25. New Premier Assumes Office. Su Tseng-chang, appointed by President Chen Shuibian on January 19, takes office as prime minister and reshuffles the cabinet. November 3. Corruption Scandal Touches Presidency. Prosecutors file corruption charges for misuse of $450,000 in government funds against the first lady, Wu Shu-chen, as well as three former presidential aides. Presidential immunity shields President Chen from charges, although calls for his resignation escalate. He again declares his innocence. November 24. Third Recall Vote Falls Short. As on June 27 and October 13, an effort by the opposition to recall President Chen fails to obtain the necessary two-thirds vote in the national legislature. December 15. Wu Shu-chen Trial Opens. The president’s wife pleads innocent to forgery and embezzlement charges as her corruption trial opens.

FIJI March 8. Chiefs Hold Presidential Election. Fiji’s Great Council of Chiefs reelects Ratu Josefa Iloilo as president and Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi as vice president.

FRANCE: RELATED TERRITORIES June 26–27. France-Oceania Summit Held in Paris. Pacific “overseas countries” French Polynesia and New Caledonia are among the participants at a Paris conference at which French President Jacques Chirac pledges France’s continuing economic, political, and environmental assistance to the Pacific region.

GEORGIA June 13–14. Georgian and Russian Presidents Confer. Presidents Mikhail Saakashvili and Vladimir Putin, meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia, fail to make progress on issues that include the South Ossetia and Abkhazia separatist conflicts. September 27. Georgia Accuses Russians of Spying. Georgia detains four Russian officers on the charge of spying. In response, Russia begins a partial evacuation of its staff and citizens in Georgia and recalls its ambassador. Russia also stops issuing visas to Georgian nationals. Russia later refuses to lift any of the sanctions it imposed, even after Georgia hands over the detained Russians. December 22. Gas Prices Double. In an ongoing dispute, Gazprom, Russia’s government-controlled gas monopoly, confirms that in 2007 it will supply natural gas to Georgia at double the previous price.

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INDIA

JAPAN

January 29. Prime Minister Announces First Major Cabinet Reshuffle. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh undertakes a cabinet reshuffle, his first since taking office in May 2004, that includes ten new ministers and a dozen ministers of state. March 2. United States and India Complete Nuclear Agreement. During a visit to India by U.S. President George W. Bush, Washington and New Delhi complete an agreement on sharing civilian nuclear technology and fuel even though India is not a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. June 26. Government Dismisses Pakistani Proposal for Kashmir. A spokesman confirms that the government has rejected proposals, including “joint management,” by Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf for the future status of Kashmir. July 11. Terrorists Attack Commuters. Coordinated bombings of commuter stations and rushhour trains in Mumbai (Bombay), India, kill 180 people and injure another 800. Kashmiri Islamic militants are suspected. Three days later, Prime Minister Singh accuses Pakistan-based “elements” of involvement.

September 20. Abe Wins Presidency of Liberal Democratic Party. With Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi having announced his decision to step down after five years in office, Shinzo Abe is elected president of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, ensuring his election as prime minister. September 26. Legislature Elects Abe as Prime Minister. By vote of the Diet, Shinzo Abe becomes prime minister of Japan. October 11. Japan Announces New North Korea Sanctions. Responding to North Korea’s October 9 underground nuclear weapons test, Japan announces unilateral sanctions. Steps include banning all imports from North Korea and preventing its ships from entering Japanese ports.

INDONESIA January 26. Government Presents Aceh Autonomy Bill. Following up on negotiations completed in 2005, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono introduces a 206-article draft law on autonomy for Aceh Province. May 27. Earthquake Kills Hundreds. Some 5,800 people are killed, 20,000 injured, and 200,000 left homeless when a 5.8 magnitude earthquake strikes a heavily populated region south of Yogyakarta. July 11. Autonomy Statute Passes. The House of Representatives votes unanimously in favor of a final Aceh autonomy bill, ending a three-decadelong struggle for independence by the Free Aceh Movement. July 17. Earthquake and Tsunami Strike. Over 650 people die as a devastating tsunami caused by a 7.7 magnitude earthquake strikes south of Java.

KAZAKHSTAN January 19. Parliament Approves Reshuffled Cabinet. Parliament confirms a revamped cabinet headed by Prime Minister Daniyal Akhmetov, who had been renominated by President Nursultan Nazarbayev following the December 4, 2005, presidential election. February 13. Opposition Figure Is Assassinated. Assassins shoot Altynbek Sarsenbayev, a leading critic of the Nazarbayev regime. Members of the antiterrorism unit of the National Security Committee (KNB) are arrested a week later, prompting the resignations of the KNB chief as well as the head of the antiterrorism unit on February 22. In August ten individuals are convicted of plotting the assassination. May 6–7. U.S. Vice President Visits. During a visit U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney describes Kazakhstan as “a good friend and a key strategic partner in many areas.” June 18. Kazakhstan Enters Space Age. Kazakhstan launches its first communications satellite from the Baykonur space center. September 8. Central Asian States Sign NuclearFree Treaty. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan create the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

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KIRIBATI

KOREA: REPUBLIC OF KOREA

March 28. Government Establishes Marine Reserve. Kiribati announces establishment of the Phoenix Islands Protected Area (PIPA), the world’s third largest marine reserve, in order to conserve the coral that is essential to tourism in the islands.

March 14. Prime Minister Resigns. Prime Minister Lee Hae Chan of the Uri Party announces his resignation; Han Duck Soo is named the interim prime minister. April 19. Legislature Confirms New Prime Minister. The Uri Party’s Han Myung-Sook, having been nominated on March 24, becomes the first female prime minister of South Korea. May 31. Governing Party Trounced at Local Elections. President Roh Moo Hyun’s Uri Party loses all seven major mayoral races as well as eight of nine gubernatorial contests in local elections. October 13. Security Council Supports South Korea’s Foreign Minister as Next UN Secretary General. The UN Security Council endorses Ban Ki Moon as successor to outgoing Secretary General Kofi Annan. December 14. Ban Ki Moon Takes Oath. Ban Ki Moon, who officially assumes the duties of UN secretary general on January 1, 2007, is sworn in.

KOREA: DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA July 5. DPRK Conducts Missile Tests. North Korea test fires seven missiles over the Sea of Japan, including one long-range missile that failed shortly after lift-off. July 15. UN Condemns North Korea. The UN Security Council unanimously passes Resolution 1695, condemning North Korea’s missile launchings and demanding that the country suspend its ballistic missile program. The resolution also prohibits UN members from handing over or trading any missile-related supplies or technology to North Korea. October 9. DPRK Conducts First Underground Nuclear Weapons Test. After days of threats, North Korea conducts its first nuclear test, provoking widespread international condemnation. October 14. UN Sanctions North Korea. In a unanimous vote, the UN Security Council imposes trade and travel sanctions on North Korea in response to its nuclear weapons test. October 31. Pyongyang Indicates Willingness to Resume Nuclear Talks. North Korea releases a statement in which it agrees to return to six-party talks (with China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and the United States) on the termination of its nuclear program. December 18. Six-Party Talks Resume in Beijing, China. North Korea returns to the negotiating table but demands that the U.S. Bush administration remove financial restrictions before discussing its nuclear weapons program. The session concludes after five days without having made progress.

KYRGYZSTAN May 2. Government Ministers Resign. Thirteen cabinet ministers submit their resignations in response to an April 28 resolution in parliament accusing them of poor job performance. President Kurmanbek Bakiyev rejects the resignations but, a week later, undertakes a cabinet shuffle. September 8. Central Asian States Sign NuclearFree Treaty. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan create the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. November 2. Opposition Demands Constitutional Changes. The opposition initiates largescale demonstrations demanding that the government undertake constitutional reform. November 9. President Signs Revised Constitution. A day after reaching agreement with the opposition on reform of key institutions, President Bakiyev signs the amended constitution, which gives greater authority to the Supreme Council. December 19. Cabinet Resigns. Prime Minister Felix Kulov and his entire cabinet resign but

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR ASIA EVENTS, 2006

continue to perform in an acting capacity, pending approval of a new Council of Ministers. The resignations come in the midst of a continuing dispute over the recently revised constitution and efforts by propresidential legislators to restore presidential powers. December 30. Legislators Approve Increase in President’s Authority. With the opposition boycotting the vote, Kyrgyzstan’s legislature votes to restore a number of presidential powers, including appointment of the prime minister and government.

LAOS March 21. Party Leadership Changes. The Eighth Congress of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, held March 18–21, names Vice President Choummaly Sayasone to replace Khamtay Siphandone as party chief. April 30. Laos Holds Parliamentary Elections. The ruling Lao People’s Revolutionary Party wins 113 seats and independents win 2 seats in the National Assembly. June 8. New National Leadership Assumes Office. With Khamtay Siphandone having announced his retirement as president, the National Assembly elects Vice President Choummaly Sayasone as his successor. Former Prime Minister Bounnhang Vorachit becomes vice president, and Bouasone Bouphavanh is named prime minister.

MALAYSIA February 14. Prime Minister Reshuffles Cabinet. Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi conducts the first cabinet reshuffle in nearly two years. April 12. Bridge Construction Stops. Malaysia unilaterally announces the termination of plans to build a new bridge link to Singapore. Singapore’s demands of sand for land reclamation and airspace access spark the stoppage. December 13. New Head of State Takes Office. Paramount Ruler Sultan Mizan Zainal Abidin ibni al-Mahun Sultan Mahmud takes office for a fiveyear term. He was elected from among and by the nine hereditary rulers of Peninsular Malaysia

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on November 3 after having served as deputy paramount ruler since February 1999.

MALDIVES March 27. President Unveils Reform Schedule. President Abdul Gayoom presents a “roadmap for the reform agenda,” which includes a June 2007 target date for completing a new constitution, to be followed by multiparty parliamentary elections in October 2008. September 21. Opposition Leader Released. The government releases from house arrest the leader of the opposition Maldivian Democratic Party, Mohamed Nasheed, whose trial for terrorism and sedition was adjourned in June.

MARSHALL ISLANDS April 11. Bikini Atoll Files Suit. Bikini files a $560 million lawsuit against the United States, claiming compensation for nuclear weapons testing in the 1940s and 1950s. Although that sum had been awarded in 2001 by the U.S.-backed Marshall Islands Nuclear Claims Tribunal, the award has yet to be paid because of inadequate funding.

FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA June 26. Appellate Judges Dismiss Lawsuit against President Urusemal. The appellate branch of the Supreme Court dismisses a lawsuit brought against President Urusemal. The Congress had questioned his use of the veto against bills whose passage, he claimed, failed to follow constitutional procedures. The judges conclude that the president’s reasoning behind use of the veto is not subject to judicial review.

MONGOLIA January 13. State Great Hural Dissolves Government. The legislature votes to dissolve the government of Democratic Party leader Tsakhiagiyn

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Elbegdorj after all ten ministers from the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) announced their resignations. January 25. New Government Takes Office. Parliament elects as prime minister the MPRP’s Miyeegombo Enkhbold, who proceeds to form a fiveparty cabinet. September 3. MPRP Secures Legislative Majority. A by-election victory by the MPRP gives it 39 seats in the 76-seat State Great Hural.

MYANMAR (BURMA) March 27. Government Celebrates Armed Forces Day at New Capital. Myanmar’s military junta holds its first major public event at recently inaugurated administrative capital Naypyidaw, near Pyinmana. May 27. Junta Renews Detention Order. Despite international objections, the government renews Aung San Suu Kyi’s detention order. The Nobel Prize–winning rights advocate has been under house arrest since September 2003. September 29. Security Council Discusses Human Rights. The UN Security Council, for the first time, addresses concerns about Myanmar’s human rights record, the narcotics trade, and other matters.

NAURU December 3. Newspapers Report Pending Departure of Asylum-Seeker. Australian newspapers confirm that the last person held since 2001 on Nauru as part of Australia’s “Pacific Solution” will be resettled in Scandinavia. Mohammed Sagar, an Iraqi, is one of some 1,500 people who attempted to enter Australia illegally by boat in 2001.

NEPAL January 2. Maoists End Cease-fire. Maoist rebels end a four-month unilateral cease-fire, citing the government’s lack of response. April 24. King Reinstates Parliament. Following weeks of antigovernment demonstrations in Kathmandu, during which the police and army some-

times fired into crowds of protesters, King Gyanendra agrees to reinstate the House of Representatives nearly four years after he dissolved it. He further calls on the seven-party opposition alliance to assume a leadership role. April 30. New Prime Minister Assumes Office. Girija Prasad Koirala, president of the Nepali Congress Party and the consensus choice of the seven-party alliance, becomes the new prime minister. May 18. House of Representatives Takes Power. The reconvened House assumes all legislative authority, removes various monarchical powers, and delegates executive authority to a Council of Ministers. June 16. Koirala and Prachanda Hold First Meeting. The prime minister and Maoist leader Comrade Prachanda meet face-to-face for the first time. Discussions conclude with an eight-point agreement that includes a commitment to holding elections for a constituent assembly that will draft a new constitution. November 7. Government and Insurgents Sign Peace Accord. A peace agreement calls for inclusion of the Maoists in an interim government and interim legislature. December 16. Parties Reach Accord on Interim Constitution. The government parties and the Maoists agree on a draft that would assign the prime minister full executive powers. December 24. Interim Constitution to Be Promulgated. The government and the Maoists agree to promulgate the interim constitution once ceasefire monitors from abroad are in place.

NEW ZEALAND May 2. Former Attorney General Rejoins Cabinet. David Parker, who stepped down as attorney general and minister for transport, energy, and climate change in late March 2006, returns to the cabinet as energy and climate change minister after having been cleared of allegations that he had filed false business returns. August 4. New Governor General Assumes Office. Anand Satyanand, who had previously served

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR ASIA EVENTS, 2006

as national ombudsman, takes the oath of office as the queen’s representative, succeeding Dame Silvia Cartwright.

NEW ZEALAND RELATED TERRITORY: COOK ISLANDS July 25. Queen’s Representative Dissolves Parliament. With the opposition Cook Islands Party having won a July 19 by-election, putting it in control of 13 seats in the 25-member Parliament, Queen’s Representative Sir Frederick Goodwin calls an early election at the request of Prime Minister Jim Marurai. September 26. Prime Minister Claims Election Victory. Prime Minister Marurai’s Democratic Party wins 14 parliamentary seats in legislative balloting.

NEW ZEALAND RELATED TERRITORY: TOKELAU February 11–15. Voters Reject Draft Free Association Treaty. Although a majority of Tokelau’s voters approve a referendum on free association with New Zealand, the 349–242 tally fails to achieve the required two-thirds majority. Treaty opponents had questioned New Zealand’s continuing financial commitment under such an arrangement.

PACIFIC COMMUNITY (PC) November 13–16. Committee of Representatives Meets. The 36th meeting of the Committee of Representatives of Governments and Administrations convenes in Noum´ea, New Caledonia.

PACIFIC ISLAND FORUM (PIF) October 24–25. Fiji Hosts PIF. At its 37th session, the Pacific Islands Forum, meeting in Nadi, Fiji, approves associate membership for New Caledonia and French Polynesia.

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PAKISTAN May 14. Former Rival Prime Ministers Meet in London. Former prime ministers Benazir Bhutto and Mohammad Nawaz Sharif, meeting in London, sign a “Charter of Democracy” as a prelude to the legislative campaign scheduled for 2007. June 24. President Offers Proposals for Kashmir. President Pervez Musharraf proposes that the future of a demilitarized Kashmir might involve self-government and “joint management” by Pakistan and India. August 29. No-Confidence Vote Fails. A noconfidence motion brought against Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz over alleged government mismanagement fails, gaining only 136 of the 172 votes needed to pass in the 342-seat National Assembly. September 5. Central Government Signs Accord in Tribal Area. Islamabad and tribal leaders in North Waziristan sign an agreement that includes the withdrawal of some 7,000 army personnel and an amnesty for Taliban leaders. October 30. Troops Raid Militant School. Pakistani troops, aided by air support, raid a madrasah near the Afghan border, killing 80 students. The government claims the school was an al-Qaida facility; however, locals express outrage at the murder of civilians.

PALAU September 3. First Taiwan-Pacific Summit Opens. Palau’s president, Tommy Remengesau, hosts the First Taiwan-Pacific Summit. Leaders of five other Pacific countries that recognize the Republic of China—Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu—also participate. October 1. Government Relocates to New Capital. Palau officially moves its capital from Koror to Melekeok, on Babeldaob.

PAPUA NEW GUINEA July 6. Prime Minister Undertakes Major Cabinet Reshuffle. Following less significant cabinet

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reshuffles in April and June, Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare announces a more comprehensive overhaul. His son, Arthur Somare, who had resigned as minister of planning and monitoring in March over misconduct allegations, returns to the cabinet as minister of state enterprise and information. November 15. Prime Minister Takes Steps to Mend Relations with Australia. To clear the way for an investigation into assistance rendered to Australian fugitive Julian Moti in his effort to evade prosecution at home for alleged child sex offenses, Prime Minister Somare suspends three senior officials. In addition, he assigns the foreign affairs portfolio to Trade Minister Paul Tiensten “to reestablish dialogue and mend relations between the PNG and Australian people.”

PHILIPPINES February 24. President Declares State of Emergency. Philippine President Gloria MacapagalArroyo declares a state of emergency with the announcement that her government has foiled an alleged coup attempt by elements of the military. The state of emergency remains in effect until March 3. August 24. Impeachment Motion Fails. An impeachment motion brought against President Macapagal-Arroyo in the House of Representatives falls far short of the one-third vote necessary for referral to the Senate.

SAMOA March 31. Government Wins Reelection. In parliamentary elections the governing Human Rights Protection Party of Prime Minister Tuila’epa Sailele Malielegaoi wins 33 seats, the Samoa Democratic United Party wins 10, and independents win the other 6.

SINGAPORE May 5. Government Wins Parliamentary Elections. The People’s Action Party wins 82 of 84 seats

in Parliament, with the remaining seats going to the Workers’ Party and the Singapore Democratic Alliance. December 16. Government Authorizes Early Prison Release for Opposition Politician. Chee Soon Juan, leader of the Singapore Democratic Party, leaves prison after serving three weeks of a five-week sentence. He had refused to pay a fine for speaking in public without a permit during the parliamentary campaign in April. He continues to face other court action, including a defamation suit brought against him by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and former prime minister Lee Kuan Yew.

SOLOMON ISLANDS April 5. Parliamentary Elections Are Held. Candidates affiliated with the Association of Independent Members of Parliament (AIMP) reportedly win 30 of the 50 parliamentary seats. April 18. Rini Elected Prime Minister. Former deputy prime minister Snyder Rini of the AIMP is elected prime minister in a contest against Job Dudley Tausinga of the Solomon Islands Party for Rural Advancement and former prime minister Manasseh Sogavare of the Solomon Islands Social Credit Party. Rini’s election is greeted by rioting in the capital. April 26. Rini Resigns. Prime Minister Rini, facing a no-confidence vote in the National Parliament, steps down. May 3. Parliament Elects Former Prime Minister. Manasseh Sogavare is elected prime minister and sworn in the same day. September 12. Australian High Commissioner Asked to Leave. Prime Minister Sogavare declares Australian High Commissioner Patrick Cole persona non grata, apparently for criticizing an inquiry into the April riots. October 11. No-Confidence Vote Fails. Prime Minister Sogavare easily survives a no-confidence vote brought by opposition leader Fred Fono. Within days, two ministers resign and Sogavare reshuffles his cabinet.

