Political Upsurges in Post-War India (1945-46)

POLITICAL UPSURGES IN POST-WAR INDIA (1945-46)

POLITICAL UPSURGES IN POST-WAR INDIA (194S-46)

Keka Dutta Ray

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Dedicated To My Parents La~e Keshab Lal & Bithika Bose

CONTENTS

Preface

be

The Post-War Situation (1945-46) 1.

2.

3. 4.

Students and the Anti Imperialist Mass Upheaval: Their Participation in the INA Release Campaign (November 1945 to February 1,946)

1

A Case Study of the Participation of Students and Workers·in Mass Movements (February 1946) as an aftermath of the RIN Mutiny

22

Labour Unrest and Trade Union Movements (1945-46)

37

Peasant Movements of the Post-War Period (1945-46)

89

5.

The Impact

136

6.

Conclusion

142

Abbreviations Used

148

Select Bibliography

150

LIST OF PICTURES After Page A Newspaper extract on the INA trial

10

Courtesy: Nehm Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi

Civil disturbances on Ra.'Ihid Ali day February, 1946

12

Courtesy: The Statesman

The Naval Strikers Out in the Streets of Bombay, February, 1946

28

Courtesy: Nehru Memorial and Library, New Delhi

Labour Unrest: Chittopra.'Iad Bhattacharya

42

Courtesy: Art Heritage

Bengal Famine 1943

96

Courtesy: Art Heritage

The Tebhaga Movement in Bengal :Somnath Hor

98

Courtesy: The Artist

Thra.'Ihing in a Wodi Village (Mabarashtra) : Chittoprasad Bhattacharya Courtes)' : Art Heritage

132

Preface The dictionary meaning of the word 'upsurge' denotes a tumultuous movement in a forward direction. Inthis case, the term 'political upsurges' refers to the violent agitations projected for a definite cause which occurred in India during the period 1945-46 in which different sections of the Indian population such as the students, workers, peasants and other people actively participated. The brunt of the movement was of course directed against the colonial authorities. There is a tendency among historians to study the top-level negotiations between the British, Congress and Muslim League politicians which culminated in the freedom and partition of the country. It is, therefore, relatively easy to get engrossed in the world of evidence concerning the Simla Conference, Cabinet Mission, Interim Government and Mountbatten Award but a second major trend of the post-war years of 1945-46 was the development of popular mass movements which were militant and sporadic but united and voluntary in character. These included movements for the release of the INA prisoners, the RIN Mutiny and Civil disturbances connected with it, the working class and peasant movements, etc., but there is hardly any systematic historical research on this field in an exhaustive manner. There are few private accounts by participants and certain aspects of this topic have been investigated which may be accounted for as individual isolated cases as fou:nd in secondary works on Trade-union and working·class movements, peasant movements, etc. However, recent release of numerous official and nonofficial· sources revealed that these popular pressures of 1945-46 played an important role in determining the course of events that led to the freedom and partition, but decisions and actions of lead~rs both British and Indian cannot be understood without the counterpoint provided by the pressures from below whose d,ramatic manifes~ tations were some of these popular mass movements. This period was undoubtedly the climatic stage in which the logic of the anti-imperialist movement and colonial rule was unfolded. The popular activity acted as a propelling force behind decision making and stances of the British Government and among national leadership and it was here that the Communists played an

x

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

important role during the economic struggles of the workers and peasants. The Congress policy did not approve of the radical potential held out by the mass struggles and violent outbreaks and moved towards a path of negotiation and compromise. The British too preferred this compromise rather than to surrender, to a more radical combination of political forces or revolutionary path of mass struggle. For my study of this period, I have consulted books and materials including newspapers, journals, etc., at the National Library (Calcutta), Centre for Studies in Social Sciences Library (Calcutta), Centres for South and South-East Asian Studies of Calcutta and Jadavpur University, (Calcutta), Ramakrishna Mission Library, Calcutta, West Bengal Secretariat Library (Calcutta), Nehru Memorial Museum & Library (New Delhi), Indian Council of World Affairs Library (New Delhi), Indian Council of Historical Research Library (New Delhi), Social Science Documerttation Centre Library (New Delhi), P.C. Joshi Archives (JawahaJtlal Nehru University), C.P.I. Archives Ajoy Bhavan, (New Delhi), Madras University Library (Madras), Indian Expr~ss Library. (Madras), Library of Netaji Institute for Asian Studies (Calcutta) for which I must thank the respective librarians concerned. I must thank the librarians of Triveni Kala Sangam, (New Delhi), British Library, (London), Gorky Sadan, {Calcutta).and the American Centre Library, (Calcutta), for giving access toforeign source materials on the subject. I owe thanks to the Director of National Archives India (New Delhi), the Commissioner of Historical Research, Tamil Nadu)State Archives, the Director of West Bengal State Archives, the Director of Bombay Archives for permitting me to gather materials ranging from archival documents to published books, newspapers, Memoirs, private papers, etc. I am grateful to the Intelligence Branch and Special Branch at Lord Sinha' Road, Calcutta, for giving me access to the Intelligence Records of the period concerned. I am also indebted to the editors of the Statesman, the Ananda Bazar Patrika, the Amrita Bazar Patrika and the Photographic Section of NMML. (Delhi) for providing me with a valuable collection of photographs to illustrate the events mentioned. My thanks are accorded to the numerous activists and participants connected with the movements namely Prof Dilip Biswas, Samarendra Nath Basu, Gautam Chattopadhyay, Somnath -Hore, Debabrata Mukhopadhyay, Renu Chakravorty, Renuka Roy, Phani

Preface

Xl

Bhusan Bhattacharya, Bma Bhowmick, Aurobindo Bose, Ranen Sen, Sunil Sen for thdr informative interviews. My thanks go to Sri Ram Chandra Bhattacharya fof reading the proofs of the manuscript and to Sri Nirmalya Bose Thakur for his invaluable assistance in reading through the typed manuscript. My mother followed the writing ofthis book with unfailing interest and helpful comments. It was with the encouragement of my husband Pradeep that this volume is being published. Finally, I must thank the Director of Netaji Institute for Asian Studies, Dr. R. Chakraborty where I worked as a research scholar, my supervisors Dr. Amalendu De, Professor of Hi.story, Jadavpur University and Smt. Chitra Ghosh, Professor of History, Netaji Institute for Asian Studies, for their critical comments, suggestions and encouragement.

39, Mahanirvan Road, Calcutta-700 029.

KEKABOSE

THE POST-WAR SITUATION (1945-46) The Second World-War ended with the victory of the anti-fascist forces and a world-wide mass upsurge of socialist and national liberation forces began in different countries of South-East Asia. Such uprisings often turned into violent revolts. India was also no exception,.The post-war period of 1945-46 saw the masses in India especially students and workers engaged in sharp economic and political struggles conditioned by historic ana socio-economic development of the country.1 A.ri adverse consequence of the Second World War was extreme inflation, disorganisation and famine in the economic field. The economic suffering of the masses instilled moods of revolt and a strong urge for political and economic liberation. While the bourgeoisie took advantage of the acute scarcity of the consumer goods as well as of the increased demand for war-necessities, reaped fabulous profits and that too through most inhuman profiteering and unscrupulous black-marketing activities, the Indian masses and the lower middle-classes suffered unbearable privations.2 Their economic discontent was further activated by the stimulant political condition of the time. In the international sphere, there was a world-wide weakening of imperialist forces. Fascism had been routed and the Communist regime more frrmly established in Russia. Socialist regimes with Communist leadership or participation were emerging in East European countries. The Chinese Revolution was forging ahead. An anti-imperialist wave swept through S.E. Asia with Indonesia, Vietnam and Burma on the vanguard and in many of these countries, the masses emerged in the forefront of these nationalist struggles.3 Meanwhile in India, though the Simla Conference had failed in the summer of 1945, the coming of the labour party to power in Britain in July 1945 created a fresh hope for India's independence. The elections in India were due to be held in winter 1945-46. Nationalist leaders including left-wing extremists who had been released from jail after the war, were looking for an issue to organise an all India national front against -the British and thereby launch a fresh Quit India rebellion. 4 The depression consequent to the brutal suppression of 1942 revolt thus dissipated and a new wave of en-

xiii

The Post-War Situation

thusiasm was evident.s India was thus seething with economic and political mass discontent. The country threa{ened to be a theatre of great mass struggles. Political and economic discontent among the people was consequently aggravated and the class struggles of the workers, peasants and middle-class employees during the immediate post-war period became a regular' feature of the situation. The discontent spread among the armed forces and services creating an explosive revolutionary situation. It was in this situation that British Imperialism, the Indian National Congress, the Muslim League and other political partie~ evolved their respective plans to secure maximum benefits in what~ver new political pattern may emerge as a result of struggle and • • 6 negotiation. REFERENCES 1. Balbushevich V. 'New Stage in the National Liberation Struggle of the People ofIndia', Soviet Document.l946 2. Desai, A.R, Recent Trends in Indian Nationalism, Bombay, 1973. 3. Moon, Penderel, Wavell: The Victory'S Journal, Delhi, 1977. 4. Prasad, Bireswar, Bondage and Freedom, Vo!. 11, New Delhi, 1979. P.548-549 5. Sarkar, Sumit. 'Popular Movements and National Leadership' (194547) in Economic and Political Weekly (EPW), Va!. XVII, 1982. pp. 677-686.

Chapter I

Students and the Anti-Imperialist Mass Upheaval (A Case Study of the students participation in the INA Release Campaign (November? 1945 to February 1946) Part-I The impact of the British rule in India was marked by the introduction of western sciences and technology which inculcated a sense ofrationalism and objectivity in the minds of the students and youth of 19th Century India. They applied this· essence while protesting against social superstition and religious dogmas. 1 With the turn of this century, the student element gradually became politically conscious. The growing intolerance of British oppression and repressive policies created an undying passion for freedom from imperialist domination. Subsequently, the students, thrQughout the struggle for independence demonstrated their patriotic sentiment as in the Swadeshi Movement (1905-08) in the sporadic terrorist activities, in the Non-cooperation and Civil Disobedience Movement (1920-34) and in the Quinndia Movement of 1942 vehemently opposing the Raj through passive resistance, strikes, militant demonstrations leading to violent anti-British activities. They fought for civil liberties, for the release of political prisoners and finally for the liberation of the country and in the course of it, suffered imprisOnIilent, tortm'-e and even sacrificed their lives in the face of British opposition. The post-war years of 1945-46 witnessed one of the greatest student revolts of Asia. 2 The economic hardship caused by the Second World War affected the student community: a bitter memory of a shattered peasant economy, high mortality and suffering caused by the Bengal Famine of 1943 haunted the youthful minds. 3 Along with their countrymen, the latter also had to face the brunt of the rising prices, food scarcity, inflation, unemployment, widespread shortages

2

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

and corruption. An ,anti-imperialist wave swept through S.E. Asia with Indonesia, Vietnam and Burma on the vanguard and in many of these countries students and youth were in the forefront of the nationalist struggle. In Indonesia, students pressure on the nationalist leadership was so high, that they virtually dictated Sukarno and Hatta's.declaration of independence which was issued by the Indonesian Preparatory Committee on August 17, 1945.4 In Burma, several stud
Students and the Anti-Imperialist Mass Upheaval

3

came with the commencement of the trial of Subhas Bose's INA men.12 These men had deserted the British-Indian army or had been t~en prisoners during the Japanese occupation of S.E. Asia and joined Bose's National Army which was formed to hasten the liberation of India by an armed insurgency. During the British recapture of. Burma from Japan in 1945, they were arrested and brought to India. 13 According to the Press communique of 27th August, 1945, three INA personnel were chosen for court-martial for waging war against the king, for murder and abetment to murder. 14 On the 5th November, 1945, the British started the trial of the three INA officers Le. Lt Col P.K. Sehgal (Hindu), Major General Shah Nawaz Khan (Muslim) and Lt Col G.S. Dhillon (Sikh) at the Delhi Red Fort. To the students and the entire pe~ple of the country Subhas Bose was accepted as a National Hero, and the INA men were worshipped as a band of patriotic heroes fighting for the liberation of their motherland. So their arrest and trial incensed deep patriotic feelings and a wave of indignant protest inflamed the mas-. ses.demanding the unconditional release of INA men. However, on 6th November, the court adjourned the trial for ten weeks. A distinct feature of the INA release campaign that followed was the enthusiastic participation of the student community. The students agitated for the INA cause by holding meetings and demonstrations in Calcutta1S, Lucknow, Cawnpore, Lahore, Jullundar, Rawalpindi, Ghaziabad, Madura, Patna, Orissa," Ajmer, S. Arcot, Rajamundry, Poona, Nagpur, Lyallpur, Bilaspur and other places; Strikes and boycott of classes marked a COmmon feature of student activity. They also collected funds for INA defence and succeeded in suspension of business activity to mark solidarity for the INA cause 16• The pro INA sentiment took the form of demonstrations culminating .in violent outbreaks and confrontations with the gover~­ ment on two occa~ions: the first being in November, 1945, rising to a country-wide campaign and the second in early February 1946, ·over the specific case of the INA personnel Rashid Ali's sentence of 7 years RI (by the Commander-in-Chief Auchinleck). On both occasions the students played an active role. The immediate cause behind the disturbance was the resumption of the INA trials"on 21st November; 1945 and 'violent' and 'pernicious' pro-INA propaganda spread by prominent politicians in the Press and on the platform which inflamed the minds of the students. 17 On 21st November, 1945, Calcutta witnessed a mamnioth demonstration of students both male and female who abstained from

4

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

their classes and assembled in a mass rally at Wellington Square to observe the INA day. Here, fiery speeches were delivered against the British and against the trial of the INA officers. Thereafter, the students emerged in a procession from the Square and proceeded along the Dharmatolla Street shouting different slogans: "Jai Hfud", "Release INA", "Quit India", etc~ The procession aimed at reaching the Dalhousie Square· but the latter was declared a prohibited area with Section 144 of IPC being imposed around the square. Hence, at thecrossmg of Madan Street aDd Dharmatolla Street, the students encountered a stiff police cordon. Another students procession came along Central Avenue and joined the first procession but was also held up by the police. The two processions facing each other were kept separated by the police. ls The students, including those associated with Subhas Chandra BOse's Forward Blockl9 were joined by students of Bengal Provincial Students Federation (BPSF) (affiliated to Communist Party and other to RSP-CSP) Bengal Provincial Students Congress (affiliated to the Congress) and the Muslim Students League. Congress, League and Communist flags were tied together and held aloft at the head of the procession. The police cordon prompted the students to squat on the street as they declined to disperse. None of the top ranking political leaders came at this juncture to take the .leadership in the demonstration. So far they were left to their resources and judgment to lead themselves and face a situation which was potentially dangerous. It was a trial of patience b~tween the students and the police. The students patience ran out first and they precipitated the riot by trying to force the cordon thereby putting pressure on the police walL Police firing ensued and as a result of. it, a student and a youngster were killed notably a Hindu and a Muslim: Rameswar Banerjee (18), a student of Calcutta Technical School and Kadam Rasul (16), a factory workt(r. The students were alleged to have pelted stones, brickbats, sodawater bottles and iron-rods at the police but the indiscriminate frring and .the charging by the mounted police chased them upto Hotel Majestic.20 After .thebloody clash, a deadlock followed. The students, instead of dispersing, poured into Dharmatolla Street and squatted throughout the night. It was only after the firing, that eminent personalitieslike Shxamaprosad Mookerjee, Dr RC. Roy, Dr Radhabenode ·Pal and Kirim Swar Roy and others visited the spot but by then mass feeling was keyed up to the highest pitch and they failed

Students and Pie Anti-Imperialist Mass Upheaval

5

to restrain it despite their exhortations. Among the elders who came to express solidarity with the students and stayed side by side with them were women leaders like Jyotirmoyee Ganguly, Bina Das and Bimal Protiva Devi. Jyotirmoyee Ganguly, however, died shortly after, in a tragic accident. News of police ftring and lathi-charge on the students brought forth a wave. of protest by the citizens-of Calcutta and its suburbs during tne next two days. There were spontaneous strikes by transport workers and factory wotkers in sympa~y with the students. A huge meeting was held at Wellington Square on 22nd November. A procession moved towards Dalhousie Square in which Congress, Mahasabha, Khaksar and Red flags were flying high. Road blocks were erected; military, police and private vehicles were obstructed and burnt. Trains were held up by demonstrators. Hence, traffic was at a standstill. Sale in shops and business establishments had to be suspended: Fot example, that of the stock exchange and the Calcutta bullion market, thereby paralysing the li(e of the commUnity. The police opened ftre at several places, killed and injured large numbers.21 . According to the contemporary Bengali poet Saroj Banerjee: "The unity forged in blood itself In Calcutta a new hop.e is throbbing, When bullets no longer frighten And side by side workers and students. Unafraid, enter the fray The brave fight rages, And let him check who dares A rising people's flaming anger."zz The Bengal Immunity and several pharmaceutical concerns organised a medical· relief party to supply free medicines and treatment to the injured. Several student organisations like the students union of the College of Engineering & Technology, Jadavpur, Medical College, Islamia College, etc. adopted resolutions condemning the autocratic high handedness of the police on the students.23 Protest was registered· from all over the country condemning the indisCriminate ftring on Calcutta students. Among the sympathisers were the students themselves: from Bombay, Ahmedabad, Lucknow; Benaras, Patna, Karachi, Delhi, Amritsar, Allahabad, Meerut, Poona, Madras, Wardha, Belgaum, Cawnpore, Bangalore, Cuttack,

6

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

Peshawar, Rawalpind~ Lahore, several districts of East Bengal and so forth. They observed strikes, demonstrations, boycotting of classes in solidarity with their Calcutta brethren and even encountered police firing and lathi-charge. The students of Viswabharati, Santiniketan fasted and went in procession. singing Tagore songs to mourn for the martyrs of the Calcutta firing. The convocations of Agra, Nagpur and Patna universities were boycotted by students in protest against the Calcutta firing. Even the Cambridge University Majlis condemned the police atrocities on the students of Calcutta. As a mark of respect to those killed and injured in the police firing, the Australian cricket team visiting Calcutta and the Bengal Cricket Association observed silence.24 The students riots for the release of the INA men displayed certain distinct characteristics: The students were united on the same platform irrespective of communal and political affiliations. While demonstrating for the release of the INA men, Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs marched side by side setting an example of joint action and spontaneously tying together all the political party flags as a symbol of anti-imperialist unity.2S The strong anti-British sentiment of the students was manifested in their attack on the army and police personnel; official vehicles and military transport were obstructed, damaged and burnt. Indians wearing western clothes were held up by mobs and asked to change into Indian clothes.z' The working class fraternised with the students in their condemnation for police firing on the peaceful student demonstrators. Tram~ workers, bus workers, rickshaw pullers, and taxi drivers went on strike as a protest against police firing on the students. 27 Similar sympathetic strikes occurred in the suburbs of Calcutta especially in the Howrah-Hooghly industrial belt where workers of mills and factories stopped work in solidarity with the student demonstration.28 Even commercial organisations like the Karachi Iron Steel and Hardware Association expressed deep concern over the news of the firing. and lathi-cha,rge on the peaceful student demonstrators in Calcutta and condemned the high handed action of the police.29 Regarding the methods of confrontation, the police mainly fired with revolvers in small groups to disperse the crowds who stood their ground and at most only receded a little to return again to attack. The students resorted to barricade fighting as modes of self-defence. They even resorted to methods of temporary sabotage and kindled the flame of militant patriotism. The rapidity with which it spread

Students and the Anti-Imperialist Mass Upheaval

7

reflected on its spontaneity thereby taking everybody including those organisations which subsequently took part in it by surprise. However, they had to bear the brunt of the battle with unwavering determination and face bullets with unflinching courage;30 The end of the students agitation on 23rd Novemb~r, was rather sudden and mysterious when the mob was almost.out of hand and transport in Calcutta was practically paralysed. The students realised that their purpose of making a symbolic assertion to challenge the alien government had been served. Their primary objective of bursting through the police cordon and the secondary objective of achieving a complete hartal had been attained with outstanding success. So the students organisations decided to withdraw their agitation. Added to this, came messages from political leaders broadcasts from cars carrying Congress and Communist flags as well as peace brigades dissuading students from further participation thereby ter. . the movement. 31 mmatmg Table Showing Loss of Lives and Property Source: Amrita Bazar Patrika, November 30, 1945 and Home Political I

1945 21/16 (NAI)

Casualties Police 1. (a) Detained in Hospital (b) Treated and discharged from hospital (c) Minor injuries

2. 3,

Fire Brigade (a) Treated and discharged from hospital Military (i)

4.

A large number not ascertained.

30

British Forces

(a) Detained in hospital (b) Treated and discharged from hospital (ii)

16 36

14 55

US Forces

(a) Killed (b) Detained in hospital (c) Treated and dis<;harged Public (a) Killed or died in hospital

1 5

32 32

Political Upsurge}'in 1945-46

8

(b) Injured upto midnight November 25-26

Not accurately ascertained but estimated to be 150-200

5.

Vehicles Destroyed and Damaged (I)

PoRce

(a) Destroyed (b) Damaged

1

12

(it) Fire brigade

(a) Destroyed (b) Damaged

1 3

{ill) Other Government Vehicles

(a) Destroyed (b) Damaged (Iv) MiHtary-BritJsb

(a) Destroyed (b) Damaged (c) Missing

1 3

37 29 4

MUi~USArmy

(a) Destroyed (b) Damaged

9 50

Official Observances: Casey, the Governor of Bengal, a witness to the students' agitation observed that the latter were not violent ,and had not planned to promulgate widespread conspiracy or to plunge Calcutta into anarchy. The actual violence was probably perpetuated by Sikhs,' upcountry mechanics and hooligan elements generally. He observed that the student procession to Dalhousie was an act of defiance of authority worked up by a mood of defiant determination in favour of the Indian National Army. The Governor was further impressed by the anti-British feeling operating behind and considered th~ situatior. explosive and dangerous. 32 Viceroy Wavell, estimated that the students were non-violent and provoked by the inflammatory speeches of the political leaders during the preceding two months. It was possibly a dress rehearsal for something bigger, to develop of itself. These riots proved a turning point in the immediate political situation and caused at least a temporary detente.33 The attitude of the political parties towards the students upsurge was varied in nature: The Congress did not support the radical potentialities held out by mass struggles and violent outbreaks. They

Students and the Anti-Imperialist Mass Upheaval

9

upheld the path of non-violence and observed a policy of negotiation and compromise, in opposing the imperialists. Likewise, most of the Congress leaders did not support the student demonstrations against the British.34 The AICC President, Maulana Azad thus appealed to the students of Calcutta in particular not to indulge in processions or demonstrations but to observe discipline and non-violence as the basis of Congress creed.35 Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel also advised the students not to 'fritter' away their energies but to conserve and fight in them for the coming struggle.36 Jawaharlal Nehru, however, rejoiced at the fervour and courage shown by the youngmen of Calcutta at the hour of crisis but warned against sporadic violence and stressed the need for discipline and organised efforts at the right time. 37 Sarat Bose; the elder brother of Subhas Chandra Bose regretted the unjustified police firing on the students and appealed to them to disperse peacefully.38 The Muslim League Spokesman, S.M. Usman too did not approve of the student demonstrations. He observed that the demonstration of students against the INA trial had created a critical situation in Calcutta and appealed to Muslim citizens and students in particular to abstain from such demonstrations. 39 However, Dr. Shyamaprosad Mukherjee, President of Hindu Mahasabha paid a glowing tribute to student heroism and claimed that the attack on the students was wanton, ruthless -and deliberate. He further expressed deep sympathy for the injured and the dead.40 The ~ommunist Party headquarters asked its members, to stage a workers rally to demand for the immediate release of the arrested students and to hold an enquiry and trial of those responsible for firing and ending of police atrocities;41 The Khaksar students were restless over the court-martial of the' INA leaders and their participation· in the agitation along with the students of other political and religious affinity was upheld by their leader Allama Mashriqui as a good chance for bringing about · du-Musl'lm umty. . 42 Hm Hence, the disturbances w~re not officially sponsored by the Congress or any other recognised political party. It only showed to what extent popular feelings had been worked up by the recent propaganda in the press and the platform and clearly established that the control over younger elements was passing out of the hands

10

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

of the leaders of the older parties. While some nationalist leaders like Nehru have applauded the students for their heroism and courage, others like Patel and Azad admonished the students for their heroism and courage. The Communists and other socio-political' parties evolved from terrorist parties were taking advantage of the 'dilemma' of the Congress to increase their hold on the stu43 . dents. Several British and Indian personalities in London condemned the firing on student demonstrations and favoured the release of the INA officers because they recognised the sincerity of motive of the INA officers under trial. V.K. Krishna Menon called. the firing incident 'tragic' and a 'disgrace'. While Rajkumari Amrit Kaur held the firing to be unjustified, William Galacher, the CommUl';'ist MP held that the matter should be raised to the Commons for further examination of action. In Burma, Indians held mass meetings in which Aung San, the President and Than Tun the General Secretary of AFL. participated urging the abandonment of the trial of the INA personnel. 44 The disturbances had an adverse effect on the morale of the army, police and the civilian population. The military, being the symbol. of the government became the target of attack and realised that the only path of safeguarding their life and property was to be in line .with the nationalists. The police too were refusing to aetas 'aunt Sally's' for the mob and complained bitterly at the absence of firm direction from the government. As for the European Community, there was a growing feeling that authority in India as represented by the existing goveriunent was steadily losing its grip and that it did not know how to deal with the immediate future of the Indian problem. They held that if steps. were not taken to reassert the government authority a situation would arise by which the government would cease to be able to exercise any authority at all and the country would plunge into an orgy of lawlessness and bloodshed. 4s Thus the student movement of November 1945 was not an isolated event but a part of the broad nationalist movement for India's liberation. It was not merely a protest demonstration against the INA trials but a solemn resolve to challenge the authority of the alien government. It was also a symbolic assertion of India's right of independence which on some pretext Or the other, th.~ British wefl~ tryins' to suppress .. Life itself and the reality of imperialist repression h/ild made. the students sink their old differences and spontaneou~ly dnlw them together to stand up for freedom. They intended ~oviolence.

A Newspaper extract on the INA trial Courtesy: Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi

Students and the Anti-ImpericUlSt Mass Upheaval

11

They were leaderle~sand took no instructions from any political organisation or leaders. The students knew they would not gain anything - neither would they secure the release of the INA or the liberation of the country.46 They were prepared for sacrifices and suffering which was the price of liberty. Inspired by patriotic idealism and fervent enthusiasm, the students participated in the demonstrations and held to their posts with exemplary discipline and restraint, never to surrender to their enemy. Indeed, they opened a new chapter in the history of freedom movement in India.

Part-II The countrywide nationalist upsurge in India against the trial of the INA and the pressure of the British opinion forced a change in the policy of the government with regard to the INA ·trials·47 The revised policy towards the INA trials was declared in a communique on 6th December, 1945, which stated that only INA members accused of murder and brutal treatment of fellow prisoners would henceforth be brought to trial (instead of the sweeping charge of waging war against the king used in the first case) and imprisonment sentences passed against the first batch were remitted in January 1946.48 Meanwhile, in December 1945, Bhulabhai Desai while defending the INA prisoners in the spirit of the anti-imperialist demonstrators throughout the country had asserted the right of the oppressed people to revolt. In February 1946, t~e British had to face a second crisis. The students, along with their countrymen, again went on war path in protest against the sentence of 7 years' rigorous imprisonment passed on Captain Abdul ~ashid, an officer of the Indian National Army accused of gross brutality to fellow Indians. ·The students of Muslim community were particularly restive on this occasion and the main reason was that the accused was a Muslim. They held that there had been discrimination by the governmen, against the Muslim LeagiIe an£LcoDsequently regarded it as a direct hit at the League. Besides, the Muslim League wanted to show that they- were equally good at agitation as the Congress, to whom the public gave the entire credit for the leniency shown in the frrst INA trial. 49 The League supported the agitation against the conviction of Abdul Rashid as an issue to retain their popular support in thecoming elections.so Further, the League suspected that the Viceroy was

12

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

about to form a Congress Central Government as a preliminary to the convening- of a single constitution-making body thereby by-pass~ ing the League and disregarding the demand for Pakistan. So, tl)e Muslim League took this issue to prepare for a future direct acti~tI . t he government, I'f necessary.SI agamst The major centres of student agitation were located in Bengal, UP, Bihar, Punjab and Bombay but the peak was reached in CalcuttaS2 where on 11th February, the students wing of the Muslim League called for a strike in schools and colleges. Students both Hindus and Muslims of Congress, Communist and other political parties joined hands with the League students and boycotted classes to fmally assemble for a meeting at Wellington Square. Thereafter, a massive students procession marched towards Dalhousie Square, which as already mentioned, was a prohibited area.S3 When the processionists arrived at Clive Street approach to Dalhousie Square, they were faced by a cordon of police. An -Iridian police officer asked them whether they were ready to go peacefully. The General Secretary of BPSF, A.S. Bhattacharya replied on behalf of the demonstrators that they would maintain absolute peace but they must be allowed to go. He next addressed the students and on his request, they all squatted down. He spoke for ten minutes and then a member of the Muslim Students League got upto speak. But before \le started, an Indian Police Officer shouted : "Either you go or we smash". Then smash came with lathis and batons and a contingent of not less than 200 policemen comprising of Gurkhas, Ser~ geants and police were let loose on the processionists whd were squatting peacefqlly. The indiscriminate assault on the students cost them heavily for it left a large number arrested and wounded. Many of them being school students pf very yourig age. S4 . The brutality of the police created wide indignation all over the city. On 12th and 13th February, Calcutta presented grim pictures of protest demonstrations prominently led by both Hindu and Muslim students carrying Congress, League, Communist and Khaksar banner shouting slogans and demanding the release of Capt. Rashid Ali and other INA members fmally urging HineJu and Muslim unity.s5 A leading daily thus gave the banner headline "Flags of all parties unite".56 Students were thus inspired by a common purpose and there was an appearance of political unity.51 It was a unique spectacle when the leaders of different political parties like H.S. Suhrawardy of Muslim Lj;:ague, Satish Dasgupta, the veteran Gandhite of Khadi Pratishthan and the Communist leader Somnath Lahiri were among the speakers

T,,"o of the "·\"rr.11 lIIilitar~' \'rhirlr~ whit"h w('re sri 011 fire dllrill~ the distl\rbaIlCe~ ill Calrutta. Thes(' ,"thicles ""('rr photn;:raphrd in Chiltaranjall A\"rllue '

Civil disturbances on Rashid Ali day February, 1946 Courtesy: lhe Statesman

Students and the Anti-Imperialist Mass Upheaval

13

who addressed the students rally at Wellington Square praising the students and youth· for urging the need for unity in the struggle for freedom. s8 The situation was worse than that of November. In the battle between the students and the military that followed, there was an anti-racial feeling. It was this sentiment which impelled the youth including students to attack the transport system and government institutions (private cars, rickshaws and bicycles were stopped by students) and military vehicles were set on fire. The gublic descended to the streets with the students and the youth. Tram depots, post-offices, railway booking offices were among the government institutions . which were looted and set on fire. Shops, restaurants, cinema halls and European establishments were damaged. The Thoburn Methodist Church, the house of the Bishop and the YMCA were looted. Attacks were made on Sahibs and Indians wearing European clothes. Flats of Anglo-Indians were attacked.60 Certain trains of the EIR and Assam Bengal Railways had to be suspended and reports of disruption of train services 'by squattiQg students and youth on rail tracks came from Naihati and Chinsurah and burning of railway stations was also reported from Kankinara and Akra. 61 Support for the demonstrators came from the working class with greater intensity. The tram; bus and rickshaw pullers of Calcutta were joined by the Jute and Cotton Mill workers of Howrah and Hooghly who refused to work, as a gesture of solidarity for the students cause and condemned the indiscriminate firing on the students. Similar protest strikes occurred in the Belting and Engineering factories and among dock-workers. Feeling ran so high that even workers of British owned industries like Jessop, Gu~st Keen Williams and Burn & Co. agitated and at the G.K.W., the workers replaced the Union Jack by the Tri-colour as a mark of protest.62 It was indeed an unequal battle between the British military, police and the student-youth. Unlike the November agitation, military assistance was requisitioned this time by the British.63 The fight followed the pattern ·of guerilla hit and run tactics. 64 Students blocked the roads by erecting barricades by felling trees and putting dustbins, debris of broken wall or burnt military trucks. As the ,police began to clear up one road block on one side, they set up .another road block on the other. The students stood at the lining of the streets fighting only with brickbats, stones and iron-rods while the military police were well equipped with rifles, machine guns, lathis and tear-gas squads.65 The scene of violence was well conjured by the

14

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

contemporary student-poet Sukanto Bhattacharya in his famous Ben' gali poem "Ajab Larai".66 Owing to the disturbed state of the city, the Calcutta University examination as scheduled were postPQned.67 The Indian National Ambulance Corps led by Dr Subodh Mitra, the Friends Service Unit, the Indian Red Cross Society, the American Red Cross were among the voluntary organisations which supplied relief to the injured. Many wealthy citizens supplied, fruits and others donated blood for the victims. The All Bengal Medical Students Association, the social service Section of the Medical College and several Medical Students volunteered to relieve the injured. Such w~ the intensity of feeling that the students of Medical College later boycotted the opening ceremony of the children ward of the college by the Governor as a protest against the firing and lathicharge on unarmed and peaceful students.68 Messrs KK Dutta & Co. (Solicitors) and J. C. Gupta consented to defend those students arrested in connection with Calcutta disturbance free of cost. Gita Mukherjee, a student volunteer of BPSF collected money for the defence of student prisoners and for providing relief to the victims of the Calcutta firing. Peace brigades were organised from 12th February onwards by political stalwarts, like Suhrawardy, Surendramohan Ghose, Sarat Bose--a.nd others. However, loud-speaker fitted cars flying League, Communist and Congress flags were attacked and smashed. Volunteers and peacemakers were mauled by the frenzied mob. The Governor Casey issued 144 IPC and warned the public not to indulge in lawlessness. The situation fmally became normalised on 16th February after 84 were reported dead and 300. injured resulting from the bitter street clashes with the military and police. 69 The students' agitation was not regional in character but acquired an all India dimension. Students and citizens all over the country condemned the sentence passed on Capt Abdul Rashid and bitterly resented the indiscriminate firing onthe students of Calcutta by the military and police; Reports of harta1s, meetings and processions came from Delhi, Madras, Bombay, Jullundar, Karachi, Meerut, . Lahore, Shillong, Lucknow, Allahabad, Aligarh, Ajmer, Patna, Cawnpore, Orissa and all over Bengal including Dacca, Faridpur, Sylhet, Behrampur, Meherpore, Khulna, Barisal, Midnapore, Chittagong, Chandpur, Tangail, Myrnensingh, Serajganj, Rajshahi, Rangpur, Dinajpur, Jalpaiguri, Kurseong, etc. to name a few. 70 In several places as in Delhi, Bombay and Meerut the leadership

Students and the Anti-Imperialist Mass Upheaval

15

was predominantly taken by Muslim students but were later supported by non-Muslims to make a common cause of the upheaval.71 Delhi particularly saw one of the biggest anti-imperialist student demonstrations. The student procession marched to the Central Assembly where a debate on the resolution for the release of the INA men was going on. In the evening, they took out a torch-light procession. Effigies of British Imperialism were burnt in DeW. and Meerut. Girl students also held meetings and shouted anti-British slogans in Madras and Delhi.12 In Madras, a distinct feature of the agitation was that students from government colleges led the procession to condemn the Calcutta firing. Even in distant Baluchistan the students were successful in closing business activity in solidarity with the occasion. In East Bengal, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was particularly active in leading the students of Faridpur to demand the relea~ of Rashid All.73 The Indian National Congress neither identified itself with these happenings nor did it officially participate in the agitation preceding the disturbance or in the disturbance itself.74 The participation of the BPSC was out of spontaneity on their own accord for a genuine national cause. 7S Although Maulana Azad, the President of the Congress regretted the excesses committed duripg the agitation and asked the students and youth to act with grel;\;ter sense of responsibility in order to serve the cause ofIndia's freedom. 76 There were exceptions within the nationalist leadershjp: we have seen the eminent Congressman Satish Dasgupta addressing the student congregation at Calcutta.77 Aruna Asaf Ali, the active .CSP worker, hailed the student martyrs of the Calcutta uprising and asked the students to infuse the message of independence throughout the country.78 The Communist Party welcomed the unity in action of the fighting youth and welcomed united political strikes by students facilitating a revolutionary consciousness in the national front. 79 Somnath Lahiri, the CPI leader, thus observed that the movement was the beginning of the final showdown with our imperialist rulers ...80 Official sourcel5, however contended that the Communist Party was the most "disruptive force" behind the disturbance. Their student organisations participated in the demonstrlltions and they issued posters and leaflets in order to prolong the agitation. Its aim was violent revolution. If it remained quiet and constitutional, its following would rapidly melt away and go over to the Congress or other o~~apisations with popular appeal. To retain a hold on their sup-

16

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

porters, they continually attracted attention by using agitation against 81 the gover~ment. The Musliin League leaders,had to encourage the demonstration by virtue of their necessity and come out in support of their students. Suhrawardy knew that his influence over the students was small and had little hope of success in the coming ~lections.82 In order to. overcome his shortcomings, he led the procession, addressed the students gathering as a protagonist of Hindu-Musliin or League-Congress unity. As a League leader, he reviled the police and criticised the government. He organised peace squads during the disturbances. Had votes not been necessary, perhaps the League would have taken a stronger line with the MusliM students. Though the disturbances arose out of a Mu~lqn demonstration against the government, the participants in them were probably more non-Muslim than Muslim.83 The Calcutta disturbances had shaken the British to such an extent that the matter. was raised in the House of Commons where Mr Arthur Henderson, the Under-secretary, explained that the disturbances had reached 'such a pitch that Was impossible to restore order with available civil resources.84 . The British Press widely published the event with provocative and intriguing headlines like: "Martial Law in Bengal", "Troops called out to quell mob rule", etc. Francis Tuker, the GOC-in-C Eastern Command recalled later in his memoirs how he had failed to land at Dum Dum but had to descend at Barrackpore on 11th February since it was cut-off from Calcutta by crowds. Then, like a 'thief in the night or as a Tudor prisoner bound for the Tower' slipped down the Hooghly to be taken by launch to Princep Ghat and was heavily escorted to Fort William to inspect the situation.86 The February disturbances were indeed a repetition of the -tragic incidents of November 1945 but of greater intensity. The students again wanted .to pass through a prohibited area in order to defy police authority and thereby start a chain-reaction leading to civil disorder....It was only after repeated firings, much bloodshed and complete dislocation of city life did the police allow the students to pass along this route· on 13th February, 1946. This decision changed the whole atmosphere for the students who had actually intended no violence. .The firing on the students during this occasion depicted how the authorities had failed to grasp the moral from November episode. The government lacked tact and patience and instead of feeling

Students and the Anti-Imperialist Mass Upheaval

17

remorse for their severity, they applied the same unimaginative tactless barriers agaif!.st the s.tudents inviting and even challenging them to dash themselves 'against the armed squads. There was no proof that the student processionists were engaged in or abetted acts of violence. But police authorities later alleged that students had participated in incidents of mob violence 'as is evident from the large numbers of them being killed or injured as a result of counter action by the police and military. The police undoubtedly defended the prohibitc::d area but life would not have been lost, lorries would not have been burnt and an atmosphere of resentment and anxiety would not have pervaded the city if the bureaucracy had been sympathetic and sensible enough to judge the situation in its proper perspetive. The situation indeed displayed the government's short-sightedness; it revealed their failure to gauge the mass psychology and the intensity of public feeling. The February agitation created an unprecedented situation in India which proved to be an opportune moment for malcontents to amalgamate with the youthful masses and indulge in insensate acts of lawlessness and for this the bureaucracy were themselves responsible. 87 The brutality of the imperialists and the fearlessness of youth resistances revealed in the INA release campaign made a decisive impact in the field of cultural activity. It, inspired young. Bengali writers like Subhas Mukhopadhyay to immortalise the November agitation in his essay 'Koler Kolkata' Nirendranath Chakravorty to .dedicate his poem to 'Shahid Rameshwar' and Manik Bandyopadhyay to write his famous novel 'Chinha'. A contemporary literary organ published the poems 'Heroic Calcutta' and the 'Fiery Star' based on the movement. The mood of the February agitation was captured in Sukanto Bhattacharya's poem 'Ajab Larai' Nani Bhowmik's short story 'Chor' and Tarasankar Bandyopadhyay's 'Jhor o Jhora pata'. The Indian People's Theatre Association (IPTA) staged a shadow play 'Shahider Dak' based on the movement. Artists like Chittoprasad Bhattacharya, Shared' and Debabrata Mukhopadhyay gave a commendable expressIon of the movement through their sketches and cartoons which w~re published in the contemporary newspapers, magazines and literary organs of the political parties of the time. 88 The unprecedented students-cum-youth heroism displayed in the INA release campaign on November 1945 and February 1946

18

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

signified that British Imperialism was indeed undergoing a period of profound crisis: a sudden united effort of the Hindus and Muslims was built on this occasion devoid of any political or communal colouring to oust the British Imperialist forces. An atmosphere was thus created at this juncture which was hardly congenial to those who spoke in favolir of separatism and the Two-nation theory. The Indian elements within the Defence Forces which were already restive, were inspired to gather momentum to play a decisive role in the final bid for power. Thus the two main pillars of keeping India in bondage i.e. through Hindu and Muslim discord and on the loyalty of the. British Indian forces were dissipating rapidly.89 The British imperialists were realising that their days were numbered. Even those who were loyal to the administration felt anxious and insecure after the disturbances sensing a lack of a definite policy by the government and a gradual loosening of governmental control.90 The observance of a parliamentary delegation visiting the country in eat:ly 1946 further induced the British to act speedily.91 Three days after the February agitation on 19th February, 1946, When a mutiny of the RIN had already broken out in Bombay and Karachi, the British Prime Minister Atlee formally announced in the House of Commons that a Cabinet Mission was going to visit India "to help her to attain freedOm as speedily and fully as possible" and "to set up the machinery for making that decision".92....This was indeed the first time that the British Imperialists spoke with explicit terms of establishing full self-government in India.

