Political Organization in Central Asia and Azerbijan: Sources and Documents (Cummings Center Series, 9)

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IN CENTRAL ASIA AND AZERBAIJAN

The Cummings Center for Russian and East European Studies The Cummings Center Series POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IN CENTRAL ASIA AND AZERBAIJAN Sources and Documents Edited by Vladimir Babak Demian Vaisman Aryeh Wasserman

THE CUMMINGS CENTER FOR RUSSIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY The Cummings Center is Tel Aviv University’s main framework for research, study, documentation and publication relating to the history and current affairs of Russia, the former Soviet republics and Eastern Europe. The Center is committed to pursuing projects which make use of fresh archival sources and to promoting a dialogue with Russian academic circles through joint research, seminars and publications. THE CUMMINGS CENTER SERIES The titles published in this series are the product of original research by the Center’s faculty, research staff and associated fellows. The Cummings Center Series also serves as a forum for publishing declassified Russian archival material of interest to scholars in the fields of history and political science. EDITOR-IN-CHIEF Gabriel Gorodetsky EDITORIAL BOARD Michael Confino Igal Halfin Shimon Naveh Yaacov Ro’i Nurit Schleifman MANAGING EDITOR Deena Leventer

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IN CENTRAL ASIA AND AZERBAIJAN Sources and Documents EDITORS

VLADIMIR BABAK DEMIAN VAISMAN ARYEH WASSERMAN

FRANK CASS LONDON • PORTLAND, OR

First published in 2004 in Great Britain by FRANK CASS PUBLISHERS Crown House, 47 Chase Side, Southgate London N14 5BP This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “ To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to http://www.ebookstore.tandf.co.uk/.” and in the United States of America by FRANK CASS PUBLISHERS c/o ISBS, 920 N.E. 58th Avenue, Suite 300 Portland, Oregon 97213–3786 Website: http://www.frankcass.com/ Copyright © 2004 Cummings Center British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Political organization in Central Asia and Azerbaijan: sources and documents.—(The Cummings Center series) 1. Political parties—Asia, Central—Sources 2. Political parties—Azerbaijan— Sources 3. Democracy—Asia, Central —Sources 4. Democracy—Azerbaijan—Sources 5. Asia, Central—Politics and government—1991—Sources 6. Azerbaijan—Politics and government— 1991—Sources I. Babak, Vladimir II. Vaisman, Demian III. Wasserman, Aryeh IV. Cummings Center for Russian and East European Studies 324.2′58′013 ISBN 0-203-01066-3 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-7146-4838-8 (Print Edition) (cloth) ISSN 1365-3733 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Political organization in Central Asia and Azerbaijan: sources and documents/edited by Vladimir Babak, Demian Vaisman, Aryeh Wasserman. p. cm.—(The Cummings Center series; 9) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7146-4838-8 (cloth) 1. Political parties—Asia, Central—Sources. 2. Political parties—Azerbaijan— Sources. 3. Asia, Central—Politics and government—Sources. 4. Azerbaijan— Politics and government—1991—Sources. I. Babak, Vladimir. II. Vaisman, Demian. III. Wasserman, Aryeh. IV. Series. JQ1089.A45P65 2003 324.2′1′0958–dc21 2003055202 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of Frank Cass and Company Limited.

Contents PREFACE

xi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

xii

GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS

xiii

INTRODUCTION Yaacov Ro’I

1

REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN INTRODUCTION Brenda Shaffer ANA VATAN

16

BOZ GURD

27

COMMUNIST PARTY OF AZERBAIJAN

30

DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AZERBAIJAN

33

DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF ENTREPRENEURS

37

DOGRU YOL

41

ISLAMIC PARTY OF AZERBAIJAN

44

MUSAVAT

47

NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE PARTY (MILLI ISTIGLAL)

51

NATIONAL SALVATION PARTY (MILLI GURTULUSH)

56

POPULAR FRONT OF AZERBAIJAN

59

SAMUR-LEZGIN NATIONAL CENTRE

67

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AZERBAIJAN

71

TALYSH PEOPLE’S PARTY

74

TURAN PARTY OF NATIONAL STATEHOOD

76

25

YENI AZERBAIJAN

81

YURDDASH

84

REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN INTRODUCTION Vladimir Babak, Demian Vaisman, Irina Vladimirskaya ADILET

89

ALASH

99

97

ASSOCIATION FOR THE LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF KAZAKHSTAN

105

AZAT CIVIL MOVEMENT

107

COMMUNIST PARTY OF KAZAKHSTAN

114

EDINSTVO

117

FORUM SOCIETY

123

INDEPENDENT SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KAZAKHSTAN

125

LAD SLAV MOVEMENT

127

LEAGUE OF MUSLIM WOMEN

130

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

134

NEVADA-SEMIPALATINSK INTERNATIONAL ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT PARTY OF DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS

137

PEOPLE’S CONGRESS OF KAZAKHSTAN

141

POPULAR COOPERATIVE PARTY OF KAZAKHSTAN

144

RENAISSANCE PARTY OF KAZAKHSTAN

148

REPUBLICAN PARTY OF KAZAKHSTAN

151

THE RUSSIAN COMMUNITY OF KAZAKHSTAN

157

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KAZAKHSTAN

160

SOCIALIST PARTY OF KAZAKHSTAN

162

UNION OF INDUSTRIALISTS AND ENTREPRENEURS

169

UNION OF NATIONAL UNITY

171

139

ZHELTOKSAN NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

175

KYRGYZ REPUBLIC INTRODUCTION Vladimir Babak, Demian Vaisman AGRARIAN LABOUR PARTY OF KYRGYZSTAN

179

ASABA

189

ASHAR

192

ATA-MEKEN

197

DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT OF KYRGYZSTAN

200

DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT PARTY OF KYRGYZSTAN

205

ERKYN KYRGYZSTAN

210

NATIONAL UNITY DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT

213

OSH-AIMAGY

217

PARTY OF COMMUNISTS OF KYRGYZSTAN

220

PEASANT PARTY OF KYRGYZSTAN

227

REPUBLICAN PEOPLE’S PARTY OF KYRGYZSTAN

231

SLAVIC DIASPORA ASSOCIATION

233

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC ASSOCIATION OF KYRGYZSTAN

237

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KYRGYZSTAN

240

TURK-ATA

247

UNITY PARTY OF KYRGYZSTAN

249

186

REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN INTRODUCTION Grigorii Kosach COMMUNIST PARTY OF TAJIKISTAN

255

DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF TAJIKISTAN

272

EKHIEI KHUJAND POPULAR MOVEMENT

281

262

EMANCIPATED LABOUR PARTY

285

ISLAMIC RENAISSANCE PARTY OF TAJIKISTAN

287

KRYNITSA SOCIETY OF UKRAINIANS

295

LA’LI BADAKHSHON

296

OSHKORO

298

PEOPLE’S PARTY OF TAJIKISTAN

302

PEOPLE’S UNITY CONGRESS OF TAJIKISTAN

306

RASTOKHEZ POPULAR MOVEMENT

309

RU BA RU

317

THE RUSSIAN COMMUNITY

318

VAHDAT

322

REPUBLIC OF TURKMENISTAN INTRODUCTION Vladimir Babak, Demian Vaisman DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF TURKMENISTAN

327

TURKMENISTAN MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM

338

332

REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN INTRODUCTION Demian Vaisman ASSOCIATION OF KOREAN CULTURAL CENTRES

343

BIRLIK

352

ERK DEMOCRATIC PARTY

360

INTER-ETHNIC UNION OF THE PEOPLES OF UZBEKISTAN

366

ISLAMIC RENAISSANCE PARTY OF UZBEKISTAN

370

OFTOBI SUGDIEN

374

PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC PARTY

376

SAMARKAND SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ASSOCIATION

385

350

SOCIAL PROGRESS PARTY

388

WATAN TARAQQIYOTI

391

BIBLIOGRAPHY

397

INDEX

404

Preface The documents that form the backbone of this volume have been translated either from Russian or from the national vernacular. The Russian texts, which made up the largest portion, were often translated unprofessionally from the languages in question or were formulated in flawed Russian, and therefore, editing them presented a major challenge. We have tried, as far as possible, to find a happy medium between making the sources readable and preserving their character. The task of creating a unified system of transliteration and orthography in the compilation of this source book was also highly problematic. The nations covered in this volume speak primarily Turkic or Persian-based languages. However, they also contain ethnic sub-groups which represent a wide range of languages from a number of unrelated linguistic groups. All have been subjected over the years to alien linguistic influences. Their written alphabets have been replaced—sometimes two or three times—to accommodate the political aims of the ruling power. Thus the issue of rendering foreign terms, place names and names of persons was extremely complex. The orthography employed in this volume is not so much a system as a series of compromises based on criteria of readability, consistency within the text and fidelity to the original language. The names used for the republics are the official ones adopted by the states following independence. Russian appellations such as Kirgiziia and Turkmeniia have been avoided—unless they are referred to in a Soviet context. Words and place names in Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Uzbek, Azeri and Tajik, as well as in Caucasian and other languages of the region, have been rendered using a simplified, largely phonetic, transliteration system without diacritical marks. The same holds for Arabic. For the most part we have tried to use native names and spellings in place of russified ones. Where a place is known primarily by a Russian or russified name, we have tried to provide it as well.

Acknowledgements The editors would like to thank a number of people who contributed to the process of preparing this work for publication. Yaacov Ro’i devoted countless hours to reading and improving the text. Without his persistence and enormous efforts the book could never have been completed. Deena Leventer and Beryl Belsky carried out tireless and extensive editorial work in the course of trying to shape the manuscript into a readable and consistent text. Brenda Shaffer was an invaluable source of information on all matters concerning Azerbaijan. Irina Vladimirskaya made an important contribution to the section on Kazakhstan. Gennady Pasechnik compiled the index and provided vital assistance in verifying the accuracy of translations and information, and in editing the text. The editors were also assisted in finding primary and secondary source material, in navigating through massive amounts of (often conflicting) facts and figures and in resolving innumerable linguistic and technical problems by William Fierman, Moshe Gammer, Arye Gut, Vera Kaplan, Meir Litvak, Boris Morozov, Saodat Olimova, Mark Tolts and Marty VonBokel. The editors are grateful to the Israel Ministry of Absorption for its financial assistance to this project.

Glossary and Abbreviations aksakal elder dehqan peasant in traditionally sedentary parts of Central Asia hakim (hokim in Tajikistan; akim in Uzbekistan) head of a town, oblast or district executive administration KhalkMaslakhaty Turkmen People’s Council kishlak rural settlement, village madrasa advanced religious school mahalla neighbourhood of traditional urban settlement majlis from the Turkish meclis (pronounced mejlis) meaning assembly; term used in various linguistic forms for representative bodies, Central Asia and Azerbaijan. In Kazakhstan the Majlis is a chamber of the Supreme Kenges; in Tajikistan the parliament is known as the Majlisi Oli and its chambers—the Majlisi Milli and the Majlisi Namoyandogon; in Turkmenistan the parliament is the Mejlis; in Azerbaijan, the Milli Majlis and in Uzbekistan the Oli Majlis mulla Muslim religious figure; often the senior clergyman in a mosque namaz (salat Arabic) basic prayer recited five times daily; one of the five pillars of Islam obkom oblast committee oblast a province—administrative territorial unit; sub-division of union republic qazi-kalon supreme Muslim religious authority raion/raiony an administrative unit in the USSR; a subdivision of an oblast Shari‘a code of Muslim law and norms of behaviour ulama scholars of Shari‘a law uraz fast of Ramadan; one of five pillars of Islam ZhogorkuKenesh Kyrgyz parliament *** ADR

Azerbaijan Democratic Republic

ALDK

Association for the Legal Development of Kazakhstan

ALPK

Agrarian Labour Party of Kyrgyzstan

ASSR

Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

ATPP

Azerbaijan Talysh People’s Party

CIS

Commonwealth of Independent States

CM

[Azat] Civil Movement

CPA

Communist Party of Azerbaijan

CPK

Communist Party of Kazakhstan

CPSU

Communist Party of the Soviet Union

CPT

Communist Party of Tajikistan

DDK

Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan (Democraticheskoe Dvizhenie Kyrgyzstana)

DPT

Democratic Party of Tajikistan

ErK

Erkyn Kyrgyzstan

FSU

Former Soviet Union

IPA

Islamic Party of Azerbaijan

IRMT

Islamic Renaissance Movement of Tajikistan

IRP

Islamic Renaissance Party

IRPT

Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan

ISDPK

Independent Social Democratic Party of Kazakhstan

LNC

Lezgin National Centre

NDPK

National Democratic Party of Kazakhstan

NIPA

National Independence Party of Azerbaijan

PCK

Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan

PCPK

Popular Cooperative Party of Kazakhstan

PDDK

Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan

PDP

People’s Democratic Party (Uzbekistan)

PDPK

Party of Democratic Progress of Kazakhstan

PDPT

People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan

PFA

Popular Front of Azerbaijan

PPT

People’s Party of Tajikistan

PSP

Party of Social Progress (Uzbekistan)

PUCT

People’s Unity Congress of Tajikistan

RPK

Republican Party of Kazakhstan

RPPK

Republican People’s Party of Kyrgyzstan

SCA/Saikal

Samarkand Social and Cultural Association

SDA

Slavic Diaspora Association

SDPA

Social Democratic Party of Azerbaijan

SDPK

Social Democratic Party of Kazakhstan

SPK

Socialist Party of Kazakhstan

TMDR

Turkmenistan Movement for Democratic Reforms

TNRP

Talysh National Revival Party

UPK

Unity Party of Kyrgyzstan

UTO

United Tajik Opposition

WTP

Watan Taraqqiyoti Party

Introduction Yaacov Ro’i The intention of this book is to demonstrate the spectrum of political and social forces at work in the six Soviet successor states whose eponymous nationalities are traditionally Muslim. As the Soviet Union embarked upon perestroika, these entities, then union republics, were essentially backwaters. Their standard of living was generally lower than the average for the country as a whole, and the level of political consciousness and involvement of their intelligentsias and leading cadres seemed to lag behind that of their counterparts in other areas of the USSR. Nevertheless, with the breakup of the Soviet body politic these republics, willy-nilly, became independent, a status for which they were singularly unprepared. Inevitably, they entered into a period of transition, in which they groped for the optimal form their new states should adopt. The documents in this volume reflect, on the one hand, their aspirations and goals and, on the other, the obstacles, problems and constraints which confronted them. In the Gorbachev era, with its slogans of glasnost, democratization and pluralism, various ‘informal’ groups began to crystallize throughout the Soviet Union, first and foremost, in the RSFSR and the Baltic republics. Their formation was an expression of large-scale dissatisfaction among significant sectors of the population with the streamlined uniformity of Soviet public life. At first their orientation tended to be cultural and social rather than political, although given the basic postulates of Marxism-Leninism, cultural, social and economic activity inevitably had implicit political significance. As Gorbachev’s hold began to waver and the CPSU’s monopoly over political power was called into question, the political importance of these organizations became highlighted. These trends and developments ultimately influenced the Muslim republics, where similar structures likewise surfaced.1 A leading role was played in the ‘informal’ organizations by the indigenous intelligentsia, especially the artistic intelligentsia, whose nationalist orientation had begun to manifest itself in the 1960s, become enhanced in the following two decades, and in the latter part of the Gorbachev period, affected the entire political atmosphere. In this way, the ‘informals’ often became the nucleus of ‘national movements’ which were inevitably alike in many ways, notably in their organizational forms and declared aims. This was the outcome of a common political experience within a highly centralized body politic in which the Communist Party comprised the sole political force. While all the political associations which came into being in the Gorbachev and immediate post-Soviet years— even the para- or quasi-communist ones—rejected some components of orthodox Marxism-Leninism and its political expression, the CPSU, most also retained certain elements of that political heritage. This was apparent, in particular, in their organization, structure and institutions, which were based, in many cases, often unwittingly, on the model of the CPSU. Despite this legacy in the administrative sphere, the raison d’être of the non-communist groupings was their objection to the monopolization of power by the CPSU, and so they aspired in a variety of ways to mitigate the subjugation of society to its hegemony and to that of the party’s local branches and affiliated bodies. Among others, this had entailed the subordination of the needs of the republics to those of the

Political organization in central Asia and Azerbaijan

2

state and the all-union centre, and the latter’s manifest disregard for the basic requirements and sensitivities of the former. Many of the issues which preoccupied society in all the republics were similar, if not identical, in their general outlines. Thus, all the ‘national movements’, or nationalist organizations, sought to present themselves as the sole mouthpiece and representative of their respective nationalities, endeavouring to identify with their culture, traditions and problems. This entailed extirpating the very rudiments of the ‘Leninist nationalities policy’ which, with all its tergiversations, had persistently stipulated that Moscow alone could dictate both the content and form of national activity and culture. Yet, while nationalist elements often predominated in the programmes and platforms of the public organizations which came into being in this period, not all of them focused primarily on national problems. Some of them were formed on territorial, rather than ethnic lines; others emphasized religious, professional and a host of different issues. The dilemmas that haunted opposition groups in other parts of the country appeared in the ‘Muslim’ union republics as well. What was their identity to be? How were their terms of reference to be defined and determined? How much leeway and manoeuvrability could they be expected to enjoy before being hunted down by the central authorities in Moscow and their representatives in the republican capitals? Might they call themselves parties and what were the implications of becoming a political party in a state which for over seventy years had not been prepared to brook the existence of any but the ruling party?2 Yet, while developments in the last year or two of the Soviet Union’s existence enabled the open politicization of these formations in other parts, the republican party and government leaderships in the Muslim areas manifested a greater conservatism and rigidity than their peers in the European capitals. Although the leaderships of these republics were formally bound by Moscow’s commitments to the slogans and enactments of the Gorbachev era, the political atmosphere they engendered stymied their application and diminished the reliance of opposition leaders in the Muslim republics on them. No leader of the ilk of Yeltsin or Brazauskas or even Gamsakhurdia could effectively threaten the genuine sources of power in the Muslim republics. Even so, the dynamics of the Gorbachev period developed a momentum of their own and inevitably a variety of groups here, too, benefited from the vistas opened up before them. As integral components of the USSR, with their own native artistic intelligentsia and officials who had long been nurturing grievances against Moscow, notions of augmenting their share of economic, cultural and political autonomy took root in the Muslim republics. With the exception of Kyrgyzstan, the leaders who assumed power in these new states with the coming of independence were all former Communist Party first secretaries. Not only had they been reared and groomed within the CPSU, but they proved themselves exceedingly unwilling to transform its organizational and conceptual postulates in order to meet the new circumstances and enable the creation of a fundamentally different type of state from that which had been constructed on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. Although they formally shed the old party, the structures they substituted remarkably resembled it and the mode of government they introduced was no less authoritarian or hierarchical than that of the Soviet Union.3 One aspect, then, of the restrictions which affected the formation and evolution of new parties and groups in the Muslim territories was the rigidity of the republican leaderships.

Introduction

3

Another, no less serious one, was the difficult situation which pertained in these areas. Again, many of their problems were akin to those which plagued other parts of the Soviet Union, but usually they were rather more acute. The most urgent issue in all of them was probably the economy. They shared the problems of the rest of the union as it sought to create frameworks more suited to the needs of the population than the old command economy and to shake off the shackles of mutual interrepublican dependence. Yet, the Muslim areas suffered additional hardships. On the whole, they seemed to lack all the prerequisites for independent economic evolution. They had little or no infrastructure; the skilled personnel who had helped maintain their economies in the Soviet period were mostly non-nationals; industry was undeveloped, except in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, and their agriculture was totally unbalanced, given over, as it was, to a monoculture of industrial crops. Two of them, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, had long been at the bottom of the scale of all the Soviet union republics from the point of view of GNP and production. Finally, there was growing unemployment as large cohorts of young people attained working age, far outnumbering those who reached retirement. The situation was so acute that the leaders of the newly independent states in Central Asia actually sought ways to achieve economic cooperation among themselves. The ecological situation in many of the Muslim parts, too, verged on catastrophe. This applied first of all to large parts of the three republics—Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan—directly affected by the desiccation of the Aral Sea and the consequential oversalination of the air, water and earth in the surrounding territory. Semipalatinsk in eastern Kazakhstan was the USSR’s most prominent nuclear testing site, which had exposed the population for decades to radioactive fallout. Considerable areas of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan suffered from the toxic fumes of a major aluminium plant that straddled their joint frontier, whereas much of Azerbaijan was severely affected by the pollution of the Caspian Sea. In addition, the quantity and quality of pesticides used in the growth of cotton in Central Asia and in viticulture in Azerbaijan failed by far to conform to accepted norms. The outcome of all this was reflected in the disastrous health situation in these republics.4 It was thus inevitable that many informal organizations focused, among other issues, on ecology, while in a number of republics it provided the raison d’être for the formation of special organizations, such as Nevada-Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan and Ekolog in Kyrgyzstan. It should be noted that similar ecological groups existed elsewhere in the Soviet Union, notably Zelenyi Svit in Ukraine following the Chernobyl accident. The growing political awareness in the Muslim republics led first to individuals and then to large groups pointing an accusing finger at Moscow for directly and consciously subordinating their economies and finances to the diktat of a central planning agency and the requirements of the imperial policy-makers, keeping them in a subservient, colonial status. They also contended that the country’s leaders had caused their deteriorating ecological and health situations, if not intentionally, at least out of criminal negligence, ignorance and irresponsibility. The ‘centre’ was likewise charged with depriving its Muslim colonies of their cultural heritage, and cutting them off arbitrarily from their historical and literary traditions by changing their alphabet; from their religion by replacing it with new, more ‘progressive’, foreign ideologies and values; and from their co-religionists and co-ethnics in neighbouring countries. Like all the union republics, the

Political organization in central Asia and Azerbaijan

4

Musiim republics passed laws making the language of the eponymous nationality the state language. The indigenous intelligentsias also addressed the issue of the historiography of the Muslim nationalities, in particular regarding the question of their entry into the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. They refuted the official Soviet line of a ‘Voluntary’ merger, stressing rather the military background to their annexation, and objected to systematic Soviet besmirching and even effacing of national heroes. Other parts of their history, too, had been suppressed by the Soviet version because they alluded to real or imagined statehood in the near or distant past, thus contradicting official dogma. Finally, there was the issue of rehabilitating the victims of Soviet, particularly Stalinist, repression. Here again informal organizations that concentrated on this were affiliated to Memorial, created in Moscow in August 1988 to collect information on and honour the memory of victims of repression. The backdrop of the common political and economic heritage, then, republics along parallel lines. But there were also some salient led to a mushrooming of organizations which emerged in the Muslim differences, each republic or state having its own characteristics and circumstances. It is these similarities and variations which make it valuable to observe the six republics concomitantly. Apart from the questions and problems which troubled all the union republics other than the RSFSR, there were a few which distinguished the Muslim ones and were common to all of them. The first was primarily a psychological one, emanating from their ethnic otherness. They were neither Slav nor European and as such in many ways had been looked upon as second-rate, and made to feel inferior by the largely Russian masters of the Soviet state. It made no difference that in the republican context, at least in certain fields, it had since the late 1960s been easier for a ‘native’ than for a Slav to make a career. As they gradually acquired assertiveness, perhaps, because of their demographic boom, or perhaps because increasing numbers among them received higher education and came to appreciate the worth of their own ethnos and tradition, the Muslim ethnicities ceased accepting this second-class status as a necessary given. The second common theme related to their religion. Although Islam had been persecuted, harassed and subdued by the Soviet regime, it had not been eradicated. To one degree or another most members of the Muslim nations and ethnic groups identified as Muslims, whether or not they were officially believers or regarded themselves as such. One of the ironies of the Soviet heritage was that this Muslim consciousness had not only persisted, but even seemed sometimes to have become enhanced, simultaneously with the watering down of Islamic practice. There was a broad feeling of ‘Muslimness’, and if this entailed but few obligations, so much the better, for the national intelligentsias themselves were primarily secular in outlook and those who so much as contemplated an Islamic state were few indeed. A third issue was the social structure of the Muslim republics. The traditionally nomadic territories—essentially Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan—retained their tribal basis. The more sedentary parts had no tribes, but their inhabitants were strongly identified with their locality, which formed the basis for clan-like ties based on patronclient relations. Thus, in both prototypes the natural affiliation was with sectorial organisms and mechanisms. Just as during the Soviet period these had presented a constant threat to the regime’s attempts to impose a centralized republican authority subordinate to Moscow, so they continued after independence to trouble the new regimes.

Introduction

5

Similarly, they often undermined the establishment of meaningful political parties and movements on a republic-wide basis as the Muslim territories entered the new period of transition. The new organizations therefore sometimes overlapped with these allegiances and rivalries and sometimes ignored them. Another problem which was present in all the Central Asian republics, although not always at the forefront of their consciousness, was the definition of the national identity of their eponymous ethnos. This nationality had, as it were, been formed by the Soviet Union’s nationalities policy, which gave them a defined territory, distinct literary language, and certain, albeit limited, collective rights chiefly in the realm of culture. In none of the Central Asian republics did this identity coincide precisely with a previous national awareness (except perhaps among a small sector of the Kazakh intelligentsia). Now, as they acquired political independence, it was incumbent upon them to create a historical, theoretical framework for their national existence which they could in no way publicly and officially attribute to Soviet gerrymandering. Finally, all six states—in common with the other states of the FSU—faced the issue of their political structure. Here too, they were inevitably influenced by their Soviet experience. The more ‘Soviet’ the leaders, the more likely they were to opt for a constitution which made promises that in no way tallied with realities. But all accepted that a constitution must be promulgated. All agreed that some sort of legislature must exist, although there were considerable differences regarding the measure of its authority vis-à-vis the executive. In the earlier stages of independence, the heads of state of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were inclined, for a variety of reasons, to grant relatively greater leverage. However, they later backed down, introducing major constitutional amendments to ensure that no parliamentary body would be able to meaningfully curb presidential power.5 In addition, there were a number of issues which characterized four or five of the six Muslim republics. All, except the Tajiks, were of Turkic origin and had a clear proclivity towards Turkism. Among other things, this found expression in an undisguised interest in Turkey and a desire, as independence came, to balance their reliance on Russia with receipt of all kinds of assistance from Ankara. All, except the Azerbaijanis, inhabited Turkestan, and there was a definite sense of Turkestani solidarity, if not among all sectors of the population, at least among certain groups. This expressed itself in a tendency to emphasize their mutual history, their common lot in the face of their subjugation by the Russian conqueror, and a perception of the possibilities entailed in cooperation within the Turkestani ‘space’. Finally, four out of six republics (i.e. excluding Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan) were predominantly raw-material appendages for the European parts of the USSR. Other questions which preoccupied political organizations in all six republics included their ethnic and demographic composition. As a result of tsarist and Soviet policies of ‘resettlement’, deportation, and of the guidelines of the ‘national delimitation’ of Central Asia in 1924–25 (which created the Turkmen and Uzbek SSRs, the Tajik ASSR within the latter and the Kyrgyz ASSR and the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast under the RSFSR), all the new states had significant ethnic minorities. These basically sub-divided into three distinct groups—Russians and other Slavs; indigenous groups not belonging to the titular nationality but to that of neighbouring republics; and other, mostly exterritorial, groups, either nationalities deported under Stalin (Germans, Koreans, Crimean

Political organization in central Asia and Azerbaijan

6

Tatars, Meskhetian Turks) or those which had come from neighbouring countries in the pre-Soviet period (Uighurs, Dungans, ‘Ironis’6). However, in each republic the role played by these minority ethnic groups was different. The entire political situation of, and within, Kazakhstan was influenced by the fact that the Russians comprised over one-third of the entire population and that the Kazakhs did not constitute a majority within their own state. (It was only from 1986 that the Kazakhs actually outnumbered the Russians.) Kyrgyzstan, too, had a rather large Slav population, while Kyrgyz-Uzbek relations were marred by the large Uzbek presence in Kyrgyzstan’s southern provinces. The situation in Tajikistan, too, was affected by the presence of a large Uzbek minority, which in 1989 comprised almost 23.5 per cent of the population7 and was especially strong in the areas adjacent to Uzbekistan, notably in the northern, most industrialized province of Leninabad, with its administrative centre Khujand. Relations between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were also influenced by the forced ‘uzbekization’ of large numbers of Tajiks in the early Soviet period and the persistent refusal of the Uzbek leadership to recognize its implications and allow the descendants of these Tajiks to re-identify as such. In Azerbaijan, too, there were not a few Turkic minorities whose members had been forced to register officially as Azerbaijanis and so were in a poor position under the Soviet regime to realize their national rights—even those limited cultural privileges guaranteed by the Soviet constitution. A large number of associations and parties formed in the late Gorbachev period and immediately after independence were based on ethnicity and expressed the cultural, and sometimes also economic and even political aspirations of individual ethnic groups. Where these ethnoses inhabited their national homeland, as in the case, for example, of the Lezgin and Talysh in Azerbaijan, their goals might even entail plans of political autonomy or actual independence. Another issue was the relationship which the new independent states developed with the outside world and particularly the regional powers: Russia, China, Turkey and Iran. These contacts had far-flung economic, cultural and political effects. Each country sought at one and the same time to attain maximum independence, and out of economic, political and strategic considerations, to reach an understanding with foreign powers that might conceivably help it overcome some of its more pressing problems. The decisions taken by the various political organizations in each of the countries varied in accordance with their perceptions, both of their country’s problems and of the intentions of the foreign capitals concerned. Receiving little economic assistance from the regional powers, Russia, Iran and Turkey (the exception being Turkish aid to Azerbaijan), the new states sought economic assistance and capital from the West (the United States and Western Europe) and East Asia (China, Japan, Singapore and South Korea) and through international agencies. Bilateral and multilateral economic links, nevertheless had few political consequences, partly because Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan received most of their external investment from multinational corporations (in hydrocarbons and metals) and because Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan declined to accept IMF aegis over economic policy. Linked with the attitude to the regional powers, especially Russia, was the perception of the CIS, the Commonwealth of Independent States. When its establishment was declared in December 1991 it comprised the three Slav states. Almost at once, however, the Central Asian states demonstrated signs of dissatisfaction, indicating the possibility of their setting up an entity of their own, as a result of which they were speedily admitted as founding members.8 Indeed, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan became two of the CIS’s most

Introduction

7

enthusiastic members, each for its own reasons, and were the sole non-Slav states to be party to its central institutions and agreements. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, at first signed the concords under Ayaz Mutalibov, but then refused to ratify them under Abulfez Elchibey on the grounds that Russia and the CIS as a whole supported Armenia in the struggle over NagornoKarabagh and that the organization was an attempt to resuscitate the Soviet Union. It only joined the Commonwealth in October 1993 after Heydar Aliyev came to power. Regional conflicts also influenced the political situation within some of the Muslim territories. The outstanding example—Azerbaijan’s war with Armenia over NagornoKarabagh—was probably the most important single political factor which every Azerbaijani political organization had to take into account. The civil war which plagued Tajikistan from 1992 and developed into an internecine war with tens of thousands of victims and hundreds of thousands of displaced persons in the years after independence, was also a regional conflict—in two senses. In the first place it was a struggle for political domination within the country between different local élites such as had characterized Tajik politics throughout the Soviet period. Secondly, it had a far-reaching, disconcerting influence on Tajikistan’s neighbours, above all Uzbekistan, which undertook, together with Russia, to try to restore stability in Tajikistan, but also Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, whose leaders were concerned about a possible spillover into their own territory. Side by side with the features they all shared or which were common to most or some of them, each of the six republics had its own specific traditions, problems and ambitions. These were the result in the first place of their different geography, history and economic resources. The documents in this volume necessarily reflect this diversity as well as the similarities. Azerbaijan, the sole new Muslim state not in Central Asia, was the site of a major war with a neighbouring former Soviet state. The situation began to deteriorate in early 1988 and became the most trenchant of the crisis situations of an ethnic nature in the remaining years of the USSR’s existence. Developing into full scale warfare in 1992, it eventually led to the single major change of boundaries between former Soviet states, when in 1993 the Armenians occupied Nagorno-Karabagh and a fairly wide area connecting it to Armenia. The conflict also resulted in changes of leadership under the Soviet regime and of government in the subsequent period. It produced considerable demographic changes, creating close to 850,000 Azerbaijani refugees by late 1993, many of whom found their way to Baku (ostensibly to occupy the homes and jobs of the approximately 200,000 Armenians who had fled that city and its surroundings).9 The war and its concomitants were probably also directly responsible for the creation and strength of the country’s popular front. Azerbaijan was the only Muslim union republic where anything of this nature developed. Led by Abulfez Elchibey, who had been a central figure among Azerbaijani nationalist activists since the mid-1970s, the front’s meteoric success in the last years of Soviet rule presaged a bitter power struggle with communists, or former communists, in the months following independence. Shortly after its accession to power, however, the popular front began to split up, and against the background of losses in the war with Armenia, the incompetence and inexperience of its leaders and appointees and the economic crisis, it was ousted in a coup in 1993. After a

Political organization in central Asia and Azerbaijan

8

short interim, Heydar Aliyev, the Azerbaijan Communist Party first secretary until appointed USSR first deputy premier in 1982, was back in power. Azerbaijan’s oil wealth was another important feature of its specific situation, for it enabled the country to negotiate major deals with western companies in the hope of extracting itself from an economic quagmire. Eventually, in September 1994 an eight billion dollar deal was concluded with a multinational consortium for development of Caspian Sea oilfields. Among other advantages of this achievement, it seemed to promise Baku the wherewithal to free itself from economic pressure by Moscow. The country’s final and major specific feature was its position as part of a larger Azerbaijan. The portion of historic Azerbaijan in present-day Iran exceeds that of independent Azerbaijan. So, too, does Iran’s Azerbaijani population. While there are vastly different figures for the number of Azerbaijanis in Iran, it probably ranges around the 20 million mark—as against a total population of 7 million in independent Azerbaijan (where the eponymous nationality comprised just over 80 per cent in 1989 but probably well over 90 per cent by the mid-1990s). Inevitably, the nationalist government of independent Azerbaijan could not but address the issue of co-nationals over the border with Iran, the more ardent nationalists calling for Azerbaijani irredentism. Given its extensive border with Iran, this placed Baku in an extremely sensitive position. Kazakhstan is not only by far the largest of the Muslim states, from the point of view of territory, with rich mineral resources and a significant industrial infrastructure, including heavy industry; it also has by far the longest history of subjugation to Russia and its entire political development is inextricably interwoven with its link to Russia and the destiny and well-being of its large Russian population. Kazakhstan has a very long common frontier with Russia, the only Central Asian state in fact to border on Russia, although Turkmenistan technically has such a frontier in the Caspian Sea. The Russian factor is so predominant in Kazakhstan that Russian nationalists speak of their country’s need to annex northern and eastern Kazakhstan. The Kazakh leadership’s anxiety over the implications of the large Russian presence is ubiquitously evident in the documents. The Kazakh nationalists have been eager to invigorate their own language and culture and assert their—rather slight—numerical preponderance, stressing the fact that Kazakhstan is their national patrimony, in which they constitute the eponymous nationality. It was this sensitivity of the Kazakhs that led to the Alma-Ata events of December 1986, the first nationalist demonstration of force against Moscow in the Gorbachev era. The Russian nationalists, on the other hand, have been fighting a manifestly rearguard action designed to help them maintain as much as possible of what they perceive as their cultural superiority, along with their jobs and property. In between are the moderates of both nationalities, including President Nazarbayev, who believe in the possibility of a compromise, considering this a prerequisite not only for their continued peaceful co-existence, but for the well-being, stability and perhaps even territorial integrity of Kazakhstan. This was the primary consideration in the decision by the president to move the country’s capital to Akmola (implemented in 1997), which, on the one hand, could be expected to move the centre of government away from Kazakh nationalist and tribal pressures and, on the other, would bring large numbers of Kazakhs connected with the administration to an area largely populated by Slavs. An interrelated aspect of Kazakhstan’s situation, highlighted in the documents of the parties and organizations, is the attempt by Kazakhs to rectify the demographic disasters

Introduction

9

inflicted by the famine of the early 1920s and by collectivization at the end of that decade and through the early 1930s.10 In this context Kazakh nationalist groupings are intent on bringing back as many as possible of the Kazakh diaspora, the descendants of those who migrated or fled to Russia, China and a number of other countries, giving them preferential treatment and encouraging them to settle in areas with a Russian majority. A few Kazakh nationalist organizations also include Islamic slogans in their platforms, although in most parts of the country, where the population prior to collectivization had been nomadic, Islam was not institutionalized. While the country’s senior executive and much of the apparatus on which he relies are former Communist Party apparatchiks, Nazarbayev has made a major effort to create an image of himself and his country as democratically inclined and prepared to accept some of the restrictions imposed by pluralism. While Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan were, from their incipience, one-party states (except for Tajikistan’s short coalition experience in 1992 and following the post civil war peace in which 30 per cent of the posts were given to the United Tajik Opposition), Nazarbayev refrained from identifying with any single party until he initiated the Union of Unity and Progress prior to the 1994 elections. Nor has Nazarbayev instituted a cult of personality as have Karimov and Niyazov. At the same time, his style of government has been distinctly managerial, including dissolution of parliaments he has been unable to control. He not only sought to make his presidential status as powerful as possible within the constraints imposed by the constitution; he amended the 1993 constitution in 1995 in order to ensure presidential supremacy. The material presented in this volume bears testimony both to the greater opportunities presented by Kazakhstan’s political mise-en-scène, than that of Uzbekistan, for example, and to a sense of insecurity, at least among certain organizations, regarding their immediate and medium-term future. The situation in Kyrgyzstan is also unique in a number of ways. Its elected president, Askar Akayev, had not stood at the head of the republican party apparatus towards the end of the Soviet period; in fact, he had not even belonged to it, having come to the presidency from the republican Academy of Sciences. Yet he, too, acceded to his post in an uncontested election. He began by devoting considerable attention to making peace between regional political élites in the north and south and to smoothing over relations between the country’s ethnic groups, particularly Kyrgyz and Slavs, and also Kyrgyz and Uzbeks, following the vicious clashes of May–June 1990 in Osh Oblast, where the majority of the country’s Uzbeks resided.11 The Osh events went a long way to finally discrediting Communist Party First Secretary Absamat Masaliyev, who was subsequently ousted from power, and with him the republican party as a whole, paving the way for Akayev’s election in October 1990. Despite the hopes which Akayev’s election aroused, as time passed he, too, resorted to increasingly high-handed methods of governing and was gradually deserted by many of his allies in the administration. Some were even dismissed as the president reverted to traditional Kyrgyz leadership tactics, preferring to select nomenklatura from among his own tribe and that of his wife, thus exacerbating tribal tensions among the Kyrgyz while endeavouring to mitigate ethnic ones. By the time of his re-election for a second five-year term in December 1995, his supporters in the localities were being accused of widespread violations of the electoral law and the OMON—the CIS riot police—had to be brought in to disperse demonstrations against his

Political organization in central Asia and Azerbaijan

10

methods of rule. In particular, he encountered opposition among Kyrgyz nationalist parties as he sought to block legislation that was biased in favour of ethnic Kyrgyz.12 The economy, on the other hand, was by this time beginning to improve. As was the case in many CIS countries, the payment of salaries and social benefits was in arrears, yet, except in agriculture, the bulk of mass privatization had been implemented, although in many instances enterprises had been converted into joint-stock companies with the state retaining part or total ownership and management. International organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank, were at least outwardly confident that Kyrgyzstan would ‘make it’ in terms of economic and democratic reform. Nonetheless, in the words of one knowledgeable commentator ‘major developments’ were still needed for the reforms to ‘take root’.13 This analysis was borne out in subsequent years. Whereas in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan a certain measure of pluralism was presented as a desired objective, this was not the case in the other three states. In Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan the old model of a one-party state predominated. Nonetheless, each of these three states had its own specific features as well, creating a number of significant variables. The civil war, which rent Tajik society in the period following the breakup of the Soviet Union, was an almost inevitable consequence of independence. Tajikistan, a political entity created by Moscow in two stages (in 1924 and 1929), was composed of a variety of incompatible ethnic and regional interests, which only the political and physical repression that were an integral component of the Soviet regime had been able to preserve as a single functioning unit for over sixty years. Even during this period Tajikistan had known bitter conflict and antagonisms between local élites and its leadership had mostly seemed to prefer to represent the interests of a particular locality rather than of the republic as a whole. The diversity of the country and its population led to the establishment under Gorbachev of a number of opposition groups. The first of these was Rastokhez, which insisted that it was a Tajik national movement, a sort of popular front that sought civil liberties and ethnic amity, stressing, however, the need to revitalize the Tajik national culture. The most important political parties were the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, founded by members of Rastokhez, whose leaders established contact with their colleagues in parallel organizations in other parts of the Soviet Union, and the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan. The latter was, rather surprisingly, permitted by the hard-line communist regime to register officially. In fact, most of the spokesmen of the Islamic Renaissance Party were distinctly cautious in presenting their programme, explaining that transforming the country into an Islamic state was a long-term objective which could only be achieved by the arduous education of society. These groups, together with La’li Badakhshon, the party of the Pamir region, participated with President Nabiyev in the coalition that ruled Tajikistan from May to November 1992. Its vicissitudes highlighted the difficulties of attaining in Tajikistan a measure of consensus sufficient to enable effective government. From the outset Nabiyev reneged on his commitments and was eventually forced to quit his post in September; he was followed two months later by the acting president and most of the coalition cabinet. The outcome of the Supreme Soviet’s efforts to nominate a new government was foreordained by the fact that it met in the hard-line stronghold of Khujand; a para-

Introduction

11

communist leadership was returned to power, which it retained with the help of Russian and Uzbek bayonets and security forces. In addition to the feeble appeal of Tajik nationalism for most of the indigenous population, the conflict in Tajikistan was shaped by the country’s poverty and economic dependence—Central Asia was the USSR’s poorest area and Tajikistan the poorest republic; by the presence in the country of security forces subservient to command centres in Tashkent and Moscow which armed one side; and by the proximity to and long border with Afghanistan, which provided arms and money for the other side. As the excesses against certain regional groups mounted in late 1992, after the appointment of Imomali Rahmonov to the country’s highest executive post, all opposition publications were banned, and in 1993 the four principal opposition groups were outlawed. From this point on they could only hope to influence events in Tajikistan either by military aid from Afghanistan or pressure on potential Middle Eastern allies (Iran and Pakistan) and the international community at large to reach a settlement in their country, which would necessarily involve a change of regime. Meanwhile, Russia and Uzbekistan continued to provide the Rahmonov government with further military aid and helped it establish new security forces with institutionalized and personal links to their own; Russia also provided subsidies. Both Moscow and Tashkent, however, agreed in principle to multifaceted negotiations to help Tajikistan reach some sort of normalcy.14 In Turkmenistan the situation was very different from the outset. Its leadership appeared to be the most successful of all rulers in the new Muslim states in preserving civil peace. It provided the most blatant example of single-party rule, maintained by a rigorously repressive regime under Sapurmurad Niyazov, whose personality cult became ubiquitously prominent. He and his party controlled the country’s political, social, economic and cultural life without brooking opposition of any sort. From time to time, the odd organization would rear its head, only to disappear. A very feeble semblance of pluralism was maintained by the creation of a second party, which hastened to declare full support of the president and the ruling party. Turkmenistan’s most important single feature is almost certainly its vast reserves of natural gas. Despite its preliminary support for Russia and the CIS, Moscow recurrently blocked its export routes, the only extant pipeline crossing Russian territory. For instance, in 1993 the Russians diverted gas that Turkmenistan had contracted to sell to Western Europe to insolvent CIS customers on the pretext of disputes over transit fees. Moreover, traditional FSU clients—Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia—proved unable to pay for the gas they received. As a result of these and other constraints, gas production, export and income fell significantly. Alternative export pipelines, such as the one envisaged in Turkmenistan’s agreement with Iran of August 1994 to deliver vast quantities of gas to Europe via Iran and Turkey, seemed for some years to remain unrealizable: their cost far exceeded anything Turkmenistan could afford, whereas western lenders would not contribute to a project which might enable Iran to acquire access to this gas. The bottom line of this combination of domestic and international political, economic and strategic factors was that Turkmenistan was both unable to take advantage of its one major asset and even to keep its economy at preindependence levels.15 The single document in this volume which represents Turkmenistan, pertaining to Niyazov’s political machine, does not reflect any of the country’s dilemmas and troubles, the nature of the regime precluding any allusion to such manifestations.16

Political organization in central Asia and Azerbaijan

12

The general outlines of the political situation in Uzbekistan were not fundamentally different from those of Turkmenistan. Islam Karimov, however, who had none of the illusions devolving from almost unlimited reserves of natural gas, and who stood at the head of a far larger population with much more complex problems, had to adopt a somewhat more conciliatory and sophisticated policy. In the words of one well-informed commentator, Uzbekistan continued in the period after independence to have ‘an authoritarian political culture’ with Karimov seeking legitimacy not through popular participation but rather through ‘distribution’ and ‘identity’.17 Prospects had looked different during perestroika when Moscow’s persistent enquiry into past corruption in the republic—specifically under former First Secretary Sharaf Rashidov—led to an awakened ethnic consciousness among Uzbekistan’s native creative intelligentsia. Some of these began to re-evaluate Uzbek history and culture and Moscow’s policies towards Uzbekistan. Together with representatives of other groups, notably of the ‘scientific-technical’ intelligentsia, they helped found in late 1988 the republic’s first major informal group, Birlik. Although it did not look kindly on this organization, the republican leadership found itself compelled to concede to some of Birlik’s demands, which were given force in a series of rather large-scale demonstrations. When, in summer 1989, First Secretary Rafiq Nishanov was replaced by Islam Karimov, the stage was set for the new leader to actually adopt considerable portions of Birlik’s political agenda. The centre was now being officially portrayed as having ‘unfairly singled out’ Uzbekistan for punishment in the so-called ‘Uzbek affair’,18 while Karimov was presented as restoring its self-respect. At the same time, Karimov distinguished between groups and individuals seeking to bring the masses into the streets and those willing to press for reform in more controllable fashion. It was in this atmosphere, perhaps even as a result of direct government involvement, that Birlik split up, the faction believing that it was possible to achieve its aims without confrontational tactics creating Erk in spring 1990. In the autumn of 1991, following the August putsch in Moscow and probably with an eye to the upcoming presidential elections at home, Karimov loosened the reins somewhat, giving opposition groups rather more leeway. Once entrenched by the December elections and the final dissolution of the Soviet Union, however, Uzbekistan’s president began once more to apply pressure and in the first half of 1992 he halted virtually all political activity outside the president’s own People’s Democratic Party, which developed close ties, on the model of the CPSU and the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, with a host of semiofficial organizations. Although Erk and Birlik existed on paper until March 1993, the regime initiated a series of carefully contemplated laws and regulations to ensure that unauthorized political activity would be well-nigh impossible. It even resorted to acts of intimidation of political opponents, including beatings and arrests and forcing those in the legislature to resign. Meanwhile, in order to forestall criticism and preserve the pretence of pluralism, Karimov, like Niyazov, created his own ‘opposition’ party, Progress of the Homeland, in May 1992. As time passed, Karimov carefully continued ‘going through the motions of democratic process without permitting (let alone creating) favourable conditions for a civic culture’.19 Uzbekistan was not just the geographical linchpin of Central Asia and the most populous republic, with considerable Uzbek populations in all four neighbouring republics and all that that implied; it also contained Turkestan’s traditional cultural and

Introduction

13

commercial centres and for all these reasons could justifiably pretend to a dominant position in the area, which, indeed, was reflected in its role as policeman of regional stability. Moreover, with Uzbekistan having its own centres of Islamic revivalism, especially in the Fergana Valley, Karimov was quick to take advantage of an apparent Islamic ‘threat’ from neighbouring Tajikistan to contend that Islamic fundamentalism was likely to jeopardize the security of his own fiefdom and Central Asia’s other new states. Among others, this perceived danger legitimized efforts to repress the Islamic Renaissance Party in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan’s leadership has continued the tendency it opted for in its early stages of glorifying Uzbekistan and, while stressing the equality of all nationalities within its population, of giving Uzbeks pride of place. Karimov has also followed in the footsteps of Uzbekistan’s leaders in the Soviet period in preferring to appoint cadres from his own political turf. As distinct from them, however, he has added an Islamic component to his identity, if only as part of his endeavour to undercut any possible formation of a political opposition using Islam to consolidate a broadbased attack on his regime. All in all, Karimov’s perception that the population did not see political participation as a boon seems to have been borne out by reality. The chief concern of the country’s inhabitants has been the economic situation, which in the 1990s deteriorated considerably, although there were no far-reaching reforms or privatization, and the desire to partake of the better things in life in the form of material goods. In addition, there has been anxiety over growing rates of crime and corruption. If the leadership can assuage these worries by deeds, it appears that it can safely contemplate by-passing democratization and greater political participation in a society with a long tradition of authoritarianism. *** For the most part, the Muslim successor states have all experienced a difficult period of transition. Despite the perceived threat to leadership hegemony reflected in political and social organizations which came into being in the Gorbachev period, they have tended to return to authoritarianism and centralization, tolerating as little opposition as politically possible. These leaders have been assisted in this trend by manipulating traditional social structures—clans and tribes—and employing tactics and patronage networks that have historically been normative in the Muslim areas of Central Asia and Transcaucasia, and which even the Soviet regime was unsuccessful in repressing or circumventing. At the same time, since the new states were committed to a certain measure of democratization—partly as a result of external pressures to which they were subjected due to their economic straits—they retained a few symbols at least of political pluralism and some political, social and cultural organizations were permitted to exist officially (with the exception of Turkmenistan). Many less fortunate organizations disappeared completely, while others persisted or resurfaced in a different guise. They tended to maintain an illegal or semilegal existence, in the hope of one day transforming the prevailing political constellation. Nonetheless, their ascendancy would not necessarily augur a greater degree of democratization. NOTES 1. For the development of ‘informal groups’ on an all-union level and its context, see Tolz, The USSR’s Emerging Multiparty System.

Political organization in central Asia and Azerbaijan

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2. For the problematics of the formation of political organizations in Russia itself, see Dallin (ed), Political Parties in Russia. 3. For an analysis of leadership styles in two of these republics, see Olcott, ‘Nursultan Nazarbaev and the Balancing Act of State Building in Kazakhstan’, pp. 169–90 and Carlisle, ‘Islam Karimov and Uzbekistan: Back to the Future?’, pp. 191–216. 4. For the ecological situation in the USSR as a whole, the Muslim republics inclusive, see Friendly and Feshbach, Ecocide in the USSR: Health and Nature under Siege. 5. For a detailed survey of this question, see Anderson, ‘Authoritarian Political Development in Central Asia’, pp. 301–20. 6. The Uighurs and Dungans were Muslim peoples who inhabited the Chinese province of Xinjiang. The Ironis were the descendants of Persian merchant communities or slaves captured in the 17th century. 7. Atkin, ‘Tajikistan: Reform, Reaction, and Civil War’, p. 608. 8. Dawisha and Parrott, Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval, p. 22. 9. The ‘population exchange’ between Azerbaijan and Armenia began before the breakup of the USSR. By the end of 1990, 160,000 Azerbaijanis had fled from Armenia, and 400,000 Armenians from Azerbaijan (excluding Nagorno-Karabagh) (Hunter, ‘Azerbaijan: Searching for New Neighbors’, p. 454; Dudwick, ‘Armenia: Paradise Regained or Lost’, p. 488). The figure 850,000 includes refugees from Armenia, Nagorno-Karabagh and the strip of Azerbaijan territory between Nagorno-Karabagh and Armenia (Sammut, ‘Population Displacement in the Caucasus’, p. 57). 10. The Kazakh population fell by approximately 40 per cent between 1913 and 1939. Actual figures are hard to come by since the Soviet authorities were careful to conceal as much as possible of these disasters in the statistical data. The uprising of 1916, the civil war and, above all, the famine of 1920–21 cost the Kazakhs hundreds of thousands of lives; then, between the censuses of 1926 and 1939 the Kazakh population decreased further, from 3.7 to 2.6 million (Khazanov, ‘The Ethnic Problems of Contemporary Kazakhstan’, pp. 245–7). See Introduction to Kazakhstan. 11. The Russians and Uzbeks are the country’s two largest ethnic minorities, with 21.5 and 12.9 per cent respectively; at the time of the 1989 census the Kyrgyz themselves comprised 52 per cent of the population. 12. Dawisha and Parrott, Russia and the New States of Eurasia, p. 152. 13. Pryde, ‘Privatization in the Kyrgyz Republic’. 14. Atkin, ‘The Politics of Polarization in Tajikistan’, pp. 211–31; and Rubin, ‘Tajikistan: From Soviet Republic to Russian-Uzbek Republic’, pp. 207–24. 15. Boss, Turkmenistan: Far from Customers Who Pay. 16. For these dilemmas and troubles and the way Niyazov has sought to cope with them, see Anderson, ‘Authoritarian Political Development in Central Asia’, pp. 509–27. 17. For this and some of the following analysis, see Fierman, ‘Political Development in Uzbekistan: Democratization?’, pp. 360–408. 18. See Introduction to Uzbekistan and note 2 there. 19. Fierman, ‘Political Development in Uzbekistan’, p. 392.

REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN

INTRODUCTION Brenda Shaffer

Capital: Baku Area: 86.6 thousand sq. km. Population: 7.021 million (1989); Main minorities (according to 1989 census) include Russians (5.6 per cent); Armenians (5.6 per cent); Lezgin (2.4 per cent); Avars (0.6 per cent). By 1995 the total population had reached 7.8 million of whom Azerbaijanis accounted for 90 per cent and Russians and Armenians were down to 2.5 per cent and 2.3 per cent respectively. Religion: No official state religion. The Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan stipulates clear separation of religion and state. The majority of the population are Shiite Muslims. Language: Azerbaijani is a Turkic language. Historical Survey The Azerbaijanis are a unique group in the Muslim world. They are mostly Shiite, though ethnically and linguistically Turks. The Islamization of Azerbaijan took place during the Arab conquest under Omar’s caliphate, at a date given variably between 639 and 643. At the time of the Islamic conquest, Zoroastrianism was prominent in Azerbaijan and one of the Azerbaijani terms of capitulation was Arab agreement to respect the sanctity of the Zoroastrian fire temples. Azerbaijan’s submission did not instil acceptance of or universal identification with the Muslim conquest. The region was the centre of the revolt of Babak, which began in 816–17 and lasted over twenty years. Until today Babak and the revolt he led symbolize for Azerbaijanis resistance to foreign rule. The borders in the region of Azerbaijan have frequently shifted, and the Republic of Azerbaijan fills only a small part of the area that Azerbaijanis consider their historical patrimony. Many in the Republic of Azerbaijan refer to most of north-west Iran as ‘South Azerbaijan’. Contingent to the Republic of Azerbaijan, there are approximately 20 million Azerbaijanis, who comprise approximately one-third of the population of Iran. For most of its history, Iranian Azerbaijan has been the centre of successive Iranian empires. In Azerbaijani historiography, the most prominent of these was the Safavid dynasty, which was founded in 1501 by Shah Isma’il, a Turkic-speaker1 who was raised in Ardabil.2 Under the Safavid dynasty, Iran returned to its pre-Islamic borders and regained its position as a major regional power. The advent of the Safavid regime was an important event in the development of Azerbaijani identity. Regarded by many Azerbaijanis today as an ‘Azerbaijani dynasty’, and portrayed as such in Azerbaijani historiography,3 the Safavids serve as an important symbol of Azerbaijani identity and power. Following the demise of the Safavid regime in 1722, the local khanates became the dominant source of political power in Azerbaijan. Central rule was reinstated in Iran in 1795 with the establishment of the Qajar dynasty. Under Qajar rule (1795–1925), Azerbaijan became the seat of residence of the heir apparent of the dynasty and Tabriz,

Introduction

17

the central city of the Azerbaijanis, was the major commercial capital of Iran. During most of Qajar rule, Turkish was the principal language spoken at court, while Persian was the predominant literary language.4 The first quarter of the 19th century was marked by a struggle between Iran and Russia for control of the Caucasus and Azerbaijan. The first military campaign resulted in an Iranian defeat, and the sides concluded the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813, according to which Iran ceded a large part of the Caucasus to Russia. Major confrontations between the sides erupted again in 1825, and once more Iran was defeated. In February 1828, the Treaty of Turkmenchay was signed. Under this agreement, Iran lost the rest of its Caucasian possessions to Russia, and the border between the sides was fixed at the Araz River, thus dividing the Azerbaijanis between two separate states. In the eyes of many Azerbaijanis, this treaty came to symbolize the division of the nation. With their inclusion in the Russian Empire, the northern Azerbaijanis were among the first Muslim groups to fall under European colonial rule. In keeping with Russian colonial policy, most of the powers of the Muslim clerical establishment were usurped. Freed from the constraints of the ulama, the Azerbaijanis, like the Tatars, became a bridgehead of secularism and proponents of modern education for the Muslim world. Moreover, the split endowed the Azerbaijanis with a unique role: owing to their ability to read texts published in Turkish and Russian, among them works translated from European languages, they were able to pass on the ideas in them to their co-ethnics in Iran while relaying ideas prominent among Iranian intellectuals to Muslims in the Russian and Ottoman Empires. Large-scale oil production in and around Baku as of the early 1870s had an important social and political, as well as economic, impact on Azerbaijan. Many non-Muslims streamed into the region, which led to increased exposure to Westem political and social ideas and mores. In addition, many Azerbaijanis from the Iranian side of the border came to Baku to find work, and this contributed to the continuance of ties between the two communities. Towards the end of the 19th century, an Azerbaijani-language press began to emerge, as did specific references to Azerbaijani nationalism. Political activity among Azerbaijanis accelerated in the aftermath of the 1905 Russian Revolution, the 1906 Constitutional Revolution in Iran and the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, which gave impetus to Turkic cultural identity. The trend of rising Azerbaijani identity was embodied in the foundation in 1912 of the Musavat (Equality) Party. Its initial goals included commitment to secular Turkic nationalism and the establishment of an autonomous Azerbaijan in association with Russia, within a federation of free and equal states.5 Until the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, few Azerbaijanis were openly calling for full political independence, a goal which most of them perceived at the time as unattainable. On 28 May 1918, after the fall of the Russian Empire, the Azerbaijan Provincial Council proclaimed the establishment of a new state, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. The declaration stated that its head was Mammed Emin Rasulzade, an Azerbaijani who had spent most of his adult life as a political activist and writer in Iran, prior to heading the Musavat Party in Russian Azerbaijan. The constitution of the new republic declared equal rights for all citizens regardless of religion, ethnic origin or gender, and granted suffrage to women. By doing so, Azerbaijan was the first Muslim state to grant women the vote, years before many European states. A polemic ensued over

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the national identity of the new state, centring on the balance between a specific Azerbaijani identity versus a broader Turkic one. The republican government declared Turkish the official state language. Employees in the public sector were given a deadline of two years to begin to conduct all business in that language, in an attempt to end the predominance of Russian. As part of the new Soviet state’s attempt to reconquer territories of the former Russian empire which had declared independence, Red Army forces attacked the young Azerbaijani republic, and on 27 April 1920, with the assistance of Azerbaijani communist supporters, occupied Baku, bringing independent Azerbaijani statehood to an end. Azerbaijan became a soviet socialist republic, and as of 1922 was part of the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, together with Armenia and Georgia. The Latin alphabet was officially adopted in Soviet Azerbaijan in 1924, predating its adoption by the Republic of Turkey in 1928.6 In 1940 Moscow imposed the Cyrillic alphabet on Azerbaijan, together with the other Turkic regions in the Soviet Union, where the alphabet had also been changed from the Arabic to the Latin in the 1920s. During the Soviet period, the Azerbaijanis in large measure retained their ethnonational identity. Linguistically and culturally, Azerbaijan remained one of the least russified of all the Soviet republics. In April 1978, Azerbaijan, alongside with Armenia and Georgia, rebuffed Moscow’s efforts to grant Russian the same status as the local languages in the republican constitution.7 In addition, Azerbaijanis had one of the lowest rates of out-migration of any of the Soviet republics and one of the highest rates of endogamy.8 Works produced by the Azerbaijani artistic intelligentsia in the 1960s and 1970s reveal a deep interest in Azerbaijani identity and culture and an effort to preserve that culture. In the 1970s, unofficial political activity in Soviet Azerbaijan centred on small discussion groups, which became known as the Chaikhana (teahouse) Movement. Azerbaijani writers and academics, later made up the hard core of those political activists who, at the end of the 1980s, led the opposition and national movement. Among the most important of these activists was Abulfez Elchibey, who had been imprisoned in 1975 for nationalistic political activity. Many researchers point to the outbreak of the conflict with Armenia for control over Nagorno-Karabagh as the trigger for the emergence of the Azerbaijani national movement, and assert that their national identity was primarily reactive.9 In reality, the process of exploring national identity and heightened expressions of Azerbaijani identity in Soviet Azerbaijan predated glasnost and the surfacing of the Karabagh issue. Political Parties and Movements In the early 1990s, the main sources and bases of power in the Republic of Azerbaijan remained outside the parliament and formal political organizations. Regional groupings and extended families remained through most of the decade the chief basis of power and a major source of support and mobilization.10 The inauguration of glasnost led to the adoption of themes, previously relegated to intellectual and literary journals, by the mass media and later on, by overtly political movements. From 1986, dozens of unofficial organizations appeared in Azerbaijan, though many did not, or could not, officially register until 1988. Many of these public organizations and societies served as the basis for political parties that were formed after

Introduction

19

legislation was passed, allowing registration of non-communist parties. At this early stage, most of them expressed their dedication to Azerbaijani identity, although they avoided dealing with matters that were explicitly political. Like their counterparts in other union republics, the activities of the new groups often centred on preserving historical sites, restoring traditional Azerbaijani names and reviving public and official use of the Azerbaijani language. The Baku Centre for the Arts,11 dealt with Azerbaijani culture, while other organizations, such as Yurd,12 sought to preserve historical and architectural monuments. Many organizations placed emphasis on re-establishing ties with co-ethnics beyond the republic’s borders, especially in Iran, and championing their rights. One of these was Vatan which held its founding conference on 28 December 1987.13 The organization Chanlibel, which was established in the spring of 1987, was especially concerned with expanding research on the history of Azerbaijan and disseminating information to the public. In keeping with the trend towards historical revisionism that emerged throughout the USSR in the wake of glasnost, one of the most important changes was the attitude towards the sovietization of Azerbaijan in 1920. Until this time, all officially published Soviet historiography had treated the fall of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic and the subsequent Soviet take-over as the ‘liberation’ of Azerbaijan; it was described as a voluntary act of the people of Azerbaijan, and Musavat was condemned as a nationalist bourgeois party.14 In contrast, a poem written in 1986 and published in August 1987 appeared in the journal Azerbaijan, which describes Baku in April 1920, immediately after the Soviet take-over, in very pessimistic terms. The poet predicted that a Musavat government might return to Baku.15 A major shift in the pattern of political activity in Azerbaijan took place in 1988. The exacerbation of the conflict with neighbouring Armenia and the Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabagh served as a rallying point for various political forces and spurred the masses to join the struggle for political change in Azerbaijan. The years 1988 and 1989 were marked by a series of mass protests and strikes by Azerbaijanis. The large demonstrations which began at the end of November 1988, and continued throughout 1989 later became known as the Maydan (Square) Movement. Some of the demonstrations included a half a million participants. These protest activities, headed by the Popular Front of Azerbaijan (PFA), became bound up with opposition to the Communist rulers in Baku, who were blamed for failing to preserve Azerbaijan’s control over Nagorno-Karabagh and for the growing number of Azerbaijani refugees from Armenia. Moreover, the fact that most Azerbaijanis perceived Moscow as pro-Armenian, strengthened their determination to distance themselves from the Soviet Union. The years 1988 and 1989 were also marked by escalating violence between Armenians and Azerbaijanis in the republic and in neighbouring Armenia. Among the most bloody events were the pogroms in Sumgait in February 1988 against the Armenian population of the city, which left twenty-six Armenians and six Azerbaijanis dead. The escalating violence led to a mass flight of Armenians from Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijanis from Armenia and created immense refugee populations in both republics. The PFA emerged as the most important opposition force during this period.16 The organization was formed as an umbrella group uniting individuals and groups of different political orientations who opposed any change in the republic’s borders, chiefly, with regard to the status of Nagorno-Karabagh; expressed concern for Azerbaijanis living outside the republic; favoured the intensification of glasnost and democratization; and

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placed emphasis on the use of the Azerbaijani language in the republic. In this period the PFA operated in a decentralized fashion, with branches forming throughout the Azerbaijan SSR. Prior to 1990, most PFA activists stopped short of calling for independence. In September 1989, Azerbaijan had declared itself ‘sovereign’ within the USSR and asserted that ‘the jurisdiction of Azerbaijan is limited only in matters which have voluntarily been delegated by the republic itself to the USSR’, that it ‘retains for itself the right to withdraw freely from the USSR’, and that it ‘has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states’.17 The tensions between the PFA-led opposition and the communist establishment reached a peak in late 1989–early 1990. In December 1989, under the leadership of activists of the local PFA chapters, the inhabitants of the Nakhichevan ASSR18 organized demonstrations on the border with Iran. Their demands focused on allowing contacts between Azerbaijanis on both sides of the frontier. Some of the protesters called outright for the unification of north and south Azerbaijan. The protesters camped out along the border and dismantled and burned many of the border installations, as well as almost 150 km of fencing. Many Azerbaijanis swam the freezing waters of the Araz in an attempt to reach their relatives in Iran. At the same time, violent confrontations surged between Azerbaijanis and Armenians and reached a climax with the pogroms against the Armenian population of Baku on the weekend of 13–14 January 1990, which left thirtytwo Armenians and a number of Azerbaijanis dead. Local security forces did little to obstruct the border incidents; however, they were utilized, together with the escalating violence between Azerbaijanis and Armenians, as a pretext for Moscow to send troops into Azerbaijan on 20 January 1990—a military occupation which took an estimated 134 Azerbaijanis lives. These events, which became known as ‘Black January’, were a watershed in Azerbaijani politics and had a profound effect on the awakening of Azerbaijani political activity and identity, dramatically accelerating the support for independence and radicalizing both Azerbaijani political forces and the masses. In June 1990, a series of laws was enacted by the Azerbaijani Supreme Soviet, which established the legal framework for multi-party elections, including a law ‘On Political Parties’. In September 1991 multicandidate and multi-party elections were held on both the local and national levels. In the elections for president in the same month, amid claims of election violations, the opposition made a poor showing, and the incumbent, Mutalibov was re-elected. The Communist Party received the majority of seats in the parliament. Mutalibov, aware of the popular climate, attempted to adopt the nationalist agenda of the opposition and made a number of gestures to nationalist sentiment, such as the replacement of the Soviet flag with the tricolour banner of the short-lived Azerbaijan Democratic Republic and declaring 28 May (independence day of that republic) to be a national holiday. As in the other union republics, the drive towards independence was greatly accelerated by the progressive breakdown of Soviet power throughout 1990 and 1991 and especially by the failed coup attempt in August 1991 and the subsequent rapid decline of the Soviet Union. On 29 August 1991, the Azerbaijan CP declared itself independent of the CPSU and on 14 September, disbanded. On 18 October the Azerbaijani parliament

Introduction

21

unanimously adopted the draft law ‘On the Restoration of State Independence of the Azerbaijan Republic’. According to this legislation, Azerbaijan was declared the legitimate successor to the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic of May 1918–April 1920. The law was formally approved on 7 November 1991. After the fall of the Soviet Union, independence of the republic was ratified by ninety-five per cent of the voters in a referendum held on 29 December 1991. After a series of carry over and caretaker governments, a Popular Front-led government under the leadership of Abulfez Elchibey was elected in June 1992, in the first democratic elections in the new state, and the PFA became the largest grouping in the parliament. From independence to the fall of the Elchibey government in June 1993, ideological issues were emphasized. Encouraged by the fact that the new regime imposed few restrictions on freedom of expression, debates abounded in the media regarding the collective identity of the new state and the means to achieve a balance between civic and ethic identity. Independent Azerbaijan did not have a honeymoon period in which to determine its creeds and national priorities. It was born in the midst of a war with Armenia, a growing refugee population, tense relations with most of its other neighbours, and a collapsed social-welfare system. In the initial post-independence period, a number of new political movements and organizations appeared. Attainment of independence and the democratic climate contributed to the disintegration of the PFA coalition, as many of its factions established independent parties. In addition, Heydar Aliyev, recognizing the importance of political parties in the new era, founded the Yeni Azerbaijan Party, despite the fact that he had considerable sources of support and power outside of the party structures. In this period three major types of parties emerged: those formed around a specific personality or oriented towards a foreign state, which had little ideological distinctiveness; parties with a strongly defined and articulated ideological platform (within this group, there were constant splits on the basis of personalities); and sectarian parties, representing specific interest groups in society with limited agendas. The first grouping included Yeni Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijan Democratic Party, the Azerbaijan Independent Democratic Party, the National Statehood Party and the Azerbaijan Independence Party. The second category contained the Popular Front of Azerbaijan, the National Independence Party (AMI), Musavat, the Social Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, Yurddash, Boz Gurd, the Azerbaijan Communist Party, the Islamic Party and Vahdat. The third classification included the Lezgin Democratic Party and other ethnic-based parties as well as the Democratic Party of Entrepreneurs. In 1993, the Azerbaijani parliament passed a law forbidding the formation of ethnicbased parties; thus many ethnic movements, such as those formed by the Lezgin and the Talysh in the post-independence period, remained public organizations or adopted names and political platforms which professed non-sectarian goals. As part of the policy of rebuffing any foreign domination, Azerbaijan under Elchibey refrained from joining any rigid political unions. Thus, during the PFA government’s term of office, Azerbaijan did not join the CIS, and refused to concede to Russian pressure to sign agreements allowing the continued presence of Russian military bases in the republic.19 The Republic of Azerbaijan pursued a decidedly nationalist policy, seeking to defy Russian pressure by adopting a clearly proTurkey and pro-Western orientation. Simultaneously, the leaders of the new state continually emphasized that Azerbaijan was

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to be a secular state, whose people, however, retained their cultural identity as Muslims.20 As president, Elchibey also expressed unequivocal support for the expansion of cultural rights and autonomy for the Azerbaijanis in Iran. The expectations of this initial period of independence were dampened by the increasing deterioration of the situation within Azerbaijan, caused mainly by continuing military defeats in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabagh. A number of conferences were held and attempts made to unite the various political forces in a common agenda due to this crisis situation. In May 1993 the last major Russian unit (the 104th Airborne Division) pulled out of Azerbaijan’s second largest city, Ganja, without prior notice, and ahead of the schedule it had set with Elchibey’s government. This enabled Suret Huseynov, a former army commander, who had put together a private army in Ganja, to take possession of the weapons left by the retreating unit. Huseynov’s forces marched across Azerbaijan to Baku and in June forced Elchibey to flee. Presidential authority was transferred by the parliament to its speaker, Heydar Aliyev, on 24 June, and his presidency was later ratified in a public referendum in October 1993. In the interim period, Aliyev’s regime was threatened by a number of additional coup attempts, which he succeeded in defusing. Heydar Aliyev was the most prominent politician in postwar Soviet Azerbaijan. He held a variety of positions in the party and security apparatus, including chief of the republic KGB and First Secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee (1969–82). Aliyev was the first Azerbaijani to be elected to the CPSU Politburo. He served as candidate member from 1976 and as full member from 1982, when he became first deputy prime minister until his removal from both positions by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987. After Heydar Aliyev’s advent to power, the regime concentrated on the day-to-day running of the republic, focusing much less on ideologyladen issues. Aliyev achieved a greater degree of internal political stability, partially through imposing many more restrictions on political activity and opposition groups. Under Aliyev’s rule, a cease-fire with Armenia was achieved in 1994 and Azerbaijan joined the Commonwealth of Independent States, reversing the anti-CIS policy of the previous government. Russian troops, however, were not allowed to return to Azerbaijan. As part of Azerbaijan’s decision to establish a clear separation of religion and state, without any official religion, a law was enacted under Aliyev that was given additional force in the Azerbaijan Constitution (Article 18), forbidding clergy and religious parties from participating in state elections. During the early years following Azerbaijan’s independence and in light of recurrent crises, a number of political blocs were formed in an attempt to unify the political efforts of different parties. For instance, in November 1993, the Round Table of Democratic Forces was established, and in March 1994, the Democratic Congress. In May 1994, the Centrist Bloc of Parties was formed, led by the Ana Vatan Party. Some of these associations participated in elections in Azerbaijan as unified blocs. Political System The Constitution of Azerbaijan was adopted on 12 November 1995 in a popular referendum. It stipulated that the Republic of Azerbaijan was a democratic and secular state. The president of the republic was to be elected in general elections for a term of

Introduction

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five years and could serve a maximum of two consecutive terms. The president bore ultimate responsibility for both domestic and foreign affairs, and he was authorized to appoint and dismiss members of the cabinet, including the prime minister. Presidential decrees have been a frequently used mechanism of governance in Azerbaijan. The National Parliament (Milli Majlis) was to consist of 125 members, of whom 100 were elected in local contests (single seat constituencies) and the complementary 25 from national party lists. Parliamentary elections were to be held every five years.21 A supreme court, an economic court and a constitutional court were among the institutions making up the judicial system. The judges to these three courts were nominated by the president, subject to approval by the national parliament. The constitutional court was formally authorized to make decisions on the constitutionality of laws of the republic, of presidential decrees, of regulations of the central government authorities, and of signatures on treaties. Local government was determined through a combination of appointments and elections. The president of the republic appointed regional governors, while local government councils were elected. There are many gaps between the formal declarative aspects of the Azerbaijani political system and the way it functions in practice. The flurry of political activity and its diversity in the initial period after independence testified to the wide expectations that a full democratic system would be established. This was reflected in the electoral system and in many of the laws which were enacted. Subsequently, many of the political transitions have not been carried out according to the legally established mechanisms. At the same time, one of the notable aspects of politics in Azerbaijan in the last decade of its existence has been the absence of violence between conflicting Azerbaijani groups. Since independence, there have been a number of uprisings and coup attempts; yet they have not escalated into major clashes and have been conducted with little bloodshed. Economy In the Soviet period, the economy of the Azerbaijan SSR was based primarily on agriculture, food production, oil and gas production and related industries. The Azerbaijani economy declined significantly after independence in 1991. In addition to the factors that affected most of the post-Soviet republics such as suspension of trade ties and supplies from former Soviet trade partners, the Azerbaijani economy was further disrupted by the war with Armenia. In the second half of 1996 the economy began to recover, and real GDP grew in 1997 by 5.8 per cent, and by 10 per cent the following year. A stringent fiscal policy was initiated in 1995 and led to stabilization and to a reduction of inflation to single digits in 1996–97. Privatization has been slow in the industrial sector, but in the agricultural sphere, over 90 per cent of the state’s farmland has been privatized. Azerbaijan’s economic development is based on the oil and gas sector, which boasts 74 per cent of direct foreign investment. In 1994, the state oil company of Azerbaijan, Socar, signed an $8 billion oil contract with a consortium of international oil companies, called the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC). This contract served as the basis for the partnership with foreign oil companies in the development of oil and gas in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has undertaken to build and refurbish multiple pipelines for export of its oil and gas. The main pipeline will run on an east–west corridor (BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan) and is expected to be operational in early 2005.

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NOTES 1. E.Denison Ross, ‘The Early Years of Shah Isma’il’, Journal of the Asiatic Society (April 1896), p. 288. 2. Today a major city in north-west Iran. 3. For examples of the official historiography in the Soviet period, see ‘Shah Isma’il’ in Azärbayjan Sovet Ensiklopediyasï, vol. 10 (1987), pp. 473–4, and ‘Iran’, Azärbayjan Sovet Ensiklopediyasï vol. 4 (1980), p. 504. An example of the Safavids being termed an ‘Azerbaijani government’ in the post-independence period is found in Mahmud Isma’il, Azärbayjan Tarikhi (Baku: Azerbaijan State Government Publishers, 1993), p. 151 and in Azärbayjan Tarikhi: än Gädim Dävrlärdän XX äsrin ävvälärindä Gädär (Baku: Elm, 1993), p. 164. 4. Henry D.G.Law, ‘Modern Persian Prose (1920s–1940s)’, in Thomas M.Ricks (ed.), Critical Perspectives on Modern Persian Literature (Washington, DC: Three Continents Press, 1984), p. 132. 5. Tadeuz Swietochowski, Russia and Azerbaijan: A Borderland in Transition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 62. 6. Hugh Seton-Watson, Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), pp. 258–9. 7. ‘O proekte konstitutsii (osnovnogo zakona) Azerbaidzhanskoi Sovetskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki i itogakh ego vsenarodnogo obsuzhdeniia’, Bakinskii rabochii, 21 April 1978, pp. 2–4. 8. In 1926 84.2 per cent of Azerbaijanis lived in their own republic; in 1959, 84.9 per cent; and in 1979, 86 per cent (Simon, Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union, Table A3, p. 388). In 1988 only 2.8 per cent of Azerbaijani men and 1.4 per cent of Azerbaijani women who married in the republic took non-Azerbaijani spouses. Comparable figures in Ukraine, for example, were 20.9 per cent for men and 22.4 per cent for women (Narodnoe kboziaistvo SSSR v 1989 g., p. 36). 9. Mark Saroyan, ‘The Karabagh Syndrome and Azerbaijani Politics’, Problems of Communism 5 (September/October 1990 1990), pp. 14–29; Hélène Carrère d’ Encausse, The End of the Soviet Empire (New York: Basic Books, 1993), p. 59. 10. Brenda Shaffer, ‘Government and Institutions’, Azerbaijan Investment Guide (Washington, DC: USACC, 2000), and Joseph A.Kechichian and Theodore W.Karasik, The Crises in Azerbaijan: How Clans Influence the Politics of an Emerging Republic’, Middle East Policy September, 1995, pp. 57–71. 11. Founded in 1986. 12. Founded in 1987. 13. ‘Sozdano Obshchestvo “Vatan”’, Bakinskii rabochii, 31 December 1987, p. 3. 14. See, for instance, ‘Musavat’, Azärbayjan Sovet Ensiklopediyasï, vol. 7 (Baku, 1983), p. 130. 15. Azäroghlu, ‘Häyat Yolu’, Azärbayjan 8 (1987), pp. 59–67. 16. The first public references to the organization appeared on Radio Baku, 23 November, 1988. See, also, Baku Domestic Service in Azerbaijani, 28 November, 1988 (FBIS-SOV88–230). 17. Moscow Television Service in Russian, 5 October, 1989 (FBIS-SOV-89–193). 18. The Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic is a part of Azerbaijan but has no common borders with it. It is situated between Armenia, Turkey and Iran. Its total area is 5.5 sq. km and its population comprises approximately 300,000 inhabitants. 19. The only exception was a small force in the Qabala station, which is an integral part of the Russian monitoring system for ballistic missiles. 20. See remarks of Elchibey, Milliyet (Istanbul), 31 May, 1992, p. 19 (FBIS-SOV-92–109). 21. See http://cec.gov.az/votingtomm/law-1.phtml.

ANA VATAN INTRODUCTION The Ana Vatan (Motherland) Party held its first constituent congress in November 1990 and was registered in August 1992. Since that time, Ana Vatan has repeatedly wavered in its political allegiances. Initially, the party was a supporter of the PFA and joined the Democratic Bloc of Parties which was formed during the 1991 elections and which constituted the first opposition faction in the Azerbaijan parliament. After Heydar Aliyev’s return to power in the summer of 1993, it transferred its support to the new government. It joined the Emergency Consultative Council of Parties created by President Aliyev to support his regime, rejecting participation in the National Salvation Movement1—a bloc created in May 1994 as a reaction of opposition forces to the Bishkek Protocol,2 which served as the basis of the cease-fire agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia. In the spring of 1994, Ana Vatan united with the Social Democrats and the Party of Independent Azerbaijan to form a bloc of centrist parties. Ethnic Azerbaijanis from Armenia, such as party chairman Fazail Agamali, formed a large portion of the party’s political base. Agamali served as deputy minister for labour and social welfare under both Elchibey and Aliyev.3 Ana Vatan supported a peaceful resolution of the conflict with Armenia, economic reforms and eventual unification with Iranian Azerbaijan. It opposed both dependence on Russia and strong ties to Islamic factors. The party newspaper Ana Vatan was published from 1992.

MAIN PRINCIPLES […] The goals of the Ana Vatan Party are being realized on the basis of the following principles: Azerbaijanism, Statehood, Democracy and Civic Duty. Azerbaijanism—from a historic and geographic perspective serves the idea of a ‘united and integrated Azerbaijan’; from an ethnic perspective this principle serves to preserve the traditions of co-existence between Turks (Azerbaijani Turks) and ethnic minorities, while maintaining and developing spiritual and political unity. Azerbaijanism is an idea which embodies a return to Turkism4 and the aspiration for a secular state in the interests of national statehood. The Ana Vatan Party supports [the establishment of] a law-governed state and believes that state interests should serve as the basis for statehood. With regard to questions of state interests and statehood, the Ana Vatan Party upholds a conservative

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point of view and feels that society’s ‘best and brightest’ should stand at the helm of the ship of state. It is the view of the Ana Vatan Party that the essence of political struggle lies in the election of state authority by democratic means. Yet another principle of the Ana Vatan Party is the democratization of all social spheres, directing the state by means of democratic principles and securing the principles of pre-eminence of the law in society and the defence of human rights. In order to realize the principles of Azerbaijanism and national statehood, the principle of civic duty must also come into play. Civic duty is the ultimate expression of Azerbaijanism in daily life. Thus, the creation and development of an independent and indivisible Azerbaijan is conditioned by the application of the principle of civic duty. Ana Vatan believes that civic duty constitutes conscious and genuine patriotism. Civic duty is dependent upon civic initiative and strong, democratic statehood. The Ana Vatan Party believes that education for civic duty must be based on the traditions and customs of the Azerbaijani people, on the ideas of justice and freedom, the moral principles and ideas of patriotism and of historical figures. Civic duty is reflected and embodied in every individual’s true love for the motherland and in his service to it. Civic duty means devoting all of your conscious life to the freedom and independence of the Homeland, to its development and prosperity. Civic duty means willingness to sacrifice one’s life in the name of the liberation of our Homeland. Civic duty means loving your Homeland deep in your soul and guarding it like the apple of your eye, regardless of age, sex or ethnic background. Civic duty is the embodiment of love for the homeland of our fellow countrymen, who have found themselves for well known reasons, in foreign lands. […] Source: Ana Vatan Party Programme, Baku, 1998. NOTES 1. Sometimes translated as the National Resistance Movement. 2. The Bishkek Protocol called for a cease-fire in Karabagh and the subsequent deployment of CIS observers. It was mediated by the CIS Inter-parliamentary Assembly and signed by then Armenian Parliament Speaker Babken Ararktsian, Azerbaijan’s First Deputy Parliament Speaker Afiyaddin Djalilov, the chairman of the parliament of the unrecognized NagornoKarabagh Republic, Karen Baburian, and Russia’s representative to the CSCE Minsk Group, Vladimir Kazimirov. RFE/RL 22 October 1999, Volume 2, Number 42. 3. Azerbaijan, 25 Feb. 1993. 4. A term commonly used for an ideology which gave precedence to Turkic over Azerbaijani identity.

BOZ GURD INTRODUCTION Iskandar Hamidov founded the Boz Gurd (Grey Wolves) Movement in 1992 as part of the Popular Front. Hamidov joined the PFA in 1991 when he was a police lieutenant colonel and he actively participated in the overthrow of Mutalibov. He served under President Elchibey as interior minister. In this capacity, his actions were severely criticized by the mainstream factions of the ruling parties, and he was dismissed by Elchibey in March 1993. Following his dismissal, Boz Gurd left the Popular Front although it did not have major ideological differences with the PFA and tended to enter into the same political blocs as the Popular Front. The first congress of the Boz Gurd Party was held on 26 December 1993. At that time Bahtiyar Ahmedov was elected to lead the party. In April 1994, the party was registered by the Azerbaijan Ministry of Justice. Despite its opposition to the Aliyev regime, party leaders declared that Boz Gurd would not wage a domestic political struggle while Azerbaijan was at war.1 As its name indicates (the Grey Wolf is an ancient totem of the Turkic peoples as well as the name of an ultra-nationalist party in Turkey2) Boz Gurd advocated a strongly nationalistic and pro-Turkic policy. As part of this policy, it supported cooperation with other Turkic nations, and called for assisting them in achieving independence. Boz Gurd accepted membership of ethnic Azerbaijanis from both the republic and abroad, emphasizing its interest in the rights of co-ethnics beyond the republic’s borders. Although party leaders in Baku denied the existence of any ties between them, there were indications that the Boz Gurd Movement cooperated with its Turkish namesake. A major aspect of the party’s platform was its support for the struggle to gain Azerbaijani sovereignty over territories that included Karabagh, parts of Georgia, Derbent (now part of the territory of the Republic of Dagestan, Russian Federation) and additional areas in Armenia which it considered to be within the country’s ‘historical borders’. The party rejected territorial compromise with Armenia, calling for a military solution to the Karabagh conflict. Other planks in Boz Gurd’s platform included conversion of the country to a market economy and fundamental opposition to joining the CIS. The Boz Gurd leadership supported the Chechen struggle for independence and reportedly trained and sent troops to assist President Dudayev in 1994 and 1995.3 Iskandar Hamidov was detained by President Aliyev in March 1995 as part of a general arrest of major opposition figures. The party itself was banned by the Aliyev government in April and on 11 July 1995 the party changed its name to the National Democratic Party of Azerbaijan. Boz Gurd was the official party press organ. It began publication in 1992.

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CHARTER Boz Gurd is a socio-political organization which operates in accordance with the constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Boz Gurd is striving for the full independence, freedom and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and the inviolability of its borders; the transformation of the Republic of Azerbaijan into a powerful country with a highly respected place in the world community; and inviolable unity based on equal rights for all peoples living in Azerbaijan. The organization, which operates openly, abides unconditionally by democratic principles and international laws, and uses all legal means to achieve its goals. Boz Gurd considers as its main goals: fulfilling the Azerbaijani people’s national, cultural and spiritual identity; preserving and enhancing its historic customs and ethics; strengthening both the minds and bodies of the people through these values, raising the level of individual development, both mental and physical, and humanizing all social relationships to the greatest degree possible. Boz Gurd is a voluntary union of people who are ready to: protect the Republic of Azerbaijan from any attempts of foreign invasion, internal separatism or foreign or domestic sabotage; to fight to liberate Azerbaijani lands till the last drop of their blood; and to help the brotherly Turkic peoples in their struggles for freedom. Boz Gurd, which is active not only in Azerbaijan but also in all countries where Turkic peoples dwell, endeavours to achieve moral unity and political solidarity among Turkic peoples, and to further expand economic cooperation and cultural relations among Turkic states. Boz Gurd fully defends all progressive peoples living in Azerbaijan, irrespective of their religion, race or ethnic background, as well as those who look favourably on Azerbaijan and seek to have peaceful and mutually beneficial cooperation with it; and supports the efforts of democratic states in this regard. Boz Gurd is a legal entity. It has its own funds and property. It opens its own accounts in the Azerbaijan State Bank and banks of foreign countries. It produces its own publications and newspapers. […] GOALS OF THE ORGANIZATION The organization considers liberation of all Azerbaijani lands from occupiers and achieving moral unity and political solidarity among Turkic peoples as its sacred goal and will continue its struggle until this supreme goal is fully achieved. The organization considers its prime goal to be liberating the last inch [qarish] of occupied Azerbaijani lands from the hands of the enemy and supports all efforts manifested in this respect; and development of a theoretical and practical scientific programme to achieve the liberation and happiness of the people and to elevate the Republic of Azerbaijan to the ranks of the developed countries. Boz Gurd, which serves the Republic of Azerbaijan and its interests, opposes the use of force, but is ready to respond to any act of aggression against or pressure on Azerbaijan.

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The organization considers it a duty to protect the security of its ethnic kin inside and outside the republic. The organization is ready to cooperate closely with any organization, political party or society struggling for the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The organization opposes all forms of terror or slave mentality instilled by the [Russian] empire. It is awakening the native memory of the people. Its goal is to make people aware of their roots and to strengthen their ethnic pride. The organization is striving to enhance Azerbaijani statehood and supports any visible efforts in this regard. The organization respects the ethnic pride, honour and morality of all peoples and nations and will render assistance in this regard whenever necessary. The organization considers Armenian nationalists its principal and eternal enemy. Anyone who considers them their friends is not considered a friend of the organization. The organization is ready to use any means to cure the wounds inflicted on our people. The organization accepts as a member any caring native son who is ready to fight for Azerbaijan and for the liberation of all Turkic peoples until his last drop of blood. MEMBERSHIP IN THE ORGANIZATION Any person, regardless of his occupation, who accepts the constitution and by-laws of the organization, can become a member of Boz Gurd. Membership may be individual or on a group basis. A member of any organization or political party whose programme proclaims the liberation of Azerbaijan and of the Turkic peoples among its goals, can become a member of Boz Gurd, on the basis of his ideas and his sincerity and upon approval by the leadership of the organization. Source: Party Pamphlet. NOTES 1. Turan (in English), 9 April, 1994. 2. In Turkish the name appears as Boz Qurd 3. See OMRI Daily Digest, 27 Feb. 1995, ‘Russian Troops Accused of Human Rights Violations in Chechnya’, 8 June 1995, ‘Gray Wolves Funneling Weapons to Chechens’, http://archive.tol.cz./

COMMUNIST PARTY OF AZERBAIJAN INTRODUCTION The Communist Party of Azerbaijan was founded in 1920. In 1987 it had 384,000 members. Following the outbreak of the Karabagh conflict and the birth of the national movement in Azerbaijan its prestige declined steadily and by the early 1990s its membership had decreased to half its previous size. The introduction of Soviet troops into Baku in January 1990 aggravated the crisis within the Communist Party. This tension peaked in August 1991 when the party leadership expressed its support for Moscow’s coup attempt. With the failure of the coup, massive numbers of demonstrators demanded that the party be outlawed. The Azerbaijan Communist Party’s 33rd (emergency) Congress held on 14 September 1991 adopted a decision on dissolution of the party by an overwhelming majority. The communist forces in Azerbaijan subsequently split into a number of factions, which organized into three separate parties—two calling themselves the Azerbaijan Communist Party. The Azerbaijan Communist Party led by Firuddun Hasanov was founded in November 1993. Many members of the leadership were of ethnic Russian origin. Hasanov and his followers supported the Aliyev government and were recognized by it as the only legitimate communist party. Hasanov’s party published a newspaper called Azerbaijan Higigaty. Ramiz Ahmedov headed the second Azerbaijan Communist Party. Ahmedov’s party also held its founding congress in November 1993, and was officially registered in March 1994. It was banned in September 1995 on the grounds that its efforts to revive the Soviet Union constituted a violation of Azerbaijani independence. Ahmedov had affiliations to Gennadii Ziuganov’s party in Russia (RCP). Unlike Hasanov, he expressed strong ideological opposition to Aliyev’s regime In January 1993, Sayad Sayadov,1 a highly placed functionary of the former Communist regime, a doctor of history and an ethnic Azerbaijani from Armenia, registered a party under the name of the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Revival Party, and declared it to be the successor of the Soviet Azerbaijan Communist Party.2 This party was registered by the Ministry of Justice in November 1993. In September 1995 Sayadov changed the name of the party to the Azerbaijan United Communist Party. It is also referred to sometimes as the New Communist Party. The Trud Labour Union Movement of Azerbaijan is affiliated with Sayadov’s party.

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INTERVIEW WITH SAYAD SAYADOV3 […] Q: […] Do you acknowledge the fact that communism and democracy are incompatible? A: No. Under communism-socialism there was genuine democracy. If you compare the Programme of the Communist Party with the Qur’an, our sacred book, you will see that there is nothing in the programme that you cannot find in the Qur’an. By the same token, our wholesome way of life is based on the namaz.4 The communists are guilty of having failed to retain power, of giving the green light to embezzlement, injustice, bribe-taking and lawlessness when they were at the helm. Q: Isn’t that enough to turn one’s back on them? A: Of course we have done that. It is not communists but the Communist Party that we are bringing back. By admitting people of integrity we are purging the party. Not a single former first secretary or minister has been admitted or ever will be. Q: Is unification with Communist parties of the former USSR possible? A: No, it is not. This entails the threat of becoming their filial. Yet we believe that a Fourth International could be created. Q: What is the difference between the CPA and the New Communist Party? A: There was only one Communist Party in Azerbaijan and we have restored it. The New CPA was founded by former party functionaries. Their strength lies in their material means, ours—in our ideology. […] Q: What is the party’s social base? A: The bulk of our party members are former communists. As of today, 25,000 members have been registered. Lately, younger people have been showing interest in it. We are going to restore a special body, the Komsomol, to carry on work among the youth. Q: Are you also planning to restore the Young Pioneer organization? A: Of course. Our party will be joined by children, too. They say it is their cherished dream to wear the red tie and the Young Pioneer star. Source: Azladlyg, 27 January 1994.

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NOTES 1. Sayad Sayadov was born in 1934 in the Vedi District of the Armenian SSR. He joined the Communist Party in 1957 and served as a Komsomol and party functionary for over 26 years, including 10 years in Stepanakert, the capital of the Nagorno-Karabagh autonomous region. 2. Pravda, 14 January, 1993, p. 1 (FBIS-SOV-93–010). 3. See also the interview of 23 February 1994 in Hurriyet. 4. The question of the compatibility of communism and the Qur’an was a recurrent theme during the Soviet period. Both among the clergy and among communists, there were those who at certain times claimed the two ideologies were indeed reconcilable. The namaz (Arabic, salat), is the collective name for the five daily prayers which constitute one of the Five Pillars of Islam.

DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AZERBAIJAN INTRODUCTION The constituent conference of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan was held in January 1991. The party was officially registered in May 1993, and was one of the founders of the Democratic Congress.1 As a self-styled centrist liberal party, it advocated adapting liberal democracy to the Azerbaijani mentality.2 Sardar Jalal oglu Mamedov, a former activist in the Popular Front of Azerbaijan, led the party from its inception. The Democratic Party opposed the change of regime in June 1993, regarding it as unlawful. It was critical of Aliyev’s policies—including the decision to join the CIS and demonstrated its opposition by joining the National Salvation Movement. In 1995, the party’s official registration was annulled. The party published two newspapers—Hurriyet and Demokratik Azerbaijan.

PROGRAMME The Azerbaijan Democratic Party, basing itself on principles of universal human values, the official abolition of capitalism in the world and the right of peoples to selfdetermination; while taking into consideration the fact that our people live in two empires, divided into northern Azerbaijan, which is approaching liberation, and southern Azerbaijan, where the political situation is uncertain;3 and bearing in mind Azerbaijan’s record and experience in statehood, and human and civil rights and freedoms; and its desire to establish a free, democratic and unitary state on the territory of Azerbaijan which will link its fate to the world community, hereby defines the following objectives as its programme: Ideology According to the ideology of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan: a democratic system is the goal and the means to political reform in society; national, religious and universal human values and traditions are essential to culture; independent statehood is the guarantee of civil rights and freedoms and national development […] The Democratic Party of Azerbaijan regards racial, ethnic, religious and class bias, chauvinism, hegemony and coercion as dangerous to the development of mankind. The Democratic Party of Azerbaijan believes that a national liberation movement fighting for a nation’s legitimate rights testifies to a sense of national identity, a return to national ascendancy, and the true path towards social evolution. Imperialism, operating under the cover of a range of ideological concepts, great-power chauvinism and

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colonialism are the main obstacles to the National Liberation Movements and national statehood. The party’s chief goal is to build an independent, unitary and law-governed Azerbaijani state, which, for the sake of national interests, rejects entering into any kind of unions. Domestic Policy, State-Building and Legality When we speak of the interests of the Azerbaijani state we mean the interests of all citizens living on its territory. The Democratic Party of Azerbaijan supports establishment of a parliamentary republic in Azerbaijan. The state will effect a division of power and guarantee the functioning [of the separate branches] independent of one another. A multi-party political system will be created […] Ethnic Policy The national policy of the state will be based: on people’s natural rights, recognized by the UN, on the right of peoples to live in their own historic territory, to be masters of their own fate and define their own political status, culture and distinctive character; on guarantees of the rights, freedom and safety of citizens, free choice of the type of economy best suited to the republic, development of cooperation on an equal basis with other countries and peoples; and on international law. The state will be the guarantor of the rights of all ethnic minorities living in Azerbaijan. People who resided in Azerbaijan and were granted Azerbaijani citizenship but now reside in other countries, will have the right to retain Azerbaijani citizenship. […] Economic Policy The economic policy of the Azerbaijani state will be based on multiple forms of ownership guaranteed by the law and a free market. The interests of the individual, the state and the people form the basis for economic policy. The following are seen as indispensable for economic development: an organic link between agriculture and industry and the environment, conservation of the environment, the judicious use of raw materials and resources, the development of traditional branches of industry, the creation of technology-intensive, state-of-the-art production facilities, balancing imports and exports, creation of a domestic market and hard currency reserves, maximal autonomy for national industry, meeting domestic needs with the help of exports, application of the latest achievements of science, engineering and technology, overcoming the shortcomings of domestic production and the development of agriculture as an industry. A law permitting various forms of land ownership will be promulgated. A policy of taxation aimed at developing concrete growth and state interests will be introduced. Guarantees for the investment of foreign capital on the basis of mutual gain will be created, while taking national interests into account […] Social Policy A system of social guarantees and social welfare will be created to protect the rights of civil servants, the unemployed and the weaker strata of the population. Inflation will be

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taken into account when the subsistence minimum is calculated. A system of progressive taxation and insurance will be created. Minimum wages should be fixed above the subsistence level […] Culture National culture is a means of affirming national consciousness, an integral part of universal culture, and a gauge of a nation’s material and cultural development. National culture is enriched by drawing on the past experience of human creativity and by mutual enrichment of different cultures […] The official language in the Azerbaijan republic is Turkic.4 The state will ensure the preservation and use of this language. […] Partial [secondary] education is to be compulsory. The state will establish a free system of secondary education. Higher education and the academic system should meet national interests. Pre-school and grade school education will be independent of political and military influences. The development of the family, the mosque and of individuals will take priority in society […] Health and Ecology […] There will be state and private sectors in the health care system. Health care should be based on a system of insurance. In the public sector medical services will be free. A clean environment is a major factor in the welfare of society and constitutes a national interest. The state’s ecological policy should be aimed at creating harmony between nature, society and man. The state should work to raise ecology-minded people and take part in international cooperation for conservation of the environment. Foreign Policy […] Foreign policy will be directed mainly at Azerbaijan’s integration in the world economic community through participation in various international organizations.5 The Azerbaijani state will cooperate in establishing regional, international, national and religious associations and take part in their activities.6 Source: Party Programme. NOTES 1. See Introduction to Azerbaijan 2. Hurriyet, 18 May 1994. 3. The Democratic Party of Azerbaijan has accused Iran of violating the rights and freedoms of the Azerbaijani population there (see Hurriyet, 18 May 1994). 4. See Introduction to Azerbaijan. 5. In 1994 Azerbaijan was a member of the CIS, the UN, the CSCE and the Islamic Conference Organization. 6. The Democratic Party’s stand on foreign policy was elaborated in Mamedov’s address to the First Party Congress. He noted there the complicated nature of relations with Iran. Iran’s renunciation of the use of religion for political ends and Azerbaijan’s pledge of nonintervention in Iran’s internal affairs under the pretext of defence of human rights would

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create an atmosphere of tranquillity and mutual trust. Mamedov further declared that the party favoured normalization of relations with Armenia; that relations with Georgia were of strategic significance to Azerbaijan, but that they would depend on how the Georgian authorities treated the 500,000 Azerbaijanis living in Georgia; that Turkey had always played and continued to play a decisive role in Azerbaijan’s statehood, yet, broader relations with Turkey should not affect relations with other countries adversely; and the dignity of the various ethnic groups in Azerbaijan should not be disregarded. Mamedov admitted that the party’s relations with Russia were strained and attached great importance to their normalization. The Democratic Party of Azerbaijan held that promotion of close relations with the Central Asian countries should be a priority in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. As to Western countries, he said that Azerbaijan should draw on their experience in economic and political development (see Hurriyet, 28 May 1994).

DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF ENTREPRENEURS INTRODUCTION The Azerbaijan Democratic Party of Entrepreneurs held its constituent congress in April 1994 and was registered a month later. At the congress, Mahmud Mamedov, the 37-yearold manager of a large holding company was elected party chairman.1 The party, which was established to represent the interests of the business sector, occupied a place in the centre of the political spectrum. It advocated the implementation of economic reform and the development of a market economy, but at the same time, insisted on maintaining an economic safety net for the lower strata of Azerbaijani society. The party newspaper Gunay was published in Azerbaijani and Russian.

PROGRAMME […] Political Aims In order to effect the division of legislative, executive and judicial powers in full conformity with the principles of a democratic society free of ideological dogma and stereotypes, the Azerbaijan Democratic Party of Entrepreneurs will participate in democratic elections for the president, parliament, and other elected state bodies, and in forming the local bodies of power of the Azerbaijan Republic. It favours general elections by direct and secret ballot. […] In its cadre policy the party considers it important to eliminate phenomena which divide the nation, such as favouritism on the basis of regional trends and nepotism; an end should be put to bribe-taking in administrative bodies, which should be restructured; the police and prosecutor’s office should not be allowed to intervene inappropriately in the economic activities of the private sector […] The Azerbaijan Democratic Party of Entrepreneurs promotes ideas of humanism and democracy, freedom of conscience, belief and speech, and social justice; it considers essential an attitude of equal respect for people of all nationalities living in the republic and preservation of their national cultures, customs and traditions. In the political and economic spheres, the Azerbaijan Democratic Party of Entrepreneurs supports pluralism and the development of a multi-party system and builds its relations with other political parties, public and state organizations on principles of equality.

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In foreign policy, the party considers essential the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with other countries, the territorial integrity and the inviolability of the frontiers of other countries, and noninterference in each other’s internal affairs […] The party maintains close ties with Azerbaijanis residing abroad, and with the cultural centres and informal structures that bring them together, and cooperates with them. The Azerbaijan Democratic Party of Entrepreneurs believes in the separation of religion and state without interference in each other’s affairs. It renders assistance in opening madrasas, restoring mosques and other places of worship and constructing new ones, in publishing religious literature and organizing pilgrimages to holy sites abroad. The party does not accept and strongly condemns religious intolerance, in particular the antagonism between Sunnis and Shiites,2 shows respect for other religions and beliefs and advocates tolerance towards their objects of worship and shrines. […] In the Economic Sphere […] The party favours the promulgation of laws guaranteeing the inviolability of all forms of property, with privatization of small enterprises in the services sphere, and the transformation of medium and large enterprises into joint stock companies;3 it supports managing them on principles of supply and demand and economic considerations. The party believes that the problems arising in the course of privatization should be resolved in accordance with the law, by creating mechanisms that will do away with injustice and arbitrariness. At this juncture, Azerbaijan’s industrial potential and the equipment of enterprises must be maintained and modernized in keeping with scientific and technical achievements. The Azerbaijan Democratic Party of Entrepreneurs sees oil extraction, heavy industry, machine building, transport, chemical, power engineering and other industries together with their materialtechnical base, and the republic’s natural wealth, as belonging to the nation. Today, when a changeover to a new system of production relations is being implemented, the party urges a restructuring of these branches by means of an efficient privatization policy in the people’s interest; the party stresses that any delay in carrying out these measures will spell the destruction of the industrial base of hundreds of enterprises, which are now in a state of paralysis, and cause additional difficulties in restoring economic ties […] The party favours restructuring of the financial-credit system, a new monetary policy, the creation of a securities market and of commodity and stock exchanges,4 and the establishment of leasing, holding, marketing and auditing firms […] In the Agricultural Sphere […] The Azerbaijan Democratic Party of Entrepreneurs does not believe that the present crisis situation in agriculture can be rectified by artificially keeping afloat the kolkhozes and sovkhozes that have gone bankrupt. It sees the solution to this situation in a changeover to a pluralistic economic system and establishing a climate for healthy competition. [The party] extrapolates from and implements the experience of modern forms of economic activity in private farming, cooperatives, land leasing as well as other new types of farming.5 […] The party is striving to attain state subsidies, easy-term credits, and tax and price discounts for farmers. It is working to turn urban-rural relationships into an industrialist-

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farmer business partnership, and to revive and give a new lease of life to hundreds of devastated and deserted mountain villages.6 In the Social Sphere One of the major considerations in creating a strong state, in the view of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party of Entrepreneurs, is improving public health and social welfare […] The party is playing a role in formulating and implementing the concept of protecting the health of the population […] It is working to improve the public health system in the republic and is doing its best to expand charity activities and check the spread of alcoholism and drug addiction—phenomena which are traditionally alien to our people.7 The party favours the establishment of medical insurance based on legislative and economic measures and an expansion of medical services partly paid for by the consumer as a way to secure the social welfare of the population. It also considers it essential that funds be allocated to provide low-cost medical services to people in the lower income brackets and to the handicapped […] The Azerbaijan Democratic Party of Entrepreneurs considers it essential for educational institutions to develop on a democratic foundation and be updated to meet world standards; to improve the educational process […] to use all available means to broaden the knowledge and training of those in institutions of higher education in Azerbaijan and recognized educational institutions abroad […] The party is struggling for the conservation of nature and the environment. It demands an end to pollution of the Caspian Sea and of other bodies of water and of the air in the republic, the cleaning of polluted waters, and the reclamation of Azerbaijan territory which has been polluted.8 Ratified by Azerbaijan Democratic Party of Entrepreneurs Constituent Congress, 23 April 1994. Source: Gunay, 30 April 1994. NOTES 1. Moscow News, 17–24 July 1994. 2. The overwhelming majority of Azerbaijanis are Shiite. The Sunni community constitutes approximately 20 per cent of Muslims in Azerbaijan, and is concentrated in the north of the republic. It seems that many of the Sunnis are not originally ethnic Azerbaijanis, but connected to the mostly Sunni ethnic groups in contiguous Dagestan, notably the Lezgin. The majority of Azerbaijanis are secular and their knowledge of Islamic doctrine is limited. Consequently, the Sunni-Shiite distinction has not emerged as a politically salient issue in the republic. 3. In July 1994 the Milli Majlis adopted a law ‘On Joint Stock Companies’. It provided for the establishment of a parliamentary-supervised State Property Fund, whose function was to exercise control over the transformation of large state-owned enterprises into public companies (Gunay, 16 July 1994). 4. In April 1994 the Milli Majlis passed a law ‘On Commodity Exchanges’, which regulated their establishment and activities and state supervision over them. By the time the law was adopted, three commodity exchanges had been set up in Azerbaijan, two of which were already functioning (Gunay, 16 April 1994).