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR ASIA EVENTS, 2006

SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION (SAARC) March 22. SAFTA Enters into Effect. The SAARC Secretariat announces that with all members having deposited instruments of ratification, the Agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) has entered into force. The first round of customs duty reductions are slated for July– August.

SRI LANKA February 22–23. Talks Stall. Talks between the government and the rebel Tamil Tigers stall amid frequent cease-fire violations, including suicide bombings, assassinations, and military engagements. September 4. Sri Lankan Army Captures Eastern Town. In a setback for the Tamil Tigers, the town of Sampur, near the major port of Trincomalee, falls to the army as the country teeters on the edge of renewed open warfare. October 30. Peace Talks Falter. Peace talks in Switzerland between the government and the Tamil Tigers break off. Fighting resumes.

TAJIKISTAN September 8. Central Asian States Sign Nuclear Free Pact. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan create the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. November 6. Incumbent President Wins Reelection. With the opposition divided, President Imomali Rakhmonov gains 79% of the vote against four other candidates and wins a third term. December 16. New Cabinet Takes Office. A new cabinet, headed by returning Prime Minister Oqil Oqilov, receives parliamentary approval.

THAILAND April 2. Opposition Boycotts Election. Thailand’s three main opposition parties boycott legislative elections that amount to a referendum on

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Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. His party wins 61 percent of valid votes; 38 percent of voters abstain. April 5. Thaksin Names Acting Prime Minister. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, having announced on April 4 that he would not accept reappointment, names Deputy Prime Minister Chitchai Wannasathit as acting prime minister. May 8. Court Nullifies Election. Thailand’s Constitutional Court declares the April 2 elections invalid and calls for new elections. May 23. Thaksin Returns to Office. Thaksin Shinawatra reassumes post of prime minister, in an acting capacity. September 19. Military Topples Government. A military coup led by Gen. Sondhi Boonyaratglin overthrows Prime Minister Thaksin, who is at the United Nations in New York at the time. October 1. King Names Retired General as Interim Prime Minister. Gen. Surayud Chulanot takes over as head of government, while General Sondhi continues as chair of a Council of National Security, pending elections tentatively scheduled for October 2007. October 9. Interim Government Takes Office. An interim civilian government is sworn in under Prime Minister Surayud. December 31. Bomb Blasts Bangkok. Eight small bombs explode in the capital, killing at least three people and wounding nearly 40 others. The government tightens security and places blame on supporters of ousted prime minister Thaksin.

TIMOR-LESTE (EAST TIMOR) January 12. Australia and Timor-Leste Sign Accord. Timor-Leste and Australia sign the Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea (CMATS), under which they are to share equally revenue from the Greater Sunrise hydrocarbon field. The agreement raises Timor-Leste’s share from 18% but postpones resolution of an underlying border dispute for 50 years. April 28. Demonstrations Turn Violent. Violence erupts in Dili, the capital, during demonstrations involving soldiers who had been dismissed

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after leaving their barracks in February to protest discrimination. Continuing gang violence and clashes between elements of the armed forces and police persist. May 25. International Contingents Begin Arriving. In response to a May 24 request from Foreign Minister Jos´e Ramos-Horta, the first of some 2,500 military personnel from Australia, New Zealand, Portugal, and Malaysia begin arriving to help calm the civil disturbances that, by late June, have claimed some 40 lives. June 22. President Threatens to Resign. President Xanana Gusm˜ao threatens to resign if Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri does not step down. June 26. Prime Minister Resigns. Prime Minister Alkatiri resigns under pressure, accepting “my own share of responsibility” for the recent civil crisis. July 8. President Chooses New Prime Minister. President Gusm˜ao nominates former foreign minister Jos´e Ramos-Horta as prime minister. Sworn in on July 10, Ramos-Horta announces his cabinet on July 14. August 25. UN Security Council Calls for New Support Mission. The Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1704, which authorizes a new UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) as successor to the UN Office on TimorLeste (UNOTIL). The UNMIT mission includes supporting the restoration of civil order and the democratic process, aiding institutional capacitybuilding, and assisting the distribution of economic aid.

TONGA February 11. Prime Minister Resigns. Prime Minister Prince ‘Ulukalala Lavaka Ata announces his resignation after six years in office. March 31. King Confirms Prime Minister. Feleti Sevele, a commoner who had been serving in an acting capacity since his predecessor’s resignation in February, becomes permanent prime minister. May 16. Prime Minister Sevele Reshuffles Cabinet. As part of a major cabinet reshuffle, the prime minister names Tonga’s first female cabinet mem-

ber to the post of minister of justice and attorney general. September 11. King Tupou IV Dies. King Taufa’ahau Tupou IV, 88, dies in an Auckland, New Zealand, hospital. He is succeeded by a son, Crown Prince Tupouto’a.

TURKMENISTAN September 8. Central Asian States Sign Nuclear Free Pact. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan create the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. December 21. President Dies Unexpectedly. Turkmenistan’s autocratic leader, President Saparmurad Niyazov, 66, succumbs to a heart attack, leaving a leadership vacuum. Deputy Prime Minister Gurbanguly Berdimuhhamedow (Kurbanduly Berdymuhhamedov) assumes the role of acting head of state. December 26. People’s Council Sets Presidential Election for February 11, 2007. The country’s highest legislative body amends the constitution to permit Acting President Berdimuhhamedow to run in a February 2007 presidential election. The legislature also approves five other, relatively obscure candidates—none of them opposition figures—for the ballot.

TUVALU August 3. Parliament Holds Elections. Eight of 15 sitting members of Parliament, including all members of the cabinet except Prime Minister Maatia Toafa, lose reelection bids in the general election August 14. Legislators Choose New Prime Minister. The new Parliament elects Apisai Ielemia as the new prime minister.

UNITED STATES RELATED TERRITORY: GUAM November 7. Gubernatorial Election Results Favor Incumbent; Republicans Control Senate.

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR ASIA EVENTS, 2006

The election for governor between the incumbent Republican, Felix Camacho, and Democratic challenger Robert Underwood concludes with Camacho holding a narrow lead. Republicans achieve an 8–7 majority in the Senate. December 20. Supreme Court Rules for Incumbent. The Guam Supreme Court, ruling that some 500 disputed ballots should be regarded as spoiled, confirms Governor Camacho’s November 7 reelection.

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VANUATU March 1. Prime Minister Shuffles Cabinet. Prime Minister Ham Lini dismisses former prime minister Barak Sope from the cabinet for allegedly trying to engineer the government’s defeat. March 21. Vote of No Confidence Fails. Prime Minister Lini easily defeats a vote of no confidence, 30–20, in the Parliament.

VIETNAM UZBEKISTAN January 25. Uzbekistan joins Eurasian Grouping. Uzbekistan joins the Eurasian Economic Community, whose other members are Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan. March 6. Opposition Leader Sentenced. Sanjar Umarov, leader of the opposition Sunny Coalition, is sentenced to a prison term of 11 years. September 8. Central Asian States Sign Nuclear Free Pact. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan create the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

April 18–25. Communist Party Congress Meets. The Tenth Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party reappoints General Secretary Nong Duc Manh and confirms the departure from the leadership of President Tran Duc Luong and Prime Minister Phan Van Khai, presaging their retirement from national office. June 27. National Assembly Elects New Leaders. Vietnam’s legislature, as expected, elects economic reformer Nguyen Minh Triet as president and confirms Nguyen Tan Dung as prime minister. November 7. Vietnam Joins the WTO. The World Trade Organization admits Vietnam as its 150th member.

APPENDIX B: SERIALS LIST

The Annual Register Asian News Digest The Boston Globe The Christian Science Monitor The Economist Editor & Publisher International The Europa World Year Book Facts on File Financial Times IMF Article IV Reports IMF Balance of Payments Statistics IMF Direction of Trade Statistics IMF Government Finance Statistics IMF International Financial Statistics IMF Survey IMF World Economic Outlook Indian Ocean Newsletter Keesing’s Record of World Events Middle East International Middle East Journal Middle East Policy

Middle East Report Middle East Studies Association Bulletin Middle Eastern Studies Le Monde (Paris) The New York Times People in Power Permanent Missions to the United Nations Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty UN Chronicle UN Handbook UN Population and Vital Statistics Report UN Statistical Yearbook UNESCO Statistician Yearbook US CIA Heads of State and Cabinet Members US Department of State, Diplomatic List The Washington Post Willings Press Guide World Bank Atlas World Bank Country Reports World Development Report

INDEX

Entries of only a single page number, and the first number in a multiple-page entry, indicate the first or primary reference to that individual. Additional page numbers typically indicate first references in a different section of a profile or in a closely related profile. ABAD, Florencio, 598 ABASHIDZE, Aslan, 231 ABDILDIN, Serikbolsyn, 338, 346 ABDULLAH, Farooq, 274 ABDULLAH, Mohammed, 274 ABDULLAH, Omar, 274 ABDULLAH, Ramli Haji, 141 ABDULLAH, Zaini, 307 ABDULLAH bin Ahmad Badawi, 419, 421, 426, 427 ABDULLOJONOV, Abdughani, 671 ABDULLOJONOV, Abdumalik, 668 ABDUL RAHMAN, Tunku, 418, 426 ABDUL RAZAK, bin Hussein, 418 ABDUR RAHMAN, Shah, 30 ABE, Shinzo, 324, 327 ABEYGUNASE-KERA, Ossie, 641 ABHISIT Vejjajiva, 688, 695 ABILOV, Bulat, 345 ABILOV, Kerrar, 101 ABIUT, Roger, 757 ABLYAZOV, Mukhtar, 338 ABU Bakar Mustapha, Abang, 428 ABULADZE, Tengiz, 242 ABULLA, Arkhan, 179 ABYKAYEV, Nurtay, 348 ABYLKASYMOV, Yerasyl, 341, 346 ACHAKZAI, Mahmood Khan, 556 ACHARYA, Madhu Raman, 511 ACHARYA, Sailaja, 502 ADA, Joseph F., 750 ADAIKALANATHAN, Selvan, 657 ADAMIA, Revaz, 245 ADAMIA, Vaja, 243 ADEANG, David, 490 ADEANG, Kennan Ranibok, 486 ADENAN bin Satem, 428 ADHIKARI, Garima, 135 ADHIKARI, Hari Prasad, 135 ADHIKARI, Man Mohan, 494 ADHIKARI, Naradmani, 135 ADVANI, Lal Krishna, 250, 267 ADZHIBEKOVA, Klara, 401 AFEEF, Hassan, 444

AFFANDI (AFANDY), Muhammad Yassin, 141 AFRIDI, Latif, 555 AFZALI, Azam, 679 AGAMALY, Fazail, 101 AGARWAL, Naresh, 275 AGAZADA, Iqbal, 104 AGCAOILI, Fidel, 602 AGUJA, Mario, 601 AHADI, Anwar al-Haq, 48 AHAMED, Z. A. Nazeer, 659 AHMAD, Amir Qazi Hussain, 553 AHMAD, Hafiz Hussein, 552 AHMAD, Maidin Haji, 141 AHMAD, Masood, 275 AHMAD, Qari, 45 AHMAD, Qazi Hussain, 552 AHMADI, Qari Yousuf, 50 AHMADOV, Ali, 101 AHMADOV, Jabrail, 100 AHMADZAY, Ahmad Shah, 43, 44 AHMADZAY, Shahpur, 35 AHMED, Afaq, 556 AHMED, E., 266 AHMED, Fakhruddin Ali, 249 AHMED, Iajuddin, 109, 115 AHMED, Kazi Aref, 123 AHMED, Kazi Zafar, 112 AHMED, Khandakar Moshtaque, 110, 119 AHMED, Moudud, 112 AHMED, Muzaffar, 122 AHMED, Sayed Zafar, 123 AHMED, Shahabuddin, 112 AHMEDOV, Abulfaz, 105 AHMEDOV, Ramiz, 105 AHSAN, Chaudhry Aitzaz, 551 AISHWARYA, Queen, 494 AISI, Robert Guba, 583 AITCHISON, Neville, 524 AITIKEYEV, Akbaraly, 404 AITMATOV, Askar, 398 AIYAR, Mani Shankar, 258 AKAYEV, Askar A., 393, 394 AKAYEVA, Bermet, 402

AKBARI, Ustad Mohammad, 44 AKBAROV, Azamjam, 406 AKHAPOL Sorasuchart, 696 AKHMETOV, Daniyal, 337, 338 AKHMETZHAN, Bakhytbek, 345 AKHUND, Mohammed Hassan, 37 AKIHITO, Crown Prince, 315 AKILOV, Akil, 667 AKISHINO, Prince, 323 AKMATABAYEV, Ryspek, 399 AKMATALIYEV, Temirbek, 402 AKMATOV, Kazat, 402 AKRAM, Munir, 562 ALAM, Mahbub, 124 ALAM, Masrat, 278 ALAM, Maulana Muhammad, 559 ALEBUA, Ezekiel, 630, 635 ALESANA, Tofilau Eti, 611, 612 ALEX, David, 703 ALEXANDER, Marc, 524 ALI, Alhaj Zamir, 121 ALI, M. T. Hasen, 659 ALI, Suryadarma, 301 ALI, Thasmeen, 442 ALI, Tofazzal, 120 ALIEV, Ali Nader, 104 ALI SAIFUDDIN, Omar, 138, 139 ALIUDDIN Mohamad Tahir, 430 ALIYEV, Chynybek, 405 ALIYEV, Emil, 401 ALIYEV, Heydar, 93, 95 ALIYEV, Hurru, 105 ALIYEV, Ilham, 93, 97, 101 ALIYEV, Mubariz, 105 ALIYEV, Mukhtar, 344 ALIYEV, Yashar, 107 ALIYEVA, Mehriban, 101 ALIZADE, Araz, 104 ALIZADE, Mammad, 105 ALKATIRI, Mar´ı, 703, 706, 710 ALLISON, Lyn, 83 ALMATOV, Shokirjon, 748 ALONTO, Tahir, 605 ALP, Kelvyn, 524

866

INDEX

ALSHIMBAYEV, Zeynulla, 345 AMANULLAH, Emir, 31 AMARAKITHTHI Thera, Katapola, 657 AMARAL, Francisco Xavier do, 706, 711 AMARAL, Le˜ao Pedro dos Reis, 711 AMARASINGHE, Somawansa, 655 AMARATUNGA, Chanaka, 659 AMARJARGAL, Rinchinnyamiin, 457 AMATYA, Tulsi Lal, 505 AMBEDKAR, Bhimrao Ramji, 266 AMIN, Hafizullah, 32 AMINI, Fazlul Huq, 119 AMINUDDIN bin Ami, 625 AMIRBEK, Atobek, 675 AMIRTHALINGAM, Appapillai, 655 AMMA, K. R. Gowri, 277 AMPATUAN, Zaldy, 604 AMSAA Alla Pilchay, 434 ANAM, Choirul, 302 ANANDASANGARI, Veerasingham, 656 ANAND Panyarachun, 685 ANDANG, Ghalib, 606 ANDENG, Amos, 758 ANDERSON, John, 79 ANDERTON, James (Jim), 515, 519 ANEK Laothammathat, 696 ANGARA, Edgardo, 587, 599 ANG DUONG, King, 144 ANSARI, Maulana Muhammad Abbas, 278 ANTONINO, Rodolfo, 598 ANTONY, A. K., 262 ANWAR, Tariq, 264 ANWAR Ibrahim, 420, 433 ANWARI, Hosayn, 48 AOKI, Mikio, 317, 327 APANG, Gegong, 275 APANG, Omak, 275 APPLEBY, Michael, 524 AQUINO, Agapito “Butz,” 599 AQUINO, Benigno, III, 598 AQUINO, Benigno S., Jr., 586 AQUINO, Corazon, 584, 586 ARAI, Hiroyuki, 331 ARARKTSIAN, Babken, 58, 69 ARAUJO, Ab´ılio, 711 ´ ARAUJO, Fernando de, 710 ARDZINBA, Vladislav, 229 ARIFF, Ibrahim, 627 ARIFOGLU, Rauf, 103 ARIKI, Travel Tou, 530 AROI, Kenas, 486 ARROYO, Joker, 587 ARSENIAN, Gurgen, 67 ARSENISHVILI, Gia, 231 ARSHAKIAN, Azat, 67 ARTHIT Kamlang-Ek, 685 ARTIKOGLU, Hussein, 105 ARTYKOV, Anvar, 401 ARYAL, Laxman Prasad, 500 ARYAN, Abdul Rashid, 48

ARZOUMANIAN, Alexander, 68 ASADOV, Oqtay, 101, 106 ASADUZZAMAN, Mohammad, 122 ASAHARA, Shoko, 316 ASANG LAOLY, 414 ASANOV, Bektur, 405 ASATIANI, Akaki, 238 ASEFI, Homayun Shah, 48 ASHOK, Dinanath, 508 ASHRAFF, Ferial, 652 ASHRAFF, Mohamed H. M., 658 ASHURKULOV, Misir, 400 ASIATA Saleimoa Va’ai, 615 ASIF, Qari Mohammed, 558 ASIMOV, Usman, 731 ASLONOV, Kadreddin, 668 ASLOV, Sirodjidin M., 681 ASO, Taro, 324, 327 ASTILL, Barbara, 522 ASYLBEK, Amantay-Haji, 347 ATAEVA, Aksoltan T., 736 ATAMBAYEV, Almaz, 399, 405 ATAPUTHARAJAH, Nadarajah, 653 ATAYEV, Ovezgeldi, 729 ATEF, Mohammed, 51 ATHAWALE, Ramdas, 266 ATHUALLAH, Ahamed Lebbe Marikkan, 651 ATHULATHMUDALI, Lalith, 642, 660 ATHULATHMUDALI, Srimani Lalith, 660 ATIENZA, Jose, Jr., 598 ATKIN, Mark, 524 ATOPARE, Silas, 571 ATTANAYAKE, Tissa, 654 ATTIQUE AHMED, Sardar, 563 AU, Stanley, 187 AU Chong Kit, 187 AUKUSO, Toi, 612 AUNG GYI, 479 AUNG SAN, 472 AUNG SAN SUU KYI, 472, 480 AUNG SHWE, 474, 480 AVAGIAN, Seyran, 68 AVOCK, Sam Dan, 765 AWALUDDIN, Hamid, 293 AWANG, Abdul Hadi, 432 AWATERE HUATA, Donna, 522 AWOM, Elias, 311 AYE KO, 471 AYE ZAW WIN, 474 AYTMATOV, Chingiz, 405 AYVAZIAN, Vartan, 69 AZAD, Abul Kalam, 122 AZAHARI, A. M. N., 138 AZAM, Golam, 118 AZHAR, Maulana Masood, 558 AZIMOV, Yakhyo, 667, 670 AZIZ, Abdul, 278 AZIZ, Shaukat, 535, 541, 549 AZIZAH Wan Ismail, Wan, 421, 432, 433