REFERENCES 1. Amarendranath Ray, 'Students Movement in Bengal in 'Challenge' ed. N. R. Ray (New Delhi 1984), p. 523. 2. P. M. Joshi, The Student Revolts in India, (Bombay 1972) Appendix

11. 3. For further reading see-A. K Sen, 'Famine Mortality : A Study of the Bengal Famine of 1943' in Hobsbawm 'Peasants in History' (Delhi 1980). 4. Sumit Sarkar, 'Popular Movement and National Leadership' (194547) 'in Economic and Political Weekly (EPW), Vo!. XVII, 1982, p. 679. 5. Johh, F. Cady, Post-war South-east Asia (New York 1976), p. 24. 6. Robin Jeffrey, Asia, the· Winning ofIndependence, Hong Kong, 1982, pp. 194-196.

Students and the Anti-Imperialist Mass Upheaval

19

7. The Hindustan Standard, (HS), October 18, 1945. 8. Home Political (Poll) I 18/8/45, National Archives of India (NAI). 9. Nicholas Mansergh and E. W. Lumby, Transfer of Power (TP} Vol. VI, No. 189. 10. P. Moon, op. cit., p. 173. 11. Amrita Bazar Patrika (ABP), 25th November, 1945. 12. K. K. Ghosh, Indian National Army: (Meerut 1969), Second Front of the Indian Independence Movement. p. 215 13. B. N. Pandey, The Break-up of the British Empire in India, (Delhi . 1982). 14. Keesings Contemporary Archives 1946-48, p. 7821, A M. Dyakov, Crisis of British rule in India and the New Stage in the Liberation of her people (1948). Soviet Document No. 4, P. C. Joshi, Archives, New Delhi. 15 N.B.: Dalhousie Square was declared a protected area because of its nearness to the Bengal Secretariat, High Court and the Government House. It was protected against public nuisance, processions, demonstrations or noise of the indian multitude, ABP-23rd NOvember '45. 16. Sucheta Mahajan, British Policy and Popular National Upsurge (194546) NMML, New Delhi, 1984 p. 40 and Home Poll (I) 18/11/45 NAI. 17. Home Poll. I 21/16/45, NAI and Sucheta Mahajan, op. cit., p. 46. 18. N. N. Mitra ed., Indian Annual Register, (IAR) An Annual Digest of Public Affairs, Calcutta, 1945 p. 29-30 and HS, November 22, 1945. 19. TP, op. cit., Vol. VI, No. 326. The Forward Bloc students were operating within BPSF. Interview with Aurobiildo Bose, an active member of FB in 1945-46 and 'Historic 21st November' Bengali Pamphlet by Buddhadev Bhattacharya. 20. ABP, 22nd November, 1945, and Hindusthan Times (HT) 22nd November, 1945. 21. Peoples Age (PA), December 2, 1945 and ABP 22nd November, 1945 and Transcript from an interview with Bina Das (Bhowmik). 22. The Student, 21st January, 1946, "Heroic Calcutta". 23. ABP November 23, 1945. 24. Home Poll. I 18/11/45, NAI and HT 27th November, 1945. 25. ABP, November 28, 1945. 26. HS 25th November, 1945 and ABP, November 25,1945. 27. HT 26th November, 1945. 28. ABP, 23rd November, 1945, HT 24th November, r~<5et{'lQ tile News Chronicle, 24th November, 1945. Home Political (Confidential) Secret Reports for 1945.No. 20/45 West Bengal State Archives (WBSA). 29. Home Poll. I 33/28/45, NAI 30. TP, Vol. VI, op. cit., No. 326 and Home Poll. I, 21/16/45 NAI. 31. TP, Vol. VI, op. cit., No. 322 and Home Poll I, 21/16/45, NAI, and Transcript from an interview with Samarendanath Basu who was the

20

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

General Secretary of Bengal Provincial Students Congress (BPSC), 1945. 32. TP, Vot. VI, op. cit., No. 326 and 246. 33. TP, Vot. VI, op. cit., No. 246 and 322. 34. Maulana Azad, India Wins Freednm (Bombay 1964), pp. 132-134. 35. HS, November 24, 1945. 36. IAR op. cit., pp. 29-30. 37. PA, December 8,1945. 38. HS, November 23, 1945. 39. Star of India (SOl), November 23, 1945. 40. IAR, op. cit., pp. 29-30. 41. HT, 23rd November, 1945. 42. Amalendu De, Khaksar Andoloner Itihas (Calcutta 1968) p. 150. 43. Home Poll.l 18/11/45, 44. HT, 27th November, 1945 and ABP November 24, 1945. 45. Home Poll. I 21/16/45, NAI 46. ABP, November 25, 1945. 47. N.B. Influential men in British Public life like Sir Stafford Cripps, Lord Mountbatten. 47. Prof Harold Laski, Reginald Sorensen, F. Brockway favoured the release of the INA officers since they believed that the INA had been fighting for the independence of their country and not sharing the exploits of fascist aggression: K. K. Ghosh, Indian National Army. op. cit, pp. 216. 48. Sumit Sarkar, Modern India, Delhi, 1983, p. 422 and Keesings Contemporary Archives 1946-48, p. 7822. 49. TP, Vot. VI, op. cit, No. 429. 50. Home Poll.l 5/22/46. 51. Ibid. 52. Peoples Age, 17th February, 1946. 53. Amrita Bazar Patrika, 12th February, 1946. 54. N. N. Mitra ed., Indian Annual Register Vot. 11, 1946 (IAR), p. 270 and Star of India, 12th February 1946. 55. Indian Annual Register (IAR) op. cit., p. 271. 56. Amrita Bazar, 13th February, 1946. 57. Sumit Sarker, op. cit., pp. 679-80. 58. AB, P 13th February, 1946 and HS, 13th February, 1946. $9. Hindusthan Standard, 13th February, 1946. 60. Ibid. and Daily Express, 13th February, 1946. 61. Home Poll. I 5/22/46, NAI, and Amrita Bazar, Feb. 14, 1946. 62. Home Poll.l18/12/46, NAI, and Amrita Bazar, Feb. 14, 1946. 63. C. H. Philips and Mary Doreen Wainwright ed., : Partition of India : . Policies and PerspecptivesLondon 1970, pp. 131-33. 64. Renu Chakravarty: Com~unists in Indian Women's Movement, New Delhi 1980, p. 98.

Students and the Anti-Imperialist Mass Upheaval

21

65. Daily Express, February 13, 1946 and Daily Herald, February 13, 1946. Transcripts from interviews with student participants; of 1946 Samarendranatli Basu, Gautam Chattopadhyay and Dilip Biswas. 66. Sukanto Bhattacharya, Mithe Kara, Calcutta 1985. 67. Amrita Bazar, February 13, 1946. 68. Ibid. 69. Daily Express, February 13, 1946, Daily Worker, February 13, 1946, Statesman, 16th February, 1946, February 13, 1946. and Amrita Bazar, February 19, 1946. 70. Home Poll.l18/2/46, NAI, Amrita Bazar, February 16, 1946 and Hin~ dustan Standard, February 17,1946. 71. Peoples Age, February 17,1946. 72. Ibid. " 73. Home Poll.l18/2/46, NAI, and Star of India, 14th Feb., 1946. 74. Home Poll.l 18/2/46, NAI (Transcript from an interview with student leaders of 1945-46 Pror. Dilipkumar Biswas and Samarendranath Basu of BPSC). 76. IAR, op. cit., p. 283. 77. Indian Annual Register op. cit., p. 271 and Amrita Bazar, February 18, 1946. 78. Amrita Bazar, F~bruary 16, 1946. 79. For the final assauIt-Tasks of the Indian people in the present phase of Indian Revolution : Resolution of the Central Committee of CPI, 1946. 80. Chattopadhyay Gautam, 'The Almost Revolution' in Essays in Honour ofS. C. Sarkar, New Delhi 1976, p. 445. 81.. Home Poll.l5/22/46, NAI. 82. Home Poll.l5/22/46, NAI. 83. Home Poll.l8/2/46, NAI. 84. Amrita Bazar,February 14, 1946. 85. Hindustan Standard, February 14, 1946. 86. Francis Tuker, While" Memory Serves, London, 1950, p. 103. 87. HS, 14th February, 1946, Amrita Bazar 14th February, 1946. Sta. of India, 14th February, 1946 and Home Poll.l5/22/46. 88. Compiled from interviews with active participants in the movement. Gautam Chattopadhyay, Debabrata Mukhopadhyay, Renu Chakravarti. The great Soviet" Encyclopaedia, 1983. The Student, 21st January, 1946. 89. G. Chattopadhyay, The Almost Revolution, op. cit., p. 442. 90. Home Poll.l 18/2/46, NAI 91. K. K. Ghose : The Indian National Army, op cit., p. 239, and New York Times, 27th November, 1945. 92. Bireswar Prasad, Bondage and Freedom, Vo!. 11, New Delhi 1978, p. 549.

Chapter 11

A Case Study of the Participation of Students and Workers in Mass Movements(February, 1946) as an Aftermath of the RIN Mutiny The spirit of nationalism roused by the trial of the INA officers inspired the defence forces as well. On 15th February, 1946, 1,200 men including Senior non-commissioned officers of the Royal Indian Air Force (RIAF) camped in Delhi, went on a strike protesting against racial discrimination and demanding gratuity, pay, bonus and pension until re-employment. 1 Close at heels came the revolt of the ratings of the Royal Indian Navy on February 18, 1946 in Bombay. The mutiny involved the whole navy (RIN):-78 ships of various descriptions stationed in Bombay, ~arachi, Madras, Calcutta, Cochin, Vizagapatnam, Mandapam, Jamnagar, Andamans and almost all (he naval shore establishments in the country joined in. Only 10 ships and 2 shore establishments remained unaffected. 2 Even the RIN ships at Aden and far off Bahrain were affected by ratings observing sympathetic strikes. Originating from grievances including derogatory racial discrimination, maltreatment, insecurity on shore and dismal service conditions of the ratings,3 the mutiny unlike the earlier disorders in the navy had a political" complexion.4 It was not only influenced by the trial and court-martial of the INA officers but a loftier step was taken by the militant youth of the RIN: "We have learnt the art of how to defend freedom - unfortunately, so far of other lands: We know how to organise; life in the navy has taught us to be on the job with perfect discipline. We are now ready to offer our services for the nation and that is why we want our national -demand for freedom". Such was the flaming revolutionary message coming from a section of our people who so far the British had regarded as their "exclusive preserve".5 The mutiny was significantly marked by the removal of the Union Jack from the ships which was replaced by the Tri-colour, League and the Red Flag. Strike committees were con-

participation of Students and -Workel"$

23

stituted. The demand as formulated by the elected Naval central strike committee combined service grievances with national political slogans: "Release INA and other political prisoners", "withdrawal of Indian troops from Iridonesia," acceptance of Indian officers alone as superiors etc. The mutineers renamed the RIN as the Indian National Navy and sought advice and help from the nationaliSt leaders but got little or .nothing in return. The ratings of Bombay hesitated fatally on the borderline of non~violent peaceful strike and determined mutiny with the promise that no action will be taken and obeyed orders of the government on February 20 afternoon to. return to their respective ships and barracks only to find themselves surrounded by armed guards.6 Fighting broke out from 21st. The call of the naval mutineers was well expressed through the Urdu song composed by the Poet Josh Malihabadi popularly sung by th~ ratings: "Kaam hai mera taghayyur, nam hai mera shabab. My job is to change, my name is Youth, Mera nara Inquilab O-Inquilab O-Inquilab. My slogan is Revolution! Revolution! Revolution! 1 A remarkable development that followed was that civilians including students and workers particularly attracted by the mutineers grievances exhibited remarkable fraternisation and came forward to express their support for the ratings by registering protest through hartals, demonstrations, etc., thereby justifying the heroic action of the mutineers. Role ofthe Students In Karachi, the agitators included Hindu students and a few Muslims.8 The students, belonging to schools and colleges enthusiastically boycotted classes on 22nd and 23rd February and went in processions led by Communist leaders urging other civilians to join.9 The Congress students also participated.' The Sindh Students Congress assisted by prominent Congress leaders took out a well attended procession followed by a meeting. The students shouted anti-British slogans and resolutions condemningmilitary.action, sympathising with the victims and demanding an impartial enquiry was passed. The anti-British speeches made on this occasion bore an anti-racial strain. Similar well-attended students meeting was held outside the Law College where anti-British resolutions were made. 10 There were certain instances of violence: such as the paratroopers escorting the ambulances carrying casl'lalties among the Indian

24

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

ratings were heavily stoned by a crowd, mostly of students.ll Europeans and Anglo-Indians were attacked and forcibly deprived of their hats and ties which were burnt on the spot. The students held up tram services and such was the intensity of feeling that traffic could only be restored by armed police action. Even political stalwarts like Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah and Said Haroon, brother of Yusuf Haroon were stoned and assaulted by crowds of students.12 Finally, the students were dispersed by joint intervention of Congress, League and other Communist Party leaders.13 To the youth the "Striker Ships" at Bombay Apollo-Bunder had become symbols of freedom. A youngster who was watching intently was asked by an elder to go away as there might be trouble-without removing his narrowed eyes from the ships he slowly and deliberately answered: "Let the police shoot me down, I shall not move from here. If I die, it will be having seen the most glorious sight in my life-A Navy of our own!,,14 The Bombay students union (affdiated to the All India Students Federation) took the lead but were later joined by the Muslim Students Federation to observe a hartal in sympathy with the ratingsls and against the firing on castle barracks. They came out with a leaflet giving facts on the firing on the naval-ratings. The General Secretary of the BSU Susheela Madimann appealed to the students to play a leading· part in building up the agitation in support of the navalratings. The messages to the students ran thus: "To express out firm solidarity with our brothers in the Indian Navy, Bombay Students Union calls upon all city students to observe complete strike on 22nd February and to hold meetings and demonstrations, let thousands of Bombay students unitedly pledge their full support to naval comrades. The BSU earnestly appeals to the Muslim Students Federation and the Students Congress to join hands, with us on this common issue and help in making the students hartal and demonstration a grand success. Inside the navy are men of all communities and different political viewpoints. They stand united to win their demands. Let us students pledge that in case these men are tried, victimised or punished in anyway, we shall not fail to make another INA out of the issue and agitation and rouse the entire country till they are released". Even the CSP leader Mrs. Aruna Asaf Ali advised the student organisation!; of Bombay to extend tHeir moral support to their legitimate demands of the naval strikers. 16

Participation of Students and Workers

25

Thereafter students notably of the G.S.N. Medical College, Wilson's College and the St. Xaviers College marched in procession to collect money in order to buy food for the RIN ratings. The student demonstrations of South Bombay were not interfered with by the police and there followed no clashes.17 In North. Bombay, the students, however, encountered police lathis and fought back with bare fists only to be dispersed after a vicious battle with the police. Such a site was the Ruia College in North Bombay where a procession of 500 students were lathicharged but they re-grouped themselves on the Tilak Bridge and half a furlong away, they were attacked near Hind Mata Cinema. The Students Congress despite 09Position from their leaders came out en masse; the League and Communist students fought desperately with sticks and barefists to protest against the firing at Bombay and Karachi but were fmally dispersed after a heavy lathi-charge by the · 18 poIIce. In Ca:lcutta on· February 22nd and 23rd over a lakh of students abstained from classes and were out in the streets talking about the heroism of the Bombay navy boys and resenting the insulating declaration of the flag-officer-in-command. 19 Later, they staged a demonstration in connection with the naval strike and paraded in small processions. Students congregated on Ashutosh Mukherjee Road shouting slogans "Accept, the demands of the ratings", "end police zodlum", "Congress, League, Communists Unite", etc. and suspended buses and trams requesting passengers to get down. The police arrived and there followed a clash between the students and the police at Jogubazar. 20 Students' primarily belonging to the Bengal Provincial Students Federation (RSP and Tagorites) organised a protest meeting at Sraddhananda Park presided by Mr Radhagovind Dutta, a student leader.21 They were enthusiastically supported by students and workers of other political affiliations. Thereafter, students carrying Congress, League and Red Flags and shouting antiBritish slogans assembled at the Park where they adopted a resolution congratulating the naval ratings of Bombay and Karachi and calling all the anti-imperialist forces to put up an organised and united front against imperialism. Similar protest meetings were summoned by the Calcutta Students Federation at Wellington Square which was addressed by the eminent Bengal Congress Leader, K. P. Chattopadhyay and other Communist leaders. 22 Among the student leaders who rose to the occasion were Binay Sen, Arun Dasgupta, Buddhadev BhattachaI'ya, Niranjan Sen, Nripen Sanyal, Shyamlal

26

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

Kshetri to name of few. 23 The students of Calcutta condemned the action of the naval authorities on the naval ratings in Bombay and held that all the demands of the ratings should be conceded. They further expressed that this incident slfrved to show that the feeling of intense nationalism had permeated into all sections of the Indian people including students as well. It was indeed a duty for the antiimperialist forces to guide this new consciousness among the students along a proper channel. The students also demanded full compensation for loss of lives jn connection with the mutiny.24 In Madras, the students organisation· affiliated to the AISF called for a peaceful strike supported by the Madras Students Congress in sympathy With the naval ratings. Thereafter, students from most institutions including girls abstained ~ classes and marched with Congress, League and Communist banner along the Mount Road, Loane Square and other main roads of Madras to asserri,b~e for meetings at Peoples Park, Napier Park, Royapettah Congress Ground, Tilak Ghat, High Court grounds, etc. where they passed protest resolutions against the police and military firing at Bombay and supported the demands of the naNal ratings. They wore badges with 'Strike for RIN' inscribed on them and raised slogans like 'Jai Hind' 'strike for the ratings', etc. as expressions of solidarity for the naval mutineers. At the High Court grounds the students were addressed by Mr. Ramunni Menon, Dravyam Krishnaswami and others. At the Tilak Ghat, the Student Federation Leader, V. Parameswaram, addressed the student gathering to be followed by speeches delivered by other student and working class leaders like Jeevana.ndan, Somasundaram etc.25 On behalf of the Indonesian Youth Association (Madras Branch), Mr . Tooi offen,d fraternal greetings to the youths of the city for making the hartal a complete success.26 'I am gla<;l, you have demonstrated your unity, the unity of Hindus and Muslims. In Indonesia, we built our unity and then we declared our independence, a representative of the Indonesian Freedom Movement present at the student congregation observed.'27 The hartals involving school boys in sympathy with the naval strikers in Bombay and Madras were generally peaceful except. in Virudhanagar where there was some stone throwing. At Conjeevaram town, in the Chinglepdut district, student processionists from a local high school however indulged in acts of violence. The situation was finally brought under .control by police action.28 From Tiruchirap.oly and Madurai came reports of .similar

participation of Students and Workers

27

student agitations.29 Mr M.R. Venkataraman, Secretary ofTamil Nadu Committee of CPI observed that the students had demonstrated their anger against the imperialist rule of terror in Bombay and their sympathy with the Indian naval ratings fighting for their demands. Mr K. Kamraj Nadar had advised the students to observe the hartal condemning the shooting incident in Bombay and Madras non-violently and without disturbing public tranquility.30 However, strong disapproval of hartals by students was expressed by the Congress leader Sardar V ~llabhbhai Patel. He said: "I understand that the communist section of the students known as the Students Federation under the inspiration of the Communist Party was trying to stage a hart~. This would naturally, result in' reviving trouble which has just began to subside, I would, therefore, appeal to the students to desist from staging any demonstration which would present the early restoration of normal conditions".31 Patei further held that the closing of schools and colleges was not likely to help the unfortunate naval ratings in their efforts to redress their legitimate grievances on difficulties in which they find themselves. The Congress was' making all possible efforts to help them out of their difficulty to redress their genuine grievances. He appealed to the people to be patient, peaceful and to maintain strict discipline and not to disturb the people ofthe city.32 Pandit Nehru sharply reprimanded the student fraternity. "They seemed to behave as if India was waiting for them to take over leadership. In all freedom movements, students were the backbone. They also provide a reservoir from which future leaders would arise. But Indian students had already usurped leadership". He said that their activity had become fantastic and riQiculous. He appealed' to them to devote themselves to study and quiet constructive work and await the lead of the Congress.33 While addressing the students of the Grant Medical College, Bombay, he- denounced the violent character of the movement and held that anti-social elements were exploiting the situatipn,and that the riots displayed that constructive tendency was'lacking. He asked the students to direct their energies along the channel of constructive work. 34 Though nationalist leaders did not seem to encourage the students agitation'in support of the naval mutineers, we have to admit that the student community irrespective of their political or communal affiliations had magnificently responded to the call of theRIN ratings exhibiting acts, of selfless devotion, marvels of resourcefulness

28

Political Upsurges in 1945-46 I

and resistance along with their countrymen in their mission for combating the imperialist forces. The students had realised that they had a decisive role to play in the final battle for India's freedom. They· had indeed shaken the roots of imperialism during the INA release campaign (November 1945-February 1946). Now they upheld a distinct sense of awareness that was seeping in the minds of the RIN ratings, that the Indian defence forces were truly national and that they should not be utilised for suppressing the freedom movements inside or abroad. Role of the Working Class The RIN mutiny genuinely moved the working class which went into extensive action in support of the ratings. On 22nd and 23rd February, the workers of Bombay supported the heroic action of the RIN ratings and in defence of their just rights exhibited an unprecedented demonstration of fraternal solidarity in the form of a complete city-wide hartal and strike.35 Earlier, the Communist Party had issued a call to the workers on 21st February to observe hartal in support of the demands of the naval ratings and to save them from the threatened destruction. They carried on propaganda in. the mill area upholding the revolutionary action of the Indian navy and announced the hartal. Speakers described the heroic action of the Navy Boys and the danger they were threatened with. 47 street meetings were held. The revolutionary action of the Indian Navy was won over and there followed· a spontaneous and voluntary strike of 3 lakhs of workers. 36 The mills, G.I.P., B.B. and c.1. railway workshops and other small and big factories struck work. Processions of workers paraded through the streets shoutirig slogans and then terminated for meetings in nearby maidans. Such a meeting was addressed by the cpi leader, S.A. Dange at Kamgar Maidan. A distinct feature of this gathering was that the workers procession from the GIP, Parel Workshop carried all the three flags of Congress, Communist and . Iy. 37 L eague respective The Tramway and bus workers too did their job without waiting for a formal call from their union. They raised the slogan 'Izzatwalla Bahar ho' (those with self-respect come out). Later in the day, they were seen in the south capturing the company buses and rushing about in them with Congress and League flags flying. 38 \ Initially, the processions were peaceful and disciplined but the provocative attacks of the police made the workers retaliate. In the

Participation pi Students and Workers

29

fort area, a procession of dock workers was suddenly driven into by a military lorry crushing two workers on the spot. In the commotion that followed two other workers wer~ killed by police fire. This infuriated the workers who attacked and burnt military lorries. This brought the British Military' on the scene and firing from rifles and tommy-guns followed wounding and killing several. The people's fury had been roused. When a sergeant for no reason arrested a worker at Lal Baug, the latter's friends rushed forward. The sergeant fired his revolver. But this only acted as a signal for hundreds of other \Yorkers to overwhelm the sergeant from all sides. The police now levelled their rifles and some workers fell bot before the police could reload, the crowd fell on them and the police' had to run for their lives. At Lal Baug, police entered into chawls and beat up workers and arrested them. When the workers demanded the release of an .arrested worker they were faced with police bullets and several lay wounded in return. In the skirmish that followed, two clerks from Haf'kine Institute who were going home were shot and one of them _died on the spot. . At De Lisle Road, the workers fought a frontal battle with the armed police who were met by a hail of stones.39 The British Military lorries ran through the working class area firing aBne crowd without the slightest provocation. They had established themselves at strategic points armed with machine-guns. At many places as people were sitting in their homes and shops, the military lorries. passed spitting fire and beating many. Thus the. disciplined political demonstration of workers was turned into mass slaughter. Almost the first victims of indiscriminate firing was Kusum Ranadive,. a labour leader and Kamal Donde, the. wife of a labour leader. 'the police firing that ensue4'left 250 of which 97 belonged to tt ~ working class area.4O A striking feature of the incident was that half of Bombay's mass shootings and death roll fell in the working .class area whereas the majority cases of hooliganism and cases of looting of banks, burning of post offices, breaking-open of shops, etc. took place in the domin~ht non-working class area of the south. The irony was that the bulk of firing was directed against the workers demonstration and not against hooligan activities. 41 The trams that were burnt were done only after the brutal firing had started. Thus it would be sheer dishonesty to justify the shooting as a mere consequence of hooliganism on part of the people. It was an undeclared martial-law operating in the streets of Bombay be-

30

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

cause the workers had dared to sympathise with those whom the government had declared 'mutinous'. The action of the government had nothing to do with either self-defence or restoration of order. It was an open attempt to suppress the 'workers for having dared to sympathise with the naval-ratings.42 During the next three days, the workers stayed away from factories and mills. Shops remained closed. On 23rd February, when the news of the surrender of the ratings at the call of Sardar Patel came, the workers were still in no mood to resume work. They crowded in hospitals to visit their wOJlnded and their dead. Scenes of brutal mili~~y frring and dauntless resistance by workers followed. Workers both Hindus and Muslims as well as lower-class people banded together -behind barricades and fought pitched-battles. Sometimes they fought in guerilla fashion: Shrill whistles announced the emergence of military from hidden places. The military fired at random and departed. This reckless firing roused the anger of the people and sometimes found vent in pointless acts of d,~struction.43 On 24th February when the workers still refused to work in protest against police firing, they were fired again by military and police and in many chawls of the working class area mass arrest~ w~m. -made. These workers mainly came from municipal chawls, Kumbhar chawls, Hug mill chawls, etc. and among those arrested were scavengers from municipal chawls. Gradually the movement subsided leaving hundred killed in the working class area alone. 44 In Madras, the strike was engineered by a number of local trade unions aild most of them were controlled by the Communist Party. On 24th February, 1946, at the annual conference of the Madras Press Labour Union, A.S.K. Iyengar, one of the Communist -leaders called upon the workers to declare a one-day strike as a mark of protest against the police firing in Bombay. Leaflets were issued immediately under the signature of a number of leading local labour unions.4S The next day, the tram workers, the Press workers, the workers of Buckingham and Carnatic Mills, Binny's and Beach Engineering Workshops and Spencers struck work46 and about 15,000 went round the city in processions shouting slogans and calling upon others to follow suit. They assembled for meetings at People's Park and in various parts of the city. Workers upheld traffic and this finally resulted in clashes with the police and workers. 47 In Karachi, the workers observed hartal and held meetings at Idgah Maidan and encountered tear-gas and firing from the police. 48 In Bengal; there were strikes in engineering, industrial and

Participation of Students and Workers

31

public utility concerns mostly controlled by Communists in sympathy with the RIN mutineers49 and against police firing in Bombay and Karachi. In Calcutta, the protest strike was led by the Calcutta Tramway workers. Transport was suspended and workers came out on the street demonstrating in various parts of the city carrying Congress, League and Communist flags shouting slogans "Accept the demands of the ratings", "End police zoolum", "Congress League and Com- . munist unite". The demonstrations terminated at Wellington Square and were addressed ·by prominent Congress and Communist leaders.50 The entire working class of Trichinopolly demonstrated against the repression let loose on the RIN ratings and the people of Bombay and Karachi. The SIR colony at Golden Rock: 5,000 workers, 500 clerks and 200 sweepers struck work at the call of the CPI and marched through the town. It was a scene of peaceful worker's strike and hartal. All the shops, factories and hotels of the Golden Rock were closed and streams of workers in processions came from all parts that included railway workers, bidi workers, scavengers, bus workers and shop assistants who assembled for rally to voice their sympathy for the RIN ratings and their condemnation of military atrocities.51 At Ahmedabad, public meetings were held in the working claSs localities and a procession of Harijan workers toured the major working class areas. Finally a rally of 6,000 workers was held at Kamgar Maidan to register protest against the police firing at Bombay and Karachi. About 10,000 workers responded to the strike at the call of the CPI and most of the Mills remained closed.52 At Cawnpore, 6,000 workers rallied at a meeting despite the heavy rains. At Madurai ther-e was· a strike in factories, presses, scavengers, handloom weavers, textile mill workers, etc.53 6,000 Railway workers of Lumding and Pandua in Assam struck work and identified themselves with the general sentiment by stopping the train for hours. 54 In Delhi a mass ·rally was organised by the Communist Party of India and the trade-unions on February 25, 1946. Speakers gave call to boycott the 'Victory Day' celebrations on March 7; ·1946 as a protest against military atrocities in Bombay, Calcutta and Karachi. On March 7, 1946 Delhi witnessed. not the illuminations and jubilations of victory but a general strike, hartal, curfew and in its defiance, a mass rally, burning of Reserve Bank and Town flall building, large scale arrests and deaths by military firing that followed. This

32

Politic(ll Upsurges in 1945-46

demonstration of the people's will was opposed by the Congress and League leaders.ss Later, on March 8, the workers of Bombay observed a rally at Kamgar Maidan to pay homage to the 300 martyrs of the military firing on those three days of February. Arepresentative of the RIN addressed the gathering. He thanked the workers for their support duritig the strike and appealed for a Congress, League and Communist united defence-committee for the defence of the arrested • S6 ratings. Thus, the Indian working class instinctively saw in the naval rising anistoric turning point in our fre.edom struggle and supported it by total protest strikes and hartals. The great solid~rity action staged by the advance guard of the Indian working class in 'Support of the naval uprising was not an isolated incident. It was a signal which annoUnced to the world that a volcanic discontent and an anti-imperialist upsurge was smouldering in the minds of the Indian people and their armed forces were ready to be united and harnessed for the final battle. Thus we see that a similar enthusiasm was evoked as in tlte case of the INA issue by st-udents and workers when the ratings went on strike over issues highlighting dismal syrvice condition and ail under• • S7 lymg demand for mdependence. Like the INA demonstrations, a virulent anti-British sentiment was manifested in the destruction of things associated with the British resulting in assault on Europeans as well. s8. Though strikes and demonstrations were organised by students and workers, the major acts of destruction stated to be anti-British in nature was committed by the hooligan element of the 'Rifraff community as observed earlier by Casey and Francis Tuker in the case of the INA agitation. s9

an

Attitude of the Indian Political Parties A distinct feature of the mass disturbance associated with the RIN Mutiny was that the students and workers demonstrations were prominently organised and led by the Communist Wing of the students organisations and the Communist controlled trade-unions. In most of the affected areas, "Victory for India" was written under hammer and sickle signs in the ~treets of the working class arei;ts a British news report obserVed. In fact, S.A. Dange stated that the exchange of shots at the Castle barracks in Bombay and the irresponsible and intimidating broadcast of Godfrey to destroy the Indian

Participation of Students and Workers

33

Navy was the conclusive proof to the people that unless they moved, the boys would be killed. Hence, the Bombay Communist Party reviewed the situation and decided to give a call for the hartal. Even the Muslim League admitted that the CommUnists had swayed the working class in the 'recent happenings,.60 . In Bombay, there was no official intervention or any assurance from the Muslim League or Congress in support of ratings cause. In fact, official Congress had disapproved of strikes and SardarPatel and S.K. Patil had made statements dissociating themselves from the hartals.61 Gandhiji was unequivocally hostile as Patel. His main argument was that the RIN men had no right to strike; and, that they should have resigned and on the civil disturbances in support of the ratings had made a very interesting statement that 'a combination betweeQ Hindus and Muslims and others for the purpose of violent action was unholy...62 But there were exceptions within the Congress Wing: for example, -Congress socialist leaders like Achyut Patwardan and Mrs. Aruna Asaf Ali of C.S.P. supported the ratings cause and argued that "if a wage-earning slave saw in his QWn humiliations by his white-race arrogant superiors an insult to whdle nation, why does Gandhi deny him the right to protest?" She had also ironically prophecised that it was easier to unite the Hindus and Muslims at the Barricade than on the constitution~l front.63 However, students and workers of other political affiliations including that of Congress joined the Communists en-masse despite opposition from their leaders on their own accord to create an appearance of political unity and the unity of three flags i.e. Congress, League and that of the Communists was in evidence everywhere. A significant feature, similar to the INA release campaign was the ,absence of sectional or communal discords. Hindu and Muslim workers and students joined hands for a common cause. Indeed, it was a dominant note of action of the students and workers against the police and military repression. The naval central strike committee thus congratulated the students and the workers claiming that their action had inspired the men and the navy with the conscieusness that all India believed to be just and right. 'We are grateful to the citizens particularly students and workers in docks, transport and factories for the solidarity and support. We pay our respectful homage to the workers who. have perished or have been injured in the hands of the British authority

34

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

for the crime of demonstrating their sympathy with our cause,.64 .The strike committee significantly pointed out that it 'Yas for the first time that the blood of men in the services and men in the streets flowed. together in a common cause.65 A magnificent Hindu-Muslim unity had been created by the revolutionary action of the Indian masses and the armed forces in February 1946, but it was thwarted by the national leadership which condemned violence and favoured a peacefultransfer of power. But the British had now realised that the loyalty of the Indian defence forces, which was one of the pivots of the British administration for keeping India in bondage with withering away. The RIAF was aheady restive. The soldiers at Jubbalpur were seething with discontent. 66 These events along with the substantial depression in the international status of Great Britain as well as deterioration in ecOnomy, growing unemployment, made the task of His Majesty's Government tremendously difficult to maintain its imperialsway. The new Labour Government was conscious of the situation and decided to transfer power to Indian hands as early as practicable. Thus a new political line was inaugurated to meet the needs. A member of the visiting parliamentary delegation to India in January-February '46 had observed:"We must quit quickly. If we don't, we shall be kicked OUt.,,67 It was therefore announced on 19th February 1946, (the day after the mutiny broke out in Bombay), by the British Prime Minister, Atlee in the House of Commons that a Cabinet Mission was going to India to help her to attain that freedom as speedily and fully as possible· and to set up the machinery for making that decision.68 As the poet Samar Sen reca:lled: The warships, fooled by bluffs lie silent at the harbour The bayonets stand on guard, Arrogant Symbols of an empire Our freedom is on its way! The Cabinet Mission is on its way! Jai Hind !70 REFERENCES L Gupta, P. S. 1980 A History of the All India Trade Union Congress, New Delhi, People Publishing House, pp. 440-41. 2. Ghose, K. K. 1969 Indian ·National Army, Meerut, Meenakshi

Participation of Students and Workers

35

Prakashan. p. 233; 3. Ganguly, S. M. 1948 Leftism in India; M. N. Roy and Indian Politics (1920-1948) Calcutta, Minerva Associates. P.261-264 4. Ghosh; K. K. op. cit., pp. 233-35. 5. The Student, 9th March, 1946. 6. ,Sarkar, Sumit, op. cit., pp. 423-424. 7. Banerjee, Subrata, 1981 The RIN Strike, New Delhi, People Publishing House, p. 112. 8. Mansergh N. and Lumby E. W. (Ed.) Transfer of Power, vo!. VI. no. 474. . 9. Mitra, N. N. (Bd.) 1946 Indian Annual Register (IAR) An Annual Digest of Public Affairs, (I), p. 298. . 10. Home PoIl.(I) 5/14/46, NAI. 11. Amrita Bazar Patrika, February 23,1946. 12. Home PoIl.(I) 5/14/46, NAI. 13. Janata, March 10, 1946. 14. The Student, March 9, 1946. 15. People's Age, March 3, 1946. 16. Home Political (I) 21/1/46, NAI, 17. The Student, March 9,1946. 18. Peop'le's Age, March 2, 1946. 19. Ibid. 20. Amrita Bazar Patrika, February 23, 1946. 21. People's Age, op. cit. 22. Amrita Bazar Patrika and the Statt;Sman. February 23, 1946. 23. People's Age, op. cit. 24. Hindusthan Standard, February 24, 1946 and Amrita Bazar Patrika, 24th February, 1946. 25. IAR, op. cit., p. 318 and the The Hindu, February 26, 1946. 26. Hindusthan Standard; February 26, 1946 and Amrita Bazar Patrika, February 26, 1946. 27. People's Age, March 3, 1946. 28. IAR, op. cit., p. 326. 29. People's Age, op. cit. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. The Bombay ChroJ'!icle 27/2/46. 34. IAR, op. cit. 35. Banerjee, Slibrata, op. cit. p,.127-135. 36. Adhikary, G. (Ed.), 1946, The Story of the Strike in the Indian Navy, New Delhi: PPH; and People's Age, March 9, 1946, pp. 24-34. 37. Ibic!. and IAR, op. cit. p. 326. 38. TheStudenl, March 9, 1946. 39. Adhikary, G., op.cit. P. 24-34 40. Banerjee, Subrata, op. cit., p. 129 and Bombay Chronicle 23/2/46.