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5. In Azerbaijan, as throughout the Soviet Union, the development of different forms of property was officially encouraged under perestroika. Under the PFA government in 1992– 93 the promotion of individual farming was seen as part of the agrarian reform programme.

Farmers met with various difficulties. They were made to sell a greater part of their produce to the state at low prices. Farms were poorly equipped (there was one tractor per four farms). The farmers’ living and social conditions were appalling (water supply was sufficient in only one-third of the farms, electricity—in 27 per cent, only 3 per cent of farms had telephones) (Azerbaijan, 23 March 1993). As of the end of 1992, Azerbaijan had 407 private farms, 993 farmers leased farmland, and 42,200 people were employed on these farms (Azerbaijan, 12 August 1993) out of the 1,156,000 people employed in the agro-industrial sector (Azerbaijan, 1 January 1994). Most, if not all of the kolkhozes have since been privatized. 6. Reference is to the numerous villages destroyed and the many villagers who fled to the cities as a result of the fighting between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the crisis in NagornoKarabagh. 7. On the proportions of drug addiction in Azerbaijan see Istiglal, 28 June 1994. 8. On the pollution of the Caspian Sea, see Introduction to Azerbaijan.

DOGRU YOL INTRODUCTION The Dogru Yol (True Path) Party held its constituent conference in January 1993, and was registered two months later by the Ministry of Justice. Party leader Tamerlan Garayev had been a founding member of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan and had served as first deputy chairman of the Azerbaijan parliament As such, he had supported the change in name of the official language of the republic from Azerbaijani to Turkic, indicating an ethnic-based approach to defining the character of the Azerbaijani state.1 Dogru Yol seems to have had links to the Dogru Yol Party in Turkey. It advocated preservation of national traditions and reducing Azerbaijan’s dependence on Russia. In the economic sphere, the party supported instituting market reform, developing the private sector and modernizing industry, while maintaining a basic level of social welfare. After the PFA-led government fell from power, Dogru Yol joined the opposition but Garayev was, nonetheless, appointed by President Aliyev as Ambassador to the People’s Republic of China. In May 1994, Dogru Yol participated in the establishment of the National Salvation Movement. From 1992 the party published the newspaper Dogru Yol.

PROGRAMME […] Political and State Structures It is necessary to establish a genuine division of power and a new structure for state bodies. A new constitution should be adopted. A reform of the judicial system should be carried out and the courts of law should be made a genuinely independent arm of power capable of protecting the citizen from unlawful actions of individuals and state agencies […] It would be expedient to carry out a new administrative-territorial division of the republic.2 Local administrative bodies should be given greater powers and autonomy. A new mechanism for their operation should be devised—one that would be approved and supported by the local population and at the same time work in the interests of the republic […] Nagorno-Karabagh and National Security

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The Karabagh conflict should be resolved by coordinated actions of the armed forces and an energetic foreign policy, while ensuring national security […] International intervention in the conflict could only be acceptable on the basis of a UN and CSCE mandate, if the territorial integrity of the republic is guaranteed and the republic’s sovereignty is respected. Armenia should be branded as an aggressor and an official embargo on economic relations with it should be imposed. It is important to secure, through diplomatic means, the political and economic support for Azerbaijan of Turkey, Iran and other countries. It is necessary to secure the active cooperation of Georgia, Ukraine and other republics in organizing resistance to any attempts at revising borders and in opposing any great power diktat.3 Urgent measures are needed to increase the efficiency of the armed forces […] The army should remain outside of politics. It should defend the borders and national security4 […] A position of active neutrality would serve Azerbaijan’s interests best. The promotion of ties with western countries and the Islamic world should be used to create a counterweight to the former military, political and economic dependence on Russia. Economy and Culture Azerbaijan has an advantageous geographic position, good climate and soil, and rich mineral deposits. Direct-action legislation, enabling people to open businesses without having first to obtain the permission of bureaucrats, should be promulgated. A national monetary-financial system will make it possible for Azerbaijan to embark on its own economic reforms. Opening the doors to foreign investment will give the economy the necessary bearings […] The assistance of our leading foreign partners will be needed for modernization of the economy and integration of the republic into international economic relations […] No administrative pressure should be applied to producers […] It would seem expedient for large factories and enterprises to be divided into smaller ones before shares are sold on the stock market and privatization is carried out. Support of national enterprises and favourable legislation and financial policies relating to those who set up new enterprises and create jobs, are needed. Agriculture, as one of the most important priorities, must be supported with financial subsidies […].5 The structure of its production should be altered in order to satisfy 70–80 per cent of the domestic demand in bread, meat and milk, and industrial crops for export should be planted on the remaining arable land. The aim of the economic reform is to create a stratum of patriotic entrepreneurs, of large, middle and small property owners, to prevent the impoverishment of the population and to enter the international market. It is important to adequately finance the public education and public health systems, and the entire cultural sphere […] The state should ensure access of every needy person to quality health care and of every capable person to modern education, ensure the preservation of our precious national culture, and offer every citizen the opportunity to enjoy the country’s resources […] National self-awareness should be raised to the level of a national responsibility. This should be reflected in awareness of the role of the Azerbaijan nation among other peoples of the world, and in state concern for the language, culture and uniqueness of the ethnic minorities living in the republic as well as for their security.6 The state is duty-bound to

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create a legal mechanism for protecting their civil rights and cultural autonomy and to allocate financial means to support their cultures and languages. Adopted on 24 July 1992, at the conference of the organizing committee of the Dogru Yol Party of Azerbaijan. Source: Vyshka, 10 September 1992. NOTES 1. Turan (in English), 26 Dec. 1992. 2. The administrative-territorial division of Azerbaijan when it achieved independence consisted of 59 districts, 1 autonomous republic (Nakhichevan) and 1 autonomous oblast (NagornoKarabagh) subordinate directly to the republican government. 3. This clause foreshadows the creation of GUAM four years later, following the 1996 talks held in Vienna on amending the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova decided to pool their diplomatic resources to oppose Russia's efforts to station its weaponry in or near the territory of the organization's member states. The GUAM countries (subsequently GUUAM after they were joined by Uzbekistan) have sought Western financial and political support as a counterweight to Russian influence. Azerbaijan was the only GUAM country not dependent on supplies of oil and gas either from or through Russia. 4. Many in the republic saw the politicization of Azerbaijan's armed forces and their use in the political struggle within the country as one of the main causes of Azerbaijan's military setbacks against Armenia in the spring of 1992 (Stolitsa 20 (1994), p. 7). 5. See Introduction to Azerbaijan. 6. See Samur-Legzin National Centre and n. 4 there.

ISLAMIC PARTY OF AZERBAIJAN INTRODUCTION The Islamic Party of Azerbaijan was established in September 1991 and registered by the Ministry of Justice in September 1992. The first party chairman was Alikram Isma'il Aliyev. The Islamic Party opposed the separation of religion and state. It aspired to the social and economic independence of Azerbaijan on the basis of the Shari'a and rejected Azerbaijani nationalism. The party advocated the adoption of the Arabic alphabet, but when it became clear that this would not pass the legislature, its leaders joined forces with the Communists and others who favoured retaining Cyrillic characters rather than introducing the Latin alphabet. With regard to foreign policy, the party supported close relations with Iran, often promoting that country's views on various issues affecting Azerbaijan, and advocated strengthening ties with other Muslim states. It campaigned to lift the 1995 ban on broadcasting Iranian television inside the republic. The Islamic Party opposed Azerbaijan's signing of major oil contracts with Western companies. In January 1993 it publicly condemned the bombing of Southern Iraq by the US and its allies and proposed convening a conference of heads of Muslims states in Baku to discuss this crisis.1 The Islamic Party was not permitted to participate in the 1995 parliamentary elections, after a law was passed forbidding clergy to run for public office. It was officially outlawed in 1996, and its leaders were tried and convicted of spying for Iran. It was also maintained that the party was financed from Tehran. Former party activists eventually reconstituted the party and it returned to the political scene, although it seems to have split in the process, some of its members forming the surrogate Islamic Democratic Party and forging ties with Musavat. The party published two newspapers—Islamin sesi (Islamic Voice) and Islam dunyasi (Islamic World).

INTERVIEW WITH ALIKRAM ALIYEV Q: What can you tell us briefly about the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan [IPA]? A: In the Name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful. In the era of the twisted communist regime Islam was subjected to persecution. At present, the crimes committed by that regime are being condemned and the wounds that have remained are beginning to heal. The liquidation of spiritual figures, the burning of all Islamic religious literature, and the liquidation of mosques and shrines—are all part of our

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recent history. But in spite of these events the light of Islam has continued to glow in the hearts of our people. A revival of lost traditions, including the spread of religious values by means of literature and the reconstruction of old neglected mosques is a high-priority task of the IPA. Following 16 years of underground activity, our party has been operating legally in the political arena for the past 3 years. The Islamic Party of Azerbaijan is a socio-political party, which functions on the basis of Islamic values. The IPA can be said to be conducting its activity in all regions of Azerbaijan. Q: I would like you to comment on the recent events which have occurred in the country. A: Azerbaijan is currently undergoing a very difficult period of its history. Profound crises are evident in every sphere. At the same time, the efforts of the authorities to strengthen independence and to secure territorial integrity can be considered satisfactory. Q: Does the IPA have contacts with other parties in Azerbaijan and abroad? A: We are ready to cooperate with all religious parties, centres, movements and societies, as well as with other political parties here in the country and abroad. The IPA, basing itself on the Qur’an and the norms and principles of Islam, appeals to all formal and informal political parties and movements to join forces in the name of securing the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, in the name of political and economic independence and in the name of the people’s interests. Q: Do you think Islam can fulfil the ideological vacuum in Azerbaijan? A: Not only is it able to do so—we feel that Islam is the only path to Azerbaijan’s revival. Both from a geographic as well as an historical point of view Azerbaijan has always been an Asiatic country. Islam is an inalienable part of the East. Today, in the face of an ideological vacuum, we observe how the American-Zionist alliance strives to spread Christianity, Baha’ism and other negative movements in Azerbaijan and to spread nationalism in our country. Ignorant of the psychology of our people, these missionaries refuse to understand that their efforts are in vain. Q: What is the nature of the role of the IPA in the revival and construction of mosques? A: The IPA is carrying out specific measures among the population, in particular among the youth in the spheres of moral, patriotic, ethical, national and internationalist education. With this goal in mind, local committees of the IPA— supported by state and unofficial organizations, as well as individuals—actively participate in the restoration of old and the construction of new mosques and shrines. Q: What are the IPA’s sources of financing? A: The IPA operates through the donations of true Muslim believers in our party.

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Q: There are rumours that the majority, in fact, 90 per cent of your party, consists of representatives of neighbourhoods in Baku. To what extent is this true? A: This is absolute disinformation. Suffice it to say that the Baku committee of the IPA was established only a month ago. Leaving aside regional and clan loyalties, the IPA considers its primary task to be active participation of all Muslims of Azerbaijan in the religious and socio-political life of the country. As for the number of party members, the majority represent Azerbaijan’s rural areas. Source: Islamin sesi (Voice of Islam), 18 April 1995. NOTES 1. Baku Azerbaijan Radio/Television Network in Russian, 23 Jan. 1993 (FBIS-SOV-93–017).

MUSAVAT Source: Musavat partijasynyn: Programy ve Niazamnamesi (Kenche, 1993), pp. 3–12. INTRODUCTION Musavat (Equality) considered itself the successor to the party of the same name, which was established in 1911 and which governed the first independent Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan (1918–20). After the Bolshevik take-over of Azerbaijan in 1920, the core of its activists escaped to Turkey, where Musavat continued operating. In the period just prior to and immediately following independence, many of the constituent groups of the Popular Front broke away and founded their own political parties. Such was the case with Musavat which was founded and led by the speaker of the Azerbaijan Parliament under Elchibey, Isa Gambar. In November 1992 it was formally reestablished in Baku as an independent party, and officially registered a month later. Its members included a large contingent representing the Azerbaijani intelligentsia— including a number of ministers and diplomats who joined Musavat following the demise of Elchibey’s regime in 1993. Musavat was a vocal opponent of Aliyev. It was an ardent supporter of Azerbaijani and Turkic nationalism, but allowed debates on such topics as the role of humanism and Islam in society to appear in its publications, including the newspaper Yeni Musavat. The majority of party members adhered to a moderate line on the issue of unification between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani provinces in Iran, believing that this should occur only with the consent of Azerbaijanis in Iran, and considering it imprudent to discuss potential unification publicly when conditions were not yet ripe to realize this goal. Prior to the November 1995 elections, the second candidate on Musavat’s list, Tofigh Gasim was arrested and charged with treason. In October the party was disqualified from participating in the elections on the grounds that it had allegedly failed to collect a sufficient number of signatures.

PROGRAMME The establishment of the first political organization in Azerbaijan’s modern history is closely bound with Musavat and the musavatists. In tsarist Russia the first musavatists fought for national and human rights. They extended the principle of equality in relations between people to relations between nations […] Musavat became a party in 1911, passed through the stages of the struggle against tsarism, of revolution, emigration and revival, and created an ideology and an

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organization, striving to rally the nation around this organization and ideology; struggled to realize the national ideal; raised the banner of national independence and democratic government, secured independent statehood for Azerbaijan, acquainted the world’s peoples with Azerbaijan’s national and cultural distinctiveness, and placed Azerbaijan’s problems on the international agenda;1 waged a renewed and selfless struggle against foreign occupation, developed a national ideology, was the only unstifled voice of truth coming from Azerbaijan; played a vanguard role in the new national democratic movement and became the movement’s ideological base […] The great M.E.Rasulzade stood at the head of the party2 […] Proclaiming loyalty to the ideas of the original Musavat, we declare: freedom of the individual to be the corner-stone of our activities; granting all nationalities independence to be the most pressing problem of the day; reaffirmation of our loyalty to the national slogan: ‘Turkism, Islamism, Modernity’; musavatism—means belonging to the great Turkic culture; absorbing the national culture and appreciating the value of each individual, fidelity to the ideals of freedom, republicanism and independence, love of Azerbaijan as our homeland […] The party offers the following programme for the transitional period. A DEMOCRATIC AZERBAIJAN STATE The Musavat Party considers the formation of a strong Azerbaijan state and service to its citizens to be the main objectives for the immediate future […] Azerbaijan must totally rebuild its state mechanism and adapt it to contemporary universal standards, bearing in mind the experience of state building in 1918–20. In the transitional period, the leading functions in society must be assumed by the Azerbaijani state […] The following features of an independent state must be instituted in the immediate future: a national passport system; a banking and taxation system; a system of levies and duties; border installations; armed forces and navy; a national security system; foreign policy-making bodies an economy based on national resources. The Azerbaijan state should be a democratic law-governed state […] The state should support a free press, and ensure its normal operation within the law. […] The state should create all necessary conditions for the emergence and activity, within the limits of the law, of public organizations and political parties, and facilitate the establishment of a multiparty system […] – Equality of people of all nationalities living in Azerbaijan should be recognized under the law; conditions should be created for small nationalities and ethnic groups to develop their languages, cultures and traditions. – Full autonomy should be granted to universities and other educational establishments. – Infrastructure should be created for the emergence of free trade unions and other public organizations […] – A socially targeted, competitive national economy is seen as a major attribute of contemporary Azerbaijan society and a basis for its material well-being. The economy should be liberated from dependence on the state and should base itself on the individual initiative and entrepreneurship of free people.

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– In Azerbaijan, the market economy should be of a mixed character; equal conditions must be created for private and other forms of ownership. If the economy is to develop dynamically, a market mechanism based on healthy competition must be complemented by reasonable state regulation. The state should play an active role in creating conditions conducive to the functioning of a market mechanism […] Agrarian reform should be implemented gradually, in stages, on the basis of democratic principles, taking concrete conditions into account […] Preserving the present level of production should be viewed as an indispensable prerequisite for agrarian reform. Considering the present ecological crisis, theoretical and practical foundations for protecting nature should be worked out [...] – To ensure political stability and social justice during the period of transition to the market economy it is necessary to protect the most vulnerable low-income strata as the least prepared for the new realities, and to carry out necessary measures. – Enhancing the position of self-reliant middle strata, such as farmers, entrepreneurs, financiers, traders, lawyers, physicians and engineers is a basic condition for society’s development on a sound social foundation […] – The political, economic and legal foundations of human rights conforming to international norms should be laid and a full-proof legal mechanism for protecting these rights should be created […] – In the period of transition to a market economy […] the state should subsidize all scientific, cultural and artistic endeavours […] All private initiatives aimed at raising the medical service to a satisfactory level should be supported. The party respects religious convictions and believes that morals are largely rooted in religion; it opposes subordinating politics to religion and religion to politics. Defending and strengthening the independence of the Azerbaijani state, establishing normal relations with neighbouring countries and making Azerbaijan an equal member of the world community must be the main thrust of our country’s foreign policy. 1. Integrity of Azerbaijan The first of these goals concerns the problem of the indivisibility of Azerbaijan. With regard to this crucial national problem, the Musavat Party proposes to be guided by the following principles: – the historical injustice of the division of Azerbaijan, and the inevitability, sooner or later, of its unification; – relating respectfully to the principle of the inadmissibility of altering borders by force, upholding human rights and national rights in Iran as well as in other countries; – the fate of southern Azerbaijan can be solved only by the Iranian Azerbaijanis; – on the basis of enhancing opportunities for ties between the two parts of Azerbaijan, to secure national-cultural unity. 2. A Free Caucasian Home The idea of a free Caucasian Home advanced by the Musavat Party3 […] and the establishment of peace in the multinational Caucasus will involve:

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– formulating political-legal and moral foundations for the Caucasian Home. It is necessary to create close cooperation between representatives of the Caucasian states and nations; – one of the most important conditions for the national security of Azerbaijan is the need for the full independence of the Caucasus; – to achieve these goals, it is necessary to support the struggle for human and national rights throughout the Caucasus and to strive to settle outstanding issues through negotiation; – to expose and thwart all actions militating against the unity of the Caucasus. 3. Attitude to the Turkic World and the Islamic World as a Whole Azerbaijan should adopt a special approach to the Turkic and the Islamic world as a whole […] […] lnasmuch as the ideological foundation of the idea of TurkicIslamic unity is protection of human rights and the struggle for democracy in the Turkic and the entire Islamic world, Azerbaijan should support the struggle for the independence of the Turkic and Islamic world and work for closer cooperation with both. NOTES 1. During the 23-month existence of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (ADR), from 28 May 1918 to 27 April 1920, a number of legislative acts, including the Regulations on Elections and Regulations on the Press, were adopted and steps taken to separate the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of power. Besides being the first Muslim republic to give women suffrage, reforms in the sphere of education were carried out and the first Azerbaijan University was opened. (Azerbaijan, 28 May 1993). The ADR leadership respected the rights, language, culture and ways of life of the nationalities and ethnic groups living in Azerbaijan and a host of national societies were active (Istiglal, 31 May 1994). The ADR pursued an active foreign policy and on 11 January 1920, the Paris conference recognized Azerbaijan’s de facto independence (N. Nasibzade, Azerbaijan Demokratik Respublikasy (Magalalar va sanadlar) [The Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan (Articles and Documents)] (Baku, 1990), p. 30). 2. Mamed Emin Rasulzade took part, together with Stalin, in establishing the Hummet Socialist Association in Baku. In 1908, he moved to Iran and became one of the founders of the Democratic Party of Iran. Compelled to emigrate from Iran to Turkey, he was attracted by the ideas of the Young Turks. Rasulzade returned to Baku in 1913, after which his life was closely intertwined with the Musavat Party. At the party’s first congress in October 1917 he was elected its chairman and in 1918 became the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic’s first president. 3. Musavat’s adherence to the idea of a Caucasian Home had a prehistory. In its day the original Musavat enjoyed the backing of various peoples including non-Turkic ethnic groups: Ajaris, Ingelois, Talysh, Tats and Dagestani ethnicities. The idea of a Caucasian Home was first discussed in 1919, at the second congress of the Musavat Party, which proclaimed that ‘it is imperative for the Caucasian republics to voluntarily unite into a confederation’ (quoted in Vyshka, 4.7.1992). In the 1990s this discussion was revived. A Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus was established in October 1991 (see Gammer, ‘Unity, Diversity and Conflict in the Northern Caucasus’, appendix 9.1, pp. 183–6). The Confederation claimed to be the legitimate heir of the short-lived Independent North Caucasian Republic (the Mountain Republic), formed on 11 May 1918.

NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE PARTY (MILLI ISTIGLAL) INTRODUCTION The founding nucleus of Milli Istiglal consisted of PFA activists, led by Etibar Mamedov,1 who split from the Popular Front during its June 1991 annual conference. The splinter group, which was known as the national patriotic wing, called for a more hard-line and militaristic policy than the mainstream of the PFA on issues such as independence and the conflict with Armenia. The organization held its first congress in July 1992 and was officially registered soon afterwards. On economic issues, Milli Istiglal supported the development of a market economy and privatization, with minimal government interference. It emphasized Azerbaijani and Turkic nationalism, and opposed Azerbaijan joining the CIS. It was critical of both Elchibey and the PFA, and later of President Aliyev, although during Elchibey’s presidency, Mamedov and Aliyev cooperated a number of times in censuring Elchibey. Mamedov registered as a candidate in the 1992 presidential elections, but retired from the race claiming that it was imprudent to hold presidential elections during wartime. He became an active opposition leader under Aliyev and the National Independence Party of Azerbaijan initiated the November 1993 round table of opposition political parties in Baku.

PROGRAMME On the threshold of the 21st century, the Azerbaijani people live an unhappy existence which contrasts with its glorious history, natural wealth, and great cultural and intellectual potential. At present, with the abolition of the Soviet Russian Empire, an opportunity to create an independent state has presented itself. At the same time the general crisis has deepened as a result of internal contradictions and subversive activity undertaken by outside forces. The idea of creating a powerful Azerbaijan state calls for rational native sons to defend our existence as a nation and participate in the struggle for national survival […] The National Independence Party of Azerbaijan (NIPA), which places priority on the people’s good, is a political organization, struggling for the following: – To create a national governmental system, free of unfavourable influences on the nation by foreign political forces or state alliances, and founded on principles of selfgovernment and the free will of the people. – In all spheres of society, to rehabilitate all national spiritual values which reflect human ideals of protecting national ethics, manners, customs and traditions from

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unfavourable influences and to follow a path of spiritual purification and cultural enrichment. – To establish the free economic relations which free men deserve and thereby to achieve rapid and significant economic progress guided by the principle that economic independence of a nation is closely connected to the economic independence of the individuals who reside there. – To develop ethnic policy on the basis of personal immunity—taking into consideration that every individual in the nation is unique and establishing a civilization which secures individual freedom. The NIPA is a parliamentary party trying to attain political power in the country and seeking to achieve these aims in a democratic society, by democratic means [based on] – Love of independence […] – Azerbaijanism (Love for the Motherland); Azerbaijan, which has been the historic motherland of the Azerbaijani Turk, as a common motherland for all peoples populating its territory […] – Nationalism. Every nation has the right to consider its own good above everything else on condition that the rights and independence of other nations are respected […] – National statehood. On the basis of the principle that ‘the state serves the nation but the nation does not serve the state’, we regard the state as an institution necessary to secure Azerbaijan’s integrity [...] The Azerbaijan state, relying on traditions of Azerbaijani statehood and the positive experience of developed countries, should guarantee political economic and spiritual progress for all Azerbaijani citizens, but not for individual classes, groups or segments of society. […] – Love of Freedom. In normal states an individual’s freedom should have no limitations so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others […] – Security. To occupy an honorary place on the historical stage among the other nations of the world our nation must do its utmost to develop our national culture, establish firm political and economic relations, making use of progressive scientific knowledge, economic and legal mechanisms and spiritual values gained by humanity, to eliminate illiteracy and ignorance, maintain a progressive world outlook and manner of thinking. – Islamic faith. The NIPA has deep respect for Islam, supports the provision of all necessary conditions for religious activity, promotion of progressive religious norms, development of religious views and religion as a science, and building temples and mosques with financial support from the government. SHORT-TERM GOALS […] in order to achieve its long-term goals, the tasks of the Azerbaijan Party of National Independence for the short term are the following: In the Political Field One of the most important tasks for the near future is to nationalize all the political ruling bodies and thereby to direct their activity to the realization of national political, economic and spiritual interests. […] The NIPA is of the opinion that fully independent activity of political organizations and parties and the struggle for political power are integral elements of

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democratic political formation. A multi-party political system should be created in Azerbaijan. The political ruling bodies shall be entitled to prohibit the activities only of those political movements and parties which call for racial discrimination, suppression of human rights and freedoms and which support separatism and betrayal of the people’s interests.2 In the Economic Field Recovery by Azerbaijan of its national economic independence and the establishment of a free economy on this basis are critical and closely related tasks. Economic independence demands that all the means of production, land and underground natural resources existing on the territory of the republic should be passed not only to de jure but also to de facto ownership of Azerbaijan—that is to say, that all profits from [these sources] should be used only for the present and future benefit of the Azerbaijani people. The national currency and banking system, all levers that are necessary for state regulation of the economy (inflation, credit, tax structure, employment, amortization, customs, incentives for foreign capital, investment etc.) must be managed by the Azerbaijan state itself, in the long- and short-term interests of the Azerbaijani people.3 Radical reforms should be carried out on all the levels in order to provide legal and economic conditions conducive to business and ownership based on equal rights and varied types of property and management in all economic fields. Economic freedom in pricing, competition and foreign economic activity should be permitted in the process of carrying out the reforms. In the course of gradual but steady implementation of agrarian reform, the essence of which is to return land to the peasants, guarantees should be provided for free and equal development of all types of management. Interference of the state in the economy should be reduced to a minimum and limited only by national control functions […] In the Field of Social Policy The NIPA adheres to the principle of social equality and tries to implement this so that each member of society has every opportunity to realize his own ability and ambitions and thereby improve his wellbeing. Creation of such opportunities depends, first of all, on government policy in the field of social economy. This policy, especially in the initial stage of economic reforms, should be directed towards creation of jobs, reducing disease in mothers and children, lowering the infant mortality rate4 and rendering financial support to large families […] In the Field of Environmental Protection For the sake of the present and future of Azerbaijan, effective economic and legal mechanisms should be established to prevent (or initially to reduce) abuse of the natural resources of our country […] In the Field of National Security

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NIPA considers it its paramount duty to mobilize all the economic and human potential in Azerbaijan since it understands the necessity of creating, in the shortest possible time, a defence system capable of safeguarding our national security. The most important elements in the organization of armed forces, designed to preserve our existence, are a superior level of military training and equipping the army with modern military technology and armaments […]5 In the Field of International Relations The NIPA believes that the foreign policy of the Azerbaijan state must be based on the ideas of peace, mutual cooperation, progress and humanism, while placing the interests of the Azerbaijan Republic above all others […] Source: Programme of the Party of National Independence of Azerbaijan, Baku, 1992, in English, published in the newspaper Millet 30.9.1993. (The original English has been edited for style.) NOTES 1. Etibar Mamedov was born in 1955 in Baku. After graduating from the Faculty of History of Baku University, he worked as a university lecturer. In the mid-1970s he was suspended from the university for dissident activities. He was active in the national movement from its inception, and was among the initiators of the strike movement. After the introduction of Soviet troops into Baku in January 1990, he was arrested and spent several months in Lefortovo Prison (Moscow). In September 1990 he was elected deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan and following the independence of Azerbaijan, he became a member of the Milli Majlis. 2. This plank was included in the programme because of the growing separatist movement in the republic and was a direct response to the proclamation of the TalyshMugan Republic (see Talysh People’s Party). Signs of Kurd separatism were also becoming more evident, and tensions were rising in other regions with compact populations of ethnic minorities. The newspaper Millet warned that in the Belakan region in northern Azerbaijan, populated by 75,000 Avars and Ingilois, the ethnic situation was explosive.

The Avar Jamahat (People’s) Movement favours secession of the Belakan and Zakataly regions of Azerbaijan and their incorporation into Dagestan (Nezavisimaia gazeta, 14 May 1994). The most active separatists are the Lezgin, some of whom aspire to uniting Lezgin in a Lezgin state, Lezginstan, on part of the territories of Azerbaijan and Dagestan (see Wasserman, ‘A Year of Rule by the Popular Front of Azerbaijan’, pp. 143–61). 3. In accordance with a decree of the president of Azerbaijan, a national currency, the manat, was introduced into Azerbaijan on 15 August 1992. Since 1 January 1994, the manat has been the only legal currency in circulation. 4. Infant mortality in Azerbaijan (the number of infants per 1,000 who died before the age of one) was 26.2. According to data for mid-1994, the ratio was between 40 and 50 (Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1999 g., p. 41). 5. On 5 September 1991, President Ayaz Mutalibov, yielding to pressure of the opposition, issued a Decree on the Establishment of the Ministry of Defence. A National Defence

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Council was formed on 29 September 1991. Later in the year, the Supreme Soviet adopted laws On the Armed Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan, On Defence, On the Status of Servicemen, On Service Pensions, and On Military Service.

NATIONAL SALVATION PARTY (MILLI GURTULUSH) INTRODUCTION The National Salvation Party, generally known by its Azerbaijani name, Milli Gurtulush, was founded in 1989. It held its constituent congress in September 1991, and was registered by the Ministry of Justice in March 1993. Its main goal was the unification of the Republic of Azerbaijan with South Azerbaijan. The party was headed by Mohammed Hatemi Tantekin, who was born in Iranian Azerbaijan. He was a leading activist in the Chanlibel Society, which promoted research on Azerbaijani culture. He was the son of a member of the Azerbaijan Provincial Government in Iran, who emigrated to the Azerbaijan SSR in 1946.1 The party advocated a militaristic line in dealing with the Karabagh conflict and favoured the expulsion of all Armenians from Azerbaijan. It opposed the PFA and President Elchibey.

INTERVIEW WITH MOHAMMED HATEMI TANTEKIN Q: Could you explain how you got into politics, and about your political activities in connection with the development of the ‘Maydan Movement’?2 A: I was born in South Azerbaijan. My father was active there in the national liberation movement. I joined the movement when I was ten. In 1946 I was brought to northern Azerbaijan as a refugee. I was educated here and studied at the university. In 1959 I became a member of the Free Azerbaijan organization whose goal was unification of the two Azerbaijans in a single state. Up till 1963 I was a member of the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan.3 On 17 February 1987 the Chanlibel Society was founded. I played a leading part in its establishment […] Q: Then you were arrested? A: Since 1988 I have been arrested six times. The last time I was put in the KGB Lefortovo prison. When I was released on 8 June 1989, the name Popular Movement Front had already been changed to PFA [Popular Front of Azerbaijan] and the fate of the movement was in the hands of KGB henchmen. I established the Party of National Salvation which played a leading role in the national liberation movement and the expulsion of the Armenians from Baku in response to that of the Azerbaijanis from Armenia. […]

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Q: What is your attitude to the PFA? A: The PFA was merely helping to suppress the national liberation movement, but the radical parties, such as the National Salvation Party, hindered its efforts. […] Q: Where does your party stand in the current political situation? A: The National Salvation Party has always been and remains a party for the liberation of the Azerbaijan people. We are not deviating from our path or from our idea and are not contemplating behind-the-scenes deals with mafia forces. We rely solely on the people, the Azerbaijan Turcomen. It is this that differentiates us from any other party active in Azerbaijan today. Q: What is your attitude to the new regime? A: The PFA leaders hatched from the same egg that the communists placed under our people—the national liberation movement. When in power, the communists patronized the PFA. Having come to power, the PFA is patronizing the communists. This is the real reason for the PFA’s failure to effect any serious personnel changes in the state apparatus. The PFA has not brought genuine independence. On the contrary, the political and economic position of the people has worsened. Moreover, wresting power from the communists, even nominally, can be seen as an achievement of our national liberation movement. Q: What is your party’s stance on the nationalities issue? A: Today there are no ethnic clashes or differences in Azerbaijan and they are unlikely to occur. Azerbaijan is a place of brotherly love for all peoples. Here, everyone is carrying on a struggle against the frenzied Armenian aggressor. Q: What in your opinion should be done to resolve the Karabagh problem? A: Under the present regime there can be no question of a military solution to the Karabagh issue, although Azerbaijan has the capability for it. On the other hand, with so many victims and so many tragedies, to negotiate a settlement and agree to restore the status quo ante of Armenians remaining there (if they concur) would mean acting against the people’s interests. That brings to mind the old slogan of Maydan: ‘Azerbaijan without Armenians’. Azerbaijan must achieve this at any cost and by any means, and it is possible. Q: You have just returned from Iran. What was the purpose of your visit? And to what extent is the idea of a united Azerbaijan practicable? A: It was a private visit. I wanted to see my relatives. I also wanted to deliver some lectures on the national liberation movement, but the Iranian government was resolutely opposed to this. The key to the liberation movement in southern Azerbaijan lies in northern Azerbaijan […] Q: What do you think of Elchibey as a personality? A: Our friendship began in the 1970s, but after he was released from prison (1975) we became estranged because of his views. Yet I continued to like him. The attitude of

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his Varlyg group4 to Chanlibel and Varlyg’s actions against the people’s movement widened the gap dividing us. Elchibey is not much of a scholar nor a politician. He could not lead the Azerbaijan people, but he has many attractive traits as a person. Source: Istiglal, 18 September 1992. NOTES 1. In 1945–46, Iranian Azerbaijani activists, protected by Soviet troops who were occupying north Iran during World War II, established the Azerbaijan Provincial Government as an autonomous administration in north-west Iran. The Azerbaijan People’s Republic was overrun by troops from Tehran in December 1946, and most of its activists fled to Baku (Interview with Mohammed Hatemi Tantekin, 18 Sept., 1992, Istiglal(Baku)). 2. See Introduction to Azerbaijan. 3. The nationalist Azerbaijan Democratic Party appeared in September 1945 in Tabriz, the capital of the Iranian province of Eastern Azerbaijan. See Touraj Atabaki, Azerbaijan Ethnicity and Autonomy in Twentieth-Century Iran, p. 105. 4. Varlyg (Reality), headed by Neymat Panakhly (Panakhov), was one of the major forces behind the mass meetings in Baku in May 1988. In February–March 1989, Varlyg and the initiative group which was to found the Popular Front formed a PFA Coordinating Committee (5 people from each group). Soon the leadership of the fledgling PFA was taken over by Elchibey, who did not belong to either grouping.

POPULAR FRONT OF AZERBAIJAN INTRODUCTION The Popular Front of Azerbaijan (PFA) was formed as an umbrella organization, which sought to consolidate opposition to the ruling Communist Party in the period preceding the collapse of the Soviet Union and in the initial period after Azerbaijani independence. It began operating openly in Azerbaijan in the second half of 1988.1 It united individuals and groups of different political orientations under the banner of opposition to any change in the republic’s borders, chiefly, in regard to the status of Nagorno-Karabagh; concern for Azerbaijanis living abroad; the expansion of glasnost and perestroika in Azerbaijan; and increasing the use of the Azerbaijani language in the republic. Initially, the PFA operated in a decentralized fashion, with branches appearing throughout the Azerbaijan SSR. In June 1989 the Front held its founding conference. After a long struggle with the republican authorities and mass demonstrations of supporters, it was registered as a political organization in October 1989. In July 1991 it held its first congress. In 1989 the PFA-led opposition in Azerbaijan became more aggressive in challenging the communist leadership of the republic and Moscow, which openly supported Armenian separatist movements in Karabagh. The Popular Front played a leading role in organizing the mass anti-government demonstrations in 1989. In January and February 1989, PFA activists began circulating a draft political platform. In its final version, the platform stressed the Turkish component of Azerbaijani identity, insisting that the only appropriate ethnic label for the people of Azerbaijan was ‘Azerbaijani Turks’. It refrained from appealing for Azerbaijani independence, advocating instead ‘sovereignty within the USSR’, yet demanded the right of Azerbaijan to be represented in the United Nations. In the wake of the introduction of a large contingent of Soviet troops to Baku on 20 January 1990 CBlack January’) and the bloodshed which followed, the PFA began calling for outright independence. The PFA won 25 seats (out of 360) in the October 1990 elections to the Supreme Soviet. In early 1992, the Popular Front declared that the re-election as president of CPA First Secretary Ayaz Mutalibov was illegal, and led protests, which ultimately brought about his resignation. In May 1992, PFA leader Abulfez Elchibey, was elected president of Azerbaijan, in the first democratic elections in the new state. Born in 1938 in Nakhichevan, Elchibey was a professor of Oriental Studies at Baku University. He had engaged in dissident nationalist activities and had been imprisoned in 1974–75, when Heydar Aliyev was head of the Azerbaijan Communist Party. The period from independence to the fall of the Elchibey government was highly charged, ideologically. The realities in the new state clashed with much of the ideology that the PFA had espoused while in opposition. For instance, the commitment of the

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movement and especially its leader, Elchibey, to campaign for expanded ties with Azerbaijanis in Iran and to champion their cultural and language rights, severely complicated Azerbaijan’s relations with Iran. Given its war with Armenia and its difficult relations with Russia, the new republic could hardly afford hostile relations with its neighbour to the south; thus, state interests conflicted with Popular Front ideology. During the PFA-led government’s term of office, Azerbaijan did not join the CIS, and refused to concede to Russian pressure to sign agreements allowing the continued presence of Russian military bases in the republic.2 In the period approaching independence and immediately after it, many of the constituent groups of the Front broke away and founded their own political parties: for example, the speaker of the Azerbaijan Parliament under Elchibey, Isa Gambar formed Musavat, while Interior Minister Iskandar Hamidov created the Boz Gurd Party. Elchibey and his Popular Front supporters were abruptly forced from office in June 1993 in a bloodless coup by the forces of Heydar Aliyev. Elchibey returned to his native village of Kaleki in Nakhichevan. On the eve of to the November 1995 parliamentary elections, however, the Popular Front registered officially as a political party—the Party of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan (PPFA)—and Elchibey was chosen party chairman. Despite representation in Parliament (3 seats) it remained a loose organization, closer to a movement than to a disciplined, ideologically directed political party. It continued to serve as a moral alternative to the Aliyev government for opposition-minded voters.3

PROGRAMME GENERAL PRINCIPLES […] 1. The Popular Front of Azerbaijan (PFA) is a broad social movement which supports perestroika and aims to improve and democratize all spheres of our lives. 2. The PFA has been formed to mobilize all healthy forces in society in order to ensure that perestroika is irreversible, and that all social, economic and political norms and practices correspond in spirit and in letter to the basic law of the republic—the Constitution of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan. The goal of the PFA is legal government, a fully developed civil society and full civil rights and freedoms. The main tasks of the PFA and the legal basis of its activities are laid down in the charter of the PFA. 3. Drawing upon the Constitutions of the USSR and the Republic of Azerbaijan, the PFA supports the further democratization of the basic laws of the country and of the republic using available legal means and procedures for social and political struggle. 4. The PFA thoroughly condemns the use of force in the political struggle and as a means to achieve its ends. The founding values of the PFA are: humanism, democracy, pluralism, internationalism and human rights. 5. The conditions for membership of the PFA are active support for democratic principles and acceptance of the aims and tasks of the PFA. The PFA does not differentiate according to social group, party membership, nationality or religion.

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[…] Political Tasks of the PFA 1. The main task of the PFA is to achieve political, economic and cultural sovereignty for the Republic of Azerbaijan as a legal government within the USSR. The Republic of Azerbaijan should be represented as a sovereign government within international organizations such as the UN and UNESCO. 2. The PFA believes that the possibilities for realizing sovereignty within the framework of the existing political and state system should be considered. 3. The PFA supports the division of powers: legislative, executive and judicial. 4. The PFA considers that elections at all levels of the political system should be general, equal, direct and should be conducted by secret ballot. 5. To ensure the rights of citizens living permanently in Azerbaijan and accepting the sovereignty of the republic, the PFA supports introduction of the status of citizenship of the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic. Accordingly, appropriate changes should be made in the Constitutions of the USSR and the Azerbaijan Republic. 6. The PFA considers it its duty to protect the rights of Azerbaijanis living outside the republic. 7. The PFA supports the abolition of all political barriers to the development of cultural and economic ties with South Azerbaijan. 8. The PFA supports the unconditional realization of the slogan ‘All power to the soviets’ and will fight for the transformation of the Soviet of People’s Deputies into a competent body of representatives of the people who express the will of the people and are granted authority on their own territory. 9. The PFA considers that the slogan ‘factories and plants to the workers’ can be put into action by endowing the soviet of workers’ collectives with all rights in the management of enterprises, and by ensuring that competent managers are put in charge of enterprises through free and democratic elections. 10. The PFA considers that the slogan ‘Land to the peasants’ can only be put into practice if the local soviets hand the land back to its true owners—the peasants—for unlimited use. It is essential to give the peasants complete freedom to cultivate the land as individual farmers or within a collective.4 11. The place of the PFA in the political system is determined by its rights as a social organization with the tasks of uniting initiatives by the public and acting only in accordance with the constitution of the Azerbaijani SSR. The Economy The republican economy should take into account the needs of the citizens, ensuring them a decent life in their native country. Our goal—a government ruled by law and a civil society—cannot be achieved without enormous improvements in the economy or without the economic independence both of society as a whole and of each individual. Rapid democratization of our economy and its reconstruction according to the principle of economic independence are the means to achieve economic progress and consequently the political sovereignty of Azerbaijan. In connection with the above, the PFA holds that: 1. The constitutional right of local soviets to exploit the natural, intellectual, and labour resources of their territory should be put into practice. All profits from this should

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be reinvested in the social and economic development of the area from which the resources are taken. 2. It is essential that all enterprises on the territory of the republic under the jurisdiction of central [all-union] ministries and departments be administered by the republic. 3. To ensure a balance in the national income and to prevent large parts of the national budget from being removed from the republic, the current taxation system, which is based on the type of enterprise, should be replaced by a system of direct taxation based on profit. 4. In order to ensure equality in product exchange between republics, the system of prices and tariffs should be reviewed and brought into line with the world market. 5. The economy of Azerbaijan should be changed to a system of [regional] cost accounting and self-financing. The republican administrative organs should be given the necessary authority to develop a strategy of economic development and to regulate all socioeconomic processes within Azerbaijan. 6. It is essential to put the ideas of economic pluralism into action, to further diversify property forms: state, private, cooperative, shareholder, rental, etc. The only measure of success in the case of enterprises should be managerial efficiency. 7. The draining of resources and half-finished goods from the republic should be stopped. The production of consumer goods and the use of skilled labour should be increased. 8. An active and well planned policy of economic development using all labour resources should be carried out. 9. The whole republican economy should be developed with the aim of selfsufficiency in consumer goods. 10. One condition for economic autonomy of the republic is to increase direct and mutually profitable economic ties with firms abroad. The borders of Azerbaijan should be contact points and not barriers. They should no longer be a point of estrangement, but of cooperation. Border zones should be abolished.5 11. The government of the republic should be able to exercise its sovereign rights to interrupt communications and other forms of activity on its territory, which threaten the interests of the people. […] Social Justice 1. The PFA believes that social justice can be achieved if the basic slogan of socialism, ‘From each according to his needs, to each according to his work’, is put into practice. Beyond this, everyone should have the right to work in his or her chosen field. 2. The PFA believes that social and demographic policies should accord with the historical and national traditions of the population of the republic. 3. The PFA supports the recognition of 71 main public institutes and supports the fact that work involving the upbringing of children should be considered equal in law to other kinds of paid work. All nonworking mothers should be paid salaries and a pension. 4. The PFA absolutely opposes any kind of privilege for members of the nomenklatura, including people’s deputies.

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5. The PFA considers one of its main goals to be a well-directed struggle against the causes of corruption, bureaucracy and localism that have caused great moral and psychological harm to our people.6 Human Rights […] 1. The PFA recognizes freedom as the highest universal good: freedom and not just well being. 2. No social goal can possibly justify the limitation of an individual’s rights. The PFA insists that political rights and freedoms should be granted not only to the majority but also to each individual. 3. Using its rights the people creates its own government and in return it expects commitments from the government for the protection of rights and freedoms. The PFA demands that the rights of the citizens of Azerbaijan be guaranteed in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights passed by the UN, and in accordance with the international pacts and statutes connected with this agreement. 4. The PFA supports the liquidation of all political and bureaucratic obstacles to the proper functioning of democratic public organizations, and the realization in practice of the right to hold peaceful gatherings, demonstrations and meetings. 5. The PFA supports the right of the individual to freedom of movement and freedom of place of residence. The existing system of internal passports should be abolished. 6. The PFA supports the democratization of the legal system. The principle of ‘innocent until proven guilty’ should predominate. It is essential to ensure that a lawyer is present from the very outset of a case and that the legal system functions in the orderly fashion that is the norm in most civilized countries. 7. The PFA demands the establishment of the right to appeal against the decisions made by government representatives, alone, or in consultation. 8. It is essential to publish complete information (numbers and statistics) about the victims of crimes against the Azerbaijani people committed during the period of the cult of personality and during the period of stagnation under Brezhnev: a. extradition of Azerbaijanis [from] neighbouring republics in the Caucasus;7 b. extradition from Azerbaijan to Central Asia and Kazakhstan;8 c. the deaths of sons of the Azerbaijani nation.9 9. The PFA supports the inalienable observance of one of the most basic human rights— the right to freedom of conscience. All religious buildings should be restored and handed back to believers.10 10. The PFA supports the demilitarization of society, the abolition of military training in secondary schools, and the reduction of military training in universities. Students and women should be freed from military obligation during peacetime. 11. The PFA is absolutely opposed to the participation of Azerbaijani soldiers in any military actions not sanctioned in international law. ETHNIC RELATIONS 1. The PFA acts according to a nationalities policy, which declares the equality of all nations and their right to self-determination and the satisfaction of their national needs. The Azerbaijanis as the dominant ethnic group in the republic are responsible for ethnic

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relations. The PFA strives to create the best conditions for the preservation and encouragement of the language, culture and national traditions of the ethnic minorities living in the Azerbaijan SSR. 2. The PFA is fighting for a change in the status of the Azerbaijani language. At present, it is recognized by the Constitution of the Azerbaijan SSR as the state language,11 but the PFA would like to see it function in reality as the language of government, science and inter-ethnic communication within the republic. The PFA supports the creation of conditions for the teaching of the Azerbaijani language to other ethnic groups living in the republic. 3. The PFA is fighting for the reinstatement of the national symbols of Azerbaijan, the nation’s own name (Azerbaijani Turks), surnames and geographical names.12 4. While recognizing the indisputable nature of the borders between the USSR and Iran the PFA supports the restoration of the ethnic unity of Azerbaijanis living on both sides of the border. The Azerbaijani people should be recognized as a united whole. Economic, cultural and social ties between our divided nation should be restored. All obstacles to the creation of direct contacts (visits to relations and friends) should be abolished. 5. The PFA supports the broadening of international cultural ties with Azerbaijanis living in the country and abroad and considers it essential to create Azerbaijani cultural centres and schools for groups of Azerbaijanis living outside the republic. The PFA demands the return of all cultural and artistic treasures that have been illegally removed from Azerbaijan. […] CULTURE AND EDUCATION 1. The PFA holds that one of the basic conditions for social progress and renewal is the real possibility for members of every stratum and ethnic group in the republic to express themselves culturally and to improve themselves. The PFA believes that an independent cultural policy is the only way to ensure that culture thrives. 2. The PFA considers it important to preserve and develop our cultural heritage, to resurrect progressive national traditions. On the other hand, the present cultural isolation should be overcome by encouraging broad cultural links with all peoples of the world and in particular with the peoples who historically formed the cultural region of the Near and Middle East. 3. The PFA believes that the history, language, literature, philosophy, traditions and art of all Azerbaijani people living in Azerbaijan and on the territory of neighbouring states should be studied as the complete heritage of a united people. 4. The PFA supports the development of a national educational policy, which satisfies the needs of the people and of the times. Rather than a uniform system of education, a diversity of institutions, methods, and programmes should be the goal. 5. The PFA aims to spread a new attitude towards Islam as a religion and culture. It is essential that religious beliefs and traditions that are respected by billions of people throughout the world no longer be subjected to the ignorant attacks of philistines. The PFA supports decisive steps towards the development of understanding and cooperation with Islam. […]

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ECOLOGY As a result of exploitation the soil of Azerbaijan has lost its fertility, our forests have been devastated and unthinking bureaucrats have destroyed the natural balance and put our health and the health of future generations at risk. A main goal of the PFA is to restore the environment. In order to achieve this, the fate of the land must be in the hands of the people. This in turn will make them aware of their responsibility towards it. 1. The PFA supports all legal and practical actions for the protection of the environment. In addition, all legal measures for the protection of the environment should be made more severe. 2. The soviets are the representatives of the populations living on any given territory and they are totally responsible for the protection of the environment. The local soviet should be granted the right to shut down any enterprise which damages the environment regardless of the will of the superior soviet—republican or all-union. 3. The PFA considers it essential to restore and encourage the traditional ecological awareness of the Azerbaijanis. 4. The PFA will keep the public informed on the state of the environment. It will form public opinion and organize public actions for the protection of the environment. 5. In order to publicize the appalling ecological state of the cities of Baku, Sumgait, Kirovabad [Ganja] and Ali-Bairamly,13 they should be declared areas of ecological disaster. 6. The PFA wishes to ensure public control over and participation in the planning and realization of regional ecological projects such as plans for the Caspian Sea, the Kura and the Araks. 7. As a first practical step we suggest that a universal and prolonged system of pollution monitoring should be introduced, the results of which shall be published periodically in the press. 8. The PFA is working for the recognition of the priority of ecological over economic matters in economic decision making, and for greater consideration of ecological matters in economic and social policies. […] Source: Central Asia and Caucasus Chronicle [in English] 4 (August, 1989), pp. 7–10. NOTES 1. The first public references to the organization appeared on Radio Baku, 23 Nov. 1988. See also, Baku Domestic Service in Azerbaijani, 28 Nov. 1988 (FBIS-SOV-88–230). 2. The only exception was a small force at the Gabala station, situated in northern Azerbaijan, which was an integral part of the Russian monitoring system for ballistic missiles. 3. See www.eurasia.net.org/departments/election/azerbaijan/azparties.htm. 4. These are slogans dating back to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, which were revived during perestroika. The return of power to the soviets implied a process of endowing the Soviet of People’s Deputies with genuine legislative power. 5. Reference is to zones along the Iranian border closed to civilians. At the end of December 1989, during disturbances on the Soviet-Iranian frontier led by the PFA, the Azerbaijanis (on the Soviet side) demolished frontier installations on a 164 km stretch of the border, demanding freedom of passage. In the course of a few days thousands of people crossed the border in both directions (Istiglal [Baku], 20 January 1993). 6. Corruption in Azerbaijan in the 1970s and 1980s was so widespread in the economy, in government and in the party apparatus, that the regime was forced to bring charges against a

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number of representatives of the political élite. ‘Localism’ referred to the widespread practice common under Aliyev’s leadership of the party (1969–82) of giving priority in political appointments to residents of Nakhichevan. See John P. Willerton, Patronage and Politics in the USSR (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), Ch. 6, ‘Azerbaidzhan and the Aliyev Network’. 7. The original text read ‘to neighbouring Caucasian republics’ but this was presumably an error as there is no record of expulsion of Azerbaijanis to the Caucasus during those periods. According to official statistics of the Office of the President, 200,000 Azerbaijanis were forcibly relocated from Armenia to Azerbaijan in 1948–1950 (http://www.president.az/). 8. As of the second half of the 1930s, a policy of compulsory resettlement of ethnic groups inhabiting the USSR’s border areas began to be implemented. In addition to Poles and Koreans, Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Turks and Armenians were also resettled between 1937 and 1939. In 1943–44 together with the punished peoples, a second group of Azerbaijanis were deported (officially—vyselenny) to Kazakhstan. By 1 January 1949 deportees in Kazakhstan numbered 820,145 (G.N.Alekseenko and N.E. Masanov, ‘Migratsionnye i etnodemograficheskie protsessy v sovetskom periode’, pp. 377–80). See also Introduction to Kazakhstan.

NUMBER OF ETHNIC AZERBAIJANIS IN KAZAKHSTAN by 1939

12,986

1959

38,362

1970

57,699

1979

73,345

1989

90,083

Source: Alekseenko and Masanov, ‘Migratsionnye i etnodemograficheskie protsessy v sovetskom periode’, pp. 588–97. 9. Refers to the repression of the intelligentsia and the party élite in the years of the Stalin personality cult. 10. The majority of Azerbaijanis are Shiite Muslims. At the beginning of 1989, there were 18 official mosques in Azerbaijan, as well as several synagogues and one Orthodox church. In the first ten months of 1989, the number of operational mosques increased to 39 (Izvestiia, 29 Nov. 1989). 11. Of the 14 non-Russian soviet socialist republics, only in the three Transcaucasian republics was the language of the eponymous nation recognized as the state language. 12. Many historical names were changed after the communists came to power in Azerbaijan in 1920, and some even before that. For instance, the historical name of the city of Ganja was changed to Elizavetpol in the time of the Russian Empire, and in 1935, it became Kirovabad. In 1989, this second largest Azerbaijan city regained its original name. Since 1989, restoring old names has become a universal practice in Azerbaijan, as in most other republics. 13. These are Azerbaijan’s most heavily industrialized and, hence, most ecologically problematic cities.

SAMUR-LEZGIN NATIONAL CENTRE INTRODUCTION The Samur-Lezgin National Centre was one of the most prominent among the several Lezgin groups that emerged in Azerbaijan. It was officially established in 1992, on the foundations of the Lezgin Cultural Centre formed in 1990. The Centre’s chairman was Ali Musayev, and it published the newspaper Samur in Lezgin and Azerbaijani. There are approximately 200,000 Lezgin1 in the Republic of Azerbaijan, predominately in the north of the country near the Russian border, and they comprise the largest of the indigenous minorities. In contrast to the majority of the population of Azerbaijan, most of the Lezgin are Sunni Muslims. Their native language, which belongs to the Ibero-Caucasian group, is quite unlike the Azerbaijani Turkish spoken in the republic. A slightly larger number of Lezgin live across the border in Russia, in the autonomous republic of Dagestan. In the Soviet period, there was no barrier to ties between Lezgin, but with the independence of Azerbaijan, their division between two separate states forced the issue of political allegiances. Moreover, Moscow has used this group as a lever with which to pressure Baku to step back in line with Moscow.2 The Lezgin Sadval (Unity) Movement, based in Dagestan, called for political unity of the Lezgin and organized demonstrations in Kusary in northern Azerbaijan were held with the Lezgin on both sides of the border.3 Members of Samur, on the other hand, expressed a desire to remain part of Azerbaijan.4

PROGRAMME 1. Introduction […] 1.2. The Lezgin, a people of the Lezgin language group, live in the north of Azerbaijan in the region of Kusary, Khachmas, Sheki, Kuba […] on the Apsheron Peninsula and in the cities of Baku, Sumgait, Mingechaur, Ganja, Ali-Bairamly, as well as in a number of areas in south Dagestan, Derbent, Makhachkala and elsewhere. […] 1.4. Life in the Russian Empire and later in the USSR put the Lezgin as an ethnic group in a deplorable position: the majority could not be educated in their native language; they were deprived of the opportunity of studying their literature, history and the arts in their own language; their culture was endangered. The land which the Lezgin inhabited was very poorly utilized and socio-economic opportunities were limited. Thousands of Lezgin left for Kazakhstan, the Urals, Siberia, Turkmenistan and other

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remote regions in search of bread. The policy of assimilating small ethnic groups pursued in the USSR […] has brought their demographic growth to a very low level.5 2. General Principles […] 2.2. The Samur LNC holds that the protection and exercise of the political, economic, social and cultural rights and freedoms of the ethnic minorities living in the territory of the Azerbaijan Republic, which are recorded in the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic and [other] relevant legal documents, must be secured by the republican bodies of state power acting in conjunction with the authorized representatives of these ethnic groups.6 2.3. The Samur LNC is a public political organization working for the progress of national culture, education and scientific creativity. As a voluntary independent organization with democratic self-government acting in the demographic and sociocultural spheres it defends the specific interests of the Lezgin in the appropriate state bodies, in different socio-political organizations and the mass media. 2.4. The Samur LNC unites in its ranks ethnic Lezgin, Tsakhurs, Rutuls, Tabasarans, Kryz, Budugs, Khinalugs, Udins, Archins, that is, the minorities belonging to the Lezgin language group, as well as people of any other language group, religion and race who show an interest in the culture, education, scientific creativity, socio-economic life, demography and public political life of the peoples of the Lezgin language group.7 2.5. […] The Samur LNC’s chief goal is to achieve a revival of the Lezgin people and its all-round development as a distinctive people, a nationality, on the territory of the Azerbaijan Republic. It will be working towards this end in the framework of the legislation and Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic, relying on the assistance of other ethnic groups in the republic. 3. Work in the Public Political Sphere […] 3.4. The Samur LNC believes that every small ethnic group living in the territory of the Azerbaijan Republic should be a subject of the state’s special concern, that the rights of each of them as a separate nationality should be fully secured and preconditions for their future development created on the basis of their present situation. […] 3.7. The Centre holds that all civil posts should be filled through a democratic selection process and vacancies in government bodies should be filled by means of public tenders with broad participation of specialists. […] The Samur LNC will struggle to achieve the return of Lezgin who live in other countries or are refugees in the territory of the former USSR, to their historic homeland and to have their Azerbaijan citizenship restored […]8 3.11. The LNC would like the Azerbaijan Republic to establish wide-ranging ties with the states that have emerged on the territory of the former USSR and with other countriest[…] […]

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4. Economic and Social Progress and Demography […] 4.4. The Samur LNC holds that land constitutes an asset belonging to the people and not to a state that has been set up. Therefore, the residents of every village, settlement, town, city and region should have the right to choose the economic branches they would develop to get optimal returns. The regulating role of the state should consist of channelling investments to the most profitable branches and encouraging the producers by setting high purchase prices for certain goods. In order to freely develop Lezgin national handicrafts and arts, the state must pay particular attention to raising the requisite capital and to creating the conditions to induce its flow. 4.5. The Samur LNC holds that the property rights of the Lezgin to the land in the region of their traditionally compact residence must be ratified by law […] 4.10. The Samur LNC is resolutely opposed to any artificial change in the demographic balance in the areas inhabited by the Lezgin and considers it unacceptable. 5. The Sphere of Education, Culture and Scientific Creativity 5.1. As a result of interaction over the centuries of Azerbaijanis, Turkmen, Lezgin, Talysh,9 Tats,10 Kurds, Rutuls, Udins, Kryz, Budugs, Khinalugs and other ethnic groups on what is today the territory of Azerbaijan, a highly developed, distinctive culture has emerged. The Lezgin have also contributed to creating this culture. The Samur LNC strives for the further development of the culture of the Republic of Azerbaijan. […] 5.3. The Lezgin population of the Republic of Azerbaijan have their own language passed down from antiquity—Lezgin, as well as a rich body of literature, art, music, dances, customs and traditions and their own tragic and joyful pages of history […] 5.4. […] The Samur LNC believes that along with knowing Turkish, the official language of the Republic of Azerbaijan,11 they should be given the opportunity to receive an education in their native language […]12 5.5. […] The Samur LNC considers it necessary to establish a Lezgin university in the republic.13 […] 6. Spiritual Life and Religion […] 6.3. The Samur LNC considers it necessary for the state organs to enable the ethnic minorities, the Lezgin included, to freely observe their national traditions and religious rites. Their places of worship should be restored and preserved and the state should assist them when needed. 7. Ecology […] 7.2. The Samur LNC holds that state organs and the Lezgin public should participate in formulating a contemporary scientific outlook and implementing ecological controls. 7.3. The Centre opposes the construction of ecologically hazardous industrial and military installations in the areas of compact Lezgin residence.

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[…] Source: Samur, 34 (February 1993), pp. 2–3. NOTES 1. In all, there were reportedly 508,000 Lezgin in 1993 of which 41 per cent were in Azerbaijan (Gammer, ‘Unity, Diversity and Conflict in the Northern Caucasus’, p. 181, table 9.3). Sadval, the radical wing of the Lezgin Movement based in Dagestan, claims that there are a total of one million, of which 670,000 reside in Azerbaijan—most of them being registered as Azerbaijanis (Wasserman, ‘A Year of Rule by the Popular Front of Azerbaijan’, p. 149). 2. Turan (in English), 23 March 1993. 3. See Wasserman, ‘A Year of Rule by the Popular Front of Azerbaijan’, p. 149. 4. Turan (in English), 23 March 1993. 5. This is contradicted by data of Feshbach, Trends in the Soviet Muslim Population’, p. 76, which states that the annual rate of growth in 1959–1979 was 3.44 per cent. 6. A presidential Decree on the Defence of the Rights and Liberties of Ethnic Minorities and on Rendering Assistance to Them in the Development of Their Languages and Cultures was issued on 16 September 1992 and was incorporated in the Constitution (Bakinskii rabochii, 14 October 1992). 7. In addition to the Lezgin, numerous small ethnic-groups speaking languages of the NorthEastern Caucasian linguistic family inhabit northern Azerbaijan. These include the Tabasarans, the Rutuls, Tsakhurs and the Sahdagh peoples—Gryz (Kryz), Budugs, Archins and Khinalug, who are known by this name because they inhabit the area of Mt. Sahdagh in the Konakhkent district of Azerbaijan. They are all Sunni Muslims of the Shafi’i school. 8. According to the census of 1989, the number of Lezgin in the Soviet republics was as follows: Kazakhstan—13,905 (Vestnik statistika [VS] 12/90, p. 71); Uzbekistan—3,071 (VS 11/90, p. 78); Kyrgyzsta—2,493 (VS 4/91, p. 76); Tajikistan—307 (VS 5/91, p. 75); Turkmenistan—10,425 (VS 6/91, p. 72). Lezgin were thought to be among the Caucasians who caused the 1989 ethnic riots in Turkmenistan. 9. See Talysh People’s Party. 10. The Tats live in Transcaucasia, mainly in the north-east of Azerbaijan and in Iran. Settlements in Azerbaijan are not ethnically isolated and Tats live mixed with Azerbaijanis. The Tati language belongs to the Iranian group of the Indo-European languages. In Azerbaijan, the Tats are actually bilingual, speaking Azerbaijani as a second language. Religion divides the Tats into three groups: 1) Islamic (Shiites, the majority); 2) Christians (of the Armenian-Gregorian church), and 3) Judaists, who are also called Mountain Jews and often treated as a separate people. The Red Book of the Peoples of the Russian Empire, http://www.eki.ee/books/redbook/tats. 11. Regarding the decision of the Azerbaijani parliament to call Azerbaijani, Turkic’ see Wasserman, ‘A Year of Rule by the Popular Front of Azerbaijan’, p. 151. That decision was reversed in the Constitution of 1995. 12. See Ibid., p. 148. 13. A Lezgin university was opened in the autumn of 1993 in Kusary (Azerbaijan, 2 October 1993).

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF AZERBAIJAN INTRODUCTION The constituent congress of the Azerbaijan Social Democratic Party (SDPA) was held in December 1989. Party leaders claimed the movement had been operating in Azerbaijan since the early 1970s.1 In June 1990, the SDPA became the first non-communist party in Azerbaijan to register officially. Zardusht Alizade, one of the founders of the Popular Front,2 and Leyla Yunusova3 left the Front in December 1989 and formed the Social Democratic Party. This move apparently resulted from opposition to Elchibey as a personality as well as to his policies. Most of the activists of the SDPA came from the ranks of the Popular Front. Zardusht Alizade and his brother Araz served as the Social Democratic Party’s first cochairmen. In the summer of 1990, the Social Democratic Party became a part of the Democratic Bloc—an opposition group formed prior to the parliamentary elections and headed by the PFA. Zardusht Alizade registered as the only challenger to First Secretary of the Communist Party Ayaz Mutalibov in the 1991 presidential elections, but later withdrew his candidacy in protest of violations of the elections laws. He stood once again as a candidate in the May 1992 presidential elections, but made a poor showing. The party suffered a major split in 1991 when Leyla Yunusova left and founded the Azerbaijan Independent Democratic Party. In an effort to achieve national reconciliation, President Mutalibov created a body consisting of officials and representatives of the Azerbaijani opposition, known as the Council of National Defence Coalition, in November 1991. The SDPA joined the coalition and endeavoured to play the role of mediator between the government and the opposition. In regard to the conflict with Armenia, the Social Democratic Party adopted a moderate stance relative to the other major political movements. Early on it proposed granting autonomy to Nagorno-Karabagh and favoured conducting negotiations aimed at obtaining international guarantees for the security of the residents of Nagorno-Karabagh, as well as a demilitarization of the region—including the withdrawal of Azerbaijani forces.4 The Social Democratic Party supported the establishment of a democratic regime and emphasized the rights of citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origin. It rejected the stress on the Azerbaijani nation, and opposed the nationalistic Azerbaijani and Turkic policies of the Popular Front, such as changing the name of the official language of the republic from Azerbaijani to Turkic.5 The party also vehemently rejected the PFAled calls for unification of the Azerbaijani provinces in Iran with the Republic of Azerbaijan, and what they viewed as a potentially dangerous public demand for cultural rights of the Azerbaijanis in Iran. It advocated Azerbaijan’s membership in the CIS.

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The Social Democratic Party of Azerbaijan maintained a close association with the Socialist International. It was one of the first opposition organizations in the republic to publish its own newspaper, Istiglal, which began to appear in February 1990 and was edited by Zardusht Alizade.

PROGRAMME The strategic goal of the SDPA is to build a civil society in an independent, united and democratic Azerbaijan […] The SDPA’s direct goal is the establishment of an independent North Azerbaijan Democratic Republic. SDPA AND STATE BUILDING The SDPA stands for the abolition of totalitarian regimes and their evolutionary replacement by a democratic system. Fully aware of the ruinous consequences that violent revolutions have for society, the SDPA seeks the establishment of a state with a multi-party system, parliamentary democracy, independent courts of law and a strong executive power […] 1. A law on citizenship of the Azerbaijan Republic must be adopted, according to which every person residing in the territory of Azerbaijan and recognizing its constitution can be a citizen. The Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet must have the prerogative of granting Azerbaijan citizenship to people persecuted for their political views. 2. A law must be adopted guaranteeing that elections to all bodies of state power throughout the republic will be direct and equal, with universal suffrage and secret ballot. […] 4. A professional salaried national army must be established. While abiding by the principle of mandatory military service, the right to some alternative service must be borne in mind. 5. A constitutional court must be established. 6. Azerbaijan’s foreign policy should be based on principles that conform to the UN Charter, peace, cooperation and peaceful living surroundings, neutrality and the renunciation of nuclear weapons. […] 8. In regard to the economy, in the first stage the private sector must be given an advantage through a process of democratic privatization. Private enterprise must be guaranteed freedom and patronage of the state. and state support should be guaranteed […] The SDPA favours the creation of independent trade unions that would protect the price of labour as a market commodity. […] 11. The SDPA needs to strive for the establishment of cultural ties, first and foremost, with friendly neighbouring peoples, and in turn with all foreign states. These relations have special significance since they enable the establishment of ties with co-nationals living in South Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijan diaspora.

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THE SDPA AND HUMAN RIGHTS The SDPA will strive to enhance in Azerbaijan the weak traditions of respect for human rights, putting an end to armed violence and to economic, political and legal inequality […] The SDPA will work to realize the following principles in the sphere of human rights: Freedom of information—informing the local and the international public about violations of the rights of any individual; permitting organizations inside the country and abroad to organize protests against such violations. Universality—equal application of the principle of human rights to all. Respect for the rights of the individual should be independent of sex, race, age, religion, political views or nationality […] Security—preventing the suspension of observance of human rights for reasons of state security […] Humanism—humane treatment of civilians and war prisoners during internal and external conflicts. Obligation—granting permission to domestic and international public and international organizations to supervise the observance of human rights. Consultation—the right to consult with any state—domestic or international public, political or state organizations is legal. Cultural autonomy—One’s ethnic freedom itself and protection of cultural and national development are implemented. Source: Azerbaijan Sosial-Demokrat Partiyasinin Nizamnamesi/ Azerbaijan SosialDemokrat Partiyasinin Meramnamesi (Lenkoran, 1991), pp. 18–23. NOTES 1. Bakinskii rabochii, 2 June 1990, p. 2. 2. Zardusht Alizade was born in Baku in 1946. He graduated from the faculty of Oriental Studies of Azerbaijan State University. He worked as an interpreter from 1969 to 1971 in Egypt, and in South Yemen from 1973 to 1976. From 1976 to 1990 he held a research position at the Institute of Oriental Sciences (Who is Who in Azerbaijan— http://www.whitepages.top.az/). 3. Leyla Yunusova, a graduate of the history faculty of Baku State University, was born in Baku in 1955. She was one of the founders of the Popular Front of Azerbaijan and subsequently of the Azerbaijan Social Democratic Party. With the rise to power of the Popular Front in May 1992, Yunusova was appointed head of the press service in the Ministry of Defence. When Aliyev became president in 1993, Yunusova resigned from the government in protest. (Who is Who in Azerbaijan—http://www.whitepages.top.az/). 4. TASS (in English), 13 March 1992. 5. ASSA-IRADA (in English), 25 Dec. 1992.

TALYSH PEOPLE’S PARTY INTRODUCTION The Talysh People’s Party (TNRP) was established on the foundations of the Talysh National Revival Party formed in 1989. The National Revival Party’s proclaimed objective was to protect the rights of the Talysh as a nationality and, in the longer term, to fight for the establishment of a constitutionally recognized Talysh Autonomous Republic. The historical justification for such a demand was the existence of a Talysh Khanate, with its capital at Lenkoran, from 1813 until its annexation to the Russian Empire during the war with Iran. The Talysh are of Iranian ethnic origin and speak an Indo-Iranian language. Their population is concentrated in the Lenkoran region of Azerbaijan, and a number live across the border, primarily in the Iranian province of Gilan. The Talysh are Ja’farite or Twelver Muslims—a mainstream Shiite sect. The TNRP was reorganized into the Talysh People’s Party in the autumn of 1991 and its constituent congress was held in July 1992. Halil Mamedov, a scientist from the Azerbaijan Academy of Sciences was elected party chairman. Speaking at the congress, Mamedov stated that the Talysh people were an organic and integral part of the Azerbaijani people and that the party would struggle against any moves towards separatism. Leaders of the party emphasized that they supported the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and viewed the future development of the Talysh people only within the context of an Azerbaijani state. According to data from 1983, nearly 100,000 Talysh live in Iran.1 Their numbers inside Azerbaijan are difficult to determine. According to the census of 1926, there were 77,039 Talysh in Soviet Azerbaijan. In the first three postwar censuses the Talysh were counted as Azerbaijanis, although the Talysh language was acknowledged as a mother tongue by 10,500 people in 1959, and in 1989 21,000 Talysh were enumerated.2 The party was officially registered in March 1993 under a different name—the National Equality Party. The second (extraordinary) congress was convened on 28 March 1993 and held in Lenkoran. In June 1993 Alikram Humbatov, a former Popular Front activist, led a revolt in the Lenkoran area and declared the establishment of the Talysh-Mugan Republic, encompassing seven districts of Azerbaijan and 10 per cent of the population. The rebellion was short-lived, ending on 24 August. Humbatov fled and was eventually arrested. He escaped from prison and resurfaced later in Moscow, indicating a possible Russian link to the failed insurrection. However, Azerbaijan also accused the Iranians of supporting the separatists.3 While there was no apparent connection between the uprising and the Talysh People’s Party/National Equality Party, it was outlawed in October 1993.

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RULES 1.1. The Azerbaijan Talysh People’s Party [ATPP] is a public political organization, which, guided by the ideas of Azerbaijanism and the sanctity of Azerbaijan, is fighting for equal political, economic, social and cultural rights and freedoms of all peoples living in the republic—Turkmen, Talysh, Lezgin, Kurds, Tatars, Russians and others, without any bias towards any of them. 1.2. The ATPP considers it one of its main duties to defend the interests of all the peoples and the territorial integrity of the republic, to further strengthen friendship and friendly relations, and with this aim in mind, to eliminate, at the appropriate time, causes that might lead to confrontation between peoples in the republic. 1.3. Acting in the interests of independent Azerbaijan and all the ethnic groups inhabiting it, the ATPP, first and foremost, supports the ideas of 1) Azerbaijanism (patriotism); 2) ethnic equality; 3) democracy. It is waging an uncompromising struggle against double standards for different ethnic groups, against ethnic exclusivity, ethnic superiority, and exacerbating ethnic hostility. 1.4. Regardless of socio-political views and trends, the ATPP ideology is based on the best intellectual achievements that human spirituality and philosophy have accumulated over the centuries and that could contribute to the progress of democracy, justice and allAzerbaijan statehood. 1.5. The ATPP’s main tasks include reviving the process of creating a sense of national identity; the political, economic, social and cultural progress of the republic’s peoples; and preserving, studying and developing their traditions, folklore, history and native language. 1.6. The ATPP is a parliamentary-type party. Its activities are carried out on the basis of international law, the principle of the self-determination of peoples, the existing republican legislation and its own Rules and Programme. It is struggling by democratic, parliamentary means for political power and for equal participation of all the republic’s peoples in Azerbaijan’s state legislature. […] 2.1. In its activity the ATPP is guided by the Constitution of the Azerbaijan Republic and the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 2.2. The ATPP will work to have its members elected to supreme and local organs of power; it favours joint actions with other public political organizations and parties, will submit its recommendations and proposals to central and local organs of power and defend the interests of its members in these bodies. […] Source: Party Programme. NOTES 1. Wasserman ‘A Year of Rule by the Popular Front of Azerbaijan’, p. 150. 2. Vestnik statistiki, 1 (1991), p. 67. 3. ‘Azarbayjan Talysh Halg Partiyasinin Ilk Qurultayi’, Halg, 28 July 1992.

TURAN PARTY OF NATIONAL STATEHOOD INTRODUCTION Turanism or Pan-Turanism was a late 19th to early 20th-century movement to unite, politically and culturally, all the Turkic, Tatar, and Uralic peoples living in Turkey and across Eurasia from Hungary to the Pacific. Its name is derived from the Persian name for the legendary birthplace of the Turkic peoples. Turan—The Party of National Statehood—was founded in 1994 by leaders and activists of the Turan Association of the Free Working People of Azerbaijan that had come into being two years previously. It advocated a strong Turkic national orientation. Neymat Panakhly (Panakhov) was elected party leader in 1994. Born in 1962 in the Nakhichevan ASSR, he became a worker in a machinebuilding plant and took an active part in the nascent Azerbaijani national movement. He was leader of the so-called Maydan Movement (see Introduction to Azerbaijan) and one of the founders of the PFA. In early 1990 Panakhly was expelled from the PFA leadership for his extremism.1 Subsequently he became one of the most vociferous critics of the Popular Front. He welcomed Aliyev’s advent to power and was appointed deputy state counsellor to the president. He held that position for two years; however, prior to the parliamentary elections of 1995, he became an outspoken critic of the regime. The party’s constituent congress was held on 2 June 1994 in Baku. It was attended by 174 delegates representing 1,972 founding members. The conference adopted a programme and rules and elected its leading bodies, a 43-man political council and a 13man presidium.2 The newspaper Devlet (State) served as the party’s press organ.

INTERVIEW WITH NEYMAT PANAKHLY [Opening remarks of Panakhly on the Karabagh conflict:] Armenia owes 99 per cent of its victories to the government of Azerbaijan. Since 1988 the Azerbaijan government has been in the service of Armenian Intelligence, Armenian terrorists, Armenian usurpers. Let us examine the facts. In the first stage, Armenia’s policy was aimed at the economic and political secession of Nagorno-Karabagh from Azerbaijani rule. In 1988 that aim was achieved by Armenia. The economy of Nagorno-Karabagh became linked to Armenia and, after the Special Administration and Organizing Committee had been set up, its political system was severed from Azerbaijan.3 In the second stage, Armenia intended to take the Karabagh issue to the international arena and by securing the backing of international organizations to annex Nagorno-Karabagh.

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The first stage was realized during A.Vezirov’s4 administration by the Azerbaijan government itself, for had the first Azerbaijanis driven out of Armenia been accommodated in Nagorno-Karabagh, Armenia would have stopped driving them out […] It was important for Armenia to conceal from the Soviet and world public the fact that 300,000 Azerbaijanis had been forced to flee Armenia and the disasters that befell them—and that this was accomplished with our government’s help! At the same time the events in Sumgait5 and Baku6 were blown out of proportion in the international arena and turned into propaganda against our people. In the second stage events took on a military character. Enjoying Moscow’s all-round support, Armenia was rapidly armed, while our people were being disarmed by the republican government. Even shotguns were confiscated. And when, having seen this, the national liberation forces wanted to rouse the people at the end of 1989-early 1990, it ended with the carnage of 20 January. A state of emergency was declared. Vezirov was replaced by Mutalibov. Under his regime, a large number of the national forces were arrested and were subjected to physical and psychological terror. Thus the national liberation struggle was replaced by the democratic ‘struggle’, and the regime that had assumed power, that is, the democratic wing of the Popular Front, was presenting itself favourably to the Azerbaijani and world public. But the Azerbaijan government had embarked on the road of deception of the people. It had been brought to power by international forces in order to further their own goals […] Were we really waging a struggle for national liberation? If so, could our goal have been to free ourselves from the clutches of Russia only to find ourselves in America’s embrace? Does it matter whether we are American or Russian servants? In its essence western imperialism is just as repulsive as Russian, and perhaps even worse, greedier. Today Azerbaijan is far from free. On the contrary, it is experiencing colonization of a more horrible type […] [Q]: How do you visualize the solution of the nationalities question in Azerbaijan? And, in this connection, what is your attitude to the slogan: ‘The only friend of a Turk is a Turk’?7 [A]: I am a Turk by nationality and consider myself a Turkist and Turanist. But Turkism and Turanism do not presuppose hatred for other nationalities, rejection of, and hostility to, other nationalities […] The present policy of Turkization in Azerbaijan is hostile to the Turkic world, it is directed at keeping the Turkic people in bondage and is an imperial policy. There was a time when people of various ethnic groups living in Azerbaijan were registered as Azerbaijanis.8 The aim was to obliterate the specific traits of these ethnic groups and the hardest hit were the Turkic peoples. In today’s Azerbaijan, a Kurd knows that he is a Kurd, a Talysh that he is a Talysh, a Lezgin that he is a Lezgin, a Tat that he is a Tat; even if the ethnic group consists of five people. The Azerbaijanis, however, have again been put in an unenviable position. All and sundry are speaking on television and asking: ‘Which is correct—Turkic or Azerbaijani?’. But there must be a limit to ignorance, dishonesty and indecency! Azerbaijan is a territorial-geographic name. How can ‘Azerbaijani’ be a nationality? Only because the policy of the state had been to

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declare it as such. The entry for nationality must be determined according to one’s choice—Turk, Talysh, Lezgin, Kurd, Russian, Jew, etc. Why does it bother other people when we speak of ‘the Turkic language? Do you need an interpreter when you are talking with Turks from Turkey? I speak Turkic. Until the 1920s Turkey was known as the Ottoman state and its people as ‘Ottomans’. ‘Turk’ was used with reference to Azerbaijan. There is the Turkic language and there are its variants. Azerbaijan is home to the Oguz Turks and their language is one of the most common dialects of the Turkic language. The alphabet has been changed, some Oguz have been given Uzbek names, others the names of Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Tatars, Azerbaijanis—and all for the purpose of keeping them divided. Moreover, cultural ties going back thousands of years unite the Azerbaijani Turks and other ethnic groups living in Azerbaijan. It would be difficult, even criminal to separate a Turk from a Talysh, Kurd, Lezgin, Tat or each of these from one another. It is a provocation planned by empires. Currently we see the rise of schemes concerning Talyshstan, Kurdistan, Lezginstan.9 Actually, the ties holding together the peoples living in Azerbaijan are so close that they cannot be broken, however hard one might try […] [Q:] What do you think of the Islamic Party? [A]: I am against it. I have been a Muslim believer since 1978. I observe fasts and carry out the namaz.10 I glorify Allah in whatever I may be doing. But at this juncture I am against the Islamic Party that appeared in Azerbaijan. Because it takes more than a declaration to establish a party, society or organization […] Is there any sense in attempts to establish an Islamic party or an Islamic state in a country in which the bulk of the population hardly knows anything about Islam?11 […] Source: Maydan, 23 and 30 June, 6 July 1993.

SPEECH BY NEYMAT PANAKHLY AT THE CONSTITUENT CONGRESS On many occasions history has been witness to the fact that peoples who have no state mechanism of their own become victims of repeated aggression, and find themselves in bondage and dependent on other countries. It is precisely the loss of the traditions of statehood that has brought a host of misfortunes to our Motherland […] Every honest citizen must realize today the importance of preserving and strengthening national statehood. This is impossible without correctly defining the source from which a threat to our statehood might come. The emergence of national statehood is the direct result of the weakening of world imperialism. The history of the African and Asian states, which became independent in the middle of this century, shows that imperialism has not reconciled itself to the loss of its position and is using sabotage to ignite civil wars and destroy these countries from

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within […] Russian imperialism is directly responsible for what is going on in Afghanistan, Georgia and Tajikistan.12 With the help of Armenia, artificially carved out from the land of Northwest Azerbaijan, Russia is bent on suppressing the indomitable will of our people. That is why its troops invaded our Motherland. Russia, which does not want to admit its defeat in Azerbaijan […] is perpetrating acts of political, economic and military sabotage on our territory […] Under these circumstances, forces craving for power are conducting propaganda among the masses against the present government, accusing it of incompetence. Their propaganda ignores the negative actions of our foreign enemies and the guilty parties are being sought inside Azerbaijan. Propaganda of this kind causes a split in the badly needed unity of the government, confuses the people and dashes hopes for a happy future of the people and specifically for our victory […] It is clear that under these circumstances, the possibility of civil confrontation cannot be excluded, the gap between the government and the people may widen, and independence may be lost. To prevent this possibility becoming a reality, it is necessary to conduct extensive educational work and direct the entire potential of the people to the preservation and strengthening of national statehood. It is for this purpose that the Party of National Statehood of Azerbaijan has been founded […] If words are to be matched by deeds in this direction, we must formulate a national ideology which will constitute an important part of the concept of national statehood […] Source: Maydan, 13 July 1994. NOTES 1. Note the publication of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion in Maydan (29 September, 6 and 13 October 1993). Announcing the upcoming publication, the paper wrote that the Protocols were ‘very interesting in light of the misfortunes that have befallen the world’ (Maydan, 22 September 1993). In 1994 the paper published excerpts from Hitler’s Mein Kampf, including antisemitic passages (Maydan, 25 March and 13 April 1994). The paper also expressed solidarity with the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq on various occasions (see, for instance, Maydan, 5 March 1993). Two issues carried an extensive interview with the Iraqi ambassador in Azerbaijan (Maydan, 6 and 13 October 1993). 2. Maydan, 13 July 1994. 3. In January 1989, Moscow introduced a special type of administration for NagornoKarabagh headed by Arkadii Vol’skii, an official of the CPSU apparatus who favoured a revision of inter-republican borders established under the ‘Stalin regime’ (Sotsialisticheskaia industriia, 11 May 1989). On 28 November 1989, the USSR Supreme Soviet abolished the Vol’skii committee and set up the Republican Organizing Committee headed by Viktor Polianichko, Second Secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party. Armenia accused this committee of forcibly expelling Armenians from Nagorno-Karabagh with the help of Soviet troops in order to change the demographic situation there (Armenpres International Service (in Armenian) 13 Sept. 1990, FBIS-SOV-90–181, 18 September 1990, pp. 71–2). 4. Abdul Rakhman Vezirov spent most of his life outside Azerbaijan. In May 1988, when the Karabagh crisis was developing, Moscow appointed him First Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. His poor Azerbaijani made him a laughing stock and caused annoyance, while his lack of initiative and blind toeing of the Moscow line in the Karabagh crisis evoked anger and accusations of betraying national interests. On the day before the Soviet troops entered Baku in January 1990, he fled the republic.

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5. On 28–29 February 1988, approximately two weeks after the beginning of the Karabagh crisis, there were pogroms against Armenians in the town of Sumgait near Baku. According to official figures, 32 people were killed, although various Armenian sources claimed that the number of dead was more than two hundred (Izvestiia, 23 March 1988). 6. During the anti-Armenian pogroms in Baku, perpetrated by Azerbaijani refugees from Armenia on 13–14 January 1990, dozens of Armenians were killed (see Audrey L. Alstadt, Azerbaijanis Struggle toward Democracy’, p. 122). 7. This slogan was popular in Azerbaijan in the early 1990s primarily among the supporters of the Popular Front and the parties close to it. 8. Wasserman, ‘A Year of Rule by the Popular Front of Azerbaijan’, p. 145. 9. See Ibid. pp 149–55. 10. The daily prayers Muslims perform five times a day. 11. Turan ideologists claimed that the anti-Islam sallies in the Western mass media could be traced to a complot of Christians and Jews who had united in a masonic lodge. It was Masons, they alleged, who had railroaded anti-Muslim resolutions through the UN, such as the resolution on the blockade of Iraq. The alliance of the US, Europe and Israel, they claimed, was formed back in the 1920s (Maydan, 15 September 1993). After the American defeat in Iran and the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, according to Maydan, Islam became the third force. The uprising against the PFA government on 4 June 1993 was a hard blow to the US, second only to its setback in Iran. The crusade waged by the West against Islam was now being directed at Azerbaijan, too (Maydan, 5 March 1993). The vacuum left by the collapse of Soviet ideology could only be filled by a synthesis of nationalism (Turkism) and Islam (Maydan, 15 March 1993). 12. That is, the internal conflicts and introduction of Russian troops into these areas.

YENI AZERBAIJAN INTRODUCTION Yeni (New) Azerbaijan was Heydar Aliyev’s own party, founded in November 1992 in his native region of Nakhichevan.1 Aside from its support for market economy, the party lacked a specific ideology and its principal raison d’être was to promote Aliyev’s political career. The power base of the party was dominated by residents of Nakhichevan and by former communist officials. In the 1995 and subsequent parliamentary elections, Yeni Azerbaijan gained the largest number of seats (51) and achieved an absolute majority in the National Assembly. The party published the newspapers Yeni Azerbaijan, Ses and Nakhichevan.

PROGRAMME Political Objectives The acquisition of independence by the Azerbaijan Republic is a historic event. At the same time, this act places before the state and its citizens many responsible and complicated tasks, such as fortifying the independence of the state, forming a democratic, law-governed state, ensuring the territorial integrity and security of the republic, ending the state of war in the near future, finding a solution to the Karabagh problem and creating for its citizens conditions for their well-being. The Yeni Azerbaijan Party regards these tasks as the main thrust of its political strategy. […] The strengthening of the independence of Azerbaijan, the creation of a civilized democratic civil society in a law-governed state will require extensive activity in a number of spheres, efforts on the part of all public political forces and utilization of the republic’s entire intellectual and socio-economic potential. […] The main goal cannot be achieved unless a civilized, law-governed, economically efficient and socially just democratic state is built. […] A good government is not one which wants to make its people happy, but one which is able, somehow, to achieve this. Civilized societies and sound-minded people are able to appreciate laws that accord with international covenants on economic, social, cultural and civil issues and on human rights, and other international documents dealing with human rights and humanitarian cooperation based on universal legal norms. It is these laws which can secure law and order and stability in a state and society.

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The supremacy of the law, strict adherence to the law on the part of the authorities and conformity to it of each political decision should be seen in light of this factor. Therefore, party legality is the second principle. The Yeni Azerbaijan Party links its future to the younger generation and therefore will spare no effort to create optimal conditions for the civil, political and economic advancement of young people and their transformation into leaders […] We envision the independent Azerbaijan of the future as a modern state ruled by law, humanism and pragmatism. Goals Yeni Azerbaijan is a parliamentary-type party. Its goal is to strengthen state independence, build a civilized law-governed democratic state, and achieve effective security and social cooperation. It wants Azerbaijan to have a stable and socially-oriented economy and to effect far-reaching democratic reforms, which will make it possible to secure the all-round development and unfailing protection of the rights and freedoms of the individual, irrespective of race, nationality, religion or language. Tasks of the Party The Yeni Azerbaijan Party considers the following essential for the achievement of its goal: – to unite all the progressive forces which want to take part in the building of an independent, civilized, democratic and law-governed state; – to carry out radical political, economic and social reforms; – to develop the democratic principles of state-building by having a professional government and effecting the division of powers which will serve as a guarantee of human rights and freedoms and of adherence to the laws; – to develop a market economy subject to regulation and to manage the economy rationally; – to contribute to society’s progress by implementing gradual reforms, taking into account the specific features of the Azerbaijan Republic; – to pursue an active social policy by means of increasing production and free market management; – to develop a civil society based on a multi-party system and a secular regime; – to improve human rights legislation, bring it into line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international norms and agreements in this sphere; to secure the genuine exercise of human rights and freedoms; […] – to let all nationalities and ethnic groups and their cultures and languages develop freely; – to respect international norms and make use of the achievements of universal civilization. Ideology — solidarity and respect for human dignity; — healthier national morals; — patriotism;

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— loyalty to the ideals of the party; — a principled civic stance. Main Objectives of Economic Policy [...] The republic has enormous natural resources, great industrial, agricultural and intellectual potential, a basic economic infrastructure and adequate manpower. All of this must be put to rational use for the purpose of strengthening Azerbaijan's independence and raising the people's living standards. Under current conditions, it is vital to implement economic reforms, notably the creation of a regulated, socially-oriented market economy capable of ensuring social stability and raising the people's living standards. In order to create a market economy, the first and primary task is the creation of a market infrastructure […] Under the conditions obtaining in Azerbaijan, a restructuring of the economy towards market relationships presupposes working out an independent strategy based on the experience of industrialized countries, a multi-structural national economy and different forms of ownership […] The single aim of economic restructuring must be improving the quality of life and the standard of living as quickly as possible. Main Objectives of Social Policy The formation of a civilized democratic society demands radical reforms, both in the social and humanitarian spheres. Thus, in the period of transition to a market economy, experience shows that science, culture, education, physical culture and sports remain ancillary to immediate economic interests and financial difficulties are to be expected in these spheres. Under these conditions, in the formative period of the future society, science and education primarily, as well as some cultural spheres should be financed from the state budget. In the sphere of public health […] the party favours budget-based financing. Historically, Azerbaijan's cultural heritage and its spiritual potential have made a valuable contribution to world culture. Today, the task of the intelligentsia is to preserve, galvanize and secure the continuity of this potential. Thus, an adequate educational level can be a powerful factor in bringing about the equal participation of independent Azerbaijan in the progress of universal civilization. Therefore, in the social sphere the party gives priority to the development of education, science and culture. In the transition period, alongside the development of a civic socioeconomic policy, social policy should be geared to the protection of the economically weak strata of the population […] Source: E.A.Ismailov (ed.), Yeni Mustagil Azerbaijan Ugrunda (Baku, 1993), pp. 9–22. NOTES 1. See Introduction to Azerbaijan, n. 16.

YURDDASH INTRODUCTION The Yurddash (Compatriot) Society was formed in 1991. In February 1993 it was transformed into a party and was officially registered in the same month. Yurddash subscribed to a domestic agenda of nationalism, rule of law and democracy but established its reputation mainly on the basis of its international agenda, particularly its efforts to promote the interests of its compatriots in Russia, Iran and Armenia. It advocated preservation of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and opposed territorial compromise with Armenia. Having maintained close cooperation with the Popular Front, the party condemned the ouster of President Elchibey as unlawful and was highly critical of Aliyev’s regime. Yurddash was one of the initiators of the idea of the Democratic Congress (DemCongress), formed in 1994 after the fall of Elchibey’s regime,1 but joined the organization only several months after its inception. The party joined forces with the Popular Front during the November elections to nominate some of its members to candidacies in the single-mandate races but failed to win a seat.2 Mais Safarli led the party from its founding, and served as editor of The Baku Times, an English-language newspaper published in the capital. From 1991, the party intermittently published a newspaper—also called Yurddash.

INTERVIEW WITH MAIS SAFARLI […] Q: Mais Bey, you are one of the initiators of Solidarity Day.3 Efforts to unite Azerbaijanis living outside Azerbaijan begun by Yurddash have added another red-letter day to our calendar. What has the past year brought to the lofty cause your society is promoting? A: The forces at the helm today have been brought to power not only by democratic trends [in Azerbaijan] but also thanks to the activities of Azerbaijanis throughout the world. The democratic processes under way in our society have, more often than not, been presented by our detractors as nationalist or chauvinist. The Azerbaijanis have invested tremendous efforts in changing this view. This has been accomplished by establishing contacts with democratic parties and movements in other countries and other former Soviet republics, and by telling the truth about the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict and overcoming rigid stereotypes.

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Q: We know that our compatriots in the neighbouring former Soviet republics are facing many difficulties (take even the situation of the Azerbaijanis in Georgia). How are they being resolved and can public activity alone bring a change for the better? A: Of course not. Unfortunately, I would not say that everyone in the republic is concerned with the problems of our compatriots […] although there is some movement in that direction. We would like Azerbaijanis residing outside Azerbaijan to be granted dual citizenship?4 That would give them the right to take part in the political life of our republic […] You mentioned Georgia. Today there is not a single Azerbaijani family in the Dmanisi and Bolnisi5 district centres, while formerly there were 1,200 and over 800, respectively. Many Azerbaijani villages in these districts have been deserted, dozens of Azerbaijani place names have been Georgianized. There is not a single Azerbaijani holding administrative office […] I think some economic and political sanctions against Georgia are needed or Azerbaijan may become a refugee camp. Q: Mais Bey, your concern and anguish are understandable. What have the Yurddash Society and newspaper, which I know is very popular outside Azerbaijan, accomplished? A: We held two conferences in Baku at which problems connected with the Georgian Azerbaijanis were discussed. Then, we met with Georgian intellectuals […] We also helped the 150,000-strong Azerbaijani community in Dagestan.[…] Q: […] Not only Russians and Jews, but Azerbaijanis, too, are leaving the republic, which is very sad. There is a drain of manpower and specialists.6 What is your attitude towards this? A: Very negative. Azerbaijan has always been known for its friendly, goodneighbourly attitude to all and tolerance towards all faiths, which makes the fact that able people are leaving even more tragic […] Q: How do you maintain contacts with Azerbaijanis living in former Soviet republics and other countries? A: Besides Yurddash, 90 per cent of whose readers live in former Soviet republics, we also publish the English-language Baku News. Source: Bakinskii rabochii, 31 December 1992. NOTES 1. See Democratic Party of Azerbaijan. 2. On the electoral system see Introduction to Azerbaijan. 3. The various governments that have been in power in the Republic of Azerbaijan since independence have all marked 31 December as Azerbaijani Global Solidarity Day. Held for the first time in 1989, Solidarity Day served as the trigger for border incidents with Iran in January 1990. Since independence, both Elchibey and Aliyev, in public speeches and statements issued on this day, have expressed support for strengthening ties with Azerbaijanis abroad.

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4. The Republic of Azerbaijan has not granted dual citizenship rights to ethnic Azerbaijanis from abroad, and even the Azerbaijani refugee populations from Armenia were only granted citizenship rights in 1998. 5. Areas in Georgia inhabited by ethnic Azerbaijani populations. 6. Jewish Emigration from Azerbaijan, 1991–1992: Year To Russia To Israel* To the US* 1991

209**

5,676

794

1992

217

2,625

1,222

* Including non-Jewish relatives. ** To urban areas only. (Source: Mark Tolts, ‘Jewish Demography of the Former Soviet Union’, in Sergio DellaPergola and Judith Even (eds), Papers in jewish Demography 1997 (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 2001), pp. 134–6). Net migration of ethnic Russians from Azerbaijan to Russia: 1991–17,600 1992–35,100 (Source: Zhanna Zayonchkovskaya, ‘Recent Migration Trends in Russia’ in George J. Demko, et al., (eds), Population Under Duress: The Geodemography of Post-Soviet Russia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), p. 120).

REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN

INTRODUCTION Vladimir Babak, Demian Vaisman and Irina Vladimirskaya Capital: Almaty (Alma-Ata) until June 1998; from June 1998, Astana (formerly Akmola). Area: 2,717.3 sq. km. Population: According to the all-union census of 1989, the total population was 16,464.000; the most numerous groups were Kazakhs (6,535,000–39.7 per cent) and Russians (6,228,000–37.8 per cent), followed by Germans (958,000–5.8 per cent), Ukrainians (896,000–5.4 per cent), Uzbeks (332,00–2.0 per cent) and Tatars (328,000–2 per cent).1 According to the 25 February 1999 census, the total population of Kazakhstan was 14,952,000, inclucling 7,984,000 Kazakhs (53.4 per cent). The population decrease resulted from emigration among the non-indigenous population.2 Religion: The Kazakhs are Sunni Muslim. The centre of Islamic activity is in the southern regions of Shymkent and Zhambyl. Language: Kazakh is a Turkic language. Historical Survey From the time of the ‘great migration’ of the Turkic peoples to the territory of present day Kazakhstan in the 3rd to 5th centuries, many nornadic empires have come and gone. The Arab conquest (8th century), which brought Islam to Central Asia, affected only part of southern Kazakhstan. From earliest times the main livelihood of the population of the Kazakh Steppe was livestock-raising. In Semirech’e (Zhetysu) and southern Kazakhstan, some of the Turkic tribes, however, took up land cultivation and urban occupations. In the Talas and Ili Valleys, cities sprang up along the great Silk Route. In the wake of the Mongol conquest (13th–14th centuries) the steppe region of contemporary Kazakhstan became part of the patrimony of the Juchi ulus,3 or ‘the Golden Horde’, while southern and south-eastern Kazakhstan carne under the control of the Chagatai ulus, and the north-eastern part under that of the Ugudei ulus. The 15th to 16th centuries saw the decline of the Golden Horde and the formation of the basic groups of tribes making up the Kazakh zhuzes.4 In the 15th century the first Kazakh politicai union was formed—the Kazakh Khanate—whose territory contained some, but not all of the ethnic Kazakh tribes, the rest remaining in neighbouring khanates. The territory of presentclay Kazakhstan was divided among the Lesser Zhuz (north-west and part of central Kazakhstan); the Middle Zhuz (northern, eastern and the rest of central Kazakhstan); and the Greater Zhuz (southern and south-eastern Kazakhstan). In the border areas economic contact with Russia was carried out on a wide scale in the 15th to l6th centuries. The first Russian settlements in the territory of contemporary western Kazakhstan, appeared in the 17th century. The formation by Mongol tribes hostile to the Kazakhs of the Zhungarian Khanate (17th century) on the present-day

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borderland between Kazakhstan and China, paved the way for the acceptance of Russian sovereignty by the khans of the Lesser Zhuz and some of the khans of the Middle Zhuz in the 1730s–40s. In the 18th to 19th centuries, the tsar’s government began to build fortified lines along various segments of the borders encompassing its new subjects, while at the same time penetrating deep into their territory. In the mid-19th century Kazakhstan’s annexation to Russia was completed. In July 1919 the Soviet government established a special Revolutionary Committee for governing the Kyrgyz Krai (the name given at that time to most of the territory of present-day Kazakhstan). In August 1920 a special decree was passed on establishing the Kyrgyz ASSR as part of the RSFSR with Orenburg as its capital. In 1925 it was renamed the Kazakh ASSR and in the same year the capital was moved to Kzyl-Orda. In May 1929 the capital was again moved, this time to Alma-Ata. In 1936 Kazakhstan was raised to the status of union republic. Due to its vast territory and natural resources, Kazakhstan occupied an important place in the USSR’s economic and political life. By the beginning of the 20th century it already had a considerable Slav population, chiefly peasants who were attracted by the possibility of receiving larger plots of land than were available in the agricultural areas of Russia and Ukraine. From 1897 to 1911 the population of Stepnoi Krai (the oblasts of Ural’sk, Turgai, Akmola and Semipalatinsk), which comprised more than half of the territory of contemporary Kazakhstan, increased from 2,470,000 to 3,800,000. Russians and Ukrainians now comprised 40 per cent of the population—twice as many as in 1897.5 By 1939 Kazakhstan’s Slavs had become a majority. The fatalities and emigration resulting from the 1916 uprising against the Tsar’s decision to draft Muslims (which encompassed the Steppe and the Fergana Valley), the revolutions of 1917 and the ensuing Civil War, have been estimated to have resulted in the loss of some half million lives, together with an additional 400,000 who fled together with their herds.6 In the famine of 1921–22 the population of Kazakhstan fell by a further 19.1 per cent, including 414,000 Kazakhs.7 The 1930s collectivization, which was accompanied in Kazakhstan by sedentarization, led to yet another major demographic disaster when 1,750,000 Kazakhs starved to death.8 Fleeing from famine and genocide, 900,000 Kazakhs left their native parts for neighbouring countries. The population in the nomadic regions dwindled by 85-90 per cent and in the semi-nomadic regions, by 55-60 per cent. It was not until the 1970 population census that the number of Kazakhs in Kazakhstan exceeded the pre–1916 figures.9 Simultaneously with the collectivization in Kazakhstan in the early 1930s, ‘resettlement’ of Slavs began to be carried out. Their deportation from Russia and Ukraine spelled the liquidation of the kulaks as a class. The number of deportees arriving in Kazakhstan grew annually.10 With the beginning of the Second World War, migration of Slavs to Kazakhstan increased. In 1941–42 more than 460 industrial enterprises were evacuated with their workers and their families from Russia and Ukraine to Kazakhstan.11 During the war years many repressed ethnic groups were exiled to Kazakhstan (notably, Volga Germans and the North Caucasian ‘punished peoples’). The Virgin Lands scheme of the mid-1950s further increased the Slav population of the northern and eastern regions of Kazakhstan. By the 1959 population census, the proportion of Kazakhs in the population was 30 per cent.12 Moscow’s russification policy was not, however, confined to immigration. It

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included, as elsewhere in the Soviet Union, efforts to achieve acculturation and, above all, the predominance of the Russian language, especially in urban centres. The first ethnic disturbances which rocked the Gorbachev regime occurred in Kazakhstan. In December 1986, the ouster of Kazakh First Party Secretary Dinmuhammad Kunayev was followed by his replacement with a non-resident Russian party functionary, Gennadii Kolbin. Thousands of students and others demonstrated their opposition in a main square of Alma-Ata against this violation of what had become an accepted norm—occupation of the senior party position in the republic by a member of the titular nation. The disturbances were put down with great brutality, thus exacerbating the sense of outrage felt by Kazakhs. Another major issue which surfaced in the subsequent five years was the demographic imbalance: it was only in 1986 that the Kazakhs surpassed the Russians to become the largest ethnic group in Kazakhstan. The large number of Russians and other russophones—primarily Germans and Ukrainians—and the dearth of Kazakh schools in the cities, exacerbated the Kazakhs’ ethnic sensitivity and, like all the union republics, they passed a Language Law in 1989 which sought to ensure the primacy of Kazakh. A major grievance, specific to Kazakhstan, which the Kazakhs nurtured against the all-union leadership in Moscow, was connected to the nuclear testing site in Semipalatinsk Oblast. The first nuclear test was carried out in August 1949. From then until the closure of the Semipalatinsk nuclear site in October 1989, 343 nuclear tests were carried out.13 Both the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site and Khrushchev’s Virgin Lands policy constituted decisive contributions to the ecological disasters which became a focus of debate in the 1980s. Kazakhstan began its independent history with the demise of the USSR and its Declaration of Independence of 16 December 1991. In the course of the same month it became a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Political System The first post-Soviet constitution was adopted on 28 January 1993. The first general presidential elections were held in December 1991, in which former Kazakhstan CP First Secretary Nursultan Nazarbayev was the sole candidate and received 99 per cent of the vote. As a result of a general referendum held on 29 April 1995, Nazarbayev’s authority as president was extended to 1 December 2000. In accordance with the new constitution adopted on 30 August 1995, following a national referendum, Kazakhstan became a presidential republic. The president of the republic was to be elected for a five-year term; he appointed the prime minister and the supreme court and served as commander-inchief. The leading representative and legislative organ of the republic was the parliament. Between 1993 and 1995 alone, Kazakhstan had three parliaments. The first, the Supreme Soviet, was dissolved in December 1993 and replaced by a new parliament, the Supreme Kenges, in March 1994. In March 1995 the independent-minded Constitutional Court declared the results of the election to the Supreme Kenges invalid. In response, the president dissolved the Supreme Kenges, abolished the Constitutional Court and ruled by decree for nine months. In December a new parliament was elected. It consisted of two chambers (the 47-member Senate (upper house) and the 67-member Majlis (lower house). The constitution stipulated that all oblasts and two other administrative units (the

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cities of Astana and Almaty) elect two deputies each to the Senate. In addition, seven senators were to be appointed by the president. In accordance with the 1997 administrative reforms, the number of oblasts was reduced from 19 to 14, hence decreasing the number of seats in the Senate. In October 1998 parliament significantly altered the structure of the legislature, increasing the size of the Majlis from 67 to 77 deputies (the ten additional deputies being elected by proportional representation on a party-list basis), and extending the Majlis term from four to five years and the Senate term from four to six years.14 The president had the right to dissolve parliament and create an advisory body in the case of a national emergency. In 1998 a further constitutional amendment was adopted establishing a seven-year term of office for the president. On 10 January 1999, President Nazarbayev was re-elected for a seven-year term in accordance with new stipulations. Political Parties and Movements The first informal public associations surfaced, as elsewhere in the Soviet Union, in 1989. The course of their development was influenced to a large extent by the Alma-Ata riots of 17–18 December 1986. This outbreak of ethnic disorder served to enhance Kazakh national self-awareness and to accelerate society’s politicization. It thus set the stage for the emergence of parties and movements. These appeared in the context of Gorbachev’s reforms despite pressure from the republican authorities, who feared a recurrence of the December events and sought to impede the formation of informal political structures. In the spring of 1987, political clubs and environmentalist groups began to appear in several cities. In October 1988, under the influence of the political movements in Moscow and in the Baltic states, 30 Russian-speaking intellectuals made an attempt to proclaim an ‘Alma-Ata Popular Front’. The authorities responded with persecution of its activists. In December 1988, following the foundation of the Moscow Memorial Society, local societies bearing the same name were created in Alma-Ata and Akmola.15 In February 1989, Nevada-Semipalatinsk, the first republic-wide movement was formed, following growing awareness of the scope of the ecological disaster afflicting the area around the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site. So, too, was the historical education society Adilet (Justice). The work of these societies in exposing the crimes committed in Kazakhstan during Stalin’s rule and in subsequent years, brought to light many horrible facts and caused widespread disillusionment with the Communist Party’s policies and a growth of political awareness among the general public, leading to its greater participation in politics. The republic’s Communist Party, still the only legal political party, was rapidly losing what remained of its prestige and power. At the same time, Kazakh nationalism was on the rise. Slogans calling for a rebirth of the Kazakh language and culture and demands for state sovereignty found a ready response among the titular population. It was these sentiments that in 1989 led to the founding of the historical-ethnographic Zheruiuk (Promised Land) Society and the Zheltoksan (December) Public Committee, both of which rallied radically-minded Kazakh intellectuals to their ranks. The year 1990 saw a renewed upsurge of Kazakh nationalism. One cause was the growing impotence of the central authorities, which proved unable to prevent the republic’s Supreme Soviet from appointing a special commission of inquiry into the circumstances that led to the

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December 1986 riots and into the way in which it was suppressed. The commission ultimately laid the blame for the riots on the central and republican party authorities. At the beginning of 1990 the Kazakh Tili (language) Society, which called for instituting Kazakh language studies, emerged in Alma-Ata; in April the Alash Party was formed; in May the Zheltoksan Public Committee declared itself a party, and, finally, in the summer, the Azat (Freedom) Civil Movement, the popular front which attracted the greatest support in the period of the USSR’s disintegration, came into being. The programmes of the parties rallying the indigenous population were very similar, differing only in their degree of radicalism. They focused on issues of national independence, language and economic and social development.16 In September 1990 Alma-Ata witnessed a further three days of nationalist demonstrations sparked by Solzhenitsyn’s proposal to annex northern Kazakhstan to Russia. The demonstrators countered by saying that the Russian Federation’s Omsk Oblast had formerly been part of Kazakh territory.17 For the most part, political organizations, parties and movements that appeared in Kazakhstan in 1988–92 either organized or split along ethnic lines.18 Indeed, the vigorous activity of the Kazakh nationalist parties and movements and the enactment of political and legislative measures favouring the eponymous nationality spurred on other ethnic groups, primarily the Slavs, to follow suit. Northern, north-eastern, and eastern Kazakhstan, as well as the city of Alma-Ata were predominantly Slav. Both the Law on Citizenship (20 December 1991) and the Law on Immigration (August 1992) accorded specific privileges to Kazakhs: those returning to settle in their historic homeland were automatically issued a permanent residence permit, without the preliminary three-year temporary residence period which was obligatory for people of other nationalities.19 The republican government decree of 18 November 1991 envisaged rendering substantial aid to Kazakh resettlers. This came in the wake of increased immigration of Kazakhs from Uzbekistan (especially Karakalpakstan), Russia and Turkmenistan. In 1991–92, about 41,000 Kazakhs arrived from Mongolia, some in order to work and others to resettle. These returning ethnic Kazakhs were encouraged to settle in regions with a compact Slav population in an attempt to increase the percentage of Kazakhs in areas bordering on Russia.20 Of the 704 families from Mongolia who arrived in the Pavlodar Region from January to September 1992, as many as 542 were given new or renovated housing already in October of the same year. They also received money and livestock.21 Finally, there was an effort to increase the number of highly-placed Kazakhs in the regional administrations in areas where Slavs made up the majority of the population.22 In August 1990, Edinstvo (Unity), a multi-ethnic movement with a programme patterned after those of the popular fronts of the Baltic republics, made its appearance in Alma-Ata. In northern and eastern Kazakhstan a Cossack movement was taking shape. Some of its member organizations demanded that these regions be handed over to Russian jurisdiction. The Slav popular movement Lad came to play a leading role, having been joined by Russian organizations in East Kazakhstan, Semipalatinsk and north Kazakhstan, areas which had large Russian/Slav communities. Lad, like many other political organizations in Kazakhstan, split at the end of 1991, and a break-away faction calling itself the Russian Community emerged. The Party of Democratic Progress of Kazakhstan, based on the Edinstvo movement, was also formed. Like the programmes of

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the Kazakh national parties, these had much in common, differing only in their emphasis on particular issues. The movement was active mostly on the regional level and in predominantly Slav localities, and had representatives in the new Supreme Soviet. Numerous Cossack organizations appeared, mostly in northern Kazakhstan, which were registered as national cultural associations in 1990. The People’s Congress Party founded in October 1991 did not succeed in playing the role of a consolidating centrist force, even though it managed to set up a ‘round table’, a sort of coordinating and advisory body that was active until the March 1994 parliamentary elections. The struggle between its cosmopolitan and nationalist wings resulted in a split and the withdrawal of part of the titular nationality’s intellectual élite. Nevertheless, it remained one of the most influential parties, first because the famous poet Olzhas Suleymenov was one of its leaders; also, because it had intellectual potential; and, finally, because it controlled important channels of information which it used to promote its programme. Naturally, it enjoyed the backing of the powerful and popular Nevada-Semipalatinsk anti-nuclear movement which Suleymenov headed. The ensuing collapse of the centre, the disintegration of the USSR and the achievement of independence created a fundamentally new political situation, which catalyzed an internal split in the Azat Civil Movement. The main force of the Kazakh national movement, Azat was plagued by power struggles among politicians who disagreed on questions of both strategy and tactics. In October 1991, one splinter group founded the Republican Party. Attempts at unification, such as the creation in autumn 1992 of the [Azat] Republican Party on the basis of the Republican and Zheltoksan parties and fragments of the Azat Civil Movement, proved abortive. A year later the [Azat] Republican Party practically disappeared from the political scene, never having asserted itself as a tangible political force. In October 1993, some of its former member parties united in a new association—the National Democratic Party, but it, too, never played a significant political role. The ultranationalist Alash Party23 continued to function unofficially in the years that followed, occupying a peripheral place in Kazakh politics. The influence of the Kazakh ultra-nationalist movement subsequently declined, despite attempts to galvanize its activities in various regions, especially those populated by a Kazakh majority. The 7 March 1994 parliamentary elections contributed to the development of a multiparty system in Kazakhstan. There were 910 candidates for 135 parliamentary seats. The best results were achieved by the Union of National Unity (32 seats), the People’s Congress of Kazakhstan (22 seats) and the Socialist Party (12 seats).24 From the time of independence, the authorities strove to set up a centrist party which would consolidate multi-ethnic Kazakhstan and unofficially play the role of a presidential party. This development is unique to Kazakhstan, for, unlike Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, the political leadership did not want to transform the Communist Party and retain it as the government party under a new name, although some forces did support this course. The Communist Party tried to adapt to the new situation by changing its name to Socialist, but its position in society remained unchanged. In February 1993, a centrist pro-presidential movement was formed and dubbed the Union of National Unity. The presence of experienced former Communist Party functionaries among its members, its open support for President Nazarbayev as its leader, proclaimed in its programme and rules, and its practically unlimited access to the mass

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media brought the party success in the March 1994 parliamentary elections. In the period between March 1994 and October 1995, several political blocs were created. The Respublika (Republic) Bloc, which consisted of the People’s Congress, the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the Social Democratic Party, Lad and the Association for Legal Development (a small party of democratic orientation), supported government policy in all but the economic sphere, where it advocated a guaranteed minimum wage and social benefits for employees. The Otan (Motherland) Civil Committee,25 which included all the nationalist parties and movements such as Alash and Azat, opposed government policy in both the social and economic spheres. These opposition nationalist groups were small in numbers and had limited support among the population. In addition, their leaders were novices in politics. The Centrist Bloc was formed by the Popular Unity Bloc, the Union of Engineers of Kazakhstan and a parliamentary faction, For the Future of Kazakhstan. The absence, in practice, of a strong opposition enabled negotiations with representatives of the parties of the Respublika Bloc, and following the December 1995 elections, many parties supported the new economic policy proposed by Nursultan Nazarbayev. The existence of a great number of parties became a reality of political life in Kazakhstan. In March 1990 there were 103 parties, public political movements and associations, both registered and unregistered.26 The situation tended to be very dynamic: new associations were springing up constantly, uniting in coalitions, splitting and fading into oblivion. Often they were poorly organized and had no clear-cut goals or principles. Their lack of pluralist political experience led both to the drafting of vague platforms full of empty rhetoric and to internal strife in newly formed movements. These weaknesses, combined with Nazarbayev’s increasing authoritarianism diminished the role played by political parties and movements in Kazakhstan. Domestic and foreign policy has been largely determined by élite groups surrounding the president, with parliamentary parties acting as little more than government-sponsored lobbying groups. Nevertheless, their formation and development were an important stage in the evolution of Kazakhstan’s political system. NOTES 1. Vestnik statistiki 12 (1990), p. 71. 2. Delovaia nedelia, 21 May 1999. 3. Ulus—tribe (Kazakh). The term is used to designate territorial and social groups of population in Central Asia and Siberia (Bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 2nd edition, Vol. 44, pp. 192–3). 4. Zhuz—larger hierarchic tribal and territorial confederation among the Kazakhs, sometimes called horde in Western literature. 5. Aziatskaia Rossiia, Vol. 1, p. 67. 6. See Introduction, n. 10. 7. Alekseenko and Masanov, ‘Migratsionnye i etnodemograficheskie protsessy v sovetskom periode’, p. 369. The 414,000 Kazakhs comprised 18.5 per cent of the Kazakh population. 8. Aralovets, ‘Izuchenie liudskikh poter’ sovetskogo obshchestva v 30-e gg’, p. 48. 9. Aiaganov, Gosudarstvo Kazakhstan, pp. 58–9; The 1913 figure for Kyrgyz, namely Krygyz and Kazakh, was 4,654,402. The 1970 census figure for Kazakhs in Kazakhstan was 4.234 million.