BAASYIR, Abu Bakar, 307 BABA, Ghazi, 558 BABA, Jale, 212 BABA, Tupeni, 216 BABAUTA, Juan, 752 BABAYAN, Samvel, 70 BABURYAN, Karen, 99 BACCHU, Ahsanul Huq, 124 BACHIR, Sutrisno, 301 BADAL, Mainuddin Khan, 123 BADAL, Parkash Singh, 268 BADALIAN, Sergey, 67 BADER, Jehangir, 551 BADJEBER, Djafar, 302 BAGABANDI, Natsagiyn, 455, 456 BAGAPSH, Seregey, 232 BAGHDASARIAN, Artur, 65 BAGRATIAN, Hrand, 57, 69 BAHADUR, Chitra, 504 BAHAR, Emran, 142 BAHRI, Ainal, 307 BAIG, Muzaffar Hussain, 266 BAIMENOV, Alikhan, 341, 345 BAING, Andrew, 574, 578 BAINIMARAMA, Frank, 205, 207 BAJA, Lauro L., Jr., 609 BAKER, Chris, 84 BAKIR-UULU, Tursunbay, 405 BAKIYEV, Aidar, 406 BAKIYEV, Kurmanbek, 393, 395 BAKRADZE, David, 237 BALAKUMAR, V., 662 BALASINGHAM, Anton S., 662 BALE, Qoriniasi, 210 BALEDADROKA, Jone, 211 BALGIMBAYEV, Nurlan, 337 BALOCH, Liaqat, 553 BALOCH, Mohim Khan, 555 BANAM, Joel, 582 BANATWALLA, Gulam Mehmood, 266 BANDARANAIKE, Anura, 650 BANDARANAIKE, S. W. R. D., 640 BANDARANAIKE, Sirimavo R. D., 640 BANERJEE, Kumari Mamata, 271 BANERJEE, Pankaj, 271 BANHARN Silpa-Archa, 686, 695 BANI, John Bernard, 759 BANKS, Rosemary, 527 BANYAT Bantadtan, 687 BANZRAGCH, D., 465 BAO DAI, 768 BAO YU XIANG, 479 BARAIYYA, Phool Singh, 265 BARAKZAI, Nasrullah, 44 BARDHAN, Bhushan Ardhendu, 272 BARI, Abdul Majed Abdul, 444 BARTLETT, Alex, 634 BARTLETT, Andrew, 83 BARUA, Dilip, 123 BARUA, Paresh, 280 BASANDORJ, Davaagiin, 465

INDEX

BASHIR, Abu Bakar, 307 BASNET, R. B., 135 BASRA, Riaz, 559 BASU, Chita, 272 BASU, Jyoti, 272 BASUMATARY, Hagrama, 280 BATIASHVILI, Irakli, 238 ¨ BATMONH, Jambyn, 456 BATOR, Sukhe, 455 BAT-UUL, Erdeniin, 464 BATZANDAN, Jalbas¨uren, 467 BAVADRA, Adi Kuini, 213, 215 BAVADRA, Timoci, 204, 205, 213 BAWAZIER, Fuad, 301 BAWIN, Nicholas, 433 BAYAR, Sanjaa, 462 ¨ BAYARSUREN, Ts., 463 BAYBOLOV, Kubatbek, 407 BAYLO, Nikolay, 403 BAZEYAN, Albert, 70 BEAZLEY, Kim, 74, 82 BECK, Collin David, 637 BECK, Stuart J., 569 BEDDOES, Millis (Mick), 214 BEG, Mirza Aslam, 556 BEGALIYEV, Bolot, 402 BEKBOYEV, Bakytbek, 403 BEKNAZAROV, Azimbek, 395, 404 BELTRAN, Crispin, 601 BERDZENISHVILI, Davit, 240 BERIANIDZE, Shalva, 242 BERMAN Angkap, 434 BEROZASHVILI, Guram, 243 BEVIN, Kerry, 524 BHAMORN Mavaratanakorn, 698 BHANDARI, Nar Bahadur, 262 BHARATI, Uma, 267 BHASHANI, Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan, 122 BHATTACHARJEE, Buddhadev, 272 BHATTACHARYA, Dispenser, 276 BHATTA-CHARYA, Pankaj, 124 BHATTARAI, Baburam, 508 BHATTARAI, Krishna Prasad, 494 BHIA, Bangla, 117, 125 BHINDRANWALE, Jarnail Singh, 249 BHOKIN Bhalakula, 700 BHUIYAN, Abdul Mannan, 118 BHUIYAN, Elia, 124 BHUIYAN, Khalequzzaman, 124 BHUMIBOL Adulyadej, King, 683, 685 BHUM-YALAGCH, Olzod, 465 BHUTTO, Begum Nusrat, 551 BHUTTO, Benazir, 533, 537, 551 BHUTTO, Ghinwa, 551 BHUTTO, Mumtaz Ali, 557 BHUTTO, Murtaza, 538 BHUTTO, Shahnawaz, 537 BHUTTO, Zulfikar Ali, 536 BIJUKCHHE, Narayan Man, 504 BILLAH, Haji al-Muhtadee, 139

BINAY, Jejomar, 599 BIN LADEN, Osama, 36, 53 BIN RAHMAN, Hamzah, 141 BIN UMAR, Abdul Aziz, 139 BIRCH, Bill, 514 BIRENDRA Bir Bikram Shah Dev, 492, 493 BISTA, Kirti Nidhi, 492 BISWAS, Abdur Rahman, 112 BISWAS, Bimal, 123 BISWAS, Debabrata, 272 BISWAS, Tipu, 124 BISWO-KARMA, Hasta Bahadur, 507 BLEYAN, Ashot, 69 BLIGHT, Derek, 523 BOBOYEV, Mukhtor, 675 BOBOYEV, Olimjon, 678 BOCHORISHVILI, Vakhtang, 237 BOGILEKA, Meli, 215 BOHARA, Amrit Kumar, 503 BOISSOU, Jean-Christopher, 221 BOKERIA, Giga, 237 BOKINI, Ovini, 210 BOLATAGICI, Samisoni, 213 BOLE, Felipe, 216 BOLGER, James (Jim), 514 BOLOBOLO, Tevita, 216 BO MYA, 473, 481 BOONITHIPHON Chinarat, 698 BOONTHAWEESAK Amornsin, 698 BOONTHUENG Pholphanit, 697 BOQUET, Anne, 221 BORDALLO, Ricardo J., 750 BORHAN Ariffin, 625 BORJA, Jesus C., 752 BOROMBAYEVA, Toktokan, 406 BORUBAYEV, Altay, 405 BOSWELL, Ron, 81 BOUASONE BOUPHAVANH, 412, 414 BOULEKONE, Vincent, 763 BOUNNHANG VORACHIT, 411, 412, 414 BOUN OUM NA, Prince, 410 BOUPHAVANH, Bouasone, 411 BOU SARIN, 157 BOUTEAU, Nicole, 220 BOYCE, Ralph Leo, Jr., 700 BRADFORD, Sue, 521 BRASH, Don, 515, 521 BRITNELL, Irinka, 524 BRITNELL, Michael, 524 BROWN, Bob, 84 BROWN, Peter, 519 BROWN, Steven, 523 BROWNLEE, Gerry, 521 BRYAN, John, 530 BUDHATHOKI, R. K., 134 BUDHISANTOSO, Subur, 298 BUGTI, Ghulam Haider, 555 BUGTI, Nawab Akbar, 555 BUGTI, Raziq, 556

867

BUILLARD, Michel, 220 BULEGODA, Ariya, 660 BUMBURING, Wilfred, 430 BUNE, Poseci, 214 BUNKER, Paul, 82 BUNKLE, Phillida, 523 BURDJANADZE, Nino, 227, 231, 245 BURMA, Krishna Raj, 503 BURRIDGE, Nina, 83 BUTADROKA, Sakeasi, 212 BUTENIS, Patricia A., 128 ¨ BYAMBASUREN, Dashiyn, 456 CALDER, Sam, 81 CALO, Georges, 763 CALVERT, Paul, 87 CAMACHO, Felix, 751 CAO Gangchuan, 178 CAPELLE, Alfred, 449 CAPILL, Graham, 523 CARLOT Korman, Maxime, 757, 763 CARNEY, Jodeen, 82 ˜ Jo˜ao Viegas, 706, 712 CARRASCALAO, ˜ M´ario Viegas, 710 CARRASCALAO, CARTWRIGHT, Silvia, 513 CASINO, Teodoro, Jr., 601 CASSIDY, Jim, 85 CAYGILL, David, 518 CHACHIA, Aleksandre, 241, 243 CHAIWAT Sinsuwong, 698 CHAKMA, Priti Kumar, 124 CHAKMA, Rabi Shankar, 125 CHAKRAPONG, Norodom, 158 CHALERM Yoobamrung, 696 CHALYSHEV, Vladimir, 344 CHAMKANI, Haji Mohammad, 32 CHAMLING, Pawan Kumar, 266 CHAMLONG Khrutkhunthod, 694 CHAMLONG Srimuang, 692 CHAN, Anson, 183 CHAN, Florinda da Rosa Silva, 187 CHAN, Heng-Chee, 628 CHAN, Julius, 572, 578 CHAN Chuen-po, 197 CHAN Fang On-song, 183 CHAN Hong Nam, George, 429 CHAN Kong Choy, 428 CHAN SI, 146 CHAND, Lokendra Bahadur, 493, 506 CHANDRACHOODAN, T. J., 272 CHANDRASEKARAN, Periyasamy, 659 CHANDUMAJRA, Prem Singh, 268 CHANG Chao-hsiung, 198 CHANG Ch’un-ch’iao, 168 CHANG Chun-hsiung, 191 CHANG Dae Whan, 380 CHANG Myon, 375 CHANG Po-ya, 198 CHANG Sang, 380 CHANKVETADZE, Ivza, 242 CHANTURIA, Georgi, 227, 239

868

INDEX

CHAO Tzu-yang, 168 CHAOVALIT Yongchaiyut, 686, 694 CHATCHAI Choonhavan, 685 CHATTA, Chaudhry Hamid Nasir, 549 CHATTERJEE, Somnath, 272, 283 CHATURON Chaisaeng, 694 CHAUDHARI, Prabhu Narayan, 505 CHAUDHRY, Fazal Elahi, 536 CHAUDHRY, Mahendra Pal, 205, 206, 214 CHAUDHRY, Mahmood, 563 CHAUHAN, Shivraj Singh, 267 CHAUTALA, Om Prakash, 276 CHEAM CHANNY, 152, 157 CHEA POCH, 152 CHEA SIM, 149, 155, 160 CHEE Soon Juan, 623, 626 CHELVANAYAKAM, S. J. V., 655 CHEN Liangyu, 178 CHEN Shui-bian, 189, 191, 196 CHEN Ta-cheng, 199 CHEO Chai Chen, 626 CHERNOMORETS, Viktor, 402 CHHETRI, Rakesh, 135 CHHIM OM YON, 158 CHIA Kiah Hong, Steve, 625 CHIA Kwang Chye, 428 CHIA Thye Poh, 624 CHIAM See Tong, 624, 625 CHIANG Ch’ing, 168 CHIANG Ching-kuo, 188 CHIANG Kai-shek, 188 CHIBIROV, Ludvig, 229 CHIDAMBARAM, Palaniappan, 262 CHIEN, Fredrick, 194 CHIEN TAM NGUYEN, 778 CHIN, Elias Camsek, 567 CHIN Iee Chong, 377 CHINGCHAI Mongkoltham, 697 CHIPP, Donald L., 83 CHISHI, K. L., 277 CHITCHAI Wannasathit, 683, 688 CHIT KHAING, 479 CHOE Byung Yol, 388 CHOIBALSAN, Khorloin, 455 CHOI Kyu Hah, 376 CHOISUREN, Baatar, 468 CHOI Young Jin, 391 CHONG Kah Kiat, 431 CHO Seung Soo, 389 CHO Sun, 387 CHOUDHURY, Saifuddin, 277 CHOUGH Soon Hyung, 389 CHOUMMALY SAYASONE, 411, 412, 414 CHOWDHURY, Abu Fazal Ahsanuddin, 111 CHOWDHURY, A. Q. M. Badruddoza, 109, 115, 122 CHOWDHURY, Iftekhar Ahmed, 128 CHOWDHURY, Mizanur Rahman, 112 CHOWDHURY, Shamsher M., 128

CHOYBALSAN, Horloogiyn, 455 CHRISTIAN, Peter M., 453 CHU Teh, 168 CHUA Soi Lek, 428 CHUAN Leekpai, 683, 686, 695 CHUCHAT Pathantham, 698 CHUCHEEP Harnsawat, 697 CHULUUNBAATAR, N., 464 CHUMA, Koki, 327 CHUN Doo Hwan, 376 CHUN Jung Bae, 387 CHUNG Jin Seok, 390 CHUNG Ju Yung, 378 CHUNG Mong Hun, 381 CHUNG Mong Joon, 381 CHUNG Sye Kyun, 387 CHUNG Won Shik, 378 CHYNGYSHEV, Tursunbek, 394 CHYUNG Dai Chul, 389 CISKARISHVILI, Malkhaz, 243 CKHEIDZE, Tamas, 242 CLARK, Helen, 513, 515, 518 CLEARWATER, Phil, 519 CLODUMAR, Kinza, 486 COJUANGCO, Eduardo, 587, 597 COJUANGCO, Jose, 598 COKANAUTO, Tu’uakitau, 215 COLEMAN, Peter Tali, 749 COLLURE, Raja, 651 CONSTANTINO, Renato, Jr., 603 COONAN, Helen, 81 COORAY, Sirisena, 654 COSTA, Frederico Almeida Santos da, 712 COSTA, Herminio da Silva da, 705, 711 COSTA, Pedro M´atires da, 712 COSTA, Zacarias de, 710 COSTELLO, Peter, 79, 81 COULTER, John, 83 CREAN, Simon, 82 CROCKER, Ryan C., 562 CRUZ, Nilo de la, 603 CULLEN, Michael, 518 CUNAYDIN, Yusuf, 101 DABIR, Abdul Hadi, 48 DAHAL, Pushpa Kamal, 496, 508 DAIM bin Zainuddin, 420 DAMBA, Dashiyn, 455 ¨ DAMDINSUREN, Lantuugiin, 466 DAMINOV, Turgunpolat, 731 DAMUIROGLU, Chingiz, 105 DANGE, S. A., 277 DAO DINH BINH, 775 DAOUD, Sardar Mohammad, 31 DAR, Abdul Majid, 279 DAR, Ghulam Rasool, 279 DAR, Ishaq, 554 DARBINIAN, Armen, 58 DARBINIAN, Vladimir, 67 DARNTON, Bernard, 524 DAS, P. V., 431

DAS, Tamir, 280 DASHBALBAR, Ochirbatyn, 466 DASHNYAM, Luvsandambyn, 465 DASH-YONDON, Budragchaagiyn, 462 DATTA, Mahendra, 302 DAVITASHVILI, Koba, 240 DAVLATOV, Davlatali, 676 DEBBARMA, Ranjit, 281 DeBRUM, Banny, 449 DEBRUM, Justin, 446, 448 DE CASTRO, Noli, 585, 590 DEFENSOR, Michael, 598 DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, Miriam, 587, 600 DELAI, Joketani, 216 DELKAR, Mohanbhai, 275 DEMIRCHIAN, Karen, 58 DEMIRCHIAN, Stepan, 59, 65 DENG Xiaoping, 167 DeROBURT, Hammer, 486 DESAI, Moraji R., 249 DETUDAMO, Beraro, 486 DEUBA, Sher Bahadur, 494, 503 DEVANANDA, Douglas, 653 DEVARAJAN, G., 272 DEVE GOWDA, H. D., 251, 273 DEVI, Anandi, 503 DEVI, Rabri, 263 DE VILLA, Renato, 600 DEVKOTA, Rajeshwor, 507 DEWA, Fereti Seru, 216 DHAKAL, Dev Narayan Singh, 135 DHALIWAL, Sukhinder Singh, 277 DHARSONO, Hartono Resko, 296 DHINDSA, Sukhdev Singh, 268 DIAS, Wije, 660 DINGER, Larry Miles, 218, 356, 490, 721, 741 DIOKNO, Jose, 594 DIPENDRA Bir Bikram Shah Dev, 493, 494 DIRO, Ted, 573, 579 DISSANAYAKE, Ariyawansha, 660 DISSANAYAKE, Gamini, 642 DISSANAYAKE, Piyasena, 652 DISSANAYAKE, S. B., 645 DISSANAYAKE, Srima, 642 DJAROT, Eros, 304 DJUMALIEV, Kubanychbek, 405 DOAN KHUE, 776 DODONOV, Aleksandr, 729 DOI, Akoka, 579 DOI, Takako, 331 DOMPOK, Bernard, 430 DO MUOI, 771 DONALD, Rod, 521 DONNELLY, Brian, 519 DOONE, Gideon, 452 DORJI, Jigme Polden, 130 DORJI, Kinzang, 131 DORJI, Rongthong Kinley, 134

INDEX

DORJI, Ugyen, 135 DORLIGJAV, Dambyn, 463 DOSBOL, Nuruulu, 403 DOSTAM, Abdul Rashid, 34, 45 DOSTMUHAMMAD, Xurshid, 731 DOUANGCHAY PHICHIT, 414 DOUGLAS, Roger, 522 DOWIYOGO, Bernard, 486 DOWIYOGO, Valdon, 490 DOWNER, Alexander, 80 DRILON, Franklin, 598 DRUAVESI, Ema, 213 DUACIA, Josaia, 215 DUCH, 150 DUJANA, Abu, 307 DUKPA, Chheku, 135 DUNDANG, Edwin, 434 DUNNE, Peter, 516, 520 DUONG VAN MINH (“Big Minh”), 769 DURANI, Ahmad Shah, 30 DURRANI, Akram Khan, 552 DUSTOV, Narzullo, 668 DUVULOCO, Iliesa, 212, 213 DUYSHEBAYEV, Keneshbek, 402 DY, Faustino, Jr., 597 DY SETHY, 158 DZHAGANOVA, Altynshash, 345 DZHEKSHEYEV, Dzhypar, 402 DZIDIGURI, Zviad, 240 EDWARDS, Clive, 719, 720 EFI, Tuiatua Tupua Tamasese, 612 EFI, Tupuola Taisi, 611 EJERCITO-ESTRADA, Luisa, 599 ELAHI, Chaudhry Pervez, 549 ELBEGDORJ, Tsakhiagiyn, 455, 457, 464 ELCHIBEY, Abulfaz Ali, 94 ELISAIA, Ali’ioaiga Feturi, 617 ELIZABETH II, Queen, 73, 513, 571, 631, 739 ELUAY, Theys, 312 ENG CHHAY EANG, 157 ENGLISH, Bill, 521 ENKHBAYAR, Nambaryn, 455, 458, 462 ENKHBOLD, Miyeegombo, 455, 458, 462 ENKHSAIKHAN, Mendsaikhan, 456 ENRILE, Juan Ponce, 586, 599 ENTRI Muran, Sylvester, 429 ERDENEBAT, Badarchiin, 458, 464 ERGALIEVA, Gulzhan, 347 ERI, Vincent Serei, 573, 579 ERSHAD, Begum Raushan, 121 ERSHAD, Hossain Mohammad, 111, 121 ESCUDERO, Francis, 597 ESHIMKANOV, Melis, 405 ESTRADA, Jose “Jinggoy,” 599 ESTRADA, Joseph E., 585, 588, 599 ETPISON, Ngiratkel, 566 ETTRIDGE, David, 84 EVANS, Andrew, 84 EVANS, Chris, 83