36 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 6i. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70.

Political Upsurges in 1945-46 Ibid. Ibid Banerjee, Subrata, op. cit, pp. 129-130. Adhikary, G., op. cit, pp. 24-34. Fortnight Report of the Madras Presidency, February 1946. Tamil Nadu Archives (TNA). Home POll.(I) 5/5/46, NAI. Banerjee, Subrata, op. cit., pp. 132-133. Ibid. Home POll.(I) 18/2/46, NAI. Banerjee, Subrata, op. cit., pp. 132-133. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Gupta, P. S., op. cit., pp. 439-441. Adhikary, G. Resurgent India at Crossroads: 1946 in review. Mahajan, Sucheta, 1984 British Policy and the Popular National Upsurge-1945-46, NMML. P.56 Ibid., pp. 55-58. Daily Worker, February 1946 and Adhikary, G., op. cit. pp. 24-34 Mansengh N. and Lumby T. P., op. cit."vOl. VI. The Star, February 1946. Sarkar, Sumit, 1983 Modern India, New Delhi, 1983 p. 425. Janata, March 31st, 1946. Adhikary, G., op. cit., pp. 24-34 and Bombay Chronicle, February 1946. Banerjee, Subrata, op. cit., p. 127. Chattopadhyay, Gautam 1975 'The Almost Revolution' in Essays in honour of S. C. Sarkar, New Delhi, p. 442. Amrita Bazar Patrika, February 23, 194~. Prasad, Bireshwar, op. cit. P.548-49 Sa mar Sener Kabita, (Bengali), Calcutt-a-1954. Chattopadhyay, G., op.,cit., p. 44.7.

Chapter III

Labour Unrest and Trade Union Movement (1945-46) The termination of the Second World War and the defeat of fascism opened a period of country-Wide mass upsurge. aimed towards the national liberation of the country. Side by side, the working class of India also engaged itself in sharp economic and political struggles conditioned by the historical and socio-economic development of the country.1 Hence, the post-War period of 1945-46, saw an unprecedented wave of countrywide labour unrest riddled by massive strikes. During the· war years, there was an increase in the number of industries as well as industrial produ<;:tion fostered by the demands of the war.2 There were advances in textile, iron and steel, cement, paper, engineering, and chemical industries3 and the industrial production rose from 102.7 in 1939 to 120.0 in 1945.4 There was an increase in the number of factories as will be clear from the following table: Factories: 1939-46

Year

Perrennial

Seasonal

All Factories

1939

6,943

3,523

10,466

1940

7,320

3,599

10,919

1941

8,175

3,693

11,868

1942

8,846

3,681

12,527

1943

9,533

.3,676

13,209

1944

10,347

3,724

14,071

1945

11,019

3M6

14,665

1946

11,026

3,179

14,025

The growth of industries created better opportunities for employment as shown in the following table:

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

38

Employment: 1939-46

Year

In Perennial Factories

In Seasona) Factories

In All Factories

1939

1,460,314

290,823

1,751,137

1940

1,548,021

2%,407

1,844,428

1941

1,850,081

306,2%

2,156,377

1942

1,980,970

301,318

2,282,288

1943

2,137,9~2

298,390

2,436,312

1944

2,227,240

295,513

2,522,753

1945

2,366,242

276,735

2,642,977

1946

2,061,902

252,685

2,314,587

Hence, the increase in the number of industrial workers was a little more than 50% over that of the pre-war period while the increase in the number of factories was of the order of 40%.5 Trade-unions: 1941 to 1947

Year

No. of Regd. Unions

Unions submitting Returns

Membership of Unions submitting Returns

1941-42

747

455

573,520

1942-43

693

489

685,299

1943-44

761

563

780,%7

1944-45

865

573

889,388

1945-46

1,O~7

585

864,031

1946-47

12~

998

13,31,%2

The gigantic growth in the trade-union membership was due to the fact that the trade-union movement was 00 longer confined to workers in large industries but spread. to white collard clerks, scavengers, peons and government servants.6 Hence, the increase in the growth and strength of the trade-unions was not only due to the growing trade-union consciousness which manifested itself in their desire for the improvement of service conditions. Workers saw huge profits that the industries were making aod desired a reasonable

Labour Unrest and Trade Union Movement

39

share in them. The following table shows the growth in profits: Profits: 1940-45 (Base 1939-40=100) Year

Index o~~rofits

1940

138.0

1941

187.0

1942

221.8

1943

245.0

1944

238.9

1945

233.6

It is true that the wages also increased during the period but they could not keep pace with the ever-increasing cost of living.7 For instance, the cost of living index in Bombay rose from 218 in January 1945 to 230 in November 1945, the corresponding figures in Allahabad were 282 and 297 for Cawnpore 301 and 317 and for Madras 217 and 230.8 Thus, even with the substantial increase in actual earnings, workers could hardly maintain the pre-war standard of living. This gave rise to numerous demands for dearness allowance to neutralise the rise in the cost of living and for bonus with a view to share in the prosperity of the, industry as well as to bridge the gap between the real wage and the fair wage. The demand led to strikes on many occasions. The following tables illustrate how real wage depreciated despite the increase in money wages. Real Earnings: 1939-45

Year

Index of Earnings

1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946

100.0 105.3 111.0 129.1 179.6 202.1 210.5 208.6

All India Consumer Price Index 100 97 107 145 268 269 269 285

Index to 'Real Earnings 100.0 108.6 103.7 89.0 67.0 75.1 74.9 73.2

Political Upsurges in 1945-46 The cessation of 'the war confronted the working class with the two major problems namely large-scale retrenchment of the war time recruits in the ordinance factories and the reduction of real wages. This imposed severe economic hardship on the working class.9 Simultaneously, their discontent was aggravated by the rampant inflation (notes in circulation shot up fr0111 Rs 2,300 million in 1939 to Rs 12,l(Xl million in 1945) rising prices, shortage of ,essential commodities, food scarcity, which appeared to be the pressing economic problems of the day affected the working class. to With this basis for dissatisfaction, the organised resistance of workers was reflected in a phenomenal figure of stoppages of work. Strikes thus'became a coronion feature indicating the stiff resistance by the working class for the restoration of the trade~imion right for better service conditions and opposing retrenchment. The table below gives the number of stoppages, the number of workers involved in them and the mandays lost during the period: The number of industrial disputes increased resulting in stoppage of work during the period upto 1945. The reason for high figure of mandays lost in 1946 was in large measure due to the generally unsettled conditions of the country.ll Disputes: 1941-46

Year

No.of Stoppage

1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946

359 694 716 658 820 '1,629

No. of Workers involved 291,054 772,653 525,088 550,015 747,530 1,961,948

Mandays Lost 3,330,503 5,779,965 2,342,287 3,447,306 4,054,499 12,717;762

A decisive feature of the working class actions of this period was that it had begun to acquire a political character. In the Asian context, the working class were playing a leading role in Vietnam who were waging a heroic struggle against French Imperialism. A partisan army was also operating in Burma and in the struggle for independence of the peoples of Indonesia and Malaya. All these were not .accidental and spontaneous b~t organised and conscious struggle of the popular masses led by'. the working class against the imperialists and internal reactionaries. 12

Labour Unrest and Trade Union Movement

41

In India, a number of labour, strikes occurred in 1945 to protest for the release of political prisoners. The All India Trade-union Congress in its Madras session of 1945 demanded the granting of independence to India. 13 The Indian working class expressed solidarity in action with the people of South-east Asia. When the British Government decided to send troops to suspend the national liberation struggle of the people of former Dutch and French colonies in Indonesia and Indo-China, a strong wave of indignation swept all over the country in which the working class played an important role. 14 On ()ctoper 6, 1945, Mrinal-kanti Bose, the President of All India Trade-union Congress emphatically stated that the employment of Indian troops in IndoChina and Java was ostensibly to restore law and order but in reality it was to reimpose French and Dutch imperialism'on those countries. This was an outrage on Indian sentiment. Expressing his sympathy for both the Indo-Chinese and the Indonesian people, Bose declared "that had India become free, :she would have sent troops no <Joubt to these countries but to help these Asiatic brethren to ous~ their imperialist masters. E;ven Indian dockers and seamen in Australi~ refused to load Dutch ships carrying arms and ammunitions for the colonialists. On November 14,1945, Indian seamen recruited to man a Dutch ship in Bombay refused to work. 1S _The working class thus went into action on political issues which had a far reaching impact on the struggle for freedom. In several places, workers were joined by the employees and students; economic strikes developed into political strikes and sometimes masses took to armed action, dashes with the police etc, as in Benaras in August 19,45, in Bombay and in Calcutta in September and so on. 16 The revolutionary potentialities of the working class was clearly displayed When the latter went into action in protest against the arrest and trial of the INA personnel in November 1945 to be followed in February 1946 Active participation of the workers was also seen in support of the RIN mutineers,cause. On March 21-22, 1946, there ~as almost a total strik~ of the police in Delhi and again the trade-union leaders bf the AITUC were arrested and put under trial. On April 3, 1946, in Bihar 10,000 policemen went on strike with the trade-union movement coming out in their support and facing repressions. Mention may be made here itself of three major strikes which had political significance and an important bearing on the developing , situation. 17

42

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

REFERENCES 1. V. Balbushevich; New State in the National Liberation Struggle of the People of India, Soviet Document 1948/40, PCTA, New Delhi. 2. V. B. Karnik, Strikes in I~dia, Bombay 1967,. p. 305. 3. Sumit Sarkar, Popular Movements and National leadership 1945-47 " EconoqJic and Political Weekly, Vo!. XVII, 1982. p.678 4. V. B. Karnik,.op. cit., p. 305. 5. V. B. Karnik, op. cit., pp. 305-06. 6. K B. Pannikar, An Out1i~e History of AITUC,New Delhi 1959, p. 307. 7. V. B. Karnik, op. cit.P. 305-6 8. Ibid. 9. Sukomal Sen, Working Class of India, History of Emergence and Movement 1830-70, Calcutta 1977, p. 402. 10. Sumit Sarkar, op. cit., p. 678. 11. V.B. Karnik, op. cit., p. 408. 12. V: Marbenni kov, On the Leading role of the working class in the National Liberation Movement of the Colonial People-1948/38, CPI document (Soviet). 13. Panchanan Saha, History of Working Class Movement in Bengal, New Delhi, 1978, pp. 184-85. 14. Ibid. 15. Birendra Prasad, Indian Nationalism and Asia, New Delhi 1979, pp. 193-94. 16. Guidelines of the Hisatory of the CPI, CPlpublication, New Delhi 1974 and Parvati Krishnan, Communists and Trade-Union Movement, New Delhi 1985. 17. Gupta, P. S.; op. cit., p. 442.

The Tramways Strike Background After the termination of the Second World War, a new upsurge was visible among the working class all over India. The class consciousness of the workers definitely increased due to the changed socio-economic condition and the conscious· attempts of the Corn:. munists and other trade unionists.! In September 1945, Calcutta witnessed a tramworkers strike. But it was more than a mere strike. It turned out to be a political battle between the Government backing British big business on one hand and Calcutta's patriotic public sqlidly supporting the workers headed by the Tramwary Workers Union. And in this battle the people won "

.Labour Unrest: Chittoprasad Bhattacharya Courtesy: Art Heritage

Labour Unrest and Trade Union' Movement.

43

and the Government had to surrender.2 In.the last five years, i.e. (1940 to 1945) the Tramway Company had piled up enormous profits: while daily passenger traffic had gone up from 3.5 lakhs in 1940 to 8.5 lakhs in 1944, the company had refused to increase the number of workers or improve the time-table. It brought extra earnings, extra profits for itself and extra work for the workers. But it withdrew even the paltry concessions the public had been getting like cheap midday fares, all-day conCessioD.,s and transfer tickets. Naturally enough, the company's profits had gone up from Rs 312,800 in 1942 to Rs 6,460,695 in 1944. On the other hand, the tram workers stuck to their posts never causing public inconvenience drawing only a meagre wage on an average of Rs 25 only. An inhuman strain was thl!S put on them by increased traffic putting a heavy strain on their health. This was shown by the alarnling increase of sick cases among the traffic section alone estimated from 22,341 in 1940 to 24,094 in 1944.3 In the midst of the Second World War in May 1942, 2,000 tram" way workers struck work "demanding reinstatement of a conductor, increase in dearness allowance by 25% in view of spiralling prices caused by the war and permission to withdraw provident fund to the extent of 90% to purchase foodgrains. The workers won a significant victory. On May 5, the workers resumed work on the assurance of the Labour Commissioner. On May 9,. the retrenched conductor was reinstated. The Labour Commissioner announced the following Concessions:" "Dearness allowance at Rs 5 and advance of two months' pay to provident fund members and one month's wage to others. Recovery of advance after the end of the war .,,4 The tramway workers were not satisfied with this announcement. They struck work again on' May 20 and called off at the intervention of state government on May 23. The British-owned Tram Company had not paid any heed to the demands of the workers which thus remained unfulfilled.s However, in 1943, the company decided to form an adjudication committee for investigating the tramwaymen's grievances. 6 . The C.T.W,U. (Calcutta Tramway Workers Union) started an agitation for early implementation of these awards 7 though the Adjudication Award was given in favour of the workers in December 1944. The Company had so long been putting off important items like new time-table, the opening of canteens and grant of leave.8 In the early months of 1945, the workers themselves put forwara proposals for a three shift time-table for which the extending running

44

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

time for cars would relieve the workers strain. But the company and the Labour Commissioner just sat on the proposals refusing to dls9 . cuss them. Driven to the last extreme, the crwu on 5th September, 1945, submitted strike notices to the Secretary of Labour Department and the Labour Commissioner of the Government of West Bengal. The notice alleged "continuous refusal" of the Calcutta Tramways Company to grant workers demands, their inability to achieve any settlement by peaceful methods of negotiation and conciliation. "Failing a satisfactory settlement of their demands within 2 weeks and workers of the Company would resort to a peaceful strike as their last weapon". In the same notice their demands included: (i) One month's pay as Id and Puja bonus every year from 1945, (ii) Increase of Dearness Allowance, (iii) Setting up of a wage and Accident Enquiry Committee consisting of representatives of the Government, the Company and the Union, (iv) Legal recognition of the workers union by the company, (v) Reinstatement of discharged workers. 10 For one week, the government took no formal notice of the situation while the company put forward the lame excuse of having referred the matter to the Board of Directors in London.ll The management of the company became alert, and issued Press statements that the demands of the tramworkers were unjust. The General Secretary of the workers union, Dhiren Majumdar, in a powerful rejoinder said: "The workers have every right moral and legal to demand that with the end of the war their wages (whose average is the miserable sum of Rs 25 per month) should be increased by atleast 25%. Similarly, their existing D.A. compensates for only 60% of the increased cost of living.ll On September 10, the General Council of the Bengal Provincial Trade Union Congress accorded ""wholeht1arted support to· the Calcutta Tramworkers Union's demands, and requested the public to lend their sympathy and support to the tramway workers in their struggle against the company.,,12 On September 13, the Government merely referred twelve of the thirty-nine demands to the Adjudicator appointed by it. This was intimated to the union by the Labour Department Secretary, Mr Kripalani, ICS on the 14th. It was also repeated to the union by Mr Walker, Government's Adviser on the 15th.!3 The Government was completely callous to the gravity of the situation and 'ready to back the British fully. Threats of intimidation to the union too were not lacking from the Labour Commissioner .14

Labour Unrest and Trade Union Movement

45

Meanwhile, the stand of the union had profound repercussions on the public. Meetings called by the union were crowded and evoked tremendous support. On the 14th September, Hazora Park, in South Calcutta, saw one of the biggest gatherings in its history where the grievances of the workers and the public against the company were openly voiced. is On September 16, in a public meeting at Wellington Square held under the auspices of the workers union appealed to the government for fair-deal and withdrawal of the adjudication orders. Prof K.P. Chattopadhyay presided over the rtleeting and among the speakers were Somnath Lahiri, Gopal Acharya, Sadhan Gupta and Annandasankar Bhattacharya of .Students Federation. 16 On September 18, the Government invited the representatives of the tramway workers to a conference. On that day, at a mammoth meeting at Wellington Square, it was resolved that the workers would go on strike and the union would not take part in the adjudication court convened by the government. The representatives of 20 tradeunions, including Motor Transport Union and Bata Workers Union had expressed their unqualified support to the tramway workers. 17 By means of thousands of handbills to the public and special memos to the leading citizens, the union convinced practically the whole of Calcutta how the fight of the workers was bound up clearly with the yital interest of the public. is The Outbreak of the Strike Tramworkers struck work on 19th September fr'om the morniTlg, trams did not come out from the depots. There was perfect peace in and around every depot. The remarkable organisations of the union and its hold over the workers was clearly seen in actual practice by the fact that out of 8,000 workers, only 2 dozens reported for duty. At every depot, union volunteers ori guard kept day and night vigilance at all approaches to the depot, but there was nb crowd. 19 The company authorities posted police forces in the depots, as well as tried to deceive the workers by spreading rumours through their agents, that workers had joined work or that trams had come out from other depots, etc,. but this intensified the worker's vigilance all the more. 20 The company tried another trick: the tramworkers used to draw rations from depot shops at cheaper .rates than at the controlled rate on credit against the next month's salary. The company now stopped this credit and the concession rate which hit the. workers particularly, because the strike had been called in the third

46

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

week of the month. But even this did not produce anyeffect. 21 On the second day of the strike, the Company and the Government made anew move to break the strike and with .it, the solidarity of the workers but it only showed the' weakness of the bosses case: through the Governor's Adviser, Mr Walker, the union was informed that the company was ready to pay one month's bonus to all workers who had done sixty day's work in the last three months, while the ca~e~ of the rest would have to go for adjudication. Realising the volume of public support behind the strike, the company made this offer but at the s~me time, deprived 650 hands, of its benefits through the condition attached. The company banked on the union calling off the strike.22 The Tramway Company made a serious blunder by precipitating a strike in the face of coming labour unrest which would affect other industries. Secondly, that the Red Flag would prevail under such conditions and that offer of bonus to all except a few hundred would split the workers and force the union to c,all off the strike. 23 The Central Strike Committee reckoned the tremendous con, , $cio.us.ness--OLthe--'Framworkers and the solidarity of the union. The strike committee after eliciting opinion from the rank and file turned down the offer and pUt forward their minimum demands. 24 Firstiy, there would be no discrimination in bonus, secondly the dismissed workers both of whom were prominent union leaders were to be at once reinstated, and thirdly, the charge-sheet against the strike leaders to be withdrawn. Regarding the rest of their demands, they agreed to put them up for adjudication.25 From September 22, the tramworkers began lining up, workers from other industries who not only sent greetings but material help in the form of donations of rice. The Oriental Gas Company Workers Union and bus workers expressed their sympathy for the striking workers of Calcutta Tramways. The Bus Workers Union even went to the extent of observing token strikes on 24th and 25th September in support of the tramwaymen of Calcutta. Their strike paralysed the city and threw the transport system out of gear. The Electric Supply Workers Union contributed' a week's pay to the strike-fund. Contributions of rice piled up in maunds from workers of all trades and industries like Railways, Liptons, Brook Bonds Tea, the Corporation, etc.26 In all cases, the workers cut down from their own rations to donate for their tram comrades. Donations of money came from the tramworkers themselves and from 'mercantile firms like Burma 'Shell,

Labour Unrest and Trade Union Movement

47

Tatas, Benga1 Tannery, etc. Rickshaw workers, Bidi workers also contributed. Donations came spontaneously from public meetings and· hundreds of 'bhadraloks' came forward to heIp.z7 Even Dacca District Textile Workers Union organised gate meetings in support of Calcutta Tramway workers strike at Dacca and Narayanganj. Even the workers of Bombay expressed solidarity with the fighting tramway workers of Calcutta. The government spokesman stated "the strike is illegal but government is deliberately refraining from taking any action."z7a The strike not only enjoyed the political and financial support of the working class of Calcutta but also received sympathy of people of all shades of opinion. 27b At a meeting held at Sraddhananda Park on 20th September, the attitude of the company was deplored. Sankarprasad Mitra said in the meeting that during last three years,. the tramworkers of Calcutta strained their physique and spirit to serve the ever-increasing mass of passengers. But they themselves remained,ill-fed and ill-clad with an average income of Rs 24 a month. Bhupesh Gupta, another speaker in the meeting said that Mr Godley, the Agent of the Company, should have come to this meeting to see how earnestly the Calcutta citizens stood behind the tramworkers in their just cause.28 Another aspect of the strike was that students of Calcutta ,;.150 observed strikes as an expression of fraternity and pledged their support to the tramwaymen of Calcutta. College and school students came out and stopped buses imploring passengers to get down. They faced police lathis; yet they took upon themselves the task of collecting donations irrespective of their political affiliations. Collegeunions have been holding meetings to support the workers demands and tramworkers addressed the students. The meetings were held jointly by students organisations like MSL (Muslim Students League), Students Federation (SF) and BSC (Bengal Students Congress) who accused the tram company's selfish methods of refusing to buy more tramcars as a result of which students had to travel in overcrowded trams. Even girl students participated in the protest demonstrations in support of the tramworkers. It was an united support to give the workers more strength. The student demonstrations made the government panicky and a spokesman from the education department remarked: "We won't let, the students stage another 1942" despite the fact that the strike was disciplined. 19 Ultimately, the British owners had to yield. The government meanwhile declared that the bonus issue would be settled but two

48

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

discharged workers would not be taken back. The tramworkers rejected the offer of joining the company without their discharged comrades: Conductor Misirji and Cashier R.K. Ghosh. The strike was called off: on the 27th September following the appointment of a non-official tribunal for settling the disputes. In a tripartite conference, it was agreed that J .C. Gupta should be appointed as the Chairman of the tribunal and this union's nominee was accepted by the company. 38 demands of the workers were to be referred to the tribunal. It was agreed that every endeavour would be made to implement the fmdings of the tribunal before the puja holiday in October.3Q.. By October 5, 1945, the diSpute was settled. The conciliation board announced: (i) All workers of Tramways Company who were in service on 31st August, 1945 would receive a month's pay as bonus, (ii) Two dismissed workers conductor Misirji and Cashier R. K. Ghosh would be reinstated. It was resolved to refer other disputes tothe adjudicator. 31 The strike of 1945 though a partial success was a great victory for the tramway workers of the post-war days. Amrita Bazar Patrika thus remarked: "So far as the boards awards are concerned, it appears that the workers have gained practicaIfy all their points".32 Although two important demands of the workers were accepted by the Company, some important issues including the increase of D.A. and the formation of Wage and Accident Committee remained unsettled. Hence, immedi~tely after the declaration of the conciliation boards, the CTWU went on discussing the unsolved problems of the workers. As a new charter of demands was in the making, some new facts came to the knowledge of CTWU. The Calcutta Tramways Company had a reserve fund of Rs 10 lakhs. In 1942 and in 1945, the company showed profits of Rs 4.6 lakhs per annum. Moreover, the management set aside Rs 10.5 lakhs year as repair cost but spend only lllakhs in 4 years (1942-45). Moreover, the company was taking a very indifferent attitude to the inconveriienc~ of the workers as well as the passengers. In 1939, the number of passengers carried by the Calcutta Tramways was 3.5lakhs and it rose to 8.5 lakhs in 1946. But the number of tramcars increased from 390 to 395 only during the same period. The workers particularly of the traffic section, had to face the burden of increased number of commuters. The company was making massive profits at the cost of starving employees, Jience, a new charter of demands was prepared 'by CTWUand it was sub-

Labour Unrest and Trade Union Movement

49

mitted to the management on 27th November, 1946. These demands included: (i) Revision of basic wages, (ii) Introduction of gratuity, (iii) Increase of Provident Fund Contribution by Company i.e., from 6.25% to 6.32% and (iv) Revision of leave rules. 33 The dispute between the Calcutta Tramways Company and their employees was thus received with gratification and it was decided that in future all such disputes would be entrusted for settlement by only disinterested public leaders commanding the confidence of both the parties. However, the success of the strike encouraged other important industries of Bengal especially engineering concerns to go on strike like Messrs Braithwaite & Co., Steel Products & Co., etc.34 Estimate The Calcutta Tramways strike was organised by the Calcutta Tramways Workers Union, a Communist organisation wl}ich struck work against 38 demands such as a month's pay as Puja and· Id bonus, increased D.A., more holidays with pay, reinstatement of dismissed workers, etc. According to official sources, it was 'engineered as" a demonstration of strength of the CPI against the Congress but it did not terminate in the way CPI desired. The Communists had hoped to secure unconditional acceptance of their terms by stopping of other public conveyance like buses and taxis thereby causing public inconvenience but due to lack of popular support and the firm attitude of the government they decided to compromise a~d agreed to refer to two important points of dispute i.e. payment of a month's bonus and reinstatement of two dismissed hands to arbitration of a conciliation Board consisting of members acceptable to both parties. The other points of dispute would be decided by the adjudicator only. The strike and the inconvenience caused to the city's population were commuted upon by all sections of the press. The press tended to support the stand of the workers and criticised the attitude of the management for whose alleged obstinacy, the government was responsl'ble. 35 The Calcutta Tramway agitators thus won their strikes backed up by the middle-classes. The Calcutta working class arid the entire middle-class stood together in !iupport of the tram strikers. The workers of Bengal were boiling with anti-British hatred and the Company's authority backed by the British policy-makers' attitude taught them that the British were alert, firm and playing a clear game of putting the political parties against each other to stay on. There-

50

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

fore, under such situation, it was the duty of the workers to win over the people and maintain unity. 36 ~EFE~ENCES

1. Saha, Panchamin: History of Working Class Movement in Bengal, PPH, New Delhi 1978. P.186-89 2. People's War, October 14, 1945. 3. Ibid. 4. Saha, Panchanan op. cit., pp. 186-89. 5. Ibid. 6. Revolt Studies, Vol. 11, December 1985, Article by Siddhartha Guha Ray, "Tramwaymen of Calcutta: Their Movements and Organisation (1920-47)", p. 93. . 7. Ibid. 8. People's War, op. cit. 9. Ibid. 10. Revolt Studies, op. cit., p. 93. 11. People's War, op. cit. 12. Revolt Studies, op. cit. p. 93. 13. People's war, op. ciL 14. Ibid 15. Ibid. 16. Saha, op. cit., pp. 186-89. 17. Ibid. 18. People's War, op. cit. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid. 22. People' War, op. cit; 1945. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. Revolt Studies, op. cit. p. 93 and People' War, op. cit. 27. Ibid. 27a. Saha, op. cit, P.I86-189, 27 Ibid 27b. Ibid 28. Ibid. 29. The Student, 28th September, 1945. 30. Saha, op. cit. P. 186:89 31. Revolt Studies, op. CiL, p. 94. 32. Saha, op. CiL, P.189 33. Revolt Studies, op. cit., p. 95. 34. Fortnightly Secret Report on ·Political Situation in Bengal for first. half of October 1945, Home Poll.!, No. 37, WBSA.

Labour Vnrest and Trade Union Movement

51

35. Fortnightly Secret Report on Political Situation in Bengal for the

second half of September, Home Poll.1. No. 37, WBSA 36. Inside Bengal: 1941-45, FOlW8rd Bloc and its allies versus Communists : Arun Bose and Khoka :Ray (Pamphlet) CPI, Ajay Bhaban, New Delhi.

The Post and Telegraph Strike of

July, 1946 Background An outstanding struggle of the post-war phase' was the iilfJefmite strike ,called by the workers and employees of the Post and Telegraphs Department of the Government of India in July, 1946. The post-war economic conditions had spelt a disaster in the lives of all sections of the working class masses.' The Government employees also fell victims to this economic holocaust. A wave of industrial. unrest continued to sweep over the whole country. The Government failed to check the ever-rising cost of living index and the compensation granted was inadequate. l The employees would have agreed voluntarily to work even in such hardship had there been financial difficulty before the authority. But the case was rever~e. The Post and Telegraph Department had earned a net profit during the war that was 53' times higher than pre-war times. This huge profit was a clear evidence of the higher capacity of the Post and Telegraph Department to pay higher D.A. to its employees. They felt that the huge profit earned by the departmeiU was the result of the hard labour of the employees and therefore they had the right to share in the profit. The Post and Telegraph employees had borrowed this idea from the industries. Such an impression was a normal development as the Post and Telegraph services were running on a commercial principle. 2 The argument gained further strength because of a very early declaration by the Government that the Post and Telegraph was not a revenue earning department. This declaration wall made by A.C. Chatterjee, Member-in-Charge of the Department of Industries and Labour in the Legislative Assembly on March 12, 1924 when he said: "I entirely agree with K.c. Neogy in considering that the post office should be looked upon as a public utility service ... and that the Post and Telegraph department should pay its way... arid that the Govern-

52

Political Upsurges in 194546

ment does not look to the Post and Telegraph Department as a revenue earning department.,,3 It was in this context that Govindlal Shivlal Matilal, the President of the AlP RMSU in a deputation waited on member-in-charge, department of Posts and Air, on March 3, 1945, strongly pleaded for a substantial portion to be made available to the Post and Telegraph employees in the form of higher scales of remuneration for the betterment of the bad economic condition of the employees who were hard-hit by the increase in the price of essential needs. 4 The demands for the revision of pay scale and increase in dearness allowance appeared to be just and responsible in the light of the arguments advanced by the Post and Telegraph employees. They were able to evolve sympathy and support from the general public as well as important political leaders in the country. Nehru stated at Allahabad on February 6, 1946: "Among the public servants, few are more deserving of just and equitable treatment than the postal and RMS empioyees. They perform an essential service with efficiency and hardwork and yet their rewards are few .. .if the postal employees owe a duty to the public, then the Government also owe a duty to the postal employees. They have to examine the grievances and remedy them where justice is on their side. The present crisis has not taken shape suddenly; behind it lie years of efforts and repeated demands as conditions become harder. Those demands resulted in the appointment of a postal Inquiry Committee in December, 1944 but the reports of this Committee has not been published and no steps have been taken with regard to any recommendations it might have made."s He further continued, "This is a strange procedure and the employees' are justified in thinking that the report has been suppressed because it favoured them. I am not in a position to go into their demands but from such information as I possess it -appears to me that they are overworked and underpaid. It is obviously the duty of the Government to publish the report of the Enquiry Council. In any event it is unwise and highly improper to allow the situation to deteriorate. In such a case, even more than in normal industrial disputes a fair and impartial arbitration is the obvious course to adopt. I hope that both the Government and the postal employees will agree to this and thus avoid a crisis".6 The failure of deputation after deputation at various levels found

Labour Unrest and Trade Union Movement

53

determined expression in militant action. The associations started submitting demands one after another, for substantial increase in D.A.·and the revision of pay scales. Preparations for successful strike were planned in case of the non-acceptance of the demands of t~e Government. The Government, aware of the increasing industrial unrest apd tension, had already issued an order in December 1945 in exercise of the power conferred by the Rule 81A of the Defence of India Rules for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community. The order prohibited strikes and lockouts in essential services. The employees were able to enlist the support of some legislators and non-official resolution requesting the Government to appoint a pay commission for revision of pay scales of the entire Central Government employees was moved. When the resolution was moved in the Central Legislative Assembly, the Secretary, Post and Air Department, in reply announced on February 7, 1946, the intention of the Government to appoint a pay Commission. This was undoubtedly a moral victory for the entire Central Government employees and their associations. But that could hardly provide any immediate solution of the problems. The work of the Pay Commission was a time consuming process. The employees wanted changes in their' emoluments and did not want to wait for long. The AlP and LGSU served 30 days strike notice on February 12, 1946. The Federation also served a strike notice on the Government of Indi;t., department of Posts and Air on February 24, 1946, declaring their intention to go on strike from March 23, 1946, if their demands were not fulfilled. The Federation demanded the introduction of the new scale of pay, revision of the Pre-1931 scales, increase in dearness and war allowance, no retrenchment, modification of the existing pension system part.icularly those relating to the inferior servants, reduction of the hours of work to 40 hours per week; i10 adequate scheme of insurance covering health, accident, unemployment and family allowance and publication of the report of the Postal Inquiry Committee appointed in December, 1944. Considering the whole situation the government decided in haste to increase t-he good conduct pay as a measure of partial relief as per letter of the Secretary of the Government of India, Posts and Air Department: "Taking into consideration also the nature and conditions of work

54

Political Up~urges in )945-46 of the Posts and Telegraph employees and as a special measure of relief for them the Government has decided to increase the good conduct payetc.,,7

The following concessions were' grarited to the Posts and Telegraphs employees by the Government:(a) Good conduct pay (which was paid to Posts and Telegraph officials) was raised from Rs 5 to Rs 12 for employees drawing salary below Rs 40 and from Rs 5 to Rs 10 for employees drawing between Rs 40 and R$ 120. (b) The salary limit to which good conduc~ pay of Rs 10/- could be drawn was increased from Rs 120 to Rs 160. (c) The increase of D.A. and good conrluctpay sanctioned from 1.1.45 was given retrospect with effect from 1.7.44. Further, the Government of India appointed on March 5, 1946, Justice G.S. Rajadhyaksha to mediate in the trade dispute be~een the Indian Post and Telegraphs Department and its non-gazetted employees on matters so as to whether the Post and Telegraph employees governed by the, new scales ,of pay by the department required any further relief pending the finding of the post-War pay commission and if so, the nature and extent of relief that was re. d8 qUire. The Adjudication The terms of reference were of a restricted pature and the adjudication was confined to the interim relief only and that too only to post-1931 staff. Though thepre-1931 entrants were also dissatisfied still they welcomed their adjudication realising, unless the post-1931 entrants' were drawn out of the rent of low pay scales, the cause of the pre-1931 entrants was not likely to be advanced. The appointment of an adjudicator and the reference of the dispute to him for adjudication had an adverse effect on the movement and caused a serious rift in the Federation. Some of the associations and the Federation welcomed the idea of adjudication and wanted to cooperate with' its working whereas other associations under the influence of B.N.Ghosh, President of AlP & RMSU, one of the affiliates of the Federation opposed adjudication and wanted to boycott the adjudication and to resort to direct action. Though the staff associations continued to be divided on the issue of adjudication, the notice of strikes was withdrawn as it was illegal to go on strike as the Gov~nment by an order prohibited strike in the Post