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10. Until 1934 peasants deported as kulaks were termed spetsposelentsy ‘special settlers’; in 1934–44 they were called trudposelentsy (worker-settlers), and from 1944 spetspereselentsy (deportees). 11. Istoriia Kazakhstana: Ocherk, p. 329. 12. Kazakhs accounted for 30 per cent of the population in 1959 and 32.5 per cent in 1970. See Alekseenko and Masanov, ‘Migratsionnye i etnodemograficheskie protsessy v sovetskom periode’, p. 403, Table 16. 13. Istoriia Kazakhstana: Ocherk, p. 341. 14. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2000: Kazakhstan, pp. 6–7. 15. Vremia (Deuir) 3, 5 March 1994. 16. Some of them also expressed dissatisfaction at Soviet policies of destroying the traditional cattle breeding economy and turning the Kazakhs into a minority in their own country. 17. Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 30 June 1990. 18. The Law of the Kazakh SSR on Public Organizations in the Kazakh SSR, adopted by the Supreme Soviet of Kazakhstan on 27 June 1991 led to the formation of numerous ethnic public and cultural organizations, one of which became the Russian Community. 19. Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 25 Aug. 1992. 20. Istoriia Kazakhstana: Ocherk, pp. 405–6. 21. Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 26 Sept. 1992. 22. There are no data available for the beginning of 1992, but as of 1 January 1993, for instance, the ratio of Kazakhs to people of other nationalities in the Karaganda Oblast administration was 6:2, in the Pavlodar Oblast 6:3, and 7:2 in Alma-Ata Oblast. Kazakhs predominated in high ranking administrative positions, in spite of the fact that they constituted a minority of the population (Karavan, 24 Dec. 1993). 23. The Alash Party was not officially registered in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. Its members considered themselves the heirs of the nationalistic Alash Party that existed from 1913 to 1918. The popularity of this party reached its peak in 1989–90. Its social base was in southern Kazakhstan, like many other Kazakh nationalist movements. 24. Tsentral’naia Aziia 2 (1998), p. 78. 25. Not to be confused with the new presidential party of the same name created in 1999, and headed by Sergei Tereshchenko, former prime minister of Kazakhstan. 26. Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 20 June 1992.

ADILET INTRODUCTION One of the first informal organizations, Adilet (Justice) was founded in 1988. Its primary aim was to disseminate knowledge of Kazakhstan’s history in the Soviet period, in the wake of the campaign which began during perestroika to expose the Stalinist personality cult and rehabilitate the victims of the purges of the 1930s and 1940s. Its programme closely resernbled that of the All-Union Memorial Society.1 The constituent congress, attended by 300 delegates, was held in April 1989.2 Sanzhar Zhandosov, director of Kazakhstan’s Labour Ministry, was elected chairman of the society. By the end of 1989, regional branches of Adilet had been created in Tselinograd, Karaganda, Shymkent, Alma-Ata and Zhezkazgan Oblasts. and in the city of Alma-Ata. Former prisoners of Stalin’s camps dominated the Adilet leadership. Adilet helped compile Kniga pamiati (the book of memory), listing thousands of Stalin’s victims, as well as victims of the December 1986 riots in Alma-Ata. It also assisted in locating many graves from the Stalinist years. While the CPSU was still in existence, Adilet insisted on loyalty to the party. Nonetheless, its activities served to destroy the prevailing conception that the CPSU could be disassociated from Stalin’s repressive policies.

INTERVIEW WITH ADILET DEPUTY CHAIRMAN MARAT HASANOV […] The goal of our historical and educational society—as laid down in its charter—is to determine the historical truth about Stalin’s rule and the famine of the 1930s; perpetuate the memory of the victims of the totalitarian regime; contribute to their full rehabilitation; reconstruct their biographies as accurately as possible; and see to it that the legitimate interests of rehabilitated persons and their families are protected in all state and public organizations.3 A major focus of our activity is the struggle for the supremacy of justice over arbitrariness and lawlessness, not only with respect to the past, but also to the present […] Adilet advocates pluralism, rule of law and the supremacy of justice and democracy, and opposes mob rule and totalitarian rule. It also opposes promoting ideas that have no scientific basis […] We are of the opinion that problems should be solved not by meetings or strikes, but mainly by parliamentary means. We have no political goals […] Source: Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 16 April 1991.

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NOTES 1. The Memorial Society was created in Moscow in 1988. Its main task was preserving the memory of the harsh political persecutions of the Soviet—and in particular the Stalinist— era. Later it was transformed into a broader human rights organization. Its activities led to repeated confrontations with the authorities. 2. Ponomarev, Obshchestvennye organizatsii v Kazakhstane i Kyrgyzstane, p. 28. 3. The Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Rehabilitation of the Victims of Mass Political Persecution was signed by the president of Kazakhstan on 14 April 1993 and published in May (Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 21 May 1993). Adilet took an active part in the work of the legislative commission which drafted it. See Khazanov, ‘Vernut’sia iz nebytyia’.

ALASH INTRODUCTION The constituent congress of the Alash1 National Freedom Party took place in April 1990. At that time estimates of the party’s membership ranged from 80 to 200. The congress elected a five-man central committee as its leading body, and a party chairman, Imashuly Sarkytbek.2 Proclaiming itself the successor of the Alash Party, which was the first Kazakh national party, established at the beginning of the twentieth century,3 the congress adopted a party platform entitled ‘Alash and the Present’. In contrast to the less ambitious aspirations of its namesake to establish autonomy of Turkic peoples within the framework of the Russian Federation, the new Alash Party aimed to unite all Turkicspeaking peoples living in the territory of the former USSR in a single state— Turkestan—and eventually, all Turkic-speaking people of the world into Greater Turkestan. Its ideology was based on advancing and implementing the ideas of Turkic unity and Muslim solidarity as a counterweight to ‘eurocentrism’. Alash’s official slogan was: ‘Islam-Turkism-Democracy’. Alash proclaimed itself an international parliamentary party, which operated in accordance with international law. Repatriation of Slavs beyond the republic’s borders was one of the main points in the section of its programme dealing with nationality issues. Unlike other parties in the republic, Alash considered Islam to be a major nationbuilding force in Kazakhstan. Alash condemned all other parties and movements functioning in Kazakhstan as ‘pseudo-democratic’ and puppets of the party apparatus.4 However, in Kazakhstan, with its large Christian population on the one hand, and lack of religious fervour among the indigenous population on the other, the party’s ideology—Pan-Turkism and PanIslamism—actually precluded its transformation into a mass political organization. Following independence, Alash continued to oppose the regime of President Nazarbayev, and was refused permission to register as a party. Its main base of support was the Kazakh population in southern rural areas. According to Nezavisimaia gazeta, its membership in mid-1992 was close to 5,000.5 In 1991, the party leaders began publishing an Islamic political newspaper, Hak (Truth), in Moscow, but only a few issues appeared. While professing non-violent methods, the party resorted to violence as a form of exerting pressure on its opponents.6 From 13 to 15 December 1991, militant Islamic activists of the Alash Party took part in disturbances at the Alma-Ata mosque, where they clashed with mosque officials who enjoyed the authorities’ support. This was part of an attempt by Alash leaders to oust the republic’s official Muslim leadership. Alash members clashed with the militia as well. After these events the party leaders made an appeal to the world Muslim community for support, which went unanswered. Some of the party leaders, Rashid Nutushev, Bolatbek Akhmetaliyev and Muratbek Esengazin, were accused of slandering President Nazarbayev, organizing a meeting without authorization and inflicting severe bodily injury on the chief mufti of Kazakhstan, Ratbek

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Nysynbayev. The three Alash leaders were sentenced to prison terms. The party subsequently declined7 and sank into obscurity.

PROGRAMME I. General Clauses 1. The national freedom party, Alash, is an international, parliamentary party, which operates in accordance with international legal agreements, and with the constitutions of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Russia and other states where Turkic and Muslim populations reside. 2. The Alash Party has specific traits [which make it suited to] the ideological-political and socio-economic shaping of a future society and, in this context, it is distinct from other parties in its organizational structure and in its methods of political struggle, which are reflected in the programme and charter of the party. II. Programmatic Aims 1. Achieving for Kazakhstan the genuine status of an independent national state. 2. Integrating ideas and propaganda regarding Turkish unity and Muslim solidarity as a counterweight to eurocentric concepts in the theory and practice of public life. 3. Reviving Kazakhstan as the historical core of a future united Turkic-Islamic state— Greater Turkestan.8 4. Raising the standard of living of the Kazakh people and of all other peoples living in the Turkic-Islamic regions. 5. Combating neo-colonial expansion by the former centre—Russia—as well by other global powers. III. State Structure 1. Creation of a democratic republic with all the characteristics of a regime elected by universal suffrage (parliament, separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers, multi-party system, etc.). IV. Domestic Policy 1. The main principles of the party’s domestic policy are considered to be the attainment of economic and political stability, and the creation of conditions conducive to carrying out peaceful political struggle in a multi-party democracy. V. Foreign Policy 1. In relations with member states of the CIS, the party stands for implementing the ideals of Turkic unity and Muslim solidarity, with a view towards creating a Greater Turkestan state—a Country of the Turks [Strana Tiurkov]. 2. In relations with the rest of the Turko-Islamic world, the party considers close political and economic cooperation to be vital.

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3. In relations with other states, the party favours observing principles of equal partnership and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. VI. Economy 1. Pluralistic structure of the economy (state, cooperative and private sectors). 2. Development of private enterprise and initiative. 3. Guaranteed social protection for the lower income population. 4. Complete economic self-sufficiency and independence. 5. Ecological security. VII. Religion 1. Breaching the divide between religion and state. 2. Reforming Islam in keeping with the true spirit of the Qur’an, contemporary demands, and the specific national characteristics of the Turkic peoples.9 3. Freedom of religion. VIII. Human Rights 1. Ensuring legal and de facto observance of all human rights (in respect to labour, private property, personal security, freedom of conscience, religion, speech, assembly, citizenship, etc.) regardless of ethnic, religious or social differences. IX. Rights of the Indigenous Nationality 1. The Kazakh (Turkic) nationality, while respecting the representatives of all other nationalities, has priority in the observance of its national traditions, the development of its language and culture and in controlling the rational and prudent use of its natural wealth. X. Rights of National Religion 1. Islam is the national religion of the Kazakhs (Turks), and, as such, its development takes priority. XI. Rights of Ethnic and Religious Minorities 1. The priority of the Kazakh (Turkic) nationality and Islam declared above, does not constitute a negation of the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, or of all other nations or religions. They all have the unquestionable right to preserve and develop their culture, and the state guarantees their personal security and material assistance. XII. International Relations 1. The party recognizes all the inhabitants of Kazakhstan as citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan, with all attendant rights and obligations. 2. The party favours state-regulated migration and the implementation of a state policy of repatriation (awarding those who desire to leave Kazakhstan full material compensation, and creating conditions for the return to Kazakhstan of individuals of the indigenous nationality living abroad, etc.).10 3. The party favours political, non-violent methods of resolving international conflicts.

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XIII. Inter-faith Relations 1. The party favours freedom of religion and the right of representatives of all religions to worship freely. XIV. International Borders 1. The party recognizes the stability of the borders which have been established between states (and between republics).11 Source: Politicheskie partii i obshchestvennye dvizheniia sovremennogo Kazakhstana. Spravochnik 1 (Almaty, 1994), pp. 62–5.

INTERVIEW WITH AN UNNAMED ALASH LEADER Q: The implementation of the idea of a united Turkestan would face a serious obstacle: the existence of Tajikistan, an Iranian-language enclave, in the very heart of the new entity […] A: The Tajiks are a people with a marginal culture. They have long lived at the crossroads of the Iranian- and Turkic-language cultures. We have ties of long standing with Tajikistan and it is not an outsider in this ensemble. We do not share ideas of pan-Turkism, that is, Turkic chauvinism.12 Q: Do you have any territorial claims to Russia? A: We do not have any territorial claims and we are positive that if we had, they would lead to endless wars. We think that the borders should remain as they are drawn today. We lay no claims to Astrakhan, Saratov, Orenburg or other territories once owned by the Kazakhs. On the other hand, there is a powerful Cossack movement in Kazakhstan which, perhaps taking its cue from Solzhenitsyn, supports the separation of Kazakhstan’s northern regions.13 This line is anything but constructive. Q: What are your main disagreements with the present leadership of Kazakhstan? A: Nazarbayev is trying to ignore old maladies. But diseases should be treated, in some cases by surgery. Today the Kazakhs make up only 42 per cent of the population. Laws on migration14 and language15 should be promulgated without delay. Meanwhile the president is making halfhearted decisions. For instance, we have two official languages—Kazakh and Russian. Q: Do you think Kazakh should be the only official language? A: There should be some decisiveness. The [issue of the] status of the Kazakh language, as one which has undergone repeated suppression, should be raised. Half-hearted decisions only push the critical mass of discontent over the edge. Nor are we satisfied with Nazarbayev’s economic policy. National resources are being squandered and sold for a song. We are resolutely opposed to selling off oil and gas reserves. Previously, Kazakhstan’s natural wealth was siphoned off by the centre;

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today anyone can do this. We support integration in the international community but on equal terms. Source: Nezavisimaia gazeta, 2 June 1992. NOTES 1. Translated by one of the party leaders, Aron Atabek, as ‘red wolves’ or ‘victors’ (Nezavisimaia gazeta, 2 July 1992). 2. Ponomarev, Obshchestvennye organizatsii v Kazakhstane i Kyrgyzstane, p. 31. 3. Nezavisimaia gazeta, 2 July 1992. The Alash Party was consolidated at the end of 1917, after a series of congresses composed of members of the Kazakh and Kyrgyz populations in a number of regions of the Steppe Krai, which constitutes most of the territory of contemporary Kazakhstan. Its programme was published in the newspaper Kazakh, on 21 November 1917. The Congress of Kazakh and Kyrgyz people held in Orenburg, 5–13 December 1917, adopted a decision to establish a national-territorial autonomy of the Kazakh and Kyrgyz regions incorporated into the Russian Federation under the name of Alash-Orda. A government and armed force were created. The government waged an armed struggle against Soviet authority, in the course of which, the Alash forces were completely defeated. In August 1920 the government of AlashOrda was liquidated and the Alash Party ceased to exist (Alash-Orda, pp. 69, 88–93). In 1999 yet another Alash Party was created. See Tsentral’naia Aziia i Kavkaz, 4 (2000), p. 35. 4. Alash 1 (May 1990). 5. Nezavisimaia gazeta, 2 June 1992. 6. For example, in August 1990 Alash organized political demonstrations in front of the parliament building. When demonstrators began a hunger strike, the security forces were called in to forcibly remove them. 7. Politicheskie partii i obshchestvennye dvizheniia sovremennogo Kazakhstana, p. 62. 8. Historically, Kazakhstan comprised part of the territory of western Turkestan—a significant part of the area inhabited by the Turks. The Turkic peoples, who are today divided into more than 30 nationalities and ethnic groups, occupy a vast area, from the Far East to Istanbul. Alash’s goal was a confederation of all the Turkic states of the post-Soviet era, led by Kazakhstan, with Islam as the consolidating force. 9. As noted, Alash was formed in southern Kazakhstan where Islamic traditions were especially strong and many holy places were situated. In contrast, in northern Kazakhstan which is part of the steppe region, religious traditions play a less influential role. Alash’s aim was to involve all Kazakhs in the revival of traditional Islam. 10. Under Kazakhstan’s Law on Immigration, which came into force on 1 December 1992, considerable privileges were granted to Kazakh settlers, most of whom arrived from Mongolia and Eastern Turkestan (China’s Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region). 11. See the interview below. 12. The idea that Turks (Turkic-speakers) and Tajiks (Persian-speakers) were a single people was advanced by Mustafa Chokayev (1890–1941), leader of the Alash-Orda. The present Alash leadership claim to be his followers. For Chokayev’s views on the relationship between Turks and Tajiks, see his article Turkestan’, first published in 1941 in the magazine Iash Turkestan and reprinted in Alash 1, May 1990.

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13. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, in his article ‘Kak nam obustroit Rossiiu?’ (How are we to set up Russia?) advocated the separation of Kazakhstan’s northern regions (Literaturnaia gazeta, 18 September 1990). The first Cossack organizations in Kazakhstan appeared in 1990. Some of these were extremist and shared Solzhenitsyn’s view. 14. See note 10. 15. Kazakh is the only official language under the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan adopted in January 1993 (Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 2 Feb. 1993).

ASSOCIATION FOR THE LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF KAZAKHSTAN INTRODUCTION The Association for the Legal Development of Kazakhstan (ALDK) was established to fight the crime and corruption which became conspicuous, particularly in the state apparatus of Kazakhstan, after independence. The first attempts to create this political movement were made as early as 1993. Following the Supreme Soviet elections of March 1994, the association registered a faction of eleven deputies. First headed by Aleksandr Peregrin1 and then by Vitalii Voronov, it proved to be an active and influential force. In June 1994, having charged that the government had no clear-cut and positive programme of reform, the faction formed a shadow cabinet and drew up its own proposal for carrying out reforms. The cabinet was headed by Vitalii Roze.2 Thus, this movement constituted the first real attempt to create a meaningful parliamentary opposition to President Nazarbayev.

GOALS AND TASKS All issues, be they economic reforms, nationalities policy or social security, can be examined by the ALDK only from the legal, in particular human rights point of view, because, undoubtedly, most of the troubles we face today stem from deliberate and unpunished disregard for the law, and from the reliance on coercive rather than legal paths to seeking solutions. Violation of the law made it possible for the powers-that-be to amass tremendous fortunes. Each of us contributed to these fortunes, because they have a single source— state property. Violations of guaranteed human rights engendered the so-called ethnic problem, which is undermining the stability of multinational Kazakhstan. All of this results from the authorities’ unlawful actions. Since the criminal and corrupt bureaucracy is the main obstacle to the normal development of Kazakhstan as a state ruled by law, the ALDK has set the following goals for itself: to expose violations of the law by civil servants; to institute legal proceedings in cases of violations of the law; to demand that officials who have discredited government bodies be forced to retire, and to use any possible means of influencing governmental personnel policies; to provide legal defence to victims of power abuse; to monitor violations of the law by civil servants […] The ALDK’s social base and structure are defined by its goals and tasks. In proclaiming its dedication to law and order, the ALDK cannot but be concerned about the

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integrity of its members, and must select its potential members with the utmost care, and expel those who have discredited themselves and the organization. The ALDK should not set itself the task of being a ‘party of the entire people’, or ‘a leading and guiding force’, or the ‘ruling party’, for that would be unacceptable from a legal point of view. It should not strive for an unlimited increase of its membership, but its actions should be attractive enough to gain the support of a great number of people who share its ideas and on whom it could rely in its activity. The social base of our movement will of course be as wide as possible, since the crisis of legality forces more and more people to seek means to establish the rule of law and make the authorities obey the law. Since the development of the law in any state is inconceivable without an independent court of law and a broad and organized stratum of independent legal practitioners, the ALDK must contribute in every way to the emergence and consolidation of independent legal associations, which would constitute a barrier to illegal activity. Since the main principle and weapon of the ALDK is glasnost, it must constantly rely on the mass media, use and protect them, and collect reliable information which can be disseminated as widely as possible […] Source: Sovety Kazakhstana, 24 July 1993. NOTES 1. Nezavisimaia gazeta, 28 May 1994. 2. Nezavisimaia gazeta, 29 June 1994.

AZAT CIVIL MOVEMENT INTRODUCTION One of the first organized national Kazakh movements, the Azat (Freedom) Civil Movement was formed in 1989 under the impact of perestroika. Its constituent conference was held on 30 June 1990 in Alma-Ata. The movement adopted a platform which stated that it was ‘fighting for an independent democratic Kazakh republic’. Initially, its programme was similar to that of the government, its main demand being ‘state sovereignty of Kazakhstan within a commonwealth of free independent states united by an international union treaty’.1 The movement’s leading organs were the coordinating council and the council of elders. Azat was registered with the Alma-Ata municipal authority in September 1990. Membership at the time of registration was 600. The movement started its own newspaper, Azat, which in 1990 had a circulation of 15,000. From its inception, the movement was headed by people directly connected with the regime. This fact partly explains the moderate character of the movement’s platform. One of the five co-chairmen of Azat was Mikhail Isinaliyev, former minister of foreign affairs; another, Marat Chormanov, was a former party official who worked in the AlmaAta City Communist Party Committee. Sabet Kazi Akatayev, a former teacher of CPSU history, later the leader of the Zhas Tulpar Kazakh youth movement, was also an Azat activist. Soon after the movement was created, internal differences arose within the leadership, especially between Chormanov and Akatayev. Isinaliyev, one of the more educated members of the moderate opposition, left the movement and returned to his former position as a diplomat at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan.2 In the spring of 1991 Chormanov became head of the movement’s executive committee. At the end of August, however, Akatayev’s faction forced a decision upon the coordinating council to convene an extraordinary congress. On 4 September, without waiting for the opening of the congress, Akatayev proclaimed the establishment, within the Azat Civil Movement, of the Republican Party of Kazakhstan. The constituent congress of the Azat Civil Movement was held on 5–6 October 1991 and attended by 350 delegates from all regions of the republic. The programme and rules were amended and the joint chairmanship was abolished. Isinaliyev was elected chairman and Zh. Kuanyshalin and Akatayev became his deputies. A 43-man coordinating council was also elected.3 In June 1992, in a bid to strengthen their position, the Azat Civil Movement, the Republican Party and the Zheltoksan National Democratic Party declared their intention to form a united Azat Republican Party. A constituent congress was held on 11 October 1992. Kamal Ormantayev, member of the Kazakhstan Academy of Sciences and a pediatric surgeon was elected chairman and Hasen Kozha-Ahmet, exchairman of Zheltoksan, became his deputy.4

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The Azat Civil Movement subsequently joined the National Democratic Party, which emerged when the Azat Republican Party broke up in October 1993.5 In 1994, Hasen Kozha-Ahmet, a well-known dissident, became the leader of the Azat Movement, contributing to its severe radicalization. As early as June 1995, the Azat leadership issued a statement bitterly critical of the Kazakhstan regime. This was clear evidence of the movement’s transition to an uncompromising opposition stance. Later the Azat leadership issued numerous statements attacking senior state officials. The authorities mostly ignored these statements. Only several years later, in January 1999, on the eve of the presidential elections, was the dialogue between the authorities and the Azat Civil Movement renewed.

OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES 1. Preamble The practical realization of Kazakhstan’s independence is obstructed by the central and local party and state apparatus. The totalitarian regime, the blatant disregard by the empire’s centre for the political and economic sovereignty of Kazakhstan, have resulted in the loss of millions of Kazakh lives, ecological disasters, forced migration and a crisis of the republic’s economic, socio-cultural and spiritual life. This makes it imperative for us to become masters of our own destiny. There is no other way. The Azat Civil Movement (CM) of Kazakhstan is an independent, socio-political organization, uniting all patriotically-minded citizens who cherish the ideals of freedom, humanism, social justice and historical truth. It unites in its ranks representatives of different political parties, trade unions and women, veterans of religious, youth and informal organizations, voluntary associations, artists’ unions, foundations, cultural centres, and other bodies, in order to give momentum to a broad civil movement for the rebirth of an independent, democratic Republic of Kazakhstan. Azat operates on the territory of Kazakhstan in accordance with the constitution of the Kazakh SSR. It resolutely rejects the use of violence, and the threat and propaganda of violence in its public and political work. It closely cooperates with other political parties, public and religious associations, and state and government bodies on all issues deriving from the goals and tasks of the movement. Azat defines its main goal as gaining full state sovereignty for Kazakhstan on the basis of international norms and the proposed treaty on a new Commonwealth of Free and Independent Republics.6 The precedence of the republic’s constitutional rights and laws and the exclusive right of the people of Kazakhstan to ownership of the republic’s national resources are intrinsic and indispensable conditions for ensuring a life of dignity for every citizen. Azat opposes divisions along national, racial, religious or social lines. Wholly accepting the fundamental historical goals and tasks of the national liberation movement of the Kazakh people, Azat regards its activities as a part of contemporary socio-political processes and is guided by the concept of a ‘world without violence’.

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Azat rejects any monopoly of political power and operates in accordance with the principles of a free, competitive struggle of political and social ideas within the framework of constitutional institutions. It intends to accomplish its mission solely by non-violent means, believing that its goals may be attained through reform, without resorting to acts that might breach the public peace […] 2. The CM favours: – political, public and economic relations in the republic that would serve the interests of the Republic of Kazakhstan [RK]’s citizens; – developing our own national model of socialism; – giving priority to the interests of RK citizens in all spheres of state activity; – a new RK in international relations, committed to maintaining friendly relations with all the world’s nations and states, irrespective of the desires of third countries, the traditional friendship with Russia or other international ties, and taking into account our desire for solidarity and cooperation with our brothers in language or ethnic origin living in Central Asia, the Volga region, the Caucasus, Crimea, Russia, China and Mongolia; – free, unconditional secession from the USSR and the right to self-determination as well as the right to join a new federation or some other form of cooperation or commonwealth based on a new treaty; – relations with the USSR and union republics based on an equal and mutually advantageous treaty. All the RK’s relations with the USSR and the union republics should be established in accordance with the principles of international law; – participation of the RK in exercising authority, which it had voluntarily relinquished to the USSR;7 – separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government; – supremacy of the constitution of Kazakhstan and its laws throughout the entire territory of the RK. Soviet laws shall not apply unless ratified by the parliament of the RK; – respect for national traditions and way of life when adopting new legislation; – territorial integrity of the republic; – demilitarization of the territory of the RK, discontinuation of the production and testing of weapons of any kind;8 – creation of national military units in the RK in which Kazakh citizens can serve their term of active service, introduction of laws permitting alternative service; – de-politicization of law-enforcement agencies, the armed forces and bodies of state power, divesting the KGB of its function as secret political police; – a diverse market economy featuring de-monopolization and equality of all forms of ownership and economic management methods; – firm guarantees of the right of RK citizens to labour, housing, medical insurance, retirement pensions and other types of national insurance, and reliable compensatory mechanisms linking the salaries of low-income groups to inflation; – distribution of production forces taking into consideration local labour resources, the demographic composition of the population, and ecology; – pursuit of independent demographic and migration policies in the vital interests of the RK;

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– a halt to the building of new, and expansion of existing, enterprises intended to serve the USSR as a whole; – adoption of a law on RK citizenship; – absolute priority to be given to citizens of the RK in filling vacant job positions; – granting Kazakh herdsmen the status enjoyed by people employed in the far north and the far east; – unrestricted distribution of residence permits to Kazakhs in regions with a shortage of labour resources and in cities where the proportion of the Kazakh population is below the republican average;9 – restoration of the legal right to a historic homeland for peoples deported in the past;10 –assistance to Kazakhs residing abroad, who wish to return to the RK;11 – granting the Karakalpak people, who are suffering a total ecological disaster, the right to temporary use of territory where it stands a chance to survive as a national-state entity;12 – declaring the areas adjoining the Aral Sea and the Semipalatinsk test site to be ecological disaster zones, and facilitating resettlement of people from these zones in the republic’s safe regions, giving due consideration to the social, clan and ethnographic links of those to be resettled and their wishes. The resettled population should be adequately provided for.13 – granting equality under the law to all ethnic groups in Kazakhstan, including cultural autonomy and the unobstructed functioning of religious, cultural and social institutions of the different ethnic communities; – regard for the nomadic and semi-nomadic nature of livestock raising—the main source of income for the Kazakh population—and on this basis, consolidating the republic’s hold over the land, its minerals, forests, water resources and air; – promulgation of a law on a democratic press in the RK and liberation of the press from party monopoly;14 – resolution of vital issues of nation-wide importance in the RK by referendum; – moral regeneration, renaissance and humanization of society, protection, preservation and restoration of the environment and of monuments of history and culture, an in-depth study of the history, culture and language of the Kazakh people and the oriental spiritual heritage, augmentation of the cultural potential of the other ethnic groups residing in the republic; – dialogue, cooperation and joint activity with the adherents of reform in the Communist Party of Kazakhstan15 and other political parties, and with state and government bodies, public and religious organizations and movements, as well as with Kazakh émigrés, for the purpose of making the republic a flourishing Asian state, in the full realization that this is the only way to ensure a life of dignity and social welfare for all citizens of Kazakhstan. 3. The CM opposes: – dictatorship by any class or party over the political life of the republic, any type of monopoly over ideology, politics, economics, culture, education, science, or information; – forceful suppression of popular democratic movements, rallies, peaceful demonstrations and acts of protest and civil disobedience;

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– seizure of power by force, ethnic intolerance and strife, revival of the totalitarian system; – a corrupt bureaucracy and the mafia, which exploit the outbreak of rampant crime, irresponsibility and incompetence to preserve their positions and sources of profit at the expense of the labour of others; – encroachment on the cultural and material wealth of the peoples of Kazakhstan; – expanding arable land by reducing the amount of pastureland; – building clusters of dachas close to big cities; – disregard for nature, labour, language, cultural values and the violation of human rights; – the diktat of the Soviet Union’s central bodies regarding the use of Kazakhstan’s natural resources; – lack of a rational approach in fixing prices for consumer goods and food; – importing manpower;16 – using the republic as a settlement for released convicts, for expanding the network of camps and prisons and turning the republic into a place of exile, bringing in persons convicted in other republics to serve their term in Kazakhstan and sending persons convicted in the republic to serve their term elsewhere, and reliance on convicts as a primary source of labour.17 4. CM Guidelines […] – Azat membership shall be open to any citizen of Kazakhstan or of any other country, irrespective of nationality, social status or political or religious orientation, who accepts its programme and rules, pays membership dues and contributes to the realization of the Union’s tasks and goals; – Kazakh and Russian shall be the working languages of the movement, documents in either language being equally valid; – the movement shall have the right to use any legally available means of communication and establish means of its own to promote its ideas and disseminate information; 5. Basic Structure and Conduct of the Movement’s Activities – participation in forming the bodies of state power by constitutional, democratic means; – drafting alternative legislation and participation in political decision-making, shaping the policies of central and local bodies of power through its representatives within them; – rendering organizational, legal, informational and material support to civil initiatives, progressive public associations and individuals; – organizing and holding meetings, rallies, demonstrations, acts of civil disobedience, picketing, collecting signatures and donations; – organizing its own economic and publishing activities, creating various institutions, and panels of experts to study and offer recommendations on concrete problems, etc. Source: Document published by the Action Committee of the Azat Civil Movement (n.d.).

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NOTES 1. Delovaia nedelia, 12 June 1998. 2. Ibid. 3. Vecherniaia Alma-Ata, 9 Oct. 1991. 4. Human Rights and Democratization in the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, p. 191. 5. Aiaganov, ‘“Mnogopartiinost’”: istoricheskie paralleli’, p. 47. 6. At the end of 1990, Gorbachev proposed creating a new Union of Free Sovereign Soviet Republics to replace the USSR. This initiative was curtailed by the coup attempt of August 1991 and the events which followed. In December 1991 the USSR was formally dissolved, being replaced by a loose Commonwealth of Independent States. 7. In the former Soviet Union, the central authorities ruled the entire country without taking into account the wishes of the union republics, granting them in effect the limited powers accorded them by the USSR constitution. 8. In the Soviet period, Kazakhstan’s territory served as a major site for testing nuclear, and other weapons of mass destruction. See Friendly and Feshbach, Ecocide in the USSR, pp. 138–9, 173–4, 176–8; Abylkhozhin, ‘Kazakhstan v sovetskom totalitarnom prostranstve: istoricheskaia dinamika’, pp. 352–3. 9. Chormanov, the leader of Azat’s centrists, opposed this wording, asserting that it contradicted the movement’s goals and alienated the Russians. However, Akatayev, who believed that in this way Russians could be ousted from the cities, where they constituted the majority of the population, insisted on preserving it and his opinion prevailed. 10. Specifically, Crimean Tatars, Meskhetian Turks, Germans, Greeks and Koreans. 11. Since 1991, the Kazakhstan government has been implementing a programme for the return of Kazakhs. Measures for assisting returnees were established by the cabinet on 18 November 1991 and 3 July 1992 (Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 26 Sept. 1992). In 1991, 12,300 Kazakhs came from Mongolia alone. An active policy to persuade diaspora Kazakhs to take up permanent residence in the republic was seen as a way to improve the eponymous nationality’s demographic situation. In 1992, Kazakhs accounted for only 42 per cent of the population (Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 25 Aug. 1992). 12. In addition to assisting the Karakalpaks who were suffering as a result of the evaporation of the Aral Sea, Azat saw it as a way for Kazakhs residing in Karakalpakstan to be resettled in Kazakhstan (‘Azat i ego printsipy’, p. 61). On 5 December 1936 Karakalpakstan became an autonomous republic of Uzbekistan. 13. Vast areas adjoining the disappearing Aral Sea and the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site were rendered ecological disaster zones. Between 1949 and 1989, 160 above-ground and some 350 underground tests were carried out, with close to 70 thousand people exposed to radiation as a result of the first nuclear test in August 1949 alone (Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 13 Oct. 1992). The test site was closed down by a decree of the President of Kazakhstan on 29 August 1989 (Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 30 Aug. 1989). The Law On Welfare of Citizens Injured as a Result of Nuclear Testing on the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site was adopted on January 1993 (Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 8 Jan. 1993). For the Aral Sea, see, for example, Friendly and Feshbach, Ecocide in the USSR. 14. A Law on the Press and Other Mass Media containing this provision was promulgated in August 1991 (Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 13 Aug. 1991). 15. The period of perestroika and glasnost revealed that in the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, as well as in the communist parties of other republics, many party members were in favour of radical changes in the communist system, especially in the economic sphere.

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16. During the war, and again in the second half of the 1950s, as a part of Khrushchev’s Virgin Lands programme, large numbers of people settled in Kazakhstan, significantly changing the demographic balance in the republic in favour of the Slav population. 17. During the years of Stalin’s terror, many prison camps were established in Kazakhstan. Their inmates included political and criminal elements, who were forced to work in mining, building and other industries, in appalling conditions

COMMUNIST PARTY OF KAZAKHSTAN INTRODUCTION The Communist Party of Kazakhstan (CPK) considered itself the legitimate successor of the Communist Party of the Kazakh SSR, which was created in 1937 following the establishment of Kazakhstan as a union republic, and which ceased to exist with the demise of the USSR in 1991. The CPK programme contained many points adopted from that of its predecessor. Many members of the party refused to recognize the decision of the September 1991 Extraordinary Congress of the Communist Party of the Kazakh SSR on self-dissolution.1 It was registered in February 1994 after four rejections by the authorities. Membership at the time of registration was 48,000.2 The party was composed of blue-collar workers (41 per cent), white-collar workers (25.1 per cent), pensioners (13.6 per cent) and students (11.4 per cent). The chairman of its coordinating council was Leonid Korol’kov (1992–94). The party held regular congresses and plenums. It opposed President Nazarbayev’s economic and social reforms. The CPK defined its goals as follows: promoting socialist and communist ideas, Marxist-Leninist teaching and progressive social thought; developing and implementing programmes geared towards the social welfare of working people; proposing election platforms based on an analysis of the social concerns of the toiling masses; strengthening international fraternity and friendship of peoples; and inculcating young people with patriotic ideals.3 In May 1994 the CPK and other opposition parties, including the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, the Popular Cooperative Party of Kazakhstan, and the Azat Republican Party, together with the Confederation of Kazakh Trade Unions, formed a ‘constructive opposition bloc’ within the parliament, with the declared aim of acting as a guarantor against ‘dictatorship by executive bodies’ in Kazakhstan.4 In October of 1994, Academician B.A.Tulepbayev was elected first secretary of the Central Committee. In April 1996, Abdilgin Serikbolsyn, former chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the republic of Kazakhstan (1991–92), took over the position. On 17 February 1997 the party reregistered in accordance with new legislation.5

OBJECTIVES […] The party [reaffirms] its faith in the prospects for communism and the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, which is seen through the prism of the development of modern society and hence is stripped of dogmatism. It completely rejects negative evaluations of the October Socialist Revolution […] which it regards as a major development in 20th century world history.

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The party’s main aim is to work towards a society of freedom and social justice, towards principles of scientific socialism, and to maintain a high regard for universal human values. At the same time, it lays no claim to a monopoly on formulating theories of social development and is ready to cooperate with other parties and movements. The Communists intend to staunchly uphold the interests and rights of workers, peasants and the working intelligentsia. This should not be construed as a confrontation with state structures because communists fully realize that today confrontation may destabilize the situation and even lead to bloodshed. What is needed is a peaceable and balanced dialogue and coordination of action with other parties advocating democracy and social justice. […] In the socio-political sphere, the party intends to work to strengthen and improve the soviets;6 in the sphere of ethnic relations—to strengthen internationalist friendship among peoples and to oppose discrimination on the grounds of nationality or language. The party insists on the restoration and development of a unified economic expanse for the CIS countries, state regulation of the economy and a flexible link to the market mechanism and various types of ownership, with public ownership predominating. Communists oppose ‘reckless’ privatization7 and the buying and selling of land, which can only result in the main forces of production being amassed in the hands of the nascent bourgeoisie and lead to the impoverishment of the majority of the population. In addition, we feel that economic problems should be handled and resolved with ecology in mind. It is essential that implementation of socio-economic programmes, their assessment by experts and the drafting of alternative programmes protecting people against the sway of market forces, be placed in the hands of the public. The party favours inculcating the younger generation with ideas of humanism and patriotism; it stands for freedom of conscience, use of all available means to fight against spiritual vacuum and the decline of culture, moral degradation and the distortion of history. Everyone should be given access to state-run services, especially education, public health and culture. Source: Editorial, Mysl’ 6 (1993), p. 43. NOTES 1. After the aborted putsch in Moscow of August 1991 the communist parties in the Soviet republics, de facto, lost the leading role which communist ideology ascribed to them. A declaration to this effect was officially made at the Congress of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan in September 1991. In November 1991 the parliament of Kazakhstan passed a law On Improving the Structure of the State and Executive Powers of the Kazakh SSR and Amending and Adding to the Constitution. The new law deprived the Communist Party of its role in the work of state and executive bodies. 2. Mysl’ 11 (1994), p. 49. 3. ‘Ustav Kommunisticheskoi Partii Kazakhstana’, p. 52. 4. The Europe World Year Book 1996, Vol. II, p. 1807. 5. D’iachenko et al., Politicheskie partii Kazakhstana, 2000, p. 39 6. The law on local administration adopted on the basis of the 1993 constitution changed the role of the soviets. The Supreme Soviet of the Republic became a parliamentaiy body of professional politicians. The oblast and local soviets were renamed maslikhats and their rights curtailed. Instead of the executive committee, which was elected by a local soviet, the

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post of head of the oblast administration, to be appointed by the president, was introduced and known as the akim. The akim was authorized to appoint lower-level heads of administration. The Communists protested against this new arrangement, which they considered to be undemocratic. 7.Polls conducted in 1994 in five regions of Kazakhstan showed that one person in three regarded privatization as pillaging of national property; one in four thought that the process was poorly organized and attended by abuses; 76 per cent noted at least some deterioration of their material situation in 1993–94. The negative evaluation of people’s material situation prevailed in northern Kazakhstan with its masses of industrial workers, who made up the Communist Party’s main social base. Only 12 per cent of those polled preferred a purely market economy (Aziia 26 [July 1994]).

EDINSTVO INTRODUCTION The Edinstvo (Unity) Inter-Ethnic Movement was formed in summer 1990, in the wake of land seizures by Kazakh youth in suburban areas in Alma-Ata Oblast, which led to increased tension between Kazakhs and Europeans. This short-lived movement appeared at a time when similar russophone movements were emerging in other Soviet republics and drew support from the republic’s Slavic population. Edinstvo’s constituent conference, which was attended by representatives of 30 Alma-Ata-based organizations and enterprises, was held at the end of August 1990. About 95 per cent of the 300 participants were Slavs and other russophones.1 The conference adopted a platform and elected a coordinating body. Soon afterwards, the movement developed its organizational structure. The supreme organ was the conference. In the interval between conferences, the movement’s work was directed by a 20-member coordinating council, which was composed, among others, of representatives from production enterprises, academic and other higher educational establishments, state and public organizations and cooperatives. The conference also elected eight cochairmen. The movement was registered on 6 October 1990. There is no conclusive data about membership. At the 13 October 1990 meeting it was announced that 30,0002 people, who worked at 82 enterprises and organizations, had joined the movement, but according to Kazakhstanskaia pravda, as of 1 January 1991, the movement had a membership of 2,366.3 In 1990–91 it cooperated with other political groups, in particular the Azat Civil Movement, in seeking ways to achieve ethnic harmony.4 It rejected the use of force as a means of dealing with ethnic conflicts, and opposed ‘nationalism’, ‘chauvinism’ and ‘privileges granted on ethnic grounds’, which degraded the dignity of other peoples and individuals. It favoured preserving the unity of the USSR, as demonstrated by its support of the Soiuz faction in the USSR Supreme Soviet.5 As stated in Edinstvo’s platform,6 this independent public movement was to base its work on the ideas and principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the constitutions of the USSR and the Kazakh SSR.

INTERVIEW WITH CO-CHAIRMEN IURII BUNAKOV AND ERNEST LANKO7 […] Q: What events influenced your decision to create the movement? What were your motives?

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A: (Iu. Bunakov): Against the background of the tragic events in the Caucasus and Central Asia, we were alarmed to see the Osh scenario8 materializing in the suburbs of Alma-Ata: the seizure of farmland accompanied by provocative slogans, clashes between young people, resolutions adopted at rallies which called for making short shrift of the Chechen-Ingush population9 and seeing to their deportation and, finally, the nationalist statements of Azat leaders in the press. Particularly perplexing was the silence of party and government bodies. Silence is a form of approval […] It aroused a spontaneous response among our membership and we addressed an open letter to the president of the republic. On August 15, a general meeting resolved to seek the support of the city’s labour collectives for our ‘Appeal’ […] EXCERPTS FROM THE APPEAL It is with heavy hearts and a feeling of alarm that we have been observing the series of national clashes in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and we have arrived at the conclusion that for reasons beyond our comprehension the union and republican authorities refuse to apply the law which bans the incitement of racial and national strife. We are alarmed to see that events resembling the Osh scenario have reached Alma-Ata. On 29 July for instance, a large group of people of Kazakh nationality tried to seize arable land belonging to the Luch Vostoka collective farm adjoining the city limits. A few days later, provocative slogans were used there, such as ‘Kazakhs, don’t buy houses, they’ll get them for us for free.’ Is this not a very blatant challenge? Judging by similar events in Osh, we can predict what will happen next. The local authorities will keep silent; no attempts will be made to stop the grossest violations of law or to identify the ringleaders and officials aiding and abetting those who go unpunished. And this is not the first instance of its kind in Alma-Ata. Today, demands for deporting the Chechens can be heard in UzunAgach.10 Whose turn will be next? Experience has shown that the tragic ethnic conflicts between the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians in Baku, Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks in Fergana, Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the Osh region and the city of Frunze [Bishkek]11 have generated tens, and hundreds of thousands of refugees of different nationalities. Will Alma-Ata be another city on this sorrowful list? We believe that such actions are the result of a series of intentional moves, in particular, the poorly formulated and hastily implemented Law on Language. Inter-ethnic strife in Kazakhstan is being actively exacerbated by certain leaders of new movements such as Alash and Azat, who in their statements to the press have claimed that the Kazakhs were subjected to discrimination by Russians and have suggested that hundreds of thousands of people from Karakalpakstan and the Aral Sea region

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should be resettled in Alma-Ata in order to attain a balance in the national composition12… We know that Kazakhs are good-tempered and kind. Many of us remember how generous they were during the Great Patriotic War when they shared bread and shelter with millions of evacuees. The Russianspeaking population, the most numerous in the republic owing to certain events of history, has never entertained or exhibited chauvinist feelings towards the indigenous population. However, the historical record and recent events in this country show what can happen to people, especially young people, when they are duped by the propaganda of blatant chauvinism disguised as nationalist socialism. We want no more tragedies, we do not want to be the victims of bloody outbursts of angry crowds running amok… Iu. Bunakov: […] The response of work collectives was immediate—dozens of enterprises and organizations voiced their support for the appeal to the president at meetings and rallies. On 28 August, representatives of 30 work collectives founded the Movement for Interethnic Harmony—Edinstvo. Q: The emergence of Edinstvo is in itself a sign of disagreement with some theses of the republican Communist Party’s concept regarding inter-ethnic relations. What is the essence of these differences? E. Lanko: No differences exist between our movement and the Communist Party of Kazakhstan on cardinal principles of inter-ethnic relations. Moreover, there are many communists among our members. Indeed, the close links existing between the republican Communist Party and state structures imply that the Communist Party pursues aims identical with those of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, on which Edinstvo is also based […] Then there is the problem of the official languages in Kazakhstan, which has three aspects. There can be no objections to using the republican titular language as the official language and the language of state structures and representation abroad. The second and third aspects are everyday and professional use of the language. As regards everyday usage, no state regulation can be acceptable. If practised, it could breed nationalism and an inevitable negative reaction to it. In the professional sphere, the choice of a language for work and communication should be objective, determined by which language serves the development of a particular field best. There was a time when doctors spoke only Latin, machine-builders—German, musicians—Italian, etc. Currently, English is used on an increasing scale. In these instances state regulation is not only out of place, it is in fact reactionary, as Lenin stated.13 Q. What is your attitude to the Azat programme and that movement’s first sociopolitical actions? Iu.Bunakov: While declaring freedom and equality for all peoples, the Azat programme advocates a firm stance that places the concept of patriotism on a nationalist plane. This is due to the instituting of privileges for the Kazakh population.14 We already discussed this at a meeting with Azat leaders. Therefore

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its first actions—the rally in Lenin Square15 […]—can be characterized as nationalist extremism. I heard a tape recording of Akatayev’s pronouncements which were later cited in newspapers. What was published was even less than half of the openly nationalistic views of this Azat ideologue. E. Lanko: I will answer the question in general, methodological terms, omitting the details. […] In the Azat platform, the completely acceptable, far-reaching socio-political ends of freedom and democracy are, in several places, incorrectly associated with unacceptable means […] Some of the Azat actions, especially its latest ill-fated rally, demonstrated this disregard for the means they use. However, the movement must not be seen as static. It is a very young movement. It can yet overcome the shortcomings and euphoria of this early stage so that in future, it can clearly and maturely reflect the coincidence of their noble goals with equally noble means. Q: How would you comment on the words: ‘We need the assistance of skilled people living in the republic, in order to get the land tilled, the cows to yield milk, and the metal smelted’, uttered by one of the Azat co-chairmen?16 A: As regards this ill-considered phrase, which is tantamount to proclaiming a ban on certain professions [for Russian speakers], there can be only one answer: a ban like this is not only undemocratic, but also unprofitable.17 Q: What forms will your opposition to any manifestations of nationalism take? Iu. Bunakov: From the promotion of the idea of inter-ethnic peace to setting up worker self-defence squads to protect the civilian population. Q: With which parties and movements would Edinstvo like to cooperate closely? E.Lanko: With those which clearly envisage political prospects and prove by their deeds that they want to normalize the inter-ethnic situation and create the conditions for a broad humanitarian dialogue among all the nationalities living in Kazakhstan. With those who are ready to accept the idea that Kazakhstan is a single nation and wish it the speediest possible advancement to modern civilization. With those who are actually working to make Kazakhstan a state ruled by law, to introduce political freedoms, create a moral and psychological climate of mutual trust, and facilitate the exchange of cultural values in the country. In concrete terms, this could be the Communist Party, Azat, the All-Union Association for a Humanitarian Dialogue and the republic’s national cultural centres. Finally, this could also be the Alma-Ata Centre of Russian and World Culture, Professionalism and Creativity. Q: In what ways, in your opinion, is social injustice still evident in the republic? What privileges are granted on ethnic grounds? What steps should be taken? Iu. Bunakov: For some time now, anyone trying to substantiate his point with figures has run the risk of being accused of engaging in ‘percentage-mania’. However, in this case figures are essential. For instance, the Russian-speaking population is wondering or, rather, is asking a legitimate question: why are only 30 per cent of students in higher educational establishments and the same proportion of officials in the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the police and state bodies, Russianlanguage

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speakers, when 70 per cent of the population in Alma-Ata is Russian-language speaking?… The Language Law is bound shortly to result in […] discrimination against a large sector of the population. This is also true of the unlawful directives issued by local authorities which forbid the sale of flats to, and their exchange with, people residing outside the republic. Take again, the distribution of confiscated plots of land. We still do not know who controls them at present. Those who confiscated them? And if not, who, with the present acute food, social and ecological crisis gripping the country, would dare to expand the city by reducing arable land and even liquidating agricultural enterprises? E. Lanko: I would like to add something: the shortcomings in the sphere of interethnic relations stem from the same source as our economic, political and general cultural backwardness. Distortions in the ethnic sphere emanating from this source are caused by pressures from the administrative-bureaucratic apparatus and its failure to operate in harmony with the life of the people. Q: Can you elaborate on this? A: Gladly. The masses and the deputies elected by them still have much less power when tackling current or long-term problems than state officials, which is a gross social injustice. The fact that the administrative-bureaucratic apparatus is composed mainly of people of the titular nationality has not made it more pro-Kazakh in terms of sharing the destiny of the Kazakh people. […] Paradoxically, in our circumstances, bureaucracy has usurped the roles of both—the producer and the customer. Ethnic affiliation is in this case either pushed into the background or exploited. Speaking of the privileges of the powers-thatbe, it can be said that in this monstrous mechanism of ‘special distribution’, one can discern nepotism, bazaar nationalism, lack of culture, etc. Of course, in such cases the law must not be caught napping and public opinion dozing. But, let me repeat, the problem must be seen as part of the system as a whole. Q: What socio-political activities does Edinstvo have in the pipeline? E. Lanko: The main activities are working with mass audiences at factories and organizations, explaining the goals and tasks of our movement and uniting our supporters […] Source: Partiinaia zhizn’ Kazakhstana 12 (1990), pp. 62–8. NOTES 1. Ponomarev, Obshchestvennye organizatsii v Kazakhstane i Kyrgyzstane, p. 35. 2. Ibid., p. 36. 3. Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 7 Aug. 1991. 4. Ponomarev, Obshchestvennye organizatsii v Kazakhstane i Kyrgyzstane, pp. 35–6. 5. Izvestiia, 8 Jan. 1991. 6. Partiinaia zhizn’ Kazakhstana, 12 (1990), pp. 62–3 7. Iu. Bunakov was chief engineer at the Almaatagiprotrans State Research Institute dealing with transport problems. E.Lanko was a mathematician and physicist.

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8. See Kyrgyzstan, Introduction. 9. In mid-1943 a plan for the deportation of Chechens and Ingush from the ChechenoIngush ASSR was formulated. After the Checheno-Ingush ASSR was re-established in 1957, 418,000 Chechens living in the Kazakh and Kyrgyz SSRs and 106,000 Ingush returned to their homeland. Some 56,000 Chechens and Ingush remained in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (Bugai, L.Beria—I.Stalinu., pp. 107, 151). 10. A great number of Chechens lived in the settlement of Uzun-Agach in Alma-Ata Oblast. Some 50,000 Chechens and Ingush were deported there in 1944. 11. Inter-ethnic conflicts took place in 1989–90 in all these towns and regions. 12. According to the 1989 census, Russians made up 59.1 per cent and Kazakhs 22.5 per cent of Alma-Ata’s population (Guboglo, ‘Etnograficheskaia i iazykovaia situatsiia’, p. 55). Changing the demographic situation in the capital became one of the main points in the Azat and Alash programmes. According to the 1999 census, Kazakhs comprised 38 per cent of the Almaty population and 41 per cent of Astana, the state capital (Delovaia nedelia, 21 May 1999). See also Alash and Azat. 13. The programme for the promotion of Kazakh and other national languages, which was launched within the framework of the Law on Languages (1989), envisaged that all office work in certain regions should be conducted in Kazakh, starting as early as 1992–93 (Karavan, 24 December 1993). This alarmed the Russian-speaking population, since only 0.9 per cent of Russians, 0.6 per cent of Ukrainians and 0.4 per cent of Belorussians were fluent in Kazakh, according to the 1989 census data (Natsional’nyi sostav naseleniia, Part 2, p. 68). 14. Bunakov was referring to the growing trend towards preferential treatment of the titular nationality. 15. In September 1990 Edinstvo took part in a demonstration, together with representatives of other parties and movements, at Lenin Square (now the Square of the Republic). In the wake of this gathering, a Soviet of Civil Concord was organized, which adopted a decision declaring a moratorium on street demonstrations in Alma-Ata. 16. This was stated by Akatayev (‘Azat i ego printsipy’, p. 59). 17. The Edinstvo leader must have been referring to the undisputed fact that in the foreseeable future the Kazakhs could not adequately replace the Russian-speaking population in some branches of the economy, primarily in industry. Even three years later, at the beginning of 1994, Kazakhs made up only 22 per cent of the total number of industrial workers (Aziia, 23 (1994)).

FORUM SOCIETY INTRODUCTION The Forum Society, a discussion club of Kazakh intellectuals and students, was formed in May 1989 in Alma-Ata. Its programme declared its chief aim to be the creation of an independent, democratic Republic of Kazakhstan. The years 1989–91 marked the peak of its activity.

DECLARATION The Kazakh people have lived and developed their culture in the land of Kazakhstan for thousands of years. About 300 years ago, lack of unity among the people made Kazakhstan part of the Russian empire1 and it lost its freedom and independence. Since then, the Kazakhs have been deprived of the right to have an opinion of their own, the right to choose, the right to be themselves. The [October] Revolution revived hopes that the crucial question of restoring Kazakh statehood would be resolved, because the revolution and Lenin had proclaimed the right of nations to self-determination. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was created. It was supposed to guarantee sovereignty and prosperity to the nations affiliated with it. However, the internal politics of Stalin and his successors ignored these guarantees and principles. The policy of genocide and forced migration brought about a demographic situation in Kazakhstan unfavourable to the Kazakhs as the titular nationality. For the first time ever the Kazakhs found themselves a minority in their own land.2 The plunder of Kazakhstan’s natural wealth continues. The environment in many regions of the republic is badly polluted, the continuing instability of the economy adversely affects the living standards of the entire population. All this has made it doubtful that solutions to the nationality question could be found within the framework of the USSR. The Kazakh people have the right to be masters of their own fate and they cannot tolerate their republic’s present colonial status and lack of rights. They have every right to advance their demands and work for the creation of their own independent state. While rejecting the principle of ‘Kazakhstan for the Kazakhs’, the ideas of Muslim fundamentalism and Pan-Turkism, we are nevertheless positive that the Kazakh national question can only be resolved if Kazakh state sovereignty is restored. Yet Kazakhstan is and will remain a multinational state, in which democratic and judicial structures of power capable of protecting and guaranteeing the rights of national minorities should be created. We recognize and support their right to cultural autonomy. We recognize the

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supremacy of the individual over the state and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We believe that the following are indispensable for ensuring stability and the permanence of democracy and pluralism in Kazakhstan: legal guarantees for the existence of a multi-party system, equal rights for all socio-political organizations to function and set up their own information media, access to the existing mass media and the right to disseminate their views freely. We also consider it indispensable: – to grant economic independence to Kazakhstan, beginning in the second half of 1990; – to transfer to Kazakhstan’s ownership all enterprises subordinated to central allunion government bodies (defence industry, air and rail transport, communications, etc.); – to discontinue artificial migration into the republic and to create conditions conducive to the return of the indigenous population;3 – to lift the restrictions on issuing Alma-Ata residence permits to young Kazakhs and other persons who have resided in the republic for ten years or more;4 – to close down all military testing sites and have the Defence Ministry provide compensation for all the damage sustained by the republic; – to create republican military units in Kazakhstan where all young people residing in the republic will do their term of active service; – to ban all organizations which incite ethnic and religious strife and threaten the republic’s territorial integrity; – to radically improve the environment and revive the Aral Sea;5 – to declare Stalin’s crimes to be crimes against humanity; we support the idea of erecting a monument to the victims of genocide in Kazakhstan. *** We appeal to all people living in Kazakhstan to join forces to build a free state based on the principles of humanism. The only thing that can revive our society is the unification of its democratic forces. Solidarity is the guarantee of our freedom! Source: Rozhdeno perestroikoi (Alma-Ata, 1992), pp. 25–7. NOTES 1. See Introduction to Kazakhstan. 2. See Azat Civil Movement, note 11. 3. See Azat Civil Movement, notes 11 and 12. 4. Restrictions on obtaining a residence permit applied to persons living in rural areas. Most of them were Kazakhs. This was part of the general system of restrictions imposed in all the capitals of union republics. As a result, Slavs constituted the bulk of the population in the Kazakh capital Alma-Ata. See Edinstvo, note 12. 5. See Azat Civil Movement, notes 12 and 13.

INDEPENDENT SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KAZAKHSTAN INTRODUCTION The Independent Social Democratic Party of Kazakhstan (ISDPK) was formed in 1991 as a result of the split in the small Social Democratic Party. Its founders blamed the failure of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) on its adherence to the principles of communist theory and practice, claiming that it was in fact a facade for the CPSU. The new party was intended to attract a broad range of students and intellectuals. The founders tried to avoid the ethnic divisions which had begun to manifest themselves in the SDP. The word ‘independent’ was meant to emphasize the party’s autonomy from both the communist and the SDP ideologies. Its chairman was Erkin Sultanbekov. The party failed to gain a prominent place in Kazakhstan’s political life. It never numbered more than a few thousand members, and soon vanished from the political arena.

INTERVIEW WITH ERKIN SULTANBEKOV […] Q: Would you outline briefly the position of the Independent Social Democrats? A: Our party has always stood in opposition to the CPSU, but it has been a constructive opposition. We drafted and submitted to the republic’s leadership the following legislative and regulatory documents: a declaration on the political regime, an alternative draft law on the judicial system, an alternative draft law on de-nationalization and privatization, a draft programme for the development of small businesses in the republic, draft regulations on small businesses, and draft regulations on a state fund for supporting small businesses. We intend to assist the authorities in creating a network of small businesses in the republic. Q: What is the party’s stance with respect to education, science and culture, families, mothers and children, and issues related to young people and the Soviet army. Would you touch on all these? A: Our educational system has reached a stage of complete degeneration, with corruption assuming enormous proportions. Therefore we see the only way out in the promotion of an alternative system, that is, private schools, colleges and higher educational establishments (the ban on the privatization of educational establishments must be lifted and the Ministry of Higher Education disbanded). In science, the increases in salaries for holders of academic degrees should be

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abolished, a law on the protection of intellectual property should be adopted, and a competitive system for getting grants from the state should be introduced. In order to render aid to cultural institutions, we consider it necessary to impose a five-year tax freeze. As far as the so-called policy towards youth is concerned, it must be explicitly stated that this is another demagogic ploy of Komsomol bureaucrats. For a long time it was used to cover up a complete fiasco in the educational sphere (young people were getting graduation diplomas without acquiring the necessary knowledge or skills). The authorities merely pretended to be concerned about young people. Much has been said lately about the problems in the army. I think that the new circumstances will dictate solutions. The armed forces of the USSR, like the USSR itself, are no more. We propose that the office of military prosecutor and military tribunals be abolished and that servicemen be tried in civil courts of law. Q: What is the meaning you attach to the word ‘social’ in the name of your party? Is it connected with socialism? A: No, it has nothing to do with socialism, which cannot exist as a social-economic formation in its own right. What is meant is social security. We think that the social security system we have today is inefficient and should be reformed. The working man is the person who can take the best possible care of himself, therefore he must be paid the bulk of the surplus value he has created (70–80 per cent). In this way he can obtain much better ‘social security’ for himself than any trade union (state or independent) can provide. In view of the transition to a market economy and the concomitant growth of unemployment, we propose that steps be taken to promote small businesses which can create many jobs (in the US, for instance, small businesses provide jobs to more than 100 million people), set up an unemployment fund (made up of a 1 per cent deduction from the income of each employee, plus allocations by enterprises), establish a committee to deal with problems of unemployment, and set minimal rates for various categories of pensions, not below the subsistence level […] Q: In your opinion, what strata of the population could become a social base for your party? A: […] We expect that our ranks will be joined by those representatives of blue- and white-collar workers, intelligentsia and students who consciously made that choice. I would like to explain to those who may be interested in the Independent Social Democratic Party of Kazakhstan that the party is an association of people of various ethnic origins who adhere to the principles of freedom, justice, solidarity, truth and responsibility, and who aim at creating a democratic state in which honour, dignity and the rights of each individual have priority over the interests of any group, person, or the state. Members of the ISDP have liberated themselves from old stereotypes and do not intend to continue a humiliating existence as the inmates of a lunatic asylum guarded by a modern police system […] Source: Gorizont 3 (18–24 Jan. 1992).

LAD SLAV MOVEMENT INTRODUCTION The Lad (Concord) Slav Movement was the largest association of the Slav population of Kazakhstan. Its constituent conference was held in Pavlodar in September 1992.1 The movement was registered in May 1993.2 Lad was the product of the merger of several smaller Slav cultural societies (of which the Slav Society in Pavlodar had been the main pillar) which had appeared in Kazakhstan during the era of perestroika and glasnost. The idea behind the new movement was to strengthen the Slavs’ social position, which had been undermined by the growth of Kazakh national awareness and emerging Kazakh statehood after the disintegration of the USSR, and to adapt to the new realities. By 15 April 1993, the Lad Movement numbered 9,360 members and had branches in the cities of Aktiubinsk, Almaty, Ust-Kamenogorsk, Zhambyl, Karaganda, Kokchetav and Kustanai, and in the Akmolinsk and Pavlodar Oblasts.3 The movement had its headquarters in Akmola (now Astana). It published Lad, a ‘Slav popular newspaper for all’.4 Apart from its regional branches, the movement had committees for aiding war veterans, for relations with the workers’ movement, relations with the Ukrainian diaspora in Kazakhstan, human rights, information and propaganda, inter-ethnic contacts, interregional contacts and coordination of activities of local cells, among others. A distinctive feature of Lad was that its committees were located throughout the entire territory of the republic, with offices both in regional administrative centres and small towns. In the 1994 parliamentary election the movement obtained eight seats. Its faction in parliament cooperated with the Progress Group, which was composed of deputies of the Socialist Party and the People’s Congress of Kazakhstan.5 The chairman of the Lad Slav Movement was Viktor Mikhailov until April 1994 when he was elected to the Supreme Soviet. He was replaced by Aleksandra Dokuchaeva, but Mikhailov soon returned to serve as chairman.6 The movement proved to be a vocal opposition force, exerting pressure on the authorities when issues of inter-ethnic relations arose and relevant decisions had to be taken. Lad issued an appeal to President Nazarbayev, as well as to the leaders of the CIS countries, to conclude agreements on dual citizenship, and even managed to collect 300,000 signatures in support of its position. However, the Kazakhstan authorities took a firm stand against dual citizenship from the outset, and Lad’s efforts in this regard were unsuccessful. It also pressed for according Russian the status of an official language along with Kazakh, and collected 500,000 signatures to this end.7 Russian was granted the status of an official, albeit not state, language in Kazakhstan in the Constitution of 1995. In January 1994, a Lad conference issued a statement criticizing the first article of the 1993 Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, which referred to a ‘self-determined Kazakh nation’. The second constitution (1995) did not contain this phrase. As a result of these activities, the authorities began monitoring the movement, including its sources of financing and press publications. The newspaper Lad was entered

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on the ‘black list’ of periodicals subjected to especially strict scrutiny by the Ministry of the Interior.8

STATEMENT OF COUNCIL MEMBER IAKOV BELOUSOV […] The movement aims to preserve the ethnos, culture and languages of the Slavs, spiritually revive the Slav peoples of Kazakhstan, develop and strengthen democracy, secure the exercise and protection of economic, political and other rights and freedoms of the individual, strengthen peace, friendship and fraternal relations among the peoples of the multinational Republic of Kazakhstan, and promote ties among the CIS countries. Lad has set itself the tasks of reviving and developing Slav national self-awareness, languages, national traditions, customs and religion, instilling a deeper awareness of the fact that Slavs are full-fledged citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and rousing them to engage in social and political activity. In order to achieve these and other aims, cultural and educational work among the population has been stipulated in the charter of the Lad Movement, together with participation in the social and political life of the republic, nomination and support for candidates to the soviets at all levels, and striving to preserve socio-political stability by countering, in every manner possible, nationalism, chauvinism, extremism and other antihumanistic manifestations. In addition to a charter, the constituent conference adopted a resolution on a draft Constitution for the Republic of Kazakhstan. It expressed, among other things, the concern that together with a deepening economic crisis and the growth of social tension within the republic, inter-ethnic tensions were mounting as well. An increasing number of citizens who do not belong to the Kazakh nation, and who are experiencing a sense of insecurity over the future, stability and defensibility of their existence, are emigrating and abandoning familiar places of residence [nasizhennye mesta]. […] The conference believes that citizens of Kazakhstan should have the right to hold citizenship of other states. The articles [of the Kazakhstan Constitution] on citizens’ rights and freedoms should be made to conform to the articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights […] Source: Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 17 Oct. 1992. NOTES 1. Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 17 Oct. 1992. 2. Mysl’ 9, (1993), p. 48. 3. Mysl’ 11 (1994), p. 50. 4. Delovaia nedelia, 19 June 1998. 5. Aziia 24 (June 1994). 6. Delovaia nedelia, 19 June 1998. 7. The movement was guided in its actions by the decree of Russia’s President Yeltsin of 11 August 1994, outlining the main directions of state policy of the Russian Federation

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concerning the language and culture of the Russian population living in the states of the FSU. 8. Delovaia nedelia, 19 June 1998.

LEAGUE OF MUSLIM WOMEN INTRODUCTION The League of Muslim Women was founded on 7 April 1990 and registered at the beginning of 1992. It was one of numerous cultural-educational organizations which appeared at the beginning of 1990.1 During the years of Soviet rule, the influence of Islamic tradition on Kazakh family life and on the status of Kazakh women significantly decreased, bringing them somewhat closer to a European model. The level of education of women underwent a marked increase, their involvement in various aspects of industry, agriculture, science, culture and society became broader. Concurrently a decrease took place in their preoccupation with family which was reflected in the ‘normalization’ of Kazakh demography.2 The League of Muslim Women was formed with the aims of resuscitating the traditions of Kazakh family and daily life, rendering help to the unfortunate and providing girls with religious education. By the time of registration the league’s membership was close to 10,000 and it had branches in eleven of Kazakhstan’s cities, as well as representation in Istanbul. As of the beginning of 1992 its chairman was Amina Nugmanova. In 1993 it began publishing a newspaper, Ak Bosaga3

GOALS AND TASKS The League of Muslim Women of Kazakhstan is a cultural and political union, created on the foundations of the Kazakhstan Public Committee for Human Rights. The league’s main goal is to be an intermediary and a protector [of women] against ecological, economic and socio-political calamities in the republic and to struggle to improve their living conditions; it takes an active part in the process of democratization and reform, and also strives to awaken political consciousness and raise the spiritual, cultural and moral level of Muslim women in the republic. The league functions in accordance with the constitutions of the USSR and the Kazakh SSR.4 The league establishes close contacts with progressive informal organizations and the muftiate5 of Kazakhstan, children’s and charity foundations in the republic, and with women’s leagues of [other] union republics and women’s associations abroad, and learns from their experience. The aim of the league is to prevent nuclear war, pollution of the environment, violence, racial discrimination, and gross violations of the rights of mothers and children. The league seeks to maintain contacts with the United Nations World Federation of Women (WFW).

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SPHERES OF ACTIVITY The main goal of the league is to fight not only for a healthier ecological and economic climate in the republic, but also for moral integrity, and to contribute to the moral education of the younger generation, and struggle for a stronger and healthier family unit, which is vital to the future nation. The league considers it necessary to fulfil the following priority tasks in order to achieve its goal and to work through the following councils.6 1. The Health Council The council organizes registration of pregnant women and helps to set up medical consulting stations in polluted areas and densely populated regions with high birth rates.7 It is keeping a watchful eye to ensure that future mothers give birth to healthy babies. It documents families with many children and—together with children’s and charity foundations—helps to use every legal opportunity available to ensure a normal life for mother and child by satisfying their material and moral requirements. The council is waging a relentless struggle against those who plunder the property of children’s institutions and against drug addiction and alcoholism, which adversely affect the health of mother and child. Legally registered and medically supervised circumcision for boys is organized at the muftiate. 2. The Council of Foster Mothers The number of abandoned Muslim children in the republic’s orphanages is growing dramatically. Following the USSR Council of Ministers’ decree No. 1022 of 17 August 1988 on the establishment of family-style orphanages, the council cooperated with republican, regional, district and rural branches of the Kazakh Tili Society8 to speed up the placement of orphan children in the care of foster mothers. Traditional dietary customs, stemming from religious convictions, are protected by law throughout the civilized world. To show respect for and satisfy the religious sentiments of the Muslims in Kazakhstan, it is necessary to establish order in public dining facilities and in commerce. State-run trade organizations should be requested to open special meat shops. The council is encouraging the establishment of cafés and restaurants with traditional Kazakh cuisine. 3. The Council of Good Daughters-in-Law There are quite a number of girls who want to start a family, but for some social reason are unable to do so. According to demographers, there are over 80,000 Kazakh women and 40,000 men who are still single at the age of 40. This social calamity, previously unknown in Kazakh history, shows that our young people cannot keep pace with sociopolitical progress. The Council of Good Daughters-in-Law, comprising mostly older women, is restoring the old tradition of matchmaking. They provide these services in a professional manner and cooperate with the Ata Meken, Kazakhstan and Kazakh Tili societies to include Kazakhs living abroad in the sphere of their activity.

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It is the moral qualities of the woman that largely save the family from disintegration. Therefore, the league intends to open Shar‘ia wedding halls in mosques. The league promotes national family traditions and the best of the Shar‘ia laws,9 which requires translating the republic’s marriage laws and United Nations legislation concerning mother and child into the Kazakh and other Turkic languages. Knowledge of these laws should be disseminated among as many people as possible. 4. The Council of Mother-Mentors In cooperation with the pedagogical councils of the [Kazakh] nationallanguage schools,10 the council prepares teaching aids to train girls for family life, namely cooking, sewing, raising children, as well as a high moral code of relations between spouses based on the well-known laws of the Shar‘ia and national tradition. The council is doing its best to teach girls to cherish the most sacred and humanistic ethical and moral norms of behaviour of Muslim women. It uses the mass media to disseminate its ideas. 5. The Council of Handicraftswomen The council is working to restore traditional folk handicrafts by organizing workshops to produce traditional consumer goods. It will also do its best to expand folk handicrafts, such as carpet weaving and feltworking, traditional embroidery, etc. If good economic results are to be achieved, public-run sovkhoz-type local vocational schools should be established, young girls and women persuaded to enrol, and skilled workers brought together. To achieve these aims, the Council of Handicraftswomen is establishing close ties with the Tuskuz, Zhetighen, Merei and Miras factories11 and intends, together with production associations, to open a shop for traditional ethnic apparel. 6. The Women‘s Labour Council The council focuses on women engaged in strenuous manual labour and is working to have their living conditions improved, proceeding from the new Constitution of the USSR and the Constitution of the Kazakh SSR. It also helps unemployed women12 to find jobs so they can earn their living […] Source: Rozhdeno perestroikoi (Alma-Ata, 1992), pp. 21–4. NOTES 1. These included the Kazakh Tili (Kazakh language) Society—a popular public movement created in 1989 with the aim of promoting wider use of the Kazakh language in all spheres of life. 2. See Tolts, ‘Modernization of Demographic Behaviour in the Muslim Republics of the Former USSR’. 3. A.K.Sultangalieva, Islam v Kazakhstane: Istoriia, Etnichnost’, Obshchestvo (Almaty: 1998), pp. 71–2; Nezavisimaia gazeta, 22 Jan. 1992. 4. The 1978 Constitution of the Kazakh SSR was amended by the Supreme Soviet of the republic in October 1991.

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5. In 1989 the religious establishment in Kazakhstan split from the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan and set up its own muftiate. It was the first union republic with a significant Muslim population to do so. 6. The structure of the councils was based on the idea of women’s soviets, which existed at the time of the Soviet regime. The issues discussed, however, were different. 7. Pollution of the environment in industrial regions was the cause of many cases of anaemia among women. As a result, at the end of the 1980s, 35,000 babies were born with congenital disorders in the Guriev, Kzyl-Orda, Ural’sk and Shymkent regions (Boldzhurova, ‘Zdorovie liudei—kategoriia sotsial’naia’, p. 131). 8. See note 2. 9. The Kazakhs do not hold marriage ceremonies in the presence of a mulla. After the parents of the bride and groom have agreed that their children can marry and the first qalym (money and goods that a groom brings to his bride’s family at marriage) instalment is made, the groom has the right to visit his bride ‘secretly’ at the house of either the bride’s brother or another relative. The second time the groom visits openly. The wedding ceremony (zhubailyk) is held in the presence of a large number of tribesmen who act as witnesses. 10. During the 1989/90 school year there were 2,768 schools (out of a total of more than 8,000) in which Kazakh was the language of instruction. In 1993 they numbered 3,081 out of 8,311 (Nauryzbaev, ‘Pust’ protsvetaet rodnoi iazyk’, p. 48). 11. These are small handicraft enterprises which produce national costumes, carpets, kitchenware and jewellery. 12. In the 1990s unemployment in independent Kazakhstan became a serious social problem. In 1994, registered and hidden unemployed comprised 8.1 per cent of the work force; in 1995, 13 per cent; in 1996, 8.6 per cent, and in 1997, 7.3 per cent. Among women, this percentage was much higher (Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, 1st quarter 1999. Kazakhstan, p. 24).

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY INTRODUCTION The National Democratic Party of Kazakhstan (NDPK) was formed by the Azat Civil Movement, the Zheltoksan National Democratic Party and a faction of the [Azat] Republican Party, which merged in an effort to strengthen the position of the crisis-ridden Kazakh national movement. The constituent congress was held in autumn 1993,1 electing as chairman Kamal Ormantayev, member of the Kazakhstan Academy of Sciences and one of the founders of the Azat Civil Movement, and Hasen Kozha-Ahmet of Zheltoksan, as his deputy. The party’s core consisted of political forces associated with the [Azat] Republican Party, which had disintegrated in October 1993. Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Justice refused to register the NDPK. The reason given was that one of the party’s aims was to spread religious propaganda in violation of Article 58 of the Kazakh constitution (1993), which banned the creation of political parties on a religious basis. In addition, it argued that the party programme contained a demand to prohibit mass immigration to Kazakhstan and provide workplaces for non-indigenous residents, in violation of the Law on Immigration.2

INTERVIEW WITH KAMAL ORMANTAYEV Q: We know that the National Democratic Party is composed of representatives of Azat, Zheltoksan and the Republican Party. They are believed to be parties of an essentially nationalist orientation. So what kind of party is yours? A: First of all, our party is open to all citizens of Kazakhstan. The party was created on the basis of the universal experience of national democratic parties, which function in many countries. In Turkey, for instance, national democratic representatives occupy a leading position in the state structure. As far as the nationalist label is concerned, we do not want it. Nationalists are those who consider themselves to be superior to other nationalities, while we are fighting for the development of the culture, education and national dignity of the Kazakh people. Some people believe that our party is nationalist because it is mono-national. That is not so. In this country every nationality and ethnic group has its own national-cultural centre. Russians have three movements: Edinstvo, the Russian Community and the Slav Union. I do not see them as nationalist. There is no doubt that ours is a multinational state, though the constitution says that there is one—Kazakh—nation in Kazakhstan and the rest are representatives of diaspora nations.3 Q: You mean that you regard Kazakhstan as a mono-national state?

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A: Our theoreticians and lawyers think that Kazakhstan is a unitary state, a one-nation state. Q: Do you think this interpretation is correct? A: Yes, each people has its homeland. Kazakhstan is the homeland of the Kazakhs, but that does not mean that other peoples cannot live here or have the right to their own development. It so happens that there are two main nationalities in Kazakhstan— Kazakhs and Russians—and both peoples must show understanding towards each other. Neither will benefit from confrontation. We have been Russia’s neighbours for centuries. Kazakhs say that we have lost our language. Yet we have come to know Russian and that is very good. Knowledge of Russian has made it possible to raise our cultural level and given us access to European culture, to world civilization. However, Russians and people of other nationalities must understand that the Kazakh people has to restore what it lost in past years. And Kazakhs would be happy if all those who lived in Kazakhstan knew their language. As for nationalism, it does exist in everyday life. That cannot be denied. But there is no state nationalism and no nationality whose rights are encroached upon. Also, the Kazakhs’ level of development is not high enough to exert pressure on other peoples. The Alash Party had a slogan, ‘Russians get out’,4 but our party does not share this view. If Russians and people of other nationalities leave, they will go to more civilized, industrialized countries and Kazakhs will hardly gain from this. If there were a greater proportion of Kazakhs in this country, I am not sure they would get along with each other so well. Resettlement is underway and the number of Kazakhs will grow, yet I believe that people of many other nationalities, those who feel at home in this country, will stay. Unlike other CIS countries, conditions for this have been created in Kazakhstan. As for Russia, fate has bound us together. Regardless of border arrangements, we will always be close. Our party’s task is to struggle for national consensus and the democratization of society. Inter-ethnic relations still present a problem and our society is far from democratic. Q: Excuse me, but the party’s name, national democratic, sounds very much like national socialist. Isn’t it possible that the first word might exclude the second, as was the case with the national socialists in the 1940s? A: I believe that our people are and will remain friendly and peace-loving […] Source: Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 1 Dec. 1993. NOTES 1. Aziia 40 (0ct. 1993). 2. Mysl’ 7 (1995), p. 48; See Alash, note 10.

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3. The 1993 Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan defined it as ‘a democratic, secular and unitary state. As a form of statehood of the self-determined Kazakh nation, the Republic of Kazakhstan ensures equal rights for all its citizens’ (‘The Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan’, Mysl’ 4 (1993), p. 3). 4. The Alash Party came out with a demand that all Russians residing in Kazakhstan should be repatriated to Russia. See Alash and also Atabek, Alash i Kazakhskaia natsiia, p. 14.

NEVADA-SEMIPALATINSK INTERNATIONAL ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT INTRODUCTION Nevada-Semipalatinsk was one of the first popular movements to emerge following the December 1986 riots in Alma-Ata. Its name derives from the locations of the main American and Soviet nuclear test sites. It was registered in Kazakhstan in 1989 and had branches in various regions of the republic as well as in other countries. The initial aim of this mass movement was to achieve the closure of the nuclear weapons test site in Kazakhstan’s Semipalatinsk region and to gain influence over the use of nuclear fuel and waste in the territory of Kazakhstan. The idea was first voiced in February 1989 by Olzhas Suleymenov, a wellknown Kazakh poet and public figure, who was later elected as the movement’s leader. By fall the Soviet military had been forced to accept a shutdown of the testing ground. The last test was carried out on 19 October 1989. Kazakhstan’s 1990 declaration of sovereignty banned nuclear testing entirely. After the Semipalatinsk test site was closed down in accordance with the decree of President Nazarbayev of 29 August 1991, the movement shifted its emphasis mainly to ecological problems and charitable work, especially ensuring clean air and water in the cities and remote villages.1 Nevada-Semipalatinsk ultimately formed the basis of the People’s Congress Party. The movement published two newspapers—Amanat (in Kazakh) and Izbiratel’ (in Russian).

EXCERPTS FROM THE CHARTER 1.1. The Nevada-Semipalatinsk Anti-nuclear International Movement is a self-governing voluntary mass organization of citizens acting in accordance with the constitutions of the USSR and the Kazakh SSR, and with existing legislation and this charter. 1.2. The Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement is a member of the international NevadaSemipalatinsk-Moruroa-Lob Nor-Novaia Zemlia Alliance.2 1.3. The aims of the movement are the elimination of nuclear weapons and wars, the ecological and socio-economic rehabilitation of regions adversely affected by nuclear testing and pollution of the environment, and a renaissance of Nature, Man and Culture. 1.4. The movement’s activities are guided by humanistic principles: – rejection of any type of activity that might cause harm to Man, Society or Nature;

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– rejection of any form of violence or strife—military, political, ideological, religious, national, etc. – readiness to cooperate with official and public entities inside and outside the country whose aims and principles do not contravene this charter. II. Aims of the Movement 2.1. A complete ban on nuclear tests and elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles and all other types of weapons of mass destruction in Kazakhstan, the USSR and world-wide. 2.2. Establishment of independent public control over the operation of test sites and industrial enterprises. 2.3. Obtaining compensation for the population of regions damaged by nuclear tests and pollution, and struggling for the ecological and socio-economic renewal of these regions. 2.4. Drafting and submitting proposals for legislation regarding victims of nuclear tests and other disasters caused by harmful technologies; improving ecological legislation. 2.5. Public control over compliance with international laws on human rights, and with treaties and agreements on preserving the environment and protecting our universal cultural heritage. Source: Politicheskie partii i obshchestvennye dvizheniia sovremennogo Kazakhstana. Spravochnik 1 (Almaty, 1994), pp. 19–20. NOTES 1. Friendly and Feshbach, Ecocide in the USSR, p. 239. 2. On 27–28 March 1992 an international conference was held in New York, which resulted in the establishment of an international anti-nuclear alliance, the NevadaSemipalatinsk— Moruroa—Lob Nor—Novaia Zemlia Alliance (named for nuclear testing sites in the US, Kazakhstan, France, China and Russia, respectively). The second congress of the antinuclear alliance was held in Almaty from 30 August to 2 September 1993.

PARTY OF DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS INTRODUCTION The Party of Democratic Progress of Kazakhstan (PDPK) emerged on the scene at the end of 1991 but never registered. Its founders, who favoured radical economic and political reforms, did not share the other parties’ views on the reforms under way, although some points in its programme appeared in the declarations of other public associations. The emergence of this party, as well as of other similar parties, is clear evidence of the politicization of Kazakhstan’s population and of its collective efforts to find a way out of the deep crisis pervading the entire system in the transition period from Communism to independence.

GOALS AND TASKS […] The PDPK is a democratic party which structures its activities in accordance with the constitution and legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and rejects the use of violence in resolving political and economic issues. Its goal is to build a civil society, in which prime importance is attached to the rights of the individual and which is based on economic freedom, rule of law and equal opportunities for all citizens irrespective of their ethnic origin. The party maintains that together with the equilibrium of the three branches of authority (legislative, executive and judicial), the criteria used when staffing bodies of state power should be competence, professionalism, and moral qualities. The party advocates a radical land reform programme that takes into account national traditions; it favours equality of all forms of ownership, entrepreneurial freedom in order to enhance the interest of the individual in labour as a means of improving personal and public wellbeing and de-nationalization of and equal access to property for all people living in the republic. According to the party’s social policy, protection of absolutely all strata of the population is incompatible with normal development of the economy because high labour productivity must be in the people’s interest. Full social protection should be given to people with low incomes, who have lost the ability to earn a living through no fault of their own. The PDPK supports efforts at integrating and establishing alliances on equal terms with sovereign CIS countries in the economic, political and military spheres. It advocates a stronger alliance with Russia to which Kazakhstan is closely tied by history, economy and a common destiny.

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The party intends to achieve its objectives through the participation of its members and supporters in power structures at all levels and through the shaping of public opinion. Its active participation in the elections to all bodies of state power has not been ruled out. The party adheres to the ideas of democratic reform and to a policy of common sense, as demonstrated in the points of its programme, and is ready to build relations with other parties and public movements on the basis of equality and independence. It is ready to cooperate and join forces with all public political associations and organizations which have resolved to contribute to Kazakhstan’s movement along the road towards democracy. At the same time the party intends to render support to trade union, worker and peasant movements […] Source: Mysl’ 9 (1993), pp. 47–8.

PEOPLE’S CONGRESS OF KAZAKHSTAN INTRODUCTION The People’s Congress was an offshoot of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement. Other groups involved in its creation were the Aral-Asia-Kazakhstan Movement, the Women’s Union, the Kazakh Tili Society and Kazakh national cultural centres.1 Its establishment was an attempt by the republican leadership to create a political force which would play a consolidating role in society and on whose backing it could rely. The constituent congress took place in Alma-Ata on 5 October 1991. It issued a Declaration of Aims and Principles, proclaiming the party’s intention to ‘wage a struggle for a sovereign, independent Republic of Kazakhstan, and to consistently work for a state founded on rule of law, civil order, inter-ethnic concord and a socially oriented market economy’.2 The Congress elected a central coordinating council, a political executive committee and two co-chairmen, Olzhas Suleymenov and Mukhtar Shakhanov, both writers. The former had headed the Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement, the latter, the Rebirth of the Aral Sea Movement. Artists, writers and scholars constituted the party’s main support base. Led by prominent figures and supported by the authorities, the party rapidly consolidated its position. Soon, however, rivalry between its leaders brought about a split. Shakhanov, who favoured priority status for Kazakhs, withdrew, leaving Suleymenov in charge. The Congress maintained close relations with a number of democratic political movements in Russia, and in Kazakhstan, specifically with the Civil Union (Grazhdanskii soiuz) and the Movement for Democratic Reform (Dvizhenie za demokraticheskie reformy). As an advocate of broad cooperation with Russia, the Congress even considered the possibility of a future confederation between Russia and Kazakhstan. This idea undoubtedly added to the party’s popularity among the Russian-speaking population of the republic,3 but many Kazakhs viewed Suleymenov’s internationalist views as an appeal to restore the Soviet empire. The party achieved the peak of its political activity in the fall of 1994. At the regular party congress of March 1995, devoted to its strategy in the upcoming presidential elections, the party leadership weighed the possibility of proposing the candidacy of Suleymenov, a highly popular figure, for the country’s highest office. It was this prospect that caused the cancellation of the presidential elections, which were replaced by a vote of confidence in President Nazarbayev by referendum.4 In its early stages, the People’s Congress had influential sponsors in some private businesses operating under the aegis of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement.5 It published a newspaper in Russian and Kazakh, Narodnyi kongress, with a circulation of 20,000. After Suleymenov was appointed Kazakhstan’s ambassador to Italy in the fall of 1994, the party became far less active. At its third congress the party’s motto was revised from ‘constructive opposition’ to ‘constructive cooperation’, signifying its transition to loyal support for the ruling powers. The party’s financial situation deteriorated, and its

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newspaper ceased to appear. The People’s Congress aligned with the Union of National Unity, but the parties did not merge, in spite of many proposals to that effect made by both sides. In October 1993 membership in the People’s Congress was variously assessed at between 10,000 and 30,000.6 In the elections held on 7 March 1994, the People’s Congress won 21 seats out of 176.7

CHARTER […] In the economic sphere […] The party’s policy consists of creating a stratum of small property owners, supporting small producers, cutting taxes on agriculture; revising unprofitable contracts for the extraction and marketing of oil, gas and non-ferrous metals; formulating a tough and rational policy with respect to exports; using hard currency earnings for the purchase of industrial equipment and technologies to produce high-tech goods instead of importing them; carrying out land reform—the gradual transfer of land to open-ended leasehold tenure with the right of inheritance and an option to purchase upon expiry of a transition period; creation of and competition between different forms of ownership in the countryside. In the political sphere—establishment of a state based on the rule of law and the creation of a civil society. The party sees the present period as a transition stage from totalitarian rule to democracy. In the sphere of inter-ethnic relations—the party rejects the ideas of national exclusiveness and separatism.8 […] Ecology is one of the main areas of the party’s activities, specifically, channelling considerable resources to the rehabilitation of regions damaged by nuclear testing and establishing medical rehabilitation centres for the treatment of oncological disorders […] In the sphere of science, culture and education—the party favours the development of national cultures and state participation in their funding. In education—the independent operation of institutions of higher learning and combining free education with private education. In science—funding and development of high technology. In the sphere of foreign policy the following are the key areas: i. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and their total ban; demilitarization of international relations, reduction of all types of weapons. ii. Establishment of a Russia-Kazakhstan confederation open to other countries, which will eventually become a Eurasian confederation.9 […] Source: Aziia 13 (April 1994). NOTES 1. Delovaia nedelia, 29 May 1998 and 5 June 1998. For Kazakh Tili, see the League of Muslim Women, note 2. 2. Narodnyi kongress 13 (Oct. 1993).

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3. Mysl’ 3 (1994), p. 46. 4. Delovaia nedelia, 5 June 1998. 5. Ibid. 6. Narodnyi kongress 13 (Oct. 1993). 7. Aziia 13 (April 1994). 8. The party held that the problem of citizenship could be solved within the framework of a Eurasian union and did not object to Russian being given the status of a state language along with Kazakh. This stand met with sharp criticism from nationalist parties such as Azat and Alash, which demanded that special privileges be given to the Kazakhs, but it was supported by parties and movements of the Russian-speaking population. 9. The People’s Congress regarded a confederation of Russia and Kazakhstan as a step towards the establishment of a Eurasian confederation, which could comprise some of the states of the former USSR. This plank in the programme was actually supported by President Nazarbayev when he came out with the idea of a Eurasian Union in 1994. The confederation idea, vigorously promoted by Suleymenov, was variously assessed, especially by Kazakh intellectuals. Its most vociferous critics were parties with a nationalist orientation.

POPULAR COOPERATIVE PARTY OF KAZAKHSTAN INTRODUCTION The Popular Cooperative Party of Kazakhstan (PCPK) was created at the end of 1994 by the leadership of the Union of Consumer Cooperatives of Kazakhstan (Kazpotrebsoiuz). Its constituent congress took place on 15 December 1994. Umirzak Sarsenov, chairman of Kazpotrebsoiuz from 1985, was elected the first chairman of the new party.1 From its inception, the party strove to work among the rural and semi-rural population, which had been involved in the cooperative network in the Soviet period. The party intended to focus its attention on the poor and pauperized strata of the rural population which, for various reasons, had not adapted to the new economic situation resulting from the market reforms carried out in the republic. The party realized that hundreds of thousands of peasants had become even more destitute, having been deprived of their habitual environment and traditional means of existence, due to the dissolution and restructuring of most of the kolkhozes.2 Despite the fact that the party aimed its activity at a specific social stratum—the simple villager—it called itself a ‘classless, parliamentary-type organization’.3 The party’s organizational structure made use of the network of rural consumer cooperatives, which had functioned in the Soviet period and which comprised 2,600,000 members.4 In 1994–95, in many cases urged by the local bureaucracy (many of whose officials had in the past been closely connected with Kazpotrebsoiuz), more than 42,000 people joined the party, which boasted 1,223 local cells and was represented in 19 regions, 210 districts and 5 cities. Initially, the party declared a centrist position. In fact, its views on the most important problems of domestic policy were close to, or even coincided with, those of the authorities. For instance, in 1995, soon after its creation, the party issued an appeal to the populace to take part in a referendum vote expressing confidence in the president and supporting the draft constitution. However, on the most important peasant issue, land ownership, the party came to disagree significantly with the authorities. From the beginning, it had been against private ownership of agricultural land, stating that the land should belong to those who worked it and that it should be handed over for lifelong tenure with the right of inheritance. The government, on the other hand, adopted the idea of a free land market, with some restrictions, such as forbidding the purchase of land by foreigners, or sale of arable land. The party’s position declined after 1995 due to the increasing concentration of power in the hands of the president and the weakening of parliament. In 1995 the party published a newspaper, Birlik (Unity) which was later closed due to financial difficulties.

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PLATFORM The PCPK programme is based on the Following theses: First, raising living standards, providing social security, improving the people’s working and living conditions, above all, those of the rural population, members of cooperatives and needy strata; second, achieving civil, national and inter-ethnic harmony; third, constructing a civil society based on the primacy of law, with provisions for a variety of forms of political and economic life; fourth, creating, not in word, but in deed, a socially-oriented, controlled market economy; fifth, consolidating a strong democratic state which would ensure the well-being of the people, civil rights and freedoms, the rule of law, the development of science, education and health care and the flourishing of multi-ethnic culture. The programme places emphasis on according economic reforms a social character. Our task is to make efforts to attain social justice, constitutionally guarantee the right to work and allocate the budget in a way that will ensure a resolution of the people’s urgent needs, as well as implement a programme aimed at elevating the social status of the peasants and members of cooperatives and resolving their problems as a matter of priority. In the economic sphere, the party’s priority is creating an efficient, socially-oriented economy, a variety of forms of ownership and economic activity, replacing the idea of a free market with measured state control and honest entrepreneurial activity. There is a need to formulate a scientific approach to resolving the crisis with the participation of the country’s best scientists. In the first stage, it is proposed to re-establish economic regulation and economic ties; in the second, to ensure a constant increase of production and a technological breakthrough in the most important branches of industry. Priority is given to agriculture and fuel and energy, which are capable of ensuring Kazakhstan’s self-sufficiency in food and energy, and stimulating the development of all other branches of the economy. The programme aims at expanding the sphere of activity and strengthening the social functions of the cooperative movement as an effective, practical mechanism for aligning the interests of rural and urban areas. It aims at developing not only consumer cooperatives, but also other forms of cooperative enterprises: those engaged in industrial production, agriculture, supplies and sales, loans and insurance, farmers’ joint ventures, etc. In the agricultural sphere, the party’s task is to strive for the creation of a mechanism of real parity between prices of industrial and agricultural goods; to ensure on this basis an increase in production, and at the same time financing from the state budget the development of an industrial and social infrastructure and the agricultural sciences. Special attention is to be given to the development of all forms of the economy in rural areas. The land is considered to be the national treasure of all generations, which cannot be an object of commerce […] The programme focuses closely on environmental problems. One issue concerns implementing an environmental policy that would prevent destabilizing the ecological

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equilibrium and constantly create mechanisms of economic activity ensuring the ecologically stable development both of agriculture and of the entire economy. The urgent issues of the Aral and Caspian Seas and the Semipalatinsk test site have also been raised. As regards the political sphere, the programme states that the PCPK will naturally strive to attain political power, to create its own faction in the Supreme Soviet and participate in a government ruling by popular consensus, where it can implement its political and socio-economic goals. In the party’s opinion, government bodies not accountable to the people should have no right to exist. The PCPK favours a presidential form of government, a strong parliament and separation of all branches of power by means of the constitution as a guarantee against the transformation of presidential rule into authoritarian rule. Noting the harmful effects of the disruption of economic ties between former republics of the USSR, the programme calls for strengthening integration processes within the CIS. One of the most important goals of the party is improving inter-ethnic relations, and preserving and developing the culture, language and identity, as well as respecting the national traditions, of each ethnic group living in Kazakhstan. It considers it its duty to fight against any manifestation of chauvinism and national or language discrimination against citizens. The party is of the opinion that the problem of the state language should be resolved on the basis of the opinion of the entire multi-ethnic population of the republic. The programme also calls for the creation of conditions necessary for forming a harmoniously developed, educated and virtuous individual […] It notes the importance of adopting the peasantry’s labour ethics and moral code of conduct […] At the same time, the party favours restricting the total penetration of western mass culture and commercialization of moral values. The programme states that, while advocating free competition of views and ideas, the PCPK rejects the monopoly of any ideology and subordinating theoretical thought to political dictate. The party considers the search for a political compromise to be the means to resolve problems in society. Its approach to the solution of concrete problems would be of a non-violent, democratic character, giving priority to common sense over ideological schematic thinking. The PCPK considers this programme to be a provisional one, which takes into account the realities of the present socio-economic and political situation. It considers it to be neither permanent nor even long-term. In the process of reform and the development of society, the party will revise some of its aims and orientations. Source: Sarsenov (chairman of the PCPK), ‘Narodnaia kooperativnaia partiia: platforma, pervye shagi’, pp. 45–9. NOTES 1. Umirzak Sarsenov (born 1942) is an economist, who graduated from the Karaganda Cooperative Institute. He began his career as the manager of a provincial retail store and became chairman of the republican cooperative union. He was a member of the nomenklatura and a people’s deputy of the Kazakh SSR and the USSR (Delovaia nedelia, 19 June 1998).

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2. The peasants in the kolkhoz had enjoyed some benefits since the state provided these collective farms with machinery and spare parts, fertilizer and bank loans. 3. Delovaia nedelia, 19 June 1998. 4. Mysl’ 4 (1995), p. 47.