EVANS, John Marshall, 71 EZAM Noor, Mohamed, 433 FAHIM, Makhdoom Amin, 551 FAHIM, Mohammad Qasim, 41, 44 FAISAL, Mustafa Amir, 124 FAKAFANUA, T¨utoatasi, 717 FALCAM, Leo A., 451 FALEOMAVAEGA, E. F. H., 750 FARHADI, Ravan A. G., 54 FARID, Ustad, 34 FAROOQ, Mirwaiz Umar, 279 FAROOQ, Moulvi Mohammed, 255 FAROOQI, Amjad Hussain, 545 FATTEYEV, Mirmahmud, 102 FATWA, A. M., 301 FAYZIYEV, Rustam, 679 FAZL, Ayatollah, 46 FERGUSON, Roy, 527 FERNANDES, Ernesto Dudo, 710 FERNANDES, George, 257, 270 FIELDING, Steve, 84 FIFITA, Nimilote, 216 FISCHER, John, 85 FISCHER, Tim, 81 FITIAL, Benigno, 753 FITTS, Robert W., 583, 637, 766 FITZSIMONS, Jeannette, 521 FLOSSE, Gaston, 219 FLYNN, Bill, 85 FONO, Fred, 635 FOSTER, Tim, 85 FRANKS, Stephen, 522 FRASER, Malcolm, 73 FRITZ, Jack S., 452 FROGIER, Pierre, 224 FUJII, Takao, 326 FUKO, Teisina, 720 FUKUDA, Takeo, 314 FUKUSHIMA, Mizuho, 331 FUNG Kin-kee, Frederick, 183 FUTRAKUL Virasakdi, 700 FUWA, Tetsuzo, 330 FUYUSHIBA, Tetsuzo, 328 GAANAYAKE, Upatissa, 654 GABUNIA, Vakhtung, 241 GACHECHILADZE, George, 243 GACHECHILADZE, Levan, 239 GACHHADAR, Bijaya Kumar, 503 GAGARIMABU, Gabia, 580 GAGNIDZE, Zurab, 243 GAILANI, Ishaq, 47 GAILANI, Pir Sayed Ahmad, 46 GAMAKHARIA, Jemal, 237 GAMASAKHURDIA, Konstantine, 243 GAMBAR, Isa, 98, 103 GAMKRELIDZE, David, 239 GAMSAKHURDIA, Konstantine (Koko), 243 GAMSAKHURDIA, Zviad, 227, 243

869

GANBAATAR, Adyagiin, 466 GANBOLD, Davaadorgjiyn, 457 GANDHI, Indira, 248 GANDHI, Mohandas Karamchand, 248 GANDHI, Rajiv, 250 GANDHI, Sonia, 251, 262 GANESAN, L., 265 GANIEV, Teyub, 105 GANILAU, Epeli, 210, 216 GANILAU, Penaia, 205, 206 GARCIA, Carlos P., 585 GARDNER, Geoffrey R., 91 GARLOSSA, Jewel, 280 GARO, John Martin, 636 GARTRELL, Tim, 83 GASANKULIEV, Gudrat, 105 GAUTAM, Bam Dev, 503 GAVAI, Ramkrishna S., 266 GAYOOM, Maumoon Abdul, 439, 442 GAZANFAROGLU, Fazil, 105 GAZIYEV, Rakhim, 95, 102 GAZMERE, Ratan, 135 GEEGANAGE, Wimal, 660 GEELANI, Syed Ali, 278 GEGHAMIAN, Artashes, 67 GENIA, Jack, 579 GEORGE, Guy, 224 GEORGE, K. Francis, 275 GEORGE, Norman, 528 ´ GEROS, Antony, 221 GHAFFAR bin Baba, Abdul, 419 GHAFFOROV, Abduhalim, 679 GHAFFORZODA, Hurinisso, 678 GHAFOOR, Hamid Abdul, 444 GHARIBASHVILI, Kartlos, 239 GHAZALI, Aminorashid, 141 GHAZI, Mahmud, 48 GHORI, Qadir Imami, 44 GHUKASIAN, Arkady, 96 GIBBONS, Ibedul Yutaka, 567 GIHENO, John, 574 GILANI, Syed Ali, 278 GILANI, Syed Yousaf Raza, 551 GILLARD, Julia, 82 GILLON, Grant, 524 GIORGADZE, Igor, 229, 241 GIORGADZE, Mamuka, 241 GIORGADZE, Panteleimon, 241 GIOURA, Derog, 487 GIREGIRE, Sinake, 582 GIRI, Tulsi, 492 GNANASEKARAN, G., 662 GOGUADZE, Vakhtang, 241 GOH Chok Tong, 619, 623 GOH Hun, 375 GOH Kun, 379 GOMBOJAV, Jambyn, 466 GOMEZ, James, 623 GONCHIGDORJ, Radnaas¨umbereliyn, 456, 464 GONOGOV, Rufiz, 105

870

INDEX

GONZALES, Neptali, 587 GONZALES, Norberto, 598 GOODWIN, Frederick, 530 GOONETILLEKE, Bernard Anton Bandara, 665 GOPALASWAMI, Vaiko, 265 GORODEY, D´ew´e, 224 GOSWAMI, Brindaban, 274 GOTO, Masako, 331 GRANT, Ron, 90 GREEN, Guy, 73 GREIG, Brian, 83 GUERRERO, Lorenzo (Larry) I. De Leon, 752 GUFRON, Ali, 307 GUINGONA, Teofisto, 585, 589 GUITE, Thanzlianpau, 281 GUJRAL, Inder Kumar, 252 GULIEV, Rasul, 103 GULLAS, Eduardo, 600 GULOMOV, Latifjon, 731 GULUA, Bakur, 238 GUMELAR, Agum, 301 GUNARATNE, Naweendra Lal, 661 GUNASEKERA, D. E. W., 651 GUNATHILAKE, Nandana, 655 GUNAWARDENA, Dinesh, 652 ¨ GUNDALAI, Lamjaviin, 460, 465 GUNESEKARA, S. L., 657 GUNGAADORJ, Sharavyn, 456 GUO Boxiong, 178 GURBANOV, Rauf, 105 GURUNG, Dev, 507 GURUNNG, Mukti, 135 GUSEINOV, Surat, 95 ˜ Kay Rala Xanana (Jos´e GUSMAO, Alexandre), 703 ¨ Laurentino Domingos Lu´ıs de, GUSMAO, 712 GUTERRES, Francisco (“Lu’Olo”), 710, 713 GUTERRES, Jos´e Lu´ıs, 710, 714 GUTERRES, Vicente da Silva, 712 GUTIERREZ, Carl, 751 GUTTERES, Eurico, 295 GYANENDRA Bir Bikram Shah Dev, 493, 494 GYAWALI, Madhav, 505 HABIBIE, Bacharuddin Jusuf, 288 HADJIEV, Sabir, 104 HAGLELGAM, John R., 451 HAGOBIAN, Ruben, 64 HAHN Hwa Gap, 389 HAIDER, Pir Syed Anis, 553 HAIRIKIAN, Paruyr, 68 HAIVETA, Chris, 574, 579 HAKEEM, Rauff, 645, 659 HAKIMI, Laftullah, 50 HAKIMOV, Shokirjon, 674, 678 HALE, Suzanne, 453

HALL, Andrew, 81 HAMAYOTSU, Toshiko, 328 HAMBALI, Riduan, 307 HAMENGKU BUWONO X, Sri Sultan, 289 HAMIDON Ali, 437 HAN Duck Soo, 375, 382 HAN Myeong Sook, 375, 382, 387 HAN Seung Soo, 380 HAN Song Ryong, 371 HANAMOW, Nurmuhammet, 724 HANAN, Ali Marwan, 301 HANG DARA, 158 HANSON, Pauline, 74 HAQ, A. F. M. Mahbubul, 124 HAQ, Shaikhul Hadith Muhammad Azizul, 119 ul-HAQ, Maulana Sami, 552 ul-HAQ, Muhammad Ijaz, 549 HAQUE, Enamul, 122 HARA, Kazumi, 332 HARMOKO, 288 HARNISH, Reno L., III, 107 HAROUTIUNIAN, Gagik, 57, 68 HAROUTIUNIAN, Khosrov, 57 ´ Laila, 523 HARRE, HARRIS, Lagumot, 486 HARRIS, Len, 85 HARRIS, Peter, 84 HARRIS, Ren´e, 486, 487 HARTONO, R., 303 HARUTIUNIAN, Lyudmila, 68 HARUTIUNIAN, Vagharshak, 70 HARYANTO, G. Seto, 305 HARYANTO, H. Dimmy, 304 HARYANTO, Petrus, 305 HASAN, Munawar, 45 HASAN, Syed Munawwar, 553 HASAN, Zulkifli, 301 HASANQULIYEV, Qurat Muzaffar, 102 HASHIM, Habib Mujahab, 604 HASHIMOTO, Ryutaro, 315 HASHMI, Makhdoom Javed, 554 HASLACH, Patricia M., 416 HASONOV, Firudin, 104 HASSAN, Hatimil, 604 HASSANAL BOLKIAH, Haji, 138, 139 HATA, Tsutomu, 315, 330 HATOYAMA, Yukio, 330 HAU Pei-tsun, 189, 197 HAWKE, Robert (Bob) J. L., 74 HAWKER, David, 87 HAWLADER, Ruhul Amin, 121 HAYAT, Sayed Faisal Saleh, 550 HAYDEN, William G., 74 HAYEE Baluch, Abdul, 555 HAZ, Hamzah, 287, 290, 301 HE Guoqiang, 178, 179 HE Yong, 179 HEATHER, Teariki, 529 HEGDE, Ramakrishna, 269

HEKMATYAR, Gulbuddin, 33, 47 HENG SAMRIN, 146, 155, 160 HENRY, Geoffrey, 528 HERBOLD, Patricia L., 628 HEWSON, John, 80 HIDAYAT, Jumhur, 305 HIDE, Rodney, 522 HIDOYATOVA, Nigora, 732 HILL, Heather, 84 HILL, Robert, 79, 88 HILLY, Francis Billy, 630, 635 HIMMATZODA, Muhhadsharif, 677 HIROHITO, Emperor, 314 HIRU, Golam Sarwar, 119 HO, Edmund, 187 HO Hau Wah, 187 HOAGLAND, Richard E., 681 HOARE, Phil, 524 HO CHI MINH, 768 HO DUC VIET, 776 HOFSCHNEIDER, Heinz, 752 HOLLINGWORTH, Peter, 73, 75 HOLYOAKE, Keith J., 513 HONASAN, Gregorio, 587 HONG Song Nam, 364, 365 HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, Ana Theresia, 601 HORIE, Takafumi, 323 HORIUCHI, Mitsuo, 326 HOSOKAWA, Morihiro, 316 HOSSAIN, Kamal, 124 HOSSAIN, Moazzem, 120 HOSSAIN, Zakir, 124 HOVANNISIAN, Hmayak, 65 HOVANNISIAN, Hovannes, 70 HOVANNISIAN, Raffi, 69 HOWARD, John Winston, 73, 81 HRANGKHWAL, Bijoy Kumar, 277 HSIEH, Frank Chang-ting, 189, 191 HSIEH Tung-min, 189 HSU Hsin-liang, 196 HTOO, Johnny, 481 HTOO, Luther, 481 HU Jintao, 167, 170, 178 HU Yaobang (HU Yao-pang), 168 HUA Guofeng (HUA Kuo-feng), 167 HUANG, William, 199 HUANG Chu-wen, 198 HUANG Hsin-chieh, 196 HUANG Hwa, 196 HUANG Ju, 178 HUDA, Mirza Nurul, 111 HUI Liangyu, 178 HUN SEN, 145, 146, 155 HUNUKI, Hunukitama, 530 HUSEYNOV, Panah, 105 HUSIN, Azahari, 307 HUSSAIN, Altaf, 549 HUSSAIN, Chaudhry Amir, 561 HUSSAIN, Chaudhry Shujaat, 535, 541, 549

INDEX

HUSSAIN, Mushahid, 549 HUSSEIN, Farouk, 589, 604 HUSSEIN bin Onn, 418, 419 HUSSEINI, Sayed Jawad, 44 HUSSIN, Parouk, 589, 604 HUTASOIT, Ruyandi Mustika, 303 HUYNH TAN PHAT, 770 HUZUR, Maulana Mohammed Ullah Hafezji, 122 HWANG In Sung, 378 IANGALIO, Masket, 580 IBRAHIM, Ilyas, 440, 442 IBRAHIM, Sardar Khalid, 278, 563 IBRAHIM Khan, Mohammad, 563 IBRAHIMLI, Ibrahim, 102 IBRAHIMOV, Niyazi, 103 IBRAIMOV, Jumabek, 394 IBUKI, Bunmei, 327 ICHIDA, Tadayoshi, 330 IDEVKHTEN, Doloonjin, 462 IDRIS, Jumat Haji, 141 IELEMIA, Apisai, 739 IENG SARY, 148 IKRAMOV, Maksud, 668 IKROMOV, Zafar, 677 ILOILO, Josefa, 205, 207 IMANALIYEV, Muratbek, 406 INDRAKUMAR, N., 657 INOYATOVA, Vasila, 732 INU, Hasanul Haq, 123 IONATANA, Ionatana, 738 IOSELIANI, Archil, 243 IOSELIANI, Dzhaba, 227 IPATAS, Peter, 580 IPATAS, Pita, 580 IQBAL, Mohaqher, 605 IQBAL, Rao Sikander, 550 IQBAL, Tahir, 564 ISAAC, Leandro, 704, 710 ISAKOV, Esengul, 403 ISAMUDDIN, Riduan, 307 ISANOV, Nasirdin, 394 ISARA Yuangprasit, 698 ISHIDA, Koshiro, 327 ISHII, Ichiji, 332 ISKANDAR, Muhaimin, 302 ISKANDAROV, Akbarsho, 667, 668 ISKANDAROV, Mahmadruzi, 674, 678 ISLAM, A. K. M. Nurul, 112 ISLAM, Mufti Izharul, 119 ISLAM, Nural, 124 ISLAM, Saiful, 279 ISLAM, Shahidul, 121 ISLAM, Siddiqul, 117, 125 ISMAIL, Ibrahim, 443 ISMAIL, Nur Mahmudi, 302 ISMAILOV, Ilyas, 103 ISMAYILOV, Ilyas, 105 ISMONOV, Saidjafar, 679 ISNAJI, Alvarez, 604

JAAFAR, Ghazali, 605 JABBAR, Abdul, 558 JACKSON, Colin, 520 JACOB, Filomeno, 706 JACOB, T. M., 276 JACOBSEN, O’Love, 530 JACOBSON, Tracey Ann, 736 JAFAROV, Samir, 104 JAGANOVA, Altynshash, 345 JAHANGIR, Nayeem, 123 JAITLEY, Jaya, 269 JALALOGLU, Sardar, 103 JALANDONI, Luis, 602 JALEEL, K. T., 265 JALIL, Abdul, 120 JALOLOV, Abdulkhafiz, 745 JAMALI, Zafarullah Khan, 535, 540, 549 JAMATIA, Nayanbasi, 281 JAMTSAI, B., 466 JAN, Arbab Ayub, 556 JANIS, Roy B. B., 306 JANJALANI, Abdurajak Abubakar, 605 JANJALANI, Khaddafy, 606 JARAU PATRICK, Louis, 433 JARGALSAIKHAN, Bazarsadiin, 460, 465 JARGALSAIKHAN, L., 466 JASRAY, Puntsagiyn, 456 JATOI, Ghulam Mustafa, 537, 556 JAVADOV, Ravshan, 95 JAWAD, Said Tayeb, 54 JAWID, Mohammad Ali, 43, 44 JAYANETHTHI, Chamil, 660 JAYARAM, Jayalalitha, 252, 271 JAYARATNE, D. A., 650 JAYASURIYA, Deshabandu Karu, 653 JAYASURIYA, Siritunga, 661 JAYATUNGA, Rohan, 660 JAYEWARDENE, J. R., 640 JEENBAEV, Nurbek, 408 JEFFERY, Michael, 73, 75 JEFRI BOLKIAH, Muda Haji, 138 JEKSHEEV, Jypar, 402 JENIE, Rezlan Ishar, 311 JEYARETNAM, May J. B., 620 JHAGRA, Iqbal Zafar, 554 JHANGVI, Maulana Haq Nawaz, 559 JIA Qinglin, 177, 178 JIANG Qing, 168 JIANG Zemin, 167, 170 JIMMY, Willie, 759 JINNAH, Mohammad Ali, 265, 534 JO Jae Hwan, 389 JOHN, Baby, 272 JOHNSON, Phil, 520 JON Pyong Ho, 371 JONES, Barry, 82 JORBENADZE, Avtandil, 231, 241 ´ E, ´ L´eopold, 224 JOREDI JOSEPH, P. J., 274 JOSHI, Sanjay, 267

871

JOSHI, Sharad, 275 JU Gau-jeng, 198 JUGELI, Besik, 239 JUMAGULOV, Apas, 394 JUMALIEV, Kubanychbek, 394 JUNEJO, Mohammad Khan, 536 JUVENTIN, Jean, 219 KABAN, M. S., 303 KABAN, Malam S., 303 KABIR, Anwarul, 124 KABIRI, Muhiddin, 677 KABUA, Amata, 446 KABUA, Imata, 446, 447 KABUI, Joseph, 571, 572, 582 KADANNAPPALLY, Ramachandran, 276 KADIRGAMAR, Lakshman, 646 KADODKAR, Shashikala, 277 KAFLE, D. P., 135 KAGOVAI, Tony, 635 KAIEDA, Banri, 330 KAIFU, Toshiki, 315 KAKARYA, Pato, 580 KAKHNIASHVILI, Jemal, 243 KALAM, A. P. J. Abdul, 247, 253 KALANDADZE, Tamaz, 242 KALAW, Eva, 597 KALIYEV, Gani, 346 KALLA, Muhammad Jusuf, 287, 299 KALPOKAS, Donald, 758, 763 KAMAL, Mofizul Islam Khan, 124 KAMAL Batcha, 434 KAMALUDDEEN, Abdulla, 440 KAMARUDDIN Jaafar, 432 KAMEI, Gangmumei, 277 KAMEI, Shizuka, 323, 331 KAMIKAMICA, Josevata, 206, 214 KAMILOV, Abdulaziz, 747, 735 KAMU, Luagalau Levaula, 612 KAN, Naoto, 330 KAN Thienkaew, 698 KANDASAMY, Karavai, 662 KANEMARU, Shin, 315 KANG KEK IEU, 150 KANG Song San, 364 KANG Young Hoon, 378 KANT, Krishan, 247, 252, 253 KANUK Gindol, 435 KANZAKI, Takenori, 328 KAO Ming-ting, 199 KAPTAGAYEV, Emilbek, 406 KAPUTIN, John, 578 KARAMAT, Jehangir, 539, 562 KARAPETIAN, Alexan, 67 KARAPETIAN, Aram, 70 KARAPETYAN, Arutiun, 69 KARAT, Prakash, 272 KARDAVA, Bachuki, 239 KARIM, Ershad Fazlul, 121 KARIM, Maulana Syed Fazlul, 121 KARIM, Pir Fazlul, 121