Labour Unrest and Trade Union Movement

55

and Teiegraph.9 The adjudication proceeding began at Simla on April 29, 1946. The adjudicator called for written statement of demands from the eight associations which had served notices of strike and to six other recognised associations though not covered in the 'Government Order'. Representatives were received by the adjudicator on behalf of the staff associations and from Individual employees as well. 10 The adjudication proceedings were going on satisfactorily but everyday of that period was like an era in itself. The discontented employees became more and more impatient everyday. The AlP and LGSU at last served one more strike notice on June 24, 1946 on the D.G., Post and Telegraphs, intending to go on strike from midnight of July 11, 1946 unless their 12 demands were conceded. It put forth demands for revision of pay scales, revival of pre-1931 leave rules, abolition of distinction between the superior and inferior servants in the matter of leave and pension rules, confirmation in higher grades on one year of satisfactory service, reservation of 50% instead of 20% posts for postmen in the clerical cadre, no retrenchment of any' employees and the reinstatement of retrenched employees, equal number of holidays like other departments of the Central Government, overtime allowance for duty on Sunday and holidays gratuity at the rate of one month's pay for one year of service for those who die before earning pension, abolition of distinction between A, Band C areas for allowances and privileges. No medical examination for employees officiating on higher grades and adequate leave resources. The Government was not in a mood to concede any of these demands before the whole thing was examined by a Pay Commission which would have resulted in a further delay in the available ability of . immediate relief. ll It was enough for the spirit of strike to spread from one corner to another in the country. Preparations were made for a successful strike. The Strike Relief Fund was started. Strike Committees were set up at different levels. In general, the situation in the country was favourable to a strike as there was an all-round labour unrest on account of the ris'e in the cost of living without corresponding increase in pay scales and the demobilisation of war service workers in addition to the increasing momentum ofthe struggle for independence. 12 The D.G., Post and telegraphs declared the ensuing strike organised by the AlP and LGSU as illegal because some issues were referred for adjudication. Considering ,the strike situation, the

56

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

government, with a view to crush the strike adopted certain precautionary measures such as the arrangement of window delivery of mails, stoppage of money-orders, parcels and registered letters from July 8. Outside letter boxes were sealed, the post master-General, Bihar began trying to enlist the services of Boy Scouts and sought the help of the regional employment exchanges. On the other hand, negotiations were going on between V;G. Dalvi, representing the AlP and LGSU and Post and Telegraph authority in which N.M. Joshi and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad were mediating. 13 The decision to launch a genf
Labour Unrest and Trade Union Movement

57

action. Yet, the pressure of problems impelled the employees of the Post and Telegraphs department to the path of struggle overcomfug all impediments led by V.G. Dalvi of the Postal Staff Union. A strike notice was served to the Government on 11th July 1946 demanding the implementation of a 16-point charter which included a revision of pay scales. The Director General of Post and Telegraph, Mr Krishna Prasad stated at a press conference that the strike notice served by the All India PQstmen and Lower Grade Union was illegal since the disputes had been referred to arbitration and some of the postmen's demands had already been referred to adjudication. 18 So the participants would be severely dealt with. Dewan Chaman Lall had already formed the Federation of Unions of Post and Telegraph Employees. Though he was personally against the strike, he failed to persuade the members to boycott the strike. His effort showed that he did not give any weight to mass feelings. This attitude of Dewan Chaman Lall forced the members to take individual steps and they later joined the strike. In fac~, the Federation was a loose organisation and was a.mere tool in,the hands of a few leaders at the top. The Federation could neither allow its affiliated associates to resign to keep unily and join the strike; nor liked them to act as blacklegs with 'no direction'. In fact, the Federation had to adopt the policy of n,eutrality to the strike and to intervene for the settlement of the dispute with the administration. 19 The strikes were able to gain the support of the public and prominent leaders. J.L. Nehru stated on July 13, 1946, at Bombay: "The causes of the postmen is just and public sympathy is with them." He further criticised the Government's attitude of staff complacency and held it responsible for the present strike and deadlock at the cost of public inconvenience. At a press conference2o, Nehru also urged both the Government of India and the All India Postal Union to accept a full adjudication or arbitration of the entire dispute. 21 The postal authorities were striving hard to break the strike. All precautionary measures were taken· beforehand for st:
"

58

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

Union, Calcutta Branch.23 It was only after the beginning of the strike that the Government took tlu< situation seriously. In the meanwhile, whenever the Post and Telegr~ph employees submitted memorandum and conducted strong agitatipn; the Government appointed some commission. The Government used both its weapons of suppression and of preaching the high sounding philosophy of service for the good of the human beings. But this time the preaching failed to satisfy the discontented Post and Telegraph employees.M In the meantime, adjudication proceeding was expedited. On July 15,1946, the arbitrator gave his award as follows: (i) ,Increase in basic pay (different percentage for different categories of employees) to be given as personal pay. (ii) Retrospective effect to be given to the above relief in respect of all categories except category No. V from the 1st of January, 1945 to the 30th June, 1946 i.e. for 11/2 years on the basis of the relief on 1st July, 1946. (iii) Grain concession allowance to be given to all the new scale employees at places where no grain concession scheme is in operation, at a rate equal to the money value of the concession at Bombay in respect of 3 1/2 consumption units. The present value of the concessiQnis Rs 3-12 annas (Rs. 3.75 p) per month. (iv) Upgrading of all' the 'C' areas into 'B' category with the result that the D.A. given to the new scale employee at .places included at present 'C' category will be increased by Rs 2 per month.25 Sir Eric Conran Smith, member of the Posts and Air Depart~ ment, took sometime to examine the points of the adjudication report and thus effect a settlement of the postal dispute. 26 The Qovernment with a view to ending the crisis now accepted the Award in toto. But the award was held unsatisfactory by the Post and Telegraph employees. The strike situation worstened in a few days. .' The Postmaster General's of the striking circles were persuading the employees of the other sections to work for the maintenance of the postal service on extra payment. This 'Divide and Rule' practice, unlike previous occasions, failed to get the support of other wings for strike breaking; rather it created wide resentment and aroused class consciousness. It increased the flame of the strike immediately.21 In the event of the P,ost and Telegraph men's proposed strike

Labour Unrest and Trade Uitibn Movement

59

that was materialising, the Government of India had requisitioned provincial governments to g;.ve th~ ioan of their own employees to work in vacant places of strikers. "We ~e confident that the government will not commit such a moral wl9ng which will set one group of go"\!ernment employees against anoth~r and lead to their eventual demoralisation. But in case our calculations come to be untrue, we would humbly and respectfully but equally str9ngly raise our voice against such a step", the government sources'observed.28 Mr V.G. Dalvi, Secretary of All India Postmen and Lower Grade Staff and RMS said that the adjudication award wou.ld 110t affect the Government unless the latter demanded to meet the representatives of the strikers with a genuine desire for settleinent.29 Strike Went on Spreading Though in the beginning, it was only the AlP, and LGSU that started the strike, the spirit of the strike spread to oth~r groups of the posts and telegraphs employees, RMS and the PMG;s office staff of Bengal and Assam also joined the strike under the banner of their respective 1}nions. The AlP and RMSU after considering the, strike situation, served a strike notice on July 18, i946 on the postmastergenerals of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa intimating their intention of going on strike after the expiry of 72 hours i.e. from July 21, 1946 unless their 14 demands were met.- Their main demands were fulfilment of the demands of the AlP and LGSU, revision of pay scales of non-gazetted einployees, introduction of pay scales for EDA, D.A. at the rate of Rs 5 for every 10 points, 36 hours a week working period in the executive branches and 27 hours a week fQr RMS, revision of rules, house accommodation or house rent allowance in lieu thereof, confirmation of all temporary staff, etc. Shortly after the strike notice the Hon'ble Minister-in-Charge for Communication sent his special envoy Niazatullah to Calcutta to discuss the issues. The discussions lasted for 3 hours but as no assurance regarding acceptance of the demands was given, the negotiation broke down. As nothing was done by.the Government to meet the demand, the AlP and RMSU went on strike cin July 21,1946 followed by the IPTU, the AlTU and the AITW on the same day and the Calcutta Branch of ·Post and Telegraphs Administrative Officers Association f1'9m July 23, 1946. Thus from the mid~ight of July 21st, the strike gained a new impetus.30 The strike was successful in Bengal, Assam,Bombay, Madras, Delhi, Rajputana, Central Provinces, Berar, Sindh and Baluchistan.

60

Political Upsurge~ in 1945-46

The strikers gained the support and sympathy of the public, the political leaders as well as of the general trade-union movement. 31 This solidarity movement was one of the biggest upheavals In the trade-union movement of this period. In Delhi; on the midnight of July 11, 1946, the postal strike was launched at a mass rally where 15,000 workers of Delhi Provincial Committee of AITUC were 'physicallypresent and protested the postal leaders from being arrested at the rally. Later, a sympathetic general strike was organised.32 The Bombay Provincial Committee of the AITUC called out and organised a OI~e-day sympathetic general strike in Bombay on July 22, 1946. More than 5 lakh workers joined in this strike and life in Bombay was more or less paralysed on that day. Later a number of lightning strikes ,occurred in Textile Mills and other' concerns but most of them were in sympathy with the Post and Telegraph employees.33 The strike of the postmen and lower grade staff "of the postal department and the operators of trunk and telephone exchanges severely crippled communication between Bombay and the rest of the. province. The postal authorities found it difficult to obtain un'skilled labour on daily wages, as coolies did not come forward in view of the general sympathy shown towards the strike. The work was however being managed with the help of the military personnel. In the mofussil, where the strike was not so complete as in Bombay and other urban towns, public hardship was less severe. The general attitude of the strikers was peaceful but there have been some isolated cases of intimidation and assault particularly in the Bombay city. Amongst the working class' expressing solidarity, for the P & T workers notable were the Railway workers, the GIP and the BB & Cl and Dock workers, Port Trust workers, Tramworkers, Gas Company workers, Transport workers, oil'glass, rubber workers, hotel workers, workers from race-course.and sports clubs, clerks from the G.P.O. and industries.34 The postal strike however did not commence in Madras on 11.7.46. The President the Madras Provincial Postal , and Lower . ' of . Grade Staff Union announced that the strike had been called off so far as this province was concerned. This caused considerable resentment amol,lgst the committee members of the union and on 12.7.46, the committee met with the Vice-President in the chair and evidently under the instructions received from Bombay, decided to call the strike from the 13th. The strike thus commenced from the 13th which was initially peaceful. In Madr.as c~ty, abmitonethousand workers

Labour. Unrest and Trade Union Movement

61

were affected. Attempts had been made to recruit substitute labour like government staff (lik~ the .Madras fire service personnel) which could be spared temporaruy, 1who were fully employed and the window delivery s}'!:tem was put ii;lto effect. The strike spread to several towns in the province but the postal seI:vices and facilities were not seriously affected.. In sympathy with the postal strike the Madras Provincial Tradeunion Congress called a general strike in the Madras city on 23.7.46 which was joined by more than one lakhworkers and the mofussil on 25.7.46. However, no untoward incidents took plaCe.3~ Similar strikes took place in other industrial towns and different provinces. In the United Provinces, the postal strike commenced on July 11. Although partial only and in its initial stages, affecting principally in Allahabad and Lucknow, it had caused considerable dislocation and later spread to a number of other centres. Arrangements for window deliveries had been made and district officers had been instructed to maintain order and to arrange to take ,delivery of official mail. In Allahabad city only, there .had been serious trouble and over 60 arrests had been made there for obstruction.36 In Bihar, the threatened postal strike began on the 11th and covered most of the urban areas of Bihar except Chota Nagpur. In Patna, a number of boy scouts volunteered at the instance Of the postal authorities, but were threatened by students and had not really been of very much assistance in consequence. Temporary recruitment by the postC\.1 authorities were taking place and no untoward incident had occurred. Naturally dislocation and inconvenience to the public had been considerable. The local press was sympathetic towards the strikers and those boys who volunteered had been. criticised.37 The postal strike spread over the whole province and the RMS which was under the guidance of the Bengal Assam Unit joined the strike on the 26th. From the same date, strikes of telegraph and telephone staff began and· had also spread over the province. So far as official mails were concerned, the system had not completely paralysed the public and were receiving no letters or telegrams at all and the dislocation of private business was complete. The strike had been given fullest support by all left wing elements such as the Congress Socialist Party, the Forward Bloc and the Communists and the students of course had taken an active part in 'picketting' and the general obstruction of those who were trying to help the communily

62

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

by assisting in the moving of mails at a number of places' mainly in Patna,Saran and Moughyr districts. Arrests were made df persons actively obstructing the moving of mails which had caused gr~at indigpation in local press.38 In Assam, the strike in the Post and Telegraphs Department had been virtually complete since the' 22nd July and offices throughout Assam had been closed for non-government business though a skeleton service had been maintained at Shillong and some other places at the Telephone exchanges. Picketting occurred sporadically at Shillong, Sylhet and Gauhati which was stimulated by charging at the incorrect statement made on the AIR and in Calcutta newspapers that there was no strike in Assam. Courier services had been established for conveyance of the government mails which had been taken over by the Army Postal· Courier Service but there was still a serious and inexplicable failure of mails from Calcutta.' The staff of the Director, Posts and Telegraphs withdrew a strike notice on .being pointed out that their Shillong allowance of 30% 011 pay might be jeopardised. The distUrbed 'conditions were made use of by the communists and socialists who had taken on rather too many commitments at one time.39 In the Central Provinces, the strike of postmen and the lower grade postal staff affected Jubbalpore; Saugar and Durg. Everywhere other arrangements had been made for the delivery of the letters etc. with the least possible inconvenience. In the North-west Frontier Province, the postal strike occurred with a suggestion. of political influence and interference creeping in. The strike was partial with the towns affected in varying degree and the rural offi~s hardly at all. It had nevertheless caused public inconvenience.40 But what happened in Calcutta was unparalleled in the history of the trade-union movement. The BPTUC of the AITUC played a decisive role in mobilising public support in favour of the postal workers and employees. Calcutta observed complete hartal in sympathy with the postal strike when the general strike in all postal departments in Calcutta commenced.41 From July 21st onwards, the employees of the Post and Telegraphs, Telephones and RMS began their historic general strike, Calcutta was cut off from the outside work. On July 26, the general council of BPTUC adopted a historic decision of observing a general protest strike throughout Bengal, on July 29 in support of the postal strike. About 15 lakh workers downed tools. Calcutta had witnessed

Labour Unrest and Trade Union Movement

~3

many hartals in the past.42 But the July 29 hartal was unique in many respects. It surpassed earlier hartals in magnitude. This was the first general strike called by the working class to express sympathy with the postal workers. For the first time, a total general hartal (bandh) took.place in Calcutta, joined in by about 40 lakh of all sections of people. Hindus al.ld Muslims enthusiastically joined the strike. Workers in fact9ries, mills and workshops, employees of government offices, mercantile firms and banking institutions went off-duty. Conservancy, transport and port workc;rs joined the strike making it a full success. Though the railway was kept outside the strike, yet in many places, normal running of trains wasstoJ?ped and newspaper offices were closed. All shops and markets, restaurants and eating houses, cinemas and theatres in the city were closed. The general strike also affected the functioning of the Bengal Council and the High Court. Gas and electric lights were not lit in Calcutta streets at night.43 There had been several incidents of police intervention against the pickets in some government offices and institutions. Some of the incidents deserve particular mention.44 A distinguished feature of the historic Post and Telegraphs strike of July 29, 1946 was that, the women telephonists who had never before come into action in large numbers joined en masse. Even the Anglo-Indian telephonists who had never before come forward joined \n. On July 21st midnight, telephone operators of Burrabazar, Park Street, exchanges all went off work. On July 23rd, Bengali and Anglo-Indian girl operators jointly· and· picketed the telephone exchanges. 45 An incident which ·aroused great anger was the attack by the police on girl students who went to picket All India Radio that day. The Assistant Station Director, Prabhat Mukherjee, shamelessly stated that it was more important for him to obey the Sarkar than to obey his country. He and the Station Director Chib cracked obscene j9kes at the girl picketeers. The latter came and pushed one of the girls. The police was called. They came in jeeps .and tried to break through the girls picket line. They hesitated as the girls threw themselves on the ground. A sergeant trampled on the arms of one of the girl picketeers. At once, Gita Mukherjee, Aloka Mazumder, Suparna Roy and Gita Mitra pounced on him. They were all student leaders. The Sergeant kicked Suparna in the stomach. With unbelievable courage, Gita Mitra tore off the Sergeant's collar. The Indian constables kept quiet all this time. As the girls were having the scuffle, the AIR jeep pushed through into the station wounding Dipti Dey

64

Politica/Upsurges in 1945-46

and other young girls. By this time, a huge crowd had gathered and they could have torn Chib and Mukherjee to bits. Just at this moment, one of the leaders of the Communist Party who was also the leader of the political prisoners, release movement, Niranjan Sen, intervened and asked them not to be provoked. For three hours, the Calcutta station of AIR. had to play grlUliophone records to fill the empty programme hours. 46 The High Court and all cinemas were closed. Not a rickshaw was on the streets. There were no newspapers. In the afternoon, at the call of the Trade-union Congress, there was an unprecedented rally of over 3 lakhs on the Calcutta Maidan where men and women of middle-classes congregated.47 HailiQg the people for responding to the call of the AITUC for a general strike, Abdul Momin, the General Secretary of the BPTUC in a press statement said: "The general strike has been an unprece~ -dented su~cess. The trade union Congress specifically directed in the interest of public convenience hold that there must be no strike in the railways and the waterWorks. Electricity too was not stopped because in view of the shortness of the notice for strike. Public, it was ,considered, might suffer in case of total breakdown of the service. However, we strongly condemn the action of the electric supply authorities in locking up the workers on the shift of the previous night." On that day,Calcutta witnessed one of the biggest rallies at the Monument Maidan. Many attended the meeting. Th,e rally was attended by men and women irrespective of caste, creed and community. The Congress tri,colour flags and the red flags of the workers with hammer and sickle dominated the scene. The slogan, "Postal strikers demands are our demands" echoed from one end of the huge rally to the other. 48 . From the early' morning, groups of people carrying flags and displaying posters began to move in procession from different parts of the city towards the Maidan. The huge rally provided not only an expression of the working class solidarity but also gave a mighty demonstration of sympathy of the public with the cause of the postal and telecommunication workers. T.he rally was presided over by Mrinalkanti Bose, President of the AITUC and the joint council of action. It adopted a resolution congratulating the workers on strike on the exemplary spirit of s9lidarity and courage with which they conducted their great lndia-

Labour Unrest and Trade Union Movement

65

wide strike. It also supported the worker's cause and condemned the government policy. Besides the representatives of the strike, the rally was addressed by Abdul Malik, MLA, Abdul Momin, Secretary, BPTUC, Bankim Mukherjee, Biswanath Dubey, Shibnath Banerjee, Dr Maitreyee Bose, Dr Charuchandra Banerjee, Soumendranath Tagore, Hemailta Bose, Phani ·Ghosh, Krishnabenode Roy, Dhiren Bhowmick, Annada-sankar Bhattacharya, Kalidas Basu and Arun Gupta. 49 Several leaders of the left wing political parties and trade-union organisations spoke in support of the strike. Tbe postal strike as well as the sympathetic strike actions faced the usual large-scale government repression. Besides, the left wing political parties, trade-unions, different student and mass organisations came forward in support of the strike. A resolution was passed in the Bengal Legislative Assembly urging the Government of India for settlement of the strike. All sections of the toiling masses supported the strike but the Indian National Congress did not support the strike or express any public support for the struggle led by the masses. The P & T workers sent a telegram to Nehru for the settlement of the strike but Nehru only sympathised with the P & T workers for honesty and efficiency but did not lend support to arbitration.so Gandhi also remarked in the 'Harijan' that the situation arising out of the postal strike and also other disorders of the country was not suitable for the observance of the hartal. s1 The Congress Whip, Satyen Sinha, called the strike 'unwise'. Azad, Sarat Bose issued an appeal to the workers stating that -it would not be advisable to further continu~ the strike in consideration of public inconvenience, leading to loss of popular support. Despite off-threats and direct opposition of Chaman Lall and his followers, the anti-strike attitude of the Congress leadership, the working classes and the masses of the country brought pressure to the government. S2 An offshoot of the Post and Telegraph strikes was a series of ,attacks during the afternoon of the 30th or very early in the morning of the 31st on the railway, telegraphic communications to the south of Calcutta, resulting in the train services in that section being reduced by 50 per cent.S3 The unrest caused by the P & T strike spread to the clerks of mercantile firms and banks in Calcutta. Their demarids inCluded higher grades of pay, bonus, better leave facilities, etc. Similar strikes occurred among press employees, tea garden labourers of J alpaiguri,

Political Upsurges in 1945-46 etc.54 It had nevertheless caused public inconvenience. A distinct feature of the strike was that 1 lakh students participated in it. Moreover, the laurels for most of the courageous action of the day was won by'the students. Muslim Students League (MSL) volunteers and the Students Federation (SF) volunteers were picketing in front of the Writers Building. The MSL picketers prevented League Ministers from entering the building. Some ICS bosses tried to penetrate their way by trampling over the bodies of student picketers and the police tried to break the cordon and even tried to race a jeep over the bodies of the picketers. But the student~ displayed their determinationed by lying down without moving an inch while other students protected them by gripping the fenders of the jeep and throwing all their weight against it. s5 In Bombay, the students observed hartal in sympathy with the Post and Telegraph employees. Students, postmen, Telegraph workers and citizens marched in a procession carrying the Postal UIVon and Student Flags shouting slogans "Students-Postmen Unity Zindabad". The students had earlier won great victory in foiling the attempts of the authorities to open emergency delivery centres in some educational institutions in the name of keeping a public utility service running. The authorities had tried to seek the help of educational institutions but even Boy Scouts refused to lend a hand to break the strike. The BSU came out with a call "Our Colleges shall not be used for Strike Breaking". Students meetings were held in Khalsa, Ruia, Wilson, Fodder, Grant Medical and several other schools and colleges. Students and postmen pic~eted together and campaigned in some centres such as the KEM hospital. On 12th August, a public meeting was organised by the BSU and several other local trade-unions in support of the strikers. S.S. Mirajkar, the Secretary of the Bombay Presidency Postmen's Union, gave a graphic description of the condition of the post and telegraph employees.56 British Official Observances The more responsible union leaders realised that they had lost control in the big centres like Calcutta to the communist elements. Viceroy Wavell had observed that a firm attitude on the part of the government combined with a gradual turning of public opinion against the strike would be sufficient to defeat it. Burrows, as an old

Labour Unrest and Trade Union Movement

67

strike leader, said that he had no sympathy with the strikers in view of the concessions which they had granted but he suggested that a face-saving device be found for the leaders to enable them to accept the governinent offer. The possibility of something in this way had been examined, he observed, but it was doubtful whether the leaders theniselves were ~ a position to call it off. It was more likely just to peter out. The ~mmunist dominated trade-union council of Calcutta called a one-day strike of all workers including transport in support of the postal strike, but this passed off almost entirely peacefully 'whi~h was very creditable to local administration. 57• 'The strike of the 150,000 postmen and telegraph workers demonstrated one of the biggest solidarity actions the country had seen. The AITUC uniQns throughout the country expressed solidarity through strikes, demonstrations aDd campaigned 'in support of the striking Post and Telegraph workers. Such was the intensity of the strike that British officials observed ,that the postal strike showed no signs of ending though in the initial stages there was some hope that the strikers might be brought to reason. Inevitable repression followed. But the movement as a whole demonstrated that the Communist Party was organising the workers in their class organisation of bringing about the realisation that they should act as a class in defence of class interests whiCh had borne fruit. A new stage was thus reached· in the trade-union movement ~n the country.58 An important feature of the postal strike was that two unions of the employees were negotiating with the government at the same time separately. In the aggregate, this amounted to bidding against each other in the matter of prestige. Th~s explains, why the government appeared to be more fIrm than it actually was in dealing with the strike. The employees federation, with greater tact than the other body was able to cash into greater account because of the situation thus created. The postmen's union representing a different class of employees had to bear the brunt of the struggle. Between the divided leadership of the two unions, the workers failed to extract the maximum concessions from the government. The postal strike started on July 11. Settlement talks started some days afterwards but they broke down when Sir E. Conran Smith said over the radio that the government had no intention of granting the postmen's demands. There were general strikes in sympathy with the postmen in all important cities. The federation expressing disapproval of the award of the arbitrator (who was

68

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

appointed to deal with the postal dispute in March) put up fresh demands and backed them up with the threat of a strike. The government announced fresh concessions .involving an expenditure of Rs 1 crore.59 The federation then withdrew their strike notice as many of their demands were met by this announcement. The postmen's strike continued and finally through the mediatiori of Mr Pakwasa, Mr Dalvi and Mr Krishna Prasad were brought together again. The fmal call off decision was largely influenced by the advice from Sardar Patel. The settlement did not cover all the demand of the workers. Agreement was reached only on seven demands; two more demands which related to basic pay were considered as coming within the purview of the pay commission and the remaining were held over till the formation of a National Government. The gains from the strike though substantial could have been greater. Apart from the conflict of leadership, regional influences that seem to have held sway over workers in a particular area which was partly responsible for the confused ending of the strike. These regional differences Came to the surface when Mr Dalvi aDnounced his decision to call off the strike and there was no uniform obedienc..,. The postal department employees formed one distinct class of labour in their relationship with the government. If they had to develop a collective strength to act decisively they would have had to rally under one organisation. The different postmen, clerks and telegraph unions would have had to merge and be influenced by one general policy if success was the real and ultimate aim.60 Regarding the number of P & T employees who went on strike, calculations differ. According to the annual report of the P~ T Department, for the years 1940-47, out of the total staff of about 160,000 persons only 50,doo employees went on strike i.e. only 31.2% employees went on strike. A daily newspaper 'Hindustan Times; estimated the number of strikers over 60,000 i.e. the per cent of participants in the strike was nearly 37.~. According to' the estimate of the AITUC, about 150,000 employers of the P & T went on strike. The Bombay Labour Gazette stated that in the Bombay Province, about 7,576 P & T employees joined the strike which resulted into 41,975 mandays' lost. The Statesman stated that about 24,000 employees of P &. T of Bengal and Assam provinces were on strike:! The success of the strike draws attention towards the staff associations. The AlP and LGSU, the initiator of the strike had a total

Labour Unrest and Trade Union Movement

69

membership of 18,540 out of 66,735 lower grade employees of the department in 1946 which was little over 28 per cent. It was a matter of great credit that the AlP and LGSU with only 28 per cent membership could organise the historic July 1946 strike and gave a hard shock compelling the government to negotiate with the staff representation. It had been undoubtedly a great victory for the P & T 62 empIoyees. The End of the Strike and Its Aftermath The post and telegraph strike came to an end on 2nd August 1946, when the federation' of P & T Unions accepted the fresh concessions made by the Government of India and called off the general strike. As a result of the demands being accepted by the government, the 23 days old postal strike was called off by Mr V.G. Oalvi and General Secretary of the All India Postmen's and Lower Grade Staff Union. lit Bengal and Assam, it ended on the 7th August and workers returned to work peacefully.63 The All India Post and Telegraph strike was no doubt a big victory for the workers. Though the major demands of the workers regarding new scales of pay etc., were not immediately settled, the workers succeeded in forcing an interim relief out of a bureaucratic government which expected the strike to collapse in three days. However, this initial victory of postmen did not clear the way for final success. The government was using the intervening period to hit b~ck, to disorgapise the ranks of the workers, to break their solidarity and disrupt their union. The government started its game of victimisation immediately after the withdrawal of the post and telegraph strike. The authorities, struck a blow at the post and telegraph workers by withdrawing recognition from a number of unions:~ This was no doubt an attempt to force the workers to leave their unions. It was also a warning that unless workers were solidly united further victimisation of individuals and active workers could take place. The strategy of the bosses of the postal department was clear. It was to crush the trade-unions before the recommendations of the pay commission were out so that the workers had no strength to resist when the time for the real battle arrived. The postal strike was actually based on a weak and vacillating leadership having no experience of organising a strike. They had made no preparations either locally or nationally to conduct the

70

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

strike. The strike came off only due to the spontaneous enthusiasm and militancy of the workers. The leaders of the strike in many cases did not consult the workers. They withdrew the strike" without even informing the workers and in the bargain, sacrificed the workers strike wages leading to disruption and workers in many places refused to accept the terms of settlement and in far off places were not even informed o{ the terms of settlement.65 The strike of the P & T workers began at a moment of turbulent mass political action of the Indian people against imperialism. It was a protest against the hardened anti-labour attitude of the British administr,ation. The hleightened anti-imperiaIist sentiment justifiably welcomed the strike.· The working classes and· the fighting masses considered the struggle an inseparable part of the people's anti-imperialist upheaval and their active support truly elevated the economic strike to a level of anti-imperialist nationalist struggle. In fact, general strike in Calcutta in support of the P & T employees hastened the British Cabinet to review the political situation and announce on 31st July that "some positive action" could not be delayed in view of the postal strike which were symptoms of a serious situation. Sir C. Wylie wrote to Wavell that it would be dangerous "if we allowed ourselves to drift into a really confused s!t\!ation not having made up our minds definitely about anything at all." Burrows did not fail to note that the successful general strike of the 29th July afforded no parallel.66 The postal strike and hartal of July 29 was marked by the passing of a historic resolution in Calcutta in support of the strike. The P & T workers formed one union after merging their separate unions. The time had come to unite With the entire working class of the country. This feeling led the All India Postal and RMS unions and the All India Lower Grade Staff Unions to decide for getting affiliated with the All India Trade-union Congress.67 Thus the strike of the postal workers became a t~rning point in the history of the trade-union movement in the country. REFERENCES 1. Singh, R. C. Indian P & T Employees Movement, A1lahabad 1973, p. 71 and Sen, Sukomal, Working Class of India, History of Emergence and Movement, Calcutta 1977, pp. 405-07. 2. Singh, R. C., op. cit., p. 72.

Labour Unrest and Trade Union Movement 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

71

Legislative Assembly Debates, March 12, 1924, p. 1569. Singh, RC., op. ciL, p. 72. Hindustan Times (New Delhi), February 7, 1946. Ibid Letter No. 178/46 from Secretary to the Government of India, Posts and Air Department, to DG, Post & Telegraph, March 4, 1946, in R. C. Singh, op. ciL, p. 75. Government of India Order No. TR 32(28), March 5, 1946 in R. C. Singh, op. ciL, pp. 75-76. R. C. Singh, op. ciL p. 76. Ibid. The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), February 21,1946. Singh, RC., op. ciL, p. 77. Ibid. Mitra, N.N. Ed., IndIan Annual Register, Volume 11 July-December 1946. Singh, RC., op. ciL, pp. 77-78. Gupta, P. S., A History of the AlTUC, New Delhi 1980, p. 445. Sen, Sukomal, Working Class of India: History of Emergence and Movement, op. cit., pp. 406-07. Mitra, N.N.Ed., Indian Annual Register, 1946. op. cit Singh, R c., op. cit., p. 78. ' Ibid. Mitra, N. N., Vol 11 op. cit. Singh, RC., op. cit., p. 78. Mitra, N. N. op. cit. Vol 11 op. cit. Singh, RC., op. cit., p. 78. Ibid. Mitra, N. N., VolII op. cit. Singh R Cop cit. p. 79. Home Poll.! (18-7-46), 1946, NAI. Ibid. Singh, R c., op. cit., p. 80. Sen, Sukomal, op. cit., pp. 405-07. Gupta, P. S., op. cit., p. 445. Ibid. Home Poll.I 18/7/46, NAI., and Peoples Age, July 28, 1946. Home Poll. Confidential, TNA (Tamil Nadu Archives), and Home Poll.I, July 1946 (NAI). Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Gupta, P. S., op. cit., p. 445-6 and Saha, Panchanan, History of Work-

Political Upsurges in 1945-46 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 5~.

6d. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67.

ing Class Movement in Bengal, New Delhi 1978, pp. 198-99., Saha, P., op. cit., pp. 198-99. Ibid. Ibid. Chakravartty, Renu, Women Role in Communist Movement, op. cit., pp. 78-79; Ibid. Ibid. Saha, P., oR. cit., pp. 198-99. Ibid. Sen, Sukamal, op. cit., pp. 405-07. Mitra, N. N., vot 11 op. cit. Sen, Sukomal, op. cit. p.405-7. Ibid. Ibid. The Student, 17th August, 1946. The Student, 3rd August, 1946. Mansergh N. and Lumby, E. W., Transfer of Power, Va\. VI, No. 98. Mansergh & Lumby, Transfer of Power, Vo!. VI, No. 98. Janata, August 1946. Ibid. Singh, R. C., pp. 84-85. Ibid. Mitra, N. N., op. cit Vot 11. Peoples Age, August 18, 1946. Ibid. Mansergh & Lumby, Transfer of Power, Vo!. VI, No. 98. Sen, Sukomal, op. cit., pp. 405-07.

The South Indian Railway Strike Background On August 24, 1946, commenced one of the most heroic struggles of the working class - The South Indian Railway Strike.! For many years, the railway workers had been demanding an increase in basic wages, dearness allowance, security of service and other facilities. During the war years, the railway workers had to work intensely and face high prices with low wages, while the Railway administration had made Rs 588 crores in war profit and a heavy war-drain out of India (i.e., Rs 28 crores for the British bosses in London). The workers' demands now became imminent. The Government of India vainly assured that all their demands would be

Labour Unrest and Trade Union Movement

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considered at the end of the war. But at the end of war, the railwaymen .were threatened. with a retrenchment of about 3 lakhs of workers and cut in D.A. and wages.2 In order to meet the situation, the Railway Workers Union organised a series of meetings in Madras city in January 1946 to protest against the retrenchmellt scheme. and to demand an adjudicator. It was also proposed that a strike ballot would be held shortly. In Trichinopoly, there were similar meetings of the railway unions wliere the local leader Kalyansundaram warned the railway authorities not to be too complacent about the threat of a railway strike which he stated would be an all India one and of a proportion without precedence.3 In February, trouble appeared to be developing at the South Indian Railway Workshops at the Golden Rock, where 5;000 labourers were employed. These workers were agitating for a general increase in wages and for an incremental scale of pay to replace the existing graded scales of pay. The Union had instructed the men to adopt a 'go-slow' policy and the manageme_nt found that the daily out-turn had become alarmingly low. The General Manager met the representatives of the Union and promised to give a few minor concessions which were within his power such as: liberalising the system of promotion within the graded system. He informed them that itwas not within his power to meet their general demands which were for the Railway Board to consider. The Union was, however, persisted in their 'go-slow'policy.4 The General Manager, now gave a notice of discharge to some of the leaders of the labourers but it was quite likely that there would be a strike .or a lockout. It was hoped that the strike, if it took place, would not spread to the operational section of the Railways. The situation was being carefully watched by the British masters. The more important of the usual railway-union meetings were two meetings of the S.I. Railway labour Union in South Arcot district where speeches were made to the effect that there should be a general strike if any retrenchment would takf< place.s Gradually, the trouble at the Golden Rock at Trichinopoly subsided. Seven leaders of the 'go-slow' policy were discharged by the General Manager on 15th February 1946. The union decided to stage a large demonstration and a procession, but these were banned by the District Magistrate. The labourers thereupon staged a stay-in strike. The General Manager on his part, decid~d on a lockout. At this stage, the labourers appeared to have· calmed down and ac-

74

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

~pted the mediation of the Regional Labour Commission of Rail~~ys. Then strike was called off on the assurance that there would be no victimisation and the grant of some minor concessions.6 The Railway 'convention which. met at Secunderabad in April 1946 passed a resolution cJiticising the Railway Board's failure to grant the demand of the railway workers including adequate dearness· allowance as recommended by the Rau Committee and called upon the affiliated· unions to prepare for all eventualities and to mobilise popular support to the reasonable stand taken by the Railwaymen's Federation.7 . As the. Government did not move, the general council of the all India Railwaymen's Federation (AIRF) decided to give a strike notice demanding no-retrenchment, revision of the scale of pay, adequate dearness allowance as recommended by the Rau Committee, and three months pay as bonus. The strike of a 9 lakh railway workers was to begin from 27th June 1946. It appointed a committee of action and called up all the constituent unions to take a strike ballot,S Strike ballot was taken with every railway employee supporting the call for strike. About 23, 536 workers had voted for the strike and only 61 against. Not only this, all along the railway line froni north to south, from east to west, serious preparations for strike were taking place.9 In April 1946, M & S.M. Railway workers of Hubli went on a strike demanding new ration cards and compensatory allowance against ration cut, etc. On May 1, 1946, 70,000 railway workers of the. North Western Railway went on a heroic strike for 4 hours protesting against low wages, continuous retrenchment process, rotten quality of rations and corruption at ration depots and against all manner of repression and victimisation hy the railway bosses. lo Everywhere on B & A Railway, B.B. & c.1. Railway, G.I.P. Railway, N.W. Railway, local actions, meetings and demonstrations were taking place. Strike committees were· being constituted and collections for the "Strike Fund" was going on Simultaneously a strike of the meni.als of the S.I. Railway was going on which disorganised the running of goods trains thereby affecting the food supply in Salem and Coimbatore j.n particular. l1 Later, it was decided to withdraw the strike notice as the Government.of India agreed to give an interim relief of Rs 9 crores to the railwaymen and further agreed to refer the questions of the hours of work, leave rules, etc., to an adjudicator .12

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75

It was also agreed by the government to suspend all retrenchpending consideration by the government of the report of the adjudicator..It was further agreed to appoint a high power committee after the publication of the adjudica,tor's award to suggest practical measures to absorb the temporary staff. The Committee was duly appointed. 13 . ' The goverll}1lent announre.d; th~ appointment of a Pay Coinmission to consider the service conditions of. all government servants and ,agreed that its recommendations as far as the railwaymen were concerned would be enforced from 1st January 1947. N.M. Josbi was also appointed a member of this commission.14 It was Wavell's Executive Council with Benthall as the railway member that was in office at that time. It was. this regime that encouraged the railway board to resist the workers demands and fight them out.1S The interim government seemed imminent at that time. Con.gratulating the railway workers on the withdrawal of the strike, Maulana Azad said : "I know that railwaymen worked under very difficult conditions and had many grievances and demands. It will be sympathe~ically considered by any government over which the Congress had influence".17 The Railway Administr,ation utilised the strike withdrawal to launch a treacherous attack on the rights previoUSly won by the workers and on their unions in an effort to smash them. Their game was plain enough. They wanted to go back on what they were forced to yield last June to the workers' strength and to reduce the pay commission to a farce. They were, therefore, utilising this truce to crush the organised strength of the railway workers to resist such a . betrayal. Henceforth, the white bosses of the Railway Board starte~ the nefarious game of smashing the Railwaymen's unions one by one and launch a perfidious attack. 1s The attack on the railway Unions came simultaneously on the N.W.R., M.S.M. and G.I.P. but the M.S.M. Perambur Workshop (Madras) and G.I.P. Parel workshop, workers had to fight and go on a stay-in-strike to defend themselves from the bosses' attack.19 . To begin with, the attack was launched on the SIR workers -andtheir unions i.e., SIR labour union (Red flag). Ail illegal lockout was declared in the Golden Rock Workshop. Scores of trade-union militants were arbitrarily dismissed. Hundreds of union militants were demoted. Over 1,000 union militants were penalised and degraded. Even low-paid staff. were transferred and service rules were drastically changed. The right of even the low-paid workers to me~t

76

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

appeal against the transfer was taken away with a view to terrorise them into not joining the union.20 Thus, a full-fledged attack on the democratic trade-union rights had been launched. The attack on the SIR workers and their union had started in last May itself. In May, 9 importattt workers and office-bearers of the union were discharged from service without enquiry for participating in the strike ballOt.21 To legalise these dismissals, the administration without even informing the union suddenly withdrew the right of enquiry before dismissal which the workers, secured after 9 years of struggle since 1936. This was a vital right for the workers and their only guarantee for some security of services at least. By withdrawing this right, the railway bosses wanted to have a free hand by victimising and dismissing union officials and active workers and to smash the union.22 · The withdrawal of this right meant that it was no more a matter of the dismissal of a few workers but one involving the security of service of 44,000 employees of the SIR and the very existence of their • 23 UDlon.

