Preparing for Peace: Military Identity, Value Orientations, and Professional Military Education

PREPARING FOR PEACE

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PREPARING FOR PEACE Military Identity, Value Orientations, and Professional Military Education Volker Franke

Foreword by the Honorable Sean O'Keefe

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publieation Data Franke, Volker, 1963Preparing for peace : military identity, value orientations, and professional military education / Volker Franke ; foreword by Sean O'Keefe. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-275-96338-1 (alk. paper) 1. Military education—United States. 2. Military socialization— United States. 3. United States—Armed Forces—Officers—Training of. 4. United States—Armed Forces—Officers—Attitudes. 5. World politics—1989- 6. Peace. 7. United States—Armed Forces— Operations other than war. 8. United States Military Academy. 9. United States. Army—Officers. I. Title. U408.F73 1999 355'.0071'073—dc21 99-34123 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 1999 by Volker Franke All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 99-34123 ISBN: 0-275-96338-1 First published in 1999 Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America

@r The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984). 10987654321

To the memory of Gerd Franke

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Contents

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Figures and Tables Foreword The Honorable Sean O'Keefe Preface Global Security after the Cold War Resolving Identity Tensions Military Identity: Old Ammo in New Weapons? Duty, Honor, Country: The West Point Experience Learning Peace: Value Orientations of West Point Cadets The Social Identities of West Point Cadets Professional Military Education: From Student to Officer Warriors for Peace: Socializing Military Leaders for Shifting Roles Postscript References Index

ix xi xv 1 13 39 67 87 115 135 161 173 177 191

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Figures and Tables

FIGURES

2.1 Conceptions of Identity 2.2 The Dynamic Model of Identity and the Network of Central Life Interests 3.1 ROE Card 3.2 Military Value-Matrix 5.1 Mutual Adherence to Values 6.1 Most Important Reference Groups by Class Status 7.1 Mutual Adherence to Values

27 33 44 60 98 120 146

TABLES

5.1 Scale Responses by Class Status 5.2 Responses to Miscellaneous Statements by Value Strength 5.3 Regression of Value Orientations on Sociopolitical Views, Decision Period, and Branch Preference 5.4 Sociopolitical Views, Branch Preference, and Age and Time Period of First Thought of a Military Career 5.5 Scale Responses by Decision Period

94 99 102 103 106

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5.6 Decision Period and Sociopolitical Views by Branch Preference 5.7 Differences in Value-Scale Means for Decision Period by Class Status 6.1 Relationship between Class Status, National Identity, and Military Identity 6.2 Scale Responses by Strength of Identification with the Military and with the United States 6.3 Logit Model for Effects on Military Identity 6.4 Logit Coefficients for Significant Effects on Military Identity by Class Status 6.5 Effects of Class Status on Military Identity by Gender 7.1 Mean Scale Responses by Service Experience 7.2 Student Attitudes by Academic Background

107 109 122 124 128 129 131 142 152

Foreword The Honorable Sean O'Keefe

General Charles Krulak, former Commandant of the Marine Corps, typically starts his speeches with a vignette from the Marine basic training experience called "The Crucible." At the conclusion of this arduous indoctrination training, the successful are awarded the Marine globe and anchor insignia—a mark of distinction among armed forces which designates the chosen few accepted into the culture of the Corps. One of Krulak's latest passages is of a young man from a rough South Chicago neighborhood, but now a Marine emerging victorious from the rigors of "The Crucible" clutching the globe and anchor, with tears streaming down his cheeks, announcing "I am somebody!" To the Marines this isn't just a testosteronedriven burst of pride or bravado. This enthusiasm is an imperative for success. It differentiates this profession from other "jobs." While the Marine Corps is truly distinctive, each of the armed services seeks to make new recruits feel they are part of something important, distinctive, and purposeful. The imperative for this approach transcends patriotic purpose or nationalism. Since the mid1970s, the United States armed forces have been dependent on voluntary enlistment to fill the ranks. The military must continually demonstrate that the profession is worthy, that the lifestyle desirable, and that it is a meaningful form of public service. The challenge of winning young Americans over is difficult, since the armed forces are competing with private companies that offer much higher compensation, far better working conditions, limited risk,

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and comparatively fewer claims on individual free time. The challenge is even more pronounced now in this period of a booming national economy. But once they become members of the armed forces, people tend to partially define themselves by their military experience and remember their service far more vividly than they recall any commercial company they work for or other professional pursuits they engage in. Indeed, this speaks to the uniqueness of military service and that at the present time Americans hold the armed forces in the highest esteem of any public institution in the country. An examination of military culture and socialization reveals but one dimension of the United States national security establishment. A separate but integral set of national security policy and strategy issues also bears on the challenges facing the nation's armed forces. And over the past ten years, national security policy and strategy have shifted significantly. A remarkable combination of technological advances, dedication of tremendous resources, and political resolve closed the Cold War era nearly a decade ago. Slowly, the armed forces have shifted from near exclusive emphasis on monolithic forces waging conventional warfare campaigns and the bipolar standoff of nuclear forces to prevent global thermonuclear war. The horrifying consequences of these potential events nearly consumed all the creative thinking of military planners for the better part of four decades. The analytical solutions to these threats concentrated on military strategy, tactics, and technology. Each option yielded a quantifiable cost, benefit, and risk assessment. In the years since the end of the Cold War, events around the globe have compelled the U.S. political, civilian leadership to respond by sending military forces to a range of contingencies as varied as peace enforcement following civil war to humanitarian assistance for famine relief. With the notable exception of the Gulf conflict in 1990-1991, virtually none of these campaigns could be quantified at the outset—and even in the Gulf, the early estimates of casualties and cost were wrong. Indeed, the vagaries surrounding each of these post-Cold War conflicts or missions have prompted wariness from the military rank and file as well as its leadership. In the immediate years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, this skeptical military mindset was so pervasive it prompted the editorial cartoonist Herblock to familiar parody—an image of the Pentagon entrance graced with a sign hanging from the door that read "We only do the big ones." In fairness, the preparation, training, tactics, and policy necessary to counter what the military likes to call "asymmetric" threats

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is difficult. Typically, problems emerge with little notice on unfamiliar territory, loosely organized by military units engaged in tactics that defy the military's standard rules of engagement. All this leads to an unpredictable outcome. This proves particularly risky when combined with the American public's general intolerance of military actions and potential casualties. Indeed, the military and the public seem to share a common concern in this environment that conjures elements of George Washington's age-old warning of "foreign entanglements." A wary public and uncertain military preparation bode poorly for successful outcome. The events in Somalia are a constant reminder of this risk. The continuing peacekeeping missions in Crete, the Sinai, Haiti, and Bosnia are evidence of the uncertain and potentially long duration for these missions. If one concludes, as Clausewitz did, that the use of armed forces is an expression of foreign policy by another means, the vagaries of contemporary mission pose a great challenge to traditional military expectations for clarity of policy and objective. Tom Ricks of the Wall Street Journal explores the factors that define the military culture in his insightful book Making the Corps. Ricks argues that some people join the armed forces, in part, to help establish a sense of order and culture where it might not otherwise exist in their lives. In no small measure, this suggests a potential intolerance among those assigned to the areas of chaos and confusion that surround peacekeeping and peace-enforcement tasks. But Ricks also observes that the very factors that contribute to enthusiasm for military service could prompt a detachment from the public the military are charged to protect. This arguable consequence of the all-volunteer armed force in lieu of conscription should prompt reflection on the compatibility of traditional military culture and contemporary missions. Volker Franke's Preparing for Peace explores precisely this point. This book examines both the military culture and the new missions the armed forces are confronting. It is an effort to analytically examine the disposition, training, and perception of aspiring military leaders compared to the challenges the military has encountered in the post-Cold War period. This exhaustive research suggests that preparation for peacekeeping and peace enforcement, as well as emergency and humanitarian assistance missions, is partially a function both of the socialization process and of the training of military leaders. Franke offers some important thoughts on the nature of training and education revisions to highlight a closer compatibility of culture and mission. In the larger sense, this work raises questions

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about the national security policy and strategy relative to the public's expectations that the armed forces can carry it out and the military's cultural disposition to do so. Exploring these relationships in the early phases of military service raises the prospect of near term understanding and long term success.

Preface Writing a scholarly book is as much an effort to contribute to a body of knowledge in one's field as it is often a reflection of one's most intimate life experiences. Unknowingly, I began the journey that culminated in this book some fifteen years ago, but it did not become a scientific project until a few years ago. Growing up in a divided Germany, I experienced the effects of the Cold War firsthand. One-third of the population of my hometown consisted of American military personnel, deployed to prevent a possible conventional or nuclear attack by the Soviet Union and to defend Western Europe in case of such an attack. Growing up with a constant military presence amidst many gruesome reminders of World War II, the danger of another, potentially more devastating confrontation on German soil loomed large. The assumptions of political Realism—that states are caught in a constant struggle for power and military dominance—had become a living reality for me. In the late 1970s, I began traveling through Eastern Europe and realized that our neighbors were just as fearful of another war as we were in the West. I began to question the principles of Realism, the strategies of deterring a possible Soviet attack and containing Communism at all cost, and the purpose of a military force prepared to fight a war that threatened to annihilate the human race. It seemed that "defending the people's interest" was perhaps not completely in the people's best interest.

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The Cold War has now ended. Lacking evidence to the contrary, it is easy to say containment and deterrence led the West to "win" the Cold War. At this point in history, it seems moot to carry on this discussion. What is beyond doubt, however, is the fact that the collapse of the Soviet Union has changed how states, peoples, and individuals relate to one another. The world is growing closer together economically, politically, socially, and culturally. National and global interests increasingly merge. With this change comes a change in the purpose of the military. Armed forces no longer only fight and win wars, but also fulfill a host of emerging roles, from humanitarian assistance to building, maintaining, and, when necessary, enforcing peace. Operations other than war are increasingly becoming routine functions. In light of these changes, I returned to the question of the military's purpose that I had become interested in over a decade ago. Writing this book afforded me an opportunity to reexamine this interest. The following eight chapters explore the extent to which military socialization affects the identity, values, and attitudes of future officers in light of the many new roles and functions. With this book, I hope to bolster discussion about the purpose of the U.S. military in the twenty-first century and about how to prepare the force most effectively to succeed in its future missions. I am grateful to many people without whose help I would never have started this project, let alone completed it. This manuscript reflects many suggestions, reactions, and critiques, and the moral and intellectual support I received from friends, mentors, colleagues, military professionals, and interested audiences who attended my presentations at various informal seminars and academic conferences. Generous financial support for this enterprise was provided by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Bonn, Germany, who, in granting me dissertation scholarships for two consecutive years, enabled me to concentrate fully on this research. A post-doctoral research assistantship with National Security Studies at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University afforded me the opportunity to conduct additional research and complete a first draft. Many individuals at the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point contributed their time, resources, and efforts to the success of this project. I am especially indebted to Lieutenant Colonel Clemson Turregano, who was my initial contact at USMA. He not only sought out interested military and civilian officials at the academy and initiated meetings with them, but also accommodated me in his home on a number of research visits to West Point. I am most grateful to Lieutenant General Howard D. Graves, former Superintendent of USMA, for granting generous access to cadets,

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and to Colonel Patrick Toffler, former Director of Policy, Planning, and Analysis at USMA, for his guidance, coordination, and supervision of the research effort and his thorough and thoughtful comments on this manuscript. My thanks also to the staff of USMA's Institutional Research Branch, especially to Lieutenant Colonel Tom Hinrichsen, Major David Fralen, and Dr. William P. Burke, who prepared and staffed several memoranda to obtain approval for this research and who reviewed a seemingly endless flow of data printouts, chapter drafts, conference papers, and article manuscripts. Finally, crucial to the success of this project was the support and guidance of Colonel Michael Anderson, Commandant of the USMA Preparatory School, Ft. Monmouth, New Jersey, who served as the institutional sponsor for this research. He graciously assisted me in wording the survey instruments and patiently reviewed and critiqued my writing from the initial stages on. His input especially shaped Chapters 4 and 5. Writing a book, just like working on any other research project, flourishes in an encouraging environment. I was fortunate to conceptualize this study, design the survey instruments, analyze the data, and write and revise this manuscript in the supportive setting of the Maxwell School. The study—and my own personal growth—benefited greatly from the understanding, the insightful criticism, and the constant reassurances from many faculty members and fellow graduate students. I am particularly indebted to Kristi Andersen, who lent her expertise to the research design and reviewed multiple drafts of the survey instruments, manuscript chapters, and conference papers; and Richard Braungart, who provided invaluable assistance in the wording of the questions and the construction of the scales. Perhaps more important, I could always turn to Dick for encouragement and reassurance whenever progress seemed to stall. If there is such a role, Dick functioned as the "cheerleader" for this project. Sean O'Keefe contributed many substantive insights to this study from his professional experiences in the Department of Defense and as former Secretary of the Navy. His input significantly increased the general import and practical appeal of this project. In addition, as Director of National Security Studies, Sean provided me with the intellectual guidance and the financial resources to write this book. Since the beginning of my graduate studies at Syracuse University, Lily H. M. Ling has been a continuous intellectual inspiration. Without her thoughtful, passionate, and oftentimes challenging critique, this study and my own intellectual development would be lacking in many ways. Lily's departure leaves the Maxwell School with a void that will be hard to fill.

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Nobody at Maxwell contributed more to the success of this study than my advisor Gavan Duffy. He was available to guide this project at any time and shared with me the many ups and downs I encountered while working on it. In one of the first courses I took at Maxwell as a new graduate student, Gavan sparked my interest in social identity theory and political cognition and laid the groundwork for the theoretical frame of this project. I am deeply grateful for his patient guidance through my initial struggle with conceptualizing the study, for his insightful comments that encouraged me to make changes to strengthen the argument, and for his overall support of my research. Although at times Gavan's feedback left me in agony and sent me back to the conceptual drawing board, without his continued interest, persistence, criticism, and support, this study would be lacking in many ways. Apart from being an exceptional academic advisor and professional mentor, I have learned to appreciate Gavan's good sense of humor and respect him as a personal friend. The best support is often provided by friends who can relate to one's situation. The dissertation part of this study benefited greatly from my ability to discuss ideas and share frustrations with many of my fellow graduate students. I am thankful for the attentiveness and the many ideas provided by Hannah Britton, Neal Carter, Karl Leib, Becky Rouse, and Catherine Smith. I must also thank David Balfoort and Neal Carter for their assistance in labeling and stuffing 1,233 envelopes with surveys, for unstuffing some 800 returned surveys three weeks later, and for helping me with the tedious data verification. Paul Bern repeatedly volunteered his methodological and statistical expertise to help me find the most appropriate quantitative techniques for analyzing the data. Adam Blank, Carrie Brush, and Philip Peterson assisted me in coding the survey responses. Most important, I am infinitely indebted to my wife, Dena Owens, whose loving support was a source of consistent inspiration and encouragement throughout the arduous research and writing stages. While working on this project, Dena contributed invaluably to maintaining my sanity. She joyfully celebrated small successes with me, listened sympathetically to my frustrations, and sensitively critiqued many of the ideas that informed this manuscript. Finally, I am grateful to my families, both in Germany and in the United States, for enduring me and encouraging this project and my decision to pursue an academic career. I know it was not always easy to understand "why that boy is still in school." I express my gratitude to all these persons for their interest, assistance, guidance, and support. None is responsible for my analysis, interpretations, and argument.

1 Global Security after the Cold War Until now, the world we've known has been a world divided, a world of barbed wire and concrete block, conflict and cold war. And now we can see a new world coming into view. A world which is a very real prospect of a new world order. . . . A world where the United Nations, freed from the cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. President George Bush (quoted in Gregg 1993, 135-36) The dramatic events comprising the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, as well as longer-term economic, demographic, environmental, and technological developments, have profoundly altered the international security environment. The security challenges of a largely bipolar world have been replaced with more ambiguous and, in some cases, equally dangerous problems. John Shalikashvili (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1995) "In t h e s t a i r w a y outside my office at t h e Pentagon," Secretary of Defense William P e r r y concluded his c o m m e n c e m e n t r e m a r k s at t h e 1996 U n i t e d S t a t e s Military Academy (USMA) g r a d u a t i o n , "hangs a favorite p a i n t i n g of mine. In t h e p a i n t i n g a young servicem a n is p r a y i n g with his family j u s t prior to his d e p a r t u r e on a foreign deployment. U n d e r t h e p a i n t i n g is t h e p a s s a g e from I s a i a h in which t h e Lord asks, 'Whom shall I send? And who will go for us?'

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And Isaiah responds, 'Here am I. Send me.' At this critical point in our history, your nation asks, 'Whom shall I send? Who will go for us?' And you have answered, 'Here am I. Send me.'" The young men and women who graduate from West Point or any other source of commission today can expect a military career more diverse and challenging than previous generations of Academy graduates could ever have imagined. The fall of the Berlin Wall has altered the operational assumptions that characterized U.S. national security for nearly half a century. At the brink of the twenty-first century, the United States is left without a clear enemy against whom to devise national security policies and military strategies. The bipolarity of the Cold War era, characterized by sharp political, economic, social, and ideological divisions, has given way to a multipolar "new world order," defined by accelerating interdependencies and increasing diversity. Over the past decade we have witnessed a growing desire for global cooperation and mutual advancement (White House 1998; Waters 1995; Gregg 1993; Rosenau 1996, 1994, 1992). The Gulf War and multinational peace-building efforts in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia have demonstrated that many nations share a common interest in thwarting deviants threatening peaceful coexistence within the global community. Consequently, the new strategic environment partially manifests the growing influence of regional and global institutions and the repeated use of military power in peace-building efforts. Today, U.S. forces are increasingly called upon to prepare for "peace missions" in defense of vital national interests. Thus, they engage in an ever more complex array of Operations Other Than War (OOTW), almost always in concert with other nations. Over the past decade, the United States has deployed troops to more than thirty problem areas around the globe to conduct just about as many different missions. Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. involvement in peace operations has surged by 300 percent. In 1996 alone, U.S. forces were engaged in Bosnia, Macedonia, Palestine, the Sinai, Kuwait, northern Iraq, Turkey, Haiti, the Western Sahara, and the Taiwan Straits. Operations spanned the spectrum from disaster relief and peacekeeping (PK) to deadly combat (see Center for Strategic and International Studies 1997). The unique nature of many of these missions calls into question what it has traditionally meant to be a soldier and may require adjustments not only in military doctrine, but also in the military's combat-oriented warrior identity. Developing military doctrine to reflect new tasks is essential to the effective conduct of military missions. However, doctrine must be supported by those who implement it in the field. Several studies have shown that positive atti-

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tudes toward nonconventional missions render individual soldiers and units more effective in peace operations (Segal and Tiggle 1997; Segal and Segal 1993; Meeker and Segal 1987; Moskos 1976). By delivering his message at West Point, Secretary Perry underscored the critical role of military socialization and professional military education in preparing future officers to meet the military's increasingly complex challenges. This study shares the secretary's concern for the importance of preparing the nation's future leaders most effectively to build peace, maintain security, and defend national interests. In the following chapters I attempt to conceptualize military identity based on a concurrent commitment to combat and noncombat roles. Moreover, I will assess the extent to which those individuals who will lead U.S. forces in the twenty-first century are prepared cognitively to shift among mission requirements. To this end, I examine the effects of military socialization at the United States Military Academy at West Point on cadets' identities and value orientations based on a model of military identity that merges adherence to combat and noncombat values. Social scientists commonly assume identity to be a fixed personality trait that allows them to ascribe certain value orientations, attitudes, or behaviors to individuals by assigning them to social groups. These approaches, however, often oversimplify the complexity of individuals' life experiences and ignore the uniqueness of their self-conceptions. In contrast, by extending social identity theory (Turner et al. 1987; Tajfel 1978), I conceive identity as a complex, contextual, and dynamic process of self-categorization and social comparison and develop a model of identity based on the assumption that attitudes, values, and behaviors reflect individuals' self-evaluations in terms of social groups. In employing the norms, rules, values, or stereotypes of relevant reference groups, individuals make sense of their experiences and form attitudes toward social reality. By analyzing the identity, values, and attitudes of future military leaders, we can estimate their commitment to the military's dual-mission purpose and their cognitive preparation for combat and noncombat assignments. The underlying assumption is that positive attitudes foster a strong commitment to each role, enhance morale and effectiveness, and help to ensure mission accomplishment. Herein lies the task of subsequent chapters. In the remainder of this chapter, I outline some of the challenges that characterize the new strategic environment, conceptualize post-Cold War military identity, and illustrate effects of the changing security needs on military socialization and professional military education at West Point.

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THE NEW STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

With the end of the Cold War, the world is becoming more interdependent economically, politically, socially, and culturally. Multinational corporations, international organizations, ethnic and religious groups, and even political parties increasingly contest the dominant role of nation-states in shaping global relations (Joffe 1997; Metz 1994; Burk 1994; Rosenau 1994, 1992). The free movement of ideas, people, and goods, processes often embraced by the term globalization, is bringing the world closer together. At the same time, serious global problems demand shared global solutions. Continued proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, growing fear of terrorist attacks, widespread distribution of illegal drugs, far-reaching violations of human rights, global warming and ozone depletion, and the spread of infectious diseases illustrate the reduced ability of states to solve problems on a purely national basis (see Waters 1995; Binnendijk and Clawson 1994; Robertson 1992). These developments challenge notions of state sovereignty and undermine traditional military power. National security in the postCold War era increasingly reflects economic rather than military concerns. Thanks to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing peace among major powers, employment and prosperity have replaced the containment of communism as the dominating factors in shaping U.S. domestic and foreign policies. Beginning in the early 1990s, defense expenditures were reduced, producing opportunity for reallocation and redistribution of the "peace dividend" (see Arnold 1994; Dandeker 1994). Yet, ironically, at the same time, the U.S. military was increasingly called upon to fulfill a growing array of nonconventional roles (Diehl 1993; Huntington 1993). Although noncombat missions were not new to the U.S. military, what was new was their number, scope, pace, and complexity (Doyle, Lewis, and Williams 1996; Segal 1995; Stiehm 1995). Peace operations are not always peaceful. In fact, many missions required officers and soldiers to shift focus and adjust between peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, deterrence, and conflict. For instance, by early 1993, some 25,000 U.S. soldiers had been deployed to Somalia, under a U.N. mandate, to help end starvation caused by internecine clan war. However, instead of simply securing food and medical care, soldiers were caught in the middle of a civil war and had to adjust to a much more hostile environment than they had initially expected. Perhaps confused about their role and the definition of the mission, some soldiers compensated by creating a new cognitive frame of reference. Some

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employed a "warrior strategy," generalizing the behavior of local rioters to all Somalis (e.g., stereotyping them as lazy and uncivilized) and regarding the entire population as potential enemies. Others relied on a "humanitarian strategy," making conscious efforts to refrain from using negative stereotypes and to understand the behavior of the Somali people (see Winslow 1997; Miller and Moskos 1995; Arnold and Stahl 1993). By contrast, Operations Just Cause (Panama in 1989) and Uphold Democracy (Haiti in 19941995) had been designed initially for the use of massive force in a war theater, but changed into peacekeeping/humanitarian assistance missions virtually overnight (Kidder 1995; Collins 1992). To accommodate new roles, Dandeker (1994) proposed substituting conventional armed forces with a constabulary "force in being," permanently mobilized for peacekeeping and other noncombat missions. He envisioned the force in being to pursue viable international relations in place of military victory (see Segal 1995; Janowitz I960). 1 The notion of a force in being implies separating the armed forces into two distinct branches, one to serve traditional combat functions, the other to fulfill noncombat roles. 2 However, shrinking defense budgets and force reductions make force separation an unfeasible option (Segal 1995; Huntington 1993; Sullivan 1993; Meeker and Segal 1987). Instead, it is more likely that, should recent trends continue, existing military units will deploy to both combat and noncombat missions. If U.S. forces continue to be charged with multiple missions, leadership training should foster officers' commitment to those missions. Some traditionalists within the defense establishment continue to believe that combat ought to remain the primary purpose of the military. Others maintain that a force equipped and trained for combat can be equally prepared to prevail in noncombat missions (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1997; Department of the Army 1994, 1993; Sullivan 1993; Huntington 1993). However, as the Somalia mission has illustrated, it is not an easy task to be well prepared for all types of contingencies. Neither is it easy to adjust rapidly from one mode to the other (Sarkesian, Williams, and Bryant 1995; Segal and Segal 1993; Meeker and Segal 1987). Almost four decades ago, Janowitz (1960) warned that professional soldiers would resist peacekeeping, because they were likely to view these policelike activities as less prestigious and less honorable than traditional combat tasks. Confirming this warning, recent studies have indicated that mobilizing military personnel for noncombat missions is considerably more difficult than mobilizing them for war. Peace operations normally lack a "focal enemy" (Burk 1994; Moynihan 1993), oftentimes do not present a clear,

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direct threat to vital national interests (Stevenson 1996; Arnold 1994; Bloom 1990), and soldiers deployed to peacekeeping commonly perceive their assignments as boring and unsatisfying (Segal and Waldman 1994). Furthermore, seeking viable international relations at the cost of decisive outcomes renders mobilization even more difficult, because it is generally easier to engage individuals in "winner-take-all" conflicts than in conflicts that rely on less-welldefined cooperative settlements (Bornstein 1992; Duffy 1993).3 In addition, rapid technological developments and growing information availability and demands have produced a public that is increasingly reluctant to support military missions that pursue ambiguous objectives, put American lives at risk, and have no clearly defined end-state (Dunlap 1996; Moskos and Burk 1994; Diehl 1993; Kull and Ramsay 1993).4 Today, individuals cannot be mobilized as easily as in the past on behalf of goals they do not comprehend and means they oppose (Sarkesian, Williams, and Bryant 1995; Arnold 1994; Rosenau 1994, 1992; Bloom 1990). Many observers have argued that social developments such as the termination of the draft and a growing focus on educational benefits as enlistment incentives have brought the civilian and military worlds closer together and have relaxed the traditional core of military identity. Some have even warned that this occupationalization of the force could undermine military professionalism and weaken warfighting skills (Moskos and Burk 1994; Moskos and Wood 1988; Faris 1988; Moskos 1977). Recent research findings point to cognitive tensions that may arise from concurrent commitments to military and civilian identities. For instance, soldiers found themselves frequently caught between the demands of their families and those of the military (Segal 1986; Stanton 1976), often identified with their counterparts in comparable civilian occupations (Wood 1988), and had become increasingly concerned with the quality of work life and job satisfaction (Segal 1989). Devilbiss and Perrucci (1982) discovered that some soldiers had difficulty fulfilling role obligations in situations that required reliance on multiple nonmilitary roles, but not in situations requiring reliance on multiple military roles. Because the military competes increasingly with other social groups for individuals' loyalty, ensuring institutional commitment has become considerably more difficult. By exploring the dynamic nature of identity, we may gain insights on how to foster the commitment of military leaders for complex roles and rapidly changing assignments. Individuals derive their self-conceptions from a multitude of identities which they must each distinguish in terms of their importance to the construction of the self as a whole. The most important identities form a core that shapes values and attitudes and informs

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conduct in a given situation (Oakes, Haslam, and Turner 1994; Brewer 1991; Turner et al. 1987). The more clearly defined the social context, the more easily individuals can invoke specific identities to guide decisions. Given the increasingly complex security context of post-Cold War missions, invoking a combat-oriented warrior identity might get in the way of effectively fulfilling noncombat roles. At the same time, preparing soldiers for peace operations might weaken discipline and undermine their combat readiness (Hackworth 1995; Segal and Segal 1993; Moskos and Wood 1988; Meeker and Segal 1987). Mission shifts and the emerging dual-mission purpose demand that soldiers are prepared and committed to fight in a massive war, but also to build, keep, or enforce the peace, distribute food, assist in nation building, and mediate conflict on the ground. The new security challenges call for a military identity that merges combat with noncombat values and prepares military professionals cognitively to invoke those subidentities that most effectively inform decisions in a given situation. The discussion points to the cardinal question for the U.S. military in the twenty-first century: Will established, combat-oriented forces deployed in noncombat operations lose their combat mission capabilities? If U.S. forces continue to be charged with multiple missions, its leaders should be committed to those missions and prepared technically and cognitively to shift focus and adjust between warfighting and peacekeeping as missions change. MILITARY IDENTITY AFTER THE COLD WAR

Military professionals, Samuel Huntington (1957) observed during the Cold War, differ from members of other professions in that they are specialists in the "management of violence" (see also Laswell 1941). Huntington explained, "The function of a military force is successful armed combat. The duties of the military officer include: (1) the organizing, equipping, and training of this force; (2) the planning of its activities; and (3) the direction of its operation in and out of combat" (p. 11). Consistent with Huntington, Janowitz (1960) characterized the Cold War "warrior" to be committed to the political status quo, to believe in the inevitability of violence in international relations, and to lack concern with the social and political consequences of warfare (see Chapter 3). Changing global security needs, a widening array of missions, and shifting operational requirements have profoundly challenged this traditional conception of the combat-oriented warrior identity. Over the past decade, the world has seen a surge of combat and noncombat operations joining military units together from all over the world. These trends indicate an increasing overlap of national

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and global interests (Doyle, Lewis, and Williams 1996; Segal 1995; Stiehm 1995). Military leaders must understand and appreciate the complex new challenges and support crosscultural political, economic, and military cooperation. The new strategic environment calls for a reconceptualization of military identity merging the traditional warrior spirit with a commitment to military involvement in peace operations and support for global institutions (Waters 1995; Baker 1994; Metz 1994). Some observers have argued that the military should adjust its traditional combat-oriented professional ethos to reflect the increasingly complex task environment (Sarkesian, Williams, and Bryant 1995; Kingseed 1992; Bacevich 1990). A professional ethos shaped exclusively by the warrior spirit prepares officers only partially for the cognitive demands of future missions. While values like patriotism, discipline, loyalty, integrity, courage, and warriorism have traditionally ensured officers' commitment to combat missions (Faris 1995; Bloom 1990; Bahnsen and Cone 1990), peace operations require military professionals to also value the following: • Constabularism, committing them to remain impartial to the conflict, to use force with restraint, and to seek viable international relations instead of military victories. • Tolerance, enabling them to recognize and respect unique cultural identities and to build trust and mutual respect within joint multinational forces. • Military involvement in peace operations, recognizing noncombat operations as viable military missions and enhancing their commitment to the military's dual-mission purpose. • Global institutions, strengthening their support for U.N. leadership in global crises, for involvement of military contingents from other nations in joint operations, and for cooperation with nonmilitary actors engaged in conflict settlement and/or humanitarian relief efforts. THE MILITARY IDENTITY OF WEST POINT CADETS

In the following chapters, I examine more closely the extent to which professional military education shapes the identity, values, and attitudes of U.S. military leaders for the complex security challenges of the post-Cold War era. The specific emphasis of this study is on West Point, since academy graduates are likely to lead the U.S. Army and to shape U.S. national security policy in the twentyfirst century. This research focuses on West Point for several reasons. First, the military academy is the only source of commission that provides a federally controlled baccalaureate education along with other

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precommissioning requirements, including the development of ethics and values. Proportionately more West Point graduates become field-grade officers and assume high-ranking leadership positions within the Army than officers from other sources (Center for Strategic and International Studies 1997; Hahn 1997).5 Second, as future military leaders, cadets train and supervise other cadets and are role models for their underclass peers (McCloy and Clover 1988; Faris 1976). As such, they serve as "social carriers" for military ethics and values (Mannheim 1971; Janowitz 1960; Huntington 1957). Third, this is a study of the U.S. Army. Among the armed forces, the Army typically conducts the most diverse range of operations and Army soldiers will be the ones charged with OOTW on the ground (Department of the Army 1994, 1993). As a land force, the Army has the most direct contact with other military forces and civilian populations from other nations regardless of whether a mission involves ground warfare or humanitarian assistance. Consequently, shifting between warfighting and peacekeeping roles becomes particularly important for Army officers. Fourth, this is a study of military socialization, professional military education, and military identity. Naturally, exposure to military socialization and indoctrination is longest and most comprehensive for officers (McCloy and Clover 1988), and many officers perceive military service as a lifetime commitment (Wood 1988; Gal 1985). Given selfselection and institutional recruitment, many cadets already embrace traditional military values upon entering the academy (Hammill, Segal, and Segal 1995; DeFleur and Warner 1987). In light of these reasons, USMA provides an opportunity to study the professional socialization of future Army leaders in a highly structured field setting. By attempting to assess cadets' attitudes toward the complex global security needs and to evaluate the effects of socialization at USMA on their identity and value orientations, this study seeks to answer the following questions: • To what extent do cadets perceive peacekeeping and other noncombat roles to be legitimate functions for warriors? • How important are conservatism, patriotism, and warriorism in shaping the identity of future military leaders? • What is the commitment of these future officers to peace operations? • How does support for global institutions influence cadets' professional self-conception? • To what extent does military socialization at West Point shape cadets' social (in particular their military and national) identities and, in turn, how do these identities affect their value orientations?

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By examining the association between identity and value orientations, we can assess cadets' commitment to varying missions and their cognitive preparation for different assignments. In addition, studying socialization at USMA extends the applicability of social identity theory from an experimental laboratory environment to a genuine social field setting. One of the main contributions of this study is the examination of the dynamics among identity, values, and attitudes for these future military leaders. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

In Chapter 2, I develop the theoretical framework for the study of identity. While varying models of social identity have been employed to study a wide range of social phenomena such as stereotyping, political activism, collective self-esteem, and conflict analysis and resolution, the fundamental premises of many of these studies have been either tested in normatively inconsequential ways or have been accepted at face value, absent empirical verification. In Chapter 2,1 illustrate that identity is more complex than commonly presumed. Based on self-categorization and social comparison, I evaluate the usefulness of common linear conceptions of identity and of social identity approaches for understanding and predicting social behavior and develop a dynamic model which assumes that identity, values, attitudes, and behaviors are mutually interdependent. The model accounts for the salience and the potency of particular subidentities in a given context and provides the conceptual frame for analyzing military identity in the subsequent chapters. In Chapter 3, I suggest a conception of military identity that merges combat and noncombat values based on the dynamic model of identity developed in Chapter 2.1 begin this chapter with a brief description of the nature and the different types of OOTW, elucidate the unique normative constraints that govern these operations, and examine potential cognitive tensions for officers conducting these missions. In the second part, I summarize the debate over the military's future purpose and discuss the extent to which military professionals require specific cognitive preparation for OOTW. Importantly, I contend that combat and noncombat values are not mutually exclusive, but rather that a professional military ethos that emphasizes noncombat values in addition to (not in place of) traditional military values can enhance morale and improve performance in increasingly complex missions. In the final part of the analysis, I explore the effectiveness of various cognitive strategies for resolving identity dilemmas in the context of peace operations. In Chapter 4, I sketch military socialization at West Point and examine the extent to which USMA's four-year experience as coor-

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dinated by the Cadet Leader Development System (CLDS) prepares cadets for their future roles as military leaders. In particular, I examine USMA's academic curriculum, military education and training, and honor code and ethics instruction. This description of life at West Point provides readers with a better understanding of and appreciation for the attitudes, perceptions, and value orientations of these future officers. Based on the assumption that the Army's effectiveness to face increasingly complex challenges can best be ensured by leaders committed to the military's dual-mission purpose, Chapter 5 assesses cadets' attitudes toward shifting military roles. The chapter summarizes the results of a survey administered in October 1995, measuring cadets' adherence to conservatism, patriotism, and warriorism, and their attitudes toward peacekeeping operations and global institutions. In the first part, I compare cadets' responses across class years based on the assumption that differences in value orientations can be attributed to length of exposure to military socialization. However, since observed attitudinal changes may not exclusively be the result of military socialization, I also examine a range of alternative factors that may have affected cadets' values and attitudes. In Chapter 6,1 analyze the extent to which the West Point experience shapes cadets' identities. Based on the dynamic identity model developed in Chapter 2, I assess the impact of military socialization at USMA on cadets' identities and their commitment to different missions by (1) conceptualizing social identity through analysis of group affiliations that are meaningful cognitively and emotionally to cadets, (2) exploring the effects of military socialization on the potency of their military and national identities, and (3) examining the extent to which these identities in turn influence value orientations. In Chapter 7,1 compare cadets' value orientations and attitudes to those of senior military officers and of their generational peers attending a private civilian university. With this analysis I further isolate the socializing influence of professional military education at West Point. More specifically, the cadet-officer comparison provides the basis for recommendations regarding the extent to which military socialization and education should emphasize preparation for OOTW or whether training for noncombat tasks is conducted more effectively on the job. The cadet-student comparison provides a baseline for assessing the effects of socialization on political attitudes across educational settings and for exploring the extent to which cadets are representative of their generational cohort. The final chapter summarizes the research results, discusses implications for military socialization and professional military

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education, a n d assesses t h e theoretical import of t h e empirical findings for t h e study of social identity. In addition, I provide a n u m b e r of recommendations t h a t may assist USMA or any of the other service academies in s h a p i n g its c u r r i c u l u m to educate a n d g r a d u a t e t h e most effective military leaders for t h e twenty-first century. These r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s m a y also help to s t r u c t u r e professional military education at all levels for t h e military's dual-mission purpose. NOTES 1. According to Janowitz (1960), "The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture" (p. 418). For further detail, see Chapter 3. 2. Consistent with this argument, Moskos and Burk (1994) predicted the emergence of two different types of post-Cold War military professionals: (1) soldier-scholars, resembling the majority of Cold War career officers; and (2) soldier-statesmen, capable of handling the media and proficient in diplomatic (and other noncombat) skills. 3. In a series of game-theoretic experiments, Bornstein (1992) found evidence that framing a conflict as a "winner takes all" matter rather than a compromise that requires political concessions was more effective in inducing intragroup cooperation, because the contribution of each member appeared pivotal to the overall group success. 4. Moskos and Burk (1994) found fundamental changes in public attitudes toward the military over time. From the nineteenth through the first half of the twentieth century, public support was closely linked with patriotism and nationalism and, therefore, was quite high. Throughout the twentieth century, the Army never saw its mission or purpose independent of the country's. In fact, it has been described as "the most loyal servant and progeny of this nation, of its institutions and people" (Builder 1989, p. 20). However, if recent trends hold and U.S. forces continue to be charged with peace operations, justifying the military's purpose solely in terms of fighting and winning the nation's wars will become increasingly difficult. 5. A recent USMA report noted that between 1989 and 1994 officers who had graduated from West Point had been selected proportionately more often for promotions, command assignments, and Command and Staff College and Senior Service College duties than officers who had received their precommissioning education and training elsewhere. Furthermore, proportionately more West Point graduates held advanced professional and academic degrees than non-West Point graduates (United States Military Academy, Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis 1994b).

2 Resolving Identity Tensions As you face the challenges of being a warrior, a statesman, a technological innovator, a manager, a coalition builder and a leader, you must never forget that you are more than an Army officer, more than the sum of your service. You are also private citizens, mentors of a community, a family, an extension of your friends and loved ones. Secretary of Defense William Perry (1996) If attitudes that have become central constituents of the self are to be changed, the person's very sense of identity must be challenged. M. Brewster Smith (1973, 72) After t e n h o u r s of i n t e n s e fighting, t h e u n i t h a d finally t a k e n t h e town. S e r g e a n t H u g g e n s w a s supervising his platoon as t h e y set u p their defensive positions when his squad leader told him t h a t a prisoner h a d indicated t h a t about fifteen more enemy troops were holed up in the three farmhouses 200 yards to the front of the roadblock. The squad leader added t h a t t h e t h r e e families who lived in those farmhouses, including a dozen children, were still in t h e m . W h e n S e r g e a n t H u g g e n s explained t h e s i t u a t i o n to his c o m p a n y comm a n d e r , t h e l i e u t e n a n t was very clear: "The batallion's p l a n calls for this town to be swept clear of all e n e m y forces, a n d those farmh o u s e s a r e p a r t of t h e town." T h e l i e u t e n a n t let t h e s e r g e a n t know

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that a battery of 105-mm artillery was available to assist him in prying the enemy out of those buildings. "It's 1500 now, Sergeant. Take your platoon and clear those farmhouses by nightfall." 1 Cadets at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point routinely encounter scenarios like this as part of their field training to learn about making ethical decisions in combat. Unfortunately, situations like these are not merely hypothetical exercises, as the case of Col. Geva, an Israeli armored-brigade commander during the war in Lebanon, illustrates: Geva's brigade had been the spearhead of the Israeli forces during their advance toward Beirut. . . . Some 10 days after the initial movement into Lebanon it became clear that a significant portion of the PLO had retreated back to Beirut, taking up positions in preselected sites throughout the densely populated Moslem sectors. The IDF was now confronted . . . with the possibility . . . of being forced to attack the capital city of an Arab nation. The Israelis' aim was not to lay siege to the entire city, with its hundreds of thousands of Lebanese civilians, but solely to destroy the PLO infrastructure located within the environs. Geva's brigade was tasked with the mission of being the first brigade to enter Beirut should the order be given. One of the youngest full colonels in recent times in the [Israeli Defense Forces], Geva was known as a decisive officer, with General Staff potential. He found himself in a painful quandary—between his military commitment to carry out his assigned mission, and his moral commitment to object to a mission he believed to be illegitimate. . . . His moral reservations finally outweighed his military obligation. Colonel Geva requested to be relieved from this particular assignment. (Gal 1985, 558) What should Sergeant Huggens do? Why did Col. Geva choose a course of action that jeopardized his promising military career? There are no easy answers to these dilemmas, no generalizable solutions for quandaries that strike the core of one's sense of self. Although we may not find ourselves often in situations when our decisions impact life or death, we nevertheless experience cognitive uncertainties regularly, some of which might severely challenge our self-conceptions. Of course, given the same situational stimuli, not everybody would respond the same way, because everybody's self-conception is a unique reflection of his or her values, attitudes, interests, experiences, desires, and hopes. As a consequence, some people favor social welfare, abortion rights, the death penalty, compulsory military service, tax breaks, affirmative action, or stricter environmental regulations, while others might oppose some or all of these policies. What motivates people to vote, sign petitions, demonstrate, or riot? What makes them fight for their country or for some other "greater good"? Why do they like or

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dislike others they don't know personally and on what grounds do they base those likes and dislikes? Social scientists commonly attempt to explain phenomena like these by linking them to the identity of individuals, claiming that values, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors are influenced by specific group memberships. The underlying assumption is that when a particular group identity becomes salient, individuals tend to reference the norms and stereotypes associated with the group and base perceptions and decisions on those group attributes. Unfortunately, many of these explanations oversimplify the complexity of individuals' life experiences and ignore the uniqueness of their selfconceptions. In this and subsequent chapters, I contend that in any given context individuals derive their self-conceptions from a "network of central life interests" which include identities, beliefs, values, and attitudes. Understanding the dynamic association between these central life interests and knowing which of them are most important to the individual's self-conception will help us explain and predict how he or she might behave or resolve cognitive inconsistencies in a given situation. I begin this chapter by conceptualizing social identity and the network of central life interests and provide a brief history of cognitive social psychology as a backdrop for aligning attitudes, beliefs, values, and identities. Next, I distinguish linear, basic, and advanced conceptions of social identity, evaluate their usefulness for understanding and predicting social behavior, and examine the merits of each conception for resolving identity tensions. Based on this analysis, I develop a dynamic model of identity, which assumes that identity, values, attitudes, and behaviors mutually influence one another. The model extends social identity theory by considering contextual variations in the salience and the potency of particular identities and by accounting for cognitive, emotional, and behavioral motives that shape individuals' self-conceptions. The model renders a conceptual frame for recognizing sources of identity tensions and for developing resolution strategies. SOCIAL IDENTITY AND THE NETWORK OF CENTRAL LIFE INTERESTS

Identifying with others who share common attributes is an important part of deriving one's sense of self. Social identity, Tajfel (1981) suggested, is "that part of individuals' self concept which derives from knowledge of their membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (p. 255). Of course, individuals draw on mul-

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tiple, sometimes even competing subidentities to derive their selfconceptions. More important subidentities form a core that influences most decisions, whereas peripheral subidentities may affect decision making only in certain circumstances (Dubin 1992; Brewer 1991; Hofman 1988; Hogg and Abrams 1988; Allport 1979). More than half a century ago, Lecky (1945) suggested that because an individual's self-conception is "his only guarantee of security, its preservation becomes a goal in itself. He seeks the type of experience that confirms and supports the unified attitude and rejects experiences which seem to promise a disturbance of his attitude" (p. 123). Consequently, people work deliberately to create and sustain stable self-conceptions and tend to be most invested in beliefs and attitudes that confirm those self-conceptions (see Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Taylor 1982). In a series of experiments, Swann and Ely (1984) discovered that subjects' responses were significantly influenced by tendencies to verify their self-views and to confirm their expectations of others. In subsequent research, Swann (1987) found that when people entered interactions with independent and sometimes conflicting agendas, they tended to resolve cognitive inconsistencies through a process of identity negotiation. If successful, a contextual "working consensus" emerges that enables individuals to assume an identity for the duration of the interaction that is consistent with their self-conceptions and that allows them to pursue the goals that motivated the interaction in the first place. Identity negotiation not only shapes social interactions but also provides a tool for resolving cognitive inconsistencies that may arise when conflicting subidentities become potent. People tend to avoid behaving in ways that clash with an identity or value that is central to their self-conception. Furthermore, they will seek confirmation first for those identities and values that are most central to the core of their self-conception. Dubin (1992) described those identities, values, beliefs, and attitudes that shape individuals' selfconceptions as "central life interests," that is, "the set of activities about which each of us says: T h a t is who I am,' and then invests all energies in realizing that T" (p. 3). Consistent with Swann and Ely's (1984) empirical evidence, Dubin suggested that individuals can fulfill the demands of conflicting social or institutional role obligations because, as long as these activities and the cognitive and emotional responses they provoke are not central to the self, contradicting demands will not usually lead to crises of conscience. However, when core values or central identities are threatened, as in the introductory examples, decisions will affect and may have lasting consequences for individuals' self-conceptions.