872

INDEX

KARIMLI, Tahir, 105 KARIMOV, Islam A., 743 KARIMOV, Jamshed, 668 KARIMOV, Olim, 732 KARIMOV, Tuyghun, 676 KARIYAWASAM, Prasad, 665 KARMAL, Babrak, 32 KARPAL Singh, 432 KARQAR, Azizullah, 45 KARTASASMITA, Ginandjar, 308 KARUN Saingam, 696 KARUNA, Col., 648, 664 KARUNAKARAN, K., 276 KARUNAMANI, Mudhitha, 660 KARUNANIDHI, Muthuvel, 263 KARUNARATNE, W. M., 660 KARUNARATNE, Wickramabahu Bandara, 660 KARZAI, Hamid, 31, 38 KARZAI, Mohammed Jamil, 48 KASEM Sorajakkasem, 695 KASHMIRI, Maulana Abdul Wahid, 280 KASI, Mir Aimal, 544 KASITAH Gaddam, 425 KASIYEV, Naken, 406 KASSIM Ahmad, 433 KASYMOV, Adylbek, 402 KASYMOV, Gani, 346 KASYMOV, Toychubek, 405 KATO, Koichi, 326 KATO, Ryozo, 334 KATTEL, Dili Ram, 135 KAUKIMOCE, Jonetani, 212 KAUONA, Sam, 573 KAUSIMAE, David, 635 KAVALI, Thomas, 580 KAWADE, Jogentra, 266 KAYSONE PHOMVIHAN, 411 KAYVEAS, M., 431 KAZHEGELDIN, Akezhan, 337, 338 KAZYKHANOV, Yerzhan, 350 KAZYMLY, Khanhuseyn, 105 KEASPAI, Song, 765 KEATING, Paul, 73, 74 KEKE, Harold, 634 KEKE, Kieren, 490 KEMAKEZA, Allan, 631, 632, 635 KEM SOKHA, 156 KENILOREA, Peter, 630, 636, 637 KENJAYEV, Safarali, 668 KENJAYEV, Shodikhon, 679 KENNEY, Kristie, 609 KERIMLI, Ali, 102 KERK Choo Ting, 428 KERNOT, Cheryl, 83 KERR, John R., 73 KESHTMAND, Soltan Ali, 33 KESRI, Sitaram, 251, 261 KEUNEMAN, Pieter, 651 KHACHATRIAN, Armen, 65 KHACHATRIAN, Grant, 66

KHACHATRIAN, Vartan, 69 KHACHATRIAN, Vigen, 69 KHADIR, Abdul, 32 KHADKA, Khum Bahadur, 502 KHAINDRAVA, Ivliane, 240 KHAIRUDDIN, Kawaja, 548 KHAJA, Hafizur Rahman, 122 KHAJIMBA, Raul, 232 KHALES, Mohammad Yunos, 47 KHALID, Malek Meraj, 538 KHALIL, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, 558 KHALILI, Karim, 31, 46 KHALILOV, Erkin, 734 KHALIQYAR, Fazil Haq, 33 KHAMARUDDIN Ahman Sufi, 625 KHAMPHOUI KEOBOUALAPHA, 412 KHAMTAY SIPHANDONE, 411 KHAN, Abdul Qadeer, 545 KHAN, Agha Mohammad Yahya, 535 KHAN, Amanullah, 278 KHAN, Amir, 556 KHAN, Arshad, 275 KHAN, Azizul Islam, 124 KHAN, Bashir Ahmad, 280, 558 KHAN, Fida Mohammad, 548 KHAN, Ghulam Ishaq, 537 KHAN, Imran, 555 KHAN, Manjural Ahsan, 123 KHAN, Mansoor Ali, 557 KHAN, Mohammad Ayub, 534 KHAN, Nasrullah, 120, 557 KHAN, Nurul Islam, 122 KHAN, Omar Asghar, 557 KHAN, Sahib, 564 KHAN, Shahnawaz, 558 KHAN, Sirajul Hossain, 120 KHANAMOV, Nurmukhammed, 724 KHARAL, Khalid Ahmad Khan, 551 KHATTAK, Ajmal Khan, 556 KHATTAK, Sharif, 556 KHAYRULLOYEV, Saydullo, 681 KHIEU RADA, 157 KHIEU SAMPHAN, 146 KHIEU SENG KIM, 158 KHIEV PISETH, 158 KHIM PHUNVIHAN, 158 KHIN MAUNG GYI, 478 KHIN NYUNT, 471, 472 KHISHA, Prasit, 125 KHLOK PRITHY, 158 KHOJAMUKHAMMED, Durdymurat, 724, 727 KHOJIYEV, Jumaboy, 733 KHON, Valery, 403 KHON OO REH, 481 KHUDOBERDIYEV, Makhmud, 670 KHUDONAZAROV, Davlat, 668 KHUN SA, 473 KHUN TUN OO, 480 ¨ KHURELBAATAR, S., 466

KHU RIMOND HTOO, 481 KHUTUKHTU, Jebtsun Damba, 455 KIBRIA, Shah, 117 KIKACHEISHVILI, Tengiz, 240 KILEI, Amasone, 738 KILLION, Redley, 451 KILMAN, Sato, 761, 764 KIM Ch˘ong Yol, 377 KIM Dae Jung, 375, 376 KIM Deog Ryong, 388 KIM Geun Tae, 387 KIM Gil Su, 391 KIM Hak Wan, 388 KIM Han Gill, 387 KIM Hye Kyung, 389 KIM Il Sung (KIM Il-s˘ong), 364, 365 KIM Jae Kyu, 376 KIM Jong Chol, 371 KIM Jong Il (KIM Ch˘ong-il ), 364, 365, 366, 369, 371 KIM Jong Nam, 371 KIM Jong Pil, 378 KIM Kye Kwan, 368 KIM Kyong Hui, 371 KIM Nak-sung, 390 KIM Pyong Sik, 371 KIM Sang Hyup, 377 KIM Suk Soo, 380 KIM Sun Dong, 389 KIM Wan Su, 371 KIM Won Ki, 391 KIM Yong Dae, 371 KIM Yong Ju, 371 KIM Yong Nam, 364, 365, 371, 373 KIM Young Sam, 376 KINGMELE, Edward, 635 KINTANAR, Romulo, 602 KIRK, Judy, 521 KIRK, Norman E., 513 KITIGAWA, Kazuo, 328 KITINGAN, Jeffrey, 434 KITOVANI, Tengiz, 227 KITTIKHOUN, Alounk`eo, 416 KO AUNG DIN, 482 KO AUNG TUN, 482 KOBAYASHI, Koki, 331 KOCHARIAN, Robert, 57, 58 KOCHARIAN, Shavarsh, 66 KOCHIYEV, Stanislav, 231 KOCHKOROV, Ismail, 407 KODING, Mark, 430 KODZHOKEYEV, Bakyt, 406, 407 KOGA, Makoto, 327 KOH Tsu Koon, 428 KOIRALA, Biseswar Prasad, 492 KOIRALA, Girija Prasad, 493, 502 KOIRALA, Sushil, 502 KOIZUMI, Junichiro, 315, 317, 327 KOKOITY (KOKOYEV), Eduard, 231 KOLOI, Montu, 281 KOLONE, Va’ai, 612

INDEX

KOMORI, Tatsukuni, 332 KOMURA, Masahiko, 327 KO MYO WIN, 482 KONG KORM, 157 KONG LE, 410 KONG MONI, 157 KONO, Yohei, 316, 327, 333 KORN Chatikavanij, 695 KORN Dabbaransi, 694 KOROI, Jokapeci, 214 KOSAREV, Vladislav, 346 KOTELAWALA, John, 639 KO THAN KE, 482 KO TIN KO KO, 482 KOYA, Siddiq, 215 KOZHAKHMET, Khasen, 347 KOZHAKHMETOV, Asylbek, 347 KRAISAK Choonhavan, 696 KRIANGSAK Chamanan, 685 KRO, Chomang, 275 KRUM, Denise, 520 KUBUABOLA, Jone, 211 KUHN SA, 479 KUKAVA, Kakha, 240 KUKRIT Pramoj, 685 KULIEV, Avde, 724 KULIYEV, Fuad, 93, 95 KULOV, Feliks, 393, 394 KUMAR, Nitish, 270 KUMARAGE, Chandra, 659 KUMARASWAMY, H. D., 273 KUMARATUNGA, Chandrika Bandaranaike, 639, 642, 650 KUMARATUNGA, Vijaya, 652 KUN, Reuben, 486 KURIHASHI, Takashi, 330 KURUP, Joseph, 431 KUVVATOV, Sulton, 679 KVIRIKADZE, Nino, 243 KWON Young Kil, 388 KYAW TINT SWE, 484 KYE Ung Thae, 371 KYI MAUNG, 479 KYOTA, Hersey, 569 LACSON, Panfilo, 599 LAFANAWA, Peter, 581 LaFLEUR, Christopher J., 437 LaFLEUR, Jacques, 224 LAGMAN, Filemon “Popoy,” 603 LAKATANI, Sani, 530 LAKSONO, Agung, 310 LAL, Bansi, 262 LAL, Devi, 250, 276 LALABALAVU, Naiqama, 212 LALDUHOMA, 278 LALHMINGTHANGA, Pu, 277 LAMA, Nirmal, 504 LAMIDZE, Lasha, 243 LANGE, David R., 513 LAOHAPHAN Laxanachantorn, 700

LAPLI, John Ini, 631, 635 LARMA, Jytrindriyo Bodhipriyo, 125 LARMA, Manabendra Narayan, 124 LASARO, Iairo, 578 LATASI, Kamuta, 738, 741 LATHAM, Mark, 79 LATHEEF, Jennifer, 442 LATHEEF, Mohamed, 442, 444 LATIEF, Asnawi, 300 LATIF Chuchu, Abdul, 141 LATIF Hamid, Abdul, 141 LATIFI, Otakhon, 677 LAU, Ambrose, 183 LAUREL, Salvador H., 586 LAUTI, Toalipi, 738 LAU Wai-hing, Emily, 184 LAWATI, Padma Sundar, 506 LAW Hieng Ding, 429 LEALOFI, Tupua Tamasese, IV, 611 LE DUAN, 769 LE DUC ANH, 771 LE DUC THO, 770 LEE, Graeme, 520 LEE Bu Young, 387 LEE Chen-yuan, 199 LEE Chu-ming, Martin, 182 LEE Hae Chan, 375, 382 LEE Han Dong, 379, 390 LEE Han Key, 377 LEE Hoi Chang, 378 LEE Hong Ku, 378 LEE Hsien Loong, 619, 620, 623 LEE Huan, 189 LEE Hyun Jae, 378 LEE Jae Oh, 388 LEE Ki Taek, 386 LEE Kuan Yew, 418, 619, 623 LEE Myung Bak, 388 LEE Peng-fei, Allen, 184 LEE Siu-kwong, Ambrose, 186 LEE Soo Sung, 379 LEE Tae Sik, 391 LEE Teng-hui, 189 LEE Wing-tat, 185 LEE Yung Duk, 378 LEE LONG, Rose, 85 LEES, Meg, 83 LEGARDA, Loren, 590 LEGHARI, Sardar Farooq Ahmad Khan, 538, 549 LE HONG ANH, 776 LEIATAVA, Tolofuaivalelei Falemoe, 616 LE KHA PHIEU, 769, 771 LEKISHVILI, Nikoloz, 229 LELONO, Heru, 298 LE LUONG MINH, 778 LEMARI, Kunio D., 446 LEONG Kah-kit, Alan, 185 ´ LEONTIEFF, Alexandre, 219 ´ LEONTIEFF, Boris, 220 LEPPING, George, 630

873

LE QUANG DAO, 776 ` LEQUES, Jean, 224 LEROUX, Didier, 224 LE THANH HAI, 776 LE VAN DUNG, 778 LEVAVUA, Ponipate, 215 LEWIS, Richard, 523 LEYE Lenelgau, Jean-Marie, 758 LEYMANG, Gerard, 763 LHO Shin Yong, 377 LI Ao, 198 LI Changchun, 178 LI Li, 179 LI Peng, 169 LI Xiannian, 169 LI Yuan-zu, 189 LIAQUAT Ali Khan, 534 LIEN Chan, 189, 190, 197 LIEW Chin Kong, 436 LIEW Teck Chan, 430 LIKHIT Dhiravegin, 698 LIM, Alfredo, 597 LIM Ah Lek, 428 LIM Boon Heng, 624 LIM Chae Jung, 387 LIM Chin Siong, 624 LIM Dong Won, 380, 381 LIM Guan Eng, 432 LIM Keng Yaik, 428 LIM Kit Siang, 432 LIM Swee Lian, Sylvia, 624 LIN, Roger, 199 LIN Biao (LIN Piao), 166 LIN Cheng-chieh, 196 LIN Chia-lung, 196 LIN Yang-kang, 197 LING How Doong, 626 LING Liong Sik, 428 LINI, Ham, 757, 760, 762 LINI, Hilda, 762, 764 LINI, Walter Hadye, 756 LIPARTELIANI, Roin, 242 LIPARTELIANI, Temur, 242 LIU Qi, 178 LIU Shaoqi, 167 LIU Yunshan, 178, 179 LLAMAS, Sotero, 601 LOBATO, Nicolau dos Reis, 711 LOBATO, Rog´erio, 708 LOCSIN, Teodoro, Jr., 599 LODHIA, Chandhu, 216 LOEAK, Iroij Kotak, 448 LOHANI, Prakash Chandra, 507 LOH Kung-wai, Christine, 184 LOKKUBANDARA, W. J. M., 664 LOMTADZE, Irakli, 243 LONE, Abdul Ghani, 278 LONE, Bilan Ghani, 278 LONE, Sajjad, 278 LONG BORET, 145 LONGOWAL, Harchand Singh, 249, 268

874

INDEX

LON NOL, 145 LOPES, Mariano, 706 LOPEZ, Flaviano Pereira, 712 LORTKIPANIDZE, Vazha, 230, 242 LOUGHNANE, Brian, 81 LOW Thia Khiang, 624 LOY SIM CHHEANG, 156 LU, Annette, 189, 191, 196 LU Hsiu-lien, 189, 191, 196 LU Ping, 183 LUCAS, Neil, 90 LUDHIANVI, Maulana Muhammad Ahmad, 559 LUI, Frank, 530 LUITEL, Pushpa Prasad, 508 LUKA, Faimalaga, 738, 739 LUNSTEAD, Jeffrey, 444, 665 LUO Gan, 178 LUTALI, A. P., 749 LUTHUFEE, Abdulla, 440 LYNGDOH, H. S., 277 MA Ying-jeou, 195, 197 MAARIF, Zainal, 302 MACAPAGAL, Diosdado, 585 MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Gloria, 585, 588, 597 MACEDA, Ernesto, 587, 597 MACHAIDZE, Edisher, 242 MACKLIN, Jenny, 83 MACKLIN, Michael, 83 MADAMINOV, Salay, 732 MADINOV, Romin, 344 MADJID, Abdul, 306 MADRAIWIWI, Joni, 205, 208 MADUMAROV, Adakhan, 401 MAEHARA, Seiji, 329 MAETIA Kaluae, John, 636 MAGSAYSAY, Ramon, 585 MAHANTA, Prafulla Kumar, 274 MAHARA, Krishna Bahadur, 508 MAHATHIR bin Mohamad, 419 MAHATO, Rajendra Kumar, 503 MAHATO, Sudhir, 265 MAHENDRA, Yusril Ihza, 290, 303 MAHENDRA Bir Bikram Shah Dev, 492 MAHMOOD Iskandar, Tunku, 423 MAHMUD, Malik, 293, 307 MAIMOAGA, Matatumua, 614 MAINALI, Chandra Prakash, 505 MAIZBHANDARI, Najibul Bashar, 122 MAKHKAMOV, Khakhor, 667 MAKMUN, Syukron, 305 MALEK, Abdul, 48 MALIELEGAOI, Tuila’epa Sailele, 611, 612, 615 MALIETOA, Tuala Tiresa, 615 MALIK, Muhammad Yasin, 278 MALIKOV, Muhammadbobir, 732 MALLEH, Radin, 430 MALLYA, Vijay, 277

MAMALADZE, Gaioz, 243 MAMALADZE, Levan, 240 MAMALONI, Solomon, 630 MAMBETALIYEVA, Asel, 404 MAMEDOV, Etibar, 104 MAMEDOV, Yagub, 94 MAMMADLI, Nuraddin, 103 MANANDHAR, Bishnu Bahadur, 505 MANDAL, Badri Prasad, 507 MANDAL, Suraj, 264 MANDOKHEL, Abdul Rahim Khan, 556 MANDOWEN, Willy, 312 MANGLAPUS, Raul, 596 MANI, K. M., 274 MANIK, Saifuddin Ahmed, 124 MANIKKADASAN, Thasan, 664 MANIKU, H. Reeko Ibrahim, 444 MANJHI, Joba, 277 MANJU, Anwar Hossain, 121 MANJUR, Naziur Rahman, 119 MANJUR, Nurul Islam, 118 MANN, Jaswant Singh, 268 MANN, Simranjit Singh, 277 MANNAN, M. A., 122 MANOIAN, Gino, 64 MANOON Roopkachorn, 685 MANSOR Abdul Rahman, 627 MANSUR, Abdul Hafez, 45 MANTAWIL, Jun, 605 MANTO, Abid Hasan, 558 MANUKIAN, Vazgen, 57, 65, 66 MANUPUTTY, Alex, 308 MANZUR, Mohammad Abdul, 111 MAOATE, Terepai, 528 MAO BOURA, 158 MAO Zedong (MAO Tse-tung), 166 MARA, Kamisese K. T., 204, 205 MARAK, Dilash, 281 MARAN, Dayanidhi, 263 MARANON, Alfredo, 601 MARC ¸ AL, Arlindo, 711 MARCOS, Ferdinand E., 584, 585 MARCOS, Imee, 600 MARCOS, Imelda, 584, 600 MAREHALAU, Jesse B., 453 MARGIANI, Avtandil, 242 MARIANO, Rafael, 601 MARINE, Michael W., 778 MARKARIAN, Andranik, 57, 59, 64 MARKARIAN, Hrant, 64 MARKARIAN, Tatoul, 71 MARSHALL, John R., 513 MARTIN, Harold, 224 MARTINS, Jo˜ao Soares, 710 MARTINS, Jos´e, 711 MARTIROSIAN, Armen, 71 MARURAI, Jim, 530 MARZBAN, Mohammad Kabir, 48 MASALIYEV, Absamat, 403 MASALIYEV, Ishak, 403 MASHKEVICH, Aleksandr, 344