When Kalyansundaram, the President of the·SIR Labour Union approached the General Manager about the first batch of the victimised workers, he· was told that the right of enquiry clause in the Discipline and Appeal Rules, D.A. Rules, had been withdrawn and later unscrupulously the dismissal was legalised. They also withdrew the assurance that low paid menial staff would not be transferred to 1 24 · d Istant paces. It was thus a deliberate plan to crush the workers. The administration further charged the union for the fall in production due to 'go-slow' policy. But the union argued that the 'go-slow' policy had been, withdrawn long before. Despite the reasonable attitude taken up by the union, the General· Manager went ahead to crush the • 25 UDlon.

Serious trouble started brewing in the Golden Rock Workshops of the SIR at Trichinopoly. Six workers of the Golden workshop were suspended against false charges. Next came the suspension of the secretary and president of the Golden Rock Paintshop Committee. As a result all the shop committees decided to go on strike on grounds of attacks on trade-union activities. 26 "From 23.7.46, about 3,000 workers decided to go a stay-in-strike demanding the cancellation of certain suspension orders. In this defensive action against the management's attacks, Hindus,Muslims, Christians ana Anglo-Indians stood together. The President of the

Labo~r Unrest

and Ttad~ Union Movement

77

Union, Kalyansundaram and Secretary Nambiar met the General Manager to bring about a settlement of disputes with the restoration of the right of enquirY. But Reynolds, the General Manager, refused and issued an ultimatum that workers would be allowed entry provided they signed a declaration not to resort to strike.27 27.7.46, there were inddents of victimisation and intimidation ·of loyal workers inside the workshops and efforts at conciliation by an officer of the labour department of the Government of India failed. Thereupon, the railway authorities, announced that only loyal workers would be allowed into the workshops. This led to picketing which was not always peaceful and the situation since then remained very tense and was charged with dangerous possibilities. A strike notice was served on the SIR authorities threatening a general strike after 15.8.46 unless' the various demands were met. The strike was however postponed to 24th Atigust.2.8 . Meanwhile, the Madras advisory committee of the AIRF sent a delegation to the Golden Rock for enquiry. The workers, conscious of the justness of their cause received the delegates with enthusiasm, but they were not permitted entry into the workshop by the management. This, however, did not prevent the delegation from studying the dispute since the delegation heard 1,200 workers' condemnation of the SIR management. The workers recommended that the AIRF should represent the matter to the Chief Commissioner of Railways at Calcutta.29 The SIR Labour Union tried every method of settlement. The m,anagement on the other hand continued its attack on the workers. 30 Therefore, on July 31st, the Central Executive Committee of the SIR ~abour Union met and decided to give a notice of general strike all over the line. The strike n<;rtice was for 14 days beginning from August 1st. Initially, there were peaceful mass picketing at the shop gates; only 600 out of 5,000 entered the shep gates. Anglo-Indians stood solidly with the workers despite Reynolds' efforts to split literate Anglo-Indians with "illiterate ignorant" workers.31 Meanwhile, the Chief Commissioner of Railways who was in Madras had a discussion with the government and Premier Prakasam also visited Trichinopoly, the Headquarters of the SIR and met some of the labour leaders. Every effort was being made to effect a compromise and to avert the strike but the Communists at whose instance the strike was being organised were spoiling for a fight': It was significant that the Tamil Nadu Provincial Congress Committee had passed a resolution disapproving of the strike.32

On

78

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

When the stay-in-strike displayed the workers' complete solidarity, Reynolds decided to use the Malabar Special Police for crushing the workers and their Communist union. Thereafter, the latter were let loose on the Golden Ro.ck Railway Colony who indiscriminately arrested the workers.33 The Labour Union was jn: no mood to precipitate the strike if a settlement could be had. They even postponed the date of strike legally from 14th to 24th August but in vain. The Managemeilt refused to yield. So the strike began.34 The Outbreak of the Strike : To tight back the offensive of the authorities against the tradeunion and democratic rights, 40,000 employees including stationmasters, assistant clerks of varioUs descriptions, pointsmen, shunters, fitters, mechanics, gatemen and even some better-paid drivers went on strike from the midnight of August 24, 1945 in response to the call of the SIR Labour Union and the station-masters' association. 3s The entire railway traffic stopped on the SIR covering 40,000 miles from Madras city in the North to the. southernmost tip of India covering the entire southern peninsula of India, in Malabar, in the states of Travancore and Cochin and all over Tamil Nadu.36 It was the most unprecedented working class action in its breadth and sweep, precision and in ddence of the elementary trade union liberties and security of service. In full,300 out of a total 650 stations, on the line, the entire staff from station-masters to coolie struck and the stations had to be shut up and sealed.3? For nearly one month, the workers fought a heroic strike 1;>attle bravin~ .all manner of repression, arrests and lathi-charge by the police. 8 The organisers and leaders of the strike had good reasons to be proud. The station-masters of the SIR and many clerks from middle-class were Congress minded, despite Prakasam ministry'S appeals and frowns by the Tamil Nadu Provincial Congress Committee, they joined the strike enthusiastically and together with the porters and coolies gave a common battle to Reynolds' management in defence of their rights. Eve~ the lower-paid categories struck work solidly and fought. With a fine spirit, they resisted the bribes of Reynolds and police repression. 39 Though V.V. Giri was the Labour Minister of Madras, the Congress Ministry led by Prakasam only helped the Railway Board bosses ·to carry out their designs and all provincial repressive machinery was let loose at their dictates. 40

Labour Unrest and Trade Union Movement

79

The Railway Board sanctioned Rs 30,000,000 to Reynolds to break the strike. The money was spent to recruit the blacklegs to run the trains. The Reynolds Administration was worried by the un~ precedented solidarity of the workers on strike. It began to put living reports and communiques to create the impression among the public that "the strikers were a small minority, that trains would run as usual and thus cheat the public and democr~tise the workers. 41 While the public was fed with lies that "a definite tendency to "drift back to duty" was noticeable and that the strike was fizzling out, the management with the assistance of the M.S.P. and the reserve police was readily doing its best to crush the strike and beat the workers back to work. 42 A few cases of removal of fish-plates and belts on the track had been reported otherwise the situation remained quiet. There was picketing in several places and house to house intiInidation of loyal workers had been reported from a number of stations. The railway bosses made an atteinpt to sell tickets from Madras despite their warning that passengers might be strandep in intermediary stations. About 72 trains could run which were often protected by pilot trains and run with the help of highly paid blacklegs, guards, drivers and others. 43 The police had taken adequate steps to maintain law and order and protect the loyal workers and the railway property. The transport of essential supplies had not been affected and goods train services which had ceased had been extended over wider areas and over branch lines. However, there were allegations that in some areas, goods trains were running empty but off course 'sealed' to give it a business touch and mails could not be delivered in some areas like Dindigul. 44 " Citizens supported the railway workers in defence of their rights and took out procession shouting "Down with Police Raj", "Hands off workers rights" etc. Funds were collected in aid of the strikers. 45 Every industry rose solidly in support of the railway workers. Apart from the Railway workers of N.W;R., G.LP., B.N.R., B & A, who observed sympathetic strikes. 70,000 workers in the Travancore state, 40,000 workers of the Coimbatore, Allahabad Textile Factory, Municipal scavengers of Dindigul all rose in solidarity with the SIR workers. 46 An inspiring feature of the strik~ was the close fighting alliance between the workers and the peasants. All over the SIR line, gangmen lived iri villages. Their income was" so meagre that their

80

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

work was supplementeil by work on land by their wives and sisters. In these villages, the kisans took up the strike struggle, gave shelter to the underground union organisers and helped them to go fIrmly from village to village. They even contributed to the strike fund and peasant women even faced police terror with great heroism. 47 On 28.8.46, the railway administration was able to run some pas" senger trains and since then their numbers were being.increased. As a measure of safety, however, all services both passenger and goods trains continued to be restricted to daylight hours. From the point of railway administration, the situation was, gradually iniproving but threats.and propaganda failed to wean the workers away from strike and the latter showed no signs of calling off the strike though the Reynolds management applied Police terror to crush it.48 The unbreakable solidarity of the stI:ike made Reynolds wild with rage. The police fIred at a funeral procession of the daughter of the Presi:dent of the SIR Labour Union but with no result. All these demands failed to break the worker's spirit. Reynolds gave an ultimatum that all those who did not return to work would be dismissed. But the workers ignored the ultimatum and continued the strike.49 By the beginning of September, about.200 persons had been injured and 160 were arrested. An orgy of repre~sion had been let loose on the railway workers· by the notorious M.S.P though lathicharge became a routine matter and several SIR labour leaders were arrested. At Golden Rock, Madura and Trichy, police entered the railway colony and beat up workers, intimidated their wives to force their husbands to join work. On September 5, the Police and the M.S.P. at Golden Rock resorted to murderous fIring on the SIR workers as a result of which 4 worker martyrs fell victims to the butchery and several were seriously injured. But the bloody terror at Golden Rock did not beat the workers to surrender to their white bosses as calculated. So daily terror continued at Golden Rock and a section of workers were forced back to work. Every method was used to cow down the workers. 50 Reynolds .res9rted to a new plan of attacking and smashing the union offIces. Thereafter, the union grounds witnessed a bloodbath with hundreds of workers wounded trying to resist the attack on union buildings. Likewise, the entire property at Golden Rock was destroyed. This repression resulted out of the management's failure to break the worker's morale. Even girls collecting for the strike fund were arrested by the police.51

Labour Unrest and Trade Union Movement

81

A distinct method of breaking the morale of the workers was to send a Catholic priest to Christian workers to tell them that they would be prevented from entering the Church if they did not report to duty. But threats of religious ex-communication too did not waver the workers.52 Inspite of the terror used to coerce the railway workers in different centres to come back to work, inspite of the fact that the entire branch union leadership throughout the line had been arrested, the workers all over the line held out heroically for about one month till the union gave the call to go back to work~53 The End of Strike By t~e beginning of September, the workers were steadily returning to duty though the strike continued. As a·result, only 20 per cent of the workers were on strike. The Railway Administration had been able to increase the number of both passenger and goods services although they were still confined to daylight hours. Facilities had been offered by the 'government to MrS. Guruswamy of the All India Railwaymen's Federation to contact the principal strike leaders who were now under arrest With a view to take action for calling off the strike. A meeting of these leaders had been arranged on the 22nd .September to consider the calling off the strike.54 The representatives of the branch unions met at Tanjore on September .22nd and unanimously decided to withdraw the strike. The meeting paid its homage to the martyrs of the SIR strike who faced police repression and gave their lives for the cause of the working class. They also pledged to fight against exploitation and tyranny.55 On 24th September; the workers marched back to work at the call of the union. It showed new confidence in their strength. The union had truly played an active role in binding the workers. Workers who were terrorised, were forced to work by police, heroically, struck till the last and stood shoulder to shoulder in rebuilding their union. The SIR Labour Union undoubtedly became one of India's strongest railway workers unions. 56 The normal running of trains resumed from the morning of 24th September in defence of the advice given by the' railway member in the interim government and his personal assurance to S. Guruswamy, the General Secretary of AIRF that no victimisation would take place and that all legitimate grievances would be sympathetically considered and routed through proper channel. Hence, the government granted special facility to Mr S. Guruswamy, Secretary of AIRF

82

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

to contact the strike committee members under arrest. 57 Congress and the -Nationalist Press The Congress Leaders both at tl;te centre and provinces did not support the strike. The interim government had come into office. When Nambiar (MLA), Kalyansundaram of the SIR Labour Union and C.V. Nair (Secretary of the Station Masters' Association) approached Premier Prakasam of the Provincial Ministry in the Assembly .about redressing the .railway workers grievances, the latter' remained indifferent.s8 It w~s true that Azad had once promise4 to redress the railway workers grievances in JUly 1946 and that Asaf Ali promised sympathetic consideration of the workers grievances but it seemed that the Congress of the south opposed the strike since it was "not opportune" in view of the adverse economic position. The Congress emphasised that public utility services shoUld be particularly immune from strike fever. They held that the SIR strike was most unfortunate and ill-advised since it paralysed the economy of the country not only inflicting heavy financial loss to the Railways, but adversely affecting trade and industry of the country.S9 The all India Railway Muslim Employees League had,however, -supported the strike overwhelmingly. As for the Communist attitude, the strike had commended at the call of the union controlled by the Red Flag and upheld the rail workers grievances. They condemned the brutal suppression of the working class movement as it aimed at fighting the battle of the common man for a better and human life against the powerful resistance of the capitalist hoarders. 60 The Communists Suppo!ted the strike and held a meeting on 11.9.46 and observed ananti-repres!iion day to condemn police firing at Trichinopoly and demanded an impartial enquiry. The Nationalist Press played an adverse role while recording the struggle of the 40,000 workers against the white bosses of the Railway Board. 'The Hindu' of Madras echoed the Anglo-Indian sentiment stating that a politically irresponsible minority was taking advantage of the difficult condition prevailing in the country whereas 'Hindustan Times' defended Reynolds Administration and called for the . 0 f t he stn'ke. 61 suppression An Assessment

The railway workers strike was not inflicted against the Congress Ministry but against the white bosses of the Railway Board. During

Labour Unrest and Trade Union Movemel1t the war years, the railway workers had to work intensely

·83 andfa~

high prices with low wages when the bosses made a heavy profit.62 . Against such annual drain, nationa1ists had once protested in the writings of Dadabahai Naoraji and' Gokhale. In fighting against Reynolds and the Railways Board, the workers were continuing the same battle that had begun 60 years agO.63 The SIR strike was thus prominent among the mounting struggles of the post:war period. It will always rank as a great chapter in the history of the struggles of the Indian toiling pe2j>le for life freedom and democracy against imperialist exploitation. Being one of the most organised seCtion of the Indian Railway workers, the SIR workers learned to resist the oppression of the white railway management. That is why the management opened a vicious .offensive against the union and its militant worker s soon after the decision to postpone the AIR strike was taken by AIRF.65 Against the provocative attack ·upon the elementary right of the workers to organise, the union proceeded constiutionally though with determination. They negotiated for months. They gave a strike notice and 20 days time for the SIR Administration and the Railway Board .to right its wrongs,66 When the strike started on August 25, "caretaker" government was in office in New Delhi and a Congress Ministry headed by Prakasam was in Qffice in Madras. It-was the duty of the GQvernment Qf India to appoint an adjudicator to go. into' the grievances of the wQrkers and it had powers to do. so. But the "caretakers" who had vested interest in the Indian Railways refused to' do. SQ. RepressiQn was let 10Qse Qn the Railway workers by the PQlice and the MSP under the instigatiQn Qf the Railway AdministratiQn, terrorising the rail wQrkers to' resume work. But the. wQrkers displayed a gallant determined resistance and the plan Qf the white bQsses failed. The herQic and self-sacrificing struggle Qf the SIR wQrkers was an inspiratiQn for all fighters Qf freedQm. It received sympathy, supPQrt and sQlidarity from the industrial workers Qf the cQuntry.67 For 29 days,the SIR wQrkers fought undeterred. On September 22; SIR wQrkers decided to' withdraw their strike. WQrkers returned to work Qn 24th September. So. ended the glQriQus and 'histQrical strike of the SIR wQrkers. The wQrking class Qn this QccasiQn was put to severe test and had to' exhibit great courage and heroism. They underwent fiery Qrdeal Qf brutal repressiQn and PQlice terror but their suffering were crowned with victQry. The legitimate grievances were assured to' be considered by the CQngress Ministry. Their restQratiQn of rights

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Political Upsurges in 1945-46

and demands would be enquired into by the Railway Board. The justness of the Railway workers was thus proved.CB REFERENCES 1. Peoples Age, September 22nd, 1946. 2. Gupta, P. S., A Short History of AlTUC (1920-47), New Delhi 1980, p.442. 3. Fortnightly Confidential Reports of Madras, January 1946, Tamil Nadu State Archives (TNA). 4. Fortnightly Confidential Reports for February 1946 from Madras, Tamil Nadu State Archives. 5. Ibid. 6. Fortnightly Confidential Reports of March 1946 from Madras, Tamil Nadu Archives. 7. Gupta, P. S., op. cit., p. 442. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. The SIR Strike, Peoples Publishing House, Ed. Kalyansundaram, Bombay 1947, p. 5. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Gupta, P. S., op. cit., p. 443. 21. Ibid. 22.· SIR Strike, op. cit., pp. 6-7. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26: Ibid. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Fortnighly confidential Reports (FCR) for July 1946, Tamil Nadu State Archives. 33. SIR Strike, op. cit., p. 12..

Labour Unrest and Trade Union Movement 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 4S. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. "4.

55. 56. 57. SS. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63.

64. 65. 66. 67. 68.

85

Ibid. Gupta, P. s., op. cit., p. 444 and SIR Strike, op. cit. p. 13. SIR Strike, op. cit., p. 15. Ibid., p. 16.. Ibid., pp. 16-17. Ibid. Gupta, P. S., op. cit., p. 444. SIR Strike, op. cit., p. IS. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. and Fortnightly Confidential Report for September 1946 from Madras, INA. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. and Fortnightly Confidential Report for September 1946 from Madras, TNA. SIR Strike, op. cit., p. 25. Fortnightly QJnfidential Reports for September 1946 from Madras, 1946; (ramil Nadu Archives) INA SIR Strike, op. cit., p. 26. Peoples Age, September 22, 1946. Ibid. Fortnighly Confidential Reports for September 1946 from Madras, Ta!pil Nadu State Archives. SIR Strike, op. cit., pp. 57-SS. Ibid. Fortnighly Confidential Reports for September 1946 of INA and Gupta, P. S.,op. cit., p. 445. Peoples Age, September 22nd, 1946. Peoples Age, September 22nd, 1946. Peoples Age, September Sth, 1946 and June 5th, 1946 and FeR for September 1946, op. cit. SIR Strike, op. cit., pp. 41-42. SIR Strike, op. cit., pp. 41-42t Ibid. Ibid. Peoples Age, September 22,1946. Ibid. Ibid. Peoples Age, September 29,1946.

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Labour Unrest and Trade-Union Movement Estimate The study of the period immediately succeeding the Second World War i.e. the years 1945-46 reveals that it was a decisive stage in the history of the working class struggle-a time when the background to the development 6f trade-union movement in independent India was formed. 1 The working class, as we have already noted were pressed by problems imposed by war time adverse economic conditions. Hence, strikes became very common and a large number of mandays were lost. The increasing tide of industrial unrest in early 1946 had become the responsibility of popular ministries which had been elected in the provinces and at the centre. In all but three provinces (Punjab, Sindh and Bengal), Congress won electoral victories in 1946 and formed a Congress Ministry at the centre. Now that Indians had taken over the government from the British, the workers probably expected that their demands would be treated more sympathetically than previously.2 However, the working class, whQ were playing a conscious role. in the political struggle of India were soon disillusioned when both the Congress and· non-Congress ministries opposed the struggles which the workers were forced to launch against retrenchment, D.A. and solution of other problems. They counselled the workers against the strike, which according to them, would not help in solving their problems, rather would mount it up~ But when the workers ignored their counsels and moved on the path of strikes, there was no wavering on part of the ministries but to firmly suppress the strikes and the disorder that accompanied them.3 The Indian government at the centre and the provincial government in Bombay both introduced legislation to take it. leading role in the settlement of industrial disputes. 4 But the Bombay Industrial Relations Act of 1946 passed by the Bombay Congress Ministry revealed an undemocratic and anti-labour attitude. This act was designed to hamstrong the struggles of the workers by more tighteningly fastening them to the machinery of arbitration. Simultaneously, the procedure which this act laid down for the recognition of the unions was also a manifestation of a crudely bureaucratic outlook.

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Instead of laying down the democratic principle of judging by secret ballot, the act, recognised the membership register as the criterion for determining the representative character of the union. The Indian trade-union movement, therefore, had to be loudly vocal against this undemocratic act. The entire chain of events tended to bring to light a well thought out attempt on the part of the Congress leadership to thwart and weaken the organised strength and impervious unity of the working class. ' In August 1946, the Congress Working Committee passed a resolutipn ,on Labour Policy which placed most of the blame for the current labour unrest on the wretched conditions under which the workers were suffer"mg but at the same time the resolution urged that strikes should be avoided and in fact that essential services should be immune from strikes and lock outs. In addition, the working committee called on Congressmen to be more active in the field of labour and to make the fullest use of the Hind Mazdoor Sevak Sangha (HMSS): In November 1946, the HMSS asked all its supporters to affiliate their unions with the AITUC. Actually, the growing political consciousness of the working class frightened the bourgeoise leadership of the Congress and in a bid to make safe their own compromising and class collaborationist position, the task of winning over the backward section of the working class to their side assumed urgency.s This class politics prompted the Congress leadership to take a direct anti-Communist stance and the Congress Working Committee which met at Calcutta on December 7-11,1946 issued instructions to remove the Communists from inside the Congress Organisation.6 Meanwhile, the Communist party emerged as the third biggest political force in the Indian political scene next to Congress and the Muslim League. In the elections to the provincial Legislative Assembly in 1946, the Communists secured 112,736 workers votes against 321,607 votes polled by Congress. In this situation, any delay on the part of the Congress leaders would have amounted to incalculable ,harm to their class position, so they decided to form a separate labour organisation strictly under their own political and ideological control.7 In the Indian political scene, fast changes were taking place. The strikes, hartals and country-wide mass upsurge advanced irresistibly and the shrewd British Government did not fail to discern the portents of a grave danger underlying it. The imperialists found the

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ground slipping off their feet. Constrained under these circumstances, in March 1946, the British Government sent the Cabinet Mission to India for working out the details for the transfer of power. Prolonged discussions were held between the Cabinet Mission, the Congress and the Muslim League in the consequence of which, in September, 1946, an Interim Government was formed in -India. Nehru headed the ministry, later joined by the Musum League in October. The struggle of the working class in this way began in the background of the struggle for Indian national freedom under the imperialist government. Through tortuous economic and political struggles, the working class emerged as an organised class conscious social force poised for future revolutionary performances on the eve of independence. By the time independence was ushered in, they were prepared and capable of raising their voices with fresh objectives under the new context of Independent India. REFERENCES 1. Revri, C. Indian Trade Union Movement; An Outline History, 18801947, New Delhi 1972, pp. 276-279., 2. Crouche, Harold, Trade Unions and Politics in India, Bombay 1966, pp. 78-84. 3. Sen, Sukomal, Working Qass of India : History of Emergence and Movement (1830-1870), Calcutta 1977. p. 402-5 4. Crouche, Harold, op. cit.,_ pp. 78-84. 5. Sen, Sukomal, op. cit. pA02-5 6. Crouche, Harold, op. cit., pp. 78-84. 7. Sen, Sukomal, op. cit. p. 402-5

Chapter IV

Peasant Movements of the Post-war Period (1945-46) Introduction

For the organised peasant movement, for the unorganised millions of peasant masses, the years since the el,1d of the Second Wodd War, had been years of mass militant actions. The democratic masses had initiated the campaign for the release of the INA prisoners, the RIN personnel raised the banner of revolt against imperialist domination, the working class had entered a new stage of mighty strike struggles. The national situation was taking an ominous turn with communalism penetrating deep into the country. Amidst this tumultuous period, the peasants did not rise, but were watching the events. With the approach of the harvesting season, the peasantry entered a new stage of struggle in various provinces of India .1 The post-War period of 1945-46 saw the rise of the mighty revolutionary peasant movements in many parts of the country against feudal exploitation and oppression, for reduction in rent and feudal levies, against evictions against debt burdens, etc., leading to the famous Tebhaga and Tanka movement in Benga~ the peasant struggle in Punjab, Orissa, Malabar, Andhra, the Bakhast struggle in Bihar, the Wadi struggle in Maharashtra and so on? Along witJt the anti-feudal maSs kisan upsurge, popular movements developed in pril,1cely states - the 'Quit Kashmir' movement, the Telengana uprising, the Punnapra-Vayalar battles, strikes in Travancore, Gwalior, etc. Before the end of the war, the landlords had been systematically dispossessing the kisans of their land and intensifying their exploitation in many ways. With the end of the war, the landlords all over the country took the offensive against the tillers of the soil by evicting them on a mass scale in order to have direct possession of lands. They had done this mainly for two purposes : Firstly to grab as much land as possible in anticipation of the legislative measures on abolition of landlordism and secondly, to get monopoly possession of much food crops as possible so as to pile up immense fortune through illicit food trade. Provoked by the offensive of the landlords and forced by the needs arising out of famine and

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Political Upsurges in 1945-4"6

high prices of essential commodities, the peasants confronted the offensive through heroic struggles to save the land and food from· the landlords.3 Thus, the condition of the peasantry worsened sharply and the deterioration of their position was aggravated by the process of accele~ation of deprivation of land and uninterrupted famine. 4 In this grin}. background, the Kisan Sabha launched the distinctive peasant movement of the period i.e., the Tebhaga and Tanka s . struggles.

REFERENCES 1. Namboodripad, E. M. S., On the agrarian question (Pamphlet), 1947 (CPI Publication, 'Ajoy -Bhavan, New Delhi). 2. AlKS Org. Reportage No. (1947-48) 21st September, 1947 and the 1 Peasant in National Economic Construction by E. M. S. Namboodripad (Pamphlet). 3. Ibid 4. Dyakov, AM., 'Crisis of British Rule in India and the stage in the liberlltion struggle of the people in crisis in colonial system' No. 7 (Soviet Document). 5. Sen, Sunil, Peasant Movements in India, Calcutta 1982, p. 106.

BENGAL The Tebhaga Movement in Bengal in· the mid-forties was a struggle by sharecroppers to retain 2/3 share of the produce for themselves and thereby reduce the rent they paid to jotedars - a class of rich farmers who held superior rights in land from one-half to .one-third of their produce. The movement was limited in its impact and spread, being launched at a critical juncture on the eve of India's independence and partition of the sub-continent. Prior to the Tebhaga .struggle, many agrarian movements developed within the framework of the Indian national movement but with a few excep" tions, their dominant ethos was Gandhian, as they sought reformist goals through 'passive resistance' and 'non-violence'. The Tebhaga movement was however a marked departure from this pattern. Being the outgrowth of the left wing mobilisation of the rural masses, it was the first consciously attempted revolt by a politicised peasantry in Indian History. Therefore, the movement assumes a special sig-

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nificance in the study of Indian peasant struggles.1 Out of 75 lakh families which existed at that time, half were landless or had plots of less than 2 acres of land, 20 lakh families had 2 to 5 acres of land and less than 20 lakh kisan families had five acres or m9re. It was recognised that no family could live on less than 5 acres of land i.e., 57 lakhs of the 75lakh kisan families were living hand to mouth.2 The landlords and jotedars had learnt that while land revenue remained the same, the price of paddy had gone on increasing. So they understood as had the peasants also that he who could hold the crop would be the gainer and could make good profit. In feudal times, the landlord gave his land to the sharecropper and he never took any responsibility for the cost of the cultivation. It was entirely borne ~y the sharecroppers (adhiar).3. Fdrty-one per cent of the peasants of Bengal were sharecroppers at thiJ time cultivating about 50 per cent of the land. They had no tenancy rights. The custom was to take the crop to the jotedar's grana;ry and surrender half the produce as rent, another part as interest o~ 100 to 300 per cent for the loan of paddy and still another part as illegal exactions as well as other extortions. At the end the adhiar was Jeft with hardly a maund of paddy per bigha he had cultivated withihis labour day and night. This was hardly sufficient to feed his fam~ly. Any loan taken in the lean period when prices were high had to b~ paid back at the time of harvest so that a loan of a bag of paddy could only be written off by paying about 3 bags of paddy at the price prevailing at harvest time which was always low.4 Natural calamities in the form of floods, famine and disease were enormous from 1941 to 1945. As a result, the prices were forced up exorbitantly and it hit and almost wiped out the sharecroppers, poor peasants and their families. The Land Revenue Commission of 1940 had admitted that the adhiar should be given occupancy rights and that rent should be fixed at 1/3. However, any follow upon the Land Revenue Commission's recommendations were .unthinkable. The number of sharecroppers had increased but their conditions went on steadily worsening. 5 Between 1940 and 1942 several leaders of the Kisan Sabha were interned which gave them an opportunity to sharpen their understanding of the agrarian crisis and the nature of class conflict in the comitryside.o The,re were rural areas in North Bengal where 60 per cent of the population had been reduced to become sharecroppers by selling their land while at the other end some jotedars had become owners of thousands of bighas of land. Such transfers of land through

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the distress of the impoverished section of the rural population was widespread. During the famine of 1943, the sharecroppers obligation to surrender half their produce to the jotedars remained unchanged. In Chittagong, during the famine, there were 32,000 sale deeds of land registered. This was 3 times the sales registered in 1942. In Faridpur district, between June and November 1942, there were 34,916 sale· deeds registered. This went up to 58,334 in the same period as in 1943. In Jessore, the period between July and November 1942 saw 17,087 sale deeds while for the same period as in 1943, 32,307 sale deeds were registered. At Tamluk in Midnapore district, in 1942, sale deeds were registered 5,000, while in 1943, this went up to 23,000. In the same district at Contai, for half-a-maund of paddy, a bigha of land was sold in November 1943.1 The famine in 1943 had given the poor peasantry a tremendous shake up. It roused their consciousness. On one hand they saw mass impoverishment and starvation and on the other hand there appeared huge accumulation of money with the jotedars. This started a simmering discontent among the impoverished peasants. In 1944, when the second wave of famine broke out, they were roused to participate in the dehoarding of paddy from the jotedar's granary. Mass starvation and mass pauperisation thus ravaged Bengal.8 The means. of production as well as the machinery of procurement arid distribution were controlled by those people aided by the bureaucracy while the masses starved. Blackmarket of rice had practically become the only market and famine as we have already seen had become like a chronic epidemic.9 Exploitation and extortion of the impoverished peasantry did not satisfy the zamindars. The landlords of Bengal who had once enjoyed the monopoly of land by the virtue of the Permanent Settlement now passed on to a new offensive to exploit their monopoly in an entirely new form. So far they had been getting a prefit of Rs 10 crores per annum while the government got only Rs 3 crores as land revenue. But this appeared to be nothing when they saw that the food hoarders of 1943 secured an illegal profit of not less than Rs 150 crores during that year. So the monopoly of food instead of the monopoly of land became the war-cry of the landlords and big jotedars of Ben10 ga.1 The offensive of the landlords assumed a form some of which were: (a) Mass eviction of tenants and sharecroppers. (b) Suspension of the age-old practice of supplying loans of

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paddy to the sharecropper for his subsistence in the period between sowing and harvesting. (c) Sale of paddy at high blackmarket prices to all in general but to a sharecropper only if he a8l:eed to virtual sale of his land or homestead if he had any of his cattle or other movable and also to pay a high rate of interest which went up to 300 per cent of the principal. l1 (d) Attempt to reduce the sharecroppers to serfdom by refusing to pay the share of the sharply increased cost of production to supply seed or manure and to help in the increase in production; which came down to 12-15 maunds per acre or to increase the share of crop due to the share-cropper. 12 315 of:the total cultivable land was cultivated by sharecropper at this time who constituted 41 per cent of the rural population and 30 per cent were landless labourers. Only 8 per cent of the rural population possessed holdings of more than 5 acres. 13 By 1945, the Kisan Sabha had predominantly become a poor peasant organisation. At the time of natural disasters the communist units and Kisan Sabha workers who were already released, engaged themselves in massive famine relief work. They set up relief committees and grain cooperatives in the mofussil districts and organised some 700 relief kitchens which fed at least 117,000 destitutes ~,:,ery­ day. These relief activities enabled theCPI and the Kis~ Sabha to consolidate themselves organisationally. In 1945, the Kisa'Q Sabha had some 77,000 members in nearly a thousand villages and about a thousand full-time organisers in the Bengal districts. In the course of relief work, Kisan Sabha workers advised tenants and bargadars to withhold rents or share of crop. But it did not organise any major peasant struggle in 1945. The committees of Kisan Sabha also waged struggles against the hated hoarders and black marketeers in various places. 14 In the summer of 1946, the provincial Kisan Sabha held its annual conference in Maubhog village· in Khulna district which was attended by delegates representing most of the districts. Curiously enough; the conference did not give the call for launching the Tebhaga Movement although a resolution demanding the abolition of Zamindari and introduction of tenancy legislation contending 2/3rd share of the crop for the bargadars was duly adopted. IS There was a radical turn in the political situation of the country: the period was marked by the big post-war .upsurge of the people campaigning for the release of the INA prisoners first in late Novem-

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Political Upsurges in 1945-46

ber 1945 and again iD. February 1946 and the solidarity actions for RIN ratings mutiny. Simultaneously, a wave of industrial unrest and labour strikes ravaged the entire country. These urban forces' struggles did not leave the rural·people of Bengal untouched though the rural repercussions were limited. 16 H we look at the industrial working class, we find that the common masses were responsible for explaining city events to the village poor in some areas. This occurred for example in the Doars area of J alpaiguri district. Here the Communist Party had built a tradeunion organisation among the gangmen who did the repairing of the railway tracks. As party members, they distributed news· to the villagers. When the All India Railway Workers' agitation in May/June 1946 was crowned with success, union activists rejoiced with victory banners, Red flags and flowers. Cadres of the same union subsequently brought the message of the Tebhaga Movement to tribal peasants in their locality.17 . In some cases, workers· strikes were occasions when a class alliance between the working class and the p~asantry was formed. This happened in the case of the famous Narayanganj Textile strike of February 1946 which lasted for 2 1/2 long months. Peasantry from surrounding villages gave very concrete solidarity. They held meetings and though facing plenty of hardship themselves provided food for the striking factory workers.1s During the strike by the Lalmonirhat railway workers in Rangpur district, thousands of villagers with Red Flags marched in procession to the mass gathering which was held in preparation for the strike. All attendants shouted "The railway workers demands should be accepted. The Tebhaga demand should be accepted! and "Let peasants and workers of the world unite !,,29 . These examples show that industrial workers through their strikes provided an indirect impetus to the masses in the countryside. After the end of the war, the workers of Calcutta launched a wave of strikes culminating in the Post and Telegraph strike of July 1946, shortly before the .outbreak of the Tebhaga uprising. On 29th July, the whole of working class in the city followed the employees of the Post and Telegraph and Telephone service in a complete general strike.20 The poor peasant~ workmen and agricultural labourers scattered over Bengal and distant villages did not receive detailed information about these urban strikes and struggles due to illiteracy and lack of communication media. But activists and travellers carried the echoes