RENAISSANCE PARTY OF KAZAKHSTAN INTRODUCTION The Renaissance Party of Kazakhstan was founded in January 1995. Party activists included intellectuals, entrepreneurs, teachers, doctors, scientists, social workers and state officials. The party leadership aimed to create a mass political movement with the participation of various strata of society, including businessmen and blue-collar workers, pensioners, students and housewives. The party leader, writer and journalist Altynshash Zhaganova,1 was the only woman in Kazakhstan who headed a political party. The party saw its chief purpose as the attainment of the people’s moral and spiritual renaissance. In the leadership’s opinion, the means to achieve this goal was the creation of a socially-oriented market economy. The party focused special attention on the social welfare of women. Like the majority of Kazakh political parties, the Renaissance Party began its activity by sharply criticizing the outcome of the market reforms carried out in the republic. Nevertheless, it did not oppose the reforms as such. From its inception, the party supported President Nazarbayev’s domestic policies and was considered invariably loyal to the powers-that-be, virtually never taking a common stand with the opposition. In its policy and practice, the Renaissance Party was close to such parties as the Union of National Unity of Kazakhstan, the People’s Congress and the Democratic Party. In the 1995 elections the party put up 25 candidates for election but received only 2 seats in the Majlis. In 1999 it lost both of those seats.

INTERVIEW WITH ALTYNSHASH ZHAGANOVA We are in favour of a market economy, but a socially-oriented one. It has become a cliché to repeat from various podiums that the ideas of communism have not brought about the promised equality and happiness. However, in our socialist past has there not been success in educating youth, in health care, in science, culture and social security? Now we are observing a total decline in all these fields and those who suffer along with the pensioners are invalids and professionals working in the nonproductive sphere, who comprise the intellectual potential of society. They are now on the brink of poverty. Consequently, our party stands for taking measures to improve their living standards. In general, it is time to stop conducting dubious experiments and to regulate the socioeconomic reforms which should correspond to a civilized market.

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[…] The pluralistic market economy of the republic should actively promote the development of the domestic production of goods, with equality of all forms of ownership. According to our programme, the main objective of the party’s industrial policy is radical structural and technological reform of the industrial basis of the national economy, which envisages the creation of industries with a complete production cycle and the construction of factories whose production would replace imported goods. In addition, a legal framework should be created that would make it possible to efficiently enhance processing industries, traditional crafts and cottage industries which might employ women, pensioners and students. The state must grant domestic producers priority in buying raw materials, privatizing industrial premises and means of production. This regulation should be implemented through specially targeted state-initiated programmes. […] The economic section of our programme directly ties the strategic aim of resolving the crisis in the agrarian sphere with the necessity to achieve national food security. We need to have a developed system of state support for the food industry, rendering it support and not abandoning it to its fate. […] The private ownership of land is inevitable, sooner or later. The question is when. Are we ready for it now, with our mentality and the present crisis? The answer is no. Today land may be sold for constructing houses or other buildings, but not arable land or land containing mineral deposits. […] The party programme states its adherence to the principle of civil peace and interethnic harmony, of equal rights for people of all ethnic origins. The Renaissance Party of Kazakhstan opposes any manifestation of nationalism and chauvinism. […] The party programme has a special subsection devoted to women. It recalls that the sphere of services is still underdeveloped in the republic, that housekeeping is becoming more difficult; these reasons prevent half of the population from engaging in politics, having normal leisure time, enjoying sports, and at the same time being the family guardian and a good mother. It is obvious that their circumstances are often very difficult, being forced to work at night and being the first to be fired. Especially serious is the situation of large families and of single mothers. That is why we emphasize social and legal protection for [women]; this problem calls for fundamental reconsideration at the governmental level. Our programme also focuses on the moral, cultural and socioeconomic problems of students, who are today left by the state to fend for themselves; for instance, those who live in dormitories. […] Among the goals to be achieved, our programme includes inter-ethnic harmony, the inviolability of state sovereignty, the people’s wellbeing and spiritual renaissance. In our activity we adhere to eternal human values. Source: Mysl’ 4 (1995), pp. 41–4. NOTES 1. Altynshash Zhaganova was a member of the national nomenklatura from the Soviet period. She graduated from the Gorky Literary Institute in Moscow. Zhaganova has published a

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number of books and plays. She was an editor at the Tselinograd (now Astana) television station and at the Kazakhstan Publishing House, chief editor of the Kazakh SSR State Committee for Cinema and a party official of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. She was twice elected to the Kazakh Supreme Soviet (Delovaia nedelia, 12 June 1998).

REPUBLICAN PARTY OF KAZAKHSTAN INTRODUCTION The Republican Party of Kazakhstan (RPK) was founded by the radical wing of the Azat Civil Movement. For this reason, it is often mistakenly called the Azat Republican Party. The constituent congress was held on 4 September 1991 in Alma-Ata, and the party was registered on 26 February 1992.1 In March 1992 the RPK numbered 50,000 members.2 Until the end of November 1992 it was affiliated to the Azat Civil Movement.3 The RPK’s organizational structure consisted of local party cells and regional, city and district committees. The supreme body, the party congress, was to be convened at least once every five years. It elected the leading bodies—the coordinating council, the executive committee (consisting of the party chairman and his deputies) and the control committee—and it appointed the editors of its press organs. Sabet Kazi Akatayev was the first party chairman. The party declared its opposition to President Nazarbayev’s programme of political, economic and social reforms. It considered privatization to be a means of apportioning the country’s national wealth to the non-Kazakh segment of the population since, in the party’s view, the Kazakh mentality was not, at this stage, suited to grasping the concept of a market economy. The RPK assumed a radical stance on inter-ethnic relations. Its leadership believed that the interests of the Kazakh ethnic group should take precedence over those of the republic’s other nationalities. At the same time, the party declared its rejection of violence and called on other Kazakh nationalist organizations to follow suit. The RPK drew its main support from the Kazakh population in the south. At the October 1992 congress, the party split into two factions. A group of radically minded members headed by Akatayev came out against the idea of uniting three political bodies: the Azat Civil Movement, the RPK and the Zheltoksan Movement, into one political party, the Azat Party. Akatayev and his adherents left the congress and convened their own. This congress decided in favour of a separate existence for both the Azat Civil Movement and the Republican Party. Akatayev remained chairman of the RPK and was also elected chairman of the Azat Civil Movement. Nevertheless, Akatayev’s adversaries announced the merger of the Azat Movement, the RPK and the Zheltoksan Movement into a single Azat Party. The chief surgeon of the Republican Children’s Hospital, Kamal Ormantayev, was elected its chairman. The Azat Party was never registered.4 Officially, it did not participate in the March 1994 parliamentary election, but the Azat Party leaders ran successfully as independents.

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PROGRAMME 1 General Principles The Republican Party of Kazakhstan (hereafter, RPK) is an independent, political, voluntary organization uniting citizens of Kazakhstan. The RPK organizes its internal activities on the basis of its own programme and rules compiled in accordance with the principles of democratic self-government, the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan5 and the Law on Public Associations in the Kazakh SSR.6 […] 2. Political System The Kazakh state system is a republic. The state, its national territory and the nation are an integral and indivisible whole. The main aims and functions of the state are to protect the independence and unity of the people of Kazakh nationality and the multinational population of Kazakhstan, to defend the integrity of territory, republic and democracy, to ensure the happiness of the individual and society, to guarantee basic human rights and freedoms and to create conditions conducive to the material and spiritual development of the individual. Sovereignty is the prerogative of the nation; its exercise shall only be vested in constitutional organs of power and not in any person or class. No person or agency shall assume state functions which are not recorded in the Constitution. Everyone is equal before the law. Transforming the Republic of Kazakhstan into a democratic, independent, national state requires developing democratic institutions of self-government and genuine government by the people, ensuring separate functioning of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of power, guaranteeing human rights and freedoms, and the freedom to form commercial, political and public alliances in accordance with international norms, non-interference of the state in the affairs of public associations, and strict maintenance of law and order […] The official name of the republic, its anthem and state emblem will be changed in accordance with the age-old ideals of the Kazakh people. 3. Political Parties and Public Associations [The party aims at] ensuring the accessibility of public associations and parties to monitor the activities of state agencies, maintaining equality of public associations and parties, equality and support for their rights under the constitution, banning the activities of public organizations which disseminate misanthropic ideas, fascism, racism, nationalism and chauvinism. 4. Defence, Security and Domestic Affairs. Foreign Policy [The party stands for] formation of a republican army, a national security committee, an independent prosecutor’s office, internal border and customs services, banning the

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production and testing of nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons as well as the extraction, processing and storage of strategic raw materials in Kazakhstan. Active participation in international anti-nuclear and non-aligned movements, cooperation in building the Turkestan confederation,7 the Turan economic commonwealth,8 the Caspian states, promotion of fraternal ties between the peoples of Central Asia and Eastern Turkestan,9 securing membership in the UN and maintaining direct contacts with all the countries of the world. 5. Economic System The land, what lies underneath it, the air, water, forests and other natural resources of Kazakhstan are declared to be the property of the republic. The land is the common property of the Kazakh people and a joint asset of the peoples of Kazakhstan. It may not be sold and may be used by any citizen of Kazakhstan. All forms of ownership are equal. With the privatization of state property, a climate will be created which will be conducive to eradicating violations of justice. Economic relations in the republic will be subordinate to the interests of the population and the development and distribution of productive forces will correspond to domestic needs. Raising livestock is the main branch of agrarian activity in Kazakhstan.10 […] Pastureland will be expanded at the expense of arable land; the cattle population will be restored, especially the traditional breeds. Intensive cattle-raising may serve to halt the senseless destruction of the homeland, the plunder of its natural wealth and the uncontrolled influx of labour from abroad. Industry will be redirected from extraction to manufacturing with the most modern technological infrastructure […] 6. Social Policy […] In selecting candidates for responsible positions, privileges stemming from class, nomenklatura, ‘local interests’ and ‘clan affiliation’ will be abolished and conditions created for the ethnic consolidation of the Kazakh nation.11 National income will be distributed according to the situation in the regions. The work week, free days and holidays will be set with an eye to Kazakh traditions. All possible steps will be taken to restore the necessary population growth rate12 […] Family and day-to-day relations will be revived on the basis of national traditions. 7. RPK Nationalities Programme All citizens of Kazakhstan are equal, irrespective of their race, nationality, religious affiliation, political views or place of residence. All discrimination, dissemination of ideas of national exclusiveness and differences will be banned. The RPK supports changing by peaceful means the criminal nationalities policies which condemn small and deported ethnic groups to assimilation; equal rights for all peoples; equal development of all ethnic groups and the unconditional supremacy of human rights; assertion of national dignity; advancement of national languages and cultures, folk customs and traditions; healthier ethnic relations; and resolution of inter-ethnic conflicts on the basis of law, public dialogue, civil and national accord and truth. The RPK rejects any attempt to use the Kazakh people as an instrument of violence against people of other nationalities living in the republic.

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As a result of the criminal nationalities policies pursued for centuries—first by the tsars and later by the Communist Party—the Kazakh people have become a minority in their own land.13 The RPK believes that the creation of a law-abiding society in the republic and restoration of state independence are inconceivable without understanding among all ethnic groups living in Kazakhstan and their active participation in this process. All citizens of Kazakhstan striving for a rebirth of the republic should be patriotically-minded. Kazakhstan is the only homeland of the Kazakhs, where they can live and develop their language, culture and statehood. It is the duty not only of the Kazakhs but the internationalist duty14 of all people living in Kazakhstan to contribute to the all-round development of the Kazakh people. The Kazakh people should concern themselves with the happiness and well-being of the entire population that makes up the Kazakh nation. The RPK is struggling to gain citizenship for all permanent residents in the republic who show civil concern for Kazakhstan, are prepared to uphold its freedom and independence, respect the culture and language of the Kazakh people and recognize the supremacy of the laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Harmony in inter-ethnic relations is impossible without persistent democratization of the political system and a sharp rise in living standards, restoration to the titular nationality of the right of self-determination, guarantees of this right, and the inclusion in the constitution of a provision stating that a consensus of deputies of soviets at all levels be required for considering resolutions that affect the vital interests of the titular nationality […] Condescending attitudes of one ethnic group towards another are prohibited. Guided by his national self-identification, each citizen of the republic may exercise his right to have his nationality recorded in official documents and to emigrate to his ethnic homeland to take up permanent residence there. The right to the establishment of national cultural centres is guaranteed. 8. Migration Only after urgent steps are taken to put an end to unauthorized migration to Kazakhstan can the restrictions on obtaining a residence permit in the bigger cities be lifted.15 There are no restrictions on internal migration. People who find themselves living outside the borders of their ethnic homeland will be given every assistance in obtaining citizenship in their homeland.16 The same assistance will be given to Kazakhs living outside Kazakhstan […] The RPK opposes forced migration resulting from ethnic tensions. 9. Attitude to Religion and Freedom of Conscience All religions and religious trends are equal under the law. Religious institutions are independent in their activity, but must not interfere in affairs of state, in science or in education. Religion is becoming widespread in everyday life and family relations. Madrasas, mosques and other religious structures will be restored at the expense of the state and returned to the religious communities. Religious institutions may own their own property17 […] 10. Culture, Science and Education For years, advocates of russification slighted national values, which led to the systematic destruction of the ethnic base of Kazakh culture. All national cultures in Kazakhstan are equal and participate in the republic’s cultural progress on an equal footing. The RPK

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upholds the right of the Kazakhs to preserve and restore their traditions, to maintain a way of life and a culture which has evolved throughout history, and to enjoy the opportunity of developing a distinctive national life, and appeals to all citizens to observe equality and parity in the cultural autonomy of all ethnic groups, irrespective of their size. Culture should serve the interests of national sovereignty […] The educational system and management of science should be independent and serve the aims of Kazakhstan’s sovereign development. Attention will be focused on training national specialists in the professions demanded by the national economy. The role of Kazakh as the official language will be restored in all spheres of life […] […] A national concept of education and upbringing will be elaborated and put into practice. The history of the Kazakh people and Kazakh language and culture will be studied in educational institutions at all levels. 11. Ecology The USSR and the CPSU must fully compensate for the damage they inflicted on Kazakhstan’s environment and the health of Kazakhstan’s peopleL […]18 Kazakhstan’s national economy will be oriented towards pollution-free production; steps will be taken to stop uncontrolled use of chemicals in agriculture; an independent quality-control body for food products will be established. The programme was adopted at the constituent congress of the Republican Party of Kazakhstan. Alma-Ata, 4 September 1991 Source: Programma Respublikanskoi partii Kazakhstana, Alma-Ata, 1991. NOTES 1. Mysl’ 5 (1993), p. 38. 2. Mysl’ 7 (1993), p. 44. 3. Vecherniaia Alma-Ata, 1 Dec. 1992. See Azat Civil Movement. 4. Mysl’ 5 (1993), pp. 34–8. 5. Reference is to the Constitution of the Kazakh SSR adopted in 1978. 6. The Law of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic on Associations in the Kazakh SSR was enacted in mid-August 1991. For the text, see Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 15 Aug. 1991. 7. The Azat leaders believed that in the initial stage a Turkestan confederation could comprise Turkey, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Eastern Turkestan (Xinjiang), Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Subsequently it could be joined by republics and regions within Russia, populated predominantly by Turkic peoples (‘From the Azat Point of View’, Aziia Dausy, 17 (1993)). 8. See Turan in Republic of Azerbaijan. 9. Reference is to the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region of China which has a sizeable Turkic population (Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz) and separatist movements working for secession from the People’s Republic of China. Referring in its programme to the XinjiangUighur Autonomous Region as Eastern Turkestan, the party stresses that the territory actually belongs to the Turkic world, rather than to China. 10. As of 1 January 1990, Kazakhstan raised 25 per cent of all sheep and goats in the USSR (Narodnoe kboziaistvo SSSR v 1989 godu, p. 464). 11. Belonging to a particular juz (see the Introduction to Kazakhstan, n. 4) and one of its subdivisions remains an important factor in determining a person’s position in society and his chances of getting a prestigious job.

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12. The natural annual population growth has been constantly declining, from 256,100 in 1989 to 145,800 in 1994, a decrease of 43 per cent. From January to June 1998 the natural population growth was only 30,700 (Karin, ‘Vnutripoliticheskie aspekty natsional’noi bezopasnosti Kazakhstana’, p. 82). 13. Kazakhstan witnessed the greatest labour migration in the years 1954 to 1962, when close to two million people arrived there, mainly from the European part of the USSR under the programme of virgin land development. As a result, in 1959, Russians comprised 42.7 per cent of the population, and Kazakhs 30 percent, 8 percent less than in 1939 (Istoriia Kazakhstana s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei, p. 403). 14. ‘lnternationalist duty’ was a euphemism of the Soviet era, according to which citizens were obliged to render aid, including military assistance, to ‘peoples in other countries fighting imperialism and oppression’. 15. People in the former Soviet Union had no right to freely choose their place of residence. For instance, in order to settle in a large city, or in an attractive geographical zone, such as the Crimea, they had to obtain a special permit from the authorities. 16. See Alash, note 10. 17. In the former Soviet Union, religious organizations were deprived of the right to own real estate; they rented prayer houses, churches, mosques, etc., from the state. 18. See Azat Civil Movement, notes 8, 12 and 13.

THE RUSSIAN COMMUNITY OF KAZAKHSTAN INTRODUCTION The Russian Community (Russkaia Obshchina) was formed in April 1992 as an expression of the Russian population’s anxiety over its future in the circumstances resulting from independence and growing Kazakh national consciousness. It was registered by the Justice Ministry on 11 September 1992. At that time it had offices in all 19 oblasts of the republic. Its main goals were to ensure the ethnic survival of the Slav— and first and foremost, the Russian—population, and to help preserve its distinctiveness and promote its interests. It opposed the emigration of Slavs, while not ruling out such an eventuality. The Community supported the idea of granting dual citizenship to Kazakhstan’s Russian residents and according Russian the status of an official language alongside Kazakh. Its programme was similar to that of Lad and Edinstvo; however, its approach to the idea of internationalism was different, the organization preferring to have purely Russian membership. Representatives of other nationalities were considered eligible for membership provided they were ‘dedicated to Russian traditions and culture’.1 The Community structure followed a territorial pattern, composed of local cells (podvor’ia) consisting of 10–15 families; district associations (zemliachestva) of 20–30 families, and regional associations. The supreme organ was the congress (veche)2 of local cell representatives. It was to be convened at least once every two years and to ratify the Community council. The supreme executive body of the district associations was the annual congress, which elected its own council. The local cells held their own meetings (skhody), which elected their chairpersons (starosty). The Community conducted its activities in constant confrontation with the authorities. For instance, in June 1993 the second veche could not conclude its work because of official opposition. In November 1993 the Community was outlawed on the grounds that some of its rules violated the constitution.3 In 1993, Iurii Bunakov, a former co-chairman of the inter-ethnic Edinstvo Movement, was elected chairman. The Community was re-registered on 28 April 1994.4 However, it split in that year and part of the splinter group founded the Russian Union. Membership in 1992 was close to 4,000, according to the organization’s own estimate.5 One of the leaders of the Russian Community, Boris Supruniuk, editor of the opposition paper Glas (Voice), was persecuted due to his activity in the movement and eventually arrested, but later released. On behalf of the veche, the Russian Community Council of Kazakhstan submitted an appeal to the president of the republic protesting against lawlessness and infringement of rights of the Russian population. It cited ‘russophobia in the Kazakh press, the cynical humiliation of Russians and the transformation of the Language Law into an instrument for displacement of Russian

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speakers from their workplaces’. They concluded that Kazakhstan was being transformed into an apartheid state.6 In May 1998, the Russian Community of Kazakhstan, the Lad Slav Movement, the Union of Steppe Krai Cossacks and the Union of the Cossacks of Semirech’e merged, forming the Association of Russian Compatriots in Kazakhstan (Rossiiskie sootechestvenniki v Kazakhstane).7

PROGRAMME AND RULES [The Russian Community of Kazakhstan] is a public organization uniting people of all nationalities, who cherish the traditions of Russian culture and Russian spiritual life. The Russian Community is guided by principles of humanism, spirituality, charity and mutual assistance. [We] do not pursue any political aims and unreservedly recognize and respect the laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The Russian Community has set itself the goal of creating an independent system of economic, social and legal assistance and protection for the Russian population in the period of transition to a market economy; contributing to the beginnings of the market economy of Kazakhstan and facilitating the business activities of Russian entrepreneurs through moral and material support.8 To alleviate the threat of unemployment, the Russian Community intends to create jobs and help its members obtain employment […] In the sphere of education, the Russian Community plans to establish Russian elementary and high schools and a Slav university in Kazakhstan.9 […] It intends to revive the tradition of sponsoring educational and cultural institutions,10 set up scholarships and other forms of material assistance to Russian-speaking students, and provide subsidies from its own funds to young people continuing or getting their education abroad. Its educational activities will include the establishment of Sunday schools [for additional instruction in Russian history, culture and religion] and holding festivals of Russian culture and folklore. […] Membership in the Russian Community is open to any citizen of the Republic of Kazakhstan or any CIS state over 18 years of age who considers himself to be a Slav, irrespective of his actual ethnic descent, or religious or party affiliation, and who wants to belong to the traditions of Russian culture and spiritual life. Source: Aziia 26 (Oct. 1992). NOTES 1. ‘Russkaia obshchina: tseli, pozitsii i konflikty’, p. 39. 2. Veche, podvor’ia, zemliachestva, skhody, starosty are historical terms referring to the system of self-government in the ancient city-state of Novgorod, which functioned as a democratic republic until the sixteenth century. 3. Russkii vestnik 15–17 (1994). 4. Vestnik Kazakhstana, 12 May 1994. 5. The estimates of membership fluctuated between 4,000 to 70,000. ‘Russkaia obshchina: tseli, pozitsii i konflikty’, p. 40.

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6. Mysl’ 11 (1994), p. 52. 7. Delovaia nedelia, 19 June 1998. 8. The administrative division of the Community included a number of special services: charity services which assisted pensioners, the disabled, and large families; legal services; and an information department. The Community also maintained its own emigration centre to help those wishing to leave Kazakhstan. See ‘Sidorova protiv Sidorovoi’. 9. The need for such schools arose because there were plans to switch over to tuition in the official language, that is Kazakh, which would have drastically reduced the access of the Russian-speaking part of the population to education. Many people could not afford the fares and tuition fees which getting an education in Russia would have entailed. The idea of establishing a Slav university in the republic was not supported by the authorities (Aziia 24 [June 1994]). 10. In tsarist Russia, private individuals often financed educational institutions and libraries, established scholarships and awards for students and researchers and funded evening classes for adults.

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KAZAKHSTAN INTRODUCTION The basis of the Social Democratic Party of Kazakhstan (SDPK) was the Association of Independent Public Organizations of Kazakhstan which, in 1989, comprised eleven organizations in Alma-Ata. A committee for establishing the new party was set up at the beginning of 1990, and at the constituent congress held in May 1990 a party programme and rules were adopted. The congress elected a five-man coordinating committee and two co-chairmen—Sergei Duvanov and Dos Kushimov.1 The party split at the beginning of 1991, its radical wing founded the Independent Social Democratic Party, and its leaders went to work for various organizations. Kushimov became sole party chairman in May 1992. The party looked to the Scandinavian countries for its model of a socialist democratic system. Its membership was small since it was supported principally by urban educated classes, which consisted largely of Russians and russophones. By the beginning of 1991 it had 200 members (50 per cent of these in Alma-Ata and its suburbs).2 According to its rules, the SDPK was a political organization uniting the adherents of political and economic reforms and social democracy. Its main goals were: ‘the humanization of society’, gaining personal freedoms for every citizen, achieving social justice, and creating a system of guarantees to ensure equal rights for all citizens and the protection of human rights. The SDPK adopted a position in opposition to the authorities. It criticized the government’s measures in the economic sphere and called for freedom of the mass media. The party maintained contacts with social-democratic organizations abroad, such as the Ebert Foundation in Germany.3 By mid-1995, the party was still not registered, having at no stage submitted an application.4 The SDPK became a member of the Socialist International.5 In 1989 the Association of Independent Public Organizations of Kazakhstan began to publish the newspaper Mnenie with a circulation of 1,000 copies. In December 1990 it was replaced by Sotsial Democrat, with a similar circulation.

OBJECTIVES I. Political Goals A. Ensuring a parliamentary system; ruling out a monopoly of power by a single party. B. De-ideologizing the state mechanism.

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II. Economic Objectives A. Establishing market relations [...] in the economy: – legal sanction of and equality for various forms of ownership—public, stockholding, cooperative, collective, private, etc.; – economic independence of enterprises; B. Liberation of business and creative activity and initiative: – those who want and can work should be allowed to choose the nature of their economic and productive activities; – land should be leased for an indefinite term to those who wish to engage in farming or it should be transferred to them as their private property; C. State regulation of the economy as the guarantee for stable social development and social protection of citizens: – an effective anti-monopoly policy; – legal mechanisms for ensuring ecological safety and social welfare; – state subsidies to farmers. III. Social Welfare Objectives – rights of citizens, secured by legislation, to a guaranteed minimum wage linked to price indices; – a price freeze and state subsidized prices of staple food products and basic manufactured consumer goods until the market mechanism reduces prices to acceptable levels; – establishing public control over funds and state housing allocations – implementation of an employment programme, retraining of, and payment of compensation to, workers whose interests have been adversely affected by the restructuring of the economy and personnel cuts in the armed forces. Source: Rozhdeno perestroikoi, (Alma-Ata, 1992), pp. 17-20. NOTES 1. Ponomarev, Obshchestvennye organizatsii v Kazakhstane i Kyrgyzstane, p. 46; Krasnaia zvezda, 2 June 1990. 2. Ponomarev, Obshchestvennye organizatsii v Kazakhstane i Kyrgyzstane, p. 46. 3. Mysl’ 3 (1994), p. 47. 4. Mysl’ 7 (1995), p. 51. 5. Mysl' 11 (1994), p. 50.

SOCIALIST PARTY OF KAZAKHSTAN INTRODUCTION In September 1991 an extraordinary congress of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan adopted a decision to rename itself, thus formally creating the Socialist Party.1 It was one of the biggest parties in the republic and the largest opposition party. By the beginning of 1994 it numbered 46,798 members2 in 1,580 local cells spread over the entire territory of the republic.3 The party was composed of white-collar workers (34.6 per cent), bluecollar workers (9.7 per cent) and farmers (41 per cent). Most of the party members were educated: 37.3 per cent had graduated from universities and other higher education institutions and 51.7 per cent had secondary education. Women constituted one-fifth (21.3 per cent) of party members.4 Most of its supporters were concentrated in south and west Kazakhstan, and in Kzyl-Orda Oblast. In 1991 the party co-chairmen were MP Ermuhamet Ertisbayev, a historian and political analyst (the party’s ideologue) and Anuar Alimzhanov, a writer and journalist. The party’s structure consisted of local cells, the regional conference, city and regional branches and the party congress. These elected the executive bodies: the local cell bureau, district, city and regional executive committees and the central party political executive committee. The party was guided by the ideas of West European social democracy: the coexistence of private and public property, a developed political democracy, and reliable social protection. It cooperated closely with the Social Democratic Party and took a favourable view of a merger of the two parties. The peak of the party’s activity was in 1993–94, when it contested seats for the parliament and published a newspaper, Res-Publika. Its activists included Prime Minister Sergei Tereshchenko (1991–94), who left the party in 1993, Petr Svoik, the chairman of the State AntiMonopoly Committee and Haziz Aldamjarov, the chairman of the Parliamentary Control Committee. For a long time the party leaders tried in vain to become the legal heirs of the property of the former Communist Party.5 The January 1994 Party Congress adopted a parliamentary election platform. In it, the party sharply criticized the government’s policies. Aldamjarov and Svoik were elected co-chairmen. In April 1994 on the initiative of the Socialist Party, a bloc of parties and public organizations known as Respublika was created in an effort to form a strong opposition to the government. In 1994 the party entered a crisis phase. Its newspaper ceased publication and Prime Minister Tereshchenko resigned. After the dissolution of parliament in spring 1995, there was a split in the party leadership. The party neither held a pre-election congress nor fielded candidates for the new parliament. As a result, only one Socialist was elected to the Majlis and one to the Senate, both of whom participated in the election as independents. At the beginning of 1997, the party had 30,000 members in 1,586 local cells.6 An agreement was reached on the unification of the Socialist and Communist

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parties in 1997, but never implemented. By 1998 the Socialist Party was essentially defunct.7

PROGRAMME Humanitarian and socialist values are fundamental to the activities of the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan [SPK]. The ultimate goal is to create a society based on social justice, freedom and solidarity of the people. The SPK champions the interests of the working people who create society’s material and spiritual values. The party strives to bring together the progressive, patriotic-minded forces of the Republic of Kazakhstan—all those who advocate the transition from a totalitarian to a democratic state based on the rule of law, with a developed civil society in which priority is given to universal human values and the principles laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in which the economy is socially oriented and all forms of ownership are legitimate […] I. KAZAKHSTAN BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE […] The Socialist Party of Kazakhstan resolutely dissociates itself from evaluations of the historical path traversed by the country that are hasty and perfunctory, emotional and in some cases motivated by immediate considerations. The SPK believes that by the beginning of the 1980s the Soviet model of society had, to all intents and purposes, exhausted its potential for progress and had nothing more to offer the people in the historical perspective. Sooner or later society had to force itself to undertake radical reforms for the sake of a better and more worthwhile future. Alongside other peoples of the USSR, the people of Kazakhstan have opted for an independent state, radical reforms and the building of a civil society. The SPK envisions the future of Kazakhstan within the CIS on a confederate basis.8 The Socialist Party of Kazakhstan offers the republic’s citizens its view on current problems and proposes its methods of solving them. II. SPK STRATEGY IN THE TRANSITION PERIOD Specific Features of the Situation in Kazakhstan Today Kazakhstan is characterized by a multinational population, weak political parties and embryonic democratic traditions. Its special regional features are a commodity-based economy, and consequently long-term prospects for state involvement in the economy, a high proportion of rural population which is mostly multiethnic, integration in the common economic space of the former USSR, and the influence of political and economic processes in neighbouring countries on the character of its reforms and the

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stability of its political life. When charting its course towards the creation of a democratic state and market economy, the Socialist Party will take these and other factors into account in elaborating and implementing its policies. A Democratic Regime is the Political Foundation of Reform in Society During the transition period, the main guarantee of social stability should be a strong regime, whose power is limited by the law. The public supports a regime based solely on the law—this is the core of democratic order. The SPK champions genuine democracy, which entails a state ruled by law with separately functioning legislative, executive and judicial branches of power, political pluralism and development of democratic institutions, equal rights for people of different nationalities, and freedom of conscience. The party supports the creation of a vertical presidential structure enabling the formation of an effective system of governing by the executive bodies, and considers reform of the legislative and judicial systems to be equally essential. The SPK takes a favourable view of the objective process that is bringing about a developed system of political parties in Kazakhstan. These are called upon to serve as an effective link between the public and the regime. The state should not intervene in the work of the political parties or of public movements that function according to the law. We see any encroachment on their rights and freedoms as an encroachment on our own rights and freedoms. Wielding power without an opposition may lead to dictatorship of the bureaucracy. We regard a constant dialogue between the authorities and the opposition as instrumental in shaping an effective policy that will meet the interests of Kazakhstan and its people […] While favouring political pluralism, we stand for an unconditional ban on the activities of parties and movements which advocate extremism, national strife and separatism, thus posing a threat to the republic’s territorial integrity. Cooperation of All Strata of Society Is the Social Basis for Reform The SPK strives for the individual’s economic emancipation and wellbeing. It is ready to support reasonable demands and initiatives of people who make their living by their own labour, and will contribute to their political education and organization, uniting them in a broad and diverse democratic movement for social progress. The SPK upholds the interests of workers, peasants and intellectuals, who are committed to fighting for fair and proper compensation for their labour. The SPK counts on the cooperation of managers for support of the programme of reform, of honest, civilized entrepreneurs, and civil servants who think that power should be used in the interests of society and who believe in genuinely serving the interests of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The SPK considers it necessary for entrepreneurs and managers, heads of enterprises and organizers of production, to join together into a separate third force, an independent party concerned with developing production, that could negotiate labour agreements with the trade unions.

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The interests of these social strata should be considered central when elaborating a policy of reform. Their cooperation and partnership constitute the social basis for any reforms. The Principles of Economic Policy Kazakhstan’s path to a market economy, as we see it, is through the intensive and systematic construction of qualitatively new labour relations which will boost state production. The fundamental aims and reference points of far-reaching economic reform are the market economy, economic freedom of the individual, the independence of commodity producers, competition and strict state control over the economic, financial and credit regulators of the macroeconomic balance. It is important that the new economic course be implemented in an aggressive and detailed manner, dealing with a number of priority issues at one and the same time. The most important of these are economic stabilization, which must be achieved through a restructuring of government spending and cutting financial subsidies to unprofitable enterprises, an austere fiscal policy, adoption of a body of laws on tax reform, denationalization and privatization of property, and deregulation of prices. Kazakhstan does not have to follow in the footsteps of other newlyemerged states which have taken the road to a market economy […] Its natural wealth makes it possible to achieve this objective in two stages. The main strategic aim for the immediate future is to create a domestic market—that is, the cooperation of producers on a market basis— which is, at this stage, relatively independent of the international market. The second stage of the economic programme starts at the point when virtually all commodities and services are sold and no longer distributed. By gradually raising prices in basic commodity sectors and bringing them closer to international prices, the government would compel domestic producers to find ways of lowering production costs and making their goods competitive. Once prices are on a par with the world level, the government can lift its control over external economic relations and its regulation of prices in basic commodity sectors; the national currency will become freely convertible, and the economy will be integrated into the world market. The key element of the economic programme should be an extensive bond between producer and property. The privatization programme and the strategy for the promotion of small and medium businesses should take care of this. At the same time, the SPK is resolutely opposed to ‘nomenklatura’ privatization, meaning, clandestine deals between corrupt officials and owners of capital of dubious origin. Privatization should be carried out in accordance with a programme elaborated openly and adopted with the participation of the trade unions and labour collectives. The SPK believes that small and medium businesses play an important part in building a market economy. The more dynamic they are and the greater the number of capable and competent people involved, the more efficiently public resources are used and the more intensively the economy develops. Sovereign Kazakhstan is about to be transformed into an independent entity in international relations and an active player in the global economic sphere.

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Nationalities Policy The Socialist Party of Kazakhstan is a party of patriots and internationalists. The SPK calls for a policy of civil peace and national concord based on friendship among peoples, equal rights of all residents of Kazakhstan, and the primacy of political stability as the underlying principle of state policy. Personal security and protection of constitutional rights and property should be guaranteed in equal measure to all citizens of Kazakhstan, irrespective of their social status or origins, religious beliefs or convictions. The SPK believes that all people of Kazakhstan, irrespective of their nationality, should enjoy equal opportunities for entering the civil service and receiving promotion. It is essential that the law on official language be implemented, and the cultures and languages of the peoples living in the republic be given state support. Kazakhs living abroad should be given concrete guarantees of the right to return to their homeland.9 The SPK sees democratic principles of respect for the rights and interests of peoples of other nationalities living in the republic as a first step to solving the problem of rebirth of the Kazakh nation. A democratic national rebirth cannot be achieved by redistributing material benefits. It comes as a result of free labour and the creativity of the people themselves. Social Policy The SPK favours a state policy that will reduce to a minimum the difficulties and losses associated with overcoming the economic crisis, create equal conditions for the workers, irrespective of the form of ownership or of the returns on labour investment, and regulate incomes through progressive taxation. The SPK considers it vital to provide for the social welfare of weaker strata of the population, mothers and children, to take preventive steps against unemployment, to create jobs, and to organize advanced training and retraining in new professions. By declaring support for social equality, we mean equal rights and equal obligations. We reject egalitarianism, the lumpen ideology of forced redistribution of material wealth created by the labour of others. We favour the development of a national health system that will ensure maximum prevention of disease, and a system of medical insurance. Socialists consider it their duty to prevent a further drift towards ecological disaster, and to find solutions to the problems of the Aral Sea, the Semipalatinsk and Eastern Kazakhstan regions and other ecological distress zones.10The SPK will support any rational initiatives aimed at improving all aspects of industrial ecology and raising the environmental safety of residential areas. Constant monitoring of the state of the environment and publication of the results are essential. Science, Culture and Education The SPK supports the development of theoretical and applied science, a radical reform of scientific institutions and the system of public education, free competition between scientific schools of thought and orientations, adequate remuneration for inventions and discoveries, and state support for gifted young people and students. The SPK considers it essential to raise the status of those engaged in intellectual occupations—engineers, physicians, teachers, researchers, scholars and artists, and white-

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collar workers in cultural institutions—and to ensure a higher material remuneration for their work. Foreign Policy, Security and Defence of the State The establishment of the Republic of Kazakhstan as an independent sovereign state is inconceivable without elaborating a long-term strategy which defines and formulates its fundamental national-state interests in the sphere of foreign policy and security. The SPK favours making Kazakhstan a powerful instrument of international peace and stability both in Central Asia and in the wider Eurasian region. We consider it necessary for our republic to pursue a consistent, peaceful foreign policy, based on the UN Charter and principles of European unity. We support the principle of the inviolability of frontiers and territorial integrity of our and other states, of settling outstanding issues by peaceful political means, non-usage of force to achieve political ends in the international arena, and international cooperation. The SPK favours turning Kazakhstan into a nuclear-free zone, which should be achieved through negotiations in which the republic would take part on an equal footing with all the nuclear powers.11 The party will strive to preserve a unified military-strategic space [prostrantsvo] on the territory of the former USSR, with Kazakhstan maintaining a reliable defence capability.12 Adequate housing should be guaranteed to career servicemen. III. WHAT KIND OF PARTY WILL IT BE? The SPK regards its ideological and theoretical renewal and overcoming ideological crisis [inherited from the Communist Party] as its priority task. The party is continuing the basic humanistic principles of Marxist teaching and Leninist methodology, making use of the wealth of local and universal socialist and democratic ideas. Striving to preserve ideological unanimity, the SPK considers democracy the guiding principle for its activity. Recognition of the right of each party member to free expression of his views on any issue concerning society, or to be a believer or atheist, is a guarantee of intraparty democracy. The Socialist Party of Kazakhstan will use only lawful political means to implement its programme, namely, it will work within the framework of parliamentary democracy through the elected deputies which make up its parliamentary factions. The party sees the extensive dissemination of its programme, as well as aggressive propaganda and agitation for the achievement of its proclaimed aims, as one of the chief means to put its programme into practice. […] The party is open to young people—to their energy, inquisitive minds and creativity. The SPK will cooperate constructively with the parties of socialist orientation operating on CIS territory and intends to become an integral part of the international socialist movement. It will cooperate actively with parties of the Socialist International and with all international organizations that have set themselves the task of fighting for progress, peace and human rights.

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*** By making its programme public, the Socialist Party of Kazakhstan calls on all staunch supporters of reform to join our party in the name of freedom, social justice and progress, and in the name of a united democratic society and prosperity for our homeland, sovereign Kazakhstan, and its rightful place in the international community. Our principles and slogans are: 1. Freedom for one is the prerequisite of freedom for all! 2. Socialism of the people and for the people! 3. Independence and prosperity of Kazakhstan in the interests of all its peoples and through the support of the republic’s patriots! 4. A market economy and democracy for all! 5. For social harmony, mutual aid and cooperation! 6. A constructive and responsible approach is the party’s political credo! Source: Unpublished memorandum (in English) of the founding group.13 NOTES 1. Delovaia nedelia, 5 June 1998. 2. Mysl’ 11 (1994), p. 48. 3. Delovaia nedelia, 5 June 1998. 4. Mysl’ 11 (1994), p. 48. 5. Delovaia nedelia, 5 June 1998. 6. Tsentral’naia Aziia, 2 (1997), p. 101. 7. Delovaia nedelia, 5 June 1998. 8. In December 1991, in the so-called Belovezh’e Agreement, three republics (Russia, Ukraine and Belarus) put an end to the existence of the USSR and initiated the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). On 21 December 1991, at a meeting in AlmaAta, 11 independent states signed a protocol on creating the CIS. 9. See Azat Civil Movement, n. 11. 10. See Nevada-Semipalatinsk. 11. More than one hundred powerful long-range missiles equipped with nuclear warheads, which used to belong to the armed forces of the former USSR, were reportedly stored in Kazakhstan in 1991 (see Babak, ‘Astana v treugol’nike Moskva, Vashington, Pekin’, p. 128). 12. Kazakhstan’s national security and its nuclear status became a critical international issue at the time of the break-up of the USSR. Some Kazakh politicians strove to retain nuclear arms on Kazakhstan’s territory, evidently for political reasons. Russia and the US insisted that Kazakhstan become a nuclear free state. During President Nazarbayev’s visit to the US in May 1992, Kazakhstan agreed to sign the nonproliferation treaty as a non-nuclear state. 13. See also D’iachenko et al., Politicheskie Partii Kazakhstana, 2000, pp. 15–18.

UNION OF INDUSTRIALISTS AND ENTREPRENEURS INTRODUCTION The creation of the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Kazakhstan testified to the fact that a new social stratum of businessmen, who supported a market economy, had emerged in Kazakhstan. The party’s constituent congress, attended by about 400 delegates, was held on 14 September 1992. Its leadership consisted of a president, nine vice-presidents and a 40-man board. The president as of February 1993 was Akezhan Kazhegeldin (later, in 1995–97, prime minister of the republic). The Union proclaimed as its main goal ensuring maximal protection of all types of producers in the face of the collapse of inter-state economic ties.

PLATFORM SUMMARY The Union’s main areas of activity are: – shaping and influencing economic policy in the republic; – creating and improving the legal basis for building a modern market economy; – scientific-technical and socio-economic innovation and assistance in the conversion of the military industry; – regulation of labour relations; – dynamic external economic activity and cooperation with foreign partners; – training of qualified personnel for work in a market economy; The Union’s immediate tasks are as follows: – formulating proposals for a state programme of radical restructuring of all governmental structures in the centre and in the provinces; – assistance in the systematic process of denationalization and privatization; – urging a restructuring of the banking system and the stabilization of monetary flow; – making adjustments in state investment policy; – drastically reducing state intervention in economic policy; – suggesting ways to restructure the taxation system; – participating in economic restructuring, and in creating market structures and infrastructure; – creating conditions which heighten the accountability of civil servants for violating the republic’s laws and abuse of power;

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– participation in establishing an efficient system of social security for the population; – demanding more active and genuine state support of private businesses. Source: ABV, 18 Sept. 1992.

UNION OF NATIONAL UNITY INTRODUCTION The constituent conference of the Union of National Unity of Kazakhstan was held in February 1993 in Alma-Ata. Eventually the Union evolved into the Party of National Unity of Kazakhstan. While the officially proclaimed goal of the Union was to render assistance in promoting the creation of a democratic society with a socially oriented market economy, in consolidating real sovereignty for Kazakhstan, and in maintaining political stability, its establishment is generally viewed as an attempt to form a presidential party designed to strengthen Nazarbayev’s political position and become the main political force facilitating Kazakhstan’s transition to an authoritarian political system.1 Serik Abdurahmanov, first secretary of the Kazakh SSR Komsomol organization in the 1980s and president of the Ecological Foundation from the beginning of the 1990s, headed the organization from its inception. Other prominent figures included the deputy chairmen, Sergei D’iachenko; former vice-president of the Ecological Foundation, Kenzhegali Sagadiev; rector of Kazakhstan State University, Oleg Nikonov; and editorin-chief of the newspaper Ekspress, and sociologist Marat Tazhin.2 In time, party membership reached between 20,000 and 30,000.3 With the assistance of local authorities, about 800 local party cells were created. The core of the party’s electorate consisted of state officials and businessmen. In 1995 the Union began publishing a newspaper, Daur (Time), which was later closed for financial reasons.4 The Union supported various presidential initiatives, thus creating the political background necessary for taking drastic decisions. For instance, in December 1993, it supported the self-dissolution of the parliament and the abolition of the old soviets, in order to strengthen presidential power. The Union of National Unity appealed to all public organizations in Kazakhstan to sign an agreement on national reconciliation, which contained a promise to refrain from mass protests that could destabilize the social situation. It scored a significant electoral success in the 7 March 1994 parliamentary elections, winning 30 seats in the parliament—far more than any other party.5

PROGRAMME Sovereign Kazakhstan is our common homeland. The Union of National Unity of Kazakhstan regards friendship among peoples as an immutable value. We oppose any radicalism in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations. The Union is not a class but a people’s political organization, uniting the most active, progressively-minded segments of the population in order to build a genuine democracy,

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promote radical economic reforms, and maintain social and political stability. It is only stability and the strengthening of law and order that can revive confidence in the future, and lead to social progress in the foreseeable rather than in the distant future. The Union is a political organization supporting President Nazarbayev’s strategy of systematic reforms, aimed at building a democratic society in the Republic of Kazakhstan with a socially-oriented market economy and at securing the genuine sovereignty of the state. The Union views the individual as the supreme value. It champions economic, spiritual and political freedom of the individual, supports social partnership and a strong democratic state. The Union is a centrist political organization, which rejects both leftist and rightist extremism and conforms to the legislation of the Republic of Kazakhstan. While supporting political pluralism, we will offer strong resistance to political forces working for a return of the totalitarian regime in any form, inter-ethnic confrontation, and separatism directed against the territorial integrity and state system of Kazakhstan. The Union rejects the use of violent means to achieve political ends, being firmly convinced that there can be no ideology worth dying or killing for. Our priorities are: In the political sphere: – in connection with the adoption of the first constitution of independent Kazakhstan (we regard it as the constitution of the transition period), drawing up new legislation to provide the legal foundation for radical reform; – promulgation of a law on lobbies to direct this spontaneously developing activity into lawful channels; – creation of a numerically small professional parliament as the only law-making body in the country, prevention of parallelism and disorder in the work of power-wielding state structures. The Union recognizes the need for separation of power by setting up a flexible balancing mechanism. Nevertheless, it considers it essential that the right of the president to dissolve parliament and a clear-cut definition of the impeachment procedure be entered into the constitution (as an amendment). However, taking account of the situation inside and outside Kazakhstan and the fact that this country is going through the initial stage of building democratic traditions, we favour the establishment of a historic precedent by allowing all the existing, lawfullyelected power structures—the president, supreme soviet and constitutional court—to function for their full term. We believe that the present name of the parliament should be changed—first and foremost, that the word ‘supreme’ be deleted—that it should be formed in a democratic way, and that democratic elections to the new parliament be held according to the lists of political organizations on the republic level. The Union emphatically supports establishing contacts with democratically oriented political and public movements outside Kazakhstan. In the economic sphere:

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The Union favours the creation of a Kazakhstan economic model, which would take into account the experience of the world’s market economies as well as Kazakhstan’s specific features, namely: – enormous natural wealth; – large territory and small population density; – geographic position; – traditional economic ties and unprecedented prospects for entering the global economic space as an independent agent; – specific structure of the national economy and the need for its restructuring; – adequately qualified labour force potential. We advocate taking tangible steps that will strengthen people’s belief in the correctness of the road that has been chosen. We stand for: – consistent restructuring of property relationships, a privatization process with equal initial opportunities for everyone, social security for all strata of the population, and complete openness; – removal of artificially created bureaucratic barriers to the functioning of healthy collective and private businesses which are bound to become the main motivating force of economic regeneration; – state regulation of the economy through indirect leverage and the unacceptability of direct state intervention in the activities of business enterprises; stronger state control over the use of national resources to prevent their squandering by corrupt organizations and shadow businesses; – a minimal number of economic priorities—the oil and gas sectors, the agrarian sphere, export-producing industries, science and culture; – reorganization of the banking system to achieve a flexible, differentiated credit policy, easy loan terms for priority branches, and funding for the development and implementation of promising technological programmes in the republic’s economy; – a civilized and stable taxation policy which favours propertyowners, producers and the state, and assistance in eliminating the criminal circulation of cash; – establishing firm legal guarantees for foreign investors; – radical revision of the present system of price setting. We are positive that the goal of the reforms and the means used to carry them out will not create an explosive polarization of the population nor will it lead to the enrichment of a handful and the impoverishment of a majority of people, but will result in the emergence of a wide stratum of middle class property-owners. Fully realizing the significance of the time factor in bringing tangible results from the economic reforms, we support securing in the constitution the possibility of parliament delegating to the president the right to promulgate laws within concretely defined frameworks. In the social sphere: While strongly disapproving of full reliance on welfare, the Union stands for guaranteed social welfare for pensioners, the disabled, orphans, large families, and students. It advocates: – immediately determining realistic criteria to establish a poverty line;

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– drawing up a special state programme that will outline concrete mechanisms for social security; – linking income to inflation, implementation of a state programme to assist ecologically distressed regions. The Union believes its most important task is to ensure the safety of the individual and the citizen and to revive the moral foundations of society. We will contribute to the attainment of law and order in every way, and to the eradication of corruption, bribetaking and the incipient mafia. In its nationalities policies, the Union proceeds from the premise that maintaining stability in inter-ethnic relations should be basic to state policy and a guarantee of success in the economic modernization of the republic. We consider it of fundamental importance that the idea of an evolutionary solution to the problem of the Kazakh ethnos be resolved in such a way that people of all nationalities enjoy equal rights and live in harmony. The Union is of the opinion that the language issue should not be an object of cheap populism. We proceed from the fact that the state of the Kazakh language is well-nigh critical. Therefore the main task today is to contribute to its firm establishment as the official language.6 We are convinced that a reasonable, step-by-step introduction of Kazakh into official documents must not be taken to mean that Russian, one of the UN official languages, is being eliminated. The Union is against discrimination on the grounds of language. Assuming full responsibility for its proclaimed programmatic objectives, the Union of National Unity of Kazakhstan is oriented towards: – specific deadlines for implementing the main planks of its programme; – support for all progressive initiatives of other political organizations; – feasibility and attainability of the set objectives. Source: Ekspress, 16 February 1993, p. 4. NOTES 1. Nezavisimaia gazeta, 13 Feb. 1993. 2. Gorizont, 13–20 Feb. 1993. 3. Delovaia nedelia, 29 May 1998. 4. Ibid. 5. Aziia 13 (April 1994). 6. As a result of the persistent Soviet policy of russification, many Kazakhs, especially those living in cities, lost their mother tongue. Russian became the only language of communication for the bulk of the population. The introduction of the Kazakh language began after the adoption of the Law on Languages of the Kazakh SSR in 1989. According to the 1993 Constitution, Kazakh is the state language and Russian is the language of interethnic communication (Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 2 Feb. 1993). According to the 1995 Constitution, Russian was given de facto status of an official language.

ZHELTOKSAN NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY INTRODUCTION The Zheltoksan (December) Public Committee1 was set up in May 1989 by a group of participants in the December 1986 riots in Alma-Ata who became victims of subsequent government persecution. These riots were the first open political demonstration by educated Kazakhs, mostly students, who were protesting against the very foundations of the Soviet political system. Hasen Kozha-Ahmet2 was the leader of the organizing body of dissidents who formed the committee. The initial demands of the committee’s leaders were relatively moderate: full political and civil rehabilitation of those convicted for participating in the December riots and social benefits for them. They lobbied for adoption of legislation which would provide privileges, which could serve as partial compensation for the repression which the ‘Decembrists’ suffered under the former regime. However, the committee’s demands soon became more radical, partly as a result of Kozha-Ahmet’s own political ambitions. It advocated, for example, closing Kazakhstan’s mines and metallurgical works for environmental reasons. The committee published materials aimed at discrediting the regime entirely. The main foci of their accusations were the economic crisis and the widespread poverty of the population, especially in rural areas. They demanded, inter alia, that the president be made accountable to the Constitutional Court and that parliament be given a greater role in the appointment of the prime minister and members of the cabinet.3 In May 1990, a portion of the committee’s members formed the Zheltoksan National Democratic Party, which was one of the earliest Kazakh national organizations with a clearly defined organizational structure. Its constituent congress was held on 20 May 1990, with the participation of about 200 people. They elected a 12-member Central Political Council and three co-chairmen. The political programme included a call for struggle against the vestiges of colonialism and support for an independent, law-governed state of Kazakhstan, in which a variety of parties representing different views would be allowed to function.4 In January 1991, Kozha-Ahmet became party chairman. The party published a newspaper, also called Zheltoksan. In the autumn of 1991, the party resolved to participate in the presidential elections. Kozha-Ahmet was nominated as a candidate, but he could not muster the minimum number of signatures required for registration. In October 1992, the party announced its voluntary dissolution and united with the Azat Civil Movement and the Azat Party to form the Republican Party.5 Kozha-Ahmet became its deputy chairman. After the new party disintegrated a year later, Zheltoksan was restored and joined the National Democratic Party.

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PROGRAMME Introduction […] About three hundred years ago the Kazakh people found themselves in Russian bondage and lost their independence. Since then the Kazakhs have undergone many hardships. The Stalinist genocide of the Soviet period was even more cruel than the tsars’ decrees, while the Virgin Lands Development and other campaigns staged on Kazakh soil pursued the selfsame policy of doing away with the Kazakh people, except that the means employed were more subtle. Migration into Kazakhstan drastically reduced the proportion of Kazakhs in their historical territory, which caused distortions in the development of the language and culture of the Kazakh people. Universal experience indicates that national liberation cannot be imposed from outside; every people has to fight for it. Naturally, this goal can only be achieved with the support of progressive forces the world over. The current outstanding problems in Kazakhstan, namely, economic instability, ecological disasters, the policy of ‘russification’, ethnic discord, etc., cannot be solved unless Kazakhstan is independent. It is well known that people of other nationalities residing in Kazakhstan have a vital stake in the just settlement of these problems. We believe that in the situation obtaining in Kazakhstan today, reliance mainly on people of Kazakh nationality supported by other fraternal peoples is needed to extricate our homeland from its present plight. Objectives 1. The ultimate goal of the Zheltoksan National Democratic Party is secession from the USSR and establishment of an independent, multiparty state based on the rule of law. 2. The party will wage its struggle by peaceful, democratic, parliamentary means, acceptable to all civilized states. Zheltoksan advocates a multi-party system and the competition of ideas; it not only supports all democratically oriented political parties and movements working for national independence, but cooperates with them. 3. The National Democratic Party acts in accordance with the Holy Qur’an and opposes violence and oppression, the use of force, and shedding the blood of any nation. 4. Parliament will be the supreme legislative body in the independent republic, with presidential power exercised in the interval between the parliamentary sessions. The president will be accountable to parliament. 5. Supreme executive power will be exercised by a government elected by parliament and endorsed by the president. 6. Power in the provinces will be exercised on the basis of a new constitution of the republic supported by the people and adopted by parliament. 7. The land and its subterranean resources are the property of the republic. The party will resolutely oppose all those who make territorial claims to the sovereignty of the republic as it has evolved historically, in the framework of its current borders.

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8. In accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the citizens of Kazakhstan, irrespective of language, religious belief, sex, age or political views, are equal before the sole Creator and the laws promulgated by parliament. 9. Religion (mosques, churches, etc.) should be separated from the state, not only in word but in deed. Those Kazakhs and other Muslims who wish to do so should be allowed to register their marriages and divorces, obtain birth certificates and perform burial and other religious rites in mosques. 10. Kazakh will be the state language and the language of inter-ethnic communication. The languages and cultures of other nationalities living in the republic will be treated with respect and consideration. 11. The Zheltoksan National Democratic Party favours the creation of national military forces in each republic and the stationing of national military units in the respective national territories. 12. A struggle to prevent new ecological disasters will be waged. The ministries guilty of polluting the environment will be forced to compensate for the damage sustained by the people. Source: Politicheskie partii i obshchestvennye dvizheniia sovremennogo Kazakhstana. Spravochnik 1 (Almaty, 1994), pp. 78–80. NOTES 1. See Rules of the Zheltoksan Public Committee in Rozhdeno perestroikoi, pp. 14–16. 2. Hasen Kozha-Ahmet graduated from the Tchaikovsky Conservatory in Alma-Ata. He began his dissident activities in the 1970s, duplicating and single-handedly distributing appeals for Kazakhstan’s sovereignty. During the same period he tried to create a political party, Zhas Kazakh. He was sentenced to two years in prison for ‘deliberately defaming the Soviet system’. In 1986 he took an active part in the December riots in Alma-Ata and was subsequently sentenced to a four-year prison term. In 1990 he was rehabilitated (Delovaia nedelia, 19 June 1998). 3. Babakumarov, ‘K chemu prishli i k chemu idem’, p. 51. 4. Ponomarev, Obshchestvennye organizatsii v Kazakhstane i Kyrgyzstane, pp. 36–7. 5. Aziia Dausy 1 (Jan. 1993).

KYRGYZ REPUBLIC

INTRODUCTION Vladimir Babak and Demian Vaisman Capital: Bishkek (changed from Frunze in 1991).1 Area: 198.5 sq. km. Population: According to the 1989 census, the population was 4,258,000; Kyrgyz constituted 52.4 per cent of the population (2,284,000); the main ethnic minorities at that time were Russians (21.5 per cent, 916,000), Uzbeks (12.9 per cent, 550,000—95 per cent of whom lived in the south of the republic in Osh Oblast), Ukrainians (2.5 per cent, 108,000) and Germans (2.4 per cent, 101,000).2 By 1996 Kyrgyz constituted 59.7 per cent, Russians 16.2 per cent and Uzbeks 14.1 per cent. By 1999 the percentage of Kyrgyz had increased to 64.9 per cent, while Uzbeks had decreased to 13.8 per cent and Russians to 12.5 per cent. According to the 24 March 1999 census, the total population was 4,852,400; the rural population constituted 64.6 per cent of this figure.3 Religion: The Kyrgyz are Sunni Muslim. Language: Kyrgyz belongs to the Turkic group of languages. Historical Survey The Kyrgyz are an ancient Turkic people. Their ancestors were Turkic tribes of southern Siberia, the Mongols and the ancient people of the Tien Shan mountains.4 In the 6th and 7th centuries, the Kyrgyz had proto-states on the Yenisey River. From the 7th to 13th centuries, they were under the control of successive Turkish khanates. In the 13th century, the Turkic states in the Tien Shan and on the Yenisey were destroyed by Genghis-Khan. For the next 200 years, the Kyrgyz remained under the Golden Horde and the khanates that succeeded that regime. Freedom was regained in 1510, but Kyrgyz tribes were overrun in the 17th century by the Kalmyks, in the mid-18th century by the Manchus, and in the early 19th century by the Uzbeks of the Kokand Khanate. By the end of the 18th century, the Kyrgyz had developed an ethnic consciousness which was linked to their common territory in the proximity of the Tien Shan, to their nomadic or semi-nomadic economy and to the Manas, the legend that recounted their glorious past.5 Part of the Kyrgyz, in the north, became subjects of the Russian Empire as of 1860 and the rest with the conquest and ultimate integration into Russia of the Kokand Khanate in 1876. In the former region there was already a considerable Slav settlement prior to World War I. At the end of April 1918, the Kyrgyz territory became a part of the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. In July 1919 the Soviet government established a special Revolutionary Committee for governing the Kyrgyz Krai, which then included the territories of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In October 1924 the Kara-Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast was established within the RSFSR; in May 1925, it was renamed the Kyrgyz Autonomous Oblast. Kara-Kyrgyz was an epithet used by the Russians to distinguish the

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mountain dwelling Kyrgyz from the steppe dwelling Kazakhs (referred to simply as Kyrgyz). On 7 May 1927 the constituent congress of the Soviets of Kyrgyzstan adopted a declaration on the establishment of the Kyrgyz Autonomous Republic. Kyrgyzstan remained an autonomous republic within the RSFSR until 1936, when it was granted the status of union republic with its capital in Frunze (changed from Pishpek in 1926). The national delimitation in Central Asia was instrumental in the consolidation of a separate Kyrgyz ethnos. In accordance with the policy of korenizatsiia which was the central tenet of the ‘socialist development of nations’ in the 1920s, this involved the formation of national cadres and of a written language that could become the official tongue of the ethnically-based administrative territory. The former was deemed necessary for the dual purpose of propagating the Bolshevik message among the indigenous toiling masses and creating a local administration based on loyal personnel on whom the distant centre could rely. The latter meant the establishment of national schools and institutions of higher education and cultural centres. Although no easy task, given the two changes of alphabet from Arabic to Latin in 1926 and then to Cyrillic in 1940, a high literacy rate was achieved by the outbreak of World War II. In this context a native Kyrgyz intelligentsia came into being which over the years sought to consolidate a national culture that did not necessarily coincide with the official Soviet line and from time to time actually clashed with it. Among the factors instrumental in the growth of this Kyrgyz ‘alternative’ national sentiment, were the recurrent forms of suppression which among others, succeeded in making the Kyrgyz a minority in their own land (40.5 per cent in 1959; 43.8 per cent in 1970; 47.9 per cent in 1979). It was only during the 1980s that they became a majority, attaining 52.4 in 1989. This process began with the suppression by the tsarist regime of the 1916 Kyrgyz uprising when many Kyrgyz were killed, and a considerable number fled abroad to China, Mongolia and Afghanistan. Its second component was the prolonged process of industrialization which brought an influx of skilled workers and managers from Russia. Finally, came the resettlement in the Kyrgyz SSR of a significant contingent of the peoples deported by Stalin’s regime (Koreans, Germans and the Caucasian ‘punished’ nationalities). Kyrgyz national awareness came to a head in the period of glasnost and perestroika when sectors of the the class of educated Kyrgyz took advantage of the new pluralism to establish informal groups and associations. A Law on the Official Language of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan was adopted on 23 September 1989. It stipulated that by 1 January 1999 all official documentation had to be in Kyrgyz. The Language Law was one of the decisive factors in the increasing emigration of the non-Kyrgyz population from the republic. The number of ethnic Russians/Slavs emigrating from Kyrgyzstan increased from 2,200 in 1989 to 16,000 in 1990. In 1993 the number increased dramatically to 66,000.6 In an effort to stem this tide, the Kyrgyz authorities granted Russian the status of a state language on a par with Kyrgyz.7 Besides ethnic emigration from Kyrgyzstan to Russia and Germany there has been mass migration from the countryside to the cities. In the period 1993–98, the population of small villages diminished by 19 per cent, and of large villages and small towns by 9 per cent. At the same time, the population of Bishkek increased from 350,000 to 500,000. Internal migration of the adult population was 29.5 per cent higher from 1987 to 1992 than in the period between 1993 and 1998.8

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The sovereignty of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan was declared officially in October 1990, and its independence on 31 August 1991. Political System Askar Akayev was first elected president by the Supreme Soviet of the Kyrgyz SSR in 1990 and then re-elected by popular vote in 1991. He was the sole Central Asian leader who had not previously held the position of first party secretary, and he lacked even a Communist Party background, having come from the republic’s Academy of Sciences. His stated goal was to replace the party bureaucrats with competent intellectuals. The election of Akayev, who was a native of the more developed northern part of the country, constituted a break with the tradition of southern dominance in Kyrgyz politics. On 5 May 1993 a new constitution of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan was adopted. It granted wide powers to the president, but also to the parliament, the Zhogorku Kenesh, to balance presidential power. In October 1994, with the apparent aim of moderating the power of the legislative branch, Akayev dissolved the parliament and in 1995 proceeded to drastically alter its structure: he created a bicameral legislative body comprising a 70member People’s Assembly (upper chamber) which met twice yearly to debate issues of regional interest and a 35member Legislative Assembly (lower chamber), which was a standing body representing the population as a whole. Elections to the parliament were held in February 1995. Following a further reform in 1999, the People’s Chamber was reduced to 60 members, elected for a five year term (45 from single-seat constituencies and 15 according to party lists), while the Legislative Assembly increased in size from 35 to 45 representatives, elected from the same single-seat constituencies. President Akayev’s attempt to prolong the 5-year term of office by a referendum (following the example of the presidents of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) ended in failure. On 24 December 1995 presidential elections were held and three candidates vied for the presidency. Akayev retained his office by gaining 71.6 per cent of the vote.9 Simultaneously, the former system of elections to the parliament, based on party lists, was abolished, and single-member district voting was introduced. This was an effort by Akayev to weaken the role of the political parties, in particular the Communist Party. Further changes in the electoral system were introduced in 1998. Fifteen members of the parliament’s lower house were again to be elected on party lists. In addition, the Constitutional Court recognized the right of President Akayev to run once again for the presidency in 2000, on the grounds that he was allowed two terms of office by law, and since the adoption of the 1993 constitution, he had been elected only once.10 On 29 October 2000 Akayev was re-elected to the presidency for five years. He received 74.5 per cent of the vote. Elections to the Zhogorku Kenesh were held in two rounds, on 20 February and 13 March 2000. In the first round, the Communists received 27.8 per cent of the votes, the Union of Democratic Forces, 18.6, the Women’s Democratic Party, 12.7, the ‘Afghans’ (veterans of the Afghan War), 8.1 and Ata-Meken, 6.5.11 Political Parties and Movements The first politically oriented informal groups independent of the Communist Party appeared in 1987.12 These associations were actually political debating clubs that

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functioned in the capital (then still called Frunze) at institutions of higher education, newspaper editorial offices and individual enterprises. The main subjects discussed were deStalinization and political and economic reform. Most of the participants were young Russian-speaking intellectuals. These political clubs ceased to exist in 1989. Undoubtedly, the authorities’ repressive actions played a significant role in their demise, yet it is equally true that by that time debating clubs had already lost their political significance. Political opposition now took the form of public associations, which chose one or two important problems, such as ecology, culture or health care, and sought to give them political expression. In 1989, members of a number of political clubs and ecological movements founded local chapters of the Memorial Society—whose objectives were to disclose the crimes of Stalin’s regime and totally rehabilitate and perpetuate the memory of its victims—and of the environmental group Ekolog.13 The turn of the decade saw the emergence of a Kyrgyz nationalist movement. The nationalist mood was sparked by the authorities’ disregard for the severe housing crisis in the capital, where less than one-quarter of the population were Kyrgyz. The shortage of dwellings was particularly acute for young Kyrgyz newcomers to the city and led to their unauthorized seizure of plots of land in the city’s suburbs and construction of buildings on those sites. A number of those concerned united to form the Ashar Movement. In June 1990 an outright clash between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks—again triggered by the housing issue—occurred in Osh Oblast, with its considerable Uzbek population. The conflict was brought to a head by the decision of the regional authorities, prodded by the Osh-Aimagy Association, to expropriate tracts of land from an Uzbek collective farm to build housing for Kyrgyz. According to official data, 308 people were killed in the clashes, but unofficial figures range up to 1000 victims.14 Relations between the Kyrgyz and Uzbek SSRs deteriorated as a result of these events.15 Two other Kyrgyz nationalist organizations appeared at about that time: Atuulduk Demilge (Civic Initiative), an organization established in March 1990 which stood for revival of Kyrgyz culture and traditions, and Asaba.16 Simultaneously, trends towards consolidating forces among ethnic minorities became more pronounced: the deterioration of ethnic relations in Osh Oblast resulted in the appearance of the Uzbek Osh-based Adolat association (1989) and in June 1990 the Slav Foundation was formed in Frunze, which in 1991 became Bishkek. Several German cultural centres also appeared. The first was established early on in the mid-1980s. In 1992 President Akayev adopted a decree on the creation of a network of German national-cultural centres in order to stem the emigration of Germans from the republic.17 In May 1990, over 30 organizations and movements which shared the idea of fighting the Communist Party apparatus founded the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan (DDK). It was perhaps the only coalition in the region comprising organizations of the titular nationality together with those of other nationalities. It became an influential force in society and in the autumn of 1990 was, to a large degree, instrumental in bringing the reform-minded Askar Akayev to power. The August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow and President Akayev’s decree suspending the activity of the Communist Party in the republic gave a powerful impetus to the creation of political parties and movements in Kyrgyzstan. At the same time, the removal from the political scene of the common enemy—the CPSU and its powerful apparatus— destroyed the multi-ethnic foundation upon which the Democratic Movement of

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Kyrgyzstan was based, and ethnic issues began to play a more important role. Pressure brought to bear by Ashar, Asaba and Erkyn Kyrgyzstan, an outgrowth of the Atuulduk Demilge, rapidly turned the DDK into an organization which spoke only for the interests of the titular nationality. Torn by conflict, its leadership proved unable to find new unifying ideas or organizational forms of coexistence, or to halt the movement’s split into radical and moderate wings, which ultimately led to its disintegration. In 1992, Ashar activists managed to piece together some splinters of what had been a powerful movement and form a small party which retained the designation DDK. In October 1991 an abortive attempt was made to establish the People’s Unity Democratic Movement, conceived as a broad centrist association. It absorbed a large portion of the old party élite which aimed at staging a political come-back as supporters of the president’s programme of reforms and, were circumstances to prove favourable, at transforming the movement into the ruling party. However, neither the wide press coverage nor the clearly favourable attitude on the part of Akayev helped it to win grass root support and it soon departed the political arena. On the other hand, the Communist Party, having recovered from the trauma of August 1991, was rapidly gaining political ground. It changed its name to the Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan and held its constituent congress in the summer of 1992. The Communists gradually removed the most unpopular figures from leading positions, such as former Central Committee First Secretary Absamat Masaliyev, who also held the post of chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium,18 and soon emerged as a major political force. This upward swing was probably the result of public dissatisfaction over steadily deteriorating social and economic conditions, widespread corruption, and the desire for stability. Other factors which contributed to their success were the party’s ability, reflected in its programme, to adapt itself to new realities, as well as its firm support in the provinces and its leadership experience. The disintegration of the Kyrgyzstan Democratic Movement was a blow to the Kyrgyz nationalist movement. As with the nationalist movements in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, slogans which had been used in the period of the struggle for sovereignty had lost their appeal and no substitutes were devised. Internal differences over the president’s policy of reforms and relations with Russia were growing more acute. These factors and conflicts within the leadership, which had proved fatal for the DDK, combined to bring about the further disintegration of the nationalist parties. The largest of them, Erkyn Kyrgyzstan, split at the end of 1992, leading to the appearance of the new Ata-Meken Party. The Republican People’s Party, aspiring to the role of a centrist party, also appeared in December of that year.19 The party proclaimed its adherence to internationalism, which was bound to bring it the backing of the non-Kyrgyz. According to an opinion poll of January 1994, it was second in popularity only to the Communists.20 In addition, two more political parties appeared in 1993: the Agrarian and the Social Democratic parties. The Agrarian Party, which at the time of registration had a membership of 1,00021 had no appreciable mass backing.22 This was not the case with the Social Democrats, who enlarged their political base.23 As of November 1993, the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan registered 258 public organizations, among them the following political parties: the Erkyn Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan, the Asaba National Revival Party, the Republican People’s Party of Kyrgyzstan, Ata-Meken, the Party of Communists of

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Kyrgyzstan and the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan.24 Another party with a centrist programme, the Party of Kyrgyzstan Unity, appeared in the first half of 1994. By April 1994, a total of nine political parties were registered in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.25 By 1995,520 associations had been registered, including twelve political parties and six ‘socio-political movements’. Yet, for all the seeming adherence to a multiparty principle, their opportunities to influence political life in the republic were greatly limited and their political activity remained, for the most part, extra-parliamentary. Certainly the political opposition proved unsuccessful in its efforts to enjoy the benefits of parliamentary democracy due to Akayev’s manipulative tactics. NOTES 1. From December 1990 to May 1993 the official name was the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. In May 1993 it was changed to The Kyrgyz Republic. 2. Natsional’nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR, Part 2 (Moscow, 1991), p. 87. 3. See http://www.britannica.com/; For 1999 figures see The Europe World Year Book 2001, Vol. II, p. 2383. 4. Huskey, ‘Kyrgyzstan: the Politics of Demographic and Economic Frustration’, pp. 654–5. 5. Ibid., p. 655. 6. The net emigration of Russians from Kyrgyzstan was 16,000 in 1990; 17,400 in 1991; 48,500 in 1992, and almost 60,000 in the first nine months of 1993 (Rossiiskaia gazeta, 19 February, 1994). See also Kuznetsova, ‘Russkie v Tsentral’noi Azii’, pp. 126–60. 7. For the text of the law, see Molodezhnaia gazeta, 30 Oct. 1991. In 1989 17,600 people emigrated from the Kyrgyz SSR; in 1990, 40,900 (Verkhovskii, Central Asia and Kazakhstan. pp. 15–16). On the resolution, see also Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 30 May 2000. 8. At the same time, the number of refugees and illegal immigrants to Kyrgyzstan increased. According to official data, in 1998 their numbers totalled 50,000. However, the actual number may have been 2.5 to 3 times higher. (Omarov and Omarov, ‘Problemy natsional’noi bezopasnosti Kyrgyzstana na sovremennom etape ego razvitiia’, p. 100). The majority (about 99 per cent) were from Tajikistan (Omarov and Makhnovskii, ‘Migratsionnye protsessy v Kyrgyzstane’, p. 51). The number of illegal immigrants apparently did not include the remigrants from Russia. For instance, in 1995, a total of 27,800 left for Russia, 9,500 of whom returned to Kyrgyzstan; in 1996, the figures were 18,900 and 8,500 respectively; in 1997, 13,700 and 6,300 (Kosmarskaia, ‘Russkie v Tsentral’noi Azii—Bol’noi vopros?’, p. 35). 9. R.Abazov, ‘Politicheskie preobrazovaniia v Kyrgyzstane i evoliutsiia prezidentskoi sistemy’, p. 29. 10. Ibid., pp. 30–1. 11. Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 24 February 2000. 12. Ponomarev, Obshchestvennye organizatsii v Kazakhstane i Kyrgyzstane, p. 81. 13. Literaturnyi Kyrgyzstan 5 (1991), pp. 102–3; Ekolog’s headquarters were located in Moscow. For information on a similar movement in Kazakhstan, see Adilet. 14. Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 2 June 2000. 15. Osh Oblast of Soviet Kyrgyzstan had common borders with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and China. In independent Kyrgyzstan the territory of the oblast was reduced considerably in size and the remaining areas were divided between Jalal-Abad and Batken Oblasts. It had a long history as a centre of agriculture and, in particular, of cotton growing. According to the 1989 population census, the total population of Osh Oblast within the then borders was 1,997,000. These included 1,192,000 Kyrgyz, 521,000 Uzbeks, 126,000 Russians, 39,000 Tatars, and 32,000 Tajiks (Natsional’nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR po perepisi 1989 g., Vol. 7, Table 21).

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16. Literaturnyi Kyrgyzstan 12 (1990), pp. 89–91; Ponomarev, Obshchestvennye organizatsii v Kazakhstane i Kyrgyzstane, p. 89. 17. From 1989 to 1995, the German population in Kyrgyzstan decreased from 101,300 to 26,100; Omarov and Makhnovskii, ‘Migratsionnye protsessy v Kyrgyzstane’, p. 49. 18. Absamat Masaliyev was first secretary of the CC of the CP of the Kyrgyz SSR from 1985 to 1991. From 1988 to 1990 he simultaneously held the post of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet—the equivalent of president of the republic. 19. Aziia 1 (Jan. 1993). 20. Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 19 Feb., 1994. 21. Tsentral’naia Aziia, 2 (1997), p. 104. 22. Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 19 Feb. 1994. 23. Ibid. 24. Kyrgyzstan Chronicle 1 (Dec. 1993). 25. Res-Publika, 15 April 1994.

AGRARIAN LABOUR PARTY OF KYRGYZSTAN INTRODUCTION The Agrarian Labour Party of Kyrgyzstan was the third agrarian party in the country, the others being the Peasant Party of Kyrgyzstan (est. 1991) and the Agrarian Party of Kyrgyzstan (est. 1993). The social base of the ALPK consisted of peasants and workers of the agrarian-industrial sector who had been disappointed by the poor achievements of the agrarian reform launched by the new regime.1 Its most militant faction was made up of members of the Peasant Union who favoured equal treatment for all forms of economic activity in the agrarian sector. The party was registered on 14 October 1994 and held its first congress in Bishkek on 25 November 1994. Usen Sydykov, former First Secretary of the Osh Obkom, and until January 1991 chairman of the Osh Oblast soviet, was elected party chairman. The congress adopted an appeal to the citizens of Kyrgyzstan, which emphasized the disastrous state which the country’s agriculture had reached under the banner of agrarian reform and put the blame on the new leaders of the country.2 The Agrarian Labour Party of Kyrgyzstan failed to attract a large membership. In 1997 it numbered about 1,200.3

PROGRAMME The Agrarian Labour Party of Kyrgyzstan is a voluntary political organization of workers and peasants and of employees of the infrastructure of the republic, who have united in order to protect social rights and vital interests of workers employed in the processing of agricultural production and of inhabitants of rural areas, their freedom and democratic values, through transformation of the economy of the agrarian sector. […] Under present conditions, the ALPK sees as the reason for its existence: breaking the chain reaction of rapid decline of the village and industry in the processing of agricultural products; preventing the catastrophic pauperization of the villagers and workers in the [agricultural] industry; the most important task of the party is to take the interests [of the villagers and agricultural workers] to heart; [our goal is] to work out and offer to society our strategy and concept of a gradual transformation of the village and of creation of a new rural social structure which takes into account the new reality; to fight for the development and consolidating of democratic values and relations, which openly reject ‘predatory’ tendencies of a small minority whose actions lead to the rapid pauperization of the majority of the population. […]

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GOALS AND TASKS OF THE ALPK 1. In the political sphere: to achieve real democracy, attain power for the people and selfgovernment with wide participation of the population in the political sphere. To strive for the ALPK’s representation in all bodies of legislative and executive power; – to overcome established conservative dogmas about political backwardness of both peasants and workers of the agrarian-industrial complex, and to introduce [the peasants] into the political arena as an independent force; – to consolidate society in an effort to carry out real reform in rural areas, [to achieve] the revival of the village, its traditional way of life and traditions; – to protect the peasantry’s political, civil, social and cultural rights and freedoms, as well as those of all workers of the agrarian-industrial complex; – to develop a pluralistic system of ownership; to establish the inviolability of the right of every citizen to freely choose forms of economic activity; […] 2. In the economic sphere: to carry out socially-oriented reform in the interests of the working people, to form a regulated socially-oriented and ecologically safe market economy, which would promote industrial growth and secure a constant increase in living standards of the population; – to establish and consolidate a planned market mechanism in the agrarian-industrial sector, to give recognition to the right of existence and development of various forms of economic activity (kolkhozes, joint-stock companies, and other associations)4 and granting them independence in the management of production; – to reject any administrative interference [in the production process], to fix the right of every peasant to choose the nature of his economic activity; – to achieve the transformation to a pluralistic economy by non-violent evolutionary means, which would require from the state the implementation of a complex reform based on long-range non-violent political, economic, demographic and scientific and technological programmes; […] to give support to the revival and development of various forms of the cooperative movement as one of our strategic goals […] to develop broad cooperation between the village and the city in order to create new sources of employment […] 3. In the sphere of land reform, [the ALPK] considers land reform and the establishment of a liberal rural economy to be one of the main aims of agrarian reform; – the party is convinced that under present circumstances free sale and purchase of land would be a tragedy for most of the peasants who have no financial means to purchase land and would lead to the emergence of a landless mass of peasants and to the concentration of land in the hands of a few profiteers, to the destruction […] of peasant farms and to the social degeneration of the rural population; […] – the party favours providing plots of land to the population for personal use, gardening and building; – the party recognizes the need for state regulation of the rights of land owners and users. […]5 Source: Central Asia Information and Analytical Centre (Sweden), (http://www.cac.org/).

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NOTES 1. In 1992–93, the total number of cattle decreased by 5.4 per cent, swine by 31.3 per cent, sheep and goats by 16.2 per cent. Potato production decreased by 20 per cent, vegetables by 38 per cent, eggs by 36 per cent, and wool by 9 per cent (Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 28 April 1994). 2. Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 29 November 1994. 3. Tsentral’naia Aziia, 2 (1997), p. 104. 4. By 1994, it became obvious that chaotic parcelling in the course of the agrarian reform had resulted in the creation of numerous farms and enterprises incapable of surviving under market conditions. By 1 July 1994, 21,018 small peasant farms had been created (Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 17 August 1994). However, some observers believed that only about 2,000 of them were capable of surviving (Stepanenko, ‘Agrarnye reformy Kyrgyzstana’, p. 38). 5. In February 1994, in accordance with the presidential decree on the further development of land reform, the peasants were not granted the right to private land ownership, but received land for their personal use for 49 years. They could lease it, exchange it, use it as collateral and bequeath it to their heirs. The November 1995 decree increased the term of land use from 49 to 99 years. However, the issue of private ownership of land remained unresolved. Despite the fact that Article 4 of the 1993 Constitution of Kyrgyzstan proclaimed the right to private ownership of land, the January 1996 constitutional amendment deleted this stipulation (Stepanenko, ‘Agrarnye reformy Kyrgyzstana’, p. 40).

ASABA INTRODUCTION The Asaba (Banner) Movement was one of the first ‘national democratic’ organizations to appear in Kyrgyzstan during the period of perestroika. About 70 people participated in the constituent conference of the ‘organizing committee of a democratic movement’, which was held on 26 April 1990. The conference adopted the organization’s rules and elected an executive committee of 25 people, and an executive council of seven, which included the party co-chairmen Kadyr Matkaziyev and Chapyrashty Bazarbayev.1 Asaba proclaimed its goals to be the democratization of society, raising the living standards of the indigenous population, creating a class of indigenous blue-collar cadres, increasing the role of the Kyrgyz language and promoting Kyrgyz national culture. The movement was very active during the period of the so-called Velvet Revolution, which brought President Akayev to power. Six of the nine initiators of the 1990 hunger strike, which was a key stage in toppling the communist regime in Kyrgyzstan, were Asaba members. In 1991, Asaba was among the organizers of the 13-day BishkekKarakul march, which commemorated the 75th anniversary of the 1916 Kyrgyz national uprising against the Russian Empire.2 Asaba considered this uprising to mark the beginning of the Kyrgyz liberation struggle. The organizational congress of the Asaba Party was held on 2 November 1991. The party, which had several branches around the republic, had a membership of 700, primarily blue-collar youth. It backed President Akayev’s reforms, which were aimed at creating a socially-oriented market economy. The Asaba Party programme favoured a privileged status for Kyrgyz nationals.

PROGRAMME […] Material Well-Being [The party is of the opinion] that public well-being should be based on private property. The state should provide for every individual with an opportunity to work and implement his/her capabilities, that is, the state should create new workplaces. This would lead to increasing employment and reducing negative social phenomena. The large enterprises which went bankrupt after the collapse of the Soviet economic system, should be ‘resuscitated.’3 […] Since in the republican economy the agrarian sector dominates, and the majority of the population lives in the countryside, there is need of a special agrarian policy. In the agrarian economy private ownership of the means of production should be predominant, along with private land ownership. The state should carry out an urgent reform in

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agriculture. The main priorities of a state programme of development of agriculture should be as follows: – to render assistance to farmers in obtaining state and foreign loans on favourable terms; providing seed and machinery at discount rates; – to guarantee sales of agricultural produce at profitable prices; – to develop existing enterprises for processing agricultural products and establishing new ones; – to develop the domestic agricultural machinery industry aimed at creating minimachines. Development of the mining industry should become an important factor in the republic’s economic growth. It should be based on state and private ownership and the attraction of foreign and domestic investments. […] 2. Intellectual and Moral Values […] A state which lacks an ideology based on a system of moral values has no future. The Kyrgyz people has its own ideology relayed through generations, whose main tenets are concentrated in the Manas epic poem. This great epic poem is a Book of Life; it was, and must remain, the nucleus of the Kyrgyz people’s ideology. Kyrgyzstan is a multiethnic state. We should not infringe the interests of ethnic minorities which have settled in our republic due to a variety of reasons. But we are aware that the Kyrgyz have no other niche on earth. Only here can we preserve our language and culture and remain an ethnic entity. […] We must acquire the knowledge accumulated by universal culture. […] We must train professionals who would ensure progress. Therefore, we need a national system of education. […] In view of this, we will promote creating a wide network of schools and other educational institutions for Kyrgyz children […] both in the country and abroad. 3. Inter-ethnic Harmony […] The basis for inter-ethnic harmony is contained in a simple and unique formula: ‘We the people of Kyrgyzstan.’ We are obliged to exist according to this formula, if we wish to exist at all. The word ‘national’ in the name of our party means that we defend the interests of the Kyrgyz people. But it does not mean infringing the rights of other peoples. We protect the language, culture and gene pool of the Kyrgyz people, its environment and statehood. […] We call on other ethnic groups of Kyrgyzstan not to isolate themselves, but to join our efforts to consolidate our common home. […] 4. Domestic Political Stability From time immemorial, the Kyrgyz people adhered to democracy, tradition and order. We propose to return to these time-tested principles in order to secure domestic political stability. The following formula: ‘Plurality of opinion plus law and order’ is the most adequate expression of these principles. We have to educate every citizen in the spirit of responsibility towards society. […]

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The interaction between the various branches of power plays an important role in preserving political stability. Each branch of power should act only on the constitutional basis within the scope of its competence and in the interests of the state. […] 5. External Security The state’s foreign policy should be based on the fact that Kyrgyzstan is a small developing multiethnic state, which has a rich labour and material potential. External security should be considered in the context of the other components (petals) of our programme. The main lines of our policy should be as follows: 1. Strengthening friendship and cooperation with fraternal Turkic states, first of all with our neighbours, trying to create a sensible union of these states, possibly a confederation. 2. To promote economic cooperation with all countries, and to create joint ventures. 3. To create Kyrgyzstan’s border guard forces with the aim of guarding the republic’s frontiers. 4. To create a small mobile modern professional army, which would be able to stop foreign aggression. 5. Strengthening of visa regime. Instituting criminal proceedings against aliens with no visa permits. 6. Introducing visas for citizens of the CIS countries. 7. Introducing strict control over real estate, which should be sold only to Kyrgyzstan’s citizens. […] The Asaba Party of National Revival will base its strategy on the above programme principles and [will remain] within the framework of the Constitution. The party tactics are as follows: – to put party members and fellow-travellers into the Zhogorku Kenesh, government, local government bodies and other state bodies; – to disseminate its ideas among people; – to support national [Kyrgyz] entrepreneurs; – to closely scrutinize the candidates for party membership in order to select the best; – to promote the new educational system created by a charity fund. Source: Central Asia Information and Analytical Centre, http://www.cac.org/datarus/asaba. NOTES 1. Ponomarev, Obshchestvennye organizatsii v Kazakhstane i Kyrgyzstane, p. 89. 2. Central Asia Information and Analytical Centre (Sweden): ‘Programma “Gul” partii natsional’nogo vozrozhdeniia “Asaba'”, http://www.ca-c.org/datarus/asaba. 3. The industrial economy of Kyrgyzstan all but collapsed after the break-up of the Soviet Union. By 1994, more than 50 factories were idle. Industrial production had fallen by onethird in one year (Huskey, ‘Kyrgyzstan: the Politics of Demographic and Economic Frustration’, p. 666).

ASHAR INTRODUCTION The Ashar (Mutual Assistance) Society was formed in the wake of the land and housing crises, which became particularly acute in the towns in the 1980s as a result of urbanization and the influx of rural population into the cities. In June 1989, rural youths carried out a mass seizure of land in the area of Frunze. A temporary committee headed by Zhypar Zheksheev1 was formed to organize this activity. From the very outset the movement bore a nationalistic character. The temporary committee sought to unite into a single organization groups of individuals seeking to build their own homes. On its initiative, a constituent congress of the Movement for the Protection of Home Builders was held on 15 July 1989. A journalist, Jumagazy Usupov, was elected chairman and an executive committee headed by Zheksheev was made responsible for economic affairs. The organization came to be known as Ashar. By the fall of 1989, there was intense friction within the organization between advocates and opponents of politicization. The authorities intervened in the conflict by accusing Zheksheev of financial abuses. Using this pretext, the opponents of politicization left the executive committee in early 1990, and in May 1990 the organization became one of the founders of the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan (DDK—Demokraticheskoe Dvizhenie Kyrgyzstand). By April 1991 Ashar was the largest organization in the DDK; its leadership, however, rejected the idea of a complete merger. Members who agitated for the dissolution of Ashar were expelled from the council and the leadership of the society. Gradually, differences arose between Ashar and the DDK leadership and the former boycotted the presidential elections of 12 October 1991, which consolidated Askar Akayev’s power. In contrast to Akayev, Ashar favoured granting priority status to ethnic Kyrgyz. For example, its leadership insisted on including a clause in the Land Code stating that historically, land in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan belonged to the Kyrgyz people—rather than to all citizens of Kyrgyzstan. Ashar was reported to have taken over the conduct of a major demonstration in Frunze on 4 February 1990 which demanded solutions to the housing shortage and environmental problems, the regulation of migration into the republic, curtailing the time frame for applying the Language Law and the creation of a popular front.2 In 1993 yet another split within Ashar led to the establishment of the Democratic Movement Party of Kyrgyzstan by Zheksheev and a politicized core of his supporters. With the departure of this faction, the movement returned to its original objective—the construction of housing for young Kyrgyz families. In a matter of just five years the movement was instrumental in putting up 22 residential blocs around Bishkek. By mid1994 they had approximately 60,000 tenants. Ashar’s detractors argued that the chaotic and hurried construction resulted in the creation of crime-ridden, low-income housing projects.3 Ashar was registered with the Ministry of Justice on 4 December 1990. It had no printed publications or deputies in parliament.

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INTERVIEW WITH ZHYPAR ZHEKSHEEV Q: Your entrance into politics is connected with the first wave of land seizures in Frunze.4 What part have you played in this movement? A: What you termed ‘seizures’ were social protests. I myself had nowhere to live, and when I learned that such actions had begun I joined these people and got a plot for construction. At first I was a rank-and-file, I may say, passive participant. I began to intervene in the general process after I saw that a wheat field was being mowed down to make room for more houses. Then I said to my fellow builders: This is no way to do it. Let’s look for a legal way. In short, I took an active stance. At the next meeting, where, incidentally, I saw First Central Committee Secretary Masaliyev, Premier Jumagulov and other republican leaders for the first time, I was elected chairman of the movement. I accepted. There was a real threat that the despair felt by these people, on the one hand, and the stubborn reluctance of the authorities to help them, on the other, might grow into dangerous forms of confrontation. It took me some time to realize that if the movement was to succeed, it had to have a status and its own strategy and tactics. That is how Ashar came into being and I became chairman of its executive committee. Q: Around the spring of 1989, when everything was just beginning, did you have any idea of what should be done in order to improve things? Did you see a way of pulling the republic out of the crisis? A: It was at that time that I began to grasp the situation. My involvement in land and housing issues helped me understand that the blame should be laid on the system rather than on Masaliyev, Jumagulov or his deputy Aseinov. It was the beginning of my own politicization and that of Ashar’s activities as a whole. I established contacts with democratic movements in other republics: we needed the experience of those who had already moved forward. This is how I learned about IADO—the Interregional Association of Democratic Organizations. Meetings with ‘informals’ from other republics helped me to see the situation more clearly and decide about what should be done next. At the next Ashar meeting connected with some construction problems, I told Jumagulov what I thought of the goings-on. Quite unexpectedly, he offered me a job at the Council of Ministers. My reply was rather rude: it’s better, I told him, to be in the mud together with the people than comfortable with you […] And more in the same vein. Q: Did you get away with it? A: Judge for yourself. Within a few days an auditing of Ashar’s financial and economic performance began. They called me a crook, a shady dealer who paid with the people’s money for his trip to consult with Baltic nationalists. And much more […] The OBKhSS [department of the Ministry of Interior dealing with embezzlement of socialist property] and the KGB stepped in. Later I learned that they even travelled to Przheval’sk, where I had lived some time ago, to collect

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compromising evidence against me. They managed to get something but not enough to build a criminal case. Q: Was it then that the scandal began? A: Yes. A satirical article appeared in Sovettik Kyrgyzstan, penned by a conformist party journalist, Zh. Saatov. Q: […] Who soon afterward became laureate of the USSR Union of Journalists Prize? A: The very man. But he went to all this trouble for nothing. Few of those who read the article believed it. And then came the February rallies of 1990. In the interim they managed to split Ashar and re-elect me. And then, in August, the second Ashar congress adopted a special resolution in which the ‘anti-Zheksheev campaign’ was considered as being directed against the Ashar Movement. Q: Did you get along with the authorities all right before that, before your work in Ashar? A: I recall one episode in my student days. I organized a society for the promotion of Kyrgyz traditions in applied art. As soon as the authorities learned of it I was accused of nationalist leanings. Some unpleasant things followed, and of course our society was banned. Q: Real politics began 25 years later? A: Yes. When the DDK came into being. Q: There you dealt with issues of an entirely different nature. This must have been the influence of the events in the south?5 A: No doubt about it. Osh has taught many of us a lesson: all the talk about the individual and about better laws will be meaningless unless there are serious political reforms. We are now heading towards a new union treaty. But with the situation obtaining in the republic today, what kind of treaty would it be? What kind of union? And what would we look like compared to other republics?6 Q: You mean the economy? A: Economics is a different question, but today it, too, is directly dependent on the political sphere. Let’s go back to the Osh events—we could not save our own people even from the excesses of the army. I have a lot of evidence concerning those very excesses […] Q: I can’t agree with you. Moreover, I am sure that as far as Osh and Uzgen7 are concerned, the military deserve every praise. But that is also a different question. How should people be protected? Or, rather, how do we eliminate the need for them to be protected? A: The people should be total masters of their republic. The declaration of sovereignty is just the first step to this end.8

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Q: But if we are talking about the republic’s sovereignty in its relations with the union, wouldn’t it make sense to begin at a lower level—the sovereignty of each citizen no matter who he might be? A: We must be realistic. Q: Do you think that the DDK programme and its concept of Kyrgyz sovereignty, according to which only the Kyrgyz people would enjoy sovereignty—with all the implications—is realistic? Why, then, does the non-Kyrgyz population stay out of the DDK? A: First, because their material situation is much better than that of the Kyrgyz population.9 I don’t know of a single instance of Russians renting living quarters from Kyrgyz, while the opposite is often the case. In addition, a philistine mentality is still very strong among the Russianspeaking population: they would rather have the dreary present they have become used to than an uncertain future. Besides, the imperialist motif can still be felt, for instance, in their attitude to language. They refuse to comprehend why it is so necessary for Kyrgyz to become the official language, yet they know that the DDK is an ardent and firm supporter of this status. So, they think, what do we gain by joining it? Then the [Communist] Party apparatus, which has monopolized the press, made clever use of the Osh events and—separately—of the events in Frunze10 to slander our movement. Well, as things stand today, the apparatus’s time has not been wasted […] Q: And what about the political hunger strike your activists held during the second session of the republican Supreme Soviet—did it have any impact on public opinion? A: The idea of going on a hunger strike came from DDK Co-chairman Topchubek Turgunaliyev. Russians also took part in it—Social Democrats, for example, Vladimir Kopylenko, Anatolii Kurochkin […] Do you remember some of its slogans? For instance: ‘Only provocateurs could demand the departure of the Russian-speaking population.’ So there can be no doubt that the erosion of stereotypes has begun. Source: Literaturnyi Kyrgyzstan 12 (1990). NOTES 1. Zheksheev was born in 1947. He graduated from the Chuikov Art School in Frunze and the Beishenaliyeva Kyrgyz State Art Institute. He worked as an artist and served as director of the Issyk-Kul’ Oblast Artistic Foundation. Zheksheev was a member of the CPSU from 1969 to 1990 (Literaturnyi Kyrgyzstan 12 (1990), p. 92). 2. Komsomol’skaia pravda, 6 Feb. 1990. 3. Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 12 July 1994. 4. In 1989, the republic’s housing supply was 75 per cent of the Soviet average (Narzikulov, ‘Dvulikii Ianus v serdtse Azii’, p. 124). At the end of the 1980s, young Kyrgyz with no housing of their own began an unauthorized seizure of land plots in the suburbs of Frunze, the republic’s capital, and put up houses on them, thus initiating the Build Your Own Home Movement, which subsequently developed into the Ashar Movement. 5. Reference is to the conflict between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks living in the Osh Oblast of Kyrgyzstan (June 1990). See the Introduction to Kyrgyzstan and Osh-Aimagy.

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6. Reference is to Gorbachev’s attempts to keep the USSR alive by concluding a new union treaty to replace the 1922 treaty which formed the basis of the USSR (see Introduction). 7. In the summer of 1990, Uzgen, a small town in Osh Oblast, became the scene of violent clashes between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. 8. The declaration on the sovereignty of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan was adopted in October 1990 (Izvestiia, 28 Oct. 1990). 9. No data for comparing the living standards of the Kyrgyz and Slav populations were ever published in the former Soviet Union. However, some indirect evidence indicates that the Slav population enjoyed a higher living standard, since the Slavs resided mainly in the urban areas, where living standards were higher than in the countryside. In 1979, 9.2 per cent of Kyrgyz workers were employed in industry, 4.8 per cent in construction, and 55.4 per cent in agriculture. The figures for Russians were, respectively, 32.4 per cent, 12.2 per cent, and 10.2 per cent (Narzikulov, ‘Dvulikii Ianus v serdtse Azii, p. 125). In 1980 the average salary of Kyrgyzstan’s blue- and white-collar industrial workers was 148 rubles, in the sovkhozes 124, and in the kolkhozes, 118 rubles. In 1985, the average salaries were 163 rubles, 151, and 160 respectively. In 1988, 184 in industry, 162 in the sovkhozes and 165 in kolkhozes (Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1989 godu. Statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Moscow, 1990), pp. 78–9). 10. The Frunze events of January–February 1990 occurred when the original founders of Ashar organized a hunger strike in front of the parliament and demanded money and credits for resolving the problems of Kyrgyz youth. As a result, a Declaration on Youth Policy was published at the beginning of 1991 and a promise was made to finance some of Ashar’s social projects.

ATA-MEKEN INTRODUCTION The constituent congress of the Ata-Meken (Homeland) Socialist Party was held on 2 December 1992 in Bishkek,1 and the party was registered two weeks later. Its core consisted of ex-members of the Erkyn Kyrgyzstan Party, who left after the split at its third congress (November 1992). Ata-Meken stood for gradual reforms, the democratization of society and the building of an independent, law-governed state. The party leaders proclaimed their adherence to ‘internationalism’—equality of and friendship among all ethnic groups inhabiting the USSR, which helped attract the noneponymous population. The party rules called for creation of a democratic form of government based on a multi-party system.2 Ata-Meken relied on intellectuals and businessmen for its support. Party membership in 1993 stood at 600. Its leaders included Kamilia Kenenbayeva, dean of the Pedagogical Faculty of the Kyrgyz Teachers’ Institute and Omurbek Tekebayev, people’s deputy of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, who ran as an alternative candidate to Akayev in 1995. Fifty thousand signatures were collected to put his name on the ballot, but a Civil Court found irregularities in the list and his candidacy was declared ‘invalid’.3 In 1994 Tekebayev replaced Kenenbayeva as chairman of AtaMeken.4

MANIFESTO Today the young Republic of Kyrgyzstan, which has achieved political independence and sovereignty and has been recognized by many states and international organizations, is facing a historic choice. What kind of state and society are we going to have? What will our values and ideals be and what road will Kyrgyzstan take? Shall we opt for radical reforms or for an evolutionary restructuring of society? As members and supporters of the Ata-Meken Party, we believe that the stage of destroying the old system is over, the euphoria of democracy has passed, and a new period, that of construction, has arrived. It requires a new tactic for political action that is free from the ideology of coercion, excessive political intrigues, and the manipulation of nationalist and patriotic slogans which breed ethnic conflicts. Our tactic is based on the consolidation of the people’s entire physical and spiritual strength for the benefit of the state and each of us. We are calling on all sensible people; let us search together for our own model of development of our state and society. The goal is to prepare the ground for a good start and define our own priorities as early as the beginning of the 21st century. We are

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convinced that, if we work together to get grass root support for reforms, the present crisis can be overcome. We stand for continuing active support of reforms and creating the foundation for a market economy based on adherence to the ideals of democracy, the rule of law, respect for the individual and for ethnic minorities, and basic freedoms. We are uniting into a political organization which favours a consistent evolutionary restructuring of society and which will constitute the institution of representative democracy linking civil society and the state. Therefore we consider it necessary: 1. To maintain a positive social climate and civil concord in the face of the continuing deterioration of living standards and the increase of negative phenomena. 2. To proceed with the transfer to a market economy while tempering its painful effects. Although we are positive that prosperity will be ensured by an economy based on private ownership, freedom of the peasantry and liberalization of trade, we do not reject the kolkhoz5 and other forms of collective ownership. We are advocates of universal human values and democratic ideals. According to our definition, democracy primarily involves creating conditions which enable everyone to choose. Therefore we want our society to be one of equal opportunities, which allows choice of lifestyles, and various forms of property, values and material benefits. Our ideal is a life of freedom and prosperity for every citizen. But the path to enrichment should be honest and dignified. We are oriented towards cooperation and reasonable compromise with all social strata, and with public and nationalist formations which favour a constructive approach and make a significant contribution to the cause of Kyrgyzstan's prosperity. We believe in the spiritual regeneration of the people in which the intelligentsia can play a decisive part. We count on its support and assistance. We express the hope that both younger people and the aksakals [elders] will understand our aspirations. The preservation of our national traditions will depend on their common effort. We are creating a party of our homeland which unites and will continue to unite all those who stand for: – constructive cooperation; – tolerance of other people's views and openness in society; – an evolutionary restructuring of society; – commitment to democracy and freedom. We hope that our people will accept new trends and will be able to adapt to them by synthesizing the traditional and the modern, and national and universal human values. We will give no cause for questioning our determination in achieving objectives which we have established. May we be blessed by the strength and spirit of our ancestors in this new endeavour! We will do our best to triumph. Source: Res-Publika, 58, 28 November 1992

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NOTES 1. Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 9 Dec. 1992. 2. Central Asia Information and Analytical Centre, www.ca-c.org/datarus/atameken. 3. Bitig, Jan. 1997, p. 10. 4. The Europe World Yearbook, 1995, Vol. 2, Col. 1827–8. 5. In 1991–93, 516 large-scale kolkhozes and state farms were liquidated in Kyrgyzstan and replaced by more than forty thousand small farms. However, no significant improvement in agriculture came about. In 1997, livestock was 62.4 per cent of the 1991 figure, and crops and cereal output were 96.3 per cent (Akeneev, ‘Problemy reformirovaniia v sel’skom khoziaistve’, pp. 52–3).

DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT OF KYRGYZSTAN INTRODUCTION The Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan (DDK—Demokraticheskoe dvizhenie Kyrgyzstana) was originally established as a voluntary association for coordinating the activity of various independent political and social organizations which appeared throughout Kyrgyzstan in the period of perestroika and glasnost. The movement was officially inaugurated at a constituent conference held on 26–27 May 19901 in the Kyrgyz capital Frunze. Among the participating organizations, all of which joined the DDK, were the Ashar Movement, the republican branch of the Memorial Society, the Asaba Party and the Atuulduk Demilge (Civic Initiative) organization. In the early stages of its existence, Kyrgyz organizations such as Ashar, Asaba and Atuulduk Demilge coexisted peacefully with interethnic russophone organizations such as the Memorial Society. However, sharp disputes over the official language of the republic and over land ownership led the Russian-speakers’ organizations to split from the DDK in winter 1991—resulting, in certain cases, in their dissolution. At this point the DDK began to take on the character of a national movement. By February 1991, the movement had 34 collective and about 200–300 individual members. The number of the movement’s supporters was estimated at 300,000.2 Usually, the organizations which made up the DDK planned their activities jointly, including: the hunger strike in October 1990 demanding: the resignation of republican First Secretary Absamat Masaliyev and party buro member Renat S. Kulmatov; the adoption of a law on public associations; and a political evaluation of the Osh clashes and commemoration of the victims of the suppression of the 1916 Steppe Uprising.3 In autumn 1991 differences surfaced once again within the DDK. Moderates and radicals disagreed over the national question and over the relationship to the republican authorities.4 There was also discord over the movement’s organizational structure. Ashar sought to turn the DDK into a coalition of larger organizations, but the smaller groups and individual members protested. The first congress of the DDK on 9–10 February 1991, provided no resolution to these problems. It was here that the radical wing formed the nucleus of the future Erkyn Kyrgyzstan (ErK). In an attempt to bridge the gaps, five co-chairmen were elected, including Topchubek Turgunaliyev, co-chairman of ErK, Zhypar Zheksheev of Ashar5 and Kazat Akmatov.6 In spite of steps taken to strengthen the DDK, the second congress on 30 November 1991 ended with ErK’s departure from the movement. Kazat Akmatov was elected chairman and Zhypar Zheksheev and Erkyn Tokobayev were elected deputy chairmen. A coordinating council was formed and membership cards were issued to active members.

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The movement ceased to exist after its third congress in May 1993. Its acronym DDK was adopted by the Democratic Movement Party of Kyrgyzstan which was registered on 20 July, 1993.7 The DDK published a weekly newspaper, Maydan (Front).

INTERVIEW WITH CO-CHAIRMEN KAZAT AKMATOV AND TOPCHUBEK TURGUNALIYEV […] Q: You have said the movement’s main task is the democratization of society. How do you envision this? TT: There seems to be no doubt today that the totalitarian imperial system has made short shrift of human rights and the rights of all the peoples of this country. No people is free. That goes for the Russian people as well. No individual is free, including those high-placed officials who helped to establish this regime, because a person or nation trampling on the rights of others becomes hostage to the regime. We envision the solution first of all in changing the social system. Q: What name would you give to the new system? TT: It must be a democratic society with unimpeded economic production. Q: Meaning that it must be based on a new form of economic activity? TT: That’s right. The form will itself determine its own superstructure. Today the old economic system is crumbling, while elements of an outdated superstructure are holding on to their places thanks to the armed forces and the mechanism of state power—and they continue doing so despite the fact that the absolute majority of people in this country realize the pernicious character of the old regime which held us in a vice for many years. In addition, we would like to see the restoration of that completely free form of ownership of which people were deprived.8 Q: Permit me to interrupt you. You are talking about a return to private ownership but both your occupations are very far removed from economic activity. Isn’t the ownership issue just theoretical for you? TT: By no means. We have just received an application from a new business whose capital stock is worth 3,000,000 [rubles]. It will be the 35th organization to join the DDK. So when we talk about new economic forms, it is not abstract philosophizing for us, because we want to place political activity on a realistic foundation. Among our members are many cooperatives and production associations of a new type. They are subjected to all kinds of pressure, sometimes even closed down, as was the case with the Moloko [dairy] cooperative in Uzgen—we are now doing our best to help it keep afloat. It is a very good farm. A kolkhoz member can only dream of

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the money its milkmaids are making. The cooperative must have crossed somebody, perhaps a public enterprise, which feared it could be a serious rival. Q: Many people think that the union centre is to some extent abandoning the ideas of perestroika. Do you realize that under a dictatorial regime the existence of your organization would be problematic? KA: We would have a much harder time if events took such a turn. Anyway, we are not going to deviate from the path we have chosen. After the recent events in Lithuania we held a meeting to express our political stance and sent a letter of solidarity to Vilnius.9 Q: As far as I know there were very few people at that meeting. Does this mean that your ideas found little support? KA: No. It was exactly how we had intended it to be and in accordance with the permission we requested from the authorities. We did not want a big crowd, which might have excited people in the capital. We just wanted to state our position openly and we did so. But the fact that the clashes in Lithuania were provoked10 is a bad example and a bad sign for our times. We condemn the use of army units, although they say the Vilnius garrison acted on its own. Q: They also say it was done in response to requests of a part of the local Russianspeaking population, who felt their rights had been encroached upon. KA: Perhaps, but this is the dialectic of social development. If one part of the population achieves independence and sovereignty, the other part is naturally unwilling to lose its position in the new circumstances. One can understand both sides and, I am sure, both sides must seek accord under such circumstances. But why should army units interfere? Q: Let’s go back to our republic. You said yours is an internationalist movement. This is questionable. All chairmen and 99 per cent of the movement’s members belong to the titular nationality. KA: We have not set any quotas, ours is an open policy. Those who want to join the movement are welcome, but those who don’t—well, frankly speaking, we don’t really need them. We have good contacts with all national cultural centres in the republic. But we are not anxious to absorb all public movements. We can cooperate well without that. The future will determine the right moment for joint action. Q: Yet you aspire to be the leading political force in the republic! KA: If that is the way things turn out, God willing, so be it. But we do not intend to dictate conditions to anyone.11 TT: I would like to add something. Our rules stipulate that every person, irrespective of his origin, can be a DDK member. A movement cannot be democratic if there is discrimination—based on nationality or any other grounds. There is a great difference between protection of the rights of people of a certain nationality and nationalism. Those who do not see or refuse to see the difference accuse us of mono-nationalist views. But this is wrong.