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Problems may arise in situations when the stability of an individual's self-conception is threatened. In instances that invoke two or more dissonant central life interests, individuals may simultaneously approach and avoid certain behaviors. For example, "The self-identification 'soldier' may include self-descriptions as loyal, tough, aggressive, dedicated, selfless, and willing to kill on others' behalf, while the self-identification 'Christian' may include loyal, strong, gentle, dedicated, selfless, and unwilling to kill at all. This is possible because people do not subjectively experience the selfconcept in its entirety but rather as relatively discrete self-images which are dependent on 'context.' Different times, places, and circumstances render different self-identifications 'salient' self-images" (Hogg and Abrams 1988, 24-25). Situations that invoke conflicting life interests may disrupt the stable self-conception. Rokeach (1968) found that changes in the importance of specific values could lead to systematic changes in individuals' overall value system. For instance, raising the importance of equality and freedom increased the importance of other social values (e.g., world peace and national security), while lowering the importance of personal values (e.g., a comfortable life, salvation, economic well-being). These findings suggest that deriving and sustaining stable self-conceptions require individuals to negotiate continually among central life interests. It is useful to conceptualize the different central life interests. Attitudes

Eagly and Chaiken (1993) defined attitude comprehensively as the psychological response to the cognitive, affective, or behavioral evaluation of particular attitude objects that "express approval or disapproval, favor or disfavor, liking or disliking, approach or avoidance, attraction or aversion, or similar reactions" (p. 3). Attitude objects can be concrete (e.g., a political candidate, a car, an ice cream flavor) or abstract (e.g., political ideologies, film genres, social groups). Cognitive evaluations stem from thoughts or beliefs about the attitude objects, while affective responses consist of feelings, moods, emotions, or nervous system activity that people experience in relation to attitude objects. Behavioral evaluations may contain either overt actions or intentions to act in support or opposition of the attitude object. Attitudes may be learned cognitively when people gain information about the attitude object and form favorable or disfavor able beliefs about it as a result of direct or indirect experience. An attitude object (e.g., praise or punishment) may also elicit affective

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responses (e.g., joy or pain) that might influence attitudes and condition future behavior. Finally, attitudes may derive directly from past behaviors—previous behaviors that resulted in favorable outcomes tend to strengthen the positive attitudes toward this behavior and may encourage the individual to repeat the behavior in a similar context. Values Values can be described as evaluations of relatively abstract goals that inform individuals' life worlds (e.g., liberty, equality, salvation). Rokeach (1968) defined a value as "an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally and socially preferable to alternative modes of conduct or end-states of existence. Once a value is internalized it becomes, consciously or unconsciously, a standard or criterion for guiding action, for developing and maintaining attitudes toward relevant objects and situations, for justifying one's own and others' actions and attitudes, for morally judging self and others, and for comparing self with others" (p. 160). Values provide abstract frames of reference for perceiving and organizing experience and for choosing among courses of action (see Robinson, Shaver, and Wrightsman 1991; Scott 1965). Unlike attitudes, values are imperative to action, "not only the belief about the preferable but also a preference for the preferable" (Rokeach 1968, 160). Rokeach distinguished between instrumental and terminal values. An instrumental value is voiced, for instance, in a single belief that a particular mode of conduct (e.g., honesty, courage, integrity) is "personally and socially preferable in all situations with regard to all objects." By contrast, a terminal value is the belief that a certain end-state of existence (e.g., salvation, world peace, equality, freedom) is personally and socially worth striving for. Quite frequently, individuals face situations in which they cannot behave in a manner congruent with all salient values. Value conflicts may occur among instrumental values (e.g., whether to behave compassionately or rationally in a given situation), among terminal values (e.g., whether to choose self-fulfillment or prestige, salvation or the comfortable life), or between instrumental and terminal values (e.g., whether to act in the passion of the moment, although that might jeopardize one's chances of salvation). Beliefs Beliefs can be described as "inferences made by an observer about underlying states of expectancy" (Rokeach 1968, 2). Beliefs, like

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a t t i t u d e s or values, cannot be observed directly b u t m u s t be inferred from w h a t t h e believer says or does. Individuals hold differe n t beliefs t h a t a r e o r g a n i z e d in a belief s y s t e m ; t h a t is, "a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which t h e elements a r e bound together by some form of constraint or functional i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e " (Converse, 1964, 207). T h u s , knowing t h a t a n individual holds a specific a t t i t u d e or value, it is possible to predict t h a t he or she holds further a t t i t u d e s or values. For instance, if a person opposes violence in any form, he or she probably also opposes fighting in a war, increases in defense expenditures, capital p u n i s h m e n t , a n d so forth. Identity W h e t h e r a p a r t i c u l a r identity (male, Jewish, G e r m a n , soldier, etc.) is invoked in a given situation depends on how salient or accessible t h a t identity is in t h e context. S t r y k e r (1968) conjectured t h a t t h e various subidentities exist in a hierarchy of salience t h a t becomes consequential in situations when attitude objects invoke evaluations based on concurrently different subidentities. In these situations, Stryker argued, invoking one subidentity over others is a function not only of its salience, b u t also of t h e level of c o m m i t m e n t to t h a t identity. More specifically, he hypothesized t h e following: • "The greater the commitment premised on an identity, i.e., the more extensive and/or intensive the network of relationships into which one enters by virtue of a given identity, the higher will be that identity in the salience hierarchy" (p. 561). • The greater the identity commitment, the more the individual will perceive the identity as instrumental to his or her "wants." • The more a person is committed to a particular identity, "the higher the probability of role performance consistent with the role expectations attached to that identity" (p. 563). • The higher an identity in the salience hierarchy, the greater the probability that a person will seek out opportunities to perform consistent with that identity. • The more the perceived consequences of a projected identity change are in the direction of reinforcing valued commitments, the less the resistance to that change. E x t e n d i n g Stryker's (1968) conception of identity, Hofman (1988) a r g u e d t h a t a person's various subidentities form specific links between t h e self a n d his or h e r m e m b e r s h i p in social groups. Hofman specified salience as t h e probability by which a s u b i d e n t i t y is re-

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membered and activated in a given context. Prolonged salience upgrades the subidentity in the "prominence hierarchy," thereby enhancing its "centrality" among subidentities (or among other life interests) and the degree to which it interconnects with other subidentities. The more central a subidentity is to an individual's selfconception and the more interconnected it is with other subidentities, the more committed the individual will be to preserving and enhancing that identity. "Valence" signifies the subidentity's attractiveness (although a subidentity might be central, it need not have a positive connotation for the individual). Centrality, commitment, and valence together influence the "potency" of a given subidentity; that is, how meaningful normatively that subidentity is and, consequently, how great its potential is for shaping attitudes, values, and social behaviors. For instance, for soldiers who view their service to the nation as a "calling" (high institutional identification), traditional values such as loyalty, self-sacrifice, heroism, morality, discipline, manhood, duty, honor, and the like will inform their self-conceptions and subsequently may influence their decisions and behavior during and beyond operational assignments. By contrast, soldiers who view military service as "just another job" (high occupational identification) tend to identify with others who do the same sort of work (e.g., engineer, mechanic, physician, accountant). Although traditional military norms and values are still salient for these soldiers, their military identity will be less potent and will have considerably weaker normative import because the identity image of "soldier" is not the dominant central life interest. These examples illustrate the importance of both salience of and commitment to social identities. While salience activates a particular group membership, it may not influence decisions and behaviors. In contrast, the stronger an individuals' commitment to a group and the more central the values derived from the group identity are to his or her selfconception, the greater the probability that he or she will act consistent with that identity. In the following section, I outline briefly the history of cognitive social psychology and discuss its significance for studying military identity after the Cold War. Based on this outline, I distinguish three conceptions of identity and evaluate the merits of each for understanding and resolving cognitive inconsistencies. COGNITIVE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: A BRIEF HISTORY

Studying the relationship between individuals and groups has been a central concern of social psychology since the turn of the

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century. Are groups merely aggregates of individuals in which the normal processes of interpersonal behavior operate just for a larger number of people, or do groups interact in ways that are qualitatively different? Based on observations of crowd and mob behavior, LeBon (1947) concluded that in crowds the conscious individual personality was lost and replaced by a "collective mind." Similarly, Freud (1921) believed that people behave differently in groups, because instinctual (for him sexual-emotional) impulses surface either as a result of identification with the group leader (the "egoideal") or identification between group members based on their perception of the similarity of their ego-ideals. Rejecting LeBon's instinctual portrayal of primitive crowds and ignoring Freud's assumptions about the deep motives of human behavior, McDougall (1920) introduced the concept of a "group mind" and suggested that, if organized, a group could develop traits similar to those of individuals, namely self-consciousness, rationality, purposive action, and the capacity to reason. He argued that continued and structured intergroup relations could promote a sense of identity and, in so doing, increase group performance (see also Allett 1996). In contrast, behavioralists like Floyd Allport (1924) applied experimental stimulus-response models to social psychology and suggested that what appeared as distinctive group behavior was simply the individual reacting to specific social stimuli presented in a given situation. For Allport, there was no distinctive group psychology, but rather only "socially facilitated" individual behavior that was merely aggregated in the crowd. While these early theories reduced the study of social groups to analyses of interactions between individuals, by the mid 1930s cognitive psychologists began to devise contextual explanations for behavior based on psychological meaning and cognitive perceptions rather than instinctual urges or blind conditioning. Through social interaction, they argued, group members create collective products such as norms, rules, values, and so on which they internalize and subsequently employ to guide their decisions. The idea of conceptualizing social identity as the combination of interindividual interactions and cognitive group identifications subsequently influenced a wide variety of research programs such as symbolic interactionism, reference group theory, and social identity theory. Symbolic Interactionism

Symbolic interactionism rests on the assumption that individuals base their behaviors on cognitive meanings they derive from

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social interactions. In turn, these meanings are employed in and modified through each individual's interpretative understanding of the experiences (or objects) in the context in which he or she encounters them. Through social interaction, individuals create collective products such as roles, norms, rules, values, stereotypes, and so on which they internalize and which, in turn, affect their self-conceptions (see Blumer 1969; Mead 1934). Symbolic interactionism has been used to explain the social construction of the self. Symbolic interactionists view the self as a contextual definition created through interaction with others. Consequently, they contend, people attempt to see themselves in part as others see them (see Rist 1978; Goffman 1968, 1959). Reference Group Theory

Consistent with symbolic interactionism, Sherif and colleagues (1988) and Sherif and Sherif (1969) maintained that perception, evaluation, and judgment were contingent upon standards or contexts against which one compares experiences. These "frames of reference" (or "stable anchors")—for example, social norms, tradition, custom, mores, taboos, folkways, fashion, or moral values— become part of each individual's identity and shape his or her self-conception. Sherif demonstrated in a number of empirical studies that norms were indeed socially constructed and that they provided psychologically internalized frames of reference. In their famous "Robbers' Cave" experiments, Sherif and associates (1988) studied the interactions of eleven- and twelve-year-old boys attending summer camp. The boys, unaware of their participation in the experiment, were assigned to two separate groups and engaged in various independent group activities (e.g., cooking, camping, boating). Each group decided on a distinct group name and quickly developed its own responsibilities, rules, codes, and hierarchies. Next, the two groups were placed in a number of competitive, tournament-like games. As the researchers had expected, the boys showed very strong ingroup favoritism, to the extent that they put down members of the other group and, by the end of the tournament, refused even to speak with outgroup members. 2 Finally, after efforts to repair the strained relations between the two groups had failed, the experimenters presented a third, competing group that appeared as a common threat to members of both original groups. This strategy allowed the boys to save face and, subsequently, enabled cooperation between the groups. Despite its initial success, the researchers deemed the "thirdgroup solution" undesirable, because instead of resolving intergroup

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conflict it had merely widened the conflict to a larger scale. To salvage this situation, Sherif and colleagues (1988) introduced superordinate goals and hypothesized that requirements that could only be met through cooperation would reduce conflict. Although specific superordinate goals did not immediately eradicate intergroup hostilities, the cumulative effect of participating in a series of cooperative interactions helped gradually resolve animosities. 3 Sherif's findings have significant implications for military socialization after the Cold War. The disintegration of the concrete enemy (i.e., the outgroup) combined with increasing military involvement in new missions have changed the "frames of reference" that shape military identity (see Chapter 1). Continued participation in multinational peace operations has undermined the "warrior anchor" and requires military leaders to adjust and internalize new standards, contexts, and values. New categories inhabit the post-Cold War task environment. Examining the cognitive processes and categories pertinent to social comparisons provides a conceptual base for understanding and shaping military identity after the Cold War. Categorization Most generally, categories simplify social perception by forming conceptual clusters, assimilating new experiences to these clusters, and identifying related objects. In his research on the nature of prejudice, Gordon Allport (1979) found that people tended to compare new experiences with familiar categories. For the most part, individuals and objects associated with ingroup categories were liked, while those associated with outgroup categories were commonly disliked and often rejected outright. Allport concluded that the salience of categories was subject to changing contexts and acknowledged that "for certain purposes an individual may affirm one category of membership, for other purposes a slightly larger category. It depends on his need for self-enhancement" (p. 35). Whereas Allport and Sherif had studied primarily the content of specific ingroup-outgroup categorizations, other researchers became increasingly interested in the more general structures and processes of categorization. For instance, Rosch (1978) and Rosch and Mervis (1975) found that members of the same category varied in their typicality (e.g., robins were perceived as more typical of the category "bird" than were ostriches). Consequently, they argued that category membership did not require the presence of a complete, necessary set of attributes, but rather only a certain level of similarity to or a few common elements with a prototype (i.e., the

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clearest case or best example of the category). They suggested that those attributes most distributed among members of a category and least distributed among members of contrasting categories were the most valid cues to membership in a particular category ("family resemblance").4 These findings on prototypicality and family resemblance apply not only to tangible objects, but also to abstract categories such as roles, norms, and values. For example, professional socialization entails the learning of categories that best describe the ideal member of a profession.5 Military officers, for instance, are socialized to "fight and win the nation's wars," inspired to value "duty, honor, country," and expected to serve as role models (or leaders) within their professional environment (see Center for Strategic and International Studies 1997; Hahn 1997; United States Military Academy 1995a; Dymek 1994; Janowitz 1960; Huntington 1957). Apart from prototypicality, some observers have suggested that the frequency and salience of particular attributes also affect cognitive processing. Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982) found that event A was judged more probable than event B whenever A appeared more "representative" than B. Also, whenever some aspect of the environment was made disproportionately salient or available to the perceiver, that aspect was given more weight in causal attribution. Like Gordon Allport, Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky warned that, given their easy availability, stereotypes could not only simplify reality but also skew the cognitive retrieval process and, consequently, yield unrepresentative frames of reference. Likewise, Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991) discovered that, unable or unwilling to master political ideology, individuals often make choices in terms of prepackaged emotional attributions (e.g., in the form of stereotypes). The authors found that processing evidence according to prior beliefs tended to bolster the initial beliefs and increased individuals' willingness to sustain them even in light of disconfirming evidence. 6 They concluded that stereotypes offered condensed, highly simplified and easily learned versions of political ideology that often (mis)guided people in their positions toward public policies. Similarly, Bennett (1981) found that many variables that affect cognition might lead to distorted, rigid, or restricted perceptions and attitudes: "First, the stronger the value deprivation, personality conflict, or emotional arousal, the greater the distortion of perceptual information will be. Second, the more ambiguous the perceptual task, the more emotional mediation will become involved in it. Finally, if strong emotional dispositions come together with an ambiguous task, perception will be overwhelmingly affected by the emotional projection of the receiver" (p. 118).

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These findings are important for structuring military socialization and professional military education and for devising strategies to resolve identity tensions. Officers' cognitive dispositions may affect how they perceive professional roles, mission assignments, military strategy, or international affairs. Thus, invoking certain cognitive cues may influence their perception of a given situation (e.g., military threat) and induce a particular response (e.g., employment of force). Peace operations could possibly create conditions that challenge soldiers' identities as warriors and may conflict with their traditional self-conceptions as military professionals. Resolving identity tensions and cognitive dilemmas that arise from the operational context becomes critical to ensure accomplishment of the mission objectives. In Chapter 4,1 examine more closely the cognitive frames provided during military socialization at West Point. Generally, the cognitive strategies individuals select to make sense of and resolve identity tensions will depend on the frame of reference that becomes salient in a given situation. The more novel, ambiguous, and uncertain a situation, the more difficult it is to rely on established frames of reference. Especially during peace operations, invoking the combat-oriented warrior identity may lead soldiers to devise and use suboptimal strategies for resolving cognitive inconsistencies. In Chapter 3,1 assess the usefulness of various resolution strategies in the context of peace operations. In the next section, I distinguish three conceptions of social identity and evaluate the merits of each for understanding and resolving cognitive inconsistencies. CONCEPTIONS OF IDENTITY Linear Conceptions of Identity

Many survey or experimental studies conceptualize identity as a fixed personality trait and ascribe specific attitudes, value orientations, or behaviors to individuals who share a common group membership. For instance, some observers have explained attitudinal differences—for example, conservatism, militarism, racism, prejudice, tolerance—in terms of subjects' gender (D'Agostino 1995; Ekehammar and Sidanius 1982), nationality (Sidanius et al. 1987; Adorno et al. 1950), level of formal education (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Converse 1964; Stouffer 1955), socioeconomic status (Sidanius and Liu 1992; Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1982), or ethnic or racial background (Wellman 1993; Sidanius, Devereux, and Pratto 1992; Allport 1979). Others have analyzed the extent to which ideological beliefs and normative values influence attitudes. A number of

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studies found that "conservatives," for instance, tend to value individual freedom, free-market capitalism, and stronger national defense policies, while "liberals" favor public programs, collective benefits, and centralized social responsibility (Miller 1994; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Ray 1983). Similarly, Greeley (1974) discovered that religious beliefs influenced opinions concerning the morality of abortion, capital punishment, or military service. Common to many of these studies is a conception of identity that simply connects observed behaviors, attitudes, or values to an ascribed identity (see Figure 2.1). These linear conceptions of identity regularly fail to consider that to affect other central life interests and inform decisions, social groups (or identities) must both be salient and normatively meaningful to individuals (see Stryker 1968). Knowing individuals' backgrounds (ethnic, religious, or class) is often sufficient for attributing attitudinal differences to these ascribed group affiliations. However, studies based on the linear conception of identity typically neglect to assess the extent to which particular identities (ethnic, religious, or class) are potent parts of respondents' central life interests and indeed influence the observed attitude, value, or behavior. Social Identity Approaches

Unlike linear conceptions of identity, social identity approaches are grounded in cognitive social psychology and consider the salience of social identities. In contrast to linear conceptions, social identity approaches presume attitudinal and behavioral choices to be influenced by the dynamic relation between group identification and group norms and values (see Oakes, Haslam, and Turner 1994; Sidanius 1993; Duffy 1993; Alba 1990; Braungart and Braungart 1989; Sherif et al. 1988; Turner et al. 1987; Tajfel 1978). Examining the effects of social categorization and social comparison on intergroup relations, Tajfel (1978), Turner et al. (1987), and Turner (1978) found that individuals commonly evaluate themselves and others in terms of social groups and internalize categories and category values such as nationality, ethnicity, gender, class, religion, or political ideology. Consequently, when a particular group identity becomes salient, individuals tend to reference the norms and stereotypes associated with the group and perceive them as part of their self-conceptions. Braungart and Braungart (1989) noted that reference groups "serve as anchors for values, attitudes, and behavior, and the more ego-involved the individual with a particular reference group, the stronger the group influence on the individual's perceptions, attitudes and behavior" (p. 187).7 In adopt-

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Figure 2.1 Conceptions of Identity

ing the group identity, individuals focus on similarities with rather than differences from other members of the group. However, the process of identification does not constitute the loss of individual identity or the suppression of the self. Rather, identification reflects the change from the personal to the social level of identity, "a change in the nature and content of the self-concept corresponding to the functioning of the self-perception at a more inclusive level of abstraction" (Turner et al. 1987, 51). Tajfel (1978) distinguished three sufficient, although not necessary, conditions that influence the potency of a group identity: "a

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cognitive component, in the sense of the knowledge that one belongs to a group; an evaluative one, in the sense that the notion of the group and/or of one's membership of it may have a positive or a negative value connotation; and an emotional component in the sense that the cognitive and evaluative aspects of the group and one's membership of it may be accompanied by emotions (such as love or hatred, like or dislike) directed towards one's own group and towards others which stand in certain relations to it" (pp. 2 8 29; emphases added). For the purpose of this research, I distinguish between basic and advanced models of social identity. The Basic Social Identity Model

In a series of "minimal group" experiments, Tajfel and Turner and colleagues (Turner et al. 1987; Tajfel 1981, 1978) discovered that even artificially created, trivial group labels significantly affected individuals' perceptions of one another. 8 For these experiments, participants were asked to indicate their preference between two alternative stimuli (in one set of experiments paintings by two different artists; in another, ink blots). Next, subjects were assigned to one of two groups based on their preferences, informed about their group membership, and asked to award points or money to other individuals who were identified only by their respective group memberships. Most subjects consistently favored anonymous members of their own "group" at the expense of outgroup members. Since the experiments were designed so that group formation did not reflect but cause attraction, subjects liked or disliked others not as individuals but merely based on their ascribed group membership. These findings suggest that when group membership becomes salient individuals tend to perceive others in terms of their respective group identities r a t h e r t h a n in terms of interindividual relationships. Consequently, group membership can be said to influence the attributions of values, attitudes, and behavior associated with both ingroups and outgroups. Figure 2.1 presents this basic social identity model. Social Dominance Theory

Consistent with the Tajfel results, Sidanius and colleagues found that individuals created social categories and positive social identities primarily by comparing ingroups with outgroups along those dimensions most likely to generate a favorable outcome for the ingroup(s) (Levin and Sidanius 1999; Sidanius et al. 1997; Sidanius,

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Devereux, and Pratto 1992). At the individual level, the authors labeled this predisposition "social dominance orientation" (SDO); that is, "the degree to which a person desires to establish and maintain the superiority of his or her own group over other groups" (Sidanius and Liu 1992, 686). This predisposition, in combination with various cultural factors, leads to the establishment of a hierarchical system that consists of at least two "castes": a hegemonic group at the top of the social system and a negative reference group at the bottom. 9 Caste hierarchy is preserved through attitudes, values, beliefs, and ideologies ("legitimizing myths") that justify the groups' position in the social system. 10 National Identification Theory

Consistent with the basic social identity frame, Bloom (1990) developed a psychological identification theory to explain why individuals give loyalty to and, in the most extreme case, are even willing to die for their country. He found the "dynamic to make adaptive identifications" was one of the central motivating factors in the construction of national identity: "In order to achieve psychological security, every individual possesses an inherent drive to internalize—to identify with—the behaviour, mores and attitudes of significant figures in her/his social environment; i.e. people actively seek identity. Moreover, every human being has an inherent drive to enhance and protect the identifications he or she has made; i.e. people actively seek to enhance and protect identity" (p. 23; emphases added). Given the same environmental circumstances, Bloom (1990) argued, people tend to make the same identifications and, consequently, act together as a group to protect and enhance their shared identity. Following Erikson's (1968, 1963) research on identity formation, Bloom suggested that ideologies provide identity-securing interpretative systems for individuals to make sense of reality. 11 Consequently, Bloom conjectured that governments, to assure public support for foreign policy decisions, tend to activate a "national identity dynamic"; that is, "the psychological dynamic by which a mass national public may be mobilised in relation to its international environment" (p. 79).12 Despite their usefulness for examining desires for social domination and for linking mass psychological processes to the study of international relations, applying social dominance theory or identification theory to the post-Cold War strategic environment is only of limited use. While the Soviet Union presented a clear military,

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political, and ideological threat to American national identity during the Cold War, constructing a common national (ingroup) identity against an apparent (outgroup) threat has become more difficult since the collapse of the former enemy. Besides, mobilizing public support for and ensuring force morale in peace operations could prove increasingly difficult if and when there is a lack of clearly defined mission objectives (see Moskos and Burk 1994; Moskos 1993; Duffy 1993; see also Chapter 1) In addition, Bloom's (1990) identity dynamic can only explain the behavior of individuals who already identify with the group (the nation), but does not account for reasons that may influence an individual's initial decision to join the group. Bloom simply assumed a linear causal relationship between mass mobilization, national identity dynamic, individual choice, and collective action. Consequently, his theory does not consider why individuals join groups in times when their identity is not threatened. Why, for instance, join the military in peacetime? It also fails to account for the fact that strength of identification with or commitment to the group (i.e., potency of the group identity) might differently affect individuals' perceptions of threats to the group. Basic models of social identity have demonstrated successfully that individuals' judgments and choices are influenced by their affiliations with particular groups. However, they commonly fail to account for the impact of the specific ideological or normative makeup of particular identities on individual behavior and social outcomes. Minimal group experiments demonstrated that individuals' judgments and choices were influenced by their affiliations with particular groups, but attractiveness and interaction among subjects were not necessary preconditions for group formation. On the contrary, the mere imposition of a shared, trivial group membership was sufficient to generate attraction between subjects. By making normatively meaningless groups salient and asking participants to identify with them, the controlled minimal group environment ignores the complexity and uniqueness of human experience. Although the results might generalize to cognitive inconsistencies among life interests of differing centrality or to conflicts where individuals identify strongly with one of the conflicting groups, minimal group experiments cannot predict behavior in situations in which individuals identify with both (or more) discrete self-images (e.g., the soldier who is also a Christian or the German dissident during World War II who opposed the Nazi regime yet fought for his nation in the war). 13 It is precisely in these situations that negotiating among central life interests becomes important and the potency of a specific identity will influence behavioral choices.

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The Advanced Social Identity Model

By showing that even the most trivial group affiliations can influence decisions and behaviors, the minimal group experiments suggest that identification with normatively meaningful social reference groups would magnify the observed effects of group identity on influencing individual choices. Subsequently, Turner and colleagues (1987) advanced the basic social identity model to account for specific ideological and contextual influences on behavior through a process of self-categorization that they conceptualized in three stages: (1) individuals define themselves as members of social groups; (2) they learn the stereotypical norms of those groups; and (3) under conditions where a particular ingroup category becomes salient, they tend to employ the ingroup attributes to decide on the appropriate conduct in the given context. The three stages are interdependent; that is, the individual, as a group member, also shapes group norms and, subsequently, contributes to a dynamic conception of the group identity. At the same time, behavior (e.g., participation in combat training exercises) that is consistent with a particular social identity (e.g., combat soldier) may affirm that identity, while behavior inconsistent with the identity (e.g., fulfilling peacekeeping duties) may impair the commitment to that identity (the effects of behavior on identity is illustrated by the feedback loop shown in Figure 2.1). Optimal Distinctiveness Theory

Based on these assumptions, Brewer (1991) developed a theory of optimal distinctiveness and argued that "social identity derives from a fundamental tension between human need for validation and similarity to others (on the one hand) and a countervailing need for uniqueness and individuation (on the other)" (p. 477). Brewer viewed social identity as a compromise between assimilation with and differentiation from others, "where the need for deindividuation is satisfied within in-groups, while the need for distinctiveness is met through inter-group comparisons." This way, she conjectured, group identities enable individuals to be "the same and different at the same time." Of course, the degrees of assimilation and differentiation vary depending on the salience of particular life interests in a given context. For instance, Winslow (1997) found that, although Canadian soldiers in Somalia shared the same national identity, the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) developed a distinct and inclusive regimental combat identity. Soldiers who were not able to meld into

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the Airborne group identity were excluded. Many CAR members reported pressure to become and remain part of the group. One CAR member observed, "The maroon beret is a very big deal. When you get to the Airborne, it's like brain washing, because after that, you spit on the green berets. You're maroon" (quoted in Winslow 1997, 105). In addition to their identity as CAR warriors, each of the three Airborne commandos had a distinct commando identity that became potent in situations when the outgroup was one of the other CAR commandos. A CAR member explained, "1 Commando was flavored by its French Canadian culture and linguistic specificity. It seemed to specialize in winning sports competitions. 2 Commando members portrayed themselves as the rebels, cowboys, wild ones—'the hardest meanest fighting section,' while 3 Commando seemed to maintain an attitude of quiet professionalism" (quoted in Winslow 1997, 143). Although both Turner and colleagues (1987) and Brewer (1991) considered the importance of multiple identities and varying contexts for behavioral choices, they assumed identity to unidirectionally influence attitudes and behaviors, yet neglected the significance of the dynamic interdependence among the various central life interests. What is needed is a model of social identity that (1) tests the validity of its assumptions within genuine social field settings, (2) focuses research on identifications that are normatively meaningful to subjects, (3) assesses the salience and potency of multiple (and often competing) identities in various social contexts, and (4) examines the interdependent association between identity, values, and attitudes (i.e., conceptualizes identity both as a dependent and an independent variable). The Dynamic Model of Identity

Figure 2.2 depicts identity as part of the dynamic network of central life interests. The underlying assumption is that identity (as represented by ingroup [I u , Ii2, . . . , I J and outgroup subidentities [Iol, Io2, . . . , Iok]), terminal (Vtl, Vt2, . . . , Vtk) and instrumental values (Vu, Vi2, . . . , Vik), attitudes (A1? A2, . . . , Ak), and behaviors (B1? B2, . . . , Bk) are interdependent. They simultaneously shape and are shaped by the individual's self-conception. The dynamic identity model considers the salience and centrality of values and attitudes and takes into account the potency of multiple identity images. In any given context individuals tend to invoke central life interests that reinforce their existing self-conception. The various subidentities, values, attitudes, and past behaviors inform individual preferences in that context, depending on how potent (as

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Figure 2.2 The Dynamic Model of Identity and the Network of Central Life Interests

Key. I. = Ingroup Identity; Io = Outgroup Identity; Vt = Terminal Values; V = Instrumental Values; A = Attitudes; B = Behaviors; Centrality indicated by distance from core. Potency indicated by differing size.

indicated by the size) and central (as indicated by the distance from the core) each is to the individual's self-conception. Valence is indicated by the sign preceding the central life interest (a negative sign indicates a negative connotation; no sign indicates that the identity invokes a positive connotation). Let's take the example of peacekeepers during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia to illustrate the model. Identity images as a Christian (1^), warrior (L2), and peacekeeper (Ii3) may have been central and potent to soldiers' self-conceptions. Thus, these subidentities were salient under most circumstances and were typically evalu-

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ated positively. Probable outgroups in this context might have been Muslim (Iol), war clan (Io2), enemy soldiers (Io3), or perceived Somali looters (Io4). As trained warriors, soldiers may perform exceptionally well during combat or peace enforcement operations (since neither central life interest is challenged in this context). As missions shift to peacekeeping or peacebuilding, however, the new identity image of peacekeeper may conflict with their core warrior identity. The dynamic model of identity can be further illustrated using Britt's (1998) analysis of psychological ambiguities in peacekeeping operations. Britt developed a model to explain individual responsibility in diverse settings. He conceptualized responsibility as a transaction between a specific event (context) that has occurred or is anticipated (e.g., exam, mission, battle, training exercise), the prescriptions or rules (norms) that govern the event (e.g., ethical codes, group norms, rules of engagement), and the identity images the individual invokes to make sense of the event or prescriptions (e.g., warrior, humanitarian, peacekeeper, Christian, parent). Events that allow soldiers to recall previous training experiences, rely on clear mission objectives and unambiguous rules of engagement, and invoke uncontested identity images will render operational decisions fairly straightforward (e.g., invoking the warrior identity image during combat). Of course, whether soldiers experience identity tensions is not only a function of their group identifications. Their social identities are interconnected with their other central life interests, the potency of which is directly influenced by the unique alignment of identities, values, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors. Predicting how individuals will act in a situation when central life interests clash requires understanding the mosaic of cognitive, affective, and behavioral motives that shape their self-conception. In Chapter 3, I extend the network of central life interests to the realm of professional military education and suggest ways in which the dynamic identity model could serve to understand, diminish, and potentially help resolve cognitive inconsistencies. CONCLUSION

How do people act under conditions that challenge the core of who they are? How do they resolve moral dilemmas or identity tensions that jeopardize their self-conceptions? In situations in which individuals experience cognitive inconsistencies, their decisions are informed by and in turn affect their entire network of central life interests. Why might one soldier refuse an order to kill? Why might another soldier

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use excessive force during a peacekeeping mission? We cannot explain these behaviors merely by attributing them to a conflict between the soldier's professional and religious identities—after all, there are many Christian soldiers who do not experience cognitive inconsistencies that threaten their self-conception. The answer in each case will depend on how the individual experiences the situation and which central life interests become potent in that context. Rapidly changing strategic assignments, mission objectives, operational partners, and norms governing the interaction context increasingly challenge soldiers' stable self-conceptions. As a result, it becomes increasingly critical for soldiers to organize their experiences and to negotiate among central life interests. With increasing exposure to new roles, their self-conceptions will more and more reflect those roles. An integrated military identity as "peace manager"— at once prepared to keep and to enforce the peace—will become more potent. To the extent that soldiers adopt this identity, their actions will become more predictable and more congruent with differing mission requirements. At the same time, they will be less likely to experience cognitive inconsistencies that challenge their self-conceptions and pose dilemmas that might undermine their effectiveness in accomplishing their missions (see Swann 1987; Swann and Ely 1984). Social comparison in terms of group affiliations allows individuals to assess their social identities and condition their subsequent behaviors in terms of similarities and differences between ingroups and outgroups. An ingroup will preserve its positive social identity function as long as it manages to sustain a positively valenced distinctiveness from other groups (Sidanius 1993; Brewer 1991; Turner 1978). During intergroup conflicts, outgroup stereotyping becomes a tool for enhancing group identity and for ensuring ingroup solidarity (Bloom 1990). But stereotyping can also raise unrealistic expectations and promote competition and conflicts that are often difficult to end (see Duffy 1993). In fact, Lilli and Rehm (1988) found evidence that learned classifications are difficult to reverse. In a number of experiments, they showed that many subjects who were exposed to trivial judgment conditions during their training phase employed the learned responses in the experimental phase, even when conditions were reversed. Lilli and Rehm concluded that, "once-learned, a categorical division of stimuli cannot easily be abandoned and replaced by another solution, even if more adequate" (p. 33). These findings suggest that military professionals might maintain learned categories (e.g., enemy stereotypes) and apply them inappropriately within new situations (e.g., peacekeeping). At the same time, perceptions guided by traditional military value orien-

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tations might be difficult to unlearn. Given that fighting and winning the nation's wars will most likely remain the military's primary objective (see Chapters 1 and 3), it is unclear that unlearning would even be desirable. Nevertheless, absent a concrete enemy, "othering" may increase as a means of identity enhancement, especially when technologically advanced Western military units are deployed side by side with less-advanced non-Western units (see Moskos 1976). In addition, pronounced cultural differences together with less clearly defined, nonconventional mission assignments might enhance the potency of soldiers' nonmilitary identities (e.g., religious or ethnic) and, consequently, undermine morale and obstruct mission accomplishment. For instance, a committed Muslim or Christian infantryman assigned to peacekeeping in Bosnia might invoke his religious identity as a cognitive frame to guide situational decisions for enforcing the peace between Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. Similarly, to the extent that military missions involve units from gender-integrated Western forces and from, for example, traditional single-gender Islamic forces, gender may become a potent category that could weaken morale and undermine force efficacy. Oakes, Haslam, and Turner (1994) analyzed self-categorization in terms of the "selective activation" of social categories and concluded that "social category accessibility will be affected by a wide range of social and contextual factors including the beliefs, norms and values of relevant reference groups" (pp. 116-17). This is consistent with Brewer's (1991) model of differentiation and assimilation. While optimal distinctiveness might in some situations trigger intergroup conflict, in others it might help to resolve potential identity tensions (e.g., between "soldier" and "Christian"; see Hogg and Abrams 1988). Although individuals may identify with different social groups in one context, they may share the same identity in another (e.g., the peacekeeper allied in a joint operation with soldiers from former enemy states). Recognizing shared bases of identification will allow them to accentuate similarities rather than differences (see Brewer 1991; Turner et al. 1987). Focusing on a common identity, a shared purpose, or similar role commitments may permit members of conflicting groups to emphasize common experiences and comparable life interests. This discussion suggests that officers' effectiveness in adjusting to changing task requirements and in resolving cognitive inconsistencies depends to a large extent on the social categories they associate with reference groups that become salient in a specific operational context. In addition, the analysis indicates that these frames of reference are socially constructed, that is, they are learned

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t h r o u g h social interaction. The dynamic model of identity developed h e r e indicates t h a t m i l i t a r y socialization a n d professional military education can shape t h e identity, values, a t t i t u d e s , a n d behaviors of soldiers a n d officers so t h e y can l e a r n to invoke identities t h a t allow t h e m to use cognitive strategies to resolve identity tensions in a given situation most effectively. NOTES 1. This scenario was taken from the West Point Cadet Field Training Honor Instruction Program (United States Military Academy 1994a, 23). 2. Turner et al. (1987) reported that the final stage of the 1953 experiment had to be terminated because of the extreme degree of intergroup antipathy that had developed between the two groups. 3. Sherif et al. (1988) explained that "the end result was obtained through introduction of a series of superordinate goals, which had compelling appeal value for both groups, but which could not be achieved by the efforts and the resources of one group alone" (p. 211). Examples for these superordinate goals included instances where the two groups needed to pool their information to determine the origin of a breakdown in the water supply or where both groups had to join together to pull a food truck that would not start. 4. The notion of family resemblance as a structural principle for learning and information processing was first suggested by Wittgenstein (1953), who argued that the referents of a word need not have common elements in order for the word to be understood and used in functioning language. Wittgenstein conceived of a family resemblance relationship if items (i.e., words) have at least one, and probably several, elements in common, and if no or only few elements are common to all items. 5. Lovell (1964) defined professional socialization as "the process by which members of a profession learn the values, attitudes, and behavior appropriate to their roles within the profession" (p. 154). 6. Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991) found that individuals could take distinct political positions notwithstanding how little they knew about underlying abstract concepts. Consequently, the authors suggested that people commonly learn social concepts based on judgments of similarity. 7. Turner and colleagues (1987) characterized a reference group as a group "that is psychologically significant for its members, to which they relate themselves subjectively for social comparison and the acquisition of norms and values . . . that they privately accept membership in, and which influences their attitudes and behaviour. In the usual terminology it is a (positive) reference group and not merely a membership group as defined by outsiders, i.e., it is not simply a group which one is objectively in, but one which is subjectively important in determining one's actions" (pp. 12). Similarly, Sherif and Sherif (1969) defined reference groups as "those groups to which the individual relates himself as a member or aspires to relate himself psychologically" (p. 41).

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8. Tajfel (1978) referred to the social categories to which subjects were assigned as "minimal groups" because the experiments were designed so that (1) the intergroup categorization itself was ad hoc and based on very trivial criteria, (2) there was no previous social interaction among subjects, (3) complete anonymity of group membership was preserved, and (4) there was no rational or instrumental link between the subject's self-interest and/or the criteria for group classification and a strategy of responding in terms of ingroup favoritism. 9. For Sidanius, Pratto, and Govender (1989), "caste" refers to an endogamous social group that exists in a relatively stable hierarchical relationship with other endogamous social groups (e.g., ethnic groups, social classes, or religious sects). 10. Legitimizing myths are not restricted to one ideological end of the political spectrum. Examples for right-wing myths include the divine right of kings and theories of European racial superiority (e.g., National Socialism); more centrist/liberal hierarchical beliefs encompass beliefs in meritocracy or the Protestant work ethic; left-wing myths are presented, for instance, in Lenin's doctrine of "the dictatorship of the proletariat." For further details, see Sidanius, Pratto, and Govender (1989). 11. Erikson (1968) conceptualized identity formation as an ongoing process, extending over a person's entire lifespan. He found evidence that the inability to resolve an identity crisis could lead to a personality breakdown, which could manifest itself anywhere from anxieties to acutely paranoid or depressive disorders. Erikson argued that "in identity diffusion,... a split of self-images is suggested, a loss of center and a dispersion" (p. 212). Subsequent empirical studies have confirmed Erikson's findings (see Marcia et al. 1993). 12. Bloom (1990) examined McCarthyism in the United States as an example for how a substantial portion of the American public was mobilized behind a witch-hunt for communists which spilled over into other issues of U.S. foreign policy. Subsequently, all enemies of the United States were defined as "Soviet inspired communists." All enemies of the Soviet Union and of communism, on the other hand, were described as "friends and allies of the United States in the struggle to preserve freedom and democracy." Similarly, to mobilize the national identity dynamic during the Falklands conflict, the Argentinean military junta portrayed Britain, a long-time historical and economic ally, as an "imperialist enemy who was holding on to the islands that were part of Argentina's sovereign territory" (see also Waisbord 1991). 13. In a classic study of cohesion and disintegration in the German Wehrmacht during World War II, Shils and Janowitz (1948) found that the unity and fighting spirit of the German Army was sustained only to a very slight extent by National Socialist political convictions of the soldiers, but was strongly reinforced by their attachment to their military reference group.