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of the city's uproar to ,the countryside. Amidst the peasants of the jungles of South Sunderbans, "Hope and a thrilling feeling were aroused by the news about the soldiers rebellion, the large strike by workers in towns ..." The scanty news which peasants heard made them curious and inspired them as well.21 Yet apparently there was all quiet on the agrarian front. Peasants did not rise in struggle in this tumultuous period: The reasons were not clear. It seemed that peasants were watching events and waiting for the harvesting season which was the normal period of the bargardar's struggle.22 Meanwhile, the political situation was taking an ominous turn. NeitherThe nationalists nor the left could understand how deep communalism had penetrated· into the country. In the absence of an agrarian movement, it was. relatively easy· for the vested interests backed by powedul political leaders to spread the poison of com.munalism. Communal riots appeared to be the dominant feature of Indian politics. On August 12th, 1946, the Muslim League which was the ruling party of Bengal held a day of direct action to press its demand for a separate state. On 16th August the city of Calcutta witnessed the beginnings of a tidal wave of communal killing which swept the country resulting in heavy death roll. On 10th October communal riots broke out in Noakhali and spread to Tippera. In this grim background the Kisan Sabha chose to launch· the Tebhaga and Tanka struggles.23 It was not until the post-monsoon period of September 1946 that BPKS decided to launch the Tebhaga Movement in the harvesting season. While the Noakha,li.riots broke out in October, the Kisan Sabha held meetings in villages which were not always largely attended but enrolled volunteers and distributed leaflets in simple languages calling upon bargadars to store paddy in their Khamars (Nij Kholane Dhan tolo) and the demand Tebhaga (Tebhaga chai) i.e. calling for the direct action from the sharecropper to retain 2/3rd share of the produce for themselves and to pay the jotedars only 1!3rd. Demonstrations followed in some villages and volunteers marched across villages shouting slogans and distributing leaflets. The time for action was ,commencing with the harvesting season approaching.24 About 60 lakh Kisans struggled for the demand of Tebhaga. Nineteen out of 26 districts of Bengal were involved in it. These pistricts were· Dinajpur, Rangpur, Jalpaiguri, Malda, Pabna and Bogra in North Bengal, Mymensingh, Faridpur, Dacca, Tippera and

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Chittagong in East Bengal, 24 Pargannas, Nadia, Jessore and Khulna in Central Bengal, Hooghly, Midnapore, Howrah and Birbhum in West Bengal. The sway of the struggle was terrific as 41 per cent of the peasants were exploited under the sharecropping system.2S Though the Bengal Kisan Sabha h-.d decided on the struggle in September 1946, it started and spread almost spontaneously in November when the harvesting season began. The demand was perfectly just and legitimate as it was recommended to the Government by the Bengal land revenue commission in early 1940. The movement first started ina village named Atwari in northwest Dinajpur in early December 1946, while several bargadar volunteers cut the paddy crop and carried it to their own Khamar (threshing floor) instead of taking it to the jotedar's Khamar as they used to do in the past. Dinajpur was a stronghold of the Kisan Sabha. In 1939, the adhiars had launched a struggle that ended in defeat. The Kisan movement was later revived between 1940 and 1945.26 The local Kisan Samity workers and some Communist workers moved from village to village shouting anti-jotedar slogans asking the adhiar to die rather than to part with his paddy. This produced quite a lot of bitterness against the jotedars. When the police intervened, peasant-police clashes followed. Fearing mass arrests, the Kisa'n Sabha and Communist leaders who spearheaded the movement went underground. The resistance of sharecroppers was initially intense in the Thakurgaon subdivision of the Dinajur district but within a fortnight the movements spread to -several villages covering nearby 3/4th of the district. Because it was the harvesting season the agitation spread very fast. By the middle of December, the movement had gathered momentum in 5 thanas out of 12 thanas of the subdivision (Parbatiput, Chirirbandar, Kotwali Kusumundi and Itahar thanas) while the adhiars of the remaining areas remained practically indifferent. Since the middle of December 1946, large bodies of adhiars and landless labourers started looting paddy from the fields. Their modus operandi was to come from 200 to 300 in number upon a plot of land, who had finished reaping alf the crop in 30 to 40 minutes, and remove the same to some adhiar's house arid then, repeat the same process in other plots. Everywhere the pattern of the struggle was the same but by mid-December 1,000 Kisan Sabha and peasant volunteers had been arrested. 27 The peasant" volunteers, who were drawn from poor peasants went, for example, to cut the paddy in the land of Phuljhari Singh, a bargadar. The police had already arrived in the village and arrested

Bengal Famine 1943 Courtesy: Art Heritage

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Sushil SeD, a Kisan Sabha leader. Next day, the volunteers went to cut the paddy in the village and there was a· clash. The police arrested a few peasants and left the village. Soon after this incident, the leading functionaries of th€? Communist Party met in Thakurgaon town and decided to go into hiding in order to guide the movement. It seems that the bargadar's response was overwhelming and within a month, the movement spread to 22 out of 30, police stations in the district and in Thakurgaon subdivision the movement was intense.28 The Tebhaga Movement spread to the adjoining Jalpaiguri and Rangpur districts. The pattern of the movement was the same. In Jalpaiguri; the movement was confined to 4 police stations : Debiganj, Boda, Kotwal and Pachagarh, later it appeared to Mal and Meteli. The area was a favourable setting for response to the BPKS call for a number of reasons. 29 First, the area had a long tradition of political activity and peasant movements. Broad sections of Rajbansi and Muslim peasants particularly from rural poor section and adhiars of the area came to have an orientation for peasant struggles and also for viewing such struggles as part of the struggle for national freedom. 30 Second, there· was a band of dedicated Communist organisers who though coming from petty bourgeois intelligentsia background, sank themselves deep into the masses.31 Thirdly, there were scores of Rajpansi and also Muslim peasant activists and cadres many of whom belonged to poor peasant and adhiar families. These peasant cadres made possible a regular and lively functioning of the Krishak SaJlliti Committees at the union and village level. Thus the area had an organisational structure for mass struggle.32 With the -call for Tebhaga, the district leaders of the CPI and the Krishak Samiti began active preparations for launching the movement. Group meetings, mass meetings, demonstrations, peasant marches through the countryside and such other forms of both propaganda and mobilisation became a regular feature. Volunteers were recruited, trained and assigned with specific responsibilities. "Ekbhai, Ek Taka, Ek Lathi" became a major rallying slogan. A distinct feature was that the movement did not have a spontaneous response from the bargadars. In fact; few adhiars and bargadars cut and took away the entire produce- from the land to the house of the adhiars cutting and taking away the entire paddy from the jotedar's land to the bargadar's house and opposed by the adhiars who thought they would be going against the existing customs. There were

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outside agitators and volunteers who organised local support to compel the adhiars to cut the paddy and take the same to the bargardar's house and most of them accompanied the volunteer with passive consent.33 From late November onwards, Tebhaga was enforced and after stacking it in the adhiars place, the jotedar was asked to come and receive his 1!3rsl share of the crop. The police was also informed. But· ndther the jotedars nor did the police turn up. At the beginning, the jotedars were adamant, ultimately, however, most of the jotedars had been able to induce their adhiars to share the crops apparently by, conceding to give some concession in other matters such as total remission of interest on paddy advanced and by jotedar's promise not to displace the adhiars. Some jotedars also agreed to accept 1I3rd of the crop due to the pressure of the agitation. Some small jotedars were also forced by their adhiars to sign Tebhaga receipts.34 The peasants and adhiars thus remained on the offensive.· Many jotedars made a retreat and arrived at compromises and some even left the area temporarily. The jotedars were on many occasions kept confined. to their houses under threat of assault and violence. the jotedars sought police help, but for several weeks even the police did not dare to enter the stronghold of the Tebhaga Movement. With the help of young boys, girls and women an elaborate forewarning arrl,lDgement was o~ganised. For two months .or so admiriistrative control over these areasw~s virtually non-eXistent and the provincial government expre~ed its serious concern over the "parallel government" in J alpaiguri, Dinltjpur and other parts· of the province. Thus, the militant peasants threw up a powerful challenge to the established structure of authority.3s' The jotedars, however, were only bidding their time and carried on a conspiracy to smash the movement. Many of the big jotedars in Pachagarh were Muslims and they tried to divide the peasantry along communal lines. Though they failed to create any cOmmunal clash~ they succeeded in keeping the bulk of the Muslim peasants away from the movement. Th~ jotedars, irrespective of their community or identity, held confabulations among themselves, raised funds and put increasing pressure on the district administrative officials -and the Muslim League Government in BengaUor police intervention.36 For colonialist bureaucrats, the movement was the outcome of the manipUlation of "outside agitators". The SDO, Jalpaiguri observed that the movement was organised by educated Communists and organised agitators. The Statesman observed that peasants were

The Tebhaga Movement in Bengal :Somnath Hor Courtesy: The Artist

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moving with a momentum that did not need any aid from outside. In fact, the SDO indicated the mass-character of the movement.37 During the harvest season, Communist volunteers in batches visited different localities and established campsin the interior, enlisting local support and helping the selected adhiars to cut and take away the entire produce from their -lands and stacking them in suitable places.38 A major indicator of the broad peasant awakening was the active participation of Rajbansi peasants and adhiar women in the movement. Led by Punnyeswari Devi, Makri and other women activists of Debiganj area and Tilak Tarini Nandi, Sikha Nandi and a hosl--of militant women activists of th!fPachagarh area, the Rajbansi peasant women took part in meetings, processions, paddy harvesting and even clashed with the armed police with brQ.Qmsticks and scythes in their hands. 39 In Rangpur district, ·~he movement was led by Rajbansi and Muslim bargadars who colle«tively carried the paddy crop to their own Khamars. But even when SQme Muslim jotedars fatally attacked their Hindu and tribal sharecroppers, the leaders of the movement disallowed any retaliation ~eating that sueh reprisals against Muslim jotedars might rupture the class unity pf Hindu tribal and Muslim bargadars and might 'spark off serious communal strife.40 The widespread agitation, to get 2/3rd of the produce for the cultivators in the district was be~ming 'very general throughout the province. It was widespread in East Bengal as in Rajshahi division" where minor clashes occurred. In Dacca, the movement was' termed as an economic dispute and the commissioner considered that the government was likely to be seriously embarrassed if the police were called to use force against the bargadars and emphasized that the landlord had his remedy in a prosecution for theft or for abetment of theft. 41 The Tebhaga activists were particularly active in Nadia, Jessore, Pabna, Chittagong, Faridpur to name a few places of East Bengal. Their activities were notable in Kushtia subdivision of Nadia, Narail in Jessore, Diamond Harbour in 24 Parganas, where Section 144 had , to be issued. In Faridpur the bargadars had adopted a different technique of refusing to harvest the share of the crop unless wages were paid to them for their work. In Chittagong, on the other hand, the movement had resulted in the bargadars taking away the entire · some cases~ 4'pro d uce In In Sundcrbans and Kakdwip, the Tebhaga Movement began

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Political Upsurges in 1945-46

from November 1946 spreading rapidly to Munsif's hat, Fatikpur, Bamanagar, Bisalakshmipur, Dwariknagar, Sibrampore, Radhanagar, Budhakhali, Durganagar, Chandonpiri, Loyalganj, Haripur, Rajnagar, Debinibas and Lakhimpur. Peasants of Ftazerganj, Mathuranagar and Sagar soon joined the fray. In all these places, Kisan Sabhas were set up ; Tebhaga committees formed and public processions organised. Slogans raised were also typical of the moyement everywhere namely, "Zamindari Khatam Karo" (abolish Zamindari), "Tebhaga Chai" (we want 2/3rd share) and Nij Khamare Dhan Tolo" (stack paddy in your own yards). Two other slogans also dominated proceedings in Kakdwip namely, "Bhag J amir Rashid Chai" (we want receipts for the sharecropping land) and "Samasta Zulum Bandho Karo" (stop all oppressions). These two slogans were attractive to Kakdwip masses. The first one represented the sharecropper's anxiety for recognition of his linkage with the land he tilled or of a semblance of his tenurial rights. The second· or the more impodant one, expressed his age long desire to free himself and his family from the oppressions and humiliations at the hands of the landlord and his agents. It was the fight against zulum more than the demand for the Tebhaga that dominated the initial phase of movement in Kakdwip.43 The peasants refusal to perform Begar of any sort) their defiance of the landlords unbridled authority, together ga\j'e an emancipatory context to the movement. This liberating nature of the agitation and the general awakening, particularly the stoppage of Begar and the exemplary act of retaliation such as forcing the landlord's men to apologise publicly for specific acts of oppression or beating an oppressive jotedar with shoes, inspired a large number of agricultural labourers in Kakdwip to join the uproar. Almost identical was also the case in, other parts of Bengal. where agricultural labourers joined the movement en masse by the side of the sharecroppers and often had a leading role, though the Tebhaga demands did not include any of their imme9iate needs. Apart from the natural solidarity that grew between the two categories - the sharecroppers and the agricultural labourers, it may be recalled that a considerable number of sharecroppers lost during the famine their agricultural implements and cattles and were compelled to join the ranks of agricultural labourers. Emotionally by resenting their relegation, they still remained sharecroppers in mentality. Even they vaguely hoped for regaining their former position by joining the movement and dreamt of securing for themselves through the struggle for a minimum proportion of land. Unlike in other parts of Ben-

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gal, this forlorn desire of the agricultural labourers, that raised in the next stage the tumult in Kakdwip to a new revolutionary height. 44 Despite their preoccupation at the beginning with the anti-zulum campaign, the Kakdwip peasants did make some progress in obtaining the Tebhaga. In a sizable number of cases there, the Bargadars carried their entire produce to their own khamars and offered 2I3rd share to the landlords which, of course, they refused to accept. Some government officials and non-government officials including the Congress member _of the legislative assembly (Sri Charuchandra Bhandari) tried to bring about a compromise between the sharecroppers and the jotedars but without much success. Seeing the involvement of J3argadars as a whole in this "spontaneous and general movement", some petty jotedars had to yield to the demands of Tebhaga and accept the one-third share offered· to them. But the BPKS slogan of "Nij Khamare Dhan Tolo" (stack paddy in your own yard) was only partially implemented in Kakdwip and in many cases - even while demanding the Tebhaga, the Bargadars allowed the harvest to be carried to the Jotedars' yards and stacked it there. Certain cases did occur when peasants assembled in the harvested fields and resisted the landlords from taking away the crop. However, these were isolated cases till 1947 when the movement continued. 45 Another stronghold of the movement was Mymensingh district of East Bengal. In the northern Susang region of the district, the Hajong tribals turned tenant, paid Tanka (a fixed quantity of crop) as rent to their landlords; in the central and southern parts, the bulk of sharecroppers were either M.uslims or tribals whereas the zamindars, talukdars and big jotedars were mostly Hindus though a few of them were Muslims. Hence the agrarian movement in this district was a mixture of the Tanka and Tebhaga struggles. Only 20 per cent of the Muslims of the district were direct lineal descendents of foreign Muhammadan settlers, the remaining were either of mixed ancestry or converts from local lower caste Hindus. However, the conversions in East Bengal, particularly in Mymensingh area took place less from a genuine change of faith than for material reasons. The great majority of the Muslim popUlation in Mymensingh pursued agriculture as the chief source of livelihood for want of a better alternative. The Kisan Sabha mobilised them as early as it did the Hajong tribals of the Susang region. The Susang subdivision, 75 km long and 15 km wide belt, south of Garo Hills, was a Communist stronghold. Here the Tanka system of fIXed rents had prevailed since Mughal times when local zamindars let out lands, free of rent in lieu

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of wages trapping wild elephants, an annual quota of which had to be supplied to the imperial authority. Such lands known as Tanka lands were subsequently resumed by the landlords as 'kbas' possession (personal reserves). For cultivators of those lands, quantities of produce (tanka) were fixed as rent. Like the Bargadar, the Tanka tenant had no occupancy right. In 1937, the Kisan Sabha tried to organise the Hajong peasants and raised the demand for the reduction of Tanka rent. Apart from Hajongs, the Muslims, formed a small proportion of the tenants and the movement was first started among the Muslim peasants of Dasal village in Susang.46 The Tanka rents were lowered considerably in 1941-43 but the famine and the resulting price increase totally upset the effects of that rent-reduction. In 1945, the BPKS held its annual conference at Netrakona which was attended by thousands of Hajongs. In the winter of 1946, the Hajong peasants of North Mymensingh launched the Tanka Movement. ~7 The Kisan Sabha in organising the Hajong peasants raised the demand of reduction of Tanka into much lower money rent, so that the tenants could benefit from the rising agricultural prices. Money rent had another advantage : in case of dispute, it could be deposited at the police station.48 In the entire northern Mymensingh comprising of Netrkoana ; Sadar and Jamalpur subdivisions, the Tanka movement rapidly spread. The peasants took the crop to their houses and refused to pay Tanka until their demands were fulfilled ; it was directed not against the jotedar but the zamindar of Susang. The leading figure was Moni Singh, a trade-union worker of Calcutta and for a long time a prisoner under the Bengal Criminal Law Amendmerlt Act who came to his h9me district, Mymensingh and remained sunk among the peasants and organised them in the Kisan Sabha after his release from the detention camp. There was Lalit Sarkar, a rich Hajong peasant who had joined the Congress Movement in the 1930s and was drawn in the Kisan Sabhain 1937-38. 49 As for the political elements involved, the Communists active in Mymensingh district from the later twenties, naturally took advantage of the situation, mobilised the Hajong peasants to resist the produce rent system itself and to demand a substitution by a fair and equitable system of cash and money_ rent. The Susang region, administratively being a partially protected area bordering Assam provided an ideal setting for guerilla activities and agitation. Hence the Communists could thrive there. so

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The war-like traditions of the Hajong tribals were conducive to their mobilisation on quasi-military lines, if not to their incorporation into a revolutionary organisation in the classical sense. Therefore, the Tebhaga Movement in this part" of Mymensin'gh held early possibilities of peasant violence. On. 8th December, 1946, some .5,000 Hajol\g peasants, in"Tanka tenants and Sharecroppers staged a.massive demonstration demanding reduction in Tanka rent and its conversion into cash rent. They cut the crops and carried the stacks to their threshing floors instead of to their landlords and jotedars (whethe.!. Hindu or Muslim), whom they boycotted socially. The Hajong Movement, however, continued in 1947 when it changed its trend from a peaceful movement to one of violence and attained a climax.Sl It is noteworthy that the Kisan Sabha had also started the Tebhaga Movement in the autumn of 1946, which was intense in Tangail and Kishoreganj §ubdivisions of Mymensingh' In Tangail, the movement was spontaneous and the bargadars took the entire produce to their Khaq:J.ar ; the publication of the Bargadar's bill gave the impression th
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bargadars and might spark off a communal strife. Characteristically enough, it was one of he ~oldest decisions of the peasant leaders to maintain Hindu-Muslim unity on the Tebhaga issue when jotedars tried to rouse communal passions to split the peasants. The Tebhaga Movement at this juncture was a blow to the communal tension and proved beneficiary to the builders of unity.ss The Muslim League represented basically the Muslim upper and middle classes and landlords but its appeal for a separate nation swept across all economic strata of the community and unified them politically. Consequently, in Bengal, the Muslim League steadily gained ground. It tried to win over the Muslim peasantry through hostile propaganda against the CPI and the Kisan Sabha. Despite spirited opposition, the Kisan Sabha mustered support from some Muslim peasants, and some of its local leaders were even Muslims.s6 The district reports from Bengal showed that the Communists initiated the Tebhaga Movement and played a prominent role in organising meetings in different places and made propaganda in the villages often distributing pamphlets on Kisan Movement. That is why official sources 'observed that the movement was not always spontaneous but a "got up one" led by "outside agitators". These Communist leaders went to villages in batches and enlisted the support of the bargadars and incited them to take the crops to their own land, boycotted the landlords and prevented them from entering the fields and to encourage payment of l/3rd share to them. The hoisting of Communist Party Flags in the corner of the fields during the • 57 operatIon was a common aspect. The reason behind the active participation of the Communists lay 'in their programme .strategy and tactical line. The aim of the Communisfs was to effectively organise and lead the peasantry by intervening and participating fearlessly in the spontaneous outbreak of popular fury against the British rule, preventing the factional game of fanning discontent between Congress and League leaders and preparing the ground for unity in action against the British rulers or against the landlords, the feudal parasites of the countryside, once propped by the British themselves. s8 . . The participation of women was a distinct aspect of the Tebhaga Movement. Their active participation. can be accounted for the fact that they were conscious of being exploited socially and economically as a class in the society often pressurised by the jotedar for sexual or economic purposes. A noticeable factor was that higher class ri~h Muslim and Hindu w.)men did not participate to the same extent a~.

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scheduled caste or tribal women because the former did not work in the field and social and ideological constraints were greater on them compared to the latter, whose societies displayed a relaxed morality where even remarriage was possible and widowhood was not socially '. S9 ostracised. The peasant women harvested the crops and even guarded the village at night. They participated in meetings, processions and even joined the volunteer squads in demand for Tebhaga and encountered police' and landlord resistance, armed with weapons that even included domestic implements like 'Da', 'Gayan', etc.60 In Debiganj, in the Jalpaiguri district, it was due to women's determination that the first battle for Tebhaga was carried through. We hear of an old Rajbansi widow who took out a procession to cut the paddy while the men vaciliated but later joined them. In areas like Kakdwip in 24 Parganas, women were given guerilla training to fight against landlords. A considerable number of women were< also killed by police frring. 61 Women were responsible for communication network. They informed about meetings and rallies, etc. when they went to the market or to visit relatives. In many cases, they displayed courage, initiative and heroism in rescuing people from police custody, warning leaders of police attacks, etc.62 Thus the women's participation in the Tebhaga Movement highlighted that women could develop a modern attitude and play both domestic and political roles without any conflict between the two. Secondly, the Tebhaga ,Movement raised the fundamental issues in men's and women's economic relations. Though tutored by urban activists, it affected every aspect of the lives' of Kisan men and women. It emerged as a protest against economic and social exploitation of the times.6~ The leaders of the Tebhaga struggles mostly came from the urban middle-class and the 'Bhadralok' families. At the village level, the Kisan Sabha committees were dominated by the mid~le peasants. Among the bargaqars themselves, there was no potential for leadership. The main, strength of the Tebhaga struggle ,lay in the poor peasant - the sharecropper.64 The first phase showed the strength of a double unity. Hindu and Muslim peasants and women firmly moved against the vicious attempts by landlords of subvertirig the class struggle through communalism. But there was also ba.sic unity between leaders and the led ; between the traders of the party and the Kisan Sabha on one hand

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and the cadres and mass on the other.1;S The leadership can be credited with having given active guidance to the first" phase of the uprising. Although it was originally pressed from below and did not agree With district cadres, the, leadership seemed to have actively helped in preparing for class struggle, once the council decision was taken. So the leadership displayed the importance and the weight of the movement they launched. As the movement unfolded, it inevitably was to outgrow the provincial leadership.66 It was not only the adhiar who was iD. action but every section of the rural popUlation was aiding him inside his village. Such solidarity was witnessed inside the Bengal villages. No more could thejotedars utilise the middle peasants against the adhiars or exploit the landless labourers. The battle was launched by the adhiars.But it was an example of unity in action debarring factionalism, making a "debut in Bengal's nationallife.67 The Bengali peasant was fighting against the oppressors with a new spirit of resistance. They were protected by the village committees which took decisions democratically. The entire peasant youth were called upon to enlist as volunteers, to collectively guard the crops, harvest it and defend the village against zamindars who came to-destroy them. A distinct feature of this movement was that peasant women had been fighting shoulder -to shoulder with men with great resistance against the zamindars.68 The biggest significance of the Tebhaga struggle lies in its historic anti~imperialist character. It was a peasants revolt against the land tenure system which the British had imposed through the permanent settlement expropriating the peasants on the one hand and creating parasitical landlords op the other hand, a system that impoverished Bengal into a land of famine. The Tebhaga struggle was thus a peasant struggle which indirectly pointed towa~ds growing Revolution.69 The Tebhaga struggle inspired quite a few litterateurs especially Conununists or those with identical leftist convictions to write stories, songs,· novels, plays or poems thereby upholding the dynamics of rural life. In the perspe~tive,of the struggles of the time, the two novels of Abdullah Rasul 'Abad' and 'Shahar Theke Grame' (from town to village) may be mentioned. 'Abad' is virtually the only one based on the subject. Here the agrarian issues remained integrated with social relationship upholding relationships within the family of a young Muslim hero who led the struggle and ultimately

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emerged as the leader of the peasantry. The rest of the novel is a description of police atrocities, landlord police collaboration and peasant resistance. The stories of Manik Bandhyopadhyay's 'Haraner Natjamai' (Hanin's grandson-in-Iaw) was the story of how an old women deceives the police and arranges the escape of Bhuban, a Tebhaga Leader. Mainas' mother asks_Bhuban to share the bed of her newly married daughter so that the police can be made to believe that it is the new groom sleeping with his wife. This leads to problems in husband-wife relationship. In the end the grandson-in-Iaw is transformed from a man of common pettiness to an actjve partner of peasant resistance. 'Gram Banglar Galpa' (the stories of rural Bengal) included Ghulam Quddus' 'Lakhe na Milaye Ekti (not even one is found in a thousand) which highlighted the Tebhaga resistance. 7o Several Tebhaga activists have recorded the movement in their autobiographical accounts, personal diaries and journalistic writings. Prominent among them is Somnath Hore's 'Tebhagar diary', Kamal ,Mesbah and Kamal Ahmed's 'Dinajpurer Tebhaga Andolan' (194648) (Tebhaga Movement of Dinajpur, 1946-48). Artistic impressions of the Tebhaga Movement were left by artists like Somnath Hore and Debabrata Mukhopadhyay71, to name a few. T~us the Tebhaga Movement was the biggest militant and most broad based class struggle of the Kisans of Bengal. It was a movement based on provincial scale drawing kisans from the poor and exploited strata who fought heroically against the jotedars, goondas, police, and defied officials. No officials provoking communal hatred and rioting to guide and conduct the movement locally, were obeyed and the kisans spontaneously formed local councils of action. Terrific police repression was let loose on the kisans in affected areas where jotedars beat and killed kisans. n The kisans fought in self-defence but their resistance movement was unplanned and sporadic. No preparation of the voluntary organisation for defence against police or jotedars was made. Not enough support was there against police repression. There was no discrimination between big and small jotedars in the matter of securing 2/3rd share of the Bargadar. The political aspect of the campaign also neglected the demand for legislation in favour of Tebhaga. The leadership of the provincial Kisan Sabha was misled by the Muslim League Ministry of Suhrawardy who did not launch any progressive measure for amelioration of the unbearable lot ofthe peasantry.73 The leadership was disarmed and failed to pursue the struggle with adequate zeal and vigour, as a result it was weakened. While jotedars were heavily backed by police, Congress and League, got

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the upper hand.74 There was raid on the bargadar's property and houses ; paddy stocks were looted and indiscriminate arrests occurred leading to a reign of terror in the countryside.7s Though the movement received a setback, the kisans surrendered and faced repression bravely. It housed entirepeasanl labour class and imbibed a sense of class solidarity and self-respect. It indeed instilled a spirit of fighting and sacrificing and taught th~t nothing could be achieved without an organised class struggle and thereby pursue for better political understanding. With this ended the first phase of the Tebhaga Movement - a movement which was characterised by spontaneous militancy but did not result in much bloodshed as one might exPect in a peasant insurrection but was the outcome of politicisation of the peasantry in Bengal.76

REFERENCES 1. Dhanagare, D. N., Peasant Movements jn india (1920-50), New Delhi 1986, pp. 156-79. 2. Chakravartty, Renu, Communists in Indian Women's Movement, New Delhi 1980, pp. 78-79. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. S. Dhanagare, op. eit., pp. 155-75. 6. How to abolish landlordism, Organisational Reportage No. 4 of 194547. All India Kisan Sabha, 15th January, 1947. 7. Chakravartty, Renu, op. eiL, p. 79. 8. Ibid. 9. How to Abolish Landlordism, op. eiL 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid. 14. Dhanagare, op. eit. P.156-79 15. Sen, Sunil, Peasant Movements in India, Caleutta 1982, pp. 106-27. 16. Custer Peter, Women in the Tebhaga Uprising: Rural Poor Women and Revolutionary Leadership (1946-47), Caleutta 1987, pp. 70-86. 17. Cusler Peter, op. eit 70-86. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Cusler Peter, op. eit. P. 70-86 22. Sen, SunH, 'Tebhaga Chai',article in Desai,A. R. Bd, Peasant Struggles in india, New Delhi 1979, pp. 442-52. 23. Sen, Sunil, Peasant Struggles, op. eit. and Peasant Movement in India p.106.

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24. All India Kisan Sabha Organisational Reportage No. 1 of 1947-48, 21st September, 1947, 25. Ibid. 26. Dhanagare, op. cit., p. 107. 27. Dhanagare, op. cit., pp. 167-68. 28. Sunil Sen, op. cit., p. 107. 29. Dasgupta, Ranajit, 'Peasants, Workers and Freedom Struggle Jalpaiguri', 1945-47 in Economic and Political Weekly, Vo!. XX, No. 30. July 27, 1985. pp.44-52. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. File No. 6rn/38/47 WBSA 34. Ibkt'-35. Dasgupta, Ranajit, op. cit., p. 47. 36. Ibid. po. 46-47. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid. 40. Dhanagare, op. cit., p. 171. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. Occasional Papers on History and Society, NMML Delhi by Amit Gupta in "Forest-fire in the Sundarbans: The communists and the Kakdwip rising (1946-50) No. XXVIII. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid. 46. Dhanagare op.cit p. 171 and Sen, Sunil, op. cit., pp. 67-69. 47. Ibid 48. Ibid. 49. Sen! Sunil, op. cit., pp. 110-11. 50. Dhanagare, op. cit., pp. 167-68. 51. Ibid. 52. Peoples Age, January 12, 1947. 53. Ibid. 54. Ibid. 55. Dhanagare, op. cit., p. 171 ,and Peoples Age, January 13,1947. 56. Ibid. 57. File No. 6m/38/47, Land and Land Revenue Department, West Bengal State Archives. 58. The New Situation and Our Tasks, Resolution ofthe Central Committee ofCPI, December 1945. 59. Gupta, Amit, 'Women and Society: The Developmental Perspective', New Delhi 1986 article: A Study of Women's mobilization for change : with special reference to Tebhaga Movement in Bengal (1946-51),

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pp. 123-36. 60. Ibid. 61. Sen, Sunil, op. cit., and Sen, Sunil, 'The Working Women and Pop!llar Movements', Calcutta 1965, pp. 35-46. 62. Gupta, Amit, Women and Society, op. cit. P. 123-36. 63. Ibid. 64. Dhanagare, op. cit., p. 173. 65. Ibid. 66. Peoples Age, January 12, 1947. 67. Ibid. 68. Ibid. 69. Ibid. 70. Chakraborty, Tapati, in "Freedom Struggle and Bengali Literature" in Gupta, Amit, Ed., The Myth and Reality: The Struggle for Freedom in India, NMML, New Delhi 1987. 71. Transcript from an interview with Somnath Hore, Debabrata Mukhopadhyay and Sunil Sen. 72. Rasul, M. A., History of the All India Kisan SQ.bha and Sarkar Sumit, Popular Movements and National Leadership 1)945-47), in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XVII, 1982, op. cit., pp. 683-84. 73. Ibid. 74. Ibid. 75. Ibid. 76. Ibid.

BIHAR With the formation of the Congress Mini$try in Bihar in 1946, a new w"ave of the bakasht Struggle started i~ Mpnghyr, Gaya, Patna, Champoran, Shahabad districts, etc. The main issues were the ejectment of kisans from bakasht lands and, payment of rent in kind (Bhawali). The kisans wanted the rent to be paid in cash after fIXing the rates of cash-rent on the basis of 1935 prices .1 Ab~ut two generations ago, landlords had some lands constituting a very. . small percentage of the land in the province which were cultivated with their own ploughs. These were recorded as their own. A second category of lands in which kisans or tenants had occupancy rights was recorded as the kisan lands. The rest of the land, a very large per cent was the landlord's land but cultivated by tenants. It was recorded that these lands belonged to the landlord!. but it was not recorded who cultivated them. The kisans, therefore, claimed their right in th~se lands (bakasht or self-culti.vated) whose claim was

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contended by .the landlords. The dispute which arose out of this created th~ problem of the Bakasht.2 Since 1937-38 which witnessed the first phase of the Bakasht Movement, the dispute on the bakasht land created considerable tension in the countryside. In Sahabad, for instance, there were 3 kinds of bakasht land: "Survey bakasht land" which was not under the plough of any cultivator during the settlement operations but recorded in the name of a zamindar; "Nilami bakasht land" which were lost by peasant proprietors for arrears of reqt but not yet settled with new tenants. "Surrendered bakasht land" which was surrendered by the tenants but remained unsettled, The landlords claimed these lands as bakasht or self-cultivated, aJthough these were actuaUy let out to the tenants who paid a large proportion of the produce as rent. It was a common practice on the part of the landlords to evict the tenants and settle the land with new tenants who had to pay saJaami. The tenants mostly drawn from the Scheduled castes had no security of tenure and were often employed by the landlord on the zirat land or "begar system".3 In 1939, the Bakasht Dispute gave rise to a powerful upsurge under the Kisan Sabha. The same de,mand of rights in land was again made by kisans and rejected by landlords which led to the outbreak of the Bakasht Movement.4 With the' exit of Swami Sahajanand from the All India Kisan Sabha in 1945, the Bihar Kisan Sabha was split. While Sahajanand claimed to be the President of BPKS, the Communists set up the BPKS which was affiliated to the All India Kisan Sabha. The Congress Socialist Party, the Forward Bloc and the Radical Democratic Party also seemed to be active in the countryside.. What is remarkable is that all the peasant organisations chose to mobilise the tenants on the bakasht issue which had continued to exacerbate the relations between the landlords and the tenants.s Between (April-July) raged the main issues for the ejectment of kisans from bakasht land and payment of rent in kind (Bhawali). Kisans wanted the rent to be paid in cash after fIxing the rates of cash rent on the basis of 1935 prices.6 0ther issues were(i) Securing supply of cloth and other commodities (ii) Unearthing food hoarders and their distribution (ill) Establishment of tenancy rights in bakasht lands (iv) Commutation of rent in kind into rent in cash by changing the Bhawali system (v) Increase in daily wage.