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Q: Do all of you hold identical views on the methods to be used to achieve your goals? TT: All of us are unanimous that it should be the method of non-violent, parliamentary struggle. We are only taking the first steps and have yet to resort to the many forms of struggle used in politics. But the main principle is that the methods used at any given moment should be appropriate to the concrete situation. For instance, our October hunger strike last year12 seems to have been the optimal form our movement could have chosen under the state of emergency […] Q: Is membership in your movement open to CPSU members? TT: There are CPSU members in the DDK. But I must stress that we have our own attitude towards the Communist Party. We consider it to be an alternative political force and we intend to argue, discuss and disagree with its line. KA: It should be noted that our movement gives its unreserved backing to the republican president’s policy, which is based on genuinely radical reforms. TT: After all, we are not against the [Communist] Party as such, but against its élite, its higher echelon, which is blinded by dogmatic notions about society and which is essentially indifferent to the fate of any ethnic group or to that of the country as a whole. But we do not deprive the CPSU of the chance to take part in the reforms if it proves able to reform itself. Q: Is it not strange that people of different nationalities who seem to expound similar democratic views cannot come to terms with each other? TT: For a long time the system has been fanning distrust among peoples. The greatest danger today is that the real conflict, the one between the totalitarian system and democracy, civil interests and the militaryindustrial complex, has been channelled into inter-ethnic relations. In the Baltic republics, for instance, it was not ordinary Russians who took part in the clashes but chauvinist-minded army units bent on defending their own privileges, which they presented as the aspirations of the whole Russian-speaking population. It might be that the other side also overreacted. We, however, must stick to peaceful, political means of finding solutions, without resorting to violence. KA: Take the Osh conflict.13 It would be a mistake to believe that the life of the Uzbeks was better than that of the Kyrgyz and that Kyrgyz were given more benefits. People of both nationalities were equally deprived of their identity and treated unfairly in their own land. Q: That wound has still not healed. What can be done now? Can the DDK suggest anything? TT: Recently, at a meeting we had with the left wing of Birlik,14 concern was voiced over the fact that people in the Fergana Valley were arming themselves.15 I suggested that leaders of the political movements of Central Asia and Kazakhstan should meet, perhaps in the Osh Oblast and that the aksakals should be invited. That could be a concrete step towards restoring trust […] Source: Sovetskaia Kyrgyziia, 9 February 1991.

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NOTES 1. Ponomarev, Obshchestvennye organizatsii v Kazakhstane i Kyrgyzstane, p. 93. 2. Ibid. 3. A revolt of Kyrgyz and Kazakhs took place in the Semirech’e and Syr-Darya regions in 1916. It was cruelly suppressed by the tsarist troops and tens of thousands of Kyrgyz and Kazakhs fled to China; For a further discussion and for the confusion in Russian sources between Kazakhs and Kyrgyz prior to 1925, see Introduction to Kazakhstan. 4. See Ashar. 5. On Zhypar Zheksheev, see Ashar. 6. Kazat Akmatov—a writer and a former secretary of the Writer’s Union of Kyrgyzstan. Served as a deputy of the Supreme Soviet. For Turgunaliyev see Erkyn Kyrgyzstan, n. 3. 7. BBC SU/1753 B/2, 29 July 1993. 8. Turgunaliyev was clearly referring to the private ownership of land that existed in the Russian Empire before the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. 9. Fourteen people were killed in clashes between Soviet security units and members of the Sajudis Lithuanian National Front in Vilnius in January 1991. 10. The events in Vilnius, as well as earlier ones in Tbilisi in April 1989 and Baku in January 1990, were allegedly provoked by the Soviet authorities in order to create a pretext for suppressing opposition forces. 11. The first paragraph of the party charter, for example, recognizes the right of its members to join local movements and associations, especially in the Osh and JalalAbad Oblasts, as well as holding membership in Ashar, Asaba and other organizations. 12. See Asaba. 13. For the Osh events, see Ashar. 14. Reference is to the Birlik National Front of Uzbekistan. 15. The division of Central Asia into national-territorial administrative units in the 1920s (known as national delimitation) split the Fergana Valley among Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT PARTY OF KYRGYZSTAN INTRODUCTION The Democratic Movement Party of Kyrgyzstan (PDDK—Partiia demokraticheskogo dvizheniia Kyrgyzstana) was founded at the third congress of the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan in May 1993 and registered in July 1993. By that time, the largest constituent organizations of the DDK, Erkyn Kyrgyzstan (ErK) and Ashar, had broken away and the idea behind the creation of the DDK—the unification of various independent, like-minded political forces in a mass organization—was no longer relevant. The final congress of the DDK became the first congress of the DDK Party. The party stood for prioritizing social and economic issues through an open dialogue with the regime. In its political activity it cooperated with Ata-Meken. Judging by opinion polls, the PDDK enjoyed greatest popularity in the Naryn and Osh Oblast—not only among the Kyrgyz population, but among Uzbek residents as well.1 The party chairman was Zhypar Zheksheev, former leader of Ashar. The party had 3,000 members. While its aims were close to those of Erkyn Kyrgyzstan, it did not share the latter’s radical approach to the solution of outstanding problems nor the form Erkyn Kyrgyzstan’s criticism of power structures took. The DDK Party demonstrated readiness for cooperation with political forces of various shades, including the communists. The party did not take part in the December 1995 presidential elections on the grounds that they were undemocratic.2

INTERVIEW WITH ZHYPAR ZHEKSHEEV Q. You refused to be a member of the public political committee working for the President. This firm stand has been given various interpretations. Does it mean that the party does not want to help the President address acute problems and is not striving for accord? A. First of all, our party holds President Akayev in great esteem and supports many of his efforts to promote democracy […] At the same time, we can see clearly that the reforms are marking time and the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic adopted last May is not being applied. Therefore we regard ourselves as a loyal opposition. The PDDK advocates a civilized evolutionary means of addressing all issues. We are against political radicalism. We have Russia’s experience to show us what dire consequences it may have. Ours is a centrist stance.

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As for the committee you mentioned, it is hardly likely that it will be productive. Its organizers intended it to be composed of representatives of various political parties, national-cultural centres and public movements having different tasks and goals. I doubt that we shall ever find a common language even if we are brought together. It appears to be a pretence at collective decision-making. People will gather, talk and argue, but what for? Let us recall how many councils of this kind we have had in the past three years and what role they have played. The way I see it, the distinctive features of the political parties will become less pronounced, issues will lose their edge. Some people might like this semblance of unity, but I see the council purely as a token gesture on the part of the President. We believe that a multi-party system offers everyone the opportunity to reveal and use his creative and intellectual potential. The parties should remain independent, clearly expressing their stance—and engaging in such child’s play is, if you will excuse me, just a waste of time. The powers-that-be should not share responsibility with anyone for their decisions. The Britons are right when they say that everyone must carry his own briefcase. Had our party won the elections we would have carried the burden of responsibility alone. This is, strictly speaking, how things are done in civilized countries. Q. So you, too, are aspiring to power? A. Remember, there was a time when the communists reproached the democrats for wanting to come to power. But this is what political forces everywhere have always wanted. Why did the communists believe they could monopolize this right? They claimed that it was they alone who expressed the will of the people. Now we know this was not true. The Kyrgyzstan Democratic Movement, which appeared as perestroika got underway, came out against the dictatorship of the Communist Party, which had usurped power and stifled the slightest inclination towards nonconformism. It is natural that every party should make its views public. But it cannot come to power unless it relies on the will of the people, which is expressed in democratic elections. Therefore the PDDK is working to increase its influence upon the masses and to win their support. But we will never resort to coercion; our sole method is persuasion. Q. There was a time when the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan was a mass organization, but then it split into several parties. Were you prepared for this? A. A natural separation process is under way. As new problems arise, like-minded people unite. In its initial stages the movement was joined by people holding different, even opposing views. Its members included those who disliked the regime and outright lumpenproletariat When the Kyrgyzstan Democratic Movement was being established we sought to bring all informal organizations together into a single movement. Do you remember the first mass rallies in the winter of 1990? I was one of the organizers. The students and Ashar took to the streets. It was a confrontation with an officialdom that had been in power for decades. But people realized, perhaps for the first time, that they too were a force and their voice must be heard.

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Later, after our main tasks were achieved—the Communist Party had been ousted from power, a multi-party system and conditions for promoting pluralism had been created, Kyrgyzstan had acquired independence and its first president had been elected in a nation-wide election—it became obvious that new parties were crystallizing within the DDK. They held similar views but favoured different approaches. At the third DDK congress held at the end of May, after Parliament adopted the Constitution of the Republic, everything became clear: we, the successors to the DDK, who retained its acronym in the name of our organization, parted company with the extreme radicals. We became a centrist party […] Q. And what is the PDDK’s social base? A. There are different people in our party. In Bishkek, most of our members are intellectuals—scientists, technicians and artists. In the provinces, they are ordinary working people. We have 3,000 members. But we do not strive to increase our numbers at any cost. Figures are not that important. It is dedication that is really important. We would be content with just a few members in a local cell. The main thing is that these party activists should express the interests of the people and the people should trust them. Incidentally, we were glad to learn the results of the recent sociological polls—along with the Republican People’s Party we have the greatest support.3 Q. Is it true that your party is mono-ethnic? A. It is not. We have people of different nationalities. V.Chernomorets, [a Slav] for instance, is a member of our supreme council. We cherish the interests of people of all nationalities and ethnic groups of our beloved Kyrgyzstan, and the party is alarmed by the continuing migration of the Russian-speaking population. Kyrgyzstan is our homeland, a common home for all who live in these parts. We have made our stand—in favour of strengthening civil concord and inter-ethnic harmony—abundantly clear. And, of course, the PDDK firmly opposes tribalism and the division of the Kyrgyz into clans. Therefore we stand for proportional representation in future elections, and oppose territorial representation, where clan interests often take precedence.4 Q. Now about the elections. What do you think of the present composition of Parliament? A. I think it is an impermissible luxury for a small republic like ours to have 350 people’s deputies. When you observe their work, you can see that no more than 50 of them are really active. The rest are just sitting there. We need a professional Zhogorku Kenesh [parliament] with all political parties and movements represented. Then the political atmosphere would improve and there would be no need for picketing and rallies. The PDDK advocates the dissolution of the present Parliament—and the sooner, the better. But this should not come as a result of violent pressure from some parties or from the President, as was the case in Russia.5 I think self-dissolution of Parliament would be the best way.

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Q. Judging by everything, you are not happy with the present government either, are you? A. Are you happy with it? A government must be trusted by the people. But what do we really have? A policy of reform was proclaimed, people were asked to tighten their belts and be patient. That would have been understandable if restructuring, however painful, were going ahead at full speed. Now, the credit and banking systems are in a mess. Banks are not interested in encouraging production; they keep raising the interest rates, which forces clients away. Therefore, instead of actual investments in agriculture, peasants and farmers are given empty promises. Take public education; Minister Zhakypova tried to improve the situation, instituted personnel changes, but immediately was told she had better stop. The law enforcement agencies are involved in bribe-taking and racketeering and no one is even taking the trouble to conceal it. In trade, speculation has assumed unheard-of proportions. Q. What do you propose to do about this? Replace ‘bad’ ministers with ‘good’ ones? A. First of all, a division of power should be effected. We must have a strong executive power, a professional parliament and independent courts of law. As long as the authorities are guided by the old laws, the nomenklatura will rule the roost. A new economic programme has been drafted, but the approaches are old, patently unacceptable for market economy conditions. Today, planning everything, down to minor details, won’t do. There must be a new concept—only the main directions should be given, so as to untangle the tight knots. There is much talk today of justice and adherence to a constitutional system. But in reality everything is different. The Constitution states that Zhogorku Kenesh deputies may not hold administrative posts. But in the by-elections, akims were often elected to Parliament. What kind of justice can you expect if a deputy’s mandate is added to the practically unlimited powers of the head of a local administration?6 You hear different things about PDDK activities. Anyway, we do not want to change the constitutional system. Moreover, we hold the same views as President Akayev on many questions of principle. But let us face the facts: as long as the reforms are marking time and constitutional provisions are disregarded, the situation will not improve; it can only deteriorate. Q. What do you expect of the upcoming Zhogorku Kenesh session? A. I have already said what I think of our parliament. Sensible decisions would be welcome. The PDDK is not going to take any action, but there are other things that are causing concern: during the session certain political forces tend to take advantage of the stress our society is experiencing to further their ends. Such political escapades are fraught with dire consequences. Therefore, all outstanding questions should be addressed within the framework of the law, with precedence given to the people’s interests and not to personal ambition. Source: Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 13 November 1993.

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NOTES 1. Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 24 Sept. 1994. 2. In December 1995, Zheksheev signed up to run as a candidate in the presidential elections but was rejected by a special decision of the Supreme Court together with five other candidates. 3. Reference is to an opinion poll conducted in October 1993. See Aziia 43 (Nov. 1993). 4. For the problem of tribalism in the republic, see Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan and Introduction to Kyrgyzstan. 5. Reference is to the Russian parliamentary crisis of October 1993, when members of the Russian Supreme Soviet refused to abide by Yeltsin’s decree of 21 September 1993, dissolving the parliament and ordering new parliamentary elections. The protestors barricaded themselves in the parliament building (known as the White House) and more than a hundred people were killed by federal troops before they surrendered. See, for example, Izvestiia. 6 Oct. 1993. 6. After the adoption of the 1993 Constitution. Akayev began to conduct a policy aimed at concentrating executive power in his hands and undermining the role of the parliament and political parties. Thus, his opponents spoke of the weakening of democracy in the country.

ERKYN KYRGYZSTAN INTRODUCTION Erkyn Kyrgyzstan (Free Kyrgyzstan—ErK1) was established in February 1991 and registered on 4 December 1991. The ideological and organizational foundations for the new movement originated in Atuulduk Demilge (Civic Initiative),2 a social organization headed by Topchubek Turgunaliyev.3 Erkyn joined the DDK as a collective member and Turgunaliyev was elected one of the DDK’s co-chairmen as well as being co-chairman of Erkyn. At the second congress of the DDK (29–30 November 1991) Erkyn split from the movement and became an independent party, the Erkyn Kyrgyzstan Democratic Party headed by Tursunbay Bakir Uulu. Prior to its third congress, two factions—one moderate and one radical—were established within Erkyn. The moderates, headed by Omurbek Tekebayev4 and Kamilia Kenenbayeva,5 supported governmental reform and ‘accepted only parliamentary, nonviolent forms of political pressure. The radicals, headed by Turgunaliyev, called for active opposition to the social and political policies of Akayev’s government. As a result of this dispute, the moderates left Erkyn after the third congress (7 November 1992) and formed Ata-Meken. The social base of the party consisted largely of Kyrgyz youth from rural areas— mostly the southern oblasts of Osh and of Jalal-Abad. The party’s deputy chairman, Askar Bazarkulov, was concomitantly deputy chairman of the Diikan-Ordo Association of Free Peasants. The party favoured giving priority to Kyrgyz cadres in both the political and economic spheres. In 1994, party membership was estimated at 7,000–8,0006 but accurate figures are difficult to obtain. An opinion poll of September 1994 rated Erkyn the third most popular party out of eight, behind AtaMeken (first place) and the Communist Party (second place).7 Party chairman Turgunaliyev represented Erkyn in the Zhogorku Kenesh in 1993–94 and continued to head the party until 1996 when he was imprisoned by President Akayev for carrying out opposition activity.

MANIFESTO In order to return to the natural path of socio-historical development, to carry out radical economic and political reforms and to halt the plummeting living standards of the population, we are uniting into a party that advocates universal human values, is devoted to the ideals of democracy and freedom and will defend those ideals for the benefit of the citizens of the republic.

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We are confident that the gifted and industrious people of Kyrgyzstan will be able to overcome the present hardships. Living standards are falling, prices are no longer stable, we see them soaring every day. People feel humiliated as they queue up to get food in exchange for their coupons. General discontent is growing. A crucial situation like this can easily be used to stage a comeback of dictatorship. All the more so since people see how the party and government upper crust are becoming capitalists, how a handful of officials are amassing fortunes by distributing goods in short supply and turning public property into their own on the pretext of privatization. Many are asking themselves: is this how we should live, is this what democracy and freedom should bring us? We hold that the time has come for Kyrgyzstan to assume responsibility for its economic future, to put an end to financial irresponsibility and abandon the illusory hope that someone might come to its aid. We are firmly convinced that an economy based on private ownership, a free peasantry, and freedom of entrepreneurship and trade will bring prosperity to our society. If our people achieve freedom of action, it will be a token of our success and economic security. Our party puts its faith solely in our people and our strength. We believe that enough food will be produced by farmers who become a class of property-owners. We believe that entrepreneurs will produce the goods we need, because personal motivation is the supreme motivation. We believe that free trade (when consumers are in a position to dictate their will) will lead to balanced price formation. We believe that given a stable economy, our intelligentsia will be able to realize its potential, working with a sense of dignity and receiving adequate remuneration for its work. We are creating a party that will be able to unite all those who: – reject violence and hatred; – are tolerant of views differing from their own; – attach primary importance to ability and competence; – are devoted to freedom and democracy. We want people in our republic to be prosperous. The path to prosperity should be honest and dignified. We want our society to be a society of equal opportunities, but how each individual exploits them would depend on his abilities and industry. Like other democratic organizations, the Erkyn Kyrgyzstan Party will strive for every citizen to be secure and confident of the morrow, so that our Kyrgyz state will be prosperous and independent. Our party is a party of like-minded people who dream of a life of freedom and prosperity for the Kyrgyz people. And we will spare no effort to achieve this. Adopted at the second congress of the Erkyn Kyrgyzstan Democratic Party. Source: Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 6 December 1991.

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EXCERPTS FROM THE RULES […] II. The main goals of ErK: 2.1. Creating conditions for unhampered development of the individual, for safeguarding the interests and rights of citizens of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. 2.2. Creating a real democratic state governed by law. Ensuring nonviolent transition to such a state, by purely parliamentary methods. 2.3. Creating a socially-oriented market economy with equal opportunities for all forms of ownership. 2.4. Creating a strong executive power: forming a strong central government of popular confidence and electing the local authorities by popular vote. 2.5. Forming a professional one-chamber parliament elected by districts. 2.6. Creating a genuinely independent judicial power at all levels. 2.7. Promoting the moral, cultural and religious regeneration of all citizens of Kyrgyzstan irrespective of race, ethnic origin, sex and age. 2.8. Preserving peace and inter-ethnic harmony. Struggling against separatism, tribalism and regionalism. 2.9. Protecting the nation’s gene pool, the impoverished strata of the population and the natural environment. […] Adopted by the second congress of ErK on 29 November 1991 and amended by the seventh congress of ErK on 27 September and 5 October 1996. Source: Central Asia Information and Analytical Centre, www.ca-c.org/datarus/erk-kir. NOTES 1. The name Erkyn Kyrgyzstan was abbreviated to ErK—an acronym meaning ‘freedom’, and the party often appears under this name as well. 2. Atuulduk Demilge—a public political organization established in March 1990 which played an important role in the creation of the DDK. It stood for the revival of Kyrgyz culture and traditions. 3. Turgunaliyev was a lecturer in philosophy and former secretary of the Communist Party committee of the State Pedagogical Institute. See also the DDK, including the interview with Turgunaliyev. 4. Tekebayev was trained as a school teacher; he served as people’s deputy from 1991 to 1992. 5. Kenenbayeva was a former member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Kyrgyz SSR and dean of the pedagogical faculty of the State Pedagogical Institute. 6. Aziia, 8 (March 1994). 7. Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 24 Sept. 1994.

NATIONAL UNITY DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT INTRODUCTION The movement was formed by members of the former Communist Party apparatus and highly-placed officials who made their debut on the political scene by rallying representatives of all social strata to support President Askar Akayev’s reforms. Its core consisted of a group of Supreme Soviet deputies who, in September 1990, affiliated themselves with the campaign ‘For a Democratic Rebirth, for Civil Harmony in Kyrgyzstan’. The emergence of the movement highlighted differences between reformist and orthodox communists in the party-state élite. The first organizational meeting of the movement was held on 24 July 1991. It elected an organizing committee consisting of about 60 members.1 During the August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow, the organizing committee supported President Akayev, who sided with the anticommunist forces.2 The movement’s constituent congress took place on 27 October 1991. It established a coordinating council and Zhumagul Saadanbekov, Iurii Razguliaev and Abdimalik Erkebayev were elected co-chairmen.3 The movement was officially registered on 31 December 1991. At that time almost 150 of the 350-man Supreme Soviet were among its members. However, the heterogeneity of the movement’s political forces adversely affected its ability to implement its ideas of civil and inter-ethnic harmony. The National Unity Movement lost its grass root support and abandoned politics approximately one year later, having little to show for its efforts.

PROGRAMME […] 4. Our Tasks To what end is the democratic movement ‘National Unity’ being created? We advocate a radical renewal, a restructuring of all aspects of public life in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan along democratic lines. Our ultimate goal is a civil society and a democratic state governed by law. The movement’s activities will be based on the following principles: – utmost assistance to all forms of social progress while democratic reforms are under way; – the harmonic unity of social justice and economic efficiency; – free self-determination of nations and ethnic groups, a democratic commonwealth of independent states;

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– precedence of universal human values over class, national, and social group values, inculcation of humanistic principles in all spheres of social life, strict observance of the rights and liberties of the individual; – rebirth of genuine folk culture, national traditions and customs; – participation in the life of the global community on an equal footing, integration into the international economy, information systems and cultural space. Proceeding from the above principles, National Unity will focus on the following tasks: In the Political Sphere To live up to its name, National Unity will work for the consolidation of all healthy forces in society, strengthening civil concord and inter-ethnic harmony. The movement firmly declares that it will serve as a political force consistently upholding the vital interests of all peoples of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and contributing to a democratic restructuring of all aspects of life. Expressing the democratic aspirations of all strata of society—the working class, peasantry, and intelligentsia—the movement will be taking a most active part in shaping the so-called ‘middle class’. It is a class of working property-owners. In all the advanced countries it plays the role of accelerating society’s progress along a democratic road. At the same time, we will resolutely protect the interests of the most vulnerable strata of the population and help them in every way; we refer to the disabled, the elderly, families with many children, single women, students, young workers. These tasks can be tackled successfully if the interests of the state are identical with the interests of society. Therefore, National Unity firmly stands for: – restructuring state institutions into instruments of genuine government by the people; – an indelible unity of state power with popular self-government; – a clear-cut division of power—legislative, executive and judicial. The activities of National Unity are centred on the individual. Guided by constitutional acts, legal norms and laws, the movement will fight for: – guaranteed rights and liberties for every citizen; – unobstructed participation of every individual in professional, political, ethnic, and cultural associations; – freedom of creativity, conscience, and expression, and freedom of the press. National Unity proclaims its adherence to the law, to legality and to action through constitutional means. Our firm stand in matters of principle does not mean that we reject compromise in other matters. We are against any confrontation, any ‘war’ with other parties and movements. In the Economic Sphere The fundamental principle here is the unity of social justice and cost efficiency. We believe the only way to achieve this is to combine two mechanisms—free market relations and sensible state regulation. We consider it to be an act of social justice to transfer the bulk of state property into the hands of society, the people, and above all, the labour collectives. At the same time we are not against the development of private ownership.

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National Unity supports: – transfer to a mixed market economy based on variety and equality of different forms of ownership: state, collective, private, public stockholding, cooperative, etc.; – maximum competition between the various forms of ownership and of economic activity as a factor facilitating the efficient development of production; – utilizing the positive experience of advanced countries in the process of privatization; – priority for the development of shareholding, that is, public companies in which every worker, every member of the work collective, becomes a property owner. We hold that if business activity is to develop, regional peculiarities must be taken into account—the ethnic and demographic composition of the population, historical traditions, economic culture, competence of the work force. We will make sure that the wealth of certain strata of the population does not become an excuse for the deterioration of living standards and even for the poverty of other strata. While supporting and opening doors to the strong and enterprising, the need for a mechanism to protect and assist the weak should not be overlooked. In the Sphere of Inter-ethnic Relations National Unity is a political organization firmly upholding equal rights for all people, irrespective of their nationality and place of birth. We advocate: – equal rights and unhindered development of people of all nationalities and ethnic groups; – the right of nations to self-determination, development of national culture and language, customs and traditions; – genuine sovereignty of republics and national autonomies; – regard for the protection of interests and rights of national minorities; – resolving interethnic conflicts through dialogue and national concord; – pre-empting [a sense of] the need to emigrate,4 and introduction of a legal refugee status; – full restoration of the rights of the peoples that were subjected to repression and deportation.5 National Unity will wage an unrelenting struggle against any form of chauvinism, nationalism, racism or discrimination on the grounds of language or national affiliation, or of place of birth or residence. In the Sphere of International Relations Today the life of independent Kyrgyzstan is arousing lively interest throughout the world. For the first time in its history the country is entering a new plane of international relations; it is establishing direct ties with foreign countries. The first nation-wide presidential elections were extensively covered in the foreign mass media. One task of National Unity is to contribute to the international recognition of Kyrgyzstan, and to its entry into the UN as an independent and equal entity. We will promote international contacts in all spheres: political, economic and humanitarian. The movement will cooperate with a variety of political parties, help strengthen contacts with foreign firms, corporations and individual businessmen and work for integrating Kyrgyzstan into the world economic order.

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*** We are living in controversial times. Our economy is on the verge of collapse. Our political situation is fraught with unpredictable changes. Long-awaited democracy is approaching, overcoming all those obstacles and hurdles. The republics and the country as a whole have a unique chance of returning to civilized social development. But it takes more than just wishing and talking. The time to act has come. What is needed today more than ever before is people generating constructive ideas, leaders capable of not only criticizing but of creating new progressive structures and accelerating political and social processes. We repeat: these are tasks that cannot be tackled single-handedly. We will prevail only through united efforts and consensus. Source: Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 22 October 1991. NOTES 1. Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 26 July 1991. 2. Ibid., 22 Aug. 1991. 3. Ibid., 29 Oct. 1991. 4. See Introduction to Kyrgyzstan and notes 7 and 9 there. 5. In the years of the Stalinist purges, many Kyrgyz, as well as representatives of other peoples of the USSR, were subjected to mass repression. In addition, Kyrgyzstan became the place of exile for many repressed peoples, especially Germans and North Caucasians. Even after their official rehabilitation, many of them did not fully regain their rights, nor were they compensated.

OSH-AIMAGY INTRODUCTION Osh-Aimagy was a political organization of Kyrgyz youth in Osh Oblast—the counterpart of Ashar. Established in 1989, it was the offshoot of a movement which advocated unauthorized seizure of land and construction on the outskirts of towns as a response to the acute housing shortage. Osh-Aimagy supported the idea of giving priority to Kyrgyz in resolving socio-economic problems, particularly, regarding land ownership and land use. It thus, eventually, opposed President Akayev, a northerner, whose nationality policy placed the Kyrgyz on an equal footing with other nationalities. Members of the organization took an active part in the inter-ethnic clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in Osh Oblast in the summer of 1990.1 Osh-Aimagy was a member of the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan.

INTERVIEW WITH KAMBARALY BEKTEMIROV Q. Can you describe what the party has been doing since the 1990 events? A. We have not been idle. I have spoken with many ordinary people. The people have as many problems as ever. As a result of the disintegration of the USSR, all of us have found ourselves in a very complicated political and economic situation; I mean not only poverty, which is spreading at a terrifying rate. After all, poverty was unknown to us. I am concerned about the fate of Kyrgyzstan as an independent republic, about the fate of my people who have long been known as freedomlovers. The sinister shadow of the tragic events in Yugoslavia is hovering over us. I fear that the cities and villages of my native land may some day be turned into a battlefield. We can no longer count on Russia dispatching its troops to restore order in Kyrgyzstan. And if we prove unable to prevent upheavals by our own efforts, we shall have to pay dearly for our failure to take matters in hand. Q. What do you suggest? A. People should be armed and voluntary units formed in villages and towns to defend our frontiers, as is being done by Russian Cossacks.2 Q. Aren’t you exaggerating the danger? A. It cannot be exaggerated, because it keeps growing. I do not have any specific neighbours in mind. The thing is that the situation on the entire territory of the CIS is explosive. We have no right to underestimate this threat. Our party is bent on

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becoming a political force that is ready to proclaim the priority of the national idea or to merge with an existing party of the same type. Q. Aren’t you playing with fire? Are you, perhaps, planning to drive the non-Kyrgyz from the republic? A. On the contrary. We do not support the mono-national idea. We fully realize the harm narrow-minded nationalism might cause our people. We also realize that close ties between individuals, nations and peoples are generally fruitful. But we refuse to be oppressed and humiliated. It is my profound conviction that every citizen of Kyrgyzstan, once he has chosen to be one, should be a patriot. People of any nationality who have decided to become Kyrgyzstan citizens should share the hardships of the transitional period with the Kyrgyz and respect our laws and customs. Q. It is the duty of the authorities and not of parties to deal with lawbreakers […] A. Of course. But the fact that the Law on the Official Language is being ignored is a sign of the weakness of state power today.3 Q. This statement could be seen as an attack on the government […] A. You can look at it whichever way you like. Who is at the helm today? Former partocrats who have donned democratic attire to show that giving food to the people is uppermost in their minds, that this is the only thing they care about. These people, especially at the local level, are too near-sighted to understand what the nation really needs. Yet they should realize the stark truth: there will be no [national] rebirth until we get up from our knees and become masters of our own destinies. The powers-that-be shun the word ‘nationalism’, which has acquired a distinctly negative connotation in the past few years. As we see it, nothing else can bring out the strength which is dormant in the people. You might say that the national idea is a consolidating force. Q. Don’t you think that all this talk about the national idea can lead to inter-ethnic conflicts, to the creation of armed units. Aren’t you afraid that complications may arise? A. This is precisely what we want to prevent. As for those who fear the dissemination of the national idea among the people, they must give up politics. Their time is up. I am sure that most politicians of this kind would like to turn the clock back to a life under the patronage of the former rulers. But the question is: would the people want it? Q. More than 18 months have passed since blood was shed in Osh in June 1990. Have you changed your opinion as to the causes of those events? A. Not really. We, the disinherited Kyrgyz, strove for opportunities for our young people to settle close to major towns.4 These are our legitimate rights. As for the clash with the Uzbeks, it was provoked. Much became clear to us in those dramatic days. We saw many things in their true light. An honest stand was taken by former leader of the region Usen Sydykov,5 who wanted to help Kyrgyz young people.

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That spelled the end of his political career. We would be happy to give him our support today […] Source: Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 1 February 1992. NOTES 1. In June 1990, Kyrgyz and Uzbeks clashed in Osh Oblast. The conflict was triggered by the decision of the regional authorities to take tracts of land from an Uzbek collective farm to build housing for Kyrgyz. See Introduction to Kyrgyz Republic. 2. Russian Cossacks lived on the outskirts of the tsarist empire, notably in the Semirech’e region, of which Kyrgyzstan was a part, and were organized in military formations. They served as a border force. Recently, their descendants have been attempting to revive Cossack military traditions. 3. Regarding the Law on the Official Language, see Introduction to Kyrgyzstan. 4. In Bishkek in 1989, there were 141,841 Kyrgyz out of a total population of 619,903, or about 22 per cent of the city’s population (Goskomstat SSSR. Natsional’nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR po dannym Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989 goda, p. 126). 5. Usen Sydykov, first secretary of the Osh Obkom of the Kyrgyz Communist Party, was the official who, in 1990, approved the decision to transfer tracts of land (see n. 1); Sydykov was soon removed from his post.

PARTY OF COMMUNISTS OF KYRGYZSTAN INTRODUCTION The Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan (PCK) was the unofficial successor to the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan. The change of name was a tactical move to circumvent the ban imposed on the former Communist Party after the August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow. The constituent congress was held in June 1992. It elected a political council and appointed Barpy Ryspayev as its head. The first congress, convened in February 1993, represented 10,000 party members and elected Jumgalbek Amanbayev party chairman. The Party of Communists became one of the largest political organizations in Kyrgyzstan. By August 1993, it claimed to have between 20,000 and 25,000 members,1 although other sources put the figure much lower, at just 8,000.2 An opinion poll conducted soon after the first party congress, indicated that the Party of Communists was well ahead of other parties in terms of numbers of supporters in almost all regions of the republic.3 In February 1994 the party began to publish its newspaper Pravda Kyrgyzstana in Kyrgyz and Russian. In 1994 Absamat Masaliyev, who had been first secretary of the Communist Party of the Kyrgyz SSR until 1991, became chairman of the PCK.4 In the December 1994 presidential elections, Masaliyev, the party’s candidate, received 24.4 per cent of the votes. The growth of the PCK was accounted for in large measure by the acute economic crisis which hit the republic after the disintegration of the USSR and created nostalgia for the communist past. The Party of Communists was composed mainly of former CPSU members, and its hierarchy resembled that of its predecessor. The Party of Communists was still one of the most popular political parties in Kyrgyzstan at the end of the 1990s. In the first round of the parliamentary elections held on 20 February 2000, it won 27.7 per cent of the vote, the biggest share of any party.

PROGRAMME The Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan (PCK) is a political organization, a voluntary union of like-minded people advocating social justice, economic progress, genuine sovereignty of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and a better life for the working people. The PCK upholds the interests of all working people, irrespective of their nationality or race, religion or ethnic origin. The Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan acts within the framework of the Constitution and the Law of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan on Public Political Associations. When analyzing social processes and charting its political course, it will be guided by Marxist

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methodology adapted to the realities of present-day life and by the specific features and conditions peculiar to Kyrgyzstan. The party condemns and rejects the distortions of socialist principles, the arbitrary rule and abuses that took place in the periods of the personality cult, voluntarism, subjectivism and revisionism. At the same time, it will be working to preserve the continuity of all that was constructive and progressive in the Soviet system. The Party regards the Great October Socialist Revolution, the Soviet regime and its nationalities policy, which saved the Kyrgyz people from extinction,5 as the consequences of the objective laws of the development of human society on the path to the radical resolution of [social] contradictions. The party expresses its heart-felt gratitude to the representatives of the first generation of Kyrgyzstan communist revolutionaries who led the struggle of the working masses for the establishment and strengthening of Soviet power in the republic, implementation of land and water reform,6 Kyrgyz statehood, and transforming this once backward patriarchal-feudal territory into an agrarian-industrial country. The impressive successes of the Kyrgyz people in the years of Soviet power in economic, political and cultural development have enabled the present-day sovereign state of Kyrgyzstan to emerge into the international arena as an equal member of the world community.7 The new society built within the Soviet structure provided real guarantees for each citizen’s right to labour, free education and medical services, housing, decent social insurance, and above all—mutual understanding and friendship of peoples, and confidence in the future. Despite the disintegration of the USSR, the internationalist aspiration for unity is still strong in the minds of the overwhelming majority of people. In the history of mankind, there has never been an idea whose ranks of supporters were completely immune to infiltration by filthy, insidious crooks or political careerists. The socialist idea is no exception. It was people of this kind who accelerated the growth of negative phenomena in society. Their professions of loyalty to the socialist choice were meant to disguise their deliberate activity aimed at dismantling socialism. [As a result of perestroika] instead of a renewed socialist society, [by 1992] the peoples of the USSR have received a ruined country and national economy. The Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan believes that it is the sacred duty of all progressive and patriotic forces to search for ways, means and methods leading out of the dead end which we have come to. In presenting its programme to the public, the party, as a political organization, proceeds from the following: 1. Given the current specific economic conditions and opportunities in the republic, the entry into market relations requires carefully considered approaches and decisions. By destroying what was created by the labour of many generations, in imitation of other regions and totally disregarding its unique characteristics, Kyrgyzstan finds itself in an even greater crisis. Instead of the prospect of integration in world civilization, the danger of being rejected from the mainstream of developing countries has become very real for the republic. 2. Once market relations, in the form they are being presented to the public, have alienated the indigenous population from the land and its natural wealth, and from plants, factories and state housing;8 limited possibilities for funding development in the cultural sphere; and instituted the savage laws of capitalism, irreparable harm will have been

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done. [Damage will be done] first of all to the way of life, traditions, customs, culture and language of the Kyrgyz people, who in the preSoviet period lived according to the rules of collective (clan-tribal) land ownership, and of common responsibility for raising the younger generation and for the behaviour of their fellow clansmen and relatives, and according to the age-old traditions of mutual assistance in time of need. 3. The probability of social upheavals is growing. They may be triggered by: – plummeting living standards in the face of economic crisis, uncontrolled growth of prices, inflation, shortages of all goods. The upheavals are more likely to come from the indigenous population because its traditions are very far removed from capitalist relations; – application of harsh measures to destroy the traditional [economy] and forcibly ‘dragging’ the population into a new ‘market paradise’;9 – actions by national and religious fundamentalists10 and tribalist forces.11 Proceeding from the real situation in the republic and its prospects, the Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan presents its programme of economic and social development. In the Socio-economic Sphere 1. In declaring its firm adherence to the socialist system, the party will take into account the positive experience of developed countries in its efforts to build a truly civilized, lawgoverned, civil society, using all means open to it under the constitution and laws of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. With these goals in mind, it will work towards: a) maximum social welfare of the individual, creation of the appropriate conditions for life and work, overcoming the alienation of the individual from political power and the material and cultural values he has created, active involvement of the individual in social processes; b) making working people and work collectives the true masters of production and its fruits on the basis of various forms of ownership (primarily public), creation of the necessary incentives for highly productive labour, rational management of natural resources and receptivity to scientific and technological progress; c) genuine government by the people, staffing all power structures from the bottom up with elected officers, elections being held under the slogan ‘All power to the soviets’,12 so that the state controlled by the people should guarantee the protection of rights and liberties, honour and dignity of the individual, irrespective of his social status, sex, age, nationality or beliefs; free competition of all public and political forces acting within the Constitution of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan; 2. The Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan fully recognizes the priority of universal human values, the socialist idea being one of the supreme human values, and will contribute to their preservation and dissemination in every way. The PCK promotes and actively defends the vital interests of the people who create and augment the material and cultural values of society through their labour, opposes any encroachment upon their interests, and supports actions by the trade unions, public movements and work collectives aimed at genuinely guaranteeing their social welfare. 3. Upholding the inalienable right to labour, the Party of Communists plans to work to moderate the trend towards the growth of unemployment, which is already making itself felt. In particular, it will do its best to contribute to the establishment of small and medium enterprises and the creation of auspicious conditions for their operation. It will

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fight against closures of factories and plants as well as cutting jobs in the interests of excess profits. 4. The party believes that the market relations that currently exist in the republic have already driven an overwhelming majority of the population to ruin, impoverished it to the extreme and made its situation hopeless—especially the more vulnerable segments, such as children, students, old people, the handicapped and families with many children. Market relations should be regulated by the state, as in the entire civilized world. The government of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan should protect the interests of the working people, specifically the urban population, by keeping stable fixed prices on foodstuffs and essential consumer goods and services, by seeing to it that incomes, including wages paid from the budget, as well as allowances, pensions, stipends and savings bank deposits, are adjusted to inflation. 5. While supporting the policy of attracting foreign investments, the party does not want such actions to lead to loss of Kyrgyzstan’s political and economic independence, squandering the republic’s wealth, or plunging it into debt-slavery which would weigh heavily on the coming generations. 6. The party will strive tirelessly for the strict upholding of citizens’ constitutional rights, and will give its active support to state agencies and public movements instrumental in the further development and improvement of the system of free public health care, public education, social security, mother and child care, and a network of state, cooperative and individual housing construction enterprises which get material and financial assistance from the state. 7. The party believes that the transfer to a market economy should be gradual and follow a concrete, comprehensive programme that would prevent robbing workers and work collectives in the course of privatization, and inhibit speculation, corruption, bribetaking and other crimes which have assumed dangerous proportions in the years of the recent economic, social and political reforms. In the Sphere of Politics and Ideology 1. The party supports the principle of establishing a state governed by law in the territory of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. It will consistently uphold a non-totalitarian and nonautocratic regime based on soviets, which gives the representatives of the working class, peasantry, businessmen and intelligentsia the best opportunity of taking a direct part in governing the state. Thus it supports the kind of state in which the working people themselves participate in defending their rights. In supporting such a state, the party proceeds from the fact that it has been a Kyrgyz tradition since time immemorial to have all matters of vital social importance tackled by soviets (councils)—the essence of public government of the Kyrgyz people in the absence of a state.13 2. Together with other progressive forces, the party will continue to pursue its course of strengthening the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan and will strive for the establishment of a farsighted legislative power, authoritative and efficient executive power and an upright judicial power. The party resolutely favours all power being retained by a Soviet of People’s Deputies; holding elections for people’s deputies in the workplace so that most of them are elected directly by work collectives; and deciding on the composition of the bodies of state power at sessions of the respective soviets.

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The party regards full restoration of the power of the soviets in the territory of the republic as the most important task of its programme. Under the conditions obtaining today it is only the soviets that are capable of becoming the main guarantor of democracy and of preventing authoritarian rule and personal dictatorship. 3. As a parliamentary party, the PCK will disseminate information among the population to secure the election of capable and worthy people to legislative bodies; it will help to supervise the work of deputies and organize their premature recall if need be. The party will influence the political line of the soviets and appointments to state bodies of government through the communist factions in representative bodies. 4. The party favours a constructive dialogue and cooperation within and outside parliament with other political parties, trade unions, public organizations, movements and individual citizens upholding, in deed, the interests of the working people, and the honour and dignity of the sovereign state of Kyrgyzstan. The Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan will focus on disseminating information, and initiating and improving non-parliamentary forms of activity in conformity with the Constitution and prevailing legislation. 5. In foreign policy, the party will work for the defence of the republic’s independence, establishment of equal economic and political relations with other states, restoration of links with CIS countries and closer relations with them in the future based on long-term and equitable agreements; the profound [present] crisis can be overcome faster by common effort in building the foundations of a future powerful Union of Independent Soviet States. 6. The party will take an uncompromising stand with respect to maintaining a united CIS armed force under a single command, which it considers to be an objective necessity if the independence of all the CIS sovereign states is to be secured and the tranquillity and lives of their citizens guarded and protected. The PCK advocates guaranteed social benefits for servicemen.14 7. While favouring a programme of national regeneration, preservation and further development of the distinctive culture of the Kyrgyz people, the party supports a policy ensuring the free development of all other nationalities and ethnic groups living in the republic, equal rights for all citizens of Kyrgyzstan to use their native language and alongside it, learn Kyrgyz as the official language. The Kyrgyz people need inter-ethnic peace and concord and political stability no less than any other people. The country’s sovereignty also hinges on this. By its vigorous political actions the Party of Communists will contribute to better inter-ethnic relations and help expose chauvinist and nationalist extremism. 8. Firmly convinced that the republic’s future depends largely upon the position and concrete actions of its young people, the party will work to secure adequate socioeconomic, cultural and day-by-day living conditions for the development of the abilities of young people. 9. The Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan is a voluntary association of workers, peasants, intellectuals and all like-minded people who recognize its programme and rules and work for their implementation. Our programme guarantees every communist the right to criticize any party body and any leader, for our Rules protect every communist against persecution for criticism. The party firmly adheres to the following principle: complete freedom in debating issues, but party discipline and obligatory implementation for every

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member once a decision, with the minority opinion taken into account, has been adopted. The party regards internal party discussion on any questions of theory or politics as an important prerequisite for its fruitful activity, but it does not accept the creation of separate factions within its ranks.15 The PCK is firmly opposed to membership being seen as a source of privilege and personal gain. At the same time, it intends to protect communists from groundless accusations and lawlessness from whatever quarter. 10. The Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan will maintain political contacts and cooperate with parties of socialist orientation in other countries. 11. [In time,] the points and conclusions of this programme of the PCK will be formalized and elaborated, taking into account [altered] social realities and internal party life. Source: Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 26 September 1992. NOTES 1. Glasnost (Moscow), 19–25 Aug. 1993. 2. Novoe vremia 22 (1993), p. 17. 3. Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 19 Feb. 1994. 4. E.Shukurov et al. (eds.), Renessans ili regress?, p. 225. 5. The assertion that the Kyrgyz people was becoming extinct has no basis in truth. According to the official statistics of the Russian imperial authorities, the indigenous population of the Semirech’e Oblast (Kazakhs and Kyrgyz) in the period 1897–1911 increased from 789,800 to 856,900 (Aziatskaia Rossiia. Liudi i poriadki za Uralom, Vol. 1., p. 82). However, 100– 120,000 Kyrgyz are believed to have been killed in the 1916 uprising (Huskey, ‘Kyrgyzstan: The Politics of Demographic and Economic Frustration’, p. 656). 6. The land and water reforms of 1921–22 and 1926–28. As a result of the reforms, private ownership of land was liquidated. Former landlords were dispossessed and the state handed over agricultural land to the rural communities for their use. 7. It should be noted that these achievements cost the Kyrgyz dearly. Industrialization, collectivization and mass repression claimed the lives of thousands upon thousands of innocent people. Industrial construction ignored the traditional occupations of the indigenous population, which made the republic dependent on the import of manpower from Russia. As a result, the Kyrgyz SSR lagged behind most of the other former Soviet republics: in 1989 the republic had among the lowest GNP per capita of the 15 union republics (A.N.Illarionov, ‘Natsional’nyi pluralizm i ekonomika’, p. 81). The republic lived on subsidies. In 1989, for instance, it received more than half a billion rubles from the federal budget (Kommunist Uzbekistana 14 (1989), p. 27). 8. During Soviet rule, most housing was owned by the state and was rented at a token rate to the bulk of the urban population. During the initial stage of market reforms, those who lived in state-owned housing were given title of the property. The Communists were insinuating that future generations were going to be deprived of inexpensive housing. 9. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the economic situation in the republic deteriorated noticeably. GNP gradually decreased and by 1996 fell to 53.5 per cent of the 1990 level, while industrial output fell to 36.3 per cent. This resulted in the deterioration of living standards, accompanied by galloping inflation: 85 per cent in 1991; 855 per cent in 1992 and 1209 per cent in 1993. In spite of wage increases, real wages of employees in the national economy dropped by an average of 30–50 per cent (Abazov, ‘Politicheskie preobrazovaniia v Kyrgyzstane i evoliutsiia presidentskoi sistemy’, p. 27). In 1992 the average wage was one-third of the figure for Russia. Consumption of meat, meat products

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and vegetables was down by 20 per cent from 1990; milk, dairy products and sugar by 30 per cent; fish and fish products by 70 per cent (Res-Publika, 16 Dec. 1992). 10. The idea of the Kyrgyz nationality’s interests taking precedence over those of other nationalities was supported by the Ashar Movement and by the Asaba Party, which also adopted Islamic slogans. See Introduction to Kyrgyzstan. 11. With regard to political appointments two important factors come into play: the age old clan rivalry which is deeply rooted in Kyrgyz society; and localist tendencies most notably the division between north and south. Conflicts arising from the northsouth divide have been documented in Jalal-Abad Oblast in 1992 (Res-Publika, 19 Dec. 1992). Akayev himself, who hails from the Issyk-Kul Oblast in the north, has been attacked for having a local bias. In reply to one such series of allegations, the press carried data on regional representation in the presidential apparatus. The aim was to show that all six oblasts then in existence were represented. Of 94 Kyrgyz, there were 11 from Jalal-Abad, 20 from Issyk-Kul, 19 from Naryn, 8 from Osh, 6 from Talas and 30 from Chu Oblast (Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 9 Dec. 1992). 12. The slogan used by the Bolsheviks during the struggle for power in 1917. 13. The name of the contemporary Kyrgyz parliament—the Zhogorku Kenesh (Supreme Council)—was taken from the Kyrgyz epic poem Manas, published in 1885, in which a body of that name decided all questions of tribal life. 14. Since the establishment of the CIS, Kyrgyzstan has favoured a system of defence based on the Soviet model in which the Kyrgyz SSR belonged to the Turkestan military district controlled from Moscow with its headquarters in Tashkent. Kyrgyzstan began to raise a national army in mid-1992. It joined the defence structures of the CIS which succeeded the USSR. In June 1995 Kyrgyzstan’s national army numbered an estimated 7,000. In June 1994, Kyrgyzstan joined NATO’s ‘Partnership for Peace’ programme of military cooperation (The Europa World Year Book 1996, Vol. 2, p. 1898). 15. The PCK modelled itself on the CPSU, whose activity was based on the principle of democratic centralism and which prohibited factions within its ranks.

PEASANT PARTY OF KYRGYZSTAN INTRODUCTION The Peasant Party was organized in October–November 19911 and officially established on 8 December 1991. It supported Akayev’s policies aimed at introducing the principles of market economy in agriculture. The founders of the party included members of the State Economic Commission on Agricultural Reform—Zh.A.Akeneyev, S.T. Absamatov, chairmen of the oblast associations of the Peasant Union,2 and a group of prosperous farmers. The aim of the founders was to create a mass party of the rural population, which would comprise over 60 per cent of the total population of Kyrgyzstan. They sought to secure rural support, not only for agricultural reform, but for Akayev’s policies in general. However, according to an opinion poll of November 1993, only 3.8 per cent of the country’s electorate supported the Peasant Party.3 The inability of the party to gain widespread backing may be explained, in part, by the failure of the agricultural reform itself, which consisted mostly of administrative restructuring of large state and collective farms and uncontrolled privatization of former state property.

DRAFT PROGRAMME Our republic is undergoing a demanding and crucial period on the path to its independence. The impact of the command economy weighs heavily on the shoulders of the Kyrgyz people, most of whom are inhabitants of rural areas.4 Agriculture is the core of Kyrgyzstan’s economy.5 However, existing economic relations do not stimulate peasant labour. Exorbitant increases in the cost of technology, building materials, fertilizers and fodder, together with fixed wholesale prices of agricultural goods, reduce the efforts of a farmer to naught. In the prevailing difficult circumstances, when, at last, it has become necessary to restore to the peasant his historical rights, it is the Peasant Party, serving as a political organization, which is able, in practice, to defend the village, the peasants and their interests. The Peasant Party intends to defend peasants’ interests at all levels, in the Supreme Soviet, in the government, and in the organs of local administration of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. The Peasant Party, acting in accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, through its representatives in the republican parliament, intends to significantly influence the process of decision making on economic and social issues in favour of peasants.

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TASKS OF THE PEASANT PARTY The aims and tasks of the Peasant Party are to give priority to the social development of rural areas; to carry out a fundamental restructuring of the existing economic organization and laws governing rural areas in order to satisfy the basic need of the entire population of the republic for food products; to support reforms in rural areas, especially, land reform, and to support various forms of entrepreneurial activity; to implement and protect the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of peasants.6 The Peasant Party bases its activity on the following principles: the independence of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan; the national wealth of the republic—its land, mineral resources, water and other natural resources are the property of the people of the republic; freedom of entrepreneurial activity of citizens, pluralism of entrepreneurial activity, development of market relations; national consensus and stability of inter-ethnic relations in the republic.

SUPPORTING THE LAND REFORM AS A KEY TO ALTERING THE STRUCTURE OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS IN RURAL AREAS The highest level of agricultural development has been achieved in countries where land ownership is predominantly private. The main task of the land reform is to end the state’s monopoly over the ownership of land. The adoption in 1991 of the Land Code and the Law on Land Reform in the Republic of Kyrgyzstan is only the first step towards abolishing the state monopoly on land and transferring its control and use to its true owners—the workers. However, political forces with vested interests in the republic, certain heads of state bodies and directors of agricultural enterprises which belong to the state, for various reasons, paramount among them being loss of power, position and easy money, are opposing implementation of the land reform.7 The Peasant Party has set as its chief goal the earliest possible implementation of the land reform. CREATING A MARKET SYSTEM IN AGRICULTURE The implementation of land reform can be efficient only on the condition that market relations exist and that competitive institutions are created in the rural economy. Creating a market system in rural areas presupposes de-monopolization, privatization of the state-ownership of the means of production, the restructuring of economic activity in existing collective farms in accordance with the generally accepted principles of the cooperative movement—especially in regard to the organization of manufacturing processes and creation of a wide network of producers of agriculture goods and of commercial bodies performing various services. SOCIAL POLICY OF THE PEASANT PARTY One of the main tasks of the Peasant Party is to enhance the development of the social infrastructure in rural areas, which is vital in order to fundamentally improve the standard of living and the material and cultural life of the rural population, including education

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and culture, and in order to develop technology for raising the level of agriculture and improving people’s daily life and work. The agricultural reforms will inevitably result in increasing the efficiency of agricultural labour and increasing its productivity, thus causing redundancy of the agricultural labour force. In order to overcome the negative consequences of this process and to defuse social tension, the Peasant Party intends to implement its special policy of guaranteeing jobs for the rural population.8 The Peasant Party supports private scientific initiatives, and seeks to establish special vocational and technical schools, which would train workers to run farms and agricultural enterprises. The Peasant Party presupposes that education and medical services among agricultural workers will eventually achieve the highest level, and it will cooperate, however possible, in this development. NATIONALITY POLICY OF THE PEASANT PARTY The Peasant Party will resolve the national question on the basis of equality of all the nationalities of the people of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, will struggle against manifestations of chauvinism and nationalism in whatever form they take, will take into account specific features of each people [ethnic group] in resolving conflicts, without infringing upon the rights and interests of citizens of other nationalities.9 This version of the draft programme of the Peasant Party has been prepared by the initiating group for convening a constituent congress. Source: Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 6 December 1991. NOTES 1. Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 20 November 1991. 2. The Peasant Union was a trade union of agricultural workers. Its constituent congress was held in February 1991. N.Jumabayev, deputy chairman of the agro-industrial council of the Panfilov Raion served as its chairman (Sovetskaia Kirgyziia, 23 February 1991). 3. Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 26 December 1993. 4. In 1989, 62 per cent of republic’s population lived in rural areas (Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1989g. Statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Moscow, 1990), p. 24). 5. In 1988, 44.6 per cent of the total manpower was employed in agriculture (Aleksandrov, ‘Spetsificheskie sluchai ekonomicheskoi otstalosti’, p. 145). 6. In 1991 a series of laws were adopted in Kyrgyzstan which called for changes in the economic structure of agriculture: the Land Code, the Law on Peasant Holdings, the Law on Employment of the Population. The laws established the legal status of farmers’ holdings, established norms for allocation of land, and defined relations of individual farmers with those government organs responsible for the agricultural reforms. In addition, a decision was taken to establish a Kyrgyz peasant bank and an agricultural commodities exchange. 7. Apparently, the reference is to the political élite of south Kyrgyzstan, headed by Masaliyev, and opposed to Akayev’s ‘northern’ approach. Agricultural relations in the south of Kyrgyzstan were characterized by an authoritarian approach. Chairmen of collective or state farms sought to preserve the former centralized agricultural structure. 8. The Law on Employment of the Population defines areas whose agricultural development is to be given priority. In these areas, the government was to subsidize employment, fostering

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the establishment of small agricultural enterprises and cooperatives producing native handicrafts by reducing taxes and offering financial assistance. 9. The reference is to representatives of nationalist parties and movements (see, e.g. Ashar and Osh-Aimagy), which demanded priority status for ethnic Kyrgyz in allocation of agricultural land and granting of loans.

REPUBLICAN PEOPLE’S PARTY OF KYRGYZSTAN INTRODUCTION The constituent conference of the Republican People’s Party of Kyrgyzstan (RPPK) was held on 5 September 1992. The party was founded by Professor Zhanybek Sharshenaliyev, an associate member of the Kyrgyz National Academy of Sciences, with the support of scientists, artists and writers, and registered on 16 December 1992. Its main goals were to stabilize the republic’s economic, political and social life and then ensure its steady development. Claiming a centrist orientation, the party gained the support of educated classes, students, blue-collar workers and pensioners. By November 1993, its membership numbered 600.1 Sharshenaliyev was elected chairman, and was later replaced by Zhenishbek Tentiyev, a member of the Zhogorku Kenesh. The party proposed its own programme for overcoming the economic crisis, which included state support of enterprises showing favourable prospects, granting them loans and creating free economic zones. At its first congress in June 1993, the RPPK called on the government to set fixed prices on a limited number of basic commodities, to introduce a flexible rate of taxation and to restore economic links with the ‘near abroad’.2

PROGRAMME 1. The Republican People’s Party of Kyrgyzstan is a political party which defends the democratic and social interests of the republic’s citizens and unites all social forces and ethnic groups on this basis. 2. The main goal of the RPPK is to stabilize economic, social and political life and to ensure its subsequent steady development. 3. RPPK policy is focused on consistently defending the rights and freedoms of all inhabitants of the republic and creating a society which favours the private initiative of all citizens. The party is strongly in favour of a harmonious combination of the rights of the individual and those of the nation. 4. The RPPK supports freedom of religion and respect for human values; it struggles against ethnic, class, language, race, sex, etc, discrimination against citizens. Kyrgyzstan citizenship is not only a right, but also an obligation. […] 5. The RPPK supports establishing close economic and cultural cooperation with the peoples of the former USSR and other nations […] To achieve this aim, we are ready to cooperate with various political parties, religious and other public organizations […]

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6. We favour the existence of various forms of property and establishing firm guarantees of social security of the republic’s population. 7. The RPPK demands that the state secure a minimal living wage for the poor, students, families with many children, women, veterans, etc. 8. The RPPK demands improvement of the environment and that the government take measures to protect the environment. 9. The RPPK favours the achievement of full independence on the basis of noninterference of any foreign power in the republic’s internal affairs, complete equality, and respect for its sovereignty, national traditions, history and culture. The RPPK considers the principles of democracy to be best suited to the strategic course of the development of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. Source: Republican People’s Party of Kyrgyzstan, Memorandum (n.d.). NOTES 1. ‘Kratkaia informatsiia o politicheskikh partiiakh v Kyrgyzskoi respublike, zaregistrirovannykh na 23 noiabria 1993 goda’, Memo, p. 2. 2. Dzhusupbekov and Niiazov, ‘Stanovlenie mnogopartiinosti v Kyrgyzstane’, pp. 224–5.

SLAVIC DIASPORA ASSOCIATION INTRODUCTION The Slavic Diaspora Association (SDA) was formed in the early 1990s under the impact of growing inter-ethnic tensions and the deteriorating position of the Slavic population during the disintegration of the USSR. A major catalyst for the establishment of the association was the promulgation of the Law on the Official Language in September 1989. The association was active in Jalal-Abad Oblast, which witnessed a major exodus of Slavs, Germans, Greeks and Koreans.1 Its programme primarily sought a path towards inter-ethnic reconciliation and prevention of a Slav exodus. Its president was Valerii Uleev, an artist and principal of the first children’s art school in Kyrgyzstan.2

INTERVIEW WITH VALERII ULEEV Q. What goals does the Diaspora [Association] strive for? A. They are multifaceted: to preserve peace and civil concord in the region. We are trying to take tangible steps and rely on actual people rather than just making political declarations. Our association is a body of like-minded people who are going to live and work in this land and who see Kyrgyzstan as their homeland. Q. When did the need for an association first arise? A. At some point—I think by the summer of 1992—the pressure on the Slavic population became distinctly noticeable in our region. You can take my word for it that we would have never set up the association without having vital reasons. For decades everything was stable, everything was integrated, we were living in a single vast country. When there was a complete turnabout, we found ourselves in the role of pariahs. I don’t think anyone is to blame. Nationalist trends are a natural phenomenon in a newly emerging state. It results from the need of other ethic groups to search for a means of survival, to unite and protect their rights and interests. Q. Some might interpret this merely as an expression of nostalgia for the status of ‘older brother’,3 You are running the risk of being accused of Great Russian chauvinism. A. Many people of my nationality had and will have their ambitions; some may also be harbouring chauvinist sentiments. Both are traits that are to a greater or lesser degree common to all nationalities. But in general, accusing Slavs of chauvinism would be a mistake. It is just that people have suddenly found themselves ousted

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from their habitual niches and this is an ongoing process. Many cannot conceal their alarm. There is confusion, perplexity, bitterness […] Accusing me of chauvinism is not very clever. The local authorities know my stance and fully approve of it. I have spent the greater part of my life in Jalal-Abad. My affinity for these parts and people here is constant and I am not going anywhere. Q. Somehow it seems to me—although I am not in a position to say whether this is really the case—that more people have, like yourself, decided to tie their destinies to Kyrgyzstan than have decided to leave. Or am I mistaken? A. An answer in the affirmative would be hypocrisy on my part. You may ask any—I repeat—any Russian or Ukrainian in Jalal-Abad if he is going to leave and the reply would be, yes! The reasons for sentiments of this kind are a different question. Local Slavs feel they are hostage both to the political system and to the shattered economy even though they are not to blame. Manifestations of nationalism in everyday life are only third in importance. Q. Did the Slavic question exist in Jalal-Abad before your association surfaced? Who addressed problems of this kind? Or, perhaps, there wasn’t any need for solutions? A. Surely there was such a need. Long before 1990 there were cases of encroachment on the rights of non-titular nationalities. The Law on the Official Language was in effect tantamount to a ban on many professions for the Russian-speaking population. This is a fact which cannot be concealed. Many narrow-minded managers who were unable to understand the purport of this law showed great zeal in implementing it. The results for the republic as a whole were grim. The number of Russian-speaking managers was reduced to a minimum. I do not mean that managerial positions should be distributed proportionately to the national composition of a town, village or region. People should be appointed on the strength of their professional merits. There were Kyrgyz, Russian, Ukrainian and other managers who failed to live up to the needs of the time […] Gradually, the Slavs have reconciled themselves to the idea that they will always be at the second or even third level as far as positions of importance are concerned. Unfortunately, the mentality of our people is such that they have to become enraged before they begin to deal with their problems. Q. Speaking of ‘becoming enraged’, are Slavs, who are seeking a place where they believe the grass is greener, motivated only by bitterness and sudden alienation from those who used to be good neighbours? A. Whomever I happened to speak with among those leaving, said there were no prospects for them in Kyrgyzstan. There are practically no career opportunities, no conditions for a normal education for their children. Many parents say that the standard of tuition in secondary schools has dropped dramatically because the exodus of Russianlanguage teachers has already taken place. There are no prospects for younger people. Q. What are the statistics on emigration.

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A. In our region, eight people in every thousand have left. It doesn’t sound like much. But most affected by the exodus are the cities, the industrial centres, because Slavs make up the bulk of those working in industry. Q. The Slavic Diaspora conducted some sociological investigations at the city’s major Nur enterprise. What trends have they revealed? A. The cream of the working class has left. I have already discussed the reasons. Today Nur is short of skilled personnel. Those who stayed and are continuing to live and work in Jalal-Abad say they feel uneasy about their present situation and intend to unite. As SDA president I was asked many questions: How does the association intend to fight for representation in the Zhogorku Kenesh? How are we going to conduct our election campaign? Why are we not concerned about having more Slavs in say, the, regional administration, and so on? Q. And does this concern you? A. Of course. After all, aside from the cleaning lady, the entire [Slav] staff of the oblast administration numbers one Russian lawyer and one bookkeeper […] Q. What are your prognoses for the future migration of the Slavs? A. I have done some analysis and have calculated that no more than 20–25 per cent of Jalal-Abad’s Russian-speaking population will leave […] Q. Has the association been doing anything in the way of organizing the emigration of Slavs to other republics? A. For the most part, no. Although people are asking us to help them in this respect […] Q. What practical steps is the association taking to reduce the number of Russian— speakers leaving the region? A. We will take an active part in the election campaign and will nominate our candidate to the post of people’s deputy. The Diaspora has opted for a social democracy patterned after the Western industrialized countries, that is, a socially oriented market economy. Therefore we will be fighting for the rights and freedoms of association members at all levels. And we will offer concrete programmes and solutions. We are trying to support the policy of inter-ethnic cooperation and conduct propaganda to persuade those who are about to leave to reconsider their decision. We are going to create our own commercial structures and national cultural centres in the region’s towns, not as a counterweight to the sundry national foundations, societies, parties, etc. that keep springing up to render social and material assistance to the indigenous population, but to act in parallel with them. Only unified efforts by the Slavs can halt emigration and in this way help the republic’s economy. I consider abandoning the republic in these hard times to be a crime. Source: Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 5 January 1994.

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NOTES 1. The Association provided the following statistics regarding the size of the non-Kyrgyz population in the city of Jalal-Abad—the oblast administrative centre: In 1992, 29 per cent of the city’s population of 78,000 were Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Koreans and Germans, who made up the bulk of the work force at industrial enterprises (Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 5 Jan. 1994). For Russian emigration from Kyrgyzstan, see Introduction to Kyrgyz Republic. 2. Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 5 Jan. 1994. 3. In Soviet terminology the analogy of an ‘older brother’ was used to describe the leading role of ethnic Russians among all Soviet peoples.

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC ASSOCIATION OF KYRGYZSTAN INTRODUCTION The declared goal of the association was to enhance the social awareness of the public and involve them in the social and political life of the republic. It advocated a sociallyoriented market economy and gradual transfer of land to private ownership.1 The Social Democratic Association grew out of the environmentalist movement Ekolog.2 Its constituent conference was held in July 1990. It elected a five-man coordinating council and two chairmen—Anatolii Kurochkin and Vladimir Kopylenko. Initially, it had a tiny membership of 20–25.3 The Social Democrats were a member of the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan (DDK) and a regional member of the Social Democratic Association of the USSR. In the fall of 1990, Kurochkin left Kyrgyzstan. A new leadership gradually emerged and in February 1991 it took the name of the Social Democratic Association of Kyrgyzstan.

INTERVIEW WITH VLADIMIR KOPYLENKO […] Q. The republican SDA has only been registered in Moscow. What are your relations with the centre?4 A. We are absolutely independent. The fundamental difference between the SDA and the CPSU is that the association has no rigid structure. Hierarchical relationships are often conducive to creating mafia-type affiliations and arbitrary, Bonapartist actions by the apparatus, which inevitably lead to the situation we have today. Q. Does the SDA have principles guaranteeing that it will not deteriorate to the present-day situation of the CPSU? A. One important principle is the absence of so-called democratic centralism. We have no subordination and no accountability of any kind. Each member has the right to make decisions and uphold his position, provided, of course, his views do not run counter to our party programme. If his views differ considerably from SDA principles, he may leave the party and keep his convictions. We do not intend to set up committees at enterprises or to direct economic activities. At first glance it may look odd: with the CPSU, we have become used to a party intervening in everything, to being the ruler of our destinies. However, we believe that every job

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must be tackled by professional specialists—economists, lawyers, and so on. A party’s job is parliamentary struggle. Our main task is to work with the voters, whose ideas of social justice should be realized by the people’s parliamentarians. Q. Does this mean that the Social Democratic Association unites people only on the basis of their convictions? A. Precisely. Our task is shaping public opinion. Q. What does that mean in practice? A. In the latest election campaign5 we worked rather well. Representatives of Ekolog, Memorial6 and other associations were active among urban voters, alongside socialists. We tried to determine our attitude to the candidates on the basis of our views, and to influence the attitude of urban residents towards the candidates. We vigorously supported some candidates, while, frankly speaking, our propaganda blocked the way of others […] People must be awakened to public activity, voters must not feel they are suppliants. They can be fully-fledged participants in the social and political process […] Q. How large is your association? A. In the republic it is rather small. But we consider as party members not those who pay membership fees and do nothing more, but those who are also trying to achieve tangible results. Public involvement in the republic is in a sorry state. Q. And why do you think that is the case? A. I think, first of all, because the state structure has in many respects been preserved intact, in the form in which it was created by the CPSU, although there have been some changes recently. People who have a vital stake in preserving the old system of relationships have kept their posts. Even the president’s team is composed of high-ranking party functionaries. To some extent this can be explained by the fact that careerists were not the only people who joined the Communist Party. Some did so in the hope of changing life for the better. It is on such people that the president counts today. Yet their notions still carry traces of ossification typical of communists. More than four-fifths of the republican Supreme Soviet are also party functionaries. This alignment of forces would make even a radically-minded president heed the opinion of the nomenklatura. He would have to do so in order for parliament to accept him. The prospects of the DDK are anything but bright. The movement has been, to all intents and purposes, tamed. Q. Do you mean that official recognition has made it more rightist? A. I would put it this way: they have acquired something they would not like to lose. That is, everyone understands that it is necessary to support the president, but many take this literally, fearing that radical actions on their part might provoke the conservative majority to stage some action against the president. This comes from lack of political culture and experience. We must always be in opposition to the powers-that-be. There are legislative and executive branches of power, but there also is the power of public opinion […]

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Q. The power of public opinion? A. That’s right. It is precisely public opinion that must serve as a counterweight to the conservatives. Meanwhile the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan is gravitating towards becoming an official structure and this hampers its further advance. Institutionalizing the presidency as an arm of power has not made life easier for us, nor eliminated the problems a public political movement should address […] Source: Literaturnyi Kyrgyzstan 5 (1991). NOTES 1. Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 16 Nov. 1991. 2. Ekolog was an independent environmentalist group founded on 17 August 1988. Its initial membership was 30–40 members. It split in the spring of 1989. Some of its former members joined the Memorial Society. 3. Ponomarev, Obshchestvennye organizatsii v Kazakhstane i Kyrgyzstane, p. 95. 4. The law permitting the establishment of independent political parties was passed in Moscow before being passed in the republics. Thus some of the early republican parties registered in Moscow. 5. Reference is apparently to the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the republic held in February 1990. 6. Concerning Memorial see the Introduction to the Kyrgyz Republic.

SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF KYRGYZSTAN INTRODUCTION The Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (SDPK) was a centrist outgrowth of the Open Association for the Development of Kyrgyzstan. It initially claimed about 50 collective members1 including factories, enterprises and kolkhozes. The party was officially established on 25 September 1993 and registered soon afterwards. At the time of registration its membership was estimated at between 800 and 2,000. Its social base consisted primarily of educated Kyrgyz and some blue-collar workers. The main goals of the party were to establish a genuine democracy governed by law and to raise living standards by adopting the best of both the capitalist and socialist models of society. The SDPK supported President Akayev’s programme of reforms. It wielded considerable power, owing to the status of its members, who included representatives of the industrial and governmental managerial élite, and to its sound financial base. Some members held prominent positions in parliament and the government, and in local administration. Consequently, the party was often called a governors’ (akyms’) party.2 It had, however, no appreciable grass root support, rating second to last in popularity according to a January 1994 opinion poll. Its influence in Bishkek and Osh Oblast was stronger than elsewhere.3

DRAFT PROGRAMME I. Contemporary Kyrgyzstan: The Need for a Social Democratic Path of Development Having achieved sovereignty, Kyrgyzstan is joining the world community at a controversial and difficult period of its development. In the past few years the republic has scored a measure of success in the democratization of society and setting the economy onto a course of market development. At the same time, there have been serious mistakes in the tactics chosen for carrying out political and socioeconomic reforms. Primary among them are the following: First, the course chosen was that of a major revolutionary leap from one socio-political structure to another. Instead of undertaking a stageby-stage restructuring of the economy, which is the foundation of any society, the political and state structure, i.e., the superstructure, was dismantled first. Practically everything that was positive in the socialist model was discarded, although developed capitalist countries have taken a creative approach and benefit from using its positive elements.

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Second, a simplistic interpretation of the monetary model and shock therapy in a situation where the state has the monopoly on the means of production and in which no ramified market infrastructure exists, have paralyzed management institutions and ruined the highly integrated [Soviet] economic space, severed economic ties and consequently led to a deep economic depression. Third, ignorance, or rather, superficial knowledge of the laws of market economy and disregard for concrete historical socio-economic and political conditions have resulted in blind emulation of the ways and means of transition to a market economy employed by countries that have a different history and mentality.4 Instead of the promised boons, another attempt5 in our history at a revolutionary restructuring by total destruction confronted us again with an economic crisis unprecedented in peacetime, declining morals and rampant crime.6 At the same time, throughout history, especially in the course of the peoples’ struggle for social justice and a life of dignity, there evolved the social democratic idea of a social system that organically combines socialist (universal human) values and democratic means of realizing them through the use of market economy levers. Experience throughout the world offers positive proof of the correctness and viability of the social democratic idea. Inscribed on its banners are social justice, pragmatism, common sense, evolutionary transformations, centrism in everything—economy, politics, culture. In Kyrgyzstan, the social democratic idea is preferable, if only because the noncapitalist stage of statehood can easily grow into a neocapitalist system, which economically developed countries now have. II. The Goals and Principles of Party Activity The party’s strategic goal is to build a genuinely democratic, lawgoverned civil society with a high standard of living, extrapolating from and using the positive experience of both the socialist and capitalist systems. We hold that the state should be governed on the principle of a civilized division of power and active partnership of the representative, executive and judicial branches. Humanism, progress, freedom, justice and social welfare are the main values of a democratic society which our party upholds. These are our guiding criteria and therefore we reject any revolutionary ideology, the single and inevitable product of which is political extremism, which recruits followers by playing on people’s emotions and aspirations, and by making unrealistic promises to change the situation for the better overnight—regardless of the declared goals of the revolutionary ideology. On the other hand, we oppose all attempts to preserve any form of socio-economic relations no matter how perfect they might seem at any given stage of development. We maintain that no society is idyllically harmonious and free of contradictions and therefore programmes that proclaim building such a society as their goal are utopian. Political, economic and judicial reforms will always be necessary. The party’s highest priority is the spiritual, political and economic freedom of the individual. A dignified existence, physical and mental health and well-being for everyone are the party’s benchmark for civilization and social progress. Each citizen of the republic should be given a guaranteed level of free education and medical services.

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We believe that the sole motivation for progress—the economic and cultural advancement of society—is development or, rather, the independent development of society and its economy. In the long term, we should rely not only on our natural resources or foreign investments, but on the levers of independent development, primarily on the individual, his intellect and personal motivation. Society should not promise people full support. It should orient them towards taking care of their own interests, but at the same time guarantee their security when they are unable to solve the problems with which life confronts them. In pursuance of its strategic aims the party is drafting concrete programmes of action in the political, economic, and social spheres and working to carry them out through its representatives in parliament, in the government and directly in society. Our party proceeds from the following fundamental principles: 1. Common sense, pragmatism, centrism, renunciation of radicalism in any form, and of all ideological dogma. 2. The democratic, non-violent, evolutionary character of political and social transformations. 3. Providing guarantees of social justice and security for the public at every stage of economic and political reform. 4. Strengthening civil and inter-ethnic concord in the republic. 5. Moral and open politics. We advocate: – imparting a practical meaning to, and defence of, the sovereignty of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, which ensures rights and freedoms for all its citizens; – the economic and cultural progress of Kyrgyzstan, its openness to the world and integration in the world community on an equal footing; – securing a stable political situation that would, to a maximum degree, be conducive to the implementation of economic reforms; – varied forms of ownership; – moderate intervention of the state in economic and social affairs (for the period that market infrastructure and legal foundations are being built); – securing reliable legal guarantees for citizens; – strengthening the Kyrgyz Republic’s economic and political ties with its neighbours—Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and other CIS states;7 – liberalizing external economic relations, integrating the Kyrgyz economy in the world market. We are confident that all of this is feasible. What is needed are joint efforts, cooperation and dialogue between various social strata and a search for political compromise. III. Economic Policy The crux of the party’s policy in the economic sphere is to create a civilized, sociallyoriented national economy, taking into account global experience and the concrete socioeconomic conditions prevailing in the republic.

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A major principle of the party’s economic policy is state regulation and the creation of the most auspicious conditions for galvanizing entrepreneurial activity and reviving production.8 This will require: 1. A cardinal change in the taxation system to provide incentives for boosting commodity production and entrepreneurial activity. The practice of giving tax breaks should be discontinued (economic priorities should be financed by additional budget allocations, foreign investments, credit privileges, etc.). 2. Consistently basing budget policy on a flexible taxation policy and not vice versa. The taxation rate should be fixed at the lowest possible level, in an effort to encourage the development of production and entrepreneurship and, in the longer term, bigger tax revenues. Low tax revenues at the initial stage should be compensated by a considerable cut in budget spending, primarily by a cut in the number and staff of government agencies (ministries, committees, etc.). 3. Implementing reform of the banking system which gives priority to the interests of the customer. 4. A financial austerity policy to keep inflation as low as possible. 5. The policy concerning external economic relations should stimulate the export of commodities and import of raw materials indispensable for the operation of all branches of the economy, while safeguarding the interests of commodity producers. 6. Drafting and adopting a government plan for economic restructuring, keeping in mind the output of competitive high-tech production. The government programme of industrial development should be geared to the production of export-oriented and import-substituting goods. 7. Special attention and state support in creating a network of small and medium-sized industrial enterprises that would produce high-tech commodities. 8. Creation of the best possible conditions for foreign investors by establishing stockholding companies and enterprises in the most promising branches of the economy, namely in such industries as fuel and power, mining, light industry, and machinebuilding. 9. A qualitative change in the policy of denationalization and privatization with an eye towards securing the participation of all strata of the population in the process and a simultaneous expansion of the sale of large blocks of shares to successful enterprise managers (whose programme for the development and expansion of production has passed the expert evaluation test), and to foreign firms. 10. Granting preferential credit terms to the agrarian sector as a major branch of the economy. To strengthen the republic’s economy, it would be expedient to exempt the agrarian sector from taxation, as is done in a number of developing countries. Stage-by-stage establishment of farms, both as independent economic entities and as units voluntarily joined in large agricultural associations and cooperatives. Drafting and launching a programme for supplying farmers with state-of-the art, highly efficient, agricultural machinery. Drafting and launching a programme for building industrial enterprises that would specialize in processing and packaging agricultural produce, preferably located in agricultural areas.

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A gradual shift from the former command system of agricultural production, when the state dictated the kind and the quantity of agricultural products to be produced, to a system of purchase of agricultural products for state needs based on a system of high material incentives for producers. 11. Carrying out a constructive regional policy based on equitable laws of government. Greater trust and independence for the regions. Strong regions make for a strong centre. IV. Social Policy The main goal of the party’s social policy is progress towards a society of equal opportunities with universal self-expression, and guaranteeing all members equal conditions of social welfare. Creation of a free, just and consolidated society with a developed culture, health insurance, and a constant search for ways to humanize labour and overcome unemployment. The system of funding public education and medical services should be radically changed. Society’s attitude to the weak and the disinherited is a yardstick of the level of its development. Therefore it is necessary to draft and implement a system of guaranteed state welfare for the old and the disabled, orphans and the handicapped, students and other vulnerable strata of the population. The significance of science and culture in society is enormous. The closer the cultural ties, the more universal and comprehensible the achievements of national culture become. Isolation leads to stagnation and degradation. Science and culture must be given broad ranging government support. The practice of feeding these spheres on leftovers should be discontinued. At the same time, the monopoly of the central authorities on managing science, education and culture should be abolished. Universities, and higher as well as special secondary education establishments must be granted full autonomy and self-government based on their own statutes. They should be allowed to be independent in organizing their academic and financial activities. Research should meet the requirements of the emergent market for scientific production. A government programme for preserving and increasing the intellectual wealth of the republic should be drafted and launched. Free education should be provided in secondary schools and conditions created which enable capable teenagers from low-income families to get a higher education. It is necessary to contribute to the revival, self-assertion and development of national cultures in Kyrgyzstan. The cornerstone, which is also the underlying principle of our party, should become the thesis that a developed economy is not an end in itself but a means towards people’s well-being. V. Main Directions in the Political Sphere The indispensable conditions for economic reforms are political stability in society, civil and inter-ethnic peace, friendly relations with neighbouring countries and openness to the outside world.

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If Kyrgyzstan is to achieve all this, its government must conduct a balanced, farsighted state policy free of decisions prompted by shortterm considerations or a drive for political dividends. Proceeding from its basic conceptions and social democratic principles, the party will work for: 1. The resolution of all political problems and questions on the basis of consensus, by constitutional democratic means, through establishing a dialogue with all branches of power, political parties, movements and national cultural centres, and through the observance of standards of social partnership and political culture. 2. The formulation and rigorous implementation of a government programme that would ensure the political, economic, and social equality of all ethnic minorities and create conditions favourable to the development of their language, culture and traditions. 3. Formulation and adoption of a law on migration. 4. The formulation and implementation of a government programme to prevent a further exodus of the Russian-speaking population,9 taking into consideration the special historic role Russia and the Russianspeaking population have played in the development of the economy, education, culture and science and in strengthening the political and economic independence of the Kyrgyz Republic. 5. Guarantees that the republic’s laws comply with the constitution; adopting strict measures to secure observance of the law, improving the functioning of state agencies and waging a relentless war against crime. 6. Adoption of a law on the civil service as part of the fight against corruption. Alongside punitive measures, the law should devise material and moral incentives for highly qualified administrative personnel. 7. The formulation and implementation of a government programme for the development of all areas of the republic and protection of their interests. 8. The establishment of friendly relations and expansion of cooperation with the CIS countries on a new economic basis, stipulating equality and partnership. VI. Tactical Aims The party’s main tactical aim is to win seats in the Zhogorku Kenesh, and to participate in forming a government and other organs of the state in order to facilitate the implementation of its programme. To achieve these aims it is necessary to: 1. form regional party organizations; 2. establish an information and analytical centre attached to the party’s leading bodies that would collect, process and analyze information, suggestions and initiatives of Kyrgyz and foreign scientists and specialists; 3. establish a party newspaper and radio and television channel; 4. create a system of political support for industrialists, peasants, entrepreneurs, new forms of economic management, and new structures of market economy; 5. expand cooperation with free independent trade unions which actually are true champions of working people’s interests; 6. formulate a scientifically-based, long-term party programme that would reflect the interests of industrialists, entrepreneurs, workers, peasants and intelligentsia;

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7. organize the recruitment of citizens into the ranks of the party’s supporters, and maintain democratic relations within the party; 8. establish cooperation with similarly oriented parties abroad. The Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan appeals to all political parties, movements and public organizations to unite their efforts in constructive cooperation in order to extricate our republic from the present crisis. [signed] SDPK Coordinating Council Source: Svobodnye gory, 12 July 1994. NOTES 1. In the Soviet period many public organizations had so-called collective members (factories, educational institutions, kolkhozes, etc.), for example, friendship societies between the USSR and other countries. 2. Dzhusupbekov and Niiazov, ‘Stanovlenie mnogopartiinosti v Kyrgyzstane’, p. 229. 3. Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 19 Feb. 1994. 4. The authors of the programme are apparently referring to attempts of the Turkic republics of the former Soviet Union to blindly follow the Turkish model of economic development. 5. The ‘other attempt’ was obviously that carried out by the Bolshevik regime in the first years after 1917. 6. In the first six months of 1994, the number of registered crimes committed with the use of firearms increased fourfold compared with the corresponding period in 1993 (Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 15 July 1994). 7. Besides the CIS countries, Kyrgyzstan has a common border with China, which is not mentioned here. Russia and Turkmenistan are not neighbours in the strict sense of the word. 8. In 1998 Kyrgyzstan’s GNP was 60.7 per cent of the 1990 figure; while agricultural production in this period decreased by 17 per cent (Matsnev, ‘Strany Tsentral’noi Azii i Kavkaza v SNG: ekonomicheskii aspekt’, p. 60). 9. See Introduction to the Kyrgyz Republic.

TURK-ATA INTRODUCTION The Turk-Ata (Turkish Motherland) national cultural centre was established in November 1993 to represent the interests of the Meskhetian Turks.1 Its president was Abduwali Mamataliyev. The Meskhetian Turks settled primarily in the Fergana Valley, and partly in Kyrgyzstan and in eastern Uzbekistan. They were deported from south-western Georgia to Central Asia in 1944, where they were employed largely in the agricultural sector in grain and livestock production. Of the 207,500 Meskhetian Turks registered in the 1989 Soviet census, over 85 per cent resided in Uzbekistan (51.2 per cent), Kazakhstan (23.8 per cent) and Kyrgyzstan (10.2 per cent). Even when finally rehabilitated in 1968, twelve years after most of the deported nationalities, they were not allowed to return to their native parts.

PROGRAMME EXCERPT The Turk Ata Organization has adopted the following programme of action: 1. To press the authorities to adopt a law making it easier for ethnic Turks residing in Kyrgyzstan to obtain new documents specifying their true nationality—‘Turkish’.2 2. To persuade the authorities to open new schools in areas of dense ethnic Turkish population, in which instruction would be in the Turkish language and students would be taught Kyrgyz and a foreign language. If this cannot be achieved, to push for the introduction of optional subjects and courses.3 3. To contribute to publishing scholarly literature and textbooks on the history, culture and language of the ethnic Turks. 4. To get the authorities to agree to send, on a regular basis, a certain number of children of ethnic Turks who want to receive or continue their education in Turkey. Source: Res-Publika, 1 April 1994. NOTES 1. According to Soviet sources, between 150,000 and 200,000 Meskhetian Turks were deported from Georgia, together with smaller ethnic groups in southern Georgia. They were accused of ‘betraying their Motherland and spying for bourgeois Turkey’. A’significant part’ of them were said to have been ‘connected by ties of kinship with populations of border areas of Turkey, involved in smuggling, had revealed a desire to emigrate and served as the pool for recruiting espionage elements and planting bandit groups’ (quoted in Khazanov, ‘Meskhetian Turks in Search of Self-Identity’, pp. 3–4). According to the 1989 census, there

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were 21,000 Turks in Kyrgyzstan (Natsional’nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR, Part 2, p. 89). Their number in Uzbekistan was far greater (106,000), but for a variety of reasons they did not create an ethnic organization (see Introduction to Uzbekistan). 2. In the years of the Soviet regime, many Turks were compelled to change their nationality entry in identity documents (internal passports) and other official documents. For example, by 1988, only one-third of those who resided in Kazakhstan were recorded as Turks. The rest had been arbitrarily declared to belong to other ethnic groups. To alter this situation, they had to prove they were not of the nationality given in their passports (Izvestiia, 13 Sept. 1988, quoted in Khazanov, ‘Meskhetian Turks in Search of Self-Identity’ p. 7). 3. Jalal-Abad and Osh Oblasts, for example, contained concentrations of ethnic Turkish population. While the Meskhetian Turks largely retained their spoken tongue, there had been no teaching of it in schools anywhere in the USSR since 1938, when most small peoples lost the opportunity of studying in their native language.

UNITY PARTY OF KYRGYZSTAN INTRODUCTION The Unity Party of Kyrgyzstan (UPK), a centrist party with de facto ties to President Akayev, was officially established on 9 April 1994. In the social, economic and political sphere, the party’s platform was akin to that of the Social Democratic Party. Like the SDP, it considered interethnic consensus among all nationalities to be the most important condition for progress. In foreign policy it gave priority to strengthening ties with the countries of the CIS. In 1999 it became a part of the progovernmental Union of Democratic Forces. Amangeldy Muraliyev, who headed the Unity Party from its founding served as prime minister from 1991–2001.

PROGRAMME (Abridged Draft) The Unity Party of Kyrgyzstan is a political organization of our country’s citizens united by the common idea of building a democratic society based on the rule of law, the priority of the individual, civil harmony, and a resolve to continue economic reforms and create a socially oriented market economy. Sovereign Kyrgyzstan is experiencing a very difficult period in its history. The political reforms are not having an adequate impact on the economy. The economic crisis is greatly undermining confidence in democratic reforms. We want to harmonize economic and democratic transformations and make this a point of departure in working for a better life for the people. Two roads are open to the country. The first road leads back to the centralized-command economy, the second road requires a consistent development of democratic reforms. We stand for the second road—the road of building a socially oriented market economy. We must work towards radical and consistent improvement of the legal basis of the lives of people and enterprises, the creation of market mechanisms, a steady reduction in taxes, incentives for private investors, and a stable local currency. We interpret the concept of a socially oriented economy not only as the obligation assumed by the state to help certain strata of the population, but also as creating opportunities for people to take care of themselves and of others. Civil harmony, as we see it, guarantees the priority of civil liberties and human rights: the right to unhindered political and economic activity, to the inviolability of private property, to cultural and intellectual advancement […] Economic Policy The Unity Party of Kyrgyzstan proposes that:

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1. An economically developed, strong and prosperous society should be based on recognizing the unconditional right of man to engage in any activity, which does not contradict the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, and is aimed at acquiring lawful profit and other benefits. Such activity should be based on the equality of all forms of ownership: – the state should provide legal guarantees of private property, including intellectual property… – the state should not interfere with the economic activity of enterprises. 2. The main goal of the current privatization process should be transferring state property to those who are able to make the best use of it. Cost efficiency should become the main criterion of privatization […] 3. Private entrepreneurship has great capacity for economic growth. In our opinion, in order to further the development of entrepreneurship, state agencies and market structures should efficiently coordinate their efforts in solving the following problem: – the complete removal of bureaucratic obstacles to the development of entrepreneurship, in particular, in the international arena. No permits of state bodies should be required to open a new business. Obtaining bank loans for enterprises should be facilitated. The time has come to adopt a law on support and protection of private entrepreneurshie […] 5. [The state] should promote the creation of a climate favourable to investmentL […] Legal guarantees for foreign investment should be introduced […] 6. The agrarian sector of Kyrgyzstan’s economy should be based on individual farming, unrestricted lease of land, private ownership of the means of production and a developed system of mortgaging, as exist in many other countries of the world […] A great variety of forms of land ownership should be permitted in the agrarian sector, provided that they are suited to those who work on the land […] Land should become an element of market relations. Citizens of the republic should have the right to private ownership of land […] Foreign Policy The Unity Party of Kyrgyzstan believes that the sole criterion for political decisions in the sphere of foreign policy should be Kyrgyzstan’s national interests. Our foreign policy should be based on the observance of the principles of international relations, as laid down in United Nations documents, namely, open borders, establishment of stable relations with all countries, involvement in foreign relations of non-governmental organizations and private commercial structures, fulfilment by Kyrgyzstan of its international obligations. Our foreign policy tasks include protection of the life, interests and dignity of Kyrgyzstan citizens and of the country’s economic interests, protection of its enterprises and organizations in every part of the globe by every means acceptable in international law; maintaining relations with all former citizens of Kyrgyzstan and their descendants, irrespective of the country in which they may reside; support for the policy of preserving the integrity of the CIS’s economic, cultural and humanitarian space [prostranstvo]; the free flow of information, people, goods and capital as the indispensable condition for the ultimate development of a market economy; political support of peoples upholding the values of freedom and democracy in their conflict with

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totalitarian regimes; expansion of good-neighbourly and amicable relations with the new Russia and the world community. State Politics The Unity Party of Kyrgyzstan favours a strong state, which is not measured in terms of the scope of its authority, but in the efficiency and inner discipline of its executive bodies and their ability to ensure full and timely implementation of decisions adopted. Ultimately, a stable balance in the distribution of functions between the state and civil society must be achieved. The Unity Party of Kyrgyzstan is working for the complete fulfilment of all human rights and liberties recorded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenant of Civil and Political Rights. The Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic should be the regulator of the state system. It is vital to introduce changes into the Law on the Elections of People’s Deputies, according to the principle of proportional majority representation. Parliamentary commissions should be formed according to the ratio of seats won by each party. The Unity Party of Kyrgyzstan assumes that the deputies will represent the interests of their voters, not of professional groups, branches of industry or government departments. The Unity Party of Kyrgyzstan is fully aware of the multinational composition of the Kyrgyzstan nation and sees as the path towards perfecting mutual relations: the general strengthening of inter-ethnic harmony and unity of the Kyrgyzstan people, with Kyrgyzstan’s territory remaining intact and indivisible economically, politically and ethnically; the constitutionally guaranteed free development of every ethnic group; seeking solutions to all inter-ethnic problems solely through dialogue. With respect to restructuring the judicial system, the Unity Party of Kyrgyzstan advocates: better material and organizational guarantees for the independence of judges; unconditional recognition of the right to defence from the moment charges are brought; the right to refuse to testify against oneself and one’s relatives; inadmissibility of testimony obtained through unlawful methods; considerable expansion of the network of state law and notary offices and creation of conditions for an increase in the number of private law and notary offices. The Unity Party of Kyrgyzstan believes that protection of the inviolability of the individual, and of the property and other rights of citizens should become the main duty of law enforcement agencies. This duty should be entrusted to an institutionalized, powerful, highly professional and adequately equipped police force acting strictly within the law and subordinate to and controlled by (republican services aside) municipal (local) authorities. […] Education, Culture, Science: Prospects for Development The Unity Party of Kyrgyzstan believes that rearing a free individual with a sense of responsibility to society is the main task of public education. The Unity Party of Kyrgyzstan will strive for equal recognition for public education programmes funded by republican, municipal, public and private sources. The preservation of the state system of free secondary education must go hand in hand with

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the development of other types of schooling and educational systems, guided by the same academic criteria but whose work should not in any way be limited by the state. The state should not absolve itself of responsibility and curtail its support for those branches of science and culture which today cannot be kept alive by any other means. We stand for restoring and promoting the culture and traditions of the peoples of Kyrgyzstan and for creating the best possible conditions for sponsorship by individuals, firms, enterprises and organizations. Through our efforts, we will make our citizens aware of the fact that the individual and his intellectual potential are the [country’s] major and most valuable resource. In the final analysis, the human resource will ensure economic progress. Conclusion The Programme of the Unity Party of Kyrgyzstan is a draft document. It outlines the main goals and tasks of the party, crystallizes our views on some aspects of social development, reveals our thoughts and aspirations and invites cooperation. We are ready for a dialogue and invite all political forces, unions and associations, and cultural and other public societies to take part in it. Our motto is: National unity is the path to economic prosperity. Constituent Conference, April 1994 Source: Memorandum (n.d.).

REPUBLIC OF TAJIKISTAN

INTRODUCTION Grigorii Kosach Capital: Dushanbe Area: 143,100 sq. km. Population: 5,109,000 (all-union census of 1989); 6,127,000 (January 2000—the first full census following independence). According to the 1989 census, 74 per cent of the population lived in rural areas, and the republic’s titular nationality, the Tajiks, comprised 64.9 per cent of the country’s inhabitants. The largest minority group were the Uzbeks (25 per cent), followed by the Russians (with 7.6 per cent). The GornoBadakhshon Autonomous Oblast, which occupies 44.5 per cent of Tajikistan’s territoiy, had just 161,000 inhabitants in 1989, and 206,000 in 2000.1 Approximately 437,000 inhabitants of Tajikistan left for other CIS states or Afghanistan between the 1989 and 2000 censuses.2 Of these, about 363,000 emigrated in the years 1989–95, including 182,000 Russians, 37,000 Tatars, 32,000 Uzbeks and 18,000 Ukrainians. As a result of these emigration patterns, the ethnic composition of the republic’s population changed significantly, the percentage of Russians declining from 7.6 per cent to 2.7 per cent in nine years.3 Religion: The republic’s titular nationality, the Tajiks and the large Uzbek minority are Sunni Muslims. The residents of the Gorno-Badakhshon Autonomous Oblast belong mostly to the Ismaili branch of Shiite Islam. Language: Tajik, a West Iranian language; various East Iranian languages are spoken by the inhabitants of Gorno-Badakhshon. Historical Survey At the time of the Russian conquest of Central Asia most of the territory of present-day Tajikistan was divided between the Kokand Khanate and the Bukharan Emirate, both of which were ruled by Uzbek dynasties. The leaders of these states and the Pushtu rulers of Afghanistan were vying for control over further areas to the north and south of the Pyanj River. These disputes were resolved by the 1885 and 1895 agreements between the Russian Empire and Great Britain, which led to the inclusion of the area to the north of the Pyanj River in the Fergana Oblast of Turkestan Krai. This area was later to become known as GornoBadakhshon. Administrative reforms carried out by the Russian authorities in the 1870s fundamentally changed the political situation in Central Asia. The Kokand Khanate was abolished, and its territory, including Khujand and the Garm area, were incorporated into Samarkand Oblast of the Turkestan Krai. The Bukharan Emirate became a protectorate of the empire. To compensate for its loss of the Samarkand and Ura-Tyube areas during the hostilities against the Russian army, it was given the Karategin, Hissar and Kulob

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regions, as well as the Western Pamir, including Khorog, all of which formed Eastern Bukhara. The Soviet period saw new, and even more radical, political and administrative reforms in Central Asia. These were preceded by vigorous sovietization, primarily with the support of the local Russian population. In April 1921 the status of the Turkestan ASSR was raised to that of an SSR, embracing all Central Asia from the Caspian Sea to Xinjiang in the East and from Persia and Afghanistan in the south to Kazakhstan in the north, except for Bukhara and Khiva. In September 1920, Red Army units overthrew the emir in Bukhara, and one month later, the Bukharan People’s Soviet Republic was proclaimed. Meanwhile, much of the local population in Eastern Bukhara joined up with remnants of the Bukharan army, forming mujahidin guerrilla bands known as Qurbashi, or Basmachi, which fought the Red Army until mid-1923 and continued sporadic resistance for another decade. The continued warfare brought depopulation and economic destruction; cultivated land decreased to less than one-half and about one-quarter of the population fled to neighbouring Afghanistan. The two principal mainsprings behind this armed opposition were the harsh suppression of the area by the Red Army in 1920–21 and the repression of Islam. The policy of national delimitation in Central Asia led in 1924 to the creation of the Tajik ASSR within the Uzbek SSR in the area formerly occupied by Eastern Bukhara, almost all of the Pamir and twelve districts (volosti) of the Turkestan ASSR.4 Not all Tajik-populated territories, notably such traditional centres of Tajik/Farsi culture and urban life as Bukhara, Samarkand and Khujand—were included in the boundaries of the new autonomous republic. In spring 1929 appeals of its leaders were partly satisfied and Khujand Okrug was incorporated into the Tajik ASSR which, in the same year, on 15 October, was elevated to the status of union republic. As elsewhere, the Soviet authorities sought to develop a Tajik national culture and educate a nucleus of Tajik cadres. In 1924 the first Tajik-language newspaper, Ovozi Tajik (The Tajik Voice) appeared. Many schools, as well as institutions of higher education with instruction in Tajik and Uzbek, were established. National associations or unions of artists, writers and musicians were created. In this way, a Tajik national culture and a Tajik intelligentsia were formed. Moreover, literacy rates rose considerably, although—as in all the Muslim republics—the script was changed twice within a decade, from Arabic to Latin in 1929–1930 and from Latin to Cyrillic in 1940. As early as the 1920s, the Tajik national intelligentsia became disturbed by what they perceived as the Soviet authorities’ discrimination in favour of the Uzbeks. They viewed the incorporation of Bukhara and Samarkand into Uzbekistan, and the forced uzbekization of their populations, as a gross historical injustice. These educated Tajiks tended to identify with the struggle of the Basmachi. Throughout the Soviet period Tajikistan was in many ways a backwater. Although it underwent considerable population transfers and collectivization, it seemed endemically to reject Soviet endeavours to modernize society and the economy. Islam continued to play a major role, especially in the more remote mountainous regions where the mosques were never closed down. The economy, too, remained largely agricultural. Industry such as it was, was concentrated around Khujand in Leninabad Oblast. Tajikistan supplied the USSR with about one-tenth of its cotton in the last years of the regime. In 1989, Tajikistan had the

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lowest per capita income in the USSR—48 per cent of the national average.5 In 1991 when Russian trade and fuel supplies were cut, the economy faced near collapse. The situation deteriorated further as a result of the civil war which began in 1992 and by the floods of 1993. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development estimates that Tajik total output fell by 29 per cent in 1992, 11 per cent in 1993 and 21 per cent in 1994. Beginning in spring of 1992 measures were taken to lay the foundation for a market economy but little progress in that direction was achieved.6 As a result of the difficult economic situation, between 200,000 and 500,000 inhabitants of Tajikistan were reported to be seeking employment in Russia in 1998. On 9 September 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR endorsed the declaration of independence of the Republic of Tajikistan. After several months of demonstrations and disquiet in which opposition groups protested the thinly disguised continuation of the communist order, a coalition government was formed in May 1992. By the end of the year, however, the hard-liners had ousted their opponents from all positions of power and Tajikistan reverted to status quo ante. The new leadership nonetheless encountered protracted antagonism which resulted in a civil war leading to some 50,000 deaths (according to conservative estimates) and the displacement of about 200,000 people who fled to Afghanistan. During the course of the civil war, which ended only in 1996, the constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan was adopted following a national referendum in November 1994. Political System The 1994 constitution created the parliament, the Majlisi Oli, the supreme representative and legislative state body, consisting of 181 deputies elected for a term of five years. The nomination of candidates to the Majlisi Oli was the prerogative of workplace collectives and public organizations in the cities and rural areas. The parliamentary election law did not provide for the nomination of candidates by political parties. Representatives of the executive organs of power could be elected to the Majlisi Oli, provided they resigned their positions in the executive branch. The first parliament to come into existence under the new constitution was elected in February 1995. The president of the republic was both head of state and chief executive. He was elected for a five-year term. In November 1990, the former first secretary of the Tajikistan Communist Party, Qahhor Mahkamov, became the first president of Tajikistan. One year later he was replaced by his predecessor to the post of first secretary, Rahmon Nabiyev. Nabiyev was replaced, in turn, in November 1992, by Emomali Rahmonov, who took office initially as parliamentary speaker—the office of president having been temporarily abolished. In November 1994 elections for a new president were held concurrently with the referendum on the constitution. Rahmonov’s only rival in the campaign was Abdumalik Abdullojonov, formerly Tajikistan’s prime minister and later ambassador to Russia. In September 1999, a referendum led to the adoption of constitutional amendments, which established a bicameral parliament and extended the presidential term of office to seven years. In November 1999, Rahmonov was again elected president under the new law. In February/March 2000, elections were held for both houses of parliament. The upper house, the Majlisi Milli, consisted of 33 deputies, 25 of whom represented administrative territorial units and eight who were appointed by the president. The lower

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house, the Majlisi Namoyandagon (House of Representatives) consisted of 63 deputies, 41 elected regionally and 22 by party lists. Sixty-five per cent of the votes went to the People’s Democratic Party, 20.6 per cent to the communists and 7.5 per cent to the Islamic Renaissance Party. The other parties did not obtain the 5 per cent minimum required to secure representation.7 Political Parties and Movements The political parties and movements which emerged in Tajikistan in 1989 in opposition to the ruling Communist Party rallied around the issues of national culture and language, the state of the environment and the existing social system which granted special privileges to the nomenklatura. In 1989 a group of intellectuals established the Rastokhez (Rebirth) Popular Movement in Dushanbe. Rastokhez led the nationalist political forces in a movement to establish Tajik as the official state language. A law to this effect was adopted by the Supreme Soviet on 22 July 1989. This was followed in August 1990 by a law on the sovereignty of the Tajik SSR and, in June 1991, by a law on Tajik citizenship. The influence of the Islamists in Tajikistan became especially conspicuous on the eve of the disintegration of Soviet power. The Tajik political élite, which was struggling to maintain its hold on power, considered religion, along with language, an instrument to achieve this goal. In this context, at the beginning of December 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR adopted a law on freedom of conscience and religious organizations, taking as a model the October 1990 Soviet law of the same name. By the time Tajikistan had gained the status of an independent state, the distinct contours of its political map had more or less taken shape.8 At one pole stood the Communist Party of Tajikistan; at the other were Rastokhez; the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT), created by former members of Rastokhez in the summer of 1990; and the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRPT). The first confrontations between these two opposing camps occurred in the period from autumn 1991 up to the end of the following spring. They took the form of public demonstrations organized on the one hand by the opposition, and on the other by former members of the Soviet ruling élite. The opposition parties had dynamic leaders who were struggling to achieve complete control in the republic, and it seemed that the actions of the republican authorities might be paving the way for them. During the fall and early winter of 1991, all opposition parties were legalized. The 13th Extraordinary Congress of the Tajikistan Communist Party held in early September 1991 discussed a programme of transforming the party into a ‘parliamentary-type’ association that would renounce its ‘claims to absolute truth and to its vanguard role in society’. At the end of September, the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan decided to ban the Communist Party and nationalize its property. The ban, which remained in force for almost three months, dealt a severe blow to those within the party ranks who favoured its gradual reform into a multinational, social democratic organization. This reformist trend had been increasingly pronounced in the era of perestroika when the Communist Party mobilized the republican Komsomol to spread the ideas of democratization. Discussion clubs such as Ru ba Ru and Ekhie in Dushanbe, Dirafshi Kovien in Nurek, and others, some of them created on the party’s initiative, had tried to steer the course of events in the direction advocated by Rastokhez and the Democratic Party of Tajikistan.