3 Military Identity: Old Ammo in New Weapons? The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards. Sir William Francis Butler (quoted in Bahnsen and Cone 1990, 28) Those who can win a war well can rarely make a good peace, and those who could make a good peace would never have won the war. Winston S. Churchill (quoted in Baker 1994, 13) Global security after the Cold War requires flexible and versatile strategies and demands a military identity merging combat with noncombat values. If U.S. forces continue to be charged with a dualmission purpose, morale and mission performance can best be ensured by officers strongly committed to the military's traditional combat roles and also to the increasingly complex array of emerging noncombat functions. The new security challenges call on military professionals to switch between applying coercive violence and employing restricted force; between "fighting and winning the nation's wars" and building, keeping, and enforcing peace and security in the global community. There is a broad consensus within the American defense community that deterring and fighting wars must remain the military's cardinal challenge, but that a force

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equipped and trained for combat can equally prevail if assigned noncombat missions (Department of the Army 1994, 1993; Huntington 1993; Sullivan 1993). However, soldiers solely trained for combat might not be properly prepared for conducting peace operations (Britt 1998; Franke 1997b; Sarkesian, Williams, and Bryant 1995; Miller 1997; Segal and Segal 1993; Meeker and Segal 1987). To address the increasingly complex dual-mission purpose, I propose a conception of military identity that merges combat and noncombat values based on the dynamic identity model developed in Chapter 2. In the first part of this chapter, I describe the nature and the different types of OOTW, elucidate the unique normative constraints that govern these operations, and examine potential cognitive tensions that might arise from the conduct of these missions. In the second part, I summarize the debate over the military's future purpose and discuss the extent to which military professionals require specific cognitive preparation for peace missions. Next, I conceptualize the values and attitudes that provide cognitive frames for post-Cold War military missions. Importantly, I contend that combat and noncombat values are not mutually exclusive, but rather that a professional military ethos that emphasizes noncombat values in addition to (not in place of) traditional military values can enhance morale and improve performance in an increasingly complex task environment. In the final part of the analysis, I explore the effectiveness of various cognitive strategies for resolving identity dilemmas in the context of peace operations. THE NATURE OF PEACE OPERATIONS

Like war, peace operations are military enterprises that serve political ends. Contemporary peacekeeping efforts began in 1948, when the United Nations dispatched unarmed officers from several nations to observe the truce between the new state of Israel and its neighbors (UNTSO). Since this first observer mission, the United Nations has sponsored some fifty peace operations in various trouble spots around the world (Daniel and Hayes 1995; Segal 1995; Stiehm 1995; Durch 1993). The end of the Cold War has seen a surge of such missions. In response to the rising number of regional conflicts, the United Nations launched some thirty peace missions between November 1989 and April 1998, double the number of U.N. operations in the previous forty years combined. Since 1948, U.N. peace operations have involved more than 720,000 personnel from some seventy different countries. 1 Although each operation is unique, peacekeeping missions share a number of strategic and operational characteristics (see Segal

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1995; Diehl 1993; James 1990). Foremost, their purpose is not to close with and destroy the enemy. Rather, these operations are intended to prevent armed conflict. Traditional peacekeeping is reactive; that is, peacekeepers are deployed to a crisis region at the onset of the conflict. Most peacekeeping missions are formed ad hoc and conducted under U.N. auspices (although some peace operations have been non-U.N. led), are usually authorized for limited periods of time, and are subject to periodic reauthorization by the U.N. Security Council (typically every six months). 2 U.N.-led peace operations require prior consent of the host state (and often of the other antagonists). 3 Threats to the safety of the peacekeepers are often paramilitary, terrorist, or otherwise masked within a nonviolent civilian population. Peace missions frequently require peacekeepers to interact with the local population in routine matters of administration, etiquette, and communication that is not typically required in combat. Although peace operations differ in size, they are normally much smaller than traditional combat operations. Nation Assistance, Peacekeeping, and Peace Enforcement

Given the lack of a focal enemy and oftentimes only vaguely specified mission objectives, peace operations are usually conducted in an environment that is less well-defined than war. Apart from traditional peacekeeping functions, peace operations also include support for diplomatic efforts and various peace enforcement activities such as protecting humanitarian assistance, establishing order and stability, enforcing sanctions, setting up protected zones, and separating belligerents (Doyle, Lewis, and Williams 1996; Daniel and Hayes 1995; Joint Chiefs of Staff 1995; Department of the Army 1994; Lewis and Sisk 1993; James 1990). Military support to diplomacy consists primarily of peace-building or "nation assistance" activities designed as post-conflict measures to strengthen and rebuild civil infrastructures and institutions and to restore the legitimate government (Ondaatje 1993; see also Department of the Army 1994, 1993). Traditional peacekeeping most generally comprises "the imposition of neutral and lightly armed interposition forces following a cessation of armed hostilities, and with the permission of the state on whose territory these forces are deployed, in order to discourage a renewal of military conflict and promote an environment under which the underlying dispute can be resolved" (Diehl 1993, 13).4 PK activities include monitoring ceasefires and supervising truces. Two distinct normative characteristics define peace operations: impartiality and noncoercion.

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Impartiality refers to the fact that peacekeepers serve as a neutral interposition force that should have no vested interest in promoting victory for any of the disputing factions. Noncoercion or restraint limits the use of force as an absolute last resort. As a result, units participating in peace missions are only lightly armed, solely for emergency use in self-defense or for the defense of peacekeeping positions should those come under attack. Very strict rules apply to the use of force in peace operations. The U.S. Army's Peace Operations manual (Department of the Army 1994) specifies that "every soldier must be aware that the goal is to produce conditions that are conducive to peace and not to the destruction of an enemy" (p. 17). To the extent that peace operations deemphasize the application of violence, noncoercion approaches in principle the constabulary model of military force proposed by Morris Janowitz (1960) nearly four decades ago. "The military establishment," Janowitz argued, "becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory, because it has incorporated a protective military posture" (p. 418). The constabulary model eliminates the distinction between peacetime and wartime military and creates a force that in many ways resembles the police. As briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, Janowitz recognized that professional soldiers might resist identifying with peacekeeping duties, because they are likely to view these policelike activities as less prestigious and less honorable than traditional combat tasks (see also Segal 1995; Dandeker 1994).5 Peace enforcement (PE) activities stand in the gray zone between peace and war and, in contrast to PK, often require application of combat skills. The Peace Operations manual (Department of the Army 1994) defines PE as "the application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions. The purpose of PE is to maintain or restore peace and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. PE may include combat action. . . . With the transition to combat action comes the requirement for the successful application of warfighting skills. Thus, in the theater of operations both combat and noncombat actions may occur simultaneously" (p. 6). Recent examples of missions involving PE activities include Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992-1993 and Operation Desert Shield preceding the Gulf War in 1991. In Somalia, the U.S. military conducted air assaults, patrols, security, and other combat operations in support of humanitarian relief efforts, whereas following the Gulf War, U.S. forces participated in establishing pro-

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tected zones to ensure the provision of assistance to the Kurdish population in Northern Iraq (see Department of the Army 1994). Although PE legitimizes the use of force, force must still be employed with restraint appropriate to the situation. While the restraint provision does not preclude the application of "sufficient and overwhelming force when required to establish situational dominance" (Department of the Army 1994, 17), it imposes constraints on the choice of weapons and equipment, the tactics, and the levels of violence applied to the situation. The exact circumstances and limitations on the use of force are described explicitly in the rules of engagement (ROE) which are drafted specifically for each mission. Rules of Engagement

The Army Operations manual (Department of the Army 1993) specifies that combat and noncombat missions alike should be directed toward "a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective." For each mission, the Army devises rules of engagement that specify the exact circumstances and limitations under which U.S. troops can initiate and/or continue combat engagement with enemy forces. In general, ROE are based on the Law of War and inform soldiers when they can use force and what kind of force to use (see Fair 1997).6 ROE provide the basic operational guidelines for peace operations and authorize the use of force for each particular mission (see Fair 1997; Department of the Army 1994). Of course, the more complex and uncertain the nature of a mission is, the more difficult it becomes to devise, pursue, and achieve clear objectives. Moreover, Britt (1998) found that soldiers who felt a "lack of control" during peacekeeping operations tended to often be less committed to the purpose of the mission. He cautioned that "rules of engagement that are overly restrictive can serve to make soldiers feel 'out of control,' thereby decreasing the soldier's belief in his or her efficacy to perform even the most basic behaviors." He concluded that psychological ambiguities during peacekeeping operations may be minimized and commitment to the mission maximized, "When a clear set of guidelines applies to the event, the rules apply to the individual as a function of proper training, the individual has personal control over his or her performance on the event, and the event is viewed as important by the individual" (pp. 122-23). Figure 3.1 shows the ROE pocket card distributed to every soldier who participated in Operation Restore Hope prior to deployment to Somalia. The card illustrates that ROE do not specify distinct policy or military objectives and, as a consequence, leave ample room for

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Figure 3.1 ROE Card

s (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), Annex A. interpretation. Miller and Moskos (1995) noted that, during the Somalia mission, "interpreting the rules of engagement was a most contentious issue for soldiers subject to acts of hostility" (p. 622). Fair (1997), who served as a U.S. Army lawyer instructing soldiers on the ROE for Somalia, described similar ambiguities: The Somalia environment was a difficult situation. Soldiers and marines faced a threat that was increasingly difficult to identify. Hostile Somalis presented unexpected dangers that soldiers and marines were not initially prepared to handle. The hostile Somalis did not wear uniforms or have any other identifying markers. Distinguishing between the peaceful and

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the hostile Somalis was impossible. Although the United States was not at war, every person had to be considered a potential threat. From the perspective of identifying hostile people or elements, a wartime scenario would have been more certain than this Military Operation Other than War (MOOTW) environment, (p. 109) Fair noted that ROE pocket cards like the one shown in Figure 3.1, while describing abstract conditions for the use of force, fail to prepare soldiers for deciding on concrete courses of action, such as whether or not to fire on a young child who might be armed with some sort of weapon. Consequently, Fair found the need for repeated training using "real-world dilemma" examples to enhance soldiers' level of comfort with the ROE. Given the complex nature of most military operations, ROE vary from mission to mission and might even change during the course of the same mission (see Chapter 1). Consequently, military leaders must understand how and when to transition from restraint to lethal force. Requirement to change ROE often result from immediate tactical emergencies at the local level. In these situations, commanders may not have sufficient time to exercise the appropriate request channels to adjust the ROE, but must rather decide on a desired course of action on the spot. Again, the need for cognitive preparation to adjust to rapidly changing mission requirements is apparent. PROFESSIONALISM AND THE NEW MILITARY ETHOS

The increasing U.S. involvement in peace operations over the past few years has sparked a debate among military scholars and practitioners about the use of U.S. forces for noncombat operations and about the compatibility of such operations with the combat identity and the traditional warrior ethos of soldiers and officers. The uncertain nature of peace operations, combined with the need to deploy forces rapidly, often precludes complete and lengthy mission preparation. Depending on the nature of the operation, military units require four to six weeks of specialized training (Department of the Army 1994). Not only is the physical and technical readiness important, but also the mental preparedness of each participating officer and soldier. The Peace Operations manual explains that "peace operations require an adjustment of attitude and approach. . . . The entire chain of command must develop a different mind set than that required for fighting wars" (pp. 86-87). The manual cautions that "national honor and prestige may significantly impact mission assignment. . . . National interest and organizational influence may com-

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pete with doctrine and efficiency. . . . Commanders can expect contributing nations to adhere to national policies and priorities, which at times complicates the multinational effort" (pp. 22-23). Given these constraints, one might wonder how well prepared U.S. troops really are for new missions. Although peace operations have become a common task since the end of the Cold War, the military establishment still regards deterrence and defense of vital national interests as the military's primary purpose (see Department of the Army 1993; Huntington 1993; Sullivan 1993; Kingseed 1992).7 While most observers agree that many of the technical skills that enable the military to achieve victory on the battlefield are also central to success in peace operations, there is growing concern that soldiers trained as warriors are not by default also the most effective peacekeepers (Franke 1997b; Sarkesian, Williams, and Bryant 1995; Miller and Moskos 1995; Segal and Segal 1993; Meeker and Segal 1987).8 In a recent study, Britt (1998) examined a number of psychological ambiguities that may affect soldiers' performance in peace operations. Britt attributed the ambiguities to, among other things, unclear rules of engagement, lack of proper training for the missions, restricted ability to act in the face of threat or abuse, questions about the relevance of peacekeeping missions to a "soldier identity," concerns about having to switch from being a peacekeeper to being a warrior, and uncertainty about the extent to which the military rewards participation in peace operations. Recent research has shown that doubts about the importance of peace operations are related to diminished morale, reduced motivation, and potential stress-related difficulties (see Litz et al. 1997; Britt 1995). Apart from developing clear and unambiguous rules of engagement and guidelines for mission success, Britt (1998) concluded that soldiers need to be prepared early in their careers for participation in peace operations, receive the proper training, perceive this training as relevant to their professional development, and adopt a flexible approach toward their work in order to be prepared for multiple operations. Tensions between Warfighting and Peacekeeping

In a recent study, Miller and Moskos (1995) examined how American troops who had served as part of the U.N.-led humanitarian assistance force during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia experienced their noncombat deployment. Consistent with the research on judgment and social cognition outlined in the preceding chapter, the authors found that, although soldiers' initial motivation for participating in the mission was high, many became disillu-

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sioned with the fact that their efforts were being met by locals with hostility rather than gratitude. Many compensated for their frustrations by creating new cognitive frames to come to terms with their mission assignment. Some employed a "warrior strategy," generalizing the behavior of local rioters to all Somalis (e.g., stereotyping them as lazy and uncivilized) and treating the entire population as potential enemies. Others relied on a "humanitarian strategy," making conscious efforts to refrain from using negative stereotypes and to understand the behavior of the Somali people.9 Miller and Moskos also found that soldiers became frustrated when, according to the rules of engagement, they were not allowed to respond to attacks by locals and were instructed to "return fire only if they saw exactly who among the rioters had shot at them, and if no other Somalis stood between them and the aggressor" (p. 622). Similarly, Collins (1992) illustrated the difficulty in shifting between combat and noncombat roles during Operation Just Cause in Panama (1989-1990): "After about a week, as the threat lessened, the mission became more directly constabulary in nature. And as C Company's mission changed, so did the rules of engagement. This change had to be articulated to the troops along with the rationale for it. This is an especially difficult task with younger soldiers. Their basic training and advanced infantry training . . . was focused on applying maximum violence. Now the leadership was asking them to be measured in their actions and to play the role of constables" (pp. 69-70). Collins noticed "a disturbing lack of training for low-intensity warfare." He found that soldiers tended to view restrictive ROE as obstacles as long as they did not fully comprehend the objectives of the mission. Personal accounts of soldiers conducting peacekeeping missions further suggest that participating in peace operations may challenge the stability of established self-conceptions. Two U.S. soldiers described their experiences in Bosnia in the following way: A Second Lieutenant: We were taught how to sneak around these tanks quietly, surprise the enemy and destroy him in combat. But here we are supposed to stay out of combat by being obvious. To me, it's like teaching a dog to walk backwards. A Sergeant: I'm a tanker, that's what I do, been one for 14 years. But let me tell you, those skills are perishable. You got to use them, and all I'm doing here is checking people's drivers licenses, (quoted in O'Connor 1996, p. A3) More than two decades ago, Moskos (1976) found similar sentiments among U.N. blue helmets assigned to peacekeeping duties in Cyprus:

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A Canadian officer: Peacekeeping makes the army over into a positive rather than a negative force in history. An army that is always at war might have combat experience. But is that good for peacekeeping? You need an army of trained men who are not used to shooting at everything. Killing is not the sign of a good army. Peacekeeping brings out the qualities of the best soldier. We just have to change our outmoded ideas as to what makes a soldier. A British officer: One thing makes a soldier different and better than anybody else. The thing which gives that dignity which nobody else can have is his respect for the man he is fighting. No civilian can ever have that. No soldier who hasn't fought can have it either. In peacekeeping the trouble is that you don't have any enemy, and this means you don't have any dignity as a soldier. A second Canadian officer: Even in peacekeeping you need some trouble to keep the men happy. The more trouble there is, the more everybody enjoys peacekeeping. Without trouble peacekeeping runs against the grain of the soldier, (pp. 126-29) W h e r e a s Moskos's s t u d y e x a m i n e d a t t i t u d e s of a n d i n t e r a c t i o n s a m o n g a relatively homogeneous a n d self-selected group of Weste r n U.N. officers, tensions will likely rise w h e n military professionals do not volunteer for t h e peace deployment a n d w h e n u n i t s from different c u l t u r a l b a c k g r o u n d s serve together, especially w h e n t h e m u l t i n a t i o n a l force comprises former e n e m y troops. The discussion t h u s far points to one of t h e central questions for t h e post-Cold W a r military: Are forces trained to fight in wars also the most effective peacekeepers, or do the men and women who participate in peace operations require specific cognitive preparation to succeed in these missions? The following section sketches t h e deb a t e over t h e military's purpose a n d t h e need to adjust t h e military's professional ethos for t h e military's dual-mission purpose. The Military's View: Prioritizing War In 1993, General Gordon Sullivan, t h e n Chief of Staff of t h e Army, outlined t h r e e m a i n t h r e a t s to U.S. national i n t e r e s t s : (1) t h e reemergence of historic nationalistic, religious, a n d ethnic tensions; (2) t h e potential failure of democratization a t t e m p t s in E a s t e r n Europe a n d in many developing countries; and (3) t h e increasing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially among unstable nations. 1 0 Binnendijk and Clawson (1994) listed four very similar challenges for U.S. security: (1) ensuring peace among t h e major powers, especially through nonviolent mechanisms for conflict resolution; (2) engaging selectively in regional conflicts, especially w h e r e U.S. int e r e s t s a n d principles a r e at s t a k e ; (3) responding to t r a n s n a t i o n a l

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nonmilitary threats, such as drug trafficking, terrorism, and illegal refugees; and (4) providing nation assistance for "failed states" (e.g., through disaster relief and peacekeeping efforts). From these challenges, the authors derived, in order of priority, the following strategic objectives for U.S. forces: (1) preventing the emergence of a peer competitor, (2) preparing for major conflicts with rogue states, (3) developing cost-effective responses to meet transnational threats, and (4) engaging selectively in "troubled states." This list illustrates that noncombat operations are second in importance to the military's traditional purpose of fighting and winning the nation's wars. Consistent with these arguments, Huntington (1993) underlined the continued importance of the military's traditional defense and security functions: The mission of the American armed forces is to combat, to deter, and to defeat the enemies of the United States. The American military should be recruited, organized, trained, and equipped solely for that task. Military forces should, where appropriate, be used in humanitarian and other civilian activities, but they should not be organized or prepared or trained to perform such functions. The core of a military force is fundamentally antihumanitarian: it is to kill people in the most efficient way possible. . . . Should the military perform other functions? Absolutely yes. . . . Should these other functions define the mission of the military? Absolutely not. . . . The military should willingly undertake whatever non-military functions the President and Congress may assign to it. If the military is to maintain itself in the coming years, however, it must define its purposes purely in military terms, (pp. 12-13) Underlining Huntington's (1993) view, some observers have warned that placing combat units in noncombat operations may cause their warfighting skills to deteriorate (Segal and Segal 1993; Meeker and Segal 1987). Analyzing the skill level of U.S. troops deployed to enforce the fragile peace in the former Yugoslavia, Hackworth (1995) noted, "My gut tells me these men may be trained in a way that could hurt them on a future hot battle field where they'll have to think on their feet—where they can't pull out the plan and consult Annex A. A CO's [commissioned officer] worst nightmare is to watch his warriors lose their hard-gotten fighting skills in peace enforcement missions like Bosnia. But this may be the price of post-cold-war soldiering" (p. 31). When advising on the nature of American participation in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) to the Sinai, David Segal (Segal and Segal 1993) expressed concern that "soldiers who are first self-selected and subsequently trained and socialized to subscribe to a warrior ethic would have difficulty adapting to the con-

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stabulary posture of a peacekeeping force, and that their participation might lead to unfortunate and unnecessary incidents. Second, . . . soldiers might, in fact, adapt to the pace of life in the desert, and . . . the sharp cutting edge of the US combat force might be dulled by the experience, rendering the unit less effective if subsequently needed for combat" (p. 57). While assigning combat soldiers to peace missions may soften their warfighting skills, a professional ethos shaped exclusively by the warrior spirit prepares military leaders only partially for the cognitive demands of future missions. Sarkesian, Williams, and Bryant (1995) suggested a military ethos of "enlightened advocacy" that should prepare military leaders for the entire spectrum of potential tasks by (1) expanding their analytical abilities to accommodate the increasing complexity of the strategic environment; (2) training "beyond the battlefield"; (3) learning to manage diversity of race, gender, religion, culture, and "affectional preferences"; and (4) incorporating these challenges "into a professional ethos that nurtures professional competence with the values and norms of democratic society and its political character" (pp. 68-69). The military cannot address the new realities effectively without considering the extent to which these realities influence the identities of its officers and soldiers (see Britt 1998; Sarkesian, Williams, and Bryant 1995; Meeker and Segal 1987). Doctrinal changes must go hand in hand with a commitment of the officer corps to traditional combat roles, emerging noncombat functions, and the values that inform conduct across operational contexts. Based on the conception of enlightened advocacy, I propose to enhance military identity with a more inclusive and broadened professional ethos that combines battlefield proficiency with an understanding of the political, social, economic, psychological, and cultural factors specific to each mission. A military identity of peace manager that merges combat and noncombat values will prepare military professionals more effectively for resolving identity tensions and cognitive dilemmas like the ones presented in Chapter 2. The following section examines more closely various cognitive resolution strategies. Resolving Inconsistencies: The Case of the Peacekeeper How can cognitive inconsistencies between the peacekeeper and warrior identities be resolved? In a classic study of "belief dilemmas," Abelson (1959) suggested four modes for resolving cognitive inconsistencies. I will assess each strategy in turn within the peacekeeping context based on the dynamic identity model developed in Chapter 2.

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Denial

The commitment to one of the conflicting identities is denied (i.e., the valence of that identity is reversed) or identification with an outgroup is asserted. In the first case, soldiers faced with a decision to kill an enemy might deny their pacifist or humanitarian identity by justifying the use of lethal force in self-defense. Examining how U.S. troops experienced their deployment to Somalia, Miller and Moskos (1995) found that a number of soldiers created new cognitive frames that enabled them to preserve the stability of their self-conception and to come to terms with their peacekeeping assignment. Some employed a "warrior strategy," generalizing the behavior of local rioters to all Somalis and treating the entire population as potential enemies. These "warriors" certainly denied their identity images as peacekeepers. In the second case, Dunivin (1988) observed that women in the U.S. Air Force often distanced themselves from other women feeling the need to exhibit nonfeminine behaviors and attitudes in an effort to become accepted by their male counterparts. She concluded that "to assimilate into the masculine social world of the military the women subordinated and sacrificed their gender roles and identities to conform to male standards" (p. 62). Bolstering/Hyper-lnvestment

This occurs when one of the conflicting identities is related to other central life interests so as to reduce dissonance. Soldiers may justify decisions to use force by claiming to act in pursuit of some greater good (restore peace and democracy, terminate an unjust regime, end civilian suffering, etc.) or by establishing congruities with previously experienced situations. For instance, Miller (1997) found that many of the U.S. peacekeepers deployed to the Balkans had initially been trained for combat missions. To resolve cognitive inconsistencies with their peacekeeper role and to maintain their self-conception as warriors, these soldiers sought identifications with more "appropriate, honorable roles." As a result, many imagined that they were stationed in Macedonia as reserve troops that could be quickly mobilized to fight in Bosnia if necessary. Similarly, Winslow (1997) concluded that the training conditions in the Canadian Airborne Regiment deployed to Somalia led to a "hyper-investment" in the warrior identity. One of her interviewees noted, "a peace-making mission in Somalia finally offered an opportunity for some gung-ho members of the CAR to prove themselves in battle" (p. 24). Another soldier reported, "I felt that

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members of 2 Commando were very gung-ho. Basically saying: T can't wait to kill my first black!' Some of them were trigger-happy and too aggressive" (p. 123). While hyper-investment or bolstering may be adaptive during a war when the self needs to be sufficiently alienated from the enemy in order to justify his destruction and to live with the emotional and cognitive consequences, this strategy is not readily adaptive to peace operations. As individuals become progressively invested in the group identity, their "capacity to relate to others outside of the group becomes significantly diminished and the potential for xenophobia increases" (p. 86). In a recent study, Levin and Sidanius (1999) concluded that exhibiting more negative affect toward the low-status outgroup (i.e., local Somalis) and increasing identification with the high-status ingroup (the regiment or unit) may enable high-status group members to simultaneously meet social dominance and social identity needs, thereby stabilizing their self-conceptions. Among U.S. peacekeepers deployed to Somalia, white male combat soldiers showed the greatest propensity for stereotyping Somalis and adopting the warrior strategy, clearly bolstering their identity images as masculine warriors (see Miller and Moskos 1995). Differentiation

This is when one identity is split into discordant subidentities. This way, the individual can focus on the positively valenced or attractive subidentity and related values and, in so doing, preserve his or her self-conception. Although combat soldiers may feel unfavorably toward peacekeeping assignments or toward serving under U.N. command, they have sworn an oath to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. As military professionals, they have pledged commitment to "political authority, loyalty, duty, selfless service, courage, integrity, respect for human dignity, and a sense of justice" (Department of the Army 1993, 1-2). Differentiation enables them to interpret their peacekeeping role as concordant with their identity as military professionals. Segal and Segal (1993) have termed this process "normalization." They found that most soldiers interpreted peacekeeping not as part of a soldier's job, but as requiring qualities that only soldiers possessed, "most particularly, obedience and discipline."11 Transcendence/Integration

In this case, both conflicting identities are combined and subsumed under a superordinate identity, and the dilemma is resolved by embedding the discordant identities into a comprehensive

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"superidentity" that, when potent, either resolves the tension or provides a cognitive justification for certain behavior. Military socialization and training that encourages positive evaluations of nonconventional assignments might prepare soldiers to view the subidentity of peacekeeper as an integral part of their professional self-conceptions. While integration strategies cannot always resolve severe moral dilemmas like the ones presented in Chapter 2, military socialization and training that teaches soldiers to employ different strategies for resolving cognitive inconsistencies may make them more effective peacekeepers. Applying Resolution Strategies

Empirical research on cognitive inconsistencies has demonstrated that when conflicting values are very unequal in strength or when one subidentity is significantly more central to the individual's selfconception than another he or she will tend to employ denial or bolstering strategies. The more individuals rely on monistic belief systems or ideologies (i.e., the more they view choices in black and white terms), the more they will tend to employ these simplistic strategies (see Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). However, Tetlock (1986) found simplistic strategies to be ineffective in situations where individuals perceive two discordant life interests as central and rank them as close to equal in importance. In situations of high-value pluralism, Tetlock suggested, people tend to turn to the more effort-demanding strategies of differentiation (distinguishing the context-specific impact of alternative choices on one's values and self-conception) and integration (developing rules or schemata for coping with value trade-offs or identity dilemmas independent of a specific context). Although socialization may not resolve identity tensions completely, differentiation and especially integration strategies, once learned, may be invoked more readily and may help to prevent indecision, resolve moral dilemmas, and avoid suboptimal behavioral outcomes. Both Britt (1998) and Tetlock (1986) illustrated the contextdependent nature of human information processing. Their research findings point to the importance of the interaction between contextual, social, and personological factors that may influence some soldiers to rely on warrior strategies while others develop humanitarian strategies to make sense of the same situation (e.g., peacekeeping in Somalia). The relative uncertainty of peace operations combined with a lack of cognitive preparation for these missions will likely motivate soldiers to employ denial or bolstering strategies to overcome conflicting identity images. But these strategies do not provide lasting solutions. By contrast, repeated exposure to

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scenarios that require soldiers to employ more complex cognitive strategies will encourage them to negotiate among central identities and to avoid or resolve identity tensions more effectively in new contexts. Clearly, different circumstances may require different strategies, but continuous exposure to identity tensions will prepare soldiers better to use the most appropriate strategy for the situation. The following section conceptualizes the values, attitudes, and beliefs that shape post-Cold War military identity and provide cognitive frames of reference for military professionals to come to terms with their mission assignments. SOLDIER'S VALUES

Officers and soldiers adhere to a unique ethos that distinguishes them from professionals in other occupations. Four decades ago, Huntington (1957) described military professionals as experts trained in the "management of violence." This training, Huntington found, developed a professional identity that legitimized officers' professional status and inspired their commitment to military service. Consistent with early cognitive psychologists (see Chapter 2), Mannheim (1971) argued that individuals adopt cognitive patterns for framing reality from their membership in groups. For Mannheim, groups functioned as "social carriers" of values and normative thought patterns. The U.S. Army Operations manual (Department of the Army 1993) describes the values that form military identity very generally as "proper subordination to political authority, loyalty, duty, selfless service, courage, integrity, respect for human dignity, and a sense of justice" (pp. 1-2). The following sections describe the values that shape the post-Cold War military ethos. Conservative Realism

In his analysis of The Soldier and the State, Huntington (1957) noted that military professionals were not motivated by financial gain but by patriotism and service to society. Huntington argued that, as a traditional warrior, "the military man is held to believe that peace is stultifying and that conflict and war develop man's highest moral and intellectual qualities; he favors aggressive and bellicose national policies. He is also thought to be opposed to democracy and to desire the organization of society on the basis of the chain of command" (p. 60). Huntington (1957) found that soldiers typically believed in the permanence, irrationality, weakness, and evil in human nature. For him, the man of the military ethic was essentially "the man of

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Hobbes." Charged primarily with combat tasks, soldiers tended "(1) to view the state as the basic unit of political organization; (2) to stress the continuing nature of the threats to the military security of the state and the continuing likelihood of war; (3) to emphasize the magnitude and immediacy of the security threats; (4) to favor the maintenance of strong, diverse, and ready military forces; (5) to oppose the extension of state commitments and the involvement of the state in war except when victory is certain" (pp. 64-65). Given the view of war as inherent in human nature, Huntington (1957) found that military professionals commonly justified war as an instrument of politics but were skeptical of international devices designed to prevent war. Consequently, they often perceived international law and organizations as being of little help to global peace and, given their specialized professional expertise, only hesitantly accepted civilian control over the armed forces. Overall, Huntington concluded, the professional military ethic was a combination of realism and conservatism. 12 Consistent with Huntington, Dunivin (1994) found that, despite a number of significant changes—most notably, more inclusionary laws and policies; a more heterogeneous military structure in terms of race, ethnicity, and gender; and increasing egalitarianism and tolerance— the post-Cold War military is still dominated by many traditional features: "The military still views itself as the primary instrument of national power whose combat mission, performed by masculine warriors, characterizes its very existence and meaning. Consequently, military ethics and customs still tend to be conservative and moralistic" (p. 537).13 A number of recent studies also found increasing levels of conservatism among military professionals (Ricks 1997; Holsti 1997). Warriorism

The term "warrior" invokes the image of a heroic figure who, prepared to defend others from attack, fights for honor and country and defeats enemy soldiers on the battleground. The U.S. military has always shown great concern that its leaders measure up to this challenge, and that they develop the right "warrior spirit." The Army entrusts the ideal-type warrior with the privilege and the confidence to defend the state and expects him or her to display the "mental readiness" to think, analyze, and develop a vision for mission success, draw respect for his or her leadership, and possess the integrity and moral character to "do the harder right instead of the easier wrong" (see Jones 1995; Bahnsen and Cone 1990). While the traditional warrior ethos defines stringent ethical rules of conduct emphasizing notions of loyalty, duty, and honor, these stan-

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dards may not suffice as cognitive frames guiding professional conduct in OOTW. Bacevich (1990) warned that officers who restrict themselves exclusively to managing and applying violence not only breach their professional code of honor and undermine their political legitimacy, but might also compromise the national interest. Consequently, he called for a revised military doctrine that should incorporate "diplomacy, information policies, economic leverage, and the imperatives of culture and morality" (p. 22).14 Almost four decades ago, Janowitz (1960) distinguished two types of military professionals: (1) "heroic leaders" or "absolutists" who embodied traditional notions of militarism and glory, and (2) "military managers" or "pragmatists" who concerned themselves primarily with the rational and scientific conduct of war. Janowitz noted that absolutists viewed war as the most fundamental basis of international relations and believed political objectives were to be gained through victory. For them, the primary military purpose was to seek tangible, forceful, immediate, and total solutions to foreign policy problems. Asked about foreign policy issues during the Cold War period, absolutists held that compromise or coexistence with communist nations was impossible. Instead, the United States should concentrate all energies on preparing for the inevitable conflict. Furthermore, allies were not to be trusted, and neutral nations, because of their perceived unwillingness to commit to U.S. goals, were regarded as enemies. In contrast, pragmatists approached warfare as only one instrument of international politics, side by side ideological and economic means (see Dandeker 1994; Arnold 1994; Carr 1946). Instead of accepting that war was inevitable, pragmatists believed that the limitation of war was not only feasible but also highly desirable. Whereas absolutists assumed the end—total victory—as given and believed the means had to be adjusted accordingly, pragmatists insisted that the end was conditioned primarily by the military's technological capabilities (see Shephard 1990). Consequently, during the Cold War, pragmatists believed in the possibility of coexistence with communist regimes and viewed neutrals as potential allies rather than potential enemies. Analyzing professional socialization at West Point, Lovell (1964) found that some cadets believed wars could be eliminated altogether. Consequently, he added a third category to Janowitz's typology. "Pacifists," he explained, believed American foreign policy should emphasize disarmament and international stability rather than nationalistic objectives. Similar to Lovell, Phillips and Cady (1996) recently profiled three distinct attitudinal perspectives concerning the morality of war.

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They distinguished "warists" or "war realists" from "just warists" and noted that the former, similar to absolutists, view war as inevitable and morally acceptable, while the latter are deeply concerned with morality in warfare. For them, engaging in war must be morally justified and, once undertaken, war must be conducted morally. While both war realists and just warists conceive of human nature as conflictual, pacifists presuppose consensual and cooperative moral dispositions. Unlike Lovell (1964), who employed a very stringent conception of pacifism, Phillips and Cady conceptualized pacifism to range from a belief in the absolute ban of all use of force at one extreme to a selective opposition to specific uses of force at the other. While absolute pacifists reject any form of violence, "collectivist pacifists" oppose war yet allow the use offeree (even lethal force) under restricted conditions (i.e., in defense against an unprovoked attack). Collectivist pacifism in many ways approximates constabularism and, in part, reflects the cognitive disposition required by twenty-first-century "peace managers" (Britt 1998; Dandeker 1994; Janowitz 1960). If recent trends hold and U.S. armed forces continue to be charged with OOTW, military socialization and professional military education should foster an appreciation for these missions, prepare future military leaders cognitively to shift between warfighting and peacekeeping, minimize their resistance to constabulary roles, and enhance their support for global institutions. A recent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (1997) on professional military education encouraged intensified educational instruction and officer preparation for OOTW. The report concluded that "perhaps the most notable lesson of such peacekeeping operations as Joint Endeavor in Bosnia is the enormous demands placed on young officers in charge of small units, whose decisions in tense and ambiguous situations can have international implications" (pp. 63-64). Patriotism

Although Moskos (1977) cautioned that the civilianization of the military (see Chapter 1) might undermine traditional notions of patriotism, Janowitz (1982) found patriotism to be a stronger motivator for military service in the all-volunteer force than it had been under conscription. Confirming Janowitz's position, a number of recent studies found that national attachments and patriotic motivations were still strong reasons for young people to pursue military careers (Burk 1989; Bachman, Sigelman, and Diamond 1987) and for enlisted personnel to make sense of their mission assignments (Faris 1995).

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In a series of interviews with military practitioners, Faris (1995) discovered that patriotic motivations and public support of military service were the most important factors informing soldiers' professional identities. Patriotic feelings, Faris found, were reinforced especially through experiences that enhanced a sense of unselfish service to the country within clearly defined military role parameters. Respondents indicated that field training, combat exercises, deployments, military symbols, and ceremonies increased their sense of purpose and strengthened feelings of patriotic service to their country, while routines that approximated civilian work diminished patriotic attachments (see also Devilbiss and Perrucci 1982). These findings suggest that force morale and, subsequently, mission performance are contingent upon how meaningful a particular deployment is to each participating soldier.15 However, if, as Faris's (1995) analysis suggests, participation in combat operations ensures stronger patriotic sentiments than involvement in noncombat missions, then morale and performance also depend on the nature of the mission. While Faris's findings indicate that patriotism can function as a potent frame of reference in combat situations, especially when those include a focal enemy (Moynihan 1993), or when soldiers' national identity is threatened (Bloom 1990), patriotism appears less appropriate for guiding behavior in the context of multinational and/or noncombat operations (see Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982). For Huntington (1957), military officers required a distinct identity reflecting their unique role as "managers of violence." However, military identity shaped exclusively by the warrior spirit prepares military leaders only partially for the cognitive requirements of the twenty-first century. In the following section, I extend the dynamic model of identity developed in Chapter 2 to merge traditional military values with a commitment to peace operations and support for global institutions. Merging Combat and Noncombat Values: The Identity of the Peace Manager

Noncombat missions are usually conducted under conditions that are less well-defined than war. The U.S. Army's Peace Operations manual (Department of the Army 1994) specifies that "commanders must be able to shift focus, tailor forces, and move rapidly and effectively from one role or mission to another. . . . Versatility . . . ensures that units are capable of conducting the full range of peace operations with the same degree of success" (p. 19). In his study of U.N. peacekeepers in Cyprus, Moskos (1976) conjectured that peace missions were most effective if soldiers' tradi-

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tional loyalty to the nation-state was superseded by a broader international loyalty, incorporating both the formal cooperation between national contingents serving under U.N. command and a subjective commitment to supranational allegiances. Moskos described internationalism only in very general terms as a "commitment to use and be bound by political institutions transcending the nation-state," and suggested that national and international attitudes could be arrayed along a continuum "ranging from giving no preference whatsoever to international bodies through meeting limited international obligations or preference for a stronger United Nations to support for a one-world government" (p. 106). Taking internationalism and constabularism together, Moskos (1976) aligned professional attitudes between two poles. At one pole he envisioned officers who, similar to Janowitz's (1960) absolutists, viewed the armed forces as unfit for constabulary roles and rigidly locked into national loyalties. The other pole comprised officers (pragmatists) who believed the military could accommodate constabulary precepts and international loyalties. Similar to Moskos, Holmes (1994) distinguished "neo-imperialists" from "internationalists." While the former envisioned the United States as the sole remaining superpower, preventing other nations from ascending to superpower status and maintaining a world order congenial to U.S. interests (see Binnendijk and Clawson 1994; Huntington 1993; Sullivan 1993), the latter anticipated a global order structured around collective security and bound by international law.16 By conceptualizing combat and noncombat values as mutually exclusive, Moskos (1976) and Holmes (1994) neglect the potential for cognitive dilemmas during military missions. The increasing number of multinational (combat and noncombat) military operations suggest that in many instances national and global interests overlap. The new global political culture cuts across national boundaries and often merges the military dominance of the United States with U.N. peacekeeping operations (see Waters 1995; Gregg 1993). If U.S. armed forces continue to be charged with a dual-mission purpose, the military's professional ethos cannot focus exclusively on the warrior spirit of the Cold War era or simply substitute noncombat for combat values. Instead, the ethos of enlightened advocacy suggests that future military leaders should be committed to fight for their nation, but also to defend the global order in combat and in peace operations (see Center for Strategic and International Studies 1997; Sarkesian, Williams, and Bryant 1995; Dandeker 1994). A professional military ethos that stresses adherence to combat and noncombat values can enhance force morale and group cohesion, improve unit performance, and help ensure mission

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Figure 3.2 Military Value-Matrix

accomplishment irrespective of the operational mode. To illustrate military identity based on the ethos of enlightened advocacy, I propose to replace Moskos's (1976) continuum of strategic perspectives with a multidimensional value-matrix that integrates combat, noncombat, national, and global values (see Figure 3.2).17 Traditionally, military training has focused on preparing soldiers and officers to fight and win the nation's wars, and on mobilizing public support for nationalistic purposes (Moskos and Burk 1994; Bloom 1990). Whereas the ideal traditional Cold War warrior would have found himself (the masculine pronoun is used on purpose here) in Quadrant D of Figure 3.2 (the further to the right the better), adherence to the post-Cold War military ethos places the postCold War peace manager in Quadrant B (the further right and up the better). Which type of military leader graduates from West Point? I will answer this question in subsequent chapters. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have conceptualized military identity after the Cold War based on a concurrent commitment to combat and noncombat roles. This model of military identity assumes that a professional military ethos emphasizing noncombat values in addition to (not in place of) traditional military values can enhance morale and improve performance in peace operations. The uncertain nature of peace operations is likely to threaten

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soldiers' identities as conservative, realist warriors. Employing simplistic strategies for resolving cognitive inconsistencies, soldiers may focus on the identity that has been threatened (bolstering their warrior identity or denying the threat to it). Absent a concrete and tangible outgroup, soldiers assigned to peacekeeping might denigrate the very people they have come to help and protect. Miller and Moskos's (1995) experience with the Somalia mission supports this argument. Those soldiers who had been trained specifically for combat against a foreign enemy were most likely to adopt the warrior strategy, constructing negative stereotypes of Somalis and perceiving them as enemies. Facing identity dilemmas for the first time while on mission duty will, at best, stimulate temporary and simplistic compensation strategies (i.e., denial or bolstering) that fall short of integrating warrior and peacekeeper roles into a superordinate military identity. Early military socialization should stress the importance of combat and noncombat roles for military professionalism in the twentyfirst century. Training in differentiation and integration strategies may equip soldiers with more effective cognitive tools to assist them in renegotiating their military identity, in resolving cognitive inconsistencies, and in making mission-congruent decisions across operational assignments. "Today, a young Army captain standing at a road juncture between formerly warring parties in Bosnia is equal parts soldier, diplomat, negotiator, provider of humanitarian relief, and law enforcer. In the future, he will have to deal with such things as information warfare and cyber crime. Better equipping him to fulfill each of those roles and responsibilities will be a key challenge facing the PME [professional military education] system" (Center for Strategic and International Studies 1997, 18). Military socialization that teaches military professionals to invoke positively valenced subidentities congruent with different mission objectives would add certainty to behavioral choices, especially in the nonconventional context of peace operations. Such cognitive preparation could diminish the need to bolster the warrior identity or to deny or normalize the peacekeeper identity and could motivate soldiers to negotiate a new military identity reflecting both combat and noncombat roles. As a result, soldiers would be able to rely on previously practiced integration strategies to help them resolve identity dilemmas more quickly and more effectively. This way they could lead U.S. forces more effectively as peace managers into future engagements. In the following chapters, I assess the commitment of West Point cadets to combat and noncombat roles and evaluate the effects of military socialization on their identities and value orientations.