MASHRIQI, Inayatullah Khan, 556 al-MASHRIQI, Hameeduddin, 556 MASIMOV, Ali, 104 MASING, James Jemut, 429 MASON, Andrea, 84 MASOOD, Mohammed, 275 MASOUD, Ahmad Wali, 48 MASOUD, Ahmad Zia, 31, 48 MASOUD, Ahmed Shah, 33 MATA’AFA, Fiame, 611 MATAICHI, Seiji, 331 MATAK, Ant´onio Aitahan, 712 MATANE, Paulias, 571 MATASKELEKELE, Kalkot, 757 MATHIEU, Michel, 224 MATHIMUGARAJAH, Ponnathurai, 656 MATIN, M. A., 119 MATSUMOTO, Takeaki, 330 MATTA, Anis, 302 MAUNG AYE, 471, 473 MAUNG MAUNG, 471, 482 MAUNG MAUNG KHA, 470 MAWAN Ikom, William, 429 MAYAWATI, Kumari, 273 MAZA, Liza, 601 MAZARI, Abdul Ali, 45 MAZARI, Balkh Sher, 537 McCALLUM, Robert M., 88 McCARTEN, Matt, 523 McCARTNEY, Bruce, 523 McCORMICK, William Paul, 527, 617 McDIVEN, Chris, 81 McKINNON, Don, 516 McLAY, James, 520 McQUEEN, Ewen, 523 MDINARADZE, Temur, 243 MEAOLE, Tupua Tamasese, 611 MEDEUBEKOV, K. U., 336, 337 MEDHANANDA Thera, Ellawala, 657 MEGHEN, Rajkumar, 281 MEL, Michael, 580 MEL, Wimalasiri de, 651 MELENCIO, Sonny, 603 MENGAL, Sardar Ataullah, 555 MENON, Rashed Khan, 123 MENON, Vanu Gopala, 628 MENZIES, Robert, 80 MESEBELUUA, Augustine, 569 MEURANT, Ross, 514, 520 MICHINOMIYA HIROHITO, 315 MIDDLETON, Hannah, 85 MIKELADZE, Jemal, 242 MIKI, Takeo, 314 MILNE, Christine, 84 MINCHIN, Nick, 81 MINDELI, Irakli, 238 MIR, Farooq Amjad, 549 MIR, Sajid, 553 MIRIANASHVILI, Mirian, 242 MIRIORI, Martin, 574 MIRIUNG, Theodore, 574

INDEX

MIRSAIDOV, Shakhrulla, 743 MIRZA, Iskander, 534 MIRZAKHANIAN, Rouben, 68, 69 MIRZIYOEV, Shavkat, 743, 745 MIRZOYEV, Akbar, 668 MISHU, Mushrefa, 124 MISUARI, Nur, 588, 604 MITHI, Mukut, 275 MITRA, Ramon, 587 MIYAZAWA, Kiichi, 315 MIZAN Zainal Abidin ibni al-Mahum Sultan Mahmud al-Muftaki Billah Shah, Sultan, 419 MKRTCHIAN, Levon, 64 MNATSAKANIAN, Ruben, 68 MOCE, Manasa, 213 MODI, Narendra, 253, 267 MOGGIE, Leo, 429 MOHAMED ALI Rustam, 427 MOHAMED Haniffah, 434 MOHAMED Isa Abdul Samad, 425 MOHAMMAD, Ghulam, 534 MOHAMMAD, Khalid Shaikh, 51 MOHAMMAD, Maulawi Mohammad Nabi, 34 MOHAN Kandassamy, 431 MOHAQEQ, Mohammad, 43, 44 MOHAZZIZI, Zaidi, 45 MOHSENI, Aseh, 45 MOJADEDI, Hashimatullah, 47 MOJADEDI, Sibghatullah, 33, 47, 53 MOLISA, Sela, 763 MOLLAZADE, Asim, 102 MOMIS, John, 577, 582 MOMOEDONU, Tevita, 205, 207, 215 MONDIA, Paul, 580 MONTRI Pongpanit, 697 MONTU, Mostafa Mohsin, 124 MOON Sung Hyun, 389 MOOPANAR, G. K., 262 MOORE, Michael (Mike), 514 MORALES, Horacio “Boy,” 599 MORAUTA, Mekere, 571, 575 MORGAN, Grant, 524 MORI, Yoshiro, 315, 317, 327 MORIARTY, James Francis, 511 MORRIS, Greta N., 449 MOSES, Marlene, 490 MOULANA, Nizar, 659 MOVSESIAN, Miran, 68 MOVSISIAN, Mihran, 69 MUALIA, Lemamea Ropati, 615 MUBAROK, Muhammad, 298 MUFTI, Mehbooba, 266 MUHABBATOV, Hakim, 675 MUHAMMAD, Maulama Sufi, 559 MUHAMMAD Ali Aman, 624, 625 MUHYIDDIN bin Mohamad Yassin, 427 MUIVAH, Thuingalend, 281 MUJAHID, Ali Ahsan, 119 MUJUTABA, Ahmed, 440

MUKARUNG, Tara, 135 MUKASHEV, Rakhmet, 344 MUKHAMEDZHANOV, Oral, 349 MUKHERJEE, Pranab Kumar, 262 MUKHIM, M. D., 277 MULDOON, Robert D., 513 MULFORD, David C., 284 MUNOKOA, Ngamau, 529 AL-MUQRIN, Abdul-Mohson, 51 MURAD, Al-Haj, 605 MURALEEDHARAN, K., 276 MURALITHARAN, Vinayagamurthi, 648, 664 MURALIYEV, Amangeldy, 394 MURAYAMA, Tomiichi, 316, 331 MUROV, Samad, 732 MURUGESU Kannan, 436 MURVANIDZE, Zurab, 243 MUSA bin Hital, 419 MUSAYEV, Elshad, 105 MUSHARAF, Khalid, 110 MUSHARRAF, Pervez, 535, 539 MUSSOMELI, Joseph A., 161 MUSTAFAYEV, Fuad, 102 MUTALIBOV, Ayaz Niyaz Ogly, 94 MUTALOV, Abdulhashim, 744 MUZADI, Hasyim, 300 MZ, Zainuddin, 302 NABI, Ahmad, 44 NABIYEV, Rakhman, 668 NAGAGAVORA, Tui Ba Ratu Sairusi, 215 NAGIYEV, Akif, 105 NAIDU, Dorsami, 216 NAIDU, N. Chandrababu, 270 NAIDU, Venkaiah, 267 NAILATIKAU, Epeli, 207, 218 NAISSELINE, Nido¨ısh, 223 NAITINI, Ilikini, 207, 212 NAJARIAN, Yeghia, 66 NAJIB bin Abdul Razak, Mohamed, 421, 427 NAJIBULLAH (NAJIB), Mohammad, 32 NAKAMURA, Kuniwo, 567, 569 NAKASONE, Yasuhiro, 314 NAKAYAMA, Masao, 453 NAKAYAMA, Tosiwo, 451 NALI, Michael, 574 NALO, Alfred Maseng, 757 NAM Duck Woo, 377 NAMALIU, Rabbie, 572, 579 NAMANGONIY, Juma, 733 NANAYAKKARA, T. M. S., 660 NANAYAKKARA, Vasudeva, 660 NAPE, Jeffrey, 582 NAQSHBANDI, Pir Abdul Rahim, 552 NAQVI, Abdul Jalil, 554 NAQVI, Allama Sajid Ali, 554 NARAIN, Raj, 248 NARAK RATANAK VOATHANOR, 158 NARANTSATSRALT, Janlaviin, 457

875

NARAYANAN, Jaya Prakash, 248 NARAYANAN, Kicheril Raman, 247, 251 NARAYAN Shah, Prithvi, 492 NARIKBAYEV, Maksut, 345 NARO, H. J., 304 NARO, Jailani, 300 NARONGLERT Surapol, 698 NARUHITO, Crown Prince, 315 NARZIEV, Mirhusayn, 678 NASARUDDIN Mat Isa, Ustaz, 425, 432 NASAU (Atafu), Kuresa, 532 NASCIMENTO, Basilio dos, 704 NASEER, Umar, 444 NASHAD, Fida Muhammad, 564 NASHEED, Mohamed, 442, 444 NASIBOV, Nadir, 96 NASIM, Abu Saleh Mohammad, 113 NASIR, Ibrahim, 439 NASIRYEV, Munavvarsho, 669 NASRIDDINOV, Hikmatullo, 675 NATADZE, Nodar, 242 NATAPEI, Edward, 759, 763 NATELASHVILI, Shalva, 239 NATHAN, Sellapan Ramanathan, 619, 620 NATTHAWAT Nuchanart, 698 NAUPA, John, 763 NAVASARDIAN, A., 67 NAWARATHNE, Ranjith, 652 NAZARBAYEV, Abishevich, 338 NAZARBAYEVA, Dariga, 341, 344 NAZARSHOYEV, Mayonsho, 669 NAZZAR, Mohammad, 290 ´ NEAOUTYINE, Paul, 223 NEHRU, Jawahar Lal, 248 NEJRABI, Ghulam Faruq, 48 NELLORE, Johnny, 276 NELSON, Brendan, 79 NEMWANG, Subash, 510 NENA, Jacob, 451 NEPAL, Madhav Kumar, 496, 503 NETTLE, Kerry, 84 NEUMANN, Ronald E., 54 NEWAZ, Garib, 124 NE WIN, 470 NEWIN Chidchob, 694 NEWMAN, Muriel, 522 NG Nuok Cheong, 187 NGEDUP, Sangay, 131 NGO DINH DIEM, 769 NGUYEN BA CAN, 770 NGUYEN CAO KY, 769 NGUYEN HUU THO, 770 NGUYEN KHANH, 769 NGUYEN LUONG BANG, 770 NGUYEN MANH CAM, 776 NGUYEN MINH TRIET, 769, 772, 776 NGUYEN PHU TRONG, 776, 778 NGUYEN SINH HUNG, 776 NGUYEN TAN DUNG, 769, 772, 776 NGUYEN THI BINH, 769, 771 NGUYEN VAN AN, 776

876

INDEX

NGUYEN VAN CHI, 776, 778 NGUYEN VAN LINH, 771 NGUYEN VAN THIEU, 769 NHIEK BUN CHHAY, 150 NHOUNG SEAP, 158 NIAZI, Maulana Abdul Sattar Khan, 553 NICOLAU, Francisco Ly Assis, 712 NIFADYEV, Vladimir, 407 NIK ABDUL AZIZ Nik Mat, 432 NIK ADLI Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, 425 NIKAI, Toshihiro, 327 NIKORA, Amberoti, 352 NILE, Fred, 85 NILU, Shawkut Hossain, 121 NISSANKA, Kamal, 659 NIWA, Yuya, 327 NIYAZOV, Jumaboy, 678 NIYAZOV, Saparmurad Atayevich, 723, 727, 729 NIZAM Din, Mohamed Din bin, 434 NIZAMI, Matiur Rahman, 119 NOGHAIDELI, Zurab, 227, 232 NOGRALES, Prospero, 597 NONG DUC MANH, 769, 771, 776, 778 NOORANI, Maulana Shah Ahmed, 553 NOORANI, Maulana Shah Muhammad Anas, 553 NOR, Fadzil Mohamad, 432 NORMAN, Russel, 521 NORODOM CHAKRAPONG, Prince, 147 NORODOM RANARIDDH, Prince, 148, 156 NORODOM SIHAMONI, King, 145, 150 NORODOM SIHANOUK, King, 144, 145 NORODOM SIRIVUDH, Prince, 156 NORODOM SURAMARIT, 144 NOTE, Kessai H., 446, 447, 448 NOUHAK PHOUMSAVAN, 411 NUNISA, Pranab, 280 NUON BUNNA, 158 NUON CHEA, 149 NURHASYIM, Amrozi bin, 307 NURI, Sayed Abdullo, 670, 677 NURIEV, Alimammud, 102 NURKADILOV, Zamanbek, 342 NURMAMEDOV, Nurherdi, 727 NURMURADOV, Shirali, 729 NURMYRADOV, Shiraly, 727 NUROLLAH, Sayyed, 45 NURULLAYEV, Telman, 105 NUR WAHID, Hidayat, 302, 308 NUWA WEA, Jacob, 300 NYAMDORJ, Tsendiin, 462, 468 NYAM-OSOR, Namsrain, 466 NYAROK, Peter, 429 NYRIN MINT, 481 NYYAZOW, Saparmyrat, 723, 727, 729 OBAIDULLAH, Mullah, 50 O’BRIEN, Kolouei, 532

OBUCHI, Keizo, 315 OCAMPO, Satur, 601 OCHIRBAT, Gombojavyn, 456 OCHIRBAT, Punsalmaagiyn, 456 OGI, Chikage, 326, 332 OHIRA, Masayoshi, 314 OITERONG, Alfonso, 565 OJABER, Nasir, 48 OJALA, Anton, 531 OLA, Sis Ram, 261 OLDFIELD, David, 84 OLI, K. P. Sharma, 503 OLIVEIRA, Domingos de, 712 OLTER, Bailey, 451 OMAR, Mohammad, 35, 50 ONA, Francis, 572 ONARIO, Rota, 352 O’NEILL, Peter, 580 ONG Ka Chuan, 428 ONG Ka Ting, 428 ONG Teng Cheong, 619, 620 ONGARBAYEV, Yerkin, 345 ONGKILI, Maximus, 430 ONORIO, Teima, 353 OQILOV, Oqil, 667 OQILOV, Oqil (Akil AKILOV), 671 ORAZOV, Khudayberdy, 724 ORAZOV, Meret Bairamovich, 736 ORDWAY, John M., 350 ORGAN, Michael, 83 ORIPOV, Otanazar, 732 ORIPOV, Shuhrat, 730 OROZALIYEV, Tabyldy, 404 OROZBEKOV, Almay, 407 OSHIMA, Kenzo, 334 OSKANIAN, Vartan, 69 OSMANI, Mohammad Ataul Ghani, 119, 122 OSMENA, Emilio “Lito” R., 600 OSMENA, John “Sonny,” 600 O’SULLIVAN, Sherry, 453 OTA, Akihiro, 328 OTHMAN, Mahmud Morshidi Awang, 141 OTI, Patteson, 634, 635 OTORBAYEV, Djoormart, 402 OTUNBAYEVA, Roza, 404 OUDOM KHATTIGNA, 412 OUK PHURIK, 158 OVANESIAN, Vahan, 64 OVANESSIAN, Gagik, 64 OVENS, Jill, 523 OWAISI, Asaduddin, 274 OWAISI, Salahuddin, 274 OYUN, Sanjaas¨urengiyn, 465 OZATA, Sadatashi, 327 OZAWA, Ichiro, 315, 330 PADMANABHA, K., 656 PAEK Nam Sun, 368 PAENIU, Bikenibeu, 738 PAGARO, Pir Sahib, 550

PAHLAWAN, Abdul Malik, 36 PAIRIN Kitingan, Joseph, 430 PAK Gil Yon, 373 PAK Pong Ju, 365 PAK Song Chol, 371 PAKI, Evan Jeremy, 583 PAKPAHAN, Mochtar, 305 PAL, Raja Ram, 273 PALEJO, Rasul Bakhsk, 557 PALMER, Geoffrey, 514 PAMUNGKAS, Sri Bintang, 305 PANAKHLY, Neimat, 105 PANDEY, Laxmikant, 507 PANDIT, Khem Raj, 506 PANDITHAN, M. G., 433 PANGILINAN, Francis, 598 PANGILINAN, Kiko, 597 PANKAJAKSHAN, K., 272 PANY YATHOTHU, 414 PAORA, Rangitukehu, 524 PARARAJASINGHAM, Joseph, 656 PARAS Bir, Crown Prince, 493 PARK Choong Hoon, 376 PARK Chung Hee, 375 PARK Geun Hye, 388 PARK Jie Won, 381 PARK Tae Joon, 379 PARNOHADININGRAT, Sudjadnan, 311 PARVATHI, Lakshmi, 270 PASCOE, B. Lynn, 311 PASHAYEV, Hafiz Mir Jalal, 107 PASKA, John, 582 PASWAN, Ram Vilas, 265 PATEL, A. D., 215 PATEL, Ahmen, 262 PATIASHVILI, Dzhumber, 241, 243 PATNAIK, Biju, 268 PATNAIK, Naveen, 268 PATSATSIA, Otar, 228 PAWANTEH, Abdul Hamid, 436 PAWAR, Sharad, 264 PEACOCK, Andrew, 80 PEDRAM, Abdul Latif, 48 PEMBERTON, John, 524 PENE, Sakumanu, 216 PENG Yen-wen, 199 PENJO, Daw, 136 PENJORE, Thinley, 134, 135 PENN NOUTH, 144 PEN SOVAN, 157 PEREIRA, Agio, 710 PERERA, Nelson, 660 PERRY, Edwin, 519 PERUASHEV, Azat, 344 PERUMAL, Annamalai Varatharaja, 642, 657 PETERS, Winston, 514, 519 PETHERBRIDGE, Tim, 85 PHADO MAHN SHA, 481 PHAM GIA KHIEM, 777 PHAM HUNG, 770

INDEX

PHAM QUANG NGHI, 777 PHAM THE DUYET, 776 PHAM TRUONG NGHI, 778 PHAM VAN DONG, 770 PHANGCHO, Rabi Kumar, 275 PHANTHONG PHOMMAHAXAY, 416 PHAN VAN KHAI, 769, 771 PHAVLENISHVILI, David, 240 PHIBHOP Dhongchai, 692, 698 PHOUMI NOSAVAN, 410 PHOUMI VONGVICHIT, 411 PHUNG QUANG THANH, 777 PIBULSONGGRAM, Luang, 684 PICKERING, David, 214 PIERANTOZZI, Sandra, 567 PIESSE, Paul, 523 PILLAI, Karakulam Krishna, 276 PILLAI, R. Balakrishna, 275 PIMENTEL, Aquilino, Jr., 599 PINIJ Jarusombat, 694 PINTO, Francisco, 711 PINTO, Paulo Sarmento, 712 PIRABAKARAN, Velupillai, 644, 662 PIRZADA, Mian Riaz Hussain, 549 PISAL Younfpeasit, 698 PITAKAKA, Moses, 631 PODIAPPUHAMI, K. A., 652 POE, Fernando, Jr., 590 POGOSIAN, Stepan, 57 POHIVA, ‘Akilisi, 716, 719 POKHAREL, Lilamani, 504 POL POT, 146 POMAT Jaroenphuvadol, 698 PONGA, Elizabeth, 529 PONG PISETH, 158 PONGPOL Adireksarn, 694 PONGTHEP Thepkanchana, 694 PONNAMBALAM, Gajendrakumar, 656 PONNAMBALAM, Kumar, 656 PORA, Paul, 580 POUDEL, Balaram, 134 POUDYAL, Ram Chandra, 502 POV PHOM, 157 PRABHAKARAN, Velupillai, 644, 662 PRACHA Maleenont, 694 PRACHAI Leophairatana, 697 PRACHANDA, Comrade, 496, 508 PRACHUAB Chaiyasarn, 694 PRADHAN, Sahana, 503 PRAKASH, N. S. K. Uma, 662 PRAMUAL Rujanaseri, 697 PRAPAS Charusathira, 684 PRAPHAT Bhothasuthon, 695 PRASAI, Nanda Kumar, 506 PREBBLE, Richard, 522 PREMACHANDRAN, Suresh K., 657 PREMADASA, Ranasinghe, 640 PREMAJAYANTHA, Susil, 650 PREM Tinsulanond, 685 PRIDI Phanomyong, 684 PRINCEN, H. Johannes, 296