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By breaking its formal ties with the Communist Party, Tajikistan’s political establishment was trying to assert its non-partisan, nationalist and patriotic character. In doing so, however, it lost its most important vehicle for mobilizing society and preserving unity in those regions where autonomist tendencies were becoming conspicuous. The most substantial proof of these trends was the emergence of regional political organizations, above all, La’li Badakhshon and the Kulob Oshkoro. Indeed, the regional factor greatly influenced the political situation in Tajikistan. It had played an important role in the formation of Tajikistan’s ruling élite throughout the Soviet era. The uneven nature of regional development during the entire evolution of Soviet Tajik statehood made Leninabad Oblast—the most developed region—the main source of recruitment for the republican party and state élite. Of course, natives of other regions were included, but they were less numerous and never made it to the top of the ruling pyramid. The existence of the Communist Party structure which permeated everything, made it possible for natives of Khujand (Leninabad) not only to effectively control the élite groups of other regions, but also to legitimize their dominant position. The proliferation of political, social and cultural associations under perestroika also generated sectorial organizations. Some of them were created by members of non-Tajik ethnic groups—Slavs and other russophones, including Germans, Jews and Koreans, who sought ways to achieve a measure of cultural autonomy. Since these groups considered Tajik national aspirations to be directed at altering the existing system of priorities in the economic, social and cultural spheres, they created their own politically-tinged ethnic associations: Russian Community (Russkaia obshchina), Krynitsa, Hoverim, and others. The post-Soviet era cleared the way for those seeking to achieve dominance under the banners of nationalism, democracy or Islam. Ironically, the new political organizations that claimed to represent the interests of the nation as a whole, turned out to be associated with those regions that had been denied a leading role in the Soviet republic of Tajikistan. Moreover, since their social base was drawn from among local supporters of the leaders of Rastokhez, the Democratic Party and the Islamic Renaissance Party, these parties were dominated by regional interests. They became dependent on Garm, Karategin or GornoBadakhshon for their support and were, in turn, used by the ruling élites of these regions. In the fall of 1992, for instance, there was an attempt to proclaim the Garm Islamic Republic. Thus, the civil war that erupted in 1992 was, in fact, in many ways a regional war,9 in which native groups struggled to preserve or change the balance of power and the methods of selecting ruling élites that had existed prior to independence. Submitting initially to pressure by opposition leaders in late spring of 1992, the Khujand ruling élite agreed to create the Government of National Reconciliation, with the participation of Rastokhez, the Democratic Party and the IRPT. At the same time, it sought a counterweight to these forces in the Kulob regional élite group which represented one of the most underdeveloped regions in Tajikistan. The loyalty of the Kulob leaders was attained in exchange for incorporation of the adjoining Kurgan-Tyube Oblast into that region. In November 1992, they compelled Rahmon Nabiyev, a native of Khujand, to resign from the office of president, and in early December 1992, detachments of the Kulob Popular Front fighters, who were recruited primarily from the most indigent groups and often headed by common criminals, entered Dushanbe. The outcome of the civil war was, to all intents and purposes, decided by the natives of Kulob. One of the main results of this bloody war—characterized by outstanding

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cruelty on all sides—was the rise of Kulobis to the top of the state hierarchy. Rahmonov, a native of Kulob, took up the post of chairman of the parliament after the Popular Front victory, and he set about decisively strengthening the position of his regional group. The Communist Party became a legal political organization again after December 1991 with the lifting of the ban on its activity. Even after the cessation of hostilities in the republic it managed to preserve its image as an all-republican and popular force,10 and it remained the largest and most vigorous party. Nevertheless, Rahmonov was not in a position to form a union with the Communist Party, mainly because during the time that had elapsed since the party’s break with the state structure, it had managed to become an independent actor on the political scene and had no ambition to come to power under the new circumstances. Other legal parties and movements—such as the Democratic Party, Adolat and the Socialist Party—were also unable to serve as instruments of power. They were too clannish and regional. Naturally, a union of the authorities with any of the exiled opposition parties would, in principle, have been out of the question. The regime therefore proceeded to lay the groundwork for creating a new party, which was founded at the end of 1993 and named the People’s Party of Tajikistan (PPT). Officially unrelated to the organs of state, the PPT proclaimed its goal as liberation from local allegiances and consolidation of the nation as a whole. The attempts of Abdumalik Abdullojonov, a prominent Khujand businessman, who was Rahmonov’s prime minister, to restore the position of the Leninabad/Khujand élite proved ineffective. In Khujand, he enjoyed considerable authority, which derived not only from his success in business, but also from his membership in one of the city’s distinguished clans, well-known in the past for its commercial activities and Muslim scholarship. His Party of People’s Unity, formed from members of his clan and its clientèle, failed to gain a dominant political position on the eve of the 1994 elections— even in his native Leninabad Oblast. The rise to power of the leaders of the Kulob regional élite in 1993 was followed by a ban in June of that year on the activity of opposition parties and movements. Leaders of Rastokhez, the Democratic Party and the IRPT, as well as a considerable number of their supporters and fellow travellers, and members of local associations, found themselves in exile in Northern Afghanistan, Iran and Russia. Nevertheless, their activity within Tajikistan did not completely cease. After the civil war, Gorno-Badakhshon, supported by local militia detachments, blocked the entrance of government troops into its territory, and the new regime in Dushanbe was unable to gain full control over the Garm and Karategin regions. In 1993 in Afghanistan, the Islamic Renaissance Movement of Tajikistan, headed by Said Abdullo Nuri with Akbar Turajonzoda as his deputy, was set up to replace the banned IRPT. In 1996, the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), headed by Nuri, emerged in exile. Formally, the UTO combined opposition groups that continued to function within the republic. In practice, however, their activities were increasingly controlled by local field commanders who adopted the UTO line out of pragmatic considerations. The exiled opposition suffered deeply from internal organizational difficulties, mostly due to isolation from its national environment. Moreover, the Islamic Renaissance Movement began to play a leading role in the ranks of the UTO, pushing the secular Rastokhez and the Democratic Party to the fringes. A direct consequence of this situation was division in the ranks of both these latter groupings, several of their leaders

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declaring that they were renouncing armed resistance to the regime. They returned from exile and directed the activities of their supporters within the country to conform to restrictions imposed by the authorities. In the spring of 1994, a dialogue on national reconciliation had begun between the official Tajik regime and the UTO. It was initiated with the active participation of the UN, other Central Asian states, Iran, Pakistan and Russia. Naturally, the points of view and interests of these countries were not identical. Nevertheless, pressure on Rahmonov’s regime and on the most implacable opposition members yielded results. Within a little over three years (April 1994–June 1997) and in seven different locations, ten rounds of negotiations, three consultations, and six summit conferences took place. On 27 June 1997, a Joint Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Reconciliation in Tajikistan was signed in Moscow. Military activity was halted. Representatives of the opposition received a 30 per cent quota in all official institutions. They were allocated the positions of deputy prime minister, minister of economy and foreign trade, minister of agriculture, deputy foreign minister and others.11 The actions of Rahmonov’s regime can be viewed as an effort to restore the system of government that existed during the Soviet era. At that time, Dushanbe’s power structures protected the regional élite groups that were loyal to them, and these élites retained a measure of autonomy provided they paid homage to the capital. In the final account, the regional discord in the republic, which had roots in pre-Soviet times, was encouraged by Moscow in the Soviet period, and survived the Soviet era, resulted in the fractional character of the emerging parties and movements and precluded any genuine political pluralism, thus becoming a serious obstacle to the democratization of Tajik society. NOTES 1. Narodnaia gazeta, 8 June 2000. 2. Ibid. The figures refer to those émigres who had not returned by the census of 2000. 3. Sokolova, ‘Demograficheskoe razvitie Respubliki Tadzhikistan v perekhodnyi period’, pp. 34–44; Narodnaia gazeta, 30 Sept. 1999. 4. For current views of Tajik researchers on the national delimitation of Central Asia, see Masov, Istoriia topornogo razdeleniia; Olimova and Olimov, ‘Nezavisimyi Tadzhikistan: trudnyi put’ peremen’, pp. 134–47. 5. Illarionov, ‘Natsional’nyi pliuralizm i ekonomika’, p. 81. 6. The Economist Intelligence Unit. 1995–96 Country Profile: Tajikistan, p. 65. 7. Narodnaia gazeta, 3 March 2000. 8. See Kosach, ‘Tajikistan: Political Parties in an Inchoate National Space’, pp. 123–42. 9. In this connection, see Niiazi, ‘Tadzhikistan: konflikt regionov’, pp. 94–107. 10. On the state of the Communist Party in the first years of independence, see Olimova, ‘Kommunisticheskaia partiia Tadzhikistana v 1992–1994 gg.’, pp. 52–62. 11. Olimova, ‘Politicheskii Islam i konflikt v Tadzhikistane’, p. 139; Dodkhudoeva, ‘Stanovlenie demokratii v respublike Tadzhikistan’, p 113.

COMMUNIST PARTY OF TAJIKISTAN INTRODUCTION In the pre-Gorbachev era Tajikistan’s Communist Party (CPT) was (as was the case in all the Soviet Republics), the sole political party. Following the failed coup attempt of August 1991, Tajik opposition forces accused the CPT of supporting the coup and demanded that its activities be banned. In an effort to counter these attacks, the communists convened the 22nd Extraordinary Party Congress, at which supporters of party reform managed to push through a change of name from ‘Communist’ to ‘Socialist’ and a declaration that the Socialist Party now constituted a new political organization.1 This, however, did not mollify the opposition which continued to insist on a total ban of Communist activity and confiscation of all the party’s property. On 2 October 1991 the Tajikistan Supreme Soviet adopted a ruling suspending the activity of the CPT. A decision was also taken at that time to create a special commission to examine the CPT’s support for the coup attempt. In practice, the party’s activity was not brought to a complete halt. It operated on a semi-legal basis and, making use of its influence among the masses, it even managed to get its former leader Rahmon Nabiyev elected to the presidency in November 1991. A ruling of the Supreme Soviet of December 1991 declared that there was no legal basis for preventing the CPT from functioning, and the ban on its activity was lifted. In January 1992 the second stage of the 22nd Congress was held. A de facto split occurred there, a number of reformist delegates insisting on radical party reforms, preservation of the term ‘socialist’ in the party’s name and its transformation into what was essentially a social democratic party. They even formulated a so-called Democratic Platform. But the majority of the delegates, orthodox communists, rejected these proposals for reform. A resolution was adopted to return to the former name—the Communist Party.2 Shodi Shabdolov became party chairman in January 1992. On 17 March 1992 the party was registered by the Ministry of Justice, and by May 1992, its membership had been re-registered.3 The civil war was fought by the communists against a coalition of opposition forces, comprising mainly the Islamic Renaissance Party, the Democratic Party and the Rastokhez Movement. After the ousting of the opposition, the CPT remained the largest political party in the republic. In May 1993, it had, according to internal figures, over 60,000 members, of which 30 per cent were blue-collar workers, 19.6 per cent kolkhoz members, 30.4 per cent white-collar workers, and 20 per cent pensioners.4 The party committees and its 4,240 local cells were located throughout the republic, except in the Garm region,5 the stronghold of the opposition. However, in summer 1993, a regional party organization was created there, too.6 As of November 1992, the Communist Party cooperated with the country’s leadership. The communists had the largest faction (54 deputies out of 230) in the highest legislative body—the Supreme Soviet.7

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The Communist Party retained its organizational set-up and managed to keep its assets almost intact despite the Supreme Soviet decree on the nationalization of its property, until they were confiscated by the regime in late 1998.8 The CPT continued to cooperate with communist parties of other former union republics. In February 1993 its chairman took an active part in the Second Extraordinary Congress of the Communist Party of Russia. In spring 1993 representatives of the Communist Party of Tajikistan participated in the 29th CPSU Congress. In the summer of the same year it became a member of the union of CPSU communist parties.9 In 1995 the Communist Party of Tajikistan took part in the elections to the Parliament—the Majlisi Oli, obtaining 60 seats (out of 181). That same year it joined the Congress of People’s Unity Movement of Tajikistan, but left in 1998. On 9 March 1996 the party became the first signatory to the Treaty on Social Concord in Tajikistan. At the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of Tajikistan held on 8–9 June 1996, new versions of the party programme and rules were adopted and Shodi Shabdolov was elected chairman of the party.10 The CPT published the newspapers Nidoi Ranjbar (in Tajik), Golos Tadzhikistana (in Russian), and Tojikiston Ovozi (in Uzbek). Two programmes are presented below. The first from 1991. The second from 1997. In the six years which transpired between the ratification of the first and second programmes, enormous changes took place in the social and political structure of the republic and in the living conditions of the populace, and this was clearly reflected in the two documents. The first programme considered the main aim of the communists to be the achievement and fortification of Tajik independence, the democratization of Tajik society, and the transition to a market economy. The second emphasized the establishment of socialist models of development, the restoration of the soviets and the participation of the masses in the ruling of the state.

DRAFT PROGRAMME OF THE SOCIALIST PARTY11 The present programme is designed to answer timely questions and serve as the ideological basis for the consolidation of communists and all supporters of the socialist idea. The party addresses this programme to all who are concerned about the fate of our republic, civil accord and the well-being of the people of Tajikistan. I. Our Principles Central to the party’s strategy and tactics are the interests of the workers, protecting their constitutional rights and liberties, honour and dignity, and securing their safety, irrespective of nationality, social status or origin, religion or convictions. This makes the Socialist Party of Tajikistan a party of democratic reform, social justice, ethnic and civil accord, and economic, political and spiritual freedom. Striving to express the aspiration of workers, dehqans [peasants], intelligentsia, young people and other segments of the population, and keeping in mind the achievements of contemporary political thought, the party will be guided in its practical activities by:

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– concern for the emergence, enhancement and development of the sovereignty of the Republic of Tajikistan, while contributing to the allround advancement of society and the acceleration of reform. The party denounces any attempt at violent restructuring of the existing Soviet system and will fight by lawful parliamentary means to give power to the workers; – principles of social justice in the broadest possible sense of the term. The party holds that the elimination of the continuing inequity in the mechanism of remuneration for conscientious and efficient work and talent is an indispensable condition for progress in production, science, culture and the social sphere; – principles of democracy, which are inseparable from discipline and civic responsibility and are inconceivable without the establishment of a civil society and a state governed by law and based on government by the people; – interests of equal and mutually advantageous cooperation with all sovereign states and integration of the republic’s national economy in the global economy. The party’s support of these principles emanates from a thorough analysis of the path traversed and the situation existing in society. II. The Lessons of History The party believes that the Soviet period in the history of the peoples of Tajikistan, its heroism, drama and hardships, should be assessed objectively, without endless revisions and reassessments. Lack of respect for the past, one’s own history, the results of the activities of the preceding generations make one a Mankurt12 who would inevitably become an obedient tool and a new victim of whatever regime arises from the ‘ruins of the old world’. It is naive and absurd to see pre-revolutionary Tajikistan as an integral, indivisible, united national state whose compact population was well-off and educated and lived in social harmony. The Great October Revolution was a turning point in the historical destiny of the Tajik people. The [Tajik] people gave their enthusiastic support to the communist programme for saving the country from national disaster. They were attracted by the slogans of social welfare for workers, especially the dehqans, farmhands and labourers, by the demands to give land to the peasants, the factories to the workers, and power—to the soviets. The right of nations to self-determination and the equality of people of all nationalities proclaimed by the Soviet regime were of vital importance.13 The milestones along this road were overthrowing the emir of Bukhara, establishing a workers’ regime, setting up a state system of the Tajik people, its economy and culture, free public education and public health, social security and other social benefits. These are the basic achievements of socialism. However, a tragic situation was created when an administrativecommand centre with a party-state bureaucratic leadership was formed and became entrenched at the end of the 1920s. The centre monopolized all power and crushed the republic’s sovereignty and elementary civil rights, disenfranchising the workers—from power, property, the fruits of their labour and spiritual values. For Tajikistan this signified preservation of the previous abnormal structure of its economy, and a reaffirmation of its status as a raw-materials appendage of the country’s military industrial complex. Today, living standards in Tajikistan are the lowest in the

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country [the former Soviet Union] and its people feel acutely the burden of [Soviet] socialism with its enforced equality.14 The policy aimed at the ‘merging’ of nations in the foreseeable future,15 the ‘internationalization’ of all spheres of life and total atheization, as well as attempts at implementing this, dealt a telling blow to the education, science, national culture and upbringing of the younger generation; it sharply limited the use of the Tajik language, generated nihilistic attitudes towards the historical heritage of the people and a disparaging approach to the moral values of Islam and the disposition of its believers. There is a threat to the gene pool of the nation and to the nation’s environment. The aspiration of progressive-minded people, real patriots of the republic, to oppose arbitrary rule and ideological diktat led to merciless repression. Tens of thousands of honest managers, mostly communists, devoted to the cause, were exterminated as ‘enemies of the people’ on fabricated charges; others were excluded from useful labour, for ‘abuses in cotton accounting’16 and other trumped-up charges.17 The experience of the republic and of other fraternal peoples of the country has shown that there is no future for the totalitarian system with its state monopoly of ownership, its egalitarianism, its thesis that the class struggle is bound to intensify and its methods of coercion and repression. The idea of a single party, which assigned the vanguard role to the CPSU and presented it as the only source of inspiration to the people, the only party which could express the people’s aspirations, is bankrupt. The disintegration of the former unitary union was a process predetermined by history. The CPSU as a single centralized party has dissolved itself. As part of the CPSU, the Communist Party of Tajikistan could not avoid distortions. Yet it must be acknowledged that even in the most trying periods of its history, the party’s core was made up of communists who were dedicated to the people’s cause and did their duty selflessly with no eye for personal gain. Throughout the decades of totalitarian rule, the republican Communist Party was actually not allowed to have a political strategy of its own and was hostage to the decisions of the CPSU’s central bodies, decisions that completely ignored the interests of the republic’s population. Red tape in inner-party relationships, the silencing of rankandfile communists who could have been instrumental in charting a realistic policy oriented to the future, blunders in personnel appointments and ideological diktat bred an atmosphere of indifference and passivity in the party and weakened the influence of its members on the masses. Taking account of this situation and guided by the interests of the republic, the 22nd Extraordinary Congress of the Communist Party considered it necessary to transform the party into the Socialist Party of Tajikistan.18 The Socialist Party inherited all that was valuable and appreciated by the people throughout the years of Communist Party work. Yet it is a fundamentally new party in its content and organizational structure, and in the type of activities in which it engages. It professes adherence to the basic revolutionary teaching of Marx, Engels and Lenin, to socialist ideas enriched by contemporary social thought and by the country’s past experience. In its activities the party will uphold the universal ideals of justice, freedom and equality, and the principles of democracy and humanism […] III. Our Primary Tasks

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The Socialist Party of Tajikistan has set itself the following priority tasks: In the political sphere: – achieving genuine sovereignty of the Republic of Tajikistan and strengthening its independence, securing the integrity of its territory and inviolability of its borders, obtaining international recognition for the republic; – contributing to the consolidation of the bodies of state power and government of the independent republic, the development of democratic processes in all spheres of life, implementing a policy of ethnic and civil peace, the creation of a law-governed state; – promoting multilateral, mutually beneficial and egalitarian political, economic and cultural relations with other independent republics within a new union of sovereign states, and strengthening traditional ties between the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan; – establishing contacts and conducting extensive cooperation with progressive parties and public movements in the union and in foreign countries. In the sphere of nationality relations: Proceeding from the generally recognized norms of international law and the Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan, the party will work to: – eradicate from social life all forms of chauvinism, nationalism, racism, national discrimination and genocide; – consolidate the peoples of Tajikistan around the principles of social justice, equality and free development, respect for historical heritage and national dignity, and inter-ethnic harmony; – consolidate the Tajik people by eliminating the differences between the levels of economic, social and cultural development of the various regions in the republic, overcoming localistic tendencies and promoting the national culture and the official language; – forming a national working class of Tajikistan […] In the economy: – putting an end to administrative diktat in the economic sphere, removing the ideological factor from economic life, building a multifaceted economy based on the equality of all forms of ownership, and encouraging initiative and entrepreneurship; – implementing a gradual transition to market-based interaction, taking into account existing conditions and the specific way of life and traditions of the republic; – supporting collective farms, the transfer of land to private tenure and ownership on a lease or other basis with the right to inheritance, the creation of peasant farms, cooperatives, various agro-trade and agroindustrial enterprises, firms and agglomerations, securing their equality and encouraging private subsidiary small-holdings; – contributing to the implementation of a balanced programme of de-étatization and de-monopolization of state property in the people’s interest, and pressing for strict state and public control over the process, openness in everything related to the issue and social guarantees for work collectives and individual workers; – supporting a programme for ending the economic crisis, for a cardinal restructuring of the economy and overcoming its lop-sided rawmaterials orientation, building fullcycle plants for processing raw materials into finished products, with foreign participation;

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– supporting the ideas of creating free economic and trade zones, of establishing a new economic union of sovereign states, of the republic’s inclusion in bilateral ties and integration of the union in the world economy. In the social sphere: – supporting by all available political means the efforts of the bodies of state power and the government geared to implementing programmes for the creation of jobs, the social welfare of the population in the transitional period and prevention of the erosion of gains won in the hard struggle for national and state independence, such as free education and medical services, social insurance and others. – doing all in our power to create normal living conditions, improve pension benefits for war and labour veterans, participants in the Afghan War,19 and establishing a subsistence level which is not below the official poverty line; – giving high priority to a programme for the protection of mother and child, facilitating the creation of equality in public health, introducing and disseminating a culture of public health, and pressing for greater allocations for public health, physical culture, sports and tourism; – attaining greater privileges and easy-term credits for young families, accelerated construction of hostels for newlyweds, housing facilities for young people in housing development projects, better working and living conditions for women; – supporting the women’s movement, facilitating the participation of women in making and implementing decisions at all levels, and their advancement to responsible posts in state and public bodies; – exerting every effort to preserve the environment, increase controls over the state of the environment and make this information public. In the spiritual sphere: – attaining greater budget allocations and tax and credit privileges for the development of culture, science and the arts, as well as for creative activities that ensure the intellectual, moral, aesthetic and physical development of the individual; contributing to the creation of a republican hard currency fund to subsidize science, education and culture; – supporting a cardinal restructuring of the general secondary school and higher educational establishments as well as pre-school education in order to bring them closer to national traditions and the achievements of global trends in education; upholding the interests of student youth, offering an equal starting point for young men and women to advance in life and get an education; and establishing a special fund to help gifted children and talented young scientists and students; – inculcating respect for the traditions and culture of all peoples and for the moral values of Islam and other faiths;20 – achieving a rebirth of the distinctiveness of Tajik national culture and folk arts, their enrichment through the cultural heritage of the world, and achieving a further expansion of the network of national cultural centres of all ethnic groups living in the republic. – promoting ties with world cultural and scientific centres, and with Tajiks living outside Tajikistan and encouraging their participation in the cultural life of the republic and in the implementation of economic and social programmes. IV. Towards a Party of Political Action

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The Socialist Party of Tajikistan resolutely rejects the organizational structure of the Communist Party, its forms and methods of work, its claims to absolute truth and to a vanguard role in society, and to being the party of all the people. The Socialist Party, as we see it, is a party of political action, a parliamentary-type party, one among equals. It intends to fight for a leading role and high positions in the constitutional bodies of power and government exclusively by democratic means, within the confines of the law, and in the course of the electoral struggle for seats. In the administrative bodies where Socialist Party deputies will be a minority, they will assume the role of a constructive opposition and challenge any attempts to encroach upon the interests of the working people, or upon the rights and liberties of the citizens of the Republic of Tajikistan. Socialist Party deputies will cooperate with other parliamentary factions in supporting positive proposals advanced by other parties and movements. A distinctive feature of the Socialist Party is its deep-seated democratization. This opens the door to initiatives by local party cells in determining the forms and methods of their activity, and their structure and budget. As far as unity of political action is concerned, it is based on the party programme and compliance with its rules and decisions, which are binding for all members. Local party organizations are free to choose their tactics in a specific situation depending on specific circumstances. The democratization of the party envisages the creation of flexiblystructured party organizations along territorial, professional, productive and functional lines, and of permanent and provisional associations of party members, enabling the party to react to changes rapidly and efficiently and to be able to manoeuvre all of its cells during preparations for elections, referendums and other political campaigns. In forming the party, it is necessary to create permanent bodies charged with analyzing views of party members and their actual participation in the party’s activity. [In order to strengthen party democracy] […] each party member should be guaranteed the right to openly argue his/her point of view. Party members are free to choose the sphere of party activity which most closely corresponds to their interests, knowledge and abilities. They may openly state their position on any question regarding the life of the party and the republic, take part in any of the party organizations or work to realize party goals in any other way, pay membership fees and render it material support. The party is open to people of any faith.21 If necessary, a party member may leave the party for a certain period. The party fights for the constitutionally guaranteed protection of its members’ rights and interests, and renders them comradely political, material and moral support. It believes that an atmosphere of comradeship, collectivism and rich intellectual and spiritual life should be maintained in party organizations. Any party member can count on help in developing his personality and strengthening his ideological convictions. There are plans for changing the structure of the party central body—its Central Committee. It will be elected by local cells according to their membership. The congress will only endorse its composition. There will be considerable personnel cuts in the Central Committee and its auxiliary staff. The Central Committee will not lead, but will merely coordinate the activities of regional and primary local cells, for which purpose a Presidium will be elected. As to

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organs of the Communist Party such as the Secretariat and CC Bureau, they will be abolished. If necessary, party organizations are entitled to raise the question of reorganizing the party to meet the new conditions. Qualitatively new demands have presented themselves for ideological work, based on truth, historical necessity, tolerance for other world views, rejection of dogma and apologetics, and the denunciation of nationalism, chauvinism and extremism. The party favours creating conditions conducive to an extensive spiritual quest, categorically rejecting ideological diktat and simplistic interpretations of religiosity and atheism. It will support in every way the aspirations of the individual for moral selfperfection and a conscious and free choice of orientation in life. The party stands for the continuing development and deepening of democratic processes in the mass media, and for their freedom to reflect varied views and assessments, while simultaneously increasing journalists’ responsibility for the authenticity and objectivity of their publications and broadcasts. Source: Narodnaia gazeta, 15 October 1991.

PROGRAMME OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF TAJIKISTAN [The goal of the political activity of the CPT is] to restore to the country the socialist mode of development, since it is best suited to the interests of the working people, genuinely guarantees all their rights and the free development of the working individual, and creates decent economic, social, political and cultural conditions of life for all. […] [In the political sphere the party stands for:] – using all forms of parliamentary and non-parliamentary activity in order to return the country to the road of socialist transformation; – restoring the workers’ power in the form of soviets or other forms of popular selfgovernment; – restoring the public controlling bodies and involving the broad working masses in governing the state by securing their wide representation in the controlling and governing bodies, and protecting the rights of work collectives; – reforming the law enforcement and judicial bodies, and the national army; disarming all illegal armed formations; – putting an end to corruption, the activities of mafia and organized crime; […] – efficiently implementing human rights in accordance with internationally accepted norms; – reinforcing the country’s sovereignty and independence; […] – broadening and strengthening relations with the international labour and communist movements. In order to achieve its strategic goals and tasks, the Communist Party of Tajikistan considers it necessary to stand for: – a peaceful, parliamentary, or other, means [sic] of restoring socialism and workers’ power;

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– a broad coalition of all the genuinely democratic and patriotic forces in society which support the ideas of restoring socialism and a socialist state; – the consolidation of ties with the Union of the Communist Parties of the Former Union Republics and the world communist movement; – combining the workers’ struggle for their rights with the struggle for the restoration of socialism, for imbuing the labour movement and the popular movement with social justice and social equality; – for compromises and alliances with other movements. […] [In the sphere of economy, the party stands for:] – strengthening the command economy in state, collective and other forms of public ownership; – combining various forms of economic activity: state enterprises and family and private businesses […] January 1997 Source: S.Olimova, and M.Olimov, Tadzhikistan na poroge peremen (Moscow, 1999), p. 79. NOTES 1. It should be noted that in 1996 a new Socialist Party was formed in Khujand, unrelated to the former Communist Party. Its founder was Safarli Kenjayev, the former speaker of the Tajikistan Parliament (Tsentral’naia Aziia, 3 (1997), p. 98). 2. See Bess Brown, ‘Whither Tajikistan’, RFE/RL, vol. 1, no. 24, 12 June 1992. 3. Golos Tadzhikistana, 26 May–2 June 1993. 4. Olimova, ‘Kommunisticheskaia partiia Tadzhikistana v 1992–94 gg’, p. 55. 5. Garm is an agricultural region located in the foothills of the Pamir Mountains. Garm Tajiks, numbering over 25,000, are mostly peasants and small entrepreneurs. Islam is deeply rooted in this region and the population is extremely religious. In 1992 a centre of political opposition to the existing regime was created, headed by religious activists. This was in reaction to a decision to build a dam on the Vakhsh River, which would have resulted in the flooding of many kishlaks (villages) and the resettlement of their populations. 6. Olimova, ‘Kommunisticheskaia partiia Tadzhikistana v 1992–94 gg’, p. 55. 7. Vechernii Dushanbe, 28 May 1993. The Supreme Soviet functioned as the highest legislative body until the adoption of a new constitution on 6 November 1994 (Narodnaia gazeta, 16 Nov. 1994). 8. ITAR-TASS, 16 Dec. 1998, Via Nexis. 9. S.Olimova, ‘Kommunisticheskaia partiia Tadzhikistana v 1992–94 gg’, p. 57. The last (29th) Congress of communist parties held in Moscow in 1993 retained the title ‘CPSU’ in spite of the fact that the Soviet Union was officially defunct as of 1991. 10. Olimova and Olimov, Tadzhikistan na poroge peremen, pp. 76–8. 11. The 22nd Extraordinary Congress of the Communist Party of Tajikistan was held in two stages—in September 1991 and in January 1992. At the first session of the 22nd Congress it was decided to rename the party the Socialist Party. Three months later, however, in the course of the debate at the second session, the decision to restore its former name was taken almost unanimously (Nezavisimaia gazeta, 22 January 1992). The draft programme appeared between the first and second stages, which explains the name ‘Socialist’. 12. Mankurt, a person who has lost his memory and become an obedient tool of his master; became widely used after the appearance of Chingiz Aitmatov’s novel I dol’she veka dlitsia den’ (The Day Lasts More than a Hundred Years).

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13. The right of nations to self-determination and the equality of all nations of the former USSR were important elements of official Soviet ideology. 14. On the economy, see Introduction to Tajikistan. 15. The nationalities policy of the CPSU was conducted in the belief that objective conditions existed for the uniting of all Soviet nations with a view to their eventual merger into a new national entity (a single Soviet people). 16. See Introduction to Uzbekistan on the so-called Uzbek affair. Similar cases involving falsified reports on cotton output occurred also in Tajikistan. 17. At the end of the 1980s, 45.7 per cent of arable land was planted with cotton. See Aleksandrov, ‘Spetsificheskie sluchai ekonomicheskoi otstalosti’, p. 143. 18. See note 1. 19. The total number of Soviet soldiers who participated in the Afghan War (December 1979 to February 1989) was about one million. After they returned home, many of them were in need of social, psychological and medical aid, which in many cases they did not receive. 20. The party made a clear distinction between the preservation of Islamic culture, and making Tajikistan a theocratic state. See Nezavisimaia gazeta, 6 Feb. 1992. 21. The new provision giving believers access to the party evoked a dual reaction, with some communists seeing it as ‘surrendering ideological positions, giving up the materialist world outlook on which scientific communism is based’. See Golos Tadzhikistana, 14–20 Sept. 1993.

DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF TAJIKISTAN INTRODUCTION The Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT) was established by a breakaway group from the Rastokhez Popular Movement. The constituent congress was held in August 1990 in Dushanbe,1 and the party was registered on 21 June 1991. Estimates of its membership in 1990–91 vary dramatically from 3,500 to 15,000.2 The party’s social base was the established urban educated classes, ‘new entrepreneurs’ and educated elements of the rural population. Attempts to expand its influence in rural areas proved largely unsuccessful: the party only managed to set up cells in the Kurgan-Tyube Region, the birthplace of its leader Shodmon Yusuf. Equally unsuccessful were the attempts to win over younger, educated Tajiks, who remained within Rastokhez’s sphere of influence, a factor that predetermined the DPT’s regional character. The Democratic Party attempted to coordinate its activity with other democratic forces both on a regional and on a country-wide level. Its representatives took part in the Congress of Democratic Movements of Central Asia and Kazakhstan held in May 1991 in Bishkek.3 In August 1991, the DPT declared its intention of affiliating with the Democratic Union4. Although composed mostly of Tajiks, the party initially claimed a multinational membership, attracted by the ideas of civil and interethnic harmony highlighted in its programme. For example, Viktor Terletskii, a Russian, was one of the party’s deputy chairmen from 1990 to 1992. However, as a result of its rapprochement with the Islamic Renaissance Party, members of other nationalities gradually left. The party was active on Tajikistan’s political stage, siding with the south in the struggle of the regional élites for a re-division of spheres of influence in the higher echelons of power. In September 1991, acting jointly with the Islamic Renaissance Party and the Rastokhez Movement, it organized a two-week-long rally in Ovozi Square in Dushanbe to demand the resignation of Tajikistan Communist Party First Secretary Qahhor Mahkamov, the dissolution of the pro-communist Supreme Soviet, the outlawing of the Communist Party and the legalization of the Islamic Renaissance Party. In the November 1991 presidential elections, the Democratic Party had no candidate of its own but supported Davlat Khudonazarov who was backed by all the opposition parties. Like the other opposition parties, the Democratic Party refused to accept the results of the elections, claiming that the election commission had tampered with them. In February 1992, the party leadership became divided over the interpretation of the election results. Five members of the party Presidium, among them two deputy chairmen—Abdullo Achilov and Viktor Terletskii—published a statement asserting that President Nabiyev had been ‘elected by the people’ and that ‘every rational citizen of the republic, and especially members of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, must do their best to help the president in this difficult hour’.5

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In May 1992, after a bitter struggle, a coalition of opposition forces, the Democratic Party included, managed to oust the communists from power. The party began moving its people into top positions in the new coalition government. Five Democratic Party members were appointed to sit on the commission to prepare the draft of a new constitution. Meanwhile, the party had lost all ties with the russophone population. Speaking on 10 May at a press conference held after opposition supporters had been fired upon, Party Chairman Shodmon Yusuf blamed the Russian garrison in Dushanbe for the incident.6 He threatened that if such an incident recurred, the entire Russian population would become hostages. The response to this statement came in the form of a protest by the coordinating council of the republic’s ethnic associations and in a mass exodus from Tajikistan by the Russian-speaking community. Yusuf s formal apology came too late.7 The last representatives of the country’s ethnic minorities had left the party, making it mononational. Shortly after the May events, when the threat of civil war was looming large, the Democratic Party proposed—with a view to consolidating the anti-communist forces— that the actions of the armed units of these forces be coordinated. In June 1992 the Patriotic Salvation Front, composed of the Democratic Party, Rastokhez and La’li Badakhshon and headed by Yusuf, was formed. The DPT, together with the Islamic Renaissance Party, participated in the Islamic Renaissance Movement of Tajikistan.8 The anti-communist forces were defeated in the civil war that broke out in the autumn of 1992. The DPT was outlawed in the summer of 1993.9 From September 1990 until its closure in 1993, the party published the newspaper Adolat (Justice). In 1993 a coordinating body of party members was established in Moscow. In September 1994 a group of party members convened an extraordinary party congress in Almaty (the so-called Almaty Platform) and elected Jumaboy Niyazov party chairman. This group, together with the Islamic Renaissance Party, formed the nucleus of the United Tajik Opposition. The remainder of the Democratic Party (the so-called Tehran Platform) held a conference on 22 June 1995 in Dushanbe. It assumed the name of the Democratic Party, adopted a new version of the party rules and programme and elected a new leadership, with Shodmon Yusuf as party chairman. The party leadership expressed its support for political, economic and social reform in the republic. On 20 July 1995 the party was registered by the republican Ministry of Interior.10 In November 1998 two factions of the former Democratic Party, the Tehran Platform and the Unity Centre, created a new Democratic Party. Thus, by the end of the 1990s two Democratic Parties were active in Tajikistan, the Almaty Platform headed by Niyazov, and the Tehran Platform headed by Azam Afzali, the successor to Shodmon Yusuf.

PROGRAMME The Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT) came into being as a result of the complicated socio-political situation in the republic. Humanistic aspirations, honest intentions, a quest

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for the truth, striving for social justice, and the desire to see a society governed by law in Tajikistan—all these factors account for the emergence of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan onto the political arena. Section I The Political, Social and Moral Crisis in Tajikistan […] The reinforcement of the foundations of distorted socialism has turned people, especially in Central Asia, into obedient robots. The sessions of the higher bodies of state power are testimony to the extremes which this robot-like behaviour has reached. The arbitrary administrative-political division, which runs counter to truth and justice and only serves the interests of the Centre, dealt a heavy blow to the Tajik nation, depriving it of its major historical and cultural centres.11 The struggle against the Book (i.e., the Qur’an) against educated people, against folk traditions, disregard for the principles of building a Tajik system of education […] have placed the very existence of the nation in jeopardy. The trade unions, Komsomol and other organizations of this kind, not to mention the KGB, courts of law and the offices of the public prosecutor, have been turned into agencies of mass surveillance. These harsh truths are an obstacle to the growth and spread of democracy and openness. Economic policy has remained unchanged, namely: – The industry of each republic was tied to the industries of other republics in a way that deprived the republics of their independence. – Regions such as Kulob, Kurgan-Tyube, Badakhshon and Garm, with their considerable unemployed manpower resources, have been left with no heavy industry.12 – Our republic has been turned into a supplier of cheap raw materials.13 – Practically nothing is being done to train qualified personnel from among our native sons,14 and, as a result, the local industries processing minerals, cotton, wool, silk cocoons and other local raw materials have been drastically curtailed. – Large enterprises of no economic value to Tajikistan, such as the factories in Tursunzade, Yavan and Vakhsh, pollute water, soil and air and make the environment unsuitable for human habitation. – The republic’s unequalled generosity towards other regions has plunged 51 per cent of Tajikistan’s population into poverty […] Instead of giving power to the soviets, the Communist Party keeps subjugating them.15 Conditions have been created to ensure the election to the Supreme Soviet, not of scientists, writers, teachers and physicians—the cream of the nation—but of prominent party and government functionaries, collective and state farm chairmen, factory directors, loyal and reliable people from the KGB and the Ministry of Interior; in other words, people who are unable to cure the country of its maladies […] Section II The DPT’s Short-Term Tasks 1. Political and Legal Issues DPT priorities are to make Tajikistan a law governed state, to improve the environment, bring peace to the population and give it the benefit of life’s advantages. To achieve all this, it is necessary to:

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– gain the independence and full political and economic sovereignty of Tajikistan within a confederation of independent states; – draft and adopt a law on Tajikistan citizenship, which, on the basis of the Constitution, will encompass such basic civil rights as freedom of speech and the press, confidentiality of correspondence and telephone communication, and banning mass surveillance of citizens conducted by the KGB as an infringement of human rights; – set up an arbitration commission composed of representatives of political parties and associations to deal with issues related to the armed forces; – ensure openness in the activities of the soviets, parties, public and other organizations; – give equal opportunities to the various parties and organizations acting within the Constitution; – draft and adopt a new election law providing for a multi-party system; – nominate candidates for the highest state office [president] on the basis of popular consensus and alternative platforms; – establish a professional army, a republican guard, border troops, security forces and organs of internal affairs, within the framework of a single administrative body—the Ministry of National Defence. The armed forces should be subordinate only to the president. The armed forces would be used only in time of need and within the borders of Tajikistan,16 on the basis of a referendum by the inhabitants and by a special decision of Parliament. The young people of the republic should perform their sacred military duty only within the territory of Tajikistan. – when necessary, referendums on foreign and domestic policies and administration of the state should be held. 2. Policy within the Confederation17 The DPT favours the creation of a Union of Sovereign Independent States and the rapid conclusion of a treaty of such a union. Such a union should be characterized by the following: – Each republic would be a sovereign independent state functioning fully in accordance with international law. – The republics would defend one another and carry out a unified domestic and foreign policy. – The republics would have a unified domestic market. – Each republic would be entitled to conclude agreements on the use of airspace, railway transportation and the like, independently of the others. – The union budget would be made up of contributions by the republics. – Travel of individuals within the union would not be limited in any way. – Factories, enterprises and individuals would have the right to engage in any commercial activity not detrimental to the union. – Each republic would have an embassy in the other republics of the union. Section III Foreign Policy The DPT aspires to have Tajikistan conduct its own foreign policy as befits an independent and sovereign state. The DPT advocates the establishment of democratic and humanistic international relations, joining a Union of Independent Soviet States in the

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name of peace, security, disarmament, and the elimination of stocks of weapons of mass destruction, and making joint use of economic and cultural achievements. The party strives for: – the establishment of mutually advantageous economic, trade and cultural relations with all sovereign states; – the building of profit-making enterprises in Tajikistan by foreign companies; – the maintenance of stable economic, cultural and political relations between Tajiks and linguistically related states;18 – keeping abreast of the status of Tajiks living abroad19 in order to be able to extend a helping hand if needed and take steps to develop their culture, and secondary and higher education. Section IV Social and Economic Policies The party advocates independence of the republic’s economy. The basic features of Tajikistan’s economic independence include the following: – The water, airspace, below- and above-ground resources of Tajikistan are the property of Tajikistan alone. – Enterprises of all-union significance on the territory of Tajikistan should be placed under the control of Tajikistan. – A market providing for equal conditions for producers and consumers of raw materials should be created. – World prices should be adopted for cotton, wool, silk cocoons, etc. – Tajikistan should be enabled to establish independent economic and trade ties with the union republics and with other states. – Various types of ownership, including private ownership, should be introduced and developed. – Conditions should be created for establishing joint ventures in Tajikistan with the participation of other union republics and foreign states. – Conditions should be created for the development of individual talent, which constitutes a national asset. – Support should be given to local and foreign cooperatives, and to firms and factories intending to build light industries which would utilize local raw materials.20 – Formulation of industrial programmes guaranteeing jobs to 30 per cent of the rural population. – Free economic zones should be established in some areas of Tajikistan. – Special attention should be paid to promoting trade relations with neighbouring countries: Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, India and China. Section V School, Education and Personnel Policy The party believes that the school and education system should be restructured to meet current needs. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to create a concept of Tajik national education that would combine the achievements of the past and contemporary worldwide practice in the field of education. This requires:

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– completely new academic programmes, curricula and a new concept of instruction; […] – establishment of various types of educational institutions: general schools, madrasas, gymnasiums, high schools, and new, private independent academies; – teachers should have a high social standing and receive adequate remuneration; — formulation of a ten-year plan for training young Tajik specialists in various professions, including training abroad; – advanced training in developed countries of scientists, specialists and authors of textbooks. Section VI Language, Culture, Customs The DPT believes that for those who speak it, every language is inalienably and inviolably sacred and that in this regard the feelings of individuals should be respected […] The DPT is of the opinion that each resident of the republic must be free to learn his native language as well as other languages, but should know Farsi as the official language of Tajikistan and use it whenever it is appropriate. All provisions of the Language Law should be meticulously observed.21 The DPT will work to help Tajik, as well as all other interested youth, to learn Farsi and use it for studying our rich scientific and literary heritage and to be shaped by its influence […] The DPT views religion and its adherents with benevolence and respect. The criterion for such an attitude should not be religious or party convictions, but justice, truth and personal happiness. The DPT considers openness and pluralism to be of the greatest importance and takes an uncompromising stand against any monopoly of the mass media. In accordance with these principles, the DPT […] considers it vital to: – revive and develop authentic folk customs; – restore people’s respect for books, bread, and water; – teach the Farsi script from the first grade and gradually make a transition to it;22 – give priority to the teaching of Tajik national history and culture in schools; – study and disseminate Tajik literature and culture in accordance with current demand; an authoritative international centre must be established for studying, translating and preparing classical literature in Farsi for publication; – preserve all historical sites and archaeological discoveries and use them for educating the population. Section VII Inter-ethnic Relations Fully recognizing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the DPT strives to follow the noble behest of our ancestors who judged people not by their national origin, social status, religion, language, family ties or party affiliation but by their thoughts and deeds. We believe no people can be happy in isolation from the outside world […]

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Tajiks have always been hospitable and friendly, establishing good relations with all fraternal peoples living in the republic, and have sought to create appropriate conditions for developing their customs and culture. We strive for the establishment of good and fruitful relations with all our neighbours, with the peoples of the Union of Sovereign Republics. Tajiks must also have fraternal multilateral relations with the Iranians and Afghans, because with these peoples we have a common past and, in the present, a common language. Section VIII Family and Society A free and prosperous society is based on the freedom and prosperity of the family. This axiom calls for rectification of the situation in the family where the formal declaration of equality between men and women resulted in placing the burden of work in the fields and the household on the shoulders of the woman. In order to rectify this situation, the following is vital: – to improve the economic status of the family by increasing the allowance to children and orphans, and those who have no relatives, as well as the handicapped and underprivileged; – to organize teaching of domestic science in schools. Section IX DPT Cooperation with Other Parties and Organizations The DPT is prepared to cooperate with all parties and organizations whose principal goals do not run counter to justice and truth. The DPT strives to establish friendly ties with the parties of the Union of Sovereign Republics and to join a democratic union of sovereign states. The DPT cooperates with all leading parties of the world in order to achieve peace and security, and advance along the road to scientific, economic and cultural progress. The DPT supports the initiative of young people concerning the establishment of a Union of Democratic Youth. Section X Environmental Policy The DPT believes that the following steps are necessary if nature and people’s health are to be preserved: – To take ecological problems into account when planning and conducting the republic’s economic policy and productive activity. – Enterprises should operate without inflicting damage to the environment, or else they should be closed down. – No enterprise or other economic project should be launched unless consent is obtained from an independent ecological commission and the local soviet. – Fertilizers and other means to increase crop yields should only be used on the basis of safe agricultural technologies. Adopted on 10 August 1990 at the DPT constituent congress Source: Adolat 1 (September 1990).

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TEHRAN PLATFORM [The main goal of the party’s political activity is] to turn Tajikistan into a law governed state based on a free market economy, and to ensure the protection of human rights and freedoms […] THE DPT’S TASKS IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE […] The DPT is a right-centrist parliamentary political party. [It stands for]: – creating conditions for the democratization of society; – giving complete support to the peace process in the country; – a clear separation of power between the judicial, executive and legislative branches of government; – implementing political rights and freedoms; – rallying society’s dependable forces in support of a peaceful solution of political problems; – forming a broad coalition of all democratic and patriotic forces supporting the revival of Tajikistan; – adopting a law, which would guarantee each citizen real protection of his/her rights from arbitrariness, non-interference in the private life of an individual, and the outlawing of gathering information on citizens; – openness in the activities of government bodies; – granting freedom and independence to the mass media; – giving equal opportunities to all political parties and associations; – adopting a law on the elections of local government bodies; – establishing a professional army. The DPT may conclude pre-election agreements with other political parties and public associations which act within the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Tajikistan; it may also give support to candidates for elective offices who are not members of the DPT, but who support democratic goals. Source: S.Olimova and M.Olimov, Tadzhikistan na poroge peremen (Moscow, 1999), pp. 71–2. NOTES 1. FBIS-SOV-157, 14 Aug. 1990, pp. 91–2. 2. Izvestiia, 10 July 1991; Olimova and Olimov, Tadzhikistan na poroge peremen, p. 67. 3. Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 31 May 1991. 4. Kommunist Tadzhikistana, 13 Aug. 1991. The Democratic Union was formed in Moscow in 1988; from the outset, it openly adopted the role of an anti-communist opposition political party. 5. Narodnaia gazeta, 28 Feb. 1992. 6. After the disintegration of the USSR, some units of the former Soviet army remained in the territories of most of the newly independent states. Their tasks were defined by special agreements between Moscow and individual CIS countries. As a rule, the governments of

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Central Asian states relied on these units for the stability of their regimes. In regard to Tajikistan, which experienced a civil war, their presence was especially significant. 7. Nezavisimaia gazeta, 13 May 1992. Regarding the Coordinating Council for Ethnic Associations see the Russian Community, n. 3. 8. Vechernii Dushanbe, 6 July 1992. The Islamic Renaissance Movement of Tajikistan was formed after the defeat of the so-called United Tajik Opposition, which included the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, during the first stage of the Tajik civil war in autumn 1992. The Islamists who fled to neighbouring Afghanistan created this movement. About 30 training centres for Tajik Islamic armed detachments were established in Afghanistan. The headquarters of these forces were located in the Afghani cities of Kunduz, Faizabad and Talukan. 9. Narodnaia gazeta, 25 June 1993. 10. Olimova and Olimov, Tadzhikistan na poroge peremen, pp. 67–8. 11. Reference is to the cities of Samarkand and Bukhara, which were incorporated into Uzbekistan following the national-state partition of Central Asia in 1924. The loss of their traditional political and cultural centres increased Tajik regionalism and adversely affected the process of their consolidation into a single nation. 12. Tajikistan’s industry was concentrated in the north (Leninabad Oblast), and in the centre, in Dushanbe and the Hissar Valley. 13. See Rastokhez Popular Movement, n. 7. 14. See Rastokhez Popular Movement, n. 13. 15. Reference is to the resolution of the 19th CPSU All-Union Conference (June-July 1988), which recommended that first secretaries of party committees at various levels be appointed to the post of chairmen of the respective Soviets of People’s Deputies. 16. Most popular fronts and democratic groupings in the various union republics demanded of Gorbachev that their recruits serve within national boundaries, which the great majority did not. 17. At the 28th Party Congress in July 1990, Gorbachev called for an updated union of sovereign states enshrined in a new union treaty to replace the original one of 1922. The draft union treaty was finally published in November 1990. 18. The reference is to Iran and Afghanistan. 19- See the Rastokhez Popular Movement, notes 11 and 13. 20. Various Central Asian democratic and national organizations demanded that their cotton, wool and silk be processed locally. 21. On the Language Law, see Introduction to Tajikistan. 22.Reference is to the Arabic script which had been abolished following the 1927 decision to substitute the Latin script in what was then the Tajik ASSR. In 1991, Tajikistan became the only Central Asian state which introduced teaching the Arabic script into the school curriculum.

EKHIEI KHUJAND POPULAR MOVEMENT INTRODUCTION The Ekhiei Khujand (Rebirth of Khujand) Popular Movement was founded in the summer of 1989 in the city of Leninabad (Khujand), the major industrial, scientific and cultural centre of northern Tajikistan. The appearance of Ekhiei Khujand was a reflection of the need felt by the northerners to restore the historical role of the city of Khujand,1 which had been in decline since Dushanbe became the capital of Tajikistan in 1929. Its interests were confined to the city of Khujand and the Leninabad region (which retained its name from the Soviet period). At the time it was founded, it had around 100 members.

PROGRAMME I. Introduction The road charted by the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU2 and the theory and policy of revolutionary restructuring outlined by the 27th CPSU Congress3 and the 19th CPSU conference are designed to rid the state and Soviet society of negative phenomena and lay the groundwork for its improvement. The various forms of power held by local élites, who are still dominated by old psychological stereotypes, are still deeply rooted in Soviet society. The Tajik people has yet to liberate itself from a state of indifference and passivity and from administrative-command methods of leadership. Society has yet to launch a revolutionary restructuring. Supporters of perestroika at industrial and other enterprises are few and far between and they do not operate in unison. Khujand, very much like Tashkent, is a cradle of the revolution in Central Asia and in the land of the Tajiks.4 Yet as a result of errors made in patriotic and moral education, the city gradually lost its revolutionary and freedom-loving traditions. The majority of the leaders of party and soviet organs of the city and oblast considered the fulfilment of economic plans to be their primary objective, and they were indifferent to the interests of the working people. The current style of leadership is far from meeting contemporary demands and has more in common with the era of stagnation. No honest individual can remain oblivious to the situation in which our society finds itself today. Inflation is rising, crisis situations are snowballing. History teaches us that a people’s fate is in its own hands. The times demand that the supporters of perestroika unite into a single public political organization. This popular movement for perestroika should be called ‘the Rebirth of Khujand’. The goal of the popular movement is to achieve genuine government by the people by enforcing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

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II. Politics The Ekhiei Khujand popular movement actively supports a restructuring of the political and economic system of Soviet society. The slogan ‘All power to the soviets’ must be implemented in practice.5 Power in the republic and the localities should be in the hands of the people. The people would exercise their power directly through referendums and through their authorized representatives in the Soviets of People’s Deputies. The Ekhiei Khujand popular movement recognizes no regime other than that of the soviets. The people should exercise power through the Soviets of People’s Deputies, which constitute the political foundation of the USSR. All other bodies of state power would be subordinate and accountable to the Soviets of People’s Deputies. The Ekhiei Khujand popular movement stands for complete sovereignty of the Tajik SSR and for concluding a new union treaty. ‘Free republics and a free union’ is the principle we uphold. The popular movement will take part in free elections to the Soviets of People’s Deputies based on the principle of ‘one man—one vote’. Only free elections can lead to genuine government by the people. The movement advocates elections of leaders of the republic, oblast, city and raion, exclusively on the basis of free elections. In accordance with Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Ekhiei Khujand popular movement firmly stands for political pluralism and freedom to express political views and conduct organized activities. III. The Economy The popular movement favours pluralism in forms of ownership and methods of conducting economic activity. Tajikistan’s territory, its mineral wealth, water and air should be the exclusive property of the republic. The popular movement supports a system under which in rural areas land would be leased and distributed by the local soviets, rather than by collective and state farms. The popular movement favours private ownership (by individuals, enterprises, establishments and public organizations on a republican, union and international scale). Ekhiei Khujand supports economic independence for the republic. The republic should be transformed from a raw-material appendage of the union, into an industrialized country.6 Tajikistan’s economy makes it possible to create a network of small industrial enterprises in various parts of the republic on the basis of different types of ownership (private, cooperative, leasehold, public). The popular movement holds that all industrial enterprises controlled by the union should be transferred to the control of the republican or regional authorities. Prior to the full transfer of industrial enterprises to the control of the local organs of power, it is vital to create the necessary technical infrastructure and to ensure that personnel are trained before 1995. Prior to the transfer, local soviets should assert their control over profits and begin to use them freely. The popular movement favours the establishment of joint ventures in the republic. The popular movement advocates a uniform system of taxation, regardless of the form of ownership. […] The movement believes that the draft budget of the city and region should be published for public discussion.

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IV. The Social Sphere The popular movement considers one of its main goals to be the achievement of the wellbeing of each individual according to his contribution. Ekhiei Khujand demands that the city and regional Soviets of People’s Deputies publish (once every three months) the following data: a) the production of meat and dairy produce (the real amounts, not as a percentage of past years); b) the distribution of meat and dairy produce for republican, union and local use; […] e) the share of the profit (in per cent) accruing from the enterprises under union administration. The popular movement insists that plans for the distribution of housing, drawn-up by an enterprise, organization or local housing distribution administration, should be published annually. […] In allocating plots of land for individual construction, account should be taken of Tajik customs and traditions as well as of the fact that Tajiks usually have large families. The popular movement believes that a system of coupons for foodstuffs and consumer goods in short supply should be introduced as a temporary expedient. The popular movement demands that its representatives be included in the people’s control groups that supervise the work of commercial, public catering, health, transport and service establishments. V. Ecology Ekhiei Khujand will work for ecological cleanliness and a revival of our cultural and historical values, including clean rivers and conservation of all kinds of trees and city parks, with new greenery planted in areas adjoining them. The Old City residential quarters should remain intact, open-air museums should be set up, and historical buildings repaired and restored, etc. The preliminary master plans for the development of the region’s towns should be submitted for public discussion. Their endorsement should require the approval of the popular movement. In addition to restoring the city’s old name of Khujand (Khojent in Russian), its streets should be given their former names. […] The popular movement advocates a revival of old handicrafts, including making and selling works of art, chinaware, bronze articles, jewellery and traditional knives, halva and flat-cakes. Ekhiei Khujand demands that the Leninabad chemical and mining industrial complex be closed and gradually moved to some other location. The pool in Ruhhak where radioactive waste is stored has for years been poisoning people and causing many diseases.7 […] Public attention should be focused on the struggle to restore the purity of the waters of the Syr-Darya River,8 its banks and the wildlife along its path. The popular movement demands of the authorities that detailed data on the degree of radioactive pollution in Khujand and its environs be published in the local press. VI. Ethnic and Cultural Issues

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The popular movement seeks an improvement in people’s morals, and supports the development of universal values, over ethnic or class values. The movement recognizes the role of both religious institutions and political organizations in inculcating universal human values. Ekhiei Khujand stresses that the rights of believers to observe rituals should be respected and that mosques and other places of worship which have been closed should be returned to the religious organizations. With respect to education and culture, the movement stands for: a) mutual understanding and respect for the languages, traditions and cultural values of all the peoples; […] c) promoting study of the Tajik language and the Arabic-Persian alphabet. d) the idea of giving priority to the pre-revolutionary history of Tajikistan and Central Asia, and instituting a course on the peoples of the USSR in Tajik-language schools, and a more extensive course on Tajik language and literature in other schools.9 The popular movement supports peaceful coexistence among all peoples living in Tajikistan and recognition of their civil rights.10 Source: Grazhdanskie dvizheniia v Tadzhikistane (Moscow, 1990), pp. 140–6. NOTES 1. Khujand is one of the most important and ancient Tajik cities. According to tradition, it was founded—together with Kulob—by Alexander the Great (Rakowska-Harmstone Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia, p. 10). It became an important industrial and cultural centre during the Soviet period. 2. The first plenum after Gorbachev came to power, which ordered a general policy review. 3. The 27th Congress of the CPSU was held in February 1986. 4. Khujand was one of four towns in Eastern Bukhara where a soviet was established in 1918. 5. The demand to transfer all power to the soviets was an indirect expression of the movement’s efforts to curtail the power of the Communist Party. Significantly, the political part of the programme does not contain any straightforward criticism of the Communist Party leadership. This can be attributed to the fact that the communist upper crust was traditionally composed of representatives from Leninabad. 6. See Rastokhez Popular Movement, n. 5. 7. Since the beginning of the 1940s, the factory near the town of Chkalovsk, 25 km from Leninabad, was an important uranium-ore processing centre and a source of radioactive pollution. 8. The Syr-Darya, which divides the city into two parts, is one of the two largest rivers in Central Asia. 9. The Leninabad Oblast included not only Tajik and Russian, but Uzbek schools as well. The majority of pupils received their education in Tajik (66 per cent), in general day schools; 22.9 per cent studied in Uzbek (most of them in Leninabad Oblast), in Russian, 9.7 per cent, and in Kyrgyz, 1.1 per cent (The Europa World Year Book. 1992, Vol. 2, p. 2826). 10. According to the 1989 census, the Leninabad Oblast had a population of 1,554,000, composed of 885,000 Tajiks, 486,000 Uzbeks, 101,000 Russians, 26,000 Tatars, 18,000 Kyrgyz and 8,000 Ukrainians (Vsesoiuznaia perepis’ naseleniia 1989 goda, Vol. 7 (Moscow, 1992), table 23).

EMANCIPATED LABOUR PARTY INTRODUCTION The Emancipated Labour Party was an alliance of the republic’s old economic élite, primarily directors of major enterprises and new commodity producers. It reflected an attempt by this stratum to stem the tide of the disintegration of the economy during the de facto state of civil war in order to influence the decision-making process. The party’s aim was to play an intermediary role between the working population and the country’s leadership. The constituent congress of the Emancipated Labour Party was held on 29 August 1992 in Dushanbe. It adopted a programme and rules and elected a political council. Jamshed Karimov, the first secretary of the Dushanbe City Communist Party Committee from 1989 to 1991, was elected party chairman. At that time he was first deputy prime minister and president of the Union of Leaseholders and Entrepreneurs.

APPEAL OF THE ORGANIZING COMMITTEE […] The Emancipated Labour Party stands for: – building a united, democratic, secular Tajikistan that will secure the supremacy of law in all spheres of life in the republic, and the functioning of state bodies and public institutions within the strict confines of the law; – the elevation of human rights to the level of universally recognized international norms, banning all discrimination on ethnic-national, political or religious grounds and protection of the rights of the individual and the citizen’s dignity under the law; – securing the unhindered transformation to free market relationships and an equitable means of transferring public property to private ownership, in order to create equal initial opportunities for everyone; unfettering commodity producers, encouraging labour and business activity, broad support for entrepreneurial activity, staunchly upholding the interests of all types of property owners; – creating conditions to attract foreign investments, technologies and know-how in key branches of the economy, establishing free economic zones; – promoting mutually advantageous economic and cultural relations with the CIS countries, neighbouring states and industrialized Western and Eastern countries, and the integration of Tajikistan into the international community of civilized states; – giving peasants the right to choose the forms and conditions of their economic activity and securing equal rights and state assistance for them; – reforming the educational system and the organizational and administrative structure of science, culture and public health […]

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– comprehensively modernizing society to reach high western standards of social progress and simultaneously preserving eastern traditions and using the sociocultural experience of the peoples of the East, especially of the advanced Muslim countries, whose national development successfully combines western and eastern achievements; – creating a regime which is most conducive to free activity—restricted only by the limits of the law—of talented, enterprising and energetic people capable of creative labour. Source: Narodnaia gazeta, 18 August 1992.

ISLAMIC RENAISSANCE PARTY OF TAJIKISTAN INTRODUCTION The Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) was founded by young Islamic radicals from the Kurgan-Tyube region. Its activists had previously been involved in a movement for a return to the traditions and values of early Islam. The movement acquired a political character in 1989, when religious differences became entwined with the struggle for power which broke out between the regional élites in anticipation of the USSR’s demise. The ideology of Islam was used by young politicians from the south as a counterpoise to the communist ideology of the northern élite, who traditionally held key positions in the party and the state during the Soviet era. Thus, the emerging Islamic movement was branded with a ‘regional’ stigma, which subsequently thwarted any attempts by its leaders to make it a republic-wide party using the integrating factor of religion. The constituent congress of the IRPT was held in October 1990. Until October 1991 it maintained its formal status as the Tajik branch of the All-Union Islamic Renaissance Party, since the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik SSR had declared the creation of an Islamic party in Tajikistan to be illegal.1 The August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow and the acute deterioration of the position of the communists which ensued, expedited the process of the party’s legalization. On 23 October 1991, the Supreme Soviet rescinded its ban,2 which made the IRPT the first legal Islamic party in the Central Asian region to operate under Soviet rule. The first party congress was held on 26 October 1991 in Dushanbe,3 attended by 657 delegates and 310 guests. Supported by Qazi-kalon Khoja Akbar Turajonzoda, the spiritual leader of the Muslims of Tajikistan, the congress opted in favour of leaving the All-Union IRP and establishing an independent Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan. The move was taken contrary to the will of the All-Union IRP. The leaders of political Islam in Russia, who made up the core of the All-Union IRP, immediately ceased supporting the IRPT. Muhammadsharif Khimatov was elected party chairman. Various sources estimate its membership at the time as between 10,000 and 20,000. On 4 December 1991 the party was registered by the Ministry of Justice.4 According to its rules, the IRPT, ‘is a political organization of the Muslims of the Republic of Tajikistan. It is based on the principles of Islam and is a parliamentary type party; it actively participates in elections and nominates its candidates to all the representative bodies’.5 In alliance with the Democratic Party and the Rastokhez Movement, the IRPT supported Davlat Khudonazarov in the November 1991 presidential elections, won by Rahmon Nabiyev. The series of demonstrations held by the IRPT and other opposition forces in Shokhidon Square in Dushanbe from March to May 1992 undermined the stability of the Nabiyev regime.

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In the spring of 1992, the party began to play a greater role in political life. In April, the Supreme Soviet appointed five IRPT members to the commission for drafting a new constitution. On 12 May 1992, party deputy chairman Davlat Usmon was appointed deputy prime minister in the coalition government. The IRPT put considerable emphasis on propaganda, and published three newspapers in 1992–93: Nadjhot (Salvation), Shahodat (Testimony) and Paemi Khak (The Voice of Truth). When the party was legalized once again in 1999, only Nadjhot was revived.6 Having established the paramilitary Patriotic Salvation Front in 1992, the IRPT began an open struggle for power. In autumn of 1992, the IRPT and its allies managed to force President Nabiyev to resign, and from September to October the party practically controlled the capital Dushanbe. At the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993, a number of IRPT adherents even made an attempt to proclaim an Autonomous Islamic Republic of Garm in Karategin, one of the areas where they exercised influence. The failure of this bid became clear when in February 1993 government troops entered Karategin. In the civil war, the IRPT and its allies were defeated. One fatal miscalculation of the IRPT was that it counted on the support of the great majority of Tajiks as professing Muslims. The IRPT overlooked the fact that for many Tajiks slogans of a politicized Islam and the possibility of an Islamic state signified a return to an Iranianstyle mediaeval society. Indeed, the IRPT failed to become a party of the entire republic, remaining primarily one of a single region—the south, from where its leaders hailed. It was natural that the IRPT did not count even on the neutrality, let alone the support, of the Russian-speaking population, which feared the prospect of finding itself in an Islamic state. The Islamic Party leadership, moreover, demonstrated its tacit approval of threats levelled against the Russian inhabitants of the republic by its ally, the leader of the Democratic Party, Shodmon Yusuf, by refusing to dissociate itself from them. All this made it possible for the communists to secure Russia’s support, which to a large extent determined their victory in the civil war. Moscow was worried not only about the plight of the Russian population, but also about the security of the CIS borders. After the defeat, the IRPT leaders and a portion of its members fled to Afghanistan and began an armed struggle against the Tajikistan regime. The party was outlawed in June 1993.7 Despite the official prohibition, however, it continued to exist as the Islamic Renaissance Movement of Tajikistan and to confront the Dushanbe government. It was especially active in Tajik refugee camps in Afghanistan and in military bands which made armed incursions into Tajikistan territory. The qazi-kalon, and head of the Islamic establishment in Tajikistan from 1988, Akbar Turajonzoda, who, identified with the IRPT and became one of its chief spokesmen, was forced to flee to Afghanistan in 1992 where he remained until 1997. In 1993 he was officially deprived of his title of qazi-kalon and replaced by Fathullo Sharifov who was given the title of mufti. In 1998, after Turajonzoda’s return from exile, he was appointed first deputy prime minister in the Tajik government.8 On 12 August 1999 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tajikistan lifted the ban on the IRPT’s activity.9 In February 2000 Turajonzoda officially left the IRPT.

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PROGRAMME INTRODUCTION Analysis of the Political Situation and Causes of the Collapse of the Soviet System In the course of over 70 years, the Muslim peoples have been unable to satisfy their political, economic, social, moral and cultural needs. Everyone is aware of the outcome of the revolution which propagated inhuman conditions, incited class hatred and so on. The pernicious policy of the communist leaders destroyed society—almost to its very foundations. In the course of 70 years, as a result of atheistic propaganda, the moral foundation of all classes of society and all peoples was undermined; and crime, depravity, excess, deceit and dishonesty became widespread. The Communist Party offered no escape from this impasse. The Muslim peoples of Central Asia were cut off from other Muslim peoples around the world. They were not represented in a single Muslim international organization. The IRPT sees the communist system’s unnatural theories, inhuman foundations and anti-ethnic structure as the cause for its downfall. The unnatural socialist society is founded on mutual hostility, malice, bloody class rivalry, and efforts to destroy private property and religion and do away with natural human needs. This, in the final analysis, is what led the communist system to ruin. To us, the followers of Islam, it is well known that the Prophet Muhammad, may the prayers and blessings of Allah be with him, was an outstanding political figure. He built a just society, which rested on the laws of truth. He brought the people piety and purification of the spirit. His caliphs followed the same path. However, from the moment that the feet of the colonizers and slavedrivers trod on the territory of the Islamic countries [of Central Asia], certain political circles began trying to separate religion from the state. These circles, in order to further their own aims, even began to form political parties using Islamic slogans. These figures hypocritically told the Muslims of these countries: ‘We guarantee your freedom of worship, we will build mosques, Sufi convents and madrasas, we will not cause you any harm. You will observe the namaz and the uraz, and discuss religious problems—the differences between Islamic sects.’ (For 70 years our Muslims did not have these rights.) ‘Only do not concern yourselves with political and economic problems.’ They wanted Muslims to deal only with issues of piety and to ignore politics. They themselves tried to exploit the natural wealth of the Muslim countries and Muslim labour. After the proclamations of glasnost, there was a similar deceitful communist policy which, instead of a divine paradise, promised the possibility of creating a communist paradise on earth. In these circumstances, the breakdown of moral, ideological, political and economic values, which are fundamental to the people, have become even more profound. The Communist Party has tried to destroy national characteristics and create a new internationalist society. For this reason the Muslims of the Republic of Tajikistan have decided to make the doctrine of the Holy Qur’an a model for themselves. The Sunna of the Prophet and the

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fruits of the achievement of Muslim theologians, in particular Muslim lawyers, have been propagated and are active in our homeland and have established as their aim the building of a just, humane and democratic society. PROGRAMME OF THE ISLAMIC RENAISSANCE PARTY OF TAJIKISTAN The IRPT is formulating its programme on the basis of pure Islam. For the party Islam is the law and the guide in all political matters. The main aim of the IRPT is to enlighten the people with regard to the principles of the Muslim religion. The IRPT joins all freedom- and independence-loving forces and places all of its own forces in the service of the cause of freedom and independence for Tajikistan. The IRPT deems that Tajikistan cannot develop normally without achieving full independence. Like all other states, Tajikistan should be recognized by the world community. It is necessary to attain for Tajikistan its own embassies, consulates and economic and cultural representatives. The IRPT opposes nationalism, chauvinism and inter-ethnic conflicts. The IRPT favours the establishment of good-neighbourly relations with all independent states, in particular with the states of Central Asia and with all linguistically and religiously kindred nations. The ultimate aim of the IRPT is the building of a society founded on the basis of faith, a just, free and independent society in which, while preserving its national and religious character, will enable each member, regardless of nationality or religious affiliation, to live and work freely. The IRPT stands for a multi-party system and for free competition of parties. The IRPT maintains ties with all democratic forces in the republic, and with all democratic and Islamic movements in foreign states. The IRPT calls for joint actions of all parties and movements, for cooperation in the name of independence and national freedom, and in the name of liquidating all the vestiges of colonial dependence. The Economic Sphere The IRPT, basing itself on Islamic doctrine, considers that in the sphere of economics, satisfying the material and moral needs of the people is the most important factor in an individual’s harmonious development. Islamic economic ideas are in harmony with human nature. Materialistic economic theories pursue the aim of amassing as much wealth as possible. From an economic point of view, such aims stimulate the moral decay of society and the corruption of mores. However, Islam also attributes great significance to the economy. From this point of view, the IRPT’s economic programme serves as a healthy foundation for satisfying the growing demands of the individual. For 70 years the economy of our people bore a colonial character. Until today our country has remained a source of raw materials. The monoculture economy has contributed to the fact that peasants, who have received almost nothing in exchange for their labour, have become poorer and poorer. Our people is still not in control of its assets. Our wealth, from gold to cotton, brings us little benefit. The economy of the republic, until the present time, has been of a barter type. We export raw materials and sell them. From this point of view, the IRPT considers that

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Tajikistan, in the short term, should be transformed into a country which processes raw materials in order to sell its products on the world market at international prices. The IRPT stands for the development of economic relations with all countries of the world. To facilitate the economic development of Tajikistan, to overcome the colonial economy and poverty and satisfy the needs of the individual, the IRPT has formulated the following programme in the economic sphere: – Plans for economic development should be equal for all regions. – Training specialists in all fields from the titular nationality. – At present we do not have adequate national cadres; the current cadre policy is a great crime against our people. At present we do not have a sufficient number of indigenous specialists in the most important spheres of the economy. – On the basis of the Shari’a, the IRPT opposes monopolism, speculation, usury and other negative economic phenomena. – A ban on unproductive outlays in all spheres of industrial and banking affairs. – Granting economic benefits to underprivileged strata of society. – Ensuring the increase of industrial production and the growth of the agricultural yield and the building of special storage facilities for guaranteeing preservation of produce. – Preferential development of those sectors of the economy which, first and foremost, satisfy the demands of the people; striving to make the republic’s economy independent. – Disbanding sovkhozes and kolkhozes, allocation of the land to the peasants. – Every individual should be considered the legal owner of the fruits of his labour; private property should be respected. – Rational use of natural resources within the borders of the republic. – Gradual transformation of the totalitarian economy into a free economy. The Sphere of Science and Culture The healthy upbringing and training of the younger generation is the guarantee of revolutionary transformations in our society. If we want to occupy a respectable position among other nations and to make progress, we must create a good system of education. The IRPT is committed to the prestige of educational institutions (schools, universities, institutes, institutions for technical training); the instructors should be among the most respected people in society. To achieve this it is necessary to do the following: – Change the system of financing educational institutions and furnish them with the newest equipment. – Send the best students to developed foreign countries. – Carry out a transition to a system of specialized training after 7th grade. – Institute the teaching of religion, intensifying the study of nationalIslamic culture; protect the youth from ignorance and superstition in this sphere. – Devote greater attention to the issue of teaching the native language. – Encourage capable and dynamic people to enter the teaching profession. – Teach higher forms of literature in school; use these literary works to propagate Islamic values. – Foreign, non-Muslim literature should be studied seriously.

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– Milestones in non-Muslim literature should be taught, providing that they do not promote corruption, and that they correspond to Islamic values and promote a healthy life style. – The IRPT is in favour of cultural values corresponding to the principles of freedom and national independence. – The IRPT opposes exploiting culture in the name of the assimilationist goals of the colonizers. – In the sphere of art, the IRPT favours the development of those spheres which are in keeping with Islam. – Public showings of films in Tajik, which are in keeping with the dictates of religion and national traditions. – Theatres should present artistic plays of high-level national and universal content, and should propagate these values among the masses. – The development of national folk and traditional music, so that the nation can become acquainted with its own past. The Ideological Sphere The basis of the IRPT’s ideology is belief in the Creator and in the mission of Muhammad. Islam, which was spread among us over a thousand years ago, is a national asset. For this reason our national traditions do not differ at all from Islam or contradict it in any way. There is no one in the world who can be equal to Allah. From this it follows that: – No one should be worshipped but Allah. – Aside from Allah, no one, neither an absolutist monarchy nor an elected government, can determine the law. – Every Muslim is obligated to do his utmost so that the axis and aim of his entire life is finding grace in the eyes of Allah. – The IRPT in a variety of ways, both in the sphere of religion itself and in the spheres of culture, civilization, everyday life and politics, and also in all matters of vital importance, proceeds from divine inspiration and does not acknowledge any law which contradicts the Shari‘a. – From the second part of our profession of faith,10 it follows that Muhammad, may the prayers and blessings of Allah be with him, is the last prophet, to whom the Divine Writ was sent down in order to instruct those living on Earth. – The IRPT spreads its teachings among the people by all legal means. – The IRPT takes a tolerant stand to the followers of other religions. The Social Sphere The IRPT favours raising the level of well-being and prosperity of all social strata. – The most important task is securing the equality of all members of society, and offering everyone a chance to work. – For a capable individual, acquiring wealth is a duty; it is the best way of serving God. – It is necessary for all fellow citizens—regardless of national or religious affiliation, provided that the citizen fulfils his obligations—to secure prosperity and a worthy lifestyle.

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– Guaranteeing the opportunity to satisfy basic needs: housing, food, clothing, medical care, education, and raising a family. – Ensuring free elections, not tolerating corruption, or appropriating the benefits of someone else’s labour. – Preserving the family is a guarantee for preserving a healthy social climate. It is necessary to adopt just legislation concerning family relationships. – Liberation of women from excessive, harmful labour. It is vital to ensure that a woman is always free to raise the younger generation, as befits a woman’s nature. The Sphere of Health People who have embarked on the path of independence and selfdetermination should be healthy, both spiritually and physically. Islam offers numerous directives regarding the need to preserve physical and corporeal strength. Allah’s prophet emphasized: ‘A healthy and strong believer is better than a weak believer.’ In this connection the IRPT considers it necessary: – To open clinics for preventive medicine, as understood from an Islamic point of view. – To open hospitals in rural locations, for that is where the majority of the republic’s population resides. To grant bonuses to doctors who fulfil their noble duty in rural locations. – To create all possible conditions for rendering medical assistance to women in the spirit of religious principles and national customs; to promote the training of doctors among women for this purpose. – To give warning of infectious diseases. To fight AIDS, the plague of the 20th century. Not to permit it to spread in the republic, to root out its causes. The Sphere of Ecology and Environmental Protection Protecting the environment should be one of the basic elements of the economic programme if today’s and tomorrow’s generations are to live in healthy natural surroundings and be safeguarded against natural disasters. At present, as the result of the unwise and exploitative policy of the centre aimed at extracting our natural resources, an unhealthy ecological situation has come about in the republic. In order to prevent a natural catastrophe and to overcome an unhealthy situation in the sphere of environmental protection, the IRPT promotes the following principles in its programme: – A ban on building factories which endanger the environment. – A ban on building artificial reservoirs in mountainous regions of the republic, which were initiated in accordance with directives of the centre. – Opposing the creation of irrigation systems in hilly and mountainous populated areas. – Use of state-of-the-art technology to minimize the harmful waste produced by factories. – Reduction of the use of chemical and mineral fertilizers in rural areas. – Moving industrial sites from the banks of rivers so as not to dump harmful waste there.

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In light of the economic situation which has taken shape in the republic, to develop light and processing industries which pollute the environment to a lesser degree. – In order to study the problems of the environment from an Islamic point of view and publicize it in the Muslim community, the IRPT is creating a department of ecological propaganda. IRPT In the name of the revival of religion, culture and tradition and the deliverance of society from its political and economic problems, the IRPT asks Almighty God to bless us with success in our mission. We hope that the leading Muslims who have united ranks around the IRPT, will make their contribution towards resolving social problems with the help of Almighty God. (Adopted by the First IRPT Congress on 26 October 1991) Source: V.I.Bushkov and V.D.Mikul’skii, Tadzhikskaia revoliutsiia i grazhdanskaia voina (1989–1994) (Moscow, 1995), pp. 183–90. NOTES 1. See Malashenko, ‘Does Islamic Fundamentalism Exist in Russia?’. 2. Narodnaia gazeta, 24 Oct. 1991. 3. Olimova, ‘Politicheskii islam i konflikt v Tadzhikistane’, p. 138. 4. Narodnaia gazeta, 25 June 1993. 5. Olimova, ‘Politicheskii islam i konflikt v Tadzhikistane’, p. 138. 6. Olimova and Olimov, Tadzhikistan na poroge peremen, p. 73. 7. Narodnaia gazeta, 25 June 1993. 8. For Turajonzoda, see Central Asian Monitor 1 (1994), pp. 16–24. 9. Olimova and Olimov, Tadzhikistan na poroge peremen, p. 72. 10. The Islamic confession of faith, shahada, reads as follows: ‘There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is his prophet’.

KRYNITSA SOCIETY OF UKRAINIANS INTRODUCTION The Krynitsa (Well) Society, sponsored by the Ukrainian Youth Association based in Kiev, was founded in September 1991. According to the 1989 census, the Ukrainian population of Tajikistan numbered about 40,000.1 The organization saw itself as a protector of Ukrainian rights in Tajikistan and to this end favoured a strong government, which could guarantee these rights.

PROGRAMME EXCERPTS The main objectives in creating an ethnic Ukrainian community in Tajikistan are: the consolidation of Ukrainians residing in the republic, revival of the traditional spiritual and cultural wealth of the Ukrainian people, restoration of links with their historical roots, protection of the national-political and socio-economic rights of the Ukrainians; assistance in checking the process of language assimilation and neutralizing its negative consequences by all available lawful means, promotion of the cultural achievements of the Ukrainian people as part of universal culture. Among the practical aspects of its work are the establishment of small businesses, joint ventures, cooperatives and foundations, and charitable assistance to the needy. The community has both group (societies, organizations, clubs, etc.) and individual members. Its members elect the leading bodies and submit programmes for improving the work of the community. Source: Oleg Panfilov, ‘Ukraintsy usikh mists’, prosimo do Dushanbe’, Soglasie 9 (December 1991). NOTES 1. Natsional’nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR, Part 2, p. 90.

LA’LI BADAKHSHON INTRODUCTION La’li Badakhshon (Ruby of Badakhshon) was a regional public political organization, created in 1990 by mathematician Amirbek Atobek.1 Its social base consisted mostly of educated natives of the Pamir mountain region (Gorno-Badakhshon Autonomous Oblast2). Its constituent conference was held on 4 March 1991 in Dushanbe. On 30 May 1991 La’li Badakhshon was registered by the Tajik SSR Ministry of Justice. Initially, La’li Badakhshon was formed as a cultural and educational society aimed at raising the cultural and political level of residents of this remote region and protecting their interests. However, very soon it became politicized. In autumn 1991 it joined a political alliance of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan, the Islamic Renaissance Party, and Rastokhez. They created a Union of Democratic Forces that chose a native of GornoBadakhshon, Davlat Khudonazarov, as its presidential candidate. In 1992 La’li Badakhshon began publishing a newspaper, Bokhtar. On 21 June 1993, the organization was banned by the Supreme Court. It continued to operate clandestinely in the remote areas of GornoBadakhshon. Its leadership fled to Afghanistan and merged there with the United Tajik Opposition. La’li Badakhshon took part in the interTajik talks on national reconciliation in 1994–97. On 12 August 1999, the Presidium of the Supreme Court of Tajikistan lifted the ban on the activity of this organization. By mid-1999, La’li Badakhshon had about 3,000 members.3

PROGRAMME EXCERPTS [The aim of the organization is]: to develop political thinking and to raise the economic, educational and cultural level of the peoples of Gorno-Badakhshon.4 [La’li Badakhshon’s goals are:] [In the political sphere] to inculcate in the population a scientific worldview and political activism. [In the economic sphere:] – to promote economic development of Gorno-Badakhshon Autonomous Oblast;5 – to disseminate economic and legal knowledge in order to enhance technological and social progress and to create a state governed by law. [In the cultural sphere:]

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– to study and develop the culture of the peoples of Badakhshon; – to promote the arts and the study of the history and languages of the peoples of Badakhshon, and to contribute to their development;6 – actively contribute to the implementation of the Law on Language of the Republic of Tajikistan. [In the social sphere:] – to render economic aid to the needy. Source: S.Olimova and M.Olimov, Tadzhikistan na poroge peremen (Moscow, 1999), pp. 112–13. NOTES 1. A.Atobek, PhD, graduated in mathematics from Dushanbe Pedagogical Institute in 1971. From 1992 he was a member of the Tajik opposition. In 1995 he became one of the leaders of the United Tajik Opposition. In 1996–97 he participated in peace talks held in Ashgabat, Tehran and Moscow. In 1997 he became a member of the Commission on National Reconciliation. 2. See Introduction to Tajikistan. 3. Olimova and Olimov, Tadzhikistan na poroge peremen, p. 111. 4. Several different ethnic groups inhabit Gorno-Badakhshon. These groups, which have their own language and religion, do not consider themselves Tajiks. During the civil war , forces from this region called for independence for their territory (Human Rights and Democratization in the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, p. 224). 5. In the Soviet era, Tajikistan was the poorest and least developed republic of the Soviet Union. See Introduction to Tajikistan. Gorno-Badakhshon Autonomous Oblast was and continues to be the poorest region of Tajikistan. 6. Languages of the Pamir linguistic group and Yaghnobi (a modern descendant of Middle Sogdian, one of the East Iranian languages), are spoken in the eastern and western Pamir region.

OSHKORO INTRODUCTION Oshkoro (glasnost) was an organization of residents of the Kulob Region, established in 1988, and consisted of urban intellectuals and members of the commercial community. Behind the emergence of Oshkoro was the long-standing frustration on the part of the inhabitants of Kulob over the fact that top party and government posts were dominated by people from Leninabad Oblast. After the disintegration of the USSR and the independence of Tajikistan, the Khujand élite conceded some of its traditional posts to Kulob, and the rivalry became less intense. This fact had an effect on Oshkoro’s position: when tensions increased in 1992, it supported the pro-communist regime of President Rahmon Nabiyev, a native of Leninabad. After he was removed from power and civil war broke out, Oshkoro members took part in the armed struggle against Rastokhez, and the Islamic and democratic opposition which was represented in the coalition Government of National Reconciliation, but by then Oshkoro had ceased to function as an organization. Many Oshkoro members perished in the civil war, (as the main fighting took place in the Kulob region), its leader Rustam Abdurahimov among them.

PROGRAMME […] The aim of the Oshkoro political organization is to search, with the broad support of the people, and in light of glasnost, for solutions to major social problems. The spiritual foundation of our movement consists of honest thoughts and deeds […] The aims of the organized movement of the Tajik people, Oshkoro, include the following: I. Participation in Building a Law Governed State in Tajikistan – Participating in referendums to make positive changes in the Tajik SSR. – Contributing in every way possible to strengthening democracy and pluralism in the course of building a multi-paity system. – Securing fundamental democratic human rights on the basis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. – Contributing to the republic’s real self-sufficiency in the political, social, economic and cultural spheres. – Establishing just relations between the [Soviet Union’s] centre and the Soviet republics and building durable political, economic, public and cultural ties with them. – Securing the right of the republics and ethnic minorities to self-determination through referendums.

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– Defence of the rights of Tajiks residing outside the republic. – Support of Tajik organizations outside the republic. – Defence of the political and social rights of ethnic minorities. – Demand for supervision by the Tajikistan Supreme Soviet (parliament) of the activities of the KGB and MVD (Ministry of the Interior). – Definition of the powers of the legislative, executive and judicial bodies. Establishment of the institution of the jury and the right of every citizen to have his own lawyer […] – Protection of the rights of local government in political and economic activity. – Activities of the draft board should be supervised by the Oshkoro organization. II. The Electoral System – Rejection of the system of electing representatives of the people to bodies of state power from regional or district public organizations.1 – Direct elections for head of the republic (president) of Tajikistan. III. Foreign Relations – Tajikistan should have its own permanent representative at the United Nations. – Direct ties with foreign countries, especially with those which share a common language,2 at embassy and consulate levels. – Cooperation with foreign countries in establishing joint ventures. – Broad scientific and cultural contacts, including the organization of joint conferences and other measures in the spheres of scientific and cultural heritage, the exchange of books and information, joint radio and television programmes, bilateral visits of scholars and students. – Unobstructed development of tourist travel to foreign countries. – Complete transfer of all tourist sites to state control and making them available to both fellow-countrymen and foreign tourists. IV. The Economy – Securing economic independence, formulation of the concept of economic independence (move to cost-accounting and self-financing) of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic. – Organization of a sovereign bank of the republic with all ensuing rights of a national bank.3 […] – Transferring all enterprises subordinate to the centre to the administration of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic.4 – Switching to a system under which a defined share of the republic’s national income goes to the federal budget. – Natural resources, including those under and above ground, forests and mountains, should be considered the national property of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic. – Utilization of the national property of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic by the central government and the union republics should be guided by principles of mutual interest, giving priority to the interests of the Tajik republic.

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– A programme has been formulated, according to which 50 per cent of the Tajik SSR’s raw material processing will be concentrated inside the borders of the republic, with the aim of further growth in the near future. – Support for the development of cotton-growing5 while meeting the following demands: conservation of the environment (ecology), switching to a system of shortening the working day by introducing two shifts, improvement of living conditions of the rural population, spiritual development of the dehqan, imposition of a ban on the use of child labour and of employing mothers with many children,6 full independence of collective and state farms, utilization of the free market, protection of pastureland, development of horticulture, viticulture, and melonand gourd-growing. – Construction of small enterprises in rural areas to meet consumer demand for goods in short supply. – Creation of a special commission for returning to the Tajik SSR all the wealth that legally belongs to it, and of which it was deprived at different periods and for various reasons […] V. The Social Sphere – Realization of social justice. – Wide-ranging assistance in raising the work ethic and the quality of everyday life. – Wide-ranging national and republican assistance to newly-weds, primarily by making it possible for them to acquire their own housing.7 – Support for the construction of apartment buildings suitable to the climate, revival of traditional architecture, among others in private houses. – Production of foodstuffs in industrial enterprises; preparation of foodstuffs in accordance with national traditions and customs […] VI. Culture – Achieving multifaceted personal development: physical, intellectual and spiritual, in accordance with humanistic ideas and high moral principles. – Preparing for publication of works from our cultural heritage and contemporary materials which extol patriotic feelings, call for respect for national and universal human values and serve to awaken national consciousness. – Recruiting press organs for all-round individual improvement among all strata of the population (including specialized, scientifictechnical, and medical publications, and newspapers and magazines in the field of physical education and aesthetics). VII. Education and Training of Personnel – Formulation of a concept for the Tajik national school. – […] supporting talented young people all over the republic, holding contests, material assistance to families with talented children. – Aiding and supporting higher educational establishments in the transition to costaccounting and financial self-sufficiency, revision of the system of enrolment and instruction in institutions of higher learning. – Training national cadres for technical professions with the development of the economic structure of the republic in mind. – Setting up specialized schools for preparing managerial staff.

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– Guaranteeing opportunities for study in foreign educational institutions on a competitive basis and with an eye towards the demands of the republic’s economic development.8 – Establishing a system of rotation of managers inside the republic, between the centre and the republic and among union republics. – Training of a Tajik working class. – Implementation of the Law on Language. Source: Handwritten text [no date], cited in Grazhdanskie dvizheniia v Tadzhikistane (Moscow, 1990), pp. 156–61. NOTES 1. Deputies allocated to public organizations essentially became a mechanism for the nomenklatura to ensure representation of deputies who were unelectable in democratic popular balloting. For a discussion of this phenomenon at the all-union level see Vera Kaplan and Boris Morozov, ‘Toward a Multi-Party System, 1985–93’ in Nurit Schleifman (ed.), Russia at a Crossroads: History, Memory and Political Practice, (London: Frank Cass, 1998), pp. 190–5; 219–20, n. 58. 2. Refers to traditional relations with Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and India. 3. The Bank of Tajik SSR, like the banks of other republics, was a branch of the Central Bank of the USSR. It had no right to issue money or stocks and bonds. 4. Some enterprises in Tajikistan, such as the uranium ore-extracting plant in Chkalovsk (Leninabad Region), were administered by the union central authorities. They were kept out of republican control, were accountable to Moscow and their top managers were appointed in Moscow. 5. By 1989, 45.7 per cent of the republic’s arable land was planted with cotton (Aleksandrov, ‘Spetsificheskie sluchai ekonomicheskoi otstalosti’, pp. 143–4). 6. By 1989, 95.5 per cent of agricultural labour was performed manually (Narodnaia gazeta, 3 Oct. 1991). The work in the cotton fields was performed by women with babies and small children, whom they took with them to the fields, and by school children and students at institutes of higher learning, who were assigned to work in the fields harvesting cotton from three weeks to two months of the year. 7. At the end of the 1980s, the number of sq. metres of housing per capita in Tajikistan was 58 per cent of the USSR average, which, itself was far below Western standards (Aleksandrov, ‘Spetsificheskie sluchai ekonomicheskoi otstalosti’, p. 124). 8. In the USSR permission to study abroad could only be granted by the central authorities.

PEOPLE’S PARTY OF TAJIKISTAN INTRODUCTION The People’s Party of Tajikistan (PPT) appeared on the scene at the end of 1993. Its constituent conference was held on 10 December 1994. The party was conceived originally by the upper echelons of the state administration as a supra-regional mass political organization which would support the regime and recruit membership throughout the republic. The founders hoped that it would play a similar role to the Communist Party in the Soviet era. The PPT was established by Abdumajid Dostiyev, who occupied the post of first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet. Dostiyev and his adherents were mainly residents of Kulob Oblast and ardent supporters of President Rahmonov. The party proclaimed itself to be in favour of far-reaching reforms. It supported a controlled market economy.1 In the February 1995 parliamentary elections the PPT won 9 out of 181 seats.2 For a certain period the party successfully challenged the Communist Party’s domination of political life in the republic. Its local cells were to be found throughout the whole of Tajikistan. From September 1996 it published a newspaper, Minbari khalq (People’s Tribune) in Tajik, Uzbek and Russian. The Third Congress of the People’s Party of Tajikistan was held on 25 June 1997. At the congress, it was renamed the People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT). In March 1998 President Rahmonov joined the PDPT. At the party’s Fourth Congress held in April 1998, he was elected chairman and Dostiyev became his first deputy. As of November 1998 party membership numbered about 20,000, including many heads of local government and highly placed officials and executives. Thus, in effect, the PDPT had become the ruling party.3

RULES 1. The People’s Party of Tajikistan is a political organization advocating radical democratic reforms in order to create conditions conducive to a lasting peace and social harmony, and a stable and socially-oriented economy. The party’s activity is designed for professionals, specialists and business people whose experience and labour are the most important means to achieve these goals. 2. The PPT operates within the framework of the Constitution and laws of Tajikistan as laid down in its programme and party rules. II. Goals and Tasks of the Party

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The People’s Party of Tajikistan stands for: – evolutionary development of society on the basis of gradual reforms, which take into account the reality and specific character of Tajikistan; – a controlled market economy as a pre-condition for efficient economic management; – the re-transfer of property to those who are able to enrich society and themselves through their work and talents; – an active social policy to secure a decent life for people by increasing production and developing free enterprise; – a civil society with a multi-party system; – a strong democratic state with separation of powers and professional administration guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of citizens and adherence to the law; – respect for international norms, receptivity to the achievements of modern civilization. 2. The PPT strives for cooperation with all those who share the goals of its programme and are ready, in a political bloc together with other parties, to assume responsibility for Tajikistan’s fate. The party participates in the formation of organs of state power and administration at all levels and nominates candidates to power bodies of all levels; if necessary, it can create a parliamentary faction. The PPT is committed to broad international cooperation with parties and social movements of other countries. III. Principles of Party Activity and Membership 1. The Party’s organizational activities are based on democratic principles of voluntary membership, the sharing of views, equality of rights, respect for the opinion of each member, self-rule of primary party cells, accountability of elected bodies and openness in its work […] Source: Ustav Narodnoi Partii Tadzhikistana (pamphlet, n.d.)

PROGRAMME OF THE PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF TAJIKISTAN […] [The strategic aim of the PDPT] is to unite all citizens of the Republic of Tajikistan irrespective of their language, social origin, political convictions or professional or ethnocultural orientation, in creating in Tajikistan a society which will be: – a sovereign secular state governed by rule of law; – an economically and politically developed society that cares about its spiritual values, a political culture that leaves no place for extremism in any sphere of people’s lives; – a country that ensures sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of its borders, defends state interests and the peaceful life of its population by taking appropriate socio-economic, political, judicial, international and other measures; – a society that enjoys stability in all spheres of life;

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– a country in which a considerable indigenous Tajik population preserves ethnic integrity on the basis of national and civil harmony; – a society that preserves and consolidates the integrity of the populace of the republic, consisting of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Russians, Kyrgyz and other ethnic groups; – a state that establishes goodwill and neighbourly relations with all countries bordering Tajikistan; – a state which enjoys friendly, equal and mutually profitable relations with all states of Eurasia and other continents […] [In the Political Sphere:] Clearly stating its adherence to the common national goal—creating a secular democratic state governed by rule of law—the People’s Democratic Party in its everyday political activity will abide by the spirit and letter of the Constitution as well as all constitutional laws; it stands against any attempts to attain power by force. Considering itself a political party of the parliamentary, centrist type, the PDPT will nominate its candidates to representative power bodies in the system of executive power at all levels. While respecting political pluralism and diversity of opinion, the PDPT strives towards constructive dialogue and cooperation with all partners, political associations and movements which cherish noble political ideals […] [In the Economic Sphere:] The PDPT proposes a transition which will result in the appearance of a socially just and ecologically safe market economy. We stand for a gradual transition to market relations. At the same time, in this process a vital role will be given to state regulation. The state should create market institutions and basic legislation to conduct financial and credit reforms, to train a body of managers, to harmonize private and public interests, to ensure social and ecological security […] [In the Social Sphere:] – preserving social benefits created by the work of generations, and a guaranteed education, health service and social security; – protecting the population from unemployment […] – improving social support and protection of low-income population strata; – indexing salaries of public sector employees, and all kinds of pensions, as well as establishing a minimum wage; – providing social pensions to the disabled from the state budget […] – implementing programmes aimed at supporting mother and child, subsidising sports and tourism; […] [Regarding reforms, the PDPT] stands for an all-embracing modernization of society, which should be conducted without coercion and not in accordance with ready-made foreign models. Changes shall not destroy the social fabric of society, they shall take into account individual and collective identities, and shall not abolish national traditions, but be based on them. [Therefore the PDPT] stands for: – a planned, painless transition to civilized market relations and a real representative democracy; – a harmonious combination of politics, economy and culture.

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Source: S.Olimova and M.Olimov, Tadzhikistan na poroge peremen (Moscow, 1999), pp. 85–7. NOTES 1. Narodnaia gazeta, 30 Oct. 1993. 2. FBIS-95-060, 29 March 1995, p. 76. 3. Olimova and Olimov, Tadzhikistan na poroge peremen, pp. 82–4.

PEOPLE’S UNITY CONGRESS OF TAJIKISTAN INTRODUCTION The constituent conference of the People’s Unity Congress of Tajikistan (PUCT), a popular political movement, was held on 24 April 1995. It was founded among others by the Union of Scientists and Industrialists of Tajikistan, the Communist Party of the Republic of Tajikistan, the Russian Community, the Uzbek Society and the International Scientific, Industrial and Trade Corporation (Isatravshan). Saifiddin Turayev, the president of Isatravshan, became the leader of the PUCT.1 The idea to create such a broad political movement originated as early as 1992, when Turayev, a businessman, became the head of an organizational committee of an association of pro-government and centrist political parties and movements in Tajikistan known as the People’s Congress of Tajikistan Association. The creation of this association was an attempt by the ruling circles and the new economic élite to coordinate the efforts and activities of member parties and movements, which were basically loyal to the government and which supported a united Tajikistan, and to monitor political trends in the country. Its draft programme contained only provisions that were approved unanimously by all its founding organizations.2

PROGRAMME The PUCT aims to combine the efforts of various strata of the population and political forces in Tajikistan in extricating society from the crisis, consolidating the Republic of Tajikistan’s independence, and [facilitating] its integration in the CIS by developing socio-political, national and cultural diversity on the basis of expanding democracy and preserving human rights. [In the Political Sphere] To promote the socio-economic integration of all regions and the consolidation of all ethnic groups residing in Tajikistan and to withstand separatist trends and the political isolation of Tajikistan; – to promote […] the restoration of mutual trust, a healthy human environment and mutual respect, to fight against various manifestations of extremism, exaggerated local patriotism, and the incitement of conflicts and wars; – to promote mutual understanding and the consolidation of various political forces that […] aim at strengthening state independence and the democratization of society;

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– to participate in implementing the Agreement on Restoring Peace and National Reconciliation in Tajikistan;3 – to strive for a flexible national policy, which will take into account the interests of Tajikistan’s ethnic groups; – to strive for the democratization of state structures and political life by carrying out consistent political and legal reforms […] – to promote a real acceleration in implementing the principle of separation and the efficient cooperation of legislative, executive and judicial branches of power; – [to strive for] the optimization of state structures, the eradication of command controls and the formation of social structures favourable to the development of the economy; – to accept a multi-party system and the diversity of political life, to ensure freedom of activity of the various political forces; – to protect basic human freedoms and rights in accordance with international norms; [In the Economic Sphere] To promote an economic policy based on the principles of democracy, freedom of entrepreneurship and an opening of the economy to prepare for integration into the world economic community; – to promote an efficient monetary, banking and taxation policy; – [to strive to] restrict the monopolistic influence of state and local government bodies and financial structures on production, industrial turnover and financial relations; – to promote developing rural areas, increasing cotton production, creating small enterprises for processing agricultural products; – to attract foreign investments […] [In the Social Sphere] To strive for the creation of equal opportunities for the socio-economic development of all regions in Tajikistan, for a consistent demographic policy and adopting programmes to create new workplaces; – to create favourable conditions for the export of workers to countries where they are needed;4 – to render support to craftsmen and artisans; – to implement programmes aimed at support for the low-income strata of the population; – to freely allocate virgin lands in the mountain foothills to individual farmers; – to render aid in restoring rural areas that have suffered as a result of the civil war; – to render aid to the victims [of disasters], large families, pensioners, invalids, WWII veterans and those who have fulfilled their internationalist duty in Afghanistan;5 – to improve the living conditions of students […] [In the Cultural and Educational Sphere] – to render all necessary support to scientific research that promotes the further development of society, the individual and production […] [In the Foreign Policy Sphere]

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– to create legal and organizational conditions in order to raise the status of the Republic of Tajikistan in the world community; – to promote the development of relations with compatriots living abroad; – to create a new scientifically-based model of international cooperation; – to carry out a policy of neutrality and peaceful coexistence. Source: S.Olimova and M.Olimov, Tadzhikistan na poroge peremen (Moscow, 1999), pp. 109–10. NOTES 1. Saifiddin Turayev was born in 1945. From 1986 to 1989 he was minister of domestic services (bytovoe obsluzhivanie). From 1989 to 1991 he studied at the Academy of National Economy in Moscow, attached to the Council of Ministers of the USSR. In 1991–92 he was the first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan. In 1991 he ran for the presidency as a centrist and got 5 per cent of the vote. In 1992 he became president of the International Scientific, Industrial and Trade Corporation. In 1995 he was elected to the Majlisi Oli, the new Tajik parliament. (Olimova and Olimov, Tadzhikistan na poroge peremen, p. 108.) 2. Olimova and Olimov, Tadzhikistan na poroge peremen, p. 108–11. 3. On 27 June 1997 the General Agreement on Peace and National Reconciliation in Tajikistan was signed in Moscow. It put an end to the six-year civil war. In compliance with this document, hundreds of thousands of refugees returned to Tajikistan. Representatives of the United Tajik Opposition were granted the right to join economic and power structures. Their share of participation in government structures was 30 per cent, and 25 per cent in the Central Electoral Commission. In June 1998, the opposition leader Akbar Turajonzoda became first vice-premier in the government (Tsentral’naia Aziia i Kavkaz 5 (1999), p. 162). 4. Unemployment in Tajikistan has been one of the most pressing issues for a long time. Natural annual population growth at the beginning of the 1990s was 3.5–4.2 per cent. In the valley regions of the republic the population density was 500–900 per sq. km. In 1970 the share of arable land per capita was 0.15 hectares, and by the beginning of the 1990s, 0.1 hectares. Moreover, a considerable portion of arable land was being expropriated for industrial sites. As a consequence of these factors, unemployment in the rural areas increased and the urban areas lacked jobs for those who arrived from the countryside (A. Niiazi, ‘Tadzhikistan: ot sistemnogo krizisa k ustoichivomu razvitiiu’, Tsentral’naia Aziia 3 (1997), p. 62). 5. In Soviet parlance, the veterans of the Afghan war.

RASTOKHEZ POPULAR MOVEMENT INTRODUCTION The Rastokhez (Rebirth) Popular Movement was founded in 1989 in Dushanbe, on the initiative of a group of young Tajik intellectuals who had been brought together by the public debate over the Law on the Official Language. Its constituent congress, held in February 1989, elected a 50-man board and drafted a programme and rules. Official registration did not come until two years later, on 21 June 1991.1 The movement’s aims included the national and cultural revival of the Tajik people, raising the status of the Tajik language, and promoting economic growth through a mixed economy. Rastokhez comprised mostly urban intellectuals from Khujand and Dushanbe. As the movement’s prestige grew, it was joined by students, white-collar workers and tradesmen from all parts of Tajikistan. The presence of representatives from both north and south reflected a unique feature of Rastokhez—its aspiration to become the voice of the republic as a whole rather than of regional interests. Nevertheless, the fact that many leaders of Rastokhez were of southern origin intensified the confrontation between it and President Nabiyev who was from the north. Rastokhez’s ideology was oriented towards nationalism and democracy, with the nationalist aspects often prevailing over the democratic ones. The nationalist component of Rastokhez’s ideology was based on the concept of pan-Iranism. According to Rastokhez Vice-Chairman Sharafiddin Imomov, Central Asia was a historical region of settlement of the Iranian peoples, including the Tajiks. The Turkic domination of Central Asia was a threat to the republic. Together with the Democratic Party and the Islamic Renaissance Party, Rastokhez supported Davlat Khudonazarov in the November 1991 presidential elections. In May 1992, Rastokhez and its allies succeeded in gaining representation in the government. It sided with the Islamic and Democratic parties in the civil war that broke out in the autumn of 1992. The alliance with the Islamic Renaissance Party sparked off a serious crisis within Rastokhez, which resulted in part of its membership leaving its ranks. After the victory of the neo-communists and their supporters, the new authorities began persecuting members of Rastokhez in an effort to crush the movement. In the summer of 1993 Rastokhez was banned.2 Its leader at the time was Tohir Abdujabbarov.