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NOTES 1. For current information about U.N. peace operations, readers should consult the U.N. Peacekeeping Operations website (http://www.un.org/ Depts/dpko), last accessed July 2, 1999, which provides regular updates on ongoing missions. 2. Perhaps the most familiar non-U.N.-led peace operation involving American armed forces is the ongoing Multinational Force and Observers deployed to monitor peace along the Israeli-Egypt border following the provisions of the Camp David Accords in 1979 (Baker 1994; Segal and Segal 1993). 3. At the height of the Cold War, some peacekeeping operations were authorized by a majority of members in the U.N. General Assembly, bypassing the Security Council because of the political stalemate there. More recently, the Security Council has reassumed its leadership role in peace and security issues. For detailed accounts of the authorization of peace operations during the Cold War, see Diehl (1993) and Gregg (1993). 4. The varying conditions of peace operations make it difficult to produce a concise definition of the term. "Peacekeeping" has been used to designate a range of different phenomena. For instance, U.S. troops that participated in the invasion of Grenada in 1983 were called the "Caribbean Peace Keeping Forces." President Reagan even labeled the deadly MX missile the "Peacekeeper." The International Peace Academy, devoted to the study of peacekeeping, offers only a very broad definition: "the prevention, containment, moderation, and termination of hostilities, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention, organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police, and civilians to restore and maintain peace" (quoted in Diehl 1993, 5). The United Nations also lack a clear definition. Traditional peace operations are authorized under the provisions of Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, which discusses the peaceful settlement of disputes. However, the fact that the U.N. Charter does not mention the term "peacekeeping" explicitly anywhere led some observers to conclude that peacekeeping operations should be considered "extra-charter" activities (Lewis and Sisk 1993). 5. Janowitz (1960) warned, "Military managers will have to prevent the constabulary from being dominated or defined by either the military technologist or the heroic leader. The military technologists tend to thwart the constabulary concept because of their essential preoccupation with the upper end of the destructive continuum and their pressure to perfect weapons without regard to issues of international politics. The heroic leaders, in turn, tend to thwart the constabulary concept because of their desire to maintain conventional military doctrine and their resistance to assessing the consequences of limited military actions which do not produce Victory'" (pp. 424-25). 6. Major Karen Fair (1997), who conducted ROE education with American ground troops during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, described the importance of ROE at various strategic levels: "United States ROE are the means by which the National Command Authority (NCA) and the mili-

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tary chain of command authorize subordinate commanders to employ military force. National level ROE are promulgated by the NCA through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and offer broad guidance to unified and specified commanders for the employment of their forces. . . . Tactical level ROEs are task oriented and frequently mission-oriented. The ROE are definitive within the commander's area of responsibility and must be adhered to at all times, notwithstanding noncompliance by opposing forces" (p. 110; emphasis added). 7. In a personal conversation with the author in November 1996, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Collin Powell, reaffirmed that training future officers as warriors would provide them with the necessary technical and strategic skills to also conduct peace operations effectively. 8. The focus on warfighting is apparent when reading military publications, many of which still frame noncombat operations in familiar combatoriented terms. For instance, peace operations are commonly described as forms of "low-intensity conflict" (Segal and Segal 1993; Huntington 1993; Kingseed 1992; Collins 1992). Similarly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1995 National Military Strategy advocated the need to "win the peace" and the Army's Operations manual, its former Chief of Staff, and several military practitioners have repeatedly stressed the importance of achieving "victory" in operations other than war (Turregano and Waddell 1994; Sullivan 1993; Department of the Army 1993). 9. Miller and Moskos (1995) noted that the "warrior" strategy was adopted most readily by white male soldiers (over 70%) who served in combat units, who "were trained intensively to operate against a foreign enemy and who did not wish to appear vulnerable to the Somalis" (p. 633). 10. The 1995 National Military Strategy devised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff described a similar set of principal dangers to international security: (1) regional instability, (2) the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, (3) transnational dangers such as drug trafficking and terrorism, and (4) danger to democracy and reform, particularly in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 11. One example illustrates particularly well the use of differentiation strategies. Segal and Segal (1993) reported that paratroopers assigned to the Sinai MFO viewed the world as a more peaceful place after they returned from their mission than they did before their deployment. However, "these perceptions were accompanied by a view that the paratrooper's role was not to keep the peace, but rather to regain it if it was broken" (p. 109). 12. Sharing many assumptions with political conservatism, realist thought has shaped U.S. foreign policy and military strategy since the end of World War II. Four assumptions form the core of realist thought in international politics: (1) Individual, sovereign states are the central actors in the international system and are therefore the primary units of analysis; (2) the international system differs fundamentally from domestic systems because of its anarchical structure and lack of order; (3) the essence of interstate behavior is a continuous struggle for power; and (4) this struggle for power follows a rational pattern; that is, states seek to

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maximize their (national) self-interests (see Waltz 1979; Bull 1977; Morgenthau 1948). Cusack and Stoll (1990) recently added two more elements to political realism that are of particular import for the military in the post-Cold War era: (5) Alliances provide an effective means for states to act whenever circumstances require quick and decisive responses; and (6) states use war as an acceptable instrument of policy. 13. Although some observers have noted that the increasing integration of individuals from diverse backgrounds has made the military more representative of society in general (Dunivin 1994; Moskos 1993), Janowitz (1960) warned that increasing integration could deprive military professionals of a consistent self-image and a concise identity: "On the one hand, the officer's conceptions of honor, purpose, and human nature lead him to assume that he is a standard bearer, who embodies the superior virtues of men, yet, at the same time, he finds it expedient and necessary to present himself as a 'representative man,' no different from other men, and part of the mainstream of contemporary society" (p. 229). 14. Bacevich (1990) explained that "professional soldiers have a stake in preserving the tradition of war as a gladiatorial contest—a conflict between opposing regular forces, governed by rules and customs and directed by an officer elite. They conjure up doctrine that assumes such a paradigm of war and that reinforces their monopoly. Thus, self-interest competes with—and may ultimately corrupt—their ability to view with detachment war and its political context" (pp. 15-16). At the extreme, these warriors might be inclined to fight even absent a direct, credible threat to their lives (see Peters 1999). 15. In addition, Faris (1995) found that respondents' service motivation also depended on how the American public perceived its military. Following the notion of the "looking-glass self," Faris referred to the "lookingglass Army," because of the observed effects of nonmilitary influences (above all in the mass media) on soldiers' self-perceptions. The notion of the lookingglass self was first introduced by C. H. Cooley in 1903 to illustrate that the individual's ideal self is constructed in part out of ideas attributed to him or her by others. Cognitively, the conception of the looking-glass Army parellels the processes of symbolic interactionism and social identity formation described by Tajfel (1978) and Turner et al. (1987). See Chapter 2 for further detail. 16. Holmes's (1994) hegemonic unipolar system approximates conceptions of the international system commonly found in theories of hegemonic stability (see Keohane 1984; Gilpin 1981). While Holmes outlined strategic perspectives for a post-Cold War system dominated by the United States, Metz (1994) distinguished among unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar models. For Metz, the principles of a future unipolar system depend on whether the United States imposes its power on other international actors (imperial system) or cooperates with them (consensual system). The key question for bipolarity will be who emerges as the second superpower: 'To the extent the system is conflictual and military force retains high utility, nationstates will be more important than non-state actors. To the extent that the system is based on cooperative relationships and the peaceful resolution

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of conflicts, non-state actors such as the United Nations will be more important" (p. 91). In a multipolar system with at least three core actors, Metz predicts a system of diffused power relations and fluid coalitions. 17. Figure 3.2 depicts mutual adherence to patriotism and globalism. Similar two-dimensional matrices could be constructed to illustrate mutual adherence between warriorism and globalism and between warriorism and patriotism. Since all three value orientations are correlated (see Franke 1997a for further detail) and might become potent within the same mission, it would be possible to construct a multidimensional array. For conceptual simplicity, however, this chapter only presents two separate dimensions. In Chapter 5, I examine the three-way relationship statistically.

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4 Duty, Honor, Country: The West Point Experience March along, sing our song with the Army of the free. Count the brave, count the true who have fought to victory. Were the Army and proud of our name; We're the Army and proudly proclaim: First to fight for the right, and to build the Nation's might, and the Army goes rolling along. Proud of all we have done, fighting till the battle's won, and the Army goes rolling along. The Official U.S. Army Song (United States Military Academy 1995a, D-43) No one knows better than a secretary of defense how much will be asked of the young officers now entering service in the U.S. military. They represent the human capital that will sustain the global leadership of the United States and secure its role as the world's sole remaining superpower into the twenty-first century. The demands placed upon these officers, and the myriad of challenges they will confront, have rarely been higher. Richard B. Cheney (Center for Strategic and International Studies 1997, ix) "On a hot summer's night in early July, after dinner, the new cadets were led off to hear a speach by the superintendent of West

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Point. It was Day 3 of Beast Barracks for the Class of 2001. They were sweating in their new dress white shirts and gray slacks, 1,192 of them marching in formation, fists clenched, eyes forward. As they crossed the stone bridge to South Auditorium, they could climpse the Hudson river—so far in the distance that the wakes from the yachts and speed boats were tiny white flecks. At the moment, many new cadets were having trouble remembering why coming to West Point seemed like such a good idea last winter" (Winerip 1997, 3). From the moment they arrive at West Point in early July for the intense summer training session that precedes their freshmen year, students know they are about to begin an educational journey unlike any other. "Though this is an institution of higher learning, it's not really a college campus," one female cadet recounted her experience. "It's more of a carefully structured leadership environment. For four years, everything you learn is aimed at making you a better leader down the road" (quoted in Center for Strategic and International Studies 1997, 25). USMA's educational philosophy is "to educate and train the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate shall have the attributes essential to professional growth throughout a career as an officer of the Regular Army and to inspire each to a lifetime of service to the nation" (United States Military Academy, Office of the Dean 1997, 3). While many institutions of higher learning might pursue similar academic objectives, West Point is unique because it is the only college in the United States that prepares every one of its students to serve the nation during and after their time as active duty officers in the U.S. Army. The entire West Point environment is designed to "foster development in leadership, moral courage, and integrity essential to such service" (United States Military Academy, Office of the Dean 1994, 3). In this chapter, I sketch military socialization at West Point and examine the extent to which the USMA system of professional military development, the Cadet Leader Development System, prepares cadets for their future roles as military leaders. In particular, I analyze the academy's academic curriculum, Military Program, and honor and ethics instruction. THE SEMINARY-ACADEMY TRADITION The Thayer System

The idea for a federally instituted and funded military academy to train young men for the profession of arms can be traced back almost to the founding of the United States. West Point, the nation's oldest service academy, was established in 1802 during the administration of Thomas Jefferson to put "the education of Army offic-

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ers on a sound, institutional basis" (Daughters of the United States Army 1994, 13). Historically, the modus operandi of West Point has been the Thayer system, named after Sylvanus Thayer, who, during his tenure as superintendent (1817-1833), developed West Point into one of the leading educational institutions in the United States. Thayer's academic reforms were modeled largely after French approaches to technical education, especially those found at UEcole Poly technique. Following the French model, Thayer insisted that all classes were to remain small enough to allow for daily recitations by each cadet. Recitation grades were posted regularly, and classes were resectioned on the basis of these grades. The academic curriculum was designed to train cadets technically and prepare them for entry into the Army's Corps of Engineers. The Thayer system reflected the strong desire to develop a scholastic program that was practically applicable. The heart of the prescribed curriculum was mathematics, believed to provide skills that could easily be transferred to most other intellectual endeavors. In addition to the technical focus of the West Point curriculum, Thayer introduced a "general order of merit," in which all cadets of the same year were ranked in order of their grades. Besides the educational program, Thayer regularized the entire cadet schedule, insisting on "a high standard of appearance, weekly attendance at chapel, and a strict enforcement of rules against lying, stealing, and other 'irregular or immoral practices'" (Ellis and Moore 1974, 33). Apart from the academic rigor, rigorous physical training was thought to stress the discipline of the body and help develop skills appropriate to the "officer-gentleman," such as riding and fencing. Emotional discipline was taught, particularly through "rites of passage" during freshmen ("plebe") year. New cadets had to practice strict obedience to their superiors (to this day, plebes can only speak to upper-class cadets when first spoken to), unquestioned dedication to the professional code of honor, and willingness to place duty first. Thayer's reforms created an institutional environment in which body, soul, and mind could be developed simultaneously. In essence, the Thayer system combined classical Spartan and Athenian principles in the context of a modern military academy. The Spartan ideals were those of the noble warrior: "austerity, discipline, the comradeship of arms, devotion to the state, and, above all, a commitment to heroic deeds and a love of glory" (Lovell 1979, 16). The Athenian ideals emphasized culture and learning and the belief in knowledge as a virtue. Besides strict hierarchy, discipline, and obedience to rules and authority, the Thayer system emphasized equal treatment of all cadets irrespective of their social backgrounds. To this day, USMA can be viewed in many ways as a model for social integration and respect for others.

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Reforms after World War II

The simplicity of the assumptions underlying the Thayer system was challenged repeatedly starting around the turn of the century until the end of World War II, after which it had become apparent that the post-war era would demand unprecedented skills and vision from military leaders. Lovell (1979) noted, "The war had posed a number of challenging social, political, and economic problems for military professionals: working together with persons from other nations in allied operations, coping with problems of supply and industrial mobilization, administering occupied territories. Many military professionals came to recognize t h a t . . . subjects such as economics, comparative government, international relations, and foreign languages should be regarded as staples rather than frills in a program of military education" (p. 50). The pressure for reforms after World War II was accelerated by the opening of the Air Force Academy in 1955, which—in abandoning the totally prescribed curriculum, instituting academic majors, and awarding graduate degrees—broke with the seminary tradition of the older academies, particularly West Point (see Lovell 1979; Masland and Radway 1957). The academy's critical self-assessment led to significant reforms, most of which were introduced during the superintendency of Major General Garrison Davidson (1956-1960). First, Davidson expanded the recruitment guidelines by shifting from exclusive reliance on college entrance examination scores to a "whole man" selection procedure, complementing academic test scores with evidence of character, leadership potential, and physical fitness. Today, West Point still measures all applicants in terms of their intellectual (through aptitude tests and high school performance), leadership (through extracurricular activities and faculty appraisals), and physical abilities. 1 Similarly, USMA provides its professional military development through growth on the intellectual, military, moral, ethical, and physical leadership dimensions. The second major reform under Davidson was the decision to require all officers who henceforth were appointed to permanent teaching positions to obtain their doctorate degrees. In addition, Davidson instituted a program of sabbatical leaves to encourage professors to further their intellectual development. Since Davidson's reforms, USMA has made considerable progress in diversifying academic instruction. Whereas at one time all but a few West Point instructors were U.S. Army officers, today civilians comprise nearly 20 percent of the regular faculty. At present, approximately 65 percent of the faculty are officers from the field army who serve on the faculty with three-year appointments following graduate education

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at the master's level. The remaining 35 percent are military and civilian faculty who have doctoral degrees and hold long-term appointments (see United States Military Academy, Center for Teaching Excellence 1996). Third, and perhaps most notable among Davidson's reforms, was the expansion of existing opportunities for qualified students to place out of introductory courses and take accelerated course work instead. Moreover, advanced students were permitted to select one elective per semester. The electives could be grouped into two broad areas: science-engineering-mathematics, and social sciences-humanities. The idea of permitting cadets to develop an academic major, however, was to be repeatedly rejected until the mid-1970s. THE CADET LEADER DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM

In the early 1990s, West Point replaced its 150-year-old Fourth Class Plebe System that had tolerated widespread, demeaning treatment of the freshmen with the Cadet Leader Development System. The CLDS provides the organizing framework for professional military development at West Point. It institutes the coordination and integration of effort among the Academic, Military, and Physical Programs. The system is sequential and progressive. It includes extracurricular activities, a conduct system, and honor and respect instruction, and articulates principles, standards, and values to be observed throughout the socialization process. Overall, the CLDS "affects the transition from civilian through cadet to commissioned officer by building upon the potential which each cadet brings to West Point; promoting individual esteem, maturity, and professional ethics; training in the basic skills of the leader/soldier; and fostering a spirit of selfless service (duty, honor, country), teamwork, and esprit de corps" (United States Military Academy 1994b, 2). The transformation from "promising new cadet" to "inspired leader" resembles the cognitive processes of assimilation and differentiation described in Chapter 2 (see Brewer 1991; Turner et al. 1987). Individuals derive their self-conceptions in part from the need to be similar to others who share the same identity and, at the same time, to be unique and distinct from those with different identities (see also Hammill, Segal, and Segal 1995). While at West Point, "cadets develop as individuals within a group context. They seek to differentiate themselves as individuals as they simultaneously seek to become members of a larger social group Through an integrative process, cadets develop or acquire the values, attitudes, beliefs, knowledge, and skills which empower them as leaders and which make effective leadership meaningful" (United States

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Military Academy 1994b, 5). USMA ensures that its programs meet all the requirements for graduation and commission specified by the Department of the Army. The CLDS provides the framework based on which cadets' four years of military socialization are synchronized and managed. The Academic Program

Similar to comparable civilian colleges, USMA requires cadets to successfully complete a minimum of forty-eight academic courses and to attain a minimum average Academic Program score (GPA) of 2.00 for graduation. West Point's academic curriculum has two primary structural features. The first is the core curriculum, consisting of thirty-one courses, which the academy considers "essential to the broad base of knowledge necessary for all graduates" (United States Military Academy, Office of the Dean 1994, 5). The core curriculum places balanced emphasis on mathematics, science, and engineering, including a five-course core engineering sequence, four mathematics courses, two chemistry and two physics courses, and a course each in computer sciences and terrain analysis. In addition, the core curriculum contains a sequence of sixteen courses from the social sciences, behavioral sciences, and history to help cadets "develop an awareness of the people, government, and society that the commissioned officer will serve" (p. 7). The remaining core courses consist of three courses in English composition and literature and a two-course foreign language requirement. This core curriculum, when combined with physical education and military science, constitutes the academy's "professional major." The second structural feature of the curriculum is the specific field of study that each cadet selects to study in depth (at least nine courses; ten to thirteen if pursued as an academic major). The Military Program

The Military Program consists of three components: military training, military education, and practical experience. Four summer activities comprise the major military training requirements. Prior to their freshmen year, Fourth Class cadets (freshmen) must successfully complete six to seven weeks of Cadet Basic Training (CBT), while Third Class cadets (sophomores) are required to participate in six to seven weeks of Cadet Field Training (CFT). Cadets of the upper two classes serve one summer in a chain-of-command duty position (either in CBT, CFT, Summer Garrison Regiment, or Air Assault cadre) and one summer as part of a unit in the field army. Second Class cadets (juniors) are assigned to the field army and

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participate in Drill Cadet Leader Training (DCLT), while First Class cadets (seniors) t a k e p a r t in Cadet Troop Leader T r a i n i n g (CTLT). Cadet Basic Training Military t r a i n i n g begins with Cadet Basic Training, which t a k e s place in t h e s u m m e r before plebe (freshmen) year. CBT serves two distinct purposes: (1) It introduces new cadets to military life a n d t r a i n s t h e m in basic soldier skills; a n d (2) it functions as a n intensive p r e p a r a t o r y experience before cadets begin t h e i r first academic y e a r at t h e academy. Upon t h e i r arrival at West Point in early July, new cadets e n t e r CBT, colloquially referred to as "Beast B a r r a c k s " or "Beast." Cadet Basic T r a i n i n g resembles A r m y Basic T r a i n i n g in m a n y ways. However, along with t h e r e g u l a r military t r a i n i n g component, it also p r e p a r e s new cadets to join t h e Corps of Cadets a n d to fulfill t h e i r responsibilities once t h e Academic P r o g r a m begins in t h e fall. In addition, CBT affords a critical leader-development opportunity for t h e upper-class juniors a n d seniors who serve as t r a i n e r s a n d cadre for t h e new cadets. Officially, CBT " n u r t u r e s t h e inculcation of fund a m e n t a l military a t t r i b u t e s , such as: a strong duty concept, being able to function u n d e r p r e s s u r e , subjugation of self to h i g h e r ideals, self-discipline, a n d s u b o r d i n a t i o n to l e g i t i m a t e a u t h o r i t y " (United S t a t e s Military Academy 1995a, 1-2). P r i e s t a n d Beach (1988) found t h a t t h e rigor of CBT produces a strong ingroup identity a m o n g new cadets: 2 First of all, new cadets are divested of previous roles and group allegiances. This is accomplished by labeling them "New Cadets," cutting their hair, putting them in uniforms, and separating them from parents and friends. Throughout CBT cadets are restricted to post. In addition to the physical isolation, their waking hours are monopolized by the sheer volume of demands placed upon them. The result is, their interactions are limited exclusively to other cadets and officers. The relatively exclusive isolation within the new group fosters the growth of each member's dependency on this group for satisfaction of needs, which in turn increases the cohesiveness of the group and its consequent influence on its members. Other practices also intensify the socialization process. Emphasizing the contrast between the low status of the new cadet and that of the upper-class cadet, maximizes the status envy experienced by new cadets, thus motivating them to identify with the upper-class cadets. Added to this, of course, is frequent indoctrination, (p. 6) Similar to P r i e s t a n d Beach, Dymek (1994) a n d D o r n b u s c h (1955) have noted t h a t d u r i n g CBT new cadets u n l e a r n p a s t a t t i t u d e s a n d behaviors a n d l e a r n new ones. They a r e purposely disconnected

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from past social networks and established identities and are expected, in order to succeed as military leaders, to develop new identities. 3 "Duty, honor, country are the words each new cadet must accept and internalize if he or she desires acceptance to the Corps of Cadets" (Dymek 1994, Appendix C, 4). Dymek observed that West Point alters the behavior of new cadets through (1) reinforcement as an external motivational force, (2) punishment (e.g., area tours, demerits) and extinction (withholding recognition), and (3) avoidance learning to produce behavior which seeks to avoid painful reprisals. Harassment and "hazing," which were common practices in earlier years, has been strongly discouraged by the academy. For instance, new cadets are no longer required to sit at attention and shout at mess, nor will they be yelled at in a demeaning manner by upper-class cadets or punished by having to do pushups. Instead, disciplinary action now is limited to a plebe's direct chain of command (see Center for Strategic and International Studies 1997; Winerip 1997). Nevertheless, cadets commonly remember their experiences during Beast Barracks as having profoundly affected their self-conceptions. One West Pointer recalled, "I think the challenge of Beast Barracks is almost entirely mental. You have got to get through a Physical Program, but the real battle is making it in your head. The pressure is almost all mental. The first week they rip you apart physically and then after that they start building you up again physically, but they are always tearing you down mentally" (quoted in Ellis and Moore 1974, 83). Life after Beast

The socialization process that begins with CBT continues throughout cadets' professional development and reaches well beyond the academy. The Army's Operations manual (Department of the Army 1993) states that military service means not only defending the country, but also accepting the specific professional identity created in the Army. "The Army serves as a repository of its [the Constitution] national values and embeds them into its professional ethos. Proper subordination to political authority, loyalty, duty, selfless service, courage, integrity, respect for human dignity, and a sense of justice are all part of the Army's identity. These values directly influence the Army's behavior in peace and war" (pp. 1-2; emphasis in original). Whereas civilian colleges and universities grant their students latitude for individual choice and personal preference, the academy has considerably reduced indecision and uncertainty at the cost of restricting cadets' potential for intellectual development. 4

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One officer recalled that "plebe year was totally reactive. I never had time to think where I was, who I was, or what I was. We were so regimented, so drilled, and you just worked so hard to stay up with the system, what else could a plebe do at night but study?" (quoted in Prashker 1988, 22). One tactical officer described the lack of control cadets experience during their West Point training: "Most cadets believe that there is little they can do to control their environment. Furthermore, some cadets view the environment as the enemy or as an obstruction blocking their path to graduation. . . . The bottom line is most of their existence is out of their control" (Dymek 1994, Appendix C, 3). During the two summers following their plebe year, cadets participate in cadet field training exercises, field army duty, and the cadet chain of command, all of which provide practical instruction to prepare them for their future careers as field officers. Military Education: The Focus on War

Core military education at West Point consists of four courses in military art and science and a number of other academic courses contributing to cadets' military development. Building on a foundation of military history, political science, and economics core courses, cadets can select further electives focusing on historical events of the twentieth century or on social and political trends influencing contemporary military affairs. While individual classes may address the increasing involvement of the U.S. military in noncombat operations, analysis of USMA's 1995 academic course descriptions—USMA's course catalogue is commonly referred to as the Redbook—revealed no required courses designed specifically to instruct cadets in the strategic and normative requirements of peace operations (United States Military Academy, Office of the Dean 1994). In fact, the curriculum contained only a relatively small number of courses that may have included noncombat lesson objectives. The history department offered one course that traced U.S. foreign relations from the turn of the century to "its present station in today's multipolar world" (HI 372), while another course reviewed the history of joint operations, including some more recent operations other than war (HI 378). Cadets interested in specializing in a particular region of the world could enroll in the foreign area studies program. Although these area studies provide some introduction to the history, geography, culture, language, literature, and military and political systems of the specific region of interest, the extent to which specific courses prepare cadets cognitively for post-Cold War missions could not be

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assessed from the course descriptions. Noncombat operations may also be addressed in a number of courses on international relations, national and international security, and American foreign policy. However, the Redbook did not mention peace missions explicitly as part of particular courses offered in the social sciences department. Finally, course offerings in the Department of Military Instruction also did not specify OOTW or peacekeeping as a distinct part of instruction. The main focus here was to train cadets for their roles as officers serving the national defense. Course descriptions contained in the Redbook are very general and provide instructors with some flexibility in designing the specific content of their classes. Thus, more courses than were apparent from their descriptions in the 1994-1995 Redbook might actually contain segments on noncombat missions. Further analysis of course syllabi and lesson objectives is needed before one can draw conclusive inferences about the content of particular courses. Overall, the analysis of the academic curriculum revealed a continued socialization focus on combat operations. However, USMA is beginning to recognize the need to prepare its cadets cognitively for noncombat missions. The 1995 review of the USMA curriculum included recommendations for increasing "academic emphasis on understanding the widening scope and complexity of security challenges facing Army forces, the ability of new officers to cope with rapid technological change . . . and creating in future Army leaders the skills, attitudes, and dispositions for a lifetime of individual learning" (Snider 1996, 30). Subsequently, the social sciences department created a new course providing cadets with the opportunity to complete research assignments specifically related to their selected branch of service. This course, taught in 1995-1996 for the first time primarily to senior social science majors, was designed to address "the major challenges facing the Army in the immediate future." Nevertheless, at present, courses containing lessons on operations other than war remain the exception. In fact, most classes that might address noncombat preparation target upper-class cadets with a specific interest in that particular Academic Program, but are not required as part of every cadets' academic core curriculum. Subsequent analysis of the 1997-1998 academic curriculum revealed that OOTW are increasingly being incorporated into some existing classes and a small number of new upper-division courses (see Postscript). 5 In a recent study of the political education of professional military officers, Hahn (1997) found that West Point socialization still emphasized Huntington's (1957) conception of military professionalism (see Chapter 3). Criticizing the relatively small number of

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cadets who take courses in civil-military relations, Hahn (1997) advocated development of academic core courses, internship opportunities, and firsthand military training providing all cadets an opportunity to study how a concurrent commitment to national values, the constitutional system, military ethics, and new missions "relates to existing policy debates at home and abroad" (p. 40). In sum, as of 1999, a commitment to peace operations and an appreciation for global institutions had not been incorporated systematically into the academic curriculum. Professional Military Ethics

The professional military ethics component of the Military Program focuses primarily on honor education, human-resources training, and leadership training and instruction. The Honor Code serves to foster cadets' commitment to the high ethical standards that each officer in the U.S. Army is supposed to incorporate into his or her overall way of life. Over the course of their four years at West Point, cadets receive over fifty hours of scheduled honor instruction that provides them with a basic understanding of the cadet honor code, ethical decision making, and the professional military ethos. 6 The Cadet Honor Code establishes minimum behavioral standards to which all cadets are expected to adhere. Honor instruction at West Point "seeks to imbue in cadets a greater awareness and appreciation for the broader set of values and personal beliefs which will guide their future actions as cadets and as leaders for the nation" (United States Military Academy 1995b, 19). The Honor Code is expressed as a series of basic prohibitions (e.g., "A cadet will not lie, cheat, steal or tolerate those who do"). Adherence to these proscriptions is essential in order to develop trust. Ultimately, all cadets must commit to the basic values of the professional army ethic: integrity, honor, respect, duty, loyalty, courage, and service. In addition, the Honor Code promotes cadets' identification with the fundamental soldier characteristics: commitment, competence, courage, compassion, and candor. In short, it is at the heart of each cadet's West Point experience and "forms a part of the ethical foundation for each graduate's life and career" (United States Military Academy 1995b, 9). While initially guided by instructors and upper-class cadets, by his or her third year, each cadet should be able to decide what is right and what is wrong and act accordingly (see United States Military Academy 1995a; Jones 1995; Ellis and Moore 1974). Responsibility for upholding the Honor Code and System rests with every cadet, not only through his or her conduct, but also by observing and, in case of an observed violation, reporting the be-

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havior of others. Even very small breaches of the honor code are investigated thoroughly and may result in severe punishments ranging from reprimand to suspension or even expulsion (see United States Military Academy 1994c).7 The Honor Code and System operates virtually completely under cadet control. The honor committee which judges honors violations consists of First Class and Second Class cadets. It evolved as a grassroots organization from within the Corps of Cadets and is the only cadet activity conducted without any distinction of rank: First Class cadets and Fourth Class cadets are held to the same ethical standards (see United States Military Academy 1994c). One cadet described his experience of serving on an honor board: "The whole experience forces you to examine how dear you really hold these values. Enough to sit in judgment of someone else? For many of us, sitting on an honor board is the defining moment of our cadet careers" (quoted in Center for Strategic and International Studies 1997, 30). Ethics Instruction

Ultimately, the result of the instruction on the Honor Code and System should be to develop officers who, in adhering to the principles of the Honor Code, are less likely to experience serious moral conflicts during their military careers. In addition to the Honor Code and System, USMA provides specific ethics instruction to help achieve this goal. During CFT after plebe year, cadets receive instructions on analyzing possible actions on the battlefield and "selecting those that will accomplish the mission in a manner that ethically fulfills law of war imperatives" (United States Military Academy, 1994a). Honor instruction during CFT exposes cadets to morality in warfare by discussing numerous cases involving principles of military necessity, unnecessary suffering, and proportionality (see, for instance, the introductory example presented in Chapter 2). However, none of the cases analyzed for this study illustrated ethical dilemmas that may occur during peace operations. Furthermore, ethics instruction did not discuss peacekeeping principles (i.e., impartiality and the use of restrictive force) and potential tensions between combat and noncombat values (see Chapter 3). USMA provides clear guidelines for cadets on how to solve ethical dilemmas: "Weighing the factors that go into ethical decisions is very important. Basic national values and legal and regulatory standards must be given the greatest weight. Personal beliefs are important and carry considerable weight, but they must be subor-

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dinated to the national values and legal standards when they conflict with these areas" (United States Military Academy 1994a, 1617). Although subordination of personal beliefs to national values may help ensure mission accomplishment in war, many of the newly emerging security challenges demand increasing consideration of cognitive dilemmas involving personal conscience in noncombat situations (see preceding chapters). If recent trends continue, officers are as likely to be involved in peace operations as they are to fight wars. Socialization that reconceptualizes military identity merging combat and noncombat values and challenges cadets to reflect on cognitive dilemmas and identity tensions associated with OOTW could prepare them more effectively to adjust across task requirements. The Physical Program

The Physical Program comprises physical education, regular physical fitness testing, and participation in competitive sports. Cadets must complete a core requirement of four physical education courses and two or more fitness tests during each of their four years at West Point. Furthermore, cadets are required to participate in competitive sports each academic semester and must maintain an appropriately low percentage of body fat. The Physical Program not only provides cadets with physical skills intended to strengthen self-confidence, it also instills such martial values as aggressiveness, combativeness, self-discipline, team focus, the warrior spirit, and respect for fair play. The Strategic Guide for USMA (United States Military Academy, Office of the Superintendent 1993) notes that "sports competition contributes to cadets' ethical growth, providing opportunities to practice adherence to sound values—due regard for both rules and one's opponent, fair play, selflessness, and sportsmanship—under trying conditions having powerful resemblance to combat" (p. 11). In short, like the Academic and the Military Programs, the Physical Program emphasizes values that most readily inform conduct during combat. FOUR YEARS AT WEST POINT: THE FORMING OF MILITARY IDENTITY

For each year at West Point, the academy specifies distinct developmental goals. The following list summarizes the main goals cadets are expected to achieve during each class year (United States Military Academy, Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis 1994b):

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Year

Purpose: • transition from civilian to cadet • be a member of a team • develop self-discipline, subordination, and selflessness Cadet Basic Training: • learn basic soldier skills • learn USMA and Army values and traditions • function in a tough, demanding environment Team Member: • contribute as a squad member • focus on following • develop the duty concept Third Class

Year

Purpose: • transition from follower to leader • develop team-building skills • learn the basics of direct leadership Cadet Field Training: • learn basic branch functions • develop teamwork and team spirit • develop tactical proficiency Team Leader: • accept responsibility for others • focus on developing leadership skills • demonstrate consideration for others Second Class

Year

Purpose: • serve in an NCO role • apply and teach soldier fundamentals • master small-unit leadership Cadre or Drill Cadet: • work with NCOs, enlisted soldiers, and other cadets

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• develop individual and unit military skills • prepare, conduct, and evaluate training Squad Leader/Staff NCO (small-unit leader): • learn to supervise squads • conduct performance counseling • learn officer-NCO relationship First Class

Year

Purpose: • serve as leader of the Corps • learn to develop subordinates • learn to exercise leadership in larger units Cadre or Cadet Troop Leader: • serve as an officer • supervise NCOs, soldiers, and other cadets • develop individual and unit military skills • plan, conduct, and evaluate training Command/Staff Officer: • learn to lead in larger unit • conduct performance counseling • practice command-staff relationships The m a i n focus d u r i n g t h e first y e a r at USMA is to t r a n s i t i o n cadets into t h e military a n d to "provide t r a i n i n g a n d education t h a t is essential to s u b s e q u e n t development as a leader" (United S t a t e s Military Academy 1994b, A-l). To this end, cadets experience responsibility as m e m b e r s of a military t e a m . They l e a r n about t h e military profession, professional ethic, a n d t h e principles of t h e Honor Code, a n d t h e y practice cooperation with o t h e r s in a n u m ber of different t e a m efforts. As Cadet Privates, F o u r t h Class cadets a r e expected to l e a r n self-discipline a n d a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g of a n d c o m m i t m e n t to t h e duty concept. In order to develop memorization skills, a t t e n t i o n to detail, a n d a n ability to function u n d e r stress, plebes a r e required to recount precise details about t h e history a n d t r a d i t i o n s of t h e A r m y a n d t h e Corps of C a d e t s at a n y time. Plebes are assigned a host of duties; every deficiency is detected, recorded, a n d corrected. These rigorous challenges d u r i n g plebe year a r e designed to help F o u r t h Class cadets develop "pride in being a p a r t of t h e West Point a n d A r m y tradition; a sense of

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accomplishment and self-confidence that will enable them to function under a demanding environment; teamwork which will establish unity and class identity; a sense of responsibility and effective time management through a system of prescribed duties; appreciation of the problems and perspectives of subordinates in a military organization; and, lastly, an understanding of the proper seniorsubordinate relationship encounters throughout a military career" (Department of the Army 1994, 37-38). In their second year, Third Class cadets ("yearlings") are promoted to Cadet Corporals and later Cadet Sergeants. They are expected to serve as role models for all Fourth Class cadets and to help ease their transition into the Corps of Cadets. Cadet Corporals learn selected precommissioning skills and develop their tactical and technical proficiency to succeed as small-unit team leaders. Following a short leave period after having completed their plebe year, Third Class cadets report to Cadet Field Training. Apart from the ethics instruction mentioned, during CFT cadets get to put their military skills into action, learn about the various Army branches, and receive hands-on instructions for the equipment used in each. In their third year, Second Class cadets ("cows") study the basic duties and responsibilities of a noncommissioned officer (NCO) either by serving in that role within one of the Army's basic Drill Cadet Leader Training units or within CBT or CFT. During Cadet Troop Leader Training, Second Class cadets assume the roles of platoon leaders and begin to teach and train under-class cadets in fundamental soldier skills. They prepare, direct, and evaluate performance-oriented training, conduct inspections, and develop supervising and counseling skills. In their final year, First Class cadets ("firsties") lead the Corps of Cadets to accomplish the goals and objectives set by the Superintendent and the Commandant and enforce USMA and USCC regulations. As cadet officers, First Class cadets learn the basic duties and responsibilities of a commissioned officer (CO) by leading either an active Army unit in CTLT or a cadet summer training unit (either in CBT or CFT). In general, cadet officers are responsible for supervising subordinates (i.e., lower ranking cadets) and training activities, presenting instructions, and fostering cooperation among other cadet officers. Importantly, "they learn to rely upon the performance of others for their own success" and "demonstrate their capacity to exercise personal self-discipline in the absence of close supervision" (United States Military Academy 1994b, D-3). Of course, in addition to successful completion of these military requirements, cadets in all four classes must meet the requirements of the Academic and Physical Programs.

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DEMOGRAPHICS

Since its founding, USMA has experienced enormous growth. For most of the academy's history, life at West Point had very familial qualities. Cadets usually knew each other and all faculty members and, despite all the formal rigors, the relations among cadets were highly personal. But the academy has steadily grown. While Sylvanus Thayer graduated in a class of fifteen, Ulysses Grant in a class of thirty-nine, and Douglas MacArthur in a class of ninetythree, by the 1930s graduating classes were commonly over 200 in size (Lovell 1964). Today, the corps size at West Point is approximately 4,000 cadets. West Point, along with the other Federal Service Academies, is consistently rated among the most selective universities and colleges in the country. 8 Since the mid-1980s, the academy has received between 12,000 and 15,000 applications annually, admitting approximately about 1,200 new cadets each year. The entering class of 1998 (freshmen in this study) consisted of 1,147 new cadets, of whom 154 (13.4%) were women and 187 (16.3%) were ethnic minority students. In terms of their intellectual abilities, West Point cadets are most comparable to students at other highly selective universities. Average SAT scores for the entering class are typically about 1250, well above the national average. 9 In addition, some 85 percent of cadets ranked in the top 20 percent of their high school class, two-thirds earned recognition by national honor societies, 12 percent were either valedictorians or salutatorians, and some 80 percent were high school varsity athletes (see Center for Strategic and International Studies 1997; United States Military Academy, Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis 1994b). Asked for their "first priority reasons for selecting West Point," cadets in the class of 1998 reported first "USMA's overall reputation" (25%), followed by the "desire to be an Army officer" (17%). The next most often cited reasons were "self-development," "Academic Program," and "leadership training" (United States Military Academy, Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis 1994b). The reported median family income of West Point cadets fell right between that reported by students of private universities and of all other four-year colleges.10 In terms of their parents' level of education, parents of USMA cadets were similar to parents of students who attended nonprivate four-year colleges. However, when compared to parents of students attending private universities, considerably more USMA parents had only finished high school (31% vs. 15% of fathers and 36% vs. 20% of mothers), whereas only half as many had received post-college education (27% vs. 45% of fathers and 15% vs. 26% of mothers). One-

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third of cadets reported their father's occupation as either "professional" (16%) or "blue collar" (16%). While these figures correspond to the occupation of parents whose children attended four-year colleges, they differ considerably from parents of students who attended private universities (26% professional, 8% blue collar). In contrast to civilian colleges, USMA normally enrolls significantly more students whose parents had pursued military careers (10% vs. 1-2% of all other universities; see United States Military Academy, Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis 1994b).11 CONCLUSION

Socialization at West Point is designed to transform high school graduates into cadets and officers of the U.S. Army and eventually into "leaders for a lifetime." For this complex and arduous process, the academy provides its students with the same compass that has guided its graduates for almost two centuries: the principles of "duty, honor, country." The Thayer method remains the essence of USMA's educational philosophy and West Point provides Academic, Military, and Physical Programs that emphasize moral-ethical leadership qualities and the development of character. While these ideals have in the past prepared USMA graduates effectively for combat, some observers have noted that the traditional socialization regimen fails to impart intellectual independence and innovative perspectives. In a recent study of the values of West Point cadets, Hammill, Segal, and Segal (1995) expressed hope that "as these [new] cadets mature and progress through their years at the Academy and assume leadership positions, first in the Corps of Cadets and subsequently in the army, they will find a balance between the discipline required by military organization, which is manifested in myriad ways by conformity, and the independence and adaptability required by modern military operations" (p. 113). Although USMA is beginning to recognize the importance of newly emerging military roles (see Postscript), military socialization still focuses primarily on instilling the warrior spirit and on preparing cadets to "serve the common defense." As of 1999, a commitment to peace operations and support for global institutions had been incorporated systematically into neither the Academic Program, the Military Program, nor the instruction on the Honor Code and System. Instead, nobility, morality, dignity, integrity, self-discipline, and character that have distinguished the traditional military ethos remain the cornerstone of the West Point experience. The following chapters explore more closely how the West Point environment

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shapes the identities, values, and attitudes of the young men and women who will lead the U.S. Army into the twenty-first century. NOTES 1. For each candidate, USMA calculates a "whole-candidate-score" (WCS) according to the following formula (see United States Military Academy, Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis 1994b): WCS = 6 (CEER) + 3 (LPS) + PAE where WCS = Whole Candidate Score, CEER = College Entrance Examination and High School Rank, LPS = Leadership Potential Score, and PAE = Physical Aptitude Evaluation. 2. The extreme rigor of CBT is illustrated by the relatively high attrition rate. Some 25 to 30 percent of all cadets who depart from the academy before graduation leave during CBT. USMA reported average attrition rates during CBT for the 1980 to 1994 classes of 9 to 10 percent. USMAs four-year attrition rate for the same time period was between 30 percent (for male cadets) and 38 percent (for female cadets). USMA attributed the attrition of most cadets in the class of 1994 to a combination of CBT and a decline in motivation (see United States Military Academy, Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis 1994b). 3. Describing military socialization at the Coast Guard Academy, Dornbusch (1955) concluded that successful completion of an academy career required "a loss of identity in terms of pre-existing statuses" (p. 344). 4. In a recent study, Murphy (1995) found that USMA has not placed particular value on creativity nor has it actively recruited creative candidates. She concluded that West Point "has not accepted or valued creativity, avoided premature criticism, given enough time to think, or allowed the loose-rein management necessary to an environment that encourages creativity" (pp. 2-3). 5. Exploring the effects of military socialization on cadets' identities, value orientations, and attitudes requires examination of the West Point curriculum at the time the data was collected. Subsequently, USMA has revised the academic curriculum. An assessment of the revisions is provided in the postscript to this study. 6. Over the last twenty years, the importance of honor instruction at USMA has steadily increased. In 1974, Ellis and Moore (1974) noted, cadets received only sixteen hours of structured honor instruction. 7. One example that illustrates the seriousness and the implications of honors violations is reported in the "Honors Instruction Program Circular" given to cadets during cadet field training. During CFT 1993, a cadet attempted to send out his laundry according to schedule. However, since the laundry room did not have any laundry tickets, the cadet went to another company and, claiming that he was a member of that company, was issued a laundry ticket. After the incident had been reported, the cadet appeared before an honor investigative hearing and was found to have violated the Honor Code. Shortly after the verdict, the cadet resigned from the academy (for

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further details, see United States Military Academy 1994a). 8. See, for instance, the annual rankings for "America's Best Colleges" in U.S. News & World Report or Barron's Profile of American Colleges. 9. The average college entrance examination scores for the USMA class of 1998 placed cadets in the upper 15 percent of all college-bound high school graduates (see United States Military Academy, Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis 1994b). 10. USMA reported the median family income of cadets in 1993 as $62,000, whereas the median family income of students at private universities was $78,000, and that of students in all other four-year colleges was $48,000 (see United States Military Academy, Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis 1994b). 11. The demographics for the sample of cadets who responded to the Future Officer Survey were similar to those reported here (see Chapter 5). The response sample comprised 15.1 percent women and 17.2 percent students of non-White ethnic backgrounds. About one-fourth of cadets sampled stated their parents had only finished high school (22% of fathers and 27% of mothers), and 30.6 percent reported their father's profession to be "professional" while 12.8 percent answered "blue collar" (34.5% and 2.0% for mother's occupation, respectively). More than one in ten (13.4%) of cadets reported their father had pursued a military career.