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A strong campaign was organised by the Sabha in some districts but specifically in Monghyr to secure cloth and other essential commodities for the villagers. It achieved considerable s~ccess. But worse than the commodity supply position, was the shortage of food in 1946 and an unbearable situation was created by mass-scale starvation and death due to hunger. Not that there was no food available at al~ but large stocks of foodgrains were hoarded by zamindars and traders as a result of the wrong policy of the ministry for purchase and procurement of foodgrains. This led kisans to organise themselves for unearthing grain stocks from hoarders which sometimes resulted in arrests on false charges of dacoity or grain-looting. Such action was organised by the Sabha in more than 20 cases in Monghyr, Bhagalpur, Darbhanga and Hazaribagh districts. The first wave of Bakasht Struggle raged during April-July 1946 in Gaya, Shahabad and Monghyr districts when kisans asserted their occupancy rights in 5,000 acres of bakasht land. The second wave of this struggle took place towards the end of 1946 after the disastrous communal riot which affected the. province. Yet the struggle was launched ona wider scale than before in Gaya, Shahabad, Monghyar, Champaran, Manbhum and Singhbhum districts. This time, the kisans harvested the paddy from nearly 10,000 acres of bakasht land 'fdr- over half of which the struggle was organised by the Sabha. The Bhawali problem was acute in Bihar. Under this system, kisaDS had to pay 18 seers i.e., 45% of their gross product out of every maund; It covered 68% of the occupied area in Gaya, 44% in Patna and 32% in South Monghyr district working out 15 lac acres of occupancy land. This system. enabled zamindars to grab maunds of grains annually, by selling, for which in the black market they made big fortunes. Hence, the kisans had a strong and widespread feeling against the Bhawali system. When the ministry passed an order restoring a provision of the Bihar Tenancy Act, under which the petitions for commutation of Bhawali into' cash-rent could be filed, 2 lack petitions were filed within a week in three districts, i.e., with Gaya, Patna and South Monghyr. Entire villages reached the courts with 40,000 to a lakh of kisans invading each of them. There. was neither enough stamps nor paper or food for them in towns. It seemed that the peasant movement was mainly directed against evictions. so that the cultivating peasants on the bakasht land could establish their claim as tenants. In Bhabua in Sahabad district,

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the mDvement began in the summer Df 1946, when the peasants held meetings and decided to. till the bakasht land and pay the actual rent after getting a receipt. On 25th June, the peasants became ready to. DCCUPY the bakasht land. The agitatiDn rapidly spread to. 75 villages and abDut ~20,OOO acres Df bakasht land were in dispute. 7 At this point, the District Magistrate intervened and this award stipulated that the dispute o.ver po.ssession of land wo.uld be decided by a tribunal co.mpo.sed o.f one representative o.f the zamindars, o.ne representative o.f the peasants and a non-party member. But the zamindars were in no. mo.od to. abdicate and decided to. defend their rights on bakasht land. Notices under section 144 were duly served o.n the disputed lands and peasants in 24 villages were prevented from tilling the land and so.wing the paddy; the zamindars, lathials began marching from village to. village. Shivnath Pasi, a poor peasant was sho.t dead. 8 Meanwhile, the mDvement had spread to. o.ther areas and the Communist-do.minated Kisan Sabha claimed to. have helped the tenants to. o.ccupy 4,000 acres o.f land in Monghyr and Gaya districts. Waving the Red Flag, the volunteers o.f the Kisan Sabha, armed with lathis mo.ved in the villages when the tenants cultivated the bakasht land.9 One o.f the mo.st impo.rtant struggles to.ok place in the Bhadali village in the Mo.nghyr district. Here the zamindar propo.sed to eject the tenants from 65 bighas o.f bakasht land but failed. Maize cro.p was reaped by kisans o.n 25 bighas and this was do.ne by kisan women. 10 After the zamindar's men were killed here, a murder case was started against kisans and brought an armed po.lice co.ntingent. When 2 persons were arrested by police, 100 wo.men go.t them released by force. ll When the zamindar wanted to. sow rabi (spring) crops on the fields which his men began to plough, kisans drove away his cattle and cultivated the fields themselves. No zamindar's employee was allowed by the kisans to. stay in the village and his goondas were driven away. A gro.up of 25 women went to. surro.unding villages with the Red Flag and held meetings there. Sugar-cane grown on these lands were crushed by the kisans who would reap paddy. The struggle was going on while the zamindar was busy with court proceedings . h k·· a~amst t e Isans. 12 In Kusma village, kisans cultivated and took possession of 100 bighas of bakasht land of which the zamindar tried to deprive them. In Banarpur, the zamindar brought hired goondas from Bhagalpur in

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order to take possession of 52 bighas. One of the kisans wounded with an arrow by the goondas was killed and 5 were seriously injured.. From among the kisans, 47 were arrested while all Bhumihar women, who were very conservative came out to guard th~ fields. 13 In order to counteraCt the Bakasht Struggle, the zamindars organised a sabha in ,some districts. They brought their leaflets among the kisans in lakhs of copies and dropped them from aeroplanes and sometimes tried to incite the communal passion of the kisans by • £ dmlsce · 11aneous questIons. . 14 ,puttmg 10rwar The total number of people involved in the struggle was over 3 lakhs while about 250 persons were arrested including 50 Kisan.Sabha workers. The arrests had been made mainly on charges of conducting the Bakasht Struggle or seizure of grains.1S It was learnt that the Subdivisional Magistrate of Madhubani of Darbhanga district, reported that he did not arrest the Kisan Sabha workers in the struggle as their speeches in Kisan Sabha meetings checked the possibility of communal rioting. 16 The bakasht dispute continued upto 1947 but what was revealed in the movement was the sweep of the tenants struggle in which Congressmen, Communists, Socialists, workers of Forward Bloc and Radical Democratic Party were all involved. The movement was faCed with fierce opposition of zamindars since it aimed for the abolition of zamindari and the settlement of bakasht dispute. It is noteworthy that the partial struggles flared up in other parts of India notably United Province, Surma Valley, Punjab and Orissa. In these struggles, which were essentially tenants struggles, the peasants fought against eviction and demanded reduction of rent while the common demand was the abolition of the zamindari system. The struggles covering a large area were unprecedented in intensity and sweep. It seems that the Kisan Sabha was drawn in these struggles which were generally started by the peasants themselves. 17 REFERENCES 1. How to ab0lish Landlordism, Organisation Reportage No. 4 of 1945-

2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

47, AIKS, 15th January, 1947. . Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Sen, Sun,jl, Peasant Struggles in India, Calcutta 1982, pp. 122-24. Ibid. and AIKS Organisation Reportage No. 1 of 1946-48.

Peasant Movements 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

115

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. How to Abolish Landlordism, op. cit. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Sen, Sunil, op. cit., pp. 122-24. Ibid

ORISSA In Orissa, there was a spontaneous movement of the tenants in Cuttack, Puri and Ganjam districts. There was excessive rackrenting of tenants. Sharecroppers had no right in land. There was a class of rent collectors called Mustadars in the zamindari areas of Ganjam district. The existence of these Mustadars was an additional source of opposition for the tenants. The kisans began to demand occupancy rights in the land they cultivated so that they could not be evicted. Reduction of rent as well as the lilndlord's share in the production of the sharecroppers land which could not exceed 1/3rd of the gross produ<;e, total remission of rent for lands which had been damaged by sand carried by flood. These were the only interior demands pending on the abolition of the zamindari system which included "the Mustadars. 1 On the basis of these interim demands, the kisans of certain areas started their struggle. Among these areas were Khurda and Jajpur where sharecrop.pers were harvesting 2,000 acres of cultivated land demanding 2/3rd of the gross produce as their own share leaving 1I3rd for the landlord? In Ganjam district, where riots of Sheragada, Badagada, Sanakhimedi, Bada Khimedi and Dhra Kota were harvesting with the demand for rent reduction while rent had not been settled there. 3 The tenants had decided not to pay any rent for 1,500 acres which" had been damaged with sand during a flood caused by a breach in the embankment which was constructed by the Kisan Sabha workers. They demanded that the zamindar should pay for the construction of the remaining part of the embankment as well as

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repair charges. Against all these struggles, zamindars and henchmen prepared for an offensive by instituting false law suits against kisans and Kisan Sabha workers. 4 REFERENCES

1. 2. 3. 4.

How to Abolish Landlordism, op. cit., and Sunil Sen, op. cit. P. 132 Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

u.p. Here kisans created a widespread unrest relating to the 'seer' and 'khudkasht' (self-cultivated) land of the zamindars and Talukdars. The 'seer' lands were claimed by landlord as their private possession. There were innumerable plots of land cultivated by kisans which were mostly shown in Patwari's register as 'seer' so that hereditary tenancy rights had not accrued to 90 per cent of them .1 There were 3 crore acres of cultivable land and 1 crore of cultivable waste land. There were 29 lakh zamindars of which 25 lakh paid less than Rs 100 as annual land revenue. There were 75 lakh tenant cultivators whose agricultural holding was 2 to 3 acres in the eastern districts and 3-4 acres in the western districts. Tenants other than those who cultivated the 'seer' and 'khudkasht' land enjoyed hereditary tenancy rights in their lands. Of the total cultivated area of the province, 20 per cent were 'seer' or 'khudkasht,.2 The Congress Ministry stayed all ejectments from 'seer' land but zamindari onslaught had been going on and large-scale eviction had been resorted to by them inspite of the law. :They wanted to resettle their 'seer' lands with other tenants in order to get big 'nazrana' (premium) and also to make it difficult for the old tenants, to establish their claim of hereditary rights on the basis of long standing occupation. They were also enclosing and grabbing communallands. 3 To counteract the offensive of the zamindars the Kisan Sabha gave out the slogans: 1. No ejectment but reinstatement of evicted kisans. 2. No zamindars to possess communal lands like pastures. 3. All culti"dble waste land to be given to cultivators.4

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There was another problem. 30 per cent of the agricultural population were practically landless. The problem was very acute in eastern districts in some parts where daily wages were incredibly low from 1/2 annas to 2 anna. This nomina~ wage was paid by zamindars where the kisans paid 6-8 annas as rent. On the western districts, the rate was much more reasonable - Re 1 Rs 1.50. The slogan was to . lDcrease the wage rates. S Then there was the question of the bataidar or sharecroper. The Kisan Sabha demanded that the bataidar must not be ejected and that his rent would" be collected in cash instead of in kind. He was advised to cut the crops and keep the grain in his own land. Thereupon, Section 145 was promulgated preventing kisans to go to their field for harvesting until a settlement was affected between them and the landlords. The Kisans, however, defied it.6 Following the offensive of large-scale eviction of Basti district, kisans began to resist it and launched a counter offensive by occupying 'seer' lands under the direct cultivation of the zamindar. In several places, complete social boycott of zamindars started in which both kisans and agricultural labourers participated. The zamindari lands remained fallow. The struggle raged extensively in Bansi and Domeriganj tehsil. The toughest battle was fought in a group of villages in the Chatra area where the zamindar was forced to confer hereditary rights on the tenant and to part with 1,500 bighas of khudkasht lands. 7 Ejectment was thus stopped in these two tehsils by the Kisan Sabha. Kisans also occupied 4,000 to 5,000 bighas in addition to what .they already held. A big zamindar tried to quell the movement with the help of the police and the bureaucracy enforced Section 145 for cutting the paddy crop on 60 bighas. The zamindar-police offensive was then intensified but the fight went on.8 In Rae Bareilly district, the struggles were launched by the Kisan Sabha in Kuri Sadauli, Sheogarh, Tikari and Rajamau. In Kuri Sadauli, the talukar, a Raja who had evicted tenants from 25 bighas, had to reinstate them. The Raja personally visited the village of the evicted kisans and returned their holdings. Also the "'begar' (forced and unpaid labour) system was totally stopped and wages increased. Frightened by the agitation of the kisails, several smaller zamindars of adjacent areas returned land to ejected peasants.9 On 7th August, Comrade Jitendra Tewari, one of the leaders of the struggle who had been imprisoned during 1942 Struggle and released from jail only shortly before was brutally beaten by Raja's goondas while he was walking alone to a village. This created a stir

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among the kisans in the estate. They held a meeting in Paharpur village, attended by 6,000 and pledged to fight the Raja. 10 Several meetings followed and a big rally was organised on 29th August. It was banned by the district authorities. But the kisans Violated the order and 1,200 joined it. The police tried to arrest Jitendra Tewari and Munshi Kalika Prasad, the veteran Kisan Sabha leaders but their attempt was failed by the entire gathering. All attempts at disruption of zamindars and police failed. ll While kisan morale was high, the Raja was extremely nervous. He sold off his cattle, bor&es, elephants and left his estate to live in Lucknow. The 'begar' was totally stopped. Some lands occupied by kisans was retained on batai or share crop basis. Some.of the more oppressive employees of the estate were discharged. The 'Peshkar' and the manager of the estate who were also very oppressive and whose discharge was demanded by kisans were not dismissed but they did not dare to move about freely on the estate.12 Similar victories were achieved on other estates as well. The struggle was on in 14 districts including Aligarh, Azamgarh and the Kisan Movement had been galvanised. A new awakening had been brought about. 13 Vigorous efforts were made by the Congress Ministry to suppress the whole movement. They had arrested about 800 kisans and the Kisan Sabha workers. Although they had passed a resolution in the Legislative Assembly expressing a resolution in favour of the abolition of landlordism, yet they were clearing all they could to let down the kisans in their struggle against the tyrannical zamindars. But the Kisan Struggle had proved too strong for their measures. 14 REFERENCES 1. How to Abolish Landlordism, Org. Reportage, AIKS, No. 4 of 194547, 15th January, 1947. ' 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 18. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid.

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12. Ibid. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid .

PUNJAB In Punjab, a large number of tenants were denied the elementary rights of permanent occup~ncy in the land they tilled. Occupancy rights oUenants were practically non-existent in the western districts of Multan and Rawalpindi. By virtue of the exclusive proprietary right in land and hence a legal right not to evict their tenants whenever they liked, the zamindars compelled their tenants to submit to various forms of feudal levies arid exactions. Apart from the batai (share crop) rent which was 50 per cent of the gross .produce, the zamindars took away 1/7 or 1/6 as 'nazrana' and from 2-7 seers as Khareha i.e., expenses for servants, religious shrines and entertainment of officials. Money was collected from cultivators by village patwaris. Even the tenant was required to cultivate 1 acre of land for the zamindaris known as khudkasht·(self-cultivated). The zamindar also raised taxes on the domestic animals such as goats, sheep, camels to be kept by the tenant known as bhunga tax. They also frequently imposed heavy levies and the tenants were to render free labour (begar) for khudkasht gardens and houses. 1 The share of the crop was not handed over to the tenant at the thrashing floor. It was deposited in· the store of the zamindar and later sold by him in the market and the amount paid to the tenants as this due was always less than the amount which the landlord realised from the market on his account.2 . Similar conditions prevailed on the government lands in Mliltan, Montgomery and Jhang leased out for cultivation but here too lease holders illegally charged kharcha and other feudal levies from the tenants. The tenants of Nilibar, Ganjbar, Haveli Project, and various other provinces rose to safeguard theit: crop against exploitation by zamindar. They were fighting for the abolition of kharcha, the nazrana, khudkasht, etc., ·and zamindars started false cases of breach of peace, theft, etc., against the tenants. J The tenants had to face large-scale eviction which zamindars were planning. The kisans were united themselves and strengthened their .organisation to defeat the zamindari offensive. The .Punjab

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Ministry which was under the control of the unionist zamindar who refused to exact any tenancy legislation granting occupancy rights to tenants fixing just terms of batai and abolishing feudal levies and exactions.4 The Provincial Kisan Committee demanded immediate legislation for complete abolition of zamindari -system, granting all tenants, permanent occupancy rights, fIXing batai rent, abolishing all feudal levies and exactions, etc.5 The above struggle was preceded by another struggle against the canal department of the government which had remodelled the 'moghas' or canal-outlets as a result of which the supply of water to the crop field had been reduced by 25 per cent in a number of villages and it was decided that kisans should go to the remodelled 'moghas' in batches ,and demolish them. The struggle started in Harsa Chhina, on July 16 after a big rally. Volunteers from different parts of the district including Congress, League, Akalis and Communist parties also participated but many volunteers were arrested by police and many remodelled 'moghas' were demolished and the police proceeded to arrest a huge demonstration staged before the canal department. There was a brutal lathi-charge by police and many were arrested. It was clear to the government that repression would not be of much use in subduing the determined kisans. Hence the government agreed to restore the water-supply to the original quantity for which the struggle had been launched but increased it by 6 25 per cent for 6 months.

REFERENCES 1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

How to abolish landlordism, Organisational Reportage No. 4. of 1945· 47 A.I.KS., 15th Jan 1947. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

SURMAVALLEY In Surma Valley, kisans started a struggle for land and against eviction for non-payment of rent at enhanced rates and for Tebhaga rights. Partial victory was won. Another struggle was against the kase

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of fisheries artificially created by Jandlords to the detriment of boro paddy (summer-crop cultivationh The most important battle of Surina Valley was fought at Udarbtmd where the bhagi and chukti bhagi peasants refused to pay thehaIf share of the winter-crop unless the landowners bore half the expenses and also refused to pay rent, . cash!. except ID

REFERENCES 1. Namboodripad, EMS, op. cit., On the agrarian Question in India;1947

(Pamphlet).

GUJARAT In Gujarat a struggle resulted in stopping the illegal exactions of Re 1 to Rs 7 per bigha of sharecrop land from 2,000 acres saving nearly Rs 8,000 per year for the sharecroppers. A 40 day strike of seasonal labourers who cut wood in the forests of Chikli Taluq resulted in an increase in wages by 25%. Similarly, in Anand Taluq, seasonal tobacco factory workers got a 25% increase in their wages after a month's strike. The Sabha fought for the abolition of hati (serf-system) which had not been abolished but the wages had been substantially increased.!

REFERENCES 1. Namboodripad E,M,S, op.cit. On the agrarian. Question in India, 1947 (pamphl~t)

ANDHRA In Andhra, the struggle was launched mainly against eviction for reduction of rent and for raising daily wages to a minimum of Re 1 and particularly covered certain big zamindari estates of Krishna district. The people of Munagala were engaged in a heroic struggle against their landlord who in violation of a compromise made in 1939 was evicting tenants for 'inam' andhome~farm lands and encroaching on communal lands. Tenants ofUtukuru estates-foughtin defence of their rights to cut tunga grass .to roof their houses, to fish in the

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. communal .tanks and to the usual rates and rights of pasture. At Tippalakatla village, tenants were resisting the zamindar's attempt to evict them,1 . REFERENCES 1: Namboodr)pad, E.M.S. On the Agrarian Question in India, CPI, 1947

TAMILNADU In Tamil Nadu, peasants in qUite a number of areas o( Tanjore, Madura, Ramnad, Tinnevelli and Cbingleput districts fought for (i) abolition of semi-serf conditions of agricuIturallabourers, (ii) occupancy rights in land for tenants, (iii) stoppage of eviction, (iv) reduction of rent to 1I4thof gross produce, (v) ipcrease in wages to a minimum of Re 1 per day. The Commwiists Were particularly active in organisingkisan Con~ ferences for the redress of peasant grievances. REFERENCES

1. AlKS Rep. No. 1 of 1947-48, New agrarian Relations, op. cit.

.MAHARASHTRA . Here the peasant niovement was primarily confined among the Warlipeasants. During 1946 the Warlis organised a strike movement against the landlotds and forest contractors which ac~ieved a partial success. The Warlis became organised in the Kisan Sabha that sent up branches in the forest areas of Umbergaon and Dahanu tal~ks in Thana district. Radical ideas among the Warlis came from outside; the Kisati Sabha workers remained sunk in theWarli villages organising and leading the partial struggles of the tribal peasants. There was hardlya~ovement directed against the landlords and forest contractors. wiiIi courage and patience the Kisan Sabha leaders sought to focus on the economic demands of the tribal peasants who readily tu!'ned to the Kisan Sabha as the hope of the future. 1

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123

Maharashtra was a ryotwari province but there were some zamindars whQ exploited their Jawhar tenants in a most brutal and feudal manner.'A number of such landlords or Sahukars were found in the Umbergaon, Dahanu, Palghar and jawhar Taluks which were largely inhabited by the Warli Tribesman, who constituted 70% of the whole population and lived in hills and jungles. This primitive tribe had little to do with modern civilised life and the simple'minded Warlis were subjected to brutal' exploitation and inhuman torture by the landlords who were also their employers. For generations, all kinds of atrocities including murder had been perpetuated on human beings. Hundreds of them lived a life of bonded slaves while the rest of them were treated as seyfs. Rice, Tamarind juice and apiece of loincloth wa~ all they got. 2 · . Most frequently, the tribal peasants were resettled on the land as tenants and had to do the farm jobs on the landlord's land without wages. Some of the landlords owned grasslands and worked as forest contractors employing the tribal peasant labourers on paltry wages. Predictably vethi 'or forced labour was widespread. [n the slack season the tribal peasants turned to the landlords for khawti or paddy-loans for which they had to pay interest in kind ranging from the 50% to 200%. As soon as the crop was harvested, they had to return the khawti. Vethi begar and the khawti went hand in hand. 3 The landlords; who were mostly Parsis, [ranis and Hindus lived in beautiful bungalows with orchards, flower-gardens and a string of granaries. The bungalows were often double storeyed and surrounded by a garden ; the dining-room was upstairs ; a wide verandah led into a large sitting room. Some of the landlords could be described as "gentlemen farmers" who lived in towns and occasionally came to villages. The Warlis who were tied to their lands as tenant~ lived like serfs. [n the forests, the tribal peasants worked on wages.: During the slack season it was common to find whole batches of tribal peasants waiting in the railway stations to be employed by the contractors. As they were drawn in the Kisan Sabha, they launched strike movement demanding better wages. The organisation of the poor and helpless Warlis was taken up by the Maha.rashtra Kisan Sabha when a handful of them attended the conference at Tituwalla village in Thana district in 1945 and invited the Kisan S~bha workers to visit their homes. Thereafter, the Kis'an Sabha workers- visited the jungle homes of the Warlis, mixed with them freely, discussed their problems and raised the demands (i) abolition of begar (forced labour), (ii) abolition of slavery, (iii)

a

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reduction of rent and (iv) increase in wages. 4 To the Warlis, these slogans were a caU of life itself which commanded obedience. Their effect was immediate and speedy. They carri~d the slogans from place to place and would address the gathering just to convey the slogans "No more begar from today ...Inquilab Zindabad".s The Kisan Sabha mobilized the Warlis against forced labour. They were asked not to cultivate the private land of the landlord' without cash wages. In the face of the Warlis Movement, the landlords gave in and the system of forced labour collapsed. In the autumn of 1945 as the season for cutting grass approached, the Kisan Sabha raised the demand of a minimum rate of Rs 2 to 8 for cutting 500 lbs of grass. Thousands of acres of land were under grass and the landlords used to make a fortune in grass trade. As the Warlis of Umbergaon and Dahanu refused to cut grass, the landlords tried to disrupt the movement. They were scared at these happenings and conspired to break the organisation and morale of the Warlis in the name of the Kisan Sabha as otherwise they might not come. The landlords spread the rumour that goondas had been brought tQ break the meeting. Actually no such meeting had at all been planned by the Kisan Sabha. But thousands of War lis assembled at Talawada. Meanwhile armed police arrived there to fire on the meeting attended by thousands of Warlis peasants resulting in deaths of 5 peasants leaving many others wounded on 10 October. But the Warlis were too -loyal and devoted to the Kisan Sabha to ruD. away until a Kisan Sabha worker got this information and went to disperse them as the meeting was not called by Kisan Sabha. But the landlords would not concede and the Warlis would not budge either. Some of the leaders of the Kisan Sabha were arrested and the landlords tried to terrorize the peasants. Even so, the strike continued and the landlords faced with a heavy loss agreed to pay Rs 2-8 annas for cutting grass. Some of the landlords paid even Rs 3 to ensure rapid -cutting of grass.6 In early 1946 the IGsan Sabha held a conference of the Warlis of Dahanu and Umbergaon which took the decision that the peasants would pay only a year's rent and refuse to pay any arrears of rent. In the face of the militant mood of the Warlis, the la!J,dlords thought it wise to be -satisfied with one year's rent. The Witrli Movement reached itlclimax in autumn, when the _time of grass cutting came. Apart from the landlords who owned grass-lands there were the forest contractors, who operated in the forest areas buying crops in-

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125

auction and employing tribal peasants on cash wages. The rural labourers cut down the trees, sorted them out, according to quality and loaded them on bullock carts for trucks. The forest contractors and their foremen set up camps in the forest to supervise the work of the labourers. As the Kisan Sabha held a series. of meetings in the villages, the tribal peasants became organized and raised the demand of Re 1-4 annas as daily wages for forest work instead of 4 annas a day which they were getting So far and Rs 2-8 annas for grass cutting. There could be no agreement between the contractors and labourers as the District Magistrate was in favour of frung the daily wages. for forest work at Re 1 and for grass cutting at Re 1-8 annas. But the landlords would not agree. At this point the Kisan Sabha gave a call for a strike which apparently received spontaneous support of the Warlis who lived in jungles and were at the mercy of the landlords and contractors.? Hence, 15,000 Warli workers engaged in this seasonal strike struck work from October 1946 remaining confined mostly in Umbergaon and Dahanu taluks, the strongholds of the Kisan Sabha. They held meetings and took out processions of 3,000-5,000 people into the jungles only to convey to the workers the Kisan Sabhas message of strike and brhig them home. It was a wonderful example of unity and solidarity of workers as well as of implicit obedience and devotion to their class organisation.8 The strike continued for a month during which the landlords tried every method of breaking the Warli unity. Apart from holding meetings, the tribal peasants passed messages to distant villages by sending a stick tied with toddy leaves ; as soon as the stick arrived in a village, the tribal peasants stopped work in the forests. Even the tribal peasants plying bullock carts refused to work, so that the contractors could not transport wood fr~m the forests to the towns. The Kisan Sabha office at Dahanu was besieged by the crowd of tribal peasants who came from the forests for instructions ; even small landlords who were ready to come to a compromise often visited the Dahanu office. This strike 6f the tribal labourers, the first of its kind in Maharashtra; covered 200 villages and did not attract public attention. 9 The Kisan Sabha was anxious to avoid a clash with the police. A meeting to observe the 'Martyrs' day was planned on 10th October, 1946. The police duly arrived at Talwada to find that the meeting had already been cancelled. When the police arrested 55 Warlis on charges of "theft", the angry Warlis assembled at Dahanu to march to the Jail ; they were persuaded to return home. As the strike continued

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Political Upsurges in 1945-46

unabated, for about a month and forest work came to a standstill, the special officer for tribal welfare thought it wise to arrange a meeting of the representatives of the Timber Merchants Association and the Kisan Sabha; it was agreed that the labourers would receive Rs 1.25 a day for forest work. The Landlords efforts thus failed miserably and they climbed down and offered a settlement. The strike was called off on 11th November. lO Thus a .lakh and a half Warli (aboriginal) peasants of Dahanu and Umbergaon Taluksof Maharashtra fought one of the biggest strike battles against their Sahukar's .time-honoured practise of forced labour. Despite police fIring and terror, despite externment of their leader~, the peasants for the fIrst time, were awakened to consciousness under the Kisan Sabha, fought and won. ll The militant movement of the Warlis died out but it made a deep impact on the villages. "Vethi begar" grass cutting and forest work ,at 4-2 annas a day arid physical torture ended in the Warli villages. It affected the relations between the landlords, and the tenants. As time passed the landlords grew wise, changed their manners and even forest contractors, government officials, police constables greeted them politely. What is remarkable is that the Warlis remained loyal to the Kisan Sabha instead of joining the Congress during the elections and gradually new leaders merged from the ranks of the Warlis who challenged the old elite in future. With the coming of independence ushered in the minimum wages act and tenants rent reduced-the demands for which the Warlis had struggled. 12 REFERENCES 1. Sen, Sunil, Peasant Movements in India, Calcutta' 1982, pp. 126-28. 2. How to Abolish Landlordism, Organisational Reportage No. 4 of 1945-47, AIKS 15th Jan., 1947. 3. Sen, Sumit, op. cit., pp 126-128. 4. Ibid. and AIKS. Organisational Reportage No. 1 of 1947-48, 21st September, 1947. 5. How to Abolish Landlordism. op. cit. 6. Sen, SuniL op., cit., pp. 126-28. 7. Ibid. 8. How to Abolish Landlordism, op. cit. 9. Ibid. 10. Sen, Sunil, op.,cit., pp. 126-28. 11. Peoples Age, October 27, 1946. 12: ',Si!P, SUl1il, op. cit., pp 126-28.

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MALABAR Here the tenants were suffering "under government policy, legislation and under the preposterous procurement system, the government had done" nothing to implement the recolDJIlendation of the Malabar Tenancy Commission. For example(a) immediate implementation of the promise contained in the Congress election manifesto to abolish landlordism, (b) .interim measures like cancellation of all arrears of rent, stopping evictioris, exemption of unecOnomic holdmg from liability to pay rent and revenue, (c) rent from economic holdings not to exceed 1/4th of the gross production, taken over by government and (d) handing over to kisans all fallow and waste land,"etc·! The government had only appointed an investigator to study the report of the tenancy committee and to adopt a tenants and Ryots Protection Act, etc., and 'lot to abolish landlordism in contemplation.2 Regarding the preposterous procurement scheme of the government, which asked every kisan to hand over to the government the whole produce minils seed; his own family ration and the rent that he owed to the landlord. Most of the kisans had to buy their rations at the shops and they had nothing left in practice after paying rent in kind. The result of the system of procurement was that while the Kisans had to purchase hiS' own ration from the ration shops and hence to pay for its at selling price, the landlord was allowed to receive maunds in rent, keep them in granaries and sell a good deal in the black market. 3 The existence and magnitude of black markets may be estimated from the fact that while the total production was 360,000 tons of rice, the total procurement in 1945-46 was only 56,000 tons. The Kisans were not allowed even to deduct cultivation expenses and were forced to buy their own rations. 4 The Kisan Sabha demanded an end to the system of procurement and introduce modifications to the scheme(i) The kisans should be allowed to keep" enough paddy for seed cultivation expenses and family ration. (ii) The whole production minus the above-mentioned allowances were to be handed over to the government at procure-

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Political Upsurges in 1945-46

ment prices. (iii) The cultivating Je!1mis and tenants were to get rent in cash. These claimants were jointly raised by the Kisan Sangham Trade-union Congress, Communist Party of Malabar. The conference exhorted the kisans to enforce the above demands without waiting for the government to modify the scheme and also exhorted the kisans to occupy and cultivate the fallow and waste land owned by the government or private landlords.5 These two resolutions roused the Kisan masses of North Malabar and made the government and landlords vigilant and resorted to repression and hooliganism. While the kisans were refusing to part with the entire produce, the police and Malabar Special Police were sent to force them to do so. While the Kisans handed over the entire surplus to the co-operative store, the latter refused to accept it unless it was accompanied a receipt from the Jenmi to the effect that he had received the rent. When the kisans paid rent in cash, the Jenmi either demanded it at rates higher than the procurement price or even demanded nothing but paddy.6 Armed Reserves and Malabar Special Police forces camped in 8 centres of Chinakkal Taluk and Kasagode. Arrests, imprisonments and prohibiting orders had become the order of the day. Along with the official repression was the hooliganism organised by the Jenmis. 7 lit spite of the oppression and hooliganism unleashed by the bureaucracy and J enmi agents, kisans were carrying on their struggle everywhere. Taking green leaves by kisan women in Kasagode Taluk, plucking berries by kisans in Waluvanaad, resisting eviction in Ernaad and Kurumbranad, cultivating a plot of government land in Chirnakkal and several plots of Jenmi land, mass entry of untouchabIes into temples, mass entry into Hindu tanks by untouchables, were the forms of struggle.8 Though struggles were small, they all showed a new spirit among kisans. They could develop into struggles against eviction for rent reduction, for fighting procurement atrocities, for a just distribution of essential commodities, for occupation by kisans of fallow lands and that these struggles would strengthen the cry for abolition of landlordism.9

REFERENCES 1. How to Abolish Landlordism. Organisational Reportage No. 4 of

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1945-47, AIKS, 15th January, 1947. 2. Ibid. 3.. Ibid.

4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid.

KASHMIR The kisan masses participated if! ,struggles for democratic rights against princely autocracy and landlord tyranny in the PriJ?celyStates. The new round of states peoples struggles were begun by people of Kashmir. The peasants of Kashmir rallied as one man behind the mi1.itant battle. 'Quit Kashmir' was raised by the national organisation of Kashmiri people against the stooge of British Imperialism under Maharaja Hari Singh. They gave solid support to the leadership of the Kashmir National Conference in their struggle to end Feudal autocracy and establish democratic rule in Kashmir.1 It was their unyielding struggle that had brought to the forefront the objective of the Indian National Movement namely the abolition of landlordism ending in feudal autocracy, winning of freedom and self-determination for the state peop'e, REFERENCES 1.

Namboodripad, E. M. S., On the Agrarian Question in India, CPI, 1947, (Pamphlet).

TELEN'GANA The peasants of Telengana rallied behind the national organisation of the Telengana people, the Andhra Mahasabha in its struggle against the Ni:z;am and his stooges. Led as they were by the Communist Party, the peasants of Telengana, organised themselves in self-defence squads, beat back the foul attacks of the Nizam's police, Razakars and landlord's goondas. Basing themselves on the strength

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in 1~45-46

of these self-defence squads behind which stood the entire -poor people of the villages, the peasants put an end to the system of 'vetti' (forced labour) and other feudal practices. They also seized landlord's limds and distributed from among the landless and landhungry peasants of the villages.1 Telengana in, Hyderabad State saw the ,biggest peasant guerilla war in modern Ipdim History having its commencement in July 1946. It affected at its height about 3,000 villages spread over 16,000 square JIliles and with a population of 3 millions. The beginning of the uprising was traditionally dated from July 4, 1946 when thugs employed by the Deshmukh of Visunur (one of the highest and most oppressive of Telengana's landlords with 40,000 acres) murdered a village militant Doddi Komaraya who had been defending a poor washerWoman's mite of land. 2 The initial centuries -of resistance were in Jangaon, Suryap~t, Huzurnagar taluks of Nalgonda but the movement soon spread into the neighbouring districts of Warangal and Kbammam. Peasants organised into village sangams began by using lathis, slings with stones and chilli _powder. By the winter of 1946, the movement had spread to about 400 villages of Warangal and Nalgonda though it covered a smaller area in comparison with the Tebhaga Movement of Bengal which covered a much, larger area. It seemed that _the movement against eviction, vetti and food grains received popular support _and clashes between the peasants and the police Occurred between October and November. The peasants marched from one village -to another, defied arrest warrants and collected -in large numbers, whenever an alarm was ~ounded by a beating of drums. The Telen~ gana struggle thus began in 1946, but was faced with brutal repre~­ sioIl, the peasants under armed guerilla squads continued their ,movement between 1947 and 1948 when the struggle attained its greatest intensity and strength and a new shift in the situation was marked by the Nizam's attitude of consistently befriending the British and refusing to join the Indian Union after i,nde,pendence.

!

REFERENCES 1. Namboodripad, E. M. S. On Agrarian Question op. cit. 2. Sunil Sen., op. cit., pp. 133-35. -

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131

PUNNAPRA-VAYALAR In the Shertalai-Alleppey-Ambalapuzha area of North-west Travancore State, the Communists by 1946 had built up a very powerful base among coir-factory workers, fishermen, toddy-tappers and agricultural labourers. The close proximity of small town industries with agricultural occupations made the formula of workers-peasant alliance more of a reality than in most areas and trade-unions had become powerful enough to control recruitment in coir-factories, establish· informal but very popular arbitration courts and even earn the right to run . own rahon-s . hops. 1 thelf Meanwhile an explosive political situation was created by economic grievances sharpened with acute food scarcity which coincided with the plan announced in January 1946 by Dewan C. P. Ramaswami Iyer of an American model' constitution with assemblies elected by universal 'suffrage but an executive controlled by -Dewan appointed by the Maharaja. The ambitious Dewan, was clearly working for an independent Travancore under his own control. Agriculturallabourers and poor peasants of the two taluks ofAmbalapuzha and Shertalai rallied behind the two slogans of' the militant democratiC movement of Travancore State : "End the Dewan's Rule" and "To end an American model constitution". Organi~ing themselves behind the powerful industrial workers of Alleppey,. the peasa~try resisted the arbitrating evictions resorted to by the landlords and to this end, formed their own local committee and volunteer squads. It was this powerful support given by the landless and poor peasantry of the neighbouring areas, that made the working class of Alleppey famous for its historic action of Punnapra and Vayalar.2 Frpm September 1946, the State Government began. an all-out campaign· against the Communists and trade-unions of the Alleppey regions, with police camps, mass arrests and brutal torture in jails. In self defence, much more than out of any plan for insurrection, camps were set up where persecuted workers took shelter, protected by volunteers who were 'given some elementary military training. A political general,strike began in the Aleppey - Sheratalai area from 22nd October and intense repression led to violent clashes and at-. tacks on police camps in Punnapra, four miles south of Alleppey,

Political Upsurges in

132

1945-4~

with volunteers armed with wooden spears, crawling forward, despite intense firing, to engage the police in hand-to-hand combat. 9 rifles were captured here but apparently no use could be found for them. Martial Law was proclaimed on 25th October and on the 27th the volunteer headquarters at Vayalar was stormed by the army after a veritable blood bath. The Punnapra-Vayalar rising left 800 killed and ultimately enhanced the prestige of the Communists of Kerala. The massacre prevented the alliance between the totally discredited Dewan and the Congress towards which some right wing Congress leaders had been moving. Finally Ramaswami Iyer accepted integration with India fairly, easily no doubt, because he had realised that the alternative might well be a violent revolution. In this sense it was Punnapra Vayalar which really brought about the integration of Travancore with India. 3 It was true that while giving leadership to the working class, the Communist Party did not work out an agrarian programme for the whole state and hence could not organise those two taluks as the first phase of the National Liberation Movement in Kerala. Punnapra Vayalar coulQ, therefore, be crushed by the brutal terror unleashed by the government. But. the tremendous support that the working class and the Communist Party Secured in the villages showed. that the working class of Alleppey had become the leader of the peasant masses. For the Communist Party despite great suffering and an immediate setback, Punnapra-Vayalar meant all the prestige of heroic martyrdom. 4

REFERENCES 1. Sarkar Sumit, Modern India, p. 442 and George K. C. Immortal Pun-

napra Vayalar, New Delhi 1975. 2. Ibid 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid.

PATIALA In thePatiala State, the tenants of 180 villages under the biswedari (landlord system) out of the total number of 420 biswedari villages refused to pay anything to the landlords and occupied land claiming the right of ownership. So far they had occupied 25,000

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Thra~hing

in a Worli Village (Maharashtra) : Chittoprasad Bhaltacharya COllrt~s~'

: Art

Herihlg~

Peasant Movements

133

acres of land. The Maharaja of Patiala was ultimately forced to make an announcement giving 3/5th of lands to the tenants.!

REFERENCES 1. Namboodripad, E. M. S., On the Agrarian Question, Op. cit.

GWALlOR In Gwalior State the land system was largely arbitrary under the control of'the feudal J agirdars who were protected by law so that one found it extremely difficult to sue them in the law court even when they perpetrated worst atrocities on kisans. They progressively impoverished kisans who lived under the most oppressive and humiliating feudal conditions.! In the Rohal village of Uiiain, the Jagirdar took away forcibly the occupancy rights in the land;J enjoyed by the kisans but they were terribly afraid of opening.their mouthjn protest. Begar or forced unpaid labour was one of the' nIOSfhated methods of oppression and all kisans and labourers wanted to abolish it. Heavy~axes in kind were imposed on artisans such as potters and chamar~ (shoe makers or leather workers). Wages when paid were 3 annas a day and even lower in case of women. Marriage tax was imposed and the people heartily detested it. 2 The workers of the Kisan Sabha organised them in secret meetings until the kisans were ready to fight in defence of their rights and demands. Their main demands were1. .Occupancy rights in land, 2. No arbitrary rent but fixed rent, 3. Begar to be stopped and 4. All illegal exactions to be stopped.3 When the Kisan Sabha workers started its open agitation, gradually the whole village tallied under the Red Flag. There was g:J;'eat enthusiasm among (children and women) labourers who were specially interested in the movement as their wages were extremely low. Though women living as they did in Jagirdari or feudal condition were very conservative, they began to attend to public meetings. Inspite of the Jagirdar'sthreats and warnings, matters came to a

134

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

head. Within a short while, the J agirdar and his family had to face complete social boycott. The villagers were determined to stop everything that was illegal. Everybody joined the struggle; even the relatives of Jagirdar as they were also oppressed and humiliated in • 4 vanous ways. This anti-Jaigirdari Movement continued as the independence ushered in 1947 and even after. REFERENCES 1. Namboodripad E. M. S., On Agrarian Question, op. cit. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid.