PROGRAMME […] Today our society is trying to extricate itself from a crisis situation through perestroika, that is, a cardinal restructuring of all spheres of life. Perestroika is the path to lead us out of economic and cultural poverty, corruption, slavery and inequality and

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towards freedom and well-being, justice and equality, friendship and fraternity, progress and revival. [Perestroika] is being invoked in order to secure a revival of all [Soviet] nations, the Tajik nation included. However, perestroika cannot be achieved unless the masses fully support it and take an active part in it. Now the people are being aroused and more than ever before, there is an increase of political consciousness and patriotic activity. The mass Rastokhez Movement has been established in these circumstances […] It unites politically conscious and energetic people with kindred views. Its activities are directed at the most rapid and extensive attainment of the goals of perestroika. The following are the main goals of the Rastokhez organization of the Tajik SSR: – overcoming the present crisis by restructuring all spheres of public and political life in Tajikistan; – ensuring the republic’s socio-economic and cultural development; – raising the people’s material and spiritual level; – securing social justice; – reviving the national language and culture and the best traditions and customs of our forefathers; – renewal of society on the basis of supreme universal human values; – elimination of coercion and oppression, exploitation, inequality and injustice, corruption, swindling, immorality, universal fear and distrust; – building a genuinely democratic system, establishing the power of the people and a state governed by law; – raising the welfare of society to the point where the individual reigns supreme and is guided by our forefathers’ motto: ‘charitable thoughts, charitable words, charitable deeds’; – protection of the environment and public health. Rastokhez holds that in order to achieve these goals, a number of radical reforms must be carried out in the political system, in the economic, ethnic, legal and cultural spheres and in social relationships. I. Political and Legal Issues One of the major causes of the crisis of our society is connected with the specific features of our political system and the way in which it functions. Therefore it is necessary: – to replace the command-administrative system of government by a system of selfgovernment and the bureaucratic totalitarian regime we still have, by a genuinely popular (democratic) order; – to secure the appointment by election of all bodies of state power from local soviets to the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan. It is vital to achieve a situation, according to which they would be fully controlled by the people and act in accordance with the people’s demands and will. People elected to these bodies should be honest, broad-minded, knowledgeable and highly educated, have civic courage and high moral and professional qualities; – to hold free, democratic, direct elections with universal suffrage so that the elected people’s deputies will champion the interests of the people; – to cut drastically the number of governmental bodies and their staff;

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– to give work collectives at enterprises, collective and state farms greater powers and broaden their responsibilities; to introduce a system of self-government on an extensive scale; – to separate the spheres of activities of party and state, as stipulated by the decisions of the 19th CPSU conference,3 and assure the party’s non-interference in affairs of state; – that the government of the Tajik SSR be appointed by the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan and that it act in conformity with the Constitution of the Tajik SSR, bearing in mind the interests of the people;4 – that the government of the Tajik SSR be accountable to the republican Supreme Soviet and start working only after the latter has given it a vote of confidence; – that the people be kept informed about the work of the bodies of state power and government so that they can bring pressure to bear on them whenever necessary. Therefore openness should be promoted and fortified. All draft bills and decrees submitted to the Supreme Soviet, the Council of Ministers and local bodies of state power should be published for general discussion. Access to all books and documents stored in special archives should be given to everyone.5 Rastokhez stands for the realization of the principle of mutual responsibility of state and populace, which is the cornerstone of a state governed by law: – detailed and reliable data on the state of the economy, the policies and socioeconomic development of the republic, the work of enterprises, establishments, ministries and departments should be published regularly so that the masses can participate intelligently in governing the state; – significant changes in the political system of the USSR and relations between the republics should be introduced. A new treaty based on the right of nations to selfdetermination should be concluded; – the Tajik SSR must be a sovereign state entitled to make decisions on all matters relating to the republic’s political, economic, social and cultural development. Relations of the Tajik SSR with the centre, with other union republics and with foreign countries should be regulated by treaties based on equality, mutual respect and noninterference in each other’s internal affairs. The Constitution of the Tajik SSR should be significantly altered and amended […] The Constitution of the Tajik SSR should be based on universal human values and basic principles of a popular-democratic system, the right of nations to selfdetermination, the UN Declaration of Human Rights and other major international documents as well as the traditions of the Tajik people and national interests of the Tajik republic. The Constitution of the Tajik SSR should also give broader rights and freedoms to its citizens. The rights of citizens to freedom of speech, conscience and views, freedom of the press, freedom to hold rallies and form associations, to travel, including abroad, and establish friendly contacts with representatives of other countries, etc., should be secured in practice and guaranteed […] The Constitution should clearly define the rights and duties of public institutions and bodies of state power and their legal and social responsibility. II. Economic Issues

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The Rastokhez organization believes that the economy and industrial activity are not a goal, but a material prerequisite and a means for the development and spiritual perfection of the individual and society. Man does not exist for the production of material goods. Rather, the production of material goods exists for the benefit of Man. Therefore, productive activities in society should have a humanistic character. Political sovereignty hinges on economic independence. A nation cannot create the conditions necessary for the development of its language, culture and spiritual life unless it is politically and economically independent. Political and economic dependence inevitably lead to a nation’s stagnation and backwardness, and to its ultimate deterioration.6 Today, Tajikistan’s economy is part of the unified economic complex of the Soviet Union. It does not have all the distinctive features a national economy should have; in other words, it is not an integrated and complete economic organism. Its composition and branch structure are not rational. Therefore, Tajikistan’s economy, with its present compartmental structure and composition that make it part of the unitary USSR economy, is incompatible with the political sovereignty of the Tajik SSR and its material and cultural advancement.7 Each Soviet republic, Tajikistan included, must have a national economy, which develops and perfects itself as an integrated independent organism, providing the material basis for the independence and sovereignty of the republics and nations of our country. This in no way constitutes a limitation of the ties and cooperation between the republics. It is clear that today, not a single country can ensure its economic development without broad participation in the process of international economic cooperation. Thus, Tajikistan, too, must take an active part in this global process, and support multifaceted ties with all republics of the Soviet Union and other countries of the world—not as a part of the all-union economy but as a sovereign and equal republic. If this goal (economic independence) is to be achieved, the land and what lies beneath it, natural resources (water, air, mineral deposits, forests, lakes and rivers) as well as all factories and enterprises (including productive and unproductive units subordinate to the centre) and the socio-economic infrastructure located in Tajikistan’s territory should be declared the property of the Tajik SSR and its people. Tajikistan’s government and people should be fully entitled to draw up socioeconomic development plans, manage public production and make use of this production and the national income as they see fit. It is necessary to increase the role of the Soviets of People’s Deputies in organizing and managing the national economy and to act in conformity with the slogan ‘All power to the soviets!’.8 […] Rastokhez favours Tajikistan’s transition to economic independence (total selffinancing), believing that self-financing and new progressive methods of managing the economy should be introduced at factories and enterprises, and at the district and regional levels in general […] Rastokhez is of the opinion that Tajikistan’s national economy must be largely regulated by cost-accounting […] Rastokhez supports the existence of different types of property ownership in our society—state, cooperative, public, individual, mixed and private—and their unhindered development. It welcomes the industrial initiatives and activities of individuals and

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groups of people. Factories and enterprises should function on the principle of selffinancing, with state intervention in the production process reduced to a minimum. Rastokhez believes that the structure of Tajikistan’s economy should be radically reformed. This also applies to the main branch of the economy—agriculture.9 It should be transformed into a mature, diverse economy, based on up-to-date technology. Towards this goal, the arable land planted with cotton must be cut by 50–60 per cent, and replaced with fruit trees, vines, melons, cereals, legumes and fodder crops. The last would help increase the livestock population and boost the output of dairy and meat products. The development of industry and changing of its structure should be carried out on the basis of the rational use of Tajikistan’s natural and human resources, with the aim of meeting the material and spiritual needs of the republic’s population. Industries which are of little use to Tajikistan’s economic progress or release strong pollutants should not be developed and new projects of this kind should not be launched. Existing enterprises of this kind should be dismantled. Moreover, at this juncture, factories, which require imported raw materials and whose output is not used in Tajikistan, should not be constructed. Tajikistan should not be a rawmaterial appendage, but an exporter of finished products. It is therefore necessary to develop production facilities, primarily in light industry, food and building-materials, in all regions of the republic. Conditions prevailing at this time demand the accelerated development of construction, transport, communications and other amenities. Construction and the accelerated development of medium and small enterprises in the towns and villages of the republic are a priority that brooks no delay. This would help to ease the pressure of many problems by reducing unemployment and increasing the output of consumer goods. Rastokhez advocates broad and multilateral technological and economic cooperation with the union republics and foreign countries, and the establishment on Tajikistan’s territory of joint ventures to give an impetus to the national economy and the production of high-quality goods for the population. III. Ecological Problems (Protection of the Environment and Public Health) […] Over the past decades, as a result of foolish policies and the devastating activity of many ministries and departments, and of the indifferent and merciless attitude of people towards nature, our environment has been destroyed and brought to a catastrophic situation. At present, too many mineral fertilizers and pesticides are used in Tajikistan’s agriculture—up to 600–800 kg. of mineral fertilizer and 60 kg. of various pesticides per hectare. This exceeds the amount used in other areas of the world many times over. Industrial enterprises, thermoelectric power plants, transport vehicles and the population in general release thousands of tons of dust, smoke, slag and other toxic waste into the environment. Ruthless deforestation, the destruction of pasture land by raising an excess of livestock, ill-considered intervention in natural processes and inadequate protection of natural landscapes have led to a deplorable situation and catastrophic pollution of the environment.

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The pollution of the environment, the toxicity of the soil, water, air, vegetables and fruit, meat, milk and other foodstuffs have reached a point which endangers the very lives of the population. Shorter life expectancy, especially due to a rise in the infant mortality rate, and the spread of various diseases in our society are largely a result of pollution and poisoning of the environment in our republic.10 Hence, the struggle against environmental pollution and the protection and restoration of nature are major tasks confronting our state and society. […] – [that] state and public independent ecological commissions to examine new projects be set up and no project be launched without their authorization; – [that] special commissions be set up to control the work of factories and enterprises and the quality of their output, especially agricultural and animal husbandry produce; such commissions should have broad powers; – [that] the quantity of mineral fertilizers and pesticides used in farming be reduced 5– 10-fold and their use gradually stopped altogether. At the same time, harmless methods (crop rotation, organic fertilizer, etc.) should be used to increase agricultural productivity. With this aim in mind, it is necessary to revise the structure of agriculture […] – foodstuffs with an excessive content of nitrates and other noxious agents should be destroyed and criminal proceedings instituted against people selling them. Budget allocations for the protection of nature should be increased and supplemented by annual contributions from the budgets of enterprises and local soviets; – ecological education should be conducted on a wide scale. Ecology as a subject should be introduced into all secondary schools and higher educational institutions. Moreover, educational work on ecological issues and agitation and propaganda on the need for conservation and a rational and considered attitude towards it should be carried out through the mass media; – Given that conservation is a common goal of peoples and governments throughout the world, the government and population of Tajikistan should cooperate with all countries of the world in the name of the protection and improvement of the environment; – Tajikistan should be declared a nuclear-free zone. The people and government of Tajikistan should fight for the elimination of nuclearweapon stockpiles, for a considerable reduction of conventional weapons, and for preserving and strengthening peace, security, friendship and fraternal relations among all peoples and countries. IV. Ethnic and Cultural Issues […] Deviation from the fundamental principles of the declared nationalities policy and democratic centralism, the over-centralization of political and economic power in the hands of all-union ministries and departments, coupled with dubious projects and unwise economic activities in various regions of the country have greatly curtailed the rights and powers of the governments and peoples in the union republics and caused the decline of their languages and cultures as well as growing inter-ethnic tensions. Today, the nationalities question has become one of the burning issues of the country and demands a just solution. The nationalities policy must be fully revised in this country, with the right of nations to self-determination not only recognized but guaranteed and secured in practice.

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It is the firm conviction of Rastokhez that each nationality, no matter how small in numbers, has the right to life and material and cultural development. Each nationality is capable of addressing its economic, social, political and cultural tasks and it must be allowed to do so as it sees fit. Inasmuch as Tajikistan is the historical homeland of the Tajiks, the place where the language and culture of the Tajik nation should develop and flourish, Rastokhez believes that all the necessary preconditions for the preservation and development of the Tajik nation and a revival of its language and culture should be created on this land. It is therefore necessary to rectify all the existing shortcomings and errors, deviations and injustices in the nationalities question. It is necessary to secure and guarantee the sovereignty and equality of the Tajik nation in all spheres of life.11 The Leninist principle of having an absolute majority of people of the titular nationality in the bodies of state power should be preserved. They must be well educated, concerned about their own people, have a deep understanding of the present crisis situation and be able to work selflessly for the rebirth and progress of the nation. We must achieve full implementation of the Law of the Tajik SSR on Language. The Tajik language (Farsi) should be used both as the official language and the language of communication between the ethnic groups living in Tajikistan. Russian should serve as the language of inter-ethnic communication with the union republics. A sound demographic policy should be formulated and put into practice to prevent excessive migration into Tajikistan (to take up permanent residence).12 A revival of the Tajik language and culture requires continuity of the Tajik cultural heritage. The current alphabet should be replaced as early as possible by the classical Arabic-Persian alphabet in the entire territory of Tajikistan.13 For this purpose, the classical alphabet should be studied in all schools from the first to the eleventh grades, in secondary specialized schools and higher educational establishments, and at enterprises and offices. Equipment should be made available for publishing various literary works, newspapers and magazines using this alphabet. It is necessary to publish and promote the works of the great Tajik poets, writers and scholars alongside the best works of other authors (in translation). Both the secondary and higher school curricula should be revised to meet the demands of the times. The concept of a national school should be defined and implemented. Cooperation with Persian-speaking countries (Iran, Afghanistan) and other countries of the world should be broadened. Rastokhez will strive to ensure that the constitutional rights of the Tajiks living beyond the present borders of Tajikistan are upheld and to strengthen the ties between them and Tajiks inside Tajikistan. The organization demands that original Tajik names, patronymic and family names be restored and that non-Tajik names of cities, villages, collective and state farms, streets and enterprises be changed to Tajik ones.14 Rastokhez stands for the observance of civil rights of people of different nationalities living in Tajikistan and for the development of their languages and cultures. At the same time, people of other nationalities must respect the national traditions, customs and rituals sacred to the Tajiks, study and use the Tajik language, and take an active part in the restructuring of society, in the conservation and improvement of the environment, and in securing Tajikistan’s general progress.

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Source: Grazhdanskie dvizbeniia v Tadzhikistane (Moscow, 1990), pp. 115–30. NOTES 1. Narodnaia gazeta, 25 June 1993. 2. Ibid. See introduction to Tajikistan. 3. The 19th CPSU Conference was held in June 1988. 4. The Constitution of Tajikistan in force at the time, was adopted in 1978. 5. In accordance with the laws in effect at that time, only a very limited circle of people had access to books and archival materials which contained documents regarded by the communist authorities as subversive. Libraries and archives had special depositories for such materials. 6. See Introduction to Tajikistan and note 5 there. 7. The republic, like its Central Asian neighbours served as a Soviet raw-material appendage. See Introduction. In the 1980s, only 10 per cent of its cotton crop of 1,000,000 tons was processed in local factories. The rest was transported for processing in other parts of the Soviet Union (Nezavisimaia gazeta, 23 Dec. 1992). 8. This was the original slogan used in 1917 by the Bolsheviks. In the circumstances prevailing under Gorbachev it acquired a new meaning, becoming a demand to transfer power from the CPSU to elected ruling bodies. Curiously, of all the post-Soviet states, only in Tajikistan the structure of the state bodies of power did not change drastically, and the soviets were not abolished. This situation continued until the outbreak of hostilities and the acute politicization of the soviets in 1993. 9. In 1988 agriculture provided employment for 55 per cent of Tajikistan’s labour force (Aleksandrov, ‘Spetsificheskie sluchai ekonomicheskoi otstalosti’, p. 145). 10. In 1986, infant mortality before the age of one year in Tajikistan was 46.7 per 1000, while in the developed countries it was about 5–10 per 1000. The USSR average was 25.4 (Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR za 70 let, p. 408). 11. In 1989, for example, only 17 per cent of Tajikistan’s engineers and technicians were Tajiks. See Literaturnaia Gazeta, 18 Dec. 1991 and Introduction to Tajikistan. 12. It should be noted that for several years there had been no significant migration into Tajikistan. From 1979 to 1989, migration into the republic declined drastically and the percentage of Tajiks rose by 3 per cent. The number of Russians fell by 2.1 per cent (Natsional’nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR, Part 2, p. 90). 13. Regarding changes of alphabet, see Introduction to Tajikistan. 14. Many streets and settlements were named after people who had never played any part in Tajik history, chiefly Soviet national figures, while national heroes were relegated to oblivion. Also, first names and surnames had been russified. See Introduction to Tajikistan.

RU BA RU INTRODUCTION The political discussion club Ru ba Ru (face to face) was established in February 1989 in Dushanbe, in accordance with a decision of the Tajik Komsomol leadership. Its members were students and educated youth of the eponymous nationality. In permitting the establishment of the club, the authorities were attempting to neutralize the nascent national movement, to keep young people away from radical elements and to secure their support for the ideas of perestroika. The club gradually turned into an organization that was used by members of nationalist movements of various hues for propagating their views. Active in 1989–90, it subsequently merged with Rastokhez. The meetings of the club were held in Tajik. This fact discouraged the participation of Russian-speakers, despite the availability of translation.

RULES 1. General Provisions 1.1. The Ru ba Ru political club is a voluntary independent association of politicallyminded citizens which was formed and operates in accordance with Marxist-Leninist ideas. 1.2. The political club is affiliated to the Central Committee of the Leninist Young Communist League of Tajikistan. Its main form of activity is organizing political debates. It operates in accordance with the Constitution of the Tajik SSR. 1.3. The club supports the restructuring begun by the CPSU and will contribute to its full implementation on the basis of democracy, openness and humanism. 1.4. The club will work to involve young people in public activities, bring new political thinking to them, shape their scientific world outlook, and arouse and develop their political awareness. 1.5. The Ru ba Ru political club renders assistance to Komsomol committees in organizing similar political clubs in and around the republic, maintains contacts with similar political clubs in other union republics and cooperates with state and various public organizations in the republic and the entire country […] Source: Grazhdanskie dvizheniia v Tadzhikistane (Moscow, 1990), pp. 166–8.

THE RUSSIAN COMMUNITY INTRODUCTION The Russian Community was created by Russians and members of other Slav groups and had a distinct ethnic orientation. It was established as a response to the growth of Tajik national self-awareness and the deteriorating position of Russians in Tajikistan as the USSR disintegrated. The community’s constituent congress was held on 1 October 1991 in Dushanbe. Valerii Iushin, a young architect, was elected chairman.1 The Russian Community was registered by the authorities on 31 March 1992.2 While stressing that the Community was not a political organization, its leadership did not deny its intention to take part in political life. When the draft of the new constitution of Tajikistan was being discussed in the spring of 1992, the Community supported the right to dual citizenship and granting the Russian language official status, alongside Tajik. On the eve of the civil war the Russian Community had already created a relatively developed network of collective members (factories, enterprises, organizations and schools) and local cells. Its position was particularly strong in Dushanbe and KurganTyube. The outbreak of war in autumn of 1992 precipitated a massive exodus of the Slav population, in particular from those cities where the fighting was heaviest. This delivered a serious blow to the structure of the Community and to its plans to preserve a substantial Slav enclave in the republic. In order to solve the issue of the Russian minority, Iushin proposed creating a separate Russian quarter in Dushanbe with its own infrastructure and enterprises and granting it special status in relations with the Russian Federation (in particular, dual citizenship for its residents). This proposal was rejected by the Tajik authorities. During the civil war the Community sympathized with the procommunist forces without openly supporting them. The leadership formally declared its neutrality, stating on many occasions its position that the war was an internal Tajik affair. Yet it repeatedly asked Moscow to intervene to protect the russophone population and Russia’s geopolitical interests in the region. The Russian Community was a member of the Coordinating Council of Ethnic Associations of the Republic of Tajikistan.3 It was also a member of the Centre for Russian Communities uniting the associations of the Russian diaspora in the republics of the former Soviet Union, and it participated in the activities of the extreme rightist Moscow-based Russian National Sobor (Assembly).4 The Russian Community did not succeed in achieving a noticeable improvement in the situation of the Slav minority in Tajikistan. Between 1990 and 1993, as many as 75 per cent of Russians were reported to have left the republic, the Russian population dwindling to between 85,000 and 90,000.5

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RULES [I] General Provisions 1.1. The Russian Community is a self-governing national-cultural society […] 1.2. Bodies of state power and state officials shall not intervene in the activities of the Russian Community except in cases stipulated by law. 1.3 The legal foundation for the Community’s activities is the Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms, the Declaration on the Sovereignty of the Republic of Tajikistan,6 and the law of the Republic of Tajikistan ‘On Public Associations in the Tajik SSR’. 1.4. The Russian Community acts within the Constitution of the Republic of Tajikistan, in conformity with republican legislation, and in accordance with the present Rules. […] II. Goals and Tasks of the Russian Community 2.1. The main goal of the Russian Community is to unite Russians, Belorussians and Ukrainians7 and the Russian-speaking minority of Tajikistan in order to realize and safeguard national-cultural, socioeconomic and political and legal freedoms, revive moral values and harmonize inter-ethnic relations. 2.2. The Russian Community in Tajikistan believes that the following tasks should be addressed to achieve its goals: – in the spiritual/educational field: establishment of an Orthodox religious/cultural centre, a Sunday church school, and a special library of spiritual and religiousphilosophic literature; carrying out various propaganda measures in the best nationalcultural traditions of the Slav peoples; – in the socio-cultural sphere: efforts should be made to create elements of the Russian national milieu—architecture and landscape, national restaurants, cafés and shops with only soft drinks available,8 revival of the national theatre and folk art festivals, establishment of a national secondary education system and other centres of education and upbringing for children and adolescents, stronger contacts with the historical homeland of the Slavs […]; – political and legal protection of the Russian and Russian-speaking population through the participation of the Community in its capacity of a’juridical entity’ in forming bodies of state power and administration, exercising the right to legislative initiative, taking part in decisionmaking, in bodies of state power and administration, representing the interests of its members in state and public agencies, and in any other actions within the present Rules and the legislation of the Republic of Tajikistan; – public activity: active participation of the Community in political life and joining other mass movements, national associations, public and government organizations in their efforts to achieve the renewal and further development of Tajikistan; – charitable activities within various social and peace foundations and associations, material and moral participation in avoiding natural disasters and social conflicts, assisting individuals or groups of people, irrespective of their nationality or religion;

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– in the economic and production sphere: to work in the various branches of Tajikistan’s economy as a body of specialists and contribute—as a juridical entity and through its financial and commercial organizations—to the promotion of multifaceted ties and cooperation with Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia and other states;9 – in the daily life of the community: to inculcate genuinely Russian communal traditions in everyday life, stronger inter-ethnic neighbourly ties, the revival of family tradition with respect to raising and educating children and fostering respect for one’s elders; 2.3. At the present stage of social development, legal protection of the Russian and Russian-speaking minority is seen as a priority task. 2.4. The activities of the community will supplement the work of state and public organizations in areas where, in the current circumstances in Tajikistan, they are not in a position to meet fully the spiritual, cultural and socio-economic requirements of the Russian and Russian-speaking population. 2.5. The Russian Community has the right to carry out various forms of activity, provided that they correspond to its objectives and functions as specified in its rules and conform to existing legislation. 2.6. The Russian Community deems it possible to take part in movements and associations whose activities do not violate existing legislation and its own objectives. 2.7. The Russian Community has the right to use the mass media to propagandize its activities and defend its interests. 2.8. The Russian Community, acting in conformity with the law of the Republic of Tajikistan On the Press and Other Mass Media, has the right to publish its own newspaper, which will be accountable to its Board […]10 (Adopted at the constituent congress of the Russian Community on 1 October 1991) Source: Vechernii Dushanbe, 9 April 1992. NOTES 1. Narodnaia gazeta, 3 Oct. 1991. 2. Vechernii Dushanbe, 9 April 1992. 3. The Coordinating Council of Ethnic Associations was made up of ten national minorities in Tajikistan. It was probably established in the first half of 1992. V. Gondusov, ‘Zalozhniki chuzhoi voiny ne khotiat byt’ izgoiami’, 24 (Moscow) 6 Oct. 1992. 4. The Russian Community was not the only Slav organization in Tajikistan. Another Russian organization, Migratsiia (Migration), was created back in February 1990. Its aim was to assist those Slavs who wanted to leave Tajikistan for Russia. Two Cossack organizations, Zolotye pogony and Amu-Dar’inskaia Liniia were formed around the same time as the Russian Community. 5. Rossiiskaia gazeta, 19 Feb. 1994. 6. The Declaration on the Sovereignty of the Republic of Tajikistan was adopted on 9 September 1991. 7. According to the 1989 census, there were 388,500 Russians, 41,400 Ukrainians and 7,200 Belorussians in Tajikistan (Vestnik statistiki 5 (1991), p. 74). The bulk of the Russians– 194,000–lived in Dushanbe, where they were the second largest ethnic group, constituting 32.8 per cent of the capital’s total population (Guboglo, ‘Etnograficheskaia i iazykovaia situatsiia v stolitsakh soiuznykh respublik SSSR v kontse 80-kh-nachale 90-kh godov’, p. 55).

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8. This refers to the revival of traditional urban culture by Slav elements. Historically, the administrative part of many cities in Central Asia, including Dushanbe, had a strongly Russian character. 9. The Community saw its task as complementing inter-governmental ties and serving as a channel for the penetration of Slav (i.e. Russian) capital and technologies to Tajikistan and farther east, beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union (Vechernii Dushanbe, 25 Dec. 1990; Russkii vestnik 22 (1992)). 10. The Law on the Press and Other Mass Media was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan on 14 December 1990 (www.internews.ru/tj/smi.html).

VAHDAT INTRODUCTION Vahdat (Unity), the popular front of supporters of perestroika in the town of Ura-Tyube (Leninabad region), was established in the spring of 1989. It relied on the educated classes for its support. Its membership was composed of representatives of various ethnic groups: Tajiks, Russians and Armenians and this was reflected in its leadership as well. The organizers of the front aimed at promoting political consciousness among UraTyube’s inhabitants.

PROGRAMME 1. General Principles […] The main tasks of the Popular Front are to raise the level of mass political awareness and boost civil activity with a view towards building a society based on genuine government by the people and a balanced economy, a society in which citizens would enjoy all human rights. One of the principal tasks of the Popular Front is to make better use of the intellectual and moral potential of the Tajik people and its most educated segment—the Tajik intelligentsia. The existing problems are of such significance, that there can be no question of allowing a great portion of the intelligentsia to remain on the sidelines as passive spectators of the process of reform. In pursuing this task the Ura-Tyube Popular Front will actively cooperate with the district authorities, government, parties, trade unions, the Komsomol and other public organizations, acting within the Constitutions of the USSR and the Tajik SSR. It intends to focus the attention of public opinion on topical trends and phenomena in public life. 2. Policy The Popular Front actively supports reform of the political system of Soviet society. The October 1917 slogan ‘All power to the soviets!’ should become our main slogan today, that is, we must work to have all power in the city and the district transferred to the Soviet of People’s Deputies.1 The Popular Front interprets the words ‘all power’ as the right to use all natural, manpower and other resources at the soviet’s discretion in the interests of the locality, correlating these interests with those of the region, the republic and the country as a whole. The Popular Front is going to take a most active part in the preparation and holding of all elections in the district in order to make maximal use of the democratic provisions

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which exist in the legislation. It will carry out an active struggle against red tape, eyewash and localism, as well as manifestations of nationalistic sentiments and other negative phenomena in the political life of the city and the district. 3. The Economy i. The Popular Front supports the idea of regional self-financing, which guarantees the economic sovereignty of the republic, and draws the attention of people’s deputies in the local and higher soviets to the importance of making active efforts to carry out these ideas. ii. The Popular Front will actively support all steps to minimize the negative effects of human economic activity. iii. The Popular Front advocates publishing all materials connected with drafting the budget of the city and the district in the local newspaper Rohi Kommunizm so that people can take part in discussing it. iv. The Popular Front demands that the newspaper Rohi Kommunizm publish all the materials on which the local budget is based and subsequent information concerning the budget. v. The Popular Front is cooperating with the Executive Committee in supplying manpower to the major industrial enterprises in Ura-Tyube and taking concrete steps to create more jobs in the district, inasmuch as a redundant supply of labour resources (unemployment) creates explosive social tensions. 4. The Social Sphere i. One of the main tasks the Popular Front has set itself is to bring the welfare of the individual into conformity with his contribution to society, taking account of his education and qualifications. ii. The Popular Front has suggested that the district leaders introduce a more equitable system of distribution of goods produced in the district, which would take account primarily of the food requirements of local citizens. iii. The Popular Front has submitted to the Executive Committee of the Soviet of People’s Deputies the proposal that Rohi Kommunizm (the local official newspaper) publish the following data (every three months): a) output of meat and dairy products (in absolute figures and not in percentages as was done previously);2 b) republican, union and local distribution of meat and dairy products3 […] iv. The Popular Front is helping to revise the lists of people who need better housing. It also helps take stock of housing resources in the city and publishes the data in Rohi Kommunizm. v. The Popular Front cooperates with the people’s and workers’ control committees in checking the operation of trading and public catering establishments, transport, public health and social amenities. 5. Ethics, Culture and Education i. The Popular Front advocates healthier morals and greater spirituality, [and] the precedence of universal human values over national, class or other criteria.

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ii. The Popular Front recognizes the role of religious organizations in the moral renewal of society and the assertion of universal human values. The Popular Front calls on all believers and non-believers to cooperate in the name of the common good. iii. In the sphere of education and culture the Popular Front stands for: a) recognition and respect for the language, customs and traditions of all nationalities; b) greater attention to teaching the history of Tajikistan than to the history of the USSR, and introducing a more extensive Tajik language programme in schools with instruction in languages other than Tajik.4 Source: Grazhdanskie dvizheniia v Tadzhikistane (Moscow, 1990), pp. 147–50. NOTES 1. See Rastokhez, n. 8. 2. Refers to Soviet manipulation of statistics in order to conceal the actual data. 3. These demands are related to the system of rationing food and other goods that was in force during the late Soviet period. 4. The Uzbeks as well as the Russians had schools in their national tongues at least in areas with large Uzbek or Russian populations. See http://www.soros.org/fmp2/html/laws/Zakons/Tajikistan/TajEngl.html.

REPUBLIC OF TURKMENISTAN

INTRODUCTION Vladimir Babak and Demian Vaisman Capital: Ashgabat. Area: 448,000 sq. km. Population: On 1 January 1993, the population numbered 4,254,000, comprising 3,118,000 Turkmen (the titular nationality), 419,000 Russians, 382,000 Uzbeks, 87,000 Kazakhs and 39,000 Tatars.1 In the period from the 1989 census up to rnid-1993, a greater number of people from the non-titular nationalities arrived in Turkmenistan than left it, the number of Russians increasing by 7 per cent and immigrants including refugees from the conflict-ridden Caucasus and Tajikistan.2 Religion: The Turkmen are Sunni Muslim. Language: Turkmen is a Turkic language. Historical Survey The ancestors of the Turkmen were the Turkic-speaking Tokuz-Oguz tribes, who migrated to the territory of Central Asia from Chinese Turkestan in the 8th century. Because of their geographic proximity to the borders of the Samanid empire, with its capital in Bukhara, the TokuzOguz—referred to in Persian and Arabic sources as ‘Turkmen’—adopted Islam, which by the 10th century had supplanted indigenous cults. During the 11th and 12th centuries, the Turkmen coexisted peacefully with the Seljuk sultanates, supplying livestock and mercenaries for their military forces. During the Mongol invasion (13th–l4th centuries), the Turkmen were divided between the Golden and the Central Asian Hordes. With the weakening of the Mongols, Turkmen territory was conquered first by the Timurids, and later by the Uzbek Shabanids (15thl6th centuries), and in the l6th century was split between the independent Uzbek khanates of Bukhara and Khorezm (later renamed Khiva). The first Turkmen contacts with Russia took place during the reign of Peter the Great, when a number of Turkmen tribes migrated from the peninsula of Mangyshlak to the western side of the Caspian Sea and accepted Russian sovereignty. In the 18th century, the Turkmen constituted a significant portion of the population of the khanates of Khiva and Bukhara. The ability of the Turkmen to exploit the conflicts between the Central Asian khanates and the Persian Empire helped them to survive as an independent ethnos. At the end of the 19th century the territory of Turkmenistan became a bone of contention between Britain and Russia. From 1869 to 1885 Russia conquered Turkmenistan as part of its endeavour to push its borders farther south. The most renowned military confrontation in this campaign took place in 1881, when the resistance of the nomad Turkmen was broken at the battle of Gök Tepe. As a result of this military activity and agreements with the British, notably that of 1895, Turkmen lands were divided among Russia, Persia and Afghanistan. A major consequence of this agreement

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was that it left substantial numbers of Turkmen in Iran and Afghanistan. Today there are between one and two million in Iran and another million in Afghanistan. In 1882 the Transcaspian Oblast, with its centre in Ashgabat, was established in the Russian part of Turkmen territory. Initially it was ruled by a Russian military governor and as of 1899 was placed under the jurisdiction of the governor-general of Turkestan. In 1918 the territory of present day Turkmenistan became a part of the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, while some regions with Turkmen populations remained in the Khiva Khanate and Bukhara Emirate. In October 1924 the national delimitation of Central Asia led to the creation of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic. For the first time in their history, the Turkmen had, at least formally, a sovereign political entity based on their ethnos. The Soviet period, especially its early decades, was marked by the development of agriculture and by the appearance of certain industries, in particular mining and cottonand oil-processing. Turkmenistan’s economy, like that of the other Central Asian republics, was directed during the Soviet period to cotton production. In order to increase its cultivable land, the Kara-Kum Canal was completed in 1954—the largest irrigation project in the Soviet Union and probably the main single cause of the desiccation of the Aral Sea. Unlike other Central Asian republics, however, Turkmenistan possessed large resources of oil and natural gas and by the 1980s it was providing nearly 10 per cent of Soviet natural gas. Nonetheless due to the poor returns received from Moscow for its natural wealth, the standard of living remained very low, even according to Soviet criteria.3 The Soviet regime also developed a network of educational institutions in order to create indigenous technical and administrative cadres. Political life existed within rigid boundaries enforced by the authorities. After the defeat of the Basmachi movement in the 1920s–1930s, all opposition activities ceased. Although there was no explicit ban on religion, religious practices were strictly supervised. The vast majority of mosques were closed or destroyed, and all religious educational institutions abolished. As against approximately 440 mosques which operated prior to 1917, just four were allowed to register and function officially throughout most of the post-World War II years. The Supreme Soviet of Turkmenistan adopted a declaration of independence on 27 October 1991. At the end of the Soviet period, Turkmenistan still represented, according to one authoritative source, ‘more of a tribal confederation than a modern nation.’4 Tribal loyalties, reinforced by rules of endogamy and the persistence of dialects, were crucial for the normal functioning of Turkmen society and were more influential than in any other of the Soviet Union’s Muslim areas. Indeed, they threatened to impede the development of a cohesive and homogeneous Turkmen nation. Moreover, tribal-clan relationships formed throughout the Soviet period—as well as after independence—the unofficial basis of a rather stable system permeating all power structures, according to which power was divided among nine tribes. Since key positions have always been held by the Tekke and Yomud tribes, the official media have often emphasized President Niyazov’s Tekke extraction in order to enhance his status in the eyes of the population. Political System According to the constitution adopted on 18 May 1992, which officially established Turkmenistan as a presidential republic, the president’s powers included: the right to

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prorogue the parliament if it passed two no-confidence motions within an 18–month period; to issue edicts with the force of law; to appoint and remove judges and to name the state prosecutor. The president also acted as prime minister and commanderin-chief. Former first secretary of the Turkmenistan Communist Party Sapurmurad Niyazov became sole candidate for president in the elections held on 21 June 1992 and received 99.5 per cent of the vote.5 As the personality cult surrounding Niyazov grew, in October 1993 the parliament officially granted him the title Turkmenbashi (leader of the Turkmen people).6 A national referendum held on 15 January 1994 extended his term of office for a further five years, from 1997, thus nullifying the election scheduled for that year.7 The results of the referendum—99.99 per cent of votes in favour—were reminiscent of the former Soviet election system. On 28 December 1999 Niyazov was proclaimed president of Turkmenistan for life. The constitution provided for a dual system of representation. The supreme representative organ, which had no parallel in other postSoviet states, was the Khalq Maslahaty (people’s council), composed of the president, all the parliamentary deputies, the chairman of the Supreme Court, the president of the Supreme Economic Court, the state prosecutor, prefects (hakims) of all five oblasts (velayats), and khalq vekilleri (people’s representatives)—one elected representative from each local territorial administrative unit or district (etrap). Khalq vekilleri were elected for a term of five years. The responsibilities of the Khalq Maslahaty included formulating recommendations for economic, social, and political development, as well as debating and adopting resolutions on issues put to nation-wide referendums, proposals for amendments to the constitution and other issues. It was convened whenever deemed necessary by the president, the parliament, or one-third of its members, but at least once a year. It had no executive or legislative powers and acted chiefly as a rubber stamp for the president. The first elections to the Khalq Maslahaty were held in December 1992; only one candidate ran for each seat.8 The legislative organ of the republic, the Mejlis (parliament), with 50 deputies, was elected for a five-year term. Political Parties and Movements The first political organizations in Turkmenistan emerged in the course of the general democratization process in the USSR. In August 1989 a society of devotees of Turkmen literature appeared, which consisted mostly of young scholars from the Turkmen Academy of Sciences. At first it set itself the goal of restoring ‘historical memory’ and national self-awareness by promoting Turkmen history and culture, protecting and restoring objects of historical and cultural value, and developing the Turkmen language and culture. Before long, however, under the impact of the general atmosphere of perestroika and glasnost, this literary society became politicized, integrating into its programme the goal of social and political democratization. The society was transformed into the Agzybirlik (Unity) Popular Movement. Its first attempt to register in the autumn of 1989 was rejected on the pretext that other existing societies covered the same area of activity.9 Agzybirlik’s only congress was held clandestinely in Ashgabat in early 1990, after its official banning on 15 January 1990 for attempting to mark the anniversary of the battle of Gök-Tepe. At the time, it had a membership of 1,000.10

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In December 1990, the right wing of Agzybirlik, concerned over the growing power of Niyazov, formed the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (not to be confused with the renamed Communist Party of the same name). The Democratic Party was hesitant to fully support Turkmenistan’s independence in October 1991 because the party membership believed that such a move would only strengthen the country’s totalitarian regime. It proclaimed itself a parliamentary party opposed to President Niyazov’s policies. The party leadership claimed 1,200 members at the time of its establishment.11 The Democratic Party published the newspaper Ata Vatan (Motherland) in Baku (Azerbaijan) from August 1992 until June 1993. This party was also refused official recognition. Both Agzybirlik and the Democratic Party cooperated in publishing an opposition magazine, Dayanch (Foothold), in Moscow. In August 1991, several opposition groups formed a coalition to coordinate the activities of the opposition and fight for political reform in Turkmenistan. The coalition, which was called Genesh (Council), included Agzybirlik, the Democratic Party and the Movement for Democratic Reform.12 The national and democratic values championed by Agzybirlik and the Movement for Democratic Reform lacked roots in Turkmen society, where patriarchal traditions persisted. One of the only attempts to set up a national minority organization was made in July 1992 with the establishment of the Russian Community. Under the leadership of Nikolai Fomin, it formulated a set of rules and a programme, but its attempt to register as an official party were thwarted by the authorities.13 It operated—primarily underground— for five years. In 1997 the leaders of Russian Community criticized President Niyazov openly on Russian radio for refusing to allow its registration. A series of arrests of party activists followed. Its ranks were depleted and by autumn 1997 Russian Community ceased to exist. The sole political association operating legally in the republic was the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, established in December 1991. It succeeded the Communist Party, and inherited all its property, organizational structure and its leader Sapurmurad Niyazov. Although the republic’s constitution permitted the establishment of political parties14 (Article 28), the authorities consistently suppressed any attempts to establish any others. The exception was the Peasant Party of Turkmenistan, organized in 1992, which was widely regarded as a puppet party created by Niyazov to give the illusion of a commitment to multi-party democracy. The Peasant Party’s draft programme described it as a ‘parliamentary-type’ party and defined its goals as defending the rights of farmers and peasants, workers in the agro-industrial sector, and the rural intelligentsia (physicians, teachers, and agricultural technicians). It advocated a free economy, the peasants’ right to own the land under cultivation and the right to bequeath this land to heirs. In September 1992 President Niyazov indicated that the new party would be permitted registration in the near future, but it was apparently never registered.15 Other political movements included the official youth organization, the Union of Turkmenistan Youth, which modelled its programme and rules on those of the Komsomol.16 Two informal student organizations—Maksat (Aim) and Nazaret (Control)—also existed in the very early 1990s.17 Opposition groups have also surfaced in the Russian Federation and in Sweden.

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NOTES 1. Aziia (March 1993). 2. Trud, 19 July 1993. 3. In 1989, 35 per cent of the population had a per capita income of less than 75 rubles per month; the figure for the USSR as a whole—11.1 per cent (in Estonia—1.9 per cent). Only 6.1 per cent of Turkmenistan’s population had an income per capita of more than 200 rubles per month (in the USSR—21.8 per cent) (Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1989 godu, p. 91). 4. Bohr, ‘Turkmen’, pp. 228–9. 5. Vechernii Ashkhabad, 4 Feb. 1993. 6. Anderson, ‘Authoritarian Political Development in Central Asia’, p. 512. 7. Turkmenskaia iskra, 18 Jan. 1994. 8. Nezavisimaia gazeta, 9 Dec. 1992. 9. Komsomolets Turkmenistana, 10 Nov. 1989 10. Moskovskie novosti, 31 March 1991. 11. Moskovskie novosti, 13 Jan. 1991. 12. Human Rights and Democratization in the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, p. 179. 13. Moskovskie novosti, 11 April 1993. 14. Constitution of Turkmenistan (Turkmenskaia iskra, 19 May 1992). 15. See J.Anderson, ‘Authoritarian Political Development in Central Asia: The Case of Turkmenistan’, pp. 509–27 and the CIA internet site: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/tx.html. For another view see Nissman, ‘Turkmenistan: Just Like Old Times’, p. 640; The Europa World Year Book, 1999, Vol. II, p. 3553; Nezavisimaia gazeta, 10 Sept. 1992. 16. Turkmenskaia iskra, 18 Nov. 1991. 17. Presidential Elections and Independence Referendums in the Baltic States, the Soviet Union and Successor States, p. 91.

DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF TURKMENISTAN INTRODUCTION The Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (DPT) became the ruling party in independent Turkmenistan, and in every way the successor to the Communist Party of Turkmenistan, which was disbanded in December 1991. Its constituent congress was held on 16 December 1991 in Ashgabat, and the party was registered in March 1992. At that time it had a membership of 52,000.1 The chairman of the DPT, President Sapurmurad Niyazov, had been first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan from 1985 to 1991. The Democratic Party of Turkmenistan inherited from its predecessor its organizational structure and ramified party apparatus. The idea of national renaissance became the ideological basis for the party’s activity. With this aim in mind, history textbooks were rewritten in order to present the Turkmen people as having had an independent state in the past, which, in fact, had never been the case. In order to firmly establish the legitimacy of the regime, a department of Turkmenistan’s main archival directorate was entrusted in 1993 with the task of proving that President Niyazov was a direct descendant of heads of the Tekke tribe, which had ruled Turkmenistan before the Russian occupation.

PROGRAMME Turkmenistan entered the 1990s in a climate of profound change. The establishment of an independent state of Turkmenistan, approved by referendum, offers new opportunities to realize major transformations in the economic and social spheres, in cultural development and in guaranteeing people decent living conditions. With the aims of enhancing the independence and sovereignty of Turkmenistan, ensuring the people’s welfare, the continued democratization of society, strengthening civil peace and harmony, and establishing social justice, the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan adopts the following programme: I. Basic Principles In its political activity the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan is guided by the following principles: – systematic implementation of reform in the economic, political and cultural spheres in the interests of social progress; – democratization of public, political, economic and spiritual life;

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– patriotism, internationalism and general development of historical, national and cultural traditions of the peoples of Turkmenistan; – humanism and the establishment and defence of universal human values; – respect for the dignity and rights of people of all nationalities inhabiting Turkmenistan. II. Immediate Aims and Tasks The main aim of the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan is to make the state of Turkmenistan genuinely independent, build a democratic society governed by law, and give effect to the principles of social justice. To implement these aims, the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan will work: In the political sphere to – establish the supremacy of the laws of Turkmenistan in the political, economic and social spheres; – support the legally elected President of Turkmenistan and representative organs of popular power. It will serve as an advocate of the Party’s programmatic objectives before the President and in Turkmenistan’s Majlis; – ensure equality of all of Turkmenistan’s citizens under the law, irrespective of social status, nationality, gender/sex, language, or religious affiliation; – defend freedom of thought and conscience. In the sphere of inter-ethnic relations to – support a state policy aimed at the development of the national cultures, languages and traditions of the peoples of Turkmenistan; – ensure unconditional priority of the rights of the individual, equality of all people, irrespective of their nationality or religious affiliation; – establish friendly and good-neighbourly relations with peoples of other countries, based on mutual respect for national and state interests; – protect the interests of the Turkmen, irrespective of their place of residence.2 In the economic sphere to – support reforms aimed at building a market economy; – cooperate in creating conditions which will facilitate privatization, diminish the role of government in individual branches of the economy and lead to equal development of all types of ownership; – cooperate towards introducing into the agro-industrial complex: leasing arrangements, private farming and a reorganization of agriculture with priority given to the production of cereals, vegetables and fruits;3 – exploit the achievements of technological progress to accelerate Turkmenistan’s economic development; – support entrepreneurial activity; – broaden Turkmenistan’s economic ties abroad and its integration into the world economy on a reciprocal basis.4 In the social sphere to

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– help to implement the state policy of social welfare for the population and prevent a further drop5 in living standards when making the transition to a market economy; – protect the constitutional right of every citizen of Turkmenistan to work, taking measures to prevent mass unemployment and ensuring maximum employment of the population;6 – take steps to improve the material situation of the disabled and veterans of war and labour, internationalist fighters,7 families of the fallen, single mothers, orphans, large families, pensioners and school and college students; – implement the constitutional right to housing for all citizens, adopt a new housing code for the Republic of Turkmenistan, implement programmes to construct housing and supply gas, water and electricity to cities and other population centres, and enhance the infrastructure for their social development; – formulate complex programmes to strengthen the family and render it assistance, enhancing its role in, and responsibility for, raising children; – defend the rights of women and the family within society; – improve the ecological situation on the territory of Turkmenistan, protect and ensure rational use of natural resources and prevent environmental pollution;8 – expand the infrastructure and financing of health care, physical education and sports facilities, improve public health services and disease-prevention systems, mother and child care, provide free medical services and hospitalization for all citizens. In the sphere of education, science and culture to – increase the share of national income channelled into education, science and culture; – preserve the system of free education and state support for gifted youth; – support basic and applied sciences; – elevate the social status of people engaged in intellectual occupations, increase remuneration for the work of the intelligentsia: engineers, physicians, teachers, scientists, as well as men of letters, artists and employees at cultural institutions; – heighten the awareness of state and public organizations to culture, especially the national culture, [and the need for] freedom of creativity and the protection of all citizens from the propagation of inhumane ideas; – guarantee the right of self-determination in the spiritual sphere to all nations, nationalities and ethnic groups living in Turkmenistan.9 III. Whose Interests Does the Party Serve? The Dernocratic Party of Turkmenistan is deterrnined to become an active political force expressing and upholding the interests of workers, dehqans, the intelligentsia and all working people. It is open to all people who wish to contribute to Turkmenistan’s progress. It will not attempt to resolve workers’ acute problems, but will support their substantiated demands and initiatives, cooperate with public and political organizations and movements acting in accordance with the Constitution and laws of Turkmenistan, and support their unification into a broad democratic movement for social progress.10 Such a role for the party presupposes that its relations with all social forces take one possible form, that of a dialogue of equals. The Democratic Party of Turkmenistan regards the trade unions as an independent mass public organization, supports their aspirations to actively intercede on behalf of the workers and champions their legal labour and socio-economic rights. The party will

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cooperate with the trade ‘unions to find solutions to vital problems of employment, create auspicious conditions for healthy and safe working conditions and fair remuneration for workers, and help organize the daily life and recreation of workers and their families. Together with the organizations of farmers, the party will uphold the interests of the dehqans, respecting their free choice of form of economic activity, help create modern working and living conditions, develop a social infrastructure in the countryside, introduce self-government for the rural population, and work for its full representation in the organs of power. It will strive to develop the cultural level of the dehqans, and revive their traditional way of life.11 The Democratic Party of Turkmenistan notes that the socioeconomic transformations taking place in the republic, indeed its present and future, depend in large measure on its young people. Therefore, it will devote a great deal of attention to creating a climate conducive to the general development of the younger generation, implementing programmes that are of vital importance for them, including involvement of young people in political and socio-economic activities. The party is of the opinion that an open dialogue with young people is vitally important. It will cooperate with all youth organizations working for the consolidation of society and the benefit of Turkmenistan. The party will support the activities of women’s organizations in every way, cooperate with public organizations of veterans, and promote various types of contacts with creative unions, scientific, scientifictechnological, cultural-educational, physical culture and sports, self-defence and other voluntary associations of citizens. The Democratic Party of Turkmenistan supports freedom of conscience for all citizens. It respects the sensitivities of believers, but considers it inadmissible for religion to be used to further political ends, fan inter-ethnic conflict or foster intolerance towards other points of view. IV. A Party of Political Action The party will not be able to address major and complex tasks unless there is broad democracy within it, unless the unity of its ranks is unshakeable, and every party member takes an active part in formulating and implementing its policy. It adheres to the following principles: – appointment by election and securing [political] continuity; glasnost and accountability; and collective decision making; – subordination of the minority to the majority, the right of the minority to uphold its opinion even after a decision has been adopted, provided it works to carry out this decision; – adopting resolutions on critical issues only after a party referendum or comprehensive discussion within the party organizations, with full freedom of criticism and consideration for the opinion of working collectives; – free expression by party members of their views, wide-ranging internal debates on socio-political issues, free thinking and diversity of views as a law of party life; – protection of the civil rights and social interests of party members, concern for continuity from one generation to the next and party comradeship; – broad democratization of election practices with direct, equal and secret balloting; – encouragement of voluntary participation of non-functionaries in party activities, broader participation in the work of elected party bodies by party members not affiliated

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with these bodies, strict control and accountability of the party apparatus to elected bodies; – keeping Turkmenistan’s population fully abreast of the activities of the party. The party’s ideology is based on the achievements of democratic thought in our country and throughout the world. The Democratic Party of Turkmenistan considers persuasion to be the only way to win people over to its side.12 Parliamentary activity will become the Democratic Party’s main method of promoting the party line. Legislative initiatives, expert assessments of draft laws submitted for the consideration of sessions of the soviets,13 and the organization of groups of deputies to serve as vehicles of party policy will all be part of the daily routine of party organizations at various levels. The Democratic Party of Turkmenistan believes that one of its major tasks is to organize party activity on a local level, to set up viable mobile local party associations, and to formulate an optimal party structure, taking into account local conditions. The Democratic Party of Turkmenistan does not receive any political privileges. Only through its position and concrete activity will it inspire the people’s trust, find a political, spiritual and moral image in keeping with the times, and secure the reputation of party members, openness and democracy. (Adopted at the constituent congress of the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan on 16 December 1991) Source: Turkmenskaia iskra, 7 January 1992. NOTES 1. Nezavisimaia gazeta 13 March 1992. 2. The International Humanitarian Association of Turkmen was established in 1992. It sponsored a conference in Ashgabat in 1995 which was attended by Turkmen from Iran, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The number of Turkmen living outside Turkmenistan is greater than that in Turkmenistan itself (Durdiev, ‘Etnogenez turkmenskogo naroda’, pp. 25–7). 3. Towards the end of the 1980s cotton was grown on more than half of all cultivated land in Turkmenistan. In an attempt to diversify agricultural production, a new presidential programme known as Novoe selo was effected in 1995. The programme encouraged increased planting and production of grains, livestock (including production of leather, milk products and wool), fruits and vegetables. To facilitate implementation of the programme, the law on dehqan households permitted leasing up to 50 hectares of farm land for a period of ten years (Khalova, ‘Nam ne nuzhny revoliutsii’, pp. 17–18). 4. By February 1996, the total value of various construction projects, including hotels and other enterprises, aided by foreign investment, equalled 428 million dollars, while those in the process of construction were valued at 1.3 billion dollars. It should be noted, however, that many projects such as luxury hotels, were not a priority for the general population (A.Ioliev [Iolliyev], ‘Problemy ekonomicheskogo i sotsial’nogo razvitiia Turkmenistana’, p. 77). 5. The average wage in Turkmenistan, according to the Institute of Economic Analysis, was 20 dollars a month in the mid-1990s. In Turkmenistan a rationing system allowed citizens to purchase basic food products at a 50 per cent discount. In addition, the citizens of Turkmenistan did not pay for salt, electricity, gas or water, and domestic transportation was subsidized (Turadzhev, ‘Ne gazom edinym’, p. 11).

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6. In 1989, there were 200,000 unemployed in Turkmenistan (Kommunist Uzbekistana 14 (1989), p. 42). 7. A Soviet euphemism for soldiers who fought in Afghanistan. 8. The air was heavily polluted. As much as 310 kg of toxic agents were released in 1988 per each urban resident. The ecological situation was especially bad in industrial centres. Thus, in 1988, 500 kg of toxic waste per inhabitant was recorded in the city of Bezmein, and air pollution in the city was sometimes 10–19 times the maximum permissible level (Turkmenskaia iskra, 25 May 1989). In the 1980s, billions of cubic metres of industrial waste and sewage were discharged into the Amu-Darya River, which was also used as a source of drinking water for the population. In 1988, in 60 per cent of samples taken from sections of the Kara-Kum Canal which was used for drinking, a high bacteria content was found. In rural localities, only 13 per cent of the population had running water. See Pravda, 31 Aug. 1987; Trud, 17 April 1988. According to Feshbach, Ecocide in the USSR, p. 5, about 45 per cent of townships were also without sewers. 9. For example, in the early 1990s, the city of Krasnovodsk (later renamed Turkmenbashi) had 68,000 inhabitants of various ethnic origins. The children studied in 8 Russian, 3 Turkmen and 2 Kazakh schools (Turadzhev, ‘Ne gazom edinym’, p. 12). 10. As mentioned above, the Constitution drastically restricted the creation of new parties. See Introduction, n. 13. 11. In 1988, 53.4 per cent of Turkmenistan’s work force was employed in agriculture compared to the USSR average of 25.7 per cent (Aleksandrov, ‘Spetsificheskie sluchai ekonomicheskoi otstalosti’, p. 145). According to the 1989 census, 55 per cent of the population lived in the countryside (Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1989 godu, p. 24). 12. Theory and practice do not seem to coincide here, since the ruling party made extensive use of repressive measures. Close to 146 people were imprisoned or beaten in demonstrations on Human Rights Day, 12 July 1996. They demanded elections for a new leadership and appealed to the Russian-speaking population of Turkmenistan for support (Central Asia List, 27 Feb. 1997—Agency of Social-Political Information 7 (25) Dec. 1996. Internet site: www.euronet.nl/users/turkfed/). 13. The soviets in Turkmenistan always had a regional tribal base. They continued to exist de facto after gaining independence, albeit renamed maslakhats.

TURKMENISTAN MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM INTRODUCTION The Turkmenistan Movement for Democratic Reform (TMDR) was a political movement that sought to carry out radical political and economic reform in Turkmenistan. The movement was established on 20 January 1995 on the foundations of a previous opposition organization, the Turkmenistan Foundation, which was active from August 1993 until November 1994. The attempt to create a political movement aimed at uniting various opposition groups within the country and abroad was initiated by: Murad Esenov, then director-general of the Turkmenistan Foundation; his deputy, Khalmurad Soyunov, a former member of the Turkmenistan parliament and well-known campaigner for human rights; and Ashir Iolliyev, an orientalist, and others. The motivation behind the creation of the TMDR was the unwillingness of the then current Turkmenistan leadership to carry out political and economic reforms;1 the decline in living conditions and rise of social tensions; and the disintegration of the Turkmenistan Foundation due to the abandonment by its president, Abdy Kulyev,2 of his opposition activities. As of late 1999, the TMDR retained underground cells within Turkmenistan and also operated abroad. Members of the movement have been constantly subjected to persecution and harassment by the Turkmenistan security services, and two leaders have been sentenced in absentia for their political activity. The movement’s publication, Turkmenistan (in Russian and Turkmen), was printed abroad and distributed clandestinely in the republic.

PROGRAMME […] 2. Methods of Our Political Struggle under the Present Circumstances The following trends are characteristic of the present situation: a deepening political and economic crisis, depreciation of moral values in society, and harsh repressive measures. These trends can be observed in all totalitarian states, and Turkmenistan is no exception. In many cases contradictions between the powers that be and the people provoke civil conflict with disastrous consequences, loss of part of the state’s territory, loss of independence, and occasionally complete disintegration of the state. None of these scenarios is admissible for this country.

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Under the present circumstances, it is absurd to expect constructive solutions from the authorities since, on the one hand, the regime has completely exhausted its political resources, and, on the other hand, in the absence of a legal mechanism of power transfer, the bankrupt regime is interested in a controlled local civil conflict as a pretext and justification for more drastic repressive measures. Therefore the opposition must take on complete responsibility for bringing the country out of the present crisis. In the opinion of the TMDR, the optimal forms of political struggle are as follows: a) information and propaganda work: efficient use of printed and electronic mass media will make it possible: – to expose the mechanisms of the regime’s anti-national activity vis-à-vis the population; – to deprive the regime of support by the population and disclose its real essence to the outside world; – to prepare the population for participation in peaceful mass campaigns and free alternative elections; – to prevent the regime’s actions aimed at provoking local civil conflicts in order to increase repression. b) organizational work – distributing among the population opposition publications and mass media materials concerning Turkmenistan; – printing leaflets calling on the population to practise civil disobedience and to boycott mass events organized by the government […] – organizing press conferences with the participation of foreign journalists […] c) organizing mass movements within the country There is no doubt that the growing discontent of the population will sooner or later lead to the appearance of spontaneous protest movements. However, here again, there is danger of a civil conflict, since a spontaneous movement may easily get out of control […] Therefore it is necessary to consolidate and politicize popular movements. At present the TMDR has practically no means to act within the country (most of its leaders being wanted by the security organs), but the movement is seeking ways to transfer its activity into Turkmenistan […] d) carrying out elections [...] From the experience of countries freed from dictatorship, it is clear that elections are usually won by former comrades-in-arms of the dictator who managed to pose as adherents of democracy and [the champions of] innocent victims. After these people come to power, dictatorship is usually replaced by authoritarianism, the public attributes of dictatorship (monuments, portraits, etc.) are dismantled, some cosmetic reforms are carried out; but at the same time, the economic mechanism and the principles of government remain unchanged. Such an electoral outcome is extremely undesirable for Turkmenistan. Therefore, elections should be free, with the participation of all opposition groups and equal starting conditions for all candidates. Source: Tsentral’naia Aziia 6 (1996), pp. 55–9.

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NOTES 1. In 1995, the GDP of Turkmenistan decreased by more than one-third, compared with 10.7 billion dollars in 1990. Cotton production dropped by two-thirds, from 1,457,000 tons in 1990 to 430,000 tons in 1996 (Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 1997–1998. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, pp. 59, 69; Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report, 1st quarter 1998. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, p. 59). 2. A former foreign minister of independent Turkmenistan who became a bitter critic of President Niyazov. In 1993 he created the Turkmenistan Foundation in Moscow and became its president.

REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN

INTRODUCTION Demian Vaisman Capital: Tashkent. Area: 447,800 sq. km. Population: 19,810,077 (1989). The most populous of the Central Asian countries. According to the 1989 census Uzbeks made up 71.4 per cent of the population. The most numerous ethnic minorities were Russians (8.3 per cent), Tajiks (4.7), Kazakhs (4.1) and Tatars (2.4). The rural population comprised 61.8 per cent and the urban, 38.2 per cent. Religion: The Uzbeks are Sunni Muslim. Language: Uzbek is a Turkic language. Historical Survey The ancient urban population of Central Asia, which comprised Sogdians and Khorezmians, belonged to Persian-speaking tribes. Its cities had lain for centuries along the famous Silk Route. The Arab victory over Turkestan was completed in the latter half of the 9th century. Following the Arab conquest, under the Persian Samanid Empire, intensive construction of mosques and rabads (mercantile and handicraft quarters) was undertaken. At the very end of the 10th century the Samanid dynasty was replaced by the Turkic-speaking Karakhanid dynasty. The change of dynasties had little effect on the cultural development of the cities, but the Turkish language supplanted the Persian as the language of administration, although the latter continued to be employed for literary and religious writings. In the early 13th century Turkestan was conquered by the Mongols. The word ‘Chagatai’ became the official term for the Central Asian Mongolian state, and the Turkic literary language also became known as Chagatai. The Uzbek Shabanid dynasty established its authority in Turkestan in the 16th century. Following the death of the founder of the dynasty, Shaban-khan, his heirs began a succession struggle which led to the break-up of the empire into the khanates of Khiva, Bukhara and Kokand. Among the Central Asian khanates, only the Bukharan Khanate (from 1848, an emirate) accepted Russian supremacy voluntarily (1873). In February 1876 the Kokand Khanate was abolished and incorporated into the Russian empire as Fergana Oblast, included in the Turkestan General-Governorship. The Khivan Khanate unwillingly acknowledged its status as ‘the obedient servant of the emperor of all Russia’. In 1918 most of the territory of Uzbekistan became part of the Turkestan Autonomous Republic. Elements within the indigenous population, however, initiated armed opposition against the Bolsheviks, which came to be known as the Basmachi movement. In 1920 the Khorezmian Soviet People’s Republic and the Bukharan Soviet People’s Republic were created. The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic was established in October 1924, comprising the greater part of all three former khanates. The Kara-Kalpak ASSR

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was incorporated into the Uzbek SSR in 1936. Until 1929 Tajikistan, which had been part of the Bukharan emirate, was an autonomous republic within the Uzbek SSR. However, a number of traditionally Tajik cities and centres, notably Bukhara and Samarkand, remained in Uzbekistan. The percentage of Tajiks in the Uzbek population, that is, among those officially registered as Uzbeks, is not known but was claimed by the Tajik national movement to be several million. Certainly, large numbers of Tajiks were forced to register as Uzbeks on the eve of the 1926 population census. They and their descendants were not included in the 4.7 per cent of Tajiks officially registered as such in 1989. The Uzbek nation was consolidated in the Soviet period. An important role in this process was played by the Uzbek language, which became the republic’s official tongue. The Jadid movement,1 which appeared in Turkestan in the first decade of the 20th century, played a considerable role in the formation and strengthening of an Uzbek nationalist worldview. In September 1917 the Jadids created their own organization, Turk Adami Merkaziiat (Turkic Federalism), which advocated that all Turkic peoples and Muslims should be united into a single federated state. Many Jadids joined the Bolsheviks and constituted the backbone of the Soviet leadership. As in other union republics, these national cadres were unable, as of the mid- 1930s, to continue negotiating the thin line between their national and political commitments. Towards the end of the decade, this entire stratum was liquidated, its two main figures, the first party secretary and the prime minister, were tried with Bukharin and executed. As the most populous Central Asian republic, Uzbekistan played a special role in the Soviet Union. At the end of the 1950s Uzbekistan Communist Party First Secretary Nureddin Muhitdinov became the first member of the CPSU Secretariat and Politburo from a Muslim nation. His successor, Sharaf Rashidov, also became a candidate member of the Politburo. Its central role notwithstanding, the Uzbek nomenklatura developed its own style of political leadership. The term of Iurii Andropov saw the explosion of the Uzbek ‘cotton affair’—known elsewhere in the Soviet Union as the ‘Uzbek affair’—in which a major sector of the republic’s bureaucracy was accused of corruption involving the manipulation of cotton production figures.2 Simultaneously, Uzbekistan’s Fergana Valley was becoming a seething centre of Islamic religious activity and towards the end of the 1980s, Islamic organizations began taking shape. Although the majority of these were at first nonpolitical, their appearance was evidence both of the revival of national and religious values, and of the weakening of the atheist, communist ideology and decay of the Soviet regime in general. The Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan approved the Declaration of Independence on 31 August 1991. Immediately after the break-up of the USSR, on 29 December 1991, a national referendum was held, in which 98 per cent of the population favoured the establishment of an independent sovereign state of Uzbekistan.3 Political System According to the Constitution adopted in December 1992, the supreme legislative body of the republic was the Oli Majlis (parliament). The chief executive and head of state was the president, who was also the head of government. All citizens of the republic aged 18 years and over had voting rights. The president was to be elected by universal, equal and direct suffrage for a five-year term. The 150-man Oli Majlis was also to be elected for a five-year term. Under the

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electoral laws, only parties registered by the Ministry of Justice at least six months before election day, and which had collected at least 50,000 signatures, could be placed on the ballot. The first presidential election in independent Uzbekistan was held on 29 December 1991. It brought victory to the candidate of the People’s Democratic Party, Islam Karimov, who was elected by 86 per cent of the vote. Opposition candidate Muhammad Solih (Erk Party) received 12.3 per cent.4 Political Parties and Movements Independent political associations appeared in Uzbekistan in 1989—a reflection, as elsewhere, of the crisis of the Soviet regime and of glasnost and perestroika. It now became possible to openly discuss topics that had formerly been taboo, such as the responsibility of the party and state for the decline of the Uzbek language and culture or the Aral Sea ecological disaster. The growth of political awareness was greatly accelerated by the so-called cotton affair and the closely related campaign to expose criminal offences committed by Sharaf Rashidov, who had been the leader of the Uzbekistan Communist Party for over twenty years, until his death in 1983.5 In spite of heavy criticism regarding the methods employed in the investigation, it revealed wholesale corruption in the highest echelons of power. The large-scale personnel reshuffling that followed in a far-reaching purge which lasted five years, bred uncertainty among members of the republican leadership and bureaucracy. At the same time, Moscow’s policy of dismissing officials and in many cases replacing them with others unfamiliar with Uzbek language and customs, aroused broad discontent and resentment and greatly undermined its influence and prestige. All these factors contributed to the growth of Uzbek national consciousness. A central role in this development was filled by the so-called technical intelligentsia as a stratum that was less subject to ideological and administrative pressure than the creative intelligentsia. It was from this stratum that the early activists came. The first political organization of the Uzbek national movement to appear during the perestroika period was Birlik (Unity), which was formally established in November 1988. Birlik’s programme, which was clearly patterned after those of the informal organizations of the Baltic republics and inspired by the spirit of the pre-revolutionary organization of the same name,6 contained a set of demands typical of that period: democratization of public life, observance of human rights, sovereignty and economic independence, and improvements in the living standards of the population. Specific to the republic were its calls to restore and develop the Uzbek language, culture, traditions and customs, and to revive the Aral Sea. Taking advantage of the weakened state of the Communist Party, Birlik rapidly gained strength and supporters. Its structure became ramified as affiliated organizations appeared, such as the Alliance of Free Youth of Uzbekistan and Tumaris (a student and a women’s movement, respectively). The first major accomplishment of the movement was the law passed by the Supreme Soviet in October 1989 making Uzbek the republic’s official language.7 However, this testimony to Birlik’s strength served as a warning signal to the regime. Islam Karimov—for many years a top republican government official who from December 1986 served as first obkom secretary of the Communist Party in KashkaDarya—had taken over as head of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan in June 1989. The

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party’s struggle against Birlik was waged on several fronts. Birlik’s leaders were accused of extremism and inciting inter-ethnic strife, and it was denied official status on these grounds. An attempt was even made to register another movement under the same name in order to create confusion. Birlik leaders and activists were persecuted. Inside the movement a crisis developed, primarily over the issue of cooperation with the authorities. Finally, the movement split, and in May 1990 a new party—Erk—appeared. It renounced confrontation with the authorities and condemned Birlik’s show of force. The Alliance of Free Youth of Uzbekistan also drifted away from Birlik and oriented itself towards Erk. According to Uzbek legislation of 1992, political parties must have at least 3,000 members and must register with the government. The law also stated that a party may not register under the same name as a movement, effectively prohibiting Birlik, which was registered as a social movement, from registering as a political party under that name.8 In spite of obstacles created by the authorities, the tendency to form new politicized associations of various orientations increased. Supporters of a united Turkestan founded the People’s Movement of Turkestan (1989). A republican branch of the Islamic Renaissance Party and the Islamic Democratic Party were formally established. The Adolat (Justice) organization, which set itself the task of reorganizing daily life according to the laws of the Shar’ia, and its youth wing Esh Ishlari (Youth), appeared in Namangan, the religious centre of the Fergana Valley. In 1989 social democrats established the Democratic Movement of Uzbekistan with the declared aim of democratizing public and political life in the republic. Ethnic minorities were also becoming politically active. In 1989, the russophone population attempted to create their own political movement, Intersoiuz, patterned after similar organizations in other Soviet republics, but pressure from the authorities caused its early dissolution. In Samarkand and Bukhara, the traditional Tajik areas, cultural associations such as the Samarkand Movement and Oftobi Sugdien9 sprang up in the same year. Jewish and Korean cultural centres also emerged. Until the August 1991 putsch attempt, among the plethora of parties and movements, two parties—the Communist Party and its main opponent, Birlik—continued to dominate the political arena. Under Islam Karimov’s leadership, Communist Party tactics became more flexible. The party began to pay more attention to ethnic issues and borrowed some of Birlik’s slogans regarding the republic’s sovereignty, language policy and the economy. This was made possible by the progressive disintegration of the USSR and the concomitant loss of Moscow’s control over the republican communist parties. In the period immediately preceding the August 1991 coup attempt, greater pressure was brought to bear on the opposition within Uzbekistan and some of its leaders were arrested. With the departure of the CPSU from the political arena in August 1991, Uzbekistan’s communists felt free to cast off the unpopular burden of being one of its filials. Early in November, the local Communist Party was transformed into the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan, although its organizational structure remained intact. There was a simultaneous change in the position of its political opponents, which proved short-lived. The sudden loss of Moscow’s support and the crisis that hit the republican leadership in the autumn had thrown the authorities in Tashkent off balance. Uncertain of their power to control the situation, they made some concessions to the opposition. In November 1991, Birlik was registered. Erk had been allowed to register

Introduction

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two months earlier. However, the authorities’ attitude to the opposition changed drastically as the first signs of a possible coalition of opposition forces appeared in the spring and especially the summer of 1992. For the first time since they had drifted apart, Birlik and Erk issued a joint appeal to hold peaceful rallies and marches in the capital and outlying regions in support of a dialogue between the authorities and the opposition. The action was scheduled for July 1992. After a series of consultations in May and July, Birlik, Erk, the People’s Movement of Turkestan, the Free Peasants’ Party and the People’s Diplomacy Association (an association of various public organizations which favoured unofficial contacts among citizens of different countries) formed an organizing committee for establishing a Milli Majlis (national assembly). According to its draft charter, it was to comprise representatives of political parties and public movements. One of its tasks was to draft bills to be submitted for discussion in appropriate legislative bodies. The authorities feared the prospect of an alliance of opposition forces, and the idea of establishing the Milli Majlis was declared unconstitutional. The members of the organizing committee were arrested and convicted.10 By the summer of 1993, the new crack-down on Birlik and Erk put an end to their activities. Although there was no official ban, the authorities acted on the strength of the January 1993 decision to suspend Birlik’s activities.11 Religious parties were prohibited a priori, the authorities fearing the potential political impact of religion on the masses, which had been demonstrated in neighbouring Tajikistan. The Islamic Renaissance Party and the Islamic Democratic Party were never legalized. Adolat had initially enjoyed the support of the authorities, but lost their trust when it began exposing corruption and adopted an independent policy which ignored the regional authorities. In February/March 1992, Adolat was disbanded and its leader sentenced to ten years in prison. In March 1993, the Council of Ministers of Uzbekistan passed a decree on the reregistration of parties. By 1 October 1993, each party had to submit complete information on the composition and employment of its members and declare its sources of financing.12 The opposition parties which had been driven underground found themselves outlawed for failure to apply for re-registration. In January 1997 a further Law on Political Parties was promulgated. It prohibited the creation of parties on an ethnic or religious basis and stipulated that all political organizations could consist only of individual registered members. It also proscribed any financial support of political parties by the state, religious organizations, foreign citizens and institutions, or anonymous donors. Two public organizations, the Social Progress Party and Watan Taraqqiyoti (Homeland Progress), established in 1992 and 1993, respectively, epitomized the true nature of the ‘multi-party system’ in Uzbekistan. They played the role of a ‘moderate opposition’, cooperating with the ruling People’s Democratic Party and supporting its foreign and domestic policies, thus lending President Karimov’s regime a democratic facade.

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NOTES 1. Jadidism favoured the reform of Islam and adopting a European system of education in Islamic societies. It appeared in the 1880s. The tsarist authorities persecuted the Jadids, viewing them as adherents of Pan-Turkism and enemies of the empire. The Soviet regime declared them to be ‘bourgeois nationalists’ and exterminated virtually all the movement’s leading adherents. 2. During the Soviet period cotton was Uzbekistan’s main agricultural product. The foundations for cotton monoculture were laid at the beginning of the 20th century. With the inauguration of the First Five-Year Plan (1928–32), the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party issued a decree on May 1929 ‘On the Status of and Prospects for the Textile Industry’, which stated: ‘As far as cotton growing is concerned, it is obligatory in cotton-growing regions to use all available irrigated lands, both those lying fallow and those sown with cereal crops, for growing cotton’ (Direktivy KPSS i Sovetskogo pravitel’stva po khoziaistvennym voprosam, p. 52). This became the guideline for the agricultural development of the region. Soon afterwards a resolution of the Second Central Asian Party Conference stipulated: ‘The implementation of the programme for the development of cotton growing in Central Asia shall be considered the principal line in the socialist transformation of agriculture’ (Resoliutsii vtorogo Sredneaziatskogo partiinogo soveshchaniia, p. 2). By 1989, about half of all arable land in Uzbekistan was planted with cotton. (In contrast, cotton growing in Egypt’s heyday never exceeded 20 per cent and by the 1980s had dropped to 10– 12 per cent.) In the years 1980–88, the area under cotton increased from 1,878 million to 2,017 million hectares (Vostok, 5 [1991], pp. 143–4). In 1983, Moscow accused the Tashkent authorities of falsifying their reports on cotton production in order to add a fictitious 20 per cent to the republic’s actual cotton output, and of widespread corruption in this connection. 3. Izvestiia, 31 Dec. 1993. 4. Pravda Vostoka, 1 Jan. 1992. 5. Sharaf Rashidov became the first secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan in 1959. From 1961 he was a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU and a candidate member of the Politburo. He was also a writer and had served in 1949–50 as the head of the Writers’ Union of Uzbekistan. His novels became classics of Soviet Uzbek literature and were compulsory reading in schools and institutions of higher education. 6. The original Birlik was a movement of the national intelligentsia that existed in the first decade of the twentieth century. The movement, which stood for national independence, and for promotion of the culture, literature and religion of the Muslim peoples of the Russian Empire, was headed by a mulla, M.Sheimerdemov. The programmes of the original and modern Birlik were similar. 7. The use of the Uzbek language had dwindled dramatically with the switch from the Arabic to the Latin script carried out in 1927, and then to the Cyrillic in 1940. With teaching in universities and colleges being conducted primarily in Russian, the Uzbek intelligentsia became detached from its native language and cultural heritage. 8. Human Rights and Democratization in the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, p. 209. 9. The Tajik and Uzbek nations had been formed on the basis of various tribal groups, the Tajik nation on Eastern Iranian tribes which were engaged in sedentary agriculture, and the Uzbek nation, on nomadic Turkic tribes. Thus, their cultural development differed. In the Bukhara Emirate the Tajik population traditionally inhabited such cities as Samarkand, Bukhara,

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Shahrisabz and Khojent. Sogdiana was a province of the Achaemenian empire, corresponding to the contemporary regions of Samarkand and Bukhara. 10. Narodnaia gazeta, 11 Aug. 1993. 11. lzvestiia, 21 Jan. 1993 12. SWB BBC SU/1676 B/8, 30 Apr. 1993, RIA 19 Apr. 1993 and Bakhtier Ergashev, ‘Formirovanie mnogopartiinoi sistemy v Uzbekistane: problemy i perspectivy’, Tsentral’naia Aziia i Kavkaz 6 (2000), p. 58.

ASSOCIATION OF KOREAN CULTURAL CENTRES INTRODUCTION In accordance with a decree of 21 August 1937, the Korean population of the Soviet Far East, 182,000 in all—was deported to Central Asia. This step was taken against the backdrop of a deteriorating security situation in the Far East following the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. The Koreans thus had the dubious distinction of being the first of the deported nationalities or so-called punished peoples. By December 1937 as many as 74,000 Koreans had been ‘resettled’ in Uzbekistan. By the beginning of 1989 their number had reached 183,000 out of a total Soviet Korean population of 439,000 (the second largest Korean diaspora in the USSR was to be found in Kazakhstan—about 140,000).1 In May 1990 the National Korean Cultural Association was established with headquarters in Moscow and with the participation of Soviet Koreans from all over the USSR. Soon after, on 12 January 1991, the Association of Korean Cultural Centres of Uzbekistan was formed out of 24 oblast, raion and urban cultural centres which had sprung up in the wake of perestroika. The primary objective of both the national and local organization was to revitalize the national culture of Soviet Koreans—in particular through a revival of the Korean language. In 1989, less than five per cent of Soviet Koreans listed Korean as their native language.2 Uzbek Association Chairman Petr Kim claimed that only two per cent of ethnic Koreans in Uzbekistan could actually read and write Korean.3 The Association received assistance from South Korea in setting up a Korean education centre in Tashkent in May 1992.4

RULES According to its rules, the main tasks and functions of the Association are: – thorough study of problems facing the Korean inhabitants of Uzbekistan, and proposing their solution within the legal framework of the Uzbek SSR; – carrying out cultural and educational work among the Soviet Koreans aimed at revival of the national culture, language, traditions and customs; – development and consolidation of Inter-ethnic relations with the purpose of harmonizing ethnic and state interests and the mutual enriching of cultures on the basis of socialist internationalism; – rendering aid to Koreans in organizing family and other events in accordance with national traditions, as well as rendering various services;

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– establishing and strengthening cultural links with Koreans in other countries. In accordance with the proclaimed tasks, the association: – in cooperation with the republican educational bodies, shall resolve the issues related to the restoration of teaching Korean and the history of Korean culture in elementary schools located in the districts of compact Korean settlement;5 – shall coordinate the activities of cultural centres (societies) and render practical aid in implementing the tasks stated in the present rules; – shall collect high-level works of classic and modern literature, of visual art, choreography and entertainment and promote them widely; – shall monitor the methods of teaching Korean, and Korean literature and the history of Korean culture; […] – shall publish a bulletin (newspaper) in Korean and Russian, as well as dictionaries, textbooks, conversation booklets, etc; – shall organize folklore festivals throughout the republic […] – shall carry out research on the history of Soviet Koreans, as well as Korean studies and international relations. […] Source: Uzbekistan: Etnopoliticheskaia panorama. Ocherki. Dokumenty. Materialy, Vol. 1 (Moscow, 1994, pp. 169–75). NOTES 1. Eighteen thousand also lived in Kyrgyzstan and 13,000 in Tajikistan where a Soviet Korean Association was founded in October 1989. See Huttenbach, ‘The Soviet Koreans’, p. 65. See also Sovetskie koreitsy Kazakhstana: Entsiklopedicheskii spravochnik, p. 154; Grazhdanskie dvizheniia v Tadzhikistane, pp. 192–4 and Bugai, ‘O vyselenii koreitsev iz Dal’nevostochnogo kraia’, pp. 142, 154. 2. Natsional’nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR, Part 2, p. 9 3. Koreitsy Respubliki Uzbekistan, p. 130. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid., pp. 125–30.

BIRLIK INTRODUCTION Birlik (Unity) came into existence in November 1988. The nucleus of the movement consisted of an organizing body of fifteen Uzbek intellectuals. Their intention was to create a political party; however, anticipating opposition from the authorities, they declared Birlik a ‘popular movement’—the Uzbek Popular Front. A constituent congress was held in May 1989. It elected a central council composed of 90 members, with Abdurahim Pulatov, doctor of mathematics and physics, as its chairman. Although Birlik’s political platform claimed it was possible to promote internationalism through the cultivation of national language, traditions and culture, in practice, the movement emphasized the struggle for an Uzbek national renaissance. This influenced its composition, which came exclusively to comprise ethnic Uzbeks. The recognition of Uzbek as the official language of the Uzbek SSR was the main rallying cry of the movement in the early period. Birlik’s leaders considered meetings and demonstrations to be the most effective instruments for awakening the political and social consciousness of the masses, as well as for gaining popularity and exerting pressure on the authorities. Active confrontation with the authorities through demonstrations, indeed, contributed to an increase in the movement’s popularity but at the same time had negative implications for its internal solidarity. In early 1990 a split occurred within the movement. A number of the more moderate leaders, including the poet Muhammad Solih, who were inclined towards collaboration with the authorities, left Birlik and formed the Erk Party. Initially, Birlik had no legal status. It was officially registered only on 11 November 1991. The fifth congress of the movement, the first after registration, which was held in May 1992, elected Pulatov and Shukhrat Ismatullayev co-chairmen. Following the disintegration of the USSR, the movement’s main focus was on the struggle for democratization. This led to confrontation with the authorities, which were composed in the main of former communist party nomenklatura. On 10 December 1992, Birlik was banned. Reregistration attempts in 1993 failed, formally for lack of an address (the government closed down Birlik’s headquarters shortly before the registration deadline). Outlawed as a political party, Birlik tried to participate in politics as a popular front.1 The ban on its activity was never lifted. Attempts on the life of Birlik’s leaders forced some of them to leave the country, and its members were persecuted. Nevertheless, Birlik remained the largest opposition movement. Although in 1992 the authorities maintained that its membership numbered fewer than 3,000, its leaders claimed a figure of 300,000, and its committees operated in all the major cities of Uzbekistan. The movement’s press organ, Nezavisimyi ezhenedel’nik was published in Moscow, in Russian and Uzbek. Its distribution in Uzbekistan was prohibited.

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PROGRAMME Prologue Birlik (Unity) is a socio-political movement that unites in voluntary fashion and in the people’s interest, without regard for nationality or origin, those concerned about Uzbekistan’s future, who are not indifferent to its natural, spiritual and material features […] The main goals of the Birlik Movement are: to raise political and social awareness; to free Uzbeks and all peoples in the republic from social backwardness and from the bondage of the periods of the cult of personality and stagnation; and to spur the masses to fight for the protection of Uzbekistan’s natural, material and spiritual wealth, and in this way to radically restructure Soviet society […] The Birlik Movement strives for the transformation of Uzbekistan into an independent republic that can determine its own fate within the union on the basis of Lenin’s nationality policy. Birlik will help expose the bureaucracy, bribery, and corruption that are the legacy of the period of stagnation.2 It will fight any attack aimed at stifling perestroika and any actions that oppose democracy and glasnost. The basic form of action of the Birlik Movement will be to urge government organizations to work in the people’s interest. National Tasks 1. The Birlik Movement is based on the idea that it is possible to instil the spirit of internationalism in the masses only through national education, cultivation of national language, traditions and culture and respect for one’s nationality. It condemns national arrogance and nationalism. It will fight against nationalism and chauvinism. 2. Conflicts that have arisen between ethnic groups should be specially studied and publicized. An important issue is the strict exposure of any provocation aimed at creating discord between Uzbeks and other peoples […]3 3. Considering that the language policy implemented in Uzbekistan in the years of the cult of personality and stagnation had an illegal and discriminatory character with respect to the Uzbek language,4 the Birlik Movement will pay special attention to correcting it […] Birlik will fight to bring Uzbek under the protection of the state, gain for it the status of Uzbekistan’s state language, and restore it to positions from which it has been removed. 4. The Birlik Movement will study the [Uzbek] cultural heritage in detail and actively seek to gain respect for long-standing progressive traditions; for the qualities of dignity, commitment, humanity and love; and, at the same time, for the languages, customs and traditions of other peoples living in the republic. […] 5. The Birlik Movement demands the adoption of a state programme that would ensure a constant increase in the number of national cadres within Uzbekistan’s working class.5 Cultural Tasks 1. The Birlik Movement stresses that the times demand the development of cultural relations with the [other] union republics and with foreign nations. It will endeavour to

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restore cultural relations with Uzbeks living in other republics and abroad,6 and considers their cultural riches an integral part of the common Uzbek culture. 2. […] The Birlik Movement will fight to resolve these problems and, at the same time, will direct the attention of the state administration to the task of having our artistic and cultural heritage returned from abroad either in the original or in reproduced form.7 3. Birlik will work for the renewed, multifaceted study of Uzbekistan’s history and the teaching of this knowledge in schools; for an end to unjustified discrimination towards local historical personages who are recognized throughout the world; and for the total elimination of demagogic attitudes and Stalinist political views of history.8 4. Birlik will work for the restoration of national traditions in urban architecture and rural construction. […] Birlik believes the time has come to preserve the names of historical places which have been lost; to restore names which were changed without reason; to change names that are repeated a dozen times for various places and to reinstate their original names.9 5. Birlik will fight to elevate the spiritual and cultural thinking of the people; to link the cultural heritage with the present; and, as the key to a thousand years of cultural heritage, to have the old Uzbek [Arabic] alphabet taught on a wide scale in [regular] secondary and special secondary schools, and schools of higher education. […] 6. The Birlik Movement is dedicated to organizing a fund to be used to meet republican requirements on the historical, cultural, economic and ecological fronts,10 and to provide stipends to send talented young people to study and increase their skills in other union republics and abroad.11 Economic Tasks 1. The Birlik Movement stresses that Uzbekistan has suffered economic and ecological damage. This view is based on indicators such as: the national income per capita in the republic is two times less than the all-union index; consumption of meat by the rural population is seven or eight times less than the all-union index; the poisoning of the republic’s land and water by various chemicals; the high infant mortality rate in the republic; and the human organism’s need for protein because the meat, dairy, and fruit products needed by the population have been greatly reduced in order to grow industrial [crops] on most of the fertile land. Birlik recognizes that the basic cause of this is the ‘cotton monoculture’ sickness which reigned in the republic in the periods of the cult of personality and of stagnation, and seeks measures to rescue the republic from it. 2. Recognizing the gravity of the economic situation in the republic makes it necessary to develop agriculture by radically restructuring this field and shifting to new methods of land use in Uzbekistan. Therefore, Birlik proposes the following: leasing land to peasants on a long-term basis to allow strict implementation of crop rotation; establishing direct communication between lessees and local soviets, without the local agro-industrial corporations of kolkhozes and sovkhozes, for the purpose of increasing the role of the local soviets and decreasing the excessive bureaucratic apparatus in agricultural management;12 seriously reduce state orders for cotton and other agricultural products in the current five-year plan; curtailing excessive administrative orders from party bureaucrats; and setting quotas of cotton products and their purchase prices at true value […]13

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3. Stating in official documents and in the press that Uzbekistan’s dependence on the state (i.e. the USSR) is completely without basis.14 The Birlik Movement believes that Uzbekistan is capable of taking care of its own economic situation. It requires a sharp reduction in the control figures for cotton production in the Uzbek SSR’s agricultural plans for 1989 and subsequent years. The amount reduced must be scientifically formulated so that it will serve to raise to the all-union levels dairy, meat, fruit, and vegetable products harvested on fields [presently] planted in cotton, and be equal to the [abolition] of the cotton monoculture. The absence of any current plans to raise to the allunion level the supply per person of foodstuffs in Uzbekistan should be specially emphasized. 4. The Birlik Movement believes that in order to develop Uzbekistan’s economy intensively and raise the prosperity of the republic’s population, it is vital to revitalize the raw material processing industry, increase material benefits for the population that produces cotton, silk and karakul pelts, and end the state’s monopoly on these products. It has always been the case that nearly all of these products are taken and processed outside the republic and bring benefit only to other regions.15 As for the republic, it grows poorer and incentive for producing these products wanes. 5. The Birlik Movement believes that construction of industrial enterprises to produce cotton and silk goods for the first time in Uzbekistan and development of direct trade with [other] union republic enterprises and foreign countries are the most appropriate ways to develop the republic’s economy. 6. Birlik considers it advisable for the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers to announce in the press the composition and objectives of the state budget, as well as all other plans. Let the people lead in their discussion. 7. It is vital to consider a certain part of the income from oil, gas, valuable non-ferrous metals and other underground riches,16 as well as from production enterprises subordinate to union organs as Uzbekistan’s national wealth. This income should be included in its national income. Similarly, the question of which portion of extracted riches should be used to meet the republic’s needs and which portion should be sold abroad, should be resolved with the participation of the republic’s government, while keeping in mind allunion interests. 8. The Birlik Movement supports the CPSU’s plans for developing union republics and regions on a cost-accounting basis (khozraschet) and will participate in implementing this task in Uzbekistan. Social Tasks 1. Birlik will strive to ensure that women’s labour conforms to humane and legal norms, and curtail the exploitation of child labour.17 2. […] Birlik stresses the urgent need to draw up a general programme for creating new jobs in the republic and considers itself obliged to participate in its formulation.18 3. In view of the extremely backward status of health care work in the republic, Birlik will strive to raise the level of local scientific cadres. Considering that the population in rural areas does not know Russian well,19 it will endeavour to have cadres from these areas instructed in their native languages. In developing medical practice, it will strive for broader use of all-union [medical practice] and of the scientific experience and theories of other states and obtain practical assistance from them.

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4. Other important tasks are: development of medical services and sports activities; radical improvement of rural sports; attraction of the local population to sports; creation of Uzbek sports schools; and exchange of experience and cadres in this area with fraternal countries.20 5. While treatment of illnesses is necessary, it is even more important to eradicate the sources from which they stem. For instance, taking into consideration the republic’s weather and climatic conditions in housing construction and the organization of sanitary and hygienic work; establishing strict medical supervision over enterprises that release pollutants in cities and closing down polluting plants; and stopping the use of toxic chemicals in rural areas.21 These are public tasks, and the Birlik Movement will be active in this field. […] Ecological Tasks One of the goals of the Birlik Movement is to try to develop society’s ecological world view by expounding the unity of man and nature, arousing responsibility for the preservation of nature […] 1. The Birlik Movement stresses the severity of the ecological situation existing in the following regions: a) in the region around the Aral Sea as a result of the desiccation of the Aral Sea and the pollution of the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya rivers with toxic chemicals;22 b) in the northern and southern regions of Surkhan-Darya Oblast affected by extremely toxic wastes from the Tajikistan Aluminium Plant;23 c) in the Tashkent industrial region, Chirchik, and other places, as a result of chemicals and various metallurgical wastes; d) in the Fergana Valley affected by toxic wastes from chemical enterprises. […] 4. Birlik considers it vital that the level of the Aral Sea be returned to its original state. A special state programme must be adopted to achieve this […] 5. The Birlik Movement demands that the volume of toxic chemicals being used in agriculture be reduced by ten times in the next one or two years and then be completely banned. 6. The Birlik Movement stresses that every enterprise being designed or constructed should pass inspection by public ecological experts […] Justice and Human Rights 1. The Birlik Movement especially emphasizes that important changes regarding human rights and justice must be made in our republic, and that the names of members of the apparatus that conducted repression in Uzbekistan, for instance, during the period of the cult of personality, should be disclosed. It believes it necessary for all documents to be handed over to the people. 2. The Birlik Movement will fight for the inviolability of every citizen’s writings, telephone conversations, and other secrets, and for legal steps to be taken when these secrets are violated. 3. The Birlik Movement demands the assurance of the legal inviolability of the individual in Uzbekistan and the creation of necessary guarantees of the right of every citizen to examine materials gathered about him by any kind of organizations and to be legally protected from slander.

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4. The Birlik Movement will endeavour to ensure that citizens of the Uzbek SSR are not persecuted for their political views or religious beliefs and that the article of the constitution covering this be fully observed and implemented.24 […] Source: Central Asia and Caucasus Chronicle, 1 (March 1990), pp. 10–12. NOTES 1. Interactive Central Asia Resource Project, http://www.rockbridge.net/. 2. The implication here is that the Uzbek SSR party leadership was not implementing perestroika in Uzbekistan but was continuing on the path of the Brezhnev leadership, which in Uzbekistan had led to the so-called Uzbek or cotton affair involving widespread corruption and bribery that had been rampant under party first secretary Sharaf Rashidov. The affair was exposed in a series of trials in the 1980s. Many top figures in the republic were sentenced to long prison terms. A number of the accused in the cotton affair were linked by the prosecution to some of the central figures of the Brezhnev era (characterized by Gorbachev as ‘the period of stagnation’), including Brezhnev’s son-in-law Iurii Churbanov. 3. In summer 1989, a major ethnic conflict between Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks in the Fergana Valley claimed 103 lives (according to official estimates). As a result, beginning in July the same year, 40,000 Turks were evacuated from Uzbekistan. Viacheslav Pankin, head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ main department accused ‘active members’ of Birlik of being among the principal participants in the Fergana Valley events. For its part, Birlik saw such assertions as a provocation on the part of the authorities which, it claimed, were not interested in power-sharing. It was convinced that the Uzbek leadership was involved in spreading rumours among the non-Uzbek population about Birlik’s involvement in the riots (Ro’i, ‘Central Asian Riots and Disturbances’, pp. 21–54; Rutkevich, ‘Dva aspekta mezhetnicheskikh otnoshenii’, p. 13). 4. Among others, it affected the publication of literature in Uzbek. Of the 2,379 titles of books and brochures published in Uzbekistan in 1988, only 929 were in Uzbek. Of 95 journals and other periodicals, only 31 were published in Uzbek (Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1989g., pp. 216–17). 5. Thirty-three per cent of the able-bodied Russian population was employed in Uzbekistan’s industry in 1979 compared to 11 per cent of Uzbeks; in the building industry, the figures were 18.2 per cent and 7.3 per cent, respectively. However, only 2.7 per cent of Russians were employed in agriculture compared to 52.6 per cent of Uzbeks. Only a small percentage of the indigenous nationality was employed in industry due, on the one hand, to the longstanding Soviet policy of encouraging skilled workers from the European part of the Union to emigrate to Central Asia to man its industrial plants, and, on the other, to the disinclination of Uzbeks to urbanize and go into industry (Vostok 5 (1991), p. 125). 6. The transmission of Uzbek radio and television programmes to Uzbeks in neighbouring republics became an issue of negotiation between Uzbek and other Central Asian leaders. Within the USSR, there were approximately one million Uzbeks in Tajikistan, half a million in Kyrgyzstan and over 300,000 in both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Over 3 million Uzbeks were also reported to be living outside the USSR, including 1,800,000 in Afghanistan, 300,000 in Saudi Arabia and 30,000 in Turkey (Pravda Vostoka, 16 July 1992). They were mainly descendants of people who had left their homeland after the revolution and the Civil War. Contacts with the Uzbek diaspora had been virtually non-existent in the Soviet period (Pravda Vostoka, 5 Oct. 1991). 7. Reference is to cultural treasures removed from Uzbekistan during the tsarist and Soviet periods and kept in Soviet museums. The most famous of these was Osman’s Qur’an, which

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was returned in 1990. Other treasures were sold to museums in Britain and France by the emirs of Bukhara and the khans of Kokand. 8. In works published in the Soviet period, the history of the Uzbek and other peoples was treated in accordance with Stalin’s Short Course of Communist Party History. Certain public figures were mentioned only in a negative context, and historical facts which contradicted official dogma were simply suppressed. A case in point was the omission, in the official Soviet version of the history of Central Asia, of the 1897 antiRussian uprising in Andijan and Margelan. 9. During the Soviet period, many place names were changed. Towns and streets were named after Soviet heroes (Lenin, Kalinin, Frunze, etc.). With the collapse of the USSR, commissions were set up in Uzbekistan to restore the traditional names. In the Uzbek capital of Tashkent, some 30 street and square names were changed in 1991–92 alone. See Fierman, ‘Independence and the Declining Priority of Language Law Implementation in Uzbekistan’. 10. In 1992, the Meros (Heritage) Society was founded in Uzbekistan. Its declared task was preserving the historical, literary and cultural heritage of the Uzbek people. In addition, the Mahalla Foundation was established in the same year to preserve national traditions. 11. A number of places in higher educational institutions in Moscow and Leningrad were reserved for students from the constituent republics. However, the opportunity to study at the best Soviet higher educational establishments or take part in international student exchanges was basically reserved for the offspring of the Soviet élite. 12. Birlik viewed the agro-industrial (agroprom) structure as a purely bureaucratic link, and collective and state farms as a means of tying the peasants to the land, and advocated their abolition. The call for a direct connection between the leaseholder and the local soviet was a way of challenging the omnipotence of the CPSU. 13. The Soviet authorities set artificially low prices on cotton and other commodities sold by producers to the state. The real market price of these goods was much higher. The difference constituted an essential part of the state income. In 1988, the average purchasing price for one ton of cotton was 806 rubles. This price barely recouped production outlays (Zhizn i ekonomika. 8 (1992), p. 29). 14. Due to low prices placed on Uzbekistan’s agricultural products and high prices on industrial products supplied to the republic, it was continually in need of subsidies. According to official data, in 1989 union subsidies to the republican budget reached about 2 billion rubles (Kommunist Uzbekistana 14 (1989), p. 27). 15. The harvested crop from approximately 1.9 million hectares of the over two million hectares of irrigated cotton fields in Uzbekistan was earmarked for the disposal of the all-union government, including the yield from 0.7 million hectares allocated for export (Vostok 5 (1991), p. 145). In the late 1980s, only 8–10 per cent of the cotton harvested in the republic was processed locally (Kommunist Uzbekistana 14 (1989), p. 24). 16. In 1989 Uzbekistan accounted for up to 25 per cent of the gold extracted in the USSR. However, the bulk of it was shipped to Moscow. Out of $11.5, the world price of a gram of gold at the time, no more than 80 cents was returned to the republic (Vechernii Tashkent, 20 Oct. 1992). 17. In 1988, almost 90 per cent of women employed in Uzbekistan’s agriculture worked at manual jobs. During the harvest season, they worked an average of 13 hours a day, seven days a week, and were paid only 60 to 70 per cent of what men received for the same work (Pravda vostoka, 19 March 1989). Children aged 12 and up were exploited as free agricultural labour by the Komsomol in order to help fulfil the cotton quota. As a rule, employees of academic institutions were also mobilized every autumn to pick cotton. 18. In 1987, some 2.5 million of Uzbekistan’s able-bodied population were not officially employed in the national economy (Kommunist Uzbekistana 14 (1989), p. 40). The republic’s total manpower resources were estimated at 9.6 million persons (Moskovskie novosti, 3 Sept. 1989). However, not all those who were not engaged in the national

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economy could, strictly speaking, be categorized as unemployed. According to a sociological poll conducted among 600,000 jobless in Uzbekistan, only 10 per cent of those without a profession or a stable job agreed to take a retraining course. This might indicate that the rest had some means of livelihood (seasonal employment by women in agriculture, etc.) (Vostok 5 [1991], p. 160). 19. According to the 1989 census, 0.4 per cent of Uzbeks named Russian as their native tongue, while 22.9 per cent said they had a perfect command of Russian. These were undoubtedly mostly urban dwellers (Rutkevich, ‘Two Aspects of Inter-ethnic Relations’, p. 21). 20. In Soviet vernacular ‘fraternal countries’ was another name for socialist countries. In this case, the term is probably used to denote mostly Turkic countries. 21. In the 1980s, up to 100,000 tons of pesticides were used annually in Uzbekistan’s cotton fields, including 10,000 tons of highly toxic compounds. The figure per hectare was 20–25 kg, while the Soviet average was no more than 3 kg (Pravda Vostoka, 24 Jan. 1989). 22. Prior to 1960, the annual discharge of water from the Amu-Darya and Syr-Darya into the Aral Sea was approximately 50 cu. kms; in the period 1961–80 it dropped to an average of 20 cu. kms; and as of the beginning of the 1980s there was no run-off from the Syr-Darya and only a token run-off from the Amu-Darya. As a result, the sea’s volume shrank to less than one-third of its original size and its surface, to about 40 per cent of its original area. Water mineralization grew from 11 to 23 parts per thousand. Salinization was expected to increase, so that by the end of the 1980s it was anticipated that by the year 2000 the few remaining species of fish would die. The World Health Organization declared the region an ecological disaster zone in 1987 (Pravda Vostoka, 24 Jan. 1989). 23. The aluminium plant, situated in Tajikistan very close to the Uzbek SSR border, was a wellknown source of pollution. 24. Although the constitution of the Uzbek SSR proclaimed these rights and freedoms (the inviolability of the home, protection from interference in citizens’ lives, privacy of correspondence, telephone conversations and telegraph communications, and freedom of conscience), in practice, they were not implemented. For the constitution, see Pravda Vostoka, 20 April 1978.

ERK DEMOCRATIC PARTY INTRODUCTION The leaders of the Erk (Will) Democratic Party split off from the Birlik Popular Movement in 1989 over the issue of Birlik’s advocacy of militant confrontation with the authorities. The constituent congress was held in May 1990 in Tashkent. It elected poet Muhammad Solih, one of the founders of Birlik, as party chairman. Erk was composed largely of urban intellectuals and students. It supported Uzbek autonomy and non-violent democratic and market reforms. The party was registered in September 1991. Solih ran for the republican presidency in the December 1991 elections. Although defeated by Karimov, he received 12.3 per cent of the vote.1 Erk refused to give unreserved support to the policies of President Karimov, who was bent on gaining full control over all spheres of the republic’s politics and economy. In June 1992, Erk attempted to unite all opposition forces into the Forum of Democratic Forces of Uzbekistan. The forum held several meetings in towns of the Fergana Valley.2 The confrontation with the authorities drew Erk and Birlik closer together and the two organizations arranged for their first joint action to be held in early July 1992. They agreed on a demonstration in Tashkent prior to the Supreme Soviet session, where they proposed to present demands for cardinal social changes.3 A clampdown on the party’s activities followed: its press organ, Erk, was subjected to heavy censorship, its leaders were persecuted and the party was driven underground. Solih protested by relinquishing his position as deputy of the Supreme Soviet. Subsequently, he was compelled to leave Uzbekistan, and was followed in 1993 by Erk’s secretary, Almaz Namatkulov. In the summer of 1993, several Erk members, including its new secretary Atanazar Arifov, were sentenced to prison for their attempt to develop closer cooperation with Birlik through the creation of a joint assembly.4 Erk’s attempt to re-register as a political party in 1993 was denied, officially because of the lack of a proper address (its headquarters had been closed by the fire department as a ‘fire hazard’). Erk and Birlik leaders made several unsuccessful attempts to create a united opposition.5 In early 1997, Erk’s membership was estimated at 5–10,000.6

PROGRAMME Introduction […] The present social, political and economic situation in the republic demands that the broad masses of the population awaken and show initiative and activity. There is a need

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for everyone to unite in pursuing a definite idea and goal; each social stratum should define its position in political life. The emergence of various political parties that would ensure mass participation in government has become an objective necessity. The appearance of the Erk Democratic Party answers these needs. In its striving to create an independent state ruled by [Uzbek] law, democratic society will rely on the will, aid and initiative of the people. Main Goals and Tasks of the Erk Democratic Party The Erk Democratic Party is a parliamentary party professing nonviolent, democratic means of action.7 Its main goal is to create an independent democratic state governed by law. In order to achieve this goal, Erk will rely on the people’s will and strive to consolidate its position in the parliament and the government, and to defend the ideals of democratic society. Erk stands for the equality of all citizens before the law, freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of assembly, speech and the press, and freedom to form parties, unions and political organizations. Erk stands for maximal consideration and coordination of the interests of all citizens, and for an efficient system of social security for the working and low-income population. Every person is entitled to live in conditions enabling him or her to freely pursue his or her vocation […] A necessary pre-condition for this is to create a state governed by law, to ensure that citizens enjoy basic political and civil rights, including the right to private property. Therefore, the Erk Democratic Party is engaged in human rights activity and cooperates with all democratic forces in creating an open society. Erk has set itself the task of achieving genuine government by the people, in which priority will be given to universal human values over class and other interests; this regime is to be characterized by a multiparty system and an effective parliamentary opposition. Government by the people shall be realized through democratic institutions, political and economic de-monopolization and de-centralization, through laws guaranteeing human and national rights, and various economic models and forms of ownership on an equal legal basis. Erk advocates openness towards the rest of the world, unobstructed access to information, freedom to travel abroad and to return, and the right of every individual who has come of age to be issued a passport for travelling abroad.8 Erk will endeavour to transform society on the basis of principles of real democracy, civil accord, inter-ethnic harmony and social partnership. While supporting society’s aspirations for consensus, and being aware of the perils of confrontation and of extremist opinions and actions, the party will actively counter any dictatorship and usurpation of power, manifestations of chauvinism, nationalism, aggression, and attempts of any groups to persecute and eliminate their opponents by unlawful means. Erk censures and opposes extremism in politics. The party condemns terrorist activities, violence and discrimination, and any manifestations of hatred on national, religious, class or ideological grounds. Erk stands for a rational system of protecting the environment, putting an end to the plundering and waste of the republic’s natural resources, and creating normal, mutually profitable economic relations with other states.9

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Erk stands for abolishing the nomenklatura—an estate of the command administrative system, the artificial division of society into classes and social strata, all types of privilege, and for replacing them with high standards of morals and social justice. Erk stands for abolishing employers’ references for citizens and for the need to obtain residence permits [propiski] as an element of feudal law.10 Erk advocates the development of political, economic and cultural links among the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, and the restoring of eternal historical ties with the peoples of the Middle East and the Indochina peninsula, as well as cooperation with patriotic democratic movements in other countries and with Uzbek emigrant organizations. Erk’s Tasks in the Sphere of Culture and the Spiritual Development of Society The Erk Democratic Party strives to achieve a spiritual rebirth of society; it stands for preserving national customs and traditions, for mutual enrichment of cultures of all ethnic groups living in Uzbekistan. Erk strives to attain the restoration of confiscated mosques, churches and other property to religious organizations and communities and the return of all destroyed buildings and other religious articles. Erk favours non-intervention of state agencies in the activities of scientific and creative unions, collectives and persons prominent in science and the arts, as well as the elimination of the influence of the [Communist] party in culture and education. It opposes the rendering of state support to CPSU appendages in the sphere of education, such as the Oktiabriata, Pioneers and Komsomol organizations.11 Everyone is free to participate in these organizations, but it should be done outside schools and other educational institutions. Erk urges improvement of the public education system. One way to achieve this is to close down evening and correspondence education institutions […], because their graduates have proven to be poorly educated and ignorant, yet seek to get highly placed positions. Erk stands for qualifying Stalin’s crimes as crimes against the people, perpetuating the memory of the victims of repression, rendering aid to the survivors, and defending their rights before all government agencies and public organizations. The Issues of State, Law and Unity The movement for Uzbekistan’s sovereignty is being indomitably broadened. The people’s will is to become the real master of its land and fate […] Erk recognizes the right of peoples and nations to make their own choice. Expressing the will of the people, the party aims to restore the sovereignty of Uzbekistan and to create a democratic republic whose citizens will enjoy full equality irrespective of their social position, ethnic origin, religion or party affiliation. Erk is aware that only a democratic and independent republic will ensure the real development of society, and the dignity and identity of the Uzbek people, as well as of other ethnic groups in Uzbekistan. At the present transitional stage to independence, Erk does not oppose the possibility of Uzbekistan joining a confederation of freely united states. At the present stage, union republics should conclude mutual agreements on economic, political and military

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cooperation and on non-interference in each others’ internal affairs, and to elect a confederative parliament on this basis […] Erk stands for supremacy of law, presidential rule, and a permanent parliament. No political party should be allowed to take the place of bodies of state power, the judicial system, the army and law enforcement organs. Legislative, executive and judicial powers should be separated. This is an indispensable precondition for democracy and the only tool capable of preventing abuse of power and its transformation to autocratic rule. In accordance with the principle of separation of powers, the parliament should be given an efficient constitutional mechanism for controlling the actions of the president. The highest authority in society should be the law […] No regime and no party or movement can be above the law. It is the law alone that must rule in our state […] This is the way to ensure that we have a strong legislative and executive power. Erk stands for a cardinal reform of judicial power and for independence of judges and their responsibility before the law12 […] Erk proposes direct elections by secret ballot of republican and local government bodies. Every five years people must elect the president and vice-president (for no more than two terms) and a parliament of no more than 200 members who should be chosen among specialists competent in law-making. Self-governing fully-empowered executive bodies must be elected in districts, cities, towns and rural areas. Their members should be elected based on party platforms, or from lists of candidates presented by political parties or a bloc of independent citizens. Self-government bodies should adopt independent decisions and be fully responsible to their voters. The independence of oblasts should be significantly extended. [A strong self-government] should become the key element of the political mechanism of a state governed by law […] At present, Erk’s primary task is to participate in the coming general multi-party elections. Its aim is to form a strong democratic bloc that would be able to ensure the success of radical reforms and the creation of a state governed by law. In order to achieve this, it is important first of all to ensure the victory of democratic forces in the election, With this in mind, Erk may join provisional or permanent blocs of any democratic parties or movements sharing the same goals. At this transitional stage, Erk proposes to adopt a provisional constitution, which would […] create political and legislative preconditions for democratic reform. A provisional constitution adopted on the basis of universal human values and respect for the rights of the individual should at least ensure the following: a) supremacy of law and separation of power; b) freedom of political association; c) the basic principles of election law; […] Erk stands for early elections on a multi-party basis under international supervision in order to avoid the possible falsifying of election results. It is also expedient to conduct referendums in order to take into account public opinion, and not only the opinion of politically active citizens. The above actually means creating new power structures, […] liquidating Soviet power in its existing form, and creating a state governed by law, with separation of powers […]

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Tasks in the Economic and Social Security Spheres […] Normal market relations are unimaginable without private property and free entrepreneurship. All enterprises should function according to the principles of the free market. This implies abolishing monopolies and state ownership of means of production, lifting restrictions on economic activity, adopting legislation on transforming forms of ownership and legal protection of private property. Erk intends to include land, estate and personal property as marketable goods in order to create a real market and avoid an imbalance between the supply of goods and the money available. The optimal solution to the problem is to sell everything that can be sold, preferably by issuing shares. Privatization should be implemented first in the services and commerce, state farming, and enterprises operating at a loss or with a small return […] From Erk’s point of view, there should be full equality of all forms of ownership guaranteed by the constitution. Land may be handed over as joint-stock property to groups of those who wish to till it, upon agreement with local government bodies. Market economy means establishing direct relations between suppliers and consumers; it eliminates the need for rationing and distribution exercised by state agencies […] It is necessary to sharply reduce the number of subsidized enterprises. […] State subsidies to heavy industry should be re-diverted to granting credits to state and private producers of consumer goods, to the development of exporting potential and to the import of goods not produced in our country. The state, including local government bodies, should implement only such nonprofitable programmes as subsidies to culture and education, development of infrastructure, social security and medical programmes for the needy, law-enforcement agencies and a minimal government apparatus. The state control of production and services should be reduced to establishing a minimum wage and prices controls and to introducing differential taxation and other economic levers that would stimulate the production of high-tech quality goods. The efficient stimuli of initiative and entrepreneurship and of high earnings, should be combined with a system of social security. It is necessary to develop an economically feasible insurance system, which should be financed by corresponding organizations and enterprises, and to introduce a uniform tax as the main source of financing social security programmes by the state. These measures would require making an inventory of all state budget items […] Erk will promote market relations, private property and freedom of entrepreneurship as the basis of economic law and order of any society; it will act in order to sway public opinion in favour of entrepreneurship as the main source of the nation’s well-being. Operating Principles of the Erk Democratic Party In its activity, Erk will abide by the constitution, and defend its position by democratic, parliamentary means, and will not allow political struggle to overstep the limits of the law. As an organized political force, Erk intends to consolidate its efforts in seeking a way out of the country’s crisis. The activity of its members is directed towards participating in election campaigns that should be carried out on a multi-party basis under international

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supervision, taking part in the work of the parliament and local government bodies, and maintaining close links with all democratic forces […] Erk’s political activity will be realistic, with adherence to universal moral values. Erk strives to achieve a harmonious merging of its political line with universal human interests and fruitful cooperation of all democratic forces in improving the power structures and the national economy. Erk will avoid bitter confrontations, which may lead to tragedy and merciless struggle; it will reject class and ideological hatred […] Erk is distinguished from other parties and movements by its striving for mutual understanding, and by its consideration of all sober opinions and ideas that express the interests of the majority of the population. The criterion here is its readiness to defend the interests of a single individual rather than those of society as a whole, or of a certain social group. In addition to the above, Erk will wage an unrelenting struggle against totalitarianism, and against diktat by the authorities, which still embody the administrative bureaucratic system. Of course, one has to learn democracy. It is a difficult task. In order to do this, each person has to learn tolerance for the opinion of others, consideration and civic culture.13 Source: Erk 1, April 1990. NOTES 1. Pravda Vostoka, 1 Jan. 1992. 2. Erk 22, 17–23 July 1992. 3. Nezavisimaia gazeta, 22 July 1992. 4. Ekspress khronika, 8 April 1994. 5. Tsentral’naia Aziia 6 (1996), p. 60. 6. Bitig, 12 Jan. 1997. 7. Erk defined itself as a parliamentary party striving to achieve its programme’s aims solely through parliamentary activity. This was one cause of the differences between Erk and Birlik (Nezavisimaia gazeta, 28 July 1992). 8. In the former Soviet Union, travelling abroad was heavily restricted in practice. Passports were issued only by permission of the party and KGB authorities. 9. Each union republic, including Uzbekistan, had a foreign ministry. In fact, however, the right to maintain relations with countries outside the USSR was strictly limited. After independence, Uzbekistan quickly established diplomatic relations with many countries. 10. In the former Soviet Union, citizens were required to supply employer recommendations for various purposes, including getting a job, travelling abroad and obtaining accommodation. 11. Communist organizations for children and youth aged 7 to 28. Oktiabriata encompassed the 7–9 age group, Pioneers, 9–14 and Komsomol members, 14–28. 12. Soviet judges and public prosecutors were dependent on the Communist Party organs, despite constitutional guarantees of their independence. 13. The party rules and programme were adopted at Erk’s second congress held in Tashkent on 3 February 1991.