5 Learning Peace: Value Orientations of West Point Cadets The military's primary focus should be preparation for and conduct of combat operations. In today's world, peacekeeping and other noncombat operations should be central to the military's functions. Future Officer Survey With the end of the Cold War, the international system has moved from an era of clear adversarial relationships into a period of uncertainty and transition characterized by security challenges that call into question traditional conceptions of military identity. In the preceding chapters, I have proposed a conception of military identity that merges adherence to combat and noncombat values in order to ensure cognitive preparation of military leaders for these challenges. If recent trends hold and U.S. troops continue to be charged with multiple missions, professional military education from precommissioning to senior levels should provide "the education, background, and experiences for the cadets, majors, and colonels of today to prepare themselves to fulfill their interrelated roles as warrior-leaders and warrior-statesmen" (Hahn 1997, 4). Military socialization at West Point (or any other service academy) should foster appreciation for and commitment to the full spectrum of missions. To assess the attitudes of USMA cadets toward these challenges and to evaluate the effects of the West Point experience

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on their value orientations, this chapter seeks to answer the following questions: • To what extent do cadets perceive peacekeeping and other noncombat roles to be legitimate functions for warriors? • How important are conservatism, patriotism, and warriorism in shaping the identity of future military leaders? • What is the commitment of these future officers to peace operations? • How does support for global institutions influence cadets' professional self-conception? Based on the model of military identity that merges the traditional warrior spirit with a commitment to peace operations and global institutions (see Chapter 3), this chapter summarizes the empirical findings obtained through an attitudinal survey of West Point cadets which measured their value orientations and their commitment to the military's post-Cold War roles. In the first part, I compare cadets' responses across class years based on the assumption that differences in value orientations can be attributed to length of exposure to socialization at West Point. However, since observed attitudinal changes may not exclusively be the result of military socialization, I also examine the impact of cadets' family background, religion, gender, sociopolitical views, preference for a particular officer specialty branch, and the time period during which they first considered a military career (i.e., during or after the end of the Cold War) on their values and attitudes. CADET VALUES Subjects, Methods, and Design

In October 1995, the Future Officer Survey was administered anonymously to a representative sample of 1,233 cadets (31% of the total student population) in all four classes at West Point. Of the 918 returned surveys (a return rate of 74.5%), 644 were completely filled out and could be used for data analysis (a response rate of 52.2%).l The survey measured cadets' adherence to traditional military values such as conservatism, patriotism, and warriorism, and their attitudes toward peace operations and global institutions. While some survey items were adapted from existing scales, no existing scales measure these values in the post-Cold War security context. Thus, most items were constructed specifically for this study following examination of the relevant literature and extensive review by experts in academia and the military. 2

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Construct validity of the scales was established by comparing survey responses across different samples. In each case, the relationships between the variables confirmed initial expectations, thus strengthening the validity of the value scales. 3 The survey was developed over the course of a year and was pilot tested on a sample of students enrolled in the Army Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program at Syracuse University. Items that did not correlate significantly with the scale factors or discriminate sufficiently between respondents were eliminated. Items that respondents found ambiguous were reworded or deleted altogether. The final survey instrument was approved by USMA and administered in cooperation with the USMA Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis and the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership. Measures

In order to assess their value orientations and attitudes, cadets were asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with forty-four separate statements. Responses were scored on a five-point numerical Likert scale (from "Strongly Agree" to "Strongly Disagree") and mean response values were calculated. Survey items measuring the same concept were combined into separate scales and mean scale values were computed.4 The following scales were constructed:5 Conservatism (CONS)

To measure political conservatism, cadets were asked for their attitudes toward a number of U.S. foreign policy issues and toward government involvement in individuals' lives. The following four items comprise the conservatism scale: 1. Economic Help. The United States should give economic help to the poorer countries of the world. 2. Equal Opportunity. The United States has gone too far in providing for equal opportunity under the law. 3. Health Insurance. The federal government should provide health insurance for every American. 4. Eradicate Poverty. The government should do everything it can to eradicate poverty in this country. Patriotism (PAT)

Cadets were asked to indicate their level of agreement with a series of statements concerning their allegiance and loyalty to the

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U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d their a t t i t u d e s toward serving a n d fighting for t h e i r country. The six-item patriotism scale consisted of t h e following s t a t e m e n t s : 1. Army as a "Calling."! look upon the Army as a "calling" where I can serve my country. 2. Allegiance to U.S. Although some people feel that they are citizens of the world, an American should always feel that his or her primary allegiance is to his or her own country. 3. Military Service. The strongest indicator of good citizenship is performance of military service in defense of one's country. 4. Promotion of Patriotism. The promotion of patriotism should be an important aim of citizenship education. 5. Fighting for US. All Americans should be willing to fight for their country. 6. Loyalty to U.S. We should strive for loyalty to our own country before we can afford to consider world brotherhood. Warriorism (WAR) Cadets were asked for t h e i r a t t i t u d e s toward t h e military's warfighting a n d peacekeeping roles, t h e i r own expectations to fight in a war, a n d t h e personal satisfaction t h e y expected to gain from p a r t i c i p a t i n g in w a r f i g h t i n g a n d p e a c e k e e p i n g m i s s i o n s . Seven i t e m s were included in t h e warriorism scale: 1. Centrality of Peacekeeping. In today's world, peacekeeping and other noncombat activities should be central to the military's functions. 2. Expectation to Fight War. When I decided to pursue a military career, I expected to fight in a war. 3. Preparation for War. The most important role of the military is preparation for and conduct of war. 4. Necessity of War. Sometimes war is necessary to protect the national interest. 5. Reward from Peacekeeping. I think I would find peacekeeping just as rewarding as war fighting. 6. Focus on Combat. The military's primary focus should be preparation for and conduct of combat operations. 7. Human Nature. Human nature being what it is, there will always be war. Globalism/Global Institutionalism (GLOB) Cadets were asked for t h e i r a t t i t u d e s toward t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s a n d t h e potential for e n s u r i n g peace t h r o u g h a world government.

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Cadets' s u p p o r t for global institutions was m e a s u r e d u s i n g t h r e e items: 1. Stronger United Nations. The increasing multinational character of military missions since the end of the Cold War shows the need for a stronger United Nations. 2. U.N. Control. The United Nations should be strengthened by giving it more control of the armed forces of all member nations. 3. World Government. A World Government is the best way to ensure international peace. Miscellaneous Statements

In addition to scale items measuring these value orientations, cadets were asked for their attitudes toward conscientious objection to military service, obedience of orders, and U.S. foreign involvement, and for their expectations for participating in combat and noncombat missions in the future. The following statements were included in the Future Officer Survey: 1. Obey Lawful Orders. A soldier must obey lawful orders under any circumstances. 2. Never Fight. A soldier's work is best done if he or she never has to fight. 3. Conscientious Objection. Conscientious objection to military service should be accepted as an individual right of U.S. citizenship. 4. Nuclear War. A nuclear war is likely to occur in my lifetime. 5. Involvement in War. I think I will be involved in a conventional war within five years of graduation. 6. Involvement in Peace Op. I think I will be involved in some form of a peace operation within five years of graduation. Limitations

Before discussing the survey results in detail, a few limitations of this research should be noted. Due to time and budgetary constraints, the research was designed and conducted as a crosssectional study. Comparisons across classes were assumed to reveal "change" in attitudes over the four years of exposure to the socializing influence of the West Point environment. Of course, such inferences can only be made with great caution, since variables other than length of military socialization might account for response differences across classes. For instance, attitudinal differences might be attributable to the overall greater maturity of First Class

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cadets (seniors) as a result of their college and general life experiences (see Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 1991; Newcomb 1943). In addition, value differences could result from the fact that most First Class cadets, who began their military socialization in 1992, experienced a significant part of their adolescent political socialization during the final phase of the Cold War period, whereas most Fourth Class cadets (freshmen) had not even entered adolescence until the Cold War had come to an end. Moreover, gender, family background, religion, and cadets' overall sociopolitical views might account for differences in value orientations. I examine the impact of these factors on cadets' value orientations later in this chapter. A second limitation of this research design is the range of socialization experiences captured by the cross-sectional measure. Since the survey was administered to all cadets in mid-October, Fourth Class cadets had already been exposed to about three months of cadet life, while First Class cadets still had more than seven months of socialization remaining. Thus, the importance of the first three and final seven months of West Point socialization on cadets' value orientations cannot be estimated from the data at hand. Follow-up research should resurvey the current Fourth Class cohort at different times during their USMA socialization to confirm observed trends longitudinally. Finally, the study measured socialization effects only within the context of the academic environment at USMA. However, changing contexts can invoke, enhance, or weaken particular identities and values (Wellman 1993; Brewer 1991; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, 1991). For instance, Faris (1995) found that participation in military exercises reinforced patriotic feelings and enhanced soldiers' national identity. Hence, attitudes and loyalties might be quite different when recorded during other phases of military socialization. Further research could, for instance, explore cadets' identities, values, and attitudes before, during, or right after basic or field training. This information could contribute considerably to developing a more comprehensive representation of cadets' military identity. RESULTS Scale Comparisons by Class Status

The effects of socialization on cadets' attitudes were assessed through multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs) with CONS, PAT, WAR, and GLOB as dependent variables and class status as

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the independent variable. Overall, cadets showed strong adherence to patriotism (M= 3.9) and warriorism (M= 3.6), average conservative beliefs (M= 3.0), but relatively weaker support for global institutions (M= 2.8).6 The results are summarized in Table 5.1. Conservatism

Comparing the four classes in terms of their mean scores on the four-item conservatism scale revealed no significant differences. Only when asked whether they thought "the United States had gone too far in providing for equal opportunity under the law," significantly more First Class cadets agreed than did Fourth Class cadets (p < 0.05). Since cadets did not differ significantly in their level of conservatism, conservatism was not further analyzed. Patriotism

The data show that cadets in all four classes were very patriotic. Somewhat surprising, however, was that cadets' patriotism scores decreased the longer they had attended West Point. Although only the overall difference between the Fourth and First Class cadets was statistically significant (p < 0.05), responses to all six patriotism items indicate a declining trend across classes. Warriorism

In contrast to patriotism, warriorism scores increased steadily the longer cadets had attended USMA. Overall, First Class cadets were significantly more warrioristic than cadets in any other class. Examining cadets' responses to individual scale items reveals further interesting differences. Almost all cadets agreed that "sometimes war is necessary to protect the national interest," and more than three-quarters thought war was an inevitable part of human nature. Whereas almost three out of four Fourth Class cadets agreed that the military's "most important role" (70%) and its "primary focus" (73%) was preparation for and conduct of combat operations, nine out of ten First Class cadets viewed war to be the military's main purpose (92% and 90%, respectively). At the same time, cadets' attitudes toward noncombat operations were less positive the longer they had attended West Point. While more than half (58%) of Fourth Class cadets found peacekeeping and other noncombat operations to "be central to the military's functions" (19% disagreed), only one-third of graduating cadets (32%) viewed peacekeeping as an essential task for the military (48% disagreed). Similarly, by

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Table 5.1 Scale Responses by Class Status Fourth Class (Freshmen, N= 184)

Third Class (Sophomores, N= 163)

Second Class (Juniors, N= 168)

First Class (Seniors, N= 125)

m Conservatism

2.90

Economic help (R)

2.99

34/29

Equal opportunity

2.99*

Health insurance (R)

3.04

2.94

3.06

3.09

38/28

34/39

3.20

2.69

24/47

2.74

Eradicate poverty (R)

3.69

66/14

3.60

Patriotism

4.01*

Army as a "calling"

4.08

82/4

3.84

71/9

3.84

73/13

3.85

Allegiance to U.S.

4.55

94/3

4.35

88/4

4.30

90/6

4.41

90/4

Military service

2.99

35/45

2.84

35/51

2.59

27/64

2.66

27/64

Promotion of patriotism

4.25

92/3

4.20

88/4

4.12

90/6

4.24

90/6

Fighting for the U.S.

4.04

78/11

3.88

70/18

3.82

74/21

3.81

74/21

Loyalty to U.S.

4.07

82/9

4.11

83/6

3.95

78/15

3.92

78/15

Warriorism

3.41***

Centrality of peacekeeping (R)

3.52***

Expectation to fight war

3.30*

Preparation for war

3.84***

Necessity of war

4.34

Reward from peacekeeping (R)

2.91

37/37

45/35

3.37

53/32

48/58

2.71

34/50

61/24

3.43

61/27

2.96

35/35

48/32

3.16

28/49

2.53

63/20

3.46 3.76

3.86

3.57***

3.81

3.85

3.65*

3.25***

50/28

50/30

3.55

70/15

4.10**

95/3

3.94***

Focus on combat Human nature

75/12

3.03

41/36

66/22

3.47

61/27

3.62

68/20

84/11

4.11**

85/9

4.48

92/4

4.25

90/6

4.37

96/2

4.38

97/2

74/10

3.60**

62/21

3.53*

60/23

3.13

45/37

3.80***

73/14

4.06

85/9

4.14

86/5

4.27

90/4

3.94

80/9

3.83

75/14

3.93

83/13

3.98

83/11

58/19

2.72

32/48

their senior year, significantly fewer cadets thought they "would find peacekeeping just as rewarding as warfighting." While almost three-quarters of Fourth Class cadets (74%) agreed with this statement (10% disagreed), less than half (45%) of First Class cadets thought they would receive the same personal satisfaction from participating in a peace operation as from a warfighting mission (37% disagreed). Global Institutionalism

Cadets' overall support for global institutions decreased significantly across classes (p < 0.05). Although two-thirds of cadets in all

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Table 5.1 {continued) Fourth Class (Freshmen, N=184) Mean

Global Institutionalism

% Agree/ % Disagree

Third Class (Sophomores, N=163) Mean

% Agree/ % Disagree Mean

2.79

2.91*

Second Class (Juniors, N= 168)

First Class (Seniors, N=125)

% Agree/ % Disagree Mean

% Agree/ % Disagree

2.64

2.83

Stronger U.N.

3.69

66/14

3.64

67/14

3.64

67/19

3.53

66/24

U.N. control

2.59**

21/51

2.53

23/54

2.42

22/60

2.26

18/68

World government

2.42

17/56

2.18

12/69

2.31

19/66

2.17

10/68

Miscellaneous Statements 68/25

Obey lawful orders

4.04*

80/14

3.63

66/24

3.48

63/28

3.67

Never fight

3.23

40/27

3.13

36/35

3.13

44/35

3.01

38/43

Avoid entanglements

3.28***

51/31

3.01

35/39

2.84

37/51

2.66

29/57

Conscientious objection

3.35

54/22

3.39

58/22

3.35

58/25

3.12

49/34

Nuclear war likely

2.55***

25/57

2.35

18/63

1.97

6/78

2.04

10/75

Involvement in war

3.45**

57/17

3.70

70/11

3.78

75/11

3.83

77/12

Involvement in peace op

4.20

91/1

4.17

91/1

4.28

96/1

4.26

97/0

Note: Scale items were measured on a five-point numerical Likert scale from "Strongly Agree" to "Strongly Disagree." Responses of "Strongly Agree" and "Agree" were combined as "% Agree"; responses of "Disagree" and "Strongly Disagree" were combined as "% Disagree." Responses to individual items were scored so that a high mean indicates a high level of agreement with the statement. For computation of overall scale scores, (R) items were reversed. i n d i c a t e s a significant difference (p < 0.05) from the First Class mean. **Indicates a significant difference (p < 0.01) from the First Class mean. ***Indicates a significant difference (p < 0.001) from the First Class mean.

four classes saw "the need for a stronger United Nations" as a result of "the increasing multinational character of military missions since the end of the Cold War," only two out of ten in each class thought the United Nations should be "strengthened by giving it more control of the armed forces of all member nations." Accordingly, more than half of Fourth Class cadets (56%) and more than two-thirds of cadets in the other classes disagreed that "a world government is the best way to ensure international peace." Miscellaneous Statements

Responses to the miscellaneous statements show some interesting differences between Fourth Class and First Class cadets. For

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instance, significantly more Fourth Class cadets agreed that "a soldier must obey lawful orders under any circumstances" than did cadets in any other class. Similarly, over half of Fourth Class cadets (51%) but only one-third of cadets in the other classes thought that "George Washington's advice to stay out of foreign entanglements" was still good advice today. Also, one-quarter of Fourth Class cadets (25%) thought a nuclear war was likely to occur during their lifetime, while significantly fewer upper-class cadets agreed (6 to 18%). At the same time, significantly fewer Fourth Class cadets (57%) believed they would be involved in a conventional war within five years of graduation than did upper-class cadets (70 to 77%). While half of cadets in all classes agreed that "conscientious objection to military service should be accepted as an individual right of U.S. citizenship," significantly more First Class cadets (34%) than cadets in any other class disagreed (22 to 25%). Mutual Adherence to Values

In order to assess cadets' mutual adherence to patriotism, globalism, and warriorism, the response sample was split into two groups of equal size for each value scale (see Figure 5.1). Cadets in each class were designated "high" and "low" scorers, depending on whether their individual mean scale score fell above or below the overall sample median for the respective scale. Given self-selection and institutional recruitment by USMA, none of the findings can be used to make inferences beyond the population of West Point cadets. Thus, cadets who are labeled low scorers on patriotism (or high scorers on globalism) might still be significantly more patriotic (or less globalistic) than their peers at other service academies, civilian universities, or the U.S. population at large. 7 Consequently, any reference to cadets as low scorers on a particular value scale carries weight only for comparisons with cadets who scored high on that scale. Generally, the findings were consistent with those presented in Table 5.1. Overall, cadets' degree of warriorism increased significantly, while their scores for patriotism and global institutionalism decreased across classes. The percentage of cadets who showed strong patriotic attitudes declined significantly between Fourth and Third Class cadets (from 71% to 56%), but remained constant thereafter. At the same time, cadets' attitudes toward global institutions declined slightly but steadily (from 55% to 47%). Examining mutual adherence to patriotism and global institutionalism shows that the percentage of cadets who scored high on both scales declined between Fourth Class and First Class years

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(from 37% to 25%), while the percentage of low scorers doubled across classes (from 10% to 20%). No significant differences were detected for cadets who scored high on one and low on the other attitudinal scale. The warriorism-globalism matrix presents a somewhat different picture. While the percentage of cadets scoring high on global institutionalism declined slightly, the percentage of cadets scoring high on warriorism rose sharply between Fourth and First Classes (from 39% to 65%). Consequently, the slight increase in the percentage of cadets scoring high on both globalism and warriorism (from 19% to 26%) suggests that many cadets who showed strong support for global institutions had become more warrioristic over the course of their socialization. This result is further confirmed by the fact that the percentage of cadets who scored low on warriorism steadily decreased over the four-year period, independent of their level of support for global institutions. Finally, the patriotism-warriorism matrix indicates a significant increase between Fourth Class and First Class years in the percentage of cadets who scored high on both scales (from 31% to 45%). Figure 5.1 shows that most of the increase can be attributed to the overall increase in warriorism. While the percentage of cadets who scored high on patriotism and low on warriorism declined significantly between Fourth Class and First Class years (from 40% to 13%), the percentage of those scoring high on warriorism and low on patriotism more than doubled over the same period (from 8% to 20%). The percentage of cadets scoring low on both scales increased significantly between the Fourth and Third Classes, but for the First Class had declined back to Fourth Class level (22%). Relationship between Scale Scores and Miscellaneous Items This part of the analysis compares cadets' responses to the miscellaneous statements in terms of their levels of patriotism, warriorism, and global institutionalism (see Table 5.2). More than two-thirds of all cadets agreed that "a soldier must obey lawful orders under any circumstances." Only those cadets who scored low on patriotism showed significantly more disagreement (and a lower mean score) with this statement than any other group. The statement that "a soldier's work is best done if he or she never has to fight" yielded slightly more agreement than disagreement across the board. When asked whether "conscientious objection to military service should be accepted as an individual right of U.S. citizenship," significantly more low than high scorers on patriotism (66% vs. 49%) and warriorism (60% vs. 50%) agreed. For this state-

Figure 5.1

Mutual Adherence to Values (in percentages)

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Table 5.2 Responses to Miscellaneous Statements by Value Strength

Patriotism Miscellaneous Statements

Mean

Global Institutionalism

Warriorism

% Agree/ % Disagree

Mean

% Agree/ % Disagree

Mean

% Agree/ % Disagree

Obey lawful orders high low

3.88*** 3.46

151X1 61/31

3.72 3.71

70/23 69/23

3.79 3.65

72/21 67/25

Never fight high low

3.11 3.16

40/35 40/34

3.14 3.12

39/35 40/33

3.06 3.21

39/38 40/31

Conscientious objection high low

3.11*** 3.63

49/32 66/15

3.38 3.24

55/21 56/30

3.15*** 3.48

50/34 60/17

2.25 2.24

15/67 16/67

2.34* 2.14

18/62 13/73

2.12** 2.37

13/72 18/62

Involvement in war high low

3.76** 3.54

71/11 66/16

3.57** 3.79

65/15 74/11

3.97*** 3.38

82/8 56/18

Involvement in peace op high low

4.29*** 4.13

94/0 93/2

4.22 4.24

94/1 93/0

4.32*** 4.14

94/1 93/0

Nuclear war likely high low

Note: Scale items were measured on a five-point numerical Likert scale from "Strongly Agree" to "Strongly Disagree." Responses of "Strongly Agree" and "Agree" were combined as "% Agree"; responses of "Disagree" and "Strongly Disagree" were combined as "% Disagree." Responses to individual items were scored so that a high mean indicates a high level of agreement with the statement. i n d i c a t e s a significant difference (p < 0.05) between cadets who scored high and those who scored low on the respective scale. **Indicates a significant difference (p < 0.01) between cadets who scored high and those who scored low on the respective scale. ***Indicates a significant difference (p < 0.001) between cadets who scored high and those who scored low on the respective scale.

ment, no significant differences were detected in terms of cadets' globalism scores. In fact, the level of agreement among high scorers on globalism was only insignificantly stronger than among high scorers on either patriotism or warriorism. When asked about the likelihood of a nuclear war, more than two-thirds of all cadets thought it was unlikely that a nuclear war

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would occur in their lifetime. However, significantly more cadets who displayed strong globalistic attitudes considered a nuclear war possible than did low scorers (18% vs. 13%). In contrast, when compared in terms of warriorism, significantly more low scorers thought a nuclear war was likely to occur than did high scorers (18% vs. 13%). Overall, over two-thirds of all cadets believed they would "be involved in a conventional war within five years of graduation," while over 90 percent thought they would "be involved in some form of a peace operation within five years of graduation." In general, high scorers on patriotism and warriorism were more inclined than low scorers to expect participation in combat missions after graduation. While eight out of ten cadets who scored high on warriorism (82%) thought involvement in a conventional war was likely, only little over half of low scorers (56%) agreed. More than two-thirds of high and low scorers on patriotism (71% vs. 66%, respectively) and global institutionalism (65% vs. 74%, respectively) thought involvement in a conventional war was likely within five years of graduation. Again, it is interesting to note the reversed response pattern between high and low scorers for these two values. OTHER INFLUENCES ON VALUE ORIENTATIONS

The analysis thus far indicates that cadets' value orientations change as a result of their West Point experience. Before such an inference can be drawn conclusively, other factors that may have influenced cadets' value orientations must be discarded. USMA draws significantly more students from military and Catholic family backgrounds than do comparable civilian universities (see United States Military Academy, Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis 1994b). A number of studies have found family background and parental socialization to have profound impact on value development. For instance, Kohn (1969) found that certain values associated with a particular socioeconomic status were passed on from the parents to their children. While middle-class parents tended to value independence and self-direction, working-class parents valued conformity. In his analysis of professional socialization at West Point, Lovell (1964) found that proportionately more cadets who came from nonmilitary family backgrounds than those who had been raised in military families initially possessed high "absolutist" perspectives (see also Chapter 3). Besides family background, some researchers observed a close association between Catholic values and such traditional military notions as service before self, duty, honor, and country (Hammill 1990; McCloy and Clover 1988). In 1994, USMA reported that ap-

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proximately 35 percent of cadets were Catholic, compared to only 24 percent of students who attended academically comparable civilian universities (United States Military Academy, Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis 1994b).8 In addition, a number of researchers found gender to be a significant predictor for militarism (D'Agostino 1995; Miedzian 1991; Ruddick 1989). Clearly, any or all of these factors may shape cadets' attitudes and values and may have influenced their responses to the Future Officer Survey. In addition to these factors, I also assess the influence of cadets' general social and political views, their preference for a particular officer specialty branch within the Army or for any of the other military services, and the time period during which they first considered a military career as potential influences on cadets' value orientations. All six factors were regressed on the patriotism, warriorism, and globalism scales for the sample as a whole and separately for each class. Results

The multivariate regressions revealed high value consensus among cadets in all four classes in terms of demographic indicators (see Table 5.3). Neither gender, religion (i.e., Catholicism), nor family background significantly affected any of the three value scales (neither for the sample as a whole nor for any particular class). 9 However, the regressions showed significant effects for the other three factors. The following section examines each factor more closely.10 Sociopolitical Views

Many observers have noted that conservatism is a central pillar of the military belief system because it helps ensure commitment, discipline, and obedience (Holsti 1997; Dunivin 1994; Janowitz 1960; Huntington 1957). Asked to "classify their general social and political views," some two-thirds of cadets in all four classes described themselves as "conservative," between 15 and 24 percent characterized themselves as "middle of the road," and about one-fifth said they viewed themselves as "liberal" (see Table 5.4). Of the three factors, the regression analysis revealed that cadets' sociopolitical beliefs had the strongest effects on their value orientations. 11 As expected given the ideological composition of the sample, cadets' conservative sociopolitical views had significant positive effects on their warriorism and patriotism scores, but affected their support for global institutions negatively (see Table 5.3).

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Table 5.3 Regression of Value Orientations on Sociopolitical Views, Decision Period, and Branch Preference Total

Fourth Class (Freshmen)

Third Class (Sophomores)

Second Class (Juniors)

First Class (Seniors)

Global Institutionalism Constant

3.69

4.08

3.37

3.58

3.65

Political Views (P)

-0.253***

-0.371***

-0.154*

-0.214**

-0.267**

Decision Period (|3)

-0.079*

-0.102

-0.175*

-0.048

0.037

Branch Preference (p)

-0.100*

-0.075

-0.052

-0.069

-0.238**

0.0944***

0.1604***

0.0708**

0.0649*

0.1396***

Constant

2.90

2.87

2.91

2.85

3.16

Political Views (P)

0.244***

0.214**

0.231**

0.301***

0.230**

Decision Period (p)

0.163***

0.005

0.187*

0.205**

0.190*

Branch Preference (p)

0.210***

0.323***

0.124

0.187*

0.189*

R2

0.1632***

0.1670***

0.1333***

0.2320***

0.1472***

Constant

3.15

3.43

3.25

3.00

2.79

Political Views (P)

0.291***

0.263***

0.224**

0.301***

0.397***

Decision Period (p)

0.136***

0.072

0.230**

0.202**

0.075

Branch Preference (p)

0.099**

0.184*

0.054

0.134

0.059

R2

0.1330***

0.1207***

0.1291***

0.2008***

0.1773***

2

R

Warriorism

Patriotism

*Indicates significant (p < 0.05) effect. **Indicates significant (p < 0.01) effect. ***Indicates significant (p < 0.001) effect.

Branch Preference

Upon graduation, cadets can select one of eighteen different Army branches, or they can choose to serve in any of the other three military services. Vacancies in the different branches are allocated by the Department of the Army. Cadets select in order of their class standing. The higher a cadet's overall rank in the graduating class, the more likely it is that he or she will be assigned to his or her first

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Table 5.4 Sociopolitical Views, Branch Preference, and Age and Time Period of First Thought of a Military Career (percentages in parentheses) Fourth Class (Freshmen)

Third Class (Sophmrs.)

Second Class (Juniors)

First Class (Seniors)

Liberal

32 (17.7)

28 (17.1)

35 (21.2)

22 (17.7)

117 (18.5)

Middle of the Road

43 (23.8)

33 (20.1)

27 (16.4)

18 (14.5)

121 (19.1)

106 (58.6)

103 (62.8)

103 (62.4)

84 (67.7)

396 (62.5)

Combat Arms

67 (36.2)

62 (37.6)

80 (47.6)

49 (39.2)

258 (40.1)

CA - Technical

61 (33.0)

45 (27.3)

40 (23.8)

48 (38.4)

194 (30.2)

Combat Support

36 (19.5)

32 (19.4)

25 (14.9)

14 (11.2)

107 (16.6)

Combat Service Support

10 (5.4)

13 (7.9)

13 (7.7)

6 (4.8)

42 (6.5)

Other/No Answer

11 (5.9)

13 (7.9)

10 (6.0)

8 (6.4)

42 (6.5)

5 years or younger

15 (8.1)

12 (7.3)

17 (10.1)

7 (5.6)

51 (8.0)

6-10 years old

36 (19.4)

30 (18.2)

27 (16.1)

18 (14.4)

111 (17.2)

11-15 years old

66 (36.5)

51 (30.9)

48 (28.6)

48 (38.4)

213 (33.0)

16-20 years old

69 (37.1)

72 (43.6)

76 (45.2)

52 (41.6)

269 (41.8)

75 (40.3)

69 (41.8)

70 (41.7)

73 (58.4)

287 (44.6)

111 (59.7)

96 (58.2)

98 (58.3)

52 (41.6)

357 (55.4)

Total N

Sociopolitical Views

Conservative Branch Preference

Age

Time Period During Cold War After Cold War Total N

186

165

168

125

643

choice of branch. For this study, cadets were asked to indicate their "first preference" for a branch, "assuming that all branches and arms of service were equally available." For the analysis, the different branches were grouped together according to Army doctrine: Combat Arms (CA), Combat Arms-Technical (CAT), Combat Support (CS), Combat Service Support (CSS), and Other. 12 Overall, branch preferences did not differ significantly among the four classes (see Table 5.4). Over two-thirds of Fourth Class and First Class cadets said they wanted to serve in either a CA (36% vs. 39%) or CAT (33% vs. 38%) branch, while considerably

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more Third and Second Class cadets selected CA (38% and 48%) than chose CAT branches (27% and 24% respectively). The percentage of cadets who preferred CS branches decreased slightly across the four classes (from 19% to 11%).13 Although their warriorism scores increased the longer cadets had been at West Point, this did not affect their branch preferences. Grouping CA and CAT together, the percentage of cadets selecting combat branches did not increase considerably between Fourth Class (69%) and First Class (77%) cadets. This result is not surprising, given that the majority of cadets in all four classes expected to fight in a war when they decided to pursue a military career, and more than threefourths of them viewed combat as the military's primary role. The question is whether and to what extent cadets' value orientations differed depending on their preference for a branch of service. Cold War Socialization

Apart from sociopolitical views, the regression analysis revealed that the most plausible alternative explanation for the observed attitudinal differences between the four classes is the time period during which cadets decided on a professional career in the military (either during or after the Cold War). The survey asked respondents how old they were when they "had first thought of a military career." From their responses and their class year it was possible to determine the year during which they had first considered a military career. Cadets were then placed into one of two groups depending on whether they had first considered a military career during (1989 or before) or after the end of the Cold War (1990 or after). Compared by age, cadets' responses were fairly consistent across classes (see Table 5.4). While no more than one-quarter of cadets had thought of a military career before the age of ten, roughly one-third had considered this career option between the ages of eleven and fifteen, and four out of ten had decided on a career in the military after the age of fifteen. Comparing cadets' value orientations based on whether they had reached their career decision during or after the Cold War reveals some interesting differences. While the majority of cadets in the first three class years said they first thought of a military career after the Cold War had ended (about 60% in each class), considerably more First Class cadets (58.4%) had considered the military as their future profession during the Cold War period. Are cadets' values and attitudes contingent upon the time period during which they first thought of a military career? One might expect cadets who decided to pursue a military career during the Cold War pe-

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riod (Cold War cadets) to be more warrioristic and patriotic and less supportive of global institutions than cadets who had made their career choice after the end of the Cold War (post—Cold War cadets). If the data confirm these expectations, cadets' adolescent political socialization prior to their military experience might in part have influenced their value orientations and, in turn, account to some extent for the observed value differences across classes. Table 5.5 indicates that cadets who had first thought of a military career during the Cold War scored significantly higher on the patriotism scale than their post-Cold War counterparts (p < 0.001). While eight out of ten Cold War cadets saw the Army as a "calling" (84%) and thought that "all Americans should be willing to fight for their country" (79%), only two-thirds of post-Cold War cadets shared those views (68% and 69%, respectively). Similarly, Cold War cadets displayed significantly higher warriorism scores than their post-Cold War peers. The effect of the Cold War on cadets' beliefs manifests itself perhaps most clearly in their expectations to fight in a war. While less than half (49%) of post-Cold War cadets anticipated to fight in a war, almost three-fourths (74%) of Cold War cadets expected war when they decided to pursue a military career. Likewise, the beliefs that "the most important role of the military is preparation for and conduct of combat operations," that war is an inevitable part of human nature, and that "sometimes war is necessary to protect the national interest" were significantly more pronounced among those cadets who had first considered a military career during the Cold War. While Cold War cadets were more warrioristic, their attitudes toward peace operations were more negative than those of their post-Cold War peers. Whereas almost half (49%) of post-Cold War cadets viewed peacekeeping and other noncombat activities to be "central to the military's functions" and two-thirds (65%) said they would find peacekeeping "just as rewarding as war fighting," significantly fewer Cold War cadets believed in the centrality and reward of noncombat activities (43% and 57%, respectively). Consistent with these findings, Cold War cadets were also significantly less supportive of global institutions than their post-Cold War counterparts. In sum, sociopolitical views and especially decision period must be considered potential alternatives to military socialization in shaping cadets' value orientations and their choice of branch of service. Associations between Alternative Factors

Table 5.6 reveals that over half of Cold War cadets (52.9%) would select a Combat Arms branch if given the choice, while only little

Table 5.5 Scale Responses by Decision Period Decided during Cold War (N=286) Mean

Patriotism

3.99

Army as a "calling"

4.15

Allegiance to U.S. Military Service

Decided after Cold War (N=354)

% Agree/ % Disagree

Mean

% Agree/ % Disagree

3.78*** 84/5

3.72***

4.44

90/4

4.37

91/5

2.90

34/49

2.69*

29/58

68/14

Promotion of patriotism

4.27

91/4

4.15*

87/4

Fighting for the U.S.

4.07

79/13

3.76***

69/20

Loyalty to U.S.

4.06

80/11

3.99

82/9

Warriorism

3.74

Centrality of peacekeeping (R)

3.04

43/37

3.27**

49/27

Expectation to fight war

3.80

74/16

3.20***

49/32

Preparation for war

4.23

84/8

4.00**

80/12

Necessity of war

4.44

94/2

4.25**

94/4

Reward from peacekeeping (R)

3.46

57/27

3.70*

65/17

Focus on combat

4.12

84/8

3.99

82/9

Human nature

4.06

85/9

3.80***

77/14

Global Institutionalism

2.69

Stronger U.N.

3.54

60/22

3.71

71/14

U.N. control

2.36

20/63

2.55*

22/53

World government

2.18

15/68

2.35

15/61

Obey lawful orders

3.66

68/25

3.76

71/21

Never fight

3.25

45/31

3.05*

36/36

Avoid entanglements

2.95

39/45

2.99

39/42

Conscientious objection

3.20

53/30

3.41*

58/21

Nuclear war

2.09

12/71

2.36**

18/65

Involvement in war

3.89

78/7

3.50***

62/18

Involvement in peace op

4.29

94/0

4.18*

93/1

3.48***

2.90**

Miscellaneous Statements

*Significant difference between means (p < 0.05). **Significant difference between means (p < 0.01). ***Significant difference between means (p < 0.001).

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Table 5.6 Decision Period and Sociopolitical Views by Branch Preference (in percentages; observed/expected frequencies in parentheses) Combat Arms

Combat Arms Technical

Combat Support

Combat Service Support

Total

Decided during Cold W a r

52.9 (138/112)

29.9 (78/84)

12.3 (32/46)

5.0 (13/19)

43.4 (261)

Decided after Cold W a r

35.2 (120/146)

34.0 (116/110)

22.0 (75/61)

8.8 (30/24)

56.6 (341)

42.9 (258)

32.2 (194)

17.8 (107)

7.1 (43)

100.0 (602)

Liberal

23.8 (25/45)

30.5 (32/34)

29.5 (31/19)

16.2 (17/7)

17.7 (105)

Middle of the Road

42.0 (47/48)

32.1 (36/36)

19.6 (22/20)

6.3 (7/8)

18.9 (112)

Conservative

48.4 (182/161)

32.7 (123/121)

14.1 (53/67)

4.8 (18/27)

63.4 (376)

42.8 (254)

32.2 (191)

17.9 (106)

7.1 (42)

100.0 (593)

Total

Total

more than one-third of post-Cold War cadets (35.2%) would make that same choice. Similarly, fewer Cold War cadets than expected would choose either Combat Support (12.3%) or Combat Service Support branches (5.0%), while more post-Cold War cadets than expected would select either of those branches (22.0% and 8.8%, respectively). Apart from decision period, cadets' sociopolitical views also appeared to affect their branch choices. Table 5.6 reveals that while more than eight out of ten cadets who claimed conservative beliefs (81.1%) selected a CA or CAT branch, only little more than half of cadets who viewed themselves as liberal (54.3%) made that choice. Similarly, significantly more liberal cadets than would be expected if political views had no effect on branch choice selected one of the Combat Support or Combat Service Support branches than did their conservative counterparts (47.7% vs. 18.9%, respectively). In addition, the analysis revealed that more cadets who claimed conservative political views had decided to pursue a military career during the Cold War period than afterward, while fewer "liberal" cadets had thought of this career option during the Cold War than had considered it afterward. However, these differences were not statistically significant.

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The data suggest that cadets' general social and political views and the time period during which they had first considered a military career impacted their branch choice. However, when compared by class year and decision period, the analysis did not reveal any significant differences in cadets' sociopolitical views. Thus, the time period during which cadets had first considered a military career remains the most viable alternative to military socialization as an explanation for the observed differences in cadets' value orientations. Military Socialization or Decision Period?

The effects of military socialization and decision period on cadets' value orientations were assessed through two-way analyses of variance, using GLOB, WAR, and PAT as dependent variables and class status and decision period as the independent factors. The test for interaction between the two factors revealed no significant effects (i.e., the relationship between cadets' value orientations and their class status did not differ depending on whether they first considered a military career during or after the end of the Cold War). A separate analysis of each factor revealed significant effects of class status on cadets' levels of warriorism and patriotism but not on global institutionalism. Decision period, on the other hand, significantly impacted all three value orientations. 14 Is decision period more influential than socialization? To answer this question, a series of means difference tests was conducted for each value-scale mean by class status and decision period. Table 5.7 reveals no significant differences in value orientations between Cold War and post-Cold War Fourth Class cadets and only a slightly significant (p < 0.05) difference in warriorism between Cold War and post-Cold War First Class cadets. In examining the Third and Second Classes, however, differences in value orientations between Cold War and post-Cold War cadets were striking. Both warriorism and patriotism scores were significantly higher for Cold War cadets in either class than for their post-Cold War peers. At the same time, Cold War cadets were considerably less supportive of global institutions. These findings lead to the conclusion that the effects of decision period on value orientations are attributable primarily to attitudinal differences between Cold War and post-Cold War cadets in the Third Class and Second Class years. One potential explanation for these differences is that cadets who had considered a military career during the Cold War identified more readily with traditional military values than those who had made their career choice after the end of the Cold War. Table 5.7 shows that even at the begin-

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Table 5.7 Differences in Vau ^Scale Means for Decision Period by Class Status (std. deviations/std. errors in parentheses) Globalism

Warriorism

Patriotism

2.83 (0.95/0.11)

3.44 (0.53/0.06)

4.07 (0.56/0.07)

Decided after Cold War (N= 109)

2.98 (0.74/0.07)

3.38 (0.57/0.05)

3.97 (0.49/0.05)

Means Difference

0.15

0.06

0.10

2.60 (0.77/0.09)

3.74 (0.64/0.08)

4.05 (0.54/0.07)

Decided after Cold War (N=94)

2.93 (0.80/0.08)

3.44 (0.61/0.06)

3.73 (0.63/0.06)

Means Difference

0.33**

0.30**

?*** 0.32*

2.73 (1.03/0.12)

3.84 (0.57/0.07)

3.95 (0.54/0.06)

Decided after Cold War (N=98)

2.90 (0.76/0.08)

3.51 (0.53/0.05)

3.63 (0.55/0.06)

Means Difference

0.17

0.33***

?*** 0.32*

2.63 (0.88/0.10)

3.95 (0.58/0.07)

3.87 (0.69/0.08)

Decided after Cold War (N=52)

2.66 (0.97/0.13)

3.70 (0.59/0.08)

3.72 (0.62/0.09)

Means Difference

0.03

0.25*

0.15

Fourth Class Decided during Cold War (N=75)

Third Class Decided during Cold War (N=69)

Second Class Decided during Cold War (N=70)

First Class Decided during Cold War (N=73)

i n d i c a t e s significant (p < 0.05) difference. **Indicates significant (p < 0.01) difference. ***Indicates significant (p < 0.001) difference.

ning of their West Point experience, Cold War plebes displayed slightly higher patriotism and warriorism scores and lower scores on global institutionalism than their post-Cold War counterparts. These differences became more pronounced and statistically significant during the Third Class and Second Class years, when the

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socialization focus lies in the training and the application of basic soldier skills and the transition to becoming military leaders (see Chapter 4). Naturally, one would expect those individuals who begin their West Point experience with already strong traditional value orientations to identify more readily with the values propounded by USMA (see Hammill, Segal, and Segal 1995; Lovell 1964). This conclusion is confirmed by a number of empirical studies on the use of heuristics in decision making. In several experiments, Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982) found that processing evidence according to prior beliefs will bolster the initial beliefs and increase the individual's willingness to sustain them even in light of disconfirming evidence. Similarly, Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991) found that, confronted with novel situations, individuals tend to base their decisions on judgments of similarity to previous experiences or on likes and dislikes. Following these findings, it is unsurprising that cadets who had first considered a military career during the Cold War period might embrace values such as "duty, honor, country" more readily than their peers who had chosen a military career after the end of the Cold War. By their senior year, First Class cadets supervise the military training of under-class cadets. As role models, they are expected to promote and reinforce the ideal of the future military leader. As a result, one would expect the differences in value orientations between Cold War and post-Cold War cadets to dwindle. Table 5.7 shows that, although graduating Cold War cadets still appeared more patriotic and warrioristic and less globalistic than their postCold War counterparts, these differences were no longer statistically significant (except for warriorism, which was only significant at p < 0.05). These findings affirm the assumption that socialization at West Point shapes the military identity of future officers and influences their value orientations. In fact, the analysis suggests that socialization is the main reason for the observed differences in value orientations. CONCLUSION

Cadets' responses to the Future Officer Survey confirm the significance of self-selection and anticipatory socialization (see Hammill, Segal, and Segal 1995) and suggest considerable effects of the West Point experience on value orientations. Consistent with the purpose of USMA, "to provide the nation with leaders of character to serve the common defense," the results indicate that the academy enhances cadets' commitment to combat missions. Most entering cadets stated that they desired professional careers as tra-

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ditional Combat Arms officers and expected to lead combat troops in a conventional war. Through initial disposition and subsequent socialization at West Point, the majority of graduating cadets, as indicated by their survey responses, appeared cognitively prepared for such a career. Consistent with recent studies (Faris 1995; Burk 1989), the analysis also found that, based on their responses to the scale items, most cadets were very patriotic. The higher they scored on the patriotism scale, the more strongly they tended to view combat as the central role of the military. By contrast, with increasing patriotism scores, cadets tended to be less supportive of global institutions. Cadets' patriotism score on average decreased the longer they had been at USMA. Since the patriotism scale measured, in part, attitudes with strong emotional attachments about the loyalty and service owed by all Americans to their country, decreasing patriotism scores might be explained by cadets' overall college experience. Higher levels of education are commonly associated with enhanced ability to consider and discriminate between an increasing number of alternative choices and with a tendency to base decisions on rational judgments instead of emotional attachments (see Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Converse 1964; Stouffer 1955). Thus, the observed decrease in patriotism might simply be a result of cadets' constant exposure to new and diverse attitudes, ideas, and beliefs which increasingly challenge them to differentiate and reason through complex alternatives (see Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 1991). Although many cadets also recognized the need for military involvement in OOTW, they showed less positive attitudes toward peace operations and global institutions the longer they had been at West Point. This suggests that if the U.S. military continues to be charged with its current dual-mission purpose USMA should foster cadets' commitment to these missions and reinforce their cognitive preparation for shifting between combat and noncombat roles. In the next chapter, I explore the extent to which West Point shapes cadets' identity. NOTES

1. Prior to administration, separate representative samples were drawn for each class at the 0.05 level of accuracy, assuming maximum response variation. Comparing the demographic distribution of the response sample to the USMA cadet population revealed no significant differences (see also Chapter 4). Thus, the response sample (16.3% of the total population) is representative and findings can be generalized to the cadet population at West Point.