Estimate Thus we notice that the new wave of KisaIf Struggles had an e!'1raordinary character and was fundamentally different from the .character of the earlier'~truggles. These struggles were spontaneous being started generally on the initiative of the kisans themselves~ They were unprecedented in intensity and sweep. They had behind them greater unity and solidarity of kisans of whom all sectiC'"s were in the struggle namely the poor peasants, sharecroppers, agt .~ultural labourers and also women and children. They enjoyed greater solidarity with non-kisan fighters like workers, student~ and women. They were more vital to the interests of the kisans "(ho were therefore militant, resolute, self-confident and self-sacrificing. They were more political and revolutionary as was evident fro~ the combination of anti-zamindari slogan with the anti-imperialist slogans. Though the peasantry was lagging behind the working class in the phase of the mass upheavals, the former resorted mass actions intensified by food crisis, shortage and high prices of essential commodities, official atrocities in the villages and landlord-moneylender oppression. In this phase of the peasant Struggle, there was certain amount of relaxation in the Congress, Congress-socialist groups and it was the units of the I9san Sabha ·and the Communists that gave effective leadership to the peasant upheaval to their battle against landlordism and other pppressors of peasantry. In th~ kisan Sabha's struggle against the nationalist bourgeoisie

Peasallt Movemellts

135

and against imperialism the latter was helping the national cause. Tlie aim of the Iqsans was thus to pressurise the government for bringing about agrarian reforms and they had to their credit, their own initiative and organising capacity of leadership. The peasant Struggle thus became the rallying point for greater democratic parties and organisation. The questions of land reform thus became the qucstions of political significance.

Chapter V

The Impact The post-war period revealed ~ big change in the British attitude towards India's Independence. The. desperate state of economy, the lUrking danger of social unrest in the wake of demobilization, acute shortage of manpower to run the industries at home dictated the need for a settlement in India.l In the international sphere, this was the period when the British Government was trying to use the Indian troops to suppress revolutionary government and restore British imperial dominance in Burma, Malaya, Singapore, the French in Indo-China, and the Dutch in Indonesia. In reaction, this marked the beginning of a policy of Asian friendship when India was making a claim she was not ·only fighting for the independence of her own country, but also of neighbouring countries and that she was striving to send out all imperialist powers from Asia along with the British from India. 2 Back in India, the victory of the Labour Party in Britain in July 1945 elections, the new Secretary for state for India, Lord Pethick Lawrence, came out with an announcement on 7th August to promote in consultation with Indian leaders, the early realisation of self-government in India.3 While the leaders of Congress and Muslim League were striving to win India's independence through bargains with the British, the feelings of Iridian masses were against thIS approach. They aimed at a revolutionary approach to end the British rule through mass struggle as distmct from the approach of bargain and compromise.A The .indications of the resurgence of people's anti-imperialist feelings was evident when Hindus and Muslims unitedly participated in the INA Release Movement, civil disturbances connected with IuN Mutiny all above religions considerations.s The people PllI'ticipating in them were influenced by workers and labourers enmasse. Leftists and' sodcllists parties provided a revolutionary perspective to them. They thought that it would be an ideal opportunity to challenge the Congress-League compromising policy with the British imperialists.6 The Congress adopted a .path of moderation and tried to main-

The Impact

137

tain peace by denial of official involvement in these political upsurges. They did not suppo~ the· revolutionary masses hence, opposed, condemned and deplored the mass-upsurges connected with the INA trial and Naval Mutineers. As for the Communist Party, it had long been dreaming of bringing the armed forces into the arena of national struggle for freedom and saw in the naval revolt, a great opportunity to launch a decisive struggle against British imperialism. A radical section of the party headed by Gangadhar Adhikari wanted to convert this uprising into a nation-wide struggle for liberation and disapproved of the Congress efforts to end the strike. But officially speaking, the central leadership of the CPI also suffered from initial hesitations and confusions. It did not approve of violent struggle and nearly urged all parties to unite in rousing public support for some demands of the naval ratings. Local party units accepted this moderate line ; students and trade-union fronts of the party remained with the masses· and gave them leadership. P. C. Joshi, the General Secretary of the CPI in November 1945, had given directive to the students of Calcutta "to be with the people".7 Hence Communist participants stayed with the masses in support of the INA Release Movement and Naval Mutineers cause, acting on their own accord. 8 The immediate reaction of the British to the two incidents of mass pressures was one of repression by handling them with prompt use ·of troops, indiscriminate ftring, stern ultimatum to naval ratings, forcing of surrender by siege of ships and ftring by troops, etc.9 From long term considerations, there were deci&ive shifts in British policy leading to certain modifying and even partial changes at this tjrne. For instance, the slow retreat on the INA trials from trying all di.ose who actively sided the formation of the INA to trying only those directly responsible for brutality to commuting sentences on the ftrst trials, to tacit abandoning the rest of the proposed trials. Other concrete changes in British policy included the withdrawal of the· Indian troops from Indo~esia, the sending of the parliamentary delegation and ftnally the sending of Cabinet Mission in 1946. 10 Certain historians, however, argue that the popular pressures connected with INA trials and Naval revolt can be attributed to ftxing a deadline for transfer of power i.e., to play an important role in determining the cause of events leading upto the coming of freedom with partition. ll But truly speaking, these developments· were results of COI,).siderations and pressures other than those alleged.

138

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

The policy changes on the INA question were gradual and based on a number of considerations. Firstly, the widespread support behind the INA prisoner's release demand as displayed in the popular demonstrations all over the country. was undoubtedly a definite reason behind the policy changes. Secondly, came the doubts about the wisdom of holding public trials especially in the Red Fort. Thirdly, they felt that the futility of expectation that public opinion would turn against the INA when their cowardice in joining the INA as an escape from being persecuted by the Japanese would be publicised and when the brutalities committed on the Pow's would be exposed.. Fourthly, the failure of the government to publicise its position before t~e political parties took up the issue. Finally, the British considered that the INA was essentially an army question despite its political implications and Indian officers within the army especially among the rank and file were generally in favour of leniency. It was to maintain the integrity of the army that the British Prime-Minister endorsed a change in policy.12 The use of Indian troops in Indonesia had in fact been severely criticised by the Viceroy himself who had demanded that they should be withdrawn. The Secretary of State had pleaded his inability to do so due to paucity of other troops and had promised to withdraw as soon 'as possible and conveyed the Viceroy's strong reaction to the relevant military authorities. So their ,withdrawal had nothing to do with the immediate pressure at the time of their withdrawal. 13 The decision to send a parliamentary delegation had originated in 1944 but it had been vetoed on grounds of non-availability of air' passages. But. it was revived in 1945 to study the realities of the Indian problem but delayed on account of some technical difficulties about sponsorship. It had been' suggested to Cripps by Rajkumari Amrit Kaur and accepted formally by the Cabinet, India and Burma Committee, on 19th November and approved by the Viceroy. Only the announcement came after the November demonstrationof 1945.14 The main shift in the British policy, however, came after the naval revolt i.e., the sending'ofthe Cabinet Mission. But truly speaking, the official cabinet decision on the Cabinet Mission was taken on January 22nd, 1946 and even the announcement on February 19 was made a week earlier. So the link with RIN revolt and the Rashid Ali day demonstrations was untenable. The idea of the Cabinet had been conceived earlier when Major Short suggested of a 'Milner type Kindergarten' going out to India. Then there was a proposal by the Prime-Minister to give the viceroy a political adviser. But the

The Impact

139

Secretary of State mindful of WaveD's objections to such an adviser tactfully suggested that only a cabinet should be sent which could take far-reaching decisions without referring back to London constantly. Hence a three-member Cabinet Mission was decided upon to negotiate a settlement. The Cabinet Mission was the implementation of that promise. 1S Thus the British decision to transfer power was not merely a response to the immediate situation prevailing in the winter of 194546 but a result of their realization that their legitimacy to rule had been irrevocably eroded over the years. 1S• Thus the two upsurges did not pose a sufficient threat to law and order in order to bring about any change in the policy towards agitations. Even the authorities responsible for maintaining law and order did not suggest any major measures to better handle similar outbreaks in future though specifically asked to do so by the Home Department. Most provinces reported that existing arrangements were adequate and only some changes such as re-equipping and strengthening of the police force and even rounding up the weifs and strays were suggested. 16 The disturbances had no organisation and were the result of an inflammatory atmosphere. However, it can be firmly established that the civil disturbances connected with the trial and the Naval revolt galvanized the national movement and reinforced the British decision to quit. The release of the INA officers left an indelible impression on the mind of the public that India as a subject country had the right to organise an army of its own to overthrow the ruling power- 17 The stage was set to put British imperialism into a tight corner. The two main props of keeping India in bondage was dissipating i.e., Hindu-Muslim discord and the loyalty of British Indian armed forces. The government's authority in the army began to decline as evident from the Naval Revolt of 1946 followed by solidarity revolts of the RIAF at Ambala and Lahore. The vast Indian masses were in a rebellious mood~ fearless and united at its base, while the Indian armed forces fraternised with them. Under such circumstances, cer. tain factors became evident 18 The British realised that it would be difficult to retain India since the defence forces were betrayi~g. So they decided to transfer the power to Congress and Muslim League in such a manlier so that united independent India could not emerge as a strong force in Asian and World politics.

140

Political Upsurges. in 1945-46

The splendid effort to channelise the united mass action through anti-Britis)l edge was blunted through communal tension and through the Congress policy of negotiation and compromise. Finally, weak and divided Indja could be' dependent on the British. That was the calculated iritention of the British policy milkers to keep India and Pakistan within the Bri~ish commonwealth. The British were successful in realising their objectives for a number ofreasons : The anti-British forces failed to organise the aggrieved section of the army to launch a protracted struggle against the British. While fhe Congress adopted a course of bargain and Compromise instead of a path of revolutionary struggle, the leftist parties includ~ng the Communists were not strong enough to unify the different streams of peoples' actions and feelings like'for example, the discontent among the ranks of defence forces and' convert them into a single comprehensive revolutionary mass upsurge. 19 Hence the British took the opportunity to convert the popular feelings into communal feelings/HindQ~Muslim discord which finally culminated in the communal riots of August 1946. The forces of freedom struggle thus failed to cope with the surging waves of communalism engineer~d by the, imperialists on the one hand and the communal and obscurantist forces on the other hand. In fact, communalism frustrated the surging united anti-imperialist struggle for a free and united India as a result of which the political parties within the country had to agree to the partition of the country. It was unfortunate, that the working class, the students and the other sections of India's population who could organise such a mighty struggle, failed to frustrate the game of the imperialists as well as communal and obscurantist forces. Though India missed the splendid opportunity to overthrow the British by revolutionary action of the Indian masses ; it was a magnificent effort created by mass action as a contemporary Urdu poet Ali Sardar J affri cited; "An omen of gladness without dead Lustre, coursing young blood, passion compressed the heart-thJ,'ob of Revolution o Harbinger of unity Flowers of freedom, peace and progress !"2O

141

The Impact REFERENCES

1. Bairathi, Shashi, Communism and Nationalism in India, Delhi 1987. P. 197-99 2.. Namboodripad, E. M. S., A History of Indian Freedom Struggle, Trivandrum 1986. 3. Bairathi, Shashi, op. cit.P. 197-99 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Mahajan, Sucheta, "British Policy and Popular National Upsurge 194546" in seminar in ~Struggle towards freedom' 194546, NMML New Delhi 1984. P. 75-77 8. Bairathi, Shashi, op. cit.P. 197-99 9. Mahajan, Sucheta, op. cit., pp. 72-73 10. Ibid., pp. 72-73 11. Sarkar, Sumit. Popular Movements and Middle Class leadership in Late Colonial India', calcutta 1983. P. 60-61. 12. Mahajan Sucheta, op. cit., pp. 75-77. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. p. 75. 15. Ibid. 15a. Chandra, Bipan, ed., India's Struggle for Independence (1857-1947), calcutta 1988. P. 476-83 16. Ibid. 17.- Bairathi, Shashi, op. cit.P; 197-99 18. . Chattopadhyay, Gautam, 'The Almost Revolution in Essays in Honour ofS. C. Sarkar and Bairathi Shashi, op. cit. P. 197-99 19. Namboodripad, E. M. S., op. ~it; 20. Translated from the Urdu original poem "The Student Flag" by Ali Sardar Jaffri and published in the Student, 21St January, 1946.

Ch pater VI

Conclusion The mass-upsurges that emerged throughout the country following the end of the Second World War which directly challenged the legitimacy of the British rule and was perceived to be doing so by colonial !luthorities. But the picture would be ~onstrained, if we leave out of our purview, the struggles by workers and peasants, the people of the native states, which had an anti-imperialist edge, and were widespread throughout the country. They undoubtedly challenged the vested interests that constituted the ,social-support of the raj, though they did not come into direct conflict with the colonial regime. 1 . The last year's of colonial rule saw a sharp increase in strikes on economic issues all over the country. The pent up economic grievances, during the war, coupled with problems due to post-war demobilization and continuation of high prices, scarcity of food and other essentials and a drop in real wages, all combined to drive the working class to the limits of tolerance:2 Hence the years 1945-46 marked the beginning of an unprecedented wave of country-wide labour unrest. The spring and summer of 1946 marked the heigh of greatest strike wave in the history of colonial India. It was this labour west which alarmed the British officials particularly in the context of repeated threats by all India organisation. of railway ~orkers, postal employees and government clerical associations. Strikers in 1920s and 30's had been mainly confined to single industrial centres primarily Bombay or Calcutta Textiles but' the development of effective country-wide labour organisation in strategic sectors gave a new muscle power to the Indian trade-union movement at this time:3 The Communists were in sympathy with the labour strikers as displayed in the strikes of the railway and postal employees. But the Congress opted for a different policy holding that strikes "were Qut of place" as the British were now acting as caretakers.· They condemned the 'hasty or ill-conceived' stoppages and the growing lack of discipline and disregard of obligations on the part of the workers. 4 The working class had expressed solidarity and participated. ac-

Conclusion

143

tively in the INA release campaign and in support of the naval mutineers. They also participated in the movements of the princely states more extensively than before. The strikes, which were launched by the working class in the states like Travancore, Hyderabad, Gwalior, etc., were linked with the political movements in the respective states. In fact, the working class struggles iti Travancore and Hyderabaa played significant roles in the development of Paimapra-Vayalar and Telengana respectively which re~resented a distinct exantple of peoples struggle in the princely states. A school of historians contend that when the labour movement threatening the very existence of the landlord system was at the peak, to disrupt it, communal riots were organised by vested interests, to stem the tide of the mass upsurges. E. M. S. Namboodripad's version directly holds that the British imperialists deVised the evil design to prepare the grounds to intensify the Hindu-Muslim tension leading to the communal riots of August 1946, while at the same time, creating the impression, that efforts were being made to transfer power to the Indians. Communal feelings did penetrate among the poor sections of the people like peasants and workers leading the less class conscious to actively participate in the communal riots. 6 B"ut as evident from the period under review, the working class unitedly fought back the communal tension as reve~ed from the resolution of the AITUC Session of November-December 1946 which held as follows : "The Counclllooks upon the communal disturbances as the most dangerous menace to the solidarity of the workers in their struggle against the exploiters...the meeting expresses deep sympathy with the Hindu-Muslim victims to the orgy of communal rioting and congratulates these workers who kept themselves aloof from the riots and at many places actually protected their brother workers belonging to other community.,,7 The riots may have been an attempt to weaken the unity of the worker's struggles against oppressing conditions perpetuating their miseries and to divert their attention from the anti-imperialist struggle.s But the mQ(~d in anticipation of freedom was pregnant with expectation. Independence was foreseen by all sections of the Indian people signalling an end to their miseries. The workers were no exception; they too were now struggling for what they hoped freedom would bring them as a matter of right. The labour force stood as the vanguard in the battle for national and socialliberation.9 The period under review witnessed a decisive growth in trade

144

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

union membership. In 1946, the World Federation of trade, unions

was born. The strikes of this period embraced not only workers of factories and mills but also employees of government departments.1o Finally a scope to ventilate their economic grievances and to secure redressal was seen when the two years between XXI-XXII Session of AlTUC saw the passing of several measures in the form Of amending the existing factory acts by the Government of India, the mines maternity benefit act, etc., for the improvement of the working conditions. The AITUC also submitted a memorandum, suggestions and negotiations for. the betterment of the labouring masses while independence dawned in at the stroke of the midnight hour on 15th August, 1947.11 The end of the war followed by the negotiations for the transfer of power and the anticipation of freedom marked a qualitatively new stage in the development of the peasant movement. A new spirit was evident and the certainty of approaching freedom with the promise of a new social order, encouraged peasants among other social groups to assert their rights and.claini with a newvigour. 12 Many struggles that had been left off in 1939 were renewed. The demand for zamindari abolition was pressed with a greater sense of urgency. The organisation of agricultural workers in Andhra which had begun a few years earlier, took on the form of a struggle for higher wages and use of standard measures for payment of wages in kind.1~

The peasants of Punnapra-Vayalar in Travancore fought bloody battles with the administration. In Telengana, the peasants organized themselves to resist the landlords oppression and played an important role in the anti-Nizam struggle. Siniilar events took place in other parts of the country. It was the Tebhaga Struggle that held the limelight in Benga1. 14 . To draw up a balance sheet of such a diverse and varied struggle, it can be asserted that the most important contribution of the peasant movements that covered large areas of the subcontinent in the last years prior to independence, was that even when they. did not register immediate successes, they created the climate which necessitated the post-independence agrarian reforms. Zamindari abolition did not come about as a direct culmination of any particular struggle but the popularization of the demand by the Kisan Sabha certainly contributed to its.achievement. 1' The immediate demands on which struggles were fought were the reduction of taxes, the abolition of illegal cesses of feudal levies

Conclusion

145

and begar or vethi, the ending of oppression by landlords and their agents, the reduction of debts, the restoration of illegally or illegitimately seized lands and security of tenure for tenants. Except in few pockets like Andhra and Gujarat, the demands of agricultural labourers did not really become part of the movement. These demands were based on the existing consciousness of the peasantry, of their just or legitimate rights, which was itself a product of tradi7 tion, custom,' usage and legal rights. When landlords or the government demanded what was seen by peasants as illegitimate : high taxes, exorbitant rents, illegal cesses, forced labour or rights over land which the peasant felt was theirs, they were willing to. resist if they could muster the necessary organizational and other resources. But they were also willing to continue to respect what they considered as legitimate deruands.16 The struggles, based on these demands, were clearly not aimed at the overthrow of the existing agrarian structure but towards alleviating its most oppressive aspects. Nevertheless, they corroded the power of the landed classes in many ways and thus prepared the ground for the transformation of the structure itself. In sum, the kisan movement was faced with the task of transforming the peasant consciousness and.building movements based on a transformed con• 17 SClOusness. The forms of struggle and mobilization adopted by the peasant movements in diverse areas were similar in nature as were their demands. The main focus was on mobilization through meetings, conferences, rallies, demonstrations, enrollment of members, formation of Kisan Sabhas, etc. Direct action usually involved satyagraha and non-payment of rent and taxes. All these forms had become the stock-in-tr.ade of the national movement for the past years. As in the national movement, violent clashes were the exception and not the norm. They were rarely sanctioned by the leadership and were usually popular responses to extreme repression. IS The relationship of the peasant movement with the national movement continued to be one of the vital and integral in nature. For .one area where the peasant movement was active were' usually the ones that had been drawn into the earlier national struggles. This was true at least of Punjab, Kerala, Andhra, U.P. and Bihar. This was hardly surprising since it was the spread of the national movement that had created the initial conditions required for the emergence of peasant. struggles, a politicized and conscious peasantry and a band of active political workers capable of and willing to perform the task

146

Political Upsurges in 1945-46

of organisation and leadership.19 In its ideology, the kisan movement accepted and based itself on the ideology of nationalism. Its cadres and leaders carried the message not only of organisation of the peasantry on class lines, but also of national freedom. In some regions, like Bihar, serious differences emerged between sections of Congressmen and the Kisan Sabha and at times, the kisan movement seemed set on the path of confrontation with the Congress but this tended to happen, only when both left wing activists or Congressmen took extreme positiveness and showed an unwillingnes~ to accommodate each other. 20 Before 1942, the kisan movement and the national movement occupied largely a common ground. But after 1942, the kisan movement found that if it diverged too far and too clearly from the path of the national movement it would tend to lose its mass base as well as to Create a split within the ranks of its leadership. The growth and development of the peasant movement in this phase was thus indissolubly linked with the national struggle for freedom. 21

REFERENCES 1. Chandra, Bipan, India's Struggle for Independence, New Delhi 1988. P.351-55 . 2. Ibid. 3. Sarkar, Sumit, Popular Movements and National Leadership 1945-47 (Economic and Politic;:ll Weekly), VoI.XVII, 1982. P. 60-61 4. Ibid. 5. Namboodripad, E. M. S., A History of Indian Freedom Struggle, Trivandrum 1987. 6. Ibid. 7. Gupta, P. S., A History of AlTUC, op. cit. P. 448-49 8. Ibid. 9. Chandra, Bipan, op. cit. P. 351-55 10. Gupta, P. S., op. cit. P. 448-49 11. Ibid. 12. Chandra, Bipan, op. cit. P.351-55 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid.

Conclusion

19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid.

147

Abbreviations Used AFL

Anti-Fascist League Amrita Bazar Patrika All India Railwaymen's ·Federation AIRF AICC All India Congress Coriunittee AISF All India Students Federation All India Kisail..Sabha AIKS AlP &-RMSU All India Postal and Railway Mail Service Union AITUC All India Trade union Congress· AlP & LGSU All India Postal and Lower Grade Staff Union BPSF Bengal Provincial Students Federation BPSC Bengal Provincial Students Congress Bombay Students Union BSU BB&CI Bombay, Baroda and Central Indian BPTUUC Bengal Provincial Trade-union Congress. Bengal and Assam B&A Bombay Nagpur Railway BNR Bengal Provincial IGsan Sabha BPKS CSP Congress Socialist Party CPI Communist Party of India Calcutta Tramway Workers Union CIWU DA Dearness Allowance EIR East Indian Railway GIP Great Iridian Penninsular GPO General Post Office Hindustan Times HT HS Hindustan Standard Hind MazdQQr Sevak Sangha HMSS Indian NatiQnal Army INA IPC Indian. Penal Code IAR Indian Annu~ Register IPTA IndiatiP'eoples theatre Association Indian Civil Service ICS IPTU Indian post & Telegraphs Uruon MSL Muslim Students League Madcas and South Mahratta M&SM Malabar Special Police MSP

ABP

149

Abbreviations NMML PA PMG RI RIAF RSP RIN RMSU SF SIR YMCA

Nehru Memorial Museum & Library People's Age Postmaster General Rigorous Imprisoument Royal Indian Air Force Revolutionary Socialist Party Royal Indian Navy Railway Mail Service Union Students Federation South Indian Railway Young Men's Christian Association

Select Bibliography (a) Private Papers 1

11

Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, New Delhi All India Congress Committee Papers 1945-46. All India Kisan Sabha Papers\1945-46. Hindu !\'3hasabha Papers 1945-46 All India Trade Union Congre~s Papers 1945-46. CPI Archives, Ajoy Bhawan, NdI,' Delhi Party Proceedings and Resolutions of CPI 1945-46. All India Kisan Sabha Reports 1945-47. Pamphlets of the CPI 1945-46.

(b) Official Records and Reports 1

11

//1

Iv. V.

National Archives ofIndia, New Delhi Home Political (I) records of the Government of India 1945-46. Ta/nil Nadu State Archives, Madras Fortnightly Confidential Reports from Madras Presidency 1945-46. Miscellaneous Confidential Reports of 1946. West Bengal State Archives, Calcutta Home Political confidential (Secret) Reports for 1945, Home Political Confidential (Secret) Reports for i946. Land and Land Revenue Department File of 1947, Government of West Bengal. Intelligence Branch Files of West benga~ 1945-46. Special Branch Records of 1945-46., Calcutta.

(c) Newspapers -of 194546 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

14. 15. 16.

The Bombay throniele The Statesman The Amrita Bazar Patrika The. Hindusthan Standard ~eHindu

The Hindustan Times The New York Times The Star Janata Peoples Age Peoples War Deccan Times Indian Express Daily Mail Daily Express The Student

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151

Swadhinata Daily Worker The News Chronicle St.ar of India

(d) Oral Testimony 1. Dilipkumar Bi~s , 2. Samarend'raGath Basllj 3. Gautam Ichattopadhyay 4. Aurobindo Bose 5. Ranendranath Sen 6. Bina Bhowmick 7. Somnath Hore 8. Debabrata Mukhopadhyay 9. ) Sunil Se~ . 10. . Phanibhilsan Bhattacharya 11. Renuka Roy 12. Renu Chakrabartty

(e) Photographs 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Ananda Bazar Patrika The Statesman Nehru Memorial Museum & Library Art Heritage; Triveni Kala Sangam. Photographs have also been obtained from private collections as well as from books and periQdicals.

(f) Journals and Periodicals Dasgupta, Ranajit, Peasants, Workers and Freedom Struggle,· Jalpaiguri 1945-47, Economic and Political Weekly, Vot. XX. No. 30, July 27,1985. Ghatak, Maitreyee, Kakdwip 1946-50, in Bartika 31st, Vot: April-September 1986 (Bengali). I Guha-Roy, Siddhartha, Tramwayman of Calcutta: their movement and organisation (192047), Revolt Studies, Vol. 2, December 1985.' . Gupta, Amit, Forest-fire in the Sundarsan and the Kakdwip rising (1946-50), Occasional Papers on History and Society, No. XXVIII, NMML !few Delhi. Gupta, Amii, the Communists and the Outbteak of th,e Telengana Rising, May 1944 to Feb. 1947, Occasional Papers on History and Society, No. VIII, NMML. New Delhi Hor~,

SGmnath, 'Tebhagar DiarY. (Bengali), in Ekshan, Annual Number 1981, Vot. XV, No.-1-2. Journal of Indian History, Vot. LP (ii) SI. No. 49, August 1972 (Indian Independence Number). Lutz, Jessie G., the Chinese Student Movement of 194549, Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 31, No. I, 1971. . Mahajan, Sucheta, British Policy and Popular National Upsurge (194546), in 'Struggle towards freedom' (194547), Seminar proceedings ofNMML New Delhi 1984. Rozhdestvensky, Robert, The Poet of the new world, Soviet Literature 1983. Roy, Ajit, Socio-political background of Mountblitten Award, Marxist Review,

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November-December 1982 to January 1983. Sarkar, Sumit, 'Popular Movement and National Leadership (1945-47), in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XVII, 1982. Webb, John, A mutiny in 1946, The Statesman, 5 March, 1986.

(g) Printed Books and Pamphlets Adhikary, G. Resurgent India at Crossroads, 1946 in Review, N. Delhi 1947. Adhikary, G., 'Strike' The Story of the Strike in the Indian Navy, N. Delhi 1946. AdJoff, Richard and Thompson, Virginia, Minority Problems in South east Asia, Stanford University Press 1955. Ahluwalia Sagar, Youth in Revolt, New Delhi 1972. AJtbach, P. G., The Student Revolution: A Global Analysis, Bombay 1970. Ambedkar, B. R., Pakistan or Partition of India, Bombay 1945. Ayer, S. A, Story of the INA, New Dehi 1972. Azad, Maulana, India wins Freedom, Bombay 1964. Balabushevich, V. and Dyakov, A Contemporary History of India, USSR 1944. Balabushevich, V. New State in the National Liberation Struggle of the People of India (Soviet Document). 1946 Banerjee, Subrata, The RIN Strike, New Delhi 1981. Bhattacharya, Sukanta, Mithe Kara, Calcutta 1985. Birla, G. D., Bapu, A Unique Association and Correspondence, Bombay 1977. Bose, Arun and Ray, Khoka, Inside Bengal: 1941-45, Forward Bloc and Us allies versus Communists, Bombay 1945. Bose, Samarendranath, 'Bangla Deshe Chhatra Andolan.', Calcutta 1945 (Bengali). Brecher, M., Nehru, A Political Biography, London 1959. Cady John, F., Post-war South-east Asia, New York, 1976. Campbell, lohnson : Mission with Mountbatten, London 1951. Casey, Personal Experience, 1939-46, London 1962. Chakravorty, Renu, Communists in Indian Women's Movement, New Delhi 1980. Chandra, Bipan, Nationalism and Colonialism in Modern India. N. Delhi 1979. . Chandra, Bipan, The Indian Left, Critical Appraisals, New Delhi 1983. Chandra, Bipan India s Struggle for Independence, Viking 1988. Chatterjee, A c., India's Struggle for Freedom, Calcuta 1947~ Chattopadhyay, Gautam, Bengal Legistlature in India's Struggle for Freedom, New' Delhi 1974. Chattopadhyay, Gautam, Bengal Students Revolt against the Raj, in Seminar on 'the struggle for freedo~n' (1945-47) NMML, N. Delhi 1984. Chattopadhyay, Gautam 'The Almost Revolution', in Essays in Honour of S. c.. Sarkar, New Delhi 1976. Chattopadhyay, Oautam, Swadhinata Sallgrame Ballgalar Chltatra Samaj, Calcutta 1984. Chowdhury, \3ulbul,Rakter Dak (Bengali), Dacca 1386. Connell, John, AI/chillleck; A Critical Biography, London 1959. Crouche, Harold, Trade Ulliom alld Politics in India, Bombay 1966. Custer, Peter, WomclI ill thc Tebhaga Uprising: Rural Poor WomclI and Rel.'Olutiollary Leadership (1946-47), CalCutta 1987 Dange; S. A, 011 the Trad{: Ullion MOI'emcllt-Report to a CO/ll'entiOll1TU.7nbers working in the trade UnrOIlI1U)I'emCIII, 1952. Das, Durga, ed., Sardar Pate!:v ('o/Tcspondellce, Ahmedabad 1971. De, Amalendu. Khaksar Alldolollcrltihas;--Calcutta 1968.

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De, Amalendu, BangaU Buddhijibi Bichhihatabad, Calcutta 1987. Desa"i, A R, Peasant Struggles in India, New Delhi 1979. Desai, A R, Recent Trends in Indian NaJionalism, Bombay 1973. Dhanagare, D. N., Peasant Movement in India, New Delhi 1979. , Dhanagare, D. N., Social Origins of Peasant Insurrection in Telengana -
to Indian Sociology, 1974. Dutt, RP., India Today, Bombay 1979. Edwards, Michael, The Last Years of British India, London 1963 Efimov Dmitri, World War II and the Destinies of Asian and African Peoples, New Del,hi 1985. Facts 'in File (1945-46). Farooqi, M., India's Freedom Struggle and the Communist Party of India, New Delhi 1974. Fergusson, Bernard, Wave~ Portrait of a Soldier, London 1981.

For the final assault-tasks of the Indian people in the present phase of Indian revolution - Resolution of the Central Committee of CPI, 1946. Ganguly, S. M., Leftism in India: M. N. Roy and Indian Politics (1920-1948) Calcutta 1984. George, K. C., Immortal Punnapra-Vayalar, New Delhi 1975. Ghosh, S., Gandhi's Emissary, London 1947. Golant, William, The LongAftemoon : British India (1901-1947), Delhi 1975. Gopal, S., lawaharlal Nehru, A Biographgy, Vol. I (1889-1947), New Delhi 1975. Gour Raj Bahadur & Others, Glorious Teiengana, Armed Struggles, New Delhi 1973. Gour Raj Bahadur Tri-colour shall flyover Hyderabad, Bombay 1947. Gupta, Amit, ed., The Myth and Reality: The Struggle for Freedom in India, NMML, New Delhi 1981. Gupta, Amit, Women and Society: The Developmental Perspective, New Delhi 1986. Guidelines ofthe Hi3tory o/CPI, New Delhi 1974. Hashim, Abdul, In Retrospect, Dacca 1974. Hobsbawm ed., Peasants in History, Delhi 1980. Hopkins & Dewey ed., ImperiJJl Impact: Studies in the Economic History ofAfrica and India, London 1978. Hodson, The Great Divide, London 1969.

Indian Labour Year Book, 1946. Indian Labour Gazette, 1945-46. In the Name of Freedom, Honour and Bread, CPI, 1945. Islam, M. M., Bengal Agriculature (1920-46) : a quantitative study, Cambridge 1978. Jag, Moban, 25 Years of Indian Independence, New Delhi, 1973. Jeffrey, Robin,Asia, the winning of Independence, Hong Kong 1981. Johari, Je. ed., India1l Freedom Movement and Thought, New Delhi 1983. Johnson, Campbell, Mission with Mountbatte1l, London 1957. Joshi, P. e., Commmunis/ Party's Reply to Congress Working Committee's Charges, Bombay 1945. Joshi, P. e. ed., Towards a People's NQI,y, Bombay 1946. Joshi, P. M., 11le Student Revolts ill/lldia, Bombay 1972. Kalyansundaram ed., The SIR strike, Bombay 1947. Karnik, V. B. Strikes in India, Bombay 1967. Karrow, Stanley, Vietnam: A HistoTY, London 1983. Kccsing's ,Contemporary Archives (1945-46) Khan,Maj Gen S. N., My Memories o/the INA alld its Netaji. New Delhi 1946. Khaliqu7Zeman, e., Pathway 10 Pakistall, Lahore 1961.

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KhO$la, G. D., Stem Reckoning: A Survey of the events leading upto and following the Partition of India; New Delhi 1950. Krishnan N. K., Communist Party and Milslim League, Calcutta 1946. Krishnan, Parvati, Communists and Trade Union Movement, New Delhi 1985. . Lewi~, Martin, D~ M., The British in India: Imperia/ism or Trusteeship, Boston 1962. Mansergh, N. and Lumby,. E. W;;-Transfer ofPower, Vol. VI & VII. Martennikov, V., On the leading role of the working class in the National liberation

movement of the colonial people, 1948.

Mehrotra, S. It, Towards Indias Fr~dom and Pariif;on, New Delhi 1979. Menon, V.P., Transfer ofPower, Bombay 1956. Mitra, N. N. ed., Indian Annual Register: An Annual Digest of public affairs I & 11 (1945-46), Calclltta 1946. Misra, B. B., Indian Political Parties, New Delhi 1978. Moheimein, Abdul, Dui Shataker Smriti, D~cca 1986. Moon, PeIiderel ed., Wavell: The Viceroy's Jouma~ New Delhi 1979. Moore, R. J., Escape from Empire, The Attlee Government and the Indian Problem, Oxford 1963. Mosley, Leonard, The last days of the British Raj, Bombay 1%1. Mukhopadhyay, Saroj, Bharater Communist Partyo.Amra, Vol. 11, Calcutta 1986. Mukhopadhyay, Subhash, Amor Bang/a, Calcutta 1946 (BengaJi). Mukul, A. R. Akil(ar, Challish thelre ekottar, Dacca 1985 (Bengali). Namboodripad, E. M. S., A History of Indian FreedOm Struggle, Trivanduml 1986. Namboodripad, E. M. S., On the Agrarian Question : peasant in national economic

construction C. P.l, 1947 Nehru, J. L., Before and after Independence, NewDelhi 1950. Overstreet, G. D. & Windmiller M., Communis1n in India, Bombay 1960. Pandey, B. N., The Breakup ofihe British Empire in India, Delhi 1982. Panjabi, K L., The Indomitable Sardar, Bombay 1%2. Pannikar, K B., On Outline History oftheAITUC, New Delhi 1959. Pannikar, K.B. ed., National and Left Movements in India, New Delhi 1980. Parikh, N. D., Sardar Vallabhai Patel, Ahmedabad 1956.. Parulekar, Revolt of me Varlis,Bombay 1947. Patel, Manibehn and G. N. Nandurkar, Sardar'sletters, Ahmedabad 1977. Pavier, Barry, The Te/engana Movement (1~44-57), New Delh~ 1~1. . Phillips, C. H. and Wainwright Mal)' Doreen ed., Panition of India: .Politics alrd Perspectives, London 1970. Roy Ashwini, E Kaler Katha (Bengali), Calcutta 1360. Saha, Panchanan, A History of Working Class Movement in Bengal, New Delhi 1978. Sanyal and Abanti Kumar, Chattopadhyay Gautam : Rakter Shakhar (Bengali), Calcutta 1945 Sarkar, Sumit, Popular Movements and Middle Class Leadership ill latc colollial India . : Perspectil'es problems of a 'History from beiow', Calcutta 1983. Sarkar, Sumit, Modern India, Delhi 1983. Sharma, Hari P. and Gough, Kathleen ed.: Imperialism alld Rel'Olmioll ill Sowh Asia. New York 1973~ Sen. Manikuntala, Slw Diner Katha, (BengaJi) Calcutta 1982. Sen. Mohit, Re\'olwion ill India: Path and Problems. New Delhi 1977. Sen, Rabin, PancitAdhyay. Calcutta 1988 (Bengali). Sen. Samar, Samar Serier K.abita~ Calcutta 1954. (Bengali). Sel'l, Satyen. Gram Banglar Pathe Pathe, Dacca 1381. (Bengali). Sen. Sukoma!, Workillg Class of India, History of Emergellce alld MOI'ml('''/ 1830-70.

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