INTER-ETHNIC UNION OF THE PEOPLES OF UZBEKISTAN (INTERSOIUZ) INTRODUCTION The Inter-ethnic Union of the Peoples of Uzbekistan, generally known as ‘Intersoiuz’ was formed in October 1989. It was initially comprised of Russian-speaking workers at major industrial enterprises in Tashkent and members of the technical and creative intelligentsia. It maintained its own press organ, Vestnik Intersoiuza. The union was established with the support of party organizations which regarded it as a counterweight to the Birlik Popular Movement. Its declared aims included active support for perestroika and easing inter-ethnic tensions by establishing a dialogue with all political movements.1 Intersoiuz was denied official status and its activities were restricted in every way. This aroused discontent in its ranks and evoked growing criticism of party and state bodies by its leaders, V.Berezovskii and Sergei Tatur, until it was forced to dissolve itself on 6 September 1991.2

DECLARATION The Inter-ethnic Union of the Peoples of Uzbekistan (Intersoiuz) is an independent public political organization established in accordance with articles 7, 9 and 51 of the Constitution of the USSR.3 Its establishment meets a need that has arisen in society to recruit representatives of different social strata and groups to provide protection against aggressive influences generated by nationalism, chauvinism, bureaucracy and corruption. Crises in the economic and social spheres, numerous violations of social justice and the increase of inter-ethnic tension, which have been triggered by the provocative activity of conservative, reactionary, antiperestroika forces, threaten the future development of the democratic transformations begun under perestroika. Only a broad civil initiative based on healthy social elements is capable of preserving and developing the victory of perestroika, and ensuring that the country will move along a path of democracy and progress. In its activity, Intersoiuz relies, first and foremost, on responsive and organized representatives of the working class, the intelligentsia, the working peasantry, students and members of cooperatives. Intersoiuz’s primary aim is to protect and give greater momentum to perestroika in the republic, and contribute to an early transformation of the USSR into a democratic, lawgoverned state, which could reliably guarantee human rights and social justice to all on the basis of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Considering the situation in Uzbekistan after the Fergana events4 and the growing discomfort felt by people who are compelled to live in an atmosphere of inter-ethnic

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tension, Intersoiuz has established the following priorities: expression in daily life of the ideas of equality, friendship among peoples, internationalism and protection of citizens against the extremist designs of nationalist trends and groups driven by nationalist, antiSoviet, anti-Russian and anti-Uzbek views. Intersoiuz resolutely opposes the political activities of individuals and organizations which instigate racial, national and class enmity and the coercion of individuals, work collectives and peoples. It resolutely condemns actions which contradict universal human values and joins the battle against such actions by exposing and defusing centres of interethnic tension. It expresses its solidarity and readiness for cooperation with all democratic public organizations which base their activities on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It believes that a successful resolution of socio-economic and ecological problems can only be achieved through the joint efforts of the peoples of the USSR within the framework of a single federated state. Intersoiuz is open to citizens of all nationalities, irrespective of sex, age, creed, party affiliation, etc.; in its work it will be guided by the principles of democracy, openness and public access to information, and by the provisions of the USSR constitution. In the sphere of Uzbekistan’s socio-economic development, Intersoiuz has set itself the task of drafting, supporting and implementing programmes which ensure a rapid reduction of social tensions in the republic, on the basis of accelerated development of production and improvement of industrial relations, expansion of economic, commercial and other ties between Uzbekistan and the rest of the country, and improving the standard of living of the republic’s population. Intersoiuz considers it imperative that: – the economy be reoriented towards the people’s needs, while industrial relations at factories and building sites and in the fields should stimulate initiative and bring back the creative, responsible and honest attitude to work that has been lost; – the approach to ownership be changed so that the producers themselves—labour collectives, cooperatives or individuals—have the right to control the means of production, the goods produced and profits as they see fit; – new technologies be introduced and free enterprise zones established to combine our considerable manpower resources with the capital and technologies of the world’s most industrialized countries; – land be allotted for unrestricted use to every peasant wishing to engage in individual farming; – the cotton monoculture system be gradually and systemically abolished, and cottongrowing be made economically viable (with the establishment of a free market for cotton fibre); emphasis should be placed on food crops most suited to our region—vegetables, fruit, grapes—and on the creation of modern facilities for their storage and processing; our requirements in cereals, metal, timber, fuel, and meat and dairy produce should be met by barter trade with other republics. In the sphere of political reform, Intersoiuz sees its task as contributing in every way possible to the establishment of democratic self-government, struggling for the abolition of the bureaucratic system of governing the state and the nomenklatura system of appointments, and fighting bureaucracy, corruption and nepotism. Intersoiuz nominates candidates to the Soviets of People’s Deputies and other public organizations and carries out programmes and initiatives aimed at achieving social

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harmony and closer inter-ethnic and inter-regional ties. It reacts vigorously to negligence or unlawful actions on the part of bodies of state power and their agencies when fulfilling their duties. It expresses its distrust of specific officials who have compromised themselves and demands that they be replaced. Intersoiuz is particularly involved in preventing encroachment of citizens’ rights on the grounds of nationality, sex, age, creed, party affiliation, etc. and directly participates in the resolution of conflicts. In such cases it is guided by the law and the principles of social justice. In the sphere of inter-ethnic relations, Intersoiuz emphasizes strengthening friendship and cooperation among citizens of all nationalities and fostering respect for the language, traditions, customs and way of life of people of the indigenous nationality. Nevertheless, Intersoiuz believes that in the specific circumstances of Uzbekistan, which has not passed through the capitalist stage of development,5 making Uzbek the official language while lowering the status of other languages, and primarily of the Russian language, is fraught with potential danger to the tangible achievements of the republic during the years of Soviet power. Intersoiuz whole-heartedly supports the demand of the peoples deported to Uzbekistan during the period of Stalinist repression that their rights be fully restored in respective autonomous formations.6 At the same time, people who, for historical reasons, have linked their fate and that of their children to Uzbekistan, should enjoy all civil rights defined in the Declaration of Human Rights. Intersoiuz promotes the positive experience of building inter-ethnic relationships which has been accumulated in the USSR over the years of its existence. In the sphere of ecology, Intersoiuz considers as its tasks of international importance the conservation, restoration and improvement of the environment, and supports curtailing harmful technologies and banning projects which damage it. It is necessary to put an end to the low standard of living and turn Uzbekistan into a flourishing society in which people trust and respect one another. The Intersoiuz of the Peoples of Uzbekistan calls upon scholars, specialists and workers in all spheres of the republic’s economy, through their ideas and concrete activities, to make a substantial contribution to curing Uzbekistan’s ills, and invites into its ranks all those who cherish tradition, mutual understanding, good-will and compassion, who strive to preserve peace and harmony in the republic’s multinational family of peoples, who care for the well-being of women and children, and who are concerned about the happiness of the present and future generations. The declaration was endorsed by the organizing committee of the Intersoiuz of the Peoples of Uzbekistan in a meeting on 18 August 1989 in Tashkent. Source: Uzbekistan: Etnopoliticheskaia panorama. Ocherki, Dokumenty. Materialy, Vol. 1 (Moscow, 1994), pp. 272–4. NOTES 1. Tatur, ‘Vmeste podnimat’ Uzbekistan’, p. 11. 2. Molodezh’ Uzbekistana, 12 Sept. 1991. 3. These articles of the Soviet Constitution of 1977 concern the establishment and activity of public organizations—Konstitutsiia Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik (Moscow, 1977), pp. 8, 9, 23.

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4. See Birlik, note 3. 5. According to Soviet economic theory, the Central Asian republics and some underdeveloped countries, for example, Mongolia, had arrived at socialism from feudalism without passing through the capitalist stage of development. 6. Reference is to the Crimean Tatars, Germans, and other deported peoples, who had autonomy prior to World War II. The Koreans and Meskhetian Turks who were deported to Central Asia did not have autonomous status prior to the war.

ISLAMIC RENAISSANCE PARTY OF UZBEKISTAN INTRODUCTION The appearance of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) in Uzbekistan, as in other Muslim-populated Soviet republics, was a result of the liberalization of political life in the Gorbachev period. In 1989 so-called underground Islam became very active in the Soviet Union; new mosques and religious schools were opened and registered by the local authorities in accordance with the new government policy towards religion.1Among other things, the period of perestroika was characterized by the increased involvement of Muslim religious figures in the political sphere. In 1989 a Qurultay (congress) of Muslims of Central Asia was held. Its decisions demonstrated that Islam was becoming a political force in the USSR.2 The first constituent conference of the All-Union Islamic Renaissance Party was held on 9 July 1990 in the southern Russian city of Astrakhan.3 In the years 1989–92 the Islamic movement in Uzbekistan gained strength. The mufti of Uzbekistan, Muhammad Sadiq Muhammad Yusuf,4 rejected secular models of development such as the Turkish one as unacceptable for Uzbekistan,5 and some Islamic radicals even proposed creating a Muslim state—Islamistan.6 Islamic groups were especially active in the cities of the Fergana Valley: Namangan, Andijan and Fergana. As of 1989, these groups coordinated their efforts in order to reopen closed mosques, to build new mosques and madrasas, and to publish Islamic books and pamphlets.7 In 1990 an attempt was made to create a legal Islamic Renaissance Party in Uzbekistan, affiliated with the All-Union IRP. The founders applied to the Tashkent authorities for permission to convene a first constituent conference of the IRP at YangiYol in Tashkent Oblast. The group also informed the authorities of their decision to convene a republican party conference on 26–27 January 1991.8 Permission was not granted, despite the fact that by that time a branch of the IRP had been officially registered in neighbouring Tajikistan. The Uzbek authorities accused the Islamic activists of being Wahhabis, who opposed a secular state.9 They said that they would not allow the existence of political parties created on either an ethnic or a religious basis,10 thus, effectively precluding the IRP from official registration. Nevertheless, it continued to exist clandestinely. Its leader was Abdullah Uta, head of the founding Tashkent group.11 IRP membership was estimated to be about 50,000.12 The power of this party lay in its structure, which was based on the traditional Uzbek neighbourhood community, the mahalla, centred around the local mosque.13 The IRP leaders strove to restore certain Uzbekistani traditions, including the concentration of secular and religious power in one office, the emir of Bukhara having also been the highest spiritual authority.

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Some religious youth organizations were apparently affiliated with the IRP. Operating under the tutelage of the aksakals, the community elders, cells consisted of 100–200 members. By the beginning of 1992, there were about 60 such cells.14 As the influence of these organizations increased, the Uzbek authorities took repressive measures against them. The first wave of arrests of IRP and Adolat activists across the country took place on 17 March 1992, followed by another at the end of April.15 Nevertheless, while intent on keeping the Muslim community out of politics, the Uzbek authorities tried to cooperate with it and to control its activities. To this end a special government body, the Committee for Religious Affairs was created, modelled on the Soviet Council for Religious Affairs.16 In December 1997, after the religiously-based disturbances in Namangan, which resulted in the killing of four militiamen, the Uzbek authorities toughened legislation on religion. Membership in nonregistered political organizations and religious activity without the authorities’ approval became subject to criminal prosecution. The ban on the activity of the Islamic Renaissance Party, as well as other religious political organizations, led to the appearance of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which was based mainly in Afghanistan and Tajikistan. It included many political and religious figures from the IRP and from other Islamic organizations. In September 1999, the IMU declared ‘jihad on the Tashkent regime’, and stated that its goal was to ‘restore an Islamic state to Uzbekistan and to liberate some 50,000 Muslims from Karimov’s dungeons’.17 President Karimov implicitly targeted the IRP when he accused the Islamists of organizing the February 1999 terrorist attacks in in Tashkent, in which 15 people were killed and more than 150 wounded.18

PROGRAMME The IRP’s aims are as follows: 1. To explain to the people the real meaning of the Holy Qur’an and Hadith and to call the people to live and act according to the Qur’an and Hadith. 2. To create its own publishing house. 3. To extol Islam throughout the mass media. 4. To fight, through understanding and persuasion, national and racial discrimination, crime, alcoholism, and all other things which are forbidden by the Shari’a. 5. To educate young people in the principles of Islam and, for this purpose, to create instruction and training centres and madrasas. 6. To insure that the rights of all Muslims are exercised according to the Qur’an. 7. To strengthen Islamic brotherhood, to develop religious relationships with the Muslim world, and to strive for equal relations with representatives of other religions. 8. To cooperate with other democratic parties and state organizations in all fields. 9. To create charitable foundations that will support anyone in need of help. 10. To support educational and scientific progress, which is to be independent and free of the command system and ideological restrictions.

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11. To strengthen the family according to the principles of Islam and to insure the rights of women and children. 12. To ensure the principles of an Islamic economy and regain ecological purity. 13. To ensure the distribution of food in society according to the Shari’a. 14. To solve the problems of people according to the Holy Qur’an and Hadith. Adopted on 16 December 1990 Source: A. Abduvakhitov, ‘Islamic Revivalism in Uzbekistan’, Russia’s Muslim Frontiers. New Directions in Cross-Cultural Analysis, ed. by Dale. F.Eickelman (Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 96–7. NOTES 1. In 1988–89 the number of registered mosques in Uzbekistan tripled from 84 to 250 (Khalmukhamedov, ‘Islamskii faktor v Uzbekistane’, p. 51). By March 1999 their number had reached 1310 (Babadzhanov, Terganskaia dolina, istochnik ili zhertva islamskogo fundamentalizma’, p. 128). 2. For instance, at the 1989 Qurultay of the Central Asian Muslims, the participants issued an appeal that religious instruction be introduced in schools. They also demanded the establishment of diplomatic relations with all Muslim countries (Khalmukhamedov, ‘Islamskii faktor v Uzbekistane’, p. 53). 3. Abduvakhitov, ‘Islamic Revivalism in Uzbekistan’, p. 85 4. Educated in Bukhara, Tashkent and Libya, he became mufti in 1989. Although not a political activist, Sadiq was elected to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Because he had contacts with the Libyan authorities, relations between the official Islamic leadership in Uzbekistan and the rest of the Muslim world became strained. Later he ran afoul of the Islamic Renaissance Party when he said that the Muslim community was Allah’s single party and therefore there was no need for other parties. This statement led to a split between some activists and Sadiq’s group (Abduvakhitov, ‘Islamic Revivalism in Uzbekistan’, p. 87). 5. Khalmukhamedov, ‘Islamskii faktor v Uzbekistane’, p. 53. 6. Umanskii and Arapov, ‘Svetskii islamizm: variant Uzbekistana’, p. 111. 7. In 1999, more than one-third of all the mosques in Uzbekistan were located in the Fergana Valley, which included no more than one-fifth of the total population of Uzbekistan (Babadzhanov, ‘Ferganskaia dolina’, p. 128). 8. Abduvakhitov, ‘Islamic Revivalism in Uzbekistan’, p. 85. 9. Wahhabism is one of the branches of Islam. Its founder, Muhammad ibn Abd-alWahhab, preached in the Arabian peninsula in the 18th century. He appealed to Muslims to return to the original Islamic path, insisting on adherence only to Qur’anic principles and rejecting later innovations in Islam. Wahhabism is currently the dominant branch of Islam in Saudi Arabia. 10. Concerning the Law on Political Parties which prohibited the creation of parties on an ethnic or political basis, see Introduction to Uzbekistan. 11. Abduvakhitov, ‘Islamic Revivalism in Uzbekistan’, p. 86. 12. Khalmukhamedov, ‘Islamskii faktor v Uzbekistane’, p. 54. 13. In the opinion of IRP chairman Muhammad Sharif Himmatzoda, Islam was inseparable from politics. His position is reflected in the following statement:

‘It is well known that mosques generally played an important role in Islamic history. They were also the centres of Islamic policy. The mosque was also the place which accumulated knowledge. It played

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both the role of a madrasa and a place for praying. It was also a place where decisions were made on the problems of the Muslim community. It was a centre of political life. It would be a mistake to deprive the mosque of its status of a political organization. Now it is high time that the mosque be given back its former significance […] Islam is a religion. Islam is a state. It exists not only in order to call people to pray. Islam must actively intervene in all spheres of life, politics, economy, etc.’ (Abduvakhitov, ‘Islamic Revivalism in Uzbekistan’, p. 86). 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid., pp. 54–5. 16. Ibid., p. 53. 17. Bibikova, ‘Batken: nastuplenie islamskogo ekstremizma’, p. 39. 18. Matveeva, ‘Ugroza islamizma v post-sovetskoi Evrazii’, p. 99.

OFTOBI SUGDIEN INTRODUCTION Oftobi Sugdien (The Sun of Sogdiana)1 was founded in October 1989 as a national cultural centre for Tajiks living in the city of Bukhara. The national-state delineation in the 1920s placed many regions where Tajiks predominated, including the ancient centres of Tajik culture Samarkand and Bukhara, and the Tajik ASSR, in Uzbekistan. After the separation of the Tajik ASSR from the Uzbek SSR in 1929, the cities of Bukhara and Samarkand remained in Uzbekistan. The establishment of the centre reflected the growing national consciousness of the Tajik population of Uzbekistan under the impact of the reforms of the Gorbachev period. While striving for the preservation and development of the Tajik language and of Tajik culture and traditions, the centre did not support demands for placing regions populated mainly by Tajiks under Tajikistan’s jurisdiction.

PROGRAMME Finding a cardinal solution to the problem of inter-ethnic relations is a major task in the restructuring of socialist society. This thesis is central to the activities of the cultural centre now being set up. The Tajiks are known to be the indigenous population of Bukhara. Outstanding Tajik-speaking poets, writers, historians and scholars include Rudaki,2 who was the first in this constellation, Abu Ali ibn Sina,3 Narshakhi,4 Shokhin,5 A.Donish,6 S.Aini,7 Jalol Ikromi8 and others. The cultural centre of the Tajik-speaking population of Bukhara, which is hereby established, has set itself the aim of preserving and advancing the national language, culture, traditions and customs and facilitating the revelation of the potential of the Tajikspeaking population in various spheres of the oblast’s economy […] 4. Working together with statistical agencies, the centre will, in the course of 1990, complete a sociological survey and compile a map of regions with dense Tajik populations. This survey should provide data on the size, age breakdown, education and professions of the population, its migrations, its ethnography, its knowledge of Tajik, the number of teachers and cultural workers, and the demand for them with a view to using them in Tajik cultural and educational activities and in education.9 5. The cultural centre renders material and moral assistance to young Tajik poets, writers and artists as well as to low income families. 6. The cultural centre studies and submits to the executive committees of local soviets, proposals on restoring the now forgotten names of streets and naming new squares,

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streets and avenues after famous thinkers and revolutionaries who were our fellow countrymen. 7. To urge scholars, writers, and journalists to study the activities of famous revolutionaries, people who took part in overthrowing the [Bukharan] emirate and fought in the Civil and Great Patriotic War, as well as the works of our compatriots who excelled in the literature and arts of Tajiks, Uzbeks and other peoples of our country. 8. To establish a propaganda group within the framework of the centre which will give lectures in Tajik on various topics: Tajik language and literature, poetry and histoiy. 9. To establish contacts with cultural centres in Samarkand and Tajikistan for an exchange of practical experience. […] Source: Uzbekistan: Etnopoliticheskaia panomma. Ocherki. Dokumenty. Materialy, Vol. 1 (Moscow, 1994), pp. 207–10. NOTES 1. See Introduction to Uzbekistan, n. 9 2. Abu Abdallah Husayn Jafar Rudaki (860–941), a Tajik Persian poet and resident of Bukhara. 3. Ibn Sina Ali Husayn ibn Abdallah (980–1037), physician and philosopher known in Europe as Avicenna. 4. Abu-Bakr Muhammad ibn Narshakhi (889–959), historian of Central Asia. His most famous work was A History of Bukhara. 5. Shokhin (1857–93), satirical poet; one of his best-known poems criticized the rule of the Bukharan emir. 6. Donish, Ahmad Mahdum ibn Nosir (1827–97), Tajik writer, philosopher, historian and spiritual leader. Drafted reforms in the Bukhara Emirate restricting the power of the emir by an advisory body. His main work was A Short History of the Manghit Emirs of Bukhara the Noble. 7. Pseudonym of Sadriddin Said Murojoda (1878–1954), Tajik writer. Took part in the Jadid movement of the nationalistically-minded liberal intelligentsia of the Bukharan Emirate who favoured socio-economic reforms which would pave the way to capitalism. In 1920 he took part in overthrowing the emir, and sometime later joined the communists. He was the first president of the Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences. He was the author of A History of the Manghit Dynasty Emirs, Memoirs and Dokhunda. 8. Ikromi, Jalol (b. 1909), contemporary Tajik writer; author of Shodi and Daughter of the Fire. 9. According to the 1989 census, the number of Tajiks living in Uzbekistan was 931,547, or about 5 per cent of the total population of the country (Natsional’nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR, Vol. 2, p. 64). The Tajiks do not recognize the validity of the official data on the population of Bukhara and Samarkand, according to which the majority of the population are Uzbeks.

PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC PARTY INTRODUCTION The ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) was established on 1 November 1991. By creating this party, the Uzbekistan leadership was attempting to set up a ruling party that would inherit the infrastructure and principles of the former Communist Party. The party’s name was designed to conceal its connection with the former Communist Party and to impute a democratic character to the party and the republic as a whole. As of March 1993, it had 337,000 members, mostly former communists.1 A total of 12,000 party cells were active in 30 towns, 11 urban and 173 rural districts. Islam Karimov, who in 1989–91 was first secretary of the Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee, was chairman of the party from its inception. Mahmud Rasulov was first secretary of the Central Council.2 In the December 1991 elections, Karimov was elected president, with 86 per cent of the vote,3 and his party obtained a majority in the parliament. Karimov declared that he would set a course towards a multi-party democratic state, privatization and a free market economy. In fact, however, the People’s Democratic Party became the only strong political party in Uzbekistan. Despite the democratic principles proclaimed in the constitution, Karimov found ways to obstruct the opposition parties (mainly Erk and the Islamic Renaissance Party), while cooperating with the Social Progress Party and Watan Taraqqiyoti, two other parties with similar programmes. As far as regional policy was concerned, Karimov sought to strengthen Uzbekistan’s position in Central Asia as a counterweight to the growing influence of Kazakhstan. The party published two newspapers, Uzbekiston Ovozi (in Uzbek) and Golos Uzbekistana (in Russian).

PROGRAMME […] I. HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE AND FUTURE PROSPECTS The policy of the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan is based on the best democratic traditions, the past experience of the people, universal human values, and consensual values of a broad stratum of the population. The party lays no claim to absolute truth in its understanding of the history of the peoples of the republic, condemns its arbitrary interpretation to suit political dogma and immediate considerations […]

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The party condemns the policy of administrative-bureaucratic diktat practised by the former federal bodies, which delegated to Uzbekistan the role of a raw material appendage of the USSR, and which did much harm to the republic and its people.4 The PDP does not identify this policy with the Russian people who have had more than their share of its consequences. We have not forgotten the positive things that have been achieved in Uzbekistan in the past 70 years due to the people’s selfless labour. We consider one of the greatest achievements to be the relations of friendship, goodneighbourliness and mutual aid among all the peoples of the FSU which have evolved in recent decades […] The People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan has defined its guiding principles as philanthropy and democracy, protection of human rights5 and of the interests of the working people and the socially vulnerable strata. We are in favour of achieving a political and state system that can guarantee every individual, freedom to choose his form of political, economic and social existence. This should be: – a society of political and economic freedom, democracy, equality and social justice; – a society in which equal access of its citizens to matters of state and society, and economic, cultural and political life is guaranteed; – a society in which there is equality of all forms of ownership and labour, of all forms of entrepreneurship and competition, and in which ideology is separated from the economic sphere; – a society in which employment and a minimum standard of living are guaranteed, first and foremost, to the elderly and to children, to pensioners and the handicapped, large families, students and people in the low-income bracket; – a society in which there would be no such thing as a dominant ideology or a dominant world outlook, in which freedom of speech and conscience, universal human morals and humanism would be guaranteed, in which there would be progress in education, and in which the traditions, customs, beliefs, and the language and culture of all the peoples living in the republic’s territory would be respected. The party sees the path to this kind of society primarily through securing social concord, and nation-wide and inter-ethnic concord, and maintaining law and order in all circumstances. II. STRENGTHENING THE REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN AS A STATE AND SECURING IT A WORTHY PLACE IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY On 31 August 1991,6 a new page was opened in the history of Uzbekistan. Since that day our republic has been, and will continue in future to be the master of its own destiny. The People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan welcomes this epoch-making development and urges consistent implementation of the constitution on the basis of the independent statehood of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The party advocates unconditionally securing the right of the sovereign people of the Republic of Uzbekistan to determine independently their path towards state, legal, economic, cultural and political development. It stands for the most extensive use of Uzbek as the official language, for the territorial integrity and inviolability of the republic’s borders, and respect for the sovereignty of the Karakalpak Republic, which has voluntarily remained part of Uzbekistan.7

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The party will strive for reliable protection and expansion of the republic’s national resources and property, which form the material basis of state independence, including its land and underground resources, natural wealth, flora and fauna, scientific, economic and cultural potential and the fruits of its economic activity. The party would like the republic to be able to pursue its own monetary and fiscal policy, including control over the extraction, processing and accumulation of gold and other precious metals and stones, and the establishment of state gold and hard currency reserves. The People’s Democratic Party would like to see the Republic of Uzbekistan recognized by the international community as an independent republic. It wants it to be a member of the United Nations and other prestigious international organizations, an independent and equal entity in international relations which sets its foreign policy course in the interests of the people. The party considers it necessary to contribute to the promotion of equal and mutually advantageous, direct political, economic and cultural ties with the other sovereign republics [of the USSR] and to assist in restoring, strengthening and developing the traditional, historicallydetermined links between the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, and to promote their cooperation in addressing regional issues of common interest. It stands for a free confederation of sovereign states operating in a single economic space and coordinating their foreign policy actions aimed at preserving peace and saving humanity from nuclear threats and ecological disasters. The party advocates carrying out a defensive military policy coordinated with the other states of the union, which is in the interests of the republic’s national security. The People’s Democratic Party advocates the development and fortification of humanitarian ties with countrymen living abroad, granting them the right to take part in the republic’s cultural life and in the implementation of economic and social programmes. The party is open to cooperation and direct ties with foreign parties and public movements of a democratic orientation. III. TO CREATE A CIVIL, DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY The People’s Democratic Party will strive to ensure that state policy is always directed at civil and ethnic harmony. It welcomes the preparation of the constitution of independent Uzbekistan and favours the creation of equal conditions for all citizens of the republic, irrespective of their nationality, social status or origin, beliefs and views, to exercise their constitutional rights and freedoms, including the right to preserve and develop their distinct cultural traditions, to educate their children in their native language, satisfy their religious requirements and maintain contacts with their historical mother country. The party’s guiding principle is to create a society governed by law and not by political vanity or waves of demonstrations. The party wants state and citizen to respect each other’s rights and be aware of their mutual responsibilities. The party stands firmly for strengthening government by the people and for increasing various forms of popular participation in the affairs of state and society. The party will gear its political activity towards building a lawgoverned state in which democracy and legality are secured by the division of power into the legislative, executive and judicial branches. The principle of secular power should be strictly

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observed as a basis of democracy. Laws and decrees passed democratically should be backed by citizens’ conscious respect for them and by strong central and local executive power. Legal protection of the interests of each citizen and of the state as a whole should be the responsibility of an independent, universally recognized and respected judicial system, with justice administered equally to all. The party believes that all healthy forces in society will join in fighting lawlessness, and crime, especially organized crime, and the sources that breed them. IV. FOR AN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY ORIENTED TOWARDS THE INDIVIDUAL, TOWARDS MARKET RELATIONS AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SPECIFIC CONDITIONS AND TRADITIONS OF UZBEKISTAN The People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan holds that there can be no political independence without economic independence. Economic policy should be geared to the requirements of each individual, his family, the people as a whole, and the various strata of the population. It should be based on the premise that ‘prosperity of the family makes for prosperity of the state’. The party favours seeking new ways to overcome the socioeconomic crisis and a creative approach to the routes already charted. It advocates a transition to a market economy, taking into account Uzbekistan’s socio-economic, historical and demographic development, and the traditional way of life of the majority of the people in the republic. The party maintains that well-thought-out approaches and purposeful reforms, which respond, first and foremost, to the interests and requirements of the people, are needed in building market relationships. It advocates an economy based on various forms of ownership and the right of all forms of ownership to exist side by side, encouragement of healthy entrepreneurship and private initiative, and wider use of material incentives to increase people’s motivation to make their work highly productive. The party considers that important preconditions for building an economy with multiple forms of ownership and market relationships are the expansion of private ownership, making people genuinely the masters of the means of production and the fruits of their labour, and the denationalization and privatization of public property, to be effected under strict public control. The state should retain control over the basic industries, air and railroad transport and the major means of communications. In all other branches, favourable conditions should be created for the extensive development of stockholding, collective, cooperative and private enterprises, with hired workers having adequate social security and the activities of such enterprises supervised by the state. Land should be leased or made available through open-ended use and ownership, with the right given to pass it down through inheritance. Public, cooperative, collective and individual peasant farms should have equal rights.8 The party favours giving priority to a thorough restructuring of the economy. The lopsided, raw-material orientation of the economy, which is a legacy of the totalitarian regime, should be redirected as quickly as possible. Uzbekistan should effect a radical transformation and create a specialized complex of industries, whose production is geared to meet consumer demand […] and plants which make use of scientific and technical progress and state-of-the-art technologies to process

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raw materials into almost finished products, and carry out a well-thought-out and balanced conversion of enterprises belonging to the military-industrial complex.9 Special attention should be given to the accelerated training of skilled workers and specialists in order to create a national work force capable of mastering modern technologies and using universal experience in organizing production […] 10 The People’s Democratic Party opposes cotton monoculture and favours the creation of legal and economic conditions that would induce all parties involved in agricultural production to do their utmost to fulfil the requirements of the republic and its population in agricultural production.11 The party intends to contribute to a revival of folk handicrafts and arts and to the distinctive culture embodied in articles made by national masters. The party advocates a cautious attitude towards Uzbekistan’s native surroundings, maintaining the ecological balance in the environment, and resolving regional and global ecological problems on a scientific basis. The state should see to it that working conditions at hazardous enterprises are improved, anti-pollution technologies introduced, and constant and open monitoring of the environment conducted.12 The party believes that a successful solution of the accumulated problems will be facilitated by promoting and deepening equal and mutually advantageous cooperation between Uzbekistan and other republics which are members of an economic commonwealth comprising a single, economically integrated territory, and by taking coordinated action to end the crisis. The party considers it essential that the republic establish direct ties with foreign partners, and on a mutually advantageous and equal basis, negotiate with them on issues relating to scientific-technical, commercial, economic and cultural cooperation, setting up joint ventures, granting concessions and establishing free economic zones. All the legal and economic prerequisites for this should be created […] Guarantees of Social Welfare for the People—a Major Prerequisite for Transition to a Market Economy The party’s main goal is a life of dignity and social welfare for the people, and firm implementation of the principle of social justice. The role of the bodies of state power, as the party sees it, is to prevent the enrichment of some at the expense of others through an appropriate taxation policy, advantageous terms, dedicated investments and other economic levers. The party organizations will struggle to achieve a reliable system of social security for people in the lower income bracket and for the most vulnerable sections of the population. War and labour veterans should be a subject of great concern. They should be provided with normal living conditions and their pensions consistently raised in real terms. For these strata, rising living costs should be compensated by providing basic goods at lower prices, and by adjusting savings and incomes, including pensions, allowances and stipends, to inflation. Everyone should have access to the public health system, prophylactic treatment establishments, and reliable, high-quality medical services. Everyone should have equal rights to housing. During the transition to market relationships the party attaches special significance to the question of employment, the creation of jobs and protection against unemployment, primarily of younger people, within the framework of the employment programme launched by the republican authorities. The programme has been drafted bearing in mind

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the people’s way of life, the traditionally large families and people’s reluctance to change their habitual place of residence.13 The party views the improvement of the working and living conditions of the rural population as one of the major tasks of its social policy. The PDP will support an investment and credit policy directed at the social restructuring of rural communities, substantially improving water supplies and bringing gas to rural homes.14 Further increasing agricultural production on auxiliary and household plots should remain a major concern of the state […] Protection of Mother and Child—the Most Important Area of the Party’s Social Policy One of the problems which concerns the party most is improvement of the nation’s gene pool [genofond]. The means to resolve it should be outlined in a special state programme for the protection of mother and child. The party advocates a substantial increase in the level of medical services provided to mothers and children […]15 The party believes that the state should introduce a system guaranteeing employment and professional training for women, and improving their working and living conditions, so that they can combine childrearing with work and activity outside the home. The party organizations will fight to sharply reduce the number of women engaged in hard labour and harmful occupations and to develop the idea of cottage industry. Given appropriate conditions, they will insist on a shorter working week for mothers and fair compensation with respect to wages and pensions. The party attaches great importance to creating favourable conditions for helping young couples get established. We favour giving increased benefits to young families, granting them low-interest loans, and expanding and improving family hostels and housing projects for young people. The party institutions will fully support those work collectives which sponsor orphanages and large families and render them material assistance. The younger generation, which has imbibed our cultural and historical heritage, is the main pillar of support for scaling the heights of civilization and progress in Uzbekistan. The younger generation is destined to take the fate of the republic in its hands and lead it to progress and prosperity. The People’s Democratic Party intends to guarantee that the state of Uzbekistan will pursue a consistent and comprehensive policy to protect the interests of young people and create political, legal, economic and materialtechnical conditions, which will facilitate the social fulfilment of every young person as a free and harmonious individual […] The People’s Democratic Party holds that all young people, irrespective of their nationality, language and attitude to religion, should have equal access to secondary, professional, special and higher education. Schools which respond to various requirements of the population should be allowed to exist side by side with state schools. State and public schools should be totally secular in character. The party favours a sweeping reform of pre-school, general secondary school and higher education with a view to raising education to an international level and orienting it towards national traditions and the civic spirit. The scientific, personnel and material basis of the educational complex should be improved,16 social protection should be given to students and teachers, and traditional respect for the teaching profession restored.

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A priority of state policy should be the early identification of children with outstanding capabilities, establishing special schools for them, providing opportunities to talented young scientists and students to study at leading academic institutions inside and outside the country […] The independence of educational scientific institutions and their organizational diversity should be ensured […] V. FOR THE SPIRITUAL AND MORAL REBIRTH OF SOCIETY The People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan resolutely condemns the ideology of coercion with respect to individuals and peoples that has been imposed for decades. We renounce great-power chauvinism, nationalism and extremism. Policy, culture and interethnic relations should be based on universal standards of charity, justice, honesty and decency. Central to our world outlook is love of man, the well-being and happiness of the family and the ethnic group, love of one’s homeland, freedom and equality for all, and social justice—notions that are simple and clear to everyone […] The party resolutely condemns de-personalizing approaches to national spirituality which were condoned in the past, and will work for a revival of Uzbek national distinctiveness and Uzbek culture. However, the revival of national distinctiveness must not be accompanied by isolation from the universal cultural heritage. The party believes that all works of art and manuscripts produced by Uzbek men of genius and illegally transported out of the republic, should be returned to it.17 We favour the preservation and restoration of historical relics, and full implementation of the Meros (Heritage) national cultural programme.18 […] The party believes that society must reject simplistic notions of atheism and religion and pave the way for each person’s spiritual quest, encourage his aspirations for moral self-perfection and a free and deliberate choice of his spiritual orientation. We advocate the efficient use of our scientific-technical potential, establishing a system of legal protection of the republic’s intellectual property and authors’ rights. Uzbekistan’s sovereignty will improve the quality of our creative contacts with scientific teams and scientists of other republics and foreign countries […] The party stands for democratic transformations in the mass media, for illuminating a variety of points of view and opinions, while at the same time increasing the responsibility of journalists for the veracity and objectivity of the material they print and broadcast. VI. THE PARTY IN A CIVIL SOCIETY The People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan is confident that from now on political parties should not, under any circumstances, run the state. The party intends to attain political leadership in free competition with other public political forces by elaborating its programmes and presenting them to society. Acting in accordance with the law, it will nominate its candidates to the bodies of power and work to secure support for them and their election. We intend to pursue our political line through the party members elected to the bodies of state power and public selfgovernment. The party will build its relations with other public organizations on the principles of non-interference in their internal affairs, cooperation and competition, forming coalitions

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and making necessary compromises. It is open to cooperation and partnership with trade unions and other public organizations and movements, which advocate social justice and progress. The party favours granting women the right to choose their role in society, their participation in making decisions and implementing them at every level, and women’s equal representation in state and public organizations. In drafting and carrying out its youth policy, the party will strive for broad and fraternal cooperation with associations and movements of the younger generation, and will actively support youth organizations of a democratic orientation. The party is open to all those who accept its programme, both atheists and believers. It stands for a broad civic dialogue and cooperation with religious associations of different faiths for the sake of promoting universal, human, spiritual and moral values, peacemaking and charity. Source: Pravda Vostoka, 19 November 1991. NOTES 1. About three-fifths were workers and peasants, two-fifths belonged to the educated classes; about 56 per cent were aged between 30 and 50, 18 per cent were younger than 30 and 25 per cent were older than 50 (SWB, BBC, SU/1664 B/l6, 16 Apr 1993; APN Uzbekistan News Agency, Tashkent in Russian 9 March 1993). 2. Analogous to the Central Party Committee of the Communist Party. 3. The Referendum on Independence and Presidential Election in Uzbekistan, 29 Dec. 1991, p. 16. 4. Moscow’s policies had been loyally implemented by the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, whose leaders and members made up the core of the People’s Democratic Party. 5. In 1991, the republican Supreme Soviet ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Narodnoe slovo, 1 Sept. 1992). In spite of this and contrary to the programme, as the ruling party, the PDP shared responsibility for the persecution of the opposition, as seen in the authorities’ treatment of Erk and Birlik. 6. The day President Karimov officially declared the independence of Uzbekistan. 7. Karakalpakstan was incorporated into Uzbekistan as an autonomous republic (ASSR) in 1936. Under the new constitution of Uzbekistan adopted in 1992, Karakalpakstan became an autonomous republic within Uzbekistan (Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, p. 22). 8. According to one estimate, total land under personal plots increased from 110,000 hectares before independence to 630,000 hectares in 1994 (of which crop land amounted to 362,840 hectares). The limit on the size of the personal plot was increased varyingly from between 0.08 and 0.1 to 0.25 hectares per household. In 1994, about 10,408 private farms were actually in operation covering an area of 89,690 hectares or 8.6 hectares per farm. By 1994 these farms occupied two per cent of the sown land. See Azizur Rahman Khan, The Transition of Uzbekistan’s agriculture to a market economy’, Issues in Development Discussion Paper #14, and especially notes 16 and 17 there, http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/strat/publ/iddp14.htm. 9. In the Soviet era, in Uzbekistan, as well as in other Soviet republics, the most important industrial enterprises belonged to the military-industrial complex. It was at these enterprises that the majority of highly-skilled engineers, technicians, and workers were employed. They were surrounded by secrecy, and full data on them are still unavailable. Examples include the uranium-processing plants in the cities of Uch Kuduk and Navoiy, the Tashkent Aviation Factory, and others. 10. See Birlik, note 5.

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11. For cotton monoculture and its consequences, see Birlik, notes 13 and 15. 12. For Uzbekistan’s ecological problems, see Birlik, notes 21 and 22. 13. In 1990, the average family in rural Uzbekistan consisted of 6.2 people, almost twice the figure for Russia (3.2). This was one of the causes of the surplus work force and unemployment (Vestnik statistiki 6 (1990), pp. 78–9). The rural population of Uzbekistan (as well as in Tajikistan) was not inclined to move to urban areas. At the end of the 1980s, only 12 per cent of the able-bodied population of Uzbekistan was employed in industry (Ubaidullaeva, Minuia kapitalizm, p. 415). 14. In early 1990, gas was supplied to just 5 per cent of households in the rural parts of KashkaDarya Oblast and 2–3 per cent in Surkhan-Darya Oblast (Ziiamov, ‘Sovershenstvovat’ mezhnatsiona’lnye otnosheniia, ukrepliat’ druzhbu narodov’, p. 40). 15. In 1989, Uzbekistan was 13th among the 15 Soviet republics in infant mortality rate before the age of one year (Demograficheskii ezhegodnik SSSR, p. 382). 16. In 1987, over one-half of the schools in Uzbekistan were housed in premises not designed for that purpose; one in ten schools was in need of repairs; and there was a shortage of about 4,000 teachers (Ubaidullaeva, ‘Minuia kapitalizm’, p. 382). 17. See Birlik Popular Movement, note 7. 18. See Birlik Popular Movement, note 10.

SAMARKAND SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ASSOCIATION INTRODUCTION The Samarkand Social and Cultural Association (SCA) was established in March 1989 in the city of Samarkand. Initially, it was known by the name Saikal. Unlike the Bukharabased Oftobi Sugdien,1 the association claimed among its members not only Tajiks, but also Tajik-speaking Central Asian Jews, gypsies (Liuli), Arabs and Ironis.2 Supported by the educated élite, its stated aim was to combat discrimination against the Tajik population and its consequences.3 Immediately after its formation, the organization launched a campaign against the policy of the ‘uzbekization’ of Tajiks.4 Two years later the authorities made several concessions: they permitted Tajiks to change the nationality entry in their internal passports, Tajik classes were opened in schools and some programmes on Samarkand regional television were broadcast in Tajik. At the same time, however, they intensified persecution of the movement’s leaders. Uktam Bekmuhamedov, leader of its radical wing, was sentenced in 1991 to a suspended prison term and was re-arrested at the end of 1992. Another radical leader, Professor Jamol Mirsaidov, was fired from his post at Samarkand University.

PROGRAMME I. General Principles 1.1. Acting in accordance with the constitutions of the USSR and of the Uzbek SSR and acknowledging and implementing the principles of the Leninist nationalities policy being revived in the country as part of the process of perestroika, democratization and glasnost, the SCA strives to achieve genuine equality for Tajiks and Tajik-speaking ethnic groups of the Uzbek SSR in all spheres of human activity and social relationships. 1.2. The activities of the SCA are based on allegiance to internationalist ideals and recognition of the rights and freedoms of people of all nationalities and ethnic groups living in the USSR and the Uzbek SSR. Any manifestation of chauvinism or nationalism is incompatible with membership in the Samarkand SCA. 1.3. The ultimate goal of the formation and activity of the Samarkand SCA is the achievement of the economic, political, social, cultural and educational goals of perestroika in the enclaves populated mostly by Tajiks and Tajik-speaking ethnic groups. It is necessary to awaken and foster in these peoples a sense of national consciousness and pride, to instil a positive work ethic, to encourage concrete efforts to eradicate

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bureaucratic red tape, corruption and parochialism, to strengthen the unity of all democratic movements of the region and the country, to maintain discipline and law and order, and to transfer all power to democratically revived soviets of people’s deputies. II. Primary Goals and Tasks 2.1. Determining the genuine size of the Tajik and Tajik-speaking population of the city of Samarkand, the Samarkand region and the territory of the Uzbek SSR as a whole, by analyzing and verifying the results of the 1989 country-wide census.5 Legislative resolution of the question of changing incorrect nationality entries in passports, forms and other identification documents according to the will of the bearer. 2.2. Granting Tajik the status of official language in the enclaves populated mostly by Tajiks and Tajik-speaking ethnic groups. Simultaneously resolving the question of unhampered education of children and youth in their native Tajik language, publication of newspapers, magazines, textbooks and other literature as well as the broadcast of radio and television programmes in Tajik. Ensuring genuine and effective equality of the language, culture and traditions of the Tajiks and Tajik-speaking peoples in Uzbekistan. 2.3. Reviving former Tajik names of settlements, streets, and other sites, promoting national folk arts and crafts […] Protecting and restoring monuments of the past, and of the [Tajik] historical, cultural and ecological heritage. 2.4. Active participation in the nomination and election of respectable representatives of the people, including Tajiks, to the soviets of people’s deputies and in the formation and activity of the organs of state power. Rendering concrete assistance to deputies. Upon request of voters, to launch campaigns for recalling people’s deputies who have compromised themselves or betrayed the voters’ trust. 2.5. Active participation in the discussion, decision-making and implementation of economic and social development programmes for territories with a predominantly Tajikspeaking population, where Tajik and Uzbek are both spoken equally, and for the republic as a whole. Participation in formulating and introducing a regional costaccounting system, based on the idea of a ‘special economic zone’ with regard to the city of Samarkand and the surrounding area. 2.6. Fighting for its convictions, which derive from the interests of the people and the tasks of perestroika. Boycotting and vigorously opposing harmful, misguided and rash decisions, regardless of their source—even to the point of demanding national autonomy for the Tajiks and Tajik-speaking peoples in the Uzbek SSR, should all other constitutional means of achieving genuine equality for them be exhausted.6 2.7. Securing fair representation of Tajiks and Tajik-speaking peoples in the leadership of party, executive, public, research, academic and economic organizations and enterprises. Fighting to eliminate the causes and consequences of distortions in the party Leninist cadre policy.7 2.8. Searching for avenues of cooperation and using them to join forces with other formal and informal public democratic movements for the solution of common problems and the achievement of mutual goals. III. Towards the Implementation of Programmatic and Concrete Tasks

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In spheres of activity such as economic, social and national-cultural policy, education, training and grounding the younger generation in their native language, strengthening intra- and inter-ethnic relations and friendship among peoples, preserving architectural monuments and the environment, and implanting tolerance and charity in the population; securing guarantees of legal defence of the people’s national honour and dignity, and so on—the concrete tasks will be defined by the SCA on the basis of the present programme, taking into account the existing situation and public opinion. They will then be submitted for discussion and endorsement to the association’s general assembly. Source: Uzbekistan: Etnopoliticheskaia panorama. Ocherki. Materialy. Dokumenty (Moscow, 1994), pp. 199–202. NOTES 1. See Oftobi Sugdien in this volume. 2. The descendants of Persian merchants and slaves who had settled in Central Asia. 3. From the early 1930s up to the mid-1950s, Tajik classes and newspapers were available in Samarkand. They were gradually closed with the intensification of the discriminatory stand of the Uzbek leadership. 4. See Oftobi Sugdien, note 10 5. The size of Uzbekistan’s Tajik population according to the 1989 census (see Oftobi Sugdien, note 10) was disputed by the Samarkand Association, which claimed a figure of 3.5 million (Nezavisimaia gazeta, 22 Dec. 1992). 6. During the period of active confrontation with the authorities, from 1989 to 1991, the Samarkand Association took steps to organize civil disobedience campaigns. The leader of its radical wing, Uktam Bekmuhamedov, was arrested during one demonstration in December 1992 (Nezavisimaia gazeta, 22 Dec. 1992). 7. This points to the presence of discrimination against Tajiks in executive bodies. For example, in 1990, out of 497 deputies in the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR, there were only 13 Tajiks. In the lower-level soviets (local government bodies) Tajiks constituted 4.3 per cent of elected deputies (Tishkov, ‘Etnichnost’ i vlast’ v SSSR’, pp. 9, 15).

SOCIAL PROGRESS PARTY INTRODUCTION The party’s constituent congress was held in the first half of 1992. Its social base consisted of scientists, intellectuals and entrepreneurs. Led by Faizulla Iskhakov, the party supported the policies of President Islam Karimov, who had encouraged its establishment in order to create the semblance of a multi-party system. From the very beginning, party membership was not large, numbering about 2,000 as of early 1997.1

PROGRAMME I. General Provisions and Principles Perestroika, launched in April 1985 in the interests of the union centre, had neither any definite concept nor any concrete, long-term programme. It was implemented in a haphazard, impulsive fashion and it culminated in the disintegration of the Soviet Union […] Despite the fact that the social situation is relatively stable and the organs of power are trying to continue with political and economic reforms, taking into account local characteristics and the existing circumstances, the economic, moral and political situation is a cause of ever-growing concern to the multinational population of Uzbekistan. The Social Progress Party of Uzbekistan [PSP] believes it is time to formulate a new strategy and a new political course for implementing reforms. It stands to reason that preference should not be given to any one model, even if it is a model of a dynamically progressive foreign state. Uzbekistan has its own unique features, distinguishing it even from neighbouring states. Therefore optimal reforms for Uzbekistan should be based on a rational analysis of living conditions in the republic, and of the role of the cultural, national and historic traditions of the peoples of Uzbekistan, and on learning from the experience of the entire global community. […] II. The Immediate Goals of the Social Progress Party The PSP believes that arresting the decline in living standards, defusing social tensions, restoring and developing severed economic ties, revitalizing production and infrastructure, achieving financial stability, mobilizing intellectual potential, strengthening law-enforcement agencies, and preventing the commercialization of higher education, public health and culture, should be given priority in the policy and practice of all organs of power, political and non-governmental organizations, and the working collectives and businesses operating in Uzbekistan.

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Denationalization of property and privatization may boost production, help preserve the currently available number of jobs and create new ones, lift restrictions on the growth of wages, and accord the participants in the economic process the right to the fruits of their labour. The first step towards extricating the republic from the crisis should be the restoration of the domestic (republic) market. This requires legislation and efforts on the part of workers’ collectives and entrepreneurs to protect economic ties and production facilities (irrespective of the form of property) from incompetent intervention by the authorities, prompted by party or political considerations. Production and service facilities cannot function normally unless there are mutual agreements on prices and tariffs, stipulating guarantees for their fulfilment and penalties for violators. A policy aimed at the development of the consumer sector and an increase in export potential ought to be flexible and sensitive in order to preserve those structures where liquidation or cutbacks may trigger a sharp rise in unemployment. Utilities and other industries which are crucial to accomplishing structural changes are in need of substantial state support and tax exemptions for investments. Agrarian policy is central to overcoming the crisis in food and raw materials, improving the nutritional patterns of the population and the ecological situation, and normalizing the social situation in the countryside. For an agrarian policy to serve these aims, there should be various forms of land ownership in the countryside. Highly profitable kolkhozes and sovkhozes should be freed from the intervention of organs of power and their reorganization should be carried out according to the express will of their members. The social policy for the period of transition to a market economy should motivate the citizens’ socio-economic activity and prevent parasitic behaviour on the part of the ablebodied population. There must be a system of material and moral support in the republic for those who, for objective reasons, are unable to satisfy their minimum consumer and cultural needs through their own labour. Until the economic situation and the social position of the citizens have improved, wages, pensions, grants, lump payments, stipends and deposits in savings banks should be adjusted regularly to inflation. The size of pensions should be determined on the basis of a fair differential, taking into account not only seniority, but also previous labour contribution and record of service to society and the republic. Mothers and children require concrete material safeguards, especially in polluted regions. The economic costs of the transition period and a lack of attention on the part of state agencies preordained the existing dismal situation in public education, public health and science. Apart from being directed at training and retraining workers and finding employment for jobless able-bodied people, employment policy should serve as a means of defusing social tensions, reducing the crime rate and improving moral standards. Therefore, in addition to job creation measures now being taken in the republic, enterprises must be given legal possibilities to employ young people without a previous service record, mothers, the handicapped and pensioners. The funds allocated for social programmes should be exempt from taxes […]

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The building of nation-states in multi-ethnic Uzbekistan should proceed from the balance of the real interests of the Republic of Karakalpakstan and the regions of Uzbekistan. The new forms of relations in society must be reflected in the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The Republic of Karakalpakstan, as a national autonomous body within the Republic of Uzbekistan,2 should have more power than the regions, although they, too, should have the power to secure local self-government. The PSP of Uzbekistan supports a clear-cut division of legislative, executive and judicial powers, within the rule of law. At the same time, the PSP believes that the exercise of the universally recognized right of the peoples to self-determination should not run counter to civil rights, and should not stimulate isolationism or bias in foreign policy. Nor should the exercise of this right weaken or sever economic or spiritual ties with the states that were formerly part of the USSR […] Source: Uzbekistan: Etnopoliticheskaia panorama. Ocherki. Dokumenty. Materialy, Vol. 1 (Moscow, 1994), pp. 259–62. NOTES 1. Bitig, 12 Jan. 1997. 2. See People’s Democratic Party, note 7.

WATAN TARAQQIYOTI INTRODUCTION The constituent congress of the Watan Taraqqiyoti Party (Homeland Progress—WTP) was held in January 1993.1 At this congress, the party defined its orientation as leftcentrist. Its support came primarily from educated Uzbeks, entrepreneurs and farmers. Membership at the end of 1993 stood at about 30,000.2 Usmon Azim, the party’s founder, had been a prominent Birlik leader, who left that movement in 1991. Watan Taraqqiyoti strongly supported President Karimov’s economic policies, favouring control of the economy through democratic parliamentary means. Its programme goals were similar to those of the People’s Democratic Party. In the 1994 parliamentary elections, the party won 14 seats.3 After 1994, the party leadership included Anwar Yoldashev (chairman) and Shavqitdin Jurayev4 (secretary-general). The party published the weekly Watan.

THESES Introduction […] In the political sphere our [Uzbekistan’s] independence is ensured. Our spiritual and moral values are being revived. We are also striving for complete economic independence. But there are some serious problems facing us, the most important one being the overall strengthening of our sovereignty. To overcome all difficulties it is necessary to unite the nation and rally the people. That is precisely why the WTP has come into existence. In contrast to the rightist conservatives and leftist radicals,5 it has chosen a centrist road in politics; it unites freethinking and selfless persons: entrepreneurs, intellectuals, farmers—irrespective of their national affiliation and religious beliefs—who are ready to ensure progress for their Motherland and people. Uzbekistan is a multinational state. Our party respects and honours national values; it unites representatives of all nations and nationalities on an equal legal basis and we are sure that it will come to deserve a high level of respect and the people’s trust […] The following are the major goals of the Watan Taraqqiyoti Party: – to ensure the well-being of the peoples of Uzbekistan on the basis of rational utilization of its natural and intellectual resources, coordination of entrepreneurial activity with government plans, the most efficient possible use of the country’s entire potential; – to create and develop a moral and spiritual foundation for the state of Uzbekistan; – to ensure the broad and complete development of democracy;

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– to turn Uzbekistan into one of the world’s developed states on the basis of market relations; Our main task is to create a great Uzbekistan. To fulfil this task, we shall encourage in every way progressive reforms and cooperation with all movements and forces striving for the same aim. In carrying out its activity, the party will rely on international experience and will involve the broader public in its activities […] The party will work in cooperation with other parties and public movements that devote themselves to the progress of the Motherland […] The Creation of the State and the Tasks of the WTP The main task of the WTP is to build a great state of Uzbekistan. While fulfilling its tasks in the sphere of state-building the party will rely on the ideas and experience of [others’] national statehood. The WTP will take part in elections to the parliament and local hokimiyats;6 it will fight for its nominees to be elected […] The main principles of the WTP in state-building are: – to stimulate the reorganization of government bodies and the creation of a professionally-trained parliament; – to take an active part in the implementation of political and administrative reforms by suggesting further improvements in the local bodies of self-government in districts and maballas.7 – to contribute to an accurate definition of the functions of the three branches of power: legislative, executive and judicial […] Tasks of the WTP in the Sphere of Foreign Policy The WTP approves of the foreign policy of Uzbekistan. More specifically, it supports the efforts to create and strengthen an association of the Central Asian states;8 the party will try hard to translate the age-old dream of the people of the land of Turan into reality.9 The party looks upon the states of Central Asia as being one family and Uzbekistan as a part of it. The party will do its best to put the basic principles of foreign policy of our state into practice. This presupposes, first of all, the priority of national interests, while taking into consideration also mutual interests […] The party considers it necessary to develop equal relations between all members of the CIS and to convert the Commonwealth into a EuroAsian Association… It supports the establishment of good relations with the states of the Asian-Pacific region. The party will try to expand relations with Muslim states, and to deepen connections with the new industrial countries of South-East Asia, which are especially important for the development of our country, on an equal basis. The party supports the establishment of mutually advantageous relations with the developed countries of the world: the USA, Canada, Japan, Germany, France, England, etc. Economic Strategy of the WTP

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The economic strategy of the WTP presupposes the creation of a powerful, stable economy steadily strengthening the sovereignty of the republic, and ensuring better living conditions and everyday life for the people. It also includes: – the stage-by-stage formation of market relations, including stimulation of the free operation of entrepreneurs, businessmen, and farmers; – ensuring the equality of various forms of property before the law, state protection of proprietors’ rights; – forbidding state interference in economic activities of enterprises, ensuring their freedom of entrepreneurship; – eradication of monopolism in the economic sphere; providing appropriate conditions for the state sector of the economy to increase the number of highly-efficient, highlyproductive enterprises; inculcating a sense of ownership in the individual; – [...] to transform the national economy in an effort to increase its export potential. Factors in Forming Market Relations in Uzbekistan […] The WTP advocates a transition to market relations which avoids revolutionary leaps and social collisions. The WTP understands that it is impossible, all at once, to change the dogmas of national socialist ownership which have been inculcated in people’s minds and everyday lives over a long period of time; it is well aware of the fact that a transition to market relations is one of the components of general progress. Thus, the party considers that the key method for elevating Uzbekistan’s economy to an international level is the gradual establishment of market relations through the implementation of reforms. The WTP considers it necessary to make fundamental transformations in production relations; […] to develop entrepreneurship, not by the issuing of permits, but by registration. The state must promote and stimulate business activity by all means. Agrarian Policy of the WTP The WTP favours giving priority to development of agriculture and its related branches, as well as to industries that process agricultural products. The key issue in the republic’s agrarian policy is land ownership. The WTP does not favour the idea of a land market. […] It is necessary to distribute land among peasants, according to location and quality […] We consider it necessary to transfer land plots to peasants in perpetuity, with the right of inheritance. The WTP regards transforming state-run farms, especially unprofitable ones, into collective and individual farms as one of the main tasks of its agrarian policy […] We pursue the following objectives: – to provide the needy with basic commodities […] – to support people running small and medium businesses. We advocate the idea of forming a mechanism ensuring the creation of a legal basis for a market economy and strict observance of legality. We resolutely demand that the Parliament pass a law on distribution of public property on the basis of social justice. It is necessary for every citizen to be given equal conditions at the start of the transition to market relations. We shall promote the adoption of a law on zones of ecological adversity […]

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The economic programme of the WTP will be corrected and improved in accordance with the dynamics of society’s development […] Relations between Nationalities Unity and friendship of various ethnic groups and nationalities that inhabit the region and make a valuable contribution to the development of Uzbekistan is a guarantee of peace, security, and national development. The securing of peace and harmony among all peoples residing in the republic is considered to be one of the party’s main tasks. The party respects the national languages, customs and traditions of the representatives of different nationalities who have become Uzbekistan’s citizens. The party will encourage them to live as one united family. From ancient times, Uzbekistan has been the historical land of the Uzbeks; it is an independent state where the majority of Uzbeks reside. Therefore, the state is responsible for the development and progress of the indigenous nation, for preserving its language, culture, and historical, national and cultural values. The party will do everything possible to ensure that the Uzbek nation occupies an honourable place in the community of nations, in accordance with the contribution made by the Uzbek people to the development of humanity […] The party regards as its sacred duty the development of diverse relations with our compatriots living abroad […] The party resolutely opposes internal and external elements which try to seize political power through dishonest and unlawful means. Source: Party pamphlet in English

RULES 1. General Provisions 1.1. The Watan Taraqqiyoti Party is a parliamentary-type political organization which unites all citizens of Uzbekistan on a voluntary basis. 1.2. The party acts on the basis of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan and these rules. To achieve its goals, it attracts to its ranks socially-active elements of society, and has formulated a programme of social development which it is struggling to implement. 1.3. The party conducts its activity throughout the entire territory of Uzbekistan. […] 2. Goals and Tasks of the Party 2.1. The main goals of the party: […] to carry out radical reforms in the sphere of industrial relations, secure the formation of a group of property owners, develop free enterprise—not by granting permits but as part of the natural order of things, by granting comprehensive state support for their activity, recognition by the state of initiative and talent, and adopting a law on intellectual property;

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– to select free-thinking people capable of taking personal responsibility for the future of Watan and the people; to strive to secure their involvement in the process of government; – to revive the historic national traditions of the Uzbek people, with compatriots from abroad being drawn into the process; – to struggle for the return of material and cultural treasures, of which the republic was deprived during the period of colonialism; – to contribute to the formation of a qualified working class from the ranks of the indigenous population, keeping in mind, first and foremost, the need to become familiar with the experience of foreign countries; – to fight red tape and corruption which have become an obstacle to progress, by eliminating factors that facilitate their emergence and by implementing a policy protecting human dignity; – to draw the attention of the world public to the ecological situation in Uzbekistan; to introduce ecologically clean and waste-free production technologies; – to contribute to the development of factors that economically stimulate scientific and technological progress and creation of the conditions which encourage the use of scientific and technological achievements; – to bring the social and educational status of the peoples of Uzbekistan close to the levels existing in developed countries; – to study the social, cultural and educational status of compatriots living on the territory of the states of Turkestan; to provide them with assistance within the framework of international organizations; – creation of an All-Turkestan House of Friendship, together with states located on the territory of Turkestan.10 […] Source: Uzbekistan: Etnopoliticheskaia panorama. Ocherki. Dokumenty. Materialy, Vol. 1 (Moscow, 1994), pp. 263–4. NOTES 1. BBC SU/1599 B/8, 29 Jan. 1993. 2. Narodnoe slovo, 20 Jan. 1994. 3. Bitig, 12 Jan. 1997. 4. The Europe World Year Book, 1995, Vol. II, p. 3367. 5. The party tried to create a public image of a constructive force opposing both the communists (leftist radicals) and Birlik, the conservative right. 6. Hokimiyat is the term used for a local government body. 7. Mahallas are traditional residential neighbourhoods. 8. The search for a form of integration of the Central Asian republics began before the collapse of the USSR. In December 1991, in response to the Belovezh’e Agreement between the Slav Soviet republics, the leaders of all five Central Asian Soviet republics met in Ashkhabad to coordinate policy. In July 1994 a Central Asian Union including three states—Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan—was created (Nezavisimaia gazeta, 12 July 1994). Tajikistan joined later. 9. See Turan in the Republic of Azerbaijan. 10. Reference is apparently to the newly independent states located fully or partially on the territory of ancient Turkestan (Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan).

BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS AND MONOGRAPHS Aiaganov, B., Gosudarstvo Kazakhstan: evoliutsiia obshchestvennykh sistem (Almaty, 1993). Alash-Orda. Sbornik dokumentov, compiled by N.Martynenko (Alma-Ata, 1992). Atabaki, Touraj, Azerbaijan Ethnicity and Autonomy in Twentieth-Century Iran (London: British Academic Press, 1993). Atobek, Aron, Alash i Kazakhskaia natsiia (Moscow, 1991). Aziatskaia Rossiia. Liudi i poriadki za Uralom,Vol. 1 (St. Petersburg, 1914; reprint by Oriental Research Partners, Cambridge, 1974). Boss, Helen, Turkmenistan: Far from Customers Who Pay (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Nov. 1995) FSS Briefing No. 4. Bugai, N.F., L.Beria—I.Stalinu. Soglasno Vashemu ukazaniiu [Moscow, 1995]. Dallin, Alexander (ed.), Political Parties in Russia (Berkeley: UC Berkeley Press, 1993). Dawisha, Karen and Bruce Parrott (eds), Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Demograficheskii ezhegodnik SSSR (Moscow, 1990). D’iachenko, S., L.Karmazina and S.Seidumanov, Politicheskie partii Kazakhstana, 2000 (Almaty, 2000). Direktivy KPSS i Sovetskogo pravitel’stva po khoziaistvennym voprosam (Moscow, 1957). Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 1997–1998. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2000: Kazakhstan. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2000: Uzbekistan. Friendly, Alfred, Jr, and Murray Feshbach, Ecocide in the USSR: Health and Nature Under Siege (NY: HarperCollins, 1991). Goskomstat SSSR, National’nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR po dannym Vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1989 goda (Moscow, 1991). Grazhdanskie dvizbeniia v Tadzhikistane (Moscow, 1990). Herzig, Edmund, Iran and the Former Soviet South (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995). Human Rights and Democratization in the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, compiled by the Staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Washington, DC, Jan. 1993). Istoriia Kazakhstana. Ocherk (Almaty, 1993). Istoriia Kazakhstana s drevneishikb vremen do nashikh dnei. Ocherk [Almaty, 1993]. Konstitutsiia Soiuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik (Moscow, 1977). Koreitsy Respubliki Uzbekistan (Tashkent, 1993). Leizerovich, E.E., Sotsial’nye i ekonomicheskie itogi rossiiskoi kolonizatsii Turkestana(Tel Aviv, 2001). Masanov, N.E., Zh.B.Abylkhozhin, I.V.Erofeeva, A.N.Alekseenko and G.S. Baratova, Istoriia Kazakhstana: narody i kul’tury (Almaty: Daik Press, 2001). Masov, R., Istoriia topornogo razdeleniia (Dushanbe, 1991). Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v 1989 g. Statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Moscow, 1990). Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR za 70 let (Moscow, 1987). Natsional’nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR, po perepisi 1989 g., Vol. 2 (Moscow, 1989)

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NEWSPAPERS AND JOURNALS ABV

Maydan (Kyrgyzstan)

Alash

Molodezh’ Uzbekistana

Azaladlyg

Molodezhnaia gazeta

Azerbaijan

Moskovskie novosti/Moscow News

Aziia

Mysl’

Aziia Dausy

Narodnaia gazeta

Bakinskii rabochii

Narodnoe slovo

Bitig

Narodnyi kongress

Central Asia and Caucasus Chronicle

Nezavisimaia gazeta

Central Asian Monitor

Otechestvennaia istoriia

Central Asian Survey

Partiinaia zhizn Kazakhstana

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Dekabr’

Pravda

Delovaia nedelia

Pravda Vostoka

Ekspress khronika

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Rossiiskaia gazeta

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Russkii vestnik

Glasnost’

Slovo Kyrgyzstana

Golos Tadzhikistana

Sotsialisticheskaia industriia

Gorizont

Sovetskaia Kirgiziia

Gunay

Sovety Kazakhstana

Halg

Stolitsa

Hurriyet

Trud

Istiglal

Tsentral’naia Aziia

Izvestiia

Tsentral’naia Aziia i Kavkaz

Karavan

Turan

Kazakh

Turkmenskaia iskra

Kazakhstanskaia pravda

Vecherniaia Alma-Ata

Kommunist Tadzhikistana

Vechernii Ashkhabad

Kommunist Uzbekistana

Vechernii Dushanbe

Komsomolets Turkmenistana

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Krasnaia zvezda

Vestnik statistiki

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Literaturnaia gazeta

Vostok

Literaturnyi Kyrgyzstan

Vremia

Maydan (Azerbaijan)

Zhizn’ i ekonomika

CHAPTERS IN BOOKS Abduvakhitov, Abdujabar, ‘Islamic Revivalism in Uzbekistan’, in Dale Eickelman (ed), Russia’s Muslim Frontiers (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1993). Abylkhozhin, Zh.B., ‘Kazakhstan v sovetskom totalitarnom prostranstve: istoricheskaia dinamika’, in Masanov et al., Istoriia Kazakhstana: narody i kul’tury, pp. 352–3. Alekseenko, A.N. and N.E.Masanov, ‘Migratsionnye i etnodemograficheskie protsessy v sovetskom periode’, in Masanov, et. al.

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ARTICLES IN JOURNALS ‘Azat i ego printsipy’, Partiinaia zhizn Kazakhstana 12 (1990). ‘From the Azat Point of View’, Azia Dausy 17 (1993). ‘Russkaia obshchina: tseli, pozitsii i konflikty’, Mysl’ 8 (1993). ‘Sidorova protiv Sidorovoi’, Aziia 23 (1992). ‘Ustav Kommunisticheskoi Partii Kazakhstana’, Mysl’ 1 (1993). Abazov, R., ‘Politicheskie preobrazovaniia v Kyrgyzstane i evoliutsiia prezidentskoi sistemy’, Tsentral’naia Aziia i Kavkaz 1, 2 (1999). Aiaganov, B., ‘Mnogopartiinost’: istoricheskie paralleli’, Mysl’ 3 (1994). Akeneev, Zh., ‘Problemy reformirovaniia v sel’skom khoziaistve’, Obshchestvo i ekonomika 7–8 (1999). Aleksandrov, lu.G., ‘Spetsificheskie sluchai ekonomicheskoi otstalosti’, Vostok 5 (1991). Anderson, John, ‘Authoritarian Political Development in Central Asia: The Case of Turkmenistan’, Central Asian Survey 4 (1995). Babadzhanov, Bakhtiiar, ‘Ferganskaia dolina, istochnik ili zhertva islamskogo fundamentalizma’, Tsentral’naiia Aziia i Kavkaz 4 (1999). Babak, Vladimir, ‘Astana v treugol’nike Moskva, Vashington, Pekin’, Tsentral’naia Aziia i Kavkaz 5 (1999), pp., 126–36. Babakumarov, E., ‘K chemu prishli i k chemu idem’, Mysl’ 11 (1994), p. 51. Bibikova, O., ‘Batken: nastuplenie islamskogo ekstremizma’, Tsentral’naia Aziia i Kavkaz 1 (2000). Boldzhurova, I. ‘Zdorovie liudei—kategoriia sotsial’naia’, Voprosy istorii KPSS 3 (1990). Brown, Bess, ‘Whither Tajikistan’, RFE/RL, Vol. 1, 24 (12 June 1992). Bugai, N.F., ‘O vyselenii koreitsev iz Dal’nevostochnogo kraia’, Otechestvennaia istoriia 6 (1992). Durdiev, M., ‘Etnogenez turkmenskogo naroda’, Aziia i Afrika 10 (1996). Guboglo, M.N., ‘Etnograficheskaia i iazykovaia situatsiia v stolitsakh soiuznykh respublik SSSR v kontse 80-kh-nachale 90-kh godov’, Otechestvennaia istoriia 1 (1993). Huttenbach, Henry R., ‘The Soviet Koreans’, Central Asian Survey 1 (1993). Ioliev, A., ‘Problemy ekonomicheskogo i sotsial’nogo razvitiia Turkmenistana’, Tsentral’naiia Aziia 4 (1997). Karin, E., ‘Vnutripoliticheskie aspekty natsional’noi bezopasnosti Kazakhstana’, Tsentral’naia Aziia i Kavkaz 3 (1999). Khalmukhamedov, A., ‘Islamskii faktor v Uzbekistane’, Svobodnaia mysl’ 4 (1998). Khalova, G., ‘Nam ne nuzhny revoliutsii’, Aziia i Afrika 10 (1996). Khasanov, M., ‘Vernut’ iz nebytiia’, Kazakhstanskaia pravda, (10 December 1993). Khazanov, Anatoly M., ‘The Ethnic Problems of Contemporary Kazakhstan’, Central Asian Survey 2 (1995), pp. 245–7. Khazanov, Anatoly M., ‘Meskhetian Turks in Search of Self-Identity’, Central Asian Studies 11, 14 (1992). Kosmarskaia, N., ‘Russkie v Tsentral’noi Azii—Bol’noi vopros? Naskol’ko i dlia kogo’, Tsentral’naia Aziia i Kavkaz 5/6 (1999). Kuznetsova, S.I., ‘Russkie v Tsentral’noi Azii’, Rossiia i sovremennyi mir: problemy, mneniia, diskussii, sobytiia 1 (1999).

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Index Abdujabbarov, Tohir, 320 Abdullojonov, Abdumalik, 264 Abdurahimov, Rustam, 309 Abdurahmanov, Serik, 175 Absamatov, S.T., 234 Achilov, Abdullo, 281 Adilet, 101, 106, 107 Adolat, 282 Adolat Association, 189, 267, 361, 362, 386 Afghan War veterans, 188, 275, 280n, 350n Afghanistan, 186, 261–3, 268, 290, 299, 307, 340, 349, 372, 386 Afzali, Azam, 282 Agamali, Fazail, 32 Agrarian Labour Party of Kyrgyzstan, 192–5 Agzybirlik Movement (Turkmenistan), 342 Ahmedov, Bahtiyar, 34 Ahmedov, Ramiz, 37 Aini, S. (see Murojoda, Sadriddin Said) Aitmatov, Chingiz, 280 Akayev, Askar, 187–91, 195, 199, 204, 206, 215, 218, 219, 223, 233, 234, 237, 245, 253 Akatayev, Sabet Kazi, 115, 121, 127, 130, 155, 156 Akeneev, Zh.A., 234 Akhmetaliyev, Bolatbek, 108 akims, 124, 218 Akmatov, Kazat, 210 Akmola (see also Astana), 98 Aktiubinsk, 135 Alash, 101, 103–5, 105n, 107–12, 112n, 126, 130n, 142, 143n, 149n Alash-Orda, 112n Aldamjarov, Haziz, 166 Ali-Bairamly, 71, 73 Alimzhanov, Anuar, 166 Aliyev, Aliakram Ismail, 49, 50 Aliyev, Heydar, 27–9, 32, 34, 37, 39, 47, 52, 56, 64, 65, 71n, 80n, 83, 87, 91, 93n Alizade, Araz, 77 Alizade, Zardusht, 77, 78, 80n Alliance of Free Youth of Uzbekistan, 360 All-Union Association for a Humanitarian Dialogue, 128 Alma-Ata (see Almaty) Alma-Ata Popular Front, 101 Alma-Ata riots (Dec. 1986), 99, 101, 106, 130n, 143, 179, 182n Almaty, 97-102, 105, 106, 108, 114, 124–32, 132n, 135, 143, 145, 147, 155, 164, 173n, 175 Almaty Platform, 282

Index

405

Agrarian Labour Party of Kyrgyzstan, 192, 193, 194 Amanat, 144 Amanbayev, Jumgalbek, 226 Amu-Dar’inskaia Liniia, 332 Amu-Darya, 350n, 371, 374 Ana Vatan, 29, 32, 33 Andijan, 372, 385 Andropov, Iurii, 358 antisemitism, 86n, 87n Aral Sea, 118, 121n, 126, 132, 151, 171, 340, 359, 360, 371, 374n Aral-Asia Kazakhstan Movement, 146 Ararktsian, Babken, 33 Archins, 74, 76 Arifov, Atanazar, 375 Asaba, 189, 191, 195–8, 209, 214n, 233n; and the Bishkek-Karakul march, 195 Ashar, 189, 190–203, 209, 210, 214–16, 223, 233n Ashgabat, 308, 339, 340, 342, 344, 349, 411 Ashkhabad (see Ashgabat) Association for the Legal Development of Kazakhstan, 104, 113, 114 Association of Independent Public Organizations of Kazakhstan, 164 Association of Russian Compatriots in Kazakhstan, 162 Association of Korean Cultural Centres of Uzbekistan, 364, 365 Astana, 97, 100, 101, 106, 130, 135, 155 Astrakhan, 111, 385 Atabek, Aron, 112n Ata-Meken, 188, 190, 191, 203–6, 214 Atobek, Amirbek, 307, 308n Atuulduk Demilge, 189, 206, 209 Atyrau, 98 Avars, 21 Azat Civil Movement, 101, 103, 104, 114–21, 124, 126–8, 130n, 141, 149, 155, 156, 160, 180 Azerbaijan, 21-93, 126, 160 Azerbaijan, 25 Azerbaijan Communist Party (see also Communist Party of Azerbaijan), 37 Azerbaijan Democratic Party (Iran), 63n Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (1918), 23, 26, 25, 52, 56 Azerbaijan Higigaty, 37 Azerbaijan Independent Democratic Party, 27, 77 Azerbaijan Independence Party, 77 Azerbaijan Islamic Party, 28 Azerbaijan People's Republic (Iran), 63n Azerbaijan Revolutionary Revival Party, 37 Azerbaijan United Communist Party, 37 Azim, Usmon, 406 Azladlyg, 38 Baburian, Karen, 33 Bakir Uulu, Tursunbay, 206 Baku, 21–3, 25, 28, 73, 83, 87, 92, 342; 1990 events in, 84, 87, 126, 214

Index

406

Baku News, 93 Basmachi (Qurbashi), 262, 358 Bazarbayev, Chapyrashty, 195 Bazarkulov, Askar, 206 Bekmuhamedov, Uktam, 401, 403n Bektemirov, Kambaraly, 224 Belakan region (Azerbaijan), 60 Belousov, Iakov, 136 Berezovskii, V., 381 Birlik (Kazakhstan), 150 Birlik (Uzbekistan), 213, 214n, 360, 361, 362, 363n, 366–76, 381n, 406, 411n Bishkek, 126, 180, 185–9, 192, 198–200, 203, 203n, 209, 217, 226n, 245, 281, 373 Bishkek Protocol, 32, 33n Boz Gurd (Grey Wolves), 27, 34–6, 65 Brezhnev, Leonid, 69, 372 Budugs, 74, 75, 76 Bukhara, 262, 339, 358, 361, 363n, 389, 390 Bunakov, Iurii, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 162 Centrist Bloc (Azerbaijan), 29 Centrist Bloc (Kazakhstan), 104 Chagatai ulus, 97, 357 Chaikhana Movement (Azerbaijan), 24 Chanlibel Society, 24, 61 Chechnya, 34 Chernomorets, V., 217 Chokayev, Mustafa, 112n Chormanov, Marat, 115, 121n Churbanov, Iurii, 372 Citizenship Law, 93n, 102, 330 Civil Union, 147 Civic Initiative (see Atuulduk Demilge) Commonwealth of Independent States, 28, 29, 33, 34, 39, 42n, 56, 64, 78, 100, 109, 120n, 123, 135, 136, 142, 146, 152, 163, 167, 172, 173, 198n, 224, 231, 233n, 248, 251, 252n, 254, 255, 261, 290n, 296, 299, 317, 408 Communist Party of Azerbaijan, 26–8, 37–9, 63, 87 Communist Party of Kazakhstan, 101, 104, 119, 121-4, 126, 128, 155, 158, 166, 172 Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan (see also Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan), 188–90, 192n, 209n, 213, 216, 219, 226, 243 Communist Party of Russia, 37, 270 Communist Party of Tajikistan, 264–7, 269–80, 284, 295n, 296, 300, 313, 316 Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 27, 28, 87, 101, 106, 115, 132, 133, 160, 189, 202n, 213, 226, 233n, 242, 243, 270, 273, 280, 290n, 291, 321, 328, 329, 358, 361, 363, 370, 373, 377 Communist Party of Turkmenistan, 341, 343, 344 Communist Party of Uzbekistan, 358, 360, 361, 363n, 390, 391, 399n Confederation of Kazakh Trade Unions, 122 Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus, 56 Congress of People's Unity Movement of Tajikistan, 270 Coordinating Council of Ethnic Associations of the Republic of Tajikistan, 330, 332 Cossacks, 102, 103, 111, 112, 162, 226n, 332 Council of National Defence Coalition (Azerbaijan), 77

Index

407

Dagestan, 34, 46, 60, 73, 76, 93 Dayanch, 342 Democratic Bloc, 32, 77 Democratic Congress (DemCongress), 91 Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan, 189, 190, 199, 201, 202, 206, 209–14, 216, 223, 242, 244 Democratic Movement of Uzbekistan, 361 Democratic Movement Party of Kyrgyzstan, 199, 210, 214–19 Democratic Party (Kazakhstan), 153 Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, 27, 39–42, 61 Democratic Party of Entrepreneurs (Azerbaijan), 43, 45 Democratic Party of Tajikistan, 265, 280–91, 307 Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (former Communist Party), 343–51 Democratic Party of Turkmenistan, 342 Democratic Union (Tajikistan), 281, 290n Derbent, 34, 73 Devlet, 83 D'iachenko Sergei, 175 Diikan-Ordo Association of Free Peasants, 206 Dirafshi Kovien, 265 Djalilov, Afiyaddin, 33 Dogru Yol, 46–9 Dokuchaeva, Aleksandra, 135 Donish, Ahmad Mahdum ibn Nosir, 389 Dostiyev, Abdumajid, 313 Dudayev, Johar, 34 Dushanbe, 261, 264, 265, 267, 280–2, 290n, 291, 296, 297, 307, 319, 328, 330, 333 Duvanov, Sergei, 164 Ecological Foundation (Kazakhstan), 175 Edinstvo Inter-Ethnic Movement, 102, 103, 124–30, 142, 161, 162 Ekhie, 265 Ekhiei Khujand, 291–5 Ekolog, 188, 191, 242, 243, 244 Elchibey, Abulfez, 24, 27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 52, 56, 57, 61, 63–5, 77, 91, 93 Emancipated Labour Party (Tajikistan), 295–7 Erk Democratic Party (Uzbekistan), 359–62, 366, 374–81, 391, 399 Erkebayev Abdimalik, 219 Erkyn Kyrgyzstan (ErK), 189, 190, 191, 203, 206–10, 214, 215 Ertisbayev, Ermuhamet, 166 Esengazin, Muratbek, 108 Esenov, Murad, 351 Fergana (city), 126 Fergana Oblast, 261, 357 Fergana Valley, 98, 213, 214, 252, 358, 361, 371, 374, 385; ethnic clashes in, 372, 382, 388 Fomin, Nikolai, 343 For the Future of Kazakhstan, 104 Forum of Democratic Forces of Uzbekistan, 374 Forum Society, 130–2

Index

408

Free Peasants’ Party, 362 Frunze (see Bishkek) Gabala, 71n Gambar, Isa, 52, 65 Ganja, 28, 71, 72, 73 Garayev, Tamerlan, 46, 47 Garm, 261, 266, 268, 270, 279n, 283, 298 Germans, 97, 121n, 185, 189, 223n, 239, 242n, 266, 385n Gasim, Tofigh, 52 Gök Tepe, Battle of, 340 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 28, 99, 101, 120n, 203n, 269, 290n, 295n, 372, 385, 389 Gorno-Badakhshon, 261, 266, 268, 307, 308 Grey Wolves (Turkey), 34 GUAM/GUUAM (Regional organization of Georgia, Ukraine,/Uzbekistan/, Azerbaijan, Moldova), 49n Gunay, 43, 45, 46 hakims, 341 Hamidov, Iskander, 34, 65 Hasanov, Firuddun, 37 Hasanov, Marat, 106 Himmatzoda, Muhammad Sharif (Khimmatov, Muhammadsharif), 297, 388n Hissar Valley, 262, 290 Hoverim, 266 Humbatov, Alikram, 81 Hurriyet, 39n, 42n Huseynov, Suret, 28 Ikromi, Jalol, 390 Imomov, Sharafiddin, 320 Independent Social Democratic Party of Kazakhstan, 132–4, 164 Inter-Ethnic Union of the Peoples of Uzbekistan (Intersoiuz), 361, 381–5 International Humanitarian Association of Turkmen, 349 International Scientific, Industrial and Trade Corporation (Isatravshan), 316 Interregional Association of Democratic Organizations, 200 Isinaliyev, Mikhail, 115 Iskhakov, Faizulla, 403 Islam dunyasi, 50 Islamic Democratic Party (Azerbaijan), 50 Islamic Democratic Party (Uzbekistan), 361, 362 Islamic Party of Azerbaijan, 49, 50, 85 Islamic Renaissance Movement of Tajikistan, 268, 282, 299 Islamic Renaissance Party (all-Union), 297, 361, 385 Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan, 264–6, 270, 281, 282, 290n, 297–306, 320 Islamic Renaissance Party of Uzbekistan, 361, 362, 385–8, 391 Islamin sesi, 50 Ismaili Shiites, 261 Ismatullayev, Shuhrat, 366 Issyk-Kul, 202n, 233 Istiglal, 46, 56, 63, 71, 78

Index

409

Iushin, Valerii, 330 Izbiratel’, 144 Ja’farite Muslims, 80 Jadid movement, 358, 363n Jalal-Abad, 206, 214, 233, 238–42, 253 Jamahat (Avar People’s Movement), 60 Jews, 77n, 87n, 93n, 266, 361, 400 Juchi ulus, 97 Jurayev, Shavqitdin, 406 Karabagh, (Nagorno-Karabagh), 24, 25, 28, 31–4, 37, 39, 46, 47, 49, 61–4, 78, 83, 87, 88 Karaganda, 105, 106, 135 Karakalpakstan, 392, 399n, 405 Karategin, 262, 266, 268, 298 Karimov, Islam, 359–62, 374, 386, 391, 399n, 403, 406 Karimov, Jamshed, 296 Kashka-Darya, 360 Kazakh Tili Society, 101, 137, 139, 140n, 146, 149 Kazakh youth movement (Zhas Tulpar), 115 Kazakhstan, 69, 72n, 73, 76, 97–182, 186, 248, 252, 262, 349n, 364, 372n, 391, 411 Kazakhstan Public Committee for Human Rights, 137 Kazakhstanskaia pravda, 105, 107, 112, 121, 124, 129, 136, 137, 143, 160, 179 Kazhegeldin, Akezhan, 174 Kazimirov, Vladmir, 33 Kenenbayeva, Kamilia, 204, 209n Khachmas, 73 Khalq Maslakhaty, 341, 342 Khalq Vekillery, 341 Khinalug, 74, 75, 76n Khiva, 262, 339, 340, 357 Khudonazarov, Davlat, 281, 298, 307, 320 Khujand, 261–3, 266, 267, 279n, 290n, 291, 294, 295, 309, 319 Kim, Petr, 364 Kokand, 185, 261, 357, 372 Kokchetav, 135 Kolbin, Gennadii, 99 Komsomol, in Azerbaijan, 38; in Kazakhstan, 133, 175; in Tajikistan, 265, 328, 329, 333; in Turkmenistan, 343; in Uzbekistan, 373, 377 Konakhkent, 76 Kopylenko, Vladimir, 202, 242 Koreans, 72, 121, 186, 239, 242, 266, 364, 365, 385 Korol’kov, Leonid, 122 Kozha-Ahmet, Hasen, 115, 179, 180, 182n Krynitsa Society, 266, 306 Kryz, 74, 75, 76 Kuanyshalin, Zh., 115 Kuba, 73

Index

410

Kulmatov, Renat S., 210 Kulob Oshkoro (see also Oshkoro), 265 Kulob Popular Front, 267 Kulyev, Abdy, 351 Kunayev, Dinmuhammad, 99 Kurgan-Tyube,, 266, 281, 283, 297, 330 Kurochkin, Anatolii, 202, 242 Kusary, 73, 77n Kushimov, Dos, 164 Kustanai, 135 Kyrgyz Krai, 98, 186 Kyrgyzstan, 76, 129n, 160n, 185–257, 372, 411 Kzyl-Orda, 98, 140 La’li Badakhshon, 265, 282, 307 Lad Slav Movement, 102, 104, 134–7, 161, 162 Language Law, 99, 128, 162, 187, 199, 287, 373 Lanko, Ernest, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129 League of Muslim Women of Kazakhstan, 137–40 Lenkoran, 80, 81 Lezgin Democratic Party, 28 Lezgin Sadval (Unity) Movement, 73 Lezgins, 21, 28, 46, 60, 72–7 madrasas, 44, 286, 300, 385, 387 Mahalla foundation, 373 mahallas, 386, 411 Mahkamov, Qahhor, 264, 281 Makhachkala, 73 Maksat (Turkmenistan), 343 Mamataliyev, Abduwali, 252 Mamedov, Etibar, 56, 60n Mamedov, Halil, 80 Mamedov, Mahmud, 43 Mamedov, Sardar Jalal oglu, 39, 42 Masaliyev, Absamat, 190, 192n, 200, 210, 226, 237n maslakhats, 350 Matkaziyev, Kadyr, 195 Maydan, 85, 86, 87n, 210 Maydan Movement, 61, 83 Memorial Society, 101, 106, 107, 188, 209, 244 Meros Society, 373 Meskhetians, 121n, 126, 252, 253n, 372, 382, 385n, 388 migration, 23, 72n, 93n, 97–9, 102, 112n, 161n, 187, 189, 191n, 240, 241, 253, 261, 328n, 372n Migration (Tajikistan), 332 Mikhailov, Viktor, 135 Millet, 60 Milli Gurtulush (see National Salvation Party-Azerbaijan) Milli Istiglal (see National Independence Party-Azerbaijan) Milli Majlis, 29, 46, 60

Index

411

Minbari halk, 313 Mingechaur, 73 Mirsaidov, Jamol, 401 Movement for Democratic Reform (Kazakhstan), 147 Movement for Democratic Reform (Turkmenistan), 342, 351–3 Movement for Islamic Renaissance of Tajikistan, 290n Movement for the Protection of Home Builders (Kyrgyzstan), 199 Muhitdinov, Nureddin, 358 Muraliyev, Amangeldy, 254 Murojoda, Sadriddin Said, 389, 390n Musavat, 23, 25, 27, 50, 52–6, 65 Musayev, Ali, 72 Mutalibov, Ayaz, 26, 34, 60n, 64, 77, 84 Mysl’, 123, 137, 143, 146, 149, 152, 155, 160, 163, 165, 173 Nabiyev, Rahmon, 264, 266, 269, 281, 298, 309, 320 Nadjhot, 298 Nagorno-Karabagh (see Karabagh) Nakhichevan, 26, 31, 49, 64, 65, 71, 83, 87, 88 Namatkulov, Almaz, 375 namaz (Muslim prayer), 38 ibn Narshakhi, Abu-Bakr Muhammad, 389 Naryn, 214, 233 National Democratic Party of Azerbaijan (see Boz Gurd) National Democratic Party of Kazakhstan, 103, 141, 143, 180 National Independence Party, 56 National Independence Party of Azerbaijan, 27, 56–60 National Korean Cultural Association (Moscow), 364 National Salvation Movement (Azerbaijan), 32, 39, 47 National Salvation Party (Azerbaijan), 61–3 National Unity Democratic Movement (Kyrgyzstan), 219–23 Nazarbayev, Nursultan, 100, 104, 105, 108, 111, 113, 122, 135, 144, 147, 149, 153, 155, 173, 175, 176 Nazaret (Turkmenistan), 343 Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement, 101, 103, 143–7, 173 Nevada-Semipalatinsk- Moruroa-Lob Nor-Novaia Zemlia Alliance, 144 New Communist Party (Azerbaijan—see Azerbaijan United Communist Party) Nezavisimaia gazeta, 60, 108, 111, 112, 114, 140, 179, 280, 290, 328, 344, 349, 381, 403, 411 Nezavisimyi ezhenedel’nik, 367 Nidoi Ranjbar, 271 Nikonov, Oleg, 175 Niyazov, Jumaboy, 282 Niyazov, Sapurmurad, 341–4, 353n North Azerbaijan Democratic Republic, 78 Nugmanova, Amina, 137 Nutushev, Rashid, 108 Nysynbayev, Ratbek Kozha, 108 Oftobi Sugdien, 361, 388–90, 400 Oli Majlis, 359 Open Association for the Development of Kyrgyzstan, 245

Index

412

Orenburg, 98, 111, 112 Ormantayev, Kamal, 115, 141, 156 Osh, 125, 126, 185, 189, 192, 201–3, 206, 210, 213, 214, 225, 226, 233, 237, 245, 253 Osh-Aimagy, 223 Oshkoro, 308–12 Otan Civil Committee, 104 Ovozi Tajik, 262 Panakhly, Neymat, 63n, 83, 85 Pankin, Viacheslav, 372 Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan, 188, 190, 191, 206, 226–33 Party of Democratic Progress of Kazakhstan, 103, 145, 146 Party of Independent Azerbaijan, 32 Party of Kyrgyzstan Unity, 191 Patriotic Salvation Front (Tajikistan), 282, 298 Pavlodar, 105, 134, 135 Payemi Khak, 298 Peasant Party of Kyrgyzstan, 192, 233–7 Peasant Party of Turkmenistan, 343 Peasant Union (Kyrgyzstan), 192, 234, 236n People’s Congress of Kazakhstan, 103, 104, 135, 144, 146–9, 153 People’s Congress of Tajikistan Association, 316 People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan, 267, 313–16 People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan, 359, 361, 362, 390–400 People’s Diplomacy Association, 362 People’s Movement of Turkestan, 360, 362 People’s Unity Congress of Tajikistan, 316–19 People’s Unity Democratic Movement (Kyrgyzstan), 190 Peregrin, Aleksandr, 113 Polianichko, Viktor, 87 Popular Cooperative Party of Kazakhstan, 122, 149–52 Popular Front of Azerbaijan, 25–7, 32, 34, 39, 46n, 56, 60–72, 77, 78, 80, 83, 87n, 91; and incidents on the Soviet-Iranian border, 71n, 93n Popular Unity Bloc (Kazakhstan), 104 Progress Group (Kazakhstan), 135 Pulatov, Abdurahim, 366 Pyanj, 261 Rahmonov, Emomali, 264, 267, 268, 313 Rashidov, Sharaf, 358, 359, 363, 372 Rastokhez Movement of the People of Tajikistan, 264–8, 270, 280–2, 298, 307, 309, 319–29 Rasulov, Mahmud, 391 Rasulzade, Mammed Emin, 23, 53, 56n Razguliaev, Iurii, 219 Rebirth of the Aral Sea Movement, 147 Renaissance Party of Kazakhstan, 153–5 Republican Party of Kazakhstan, 103, 115, 122, 141, 155–61, 180 Republican People’s Party of Kyrgyzstan, 190, 191, 217, 237, 238 Respublika Bloc, 104, 166 Revolutionary Committee for Governing the Kyrgyz Krai, 185 Round Table of Democratic Forces, 29

Index

413

Roze, Vitalii, 113 Ru ba Ru, 265, 328, 329 Rudaki, Abu Abdallah Husayn Jafar, 389 Russian Communities, Centre for (Tajikistan), 330 Russian Community (Kazakhstan), 103, 105n, 142, 161–3 Russian Community (Tajikistan), 266, 316, 329–33 Russian Community (Turkmenistan), 343 Russian National Sobor (Assembly), 330 Rutuls, 74, 75, 76 Ryspayev, Barpy, 226 Saadanbekov, Zhumagul, 219 Sadiq, Muhammad Yusuf, 385 Safarli, Mais, 91 Sagadiev, Kenzhegali, 175 Sahdagh, 76 Sajudis Lithuanian National Front, 214 Samarkand, 358, 363n, 388–90 Samarkand Cultural Association, 361, 400–3 Samur Lezgin National Centre, 72–6 Sarkytbek, Imash-uly, 107 Sarsenov, Umirzak, 149, 152n Sasgen Association, 137 Sayadov, Sayad, 37–9 Semipalatinsk (see also Nevada-Semipalatinsk), 98, 99, 102, 121, 143, 171, Semirech’e, 97, 162, 214n, 226n, 232n Shabdolov, Shodi, 270 Shafi’i, 76n Shahodat, 298 Shakhanov, Mukhtar, 147 Shari’a, 49, 302, 303, 387 Sharifov, Fatullo, 299 Sharshenaliyev, Zhanybek, 237 Sheimerdemov, M., 363 Sheki, 73 Shiites, 46n, 72n, 80 Shokhin, 389, 390n Shymkent, 97, 106, 140 ibn Sina, Abu Ali, 389 Slav Foundation, 189 Slav Union, 142 Slavic Diaspora Association (Kyrgyzstan), 238–42 Social Democratic Association of Kyrgyzstan, 242–4 Social Democratic Association of the USSR, 242 Social Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, 27, 77–80 Social Democratic Party of Kazakhstan, 104, 132, 164–6 Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan, 190, 191, 245–52 Social Progress Party of Uzbekistan, 361, 392, 403–6 Socialist Party of Kazakhstan, 104, 122, 135, 166–73 Socialist Party of Tajikistan, 271, 274, 276 Sogdiana, 361, 363, 388

Index

414

Solih, Muhammad, 359, 366, 374, 375 Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr, 102 Soviet Korean Association, 365 Soyunov Khalmurad, 351 Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, 140 Stepnoi Krai, 98 Suleymenov, Olzhas, 103, 143, 147, 149 Sultanbekov, Erkin, 132 Sumgait, 71, 73; ethnic clashes in, 84, 87n Supruniuk, Boris, 162 Surkhan-Darya oblast, 371 Svoik, Petr, 166 Sydykov, Usen, 192, 225, 226 Syr-Darya, 214n, 294, 295, 371, 374 Tabasarans, 74 Tajikistan, 76, 86, 111, 191, 192, 214, 248, 261–335, 339, 358, 362, 365, 372n, 374n, 386, 390; Commission on National Reconciliation, 308n; General Agreement on Peace and National Reconciliation, 317, 319n, 268 Talysh, 28, 56, 75, 84, 85 Talysh National Revival Party, 80 Talysh People’s Party, 60, 80–2 Talysh-Mugan Republic, 60, 81 Tantekin, Muhammed Hatemi, 61 Tashkent, 233, 291, 357, 361, 363, 364, 371, 373, 374, 381, 384, 385, 386, 388, 400 Tatars, 97, 192n, 385n Tats, 77n Tatur, Sergei, 381 Tazhin, Murat, 175 Tehran Platform, 282, 289 Tekebayev, Omurbek, 204, 209 Tekke tribe, 344 Tentiev, Zhenishbek, 237 Tereshchenko, Sergei, 105n, 166 Terletskii, Viktor, 281 Tien Shan, 185 Tili Society (see Kazakh Tili Society) Tojikiston Ovozi, 271 Tokobayev, Erkyn, 210 Trud Labour Union (Azerbaijan), 37 Tsakhurs, 74, 76 Tselinograd (see Astana) Tumaris, 360 Turajonzoda, Akbar, 268 Turan, 36, 49, 76 Turan, 82, 87n, 157, 408 Turan Association of the Free Working People of Azerbaijann 83 Turan Party of National Statehood, 27, 82–6 Turayev, Saifiddin, 316 Turgai, 98 Turgunaliyev, Topchubek, 202, 206, 209, 210, 214

Index

415

Turk Adami Merkaziiat, 358 Turk-Ata, 252, 253 Turkmenistan, 160n, 339–52, 372, 411 Turkmenistan Foundation, 351, 353 Turkmenistan Movement for Democratic Reform, 351 Udins, 74, 75, 76 Ukrainian Youth Association (Kiev), 306 Uleev, Valerii, 239 Union of Consumer Cooperatives of Kazakhstan, 149 Union of Democratic Forces, in Kyrgyzstan, 188, 254; in Tajikistan, 307 Union of Engineers of Kazakhstan, 104 Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Kazakhstan, 174–5 Union of Leaseholders and Entrepreneurs (Tajikistan), 296 Union of National Unity (Kazakhstan), 103, 104, 147, 153, 175–9 Union of Scientists and Industrialists of Tajikistan, 316 Union of Steppe Krai Cossacks, 162 Union of the Cossacks of Semirech’e, 162 Union of Turkmenistan Youth, 343 United Tajik Opposition, 268, 282, 290, 307, 308, 319 Unity Centre (Tajikistan), 282 Unity Party of Kyrgyzstan, 253–7 Ural’sk, 98 Ura-Tyube, 262, 333 Ura-Tyube People’s Front, 333 Usmon, Davlat, 298 Ust-Kamenogorsk, 135 Usupov, Jumagazy, 199 Uta, Abdullah, 386 Uzbek Society (Tajikistan), 316 Uzbekistan, 49, 160n, 328n, 349n, 357–411 Uzgen, 201; ethnic clashes in, 203n Vahdat, 28, 333–5 Varlyg, 63 Vezirov, Abdul Rahman, 83, 84, 87 Vol’skii, Arkadii, 87 Voronov, Vitalii, 113 Vyshka, 49, 56 ibn Wahhab, Muhammad, 388n Wahhabism, 386, 388 Watan Taraqqiyoti, 362, 391, 406–11 Women’s Union (Kazakhstan), 146 Yeltsin, Boris, 137n, 219 Yeni Azerbaijan, 27, 87–91 Yeni Musavat, 52 Yoldashev, Anwar, 406

Index

416

Yolliyev, Ashir, 351 Yunusova, Leyla, 77 Yurd, 24 Yurddash, 27, 91–3 Yusuf, Shodmon, 281, 282, 298 Zakataly, 60 Zhaganova, Altynshash, 153–5 Zhambyl, 135 Zhandosov, Sanjar, 106 Zhas Kazak, 182n Zheksheev, Zhypar, 199–202, 210, 215, 219 Zheltoksan, 180 Zheltoksan Movement, 156 Zheltoksan National Democratic Party, 103, 115, 141, 179–82 Zheltoksan Public Committee, 101, 179; establishes itself as a party, 101, 182n Zheruiuk Society, 101 Zhezkazgan Oblast, 106 Zhumagulov, Apas, 200 Ziuganov, Gennadii, 37 Zolotye pogony, 332n