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2. I am especially indebted to Col. Patrick Toffler, Col. Michael Anderson, and Professors Gavan Duffy and Richard Braungart for their assistance in wording the survey items. 3. For instance, as was expected, cadets in the West Point sample who selected Combat Arms branches as their desired officer specialty tended to be more warrioristic and less globalistic than cadets who chose Combat Support or Combat Service Support branches. Also, male cadets tended to be more warrioristic and patriotic than female cadets. In addition, USMA cadets were significantly more warrioristic, more patriotic, more conservative, but less globalistic than civilian students attending Syracuse University (see Chapter 7 for further details). In all these analyses, respondents who scored highly on the patriotism scale tended to score fairly low on the globalism scale. In addition, the more militaristic or warrioristic respondents tended to be, the less concern they showed toward peacekeeping efforts. 4. The following scale results were obtained for the sample as a whole: (1) four-item conservatism scale (CONS: M= 2.98; SD = 0.76; range = 1.205.00; Cronbach's alpha = 0.59); (2) six-item patriotism scale (PAT: M- 3.87; SD = 0.59; range = 1.50-5.00; Cronbach's alpha = 0.69); (3) seven-item warriorism scale (WAR: M= 3.60; SD = 0.61; range = 1.71-5.00; Cronbach's alpha = 0.73); and (4) three-item global institutionalism scale (GLOB: M~ 2.81; SD = 0.86; range = 1.00-5.00; Cronbach's alpha = 0.66). Boxplots and normal probability plots generated separately for each scale showed that the scale values for the response sample were normally distributed. 5. Although constructed conceptually as separate scales, the underlying value orientations are not necessarily distinct. In fact, the factor matrix for the scales revealed moderate correlations of the two peacekeeping items used in the warriorism scale with the globalism factor. This illustrates overlap between values and indicates a strong correlation between, in this case, attitudes toward peace operations and global institutions. For a more detailed description of these measures and the results of the factor analysis, see Franke (1997a). 6. All means-difference tests were conducted as Bonferroni t-tests, providing very conservative estimates of significant differences. 7. Hammill, Segal, and Segal (1995) recently noted that career-oriented military personnel differ markedly from civilians in their opinions about the importance of military supremacy, willingness to use force in international relations, and the influence of the military in American policy. 8. In order to assess the extent to which military family background affected their value orientations, cadets in all four classes were compared in terms of whether or not their fathers had served in the U.S. armed forces and, if so, how long they had served and what rank they had achieved. Cadets were asked the same questions about their mothers' military service, but since only seventeen cadets (2.6% of the sample) reported their mothers had served in the U.S. military, no separate analysis using mother's service as a proxy for military family background was conducted. 9. The gender findings might be attributable to the small sample size (only 15% of the sampled cadets were female). Before one can draw conclusive inferences about the effects of gender identity on value orientations,

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cadets' attitudes should be examined in a more balanced sample. Subsampling cadets who indicated a service preference for either Combat Support or Combat Service Support branches, I detected socialization effects for male but not for female cadets. See Chapter 6 for further detail. The sample distribution for religious preference is 50.8 percent Protestant, 35.0 percent Catholic, and 7.2 percent other (including Mormon, Jewish, and Moslem), and 7.1 percent of cadets indicated no religious preference. 10. For the exact results of the regression analyses, see Franke (1997a). 11. Sociopolitical views, decision period, and branch preference appeared uncorrelated with one another in each of the regression analyses. Thus, multicollinearity was ruled out as a potential bias for the results. The standardized regression coefficients (/3s) were statistically significant (at or below p < 0.01 for all but one case) for all three value scales in each of the four classes and for the sample as a whole. 12. Branches were grouped in the following way: (1) Combat Arms includes Infantry, Armor, Field Artillery, Special Forces, and Air Defense; (2) Combat Support includes Signal Corps, Military Police, Chemical, and Military Intelligence; (3) Combat Support Services includes Adjutant General, Finance, Transportation, Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Medical Service Corps; and (4) Other includes Air Force, Marines, Navy, and Coast Guard. While USMA subsumes the Aviation and Engineer branches under Combat Arms, they often fulfill combat support tasks. Thus, for the purpose of this analysis, they were classified in a separate category as Combat Arms-Technical. Readers should note, however, that cadets who select Aviation or Engineer specialties will, in most cases, view themselves and are regarded by USMA as Combat Arms officers. 13. Since Infantry and Armor branches are not available to female cadets, responses were controlled for gender. Reponses for male cadets were similar to those reported for the sample as a whole. Some three-quarters of male cadets irrespective of class standing opted for either CA or CAT branches. The percentage of male cadets who preferred CS branches decreased slightly across classes (from 15% to 9%). 14. For further details, see Franke (1997a).

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6 The Social Identities of West Point Cadets Belonging to a group (of whatever size and distribution) is largely a psychological state which is quite distinct from that of being a unique and separate individual, . . . it confers social identity, or a shared/collective representation of who one is and how one should behave. Michael Hogg and Dominic Abrams (1988, 3) Loyalty is like an onion with many skins. At the core is your family, it radiates out from that point. Family and friends are the only things you have when everything else is in chaos. The family is the only thing that anyone is bound to protect. I am not here to protect some abstract cause, such as liberty and honor, I am here to one day fight to protect my family. A West Point cadet (comment made on the Future Officer Survey) In January 1996, Michael New, a medic in the 3rd U.S. Infantry division stationed in Germany, was convicted of failure to obey a lawful order by refusing to wear the U.N. blue beret and patch as part of a peacekeeping task force to be deployed to Macedonia. In an interview, New explained that for him wearing U.N. insignia symbolized a shift of allegiance from the United States, whose Constitution he had sworn to support and defend, to the United Nations, whose charter, in his opinion, was at odds with the U.S.

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Constitution. New was the first soldier who officially notified his chain of command about his opposition to serving under U.N. authority (Pexton 1996, 1995; Scarborough 1995). In preceding chapters, I have argued for a reconceptualization of military identity, preparing military professionals cognitively to shift focus and adjust between warfighting and peacekeeping. Whether and the extent to which officers adopt a professional military ethos that combines combat and noncombat values (see Chapters 1 and 3) or embrace the traditional warrior spirit depends in part on the social categories (norms, rules, beliefs, values, customs, etc.) they associate with relevant reference groups. The case of Private New illustrates the extent to which the military's dual-mission purpose can affect the self-conception and the commitment of the men and women in uniform. In Chapter 2, I developed a model of social identity that conceptualized identity as a dynamic process of self-categorization and social comparison. I suggested that incorporating mutual adherence to combat and noncombat values into the identity of military professionals would prepare them cognitively to accommodate rapidly changing strategic assignments, mission objectives, partner forces, and norms governing the operational context. With increasing exposure to new roles, the self-conceptions of the service men and women will more and more need to reflect those roles. An integrated military identity as "peace manager"—at once prepared to keep and to enforce the peace—may become an effective frame for operational decisions. Building on social identity theory, I will, in this chapter, explore the extent to which military socialization at USMA shapes the identities of West Point cadets. As discussed in Chapter 2, when particular reference groups become salient, individuals tend to internalize certain group categories such as nationality, ethnicity, gender, social class, religion, political ideology—or in the West Point case, their Cadet Company, unit, or branch preference—and will reference the norms and values premised on those categories for behavioral and attitudinal choices. Identifying with others who share common attributes is important for deriving one's sense of self. Of course, individuals draw on multiple and sometimes competing identities to derive their self-conceptions. Although socialization at West Point is designed to develop a strong commitment to such values as duty, honor, country, and a lifetime of selfless service, cadets' identities are also affected considerably by their personal life experiences and their extramilitary commitments and associations which, in turn, shape their value orientations and attitudes.

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THE SOCIAL IDENTITIES OF CADETS

In this chapter, I assess the impact of military socialization at USMA on cadets' identities and their commitment to different missions by (1) conceptualizing social identity through analysis of group affiliations that are meaningful cognitively and emotionally to cadets; (2) exploring the effects of military socialization on the potency of their identifications with military and national reference groups; and (3) examining correlations between cadets' identity images and their value orientations. While minimal group experiments induced normatively inconsequential intergroup categorizations in a laboratory setting, I examine social identity within the West Point environment, thereby extending social identity theory to a genuine field setting. MEASURING IDENTITY Subjects, Methods, and Design

To assess the effects of military socialization at West Point on their social identities, cadets were asked for their most important reference group affiliations. The Future Officer Survey presented respondents with this statement: "As individuals in society we all belong to a variety of groups, e.g., social (club, family, friendship), religious, ethnic, academic, occupational, geographic, ideological, etc." Next, cadets were asked to "identify in order of priority those groups that you very strongly identify with and that affect how you see yourself as a person." Unlike most empirical research on social identity, respondents were not asked to select their most important reference groups from among a prearranged list of categories (see Hooper 1985; Tajfel 1978). Instead, subjects were provided with space to list up to five groups in order of importance to their selfconception. Each respondent's list was recorded verbatim and classification codes for social reference groups were converted to group entries belonging to the same category. 1 Two judges independently reviewed the entries and assigned a numeric code to each of the groups listed following the instructions in the codebook.2 Of the 1,233 cadets in the sample (31% of the total student population), 594 completed this part of the survey (a response rate of 48.2%). In the analysis, cadets' reference group identifications were correlated with their adherence to combat and noncombat values across classes to further explore USMA's effectiveness in preparing its graduates for new operational requirements (see Chapters 3 and 5 for a conceptualization of these values and the specific wording of the survey items).

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Additional Measures

In addition to t h e scales u s e d in C h a p t e r 5, t h e effects of West Point socialization were also assessed with r e g a r d to cadets' comm i t m e n t to a professional career in t h e military. T h r e e i t e m s were u s e d to m e a s u r e career commitment: 1. Commitment to Military Career. I have a strong commitment to a military career. 2. Serve until Retirement. I plan to serve the Army until retirement. 3. Pride in West Point. In retrospect, I am proud of my decision to attend and remain at West Point. Operational Hypotheses

Given t h e West Point culture a n d t h e academy's historic purpose—"to provide t h e nation with leaders of c h a r a c t e r to serve t h e common defense"—cadets' West Point experiences should boost t h e potency of t h e i r military a n d national identity images a n d t h e i r c o m m i t m e n t to a military career. In t u r n , consistent with t h e model of dynamic identification developed in C h a p t e r 2, t h e d a t a should show strong correlations between t h e potency of cadets' military a n d national subidentities a n d their value orientations. The analysis can be b r o k e n down into t h e following operational h y p o t h e s e s (H) a n d expectations (E): H.l

Military/national identity becomes more potent as a result of military socialization. E l . 1 The percentage of cadets for whom the military or the United States is the most important reference group (central identity image) should increase across class years. El.2 The percentage of cadets listing one or more military or national groups as among their important reference groups (i.e., potent identity image) should increase across class years.

H.2

Type and strength of reference group identifications affect value orientations. E2.1 Cadets for whom the military is the central identity image should show stronger warrioristic and patriotic value orientations than cadets for whom other identity images are central (see E l . l ) . E2.2 Cadets who most strongly identify with the United States should be more patriotic and less globalistic than cadets for whom national identity images are less central (see E l . l ) .

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THE SOCIAL IDENTITIES OF CADETS

E2.3 Cadets with potent military identity images show stronger warrioristic and patriotic value orientations and less support for U.S. involvement in peace operations and for global institutions than cadets who identify less strongly with the military (see E1.2). E2.4 Cadets with potent national identity images should display higher levels of patriotism and warriorism, and less support for global institutions than cadets whose national identity is less potent (see El.2). E2.5 Cadets with a potent military or national identity should be more committed to a military career than cadets whose military or national identity images are less potent. RESULTS Social Identity Effects

The effects of military socialization on cadets' social identities were assessed in two ways: (1) by comparing cadets across the four classes in terms of their primary reference group affiliations (central identity image) (El.l), and (2) by examining whether and the extent to which the potency of cadets' military and national identities changed across classes (i.e., how many cadets identified a military or national group as among their important reference groups) (potent identity image) (El.2). Differences between classes were assumed to reveal real change over time that was attributable to length of exposure to military socialization. 3 Central Identity Image

Figure 6.1 shows that family was the primary reference group— that is, the ingroup most respondents listed first—for cadets in all four classes. While only about one-third of Fourth Class cadets (31.1%) mentioned family as their most important ingroup, more than four in ten cadets in each of the other three classes said they identified most strongly with their family. The lower percentage of Fourth Class cadets for whom family was the most important reference group might be attributable to the fact that, when the survey was administered, those cadets had just completed cadet basic training, a process that might have divested them of previous (civilian) roles and group allegiances (see Chapter 4). Alternatively, this result may be attributable to the fact that these new cadets had just left their families and may not have been aware of how much their families meant to them. Or it may simply be an indica-

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Figure 6.1 Most Important Reference Groups by Class Status

Key:

• Family • Religious H Social ED Military Efl Country

tion of cadets' growing independence from their families as a result of their transition into adulthood. 4 The second most often mentioned reference groups were religious or church groups. While the importance of family to cadets' selfconceptions remained consistently high across classes, the degree of religiosity decreased slightly between Fourth and First Class years (from 26.9% to 19.8%). Nevertheless, their religious subidentity was most important to about one out of five cadets irrespective of class year. In addition, between 10 and 18 percent of cadets across classes listed social groups (e.g., friends, clubs, athletic teams) as their most important ingroups. As expected (El.l), military and national ingroups were also very important in shaping cadets' self-conception. Some 10 percent of

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121

cadets in all four classes listed a military group as their first ingroup and some 3 percent viewed the United States as their most important reference group. Contrary to the initial expectation (El.l), the percentages remained constant across class years. This result indicates that military identity is a potent central life interest for cadets, but it does not replace the centrality of their other social identities. In sum, the data show no consistent change in cadets' primary reference group affiliations across classes. Nevertheless, traditional American values—family and friends, religion, honor, duty, country— seemed central to shaping cadets' reference group identifications. To what extent do the different reference groups influence cadets' value orientations? Cadets whose primary reference group was the military scored significantly higher on the warriorism scale (M = 3.88) than cadets who identified most strongly with their family, religion, or a social group (M = 3.51-3.62). They were also more patriotic than cadets who identified most strongly with any other group, although this difference was not significant statistically. Further, cadets who most strongly identified with the United States tended to be least supportive of global institutions (M= 2.32), followed by cadets whose first ingroup was the military (M = 2.69). Although only the differences in warriorism were significant statistically, the results are consistent with the directions in which identity was hypothesized to shape value orientations (E2.1, E2.2). Potent Identity Images

To account for contextual variations in the way that multiple identities interact and shape value orientations, cadets were not only compared in terms of their most important ingroup, but also in terms of whether or not they viewed any military or national reference groups as important to their self-conceptions. Respondents were assigned to one of two groups. Those who listed one or more military groups as important reference groups were classified as having a "potent military identity." Those who did not list any military reference groups were assumed to have a less potent ("latent") military identity. Similarly, cadets who mentioned the United States or any other national reference group as important to their self-conceptions were assumed to have a potent national identity, whereas those who did not specify any national groups were assumed to have a latent national identity. Table 6.1 shows potency of cadets' military and national identities broken down by class year. The data reveal no significant differences across classes in the percentage of cadets who strongly identified with a national ingroup. By contrast, the percentage of cadets who strongly identified with

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Table 6.1 Relationship between Class Status, National Identity, and Military Identity (in percentages; observed/expected frequencies in parentheses) Fourth Class (Freshmen)

Third Class (Sophomores)

Second Class (Juniors)

First Class (Seniors)

Total

Potent National Identity

13.7 (23/25)

14.0 (20/22)

16.8 (26/23)

16.5 (18/16)

15.1 (87)

Latent National Identity

86.3 (145/143)

86.0 (123/121)

83.2 (129/132)

83.5 (91/93)

84.9 (488)

Potent Military Identity

34.5 (58/77)

42.0 (60/65)

56.8 (88/71)

52.3 (57/50)

45.8 (263)

Latent Military Identity

65.5 (110/91)

58.0 (83/78)

43.2 (67/84)

47.7 (52/59)

54.2 (312)

29.2 (168)

24.9 (143)

27.0 (155)

19.0 (109)

100.0 (575)

Total

the military rose significantly across classes. While only little more than one-third of Fourth Class cadets listed at least one military ingroup (34.5%), more than half of Second Class cadets (56.8%) and First Class cadets (52.3%) stated that one or more military ingroups were important to their self-conceptions. These results confirm initial expectations that military socialization at West Point enhances the potency of cadets' military identities (El.2). Scale Comparisons for Military and National Identities

The effects of cadets' identities on their levels of patriotism, warriorism, and globalism were measured through a series of means-difference tests. Cadets whose military or national identities were potent were labeled "strong identifiers," while cadets with latent military or national identities were labeled "weak identifiers." Given self-selection and institutional recruitment, classifying cadets as either strong identifiers or weak identifiers holds meaning only with respect to other West Point cadets. Weak identifiers might still identify more strongly with the military or their nation than their peers at other service academies, civilian universities, or the U.S. population at large (see Hammill, Segal, and Segal 1995). Consequently, any reference to cadets as weak identifiers carries

THE SOCIAL IDENTITIES OF CADETS

123

weight only for comparisons with cadets who were classified as strong identifiers. The results are summarized in Table 6.2.5 Patriotism

The analysis found cadets to be very patriotic, as measured for the purpose of this study. Contrary to the initial expectation (E2.3), however, Table 6.2 reveals no significant differences in the patriotism scores of strong and weak military identifiers. Neither differences for the overall scale means nor for the mean responses to any individual statements were significant statistically. However, when compared in terms of their national identity (E2.4), strong identifiers scored significantly higher on the patriotism scale than weak identifiers (p < 0.05). While three of the six statements revealed no significant differences between the two groups, significantly more strong than weak identifiers "looked upon the Army as a 'calling' where they can serve their country" (86% vs. 75%) and thought that "an American should always feel that his or her primary allegiance is to his or her country" (97% vs. 90%). Warriorism

Analyzing the extent to which cadets' military and national identities affected their warriorism scores confirmed initial expectations (E2.3, E2.4). The differences between strong and weak military identifiers were statistically significant for the overall scale mean (p < 0.001) and for all but one individual measure. Perhaps most striking were attitudinal differences about the inevitability of war. While 85 percent of strong military identifiers agreed that "human nature being what it is, there will always be war," only 76 percent of weak identifiers agreed. Whereas almost three-fourths of strong identifiers (72%) expected to fight in a war "when they decided to pursue a military career," only slightly more than half of weak identifiers (53%) shared this expectation. Similarly, significantly more strong than weak identifiers agreed that the military's "most important role" (85% vs. 79%) and its "primary focus" (87% vs. 79%) was preparation for and conduct of combat operations. Consistent with initial expectations (E2.3), strong military identifiers also showed less positive attitudes toward peace operations. While almost half of all cadets agreed that "peacekeeping and other noncombat activities should be central to the military's functions" (45% of strong identifiers and 47% of weak identifiers), significantly more strong identifiers disagreed (37%) than did weak identifiers (28%). Similarly, fewer strong identifiers said they "would find peacekeeping

Table 6.2 Scale Responses by Strength of Identification with the Military and with the United States (std. dev. in parentheses) Potent Military Identity (N=263) Mean

Patriotism

% Agree/ % Disagee

3.91 4.00 4.46

79/9

124

2.78

91/4

4.27

32/55

3.98

88/4

3.98 (0.94)

Warriorism

76/18 79/11

3.76 4.21

45/37 72/18

4.44 (0.63)

91/4

4.07

85/9

33/52

0.12

89/4

0.07

72/16 83/9

0.04

2.82

0.09

4.34

0.12

4.10

0.09

4.03

0.22***

53/28

0.17

97/1 30/50

0.19*

93/5

0.18**

4.20

81/14

3.88

80/12

4.53

0.21**

33/54

0.03

88/4

0.14

73/17

0.22

4.03

81/10

0.00

(0.91)

3.58

(0.57)

90/4

(1.11)

(0.63)

4.40

0.22*

(0.75)

41/41

3.20

0.21*** 47/30

0.27

59/25

0.39**

80/12

0.34***

94/4

0.22**

(1.11)

77/14

3.45 (1.10)

89/4

(0.77)

93/5

2.79

3.79

3.84

75/10

(1.14)

(0.95)

79/12

4.39

Means Diff.

0.15*

(0.79)

(1.22)

0.46***

3.90

(0.55)

2.93

% Agree/ % Disagree

(0.95)

(0.95)

3.30

4.26

86/6

(1.08)

47/28

(0.74)

4.60

Mean

3.86

(0.83)

(0.99)

96/2

4.12

Latent National Identity (N=485)

(0.61)

(1.09)

3.24 (1.06)

4.02

4.01

(0.60)

(1.07)

(0.93)

Necessity of war

3.86

% Agree/ % Disagree

(0.87)

3.51

(1.06)

Preparation for war

14/9

(0.61)

(1.21)

Expectation to fight war

4.18

(0.89)

3.73 3.07

2.82

Mean

(0.48)

(1.09)

(0.62)

Centrality of peacekeeping (R)

0.05

(0.72)

(1.13)

Loyalty to U.S.

4.39

(1.10)

(0.80)

Fighting for U.S.

Means Diff.

(0.76)

(1.16)

Promotion of patriotism

3.88

Potent National Identity (N=87)

(0.93)

(0.77)

Military service

% Agree/ % Disagree

3.86

(0.95)

Allegiance to U.S.

Mean

(0.60)

(0.60)

Army as a "calling"

Latent Military Identity (N=312)

4.06 (0.99)

97/0

4.31 (0.71)

Reward from peacekeeping (R)

3.49

58/26

Focus on combat

4.18

87/7

(0.85)

Human nature

4.02

Stronger U.N.

85/11

2.87 (0.82)

65/19

2.26

18/66

79/10

0.26**

2.60

17/66

2.29

55/27

4.27

76/12

0.17*

3.87

88/3

67/15

0.03

82/11

0.30***

2.83 (0.85)

60/23

13/62

0.03

2.30

82/10

0.26**

80/12

0.06

3.68

0.16 67/16

0.23

21/56

0.23

15/65

0.03

54/10

0.35***

23/25

0.33**

93/2

0.25***

(111)

18/66

(1.03)

(1.03)

3.93

2.67

2.27

0.13

(0.91)

(1.18)

23/50

4.01

(0.90)

3.45

62/21

(0.91)

(0.84)

0.14

3.59 (1.18)

(0.76)

(1.01)

(1.14)

125

3.66

3.46 (1.15)

(1.08)

(1.05)

World government

3.85

2.73

2.30

0.15

(0.92)

(1.17)

U.N. control

3.94

(0.91)

3.63

63/19

(0.91)

(0.87)

Global Institutionalism

3.64 (1.13)

(1.22)

2.50 (1.04)

14/60

(1.06)

2.27 (1.08)

Career Commitment Commitment to military career

3.74

58/7

(0.89)

Serve until retirement

3.11

29/22

(1.05)

Pride in West Point

4.70 (0.65)

3.59

55/11

(0.97)

2.94

0.15

21/25

0.17

(1.04)

95/1

4.50 (0.75)

3.96

74/5

(0.83)

3.30

33/16

(0.97)

92/3

0.20***

4.80 (0.43)

3.61 (0.95)

2.97 (1.06)

99/0

4.55 (0.75)

Note: Items were measured on a five-point numerical Likert scale from "Strongly Agree" to "Strongly Disagree." Responses of "Strongly Agree" and "Agree" were combined as "% Agree"; responses of "Disagree" and "Strongly Disagree" were combined as "% Disagree." Responses to individual items were scored so that a high mean indicates a high level of agreement with the statement. For computation of overall scale scores, (R) items were revised. *Indicates significant difference (p < 0.05). **Indicates significant difference (p < 0.01). ***Indicates significant difference (p < 0.001).

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just as rewarding as warfighting" (58% vs. 26% who disagreed) than did weak identifiers (63% agreed and 19% disagreed). However, these differences were not significant statistically. Comparing cadets in terms of the strength of their national identity also confirmed initial expectations (E2.4). Overall, strong national identifiers were significantly more warrioristic than weak identifiers (p < 0.01). On average, agreement with the statements that the military's "most important role" and its "primary focus" was preparation for war was significantly higher among strong identifiers than among weak identifiers. Although eight out of ten cadets in either group thought war was an inevitable part of human nature, significantly more strong identifiers (77%) expected to personally fight in a war than did weak identifiers (59%). At the same time, strong national identifiers showed less support for peace operations than did weak identifiers. While nearly half of weak identifiers (47%) agreed t h a t peacekeeping and other noncombat activities should be central to the military's functions (30% disagreed), strong identifiers were evenly split in their opinion (41% agreed vs. 41% disagreed). However, this difference was not significant statistically. Global Institutionalism

Compared in terms of potency of military and national identities, cadets did not differ significantly in their overall support for the United Nations. Examining responses to individual scale items revealed only a few statistically significant differences. While twothirds of strong military identifiers (66%) disagreed that "the United Nations should be strengthened by giving it more control of the armed forces of all member nations," only half (50%) of weak identifiers disagreed (p < 0.001). Similarly, fewer strong national identifiers saw a stronger need for the United Nations (60%) and favored more U.N. control over its member nations' armed forces (18%) than did weak identifiers (67% and 21%, respectively). However, these differences were not significant statistically. Career Commitment Measures

Comparing cadets' commitment to the military revealed significant differences across the board. As expected (E2.5), both strong military and national identifiers were significantly more committed to a military career than weak identifiers. More strong identifiers than weak identifiers in either group planned to serve the Army until retirement (note that almost half of respondents were unde-

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127

cided on this question at the time the survey was administered), and showed greater pride in their decision to "attend and remain at West Point." Effects on Identity

The first part of the analysis assumed that the potency of social identities shape individuals' value orientations and might, subsequently, influence their actions. In this part of the analysis I examine the extent to which specific reference group identifications, demographic factors, and value orientations might enhance or reduce the potency of cadets' military and national identities. Potency of military and national identity was again coded as a binary response variable (1 for cadets who listed one or more military/ national groups as important to their self-conceptions and 0 for cadets who did not mention any military/national ingroups). The effects of demographic and attitudinal variables on cadets' identity were assessed through maximum likelihood estimations (MLE) using logistic regression models. Table 6.3 indicates that gender, military socialization (the effects of each class year were dummy coded), salience of national identity, and warriorism significantly enhanced the potency of cadets' military identities. The odds of having a potent military identity were twice as high for male cadets as for female cadets, and almost three times higher for cadets with a potent national identity than for those with a latent national identity. The odds were also higher for upper-class cadets (particularly Second Class cadets) and for cadets with strong warrioristic value orientations. These results indicate that military socialization, gender identity, warriorism, and a strong attachment to the nation tend to enhance the potency of military identity. Table 6.3 also reveals that other variables did not affect military identity significantly. Generally, military identity tended to be slightly more potent for cadets who had first considered a military career during the Cold War period, who indicated a preference for serving in one of the Combat Arms branches (e.g., infantry, armor, artillery), and who showed little support for global institutions. Conservative political beliefs and patriotic sentiments tended to reduce the potency of military identity somewhat, although none of these effects were significant statistically. Separate logistic regressions for each class year revealed that the import of gender, national identity, and warriorism for enhancing the potency of military identity changed across classes (see Table 6.4). While potent national identity was the most significant factor

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Table 6.3 Logit Model for Effects on Military Identity Variable

Coefficient

se(b)

Male

0.738

0.319

0.146**

2.093

First Class

0.425

0.289

0.093

1.529

Second Class

0.741

0.259

0.182***

2.099

Third Class

0.146

0.260

0.034

1.157

Combat Arms

0.240

0.415

0.334

1.271

Combat Arms-Technical

0.206

0.414

0.053

1.229

p

Odds Ratio

Combat Support

-0.116

0.434

-0.025

0.891

Decided during Cold War

0.156

0.198

0.043

1.168

Conservative Views

-0.095

0.207

-0.025

0.910

1.062

0.272

0.211****

2.893

Globalism

-0.071

0.118

-0.034

0.931

Warriorism

0.350

0.193

0.118*

1.419

Patriotism

-0.137

0.177

-0.045

0.872

Potent National Identity

Constant

-1.988

-2 LOG Likelihood (df=13)

60.059****

Goodness-of-Fit Statistic (df=8)

1.975

Note: Association of predicted probabilities and observed responses: -y = 0.388; Somer's D = 0.387. *Significant a t p < 0.1. **Significant a t p < 0.05. ***Significant a t p < 0.01. ****Significant a t p < 0.001.

for enhancing military identity among under-class cadets, national identity was less important in influencing military identity for upperclass cadets. This result is unsurprising, given the fact that strong and weak military identifiers did not differ significantly in their patriotism scores (see Table 6.2). For the first three class years, military identity appeared unaffected by cadets' levels of warriorism. However, by their senior year the odds to identify strongly with the military were 2.5 times higher for cadets who scored high on the warriorism scale than for lower scoring classmates. This result indicates that military socialization at West Point fosters a military identity committed to the combat-

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THE SOCIAL IDENTITIES OF CADETS

Table 6.4 Logit Coefficients for Significant Effects on Military Identity by Class Status All Cadets (N=574) P

Odds Ratio

Fourth Class (N=167)

Third Class (N=143)

Second Class (N=155)

p

Odds Ratio

p

Odds Ratio

p

Odds Ratio

First Class (N=109) p

Odds Ratio

Male

0.122

1.862*

0.023

1.130

0.257

3.630*

0.279

3.854**

0.011

1.061

Potent National Identity

0.223

3.094***

0.189

2.703*

0.364

6.654**

0.274

3.763*

0.083

1.498

Warriorism

0.146

1.530**

0.094

1.356

0.906

0.124

1.464

0.311

2.524*

-0.036

*Significant at p < 0.05. **Significant a t p < 0.01. ***Significant a t p < 0.001.

oriented warrior spirit. However, since support of the United Nations was not at all significant in forming military identity, cadets' socialization experiences might not equally foster commitment to U.N.-led noncombat operations. The odds for having a potent national identity were almost three times higher for cadets with a potent military identity than for cadets with a latent military identity. Apart from potency of military identity, no other factors enhanced cadets' national identity significantly. This result can be attributed to the virtually identical (relatively small) percentage of strong national identifiers across classes (see Table 6.1). In sum, the analysis suggests that socialization at West Point enhances military identity, but does not affect national identity significantly. This result is unsurprising given the structured military environment and the rigorous physical, emotional, and mental demands USMA places on its cadets. In addition, cadets typically already display strong patriotic sentiments upon entry into the academy (see Lovell 1964). Therefore it is unsurprising that the potency of cadets' national identities remained unaffected. Socializing W o m e n

While the odds for identifying with the military were virtually identical for Fourth Class male and female cadets, Third and Second Class male cadets were almost four times more likely than

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PREPARING FOR PEACE

their female classmates to view the military as important to their self-conceptions (see Table 6.4). One potential explanation for this difference may be found in the focus of cadet socialization. During the second and third year, especially while participating in summer fieldtraining exercises, cadets learn to apply basic soldier skills. Competitive Academic and Physical Program requirements combined with training emphasis on warrior skills and martial values are likely to enhance the potency of cadets' "combat-masculine-warrior" identity (Dunivin 1994; see also Ruddick 1989). This may in part account for the observed differences between male and female cadets. First Class cadets (male and female) serve as role models for under-class cadets (see United States Military Academy, Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis 1994b). Consequently, by their senior year, gender should no longer be a significant factor for predicting the potency of military identity images. Indeed, Table 6.4 reveals that the odds for male and female First Class cadets to have a potent military identity had almost evened. Nevertheless, the observed differences between male and female cadets raise the question of how effective West Point is in socializing female cadets for careers as commissioned officers, especially in light of recent incidents of gender discrimination and sexual harassment in the military (Center for Strategic and International Studies 1997; Vistica 1997; Thomas and Vistica 1997; Bullis and Wong 1995; U.S. General Accounting Office 1994; United States Military Academy, Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis 1994a; United States Military Academy, Office of the Dean 1994).6 While the data at hand do not allow conclusive inferences about the effects of socialization at West Point on the integration of women into the Corps of Cadets or the U.S. Army, the analysis provides some preliminary findings suggesting that this question should be examined more closely. Since female cadets are prohibited from selecting Infantry and Armor branches, only responses from cadets who indicated a preference for serving in either a Combat Support or a Combat Service Support branch were used for this analysis. Not surprising, male CS/CSS cadets were significantly more warrioristic, considerably more patriotic, and slightly less supportive of global institutions than their female counterparts. Interestingly, the data reveal significant overall socialization effects on military identity for male but not for female cadets (see Table 6.5). While three out of ten male under-class cadets (Fourth and Third Classes combined) identified strongly with the military, seven out often male upper-class cadets (Second and First Classes combined) displayed a potent military identity. The proportion of female cadets with a potent military identity was considerably lower than the proportion of male cadets and remained consistently low across

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THE SOCIAL IDENTITIES OF CADETS

Table 6.5 Effects of Class Status on Military Identity by Gender (CS and CSS cadets only)

Male Cadets Potent Military Identity

Female Cadets

Latent Military Potent Military Identity Identity

Latent Military Identity

Under Classes (Fourth and Third Classes)

17 (31%)

38 (69%)

6 (22%)

21 (78%)

Upper Classes (Second and First Classes)

16 (59%)

11 (41%)

5 (20%)

20 (80%)

Note: Statistics for gender subsamples: Male cadets: x2 (df = 1) = 6.053 (p = 0.014); Goodman and Krusal's Tb = 0.0541; 7 = 0.530. Female cadets: x2 (df = 1) = 0.033 (p = 0.845); Goodman and Krusal's Tb = 0.0007; 7 = -0.067. Statistics for entire table: x2 (df = 2) = 6.091 (p < 0.05); weighted Tb = 0.0350.

class years (only some 20% of female cadets irrespective of class status identified strongly with the military). These findings suggest that military socialization at USMA might be more effective in enhancing the military identity in male cadets than in their female counterparts. While this conclusion must remain speculative at this time, it indicates the need for further research into the socialization of female cadets. CONCLUSION

In this chapter I set out to examine the extent to which military socialization at West Point shapes cadets' identity images. By examining cadets' identification with and commitment to different social identities, I hoped to gain insight into their cognitive preparation for increasingly complex military missions. Overall, military socialization at West Point appeared to affect cadets' identifications with military and national groups differently. While their USMA experience did not enhance their identification with the United States, military reference groups became significantly more potent with length of exposure to military socialization. However, identification with the military did not render other reference groups less central to cadets' self-conceptions. Cadets with a potent military identity scored significantly higher on the warriorism scale than cadets whose self-conception was less strongly based on military reference groups. In addition, strong identifiers were slightly more patriotic, tended to be more strongly committed to a military career, and were less supportive of peace operations and global institutions than weak identifiers. In turn, cadets with a potent national identity tended to be more patriotic,

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PREPARING FOR PEACE

more warrioristic, and more strongly committed to a military career than cadets with a latent national identity. At the same time, they were less supportive of the United Nations. Overall, the analysis suggests that USMA continues to prepare its cadets effectively "to fight and win the nation's wars." USMA succeeds, at least for its male cadets, in shaping the traditional identity image of the "warrior." However, based on their responses, cadets' West Point experiences neither strengthened their support of the United Nations nor their commitment to noncombat missions. Given increasingly complex global security demands, these findings prompt the need for further research on the attitudes of military professionals toward expanding roles and widening mission requirements. Preparing future officers cognitively for multinational missions and for peace operations might increase their identification with noncombat roles and their commitment to OOTW. Shaping military identity to reflect mutual adherence to combat and noncombat values might be one way to strengthen force morale and improve mission performance in an increasingly complex security environment. Given the demonstrated impact of socialization on the military identity of cadets, there is no reason to believe that USMA could not effectively enhance the potency of cadets' noncombat identities, strengthen their commitment to peace operations, and improve their cognitive preparation for the military's dual-mission purpose. The results also affirm that the main tenets of social identity theory are applicable to normatively meaningful group identifications. Cadets who displayed potent military identity images tended to score higher on the warriorism and patriotism scales and were more committed to a professional career in the military than cadets whose military identity was less potent. In addition, these findings also confirm the assumption that self-categorization in terms of a social group enhances potency of the group identity which, in turn, can affect value orientations and stimulate or constrain behavior. Studying socialization at USMA extends the applicability of the social identity frame from the experimental laboratory environment to a genuine social field setting. The empirical results confirm that members of a social group (e.g., cadets at West Point) can perceive particular identity images as more or less potent. In turn, the data indicate that potency of military or national identity significantly affected respondents' attitudes. At this point, I should discuss one limitation with this part of the analysis. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the study measured socialization effects only within the context of the academic environment at USMA. However, changing contexts can invoke, enhance, or

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THE SOCIAL IDENTITIES OF CADETS

weaken p a r t i c u l a r identities (Wellman 1993; Brewer 1991; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). For instance, Faris (1995) found that participation in military exercises reinforced patriotic feelings and enhanced soldiers' national identity. The more welldefined a situation, the more easily individuals can invoke the identity image most appropriate to guide behavior. Invoking their identity as warriors during combat increases soldiers' ability to apply the kind of force necessary to win the battle. However, less well-defined peace operations may require soldiers to simultaneously function as peacekeepers and warfighters. Future research should assess which reference groups are relevant to military professionals (or, more generally, to individuals sharing membership in a social group) under different conditions. This way it might be possible to discover whether (and which) subidentities are enhanced as a result of changing contexts. If research corroborates the contention that value orientations and attitudes are contingent upon a combination of context and reference-group identifications, one might conclude that military personnel employ different cognitive frames to come to terms with varying mission assignments. This research might also indicate whether and the extent to which behavior (e.g., training for or participation in specific missions) can alter attitudes and values and, subsequently, improve or constrain mission effectiveness. For this study, I estimated the potency of identity by analyzing self-described reference-group identifications. But, as the literature on social identity indicates, individuals derive their selfconceptions from a combination of assimilation with ingroup categories and differentiation from outgroup categories (Brewer and Weber 1994; Brewer 1991; Hall 1989). Consequently, future research should also explore the importance of outgroup categorizations to the identity of military leaders. This research could point to potential problems that might arise, especially during multinational military operations, from perceived threats to national identity (Bloom 1990), or from a perceived need to establish and maintain ingroup superiority (Levin and Sidanius 1999; Sidanius et al. 1997; Sidanius 1993; Sidanius, Devereux, and Pratto 1992). NOTES 1. For instance, specific cadet company names (e.g., "E-3" or "H-4") that indicate identification with that particular cadet company were classified as "cadet company." Less inclusive classification codes for identifications with the military included "class of 19?? [year of graduation]," "U.S. Corps of Cadets (USCC)," or "Army" in general. All these identifications

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were recorded as separate subcategories of the "military/soldier" identity. Based on cadets' responses, similar classification schemes were devised for "religious," "ethnic/racial," "geographic," "ideological/political," "social issues," "gender," and "other" social reference groups. Subsequent analyses compared cadets' responses by degree of reference-group specificity for each classification scheme (e.g., "military" or "Army" versus "E-4 company"). No statistically significant differences were found. 2. Initial agreement among the judges was high (interrater reliability of 0.9514). The interrater reliability was computed as (n-d)/n, where n = number of total ratings and d = number of disagreements. Note that consistent disagreements (i.e., coders consistently disagreed in the same way on how to classify a particular response) were included only once in the number of disagreements. For instance, one judge consistently coded "American" or "U.S. Citizen" with the code for "Country/U.S.," while the other judge consistently coded this as "Ethnic." Similarly, one judge consistently coded sport groups (e.g., softball team, wrestling, etc.) as "Athletic Teams," while the other coded them simply as "Other." Discussing coding differences with the judges led them to agree to the same numeric code for each entry, thereby improving the interrater reliability to 1.00. Discussing judges' reasons for assigning a particular code revealed coding biases due to differing life experiences of judges and researcher. In agreeing on the same code, those biases were excluded from the analysis. 3. See Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion of the limitations of this research approach. 4. Based on his research on the stages of psychosocial development, Erikson (1963) found that by young adulthood individuals tend to depend less on parental guidance, establish a separate world, seek to find their personal identity, and begin to develop cooperative and occupational relationships with others. For further research on personal identity formation, see also Marcia et al. (1993). 5. Since no significant relationships were detected between potency of national and military identities and cadets' conservatism scores, conservatism was not further analyzed in the present context. 6. A 1994 report by the U.S. General Accounting Office suggested that over 90 percent of female cadets at West Point had experienced one or more forms of sexual harassment on a regular basis (U.S. Government Accounting Office 1994; see also Bullis and Wong 1995). A 1994 survey of USMA cadets found that consistently more than half of male cadets felt "totally accepted by their classmates," while less than one-third of female cadets felt accepted (see United States Military Academy, Office of the Dean 1994). Furthermore, while more than two-thirds of female cadets believed that "men and women are good for the Army/USMA," less than one-third of male cadets agreed. Interestingly, more female than male cadets agreed that "the integration of women has been a success" (66% of female vs. 54% of male cadets).