PRODHAN, Shafiul Alam, 121 PUAPUA, Tomasi, 738 PU CIN SIAN THANG, 480 PULAT, Abdurahim, 732 PULUNGAN, Rivai, 303 PUN, Narayan Singh, 496, 507 PUNDARI, John, 578 PUNO, Ronaldo, 593, 598 PURNELL, Jon R., 735 PURNOMO, Nurdin, 304 PUTEH, Abdullah, 296 PUTEH, Pengiran Anak Dato, 142 PYITHIT NYUENT WAI, 482 ul-QADRI, Tahir, 557 QAMAR-U-ZAMAN, Sardar, 563 QANUNI, Mohammad Yunos, 41, 43, 53 QARASE, Laisenia, 205, 211, 212 QAYYUM, Sardar Abdul, 563 QIAN Qichen, 173 QIAO Shi, 178 QIN Yongmin, 179 QORAQULOV, Amir, 677 QOZHAKHMET, Hasan, 347 QUAMARUZZAMAN, Muhammad, 119 QUIRINO, Elpidio, 585 QURESHI, Fazal-ul-Haq, 278 QURESHI, Mazhan, 549 QURESHI, Moeenuddin Ahmad, 537 QURESHI, Shah Mahmood, 540 QUVVATOV, Sulton, 679 RAB, A. S. M. Abdur, 123 RABBANI, Burhanuddin, 34, 45 RABBANI, Mian Raza, 551 RABBANI, Mohammad, 35 RABIA, Abu Hamza, 51 RABIEBRAT Pongpanit, 698 RABUKA, Sitiveni, 204, 205, 213 RADHAKRISHNAN, V., 659 RADZI Sheikh Ahmad, 426, 427 RAE, Pramod, 216 RAFEER, M. I. M., 652 RAFFLES, Stamford, 619 RAFIQ, Khawaja Saad, 554 RAHIM, Arbab Ghulam, 548 RAHIZAN Yaacob, Mohammed, 625 RAHMAN, A. K. M. Obaidur, 118 RAHMAN, Azizur, 111 RAHMAN, Fazlur, 122, 540, 552 RAHMAN, Latifur, 109, 114 RAHMAN, Maulana Abdur, 117, 125 RAHMAN, Maulana Fazlur, 35, 552 RAHMAN, Mohammad Habibur, 113 RAHMAN, Mujibur, 110, 536 RAHMAN, Tarique, 118 RAHMAN, Ziaur, 110 RAHMONOV, Emomali, 667, 669, 676 RAHUL, Hisila, 508 RAINSY, Sam, 148, 157 RAIR, Kishor, 135

877

RAIS, Amien, 288, 301 RAJA, Doraiswamy, 272 RAJAN, Parathan, 662 RAJAPAKSE, Mahinda, 639, 646, 650 RAJARATTINAM, R., 662 RAJKHOWA, Arabinda, 280 RAJMAH Hussain, 437 RAKHMONOV, Imomali, 667, 669, 676 RAKKA, Balwant Singh, 206 RAKKIAT Sukthana, 697 RAM, Sukh, 262 RAMACHANDRAN, Maruthur Gopala, 271 RAMACHANDRAN, Panrutti S., 276 RAMA IX, King, 683 RAMDOSS, Anbumani, 264 RAMDOSS, S., 264 RAMLI bin Ngah Talib, Diraja, 436 RAMOS, Fidel V., 586, 597 RAMOS-HORTA, Jos´e, 703 RAMZI, Asif, 559 RANA, Pashupati Shumsher, 506 RANDT, Clark T., Jr., 181 RAO, K. Chandrasekhar, 265 RAO, Nandmuri Tarak (N. T.) Rama, 270 RAO, P. V. Narasimha, 247 RASHID, Hussein, 444 RASHID, Kazi Firoz, 121 RASIZADE, Artur, 93, 96, 101 RASMUSSEN, Wilkie, 529 RASOOL, Abdul, 659 RASYID, Ryaas, 303 RATA, Matiu, 522 RATAN, Abdul Malek, 123 RATHORE, Mumtaz Hussain, 563 RATURI, B. D., 278 RAVDAN, Bold, 468 RAVUTIA, Albert, 765 RAYAMAJHI, Keshar Jung, 505 RAYONG NYIPA, Johnical, 433 RAZALEIGH Hamzah, Tengku, 419 RAZZAQ, Abdur, 119 RCHEULISHVILI, Vakhtang, 238 REACH CHAN SOVAN, 157 REANG, Surjomoni, 281 RECTO, Ralph, 600 REDDY, Jai Ram, 206 REDDY, Neelam Sanjiva, 249 REDDY, Ram, 215 REES, Grover Joseph, III, 714 REEVES, Graeme, 520 REEVES, Paul, 206 REGENVANU, Sethy John, 758, 762 REHMAN, Qari Gul, 552 REID, Alan, 567 REID, Leala P., 750 REINADO, Alfredo, 708 REKLAI, Johnny, 569 REMELIK, Haruo I., 565 REMENGESAU, Thomas (Tommy), 566, 567

878

INDEX

RETZLAFF, Misa Telefoni, 615 REX, Robert R., 530 REX, Robert R. Jr., 530 REYES, Ike de los, 603 RHEE, Syngman, 375 RHEE In Je, 390 RICHARDS, Len, 523 RICHARDSON, Dennis James, 88 RICHARDSON, Ruth, 514 RIDGEWAY, Aden, 83 RIJAL, Nagendra Prasad, 492 RIKIS, Rore, 581 RIMONI Ah Chong, Su’a, 615 RINGU, Kamen, 275 RINI, Snyder, 631, 632, 636 RIO, Neiphiu, 271 RIZAL, Tek Nath, 131, 135 RO Jai Bong, 378 ROBSON, Matt, 519 ROCO, Raul S., 600 RODRIGUES, Roque F´elix, 708 ROH Moo Hyun, 375, 381, 387 ROH Tae Woo, 377 ROMERO, Miguel, 599 RONGPI, Jayanta, 276 ROSAL, Gregorio, 602 ROSALES, Etta, 601 ROSARIO, Albert Ferreros Del, 609 ROWLING, Wallace E., 513 ROXAS, Manuel, 585 ROXAS, Manuel, III, 598 ROY, Abani, 272 ROY, Ajoy, 124 ROY, Donkupar, 277 ROY, Heather, 522 ROY, Mukul, 271 ROZI, Abdul Majid, 45 RUAK, Taur Matan, 703 RUBIS, Patau, 434 RUDD, Kevin, 82 RUKMANA, Siti Hardiyanti, 303 RURUA, Roman, 238 RUSDAN, Abu, 307 RUSSELL, David, 81 RUSTAMKHANLY, Sabir, 103 RUSTAMOV, Asliddin, 731 RUSTAMOV, Ayaz, 104 RUYTER, Stephnie de, 524 RYU Keun Chan, 390 RYU Mi Yong, 373 SAAKASHVILI, Mikhail, 227, 231, 237 SABARATNAM, Mohan Sri, 657 SABDULA, Najmi, 606 SABINO, Mariano, 710 SADEQ, Mohammed, 124 SADOYAN, Arshak, 66 SADYGALIYEV, Sarygul, 403 SADYRBAYEV, Dooronbek, 404 SAEED, Hassan, 442 SAFARLI, Mais, 100, 105

SAFAROV, Sangak, 669 SAHABUDDAIN, Abu Hamed, 123 SAHAKIAN, Galust, 64 SAHAKIAN, Sanatruk, 67 SAID, Umar, 298 SAIDI, Ridwan, 301 SAIDOV, Hikmatullo, 679 SAIKHANBILEG, Ts., 466 SAILO, Thenphunga, 277 SAI NYUNT LWIN, 480 SAI SOE NYUNT, 482 SAIT, Ibrahim Sulaiman, 271 SAIYA, Simon, 308 SAI YI, 479 SAJJAD, Wasim, 537 SAKI, Jonaid, 124 SALAHUDDIN, Syed, 279 SALAHUDDIN Abdul Aziz Sha al-Haj ibni al-Marhum, 419 SALAM, Abdus, 124 SALAMAT, Hashim, 590 SALEH, Abdul Rahman, 303 SALI, Brahama, 605 SALIH, Muhammad, 744, 732 SALII, Lazarus, 565 SALLEH bin Abas, Mohamad, 420 SALONGA, Jovito, 597 SALOTE TUPOU, Queen, 716, 717 SAMAD, Abdus, 124 SAMADOV, Abadujalil Ahadovich, 669 SAMADOV, Abutalyb, 105 SAMAK Sundaravej, 686, 697 SAMANE VIYAKHET, 414 SAMARAWEERA, Mangala, 650 SAMARAWICKRAMA, Malik, 654 SAMI, Beni, 216 SAMIR, Hashim, 605 SAMPANTHAN, Rajavarothiyam, 655, 656 SAMUDRA, Imam, 307 SANAN Kachornprasart, 688, 696 SANDAR WIN, 474 SANG, Gaston Tong, 221 SANGAD Chaloryu, 685 SANGMA, Purno, 264 SANI Jan, M., 627 SANJAR, Sebghatullah, 48 SAN JUAN, Frisco, 597 SANOH Thienthong, 697 SANTANA, Konis, 703 SANTOS, Hilarion del Rosario (Ahmad), 606 SANTOS, Jo˜ao Baptista Dos, 712 SANYA Dharmasakti (Thammasak), 684 SAN YU, 470 SAPTA, Oesman, 305 SARGSIAN, Sos, 64 SARI, Dita Inda, 305 SARISHVILI-CHANTURIA, Irina, 239, 243 SARIT Santimethanedol, 698

SARIT Thanarat, 684 SARKAR, Manik, 272 SARKISIAN, Aram G., 57, 59, 65, 66 SARKISIAN, Armen, 58 SARKISIAN, Vazgen, 59 SARMENTO, Carlos de Almeida, 712 SARSEMBAYEVA, Raushan, 344 SARSENBAYEV, Altynbek, 341 SASONO, Adi, 305 SATHANANTHAN, S., 664 SATHASIVAM, S., 660 SATO, Eisaku, 314 SATTAR, Abdus, 111 SATTAR, Farooq, 549 SATYANAND, Anand, 513 SAUDABAYEV, Kanat B., 350 SAUKHAM KHOY, 146 SAVANG VATTHANA, King, 411 SAVU, Viliame, 213 SAVUA, Isikia Rabici, 218 SAW BA THEIN SIEN, 481 SAW MAUNG, 471, 472 SAW MRA AUNG, 480 SAW TUN OO, 479 SAYADOV, Sayad, 105 SAYAF, Abdul Rasul, 33, 47 SAY CHHUM, 155 SAYEED, Hafiz Mohammed, 280, 558 SAYEED, Mufti Mohammed, 266 SAYEM, Abu Sadat Mohammad, 110 SAYOMPHU Kiatsayomphu, 698 SCHIEFFER, John T., 334 SCHYLE, Philippe, 220 SCINDIA, Madhavrao, 261 SCOTTY, Ludwig, 487 SCULLION, Nigel, 82 SEIN LWIN, 471 SEIN WIN, 470, 482 SELIM, Mujahidul Islam, 123 SELUKA, Alesana Kleis, 741 SEMA, Muslimin, 604 SEMBIRING, Tifatul, 302 SEN, Mohit, 277 SEN, Nirmal, 124 SEN, Nirupam, 284 SEN, Ranendra, 284 SENANAYAKE, D. S., 639 SENANAYAKE, Dudley, 639 SENANAYAKE, Maithripala, 650 SENI Pramoj, 684 SENILOLI, Jope, 205, 207 SEREYWATH EK, 161 SERU, Thomas Reuben, 763 SEVELE, Feleti (Fred), 717 SHABDOLOV, Shodi, 676 SHAFEEQ, Ali, 442 SHAFEEU, Ismail, 442 SHAH, Dildar, 216 SHAH, Ganesh, 505 SHAH, Sajjad Ali, 538 SHAH, Shabir Ahmed, 278

INDEX

SHAH, Yusuf, 279 SHAHEED, Ahmed, 442 SHAHEEM, Mohamed, 444 SHAHNAZARIAN, Davit, 68 SHAIKH, Ahmad Omar, 544 SHAIKH, Qaiser Ahmed, 557 SHAILIYEVA, Tokon, 403 SHAMSHIBEKOV, Medetbek, 400 SHAMSIDDINOV, Shamsiddin, 677 SHARADZE, Guram, 238 SHARIF, Kulsoom, 554 SHARIF, Mian Shabaz, 554 SHARIF, Mohammad Nawaz, 535, 537, 554 SHARMA, Dinanath, 508 SHARMA, Harish, 213 SHARMA, Rabindra Nath, 506 SHARMA, Ram Hari, 508 SHARMA, Shankar Dayal, 250 SHARMA, Shri Bhadra, 502 SHARPLES, Pita, 522 SHARQ, Mohammad Hasan, 33 SHASTRI, Lal Bahadur, 248 SHEDHAWAT, Bhairon Singh, 283 SHEEHAN, Greg, 521 SHEKHAR, Chandra, 250, 275 SHEKHAWAT, Bhairon Singh, 247, 253 SHERCHAN, Amik, 504 SHERIMKULOV, Medetkan, 404 SHERPAO, Aftab Ahmad Khan, 550 SHEVARDNADZE, Eduard Amvrosiyevich (Georgi), 226, 227 SHI Tau, 176 SHIH Ming-teh, 196 SHIHAB, Alwi, 302 SHII, Kazuo, 330 SHIKHMURADOV, Boris, 724 SHIN Hyon Hwak, 376 SHIN Ki Nam, 387 SHIN Kook Hwan, 390 SHIN Nak Kyun, 389 SHIPLEY, Jennifer (Jenny) M., 513, 514 SHIRLEY, Ken, 522 SHOVKET HACIYEVA, Lala, 103 SHRESTHA, Gopal Man, 503 SHRESTHA, Kedar Bhakta, 511 SHRESTHA, Krishna Das, 506 SHRESTHA, Marich Man Singh, 493 SHRESTHA, Pushpa Lal, 502 SHUKLA, V. C., 264, 267 SIDDHARTHAN, Dharmalingam, 664 SIDDIQUI, Kader, 122 SIDDIQUI, Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani, 552 SIDDIQUI, Muhammad Hashim, 553 SIDI Munan, 429 SIEW, Vincent, 190 SIEWERT, Rachel, 84 SIGUA, Tengiz, 227 SIKANDER Batcha, 434 SIKHARULIDZE, Vasil, 245

SILVA, Anura de, 660 SILVA, Armando Jos´e Dourado da, 712 SILVA, Avelino da, 712 SILVA, M. Tilvin, 655 SILVA, Wijetamuni Rohana De, 660 SILVA GUTERRES, Paulo Freitas da, 713 SIM Dae Pyung, 390 SIM Kheung Hui, 429 SIMPKIN, David, 523 SIM SOKHOM, 158 SIN, Jaime, 587 SINATO, Gerard, 574 SINGEROK, Jerry, 574 SINGH, Ajit, 274 SINGH, Areambam Samrendra, 281 SINGH, Arjun, 251, 261, 262 SINGH, Bhim, 277 SINGH, Charan, 249 SINGH, Gajendra Narayan, 507 SINGH, Ganesh Man, 501 SINGH, Giani Zail, 249 SINGH, Jagmohan, 277 SINGH, Jaswant, 267 SINGH, J’swant, 436 SINGH, Manjit, 268 SINGH, Manmohan, 247, 253, 262 SINGH, Mohan Bikram, 504 SINGH, Natwar, 258 SINGH, O. Joy, 277 SINGH, Prem, 215 SINGH, Rajnath, 267 SINGH, Surender, 262 SINGH, Vishwanath Pratap, 250 SINGH, Wadhwa, 281 SINGSON, Luis, 588 SINHALA, Gast˜ao, 708 SIN Kek Tong, 625 SIRADEGHYAN, Vano, 68 SIRAJ, Shahjahan, 118 SIRCAR, Muhammad Jamiruddin, 109, 127 SIRISENA, Maithiripala, 650 SISAVATH KEOBOUNPHANH, 412, 414 SISON, Jose Maria, 602 SIVAJILINGAM, M. K., 657 SIVALINGAM, Muttu, 658 SIVAPALAN, Ponnuthurai, 655 SKATE, William (Bill), 574 SKODON, Emil M., 142 SLUTZ, Pamela J. H., 468 SMITH, Mike, 519 SNG Chee Hua, 429 SOARES, Ab´ılio, 295 SOARES, Domingos, 704 SOARES, Florentino, 705 SOARES, Jos´e Abilio, 704 SOBIROV, Ilgizor, 734 SOBITHA Thera, Omalpe, 657 SODNOM, Dumajiyn, 456 SOERJOSOEMARNO, Yapto Sulistio, 305 SOE WIN, 471, 474

879

SOFIHARA, Endien, 301 SOGAVARE, Manasseh Damukana, 631, 635 SOHN Hak Kyu, 388 SOK DY, 158 SOKOMANU, George Ati, 757, 763 SOLIH (SOLIKH), Muhammad, 732 SOMARE, Michael Thomas, 571, 572, 578 SOMBOON Rahong, 696 SOMKIAT Pongpaibun, 692, 698 SOMPONG Amornvivat, 695 SOMSAK Kosaisuk, 692 SOMSAK Thepsutin, 694 SOMSAVAT LENGSAVAD, 414 SONDHI Limthongkul, 692 SONOMPIL, Mishigiyn, 458 SON SANN, 146 SON SEN, 148 SON SOUBERT, 156 SONTAYA Kunplome, 694 SONTHIYA Sawassde, 697 SOOMRO, Mohammad Mian, 541, 561 SO’ONALOLE, England, 520 SOONG, James C. Y., 191, 198 SOPE Ma’au Tamate, Barak, 757, 763 SOPOAGA, Enele Sosene, 741 SOPOANGA, Saufatu, 738 SOREN, Shibu, 264, 265 SOTHINATHAN, S., 428 SOULIVONG SAVANG, 414 SOUPHANOUVONG, Prince, 410 SOUVANNA PHOUMA, 410 SOVEA, Lasarusa, 212 SOYSA, Bernard, 651 SOYZA, Aruna, 660 SPEED, Clive, 213 SPEED, Kuini, 214 SPEIGHT, George, 207, 212 SRITHARAN, Thirunavakkarasu, 657 STALIN, M. K., 263 STALLMAN, Pam, 81 STANLEY, Laulu Dan, 615 STEVENS, Frankie, 758, 764 STEVENS, Jimmy Tupou Patuntun, 756 STOTT DESPOJA, Natasha, 83 SU Chin-chiang, 198 SU Tseng-chang, 189, 192, 196 SUALAUVI, Tuimalealiifano Va’aletoa, 615 SUBAIRDEEN, Athuallah, 651 SUBAIRDEEN, S., 651 SUBATHIRAN, Thambirajah, 656 SUBBA, Suk Bahadur, 135 SUBEDI, Lok Narayan, 505 SUBEDI, Nav Raj, 504 SUBRAMANIAM, S., 428 SUCHINDA Kraprayoon, 686 SUCHON Chaleekrua, 699 SUDARAT Keyuraphan, 694 SUDARSO, Suko, 298 SUDJATMIKO, Budiman, 305