7 Professional Military Education: From Student to Officer

Civilian institutions were preeminently liberal in character, but no necessary conflict existed between them and professional military institutions, so long as each was kept within its proper sphere. The real problem was the ideological one, the American attitude of mind which sought to impose liberal solutions in military affairs as well as in civil life. Samuel Huntington (1957, 457) The new tasks of the military require that the professional officer develop more and more the skills and orientations common to civilian administrators and civilian leaders. Morris Janowitz (1960, 9)

The preceding chapters have provided evidence that West Point shapes the identities, values, and attitudes of its graduates. Responses to the Future Officer Survey indicate that USMA strengthens military identity, fosters traditional military values, and succeeds in preparing its graduates cognitively for combat tasks. However, although many cadets recognized the need for military involvement in peace operations, they tended to become less supportive of peacekeeping missions and the United Nations the longer they had been at West Point. In this chapter, I compare cadets' value orientations and attitudes to those of senior military officers and to a sample of cadets' generational peers attending Syracuse

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University. With this analysis I hope to isolate further the socializing influence of professional military education at West Point. The profession of arms is distinct from any other profession in American society. The basic components that make the military unique, Huntington (1957) argued, are service to the state, a deep sense of loyalty, and, perhaps most important, expertise in the application and management of violence. Because of these unique characteristics, Huntington contended, the military should remain separate from society. By contrast, Janowitz (1960) believed that the military's increasing engagement in constabulary tasks suggested a growing need for politically sensitive officers and challenged the traditional warrior conception of military professionalism. At the brink of the twenty-first century, some observers have noted, the military, as a servant of society, should reflect societal core values and culture. The dual-mission purpose indicates that the military "must adopt an identity that encompasses warfighting, peacekeeping, and disaster relief roles" (Dunivin 1994, 542). In addition, Dunivin conjectured that the military must alter its masculine combat warrior image and further integrate women and homosexuals into its ranks (see also Scott and Stanley 1994; Moskos 1993). Despite calls for greater social representativeness of the forces, a series of recent studies suggest that the ideological gap between the military and civilian society is widening (Holsti 1997; Ricks 1997). The purpose of this chapter is, in part, to examine the extent to which cadets at USMA are representative in their value orientations and attitudes of the U.S. Army Officer Corps and, more generally, of their civilian age peers. As noted earlier, many experts have argued that a force equipped and trained for combat can be equally well prepared to prevail in noncombat missions. Many of the specific skills needed for peacekeeping can be acquired prior to and during a peace operation (Department of the Army 1994, 1993; Huntington 1993; Sullivan 1993). Consistent with this argument, professional military education and mission experience should not only affect officers' skill levels but also their value orientations and their attitudes toward combat and noncombat missions. To examine these effects and find out whether and the extent to which cadets differ in their value orientations from experienced military leaders, the USMA sample was compared to a sample of seniorlevel military officers attending the U.S. Army War College. The results of the analysis provide a basis for recommendations regarding the extent to which precommissioning military socialization and professional military education should emphasize preparation for OOTW. In addition to the cadet-officer comparison, I compare cadets' survey responses to those of their generational peers attending a

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

137

private civilian university. Chapter 4 has illustrated the importance of self-selection, anticipatory socialization, and institutional recruitment of USMA cadets. Upon entry into the academy, many cadets are already strongly committed to traditional military values (see DeFleur and Warner 1987; Lovell 1964). In the second part of this chapter, I examine more closely self-selection as a factor enhancing the effects of military socialization by comparing the value orientations of USMA cadets to those of civilian students attending Syracuse University. This analysis will provide a baseline for comparing the effects of socialization on political attitudes across educational settings and for assessing how representative cadets are of their generational peers. Additional Measures

In addition to the CONS, PAT, WAR, and GLOB scales used in Chapters 5 and 6, the cadet, officer, and student cohorts were also compared in terms of their levels of individualism and collectivism. For this analysis subjects were asked to respond to an abbreviated version of the widely used Machiavellianism scale (Mach). Following the writings of Machiavelli, Christie and Geis (1970) developed a series of hypothetical personality traits that someone who is effective in controlling others (high Mach) should possess, among them a relative lack of affect in interpersonal relationships, little concern with conventional morality, and a focus on getting things done rather than on pursuing and achieving long-range ideological goals. These initial studies showed that high Machs were more likely than low Machs to become emotionally involved with others, with sensitive issues, or with saving face in embarrassing situations. They were also less susceptible to social pressures that might urge compliance, cooperation, or even attitude change. Low Machs, on the other hand, tended to be swayed more easily to do or accept what others wanted, at times even with little or no cognitive justification. Christie and Geis (1970) found that low Machs could be led more easily than high Machs into activities that violated their beliefs, although they tended to accept the implicit assumption that one ought to act guided by one's beliefs and believe in one's actions. In a recent study, Oyserman (1993) used the Mach scale to measure subjects' levels of individualism and collectivism. She found individuals with a strong individualist disposition (high Mach) to focus attention on self-actualization and attainment of personal goals. By contrast, collectivist individuals (low Mach) tended to focus on development of a set of common beliefs, attitudes, and practices and on "maintenance of social norms and performance of social

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duties as defined by the ingroup" (p. 993). Consistent with Christie and Geis, Oyserman described high Mach individuals as competitive, self- rather than other-oriented, and less inclined to value the group's success unless it can be used to their own advantage. By contrast, she found low Machs to be susceptible to affective involvement, focused on the group, and oriented toward interpersonal interactions. Given such military values as loyalty, commitment, and selfless service, USMA's motto "duty, honor, country," and the strong tradition of and need for unit cohesion (see, e.g., Shils and Janowitz 1948), comparing responses to the Machiavellianism scale across samples will provide useful insights into the effect of socialization on strength of group identifications. In addition, the Machiavellianism scale provides an instrument for assessing the cognitive implications of the changes in military structure, organization, and culture. Following the creation of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973, Moskos (1977) hypothesized that military service as a "calling to the nation" was giving way to views of military service as "just another job." He conjectured that the U.S. military was shifting from an institutional format, legitimized by values and norms transcending individual self-interest in favor of a presumed higher good, to an occupational format, legitimized primarily in terms of marketplace conditions, according to the empirical experiences of supply and demand, and not according to normative considerations. Consequently, the occupational model implies priority of (mainly economic) self-interest over group cohesion and collective benefits. Cadets' responses to the Mach scale provide a means for assessing the extent to which their decisions to pursue careers in the military might have been motivated by institutional (low Mach) or occupational (high Mach) factors. Consistent with Oyserman's (1993) conceptions, we would expect the military cohorts in this analysis to score lower on the Mach scale (high collectivism) than the civilian student cohort. In particular, the analysis will test the following hypotheses: H.l USMA cadets should be more collectivist and group oriented than Syracuse University (SU) students (i.e., they will score lower on the Mach scale). H.2 Mission experience and length of exposure to military socialization should raise collectivism (i.e., the Mach scores of senior officers should be lower than the Mach scores of cadets). Moreover, coming of age during a more community-oriented era (the 1960s and 1970s) should result in more collectivist attitudes. Hence, officers should score lower on the Mach scale than respondents in either of the other cohorts.

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139

H.3 If military traditions and notions of "duty, honor, country" and selfless service are conveyed effectively as part of the West Point experience, cadets' Mach scores should decline across classes. For this study, subjects were asked to respond to an abbreviated six-item version of the Mach scale: 1. Honesty Best. Honesty is the best policy in all cases. 2. People Won't Work. Generally speaking, people won't work unless they are forced to. 3. Cutting Corners. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there. 4. Moral Actions. One should take action only when one is sure it is morally right. 5. Vicious Streak. It is safe to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when they are given a chance. 6. Trust in Others. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble. MILITARY IDENTITY AND SERVICE EXPERIENCE Subjects and Design

The senior service colleges are the pinnacles of professional military education. The services draw their future leadership from among service college graduates. The student body at the U.S. Army War College, the focus of this research, represents carefully selected officers at the lieutenant colonel and colonel levels with sixteen to twenty-two years of active service experience. Attending a senior service college is usually the final step in professional military education, preparing officers for assignments at the highest levels of responsibility. Since most attendees have completed command tours in major units, the focus at the war colleges is on the strategic levels of warfare. For ten months, students learn about the integration of their service into joint and multinational operations, explore civil-military relations, and study the role of the military as one instrument for safeguarding national security alongside political, diplomatic, intelligence, and economic approaches. Emphasizing macrolevel national security strategy, "the war colleges strive to create officers who know how to think as opposed to what to think" (Center for Strategic and International Studies 1997, 41, emphases original). In a recent analysis, Hahn (1997) found that the war colleges pro-

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vided students with the "climate of relative intellectual freedom" necessary to "prepare the soldier-statesman for entry into the ranks of senior-level policymakers" (p. 53). The selection of students to the War Colleges is the prerogative of each service, and is usually highly competitive. In 1996, the overall admission rate at the senior service colleges was only 6.1 percent (see Hahn 1997). : While graduating from one of the War Colleges is by no means a guarantee for future success, military records show that personnel attending a War College are more likely to be promoted than their counterparts who did not attend a War College (see e.g., Center for Strategic and International Studies 1997; Ball 1984; Masland and Radway 1957). To assess the attitudes of mission-experienced officers, a slightly revised version of the Future Officer Survey was administered anonymously in March 1996 to all 325 students at the U.S. Army War College at Carlisle Barracks in southern Pennsylvania, about one-and-one-half hours north of Washington, D.C. The survey contained the same items that were included in the Future Officer Survey minus those statements that were specific to the West Point setting. Of the returned officer surveys, 155 were filled out and analyzed (a response rate of 47.7%). The War College Sample To account for value differences among the War College cohort that might be attributable to respondents' socialization experiences, officers' responses were initially compared by source of commission (e.g., USMA or any of the other service academies, the Reserve Officer Training Corps, or Officer Candidate School) and the officers' branch selections. More than half of the War College respondents (60%) had received their initial military training as members of the Reserve Officer Training Corps, while only one-quarter (25%) had graduated from one of the service academies (21% were USMA graduates). The remaining officers had received their officer commissions either directly or by graduating from Officer Candidate School. Some three-quarters of USMA graduates (72%) were Combat Arms officers, but only less than half of nonacademy graduates (44%) served in a Combat Arms branch. About one-fifth of officers in either group (17% USMA vs. 22% nonacademy graduates) were Combat Support officers, while significantly more nonacademy graduates served in Combat Service Support roles (32% vs. 6% of USMA graduates). Neither type of precommissioning socialization nor branch appeared to have influenced respondents' levels of conservatism, patriotism, globalism, or Machiavellianism. However, USMA graduates appeared more warrioristic than their peers who

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141

had received their officer preparation in one of the other socializing environments. But since the statistical significance was fairly low (p < 0.05) in a relatively small subsample (twenty-five West Point graduates), the responses of the officer cohort were grouped together for comparison with the Fourth and First Class cadet cohorts. Scale Comparisons by Service Experience

As in the previous analyses, the effects of military socialization and service experience on respondents' attitudes were assessed through multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs) with CONS, PAT, WAR, GLOB, and MACH as dependent variables and rank (i.e., Fourth Class cadets, First Class cadets, officers) as the independent variable. Overall, responses revealed strong adherence to patriotism (M= 3.95) and warriorism (M= 3.68), average levels of conservatism (M = 3.00), but relatively weaker support for global institutions (M = 2.67), and considerably low Machiavellianism scores (M= 2.32). The results are summarized in Table 7.1 (for the exact wording of the statements, see Chapter 5). Conservatism

Measured in terms of their responses to the four-item political conservatism scale, respondents appeared moderately conservative. Overall, First Class cadets and senior officers tended to be slightly more conservative than Fourth Class cadets. While respondents' attitudes toward government involvement in individuals' lives did not differ considerably, significantly more First Class cadets believed "the United States has gone too far in providing equal opportunity under the law" (53%) than did either entering cadets (34%) or senior officers (35%). Officers, on the other hand, were significantly more supportive of aiding underdeveloped countries. While almost two-thirds of officers (64%) agreed that "the United States should give economic help to the poorer countries of the world," only little more than one-third of cadets agreed with this statement (34% of Fourth Class cadets and 37% of First Class cadets). Since no other significant differences were detected, conservatism was not analyzed further. Patriotism

The data suggest that respondents in the officer and cadet cohorts were very patriotic. While mean patriotism scores for Fourth Class cadets and officers were virtually identical, scores for First Class cadets were significantly lower. Although three-fourths of

Table 7.1 Mean Scale Responses by Service Experience (percentage agree/percentage disagree in parentheses) Fourth Class Cadets (P) (Freshmen; N= 184)

First Class Cadets (F) (Seniors; N=125) 3.06

Officers (O) (N=147) 3.09

Means Differences P/F

P/O

F/O

Conservatism:

2.90

0.16

0.19

0.03

Economic help (R)

2.99

(34/29)

2.91

(37/37)

3.52

(64/13)

0.08

0.53***

0 61***

Equal opportunity

2.99

(34/39)

3.37

(53/32)

2.85

(35/41)

0.38*

0.14

0.52***

Health insurance (R)

2.69

(24/47)

2.71

(34/50)

2.58

(27/58)

0.02

0.11

0.13

Eradicate poverty (R)

3.69

(66/14)

3.43

(61/27)

3.47

(60/20)

0.26

0.22

0.04

Patriotism

4.01

0.20*

0.01

0.19*

Army as a "calling"

4.08

(82/4)

3.85

(75/12)

4.29

(93/2)

0.23*

0.21

0.44***

Allegiance to U.S.

4.55

(94/3)

4.41

(90/4)

4.55

(96/1)

0.14

0.00

0.14

Military Service

2.99

(35/45)

2.66

(27/64)

2.97

(40/43)

0.33*

0.02

0.31

Promotion of patriotism

4.25

(92/3)

4.24

(90/6)

4.29

(92/1)

0.01

0.04

0.05

Fighting for the U.S.

4.04

(78/11)

3.81

(74/21)

4.17

(86/10)

0.23

0.13

0.36*

Loyalty to U.S.

4.07

(82/9)

3.92

(78/15)

3.71

(71/13)

0.15

0.36**

0.21

Warriorism

3.41

0.44***

0.49***

0.05

4.00

.3.81

3.85

3.90

Centrality of peacekeeping (R)

3.52

(58/19)

2.72

(32/48)

2.60

(27/55)

0.80***

0.92***

0.12

Expectation to fight war

3.30

(50/30)

3.62

(68/20)

3.90

(75/8)

0.32*

0.60***

0.28

Preparation for war

3.84

(70/15)

4.48

(92/4)

4.56

(96/1)

0.64***

0.72***

0.08

Necessity of war

4.34

(95/3)

4.38

(97/2)

4.46

(99/0)

0.04

0.12

0.08

Reward from peacekeeping (R)

3.94

(74/10)

3.13

(45/37)

3.43

(57/25)

0.81***

0.51***

0.30

Focus on combat

3.80

(73/14)

4.27

(90/4)

4.44

(97/0)

0.47***

0.69***

0.17

Human nature

3.94

(80/9)

3.98

(83/11)

3.89

(81/9)

0.04

0.05

0.09

Global Institutionalism

2.91

0.27*

0.52***

0.25*

Stronger U.N.

3.69

(66/14)

3.53

(66/24)

3.52

(63/22)

0.16

0.17

0.01

U.N. control

2.59

(21/51)

2.26

(18/68)

1.68

(3/90)

0.33**

0.91***

0.58***

World government

2.42

(17/56)

2.17

(10/68)

1.92

(8/77)

0.25

0.50***

0.25

Machiavellianism

2.36

0.09

0.21***

0.30***

Honesty best (R)

4.37

(92/3)

3.79

(71/20)

4.57

(98/1)

0.58***

0.20

0.78***

People won't work

2.37

(19/70)

2.18

(14/78)

1.90

(8/86)

0.19

0.47***

0.28*

Cutting corners

2.43

(20/64)

2.38

(22/69)

2.43

(22/67)

0.05

0.00

0.05

Moral actions (R)

3.81

(73/13)

3.33

(54/29)

3.58

(62/18)

0.48***

0.23

0.25

Vicious streak

3.12

(42/33)

2.75

(33/56)

2.36

(17/67)

0.37**

0.76***

0.39**

Trust in others

2.55

(23/57)

2.50

(26/63)

2.37

(14/71)

0.05

0.18

0.13

2.64

2.39

2.45

2.15

Note: Scale items were measured on a five-point numerical Likert scale from "Strongly Agree" to "Strongly Disagree." Responses of "Strongly Agree" and "Agree" were combined as "% Agree"; responses of "Disagree" and "Strongly Disagree" were combined as "% Disagree." Responses to individual items were scored so that a high mean indicates a high level of agreement with the statement. For computation of overall scale scores, (R) items were reversed. *Significant a t p < 0.05. **Significant a t p < 0.01. ***Significant a t p < 0.001.

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First Class cadets (75%) said they "looked upon the Army as a calling where I can serve my country," significantly more Fourth Class cadets (82%) and senior officers (93%) shared that view. Similarly, two-thirds of First Class cadets (64%) disagreed that "the strongest indicator of good citizenship is performance of military service in defense of one's country" (45% of Fourth Class cadets and 43% of senior officers disagreed), and significantly fewer of them thought "all Americans should be willing to fight for their country" (74%) than did senior officers (86%). Also, officers displayed greater concern for global cooperation than cadets. While more than eight in ten Fourth Class cadets (82%) agreed that "we should strive for loyalty to our own country before we can afford to consider world brotherhood," fewer First Class cadets (78%) and officers (71%) shared this perception. Warriorism

Overall, respondents scored higher on the warriorism scale the longer they had served in the military. While First Class cadets and senior officers showed virtually the same mean scale score, both cohorts were significantly more warrioristic than the cohort of entering cadets (p < 0.001). This result suggests that commitment to the "warrior-spirit" is inculcated already as part of officers' precommissioning socialization. Examining respondents' attitudes toward individual statements revealed significant differences between these cohorts for all but two measures. The longer respondents had served in the armed forces, the more strongly they tended to view combat as the military's primary focus, and the higher their initial expectation had been to fight in a war. While more than two-thirds of Fourth Class cadets thought that "the most important role" (70%) and the "primary focus" (73%) of the military was preparation for and conduct of combat operations, almost all First Class cadets (92% and 90%) and officers (96% and 97%) viewed combat as the military's main purpose. Along the same lines, significantly fewer Fourth Class cadets had expected to fight in a war "when they decided to pursue a military career" (50%) than either First Class cadets (68%) or officers (75%). This response pattern could be attributable to the time period during which respondents had first thought of a military career. While most Fourth Class cadets had decided on a military career after the end of the Cold War, the majority of First Class cadets had reached their career decision while the Cold War was still going on (see Chapter 5). Officers, on the other hand, had made their career choice, received their precommissioning socialization

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and intermediate-level professional military education, and gained much of their active duty experience during the Cold War period. The longer respondents had served, the less they tended to view "peacekeeping and other non-combat activities to be central to the military's functions." While more than half of Fourth Class cadets (58%) viewed peacekeeping as central, less than two-thirds of First Class cadets (32%) and even fewer officers (27%) shared this view. Similarly, significantly more Fourth Class cadets (74%) than respondents with more military experience thought they would find or had found "peacekeeping just as rewarding as war fighting." While less than half of First Class cadets thought they could get the same personal satisfaction out of participating in combat and noncombat operations (45%), this number increased with actual mission experience (57% of officers). The lower score for the First Class cohort may again be attributable to USMA's socialization focus on traditional military values. Global Institutionalism

In contrast to the relatively high patriotism and warriorism scores in all three groups, respondents' overall support for global institutions was fairly low and decreased significantly across cohorts. Although some two-thirds of respondents in all three groups agreed that "the increasing multinational character of military missions since the end of the Cold War shows the need for a stronger United Nations," their attitudes toward "United Nations control over the armed forces of all member nations" tended to be less positive with increasing service experience. While only half of Fourth Class cadets (51%) disagreed that the United Nations "should be strengthened by giving it more control of the armed forces of all the member nations," over two-thirds of First Class cadets (68%) and nine out often officers (90%) disagreed (p < 0.001). Similarly, disagreement with the statement that "a world government is the best way to ensure international peace" increased significantly across cohorts from little over half (56% of Fourth Class cadets) to more than threefourths (77% of officers; p < 0.001). Again, the lower scores among officers may in part be attributable to their military socialization during the Cold War era. Machia vellianism

On average, respondents scored relatively low on the abbreviated Mach scale. As hypothesized (H.2), Mach scores for the officer cohort were significantly lower (M= 2.15; p < 0.001) than for either cadet

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cohort. Almost all Fourth Class cadets (92%) and officers (98%) thought "honesty is the best policy in all cases," but less than three-fourths of First Class cadets (71%) shared this view. Similarly, only little more than half of First Class cadets (54%) agreed that "one should take action only when one is sure that it is morally right," while almost two-thirds of officers (62%) and nearly three-quarters of plebes (73%) agreed. On the other hand, the percentage of respondents who agreed that "it is safe to assume that all people have a vicious streak" decreased significantly the longer they had served in the military (from 42% of Fourth Class cadets to 17% of officers; p < 0.001). Contrary to expectations (H.3), the mean Mach score of First Class cadets was slightly higher (M = 2.45) than that of Fourth Class cadets (M= 2.36). While the overall means difference was not significant statistically, significantly more Fourth Class than First Class cadets agreed that "honesty is the best policy in all cases" (92% vs. 71%) and that "one should take action only when one is sure it is morally right" (73% vs. 54%). However, significantly more Fourth Class cadets than First Class cadets also believed that "all people have a vicious streak" (42% vs. 33%). These results could simply be attributable to the highly competitive West Point environment as evidenced, for instance, by the rigorous class ranking system (see Chapter 4). However, cadets' responses to the Mach scale suggest that they might become somewhat less suspicious of others, but also that they might hold their own actions to less stringent moral standards with increasing exposure to military socialization. Perhaps cadets perceive the academy's rules governing moral actions to be set unrealistically high. As a result, they might feel that they cannot complete the educational regimen by adhering to standards that may seem unachievable. These results and recent reports of cheating, drug abuse, theft, and sexual harassment in the service academies (see Center for Strategic and International Studies 1997; Bullis and Wong 1995) may suggest the need for careful reassessment of the instruction on the Honor Code and System. Mutual Adherence to Values

In order to assess respondents' mutual adherence to patriotism, globalism, warriorism, and Machiavellianism, the response sample was split into two groups of equal size for each of the four value scales (see Figure 7.1). Respondents in each cohort were designated "high" or "low" scorers, depending on whether their individual mean scale score fell above or below the overall sample median for the respective scale. Again, readers should be reminded that none of the findings can be used to make inferences beyond this sample of

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Figure 7.1 Mutual Adherence to Values (in Percentages)

military professionals. Thus, respondents who are labeled low scorers on patriotism (or high scorers on globalism) might still be significantly more patriotic (or less globalistic) than other military personnel or the U.S. population at large. Consequently, any reference to respondents as low scorers on a particular value scale car-

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Figure 7.1 {continued)

ries weight only for comparisons with respondents who scored high on that scale. Generally, the findings were consistent with those presented in Table 7.1. Overall, respondents scored higher on the warriorism scale the longer they had served in the military (adding together

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the percentages for the two high quadrants). While only one-quarter of Fourth Class cadets showed high warriorism scores (26%), over half of First Class cadets (54%) and nearly two-thirds of officers (62%) scored high on the warriorism scale. At the same time, with increasing service experience, respondents tended to be significantly less supportive of global institutions. While more than half of Fourth Class cadets (56%) displayed high globalism scores, slightly fewer First Class cadets (47%) but significantly fewer officers (24%) revealed strong globalism scores. Consistent with earlier findings, most respondents scored high on the patriotism scale. While the percentage of high scorers decreased slightly across cadet cohorts (from 60% to 47%), it increased again for officers (60% of high scorers). In addition, mission experience appeared to affect Machiavellianism negatively. While cadets' overall Mach score increased slightly between Fourth Class (58%) and First Class (64%), significantly fewer officers (36%) displayed high Mach scores. Figure 7.1 also reveals strong positive correlations between patriotism and warriorism for all three cohorts (r > 0.31) and fairly strong negative warriorism/globalism correlations (r > -0.25). Correlations between patriotism and globalism were negative for all cohorts, but overall fairly weak. Correlations between Machiavellianism and the other value scales were insignificant. These results suggest that military socialization and service experience enhance warriorism and preserve patriotism, but weaken self-centered individualism, as measured by the Mach scale, and reduce support for global institutions. Of course, these inferences should be reexamined longitudinally. The data indicate that military socialization at West Point enhances cadets' warrior spirit and prepares them cognitively for combat. Active duty experience appeared to further strengthen this combat identity and to increase patriotic sentiments as measured in the present context. At the same time, Machiavellianism decreased with increased service experience. This suggests growing collectivism, group cohesion, and potency of military identity as a result of professional military education and service experience. The scale correlations for the three groups indicate that, while adherence to traditional values became stronger with increasing service experience, military socialization and mission experience tended to weaken respondents' support for global institutions, especially the United Nations. Again, this result suggests that if U.S. forces continue to be charged with combat operations and OOTW, professional military education at all levels should bolster cognitive preparation for this dual-mission purpose.

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MILITARY IDENTITY AND ACADEMIC BACKGROUND Subjects and Design

Citizens who come of age during particular periods of history often exhibit distinct attitudes and patterns of behavior. America's post-baby-boom generation is decidedly different from previous generations. During their formative years, the members of Generation X, as this age cohort is commonly referred to, had to contend, among other factors, with the breakdown of the nuclear family; severe challenges to the educational system; a steady rise in crime; the political, economic, and social ramifications of the Cold War; the legacy of the unpopular Vietnam War; and the absence of war or any other major social or political upheaval that could have formed a collective outlook. As a result, Gen Xers tend to be disengaged politically, with lower voter turnouts and a fairly high degree of political cynicism compared to previous young generations. Cohn (1992) found that many Gen Xers displayed severe distrust in government and focused their social activities primarily outside the political realm (see also Howe and Strauss 1993). Not surprising, given these experiences, the values of Gen Xers are shaped by a generational mentality emphasizing independence, self-sufficiency, and supremacy of material values over teamwork, community, or civic virtue (see Janowitz 1983). Of course, this generational outlook is inconsistent with traditional military values like "duty, honor, country" or service before self. Empirical evidence suggests that Gen Xers are somewhat less patriotic than preceding generations (Owen 1997; Owen and Shumate 1997) and, consistent with Moskos's (1977) observed I/O-shift, they are motivated to join the military more by personal benefits (e.g., educational financing or job training) than they are by an intrinsic desire to serve their country. 2 How do Gen Xers view post-Cold War security issues? Owen and Shumate (1997) found that respondents from their sample of young males aged sixteen to twenty-one who expressed interest in signing up for military service tended to view the opportunity to engage in nontraditional military missions, especially to provide disaster relief, more positively than to serve in a more traditional war scenario. In contrast, the analysis in Chapter 5 found USMA cadets to prefer participation in traditional combat operations to involvement in OOTW. Also, Owen and Shumate found that likely joiners were more inclined to note the significance of "doing something for their country" than their peers who were less likely to join

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the military. This is consistent with the relatively high levels of patriotism among USMA cadets, as measured by the Future Officer Survey. Finally, consistent with their USMA peers, Owen and Shumate found that civilian Gen Xers did not have an overwhelming desire to pursue missions on foreign soil. For example, when asked to rank order types of missions, they preferred disaster relief assistance within the United States (62%) over worldwide assistance (45%) and U.N. peacekeeping missions (29%). The following hypotheses were derived for the comparison of attitudes across educational settings: H.4 Given self-selection, anticipatory socialization and an educational environment steeped in military tradition, West Point cadets should be more conservative, patriotic, and warrioristic than civilian college students. H.5 In contrast, given greater campus diversity and the more liberal nature of a civilian college environment, SU students should be more supportive of peace operations and of global institutions. H.6 The value differences between military and civilian students should be magnified as a result of their respective college experiences (i.e., cadets should become more committed to traditional military values, while civilian students should become less conservative, warrioristic, and patriotic, and more supportive of peace operations and global institutions). To compare the value orientations of future military elites with those of their civilian peers, a revised version of the Future Officer Survey—statements referring to respondents' direct involvement in military tasks or to particulars of the West Point setting were either deleted or revised to fit the civilian academic environment— was administered to 372 students in entry- and upper-level social science classes at Syracuse University between January and April 1996. One limitation of this research is that the data were collected from a nonrandomly selected sample of students from only one private university. Unlike their West Point peers, only some 5 percent of students in the SU sample were science and engineering majors. Nevertheless, the demographic distribution of the SU sample was consistent with demographics reported for many private universities in the United States in terms of ethnic and socioeconomic background, family income, and parental education. 3 While the data at hand can only render an exploratory comparison of the value orientations of future military and civilian leaders, the analysis nonetheless provides a baseline for evaluating the effects of secondary educational socialization on students in different academic settings.

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Further research should extend this study to include students from other public and private academic institutions, members of ROTC, and student officers from the other service academies. Results

The effects of socialization by academic environment on respondents' attitudes were assessed through separate t-test analyses. The between-sample test compared the overall scale and item scores across educational cohorts. The within-sample test compared scale and item scores between freshmen and seniors separately in both samples. 4 The results are summarized in Table 7.2. Conservatism

The analyses in Chapter 5 revealed no significant differences in conservatism scores across USMA classes. For the SU sample, Table 7.2 shows a slight decline in the overall conservatism score between freshmen and senior classes. Although seniors displayed less conservative attitudes on all four scale items, this difference was significant only with regard to their attitude toward giving "economic help to the poorer countries of the world" (58% of seniors vs. 31% of freshmen were supportive; p < 0.001). While within-sample differences were not significant statistically, it is interesting to note that cadets' attitudes tended to grow slightly more conservative the longer they had been at West Point, while students' attitudes tended to become less conservative across classes. Although not significant statistically, the observed value change among civilian students seems to confirm the assumption that political conservatism will decline with increasing levels of political sophistication (Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 1991; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Bachman, Sigelman, and Diamond 1987; Astin 1977; Converse 1964). However, value changes among cadets in the opposite direction suggest that these tendencies might not be as generalizable as commonly presumed. In addition, the fact that changes in civilian students' conservatism scores across classes were not significant statistically suggests that self-selection, institutional recruitment, and anticipatory socialization may affect private universities just as much as the service academies. Subsequent research should more closely examine socialization effects across different educational settings. As hypothesized (H.4), the between-sample differences were highly significant statistically. Overall, USMA cadets were significantly more conservative than SU students (p < 0.001). This result

Table 7.2 Student Attitudes by Academic Background (percentage agree/percentage disagree in parentheses) Syracuse University Freshmen (N=131) Conservatism

2.57

Seniors (N=53) 2.28

U.S. Military Academy Freshmen (N=184) 2.90

Seniors (N=125) 3.06

All Respondents dlSU N=371)

All USMA (N=645)

2.44

2.98***

Economic help (R)

2.89 (31/37)

3.53*** (58/13)

2.99 (34/29)

2.91 (37/37)

3.12 (42/28)

2.99* (36/32)

Equal opportunity

2.56 (25/60)

2.27 (15/65)

2.99 (34/39)

3.37* (53/32)

2.43 (20/63)

3.17*** (45/35)

Health insurance (R)

3.53 (62/18)

3.55 (56/25)

2.69 (24/47)

2.71 (34/50)

3.62 (63/18)

2.66*** (28/51)

Eradicate poverty (R)

3.86 (76/13)

4.04 (81/11)

3.69 (66/14)

3.43 (61/27)

3.93 (79/11)

3.55*** (63/21)

3.19

3.87***

Patriotism

3.25

3.06

Army as a "calling"

4.01

3.81*

4.08 (82/4)

3.85* (75/12)

—

3.91 (75/10)

Allegiance to U.S.

3.95 (80/14)

3.79 (66/17)

4.55 (94/3)

4.41 (90/4)

3.85 (75/14)

4.40*** (90/4)

Military service

2.18 (13/75)

1.89* (6/87)

2.99 (35/45)

2.66* (27/64)

2.11 (12/78)

2.78*** (31/54)

Promotion of patriotism

3.65 (65/16)

3.53 (68/26)

4.25 (92/3)

4.24 (90/6)

3.57 (63/18)

4.20*** (89/4)

Fighting for the U.S.

2.75 (36/55)

2.66 (32/55)

4.04 (78/11)

3.81 (74/21)

2.76 (34/52)

3.90*** (74/17)

Loyalty to U.S.

3.77 (68/13)

3.42* (57/25)

4.07 (82/9)

3.92 (78/15)

3.68 (68/17)

4.02*** (81/10)

2.97

2.81**

Global Institutionalism

2.93

3.07

2.91

2.64*

Stronger U.N.

3.61 (58/14)

3.88 (76/16)

3.69 (66/14)

3.53 (66/24)

3.70 (64/12)

3.64 (66/17)

U.N. control

2.62 (26/53)

2.60 (26/53)

2.59 (21/51)

2.26** (18/68)

2.66 (25/50)

2.46** (21/57)

World government

2.55 (23/53)

2.58 (20/52)

2.42 (17/56)

2.17 (10/68)

2.53 (21/54)

2.28*** (15/64)

1

Table 7.2 (continued) Syracuse University Freshmen (N=131) Warriorism Centrality of Peacekeeping (R) Expectation to fight war

3.05 3.71 (67/17)

—

U.S. Military Academy Freshmen (N=184)

Seniors (N=53)

Seniors (N=125)

All Respondents A11SU (N=371)

All USMA (N=645)

3.41

3.85***

2.92

3.60***

3.94 (79/8)

3.52 (58/19)

2.72*** (32/48)

3.75 (69/16)

3.16*** (46/32)

—

3.30 (50/30)

3.62* (68/20)

—

3.49 (60/25)

2.83

Preparation for war

2.99 (43/41)

2.62* (21/56)

3.84 (70/15)

4.48*** (92/4)

2.78 (34/50)

4.10*** (82/10)

Necessity of war

3.92 (82/6)

3.91 (83/8)

4.34 (95/3)

4.38 (97/2)

3.85 (80/10)

4.33*** (94/3)

3.50 (62/27)

3.76 (70/18)

3.94 (74/10)

3.13*** (45/37)

3.75 (72/17)

3.59* (62/21)

Focus on combat

2.96 (38/42)

2.77 (27/48)

3.80 (73/14)

4.27*** (90/4)

2.84 (32/45)

4.05*** (83/8)

Human nature

3.59 (71/19)

3.42 (62/26)

3.94 (80/9)

3.98 (83/11)

3.49 (66/23)

3.92*** (80/12)

Reward from Peacekeeping (R)

Machiavellianism

2.75

2.72

2.44***

Honesty best (R)

3.61 (69/21)

3.66 (74/19)

4.37 (92/3)

3.79*** (71/20)

3.60 (68/20)

4.00*** (81/12)

People won't work

2.32 (18/74)

2.25 (17/79)

2.37 (19/70)

2.18 (14/78)

2.27 (18/76)

2.26 (16/74)

Cutting corners

3.27 (57/34)

3.10 (48/38)

2.43 (20/64)

2.38 (22/69)

3.20 (53/34)

2.49*** (23/63)

Moral actions (R)

3.46 (55/20)

3.31 (51/24)

3.81 (73/13)

3.33*** (54/29)

3.35 (51/24)

3.60** (64/20)

Vicious streak

3.05 (46/36)

2.72 (32/54)

3.12 (42/33)

2.75** (33/56)

2.91 (40/43)

3.02 (41/41)

Trust in others

2.97 (44/44)

2.94 (45/47)

2.55 (23/57)

2.50 (26/63)

2.90 (41/47)

2.54*** (25/60)

2.36

2.67

2.45

Note: Scale items were measured on a five-point numerical Likert scale from "Strongly Agree" to "Strongly Disagree." Responses of "Strongly Agree" and "Agree" were combined as "% Agree"; responses of "Disagree" and "Strongly Disagree" were combined as "% Disagree." Responses to individual items were scored so that a high mean indicates a high level of agreement with the statement. For computation of overall scale scores, (R) items were reversed. *Significant a t p < 0.05. **Significant a t p < 0.01. ***Significant a t p < 0.001. 153

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corresponds to the findings of a recent study comparing cadets at the U.S. Naval Academy with students attending public four-year colleges (see Cochran and Malone 1997). Perhaps most pronounced was this difference in terms of respondents' attitudes toward social welfare. Almost two-thirds of SU students (63%) agreed that "the federal government should provide health insurance for every American," but only one-quarter of cadets (28%) shared this view. Similarly, significantly more students (79%) than cadets (63%) thought "the government should do anything it can to eradicate poverty." In contrast, while nearly half of cadets (45%) agreed that the United States had "gone too far in providing equal opportunity under the law," only two in ten students (20%) shared this view. These findings are consistent with the results of a recent study that found military officers to generally take more conservative positions on economic issues (i.e., relaxing environmental regulations, redistributing income, reducing the defense budget) than civilian opinion leaders (Holsti 1997).5 Patriotism

Although cadets were found to be very patriotic, their overall patriotism score decreased across classes. This change in attitude was attributed primarily to the fact that, apart from their military training, First Class cadets had also completed three more years of college, filled with continuous exposure to new and diverse attitudes, ideas, and beliefs. Consequently, civilian college students should also display lower patriotism scores with increased length of college socialization. As expected (H.6), Table 7.2 shows that the patriotism scores for SU seniors were lower than for SU freshmen for all six items, although this difference was only slightly significant (p < 0.05) for two of the four items. By contrast, the between-sample comparison for patriotism revealed highly significant differences between cadets and students for the overall scale score as well as for each of the six items. While nine in ten cadets agreed that "an American should always feel that his or her primary allegiance is to his or her country" (90%) and that the "promotion of patriotism should be an important aim of citizenship education" (89%), significantly fewer students felt this way (75% and 63%, respectively). Similarly, eight in ten cadets (81%) agreed that "we should strive for loyalty to our own country before we can afford to consider world brotherhood," while only two-thirds of students (68%) agreed. While three-quarters of cadets (74%) thought that "all Americans should be willing to fight for their country," only one-third of students (34%) shared this view. Finally, more

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than three-quarters of students (78%) disagreed that "the strongest indicator of good citizenship is performance of military service in defense of one's country." Not surprising, significantly fewer cadets (54%) disagreed with this statement. Warriorism

The analyses thus far found socialization at West Point to increase cadets' warriorism scores significantly, to the point where the scores of graduating cadets were only slightly below those of mission-experienced officers. Given civilian academic socialization at Syracuse University, students were expected to show significantly lower warriorism scores than their USMA peers (H.4). Moreover, their warriorism scores, if at all subject to change, should decrease across classes. Indeed, Table 7.2 reveals a within-sample decline in the overall warriorism score and in the mean scores for items measuring combat attitudes. However, the only significant difference between the freshmen and senior classes was students' responses to the statement that "the most important role of the U.S. military is preparation for and conduct of war." Twice as many freshmen (43%) as seniors (21%; p < 0.05) agreed with this statement. In contrast to the combat items, when asked about the centrality of peacekeeping and the reward of peacekeeping operations for soldiers, more seniors showed support for these missions than freshmen. However, these differences were not significant statistically. Consistent with the other measures of traditional military values, the between-sample comparison revealed significant differences in respondents' overall level of warriorism (p < 0.001), as well as for each individual item score. More than eight in ten cadets thought that "the most important role of the U.S. military is preparation and conduct of war" (82%) and that "the U.S. military's primary focus should be on preparation for and conduct of combat operations" (83%), while only one-third of students shared this enthusiasm for combat operations (34% and 32%, respectively). Similarly, significantly more cadets than students agreed that sometimes war was necessary (94% vs. 80%) and that "human nature being what it is, there will always be war" (80% vs. 66%). In turn, students were significantly more supportive of noncombat operations. More than two-thirds (69%) felt "peacekeeping and other non-combat operations should be central to the military's functions," but fewer than half of the surveyed West Pointers (46%) agreed with this statement. At the same time, significantly more students than cadets felt that peace operations should be just as rewarding as combat missions (72% vs. 62%).

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Global Institutionalism

The earlier analyses revealed that cadets' globalism scores were fairly low and declined across class years. In contrast, the level of support for the United Nations was slightly stronger for SU seniors than for SU freshmen, but this difference was insignificant statistically. Again this could be the result of students' college experience, exposing them to cultural, social, and intellectual diversity. By their senior year, more than three-quarters of students (76%) agreed that "the increasing multinational character of military missions since the end of the Cold War shows the need for a stronger United Nations." Only about half of freshmen (58%) saw the need for a stronger United Nations. Interesting to note is the fact that less than 25 percent of respondents in either sample agreed that "the U.N. should be strenghtened by giving it more control of the armed forces of all member nations" (25% of students and 21% of cadets) and that "a world government is the best way to ensure international peace" (21% of students and 15% of cadets). Machia vellianism

USMA cadets scored relatively low on the Mach scale. Again, the observed slight increase in Mach scores across classes may be attributable to the competitive structure of the West Point environment. As hypothesized (H.l), the cadet mean scale score was significantly lower than the mean student score (p < 0.001). Significantly more cadets than students agreed that "honesty is the best policy in all cases" (81% vs. 68%) and that "one should take action only when one is sure that it is morally right" (64% vs. 51%). Consistent with these results, students appeared significantly more self-interested (ego-involved) than cadets. While less than one-quarter of cadets (23%) believed that "it is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there," more than half of students (53%) agreed with this statement. Similarly, significantly more students than cadets agreed that "anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble" (41% vs. 25%). No significant differences in item scores between freshmen and seniors were found for the SU sample. Interesting to note is the fact that cadets' overall Mach scores increased slightly, while those of civilian students decreased slightly. The fact that the difference between SU and USMA freshmen is highly significant suggests that cadets might indeed have been motivated to pursue their education at USMA by institutional factors and collectivist aspirations, while SU students on average may have made their college choice in response to perceived occu-

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pational benefits. USMA's mandate, "to develop leaders of character to serve the national defense," combined with the fact that USMA recognizes candidates' prior societal activities and leadership experiences in its admission decisions, suggests that individuals who apply to military academies may differ, at least in those respects, from their generational peers who apply to and attend civilian colleges and universities (see Chapter 4; see also Cochran and Malone 1997; Hammill, Segal, and Segal 1995). If self-selection is indeed a significant factor and collectivist educational settings attract students whose orientation is also collectivist, then one should find strong group cohesion and collectivist attitudes among students who enter other institutions of higher education that are based on a strong group identity. Subsequent research could examine the effects of socialization in other educational settings founded on the basis of strong group identities (e.g., denominational colleges, seminaries, or single-gender institutions). CONCLUSION

The purpose of this chapter was to compare the value orientations and attitudes of USMA cadets to those of experienced officers and civilian generational peers. Based on the assumption of a strong association between attitudes, morale, and performance, analyzing the values and attitudes of military professionals at different stages of their careers enables us to assess their levels of cognitive preparation for different mission assignments. Similarly, comparing the effects of socialization on attitudes across academic settings provides valuable insights into the effects of distinct educational socialization processes and allows us to measure the representativeness of future military leaders of their generational cohort. While this research cannot provide conclusive explanations for observed attitudinal differences among cadets, civilian undergraduate students, and senior officers, it can render preliminary inferences about the impact of professional military education, educational socialization, and service experience on value orientations. Although the data show changes in attitudes and values over the duration of civilian college education, none of these differences were significant statistically. While previous research has found college education to have a "liberalizing" effect on students' values and attitudes (Alwin, Cohen, and Newcomb 1991; Astin 1977; Newcomb 1943), a recent study by Cochran and Malone (1997) found that students' undergraduate experiences had virtually no effect on their political attitudes. Consistent with these findings, the data at hand indicate that socialization effects on attitudes may not be as strong

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as reported in past research. Perhaps the "liberalizing" experience of attending college has given way to an interest in maximizing one's self-interest and achieving economic well-being, financial security, and self-fulfillment. Comparing respondents' Machiavellianism scores across cohorts certainly substantiates this implication. Overall, survey responses across military cohorts revealed strong levels of patriotism and warriorism and fairly low scores on the Machiavellianism and globalism scales. While socialization at West Point reduced cadets' patriotism scores slightly, active duty experience appeared to strengthen patriotic sentiments again. Although First Class cadets scored significantly higher on the warriorism scale than Fourth Class cadets, their overall warriorism score was only insignificantly lower than that of commissioned officers. This suggests that military leaders become committed to the warrior spirit early on in their professional socialization. While military socialization and service experience appeared to increase cognitive preparation for combat operations, officers viewed peacekeeping as less central to the military's functions and responded that these missions might be less rewarding than did entering cadets. At the same time, officers' overall support for global institutions was significantly lower than that of respondents in either cadet cohort. Further research should examine whether and the extent to which these attitudinal differences can be attributed to adjustments in military socialization in response to changing security needs, to the fact that officers had decided on a military career during the Cold War, to particular experiences officers might have had during various combat and noncombat assignments, or to perceptions of the effectiveness of the United Nations as the prevalent authority for responding to global security challenges. Machiavellianism was fairly low across military samples. Given military socialization guided by notions of "duty, honor, country," "service before self," and emphasis on a strong military group identity (Dunivin 1994; Janowitz 1960; Huntington 1957), the low Mach scores are unsurprising. In fact, they suggest a strong cognitive commitment to unit cohesion and group morale, attributes likely to strengthen discipline, motivate performance, and help ensure mission accomplishment. Closer examination of the responses also suggests that the beliefs of senior officers were more differentiated than those of cadets. For instance, while most respondents in each cohort valued loyalty to the United States and viewed military service as a "calling," senior officers were significantly more concerned than cadets with the well-being of others, as evidenced by their greater support for giving economic help to poorer countries and by their lower Mach scores. Similarly, despite their high warriorism

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scores, significantly more officers than First Class cadets thought they would "find peacekeeping just as rewarding as war fighting." These results corroborate research findings that attribute increased abilities to differentiate values, attitudes, and opinions to higher levels of education and task sophistication (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Converse 1964; Stouffer 1955). Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991) found that with increasing levels of sophistication individuals tended to rely on cognitive reasoning based on ideology and principled beliefs rather than on emotional attachments. Consequently, the fact that officers in this sample revealed more differentiated beliefs than cadets may, at least in part, be attributable to greater professional sophistication. Consistent with the argument for a revised professional ethos, early military socialization should introduce future officers to more differentiated cognitive frames (see Chapter 3). If recent trends continue, military leaders are as likely to be involved in peace operations as they are to fight wars. Socialization that is structured to merge combat and noncombat values and to train military leaders in integration and differentiation strategies for resolving cognitive inconsistencies could prepare them more effectively to adjust across tasks. The fairly low commitment of respondents in the military samples to noncombat assignments, combined with the fact that noncombat operations have been completed successfully in the past, indicates that many technical skills and cognitive abilities can be learned on the job. For many observers, previous success in military operations other than war has indicated that military professionals are sufficiently prepared for these missions (Arnold and Stahl 1993; Sullivan 1993; Department of the Army 1994, 1993). Although combat-trained officers are certainly capable of conducting peace operations, the increasing number, scope, and complexity of those operations suggest that training in integration and differentiation strategies could prepare them more effectively for these missions. Given the demonstrated effectiveness of military socialization for combat, there is no reason to believe that future military leaders could not also be prepared cognitively for peacekeeping and other noncombat tasks at all levels of professional military education. NOTES

1. Hahn (1997) also found that only 320 of some 4,500 officers serving in positions in which they would benefit from an Army War College education were given the opportunity to participate in the program. 2. Cohn (1992) cites an ACE/UCLA survey that found that young people increasingly cited financial well-being as a goal in life (from 44% in 1966 to 78% in 1992).