880

INDEX

SUDRAJAT, Edi, 304 SUGIYAMA, Peter, 567 SUHARTO, 286 SUKARDI, Laksamani, 306 SUKARNO, 286 SUKARNOPUTRI, Megawati, 287, 300 SUKARNOPUTRI, Rachmawati, 303 SUKARNOPUTRI, Sukmawati, 304 SULEYMANOV, Nizami, 101 SULTANOV, Marat, 405, 407 SULTONOV, Otkir, 743, 744 SUMIT Sundaravej, 697 SUN Yat-sen, 192 SUN Yun-hsuan, 189 SUNARSO, Arif, 307 SUNIA, Tauese P. F., 750 SUPARNO, Erman, 302 SUPREYANTI, Didi, 306 SURAWEERA, Achala Ashoka, 660 SURI, Gabriel, 635 SURIYA Jungrungreangkit, 694 SURIYASI Kitasila, 692 SURYADI, 299 SUTH DINA, 158 SUTHEP Thaugsuban, 695 SUTJIPTO, 300 SUTRISNO, Try, 288 SU’U, Moses, 634 SUWAL, Prem, 504 SUWARNOPUTRO, Achmad Marhaen, 304 SUWAT Liptapanlop, 694 SUWIT Khunkitti, 694 SUWIT Watnoo, 692 SUYUNOV, Nazar, 729 SUZUKI, Muneo, 331 SUZUKI, Zenko, 314 SVOIK, Petr, 342 SWAMY, Subramanian, 277 SWU, Isaac, 281 SYAFII, Abdullah, 306 SYAHRIR, 305 SYDYKOV, Tolegen, 345 SYDYKOV, Usen, 403 SYDYKOVA, Beksultanovna, 408 SYDYKOVA, Zamira, 405 SYED HUSIN Ali, 433 SYED Sirajuddin ibni al-Marhum Syed Putra Jamalulail, Tuanku, 419 TABAI, Ieremia T., 352 TABARA, Arturo, 603 TAGA, Henri, 764 TAGO, Stephen, 580 TAHER, Abu, 110 TAIAN, Moses, 579 TAIB bin Mahmud, Patinggi Amar Abdul, 428 TAJEM, Daniel, 429 TAKEBE, Tsutomu, 327 TAKESHITA, Noburu, 314

TAKI, Makoto, 331 TAKIVEIKATA, Inoke, 210 TALAGI, Toke, 531 TALAKE, Koloa, 738 TALUKDER, Ushaton, 125 TAM, Francis, 187 TAMBLING, Grant, 91 TAMLA BAW, 481 TA MOK, 149 TAM Pak Yuen, 187 TAN Chee Khoon, 428 TAN Lead Shake, 627 TAN Soo Phuan, 626 TANADA, Lorenzo, 594 TANAI, Shahnawaz, 33 TANAKA, Kakuei, 314 TANAKA, Tommy, 751 TANAKA, Yasuo, 331 TANAY, Shahnawaz, 48 TANAYEV, Nikolay, 395 TANCZOS, Nandor, 521 TANG Fei, 191 TANG Liang Hong, 624 TANG Yian-min, 197 TANG Ying-yan, Henry, 185, 186 TANIGAKI, Sadakazu, 324, 327 TANIS, James, 582 TANJUNG, Akbar, 298 TANUMAFILI, Susuga Malietoa, II, 611 TAOFINUU, Pio, 612 TAPUELUELU, Semisi, 720 TARAKI, Nur Mohammad, 32 TARAR, Mohammad Rafiq, 535, 538 TARI, Paul Ren, 759 TARIQ, Azim Ahmad, 549 TARIQ, Muhammad Azam, 559 TARMUGI, Abdullah, 627 TARVERDIYEV, Sabir, 105 TASHTANBEKOV, Akbokon, 404 TASMAGAMBETOV, Imangali, 337, 338 TAUFA’AHAU TUPOU IV, 716, 717 TAVAIQIA, Josaia, 205 TAVARES, Jo˜ao da Silva, 704 TEANGANA, Etera, 356 TEANNAKI, Teatao, 352 TECHIN Tap-Plee, 698 TEFAARERE, Hiro, 221 TEFFT, John, 245 TEIWAKI, Roniti, 352 TEKEBAYEV, Omurbek, 395, 405 TEKWIE, John, 580 TELAWA, Saula, 213 TELITO, Filoimea, 739 TELUKLUK, Paul, 763 TEMARU, Oscar, 221 TEMIRBAYEV, Kurmanbek, 404 TEMIRKHAN, Avaz, 103 TENG Hsiao-p’ing, 167 TENORIO, Froilan C. (“Lang”), 752 TENORIO, Pedro Pangelinan (“Teno”), 752

TENTIYEV, Jenishbek, 404 TENTOA, Tewareka, 355 TEO, Fiatau Penitala, 738 TEO, Sebastain, 625 TERANG, Holiram, 275 TERESHCHENKO, Sergei, 337 TERON, Elwin, 275 TER-PETROSIAN, Levon, 57, 68 TER-TADEVOSSIAN, Arkedii, 69 TESHABOYEV, Muhammadyusuf, 730 TEWU, Denny, 303 THACKERAY, Balashaheb (Bal), 268 THACKERAY, Raj, 268 THACKERAY, Uddhav, 268 THAHIM, Abdul Razzaq, 550 THAKSIN Shinawatra, 683, 687, 694 THA KYAW, 478 THAMILSELVAN, S. P., 662 THANBUNSONG Promsutra, 697 THANGAL, Shihab Panakkad Mohammed Ali, 266 THANIN Kraivichien, 685 THANOM Kittikachorn, 684 THAN SHWE, 471, 472 THAPA, Kamal, 506 THAPA, Surya Bahadur, 492, 507 THEIN SEIN, 471, 475 ´ THEMEREAU, Marie-No¨elle, 224 THINLEY, Yoser, 131 THIRUMAVALAVAN, T., 271 THOMAS, C. F., 275 THOMAS, P. C., 275 THOMPSON, Gordon, 90 THONDAMAN, Arumugam, 658 THONDAMAN, Sauvmiamoothy, 657 THONGLOUN SISOULITH, 414 THONGSING THAMMAVONG, 414, 416 TIAMZON, Benito E., 602 TIAMZON, Wilma, 602 TIAN Chua, 432, 433 TIENCHAI Sirisamphan, 696 TIEN Pei-chun, James, 185 TIENSTEN, Paul, 578 TIKAIT, Mahendra Singh, 273 TIKOINASAU, Samisoni (Sam Speight), 212 TI-LIANG Yang, 184 TILMAN, Manuel, 711 TIMAKATA, Fred, 757 TIMEON, Taberannang, 352 TIN AUNG, 482 TINGA, Beniamina, 353 TINGGOM Karmarau, Peter, 434 TIN OO, 474, 480 TIRKEY, Bandhu, 277 TIRO, Hasan di, 290, 307 TIRUCHELVAM, Neelan, 656 TITO, Teburoro, 352, 353 TITONGOA, Willie, 762 TIWARI, Narain Dutt, 251

INDEX

TJAKRANINGRAT, Rahardjo, 305 TJIBAOU, Jean-Marie, 221 TMETUCHL, Roman, 566 TOAFA, Maatia, 738, 739 TOHA, Abdillah, 301 TOHRA, Gurcharan Singh, 268 TO HUY RUA, 778 TOKAYEV, Kasymzhomart, 338 TOKMAJIAN, Hovhannes, 68 TOKOMBAYEV, Giyaz, 405 TOKUDA, Torao, 332 TOLLNER, David, 82 TOMEING, Litokwa, 448 TON DUC THANG, 770 TONG, Anote, 352, 353, 355 TONG, Harry, 356 TONG THI PHONG, 778 TOP, Noordin Mohammed, 307 TOPADZE, Gogi, 238 TORA, Apisai, 215, 216 TORIBIONG, Johnson, 567, 569 TOROAMA, Ishmael, 577 TOROSIAN, Tigran, 64, 71 TOSHMATOV, Qobiljon, 730 TOYCHUBEKOV, Yuruslan, 404 TRAN DO, 776 TRAN DUC LUONG, 769, 771 TRAN THIEN KHIEM, 770 TRAN VAN HUONG, 770 TRAN VAN TRA, 770 TRIBHUVAN Bir Bikram Shah Dev, 492 TRIPATHI, Hridayesh, 503 TRIPATHI, Pushpesh, 278 TRIPURA, Raktatpol, 125 TRUONG CHINH, 771 TRUONG MY HOA, 769, 772 TRUONG TAN SANG, 777, 778 TRUONG VINH TRONG, 777, 778 TRUSS, Warren, 81 TSAI Chung-hsiung, 198 TSANG, Donald, 184, 186 TSANG Yam-kuen, 184, 186 TSANG Yok-sing, 184 TSARUKIAN, Gagik, 69 TSEDENBAL, Yumjaagiyn, 455 TSERETELI, Irakli, 243 TSERETELI, Nugzar, 243 TSIKLAURI, Ivane, 243 TSUGUNOMIYA AKIHITO, Emperor, 315 TSUJIMOTO, Kiyomi, 331 TSUSHIMA, Yuji, 327 TUAN Hong-Chun, 197 TUANAKOTTA, Moses, 308 TUDEV, Lodongiyn, 456 TUHANUKU, Joses, 633, 635 TUIA, Pio, 532 TU’IHA’ANGANA, 720 TUILIMU, Lagitupu, 738 TU’IPELEHAKE, Fatafehi, 716

TULAFONO, Togiola T. A., 750 TUMANIAN, Karine, 70 TUNG Chee-hwa, 184 TUN TIN, Thura, 471 TUPOU, Tevita, 717 TUPOUTO’A, Prince, 717 TURAJONZODA, Kazi Ali Akbar, 668 TURAYEV, Saifuddin, 675 TURGUNALIYEV, Topchubek, 402 TURIA, Tariana, 515, 522 TURSUNOV, Ahtam, 731 TURUMBEKOV, Kurmanbek, 404 TUVDENDORJ, Sh., 464 TUYA, Nyamosor, 457 TUYAKBAI, Zharmakhan, 339 TY CHHIN, 158 UAYCHAI Watha, 696 UBAYDULLAYEV, Makhmadsaid, 670, 681 UJANG, Celestine, 428 UKIL, Abdul Malek, 119 ULAFA’ALU, Bartholomew, 631 ULANHU, 169 ‘ULUKALALA Lavaka Ata, 717 U LWIN, 470, 480 UMAROV, Hojimuhammad, 678 UMAROV, Sanjar, 732 UNDERWOOD, Robert, 751 UNG CHOEUN, 149 UNG HUOT, 145, 148 UNO, Sosuke, 314 U NU, 470 UPRETY, Rajendra Prasad, 277 UREGEI, Yann C´el´en´e, 223 URUSEMAL, Joseph J., 451 USAROV, Olim, 731 USENOV, Daniyar, 405 USITASHVILI, Guram, 243 USMON, Davlat, 671 USUPASHVILI, David, 240 UTAYEV, Abdullah, 734 ‘UTOIKAMANU, Fekitamoeloa, 721 VAEA, Baron, 717 VAIDYA, Arun, 250 VAILE, Mark, 79, 81 VAJIRALONGKORN, Maha, 683 VAJPAYEE, Atal Bihari, 247, 251, 267 VAKALALABURE, Rakuita, 212 VALIYEV, Rakhmatullo, 678 VANG PAO, 414 VANLALZAWMA, 271 VARAPETIAN, Varden, 68 VARSHALOMIDZE, Levan, 232 VASANTHAN, S. Ramu, 276 VASHKAMADZE, Zaza, 243 VATANA Asavahame, 696 VELLU, S. Samy, 428 VENECIA, Jose de, Jr., 597, 608 VENKATARAMAN, Ramaswamy, 250

881

VER, Fabian, 586 VERNAUDON, B´eatrice, 220 ´ VERNAUDON, Emile, 219 VERSHBOW, Alexander R., 391 VIGNESHWARAN, K., 655 VIJAYAKUMARAN, S., 659 VIJAYKANT, President, 276 VILLAFUERTE, Luis, 598 VILLANUEVA, Eduardo, 600 VILLAR, Cynthia, 600 VILLAR, Manuel, Jr., 589, 600, 606 VIRADOR, Joel, 601 VIRATA, Cesar E. A., 586 VITALE, Eletise Leafa, 612 VITHARANA, Tissa, 651 VITUSAGAVULU, Jesoni, 218 VIVIAN, Young, 531 VO CHI CONG, 771 VOHIDOV, Alisher, 735 VOHOR, Serge, 757, 758, 764 VOSANIBOLA, Josefa, 210 VOSIYEV, Qurbon, 679 VO VAN KIET, 771 VUTA, Peter, 764 WAENA, Nathaniel, 631 WAHEED, Abdul, 537 WAHESWARAN, Uma, 662 WAHID, Abdurrahman, 289, 302 WAHID, Salahuddin, 298 WAILERUNY, Samuel, 308 WAJED, Hasina, 109, 111, 120 WALE, Matthew, 635 WALI, Begum Nasim, 555 WALI KHAN, Asfandyar, 555 WALI KHAN, Khan Abdul, 554 WALL, Ed, 85 WALTER, Neil, 532 WAMYTAN, Rock, 223 WAN Muhammad Noor Matha, 694 WANG Ce, 179 WANG Chien-shien, 198 WANG Chin-ping, 197 WANG Gang, 179 WANG Guangya, 181 WANG Hongwen (WANG Hung-wen), 168 WANG Jin-pyng, 202 WANG Lequan, 178 WANG Youcai, 179 WANG Zhaoguo, 178 WANG Zhen, 169 WANGCHUK, Dasho Jigme Khesar Namgyel, 131 WANGCHUK, Jigme Dorji, 130, 131 WANGCHUK, Jigme Khesar Namgyel, 133 WANGCHUK, Jigme Singye, 130, 131 WANGCHUK, Khandu, 131 WANGCHUK, Ugyan, 130 WAQABACA, Josaia, 213

882

INDEX

WAQAVAKATOGA, Taito, 217 WARAPONG Klansuta, 698 WARDAG, Rehmat Khan, 557 WARDAK, Taj Mohammad, 44 WATANUKI, Tamisuke, 331 WATTOO, Manzoor Ahmad, 549 WEE Choo Keong, 433 WEERAKOON, Batty, 651 WEERASAK Uppatham, 698 WEERAWANSA, Wimal, 655 WEI Jingsheng, 170 WELLES, Timothy, 756 WEN Jiabao, 167, 178 WENDA, Mathias, 312 WENDT, Felix, 614 WERAGODA, N. V. K. K., 654 WERROR, Moses, 311 WHITLAM, E. Gough, 73 WHITMORE, Daphna, 524 WIBOWO, Pramono Anung, 300 WICKREMANAYAKE, Ratnasiri, 639, 644, 650 WICKREMESINGHE, Ranil, 642, 653 WIDHYA, Chem, 161 WIJESINHA, Rajiva, 659 WIJETUNGE, Dingiri Banda, 641 WIJETUNGE, Harischandra, 660 WIJEWEERA, Rohana, 654 WILLIAMS, Joe, 528 WILLIAMS, Mike, 519 WILLIAMSON, Anne, 523 WILSON, Margaret, 527 WIN AUNG, 475 WINGTI, Paias, 572, 578 WIN KHET, 482 WIN MYINT, 474 WIRANTO, 288, 299 WIRASAK Khowsurat, 695 WIROSAROYO, Gunawan, 300 WITOELAR, Rachmat, 298 WONG Hong Toy, 626 WONG Kim Ming, James, 434 WOO, Peter, 184 WOOLERTON, Douglas, 519 WOONTON, Robert, 529 WOREK, George, 763 WU Bangguo, 178, 179 WU Guanzheng, 178 WU Yi, 178 XAVIER, Jacob, 711 XIMENES, Ant´onio, 711 XIMENES BELO, Carlos Felipe, 703 XU Caihou, 179 XU Wenli, 179

YAACOB Ibrahim, 624 YADAV, Bharat Bimal, 503 YADAV, Devendra Prasad, 269 YADAV, Lalu Prasad, 263 YADAV, Mulayam Singh, 273 YADAV, R. P., 263 YADAV, Ram Gopal, 273 YADAV, Sharad, 270 YAIMA, Sana, 281 YAKI, Roy, 580 YAMA, Peter, 579 YAMAHANA, Sadao, 330 YAMASAKI, Taku, 327 YAMI, Hisila, 508 YANG Shangkun, 169 YAO Wenyuan, 168 YASSIN, Kamaludin ibni Mohamed, 142 YAWD SERK, 481 YAZID, Hambali, 434 YEE Moh Chai, 430 YEGORYAN, Eduard, 67 YEIWENE, Yeiwene, 223 YE Jianying (YEH Chien-ying), 168 YELEUSIZOV, Mels, 341, 347 YEN, C. K., 189 YERMEGIYAYEV, Amangeldy, 344 YEUNG Sum, 185 YIP Yew Meng, 624, 625 YOAWAPA Wongsawat, 694 YOGESWARAN, Sarojini, 655 YOGI, Yogarathnam, 662 YOK Mu-ming, 199 YOLDOSHEV, Tohir (Tahir YOLDASH), 734 YONEZAWA, Takashi, 324 YONG Seng Fatt, 625 YONG Teck Lee, 430 YONG We Kong, Richard, 430 YOO Chang Soon, 377 YOO Si Min, 386 YOSFIAH, Yunus, 301 YOUSEF, Ramzi Ahmed, 544 YOUSUF, Abdul Kalam Muhammad, 119 YOVANOVITCH, Marie L., 408 YU Kuo-hua, 189 YU Shyi-kun, 191, 196 YU Zhengsheng, 178 YUDHOYONO, Susilo Bambang, 287, 292, 298 YUDOHUSODO, Siswono, 305 YUN Po Sun, 375 YUNUSOVA, Leyla, 101 YUSUF, Marina, 433

YUSUF, Shodmon, 668, 677 YUSUF, Syaifullah, 302 ZAFAR, Sahibzada Ishaq, 563 ZAFAR-UL-HAQ, Raja Muhammad, 554 ZAHID Hamidi, Ahmad, 420 ZAHIR, Ahmed, 444 ZAHIR SHAH, Mohammad, 32 ZAINAL Abidin, Hatta, 141 ZAINAL Abidin Yusuf, 434 ZAINUDDIN MZ, 302 ZAKI, Ahmed, 439 ZAKI, Faysollah, 45 ZAKI, Ibrahim Hussain, 444 ZALDIVAR-PEREZ, Sally, 598 ZAMORA, Ronaldo, 599 ZARDARI, Asif Ali, 538, 551 ZARIPOV, Khamrokhon, 681 AL-ZARQAWI, Abu Musab, 51 AL-ZAWAHIRI, Ayman, 53 ZENG Peiyan, 178 ZENG Qinghong, 167, 178, 179 ZHAKIYANOV, Galymzhan, 338, 347 ZHANDOSOV, Oraz, 345 ZHANG Chunqiao, 168 ZHANG Dejiang, 179 ZHANG Lichang, 179 ZHANG Lin, 176 ZHAO Ziyang, 168 ZHARA, Najia, 43 ZHOU Enlai (CHOU En-lai), 167 ZHOU Wenzhong, 181 ZHOU Yongkang, 179 ZHU De, 168 ZHU Rongji, 167, 170 ZHUKEYEV, Tulegen, 345 ZHUMAGULOV, Bakhytzhar, 344 ZHVANIA, Zurab, 227, 231, 240 ZHYLANOVA, Ludmila, 345 ZIA, Begum Khaleda, 109, 111, 118 ZIA ul-Haq, Mohammad, 536 ZIKU, Nur Alam, 123 ZIMBA, Yeshey, 131 ZINCK, Kenneth, 216 ZOHIDOV, Marat, 732 ZOIROV, Rahmatullo, 674, 678 ZORAMTHANGA, 271 ZORIG, Sanjaas¨urengiyn, 457 ZORIGT, M., 465 ZOURABICHVILI, Salome, 243 ZUBAYDAH, Abu, 51 ZULFUGAROV, Tofiq, 97 ZULKARNAEN, Arif, 307 ZULQARNAIN Khan, Raja, 563 ZURABISHVILI, Davit, 240