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3. Slightly more than half of students in the SU sample were male (55.7%), and the vast majority were white (81.5%). Some 7.3 percent of students were of African American descent, a figure that is compatible with the proportion of African American students in other leading universities (7.5% at the University of Michigan, 6.8% at Duke University, 5.9% at Harvard, 5.4% at the University of Pennsylvania; see United States Military Academy, Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis 1994a; see also various annual editions of U.S. News & World Report, "America's Best Colleges"). 4. The following scale results were obtained for the Syracuse University sample: (1) four-item conservatism scale (CONS: M- 2.44; SD = 0.70; range = 1.00-4.75; Cronbach's alpha = 0.61); (2) five-item patriotism scale (PAT: M= 3.19; SD = 0.75; range = 1.00-5.00; Cronbach's alpha = 0.75); (3) six-item warriorism scale (WAR: M= 2.92; SD = 0.59; range = 1.174.67; Cronbach's alpha = 0.62); (4) three-item global institutionalism scale (GLOB: M = 2.97; SD = 0.78; range = 1.00-5.00; Cronbach's alpha = 0.57); and (4) six-item Machiavellianism scale (MACH: M = 2.72; SD - 0.57; range = 1.17-4.33; Cronbach's alpha = 0.46). 5. Holsti (1997) acknowledged that one of the shortcomings of his research was its focus on senior military leaders, most of whom were either top-level officers at the Pentagon or students at the National War College. Hence, the results of his study are not representative of the military as a whole. Since the data at hand show similar results, Holsti's conclusions can be extended to junior officers. Similar analyses of enlisted personnel are still needed at this time.

8 Warriors for Peace: Socializing Military Leaders for Shifting Roles From the Far East I send you one single thought, one sole idea— written in red on every beachhead from Australia to Tokyo— There is no substitute for Victory! General Douglas MacArthur1 A West Pointer is a guy of absolute conviction, who, almost without question accepts a certain way of life that requires that he be masculine, dominant, certain. Major F. E. Conrad, USMA Class of 1973 (quoted in Ellis and Moore 1974, 125) The end of the Cold War fundamentally changed many of the operational assumptions that had characterized U.S. national security for nearly half a century. Although the threat of a nuclear war or a military confrontation among major powers has virtually vanished, growing demands for ethnic, religious, and national autonomy and escalating planetary problems pose ever more complex challenges to global security. One result of the dramatic developments we have witnessed over the past decade is the emergence of a new strategic environment that is redefining the purpose of the military. U.S. forces are no longer called upon only to fight and win the nation's wars, but also to fulfill a host of emerging nonconventional roles, from humanitarian assistance and nation building to peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Like it or not, OOTW are increas-

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ingly becoming part of the U.S. military's routine mission repertoire. Unless the U.S. government establishes distinct forces specifically for deployment in OOTW, which, given dwindling defense budgets and continued force reductions, appears highly unlikely in the foreseeable future, current and future forces will have to be equipped and trained to successfully complete the military's dualmission purpose. Officers and soldiers must be prepared technically, doctrinally, cognitively, and emotionally to shift between warfighting and peacekeeping. Describing the security challenges for the twenty-first century, John Shalikashvili (1994), former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, proclaimed, "What we gained in losing a threat of the magnitude of the Soviet Union has been offset by the ambiguity and proliferation of threats around the world. We have traded frightening certainty for dangerous uncertainty" (p. 5). Are the men and women who will lead the U.S. military into the next century prepared to face and overcome those ambiguities and challenges? The purpose of this study was to examine the extent to which future military leaders are committed to traditional combat roles and to the increasing array of emerging noncombat functions. Its primary focus was to assess the impact of precommissioning professional development on the cognitive preparation of cadets at USMA for an ever more complex task environment. While developing military doctrine to reflect new roles and objectives is essential to the effective conduct of military missions, doctrine must be supported by those who implement it in the field. Moskos (1976) and Segal and colleagues (Segal and Tiggle 1997; Segal and Segal 1993; Meeker and Segal 1987) have shown that positive attitudes toward nonconventional missions render individual soldiers and units more effective in peace operations. To estimate cognitive preparation, I examined the effects of military socialization at USMA on the identity and value orientations of cadets across classes. Social science research commonly assumes identity to be a fixed personality trait that ascribes certain value orientations, political attitudes, and social behaviors to individuals. In contrast, I extended the applicability of social identity theory by conceptualizing identity as a complex, contextual, and dynamic process of self-categorization and social comparison. In employing the norms, rules, and stereotypes of relevant reference groups, individuals can come to terms with new experiences, form attitudes toward social reality, and structure their behavior. By analyzing the attitudes and value orientations of future military leaders, we can estimate their commitment to the dual-mission purpose and assess their cognitive preparation for different assignments.

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MAKING WARRIORS: THE ACADEMIC CHALLENGE

West Point aims to educate, train, and inspire cadets for careers as commissioned officers in the U.S. Army based on the traditional values of "duty, honor, country." To instill the warrior spirit, and prepare and motivate cadets to become "leaders for a lifetime," West Point creates an eclectic environment that combines moral-ethical development in concert with intellectual, military, physical, social, and leadership development. While the West Point experience of the past has prepared USMA graduates effectively for combat, some observers have noted that the traditional socialization regimen may not impart the "independence and adaptability required by modern military operations" (Hammill, Segal, and Segal 1995, 113). The analysis of cadets' West Point experiences revealed that a commitment to peace operations and support for global institutions had been incorporated systematically into neither the academic nor the military programs, nor within instruction on the professional military ethic. Values such as integrity, honor, respect, loyalty, duty, and service are the basis for the character of cadets and the professional military ethos. This focus remains the cornerstone of socialization at West Point. However, today military leaders are as likely to serve the nation in peace operations as they are to fight its wars. Military socialization and professional military education that take into account the dual-mission purpose and reconceptualize military identity to merge combat and noncombat could prepare military professionals at all ranks more effectively to shift across task requirements. PREPARED FOR COMBAT: ATTITUDES OF USMA CADETS

Responses to the Future Officer Survey showed that cadets in all four classes were very patriotic. In addition, upon graduation most were strongly committed to the warrior spirit. Although many cadets recognized the need for military involvement in peace operations, they showed less positive attitudes toward peacekeeping missions and decreasing support for global institutions, especially the United Nations, the longer they had attended West Point. Some cadets openly questioned the importance of emerging military tasks and of specialized training for those tasks. In fact, their reactions to the Future Officer Survey were consistent with claims that involvement in peace operations may undermine the military's effectiveness to conduct combat missions (see Hackworth 1995; Segal and Segal 1993; Moskos and Wood 1988; Meeker and Segal 1987; see also Chapter 3).2 One cadet commented, "We [the United

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States] a r e n ' t t h e world's police," while a n o t h e r a s s e r t e d t h a t "one of t h e most respectable accomplishments one can do is serve in a w a r for t h e U n i t e d States." A t h i r d cadet noted t h a t "people who don't believe in t h e Constitution enough to support it should not be s u p p o r t e d by it. On t h e s a m e token, I don't w a n t a pacifist serving in my a r m y . They'll j u s t be e n d a n g e r i n g other soldiers." These opinions s u b s t a n t i a t e empirical findings suggesting t h a t cadets t e n d to view combat as t h e military's p r i m a r y role a n d r e d e e m J a n o w i t z ' s (1960) prediction t h a t m i l i t a r y professionals would r e s i s t being called upon to fulfill police functions a n d constabulary roles (see also Segal 1995; Binnendijk a n d Clawson 1994). A n u m b e r of r e s p o n d e n t s also criticized military socialization at West Point for moving away from p r e p a r i n g cadets exclusively for t r a d i t i o n a l combat roles: A Third Class cadet: I think USMA has gotten too easy. We need it harder in order to prepare officers for war. We should be about warfare preparation, not sensitivity training. An example of the weakness was Maj. Smith 3 last year chewing out cadre during Beast [cadet basic training] for yelling at New Cadets. If they can't stand being yelled at, how can they perform in war? West Point needs to get rid of politically correct leftists influence and focus more on hardening its cadets for war. A Second Class cadet: I believe there are far too many cadets here just for the "free ride." This place is special. We are not ROTC (I've done that) and we are not a university. We are THE military academy. We should strive to return to the ideals MacArthur enforced and embodied as Superintendent 73 years ago. Make this place combat arms only and we'll get rid of all the slackers (many of them). A First Class cadet: I came to W.P. thinking that I would be set up for a successful career in the military. I see that is not so. It seems that you have to walk on water and kiss ass to get ahead. I still want to make it a career, but I will not lower myself to the level I've seen some cadets and officers go to here at W.P. I'll be happy to lead my platoon, and hopefully company, in combat and serve my country just as other Americans have before. I don't see myself making it in this zero-defects Army. I will also be very surprised if West Point is still around in 10 or 20 years with the way things are going. It's going to take one hell of a war to get us on track. I don't wish for war, but it seems like that's what's going to happen, It's about that time in history. After my service I just want to go back to my farm and be left alone. T h e s e reactions, a l t h o u g h not necessarily r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e cadet population as a whole, further s u b s t a n t i a t e t h e fairly low c o m m i t m e n t to noncombat roles detected in t h e a s s e s s m e n t of cadets' a t t i t u d e s a n d support t h e contention t h a t officers t r a i n e d a n d equipped for combat might not invariably also be t h e most effective

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peacekeepers. While these comments present the attitudes of only those few respondents who expressed their views about the survey, they nevertheless foreshadow potential cognitive tensions that might arise from mission preparation (e.g., for combat) that is incongruent with the mission assignment (e.g., peacekeeping). MILITARY IDENTITY: REFERENCE GROUPS AND VALUES AT USMA

As discussed in Chapter 2, people often rely on cognitive frames derived from past experiences in order to come to terms with novel situations. Segal and Segal (1993) found that soldiers confronted with unfamiliar peacekeeping assignments tended to "normalize" their roles as peacekeepers by using more familiar combat frames. Similarly, Miller and Moskos (1995) reported that a substantial number of U.S. soldiers devised a "warrior strategy" to rationalize their participation in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in, for them, familiar terms (see Chapter 3). Social psychologists have noted that interpreting new experiences through previously established frames might skew perceptions (Oakes, Haslam, and Turner 1994; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Kahneman, Slovik, and Tversky 1982; Allport 1979). Invoking cognitive frames (e.g., warrior) that are ill-suited for a particular assignment (e.g., peacekeeping) might weaken morale and performance and undermine mission accomplishment. Instead, peace operations require cognitive frames that enable military leaders to rationalize each assignment on its own terms. In Chapter 3, I have proposed a new framework for military training based on the assumption that combining battlefield proficiency with an understanding of the political, social, psychological, economic, and cultural factors specific to each mission can prepare future military leaders more effectively for increasingly complex assignments. The extent to which military professionals adopt the identity of "peace manager" or embrace the traditional warrior spirit in a given situation will depend in part on the social categories they associate with reference groups that become salient in that situation. Among the sample of West Point cadets, those with potent military and national subidentities scored higher on the warriorism and patriotism scales and appeared more strongly committed to a military career than cadets for whom these subidentities were less potent. At the same time, these cadets tended to be considerably less supportive of the United Nations and of military involvement in peace operations than their peers who viewed military or national ingroups as less central to their self-conceptions. The analy-

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sis also found evidence that West Point might be more effective in enhancing the warrior identity in male cadets than in female cadets. Although the data at hand do not allow conclusive inferences about the integration of women into the Corps of Cadets or the U.S. Army, the findings indicate the need for further research of the socialization of female cadets. Cadets' and officers' overall low commitment to noncombat assignments, combined with the fact that many peace operations have been completed successfully in the past, may suggest that many mission-specific technical and leadership skills can be learned on the job. For many observers, previous success in OOTW indicated that military professionals were sufficiently prepared for these missions (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1997; Arnold and Stahl 1993; Sullivan 1993; Department of the Army 1994, 1993). Although combattrained officers are certainly capable of conducting peace operations, the increasing number, scope, and complexity of those operations suggest that specific cognitive training could prepare them more effectively for these missions. Consistent with the assumption that attitudes and mission performance are intimately linked, the data indicate that military socialization based on a professional ethos that emphasizes both combat and noncombat values could strengthen officers' appreciation for and enhance their commitment to peace operations. ASSESSMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

More than three decades ago, Lovell (1964) found that cadets' professional socialization at USMA affected their attitudes and perspectives only slightly. In contrast, this study detected rather significant socialization effects on cadets' values and attitudes. Observed differences across classes are consistent with the structure and content of USMA's Academic, Military, Physical, and Moral-Ethical Programs. West Point meets its paramount purpose by preparing its graduates to serve the common defense and, when necessary, to fight and win the nation's wars. The academy succeeds in instilling essential leadership qualities and adherence to the Army's core values of integrity, honor, respect, selfless service, loyalty, courage, and duty. In addition, their West Point experience appears to strengthen cadets' military identities and their commitment to combat values. However, examination of the Academic and Military Programs and analysis of cadets' responses to the Future Officer Survey indicate that USMA may not impart an equally strong commitment to noncombat values. As a result, gradu-

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ating junior officers may be less well prepared cognitively to support global institutions and conduct peace operations than they are to carry out more traditional combat missions. Given that the number of peace operations will likely increase as we enter the twenty-first century and given that many if not most of these operations will include large joint and multinational formations, officers need to acquire the knowledge and skills that will enable them to serve as peace builders, peacekeepers, and, when necessary, peace enforcers. West Point and the other service academies not only serve as carriers of military tradition but must also set standards for precommissioning professional military education to ensure that future military leaders are prepared technically, militarily, cognitively, and ethically to take on complex challenges and effectively serve the military's dual purpose. Before one can draw conclusive inferences about the effects of military socialization and professional military education on the identity and the value orientations of current and future military leaders, socialization effects should be assessed longitudinally. A panel study could analyze cadets' attitudes at different times over the four-year period and compare the responses of West Point graduates to cadets who left the academy before graduation. Cadets' commitment to different missions could be evaluated further through a series of in-depth interviews and focus group studies conducted at different times during their West Point experience and again after completion of their first mission assignment(s). In addition, subsequent research should examine more closely the content of the academic curriculum and the honor education (i.e., course syllabi, class assignments, lesson objectives), the pedagogical philosophy of USMA instructors, and the objectives of the military training component to gain further insight into the extent to which a commitment to peace operations and support for global institutions are incorporated into the professional socialization of future officers. Despite some limitations, the present findings generate a number of recommendations that may assist USMA in shaping its curriculum to educate and graduate highly qualified individuals who are prepared to lead U.S. forces into the twenty-first century: 1. USMA should incorporate discussions of OOTW into its academic core curriculum and its military training. Entry-level classes in the social sciences, humanities, and military instruction should address the need for and unique characteristics of OOTW. Similarly, cadet field training and active duty assignments during the summers should place cadets in noncombat operational contexts so they can practice the application of their knowledge to the entire spectrum of missions.

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2. Instruction on the Honor Code and System should introduce cadets to moral and ethical dilemmas encountered during peace operations. This, combined with increased classroom focus on OOTW, would assist in devising cognitive strategies that will prepare cadets for resolving identity tensions irrespective of the operational context. 3. USMA should promote interaction among instructors and cadets with their counterparts from the other service academies and from ROTC programs. Frequent contact will ensure greater consistency of instruction and learned knowledge, especially in the areas of leadership development and ethics instruction. Increased coordination among socializing environments will prepare future military leaders more effectively for joint command responsibilities. 4. In addition to focus on joint operations, the curriculum should also emphasize the multinational character of many future operations. Coursework and military field training should teach cadets to recognize, understand, and respect cultural diversity and prepare them for operational requirements that may emerge from participating in multinational coalitions. 5. USMA should increase the proportion of civilian instructors, especially in the social sciences and humanities. Civilian instructors bring diverse educational and professional experiences to the classroom that would broaden the portfolio of topical offerings and might help to close the widening gap between the military and civilian society (Bacevich and Kohn 1997; Holsti 1997; see also Chapter 7).

The present study set out to examine the effects of military socialization on the attitudes of future officers toward new security challenges and to assess the extent to which they are prepared cognitively to accommodate rapidly changing roles. The data show that while graduating cadets resembled senior officers in terms of their commitment to traditional military values, officers displayed more differentiated beliefs. Longitudinal research could provide further insight into the evolution of strategic thinking among military professionals. Lessons from this research could help structure curriculum development at the service academies and at the intermediate levels of professional military education. Beyond mental (and technical) preparedness, military leaders need also be emotionally ready to shift between warfighting and peacekeeping. The present study did not assess cadets' emotional preparation, but further research should examine how individual soldiers and officers cope emotionally with the demands imposed on them in novel situations and by rapidly changing assignments. This research could be conducted as field observations during mission training or as laboratory experiments that place subject3 in a variety of role-play situations provoking them to employ different

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cognitive strategies to resolve moral dilemmas or invoke different identities (e.g., combat soldier or peacekeeper) to guide their behavior in these situations. 4 MODELING IDENTITY FORMATION IN THE MILITARY

Beyond its practical implications, this research has considerable theoretical import for the study of social identity. Studying socialization at USMA extends the applicability of social identity theory from the experimental laboratory environment of minimal group experiments to a genuine social field setting. One of the main contributions of this study is the examination of the dynamic relationship between identity, values, and attitudes for identifications that are meaningful to subjects: the military and national identities of future military leaders. The empirical results confirm that members of a social group (e.g., cadets at West Point) can perceive particular identity images as more or less potent. In turn, the data indicate that potency of military or national identity significantly affected respondents' attitudes. However, the study measured the potency of cadets' social identities only within the context of the academic environment at USMA. The literature suggests that changing contexts can invoke, enhance, or weaken particular identities (Wellman 1993; Brewer 1991; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). For instance, Faris (1995) found that participation in military exercises reinforced patriotic feelings and enhanced soldiers' national identity. The more well defined a situation, the more easily individuals can invoke the identity best suited to guide behavior. For example, invoking their identity as warriors during combat increases soldiers' ability to apply the kind of force necessary to win the battle. However, situations that are less well defined make reliance on one specific identity to guide behavior more difficult. Chapter 3 points to cognitive tensions that may arise from invoking identities (e.g., warrior) that are ill-suited for a particular assignment (e.g., peacekeeping). Ultimately, retrieving skewed cognitive frames might undermine force effectiveness and endanger mission accomplishment. The uncertain nature of peace operations is likely to threaten soldiers' stable warrior identities. Employing simplistic resolution strategies, they may respond to cognitive inconsistencies by focusing on the identity that has been threatened (bolstering their warrior identity or denying the threat to it). Absent a concrete and tangible outgroup, soldiers assigned to peacekeeping might denigrate the very people they have come to help and protect. Miller and Moskos's (1995) experience with the Somalia mission supports

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this argument. Those soldiers who had been trained specifically for combat against a foreign enemy were most likely to adopt the "warrior strategy," constructing negative stereotypes of Somalis and perceiving them as enemies. Sadly, the Somalia peace mission presented an even more extreme case of outgroup denigration, the reported torturing and killing of a Somali youth by a group of Canadian peacekeepers. 5 By contrast, training in differentiation and integration strategies may equip soldiers with more effective cognitive tools to assist them in renegotiating their military identity, for resolving cognitive inconsistencies, and for making mission-congruent decisions across operational assignments. Military socialization that teaches soldiers to invoke positively valenced identity images that are congruent with different mission objectives would add certainty to behavioral choices, especially in the nonconventional context of peace operations. Systematic cognitive preparation could diminish the need to bolster the warrior identity or to deny or normalize the peacekeeper identity and could motivate soldiers to negotiate a new military identity reflecting both combat and noncombat roles. As a result, soldiers would be able to rely on previously practiced integration strategies to help them resolve identity dilemmas more quickly and more effectively. Given the contextual nature of identity negotiation, future research should assess which reference groups are relevant to military professionals (or, more generally, to individuals sharing membership in a social group) under different conditions. This way it might be possible to discover whether (and which) subidentities are enhanced as a result of changing contexts. If research corroborates the contention that value orientations and attitudes are contingent upon a combination of context and reference-group identifications, then one could conclude that military personnel employ different cognitive frames to come to terms with mission assignments. This research might also indicate whether and the extent to which behavior (e.g., training for or participation in specific missions) can alter attitudes and values and, subsequently, improve or constrain mission effectiveness. For this study, I estimated the potency of identity by analyzing selfdescribed reference-group identifications. But, as the literature on social identity indicates, individuals derive their self-conceptions from a combination of assimilation with ingroup categories and differentiation from outgroup categories (Brewer and Weber 1994; Brewer 1991; Hall 1989). Consequently, future research should explore the importance of outgroup categorizations for the identity of military leaders. This research could point to potential problems

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that might arise, especially during multinational military operations, from perceived threats to national identity (Bloom 1990) or from a perceived need to establish and maintain ingroup superiority (Levin and Sidanius 1999; Sidanius et al. 1997; Sidanius 1993; Sidanius, Devereux, and Pratto 1992). In light of rapidly changing tasks and decreasing defense budgets, addressing these concerns would be useful to policy makers who allocate resources to national security and to military strategists who devise doctrine and mission objectives. While the present study has provided a first insight into the commitment of future military leaders to combat and noncombat assignments and into their cognitive preparation for the post-Cold War strategic environment, it has also raised many questions beyond its scope. Nevertheless, these questions are pertinent to devising military doctrine and strategy, to defining roles for U.S. forces at the brink of the twenty-first century, and to structuring military socialization and professional military education to prepare the current and future cohorts of military leaders for the military's dual-mission purpose. Given the demonstrated effectiveness of military socialization at USMA, there is no reason to believe that West Point or any other service academy could not reconceptualize military identity to merge technical and intellectual leadership qualities, moral decision making, a willingness to serve the common defense and fight on the battlefield, support for global institutions, and a commitment to peace operations. Enhancing the potency of a comprehensive military identity could serve to prepare military professionals more effectively for the entire spectrum of future missions. NOTES 1. This statement was quoted as "MacArthur's Message" in a booklet given to new cadets at the beginning of their tour at West Point. The circular contains information and instructions pertaining to the conduct of Fourth Class development during Cadet Basic Training (see United States Military Academy 1995a, D-24). 2. At the end of the Future Officer Survey, cadets were asked to provide "any comments about this survey in general or any particular statement or question." Only some 5 percent of respondents included reactions whose content provided further insight into their attitudes and beliefs. While the comments presented in this context might not be representative of the sample as a whole, they illustrate sentiments that are shared by at least a subsample of cadets. Specific comments were selected to provide readers with a sense of the range of reactions cadets voiced toward the survey. No comments that contained reactions opposed to those presented here were deliberately excluded.

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3. The officer's name and rank were changed to ensure anonymity. 4. I am indebted to Margaret Hermann for her insightful comments on the need for emotional preparation of service personnel for military missions. 5. In March 1993, members of the elite Canadian Airborne Regiment deployed to Somalia as part a multinational U.N. peacekeeping force brutally tortured and killed sixteen-year-old Shidane Arone. Although Arone claimed he entered the Canadian camp because he was looking for a lost child, the soldiers who captured him believed he was just another wouldbe looter—and showed him no mercy. The primary culprit in this incident was subsequently convicted of manslaughter and torture, dishonorably discharged, and sentenced to five years in jail. As a result of the government investigation into the deployment of Canadian forces to Somalia, the Canadian Airborne Regiment was disbanded on March 4,1995 (see Winslow 1997; Phillips 1994; Bergman and Fisher 1994).

Postscript

USMA's general educational goal, as stated in its 1997-1998 academic program, is to "enable its graduates to anticipate and to respond effectively to the uncertainties of a changing technological, social, political, and economic world" (United States Military Academy, Office of the Dean 1997, 3). The present study has shown that professional military education centers around instilling traditional military values and preparing cadets to lead forces into combat. Cadets' values, attitudes, and social identities, as measured by the Future Officer Survey, indicate successful accomplishment of these objectives. However, the data also suggest that, especially given the rapidly changing complexities of global security, USMA should strengthen cadets' support of global institutions and foster their commitment to peace operations. The results presented in the preceding chapters have indicated the need for preparation of military professionals of all ranks for the emerging dual-mission purpose of the armed forces: to "fight and win the nation's wars" and to engage in a variety of operations short of war. The findings confirm conclusions drawn by a number of observers who have pointed out the need for adjustments in the system of professional military education to strengthen educational instruction and officer preparation for OOTW. In a recent report, the Study Group on Professional Military Education at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (1997) chaired by former U.S. Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, recommended "that the

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services adjust the curricula of all their PME institutions to reflect a greater emphasis on peacemaking and peacekeeping operations, as well as other tools of 'preventive defense.' As the services have discovered in a continuous string of such 'operations other than war,' warriors prepared for the kill-or-be-killed dynamic of the battlefield often are inadequately prepared for the more benign imperatives of peacekeeping" (p. 63). Hahn (1997) provides a similar conclusion for his assessment of the challenges for PME: "Whether operating in Haiti, Bosnia, Africa, Iraq, Korea, or the streets of the United States, today's officer needs to be as much a statesman and a diplomat as a warrior. Each officer needs to be able to serve as a peace broker, peace keeper, and when necessary, a peace enforcer. Officers also need to be able to lead large joint and multinational military formations engaged in high speed, high technology, and extremely deadly warfare. The professional military education system must provide them with these skills" (p. 59). West Point has taken on this challenge. Since administration of the Future Officer Survey during Academic Year (AY) 1995-1996, USMA has implemented a number of curricular changes that begin to address the military's dual-mission purpose. While the analysis indicated that a commitment to peace operations had been incorporated systematically into neither Academic Program, Military Program, nor Honor instruction for AY 1995-1996, examination of the 1997-1998 Redbook (United States Military Academy, Office of the Dean 1997) reveals a considerably greater focus on the military's "other" missions. While the AY 1994-1995 Academic Program Goals determined very generally that cadets should "gain a cultural perspective, become historically minded, and understand human beings" (United States Military Academy, Office of the Dean 1994, 4), the AY 1997-1998 goals are more specific, targeting cadets to draw on an appreciation of culture and history "to understand in a global context human behavior, achievement, and ideas" (United States Military Academy, Office of the Dean 1997, 3). In addition to the overall program goals, considerably more classes now address new operational requirements. A course on "Armed Forces and Society" offered by the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership (PL 482) makes specific mention of "changing roles and missions." The English Department offers a new course on "The Ethics of the Military Profession" (EP 365), which examines the fundamental values of the warrior ethos and discusses the moral principles that define the profession of arms. This course includes a specific module on the use of force and the limits to the use of force. While courses in the "History of the Military Art" (HI 301/302 and HI 351/352) remained unchanged from previous years, a course

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on "The History of Joint Operations" (HI 378) includes a discussion of Operation Provide Comfort. The Department of Law has revised its course in "International Law" (LW 481), now requiring cadets to study human rights, cultural relativism, international judicial bodies, regional international courts, and International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. "National Security Law" (LW 482) examines the "legality and scope of war and other uses of the armed forces short of war" (United States Military Academy, Office of the Dean 1997, 331). Interestingly, the Social Sciences Department has made very few changes to the content of its curriculum. Courses in international relations still contain primarily traditional theories focusing on Realism, political economy, and systems theory. Incorporating critical theories, postmodernism, feminism, negotiation and mediation, and nonviolent conflict resolution may further challenge cadets to engage in critical thinking and may provide a valuable knowledge base to draw on during deployments as peacekeepers, peace builders, diplomats, or warrior-statesmen. The AY 1997-1998 course on "American Foreign Policy" (SS 473) examines the dilemmas and their implications that stem from America's unique role as the sole remaining superpower and now provides more room for critical reflection on trends for future U.S. foreign policy. Finally, the Department of Military Instruction has specifically added course modules on "peacekeeping, counter-terrorism, insurgency, and peacetime contingency operations" to its "Low Intensity Conflict" course (MS 360). While the 1994-1995 Redbook specified that "a significant portion of the course involves student research" (United States Military Academy, Office of the Dean 1994, 376), the AY 1997-1998 course "culminates with a practical exercise in which cadets role play a battalion staff preparing for deployment to a LIC" (United States Military Academy, Office of the Dean 1997, 413). This course is an example for how peace operations are no longer addressed merely as thought exercises (or theoretical research projects), but are increasingly being viewed as viable missions. This type of instruction teaches cadets new frames of reference and introduces them to cognitive strategies that may help them solve identity tensions and moral dilemmas under diverse operational circumstances. West Point has undertaken the first steps to prepare its cadets for the full spectrum of next-century operations. While these changes are important, they still do not reach the entire student population. Review of the 1997-1998 Redbook (United States Military Academy, Office of the Dean 1997) indicates that discussions of OOTW are still more or less limited to upper-division courses. Again,

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this confirms the need to incorporate these missions into the standard curriculum for all cadets. The Center for Strategic and International Studies report (1997) concluded that "perhaps the most notable lesson of such peacekeeping operations as Joint Endeavor in Bosnia is the enormous demands placed on young officers in charge of small units, whose decisions in tense and ambiguous situations can have international implications" (p. 64). As Second Lieutenants after having graduated from West Point, officers must be prepared to face those demands. The academy has changes underway that assist in this preparation. Nevertheless, the results of this study indicate that further adjustments in academic curriculum and military training may be needed. West Point has been able to adjust effectively to changing social, political, and international requirements since its inception. There is no reason to believe that it cannot prepare future military leaders to lead U.S. troops into ever more complex missions irrespective of the operational requirements. This study has shown the need for change. USMA has initiated such change. It must continue to provide the nation with "leaders that serve the common defense." Preparing its graduates for the dual-mission purpose of the twentyfirst century will enhance their effectiveness in the field and provide the academy with reasons for continuing its tradition of socializing and training high-quality military leaders.

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Index Abelson, Robert P., 50 Abrams, Dominic, 115 Absolutists, 56 Affectional preference, 50 Allport, Floyd, 21 Allport, Gordon, 23, 24 Athenian ideals, 69 Attitude, defined, 17 Attitude object, 17 Bacevich, Andrew J., 56 Beach, Johnston, 73 Beast Barracks (Beast), 68, 73, 74. See also Cadet Basic Training Behavioral evaluations, 17 Beirut, 14 Belief dilemmas, 50 Beliefs, defined, 18 Belief system, defined, 19 Bennett, Lance W., 24 Binnendijk, Hans, 48 Bloom, William, 29, 30 Bolstering strategies, 53 Braungart, Margaret M., 26 Braungart, Richard G., 26 Brewer, Marilynn B., 31, 32, 36 Britt, Thomas W., 34, 43, 46, 53

Brody, Richard A., 24 Bryant, Fred B., 50 Cadet Basic Training (CBT), 72, 73, 74 Cadet Field Training (CFT), 72, 78 Cadet goals, 79-81 Cadet-officer comparison, 11, 136 Cadet-student comparison, 11 Cadet Troop Leader Training (CTLT), 73 Cadet values, 88-92 Cady, Duane I., 56, 57 Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR), 31-32, 51 Carlisle Barracks, 140 Caste hierarchy, 29 Categorization, 23-25 Center for Strategic and International Studies, 57 Centrality, 20 Central life interests, 17 Chaiken, Shelly, 17 Cheney, Richard B., 67, 173 Christie, Richard, 137, 138 Civilian instruction, 168 Clawson, Patrick, 48

192

CLDS (Cadet Leader Development System), 11, 68, 71, 72 Cognitive component, 28 Cognitive evaluations, 17 Cognitive inconsistencies, 16, 50 Cognitive processing, 24 Cognitive social psychology, 20-25, 26 Cognitive strategies, 25 Cold War, 2, 4; aftermath, 1; warrior, 7 Cold War versus post-Cold War cadets, 105, 108; patriotism scores, 112; plebes, 109-110 Collective mind, 21 Collectivist pacifist, 57 Collins, Steven N., 47 Combat-oriented professional ethos, 8 Commitment, 20 Common identity, 36 Competing subidentities, 16 Conservatism, 89, 93, 141, 151, 154 Conservative realism, 54-55 Conservatives, 26 Constabularism, 8, 42, 59 Cows (second class cadets), duties, 82 Dandeker, Christopher, 5 Davidson, Garrison, 70 Davidson's reforms, 70, 71 Denial, 51, 53 Desert Shield, 42 Differentiation, 52, 53 Dornbusch, Sanford M., 73 Drill Cadet Leader Training (DCLT), 73 Dual-mission purpose, 40, 116, 162, 163 Dubin, Robert, 16 Dunivin, Karen O., 51, 55 Dymek, Jay, 73, 74 Dynamic identity model, 11, 40, 50 Eagly, Alice H., 17 Ego-ideal, 21

INDEX

Emotional component, 28 Enlightened advocacy, 50 Erikson, Erik H., 29 Ethics instruction, 78 Evaluative component, 28 Faris, John H., 58, 92 Firsties (first class cadets), objectives, 82 Force in being, 5 Fourth Class Plebe System, 71 Freud, Sigmund, 21 Future Officer Survey, 88, 101, 110, 117, 135, 150; Cold War influence, 92; limitations, 91-92; miscellaneous statements, 91, 95; nuclear war possibility, 100; pilot test group, 89; results, 92-100, 101 Geis, Florence L., 137, 138 Gen Xers, 149, 150 Geva, Colonel, 14 Global institutions, 8 Globalism, 90-91, 94, 99, 126, 144, 156 Globalization, 4 Global security needs, 7 Grant, Ulysses, 83 Greeley, A., 26 Group identity, 15 Group mind, 21 Gulf War, 42 Hackworth, David H., 49 Hahn, Robert F., 76, 77, 174 Hammill, John P., 84 Haslam, S. Alexander, 36 Hazing, 74 Heroic leaders, 56 High-value pluralism, 53 Hofman, John E., 19 Hogg, Michael, 115 Holmes, Robert L., 59 Honor Code, Cadet, 77, 78, 81, 84, 168 Humanitarian assistance force, U.N. led, 46 Humanitarian strategy, 5, 47

193

INDEX

Huntington, Samuel, 7, 49, 54, 55, 58, 76, 135, 136 Identity, 19 Identity conceptions: advanced social model, 31; basic social model, 28; dynamic model, 3 2 34; linear model, 25-26; national theory, 29; optimal distinctiveness theory, 31-32; social dominance theory, 29; social model, 26-28 Identity dynamic, 30 Identity negotiation, 16 Identity-securing interpretive system, 29 Identity tensions, 25, 54 Impartiality, 42 Ingroup-outgroup categorization, 23, 133 Ingroup relations, 26, 35 Instrumental value, 18 Integration strategies, 52-53, 170 Internationalism, 95 Janowitz, Morris, 5, 7, 42, 56, 57, 135, 136 Just warrist, 57 Kahneman, Daniel, 24 Kohn, Melvin L., 100 Kurdish assistance, 43 Lebanon, 14 LeBon, Gustave, 21 LEcole Poly technique, 69 Levin, Shana, 52 Liberals, 26 Likert scale, 89 Lilli, Waldemar, 35 Lovell, John P., 56, 57, 70, 100, 166 MacArthur, Douglas, 83 Machiavellianism scale, 137, 144145, 148, 156-157 Male versus female cadet identity, 127 Mannheim, Karl, 54

McDougall, William, 21 Measuring identity, 117-119; central identity image, 119-121; military identity, 121, 122; national identity, 121, 122; religious subidentities, 120 Mervis, Carolyn B., 23 Military force, function, 7 Military identity, 79, 88, 135 Military managers, 56 Military missions, reluctant to support, 6 Military officer duties, 7 Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW), 45 Military socialization, 3, 9, 25; criticized, 164; post-Cold War, 23, 60; at West Point, 9, 117 Miller, Laura L., 44, 46, 47, 51, 60, 165 Minimal group experiments, 30 Moskos, Charles, 44, 46, 47, 48, 51, 57, 58, 59, 60, 149, 165 Multidimensional value-matrix, 60 Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), 49 Multinational military operations, 171 Multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs), 92 Mutual adherence to values, 96 National identity dynamic, 29 Nation assistance, 41 Neo-imperialist, 59 New, Michael, 115-116 New military ethos, 45 Noncoercion, 42 Noncombat missions, 4 Normalization, 52 Oakes, Penelope J., 36 OOTW (Operations Other Than War), 2, 9, 10, 40, 57, 76, 148, 149, 161, 173 Operation Joint Endeavor, 57, 176 Operation Just Cause, 5, 47 Operation Provide Comfort, 175

194

Operation Restore Hope, 33, 42, 46, 165 Outgroup stereotyping, 35 Oyserman, Daphna, 137, 138, 139 Pacifist, 56, 57 Patriotic sentiments, 58 Patriotism, 89-90, 93, 123, 141, 143, 146, 148; civilian versus USMA, 154 Patriotism-globalism matrix, 96 Patriotism-warriorism matrix, 97 Peace enforcement (PE), 41, 42 Peacekeeping, cadets' perceptions of, 9 Peace managers, 50, 57, 116 Peace mission, 2; cadets' commitment to, 9-10 Peace operation, military involvement, 8; U.N. led, 41; U.N. sponsored, 40 Pedagogical philosophy, 167 Peripheral subidentities, 16 Perry, William, 1 Phillips, Robert L., 56, 57 Plebe year socialization, 75 PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization), 14 Post-Cold War military, 3, 7; ethos, 54; identity, 54 Potency, 20 Pragmatists, 56 Priest, Robert F., 73 Privates (fourth class cadets), expectations of, 81 Professionalism, 45, 76; PME (professional military education), 61 Professional military ethics, 77, 163 Prominence hierarchy, 20 Prototypicality, 24 Psychological ambiguities, 46 Reference group theory, 21, 22-23 Reference groups, 117 Rehm, Jiirgen, 35 "Robbers' Cave" experiments, 22 Rokeach, Milton, 18

INDEX

Rosch, Eleanor, 23 Rules of engagement (ROE), 43, 44, 45, 47 Sarkesian, Sam C , 50 Segal, David R., 49, 52, 84, 165 Segal, Mady W., 52, 84, 165 Selective activation, 36 Self-categorization, 10, 31, 36 Self-conceptions, 15, 16, 17, 35, 53, 74, 116 Self-images, 17 Self-interested, 156 Senior-subordinate relationship, 82 Shalikashvili, John, 162 Sherif, Carolyn W., 22-23 Sherif, Muzafer, 22-23 Sidanius, Jim, 28, 52 Slovic, Paul, 24 Sniderman Paul M., 24 Social carriers, 54 Social categorization, 26 Social comparison, 10 Social dominance orientation (SDO), 29 Social groups, 26 Social identity theory, 3, 10, 15, 21, 46, 117, 132, 162 Socializing women, 129-131 Socially facilitated individual behavior, 21 Spartan ideals, 69 Strong identifiers, 122-123, 126, 131 Stryker, Sheldon, 19 Subidenties, hierarchy of salience, 19 Sullivan, Gordon, 48 Superidentity, 53 Symbolic interactionism, 21-22 Syracuse University, 137, 150 Tajfel, Henri, 15, 26, 27, 28 Terminal value, 18 Tetlock, Philip E., 24, 53 Thayer, Sylvanus, 69, 83 Thayer system, 68-69, 70, 84 Tolerance, 8

195

INDEX

Turner, John C , 28, 31, 32, 36 Tversky, Amos, 24 U.N. Security Council, 41 Uphold Democracy, 5 USMA (United States Military Academy): academic program, 72, 174; cadet attitudes, 165; ethics instruction, 78; military program, 72, 75-78; noncombat operations instruction, 76; OOTW, 76; physical program, 79 Valence, 20 Value orientations influences: branch preference, 102-104, 107; Catholic family background, 100; Cold War socialization, 104; military socialization, 108, 119; nonmilitary family background, 100; parental socialization, 100; socialization views, 101

Values, defined, 18 War realist, 57 Warrior ethos, 45 Warriorism, 55-57, 90, 93, 123, 126, 131, 143, 147, 148, 155 Warriorism-globalism matrix, 97 Warrior strategy, 5, 47, 51, 170 Warrist, 57 Weak identifiers, 122-123, 126, 131 West Point: attitudinal survey, 88; cadet demographics, 83-84; class size, 83; curriculum, 69, 84; environment, 68; military socialization, 68, 84; reasons for selecting, 9, 83 Williams, John Allen, 50 Winslow, Donna, 31, 51 Yearlings (third class cadets), expectations of, 82

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Volker Franke is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Western Maryland College. He also serves as Managing Editor of the National Security Studies Case Studies Program at Syracuse University. Franke's articles have appeared in Armed Forces and Society, The Journal of Political and Military Sociology, and The Journal of Conflict Studies.